Title: Schmitz v. Hon. Gregory A. Peterson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2014AP000421-W, 2014AP000420-W, 2014AP000419-W, 2014AP000418-W, 2014AP000417-W, 2014AP000296-OA, 2013AP002508-W, 2013AP002507-W, 2013AP002506-W, 2013AP002505-W, 2013AP002504-W
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 2, 2015

2015 WI 103 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W, 2014AP296-OA & 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W  
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of John Doe Proceeding 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Three Unnamed 
Petitioners, 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
the Honorable Gregory A. Peterson, John Doe 
Judge, the Honorable Gregory Potter, Chief Judge 
and Francis D. Schmitz, as Special Prosecutor, 
          Respondents. 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Two Unnamed 
Petitioners, 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
The Honorable Gregory A. Peterson, John Doe Judge 
and Francis D. Schmitz, Special Prosecutor, 
          Respondents. 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Francis D. Schmitz, 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
Honorable Gregory A. Peterson, John Doe Judge, 
          Respondent, 
Eight Unnamed Movants, 
          Interested Party. 
 
 
 
 
 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 2, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:    
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 COURT: 
Circuit 
 COUNTY: 
Milwaukee, Iowa, Dodge, Dane and Columbia 
 JUDGE: 
Gregory A. Peterson (Reserve) 
 
  
 
 
 
2 
JUSTICES: 
 
 CONCURRED: 
      
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., concurs and dissents. (Opinion 
Filed) 
 DISSENTED: 
      
 NOT 
PARTICIPATING: 
A.W. BRADLEY, R.G. BRADLEY, J.J., did not 
participate. 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, Jr., passed away while these 
motions were pending and prior to their final 
resolution by the court.   
  
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 103
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos. 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
 
2014AP296-OA 
 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
(L.C. Nos. 2013JD11 & 2013JD9 & 2013JD6 & 2013JD1 & 2012JD23) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of John Doe Proceeding 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Three Unnamed 
Petitioners, 
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
The Honorable Gregory A. Peterson, John Doe 
Judge, the Honorable Gregory Potter, Chief 
Judge and Francis D. Schmitz, as Special 
Prosecutor, 
 
          Respondents. 
_____________________________________________ 
FILED 
 
DEC 2, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Two Unnamed 
Petitioners, 
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
The Honorable Gregory A. Peterson, John Doe 
Judge and Francis D. Schmitz, Special 
Prosecutor, 
 
          Respondents. 
_____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
2 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Francis D. Schmitz, 
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Honorable Gregory A. Peterson, John Doe Judge, 
 
          Respondent, 
 
Eight Unnamed Movants, 
 
          Interested Party. 
 
 
 
 
MOTION for reconsideration of a decision of the Supreme 
Court.  Motion for reconsideration and motion for stay denied; 
mandate clarified.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Francis Schmitz, who has been 
designated as the special prosecutor representing the State of 
Wisconsin throughout the proceedings in this court, has filed a 
motion for reconsideration of a portion of this court's July 16, 
2015 decision.  Attorney Schmitz also asks this court to stay 
its mandate regarding the documents and data gathered during the 
investigation while the prosecution team determines whether to 
seek federal review of our decision.  In response, some of the 
Unnamed Movants (as that term was defined in the July 16, 2015 
majority opinion) challenge whether Attorney Schmitz retains any 
authority to act as the special prosecutor.  The Unnamed Movants 
also argue that the motions should be denied because they fail 
to meet the relevant standards for relief. 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
3 
 
¶2 
We first address the question of Attorney Schmitz's 
authority and hold that, as of the date of this opinion, with 
the exception of the limited tasks explicitly imposed on him by 
this opinion, Attorney Schmitz's authority to act as the special 
prosecutor in what has become known as "John Doe II"1 is 
terminated because his appointment was invalid.  We further deny 
both the motion for reconsideration and the motion for a stay.  
As described below, we clarify the portion of the mandate in the 
July 16, 2015 decision that required Attorney Schmitz to return 
and destroy documents and electronic data obtained during the 
John Doe II investigation.   
¶3 
Before we can address the substance of Attorney 
Schmitz's motions, we must address whether his motions should be 
dismissed because he lacks authority to continue acting as the 
John Doe special prosecutor.  One of the issues we asked the 
parties to address in State ex rel. Three Unnamed Petitioners v. 
Peterson, Case Nos. 2013AP2504-08-W, was whether Attorney 
Schmitz's appointment as the special prosecutor was valid.  Some 
of the Unnamed Movants argue that in light of a legal conclusion 
in Justice David T. Prosser's July 16, 2015 concurring opinion 
                                                 
1 We use the term "John Doe II" to refer to the John Doe 
proceedings and the accompanying investigation in five counties 
that was initially presided over by Reserve Judge Barbara A. 
Kluka and since the fall of 2013 has been presided over by 
Reserve Judge Gregory A. Peterson.  We use the term "John Doe I" 
to refer to the earlier John Doe proceeding and investigation in 
Milwaukee County (Case No. 10JD7) that was presided over by 
Reserve Judge Neal Nettesheim. 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
4 
 
that Attorney Schmitz's appointment was invalid, which was 
joined by three other justices, Attorney Schmitz lacks standing 
to pursue a motion for reconsideration or a motion for a stay of 
this court's decision.  On the other hand, Attorney Schmitz 
argues that the legal ruling of this court in Three Unnamed 
Petitioners, Case Nos. 2013AP2504-08-W, was an affirmance of the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
decision 
denying 
the 
Three 
Unnamed 
Petitioners' petition for a supervisory writ, which means that 
he continues to have standing to act as the special prosecutor 
in all respects, including by filing new motions and other 
papers in this court.  Resolving this issue requires that we 
clarify the legal effect of the opinions we issued on July 16, 
2015. 
¶4 
When we were addressing the merits of Three Unnamed 
Petitioners, Case Nos. 2013AP2504-08-W, the court's task was to 
determine whether the court of appeals had properly denied the 
Three Unnamed Petitioners' petition for a supervisory writ.  
Accordingly, we looked to the standard of review and the 
standard for obtaining such a writ.  In the July 16, 2015 
majority opinion, this court determined that the Three Unnamed 
Petitioners could not meet one of the requirements for the 
issuance of a supervisory writ——namely, that the John Doe judge 
at the time of Attorney Schmitz's appointment, Reserve Judge 
Barbara Kluka, had violated a plain duty under then-existing law 
in appointing Attorney Schmitz.  Accordingly, this court 
affirmed the court of appeals' decision denying the Three 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
5 
 
