Title: Sollami v. Eaton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 91284, 91378
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 2002

Docket Nos. 91284, 91378 cons.-Agenda 35-September 2001.
KATHLEEN M. SOLLAMI et al., Appellees, v. LAWRENCE 								EATON et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed June 6, 2002.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	In May 1997, plaintiff Kathleen Sollami, then 15 years old,
injured herself while jumping on a large recreational trampoline
located on premises owned by defendant Lawrence Eaton and
manufactured by defendant Icon Health and Fitness, Inc., doing
business as Jumpking (hereafter, Jumpking). Her father, Phillip
Sollami, sued on her behalf. The circuit court of Williamson
County entered summary judgment for both defendants. The
appellate court reversed and remanded (319 Ill. App. 3d 612), and
we granted leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315). We now reverse
the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND
	The facts of this case are not in dispute and may be briefly
summarized. Kathleen was acquainted with Lawrence Eaton's
daughter. Kathleen went to Eaton's house on the day in question
to see her friend. Another friend arrived. The girls called two boys
to come over. At one point, all five of the children were jumping
at the same time on the Eatons' trampoline, which was located in
the side yard. The trampoline was described as a " 'Backyard
Round 14' diameter trampoline.' " 319 Ill. App. 3d at 614. Neither
Lawrence Eaton nor his wife were home at the time. The group
decided to do "rocket" jumps, in which one jumper is propelled
higher than the other jumpers. Completing a rocket jump requires
three or four persons to jump simultaneously on the perimeter of
the trampoline mat, while one person jumps to the center and is
thereby propelled higher than the other jumpers. After watching
one of her friends successfully complete a rocket jump, Kathleen
took a turn at being the "rocket". As she landed on the trampoline
mat, Kathleen felt her knee pop. 319 Ill. App. 3d at 614.
	Lawrence Eaton had purchased the trampoline in 1992 and
assembled it according to written instructions provided by
Jumpking. Pursuant to those instructions, Eaton affixed decals to
the trampoline mat and frame warning that the trampoline should
be used only by properly trained participants with direct
supervision of a qualified instructor. Eaton also attached an
instruction placard to the frame with a wire tie. During the spring
prior to Kathleen's injury, Eaton found the placard on the ground
and did not reattach it. 319 Ill. App. 3d at 616.
	Count I of plaintiffs' third amended complaint alleged, as to
Eaton, that Kathleen was an invited guest on premises owned and
controlled by Eaton and was injured while jumping on a
trampoline located on said premises. Plaintiffs alleged that Eaton
was negligent in (1) failing to warn Kathleen of the dangers
associated with more than one person jumping on the trampoline
simultaneously in that he failed to replace the warning placard
provided by Jumpking on the trampoline prior to the date of
Kathleen's injury, (2) permitting more than one person to use the
trampoline at one time, and (3) failing to supervise the activity of
minors on his premises to verify that only one person used the
trampoline at a time. Count III of the complaint, as to Jumpking,
alleged that the trampoline contained one or more manufacturing
or design defects which rendered it not reasonably safe for its
intended use. It was alleged that Jumpking (1) permitted the
trampoline, which was designed as a training device, to be used as
a backyard toy, (2) failed to warn persons, including Kathleen, that
only one person was permitted to use the trampoline at a time, (3)
failed to verify that when the trampoline was sold, its instructions
as to use were attached to the trampoline and could not be
removed, and (4) failed to adequately warn persons, including
Kathleen and Eaton, that the trampoline should be used only under
the direct supervision of a qualified instructor recommended by
the United States Gymnastics Federation.
	In its motion for summary judgment, Jumpking alleged that
the danger of jumping on a trampoline is open and obvious and
should be appreciated by a reasonable 15-year-old person. Thus,
as a matter of law, Jumpking had no duty to warn. Eaton's motion
for summary judgment made similar allegations. The circuit court
granted the motions, finding that it was bound by the decision of
the Fourth District of the appellate court in Ford v. Nairn, 307 Ill.
App. 3d 296 (1999), which the circuit court found virtually
indistinguishable from the instant case.
	In reversing the circuit court, the appellate court focused on
the instructions and warnings given in the literature accompanying
the trampoline. The court found that such extensive instructions
and warnings demonstrated knowledge on Jumpking's part that
was superior to that of purchasers and users of the trampoline
regarding its characteristics and the risk of harm to consumers who
purchase a trampoline for use as a backyard toy. The court stated:
			"Though certain recognized hazards associated with
trampoline jumping may be considered open and obvious
depending on the circumstances, we doubt that
recreational users appreciate the hazards and the risk of
injury posed by the thrust capacity of the trampoline mat
and appreciate that the risk and severity of the injury is
reduced when the user is instructed on fundamental
landing techniques to manage that impact. The
instructions and warnings demonstrate that the
consequences of encountering these hazards are not
obvious and are not appreciated or understood by
foreseeable purchasers and users." 319 Ill. App. 3d at 619.
