Title: Dakter v. Cavallino
Citation: 2015 WI 67
Docket Number: 2013AP001750
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 2015

2015 WI 67 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP1750 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Ronald J. Dakter and Kathleen M. Dakter, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross-
Appellants, 
     v. 
Dale L. Cavallino, Hillsboro Transportation 
Company, LLC  
and Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Defendants-Appellants-Cross-
Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 358 Wis. 2d 434, 856 N.W.2d 523) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No: 2014 WI App 112 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 22, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Juneau 
 
JUDGE: 
John P. Roemer Jr. 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, C. J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER, joined by GABLEMAN, JJ. concur (Opinion 
filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-appellants-cross-respondents-
petitioners, there were briefs by Paul D. Curtis, Timothy M. 
Barber and Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison. Oral argument by Paul 
D. Curtis. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents-cross-appellants, there was 
a brief by John R. Orton and Curran, Hollenbeck & Orton, S.C., 
Mauston. Oral argument by John R. Orton. 
 
 
2
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, 
III and Pitman, Kalkhoff, Sicula & Dentice, Milwaukee and Lynn 
R. Laufenberg, and Laufenberg, Jassack & Laufenberg, Milwaukee, 
on behalf of The Wisconsin Association for Justice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 67
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP1750 
(L.C. No. 
2009CV147) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
  : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Ronald J. Dakter and Kathleen M. Dakter,   
 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross-
Appellants, 
 
 
v. 
 
Dale L. Cavallino, Hillsboro Transportation 
Company, LLC, and Michigan Millers Mutual 
Insurance Company,   
 
 
Defendants-Appellants-Cross-
Respondents-Petitioners.   
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.  This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals affirming a judgment 
and order of the Circuit Court for Juneau County, John P. 
Roemer, Judge.1 
                                                 
1 Dakter v. Cavallino, 2014 WI App 112, 358 Wis. 2d 434, 856 
N.W.2d 523. 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
2 
 
¶2 
This case arises from the collision of a passenger 
automobile driven by Ronald J. Dakter, the plaintiff,2 and a 65-
foot 
semi-trailer 
truck 
operated 
by 
Dale 
Cavallino, 
the 
defendant.3  After a 10-day trial, the jury found the defendant 
65 percent causally negligent and the plaintiff 35 percent 
causally negligent and assessed damages at $1,097,955.86 for the 
plaintiff and $63,366 for the plaintiff's wife. 
¶3 
The defendant raises only one question of law for our 
consideration:  Was the truck driver negligence instruction 
given to the jury on the standard of care applicable to the 
defendant as the operator of a semi-trailer truck erroneous, 
such that the defendant is entitled to a new trial? 
¶4 
The truck driver negligence instruction that is the 
subject of the defendant's challenge provided in relevant part 
as follows: 
                                                 
2 For ease of reference, we refer to Ronald J. Dakter as the 
plaintiff.  Kathleen M. Dakter, the plaintiff's wife, is also a 
complainant in the instant case and was awarded damages for her 
injuries.  Ms. Dakter is governed by the court's ruling in the 
instant case. 
3 For ease of reference, we refer to Dale Cavallino as the 
defendant. 
 
Hillsboro 
Transportation 
Company, 
LLC 
(the 
defendant's employer) and Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance 
Company (the employer's insurance provider) are also defendants.  
They are governed by the court's ruling in the instant case. 
The parties, the circuit court, and the court of appeals 
refer to the truck operated by the defendant in various ways——as 
a semi, a semi truck, a semi-tractor trailer, and a semi-trailer 
truck.  We refer to it as a semi-trailer truck throughout this 
opinion. 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
3 
 
At the time of the accident, the defendant, Dale 
Cavallino was a professional truck driver operating a 
semi tractor-trailer pursuant to a commercial driver's 
license issued by the State of Wisconsin.  As the 
operator of a semi tractor-trailer, it was [the 
defendant's] duty to use the degree of care, skill, 
and judgment which a reasonable semi truck driver 
would exercise in the same or similar circumstances 
having 
due 
regard 
for 
the 
state 
of 
learning, 
education, experience, and knowledge possessed by semi 
truck drivers holding commercial driver's licenses.  A 
semi truck driver who fails to conform to the standard 
is negligent.  The burden is on the plaintiff to prove 
that [the defendant] was negligent. 
¶5 
The defendant asserts that the truck driver negligence 
instruction was erroneous because it directed the jury to 
consider the defendant's special knowledge and skill as a semi-
trailer truck driver when determining whether the defendant was 
negligent.  According to the defendant, an instruction regarding 
an actor's  special knowledge and skill should not be given in 
"mine-run" motor vehicle negligence cases like the instant case; 
it should be given only in professional negligence cases.  The 
defendant contends that by giving an instruction regarding the 
defendant's special knowledge and skill, the circuit court 
imposed a heightened standard of care on him.  This, says the 
defendant, was prejudicial error entitling him to a new trial. 
¶6 
In contrast, the plaintiff contends that the truck 
driver negligence instruction directed the jury to take the 
special knowledge and skill possessed by professional semi-
trailer truck drivers into account only in order to determine 
whether the defendant met the standard of ordinary care.  In the 
plaintiff's view, the truck driver negligence instruction did 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
4 
 
not impose a heightened standard of care on the defendant and 
was not erroneous. 
¶7 
The circuit court sided with the plaintiff, entering a 
judgment on the verdict in favor of the plaintiff and denying 
the defendant's post-verdict motions. 
¶8 
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment and order 
of the circuit court.  The court of appeals explained that it 
did not consider the challenged jury instruction a misstatement 
of the law: 
[I]n evaluating whether an actor has acted as a 
reasonable person would, jurors may consider the 
actor's 
superior 
knowledge 
or 
skills 
when 
the 
knowledge or skills give the actor an ability to avoid 
injury or damage to others.  If someone "has skills or 
knowledge that exceed those possessed by most others, 
these skills or knowledge are circumstances to be 
taken into account in determining whether the actor 
has behaved as a reasonable careful person."4 
¶9 
The court of appeals further explained that although 
the truck driver negligence instruction was not incorrect, a 
jury could possibly have misinterpreted the instruction as 
imposing a higher standard of care on semi-trailer truck drivers 
than that applied to other drivers: 
[W]e see at least some danger that the truck driver 
instruction could have been interpreted by the jury to 
suggest that [the defendant] should be held to a 
different, higher standard of care than other drivers 
because he is a professional truck driver. . . . If 
understood this way, it would state the legal doctrine 
incorrectly.5 
                                                 
4 Dakter, 358 Wis. 2d 434, ¶39 (quoted source omitted). 
5 Id., ¶44. 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
5 
 
¶10 The court of appeals ultimately concluded that it was 
"at least as likely as not that jurors aiming to apply the 
[truck driver negligence] instruction would have hit the mark by 
focusing on evidence of [the defendant's] superior knowledge and 
skills, and not missed the mark by holding him to a separate, 
higher truck driver standard of care."6 
¶11 Nevertheless, the court of appeals opted to assume, 
without deciding, that the truck driver negligence instruction 
was erroneous.  It then denied the defendant relief, concluding 
that any error in the challenged jury instruction was not 
prejudicial. 
¶12 We conclude that the circuit court did not err in 
giving the truck driver negligence instruction.  The truck 
driver negligence instruction did not misstate the law and was 
not misleading.  The defendant's arguments to the contrary are 
not persuasive, and the defendant is not entitled to a new 
trial.  Accordingly, although our reasoning differs, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
I 
¶13 Many details about the collision that spawned the 
instant litigation remain in dispute.  The following description 
of the collision focuses on the uncontested facts. 
¶14 The collision took place on May 29, 2008, at the 
intersection of State Trunk Highway 80 (running north/south) and 
                                                 
