Title: George v. National Water Main Cleaning Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12191
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2017

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SJC-12191 
 
ROBERT GEORGE & others1  vs.  NATIONAL WATER MAIN CLEANING 
COMPANY & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 14, 2017. - June 26, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Certification of questions of law.  
Massachusetts Wage Act.  Labor, Wages, Failure to pay 
wages, Damages.  Damages, Interest.  Interest.  Judgment, 
Interest.  Practice, Civil, Interest, Judgment, Damages. 
 
 
 
 
Certification of a question of law to the Supreme Judicial 
Court by the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts. 
 
 
 
Adam J. Shafran (Jonathon D. Friedmann also present) for 
the plaintiffs. 
 
Richard L. Alfred (Dawn Reddy Solowey & Anne S. Bider also 
present) for the defendants. 
                     
 
1 Michael Curvin, Mark Bassett, Kevin Colvin, Justin Kordas, 
Carlos Villarreal, Paul Dockett, Jon Eldridge, Chris Myers, Zef 
Zeka, Paul LeDoux, Erik Paiva, Jeffrey David, and Chris 
Mirisola, individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. 
 
 
2 Carylon Corporation, Dennis Sullivan, Antonino 
LaFrancesca, and Carl Cummings. 
 
 
2 
 
John Pagliaro & Martin J. Newhouse, for New England Legal 
Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Annette Gonthier Kiely, Kathy Jo Cook, Thomas R. Murphy, & 
Timothy J. Wilton, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  Several employees of National Water Main 
Cleaning Company filed a class action suit against the company 
and its parent company, Carylon Corporation, in the Superior 
Court, alleging, among other claims, nonpayment of wages in 
violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 
150 (Wage Act).  After the case was removed to the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, the judge 
granted final approval of a class settlement agreement that 
resolved all outstanding issues except one question of law.  To 
resolve that question, the judge certified to this court the 
following question pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 1:03, as appearing in 
382 Mass. 700 (1981): 
 
"Is statutory interest pursuant to [G. L. c. 231, § 6B 
or 6C,] available under Massachusetts law when liquidated 
(treble) damages are awarded pursuant to [G. L. c. 149, 
§ 150]?" 
 
In answer to the question, we declare that, under Massachusetts 
law, statutory prejudgment interest pursuant to G. L. c. 231, 
§ 6H, shall be added by the clerk of court to the amount of lost 
wages and other benefits awarded as damages pursuant to G. L. 
c. 149, § 150, but shall not be added to the additional amount 
of the award arising from the trebling of those damages as 
 
 
3 
liquidated damages.3 
 
Interpretation of the certified question.  Before we answer 
the certified question, which the judge issued at the joint 
request of the parties, we must first ascertain its meaning.  
The question is an inquiry into the availability of statutory 
interest pursuant to two statutes:  G. L. c. 231, § 6B, which 
directs the clerk of court to add interest at the rate of twelve 
per cent per year to awards of judgment "for personal injuries 
to the plaintiff or for . . . damage to property"; and G. L. 
c. 231, § 6C, which directs the clerk to add interest at the 
same twelve per cent rate to awards of judgment "[i]n all 
actions based on contractual obligations."  The parties appear 
to treat the certified question essentially as two questions:  
first, whether Wage Act claims fall within the scope of either 
§ 6B or § 6C, and second, if they do, whether prejudgment 
interest should be added to the award of damages for lost wages 
and other benefits where § 150, as amended in 2008, provides for 
the trebling of those damages and characterizes such an award as 
"liquidated damages."  We decline to answer the first of these 
questions because, even if prejudgment interest could not be 
added to Wage Act awards under § 6B or § 6C, it plainly could be 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the New 
England Legal Foundation and the Massachusetts Academy of Trial 
Attorneys. 
 
