Title: Ira B. Robins v. Patrick J. Madden
Citation: 2009 WI 46
Docket Number: 2007AP001526-W
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 11, 2009

2009 WI 46 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1526-W 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the matter of the John Doe petition: 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Ira B. Robins, 
          Petitioner-Petitioner, 
     v. 
The Honorable Patrick J. Madden , presiding, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 11, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 6, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Taylor   
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick J. Madden   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-petitioner there were briefs by Joseph 
F. Owens and Arthur & Owens, S.C., New Berlin, and oral argument 
by Joseph F. Owens. 
 
For the respondent the cause was argued by David C. Rice, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van 
Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 46
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP1526-W  
(L.C. No. 
2007JD1) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the John Doe petition: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Ira B. Robins, 
 
          Petitioner-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
The Honorable Patrick J. Madden, presiding, 
 
          Respondent. 
FILED 
 
JUN 11, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of an opinion and order of the Court of Appeals.  
Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished opinion and order of the court of appeals denying a 
petition for a supervisory writ of mandamus.1  Ira Robins 
("Robins") sought the writ to compel the Circuit Court for 
Taylor County, Patrick J. Madden, Judge, to examine all the 
witnesses produced by Robins at a John Doe hearing under Wis. 
                                                 
1 State ex rel. Robins v. Madden, No. 2007AP1526-W, 
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2008). 
No. 
2007AP1526   
 
2 
 
Stat. § 968.26 (2007-08).2  The court of appeals concluded that 
§ 968.26 does not require the circuit judge to examine all the 
witnesses produced by a John Doe complainant.3  It therefore 
denied the petition for a writ of mandamus because Judge Madden 
had no plain legal duty to examine all the witnesses Robins 
produced.  Robins then sought review before this court. 
¶2 
The issue we address today is whether the judge in a 
John Doe hearing is required under Wis. Stat. § 968.26 to 
examine all the witnesses a complainant produces and to issue 
subpoenas to all the witnesses a complainant wishes to produce.  
We read the statute as extending judicial discretion in a John 
Doe hearing not only to the scope of a witness's examination, 
but also to whether a witness need testify at all.  Accordingly, 
we hold that a judge is not required by § 968.26 to examine all 
the witnesses a complainant produces at a John Doe hearing, or 
to subpoena all the witnesses a complainant wishes to produce.  
Robins has no clear legal right to have each of the witnesses he 
produced examined, and his petition for a writ of mandamus must 
therefore fail.  Because the court of appeals examined the 
relevant facts, applied the proper standard of law, and used a 
rational process to reach a rational result, the court of 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 The "complainant" is the person who complains to the judge 
because he or she believes a crime has been committed.  Robins 
is the complainant in the case at bar. 
No. 
2007AP1526   
 
3 
 
appeals did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying 
Robins' writ of mandamus. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶3 
On May 16, 2007, Robins submitted a petition for the 
initiation of a John Doe proceeding to the Circuit Court for 
Taylor County.  The complaint detailed multiple instances of 
alleged criminal conduct by the Taylor County District Attorney, 
Karl Kelz ("Kelz"), involving a wide variety of purported 
misconduct in public office and criminal defamation.  Robins 
requested in his complaint that: (1) venue of the John Doe 
hearing be changed to any county in which Kelz had not 
previously practiced law and to which criminal cases from Taylor 
County are not often transferred; (2) the court appoint a 
special prosecutor to participate in the hearing; (3) the 
proceedings remain open to the public; and (4) Kelz have no 
contact with the witnesses listed in the complaint.  Taylor 
County Circuit Judge Gary L. Carlson then recused himself, and 
the matter was transferred by judicial assignment to the 
Honorable Patrick J. Madden of the Circuit Court for Iron 
County. 
¶4 
On June 6, 2007, Judge Madden convened the John Doe 
hearing.  Robins brought five witnesses with him to the hearing 
to testify regarding the allegations, and had two other 
witnesses on-call and available for a telephonic examination.  
At the commencement of the hearing, Judge Madden announced that 
the proceeding would be secret.  He ordered all non-court 
personnel——besides 
Robins 
and 
his 
attorney——to 
leave 
the 
No. 
2007AP1526   
 
