Title: Ex parte Michael Wayne Adams II. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Olivia Renee (Wright) Chavers v. Michael Wayne Adams II)(Monroe Circuit Court: CV-22-900028).
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC-2023-0423, SC-2022-0981
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 27, 2023

Rel: October 27, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0423 
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte Michael Wayne Adams II  
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS  
 
(In re: Olivia Renee (Wright) Chavers  
 
v.  
 
Michael Wayne Adams II) 
 
(Monroe Circuit Court: CV-22-900028) 
 
COOK, Justice. 
 
PETITION DENIED. NO OPINION. 
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2 
 
 
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, Mendheim, Stewart, and Mitchell, 
JJ., concur.  
 
Sellers, J., dissents, with opinion, which Wise, J., joins. 
 
 
SC-2023-0423 
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SELLERS, Justice (dissenting). 
 
I respectfully dissent. Almost a year after an automobile accident 
between Michael Wayne Adams II and Olivia Renee Wright,1 Wright's 
attorney, Matthew Chavers, sent Adams's insurer, State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company, a letter requesting that it tender a 
check in the amount of Adams's policy limit and provide an affidavit of 
his assets. In a letter emailed approximately two weeks later, State Farm 
noted that it had mailed a settlement check in the amount of Adams's 
policy limit of $25,000. Written in the check's remarks section was "BI 
Settlement." State Farm stated in the email that it had issued the check 
on the condition that Wright sign an accompanying release. 
Approximately 20 minutes later, Chavers replied that he would discuss 
with Wright her signing of the release but that in no event would he 
permit her to sign the release unless State Farm provided Adams's assets 
affidavit.  
Eleven days later, an attorney retained by State Farm, Mark 
Ulmer, responded to Chavers's requests for an assets affidavit, noting 
 
1It appears that at some point between the accident and the filing 
of this lawsuit, Wright married her attorney, Matthew Chavers. To avoid 
confusion, Wright is referred to by her maiden name. 
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that Alabama law does not require an insurer to furnish its insured's 
assets affidavit to obtain a settlement. Later that day, Chavers replied to 
Ulmer, contending that a settlement was never contemplated and that, 
regardless of common practice, he could sue State Farm to obtain the 
assets affidavit. Aside from an email sent two days later in which State 
Farm confirmed Adams's policy limit, communication between Chavers 
and State Farm ceased. A month and a half later, however, Chavers 
emailed State Farm to inform it that Wright had never received the check 
and to request that the check be reissued. That day, State Farm reissued 
the check with "As payment for injuries arising out of the auto accident 
of 4-6-2020" written in the remarks section. According to State Farm's 
financial logs, Wright deposited the check a week later.  
Nine and a half months later -- one day before the expiration of the 
statute-of-limitations period -- Wright filed a complaint in the Monroe 
Circuit Court against Adams, asserting claims of negligence and 
wantonness. Ten and a half months later, Adams filed a "Motion to 
Enforce Settlement Agreement," and, a few days later, he filed a 
"Supplemental Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement." Both motions 
requested that the circuit court enter an order acknowledging that the 
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parties had entered into a settlement agreement and enforcing that 
agreement against Wright, compelling Wright to execute the release of 
all claims against Adams, and dismissing the case with prejudice. Two 
and a half months later, the circuit court denied both motions. 
Approximately three weeks later, Adams filed a motion requesting that 
the circuit court reconsider its order denying Adams's motions to enforce 
the settlement agreement. The circuit court denied that motion, and 
Adams petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus. 
As a rule, this Court typically does not review the denial of a motion 
to dismiss or a motion for a summary judgment. See Ex parte Sanderson, 
263 So. 3d 681, 685 (Ala. 2018). However, this case represents the rare 
exception to that rule because here, based on accord and satisfaction, 
Adams has a clear legal right to have the parties' settlement agreement 
enforced and the case dismissed. Any other result undermines this 
Court's policy of promoting settlements and curtailing unnecessary 
litigation. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Amerisure Ins. Cos., 603 So. 2d 
961, 965 (Ala. 1992) ("[I]t is the policy of the law to encourage 
settlements." (citing Large v. Hayes, 534 So. 2d 1101, 1105 (Ala. 1988), 
and Maddox v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 357 So. 2d 974, 975 (Ala. 1978))). 
SC-2023-0423 
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It is well established that  
"[a] writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available 
only when there is: '(1) a clear legal right to the order sought; 
(2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, 
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another 
adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of 
the court.'" 
 
Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541, 543 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte BOC 
Grp., Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)). Generally, "'"'[t]he denial 
of a motion to dismiss or a motion for a summary judgment ... is not 
reviewable by a petition for writ of mandamus ....'"'" Ex parte Sanderson, 
263 So. 3d at 685 (quoting Ex parte University of S. Alabama, 183 So. 3d 
915, 918 (Ala. 2016), quoting in turn other cases). Indeed, "this Court has 
declined to issue [an] extraordinary writ and has held that an appeal 
following a final judgment is an adequate remedy" when "no recognized 
exception [to the general rule] is applicable and in cases where it is not 
clear from the face of the complaint that a defendant has a clear legal 
right to a dismissal or a judgment in its favor." Id. at 688 (citing Ex parte 
Watters, 212 So. 2d 174, 182 (Ala. 2016)) (emphasis omitted).  
 
