Title: Miller v. Lampert
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S51716
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2006

FILED:  January 12, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF 
OREGON
MICHAEL WAYNE MILLER,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
ROBERT LAMPERT,
Superintendent,
Snake River Correctional Institution,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 0007403M; CA A120055; SC S51716)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January 12, 2005.
Rankin Johnson IV, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With him on
the briefs were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director of the Office
of Public Defense Services, and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender.
Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. 
With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Thomas J. Hester and Steven T. Wax, Portland, filed the
brief for amici curiae OCDLA and Federal Defender.
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed. 
*Appeal from Malheur County Circuit Court, William L. Richardson, Judge. 194 Or App 329, 95 P3d 757 (2004).
KISTLER, J.
Petitioner raises two issues in this post-conviction
proceeding.  The first is whether Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US
466, 120 S Ct 2348, 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), applies
retroactively.  Petitioner acknowledges that this court has held
that it does not, see Page v. Palmateer, 336 Or 379, 84 P3d 133
(2004) (so holding), but he argues that later cases have
undermined Page's reasoning.  If Apprendi does not apply
retroactively, the second issue is whether petitioner's trial
counsel was constitutionally inadequate for failing to anticipate
and argue for the federal rights that Apprendi later recognized.
In January 1998, petitioner entered a high school,
grabbed a 16-year-old girl by the arm, reached up her skirt, and
touched her vagina.  The victim broke away, and petitioner again
grabbed her and reached up her skirt.  After the victim broke
away a second time, petitioner blocked the door to prevent her
from escaping.  The state charged petitioner with one count of
first-degree unlawful sexual penetration, ORS 163.411; one count
of first-degree sex abuse, ORS 163.427; two counts of first-degree burglary, ORS 164.225; and one count of attempted first-degree rape, ORS 163.375.  A jury convicted petitioner of all the
charges except first-degree unlawful sexual penetration.
The trial court held a sentencing hearing on August 12,
1998.  At that hearing, the state argued that the court should
sentence petitioner as a dangerous offender because, among other
things, he had committed a Class A felony and was suffering "from
a severe personality disorder indicating a propensity toward
crimes that seriously endanger the life or safety of another." 
See ORS 161.725(1) (stating criteria for dangerous offender
sentence). (1)  If imposed, a dangerous offender sentence would
exceed the maximum sentence that the trial court otherwise could
have imposed on petitioner.  See ORS 161.725(1) (authorizing
maximum indeterminate sentence of 30 years for dangerous
offenders); ORS 161.737(1) and (2) (authorizing maximum
determinate sentence equal to twice presumptive sentence for
dangerous offenders).  
In arguing that the court should sentence petitioner as
a dangerous offender, the state relied primarily on the
presentence investigation (PSI) report.  The PSI revealed that
petitioner had 10 prior convictions, including a robbery
conviction, four prior convictions for exposing himself to women,
and a conviction for battery in which, similarly to this case, he
had grabbed a woman while exposing himself.  The state also
relied on a psychological evaluation, which concluded that
petitioner is "a seriously character-disordered individual who is
not amendable to community-based sex offender treatment and who
poses a substantial threat to the safety and welfare of the
community relative to commission of further sex crimes."
At the sentencing hearing, petitioner did not challenge
the trial court's authority to sentence him as a dangerous
offender, he did not contest the accuracy of his criminal history
set out in the PSI, and he did not seek to cross-examine the
psychologist on whose report the state relied.  Defense counsel
explained that he had been present during the psychological
examination, that he had reviewed the psychologist's report, and
that he did not "think there's much to be gained by having him
present today."  The only evidence that defense counsel offered
at the sentencing hearing was an unsworn statement from a person
who had worked with petitioner at Good Samaritan Ministries.  She
stated that, in her opinion, "if [petitioner] were to have a
focused, intensive, concise program, he could be
rehabilitated." (2)
Defense counsel acknowledged that the trial court could
sentence petitioner as a dangerous offender but asked the court
to impose a 75-month rather than a 30-year sentence.  He told the
court:  "Clearly, based on [petitioner's] history, if you want to
apply that statute, you can do it, but I ask if you consider
doing that to use the 75 months as the base sentence."  Counsel
argued that a 75-month sentence both would give petitioner
sufficient incentive to take advantage of various programs and
also would be adequate to protect society.
