Title: Anderson Plasterers v. Meinecke
Citation: 543 N.W.2d 612
Docket Number: N/A
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: February 14, 1996

543 N.W.2d 612 (1996) ANDERSON PLASTERERS, Appellant, v. George MEINECKE and Meinecke Brothers, Appellees. No. 94-1862. Supreme Court of Iowa. February 14, 1996. Theodore R. Hoglan of Fairall, Fairall, Kaplan, Hoglan, Condon &amp; Klaessy, Marshalltown, for appellant. Sharon Soorholtz Greer of Cartwright, Druker &amp; Ryden, Marshalltown, for appellees. Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LARSON, CARTER, LAVORATO, and SNELL, JJ. *613 LARSON, Justice. Two workers for Anderson Plasterers (employer) were injured by a third party, George Meinecke. The employer sued Meinecke for damages for its loss of the workers' time, expense of hiring replacement workers, and increased workers' compensation premiums. The district court granted summary judgment against the employer on the ground that Iowa does not recognize such a claim. We affirm. The sole issue is whether we will recognize a claim by an employer against a negligent third party for injuries suffered by the plaintiff's employees. The case does not involve disputed factual issues, and it therefore lends itself to disposition by summary judgment. See Hameed v. Brown, 530 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 1995). Our court has apparently not addressed the issue of third-party liability to an employer. However, under old English common law, the cause of action per quod servitium amisit allowed a master to recover for the loss of a servant's services. B.V. Merrow Co. v. Stephenson, 102 Mich.App. 63, 300 N.W.2d 734, 735 (1980) (citing Mary's Case, 9 Coke 111b (5 Coke's Rpts. 201, 204); 77 Eng.Rep. 895 (1612)); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1028 (5th ed. 1979). The rationale for this cause of action was that employees were then virtually property of their employers, and the suit against the third party was to redress a property loss. See Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Employer's Right of Action for Loss of Services or the Like Against Third Person Tortiously Killing or Injuring Employee, 4 A.L.R.4th 505, 508 (1981) [hereinafter Annotation]. Now such claims have been virtually eliminated. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 316 cmt. b (1958) ("For several hundred years ... there have been few cases in which a master has brought an action for negligent harm to a servant not a member of his family."). The present status of the law is summarized: Annotation, at 509. Such claims are said to be poorly suited to modern society. I.J. Weinrot &amp; Son, Inc. v. Jackson, 40 Cal. 3d 327, 220 Cal. Rptr. 103, 112, 708 P.2d 682, 691 (1985) (finding doctrine "obsolete, archaic and outmoded" and irrelevant to contemporary employer-employee relationships); B.V. Merrow Co., 300 N.W.2d at 736 (characterizing such claims as based on "outdated social concepts"); Frank Horton &amp; Co. v. Diggs, 544 S.W.2d 313, 314 (Mo.App.1976) (considering the rule "anomalous to contemporary life"). Under the Restatement of Torts, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766C (1979). In addition to being obsolete because of changes in the employer-employee relationship, the Restatement explains further why the cause of action is now rejected: Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766C cmt. a. The Restatement rule under section 766C applies when the interference is unintentional. The rule is different if the interference was intentional; in that case, a cause of action may be recognized. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766; Annotation, at 512. However, this employer does not claim that the injuries were intentionally caused. The employer acknowledges that recovery under its theory has been almost universally denied but asks us to adopt its argument that public policy supports recognition of such claims. It argues that it is reasonably foreseeable that other victims not directly involved in the event may be damaged, and those victims should be allowed a right of recovery. Such a suit would be analogous to one in which a family member who was not involved directly in the incident is allowed to recover for loss of consortium. In this case, as in others in which public policies are considered, line drawing is always necessary. We believe that the problems pointed out above are greater in the context of an employer/third-party confrontation than in other cases such as those involving loss of consortium. Moreover, the solicitude shown by courts for the rights of family members is considerably greater than for those arising out of a purely commercial relationship. We adopt the prevailing view that such claims should be denied and therefore hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment. AFFIRMED.