Title: Faith Lutheran Retirement Home v. Veis
Citation: 473 P.2d 503
Docket Number: 11794
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 18, 1970

473 P.2d 503 (1970) FAITH LUTHERAN RETIREMENT HOME, a corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. M.E. VEIS, Administrator of the Estate of John E. Thorson, Deceased, Defendant and Appellant. No. 11794. Supreme Court of Montana. August 18, 1970. Francis Gallagher, argued, Glasgow, for appellant. Baxter Larson, argued, Wolf Point, for respondent. DALY, Justice. This action was commenced in the district court of the fifteenth judicial district, county of Daniels, by the Faith Lutheran Retirement Home, a Montana corporation, located in Wolf Point, Montana, hereinafter referred to as "the Home", against the administrator of the estate of John E. Thorson, deceased, hereinafter referred to as "defendant". The action was to recover on a creditor's claim filed in the defendant estate for $10,000 and rejected by the administrator. John E. Thorson entered the Home on June 4, 1965. He was 81 years of age, a retired farmer, unmarried, and had no children. He had been acquainted with the *504 administrator and chaplain of the Home, Rev. Thomas Boe, since 1960. He had contributed to the Home since that time in amounts considered liberal by Rev. Boe. After his admission on June 4, Rev. Boe invited John Thorson into his office on June 7 to complete the formal application and articles of agreement for admission to the Home. The application consists of four pages. In addition to the normal data and payment agreements for board, room, and services, John Thorson dictated and had inserted as paragraph 16, page 2 of the agreement the following: It was established that the method used by John Thorson resulted from his unkind feeling toward lawyers. This application was signed by John Thorson and witnessed by Mary L. Buck, a registered nurse at the Home and by Rev. Boe. The acceptance of the application was signed by C.H. Brocksmith, president of the Home, and Herbert Houg, its secretary. The original was filed at the Home. John Thorson left the Home on June 21, 1965 and died in the state of Minnesota on May 16, 1966. The creditor's claim filed and rejected and the action against the defendant was based on the clause inserted in the application, heretofore quoted. Defendant answered alleging the agreement was invalid for want and failure of consideration. Defendant took Rev. Boe's deposition as an adverse witness, introduced the application as defendant's Exhibit No. 1, and moved the court for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., based on the allegation that the record showed no genuine issue as to material fact. The Home filed a cross-motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(a) and (c), M.R. Civ.P. and urged the court that a gift was made by John Thorson. The court on September 8, 1969, granted the motion of the Home for summary judgment and set forth the following: Judgment was entered accordingly and defendant appeals on the following statement of issues. 1. The court erred in holding that the decedent, John E. Thorson, had, during his lifetime, made a gift in writing in the amount of $10,000 to the plaintiff. 2. The court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 3. The court erred in not granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. The controlling issue is issue No. 1 and defendant cites Sylvain v. Page, 84 Mont. 424, 439, 440, 276 P. 16, 20, as concerns gifts: Defendant contends that all of the essential elements as set out in Sylvain are lacking in the present case. *505 Mr. Chief Justice Callaway in Sylvain, discussing gifts of personal and real property, said: He observed further in the same case: It would appear from Sylvain that the matter of delivery is not at issue as the instant case involves an instrument in writing. Yet, defendant urges Sylvain limits this rule to formal instruments as opposed to informal writings. Defendant further cites In re Brown's Estate, 122 Mont. 451, 457, 206 P.2d 816, 820, in support: At page 459, 206 P.2d at page 821 of In re Brown's Estate, this Court said: Defendant fails to take into account that In re Brown's Estate is a discussion concerned with the gift aspect of United States bonds registered in the name of the deceased as co or joint owner with her children, the delivery of the same, and the tax liability to the state of Montana. Bonds and other securities are generally subjected to more stringent rules of law in gift cases and especially if the application of the law has to do with taxes. This Court at p. 458, 206 P.2d at p. 820 in In re Brown's Estate made this clear: *506 This Court said at p. 454, 206 P.2d at p. 818 of In re Brown's Estate, when commenting on the case of State Board of Equalization v. Cole, 122 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d 989, wherein bonds were purchased in co-ownership: We cannot agree that Sylvain or In re Brown's Estate establishes defendant's position regarding formal instruments. Defendant relies further on 63 A.L.R. 537 and 48 A.L.R.2d 1406, alleging that these discussions deal for the most part with formal writings. 