Title: Stone v. N.C. Dept. of Labor
Citation: 347 N.C. 473
Docket Number: 81PA97
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: February 6, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 81PA97
FILED: 6 FEBRUARY 1998
JANET B. STONE; ANNIE B. LOCKLEAR; MARY BARBARA WASHINGTON;
CARRIE M. GALLOPS and WILLIAM E. PEELE, JR., Co-Administrators of
the Estate of ROSE GIBSON PEELE; JIMMIE BROADY, Administrator of
the Estate of MINNIE THOMPSON; LILLIE B. DAVIS; JOHNNY DAWKINS;
SHARON E. TOWNSEND; GEORGIA ANN QUICK; RONALD WAYNE POOL;
ALFORENCE ANDERSON, Administrator of the Estate of PEGGY JEAN
ANDERSON; DAVID MACK ALBRIGHT, Administrator of the Estate of
DAVID MICHAEL ALBRIGHT; FRED ERNEST BARRINGTON, SR. and NELSON
BARRINGTON; Co-Administrators of the Estate of JOSEPHINE
BARRINGTON, PEARLIE GAGNON, Administratrix of the Estate of
JOHN R. GAGNON; MATTIE FAIRLEY; MARTHA WATERS; EVELYN WALL;
KENNETH WHITE; CONESTER WILLIAMS; JOHN SANDERS; LARRY BELLAMY,
Administrator of the Estate of ELIZABETH ANN BELLAMY; SARAH
WILLIAMS; NELSON BARRINGTON and LINDA OWENS, Co-Administrators of
the Estate of FRED BARRINGTON, JR.; ADA BLANCHARD; AUDREY SUE
SCOTT; LETHA TERRY; ELAINE GRIFFIN; KIM MANGUS; SYLVIA MARTIN;
GLORIA MALACHI; ALBERTA MCRAE; SANDRA MCPHAUL; EVANDER LYNCH,
Administrator of the Estate of JANICE LYNCH; BERNETTA ODOM;
THOMAS OATES, III; KATIE NICHOLSON; PAMELA MOORE; PRISCILLA
MURPHY; SALLY MURPHY; NORA BUSH; THOMAS COBLE; BRENDA CHAMBERS,
Administratrix of the Estate of ROSIE ANN CHAMBERS; BERNARD
CAMPBELL; ROSE CHAPPELL; MARTHA NELSON, Administratrix of the
Estate of MARTHA RATLIFF; DEBORAH PITTMAN; ANNETTE PIERCE; ZELDA
ROBERTS; RICHARD ROBERTS; CLEO REDDICK; DELORES PAUNCY; BOBBY
QUICK; DELORES QUICK; LULA SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of
CYNTHIA RATLIFF; WILLIE QUICK; MARY BRYANT; DONNA BRANCH DAVIS;
DORIS BOSTIC; RACHEL INGRAM; RICHARD M. LIPFORD; ALICE S. WEBB,
Administratrix of the Estate of JEFFREY A. WEBB; BARBARA SHAW;
FLORA C. BANKS, Administratrix of the Estate of MARGARET TERESA
BANKS; JAMES THOMAS BANKS; LINDA CAROL ELLISON; PAUL SAUNDERS,
Administrator of the Estate of MARY LILLIAN WALL; JOANNE PAGE,
Administratrix of the Estate of GAIL VIVIAN CAMPBELL; VELMA
BUTLER; ROY FUNDERBURK; MARY SUE RICH, Administratrix of the
Estate of DONALD BRUCE RICH; PEGGY BROWN, Administratrix of the
Estate of MARY ALICE QUICK; CAROLYN M. RAINWATER; MARGIE
MORRISON, Administratrix of the Estate of MICHAEL A. MORRISON;
SHERMAN MCDONALD; WILLIAM G. HAMILTON and MARIE A. HAMILTON;
BRENDA F. BAILEY; ELTON RAY CAFFERATA; PAMELA S. COOPER; WILLIAM
KELLY, JR., Administrator of the Estate of BRENDA GAIL KELLY;
CATHERINE DAWKINS, Administratrix of the Estate of PHILIP R.
