Title: Commonwealth v. Gonzalez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11428
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 19, 2014

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SJC-11428 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MARIO GONZALEZ. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 11, 2014. - August 19, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.1 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness 
of statement, Dying declaration, Prior misconduct, 
Intoxication, Intent.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, 
Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, 
Instructions to jury.  Intoxication.  Mental Impairment.  
Intent. 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 19, 2009. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Charles 
J. Hely, J., and the case was tried before Geraldine S. Hines, 
J.  
 
 
 
David Keighley for the defendant. 
 
Helle Sachse, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GANTS, J.  In the early morning hours of February 15, 2009, 
the defendant stabbed his girl friend multiple times shortly 
after they returned to his apartment from a local bar. The 
1 Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his retirement. 
                     
2 
 
victim died of her wounds later that morning.  A Superior Court 
jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on a 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, in violation of G. L. c. 
265, § 1.2  On appeal, the defendant claims that:  (1) the 
statements the defendant made from his holding cell in response 
to police questioning should have been suppressed because he had 
earlier invoked his right to silence; (2) the admission in 
evidence of the defendant's invocation of his right to silence 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; 
(3) the trial judge erred in admitting statements made by the 
victim as dying declarations; (4) the judge erred in admitting 
certain testimony regarding the defendant's prior bad acts; and 
(5) the absence of an instruction to the jury that they may 
consider the defendant's consumption of alcohol in determining 
whether the defendant acted in a cruel or atrocious manner in 
causing the victim's death created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.   The defendant also requests that we 
exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the 
conviction to a lesser included offense.  We reject the 
defendant's first four claims, but agree with the fifth.  We 
therefore reverse the defendant's conviction of murder in the 
first degree and remand the case to the Superior Court to allow 
2 The jury did not find the defendant guilty of murder in 
the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation. 
                     
3 
 
the Commonwealth to choose between entry of a verdict of murder 
in the second degree or retrial of the defendant on the charge 
of murder in the first degree. 
 
Background.  We summarize the evidence at trial, but 
reserve certain details for our discussion of the defendant's 
claims of error. 
 
The defendant and the victim had been dating for 
approximately six months before the killing.  The victim had 
asked the defendant to stop drinking, and on one occasion, the 
victim refused to go home with the defendant because he was 
intoxicated.  The couple spent the evening of February 14, 2009, 
at a local bar, celebrating Valentine's Day in the company of 
the victim's mother.  During the course of the evening, the 
victim had a few drinks and the defendant drank steadily.  When 
they left the bar and entered a taxicab at approximately 1 A.M., 
both the defendant and the victim were intoxicated.  The 
victim's mother was dropped off at her son's house, and the 
taxicab then drove the defendant and the victim to the 
defendant's apartment in the Dorchester section of Boston.  At 
approximately 2:30 A.M., the victim telephoned her mother to 
make sure she arrived home safely. 
 
At 3:15 A.M., the defendant telephoned 911, and reported, 
in Spanish, that someone had entered his apartment and stabbed 
4 
 
his wife.3  The defendant told the 911 operator that he did not 
know who had entered his home, and explained, "I came a while 
ago, and my wife left the door open for him and someone entered 
and I don't know what happened, but . . . she's letting out a 
lot of blood." 
 
Police and emergency medical technicians arrived at the 
apartment house within a few minutes, and the defendant brought 
them to a bedroom in the third-floor apartment.  The victim was 
lying on a bed, bleeding heavily from stab wounds.  There was 
blood on the pillows and the doorknob, and blood spatter stains 
on the walls, but no blood on the floor; a wet mop was 
discovered behind the door of the defendant's bedroom, and the 
floor was wet underneath the bed where the victim lay bleeding.  
Boston police Officer James O'Brien several times asked the 
victim who had stabbed her, and each time she replied, "I don't 
want to die."  Upon removing the victim's clothing, emergency 
medical technician Emilie Howard discovered that she had 
suffered six stab wounds to her left shoulder, one to her right 
shoulder, and one to her left chest just below the breast.  The 
victim had no palpable blood pressure and was "close to dying."  
In response to Howard's question about the length of the knife 
 
3 The victim and the defendant were not married, but 
they referred to each other as husband and wife. 
                     
5 
 
used in the attack, the victim implored, "Please don't let me 
die," four times. 
 
