Title: Jaynes v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 062388
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 12, 2008

Present: Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Agee,1 and 
Goodwyn, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
JEREMY JAYNES 
OPINION BY 
v. Record No. 062388               
 JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
    September 12, 20082 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
Upon rehearing pursuant to orders dated 
 April 28, 2008 and May 19, 2008 
 
Jeremy Jaynes appeals from the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals which affirmed his convictions in the Circuit Court of 
Loudoun County for violations of Code § 18.2-152.3:1, the 
unsolicited bulk electronic mail (e-mail) provision of the 
Virginia Computer Crimes Act, Code §§ 18.2-152.1 through –
152.15.  For the reasons set forth below, we will reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
From his home in Raleigh, North Carolina, Jaynes used 
several computers, routers and servers to send over 10,000 e-
mails within a 24-hour period to subscribers of America Online, 
Inc. (AOL) on each of three separate occasions.  On July 16, 
2003, Jaynes sent 12,197 pieces of unsolicited e-mail with 
                     
1 Justice Agee participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to his retirement from the Court on June 30, 
2008. 
2 The prior opinion rendered February 29, 2008, reported at 
275 Va. 341, 657 S.E.2d 478 (2008), was withdrawn by the Court 
after a petition for rehearing was granted by Orders dated April 
28, 2008 and May 19, 2008. 
1 
falsified routing and transmission information onto AOL’s 
proprietary network.  On July 19, 2003, he sent 24,172, and on 
July 26, 2003, he sent 19,104.  None of the recipients of the e-
mails had requested any communication from Jaynes.  He 
intentionally falsified the header information and sender domain 
names before transmitting the e-mails to the recipients.3  
However, investigators used a sophisticated database search to 
identify Jaynes as the sender of the e-mails.4  Jaynes was 
arrested and charged with violating Code § 18.2-152.3:1, which 
provides in relevant part: 
A. Any person who: 
1. Uses a computer or computer network with 
the intent to falsify or forge electronic 
mail transmission information or other 
routing information in any manner in 
connection with the transmission of 
unsolicited bulk electronic mail through 
or into the computer network of an 
electronic mail service provider or its 
subscribers . . . is guilty of a Class 1 
misdemeanor. 
 
B. A person is guilty of a Class 6 felony if 
he commits a violation of subsection A 
and: 
1. 
The volume of UBE transmitted exceeded 
10,000 attempted recipients in any 24-
                     
3 Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is what an e-mail 
server uses to transmit an e-mail message, and the SMTP requires 
verification of the sender’s IP address and domain.  Evidence at 
trial demonstrated that Jaynes sent the e-mails with domain 
names which did not correspond to the domain names assigned to 
the sending IP addresses. 
4 Computers may be identified by their unique IP address 
number, which consists of blocks of numerals separated by 
periods.  
2 
hour period, 100,000 attempted 
recipients in any 30-day time period, 
or one million attempted recipients in 
any one-year time period. . . . 
While executing a search of Jaynes’ home, police discovered 
a cache of compact discs (CDs) containing over 176 million full 
e-mail addresses and 1.3 billion e-mail user names.  The search 
also led to the confiscation of storage discs which contained 
AOL e-mail address information and other personal and private 
account information for millions of AOL subscribers.  The AOL 
user information had been stolen from AOL by a former employee 
and was in Jaynes’ possession.  During trial, evidence 
demonstrated that Jaynes knew that all of the more than 50,000 
recipients of his unsolicited e-mails were subscribers to AOL, 
in part, because the e-mail addresses of all recipients ended in 
“@aol.com.”5 
An expert witness testified that the e-mails sent by Jaynes 
were not consistent with solicited bulk e-mail, but rather 
constituted unsolicited bulk e-mail (sometimes referred to as 
“spam” e-mail) because Jaynes had disguised the true sender and 
header information and used multiple addresses to send the e-
mails.  Other evidence at trial demonstrated that all of AOL’s 
                     
