Title: In re Peloquin - Three-month suspension video
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 111127
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: December 5, 2014

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 111,127 
 
In the Matter of MICHAEL PELOQUIN, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed December 5, 2014. Three-month suspension.  
 
Kimberly L. Knoll, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause and was on the brief for the 
petitioner. 
 
Michael Peloquin, respondent, argued the cause and was on the brief pro se. 
 
Per Curiam:  This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Michael Peloquin, of Wichita, an 
attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 2000. 
 
 
On August 26, 2013, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct (KRPC). The respondent filed an answer on September 16, 2013. The 
Disciplinary Administrator and the respondent entered into a joint stipulation of facts. A 
hearing was held on the complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of 
Attorneys on October 21, 2013, where the respondent was personally present. The 
hearing panel determined that respondent violated KRPC 1.3 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 
464) (diligence); 1.15 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 553) (safekeeping property); and 5.3 
(2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 627) (responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistants). 
 
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Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this court: 
 
"Findings of Fact 
 
. . . . 
"Representation of S.W. 
 
"8. 
In October, 2010, S.W. retained the respondent to expunge a criminal 
matter in Shawnee County, Kansas. The respondent and S.W. agreed to a fee of $500.00. 
Additionally, S.W. was to pay the $115.00 filing fee. The respondent agreed to file the 
expungement after the fee was paid. 
 
"9. 
S.W. made payments on the fees from October 2010, to May 4, 2011. On 
May 4, 2011, the respondent's legal assistant noted that the fee was 'paid in full.' After 
S.W. paid the fee, the respondent failed to file the expungement petition on behalf of 
S.W., as agreed. 
 
"10. 
On August 23, 2011, S.W. filed a complaint with the disciplinary 
administrator's office. By letter, the disciplinary administrator directed the respondent to 
provide a written response to the complaint filed by S.W. The respondent failed to 
provide a written response as directed. 
 
"11. 
The disciplinary administrator sent two additional letters, again, directing 
the respondent to provide a written response to the complaint. The letters were returned 
to the disciplinary administrator and marked, 'unable to forward.' 
 
"12. 
Eventually, the attorney assigned to investigate S.W.'s complaint made 
contact with the respondent and the respondent provided a written response to the 
complaint. In his response, the respondent explained that the post office made an error in 
his request to have his mail forwarded. 
 
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"13. 
The respondent also explained that initially he filed the petition in the 
wrong court. And, later, when he filed the petition in the correct court, he did not provide 
a sufficient number of copies and the petition was returned by the court. The respondent 
claims that he never received the returned petition because of the post office's error with 
the request to forward the mail. 
 
"14. 
After the respondent received a copy of S.W.'s complaint, the respondent 
contacted S.W. in person. Again, S.W. asked the respondent to file a petition for 
expungement. The respondent filed the petition and obtained an order of expungement. 
 
"Representation of E.G. 
 
"15. 
E.G. retained the respondent to represent her in a civil action which arose 
following a car accident. The respondent made a settlement offer of $2,500.00. E.G. 
rejected the settlement offer. E.G. terminated the respondent's representation and hired 
new counsel, Tom Warner. 
 
"16. 
Mr. Warner attempted to negotiate a settlement. The insurance company 
informed Mr. Warner that it had already settled the matter for $15,000.00. 
 
"17. 
The respondent's office manager negotiated the settlement without the 
respondent's knowledge. Additionally, unbeknownst to the respondent, the respondent's 
office manager negotiated the check. 
 
"18. 
The respondent filed a claim with his malpractice carrier. The insurance 
company denied the claim. 
 
"19. 
Mr. Warner filed suit against the respondent on behalf of E.G. The 
respondent negotiated a settlement with Mr. Warner, with a payment plan. On September 
5, 2012, the court entered an order of judgment in the amount of $20,861.30, plus interest 
against the respondent as a result of the settlement. Mr. Warner has filed an order in aid 
of execution of the judgment. At the time of the attorney disciplinary hearing, the 
respondent was current on the settlement payments. 
4 
 
 
 
 
"Settlements Involving Wesley Medical Center 
 
"20. 
During the course of the investigation of E.G.'s complaint, the attorney 
investigating the complaint learned of additional settlements checks which the 
respondent's office manager negotiated without the respondent's knowledge. 
 
