Title: County of Hennepin v. Mikulay
Citation: 194 N.W.2d 259
Docket Number: 43434, 43439
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: January 28, 1972

194 N.W.2d 259 (1972) COUNTY OF HENNEPIN, Respondent, v. Arnold P. MIKULAY, a. k. a. Arnold Mikulay and Leonard Mikulay, Appellants. Nos. 43434, 43439. Supreme Court of Minnesota. January 28, 1972. *260 O'Connor, Green, Thomas, Walters &amp; Kelly, and James R. Dorsey, Minneapolis, for appellants. George M. Scott, County Atty., Floyd B. Olson, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent. Heard and considered en banc. KNUTSON, Chief Justice. This is a consolidated appeal from summary judgments entered by the District Court of Hennepin County. Appellants herein, Arnold P. and Leonard J. Mikulay, were the owners of three parcels of land in downtown Minneapolis involved in a condemnation proceeding commenced by Hennepin County for the acquisition of land on which to build a new county hospital. The land owned by the Mikulays was described as parcels 3, 5, and 10 in the condemnation petition. A more detailed description is unnecessary. On December 10, 1970, a hearing was held in the district court on the petition to condemn. The Mikulays were present at the hearing but made no objection to the taking, so on December 22 the petition was granted and commissioners were appointed pursuant to statute. On March 26, 1971, the commissioners filed their report. The Mikulays were willing to accept the commissioners' appraisal on all three parcels and took no appeal from the award. Hennepin County, however, filed appeals as to parcels 3 and 5. *261 The county filed a motion, apparently under Minn.St.1969, § 117.20, subd. 5,[1] for permission to deposit with the clerk of district court three-fourths of the amount of the award. The Mikulays then moved for leave to file a supplemental answer contesting whether the county intended to take the land involved for a public purpose. The court on July 9, 1971, made its order authorizing the county to deposit with the clerk of court the sum of $171,375, that amount being three-fourths partial payment of the award plus appraisal fees, and it also permitted the Mikulays to file a supplemental answer. It was further provided that the amount of money deposited should not be released "until there has been an order of [the trial] Court entered that [the Mikulays] have relinquished possession of the property designated as Parcels numbered 3 and 5 herein." Thereafter, the Mikulays did file a supplemental answer, in which they alleged that the land was not being taken by the county for a public use but that instead it was the county's intention to sell part of the land. The Mikulays now concede that parcel 5 was taken for a public purpose, so this appeal concerns only parcel 3. The county thereafter moved for summary judgment, seeking a determination that the taking of the property was for a public purpose. It then commenced an action in ejectment, seeking to gain possession of the property, and subsequent thereto it moved for summary judgment in that action also. The motions for summary judgment were supported by affidavits of Floyd B. Olson, assistant county attorney; Jack M. Provo, chairman of the Board of County Commissioners; and Stanley R. Cowle, administrator of Hennepin County. All affidavits alleged that the taking of the parcels involved was necessary for public purposes. Cowle's affidavit, which is characteristic of the three, states among other things: The motion also finds support in a deposition of Cowle, taken at the Mikulays' instance, in which he testified that all the property was needed for the present and future use of the hospital. No counteraffidavits were submitted by the Mikulays nor did they present any other material which was persuasive as to the existence of any issue of fact. On August 10, 1971, the court granted summary judgments on both motions. In *262 its memorandum, the court, among other things, said: 1. We have held on a number of occasions that where affidavits are submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, Rules of Civil Procedure, the nonmoving party cannot simply rely upon general statements in a complaint. We think the same rule applies to the supplemental answer we have here. A party cannot create a fact issue by claiming that the facts which may be developed on cross-examination at the time of trial will permit him to reach the trier of facts. Instead, the nonmoving party must show at the time of answering that specific facts do exist which create an issue for the trier of facts. Rosvall v. Provost, 279 Minn. 119, 155 N.W.2d 900 (1968); Ahlm v. Rooney, 274 Minn. 259, 143 N.W.2d 65 (1966); Borom v. City of St. Paul, 289 Minn. 371, 184 N.W.2d 595 (1971); Morgan v. McLaughlin, 290 Minn. 389, 188 N.W.2d 829 (1971). We have recognized that Rule 56 was amended in 1959 "to provide that if a summary judgment motion is supported by affidavits, depositions, etc., the nonmoving party cannot rely on assertions in his pleadings to create fact issues. If the summary judgment motion is to be properly contested, the adverse party must present specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial unless, of course, the facts asserted by the moving party fail to adequately negate any issue of fact raised by the pleading." Ahlm v. Rooney, 274 Minn. 259, 262, 143 N.W.2d 65, 68 (1966). See, 2 Hetland &amp; Adamson, Minnesota Practice, Civil Rules Ann., Authors' Comments to Rule 56, p. 570. It follows that in this case, where there was nothing persuasive submitted in opposition to the affidavits supporting the motion for summary judgment, the court properly granted the motion. 