Title: STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. RUNNING
Citation: 2011 OK 75
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: August 17, 2011

STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. RUNNING Annotate this Case STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. RUNNING 2011 OK 75 Case Number: SCBD-5737 Decided: 08/17/2011 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION, Complainant, v. JON R. RUNNING, Respondent. BAR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING PURSUANT TO RULE 6 ¶0 Complainant, Oklahoma Bar Association, alleged the Respondent had committed professional misconduct, and the imposition of discipline is warranted. The Professional Responsibility Tribunal recommended that the Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for eighteen months. RESPONDENT IS SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR TWO YEARS AND A DAY FROM THE DATE THIS OPINION BECOMES FINAL; AND ORDERED TO PAY COSTS Gina L. Hendryx, General Counsel, OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Complainant. Jon R. Running, Dallas, Texas, Respondent Pro Se. COMBS, J. ¶1 On March 17, 2011, Complainant, Oklahoma Bar Association (Complainant), filed a formal disciplinary complaint pursuant to Rule 6, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (RGDP), 5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A, which alleged Respondent, Jon R. Running (Respondent), continued to actively engage in the practice of law during a time period when he was administratively suspended from the practice of law for nonpayment of membership dues. BACKGROUND ¶2 Each active member of the Oklahoma Bar Association (Bar) shall pay his or her bar dues annually on or before the 2nd of January. ¶3 One of Respondent's clients, John Sipes (Sipes) filed a grievance with the Bar on April 26, 2010. ¶4 The evidence at the May 4, 2011, hearing, showed that Respondent represented Sipes in two cases during the suspension period and another client, On Site Welding LLC, during the same period. Respondent entered an appearance on February 12, 2009, representing Sipes in a foreclosure case brought by Arvest Bank. This case was filed in the District Court of Tulsa County. Respondent admitted he was in Tulsa at the end of July to help finalize the Arvest case. He admitted he attended and negotiated the settlement of that case during his suspension. Respondent neither withdrew as an attorney from the case, nor notified his client or opposing counsel that he was suspended from practicing law. Respondent claims that he did approximately six hours of work on the Arvest case after he was suspended. ¶5 Respondent also admitted that he provided legal advice to Sipes in a second lawsuit (Whatley litigation) during his suspension. This was a case filed in the District Court of Okmulgee County. Although Respondent did not enter an appearance in the case, he admitted representing Sipes from August 3, 2009, through November 13, 2009, to resolve the Whatley litigation. Respondent's facsimiles to Sipes dated November 20, 2009, and December 2, 2009, explain his involvement in the Whatley litigation. He notes that a deposition was scheduled for September 9, 2009, and he had agreed to continue with the deposition if he was paid in full. He notes that he made calls to Sipes during the time he was suspended to prepare for the deposition, and when Sipes did not pay, he notified Ken Smith, attorney for Whatley, on September 8, 2009, to cancel the deposition. He also billed Sipes for a total of fourteen hours during this period. ¶6 On May 1, 2009, Respondent entered an appearance in another case representing On Site Welding, LLC. Respondent did not withdraw from the case during the suspension period, and did not notify his client that he had been suspended. He also admitted at the hearing that he had made calls to opposing counsel concerning the case during his suspension. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶7 "In a bar disciplinary proceeding the court functions as an adjudicative licensing authority that exercises exclusive original cognizance." DISCUSSION ¶8 The notice of suspension dated June 29, 2009, informed Respondent he must notify his clients of his suspension by certified mail, he must file a formal withdrawal from all cases, and must file an affidavit with the Professional Responsibility Commission and the Clerk of the Supreme Court stating he has complied with Rule 9.1. Respondent admits at the hearing that he was sure he had received notice of his suspension. However, he stated the first time he focused on his suspension was when Sipes sent him a text. He testified this occurred in February 2010 but was unsure. ¶9 In his Response to Complainant's Brief-In-Chief, Respondent states he neither denies that his services constituted the unauthorized practice of law nor denies he should be held accountable for his actions. Respondent's defense is basically that he did