Because he spoke only Spanish and the responding officers 
spoke only English, the defendant was unable to communicate with 
the officers who first arrived at the scene.  While the 
emergency medical technicians prepared to transport the victim 
to the hospital, the defendant was pat frisked; no weapons were 
found on his person.  Shortly thereafter, Officer Omar Cepeda, a 
fluent Spanish speaker, arrived and spoke with the defendant in 
Spanish.  Officer Cepeda noted that the defendant had "red, 
glassy eyes" and smelled of alcohol, and that the defendant had 
fresh wounds to his nose and lip.  In response to Officer 
Cepeda's inquiry, the defendant stated that he had arrived home 
from drinking at a local bar to find the front door of the 
apartment open and the victim lying on the bed in a pool of 
blood.  According to the defendant, the victim told him that an 
unknown person had entered the apartment, demanded money, 
stabbed her, and fled.  In response to Officer Cepeda's question 
about the cut on his nose, the defendant stated that he had 
received it about three days ago in a fight.  Officer Cepeda 
told Sergeant Daniel Tracey about the defendant's statements, 
and Tracey told Cepeda to give the defendant the Miranda 
warnings.  Cepeda recited the warnings to the defendant in 
Spanish; the defendant said that he understood and had "nothing 
6 
 
to hide."  Thereafter, in response to Cepeda's renewed inquiry 
about the injury on his nose, the defendant repeated it was from 
a fight two to three days previously.  The defendant, when asked 
whether the victim had described her assailant, said that he 
could not get a description from her.  Cepeda informed the 
defendant that the victim was still alive, and asked, "Do you 
want to tell me what happened here?"  The defendant replied, 
"No." 
 
Meanwhile, paramedics Sean Murphy and Michael Sullivan 
accompanied the victim in the ambulance to the hospital.  They 
noted that the victim was pale, had no blood pressure, and had a 
life-threatening wound.  As Murphy prepared to insert an 
intravenous (IV) tube, the victim pulled away and looked scared.  
Murphy explained to the victim that she was very sick, whereupon 
the victim allowed him to start the IV.  Following instructions, 
the victim squeezed Murphy's hand to indicate that she 
understood what he was saying.  Thereafter, Murphy asked the 
victim if her husband did this to her.  The victim answered, 
"Yes."  Sullivan also asked the victim, "Your husband did this?" 
and the victim answered, "Yes, my husband."  The victim arrived 
at the hospital at approximately 3:30 A.M.4 
4 The victim succumbed to her injuries at 7:54 A.M.  The 
cause of death was multiple stab wounds to the torso. 
                     
7 
 
 
On arrival at the hospital, the paramedics told police what 
they had learned in the ambulance.  This information was 
communicated to Sergeant Tracey, who, while the defendant was 
speaking with Officer Cepeda, ordered the defendant's arrest. 
 
When the defendant arrived at the police station, Cepeda 
brought the defendant to a holding cell and told him that he 
(Cepeda) would be across the hall if the defendant needed 
anything.  As Cepeda started to walk away, the defendant said, 
"I was the one that got hit with a beer bottle in the face."  
Cepeda turned around and asked him what really happened.  The 
defendant then stated that he had come home from the bar and 
gotten into an argument with the victim about his drinking.  The 
defendant said that the argument escalated, she hit him with a 
beer bottle in the face, pulled out a black, folding knife, and 
charged at him.  The defendant stated that he was able to twist 
the knife away from the victim, and then stabbed her in the back 
several times. As the victim ran towards the front door, the 
defendant followed and said, "I'm sorry, I don't know what 
happened. I don't know why I did this."  The defendant then 
helped the victim into bed, and telephoned 911.  Officer Cepeda 
asked the defendant about the location of the knife.  The 
defendant first responded that it might be in the hallway, then 
said that it might have been thrown out the bedroom window, and 
8 
 
later said that it might be in another room in the apartment.5  
At approximately 9 A.M., the defendant called his roommate from 
the telephone by the booking desk of the station.  The defendant 
left a message on his roommate's voicemail, in which he said he 
had been drinking and "had problems with the Puerto Rican woman" 
and stabbed her. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Suppression of defendant's statements made 
from the holding cell.  Before trial, the defendant moved to 
suppress all statements he made to the police.  In the affidavit 
accompanying the motion, the defendant stated that Cepeda "did 
not speak Spanish, as I know it, very well," and that, as a 
result, the defendant did not understand what Cepeda said, and 
vice-versa.  He claimed, "Because of my inability to understand, 
no statement made by me at the police station was voluntary."  
He did not assert that he ever invoked his right to silence. 
 