Relying on the PSI and the psychological evaluation
that the state had submitted, the trial court found that
petitioner was a dangerous offender.  The court reasoned:
"[Petitioner's] situation is one where I think the
[c]ourt would be, quite frankly, really not living up
to its obligation as one of the linchpins of an ordered
society to say anything other than that he certainly
fits the criteria for dangerous offender sentencing. 
You just have to take [the psychological] reports and
evaluations and just drop them in the dust bin to say
otherwise."
Pursuant to the dangerous offender statute, the trial court
imposed, on petitioner's two burglary convictions, concurrent 96-month determinate sentences and concurrent 30-year indeterminate
sentences.  The court imposed guidelines sentences on
petitioner's other convictions and ruled that those sentences
would run concurrently with the dangerous offender sentences. 
Petitioner did not appeal from the resulting judgment.
Almost two years after petitioner's conviction became
final, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
Apprendi.  Relying on the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that, "[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 
530 US at 490.
Shortly after the Court issued its decision in
Apprendi, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. 
Relying on Apprendi, he alleged that the trial court had imposed
his sentence in violation of the Sixth Amendment and the Due
Process Clause because a jury had not found beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was a dangerous offender.  Alternatively, he
alleged that his trial counsel had been constitutionally
inadequate for failing to assert that he had a right under the
federal constitution to have a jury make the requisite factual
findings beyond a reasonable doubt.  The post-conviction court
denied both claims for relief.
Petitioner appealed, renewing the arguments that he 
had made to the post-conviction court.  While petitioner’s case
was on appeal, this court issued its decision in Page v.
Palmateer, holding that Apprendi does not apply retroactively to
judgments that became final before the decision in Apprendi
issued.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction
court's judgment from the bench, presumably relying on this
court's decision in Page and its own decision in Teague v.
Palmateer, 184 Or App 577, 591-92, 57 P3d 176 (2002), rev den,
335 Or 181 (2003), holding that trial counsel had not been
inadequate in failing to foresee Apprendi.
We allowed review primarily to consider petitioner's
argument that our decision in Page is no longer good law in light
of later developments in federal law.  In analyzing that issue,
we begin with a discussion of our decision in Page and a later
United States Supreme Court decision addressing whether Apprendi
applies retroactively.  We then turn to petitioner's arguments
and explain why they do not persuade us that we should retreat
from our holding in Page.
Procedurally, the facts in Page are identical to the
facts here.  In Page, as in this case, the trial court sentenced
the petitioner as a dangerous offender pursuant to ORS 161.725(1)
and imposed a 30-year indeterminate sentence.  336 Or at 381-82. 
The petitioner's conviction in Page became final in 1998, as did
petitioner's conviction.  Id. at 382; see Caspari v. Bohlen, 510
US 383, 390, 114 S Ct 948, 127 L Ed 2d 236 (1994) (defining when
convictions become final for purposes of retroactivity analysis). 
Approximately two years later, the Court issued its decision in
Apprendi, and the petitioner in Page filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the trial court had imposed his
sentence in violation of Apprendi.  Id.
As in this case, the petitioner in Page did not dispute
that Apprendi had announced a new rule or that his conviction
became final before the Court issued its decision in Apprendi. 
The only question before the court in Page was whether Apprendi
applied retroactively.  Page, 336 Or at 383.  On that issue, this
court explained that federal retroactivity principles govern
whether a new federal rule applies retroactively in state court. 
Id. at 385-87.