4 
 
courtroom, including the five witnesses Robins had produced.  
Robins' attorney was ordered not to argue points of law or 
participate in the presentation of Robins' testimony during the 
hearing.  Judge Madden then examined Robins under oath for more 
than two hours regarding the allegations in the complaint.  As 
part of this examination, Judge Madden elicited a summary of the 
substance of each prospective witness's testimony.   
¶5 
After the examination, Judge Madden concluded: 
The court does not have a substantial basis in fact to 
find that any crime in violation of 942.01 or 946.12 
or any other of the statutes which the court would 
consider based on these facts has been violated to the 
point where this would meet the threshold test of a 
probable cause hearing, and for that reason, this 
petition is dismissed.   
Five days thereafter, on June 11, Judge Madden issued an order 
dismissing the petition4 on the grounds that there were 
"insufficient facts to warrant a criminal prosecution."5  
¶6 
On July 5, 2007, Robins petitioned the court of 
appeals for a supervisory writ of mandamus to compel Judge 
                                                 
4 Pursuant to his authority under the statute, Judge Madden 
also ordered "that the file be sealed, and the proceedings 
remain secret." See Wis. Stat. § 968.26 ("The examination 
. . . may be secret."). 
5 Robins contends that Judge Madden used the wrong legal 
standard in dismissing his petition.  Judge Madden admits that 
his written order did not accurately reflect the standard, but 
argues that he applied the proper legal standard at the hearing 
when 
he 
orally 
concluded 
that 
Robins 
had 
not 
presented 
sufficient facts that "would meet the threshold test of a 
probable cause hearing."  We are satisfied that Judge Madden 
applied the proper standard as evidenced by his oral ruling and 
do not reexamine the question here. 
No. 
2007AP1526   
 
5 
 
Madden to: (1) reconvene the John Doe proceeding; (2) examine 
all witnesses produced by Robins regarding the allegations in 
the complaint; (3) appoint a special prosecutor; and (4) issue a 
final written decision that includes findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.   
¶7 
After receiving Judge Madden's response, the court of 
appeals issued an opinion and order on January 4, 2008, 
concluding that the trial court was not required to examine each 
witness under Wis. Stat. § 968.26.  Rather, the provision 
requiring examination of the complainant's witnesses was to be 
understood in the context of the provision granting the judge 
discretion 
over 
the 
extent 
of 
the 
examination. 
 
After 
determining that Judge Madden did not refuse to perform a plain 
legal duty, the court of appeals denied Robins' petition for a 
writ of mandamus.6  
¶8 
Robins now appeals the denial of his petition.  Upon 
granting review, we directed the parties to also address the 
closely related question of whether a judge has discretion over 
the issuance of subpoenas to witnesses the complainant wishes to 
produce. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶9 
This case involves our review of the court of appeals' 
denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus.  We review the 
                                                 
6 The court of appeals did not address the request to compel 
Judge Madden to appoint a special prosecutor because it denied 
Robins' petition.  For the same reason, we also decline to 
address this question. 
No. 
2007AP1526   
 