6 Id., ¶47. 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
6 
 
State Trunk Highway 82 (running east/west).  This intersection 
is located in Elroy, Juneau County, Wisconsin. 
¶15 The plaintiff was driving a passenger automobile 
northbound on Highway 80.  He intended to turn left onto Tilmar 
Street, which is the portion of Highway 82 running west of 
Highway 80.  He approached the intersection with his turn signal 
on and stopped. 
¶16 Wyman Hoiland, who is not a party to this lawsuit, was 
driving a van southbound on Highway 80 and intended to turn left 
onto Highway 82.  Hoiland approached the intersection with his 
turn signal on and stopped.  His vehicle was opposite the 
plaintiff's vehicle in the intersection and was in front of the 
defendant's semi-trailer truck. 
¶17 The defendant, who had a commercial driver's license 
issued by the State of Wisconsin and had driven a semi-trailer 
truck for 31 years, was driving a 65-foot semi-trailer truck 
southbound on Highway 80.  The defendant intended to continue 
straight on Highway 80.   
¶18 As the defendant approached the intersection, Hoiland 
may have turned left, permitting the defendant to remain in his 
lane and continue straight.  Alternatively, Hoiland may have 
remained in the intersection waiting to turn left, leading the 
defendant to switch into the right-hand lane in order to drive 
around Hoiland and continue straight. 
¶19 In any event, it is undisputed that the plaintiff 
attempted to execute a left turn onto Tilmar Street and collided 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
7 
 
with 
the 
defendant's 
semi-trailer 
truck. 
 
The 
plaintiff 
sustained serious injuries.  
¶20 The 
plaintiff 
filed 
suit 
against 
the 
defendant, 
asserting that the defendant's negligence caused the collision. 
¶21 Before trial, the parties agreed that the usual 
standard of ordinary care applies to semi-trailer truck drivers.  
They disagreed, however, about whether the jury should hear 
expert testimony regarding the special knowledge and skill 
possessed by semi-trailer truck drivers. 
¶22 The circuit court agreed with the position of both 
parties that the standard of ordinary care applies to semi-
trailer truck drivers, stating as follows: "I don't believe 
there is a heightened standard of care.  I believe all of us are 
required to maintain our speed, maintain our management, control 
of our vehicles, and also to maintain a proper look-out." 
¶23 The circuit court went on to explain that with regard 
to semi-trailer truck drivers, ordinary care means the care "a 
reasonable and prudent truck driver would use under the same or 
similar circumstances."  Accordingly, the circuit court ruled 
that 
expert 
testimony 
regarding 
the 
knowledge 
and 
skill 
possessed by semi-trailer truck drivers was admissible. 
¶24 Three expert witnesses testified regarding the safety 
standards and practices that govern semi-trailer truck drivers. 
¶25 The plaintiff called Charles Collins, a retired truck 
driving safety instructor for a driver training program at a 
technical college, as an expert witness.  Collins explained, 
among other things, that the defendant was driving his semi-
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
8 
 
trailer truck with an empty trailer and that "[i]t takes longer 
to stop with an empty trailer."  Collins also explained that the 
pavement was wet and that "[w]hen the pavement is wet, it is 
accepted in all literature, textbooks, [and] videos that you 
must reduce your speed by a third," which the defendant did not 
do. 
¶26 The plaintiff also called Andrew Sievers, a safety 
consultant, as an expert witness.  Sievers testified about 
defensive driving techniques for semi-trailer truck drivers, 
including the "cushion of safety" (that is, the distance) that 
semi-trailer truck drivers should maintain between the front of 
their trucks and the back of the vehicles in front of them.  
Sievers opined that the defendant had not been maintaining a 
proper cushion of safety when the collision occurred.  Sievers 
also explained that an intersection is "the location where a 
truck driver has the most likelihood to be involved in an 
accident, and because of that . . . the truck driver should be 
extra cautious and should reduce their speed . . . ."  Sievers 
testified that in his opinion, the defendant was driving at an 
unsafe speed considering that he was entering an intersection in 
rainy weather. 
¶27 The 
defendant 
called 
William 
Emerick, 
a 
safety 
consultant, as an expert witness.  Emerick discussed the 
importance of maintaining hazard awareness and using common 
sense when operating a semi-trailer truck.  Emerick also 
asserted that driving as slowly as official safety standards 
require can be dangerous, even when approaching an intersection 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
9 
 
in rainy weather, because it can cause "traffic backup" and is 
"something people wouldn't expect."  Emerick testified that in 
his view, when the accident occurred, the defendant was driving 
his truck in conformity with normal safe driving practices and 
industry standards for drivers of commercial motor vehicles. 
¶28 When the circuit court took up the issue of jury 
instructions near the close of trial, the parties revisited the 
subject of the special knowledge and skill possessed by semi-
trailer truck drivers.  After lengthy argument, the circuit 
court 
gave 
the 
truck 
driver 
negligence 
instruction, 
an 
instruction specific to the defendant as the operator of a semi-
trailer truck. 
¶29 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.  
The defendant filed post-verdict motions seeking a new trial.  
The circuit court denied the defendant's post-verdict motions 
and entered a judgment on the verdict in favor of the plaintiff.  
The court of appeals affirmed. 
II 
¶30 Because the defendant challenges a jury instruction, 
we first recite the standard of review applicable to a challenge 
to jury instructions. 
¶31 A circuit court has broad discretion in crafting jury 
instructions based on the facts and circumstances of the case.7  
A circuit court is required, however, to exercise its discretion 
                                                 
7 State v. Neumann, 2013 WI 58, ¶89, 348 Wis. 2d 455, 832 
N.W.2d 455. 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
10 
 
"to fully and fairly inform the jury of the rules of law 
applicable to the case and to assist the jury in making a 
reasonable analysis of the evidence."8 
¶32 We review jury instructions as a whole to determine 
whether "the overall meaning communicated by the instructions 
was a correct statement of the law . . . ."9  Whether the circuit 
court erred by stating the law incorrectly or in a misleading 
manner constitutes a question of law this court decides 
independently of, but benefiting from, the analyses of the 
circuit court and court of appeals.10 
¶33 Even if the truck driver negligence instruction was in 
error, the defendant is not necessarily entitled to a new trial.  
Erroneous jury instructions warrant reversal and a new trial 
only when the error is prejudicial.11  Whether an error is 
prejudicial 
is 
a 
question 
of 
law 
this 
court 
decides 
independently of, but benefiting from, the analyses of the 
circuit court and court of appeals.12 
III 
                                                 
8 Neumann, 348 Wis. 2d 455, ¶89 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
9 Fischer by Fischer v. Ganju, 168 Wis. 2d 834, 850, 485 
N.W.2d 10, 16 (1992). 
10 Neumann, 348 Wis. 2d 455, ¶89. 
11 Fischer, 168 Wis. 2d at 849-50. 
12 Weborg v. Jenny, 2012 WI 67, ¶43, 341 Wis. 2d 668, 816 
N.W.2d 191. 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
11 
 
¶34 Our 
analysis 
of 
the 
truck 
driver 
negligence 
instruction has three parts.   
¶35 First, we set forth the negligence principles that 
govern the instant dispute, namely the superior knowledge rule, 
which requires an actor with special knowledge or skill to act 
commensurate with that knowledge or skill, and the profession or 
trade principle, which requires an actor engaged in a profession 
or trade to act as a reasonable member of such profession or 
trade would act under the same or similar circumstances.   
¶36 Second, 
we 
determine 
that 
these 
two 
negligence 
principles apply to the defendant and thus that the truck driver 
negligence instruction did not misstate the law. 
¶37 Third, we determine that in the context of the jury 
instructions as a whole, the truck driver negligence instruction 
was not misleading.   
¶38 Because the truck driver negligence instruction was 
neither incorrect nor misleading, we conclude that the circuit 
court did not err.  We therefore need not and do not address the 
issue of prejudice. 
A 
¶39 We begin with well-settled principles of negligence. 
¶40 Negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care 
under the circumstances, that is, the failure to exercise "that 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
12 
 
degree of care which under the same or similar circumstances the 
great mass of mankind would ordinarily exercise."13 
¶41 The 
standard 
of 
ordinary 
care 
is 
an 
objective 
standard; it is the care that would be exercised by a reasonable 
actor under the circumstances. 
¶42 The 
circumstances 
that 
demarcate 
the 
bounds 
of 
ordinary care in a particular case include any relevant special 
knowledge or skill the actor brings to bear.14  This principle is 
sometimes called the "superior knowledge rule."15 
¶43 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 289, at 41 (1965) sets 
forth the superior knowledge rule as follows: "The actor is 
required to recognize that his conduct involves a risk of 
causing an invasion of another's interest if a reasonable man 
would do so while exercising . . . (b) such superior attention, 
perception, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment as the 
actor himself has."16 
                                                 
