Title: Gustin v. Vulcan Termite and Pest Control, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1190255
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 30, 2020

REL: October 30, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
____________________
1190255
____________________
Brenda Gustin and James Gustin
v.
Vulcan Termite and Pest Control, Inc., and Fred Smith
Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court
(CV-15-901042)
PARKER, Chief Justice.
Brenda Gustin and James Gustin appeal from a summary
judgment entered by the Shelby Circuit Court in favor of
Vulcan Termite and Pest Control, Inc. ("Vulcan"), and its
1190255
general manager, Fred Smith.  We reverse the judgment in part
and affirm it in part.
I. Facts
In 1998, Vulcan was hired by a construction company to
pretreat a house in Shelby County for termites. The house was
three stories tall, with three concrete decks overlooking a
lake. The decks were supported by 18 wooden columns. 
Additionally, to the left of the front door was a porte
cochere -- a covered entrance for vehicles to pass through on
their way up the driveway. The exterior of the house was
entirely covered in faux-stone cladding.  The house was
purchased by the Gustins in 2006.
In 2009, the Gustins entered into a contract with Vulcan
for termite-damage inspection, treatment, and repair.  The
contract provided that Vulcan would periodically inspect the
house for termites and would "provide remedial service and/or
treatment as deemed necessary by Vulcan so as to control said
termites. Such service and/or treatment will be performed in
accordance with requirements of federal and state regulations
...."  The contract also provided that Vulcan would repair any
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damage caused by termites but excluded "damage[] resulting
from wood in direct contact with the soil."
In 2015, the Gustins hired a decorating company to
renovate one of the rooms in the house.  The company removed
several sections of beadboard from the porte cochere,
revealing extensive termite damage. The Gustins continued to
investigate, removing the faux-stone cladding from the facade
of the house.  Under the cladding, the Gustins discovered
active termites and severe damage to all levels and all sides
of the house, as well as damage to a deck.  The Gustins hired
an expert, who estimated that it would cost roughly $950,000
to repair the house.
Several days after the damage was discovered, Vulcan's
general manager, Smith, went to the house to inspect.  Smith
observed active termites, but Vulcan did not repair the house.
The Gustins sued Vulcan and Smith in the Shelby Circuit
Court, alleging that Vulcan had breached the contract in
multiple respects and that Vulcan had been negligent and
wanton in multiple respects.  After extensive discovery,
Vulcan and Smith moved for a summary judgment.  The court
granted the motion.  The court ruled that some of the Gustins'
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claims were barred by a class-action settlement.  Further,
regarding the breach-of-contract claims, the court ruled:
"[T]here is no evidence that Vulcan breached the contract by
failing to discover hidden termites.  The Gustins presented no
evidence that the annual inspections were not performed in
accordance with the regulations or industry standards."  With
respect to the negligence and wantonness claims, the court
ruled: "The Gustin[s'] negligence/recklessness/wantonness
claim[s] ... also revolve around the inspections and 
treatment
of the home.  There is no evidence that [Vulcan and Smith] did
not perform their duties in accordance with the regulations or
industry standards."  The Gustins appeal.
II. Standard of Review
This 
Court 
reviews 
a 
summary 
judgment 
de 
novo,
"apply[ing] the same standard of review as the trial court." 
Slay v. Keller Indus., Inc., 823 So. 2d 623, 624 (Ala. 2001). 
"In order to enter a summary judgment, the trial court must
determine: 1) that there is no genuine issue of material fact,
and 2) that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law."  Williams v. Ditto, 601 So. 2d 482, 484 (Ala.
1992).  This Court must view the evidence in the light most
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favorable to, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of,
the nonmoving party.  Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. DPF
Architects, P.C., 792 So. 2d 369, 372 (Ala. 2001). 
III. Analysis
A. The Class-Action Settlement
The Gustins argue that the trial court incorrectly ruled
that a 2005 class-action-settlement agreement between Vulcan
and the previous owners of the Gustins' house barred some of
the Gustins' claims. In the summary-judgment order, the court
wrote: "The Gustins are ... barred [from] asserting any claims
[that arose] prior to their April 2006 purchase[,] due to a
class action settlement that the previous owners entered into
with Vulcan."  On appeal, the Gustins concede that, in the
trial court, they were not attempting to assert any claims
that arose before their purchase of the house. Therefore, the
trial court's ruling on this issue did not affect the
viability of any of the Gustins' claims. Hence, the
correctness or incorrectness of that ruling is irrelevant to
the outcome of the case and cannot be a basis for reversal of
the summary judgment.  
