Title: Commonwealth v. Marrero
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12782
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 20, 2020

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SJC-12782 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  FRANCISCO MARRERO. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 6, 2019. - March 20, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Intent.  Identification.  Evidence, Intent, Firearm, 
Identification, Photograph. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 22, 2016. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Heidi 
E. Brieger, J., and the cases were tried before Robert B. 
Gordon, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Jon R. Maddox for the defendant. 
 
Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
David Rassoul Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, & Michelle Huynh, for Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The defendant discharged a firearm twice into 
the air.  Police were unable to find the weapon or any 
2 
 
 
projectiles.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of 
unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful possession of a 
loaded firearm, and discharging a firearm within 500 feet of a 
building.  The defendant argues that there was insufficient 
evidence that he had knowledge of the physical characteristics 
of the firearm that subjected it to regulation, and accordingly, 
the convictions must be vacated.1  We conclude that, in order to 
establish unlawful possession of a firearm, the Commonwealth 
must prove only that the defendant knew the weapon was a firearm 
in the conventional sense of the word.  The defendant need not 
have had knowledge of the specific physical characteristics that 
made the weapon a firearm according to statute. 
 
The defendant argues further that there was insufficient 
evidence to establish that the weapon did in fact meet the 
statutory definition of a firearm, and that two out-of-court 
identifications were impermissibly suggestive.  We conclude 
otherwise.  The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find 
that the weapon met the statutory definition of a firearm, and 
the identification procedures were not impermissibly suggestive.2 
                     
 
1 The defendant also maintains that discharging a firearm 
within 500 feet of a building requires proof of knowledge for 
the element of discharge, a proposition foreclosed by our recent 
decision in Commonwealth v. Kelly, 484 Mass. 53, 54, 66 (2020). 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
3 
 
 
 
Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have found 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving some 
details for later discussion.  See Commonwealth v. Palermo, 482 
Mass. 620, 621 (2019). 
 
Nathaniel Perez, David Semprit, Vanessa Dubey, and Ricky 
Alcantara attended a party and left together in Perez's 
automobile.  They drove to a hotel, where another party was 
underway.  Outside the hotel, they encountered the defendant, 
who got into the vehicle.  The group then drove to the home of a 
friend of Dubey's, and some or all of the vehicle's occupants 
got out.  The defendant took a firearm that belonged to Perez 
from the vehicle and discharged it twice into the air. 
 
Police officers responded to a report of shots fired in the 
area.  They did not recover the weapon or any projectiles, but 
they did find two shell casings imprinted with the characters 
"9-M-M."  An officer testified that the casings were "consistent 
with shell casings that would be left behind after a piece of 
ammunition had been fired." 
 
Police obtained a surveillance video recording of the 
intersection where the incident took place.  The recording 
showed a man getting out of a vehicle, raising an object in the 
air, and two flashes of light emitting from the object.  Based 
on the recording, police interviewed Dubey, Perez, Semprit, and 
Alcantara.  An officer showed Dubey an array of eight 
4 
 
 
photographs, one of which was the defendant.  She identified the 
defendant as "the guy with the gun."  Police later interviewed 
Semprit and showed him the same photographic array.  He 
identified the defendant as the person who had discharged the 
weapon. 
 
Semprit and Perez each testified at trial that the 
defendant had discharged the weapon.  Additionally, the 
surveillance video recording was introduced in evidence.  Dubey 
identified the man who appeared to discharge a firearm as the 
defendant.3  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of 
unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful possession of a 
loaded firearm, and discharging a firearm within 500 feet of a 
building.  The defendant appealed from his convictions, and we 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Unlawful possession of a firearm.  General 
Laws c. 269, § 10 (a), states that "[w]hoever, except as 
provided or exempted by statute, knowingly has in his 
possession . . . a firearm, loaded or unloaded, as defined in 
[G. L. c. 140, § 121,] . . . shall be punished . . . ."  A 
firearm is defined as a "weapon . . . from which a shot or 
bullet can be discharged and of which the length of the barrel 
or barrels is less than [sixteen] inches."  G. L. c. 140, § 121. 
                     