	The court concluded that Jumpking had a duty to warn
because of its superior knowledge of the hazards and risks of harm
that its trampoline posed to foreseeable users. 319 Ill. App. 3d at
620.
	The court also concluded that Eaton had a duty to warn
Kathleen of the dangers of jumping on his trampoline, based upon
his superior knowledge of the warnings and instructions supplied
by Jumpking with the trampoline. 319 Ill. App. 3d at 620.

ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
	Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000); Petrovich v. Share
Health Plan of Illinois, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 17, 30-31 (1999). Our
review of the circuit court's judgment is de novo. Morris v.
Margulis, 197 Ill. 2d 28, 35 (2001).

II. Duty to Warn in Product Liability Cases
	To recover in a product liability action, a plaintiff must plead
and prove that the injury resulted from a condition of the product,
that the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one, and that the
condition existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's
control. Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 540 (1996);
Korando v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 159 Ill. 2d 335, 343
(1994). A product may be found unreasonably dangerous by virtue
of a physical flaw, a design defect, or a failure of the manufacturer
to warn of the danger or instruct on the proper use of the product
as to which the average consumer would not be aware. Renfro v.
Allied Industrial Equipment Corp., 155 Ill. App. 3d 140, 155
(1987). A manufacturer has a duty to warn where the product
possesses dangerous propensities and there is unequal knowledge
with respect to the risk of harm, and the manufacturer, possessed
of such knowledge, knows or should know that harm may occur
absent a warning. Goldman v. Walco Tool &amp; Engineering Co., 243
Ill. App. 3d 981, 992 (1993); Smith v. American Motors Sales
Corp., 215 Ill. App. 3d 951, 957 (1991). No duty to warn exists
where the danger is apparent or open and obvious. Ford, 307 Ill.
App. 3d at 300. The duty to warn is determined by an objective
analysis, i.e., the awareness of an ordinary person. Klen v. Asahi
Pool, Inc., 268 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1035 (1994). The determination
of whether a duty to warn exists is a question of law. Modelski v.
Navistar International Transportation Corp., 302 Ill. App. 3d 879,
887 (1999); Bell v. Lincoln Electric Co., 258 Ill. App. 3d 842, 846
(1994).
	The circuit court in this case relied on Ford, a Fourth District
case with an almost identical factual situation. There, a 14-year-old girl injured herself on a backyard trampoline manufactured by
Jumpking. The injury occurred while the plaintiff and some
friends were "double-jumping," an activity designed to make one
jumper go higher, similar to the "rocket" jump performed by
Kathleen and her friends in the instant case. The plaintiff injured
her knee when she contacted the trampoline mat. The owner of the
trampoline received a user's manual, warning decals, and a
warning placard with the trampoline. Ford, 307 Ill. App. 3d at
299. The plaintiff sued Jumpking and the premises owner. The
appellate court affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary
judgment to defendants, finding that the dangers involved in using
a recreational trampoline are analogous to the dangers associated
with falling from a height. Such dangers are open and obvious to
teenagers and adults. The court also stated that "[r]isks associated
with double jumping, such as collisions or increased impact from
someone else in addition to oneself applying pressure to the
trampoline mat, are also open and obvious. The increased impact
and the ability to jump even higher is exactly what attracts jumpers
to engage in double jumping and is what attracted [the plaintiff] in
this case." Ford, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 302.
	Plaintiffs argue that the open and obvious risk principle has
been inconsistently applied and should be abandoned. As an
example, they assert that the Ford case is contradictory to a
previous Fourth District decision in Johnson v. Decatur Park
District, 301 Ill. App. 3d 798 (1998). However, Johnson involved
the use of a mini-trampoline, which is a small, round trampoline
set at an angle and used as a rebound device. It provides the
gymnast with greater height in performing somersaults and other
gymnastic maneuvers. AMF, Inc. v. Victor J. Andrew High School,
172 Ill. App. 3d 337, 338 (1988). The plaintiff in Johnson was
injured when, in attempting to perform a front flip, he fell on his
head and shoulders, breaking his neck. Johnson, 301 Ill. App. 3d
at 800. Ford distinguished the Johnson case on the basis that there
were significant physical differences between the mini-trampoline
and the type of round recreational trampoline involved in Ford,
and in the different functions of the two trampolines. Ford, 307 Ill.
