Title: Augsburger v. Homestead Mut. Ins. Co.
Citation: 2014 WI 133
Docket Number: 2012AP000641
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 26, 2014

2014 WI 133 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP641 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Julie A. Augsburger, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Homestead Mutual Insurance Company and George 
Kontos, 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
ABC Insurance Company, Janet C. Veith, Edward 
Veith and  
Convergys Corporation, 
          Defendants.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 350 Wis. 2d 486, 838 N.W.2d 88) 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished) 
PDC No.: 2013 WI App 106 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 26, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 4, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 
JUDGE: 
Gary R. Sharpe 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents. (Opinion filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by Robert N. Duimstra, Jarrod J. Papendorf, Kurt F. 
Ellison, and Menn Law Firm, Ltd., Appleton. Oral argument by 
Jarrod J. Papendorf. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Susan 
R. Tyndall, with whom on the briefs was Joseph M. Troy and 
Habush, Habush & Rottier S.C., Appleton and Waukesha.  
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy M. Barber and 
Axley Brynelson LLP, Madison; and Monte E. Weiss and Weiss Law 
Office S.C., Mequon, on behalf of Wisconsin Defense Counsel. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner III 
and Law Offices of William Gleisner, Hartland, on behalf of 
Wisconsin Association for Justice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 133
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2012AP641 
(L.C. No. 
10CV844) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Julie A. Augsburger, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Homestead Mutual Insurance Company and George 
Kontos, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
ABC Insurance Company, Janet C. Veith, Edward 
Veith and Convergys Corporation, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 26, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. Petitioners, George Kontos and 
his insurance company, Homestead Mutual Insurance Company, seek 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals.  It 
affirmed the circuit court's determination that Kontos could be 
No. 
2012AP641   
 
2 
 
held liable to the plaintiff, Julie Augsburger, for injuries 
caused by his daughter's dogs.1 
¶2 
Kontos contends that he cannot be held strictly liable 
for injuries caused by the dogs because he is not an "owner" of 
the dogs under the statutory definition.  According to Kontos, 
although 
the 
statutory 
definition 
of 
"owner" 
includes 
a 
"harborer," he did not harbor his daughter's dogs when he 
permitted his daughter and her family to live in a house he 
owned while he resided elsewhere.  Kontos asserts that because 
he lived elsewhere, he did not have the requisite control to be 
a harborer under the statute. 
¶3 
We conclude that mere ownership of the property on 
which a dog resides is not sufficient to establish that an 
individual is an owner of a dog under Wis. Stat. § 174.02 (2011-
12).2  Rather, the totality of the circumstances determines 
whether the legal owner of the property has exercised the 
requisite control over the property to be considered a harborer 
and thus an owner under the statute.  
¶4 
We determine that Kontos is not an "owner" under the 
statute.3  A statutory owner includes one who "owns, harbors or 
                                                 
1 Augsburger v. Homestead Mutual Ins. Co., 2013 WI App 106, 
350 Wis. 2d 486, 838 N.W.2d 88 (affirming judgment of the 
circuit court for Winnebago County, Gary R. Sharpe, Judge). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Because this issue is dispositive, we need not reach the 
alternative argument raised by Kontos——that even if he is an 
owner, public policy weighs against holding him liable. 
No. 
2012AP641   
 
3 
 
keeps a dog."  Wis. Stat. § 174.001(5).  It is undisputed that 
Kontos did not legally own the dogs and did not "keep" them.  
Additionally, we conclude that he was not a harborer as 
evidenced by the totality of the circumstances.  He neither 
lived in the same household as the dogs nor exercised control 
over the property on which the dogs were kept.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals. 
I 
¶5 
The relevant facts in this case are undisputed.  
Kontos owned a property in Larsen, Wisconsin on Grandview Road 
("the Grandview property").  He purchased the Grandview property 
for his daughter, Janet Veith, and her family to live in so that 
she could be near her mother who was having medical difficulties 
at the time.   
¶6 
Kontos did not reside at the property with the Veiths.  
General repairs and maintenance were done by Veith's husband.  
This included partially remodeling the interior of the home. 
There was no formal lease between Kontos and the Veiths.  Kontos 
was aware that the Veiths were having financial difficulties and 
he did not expect them to pay rent.  At times he gave his 
daughter money to help with the bills.  She dealt with Kontos as 
her dad and did not think of him as her landlord.  In explaining 
the arrangement, Veith explained that the Grandview property was 
"[Kontos'] house.  We live there."  In contrast, her husband did 
consider Kontos to be their landlord.   
¶7 
At the time Kontos purchased the property he was aware 
that the Veiths owned horses and two dogs and that the animals 
No. 
2012AP641   
 
4 
 
would be living with the family.  Kontos' deposition testimony 
reflects that part of the reason he chose the Grandview property 
was its suitability for the horses.  After the Veiths moved in, 
they rescued another dog named Bailey.  Bailey was pregnant and 
had four puppies.  The Veiths kept three of the puppies. 
Although Kontos was not fond of the dogs, he did not tell his 
daughter 
to 
remove 
them 
from 
the 
property. 
The 
Veiths 
acknowledged he had the authority to prohibit the dogs from the 
property, but that he did not exercise that authority.  Although 
Kontos 
apparently 
appeared 
on 
the 
property 
on 
multiple 
occasions, the record reveals that it was not frequent. 
¶8 
When he did visit, Kontos would rarely go near the 
dogs.  He never fed the dogs, watered, or bathed them.  Further, 
he did not groom them or take them to the vet.  He did not pay 
for their food, take care of them, or instruct his daughter how 
to take care of them.  He did, however, yell at the dogs a few 
times to be quiet.   
¶9 
On the date of the incident Veith invited Augsburger 
to visit her at the Grandview property.  When Augsburger 
arrived, Veith's daughter informed her that Veith was in the 
barn.  As Augsburger made her way to the barn, four dogs ran at 
her from the house.  They attacked her and bit her multiple 
times. 
¶10 Augburger filed a complaint against the Veiths, 
Kontos, and Homestead Mutual Insurance Company.  In the 
complaint Augsburger alleged that Kontos and the Veiths were 
negligent in keeping and controlling the dogs and were liable 
No. 
2012AP641   
 