Although no previously recognized specific exception to the general 
rule stated in Ex parte Sanderson is applicable here, it is abundantly 
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clear from the face of Wright's complaint that, based on accord and 
satisfaction, Adams has a clear legal right to the relief he seeks. "'Accord 
and satisfaction[]' ... is a term used for denoting one of the recognized 
methods of discharging a previously existing right. The nature or source 
of the previously existing claim is irrelevant. It may have been one 
arising from a contract, quasi contract, tort, or otherwise." 13 Sarah 
Howard Jenkins, Corbin on Contracts § 70.1, at 303 (Joseph M. Perillo 
ed., rev. ed. 2003). In this case, there was a dispute as to liability arising 
from an automobile accident between Wright and Adams. Wright 
solicited a check from Adams's insurer for the amount of Adams's policy 
limit, and Adams's insurer counteroffered by providing a check for that 
amount conditioned on Wright's fully releasing and discharging Adams, 
who expressly denied any liability. Wright contends, however, that the 
correspondence following the issuance of the check and the language in 
the memo section of a reissued check, which she deposited, made it clear 
that neither a settlement agreement nor the signing of a release was ever 
contemplated, much less agreed upon; therefore, Wright argues that, by 
depositing the check, she neither settled the dispute nor released Adams 
from any further liability.  
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I strongly disagree with that assertion. Although "[i]t is a question 
of fact whether the creditor knew or should have known [from the 
obligor's actions or expressions or from the circumstances] that the 
payment ... by check ... is tendered by the obligor in full satisfaction of 
the original claim," id. § 70.2(2), at 316, and although "[t]he obligor bears 
the risk of any uncertainty arising from the circumstances or its 
statements," id. § 70.2(2), at 316-17, Wright should not be permitted to 
profit from the "uncertainty" she manufactured by protesting the 
condition upon which the check was issued, but nevertheless depositing 
the check, the latter action indicating an acceptance in full of the terms 
of the settlement. Indeed, I fail to identify a material difference between 
this case and those in which a creditor writes on a check that the creditor 
cashes or deposits: "under protest or with reservation of all rights." Id. § 
70.2(3), at 323. In those latter cases, such language does "not prevent the 
creditor's action of cashing or retaining the check from operating as an 
accord and satisfaction." Id.; see also, e.g., Ex parte Meztista, 845 So. 2d 
795, 798 (Ala. 2001) (holding that creditor who deposited check that 
stated it was payment in full was estopped from denying that assertion, 
despite writing on check that her cashing it was not an acceptance of the 
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amount as payment in full). Here, Adams's insurer offered the check on 
the condition that Wright release Adams from further liability. Wright 
wrote Adams's insurer to protest the condition upon which the check was 
tendered, but that did not change the fundamental nature of the offer. 
Furthermore, when the check was reissued with a different statement on 
the memo line, that did not change the underlying condition to the offer, 
of which Wright remained well aware. Thus, Wright's depositing the 
check operated as an accord and satisfaction, settling the controversy and 
binding her to release Adams from future liability on her claims. From 
the face of Wright's complaint, which is based on the same facts that 
underlie claims already released by Wright, Adams has a clear legal right 
to the relief sought based on accord and satisfaction. Moreover, because 
Adams has demonstrated from the face of Wright's complaint a clear legal 
right to have the parties' settlement agreement enforced and the case 
dismissed, an appeal is inherently an inadequate remedy. See Ex parte 
Sanderson, 263 So. 3d at 687-88. 
Beyond the facts of this case, I believe that, as a rule, when an 
insurance company tenders to a third-party claimant a check in an 
amount equal to the limit of its insured's policy, it should be eminently 
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clear to the third-party claimant's attorney that depositing the check 
amounts to an acceptance of the terms upon which it was tendered and 
binds the third-party claimant to a release of the insurance company and 
its insured, and the attorney should advise his or her client of those 
matters. There is simply no set of circumstances under which an 
insurance company's payment of its insured's policy limit could be 
construed or perceived as a partial payment, and an insurance company 
would never anticipate further litigation against its insured after making 
such a payment. It is common practice understood by lawyers in Alabama 
that an insurance company's tendering a check in the amount of its 
insured's policy limit creates an offer to resolve the case in its entirety. 
Once a third-party claimant deposits the check, he or she has accepted 
the offer, and that acceptance releases the insurance company and its 
insured from further litigation. 
Under both the facts of this case and the general rule I have 
proposed, Adams has a clear legal right to the relief sought. I would 
therefore issue the writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to 
enforce the parties' settlement agreement by requiring Wright to execute 
the release and to dismiss the action, with prejudice. 
SC-2023-0423 
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Wise, J., concurs.