13 Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 231, 234 N.W. 372 
(1931). 
14 Id. at 231. 
15 See, e.g., 1 Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts § 132, 
at 417 (2nd ed. 2011). 
16 Comment m. to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 289 (1965) 
explains: 
m. Superior qualities of actor.  The standard of the 
reasonable man requires only a minimum of attention, 
perception, 
memory, 
knowledge, 
intelligence, 
and 
judgment in order to recognize the existence of the 
risk.  If the actor has in fact more than the minimum 
of these qualities, he is required to exercise the 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
13 
 
¶44 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical 
and Emotional Harm § 12, at 141 (2010) describes the superior 
knowledge rule as follows: "If an actor has skills or knowledge 
that exceed those possessed by most others, these skills or 
knowledge are circumstances to be taken into account in 
determining whether the actor has behaved as a reasonably 
careful person."17 
¶45 In 
the 
seminal 
Wisconsin 
case 
of 
Osborne 
v. 
Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931), this court made 
clear that the superior knowledge rule applies in Wisconsin. 
¶46 The Osborne court first defined negligence as conduct 
that foreseeably creates an unreasonable risk of harm to the 
interests of another, stating: 
Every person is negligent when, without intending to 
do any wrong, he does such an act or omits to take 
such a precaution that under the circumstances present 
he, as an ordinarily prudent person, ought reasonably 
to foresee that he will thereby expose the interests 
of another to an unreasonable risk of harm.18 
¶47 The Osborne court then declared: "If the actor in a 
particular case in fact has superior perception or possesses 
                                                                                                                                                             
superior qualities that he has in a manner reasonable 
under the circumstances.  The standard becomes, in 
other words, that of a reasonable man with such 
superior attributes. 
17 According to the Reporter's Note to Restatement (Third) 
of Torts, § 12 derives in part from Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 289(b), comment m, set forth at note 16, supra.  
18 Osborne, 203 Wis. at 242. 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
14 
 
superior knowledge, he is required to exercise his superior 
powers in determining whether or not his conduct involves an 
unreasonable 
risk 
of 
injury 
to 
the 
interests 
of 
another . . . ."19  Thus, pursuant to the superior knowledge rule 
adopted in Osborne, an actor with special knowledge or skill 
meets the standard of ordinary care by employing that special 
knowledge or skill. 
¶48 Various tort texts provide similar explanations of the 
superior knowledge rule.  See, for example, the following: 
• 
"The superior knowledge rule can be explained by 
saying that the actor's superior knowledge is one of 
the 'circumstances' that a reasonable person would 
take into account or by saying that a reasonable 
person will use all the knowledge he actually has in 
dealing with a recognizable risk. . . . . So it is 
right to tell a jury that a reasonable person will use 
the relevant special knowledge he has, but not right 
to tell the jury that he is held to a higher standard 
of care."  1 Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts 
§ 132, at 417 (2nd ed. 2011) (footnotes omitted). 
• 
"[I]f a person in fact has knowledge, skill, or even 
intelligence superior to that of the ordinary person, 
the law will demand of that person conduct consistent 
with it.  Experienced milk haulers, hockey coaches, 
                                                 
19 Osborne, 203 Wis. at 243. 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
15 
 
expert skiers, construction inspectors, and doctors 
must all use care which is reasonable in light of 
their 
superior 
learning 
and 
experience, 
and 
any 
special 
skills, 
knowledge 
or 
training 
they 
may 
personally have over what is normally possessed by 
persons in the field."  W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser 
and Keaton on Torts § 32, at 185 (5th ed. 2000) 
(footnotes omitted). 
• 
"In addition to the knowledge that may be imputed to a 
reasonable person, a person's actual knowledge and 
skills may be taken into account when the level of the 
person's knowledge or skills exceeds the average."  1 
J.D. Lee & Barry A. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law: 
Liability & Litigation § 3:21 (2d ed. 1990). 
¶49 These texts neither bind this court nor declare the 
law of Wisconsin.  They do, however, support the superior 
knowledge rule adopted in Osborne. 
¶50 The parties' briefs and the court of appeals opinion 
spend much time discussing the superior knowledge rule and 
debating whether it applies to the defendant.  A close 
examination of the briefs and the court of appeals opinion, 
however,  reveals that the parties and the court of appeals have 
at times conflated the superior knowledge rule with a related 
negligence principle that applies to individuals engaged in a 
profession or trade.  We turn to that principle now. 
¶51 Ordinarily, actors engaged in a profession or trade 
must exercise the knowledge and skill that a reasonable member 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
16 
 
of that profession or trade would exercise under the same or 
similar circumstances.20  In Kerkman v. Hintz, 142 Wis. 2d 404, 
419-20, 418 N.W.2d 795 (1988), for example, this court stated 
that 
"a 
chiropractor 
must 
exercise 
the 
degree 
of 
care, 
diligence, 
judgment, 
and 
skill 
which 
is 
exercised 
by 
a 
reasonable chiropractor under like or similar circumstances."21 
¶52 Various Wisconsin pattern jury instructions regarding 
the standard of ordinary care applicable to those in particular 
professions and trades illustrate the principle that a person 
engaged in a profession or trade must act commensurate with the 
knowledge and skill a reasonable member of that profession or 
trade possesses. 
¶53 For example, the Wisconsin pattern jury instruction 
titled "Negligence: Building Contractor" defines the ordinary 
care standard applied to building contractors as the degree of 
care exercised by a reasonably prudent and skilled contractor 
engaged in a similar construction project.  Thus, a jury must 
consider 
the 
knowledge 
and 
skill 
possessed 
by 
building 
                                                 
20 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A explains the role an 
actor's engaging in a profession or trade plays in determining 
whether the actor was negligent as follows:  "Unless he 
represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one 
who undertakes to render services in the practice of a 
profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and 
knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or 
trade in good standing in similar communities." 
21 See also Zastrow v. Journal Commc'ns, Inc., 2005 WI App 
178, ¶25, 286 Wis. 2d 416, 703 N.W.2d 673 ("In the professional 
negligence case, the duty is . . . based on what a reasonable 
professional would do in the same or similar circumstances."). 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
17 
 
contractors to determine whether a particular contractor's 
conduct met the standard of ordinary care. 
¶54 The pattern jury instruction applicable to building 
contractors provides in full as follows: 
A building contractor has a duty to exercise ordinary 
care in the construction or remodeling of a building.  
This duty requires such contractor to perform work 
with the same degree of care and skill and to provide 
such suitable materials as are used and provided by 
contractors 
of 
reasonable 
prudence, 
skill, 
and 
judgment in similar construction.22 
¶55 Likewise, 
the 
pattern 
jury 
instruction 
titled 
"Negligence of Insurance Agent" defines the ordinary care 
standard applied to insurance agents by reference to the care, 
skill, and judgment usually employed by agents licensed to sell 
insurance in Wisconsin.  Accordingly, a jury must consider the 
knowledge and skill possessed by licensed insurance agents to 
determine whether a particular agent's conduct met the standard 
of ordinary care. 
¶56 This pattern jury instruction reads in relevant part 
as follows:  "An insurance agent, such as (defendant), must use 
the degree of care, skill, and judgment which is usually 
exercised under the same or similar circumstances by insurance 
agents licensed to sell insurance in Wisconsin."23 
¶57 These are just two of several examples of Wisconsin's 
adoption of the profession or trade principle.  The profession 
                                                 
