Title: Ex parte Roy Duncan and Air Flow Awning Company, Inc. PETITIONFOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Roy Duncan and Air Flow Awning Company, Inc. v. City of Montgomery et al.)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1061393
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 11, 2008

rel:  04/11/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1061393
_________________________
Ex parte Roy Duncan and Air Flow Awning Company, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:  Roy Duncan and Air Flow Awning Company, Inc.
v.
City of Montgomery et al.)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-05-1628;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2060198)
1061393
2
COBB, Chief Justice.
On August 15, 2007, this Court granted the joint petition
for a writ of certiorari filed by Roy Duncan and Air Flow
Awning Company, Inc. ("Air Flow"), to review the no-opinion
affirmance by the Court of Civil Appeals of the trial court's
summary judgment in favor of the City of Montgomery ("the
City").  Duncan v. City of Montgomery (No. 2060198, June 15,
2007), ____ So. 2d. ____ (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)(table).  We
reverse and remand.
Facts
Duncan and Air Flow Awning Company, of which Duncan is
the chief executive officer, began replacing the original
wooden windows in a house in the Old Cloverdale historic
district in the City with vinyl windows manufactured by Air
Flow.  (Duncan and Air Flow are hereinafter referred to
collectively as "Duncan.")  Duncan did not apply for a
building permit or get approval for replacing the wooden
windows with vinyl windows from those governmental entities
vested with the responsibility of preserving the historic,
aesthetic, and cultural qualities of the City's designated
historic districts.
1061393
The record does not identify the person or governmental
1
entity who ordered Duncan to stop the installation.
3
A resident of Old Cloverdale whose name is not revealed
in the record complained to the City about "changes being
made" to the exterior of a neighbor's house, the house at
which Duncan was replacing the windows.  The City investigated
the complaint and discovered that three of the original wooden
windows on the house had been replaced with vinyl windows.
Duncan was ordered to stop the installation of the vinyl
windows until he procured approval for the project from the
Architectural Review Board for the City ("the Board").    
1
The Board reviews and then either approves or disapproves
homeowners' repair, restoration, and improvement projects in
the historic districts in the City, with the goal of
"carry[ing] out the purposes and responsibilities" of
Municipal Ordinance 28-2004. See Ala. Code 1975, § 11-68-2.
Municipal Ordinance 28-2004 was enacted for the purpose of
protecting, 
preserving, 
and 
rehabilitating 
"historic
properties and the historic, cultural, and aesthetic heritage
of the City."  Municipal Ordinance 28-2004 provides that "no
change in the exterior appearance of ... any building,
1061393
4
structure, or site within a Historic District may be made ...
unless and until a certificate of appropriateness for such
change, erection or demolition is approved by the Board."
After being told that a certificate of appropriateness
was required before the installation of the windows could
proceed, Duncan submitted to the Board an "[a]pplication for
review of construction in a historic district."  The
application is dated May 2, 2005.  On the application, Duncan
described the work to be done as "remov[ing] wood windows
[and] replac[ing] with white vinyl welded multi-light
windows."
On May 24, 2005, the Board held a meeting at which it
reviewed and rejected Duncan's application.  The Board
informed Duncan of its decision in a letter dated May 31,
2005, which stated:
"[T]he Board denied this request as presented since
vinyl windows are not in compliance with the
[Board's] guidelines for historic districts.  It is
the recommendations of the Board to replace all
vinyl windows with original materials and resubmit
details to the Board for review within six months.
Furthermore the [Board] requests a review of this
property in six months if [Duncan] has not replaced
the 
vinyl 
windows 
installed 
without 
[Board]
approval, to remediate the situation."
1061393
5
On June 30, 2005, Duncan filed in the Montgomery Circuit
Court an "Appeal of Final Decision of the Architectural Review
Board of the City of Montgomery and Complaint."  Duncan named
as 
defendants 
the City, the Board, 
and Montgomery's Historical
Preservation Commission (the City, the Board, and the
Commission are hereinafter referred to collectively as "the
defendants").  In addition to his appeal, Duncan's complaint
contained an application for a preliminary injunction, a
request for a declaratory judgment, and a claim based on
negligence.  
The defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment on
Duncan's claims.  The defendants argued that they were
entitled 
to 
a 
summary 
judgment 
because, 
they argued, replacing
the wooden windows with vinyl ones constituted a "change or
alteration to the exterior of the residence" and, therefore,
according to the defendants, under Municipal Ordinance 28-
2004, Duncan was required to obtain a certificate of
appropriateness from the Board before replacing the wooden
windows.  Further, the defendants interpret the Board's
guidelines to authorize the Board to prohibit  vinyl windows
in the City's historic districts; therefore, according to the
1061393
6
defendants, 
the 
Board 
properly 
denied 
Duncan's 
application 
for
a certificate.  In addition, the defendants argued that Duncan
could not maintain a negligence claim because, they argued,
the City does not owe Duncan a duty to permit him to do
anything unlawful, and, according to the defendants, vinyl
windows are unlawful "changes to [the] exterior [of]
buildings" that are not allowed without the Board's approval.
Further, 
according 
to 
the 
defendants, 
Duncan 
was
contributorily negligent and assumed the risk of incurring
damages by unlawfully beginning the installation of the vinyl
windows 
without 
applying 
for 
a 
certificate 
of 
appropriateness.
In response to the defendants' summary-judgment motion,
Duncan argued that the vinyl windows do not constitute a
"change in the exterior appearance" of the house as that term
is used in Municipal Ordinance 28-2004, and, therefore, that
the ordinance did not require him to obtain a certificate of
appropriateness before installing the vinyl windows.  Duncan
submitted photographs in support of his argument. Although
Duncan did not submit an authenticating affidavit with the
photographs, 
none 
of 
the defendants 
objected 
to 
the submission
of the photographs, and none of the defendants moved to strike
1061393
7
them.  Duncan further argued in opposition to the summary-
judgment motion that the vinyl windows were not expressly
prohibited by the written guidelines of the Board and,
therefore, according to Duncan, the Board could not lawfully
stop him from replacing the wooden windows with vinyl ones.
The trial court held a hearing on the defendants'
summary-judgment 
motion. 
 
During 
that 
hearing, 
the 
trial 
court
stated that from the evidence presented it could not tell the
difference between the vinyl and wooden windows.  At the
conclusion of the hearing, however, the trial court granted
the City's motion for a summary judgment.  Subsequently, the
trial court entered a summary judgment for all the defendants
on all Duncan's claims.
Standard of Review
"'"This Court's review of a summary judgment is
de novo. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
886 So. 2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003).  We apply the same
standard of review as the trial court applied.
Specifically, we must determine whether the movant
has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue
of material fact exists and that the movant is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  Rule
56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala.
2004). In making such a determination, we must
review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758
(Ala. 1986). Once the movant makes a prima facie
1061393
8
showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
produce 'substantial evidence' as to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v.
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12.
'[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such weight
and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise
of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the
existence of the fact sought to be proved.'  West v.
Founders Life Assur. Co. of Fla., 547 So. 2d 870,
871 (Ala. 1989)."'"
Gooden v. City of Talladega, 966 So. 2d 232, 235 (Ala. 2007)
(quoting Prince v. Poole, 935 So. 2d 431, 442 (Ala. 2006),
quoting in turn Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d
1035, 1038-39 (Ala. 2004)).
Analysis
Duncan argues that the summary judgment was not
appropriate because, he says, genuine issues of material fact
exist as to whether the replacement of the wooden windows with
vinyl ones was a "change in the exterior appearance" of the
building and, therefore, as to whether a certificate of
appropriateness was required under Municipal Ordinance 28-
2004.  The defendants argue, as they did in their motion
before the trial court, that, under Municipal Ordinance 28-
2004, every "change in the exterior" of a building in a
historic district in the City requires the approval of the
1061393
9
Board, and, in this case, according to the defendants, the
Board's approval was properly withheld. 
"Municipalities have the authority to regulate the use of
structures and improvements in certain zones or districts and
can use their zoning power to regulate aesthetics in
maintaining 
property 
values." 
City of 
Mobile 
v. 
Weinacker, 720
So. 2d 953, 954 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (citing Chorzempa v.