6 
 
court of appeals decision for erroneous exercise of discretion.  
Watton v. Hegerty, 2008 WI 74, ¶6, 311 Wis. 2d 52, 751 
N.W.2d 369.  We will sustain a court's exercise of discretion if 
the court: (1) examined the relevant facts; (2) applied a proper 
standard of law; and (3) using a demonstrably rational process, 
reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.  Loy 
v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982). 
¶10 "Mandamus is an 'extraordinary writ' that may be 
employed to compel public officers to perform a duty that they 
are legally obligated to perform."  Watton, 311 Wis. 2d 52, ¶7 
(citing State ex rel. Greer v. Stahowiak, 2005 WI App 219, ¶7, 
287 Wis. 2d 795, 706 N.W.2d 161).  For a writ of mandamus to 
issue, the petitioner for the writ must establish that: (1) he 
possesses a clear legal right to the relief sought; (2) the duty 
he seeks to enforce is positive and plain; (3) he will be 
substantially damaged by nonperformance of such duty; and (4) 
there is no other adequate remedy at law.  Law Enforcement 
Standards Bd. v. Vill. of Lyndon Station, 101 Wis. 2d 472, 493, 
305 N.W.2d 89 (1981).   
¶11 The determination of whether Judge Madden refused to 
perform a plain legal duty depends on whether there is in fact a 
duty under Wis. Stat. § 968.26 to examine all witnesses a 
complainant produces at a John Doe hearing.  We interpret 
statutes independently, but benefit from the analysis of 
previous court decisions.  Watton, 311 Wis. 2d 52, ¶6. 
No. 
2007AP1526   
 
7 
 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Statutory Interpretation Generally 
¶12 The 
present 
case 
involves 
interpretation 
and 
clarification of the John Doe proceedings outlined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.26.  "[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  Our analysis "'begins with the language of the 
statute.'"  Id., ¶45 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, 
¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  "[S]tatutory language is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46.  We strive 
where possible "to give reasonable effect to every word, in 
order to avoid surplusage."  Id. 
B. John Doe Proceedings Generally 
¶13 John Doe proceedings, which have been around since 
Wisconsin's territorial days, have two purposes.  First, they 
are an investigative tool designed to allow the judge to 
determine whether a crime has been committed, and if so, who 
committed it.  State ex rel. Reimann v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, 214 Wis. 2d 605, 621, 571 N.W.2d 385 (1997).  Second, 
No. 
2007AP1526   
 
8 
 
they exist to protect innocent people from frivolous and 
groundless prosecutions.  Id.  
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.26 outlines a four-step process 
for John Doe proceedings.7  First, the judge must determine 
whether a complainant has alleged "objective, factual assertions 
sufficient to support a reasonable belief that a crime has been 
committed."  Reimann, 214 Wis. 2d at 623.  
¶15 If the petitioner's complaint supports a reason to 
believe that a crime has been committed, then the judge must 
proceed with a hearing at which "the judge shall examine the 
complainant under oath and any witnesses produced by him or 
her."  Wis. Stat. § 968.26.  We have previously concluded that 
this provision requires the judge to examine the complainant.  
Reimann, 214 Wis. 2d at 615 ("[W]e conclude that once a John Doe 
complainant has shown that he or she has reason to believe a 
crime has been committed, the judge has no discretion to refuse 
                                                 
7 The statute provides in pertinent part: 
If a person complains to a judge that he or she has 
reason to believe that a crime has been committed 
within his or her jurisdiction, the judge shall 
examine the complainant under oath and any witnesses 
produced by him or her and may, and at the request of 
the district attorney shall, subpoena and examine 
other witnesses to ascertain whether a crime has been 
committed and by whom committed.  The extent to which 
the judge may proceed in the examination is within the 
judge's discretion. . . . If it appears probable from 
the testimony given that a crime has been committed 
and who committed it, the complaint may be reduced to 
writing and signed and verified; and thereupon a 
warrant shall issue for the arrest of the accused.  
No. 
2007AP1526   
 
9 
 
to examine the complainant.").  Today we address the statute's 
applicability to witnesses the complainant proffers.8  Critical 
to our analysis here is the statute's declaration that "[t]he 
extent to which the judge may proceed in the examination is 
within the judge's discretion."  Wis. Stat. § 968.26.   
¶16 At the close of the hearing, the judge must determine 
whether "it appears probable from the testimony given that a 
crime has been committed and who committed it."  Id.  This means 
a judge must determine whether probable cause exists as to each 
                                                 
