Title: STATE v CUNNINGHAM
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12846
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: May 2, 1975

No. 12846 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A W 1975 THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - C L A N C Y CUNNINGHAM, Defendant and Respondent, Appeal from: D t s t r i c t Court of the Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert H . Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Richard Dzivi argued, Special Assistant Attorney General, Great F a l l s , Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana For Respondent : Moses, Kampfe, Tolliver and Wright, Billings, Montana Ralph Wright argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: April 14, 1975 Decided : ! \ M ' Y - 2 197s Clerk + M r . J u s t i c e Frank I , Haswell delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. The question i n t h i s case is whether f u r t h e r prosecution is barred by t h e double jeopardy provisions of the United S t a t e s and Montana Constitutions. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t held it was. W e reverse. O n August 24, 1973, defendant Clancy Cunningham was charged with f i r s t degree a s s a u l t a r i s i n g o u t of t h e a l l e g e d stabbing of one Larry Catlin. Defendant entered a plea of "not g u i l t y " . The case was s e t f o r t r i a l on March 2 1 , 1974, i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Yellowstone County. O n t h e t r i a l d a t e , a jury was duly selected and sworn. The d i s t r i c t judge then read a general omnibus jury i n s t r u c t i o n without objection. Court was then recessed over t h e noon hour. When court reconvened, t h e deputy county attorney moved t o dismiss t h e a c t i o n on t h e ground t h a t a new and d i f f e r e n t charge, s p e c i f i c a l l y t h i r d degree a s s a u l t , was being f i l e d a g a i n s t t h e defendant i n j u s t i c e c o u r t . The s u b s t a n t i a l reason f o r t h e d i s - missal was t h a t t h e victim of t h e alleged a s s a u l t was not a v a i l - a b l e t o t e s t i f y . The victim, a r e s i d e n t of Wyoming, had n o t been subpoenaed. The s t a t e ' s motion t o dismiss was granted without objection. Defendant entered a plea of " g u i l t y " t o t h e t h i r d degree a s s a u l t charge based on t h e same incident. He was sentenced i n t h e j u s t i c e c o u r t t o s i x months i n t h e county j a i l . Thereafter on May 17, 1974, defendant, represented by d i f f e r e n t counsel, withdrew h i s p r i o r plea of "guilty" and enter- ed a plea of "not g u i l t y " t o t h e t h i r d degree a s s a u l t charge i n t h e j u s t i c e c o u r t . Thereupon t h e state dismissed t h e t h i r d de- gree a s s a u l t charge and f i l e d a f i r s t degree a s s a u l t charge based on t h e same incident i n t h e d i s t r i c t court. Defendant moved t o quash t h e l a t t e r charge on t h e ground t h a t it placed defendant i n jeopardy a second t i m e on t h e same charge i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e double jeopardy provisions of t h e f e d e r a l and s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n s . A f f i d a v i t s were f i l e d by t h e deputy county a t t o r n e y , a p a r a l e g a l o f f i c e r of t h e county a t t o r - n e y ' s s t a f f , and t h e victim. These a f f i d a v i t s a r e somewhat a t variance concerning what p r i o r arrangements had been made f o r t h e victim t o t e s t i f y and why he d i d not appear t o t e s t i f y on March 2 1 on t h e former charge of f i r s t degree a s s a u l t a g a i n s t defend- a n t . A f t e r hearing, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t granted d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o quash. The s t a t e appeals. The F i f t h Amendment's p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t placing a per- son twice i n jeopardy f o r t h e same offense a p p l i e s t o s t a t e c o u r t criminal proceedings through t h e "due process1' c l a u s e of t h e Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland (1969) 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L ed 2d 707. This p r o s c r i p t i o n i s not only a g a i n s t being twice punished, but a l s o a g a i n s t being twice p u t i n jeopardy. United S t a t e s v. B a l l (1896) 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 4 1 L.ed. 300; United S t a t e s v . Jorn (1971) 4 0 0 U.S. 470, 9 1 S.Ct. 547, 27 L ed 2d 543. It t h u s becomes necessary t o determine when jeopardy a t t a c h e s i n a Montana s t a t e c o u r t criminal prosecution. Montana s t a t u t e s provide t h a t jeopardy a t t a c h e s i n a