22 Wis JI——Civil 1022.4. 
23 Wis JI——Civil 1023.6. 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
18 
 
or trade principle is similarly reflected in pattern jury 
instructions regarding the standard of ordinary care applicable 
to teachers,24 chiropractors,25 doctors,26 nurses and licensed 
technicians,27 dentists,28 and lawyers.29 
                                                 
24 Wis JI——Civil 1381 (providing in relevant part that a 
teacher must "maintain that degree of supervision which an 
ordinarily 
prudent 
(chemistry 
teacher, 
physical 
education 
teacher, manual arts teacher) would maintain under the same or 
similar circumstances"). 
25 Wis JI——Civil 1023.8 (stating that a chiropractor is 
"required to use the degree of care, skill, and judgment which 
reasonable chiropractors would exercise in [] like or similar 
circumstances, having due regard for the state of chiropractic 
knowledge at the time (plaintiff) was treated"). 
26 Wis JI——Civil 1023 (explaining that a doctor is required 
to use the degree of care, skill, and judgment which a 
reasonable doctor in the same medical sub-field would exercise 
"in the same or similar circumstances, having due regard for the 
state of medical science at the time (plaintiff) was (treated) 
(diagnosed)"). 
27 Wis JI——Civil 1023.7 (stating that registered nurses and 
licensed technicians have the duty "to use the degree of care, 
skill, 
and 
judgment 
which 
reasonable 
(registered 
nurses) 
(licensed technicians) would exercise in the same or similar 
circumstances, having due regard for the state of learning, 
education, experience, and knowledge possessed by (registered 
nurses) (licensed technicians) at the time in question"). 
Plaintiff's counsel told the circuit court that he modeled 
his proposed truck driver negligence instruction after the 
instruction applicable to nurses and licensed technicians. 
28 Wis JI——Civil 1023.14 (providing that a dentist must 
exercise "the degree of care, skill, and judgment" that a 
reasonable dentist would exercise "in the same or similar 
circumstances, having due regard for the state of dental science 
at the time (plaintiff) was (treated) (diagnosed)"). 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
19 
 
¶58 The profession or trade principle and the superior 
knowledge rule are closely related.  Both recognize that a 
reasonable actor will use any relevant special knowledge or 
skill the actor possesses, including the knowledge and skill the 
person possesses on account of his or her occupation.30 
¶59 The two doctrines also work in combination in certain 
cases:  An actor engaged in a profession or trade who has 
knowledge or skill superior to that of a reasonable person 
within that profession or trade must employ such knowledge or 
skill in order to meet the standard of ordinary care. 
¶60 Dobbs' 
text 
on 
torts 
explains 
the 
overlapping 
relationship between these two negligence doctrines as follows: 
Superior 
or 
specialized 
knowledge 
or 
skill. 
A 
reasonable person will act in the light of (a) 
knowledge shared by the community generally and also 
(b) information, knowledge and skill that he himself 
has that is not generally known and that reasonable 
people would not ordinarily have. . . . 
                                                                                                                                                             
29 Wis JI——Civil 1023.5 (stating that "it is a lawyer's duty 
to use the degree of care, skill, and judgment which reasonably 
prudent lawyers practicing in this state would exercise under 
like or similar circumstances"). 
30 The Reporter's Note to Restatement (Third) of Torts § 12, 
at 144, illustrates the connection between the profession or 
trade principle and the superior knowledge rule by explaining 
that the superior knowledge rule "can easily be applied to cases 
involving the liability of professionals.  Those professionals 
routinely represent themselves as having special knowledge and 
skills . . . ."  (Citation omitted.) 
See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A, cmt. a., at 
73 (1965), stating:  "All professions, and most trades, are 
necessarily skilled . . . ." 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
20 
 
The superior knowledge rule has obvious application to 
professionals like physicians and surgeons, who are 
held to possess the skills and knowledge of others in 
good standing in their profession.  A physician who 
knows more than a layman must use that additional 
knowledge in the practice of medicine.  But the point 
reaches even further.  A physician who knows more than 
other physicians is also expected to use that special 
knowledge.  . . . The principle applies equally to any 
kind of skill or experience. 
Reasonable person standard and superior knowledge. The 
superior knowledge rule can be explained by saying 
that the actor's superior knowledge is one of the 
"circumstances" that a reasonable person would take 
into account or by saying that a reasonable person 
will use all the knowledge he actually has in dealing 
with a recognizable risk.  Either way, the standard of 
care, that of the reasonable person under the same or 
similar circumstances, remains the same.  So it is 
right to tell a jury that a reasonable person will use 
the relevant special knowledge he has, but not right 
to tell the jury that he is held to a higher standard 
of care.31 
¶61 Importantly, although both the superior knowledge rule 
and the profession or trade principle describe the circumstances 
the jury is to consider in determining negligence, neither 
doctrine sets forth a heightened standard of care.32 
¶62 In sum:  
                                                 
31 1 Dobbs et al., supra note 15, § 132, at 416-17 
(footnotes omitted, emphasis added). 
32 Restatement (Third) of Torts § 12, comment a. at 142, 
explains:  "It can be noted that even though the actor's extra 
skills can properly be considered, these skills do not establish 
for the actor a standard of care that is higher than reasonable 
care; rather, they provide a mere circumstance for the jury to 
consider in determining whether the actor has complied with the 
general standard of reasonable care." 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
21 
 
• 
Under the superior knowledge rule, a person with 
special knowledge or skill is required to exercise the 
care a reasonable person with such special knowledge 
or skill would exercise under the same or similar 
circumstances. 
• 
Under the profession or trade principle, a person 
engaged in a profession or trade is required to 
exercise 
the 
care 
a 
reasonable 
member 
of 
the 
profession or trade would exercise under the same or 
similar circumstances. 
• 
Regardless of whether the jury applies the superior 
knowledge rule, the profession or trade principle, 
both doctrines, or neither doctrine, the standard of 
care remains that of ordinary care. 
¶63 With these negligence principles in mind, we turn to 
the truck driver negligence instruction, which is the subject of 
the defendant's challenge in the present case. 
B 
¶64 We now explore whether the superior knowledge rule and 
the profession or trade principle apply to the defendant in the 
instant case.  We conclude that they do and thus that the truck 
driver negligence instruction did not misstate the law. 
¶65 The truck driver negligence instruction required the 
jury to consider the defendant's special knowledge or skill as a 
"professional" semi-trailer truck driver, thereby incorporating 
both the superior knowledge rule and the profession or trade 
principle.  The instruction provided as follows: 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
22 
 
At the time of the accident, the defendant, Dale 
Cavallino, was a professional truck driver operating a 
semi tractor-trailer pursuant to a commercial driver's 
license issued by the State of Wisconsin.  As the 
operator of a semi tractor-trailer, it was [the 
defendant's] duty to use the degree of care, skill, 
and judgment which a reasonable semi truck driver 
would exercise in the same or similar circumstances 
having 
due 
regard 
for 
the 
state 
of 
learning, 
education, experience, and knowledge possessed by semi 
truck drivers holding a commercial driver's license.  
A semi truck driver who fails to conform to the 
standard is negligent. The burden is on the plaintiff 
to prove that [the defendant] was negligent.   
¶66 The defendant asserts, however, that neither the 
superior knowledge rule nor the profession or trade principle 
applies to him. 
¶67 The defendant concedes that an individual must undergo 
specific training and testing to obtain a commercial driver's 
license and operate a semi-trailer truck.  Nevertheless, the 
defendant contends that the jury cannot take into account the 
special knowledge or skill required to operate a semi-trailer 
truck.  According to the defendant, "all users of the roadway 
have the same duty of ordinary care regardless of their driving 
experience or skills."  In the defendant's view, permitting a 
jury to "consider a driver's individual skill, experience, and 
training would result in an unworkable subjective standard of 
care with 'ceaseless variations.'"33  
                                                 
33 The defendant places heavy reliance on Saxby v. Cadigen, 
266 Wis. 391, 63 N.W.2d 820 (1954), and on several cases from 
other jurisdictions, for the proposition that it is error to 
instruct a jury to consider the knowledge, skill, or experience 
of particular drivers in a motor vehicle negligence case. 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
23 
 