8 It is true that certain passages in the Reimann opinion 
seem to implicate the question before us today.  The opinion 
states, for example: "The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 968.26 
requires a judge to examine a John Doe complainant and his or 
her witnesses, if any, when the complainant has reason to 
believe 
a 
crime 
has 
been 
committed 
within 
that 
judge's 
jurisdiction."  State ex rel. Reimann v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, 214 Wis. 2d 605, 614, 571 N.W.2d 385 (1997).  
The facts of that case make clear, however, that the court 
was not addressing witness examinations in a John Doe hearing.  
In Reimann, a John Doe complainant's petition was denied without 
a hearing or any examination of the complainant.  We held that 
if the reasonable belief threshold requirement is satisfied, 
then 
and 
only 
then 
are 
the 
statute's 
mandatory 
hearing/examination provisions triggered.  See id. at 615.  
Thus, although the issue in Reimann was broadly framed, we 
concluded that "once a John Doe complainant has shown that he or 
she has reason to believe that a crime has been committed, the 
judge has no discretion to refuse to examine the complainant."  
Id.   
We affirm Reimann's holding that once the threshold 
requirement is met, the judge must examine the complainant.  
However, in order to avoid any confusion, we withdraw the 
language in Reimann which appears to require a John Doe judge to 
examine all witnesses produced by a complainant.  We recognize 
that this language was set forward in a context different from 
that which we address today. 
No. 
2007AP1526   
 
10 
 
essential element of the alleged crime.  See State v. Watson, 
227 Wis. 2d 167, 205, 595 N.W.2d 403 (1999).  The judge makes 
his or her probable cause determination by assessing only the 
plausibility of a witness's testimony, not the credibility or 
trustworthiness of the witness.  See Wilson v. State, 59 
Wis. 2d 269, 294, 208 N.W.2d 134 (1973).  
¶17 Finally, if the judge determines that probable cause 
is present——that is, that a crime probably has been committed—— 
and who the perpetrator of the alleged crime is, the judge may 
order that a criminal complaint be reduced to writing and (if so 
ordered) that a warrant issue for the arrest of the accused.  
Wis. Stat. § 968.26.  A John Doe judge has broad discretion to 
decide whether to file a criminal complaint, even upon a finding 
of probable cause.9 
C. Must a Judge Examine All Witnesses a John Doe Complainant 
Produces? 
¶18 This case requires us to make sense of a statute that 
is not a model of clarity.  On the one hand, Wis. Stat. § 968.26 
provides that "the judge shall examine the complainant under 
oath and any witnesses produced by him or her." (Emphasis 
added.)  On its own, this provision manifestly requires that 
"any witnesses produced" "shall" be examined.  But the statute 
                                                 
9 Previously, the statute required a judge to issue a 
criminal complaint upon a finding of probable cause.  However, 
the legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 968.26 in 1991.  Prior to 
this amendment, the statute stated that a complaint "shall be 
reduced to writing," and now states that it "may be reduced to 
writing."  See 1991 Wis. Act 88, § 1. 
No. 
2007AP1526   
 
11 
 
also provides a significant qualifier: "The extent to which the 
judge may proceed in the examination is within the judge's 
discretion."  Id.  The question, then, is whether this statute 
requires a judge to examine all witnesses produced by the 
complainant, or whether the judge's discretion over the scope of 
the examination includes the authority to decide which witnesses 
will be heard. 
¶19 Robins contends that once a judge determines the 
complaint supports a reason to believe a crime has been 
committed, the judge is required to examine not only the 
complainant, but also all witnesses produced by the complainant 
at the hearing.  The statute's use of the word "shall," 
according to Robins, is both straightforward and unalterable.  
He maintains that this mandatory examination clause stands on 
its own, and therefore must be interpreted independently of the 
judicial 
discretion 
clause. 
 