After an evidentiary hearing, the motion judge, who was not 
the trial judge, found that "[t]he defendant spoke freely and 
coherently with Officer Cepeda in Spanish" and that "[t]he 
defendant had no trouble in understanding Officer Cepeda or in 
expressing himself to the officer in Spanish."  The judge denied 
the motion to suppress, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that 
all of the defendant's statements were voluntary and that the 
5 The police recovered three knives from the premises and 
one from the sidewalk in front of the apartment, but none 
contained evidence of blood. 
                     
9 
 
defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of 
his Miranda rights.  The motion judge did not address the claim 
that the defendant makes on appeal -- that the defendant invoked 
his right to silence after being given the Miranda warnings at 
the apartment -- because no such claim was made at the time of 
the motion and there was no evidence to support such a claim.6 
 
But Officer Cepeda's testimony at trial regarding what the 
defendant had said at the apartment after he waived his Miranda 
rights differed from his testimony at the motion hearing.  At 
the motion hearing, Cepeda testified that, after he told the 
defendant that the victim was still alive, "I asked him again 
what happened in the apartment, if anything else happened in the 
apartment."  Cepeda stated that the defendant replied, "No, 
nothing else happened."  At trial, however, Cepeda testified as 
follows: 
The prosecutor:  "Did you . . . tell him at that point 
anything about [the victim's] condition?" 
 
The witness:  "Yes, I did." 
 
The prosecutor:  "What did you say to him?" 
 
The witness:  "I told him she's still alive.  Do you want 
to tell me what happened here?" 
 
The prosecutor:  "Did he say anything else?" 
 
6 The Commonwealth agreed not to admit in evidence a 
statement that the defendant made to the police after his 
holding cell discussion with Officer Cepeda, conceding that it 
had been obtained in violation of Commonwealth v. Rosario, 422 
Mass. 48, 56 (1996). 
                     
10 
 
 
The witness:  "He said no." 
 
The defendant contends that Officer Cepeda's testimony at 
trial demonstrates that he invoked his right to remain silent by 
answering, "No," to the officer's question.  The defendant, 
however, did not object to the question or move to strike the 
answer.  Nor did he ask the trial judge to revisit the denial of 
the motion to suppress in view of this answer.  As a result, the 
issue before us is not whether the motion judge erred in denying 
the motion to suppress or whether the trial judge erred in not 
revisiting the denial.  "[I]n reviewing a judge's ruling on a 
motion to suppress, an appellate court 'may not rely on the 
facts as developed at trial' even where the testimony differed 
materially from that given at trial."  Commonwealth v. Deramo, 
436 Mass. 40, 43 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 
Mass. 135, 137 (2001).  Rather, the issue before us is whether, 
as part of our plenary review of capital cases under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, the failure to recognize the defendant's 
invocation of his right to silence created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
We consider first whether a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice arose from the admission of evidence at 
trial that should have been suppressed had the defendant invoked 
his right to silence.  The defendant made no further statement 
11 
 
at the apartment following his purported invocation, and the 
defendant concedes that his volunteered statement to Officer 
Cepeda from the holding cell that he was "the one that got hit 
with a beer bottle in the face" was admissible.  See, e.g., 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) ("Volunteered 
statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment [to 
the United States Consitution]").  Therefore, the only 
statements at issue are those made by the defendant from his 
holding cell after Cepeda asked him what really happened. 
 