App. 3d at 301. Johnson is thus distinguishable from Ford.
	Plaintiffs cite two other cases that they contend demonstrate
that there is a "problem" with application of the open and obvious
danger rule. They argue that these cases, both from the First
District, inconsistently applied the rule. However, upon closer
review, it is clear that the cases are not inconsistent. In Venus v.
O'Hara, 127 Ill. App. 3d 19 (1984), the plaintiffs filed a
negligence action against an exterminator for damages caused by
his use of naphthalene flakes in the plaintiffs' home. The
exterminator filed a third-party action in strict liability against bulk
distributors of the flakes, alleging a failure to adequately warn of
the dangerous propensities of the flakes. The circuit court granted
summary judgment to the distributors on the ground that the
distributors had no control over the warnings or labels placed on
the containers by their purchasers. Venus, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 23.
The appellate court reversed, holding that a supplier has a duty to
supply adequate warnings to its immediate vendee and may be
held liable to the ultimate user for failure to do so. The court
rejected the distributors' contention that they had a right to rely on
their vendees to provide adequate warnings, noting that nothing in
the record suggested that the distributors were justified in relying
on the expertise of subsequent distributors or that the dangerous
propensities of naphthalene are so commonly known as to obviate
the need for warnings. Venus, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 27.
	In contrast, the record in Jackson v. Reliable Paste &amp;
Chemical Co., 136 Ill. App. 3d 766 (1985), demonstrated such
knowledge as to the dangerous propensities of methanol. In
Jackson, plaintiffs filed suit asserting negligence and strict liability
against Reliable, maker of shellac solvent that contained methanol.
Reliable purchased the methanol from three suppliers. Reliable
sued two suppliers for indemnification on the basis that they were
strictly liable for their failure to warn Reliable of the dangerous
explosive and flammable propensities of methanol. The suppliers
alleged that they had no duty to warn because Reliable was fully
aware of the dangerous propensities of methanol. The circuit court
entered summary judgment in favor of the suppliers. Jackson, 136
Ill. App. 3d at 767. The appellate court affirmed, noting that the
record showed that Reliable took special safety precautions in
pumping the methanol from tanker trucks into its storage tanks,
attaching the hose to its grounding lines to eliminate the possibility
of static electricity or sparks. Reliable also packaged the methanol
in a building constructed with explosion-proof electrical wiring.
In addition, Reliable's president was very familiar with the
flammable and explosive properties of methanol. Accordingly, the
appellate court held that the suppliers had no duty to warn Reliable
regarding dangers of which it was already aware. Jackson, 136 Ill.
App. 3d at 771-72.
	It is settled law that a manufacturer has no duty to warn of
"those inherent propensities of a product which are obvious to all
who come in contact with the product." McColgan v.
Environmental Control Systems, Inc., 212 Ill. App. 3d 696, 700
(1991). We see no reason to depart from this rule.
	We now address application of the rule in the instant case.
The appellate court quoted extensively from the user's manual that
came with the trampoline. The court focused on the various
warnings and instructions for use given in the manual. It noted
that, as no reference was made to these warnings and instructions
by the Ford court, those materials were either not provided to that
court or not considered by it. The appellate court in this case used
the instructions and warnings to conclude that the risk of injury
posed by the thrust capacity of the trampoline mat is not obvious
and appreciated by foreseeable purchasers and users. 319 Ill. App.
3d at 619. The court stated that, based upon the record, Jumpking
had a duty to warn "because it had superior knowledge of the
hazards and the risks of harm that its product posed to foreseeable
users. Because Jumpking had superior knowledge, it had a duty to
warn purchasers and users of the hazards and the risk of harm that
they may encounter while using its product." 319 Ill. App. 3d at
620.
	Initially, we note that the appellate court is incorrect in stating
that the Ford court did not refer to the user's manual supplied with
the trampoline in that case. That court specifically referred to
instructions in the manual stating that no more than one person
should be allowed on the trampoline at a time and noted that the
warning placard stated that two or more persons jumping on the
trampoline at one time create additional risks of injury due to
collisions, being bounced off the trampoline, and unexpected
responses of the trampoline mat. Ford, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 300.
The appellate court in the instant case used Jumpking's warnings
and instructions in the user manual and on the warning decals and
placard to bootstrap a duty to warn. No duty to warn arises where
the risk of harm is apparent to the foreseeable user, regardless of
any superior knowledge on the part of the manufacturer.