 
4 
added under G. L. c. 231, § 6H, which declares that interest at 
the rate of twelve per cent per year shall be added to the award 
of damages "[i]n any action in which damages are awarded, but in 
which interest on said damages is not otherwise provided by 
law."  The question we shall answer, which we consider to be the 
true gist of the certified question, is whether the Legislature, 
when it amended § 150 in 2008 to require the award of treble 
damages on Wage Act judgments and characterized the award as 
"liquidated damages," intended that prejudgment interest not be 
added to any part of this award because such interest was 
included within the scope of "liquidated damages."4  See Tyler v. 
Michaels Stores, Inc., 464 Mass. 492, 499 n.12 (2013) (declining 
to limit answer to narrow confines of certified question where 
broader discussion was necessary to articulate law regarding 
issue presented). 
                     
 
4 We note from the record that the parties initially had 
agreed that the unresolved legal issue in their settlement 
agreement would be resolved through this court's answer to the 
certified question in Travers v. Flight Servs. & Sys., Inc., 808 
F.3d 525, 551 (1st Cir. 2015), which asked:  "Did [G. L. c. 149, 
§ 150,] impliedly repeal [G. L. c. 231, § 6B,] as to cases in 
which a party was awarded liquidated damages under § 150 and is 
eligible for prejudgment interest under § 6B, such that the 
award of prejudgment interest is precluded?"  That resolution 
became impossible when the Travers case settled and the 
certified question was withdrawn.  That certified question 
assumed that an award under the Massachusetts Wage Act, G. L. 
c. 149, § 150 (Wage Act), would include prejudgment interest 
under § 6B unless the Legislature had impliedly repealed that 
provision as applied to Wage Act awards. 
 
 
5 
 
Discussion.  The Wage Act was enacted "to protect wage 
earners from the long-term detention of wages by unscrupulous 
employers."  Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., 462 Mass. 164, 170 (2012), 
quoting Cumpata v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 113 F. 
Supp. 2d 164, 167 (D. Mass. 2000).  Employers violate the Wage 
Act when they fail to pay "each . . . employee the wages earned" 
and when they fail to do so within the time period set by 
statute.  See G. L. c. 149, § 148. 
 
Before the 2008 amendment, G. L. c. 149, § 150, provided 
that an aggrieved employee may initiate "a civil action for 
. . . any damages incurred, including treble damages for any 
loss of wages and other benefits" and, if he or she prevails, 
"shall be entitled to an award of the costs of the litigation 
and reasonable attorney fees."  St. 2005, c. 99, § 2.  In 
Wiedmann v. The Bradford Group, Inc., 444 Mass. 698, 709 (2005), 
we noted that the text of this statute "states only that a 
plaintiff 'may' institute a suit for damages that includes a 
request for treble damages," and concluded that "there is 
nothing in the plain language of the statute that requires an 
award of treble damages."  We declined to require a judge to 
award treble damages to a prevailing plaintiff where the plain 
language of § 150 did not require it, and declared that the 
award of treble damages in Wage Act cases was a decision left to 
the discretion of the judge.  Id. at 710.  This conclusion was 
 
 
6 
similar to the conclusion we reached in Goodrow v. Lane Bryant, 
Inc., 432 Mass. 165, 178-179 (2000), where we rejected the 
argument that the award of treble damages was mandatory once a 
plaintiff requested such an award for an employer's failure to 
pay required overtime compensation, in violation of G. L. 
c. 151, § 1B.  Wiedmann, supra.  We noted that we had declared 
in Goodrow that "treble damages are punitive in nature, allowed 
only where authorized by statute, and appropriate where conduct 
is 'outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his 
reckless indifference to the rights of others.'"  Wiedmann, 
supra, quoting Goodrow, supra at 178. 
 
