Title: Mark Sonday v. Dave Kohel Agency, Inc.
Citation: 2006 WI 92
Docket Number: 2004AP002322
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2006

2006 WI 92 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP2322 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Mark Sonday and Joyce Sonday, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Dave Kohel Agency, Inc., 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 27, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Fisher 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants, there were briefs by John L. 
DeStefanis, Catherine A. Goodman, and Fuchs, DeStefanis & Boyle, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by John L. DeStefanis. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief by Susan J. 
Marguet, Brian Sajdak, and Weiss Berzowski Brady LLP, Delafield, 
and oral argument by Susan J. Marguet. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Debra P. Conrad and 
Reese C. Phillips, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Realtors 
Association. 
 
 
2006 WI 92
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP2322  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV907) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Mark Sonday and Joyce Sonday, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Dave Kohel Agency, Inc., 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Kenosha 
County, Michael S. Fisher, Judge.  Affirmed in part, reversed in 
part and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.  This case comes to us on 
certification from the court of appeals. Mark and Joyce Sonday 
appeal from a summary judgment in favor of Dave Kohel Agency, 
Inc., with whom the Sondays listed two parcels of commercial 
property.  The circuit court, Honorable Michael S. Fisher, 
Kenosha County, granted summary judgment in favor of Kohel and 
dismissed the Sondays' action seeking a declaration that Kohel 
did not have a right to a commission under its listing contract 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
2 
 
with 
the 
Sondays 
because 
the 
Sondays' 
properties 
were 
transferred as the result of a condemnation action.  On appeal, 
the Sondays contend that Kohel is not entitled to a commission 
because a condemnation is not a "transaction" as the term is 
defined under Wisconsin law, nor as the term is used in the 
listing contract.   
¶2 
The court of appeals certified two questions to this 
court: 1) is a real estate broker entitled to a broker's 
commission under a listing contract when the listed real estate 
is condemned and acquired by a governmental agency during the 
listing; and 2) if the real estate listing contract permits 
recovery of a broker's commission in a condemnation, does public 
policy preclude such payment? 
¶3 
We conclude that the transfer of property by a 
condemnation action constitutes a sale under the terms of the 
contract in this case.  We further conclude that the real estate 
broker is entitled to a 6 percent commission based on the 
jurisdictional award.  We also conclude that public policy does 
not preclude Kohel from recovering a commission in this case.  
We therefore affirm the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment.  Because we conclude that the condemnation action 
constituted a sale under line 49 of the commission clause as 
opposed to a transaction under line 52, we reverse the amount of 
the judgment and remand the cause to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
3 
 
I 
¶4 
The parties stipulated to the following facts.  Mark 
and Joyce Sonday ("the Sondays") owned two parcels of commercial 
property 
in 
the 
Village 
of 
Pleasant 
Prairie, 
Wisconsin 
("Village").  The Sondays owned and operated a military museum 
on one of the parcels, and Sonday's Vans, an automotive repair, 
restoration, and customization business, on the other parcel.     
¶5 
On May 15, 2002, the Sondays contracted with the Dave 
Kohel Agency, Inc. ("Kohel") to list the two parcels.1  Both Dave 
Kohel, Jr. and Dave Kohel, Sr. are licensed real estate brokers 
in Kenosha.  The parties used the standard WB-5 commercial 
listing contract form approved by the Wisconsin Department of 
Regulation and Licensing.  The contract provided a 6 percent 
commission and ran for a term of one year.  Kohel listed the 
military museum parcel for $2,250,000, and the Sonday's Vans 
parcel for $800,000. 
¶6 
On May 28, 2002, David Kohel, Sr. met with Pleasant 
Prairie 
Village 
Administrator 
Michael 
Pollocoff. 
In 
an 
affidavit, David Kohel, Sr. stated that he met with Pollocoff 
"about Dave Kohel Agency, Inc.'s listing of the Sondays' and 
other properties and to discuss the Village's possible purchase 
and the properties' development potential."  Affidavit of David 
                                                 
1 The Sondays had earlier contracted with the Dave Kohel 
Agency (Kohel) from September 1998 to September 2000 to list the 
parcel containing Sonday's Vans, and from July 1999 to January 
2000 to list the military museum parcel.  Neither parcel was 
sold during the terms of these earlier contracts.  These 
contracts are not at issue in this case. 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
4 
 
Kohel, Sr., February 4, 2004.  According to an affidavit by 
Pollocoff,  
In the year 2002, I was approached by Mr. Dave Kohel 
regarding the properties of Mr. and Mrs. Joyce Sonday 
[sic].   
Mr. Kohel suggested the Village of Pleasant Prairie 
purchase the Sondays' properties for an amount in the 
two million dollar range. 
I advised Mr. Kohel that the Village of Pleasant 
Prairie was not interested in purchasing the Sondays' 
properties for two million dollars. 
The Village of Pleasant Prairie did not negotiate with 
or through Dave Kohel Agency, Inc. for the purchase of 
the Sondays' properties at that time. 
The 
Village 
of 
Pleasant 
Prairie 
has 
not 
since 
negotiated with or through Dave Kohel Agency, Inc. for 
the purchase of the Sondays' properties. 
All actions for obtaining the Sondays' properties have 
been done under state statutes for eminent domain 
through 
the 
Community 
Development 
Authority 
and 
through HNTB. 
Affidavit of Michael R. Pollocoff, March 15, 2004. 
¶7 
In early June 2002, the Village held a hearing to 
consider the possible condemnation of properties in the vicinity 
of I-94, State Highway 165, and County Highway Q ("Redevelopment 
Area"), which included the Sondays' properties.  On June 17, 
2002, the Village voted to establish a community development 
authority ("CDA") to implement a proposed "master land use plan" 
to 
eliminate 
blight 
and 
redevelop 
properties 
in 
the 
Redevelopment Area ("Redevelopment Plan").   
¶8 
In a letter from the Sondays' attorney, dated July 3, 
2002, the Sondays instructed Kohel not to contact the Village on 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
5 
 
their behalf, and informed Kohel of their belief that Kohel 
would not be entitled to any commission under the listing 
contract 
if 
the 
Village 
acquired 
the 
properties 
by 
a 
condemnation action.  The letter states, in relevant part: 
It is our understanding that you induced Mr. Sonday to 
sign the contract by indicating that you had lined up 
a buyer to purchase the property for more than 
$2,000,000. 
If you did have such a buyer available, you have not 
provided him; if you had the Village of Pleasant 
Prairie in mind because of your knowledge of the 
pending condemnation, it is our opinion that you would 
not be entitled to a commission based upon any funds 
paid to the Sondays by the Village.  Mr. Sonday will 
honor the contract to the extent that you produce a 
buyer, other than the Village of Pleasant Prairie, 
willing to pay $2,500,000 for his land. 
We are writing specifically to indicate that you do 
not have authority to negotiate on Mr. Sonday's behalf 
with the Village, are directed not to contact them, 
and you will not be compensated in any regard if the 
pending condemnation results in a negotiated purchase 
with the Village of Pleasant Prairie. 
¶9 
In response to this letter, Kohel recorded its intent 
to claim liens on the two properties with the Kenosha County 
Register of Deeds on September 19, 2002, and served notices of 
its intent to claim broker liens against the properties on 
September 26, 2002, in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 779.32(3) 
(2003-04).2   
                                                 