DAWKINS; JEANETTE L. SMITH; RUBY BULLARD SELLERS; REGGIE SMITH;
CYNTHIA FAYE GRAHAM; WILLIAM WINSTON SMITH, SR.; WILLIAM NOCONDA
SMITH, JR.; BETTY EUBANKS, Administratrix of the Estate of
CYNTHIA S. WALL; BETTY B. WHITE; DARRELL LEONARD WILKINS,
Administrator of the Estate of ROSE LYNETTE JACOBS WILKINS;
ANGELA LYNN COULTER, Administratrix of the Estate of JOSIE MAE
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COULTER; FELTON ALBERT HATCHER; PATRICIA W. HATCHER; MILDRED
LASSITER MOATES; OLIN DELLANO MOATES; GLADYS FAYE NOLAN; RONNIE
CARROL NOLAN; HOMER F. JARRELL, Administrator of the Estate of
BERTHA JARRELL; LORETTA SCOTT; LORETTA GOODWIN; BENITA INGRAM;
MATTIE P. NICHOLSON; MARY ANN DAIREN; MONICA MCDOUGALD; ALLISON
GRIFFIN; BRENDA MCDOUGALD; AND ROY S. MORRISON, JR.
v.
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH DIVISION
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of
a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 125 N.C. App. 288,
480 S.E.2d 410 (1997), affirming a decision of the Industrial
Commission denying defendants' motions pursuant to N.C.G.S. §
1A-1, Rules 12(b)(1), (2), and (6), to dismiss plaintiffs'
claims.  Heard in the Supreme Court 20 November 1997.
Adams, Kleemeier, Hagan, Hannah & Fouts, P.L.L.C., by
J. Alexander S. Barrett; Kitchin, Neal, Webb & Futrell,
by Henry L. Kitchin; Fuller, Becton, Slifkin & Bell, by
Charles L. Becton; Edward L. Bleynat, Jr., and Woodrow
W. Gunter, II, for plaintiff-appellees.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by David Roy
Blackwell, Elisha H. Bunting, Jr., and Ralf F. Haskell,
Special Deputy Attorneys General, for defendant-
appellants.
WHICHARD, Justice.
Plaintiffs commenced this negligence action against
defendants, the North Carolina Department of Labor and its
Occupational Safety and Health Division, pursuant to the Tort
Claims Act, N.C.G.S. §§ 143-291 to -300.1 (1996).  Plaintiffs
sought damages for injuries or deaths resulting from a fire at
the Imperial Foods Products plant in Hamlet, North Carolina. 
Defendants moved, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rules 12(b)(1),
-3-
(2), and (6), to dismiss plaintiffs' claims.  Deputy Commissioner
D. Bernard Alston denied the motions.  The full Commission
affirmed and adopted his decision.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed.  It held that N.C.G.S. §
95-4, which describes the authority, power, and duties of the
Commissioner of Labor, imposed a duty upon defendants to inspect
the workplaces of North Carolina and that the breach of this duty
gave rise to plaintiffs' action for negligence.  Stone v. N.C.
Dep't of Labor, 125 N.C. App. 288, 291-92, 480 S.E.2d 410, 413
(1997).  It further held that the public duty doctrine did not
apply to actions brought against the State under the Tort Claims
Act.  Id. at 291, 480 S.E.2d at 412.  On 5 June 1997 this Court
granted defendants' petition for discretionary review.
Because these claims arise upon defendants' motions to
dismiss, we treat plaintiffs' factual allegations, which follow,
as true.  See Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hospitality Ventures of
Asheville, 332 N.C. 645, 646, 423 S.E.2d 72, 72 (1992).  On 3
September 1991 a fire started in a hydraulic line near a deep fat
fryer in the Imperial Foods Products chicken plant (the plant) in
Hamlet, North Carolina.  The fire grew in intensity and spread
rapidly through the interior of the plant.  Plaintiffs are either
former employees of Imperial Foods who suffered injury in the
fire or personal representatives of the estates of employees who
died in the fire.  They or their decedents (plaintiffs) were
lawfully inside the plant at the time of the fire.  Plaintiffs
could not easily escape the plant or the fire because the exits
in the plant were unmarked, blocked, and inaccessible.  After the
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fire the North Carolina Department of Labor and its Occupational
Safety and Health Division (defendants) conducted their first and
only inspection in the plant's eleven-year history of operation. 
As a result of this inspection, defendants discovered numerous
violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of North
Carolina (OSHANC), including the plant's inadequate and blocked
exits and inadequate fire suppression system.  Defendants issued
eighty-three citations against Imperial Foods Products for
violations of OSHANC standards.  Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia,
that defendants had a duty under OSHANC to inspect the plant,
defendants breached that duty by failing to inspect until after
the fire, defendants' breach caused plaintiffs' injuries or
deaths, and plaintiffs' injuries or deaths entitle them to
damages in tort.
Plaintiffs have asserted a common law negligence action
against the State under the Tort Claims Act.  To recover damages 
under the common law of negligence, private parties "must
establish (1) a legal duty, (2) a breach thereof, and (3) injury
proximately caused by such breach."  Kientz v. Carlton, 245 N.C.