	There is a dearth of Illinois cases on the issue of the open and
obvious dangers of jumping on a recreational trampoline. One
case, Fallon v. Indian Trail School, Addison Township School
District No. 4, 148 Ill. App. 3d 931 (1986), involved the question
of whether a trampoline was a dangerous instrumentality and
whether its use was an ultrahazardous activity. The plaintiff had
been attempting to perform a "front drop" maneuver on the
trampoline at the time of her injury. The appellate court upheld the
circuit court's determination that the trampoline was not a
dangerous instrumentality and that its normal use was not an
ultrahazardous activity. Fallon, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 934.
	Cases from other jurisdictions are of limited assistance as
many of them involved plaintiffs who were experienced
trampoline users and who therefore appreciated the risks. In these
cases, the court found no duty to warn. Although Liccione v.
Gearing, 252 A.D.2d 956, 675 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1998), involved
double-jumping on a recreational trampoline, the court's decision
finding no duty to warn was based upon the plaintiff's failure to
raise a triable issue of fact as to whether double-jumping is unique
and created a dangerous condition different from the usual dangers
inherent in jumping on a trampoline. The court also found that the
plaintiff was of sufficient age, education and experience to assume
the risks of jumping on a trampoline. In addition, the court found
that the manufacturer's warnings were adequate as a matter of law.
Liccione, 252 A.D.2d  at 956-57, 675 N.Y.S.2d  at 729.
	In Anderson v. Weslo, Inc., 79 Wash. App. 829, 835, 906 P.2d 336, 339 (1995), the plaintiff injured himself while attempting to
perform a double flip on a neighbor's backyard trampoline. The
plaintiff was a very experienced trampoline user and was aware of
previous accidents. The court of appeals used a subjective test in
finding that the landowners could reasonably expect that the
plaintiff would realize the danger.
	Burchinal v. Gregory, 41 Colo. App. 490, 586 P.2d 1012
(1978), involved a plaintiff who was injured while attempting a
back flip on a recreational trampoline. The plaintiff had experience
using trampolines at school and was aware of the dangers
involved. He had successfully performed the back flip several
times prior to his injury. He sued the owners of the trampoline,
alleging a duty to warn and supervise. The court held that the
owners had no duty to warn the plaintiff of dangers that he already
understood and appreciated. Burchinal, 41 Colo. App. at 491-92,
586 P.2d  at 1013.
	In Anderson v. Hedstrom Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 422 (S.D.N.Y
1999), the plaintiff was injured when he was propelled off the
trampoline onto the ground. At the time of the injury, the plaintiff
was jumping up and down on his feet, without turning his body in
any way. He was alone on the trampoline and was propelled off
the trampoline when he got off-center on the trampoline mat. The
district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding it
to be a question of fact as to whether the risks attendant to
bouncing off-center on a trampoline were open and obvious.
Anderson, 76 F. Supp. 2d  at 448. The district court noted that the
affidavit of the plaintiff's expert, together with other materials,
raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the need to jump only in
the center of the trampoline mat and the ease of being propelled
off the trampoline and being injured, are obvious to the average
person with little or no trampoline experience. Anderson, 76 F. Supp. 2d  at 446.
	Although the court in Bryant v. Adams, 116 N.C. App. 448,
465-66, 448 S.E.2d 832, 841-42 (1994), found that a question of
fact existed as to whether the risks of jumping on a trampoline are
open and obvious dangers, that decision was based upon an
affidavit of a trampoline instructor who stated that the dangers
were not apparent to children or adults in the absence of
instruction from a qualified instructor.
	The purpose of double-jumping or rocket-jumping is to propel
one jumper higher than the others. It is apparent that when one is
propelled higher than normal on a trampoline, contact with the
trampoline mat when coming down from the greater height will
cause a considerable impact to the jumper's legs. The danger of
falling from a height has been held by this court to be open and
obvious to any child old enough to be allowed at large. Corcoran
v. Village of Libertyville, 73 Ill. 2d 316, 327 (1978), quoting
Restatement of Torts §339, Comment j, at 203 (1965); Mt. Zion
State Bank &amp; Trust v. Consolidated Communications, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 110, 118 (1995). In addition, we consider it to be apparent that
a trampoline mat may react differently and that injury may occur
when two or more jumpers are jumping on it, as opposed to a
single jumper. When, as here, three people jump down on the
perimeter of the trampoline mat, other portions of the mat will
tend to go up, as happened in this case and the Ford case. We note
that Kathleen was not attempting to do a front or back flip or any
other unusual maneuver on the trampoline. She merely jumped
into the middle of the trampoline mat and injured her knee.