5 Jaynes’ e-mails advertised one of three products: (1) a 
FedEx refund claims product, (2) a “Penny Stock Picker,” and (3) 
a “History Eraser” product. To purchase one of these products, 
potential buyers would click on a hyperlink within the e-mail, 
which redirected them outside the e-mail, where they could 
3 
servers were located in Virginia, although some were located in 
Loudoun County and others were located in Prince William County. 
Jaynes moved to dismiss the charges against him on the 
grounds that the statute violated the dormant Commerce Clause, 
was unconstitutionally vague, and violated the First Amendment.  
The circuit court denied that motion. Jaynes filed a separate 
motion to strike in which he challenged the jurisdiction of the 
circuit court.  The court determined it had jurisdiction and 
denied the motion to strike. 
A jury convicted Jaynes of three counts of violating Code 
§ 18.2-152.3:1, and the circuit court sentenced Jaynes to three 
years in prison on each count, with the sentences to run 
consecutively for an active term of imprisonment of nine years.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions, Jaynes v. 
Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 673, 634 S.E.2d 357 (2006).  We 
awarded Jaynes an appeal. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Jaynes makes four assignments of error to the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals.  First, he assigns error to the 
determination that the circuit court had jurisdiction over him 
on the crimes charged.  Second, Jaynes contends Code § 18.2-
152.3:1 “abridge[s] the First Amendment right to anonymous 
speech,” and it was error not to reverse his convictions on that 
                                                                  
consummate the purchase. 
4 
basis.  Separately, Jaynes assigns as error the failure of the 
Court of Appeals to hold that Code § 18.2-152.3:1 is void for 
vagueness.  Lastly, Jaynes posits that the statute violates the 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 
A. JURISDICTION 
 
