Title: Johnson v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 212, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 12, 2005

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SCOTT O. JOHNSON, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 212, 2005 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID. 0310002701 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 10, 2005 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: October 12, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  DISMISSED. 
 
Scott O. Johnson, pro se. 
 
Loren C. Meyers, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
2
 
The primary question before this Court is whether we have 
jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal in a criminal proceeding from a sentence 
that was imposed by a Superior Court Commissioner.  The secondary 
question raised by this appeal is whether a Superior Court Commissioner has 
the authority to adjudicate a violation of probation (VOP) charge.  We have 
concluded that both of these questions must be answered in the negative. 
Accordingly, this appeal will be dismissed.  The Superior Court, however, 
must vacate the sentence imposed by the Commissioner and take further 
action in accordance with this opinion. 
Procedural History 
 
The defendant, Scott Johnson, pled guilty1 in December 2003 to one 
count of drug possession, a misdemeanor.2  In accordance with title 10, 
section 512(a)(4) of the Delaware Code,3 the Superior Court Commissioner 
who accepted Johnson’s guilty plea immediately sentenced Johnson to one 
                                                 
1 Although the Superior Court docket reflects that a plea hearing was held, there is no 
plea agreement or guilty plea transcript in the Superior Court record. 
2 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4753 (2005). 
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 512(a)(4) (“Each Commissioner serving under this chapter 
shall have. . . .[t]he power to accept a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor or violation and, 
with the consent of the parties, to enter a sentence thereon.”); see also Del. Super. Ct. 
Crim. R. 62(a)(3) (providing that each Commissioner shall have “the power to accept a 
plea of guilty to a misdemeanor or to a violation and, with the consent of the parties, to 
enter sentence thereon”). 
 
3
year at Level 5 incarceration, suspended immediately for eighteen months at 
Level 2 probation.4 
 
In February 2005, a Superior Court judge found Johnson in violation 
of his probation for violating curfew and sentenced him to one year at Level 
5 incarceration, suspended immediately for one year at Level 2 probation.  
The judge also discharged Johnson as unimproved from a probationary 
sentence he was serving on another, unrelated drug charge. 
 
In April 2005, Johnson was picked up on his second violation of 
probation charge.  This time, a Superior Court Commissioner conducted a 
hearing and found Johnson in violation of his probation and also, apparently, 
in contempt of court.5  The Commissioner immediately sentenced Johnson to 
one year at Level 5 imprisonment for the VOP and to sixty days 
imprisonment on the contempt finding.6   
 
 
                                                 
4 Although the Commissioner accepted Johnson’s plea, there is no indication in the 
record that Johnson or the State consented to allowing the Commissioner to sentence him.  
Neither Johnson nor the State dispute that they consented to sentencing by the 
Commissioner. 
5 Both the State and Johnson indicate that Johnson was found in contempt of court, 
although there is nothing in the record to reflect the basis for the Commissioner’s 
contempt finding. 
6 There is no sentencing order in the record; however, the State contends that these were 
the sentences imposed. 
 
4
Show Cause Notice 
Johnson filed the present appeal from the sentences imposed by the 
Commissioner following the second violation of probation hearing.  The 
Clerk of this Court issued a notice for Johnson to show cause why the appeal 
should not be dismissed based on this Court’s lack of jurisdiction to hear an 
interlocutory criminal appeal.7  Johnson’s response did not address the 
interlocutory nature of his appeal. 
This Court then directed the State to respond and address specifically 
whether the Superior Court Commissioner had the authority to hold the 
violation of probation hearing and, thereafter, to sentence Johnson.  The 
State asserts that the Commissioner had implicit, albeit not explicit, 
authority to adjudicate and sentence Johnson on the second VOP charge 
because a Commissioner had imposed Johnson’s original sentence in 2003.  
The State also submits that the Commissioner’s sentencing order is not 
interlocutory but is directly appealable to this Court.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Del. Const. art. IV, § 11(1)(b); Redden v. McGill, 549 A.2d 695 (Del. 1988) (dismissing 
as interlocutory an appeal from a decision of a Family Court master); Carr v. State, 757 
A.2d 1277 (Del. 2000) (dismissing as interlocutory an appeal from a sentencing order of 
a Superior Court Commissioner).  
 