48 A.L.R.2d 1406 is a supplement to 63 A.L.R. 537. We do not find this much imbalance in the treatment of the problem. We do agree with the finding there that a number of cases, including Sylvain which was selected for detailed analysis by 63 A.L.R., could be more direct in assessing informal writings and that a good deal of confusion exists because in some jurisdictions it cannot be determined if the gift was denied because of the writing or on other grounds. Yet, an adequate treatment of the subject was developed and the approving jurisdictions given, including New York. 63 A.L.R. concludes at page 560 with this observation about informal writings: that they only serve the same purpose as delivery in an oral gift; namely to preclude unfounded claims and authenticate the gift, and in relation to the three legal theories discussed in support it was stated that these instruments operate to transfer title. There is no other theory necessary. 48 A.L.R.2d supplementing this is very similar in its analysis and states at p. 1414 as follows: With this we agree. This takes us now to the matter of donative intent. Defendant contends that the words "I wish to pay" as used in paragraph 16 of the application demonstrates that Mr. Thorson had no present intent to make a gift to the Home. The California Supreme Court in Berl v. Rosenberg, 169 Cal. App. 2d 125, 336 P.2d 975, 980, stated: Here, the circumstances surrounding the drawing of the instrument are that Mr. Thorson did not believe in lawyers and he was accustomed to giving money to support the Home. He directed the Rev. Boe to type the instrument in his own words which were "I wish to pay". Section 93-401-17, R.C.M. 1947, provides: Here, the circumstances under which the instrument was prepared are set out in the testimony of the Rev. Thomas Boe, taken by deposition: It must be remembered that the only testimony taken was Rev. Boe's deposition and it stands alone, uncontradicted. There has been no challenge that it is not credible. Following the fundamental rule that the trial court may not disregard uncontradicted credible evidence, we must accept the circumstances related by Rev. Boe. His testimony establishes that John Thorson rejected lawyers, a will, or a note and he stated directly that he "wanted to give a gift" and did so in the manner related. Defendant argues further that the Home did not accept the gift and made no demand on John Thorson during his lifetime. Section 67-1511, R.C.M. 1947, provides: In addition to the statute, the written instrument was accepted by the Home and filed there until the demand was made. This satisfies Montana law as it concerns acceptance of gifts by written instrument. On Issue No. 2, we agree generally with defendant's argument about the mechanics of motions for summary judgment but feel the circumstances of this case do not square with McNabb v. Fisher, 38 Ariz. 288, 299 P. 679, cited by defendant, in as much as fraud was never an issue in this case. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. provides in part that the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Here, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The Home also filed a motion for summary judgment. In 3 Barron &amp; Holtzoff, § 1239, pp. 176-178, it is stated that the fact both parties have moved for summary judgment does not establish that there is no issue of fact. A party may concede that there is no issue if his legal theory is accepted and yet maintain there is a genuine dispute as to material facts, if his opponent's theory is adopted. Defendant contends the Home's motion for summary judgment left certain factual questions unanswered. However, it was not until this appeal that certain questions, such as the senility of Mr. Thorson, were raised by the defendant. This Court has stated that a trial court, in considering a motion for summary judgment, *508 has no duty to anticipate possible proof that might be offered under the pleadings. Asking for such foresight demands clairvoyance not possessed even by a trial judge. Silloway v. Jorgenson, 146 Mont. 307, 406 P.2d 167; Naegeli v. Daniels, 145 Mont. 323, 400 P.2d 896. Upon considering defendant's Exhibit No. 1, the deposition of the Rev. Boe, and the briefs filed in support of and in opposition to the motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that there was a valid gift, there was no genuine issue of fact, and plaintiff Home was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We find no evidence, law, or material fact, properly presented, to disturb the findings of the trial court. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed. CASTLES, JOHN C. HARRISON, and HASWELL, JJ., concur. JAMES T. HARRISON, C.J., deemed himself disqualified and therefore did not participate in this Opinion.