Title: State v. Thompkin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S51405
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 14, 2006

FILED: September 14, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
ERIKIA MARIE THOMPKIN,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 0105-33237; CA A116637; SC S51405)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January 6, 2005.
Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Salem, argued the cause and
filed the brief on the merits for petitioner on review.  With him
on the brief was Peter Ozanne, Executive Director, Office of
Public Defense Services.  Rebecca Duncan, Chief Deputy Public
Defender, filed the petition for review.  With her on the
petition were Peter Ozanne, Executive Director, Office of Public
Defense Services, and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice,** and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz,***, Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.
RIGGS, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Gillette, J., dissented and filed an opinion, in which
Durham, J., joined.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Janice R.
Wilson, Judge. 192 Or App 364, 87 P3d 709 (2004)
**Chief Justice when this case was argued.
***Chief Justice when this case was decided.
RIGGS, J.
In this criminal case, we decide whether police
officers unlawfully "seized" an automobile passenger under
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. (1)
During a lawful traffic stop of the vehicle in which
defendant was a passenger, the officers requested and retained
defendant's identification to conduct a records check.  At the
time, the officers did not have either a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity on defendant's part or a concern about an
immediate threat to officer safety.  While one officer ran the
records check, a second officer questioned defendant about drugs. 
That conversation prompted defendant to surrender a pipe used for
smoking crack cocaine.  A subsequent search of defendant's person
produced a small rock of crack cocaine.  The state charged
defendant with possession of cocaine.  The trial court denied
defendant's pretrial motion to suppress the state's evidence on
grounds that defendant voluntarily surrendered the evidence and
that she was not unlawfully detained.  The trial court convicted
defendant of the charged offense, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed that judgment from the bench.  State v. Thompkin, 192 Or
App 364, 87 P3d 709 (2004).  We allowed defendant's petition for
review, and now, for the reasons that follow, conclude that the
officers' interaction with defendant constituted an unlawful
seizure under Article I, section 9.  We further conclude that the
state failed to prove that the discovery of the evidence at issue
was sufficiently independent of that preceding violation of
defendant's rights; therefore, the evidence must be suppressed. 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
the judgment of the trial court.
We take the following facts from the trial court's
findings and from the record.  At approximately 3:15 a.m. on May
11, 2001, Portland Police Officers Hill and Reagan were
patrolling in a marked police vehicle in Northeast Portland; Hill
was driving.  While on patrol, Hill observed the driver of a
vehicle, in which defendant was the front-seat passenger, fail to
signal a turn.  Hill initiated a traffic stop and approached the
vehicle after it had stopped in front of defendant's apartment.
Hill approached the driver's side of the vehicle, while
Reagan approached defendant on the passenger's side.  Hill spoke
to the driver regarding the reason for the traffic stop and asked
for identification from both the driver and defendant, which they
provided.  Hill then returned to the police vehicle to run a
records check on the information from each piece of
identification, a process that took less than five minutes. 
During that time, Reagan remained on the passenger side of the
vehicle and asked defendant about her activities with the driver
that evening.  Reagan also asked defendant if she had any drugs
or weapons on her person.  In response to that question,
defendant removed a crack pipe from her pocket and handed it to
Reagan.
After Hill returned from running the records checks on
the driver and defendant, he gave the driver a verbal warning
regarding his failure to signal the turn.  Reagan then informed
Hill of the crack pipe that he had obtained from defendant. 
Based on that information, Hill requested that defendant step out
of the vehicle and asked her if she would submit to a search. 
Defendant got out of the vehicle and complied with Hill's request
to search her person.
Prior to conducting the search, Hill asked defendant to
interlock her fingers behind her head.  Defendant complied but
kept her left thumb folded into her palm, which prompted Hill to
make a second request that she interlock her fingers.  Noticing
that something was interfering with defendant's ability to
interlock her fingers properly, Hill lifted up defendant's thumb
on her left hand.  At that point, defendant dropped or threw what
appeared to be a small rock to the ground where it shattered. 
Hill observed the substance and believed it to be consistent with
crack cocaine.  Hill then took defendant into custody and advised
her of her Miranda rights.  A subsequent lab report confirmed
that the substance was cocaine and that the pipe contained
cocaine residue.  The state charged defendant with possession of
cocaine under former ORS 475.992 (2001).