Following the principles announced in Teague v. Lane,
489 US 288, 109 S Ct 1060, 103 L Ed 2d 334 (1989) (plurality),
this court explained that, with two exceptions, a new federal
constitutional rule does not apply retroactively.  Page, 336 Or
at 388.  The petitioner in Page did not argue that the first
exception that Teague recognized -- for rules that "place[]
certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the
power of criminal law-making authority" -- applied.  See Teague,
489 US at 307 (describing first exception).  He argued, however,
that the second Teague exception -- for rules that "requir[e] the
observance of those procedures that * * * are implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" -- did apply.  See id. (describing
second exception).  It followed, he concluded, that Apprendi
applied retroactively.
This court reached a different conclusion.  It observed
that the second Teague exception applies only to "'watershed
rules'" of criminal procedure, "'without which the likelihood of
an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.'"  Page, 336 Or
at 389 (quoting Teague, 489 US at 311, 313).  The court reasoned
that the rule announced in Apprendi -- requiring any fact that
increases a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum,
other than the fact of a prior conviction, be proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt -- is not a "watershed" rule because
"[t]he rule [in Apprendi], by its terms, is not concerned with
ensuring the accuracy of a criminal defendant's conviction."  Id.
at 390 (emphasis added).  It followed, under Teague, that
Apprendi did not apply retroactively.  Id.
After this court's decision in Page, the United States
Supreme Court held in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 US 348, 124 S Ct
2519, 159 L Ed 2d 442 (2004), that the jury-right aspect of
Apprendi -- requiring that a jury find each fact increasing a
criminal defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum -- is
not a watershed rule of criminal procedure that applies
retroactively.  The Court explained that "we cannot confidently
say that judicial factfinding seriously diminishes accuracy." 
Id. at 356 (emphasis in original).  The Court was careful to
note, however, that the reasonable-doubt aspect of Apprendi --
requiring that each fact increasing a criminal defendant's
sentence beyond the statutory maximum be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt -- was not at issue in that case.  Id. at 351
n 1.
On review in this case, petitioner points out that the
reasoning in Schriro does not apply to the reasonable-doubt
aspect of Apprendi, and he argues that the cases decided since
Apprendi demonstrate that the reasoning in Page is unsound.  With
regard to Schriro, petitioner reasons that, although judicial
fact-finding may not "seriously diminish" the accuracy of a
criminal proceeding, as the Court held in Schriro, the failure to
apply a reasonable-doubt standard does.  Noting that the Court
has described the reasonable-doubt standard as "a prime
instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on
factual error," In re Winship, 397 US 358, 363, 90 S Ct 1068, 25
L Ed 2d 368 (1970), petitioner contends that this court should
recognize that the reasonable-doubt aspect of Apprendi is a
"watershed" rule of criminal procedure that applies
retroactively.
With regard to Page, petitioner argues that this
court's distinction between new rules that affect a defendant's
conviction and new rules that affect a defendant's sentence is
not good law in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 US 296, 124 S
Ct 2531, 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004).  Blakely made clear, petitioner
contends, that any fact that enhances a defendant's sentence --
whether it is a necessary prerequisite to a finding of guilt or a
sentencing factor -- is an element of the crime for the purposes
of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and the due process
right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Petitioner's argument that the reasonable-doubt aspect
of Apprendi is a watershed rule is difficult to square with the
retroactivity analysis in Teague and the Court's consistent
application of that analysis.  As noted, a plurality of the Court
reasoned in Teague that, with two narrow exceptions, new federal
constitutional rules do not apply retroactively.  489 US at 310. 
Petitioner does not rely on the first Teague exception; he bases
his argument instead on the second exception.  The plurality in
Teague explained, however, that the second exception includes
only those watershed rules of criminal procedure that "'alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements'" essential to
the fairness of a proceeding.  Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey v.
United States, 401 US 667, 693-94, 91 S Ct 1160, 28 L Ed 2d 404
(1971)) (emphasis in original).  The plurality observed that, for
a new rule of procedure to fall within this exception, it must be
a rule that is both an "absolute prerequisite to fundamental
fairness" and one "without which the likelihood of an accurate
conviction is seriously diminished."  Id. at 313-14.