Three years after we decided Wiedmann, the Legislature 
"effected a critical change in the language of the statute, 
removing the provision that treble damages 'may' be awarded, and 
replacing it with the directive that treble damages 'shall be 
awarded.'"  Rosnov v. Molloy, 460 Mass. 474, 479 (2011).  Under 
G. L. c. 149, § 150, as amended through St. 2008, c. 80, § 5, 
where an aggrieved employee prevails in a civil action seeking 
damages under the Wage Act, the employee "shall be awarded 
treble damages, as liquidated damages, for any lost wages and 
other benefits and shall also be awarded the costs of the 
litigation and reasonable attorneys' fees."5  By its plain 
                     
 
5 General Laws c. 149, § 150, provides, in pertinent part: 
 
 
 
7 
language, the 2008 amendment to § 150 mandates the award of 
treble damages for lost wages and benefits once an aggrieved 
employee prevails on a Wage Act claim; the plaintiff no longer 
need show that the defendant's conduct was "outrageous" to 
obtain such an award. 
The 2008 amendment did more than mandate the award of 
treble damages to a prevailing plaintiff in a Wage Act case; it 
characterized the treble damages "as liquidated damages."  The 
                                                                  
 
 
"An employee claiming to be aggrieved by a violation 
of [G. L. c. 149, § 33E, 52E, 148, 148A, 148B, 148C, 150C, 
152, 152A, 159C, or 190, or G. L. c. 151, § 19,] may, 
[ninety] days after the filing of a complaint with the 
attorney general, or sooner if the attorney general assents 
in writing, and within [three] years after the violation, 
institute and prosecute in his own name and on his own 
behalf, or for himself and for others similarly situated, a 
civil action for injunctive relief, for any damages 
incurred, and for any lost wages and other benefits; 
provided, however, that the [three-]year limitation period 
shall be tolled from the date that the employee or a 
similarly situated employee files a complaint with the 
attorney general alleging a violation of any of these 
sections until the date that the attorney general issues a 
letter authorizing a private right of action or the date 
that an enforcement action by the attorney general becomes 
final.  An employee so aggrieved who prevails in such an 
action shall be awarded treble damages, as liquidated 
damages, for any lost wages and other benefits and shall 
also be awarded the costs of the litigation and reasonable 
attorneys' fees." 
 
General Laws c. 149, § 150, also provides that "[t]he attorney 
general may make complaint or seek indictment against any person 
for a violation of [§ 148]," an additional enforcement mechanism 
not at issue in this case.  See Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., 462 
Mass. 164, 170 (2012) ("Wage Act provides for both public and 
private enforcement"). 
 
 
8 
crux of this appeal is to ascertain what the Legislature 
intended by this characterization.  The defendants contend that 
the inclusion of this phrase reflects the intent of the 
Legislature that, apart from the award of reasonable attorney's 
fees and the costs of litigation, the judgment in favor of a 
prevailing plaintiff shall be limited to three times the amount 
of lost wages and benefits; it shall not include any prejudgment 
interest, whether under § 6B, 6C, or 6H, because prejudgment 
interest is included within the award of liquidated damages.  
The plaintiff contends that the inclusion of this phrase 
reflects the intent of the Legislature that treble damages be 
treated as compensatory in nature, rather than punitive, and 
does not reflect an intent to deprive employees of prejudgment 
interest they would otherwise be due as a matter of statute for 
their lost wages and benefits. 
 
"Liquidated damages" is a term derived from contract law to 
identify the amount of damages that the parties agree must be 
paid in the event of a breach.  See Cochrane v. Forbes, 267 
Mass. 417, 420 (1929) ("Liquidated damages . . . mean damages, 
agreed upon as to amount by the parties, or fixed by operation 
of law, or under the correct applicable principles of law made 
certain in amount by the terms of the contract, or susceptible 
of being made certain in amount by mathematical calculations 
. . .").  See also 24 R.A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 65:1 
 
 
9 
(4th ed. 2002).  "A liquidated damages provision will usually be 
enforced, provided two criteria are satisfied:  first, that at 
the time of contracting the actual damages flowing from a breach 
were difficult to ascertain; and second, that the sum agreed on 
as liquidated damages represents a 'reasonable forecast of 
damages expected to occur in the event of a breach.'"  NPS, LLC 
v. Minihane, 451 Mass. 417, 420 (2008), quoting Cummings Props., 
LLC v. National Communications Corp., 449 Mass. 490, 494 (2007).  
"Where damages are easily ascertainable, and the amount provided 
for is grossly disproportionate to actual damages or 
unconscionably excessive, the court will award the aggrieved 
party no more than its actual damages."  NPS, LLC, supra. 
 