¶68 The defendant further contends that the profession or 
trade principle applies only in professional malpractice cases, 
that is, in situations in which the actor is providing a highly 
specialized professional service to the plaintiff that involves 
a unique standard of care.  The defendant points out that he was 
not providing a service to the plaintiff and that semi-trailer 
truck driving is not the kind of highly specialized occupation 
normally classified as a profession.   
¶69 We disagree with the defendant and conclude that both 
the superior knowledge rule and the profession or trade 
principle apply to the defendant.  We review them in turn. 
¶70 Insofar as the defendant argues that the superior 
knowledge rule does not apply to semi-trailer truck drivers, he 
is plainly incorrect.  The skill and knowledge required to drive 
a semi-trailer truck are not part of the "ordinary equipment" of 
a reasonable person.34  Rather, they are the result of acquired 
learning and experience. 
                                                                                                                                                             
None of the cases the defendant cites are on all fours with 
the instant case.  Some do not involve trucks.  Others were 
decided before the adoption of the special rules, regulations, 
and standards that now govern the licensure of semi-trailer 
truck drivers and the operation of semi-trailer trucks.  See, 
e.g., Fredericks v. Castora, 360 A.2d 696 (Pa. Super. 1976).  In 
short, the cases cited by the defendant do not address whether 
it was error to give a jury instruction setting forth a standard 
of care particular to the defendant as a professional truck 
driver operating a semi-trailer truck pursuant to a commercial 
driver's license. 
34 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A, cmt. a (1965). 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
24 
 
¶71 The defendant was required to, and did, undergo 
specialized 
testing 
and 
obtain 
a 
specialized 
license 
to 
demonstrate that he possesses the special knowledge and skill 
necessary 
to 
safely 
operate 
a 
semi-trailer 
truck. 
 
The 
defendant's assertion that this special knowledge and skill 
could not be considered by the jury is not cogent.   
¶72 The statutes and regulations applicable to semi-
trailer trucks and semi-trailer truck drivers bolster our 
conclusion that the superior knowledge rule applies to the 
defendant. 
¶73 Semi-trailer trucks are commercial motor vehicles.  
Under Wis. Stat. § 343.05(2) (2007-08),35 a person can operate a 
commercial motor vehicle only if certain conditions are met.  
Among other requirements, the person must carry a commercial 
driver's license that is not revoked, suspended, canceled, or 
expired.36 
¶74 Federal 
regulations 
likewise 
dictate 
that 
those 
operating commercial motor vehicles must generally carry a 
commercial driver's license.37  Federal regulations also specify 
the knowledge and skills drivers must possess in order to obtain 
                                                 
35 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
36 See Wis. Stat. § 343.05(2).  An exception is set forth at 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.055, 
titled 
"Commercial 
Driver 
License 
Waivers." 
37 See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 383.23(a). 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
25 
 
such licensure.  Three provisions are particularly relevant in 
the instant case. 
¶75 First, 49 C.F.R. § 383.110 provides that to ensure 
safety, commercial motor vehicle drivers are required to have 
the baseline level of knowledge and skills set forth in 
subsequent provisions.  It states in full as follows: 
All drivers of [commercial motor vehicles] must have 
the knowledge and skills necessary to operate a 
[commercial motor vehicle] safely as contained in this 
subpart.  The specific types of items that a State 
must include in the knowledge and skills tests that it 
administers 
to 
[commercial 
driver's 
license] 
applicants are included in this subpart. 
¶76 Second, 49 C.F.R. § 383.111 sets forth and explains 20 
areas in which commercial motor vehicle operators are required 
to have specified knowledge to obtain a commercial driver's 
license.  These areas include safe operations regulations, speed 
management, extreme driving conditions, hazard perceptions, and 
emergency maneuvers.38 
¶77 Third, 49 C.F.R. § 383.113 enumerates the skills a 
commercial motor vehicle operator must possess to obtain a 
commercial driver's license.  These skills include identifying 
safety-related vehicle parts, like the engine compartment and 
brakes;39 inspecting and operating air brakes;40 and safely 
                                                 
38 See 49 C.F.R. § 383.111(a). 
39 See 49 C.F.R. § 383.113(a)(1). 
40 See 49 C.F.R. § 383.113(a)(2). 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
26 
 
driving the vehicle by, for example, maintaining "a safe 
following distance depending on the condition of the road."41 
¶78 These 
state 
statutes 
and 
federal 
regulations 
demonstrate that the conduct of a semi-trailer truck driver 
should be assessed by reference to the conduct of a reasonable 
person with the special competence required of semi-trailer 
truck drivers——not by reference to the conduct of a reasonable, 
ordinary driver. 
¶79 We turn to the profession or trade principle, which 
was incorporated into the truck driver negligence instruction.  
¶80 The Wisconsin pattern jury instructions discussed 
previously demonstrate that the profession or trade principle 
applies not merely to highly specialized professionals, as the 
defendant asserts, but more broadly to those engaged in 
occupations that require the exercise of "acquired learning, and 
aptitude developed by special training and experience."42 
¶81 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A is also helpful 
in determining what constitutes a profession or trade.  A 
comment to § 299A references a wide range of occupations 
(including plumbers, carpenters, and blacksmiths) to which the 
profession or trade principle generally applies.  This comment 
reinforces our conclusion that the profession or trade principle 
has broader applicability than the defendant lets on.  It 
                                                 
41 See 49 C.F.R. § 383.113(c)(6). 
42 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A, cmt. a (1965). 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
27 
 
governs an actor in the performance of his or her occupation so 
long as reasonably performing that occupation requires acquired 
learning 
and 
aptitude 
developed 
by 
special 
training 
and 
experience.43 
¶82 Clearly, driving a semi-trailer truck constitutes a 
profession or trade within the context of the profession or 
trade principle.  It was therefore appropriate for the jury to 
evaluate the defendant's conduct by reference to the conduct of 
a reasonable semi-trailer truck driver. 
¶83 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the truck 
driver negligence instruction did not misstate the law.   
¶84 A circuit court can err in instructing the jury not 
only by misstating the law but also by stating the law in a 
manner likely to mislead the jury.  Accordingly, we now turn to 
the possibility (discussed by the court of appeals) that the 
jury misinterpreted the truck driver negligence instruction. 
C 
                                                 
43 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A, Comment b, at 
73 (1965): 
This 
Section . . . applies 
to 
any 
person 
who 
undertakes to render services to another in the 
practice of a profession, such as that of physician or 
surgeon, 
dentist, 
pharmacist, 
oculist, 
attorney, 
accountant, or engineer.  It applies also to any 
person who undertakes to render services to others in 
the practice of a skilled trade, such as that of 
airplane 
pilot, 
precision 
machinist, 
electrician, 
carpenter, blacksmith, or plumber. 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
28 
 
¶85 The defendant's basic contention is that even if the 
truck driver negligence instruction did not technically misstate 
the law, it likely misled the jury and was therefore prejudicial 
error. 
¶86 The defendant argues that the truck driver negligence  
instruction "had the practical effect of telling the jury that 
[the defendant] had a higher standard of care because he held a 
[commercial driver's license]."44  The defendant points out that 
within the same negligence instruction, the circuit court set 
forth the standard of ordinary care applicable to the plaintiff.  
The implication, says the defendant, was that the jury should 
apply a heightened standard of care to the defendant. 
¶87 We disagree with the defendant.  The truck driver 
negligence instruction was not a stand-alone instruction.  It 
was part of lengthy set of negligence instructions given by the 
circuit court.  We do not evaluate the truck driver negligence 
instruction in isolation.  We review the jury instructions as a 
whole to determine whether they fully and fairly convey the 
applicable rules of law to the jury.45 
                                                 
44 One commentator has acknowledged that it is difficult to 
instruct a jury in a way that maintains the distinction between 
considering an actor's special knowledge and skill as a relevant 
circumstance and holding the actor to a heightened standard of 
care.  Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm § 12, Reporter's Note to cmt. a., at 145 (2010).  
Nevertheless, a jury can take an actor's special knowledge or 
skill into account without transforming the standard of care 
being applied. 
45 Weborg, 341 Wis. 2d 668, ¶74 ("Jury instructions are 
evaluated in their entirety, not in isolation."). 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
29 
 
¶88 Relevant here are several paragraphs of the negligence 
instructions in which the circuit court (1) introduced the 
special 
verdict 
questions 
pertaining 
to 
negligence; 
(2) 
introduced the concepts of negligence and of ordinary care; (3) 
provided specific instruction regarding the standard of care 
applicable to the defendant as a semi-trailer truck driver; and 
(4) elaborated upon the standard of ordinary care, with 
particular attention to highway driving.46 
¶89 These 
paragraphs 
of 
the 
negligence 
instructions 
provided as follows: 
Question number 1 and question number 3 of the verdict 
asked 
whether 
or 
not 
[the 
defendant] 
and 
[the 
plaintiff] 
were 
or 
were 
not 
negligent. 
 
