Title: Gault v. Board of County Commissioners
Citation: 208 Kan. 578, 493 P.2d 238
Docket Number: 46,192
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: January 22, 1972

208 Kan. 578 (1972)
493 P.2d 238
W.E. GAULT AND CAROLYN B. GAULT, husband and wife, Appellees,
v.
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF JOHNSON COUNTY, KANSAS, Appellant.
No. 46,192

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 22, 1972.
Maurice R. Hubbard, of Olathe, argued the cause, and James H. Bradley, of Olathe, was with him on the brief for appellant.
Park McGee, of Haskin, Noonan, McGee &amp; Hinkle, of Olathe, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FATZER, C.J.:
This is an appeal by the condemner from a jury verdict increasing the appraisers' award in a condemnation proceeding.
*579 The pertinent facts may be stated as follows: The landowners-appellees and cross-appellants owned a quarter section of land some 600 feet north of the city limits of the city of Gardner, Johnson County. On July 1, 1968, the Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County proceeded to acquire by eminent domain easements for the widening and improvement of a county road. The project commenced at the northern boundary of the city of Gardner and extended in a northernly direction for about three miles.
The land to be taken from the appellees' quarter section consisted of a strip fronting the existing road. It was 80 feet in width at the southern boundary, increasing to 100 feet, and then decreasing to 90 feet at the northern boundary. The total distance was 2,640 feet, and 4.18 acres were to be acquired.
The appraisers awarded the appellees $5,113 for the 4.18 acres taken. They were not satisfied with the award and on appeal to the district court, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the landowners in the amount of $14,000, and judgment was entered on the verdict. The condemner has appealed. The appellees have cross-appealed from the order of the district court denying them the right to recover reasonable attorney fees.
The appellant first contends that W.E. Gault and Carolyn B. Gault, the original landowners, were not the real parties in interest to appeal from the appraisers' award, and that the district court erred in overruling the condemner's motion to dismiss the appeal. More detailed facts are presented on this issue.
The condemner deposited with the clerk of the district court, in the original eminent domain proceeding, the amount of the landowners' award. This was done on August 16, 1968. A general warranty deed bearing the date of August 12, 1968, was executed by the original landowners conveying the quarter section in question to Western Lumber &amp; Building Supply, Inc. The deed contained the usual covenants of warranty, but did not contain any reservations or exceptions other than a recital as to encumbrances. It was recorded in the register of deeds office of Johnson County on August 16, 1968, at 4:19 o'clock p.m.
The record states:
In overruling the condemner's motion to dismiss, the district court stated:
On November 6, 1969, the condemner's motion to vacate and set aside the judgment was heard by the district court. At the hearing, evidence was presented which would tend to establish the deposit of the award by the condemner was made sometime after 3:24 o'clock p.m. August 16, 1968.
The district court, in overruling the condemner's motion to vacate and set aside the judgment, stated in part:
This court finds no basis for disturbing the district court's finding the money was paid in and the land taken by the condemner before the title passed by the warranty deed. Findings of fact of a district court will not be set aside on appellate review where they are supported by substantial, competent evidence, although such evidence may be conflicting. (Isis Foods, Inc. v. Mo-Kan Enterprises, Inc., 205 Kan. 203, 468 P.2d 113.) Where, as here, the condemner failed to establish the land was transferred before the money was paid into the office of the clerk of the court, there is no basis for the appellant's contention the original landowners were not the real parties in interest and the proper parties to appeal from the appraisers' award. As indicated, the 4.18 acres were acquired by the condemnation proceeding before transfer of the title to the land, and it follows the conveyance from the Gaults to the Lumber Supply Company did not include the land taken, or the proceeds therefrom, in the absence of a specific provision in the deed. This court so held in Taylor Investment Co. v. Kansas City Power &amp; Light Co., 182 Kan. 511, 322 P.2d 817:
The appellant objected to appellees' witness testifying as to other sales on the ground they were not comparable in size or in location. One sale so considered was of land 2.6 acres in size and just inside the city limits. The appellees' land was 600 feet outside the city limits.
