Title: State v. Maness
Citation: 363 N.C. 261
Docket Number: 402A06
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 2009

Supreme Court
Slip Opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 402A06 
FILED: 18 JUNE 2009
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
v.
DARRELL WAYNE MANESS
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from
a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Judge D. Jack
Hooks, Jr. on 4 April 2006 in Superior Court, Brunswick County,
upon a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree
murder.  On 10 July 2008, the Supreme Court allowed defendant’s
motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to his appeal of
additional judgments.  Heard in the Supreme Court 10 September
2008.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Barry S. McNeill,
Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr.; and Staples S. Hughes,
Appellate Defender, by Katherine Jane Allen, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.
EDMUNDS, Justice.
Defendant Darrell Wayne Maness was indicted for one
count of murder, three counts of attempted first-degree murder,
three counts of assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to
kill, three counts of assault with a firearm on a law enforcement
officer, and one count of robbery with a dangerous weapon. 
Defendant was tried by jury and on 31 March 2006 was convicted of
one count of first-degree murder on the basis of malice,
premeditation and deliberation, and also under the felony murder
rule.  He was also convicted of two counts of attempted first-
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degree murder, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon with
the intent to kill, two counts of assault with a firearm on a law
enforcement officer, and one count of robbery with a firearm. 
Following a capital sentencing hearing, the jury recommended a
sentence of death.
Defendant appealed his capital conviction to this Court
and we allowed his motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to
his other convictions.  We find that defendant’s trial and
capital sentencing proceeding were free from error and that
defendant’s sentence of death is not disproportionate.
At approximately one o’clock a.m. on 18 January 2005,
Officer Mitchell Prince of the Boiling Spring Lakes Police
Department pulled over a gray Honda after it swerved to avoid a
deer.  Defendant was driving, Michael Brennan sat in the
passenger seat, and Tia Isley was in the back seat.  Officer
Prince asked defendant for his driver’s license and vehicle
registration.  According to Brennan, defendant gave Officer
Prince the registration but claimed he did not have
identification.  Officer Prince took the registration back to his
car, where he determined that the Honda was registered under Tia
Isley’s name.  Officer Prince returned to the Honda, asked
defendant a few questions, then requested that he step out of the
car.  Officer Prince searched defendant and found an empty
marijuana baggie and, in defendant’s back pocket, an
identification card.
Defendant told Officer Prince that marijuana was
beneath the passenger seat.  Officer Prince looked but did not
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find marijuana in the car, although he did find a partially full
E & J Brandy bottle.  Brennan poured out the brandy and Isley
placed the empty bottle in a trash bag on the floorboard. 
Officer Prince then saw a bag of marijuana underneath the Honda
and asked defendant to show him where the rest of it was. 
Although witnesses testified that defendant knew marijuana was in
a backpack in the Honda’s trunk, defendant looked only in the
passenger compartment, without success.
When defendant failed to locate contraband, Officer
Prince attempted to handcuff him.  Defendant resisted by picking
up the trash bag containing the empty brandy bottle and
repeatedly hitting Officer Prince on the head with it.  As
Officer Prince struggled to subdue defendant, they fell into a
water-filled ditch beside the road.  Defendant emerged with
Officer Prince’s gun, and Officer Prince crawled out of the ditch
repeating words to the effect of, “Please don’t kill me; please
don’t kill me.”  Brennan testified that defendant told Officer
Prince to “shut up.”  Then, as a backup police car arrived,
defendant shot Officer Prince three times while Officer Prince
was on his knees.  Officer Prince suffered two gunshot wounds to
his head, while the third shot hit him in the right shoulder.  He
died before he could be taken to a hospital.
Defendant then fired at the backup officer, reentered
the Honda, and drove away.  Brennan and Isley remained at the
scene, refusing defendant’s directive to get back in the car.  A
chase involving two police vehicles ended after approximately two
miles when defendant stopped, exited the Honda, and shot out a
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window of one of the pursuing police cars.  The officers returned
fire and defendant ran to a nearby mobile home.  Two men and two
women, one carrying an infant, emerged from the mobile home in
response to police instructions.  The record contains no
indiction that these individuals knew defendant or had any
connection with him.  Defendant was discovered hiding beneath the
home by the officers, who pulled him out and arrested him. 
Defendant was placed inside a sheriff’s department
S.W.A.T. van and advised of his Miranda rights.  Defendant agreed
to speak to the investigators and stated that he hit Officer
Prince with the bottle at least twice, that Officer Prince was
begging “Please, don’t shoot.  Please.  Please,” and that he
blacked out and shot Officer Prince.  When Brunswick County
Sheriff’s Department Chief Deputy Cummings asked defendant why he
shot at the other officers, defendant responded that he shot one,
so why not two.
Additional facts will be set forth as necessary for the
discussion of specific issues.
JURY SELECTION ISSUES
Defendant contends the trial court erred by not
allowing defense counsel to question prospective jurors about
their ability (1) to not surrender their honest convictions for
the purpose of returning a sentencing recommendation and (2) to
recommend a life sentence even if other jurors disagreed.  “The
voir dire of prospective jurors serves a two-fold purpose:  (I)
to determine whether a basis for challenge for cause exists, and
(ii) to enable counsel to intelligently exercise peremptory
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challenges.”  State v. Gregory, 340 N.C. 365, 388, 459 S.E.2d
638, 651 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1108, 134 L. Ed. 2d 478
(1996).  A defendant in a capital case “should be given great
latitude in examining potential jurors.”  State v. Conner, 335
N.C. 618, 629, 440 S.E.2d 826, 832 (1994).  Nevertheless,
“[r]egulation of the manner and the extent of inquiries on voir
dire rests largely in the trial court’s discretion.”  State v.
Green, 336 N.C. 142, 164, 443 S.E.2d 14, 27, cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1046, 130 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994).  A defendant claiming that
his or her voir dire was erroneously restricted must show both
that the restriction was an abuse of discretion and that he or
she was prejudiced thereby.  State v. Jones, 339 N.C. 114, 134,
451 S.E.2d 826, 835 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1169, 132 L.
Ed. 2d 873 (1995).  The trial court has significant discretion in
controlling the jury voir dire.  See Gregory, 340 N.C. at 389,
459 S.E.2d at 651 (finding no abuse of discretion when “[t]he
majority of defendant’s questions to which the prosecutor’s
objections were sustained were either irrelevant, improper in
form, attempts to ‘stake out’ a juror, questions to which the
answer was admitted in response to another question, or questions
that contained an incomplete statement of the law”).
Defendant contends the trial court erred in restricting
his voir dire of prospective juror Teresa Register.  The
following exchange took place between defense counsel and
Register:
Q. Do you think you could, if you were
convinced that life imprisonment without
parole was the appropriate penalty after
hearing the facts, the evidence, and the law
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from the Judge and you were convinced that it
was the appropriate penalty, could you come
back and return a verdict of life
imprisonment without parole?
A. Yes.
Q. Even if your fellow jurors were of
different opinions?
[PROSECUTOR]:  Well, objection.
[THE] COURT:  Sustained.
The State responds that defense counsel was attempting
to stake out the juror.  “Counsel may not pose hypothetical
questions designed to elicit in advance what the juror’s decision
will be under a certain state of the evidence or upon a given
state of facts.”  State v. Vinson, 287 N.C. 326, 336, 215 S.E.2d
60, 68 (1975), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 428
U.S. 902, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1206 (1976).  “[S]uch questions tend to
‘stake out’ the juror and cause him to pledge himself to a future
course of action.”  Id.  In addition, hypothetical questions tend
to confuse jurors who have not yet heard evidence or been
instructed on the applicable law.  Id.
This Court has held that it was not error for a trial
court to disallow the following attempted voir dire query:
“If, after the State has put on all of its
evidence and after you have heard all the
evidence in the case and after the Judge has
instructed you, you held an opinion that the
defendant was not guilty, that the State had
not met its burden of proof in this case,
would you change that opinion simply because
eleven other jurors held a different opinion,
that opinion being that the Defendant is
guilty?  Would any of you change your opinion
simply for that reason?”
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State v. Bracey, 303 N.C. 112, 118-19, 277 S.E.2d 390, 395
(1981).  Such a question, designed to determine how well a
prospective juror would withstand pressure to change his or her
mind when jurors disagree, is an impermissible “stake out.” 
State v. Elliott, 344 N.C. 242, 262, 475 S.E.2d 202, 209, cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1106, 137 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1997).  The
hypothetical question at issue here was a “stake out” question
similar to the one disallowed in Bracey, and the trial court did
not err in excluding it.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in
restricting his voir dire of prospective juror Chester Davis. 
During his questioning of the prospective juror, defense counsel 
stated that:  “Now, his Honor may charge you at one point on what
some attorneys call an Allen charge and I’m going to read it to
you and ask you if you would be able to follow that law if the
Judge did instruct you that way.”  The prosecutor objected, and,
outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel advised the
trial court that he intended to read the following to prospective
juror Davis:
[I]f you were given an instruction that you,
all as jurors, have a duty to consult with
one another and to deliberate with a view of
reaching an agreement if it can be done
without violence to individual judgment. 
Each of you must decide the case for
yourself, but only after an impartial
consideration of the evidence with fellow
jurors.
. . . . 
In the course of deliberations, each
of you should not hesitate to reexamine your
own views and change your opinion if it is
erroneous.  But none of you should surrender
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your honest conviction as to the weight or
the effect of the evidence solely because
[sic] your opinion or your fellow juror’s, or
for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
After considering arguments of counsel, the trial court sustained
the prosecutor’s objection.
Our review of the complete voir dire of prospective
juror Davis reveals that the trial court previously had allowed
defense counsel to ask Davis if he could consider life in prison
without parole as an appropriate punishment, follow the law as
instructed by the trial court, independently weigh the evidence
and respect the opinion of other jurors, and be strong enough to
ask other jurors to respect his opinion.  Thus, defendant’s
proposed question added little new.  A trial court permissibly
may limit redundant questions during voir dire.  State v.