"21. 
Travelers Insurance issued a check in the amount of $37,264.08, made 
payable to the respondent, Wesley Medical Center, and Michael Serve. Wesley Medical 
Center did not endorse the check, however, its endorsement that appears on the check 
was forged. It appears that the respondent's office manager cashed the check without the 
respondent's knowledge. The respondent reported the theft to the Overland Park Police 
Department. 
 
"22. 
Wesley Medical Center filed suit against the respondent. On July 18, 
2012, the court granted partial judgment against the respondent. On December 16, 2012, 
the court issued a garnishment in the amount of $21,542.53. On January 22, 2013, Mr. 
Serve filed a cross-claim against the respondent. Mr. Serve's cross-claim remains pending 
against the respondent. 
 
"23. 
At the time the respondent discovered the thefts, the respondent's office 
manager removed his computer from the respondent's office and did not return to work. 
The law enforcement officers assigned to investigate the thefts have been unable to locate 
the respondent's former office manager. 
 
"24. 
The respondent believes that there are two additional checks which the 
office manager negotiated without authorization. Because the officer manager took the 
computer, the respondent is unable to determine additional individuals victimized by the 
office manager's theft. 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
 
"25. 
Based upon the findings of fact, the hearing panel concludes as a matter 
of law that the respondent violated KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.15, and KRPC 5.3, [Footnote: 
The disciplinary administrator also charged the respondent with violating KRPC 8.4(a). 
However, in the hearing panel's opinion, concluding that the respondent violated KRPC 
8.4(a) would require that the hearing panel conclude that the respondent knew what the 
office manager was doing. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent did not know 
what the officer manager was doing. If the definition of 'knowing' also included 'should 
have known,' the hearing panel would have concluded that the respondent also violated 
KRPC 8.4(a). The respondent should have known what the office manager was doing. 
The respondent did not, however, know what the office manager was doing.] as detailed 
below. 
 
"KRPC 1.3 
 
"26. 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client. KRPC 1.3. The respondent failed to diligently and promptly 
represent S.W. by properly filing the expungement. Because the respondent failed to act 
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his client, the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.3. 
 
"KRPC 1.15 
 
"27. 
Lawyers must keep the property of their clients safe. See KRPC 1.15. In 
E.G.'s case, the respondent failed to properly safeguard his client's property when he 
failed to properly supervise his office manager. Therefore, the hearing panel concludes 
that the respondent violated KRPC 1.15. 
 
"KRPC 5.3 
 
"28. 
Attorneys have certain responsibilities with respect to nonlawyer 
employees. In that regard, KRPC 5.3(b) provides, 'a lawyer having direct supervisory 
6 
 
 
 
authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's 
conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.' In this case, the 
respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to ensure that his office manager's conduct 
was compatible with the respondent's professional obligations. 
 
"American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
"29. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors. 
 
"30. 
Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to his client to provide 
diligent representation and the respondent violated his duty to his clients to properly 
safeguard his clients' property. 
 
"31. 
Mental State. The respondent knowingly violated his duty to his client to 
provide diligent representation and the respondent negligently violated his duty to his 
clients to properly safeguard his clients' property. 
 
"32. 
Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 
actual injury to his clients and third parties. 
 
"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
"33. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel found the following aggravating factors 
present: 
 
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"34. 
A Pattern of Misconduct. The respondent has engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct by failing to supervise his office manager for an extended period of time. 
 
"35. 
Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule violations. 
The respondent violated KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.15, and KRPC 5.3. 
 
"36. 
Vulnerability of Victim. S.W. and E.G. were vulnerable to the 
respondent's misconduct. 
 
"37. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel found the following mitigating 
circumstances present: 
 
"38. 
Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record. The respondent has not 
previously been disciplined. 
 
"39. 
Absence of a Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The respondent's misconduct 
does not appear to have been motivated by dishonesty or selfishness. 
 
"40. 
Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes Have Contributed 
to Violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. The respondent suffers from 
many health problems. It is clear that the respondent's health problems contributed to his 
misconduct. 
 
"41. 
The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her 
Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Acknowledgment of the 
Transgressions. The respondent fully cooperated with the disciplinary process. 
Additionally, the respondent admitted the facts that gave rise to the violations. 
 
"42. 
Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Including 
Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of the Character and General 
Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent is an active and productive member of the 
8 
 
 
 
bar. The respondent also enjoys the respect of his peers and generally possesses a good 
character and reputation as evidenced by several letters received by the hearing panel. 
 
