Title: Walworth County v. M.R.M.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2022AP000140-FT
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2023

2023 WI 59 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2022AP140-FT 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the matter of the mental commitment of 
M.R.M.: 
 
Walworth County, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
M.R.M., 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 20, 2023   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
Kristine E. Drettwan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion. ZEIGLER, 
C.J., filed a dissenting opinion. ROGGENSACK, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Megan Sanders-Drazen and the Wisconsin Defense Initiative, 
Madison. There was an oral argument by Megan Sanders-Drazen.  
 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Cortney J. Iverson, assistant corporation counsel. There was an 
 
 
2 
oral argument by Cortney J. Iverson, assistant corporation 
counsel.  
 
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 59 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2022AP140 
(L.C. No. 
2021ME9) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the mental commitment of 
M.R.M.: 
 
 
 
Walworth County, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
M.R.M., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2023 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion. ZEIGLER, 
C.J., filed a dissenting opinion. ROGGENSACK, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Walworth 
County, Kristine E. Drettwan, Judge.  Reversed.   
 
No. 
2022AP140   
 
2 
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   M.R.M. was involuntarily 
committed1 and forcibly medicated for six months following a 
mental health crisis.  When Walworth County sought to extend 
M.R.M.'s commitment, he filed a jury demand at least 48 hours 
prior to his rescheduled final hearing date.  The circuit court 
denied that jury demand as untimely, held a final hearing, and 
extended his commitment for 12 additional months. 
¶2 
We subsequently decided Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 
2021 WI 85, 399 Wis. 2d 471, 966 N.W.2d 590, holding that a jury 
demand is timely if it is filed at least 48 hours before a 
rescheduled final hearing.  M.R.M. contends that E.J.W. applies 
retroactively to his case.  He further argues that reversal of 
the extension order,2 rather than reversal and remand, is the 
proper remedy because the circuit court would lack competency on 
remand.   
                                                 
1 Wisconsin law allows for the involuntary commitment of 
individuals who are "(1) mentally ill; (2) a proper subject for 
treatment; and (3) dangerous to themselves or others."  Langlade 
County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶29, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 
N.W.2d 277; see also generally Wis. Stat. § 51.20 (2021-22).  
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
2021-22 version.   
2 Wis. Stat. § 51.20 and our case law use "extension order" 
and "recommitment order" interchangeably.  Compare Waukesha 
County v. E.J.W., 2021 WI 85, ¶17, 399 Wis. 2d 471, 966 N.W.2d 
590 ("extension orders"), with D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶44 
("recommitment orders").  We use "extension order" because it is 
the language included in the statutory provision which governs 
commitment beyond the initial commitment period.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(13)(g)3. (referring to the filing of an "application for 
extension of a commitment"). 
No. 
2022AP140   
 
3 
 
¶3 
We hold that E.J.W. applies retroactively and that the 
circuit court's denial of M.R.M.'s jury demand was erroneous.  
We further hold that remand is inappropriate because the circuit 
court lacks competency on remand when, as in this case, an 
extension order is reversed on appeal and the preceding 
commitment order has expired.  
I 
¶4 M.R.M. was involuntarily committed in Walworth County in 
January 2021 for a period of six months.  In July 2021, the 
County 
petitioned 
the 
circuit 
court 
to 
extend 
M.R.M.'s 
commitment for 12 months.  The circuit court adjourned the date 
originally set for the final hearing so M.R.M. could retain 
counsel.  At least 48 hours before the August 12 rescheduled 
final hearing, M.R.M. filed a jury demand.  
¶5 
The circuit court concluded that M.R.M.'s jury demand 
was untimely based on Marathon County v. R.J.O., 2020 WI App 20, 
392 Wis. 2d 157, 943 N.W.2d 898, which held that Wis. Stat. § 
51.20(11)(a) "requires a subject individual to request a jury 
trial at least forty-eight hours before 'the time set for final 
hearing,' not at least forty-eight hours before the final 
hearing actually occurs."  R.J.O., 392 Wis. 2d 157, ¶41.  The 
circuit court then held a bench trial and extended his 
commitment for 12 months. 
¶6 
After the final hearing but before M.R.M. filed this 
appeal we decided E.J.W., which overruled R.J.O. in part and 
held that a jury demand is timely if it is filed at least 48 
No. 
2022AP140   
 
4 
 
hours before a rescheduled final hearing takes place.  See 
E.J.W., 399 Wis. 2d 471, ¶¶38-39, ¶38 n.9.  M.R.M.'s jury demand 
would have been timely if E.J.W. had been decided before his 
rescheduled final hearing. 
¶7 
M.R.M. filed an appeal which the court of appeals 
certified to this court.  He raised two issues:  (1) whether 
E.J.W. applies retroactively, and (2) if it does, whether the 
appropriate remedy for the denial of M.R.M.'s jury demand is 
reversal or reversal and remand.3 
II 
¶8 
The 
retroactivity 
of 
a 
prior 
decision 
and 
the 
appropriate remedy on appeal are both questions of law we review 
de novo.  See Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, ¶15, 402 
Wis. 2d 1, 974 N.W.2d 733; State ex rel. Krieger v. Borgen, 2004 
WI App 163, ¶7, 276 Wis. 2d 96, 687 N.W.2d 79. 
                                                 
3 In briefing before both the court of appeals and this 
court M.R.M. also asserted that the circuit court failed to 
comply with the requirement in D.J.W. that "circuit courts in 
[extension] proceedings . . . make specific factual findings 
with reference to the subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the [extension] is based."  391 Wis. 2d 
231, ¶3.  When we accept a certification, we "acquire[] 
jurisdiction over all issues, not merely the issues certified."  
See Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Thompson, 2018 WI 57, ¶9 n.4, 381 
Wis. 2d 609, 912 N.W.2d 364.  We need not address this issue, 
however, because we reverse the circuit court's extension order 
on the grounds that it erroneously denied M.R.M.'s jury demand. 
No. 
2022AP140   
 
5 
 
III 
A 
¶9 We first address whether our holding in E.J.W. applies 
retroactively to M.R.M.'s case.4  If it does, then the circuit 
court's denial of M.R.M.'s jury demand was erroneous.  
¶10 There is a general presumption that civil decisions 
apply retroactively.  See Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶69, 
274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405.  The County argues, however, 
that E.J.W. should not be applied retroactively.  We have 
previously recognized three factors that guide us in deciding 
whether a civil decision should apply only prospectively.  These 
factors are set forth in Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 
Wis. 2d 103, 109, 280 N.W.2d 757 (1979), and adopted from 
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).5  See Trinity 
Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88, ¶76, 302 Wis. 2d 
299, 735 N.W.2d 1.  They are:   
(1) Does the rule establish a new principle of law, 
either by overruling clear past precedent on which 
litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of 
first impression whose resolution was not clearly 
foreshadowed?  
                                                 
4 Neither party asked us to overrule E.J.W.   
5 The United States Supreme Court abandoned the Chevron 
factors in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 
86 (1993), which mandated retroactivity in all civil cases.  See 
id. at 90.  We have nevertheless continued to apply the 
Chevron/Kurtz factors.  See, e.g., State v. Schulpius, 2006 WI 
1, ¶27 n.6, 287 Wis. 2d 44, 707 N.W.2d 495 (declining to 
overrule Kurtz).  Neither party asks us to reconsider Kurtz. 
No. 
2022AP140   
 
6 
 
(2) Will retroactive operation further or retard the 
operation of the new rule?  
(3) Will retroactive application produce substantial 
inequitable results?   
Id., ¶77.6   
¶11 The 
first 
factor——whether 
the 
decision 
clearly 
overruled past precedent——weighs against retroactively applying 
E.J.W.  In R.J.O., the court of appeals held that a jury demand 
must be made 48 hours before the first time set for a final 
hearing.  See 392 Wis. 2d 157, ¶41.  This rule governed ch. 51 
cases for 18 months before this court concluded in E.J.W. that a 
jury demand is timely if it is made at least 48 hours before a 
rescheduled final hearing.  See 399 Wis. 2d 471, ¶3.  This 
represents a clear break with the past precedent governing jury 
demands.   
                                                 
6 We have not been entirely consistent in how we treat these 
factors.  Some decisions treat them as factors to "weigh" or 
"consider" while others treat them as a "test" or "threshold," 
each element of which the party seeking only prospective 
application of a decision must satisfy.  Compare Kurtz v. City of 
Waukesha, 
91 
Wis. 2d 103, 
109, 
280 
N.W.2d 
757 
(1979) 
("consideration of the factors"); State ex rel. Brown v. 
Bradley, 2003 WI 14, ¶15, 259 Wis. 2d 630, 658 N.W.2d 427 
(same); Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶70, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 
682 N.W.2d 405 (describing Chevron factors as "bear[ing] on the 
issue"); with Browne v. WERC, 169 Wis. 2d 79, 112, 485 N.W.2d 
376 (1992) ("[A]ll three Chevron factors must be satisfied in 
order 
for 
a 
decision 
to 
apply 
prospectively."); 
Trinity 
Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88, ¶77, 302 Wis. 2d 
299, 735 N.W.2d 1 ("If these factors are met, the judicial 
holding in question should not be applied retroactively.").   
We need not resolve these inconsistencies because either 
approach leads to the same conclusion in this case:  E.J.W. 
applies retroactively.  Accordingly, we assume for purposes of 
this discussion that Kurtz sets forth factors to weigh. 
No. 
2022AP140   
 
7 
 
¶12 Although the first factor weighs against retroactively 
applying E.J.W., the second and third factors weigh heavily in 
favor of retroactivity.  The second factor asks if retroactively 
applying the new rule would further or impede its operation.  
See Kurtz, 91 Wis. 2d at 109.  To answer this question, our 
cases 
have 
looked 
to, 
for 
example, 
whether 
retroactive 
application of the new rule would further "the specific 
objective embodied in" a statute, and whether meaningful relief 
could be granted through retroactively applying the new rule.  
Wenke, 274 Wis. 2d 220, ¶73; see also State ex rel. Buswell v. 
Tomah Area Sch. Dist., 2007 WI 71, ¶48, 301 Wis. 2d 178, 732 
N.W.2d 804.   
¶13 Here, there are two reasons why applying E.J.W. 
retroactively would further——not impede——its operation.  First, 
doing so would give effect to the legislature's policy choices, 
reflected in ch. 51, "to afford due process protections 
including jury trials" to all persons subject to commitment.  
E.J.W., 399 Wis. 2d 471, ¶32.  To that end, the legislature 
adopted Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a), which states that a jury 
demand is timely so long as it is filed at least 48 hours prior 
to the time set for the final hearing.  See E.J.W., 399 Wis. 2d 
471, 
¶28. 
 