crim- inal t r i a l a f t e r t h e f i r s t witness i s sworn. The 1969 Montana l e g i s l a t u r e s o provided i n Ch. 228, Session Laws of 1969, c o d i f i e d as s e c t i o n 94-6808.3, R.C.M. 1947. This Montana s t a t u t e was de- r i v e d from t h e Model Penal Code. B 1.08, Model Penal Code, Pro- posed O f f i c i a l Draft, 1962. The American Law I n s t i t u t e , i n formu- l a t i n g t h i s portion of t h e Model Penal Code, determined t h a t jeop- ardy customarily a t t a c h e s i n nonjury c a s e s upon swearing t h e f i r s t witness (see Anno. 49 ALR3d 1039); and concluded t h a t no v a l i d r a t i o n a l e e x i s t s f o r jeopardy a t t a c h i n g a t a d i f f e r e n t t i m e i n a j u r y t r i a l . The Montana l e g i s l a t u r e i n 1969 adopted t h i s s t a n d a r d of when jeopardy a t t a c h e s . The 1973 Montana l e g i s l a t u r e , meeting a f t e r adoption of t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , a g a i n considered t h i s s t a t e ' s c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e s on former p r o s e c u t i o n s and double jeopardy. T h i s l e g i s l a t u r e reenacted s e c t i o n 94-6808.3, R.C.M. 1947, pro- v i d i n g t h a t jeopardy a t t a c h e s i n a c r i m i n a l t r i a l a f t e r t h e f i r s t w i t n e s s is sworn. S e c t i o n 95-1711, R.C.M. 1947. The f e d e r a l r u l e , u n l i k e t h e Montana s t a t u t e , p r o v i d e s t h a t i n c r i m i n a l t r i a l s i n t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s jeopardy a t t a c h e s when t h e j u r y i s s e l e c t e d and sworn. Downum v. United S t a t e s , (1963) 372 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 1 0 L ed 2d 100. Whether t h e source of t h i s r u l e lies i n t h e r u l e making power of t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court over f e d e r a l c o u r t proceedings o r c o n s t i t u t e s a pronouncement of double jeopardy s t a n d a r d s of t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n is u n c l e a r . Thus t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e Montana s t a t u t e providing t h a t jeopardy a t t a c h e s when t h e f i r s t w i t n e s s i s sworn i s s q u a r e l y presented. Defendant contends t h e Montana s t a t u t e i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l because it v i o l a t e s t h e double jeopardy s t a n d a r d s of t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n as enunciated i n a s e r i e s of United S t a t e s Supreme Court d e c i s i o n s , p r i n c i p a l l y Downum v. United S t a t e s (1963), supra; Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1 4 4 4 , 20 L ed 2d 1412; I l l i n o i s v. Somerville (1973), 410 U.S. 458, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L ed 2d 425, 433, 434, and S e r f a s s v. United S t a t e s (1975 - U.S. , 43 L ed 2d 265, 95 S.Ct. - . Although t h e r e i s language i n t h e s e o p i n i o n s t h a t s u p p o r t s t h i s conclusion, t h e f a c t s and i s s u e s i n t h e s e c a s e s do n o t i n o u r opinion set up a r i g i d , i m - mutable c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r u l e t o be a p p l i e d mechanically i n determining whether s t a t e laws conform. Although c o n s t i t u t i o n a l opinions of t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court a r e necessarily painted with a broad brush, t h e language cannot be i n t e r p r e t e d i n a f a c t u a l vacuum. A s t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court observed i n Somerville i n commenting on i t s holding i n a p r i o r case: "While it i s possible t o excise various portions of t h e p l u r a l i t y opinion t o support t h e r e s u l t reached below, divorcing t h e language from t h e f a c t s of t h e case serves only t o d i s t o r t its holdings." Each of t h e cases noted i n t h e preceding paragraph on which t h e defendant r e l i e s is c l e a r l y distinguishable from t h e i n s t a n t case and does not present t h e i s s u e with which we a r e here confronted. Downum involved a t r i a l i n f e d e r a l c o u r t where jeopardy had c l e a r l y attached under t h e f e d e r a l r u l e . Duncan involved t h e r i g h t t o t r i a l by jury, not double jeopardy. Somer- v i l l e involved a s t a t e criminal t r i a l where jeopardy had c l e a r l y attached under a s t a t e s t a t u t e providing t h a t jeopardy attached when t h e former prosecution was "terminated improperly a f t e r t h e jury was impaneled and sworn", the f e d e r a l r u l e . (For t h e t e x t of t h e s t a t u t e see People v. Somerville, 88 Ill.App.2d 2 1 2 , 232 N.E.2d 115). Serfass involves a