Title: The Florida Bar v. Ann Bitterman
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC07-1071
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 25, 2010

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-1071 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
ANN BITTERMAN, 
Respondent. 
 
[February 25, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review the referee’s report and recommendations pertaining to 
the misconduct of Ann Bitterman while under a rehabilitative suspension.  The Bar 
seeks review of the referee’s recommended discipline.  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  As explained below, we approve the referee’s findings of 
fact and recommendation of guilt, but disapprove the recommended sanction and 
disbar Ann Bitterman and tax her with costs. 
Facts 
On September 23, 2004, as a result of her inappropriate behavior in dealing 
with an unrepresented person and conduct involving dishonesty, the Court 
 
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suspended Bitterman for a period of ninety-one days and imposed probation, 
effective immediately, for three years, in case number SC03-1370.  Fla. Bar v. 
Bitterman, 885 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 2004) (table).  At no time after the expiration of 
the ninety-one-day period did Bitterman seek reinstatement as required by Rule 
Regulating the Florida Bar 3-7.10. 
Subsequently, on June 11, 2007, pursuant to Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 
3-7.11(f) (contempt), The Florida Bar filed a petition for contempt and order to 
show cause against Bitterman.  The Court issued an order to show cause, and a 
referee was appointed after responses were filed.  The final hearing was conducted 
and concluded on December 3, 2008. 
The referee’s report contains the following findings of fact. 
On May 20, 2006, Bitterman went to the Miami-Dade County Women’s 
Detention Center and presented her Florida Bar card as identification in order to 
gain immediate access in a private room to visit a friend, incarcerated at the time, 
in accordance with the privileges reserved for attorneys visiting clients or 
witnesses in jail.  While at the jail that day, Bitterman tried to persuade her friend 
to sign a lease granting Bitterman an interest in an automobile that Bitterman had 
given to the friend.  The friend became very upset and refused to sign the lease.  
Bitterman left the jail and went to Diaz Towing, where she represented herself as 
counsel for the vehicle’s owner, again using her Florida Bar card, in order that the 
 
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vehicle would be released to her.  In order for the friend to regain possession of the 
vehicle, a replevin action had to be filed against Bitterman.  The referee 
specifically found that the above-described actions constituted contemptuous 
conduct by a suspended attorney, in that she twice held herself out to be a member 
in good standing of The Florida Bar for her own benefit. 
In considering the appropriate sanction to recommend, the referee found the 
following aggravating factors: (1) prior disciplinary offenses; (2) dishonest or 
selfish motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) refusal to acknowledge wrongful 
nature of conduct; and (5) vulnerability of victim.  The referee found the following 
mitigating factors: (1) personal or emotional problems; (2) physical or mental 
disability or impairment; and (3) interim rehabilitation. 
The referee recommended a thirty-day suspension from the practice of law 
and, upon reinstatement, that Bitterman be placed on probation for a period of 
three years subject to specific conditions.  Further, the referee recommended that 
the Bar recover costs in the amount of $3,211.47.  The Florida Bar seeks review of 
the recommended discipline, arguing that existing case law does not support the 
referee’s recommendation and that disbarment is warranted.  
Analysis 
This Court’s standard of review in a contempt case is the same as that 
applicable to attorney disciplinary cases in general.  Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 913 So. 
 
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2d 554, 561 (Fla. 2005).  In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, the 
Court’s scope of review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of 
fact because, ultimately, it is our responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  
See Fla. Bar v. Ticktin, 14 So. 3d 928, 939 (Fla. 2009); Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 
So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  However, the Court 
will generally not second-guess the referee’s recommended discipline as long as it 
has a reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999). 
In this case, the only evidence presented at the hearing to support the 
referee’s findings of mitigation, particularly of interim rehabilitation, was 
Bitterman’s own subjective, self-interested testimony.  Moreover, the referee did 
not expressly consider the Standards for determining the appropriate sanction to 
recommend, or cite existing case law to support a thirty-day suspension.   Because 
the referee failed to engage in a considered review of the appropriate sanction 
under existing case law and the Standards, we reject the referee’s recommendation 
as to discipline and instead conclude that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. 
Applied to the facts found by the referee and supported by the record, 
Standards 5.11(f), 7.1, and 8.1 support disbarment.  Under Standard 5.11(f), 
disbarment is the presumptively appropriate sanction, absent aggravating or 
mitigating factors, when “a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct 
 
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involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely 
reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.”  Also absent aggravating or mitigating 
factors, Standard 7.1 provides for disbarment “when a lawyer intentionally engages 
in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to 
obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious 
injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”  Finally, Standard 8.1 provides 
for disbarment when a lawyer: 
a.   intentionally violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order 
and such violation causes injury to a client, the public, the legal 
system, or the profession; or 
 
b.   has been suspended for the same or similar misconduct, and 
intentionally engages in further similar acts of misconduct. 
 