This 
statute 
reflects 
the 
legislature's 
"determin[ation] 
that 
a 
minimum 
of 
48 
hours' 
notice 
is 
sufficient for the circuit court to secure the presence of 
jurors and the County to prepare for a jury trial in a mental 
health commitment case."  Id., ¶29.  Second, applying E.J.W. 
retroactively would provide meaningful relief to M.R.M.  The 
No. 
2022AP140   
 
8 
 
circuit court "cannot go back" in time and grant M.R.M. a jury 
trial after the extension order has expired.  See Buswell, 301 
Wis. 2d 178, 
¶48. 
 
Nevertheless, 
reversing 
that 
unlawful 
extension order will further E.J.W.'s operation by relieving 
M.R.M. from the order's collateral consequences, such as 
restrictions on his constitutional right to bear arms and 
liability for the cost of his care.  See Sauk County v. S.A.M., 
2022 WI 46, ¶¶19-27, 402 Wis. 2d 379, 975 N.W.2d 162. 
¶14 The 
third 
factor——whether 
retroactive 
application 
would produce substantial inequities——also weighs in favor of 
retroactivity.  "The equity factor requires us to take into 
account the desirability of treating similarly situated parties 
alike."  State v. Thiel, 2001 WI App 52, ¶16, 241 Wis. 2d 439, 
625 N.W.2d 321.  E.J.W. and M.R.M. are similarly situated.  Both 
were denied a jury trial even though their jury demands came at 
least 48 hours before their rescheduled final hearings.  The 
availability of a jury trial upon timely demand is one of ch. 
51's 
"many 
provisions 
designed 
to 
offer 
procedural 
and 
substantive protections to the person subject to commitment."  
E.J.W., 399 Wis. 2d 471, ¶31.  And for that reason, it would be 
inequitable to deprive M.R.M. of his right to a jury trial under 
the same circumstances that were present in E.J.W. by applying 
that holding only to future cases. 
¶15 In sum, the Chevron/Kurtz analysis does not provide a 
reason for departing from our presumption of retroactivity in 
civil cases.  Accordingly, we hold that the rule announced in 
No. 
2022AP140   
 
9 
 
E.J.W. applies retroactively and that M.R.M.'s jury demand was 
therefore timely.  
B 
¶16 Having concluded that E.J.W. applies retroactively, we 
next consider the proper remedy for the circuit court's denial 
of M.R.M.'s jury demand.  M.R.M. argues that reversal is the 
appropriate remedy because when the circuit court failed to 
enter a lawful extension order before the preceding commitment 
order expired, it lost competency to conduct further proceedings 
on remand.  Before addressing that argument, we begin with some 
background on competency.  
1 
¶17 Article VII, § 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides 
circuit courts with subject-matter jurisdiction in "all matters 
civil and criminal."  Subject-matter jurisdiction is distinct 
from a circuit court's competency, which "refers to the court's 
power 
to 
exercise 
its 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction 
in 
a 
particular case."  M.W., 402 Wis. 2d 1, ¶35.  Thus, although a 
circuit 
court 
is 
almost 
never 
without 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction,7 it may nonetheless lack competency to exercise 
                                                 
7 There are exceptions to Mikrut's broad statement that 
circuit courts always have subject-matter jurisdiction.  See, 
e.g., State ex rel. CityDeck Landing LLC v. Cir. Ct. for Brown 
Cnty., 2019 WI 15, ¶32, 385 Wis. 2d 516, 922 N.W.2d 832 (noting 
the Wisconsin Arbitration Act "comprises one constitutionally-
permissible 
exception 
to 
a 
circuit 
court's 
original 
jurisdiction"). 
No. 
2022AP140   
 
10 
 
that jurisdiction on account of "noncompliance with statutory 
requirements pertaining to the invocation of that jurisdiction."  
Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶2, 273 Wis. 2d 
76, 681 N.W.2d 190.   
¶18 Chapter 
51 
contains 
numerous 
such 
statutory 
requirements.  For example, a circuit court loses competency if 
it fails to comply with Wis. Stat. § 51.20(7)(a)'s requirement 
to hold a probable cause hearing "within 72 hours after the 
individual arrives at the facility."  Dodge County v. Ryan E.M., 
2002 WI App 71, ¶5, 252 Wis. 2d 490, 642 N.W.2d 592.  Similarly, 
failing to hold a final commitment hearing within 14 days of 
detention as required by § 51.20(7)(c) results in a loss of 
competency over an initial commitment proceeding.  See State ex 
rel. Lockman v. Gerhardstein, 107 Wis. 2d 325, 328-29, 320 
N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1982).   
¶19 The circuit court can also lose competency over 
extension proceedings.  In G.O.T. v. Rock County, 151 Wis. 2d 
629, 445 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1989), the circuit court twice 
extended an initial commitment order beyond the six-month limit 
imposed by § 51.20(13)(g).  Although G.O.T.'s jury demand 
"authorized the trial court to temporarily extend the commitment 
to accommodate that demand," the circuit court lost competency 
to extend the commitment a second time after the statutory 
deadline passed.  Id. at 633. 
¶20 The upshot of these cases is that some of the time 
limits imposed by ch. 51 are so "'central to the statutory 
scheme'" that if the circuit court fails to comply with them, it 
No. 
2022AP140   
 
11 
 
loses competency to proceed in a particular case.  Mikrut, 273 
Wis. 2d 76, ¶10 (citing State v. Bollig, 222 Wis. 2d 558, 567-
68, 587 N.W.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1998)).  
2 
¶21 To understand M.R.M.'s argument that because the 
circuit court lacks competency, reversal is the appropriate 
remedy, it is necessary to distinguish between two important 
dates.  The first important date, August 12, 2021, is the date 
on which M.R.M.'s initial six-month commitment order expired.8  
The circuit court had competency to extend M.R.M.'s initial 
commitment only before that date.  See G.O.T., 151 Wis. 2d at 
633 (explaining that "the trial court must hold the extension 
hearing before the [prior] commitment expires" because Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)1. limits initial commitment order to a 
period "not to exceed 6 months" and extension orders to "a 
period not to exceed one year.").  And the circuit court 
attempted to do just that.  Before M.R.M.'s initial commitment 
order expired, the circuit court held a final hearing in which 
it granted a 12-month extension order.  The second important 
date, August 12, 2022, is when that extension order expired. 
                                                 
8 The initial six-month commitment order was set to expire 
on July 29, 2021.  However, the circuit court briefly extended 
that commitment due to M.R.M.'s request to postpone so he could 
secure counsel.  Accordingly, the circuit court retained 
competency over the proceedings until August 12, 2021.  See 
G.O.T. v. Rock County, 151 Wis. 2d 629, 633, 445 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. 
App. 1989). 
No. 
2022AP140   
 
12 
 
¶22 In appeals challenging an extension order, it is all 
but certain that the first date——the expiration of the initial 
six-month commitment order——will have passed by the time the 
appeal is resolved.  And it is also likely, though less certain, 
that the second date——the expiration of the challenged extension 
order——will also have passed.  Here, both dates are behind us.  
For that reason, reversal is the appropriate remedy in this case 
based on a straightforward application of M.W.  That case held 
that when "the specific [order] at issue"——here, the challenged 
12-month extension order——expires while on appeal, reversal is 
the 
appropriate 
remedy 
because 
the 
circuit 
court 
lacks 
competency to conduct further proceedings on remand.  M.W., 402 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶37.   
¶23 M.R.M., however, makes a different argument.  Rather 
than focus on the expiration of the unlawful extension order, he 
contends that a circuit court loses competency to conduct 
proceedings on remand when the preceding commitment order 
expires.  In other words, he asks us to conclude that competency 
on remand is determined from the expiration of the preceding 
commitment order (the first date in 2021), not the expiration of 
the unlawful extension order (the second date in 2022).  We 
agree and hold that it is the expiration of the preceding 
commitment order that determines whether the circuit court has 
competency on remand.  
¶24 As we have explained previously, "[t]he circuit court 
must hold a hearing on the petition for extension before the 
previous order expires or it loses competency to extend the 
No. 
2022AP140   
 
13 
 
commitment."  M.W., 402 Wis. 2d 1, ¶36; see also G.O.T., 151 
Wis. 2d at 635.  And in order to extend someone's commitment at 
that hearing, the circuit court must "determine[] that the 
individual is a proper subject for commitment . . . [and] order 
judgment to that effect."  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)3.  A 
circuit court that enters an unlawful extension order——by 
wrongfully denying a timely jury demand, for example——has not 
complied with these statutory obligations.  See G.O.T., 151 Wis. 
2d at 632-33.  And importantly for competency purposes, once the 
preceding order expires, it has not complied with these 
requirements within the statutory time limits for holding a 
final hearing.  See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)1. (setting forth 
the maximum time periods for initial commitments and extension 
orders).  Because those time limits are mandatory and ensure 
that individuals are in fact "a proper subject for commitment" 
at the time a commitment or extension order is imposed, they are 
central 
to 
the 
statutory 
scheme 
of 
ch. 
51. 
 