236, 240, 96 S.E.2d 14, 17 (1957).
Defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted because defendants did not
owe a duty to the individual plaintiffs due to the public duty
doctrine.  This doctrine, articulated in Braswell v. Braswell,
330 N.C. 363, 370-71, 410 S.E.2d 897, 901-02 (1991), provides
that governmental entities and their agents owe duties only to
the general public, not to individuals, absent a "special
-5-
relationship" or "special duty" between the entity and the
injured party.  Defendants also contend that because plaintiffs
have not stated a claim, the Industrial Commission lacks personal
and subject matter jurisdiction over defendants.
The issue, whether the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the Industrial Commission's denial of defendants'
motions to dismiss, requires resolution of three sub-issues. 
First, does the public duty doctrine apply to claims brought
under the Tort Claims Act?  Second, if it does, does it apply to
state agencies like defendants?  Finally, if the doctrine
applies, does an exception to it apply as well?
The Tort Claims Act provides that the State is liable
"under circumstances where [it], if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the laws of North
Carolina."  N.C.G.S. § 143-291.  Defendants recognize that the
State, like a private person, may be subject to liability for
negligence under the terms of this legislation.  They contend,
however, that they are not liable to plaintiffs because under the
public duty doctrine, they owe no legal duty to the individual
plaintiffs.  Defendants assert that their obligation under
N.C.G.S. § 95-4 to inspect workplaces in North Carolina serves
the public at large, not individual employees.  See Braswell, 330
N.C. at 370-71, 410 S.E.2d at 901.  Plaintiffs assert, and the
Court of Appeals held, that the public duty doctrine does not
apply to bar plaintiffs' claims because it does not apply to the
liability of a private person, and under the Tort Claims Act, the
-6-
State is liable if a private person would be.  We disagree, and
we reverse the Court of Appeals.
In construing the Tort Claims Act to determine whether
it incorporates the common law public duty doctrine, "our primary
task is to ensure that the purpose of the legislature, the
legislative intent, is accomplished."  Electric Supply Co. of
Durham v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294
(1991).  "Legislative purpose is first ascertained from the plain
words of the statute."  Id.  Under the Act the State is liable
only under circumstances in which a private person would be. 
N.C.G.S. § 143-291.
Private persons do not possess public duties.  Only
governmental entities possess authority to enact and enforce laws
for the protection of the public.  See Grogan v. Commonwealth,
577 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Ky.) (recognizing that if the State were held
liable for a failure to enforce laws and regulations establishing
safety standards for construction and use of buildings, the
State's status as a governmental entity "would be the only basis
for holding a city or state liable, because only a governmental
entity possesses the authority to enact and enforce laws for the
protection of the public"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 835, 62 L. Ed.
2d 46 (1979).  If the State were held liable for performing or
failing to perform an obligation to the public at large, the
State would have liability when a private person could not.  The
public duty doctrine, by barring negligence actions against a
governmental entity absent a "special relationship" or a "special
duty" to a particular individual, serves the legislature's
-7-
express intention to permit liability against the State only when
a private person could be liable.  See Braswell, 330 N.C. at
370-71, 410 S.E.2d at 901-02.  Thus, the plain words of the
statute indicate an intent that the doctrine apply to claims
brought under the Tort Claims Act.
Our determination of legislative intent is also "guided
by . . . certain canons of statutory construction."  Swain Elec.
Co., 328 N.C. at 656, 403 S.E.2d at 294.  Acts, such as the Tort
Claims Act, that permit suit in derogation of sovereign immunity
should be strictly construed.  Floyd v. N.C. State Highway & Pub.
Works Comm'n, 241 N.C. 461, 464, 85 S.E.2d 703, 705 (1955),
overruled in part on other grounds by Barney v. N.C. State
Highway Comm'n, 282 N.C. 278, 284-85, 192 S.E.2d 273, 277 (1972). 
Statutes in derogation of the common law likewise should be
strictly construed.  McKinney v. Deneen, 231 N.C. 540, 542, 58
S.E.2d 107, 109 (1950).
In passing the Tort Claims Act, the legislature
incorporated the common law of negligence.  MacFarlane v. N.C.
Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 244 N.C. 385, 387, 93 S.E.2d 557,
559-60 (1956), overruled in part on other grounds by Barney, 282
N.C. at 284-85, 192 S.E.2d at 277.  The public duty doctrine
forms an integral part of that common law.  Braswell, 330 N.C. at
370, 410 S.E.2d at 901.  Plaintiffs ask us to construe the Tort
Claims Act broadly so as to erase a fundamental common law
doctrine.  We decline to do so.  Until the legislature clearly
expresses that immunity is to be waived even in situations in
which the common law public duty doctrine would otherwise apply
-8-
    Plaintiffs also argue that Jordan v. Jones, 314 N.C. 106,
1
331 S.E.2d 662 (1985) (permitting plaintiff to bring a tort
action against the Department of Transportation), supports their
position that the public duty doctrine does not bar their claim
and that they may recover from the State for its negligent
failure to take action that could have protected its citizens. 
Jordan was decided before this Court recognized the public duty
doctrine in Braswell, 330 N.C. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 902.  The
Court in Jordan did not consider whether plaintiff's claims were
barred by the public duty doctrine.  Thus, Jordan is inapplicable
to the question of whether the public duty doctrine applies to
claims against the State.  Plaintiffs make no argument that the
holding and reasoning of Jordan fall within one of the exceptions
to the public duty doctrine.
to bar a negligence claim, we construe the Tort Claims Act as
incorporating the existing common law rules of negligence,
including that doctrine.  See Floyd, 241 N.C. at 464, 85 S.E.2d
at 705; McKinney, 231 N.C. at 542, 58 S.E.2d at 109.  Any change
in the State's sovereign immunity to permit the State to be
liable in a situation in which a private person could not should
be made by the legislature, not by this Court under the guise of
construction.
Plaintiffs argue that even if the public duty doctrine
applies to claims brought under the Tort Claims Act, it does not
apply in this case.  They contend that it applies only to claims
against local governments for failure to prevent crimes.1
When this Court first recognized the public duty
doctrine, it discussed the doctrine in terms of the facts before
it.  See Braswell, 330 N.C. at 370, 410 S.E.2d at 901 (addressing
the public duty doctrine as it applied to a plaintiff's claims
against the Sheriff of Pitt County for failure to provide her
with protection).  In the context of a claim against a sheriff,
we explained that, under the doctrine, "a municipality and its
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agents act for the benefit of the public, and therefore, there is
no liability for the failure to furnish police protection to
specific individuals."  Id. (emphasis added).
Once this Court recognized the doctrine, however, our
Court of Appeals applied it to a variety of local governmental
operations.  See, e.g., Simmons v. City of Hickory, ___ N.C. App.
___, ___, 487 S.E.2d 583, 585 (1997) (holding that the public
duty doctrine applied to bar claim against city for negligently
inspecting homes and issuing building permits and stating that
"[t]he public duty doctrine has been applied to a variety of
statutory governmental duties"); Sinning v. Clark, 119 N.C. App.
515, 518, 459 S.E.2d 71, 73 (holding that the public duty
doctrine applied to bar a claim against a municipality, the city
building inspector, and the city code administrator for gross
negligence in an inspection of a home and stating that this
doctrine "has been applied by our [c]ourts to various statutory
governmental duties"), disc. rev. denied, 342 N.C. 194, 463
S.E.2d 242 (1995); Davis v. Messer, 119 N.C. App. 44, 55-56, 457
S.E.2d 902, 909 (holding that the public duty doctrine applied to
a claim against a fire chief, a fire department, a town, and a
county for negligence in their failure to complete their effort
to extinguish a fire in plaintiff's home), disc. rev. denied, 341
N.C. 647, 462 S.E.2d 508 (1995); Prevette v. Forsyth County, 110
N.C. App. 754, 758, 431 S.E.2d 216, 218 (holding that the public
duty doctrine applied to bar wrongful death claim against county
and against director and employee of the county animal control
shelter for failing to protect plaintiff from dogs which
-10-
defendants knew were dangerous), disc. rev. denied, 334 N.C. 622,
435 S.E.2d 338 (1993).  The Court of Appeals has also applied the
doctrine to a state agency.  See Humphries v. N.C. Dep't of
Correction, 124 N.C. App. 545, 547, 479 S.E.2d 27, 28 (1996)
(holding that the doctrine barred claim against Department of
Correction for alleged negligence in the supervision of a
probationer), disc. rev. improvidently allowed, 346 N.C. 269, 485
S.E.2d 293 (1997).  While this Court has not heretofore applied
the doctrine to a state agency or to a governmental function
other than law enforcement, we do so now.
