Title: Hicks v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 100727
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 2011

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 
JJ., and Koontz, S.J.∗ 
 
MICHAEL DEON HICKS 
 
v.  Record No. 100727 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   March 4, 2011 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred when it affirmed the conviction of Michael Deon Hicks 
("Hicks") for possession of heroin which occurred after denial 
of his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to 
execution of a search warrant. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
On September 11, 2008, Richmond Police Narcotics 
Detective Sergeant Ronald Armstead ("Armstead") was involved 
in an unrelated police drug investigation using a confidential 
informant in a "control[led] buy operation."  The informant 
had been working with the police and making controlled buys 
for a six month period, and he was considered reliable.  His 
information had helped police obtain search warrants, arrest 
several individuals, and seize illegal narcotics.  The 
informant had used cocaine and heroin in the past, and he was 
                     
∗ Justice Koontz presided and participated in the hearing 
and decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on February 1, 2011; Justice Kinser was sworn in as 
Chief Justice on February 1, 2011. 
familiar with their packaging and street-level distribution.  
The informant was "wired" for audio and video recording. 
While working on this unrelated operation, Armstead 
observed four individuals enter a home at 2111 Richmond Street 
(the "home") at different times and leave within 30 seconds.  
The home is located in what police referred to as "a high drug 
area."  Armstead saw one man take money out of his pocket 
before entering the home.  After another person, a woman, 
entered and exited the home, she was approached by the 
informant.  She opened a piece of folded paper and showed the 
contents to the informant.  The informant subsequently told 
Armstead that the woman showed him what she said was heroin 
that she had just purchased inside the "Dope House," referring 
to the home.  Armstead and the informant then met with 
Detective Marvin Marsh ("Marsh") at a staging location and 
told him what had occurred. 
Based on this information, Marsh completed an affidavit 
in support of a search warrant ("the affidavit"), in which he 
additionally stated that "this activity is an indicator and is 
consistent with foot traffic when purchasing illegal narcotics 
from a drug house."  In the affidavit, Marsh concluded that 
"[he] believe[s] evidence supporting the involvement of [the 
home] and those who frequent this residence solely to sell and 
 
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or purchase heroin, will be recovered from the 
residence. . . ." 
Based on the information in the affidavit, Marsh secured 
a search warrant ("the warrant") for the home on September 12, 
2008.  The warrant commanded the search of the home for the 
following: 
Heroin . . . and any paraphernalia used in the 
preparation, packaging, and distribution of 
Heroin.  Any instruments of the illegal drug 
trade and fruits from the sale of Heroin.  Any 
electronic devices used to aid the distribution 
of Heroin.  Any financial or written records or 
documents identifying the owners involvlement 
[sic] in the illegal drug trade.  Any firearms 
and/or ammunition found inside the residence. 
 
The search warrant was not executed until 13 days later 
on September 25, 2008.  During the interim period, Marsh's 
investigation revealed that the utilities at the home were 
registered to Isis Trent, whose boyfriend, Hicks, had "been 
involved in two pending drug transactions" that police 
recorded on video, and he had a criminal record involving 
robbery and heroin distribution. 
Marsh testified that after the warrant was issued on 
September 12, he conducted several "spot checks, mobile 
surveillances, driving through the area, sitting for a while, 
and [he] didn't at that point in time observe any foot traffic 
in and out of the residence."  Each time he drove by, "there 
 
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was no one in the front yard, no one on the sidewalk areas, no 
one out," and he considered the area "to be dead." 
However, on September 25, Marsh testified that there was 
an increase in activity, and within the span of 10 minutes he 
saw "more than five" individuals enter the home, stay for 20-
30 seconds, and then leave.  Marsh testified that this was 
similar to the pattern of foot traffic observed by Armstead on 
September 11th.  He explained that the short visit time was 
significant, stating that "because we are dealing with illegal 
narcotics, they don't want to stay too long.  They purchase 
what they're going to purchase and they leave."  Marsh also 
observed men who appeared to be "posting up," "standing in the 
front yard, [who] from time to time would glance to the left 
and to the right as if being lookouts."  He said that these 
men appeared to be "very conscientious [sic] of their 
whereabouts, their surroundings."  Marsh testified that, in 
his experience, when people "post up" as lookouts, it is "very 
obvious" and their role is to "yell out" if they see the 
police to warn others that law enforcement is in the area.  
Marsh concluded that his observations were "consistent with 
the sale of narcotics," and he left the area to assemble other 
officers to execute the search warrant. 
When the search warrant was executed that evening, police 
found several individuals inside the home, including Hicks, 
 