Had the defendant raised this claim with the trial judge 
and asked her to revisit the denial of the motion to suppress, 
the judge could have conducted a new evidentiary hearing, 
explored with Cepeda whether his testimony was more accurate at 
the motion hearing or at trial regarding what he asked the 
defendant and what the defendant said in response, and made 
findings of fact based on her evaluation of Cepeda's credibility 
as to what actually was said, which we would accept unless 
clearly erroneous.  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 
646 (2004).  Without the benefit of such findings, we must 
determine whether the appeal can be resolved without remanding 
the case for such findings.  We conclude that no remand is 
necessary because, even if the defendant were to prevail on 
remand as to every factual dispute and we were to conclude that 
all the defendant's statements from the holding cell made after 
12 
 
Cepeda asked him what really happened should have been 
suppressed, the admission in evidence of those statements did 
not so materially strengthen the Commonwealth's case as to 
create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
If these statements were not admitted, the jury would have 
been left with evidence that the defendant's girl friend was 
found on a bed in his apartment with multiple stab wounds; that 
the defendant had fresh wounds on his nose and lip that he 
reported he had suffered from a fight two or three days earlier; 
that he told the police that he came back from a bar to find the 
door open and the victim lying on a bed in a pool of blood even 
though there was compelling evidence that he had just returned 
from a bar with her; that he denied knowing anything about her 
stabbing but told his roommate in a recorded voicemail that he 
had stabbed the victim and told Cepeda that the victim had hit 
him with a beer bottle; and that the victim, in the ambulance to 
the hospital where she soon died, identified the defendant as 
the person who had stabbed her.  Based on this evidence alone, 
there could be no reasonable doubt that the defendant stabbed 
the victim and lied about it to the police. 
 
The statements that the defendant claims should have been 
suppressed provided his most favorable version of events:  an 
escalating argument about drinking, culminating in an assault by 
the victim, first with a beer bottle and then with a folding 
13 
 
knife, which the defendant wrested from the victim and used to 
stab her multiple times before apologizing and helping her into 
bed and calling 911.  It was this narrative that, if credited, 
permitted him to claim that he acted in self-defense or, if that 
fell short, that he should be convicted only of manslaughter 
because the killing was mitigated by reasonable provocation, 
heat of passion in sudden combat, or the excessive use of force 
in self-defense.7   In short, the admission of this evidence, if 
credited, gave him his best chance at an acquittal or a lesser 
verdict.  Under these circumstances, the admission of this 
evidence did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice because we are substantially confident 
that, had this evidence been suppressed, the jury verdict would 
have been the same.  Commonwealth v. Ruddock, 428 Mass. 288, 292 
n.3 (1998). 
 
2.  Admission in evidence of defendant's purported 
invocation of silence.  The defendant also contends that the 
admission in evidence of Cepeda's answer to the prosecutor's 
question, "Did [the defendant] say anything else?" compromised 
7 Defense counsel in his opening statement claimed that the 
Commonwealth would be unable to prove that the defendant had not 
acted in self-defense.  In closing argument, defense counsel 
stated, "If, in fact, it occurred as the defendant subsequently 
told the police, that is, as a result of this physical 
altercation, if you accept that version, then, while he is 
responsible, it would not be murder, but it would be . . . 
manslaughter." 
                     
14 
 
the defendant's constitutional right to silence. We recognize 
that "Miranda warnings contain an 'implicit assurance that a 
defendant's silence after such warnings will carry no penalty,' 
and due process requires that, when in the hands of the police, 
a defendant must be able to 'invoke core constitutional rights 
without fear of making implied or adoptive admissions.'" 
Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 Mass. 61, 73 (2010), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Peixoto, 430 Mass. 654, 657, 658-659 (2000). 
See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).  Where there 
was no objection to the question, and no motion to strike the 
answer, we consider whether the error, if any, created a 
substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice.  Beneche, 
supra at 76.  We conclude that, even if the admission of this 
evidence were error, it did not create a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice in this case. 
 
Although we recognize the risk that the jury may have made 
an adverse inference that the defendant did not want to tell the 
officer what really happened because he had committed the 
stabbing, we are confident that this adverse inference would 
have added little to the overwhelming weight of the evidence of 
the defendant's guilt.  The prosecutor in closing argument 
referred to this testimony, but suggested that it showed the 
defendant's lack of empathy for the victim, not his fear of the 
15 
 
consequences of telling the truth.8  This inference was supported 
more strongly by other testimony, including his demeanor during 
the recorded phone call to his roommate and his characterization 
of the victim as "the Puerto Rican."  Therefore, we are 
substantially confident that, if this testimony had never been 
heard by the jury, their verdict would have been the same.  See 
id. at 75-76 (although defendant's statement, "I don't want to 
talk about it," "should not have reached the jury, and the 
prosecutor should not have mentioned it in the closing argument, 
. . . [it] did not cause a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice"). 
 
