Title: Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.
Citation: 2012 WI 20
Docket Number: 2009AP002768
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 6, 2012

2012 WI 20 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP2768 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Joel Hirschhorn and Evelyn F. Hirschhorn, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2010 WI App 154 
Reported at: 330 Wis. 2d 232, 792 N.W. 2d 639 
(Ct. App. 2010 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 6, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
 
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 5, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Oneida 
 
JUDGE: 
Mark Mangerson 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. dissents (Opinion filed).   
BRADLEY, J. joins dissent.  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Timothy M. Barber and Arthur E. Kurtz and Axley Brynelson, 
Madison and oral argument by Timothy M. Barber. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by Joel 
Hirschhorn and Hirschhorn & Bieber, P.A., Coral Gables and oral 
argument by Joel Hirschhorn.
 
 
2012 WI 20
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP2768 
(L.C. No. 
2008CV202) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Joel Hirschhorn and Evelyn F. Hirschhorn, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 6, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, Hirschhorn v. Auto-
Owners Insurance Co., 2010 WI App 154, 330 Wis. 2d 232, 792 
N.W.2d 639, that reversed a judgment entered by the Oneida 
County Circuit Court1 dismissing Joel and Evelyn F. Hirschhorn's 
(collectively, 
the 
Hirschhorns) 
complaint 
against 
their 
homeowners insurer, Auto-Owners Insurance Company (Auto-Owners).  
The Hirschhorns filed suit against Auto-Owners for breach of 
contract and bad faith, claiming that Auto-Owners was liable for 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Mark A. Mangerson presided. 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
2 
 
the total loss of their vacation home.  The Hirschhorns alleged 
that their vacation home became uninhabitable and unsaleable as 
a result of the accumulation of bat guano2 between the home's 
siding and walls. 
¶2 
Auto-Owners moved for summary judgment, which the 
circuit court initially denied.  Upon reconsideration, however, 
the circuit court agreed with Auto-Owners that its insurance 
policy's pollution exclusion clause excluded coverage for the 
Hirschhorns' loss.  The court of appeals reversed, concluding 
that the pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous and therefore 
must be construed in favor of coverage. 
¶3 
We granted Auto-Owners' petition for review and now 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶4 
We conclude that the pollution exclusion clause in 
Auto-Owners' insurance policy excludes coverage for the loss of 
the 
Hirschhorns' 
home 
that 
allegedly 
resulted 
from 
the 
accumulation of bat guano.  First, we conclude that bat guano 
falls 
unambiguously 
within 
the 
policy's 
definition 
of 
"pollutants."  Second, we conclude that the Hirschhorns' alleged 
loss resulted from the "discharge, release, escape, seepage, 
migration or dispersal" of bat guano under the plain terms of 
the policy's pollution exclusion clause.  Accordingly, the 
                                                 
2 "Guano" is defined as "[a] substance composed chiefly of 
the dung of sea birds or bats, accumulated along certain coastal 
areas or in caves and used as fertilizer."  The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 802 (3d ed. 1992).  
For purposes of this opinion, we assume that guano includes both 
feces and urine. 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
3 
 
circuit court properly dismissed the Hirschhorns' complaint 
against Auto-Owners. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶5 
The facts of this case are few and undisputed.  
Beginning in 1981, the Hirschhorns owned a vacation home in the 
town of Lake Tomahawk, Wisconsin.  At all relevant times, the 
home was covered by a homeowners insurance policy issued by 
Auto-Owners.  The policy insured the home itself, along with 
structures 
and 
personal 
property 
located 
at 
the 
insured 
premises, against "accidental direct physical loss."  However, 
relevant to this case, the policy contained a pollution 
exclusion clause that excluded from coverage any "loss resulting 
directly or indirectly from: . . . discharge, release, escape, 
seepage, migration or dispersal of pollutants . . . ."  The 
policy, in turn, defined "pollutants" as "any solid, liquid, 
gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, 
vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, liquids, gases 
and 
waste. 
 
Waste 
includes 
materials 
to 
be 
recycled, 
reconditioned or reclaimed." 
¶6 
Since 1981, at least once or twice each month, the 
Hirschhorns arranged for a neighbor or hired cleaner to access 
their vacation home to inspect it, confirm that no damage had 
been done in the Hirschhorns' absence, and clean and perform 
maintenance as necessary.  During that time, bat guano was never 
found in the home. 
¶7 
In May 2007, Joel Hirschhorn met with a real estate 
broker to list the home for sale.  At that time, the broker 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
4 
 