B. Contractual Duty-to-Repair Claim
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The Gustins argue that the trial court erred by entering
a 
summary 
judgment 
on 
their 
breach-of-contract claim 
involving
Vulcan's duty to repair termite damage because, they assert,
there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
Vulcan breached that duty.  Vulcan and Smith respond that the
termite damage came within the exclusion in the contract of
"damages resulting from wood in direct contact with the soil." 
Vulcan and Smith assert that W. Bruce Alverton, Vulcan's
termite expert, testified in a deposition that some of the
wood framing of the house was "below-grade," that is, below
ground level. Vulcan and Smith also argue that Alverton
identified several instances of "wood-to-ground contact."  
However, as the Gustins point out, Alverton's testimony
was not clearly evidence of the condition required to meet the
exclusion: "wood in direct contact with the soil" (emphasis
added).  Rather, in the context of Alverton's whole testimony,
his statements can reasonably be interpreted as meaning that,
although the wood was below ground level and in contact with
the concrete foundation, it was shielded from direct contact
with the soil by the faux-stone cladding and the foundation. 
For example, Alverton testified that "the level of the
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[concrete foundation] slab to the edge of the outside grade is
almost even" and that "on the ... outside perimeter of that
concrete slab there is a faux-stone installation that rests
below grade that allowed the termites to enter from the
outside foundation up behind the faux stone into the stud
wall." Alverton also indicated that the "outside grade"
(presumably including the soil) had been in contact with the
faux stone before it was removed and that "the faux stone came
to the ground and came to the top of the concrete all the way
around the property."  Although Alverton's testimony is not a
model of clarity, it appears to indicate that the wood-stud
walls of the house rested on the concrete foundation and were
covered on the exterior by the faux-stone cladding.  Thus, a
genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the wood
was in direct contact with the soil. 
Moreover, even assuming wood-to-soil contact existed,
there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
the damage to the house "result[ed] from" that contact, as
required by the exclusion.  In his deposition, Alverton
discussed at least four causes of the termite infestation,
including (1) moisture intrusion caused by the angle of a
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portion of the roof, which allowed rain to "continually wet[]
the [front] foundation wall, causing wood rot and decay and
subterranean termite damage"; (2) a roof leak that, coupled
with the lack of a "footer" or concrete barrier against the
ground, allowed a moisture intrusion that permitted termites
to enter from the ground; (3) the angle of the roof over the
deck columns, which allowed rainwater to enter an "envelope"
between the faux stone and the columns, which "made a
situation where it was possible for subterranean termites to
survive 
without 
wood-to-ground contact"; and 
(4) 
decaying 
wood
in the framing around a basement window.  Alverton did not
explain which of these causes, if any, were related to direct
wood-to-soil contact.  Therefore, genuine issues of material
fact existed as to whether the wood-to-soil exclusion applied
and thus whether Vulcan breached its duty to repair.
Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment as to the
Gustins' breach-of-contract claim regarding the duty to
repair.
C. Negligence and Wantonness Claims
The Gustins also argue that the trial court erred by
determining that there was not substantial evidence that
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Vulcan was negligent or wanton.  The Gustins identify a number
of duties they assert that Vulcan breached.  Specifically, the
Gustins assert that Vulcan was negligent or wanton in the
following ways:
•
Vulcan did not report conditions conducive to
termites when it inspected the house at the
time of the Gustins' purchase; Vulcan thereby
failed to perform its work in a good and
workmanlike manner. 
•
Vulcan never informed the Gustins that it could
not perform an adequate inspection.
•
Although aware that it could not perform a
visual inspection in certain areas, Vulcan did
not "sound or probe" anywhere on the Gustins'
house.
•
Vulcan never inspected portions of the house
not amenable to visual inspection to determine
whether there were construction defects or
deficiencies that created conditions conducive
to termites or that hindered Vulcan's ability
to perform a meaningful inspection.
•
Vulcan never sought information about the
construction materials used in the house.
•
Vulcan never re-treated the house, even though
it knew the earlier-applied termiticide was no
longer effective.
•
Vulcan never re-treated the house, even though
it knew the spot treatment it performed in 2009
did not cover the front of the house.
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The Gustins' tort claims were predicated exclusively on
duties, 
actions, 
and 
omissions related 
to 
Vulcan's 
performance
of its termite-treatment contract. "[A] mere failure to
perform a contractual obligation is not a tort." Barber v.
Business Prods. Ctr., Inc., 677 So. 2d 223, 228 (Ala. 1996).
The Gustins have cited no legal authority in support of their
position that a negligence or wantonness claim can be
predicated merely on a defendant's failure to 
properly perform
under a contract, nor have they cited any authority or
provided any reasoning in support of their implicit argument
that 
Vulcan's 
acts 
and 
omissions 
were 
somehow
extracontractual. Thus, we affirm the trial court's summary
judgment on all the negligence and wantonness claims. 