3.  Dying declaration.  The defendant argues that the judge 
erred by permitting paramedic Sean Murphy to testify, over the 
defendant's objection, that the victim, while being transported 
to the hospital, asserted that her "husband" "did this to 
[her]."  We conclude that the victim's statements were properly 
admitted as dying declarations. 
 
"[A] victim's out-of-court statement may qualify as a dying 
declaration if the 'statement [is] made . . . under the belief 
of imminent death and [the declarant] died shortly after making 
the statement, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the 
8 The prosecutor in closing argument said:  "Officer Cepeda 
says to him, after [the victim] was taken away but before they 
made any decision to arrest him:  'She's still alive.  Is there 
anything else you want to tell me?'  'No.'  Not good, what 
hospital is she going to, but no." 
                     
16 
 
declarant believed to be the declarant's own impending death or 
that of a co-victim.'"  Commonwealth v. Middlemiss, 465 Mass. 
627, 632 (2013), quoting Mass. G. Evid. § 804 (b) (2) (2013).9  
The victim's belief in her impending death may be inferred from 
the character of the injury.  Commonwealth v. Key, 381 Mass. 19, 
25 (1980).  The judge, and then the jury, must both determine 
whether the requirements for admission have been met by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 
Mass. 236, 251 n.16 (2008), quoting Key, 381 Mass. at 22.10 
 
The evidence was more than sufficient to support the 
judge's finding that the victim's statements met this 
evidentiary standard.  When the victim made the statements, she 
had been stabbed eight times, and four of her wounds were 
independently life threatening.  The wounds penetrated the 
victim's lung and spleen, causing profuse bleeding and affecting 
9 The admission of a dying declaration does not implicate 
the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation.  
Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 Mass. 236, 249-251 (2008), quoting 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004).  The 
constitutional right "is most naturally read as a reference to 
the right of confrontation at common law," Crawford, supra at 
54, and the dying declaration was recognized at common law as an 
exception to the right of confrontation when the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution was adopted.  Id. at 56 & n.6.  
See Nesbitt, supra at 250. 
 
10 The judge in this case instructed the jury that they 
could consider this evidence only if they were to find that the 
statements met the requirements for dying declarations by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
                     
17 
 
her breathing.11  The victim was pale and distraught, and 
seemingly in pain.  At the apartment, the victim pleaded, "I 
don't want to die," and, "Please don't let me die," which she 
repeated multiple times.  In the ambulance, the paramedics noted 
that the victim had no palpable blood pressure.  In persuading 
her to allow the insertion of an IV, a paramedic informed her 
that she was "very sick."  She made the declarations regarding 
who "did this to [her]" in the ambulance, and died less than 
five hours later.  See Middlemiss, supra at 632; Nesbitt, supra 
at 252. 
 
The defendant acknowledges that the admission of the 
victim's statements is consistent with the standard articulated 
in our decisions in Middlemiss, 465 Mass. at 631-632 and 
Nesbitt, 452 Mass. at 251-252, but urges us to adhere to the 
stricter requirements of older cases, where we held that a dying 
declaration was not admissible "unless all hope of recovery has 
gone from the mind of the declarant, and [s]he speaks under a 
sense of impending death."  Commonwealth v. Polian, 288 Mass. 
494, 497 (1934), and cases cited.  We decline to adopt the 
defendant's proposed test.  The current standard appropriately 
ensures that admission of the dying declaration is necessary 
(because it requires that the declarant has died) and that the 
11 The medical examiner testified that, by the time of her 
death, the victim had lost approximately 1.2 liters of blood. 
                     
18 
 
statement is trustworthy (because it requires that the declarant 
fear that death is imminent).  See, e.g., M.S. Brodin & M. 
Avery, Massachusetts Evidence § 8.4.1 at 491 (8th ed. 2007).  
The judge did not err in admitting the victim's statements as 
dying declarations. 
 