inspected the home and saw no signs of bats.  However, in July 
2007, upon inspecting the home again, the broker discovered the 
presence of bats and bat guano.  The broker attempted to remove 
the bats and clean the home, to no avail. 
¶8 
The Hirschhorns and their family stayed at their 
vacation home between August 9 and 14, 2007.  During their stay, 
they noticed a "penetrating and offensive odor emanating from 
the home."  Upon leaving on August 14, 2007, they arranged for a 
contractor to conduct a more thorough inspection of the home.  
The contractor determined that the cause of the odor was the 
accumulation of bat guano between the home's siding and walls.  
The contractor provided the Hirschhorns a remediation estimate 
but could not guarantee that cleaning up the bat guano would rid 
the home of its odor. 
¶9 
Subsequently, on October 23, 2007, the Hirschhorns 
filed with Auto-Owners a notice of property loss.  The notice 
described the loss as resulting from the discovery of bats in 
the Hirschhorns' home and specifically stated, "smell awful and 
[insured] cannot stay in house . . . ."  Auto-Owners denied the 
claim three days later, reasoning that the accumulation of bat 
guano was "not sudden and accidental" and, in any case, resulted 
from "faulty, inadequate or defective" maintenance within the 
terms of the policy's maintenance exclusion clause.   
¶10 On November 4, 2007, the Hirschhorns entered into a 
contract with a builder to demolish their existing vacation home 
and construct a new one in its place.  In his affidavit, Joel 
Hirschhorn explained that he thought it was more practical 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
5 
 
financially to demolish the home than to spend the money to make 
it habitable again. 
¶11 After the home's demolition, on February 22, 2008, 
Auto-Owners sent to the Hirschhorns a revised denial letter.  
Auto-Owners denied the Hirschhorns' claim on the additional 
ground that "[b]at guano is considered a pollutant" within the 
terms of the policy's pollution exclusion clause. 
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶12 On May 15, 2008, the Hirschhorns filed suit against 
Auto-Owners for breach of contract and bad faith, claiming that 
Auto-Owners was liable for the total loss of their vacation 
home.  The complaint alleged that the Hirschhorns' home "became 
uninhabitable 
and 
unsaleable 
due 
to 
the 
penetrating 
and 
offensive odor" of bat guano accumulated between the home's 
siding and walls.  The complaint further alleged that "the 
drapes, carpets, fabrics and fabric furnishings in the home were 
rendered unusable as a result of the absorption of the bat guano 
odor."  Taking into account the value of the home itself, a 
free-standing 
garage, 
and 
their 
personal 
property, 
the 
Hirschhorns sought 
compensatory damages of $308,500, plus 
interest; punitive damages; and attorney fees and costs. 
¶13 Auto-Owners moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
its 
insurance 
policy 
did 
not 
provide 
coverage 
for 
the 
Hirschhorns' loss.  Specifically, Auto-Owners maintained that 
the accumulation of bat guano in the Hirschhorns' vacation home 
was predictable and therefore did not result in an accidental 
loss, as required by the policy's initial grant of coverage.  
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
6 
 
Alternatively, even if the Hirschhorns' loss fell within the 
policy's initial grant of coverage, Auto-Owners argued that 
coverage 
was 
nevertheless 
excluded 
under 
three 
separate 
exclusions: a maintenance exclusion clause, a vermin exclusion 
clause, and a pollution exclusion clause.  First, Auto-Owners 
contended that the loss resulted from "faulty, inadequate or 
defective maintenance," namely, the Hirschhorns' inadequate 
upkeep of the home's siding, resulting in hundreds of access 
points for bats.  Second, Auto-Owners argued that the loss 
resulted from "vermin," a category of noxious pests that 
reasonably includes bats.  Third and finally, Auto-Owners argued 
that 
the 
loss 
resulted 
from 
the 
odorous 
discharge 
of 
"pollutants," a term that, as defined by the policy, reasonably 
encompasses bat guano. 
¶14 In an oral ruling on April 6, 2009, the circuit court 
initially denied Auto-Owners' motion for summary judgment.  At 
the outset, the circuit court concluded that the Hirschhorns' 
loss constituted an "accidental direct physical loss" within the 
terms of the policy's initial grant of coverage.  The court 
rejected Auto-Owners' argument that the accumulation of bat 
guano was predictable, explaining that the Hirschhorns could not 
reasonably have anticipated that bats would infest their 
vacation home to the point of total destruction.   
¶15 Next, the circuit court determined that none of the 
three specified exclusion clauses applied.  The court viewed the 
Hirschhorns' loss as a result of an "apparent structural 
defect," as opposed to inadequate maintenance.  In addition, the 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
7 
 
court concluded that bats do not unambiguously qualify as 
"vermin" and so construed the vermin exclusion clause in favor 
of coverage.  Lastly, the circuit court determined that the 
pollution exclusion clause did not apply to these facts, 
reasoning that bat guano accumulating inside the home is unlike 
"traditional pollution":  
When we talk about pollution, it's usually a leakage 
or a seeping from a polluted area into some other area 
causing damage.  And we don't have that same situation 
here.  We have the damage actually being caused by 
things coming into the structure and the deposit being 
actually made in the structure, which isn't the same 
as the traditional pollution cases. 
¶16 Auto-Owners 
moved 
the 
circuit 
court 
for 
reconsideration, arguing, inter alia, that the court failed to 
apply the proper analytical framework to the pollution exclusion 
clause.  
¶17 The circuit court agreed.  On September 18, 2009, the 
court 
granted 
Auto-Owners' 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, 
concluding that the pollution exclusion clause in Auto-Owners' 
policy excluded coverage for the Hirschhorns' loss.3  Guided by 
this court's analysis of a similar pollution exclusion clause in 
Peace v. Northwestern National Insurance Co., 228 Wis. 2d 106, 
596 N.W.2d 429 (1999), the circuit court concluded that bat 
guano qualifies as a "pollutant," the odor of which "seeped 
                                                 