 
3 Ricky Alcantara did not testify. 
5 
 
 
 
The defendant argues that his conviction of unlawful 
possession of a firearm required proof that he knew the facts 
that caused the weapon to meet the statutory definition of a 
firearm, and that the evidence of such knowledge in this case 
was insufficient. 
 
Our objective in interpreting a statute "is to ascertain 
and effectuate the intent of the Legislature."  Commonwealth v. 
Newberry, 483 Mass. 186, 192 (2019), citing Commonwealth v. 
Curran, 478 Mass. 630, 633 (2018).  To do so, "we look to the 
words of the statute, 'construed by the ordinary and approved 
usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause 
of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied 
and the main object to be accomplished.'"  Commonwealth v. J.A., 
478 Mass. 385, 387 (2017), quoting Boston Police Patrolmen's 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Boston, 435 Mass. 718, 720 (2002). 
 
Prior to 1974, the crime of unlawful possession of a 
firearm did not contain a mandatory minimum punishment for 
individuals who previously had not been convicted of a felony.  
See G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), as amended through St. 1973, c. 588.  
Nor did it contain a mens rea requirement.  See id.  In 1974, 
the Legislature enacted the so-called Bartley-Fox legislation, 
which amended the statute to mandate a minimum punishment of one 
year of imprisonment.  See Commonwealth v. Lemay, 11 Mass. App. 
Ct. 992, 992 (1981), citing G. L. c. 269, § 10, as amended by 
6 
 
 
St. 1974, c. 649, § 2.  In response to the change, and "mindful 
of . . . the need to avoid possible constitutional doubts," 
(citation omitted), we interpreted the statute to contain an 
implied requirement that a defendant knew he or she possessed a 
firearm.  See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 916 
(1976).  We later clarified the contours of this knowledge 
requirement, and held that the Commonwealth must prove the 
defendant knew that the weapon was a firearm "within the 
generally accepted meaning of that term."  See Commonwealth v. 
Sampson, 383 Mass. 750, 762 (1981), and cases cited.  See also 
Commonwealth v. Bacon, 374 Mass. 358, 361 (1978) ("the 
characteristics of a gun are obvious.  Therefore, in gun cases, 
all an accused need know is that he [or she] is carrying a 
gun"); Commonwealth v. Papa, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 987, 987-988 
(1984), citing Sampson, supra at 762-763 & n.16 (where "a 
conventional firearm with its obvious dangers is involved, the 
Commonwealth need not prove that a defendant knows the exact 
capabilities or characteristics of the gun which make it subject 
to regulation"). 
 
In 1990, the Legislature added the word "knowingly" to the 
statute.  See St. 1990, c. 511, § 2; Commonwealth v. Cornelius, 
78 Mass. App. Ct. 413, 416 & n.3 (2010).  The defendant argues 
that this insertion abrogated our holding in Sampson, 383 Mass. 
at 762.  He bases his argument on Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 479 
7 
 
 
Mass. 527, 532 (2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 276 (2018), in 
which we examined the mens rea requirements for a violation of 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m).  That statute provides for punishment of 
anyone who, without a license, "knowingly has in his [or her] 
possession . . . a large capacity weapon" (as defined in G. L. 
c. 140, § 121).  See G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m).  We stated that 
"courts ordinarily read a phrase in a criminal statute that 
introduces the elements of a crime with the word 'knowingly' as 
applying that word to each element."  Cassidy, supra at 534, 
quoting Flores–Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 652 
(2009).  We therefore concluded that the Commonwealth must prove 
that the defendant was aware of the facts that caused the weapon 
to meet the statutory definition of a large capacity weapon.  
Cassidy, supra at 536. 
 
The defendant argues that this principle of statutory 
interpretation also should be applied to G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), 
which is worded similarly:  "Whoever . . . knowingly has in his 
possession . . . a firearm, loaded or unloaded, as defined in 
[G. L. c. 140, § 121,] . . . shall be punished. . . ."  But the 
situation here is distinguishable for several reasons.  First, 
the history of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), demonstrates that the 
Legislature did not intend to require knowledge that the weapon 
8 
 
 
met the statutory definition.  From 1984 through the present,4 
the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District 
Court have stated that a defendant need know only that the 
weapon is a firearm within the common meaning of the word.5  
Since 1990, the Legislature repeatedly has amended G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10, and has not demonstrated a clear intent to change the rule 
articulated in Sampson, 383 Mass. at 762.  See Commonwealth v. 
                     