See 
§ 51.20(13)(g)3.; see also G.O.T., 151 Wis. 2d at 633; Lockman, 
107 Wis. 2d at 330 (explaining that the 14-day deadline for 
holding a final hearing after an individual is detained is 
"mandatory and cannot be varied at the discretion of the trial 
court.").  Accordingly, the failure to enter a lawful extension 
order before the preceding order expires results in a loss of 
competency.  See Shawano County v. S.L.V., No. 2021AP223, 
unpublished slip op., ¶20 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2021) 
(reaching the same conclusion).  As argued by M.R.M., the 
expiration of the unlawful extension order——the second date——is 
No. 
2022AP140   
 
14 
 
therefore irrelevant because the circuit court lost competency 
to hold an extension hearing when the preceding commitment order 
expired.  See Eau Claire County v. J.M.P., 2020AP2014-FT, 
unpublished slip op., ¶21 (Wis. Ct. App. June 22, 2021) (holding 
that 
a 
circuit 
court's 
competency 
is 
determined 
by 
the 
commitment order preceding the unlawful extension order, not the 
unlawful extension order itself).  
3 
¶25 Before 
closing, 
we 
briefly 
explain 
why 
these 
conclusions are consistent with our decision in Portage County 
v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509.  In that 
case, we rejected the defendant's "domino theory" that reversing 
an extension order would "necessarily invalidate all later 
extension[ orders]."  J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶¶15, 21.  In 
doing so, we held that the validity of a previous commitment 
order has no bearing on the validity of an extension order.  See 
id., ¶21.   
¶26 There is an important difference, however, between how 
we evaluate the validity of a commitment order, as in J.W.K., 
and how we determine whether a circuit court has competency, as 
in this case.  To assess a commitment order's validity, a 
reviewing court looks to the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting that order.  See id. ("[T]he circuit court may order 
the extension if the County proves its case under the statutory 
criteria."); see also Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(e) ("The petitioner 
has the burden of proving all required facts by clear and 
No. 
2022AP140   
 
15 
 
convincing evidence.").  The validity of a prior commitment 
order 
could 
never 
be 
relevant 
when 
determining 
whether 
sufficient evidence supports an extension order.  See J.W.K., 
386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶21.  By contrast, the expiration of the 
immediately preceding commitment order is always relevant when 
we determine whether a circuit court had competency to grant an 
extension order.  See M.W., 402 Wis. 2d 1, ¶36.  As we have 
explained previously, because the time limit for entering an 
extension order is central to ch. 51's statutory scheme, the 
circuit court's competency to enter such an order is contingent 
on the immediately preceding order not having expired.  See id.  
And when an extension order is reversed on appeal, as is the 
case here, the circuit court's competency on remand is still 
tied to the expiration of that immediately preceding commitment 
order.  Because this case and J.W.K. analyze different issues, 
our holdings are not in tension.9 
¶27 In sum, the circuit court may issue an extension order 
only before the preceding commitment order expires.  See M.W., 
                                                 
9 Justice 
Roggensack's 
dissent 
misunderstands 
the 
distinction between the validity of an extension order and the 
circuit court's competency to conduct proceedings on remand.  
Despite the dissent's claims to the contrary, nothing in this 
decision affects the validity of any commitment order M.R.M. may 
be subject to currently.   
Moreover, our conclusion that the circuit court lost 
competency to conduct further proceedings on remand when it 
failed to enter a lawful extension order before the preceding 
commitment order expired does not mean that the circuit court 
would necessarily lack competency to extend any commitment order 
that M.R.M. may be subject to currently or to consider a new 
petition for commitment. 
No. 
2022AP140   
 
16 
 
402 Wis. 2d 1, ¶36.  If that extension order is reversed on 
appeal, the circuit court's competency to conduct proceedings on 
remand depends on whether the preceding commitment order has 
expired.10  See G.O.T., 151 Wis. 2d at 632-33.  In this case, 
because the circuit court denied M.R.M.'s timely jury demand, 
its extension order is unlawful.  And because the preceding 
commitment order has expired, the circuit court lacks competency 
to conduct proceedings on remand.  Therefore, reversal is the 
appropriate remedy. 
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is 
reversed. 
                                                 
10 While this case involves an initial six-month commitment 
order and a 12-month extension order, the same logic applies to 
cases involving consecutive 12-month extension orders.  When an 
extension order is reversed on appeal, a circuit court's 
competency on remand depends on whether the preceding commitment 
order has expired. 
No.  2020AP140-FT.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶28 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).   
[T]he common law . . . stands or falls with the 
admission of legal principles obtained not by command, 
but by retrospective estimates of right and justice. 
Paul Vinogradoff, Common-Sense in Law 207 (1913). 
¶29 The majority reaches the correct outcome; however, its 
analysis is incompatible with "[t]he true traditional view" that 
"courts 
have 
no 
authority 
to 
engage" 
in 
"prospective 
decisionmaking[.]"  Harper v. Va. Dep't of Tax'n, 509 U.S. 86, 
106 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).  Among other errors, the 
majority conflates this court's judicial power with legislative 
power.  Unlike the legislature, the judiciary generally has only 
the power to "expound" on existing law——not the authority to 
"pronounce . . . new 
law[.]" 
 
Intro., 
William 
Blackstone, 
Commentaries *69.  "[A] judicial . . . act" is "a determination 
of what the existing law is in relation to some existing thing 
already done," while "a legislative act" is "a predetermination 
of what the law shall be for the regulation of all future 
cases."  Harper, 509 U.S. at 107 (quoting Thomas Cooley, 
Constitutional Limitations *91).  An overruled decision loses 
not only its future application but any retroactive effect as 
well; once the court corrects its error of interpretation, the 
decision is for all purposes erased: 
The theory is, not that . . . [an] overruled decision 
made 
law, 
which 
is 
changed 
by . . . [a] 
later 
decision, but that the earlier decision, being a 
mistake, never was the law, but that the law is and 
always has been as expounded in the later decision.  
This . . . is not at all like changing the existing 
body of law by the repeal of a statute; it is more 
like "removing a cloud" from the law.  It does not 
regard the prior decision as law, though bad law, 
No.  2020AP140-FT.rgb 
 
2 
 
which must be altered, but as mere color of law 
without any substance.  Hence the overruling of a 
decision relates back to the date of the overruled 
decision, 
operating 
retrospectively, 
upon 
all 
transactions which can be reached by it, and the prior 
decision stands as though it had never been made. 
Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Law of Judicial Precedents 
or the Science of    
¶30 In derogation of this longstanding principle, the 
freewheeling test adopted in Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, which 
the majority employs in this case, offends the separation of 
powers by dislodging the legislature from its lawmaking function 
whenever the court decides to craft a more "just" result than 
the law would otherwise produce.  91 Wis. 2d 103, 280 N.W.2d 757 
(1979).  This court has a duty to overrule Kurtz, which was 
premised on a United States Supreme Court decision from which 
the Court retreated 30 years ago.  Id. at 109 (quoting Chevron 
Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), limited by Harper, 509 U.S. at 
89 (majority op.)).  For decades, this court has employed 
decision-avoidance mechanisms to preserve Kurtz, contravening 
its duty to act within the limited scope of power the people 
vested in the judiciary.  Because the court continues to cling 
to lawmaking power the people never gave it, I do not join the 
majority opinion but respectfully concur. 
¶31 Retroactive application of precedent is a deeply-
rooted traditional rule in common law jurisprudence.1  One United 
States Supreme Court justice "was prepared to hazard the guess 
                                                 
1 The traditional rule has "a few exceptions," "collateral 
review and vested rights," which are not at issue in this case.  
Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 308 
(2016). 
No.  2020AP140-FT.rgb 
 
3 
 
that '[j]udicial decisions have had retrospective operation for 
near a thousand years.'"  Harper, 509 U.S. at 106 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (quoting Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 
372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).  "For most of our history, 
the [United States] Supreme Court followed the common-law 
tradition and the Founders' guidance, largely keeping to 'a 
general rule of retrospective effect[.]'"  Bryan A. Garner et 
al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 310 (2016) (quoting Robinson 
v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507 (1973)).  Currently, the Court 
follows the traditional rule, as do "[m]ost states[.]"  Id. at 
313.  Wisconsin is an exception.   
¶32 In the twentieth century, the United States Supreme 
Court briefly abandoned the traditional rule, only to return to 
it near the end of that century.  As relevant to this case, the 
United States Supreme Court wrote the following in Chevron Oil 
v. Huson, a 1971 decision: 
In 
our 
cases 
dealing 
with 
the 
nonretroactivity 
question, we have generally considered three separate 
factors. 
 
First, 
the 
decision 
to 
be 
applied 
nonretroactively must establish a new principle of 
law, either by overruling clear past precedent on 
which litigants may have relied or by deciding an 
issue of first impression whose resolution was not 
clearly foreshadowed.  Second, it has been stressed 
that 'we must * * * weigh the merits and demerits in 
each case by looking to the prior history of the rule 
in question, its purpose and effect, and whether 
retrospective operation will further or retard its 
operation.'  Finally, we have weighed the inequity 
imposed by retroactive application, for '(w)here a 
decision of this Court could produce substantial 
inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is 
ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice 
or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity.' 
No.  2020AP140-FT.rgb 
 
4 
 
404 U.S. at 106–07 (citations omitted) (modifications in the 
original).   
¶33 Two serious deficiencies plague this "new approach."  
Garner et al., 
The Law of Judicial Precedent, at 311.  
Fundamentally, it created "serious constitutional problems[.]"  
Id.  In the words of Justice Antonin Scalia, "'the province and 
duty of the judicial department [is] to say what the law is,' 
not what the law shall be."  Harper, 509 U.S. at 107 (quoting 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).  Judges 
interpret law; they do not make it.  To apply precedent only 
prospectively suggests the court's decision changed the law, 
which cannot be.  See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 
(1987) ("In truth, the Court's assertion of power to disregard 
current law in adjudicating cases before us that have not 
already run the full course of appellate review, is quite simply 
an assertion that our constitutional function is not one of 
adjudication but in effect of legislation.")  (quoting Mackey v. 
United States, 410 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring 
in the judgment))).  "Even when a 'former determination is most 
evidently contrary to reason . . . [or] contrary to the divine 
law,' a judge overruling that decision would 'not pretend to 
make 
a 
new 
law, 
but 
to 
vindicate 
the 
old 
one 
from 
misrepresentation.'"  Harper, 404 U.S. at 107 (quoting Intro., 
Blackstone, Commentaries *70). 
 