Jaynes asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in holding 
that the circuit court had jurisdiction over him for violating 
Code § 18.2-152.3:1 because he did not “use” a computer in 
Virginia.  He contends that a violation of that statute can occur 
only in the location where the e-mail routing information is 
falsified.  Jaynes maintains that because he only used computers 
to send the e-mails from his home in Raleigh, North Carolina, he 
committed no crime in Virginia.  Further, because he had no 
control over the routing of the e-mails, he argues his actions 
did not have an “immediate result” in Virginia, and under Moreno 
v. Baskerville, 249 Va. 16, 452 S.E.2d 653 (1995), could not be 
the basis for jurisdiction over him by Virginia courts.  
Therefore, according to Jaynes, the circuit court had no 
jurisdiction over him and his convictions are void. 
To successfully prosecute a crime under Code § 18.2-
152.3:1(B), the Commonwealth must establish all the elements of 
that crime.  In addition to the element of the volume of 
transmissions within a specific time period, the Commonwealth 
must prove the sender used a computer and that such use was with 
5 
the intent of falsifying routing information.  The Commonwealth 
must also prove that the transmission of such false routing 
information occurred in connection with the use of an e-mail 
provider’s computer network for that transmission.  Thus, the 
crime is not complete until there is e-mail transmission passing 
through or into the computer network of the e-mail provider or 
subscriber containing the false routing information. 
Jaynes argues that he “merely sent e-mails that happened to 
be routed through AOL servers.”  We disagree.  As the evidence 
established, all e-mail must flow through the recipient’s e-mail 
server in order to reach the intended recipient.  By selecting 
AOL subscribers as his e-mail recipients, Jaynes knew and 
intended that his e-mails would utilize AOL servers because he 
clearly intended to send to users whose e-mails ended in 
“@aol.com.”  The evidence established that the AOL servers are 
located in Virginia, and that the location of AOL’s servers was 
information easily accessible to the general public.  Applying 
our standard of review to the evidence presented along with all 
reasonable inferences therefrom, we conclude that the evidence 
supports the conclusion that Jaynes knew and intended that the 
e-mails he sent to AOL subscribers would utilize AOL’s servers 
which are located in Virginia.  Thus an intended and necessary 
result of Jaynes’ action, the e-mail transmission through the 
computer network, occurred in Virginia. 
6 
Furthermore, a state may exercise jurisdiction over 
criminal acts that are committed outside the state, but are 
intended to, and do in fact, produce harm within the state.  
“ ‘It has long been a commonplace of criminal liability that a 
person may be charged in the place where the evil results, 
though he is beyond the jurisdiction when he starts the train of 
events of which the evil is the fruit.’ ”  Travelers Health 
Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 877, 892, 51 S.E.2d 263, 269 
(1949) (citing Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284-85 
(1911)). 
Jaynes, relying on Moreno, argues that this principle, 
referred to as the “immediate result doctrine,” is not 
applicable if third parties intervene between the out-of-state 
conduct and the in-state harm.  In Moreno, the defendant, while 
in Arizona, arranged for delivery of drugs to an accomplice in 
Arizona who, in turn, delivered the drugs to two other 
accomplices who ultimately sold the drugs in Virginia.  249 Va. 
at 17-18, 452 S.E.2d at 654.  Noting that drug distribution is 
not a continuing offense and that payment is not an element of 
the crime of drug distribution, id. at 18-20, 452 S.E.2d at 654-
55, we concluded that the discrete crime of drug distribution 
was committed by the defendant while in Arizona and that the 
ultimate sale of the drugs in Virginia was not the “immediate 
result” of the distribution of drugs in Arizona because the 
7 
subsequent distributions by Moreno’s accomplices intervened.  
Id. at 19, 452 S.E.2d at 655.  
Jaynes argues that an e-mail could be routed through a 
number of different mail handling networks before the e-mail 
reaches its destination, and that an e-mail sender cannot 
control the route used.  Such routing, Jaynes contends, is the 
same type of intervention which occurred in Moreno.  Therefore, 
according to Jaynes, the intervention of intermediate e-mail 
routers and servers prior to arrival of the e-mails at the AOL 
servers shows that the alleged harm through the AOL servers in 
Virginia was not the “immediate result” of Jaynes’ actions in 
North Carolina. 
Jaynes’ reliance on Moreno fails because, as noted above, 
Jaynes’ affirmative act of selecting AOL subscribers as 
recipients of his e-mails insured the use of AOL’s computer 
network to deliver the e-mails and such use was the “immediate 
result” of Jaynes’ action, regardless of any intermediate routes 
taken by the e-mails.  Because the use of the computer network 
of an e-mail service provider or its subscribers is an integral 
part of the crime charged and because the use of AOL’s e-mail 
servers was the “immediate result” of Jaynes’ acts, we hold that 
Jaynes was amenable to prosecution in Virginia for a violation 
of Code § 18.2-152.3:1.  Accordingly, the circuit court had 
jurisdiction over Jaynes.  
8 
B. FIRST AMENDMENT OVERBREADTH  
Jaynes next contends that Code § 18.2-152.3:1 is 
constitutionally deficient as overbroad under the First 
Amendment and therefore the statute cannot be enforced.  He 
argues the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the circuit 
court’s ruling denying his motion to dismiss on that basis. 
The Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that Jaynes 
had standing to raise a First Amendment challenge, but concluded 
that Code § 18.2-152.3:1 was in the nature of a trespass 
statute, thereby eliminating the need to address the First 
Amendment issue.  The Commonwealth, in addition to arguing that 
the Court of Appeals correctly construed the statute as a 
trespass statute, contends in an assignment of cross-error that 
Jaynes lacks standing to raise a First Amendment challenge to 
Code § 18.2-152.3:1 and therefore the First Amendment issues 
raised by Jaynes should not be considered.  We will begin by 
addressing the issue of standing. 
1.  STANDING 
Jaynes does not make a pure facial challenge to Code 
§ 18.2-152.3:1 as he does not argue “that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”  
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).  Similarly, 
Jaynes does not make an “as-applied challenge” to the statute, 
meaning he does not contend the application of the statute to 
9 
the actual acts for which he was convicted violates the First 
Amendment.  See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. ___, ___, 127 
S.Ct. 1610, 1638-39 (2007) (comparing facial and as-applied 
challenges).  Instead, Jaynes challenges the statute by claiming 
it is unconstitutional as overbroad.  See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 
U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003) (“Hicks II”).6  That is, Jaynes contends 
that because the statute could potentially reach the protected 
speech of a third party, he (Jaynes) is entitled to claim 
exoneration for his otherwise unprotected speech.7 
The Commonwealth contends Jaynes has no standing to raise a 
First Amendment overbreadth defense.  Citing the decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in Hicks II, the Commonwealth argues 
there is no federal law obligation for state courts to 
hear facial challenges alleging overbreadth.  While 
the question of whether a statute is overbroad is a 
matter of federal constitutional law, the question of 
who may bring a facial challenge alleging overbreadth 
is a matter of state law. 
                     
6 Unlike a “facial” or “as-applied” challenge, an 
overbreadth challenge “suffices to invalidate all enforcement of 
that law” upon showing that the law “punishes a ‘substantial’ 
amount of protected free speech, ‘judged in relation to the 
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Hicks II, 539 U.S. at 
118-19 (2003)(quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 
(1973)). 
7 The Commonwealth also argues that Jaynes did not preserve 
this issue for appeal because he did not raise his overbreadth 
challenge in the circuit court.  This contention is without 
merit.  Jaynes raised it in his brief in support of his motion 
to dismiss, the Commonwealth addressed a facial challenge in 
response and the circuit court in its letter opinion labeled 
Jaynes’ argument “a broad, general, facial First Amendment 
challenge.”  
10 
. . . . 
In other words, the fact that Jaynes could bring his 
facial challenge alleging overbreadth in federal court 
is irrelevant.  The issue is whether Jaynes may bring 
his facial challenge alleging overbreadth in the 
Virginia state courts. 
The Commonwealth concludes that based on Hicks II “except where 
there is no set of circumstances where the statute is 
constitutional, or where a litigant is engaged in non-commercial 
speech, this Court, as a matter of state law, should entertain 
only as-applied challenges.” (citation omitted). 
Jaynes responds that Hicks II does not support the rule on 
standing advocated by the Commonwealth.  He contends “[a]lthough 
Hicks [II] permits state courts to allow more facial challenges 
than federal law would permit, it does not authorize state 
courts to accept fewer facial challenges.”  Citing New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982), Jaynes maintains that the 
overbreadth doctrine is a “constitutional exception to state and 
federal rules of standing, which ordinarily limit parties to as-
applied challenges to statutes.”8 
                     