2 Under this statute,  
A broker has a lien under sub. (2) (a) or (b) only if 
the broker files or records a written notice of intent 
to claim a lien under this section at the office of 
the register of deeds for the county in which the 
commercial real estate is located and delivers a copy 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
6 
 
¶10 The 
CDA 
adopted 
by-laws 
and 
appointed 
Village 
Administrator Pollocoff as the Executive Director of the CDA on 
September 25, 2002.  On December 4, 2002, the CDA met to 
consider a draft of the Redevelopment Plan.  The CDA discussed, 
among other properties, the two parcels owned by the Sondays, 
examined photographs taken of the Sondays' properties, and 
referred to observations made previously by the CDA of the 
Sondays' properties on October 22 and November 22, 2002.  The 
CDA concluded that the Sondays' use of the property was 
nonconforming with Village Zoning Ordinance requirements and 
that blight conditions existed.  The CDA delivered a copy of a 
report 
to 
owners 
of 
property 
affected 
by 
the 
proposed 
Redevelopment Plan, which included the Sondays.  On January 2, 
2003, the CDA held a public hearing, allowing members of the 
public to comment on and ask questions about the proposed 
Redevelopment Plan.  Mr. Sonday attended this meeting, and 
stated that he was offended by the CDA's description of his 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the notice to the person owing the commission under 
sub. (2)(a) or (b).  A broker has a lien under sub. 
(2)(c) only if the broker provides a written notice of 
intent to claim a lien under this section to the 
person owing the compensation under sub. (2)(c).  All 
notices required under this subsection shall contain 
the name of each party to the agreement under which 
the lien is claimed, the date that the agreement was 
entered into and a brief description of the commercial 
real estate on which the lien is intended to be 
claimed . . . .   
Wis. Stat. § 779.32(3). 
 
All 
references 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
7 
 
properties.3  Mr. Sonday also noted that he had no problem 
relocating his museum.  At this hearing, there was no discussion 
regarding compensation for the property.  The record reflects no 
further discussions between the Sondays and the CDA prior to the 
May 15, 2003, termination of the original contract. 
¶11 The Village found the Redevelopment Area to be 
blighted on January 6, 2003.  Resolution of the Village of 
Pleasant Prairie Board of Trustees No. 03-03, January 6, 2003.  
On February 12, 2003, the Village and the CDA approved the 
Redevelopment Plan.  On April 16, 2003, the CDA approved an 
amended 
relocation 
order, 
permitting 
acquisition 
of 
the 
Redevelopment Area, including Sondays' properties.   
¶12 On May 9, 2003, pursuant to lines 63-76 of the listing 
contract, Kohel served the Sondays with a notice of extension of 
the May 2002 listing contracts for one year with respect to 
"protected buyers" as defined in the contract.  Kohel listed the 
                                                 
3 At the December 4, 2002, CDA meeting, the members of the 
CDA discussed the Redevelopment Plan Project Area as "blighted" 
and "nonconforming with Village Zoning Ordinances" because there 
existed a "substantial number of substandard, deteriorated or 
deteriorating 
structures, 
predominance 
of 
defective 
or 
inadequate street layout, faulty lot layout in relation to size, 
adequacy, accessibility or usefulness, unsanitary or unsafe 
conditions, 
deterioration 
of 
site 
or 
other 
improvements . . . constitut[ing] 
an 
economic 
or 
social 
liability and [] a menace to the public health or welfare in its 
present condition and use."  The Sondays' museum parcel was 
described as a "military museum salvage yard."  At the January 
2, 2003, public hearing before the CDA, Mark Sonday stated that 
he was offended that his property had been described as a 
junkyard and that they incorrectly described his van shop as a 
vacant commercial building. 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
8 
 
Village, Panattoni Company, and Trammell Crow as protected 
buyers.   
¶13 On June 3, 2003, the Sondays demanded Kohel remove its 
"intent to file lien" from the Sondays' title.  Kohel responded 
on June 12, 2003, stating that the Sondays breached the listing 
contract by refusing to allow Kohel to negotiate on their behalf 
and attempting to terminate the listing contract as to the 
Village. 
¶14 The CDA approved a second amended relocation order and 
plan permitting the acquisition of the Redevelopment Area on 
August 20, 2003.  On October 27, 2003, the Sondays received an 
offer on behalf of the CDA to purchase the military museum 
parcel for $812,300.  The offer was later increased to $850,000 
on January 20, 2004.  On December 4, 2003, the Sondays received 
an offer from the CDA to purchase the van business parcel for 
$532,000.  The Sondays made no response to these offers.     
¶15 On February 19, 2004, the Sondays received statutory 
jurisdictional offers, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3), on 
behalf of the CDA to purchase the military museum parcel for 
$850,000 and the van business parcel for $532,000.  The Sondays 
did not respond to the jurisdictional offer.  Because the 
Sondays did not accept the jurisdictional offer, on February 23, 
2004, the CDA filed a petition with the Kenosha County circuit 
court, 
pursuant 
to 
§ 32.05(7), 
for 
proceedings 
on 
the 
condemnation action.  The CDA also filed two lis pendens with 
the Kenosha County Register of Deeds, encumbering both parcels, 
pursuant to § 32.05(7). 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
9 
 
¶16 On March 4, 2004, the CDA filed statutory compensation 
awards with the Kenosha County Clerk of Courts and recorded the 
awards 
with 
the 
Register 
of 
Deeds, 
as 
required 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7).  The jurisdictional award of $1,382,000 
was paid by the CDA to the Sondays, and title to the property 
transferred 
from 
the 
Sondays 
to 
the 
CDA, 
pursuant 
to 
§ 32.05(7)(c). 
 
The 
Sondays 
appealed 
the 
amount 
of 
the 
jurisdictional award, and that appeal was settled on December 
17, 2004.4 
¶17 On March 16, 2004, the Sondays and Kohel stipulated 
that the Sondays would hold $228,750 in escrow for Kohel pending 
resolution of their disagreement over Kohel's commission under 
the terms of the contract. 
¶18 On July 9, 2004, the Sondays sued Kohel, seeking a 
judgment declaring that Kohel had no right to a commission under 
the listing contract, and that it was not entitled to file a 
broker's lien on the properties.  Kohel defended against the 
suit and filed a counterclaim seeking full commission on the 
listing contracts.  Kohel moved for summary judgment on the 
Sondays' complaint and its counterclaim.  The parties filed 
jointly an extensive stipulation of facts, and submitted 
affidavits and supporting briefs. 
                                                 
4 Sonday v. Village of Pleasant Prairie Cmty. Dev. Auth., 
Kenosha County Circuit Court, No. 2004CV748.  The settlement 
included an additional compensation for the Sondays' property 
for $872,000, plus $8,400 for appraisals and $160,000 for 
attorneys' fees. 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
10 
 