	In Illinois, as we have stated, the duty to warn is determined
by an objective analysis. We conclude that a reasonable 15-year-old teenager would appreciate the danger of rocket-jumping on a
recreational trampoline. Accordingly, Jumpking had no duty to
warn Kathleen of these dangers. In light of our conclusion, we
need not address the question of the adequacy of the warnings
provided by Jumpking.

III. Duty to Warn in Premises Liability Cases
	In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that Eaton was
negligent in failing to warn Kathleen of the dangers associated
with more than one person jumping on the trampoline. The
appellate court found based on its conclusion that the risk
attendant to rocket-jumping was not open and obvious, that
summary judgment in Eaton's favor was erroneously granted. 319
Ill. App. 3d at 620.
	The duty owed by Eaton to Kathleen is one of reasonable care
under the circumstances regarding the state of the premises or acts
done or omitted on them. 740 ILCS 130/2 (West 1994); Ward v.
K mart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 147 (1990). According to section
343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, cited with approval in
Ward, 136 Ill. 2d  at 151, "[a] possessor of land is not liable to his
invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or
condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them,
unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such
knowledge or obviousness." Restatement (Second) of Torts
§343A(1) (1965). For example, reason to expect harm from a
known or obvious danger may arise "where the possessor has
reason to expect that the invitee's attention may be distracted, so
that he will not discover what is obvious, or will forget what he
has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it. Such reason
may also arise where the possessor has reason to expect that the
invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger
because to a reasonable man in his position the advantages of
doing so would outweigh the apparent risk." Restatement (Second)
of Torts §343A(1), Comment f, at 220 (1965). The former
example set forth in the Restatement has come to be known as the
"distraction exception" to the obvious risk principle and the latter
example is known as the "deliberate encounter exception."
Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc., 317 Ill. App. 3d 628, 639 (2000).
Accordingly, the existence of an open and obvious condition is not
a per se bar to a finding of legal duty on the part of a premises
owner or occupier. See Ward, 136 Ill. 2d  at 145; Bucheleres v.
Chicago Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 435, 449 (1996). Thus, whether
a possessor of land should guard against harm to the invitee,
despite the obviousness of the danger, depends upon whether
either the "distraction exception" or the "deliberate encounter
exception" applies in a given case. LaFever v. Kemlite Co., 185 Ill. 2d 380, 391 (1998).
	The distraction exception is illustrated in the Ward case.
There, the plaintiff walked into a concrete post located just outside
a customer entrance to a store. At the time of his injury, the
plaintiff had exited the store carrying a large mirror he had
purchased and he failed to see the post. Plaintiff filed a negligence
action against defendant based upon a theory of premises liability.
This court noted section 343A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts and found that, despite the fact that the concrete post was an
open and obvious condition, it was reasonably foreseeable to the
store owner that customers might momentarily forget the post's
presence when exiting the store or might become distracted while
carrying large, bulky items purchased in the store. Ward, 136 Ill. 2d  at 153.
	In the instant case, no evidence presented to the circuit court
tends to show that Kathleen was distracted while jumping on the
trampoline. Thus, we conclude that this exception does not apply
here.
	The deliberate encounter exception has most often been
applied in cases involving some economic compulsion. See
LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d  at 392 (defendant could have reasonably
foreseen that plaintiff would deliberately walk on slippery edge
trim in course of performing his job duties); Ralls v. Village of
Glendale Heights, 233 Ill. App. 3d 147, 155-56 (1992) (it was
reasonably foreseeable that construction workers would use the
shortest path to door of building on work site, even though the
path was snow-covered and slippery). Although we do not hold
that the deliberate encounter exception is applicable only in the
kind of situations involved in LaFever and Ralls, we find the
exception is inapplicable to this case. Here, there is no indication
of any compulsion or impetus under which a reasonable person in
Kathleen's position would have disregarded the obvious risk of
rocket-jumping on the trampoline.
	Determining that the open and obvious doctrine applies does
not end the inquiry regarding duty in a negligence case. In
determining whether a duty exists, a court should consider the
following factors: (1) the reasonable foreseeability of injury, (2)
the reasonable likelihood of injury, (3) the magnitude of the
burden that guarding against injury places on the defendant, and
(4) the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant.
LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d  at 389; Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d  at 456.
	With respect to the reasonable foreseeability factor, the law
does not impose a duty to warn of open and obvious conditions
unless one of the two exceptions discussed above is found.
Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d  at 457. As to the reasonable likelihood of
injury factor, we note that the law generally considers the
likelihood of injury slight when the condition in issue is open and
obvious, because it is assumed that persons encountering the
potentially dangerous condition of the land will appreciate and
avoid the risks. Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d  at 456. Thus, because the
risks involved in the instant case are open and obvious to a
reasonable person in Kathleen's position, the likelihood of injury
factor carries little weight. We also find that the last two
factors-the magnitude of the burden of imposing the duty and the
consequences of such a burden-do not favor imposing a duty on
Eaton. The mere fact that Eaton may be aware that teenagers such
as Kathleen use his trampoline and may injure themselves while
performing inappropriate maneuvers, such as rocket jumping, does
not translate into a legal duty to provide warnings or supervision
or to prevent use of the trampoline altogether. See Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d 457-58. Moreover, such burdens are unjustified, given the
open and obvious nature of the risk involved in this case. We
conclude that no legal duty should be imposed on Eaton.

CONCLUSION
	In summary, we conclude that the risks of trampoline usage
involved in this case are open and obvious and that neither of the
recognized exceptions to the open and obvious doctrine is
applicable. We further conclude that Eaton had no duty to warn
Kathleen of the risks involved. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the
circuit court.
Appellate court reversed;
circuit court affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	I agree with the appellate court that the circuit court
committed reversible error when it entered summary judgment in
favor of defendants. The purpose of a summary judgment
proceeding is not to try an issue of fact, but to determine whether
any genuine issue of material fact exists. Happel v. Wal-Mart
Stores, No. 90482, slip op. at 5 (March 21, 2002). Because
summary judgment is a drastic means of disposing of litigation,
the court has a duty to construe the record strictly against the
movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. Summary
judgment should not be allowed unless the moving party's right to
judgment is clear and free from doubt. Accordingly, where
reasonable persons could draw divergent inferences from the
undisputed material facts or where there is a dispute as to a
material fact, summary judgment should be denied and the issue
should be decided by the trier of fact. Jackson v. TLC Associates,
Inc., 185 Ill. 2d 418, 423-24 (1998).
	My colleagues' analysis overturns the appellate court and
deprives plaintiffs of the right to have their claims decided by a
jury on the theory that the issue before the court presents a
question of law. I disagree. Plaintiffs' claim against Jumpking is
based on products liability. In a products liability case, the
determination of whether a product is defective, and therefore
unreasonably dangerous, is ordinarily a question of fact for the
jury. Korando v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 159 Ill. 2d 335, 344
(1994).
	The failure to warn of a product's dangerous propensities may
serve as the basis for holding a manufacturer or seller strictly
liable in tort. In such cases, the product is considered to be
defective and unreasonably dangerous, not because of some defect
inherent in the product itself, but because of the absence of an
adequate warning accompanying the product. Woodill v. Parke
Davis &amp; Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 29-30 (1980). This is the type of
products liability claim plaintiffs are asserting against Jumpking.
	Just as the issue of whether a product is defective presents a
question of fact for the jury, so too does the issue of whether a
product was in an unreasonably dangerous or defective condition
because of the failure to give adequate warnings. See Collins v.
Sunnyside Corp., 146 Ill. App. 3d 78, 80-81 (1986). Whether the
warnings given were adequate is likewise a question for the jury
in most instances. Palmer v. Avco Distributing Corp., 82 Ill. 2d 211, 221 (1980). A jury may determine that warnings are not
adequate if those warnings: (1) do not specify the risk presented by
the product; (2) are inconsistent with how a product would be
used; (3) do not provide the reason for the warnings; or (4) do not
reach foreseeable users. See Pell v. Victor J. Andrew High School,
123 Ill. App. 3d 423, 428 (1984).
	The purpose of a warning is to apprise a person of a danger of
which he is not aware, and thus enable the person to protect
himself against it. When a danger is fully obvious and generally
appreciated, a warning adds nothing of value. Collins v. Sunnyside
Corp., 146 Ill. App. 3d at 81. Accordingly, there is no duty to warn
where the product is not defectively manufactured and where the
possibility of injury results from a common propensity of the
product which is open and obvious. Genaust v. Illinois Power Co.,
62 Ill. 2d 456, 467 (1976).
	My colleagues hold that the risks attendant to use of the
Jumpking trampoline should have been open and obvious to a
person in Kathleen's position. They have overlooked, however,
that the issue is not for them to resolve. Whether a condition
presents an open and obvious danger is a question of fact for the
trier of fact. See Simmons v. American Drug Stores, Inc., No.
1-01-0882, slip op. at 8 (March 25, 2002); Pullia v. Builders
Square, Inc., 265 Ill. App. 3d 933, 939 (1994); see also American
National Bank &amp; Trust Co. of Chicago v. National Advertising
Co., 149 Ill. 2d 14, 27 (1992).
