Title: APARTMENT ASS'NS v. Evans
Citation: 564 P.2d 788, 88 Wash. 2d 563
Docket Number: 43879
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: May 26, 1977

88 Wn.2d 563 (1977) 564 P.2d 788 WASHINGTON ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT ASSOCIATIONS, INC., ET AL, Respondents, v. DANIEL J. EVANS, as Governor, ET AL, Appellants. No. 43879. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. May 26, 1977. Slade Gorton, Attorney General, Malachy R. Murphy, Deputy, and Wayne L. Williams and Carol A. Smith, Assistants, for appellants. Merges, Youngberg, Goucher, Allen, Larson &amp; Brain, Edwards E. Merges, Nicolai, Sorrel, Binns &amp; Beck, and Max R. Nicolai, for respondents. WRIGHT, C.J. The problem presented in this litigation is the validity of the Governor's 14 attempted item and section vetoes to Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill No. 2226. This bill ultimately became Laws of 1973, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 207 (codified in RCW 59.18), and is commonly known as the landlord-tenant act of 1973. The Governor exercised his veto power by attempting to excise parts of sections 6, 7, 8, 11, 19, 23, 24, 25, and 31 and *565 all of sections 43 and 47. At the time of these vetoes, Const. art. 3, § 12 provided in pertinent part: Since then, Amendment 62 has been passed which alters the Governor's item veto power. However, we are concerned only with the constitutional provision as it existed in 1973. Each veto must necessarily be considered separately. A few general principles should be stated at the outset, however. The Governor when exercising the veto power is acting in a legislative rather than in an executive capacity. He is, in effect, a part of the legislature. Gottstein v. Lister, 88 Wash. 462, 153 P. 595 (1915); State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 25 P.2d 91 (1933); Lynch v. Department of Labor &amp; Indus., 19 Wn.2d 802, 145 P.2d 265 (1944); Shelton Hotel Co. v. Bates, 4 Wn.2d 498, 104 P.2d 478 (1940). [1, 2] In order for a veto to be valid, it must pass two tests. Each of these tests is independent of the other, and if an attempted veto fails either test, it is invalid. First, the excised portion of a bill must constitute an item or section within the meaning of Const. art. 3, § 12. Moreover, what constitutes a valid item or section is a question of law for the court to decide, and does not depend upon the legislature's arrangement of the subject matter by arbitrary divisions of a bill into items or sections. Cascade Tel. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 176 Wash. 616, 30 P.2d 976 (1934), Second, the veto power may be exercised only in a negative way, and not in an affirmative way. That is to say, the Governor may use the veto power to prevent some act or *566 part of an act of the legislature from becoming law. Likewise, the Governor may not use the veto power to reach a new or different result from what the legislature intended. Spokane Grain &amp; Fuel Co. v. Lyttaker, 59 Wash. 76, 109 P. 316 (1910). In other words, the veto power must be exercised in a destructive and not a creative manner. [3] An examination of the vetoed portions of the act will be necessary in order to determine if each of the vetoes is in fact valid. Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill No. 2226, section 6, states: (Italics indicate vetoed sections.) With regard to the portion of subsection (1), the attempted veto substantially altered the scope of the section. The effect of the subsection was increased to include all violations of code, statute, ordinance or regulation. As passed by the legislature the subsection applied only to violations "if such condition substantially endangers or impairs the health or safety of the tenant". The attempted veto, therefore, had an affirmative effect. With regard to the portion of subsection (4), the effect of the attempted veto would be to extend the act to apply to single family residences which were not included in the act as passed. That again attempted an affirmative result. *567 Section 7 of the act states: (Italics indicate vetoed section.) Again, the portion attempted to be vetoed was a limitation or restriction upon the effectiveness of the act. Therefore, if that portion were vetoed the effect of the act is increased by removing an excuse for timely compliance which otherwise would be available to the landlord. That produces an affirmative result. Section 8 of the act states in part: (Italics indicate vetoed section.) This attempted veto extends the effect of the act. If the tenant is required to pay all utilities which he has agreed to pay before exercising certain remedies that is a restriction upon the right to use certain remedies. The attempted veto removes that restriction and, therefore, extends the effect of the act, and is affirmative in character. Section 11(1) of the act states in part: (Italics indicate vetoed section.) The portion which was the subject of the attempted veto in section 11(1) was a limitation upon the right of the tenant to contract for repairs at the expense of the landlord, which limited such right to not more than an amount equal to 1 month's rent in any year. The removal of that limitation was obviously an extension of the act and, therefore, affirmative. Section 19 reads in part: (Italics indicate vetoed section.) This section as passed by the legislature gives to the landlord the right to require the tenant to remedy nonconformance with (a) section 13 of the act, or (b) the terms of *569 the rental agreement, or (c) rules enforceable after the commencement of the tenancy. This all related to a single subject, the right of the landlord to require performance. It is not severable and is, therefore, not a proper item. The attempted veto must fail for that reason. Section 23(4) of the act states in part: (Italics indicate vetoed sections.) Both of the attempted vetoes extend the effect of the act. The first makes the landlord liable for taking or detaining personal property even if the tenant specifically consents to the same; a definite extension of the liability imposed by the act as it was passed by the legislature. The second attempted veto sought to remove from the tenant the duty to make a written demand for the return of his property, likewise a definite extension of the liability of the landlord. Both of the attempted vetoes are, therefore, affirmative in scope and effect. Section 24 states as follows: (Italics indicate vetoed sections.) The first of the attempted vetoes in section 24 is identical with the attempted veto in section 6(1) and the same reasons demonstrate that it is affirmative in character. The second attempted veto in the section expands the scope of the act in that it attempts to cause the act to apply to all evictions. However, the act as passed by the legislature applied to a more limited class, namely evictions excluding those provided in section 20 of the act. The Governor attempted to legislate affirmatively by use of the veto and that is not permissible. Section 25 of the act states in part: (Italics indicate vetoed section.) The portion attempted to be vetoed relates to the burden of proof. If the attempted veto were to be valid the burden of proof upon the landlord would be increased and thus the effect would be affirmative. Section 31(2) states: (Italics indicate vetoed section.) The attempted veto, if effective, would change existing law, and would increase the burden upon the landlord. The attempted veto must be considered as a whole. The item of *572 attorney's fees, if it stood alone, might have been a proper subject of a veto, however, since the balance of the attempted veto is improper the whole must fail. It is, therefore, invalid as a veto. Section 43 of the act reads: (Italics indicate this entire section vetoed.) This veto of an entire section is definitely affirmative in character. It makes the act applicable to a substantial class of transactions which the legislature had intended to exempt from the act. Section 47 states: (Italics indicate this entire section vetoed.) This attempted veto of a whole section would have had the effect of extending the act to leases entered into prior to the effective date of the act. Without the necessity of discussion of possible impairment of contract versus the police power, there can be no doubt this extends the effect of the act and is, therefore, affirmative. For the reasons stated in connection with each of the attempted vetoes, the decision of the trial court is affirmed *573 in whole and the attempted vetoes are hereby found in each instance to be invalid. ROSELLINI, HAMILTON, STAFFORD, UTTER, BRACHTENBACH, and HOROWITZ, JJ., and LANGSDORF, J. Pro Tem., concur.