"43. 
Imposition of Other Penalties or Sanctions. As a result of the 
respondent's office manager's thefts, judgments have been entered against the respondent. 
The respondent is currently making payments toward the satisfaction of the judgments. 
Thus, the respondent has experienced other sanctions for his failure to properly supervise 
his office manager. 
 
"44. 
Remorse. At the hearing on this matter, the respondent expressed genuine 
remorse for having engaged in the misconduct. 
 
"45. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards: 
 
'4.13 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in 
dealing with client property and causes injury or potential injury 
to a client. 
 
'4.42 
Suspension is generally appropriate when: 
 
(a) 
a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for 
a client and causes injury or potential injury to a 
client; or 
 
(b) 
a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and 
causes injury or potential injury to a client. 
 
'7.2 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a 
professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the 
public, or the legal system.' 
 
9 
 
 
 
"Recommendation 
 
"46. 
The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent's 
license to practice law be suspended for a period of 6 months. The disciplinary 
administrator further recommended that the respondent undergo a reinstatement hearing, 
pursuant to Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 219, prior to consideration of reinstatement. The respondent 
recommended that his proposed plan of probation be adopted and that he be allowed to 
continue to practice, subject to the terms and conditions set forth in his proposed 
probation plan. 
 
"47. 
The hearing panel shall not recommend that a respondent be placed on 
probation unless: 
 
'(i) 
the Respondent develops a workable, substantial, and detailed 
plan of probation and provides a copy of the proposed plan of 
probation to the Disciplinary Administrator and each member of 
the Hearing Panel at least fourteen days prior to the hearing on 
the Formal Complaint; 
 
'(ii) 
the Respondent puts the proposed plan of probation into effect 
prior to the hearing on the Formal Complaint by complying with 
each of the terms and conditions of the probation plan; 
 
'(iii) 
the misconduct can be corrected by probation; and 
 
'(iv) 
placing the Respondent on probation is in the best interests of the 
legal profession and the citizens of the State of Kansas.'  
 
Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(g)(3). 
 
"48. 
In this case, the respondent failed to develop a workable, substantial, and 
detailed plan of probation as the proposed plan does not assure restitution to all 
victimized clients. By respondent's own admission, he cannot identify all who may have 
10 
 
 
 
lost funds to the office manager's theft and, therefore, the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent cannot make all injured clients whole. Further, the respondent's proposal that 
he be allowed to accept two new personal injury cases per month is unworkable. The 
respondent first met with the practice supervisor the day before the respondent's 
disciplinary hearing. It is therefore difficult to conclude that the respondent put the 
proposed plan of probation into effect prior to the hearing on the formal complaint. 
Consequently, the hearing panel concludes that placing the respondent on probation is not 
in the best interests of the legal profession and the citizens of the State of Kansas. 
 
"49. 
Based upon the joint stipulation, the findings of fact, the conclusions of 
law, and the Standards listed above, the hearing panel unanimously recommends that the 
respondent be suspended for a period of three months. The hearing panel also 
recommends that the respondent proactively try to determine the other checks that he 
believes the former office manager negotiated without authorization. The hearing panel 
recommends that the respondent immediately and before the oral argument before the 
Kansas Supreme Court, undergo a complete psychological evaluation and provide a copy 
of the report of the evaluation to the disciplinary administrator. The purpose of the 
evaluation should be to determine if the respondent suffers from a mental condition that 
materially impairs his ability to represent clients. The hearing panel further recommends 
that prior to consideration of reinstatement, the respondent be required to undergo a 
reinstatement hearing, pursuant to Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 219. During the reinstatement 
hearing, the hearing panel recommends that the respondent be required to establish that 
his health and memory are sufficient to engage in the active and continuous practice of 
law. Finally, the hearing panel recommends that if the respondent is reinstated, that he be 
reinstated subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the respondent's probation plan 
for a period of two years. The hearing panel also recommends that the respondent be 
required to complete a continuing legal education program on law practice management 
as a condition of probation. 
 
"50. 
Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator." 
 
 
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DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 
disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of 
the KRPC exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 
258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 356). 
Clear and convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the 
truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 
610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]). 
 
Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, to which he filed 
an answer, and adequate notice of the hearing before the panel and the hearing before this 
court. The respondent filed exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing report. More 
specifically, he took exception to the panel's finding that he violated KRPC 1.3, KRPC 
1.15, and KRPC 5.3. The respondent did not take exception to hearing panel's factual 
findings, however. Instead, he admitted the facts as laid out in the report, although he 
asked that those facts be considered in light of several mitigating circumstances.  
 
