Title: Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Batson
Citation: 359 So. 2d 70
Docket Number: N/A
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: May 22, 1978

359 So. 2d 70 (1978) LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION v. Emmett E. BATSON. No. 58725. Supreme Court of Louisiana. May 22, 1978. Alex W. Wall, Trial Counsel, Dodd, Barker, Avant, Wall &amp; Thomas, Baton Rouge, for defendant-respondent. John B. Scofield, Chairman, Lake Charles, Wood Brown, III, New Orleans, Sam J. D'Amico, Baton Rouge, Leonard Fuhrer, Alexandria, Harold J. Lamy, New Orleans, Edgar H. Lancaster, Jr., Tallulah, Henry A. Politz, Shreveport, John F. Pugh, Thibodaux, A. Russell Roberts, Metairie, Thomas O. Collins, Jr., Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, New Orleans, for plaintiff-petitioner. SANDERS, Chief Justice. On October 8, 1976, the Louisiana State Bar Association, appearing through the Committee on Professional Responsibility, brought this proceeding against Emmett E. Batson, a practicing attorney, seeking his disbarment for professional misconduct. A hearing was conducted by the Committee. Mr. Batson appeared before the Committee, represented by counsel of his choice. Based upon its investigation and the evidence at the hearing, the Committee concluded "that the Respondent had been guilty of a violation of the laws of this State relating to the professional conduct of lawyers and to the practice of law of sufficient gravity as to evidence a lack of fitness for the practice of law. . . ." *71 On October 29, 1976, we appointed a Commissioner to report his findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Commissioner's hearing was conducted on January 25, 1977 and March 11, 1977. Respondent was present for the hearing, represented by counsel. The Commissioner found that respondent had been guilty of violating Disciplinary Rule 9-102 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (LSA-R.S. 37, Ch. 4-App., Art. 16, Canon 9, DR 9-102) and Disciplinary Rule 1-102 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (LSA-R.S. 37: Ch. 4-App., Art. 16, Canon 1, DR 1-102), which respectively provide: The basic facts, upon which the Bar Association's complaints are based, are not in dispute: On and prior to September 19, 1968, respondent was an attorney retained by the Louisiana Department of Revenue concerning a delinquent tax liability of one Ben Beckham, Jr. The claim against Beckham was one of long-standing arising as early as the 1940's. By September 19, 1968, a portion of the money had been seized and was in the registry of the First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo, and, on this date, a check in the amount of $11,834.72 was issued by the Clerk of that court to respondent's order as attorney for the Department of Revenue. Of the $11,834.72, $1,075.88 was due respondent for attorney's fees; the remainder belonged to the Department of Revenue. Respondent deposited the entire sum in his personal account the day following the issuance of the check. The record reflects that the State Collector of Revenue authorized respondent to retain these funds pending disposition of other matters regarding the Beckham account. There was no express authorization *72 for the funds to be placed in a personal account, although respondent interpreted his authority in this manner. It is clear, however, that respondent was given no permission to use the funds for his own purposes. The Commissioner so found, and his finding is adequately supported. Between September, 1968 and October, 1971, respondent left the employ of the Department of Revenue. In October of 1971, an investigation began in the Department concerning the whereabouts of the funds realized in the Beckham collection. Thereafter, through the intercession of others, respondent obtained the issuance of an undated bank money order from the Citizen's National Bank of Hammond in the amount due the Department, $10,758.84. Respondent caused the date of September 27, 1968, to be placed on the money order and caused it to be placed in the appropriate file in the Department where it would be "found." It was subsequently "found." These are findings by the Commissioner, which are not traversed by the respondent. Respondent had possession of the funds from September, 1968 through November 9, 1971. Respondent does not contest this fact; however, he denies that they were converted to his own use. This same matter was also the subject of a criminal prosecution against this respondent for the misappropriation of funds. The State's criminal prosecution was dismissed after the close of the State's case by a directed verdict of acquittal. Respondent did not testify in the criminal proceeding and declined to testify in the hearing before the Commissioner. Two issues are raised for our consideration: (1) the effect of the acquittal of the criminal charges based upon the same transaction; and (2) the disciplinary action, if any, to be taken against respondent. Defendant argues that, because the Louisiana State Bar Association Articles of Incorporation Article XV § 8 makes criminal conviction conclusive proof of misconduct, an acquittal must constitute conclusive proof that there has been no misconduct. Defendant argues that to hold otherwise i.e., that an acquittal does not bar subsequent disciplinary proceedings would constitute a denial of due process and equal protection of the law. U. S. Const. Amend. 14, § 1. This argument is without merit. Louisiana State Bar Association Articles of Incorporation Article XV § 8(7) provides: Making "the certificate of the conviction. . . conclusive evidence of his guilt of the crime" does not violate due process and equal protection by giving greater weight to a conviction than to an acquittal. Under Article XV § 8, an acquittal is given equal weight regarding innocence of the crime for which respondent has been acquitted. Under § 8(7)(c)(d), the conviction or acquittal is conclusive evidence of guilt or innocence of the crime rather than conclusive evidence of guilt or innocence of unethical *73 conduct on respondent's part. The acquittal does not preclude disciplinary action for professional misconduct. In the absence of a conviction either due to an acquittal or a lack of criminal prosecution the Committee must determine whether or not the respondent has violated "any rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility of sufficient gravity as to evidence a lack of moral fitness for the practice of law . . .." Louisiana State Bar Association Articles of Incorporation Article XV § 6. The standard for determining respondent's moral fitness to practice law is the same whether or not he has been convicted or acquitted of a criminal charge. Louisiana State Bar Association Articles of Incorporation Article XVI EC 9-6 provides: Attorneys in this State are held to a very high standard of conduct. An attorney must avoid the appearance of impropriety as well as impropriety itself. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Weysham, La., 307 So. 2d 336 (1975); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Blum, 256 La. 530, 237 So. 2d 366 (1970); In re Novo, 200 La. 833, 9 So. 2d 201 (1942). See also: Louisiana State Bar Association v. Cox, 252 La. 978, 215 So. 2d 513 (1968); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Powell, 248 La. 237, 178 So. 2d 235 (1965); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Wheeler, 243 La. 618, 145 So. 2d 774 (1962). In the case before us, the record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the attorney committed professional improprieties in the following respects: (1) to retention of the funds after the termination of his employment; (2) failing to return the funds until an investigation was launched to determine their whereabouts; and (3) returning the funds in a surreptitious manner. This conduct is sufficient to warrant disciplinary action. There are mitigating circumstances: (1) there was a legitimate question about the handling of the funds collected; (2) respondent retained the funds with the approval of his employer; (3) he did make the funds available when an inquiry was made, although in an irregular manner; and (4) in his almost twenty years of practice, this is the only complaint ever made against respondent. In light of these mitigating circumstances, we conclude that a six month suspension from the practice of law is an adequate disciplinary action. For the reasons assigned, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that Emmett E. Batson, respondent herein, be suspended from the practice of law and his license to practice law be revoked for a period of six months and that he pay all costs herein.