Huffstetler, 312 N.C 92, 104, 322 S.E.2d 110, 118 (1984) (“The
trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit error by
preventing repetitious questions to prospective jurors.”), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1009, 85 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1985).  Moreover, there
was no indication at this early stage of the trial that an Allen
instruction would be either necessary or given.  The trial court
did not refuse to allow a permissible line of voir dire inquiry. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
sustaining the State’s objection.
Defendant next contends he is entitled to a new trial
because his constitutional right to a jury selected without
regard to race or to gender was violated when the trial court
overruled his objections to the State’s use of peremptory
challenges against five prospective jurors who were either
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female, African-American, or both.  Article I, Section 26 of the
North Carolina Constitution prohibits exclusion “from jury
service on account of sex, race, color, religion, or national
origin.”  The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution also prohibits discrimination
in jury selection on the basis of race, see Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), or gender, see J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1994).
Our review of race-based or gender-based claims of
discrimination in petit jury selection has been the same under
the Constitution of the United States and the North Carolina
Constitution.  See State v. Taylor, 362 N.C. 514, 527, 669 S.E.2d
239, 253-54 (2008) (race); State v. Bates, 343 N.C. 564, 595-96,
473 S.E.2d 269, 286-87 (1996) (gender), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1131, 136 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1997); but cf. State v. Cofield, 320
N.C. 297, 301-08, 357 S.E.2d 622, 624-29 (1987) (finding that
racial discrimination in selection of a grand jury foreperson
violates the United States and North Carolina Constitutions, and
stating that “Article I, section 26 (of the North Carolina
Constitution) does more than protect individuals from unequal
treatment”).  A party alleging either a race-based or gender-
based discriminatory peremptory challenge of a prospective juror
“must make a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination
before the party exercising the challenge is required to explain
the basis for the strike.”  J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 144-45, 128 L.
Ed. 2d at 106-07 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 90 L. Ed. 2d at
88).  If a prima facie case of gender-based discriminatory
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dismissal is established, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to
articulate a gender-neutral explanation.  Id.  Similarly, if a
defendant establishes a prima facie case of race-based
discriminatory dismissal, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to
establish a race-neutral explanation.  Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S.
333, 338, 163 L. Ed. 2d 824, 831 (2006).  The prosecutor’s
explanation need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause,
but it must be comprehensible and not pretextual.  Id.; J.E.B.,
511 U.S. at 145, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 107.  A defendant may respond
by introducing evidence that the State’s explanations are in fact
a pretext.  Bates, 343 N.C. at 596, 473 S.E.2d at 287 (citing
State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 16, 409 S.E.2d 288, 296 (1991)). 
The trial court’s findings regarding intentional discrimination
will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.  Id.
When the State excused prospective juror Sanica
Maultsby, defense counsel objected “on a Batson ground.” 
“[F]inding the existence of at least what can be described as a
prima facie case,” the trial court directed the State to offer “a
race neutral reason.”  The prosecutors indicated that, because
prospective juror Maultsby had been treated for obsessive
compulsive disorder and also had worked as a detoxification nurse
involved in mental health counseling and in working with
substance abusers, they feared she would overly identify with
defense evidence pertaining to defendant’s cannabis dependence
and attention deficit disorder.  Defense counsel declined to be
heard in response and the trial court overruled the objection,
finding that the State had “announced several race neutral
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reasons, that it’s not a discriminatory challenge, and any
accompanying motion with the objection would be denied.”
Although defendant’s citation of Batson indicated to
the trial court that his objection to the State’s peremptory
challenge was based solely upon alleged racial discrimination,
defendant contends in his brief to this Court that Maultsby’s
peremptory excusal was also improper gender discrimination.  As
to defendant’s claim of racial discrimination, we have reviewed
the trail court’s findings and conclude that they are not clearly
erroneous.  Accordingly, defendant’s Batson objection to the
State’s peremptory challenge was properly overruled.
As to defendant’s claim of impermissible gender
discrimination, we note that defendant amended the record on
appeal to include an assignment of error alleging gender
discrimination against prospective juror Maultsby.  However, an
assignment of error cannot substitute for proper preservation of
an issue before the trial court.  “[T]o preserve a question for
appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court
a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific
grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the
specific grounds were not apparent from the context.”  N.C. R.
App. P. 10(b)(1).  The only exception is when a defendant claims
plain error, and defendant has not made such a claim here.  Id.
10(c)(4).
Ordinarily, failure to follow Rule 10(b)(1) justifies
an “appellate court’s refusal to consider the issue on appeal.” 
Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C.
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191, 195-96, 657 S.E.2d 361, 364 (2008); see also State v.
Raines, 362 N.C. 1, 18, 26, 653 S.E.2d 126, 137, 142 (2007)
(affirming the defendant’s two capital sentences and not
considering the merits of his constitutional arguments raised for
the first time on appeal).  A similar scenario arose in State v.
Best, when the defendant objected at trial to the dismissal of
female African-American prospective jurors on the basis of racial
discrimination.  342 N.C. 502, 511, 467 S.E.2d 45, 51, cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 878, 136 L. Ed. 2d 139 (1996).  On appeal, the
defendant additionally argued that the State’s peremptory
challenges of seven of nine African-American women established a
prima facie case of gender discrimination.  Id. at 513, 467
S.E.2d at 52.  This Court held that because the defendant had not
objected to any of the State’s peremptory challenges on the
ground of discrimination against women or African-American women,
he could not raise the issue for the first time on appeal.  Id.
Nevertheless, “[t]he imperative to correct fundamental
error . . . may necessitate appellate review of the merits
despite the occurrence of default.”  Dogwood, 362 N.C. at 196,
657 S.E.2d at 364.  Appellate courts may excuse a party’s default
when necessary to “expedite decision in the public interest” or
to “prevent manifest injustice to a party.”  N.C. R. App. P. 2;
Dogwood, 362 N.C. at 196, 657 S.E.2d at 364.  This Court utilizes
Rule 2 in its discretion to excuse default only “in exceptional
circumstances.”  Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 66, 511
S.E.2d 298, 299-300 (1999).  We conclude that defendant’s claim
of gender bias in the State’s peremptory challenge of prospective
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1 This prospective juror’s name is spelled at different
points in the materials filed with the appeal as “Gilliard,”
“Gillard,” “Gilliand,” and “Gilland.”
juror Maultsby is not an exceptional circumstance calling for
invocation of Rule 2.  Accordingly, defendant may not raise this
question for the first time on appeal.
Defendant argues the trial court erred in overruling
defense counsel’s objections to the State’s use of peremptory
challenges against prospective jurors Recaldo Simmons, Nancy
Britt, Katrina Gilliard,1 and Jamie Boyd.  Simmons is an African-
American male, and the other three are African-American females. 
In each instance, the trial court considered defendant’s
objections and found no prima facie case of discrimination.  When
the trial court finds no such showing has been made, “our review
is limited to whether the trial court erred in finding that
defendant failed to make a prima facie showing, even if the State
offers reasons for its exercise of the peremptory challenges.” 
State v. Smith, 351 N.C. 251, 262, 524 S.E.2d 28, 37, cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 862, 148 L. Ed. 2d 100 (2000).  The trial
court’s ruling will be disturbed only if it is clearly erroneous. 
State v. Augustine, 359 N.C. 709, 715, 616 S.E.2d 515, 522
(2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 925, 165 L. Ed. 2d 988 (2006).
As to prospective jurors Britt, Gilliard, and Boyd,
defendant’s arguments address both their race and their gender,
sometimes together.  Because neither the Supreme Court of the
United States nor this Court has found that being a female member
of a racial minority group is an independent basis for an
objection to the State’s exercise of a peremptory challenge, we
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will consider defendant’s Batson arguments (race) and J.E.B.
arguments (gender) separately.
Defendant argues that the record established a prima
facie case of gender discrimination at the time of the State’s
peremptory challenges of prospective jurors Britt, Gilliard, and
Boyd.  As with prospective juror Maultsby, above, defendant
amended the record on appeal to include assignments of error
relating to allegations of gender discrimination against
prospective jurors Gilliard and Boyd and to include an assignment
of error relating to claims of both race and gender
discrimination against prospective juror Britt.  However, as
stated above, an assignment of error cannot substitute for proper
preservation of issues before the trial court, except when plain
error is alleged.  N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1); id. 10(c)(4).  As
with prospective juror Maultsby, defendant’s trial counsel
objected to the peremptory removal of Gilliard and Boyd on Batson
grounds only.  Defendant does not allege plain error.  Moreover,
we discern no exceptional circumstances meriting departure from
the Appellate Rules here.  Steingress, 350 N.C. at 66, 511 S.E.2d
at 299-300.  Because he did not raise and preserve the issue of
gender discrimination before the trial court, defendant may not
make a gender discrimination argument for the first time on
appeal as to these two jurors.
Defendant next argues that the record established a
prima facie case of racial discrimination at the time of his
objection to the State’s peremptory challenges of prospective
jurors Simmons and Gilliard.  However, the record does not
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support defendant’s argument.  We consider a number of factors
that may be relevant in determining whether a defendant has
raised an inference of discrimination.  State v. Quick, 341 N.C.
141, 145, 462 S.E.2d 186, 189 (1995).
Those factors include the defendant’s race,
the victim’s race, the race of the key
witnesses, questions and statements of the
prosecutor which tend to support or refute an
inference of discrimination, repeated use of
peremptory challenges against blacks such
that it tends to establish a pattern of
strikes against blacks in the venire, the
prosecution’s use of a disproportionate
number of peremptory challenges to strike
black jurors in a single case, and the
State’s acceptance rate of potential black
jurors.
Id.