Unnamed Petitioners' petition for a supervisory writ.  Given 
that standard of review, the determination of no violation of a 
plain legal duty was the extent of this court's legal ruling in 
Case Nos. 2013AP2504-08-W with respect to the question of 
whether the Three Unnamed Petitioners were entitled to the 
supervisory writ they had requested from the court of appeals. 
¶5 
Indeed, because the issue was presented at that point 
in time in the context of a supervisory writ petition and the 
court determined that the writ standard had not been satisfied, 
there was no need for the majority opinion to reach the issue of 
whether Attorney Schmitz could continue to act as the special 
prosecutor.  See State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. 
Peterson, 2015 WI 85, ¶132 n.43, 363 Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 165. 
("We need not address what effect an unlawful appointment would 
have had because no violation of a plain legal duty occurred."). 
¶6 
On the other hand, Justice Prosser's concurring 
opinion proceeded to discuss the underlying legal issue——namely, 
whether Attorney Schmitz's appointment as the special prosecutor 
had been valid.2  Justice Prosser interpreted the special 
                                                 
2 This was not the first time that, despite the court having 
denied a supervisory writ because the petitioner could not 
demonstrate a violation of a plain legal duty, the court has 
gone on to discuss the underlying legal issue.  See, e.g., State 
ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶26, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("Although the Kalals have 
failed to establish the existence of a plain duty and are not 
entitled to a supervisory writ, we will address the statutory 
interpretation question presented by this case."). 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
6 
 
prosecutor statute, Wis. Stat. § 978.045, to contain two 
prerequisites that must be satisfied in order for an appointment 
of a special prosecutor to be valid:  (1) the court or district 
attorney seeking the appointment of a special prosecutor must 
first seek assistance from other prosecutors, including from an 
assistant attorney general, and (2) one of the nine conditions 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 978.045(1r) must apply to the 
situation.  Justice Prosser concluded that the appointment of 
Attorney Schmitz as a special prosecutor for the John Doe II 
proceedings in the five counties at issue had been invalid 
because the appointment had not satisfied one of the nine 
conditions in subsection (1r) of the special prosecutor statute. 
¶7 
Three other justices joined this portion of Justice 
Prosser's 
concurring 
opinion. 
 
Two 
Unnamed 
Petitioners, 
363 Wis. 2d 1, ¶306 (Prosser, J., concurring, joined as to 
Section IV by Chief Justice Roggensack, Justice Ziegler, and 
Justice Gableman).  It should be noted, however, that there was 
no mandate at the end of Justice Prosser's opinion.3  Indeed, as 
                                                 
3 There also was no part of the mandate at the end of the 
majority opinion that addressed the legal conclusion in Justice 
Prosser's concurring opinion that the appointment of Attorney 
Schmitz as the special prosecutor had been invalid.  The mandate 
at the end of the majority opinion merely stated "Petition for 
supervisory writ denied and decision affirmed in Three Unnamed 
Petitioners."  This tracked the holding set forth in the 
majority opinion that the petition for supervisory writ must be 
denied 
because 
the 
Three 
Unnamed 
Petitioners 
had 
not 
demonstrated that the John Doe judge had violated a plain legal 
duty. 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
7 
 
in the majority opinion, there was no discussion in Justice 
Prosser's concurring opinion of the effect of the legal 
determination that Attorney Schmitz's appointment as special 
prosecutor was invalid.  In essence, given the procedural 
posture, while there were four justices who reached the same 
conclusion about a question of law, there was no legal ruling by 
the court at that point in time on the issue of Attorney 
Schmitz's past or present authority as the John Doe II special 
prosecutor. 
¶8 
The fact that the court confined its legal ruling to 
affirming the court of appeals' denial of the supervisory writ 
petition that was the subject of its review due to the 
applicable standard does not mean that Attorney Schmitz should 
be able to continue to act as the special prosecutor in all 
respects as if his appointment were valid.  That would ignore 
the reality shown in Justice Prosser's concurrence that a 
majority of the justices of this court conclude that his 
appointment was invalid.  That legal conclusion of four justices 
set forth in Justice Prosser's concurrence remains regardless of 
any subsequent actions or inactions by Attorney Schmitz or 
anyone else.  Attorney Schmitz, however, has chosen to continue 
to act as the special prosecutor by filing his current motions 
for reconsideration and a stay in this court.  Moreover, he has 
specifically made a continuing claim in his filings that, 
because of the denial of the supervisory writ filed by the Three 
Unnamed Petitioners, he retains complete authority to act as the 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
8 
 
special prosecutor going forward, despite the writings issued by 
this court on July 16, 2015.  Because we are presented with his 
continued filings brought in his capacity as the appointed 
special prosecutor, we now must address the underlying legal 
question of Attorney Schmitz's authority to act as the special 
prosecutor under the appointment orders issued by the initial 
John Doe II judge.  If Attorney Schmitz lacks the authority to 
act as the special prosecutor because his appointment was 
invalid, then his motions could be dismissed simply on that 
ground without considering the arguments made in those motions. 
¶9 
For the reasons set forth in Justice Prosser's 
July 16, 
2015 
concurring 
opinion, 
we 
hold 
that 
Attorney 
Schmitz's appointment as the special prosecutor in the John Doe 
II proceedings pending in each of the five counties was invalid.  
Two Unnamed Petitioners, 363 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶203-39 (Prosser, J., 
concurring).  With three justices having already declared 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
9 
 
agreement with Justice Prosser's reasoning, there is no reason 
to repeat that reasoning here.4 
¶10 The next question, which was not addressed in the 
July 16, 
2015 
opinions, 
is 
what 
is 
the 
effect 
of 
the 
determination that Attorney Schmitz's appointment was invalid.  
Because the appointment process and order did not comply with 
the special prosecutor statute, was the appointment order 
essentially a nullity from the beginning, rendering void all of 
Attorney Schmitz's acts as the special prosecutor, or did 
Attorney Schmitz lose his authority to act at a later time? 
¶11 We conclude that the proper answer is that the 
authority of someone who is appointed as a special prosecutor 
ends at the point in time when a court makes a legal ruling that 
the appointment was invalid and orders as a matter of law that 
                                                 
4 We note that over the last few months, the legislature has 
passed and the governor has signed two pieces of legislation 
that affect the conduct of John Doe proceedings in a number of 
ways, including the appointment of special prosecutors.  See 
2015 Wis. Act 55 (the 2015 "Executive Budget Act") and 
2015 Wis. Act 64.  As a result of those enactments, it is now 
clear that in order for an individual to be appointed as a 
special prosecutor in a John Doe proceeding, one of the 
conditions listed in the special prosecutor statute must exist.  
Wis. Stat. § 978.045(cm) ("The judge may not appoint an attorney 
as a special prosecutor to assist the district attorney in John 
Doe proceedings under s. 968.26 unless a condition under 
par. (bm)1. to 8. exists or unless the judge determines that a 
complaint received under s. 968.26(2)(am) relates to the conduct 
of the district attorney to whom the judge otherwise would refer 
the complaint.  This paragraph does not prohibit assistance 
authorized by s. 978.05(8).").  This statutory revision is 
consistent with the reasoning of Justice Prosser's July 16, 2015 
concurring opinion. 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
10 
 
the individual's authority is terminated.  While four justices 
of this court reached a legal conclusion as part of the July 16, 
2015 writings that Attorney Schmitz's appointment was invalid, 
there was not a legal ruling from the court at that juncture and 
no order that Attorney Schmitz cease acting as a special 
prosecutor in the John Doe II proceedings.  Given Attorney 
Schmitz's continuing reliance on Judge Kluka's appointment 
orders as the basis for continuing to act as the special 
prosecutor, we now issue a legal ruling and order that, because 
of the invalidity of his appointment, Attorney Schmitz must 
cease taking any actions as the John Doe II special prosecutor 
as of the date of this opinion and order, except for the actions 
this 
court 
directs 
below 
to 
conclude 
the 
John 
Doe 
II 
investigation. 
¶12 We do not hold that because of the invalidity of 
Attorney Schmitz's appointment, all of his actions as the 
special prosecutor since his appointment, including his filing 
of briefs, motions, memoranda, etc. before the John Doe judge, 
the court of appeals, and this court, were nullities at the time 
they were taken.5  Such a ruling would unfairly void actions 
relied on by the special prosecutor, the lower courts, law 
enforcement, 
and 
the 
individuals/entities 
that 
have 
been 
                                                 
5 Rather than voiding an appointed individual's authority to 
act from the time of an invalid appointment, we hold that the 
individual's authority to act as a special prosecutor is 
prospectively voidable by a court. 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
11 
 
involved with the John Doe investigations and proceedings.  A 
John Doe judge did sign orders that appointed Attorney Schmitz 
as the special prosecutor in each of the five John Doe II 
proceedings.  Both he and the John Doe judges relied on those 
orders.  As a result of that reliance, the John Doe judge issued 
search warrants and took other actions.  Nullifying those 
actions now because of his invalid appointment would unfairly 
upset that reliance without providing any countervailing benefit 
to the administration of justice. 
¶13 Moreover, making all of a special prosecutor's actions 
void ab initio when an appointment order has failed to comply 
with the special prosecutor statute would carry the potential 
for grave mischief.  If that were the law, a defendant who was 
being criminally prosecuted by a special prosecutor could 
potentially wait until after a judgment of conviction had been 
entered and then obtain a ruling from the trial court (or even 
an appellate court) that the conviction was invalid because the 
special prosecutor's actions in filing the criminal complaint 
and trying the case were legal nullities.  Such a rule could 
undo convictions that were otherwise valid in all respects 
simply because the appointing judge failed to ensure that the 
appointment 
process 
and 
order 
complied 
with 
the 
special 
prosecutor statute.  Where there are no other bases for 
overturning what a special prosecutor has done, including 
obtaining a criminal conviction, and no personal rights of the 
defendant have been violated, justice would be thwarted by 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
12 
 
allowing a defendant to undo otherwise valid prosecutorial 
actions.   
¶14 The rule that we adopt, however, does not leave a 
defendant (or a subject of a John Doe investigation) without any 
remedy where a special prosecutor has been invalidly appointed.  
Where the defendant learns of the grounds for the invalidity of 
the appointment, the defendant has an incentive to bring that 
issue to the attention of a court as soon as possible in order 
to obtain a ruling on whether the appointment was invalid and 
whether the special prosecutor may continue to act in that 
capacity.  A ruling on that issue would then provide clarity to 
all as to whether and how the case may proceed. 
¶15 Our ruling herein, that Attorney Schmitz's authority 
to act as the special prosecutor in John Doe II terminates with 
the release of this opinion (except to comply with the limited, 
specified obligations imposed in this opinion), means that the 
actions Attorney Schmitz has previously taken, including filing 
the current motion for reconsideration and motion for a stay, 
were within his authority at that time.  Consequently, we do not 
dismiss the current motions, as requested by some of the Unnamed 
Movants. 
¶16 Having now terminated Attorney Schmitz's authority to 
act as the special prosecutor, we recognize that to this point 
he has been the sole named party in these three John Doe 
proceedings to appear on behalf of the prosecution.  We note 
that Attorney Schmitz has indicated in his recent filings that 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
13 
 
the prosecution intends to seek review of our July 16, 2015 
decision in the United States Supreme Court.  Our decision to 
terminate Attorney Schmitz's authority is not meant to interfere 
with the ability of the prosecution team to seek Supreme Court 
review.  We simply conclude that, where a court rules that an 
individual has not been validly appointed to act as a special 
prosecutor on behalf of the state, it would be illogical to 
allow the individual to continue to file pleadings and briefs on 
the state's behalf.6  To allow such ongoing conduct would render 
meaningless the legal conclusion of an invalid appointment.  
Nonetheless, in view of the fact that Attorney Schmitz has been 
the only member of the prosecution team named as a party in 
these matters, this ruling has the potential to create problems 
with respect to who may act on behalf of the prosecution in this 
court or elsewhere going forward.   
¶17 We recognize that the five district attorneys have not 
been named parties in the proceedings in this court.  In fact, 
this court denied a motion to add them as parties as part of its 
December 
16, 
2014 
order 
granting 
review 
of 
the 
three 
proceedings.  That motion, however, was not brought by the 
district attorneys; it was a motion filed by the Three Unnamed 
Petitioners at the time of the filing of their petition for 
                                                 
