Title: State v. Luis Cardenas-Hernandez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP003605-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3605-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Luis Cardenas-Hernandez,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  214 Wis. 2d 71, 571 N.W.2d 406 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-PUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 30, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 27, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Stuart A. Schwartz 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Robert T. Ruth and Ruth Law Office, Madison and oral 
argument by Robert Ruth. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-cross petitioner the 
cause was argued by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney 
general. 
 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-3605-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent- 
          Cross Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Luis Cardenas-Hernandez,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.   This case raises two issues 
for review: 
(1) Whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion when it refused to admit into evidence in a criminal 
proceeding statements made by an assistant district attorney to 
the circuit court during preliminary proceedings in a prior  
criminal prosecution; and  
(2) Whether the absolute civil privilege for defamatory 
statements made in judicial proceedings applies in a criminal 
prosecution for defamation under Wis. Stat. § 942.01 when the 
statements are perjurious as well as defamatory. 
¶2 
This case is before the court on cross-petitions for 
review of a published opinion of the court of appeals, State v. 
Cardenas-Hernandez, 214 Wis. 2d 71, 571 N.W.2d 406 (Ct. App. 
1997).  The court of appeals affirmed in part, and reversed in 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
2 
part, the judgment of conviction entered by the Circuit Court 
for 
Dane 
County, 
Stuart 
A 
Schwartz, 
Judge, 
against 
the 
defendant, Luis Cardenas-Hernandez.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the defendant’s conviction on two counts of perjury in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.31, rejecting the defendant’s 
argument that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by refusing to admit into evidence statements made by 
the assistant district attorney in a prior criminal proceeding. 
 The court of appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction on two 
counts of criminal defamation, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 942.01, holding that statements made by the defendant during a 
John Doe proceeding are absolutely privileged. 
¶3 
The 
relevant 
facts 
of 
this 
case 
are 
somewhat 
complicated and involve three separate but related court 
proceedings.  In April 1991, the defendant was arrested and 
charged with various drug offenses.  On April 3, 1991, police 
officers executed a search warrant on the defendant’s home.  
During the search of the defendant’s home, Detective Mary 
Ricksecker discovered and seized a lock box and its contents.  
Detective Ricksecker listed the contents of the lock box as 
$5,600 cash.  Detective Ricksecker also reported that she 
discovered and seized another $600 from a dresser in the 
defendant’s home.  Sergeant Mark Bradley further reported that 
when the defendant’s clothing was later searched at the police 
station, money prerecorded as part of a drug sting operation 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
3 
conducted earlier that same day was found in the defendant’s 
wallet.1 
¶4 
The defendant ultimately pled no contest to the drug 
charges and received a six-year prison sentence. After his 
conviction, however, the defendant wrote a letter to Dane County 
Circuit Court Judge Angela B. Bartell, requesting a John Doe 
proceeding 
to 
investigate 
alleged 
misconduct 
by 
Detective 
Ricksecker and Sergeant Bradley.  Based on the defendant’s 
letter, Dane County Circuit Court Judge Robert A. DeChambeau 
conducted a John Doe proceeding pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 968.26 
to determine whether further action was necessary.  During the 
John Doe hearing, the defendant testified under oath that 
Sergeant Bradley had lied both when he reported that money he 
had found in the defendant’s wallet had been prerecorded and 
when he reported the defendant's home was less than 1,000 feet 
from a day care center.2  The defendant also testified that 
Detective Ricksecker had stolen $3,300 from the lock box in the 
defendant’s home when she searched it pursuant to the search 
warrant on April 3, 1991.  After conducting the John Doe 
                     
1 In separate searches, the officers discovered and seized 
$5,600 in cash from the defendant's lock box and $600 in cash 
from a dresser in the defendant's home on April 3, 1991 and 
$1,150 in cash from a bank safety deposit box on April 4, 1991. 
 In total, the officers seized approximately $7,350 in cash from 
the defendant.  
2 The defendant faced enhanced penalties in a drug case 
under Wis. Stat. § 161.495 because Sergeant Bradley reported 
that the distance between the defendant's home and the Pooh Bear 
Day Care Center was less than 1,000 feet. 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
4 
proceeding, Judge DeChambeau determined that no further action 
was necessary. 
¶5 
The State subsequently charged the defendant with two 
counts of perjury and two counts of criminal defamation as a 
result of the defendant’s alleged false testimony at the John 
Doe proceeding accusing the officers of stealing money from the 
lock box and of lying about his possession of prerecorded money. 
 At the perjury trial, the defendant attempted to admit into 
evidence statements made by Assistant District Attorney Ann 
Smith (ADA Smith) who had prosecuted the defendant’s original 
drug conviction.  During the preliminary proceedings in the 
original drug prosecution, ADA Smith repeatedly argued to the 
circuit court that the defendant likely had the ability to post 
bail since the officers had found "over $8,000 in cash" when 
executing the search warrant on the defendant's home.3  In the 
                     
3 On April 5, 1991, during a bond hearing in the drug case, 
Assistant District Attorney Smith asserted to the circuit court: 
[I]t appears that Mr. Hernandez has an ability to post 
cash bail.  Some of the charges arise from the 
execution of a search warrant on the late evening of 
April 3rd.  During the course of the search warrant 
execution over $8,000 in cash was found in $100 and 
$50 bills. 
 