Focusing on prospective juror Simmons, defendant argues
that the trial court’s inquiry was insufficient because it did
not consider the numbers and percentages of African-American
prospective jurors who were challenged.  Defendant asserts that
when the State struck prospective juror Simmons, five of the
State’s eight strikes (62.5%) had been against African-Americans
and the State had only accepted three of eight African-Americans
(37.5%).  However, numerical analysis in this inquiry, while
often useful, is not necessarily dispositive, and a prima facie
showing is not automatically made when the minority acceptance
rate is 37.5%.  State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 344, 572 S.E.2d
108, 127-28 (2002) (citing, inter alia, Gregory, 340 N.C. at 398,
459 S.E.2d at 657), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1040, 155 L. Ed. 2d
1074 (2003).  Moreover, defendant does not assert, and the record
does not indicate, that the race of defendant, the victim, or any
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key witness was a factor in defendant’s trial; moreover, the
trial court indicated that, in denying defendant’s motion, it
considered the race of defendant and the victim, the consistent
manner in which the State questioned Simmons and previous
prospective jurors, and that the State had seated three African-
Americans among the nine jurors then seated.  In addition, as to
prospective juror Gilliard, the trial court found no prima facie
case after considering the way Gilliard was questioned, her
questionnaire, the number of minorities seated, and the manner in
which the State used its peremptory challenges.  We conclude that
the trial court did not err in finding no prima facie case of
racial discrimination was established as to Simmons or Gilliard.
Defendant uses a similar statistical analysis to
support in his claim that the State’s peremptory challenge of
prospective juror Britt was made on the basis of gender
discrimination.  The trial court noted that the State had at that
point seated three females, used an almost equal number of
challenges on males and females, and treated Britt no differently
from other prospective jurors during questioning.  Our review of
the record confirms this assessment.  We conclude that the trial
court did not err in finding no prima facie case of gender
discrimination in this challenge.
In short, upon thorough review of the record, we have
found no prima facie case of discrimination based on race,
gender, or, for that matter, a combination of race and gender as
to prospective jurors Simmons, Britt, Gilliard, or Boyd.  These
assignments of error are overruled.
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GUILT PHASE ISSUES
Defendant contends the trial court committed
prejudicial error when it denied a jury request to review certain
exhibits.  Defendant argues that the trial court’s denial was an
abuse of discretion pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1233(a). 
Defendant also claims that the denial violated his constitutional
rights to present evidence, to a fair trial, to due process of
law, and to a reliable capital sentencing hearing.  Defendant
contends that he is entitled to a new trial or a new sentencing
proceeding.
The trial transcript indicates that defendant intended
to supplement the testimony of his expert witness, psychiatrist
Moira Artigues (Dr. Artigues), by projecting her reports on a
screen that the jury could view as she testified.  However, when
technical difficulties with projection equipment cropped up
unexpectedly, the documents were hurriedly photocopied for each
juror.  While the copies were being made, the State noted that
Dr. Artigues had, up to that point, been testifying only from
portions of her reports and the prosecution expressed concern
that the jury might have access in the hard copies to
inadmissible information upon which Dr. Artigues had not relied. 
The State indicated that the possible problem would be resolved
if the documents were collected after Dr. Artigues’ testimony and
not used for other purposes.  Defense counsel responded that
their intention was to let the jury have the exhibits during the
testimony for illustrative purposes only and then collect them. 
The State indicated its satisfaction with this procedure.  The
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photocopies were provided to the jury and introduced into
evidence for purposes of illustrating Dr. Artigues’ testimony as
defendant’s Exhibits 19 through 44 and 46 through 58.
Two days later, during its deliberations at the guilt-
innocence phase, the jury submitted a note requesting that the
trial court “[p]lease provide a list of exhibits so that we may
select which ones we would like to review.  We would like
[numbers] 19 [through] 58 (Defense).”  In the ensuing colloquy
between trial counsel and the trial court, the court accurately
recalled that the exhibits were offered for illustrative
purposes.  However, when the judge stated, inaccurately, that he
recalled the statement “we do not intend to send those items to
the jury” was made, defense counsel responded that he did not
remember saying the exhibits would not go back to the jury room,
but only “that they would be removed from the jurors after” the
testimony or after the jurors “looked at” the exhibits.  The
trial court then stated:
The other option is simply this:  in
the court’s discretion, I may instruct:  “You
have seen and heard all of the testimony and
evidence.  It is your duty to recall the
same.  If your recollection differs from that
urged upon you by counsel, you shall in your
deliberations be guided exclusively by your
recollection of the testimony and the
evidence.  In the court’s discretion, your
request is denied.”
The trial court also asked counsel if they could
resolve the issue before the court made its final decision, but
no agreement was reached.  Defense counsel noted that by statute
a judge may permit the jury to take exhibits to the jury room
-19-
only with consent of all parties, and prosecutors confirmed that
they did not consent.  After further discussion as to whether the
judge’s instruction to the jury should name the non-consenting
party or cite the controlling statute, the trial judge stated: 
“The statutory reference in the case law is, in the court’s
discretion, denied.  Bring [the jurors] in.”  The trial court
instructed the jury that its duty was to recall the evidence and
that, in the trial court’s discretion, its request for those
exhibits was denied.
Section 15A-1233 provides in pertinent part:
(a) If the jury after retiring for
deliberation requests a review of certain
testimony or other evidence, the jurors must
be conducted to the courtroom.  The judge in
his discretion, after notice to the
prosecutor and defendant, may direct that
requested parts of the testimony be read to
the jury and may permit the jury to reexamine
in open court the requested materials
admitted into evidence.
(b) Upon request by the jury and with
consent of all parties, the judge may in his
discretion permit the jury to take to the
jury room exhibits and writings which have
been received in evidence.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1233 (2007).  To comply with this statute, a court
must exercise its discretion in determining whether or not to
permit the jury to examine the evidence.  State v. Ashe, 314 N.C.
28, 34, 331 S.E.2d 652, 656 (1985).  A court does not exercise
its discretion when it believes it has no discretion or acts as a
matter of law.  Id. at 35-36, 331 S.E.2d at 656-57 (citing State
v. Lang, 301 N.C. 508, 510-11, 272 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1980)). 
However, when a trial court assigns no reason for a ruling which
is to be made as a matter of discretion, the reviewing court on
-20-
appeal presumes that the trial court exercised its discretion. 
State v. Guevara, 349 N.C. 243, 252, 506 S.E.2d 711, 717 (1998),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1013 (1999).
A similar situation arose in State v. Fullwood, where
the trial judge denied a jury request to review a portion of
testimony because the court reporter who had recorded the
testimony was no longer in the courthouse.  343 N.C. 725, 742,
472 S.E.2d 883, 892 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1122, 137 L.
Ed. 2d 339 (1997).  The trial judge explained the situation to
the jury, added that the decision was in his discretion, and
reminded the jury to rely on its own recollection of the
evidence.  Id.  After reviewing the record and transcripts, this
Court found that the trial court plainly exercised its
discretion.  Id. at 743, 472 S.E.2d at 892.  In contrast, we held
in State v. Ashe that the trial court erred when it denied a jury
request for a transcript by stating that there was no transcript
at that point.  314 N.C. at 34-35, 331 S.E.2d at 656-57 (citing
Lang, 301 N.C. at 510-11, 272 S.E.2d at 125).  We noted that
various methods existed for allowing a jury to review testimony,
id. at 35 n.6, 331 S.E.2d at 657 n.6, then found that the court’s
response indicated that the judge mistakenly believed he was
unable to grant the request and thus had no discretion to
exercise, id. at 34-35, 331 S.E.2d at 656-57.  Here, the trial
judge noted numerous times that he was denying the jury’s request
in his discretion.  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
correctly understood that it was permitted to exercise its
discretion pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1233.
-21-
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion.  Such an
abuse occurs when a ruling “is manifestly unsupported by reason
or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a
reasoned decision.”  State v. Peterson, 361 N.C. 587, 602-03, 652
S.E.2d 216, 227 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 170 L. Ed. 2d 377 (2008).  “In our review,
we consider not whether we might disagree with the trial court,
but whether the trial court’s actions are fairly supported by the
record.”  State v. Lasiter, 361 N.C. 299, 302, 643 S.E.2d 909,
911 (2007).
Although the trial court made a trivial mistake when it
attempted to recall specific words spoken when the exhibits were
first discussed, the trial court’s ruling is amply supported by
the record.  The exhibits were admitted solely for the purpose of
illustrating an expert’s testimony and the jury already had seen
the exhibits in their entirety.  The transcript of the discussion
between the trial court and the parties when the exhibits were
initially admitted indicates that these exhibits did indeed
contain some inadmissible material.  The trial court’s decision
was not an abuse of discretion.
Defendant also now contends that the trial court’s
action violated his constitutional rights to present evidence, a
fair trial, due process of law, and a reliable capital sentencing
hearing.  However, we have held that “[a] constitutional issue
not raised at trial will generally not be considered for the
first time on appeal.”  Anderson v. Assimos, 356 N.C. 415, 416,
572 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2002) (per curiam) (citing State v. Nobles,
-22-
350 N.C. 483, 495, 515 S.E.2d 885, 893 (1999); Porter v. Suburban
Sanitation Serv., Inc., 283 N.C. 479, 490, 196 S.E.2d 760, 767
(1973)).  Because defendant did not raise these constitutional
issues below, we decline to address them now.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a mistrial, made when law enforcement
officers approached the jury box.  Defendant argues that the
denial of his motion was, under the totality of the
circumstances, an abuse of discretion and that his constitutional
rights to a fair trial and a reliable sentencing proceeding were
violated.
This case understandably generated interest among law
enforcement, and defendant made a pretrial motion to limit the
presence of uniformed officers at trial.  The trial judge
declined to issue a blanket order but noted that he was aware of
potential problems and would “keep a constant eye on” the
situation.  The trial court suggested that the prosecutor advise
any officers who came to observe that it might be prudent if they
dressed in mufti and also asked trial counsel to alert him if
counsel saw a troubling number of uniformed officers.