The policies underlying recognition of the public duty
doctrine in Braswell support its application here.  In Braswell 
we explained that the doctrine was necessary to prevent "an
overwhelming burden of liability" on governmental agencies with
"limited resources."  Braswell, 330 N.C. at 370-71, 410 S.E.2d at
901.  We stated:
"The amount of protection that may be
provided is limited by the resources of the
community and by a considered legislative-
executive decision as to how those resources
may be deployed.  For the courts to proclaim
a new and general duty of protection in the
law of tort . . . would inevitably determine
how the limited police resources . . . should
be allocated and without predictable limits."
Id. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 901 (quoting Riss v. City of New York,
22 N.Y.2d 579, 581-82, 240 N.E.2d 860, 860-61, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897,
898 (1968)).  Just as we recognized the limited resources of law
enforcement in Braswell, we recognize the limited resources of
defendants here.  Just as we there "refuse[d] to judicially
impose an overwhelming burden of liability [on law enforcement]
-11-
for failure to prevent every criminal act," id. at 370-71, 410
S.E.2d at 901, we now refuse to judicially impose an overwhelming
burden of liability on defendants for failure to prevent every
employer's negligence that results in injuries or deaths to
employees.  "[A] government ought to be free to enact laws for
the public protection without thereby exposing its supporting
taxpayers . . . to liability for failures of omission in its
attempt to enforce them.  It is better to have such laws, even
haphazardly enforced, than not to have them at all."  Grogan, 577
S.W.2d at 6 (emphasis added).
Further, we do not believe the legislature, in
establishing the Occupational Safety and Health Division of the
Department of Labor in 1973, intended to impose a duty upon this
agency to each individual worker in North Carolina.  Nowhere in
chapter 95 of our General Statutes does the legislature authorize
a private, individual right of action against the State to assure
compliance with OSHANC standards.  Rather, the most the
legislature intended was that the Division prescribe safety
standards and secure some reasonable compliance through spot-
check inspections made "as often as practicable."  N.C.G.S. §
95-4(5) (1996).  "In this way the safety conditions for work[ers]
in general would be improved."  Nerbun v. State, 8 Wash. App.
370, 376, 506 P.2d 873, 877 (holding that Washington Department
of Labor did not owe an absolute duty to individual workers and
concluding that the Washington legislature intended only that the
Department act on behalf of workers in general), disc. rev.
denied, 82 Wash. 2d 1005 (1973).
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Because we hold that the legislature intended the
public duty doctrine to apply to claims against the State under
the Tort Claims Act, we now apply the doctrine to the facts of
this case.  The general common law rule provides that
governmental entities, when exercising their statutory powers,
act for the benefit of the general public and therefore have no
duty to protect specific individuals.  See Braswell, 330 N.C. at
370, 410 S.E.2d at 901; see also DeFusco v. Todesca Forte, Inc.,
683 A.2d 363, 365 (R.I. 1996) (recognizing that with certain
exceptions, "[t]he public duty doctrine shields the state and its
political subdivisions from tort liability arising out of
discretionary governmental actions that by their nature are not
ordinarily performed by private persons").  Because the
governmental entity owes no particular duty to any individual
claimant, it cannot be held liable for negligence for a failure
to carry out its statutory duties.  Braswell, 330 N.C. at 370,
410 S.E.2d at 901.  Absent a duty, there can be no liability. 
Kientz, 245 N.C. at 240, 96 S.E.2d at 17.
In Braswell this Court recognized two exceptions to the
public duty doctrine "to prevent inevitable inequities to certain
individuals."  Braswell, 330 N.C. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 902.  It
explained that exceptions to the doctrine exist:  (1) where there
is a special relationship between the injured party and the
governmental entity; and (2) when the governmental entity creates
a special duty by promising protection to an individual, the
protection is not forthcoming, and the individual's reliance on
the promise of protection is causally related to the injury
-13-
suffered.  Id.  These exceptions are narrowly construed and
applied.  Id. at 372, 410 S.E.2d at 902; see also Sinning, 119
N.C. App. at 519, 459 S.E.2d at 74.
Plaintiffs assert that defendants owed each claimant a
duty under N.C.G.S. § 95-4 to inspect the Imperial Foods Products
plant.  This statute provides that the Commissioner of Labor is
"charged with the duty" to visit and inspect "at reasonable
hours, as often as practicable," all of the "factories,
mercantile establishments, mills, workshops, public eating
places, and commercial institutions in the State."  N.C.G.S. §
95-4(5).  It also imposes on the Commissioner a duty to enforce
these inspection laws and request prosecution of any violations
found.  N.C.G.S. § 95-4(6).  It creates no private cause of
action for individual claimants for violations of OSHANC.