4.  Prior bad acts.  At trial, the Commonwealth elicited 
evidence of prior bad acts from two witnesses.  First, the 
victim's mother testified that she twice heard the victim tell 
the defendant to stop drinking, and that, a few days before the 
victim was killed, she saw the defendant pull the victim's arm 
after she told him that he should leave before he got drunk.  
After defense counsel objected to the testimony, the judge 
instructed the jury that the evidence was admitted for the sole 
purpose of establishing the defendant's state of mind and the 
relationship between the defendant and the victim.  In addition, 
the taxicab driver, who had driven the defendant and the victim 
on multiple occasions, testified over objection that, a few 
months before her death, the victim said that she was expecting 
a baby and would take it to Puerto Rico if the defendant did not 
"do right."12 
 
The defendant argues that this evidence was too remote to 
rationally prove any issue at trial, and unduly prejudicial to 
12 The taxicab driver later told the defendant that the 
victim's threat was not serious, and she had said it just to 
worry him.  The victim's autopsy revealed no signs of a pregnancy. 
                     
19 
 
the defendant.  "While evidence of the defendant's prior bad 
acts is not admissible to show bad character or propensity to 
commit a crime, . . . such evidence is admissible if relevant to 
show the defendant's motive, intent, or state of mind."  
(Citations omitted.)  Beneche, 458 Mass. at 80.  "To be 
sufficiently probative the evidence must be connected with the 
facts of the case [and] not be too remote in time."  
Commonwealth v. Butler, 445 Mass. 568, 574 (2005), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Barrett, 418 Mass. 788, 794 (1994).  The judge 
also must find that the probative value of the evidence in 
question outweighs undue prejudice to the defendant.  Butler, 
supra, quoting Barrett, supra.  We uphold a judge's decision to 
admit prior bad acts absent an abuse of discretion.  
Commonwealth v. Sharpe, 454 Mass. 135, 143 (2009), citing 
Commonwealth v. Valentin, 420 Mass. 263, 270 (1995). 
 
The evidence reflecting the victim's prior dissatisfaction 
with the defendant's drinking illustrated the nature of their 
relationship and suggested a motive for the killing:  conflict 
about his excessive drinking.  See Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 
Mass. 244, 269-270 (1982) ("prosecution [is] entitled to present 
as full a picture as possible of the events surrounding the 
incident itself" lest murder appear "as an essentially 
inexplicable act of violence").  Where the evidence was 
20 
 
accompanied by the judge's limiting instruction, we find no 
error in its admission. 
 
We do not, however, see the relevance of the victim's 
musing about returning to Puerto Rico if she had a baby and the 
defendant did not "do right," where there was no evidence that 
the victim was pregnant when she was killed or that there was 
discussion on the night of the killing about the possibility of 
her return to Puerto Rico.  But we also see no risk of prejudice 
to the defendant arising from its admission, where it was not 
clear what the victim meant by "do right," and where there was 
no suggestion that the defendant had abused the victim or wished 
to shirk his obligations if he were to father a child with the 
victim.  If it were error to admit this testimony, it was not 
prejudicial error. 
 
5.  Jury instructions regarding intoxication.  At the close 
of the evidence, the judge instructed the jury on the elements 
of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, as well as the 
lesser included offenses of murder in the second degree and 
manslaughter.  The judge gave the following instruction on 
intoxication after explaining murder in the first degree and its 
lesser included offenses:  "In determining whether the 
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the 
defendant's intent to commit the offenses I have just defined 
21 
 
for you, you should consider all credible evidence relevant to 
the defendant's intent, including any credible evidence of the 
effect of drug or alcohol impairment on the defendant."  The 
judge did not instruct the jury that they could consider any 
credible evidence of the defendant's consumption of alcohol in 
determining whether the defendant committed the killing with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, an instruction that in substance is 
required where there is evidence that the defendant was under 
the influence of alcohol at the time of the killing.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, 459 Mass. 794, 798 (2011) ("It should 
have been made clear to the jury that they could consider 
evidence of mental impairment on the specific question whether 
the murder was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty"); 
Commonwealth v. Perry, 385 Mass. 639, 648-649 (1982) (jury must 
be instructed that they may consider defendant's intoxication in 
determining whether killing was committed with extreme atrocity 
or cruelty).  See also Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 61-62 
(1999) & 49 (rev. 2013).  The defendant did not request such an 
instruction or object to its absence.  Where the only theory of 
murder in the first degree on which the jury found the defendant 
guilty was extreme atrocity or cruelty, the defendant on appeal 
argues that the absence of such an instruction was error that 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
22 
 