During the guilt-innocence phase of defendant’s trial,
the State tendered into evidence autopsy photographs of Officer
Prince.  The photographs were then circulated to jurors who
wished to see them.  As the photographs circulated, three
uniformed law enforcement officers (including one who had been a
participant in the events of 18 January 2005 and had testified
-23-
for the State earlier in the trial) stepped up to the courtroom
bar, approximately eighteen inches to three feet from the jury.
As soon as the incident occurred, the officers were
directed to sit down and the court held a bench conference. 
Counsel for the State informed the court that the officers
stepped forward to form a shield to keep Officer Prince’s mother
from seeing the photographs.  Defense counsel responded that the
officers’ actions could reasonably be inferred as intending to
intimidate the jurors, then moved for a mistrial.  The court
ruled that:
Motion for a mistrial, in the court’s
discretion, is denied.  The court notes most
of the jurors seemed to be looking in my
direction.  I owe an apology to every one of
them but that would make it - I’m not sure
they knew they were there.  As far as
intimidating effect, it was peculiar, but I
don’t think any jurors were intimidated.
The trial judge did not address the jurors about the
incident but commented that “[t]hey wouldn’t notice until we
brought it to their attention.  For all they know, the officers
were up there trying to get a look at the pictures.”  Defendant
renewed his motion for a mistrial at the close of the State’s
evidence, and the court again denied the motion.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial.  Defendant,
contending that the behavior of the officers was inherently
prejudicial, cites cases from other jurisdictions in which
courtroom spectators’ demonstrations of support for the victim
were found to be grounds for a new trial:  Woods v. Dugger, 923
F.2d 1454 (11th Cir.) (fair trial denied to the defendant when
-24-
prison guards constituted approximately half the spectators
filling the courtroom during a trial for murder of a prison
guard), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 953, 116 L. Ed. 2d 355 (1991);
Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1990) (fair trial denied
to the defendant when female spectators wore large buttons
bearing the slogan “Women Against Rape” at the defendant’s trial
for kidnapping and non-consensual sexual intercourse); State v.
Franklin, 174 W. Va. 469, 327 S.E.2d 449 (1985) (fair trial
denied to the defendant when several spectators wore MADD buttons
at the defendant’s trial for driving under the influence
resulting in death).  Defendant further argues that the behavior
of the officers was reflected in the subsequent unusual events at
defendant’s sentencing proceeding, which are detailed later in
this opinion, thereby calling into question the reliability of
defendant’s sentence.
Our research has found no instance of similar conduct
by police officers attending a criminal trial.  A somewhat
analogous situation arose in Holbrook v. Flynn, when four
uniformed and armed state troopers sat in the front row of the
spectator section at the defendant’s trial.  475 U.S. 560, 562,
89 L. Ed. 2d 525, 530 (1986).  The record in Holbrook indicated
that the officers were present to ensure courtroom security.  Id.
at 562-63, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 530-31.  In finding no error, the
Supreme Court observed that a juror might draw any of several
reasonable inferences from the presence of uniformed officers in
a courtroom, whereas other procedures such as trying a defendant
who is wearing prison garb are inherently prejudicial.  Id. at
-25-
569, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 534-35.  The Supreme Court declined to
presume that any use of identifiable security guards in a
courtroom is inherently prejudicial and adopted instead a case-
by-case approach.  Id. at 568-69, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 534-35.  In
State v. Braxton, some trial spectators wore badges that appeared
to be photographs of one of the victims.  344 N.C. 702, 709-10,
477 S.E.2d 172, 176 (1996).  The defendant argued that the
presence of these badges was inherently prejudicial to his right
to a fair trial.  Id. at 710, 477 S.E.2d at 176.  The record did
not indicate who wore the buttons, who was depicted on the
buttons, or whether the jurors even noticed the buttons.  Id. at
710, 477 S.E.2d at 177.  This Court found that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion
for a mistrial based on the buttons.  Id.
We are mindful of the troubling aspects of the
officers’ behavior.  While the record is unclear as to whether
the officers actually came within the bar of the courtroom, the
transcript leaves no doubt that some were quite close to several
of the jurors.  The record does not indicate whether the episode
was planned or was spontaneous, but it is apparent that the trial
court, counsel for the State, and counsel for defendant were
unsure what had just happened, and why.  Nevertheless, our review
of the record satisfies us that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying defendant’s motion for mistrial.  The
officers were immediately directed to sit back down as soon as
the court perceived what was happening.  The judge who observed
the episode believed that jurors may not have even noticed the
-26-
officers’ conduct; did not believe that any jurors had been
intimidated; found that little, if any, potential prejudice had
occurred; and concluded that any further mention of the incident
to the jurors would be counterproductive.  Assuming that the
jurors did notice the officers’ conduct, several plausible
inferences could have been drawn as in Holbrook, such as the
State’s suggestion to the trial court that the officers were
shielding the victim’s mother from the photographs, or the
court’s response that the officers may have wanted to look at the
photographs themselves.  Whatever the cause of the officers’
behavior, the trial court acted promptly and effectively to
regain control of the courtroom.  We will not second-guess the
trial court to presume that this incident was fatally prejudicial
as a matter of law, and we do not perceive any abuse in the
judge’s exercise of his discretion to deny defendant’s motion for
a mistrial.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1061 (2007).  This assignment of
error is overruled.
Defendant next contends the trial court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss the charge of robbery with a
dangerous weapon.  Pointing out that defendant was not armed
until he took Officer Prince’s firearm, defendant argues that he
cannot be convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon when the
object taken in the robbery is also the firearm used to
perpetrate the offense.  Defendant asserts that the State is
required to prove that defendant actually possessed and used the
weapon at the time the assault and robbery is committed.  When
the weapon is the object of the robbery, a defendant does not
-27-
control it before the taking.  Therefore, according to defendant,
the weapon used and the property obtained must be two distinct
items.  In addition, defendant argues that his conviction cannot
be sustained under the continuous transaction theory because
defendant was charged with taking only Officer Prince’s weapon. 
Defendant contends that, even where the continuous transaction
theory is applicable, a defendant cannot be convicted of robbery
with a dangerous weapon solely for stealing the same weapon used
to commit the robbery.
Section 14-87(a) provides in pertinent part:
Any person or persons who, having in
possession or with the use or threatened use
of any firearms or other dangerous weapon,
implement or means, whereby the life of a
person is endangered or threatened,
unlawfully takes or attempts to take personal
property from another . . . shall be guilty
of a Class D felony.
N.C.G.S. § 14-87(a) (2007).
“[U]nder N.C.G.S. § 14-87(a), armed robbery is:  (1)
the unlawful taking or an attempt to take personal property from
the person or in the presence of another (2) by use or threatened
use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon (3) whereby the life
of a person is endangered or threatened.”  State v. Hope, 317
N.C. 302, 305, 345 S.E.2d 361, 363 (1986) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).  Under the facts of the case at bar,
the only element in question is whether defendant’s taking of
Officer Prince’s weapon was accomplished by use or threatened use
of a firearm.
We have previously held that an armed robbery can be a
continuous transaction, id. at 305-06, 345 S.E.2d at 363-64, and
-28-
“‘[w]here a continuous transaction occurs, the temporal order of
the threat or use of a dangerous weapon and the taking is
immaterial,’” State v. Haselden, 357 N.C. 1, 17, 577 S.E.2d 594,
605 (quoting State v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 566, 411 S.E.2d 592,
597 (1992)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 988, 157 L. Ed. 2d 382
(2003).  Under analogous circumstances, when a defendant took a
knife from the victim, threatened the victim with that knife, and
then left the victim’s store with the knife, State v. Black, 286
N.C. 191, 192, 209 S.E.2d 458, 459 (1974), we concluded that
“[c]learly, defendant robbed [the victim] with a knife, or he did
not rob [the victim] at all,” id. at 196, 209 S.E.2d at 462.
Here, defendant emerged from the fight with Officer
Prince’s gun.  Despite defendant’s argument to the contrary, we
see no reason why the use of a weapon stolen from the victim
cannot also be a part of the continuing transaction of the armed
robbery.  The evidence presented was sufficient for the jury to
find that defendant’s use of the gun was inseparable from the
taking of it and defendant’s efforts to flee.  This assignment of
error is overruled.
SENTENCING PROCEEDING
Defendant contends that the trial court committed
reversible error in its rulings when the jury initially returned
with a nonunanimous sentencing recommendation.  First, defendant
argues that the trial court misinterpreted the applicable
statutes when it stated that it was required to instruct the jury
to resume its deliberations.  Second, defendant argues that the
trial court failed to exercise its discretion when it denied his
-29-
motions to impose a life sentence and for a mistrial.  However,
because the trial court correctly interpreted the statutes,
because a nonunanimous poll alone does not provide authority to
impose a life sentence, and because the record indicates that the
trial court did exercise its discretion in denying a mistrial,
these contentions are without merit.
After deliberating in the sentencing proceeding for
just over one and one-half hours, the jury indicated it had
reached a verdict.  Upon inquiry by the trial court, the
foreperson responded that the jury had arrived at a unanimous
recommendation as to sentence and that he had personally
answered, dated, and signed the Issues and Recommendation As To
Punishment form (sentencing form).  The foreperson affirmed that
on the sentencing form the jury unanimously answered Issue One,
“Yes”; Issue Two, “Yes”; and Issue Three, “No,” and that it
recommended that defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment. 
When the clerk asked whether this was the unanimous
recommendation of the jury, the foreperson answered, “Yes.”  The
clerk then asked, “So say you all?” and the jurors answered
“Yes.”  These oral responses were consistent with the answers
written on the sentencing form.
Then, as required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(b), the trial
court began polling the jurors individually.  The court restated
that the sentencing form responses were “Yes” as to Issues One
and Two, and “No” as to Issue Three, with a unanimous
recommendation of a sentence of life imprisonment, then asked the
foreperson if this was still his recommendation.  The foreperson
-30-
responded, “Yes, sir.”  When the next two jurors were similarly
questioned, both affirmed that their recommendation was
consistent with the answers given on the verdict sheet.