	There are sound reasons for this rule. A danger is open and
obvious only where "both the condition and the risk are apparent
to and would be appreciated by a reasonable person in the
plaintiff's position exercising ordinary perception, intelligence,
and judgment." (Emphasis omitted.) Simmons, slip op. at 8. Where
the product at issue is one whose use by children is reasonably
foreseeable, and Jumpking trampolines certainly fall within that
category, the determination of what is open and obvious must be
made from the point of view of a child, rather than an adult.
Accordingly, the pertinent inquiry here is whether it should have
been obvious to a reasonable 15-year-old girl, exercising the
ordinary perception, intelligence and judgment of someone her
age, that "rocket" jumping on a backyard trampoline could result
in the type of knee injuries that Kathleen sustained. See Klen v.
Asahi Pool, Inc., 268 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1039-40 (1994).
	This court (average age, approximately 61; predominant sex,
male; trampoline experience, negligible) is ill-equipped to assess
what 15-year-old girls know or should know about trampoline
gymnastics, potential knee injuries, or any other topic. That is why
the law has made assessments such as this the jury's responsibility
and not ours.
	There is no merit to the majority's efforts to sidestep these
considerations by analogizing this case to situations where a
person has disregarded the danger of falling from heights. Being
up high does not, in itself, constitute an open and obvious danger
for tort liability purposes. Seven thousand feet above sea level is
a considerable elevation, for example, but how one assesses the
danger of being there depends on whether one is sitting on the
front porch of a log cabin in the Rocky Mountains or jumping
from a light plane with a parachute strapped to one's back.
Context, in other words, is everything.
	Consider the surrounding circumstances here. This is not a
case where a child old enough to be at large failed to appreciate
the risks attendant to climbing a neighbor's tree or walking too
near an open stairwell or edging too close to a steep cliff. This
case involves the use of a recreational device whose very purpose
was to enable individuals to go up high and come down again
safely and for fun.
	Kathleen used the trampoline for its intended purpose, and she
did so in a straightforward way. No acrobatics were involved. In
the majority's words, "Kathleen was not attempting to do a front
or back flip or any other unusual maneuver ***. She merely
jumped into the middle of the trampoline mat and injured her
knee." Slip op. at 10.
	Certainly, any reasonable person in Kathleen's position would
have realized that rocket jumping would propel her higher than if
she jumped alone. That was the whole point of doing it. There can
also be no question that a reasonable person of Kathleen's age
would know that she risked serious injury if she fell off the
trampoline or hit another jumper while performing rocket jumps.
Such risks would be obvious to anyone mature enough to perform
the maneuver.
	Kathleen, however, did not fall off. She stayed on the mat
perfectly well. Nor did she strike another jumper. The problem she
had was in failing to appreciate that neither the normal "give" in
the trampoline mat nor the strength in her knee were sufficient to
counteract the additional stress on landing that resulted from the
higher altitude she was able to attain through rocket jumping. This
was a qualitatively different and more subtle type of danger than
the kind attendant to improper stunts, or striking another jumper
or falling off the device. While that risk may be obvious to a
Jumpking engineer or to an experienced instructor, my colleagues
have no basis, other than their subjective beliefs, for holding that
it should have been apparent to a casual teenage user such as
Kathleen.
	Because there is no basis for holding, as a matter of law, that
the danger which befell Kathleen should have been open and
obvious to a reasonable 15-year-old girl, exercising the ordinary
perception, intelligence and judgment of someone that age, the
appellate court was correct in reversing the entry of summary
judgment on the products liability count against Jumpking. For the
same reason, the court was also correct in reversing summary
judgment on the premises liability claim against Eaton. If the
danger was not open and obvious for purposes of evaluating a
manufacturer's duty to warn in a products liability case, it was not
open and obvious for purposes of assessing a landowner's liability.
	I note, moreover, that I am somewhat startled by the
majority's suggestion (slip op. at 12-13) that requiring Eaton to
have supervised activity on the trampoline at his house would have
subjected him to an unjustifiable burden. If a parent buys and
installs a recreational device as obviously dangerous to children as
the majority depicts Jumpking trampolines as being, I would have
thought that parental supervision would be the least the law should
require. As the risk of serious injury to children increases, the
obligation for parents to provide supervision should go up, not
down. The majority's approach, however, would yield the opposite
result. As they would have it, the more blatantly hazardous the
activity parents have provided for their children and their
children's friends, the more inattentive the parents are entitled to
be.
	All too often, this court has taken the view that children
should exercise a higher degree of judgment than adults or
corporations. See, e.g., Mt. Zion State Bank &amp; Trust v.