On 
April 
8, 
1991, 
during 
the 
defendant's 
initial 
appearance, ADA Smith again stated to the court: "I'd like to 
add that Mr. Hernandez has a significant ability to pay . . . . 
 Over $8,000 in cash was seized pursuant to the execution of a 
search warrant, all in $50 and $100 bills." 
Finally on April 11, 1991, during a separate bail hearing, 
ADA Smith stated to the court that "when the Metro unit executed 
a search warrant on [the defendant's] home . . . back in April, 
they found $8,000 in cash . . . ." 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
5 
perjury trial, the defendant attempted to introduce ADA Smith’s 
statements to corroborate his claim that $8,800, rather than the 
$5,600 reported by Detective Ricksecker, was in the lock box 
when the officers seized its contents on April 3, 1991. 
¶6 
At a pretrial evidentiary hearing in the perjury 
trial, ADA Smith testified that while she had no first-hand 
knowledge of the amount of cash found in the defendant’s home on 
April 3, 1991, she normally has a basis for the representations 
she makes to the court, and that she was sure she had a similar 
basis for her statements in this case.  The defendant testified 
at the pretrial hearing that he heard ADA Smith’s statements 
regarding the amount the officers seized during the search of 
his home.  The defendant also testified that he never forgot ADA 
Smith’s 
statements. 
 
On 
cross-examination, 
the 
defendant 
admitted that he never mentioned ADA Smith’s statements in the 
letter he sent to initiate the John Doe proceeding or at the 
John Doe proceeding before Judge DeChambeau.  The circuit court 
declined to admit ADA Smith’s statements in the perjury trial, 
reasoning 
that 
the 
statements 
were 
not 
evidence, 
were 
inadmissible hearsay, and, if offered for the nonhearsay purpose 
of showing the defendant’s intent, were not admissible due to a 
lack of foundation. 
¶7 
At the circuit court, the defendant also moved to 
dismiss the defamation charges on the theory that his sworn 
statements in the John Doe proceeding were absolutely privileged 
because he made those statements as a witness in a judicial 
proceeding.  The circuit court denied the defendant’s motion, 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
6 
concluding that defamatory statements enjoy only a conditional 
privilege in a criminal defamation case and that this limited 
privilege did not apply in this case because the defendant 
abused the privilege by recklessly disregarding the falsity of 
his statements.  A jury convicted the defendant on two counts of 
criminal defamation and two counts of perjury.  The defendant 
appealed from the circuit court’s judgment of conviction. 
¶8 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed 
the 
defendant’s 
conviction on two counts of criminal defamation.  The court held 
that the statements made in judicial proceedings are absolutely 
privileged in a prosecution for criminal defamation.  The court 
therefore concluded that the defendant could not be charged with 
and convicted of criminal defamation for his statements in the 
John Doe proceeding.   
¶9 
The court of appeals also affirmed the defendant’s 
conviction for perjury.  The court determined that the circuit 
court could reasonably conclude that ADA Smith’s assertions that 
more than $8,000 was seized during the search of defendant’s 
home  was not inconsistent with the officers’ statements that 
$5,600 was found in the defendant’s lock box.  The court of 
appeals 
also 
determined 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
properly 
exercised its discretion in determining ADA Smith’s statements 
were not relevant to establish the defendant’s intent, belief, 
or state of mind when he accused the officers of misconduct. 
¶10 The defendant appeals from the court of appeals' 
determination that the statements of ADA Smith in the drug case 
were not admissible in the subsequent perjury case.  The State 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
7 
cross appeals, claiming that the court of appeals improperly 
applied the absolute privilege to the defamatory and perjurious 
statements the defendant made during the John Doe proceedings. 
¶11 The first issue raised in this case is whether the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it 
refused to admit into evidence in the defendant's perjury trial 
statements made by ADA Smith to the circuit court during 
preliminary proceedings in a prior drug case.  The defendant 
argues that ADA Smith's statements were not hearsay and were 
admissible as admissions of a party-opponent under Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.01(4)(b); that the statements were admissible for the non-
hearsay purpose of establishing his state of mind at the time he 
accused the officers of misconduct; and that the statements were 
admissible to discredit witnesses who testified at the perjury 
trial.  The defendant additionally argues that to exclude ADA 
Smith's statements denied him of his right to a fair trial.  We 
address in turn each of the defendant's arguments. 
¶12 The question of whether to admit evidence is a 
decision left to the discretion of the circuit court.  See In 
Interest of Michael R.B., 175 Wis. 2d 713, 723, 499 N.W.2d 641 
(1993); State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 
(1983).  We will uphold a circuit court's discretionary decision 
to admit or exclude evidence if the decision has "a reasonable 
basis" and was made "in accordance with accepted legal standards 
and in accordance with the facts of record." Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 
at 342 (citation omitted); see Grube v. Daun, 213 Wis. 2d 533, 
542, 570 N.W.2d 851 (1997). 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
8 
¶13 We are first asked to determine whether a defendant in 
a criminal proceeding may introduce into evidence as an 
admission by a party-opponent under Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(b) a 
statement made by a prosecutor in a prior criminal proceeding.  
The defendant complains that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in excluding from the perjury trial the 
in-court statements ADA Smith made during the drug case.  The 
defendant contends that ADA Smith’s statements are not hearsay 
when offered to establish the amount of cash the officers seized 
from the defendant’s home because those statements constitute an 
admission of a party-opponent (the State) excluded under Wis. 
Stat. § 908.01(4)(b) from the general hearsay rule.  We 
conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the circuit court 
properly exercised its discretion in determining that ADA 
Smith's statements were not admissible as admissions of a party-
opponent. 
 
¶14 The general rule in Wisconsin is that hearsay is 
inadmissible as evidence.  See Wis. Stat. § 908.02.  Hearsay is 
"a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted."  Wis. Stat. § 908.01(3).  A 
statement, however, is not inadmissible hearsay if the statement 
is offered against a party to the proceeding and is: 
 
1. 
The party’s own statement, in either the party’s 
individual or a representative capacity, or 
 
2. 
A statement of which the party has manifested the 
party’s adoption or belief in its truth, or 
 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
9 
3. 
A statement by a person authorized by the party 
to make a statement concerning the subject, or 
 
4. 
A statement by the party’s agent or servant 
concerning a matter within the scope of the agent’s or 
servant’s 
agency or 
employment, 
made 
during the 
existence of the relationship . . . . 
 
Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(b).4 
¶15 No Wisconsin court has considered whether factual 
assertions made by an attorney in one criminal proceeding are 
admissible against the client in a subsequent proceeding under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(b).5  Except for a few minor grammatical 
differences, Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(b) mirrors FED. R. EVID. 
                     
4 The defendant claims that ADA Smith's statements during 
the drug case meet subsections 2, 3, and 4 of Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.01(4)(b).  We agree with the court of appeals that ADA 
Smith's statements do not fit into subsection 2 of Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.01(4)(b), since no evidence has been offered to show that 
the State manifested its adoption of or belief in ADA Smith's 
statements.  See State v. Cardenas-Hernandez, 214 Wis. 2d 71, 
89, 571 N.W.2d 406 (Ct. App. 1997).  We therefore focus our 
inquiry on whether ADA Smith's statements are admissible under 
the third or fourth subsection of Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(b).  In 
this case, whether ADA Smith appeared before the circuit court 
as a person authorized by the State under subsection 3 or as the 
State's agent under subsection 4, we apply the same test to 
determine 
whether 
her 
statements 
in 
the 
drug 
case 
were 
admissible as admissions of a party opponent.     
5 We note that The Judicial Council Committee Note to Wis. 
Stat. § 908.01(4)(b) states:  "Wisconsin's cases have implied 
that evidentiary admissions by attorneys are admissions of the 
client . . . ." 59 Wis. 2d at R243 (1973).  As the court of 
appeals pointed out, however, the cases cited in this note "are 
all civil cases and merely imply, without deciding, that an 
attorney's statement may be considered an 'admission' of the 
client."  Cardenas-Hernandez, 214 Wis. 2d at 90.  The cases 
cited in the note, therefore, do not aid our analysis in this 
case.    
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
10
801(d)(2).6  In such situations, Wisconsin courts look to federal 
cases interpreting and applying the federal rules of evidence as 
persuasive authority.  See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 
817, 830 n.6, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995); accord Neylan v. 
Vorwald, 124 Wis. 2d 85, 368 N.W.2d 648 (1985); In re Estate of 
Kersten, 71 Wis. 2d 757, 763, 239 N.W.2d 86 (1976). 
¶16 To guide our analysis of Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(b), we 
therefore turn to federal court decisions interpreting FED. R. 
EVID. 801(d)(2).  Federal courts have concluded that the 
defendant and the government, as represented by its prosecutors, 
constitute party-opponents of one another in a criminal case.  
See United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 131 (1st Cir. 1988); 
United States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
Federal courts have also determined that an attorney may be the 
agent of his or her client for purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(C)-
(D).  See United States v. Harris, 914 F.2d 927, 931 (7th Cir. 
1990); United States v. McClellan, 868 F.2d 210, 215 n.9 (7th 
Cir. 1989);  see also United States v. Margiotta, 662 F.2d 131, 
142-43 (2nd Cir. 1981).  Accordingly, federal courts applying FED. 
                     
6 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) provides in pertinent part that a 
statement is not hearsay if: 
The statement is offered against a party and is 
(A) the party's own statement, in either an individual 
or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of 
which the party has manifested an adoption or belief 
in its truth, or (C) a statement by person authorized 
by the party to make a statement concerning the 
subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or 
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the 
agency or employment, made during the existence of the 
relationship, . . . . 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
11
R. EVID. 801(d)(2) have concluded that statements made by defense 
counsel during criminal proceedings may be admissible at trial 
as admissions of the defendant.  See, e.g., Harris, 914 F.2d at 
931; United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 33 (2nd Cir. 1984). 
¶17 In McKeon, the court considered the admissibility of  
statements made by a defense attorney in the opening statement 
in which he described the defendant’s wife’s role in certain 
incidents.  A mistrial occurred before the defense presented its 
case.  See McKeon, 738 F.2d at 28.  During the opening statement 
in the second trial, the same defense attorney described the 
wife’s role in a manner that was inconsistent with that 
described in the first trial.  See id.  The prosecution sought 
to introduce the opening statements from the first trial under 
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) as an admission of the defendant and 
relevant to the defendant's consciousness of guilt.  See id. at 
29.  
¶18 The McKeon court concluded that the defense attorney’s 
prior opening statements were not per se inadmissible in a 
subsequent criminal case.  See id. at 31.  To avoid "entrenching 
upon other important policies," however, the court circumscribed 
the evidentiary use of such prior statements.  Id. at 31-33.  
The court detailed three specific requirements that must be met 
before a defense counsel’s prior statements are admissible as 
evidence in a subsequent criminal case.  First, the circuit 
court must be satisfied that the prior statement is an assertion 
of fact that is inconsistent with the assertion at a later 
trial.  See id. at 33.  The inconsistency in the statements must 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
12
be "clear and of a quality which obviates any need for the trier 
of fact to explore other events at the prior trial."  Id.  
Second, the circuit court must determine that the statements of 
counsel are the equivalent of testimonial statements by the 
defendant; there must be something beyond the attorney-client 
relationship to show participation by the defendant.  See id.  
Third, the trial court must, in a hearing outside the jury, 
"determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the inference 
the prosecution seeks to draw from the inconsistency is a fair 
one and that an innocent explanation . . . does not exist."  Id. 
 If 
opposing 
inferences 
are 
of 
equal 
weight, 
or 
the 
preponderance of evidence favors the innocent explanation, the 
prior statement should be excluded.  See id.  Applying these 
three criteria, the McKeon court concluded that the defense 
counsel’s prior opening statements were admissible in the 
subsequent trial as an admission of his client under FED. R. EVID. 
801(d)(2)(B) and (C). 
¶19 Although the specific inquiry in McKeon involved a 
statement made by a criminal defense attorney, analogous 
reasoning is applicable to statements made by an assistant 
district attorney, and federal courts have held that the 
criteria set forth in McKeon apply equally to statements made by 
such prosecutors.  See, e.g., United States v. DeLoach, 34 F.3d 
1001 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Orena, 32 F.3d 704, 716 
(2nd Cir. 1994); United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797 (2nd Cir. 
1991), rev’d on other grounds, 505 U.S. 317 (1992). 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
13
¶20 In 
Salerno, 
the 
court 
considered 
whether 
a 
prosecutor’s opening and closing statements in a prior criminal 
case were admissible as admissions of a party-opponent in a 
subsequent criminal case in which the government presented an 
inconsistent theory of prosecution.  See Salerno, 937 F.2d at 
810-11.  Relying on the reasoning of McKeon, the court refused 
to adopt a per se prohibition on the use of the prosecutor’s 
prior statements in subsequent criminal trials.  The Salerno 
court explained: 
 
To hold otherwise would not only invite abuse and 
sharp practice but would also weaken confidence in the 
justice system itself by denying the function of 
trials as truth-seeking proceedings.  That function 
cannot be affirmed if parties are free, wholly without 
explanation, to make 
fundamental 
changes 
in the 
version of facts within their personal knowledge 
between trials and to conceal knowledge between trials 
and to conceal these changes from the final trier of 
fact. 
Id. at 811 (quoting McKeon, 738 F.2d at 31).  Recognizing that 
"serious 
collateral 
consequences" 
could 
result 
from 
the 
"unbridled 
use 
of 
such 
statements," 
the 
Salerno 
court 
circumscribed the use of a prosecutor’s prior opening statement 
in a subsequent criminal trial by applying the three criteria 
established in McKeon.  Id.  Finding that the use of the 
prosecutor’s prior statement satisfied the McKeon criteria, the 
Salerno court determined that the statement was admissible in 
the subsequent criminal trial.  See id. 811-12.  The court 
concluded that "the jury is at least entitled to know that the 
government at one time believed, and stated, that its proof 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
14
established something different from what it currently claims." 
 Id. (quoting United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253, 1260 
(2nd Cir. 1991)). 
¶21 We find persuasive the reasoning of Salerno and 
McKeon.  We therefore refuse to adopt a per se prohibition on 
the use of prior statements of prosecutors as admissions of a 
party-opponent under Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(b).  We agree that 
to adopt such a rule could invite abuse and sharp practice by 
prosecutors and could weaken the public’s confidence in the 
justice system itself by denying the function of trials as 
truth-seeking proceedings.  See Salerno, 937 F.3d at 811; cf. 
McKeon, 738 F.2d at 31.  We also agree, however, that the use of 
a prosecutor’s prior statements must be circumscribed to avoid 
the possible collateral consequences that could result from 
unbridled use of such statements.  See DeLoach, 34 F.3d at 1005-
06; Orena, 32 F.3d at 716; Salerno, 937 F.2d at 811; cf. McKeon, 
738 F.2d at 31-33. 
¶22 Although not identical, concerns parallel to those 
raised by the McKeon court exist in admitting into evidence in a 
criminal trial unsworn statements made by a prosecutor in a 
prior criminal proceeding.  A particular prosecutor called to 
testify in a subsequent case may be forced to withdraw from that 
case due to statements that prosecutor made in a prior 
proceeding.  In addition, the relevant issues and applicable 
burdens may vary from one proceeding to another and could lead 
the jury to draw unfair inferences from inconsistent statements 
made by prosecutors in a prior proceeding.  Furthermore, 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
15
pursuing marginal or collateral matters could provoke further 
time-consuming and distracting litigation and may complicate the 
subsequent proceeding.  Finally, admitting prior statements of a 
prosecutor could expose the jury to statements that may 
otherwise be inadmissible or prejudicial and could deter the 
prosecutor from vigorous advocacy in preliminary proceedings. 
¶23 To avoid such collateral consequences, we conclude 
that a court should not admit into evidence in a criminal 
proceeding a prior statement made by a prosecutor unless the 
court concludes that the three guidelines established in McKeon, 
and applied in Salerno, Orena, and DeLoach, are satisfied.  
Applying those guidelines in this case, we conclude that 
statements ADA Smith made in the drug case were not admissible 
in the defendant’s perjury trial as admissions of a party-
opponent under Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(b). 
¶24 Upon review, we conclude that ADA Smith’s statements 
in the drug case fail the first McKeon guideline.  As we have 
explained, before a court admits into evidence a prosecutor’s 
prior statement, the court first "must be satisfied that the 
prior argument involves an assertion of fact inconsistent with 
similar assertions in a subsequent trial."  Salerno, 937 F.2d at 
811 (quoting McKeon, 738 F.2d at 33); see DeLoach, 34 F.3d at 
1005; Orena, 32 F.3d at 716.  Although ADA Smith’s statements to 
the circuit court in the drug case were factual assertions, 
those statements were not clearly inconsistent with the State’s 
assertions in the perjury trial.   
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
16
¶25 To persuade the circuit court that the defendant 
likely could post bail in the drug case, ADA Smith asserted that 
officers found "more than $8,000" in cash during the execution 
of the search warrant on the defendant’s home.  At the perjury 
trial, Detective Ricksecker testified that she recovered $5,600 
from the lock box in the defendant’s home.  ADA Smith never 
asserted that more than $5,600 was found in the lock box.  Nor 
did the State ever contend after the drug case that the 
defendant likely could not post bail.  As the court of appeals 
noted, the more general statement of ADA Smith referred to the 
amount of cash found in the defendant’s entire house, while 
Detective Ricksecker's testimony referred only to the amount of 
cash found in the lock box.  ADA Smith’s assertion that more 
than $8,000 was found in the defendant’s entire home, although 
inaccurate, 
is 
not 
clearly 
inconsistent 
with 
Detective 
Ricksecker’s testimony in the perjury trial that only $5,600 was 
found 
in 
the 
defendant’s 
lock 
box. 
 