Although N.C.G.S. § 95-4 imposes a duty upon
defendants, that duty is for the benefit of the public, not
individual claimants as here.  Braswell, 330 N.C. at 370, 410
S.E.2d at 901.  Plaintiffs' claims thus fall within the public
duty doctrine, and to state claims for actionable negligence,
plaintiffs must allege facts placing the claims within one of the
exceptions to the doctrine.  They make no such "special
relationship" or "special duty" allegations.  The claims
therefore must fail.  See id. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 902.
The dissent asserts that we have eviscerated the Tort
Claims Act, nullified it, rendered it obsolete, left it
purposeless, absolved the State of all liability, and barred all
negligence claims against the State.  These assertions are
-14-
hyperbolic and overwrought.  A myriad of reported and unreported
cases, covering a great variety of fact situations, have allowed
recovery against the State under the Tort Claims Act.  Nothing in
this opinion even hints at the overruling of those cases.  Absent
legislative change, the Act functions and will continue to
function as it has for almost half a century.  We simply hold,
with sound reason and substantial grounding in the law of both
this and other jurisdictions, that in this limited new context,
not heretofore confronted by this Court, the Act was not intended
to and does not apply absent a special relationship or special
duty.
For the reasons stated, the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the Industrial Commission's denial of defendant's
motions to dismiss.  The decision of the Court of Appeals is
therefore reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of
Appeals for further remand to the Industrial Commission for entry
of an order of dismissal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
=================================
Justice ORR dissenting.
The majority opinion erroneously takes a limited and
obscure common law concept, the public duty doctrine, which has
traditionally applied only to municipalities and their law
enforcement responsibilities, and expands the doctrine’s
application to effectively eviscerate the Tort Claims Act.  As a
result, the right of individuals to sue the State for negligent
acts committed by the State, a right expressly conveyed by the
-15-
General Assembly, is nullified without the support of any
precedential authority permitting such an indulgence.  Therefore,
I dissent for the reasons which follow.
The recognition of the public duty doctrine in this
country is traced to an 1855 decision of the United States
Supreme Court.  South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 396, 15 L. Ed. 433
(1855).  The case involved a negligence suit brought by
plaintiffs to recover against a sheriff and his sureties on an
official bond for failure to keep the peace and protect the
plaintiffs.  The Court stated:
Actions against the sheriff for a breach of
his ministerial duties in the execution of
process are to be found in almost every book
of reports.  But no instance can be found
where a civil action has been sustained
against him for his default or misbehavior as
conservator of the peace, by those who have
suffered injury to their property or persons
through the violence of mobs, riots, or
insurrections.
Id. at 403, 15 L. Ed. at 435.  The Court went on to examine
several earlier British decisions and concluded that because no
special right was alleged, the cause of action failed.
In reviewing this seminal decision and other
authorities, I can find no common law basis for the majority
taking the public duty doctrine beyond the original bounds of 
local law enforcement.  In South, where the doctrine first
originated, the public duty doctrine was applied to address only
municipalities and law enforcement.  This was also the case in
Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 410 S.E.2d 897 (1991), where
this Court first adopted the public duty doctrine.  In Braswell,
-16-
the doctrine was again only applied to factors involving a
municipality and law enforcement.  There, Justice Meyer, writing
for a unanimous Court, explained:
The general common law rule, known as
the public duty doctrine, is that a
municipality and its agents act for the
benefit of the public, and therefore, there
is no liability for the failure to furnish
police protection to specific individuals.
Id. at 370, 410 S.E.2d at 901.  Neither South nor Braswell
justify the majority’s sudden expansion or enlargement of the
doctrine to situations beyond local law enforcement.  No mention
is made or reference cited by the majority which authorizes this
extension, and no common law authority is offered.  This judicial
amplification, therefore, is not justified, and to the extent
that other state jurisdictions have bent and skewed the common
law to expand the doctrine, we cannot, and should not, follow
such an ill-advised course.
Prior to the Tort Claims Act, the State and its
agencies were immune from tort liability under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.  Gammons v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Resources,
344 N.C. 51, 54, 472 S.E.2d 722, 723-24 (1996).  This common law
doctrine of immunity extended protection to government entities
for liability for injuries caused by government acts no matter
how wanton or reckless the government’s conduct.  Davis v.
Messer, 119 N.C. App. 44, 52, 457 S.E.2d 902, 907, disc. rev.
denied, 341 N.C. 647, 462 S.E.2d 508 (1995);  Wiggins v. City of
Monroe, 73 N.C. App. 44, 49, 326 S.E.2d 39, 43 (1985).  When the
General Assembly enacted the Tort Claims Act in 1951, it
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partially waived or eliminated the State’s sovereign immunity by
allowing actions to be brought against the State in cases where
negligence was committed by its employees in the course of their
employment.  Gammons, 344 N.C. at 54, 472 S.E.2d at 723-24.  The
purpose and effect of the Act was to remove the blanket immunity
traditionally enjoyed by the State under the English common law
and permit injured persons to recover against the State for
negligent acts, Lyon & Sons, Inc. v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., 238
N.C. 24, 27, 76 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1953), or omissions, Phillips v.
N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 80 N.C. App. 135, 341 S.E.2d 339 (1986) 
(1977 amendment to the Act extended State’s liability to include
negligent omisisons).  To ensure this, the legislature made the
Act expressly provide that the State is liable “under
circumstances where [it], if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the laws of North Carolina.” 
N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a) (1996).
In the case sub judice, plaintiffs assert negligence
claims against the State for its alleged failure to inspect the
Imperial Foods Products plant.  The public duty doctrine, as
enunciated in Braswell, does not apply in this case because here: 
(1) the suit is against the State, not a municipality as in
Braswell; and (2) the suit involves failure to inspect, not
failure to provide police protection as in Braswell.  Enlarging
the doctrine as the majority does in this case means that it will
be extended beyond its traditional realm of protecting local law
enforcement and will apply to circumstances outside those
identified in Braswell.  The public duty doctrine, moreover,
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should not be applied here because, unlike in Braswell, this suit
was brought under the Tort Claims Act.  The public duty doctrine
should not be used to grant the State immunity when the express
intent of the Tort Claims Act was to remove immunity and make the
State liable for its wrongs.  Granting immunity to the State
under the public duty doctrine makes the Tort Claims Act
virtually obsolete.  Thus, not only does Braswell not justify
extending immunity, but the specific language and underlying
policy of the Tort Claims Act precludes such an expansion.
The majority, however, attempts to justify its decision
on the grounds that the public duty doctrine applies because: 
(1) The Tort Claims Act requires the State to be treated like a
private person and private persons do not have public duties;
(2) The Tort Claims Act incorporates the common law and therefore
incorporates the public duty doctrine; (3) The Braswell policies
support application of the doctrine; and (4) Under OSHANC, the
General Assembly never intended for a duty to be imposed.  All of
these arguments are untenable.
First, it is patently unreasonable to interpret the
Act’s requirement that the State be treated like a private person
as absolving the State of all liability.  The very reason for
this language is to eliminate the common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity.  The intent is to allow an individual to
assert a suit against the State, the same suit an individual
could assert against a private person or entity.  The legislative
intent of the Act was not to take this right away, especially
since there was no liability to take away when this language was
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chosen and the Act adopted.  If the language concerning treatment
like a private person had been intended to mean what the majority
says it means, i.e., that the State receives immunity, the Act
would have no purpose.  If that had been the case, the
legislature could have just left sovereign immunity in place.
In addition to clashing with the intent of the Act, the
majority’s interpretation of this language also approves an
oblique reading of the Act which necessitates a kind of acrobatic
reasoning.  The majority asserts that the legislative request to
treat the State as a private person really means that the State
has immunity.  This does not make sense.  The legislature did not
intend to be so obtuse as to ostensibly take immunity away from
the State, yet by including language requiring treatment like a
private person, grant it back that very same immunity under the
public duty doctrine.  Such reasoning would require the Court to
read between the lines and discover a whole line of reasoning in
the one sentence innocuously addressing treatment like a private
person.  If the legislature had intended to grant the State
immunity by requiring that it be treated like a private person it
could have simply said such.
The majority’s second argument, that the Act
incorporates the public duty doctrine because it incorporates the
common law, is also erroneous.  As previously noted, the public
duty doctrine originated in the United States Supreme Court case
South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 396, 15 L. Ed. 433 (1855). 
Thereafter, “the public duty doctrine was widely accepted by most
state courts.”  Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tenn.
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1995).  When most states abolished sovereign immunity by statute,
the doctrine came under attack.  Id. at 398.  Some state courts
abolished the doctrine, arguing that it was simply sovereign
immunity under another guise and to apply it was inconsistent
with statutes that eliminated immunity.  Id.  Other states, such
as Georgia, limited the application of the public duty doctrine
to apply only in situations involving police protection. 
Hamilton v. Cannon, 267 Ga. 655, 482 S.E.2d 370 (1997).
In North Carolina, the common law tradition of the
public duty doctrine was never extended by this Court beyond its
limited application to municipalities and law enforcement. 