These 
questions read as follows, question number 1, was [the 
defendant] negligent in the operation of his vehicle 
immediately before or during the accident, yes or no.  
Question number 3, was [the plaintiff] negligent in 
the operation of his automobile immediately before or 
during the accident, yes or no.  I will now instruct 
you of the definition of negligence and the various 
rules and safety statutes you must apply to determine 
whether 
or 
not 
either 
[the 
defendant] 
or 
[the 
plaintiff] or both were negligent in this case. 
A person is negligent when they fail to exercise 
ordinary care.  Ordinary care is the care which a 
reasonable person would use in similar circumstances.  
A person not using ordinary care is negligent, if the 
person without intending to do harm does something or 
fails to do something that a reasonable person would 
recognize as creating an unreasonable risk of injury 
                                                 
46 These are the first four paragraphs of a ten-paragraph 
set of negligence instructions.  The following five paragraphs 
cover particular facets of the standard of ordinary care as it 
applies to individuals driving on a highway.  The tenth and 
final paragraph explains the concept of comparative negligence. 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
30 
 
or damage to a person or property.  At the time of the 
accident, [the defendant] was a professional truck 
driver operating a semi tractor-trailer pursuant to a 
commercial driver's license issued by the State of 
Wisconsin.  As the operator of a semi tractor-trailer, 
it was [the defendant's] duty to use the degree of 
care, skill, and judgment which a reasonable semi 
truck driver would exercise in the same or similar 
circumstances having due regard for the state of 
learning, 
education, 
experience, 
and 
knowledge 
possessed by semi truck drivers holding commercial 
driver's licenses.  A semi truck driver who fails to 
conform to the standard is negligent.  The burden is 
on the plaintiff to prove that [the defendant] was 
negligent. 
Every person in all situations has a duty to exercise 
ordinary care for his or her own safety.  This does 
not mean that a person is required at all hazards to 
avoid injury.  A person must, however, exercise 
ordinary care to take precautions to avoid injury to 
himself or herself.  A person must exercise ordinary 
care to employ his sense of sight and hearing so as to 
become aware of the existence of danger to him or her.  
A failure to do so is negligence.  It is the duty of 
every person to exercise ordinary care, and to 
recognize and appreciate all dangers that are open and 
obvious to him, or which [would] have been recognized 
and appreciated by a reasonable, prudent person under 
the same or similar circumstances.  That the warning 
of the existence of danger was not seen or was not 
heard does not free one from negligence.  In addition, 
one who looks and fails to see or listens and fails to 
hear a warning of danger, which under like or similar 
circumstances would have been seen or would have been 
heard by a reasonable, prudent person is as guilty of 
negligence as one who did not look or listen at all.  
However, a person is not bound to see every hazard or 
danger in his or her pathway even though they should 
be plainly observable or to remember the existence of 
every condition of which a person has had knowledge.  
A person is only required to act as a reasonable, 
prudent person would act under the same or similar 
circumstances. 
To be free of negligence, a person must exercise 
ordinary care in choosing his or her course of conduct 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
31 
 
in the pursuit of that choice.  A person is not guilty 
of negligence in making the choice of conduct if the 
person has no knowledge that one course of conduct 
carries a greater hazard than another provided that 
such lack of knowledge is not the result of a person's 
failure to exercise ordinary care.  Every user of the 
highway has the right to assume that every other user 
of the highway will obey the rules of the road.  
However, a person cannot continue to make that 
assumption if the person becomes aware or in the 
exercise of ordinary care, ought to be aware that 
another user of the highway by his or her conduct is 
creating 
a 
dangerous 
situation. 
 
Under 
such 
circumstances, a person using the highway must use 
ordinary care to avoid the danger.  A driver must use 
ordinary care to keep a careful look out ahead and 
about him or her for the presence of vehicles, 
movement, objects or pedestrians, or may be within 
approaching the driver's course of travel.  In 
addition, the driver has to use ordinary care to look 
out to the condition of the highway ahead, for traffic 
signs, markers, obstructions to vision, and other 
things that might warn of possible danger.  The 
failure to use ordinary care to keep a careful look 
out is negligence. 
¶90 The defendant's contention that the truck driver 
negligence instruction likely misled the jury is untenable in 
light of the numerous statements, made throughout the portion of 
the negligence instructions set forth above, that the standard 
of ordinary care applies to all drivers. 
¶91 Particularly relevant here are the portions of the 
jury 
instructions 
immediately 
preceding 
and 
immediately 
following the truck driver negligence instruction. 
¶92 Right 
before 
giving 
the 
truck 
driver 
negligence 
instruction, 
the 
circuit 
court 
instructed 
the 
jury 
that 
negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care.  The 
circuit court did not limit this statement to the plaintiff in 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
32 
 
any way; it stated the standard of ordinary care in general 
terms, as applied to everyone. 
¶93 The circuit court's exact words, taken from the 
pattern jury instruction on negligence, were as follows: 
A person is negligent when they fail to exercise 
ordinary care.  Ordinary care is the care which a 
reasonable person would use in similar circumstances.  
A person not using ordinary care is negligent, if the 
person without intending to do harm does something or 
fails to do something that a reasonable person would 
recognize as creating an unreasonable risk of injury 
or damage to a person or property. 
¶94 Right 
after 
giving 
the 
truck 
driver 
negligence 
instruction, the circuit court reiterated the standard of 
ordinary care and then elaborated upon the concept of negligence 
in the context of highway driving. 
¶95 The circuit court stated as follows: 
It is the duty of every person to exercise ordinary 
care, and to recognize and appreciate all dangers that 
are open and obvious to him, or which [would] have 
been recognized and appreciated by a reasonable, 
prudent 
person 
under 
the 
same 
or 
similar 
circumstances. . . .  
 
. . . . 
Every user of the highway has the right to assume that 
every other user of the highway will obey the rules of 
the road.  However, a person cannot continue to make 
that assumption if the person becomes aware or in the 
exercise of ordinary care, ought to be aware that 
another user of the highway by his or her conduct is 
creating 
a 
dangerous 
situation. 
 