8 Jaynes’ arguments as to the effect of Hicks II and 
response to the Commonwealth’s position that states can set 
whatever standing rules they choose for First Amendment 
overbreadth claims were not made until his petition for 
rehearing and brief on rehearing.  Even though Jaynes failed in 
his opening or reply briefs to address the standing issue as 
presented by the Commonwealth, that issue is properly before us 
and we address it because the issue was raised and placed before 
the Court by the Commonwealth. 
11 
 
The Commonwealth bases its position on the following 
discussion of standing in the Hicks II opinion: 
[O]ur standing rules limit only the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction over certain claims. State courts are not 
bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or 
other federal rules of justiciability even when they 
address issues of federal law.  Whether Virginia’s 
courts should have entertained this overbreadth 
challenge is entirely a matter of state law. 
Hicks II, 539 U.S. at 120 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
On its face, and without context, this passage from Hicks 
II appears to support the rule of standing advocated by the 
Commonwealth.  In a nutshell, that rule would be that state 
courts are not required to apply the same standing requirements 
to a claimant who raises a First Amendment overbreadth challenge 
to a state statute in a state court as would be accorded that 
claimant in a federal court considering a similar First 
Amendment overbreadth claim.  However, when viewed in the 
context of the standing issue actually presented in Hicks II, 
and the longstanding Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence by which 
First Amendment rights are made applicable in state court 
proceedings, we disagree with the Commonwealth’s arguments. 
In Commonwealth v. Hicks, 264 Va. 48, 563 S.E.2d 674 (2002) 
(“Hicks I”) this Court accorded standing to that defendant to 
raise a First Amendment overbreadth challenge to certain 
policies of the Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority 
(RRHA).  264 Va. at 55-56, 563 S.E.2d at 678-79.  Hicks had been 
12 
banned from RRHA property because of prior trespass and property 
damage offenses, but continued to trespass on RRHA property.  
Id. at 52-53, 563 S.E.2d at 676-77.  Upon his subsequent 
trespass arrest and conviction, Hicks asserted that he had a 
right to assert that the RRHA policies determining which persons 
would be barred from access to its properties were overbroad 
under the First Amendment and thus his conviction was invalid.  
Id. at 54, 563 S.E.2d at 677-78.  Although Hicks did not contend 
that he had engaged in any expressive conduct or that the 
trespass statute under which he was convicted was invalid, this 
Court in Hicks I reversed his conviction because it concluded 
the RRHA trespass policy “also prohibits speech and conduct that 
are clearly protected by the First Amendment.”  Id. at 58, 563 
S.E.2d at 680. 
Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the 
Commonwealth did “not ask the Court to abolish the overbreadth 
doctrine, only to place meaningful limits on its use.”  Brief of 
Petitioner, Virginia v. Hicks, No. 02-371, at 18 (Mar. 7, 2003).  
The Commonwealth argued on brief that “the Supreme Court of 
Virginia treated the [overbreadth] doctrine as if it were 
virtually unbounded,” id. at 19, and consequently Hicks I 
“represents a radical expansion of the overbreadth doctrine.”  
Id. (emphasis added).  This was so, the Commonwealth argued, 
because the Hicks I view of overbreadth standing “has no 
13 
precedent in this Court’s jurisprudence,” id. at 21, and urged 
the Court to limit First Amendment overbreadth standing to 
persons who “at least show (1) that his own conduct involved 
some sort of expressive activity, and (2) that his conduct falls 
within the particular prohibition he challenges as overbroad.”  
Id. at 25.  Because Hicks conceded his trespass was not 
expressive activity and he did not challenge the trespass 
statute under which he was convicted as overbroad, the 
Commonwealth’s position before the United States Supreme Court 
in Hicks II was that Hicks’ conduct failed to meet its proposed 
overbreadth standing rule.  At no point, on brief or in oral 
argument before the Supreme Court, did the Commonwealth argue 
the standing rule it now posits: that state courts are free to 
set their own standing rules in cases involving First Amendment 
overbreadth claims.  In point of fact, as the foregoing 
illustrates, the Commonwealth argued the polar opposite: that 
state court standing rules should be constrained. 
The oral argument in Hicks II makes this conclusion 
unmistakable and reflects the Commonwealth’s clear 
acknowledgement of a First Amendment overbreadth rule that is 
directly contrary to the position it now advances in the case at 
bar.  In discussing the Virginia Supreme Court’s resolution of 
standing in Hicks I, the following colloquy took place between 
members of the Court and counsel for the Commonwealth: 
14 
QUESTION: The issue is whether – whether 
[Virginia] adopted a broader interpretation under 
State law than Federal law would require. 
. . . . 
[ANSWER]:  That is correct. A – a State may well 
be able to adopt a broader interpretation of standing 
than this Court requires, but it cannot adopt a 
narrower interpretation. It cannot disregard this 
Court’s direction that you give overbreadth standing 
according to the Federal constitutional 
standards. . . . 
QUESTION: And if they were correct about what our 
standing rules are, they would have to follow those 
standing rules, wouldn’t they? They could not apply a 
narrower . . . basis for standing, could they? 
[ANSWER]: That is absolutely correct, Your Honor. 
The State supreme court has no discretion to disregard 
this Court’s application of the First Amendment 
through its overbreadth doctrine.  
Oral Arg. Tr., Virginia v. Hicks, No. 02-371, at 5 (Apr. 30, 
2003) (emphasis added). 
 