The plurality envisioned that few rules would meet
those criteria, stating:
"Because we operate from the premise that such
procedures would be so central to an accurate
determination of innocence or guilt, we believe it
unlikely that many such components of basic due process
have yet to emerge."
Id. at 313.  Since Teague, the Court has not identified any new
rule that would qualify as a watershed rule under the second
exception, and it has pointed "only" to the right to counsel
recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335, 83 S Ct 792, 9 L
Ed 2d 799 (1963), as the kind of rule that would qualify.  See
Beard v. Banks, 542 US 406, 417-18, 124 S Ct 2504, 159 L Ed 2d
494 (2004) (describing second Teague exception).  The rule in
Gideon would qualify as a watershed rule, the Court explained,
because that decision "alter[ed] our understanding of the bedrock
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding." 
Id. at 418 (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted).  To date, no other rule has had "the primacy and
centrality of the rule adopted in Gideon."  Id. at 420.
Consistently with that view of the second Teague
exception, the Court has explained that the fact that a new rule
advances the "accuracy and fairness of capital sentencing
judgments" is not enough to make it a watershed rule.  Sawyer v.
Smith, 497 US 227, 242, 110 S Ct 2822, 111 L Ed 2d 193 (1990). 
"More is required.  A rule that qualifies under [the second]
exception must not only improve accuracy, but also must alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the
fairness of the proceeding."  Id. (emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted).
The Court accordingly held in Sawyer that a new
constitutional rule preventing prosecutors from diminishing a
jury's sense of responsibility for imposing the death penalty did
not apply retroactively.  The Court reasoned that a capital
defendant always could have claimed that the prosecutor's remarks
rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair.  See id. at 243-44
(citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 US 637, 94 S Ct 1868, 40 L
Ed 2d 431 (1974)).  It followed, the Court concluded, that the
new rule enhanced the fairness and accuracy of capital sentencing
only incrementally -- a change that was not sufficient to make it
a watershed rule.  Id. at 244.
Similarly, in Beard, the question was whether a new
rule that states may not require juries in death penalty cases to
find mitigating circumstances unanimously came within the second
Teague exception.  See 542 US at 408, 419-20 (stating question). 
The Court recognized that the new rule increased the likelihood
that juries would be able to consider capital defendants'
mitigating evidence fully and thus avoided situations that the
Court previously had described as the "height of arbitrariness." 
Id. at 419 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court
explained, however, that "the fact that a new rule removes some
remote possibility of arbitrary infliction of the death sentence
does not suffice to bring it within Teague's second exception." 
Id. at 419-20.
With that background in mind, we turn to the question
whether the reasonable doubt aspect of Apprendi constitutes a
watershed rule within the meaning of Teague.  We begin by
recognizing that, as petitioner argues, applying a reasonable
doubt standard to sentencing factors decreases the risk of an
erroneous enhanced sentence.  However, to qualify as a
"watershed" rule of criminal procedure under Teague, it is not
enough that the rule enhances the accuracy of a criminal
proceeding.  Sawyer, 497 US at 242.  The rule "also must alter
our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to
the fairness of the proceeding."  Id. (emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted).
We are not persuaded that Apprendi's application of the
reasonable doubt standard meets that test for two reasons. 
First, we do not believe that the rule announced in Apprendi is
an "absolute prerequisite to fundamental fairness" because the
extent to which the rule plays a role in criminal proceedings is
dependent on the sentencing scheme that the legislature devises. 
As one court has put it, the rule "floats and flows with the tide
of legislative pronouncements."  United States v. Moss, 252 F3d
993, 1000 (8th Cir 2001).  The Court's recent decision in United
States v. Booker, 543 US 220, 125 S Ct 738, 160 L Ed 2d 621
(2005), illustrates the point.   
