Title: Wright v. Moore, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 392, 2006
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DEBRA WRIGHT,
 
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No. 392, 2006
Plaintiff Below,
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Appellant/Cross-
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Appellee,
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Court Below: Superior Court
v.
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of the State of Delaware,
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in and for New Castle County
MICHAEL MOORE, and SIMCO
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C.A. No. 03C-07-202 
SALES SERVICE OF 
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PENNSYLVANIA, INC., a
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Pennsylvania Corporation,
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Defendants Below, 
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Appellees/Cross-
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Appellants.
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Submitted: March 28, 2007
Decided:  July 2, 2007
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED.
Gary W. Aber, Esquire, of Aber, Goldlust, Baker & Over, Wilmington, Delaware, for
Plaintiff Below, Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
William L. Doerler, Esquire, of White and Williams LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, for
Defendants Below, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
BERGER, Justice:
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In this appeal, we again consider the admissibility of settlement evidence.
Appellant was involved in two motor vehicle accidents, a few months apart, and sued
the drivers of both vehicles in a single complaint.  One driver settled before trial.  The
trial court allowed the other driver to argue to the jury that the settlement fully
compensated  appellant for all of her injuries.   This Court has explained that, if
necessary to avoid confusion, a jury may be told that one party to a lawsuit has settled.
Here, however, there was no risk of jury confusion, and appellee used the settlement
information for an improper purpose.  Accordingly, we must reverse.
Factual and Procedural Background
In March 2002, Debra Wright collided with a car, owned by Patricia A. Green,
that was stopped in the roadway.  The day after the accident, Wright sought medical
treatment for injury to her left knee.  Thereafter, Wright’s left arm started to hurt, and
she received physical therapy for pain and stiffness in her leg, arm and neck.  Wright
was still suffering pain in September 2002, when she was involved in a second
accident.
In the September accident, Michael Moore was attempting to back his delivery
truck into a Wawa parking lot, when the truck struck the front of Wright’s car.  Moore
testified that when he arrived at the Wawa, there were two cars parked in the loading
area.  He  double-parked on the road in front of the Wawa, put on his flashing lights,
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and waited for the two cars to pull out.  After the area cleared, Moore drove up to the
entrance, swung the truck out into the road, and started backing into the parking lot.
Moore claims that he was going very slowly, checking both of the rear view mirrors.
Wright said that he was only looking in his right mirror, and that he would have seen
her car if he had looked in the left mirror.  She testified that she was stopped, waiting
to exit the parking lot, when she saw Moore’s truck backing up.  According to Wright,
there was nothing she could do to avoid the collision because there were cars waiting
behind hers.
After the collision, Wright testified that she was scared, but did not believe she
was injured.  A police officer came to investigate, and issued a citation to Moore for
inattentive driving.  Moore paid the ticket, but testified that he did so because he did
not want to spend the time necessary to contest it.  The day after the accident, Wright
went to the hospital because she “couldn’t move.”  Wright was treated conservatively,
with medication and physical therapy, for approximately one year.  In September
2003, Dr. Bikash Bose performed a cervical diskectomy and decompression as well
as an interbody fusion.  Two years later, Bose performed additional disk surgery in an
effort to relieve Wright’s severe neck and shoulder pain.  Wright incurred more than
$100,000 in medical bills.
Appellant’s Appendix, A-13-14.
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In July 2003, Wright filed suit against Green, Moore, and Moore’s employer,
Simco Sales Service of Pennsylvania, Inc.  The complaint alleged that the negligence
of Green and Moore caused Wright to “sustain severe and permanent injuries
including, but not necessarily limited to, injuries to her left upper extremity...; to her
left lower extremity...; to her neck and her back.”   It demanded judgment against the
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defendants, jointly and severally.  Interestingly, prior to trial Moore asked the court
to rule that there was no joint and several liability.  Wright argued in support of joint
and several liability, claiming that the injuries from the two accidents could not be
apportioned.  By the time of trial, however, Green had settled.  As a result, Wright
conceded that  there would be no claim of joint and several liability.
 At trial, the issue of Wright’s settlement with Green first arose during Moore’s
opening statement.  The trial court ruled, over Wright’s objection, that Moore could
discuss the fact that there was a settlement, but not the amount of the settlement.
Moore then argued to the jury that Wright had changed tactics after the settlement.
Instead of claiming that both drivers were responsible for her injuries, as she had
before, Wright’s witnesses were now saying that the second accident was the more
serious.  
Appellant’s Appendix, A-190.
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The settlement again became an issue during Wright’s cross-examination. The
trial court ruled, again over objection, that Moore could examine Wright about the
release given in connection with the settlement.  Moore reviewed with Wright both
the release and the allegations in the complaint, and Wright agreed that the complaint
alleged neck injuries from the first accident as well as the second.  In closing,  Moore
again pointed out that the complaint alleged the same injuries in the first accident as
in the second.  Then, at the end of his closing, Moore said:
And, in fact, Ms. Wright has been compensated for all
those injuries laid out in that complaint, all the exact injuries
she’s claiming against Mr. Moore.  She’s compensated for her
neck, for her back, for her knee, for her ankle, for her arm.  It’s
all in the complaint.  It’s all right there. She signed that release
one day before Dr. Bose testifies.
 