The term is used in the damages provision of the Federal 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which 
provides, "Any employer who violates the provisions of [§ 206 or 
207] of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees 
affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their 
unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an 
additional equal amount as liquidated damages."  The United 
States Supreme Court has declared that liquidated damages under 
the FLSA "are compensation, not a penalty or punishment by the 
[g]overnment."  Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 
572, 583 (1942).  "The retention of a workman's pay may well 
result in damages too obscure and difficult of proof for 
 
 
10 
estimate other than by liquidated damages."  Id. at 583-584.  
Liquidated damages under the FLSA "constitute[] a Congressional 
recognition that failure to pay the statutory minimum on time 
may be so detrimental to maintenance of the minimum standard of 
living 'necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being 
of workers' and to the free flow of commerce, that double 
payment must be made in the event of delay in order to insure 
restoration of the worker to that minimum standard of well-
being" (footnote omitted).  Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 
U.S. 697, 707 (1945). 
 
Although the legislative history is silent regarding the 
Legislature's purpose in characterizing treble damages as 
"liquidated damages" in the 2008 amendment to the Wage Act, we 
infer that the Legislature knew that 
 the FLSA had characterized the "additional equal amount" of 
unpaid minimum wages and unpaid overtime compensation as 
"liquidated damages"; 
 
 the United States Supreme Court had regarded liquidated 
damages as compensatory in nature rather than punitive; and 
 
 the characterization of treble damages as "liquidated 
damages" could be used to defend an award of treble damages 
from the constitutional challenge that such an award was 
punitive in nature and therefore required a finding that 
the employer's conduct had been "outrageous."  See 
Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp., 699 F.3d 129, 140 (1st Cir. 
2012) (defendant employer's argument that treble damages 
under Wage Act violate due process in absence of finding of 
employer "reprehensibility" was "misplaced" because, "[b]y 
definition, . . . liquidated damages are not punitive 
damages"). 
 
 
 
11 
 
The defendants contend that we should make one further 
inference:  that, by characterizing treble damages as 
"liquidated damages" under the Wage Act, the Legislature 
intended to adopt Federal law and preclude a plaintiff from 
receiving any prejudgment interest on the award, including the 
award of lost wages and benefits.  We conclude that this is one 
inference too far. 
 
We recognize that the Supreme Court has declared that 
Congress, by providing an award of liquidated damages under the 
FLSA, "meant to preclude recovery of interest on minimum wages 
and liquidated damages."  Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 715-
716.  The Court described "liquidated damages" as "compensation 
for delay in payment of sums due under the [FLSA]."  Id. at 715.  
Consequently, according to the Court: 
"Since Congress has seen fit to fix the sums recoverable 
for delay, it is inconsistent with Congressional intent to 
grant recovery of interest on such sums in view of the fact 
that interest is customarily allowed as compensation for 
delay in payment.  To allow an employee to recover the 
basic statutory wage and liquidated damages, with interest, 
would have the effect of giving an employee double 
compensation for damages arising from delay in the payment 
of the basic minimum wages. . . .  Allowance of interest on 
minimum wages and liquidated damages recoverable under § 16 
(b) tends to produce the undesirable result of allowing 
interest on interest."  (Citation omitted.) 
 
Id. 
 
We are not persuaded that the Legislature shared the 
Congressional intent in this regard.  When the FLSA was enacted, 
 
 
12 
there was no Federal statute generally mandating the payment of 
prejudgment interest.  See Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat. Gypsum 
Co., 515 U.S. 189, 194 (1995).  The payment of prejudgment 
interest in Federal court, in the absence of a statute regarding 
prejudgment interest, "is governed by traditional judge-made 
principles."  Id.  In contrast, as noted earlier, the payment of 
prejudgment interest in a Massachusetts court is governed by 
statute, either G. L. c. 231, § 6B, 6C, or 6H.  The enactment of 
§ 6H, St. 1983, c. 652, § 1, mandating the payment of 
prejudgment interest where "not otherwise provided by law," 
reflects the Legislature's intent that prejudgment interest 
always be added to an award of compensatory damages. 
 
Where § 6H provides for the award of prejudgment interest 
whenever compensatory damages are awarded, an interpretation of 
§ 150, as amended, that would preclude the payment of 
prejudgment interest on the award of lost wages and benefits 
under the Wage Act would be an implied repeal of § 6H with 
respect to Wage Act awards.  Under our "long standing rule of 
statutory interpretation," the implied repeal of a statute by a 
subsequent statute has "never been favored by our law."  
Commonwealth v. Hayes, 372 Mass. 505, 511 (1977), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Bloomberg, 302 Mass. 349, 352 (1939).  Where two 
statutes appear to be in conflict, we do not mechanically 
determine "that the more 'recent' or more 'specific' statute 
 
 
13 
. . . trumps the other."  Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 
725 (2005).  Instead, we "endeavor to harmonize the two statutes 
so that the policies underlying both may be honored."  Id.  "[A] 
statute is not to be deemed to repeal or supersede a prior 
statute in whole or in part in the absence of express words to 
that effect or of clear implication."  Id., quoting Hayes, supra 
at 512.  Repeal is not clearly implied "[u]nless the prior 
statute is so repugnant to and inconsistent with the later 
enactment that both cannot stand."  Hayes, supra at 511. 
 
Here, amended § 150 is in conflict with § 6H only if we 
conclude that the Legislature intended the trebled "liquidated 
damages" to incorporate all prejudgment interest.  But, because 
we disfavor implied repeal, we may reach that conclusion only if 
§ 150 expressly states that "liquidated damages" includes all 
prejudgment interest or otherwise negates the entitlement in 
§ 6H to prejudgment interest (which it does not), or if the 
addition of prejudgment interest to an award of lost wages and 
benefits is clearly inconsistent with the characterization of 
treble damages as "liquidated damages" (which it is not).  
 
Before § 150 was amended in 2008, an aggrieved employee who 
prevailed on a Wage Act claim was entitled to prejudgment 
interest on an award of lost wages and benefits.  See, e.g., 
DeSantis v. Commonwealth Energy Sys., 68 Mass. App. Ct. 759, 
768, 771 (2007) (upholding award of prejudgment interest on 
 
 
14 
damages for lost wages and benefits under Wage Act).  Where the 
employer's conduct was so outrageous as to justify punitive 
damages, prejudgment interest would not be added to the trebled 
punitive damages award, but the award of punitive damages did 
not mean the deprivation of prejudgment interest on the award of 
lost wages and benefits.  Cf. McEvoy Travel Bur., Inc. v. Norton 
Co., 408 Mass. 704, 717 & n.9 (1990) (prejudgment interest added 
to actual damages in G. L. c. 93A judgment, but not to multiple 
punitive damages).  There is nothing in the legislative history 
of the 2008 amendment of § 150 to suggest that the Legislature 
intended to deprive an employee of prejudgment interest on lost 
wages and benefits when it characterized what had been punitive 
damages as liquidated damages.  To do so would mean that an 
employee who was deprived of wages and benefits because of the 
outrageous conduct of his or her employer would receive the same 
treble damages under the amended § 150 as he or she would have 
obtained before the amendment, albeit as liquidated damages 
rather than punitive damages, but would obtain a lesser judgment 
because of the preclusion of prejudgment interest.  Section 6H 
may be read in harmony with the amended § 150 simply by 
recognizing that the Legislature intended no change in the 
payment of prejudgment interest.6 
                     
 
6 Because we recognize that the Legislature intended no 
 
 
 