¶34 "Nonretroactivity also raised obvious equal-protection 
concerns 
by 
treating 
similarly 
situated . . . [parties] 
differently:  often the Court would apply a new rule only to 
No.  2020AP140-FT.rgb 
 
5 
 
the . . . [party] lucky enough to have appealed his case to the 
Court at just the right moment."  Garner et al., The Law of 
Judicial Precedent, at 311.  As the United States Supreme Court 
later explained, "it is the nature of judicial review that 
precludes us from '[s]imply fishing one case from the stream of 
appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing 
new . . . standards, and then permitting a stream of similar 
cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule.'"  
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679). 
¶35 Relatedly, 
"Chevron 
Oil 
created 
confusion 
and 
inconsistent results[.]"  Garner et al., The Law of Judicial 
Precedent, at 312.  As an amorphous judicial invention, the 
Chevron Oil test, unsurprisingly, can be applied to reach 
whatever result the judge favors.  Such inconsistent application 
also amplifies equal-protection concerns. 
¶36 In 1993, the United States Supreme Court all but 
abandoned Chevron Oil.  In Harper v. Virginia Department of 
Taxation, the Court explained: 
When this Court does not "reserve the question whether 
its holding should be applied to the parties before 
it," . . . an opinion announcing a rule of federal law 
"is properly understood to have followed the normal 
rule of retroactive application" and must be "read to 
hold . . . that its rule should apply retroactively to 
the litigants then before the Court." 
509 U.S. at 97–98 (majority op.) (quoting James B. Beam Co. v. 
Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 539 (1991) (lead op.)) (second ellipsis 
in the original).  As interpreted and applied federally, "Harper 
means that new rules of civil cases are now almost always 
applied retroactively" absent an express reservation in the case 
No.  2020AP140-FT.rgb 
 
6 
 
announcing the rule.  Garner et al., The Law of Judicial 
Precedent, at 312; see also Green v. Humama at Home, Inc., 
unpublished slip. op, No. 16-cv-7586 (AJN), 2017 WL 9916832 *8–9 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017) ("[U]nless a court explicitly reserves 
the question of retroactivity, its decision 'is properly 
understood to have followed the normal rule of retroactive 
application.'  Humana has not presented a compelling reason why 
this [c]ourt should consider the Chevron Oil factors.  As 
explained above, there is nothing in Weil II to suggest that the 
D.C. 
Circuit 
expressly 
reserved 
on 
the 
question 
of 
retroactivity.  As a result, under Harper, the Chevron Oil 
factors are inapplicable."  (quoting Harper, 509 U.S. at 97–
98)). 
 
¶37 Fourteen years before Harper, this court applied 
Chevron Oil in Kurtz.  Kurtz, 91 Wis. 2d at 108–09.  In that 
case, however, this court applied Chevron Oil to determine 
whether a recent United States Supreme Court decision had 
retroactive effect.  Id.  On questions of federal law, this 
court follows federal precedent.  Johnson v. Wis. Elections 
Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, ¶21, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469.  As 
evidenced by the majority opinion in this case, Kurtz has been 
carelessly extended to govern the retroactivity of Wisconsin 
precedent as well.  Despite Harper's course correction 30 years 
ago, this court continues to apply Kurtz.  
¶38 This court has avoided addressing the soundness of 
Kurtz for decades, typically invoking the party presentation 
principle.  See State ex rel. Brown v. Bradley, 2003 WI 14, ¶41, 
No.  2020AP140-FT.rgb 
 
7 
 
259 Wis. 2d 630, 658 N.W.2d 427 (Sykes, J., dissenting) ("As the 
majority notes, although the State mentioned Harper in its 
brief, it declined to take a position on whether we ought to 
enunciate a uniform standard of retroactivity . . . ; Brown did 
not even cite Harper.  While it is clear that Chevron Oil is no 
longer good law and Kurtz should therefore be revisited, I agree 
that the question is better left for another case[.]"  (Citation 
omitted)); State ex rel. Giffin v. Smith, 2004 WI 36, ¶65, 270 
Wis. 2d 235, 677 N.W.2d 259 (Sykes, J., concurring) ("Here, as 
in Brown, the parties did not brief the issue of Wisconsin's 
continued reliance on Chevron Oil in light of Harper.  For that 
reason, . . . we need not address here whether to conform our 
law to Harper."). 
 
¶39 Even when the issue has been raised, however, this 
court has avoided it.  The majority in this case attempts to 
justify applying the Kurtz test by relying on State v. 
Schulpius, 2006 WI 1, ¶27 n.6, 287 Wis. 2d 44, 707 N.W.2d 495.  
In that case, this court determined the retroactivity question 
was irrelevant because the respondent had forfeited a key 
objection.  Id., ¶27.  Nevertheless, this court commented on the 
retroactivity issue in a footnote.  In full, the footnote 
states:  
Schulpius urges this court to overrule its decision in 
Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 280 
N.W.2d 757 (1979), and adopt the rule of Harper v. 
Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 113 
S. Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) on the retroactive 
application of a new rule of law.  We decline to do so 
here.  However, even if this court were to adopt the 
rule of Harper on retroactivity, we do not believe it 
No.  2020AP140-FT.rgb 
 
8 
 
would impact on this case.  Harper held that when the 
United States Supreme Court: 
applies a rule of federal law to the parties 
before it, that rule is the controlling 
interpretation of federal law and must be 
given full retroactive effect in all cases 
still open on direct review and as to all 
events, regardless of whether such events 
predate or postdate our announcement of the 
rule. 
Id. at 97, 113 S. Ct. 2510.  Because Schulpius failed 
to appeal the November, 2000 order within 90 days of 
entry of the order, as per Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1), 
Schulpius's case was not open on direct review at the 
time of this court's decision in Morford. 
Id., ¶27 n.6.  This conclusory footnote, which offers no 
reasoning and largely reads like dicta ("even if this court were 
to adopt the rule of Harper on retroactivity, we do not believe 
it would impact on this case") is inconsistent with this court's 
law-declaring function.  See State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. 
Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 436, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988) ("[I]t is 
this court's function to develop and clarify the law.").  This 
court is not supposed to ignore "major questions of substantive 
law" by employing "superficial" reasoning.  Citizens Study Comm. 
on Jud. Org., Report to Governor Patrick J. Lucey 78 (1973) (on 
file at the David T. Prosser Jr. State Law Library).  Had this 
court in Schulpius analyzed whether Kurtz should be overruled, 
perhaps Schulpius would have present utility, but in the absence 
of such an analysis, Schulpius has none.  See also Wenke v. Gehl 
Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶75 n.43, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405 
("Even if we followed the Harper approach, we would nonetheless 
apply 
this 
ruling 
retroactively, 
as 
Harper 
disavows 
any 
No.  2020AP140-FT.rgb 
 
9 
 
exceptions to the rule of retroactive application in the civil 
context."). 
 
¶40  Sometimes decision avoidance is appropriate; however, 
when an issue concerns the parameters of judicial power, the 
court should decide it.  Because Kurtz is objectively wrong, 
this court has a duty to overrule it.  State v. Johnson, 2023 WI 
39, ¶49, 407 Wis. 2d 195, 990 N.W.2d 174 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., concurring) (citing Friends of Frame Park, U.A. v. 
City of Waukesha, 2022 WI 57, ¶42, 403 Wis. 2d 1, 976 N.W.2d 405 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring)).  Kurtz poses an 
especially grave threat to the rule of law because this court 
appropriated power in the absence of authority.  Specifically, 
it equated law with precedent interpreting law, blurring the 
fundamental distinction between the legislative and judicial 
domains.  Cf. id., ¶76 ("The judiciary takes an oath to uphold 
the United States Constitution, not precedent. . . .  Our oath 
obligates us to overturn 'judge-made constitutional law,' when 
'divorced' from the United States Constitution."  (Quoting Lino 
A. Graglia, Constitutional Law Without the Constitution:  The 
Supreme Court's Remaking of America, in "A Country I Do Not 
Recognize":  The Legal Assault on American Values 1–2 (Robert H. 
Bork ed., 2005))).  It would be "crazy not to worry that if 
judges consider themselves free to disregard the Constitution's 
separation of powers they might soon find other bothersome parts 
of the Constitution equally unworthy of their fidelity."  Neil 
M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the 
No.  2020AP140-FT.rgb 
 
10 
 
Legacy of Justice Scalia, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905, 911 
(2016). 
 
¶41 The United States Supreme Court's decision in Harper 
illuminates another aspect of this court's error in Kurtz.  
Precedent may be overturned when "[c]hanges or developments in 
the law have undermined the rationale behind a decision."  State 
v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶50, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813 
(quoting Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund & Compcare 
Health Servs. Ins., 2006 WI 91, ¶33, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 
N.W.2d 216).  Chevron Oil spawned Kurtz, but Harper deflated 
Chevron Oil, thereby undermining the foundation of this court's 
reasoning in Kurtz.  See Friends of Frame Park, 403 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶89 (explaining a similar series of events undermined the 
rationale behind several court of appeals decisions). 
 
¶42 Kurtz also borders on "unworkable," providing yet 
another reason to overrule it.  See Roberson, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 
¶50 (quoting Bartholomew, 293 Wis. 2d 38, ¶33).  The erosion of 
the traditional rule of retroactivity "generated . . . many 
incompatible rules and inconsistent principles."  Desist v. 
United 
States, 
394 
U.S. 244, 
258 
(1969) 
(Harlan, 
J., 
dissenting).  The majority cannot even explain what the actual 
Kurtz test is——despite Kurtz being 44 years old.  The majority 
admits: 
We have not been entirely consistent in how we treat 
these factors.  Some decisions treat them as factors 
to "weigh" or "consider" while others treat them as a 
"test" or "threshold," each element of which the party 
seeking only prospective application of a decision 
must satisfy.  Compare Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 
Wis. 2d 103, 
109, 
280 
N.W.2d 757 
(1979) 
No.  2020AP140-FT.rgb 
 
11 
 
("consideration of the factors"); State ex rel. Brown 
v. Bradley, 2003 WI 14, ¶15, 259 Wis. 2d 630, 658 
N.W.2d 427 (same); Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, 
¶70, 
274 
Wis. 2d 220, 
682 
N.W.2d 405 
(describing 
Chevron factors as "bear[ing] on the issue"); with 
Browne v. WERC, 169 Wis. 2d 79, 112, 485 N.W.2d 376 
(1992) ("[A]ll three Chevron factors must be satisfied 
in order for a decision to apply prospectively."); 
Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88, 
¶77, 302 Wis. 2d 299, 735 N.W.2d 1 ("If these factors 
are met, the judicial holding in question should not 
be applied retroactively."). 
We need not resolve these inconsistencies because 
either approach leads to the same conclusion in this 
case:  E.J.W. applies retroactively.  Accordingly, we 
assume for purposes of this discussion that Kurtz sets 
forth factors to weigh. 
Majority op., ¶10 n.6.  If the rule of law is to be more than 
the rule of judges, the vagueness and subjectivity inherent in 
Kurtz cannot stand. 
¶43 For all of these reasons, this court should overrule 
Kurtz and restore the traditional rule of retroactivity that 
previously prevailed for a millennium.  Its application in this 
case is straightforward.  In Waukesha County v. E.J.W., this 
court interpreted Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) (2019–20).  2021 
WI 85, 399 Wis. 2d 471, 966 N.W.2d 590.  In doing so, it 
partially overruled a court of appeals decision, Marathon County 
v. R.J.O., 2020 WI App 20, 392 Wis. 2d 157, 943 N.W.2d 898.  
This court in E.J.W. did not——indeed, could not——alter the fixed 
meaning of § 51.20(11)(a).  R.J.O. was not "the law" but "the 
opinion" of judges who (as the majority saw it) "mist[ook] the 
law."  Blackstone, Commentaries, *71.  Because this court in 
E.J.W. did not reserve the retroactivity issue, E.J.W. applies 
retroactively——even though lower courts in this state were 
No.  2020AP140-FT.rgb 
 