not "maintain"a "systematic and continuous" presence in Oklahoma during the suspension period, and his limited legal work did not amount to "actively" engaging in the practice of law in Oklahoma as asserted by the Bar. In his response he states that less than one week of legal work during a forty-six-week period is not being "actively" engaged in the practice of law. This assertion was made after the May 4, 2011, hearing where he conceded that even "one hour" of legal work amounts to the practice of law. ¶10 Respondent asserts that his legal work during his suspension was limited to longtime clients, assisting persons recommended to him from people he knew for a long time, and work for attorneys he knew in connection to a particular case. He was living in Dallas, Texas, and did not maintain an office in Oklahoma. However, he testified that he "always" used a Tulsa/Bixby address on his pleadings which he says was merely a mail drop. He states that a mail drop is not an office. Testimony showed, during his suspension, Respondent occasionally met with Sipes in Oklahoma and that signing of paperwork in the Arvest case was done in Oklahoma at Sipes' office. ¶11 Respondent also asserts that he discontinued representing Sipes in November 2009, and Sipes should have obtained another attorney. Respondent sent a facsimile to Sipes dated November 20, 2009. In this facsimile he states he will not represent Sipes unless he contacts Respondent that day to make payment arrangements. Default judgment was entered in the Whatley litigation against Sipes in February 2010 because Sipes failed to respond to a Motion for Default Judgment. Sipes obtained new counsel (Michael Taubman) in March 2010. Taubman filed a Motion to Vacate Default Judgment on March 11, 2010. On or about March 4, 2010, Taubman discovered that Respondent had been suspended from the practice of law and informed Sipes. An Affidavit of John Sipes was attached to the motion to vacate. In the affidavit, Sipes stated he believed Respondent had a license to practice law in Oklahoma and believed Respondent was protecting his and his wife's interests in the Whatley litigation. In his Response, Respondent states that he did not represent Mrs. Sipes, he discontinued representation of Mr. Sipes in November 2009, and any detriment that may have occurred to Sipes was his own fault for waiting so long to hire another attorney. ¶12 The Respondent's arguments are unfounded. The practice of law is neither determined by the number of hours worked on a matter, nor is it diminished by the relationship an attorney has with his client. There is no merit to his argument that his work should not be considered an "active" practice of law. This Court has found that the "practice of law" is the "rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interests of another with his consent." ¶13 Here, the Respondent negotiated a settlement, tried to arrange a deposition, gave legal advice, billed Sipes for legal advice, had contacts with opposing counsel, and received pleadings in cases where he was still an attorney of record. All of these actions occurred during Respondent's suspension and fall within our definition of "the practice of law." These unauthorized acts concerned cases filed in Oklahoma. Filings in these cases also show an Oklahoma address for him. Regardless, if Respondent maintained a continuous and systematic practice of law in Oklahoma, his actions were the practice of law in Oklahoma. Such actions violated Rule 5.5 (a), RGDP, for practicing law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction. ¶14 Sipes asserts that he was detrimentally affected in the Whatley litigation because he believed Respondent was licensed to represent him. Respondent was already suspended when he performed legal work for Sipes on the Whatley litigation. His communications with Sipes indicating he would continue representing him if Sipes would arrange to pay Respondent were disingenuous. ¶15 Respondent last asserts that the disciplinary sanction recommended by the Trial Panel is excessive. The Trial Panel recommends that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for eighteen months. Respondent relies on previous cases to assert he should have leniency. ¶16 The Complainant has filed an Application to Assess Costs in the amount of $1,382.32. The Respondent is ordered to pay this amount within ninety (90) days of the date this opinion becomes final. RESPONDENT IS SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR TWO YEARS AND A DAY FROM THE DATE THIS OPINION BECOMES FINAL; AND ORDERED TO PAY COSTS ¶17 CONCUR: TAYLOR, C.J., COLBERT, V.C.J., WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, REIF, AND COMBS, JJ. ¶18 CONCUR IN PART; DISSENT IN PART: KAUGER, WATT and GURICH, JJ. WATT, J., with whom KAUGER AND GURICH, JJ. join, concurring in part and dissenting in part I would follow the Professional Responsibility Tribunal's recommendation for an 18 month suspension. FOOT