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence
of the pipe and the cocaine on grounds that the officers had
seized that evidence without statutory authorization and in
violation of her state and federal constitutional rights. 
Defendant argued that her surrender of the pipe had not been
voluntary but, rather, had been mere acquiescence to police
authority.  Alternatively, defendant argued that, even if the
action of handing over the pipe could be construed as voluntary,
the retaining of her identification to run a records check
without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity constituted an
unlawful seizure.  Defendant contended that Reagan had exploited
that illegality to obtain the evidence and, therefore, the
evidence should be suppressed.
When asked what prompted defendant to hand over the
crack pipe, Reagan testified:  "Well, I asked her if she had a
crack pipe -- or I asked her if she had any drugs or weapons on
her, and she handed me a crack pipe from her right pocket." 
Reagan also testified that he commonly inquires about drugs and
weapons and that, at the time that he inquired of defendant, he
had no reason to believe that defendant actually possessed such
items. (2)
The trial court concluded that the officers had not
detained defendant unlawfully by taking her identification
because no evidence in the record demonstrated that she otherwise
would have left the scene while Hill was evaluating the driver's
identification.  The trial court found:
"Here[, defendant] was sitting in the car and would
have been sitting in the car -- on the face of this
record, and I so find -- while Officer Hill was running
[the driver's] identification information.  Even if her
own [identification] had not been taken, there's no
evidence that she would have gotten out of the car or
left the scene, that she didn't feel free to leave
because her ID was there and not because she was
waiting there for them to do what they had the right to
do while processing a traffic infraction with [the
driver]."
Additionally, the trial court found that defendant voluntarily
had surrendered the crack pipe and had not done so in response to
any threat or promise on Reagan's part.  As a result, the trial
court denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of the
crack pipe and cocaine.
Following a trial on stipulated facts, the trial court
found defendant guilty of the charged offense, and defendant
appealed.  On appeal, defendant argued that Reagan's conduct was
not authorized by ORS 810.410, (3) which governs officer
conduct during a stop for a traffic violation.  Relying on
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, (4) defendant also
argued that she unlawfully had been seized without reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity when Hill took and retained her
identification, thereby rendering her response to Reagan's
questioning involuntary and tainting the evidence as the fruit of
an illegal seizure.  As noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed
defendant's conviction from the bench.
On review, defendant argues that, absent reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity or an immediate threat to officer
safety, ORS 810.410 and Article I, section 9, do not permit
police officers to request and retain a passenger's
identification for the purpose of running a records check while
conducting a lawful traffic stop of the driver of a vehicle. 
Consequently, defendant contends, evidence obtained during her
unlawful detention must be suppressed because no intervening
event broke the connection between the illegality and the
discovery of the evidence.  Defendant makes similar arguments
under the Fourth Amendment.
The state responds that Hill's request for defendant's
identification did not amount to a seizure because Hill did not
demand compliance or otherwise suggest that defendant was not
free to refuse his request.  The state characterizes Hill's
request for identification as "nothing more than a permissible
attempt to obtain defendant's cooperation and assistance." 
Further, the state continues, running a records check on
defendant's identification information did not constitute a
seizure because Hill's brief retention of the identification for
that purpose did not amount to a significant restriction on
defendant's liberty.
We begin our analysis by addressing defendant's
argument under ORS 810.410, which authorizes certain police
conduct during the course of a valid traffic stop.  See State v.
Rodriguez, 317 Or 27, 31, 854 P2d 399 (1993) (court considers
sub-constitutional issues before constitutional issues); State v.
Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 262, 666 P2d 1316 (1983) (court considers
questions of state law before those raised under the federal
constitution).
In State v. Amaya, 336 Or 616, 623-24, 89 P3d 1163
(2004), this court concluded that ORS 810.410(3) authorizes a
police officer to inquire into circumstances during a traffic
stop that (1) are reasonably related to the traffic violation,
ORS 810.410(3)(b); (2) develop during the stop and give rise to a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, ORS 810.410(3)(c); or
(3) help ensure the safety of the officer, including an inquiry
about weapons, ORS 810.410(3)(d).  Under the facts of this case,
it is clear that the inquiry in question -- the request and
retention of defendant's identification to run a records check --
was not reasonably related to the traffic violation and was not
initiated to ensure the safety of the officers.  Thus, the only
remaining statutory source of authority for the officers' conduct
lies in ORS 810.410(3)(c) -- that is, did a circumstance develop
during the stop that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of
defendant's criminal activity?