12 
 
required to follow the incorrect interpretation in R.J.O. until 
this court overturned it. 
¶44 The majority could have simply applied the traditional 
rule of retroactivity in a few short paragraphs, but instead 
preserves a faulty test the United States Supreme Court deserted 
three decades ago.  Although "liberty can have nothing to fear 
from the judiciary alone" it has "every thing to fear from its 
union with either of the other departments[.]"  The Federalist 
No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).  "The accumulation of all powers, 
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, 
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, 
selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very 
definition of tyranny."  The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison).  
The majority perpetuates the augmentation of judicial power with 
the legislative power through unquestioned, dogmatic adherence 
to now-defunct precedent.  In doing so, the majority disfigures 
the structural separation of powers and treads a path to tyranny 
the constitution does not abide.  I do not join it.     
No.  2022AP140-FT.akz 
 
1 
 
¶45 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (dissenting).  I 
dissent because M.R.M.'s recommitment contains no legal error.  
Almost two years ago in Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2021 WI 85, 
399 Wis. 2d 471, 966 N.W.2d 590, a majority of this court 
erroneously interpreted the unambiguous command under Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(11)(a) that "[a] jury trial is deemed waived unless 
demanded at least 48 hours in advance of the time set for final 
hearing."  The E.J.W. majority held "that when a final hearing 
is rescheduled, § 51.20(11)(a) allows a jury demand to be filed 
up until 48 hours prior to a rescheduled final hearing."  Id., 
¶3.  The majority's conclusions today only serve to highlight 
E.J.W.'s error.  E.J.W. was wrong when it was decided, it 
remains wrong today, and the majority's failure to overrule 
E.J.W. sends our interpretation of § 51.20(11)(a) further out to 
sea.  Instead of ruling E.J.W. applies retroactively, I would 
overrule E.J.W. and conclude M.R.M. waived his right to a jury 
trial at his recommitment hearing. 
¶46 I also conclude that the circuit court did not run 
afoul of our decision in Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 
391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277, where we instructed circuit 
courts in ch. 51 recommitment proceedings "to make specific 
factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of 
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based."  
Id., ¶3.  The circuit court thoroughly explained its factual 
findings.  It is clear the court concluded there was a 
substantial likelihood that, if M.R.M. was not recommitted, 
M.R.M.'s impaired judgment would again make him a danger to 
No.  2022AP140-FT.akz 
 
2 
 
himself or others and a proper subject for commitment under Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.  The circuit court therefore complied 
with our instruction in D.J.W.  M.R.M.'s argument to the 
contrary amounts to a complaint that the circuit court did not 
use 
"magic 
words" 
by 
specifically 
citing 
or 
quoting 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c.  Even if the circuit court's explanation did 
not comport with D.J.W., that error would be harmless because we 
have no trouble discerning the basis for M.R.M.'s recommitment.  
Accordingly, M.R.M.'s recommitment contained no error, and that 
recommitment should be affirmed.    
I 
¶47 Our state constitution provides, "The right of trial 
by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at 
law without regard to the amount in controversy; but a jury 
trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner 
prescribed by law."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 5 (emphasis added).  
As is true in other civil cases, juries in ch. 51 commitment 
proceedings are waived absent a jury demand.  Sheboygan County 
v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, ¶52, 402 Wis. 2d 1, 974 N.W.2d 733 
(Ziegler, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that ch. 51 proceedings 
are civil cases and, "absent a jury demand," factual findings 
are 
left 
to 
the 
circuit 
court). 
 
In 
accord 
with 
our 
constitution, Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) prescribes the manner in 
which a jury is waived in ch. 51 proceedings:  "A jury trial is 
deemed waived unless demanded at least 48 hours in advance of 
the time set for final hearing, if notice of that time has been 
No.  2022AP140-FT.akz 
 
3 
 
previously provided to the subject individual or his or her 
counsel."     
¶48 The statutory text is plain.  Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(11)(a), the circuit court sets the time for the final 
hearing.  The commitment subject must submit a jury demand "at 
least 48 hours in advance" of that time.  Id.  If the subject 
does not do so, then "[a] jury trial is deemed waived."  Id.  
Here, the circuit court set the time of M.R.M.'s final hearing 
for July 28, 2021.  He was informed:  
If you want a jury trial, it must be demanded or 
requested at least 48 hours in advance of the trial 
date.  In the event the request is not made within 48 
hours in advance of the trial date, you automatically, 
under the statutes, waive your right to a jury trial. 
M.R.M. failed to demand a jury trial at least 48 hours in 
advance of his trial date.  Therefore, at that time, M.R.M. was 
deemed to have waived his right to a jury trial.  Even though 
the court rescheduled his final hearing, M.R.M. could not later 
demand a jury trial because he already waived that right.  The 
waiver occurred 48 hours before the time set for final hearing, 
"not . . . forty-eight hours before the final hearing actually 
occurs."   Marathon County v. R.J.O., 2020 WI App 20, ¶41, 392 
Wis. 2d 157, 
943 
N.W.2d 898, 
overruled 
by 
E.J.W., 
399 
Wis. 2d 471.  M.R.M. waived a jury trial in the manner 
prescribed by law, and the law provides no mechanism for him to 
claw back that waiver.  
¶49 However, "[t]he majority in [E.J.W.] replaced [this] 
clear jury waiver standard in chapter 51 commitment proceedings 
with a shifting and unpredictable rule" which "depart[ed] from 
No.  2022AP140-FT.akz 
 
4 
 
sound judicial administration [and] is not supported by the 
plain text."  E.J.W., 399 Wis. 2d 471, ¶41 (Ziegler, C.J., 
dissenting).  Since the day E.J.W. was decided, it has been 
"detrimental to coherence and consistency in the law" and 
"unsound in principle."  Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emps. Ins. of 
Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶¶98-99, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257.   
¶50 The majority in E.J.W. fundamentally misunderstood the 
concept of waiver.  Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) defines the 
point in time at which waiver occurs.   
Thus, 
the 
only 
question 
under 
[]§ 51.20(11)(a) 
. . . is procedural:  at what time and date was [the] 
deadline to submit a jury demand or have it deemed 
waived? 
 
Section 
51.20(11)(a) 
provides 
a 
straightforward and rational answer:  "[A]t least 48 
hours in advance of the time set for final hearing."   
E.J.W., 399 Wis. 2d 471, ¶47 (Ziegler, C.J., dissenting).  Once 
that waiver occurs, the "jury right [is] permanently waived."  
Id., ¶54 (Ziegler, C.J., dissenting).  "'[W]aiver,' under the 
plain language of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a), is not conditional 
or subject to revocation.  It is a final extinguishment of a 
right."  Id., ¶59 (Ziegler, C.J., dissenting).  "A waiver when 
once made cannot be recalled, revived, expunged, or revoked, nor 
can the right waived be reclaimed . . . ."  31 C.J.S. Estoppel 
and Waiver § 93 (2023).  Once a jury trial is deemed waived 
under § 51.20(11)(a), that waiver is effective going forward.  
This is true regardless of whether the circuit court reschedules 
the final hearing.  The right to a jury trial has been waived, 
and nothing has restored it.  
No.  2022AP140-FT.akz 
 
5 
 
¶51 By 
concluding 
"that 
when 
a 
final 
hearing 
is 
rescheduled, [Wis. Stat.] § 51.20(11)(a) allows a jury demand to 
be filed up until 48 hours prior to a rescheduled final 
hearing," the majority in E.J.W. altered the statutory text.  
399 Wis. 2d 471, ¶3.  It effectively inserted a provision 
permitting a right once waived to be restored.  E.J.W. thus 
amended the "the manner prescribed by law" for waiving a jury 
trial in ch. 51 proceedings.  Wis. Const. art. I, § 5.  E.J.W. 
also undermined consistency in the law, creating a special rule 
for jury trial waivers in ch. 51 proceedings as opposed to 
waivers that take place in any other context.  The majority's 
interpretation in E.J.W. contravened both the statutory text and 
the law generally.  
¶52 The majority's opinion in this case only serves to 
highlight E.J.W.'s errors and the consequences of those errors.  
In concluding E.J.W. should be afforded retroactive application, 
the majority in part relies on "the legislature's policy 
choices," among those the apparent choice "to afford due process 
protections" in ch. 51 civil commitment proceedings.  Majority 
op., ¶13 (quoting E.J.W., 399 Wis. 2d 471, ¶28).  The majority's 
invocation of due process principles, both here and in E.J.W., 
further 
inches 
judicial 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(11)(a) away from the statutory text.  It puts a due 
process gloss on a statutory provision, which "ha[s] no 
relevance to the issues in this case."  E.J.W., 399 Wis. 2d 471, 
¶45 (Ziegler, C.J., dissenting).  Section 51.20(11)(a) is not a 
bulwark protecting the right to a jury trial in ch. 51 civil 
No.  2022AP140-FT.akz 
 
6 
 
commitment proceedings.  It is simply "the manner prescribed by 
law" by which "a jury trial may be waived."  Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 5.  The majority's analysis infers a far greater purpose than 
the text fairly implies, building upon the errors that began 
with E.J.W.   
¶53 Giving 
E.J.W. 
retroactive 
effect 
rather 
than 
overruling it will also throw circuit court dockets into chaos.  
In an equally flawed decision, a majority of this court created 
a bright-line rule that recommitment orders are never moot.  
Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2022 WI 46, ¶3, 402 Wis. 2d 379, 975 
N.W.2d 162.  It did so based on "[a] theoretical and unproven 
collateral consequence" of recommitment, which "has never been a 
standalone reason to conclude that a case is not moot."  Id., 
¶40 (Ziegler, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  By 
giving E.J.W. retroactive effect, the majority opens the 
floodgates, inviting innumerable challenges to recommitment 
orders that have long since expired.   
¶54 "Precedents should be respected, but sometimes the 
[c]ourt errs, and occasionally the [c]ourt issues an important 
decision that is egregiously wrong.  When that happens, stare 
decisis is not a straitjacket."  Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health 
Org., 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2280 (2022).  Here, the 
majority "do[es] more damage to the rule of law by obstinately 
refusing to admit [its] errors, thereby perpetuating injustice, 
than by overturning [this] erroneous decision."  Johnson 
Controls, Inc., 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶100.  I would correct this 
No.  2022AP140-FT.akz 
 