15 
 
Nor is there anything in the legislative history to suggest 
that the Legislature intended that the amended § 150 mirror the 
FLSA with respect to "liquidated damages."  We can infer that 
the Legislature did not intend the Wage Act fully to replicate 
the FLSA because it declined to adopt a good faith exception to 
the Wage Act's mandatory damages requirement.  As a result of 
the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1947), liquidated 
damages under the FLSA must be remitted "if the employer shows 
to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving 
rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable 
grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a 
violation of the [Act]."  See Reich v. Southern New England 
Telecomm. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1997).  By 
contrast, following the passage of the 2008 amendment to the 
Wage Act, the Legislature declined to accept the Governor's 
                                                                  
change in the payment of prejudgment interest, we also conclude 
that the Legislature did not intend that prejudgment interest be 
awarded on the liquidated portion of the award of damages.  If 
it did, an employee under the amended § 150 who was deprived of 
wages because of a good faith error by the employer would obtain 
a significantly larger judgment than he or she would have 
obtained before the amendment where the deprivation of wages 
arose from the employer's outrageous conduct, because 
prejudgment interest would be added to the "liquidated damages" 
portion of the award but it would not have been added to the 
punitive damages portion of the award under the previous version 
of the statute.  Under the amended § 150, prejudgment interest 
is to be calculated based on the portion of damages reflecting 
lost wages and benefits alone.  The plaintiff does not contend 
that the class members are entitled to prejudgment interest 
beyond this. 
 
 
16 
proposed amendments -- similar to those in the Portal-to-Portal 
Act -- that would have allowed an exception to mandatory treble 
damages for employers who violated the Wage Act in good faith.  
See Rosnov, 460 Mass. at 482 n.9.  The amended § 150 became law 
without the Governor's signature.  Id. 
 
 Moreover, prejudgment interest and § 150 damages are 
different in kind and accomplish distinctly different purposes.  
Prejudgment interest is not generally included within 
"liquidated damages" under our common law of contract.  In fact, 
prejudgment interest is not even a category of damages; where 
liquidated damages are awarded in a civil contract action, 
prejudgment interest is added to the award of liquidated 
damages.  See Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 397 Mass. 
837, 840 (1986) (prejudgment interest under G. L. c. 231, § 6C, 
paid on both liquidated and unliquidated damages); Cochrane v. 
Forbes, 267 Mass. 417, 420 (1929) (under common law, prejudgment 
interest on liquidated damages runs from date of demand). 
 
Prejudgment interest is awarded to compensate a plaintiff 
for the depreciation of the eventual recovery arising from the 
often substantial delay between the commencement of the action 
and the judgment.  See Smith v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 
462 Mass. 370, 375 (2012).  In the context of a violation of the 
Wage Act, "liquidated damages" properly would include the 
various additional costs that might be incurred by an employee 
 
 
17 
who has not been timely paid his or her full wages, but who 
still needs to pay for the family's housing, transportation, 
food and clothing, tuition, and medical expenses.  The damages 
arising from delay in paying the wages due might be 
considerable, depending on the employee's circumstances, but 
they would be difficult to quantify with precision.  In 
contrast, prejudgment interest on the amount of lost wages and 
benefits is simple to quantify, and would not properly be a 
subject of "liquidated damages." 
  
In short, we conclude that the Legislature's 
characterization of treble damages as "liquidated damages" in 
the 2008 amendment to § 150 was not intended to produce any 
change in the award of prejudgment interest in Wage Act 
judgments.  Prejudgment interest is still to be added to the 
amount of lost wages and benefits, and is still not to be added 
to the trebled portion of the judgment that previously had been 
punitive damages and is now characterized as liquidated damages. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, in answer to the 
certified question, we declare that, under Massachusetts law, 
statutory prejudgment interest shall be added by the clerk of 
court to the amount of lost wages and other benefits awarded as 
damages pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 150, but shall not be added 
to the additional amount of the award arising from the trebling 
of those damages as "liquidated damages." 
 
 
18 
 
The Reporter of Decisions is to furnish attested copies of 
this opinion to the clerk of this court.  The clerk in turn will 
transmit one copy, under the seal of the court, to the clerk of 
the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, as the answer to the question certified, and will 
also transmit a copy to each party.  See, e.g., DiFiore v. 
American Airlines, Inc., 454 Mass. 486, 497 (2009).