The record in this case demonstrates that the answer to
that question must be "no."  The trial court made no findings
that defendant had acted suspiciously, and the state does not
argue otherwise.  Therefore, based on the record before us, we
conclude that the taking and retaining of defendant's
identification for the purpose of running a records check, and
the subsequent questioning of her concerning drugs, were not
authorized by ORS 810.410(3)(c) because the officers lacked "a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity."
Our conclusion that the officers' conduct violated ORS
810.410 does not resolve this case, however, because the
legislature has determined that such statutory violations do not
provide a sufficient basis to exclude challenged evidence.  See
ORS 136.432 (so stating). (5)  We therefore turn to the
question whether the officers' conduct was permissible under
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.
Among the potentially "infinite variety of encounters
between law enforcement officers and citizens," State v. Holmes,
311 Or 400, 406, 813 P2d 28 (1991), this court has identified
three general categories of encounters and indicated whether
those encounters constitute a "seizure" under Article I, section
9.  Id. at 406-07.  First, "mere conversation" between an officer
and a citizen without any restraint of liberty requires no
justification and does not violate Article I, section 9.  Id. at
407.  Second, a temporary restraint of a person's liberty for the
purpose of investigation -- i.e., a "stop" -- qualifies as a
"seizure" and must be justified by a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.  Id.  Third, an arrest also constitutes a
"seizure" and must be justified by probable cause to believe that
the person arrested has committed a crime.  Id.  Additionally, we
note here that, as we opined in Amaya, all passengers in a
vehicle subject to a valid traffic stop have been "stopped" (at
least physically) but, without more, have not been "seized" as a
constitutional matter.  336 Or at 630.  However,  "further
exercise of coercive authority over the passengers" by officers
"may, in certain circumstances, constitute a seizure."  Id. at
631.  As this court held in Holmes, a person is "seized" under
Article I, section 9, when either (1) a police officer
intentionally and significantly interferes with the person's
liberty of movement; or (2) the person believes, in an
objectively reasonable manner, that his or her liberty of
movement has been so restricted. 311 Or at 409-10.  That
determination requires a "fact-specific inquiry into the totality
of the circumstances of the particular case."  Id. at 408.
Here, the trial court concluded that the officers'
interaction with defendant did not amount to a seizure and,
therefore, did not implicate Article I, section 9.  We are bound
by the trial court's findings of historical fact if those facts
are supported by constitutionally sufficient evidence in the
record; however, we must assess independently whether those
findings support the trial court's legal conclusion.  State v.
Ehly, 317 Or 66, 75, 854 P2d 421 (1993).  In light of this
court's recent decision in State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 115 P3d 908
(2005), we conclude that the trial court's legal conclusion that
the officers had not seized defendant for purposes of Article I,
section 9, cannot be sustained on the facts of this case.
In Hall, this court concluded that a police officer's
observations of the defendant's repeated turning to look at the
officer's police vehicle and then quickly looking away did not
give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
Nevertheless, this court determined that the officer's initial
actions of stopping his vehicle next to the defendant and
motioning with two fingers for the defendant to approach had not
interfered significantly with the defendant's liberty of
movement.  The court concluded that, even if the defendant had
been inconvenienced, the officer's actions had not "constitute[d]
a show of authority involving conduct 'significantly beyond that
accepted in ordinary social intercourse.'"  Hall, 339 Or at 19
(quoting Holmes, 311 Or at 410).  However, the court determined
that, when the officer in Hall retained the defendant's
identification and radioed for a warrant check,"the consensual
nature of that encounter dissipated, and the encounter evolved
from a 'mere conversation' encounter into a restraint upon
defendant's liberty of movement."  Id.  Although the officer in
Hall promptly had returned the defendant's identification, this
court nevertheless concluded that
"defendant was cognizant that [the officer] was
investigating whether defendant was the subject of any
outstanding warrants.  Although the state insists to
the contrary, we find it difficult to posit that a
reasonable person would think that he or she was free
to leave at a time when that person is the
investigatory subject of a pending warrant check.  We
further observe that, in this case, [the officer] did
nothing to dispel what would have been an objectively
reasonable belief that defendant was restrained from
leaving until [the officer] had received the results of
the warrant check.  Instead, immediately upon returning
defendant's identification card, [the officer]
questioned defendant about whether defendant was
carrying any weapons, knives, or illegal drugs, and he
asked defendant for consent to search defendant's
person."