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Hicks' girlfriend, Hicks' cousin, and three young children.  
After being advised of his rights, Hicks told Marsh that his 
cousin had heroin hidden in his undergarments.  When the 
police searched the kitchen and rear porch area of the home, 
Marsh observed that Hicks showed interest in the search, 
appeared "real antsy," and "would maintain eye contact with 
officers while they were in the kitchen area searching."  On 
the rear porch, police found a bag containing approximately 14 
grams of heroin.  In response to questioning, Hicks said that 
his DNA may be on the bag, and he admitted that "I put up the 
money and my cousin sells the stuff."  From other areas of the 
home, police also recovered 45 individually wrapped small 
"baggies" of heroin, a digital scale, packaging materials, and 
ammunition.  Hicks admitted that the digital scale was used to 
weigh the heroin. 
In denying Hicks' motion to suppress the evidence, the 
trial court held that "the affidavit in support of the search 
warrant was sufficient in its statement of material facts 
constituting probable cause for the magistrate to have issued 
the warrant for the search of [the home]."  The trial court 
also held that the execution of the search warrant 13 days 
after its issuance did not constitute undue delay because once 
Marsh "observed the things that signaled to him as a drug 
detective that there was dealing going on, again, and that 
 
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dealing was probably heroin based on what happened on 
September 11th, it was appropriate . . . for the warrant to be 
executed at that time."  A jury found Hicks guilty of 
possession of heroin in violation of Code § 18.2-250.  The 
trial court imposed the jury's verdict and sentence of ten 
years in prison. 
In an unpublished order, the Court of Appeals denied 
Hicks' petition for appeal.  Hicks v. Commonwealth, Record No. 
2183-09-2 (March 17, 2010).  The Court of Appeals held that 
the affidavit provided sufficient probable cause to justify 
the issuance of the search warrant.  Id., slip op. at 2-3.  
The Court of Appeals further held that probable cause did not 
dissipate during the 13-day period, as "the detectives 
executed the warrant 'forthwith' within the meaning of Code 
§ 19.2-56 and in compliance with the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment."  Id., slip op. at 3-4.  Hicks timely filed 
his notice of appeal to this Court.  We awarded an appeal on 
the following assignments of error: 
 
1. The Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court's 
decision to deny Hicks' motion to suppress the evidence 
when there was no probable cause to justify the search 
warrant. 
 
2. The Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court's 
denial of Hicks' motion to suppress the evidence when the 
probable cause, if any, had dissipated, and the police 
did not execute the search warrant in a timely manner. 
 
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II.  Analysis 
 
A. Standard of Review 
The standard of review in this case is well settled. 
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress 
evidence claiming a violation of a person's 
Fourth Amendment rights, we consider the facts 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
the prevailing party at trial. The burden is on 
the defendant to show that the trial court 
committed reversible error. We are bound by the 
trial court's factual findings unless those 
findings are plainly wrong or unsupported by the 
evidence. We will review the trial court's 
application of the law de novo. 
 
Whitehead v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 300, 306-07, 683 S.E.2d 
299, 301 (2009) (quoting Malbrough v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 
163, 165, 665 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2008)). 
B. Probable Cause to Support Issuance 
 of the Search Warrant 
 
Hicks argues that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming 
the trial court's decision to deny his motion to suppress the 
evidence and holding that the affidavit was sufficient to 
support probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. 
We must look to the totality of the circumstances in 
order to determine whether the affidavit was sufficient to 
support the search warrant. Garza v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 
559, 563, 323 S.E.2d 127, 129 (1984) (citing Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)).  Probable cause for issuance 
of a search warrant exists when "there is a fair probability 
 
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that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place."  Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171, 178, 
670 S.E.2d 727, 731 (2009) (quoting United States v. Grubbs, 
547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006)).  In Gates, the United States Supreme 
Court rejected any hypertechnical, rigid analyses when 
reviewing probable cause determinations made by judges and 
magistrates; rather, the proper approach is as follows: 
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to 
make a practical, common-sense decision whether, 
given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit before him, including the "veracity" 
and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying 
hearsay information, there is a fair probability 
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place.  And the duty of a 
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the 
magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . 
conclud[ing]" that probable cause existed. 
 