3 The 
circuit 
court declined to reverse its initial 
conclusions that the Hirschhorns' loss fell within the policy's 
initial grant of coverage and that the maintenance and vermin 
exclusion clauses did not apply.  Auto-Owners opted not to 
challenge those conclusions on appeal, and accordingly, we do 
not address them further. 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
8 
 
or . . . disbursed throughout the residence to cause the loss."  
Accordingly, the court ruled that the Hirschhorns' loss was not 
covered under Auto-Owners' insurance policy and, as a result, 
entered judgment dismissing their complaint. 
¶18 The Hirschhorns appealed, and the court of appeals 
reversed.  Hirschhorn, 330 Wis. 2d 232.  The court of appeals 
concluded that the pollution exclusion clause in Auto-Owners' 
insurance policy is ambiguous and therefore must be construed in 
favor of coverage.  Id., ¶1.  Analogizing bat guano to exhaled 
carbon dioxide as considered by this court in Donaldson v. Urban 
Land Interests, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 224, 564 N.W.2d 728 (1997), 
the court of appeals explained that a reasonable insured might 
interpret the term "pollutants" as not including bat guano.  
Hirschhorn, 330 Wis. 2d 232, ¶10.  Considering the policy's 
enumerated "pollutants," the court remarked that "waste" is the 
only exemplar that suggests bat guano.  Id., ¶12.  While "waste 
can mean excrement," the court of appeals reasoned, "in the 
context it is presented here, when a person reading the 
definition [of 'pollutants'] arrives at the term 'waste,' poop 
does not pop into one's mind."  Id.  Moreover, the court of 
appeals determined that the terms "pollutants" and "waste" are 
further circumscribed by the language of the pollution exclusion 
clause itself, "which omits coverage for the 'discharge, 
release, 
escape, 
seepage, 
migration 
or 
dispersal 
of 
pollutants.'"  Id., ¶15.  According to the court of appeals, 
none of those terms suggests a biological process such as the 
movement of excrement.  Id.  "Therefore, because a person might 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
9 
 
reasonably 
interpret 
the 
pollution 
exclusion 
as 
not 
contemplating bat guano," the court of appeals concluded that 
Auto-Owners' 
policy 
did 
not 
exclude 
coverage 
for 
the 
Hirschhorns' loss. 
¶19 Auto-Owners petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on March 16, 2011. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶20 In this case, the circuit court granted Auto-Owners' 
motion for reconsideration of the court's order denying Auto-
Owners' motion for summary judgment.  We review summary judgment 
rulings independently, applying the well-established standards 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08 (2007-08).4  Siebert v. Wis. Am. 
Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 WI 35, ¶27, 333 Wis. 2d 546, 797 N.W.2d 484; 
Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 119; Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 229-30.  
Summary 
judgment 
"shall 
be 
rendered 
if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  § 802.08(2). 
¶21 Here, the parties do not dispute the material facts 
giving rise to the Hirschhorns' loss.  Rather, the sole issue is 
whether the pollution exclusion clause in Auto-Owners' insurance 
policy excludes coverage for the loss of the Hirschhorns' home 
that allegedly resulted from the accumulation of bat guano.  The 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
10 
 
interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law that 
we review de novo.  Siebert, 333 Wis. 2d 546, ¶28. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
¶22 Our goal in interpreting an insurance policy, like our 
goal in interpreting any contract, is to ascertain and carry out 
the parties' intentions.  Id., ¶31; Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 120-
21.  To that end, we interpret policy language according to its 
plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a reasonable person 
in the position of the insured.  Siebert, 333 Wis. 2d 546, ¶31; 
Zarder v. Humana Ins. Co., 2010 WI 35, ¶26, 324 Wis. 2d 325, 782 
N.W.2d 682; Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 121. 
¶23 Words or phrases in an insurance policy are ambiguous 
if they are fairly susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation.  Zarder, 324 Wis. 2d 325, ¶26; Peace, 228 
Wis. 2d at 121; Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 231.  If we determine 
that the policy language is ambiguous, our construction is 
"quite constrained" by the doctrine of contra proferentem:5 
ambiguities are construed against the insurer, the drafter of 
the policy.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Langridge, 2004 
WI 113, ¶46, 275 Wis. 2d 35, 683 N.W.2d 75; see also Zarder, 324 
Wis. 2d 325, ¶27.  However, this does not mean that we must 
embrace any grammatically plausible interpretation created by an 
insured for purposes of litigation.  Langridge, 275 Wis. 2d 35, 
                                                 