6 While we hold that a special prosecutor may not continue 
to act on the merits in such a situation, we do not intend to 
foreclose the special prosecutor from seeking reconsideration or 
review of the decision terminating his/her authority, to the 
extent it is otherwise available. 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
14 
 
review to forcibly add all five of the district attorneys as 
parties in Case Nos. 2013AP2504-08-W.  The district attorneys 
did not express a desire to become named parties at that point.  
Indeed, at that point in time there was no need to add the 
district attorneys as parties because the prosecution was 
represented by Attorney Schmitz as the special prosecutor. 
¶18 The fact that the district attorneys were not named 
parties to the proceedings in this court, however, does not mean 
that none of them has been involved in the John Doe II 
investigation and the proceedings in this court.7  To the 
contrary, the district attorneys from the five counties and some 
or all of their assistants have been admitted to participate in 
                                                 
7 The dissent criticizes the court for referring to the John 
Doe II "prosecution team" in this opinion, implying that there 
was no group of prosecutors, investigators, and others who 
prosecuted the John Doe II investigation, and that Attorney 
Schmitz worked alone in prosecuting the John Doe II.  Although 
the court will not disclose any of the specific individuals who 
clearly worked with Attorney Schmitz on the John Doe II 
investigation, as the dissent well knows, the John Doe record is 
replete 
with 
prosecution 
documents 
that 
were 
signed 
by 
individuals other than Attorney Schmitz.  Given the size and 
scope of the investigation and the voluminous filings in this 
court, it would have been impossible for Attorney Schmitz to 
pursue 
the 
investigation 
and 
the 
subsequent 
appellate 
proceedings singlehandedly after he became the nominal leader of 
the prosecution.  Finally and most importantly, in his reply in 
support of the current motions, Attorney Schmitz himself makes 
multiple references to the "prosecution team" and asserts that, 
while he consulted members of that team about various matters, 
he exercised the final decision-making authority during the time 
he acted as the special prosecutor.  To claim that there has not 
been and is not now a "prosecution team," when the dissent 
clearly knows otherwise, is disingenuous. 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
15 
 
the John Doe II proceedings.  It should be remembered that it 
was the Milwaukee County District Attorney and his office that 
initiated the John Doe II proceeding, led the prosecution for 
the first year, and then sought the involvement of the four 
other district attorneys.   
¶19 While the court did not see a need to force all five 
of the district attorneys into becoming named parties at the 
time it granted review, the situation has now changed as a 
result of the legal ruling in this opinion that Attorney Schmitz 
will no longer be able to represent the prosecution as the 
special prosecutor.  Accordingly, one or more of the district 
attorneys could seek to intervene in these actions, which would 
allow 
for 
the 
prosecution 
to 
be 
represented 
in 
future 
proceedings.  Given the inability of Attorney Schmitz to 
continue acting as the special prosecutor based on his invalid 
appointment, such a motion to intervene by one or more of the 
district attorneys would receive prompt review by this court. 
¶20 We now turn to the substance of Attorney Schmitz's 
motion for reconsideration.  The court's Internal Operating 
Procedures (IOPs) set forth the standard we have applied to such 
motions: 
Reconsideration, in the sense of a rehearing of 
the case, is seldom granted.  A change of decision on 
reconsideration will ensue only when the court has 
overlooked controlling legal precedent or important 
policy 
considerations 
or 
has 
overlooked 
or 
misconstrued 
a 
controlling 
or 
significant 
fact 
appearing in the record. 
Wis. S. Ct. IOP II.J. 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
16 
 
¶21 We conclude that Attorney Schmitz's motion does not 
present any grounds to reconsider our prior decision.   
¶22 The thrust of the motion for reconsideration is an 
argument that this court erred by not allowing Attorney Schmitz 
(or presumably the district attorneys) to continue the current 
John Doe II investigation to the extent of investigating whether 
there was coordination related to express advocacy.   
¶23 We conclude that the argument that the previous search 
warrants and subpoenas were valid because they sought evidence 
of coordination of express advocacy has been forfeited.  When 
the Unnamed Movants filed motions with the John Doe judge for 
the return of seized property and to quash subpoenas, they 
argued that the state's theory of criminal liability on the 
basis of coordination of issue advocacy was unsupported by 
statutory and constitutional law.  Attorney Schmitz's response 
to those motions was a frontal counter-attack to the Unnamed 
Movants' arguments regarding the ability of the state to 
regulate the coordination of issue advocacy, both under the 
relevant provisions in Chapter 11 of the Wisconsin Statutes and 
under the federal and state constitutions.  His response never 
claimed that the subpoenas and search warrants that were the 
subjects of the Unnamed Movants' motions were valid because they 
were directed at finding evidence of coordination of express 
advocacy and never provided any examples of evidence of such 
express advocacy coordination.  Indeed, in his January 10, 2014 
order granting the Unnamed Movants' motions, the John Doe judge 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
17 
 
specifically concluded that "[t]he State is not claiming that 
any of the independent organizations expressly advocated" and 
"[t]here is no evidence of express advocacy."  The John Doe 
judge granted the motions for return of seized property and for 
quashing subpoenas on the ground that the state's theory that 
coordination of issue advocacy is regulated by Chapter 11 was 
legally incorrect. 
¶24 It is true that, after the John Doe judge rejected the 
arguments Attorney Schmitz actually made to support the search 
warrants and subpoenas, he then attempted to bring express 
advocacy into the appellate writ case (State ex rel. Schmitz v. 
Peterson, Case Nos. 2014AP417-21-W) by including a second issue 
in his writ petition that asked whether "the record"8 provided a 
reasonable belief that a campaign committee had violated 
Wisconsin's 
campaign 
finance 
laws 
by 
coordinating 
with 
independent disbursement committees that engaged in express 
advocacy.  Indeed, when the supervisory writ petition came to 
this court via petitions for bypass, this court's December 16, 
2014 order included this second issue in its list of issues to 
be briefed.  Attorney Schmitz's attempt to introduce express 
advocacy coordination in the appellate court and this court's 
initial inclusion of his new issue, however, do not change the 
fact that he never raised this issue or made this argument 
                                                 
8 This would have to be the record that was before the John 
Doe judge, namely, what the parties had presented to him in 
their filings. 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
18 
 
before the John Doe judge.  By failing to raise the issue and 
argument in front of the John Doe judge, Attorney Schmitz 
forfeited his ability to argue that the subpoenas and search 
warrants at issue were valid because they were actually intended 
to obtain evidence of coordination of express advocacy.  See, 
e.g., Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 2013 WI 78, 
¶83, 350 Wis. 2d 554, 835 N.W.2d 160 (where party attempted to 
make fundamentally different argument on appeal than it had made 
before the trial court, this court deemed the argument forfeited 
and declined to address it); Tatera v. FMC Corp., 2010 WI 90, 
¶19 n.16, 328 Wis. 2d 320, 786 N.W.2d 810 ("Arguments raised for 
the first time on appeal are generally deemed forfeited.").  
Accordingly, the argument was not addressed in the court's 
July 16, 2015 decision. 
¶25 Indeed, even if the court had reached the merits of 
this issue, the nature of the matter before this court would 
have required the same result as set forth in the court's 
July 16, 2015 decision.  It must be remembered that it was the 
John Doe judge's January 10, 2014 order that this court was 
asked to review in both the original action (Two Unnamed 
Petitioners v. Peterson, Case No. 2014AP296-OA) and the writ 
proceeding (State ex rel. Schmitz v. Peterson, Case Nos. 
2014AP417-21-W). As noted above, the only means by which 
Attorney Schmitz attempted to bring coordination of express 
advocacy before any appellate court was his listing of express 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
19 
 
advocacy coordination as an issue in his petition for a 
supervisory writ.   
¶26 As was thoroughly explained in the July 16, 2015 
majority opinion, in order to obtain a supervisory writ from an 
appellate court ordering the John Doe judge to reverse his 
January 10, 2014 order, Attorney Schmitz was required to prove 
that:  "(1) an appeal is an inadequate remedy; (2) grave 
hardship or irreparable harm will result; (3) the duty of the 
trial court is plain and it must have acted or intends to act in 
violation of that duty; and (4) the request for relief is made 
promptly and speedily."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶17. 
¶27 Attorney Schmitz could not meet this standard for the 
issuance of a supervisory writ regarding investigation of 
express advocacy.  Given that he was asking this court to direct 
the John Doe judge to reverse his January 10, 2014 order, how 
could Attorney Schmitz show that the John Doe judge had violated 
a plain legal duty by failing to rely on a theory that Attorney 
Schmitz never presented to that judge?  It simply cannot be 
done.  Thus, given the limited nature of the writ proceeding 
that Attorney Schmitz initiated for review of the John Doe 
judge's ruling and the standards that he was therefore obligated 
to meet, the writ petition would have been denied even if the 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
20 
 
express advocacy coordination argument had been considered on 
the merits.9 
¶28 We now turn to the issue of what should become of the 
multitude of documents and electronic files that Attorney 
Schmitz and the prosecution team amassed in the course of the 
John Doe II investigation, including via subpoenas and search 
warrants.  Having been advised in the motion for reconsideration 
that the prosecution team presently intends to seek review of 
the July 16, 2015 decision in the United States Supreme Court 
and in order to eliminate any confusion about what should happen 
to the evidence collected during the John Doe II investigation, 
we modify and clarify the portion of the July 16, 2015 mandate 
relating to the return of property seized in the investigation 
and the destruction of copies of documents and other materials 
obtained through the investigation.  The intent of this portion 
of our mandate was to require that the prosecution team divest 
itself of documents and data that were the product of an 
investigation based on an invalid theory under Wisconsin's 
campaign finance laws in order to ensure that the prosecution 
                                                 
9 The court also notes the very careful way in which 
Attorney Schmitz has phrased his express advocacy argument.  He 
asserts that there is evidence (somewhere) of coordination 
between a campaign committee and other organizations, which 
happened to engage (at some point in time) in express advocacy.  
He does not affirmatively assert that any particular piece of 
express advocacy was the subject of specific coordination. 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
21 
 
team would comply with the court's order to cease all activities 
related to the John Doe II investigation. 
¶29 We still hold to these results, but we modify the 
means to accomplish them in order to avoid impeding in any way 
the ability of the prosecution team to seek certiorari review in 
the United State Supreme Court.  It is for that reason that, 
with certain exceptions, we do not impose an immediate deadline 
for Attorney Schmitz and his prosecution team to complete the 
obligations we impose below.  Unless otherwise noted, all of 
these obligations must be completed within 30 days following the 
completion of proceedings in the U.S. Supreme Court on any 
petition for certiorari review.  If no petition for certiorari 
review is filed, these actions must be completed within 30 days 
after the deadline for filing a petition for certiorari review.    
¶30 We do impose these obligations on Attorney Schmitz.  
Although we have now held that he no longer possesses the 
authority to act as the special prosecutor in conducting the 
John Doe II investigation or filing documents on behalf of the 
state, he must still be allowed to perform the tasks that this 
court now assigns to him in order to rectify the results of the 
investigation, which we have determined was based on a faulty 
reading of the law.  If Attorney Schmitz could not be required 
to perform these tasks, there would be no party currently before 
the court to whom these tasks could be assigned.  Moreover, in 
his reply in support of his motion for reconsideration, Attorney 
Schmitz strongly contended that he was the person in charge of 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
22 
 
the John Doe investigation and solely exercised final decision-
making authority.  Given this assertion, it is appropriate that 
this court requires him to ensure that certain actions are 
performed (whether by him or by members of his prosecution team) 
and to make representations that those required actions have 
been completed. 
¶31 We now turn to the specific tasks that must be 
performed.  First, we continue to require, to the extent it has 
not already been done, that Attorney Schmitz and his prosecution 
team return to the rightful owner any computer hardware and 
other items of tangible personal property that were seized by 
the prosecution team or law enforcement officers in the course 
of executing search warrants or obtained in response to 
subpoenas issued as part of the John Doe II investigation.  This 
must be completed within 30 days of the date of this decision.  
The return of these items will not impede the preparation of a 
petition for certiorari review because Attorney Schmitz and his 
prosecution team will not be obligated to return any copy of 
data that resided on any such computer hardware, although they 
will be required at a later date to turn over all such copies to 
the clerk of this court, as described below. 
¶32 Second, we require that Attorney Schmitz gather all 
documents and copies thereof (whether in hard copy or in digital 
form) and all electronic data and copies thereof obtained as a 
result of the John Doe II investigation from all persons who 
worked for or were associated with him and the prosecution team 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
23 
 
in the John Doe proceedings/investigations.  The documents and 
electronic data that must be gathered also include all copies of 
documents and of electronic data that were obtained during the 
John Doe I investigation but were authorized by Judge Nettesheim 
in an August 10, 2012 order in Milwaukee County Case No. 10JD7 
to be used in the subsequent John Doe II investigation.10  The 
universe of individuals from whom such documents and electronic 
data should be gathered must include all individuals, other than 
the John Doe judge and the employees of the five offices of the 
clerks of circuit court, who were granted access by the John Doe 
judge to the documents and/or electronic data obtained or used 
in the John Doe II investigation.  (This would include 
individuals who were granted access to the documents and 
electronic data that were the subject of Judge Nettesheim's 
August 10, 2012 order authorizing use of those documents in a 
subsequent John Doe II proceeding and investigation.)  The 
documents and electronic data should be collected and organized 
in a manner that allows the clerk of this court to retrieve 
                                                 
10 We do not require that Attorney Schmitz gather and submit 
to the clerk of this court the work product generated by members 
of the prosecution team.  For example, he is not obligated to 
gather and submit memoranda, notes, and email messages generated 
by the prosecution team, even if those documents reference 
materials gathered or used during the John Doe II investigation.  
On the other hand, if there is a copy of a document or a 
computer file containing a copy of electronic data obtained or 
used during the course of the John Doe II investigation, the 
copy of the document or the computer file must be detached from 
the work product document and submitted to the clerk of this 
court as set forth in this opinion. 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
24 
 
specific documents or sets of electronic data, in the event that 
such retrieval is subsequently ordered. 
¶33 All of the documents and electronic data described 
above and all of the copies of such documents and electronic 
data shall be described on a written index.  The index shall 
describe, with reasonable specificity and consistent with the 
organization described in the preceding paragraph, the documents 
or electronic data that have been collected. 
¶34 Third, we require that all of the documents and 
electronic data (and all copies thereof) be submitted under seal 
to the clerk of this court.11  Once this submission has occurred, 
no document or piece of electronic data (or any copies thereof) 
that was gathered in the course of the John Doe II investigation 
or that was gathered in the John Doe I investigation but 
                                                 
11 In 
his 
reply 
in 
support 
of 
the 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, Attorney Schmitz stated that the electronic 
data obtained by the prosecution team in the course of the John 
Doe II investigation was stored on a portable hard drive that 
was in the possession of an investigator in the office of the 
Milwaukee County district attorney.  That portable hard drive 
and 
any 
other 
portable 
storage 
devices 
containing 
such 
electronic data must be included within the materials that are 
submitted to the clerk of this court.  If files containing 
electronic data obtained in the course of the John Doe II 
investigation are currently stored on the hard drives of 
computers used by members of the prosecution team or other 
individuals who were granted access to such data, Attorney 
Schmitz shall ensure that such prosecution team members copy 
such data to some form of portable memory (CD-ROM, portable hard 
drive, flash drive, etc.), which shall be submitted to the clerk 
of this court, and that the applicable data files are deleted 
from the computer hard drives. 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
25 
 
authorized to be used in the John Doe II investigation should 
remain in the possession of Attorney Schmitz, any member of the 
prosecution team, or anyone who was authorized by the John Doe 
judge to have access to documents, materials, and electronic 
data gathered in the course of the John Doe II investigation.  
The prosecution team should be completely divested of all such 
documents, materials, and electronic data.  The clerk shall not 
file them as part of the appellate record in this case, but 
shall merely maintain them in a sealed and secure manner pending 
further order of the court.   
¶35 Fourth, at the time that the documents and electronic 
data are submitted to the clerk of this court, Attorney Schmitz 
shall file with the clerk of this court and with the John Doe 
judge the index of the documents and electronic data described 
above. 
¶36 Fifth, in addition to filing the index, Attorney 
Schmitz shall file an affidavit with both this court and the 
John Doe judge in which he avers that, to the best of his 
knowledge, he has collected and submitted to the clerk of this 
court all originals and all copies of documents and electronic 
data that were obtained in the course of the John Doe II 
investigation and that were obtained during the John Doe I 
investigation but were authorized to be used in the John Doe II 
investigation.  The affidavit shall also include an averment 
that Attorney Schmitz has received written statements from all 
members of the prosecution team and all individuals who were 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
26 
 
granted access to John Doe II documents and electronic data that 
those persons have turned over to him all such documents and 
electronic data within their possession and that they no longer 
possess any such documents or electronic data (or copies 
thereof). 
¶37 Finally, because we are not requiring Attorney Schmitz 
and the prosecution team to return and destroy all documents and 
electronic data immediately, we do require Attorney Schmitz, 
within 30 days of the date of this decision, to provide written 
notices to all individuals and organizations whose documents or 
electronic data were obtained by the prosecution team in the 
course of the John Doe II investigation or were obtained in the 
course of the John Doe I investigation and were authorized to be 
used in the John Doe II investigation.12  The notice should 
describe, with particularity, the nature and scope of the 
documents or electronic data that the prosecution team obtained, 
and from whom the documents and/or electronic data were 
obtained.  It should also notify the individual or organization 
that the documents and/or electronic data will be submitted to 
                                                 
12 For example, if the prosecution team served a subpoena on 
Individual A's internet service provider that asked for all of 
Individual A's emails during a specified time period, Attorney 
Schmitz must notify Individual A that his/her emails from that 
time period were obtained from the specific internet service 
provider.  Attorney Schmitz is not obligated to notify all of 
the other individuals who are listed as recipients or senders of 
Individual A's emails or are mentioned within the text of 
Individual A's emails. 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
27 
 
the clerk of this court pursuant to this court's order and that 
the clerk of this court will maintain the documents and/or 
electronic data under seal and in a secure manner until further 
order of the court. 
¶38 Having modified and clarified the mandate in our 
July 16, 2015 decision, we turn to the motion for a stay filed 
by Attorney Schmitz.  In order to obtain a stay pending appeal, 
Attorney Schmitz would be required to:  (1) make a strong 
showing that he or the prosecution team is likely to succeed on 
the merits of any further appeal; (2) show that, unless a stay 
is granted, he and the prosecution team will suffer irreparable 
injury; (3) show that no substantial harm will come to other 
interested parties; and (4) show that a stay will do no harm to 
the public interest.  State v. Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d 431, 
440, 529 N.W.2d 225 (1995).  In light of our modification and 
clarification of the court's mandate with respect to the 
disposition of the documents and electronic data obtained in the 
John Doe II investigation or authorized to be used in the John 
Doe II investigation, we conclude that Attorney Schmitz cannot 
show that he or the prosecution team will suffer irreparable 
injury.  The prosecution team will continue to possess all of 
its work product and all of the evidence gathered in the 
investigation, subject to the previous orders issued by the John 
Doe judge, during the time that it would be preparing any 
petition for U.S. Supreme Court review and until the conclusion 
of proceedings in that Court.  Thus, the prosecution team can 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
28 
 