We will, therefore, segment our discussion of the hearing panel's factual findings 
and its conclusions of law. Regarding the factual findings, the respondent's admissions 
and our own review of the record lead us to conclude there is substantial competent 
evidence to support the panel's findings. The respondent's approach to the panel's 
conclusions of law is more complicated. 
 
As indicated, although respondent took exception to the panel's conclusions that he 
violated KRPC 1.3, 1.15, and 5.3, his brief before this court is less clear; in fact, it is 
confusing and contradictory. On the one hand, the respondent "admits violations of the 
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K.R.P.C." Further, he enumerates only one issue:  "What is the appropriate discipline to 
be imposed against Michael Peloquin?" He then argues that mitigating facts explain his 
violations. For example, respondent argues his lack of diligence and promptness in his 
representation of S.W. resulted from him having to deal with health issues and his lack of 
awareness of certain court requirements. He also explains that he failed to timely respond 
to the three letters from the Disciplinary Administrator regarding S.W.'s complaint 
because the post office committed a forwarding error. On the other hand, portions of 
respondent's brief can be read as arguments that he did not violate any rules.  
 
Regardless of whether we rely on the procedural insufficiencies of respondent's 
briefing or on our independent review of the record, we reach the same conclusion:  The 
record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated KRPC 
1.3, 1.15, and 5.3.  
 
The record fully supports the panel's findings of misconduct 
 
Regarding the violation of KRPC 1.3, the record clearly establishes that the 
respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his 
client S.W. in the expungement proceeding. Respondent admits there was a delay but 
argues that "some delays were not unreasonable," and the delay in filing S.W.'s action 
was not unreasonable in light of his "health issues, problems with the post office, and the 
restitution delay in obtaining the orders of expungement." We disagree with the 
suggestion that the delay encountered by S.W. was reasonable. Even if we accept that 
respondent's health issues and the problem with the post office reasonably explain some 
of the delay, neither excuse—either independently or cumulatively—justifies the lengthy 
delay in this case. Despite respondent's health issues, he was responsible for acting with 
reasonable diligence and promptness; consequently, if his health prevented him from 
getting the action on file, he should have advised S.W. Instead, respondent took no action 
13 
 
 
 
for over 7 months after S.W. had paid the requisite fee. Then respondent filed the petition 
in the wrong court, failed to provide a sufficient number of copies when he subsequently 
filed the petition in the correct court, and apparently failed to take steps to promptly 
follow up once he thought there was a pending action. Because of his failure to prosecute 
the petition, he was oblivious to the fact the court had returned the petition or to the fact 
that the court's mailing had not reached him because of a glitch with the post office. 
Given respondent's lack of diligence, neither the health issues nor the problems with the 
post office can justify the lengthy delay encountered by S.W.  
 
With regard to KRPC 1.15 and 5.3, the facts are clear and convincing that 
respondent did not properly supervise his office manager, he failed to keep a master list 
of clients, and he failed to keep proper accounting records. These failures resulted in 
unauthorized settlement negotiations, delays or omissions of deposits or disbursement of 
funds, and misappropriation of monies. Had respondent acted with the care of a 
"professional fiduciary" (see KRPC 1.15, Comment [1] [2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 556]) 
and provided "appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects" of 
the office manager's employment (see KRPC 5.3, Comment [1] [2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 
627]), the monetary losses may have been thwarted and certainly could be more 
accurately accounted for so that full restitution could occur. There is clear and convincing 
evidence that respondent violated KRPC 1.15 and 5.3. 
 
Suspension is an appropriate discipline 
 
The hearing panel recommended the respondent be suspended from the practice of 
law for a period of 3 months. In reaching this recommendation, the panel rejected the 
Disciplinary Administrator's recommendation for a 6-month suspension and the 
respondent's request for informal censure or probation. The panel concluded the 
respondent failed to develop a workable, substantial, and detailed probation plan. In large 
14 
 
 
 
part, this was because respondent failed to identify all who might be owed restitution. 
Further, respondent failed to implement the plan before the disciplinary hearing, instead 
meeting with his practice supervisor for the first time only the day before the panel's 
hearing. Finally, the panel concluded the plan was not in the best interests of the legal 
profession or the citizens of the state of Kansas. The panel recommended that respondent 
"immediately and before the oral arguments before the Kansas Supreme Court, undergo a 
complete psychological evaluation and provide a copy of the report of the evaluation to 
the disciplinary administrator." The panel also recommended that before respondent 
could be readmitted to the practice of law, he must undergo a reinstatement hearing under 
Supreme Court Rule 219 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 407) at which he must establish that 
he was sufficiently healthy to engage in the active and continuous practice of law. If 
respondent was reinstated, the panel recommended his reinstatement should be subject to 
the terms and conditions of respondent's proposed probation plan for a period of 2 years 
and that he be required to complete a continuing legal education program on law practice 
management.  
 