5 
 
for her injuries under Wis. Stat. § 174.02(1), which imposes 
strict liability on dog owners for injuries caused by their 
dogs. 
¶11 Both Kontos and Augsburger filed summary judgment 
motions addressing the issue of whether Kontos was a statutory 
owner.4  Kontos relied on Smaxwell v. Bayard, 2004 WI 101, 274 
Wis. 2d 278, 682 N.W.2d 923, which held that under the 
circumstances a landlord could not be held liable for injuries 
caused by a tenant's dog.  Augsburger relied on Pawlowski v. 
American Family Ins. Co., 2009 WI 105, 322 Wis. 2d 21, 777 
N.W.2d 67, which determined that a landowner was a statutory 
owner when she harbored a dog by allowing the dog and its legal 
owner to reside in her residence.   
¶12 The circuit court determined that the term "harbor" 
means "to give shelter or refuge to" and concluded that Kontos 
gave shelter to the Veiths and their dogs.  Accordingly, it 
determined that he was a statutory owner. 
¶13 Kontos and his insurer filed an interlocutory appeal, 
asserting that he was not a statutory owner because he did not 
exercise custody or control over or care for the dogs, and that 
public policy precluded his liability.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court, reasoning that Kontos was a harborer 
under the statute because he was the owner of the home and 
                                                 
4 Homestead Mutual Insurance Company also filed a summary 
judgment motion seeking a determination that the Veiths were not 
"insureds" under the policy it provided to Kontos.  The circuit 
court granted that motion. 
No. 
2012AP641   
 
6 
 
knowingly afforded lodging and shelter to the dogs.  Augsburger 
v. Homestead Mutual Ins. Co., 2013 WI App 106, ¶¶13-14, 350 
Wis. 2d 486, 838 N.W.2d 88.  It further determined that public 
policy considerations did not preclude Kontos' liability.  Id., 
¶23. 
II 
¶14 In this case, we are asked to review the court of 
appeals' decision affirming the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment to Augsburger.  When we review grants of summary 
judgment we apply the same methodology as does the court of 
appeals and the circuit court.  Pawlowski, 322 Wis. 2d 21, ¶15.  
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and [] the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). 
¶15 Here, the relevant facts are not in dispute.  At issue 
is whether Kontos can be held liable as an "owner" under Wis. 
Stat. § 174.02.  Statutory interpretation is a question of law 
that we review independently of the determinations rendered by 
the circuit court and the court of appeals.  Pawlowski, 322 Wis. 
2d 21, ¶16. 
¶16 We look first to the statutory language at issue.  
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We interpret statutory 
language "in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes."  Id., ¶46.  Prior 
caselaw can aid in this inquiry as it "may illumine how we have 
No. 
2012AP641   
 
7 
 
previously interpreted or applied the statutory language."  
Belding v. Demoulin, 2014 WI 8, ¶16, 352 Wis. 2d 359, 843 N.W.2d 
373.   
¶17 Our interpretation of a statute is guided also by the 
canons of statutory construction.  "When the legislature chooses 
to 
use 
two 
different 
words, 
we 
generally 
consider 
each 
separately and presume that different words have different 
meanings."  
Pawlowski, 322 Wis. 2d 21, ¶22. 
 Further, 
"[s]tatutes in derogation of the common law are strictly 
construed."  Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 2001 WI 
81, ¶26, 244 Wis. 2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 833; see also NBZ, Inc. v. 
Pilarski, 185 Wis. 2d 827, 836, 520 N.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1994) 
("A statute in derogation of the common law must be strictly 
construed so as to have minimal effect on the common law 
rule.").   
III 
¶18 We begin with the language of the statutes.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 174.02, often referred to as the dog bite statute, 
imposes strict liability on dog owners for injuries caused by 
their dogs.  It states: "the owner of a dog is liable for the 
full amount of damages caused by the dog injuring or causing 
No. 
2012AP641   
 
8 
 
injury to a person, domestic animal or property."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 174.02(a).5   
¶19 A neighboring statute contains a definition of the 
term "owner."  Wisconsin Stat. § 174.001 provides: "As used in 
this chapter, unless the context indicates otherwise: . . . 
'Owner' includes any person who owns, harbors or keeps a dog."  
Wis. Stat. § 174.001(5).  The parties agree that Kontos was not 
the legal owner of the dogs and did not keep them, but dispute 
whether he harbored them.  
¶20 The term "harbor" is not defined in the statute.  
Accordingly, the plain language of the statutory scheme fails to 
provide clear guidance on how the term "harbor" should be 
interpreted in the present situation.  Wisconsin caselaw, 
however, has addressed the definition of the term "harbor" and 
we find guidance from those cases. 
¶21 A general definition of the term "harborer" is 
provided in Pattermann v. Pattermann, 173 Wis. 2d 143, 149 n.4, 
496 N.W.2d 613 (Ct. App. 1992).6  There, the court defined the 
term by contrasting it with the term "keeper."  It explained 
                                                 
5 Subsection (b) of the statute provides: "After notice. 
Subject to s. 895.045 and except as provided in s. 895.57 (4), 
the owner of a dog is liable for 2 times the full amount of 
damages caused by the dog injuring or causing injury to a 
person, domestic animal or property if the owner was notified or 
knew that the dog previously injured or caused injury to a 
person, domestic animal or property."  Wis. Stat. § 174.02(b). 
6 The comment in Pattermann v. Pattermann, 173 Wis. 2d 143, 149 n.4, 496 N.W.2d 613 
(Ct. App. 1992), that a landowner could be liable under a common law negligence theory for 
injuries caused by a known dangerous dog allowed on her premises was abrogated in Smaxwell 
v. Bayard, 2004 WI 101, ¶42 n.8, 274 Wis. 2d 278, 306, 682 N.W.2d 923. 
No. 
2012AP641   
 
9 
 
"[c]ourts generally define 'keeping' as exercising some measure 
of care, custody or control over the dog, while 'harboring' is 
often defined as sheltering or giving refuge to a dog.  Thus, 
'harboring' 
apparently 
lacks 
the 
proprietary 
aspect 
of 
keeping.'"  
Id.  Further expounding on the meaning of 
"harboring," the court stated that: "'[h]arboring a dog' means 
something more than a meal of mercy to a stray dog or the casual 
presence of a dog on someone's premises.  Harboring means to 
afford lodging, to shelter or to give refuge to a dog."  Id. at 
151.  Thus, it determined that a mother who permitted her adult 
son to bring his dog to a family gathering was not a "harborer."  
Id. 
¶22 Whether an individual fits within this definition of 
"harborer" depends upon "the peculiar facts and circumstances of 
each individual case."  Pawlowski, 322 Wis. 2d 21, ¶20; Hagenau 
v. Millard, 182 Wis. 544, 547, 195 N.W. 718 (1924).  In other 
words, the determination is based on a totality of the 
circumstances.  Cases undergoing such an analysis suggest that 
whether the landowner lives on the premise with the dog is an 
important factor in making the determination.   
¶23 For example, this court recently construed the term 
"harbor" in Pawlowski, 322 Wis. 2d 21.  In that case, a 
homeowner allowed an acquaintance and his dogs to live with her.  
Id., ¶9.  During that time, one of the dogs attacked the 
plaintiff.  Id., ¶11.  Relying on the definition of "harborer" 
in Pattermann, the court determined that the homeowner was a 
statutory owner under Wis. Stat. § 174.02.  Id., ¶26 (quoting 
No. 
2012AP641   
 