The question of comparable sales is a discretionary matter and presents a troublesome problem. There are no two tracts exactly alike. Where there is a reasonable basis for comparison, dissimilarities affect the weight and value of the testimony rather than its competency. (29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 273 [10], p. 1208.)
Whether the properties are sufficiently similar that the sale prices will have some bearing upon the value of the property being considered, must be left largely to the sound discretion of the district court, and this court should interfere only when such discretion is abused. The rule is well stated in Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain, Rev.3d Ed., Vol. 5, Sec. 21.31, pp. 21-56, as follows:
City boundary lines may not necessarily affect the similarity of properties if the land is subject to being taken into the city limits and lies close thereto. (Morgan v. City of Overland Park, 207 Kan. 188, 483 P.2d 1079.)
Likewise, there is no merit in the appellant's contention the district court erred in allowing testimony and evidence of sales of land that were not complete or absolute sales. The appellant directs *583 our attention to the fact that offers to purchase real estate cannot be used to establish value in a condemnation proceeding (State v. Nelson, 126 Kan. 1, 266 Pac. 107), and that option contracts have also been excluded (City of Wichita v. Jennings, 199 Kan. 621, 433 P.2d 351). We have no quarrel with the conclusions there reached. In neither case was there a binding contract. See, however, Wilcox v. Wyandotte World-Wide, Inc., 208 Kan. 563, 493 P.2d 251.
In the case before us, the comparable property was sold under a binding contract for a deed, and the contract was binding on both parties. The controlling rule is stated in 31A C.J.S., Evidence, § 182 (2), p. 469, which reads:
The appellant next contends the district court erred in permitting the landowners to introduce evidence of sales of real estate which were not submitted to its counsel prior to trial as directed by the court at pretrial conference.
It appears that at a pretrial conference held on March 5, 1969, the appellant submitted a list of witnesses and sales which it intended to rely on as being comparable to the tract in question. A copy was submitted to appellees' counsel and also made an exhibit in the case. Evidence of sales which appellees intended to use were generally described in the record, but the district court directed the appellees to deliver to appellant within twenty days a written list setting forth the particulars of each sale they intended to use as evidence. The list was delivered some five and one-half months later, and only four days prior to the trial.
The specific objections made to previous sales as evidence were made on the grounds of remotenness of time; incomplete contracts of sale, and location of the property. Evidence of an offer of sale was rejected by the district court. Although counsel for appellant mentioned in his opening argument the delay in finding a list of the sales which appellees intended to use as evidence, he made no specific objection on such grounds. Where a ruling on an objection is not insisted upon, the ruling is waived. (State v. Childs, 198 Kan. 4, 11, 422 P.2d 898.) Appellate courts will review only questions shown by the record to have been presented to the district court. *584 (Rich v. Yoder, 170 Kan. 726, 228 P.2d 533.) However, if we overlook the appellant's failure to make a specific objection, and consider the question on its merits, this court would be faced with the question of the district court's discretion. In Davis v. Best Cabs, Inc., 203 Kan. 930, 457 P.2d 516, we held:
Other questions raised by the appellant have been considered and found to be without merit. We note briefly, however, the jury's verdict is supported by substantial evidence based upon present use of the quarter section, that is, agriculture and grazing purposes.
We now turn to the appellees' cross-appeal from the order of the district court denying their application for costs, such as payment for expert witnesses and attorney fees. Appellees argue with some justification they are not fully compensated if their expenses of a successful appeal, including attorney fees, are not paid by the condemning authority. However, we find no provision in our statutes specifically providing for attorney fees in condemnation cases. In the absence of such a specific provision, attorney fees will not be allowed. In McGuire v. McGuire, 190 Kan. 524, 376 P.2d 908, this court stated:
A careful examination of the record discloses no trial errors that would justify a reversal of the judgment.
The judgment is affirmed.