At the hearing before this court, at which the respondent appeared, Deputy 
Disciplinary Administrator Kimberly L. Knoll recommended that the respondent be 
indefinitely suspended. In part, Knoll based her recommendation on the respondent's 
failure to provide evidence that he had undergone the psychological evaluation suggested 
by the hearing panel. Respondent proferred that he had completed an evaluation, but he 
explained that he did not understand that he could present additional evidence after the 
record before the panel hearing had closed. In rebuttal, Knoll pointed to this court's 
practice of receiving affidavits from a respondent under Rule 211(g)(5) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. 
Annot. 356), which requires a respondent to file an affidavit with the Disciplinary 
Administrator and the Clerk of the Appellate courts establishing that the respondent has 
complied with terms of a proposed probation plan during the time between the panel 
hearing and oral argument before the Supreme Court.  
15 
 
 
 
 
But a psychological evaluation was not part of respondent's proposed probation 
plan, and the hearing panel did not recommend probation. Hence, although we agree that 
the respondent would have been well served to have filed an affidavit, we conclude that 
the respondent's view that the record was closed is not unreasonable. Rule 211 is 
ambiguous; our rules do not make it clear that an affidavit could be filed in these 
circumstances.  
 
Knoll also suggested that a 3-month period of suspension is too short a period for 
respondent to effectively deal with any psychological issues. It would be unfair, she 
argued, to give respondent a false hope of being readmitted after so short a period of 
time. Her argument presupposes an outcome that might differ from the recommendations 
of the evaluators. In addition, we note that the hearing panel did not question the 
respondent's fitness to practice law. 
 
In weighing the respondent's conduct and the ABA Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions, we adopt the hearing panel's recommendation. See ABA 
Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and Standards (2012); In re 
Woodring, 289 Kan. 173, 180, 186, 210 P.3d 120 (2009) (discussing and applying ABA 
Standards). We agree with the hearing panel's conclusions that respondent failed to 
develop a workable, substantial, and detailed probation plan; the respondent's probation 
plan was not in effect at the time of the panel hearing; and it was not in the public's best 
interests. We, therefore, reject respondent's request that we place him on probation. We 
unanimously adopt the hearing panel's recommendation that the respondent be suspended 
from the practice of law for 3 months from the date of this opinion. Respondent may then 
petition for reinstatement under Rule 219. If respondent seeks reinstatement in the future, 
he will be required to produce reasonably contemporaneous reports from physical and 
mental health professionals describing his compliance with any treatment 
16 
 
 
 
recommendations and supporting his petition for reinstatement. Further, respondent's 
reinstatement panel should investigate and develop recommendations for the court on 
whether any period of respondent's future law practice should be supervised. In addition, 
in order to achieve any future reinstatement, the respondent must be in compliance with 
CLE requirements and should have completed one or more programs in law office 
management. Finally, the reinstatement panel should evaluate whether the respondent has 
taken all appropriate steps to identify all clients to whom restitution is owed for the 
misappropriation of funds. In imposing this requirement, the court recognizes the 
possibility that all losses may never be ascertained. Nevertheless, respondent must make 
a reasonable effort to determine whether there are any unreported losses. The 
reinstatement panel should also evaluate whether respondent has developed a plan of 
restitution for all identified clients.  
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Michael Peloquin be suspended from the practice 
of law in the state of Kansas for a period of 3 months effective on the filing of this 
opinion in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(2) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 
300). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall comply with Supreme Court 
Rule 218 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 406) and, in the event of his filing a petition for 
reinstatement, shall be subject to a reinstatement hearing under Rule 219.  
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports. 
 
MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned.1 
                                                 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE: Senior Judge Malone was appointed to hear case No. 111,127 
to fill the vacancy on the court created by the appointment of Justice Nancy Moritz to the 
United States 10th Circuit Court of Appeals.