Title: Travelers Insurance Company v. LaClair
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 941863
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 1995

Present:  All the Justices 
 
 
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
v.  Record No. 941863    
 
DARYL F. LACLAIR 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
                                   November 3, 1995 
 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA 
 
v.   Record No. 941896 
 
DARYL F. LACLAIR 
 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
 
Thomas A. Fortkort, Judge 
 
 
These two appeals in a declaratory judgment proceeding 
present a question of motor vehicle insurance coverage.  The 
dispositive issue is whether an intentional shooting by a person 
occupying an uninsured vehicle constitutes "use" of the vehicle 
for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage.  We answer that 
query in the negative, and reverse. 
 
The facts are virtually undisputed.  On November 21, 1990, 
appellee Daryl F. LaClair, an Arlington County deputy sheriff, 
was operating his marked police vehicle on Lee Highway in 
Arlington County.  An automobile ahead of LaClair, driven by one 
Marcus Arban, was being operated erratically in the left lane.  
The officer assumed the driver was lost and was attempting to 
read a map. 
 
As the officer pulled alongside the automobile in the right 
lane, it sped in front of him, pulled into the right lane, and 
stopped.  The officer stopped his vehicle "four to five feet" 
behind Arban's automobile, followed standard procedures for 
 
 
 
 
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making a traffic stop, such as activating emergency lights, 
stepped from his vehicle, and began to approach the automobile.  
He was wearing leisure clothes, not his police uniform. 
 
When Arban began to open the door on the driver's side of 
the automobile, the officer ordered him to remain in the vehicle. 
 The door continued to open, and the officer again told Arban to 
remain in his car. 
 
Suddenly, the officer felt a blow to his left elbow.  As he 
turned to examine the elbow, "a second shot struck" him; the 
bullet grazed his head cutting through his right eyelid and 
exited the eyebrow.  The officer dove between the automobile and 
his police vehicle to avoid further shots.  As the Arban car 
began to leave the scene, the officer, partially blinded, managed 
to fire several shots into its rear. 
 
The next day, the Prince William County police attempted to 
serve a search warrant on Arban.  He resisted entry into his 
home.  During an exchange of gunfire, Arban and a police officer 
were killed. 
 
Subsequently, LaClair filed a civil action in Arlington 
County against Arban's personal representative seeking recovery 
against the estate for his personal injuries.  The automobile 
liability insurer on Arban's vehicle denied coverage. 
 
Appellant Travelers Insurance Company issued a policy of 
automobile insurance on LaClair's personal automobile.  Appellant 
Insurance Company of North America (I.N.A.) carried the liability 
 
 
 
 
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insurance on the vehicles of the Arlington County Sheriff's 
Office. 
 
Later, Travelers and I.N.A. sought, in the present 
declaratory judgment action, a ruling that they were not 
obligated to provide coverage to LaClair under the uninsured 
motorist provisions of their respective polices for the claims 
made in the personal injury action pending in Arlington County.  
As pertinent to the issue to be decided in this appeal, the 
respective policies obligated the insurer to pay LaClair all sums 
that he is legally entitled to recover as damages from the driver 
of an uninsured motor vehicle resulting "from the ownership, 
maintenance or use of" the uninsured motor vehicle. 
 
After an evidentiary hearing in the declaratory judgment 
proceeding, the trial court "determined as a matter of fact that 
the shooting of Captain LaClair was an intentional, not an 
accidental act, and that Arban was still partially inside his car 
at the time he fired the shots at Captain LaClair."  In deciding 
the question whether "the circumstances of this case constitute 
`use' of an automobile as that term is employed in the insurance 
policies," the trial court ruled in favor of LaClair in an August 
1994 order from which these appeals were taken. 
 
The court below opined that LaClair's "injuries were linked 
to the `use' of the vehicle by Arban."  The court said that 
"Arban's vehicle, in a fundamental way, was used to facilitate 
the act which produced the injury to . . . LaClair.  Arban used 
 
 
 
 
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his vehicle first to lure . . . LaClair into stopping behind him, 
then as a shield, from behind which the shots were fired, and 
finally as a swift means of escape."  The court, stating that 
Arban's car "was the instrumentality and the accessory" for 
inflicting the injuries, found that LaClair's injuries were 
covered under the uninsured motorist provisions of Travelers' and 
I.N.A.'s policies.  This was error. 
 