5 Contra proferentem is Latin for "against the offeror."  
Black's Law Dictionary 328 (7th ed. 1999); see also Donaldson v. 
Urban Land Interests, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 224, 230 & n.3, 564 
N.W.2d 728 (1997). 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
11 
 
¶46.  "The tenets of insurance policy construction provide that 
there is ambiguity where a policy is susceptible to more than 
one reasonable interpretation."  Id., ¶48.  Likewise, the mere 
fact that a word has more than one dictionary definition, or 
that the parties disagree as to its meaning, does not render the 
word ambiguous if only one meaning comports with an insured's 
objectively reasonable understanding.  See id., ¶41; Peace, 228 
Wis. 2d at 136; Landshire Fast Foods of Milwaukee, Inc. v. 
Emp'rs Mut. Cas. Co., 2004 WI App 29, ¶16, 269 Wis. 2d 775, 676 
N.W.2d 528; Richland Valley Prods., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Cas. 
Co., 201 Wis. 2d 161, 168-69, 548 N.W.2d 127 (Ct. App. 1996). 
¶24 Absent a finding of ambiguity, we will not apply rules 
of construction to rewrite an insurance policy to bind an 
insurer to a risk it did not contemplate and for which it did 
not receive a premium.  See Siebert, 333 Wis. 2d 546, ¶31; 
Peace, 
228 
Wis. 2d at 
121 
("[T]his 
principle 
[of 
contra 
proferentem] does not allow a court to eviscerate an exclusion 
that is clear from the face of the insurance policy."); 
Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 231 ("Absent a finding of ambiguity, 
this court will not use the rules of construction to rewrite the 
language of an insurance contract."). 
¶25 In this case, we are asked to determine whether the 
pollution exclusion clause in Auto-Owners' insurance policy 
excludes coverage for the loss of the Hirschhorns' home that 
allegedly resulted from the accumulation of bat guano.  The 
pollution exclusion clause excludes from coverage any "loss 
resulting directly or indirectly from: . . . discharge, release, 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
12 
 
escape, seepage, migration or dispersal of pollutants . . . ."  
The policy defines "pollutants" as "any solid, liquid, gaseous 
or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, 
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, liquids, gases and 
waste.  Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned 
or reclaimed."  Accordingly, to resolve the issue before us, we 
must first determine whether bat guano falls unambiguously 
within the policy's definition of "pollutants."  If it does, we 
must then determine whether the Hirschhorns' alleged loss 
resulted 
from 
the 
"discharge, 
release, 
escape, 
seepage, 
migration or dispersal" of bat guano under the plain terms of 
the policy's pollution exclusion clause.  In order for the 
pollution exclusion clause to apply, both inquiries must be 
answered in the affirmative.  See Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 119; 
Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 229.  We analyze them in turn. 
A 
¶26 First, we must determine whether bat guano falls 
unambiguously within the policy's definition of "pollutants."  
We conclude that it does. 
¶27 Again, 
Auto-Owners' 
insurance 
policy 
defines 
"pollutants" as "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant 
or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, 
alkalis, chemicals, liquids, gases and waste.  Waste includes 
materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed."  In other 
words, under the policy, a pollutant includes (1) any solid, 
liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant; or (2) any solid, liquid, 
gaseous, or thermal contaminant.  See Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 122.  
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
13 
 
Moreover, relevant to this case, the policy lists waste as one 
such irritant or contaminant.   
¶28 The 
policy 
does 
not 
further 
define 
"irritant," 
"contaminant," or "waste."  Accordingly, pursuant to our rules 
governing insurance policy interpretation, we construe these 
terms according to their plain and ordinary meanings as 
understood by a reasonable person in the position of the 
insured, 
in 
this 
case, 
homeowners. 
 
See 
Siebert, 
333 
Wis. 2d 546, ¶31.   
¶29 Our decisions in Donaldson and Peace are instructive.  
In both cases, this court had the occasion to construe the terms 
"irritant" and "contaminant" in the context of nearly identical 
pollution exclusion clauses.   
¶30 First, 
in 
Donaldson, 
this 
court 
held 
that 
the 
pollution exclusion clause did not exclude coverage for the 
plaintiffs' personal injury claims arising out the inadequate 
ventilation of exhaled carbon dioxide in their office building.  
211 Wis. 2d at 227.  The court reasoned that a reasonable 
insured would not necessarily understand the policy's definition 
of "pollutant" to include exhaled carbon dioxide.  Id. at 233-
34.  As the court recognized, the definition of "pollutant" was 
undeniably broad: "'[t]he terms 'irritant' and 'contaminant,' 
when viewed in isolation are virtually boundless, for there is 
virtually no substance or chemical in existence that would not 
irritate or damage some person or property.'"  Id. at 232 
(quoting Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. 
Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 1992)).  Consequently, the 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
14 
 