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The jury returned a defense verdict, answering “No” to the question, “Do you
find that defendant, Michael Moore , was negligent in a manner proximately causing
injuries to the plaintiff, Debra Wright?”  This appeal followed.
Discussion
Wright argues that the trial court erred by: 1) allowing Moore to ask questions
about the Green settlement and then letting him argue to the jury that the settlement
compensated Wright for both accidents; and 2) failing to instruct the jury that Moore’s
829 A.2d 117 (Del. 2003).
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violation of the motor vehicle laws constituted negligence per se.  Moore filed a cross
appeal, and argues that the trial court erred by: 1) allowing medical testimony that
lacked a proper foundation; 2) failing to instruct the jury about the legal significance
of a finding that the accident occurred in a parking lot; and 3) instructing the jury that
it could compensate Wright for emotional distress.
Rule 408 of the Delaware Rules of Evidence provides that evidence of a
settlement is inadmissible “to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount.”  In Alexander v. Cahill,  this Court addressed the limited circumstances
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under which settlements with third-party tortfeasors are admissible:
Delaware courts, as the federal courts, allow judges to
disclose the fact of settlement by third-party defendants for a
purpose other than to prove liability or invalidity of the claim or
its amount.  Specifically, we have stated,  “[I]t would not have
been improper for the trial judge to tell the jury that [one of the
defendants] was no longer part of the case and instructing them
that they need not speculate why.  The purpose of the
instruction would have been to inform the jury of the alignment
of the parties.”
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In the case at hand, ... the trial judge allowed the
following question to be asked by defendant[’s] counsel on
cross-examination of plaintiff:
Q: Mrs. Alexander, you and your husband have reached a
settlement on behalf of your son against Defendant
829 A.2d at 124-127(Emphasis added.).
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419 A.2d 927 (Del. 1980).
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Knotts and Bermudez... and have or will receive moneys
for releasing liability against them; is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
D.R.E. 408 bars this testimony because counsel asked the
question for the purpose of persuading the jury that the persons
to blame for the accident had already admitted liability, raising
the question that the plaintiff’s claim against Cahill might be
invalid or to limit a damage award by suggesting that the
Alexanders had already been guaranteed some payment toward
damages.4
Moore’s questions about Wright’s release, and the allegations in the complaint,
were more clearly designed to demonstrate that Wright had been compensated.  Then,
in his closing, Moore went even further.  He specifically told the jury that Wright had
been fully compensated through her settlement with Green.  Both the questions and
the closing comments were highly improper.  In other circumstances, we would expect
Wright to have interrupted the closing in an effort to cure Moore’s prejudicial
statements.  Here, however, Wright had objected during the opening and again when
Wright was being cross-examined.  The trial court was emphatic about its ruling.
Thus, Wright’s failure to object for a third time, during the closing, is excusable.  
Wright also argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that
Moore’s acceptance of a citation for inattentive driving constitutes negligence per se.
The trial court, relying on Joseph v. Monroe,  ruled that the inattentive driving statute
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Duphily v. Delaware Electric Cooperative, Inc., 662 A.2d 821, 828 (Del. 1995).
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does not provide a specific standard of conduct and, as a result, violation of the statute
is not negligence per se.   In Monroe, this Court held that violation of a set of
playground rules in a Teacher’s Handbook does not constitute negligence per se.
Among other reasons for its decision, the Court noted that a rule requiring the
playground area to be “pleasant and safe” did not set forth any specific duty.
The Monroe decision is inapposite.  It is settled law that violation of a statute
enacted for the safety of others constitutes negligence per se.   The motor vehicle
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statutes, without doubt, are enacted for the safety of the traveling public.  The
inattentive driving statute, 21 Del.C. § 4176(b), provides that anyone who “operates
a motor vehicle on a public highway and who fails to give full time and attention to
the operation of the motor vehicle, or... fails to maintain a proper lookout while
operating the motor vehicle, shall be guilty of inattentive driving.”  We hold that it is
sufficiently specific to support an instruction on negligence per se.  
Moore raises three arguments in his cross appeal.  First, he says that the trial
court erred in allowing Bose to provide expert testimony.  Moore argues that Bose’s
opinions lacked a proper foundation because he failed to review any medical records
for the period before the second accident.  In addition, Bose was unable to apportion
the extent of Wright’s injuries attributable to each accident. 
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 448 (Del. 1996).
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This argument lacks merit.  Bose based his initial opinion on his patient’s
description of her medical history.  Prior to his trial deposition, Bose reviewed
Wright’s medical records and reconfirmed his opinion.  Although he was unable to
reach a conclusion as to exactly how much of Wright’s injuries were caused by each
accident, there is no requirement that a medical expert be able to make that
calculation.  The trial court acted within its discretion in allowing Bose’s testimony.7
Moore next argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that,
if the accident occurred in the parking lot, and not on the road, the inattentive driving
statute would not be applicable.  This argument fails, among other reasons, because
the record evidence establishes that Moore’s truck was at least partially on the road
at the time of the collision.  
Finally, Moore complains that the trial court should not have instructed the jury
that Wright could recover for emotional distress.  He says that, because Wright was
suffering from mental and emotional problems before the accident, she was required
to present expert testimony to establish that the accident caused any mental or
emotional damages.  The trial court gave the jury a standard instruction on damages,
which included the statement that pain and suffering may include mental as well as
 
The court said, “ In evaluating pain and suffering, you may consider its mental as well as
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its physical consequences.  You may also consider such things as discomfort, anxiety, grief, or other
mental or emotional distress that may accompany any deprivation of usual pleasurable activities and
enjoyments.” Appellees’ Appendix, B-127.
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physical components.    From the record, it does not appear that Wright was seeking
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any damages specifically associated with mental or emotional harm.  She was
claiming physical injury and pain and suffering associated with the physical injury.
As a result, we find no error in the instruction, as given.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Superior Court is reversed and this
matter is remanded for a new trial.  Jurisdiction is not retained.