 
4 Our case law during this period implicitly has endorsed 
the rule set forth in Commonwealth v. Sampson, 383 Mass. 750, 
762 (1981).  See Commonwealth v. Young, 453 Mass. 707, 713 n.9 
(2009), citing Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 916 
(1976), and Sampson, supra at 753 ("To establish a violation of 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 [a], the Commonwealth must establish 
that . . . the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm"); 
Commonwealth v. Sann Than, 442 Mass. 748, 752-753 nn.4, 5 (2004) 
(quoting jury instructions regarding mens rea); Commonwealth v. 
O'Connell, 432 Mass. 657, 663-664 (2000), citing Sampson, supra 
at 762-763 & n.16, Commonwealth v. Bacon, 374 Mass. 358, 360-361 
(1978), and Commonwealth v. Papa, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 987, 987-988 
(1984) (in prosecution for violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 [c], 
defendant's "ignorance vis-à-vis . . . firearm's dimensions is 
not a valid defense"). 
 
 
5 See Instruction 7.600 of the Criminal Model Jury 
Instructions for Use in the District Court (2013) ("Commonwealth 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant . . . 
knew that the item was a 'firearm,' within the common meaning of 
that term.  If it was a conventional firearm, with its obvious 
dangers, the Commonwealth is not required to prove that the 
defendant knew that the item met the legal definition of a 
firearm"); Instruction 5.601 of the Model Jury Instructions for 
Use in the District Court (1995) (same); Instruction 5.60 of the 
Model Jury Instructions for Criminal Offenses Tried in the 
District Court (1984) ("If the defendant knew that he [she] was 
carrying a conventional weapon, the Commonwealth is not required 
to prove that the defendant knew that it met the legal 
definition of a firearm" [citing Papa, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 987-
988]). 
9 
 
 
Callahan, 440 Mass. 436, 441-442 (2003) (we presume that 
Legislature is aware of decisions of this court and previous 
legislation and would enact changes if it disagreed with our 
interpretation of its intent); St. 1996, c. 20; St. 1996, 
c. 151, §§ 487, 488; St. 1998, c. 180, §§ 68-70; St. 2006, 
c. 48, §§ 5-7; St. 2014, c. 284, §§ 89, 90, 92. 
 
Moreover, the rule suggested by the defendant would be 
unworkable and counterproductive.  See Ciani v. MacGrath, 481 
Mass. 174, 178 (2019) ("we will not adopt a literal construction 
of a statute if the consequences of doing so are absurd or 
unreasonable" [quotation and citation omitted]).  General Laws 
c. 269, § 10 (a), was intended to criminalize unlicensed 
possession of a firearm, even absent discharge.  Compare id. (no 
element of discharge) with G. L. c. 269, § 12E (prohibiting 
discharge within 500 feet of building).  But proving knowledge 
that a firearm met the statutory definition would entail proving 
knowledge of the weapon's operability.  See G. L. c. 140, § 121.  
This, in turn, often would require proof that the weapon had 
been discharged previously, thereby running counter to the 
statute's goal of criminalizing mere possession.  Cf. Cassidy, 
479 Mass. at 537, quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 
600, 615 n.11 (1994) ("firing a fully automatic weapon would 
10 
 
 
make the regulated characteristics of the weapon immediately 
apparent to its owner").6 
 
Lastly, the large capacity of a weapon often is not readily 
apparent.  See Commonwealth v. Resende, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 194, 
202 (2018) (insufficient evidence to infer knowledge of large 
capacity).  Cf. Cassidy, 479 Mass. at 533, quoting Staples, 511 
U.S. at 615 ("type of weapon owned by that defendant might 'give 
no externally visible indication that it is fully automatic'").  
Therefore, in Cassidy, supra at 536, it was logical to require 
knowledge of the large capacity of the weapon prior to imposing 
criminal responsibility.  See Staples, supra at 621-622 ("mere 
unregistered possession of certain types of regulated weapons -- 
often difficult to distinguish from other, nonregulated types, 
has been held inadequate to establish the requisite knowledge" 
[quotation, citation, and alterations omitted]).  Here, 
conversely, the "characteristics of a gun are obvious."  See 
Sampson, 383 Mass. at 763, quoting Bacon, 374 Mass. at 361.  See 
                     