7 
 
mistake by overruling E.J.W., and therefore conclude that 
M.R.M.'s recommitment did not violate Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a). 
II 
¶55 M.R.M. also argues his recommitment was unlawful 
because the circuit court's explanation of its decision did not 
follow D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231.   In D.J.W., we instructed "that 
going forward circuit courts in recommitment proceedings are to 
make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision 
paragraph 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. 
on 
which 
the 
recommitment is based."  Id., ¶3.  M.R.M. argues "the circuit 
court ran afoul of D.J.W. by failing to set forth either the 
requisite findings of fact or the dangerousness standard it 
deemed proven."  
¶56 "For a person to be subject to a chapter 51 
involuntary commitment, three elements must be fulfilled:  the 
subject individual must be (1) mentally ill; (2) a proper 
subject for treatment; and (3) dangerous to themselves or 
others."  Id., ¶29 (citing Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)1.-2.).  In 
an initial commitment, the county must provide evidence of the 
potential commitment subject's current dangerousness under one 
of five subdivision paragraphs in ch. 51:  
a.  Evidences 
a 
substantial 
probability 
of 
physical harm to himself or herself as manifested by 
evidence of recent threats of or attempts at suicide 
or serious bodily harm. 
b.  Evidences 
a 
substantial 
probability 
of 
physical harm to other individuals as manifested by 
evidence 
of 
recent 
homicidal 
or 
other 
violent 
behavior, or by evidence that others are placed in 
reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious 
physical harm to them, as evidenced by a recent overt 
No.  2022AP140-FT.akz 
 
8 
 
act, 
attempt 
or 
threat 
to 
do 
serious 
physical 
harm. . . .    
c.  Evidences such impaired judgment, manifested 
by evidence of a pattern of recent acts or omissions, 
that there is a substantial probability of physical 
impairment or injury to himself or herself or other 
individuals. . . .  
d.  Evidences behavior manifested by recent acts 
or omissions that, due to mental illness, he or she is 
unable to satisfy basic needs for nourishment, medical 
care, shelter or safety without prompt and adequate 
treatment so that a substantial probability exists 
that death, serious physical injury, serious physical 
debilitation, 
or 
serious 
physical 
disease 
will 
imminently ensue unless the individual receives prompt 
and adequate treatment for this mental illness. . . .  
e.  For an individual, other than an individual 
who is alleged to be drug dependent or developmentally 
disabled, after the advantages and disadvantages of 
and alternatives to accepting a particular medication 
or treatment have been explained to him or her and 
because 
of 
mental 
illness, 
evidences 
either 
incapability of expressing an understanding of the 
advantages and disadvantages of accepting medication 
or treatment and the alternatives, or substantial 
incapability of applying an understanding of the 
advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to his or 
her mental illness in order to make an informed choice 
as to whether to accept or refuse medication or 
treatment; and evidences a substantial probability, as 
demonstrated 
by 
both 
the 
individual's 
treatment 
history and his or her recent acts or omissions, that 
the individual needs care or treatment to prevent 
further disability or deterioration and a substantial 
probability that he or she will, if left untreated, 
lack services necessary for his or her health or 
safety 
and 
suffer 
severe 
mental, 
emotional, 
or 
physical harm that will result in the loss of the 
individual's ability to function independently in the 
community or the loss of cognitive or volitional 
control over his or her thoughts or actions. . . .  
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. 
¶57 In a recommitment hearing, current dangerousness may 
be proved by demonstrating the treatment following the initial 
No.  2022AP140-FT.akz 
 
9 
 
commitment 
"ameliorated 
[the 
dangerous] 
behavior, 
but 
if 
treatment were withdrawn, there may be a substantial likelihood 
such behavior would recur."  Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 
54, ¶19, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509. 
If the individual has been the subject of inpatient 
treatment 
for 
mental 
illness, 
developmental 
disability, or drug dependency immediately prior to 
commencement of the proceedings as a result of a 
voluntary 
admission, 
a 
commitment 
or 
protective 
placement 
ordered 
by 
a 
court 
under 
this 
section . . . , the requirements of a recent overt 
act, attempt or threat to act under par. (a)2. a. or 
b., pattern of recent acts or omissions under par. 
(a)2. c. or e., or recent behavior under par. (a)2. d. 
may be satisfied by a showing that there is a 
substantial 
likelihood, 
based 
on 
the 
subject 
individual's treatment record, that the individual 
would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment 
were withdrawn. . . .  
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am).  
¶58 The 
issue 
in 
D.J.W. 
was 
whether 
"the 
evidence 
introduced at the recommitment hearing was insufficient to 
support a conclusion that D.J.W. is 'dangerous' pursuant to 
either §§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c. or 2.d. and 51.20(1)(am)."  391 
Wis. 2d 231, ¶3.  Resolving this issue proved difficult because 
"[i]t was not clear at either the initial commitment hearing or 
the extension hearing on which subdivision paragraph of Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. the commitment was based."  Id., ¶36.  To 
avoid future difficulties of this sort, "we determine[d] that 
going forward circuit courts in recommitment proceedings are to 
make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision 
paragraph of § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is 
based."  Id., ¶40.  The purpose of this requirement is to 
No.  2022AP140-FT.akz 
 
10 
 
provide notice of the statutory basis for recommitment to both 
the subject and reviewing courts.  Id., ¶¶42-44 ("[I]t provides 
clarity 
and 
extra 
protection 
to 
patients 
regarding 
the 
underlying basis for a recommitment" and "will clarify issues 
raised on appeal of recommitment orders and ensure the soundness 
of judicial decision making."). 
¶59 However, our decision in D.J.W. did not create a 
"magic words" requirement.  "The court in D.J.W. did not hold 
that a circuit court's failure to cite a statutory reference is 
enough to overturn a valid mental health commitment."  M.W., 402 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶45 
(Ziegler, 
C.J., 
dissenting).1 
 
It 
merely 
"reiterated the long-established principle that circuit courts 
must explain their reasoning and legal conclusions when they 
decide civil cases."  Id., ¶64 (Ziegler, C.J., dissenting).  
"Nowhere in D.J.W. did we state that appellate courts would 
reverse any and all recommitment orders that, on a cursory 
review, lack citation to an initial commitment pathway."  Id., 
¶55 (Ziegler, C.J., dissenting).  Furthermore, ch. 51 compels 
that a reviewing court undertake a harmless error review even if 
it finds the circuit court failed to adequately explain the 
facts and law.  Under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(c), "The court 
shall, in every stage of an action, disregard any error or 
defect in the pleadings or proceedings that does not affect the 
substantial rights of either party."  D.J.W.'s instruction to 
                                                 
1 The majority in M.W. did not disagree with my analysis of 
D.J.W.  It failed to reach the D.J.W. issue in that case, just 
as the majority does here.    
No.  2022AP140-FT.akz 
 
11 
 
circuit courts in no way absolves us of our statutory obligation 
to apply harmless error review in ch. 51 proceedings.     
¶60 The circuit court in this case did not run afoul of 
D.J.W.  The record sufficiently demonstrates that the circuit 
court made factual findings supporting a determination of 
dangerousness under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. using the 
alternative evidentiary method in § 51.20(1)(am).  In other 
words, the record demonstrates that the circuit court found "a 
substantial likelihood, based on [M.R.M.'s] treatment record, 
that" "there [would be] a substantial probability of physical 
impairment or injury to himself . . . or others" "if treatment 
were withdrawn" due to M.R.M.'s "impaired judgment." 
¶61 The circuit court relied heavily on the testimony of a 
psychiatrist 
who 
examined 
M.R.M. 
 
The 
psychiatrist 
also 
submitted to the circuit court a 14-page written report 
detailing M.R.M.'s treatment history, the psychiatrist's account 
of interviewing M.R.M., an examination of M.R.M.'s mental 
status, psychiatric diagnosis, and opinions regarding civil 
commitment.  His report discussed the January 2021 incident 
prompting M.R.M.'s initial commitment:  M.R.M. "walking around 
his property with a loaded gun making suicidal and homicidal 
remarks" and, "[u]pon arrival at the ER, . . . yell[ing] that he 
was going to take everybody out."  The psychiatrist's report 
concluded M.R.M. "suffers from Schizoaffective Disorder" and 
that M.R.M.'s condition "only improved as a result of subsequent 
involuntary psychotropic treatment."  The psychiatrist also 
stated in his report that he was "concerned about the current 
No.  2022AP140-FT.akz 
 
12 
 
plan to reduce medication dosages until symptoms of psychosis 
re-emerge" and opined that "commitment extension is warranted in 
order to allow staff to intervene when [M.R.M.] becomes 
symptomatic again, given that he already has no insight into his 
mental illness, treatment needs and concerns about prior 
dangerousness while less actively symptomatic."  His report 
further concluded,  
[T]here is a substantial likelihood that he would 
become a proper subject for commitment if treatment 
were withdrawn.  At the current time, his risk of harm 
to himself and others through judgment impaired by 
paranoid psychosis, leading him recklessly brandishing 
a weapon in public amid suicidal and homicidal threats 
has been mitigated by the oversight of medication 
compliance under the conditions of civil commitment.  
¶62 At 
the 
recommitment 
hearing, 
the 
psychiatrist 
testified in a manner consistent with his report.  He stated 
M.R.M. "suffers from schizoaffective disorder[, which] is a 
treatable mental illness."  He also testified M.R.M. "has told 
every one along the way that he does not believe that he suffers 
from a mental illness or need[s] treatment when all evidence 
suggests otherwise."  Based on his review of clinical records 
and independent examiner reports discussing M.R.M.'s treatment 
history, the psychiatrist testified, "I believe it is a 
substantial likelihood that [M.R.M.] would exhibit or experience 
the same type of symptoms he exhibited back in January with the 
associated dangerousness if treatment were withdrawn," which he 
described as "judgment impaired by paranoid psychosis."      
¶63 Based on the psychiatrist's testimony and report, the 
circuit court "found his opinions and his insight to be 
No.  2022AP140-FT.akz 
 
