Title: Weathers v. State
Citation: 208 Kan. 653, 493 P.2d 270
Docket Number: 46,457
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: January 22, 1972

208 Kan. 653 (1972)
493 P.2d 270
ROBERT CHESTER WEATHERS, Appellant
v.
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee.
No. 46,457

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 22, 1972.
Richard D. Ewy, of Foulston, Siefkin, Powers and Eberhardt, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Gary H. Jarchow, Deputy County Attorney, argued the cause, and Vern Miller, Attorney General, and Keith Sanborn, County Attorney, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KAUL, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the district court summarily denying petitioner's motion under K.S.A. 60-1507.
On July 16, 1968, petitioner entered pleas of guilty to robbery in the first degree (K.S.A. 21-527 [now K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 21-3426 and 21-3427]), and possession of a pistol after conviction of a felony (K.S.A. 21-2611 [now K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 21-4204]). Thereafter petitioner appealed. In an opinion filed on May 9, 1970, this court affirmed both convictions. (See State v. Weathers, 205 Kan. 329, 469 P.2d 292.)
On July 6, 1970, petitioner filed a motion pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507 in the district court of Sedgwick county. Petitioner contended the sentences should be vacated because: (1) Count I of the information was defective because it failed to describe the property taken in the robbery and (2) Count II of the information was defective because it failed to allege the date of the prior conviction; and further that there was no evidence presented showing that petitioner had counsel on his prior conviction.
*654 On August 11, 1970, the district court considered petitioner's motion, examined the files and records in the case, and ruled in pertinent part as follows:
On August 18, 1970, petitioner filed what he labeled a "Motion To Release De Novo," wherein he reasserted his contentions with respect to Count I. He abandoned his previous contentions as to Count II, and in lieu thereof claimed that the prior felony conviction alleged in Count II could not serve as a basis for a conviction under 21-2611, supra, because he was not afforded counsel on appeal from the denial of a postconviction remedy. (See Weathers v. Hand, 186 Kan. 373, 350 P.2d 128.) In addition, petitioner claimed for the first time that he did not intelligently and understandingly enter a plea of guilty for reason of his temporary insanity. In this connection, petitioner directed attention to a report of the Kansas Reception and Diagnostic Center which was filed with the court.
The district court treated petitioner's second motion as a motion for rehearing and again denied relief on September 8, 1970. After noting that petitioner's first ground concerning the robbery charge had been disposed of by the previous ruling, the court further ruled in pertinent part as follows:
*655 From this second and last ruling of the district court petitioner appeals.
In his brief petitioner argues three points. He reasserts his contentions concerning Counts I and II of the information; and as a third point he says that if this court does find the district court had jurisdiction on Counts I and II of the information then he claims in the alternative the district court erred in failing to appoint counsel and conduct an evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of his plea.
At the outset, it should be noted that petitioner was represented by counsel prior to his preliminary hearing and throughout the proceedings in district court. The record shows that petitioner fully understood the charges lodged against him at the time of entering his pleas. The colloquy between petitioner and the court appears as follows:
"THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
"MR. MOLINE: No, sir."
Notwithstanding his pleas of guilty, petitioner now claims the district court was without jurisdiction because the information did not specifically describe the property taken in the robbery.
We find no merit in petitioner's contention since the elements of the offense are stated in the identical terms of 21-527, supra. Eliminating formalities, the information states that petitioner:
The statute in question, 21-527, supra, reads:
The well-established rule in this jurisdiction is that, except in those cases where it fails to state a public offense, thus giving a court no jurisdiction of the matter, the sufficiency of an information must be challenged by appeal and not by habeas corpus or a postconviction proceeding. (Carithers v. State, 207 Kan. 607, 485 P.2d 1368, and Gray v. Hand, 186 Kan. 668, 352 P.2d 3.)
In Carithers the distinction was pointed out between a challenge of the sufficiency of an information in a postconviction proceeding after a plea of guilty, and where raised by direct appeal after a trial such as in the cases of State v. Minor, 197 Kan. 296, 416 P.2d 724, and State v. Baker, 197 Kan. 660, 421 P.2d 16, cited by petitioner.
In the recent case of State v. Melton, 207 Kan. 700, 486 P.2d 1361, we said:
With respect to Count II of the information, petitioner claims the previous conviction relied upon as a basis for the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm was void because he was not afforded counsel on appeal from a denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he attacked that sentence and conviction. (Weathers v. Hand, supra.)
The previous conviction referred to was had on petitioner's plea of guilty to an armed robbery in Shawnee County in 1956. Although the appeal to this court in Weathers v. Hand, supra, was by petitioner pro se, this court carefully considered each point raised in the opinion filed therein.
*657 In the Weathers v. Hand opinion it is pointed out that petitioner had counsel at his preliminary hearing in the Shawnee County case and that the same counsel was appointed to represent him when he appeared before the district court, entered his plea of guilty, and was sentenced on April 13, 1956. It was further noted in the opinion that the record in no respect indicated that petitioner's plea was not voluntary. In his habeas corpus action, petitioner made no claim that he attempted to or desired to appeal from the 1956 conviction and makes no such assertion now. He simply argues that the 1956 conviction should fall because he was not afforded counsel in his appeal in the collateral habeas corpus proceeding.
When entering his pleas of guilty in the instant case, petitioner freely admitted the previous felony conviction in Shawnee County. He offers no excuse nor does he make any explanation of his failure to appeal from that conviction; neither does he give any reason for failing to include the points raised herein in his direct appeal in the instant case. Absent a showing of exceptional circumstances excusing failure to raise matters in a direct appeal, we have consistently held, in accord with our Rule No. 121 (205 Kan. XLIV), that a proceeding under K.S.A. 60-1507 cannot be used as a substitute for a second appeal, even though constitutional questions may be involved. (Neil v. State, 207 Kan. 212, 483 P.2d 1117; Hacker v. State, 207 Kan. 195, 483 P.2d 484; and Davis v. State, 204 Kan. 816, 466 P.2d 311.)
For his third point herein, petitioner claims the district court erred in failing to appoint counsel and granting a full evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of petitioner's pleas. His argument is that despite the fact the report of the Reception and Diagnostic Center was before the district court, a witness for the Center should have been subpoenaed and a hearing had concerning temporary insanity at the time of his pleas. Here again petitioner offers no explanation why this matter was not raised in his direct appeal. Although what has been said before adequately disposes of petitioner's contention; we would further note that the district court's order discloses that the report of the Reception and Diagnostic Center was examined and that nothing in the report indicated that petitioner's mental state was incompatible with a voluntary, intelligent plea of guilty. It should be further noted that petitioner made no effort to withdraw his plea.
The petitioner's motion raised no substantial questions of fact or law and no error is shown in the district court's rulings.
The judgment is affirmed.