¶19 The 
circuit court 
for Kenosha County, 
Honorable 
Michael S. Fisher, determined that the listing contract was in 
effect at the time of the transfer of the properties to the CDA.  
The 
court 
granted 
Kohel's 
motion 
for 
summary 
judgment, 
dismissing the Sondays' complaint and ordering the Sondays to 
pay 6 percent commission on the list prices of the properties, 
plus attorney fees.  The circuit court stayed execution of the 
judgment upon the Sondays' motion pending the appeal.  The court 
of appeals certified the case to this court, and we accepted 
certification. 
II 
¶20 This case is a review of the circuit court's grant of 
summary judgment.  We review a grant of summary judgment de 
novo, applying the same methodology as the circuit court.  
Alvarado v. Sersch, 2003 WI 55, ¶10, 262 Wis. 2d 74, 662 
N.W.2d 350.  The court will affirm a grant of summary judgment 
only 
when 
"the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  See also 
Alvarado, 262 Wis. 2d 74, ¶10. 
¶21 We are asked to determine whether the transfer of 
property by condemnation is covered under the terms of a 
particular brokerage contract.  "The ultimate aim of all 
contract interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the 
parties."  DeWitt Ross & Stevens, S.C. v. Galaxy Gaming & Racing 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
11 
 
Ltd. P'ship, 2004 WI 92, ¶44, 273 Wis. 2d 577, 682 N.W.2d 839 
(quotation and citation omitted).  We interpret a contract to 
give "reasonable meaning to each provision and without rendering 
any portion superfluous."  Id., 44 (citation omitted).   
III 
¶22 This case requires us to determine whether the 
transfer of property by a condemnation action5 is covered under 
                                                 
5 The United States and Wisconsin Constitutions prohibit the 
government from taking private property for public use without 
just compensation.  U.S. Const., amend. V; Wis. Const. art. I 
sec. 13.  Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 32 addresses who may 
condemn private property and the procedures for a lawful 
condemnation action.  Under this statutory scheme, certain 
departments, 
municipalities, 
boards, 
commissions, 
public 
officers, and corporations are authorized to "acquire by 
condemnation any real estate and personal property . . . for the 
purposes specified, in case such property cannot be acquired by 
gift or purchase at an agreed price."  Wis. Stat. § 32.02.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05 
establishes 
the 
procedures 
for 
the 
acquisition of private property for transportation matters; 
§ 32.06 addresses the procedures for all acquisitions other than 
those involving transportation matters.   
Because 
the 
condemnation 
in 
this 
case 
involves 
Wis. Stat. § 66.1333, addressing blight elimination and slum 
clearance, the condemning authority can choose to proceed with 
the condemnation under either Wis. Stat. § 32.05 or § 32.06.  
§ 32.05.  Here, the CDA's condemnation of the Sondays' property 
proceeded under § 32.05. 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
12 
 
the 
WB-5 
Listing 
Contract 
for 
purposes 
of 
the 
broker's 
commission.  We operate under the premise that at least some 
contract claims are preserved apart from and despite any 
condemnation action.  See Hastings Realty Corp. v. Texas Co., 28 
Wis. 2d 305, 317, 137 N.W.2d 79 (1965); Kilps v. Pawinski, 27 
Wis. 2d 467, 473, 134 N.W.2d 470 (1965). 
¶23 Under Wisconsin law, a broker is required to enter 
into a written agreement, such as a listing contract, before 
providing services to a consumer.  Wis. Stat. §§ 240.106 and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Prior to condemning private property, the government must 
first "attempt to negotiate personally with the owner or one of 
the owners or his or her representative of the property sought 
to 
be 
taken 
for 
the 
purchase 
of 
the 
same."  
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2a).  If the private owner of the property 
rejects the government's offer(s) to purchase the property, the 
government is authorized to make a jurisdictional offer for the 
property.  §§ 32.05(3) & (4).  "The owner has 20 days from the 
date of personal service of the jurisdictional offer . . . in 
which to accept the jurisdictional offer . . . ."  § 32.05(6).  
If the owner fails to respond within the requisite 20 days, the 
government may file a petition for condemnation in the circuit 
court for the county in which the property to be taken is 
located.  § 32.05(7).   
Upon filing a petition for condemnation, if the government 
entity seeking to acquire the property is entitled to condemn 
the property, the circuit judge assigns the matter to the 
county's 
condemnation 
commissioners, 
who 
ascertain 
the 
compensation 
for 
the 
taking 
of 
the 
property.  
Wis. Stat. § 32.08(5). 
 
Both 
the 
private 
owner 
and 
the 
government may appeal the commission's award within 60 days of 
the date the award is filed.  § 32.05(10)(a). 
6 In 2004, Wis. Stat. § 240.10 read: 
No broker may provide brokerage services without an 
agency agreement that authorizes the broker to provide 
those brokerage services.  The agency agreement shall 
contain a statement of the terms and conditions of the 
brokerage services that the broker will provide, 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
13 
 
452.135(1) 
(2003-04); 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
RL 
24.08.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 240.10 is the primary law that establishes the 
requirements for listing contracts.  If the contract fails to 
meet the requirements of § 240.10, the broker cannot enforce the 
right to a commission even if the owner sells to a buyer 
procured by the broker.  Raskin v. Hack, 16 Wis. 2d 296, 299, 
114 N.W.2d 483 (1962) ("In order to carry out the legislative 
intent, courts hold void contracts which do not substantially 
comply with the same.) (citation omitted); Gilbert v. Ludtke, 1 
Wis. 2d 228, 232, 83 N.W.2d 669 (1957) ("[T]he statute means 
just what it says and [] there can be no recoveries of real-
estate brokers' commissions upon quantum meruit.") (citation 
omitted); Otto v. Black Eagle Oil Co., 266 Wis. 215, 218, 63 
N.W.2d 47 (1954) ("[W]e believe that in order to carry out the 
legislative intent we should hold contracts void which do not 
substantially comply with the statute.") (citations omitted).  
See also Wozny v. Basack, 21 Wis. 2d 86, 88, 123 N.W.2d 513 
(1963); Hale v. Kreisel, 194 Wis. 271, 272-73, 215 N.W. 227 
(1927); Gifford v. Straub, 172 Wis. 396, 399-400, 179 N.W. 600 
(1920). 
¶24 In 
1982, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature 
created 
the 
Department of Regulation and Licensing ("Department"), granting 
                                                                                                                                                             
including a statement required under s. 452.138, if 
applicable.   
We note that this statute was amended by 2005 Wis. Act 87, 
effective July 1, 2006.  The 2003-04 statute is at issue in this 
case. 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
14 
 
the 
Department 
rule-making 
authority,7 
and 
directing 
the 
Department to approve forms for use in real estate practice.  
Wis. Stat. § 452.05(1)(b); Admin. Code RL § 16.03. In compliance 
with these statutory and administrative code requirements, the 
Department has prepared and approved numerous forms, including 
the WB-5 Commercial Listing Contract-Exclusive Right to Sell 
("WB-5 Listing Contract"), at issue in this case.8  The WB-5 
Listing Contract was made available on April 1, 2000, and 
brokers have been required to use this form since September 1, 
2000.9   
 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 227.11(2)(b) 
confers 
rulemaking 
authority 
on 
the 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Regulation 
and 
Licensing (Department) to effectuate the purpose of chapter 452.  
See also § 452.07 (directing the Department to review rules that 
affect the real estate profession).  In addition, chapter 452 
establishes the Department's responsibilities with regard to the 
licensing and education of brokers and salespersons.  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 452.03, 452.05, 452.09, 452.10, 452.11, 452.12, 452.14, 
452.15, and 452.17 of the statutes, and chapters RL 1, 2, 6, 12, 
13, 17, 22, 23, 25, and 26 of the rules.  See also Minter, Scott 
C. & Richard J. Staff, Wisconsin Real Estate Law 2, 21 (2003).   
8  The Department has approved, for use by brokers:  
Forms prepared and approved by the state bar of 
Wisconsin for deeds, mortgages, mortgage notes, truth-
in-lending disclosures, land contracts, release of 
mortgage, satisfaction of mortgage, assignment of 
mortgage and assignment of land contract. 
Wis. Admin. Code RL 16.03(1)(a). 
9 The administrative rules that regulate the use of approved 
forms are found in RL 16.  Under RL 16.04, licensed brokers must 
use approved listing form in every case where there is an 
appropriate listing form. 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
15 
 
