Title: Poindexter v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF WINSTON SALEM
Citation: 101 S.E.2d 682, 247 N.C. 606
Docket Number: 381
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: January 31, 1958

101 S.E.2d 682 (1958) 247 N.C. 606 Mrs. Mary Crews POINDEXTER and Mary Elizabeth Poindexter v. The FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF WINSTON SALEM. No. 381. Supreme Court of North Carolina. January 31, 1958. *689 Eugene H. Phillips, Winston-Salem, for plaintiffs appellees. McLennan &amp; Surratt, Ratcliff, Vaughn, Hudson, Ferrell &amp; Carter, Winston-Salem, for defendant appellant. WINBORNE, Chief Justice. The record and case on appeal here presented contains five hundred fourteen printed pages, in which there are seventy-nine assignments of error predicated upon one hundred twelve exceptions. And in brief filed in this Court defendant appellant states nine questions as involved on this appeal. However it appearing, upon consideration of the exceptions taken, assigned as error, that in the trial below there is prejudicial error for which a new trial must be granted, it is deemed expedient to advert only to some of them. I. Assignment of error No. 71, based upon exception No. 104, is well taken. It is that the court erred in its charge on the first issue to differentiate between the numerous causes of action alleged by the plaintiffs, to state clearly the causes of action and the damages flowing therefrom, and to apply the law in each case to the evidence and other contentions of the parties in relation thereto as follows: II. Defendant appellant excepts to that portion of the charge to the jury in which the court instructed "that if the jury find from the evidence the facts to be as all the evidence tends to show, that you will answer the second issue submitted to you in this case `No'." Exception No. 100, assignment of error No. 68. In the light of the amendments to answer of defendant, and evidence in relation thereto, the exception is well taken. Furthermore, defendant, in apt time, requested the court to instruct the jury on the second issue as follows: These requests were refused, and defendant excepts, exceptions numbers 73 and 75, assignments of error numbers 41 and 43. Considering the evidence in respect to the proceeding to sell land to make assets as described in defendant's plea of estoppel, the Court is of opinion and holds that defendant is entitled to the requested instruction, and the exceptions to the refusal thereof are well taken and valid. In this connection the evidence offered, as shown in the record, appears to support the statement of contention, on which the request is based. It is clear that in the verified petition to sell lands to make assets it is alleged by the petitioner as a fact that the $13,750 note is a debt of the estate of N. S. Poindexter, and the respondents, his widow and daughter, in their answer, verified by both of them, admit that the note is such a debt. Having made such solemn admission they are estopped in the present action to contend otherwise. Armfield v. Moore, 44 N.C. 157; Crawford v. Crawford, 214 N.C. 614, 200 S.E. 421; Craver v. Spaugh, 227 N.C. 129, 41 S.E.2d 82; Smith v. McDowell Furniture Co., 232 N.C. 412, 61 S.E.2d 96; Stansel v. McIntyre, 237 N.C. 148, 74 S.E.2d 345; Bowen v. Darden, 241 N.C. 11, 84 S.E.2d 289; Pemberton v. Lewis, 243 N.C. 188, 90 S.E.2d 245, and cases cited. In Armfield v. Moore, supra, Pearson, J., writing for the Court and referring to definition of estoppel, had this to say: "The meaning of which is, that when a fact has been agreed on or decided in a court of record, neither of the parties shall be allowed to call it in question, and have it tried over again at any time thereafter, so long as the judgment or decree stands unreversed * * * In other words, his mouth is shut, and he shall not say, that is not true which he had before in a solemn manner asserted to be the truth." This is cited with approval in numerous cases, some of which are cited in the Crawford case. Moreover, the essential fact to be found to enable an administrator to maintain a proceeding to sell land to make assets, G.S. § 28-81 et seq., is the insufficiency of personal property to pay the debts of the decedent. Therefore there must be definite statements in the petition as to the amount of debts outstanding against the estate, and as to the personal estate, and the application therefor, to enable the court to see that there is such insufficiency of personal property. And the respondents, heirs at law, who are required to be made parties to the proceeding, have the right to plead any defense against a debt for which sale of the lands are to be made. Smith v. Brown, 101 N.C. 347, 7 S.E.2d 890; Matthews v. Peterson, 150 N.C. 134, 63 S.E. 721; Alexander v. Galloway, 239 N.C. 554, 80 S.E.2d 369. And much more, a fortiori, if the respondents have the right to challenge the validity of such a debt, they have the right to admit the validity of it. Such admission becomes material to the proceeding. And when solemnly made in pleading it should be effective. Indeed, as stated by this Court in Craver v. Spaugh, supra, opinion by Barnhill, J., later C. J., [227 N.C. 129, 41 S.E.2d 84.] "`It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that material facts or questions which were in issue in a former action, and were there admitted or judicially determined, are conclusively settled by a judgment therein, and that such facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action *692 between the same parties * * *, regardless of the form the issue may take in the subsequent action. * * *' 30 A.J. 920." And, continuing, it is said: "This rule prevails as to matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation and necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto. If the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it shall be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties. 30 A.J. 929." The Court is not unmindful of the decisions in the cases of Latta v. Russ, 1860, 53 N.C. 111; Austin v. Austin, 1903, 132 N.C. 262, 43 S.E. 827, 95 Am.St.Rep. 637; Annotation 128 A.L.R. 472, at page 527, Atlantic Trust &amp; Banking Co. v. Stone, 1918, 176 N.C. 270, 97 S.E. 8; In re Gorham, 1919, 177 N.C. 271, 98 S.E. 717. But it is considered that they are distinguishable in factual situations from that in hand. III. The fifth question, stated by appellant as involved on this appeal, is this: "Did the court err in failing to comply with G.S. § 1-180 on the third issue relating to damages, and particularly by failing to state any measure of damages, by failing to state the evidence as to each element of damage and by failing to apply the law to the evidence?" This question is founded upon assignments of error 69, 73 and 74, which are based upon Exceptions 101, 106 and 107, respectively. A reading of the charge indicates that this challenge to its correctness is properly directed. Since there must be a new trial, it is deemed inexpedient to launch upon any extended discourse on the subject to which this question relates. And, too, matters to which other questions raised and assignments of error entered relate may not then recur. Hence the opinion will not be unduly lengthened to no useful purpose. Nevertheless, let it be noted that further rights of the parties in respect to defendant's pleas of estoppel are reserved for consideration and determination by the court in the light of evidence to be adduced upon the new trial. For errors pointed out there must be a New trial.