13 
 
credible, to be thoughtful."  The court "f[ou]nd by clear and 
convincing evidence, here, [M.R.M.] does have a mental illness 
whether he wishes to admit it or not.  At least five 
psychiatrists believe that he does . . . ."  It "agree[d] that 
[M.R.M.] is a proper subject for treatment.  He has been 
responding to the medication or medications that he's been 
receiving . . . since the incident in January."  The court 
remarked that "[w]hat happened in January was incredibly 
serious, incredibly frightening, incredibly dangerous not only 
to [M.R.M.], but to other people, too."  The court further 
explained, "[I]f you choose not to believe you have the mental 
illness or don't want to take the medications, the person you're 
potentially hurting[,] and there's clear and convicting evidence 
of that, is not only yourself, but it's others, too."  The court 
told M.R.M.,  
I think that if you are not under the commitment that 
you will not take your medication; you will not avail 
yourself of the other treatments in addition to 
medication and we will be right back where we were in 
January and maybe this time somebody really will be 
hurt. 
The court found, "because of [M.R.M.'s] poor insight into his 
having this illness and needing treatment . . . and attempts to 
manipulate 
care 
providers . . . I'm 
concerned 
at 
the 
forcefulness of which he wants to have a weapon back in his 
hands."  It therefore concluded there was "a substantial 
likelihood that [M.R.M.] would again become a proper subject for 
treatment relatively quickly and would again be dangerous." 
No.  2022AP140-FT.akz 
 
14 
 
¶64 M.R.M. complains that, based on the circuit court's 
findings, he "is left to guess what specific threat the circuit 
court believed he posed" under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.  This 
is simply not true.  The circuit court repeatedly voiced its 
concern that something similar to the January 2021 incident 
where M.R.M. brandished a gun could occur if he was not 
recommitted.  This was based on both the January 2021 incident 
and M.R.M.'s conduct during treatment denying the existence of 
his condition.  Additionally, the psychiatrist's report and 
testimony both referenced M.R.M.'s "impaired judgment."  Based 
on the circuit court's findings, it takes little effort to 
understand the circuit court found M.R.M. would pose "a 
substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to 
himself . . . or 
other 
individuals" 
due 
to 
his 
"impaired 
judgment" under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.  The circuit court relied on 
M.R.M.'s treatment record and the psychiatrist's conclusions 
from that record, which showed that M.R.M. had "judgment 
impaired by paranoid psychosis."  The court believed this 
affliction could recur, and M.R.M. "would be a proper subject 
for commitment if treatment were withdrawn."  § 51.20(1)(am).  
M.R.M.'s quarrel therefore appears to be with the circuit 
court's failure to use "magic words" by either quoting or citing 
the applicable subdivision paragraph.  D.J.W. does not require 
this.  Even if it did, we must disregard such an error as 
harmless under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(c) because the statutory 
basis for M.R.M.'s recommitment is easily discerned from the 
record.  
No.  2022AP140-FT.akz 
 
15 
 
III 
¶65 M.R.M.'s recommitment is devoid of legal error.  
Instead of ruling E.J.W. applies retroactively, I would overrule 
E.J.W. and conclude M.R.M. waived his right to a jury trial at 
his recommitment hearing.  E.J.W. was wrong when it was decided, 
it remains wrong today, and the majority's failure to overrule 
E.J.W. sends our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) 
further out to sea.  The majority's conclusions today only serve 
to highlight E.J.W.'s error, and we should take this opportunity 
to overrule it.     
¶66 I also conclude that the circuit court did not run 
afoul of our decision in D.J.W.  The circuit court thoroughly 
explained its factual findings.  It is clear the court concluded 
there was a substantial likelihood that, if M.R.M. was not 
recommitted, M.R.M.'s impaired judgment would again make him a 
danger to himself or others and a proper subject for commitment 
under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.  The circuit court therefore 
complied with our instruction in D.J.W.  M.R.M.'s argument to 
the contrary amounts to a complaint that the circuit court did 
not use "magic words" by specifically citing or quoting 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c.  Even if the circuit court's explanation did 
not comport with D.J.W., that error would be harmless because we 
have no trouble discerning the basis for M.R.M.'s recommitment.  
Accordingly, M.R.M.'s recommitment contained no error, and that 
recommitment should be affirmed.    
¶67 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.   
 
No.  2022AP140-FT.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶68 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   (dissenting).  The 
majority opinion concludes that because a commitment extension 
order was entered in error due to denial of a jury request that 
was deemed untimely, the circuit court lost competency to 
proceed further in regard to the effect of M.R.M.'s mental 
illness on the State's ability to bring him to trial.1  In so 
concluding, the majority opinion directly conflicts with our 
decision in Portage Cnty. v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶21, 386 
Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509, with regard to circuit court 
competency for orders issued subsequent to a defective order.  
The 
majority 
opinion's 
holding 
on 
competency 
is 
totally 
unnecessary to resolving the jury request issue for which we 
granted review and it also has the potential to terminate the 
treatment that M.R.M. likely is receiving today based on an 
order that would have had to be entered before expiration of the 
extension order that we review today.2  
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶3.  The majority opinion concludes that a 
commitment extension order for M.R.M. entered August 13, 2021 is 
invalid because M.R.M.'s request for a jury trial was not 
honored based on a decision from this court that occurred after 
the circuit court addressed M.R.M.'s jury trial request.  To 
clarify, the circuit court correctly applied Marathon Cnty v. 
R.J.O., 2020 WI App 20, 392 Wis. 2d 157, 943 N.W.2d 898, to 
M.R.M.'s jury trial request, which was the controlling law at 
the time of the circuit court's decision.  I choose not to 
address that portion of the majority opinion that deals with 
retroactivity.   
2 The majority opinion ignores that this dissent is grounded 
in the findings of four psychiatrists who have personally 
examined M.R.M. and have found that he is dangerous due to a 
substantial probability of physical harm to himself.  While most 
people with mental illness are not a danger to themselves or 
others, the record before us conclusively shows that M.R.M. 
needs medical care because of the substantial probability that 
No.  2022AP140-FT.pdr 
 
2 
 
¶69 As I explain below with my review of the record before 
us, the majority opinion is wrong under our precedent and it 
puts M.R.M. at significant risk of inflicting self-harm and/or 
harm to others because the majority opinion makes necessary 
medical care more difficult to receive.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶70 In January of 2021, M.R.M. came to the attention of 
law enforcement because he was carrying a loaded gun and making 
suicidal and homicidal statements.  He is reported to have been 
"screaming" and "stated several times he was going to kill 
people and then himself and at one point said he is Jesus 
Christ."3  The gun M.R.M. was waving while he screamed was a 
"loaded glock 27 (.40 cal[iber]) pistol, [that had] a round in 
the chamber" and seven rounds in the magazine.4   
¶71 M.R.M. is reported to have told the admitting nurse at 
Aurora Lakeland Emergency Room that "the numbers told him 
everyone had to die, and he had to kill himself as well.  [He] 
stated he has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder and would then laugh and say, 'No, I am not.'"5  
                                                                                                                                                             
he will inflict physical harm on himself.   
3 R. 1:  Statement of Emergency Detention by Law Enforcement 
Officer. 
4 Id.   
5 R. 1:  Village of Genoa City Police Department Incident 
Report (emphasis added).    
No.  2022AP140-FT.pdr 
 
3 
 
¶72 He 
was 
transported 
to 
Winnebago 
Mental 
Health 
Institute 
(WMHI) 
and 
was 
examined 
initially 
by 
three 
psychiatrists.6  At the Probable Cause Hearing, Dr. Pjerla 
testified:   
A  [M.R.M.] was admitted to Winnebago on an 
emergency detention.  So I was to evaluate and assess 
whether he required further hospitalization.  
Q  And what day did the examination occur on?  
A  The 20th. 
. . . .  
Q  Doctor, can you estimate how much total time 
you spent with [M.R.M.]?  
A  In person over the last two days, maybe 45 
minutes.  And then reviewing records, talking and 
obtaining collateral information, discussing things 
with the team, another 45 minutes to an hour.  
Q  And, 
Doctor, 
what 
records 
or 
collateral 
information have you been able to review?  
A  I was able to review the information from the 
crisis report, the emergency detention, the emergency 
room documentation, some collateral information from 
[the] patient's mother as well. 
. . . .  
Q  After your examination of [M.R.M.], do you 
have an opinion as to whether he has a mental illness?  
A  Yes.  
Q  And what is your opinion?  
A  I believe he does. 
. . . .  
                                                 
6 Dr. Srananthi Pjerla, Dr. Marshall Bales and Dr. Leslie 
Taylor are licensed psychiatrists.     
No.  2022AP140-FT.pdr 
 
4 
 
Q  Do you have an opinion as to whether [M.R.M.] 
is a proper subject for treatment of his mental 
illness?  
A  I believe he is. 
. . . .  
Q  And, Doctor, do you have an opinion as to 
whether [M.R.M.] is a danger to himself or to others?  
A  Yes, I believe he is.  
Q  And what is the nature of risk that you 
believe?  
A  So I believe that he was dangerous to himself 
when he pointed a gun at his head and was threatening 
to kill himself.  Now, [M.R.M.] has said that he was 
not intending to do this, but that he was just 
pretending in order to scare his mother.  [M.R.M.] has 
said that he did not believe that the gun was loaded. 
But on review of some of the information, it does 
appear that the gun was loaded.  So I believe that 
[M.R.M.'s] thought process and confusion about reality 
contributed to those behaviors and the suicide gesture 
or attempt.  He also made threats to kill other 
people.[7]  
¶73 During Dr. Bales's exam, [M.R.M.] repeated he was 
Jesus Christ and that "everyone had to die."8  Since admission to 
WMHI, M.R.M. admitted "he was intent on killing himself but that 
his mother talked him out of it.  He was distinctly manic, 
hyperverbal, labile, dysphoric, agitated, and defensive, stating 
he did not have a mental health problem."9  Dr. Bales found that 
                                                 
7 R. 79 at 6-10:  Dr. Pjerla's testimony at probable cause 
hearing.   
8 R. 21:  Report of Examination (by Dr. Bales, M.D.).   
9 Id.  
No.  2022AP140-FT.pdr 
 