A 
¶25 Before we determine whether a condemnation action is 
covered under the WB-5 Listing Contract, a threshold issue is 
whether the contract was in effect when the Village condemned 
the Sondays' property in March 2004.  Without a valid listing 
contract, Kohel would not be entitled to any commission.  See 
Raskin, 16 Wis. 2d at 299.   
¶26 The listing contract between the Sondays and Kohel was 
for a one-year term, beginning on May 15, 2002, and terminating 
at midnight on May 15, 2003.  The CDA took legal title of the 
Sondays' property through condemnation action on March 4, 2004.  
Although the March 2004 condemnation action is clearly not 
within the original one-year term of the contract, the WB-5 
Listing Contract includes provisions to extend the listing for 
an additional year when certain conditions are met.  We must 
therefore determine whether any of the contractual conditions 
for extending the listing were met that would have extended the 
listing to include March 4, 2004.   
¶27 The contract can be extended for one year for: 
any buyer who personally or through any person acting 
for such buyer either negotiated to acquire an 
interest in the Property or submitted a written offer 
to purchase, exchange or option during the term of 
this Listing.   
The contract further establishes: 
If 
the 
extension 
is 
based 
on 
negotiation, 
the 
extension shall be effective only if the buyer's name 
is delivered to Seller, in writing, no later than 
three days after the expiration of the Listing, unless 
Seller was directly involved in discussions of the 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
16 
 
potential terms upon which buyer might acquire an 
interest in the Property. 
¶28 Based on these provisions, the term of the listing 
contract is automatically extended for one year, extending the 
broker's ability to earn commission, if during the term of the 
listing contract, the buyer (1) submitted a written offer to 
purchase; or (2) negotiated directly with the seller.  If the 
buyer negotiated with the broker during the term of the listing 
contract, then the listing contract is extended for one year 
only if the broker delivers the potential buyer's name to the 
seller within three days of the expiration of the contract term. 
¶29 In 1999, the Department revised the WB-5 listing 
contract form to define the term "negotiated."  Lines 71-73 of 
the current listing contract between the parties defines 
"negotiated" as a discussion of "the potential terms upon which 
buyer might acquire an interest in the Property or to attend an 
individual showing of the Property."   
¶30 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
contractual 
definition 
of 
"negotiate" is clear and unambiguous.  Gottsacker v. Monnier, 
2005 WI 69, ¶22, 281 Wis. 2d 361, 697 N.W.2d 436 ("When the 
terms of a contract are plain and unambiguous, we will construe 
it as it stands.").  In order to satisfy the definitional 
requirements for a negotiation, therefore, a broker must discuss 
"potential terms upon which the buyer might acquire an interest 
in the Property."10   
                                                 
10 In 1993, the Wisconsin Legislature created subsection 
(5m) to Wis. Stat. § 452.01, which defined "negotiate" as 
applied to real estate practice in Wisconsin.  The relevant 
subsection of this statute states: 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
17 
 
¶31 In addition, the listing contract requires a broker to 
notify the seller of "protected buyers" within three days of the 
termination of the listing contract. This court has consistently 
concluded that a provision entitling a broker to commission 
after the listing has expired is read strictly against the 
broker.  Dunn & Stringer Inv. Co. v. Krauss, 264 Wis. 615, 619, 
60 N.W.2d 346 (1953); Klapinski v. Polewski, 19 Wis. 2d 124, 
126-27, 119 N.W.2d 424 (1963).   
¶32 In the present case, the CDA did not submit a written 
offer to purchase the Sondays' property during the term of the 
original listing contract. In addition, prior to the termination 
                                                                                                                                                             
"Negotiate" means to act as an intermediary between 
the parties to a transaction, including . . . 
[f]acilitating 
or 
participating 
in 
the 
parties' 
discussion of the terms of a contract or agreement 
concerning a transaction. . . .  
Wis. 
Stat. § 
452.01(5m); 
1993 Wisconsin Act 
127. 
 The 
legislature further defined a "party" as a person "seeking to 
sell, exchange, buy or rent an interest in real estate . . . ."  
Wis. Stat. § 452.01(5r),  and a "transaction" as "the sale, 
exchange, purchase or rental of . . . an interest in real 
estate." Wis. Stat. § 452.01(10).  (We note that the Wisconsin 
Legislature amended this statute in 2005 Wis. Act. 87.) 
We recognize that the statutory definition is not fully 
reflected in the form contract and that the contractual 
definition appears to be broader than the statutory definition.  
The contractual language involving "potential terms" upon which 
the buyer "might acquire" an interest in the property does not 
require the potential buyer to become a "likely purchaser."  
However, because neither party briefed or argued the propriety 
of the contractual definition being different than statutory 
definition, we do not reach this issue.  Milwaukee Metro. 
Sewerage Dist. v. City of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 8, ¶87 n.30, 277 
Wis. 2d 635, 691 N.W.2d 658.  We instead interpret the contract.   
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
18 
 
of the May 15, 2002, listing contract, the Sondays' interaction 
with the CDA was limited.  Although Mr. Sonday attended the 
January 2, 2003, CDA public hearing and shared his comments on 
the proposed Redevelopment Plan with the CDA, the Sondays and 
the CDA did not discuss potential terms upon which the CDA might 
acquire the Sondays' property.   
¶33 We must therefore determine if Kohel negotiated with 
the CDA prior to May 15, 2003, and properly delivered the CDA as 
a protected buyer to the Sondays within three days of the 
termination of the original contract. 
¶34 We 
conclude 
that 
Kohel's 
actions 
constitute 
a 
"negotiation" with the Village, as defined in the listing 
contract.  Kohel initiated contact with the Village of Pleasant 
Prairie on May 28, 2002.  Kohel suggested to the Village that it 
purchase the Sonday property for approximately $2 million.  The 
Village 
refused 
the 
offer. 
During 
this 
May 
28, 
2004, 
conversation between Kohel and the Village, Kohel and Village 
Administrator Pollocoff clearly discussed "potential terms upon 
which the buyer might acquire an interest in the Property," 
fulfilling the listing contract requirement.   
¶35 We also conclude that Kohel sufficiently notified the 
Sondays that the CDA was a protected buyer.  Within three days 
of the termination of the original one-year term of the listing 
contract, Kohel notified the Sondays that the Village of 
Pleasant Prairie was a protected buyer.  The Sondays contend 
that because Kohel listed the Village, and not the CDA, Kohel 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
19 
 
failed to notify the Sondays that the CDA was a protected buyer.  
We disagree. 
¶36 The Sondays correctly assert that, under the Wisconsin 
Statutes, a redevelopment authority is "independent, separate 
and distinct" from the municipality that creates the authority.11  
However, The "Resolution Creating the Community Development 
Authority of the Village of Pleasant Prairie, Wisconsin," which 
passed unanimously, explicitly established that the CDA was an 
"agent of the Village."  Resolution No. 02-21, June 17, 2002.  
                                                 