Although 
different 
inferences may be drawn from ADA Smith’s statements in the drug 
case, the factual assertions made by ADA Smith are not clearly 
inconsistent with the State’s position in the perjury case. 
¶26 We therefore conclude that the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion in determining that ADA Smith’s 
statements were not admissible in the perjury case as admissions 
of a party-opponent under Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(b). 
¶27 The defendant next argues that the statements made by 
ADA Smith in the drug case were admissible for the non-hearsay 
purpose of establishing the defendant's state of mind when he 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
17
accused the officers of stealing money from his lock box.  The 
defendant contends that he was relying on ADA Smith’s statements 
that over $8,000 was found in his home when he accused Detective 
Ricksecker of stealing money. 
¶28 As the court of appeals noted, the admission of 
contested evidence is dependent upon the presentation of a 
sufficient foundation establishing the relevancy of the evidence 
under Wis. Stat. § 901.04(1).  At the evidentiary hearing in the 
perjury 
case, 
the 
defendant 
testified 
that 
although 
he 
remembered ADA Smith’s statements, he never referred to those 
statements in his letter to the circuit court or in his 
testimony in the John Doe proceeding.  Because the defendant 
never cited ADA Smith’s statements prior to or during the John 
Doe proceeding, the circuit court concluded that the evidence 
did not sufficiently establish the necessary foundation upon 
which to base the admission of ADA Smith’s statements to 
establish the defendant’s state of mind.  The circuit court’s 
conclusion is supported by the record and is in accord with 
accepted legal standards.  We will not upset it. 
¶29 The defendant next argues that ADA Smith’s statements 
should have been admitted into evidence in the perjury trial for 
the purpose of discrediting witnesses who testified that only 
$5,600 was in the lock box and that the defendant was lying.  If 
ADA Smith’s statements were offered to discredit those witnesses 
by showing that there was in fact over $8,000 in the lock box, 
then the statements were offered to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted and admission of those statements is barred by 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
18
the hearsay rule.  In addition, since we have concluded that ADA 
Smith’s statements are not admissible as admissions of a party-
opponent, those statements cannot be attributed to other 
witnesses for the purpose of discrediting their testimony at the 
perjury trial. 
¶30 The defendant additionally argues that to exclude ADA 
Smith’s statements from the perjury trial deprived him of his 
right to a fair trial.  Whether a defendant’s right to present a 
defense was violated is a question of constitutional fact that 
this court reviews de novo.  See State v. Heft, 185 Wis. 2d 288, 
296, 517 N.W.2d 494 (1994).  In reviewing a question of 
constitutional fact, we accept the circuit court's findings of 
historical fact, unless those facts are clearly erroneous, but 
we independently apply those facts to the constitutional 
standard.  See State v. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 156, 165, 570 
N.W.2d 384 (1997). 
¶31 Citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), 
the defendant argues that because the right to offer testimony 
is 
constitutionally 
guaranteed 
by 
the 
Fifth, 
Sixth, 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, 
application of the State’s rules of evidence to bar ADA Smith’s 
testimony in his perjury trial violates his constitutional 
rights.  The defendant contends that ADA Smith’s statements 
provide powerful exculpatory evidence which must be admitted to 
guarantee a fair trial.  The defendant’s reliance on Chambers is 
misplaced. 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
19
¶32 The Court in Chambers did not hold that a defendant is 
denied a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s 
accusations whenever evidence critical to his argument is 
excluded.  See id. at 302.  Rather, the Court held only that 
under the facts presented in that case, the rulings of the trial 
court deprived Chambers of his right to a fair trial.  See id.  
The Court explained: "In reaching this judgment we establish no 
new principles of constitutional law.  Nor does our holding 
signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to 
the States in the establishment and implementation of their own 
criminal trial rules and procedures."  Id. at 302-03.  Chambers 
therefore does not create an absolute entitlement to introduce 
relevant evidence. 
¶33 This court has explained that while a court may not 
"deny [a] defendant a fair trial or the right to present a 
defense by the mechanistic application of rules of evidence," 
State v. DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d 774, 793, 456 N.W.2d 600 (1990), 
"[c]onfrontation and compulsory process only grant defendants 
the constitutional right to present relevant evidence not 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect."  State v. 
Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 646, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990).  Thus, 
there is no constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence. 
 See State v. Jackson, 188 Wis. 2d 187, 196, 525 N.W.2d 739 (Ct. 
App. 1994).  As we have explained above, ADA Smith’s statements 
in the drug case are hearsay and are not admissible as 
admissions of a party-opponent under Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(b). 
 In addition, the defendant failed to establish a proper 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
20
foundation upon which to introduce those statements for the non-
hearsay purpose of showing his state of mind when he accused the 
officers of misconduct.  Under the facts of this case, we are 
unconvinced that the circuit court applied the rules of evidence 
in a prejudicially mechanistic manner or that to exclude ADA 
Smith’s statements in any way deprived the defendant of his 
right to a fair trial. 
¶34 The second issue we address in this case is whether 
the absolute civil privilege for defamatory statements made in 
judicial proceedings7 applies in a criminal prosecution for 
defamation under Wis. Stat. § 942.01 when the statements are 
perjurious as well as defamatory.  After considering Wis. Stat. 
§ 942.01, its legislative history, and cases interpreting its 
language, the court of appeals concluded that the absolute 
privilege against civil liability for statements made in 
judicial proceedings also applies to bar prosecution for 
criminal defamation for those statements.  See Cardenas-
Hernandez, 214 Wis. 2d at 83-84.  We agree with the analysis and 
conclusion of the court of appeals. 
                     
7 Under current Wisconsin law, statements made by witnesses 
in judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged and cannot be 
the basis for civil liability for defamation or perjury, if 
those statements are relevant to the issues in the matter where 
the testimony is given.  See Spoehr v. Mittelstadt, 34 Wis. 2d 
653, 661, 150 N.W.2d 502 (1967); Keeley v. Great Northern R.R. 
Co., 156 Wis. 181, 187, 145 N.W. 664 (1914); Schultz v. Strauss, 
127 Wis. 325, 328, 106 N.W. 1066 (1906); Calkins v. Sumner, 13 
Wis. *193, *196-97 (1860).  
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
21
¶35 The defendant was charged and convicted of two counts 
of criminal defamation, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 942.01(1), 
for statements he made during the John Doe proceeding.  At the 
circuit court, the defendant moved to dismiss the two defamation 
charges on the ground that this sworn testimony in the John Doe 
proceeding 
was 
absolutely 
privileged 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 942.01(3).  The circuit court denied the defendant's motion.  
The court of appeals reversed the defendant's convictions for 
criminal defamation, concluding that the defendant's statements 
were absolutely privileged.  On appeal, the State argues that no 
privilege from criminal prosecution exists for statements made 
in a judicial proceeding that constitute both defamation and 
perjury.  Resolution of this issue requires the court to 
interpret the language of Wis. Stat. § 942.01 and to consider 
the scope of the application of the common law privilege for 
statements made in judicial proceedings. 
¶36 Statutory interpretation is a question of law.  See  
Stockbridge Sch. Dist. v. DPI, 202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 
96 (1996); Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 
548 N.W.2d 519 (1996).  This court reviews questions of law 
independent of the decisions of the circuit court and the court 
of appeals.  See Jungbluth, 201 Wis. 2d at 327.  The ultimate 
goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect 
to the intent of the legislature.  See Stockbridge Sch. Dist., 
202 Wis. 2d at 219.  To achieve this goal, we first look to the 
plain language of the statute.  See Jungbluth, 201 Wis.2d at 
327.  If a statute is unambiguous, this court will apply the 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
22
ordinary and accepted meaning of the language of the statute to 
the facts before it.  See Swatek v. County of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 
47, 57, 531 N.W.2d 45 (1995).  If a statute does not clearly set 
forth the legislative intent, we may look at the history, scope, 
context, subject matter, and object of the statute.  See id. 
¶37 We therefore first look to the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 942.01 to determine whether it clearly sets forth the intent 
of the legislature.  The pertinent elements of criminal 
defamation under Wis. Stat. § 942.01 are: 
 
(1) Whoever with intent to defame communicates any 
defamatory matter to a third person without the 
consent of the person defamed is guilty of a Class A 
misdemeanor. 
 
(2) Defamatory matter is anything which exposes the 
other to hatred, contempt, ridicule, degradation or 
disgrace in society or injury in the other’s business 
or occupation. 
 
(3) This section does not apply if the defamatory 
matter was true and was communicated with good motives 
and for justifiable ends or if the communication was 
otherwise privileged. 
(emphasis added). 
¶38 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 942.01(3) provides 
that criminal defamation does not apply to communications that 
are "otherwise privileged."  The issue in this case then is 
whether defamatory statements made by witnesses in a John Doe 
proceeding 
are 
"otherwise 
privileged" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 942.01(3).  The term "otherwise privileged" is not defined by 
statute.  Nor does Wis. Stat. § 942.01 explain which privileges 
are recognized under subsection (3).  We agree with the court of 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
23
appeals that the "unexplained reach" of this privilege renders 
Wis. Stat. § 942.01(3) ambiguous.  See State v. Gilles, 173 
Wis. 2d 101, 111, 496 N.W.2d 133 (Ct. App. 1992).  We therefore 
turn to the legislative history of this section to ascertain the 
intent of the legislature.  See Swatek, 192 Wis. 2d at 57. 
¶39 In Gilles, the court of appeals construed the language 
of Wis. Stat. § 942.01(3) in the context of a conditional 
privilege.  After finding Wis. Stat. § 942.01(3) ambiguous, the 
court turned to its legislative history and, in particular, to 
the Legislative Council Comment to the criminal defamation 
statute, originally enacted as § 342.01, which states: 
 
 
There are situations in which the communication of 
defamatory 
matter 
is 
not 
criminal. . . . 
The 
communication is not criminal if the defamatory matter 
was true and communicated with good motives and for 
justifiable 
ends. . . . 
Nor 
is 
the 
communication 
criminal if it was otherwise privileged. . . . [T]he 
common-law 
privileges 
relating 
to 
defamation 
are 
preserved.  In general they are the same as the 
privileges relating to civil law defamation.  See 
Restatements, Torts, sec. 585 to 612 (1934). 
5 Wisconsin Legislative Council, Judiciary Committee Report on 
the Criminal Code, comment to proposed § 342.01 at 91 (1953).  
Based on this Comment, the court of appeals in Gilles concluded 
that the conditional privilege for publication of information to 
one with a common interest, as recognized in civil defamation 
actions, also applied in prosecutions for criminal defamation 
under Wis. Stat. § 942.01.  See Gilles, 173 Wis. 2d at 111. 
¶40 As the defendant points out, the Legislative Council 
Comment indicates that "the common-law privileges relating to 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
24
defamation" are preserved in Wis. Stat. § 942.01(3) and that, in 
general, "they are the same as the privileges relating to civil 
law defamation."  In addition, to clarify the common-law 
privileges relating to civil law defamation, the Comment cites 
the Restatement of Torts §§ 585-612, which provides absolute 
immunity to statements made by counsel, parties, and witnesses 
in judicial proceedings.  Section 588, in particular, provides 
that "a witness is absolutely privileged to publish false and 
defamatory matter of another in communications preliminary to a 
proposed judicial proceeding and as a part of a judicial 
proceeding in which he is testifying, if it has some relation 
thereto." 
¶41 We agree with the court of appeals that the language 
of  Wis. Stat. § 942.01, its legislative history, and the cases 
interpreting it indicate that the legislature intended that the 
common-law absolute privilege for statements made in judicial 
proceedings applies to criminal as well as civil defamation: 
 
There is nothing in the language of the statute, its 
legislative history, or any other materials the State 
has brought to our attention, that suggests that the 
legislature intended to exclude the absolute privilege 
for perjurious testimony in judicial proceedings, 
available 
in 
civil 
defamation actions, 
from the 
privileges 
applicable 
under 
§ 
942.01(3). 
 
The 
Legislative 
Council 
Comments' 
reference 
to 
the 
Restatement of Torts section containing this privilege 
convinces us that this privilege does apply to the 
crime of defamation.  
Cardenas-Hernandez, 214 Wis. 2d at 83-84. 
¶42 The State argues that no privilege should be afforded 
the 
defendant's 
defamatory 
statements 
in 
the 
John 
Doe 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
25
proceedings because it is impossible to separate the perjurious 
elements from the defamatory elements in those statements.  We 
find this argument unpersuasive.  Although the defendant’s 
defamatory words may not be severable from his perjurious words, 
the individual charges brought by the State are severable.  In 
this case, the defendant was charged and convicted for perjury, 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.31, for his sworn testimony at 
the John Doe proceeding.  Section 946.31, unlike § 942.01(3), 
does not provide an exception for "otherwise privileged" 
statements.  The proper sanction in this case, therefore, was 
criminal prosecution for perjury under Wis. Stat. § 946.31.8 
¶43 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the court of 
appeals' decision reversing the defendant’s two convictions for 
criminal defamation because we conclude that the absolute civil 
privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings applies to 
criminal defamation under Wis. Stat. § 942.01(3).  We also 
affirm the defendant's two convictions for perjury because we 
                     
8 The 
State 
additionally 
argues 
that 
public 
policy 
considerations do not support recognizing an absolute privilege 
against prosecution for criminal defamation for statements made 
in judicial proceedings.  Our task in this case is not to weigh 
public policy but to interpret Wis. Stat. § 942.01.  "[T]he 
Legislature settles and declares the public policy of a state, 
and not the court."  Hengel v. Hengel, 122 Wis. 2d 737, 742, 365 
N.W.2d 16 (Ct.App.1985) (citing Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 
327, 351, 133 N.W. 209 (1911)).  In enacting Wis. Stat. 
§ 942.01(3), the legislature apparently concluded that public 
policy 
was 
best 
served 
by 
recognizing 
such 
an 
absolute 
privilege.  We therefore reject the State's argument without 
further discussion. 
 
No.  96-3605-CR 
 
26
conclude the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in 
excluding the statements of ADA Smith.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
1