In Booker, the Court held that the federal sentencing
guidelines were in conflict with the rule announced in Apprendi
because, if a sentencing court made certain findings, the
guidelines required the court to enhance a defendant's sentence
beyond that authorized by the jury verdict alone.  See 125 S Ct
at 748-52.  After concluding that the guidelines conflicted with
Apprendi, the Court sought "to determine what Congress would have
intended in light of the Court's constitutional holding."  Id. at
757 (internal quotations omitted).  The Court determined that it
would deviate less from Congress' intended sentencing scheme by
severing the portions of the guidelines that made them mandatory,
rendering the guidelines merely advisory.  Id. at 756-57.
The Court's chosen remedy in Booker allows federal
sentencing courts to sentence defendants anywhere between the
statutory minimum and maximum after taking the factors set out in
the guidelines into consideration.  Id.  In doing so, sentencing
courts, without running afoul of Apprendi, may make any finding
by a preponderance of the evidence that they deem appropriate in
determining the sentence.  The Court explained: 
"We have never doubted the authority of a judge to
exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within
a statutory range.  * * *  [W]hen a trial judge
exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence
within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a
jury determination of the facts that the judge deems
relevant."
Id. at 750.  
The Oregon Legislature, without running afoul of the
rule announced in Apprendi, could devise a similar system,
creating wide sentencing ranges that it deemed appropriate and
allowing sentencing courts to impose sentences within that range
after making any findings that it deemed relevant -- including
whether a defendant is a "dangerous offender."  See Apprendi, 530
US at 490 n 16 (recognizing that states could devise such a
system without running afoul of Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments). 
In our view, a rule like that in Apprendi that is so dependent on
legislative choice cannot be considered a "watershed" rule of
criminal procedure that is an "absolute prerequisite to
fundamental fairness."  See Beard, 542 US at 418-20 (recognizing
that rules that apply only incrementally or situationally do not
constitute watershed rules under the second Teague exception).
A second consideration supports our conclusion.  The
Court has held in another context that the failure to submit an
element of a criminal offense to a jury can be harmless error
because, on the facts of a particular case, the error may not
have "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of [the] judicial proceedings."  Johnson v. United
States, 520 US 461, 469-70, 117 S Ct 1544, 137 L Ed 2d 718
(1997). (3)  In reaching that conclusion, the Court rejected
the defendant's argument that the right to have a jury find each
element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt was so
fundamental to a fair trial that its omission should be
considered, like the failure to provide counsel, structural
error.  Id. at 466.  Given the Court's rejection of that
argument, we cannot say that the new rule that Apprendi announced
is, like the right to counsel, a bedrock procedural element
essential to fundamental fairness.  See Sawyer, 497 US at 244-45
(looking to Court's treatment of new rule in other contexts to
determine whether it came within second Teague exception).
Having concluded that the rule announced in Apprendi
does not apply retroactively, we turn to petitioner's alternative
claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally inadequate in
violation of Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution
and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  We
begin with Article I, section 11.  See Lichau v. Baldwin, 333 Or
350, 358-59, 39 P3d 851 (2002) (court should consider state
constitutional claims before federal constitutional claims).  In
determining whether petitioner received constitutionally
inadequate assistance of counsel under Article I, section 11, we
consider two issues:
"'First, we must determine whether petitioner
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that
[his lawyer] failed to exercise reasonable professional
skill and judgment.  Second, if we conclude that
petitioner met that burden, we further must determine
whether he proved that counsel's failure had a tendency
to affect the result of his trial.'"
Burdge v. Palmateer, 338 Or 490, 492, 112 P3d 320 (2005) (quoting
Lichau, 333 Or at 359).