10 
 
Pattermann, 173 Wis. 2d at 149 n.4).  It explained that it 
reached an outcome different from that in Pattermann due to the 
different facts.  Specifically, it observed that in Pattermann 
"the dog did not live in the house, and the homeowner had not 
'fed or cared for the dog in any way.'"  Id., ¶28.   
¶24 The Pawlowski court also acknowledged caselaw holding 
generally that landlords are not liable for the actions of their 
tenants' dogs.  Id., ¶52 (citing Smaxwell, 274 Wis. 2d 278; 
Gonzales v. Wilkinson, 68 Wis. 2d 154, 227 N.W.2d 907 (1975); 
Malone v. Fons, 217 Wis. 2d 746, 580 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 
1998)).  It noted that in traditional landlord-tenant cases, 
"the landlord had limited control over the tenant's premises."  
Id.  It explained that the circumstances it was considering were 
different because the dog and its owner lived in a bedroom in 
the landowner's home.  Id.  Thus, the dog owner was "more akin 
to a houseguest than a tenant," and so the landlord-tenant 
caselaw did not apply.  Id.   
¶25 Other cases construing "owner" in the context of 
liability for dog bites likewise suggest that a landowner who 
lives in a separate residence from a dog is not typically 
considered a statutory owner of that dog.  In Hagenau, 182 Wis. 
544, the court considered a situation where Ritter, who was the 
defendant's sister-in-law and employee, rented two rooms in the 
defendant's building in which Ritter and her dogs lived.  The 
court stated that: "the word 'harbor' in its meaning signifies 
protection; and it has been held that the keeper is one who 
No. 
2012AP641   
 
11 
 
treats the dog as living at his house and who undertakes to 
control his actions. . . ."  Id. at 547.   
¶26 The Hagenau court stressed the importance of where the 
landowner was living.  It noted that the defendant "occupied 
separate and distinct portions of the premises and maintained a 
separate and distinct home or place of abode." The court further  
determined that "[t]here is no evidence, however, in the case 
which tends to indicate that [defendants] could be deemed to be 
harborers of the dogs; that they furnished them with shelter, 
protection, or food, or that they exercised control over the 
dogs."  Id. at 548.  Accordingly, it concluded that the 
defendants were not liable as owners.  Id. at 549. 
¶27 The court addressed the alternative scenario of a 
defendant who permitted his adult daughter and her dog to live 
with him in Koetting v. Conroy, 223 Wis. 550, 270 N.W. 625 
(1937).  The court observed that the dog lived "in the dwelling 
house of [defendant], with his knowledge and permission, and fed 
from the remnants of his table."  Id. at 552.  Additionally, it 
stated that "[w]here a child is the owner of a dog kept on the 
premises of the father, who supplies it with food and furnishes 
it with shelter upon his premises, the father is deemed to be a 
keeper of the dog." Id. at 552 (quoting Hagenau, 182 Wis. at 
547).  Accordingly, the court determined that the defendant was 
a keeper under the statute.   
¶28 Although 
Koetting discussed "owner" in terms of 
"keeper" and not "harborer," the opinion seems to use the words 
interchangeably.  See id. at 555 ("One purpose of the statute is 
No. 
2012AP641   
 
12 
 
to protect domestic animals from injury by whomsoever the dogs 
are kept or harbored."); id. at 552 (noting that in order to 
make a case against a defendant under Wis. Stat. § 174.02, a 
plaintiff must show facts "which made him the keeper of the 
dog"). 
¶29 Further 
support 
for 
the 
importance 
of 
where 
a 
landowner resides can be found in Malone v. Fons, 217 Wis. 2d 
746, 580 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1998).  In that case the court 
considered whether a landlord was a harborer of a dog owned and 
kept by a tenant.  The court concluded that "a landlord does not 
become a harborer of a tenant's dog merely by permitting his or 
her tenant to keep the dog."  Id. at 766.   
¶30 Augsburger argues that landlord-tenant cases, such as 
Malone, are not applicable because there was no formal rental 
agreement between Kontos and the Veiths.  In response, Kontos 
asserts that the Veiths were tenants-at-will.  We need not 
determine whether there was a landlord-tenant relationship in 
this case.  As indicated by Pawlowski, 322 Wis. 2d 21, ¶52, our 
focus is not on the official relationship between the dog owner 
and the landowner; rather our focus is on the amount of control 
the landowner exerts over the premises on which the dog is kept—
—whether the dog's legal owner is more akin to a houseguest or a 
tenant.   
¶31 The rule we glean from the cases discussed is 
supported by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 514 cmt. a 
(1977).  The Restatement stresses that land ownership by itself 
is not enough to qualify a landowner as a harborer: "the 
No. 
2012AP641   
 
13 
 
possession of the land on which the animal is kept, even when 
coupled with permission given to the third person to keep it, is 
not enough to make the possessor of the land liable as a 
harborer of the animal."  The court of appeals has previously 
cited this language with approval, Malone, 217 Wis. 2d at 766 
n.7, and we likewise find it persuasive. 
¶32 The Restatement further emphasizes the importance of 
considering whether the landowner is residing on the premises 
with the dog.  It explains that an individual "harbors [an 
animal] by making it part of his household."  Id.  It states 
that: "[t]his he may do by permitting a member of his household 
. . . to keep the animal either in the house or on the premises 
that are occupied as the home of the family group of which he is 
the head."  Id.   
¶33 The fact scenario in this case (although admittedly 
more detailed) matches an example provided in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 514.  In explaining who qualifies as a 
harborer, the Restatement observed that "a father, on whose land 
his son lives in a separate residence, does not harbor a dog 
kept by his son, although he has the power to prohibit the dog 
from being kept and fails to exercise the power."  Id.  
Similarly here, Kontos' ownership of the land on which his 
daughter resides in a separate residence is insufficient to 
No. 
2012AP641   
 
14 
 
qualify Kontos as a harborer even though he possessed the power 
to exclude the dogs but failed to exercise that power.7 
¶34 Cases from a number of other jurisdictions likewise 
support the view that whether the landowner resides on the 
premises with the dog is relevant to determining whether the 
landowner is a harborer.  See, e.g., Carr v. Vannoster, 281 P.3d 
1136, 1144 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) ("[Defendant] was not a harborer 
of 
[his 
son's] 
dog . . .; [Son] 
was 
not 
a 
member 
of 
[defendant's] household. [Son] maintained his own household on 
the premises where he lived with his wife. The home where he 
kept his dog was not the home or premises occupied as the home 
of the family group of which [defendant was] the head."); 
Barnett v. Rowlette, 879 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) 
("the fact that Kenneth was in possession of [the dog] and lived 
in a separate residence from [the landowner] prevents the 
conclusion from being drawn that [the landowner] harbored [the 
dog]."). 
¶35 The court of appeals in this case relied on another 
out-of-state case, Anderson v. Christopherson, 816 N.W.2d 626 
(Minn. 2012), to reach its conclusion that as the owner of the 
land, Kontos was a statutory owner of the dogs.  Augsburger, 350 
                                                 
7 The dissent criticizes the use of the Restatement to 
support our analysis. Dissent ¶¶93-95.  It maintains that both 
section 514 and 518 of the Restatement differ from the strict 
liability scheme currently in place in Wisconsin for domestic 
dog bites.  We agree and accordingly apply neither.  We do, 
however, cite to section 514 as an analogous strict liability 
scheme that discusses what constitutes a "harborer." 
No. 
2012AP641   
 
15 
 
Wis. 2d 486, ¶15.  In Anderson, the defendant had two houses.  
He permitted his son who owned a dog to visit his Minnesota 
house with his fiancée. 816 N.W.2d at 629.  The defendant 
specifically gave permission for his son to bring the dog, but 
established rules for the dog's presence.  Id.  The defendant 
lived in another state and was not present when his son visited.  
Id.  The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the defendant 
could be held liable as a harborer of the dog, and remanded the 
case for a jury determination on the issue.  Id. at 633. 
¶36 Anderson does not convince us that mere ownership of 
the property on which a dog is kept is sufficient to qualify the 
landowner as a harborer.  It did not hold that a defendant 
necessarily is a harborer if he owns the property on which the 
dog resides.  Indeed, it stated that Minnesota caselaw "requires 
that a harborer do more than exercise control over land upon 
which the dog resides."  Id.  Further, Anderson quoted the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 514 with approval.  Id. 
("neither the 'mere right to exclude' nor '[t]he possession of 
the land on which the animal is kept, even coupled with 
permission given to a third person to keep it' were sufficient 
to convert the landlord of a property into a harborer.").   
¶37 Insofar 
as 
Anderson 
considered 
the 
issue 
of 
a 
defendant's ownership of the property, it merely held that 
property ownership was a factor to consider in answering the 
question of whether a landowner is a harborer and remanded the 
case for a jury to decide whether under the facts of the case 
the defendant was an owner.  Id. at 633-34.  Thus, Anderson does 
No. 
2012AP641   
 
16 
 
not militate toward finding a landowner to be per se an owner of 
a dog residing on his land. 
¶38 A narrow interpretation of the word "harbor" is 
consistent 
with 
the 
canons 
of 
statutory 
construction.  
Augsburger raised the concern that this court would include 
control in the definition of harbor, conflating the word 
"harbor" with the word "keep" in Wis. Stat. § 174.001, which 
would conflict with the canon of construction that different 
words be given different meanings.  See Pawlowski, 322 Wis. 2d 
21, ¶22 ("[w]hen the legislature chooses to use two different 
words, we generally consider each separately and presume that 
different words have different meanings.").  Whereas Pawlowski 
defines "keeping" as "exercising some measure of care, custody 
or control over the dog," id., ¶26, Augsburger maintains that 
the court should not put any requirement for control into the 
definition of "harborer."  
¶39 Our interpretation of the dog bite statute does not 
overlook the canon of construction that Augsburger cites.  We 
acknowledge that in interpreting "harborer" in a manner that 
considers where the landowner resides necessarily takes into 
consideration some aspect of control.  An off-premises landowner 
generally has less control over the property than an on-premises 
landowner.  However, the control that is implicated in our 
interpretation of "harborer" is not the same as the control an 
individual must exercise to be a "keeper."  The control 
considered in the analysis of "keeper" is control over the dog, 
not control over the property.  Pawlowski, 322 Wis. 2d 21, ¶26.  
No. 
2012AP641   
 
17 
 
Thus, our interpretation of the dog bite statute which takes 
into account where the landowner resides is in keeping with the 
canon of construction that different words in a statute have 
different meanings. 
¶40 Additional support for our interpretation comes from 
the 
canon 
of 
construction 
providing 
that 
legislation 
in 
derogation of the common law should be strictly construed so as 
to have minimal effect on the common law rule.  Fuchsgruber, 244 
Wis. 2d 758, ¶25; NBZ, Inc., 185 Wis. 2d at 836.  The dog bite 
statute is in derogation of the common law.  Malone, 217 Wis. 2d 
at 763; Pattermann, 173 Wis. 2d at 150.  Under the common law 
rule, an owner needed to have notice that a dog was dangerous in 
order to be held liable for an injury caused by the dog.  
Smaxwell, 274 Wis. 2d 278, ¶42; Nelson v. Hansen, 10 Wis. 2d 
107, 118, 102 N.W.2d 251 (1960).  In 1981, the legislature 
amended Wis. Stat. § 174.02 to impose strict liability on dog 
owners.  § 10, ch. 285, Laws of 1981 ("Liability for injury. (a) 
Without notice.  The owner of a dog is liable for the full 
amount of damages caused by the dog injuring or causing injury 
to a person, livestock or property.").   
¶41 As the strict liability imposed by Wis. Stat. § 174.02 
on owners for injuries caused by dogs is in derogation of the 
common law, the statute should be interpreted narrowly.  Malone, 
217 Wis. 2d at 763; Pattermann, 173 Wis. 2d at 150.  A 
conclusion that "harboring" requires more than mere ownership of 
the land on which a dog resides is consistent with a narrow 
reading of the statute.  A contrary interpretation would extend 
No. 
2012AP641   
 
18 
 
the strict liability in the statute, being in further derogation 
of the common law rule requiring negligence or fault.  
¶42 In sum, the determination of ownership under the dog 
bite statute is based on the totality of the circumstances.  Our 
review of the statutes, caselaw, and the canons of statutory 
construction convinces us that mere ownership of the property on 
which a dog resides is insufficient to establish that an 
individual is a harborer.   
IV 
 
¶43 Having determined that ownership of the property on 
which a dog resides is not sufficient to establish that the 
individual is an owner under the dog bite statute, we turn to 
the facts of this case.  
¶44 First, we consider the degree of control that Kontos 
had over the Grandview property to determine whether the Veiths 
were more akin to houseguests or tenants.  There are limited 
facts 
to 
support 
the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
Veiths 
were 
houseguests.  In essence, they are limited to the fact that 
there was no formal rental agreement between Kontos and the 
Veiths, and that Kontos did not expect the Veiths to pay rent 
due to their financial circumstances.  
¶45 On the other hand, multiple facts suggest that the 
Veiths were more akin to tenants.  Kontos did not live at the 
property with the Veiths, but maintained a separate residence 
approximately seven miles away.  The record does not reflect 
that he prescribed particular rules for the Veiths to follow.  
Mr. Veith performed repairs and general maintenance on the 
No. 
2012AP641   
 
19 
 
property and partially remodeled the interior of the home.  
Further, although Kontos apparently appeared on the property on 
multiple occasions, the record reveals that it was not frequent.   
¶46 Overall, the record demonstrates that Kontos did not 
exercise 
control 
over 
the 
Grandview 
property. 
 
By 
all 
indications, Kontos provided the property for his daughter with 
the intention that she treat it as her home.  This was not the 
situation at issue in Pawlowski where the dog's legal owner 
lived in the same residence with the property owner in a 
relationship akin to a houseguest.  Rather, the Veiths lived on 
the Grandview property, maintaining it as if it were their own 
residence.  
¶47 Considering the totality of the circumstances detailed 
above, we conclude that Kontos was not a statutory owner of the 
dogs such that he could be held liable under Wis. Stat. 
§ 174.02.  It is undisputed that Kontos did not legally own the 
dogs and did not exercise the requisite care, custody or control 
of the dogs to qualify as a keeper.  Further, he was not a 
harborer of the dogs.  Although Kontos provided shelter for his 
daughter and family by buying the house for them to live in, he 
exercised no control over that property and maintained a 
separate residence.  Ultimately, it was his daughter who 
provided shelter to the dogs. 
V 
 
¶48 We conclude that mere ownership of the property on 
which a dog resides is not sufficient to establish that an 
individual is an owner of a dog under Wis. Stat. § 174.02.  
No. 
2012AP641   
 
20 
 
Rather, the totality of the circumstances determines whether the 
legal owner of the property has exercised the requisite control 
over the property to be considered a harborer and thus an owner 
under the statute.  
¶49 We determine that Kontos is not an "owner" under the 
statute.  A statutory owner includes one who "owns, harbors or 
keeps a dog."  Wis. Stat. § 174.001(5).  It is undisputed that 
Kontos did not legally own the dogs and did not "keep" them.  
Additionally, we conclude that he was not a harborer as 
evidenced by the totality of the circumstances.  He neither 
lived in the same household as the dogs nor exercised control 
over the property on which the dogs were kept.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2012AP641.dtp 
1 
 
 
¶50 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  On June 21, 
2008, Julie Augsburger (Augsburger) visited the home of her 
longtime 
friend 
Janet 
Veith 
in 
rural 
Winnebago 
County.  
Augsburger had visited Janet, her husband Edward, and their 
daughter Jordan (the Veiths) on other occasions, and she knew 
that the Veiths kept multiple dogs on the premises.  She asked 
Jordan whether the dogs had been let out of the house into a 
fenced-in yard because she had to walk through the yard to get 
to the barn where Janet was working.  Jordan told her the dogs 
were not out. 
¶51 When Augsburger entered the fenced-in area, she was 
suddenly attacked by four dogs.  The dogs repeatedly bit her and 
tore off her pants.  She was bitten at least 11 times and 
suffered serious lacerations on both legs——that is, on her left 
thigh, left calf, and right calf.  Some of these lacerations 
required "surgical closure."  The most serious laceration——on 
her right calf——measured ten centimeters, resulting in a "6 cm 
long dented area."  Augsburger was given morphine to relieve her 
pain when she was transported by ambulance to a local hospital, 
and she was given another opiate at the hospital. 
¶52 In due course, Augsburger sued Janet and Edward Veith; 
Janet's father, George Kontos; and Kontos's insurer, Homestead 
Mutual Insurance Company, to recover damages.  The question in 
this case is whether George Kontos may be held liable for the 
full amount of damages caused by the dogs, on grounds that he 
No.  2012AP641.dtp 
2 
 
"harbored" 
the 
dogs 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 174.001(5) 
and 
174.02(1).1 
¶53 The majority answers this question "no," concluding 
that he is in no way liable.  It reverses a published decision 
of the court of appeals, which affirmed a ruling of the 
Winnebago County Circuit Court, Gary R. Sharpe, Judge, that 
reached the opposite conclusion.  Augsburger v. Homestead Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2013 WI App 106, 350 Wis. 2d 486, 838 N.W.2d 88.  
Because 
I 
believe 
the 
majority 
is 
misinterpreting 
and 
misapplying the applicable statutes, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶54 The statutory law in this case is found in Chapter 174 
of the Wisconsin Statutes.  Wisconsin Stat.§ 174.02 is entitled 
"Owner's liability for damage caused by dog."  Subsection (1), 
"Liability for Injury," provides in part: 
(a) Without notice. . . .  [T]he owner of a dog 
is liable for the full amount of damages caused by the 
dog injuring or causing injury to a person, domestic 
animal or property.  
(b) After notice. . . .  [T]he owner of a dog is 
liable for 2 times the full amount of damages caused 
by the dog injuring or causing injury to a person, 
domestic animal or property if the owner was notified 
or knew that the dog previously injured or caused 
injury to a person, domestic animal or property. 
¶55 The 
term 
"owner" 
is 
defined 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 174.001(5): "'Owner' includes any person who owns, harbors or 
keeps a dog."  (Emphasis added.) 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2012AP641.dtp 
3 
 
¶56 The quoted statutes were adopted at different times. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 174.001(5) was part of Section 8m, Chapter 
289, Laws of 1979.  It became effective on January 1, 1981.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 174.02(1) was part of Section 10, Chapter 285, 
Laws 
of 
1981. 
 
It 
became 
effective 
on 
May 
1, 
1982.  
Understanding the legislative history of these dog bite statutes 
is essential to rendering a correct interpretation of the 
statutes. 
¶57 There have been dog bite statutes in Wisconsin since 
the early 1850s.  Section 1620 of the Wisconsin Statutes of 1898 
read in part as follows: 
Owner's Liability.  The owner or keeper of any 
dog which shall have injured or caused the injury of 
any person or property . . . shall be liable to the 
person so injured . . . without proving notice to the 
owner or keeper of such dog or knowledge by him that 
his 
dog 
was 
mischievous 
or 
disposed 
to 
kill 
[animals] . . . . 
This same language appeared in Wis. Stat. § 174.02 (1923), and 
the language and substance of this statute remained largely 
unchanged until Wis. Stat. § 174.02 was repealed and recreated 
in 1982. 
¶58 The above-quoted statute was not a strict liability 
statute.  This was made clear in Chambliss v. Gorelik, 52 
Wis. 2d 523, 191 N.W.2d 34 (1971), and in an earlier case, 
Nelson v. Hansen, 10 Wis. 2d 107, 102 N.W.2d 251 (1960). 
¶59 In Chambliss, Justice Nathan Heffernan, writing for a 
unanimous court, stated: 
At common law the owner or keeper of a dog was 
not liable for the vicious or mischievous acts of the 
dog unless he had prior knowledge of the vicious or 
mischievous propensities of the dog or unless the 
No.  2012AP641.dtp 
4 
 
injury was attributable to the negligence of the owner 
or keeper.  Nelson v. Hansen (1960), 10 Wis. 2d 107, 
102 N.W.2d 251. . . .  
[I]n Nelson v. Hansen, . . . the court determined 
that the legislature did not impose or intend to 
impose strict liability on the keeper of a dog.  It 
was also determined that an action brought under the 
statute continued to be one for negligence but that 
the statute eliminated the necessity of proving 
scienter.  In all other respects, the responsibility 
of an owner or keeper remained the same.  As we said 
in Nelson v. Hansen, . . . page 115, after discussion 
of early cases: ". . . the statute only applied to 
injuries from mischievous or vicious acts of a dog for 
which at common law the owner would not be liable 
unless he had knowledge or ought to have known of such 
propensities." . . .  
For cases under the statute in which no proof of 
scienter is required and where there is no evidence of 
the keeper's negligence . . . there must be proof that 
the dog was vicious or mischievous. . . .  
Thus, under the statute, it continues to be 
necessary to show that the dog, prior to the act 
complained about, had vicious and destructive habits.  
The statute merely eliminates the necessity of proving 
that the keeper had such knowledge. 
Chambliss, 52 Wis. 2d at 528-30 (quoting Nelson, 10 Wis. 2d at 
115). 
¶60 A flurry of legislative activity in the early 1980s 
significantly altered the law.  First, Wis. Stat. § 174.001(5) 
provided a definition of "owner" that added the word "harbors," 
and also used the word "includes" before its reference to "any 
person who owns, harbors or keeps a dog."  These changes 
extended dog bite liability to a broader group of people.  
¶61 Second, the rewritten § 174.02(1) borrowed a provision 
from a statute that the legislature repealed in 1982——namely, 
Wis. Stat. § 174.03 (1979)——that provided double damages when a 
dog known to be dangerous is responsible for a repeat attack on 
No.  2012AP641.dtp 
5 
 
animals; the rewritten statute made double damages available 
when a repeat attack injures a person. 
¶62 Third, the rewritten § 174.02(1) also created strict 
liability.  A strict liability statute imposes liability for a 
dog bite irrespective of an "owner's" scienter and irrespective 
of whether the dog had a previous propensity for biting. 
¶63 The strict liability point was discussed in Cole v. 
Hubanks, in which the court said: "Wisconsin Stat. § 174.02 is a 
'strict liability' statute wherein the legislature has made the 
policy choice to place the burden of damage caused by a dog on 
the dog's owner."  Cole v. Hubanks, 2004 WI 74, ¶22, 272 
Wis. 2d 539, 681 N.W.2d 147 (citing Becker v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 141 Wis. 2d 804, 815, 416 N.W.2d 906 (Ct. App. 
1987); Fifer v. Dix, 2000 WI App 66, ¶12, 234 Wis. 2d 117, 608 
N.W.2d 740).2 
¶64 The court's statement in Cole was affirmed unanimously 
in Pawlowski v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 2009 WI 
105, ¶¶14, 17, 322 Wis. 2d 21, 777 N.W.2d 67, when the court 
said, "Both a legal owner and a statutory owner of a dog can be 
simultaneously strictly liable under Wis. Stat. § 174.02. . . .  
Section 174.02 is a strict liability statute." 
¶65 Surprisingly, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
places 
little 
emphasis on the history of the two statutes.  In fact, it seeks 
to compare the present statutes, not to the prior statute in 
                                                 
2 The decision in Becker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co., 141 Wis. 2d 804, 416 N.W.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1987), 
relied on Meunier v. Ogurek, 140 Wis. 2d 782, 412 N.W.2d 155 
(Ct. App. 1987). 
No.  2012AP641.dtp 
6 
 
force from 1898 to 1982, but to Wisconsin common law that has 
not existed since at least 1871.  See § 8, ch. 67, Laws of 1871.  
The majority relies selectively on a canon of statutory 
construction (statutes in derogation of the common law), 
Majority op., ¶40, but it fails to acknowledge that one of the 
present statutes contains a definition of "owner" that uses the 
word "includes," which invites a broader interpretation of the 
statute.  See Black's Law Dictionary 766 (7th ed. 1999) ("The 
participle 
including 
typically 
indicates 
a 
partial 
list . . . ."); see also Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 
2012 WI 20, ¶36, 338 Wis. 2d 761, 809 N.W.2d 529 ("When a list 
of terms follows the word 'includes,' the list is commonly 
understood to be non-exhaustive."). 
¶66 The purpose of the revised dog bite statutes was well 
stated in Pawlowski, 322 Wis. 2d 21, ¶76: 
The purpose of Wis. Stat. § 174.02 is "to protect 
those people who are not in a position to control the 
dog." [quoting Armstrong v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 
202 
Wis. 2d 258, 
268, 
549 
N.W.2d 723 
(1996).]  
Imposing 
liability . . . furthers 
the 
legislative 
policy embodied in Wis. Stat. § 174.02 of protecting 
innocent people from injury by dogs, of ensuring that 
an 
innocent 
victim 
of 
a 
dog 
bite 
recovers 
compensation, and of making a person who owns, 
harbors, or keeps a dog responsible for injuries 
inflicted by the dog. 
¶67 In 
sum, 
the 
statutory 
history 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 174.001(5) and 174.02(1) and the clear policy embodied in the 
statutes are not consistent with the majority's restrictive 
reading of these statutes. 
II 
No.  2012AP641.dtp 
7 
 
¶68 The key word requiring interpretation is "harbors."  I 
agree with much of the majority's discussion of the pertinent 
case law.  I disagree with the majority's failure to apply that 
law. 
¶69 The majority opinion reads in part: 
 
The 
term 
"harbor" 
is 
not 
defined 
in 
the 
statute. . . .  
Wisconsin 
caselaw, 
however, 
has 
addressed the definition of the term "harbor" and we 
find guidance from those cases. 
 
A general definition of the term "harborer" is 
provided in Pattermann v. Pattermann, 173 Wis. 2d 143, 
149 n.4, 496 N.W.2d 613 (Ct. App. 1992).  There, the 
court defined the term by contrasting it with the term 
"keeper."  It explained "[c]ourts generally define 
'keeping' as exercising some measure of care, custody 
or control over the dog, while 'harboring' is often 
defined as sheltering or giving refuge to a dog.  
Thus, 'harboring' apparently lacks the proprietary 
aspect of 'keeping.'"  Id.  Further expounding on the 
meaning 
of 
"harboring," 
the 
court 
stated 
that: 
"'harboring a dog' means something more than a meal of 
mercy to a stray dog or the casual presence of a dog 
on someone's premises.  Harboring means to afford 
lodging, to shelter or to give refuge to a dog."  Id. 
at 151. 
Majority op., ¶¶20-21 (emphasis added)(footnote omitted). 
¶70 In light of this case law, the question is whether 
George Kontos harbored the Veiths' dogs; that is, whether he 
provided lodging or shelter for the Veiths' dogs. 
¶71 The circuit court (Judge Sharpe) said: 
 
The definition of harbor is "to give shelter or 
refuge to" and there is no question that Mr. Kontos 
gave shelter to Edward and Janet Veith and their dogs.  
No landlord tenant relationship existed. . . .  [T]he 
Court 
feels 
that 
[Mr. 
Kontos] 
had 
sufficient 
connection and that the arrangement was based upon 
family as opposed to a landlord tenant/business 
relationship.  As a result, the Court finds that Mr. 
No.  2012AP641.dtp 
8 
 
Kontos harbored the dogs pursuant to Wis. Stats. 
§ 174.001(5) . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶72 In a well-reasoned opinion, the court of appeals 
affirmed this determination: 
Like the homeowner in Pawlowski, Kontos afforded the 
Veiths' dogs shelter and lodging for many months, some 
for more than a year, before the incident, and thus he 
harbored them.  Further, his status as a harborer is 
not undermined by the fact he was not also a keeper 
exercising custody or control over the dogs. 
Augsburger, 350 Wis. 2d 486, ¶12. 
¶73 The court added: 
 
Kontos contends in his reply brief that because 
he personally resided in a different home from the 
dogs, this case is substantively distinguishable from 
Pawlowski.  We disagree.  In both cases, the owner of 
the homes knowingly afforded lodging and shelter to 
the dogs, the relevant consideration in deciding a 
question of "harboring."  The fact that Kontos resided 
in a separate home from the dogs, and therefore was 
not in a convenient position to and in fact did not 
exercise custody or control over or care for the dogs, 
would be most relevant if the issue was whether Kontos 
was a "keeper."  Indeed, had the legislature limited 
the statutory definition of "owner" to only owners and 
keepers of dogs, we would have no difficulty holding 
for Kontos.  But the legislature did not so limit the 
statute.  In choosing to include "harbor[ers]" in the 
definition of owners, the legislature broadened the 
pool of potentially liable persons beyond just those 
who own or keep offending dogs. 
Id., ¶13. 
¶74 The majority opinion correctly states that the "mere 
ownership of the property on which a dog resides is not 
sufficient to establish that an individual is an owner of a dog 
under Wis. Stat. § 174.02."  Majority op., ¶48.  Instead, "the 
totality of the circumstances determines whether the legal owner 
of the property has exercised the requisite control over the 
No.  2012AP641.dtp 
9 
 
property to be considered a harborer and thus an owner under the 
statute."  Id. 
¶75 This brings us to the totality of the circumstances 
and raises the question of what control Mr. Kontos did not 
exercise over "the circumstances." 
III 
¶76 The facts are not in dispute.  In 2007 George Kontos 
and his wife were living at their home in Butte Des Morts in 
Winnebago County.  Mrs. Kontos was seriously ill.  Their 
daughter, Janet Veith, was living with her husband and daughter 
in Colorado, under circumstances that permitted the Veiths to 
maintain horses and dogs on their property. 
¶77 Mr. and Mrs. Kontos wanted their daughter to come home 
to be near her mother.  Janet Veith wanted to come.  However, 
the Veiths were in no position financially to give up what they 
had in Colorado in terms of property and employment to move to 
Wisconsin.  George Kontos made that possible. 
¶78 In sum, Mr. Kontos asked that Janet and her family 
relocate to Wisconsin to be near Mrs. Kontos.  Mr. Kontos helped 
pay for the move.  Mr. Kontos purchased a house for the Veiths 
to live in and he selected a house in a rural area that 
permitted the Veiths to keep horses and dogs.  He continued to 
own that property.  He paid the taxes on the property.  And he 
acquired the only insurance policy on the property. 
¶79 The Veiths did not pay rent for the property and were 
not expected to pay rent.  Even if they earned some income, the 
Veiths were financially subsidized by Mr. Kontos.  For example, 
he made Janet's car payments.  When Janet wrote Mr. Kontos a 
No.  2012AP641.dtp 
10 
 
$2,000 check as partial reimbursement for this assistance, he 
did not cash it. Why?  When Mr. Kontos was asked in a deposition 
whether it was "accurate to say that as far as [he] knew [the 
Veiths] just have enough money to get by," he replied "Yes."  
The deposition continued: "[Question:] Is that yes? [Answer:] 
That's probably a generous statement." 
¶80 As the court of appeals explained, "Kontos was aware 
the Veiths had two dogs when they moved into the property in 
February 2007, and he permitted these and additional dogs they 
acquired a few months later to be kept on the property."  
Augsburger, 350 Wis. 2d 486, ¶3. 
¶81 At the time of the attack in June 2008, there were six 
dogs on the property.  The presence of the dogs was not unknown 
to Mr. Kontos because he visited the property on multiple 
occasions and had some interaction with them.3 
¶82 The majority opinion states: "Kontos would rarely go 
near the dogs.  He never fed the dogs, watered, or bathed them.  
Further, he did not groom them or take them to the vet.  He did 
not pay for their food, take care of them, or instruct his 
daughter how to take care of them."  Majority op., ¶8.  
¶83 Most of these statements are not relevant because they 
involve "keeping" a dog.  Mr. Kontos is not alleged to have 
"kept" the dogs.  Even so, the statements go too far.  Although 
Mr. Kontos may not have gone to the supermarket to buy food for 
the dogs, his various financial subsidies to the Veiths made it 
                                                 
3 For example, Kontos would sometimes yell at the dogs to be 
quiet when he was visiting the Veiths. 
No.  2012AP641.dtp 
11 
 
possible for the Veiths to acquire additional dogs, buy food for 
the dogs, and get all of the dogs properly licensed. 
¶84 Mr. Kontos admittedly did not assert direct control 
over the dogs but he had complete authority to remove them from 
the property, as he could have asked the Veiths to leave the 
property.  He did exercise a lot of control over the property——
more than simple ownership.  For instance, he stored his boat on 
the property. 
¶85 Looking at the totality of the circumstances, it would 
be hard to contend that Mr. Kontos did not shelter the Veith 
family.  It would be hard to contend that Mr. Kontos did not 
shelter the Veith horses, inasmuch as he enabled them to move 
from Colorado and bought property with a barn for horses. 
¶86 Why then did he not shelter the dogs?  Why was the 
circuit court clearly erroneous when it found that Mr. Kontos 
had harbored the dogs?  The majority does not provide a 
satisfactory answer. 
IV 
¶87 The majority cannot be indifferent to the plight of 
the victim in this case.  It knows that the Veiths, who owned, 
harbored, and kept six dogs on the property but had no liability 
insurance——even though there had been a previous dog bite 
incident involving a woman who kept her horse with the Veiths——
are in no position to pay damages to Julie Augsburger.  Thus, it 
must be acting in the belief that it is serving some higher 
purpose when it denies recovery. 
¶88 The first purpose, apparently, is to protect landlords 
from liability for the torts of their tenants. 
No.  2012AP641.dtp 
12 
 
¶89 The majority concludes that "mere ownership of the 
property on which a dog resides is not sufficient to establish 
that an individual is an owner of a dog under Wis. Stat. 
§ 174.02."  Majority op., 
¶¶3, 48.  This principle is 
unassailable.  It is supported by our decisions in Gonzales v. 
Wilkinson, 68 Wis. 2d 154, 158, 227 N.W.2d 907 (1975), and 
Smaxwell v. Bayard, 2004 WI 101, ¶¶46-54, 274 Wis. 2d 278, 682 
N.W.2d 923.  The holdings in these cases are not in jeopardy. 
¶90 Nonetheless, the majority is unwilling to acknowledge 
the pervasive and unusual influence that Mr. Kontos had over the 
Veith family's circumstances.  The "mere ownership" of the 
property is but one of the circumstances present in this case; 
it is the totality of all the circumstances that demonstrates 
that Kontos harbored the dogs that mauled Julie Augsburger. 
¶91 The circuit court stated unequivocally that "No 
landlord tenant relationship existed" between Mr. Kontos and the 
Veiths.  Yet the majority seeks to keep this issue alive, 
saying: "We need not determine whether there was a landlord-
tenant relationship in this case."  Majority op., ¶30. 
¶92 In truth, this case is not about landlord liability 
for dog bites.  This case is about a harborer's liability for 
dog bites.  The majority's concern about landlords on these 
facts is not well founded. 
¶93 A second purpose is to demonstrate the court's respect 
for the American Law Institute's Restatements of the Law.  The 
majority notes that "[t]he Restatement . . . emphasizes the 
importance of considering whether the landowner is residing on 
the premises with the dog," and that "[t]he fact scenario in 
No.  2012AP641.dtp 
13 
 
this case . . . matches an example provided in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 514."  Majority op., ¶¶ 32-33.  This example 
states: 
Thus a father, on whose land his son lives in a 
separate residence, does not harbor a dog kept by his 
son, although he has the power to prohibit the dog 
from being kept and fails to exercise the power or 
even if he presents the dog to his son to be so kept. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 514 cmt. a (1977). 
¶94 The majority's focus on the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts is misguided.  Section 514 concerns "Wild Animals or 
Abnormally Dangerous Domestic Animals."  The example from § 514 
dates back at least to 1938 and the Restatement (First) of 
Torts, in which it also appears.  See Restatement (First) of 
Torts § 514 cmt. a (1938).  That section, too, dealt with "Wild 
Animals or Abnormally Dangerous Domestic Animals." 
¶95 The 
Restatement 
considers 
dogs, 
however, 
to 
be 
domestic animals that are not abnormally dangerous.  Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 509 cmt. f (1977).4  Indeed, neither 
Restatement scheme imposes strict liability on owners or 
harborers of dogs.  Under the Restatement: 
                                                 
4 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 509 cmt. f (1977) states: 
Although dogs, even hunting dogs, have no material 
utility 
comparable 
to 
cattle, 
horses 
and 
other 
livestock, 
they 
have 
from 
time 
immemorial 
been 
regarded as the friends and companions of man.  The 
great 
majority 
of 
dogs 
are 
harmless, 
and 
the 
possession of characteristics dangerous to mankind or 
to livestock is properly regarded as abnormal to them.  
Consequently the possessor of a dog is not liable for 
its biting a person or worrying or killing livestock 
unless he has reason to know that it is likely to do 
so. 
No.  2012AP641.dtp 
14 
 
one who possesses or harbors a domestic animal that he 
does not know or have reason to know to be abnormally 
dangerous, is subject to liability for harm done by 
the animal if, but only if, 
(a) he intentionally causes the animal to do the 
harm, or 
(b) he is negligent in failing to prevent the 
harm. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518 (1977). 
¶96 The 
treatment 
of 
dog 
bite 
liability 
under 
the 
Restatement differs from the treatment of dog bite liability 
under the Wisconsin statute even before the 1982 shift to strict 
liability.  Our statute provided for liability of owners of 
vicious or mischievous dogs even if the owner lacked scienter as 
to 
the 
dog's 
nature 
and 
did 
not 
act 
intentionally 
or 
negligently. 
 
See 
Chambliss, 
52 
Wis. 2d at 
530. 
 
The 
Restatement, on the other hand, requires negligence or intent in 
the absence of scienter.  Needless to say, the Restatement 
scheme 
differs 
greatly 
from 
the 
strict 
liability 
scheme 
currently in place. 
¶97 Affirming 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination 
that 
Kontos 
harbored 
the 
dogs 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
these 
circumstances would not offend the Restatement——the Restatement 
has no relation to Wisconsin's dog bite statute.  Our definition 
of "harbor" in a strict liability statute passed in 1982 should 
not be guided by a comment on a negligence scheme from 1938. 
V 
¶98 In conclusion, the majority misses the mark in its 
application of the law to the facts.  Only by ignoring the clear 
purpose of Wisconsin's strict liability dog bite statute and 
No.  2012AP641.dtp 
15 
 
looking 
instead 
to 
outmoded 
authority 
and 
a 
canon 
of 
construction contradicted by the statute itself, does the 
majority arrive at its conclusion that Kontos did not "harbor" 
the Veiths' dogs.  Yet this result forecloses any realistic 
possibility that Julie Augsburger will recover damages for her 
medical expenses, as well as her scars and her pain and 
suffering.  This outcome contradicts the language, design, and 
purpose of the statute, and unfairly victimizes Augsburger a 
second time. 
¶99 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
No.  2012AP641.dtp 
 
 
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