court cautioned that "[t]he reach of the pollution exclusion 
clause must be circumscribed by reasonableness," lest everyday 
incidents be characterized as pollution and "the contractual 
promise of coverage be reduced to a dead letter."  Id. at 233.  
In that case, the court explained that exhaled carbon dioxide, 
while potentially harmful in a confined and poorly ventilated 
area, is "universally present and generally harmless."  Id. at 
234.  Accordingly, the court could not conclude that a 
reasonable insured would necessarily view exhaled carbon dioxide 
as a "pollutant."  Id. 
¶31 Two years later, in Peace, this court held that the 
pollution exclusion clause excluded coverage for the minor 
plaintiff's personal injury claims arising out of his ingestion 
of lead-based paint chips, flakes, and dust present in the 
insured's apartment.  228 Wis. 2d at 110-11.  The court 
concluded that lead present in paint fell plainly within the 
insurance policy's definition of "pollutants."  Id. at 121-22.  
Consulting a non-legal dictionary, the court determined that the 
ordinary meaning of "contaminant" is "one that contaminates" or 
"'make[s] impure or unclean by contact or mixture.'"  Id. at 122 
(quoting The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 406 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter American Heritage 
Dictionary]).  The court further determined that the ordinary 
meaning of "irritant" is a "source of irritation, especially 
physical irritation," as in "'[a] condition of inflammation, 
soreness, or irritability of a bodily organ or part.'"  Id. 
(quoting American Heritage Dictionary 954).  Applying these 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
15 
 
definitions to the plaintiff's claims, the court concluded that 
"[t]here is little doubt that lead derived from lead paint 
chips, flakes, or dust is an irritant or serious contaminant."  
Id. at 125.  As the court explained, the physical consequences 
of lead paint used in a home are well-documented: "Lead 
poisoning from paint at residential properties is generally 
caused by the inhalation of lead-contaminated dust particles or 
toxic lead fumes through respiration or the ingestion of lead-
based paint chips by mouth."  Id. at 123. 
¶32 The Peace court contrasted its decision with that in 
Donaldson, explaining that unlike exhaled carbon dioxide, lead 
paint chips, flakes, and dust "are widely, if not universally, 
understood to be dangerous . . . ."  Id. at 137; see also id. at 
150 ("[T]he act of human breathing is in sharp contrast to the 
peeling of lead paint from residential surfaces.  Lead is a 
substance that has been recognized for centuries as harmful.  It 
is a substance that is heavily restricted by the modern 
regulatory state.") (Bradley, J., concurring).  Because "[t]he 
toxic effects of lead have been recognized for centuries," the 
Peace court concluded that a reasonable person in the position 
of the insured, an owner of rental property, would consider lead 
present in paint to be a pollutant.  Id. at 137-38. 
¶33 Turning back to the instant case, we conclude that bat 
guano falls unambiguously within the term "pollutants" as 
defined by Auto-Owners' insurance policy.  Bat guano, composed 
of bat feces and urine, is or threatens to be a solid, liquid, 
or gaseous irritant or contaminant.  That is, bat guano and its 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
16 
 
attendant odor "'make impure or unclean'" the surrounding ground 
and air space, see id. at 122 (quoting American Heritage 
Dictionary 406), and can cause "'inflammation, soreness, or 
irritability'" of a person's lungs and skin, see id. (quoting 
American Heritage Dictionary 954).  See Wis. Dep't of Health & 
Family 
Servs. 
in 
cooperation 
with 
the 
Agency 
for 
Toxic 
Substances & Disease Registry, Indoor Air and Health Issues: Bat 
Guano, Antigo, Langlade County, Wisconsin (June 9, 1998), 
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/hac/pha/batg/bat_toc.html 
(concluding 
that "[p]eople who live around large quantities of bat wastes 
are more likely to become ill with histoplasmosis"; "[p]eople 
who contact mites that live in bat wastes may get skin rashes"; 
and "[m]olds that grow in moist, warm, highly organic situations 
may increase asthma attacks in affected people").  These points 
cannot be seriously contested by the Hirschhorns, who alleged in 
their complaint that the odor of bat guano was so "penetrating 
and offensive" as to render their vacation home unfit to live 
in.   
¶34 Our 
conclusion 
that 
bat 
guano 
unambiguously 
constitutes an "irritant" or "contaminant" is buttressed by the 
fact that the policy explicitly lists "waste" as one such 
irritant or contaminant.  The noun "waste" is defined as, among 
other things, "[t]he undigested residue of food eliminated from 
the body; excrement."  American Heritage Dictionary 2016.  To be 
sure, as the Hirschhorns point out, "waste" has several other 
dictionary definitions, including "[t]he act or an instance of 
wasting or the condition of being wasted"; "[a] place, region, 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
17 
 