11 Under current law,  
A city may . . . adopt an ordinance or resolution 
creating a housing and community development authority 
which shall be known as the "Community Development 
Authority" of the city.  It is a separate body politic 
for the purpose of carrying out blight elimination, 
slum clearance, urban renewal programs and projects 
and housing projects.  The ordinance or resolution 
creating a housing and community development authority 
may also authorize the authority to act as the agent 
of the city in planning and carrying out community 
development programs and activities approved by the 
mayor and common council . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 66.1335(1) (emphasis added).   
In addition, for purposes of redevelopment in furtherance 
of 
blight 
elimination 
and 
slum 
clearance, 
a 
community 
development authority is  
an independent, separate and distinct public body and 
a body corporate and politic, exercising public powers 
determined to be necessary by the state to protect and 
promote 
the 
health, 
safety 
and 
morals 
of 
its 
residents, and may take title to real and personal 
property in its own name. 
Wis. Stat. § 66.1333(3)(f). 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
20 
 
In addition, when the Village of Pleasant Prairie established 
the CDA, Village Administrator Pollocoff stressed that the CDA 
would function "under the umbrella of the Village Board and the 
Village operations" in order to "implement the master land use 
plan for the Village that the Plan Commission has created, and 
do so only under the approval of the Village Board to implement 
qualified redevelopment plans."  Village Board Meeting Minutes, 
June 17, 2002.  Pollocoff further emphasized that the CDA "has 
no authority other than what the Board gives it," and that the 
resolution granted the CDA authority only to prepare plans, 
which would be subject to approval by the Board and the Plan 
Commission, and granted the CDA the authority to acquire 
property.  Id.   
¶37 In addition, in 1983, this court reviewed an earlier 
version of the WB-5 Listing Contract, which read, in relevant 
part:  
If a sale or exchange is made or a purchaser procured 
by the Broker, by the undersigned Seller, or by any 
other person, at the price and upon the terms 
specified herein, or at any other terms and price 
accepted by the undersigned Seller, during the term of 
this contract, or if sold or exchanged within twelve 
(12) months after the termination of same to anyone 
with whom the Broker negotiated during the term of 
this contract and whose name the Broker has submitted 
to Seller in writing prior to the expiration date of 
this contract, the Seller agrees to pay Broker a 
commission of ten per cent (10%) of the sale price. 
United 
Farm 
Agency 
of 
Wisconsin, 
Inc. 
v. 
Klasen, 
112 
Wis. 2d 634, 637, 334 N.W.2d 110 (1983) (quoting Form WB-12, 
Hotel, Motel, Resort——Exclusive Listing Contract) (emphasis 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
21 
 
added).  This court concluded that, under the terms of the 
contract, "[t]he word "anyone" is sufficiently broad so as to 
include a likely purchaser who ultimately purchases the property 
in combination with other parties."  Id. at 642.  Although the 
current version of the WB-5 Listing Contract does not use the 
term "anyone," the contractual reference to "any buyer" must 
similarly include a buyer who purchases the property, even if 
the buyer has purchased the property in combination with another 
party. 
¶38 Consequently, because the CDA was an agent of the 
Village and authorized to act only with the approval of the 
Village Board, the Village was one of the buyers, having 
purchased the Sondays' properties with the CDA.   We therefore 
conclude that when Kohel named the Village as a protected buyer, 
because the Village ultimately purchased the properties along 
with the CDA, the listing contract was properly extended through 
May 15, 2004. 
B 
¶39 Having concluded that the WB-5 listing contract was in 
effect when the condemnation action was finalized in March 2004, 
we next examine whether the condemnation action entitles Kohel 
to a commission under the terms of that contract.   
¶40 Under the Commission Clause in the WB-5 Listing 
Contract, lines 49-55, the broker earns a commission if one of 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
22 
 
five conditions occurs.12  In particular, according to lines 49 
and 57 of the contract, a commission of 6 percent of the sale 
price is earned if the "Seller sells or accepts an offer which 
creates an enforceable contract for the sale of all or any part 
of the Property."  Under lines 52 and 59 of the contract, the 
broker earns 6 percent interest of the list price if "[a] 
transaction occurs which causes an effective change in ownership 
or control of all or any part of the Property."  The contract 
does not specifically address whether the transfer of property 
by condemnation constitutes a sale or other form of transaction.   
¶41 This court has not previously evaluated whether a 
condemnation action constitutes a sale or transaction for 
purposes of a broker's commission.  Various jurisdictions have 
concluded that a condemnation action cannot constitute a sale, 
whereas other jurisdictions have concluded that a condemnation 
action does constitute a sale.  We find more persuasive the 
reasoning among the jurisdictions that consider a condemnation 
action to be a sale. 
                                                 
12 Under lines 49-55 of the WB-5 Listing Contract, the five 
conditions are: (1) if the seller sells or accepts an offer 
which creates an enforceable contract for all or any part of the 
property; (2) if the seller grants an option to purchase all or 
any part of the property; (3) if the seller exchanges or enters 
into a binding agreement to exchange all or any part of the 
property; (4) if a transaction occurs which causes an effective 
change in ownership or control of all or any part of the 
property; or (5) if the seller, broker, or a third party 
procures a purchaser at the price and terms set forth in the 
listing, even if the seller does not accept the offer. 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
23 
 
¶42 The jurisdictions that have concluded that a transfer 
of property by condemnation does not constitute a sale for 
purposes of a broker's commission have relied on the fact that 
the brokerage contract under review did not contain any explicit 
reference to a condemnation action.  According to these courts, 
a condemnation action should constitute a sale only when the 
contract explicitly defines "sale" to include a condemnation 
action.  See, e.g., Forest Preserve Dist. of Du Page County v. 
Brookwood Land Venture, 229 Ill. App. 3d 978, 983, 595 N.E. 2d. 
136 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (concluding that a condemnation was not 
a sale because the "clear and unambiguous language of the 
termination agreement applies to a 'purchase/sale agreement' 
that is 'the result of good faith arm's length negotiations'"); 
St. Joe Corporation v. McIver, 875 So. 2d 375, 381 (Fla. 2004) 
("[I]f the seller and the broker agreed to, and did, pursue 
condemnation as an acceptable substitute for a sale, then the 
broker should be entitled to commission when the property is 
condemned.  If, however, the seller specifically authorized the 
broker to pursue only a sale, then the broker would not be 
entitled to a commission for a condemnation."); Wilson v. Ross 
Investment Co., 180 P.2d 226, 230 (Colo. 1947) (noting that no 
court in any other jurisdiction had previously evaluated this 
issue with regard to a broker's contract for commission, the 
court concluded that the condemnation action did not constitute 
a sale under the broker's contract for commission when "sale" 
meant "a contract between parties to give and to pass rights of 
property for money which the buyer pays or promises to pay the 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
24 
 
seller for the thing bought or sold" because there was no 
contract between the seller and the government purchaser——there 
was never a meeting of the minds regarding the price and 
acreage).  
¶43 In contrast, other jurisdictions have concluded that 
the term "sale," unless specifically limited to voluntary or 
arms-length transactions, includes the transfer of property by 
condemnation.  See, e.g., United States v. 27,233.21 Acres of 
Land, 589 F. Supp. 1121, 1124 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1984) (evaluating 
whether a condemnation was a sale within the meaning of a lease, 
the federal district court concluded that a condemnation action 
constitutes a sale and "[t]he fact that it is an enforced sale, 
where the government stands toward the owner as buyer toward 
seller, does not alter this conclusion"); People v. County of 
Santa Clara, 79 Cal. Rptr. 787, 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) 
(evaluating a stamp tax law, the court concluded that a final 
order of condemnation is an instrument by which real property is 
vested in the condemnor, noting that "neither the ordinance in 
question nor the enabling legislation limit the applicability of 
the legislation to 'voluntary' as contrasted with 'involuntary' 
sales"); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Loyalstock 
TP, Lycoming County, PA., 51 F. Supp. 811, 812 (Dist. Ct. Penn. 
1943) (in reviewing a landlord-tenant lease, the court concluded 
that a condemnation action is a transaction that "partakes of 
all the incidents of a 'sale,' as that term is used.  It is true 
that the transaction is an involuntary sale of the property but 
it is a sale nonetheless.") (citation omitted); Jackson v. 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
25 
 