While 
the 
judge 
retains 
considerable discretion under Robins' approach, that discretion 
applies only to the scope of each witness's examination, not to 
which witnesses will be called.  While Robins acknowledges that 
this interpretation may lead to some inefficiencies, he insists 
the statute is clear.   
¶20 Judge Madden, on the other hand, argues that though 
examination of the complainant is required, examination of 
witnesses must be viewed in the context of the judicial 
discretion clause.  To see it otherwise, Judge Madden asserts, 
opens the court up to all manner of abuses.  Judges, for 
example, 
would 
be 
required 
to 
call 
an 
irrelevant 
but 
No. 
2007AP1526   
 
12 
 
nevertheless produced witness, only to ask the witness nothing 
of substance.  Judge Madden maintains that this formalistic 
interpretation would force judges to waste considerable time and 
resources by requiring them to call irrelevant and repetitive 
witnesses.  Thus, the only reasonable way to interpret the 
statute, according to Judge Madden, is to view the discretion 
clause as controlling the whole examination.  The only person 
who must be examined if the "reason to believe" standard is met 
is the complainant. 
¶21 Our interpretation of this passage is ultimately 
guided by our obligation to view the text as a whole, and in 
particular with a view to avoiding absurd or unreasonable 
results.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  Requiring John Doe 
judges to examine all produced witnesses makes no sense.  Such a 
requirement does not comport with: (1) the general principles of 
judicial oversight and discretion; (2) the purpose of a John Doe 
hearing; and (3) leads to absurd and unreasonable results.  
Therefore, Robins' interpretation must be rejected.   
¶22 As we have previously noted, "[t]he John Doe judge is 
a judicial officer who serves an essentially judicial function." 
State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 823, 266 N.W.2d 597 (1978).  
A John Doe judge has authority to "issue subpoenas, examine 
witnesses, 
adjourn 
the 
proceedings, 
take 
possession 
of 
subpoenaed records, adjudicate probable cause, and issue and 
seal warrants."  In re John Doe Proceeding, 2003 WI 30, ¶54, 260 
Wis. 2d 653, 660 N.W.2d 260.  As to all aspects of the conduct 
of the judicial function, the judge is the governor of the 
No. 
2007AP1526   
 
13 
 
proceedings, and as such is responsible for maintaining the good 
order, dignity, and insofar as it is compatible with the 
administration of justice, efficiency of those proceedings.  See 
id., ¶¶52-54 (discussing the broad powers of a John Doe judge to 
oversee the hearing and exercise the authority inherent in the 
judicial office).  
¶23 The goal of a John Doe hearing is to allow the judge 
to determine whether "it appears probable from the testimony 
given that a crime has been committed and who committed it," and 
then whether to file a complaint.  See Wis. Stat. § 968.26.  The 
whole of the hearing must be seen in this light.  See 
Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 823 ("The John Doe judge should act 
with a view toward issuing a complaint or determining that no 
crime has occurred.").  As we have previously said, the John Doe 
hearing is primarily an investigative device, the scope of which 
"is essentially limited to the subject matter of the complaint."  
Id. at 822.  The John Doe judge has a mandate, and he or she is 
to exercise his or her discretion toward this end.  Requiring 
the judge to call all produced witnesses to the stand, without 
regard to the competence, relevance, or repetitive nature of the 
witness's testimony, does not advance this goal.   
¶24 Robins' interpretation calls forth the specter of 
absurdities that are as numerous as they are wasteful.  Under 
his approach, a complainant could produce all of his neighbors——
be they fellow residents of a tree-lined neighborhood or fellow 
inmates of a prison cell block——and require the judge to clear 
the court's calendar for however many hours or days it might 
No. 
2007AP1526   
 
14 
 
take 
to 
call 
and 
perfunctorily 
examine 
each 
witness.10  
Similarly, Robins' approach means the John Doe judge would have 
discretion over non-produced witnesses and over witnesses the 
complainant wishes to subpoena, but not over witnesses brought 
to the hearing.  Such a distinction makes little sense.  Or, if, 
for example, after the testimony of only one or two witnesses, 
the John Doe judge determined that probable cause exists, the 
judge would still be required to examine all of the remaining 
witnesses the complainant produced (if the complainant does not 
wish to excuse them).  See id. at 824 (noting that when the 
facts make clear that a person is probably guilty of an offense, 
it would not be proper to continue the John Doe hearing). 
¶25 Such an approach removes control of the courtroom from 
the hands of the judge and places it into the hands of the John 
Doe complainant.  This cannot be squared in any way with either 
common sense or the statute's language that the judge retains 
discretion over the extent of the examination.  This approach 
would divorce the examination from the goal of the proceedings 
and waste the time of the complainant, the court, and the 
witnesses themselves.   
¶26 Just as it is unreasonable to force a judge to call 
all witnesses once an affirmative probable cause determination 
has been made, it is equally unreasonable to force a judge to 
examine all witnesses once a determination has been made that 
                                                 