Id.  Accordingly, the court held in Hall that the defendant had
been seized under Article I, section 9, because the restraint
imposed during the pending warrant check had not been justified
by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  Id.
The facts at issue here are similar to those in Hall. 
Here, one officer (Hill) requested and retained defendant's
identification to conduct a records check, including a check for
outstanding warrants.  While awaiting the results of that check,
another officer (Reagan) questioned defendant concerning drugs
and weapons, which prompted defendant to surrender the crack
pipe.  Here, as in Hall, we find it doubtful that a reasonable
person in defendant's position would think that he or she was
free to leave at a time when that person was the investigatory
subject of a pending warrant check and was being questioned about
illegal activity.  See id. at 19 (so stating).  In view of those
facts, defendant was unlawfully seized under Article I, section
9, because her liberty of movement was significantly restrained
under the totality of the circumstances.  See State v. Painter,
296 Or 422, 425, 676 P2d 309 (1984) (holding that officer's
action of retaining defendant's identification cards constituted
seizure because it had practical effect of making defendant
unable to leave). 
Having concluded that defendant was unlawfully "seized"
for purposes of Article I, section 9, we must next determine
whether suppression of the evidence obtained during that
illegality is required.  As noted above, the trial court
concluded that defendant had voluntarily surrendered the crack
pipe in response to Reagan's questioning.  Again, Hall is the
guiding precedent on this issue.  In Hall, this court reiterated
that the Oregon exclusionary rule is not predicated upon a
deterrence rationale like its Fourth Amendment counterpart, but
is a "constitutionally mandated rule that serves to vindicate a
defendant's personal rights."  339 Or at 24.  See State v. Davis,
313 Or 246, 249, 834 P2d 1008 (1992) (holding that protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article I,
section 9, includes right "to be free from the use of evidence
that has been obtained in violation of the defendant's rights
prescribed by that provision").  "Thus, in deciding the
applicability of the Oregon exclusionary rule, the critical
inquiry is whether the state obtained the evidence sought to be
suppressed as a result of a violation of the defendant's rights
under Article I, section 9."  Hall, 339 Or at 24.  The
methodology of that inquiry was explained in State v. Johnson,
335 Or 511, 520-21, 73 P3d 282 (2003), and recently summarized in
Hall:
"[A]fter a defendant establishes the existence of a
minimal factual nexus -- that is, at minimum, the
existence of a 'but for' relationship -- between the
evidence sought to be suppressed and prior unlawful
police conduct, the state nevertheless may establish
that the disputed evidence is admissible under Article
I, section 9, by proving that the evidence did not
derive from the preceding illegality.  To make that
showing, the state must prove that either (1) the
police inevitably would have obtained the disputed
evidence through lawful procedures even without the
violation of the defendant's rights under Article I,
section 9; (2) the police obtained the disputed
evidence independently of the violation of the
defendant's rights under Article I, section 9; or (3)
the preceding violation of the defendant's rights under
Article I, section 9, has such a tenuous factual link
to the disputed evidence that that unlawful police
conduct cannot be viewed properly as the source of that
evidence[.]"
339 Or at 25 (internal citations omitted).  In Hall, where the
defendant's consent to search followed an unlawful stop, the
court recognized several considerations relevant to determining
whether exclusion is required to vindicate a defendant's rights
under Article I, section 9.  Hall, 339 Or at 35, 35-36 n 21. 