State, 106 N.E. 758, 758 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1914) (concluding that, 
after appropriating a warehouse, the government did not have the 
right to reject the fixtures in the warehouse and refuse to pay 
for them, reasoning that a condemnation action "is an enforced 
sale, and the State stands toward the owner as buyer toward 
seller."); American Creameries Co. v. Armour Co., 271 P. 896, 
692 (1928) (reviewing a landlord-tenant lease, the court 
concluded 
that 
"the 
transaction 
by 
which 
the 
land 
is 
condemned . . . in a legal sense is a purchase of the land, or 
an interest in the land . . ."). 
¶44 The cases that concluded that a condemnation action 
does not constitute a sale are distinguishable from the present 
case.  This case does not involve unambiguous contractual 
language requiring that a sale be the result of an arms-length 
negotiation, see Forest Preserve, 229 Ill. App. 3d at 983, nor 
does this court need to rely on the definition of "sale" from 
Corpus Juris, which requires that the sale be a contract between 
the parties, see Wilson, 180 P.2d at 230.  In addition, we find 
persuasive the rationale employed by the jurisdictions that have 
concluded that a condemnation action constitutes a sale, 
particularly, 27,223.21 Acres of Land, 589 F. Supp. 1121.  In 
that case, the court examined a lease that preserved the state's 
right to cancel the lease if the state elected to sell any part 
of the premises.  Id. at 1124.  The court concluded that a 
condemnation action constituted a sale for purposes of that 
lease.  Id. at 1125.  The court reasoned that when a contract 
contains "both a 'sale' clause and a 'condemnation' clause, the 
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
26 
 
parties can only mean a 'voluntary sale' in the sale provision."  
Id. at 1124.  On the other hand, when a contract contains only a 
sale clause, and no condemnation clause or other express 
limitation on the term "sale," a condemnation action can 
constitute a sale within the meaning of that contract.  Id. at 
1125.  The court emphasized that the parties to the contract had 
made a promise to relinquish possession in the event of a sale 
and the fact that the "actual transfers were effected by 
involuntary sales had no impact on that promise."  Id.  
¶45 In a condemnation action in Wisconsin, the title to 
the property is conveyed to the government and the title vests 
in that government entity as of the date and time of the 
recording of the compensation award.  Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(c).  
Because the transfer of title in exchange for compensation 
constitutes a sale,13 and because a condemnation action transfers 
title 
in 
exchange 
for 
compensation, 
we 
conclude 
that 
a 
condemnation action constitutes a sale, albeit a forced sale, 
for purposes of the Department-approved WB-5 Listing Contract.  
The WB-5 Listing Contract ensures a broker will earn commission 
if the "Seller sells or accepts an offer which creates an 
enforceable contract for the sale of all or any part of the 
Property." This contractual provision does not limit the 
applicability of the contract to "voluntary" or "arm's-length" 
                                                 
13 Bruns v. Rennebohm Drug Stores, Inc., 151 Wis. 2d 88, 98, 
442 N.W.2d 591 (Ct. App. 1989) ("A sale has been defined as 'the 
exchange of an interest in real or personal property for money 
or its equivalent.'") (citing Mansfield v. Dist. Agric. Asso. 
No. 6, 97 P. 150 (1908)).   
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
27 
 
sales. Compare Forest Preserve, 595 N.E.2d at 141. The contract 
also does not specifically address condemnation actions. In 
signing the WB-5 Listing Contract, the parties agreed that the 
broker would earn 6 percent commission if the seller sold any or 
all of the listed property. That the actual sale of the property 
was involuntary has no impact on this agreement. We therefore 
conclude that the transfer of this property by condemnation 
action from the Sondays to the CDA constituted a sale under the 
WB-5 listing contract.14   
¶46 This conclusion supports Wisconsin's long-standing 
public policy in favor of promoting certainty in real estate 
title transfers.  Steiner v. Wisconsin Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 2005 
WI 72, ¶54, 281 Wis. 2d 395, 697 N.W.2d 452; Maxon v. Ayers, 28 
Wis. 
612 
(1871). 
Concluding 
that 
a 
condemnation 
action 
                                                 
14 Under line 52 of the WB-5 Listing Contract, a broker has 
earned commission if "[a] transaction occurs which causes an 
effective change in ownership or control of all or any part of 
the Property." The percentage commission earned by the real 
estate broker is calculated differently depending upon whether 
the commission is earned through a transaction or a sale.  WB-5 
Listing Contract, lines 57-59.  The commission is based on the 
purchase price if the commission is earned through a sale, and 
based on the listing price if the commission is earned through a 
transaction.  Id.  Therefore, a sale is treated differently for 
purposes of calculating commission under the WB-5 Listing 
Contract.  For purposes of this contract, a transaction must be 
something other than when a "Seller sells or accepts an offer 
which creates an enforceable contract for the sale of all or any 
part of the Property."  Id. line 49.  Because we conclude that a 
condemnation action constitutes a sale for purposes of the WB-5 
Listing Contract, we conclude that a condemnation action does 
not constitute a "transaction" as defined in the contract.     
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
28 
 
constitutes a sale embodies this public policy of finality and 
clarity for passage of title.  Steiner, 281 Wis. 2d 395, ¶54. 
C 
¶47 Because the condemnation action constitutes a sale, we 
next examine the issue of Kohel's commission under the terms of 
the WB-5 Listing Contract.   
¶48 The Wisconsin Statutes establish clear procedures for 
transferring title of property pursuant to a condemnation 
action.  On or before the date of the taking, the condemning 
authority must issue a check to the condemnee(s) for the amount 
of the jurisdictional award.  Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d).  Upon 
proper service and payment of the award to the condemnee by the 
condemning authority, the jurisdictional award is recorded with 
the county register of deeds.  § 32.05(7)(c).  At the time that 
the award is recorded, title in fee simple transfers to the 
condemning authority.  Id.   
¶49 The transfer of title in exchange for compensation 
constitutes a sale.15  Under the WB-5 Listing Contract, a 
broker's commission is earned when the property is sold.  WB-5 
Listing Contract, lines 49, 57.  We therefore conclude that the 
award recorded with the county register of deeds and paid to the 
condemnee, which causes the transfer of title, is the proper 
basis for the broker's commission.   
¶50 In 
the 
present 
case, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d), 
the 
CDA 
compensated 
the 
Sondays 
                                                 