2. As far as the ejectment case is concerned, that has now become moot by virtue of the surrender of possession by the landowners to the county and the county's acceptance of such possession. There is no longer anyone to eject, so there is nothing for us to decide as far as that appeal is concerned. 3. The Mikulays' claim that there may have been a change of the county's plans to use the property for hospital purposes is based on two newspaper articles, one of which appeared in the Minneapolis Tribune on June 2, 1971, and the other in the Minneapolis Star on June 28, 1971. These articles purported to relate statements by the chairman of the Hennepin County Board and the administrator of the county that some of the condemned land might be sold to the public because of some revisions in the hospital construction plans. Apparently, the description of the land that might be sold included parcels 3, 5, and 10, the Mikulays' property, or some part thereof. While it does not appear in the record, it was admitted on oral argument that subsequent to the granting of summary judgment by the lower court the Mikulays surrendered and the county took possession of the property involved, and that the Mikulays have accepted and have been paid the amount deposited with the clerk of court, which represents three-fourths of the amount of the commissioners' award. *263 While the Mikulays raise other issues in their appeal here, the main thrust of their argument is that, inasmuch as the county may abandon the proceedings at any time prior to final judgment, it may not take possession under Minn.Const. art. 1, § 13, until the full amount of the award of the commissioners is paid. Article 1, § 13, reads: We think this argument has been sufficiently answered by our prior decisions. In Johnson v. Town of Clontarf, 98 Minn. 281, 288, 108 N.W. 521, 524 (1906), we said: In State ex rel. McFarland v. Erskine, 165 Minn. 303, 306, 206 N.W. 447, 449 (1925), we said: Here, while the statute permits the deposit of not more than three-fourths of the amount of the award, ostensibly for the purpose of saving the condemnor interest on the commissioners' award, the county is obligated to pay whatever the damages are assessed to be on the trial, at least if the right to abandon the proceeding has been lost. The case of Curtis v. St. Paul, S. &amp; T. F. R. Co., 21 Minn. 497 (1875), involved a condemnation by a railroad company. G. S.1866, c. 34, tit. 1, § 23, in effect at that time, provided: With respect to the filing of such bond, we said (21 Minn. 498): If the filing of such bond satisfied the constitutional requirement of art. 1, § 13, it must follow that the deposit of three-fourths of the award, coupled with a charge upon the county treasury for any additional amount awarded, also satisfied the constitutional requirement. 4. The county argues that the determination of whether the land is being taken for a public purpose must be made at the original hearing on the petition. Many of our cases would so indicate. In State, by Mondale, v. Wren, Inc., 275 Minn. 259, 261, 146 N.W.2d 547, 550 (1966), we said: Clearly, if the above language is applied literally, the question of whether land is taken for a public purpose could never be raised except at the time of the hearing on the petition. The trouble in this case, and it may arise in others, is that the purported intention of the county to abandon its plan to take for a public purpose did not appear until long after the hearing on the petition. Assuming that the newspaper articles upon which the Mikulays rely could be considered evidencewhich we doubtit may be arguable that they should have an opportunity to litigate the issue of taking for a public purpose at some point. In Housing and Redevelopment Authority v. Minneapolis Metropolitan Co., 259 Minn. 1, 14, 104 N.W.2d 864, 874 (1960), we reviewed a question of this kind by certiorari. There we said: The question of public necessity for the taking in a condemnation proceeding is *265 legislative, and a determination thereof by the legislative tribunal is reviewed on appeal by the courts only to determine whether the taking was arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or contrary to law. City of Austin v. Wright, 262 Minn. 301, 114 N.W.2d 584 (1962). In State, by Mondale, v. Ohman, 263 Minn. 115, 120, 116 N.W.2d 101, 104 (1962), we said: Again, in State, by Lord, v. North Star Concrete Co., 265 Minn. 483, 486, 122 N.W.2d 118, 121 (1963), we said: See, also, State, by Hilton, v. Voll, 155 Minn. 72, 192 N.W. 188 (1923); Packard v. County of Otter Tail, 174 Minn. 347, 219 N.W. 289 (1928); Housing and Redevelopment Authority v. Minneapolis Metropolitan Co. supra. Had the Mikulays raised this question at the original hearing on the petition, they obviously would have had a full hearing. But, as has been said above, the difficulty here is that they had no information at that time that would lead them to believe that the county might not use all of the property for a public purpose. Consequently, while we feel that in this case they have made no showing on the motion for summary judgment that would raise any material issue of fact, we do not wish to close the door in a proper case to a landowner's raising the question of whether the taking is for a proper purpose. We decide only that in this case the summary judgment was properly granted. 