10 As Robins concedes, his approach would force a judge to 
call all extraneous witnesses produced by the complainant, have 
them state their names, and simply excuse them from the stand. 
No. 
2007AP1526   
 
15 
 
probable cause does not exist.  We see no danger in allowing a 
judge to determine prior to examination that the produced 
witness or witnesses are not competent to testify, do not have 
relevant testimony, have testimony that is cumulative or 
repetitive, or any other such factors making examination of the 
witness inappropriate or unnecessary.  The John Doe judge may 
accomplish this in a variety of ways, including eliciting an 
offer of proof from the complainant as was essentially done 
here, receiving brief written witness summaries from the 
complainant, a combination of oral and written offers of proof, 
or some similar procedure reasonably calculated to allow the 
judge to exercise his or her discretion with regard to the 
testimony he or she will hear. 
¶27 A judge is to oversee a John Doe hearing in such a way 
as "to ensure that the proceeding is conducted in an orderly and 
expeditious manner."  Id.  The only way the judge can do this is 
to limit not only the scope of an individual witness's 
examination, but also which witnesses may testify.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 968.26 cannot be reasonably interpreted otherwise.  John 
Doe judges must not be shackled to a process that frustrates the 
goal of ascertaining probable cause in an expeditious manner.  
The statute, then, is susceptible to but one reasonable 
construction: Wis. Stat. § 968.26 when read as a whole preserves 
the circuit court's discretion as to which witnesses it will 
examine in a John Doe proceeding. 
No. 
2007AP1526   
 
16 
 
 
D. Must a Judge Subpoena All Witnesses a John Doe Complainant 
Wishes to Produce? 
¶28 In response to our request, the parties addressed the 
question of whether a John Doe judge must issue subpoenas for 
all witnesses a complainant wishes to produce.  Both parties 
agree that a judge retains discretionary authority as to the 
issuance of such subpoenas.  We conclude that a John Doe judge 
need not issue subpoenas for every witness a complainant wishes 
to produce.  Those same factors which lead us to conclude a John 
Doe 
judge 
need not examine each witness produced by a 
complainant compel a symmetrical result as to the issuance of 
subpoenas.  Indeed, it would be even more wasteful to compel a 
John Doe judge to issue subpoenas for incompetent, cumulative, 
unnecessary, or irrelevant witnesses than it would be to force 
the judge to examine them.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶29 The issue we address today is whether the judge in a 
John Doe hearing is required under Wis. Stat. § 968.26 to 
examine all the witnesses a complainant produces and to issue 
subpoenas to all the witnesses a complainant wishes to produce.  
We read the statute as extending judicial discretion in a John 
Doe hearing not only to the scope of a witness's examination, 
but also to whether a witness need testify at all.  Accordingly, 
we hold that a judge is not required by § 968.26 to examine all 
the witnesses a complainant produces in a John Doe hearing, or 
to subpoena all the witnesses a complainant wishes to produce.  
No. 
2007AP1526   
 
17 
 
Robins has no clear legal right to have each of the witnesses he 
produced examined, and his petition for a writ of mandamus must 
therefore fail.  Because the court of appeals examined the 
relevant facts, applied the proper standard of law, and used a 
rational process to reach a rational result, the court of 
appeals did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying 
Robins' writ of mandamus. 
By the Court.—The opinion and order of the court of appeals 
is affirmed. 
SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRHAMSON, 
C.J., 
did 
not 
participate.
No. 
2007AP1526   
 
 
 
1