 
The absence of such an instruction was error.  See 
Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 797-799; Commonwealth v. McDermott, 393 
Mass. 451, 457-459 (1984).  There was sufficient evidence of the 
defendant's intoxication at the time of the killing to warrant 
the instruction, and the instruction that was given regarding 
alcohol impairment was limited to consideration of the 
defendant's intent.  "Intent and knowledge are not aspects of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty."  Rutkowski, supra at 797-798.13  
Therefore, the judge's instructions on intoxication would have 
been understood by the jury to relate only to the elements of 
premeditation and malice, and not to whether the defendant acted 
with extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
 
We turn now to whether the error in the jury instructions 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
The Commonwealth contends that there was no substantial 
likelihood because its theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty 
focused on the number of stab wounds the defendant inflicted on 
the victim and her degree of suffering, and these Cunneen 
13 "The Commonwealth need not prove that the extreme 
atrocity or cruelty was premeditated, . . . that the defendant 
intended to inflict extraordinary pain, . . . or that she knew 
that her acts were extremely atrocious or cruel" (citations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, 459 Mass. 794, 798 n.3 
(2011). 
 
                     
23 
 
factors would not be affected by the defendant's intoxication.14   
This overlooks the rationale for the jury instruction, which is 
that "the jury should reflect the community's conscience in 
determining what constitutes an extremely cruel or atrocious 
killing."  McDermott, 393 Mass. at 458.  "In that role, the jury 
must take a defendant's intoxication into account when 
evaluating cruelty or atrocity aside from any issue of intent."  
Id. at 458-459.  See Perry, 385 Mass. at 649, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 686 (1980) ("Consideration 
of the defendant's impaired capacity as well as the character of 
his acts is essential if the jury [is] to serve fully and fairly 
as the community's conscience in separating extreme atrocity or 
cruelty from that atrocity or cruelty inevitably included in the 
destruction of any human life"). 
 
Here, there was strong evidence of the defendant's 
intoxication at the time of the killing, and defense counsel in 
closing argument told the jury that "the consumption of alcohol 
that night could be key; it could be major."  But the jury 
instruction on intoxication "effectively removed what may have 
14 The Cunneen factors are:  the defendant's indifference to 
or pleasure in the victim's suffering, the victim's 
consciousness and degree of suffering, the extent of the 
victim's physical injuries, the number of blows delivered by the 
defendant, the manner and force with which the defendant 
delivered the blows, the weapon or weapons used by the 
defendant, and the disproportion between the means needed to 
cause death and the means used by the defendant.  Commonwealth 
v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983). 
                     
24 
 
been [his] only viable defense to the question of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty."  Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 799.  Where the 
jury did not find the defendant guilty on the theory of 
deliberate premeditation, where the defendant was the first to 
telephone 911 after the stabbing, and where there was no 
evidence of a history of domestic abuse, we cannot say that "we 
are substantially confident that, if the error had not been 
made, the jury verdict would have been the same."  Ruddock, 428 
Mass. at 292 n.3.  See Rutkowski, supra, citing Commonwealth v. 
Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992) ("[w]e cannot say that this 
error did not likely influence the jury's verdict").  We, 
therefore, vacate the verdict of murder in the first degree.  
Because the error affected only the jury's finding regarding the 
element of extreme atrocity or cruelty, and did not affect the 
jury's finding regarding the elements of murder in the second 
degree, the Commonwealth shall have the option of either 
proceeding with a new trial on the murder indictment or 
accepting a reduction of the verdict to murder in the second 
degree. 
 
6.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
considered the entire record pursuant to our obligation under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  With the exception of the jury 
instruction, discussed above, there was no error that created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
25 
 
 
Conclusion.  The defendant's conviction of murder in the 
first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity and cruelty is 
vacated.  The Commonwealth shall have the option of either 
proceeding with a new trial on the murder indictment or 
accepting a reduction of the verdict to murder in the second 
degree.  Within fourteen days of the issuance of this opinion, 
the Commonwealth shall inform this court whether it will move to 
have the defendant sentenced on the lesser offense of murder in 
the second degree or whether it will retry the defendant for 
murder in the first degree.  See Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 800.  
We will issue an appropriate rescript to the Superior Court 
after the Commonwealth informs us of its decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.