Under 
such 
circumstances, a person using the highway must use 
ordinary care to avoid the danger. 
(Emphasis added.) 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
33 
 
¶96 Read as a whole, the message conveyed by the jury 
instructions was clear:  The standard of ordinary care applies 
to both the plaintiff and the defendant.  Ordinary care is the 
care a reasonable person would exercise under the circumstances.  
In 
the 
instant 
case, 
the 
circumstances 
relevant 
to 
a 
determination of whether the defendant acted reasonably include 
the fact that at the time of the collision, the defendant was 
engaged in a profession or trade (semi-trailer truck driving) 
and possessed the special knowledge and skill required of semi-
trailer truck drivers. 
¶97 Could the truck driver negligence instruction have 
been more clearly worded?  Perhaps.  But perfection is not what 
the law requires.  An appellate court need decide only whether 
"the overall meaning communicated by the instruction . . . was a 
correct statement of the law[] . . . ."47  In the instant case, 
the overall meaning communicated by the totality of the 
negligence instructions was a correct statement of the law and 
was not misleading. 
¶98 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court did not err 
in giving the truck driver negligence instruction.  The truck 
driver negligence instruction did not misstate the law and was 
not misleading.  The defendant's arguments to the contrary are 
                                                 
47 White v. Leeder, 149 Wis. 2d 948, 954-55, 440 N.W.2d 557 
(1989).  See also Nommensen v. Am. Cont'l Ins. Co., 2001 WI 112, 
¶50, 246 Wis. 2d 132, 629 N.W.2d 301. 
No. 
2013AP1750   
 
34 
 
not persuasive, and the defendant is not entitled to a new 
trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2013AP1750.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶99 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J. (concurring).   The 
central issue presented is whether the circuit court erred by 
giving the jury a special skills instruction because Dale L. 
Cavallino held a commercial license to operate the semi-truck at 
the time of the accident.1  I conclude that the circuit court's 
special skills instruction was erroneous because it incorrectly 
stated the law.  However, I also conclude that the error was 
harmless.  Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals, and 
although I do not join the majority opinion, I respectfully 
concur. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶100 The majority opinion fully sets out the facts that 
underlie the dispute before us.  Therefore, I will not repeat 
them. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶101 Challenges to jury instructions present questions of 
law for our independent review.  State v. Beamon, 2013 WI 47, 
¶18, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681.  Whether an erroneously 
given instruction is harmless error also presents a question of 
law that we review independently.  State v. Nelson, 2014 WI 70, 
¶18, 355 Wis. 2d 722, 849 N.W.2d 317. 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶3. 
No.  2013AP1750.pdr 
 
2 
 
B.  Jury Instructions 
¶102 The defendant, Cavallino,2 argues that the special 
skills instruction was erroneous because it directed the jury to 
consider Cavallino's superior knowledge and skill as a licensed 
semi-truck driver.   According to Cavallino, the circuit court 
erred because the court gave an instruction regarding superior 
knowledge and skill similar to that employed in professional 
negligence 
cases, 
rather 
than 
the 
standard 
negligence 
instruction that is customarily given in vehicular negligence 
cases.  Cavallino argues that the circuit court's instruction 
imposed a heightened standard of care on him, and that doing so 
was prejudicial error entitling him to a new trial. 
¶103 The plaintiff, Ronald J. Dakter,3 contends that the 
instruction directed the jury to take superior knowledge and 
skill of professional semi-truck drivers into account so that 
the jury could determine whether Cavallino met the standard of 
ordinary care under the circumstances.  
1.  General principles for instructions 
¶104 "The purpose of a jury instruction is to fully and 
fairly inform the jury of a rule or principle of law applicable 
to a particular case."  Nommensen v. Am. Cont'l Ins. Co., 2001 
WI 112, ¶36, 246 Wis. 2d 132, 629 N.W.2d 301.  Jury instructions 
                                                 
2 Cavallino's employer, Hillsboro Transportation Company, 
LLC, and Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Company, Hillsboro's 
insurance provider, are also defendants.  Their positions are 
consistent with Cavallino's. 
3 Kathleen M. Dakter, Ronald's wife, is also a plaintiff. 
No.  2013AP1750.pdr 
 
3 
 
"explain what the law means to persons who usually do not 
possess law degrees."  Id. (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
¶105 "A circuit court has broad discretion when instructing 
a jury."  Id., ¶50 (citing White v. Leeder, 149 Wis. 2d 948, 
954, 440 N.W.2d 557 (1989)).  A circuit court appropriately 
exercises its discretion when the instruction correctly states 
the law and comports with the facts of the case.  Weborg v. 
Jenny, 2012 WI 67, ¶42, 341 Wis. 2d 668, 816 N.W.2d 191; White, 
149 Wis. 2d at 954-55.  However, even if the circuit court 
erroneously 
exercises 
its 
discretion, 
an 
"erroneous 
jury 
instruction warrants reversal and a new trial only if the error 
was prejudicial."  Kochanski v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 2014 
WI 72, ¶11, 356 Wis. 2d 1, 850 N.W.2d 160 (quoting Fischer v. 
Ganju, 168 Wis. 2d 834, 849, 485 N.W.2d 10 (1992)).  "An error 
is prejudicial when it probably misled the jury."  Id.  In other 
words, a jury instruction error "is not prejudicial if it 
appears that the result would not be different had the error not 
occurred."  Id. (quoting Lutz v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 70 
Wis. 2d 743, 751, 235 N.W.2d 426 (1975)).   
2.  Special skills instruction 
¶106 There are professions and trades for which special 
skills are necessary to performance of the profession or trade.  
See Racine Cnty. v. Oracular Milwaukee, Inc., 2009 WI App 58, 
¶28, 317 Wis. 2d 790, 767 N.W.2d 280 (parsing whether computer 
software installers were subject to a higher professional 
standard of care based on special skills).  When those special 
No.  2013AP1750.pdr 
 
4 
 
skills 
are 
required 
but 
not 
competently 
performed, 
the 
"[p]rofessionals may be sued for malpractice because [of] the 
higher standards for care imposed on them by their profession."  
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Further, 
when a higher standard of care is imposed on members of a 
profession or trade, expert witness testimony generally is 
required to prove that those standards were not met.  Id., ¶34.  
3.  Instructions given 
¶107 The circuit court gave a special skills instruction 
based on Cavallino being licensed as a semi-truck driver.  That 
instruction stated in pertinent part:4 
At the time of the accident, the defendant, Dale 
Cavallino, was a professional truck driver, operating 
a semi tractor trailer pursuant to a Commercial 
Driver's License issued by the State of Wisconsin.  As 
the operator of a semi tractor-trailer, it was Dale 
Cavallino's duty to use the degree of care, skill and 
judgment which reasonable semi truck drivers would 
exercise in the same or similar circumstances, having 
due regard for the state of learning, education, 
experience, and knowledge possessed by semi truck 
drivers holding Commercial Driver's Licenses.  A semi 
truck driver who fails to conform to this standard is 
negligent. 
¶108 Immediately 
prior 
to 
the 
semi-truck 
driver 
instruction, the jury received instruction on the standard of 
ordinary care:5  
A person is negligent when he fails to exercise 
ordinary care.  Ordinary care is the care which a 
reasonable person would use in similar circumstances.  
                                                 
4 Labelled "New #3 Negligence:  Semi Truck Driver." 
5 Labelled "1005 Negligence:  Defined." 
No.  2013AP1750.pdr 
 
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A person is not using ordinary care and is negligent, 
if the person, without intending to do harm, does 
something or fails to do something that a reasonable 
person would recognize as creating an unreasonable 
risk of injury or damage to a person or property. 
¶109 In regard to these two instructions, the court of 
appeals melded them together and explained how it concluded that 
Cavallino's superior knowledge and skill fit into the standard 
of ordinary care: 
Putting together the general standard of care 
with its application to the circumstances in which an 
actor 
possesses 
pertinent 
superior 
knowledge 
or 
skills:  (1) all have a duty to use ordinary care to 
avoid acts that a reasonable person would recognize 
create unreasonable risks of injury or damage to 
others or property, and (2) a "reasonable person will 
act in the light of (a) knowledge shared by the 
community 
generally 
and 
also 
(b) 
information, 
knowledge and skill that he himself has that is not 
generally known and that reasonable people would not 
ordinarily have." Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of 
Torts § 132 (2d ed. 2014). 
Dakter v. Cavallino, 2014 WI App 112, ¶40, 358 Wis. 2d 434, 856 
N.W.2d 523.   
¶110 The parties agree that it would have been improper for 
the circuit court to have instructed the jury that Cavallino is 
held to a higher standard of care than other drivers on the 
highway because he was a professional semi-truck driver.6  Dakter 
acknowledges that the standard of care for all drivers is 
ordinary care.   
¶111 However, the wording of the special skills instruction 
for semi-truck drivers implies that there is a semi-truck driver 
                                                 