15 Bruns, 151 Wis. 2d at 98.   
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
29 
 
$1,382,000 for the two properties on March 4, 2004.  The CDA's 
jurisdictional award was recorded with the Kenosha County 
Register 
of 
Deeds 
on 
March 
4, 
2003. 
Pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(c), title to the property transferred from 
the Sondays to the CDA when this compensation award was 
recorded.  We therefore conclude that the award recorded with 
the 
Kenosha 
County 
Register 
of 
Deeds, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(c), 
constitutes 
the 
proper 
basis 
for 
Kohel's commission.  Kohel has, therefore, earned a 6 percent 
commission based on the jurisdictional award of $1,382,000. 
¶51 We recognize that parties can appeal the amount of the 
jurisdictional award and may be awarded additional compensation 
based on the outcome of that litigation.  Wis. Stat. § 32.05(9).  
In 
this 
case, 
the 
Sondays 
appealed 
the 
March 
4, 
2004 
condemnation award.  Sonday v. Village of Pleasant Prairie Cmty. 
Dev. Auth., Kenosha County Circuit Court, No. 2004CV748.  The 
case was settled on December 17, 2004, and the Sondays were 
awarded an additional $872,000.  Id.  However, Kohel was not 
involved in that appeal.  In addition, the long-standing policy 
of promoting certainty, finality, and clarity for passage of 
title in real estate transactions,16 requires that the broker's 
commission be based on the jurisdictional award paid at the time 
the title is transferred. 
 
                                                 
16 See Steiner v. Wisconsin Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 2005 WI 72, 
281 Wis. 2d 395, 685 N.W.2d 831; Maxon v. Ayers, 28 Wis. 612 
(1871).  
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
30 
 
IV 
¶52 The second question certified by the court of appeals 
asks whether public policy prohibits Kohel from recovering 
commission because the property was transferred as the result of 
a condemnation action.  We conclude that it does not. 
¶53 This court has consistently recognized that parties 
are free to contract and has endeavored to protect the right to 
contract by ensuring that promises will be performed.  State ex 
rel. Journal/Sentinel, Inc. v. Pleva, 155 Wis. 2d 704, 710, 456 
N.W.2d 359 (1990); Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 521, 405 
N.W.2d 305 (1987).  Yet, contractual rights are not absolute and 
a contract that is deemed contrary to public policy is void and 
unenforceable.  Heyde Companies, Inc. v. Dove Healthcare, LLC, 
2002 WI 131, 10, 258 Wis. 2d 28, 654 N.W.2d 830.17  Nevertheless,  
[a] declaration that the contract is against public 
policy should be made only after a careful balancing, 
in the light of all the circumstances, of the interest 
in enforcing a particular promise against the policy 
against enforcement. Courts should be reluctant to 
frustrate a party's reasonable expectations without a 
corresponding 
benefit 
to 
be 
gained in 
deterring 
"misconduct" or avoiding inappropriate use of the 
judicial system. 
Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 521 (citations omitted).   
 ¶54 In the present case, the Sondays and Kohel entered 
into a Department-approved WB-5 Listing Contract that explicitly 
                                                 
17 Public policy is expressed by statute, administrative 
regulation, and decisions by this court.  Heyde Cos., Inc. v. 
Dove Healthcare, LLC, 2002 WI 131, ¶10, 258 Wis. 2d 28, 654 
N.W.2d 830.    
No. 
2004AP2322   
 
31 
 
entitled Kohel to commission if the Sondays sold the listed 
property.   
¶55 We discern no statute, administrative regulation, nor 
prior decision by any Wisconsin court that prohibits parties 
from entering into such brokerage contracts.  We therefore 
conclude that public policy does not prohibit Kohel from 
receiving commission under this contract. 
V 
¶56 We conclude that the WB-5 listing contract was in 
effect when the condemnation action was completed in July 2004.  
We also conclude that the transfer of title by condemnation 
action constitutes a sale under the WB-5 listing contract and 
that Kohel is entitled to 6 percent of the jurisdictional award.  
Finally, we conclude that public policy does not preclude Kohel 
from recovering the commission agreed to in the WB-5 listing 
contract.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's grant of 
summary judgment for Kohel.  Because we conclude that the 
condemnation action constituted a sale under line 49 of the 
commission clause as opposed to a transaction under line 52, we 
reverse with respect to the amount of the commission to be 
awarded and remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
By the Court.— The judgment of the circuit court for 
Kenosha County is affirmed in part and reversed in part and the 
cause is remanded. 
 
 
No.  2004AP2322.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶57 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Absent an 
express provision in the listing contract, it is unclear whether 
a broker is entitled to a commission when there is a transfer of 
property by condemnation.  Applying a long-standing rule of 
construction, I conclude that any ambiguity here should be 
construed against Kohel.  In my view, the listing contract in 
this case should not be interpreted to provide that Kohel 
receive a commission.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶58 The WB-5 form listing contract used in this case 
includes the following provisions: 
COMMISSION:  Seller shall pay Broker's commission, 
which shall be earned if, during the term of this 
Listing: 
1) 
Seller sells or accepts an offer which 
creates an enforceable contract for the sale 
of all or any part of the Property; 
. . . . 
4) 
A 
transaction 
occurs 
which 
causes 
an 
effective change in ownership or control of 
all or any part of the Property . . . . 
The 
question 
becomes 
whether 
a 
transfer 
of 
property 
by 
condemnation is included within one of these provisions. 
¶59 I 
begin 
with 
the 
first 
of 
the 
two 
enumerated 
provisions, which refers to whether the seller "sells . . . all 
or any part of the Property."  The term "sells" is not defined 
in the contract. 
¶60 To "sell" is to "transfer (property) by sale."  
Black's Law Dictionary 1365 (7th ed. 1999).  Black's defines 
"sale," in turn, as "the transfer of property or title for a 
No.  2004AP2322.awb 
 
2 
 
price."  Id., 1337.  This definition is arguably broad enough to 
include a transfer by condemnation.1  Yet, Black's also states 
that there are four elements of a "sale":  "(1) parties 
competent to contract, (2) mutual assent, (3) a thing capable of 
being transferred, and (4) a price in money paid or promised."  
Id.  The nature of at least two of these four elements makes it 
difficult to conceive of a "sale" as an involuntary transfer 
such as a transfer by condemnation.2  I doubt that a reasonable 
seller would expect that the sale provision here includes a 
transfer of property by condemnation. 
¶61 Moreover, this court is not writing on a clean slate 
in seeking to interpret the term "sale" for purposes of a real 
estate broker's commission.  A number of courts have determined 
that a transfer by condemnation is generally not a sale that 
entitles the broker to a commission, at least not without a 
specific provision to that effect in the contract.  See, e.g., 
Preston v. Carnation Co., 196 Cal. Rptr. 240, 244 (Ct. App. 
1961);  Wilson v. Frederick R. Ross Inv. Co., 180 P.2d 226, 230 
(Colo. 1947); Shaw v. Avenue D Stores, Inc., 115 N.Y.S.2d 194, 
197 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1952) ("In the absence of a specific 
provision in a broker's contract to the contrary, disposition of 
                                                 
1 The word "price" might suggest a voluntary transfer, 
however.  Black's defines "price" as "[t]he amount of money or 
other consideration asked for or given in exchange for something 
else; the cost at which something is bought or sold."  Black's 
Law Dictionary 1207 (7th ed. 1999). 
2 Under the general definition of "sale," Black's also 
separately defines various types of "sales," including a 
"compulsory sale" and a "forced sale."  Black's Law Dictionary 
1337-38 (7th ed. 1999). 
No.  2004AP2322.awb 
 