D. Other Breach-of-Contract Claims
In opposition to the motion for a summary judgment and in
their appellate briefs, the Gustins advanced numerous other
breach-of-contract arguments related to the allegations that
were also included in their tort claims:
"Vulcan breached its duties to use reasonable care
and perform its work in a workman-like manner in 6
ways: (1) during the seven ... years it inspected
the home for the Gustins, Vulcan never inspected or
treated 
the 
rear 
posts/columns 
and 
only
inspected/treated the porte cochere once; (2) Vulcan
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knew of previous termite activity at the home but
never investigated to see if additional activity was
present at the home; (3) Vulcan knew it was
incapable of adequately inspecting behind the home's
exterior cladding for areas conducive to termite
activity but never performed any tests, other than
site evaluations, and never advised the Gustins that
it could not adequately inspect the property; (4)
Vulcan was aware of areas of the home's exterior
faux-stone cladding that extended below grade but
never alerted the Gustins that such condition was
conducive 
to 
termites; 
(5) 
Vulcan 
knew 
the
termiticide it used in 1998 was ineffective for long
periods of time and failed to retreat the property
with another chemical until over ten ... years later
in 2009; (6) Vulcan improperly treated areas of the
home's foundation by drilling application holes over
twelve ... inches apart, contrary to applicable
labels and regulations; and (7) even after being
advised to properly treat the home by the [Alabama
Department of Agriculture and Industries] in 2015,
Vulcan 
failed 
to 
use 
the 
proper 
amount 
of
termiticide."
(Gustins' brief, pp. 25-26.)  With respect to these breach-of-
contract claims, the trial court's summary-judgment order
stated:
"[T]here is no evidence that Vulcan breached the
contract by failing to discover hidden termites. The
Gustins presented no evidence that the annual
inspections were not performed in accordance with
the regulations or industry standards. Summary
judgment is granted as to the breach of contract
claims." 
Notably, the alleged acts and omissions that underlay the
Gustins' breach-of-contract claims quoted above were not tied
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to any duty Vulcan had to find hidden termites or to comply
with inspection regulations or standards. In particular, the
Gustins' 
breach-of-contract 
claims 
were 
predicated 
on 
Vulcan's
alleged failure to report conditions conducive to termites in
accordance with industry standards; Vulcan's alleged failure
to adequately advise the Gustins of termite activity and of
Vulcan's inability to inspect certain areas; and Vulcan's
alleged failure to properly treat the house. 
Moreover, there was substantial overlap between the
evidence and arguments that the Gustins advanced in support of
these breach-of-contract claims and those they advanced in
support of their tort claims. Although the trial court
assessed in detail this evidence and these arguments in
relation to the Gustins' tort claims, the court did not
indicate that it assessed the overlapping evidence and
arguments in relation to the breach-of-contract claims. This
inconsistency indicates either that the trial court did not
recognize that the evidence that supported the tort claims
also supported the breach-of-contract claims or that it
incorrectly concluded that the evidence that was insufficient
to support the tort claims was therefore insufficient to
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support 
the 
related 
breach-of-contract 
claims. 
Regardless, 
the
trial court's judgment was incorrect. Our review of the record
indicates 
that 
the 
Gustins 
submitted substantial evidence 
that
Vulcan committed the acts and omissions underlying each of the
seven breach-of-contract claims listed above. That evidence
created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
Vulcan breached its duty to "perform all services in a
workmanlike manner," as the contract required.  
The determination whether a defendant has committed a
material breach of contract is "typically for a [fact-finder]
to make," and summary judgment is appropriate only when "'"the
question is so clear as to be decided only in one way."'"
LNM1, LLC v. TP Props., LLC, 296 So. 3d 792, 797 (Ala. 2019)
(quoting Harrison v. Family Home Builders, LLC, 84 So. 3d 879,
890 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011), quoting in turn Birmingham News Co.
v. Fitzgerald, 222 Ala. 386, 388, 133 So. 31, 32 (1931)).
Therefore, the trial court erred in entering a summary
judgment on these other breach-of-contract claims. 
IV. Conclusion   
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the summary
judgment with respect to the Gustins' breach-of-contract
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claims.  We affirm the judgment in all other respects, and we
remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Bolin, Wise, Sellers, Mendheim, Stewart, and Mitchell,
JJ., concur.
Bryan, J., concurs in the result.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result and dissents in part.
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SHAW, Justice (concurring in the result and dissenting in
part).
I concur in the result reached by the main opinion. I
dissent, however, as to Part III.D.
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