On the first issue, petitioner contends that
constitutionally adequate counsel would have foreseen the holding
in Apprendi and argued, at petitioner's sentencing hearing, that
the federal constitution required a jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that petitioner was a dangerous offender. (4) 
Petitioner acknowledges that the Court did not decide Apprendi
until almost two years after his sentencing hearing.  He argues,
however, that three United States Supreme Court decisions
foreshadowed the Court's later holding in Apprendi. (5)
This court has explained that, in reviewing whether
counsel exercised reasonable professional skill and judgment, it
must "'make every effort to evaluate a lawyer's conduct from the
lawyer's perspective at the time, without the distorting effects
of hindsight.'"  Burdge, 338 Or at 492 (quoting Lichau, 333 Or at
360).  Accordingly, we look to the decisions that preceded
petitioner's sentencing hearing and ask whether, in the exercise
of reasonable skill and judgment, petitioner's counsel should
have foreseen the Court's decision in Apprendi. 
Before petitioner's sentencing hearing in August 1998,
the Court twice had considered and rejected the argument that a
sentencing factor constituted an "element" of the crime, which a
jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 US 224, 118 S Ct 1219, 140 L Ed 2d
350 (1998); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 US 79, 106 S Ct 2411,
91 L Ed 2d 67 (1986) (illustrating proposition).  The statute at
issue in McMillan authorized a trial court to impose a mandatory
minimum sentence if it found by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" while committing
certain underlying crimes.  477 US at 81.  The statute explicitly
stated that visible possession of a firearm was not an element of
the underlying crime.  Id. at 83.
Reaffirming its decision in Patterson v. New York, 432
US 197, 97 S Ct 2319, 53 L Ed 2d 281 (1977), the McMillan Court
reasoned that, "[w]hile there are obviously constitutional limits
beyond which the States may not go in this regard, the
applicability of the reasonable doubt standard * * * has always
been dependent on how a State defines the offense that is charged
in any given case[.]" 477 US at 85 (internal quotation marks
omitted).  Under the terms of the statute, "visible possession"
was not an element of the crime, which the state had to prove to
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and the Court rejected the
petitioners' arguments that the Sixth Amendment and the Due
Process Clause required a different conclusion.  Id. at 86-91.
In the course of rejecting the petitioners' argument,
the Court observed that their argument "would have at least more
superficial appeal if a finding of visible possession exposed
them to greater or additional punishment" rather than a mandatory
minimum sentence.  Id. at 88.  Although the Court's recognition
of that distinction appears to provide some support for
petitioner's inadequate assistance claim here, the Court's later
decision in Almendarez-Torres negated whatever support McMillan
provided.
In Almendarez-Torres, a federal statute authorized
sentencing courts to impose two-year sentences on deported aliens
who returned illegally to the United States; it also authorized
an enhanced sentence of up to 20 years if the court found by a
preponderance of the evidence that the returning alien had a
prior felony conviction.  See 523 US at 226 (describing federal
statute).  Having received an enhanced sentence under that
statute, the petitioner in Almendarez-Torres argued that, because
a prior conviction authorized imposition of a sentence in excess
of the statutory maximum rather than a mandatory minimum
sentence, the fact of a prior conviction was an "element" of the
offense that the government had to prove to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The Court rejected the petitioner's argument.  Id. at
245.  It reasoned that whether a sentencing factor triggers an
increased maximum sentence or a mandatory-minimum sentence, which
the Court had held constitutional in McMillan, is not dispositive
because "the risk of unfairness to a particular defendant is no
less, and may well be greater, when a mandatory minimum sentence,
rather than a permissive maximum sentence, is at issue."  Id. 
Thus, the Court declined to "adopt a rule that any significant
increase in a statutory maximum sentence would trigger a
constitutional 'elements' requirement[,]" reasoning that "such a
rule would seem anomalous in light of existing case law[.]"  Id.
at 247.
Although later cases have recast Almendarez-Torres as
establishing only a "prior conviction" exception to the rule in
Apprendi, the decision in Almendarez-Torres, read on its own
terms, stands for a far broader proposition:  The Court held in
Almendarez-Torres that, as a general rule, sentencing factors
that enhance the statutory maximum sentence do not constitute
elements of an offense that the state must prove to a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt. (6)  Indeed, the dissent in Almendarez-Torres invited the majority to apply the constitutional rule that
the Court later announced in Apprendi -- an invitation that the
Court declined.  See 523 US at 251 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(urging rule later adopted in Apprendi). (7)  Far from
foreshadowing the rule in Apprendi, the Court's decision in
Almendarez-Torres appeared to reject it.