or land that is uninhabited or uncultivated"; "[a] devastated or 
destroyed region, town, or building"; "[a] useless or worthless 
byproduct, as from a manufacturing process"; and "[g]arbage, 
trash."  Id.  However, the mere fact that "waste" has more than 
one dictionary definition, or that the parties may disagree as 
to its meaning, does not necessarily make the word ambiguous.  
See Langridge, 275 Wis. 2d 35, ¶41.  Rather, our primary inquiry 
is whether a reasonable person in the position of the insured 
would understand bat guano to be waste.  See Siebert, 333 
Wis. 2d 546, ¶31.  The answer is yes.  Bat guano is composed of 
bat feces and urine.  Feces and urine are commonly understood to 
be waste.  Indeed, the ordinary meaning of "feces" is "[w]aste 
matter eliminated from the bowels; excrement," American Heritage 
Dictionary 668, and the ordinary meaning of "urine" is "[t]he 
waste product secreted by the kidneys . . . ," id. at 1965.6   
¶35 Still, the Hirschhorns argue, and the court of appeals 
agreed, that the term "waste" does not necessarily call to mind 
feces and urine, given the policy's other examples of irritants 
and contaminants, namely, "smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, 
alkalis, chemicals, liquids, [and] gases."  See Hirschhorn, 330 
                                                 
6 Interestingly, in their response brief, the Hirschhorns 
concede 
that 
"[a] 
reasonable 
insured 
may 
understand 
the 
pollution exclusion to include human excrement."  They fail to 
explain, however, why the policy's definition of "pollutants" 
should be interpreted differently for feces and urine specific 
to bats. 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
18 
 
Wis. 2d 232, ¶¶12-14.  Invoking the ejusdem generis7 rule of 
construction, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
determined 
that 
the 
interpretation of "waste," an otherwise broad term, should be 
limited to "damaged, defective, or superfluous material produced 
during or left over from a manufacturing process or industrial 
operation," consistent with the industrial and chemical nature 
of the other listed examples.  Id., ¶13 (internal quotations 
omitted).  However, we have already concluded that the term 
"waste" unambiguously includes feces and urine.  That being the 
case, we will not apply rules of construction to rewrite the 
plain terms of the policy's definition of "pollutants."  See 
Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 231; Richland Valley Prods., 201 
Wis. 2d at 173.  Moreover, in Peace, this court already rejected 
the argument that the pollution exclusion clause should apply to 
only industrial-type pollutants.  See 228 Wis. 2d at 138-44. 
¶36 Relatedly, 
the 
Hirschhorns 
also 
argue 
that 
a 
reasonable insured would not necessarily understand the term 
"waste" 
to 
include 
feces 
and 
urine, 
given 
the 
policy's 
explanation that "[w]aste includes materials to be recycled, 
reconditioned or reclaimed."  The Hirschhorns reason that 
"[n]othing about those three words relates in any way to 
excrement."  While that may be true, the policy does not limit 
                                                 
7 Ejusdem generis is Latin for "of the same kind or class" 
and refers to the rule of construction that "when a general word 
or phrase follows a list of specific persons or things, the 
general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only 
persons or things of the same type as those listed."  Black's 
Law Dictionary 535 (7th ed. 1999). 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
19 
 
the term "waste" only to materials to be recycled, reconditioned 
or reclaimed; rather, the policy merely clarifies that waste 
"includes" materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.  
When a list of terms follows the word "includes," the list is 
commonly understood to be non-exhaustive.  See Weber v. Town of 
Saukville, 209 Wis. 2d 214, 226, 562 N.W.2d 412 (1997).  In this 
case, because the term "waste" denotes a condition of being 
wasted, as in useless, it makes sense that Auto-Owners wished to 
clarify that, for purposes of the pollution exclusion clause, 
"waste" may include material to be used again. 
¶37 Finally, 
our 
conclusion 
that 
bat 
guano 
falls 
unambiguously within the term "pollutants" as defined by Auto-
Owners' insurance policy is consistent with our prior decisions 
in Donaldson and Peace.  Unlike exhaled carbon dioxide, bat 
guano is not "universally present and generally harmless in all 
but the most unusual instances."  See Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 
234.  To the contrary, bat guano, like lead present in paint, is 
a unique and largely undesirable substance that is commonly 
understood to be harmful.  See Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 137-38.  A 
reasonable homeowner would therefore understand bat guano to be 
a pollutant. 
B 
¶38 Our conclusion that bat guano falls unambiguously 
within the policy's definition of "pollutants" does not resolve 
this case.  We still must determine whether the Hirschhorns' 
alleged loss resulted from the "discharge, release, escape, 
seepage, migration or dispersal" of bat guano under the plain 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
20 
 