However, the fourth juror polled answered “No” when
asked whether his recommendation was consistent with the verdict
sheet.  The trial court immediately called a bench conference and
defense counsel moved that the court impose a life sentence.  The
court responded:  “Denied at this time.  As I recall the statute
it says it’s my duty to direct them to retire and begin
deliberations.  Is that not correct?”  State’s counsel responded,
“Yes, sir.”  Defense counsel then asked that the polling be
completed.  Counsel for the State agreed and the court completed
polling the jury.  Six of the remaining eight jurors stated that
they disagreed with the responses that had been set out on the
sentencing form, while two jurors affirmed agreement with the
responses.  After the polling appeared to be complete, the third
juror polled (who had initially affirmed her agreement with the
sentencing form responses) raised her hand and stated:  “I think
maybe I answered that the wrong way.  I meant ‘No’ for mine.”
The trial court then declared that there was not a
unanimous sentencing recommendation and that his duty under North
Carolina law was to direct the jury to resume deliberations.  The
jury was given a recess and defense counsel moved for a mistrial. 
The trial court responded:  “In the court’s discretion, the same
is denied.  These jurors have been out two, two and a half
hours?”  State’s counsel answered, “An hour and 40 minutes.”
-31-
After the recess, defense counsel “renew[ed] our motion
for mistrial,” pointing out that the jurors “had an opportunity
to witness all emotions on both sides” and “reactions to their
verdict.”  When the court asked defense counsel to clarify the
grounds for his motion, defense counsel responded:  “I mean
specifically, there was crying.  There was probably some
happiness.  I’m sure there was sadness and reactions on the other
side.  I only observed, myself personally, the reactions that
were on this side of the bench.  They varied from joy to crying.” 
Defense counsel argued that in light of the reactions of
spectators and the third juror’s reversal of her position after
the polling had appeared complete, no verdict could command
confidence.  As a result, defense counsel argued, the court
should declare a mistrial.  The court responded:  “All right. 
The motion has been renewed.  I’ve heard counsels’ arguments and
considered the same and, in the court’s discretion, the motion is
denied.  The statute says that we shall – or the law says, we
shall begin deliberations anew.  And so we’re going to try.”
The trial court instructed the jury regarding the
deliberative process, then directed the jurors to resume
deliberations.  Just over an hour later, the jury again indicated
that it had reached a verdict and defendant again renewed his
motion for mistrial.  After calculating the approximate time the
jury had deliberated since being reinstructed, the court stated,
“In the court’s discretion denied.”  Upon returning to the
courtroom, the foreperson indicated that changes to the
sentencing form had been made in blue ink and that he had dated
-32-
and re-signed the sentencing form.  The altered sentencing form
reflected a unanimous recommendation of death.  The jury was
polled in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(b), and each juror
confirmed this recommendation.
Prior to entry of judgment, defense counsel stated:
Judge, we respectfully renew our
motion for mistrial.  The grounds for that is
the 6th, 8th, 9th and 14th amendments of the
United States Constitution, Article One,
Section One.  19, 23, 27, and 26.  And the
grounds really being that there was a very
significant emotional response when the
verdict was being read.  And it was
subsequent to that, that apparently they – a
considerable reversal was had by the way of
the jurors in the box, which led them to a –
re-deliberations, which led to even more of a
reversal even as to issues three and four. 
We think that the emotional outburst and such
was something that’d be very difficult,
especially to see the reaction of people, the
victim’s family to what would amount to a
life sentence.  And then the jury to go back
and deliberate without being impaired by that
process.
The court responded:  “In the court’s discretion, having had the
opportunity to witness all of what occurred after the
announcement that the verdict was not unanimous when first taken,
denied.”
Although defense counsel cited the constitutions of the
United States and of North Carolina to the trial court in his
motion for mistrial, and although defendant’s assignment of error
alleges that the trial court’s rulings denied defendant his
constitutional rights, in the body of his brief defendant makes
only a statutory argument.  “Questions raised by assignments of
error . . . but not then presented and discussed in a party’s
brief, are deemed abandoned.”  N.C. R. App. P. 28(a).  Defendant
-33-
also contends that the court failed to exercise its discretion
when it denied defendant’s motion to impose a life sentence.
When a trial court fails to exercise its
discretion in the erroneous belief that it
has no discretion as to the question
presented, there is error.  Where the error
is prejudicial to a party, that party is
entitled to have the question reconsidered
and passed upon as a discretionary matter.
State v. McAvoy, 331 N.C. 583, 591, 417 S.E.2d 489, 494 (1992).
Section 15A-1238, dealing with criminal trials in
superior court generally, provides:
Upon the motion of any party made after a
verdict has been returned and before the jury
has dispersed, the jury must be polled.  The
judge may also upon his own motion require
the polling of the jury. . . .  If upon the
poll there is not unanimous concurrence, the
jury must be directed to retire for further
deliberations.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1238 (2007).
Section 15A-2000(b) specifically addresses sentencing
proceedings in capital cases and provides in relevant part:
The sentence recommendation must be agreed
upon by a unanimous vote of the 12 jurors. 
Upon delivery of the sentence recommendation
by the foreman of the jury, the jury shall be
individually polled to establish whether each
juror concurs and agrees to the sentence
recommendation returned.
If the jury cannot, within a reasonable
time, unanimously agree to its sentence
recommendation, the judge shall impose a
sentence of life imprisonment; provided,
however, that the judge shall in no instance
impose the death penalty when the jury cannot
agree unanimously to its sentence
recommendation.
Id. § 15A-2000(b) (2007).
While section 15A-1238 explicitly states that if a poll
reveals lack of unanimity, the jury must be directed to retire
-34-
for further deliberations, section 15A-2000(b) is silent as to
what a court can or cannot do when the polling reveals a
nonunanimous sentencing recommendation in a capital case. 
Defendant interprets these two statutes to support his argument
that the trial court erred when it concluded that it did not have
authority to impose a life sentence once the jury revealed itself
to be nonunanimous.  However, section 15A-2000(b) requires that a
sentence recommendation in a capital case be agreed upon by a
unanimous vote of twelve jurors.  The statute authorizes the
court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment in the absence of
jury unanimity only when the jury cannot, within a reasonable
time, agree on its sentence recommendation.
Even when, as here, an inconsistency arises between the
verdict and the responses of jurors during the polling process,
the trial court must nevertheless allow the jury a reasonable
opportunity to attempt to reach a unanimous sentence
recommendation.  Only when the court concludes that “the jury
cannot, within a reasonable time, unanimously agree to its
sentence recommendation” may the court impose a life sentence. 
Id. § 15A-2000(b).  A nonunanimous poll does not necessarily
indicate that a jury cannot agree to a unanimous sentencing
recommendation within a reasonable time, nor does such a poll
automatically give the trial court authority to impose a life
sentence.  When defendant made his motion for a life sentence,
the trial court affirmed that the jury had deliberated for little
more than an hour and a half at the time it delivered its initial
sentencing recommendation.  No evidence suggested that the jury
-35-
2 The dissent argues that a trial court in a capital case
has the discretionary power to impose a life sentence whenever a
jury deliberating the appropriate sentence recommendation is not
unanimous.  However, the General Assembly has set out specific
procedures to be followed in capital sentencing, thereby limiting
and in some instances foreclosing the exercise of discretion by
the trial court.  Under the statute applicable here, the only
contingency in which a trial court unilaterally shall impose a
life sentence in a capital case is when the jury is nonunanimous
after having deliberated for a “reasonable time.”  N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(b).  Otherwise, a capital sentencing recommendation is
exclusively the province of the jury, id.; State v. Smith, 305
N.C. 691, 711, 292 S.E.2d 264, 276, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056,
74 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1982) (trial court must enter judgment
consistent with jury’s recommendation of death), and the statute
permits the trial court to intervene and impose a life sentence
only when the jury cannot agree, not when the jury merely has not
agreed.
could not agree and the jury had given no indication that it was
having trouble reaching a sentencing recommendation.  The issue
whether the jury might be unable to agree unanimously on a
sentence recommendation was never raised.  The trial court was
correct in its conclusion that it lacked authority to impose a
life sentence in this case at the time defendant made his
motion.2
Defendant also contends that the trial court failed to
exercise its discretion in denying his motions for a mistrial.  A
trial judge may declare a mistrial at any time during the trial
upon defendant’s motion or with defendant’s concurrence.  Id. §
15A-1061 (2007).  Although “[t]he decision to grant or deny a
mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court,” 
State v. Bonney, 329 N.C. 61, 73, 405 S.E.2d 145, 152 (1991), a
trial court errs when it fails “to exercise its discretion in the
erroneous belief that it has no discretion as to the question
presented,” McAvoy, 331 N.C. at 591, 417 S.E.2d at 494.  
-36-
Here, as detailed above, when the polling of the jury
revealed a lack of unanimity, defendant initially moved for the
trial court to impose a life sentence, and the trial court
correctly concluded that it then lacked authority to grant such a
motion.  Defendant’s motions for mistrial came later and were
based on the premise that jurors had seen the reactions of those
in the courtroom when the initial verdict indicating a
recommendation of a life sentence was read.  The record does not
indicate that the trial court believed it had no discretion to
declare a mistrial.  Instead, each time it ruled on defendant’s
mistrial motions, the trial court specifically stated that it was
denying the motions in its discretion.  Accordingly, this
assignment of error is overruled. 
Defendant argues the trial court committed plain error
by allowing the jury to consider both the N.C.G.S. § 15A-
2000(e)(4) and (e)(8) aggravating circumstances.  However, we
have held that submission of both the (e)(4) (crime committed for
the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest) and (e)(8)
(crime committed against a law-enforcement officer while engaged
in the performance of official duties) aggravating circumstances
is not error because the (e)(4) aggravating circumstance focuses
on the defendant’s subjective motivation for his actions, while
(e)(8) pertains to the underlying factual basis of the crime. 
State v. Nicholson, 355 N.C. 1, 47-49, 558 S.E.2d 109, 140-41,
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 845, 154 L. Ed. 2d 71 (2002); State v.
Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 481-82, 533 S.E.2d 168, 243-44 (2000),
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 931, 149 L. Ed. 2d 305 (2001).  We have
-37-
recently treated this issue as a preservation issue, State v.
Polke, 361 N.C. 65, 75, 638 S.E.2d 189, 195 (2006), cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___, 169 L. Ed. 2d 55 (2007).  However, because
defendant has not denominated this issue in his brief as a
preservation issue and has made a lengthy and sustained argument,
we will address the merits of defendant’s contention.
Defendant seeks to distinguish Nicholson and Golphin,
claiming that in those cases the State presented distinct and
separate evidence supporting each aggravating circumstance. 
Specifically, defendant argues that the motive of the defendant
in Nicholson for killing an officer performing the official duty
of responding to a domestic disturbance call was to avoid being
arrested for having assaulted his wife.  In Golphin, the officer
was enforcing the traffic law, while the defendant’s motive for
killing the officer was to avoid arrest for auto theft. 
Defendant argues that, in contrast, his motive for killing
Officer Prince was to avoid the very arrest that the officer was
attempting to carry out and that therefore, the evidence
supporting the (e)(4) and (e)(8) aggravating circumstances
impermissibly overlapped.  However, our analysis in Nicholson
applies here because the (e)(4) aggravating circumstance in this
case focused on defendant’s subjective intention to avoid being
arrested, while the (e)(8) aggravating circumstance addressed the
objective fact that the victim was a law enforcement officer
performing his official duties.  The facts here are almost
identical to those in Polke, in which the defendant stole the
service weapon of a sheriff’s deputy who was attempting to arrest
-38-
the defendant, then used the weapon to kill the deputy.  361 N.C.
at 67, 638 S.E.2d at 190.  Accordingly, we find no plain error in
the trial court’s instructions.  This assignment of error is
overruled.
Defendant next contends the trial court erred by
failing to give requested peremptory instructions as to two
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  Defendant asked the court
to instruct that:  “The defendant was cooperative with officers
after being taken into custody and polite during interviews,” and
“The defendant has accepted responsibility for his criminal
conduct.”  The trial court did give these instructions, but not
peremptorily.  Defendant argues that these circumstances were
uncontradicted and supported by manifestly credible evidence and
that the trial court was therefore required to give the
instructions peremptorily, pursuant to State v. McLaughlin, 341
N.C. 426, 449, 462 S.E.2d 1, 13 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
1133, 133 L. Ed. 2d 879 (1996).
The record indicates that before the jury began its
sentencing proceeding deliberations, the trial court gave
peremptory instructions as to three statutory mitigating
circumstances.  The trial court also gave nonperemptory
instructions as to one other statutory mitigating circumstances
and submitted the statutory catchall mitigating circumstance.  In
addition, the trial court gave peremptory instructions as to
twenty-one nonstatutory mitigating circumstances submitted by
defendant.  One of these was “at [an] early stage of the criminal
process, the Defendant voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing in
-39-
connection with the offense to a law enforcement officer,” and at
least one juror found that this circumstance existed and had
mitigating value.
However, while agreeing to instruct on defendant’s
requested nonstatutory mitigating circumstances that “[t]he
Defendant was cooperative with officers after being taken into
custody and polite during interviews” and “[t]he Defendant has
accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct,” the trial
court declined to instruct peremptorily.  At least one juror
found that the former mitigating circumstance existed and had
mitigating value, but no juror found the latter circumstance. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not instructing
peremptorily as to these two nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances.
“[A] trial court should, if requested, give a
peremptory instruction for any mitigating circumstance, whether
statutory or nonstatutory, if it is supported by uncontroverted
and manifestly credible evidence.”  Id. at 449, 462 S.E.2d at 13. 
However, a peremptory instruction is not appropriate when the
evidence is conflicting as to the circumstance.  State v. Call,
353 N.C. 400, 412, 545 S.E.2d 190, 198, cert. denied, 534 U.S.
1046, 151 L. Ed. 2d 548 (2001).
As to the instruction that defendant was cooperative
and polite, while some evidence supported the instruction, other
evidence indicated that defendant was neither cooperative with
officers after being apprehended nor polite during interviews. 
For instance, defendant claimed to interrogating officers that he
-40-
blacked out both when Officer Prince grabbed him and later when
he took Officer Prince’s weapon, even though he also described
what happened after the purported blackouts.  Defendant initially
denied knowing what was in the bag with which he hit Officer
Prince and only later, when confronted, admitted that he knew a
bottle had been in the bag.  Moreover, State Bureau of
Investigation Agent Francisco testified that defendant “kept
trying to minimize the fact that he had struck Officer Prince
with a weapon.”  Also, defendant’s statements to the authorities
were inconsistent with other evidence regarding the distance from
which defendant shot Officer Prince.  One of the officers who
interviewed defendant testified that defendant was “[v]ery cocky”
and “appeared almost proud of what he had done.”  Because the
evidence was conflicting as to whether defendant was cooperative
and polite after being apprehended and during interviews, the
trial court did not err in declining to instruct peremptorily on
this nonstatutory mitigating circumstance.
As to defendant’s requested instruction that he
accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct, the record
indicates that, while defendant admitted killing Officer Prince
and acknowledged that the killing was a terrible mistake, he
authorized his attorneys to concede guilt to second-degree murder
only.  This Court has stated that a defendant’s willingness to
plead guilty to second-degree murder “is evidence only of
defendant’s willingness to lessen his exposure to the death
penalty or a life sentence upon a first-degree murder
conviction.”  State v. Carroll, 356 N.C. 526, 549, 573 S.E.2d
-41-
899, 914 (2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 949, 156 L. Ed. 2d 640
(2003); see also State v. Thompson, 359 N.C. 77, 95, 604 S.E.2d
850, 865 (2004) (finding difficulty in assessing whether a
defendant’s willingness to plead guilty to first-degree murder in
exchange for a sentence of life without parole had mitigating
value in demonstrating an admission of the defendant’s
responsibility), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 830, 163 L. Ed. 2d 80
(2005).  Defendant’s admissions regarding his behavior and
concession of guilt to second-degree murder constituted a
voluntary acknowledgment of wrongdoing, as to which the trial
court instructed peremptorily and which at least one juror found
to exist and have mitigating value, but these admissions
constituted only a partial acceptance of responsibility for his
criminal conduct, which the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt
to be first-degree murder.  Accordingly, the trial court did not
err in declining to give this instruction peremptorily.
PRESERVATION ISSUES
Defendant raises ten additional issues that he concedes
previously have been decided by this Court contrary to his
position.  Defendant contends the trial court erred by sentencing
him for both assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and
attempted first-degree murder based upon the same conduct.  As
defendant acknowledges, we have rejected this argument.  State v.
Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 578-79, 599 S.E.2d 515, 534 (2004), cert.
denied, 544 U.S. 909, 161 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2005).  Defendant next
maintains that the trial court committed constitutional error
because a short-form indictment is not sufficient to charge a
-42-
defendant with first-degree murder, as was done here.  This Court
has consistently held that such indictments “are in compliance
with both the North Carolina and United States Constitutions.” 
State v. Lawrence, 352 N.C. 1, 10, 530 S.E.2d 807, 813-14 (2000),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1083, 148 L. Ed. 2d 684 (2001); State v.
Wallace, 351 N.C. 481, 504-05, 528 S.E.2d 326, 341, cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1018, 148 L. Ed. 2d 498 (2000).
Defendant asserts the trial court committed plain error
by instructing the jury that it had to return unanimous answers
to the sentencing form issues, because in practice a sentence of
life without parole results when the jury does not unanimously
answer “Yes.”  This Court has previously considered and rejected
this argument.  State v. DeCastro, 342 N.C. 667, 686-88, 467
S.E.2d 653, 662-64, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 896, 136 L. Ed. 2d 170
(1996); State v. McCarver, 341 N.C. 364, 388-94, 462 S.E.2d 25,
38-42 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110, 134 L. Ed. 2d 482
(1996).  Defendant also assigns as plain error the trial court’s
use of “satisfy” in explaining the burden of proof on mitigation. 
Instructions using this term to explain the burden of proof have
been found adequate.  State v. Payne, 337 N.C. 505, 531-33, 448
S.E.2d 93, 108-09 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1038, 131 L. Ed.
2d 292 (1995).  Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred
by instructing jurors to decide whether nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances, including those circumstances which are
uncontroverted, have mitigating value.  This Court has previously
considered and rejected this argument.  State v. Duke, 360 N.C.
110, 141, 623 S.E.2d 11, 31 (2005) (citing Payne, 337 N.C. at
-43-
533, 448 S.E.2d at 109-10), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 855, 166 L.
Ed. 2d 96 (2006).
Defendant assigns as plain error the trial court’s jury
instructions on the definition of “mitigation,” contending that
the definition is too narrow and precludes jury consideration of
all proffered aspects of defendant’s character.  This Court has
previously considered and rejected this argument.  State v. Goss,
361 N.C. 610, 627, 651 S.E.2d 867, 878 (2007), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 172 L. Ed. 2d 58 (2008); State v. Conaway, 339 N.C.
487, 533-34, 453 S.E.2d 824, 853-54, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 884,
133 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1995).  Defendant contends the trial court
committed plain error by its use of the term “may” instead of
“must” in sentencing Issues Three and Four, thereby making
consideration of proven mitigation discretionary.  We have
rejected this argument.  Duke, 360 N.C. at 141-42, 623 S.E.2d at
31-32; State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 286-87, 439 S.E.2d 547, 569-
70, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891, 130 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1994).