 
6 Courts in some other jurisdictions have come to the same 
conclusion that requiring knowledge of the physical 
characteristics that subject a weapon to regulation would 
undermine the goals of the statutory scheme.  See State v. 
Winders, 366 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) ("To hold 
otherwise would only serve to undermine the very purpose of the 
provision in regulating possession of weapons in the interest of 
public safety.  Furthermore, it would place an almost impossible 
burden of proof on the State . . ."); State v. Hill, 970 S.W.2d 
868, 873 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998), citing Winders, supra (same); 
State v. Watterson, 198 N.C. App. 500, 512 (2009) (noting 
difficulty of proving knowledge of barrel length). 
11 
 
 
also United States v. Jones, 222 F.3d 349, 353 (7th Cir. 2000) 
("Based on the rifle's obvious characteristics[,] . . . the jury 
could infer that [the defendant] knew that the instrument he 
possessed was a firearm, not a BB gun"); Papa, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 987 ("conventional firearm with its obvious dangers").  
Therefore, under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), it is sensible to 
require knowledge only that the "instrument is a firearm within 
the generally accepted meaning of that term."  See Sampson, 
supra at 762. 
 
In light of the above, we conclude that G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a), does not require knowledge of the facts that make the 
weapon a firearm according to the statutory definition. 
 
The defendant raises three other arguments that are 
dependent on his mens rea argument.  First, he asserts that the 
evidence before the grand jury was insufficient to establish 
probable cause that he knew the firearm was capable of 
discharging a shot or a bullet.  Second, he argues that there 
was a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice created by 
the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury that the 
defendant must have known of the physical characteristics that 
made the weapon a firearm according to the statute.  Third, he 
contends that if this type of knowledge is required for a 
conviction under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (unlawful possession of 
a firearm), it necessarily must be required for a conviction 
12 
 
 
under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n) (unlawful possession of a loaded 
firearm).  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 479 Mass. 600, 604 (2018) 
("in order to be convicted under G. L. c. 269, § 10 [n], an 
individual must first have been convicted under G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 [a] or [c]").  Because we conclude that a defendant need 
not be aware of the physical characteristics that brought a 
weapon within the statutory definition of a firearm, these three 
claims are unavailing. 
 
2.  Sufficiency.  The defendant argues further that the 
evidence was insufficient to establish that the weapon was 
capable of discharging a shot or bullet, as required by G. L. 
c. 140, § 121.  We do not agree. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Housewright, 470 Mass. 665, 680 (2015), 
a witness testified that the defendant loaded a weapon and fired 
it at someone, creating a flash and a loud sound.  We held that 
the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the weapon 
met the statutory definition of a firearm, despite the fact that 
neither the weapon nor any projectiles were recovered.  See id.  
See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 422 Mass. 111, 120-121 (1996) 
("jury could properly have considered eyewitness testimony that 
the defendant had a firearm in his possession, even in the 
absence of the recovery of such a firearm" [citation omitted]); 
Commonwealth v. Tuitt, 393 Mass. 801, 810 (1985), citing 
Commonwealth v. Fancy, 349 Mass. 196, 204 (1965) (expert 
13 
 
 
testimony was not necessary to establish that weapon met 
statutory definition of firearm). 
 
Here, Perez testified that the defendant "had my gun, and 
he shot it."  Semprit testified that the defendant "set off a 
shot."  Surveillance video footage showed the defendant holding 
an object resembling a firearm in the air, and two flashes of 
light emitting from it.  Two shell casings labelled "9-M-M" were 
found at the scene, and an officer answered affirmatively when 
asked whether the casings were "consistent with actual working 
ammunition."  This evidence is substantially similar to that in 
Housewright, 470 Mass. at 680. 
 