Second, the North Carolina legislature has never adopted or
recognized the public duty doctrine.  In fact, this Court only
recognized the doctrine for the first time in 1991, and only
then, the Court recognized the defense in the most narrow of
terms.  To argue, as the majority does, that by enacting the Tort
Claims Act in 1951, the Legislature somehow incorporated the
expansive public duty doctrine enunciated by the majority is at
best, simply wrong.
In its third argument, the majority asserts that the
Braswell rationale of preventing enormous liability on agencies
with limited resources applies here as well.  This is misplaced.  
First, damages are capped under the Tort Claims Act.  The
“General Assembly amended N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a) so that damages
are capped at $150,000 for causes arising on or after 1 October
1994.”  Parham v. Iredell County Dep’t of Social Servs., ___ N.C.
App. ___, ___, 489 S.E.2d 610, 613 (1997).  Thus, the majority’s
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fear of an “overwhelming burden of liability” has already been
directly addressed by the General Assembly which has chosen, in
its legislative capacity, to limit liability as it deemed
necessary.
Also, the potential for liability and circumstances in
Braswell and in this case are very different.  In Braswell, there
was a potential for overwhelming and unlimited liability because
the plaintiff was claiming that the police failed to protect her
from an unpredictable criminal act.  If the police could be
liable for such failures, the city would endure enormous
liability for all criminal acts it allegedly failed to prevent. 
In this case, we are dealing with inspections which are required
to be carried out on a regular, predictable basis.  Here, the
duty to perform is clearly set out and can be accomplished.  It
is feasible.  Also, although there may be the inclination to
protect the State from suit, this case does not involve
determining how “limited police resources should be allocated,”
as was the issue in Braswell.  Braswell, 330 N.C. at 371, 410
S.E.2d at 901.  Instead, this case is more similar to what we
differentiated in Braswell, where we stated that dealing with
police resources was “quite different from the predictable
allocation of resources and liabilities when public hospitals,
rapid transit systems, or even highways are provided.”  Id. at
371, 410 S.E.2d at 901-02.  Thus, the policies articulated in
Braswell are also inapplicable.
The fourth and final argument offered by the majority
is that OSHANC did not impose a duty to conduct investigations. 
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This is incorrect because N.C.G.S. § 95-4 provides that the
Commissioner of Labor is “charged with the duty” to visit and
inspect the factories for violations.  It is unlikely that the
legislature intended inspections only “as often as practicable,”
as the majority asserts, when it used such express language and
included an extended list of requirements or actions that the
Commissioner was required to take in order to fulfill this
mandated duty.
It must be emphasized that the legislature, by removing
sovereign immunity, made a policy decision to allow negligence
suits against the state under circumstances and limitations
imposed by the Tort Claims Act.  Likewise, to the extent the
legislature wants to limit lawsuits in the future which are
similar to the one before us, it can certainly amend the Act --
or abolish it altogether and reimpose sovereign immunity.  It is
unnecessary and inappropriate for this Court to become the
protector of the legislative treasury by undoing what the
representatives of the public voted to accomplish.
Finally, it should be noted that other commentators
have recognized the many valid, cogent arguments which have been
made against extending the public duty doctrine to cases such as
this one.  As one author noted in his critique of the doctrine:
[f]irst, the application of the doctrine
allows governmental entities to use the
shield of sovereign immunity when the
legislature no longer mandates such immunity. 
Second, the application of the doctrine
requires that plaintiffs injured by a
negligent official suffer solely because of
the governmental status of the tortfeasor. 
Third, the application of the doctrine
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promotes incompetence by providing no
meaningful incentive for the governmental
entity to provide the services of optimal
quality.  Fourth, even with the elimination
of the doctrine, plaintiffs must still prove
breach of duty, causation, and damages; a
vigorous task just like in any other
negligence action.  Finally, the wide
availability of liability insurance allows a
governmental entity limited to pecuniary
exposure while still compensating the injured
individual.
Frank Swindell, Municipal Liability for Negligent Inspections in
Sinning v. Clark -- A “Hollow” Victory for the Public Duty
Doctrine, 18 Campbell L. Rev. 241, 250-51 (1996).  Moreover,
other writers have noted that many “jurisdictions [have]
abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity because of the
degree of injustice it caused.”  John Cameron McMillan, Jr.,
Note, Government Liability and the Public Duty Doctrine, 32 Vill.
L. Rev. 505, 529 (1987).  By resurrecting sovereign immunity in
the guise of the public duty doctrine, the majority perpetuates
this injustice and disregards the mandate of the Tort Claims Act
to protect injured citizens from government negligence.