5
Superior Court Commissioners’ Authority 
 
The first statute authorizing the use of Commissioners in the Superior 
Court was adopted in 1968.8  Initially, those Commissioners only had 
authority to issue warrants and fix bail.9 The scope of responsibilities 
assigned to Superior Court Commissioners has been significantly expanded.  
In 1994, the Delaware General Assembly adopted title 10, section 512 of the 
Delaware Code, which now sets forth the jurisdiction and powers of 
Commissioners of the Superior Court.  The purpose of the 1994 statute is to 
allow the Commissioners to assist the Superior Court judges by addressing 
many “pretrial matters in criminal and civil cases, thereby allowing the 
judges more time to try cases.”10 
                                                 
8 See 56 Del. Laws ch. 375 (adopting Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 1973-78). 
9 Id. 
10 H.B. 477, 137th Gen. Assembly, 2nd Sess., synopsis (Del. 1994) (emphasis added). 
 
6
 
Section 512(a)11 generally confers authority upon Commissioners over 
specific nonadjudicatory matters, while section 512(b)12 confers authority 
                                                 
11 Section 512(a) provides: 
 
(a) Each Commissioner serving under this chapter shall have: 
 
(1) All powers and duties conferred or imposed upon Commissioners by law 
or by the Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure for the Superior Court; 
 
(2) The power to administer oaths and affirmations, issue orders pursuant to 
Chapter 21 of Title 11 concerning release or detention of persons pending 
trial, and take acknowledgements, affidavits and depositions; 
 
(3) The power to accept pleas of not guilty to any offense within the 
jurisdiction of the Superior Court and to appoint counsel to represent 
indigent defendants; 
 
(4) The power to accept a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor or violation and, 
with the consent of the parties, to enter a sentence thereon. 
 
 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 512(a) 
 
12 Section 512(b) provides, in pertinent part: 
 
(b) Commissioners may be designated to perform the following with the approval 
of the President Judge or his designee: 
 
(1)a. A judge may designate a Commissioner to hear and determine any 
pretrial matter pending before the Court, except a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or 
information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and to 
involuntarily dismiss an action.  A judge of the Court may reconsider any 
pretrial matter under this subparagraph where it has been shown that the 
Commissioner's order is based upon findings of fact that are clearly 
erroneous, or is contrary to law or an abuse of discretion. 
 
b. A judge may also designate a Commissioner to conduct hearings, 
including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the Court 
proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a 
judge of the Court, of any motion excepted in subparagraph a. of this 
paragraph or of applications for postconviction relief made by individuals 
convicted of criminal offenses. 
 
7
upon the President Judge of the Superior Court to designate Commissioners 
to perform limited adjudicatory functions that are all subject to later review 
by a judge.  The only adjudicatory power conferred upon Superior Court 
Commissioners under section 512(a) is the power to sentence a defendant 
following the acceptance of a guilty plea to a misdemeanor or violation.  
That authority to sentence following a guilty plea, however, is specifically 
limited to cases in which both parties consent. 
Supreme Court Jurisdiction 
Under the Delaware Constitution, this Court’s appellate jurisdiction in 
a criminal case is limited to reviewing a final judgment of the Superior 
Court.13  In a direct criminal appeal, the Superior Court’s final judgment is 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
c. The Commissioner shall file proposed findings and recommendations 
under subparagraph b. of this paragraph with the Court and shall mail copies 
forthwith to all parties. 
 
d. Within 10 days after being served with a copy of proposed findings and 
recommendations under subparagraph b. of this paragraph any party may 
serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and 
recommendations as provided by rules of Court.  A judge of the Court shall 
make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified 
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.  A judge 
of the Court may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings 
or recommendations made by the Commissioner.  The judge may also 
receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the Commissioner with 
instructions. 
 
 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 512(b). 
 
 
13 Del. Const. art. IV, § 11(1)(b). 
 
8
the imposition of sentence.14  Only sentences of imprisonment exceeding 
one month or fines exceeding one hundred dollars are appealable to this 
Court.15 
Intermediate Review Required 
In other contexts, this Court has held that our appellate jurisdiction is 
limited to reviewing orders entered by judges of a trial court, not orders 
entered by masters16 or commissioners.17   In Carr v. State,18 on procedural 
facts similar to Johnson’s case, this Court dismissed an appeal from a 
Superior Court Commissioner’s VOP sentencing order as interlocutory.  In 
Carr, we assumed, without analysis, that the Commissioner’s sentencing 
order fell within the category of case-dispositive orders that are subject to de 
novo review by a Superior Court judge under Superior Court Criminal Rule 
62(a)(5) and section 512(b).19   
                                                 
14 Eller v. State, 531 A.2d 948, 949 (Del. 1987). 
15 Del. Const. art. IV, § 11(1)(b); Weaver v. State, 779 A.2d 254, 259 (Del. 2001). 
16 Redden v. McGill, 549 A.2d 695, 697 (Del. 1988) (holding that a master is not a 
judicial officer and a master’s ruling, therefore, could not constitute a ruling by the 
“Court”). 
17 Postles v. Division of Child Support Enforcement, 784 A.2d 1081 (Del. 2001) (“This 
Court does not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal—any appeal—from an order of a 
Family Court Commissioner.”). 
18 Carr v. State, 757 A.2d 1277 (Del. 2000). 
19 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a)(5) provides: 
 
(5) Case-dispositive matters.  The power to conduct case-dispositive hearings, 
including case-dispositive evidentiary hearings, motions to suppress evidence in a 
criminal case (whether case-dispositive or non case-dispositive), to dismiss or quash an 
 
9
We adhere to our holding in Carr. Section 512 is patterned on the 
Federal Magistrates Act.20  In the federal court system, defendants who 
properly consent to a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction over their criminal 
proceedings are required to appeal to the federal district court in the first 
instance.21  Federal courts of appeal are without jurisdiction to review a 
direct appeal from a misdemeanor conviction and sentence entered by a 
magistrate judge.22  The federal district court is the only forum in which a 
                                                                                                                                                 
indictment or information, or hearings involving post-conviction relief pursuant to Super. 
Ct. Crim. R. 61, and to submit to a judge of the Court proposed findings of fact and 
recommendations for the disposition, by a judge, of any such matter. 
 
(i) The Commissioner shall file proposed findings of fact and recommendations 
under subparagraph (5) with the Prothonotary, and shall mail copies forthwith to all 
parties, or to the party’s attorney, if the party is represented. 
 
(ii)  Within 10 days after filing of a Commissioner’s proposed findings of fact and 
recommendations under subparagraph (5), any party may serve and file written objections 
to the Commissioner’s order which set forth with particularity the basis for the 
objections.  The written objections shall be entitled “Appeal from Commissioner’s 
Findings of Fact and Recommendations.”  A copy of the written objections shall be 
served on the other party, or the other party’s attorney, if the other party is represented.  
The other party shall then have 10 days from service upon that party of the written 
objections to file and serve a written response to the written objections. 
 
(iii)  The party filing written objections to a Commissioner’s order shall cause a 
transcript of the proceedings before the Commissioner to be prepared, served, and filed 
unless, subject to approval of a judge, all parties agree to a statement of facts. 
 
(iv)  A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or 
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which an objection is made.  A judge 
may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings of fact or 
recommendations made by the Commissioner.  A judge may also receive further 
evidence or recommit the matter to the Commissioner with instructions. 
20 28 U.S.C.A. § 636 (2005). 
21 U.S. v. Soolook, 987 F.2d 574, 574 (9th Cir. 1993). 
22 U.S. v. Smith, 992 F.2d 98, 99 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 
10
defendant can seek review of a United States magistrate judge’s decision.23 
Similarly, the Superior Court is the only forum in which a defendant 
can seek review of a Commissioner’s decision.  In the absence of that 
intermediate review by a Superior Court judge, this Court is without 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from any action taken by a Commissioner.24  
The Superior Court must amend Criminal Rule 62 to provide for that right of 
de novo intermediate review by a Superior Court judge in the first instance.25   
Only Judges Conduct Trials 
The State acknowledges that there is no Delaware statute, rule, or 
administrative directive that specifically conferred authority upon the 
Superior Court Commissioner to conduct Johnson’s violation of probation 
hearing.26  Nonetheless, the State asserts that the Commissioner’s power to 
sentence under section 512(a)(4) following the entry of a guilty plea also 
must necessarily include the power to enforce the sentence and punish any 
violations of the Commissioner’s sentencing order.  Accordingly, the State 
                                                 
23 U.S. v. Jones, 117 F.3d 644, 645 (2d Cir. 1997). 
24 Carr v. State, 757 A.2d at 1277; accord U.S. v. Smith, 992 F.2d at 99; U.S. v. Soolook, 
987 F.2d at 574. 
25 See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 58(g)(2)(B). 
26 See, e.g., Admin. Directive No. 2000-3, Superior Court of Delaware (Jan 1, 2000) 
(assigning duties to Superior Court Commissioners). 
 
11
argues that, because Johnson gave his consent27 to allow the Commissioner 
to sentence him on the original drug possession charge, the Commissioner 
also had authority to adjudicate and sentence Johnson on the violation 
charge pursuant to section 512(a)(4). 
 
The State’s argument fails to recognize two important legal concepts.  
First, a violation of probation hearing is a separate and distinct adjudicatory 
proceeding in the nature of a trial.28  Second, the finding of a violation can 
lead to the imposition of a new sentence that would require a separate 
consent before it could be imposed by a Superior Court Commissioner.29 
 
Although patterned on the Federal Magistrates Act, section 512 differs 
in at least one significant respect from its federal counterpart.  Section 512 
does not confer upon Superior Court Commissioners any authority to 
conduct trials.30 A violation of probation hearing may be informal or 
summary in nature.31 Nevertheless, it is still an adjudicatory proceeding in 
                                                 
27 Again, we assume the truth of this factual assertion without deciding it, although we 
note there is no indication in the present record to support it. 
28 See Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 4334(c) (establishing that a VOP hearing may be 
informal or summary). 
29 See Pavulak v. State, 880 A.2d 1044, 1046 (Del. 2005) (discussing how the original 
sentence limits the possible range of a subsequent sentence). 
30 Compare 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(3). 
31 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4334(c) (establishing that a VOP hearing may be informal 
or summary). 
 
12
the nature of a trial that must “comport with the protections of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”32   
Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 32.1 sets forth the due 
process protections afforded to Delaware probationers.  Rule 32.1 
specifically provides that a probationer charged with a violation of probation 
“shall be afforded a prompt hearing before a judge of Superior Court on the 
charge of violation.”33  Accordingly, we hold that Superior Court 
Commissioners are without authority to conduct violation of probation 
hearings. 
Conclusion 
 
This appeal is dismissed.  The Commissioner’s sentencing order was 
without legal effect and must be vacated by the Superior Court.34  Johnson is 
entitled to a new violation of probation hearing before a Superior Court 
judge.  The Clerk of this Court is directed to send a copy of this opinion to 
the President Judge of the Superior Court and the judge who sentenced 
Johnson in February 2005. 
                                                 
32 Gibbs v. State, 760 A.2d 541, 543-44 (Del. 2000). 
33 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 32.1(a) (emphasis added). 
34 Franklin v. State, 855 A.2d 274, 279 (Del. 2004).