City of Huntsville, 643 So. 2d 1021 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993),
and Pate v. City Council of Tuscaloosa, 622 So.2d 405 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1993)).  However, "'"[s]o far as [an ordinance]
restricts the absolute dominion of the owner over its
property, it should furnish a uniform rule of action, and its
application cannot be left to the arbitrary will of the
governing authorities."'" 720 
So. 2d 
at 
955 (quoting Longshore
v. City of Montgomery, 22 Ala. App. 620, 622, 119 So. 599, 600
(1928), quoting in turn City Council of Montgomery v. West,
149 Ala. 311, 314, 42 So. 1000, 1000 (1907)).
"City ordinances are subject to the same general rules of
construction as are acts of the legislature."  City of
Birmingham v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 591 So. 2d 473, 476 (Ala.
1991) (citing S & S Distrib. Co. v. Town of New Hope, 334 So.
1061393
10
2d 905 (Ala. 1976)).  In Ex parte City of Orange Beach Board
of Adjustment, 833 So. 2d 51, 55-56 (Ala. 2001), this Court
applied the following general rules of statutory construction
to a municipal ordinance:
"'"The fundamental rule of statutory
construction is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the [city council]
in 
enacting 
the 
[ordinance]. 
Advertiser 
Co.
v. Hobbie, 474 So. 2d 93 (Ala. 1985);
League of Women Voters v. Renfro, 292 Ala.
128, 290 So. 2d 167 (1974). If possible,
the intent of the [city council] should be
gathered 
from 
the 
language 
of 
the
[ordinance] itself. Advertiser Co. v.
Hobbie, supra; Morgan County Board of
Education v. Alabama Public School &
College Authority, 362 So. 2d 850 (Ala.
1978). ..."'
"In Ex parte Dorough, 773 So. 2d 1001, 1003
(Ala. 2000) (citing Ex parte Pfizer, Inc., 746 So.
2d 960, 964 (Ala. 1999)), this Court stated: 
"'"'....
"'"'"'Words used in a statute
must be given their natural, plain,
ordinary, and commonly understood
meaning, and where plain language is
used a court is bound to interpret
that language to mean exactly what it
says. If the language of the statute
is unambiguous, then there is no room
for judicial construction and the
clearly 
expressed 
intent 
of 
the
legislature 
must 
be 
given
effect.'"'"'"
1061393
11
Municipal Ordinance 28-2004, to which this Court now
applies the above principles of construction, states plainly
that
"[n]o change in the exterior appearance of ... any
building, structure, or site within a Historic
District may be made ... unless and until a
certificate of appropriateness for such change,
erection or demolition is approved by the Board."
Municipal 
Ordinance 
28-2004, 
Part 
IV, 
§ 1(a) 
(emphasis 
added).
Likewise, Ala. Code 1975, § 11-68-9, the statute pursuant to
which the City adopted Municipal Ordinance 28-2004, allows
municipalities 
to 
require 
a 
certificate 
of 
appropriateness 
for
any "change in the exterior appearance of an historic property
or any building ... within an historic district" (emphasis
added).
Duncan argues that the term "exterior appearance" means
the "way the building looks on the outside."  Therefore,
according to Duncan, only changes to the outside appearance of
a house in a historic district must be submitted to the Board
for approval.  Duncan further argues that the vinyl windows he
is installing do not change the way the house looks on the
outside and thus a certificate of approval was not required
for their installation.
1061393
12
The defendants take a much more nuanced approach.  The
defendants 
presume, 
without 
presenting 
any 
authority,
argument, or discussion, that "exterior appearance" means
merely "exterior"; thus, they argue, any changes or repairs to
the exterior of a building in a historic district, regardless
of whether those changes actually alter the outside
"appearance" of the building, require a certificate of
appropriateness.
The first step in our de novo review of the trial court's
summary judgment is to determine whether the defendants, as
the movants, "'"made a prima facie showing that no genuine
issue of material fact exists and that the [defendants are]
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."'"  Gooden v. City
of Talladega, 966 So. 2d at 235 (quoting Prince, 935 So. 2d at
442, quoting in turn Dow, 897 So. 2d at 1038). In this case,
we need go no further than this first step, because the
defendants have not met their burden.  