3 
 
the title to real estate through condemnation proceedings does 
not constitute a sale, transfer or assignment."); cf. Mealey v. 
Orlich, 585 P.2d 1233, 1234 (Ariz. 1978) (broker conceded that 
the term "sale" in listing agreement did not cover "condemnation 
sale" and would not give rise to a commission); see also 12 Am. 
Jur. 2d Brokers § 234 (a transfer of real property to a county 
public transportation authority is not a "sale" that entitles a 
broker to a commission under an exclusive listing agreement that 
contains no reference to eminent domain, condemnation, taking, 
or sale to any governmental agency). 
¶62 Cases such as those cited have led at least one state 
court of appeals to observe as follows:   
The jurisdictions that have considered the question 
have consistently held that, in the absence of a 
specific provision in the agreement or a specific 
indication of the parties' intent, a transfer of 
property by condemnation is not a sale that entitles a 
broker to recover a commission under a listing 
agreement. 
Lundstrom, Inc. v. Nikkei Concerns, Inc., 758 P.2d 561, 564 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1988).3  
                                                 
3 The majority posits that "[v]arious jurisdictions have 
concluded that a condemnation action cannot constitute a sale, 
whereas other jurisdictions have concluded that a condemnation 
action does constitute a sale."  Majority op., ¶41.  It "find[s] 
more persuasive the reasoning among the jurisdictions that 
consider a condemnation action to be a sale."  Id. 
No.  2004AP2322.awb 
 
4 
 
¶63 Considering the form contract language here in light 
of this case law, it seems unclear, at best, whether a "sale" 
under the contract includes a transfer by condemnation.  Given a 
lack 
of 
clarity, 
I 
turn 
to 
the 
long-standing 
rule 
of 
construction that applies when there is ambiguity in such a 
contract:  a form listing contract provided by a real estate 
broker must be "strongly construed against the broker in case of 
any ambiguity or doubt."  Mansfield v. Smith, 88 Wis. 2d 575, 
594-95, 277 N.W.2d 740 
(1979) 
(citations omitted); 
accord 
Boutelle v. Chrislaw, 34 Wis. 2d 665, 677, 150 N.W.2d 486 
(1967); E.M. Boerke, Inc. v. Williams, 28 Wis. 2d 627, 634, 137 
N.W.2d 489 (1965); Dunn & Stringer Inv. Co. v. Krauss, 264 Wis. 
615, 619, 60 N.W.2d 346 (1953). 
                                                                                                                                                             
I am not persuaded by the cases that persuade the majority.  
None of the cases the majority cites in support of its 
conclusion involves real estate listing contracts or broker 
commissions.  See id., ¶43 (citing United States v. 27,223.21 
Acres of Land, 589 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Colo. 1984) (involving 
allocation of condemnation proceeds between lessors and lessees 
based in part on the meaning of the term "sale" in a lease); 
People ex rel. Dept. of Pub. Works v. County of Santa Clara, 79 
Cal. Rptr. 787 (Ct. App. 1969) (involving stamp tax ordinance); 
United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 51 F. Supp. 811 (M.D. 
Pa. 1943) (involving the meaning of the term "sale" in a lease); 
Jackson v. State, 106 N.E. 758 (N.Y. 1914) (involving the role 
of fixtures in valuation of condemned property); American 
Creameries Co. v. Armour & Co., 271 P. 896 (Wash. 1928) 
(involving the meaning of the term "sale" in a lease)). 
The majority follows these cases, deeming other cases that 
involve real estate listing contracts and brokers' commissions 
to be "distinguishable from the present case."  Majority op., 
¶44.  In my view, cases that do involve real estate listing 
contracts and brokers' commissions are more on point than cases 
that do not. 
No.  2004AP2322.awb 
 
5 
 
¶64 Applying this rule to the facts here, I conclude that 
the contract should not be interpreted to allow for a broker 
commission based on the contract's provision that a commission 
is due when the seller "sells . . . all or any part of the 
Property."  
¶65 This brings me to the other pertinent provision in the 
contract, and the question of whether a transfer by condemnation 
may be a "transaction . . . which causes an effective change in 
ownership or control of all or any part of the Property."   To 
my mind, this question presents a closer call. 
¶66 The term "transaction" is not defined by the contract 
provision other than as something "which causes an effective 
change in ownership or control of all or any part of the 
Property."  Yet, a "transaction" under the contract seems 
unlikely to mean any such change in ownership or control.  Kohel 
declines to assert, for example, that a broker would be entitled 
to a commission if the property were transferred by gift or 
inheritance.4 
¶67 In addition, Wis. Stat. ch. 452 and Wis. Admin. Code. 
ch. RL 24, which pertain to the regulation of real estate 
practice, define "transaction" as "the sale, exchange, purchase 
or rental of, or the granting or acceptance of an option to 
sell, exchange, purchase or rent, an interest in real estate, a 
business or a business opportunity."  Wis. Stat. § 452.01(10) 
(2003-04); Wis. Admin. Code § RL 24.02(18) (Jan. 2001).  This 
                                                 
4 The WB-5 form listing contract makes an express exception 
for certain transfers of an interest in the property "by divorce 
judgment." 
No.  2004AP2322.awb 
 
6 
 
definition 
does 
not 
appear 
to 
include 
a 
transfer 
by 
condemnation.5 
¶68 I need not and do not decide whether the statutory or 
administrative code definition of "transaction" necessarily 
controls the meaning of "transaction" in the WB-5 form listing 
contract.  Suffice it to say that the uncertain relationship 
between that definition and the term "transaction" in the form 
contract adds to the uncertainty of what this contract term 
means for our purposes here. 
¶69 I am again left to construe a form listing contract 
term that is unclear as to whether it includes a transfer by 
condemnation.  Thus, I again apply the long-standing rule that 
such a contract provided by a real estate broker is "strongly 
construed against the broker in case of any ambiguity or doubt."  
Mansfield, 88 Wis. 2d at 594-95.  Applying that rule, I conclude 
that the term "transaction" in the WB-5 form listing contract 
should not be interpreted to include a transfer by condemnation. 
¶70 The contract language at issue in this case is 
problematic for sellers who may not anticipate that a commission 
would be owed in the event of a condemnation.6  Although the 
language may also be problematic for brokers who hope or expect 
to earn a commission on a transfer by condemnation, the brokers 
are not without recourse. 
                                                 
5 This assumes, of course, that a transfer by condemnation 
is not a "sale." 
6 The WB-1 form "Residential Listing Contract" contains the 
same terms that are at issue here in the WB-5 form "Commercial 
Listing Contract." 
No.  2004AP2322.awb 
 
7 
 
¶71 Brokers are more likely to anticipate the problem 
caused by this language and are in the best position to prevent 
it.  They may readily protect their commissions by inserting 
clear, express language in their listing contracts.  The 
interests of both sellers and brokers should generally be served 
when all have a clear understanding of whether a commission is 
owed in the event of condemnation. 
¶72 In sum, I conclude that the listing contract in this 
case should not be interpreted to provide that Kohel receive a 
commission where the property was transferred by condemnation.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2004AP2322.awb 
 
 
 
1