terms of the policy's pollution exclusion clause.  We conclude 
it did. 
¶39 The 
pollution 
exclusion 
clause 
in 
Auto-Owners' 
insurance policy excludes from coverage any "loss resulting 
directly or indirectly from: . . . discharge, release, escape, 
seepage, migration or dispersal of pollutants . . . ."  We have 
already concluded that bat guano constitutes a pollutant.  
Accordingly, the remaining inquiry is whether the Hirschhorns' 
alleged loss, the loss of their vacation home, resulted from the 
"discharge, release, escape, seepage, migration or dispersal" of 
bat guano.   
¶40 The policy does not define "discharge," "release," 
"escape," "seepage," "migration," or "dispersal."  Accordingly, 
as we did before, we construe these terms according to their 
plain and ordinary meanings as understood by a reasonable person 
in the position of the insured.  See Siebert, 333 Wis. 2d 546, 
¶31. 
¶41 In Peace, this court explained that four of these 
terms, 
"discharge," 
"dispersal," 
"release," 
and 
"escape," 
"describe the entire range of actions by which something moves 
from a contained condition to an uncontained condition."  228 
Wis. 2d at 126.  For example, the noun "discharge" means 
"[s]omething 
that 
is 
discharged, 
released, 
emitted, 
or 
excreted."  American Heritage Dictionary 530.  Likewise, 
"dispersal" is "the condition of being dispersed," meaning 
"scatter[ed] 
in 
different 
directions" 
or 
"strew[n] 
or 
distribute[d] widely."  Id. at 537.  A "release" is defined as a 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
21 
 
"liberation," "[a]n unfastening or letting go . . . ."  Id. at 
1524.  Finally, an "escape" is "[a] means of obtaining temporary 
freedom" or "[a] gradual effusion of an enclosure; a leakage."  
Id. at 625-26.   
¶42 The two additional terms found in the pollution 
exclusion 
clause 
in 
Auto-Owners' 
policy, 
"seepage" 
and 
"migration," are similar still.  "Seepage" is defined as "[t]he 
act or process of seeping," meaning to "ooze" or "[t]o enter, 
depart, 
or 
become 
diffused 
gradually." 
 
Id. 
at 
1634.  
"Migration" means "[t]he act or an instance of migrating," as in 
moving from one location and settling in another.  Id. at 1143. 
¶43 As their definitions make clear, these six terms are 
often 
synonymous 
with 
one 
another 
and 
"'taken 
together 
constitute a comprehensive description of the processes by which 
pollutants may cause injury to persons or property.'"  Peace, 
228 Wis. 2d at 127 (quoting Emp'rs Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 17, 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)). 
¶44 We applied these same terms in Peace.  In that case, 
the court concluded that the plain language of the pollution 
exclusion clause excluded the minor plaintiff's claims for 
bodily injury that resulted from the ingestion of lead in paint 
that chips, flakes, or breaks down into dust or fumes.  Id. at 
130.  The court explained that the pollutant lead, once 
contained on the painted surface, dispersed, discharged, or 
escaped from the containment, thereby becoming ingestible and 
causing the plaintiff's bodily injury.  See id. 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
22 
 
¶45 In addition, in United States Fire Insurance Co. v. 
Ace Baking Co., 164 Wis. 2d 499, 504-05, 476 N.W.2d 280 (Ct. 
App. 1991), the court of appeals concluded that a similar 
pollution exclusion clause unambiguously excluded coverage for 
the loss of the insured manufacturer's ice cream cones that were 
fouled by fabric softener stored in the same warehouse.  The 
fragrance softener contained a fragrance additive, linalool, 
that made the ice cream cones smell and taste like soap.  Id. at 
501.  The court of appeals concluded that the loss of ice cream 
cones was caused by the release, discharge, or dispersal of a 
pollutant, linalool, under the plain terms of the pollution 
exclusion clause.  Id. at 505. 
¶46 Similarly, in the case before us, we conclude that the 
alleged loss of the Hirschhorns' vacation home resulted from the 
"discharge, release, escape, seepage, migration or dispersal" of 
bat guano under the plain terms of the policy's pollution 
exclusion clause.  The bat guano, deposited and once contained 
between the home's siding and walls, emitted a foul odor that 
spread throughout the inside of the home, infesting it to the 
point of destruction.  The Hirschhorns acknowledged as much in 
their complaint.  They alleged that "the drapes, carpets, 
fabrics and fabric furnishings in the home were rendered 
unusable as a result of the absorption of the bat guano odor."  
Accordingly, implicit in their complaint is an allegation that 
the bat guano somehow separated from its once contained location 
between the home's siding and walls and entered the air, only to 
be absorbed by the furnishings inside the home.  See Peace, 228 
No. 
2009AP2768   
 