It is thus clear that the opinion of the United States 
Supreme Court in Hicks II addressed the issue of First Amendment 
standing only in the context by which that issue was placed 
before the Court: whether a state’s expansion of First Amendment 
standing was subject to review by federal courts.  When the 
Hicks II opinion states “[w]hether Virginia’s courts should have 
entertained this overbreadth challenge is entirely a matter of 
state law,” Hicks II, 539 U.S. at 120, the term “this” plainly 
limits the standing issue to what was before the Court in that 
case: an expansion, not a restriction, of state court standing.  
15 
 
Thus, read in context, the seemingly broad language about 
standing in the Hicks II opinion cannot have the meaning now 
espoused by the Commonwealth.  This view is amply verified by 
decades of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence that establishes 
First Amendment rights, among others, as applicable in state 
court proceedings.  In 1925, the United States Supreme Court 
enunciated the principle “that freedom of speech and of the 
press – which are protected by the First Amendment from 
abridgement by Congress – are among the fundamental personal 
rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”  Gitlow 
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); accord Stromberg v. 
California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931) (“the conception of liberty 
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
embraces the right of free speech”). 
 
The Supreme Court has also recognized that the assertion of 
a First Amendment overbreadth claim is not the application of a 
procedural rule, but a substantive part of the First Amendment.  
“[O]verbreadth is a function of substantive First Amendment 
law.”  Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 610 (2004) (citing 
Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 S.Ct. Rev. 1, 24).  As a 
matter of substantive law, the First Amendment overbreadth 
doctrine is a constitutional exception to state and federal 
rules of standing that would otherwise limit a party to an as-
16 
applied challenge to a statute.  Thus, “[a] state court is not 
free to avoid a proper facial attack on federal constitutional 
grounds.”  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982). 
 
To accept the Commonwealth’s view of Hicks II would permit, 
under the guise of standing, a state court to ignore the 
substantive constitutional rights of citizens in contravention 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  That is an untenable position 
because the right to assert the protection of the First 
Amendment (by overbreadth or otherwise) can no more be 
restricted by a state rule of standing than the exclusionary 
rule applied to impermissible searches and seizures could be 
limited by state evidence law. 
 