Those considerations include:  (1) the temporal proximity between
the unlawful police conduct and the challenged evidence; (2) the
existence of any intervening circumstances -- such as the
provision of Miranda warnings before asking about drugs and
weapons; and (3) the presence of any circumstances that mitigated
the effect of the unlawful police conduct -- such as informing a
defendant of the right to refuse to comply with an officer's
request.  Id. at 35.  Once a defendant demonstrates a minimal
factual nexus between prior, unlawful police conduct and the
evidence sought to be suppressed, deciding whether the state has
carried its burden requires a fact-specific inquiry into the
totality of the circumstances.  Hall, 339 Or at 35.
Again, the facts at issue here are similar to Hall,
where the defendant did not spontaneously grant consent to a
search but, rather, gave consent in response to the officer's
request.  There, the officer requested consent to search
immediately after the officer had questioned the defendant about
weapons and illegal drugs and while the defendant was awaiting
the results of a warrant check.  339 Or at 36.  Under those
circumstances, this court concluded:
"Given the close temporal proximity between the illegal
detention and defendant's consent, and the absence of
any intervening circumstances or other circumstances
mitigating the effect of that unlawful police conduct,
we cannot say that the state has proved that
defendant's decision to consent, even if voluntary, was
not the product of the preceding violation of
defendant's rights under Article I, section 9."
Id.; see also State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 537-38, 964 P2d 1007
(1998) (requiring suppression of evidence where defendant
voluntarily consented to search during unlawful seizure); State
v. Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or 206, 214, 895 P2d 306 (1995)
(same).  Although Hall, as well as the cases that it relies upon,
analyzed whether a defendant's consent to search was vitiated by
prior, unlawful police conduct, the reasoning in those decisions
is equally applicable to this case, where defendant voluntarily
surrendered incriminating evidence in response to the officer's
questioning during an impermissible seizure.  We conclude that,
given the close temporal proximity between the illegal seizure of
defendant and her surrender of the crack pipe, as well as the
absence of any intervening circumstances or other circumstances
mitigating the effect of the unlawful police conduct, the state
failed to prove that defendant's decision to surrender
incriminating evidence, even if voluntary, was not the product of
the preceding violation of her rights under Article I, section 9. 
Consequently, the evidence obtained during the unlawful seizure
of defendant must be suppressed.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
GILLETTE, J., dissenting
The majority today regrettably pushes ahead with a line
of analysis that the court first articulated as its rationale in
State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 115 P3d 908 (2005).  That rationale
utterly fails to appreciate or give constitutional validity to
the defendant's non-coerced consent in this case, just as the
majority in Hall failed to understand the significance of the
defendant's consent there.  See, generally, Hall, 339 Or at 37-52 (Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(identifying fallacy in majority's treatment of the defendant's
consent in that case).  "Consent" used to be an event of
significant constitutional moment, but the majority's rationale
here and in Hall robs it of that constitutional significance.
I respectfully dissent.
Durham, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
1. Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution provides:
"No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized."
2. In his report of the incident and his testimony to the trial court, Hill stated that
defendant was not wearing her seatbelt.  The trial court found, however, that neither Hill
nor Reagan had seen defendant riding in the vehicle without a seatbelt while it was
moving in traffic.  Consequently, the trial court concluded that the officers did not have
probable cause to detain or cite defendant for a traffic violation.
3. ORS 810.410 provides, in part:
"(3) A police officer:
"* * * * *
"(b) May stop and detain a person for a traffic violation for the purposes of
investigation reasonably related to the traffic violation, identification and issuance
of citation.
"(c) May make an inquiry into circumstances arising during the course of a
detention and investigation under paragraph (b) of this subsection that give rise to
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
"(d) May make an inquiry to ensure the safety of the officer, the person
stopped or other persons present, including an inquiry regarding the presence of
weapons.
"(e) May request consent to search in relation to the circumstances referred
to in paragraph (c) of this subsection or to search for items of evidence otherwise
subject to search or seizure under ORS 133.535.
"* * * * *."
4. The Fourth Amendment provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643, 655, 81 S Ct 1684, 6 L Ed 2d 1081
(1961).
5. ORS 136.432 provides, in part:
"A court may not exclude relevant and otherwise admissible
evidence in a criminal action on the grounds that it was obtained in
violation of any statutory provision unless exclusion of the evidence is
required by:
"(1) The United States Constitution or the Oregon Constitution[.]"