We have examined the question whether an injury or death 
arose from the "use" of a motor vehicle in three fairly recent 
insurance coverage cases.  In State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Powell, 227 Va. 492, 318 S.E.2d 393 (1984), we 
held that a death resulting from discharge of a shotgun, resting 
in a gun rack affixed to a pickup truck, did not arise out of 
"use" of the vehicle under the circumstances of that case.  We 
said that the truck was merely the situs for a social gathering, 
and was not employed for any enterprise usually associated with 
use of the vehicle.  Id. at 501, 318 S.E.2d at 398. 
 
There, we noted certain basic concepts that are uniformly 
applied to the "ownership, maintenance, or use" provisions of 
automobile liability policies.  Id. at 500, 318 S.E.2d at 397.  
We said that these "precepts are consistent with the principles 
applicable to insurance contracts generally.  For example, 
consideration must be given to the intention of the parties to 
the insurance agreement in determining the scope of the coverage 
afforded."  Id. 
 
 
 
 
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Also, we pointed out that "the `ownership, maintenance, or 
use' provision should be construed in the light of the subject 
matter with which the parties are dealing; the terms of the 
policy should be given their natural and ordinary meaning."  Id. 
 Importantly, we said that although "ownership, maintenance, or 
use of the vehicle need not be the direct, proximate cause of the 
injury in the strict legal sense," nonetheless, there must be a 
causal relationship between the incident and the employment of 
the "motor vehicle as a vehicle."  Id. 
 
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Rice, 239 
Va. 646, 391 S.E.2d 71 (1990), we applied the principles set 
forth in Powell and ruled that an injury caused by the accidental 
discharge of a rifle arose out of the "use" of the motor vehicle 
under the circumstances of that case.  There, two hunters were 
utilizing a Jeep vehicle to transport themselves, and their 
hunting equipment, to the site where they would embark on their 
hunting expedition.  While unloading the vehicle at the site, the 
rifle discharged injuring one hunter.  We concluded "that the 
requisite causal relationship between the accident and employment 
of the Jeep as a vehicle for imposition of coverage on the 
automobile carrier exists."  Id. at 650, 391 S.E.2d at 73. 
 
And, in Erie Insurance Company Exchange v. Jones, 248 Va. 
437, 448 S.E.2d 655 (1994), decided after the trial court's 
ruling in the present case, we applied the Powell principles and 
held that two automobile liability insurers were not 
 
 
 
 
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contractually bound to provide uninsured motorist coverage in a 
wrongful death claim because the damages were "merely incidental 
or tangential" to use of the truck in question, under the facts 
of that case.  Id. at 443, 448 S.E.2d at 659.  There, the 
operator of the uninsured truck alighted from the stopped vehicle 
and, with a rifle in hand, walked to the side of an automobile 
that had been following the truck closely with the driver 
repeatedly raising and lowering the headlights.  While tapping 
the rifle barrel on the car window, the rifle discharged, killing 
a passenger in the car. 
 
Applying the foregoing principles to the present facts, we 
hold that the employment of Arban's vehicle did not amount to a 
"use" of that vehicle within the meaning of the policy provisions 
at issue.  Even though Arban may have utilized the vehicle to 
"lure" LeClair into stopping behind him, even though Arban was 
partially inside his car when the shots were fired, even though 
Arban employed the car as a "shield," even though the vehicle was 
employed to "facilitate the act which produced the injury," and 
even though Arban's car may have been an "accessory" to the 
shooting, nevertheless, none of those acts or circumstances 
involved the use of the Arban vehicle as a vehicle.  Thus, we 
conclude that the requisite causal relationship between the 
incident and employment of the automobile as a vehicle does not 
exist. 
 
Manifestly, the natural and ordinary meaning of "use" of a 
 
 
 
 
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private, passenger motor vehicle does not contemplate its 
utilization as a mobile or stationary pillbox or fortress, or as 
a shield, or as an outpost from which an assailant may inflict 
intentional injury with a firearm.   
 
Therefore, the judgment appealed from will be reversed, and 
we will enter final judgment here in favor of the insurers 
declaring that neither owes coverage to LaClair under their 
respective policies. 
 
Reversed and final judgment.