Thus, read in context, Hicks II does not support the 
argument on standing advanced by the Commonwealth.  To the 
contrary, as the Commonwealth expressly admitted before the 
United States Supreme Court, a state supreme court has no 
discretion to disregard the United States Supreme Court’s 
application of the First Amendment through its overbreadth 
doctrine because it cannot disregard the Court’s direction that 
overbreadth standing be given according to the Federal 
constitutional standards.  Oral Arg. Tr., Virginia v. Hicks, No. 
17 
02-371, at 5.  Accordingly, we hold Jaynes has standing to raise 
the First Amendment overbreadth claim.9 
2.  TRESPASS 
The Commonwealth argues, in the alternative, that if Jaynes 
has standing to raise a First Amendment overbreadth claim, that 
claim is not proper for consideration because his conduct was a 
form of trespass and thus not entitled to First Amendment 
protection.  Code § 18.2-152.3:1, in the Commonwealth’s view, is 
like a trespass statute, prohibiting trespassing on the 
privately owned e-mail servers through the intentional use of 
false information and that no First Amendment protection is 
afforded in that circumstance.  The Court of Appeals adopted 
this position and held Jaynes’ First Amendment argument was “not 
relevant.”  Jaynes v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 673, 693, 634 
S.E.2d 357, 367 (2006).  Concluding that Code § 18.2-152.3:1 
“prohibits lying to commit a trespass,” id. at 693, 634 S.E.2d 
at 366, the Court of Appeals determined the “statute proscribes 
intentional falsity as a machination to make massive, 
uncompensated use of the private property of an ISP. Therefore, 
the statute cannot be overbroad because no protected speech 
                     
9 The Commonwealth also argues an alternate standing rule: 
that standing in First Amendment overbreadth cases not extend to 
persons who engage only in commercial speech.  That rule was 
previously rejected in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 817 
(1975); see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
18 
whatsoever falls within its purview.”  Id. at 693, 634 S.E.2d at 
367.  We disagree.  
Trespass is the unauthorized use of or entry onto another’s 
property.  See e.g., Vines v. Branch, 244 Va. 185, 190, 418 
S.E.2d 890, 894 (1992) (“Where a person has illegally seized the 
personal property of another and converted it to his own use, 
the owner may bring an action in trespass, trover, detinue, or 
assumpsit.”) (emphasis added); Code § 18.2-119, -125, -128, -
132. 
Significantly, Code § 18.2-152.3:1 does not prohibit the 
unauthorized use of privately owned e-mail servers.  The statute 
only prohibits the intentional use of false routing information 
in connection with sending certain e-mail through such servers.  
Thus, even if an e-mail service provider specifically allowed 
persons using false IP addresses and domain names to use its 
server, the sender could be prosecuted under Code § 18.2-152.3:1 
although there was no unauthorized use or trespass.  Therefore, 
Code § 18.2-152.3:1 is not a trespass statute. 
The Commonwealth’s argument that there is no First 
Amendment right to use false identification to gain access to 
private property is inapposite.  First, in making this argument 
the Commonwealth uses the terms “false” and “fraudulent” 
                                                                  
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (“commercial 
speech, like other varieties, is protected”). 
19 
interchangeably.  Those concepts are not synonymous.10  At issue 
here is the statute’s prohibition of “false” routing 
information.  Second, the cases upon which the Commonwealth 
relies are civil cases between Internet service providers and 
the entities engaged in sending commercial unsolicited bulk e-
mails: CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F.Supp. 
1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997), Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, 
Inc., 948 F.Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996), and America Online, Inc. 
v. IMS, 24 F.Supp.2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998).  In litigation between 
these private parties, the courts have held that the 
unauthorized use of the Internet service providers’ property 
constituted common law trespass and that a First Amendment claim 
could not be raised against the owner of private property.  
These cases have no relevance here because this is not a 
trespass action by a private property owner and the First 
Amendment right is not being asserted against the owner of 
private property, but against government action impacting the 
claimed First Amendment right.  Accordingly, we reject the 
Commonwealth’s argument and hold the Court of Appeals erred in 
this regard. 
                     
10 Fraud involves a false representation of a material fact, 
made intentionally, which induces reliance on that false 
representation, and resulting damage.  Klaiber v. Freemason 
Assocs., 266 Va. 478, 485, 587 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2003). 
20 
3. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CODE § 18.2-152.3:1 
 
We now turn to Jaynes’ contention that Code § 18.2-152.3:1 
is unconstitutionally overbroad.  To address this challenge, we 
first review certain technical aspects of the transmission of e-
mails.  In transmitting and receiving e-mails, the e-mail 
servers use a protocol which prescribes what information one 
computer must send to another.11  This SMTP requires that the 
routing information contain an IP address and a domain name for 
the sender and recipient of each e-mail.  Domain names and IP 
addresses are assigned to Internet servers by private 
organizations through a registration process.  To obtain an IP 
address or domain name, the registrant pays a fee and provides 
identifying contact information to the registering organization.  
The domain names and IP addresses are contained in a searchable 
database which can associate the domain name with an IP address 
and vice versa. 
The IP address and domain name do not directly identify the 
sender, but if the IP address or domain name is acquired from a 
registering organization, a database search of the address or 
domain name can eventually lead to the contact information on 
file with the registration organizations.  A sender’s IP address 
or domain name which is not registered will not prevent the 
                     
11 The protocol is the product of private collaboration and 
not established by a governmental entity. 
21 
transmission of the e-mail; however, the identity of the sender 
may not be discoverable through a database search and use of 
registration contact information.12 
As shown by the record, because e-mail transmission 
protocol requires entry of an IP address and domain name for the 
sender, the only way such a speaker can publish an anonymous e-
mail is to enter a false IP address or domain name.  Therefore, 
like the registration record on file in the mayor’s office 
identifying persons who chose to canvass private neighborhoods 
in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Village of Stratton, 536 
U.S. 150 (2002), registered IP addresses and domain names 
discoverable through searchable data bases and registration 
documents “necessarily result[] in a surrender of [the 
speaker’s] anonymity.”  536 U.S. at 166.  The right to engage in 
anonymous speech, particularly anonymous political or religious 
speech, is “an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the 
First Amendment.”  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 
334, 342 (1995).  By prohibiting false routing information in 
the dissemination of e-mails, Code § 18.2-152.3:1 infringes on 
that protected right.  The Supreme Court has characterized 
regulations prohibiting such anonymous speech as “a direct 
regulation of the content of speech.”  Id. at 345. 
                     
12 In this case Jaynes used registered IP addresses, 
although the domain names were false. 
22 
State statutes that burden “core political speech,” as this 
statute does, are presumptively invalid and subject to a strict 
scrutiny test.  Under that test a statute will be deemed 
constitutional only if it is narrowly drawn to further a 
compelling state interest.  Id. at 347.  In applying this test, 
we must also consider that state statutes are presumed 
constitutional, City Council v. Newsome, 226 Va. 518, 523, 311 
S.E.2d 761, 764 (1984), and any reasonable doubt regarding 
constitutionality must be resolved in favor of validity.  In re 
Phillips, 265 Va. 81, 85-86, 574 S.E.2d 270, 272 (2003).  
There is no dispute that Code § 18.2-152.3:1 was enacted to 
control the transmission of unsolicited commercial bulk e-mail, 
generally referred to as SPAM.  In enacting the federal CAN-SPAM 
Act, Congress stated that commercial bulk e-mail threatened the 
efficiency and convenience of e-mail.  15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(2).  
Many other states have regulated unsolicited bulk e-mail but, 
unlike Virginia, have restricted such regulation to commercial 
e-mails.  See e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1372.01; Ark. Code 
Ann. § 4-88-603; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17538.45; Fla. Stat. 
§ 668.603; Idaho Code § 48-603E; Ill. Comp. Stat., tit. 815 
§ 511/10; Ind. Code § 24-5-22-7; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-6, Md. 
Code Ann., Commercial Law § 14-3002.  There is nothing in the 
record or arguments of the parties, however, suggesting that 
unsolicited non-commercial bulk e-mails were the target of this 
23 
legislation, caused increased costs to the Internet service 
providers, or were otherwise a focus of the problem sought to be 
addressed by the General Assembly through its enactment of Code 
§ 18.2-152.3:1. 
Jaynes does not contest the Commonwealth’s interest in 
controlling unsolicited commercial bulk e-mail as well as 
fraudulent or otherwise illegal e-mail.  Nevertheless, Code 
§ 18.2-152.3:1 is not limited to instances of commercial or 
fraudulent transmission of e-mail, nor is it restricted to 
transmission of illegal or otherwise unprotected speech such as 
pornography or defamation speech.  Therefore, viewed under the 
strict scrutiny standard, Code § 18.2-152.3:1 is not narrowly 
tailored to protect the compelling interests advanced by the 
Commonwealth. 
4. SUBSTANTIAL OVERBREADTH 
The Commonwealth argues that we should not preclude 
enforcement of Code § 18.2-152.3:1 because, even if 
unconstitutionally overbroad, that remedy is limited to those 
statutes that are substantially overbroad.  The concept of 
substantial overbreadth is not a test of the constitutionality 
of a statute, but a policy related to the remedy flowing from a 
successful facial challenge.  A successful facial overbreadth 
challenge precludes the application of the affected statute in 
all circumstances.  Recognizing the sweep of this remedy, the 
24 
United States Supreme Court has stated that it will not impose 
such an expansive result where the chilling effect of an 
overbroad statute on constitutionally protected rights cannot 
justify prohibiting all enforcement of the law.  “For there are 
substantial social costs created by the overbreadth doctrine 
when it blocks application of a law to constitutionally 
unprotected speech. . . .”  Hicks II, 539 U.S. at 119.  Thus a 
statute should be declared facially overbroad and 
unconstitutional only if the statute “punishes a ‘substantial’ 
amount of protected free speech, ‘judged in relation to the 
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ”  Id. at 118-19 (citing 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)). 
The Commonwealth argues that Code § 18.2-152.3:1 is not 
substantially overbroad because it does not impose any 
restrictions on the content of the e-mail and “most” 
applications of its provisions would be constitutional, citing 
its application to unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail, 
unsolicited bulk e-mail that proposes a criminal transaction, 
and unsolicited bulk e-mail that is defamatory or contains 
obscene images.  According to the Commonwealth an “imagine[d] 
hypothetical situation where the Act might be unconstitutional 
as applied does not render the Act substantially overbroad.” 
25 
 
The United States Supreme Court recently reviewed the First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine in United States v. Williams, 553 
U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1830 (2008).  The Court noted  
[i]n order to maintain an appropriate balance, we have 
vigorously enforced the requirement that a statute’s 
overbreadth be substantial, not only in an absolute 
sense, but also relative to the statute’s plainly 
legitimate sweep. 
. . . [I]t is impossible to determine whether a 
statute reaches too far without first knowing what the 
statute covers. 
553 U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1838.  Applying that inquiry under 
Williams in this case is relatively straightforward as Code 
§ 18.2-152.3:1 would prohibit all bulk e-mail containing 
anonymous political, religious, or other expressive speech.  For 
example, were the Federalist Papers just being published today 
via e-mail, that transmission by Publius would violate the 
statute.  Such an expansive scope of unconstitutional coverage 
is not what the Court in Williams referenced “as the tendency of 
our overbreadth doctrine to summon forth an endless stream of 
fanciful hypotheticals.”  553 U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1843.  
We thus reject the Commonwealth’s argument that Jaynes’ facial 
challenge to Code § 18.2-152.3:1 must fail because the statute 
is not “substantially overbroad.” 
5. NARROWING CONSTRUCTION 
 
Lastly, the Commonwealth asserts that we need not declare 
Code § 18.2-152.3:1 unconstitutional because a limiting 
26 
construction can be adopted by this Court that would prevent 
invalidating the statute.  Such a construction according to the 
Commonwealth would be a declaration that the statute does not 
apply to “unsolicited bulk non-commercial e-mail that does not 
involve criminal activity, defamation or obscene materials.”  
Alternatively the Commonwealth suggests that we hold the statute 
applies only in instances where the receiving Internet service 
provider “actually objects to the bulk e-mail.” 
Our jurisprudence requires us to interpret a statute to 
avoid a constitutional infirmity.  Burns v. Warden, 268 Va. 1, 
2, 597 S.E.2d 195, 196 (2004).  Nevertheless, construing 
statutes to cure constitutional deficiencies is allowed only 
when such construction is reasonable.  Virginia Soc’y for Human 
Life v. Caldwell, 256 Va. 151, 157, 500 S.E.2d 814, 816-17 
(1998).  A statute cannot be rewritten to bring it within 
constitutional requirements.  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884-85 
& nn.49-50 (1997); Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n, 484 
U.S. 383, 397 (1988).  The construction urged by the 
Commonwealth is not a reasonable construction of the statute.  
Nothing in the statute suggests the limited applications 
advanced by the Commonwealth.  If we adopted the Commonwealth’s 
suggested construction we would be rewriting Code § 18.2-152.3:1 
in a material and substantive way.  Such a task lies within the 
province of the General Assembly, not the courts.  Jackson v. 
27 
28 
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 269 Va. 303, 313, 608 S.E.2d 901, 906 
(2005) (“Where the General Assembly has expressed its intent in 
clear and unequivocal terms, it is not the province of the 
judiciary to add words to the statute or alter its plain 
meaning.”). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit court 
properly had jurisdiction over Jaynes.  We also hold that Jaynes 
has standing to raise a First Amendment overbreadth claim as to 
Code § 18.2-152.3:1.  That statute is unconstitutionally 
overbroad on its face because it prohibits the anonymous 
transmission of all unsolicited bulk e-mails including those 
containing political, religious or other speech protected by the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Accordingly, 
we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacate 
Jaynes’ convictions of violations of Code § 18.2-152.3:1. 13 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
                     
13 In light of this holding, we do not address Jaynes’ other 
assignments of error.