Consolidated Communications, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 110 (1995) (six-year-old boy who suffered permanent brain damage after falling
into swimming pool held to higher standard of care than
multimillion-dollar telephone company); First Springfield Bank &amp;
Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252 (1999) (teenage French exchange
student fatally injured as a result of defendants' illegally parked
truck held to higher standard of care that multinational
corporation). As applied by the majority in the case before us
today, the "open and obvious danger" doctrine perpetuates this
bizarre approach. Jumpking, the corporation, and Eaton, the adult
property owner, have been exonerated without regard to how lax
they may have been. Only the teenage girl is held accountable for
her actions.
	Such a result is fundamentally incompatible with the
principles of comparative fault we have adopted in Illinois. Now
that we have a comparative fault system, the open and obvious
danger rule makes no more sense that the old defenses of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk, which we have
jettisoned. Bucheleres v. Chicago Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 435,
464 (1996) (Harrison, J., dissenting). Accordingly, even if
Kathleen should have known better than to rocket jump on Eaton's
Jumpking trampoline, that fact should not bar her right to seek
recovery from either Jumpking or Eaton. Rather, it should merely
be an element for the jury to consider when apportioning fault
between the parties.
	For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
	I agree with Chief Justice Harrison that the majority errs by
reversing the appellate court and affirming the trial court in this
case. The trial court improperly issued summary judgment in favor
of each defendant. I write separately to put forth additional
rationale for my disagreement with the majority's decision.
	As to the claims against the manufacturer, the appellate court
properly reviewed the warnings contained in the decals to be
affixed to the trampoline by the purchaser during assembly and the
warnings and other information about the proper use of the
trampoline contained in the user's manual. The appellate court
then correctly concluded that these instructions and warnings
demonstrate that the manufacturer possessed knowledge superior
to the purchasers and users about the characteristics of its product
and the risks of harm to ordinary consumers who purchased the
trampoline as a backyard toy. 319 Ill. App. 3d at 619.
	The majority acknowledges the proposition that a
manufacturer has a duty to warn where the product possesses
dangerous propensities and there is unequal knowledge with
respect to the risk of harm, and the manufacturer, possessed of
such knowledge, knows or should know that harm may occur
absent a warning. Slip op. at 4. Nonetheless, the majority holds no
duty to warn arises where the risk of harm is apparent to the
foreseeable user, regardless of any superior knowledge on the part
of the manufacturer. Slip op. at 12-13.
	If the "risk of harm" from trampoline use were considered to
be limited to the danger of falling from a height, we would
certainly be bound by our precedent in Corcoran v. Village of
Libertyville, 73 Ill. 2d 316, 327 (1978), and would correctly hold
that such a danger is open and obvious, even to a 15-year-old. That
is not the case here. As plaintiffs argued, the specific risk of harm
at issue here, the likelihood of significant impact to a user's knees
resulting from the increased thrust capacity of the mat when more
than one person is jumping at a time, is not so apparent,
particularly to an inexperienced teenager, as to be "open and
obvious" as a matter of law. A jury should decide this issue.
	The adequacy of the warning given by the manufacturer
similarly presents a jury question. Although the decals warned of
the danger of unsupervised use and the user's manual discussed
some of the responsibilities of both users and instructors, only the
placard contained any warning of the risks of double jumping. The
placard, originally wired to the trampoline by the purchaser, had
fallen off and was not reattached. It contained the following
warning:
		"Permit only one performer at a time on the trampoline.
Two (2) or more performers create additional risks of
injury due to collisions, being bounced off the trampoline
and unexpected responses by the trampoline mat."
	Warnings must be adequate to perform their intended function
of risk reduction. See Pell v. Victor J. Andrew High School, 123
Ill. App. 3d 423, 428 (1984), citing Palmer v. Avco Distributing
Corp., 82 Ill. 2d 211, 221 (1980). Even if the warning on the
placard had reached the minor plaintiff in this case, its vague
reference to "unexpected responses by the trampoline mat" may
not have alerted her to the specific danger posed by those
responses. The adequacy of the warning in this case is, therefore,
a jury question.
	Similarly, I believe the questions of whether a duty to warn on
the part of the property owner exists, as well as the adequacy of
any warnings given, are also issues that should be determined by
a jury. Of particular relevance to these questions is the following
instruction contained in the users manual: "USE OF A
TRAMPOLINE SHOULD ALWAYS BE UNDER THE DIRECT
SUPERVISION OF A QUALIFIED INSTRUCTOR." It could be
determined that the property owner should have not permitted the
unsupervised use of the trampoline. Further, since the detached
placard was the only source warning of the specific risks
associated with injury at issue here, a jury could conclude that the
property owner utterly disregarded the duty to warn in this case.
	For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.