When the Alabama Legislature and the City enacted the
governing 
statute 
and 
Municipal 
Ordinance 
28-2004,
respectively, they chose to use the words "change in the
exterior appearance" to prescribe when a certificate of
1061393
13
appropriateness is required. 
 
Despite caselaw stating 
that, 
in
determining the meaning of a statute or ordinance, "this Court
looks to the plain meaning of the words as written," Orange
Beach, 833 So. 2d at 56 (emphasis added), the defendants
simply ignore the word "appearance" in the ordinance.  The
defendants supplied no legal authority for the  definition of
the term "exterior appearance" and produced no evidence to
support the conclusion that the change created by replacing
the wooden windows on the house with the vinyl ones is a
change in the "exterior appearance" of the house.  Rather, the
defendants' arguments all presume that a change in the
"exterior" of a building, regardless of whether the outside
"appearance" of the building is affected by the change, is all
that is needed to trigger the requirement of a certificate of
appropriateness.  Because the defendants' arguments are not
based on the language of Municipal Ordinance 28-2004 "as
written," the defendants did not carry their  initial burden
at the summary-judgment stage, and they were not entitled to
a summary judgment.
In ruling that the defendants did not carry their burden,
this Court is not to be understood as necessarily adopting or
1061393
14
rejecting 
Duncan's 
proposed 
definition 
of 
"exterior
appearance."  The defendants' failure to meet their initial
burden at the summary-judgment stage simply means that we need
not consider Duncan's proposed definition of that term or the
effect of the photographs of the vinyl and wooden windows he
submitted as evidence or the trial court's comment that, based
on the evidence before it, it could not tell the difference
between the vinyl windows and the wooden ones being replaced.
Further, we emphasize that we are expressing no opinion
on whether the vinyl replacement windows in fact constitute a
change in "exterior appearance."  Rather, our holding is
limited to a determination that, on this record, the
defendants have not met their burden of demonstrating that no
genuine issue of material fact exists and that they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Duncan also argues that, because vinyl windows are not
among those items listed in a document titled "Architectural
Review 
Board 
Guidelines" 
as 
expressly 
prohibited 
in 
historical
districts, the Board has no authority to prevent him from
replacing the wooden windows on the house with vinyl ones.
Having found that summary judgment was improper because the
1061393
15
defendants failed to carry their burden of showing that the
vinyl windows changed the "exterior appearance" of the
residence, the Court will not address Duncan's argument as to
the guidelines.
Finally, the defendants argue that they are entitled to
a summary judgment as to Duncan's negligence claim because,
they argue, the City "does not owe Duncan a duty to do
anything unlawful."  Thus, the defendants' argument as to the
existence of a duty rests on the defendants' assumption that
the installation of the vinyl windows is unlawful under
Municipal 
Ordinance 
28-2004. 
 
However, 
as 
discussed 
above, 
the
defendants have not met their burden of demonstrating that
they are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on this
issue. Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate on
Duncan's negligence claim, based on this record.  In so
holding, we do not hold that the City owed Duncan any duty; we
simply hold that the defendants have not demonstrated that the
City owes Duncan no duty and, therefore, the defendants are
not entitled to summary judgment on Duncan's negligence at
this time.
1061393
16
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the defendants are not
entitled to a summary judgment on this record.  The judgment
of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded 
for 
further 
proceedings 
consistent 
with 
this 
opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
See, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ.,
concur.  
Parker, J., concurs specially.
Lyons, J., concurs in the result.
1061393
17
PARKER, Justice (concurring specially).
Roy Duncan and Air Flow Awning Company, Inc., sought
certiorari review of the Court of Civil Appeals' no-opinion
affirmance, alleging a conflict with that decision and City of
Mobile v. Weinacker, 720 So. 2d 953 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).
I write specially to reiterate a fundamental principle
about private property set forth in Weinacker:
"'"[S]o far as [an ordinance] restricts the absolute
dominion of the owner over its property, it should
furnish 
a 
uniform 
rule 
of 
action, 
and 
its
application cannot be left to the arbitrary will of
the governing authorities."' Longshore v. City of
Montgomery, 22 Ala. App. 620, 622, 119 So. 599, 600
(1928), quoting City Council of Montgomery v. West,
149 Ala. 311, 314, 42 So. 1000, 1000 (1907)."
720 So. 2d at 954-55.