6 Respondent's Brief at 22:  "We agree; the standard is 
always 'ordinary care.'" 
No.  2013AP1750.pdr 
 
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standard of care and that Cavallino was obligated to conform his 
conduct to that standard of care, which differs from ordinary 
care.  That implication permitted the jury to hold Cavallino to 
a different standard of care than the standard of care that the 
jury applied to Dakter.  
¶112 Specifically, the instruction directed that it was 
Cavallino's "duty to use the degree of care, skill and judgment 
which reasonable semi truck drivers would exercise in the same 
or similar circumstances."  This is an incorrect statement of 
the law.  It establishes a semi-truck driver standard of care 
that required Cavallino to use skills in addition to those 
required of Dakter while both were using a public highway.  
Accordingly, the circuit court erred by giving the jury the 
special skills instruction that was focused on the skills 
required of a commercial driver of a semi-truck.  
¶113 I also conclude that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
in 
giving 
the 
special 
skills 
instruction because the application of the superior knowledge 
and skills doctrine is limited to persons taking actions in a 
venue where special skills are required by that venue.  For 
example, when one takes action in a venue where special skills 
are 
required, 
e.g., 
physicians, 
lawyers, 
pharmacists 
and 
dentists, the circumstances that underlie the standard of 
ordinary care take into account the similarity of experience 
among 
those 
who 
work 
in 
the 
exclusive 
venue 
where 
the 
particularized superior knowledge and skills are required.  
Stated otherwise, in cases where special skills are relevant, 
No.  2013AP1750.pdr 
 
7 
 
the duty is defined by standards applicable to the particular 
profession of the alleged tortfeasor.  Zastrow v. Journal 
Commc'ns, Inc., 2005 WI App 178, ¶25, 286 Wis. 2d 416, 703 
N.W.2d 673.  
¶114 In contrast to those who work in exclusive venues that 
require special skills in order to work in that venue, 
professional and lay vehicle operators employ the same venue, 
i.e., they share the same roadways.  In addition, a driver with 
a license permitting him or her to drive a semi-truck7 could also 
drive a large truck, a pickup truck or a car.  A driver with a 
commercial license could be a professional semi-truck driver, or 
he or she may drive a semi-truck only rarely.  Alternatively, a 
driver holding a class D (regular) driver's license8 may operate 
any number of large and cumbersome vehicles, including large 
moving trucks or trucks with large trailers.  Because all of 
these vehicle operators act in the same venue, i.e., the shared 
roadway, they are subject to the same ordinary care.  Ordinary 
care is that care exercised by a reasonable person under the 
circumstances.  See Hoida, Inc. v. M&I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 
69, ¶¶30-32, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17.  The circumstances 
of ordinary care are not modified according to the type of 
vehicle operator, but rather, uniformly reflect the nature of 
the shared venue, a public roadway.  See State Dep't of Transp. 
v. Robbins, 246 P.3d 864, 867 (Wyo. 2011) (citing Cervelli v. 
                                                 
7 Wis. Stat. § 343.03(3)(b). 
8 Wis. Stat. § 343.03(3)(a). 
No.  2013AP1750.pdr 
 
8 
 
Graves, 661 P.2d 1032, 1038-39 (Wyo. 1983) (affirming the trial 
court's refusal to give a jury instruction that set an 
individualized standard of care for a semi-truck driver and 
reasoning that to do so would be to convert an ordinary 
negligence case into a semi-truck driver's malpractice action)).   
¶115 Even though I conclude that the circuit court erred in 
giving 
the 
semi-truck 
driver 
negligence 
instruction, 
the 
instruction was not prejudicial and therefore was harmless.  As 
the court of appeals noted, the erroneous instructions may have 
subjected Cavallino to a higher standard of care than that to 
which he would have been held if he lacked superior knowledge or 
skills.  Dakter, 358 Wis. 2d 434, ¶47.  However, I also agree 
that jurors likely focused on the evidence presented at trial.  
Id. 
 
Therefore, 
if 
jurors 
were 
presented 
with 
accurate 
statements of the standard of ordinary care, they would have 
been as likely to reach the same conclusion.   
¶116 Furthermore, "[j]ury instructions are evaluated in 
their entirety, not in isolation."  Weborg, 341 Wis. 2d 668, 
¶74.  The erroneous semi-truck driver instruction was surrounded 
by correct instructions that repeatedly reminded the jury of the 
standard of ordinary care.   
¶117 In addition, the jury's apportionment of negligence is 
substantially supported by the facts and does not indicate 
prejudice.  Trial testimony supports the jury's verdict.  For 
example, under hypothetical facts matching Dakter's testimony 
regarding the accident that gives rise to this case, Cavallino's 
own expert stated that if the hypothetical facts were true, the 
No.  2013AP1750.pdr 
 
9 
 
driving was "reckless" and Cavallino's own employer stated that 
such driving would be "unsafe."   These facts in combination 
with the multiple instructions on ordinary care cause me to 
conclude that there is no reasonable probability that the 
circuit 
court's 
error 
in 
giving 
the 
semi-truck 
driver 
instruction 
contributed 
to 
the 
outcome 
of 
the 
trial.  
Accordingly, the jury instruction error was not prejudicial 
because the jury's verdict likely would have been the same had 
the error in instructions not occurred.  See Kochanski, 356 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶11. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶118 I conclude that the circuit court's special skills 
instruction was erroneous because it incorrectly stated the law.  
However, 
I 
also 
conclude 
that 
the 
error 
was 
harmless.  
Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals, and although I 
do not join the majority opinion, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
No.  2013AP1750.akz 
 
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¶119 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion's conclusion that the semi-truck driver 
jury instruction at issue was not erroneous under the facts of 
this case.  I also join Chief Justice Roggensack's conclusion 
that, if this jury instruction were erroneous, the error was 
harmless.  I write separately to clarify two points. 
¶120 First, I write to clarify that the semi-truck driver 
jury instruction at issue was proper because the defendant was 
driving a semi-truck at the time of the accident.  See majority 
op., ¶96 ("In the instant case, the circumstances relevant to a 
determination of whether the defendant acted reasonably include 
the fact that at the time of the collision, the defendant was 
engaged in a profession or trade (semi-trailer truck driving) 
and possessed the special knowledge and skill required of semi- 
trailer truck drivers." (emphasis added)).  Had the defendant 
been driving a passenger automobile rather than a semi-truck at 
the time of the accident, the semi-truck driver jury instruction 
would have been erroneous, notwithstanding the fact that the 
defendant is a professional semi-truck driver.   
¶121 Second, I write to clarify that certain treatises that 
the majority opinion cites are overly broad and do not dictate 
the law in Wisconsin.  See, e.g., majority op., ¶48 ("[I]f a 
person in fact has knowledge, skill, or even intelligence 
superior to that of the ordinary person, the law will demand of 
that person conduct consistent with it." (quoting W. Page Keeton 
et al., Prosser and Keaton on Torts § 32, at 185 (5th ed. 
2000))); id. ("In addition to the knowledge that may be imputed 
No.  2013AP1750.akz 
 
2 
 
to a reasonable person, a person's actual knowledge and skills 
may be taken into account when the level of the person's 
knowledge or skills exceeds the average." (quoting 1 J.D. Lee & 
Barry A. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law: Liability & Litigation § 3:21 
(2d ed. 1990))); id., ¶43 n.16 ("The standard of the reasonable 
man requires only a minimum of attention, perception, memory, 
knowledge, intelligence, and judgment in order to recognize the 
existence of the risk.  If the actor has in fact more than the 
minimum of these qualities he is required to exercise the 
superior qualities that he has in a manner reasonable under the 
circumstances." (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 289 
cmt. m. (1965))).  These passages should not be improperly 
construed as an expansion of Wisconsin law.  See majority op., 
¶49 ("These texts neither bind this court nor declare the law of 
Wisconsin.").  Instead, I write to clarify that the majority 
opinion cites these treatises for the sole and limited purpose 
that, under the facts of this case, the semi-truck driver jury 
instruction was proper because the defendant was driving a semi-
truck at the time of the accident.  The majority opinion 
expressly recognizes that these broad treatise passages do not 
"declare the law of Wisconsin."  Majority op., ¶49. 
¶122 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.  
¶123 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2013AP1750.akz 
 
1