suffer no injury during that time.  Even after that time, the 
documents and electronic data will not be destroyed, but will be 
stored by the clerk of this court in a sealed and secure manner 
pending further order of this court.  Thus, in the event that 
the investigation would be allowed to proceed at some future 
date, 
the 
documents 
and 
electronic 
data 
would 
still 
be 
available.  They could also potentially be available for use in 
related civil proceedings, if there is a request and a 
determination that such use is proper under the circumstances.  
Consequently, while we have modified and clarified the court's 
mandate in a manner that grants much of the relief sought by 
Attorney Schmitz, we deny his motion for a stay. 
¶39 For the foregoing reasons, 
IT IS ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration and the 
motion for stay are denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the mandate of this court is 
modified and clarified as set forth above. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney Francis Schmitz shall 
immediately cease acting as the special prosecutor, except that 
he shall perform the specific tasks imposed on him by the court 
in this opinion. 
By the Court.—The motion for reconsideration is denied, the 
motion for stay is denied, and the mandate is clarified, as 
described in the opinion. 
¶40 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., and REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J., did 
not participate. 
Nos.  2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W 
2014AP296-OA 
2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W 
 
29 
 
¶41 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J., passed away while these motions 
were pending and prior to their final resolution by the court. 
 
 
 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶42 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  I agree with the per curiam that the July 
16, 2015 majority opinion authored by Justice Gableman is 
significantly flawed and must be modified.1  I do not, however, 
join the per curiam denying the Special Prosecutor's motion for 
reconsideration.2 
¶43 In response to the motion for reconsideration, the per 
curiam significantly modifies the July 16, 2015 majority opinion 
by creative writing devoid of supporting legal authority.  
Furthermore, events subsequent to the motion for reconsideration 
have overtaken the per curiam.   
¶44 Although professing to be even-handed in its treatment 
of the Special Prosecutor and the Unnamed Movants, the per 
curiam is anything but even-handed.  The per curiam terminates 
the Special Prosecutor's authority to act as Special Prosecutor 
from this date forward and leaves the prosecution and State 
totally unrepresented in future proceedings in the John Doe 
trilogy.   Yet the per curiam nonetheless assigns the Special 
                                                 
1 Throughout my writing, I will refer to Justice Gableman's 
July 16, 2015 majority opinion as such, or as "the majority 
opinion."  The full citation to the majority opinion is State ex 
rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 2015 WI 85, 363 
Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 165.  I refer to today's per curiam 
opinion 
denying 
the 
Special 
Prosecutor's 
motion 
for 
reconsideration as "the per curiam." 
2 For an example of the court granting rather than denying a 
motion for reconsideration in order to clarify a previous 
decision, see State v. Johnson, 2014 WI 16, 353 Wis. 2d 119, 846 
N.W.2d 1.  See also Wis. S. Ct. IOP II. J. (governing 
reconsideration).      
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
 
2 
 
Prosecutor new tasks and new deadlines without providing the 
Special Prosecutor (a private practitioner) any compensation or 
assistance.   
¶45 The per curiam appears to derail any meaningful review 
of the July 16, 2015 majority opinion, to stop any and all 
further investigation, and to prevent the release of information 
obtained during the investigation. 
¶46 In 
sum, 
the 
per 
curiam 
embraces 
confusing 
and 
conflicting positions, all the while leaving many important 
issues unresolved, including those posed by events subsequent to 
the motion for reconsideration.   
¶47 Specifically, the per curiam fails to address six 
events that have occurred since Justice Gableman's July 16, 2015 
majority opinion and the Special Prosecutor's August 4, 2015 
motion 
for 
reconsideration. 
 
These 
intervening 
events 
significantly and immediately affect a response to the motion 
for reconsideration.  But the per curiam ignores the intervening 
events.   
¶48 The six intervening events in chronological order are 
as follows: 
1. 
The legislature enacted 2015 Wis. Act 55 (effective July 
14, 2015) and 2015 Wis. Act 64 (effective October 25, 
2015), revising the John Doe statutes.  The current, as-
revised statutes are attached hereto as Attachment B.  
The statutory revisions address, among other matters, the 
authority of reserve judges to preside over John Doe 
proceedings, secrecy orders, return of seized material, 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
 
3 
 
and notice to persons with an interest in seized 
materials.    
2. 
On October 28, 2015, Unnamed Movant No. 2 filed a 
document labelled a "notice of statutory changes."  In 
essence, the "notice" is a motion seeking relief.  The 
motion asserts that Act 64 affects, among other things, 
existing John Doe secrecy orders and the continued 
authority of reserve judges who were appointed John Doe 
Judges before Act 64 was enacted.  The position of 
Unnamed Movant No. 2 appears to be that one of the 
statutory revisions terminates existing secrecy orders in 
John Doe I and John Doe II as to everyone except a judge, 
district attorney, other prosecutor, law enforcement 
officer, interpreter, or court reporter.3  Unnamed Movant 
No. 
2 
also 
contends 
that 
various 
other 
statutory 
revisions affect the John Doe I and John Doe II 
investigations going forward.  As a result, Unnamed 
Movant No. 2 argues this court should grant the Unnamed 
Movants relief according to the terms of the statutory 
revisions.  
3. 
On October 29, 2015, counsel for the Reserve Judge 
appointed to preside over John Doe II proceedings advised 
the court that the Reserve Judges appointed to preside 
over the John Doe I and John Doe II proceedings will take 
                                                 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 968.26(4)(a) (2015); 2015 Wis. Act 64, 
§ 12j.   
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
 
4 
 
no further action unless and until this court determines 
that it is appropriate for them to proceed. 
4. 
On November 11, 2015, the Special Prosecutor filed a 
response to Unnamed Movant No. 2's motion, arguing that 
the statutory revisions are inapplicable to the instant 
cases; and that if the revised statutes are applicable to 
the instant cases they interfere with existing court 
orders 
and 
are 
unconstitutional 
violations 
of 
the 
separation of powers doctrine. 
5. 
On November 12, 2015, a district attorney and two 
assistant 
district 
attorneys 
filed 
a 
supplemental 
memorandum in support of their petition for limited 
intervention 
seeking 
to 
preserve 
documents 
from 
destruction. These petitioners for limited intervention 
argue that Unnamed Movant No. 2's filing (which they 
consider a motion) improperly seeks to expand the scope 
of Justice Gableman's July 16, 2015 majority opinion to 
require the destruction of not only materials obtained in 
the John Doe II investigation but also materials acquired 
in the John Doe I investigation and that limited 
intervention is required to afford the petitioners 
procedural and substantive due process.  
6. 
On November 19, 2015, Unnamed Movant No. 2 filed a "reply 
regarding notice of statutory change."  The filing of a 
reply further demonstrates that Unnamed Movant No. 2's 
"notice of statutory changes" is really a motion.  Among 
other things, the reply clarifies Unnamed Movant No. 2's 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
 