 
Bitterman violated this Court’s suspension order by holding herself out as an 
attorney.  This Court, and thus the legal system, are injured when there is a lack of 
compliance with an order, and particularly a suspension order by an individual who 
had sworn an oath to “maintain the respect due courts of justice and judicial 
officers.”  Bitterman’s disregard for the Court’s authority, based upon her belief 
that she was justified in her actions, casts doubt upon her fitness to practice law 
within the confines of ethical standards.  Such misconduct also adds to the public’s 
negative perception of lawyers, thus causing injury to the legal profession.  
Moreover, by using her Florida Bar identification card to misrepresent her status as 
an attorney, both to enter the jail and obtain immediate and private access to a 
 
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prisoner and to obtain the prisoner’s vehicle from the impound lot, Bitterman acted 
deceitfully and engaged in misrepresentation.  Consequently, jail officials 
sustained injury, where their policy prohibiting members of the public from 
immediate and private access with prisoners, presumably for purposes of security, 
was eluded.   Finally, the owner of the vehicle had to take legal action to ultimately 
recover the vehicle from Bitterman.   
Existing case law also supports disbarment.  This Court has found 
disbarment to be proper when a suspended attorney is held in contempt for 
engaging in the practice of law during the period of suspension.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar 
v. Walkden, 950 So. 2d 407, 411 (Fla. 2007) (citing cases); Fla. Bar v. Greene, 589 
So. 2d 281, 282-83 (Fla. 1991).  The fact that Bitterman did not give legal advice, 
make an appearance on behalf of a client, or otherwise file pleadings in court is not 
relevant to our analysis, as she held herself out to be a member in good standing of 
The Florida Bar and represented that she was counsel for her incarcerated friend. 
“[T]his Court [also] considers prior misconduct and cumulative misconduct, 
and treats more severely cumulative misconduct than isolated misconduct.”  Fla. 
Bar v. Vining, 761 So. 2d 1044, 1048 (Fla. 2000).  Bitterman has a history of 
misconduct that dates back to 1996.  As a result of neglect of legal matters and 
taping telephone conversations without the other parties’ consent, Bitterman was 
suspended for a period of thirty days and placed on probation for a period of three 
 
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years.  See Fla. Bar v. Bitterman, 676 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1996) (table).  Bitterman’s 
second suspension, for ninety days with a three-year probationary period, resulted 
from inadequate communication, incompetence, and neglect of legal matters.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Bitterman, 751 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1999) (table).  A public reprimand was 
imposed on July 5, 2001, as the result of a conflict of interest.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Bitterman, 791 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2001) (table).  The Court imposed a third 
suspension on September 23, 2004, as a result of Bitterman’s inappropriate 
behavior in dealing with an unrepresented person and conduct involving 
dishonesty, for a period of ninety-one days with three years’ probation.  See Fla. 
Bar v. Bitterman, 885 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 2004) (table).  Another ninety-one day 
suspension and three-year probationary period was imposed against Bitterman on 
January 18, 2007, effective, nunc pro tunc, September 23, 2004, based upon 
incompetence and lack of diligence.  See Fla. Bar v. Bitterman, 949 So. 2d 199 
(Fla. 2007) (table).  Most recently, the Court found Bitterman in contempt of the 
terms of probation imposed on September 23, 2004, in Case No. SC03-1370.  As a 
result, the Court suspended Bitterman for a period of six months.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Bitterman, 984 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 2008) (table).  In light of the applicable Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Discipline, case law, and Bitterman’s lengthy disciplinary 
history, as discussed above, we conclude that the appropriate sanction in this case 
is disbarment. 
 
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Conclusion 
 
Accordingly, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendation 
of guilt.  However, we disapprove the referee’s recommended discipline and 
respondent Bitterman is hereby disbarred from the practice of law.  The disbarment 
is effective immediately.  Because Bitterman has been suspended since September 
23, 2004, it is not necessary to provide her with thirty days to close out her practice 
to protect the interests of existing clients. 
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Ann Bitterman in the 
amount of $3,211.47, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Staff 
Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida, and Jennifer R. Falcone Moore, Bar Counsel, 
Miami, Florida, The Florida Bar, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Roy D. Wasson of Wasson and Associates, Chartered, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent