Title: People Ex Rel. Carey v. Covelli
Citation: 336 N.E.2d 759, 61 Ill. 2d 394
Docket Number: 47714
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: September 26, 1975

61 Ill. 2d 394 (1975)
336 N.E.2d 759
THE PEOPLE ex rel. BERNARD CAREY, State's Attorney, Petitioner,
v.
DANIEL A. COVELLI, Judge, et al., Respondents.
No. 47714.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
Opinion filed September 26, 1975.
*395 Bernard Carey, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Barry Gross, Special Assistant State's Attorney, Henry A. Hauser, Donald P. Smith, and David A. Novoselsky, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for petitioner.
Patrick A. Tuite, of Chicago, and Dominic P. Gentile, of Barrington, for respondents.
Writ awarded.
MR. JUSTICE SCHAEFER delivered the opinion of the court:
The controversy in this case centers upon an order entered by the Honorable Daniel A. Covelli, a judge of the circuit court of Cook County, directing the return of property seized under a search warrant issued by another judge of the same court, the Honorable John F. Hechinger.
We granted leave to the State's Attorney of Cook County to file an original petition for mandamus and prohibition directed to Judge Covelli, stayed the enforcement of his order, and closed the issues upon the petition and the respondents' suggestions in opposition, which were allowed to stand as a motion to dismiss. An accelerated briefing schedule was fixed, briefs were filed, and oral argument was heard. At the conclusion of the argument this court ordered that a writ of mandamus issue directing Judge Covelli to expunge his order and to dismiss the complaint in the case that had been before him. The order was entered "without prejudice to the application for the entry of an appropriate protective order under the provisions of section 108-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."
*396 This opinion explains the reasons for that order. The underlying facts are as follows:
The respondents in the original action now before this court  Judge Covelli and the daughters of the deceased  challenge the propriety of the relief sought. They assert that the original writs of mandamus and prohibition should not be employed as substitutes for an appeal, and they point out that a remedy by appeal was available in this case. We agree that a remedy by way of appeal was available to the State's Attorney; it would have been, in our opinion, no less expeditious than the remedy by original action, for the appeal could have been readily expedited under Rule 302(b). Moreover, an appeal would avoid the possible intrusion of an issue of fact. See Rule 381.
In this case, however, the issues presented are novel, *401 and they appear to be of considerable importance to the administration of justice. In People v. Sears (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 14, 33, we reiterated that: "This court, however, charged with the supervisory and administrative powers and duties provided in the constitution, may, when appropriate, award these writs [mandamus and prohibition] even though all of the normal criteria are not present." See also People ex rel. Sears v. Romiti (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 51, 55; People ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Bua (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 180, 192; People ex rel. Continental Air Transport Co. v. Strouse (1969), 41 Ill. 2d 567, 570; People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 231.
Moreover, in this case as in People ex rel. MacMillian v. Napoli (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 80, and People ex rel. East Side Levee and Sanitary District v. Madison County Levee and Sanitary District (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 442, there is involved a conflict with respect to the same subject matter between judges of coordinate authority, which "can only serve to diminish public respect for the judicial system of this State." (54 Ill. 2d 442, 445.) For these reasons, we decided that the remedy by way of original action rather than appeal was not improper in the present situation.
On the merits, the respondents would justify the exercise of equitable jurisdiction by Judge Covelli upon the ground that the daughters of the deceased had no adequate common law or statutory remedy by which they could challenge a search which, in their opinion, was based upon a complaint that failed to show probable cause. They say:
And again:
The respondents also point to the language of section 114-12(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.
And since there are no "defendants" in the present case, they conclude that section 114-12 is inapplicable. On the basis of this analysis, they assert that in the absence of a legal remedy they were justified in resorting to equity to protect their property and their privacy.
In their analysis of the remedies available to them, however, the daughters have failed to consider article 108 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which relates to the issuance of search warrants, their execution, the return of the things seized and the disposition of those things. Sections 108-10 and 108-11 are as follows:
As we pointed out in People v. Canaday (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 416, 423, section 108-11 does not prevent the court from releasing property seized under a search warrant to the owners or to those persons entitled to possession. Indeed, *403 it appears that some relief of this kind was actually granted to the daughters in an order entered by Judge Hechinger after Judge Covelli had entered his temporary restraining order.
We hold that the remedy of the daughters under section 108-11 is adequate to protect their interests in property and privacy. It was therefore error to interfere with the statutory remedy governing the return of the warrant and the disposition of the things seized under it. For these reasons, we directed the issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding Judge Covelli to expunge his order and to dismiss the complaint which was pending before him.
A further word is necessary to explain the reference in our order of August 12, 1975, to "an appropriate protective order under the provisions of section 108-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." The basic contention of the respondents is that the search warrant was issued without probable cause and was therefore invalid. In our opinion this contention is unsound. Analysis of the existence or nonexistence of probable cause begins with a consideration of the nature of the proceeding for which the evidence is sought. (See United States v. Nixon (1974), 418 U.S. 683, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039, 94 S. Ct. 3090.) As we pointed out in People v. Allen (1951), 410 Ill. 508, 514, "* * * what the constitutions prohibit is not all searches and seizures, but only those which are unreasonable. (People v. Reid, 336 Ill. 421; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361.) The reasonable scope of an investigation depends upon what is being investigated."
In this case what is being investigated is a murder. It is true that there is no criminal action pending, but that means only that questions of materiality and relevance must be tested by a standard which is broader than that which is available when the issues have been delineated by pleadings in a civil case or by indictment and plea in a criminal case.
*404 What is actually sought to be examined by the prosecutor is not described with particularity in the complaint or the warrant. It is not the desk or the safe in which the prosecutor is interested; it is their contents. The question then becomes whether or not it is reasonable for the prosecutor to examine those contents when the circumstances indicate that the deceased has been killed by someone known to him who was familiar with his personal affairs and his way of life, and who, as the complaint for the warrant states, was apparently looking for something. The absence of a specific description of those articles or documents that may provide clues as to the identity of the murderer or the reasons for the murder does not mean that the concern of the law for the punishment of criminals must be sacrificed. Nor does it mean that the concern of the law for the privacy of the administratrix and the other daughters of the deceased must be disregarded. The remedy provided by section 108-11 is adequate to accommodate both interests.
Rights of privacy may be protected by an in camera examination before the judge. Any questions of relevance or privilege that may arise with respect to particular items will be decided by the judge in making his determination as to whether or not the item is to be returned. As in the case of a search accompanying an arrest, items which afford evidence of the commission of other crimes may be retained. See Harris v. United States (1947), 331 U.S. 145, 91 L. Ed. 1399, 67 S. Ct. 1098.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we entered the order of August 12, 1975, directing the issuance of the writ of mandamus.
Writ awarded.
MR. JUSTICE WARD, with whom MR. CHIEF JUSTICE UNDERWOOD joins, dissenting in part:
Mr. Chief Justice Underwood and I agree that Judge Covelli erred in entertaining the complaint of the daughters *405 of the decedent and in ordering that the property seized under the search warrant was "to be returned (sic!) forthwith" to them. But we dissent from the conclusion that under section 108-11 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 108-11) the judge after the making of a return following an evidentiary search can and should enter into the investigation of an unsolved crime and decide for the police and prosecutor what materials obtained in their search will be relevant, and material as well, in their investigation of the crime, and determine what materials should be turned over to persons who claim violations of privacy.
The majority states in part: "Rights of privacy may be protected by an in camera examination before the judge. Any questions of relevance or privilege that may arise with respect to particular items will be decided by the judge in making his determination as to whether or not the item is to be returned." No authority is cited to support this imposition of a responsibility trial courts will find impossible to discharge intelligently, and no authority is given to justify the intrusion upon investigative and prosecutive functions. The above direction to trial judges is summarily and unhesitatingly given, but we anticipate it will cause severe problems for those who must give it effect. There is no explanation of how the judge in the course of the investigation of an unsolved crime will be in a position to make an informed judgment as to what materials obtained by the authorities are relevant and material, including materials which appear to be irrelevant, for example, a letter or photograph, but which if developed through investigation will prove to be important evidence.
We consider that the legislature never contemplated that section 108-11 could be invoked to secure an adjudication of the character the majority orders. The section prescribes that the judge before whom material seized under a search warrant has been returned shall *406 provide for their custody pending further proceedings.
People v. Canaday, 49 Ill. 2d 416, does not provide authority for the use the majority would make of section 108-11. Canaday simply involved a rejection of a claim by defendants that due process was violated when the trial judge prior to trial ordered the return to the owner of some of the stolen television sets which had been seized from the defendants, who were convicted of theft and burglary. The return to owners by the court or prosecutor of all but a sample quantity of goods recovered (or all in the instance of perishable goods) is routine.