Defendant next argues that the trial court
unconstitutionally precluded full and free consideration of
mitigation in the balancing and weighing stages of the sentencing
proceeding by instructing that each juror could consider at
Issues Three and Four only those mitigating circumstances which
that particular juror had found at Issue Two.  This Court has
previously considered and rejected this argument.  Lee, 355 N.C.
at 286-87, 439 S.E.2d at 569-70.  Defendant contends that the
trial court erred by allowing jurors who express unequivocal
opposition to the death penalty to be struck for cause.  This
-44-
Court has “repeatedly held that prospective jurors who express an
unequivocal opposition to the death penalty may be excused
without violating a defendant’s constitutional rights.”  State v.
Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 172, 604 S.E.2d 886, 911 (2004), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 830, 163 L. Ed. 2d 79 (2005).
Finally, defendant contends that the death penalty is
inherently cruel and unusual, that North Carolina’s capital
sentencing scheme is vague and overbroad and involves subjective
discretion, and that capital punishment is applied arbitrarily
and capriciously pursuant to a pattern and practice of
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and poverty, all in
violation of the North Carolina and United States Constitutions. 
This Court has previously considered and rejected these
arguments.  See, e.g., Duke, 360 N.C. at 142, 623 S.E.2d at 32;
Morgan, 359 N.C. at 168-70, 604 S.E.2d at 908-09; State v.
Williams, 304 N.C. 394, 409-11, 284 S.E.2d 437, 448 (1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 932, 72 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1982).
We have considered defendant’s contentions on these
issues and find no reason to depart from our prior holdings. 
Thus, we reject these arguments.
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
In accordance with section 15A-2000(d)(2), we now
consider whether the record supports the aggravating
circumstances found by the jury, whether the death sentence “was
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary factor,” and whether the death sentence “is excessive
or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
-45-
considering both the crime and the defendant.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-
2000(d)(2) (2007).
We begin with the aggravating circumstances.  Defendant
was convicted of one count of first-degree murder on the basis of
malice, premeditation, and deliberation, and under the felony
murder rule.  The trial court submitted the following four
aggravating circumstances:  (1) the murder was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest; (2) the murder
was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of
robbery with a dangerous weapon, to wit, an E & J Brandy bottle;
(3) the murder was committed against a law enforcement officer
while engaged in the performance of his official duties; and (4)
the murder was part of a course of conduct in which defendant
engaged that included the commission by defendant of other crimes
of violence against other persons.  Id. § 15A-2000(e) (2007). 
The jury found each of these aggravating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt.  Our review of the record indicates that each
of the four circumstances is fully supported.
Defendant contends that the death sentence was imposed
under the influence of passion and prejudice.  Defendant supports
this argument by citing the incidents at trial where police
officers approached the jury box as jurors viewed autopsy
photographs, the jury’s original nonunanimous recommendation of a
life sentence, and the reaction in the courtroom to the jury’s
original sentencing recommendation.  None of these incidents, as
discussed above, nor anything else in the record indicates that
-46-
the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.
Finally, we turn to the issue of proportionality.  We
must determine whether the sentence of death is excessive or
disproportionate by comparing this case with other cases where we
have found the death sentence to be disproportionate.  Augustine,
359 N.C. at 739, 616 S.E.2d at 536.  This Court has found a death
sentence disproportionate on eight occasions.  State v.
Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 573 S.E.2d 870 (2002); State v. Benson,
323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1,
352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d
713 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345
N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed.
2d 177 (1997), and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d
373 (1988); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985);
State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v.
Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); and State v.
Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).  We conclude that
defendant’s case is not substantially similar to any of these.
First, the evidence shows that for the purpose of
evading lawful arrest, defendant intentionally murdered a law
enforcement officer who was performing his official duties. 
“[T]he N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(4) and (e)(8) aggravating
circumstances reflect the General Assembly’s recognition that
‘the collective conscience requires the most severe penalty for
those who flout our system of law enforcement.’”  Golphin, 352
N.C. at 487, 533 S.E.2d at 247 (quoting State v. Brown, 320 N.C.
-47-
179, 230, 358 S.E.2d 1, 33, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970, 98 L. Ed.
2d 406 (1987)).
The murder of a law enforcement
officer engaged in the performance of his
official duties differs in kind and not
merely in degree from other murders.  When in
the performance of his duties, a law
enforcement officer is the representative of
the public and a symbol of the rule of law. 
The murder of a law enforcement officer
engaged in the performance of his duties in
the truest sense strikes a blow at the entire
public—the body politic—and is a direct
attack upon the rule of law which must
prevail if our society as we know it is to
survive.
Id. at 487-88, 533 S.E.2d at 247 (quoting Hill, 311 N.C. at 488,
319 S.E.2d at 177 (Mitchell, J. (later C.J.), concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
In addition, defendant was convicted of first-degree
murder both under the felony murder rule and on the basis of
malice, premeditation, and deliberation.  “Although a death
sentence may properly be imposed for convictions based solely on
felony murder, a finding of premeditation and deliberation
indicates a more calculated and cold-blooded crime for which the
death penalty is more often appropriate.”  Taylor, 362 N.C. at
563, 669 S.E.2d at 276 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Moreover, the evidence shows that despite the kneeling
officer’s pleas for mercy, defendant fatally shot Officer Prince
multiple times.  The evidence further indicates that defendant
shot at the arriving back-up officer, fled the scene with Officer
Prince’s weapon, shot again when he abandoned his car, then hid
under an occupied mobile home as armed police officers closed in,
-48-
potentially endangering the innocent occupants.  The jury found
that the murder of Officer Prince was part of a course of conduct
that included violent crimes against another person or persons,
constituting the (e)(11) aggravating circumstance.  This Court
has never found a death sentence to be disproportionate when the
jury found more than two aggravating circumstances to exist, and
has found the N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(11) circumstance, standing
alone, sufficient to support a death sentence.  Polke, 361 N.C.
at 77, 638 S.E.2d at 196.
This Court also compares the instant case with cases in
which we have found the death penalty to be proportionate.  State
v. Al-Bayyinah, 359 N.C. 741, 762, 616 S.E.2d 500, 515 (2005),
cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1076, 164 L. Ed. 2d 528 (2006).  After
carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that this case is
more analogous to cases in which we have found the sentence of
death proportionate than to the cases in which we have found it
disproportionate or cases in which juries have consistently
recommended sentences of life imprisonment.  Although defense
counsel assiduously presented pertinent mitigating circumstances
and aspects of this case, including defendant’s youth and
difficult upbringing, we are nonetheless convinced that the
sentence of death here is not disproportionate.
Accordingly, we conclude defendant received a fair
trial and capital sentencing proceeding, free from error, and the
death sentence recommended by the jury and ordered by the trial
court is not disproportionate.
NO ERROR.
No. 402A06 - State v. Maness
Justice HUDSON dissenting.
Because I conclude that the trial judge here acted
under the misapprehension that, when polling revealed the jury
was not unanimous, he had no discretion to direct the jury to
resume deliberations or instead to impose a life sentence on
defendant, I respectfully dissent.  I concur in the majority
opinion except as to this sentencing issue.  In my opinion, this
failure to exercise discretion has profoundly prejudiced
defendant, as it undermines confidence in the fairness of the
ultimate sentence here--the death penalty.  I would hold that the
trial court’s conclusion was an error of law and would vacate the
sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
This Court has consistently recognized--indeed,
emphasized--the inherent authority and discretion of the trial
judge to supervise and control the proceedings before him “to
ensure fair and impartial justice for both parties.”  State v.
Fleming, 350 N.C. 109, 126, 512 S.E.2d 720, 732 (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 941, 145 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1999). 
Since our earliest cases, we have entrusted trial judges with
great discretion in assessing the possibility of undue influence
on a jury:
[A trial judge] is clothed with this power
because of his learning and integrity, and of
the superior knowledge which his presence at
and participation in the trial gives him over
any other forum.  However great and
responsible this power, the law intends that
-50-
the Judge will exercise it to further the
ends of justice, and though doubtless, it is
occasionally abused, it would be difficult to
fix upon a safer tribunal for the exercise of
this discretionary power, which must be
lodged somewhere.
Moore v. Edmiston, 70 N.C. 382, 390, 70 N.C. 470, 481 (1874). 
Although Moore specifically involved the trial court’s discretion
in dealing with undue influence on a jury, we have stressed the
importance and scope of that discretion in all aspects of
managing a trial by jury.  See, e.g., State v. Davis, 317 N.C.
315, 318, 345 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1986) (“The trial judge has
inherent authority to supervise and control trial proceedings. 
The manner of the presentation of the evidence is largely within
the sound discretion of the trial judge and his control of a case
will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion.”
(citations omitted)); State v. Blackstock, 314 N.C. 232, 236, 333
S.E.2d 245, 248 (1985) (“In this connection it is well settled
that it is the duty of the trial judge to supervise and control
the course of a trial so as to insure justice to all parties.”).
Here, the majority’s construction of N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-
1238 and -2000(b) restricts that principle, unnecessarily in my
view.  Moreover, the majority opinion’s repeated statement that
the trial court “lacked authority to impose a life sentence”
inadvisably constrains the discretion of a trial judge overseeing
a capital sentencing proceeding while also incorrectly framing
the question before us.  The issue is whether, given the language
of N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(b), the trial court had the discretion to
choose among these options:  (1) order the jury to resume
deliberations; (2) impose a life sentence; or (3) declare a
-51-
mistrial.  The canons of statutory construction and prior case
law demonstrate that it did.
According to the majority, the trial court’s authority
here was defined by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1238, which reads:
Upon the motion of any party made after
a verdict has been returned and before the
jury has dispersed, the jury must be polled. 
The judge may also upon his own motion
require the polling of the jury.  The poll
may be conducted by the judge or by the clerk
by asking each juror individually whether the
verdict announced is his verdict.  If upon
the poll there is not unanimous concurrence,
the jury must be directed to retire for
further deliberations.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1238 (2007) (emphasis added).  The majority
maintains that § 15A-1238 controlled the situation faced by this
trial judge because § 15A-2000(b) is “silent as to what a court
can or cannot do where the polling reveals a nonunanimous jury as
to sentencing recommendation in a capital case.”  The relevant
portion of § 15A-2000(b) provides:
The sentence recommendation must be
agreed upon by a unanimous vote of the 12
jurors.  Upon delivery of the sentence
recommendation by the foreman of the jury,
the jury shall be individually polled to
establish whether each juror concurs and
agrees to the sentence recommendation
returned.
If the jury cannot, within a reasonable
time, unanimously agree to its sentence
recommendation, the judge shall impose a
sentence of life imprisonment; provided,
however, that the judge shall in no instance
impose the death penalty when the jury cannot
agree unanimously to its sentence
recommendation.
Id. § 15A-2000(b) (2007) (emphases added).  Thus, § 15A-2000(b)
tracks the basic outline of § 15A-1238 as to the return of a
verdict by a jury and the subsequent polling of the jury, but §
-52-
15A-2000(b) eliminates the legislative command that “the jury
must be directed to retire for further deliberations” if not
unanimous.
The majority would graft that language onto § 15A-
2000(b) with its holding that the trial court “lacked authority
to impose a life sentence.”  Had the General Assembly intended to
limit the trial court’s discretion when a jury is nonunanimous in
its capital sentencing recommendation, the language of § 15A-1238
clearly shows that it knows how to do so.  See, e.g., N.C.
Baptist Hosps., Inc. v. Mitchell, 323 N.C. 528, 538, 374 S.E.2d
844, 849 (1988) (in construing statute, noting “[t]here is no
doubt that the legislature knows how to draft such language when
it chooses to do so”).  Nevertheless, “‘[t]he short answer is
that [the legislature] did not write the statute that way.’” 
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 78 L. Ed. 2d 17, 24
(1983) (quoting United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773, 60
L. Ed. 2d 624, 630 (1979)).
Likewise, we have long held that, “[w]here one of two
statutes might apply to the same situation, the statute which
deals more directly and specifically with the situation controls
over the statute of more general applicability.”  Trs. of Rowan
Tech. Coll. v. J. Hyatt Hammond Assocs., 313 N.C. 230, 238, 328
S.E.2d 274, 279 (1985) (citations omitted); see also Lowder v.
All Star Mills, Inc., 301 N.C. 561, 579, 273 S.E.2d 247, 257
(1981) (“Where two statutory provisions appear, a special or
particular provision will control over a general one.” (citation
omitted)); State v. Baldwin, 205 N.C. 174, 176, 170 S.E. 645, 646
-53-
(1933) (“A settled rule of construction requires that all
statutes relating to the same subject shall be compared and
harmonized if this end can be attained by any fair and reasonable
interpretation, and that if two statutes are apparently
incompatible, one general in its terms and the other special and
expressive of a restricted application, the latter may be
considered in the nature of an exception and sustained upon this
theory.” (citations omitted)); State v. Johnson, 170 N.C. 771,
776, 170 N.C. 685, 690-91, 86 S.E. 788, 791 (1915) (stating that
a special statute controls over general statute that relates to
the same subject matter and is inconsistent).
Here, section 15A-1238 falls under Article 73,
“Criminal Jury Trial in Superior Court,” while § 15A-2000(b) is
within Article 100, “Capital Punishment,” which the legislature
specifically drafted to govern the conduct of capital
proceedings.  There is no indication that the General Assembly
intended to make § 15A-1238, the more general act, controlling
over § 15A-2000(b).  See Nat’l Food Stores v. N.C. Bd. of
Alcoholic Control, 268 N.C. 624, 629, 151 S.E.2d 582, 586 (1966)
(“[T]o the extent of any necessary repugnancy between them, the
special statute, or the one dealing with the common subject
matter in a minute way, will prevail over the general statute,
according to the authorities on the question, unless it appears
that the legislature intended to make the general act controlling
. . . .” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Further, the rule of lenity requires us to “construe[] strictly”
and resolve “[a]ll conflicts and inconsistencies” in penal
-54-
statutes “in favor of the defendant.”  State v. Scoggin, 236 N.C.
1, 10, 72 S.E.2d 97, 103 (1952).
Although the unique factual situation presented by this
case has never before been considered by this Court, we have
discussed the discretion of the trial court in the context of
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000.  In State v. Sanders, this Court affirmed
the trial court’s declaration of a mistrial based on a finding of
“manifest necessity” after learning of juror misconduct during
deliberations, including the jury’s acting contrary to the
instructions given by the trial court.  347 N.C. 587, 599, 496
S.E.2d 568, 576 (1998).  The trial court sent the jury to
deliberate, or resume deliberations, on three separate occasions
before ultimately declaring a mistrial upon the State’s motion. 
Id. at 597-98, 496 S.E.2d at 575.  Our “thorough review of the
record” led us to conclude that “the trial court properly
exercised its discretion in ordering a mistrial.”  Id. at 599,
496 S.E.2d at 576.
This is not to suggest that Sanders should be read as
having compelled the trial judge here to declare a mistrial. 
Rather, Sanders is instructive in that it discussed approvingly
the trial court’s “exploring alternative remedies which could
have allowed the sentencing proceeding to continue” before its
ultimate declaration of a mistrial.  Id. at 600-01, 496 S.E.2d at
576-77.  Sending the jury back to resume deliberations was one
such option employed by the trial court in Sanders.  Justice
Frye, in his dissent in Sanders, stated even more succinctly his
view of the “alternative remedies” available to the trial court
-55-
under § 15A-2000(b), when faced with a nonunanimous jury:  “The
appropriate action was for the judge to either impose a sentence
of life imprisonment or encourage the jurors to continue
deliberating to see if they could unanimously agree to a
sentencing recommendation.”  Id. at 601, 496 S.E.2d at 577 (Frye,
J., dissenting).
This language--admittedly, dicta--strongly suggests
that this Court previously concluded that the trial court is
vested with discretion to determine the most appropriate action
when faced with a nonunanimous jury in a capital sentencing
proceeding.  Sending the jury back to resume deliberations is one
acceptable option.  However, according to the plain language of §
15A-2000(b), if the trial court determines that the jury has
deliberated for a “reasonable time,” imposing a life sentence is
another alternative.  See State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 370,
259 S.E.2d 752, 762 (1979) (“[W]hat constitutes a ‘reasonable
time’ for jury deliberation in the sentencing phase should be
left to the trial judge’s discretion.”).
Nevertheless, as reflected in the transcript, and as
argued by defendant in his brief, the trial judge’s error here
was in believing that he was required to send the jury back to
resume deliberations.  The following excerpts from the transcript
of sentencing, immediately after polling initially showed that
the jury was not unanimous, clearly reflect that the trial judge
believed he had no discretion at this point:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I move that you
impose a life sentence.
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THE COURT:  Denied at this time.  As I
recall the statute it says it’s my duty to
direct them to retire and begin
deliberations.  Is that not correct?
[DISTRICT ATTORNEY]:  Yes, sir. 
. . . .
[Again, after polling was concluded:]
THE COURT:  . . . . Ladies and
gentlemen, finding that there is not, at this
time, a unanimous recommendation as to
sentence . . . . Under North Carolina law, it
is thus my duty to direct you to retire and
resume your deliberations.
(Emphases added.)  The trial court then sent the jury out for a
short recess, during which defense counsel renewed the motion for
a mistrial and mentioned the jury’s “opportunity to witness all
emotions on both sides,” arguing that it was “prejudicial” for
jury to see “emotions” and “reactions” to the sentencing
recommendation, including “crying” and “some happiness.”  Defense
counsel also referred to Alicia Patrick, the third juror polled,
changing her mind at the end of the polling, and he stated that
“when you have a situation like that, we just are not going to be
able to achieve a verdict that we could have confidence in.”  The
defense again renewed its motion for a mistrial, and the trial
court responded:  “I’ve heard counsels’ arguments and considered
the same and, in the court’s discretion, the motion is denied. 
The statute says that we shall--or the law says, we shall begin
deliberations anew.  And so we’re going to try.”  (Emphasis
added.)
As quoted by the majority, and under long-standing
precedent: 
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When a trial court fails to exercise its
discretion in the erroneous belief that it
has no discretion as to the question
presented, there is error.  Where the error
is prejudicial to a party, that party is
entitled to have the question reconsidered
and passed upon as a discretionary matter. 
In such cases, this Court may remand the case
or take such other actions as the rights of
the parties and applicable law may require.
State v. McAvoy, 331 N.C. 583, 591, 417 S.E.2d 489, 494-95 (1992)
(citations omitted); see also State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 36-37,
331 S.E.2d 652, 657-58 (1985) (concluding that a trial court’s
complete failure to exercise discretion amounted to reversible
error).  
Here, the error was neither the denial of defendant’s
motion for a sentence of life imprisonment nor sending the jury
back to resume deliberations.  Instead, the error was the trial
judge’s erroneous belief, apparent from the transcript, that he
had no discretion in reaching his decision.  The trial judge
faced a highly unusual situation:  the jury indicated its
unanimity; then, on polling, some individual jurors disavowed
their assent to that unanimous recommendation, including one
juror who changed her vote after already having been polled, all
following emotional reactions in the courtroom to the initial
recommendation of life imprisonment for a defendant convicted of
killing a police officer.  In light of these circumstances, it is
impossible to determine how the trial judge might have ruled on
defendant’s motion for imposition of a sentence of life
imprisonment had he been aware such a ruling was discretionary. 
Thus, this failure to exercise discretion was fundamental to the
fairness of defendant’s sentencing proceeding.  
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The authority of the trial judge to supervise and
control proceedings in the courtroom is paramount in our criminal
justice system.  I do not necessarily find error in the trial
court’s decision to direct the jury to resume deliberations;
rather, I conclude only that the court erred in believing that
decision was mandated.  In my view, our precedents and long-
standing rules of statutory construction clearly indicate that
such a decision is discretionary.  The trial court thus erred by
failing to make the decision as an exercise of that discretion,
resulting in the most extreme prejudice possible to defendant, a
sentence of death.  As such, I would vacate and remand for a new
sentencing hearing for defendant.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON joins in this dissenting
opinion.