The defendant argues that the discharges could have been 
blanks, and the weapon might have been incapable of firing an 
actual shot or bullet.  This farfetched explanation does not 
negate the strong evidence that the weapon was operable.  See 
Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205, 214 (1995), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Merola, 405 Mass. 529, 533 (1989) (evidence 
"need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, 
provided the record as a whole supports a conclusion of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt").  See also Commonwealth v. Combs, 
480 Mass. 55, 61–62 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 475 
Mass. 396, 407 (2016) ("Proof of an essential element of a crime 
may be based on reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, 
but it may not be based on conjecture").  Here, there was 
14 
 
 
sufficient evidence that the weapon met the statutory definition 
of a firearm. 
 
3.  Discharge of firearm within 500 feet of building.  The 
defendant contends that we should interpret G. L. c. 276, § 12E, 
to contain an implied requirement that the discharge be done 
knowingly.  He further argues that, after we infer that the word 
"knowingly" modifies the element of discharge, we should apply 
the analysis from Cassidy, 479 Mass. at 534, to require 
knowledge of all elements of the statute.  The first part of the 
defendant's argument is foreclosed by our recent decision in 
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 484 Mass. 53, 54, 66 (2020), in which we 
held that the statute did not contain a mens rea requirement for 
the element of discharge.  The second part of the defendant's 
argument relies on the first, and therefore falls with it. 
 
4.  Photographic array.  The defendant argues that the 
Superior Court judge who heard his pretrial motion to suppress 
the out-of-court identifications made by Dubey and Semprit 
(motion judge) erred in denying the motion.  "[T]he defendant 
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that, in light of 
the totality of the circumstances, the procedures employed were 
so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable 
misidentification as to deny the defendant due process of law."  
Commonwealth v. Arzola, 470 Mass. 809, 813 (2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 792 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Cavitt, 460 Mass. 
15 
 
 
617, 632 (2011).  "'[W]e accept the [motion] judge's findings of 
fact . . . absent clear error,' but we independently determine 
'the correctness of the judge's application of constitutional 
principles to the facts as found.'"  Commonwealth v. Amaral, 482 
Mass. 496, 499 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Molina, 467 Mass. 
65, 72 (2014). 
 
The motion judge found that the eight photographs showed 
men of the same eye color, race, and hair color, with similar 
facial hair and similar facial features; two of the men had 
slightly higher hairlines.  In the photographs, four men wore 
white shirts, one had a black shirt, and two were shirtless.  
The defendant was the only individual wearing a red shirt.  The 
officers who administered the photographic arrays knew that the 
defendant was a suspect.  The judge concluded that the 
photographic arrays were not impermissibly suggestive. 
 
The defendant argues that because he was the only person 
wearing a red shirt, the identification procedures were 
inherently suggestive.  See Commonwealth v. Thornley, 406 Mass. 
96, 100 (1989) ("we disapprove of an array of photographs which 
distinguishes one suspect from all the others on the basis of 
some physical characteristic" [citation omitted]).  The man who 
discharged the firearm, however, was not described as wearing a 
red shirt.  Indeed, a witness testified that he might have been 
shirtless.  Therefore, any suggestibility created by the red 
16 
 
 
shirt was minimal.  See Arzola, 470 Mass. at 813 (array was not 
impermissibly suggestive despite fact that perpetrator wore gray 
shirt and defendant's photograph was only one shown wearing gray 
shirt).  Contrast Thornley, supra at 100-101 (fact that only 
photograph in array with individual wearing glasses was 
defendant's photograph was impermissibly suggestive because 
eyewitnesses relied on glasses in making identification). 
 
The defendant also argues that the identification was 
tainted because the administering officers knew his identity and 
that he was a suspect.  "[I]t is the better practice to have an 
identification procedure administered by a law enforcement 
officer who does not know the identity of a suspect . . . ."  
Commonwealth v. Watson, 455 Mass. 246, 253 (2009).  The absence 
of such a procedure, however, does not mean that the 
identification was inevitably impermissible.  See id., citing 
Commonwealth v. Silva–Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 797 (2009).  
Importantly, the motion judge found that the witnesses knew the 
defendant prior to the incident.  This familiarity outweighed 
any suggestiveness created by the officers' knowledge of the 
defendant's identity.  See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 476 Mass. 
451, 461 (2017).  The judge's finding was not clearly erroneous. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.