462 U.S. at 238-39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 
257, 271 (1960)). Additionally, when we review the 
magistrate's decision to issue the warrant, we must grant 
"great deference" to the magistrate's finding of probable 
cause.  Garza, 228 Va. at 563, 323 S.E.2d at 129. 
 
Here, the affidavit was sufficient on its face to support 
probable cause for the search warrant.  Armstead observed 
several individuals enter the home at different times, each 
exiting within 30 seconds, and one of the individuals had 
money in his hand.  The reliable confidential informant spoke 
with a woman who had just exited the home, and she referred to 
 
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the home as a "Dope House."  Armstead also saw the woman open 
a folded piece of paper to show the informant what she stated 
was heroin she had just purchased inside the home. 
Based on this information, as well as his training and 
experience, Marsh completed the affidavit in which he 
concluded that "this activity is an indicator and is 
consistent with foot traffic when purchasing illegal narcotics 
from a drug house."  From this evidence, the magistrate had a 
substantial basis for concluding that "there [was] a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime [would] be 
found" in the home.  Consequently, the affidavit presented 
sufficient probable cause for issuance of a search warrant.  
Jones, 277 Va. at 178, 670 S.E.2d at 731 (quoting Gates, 462 
U.S. at 238). 
C. Dissipation of Probable Cause 
 Prior to Execution of the Warrant 
 
Hicks further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in 
holding that probable cause did not dissipate during the 13-
day period between issuance of the search warrant and its 
execution.  Hicks argues that even if probable cause to search 
the home existed, it had dissipated by the time the search 
warrant was executed in violation of Code § 19.2-56. 
Code § 19.2-56 imposes a 15-day limitation period on the 
execution of search warrants, stating that "[a]ny search 
 
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warrant not executed within 15 days after issuance thereof 
shall be returned to, and voided by, the officer who issued 
such search warrant."  Under this provision, no search warrant 
may be executed more than 15 days after its issuance.  
Additionally, the statute further provides that "the 
[search] warrant shall command that the place be forthwith 
searched."  (Emphasis added.)  The Court of Appeals has 
previously observed that: 
"Forthwith," within the context of Code § 19.2-
56, does not mean immediately or as soon as 
physically possible.  It does not mandate that 
officers must immediately execute the search 
warrant without regard to the circumstances that 
obtain.  The fact that the statute provides that 
the warrant expires if not executed within 
fifteen days means that some latitude is provided 
for the time within which the search may be 
conducted.  But, under that statute, "it is . . . 
necessary that search warrants be executed with 
some promptness in order to lessen the 
possibility that the facts upon which probable 
cause was initially based do not become 
dissipated." 
 
Turner v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 737, 742, 420 S.E.2d 235, 
238 (1992) (citations omitted).  We agree with the Court of 
Appeals that "[t]he 'forthwith' requirement defines the policy 
of the state that search warrants, which are the foremost 
safeguard to protect against unreasonable searches proscribed 
by the Fourth Amendment, are to be executed with reasonable 
dispatch."  Id.  Therefore, "a warrant will be tested for 
'staleness' by considering whether the facts alleged in the 
 
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warrant provided probable cause to believe, at the time the 
search actually was conducted, that the search conducted 
pursuant to the warrant would lead to the discovery of 
evidence of criminal activity."  Johnson v. Commonwealth, 259 
Va. 654, 671, 529 S.E.2d 769, 778 (2000). 
 
Here, the search meets both the 15-day and "forthwith" 
mandates of Code § 19.2-56.  Hicks suggests that probable 
cause had dissipated because Marsh waited to execute the 
search warrant until he saw signs of activity around the home.  
While we cannot know and will not speculate as to Marsh's 
intentions, it is clear from the record that no dissipation 
occurred over those 13 days as to the subject matter of the 
search.  The warrant commanded the search of the home not only 
for heroin, but also for "paraphernalia," "instruments of the 
illegal drug trade," "fruits from the sale of Heroin," 
"electronic devices used to aid the distribution of Heroin," 
"financial or written records or documents," "firearms," and 
"ammunition."  The probable cause that existed to support the 
issuance of the search warrant for these items had not 
dissipated when the search warrant was executed on September 
25, 2008.  Accordingly, the search warrant was timely executed 
pursuant to the requirements of Code § 19.2-56 and was 
conducted "forthwith" in compliance with the requirements of 
that statute and the Fourth Amendment. 
 
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III.  Conclusion 
For the reasons stated, we hold that the Court of Appeals 
did not err in affirming Hicks' conviction for possession of 
heroin in violation of Code § 18.2-250.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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