23 
 
Wis. 2d at 127-28.  According to the Hirschhorns, the result was 
the total loss of their vacation home.  Such an allegation falls 
squarely within the terms of the pollution exclusion clause. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶47 We conclude that the pollution exclusion clause in 
Auto-Owners' insurance policy excludes coverage for the loss of 
the 
Hirschhorns' 
home 
that 
allegedly 
resulted 
from 
the 
accumulation of bat guano.  First, we conclude that bat guano 
falls 
unambiguously 
within 
the 
policy's 
definition 
of 
"pollutants."  Second, we conclude that the Hirschhorns' alleged 
loss resulted from the "discharge, release, escape, seepage, 
migration or dispersal" of bat guano under the plain terms of 
the policy's pollution exclusion clause.  Accordingly, the 
circuit court properly dismissed the Hirschhorns' complaint 
against Auto-Owners. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  2009AP2768.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶48 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  It is 
firmly established that "words or phrases in an insurance policy 
are ambiguous if, when read in context, they are susceptible to 
more than one reasonable interpretation."1  I agree with the 
court of appeals because it faithfully applied this standard, 
holding that "[o]ne could review the pollution exclusion as a 
whole and reasonably interpret 'pollutant' as not including bat 
guano excreted in a house."2  
¶49 The majority, on the other hand, concludes that the 
pollution exclusion is unambiguous, majority op., ¶4, which 
means the majority believes that word "waste" in the policy's 
definition of "pollutants" is susceptible to only one reasonable 
interpretation.   
¶50 One definition of "waste" is excrement.  Guano is 
excrement.  Majority op., ¶34.  It simply does not follow, as 
the majority opinion asserts, that guano was unambiguously 
included as waste in the definition of "pollutants" in Auto-
Owners' pollution exclusion clause.   
¶51 As the majority acknowledges, the word "waste" has 
many meanings.  Majority op., ¶34.  The majority opinion 
explains that a word with multiple meanings is not ambiguous "if 
only 
one 
meaning 
comports 
with 
an 
insured's 
objectively 
reasonable understanding."  Majority op., ¶23. 
                                                 
1 Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 224, 
231, 564 N.W.2d 728 (1997). 
2 Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2010 WI App 154, ¶10, 
330 Wis. 2d 232, 792 N.W.2d 639. 
No.  2009AP2768.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶52 The majority then selects one meaning of the word 
"waste" from the dictionary to define "waste" in the policy. 
Ironically, to determine that its chosen dictionary definition 
of "waste" is the one used in the context of the insurance 
policy, the majority explicitly ignores context.  Majority op., 
¶35.  In contrast, a reasonable insured would look to words 
surrounding "waste" to determine what "waste" means in this 
policy.  The majority's refusal to consider context is baffling.  
How else but by considering the word "waste" in context would we 
determine which of the many meanings of "waste" is objectively 
reasonable? 
¶53 The majority asserts that it will not use context to 
help interpret a word, since doing so would invoke a canon of 
construction, and canons of construction are not called upon 
until after a finding of ambiguity.  Majority op., ¶35.  This is 
a faulty application of the canons of contract interpretation. 
¶54 The court of appeals did not refer to the ejusdem 
generis rule3 to "rewrite the plain terms of the policy[ ]," as 
the majority suggests.  Majority op., ¶35.  Rather, the 
reference to ejusdem generis as used by the Hirschhorns was 
meant to illustrate why a reasonable insured might conclude that 
guano was not excluded by the pollution exclusion.   
¶55 A reasonable insured reading the insurance policy 
would draw conclusions about the meaning of "waste" in light of 
the words that appear near it.  This interpretive strategy 
underlies the ejusdem generis rule of construction, which is why 
                                                 
3 See Hirschhorn, 330 Wis. 2d 232, ¶12.  
No.  2009AP2768.ssa 
 
3 
 
the Hirschhorns invoked the rule and the court of appeals 
referred to it.     
¶56 In some contexts——for example, a rental agreement for 
portable toilets with a clause requiring the renter to dispose 
of all "waste" before returning the toilets——an objectively 
reasonable interpretation of the word "waste" would include 
excrement.  In the context of the definition of "pollutant," 
when the word "waste" follows the words "smoke, vapor, soot, 
fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, liquids, [and] gasses," a 
reasonable insured might well conclude that "waste" does not 
encompass guano.  The court of appeals suggests that when the 
word "excrement" is substituted in the policy for the word 
"waste," it is clear that the word "waste" is not like the other 
words.  Nor do bat feces and urine come to mind when the policy 
declares 
that 
"waste 
includes 
materials 
to 
be 
recycled, 
reconditioned, or reclaimed." 
¶57 In sum, instead of utilizing context to discern 
meaning, the majority uses a backward method.  It first selects 
one dictionary definition from among many to define "'waste' 
[as] unambiguously includ[ing] feces and urine."  Majority op., 
¶35.  The majority's selected dictionary definition ends the 
discussion of the meaning of "waste."  The majority's approach 
fails in several respects.  It fails to read words in the 
insurance policy in context to discern their meaning; it fails 
to read the insurance policy from the perspective of a 
reasonable insured; and it fails to construe ambiguities against 
the drafter and in favor of coverage.  
No.  2009AP2768.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶58 For the reasons stated above, I dissent.     
¶59 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
No.  2009AP2768.ssa 
 
1