5. The authorities are in hopeless conflict on the question as to when the right of the condemnor to abandon the proceedings is lost. See, generally, Annotation, 121 A.L.R. 12. In 27 Am.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain § 453, we find the following general rule: It has been held that when the condemnor takes possession and files a bond as security for payment, or pays the amount of the award into court, the rights of the parties have vested and the condemnor has lost the right to abandon. 27 Am.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 453, p. 375; Annotation, 5 A.L. R.2d 724, § 5. Nor is it easy to determine from our cases when the right to abandon the proceedings arises.[2] The general rule is quite broadly stated in a number of cases, but the determination of the exact question of when the right to abandon arises seems to be left in a vacuum. In State, by Ervin, v. Appleton, 208 Minn. 436, 438, 294 N.W. 418, 420 (1940), some importance was attached to the fact that the condemnor had taken possession. We there said: Thus, it appears that where possession is not taken, the right to abandon still exists; but the opposite question, whether, when possession has been taken, the right to abandon has been lost, is more difficult to decide. In Witt v. St. Paul &amp; N. P. Ry. Co., 35 Minn. 404, 407, 29 N.W. 161, 162 (1886), the majority of the court refused to pass on the question as to whether the condemnor, by taking possession, had lost the right to abandon the proceeding. The majority did say: Mr. Justice Mitchell and Mr. Justice Dickinson, in a special concurring opinion, said (35 Minn. 407, 29 N.W. 162): It may be stated generally that the condemnor ordinarily may abandon the proceedings until the reciprocal rights of the parties have vested. The difficulty is in determining when the reciprocal rights of the parties have vested. In State, by Lord, v. Myhra G. M. C. Truck &amp; Equipment Co. Inc., 254 Minn. 17, 20, 93 N.W.2d 204, 206 (1958), we said: In State ex rel. McFarland v. Erskine, 165 Minn. 303, 307, 206 N.W. 447, 449 (1925), we said: *267 Applying these rules to the present case, it would seem that, upon the property owners' surrender of possession and the condemnor's acceptance of it, coupled with the acceptance by the landowners of the amount deposited with the clerk, the rights of the parties became vested and it was then too late for the condemnor to abandon the proceeding. All that remained was a determination of the amount of damages which the property owners were entitled to receive. This does not conflict with Independent School Dist. No. 273 v. Gross, Minn., 190 N.W.2d 651, 657 (1971), where we said: The above case is distinguishable from that now before us in that there the school district had not taken possession nor had it paid any portion of the award, and it had preserved the right to abandon the condemnation proceedings by filing a dismissal prior to the expiration of the time for appeal. Here, not only did the county take possession, but the property owners accepted a substantial partial payment of the award. Under these circumstances, the rights of the parties have become reciprocally vested. Thus, while the court properly granted summary judgment on the record before us due to failure of the nonmoving parties to submit any evidence to substantiate the existence of a genuine issue of fact for trial, it would appear that, even if the nonmoving parties could have submitted evidence that would raise a question of fact for trial, events that have occurred since the summary judgment was granted have now reached a point where the rights of the parties are definitely vested. As a result, the decision should be affirmed. Affirmed. TODD, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. [1] Minn.St.1969, § 117.20, subd. 5, contains no express provision for taking possession upon making such deposit. Minn.St.1969, c. 117, was in large part repealed by L. 1971, c. 595, § 29, and was replaced by amendatory statutes contained in L.1971, c. 595. L.1971, c. 595, § 6, codified as Minn.St.1971, § 117.042, provides that the condemnor may take title and possession prior to the filing of the award by paying the owner or depositing with the court an amount equal to the condemnor's approved appraisal. [2] Cases involving the right to abandon under home rule charter or specific authority granted by the legislature are not in point nor are they discussed herein. See, for instance, McRostie v. City of Owatonna, 152 Minn. 63, 188 N.W. 52 (1922).