Almendarez-Torres was the controlling United States
Supreme Court decision when the trial court imposed a dangerous
offender sentence on petitioner.  Measured against the law in
effect at the time of petitioner's sentencing hearing, the
performance of petitioner's trial counsel was constitutionally
adequate.  Counsel was not required to anticipate that two years
later the United States Supreme Court would reverse course in
Apprendi, interpret the Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clauses
as the dissent had urged in Almendarez-Torres, and read its
decision in Almendarez-Torres as establishing only a narrow
exception to the new rule announced in Apprendi.  Petitioner's
trial counsel did not fail to exercise reasonable professional
skill and judgment.  See Burdge, 338 Or at 492 (stating
standard).
We turn finally to petitioner's argument that his trial
counsel was constitutionally inadequate under the Sixth
Amendment.  To prevail on that claim, petitioner must demonstrate
that his trial counsel's performance "fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness * * * under prevailing professional
norms" and that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different."  Strickland v. Washington, 466 US
668, 688, 694, 104 S Ct 2052, 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).  The Court
has cautioned that "[a] fair assessment of attorney performance
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting
effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel's perspective at the time."  Id. at 689.  For the reasons
discussed above, we conclude that trial counsel's performance did
not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms.
Having considered petitioner's arguments, we hold that
Apprendi does not apply retroactively and that petitioner's trial
counsel's performance did not fall below the minimum standard
that Article I, section 11, and the Sixth Amendment require. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.
1. ORS 161.725(1) provides, in part:
"[T]he maximum term of an indeterminate sentence
of imprisonment for a dangerous offender is 30 years,
if the court finds that because of the dangerousness of
the defendant an extended period of confined
correctional treatment or custody is required for the
protection of the public and if it further finds * * *
that one or more of the following grounds exist:
"(a)  The defendant is being sentenced for a Class
A felony, and the court finds that the defendant is
suffering from a severe personality disorder indicating
a propensity toward crimes that seriously endanger the
life or safety of another."
2. It is unclear whether the witness was a licensed
counselor, some other person qualified to offer an opinion on
petitioner's amenability to treatment, or a layperson.
3. The Court held in Johnson that, because the evidence of
materiality was overwhelming, the trial court's failure to submit
that element of the crime of perjury to the jury was harmless
error.  520 US at 469-70.
4. Petitioner does not contend that his trial counsel was
constitutionally inadequate for failing to argue that Article I,
section 11, of the Oregon Constitution required a jury to decide
whether he was a dangerous offender.  See State v. Wedge, 293 Or
598, 607, 652 P2d 773 (1982) (requiring jury to decide whether
defendant used firearm); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 407, 623 P2d
630 (1981) (requiring jury to decide whether defendant acted
deliberately).  Rather, petitioner bases his inadequate
assistance claim solely on his counsel's failure to anticipate
the federal rights that Apprendi later recognized.
5. Petitioner relies on a fourth case, Jones v. United
States, 526 US 227, 119 S Ct 1215, 143 L Ed 2d 311 (1999).  The
Court, however, did not decide Jones until seven months after
petitioner's sentencing hearing.  We do not consider Jones in
deciding whether petitioner's counsel should have foreseen the
decision in Apprendi.  
6. The Court identified a five-factor test that it drew
from McMillan and earlier cases to identify those few instances
in which a sentencing factor would constitute an element of a
crime.  See Almendarez-Torres, 523 US at 242-43 (listing
factors).
7. Justice Scalia explained that, in his view, it was
constitutionally impermissible for "a judge (rather than a jury)
to determine by a mere preponderance of the evidence (rather than
beyond a reasonable doubt) a fact that increases the maximum
penalty to which a criminal defendant is subject."  See
Almendarez-Torres, 523 US at 251 (dissenting opinion).