prosecution i n f e d e r a l c o u r t where t h e indictment was dismissed by p r e t r i a l order and defend- a n t had not y e t been put t o t r i a l before t h e t r i e r of t h e f a c t s . Our inquiry here focuses on whether t h e f e d e r a l r u l e is of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l dimensions precluding s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n on t h e subject. O r s t a t e d another way, i s t h e f e d e r a l r u l e so fundamen- t a l t o t h e American system of j u s t i c e t h a t t h e "due process" clause of t h e Fourteenth Pmendment mandates i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o s t a t e court criminal proceedings? W e perceive no inherent m e r i t i n t h e f e d e r a l r u l e over Montana's s t a t e law. It has been s a i d t h e f e d e r a l r u l e i s de- signed t o prevent prosecutorial manipulation. I l l i n o i s v. Somerville, supra. I t has f u r t h e r been s a i d t h a t t h e f e d e r a l r u l e guaran- tees t h e defendant h i s valued r i g h t t o have h i s t r i a l completed before t h e t r i b u n a l and jury selected f o r h i s case. Wade v. Hunter, (1949) 336 U.S. 684, 93 L.Ed 975; United S t a t e s v. Jorn, supra. W e f a i l t o see i n what manner t h e f e d e r a l r u l e p r o t e c t s a g a i n s t t h e s e abuses tc a g r e a t e r e x t e n t than Montana law. Prose- c u t o r i a l manipulation can be e f f e c t e d a s r e a d i l y under one r u l e a s under the other. I f bent on manipulation, a f e d e r a l prosecu- t o r can move t o dismiss a f t e r t h e jury is selected but before it is sworn, as r e a d i l y a s a s t a t e prosecutor can move t o d i s - m i s s a f t e r t h e jury i s sworn but before t h e f i r s t witness i s c a l l e d . I n e i t h e r case, t h e r e a l protection a g a i n s t prosecutorial manipu- l a t i o n is t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge i n granting o r deny- i n g dismissal. Here, f o r example, t h e judge could have, but d i d not, dismiss with prejudice. Nor do w e see any g r e a t e r protection i n t h e f e d e r a l r u l e a s f a r a s securing t o defendant t h e r i g h t t o have h i s t r i a l com- p l e t e d before the c o u r t and jury selected t o t r y h i s case. Mon- tana adheres t o t h i s p r i n c i p l e a l s o . It a l l depends on when t h e t r i a l is considered t o have commenced--whether on s e l e c t i o n and swearing of t h e jury a s i n t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s , o r on swearing t h e f i r s t witness a s i n Montana s t a t e courts. W e f i n d no s u b s t a n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e between t h e two r u l e s . Montana policy a s enunciated by i t s l e g i s l a t u r e is t h a t t h e t r i a l does not s t a r t u n t i l t h e f i r s t witness i s sworn. Sound policy reasons e x i s t f o r t h i s r u l e , p r i n c i p a l l y t h a t the jury a s t h e t r i e r of t h e f a c t s has nothing t o consider u n t i l t h e f i r s t w i t - ness is c a l l e d and sworn. This appears e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t with t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l standard t h a t jeopardy does not a t t a c h u n t i l t h e defendant has been put t o t r i a l before t h e trier of t h e f a c t s . S e r f a s s v. United S t a t e s (1975), supra. And a s t h e united S t a t e s Supreme Court observed i n Somerville: "Federal c o u r t s should not be quick t o conclude t h a t simply because a s t a t e procedure does not conform t o t h e corresponding f e d e r a l s t a t u t e o r r u l e , it does n o t s e r v e a l e g i t i m a t e s t a t e policy." For t h e s e reasons, w e conclude t h a t t h e Montana s t a t u t e does not v i o l a t e United S t a t e s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l standards of double jeopardy. Neither does t h e s t a t u t e v i o l a t e t h e double jeopardy provision of t h e 1972 Montana Constitution, A r t . 11, Section 25. This provision does n o t d e f i n e when jeopardy a t t a c h e s leaving t h e l e g i s l a t u r e f r e e t o make t h a t determination. The l e g i s l a t u r e has done so by enactment of t h e s t a t u t e s heretofore noted. I n so doing it has n u l l i f i e d any suggestion found i n t h e language of S t a t e v. Gaimos (1916) 53 Mont. 118, 162 P . 596, t h a t jeopardy a t t a c h e s upon impaneling and swearing t h e jury. This cause i s remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Yellow- stone County f o r f u r t h e r proceedings. J u s t i c e W e concur: - .& * . - , , - - - , - , - - , - - ' - - - - , - - - - - - - -- -"- - ' L Chief J u s t i c e