5 
 
M.R.M. is dangerous because there is a "substantial probability 
of physical harm to himself."10  
¶74 Dr. Bales also said: 
[M.R.M.] is a 43-year-old Caucasian male who suffers 
from a substantial disorder of thought, mood, or 
perception.  He has been dangerous in ways noted.  His 
condition is treatable, and he is a proper subject for 
treatment.  Based on the above, it is my opinion with 
a reasonable degree of medical certainty that he does 
meet 
the 
criteria 
for 
a 
six-month 
Chapter 
51 
commitment with an order to treat.  The least 
restrictive environment is inpatient on a locked 
psychiatric unit.  At the discretion of his inpatient 
treating physician, he can transition to outpatient 
care when stable.  He will benefit from psychotherapy, 
case 
management, 
psychiatric 
care, 
and 
other 
services.[11]   
¶75 Another 
psychiatrist, 
Dr. Taylor, 
also 
examined 
M.R.M., his intake records, talked with his mother and with his 
brother-in-law.  She confirmed that M.R.M. is dangerous due to a 
"substantial probability of physical harm to himself . . . [and] 
[a] substantial probability of physical harm to other subjects 
as manifested by evidence of recent homicidal or other violent 
behavior."12  Based on the above history, M.R.M. was committed 
for six months in January 2021.   
¶76 In July 2021, Walworth County petitioned to extend 
M.R.M.'s commitment, with an adjourned recommitment hearing 
scheduled for August 12, 2021.  Dr. Robert Rawski testified 
about his examination of M.R.M.13  He said that he spent about an 
                                                 
10 Id.   
11 Id. 
12 R. 23:  Report of Examination (by Dr. Taylor).  
13 R. 66:  Dr. Rawski is a licensed psychiatrist.  
No.  2022AP140-FT.pdr 
 
6 
 
hour and 45 minutes talking to M.R.M. and he spent about three 
hours reviewing his records and constructing a report.  His 
testimony included the following: 
Q.  [W]hat is your opinion and what is his diagnosis? 
A.  I believe to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty that [M.R.M.] suffers from schizoaffective 
disorder.  That is a treatable mental illness.  It 
features a substantial disorder of thought, mood and 
perception 
that 
grossly 
impairs 
his 
judgment, 
behavior, capacity to recognize reality and the 
ability to meet the ordinary demands of life. 
. . . .  
Q.  Do you have an opinion whether based on [M.R.M.]'s 
treatment record that he would be a proper subject for 
commitment if treatment were withdrawn? 
A.  Yes.  I believe it is a substantial likelihood 
that he would exhibit or experience the same type of 
symptoms he exhibited back in January with the 
associated 
dangerousness 
if 
treatment 
were 
withdrawn. . . . 
 
The 
likelihood 
of 
that 
is 
significant given his poor insight into his mental 
illness and need for treatment.[14] 
¶77 After that hearing, M.R.M. again was found to have a 
mental illness that was a proper subject for treatment, and that 
he met the statutory standards for dangerousness.  The circuit 
court signed and entered a commitment extension on August 13, 
2021 for 12 months "from the expiration date of the prior 
commitment order."15  The "prior commitment order" to which 
reference was made is the original commitment that expired 
August 12, 2021.  Therefore, the extension order that is subject 
to these proceedings expired by its terms on August 11, 2022.   
                                                 
14 R. 66 at 11-14.   
15 R. 53:  Order of Extension of Commitment.   
No.  2022AP140-FT.pdr 
 
7 
 
¶78 Given that M.R.M. has a mental illness that causes him 
to be a danger to himself and to others, it is likely another 
commitment extension was processed on or before August 11, 2022, 
such that M.R.M. currently is receiving treatment for his 
illness.  Because health care records are confidential, we do 
not know the current status of his treatment today, but the 
record 
informs 
us 
that 
four 
licensed 
psychiatrists 
have 
concluded that he is dangerous to himself and to others.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶79 The majority opinion concludes that the circuit 
court's denial of a jury trial in regard to the one year 
extension order that began in August 2021 and expired in August 
2022 was a "failure to enter a lawful extension order before the 
preceding order expires," and results in the circuit court 
losing competency to conduct further proceedings.  It cites an 
unpublished 
court 
of 
appeals 
decision 
to 
support 
its 
conclusion.16   
¶80 In 
briefing, 
M.R.M. 
addressed 
the 
relevance 
of 
competency very differently from the position of the majority 
opinion herein.  In his briefing, M.R.M. explained "it's whether 
a reviewing court that deems an unexpired commitment order 
unlawful should reverse it outright or also remand the case for 
a new trial. . . .  [However, the] circuit court cannot hold a 
new trial on an old commitment petition, as it will invariably 
                                                 
16 Majority op., ¶24, citing Shawano Cnty. v. S.L.V., 
No. 2021AP223, unpublished slip op., ¶20 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 
2021).   
No.  2022AP140-FT.pdr 
 
8 
 
lose competency before remand [to hold a new trial]."17  The 
majority opinion's conclusion that the circuit court loses 
competency to conduct further proceedings presents an unlimited 
loss of competency, far beyond M.R.M.'s position that competency 
to hold a new trial within the time frame of the extension order 
likely would be lacking.  
¶81 The majority also concludes that the date the one year 
extension order expired is "irrelevant because the circuit court 
lost competency to hold an extension hearing when the preceding 
commitment order expired."  The majority opinion again cites an 
unpublished court of appeals decision to support its assertion.18   
¶82 What is unstated, but held nonetheless by the majority 
opinion, is that once an order is determined to be unlawful any 
orders that are connected to that order are also invalid because 
the circuit court had no competency to issue valid subsequent 
orders.  This creates the same "domino theory" that we held in 
J.W.K. "[was] not supported by the text of the statute."  
J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶21.    
¶83 To explain further, in J.W.K. we held:  "Reversing the 
expired 2016 order for insufficient evidence would have no 
effect on subsequent recommitment orders because later orders 
stand on their own under the language of the statute."  Id., ¶1 
(emphasis added).  J.W.K. had argued, similar to what the 
                                                 
17 M.R.M. brief, p. 13.   
18 Majority op., ¶24 (citing Eau Claire Cnty. v. J.M.P., 
2020AP2014-FT, unpublished slip op., ¶21 (Wis. Ct. App. June 22, 
2021). 
No.  2022AP140-FT.pdr 
 
9 
 
majority holds today, that "reversal of the 2016 order would 
mean the circuit court lacked competency to issue the 2017 
extension order."  Id., ¶15. 
¶84 The majority opinion says, "There is an important 
difference, however, between how we evaluate the validity of a 
commitment order, as in J.W.K., and how we determine whether a 
circuit court has competency, as in this case."19  That may be 
true, but prior to this matter, circuit courts did not lose 
competency to issue orders prior to the preceding order's 
expiration date even if an order was later declared unlawful.   
¶85 Here, the extension order was held unlawful because a 
jury trial was denied and a loss of competency followed.20  In 
J.W.K., "An appellate court's later conclusion that the evidence 
was insufficient to support the August 2016 extension order 
would not retroactively change the fact that at the time the 
circuit court entered the extension order in July 2017, the 
prior order had not expired; therefore, the circuit court 
retained competency to enter the unchallenged July 2017 order."  
Id., ¶22.   
¶86 We explained in J.W.K. Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)1. 
contemplates "consecutive orders of commitment," and as long as 
"the extension is made prior to the expiration of the previous 
commitment order, the circuit court may order the extension if 
                                                 
19 Majority op., ¶26.  
20 "Accordingly, the failure to enter a lawful extension 
order before the preceding order expires results in a loss of 
competency."  Id., ¶24. 
No.  2022AP140-FT.pdr 
 
10 
 
the County proves its case under the statutory criteria."  Id., 
¶21.21  We also concluded that "reversing the [earlier] 
commitment order does not retroactively deprive the circuit 
court that issued a subsequent commitment order of competency."  
Id.  Our holding rejected the concurrence/dissent's position in 
J.W.K..22  
¶87 It is the same "loss of competency" contention that we 
rejected from the dissent in J.W.K. that the majority opinion 
articulates in the case now before us:  "[B]ecause the circuit 
court denied M.R.M.'s timely jury demand, its extension order is 
unlawful.  And because the preceding commitment order has 
expired, 
the 
circuit 
court 
lacks 
competency 
to 
conduct 
proceedings on remand."23  
¶88 The majority opinion cites G.O.T. v. Rock Cnty., 151 
Wis. 2d 629, 445 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1989) to support its 
                                                 
21 The concurrence/dissent in Portage Cnty. v. J.W.K., 2019 
WI 54, ¶36, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509, (Dallet, J., 
concurring/dissenting), also argued that if an extension order 
was invalid the "chain of commitment was broken" and the county 
had to begin the commitment process as though there had been no 
prior finding of incompetence.    
22 In J.W.K. we rejected the same competency argument the 
majority holds in favor of today: 
If current dangerousness was not established at the 
August 
2016 
extension 
hearing, 
the 
August 
2016 
extension 
was 
invalid. 
 
As 
such, 
the 
initial 
commitment order would have expired prior to it being 
extended and the circuit court would have lacked 
competency to enter any subsequent extension orders.   
Id., ¶34 (Dallet, J., concurring/dissenting) (emphasis 
added).   
23 Majority op., ¶27.   
No.  2022AP140-FT.pdr 
 
11 
 
global, prospective loss of competency.24  In G.O.T., the circuit 
court repeatedly extended a commitment beyond the amount of time 
that Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g) permitted, and the court of 
appeals concluded that the circuit court did not have competency 
to ignore a statutory directive.  Id. at 633.  G.O.T. reviewed a 
past court act.  It did not establish a prospective loss of 
competency for "any subsequent extension orders," as the 
majority opinion has done.   
¶89 There are real-life dangers in setting up a "domino 
effect" whenever the circuit court makes an error that causes 
the overturning of all subsequent orders.  One is that a 
majority opinion of this court takes away the only means the 
State has to protect a repeatedly dangerous person from harm to 
himself and/or to others.   
¶90 The extension order under review here, by its terms, 
expired in August of 2022.  It is likely that an extension of 
treatment was ordered then.  If so, subsequent treatment would 
be on-going now; however, the majority opinion has the potential 
to terminate it with its conclusion that the circuit court 
lacked competency to issue subsequent extension orders.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶91 The 
record 
before 
us 
clearly 
shows 
that 
four 
psychiatrists have concluded that M.R.M. is dangerous because he 
is substantially likely to cause physical harm to himself and/or 
others.  Concluding that circuit courts lack competency to 
provide needed care for an individual that is dangerous to 
                                                 
24 Id., ¶19. 
No.  2022AP140-FT.pdr 
 
12 
 
himself and others is unsupported in the law and irresponsible.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
 
 
 
No.  2022AP140-FT.pdr 
 
1