5 
 
position regarding the effect of the statutory revisions 
on the John Doe I and John Doe II investigations and 
responds to the Special Prosecutor's argument that the 
application of the revised statutes to the instant cases 
unconstitutionally violates the separation of powers 
doctrine.    
¶49 In short, these intervening events raise the issue of 
whether recently-enacted statutory revisions effective July 14 
and October 25, 2015, apply to the John Doe proceedings 
commenced prior to the effective date of the revised statutes.    
¶50 These intervening events make clear that the per 
curiam is too little, too late.  The per curiam fails to come to 
grips with the present circumstances in which the court and 
parties find themselves.  The court leaves these and other 
important issues for another day, although they are of immediate 
significance and ripe for decision, having been fully briefed.       
¶51 The per curiam is too little: It does not address the 
effect of the revised John Doe statutes on the majority opinion, 
the per curiam, and the pending John Doe proceedings commenced 
prior to the effective date of the revised statutes. It merely 
references the recently revised John Doe statutes once, in 
footnote 4,4 and ignores the other filings relating to the 
revised statute.   
                                                 
4 Per curiam, ¶9 n.4.  The per curiam's reference to 2015 
Act 64 is ambiguous.  Does it mean that the per curiam views Act 
64 as applying (or not applying) to John Doe II?    
(continued) 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶52 The per curiam is too late:  As a result of these six 
intervening events, the per curiam is responding to pre-October 
28, 2015 circumstances, not present circumstances.  Therefore, 
the per curiam is an interim, temporary document that will have 
to be modified and clarified.  The court is dealing with the 
John Doe trilogy in a piecemeal fashion.  Thus, each opinion or 
order will be short-lived, requiring expeditious revision.  The 
per curiam's piecemeal approach creates more work for the 
litigants, the lawyers, and this court.   
¶53 I would grant the motion for reconsideration, order 
oral 
argument 
on 
the 
issues 
raised 
in 
the 
motion 
for 
reconsideration and the effect of the revised John Doe statutes, 
and then issue a decision.  Oral argument would allow the court 
and the public to consider the numerous issues raised by the 
parties and the six intervening events in the crucible of an 
open, adversary proceeding.    
¶54 I turn now to the substance of the too-little-too-late 
per curiam.  
¶55 The per curiam is confronted with five sealed motions 
(and responses thereto):  
1. 
A motion for reconsideration filed by the Special 
Prosecutor. 
                                                                                                                                                             
In addition to 2015 Wis. Act 64, which Unnamed Movant 2 
discusses in its motion, the per curiam also cites 2015 Wis. Act 
55 (effective July 13, 2015), which modifies the Special 
Prosecutor statute.  See Wis. Stat. § 978.045(1r)(bm) (2015).   
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
 
7 
 
2. 
Three motions for limited intervention.  One was filed 
by two investigators; a second was filed by a law 
enforcement officer.  A third was filed by a district 
attorney and two assistant district attorneys, but is 
not addressed by the court.  This third motion is 
substantially similar to the other two motions for 
limited intervention and received the same response 
from the Unnamed Movants.  
3. 
A motion filed by Unnamed Movants Nos. 4 and 5 for 
immediate remand to John Doe Judge Gregory Peterson. 
¶56 Today four justices deny four of the five sealed 
motions in the per curiam and two separate orders.   
¶57 The motion for reconsideration is denied in the per 
curiam, but Justice Gableman's July 16, 2015 majority opinion is 
significantly modified.   
¶58 Two of the three motions for limited intervention are 
denied in a separate order.  No explanation is offered for the 
denial.  
¶59 The per curiam ignores the third motion for limited 
intervention by a district attorney and assistant district 
attorneys.  It is still pending before the court.  No 
explanation is offered for not responding to the motion. (Is the 
court holding this motion to try to induce the district attorney 
and two assistant district attorneys to seek full intervention 
so the prosecution and State are represented hereafter?)  
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶60 The motion to remand matters to John Doe Reserve Judge 
Peterson is denied in a second order.  No explanation is offered 
for the denial.  
¶61 My separate writings about the per curiam and two 
orders, one denying limited intervention and the other denying 
the remand to the John Doe Judge, should be read together.5     
¶62 In this writing, I address the per curiam denying the 
Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration.   
¶63 Lest the reader get lost in the per curiam's thicket, 
let 
me 
begin 
by 
summarizing 
the 
per 
curiam's 
salient 
modifications of the majority opinion.   
¶64 First, the per curiam does not modify the majority 
opinion's 
misguided 
conclusion 
that 
the 
State 
cannot 
constitutionally regulate coordinated issue advocacy at all.6  
The Special Prosecutor has called the court's attention to a 
recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit that is contrary to the July 16, 2015 majority 
opinion.  The Third Circuit recognized on July 16, 2015, that 
the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that 
                                                 
5 The order denying limited intervention and my separate 
writing is attached hereto as Attachment D.  The order denying 
the motion to remand matters to John Doe Judge Peterson and my 
separate writing is attached hereto as Attachment E.   
6 "No opinion issued by the Supreme Court, or by any court 
of appeals, establishes ('clearly' or otherwise) that the First 
Amendment forbids regulation of coordination between campaign 
committees and issue-advocacy groups——let alone that the First 
Amendment forbids even an inquiry into that topic."  O'Keefe v. 
Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 2311 (2015).   
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
 
9 
 
disclosure requirements are not constitutionally limited to 
express advocacy; "there is not a 'rigid barrier between express 
advocacy and so-called issue advocacy.'"7    
¶65 Second, the per curiam does modify the majority 
opinion's mandate regarding the validity of the appointment and 
continuing authority of the Special Prosecutor.8   
¶66 The per curiam modifies the majority opinion's mandate 
by 
"order[ing] 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
law 
that 
the 
[Special 
Prosecutor's] authority is terminated" from this date forward.9  
Thus the prosecution and State are left totally unrepresented 
hereafter.  If the Special Prosecutor is not permitted to 
represent the prosecution's and State's interests, then who may?  
                                                 
7 Del. Strong Families v. Att'y Gen., 793 F.3d 304, 308 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 193 (2003)) 
(emphasis added); see also Lyle Denniston, Constitution Check:  
What's 
the 
Next 
Big 
Controversy 
on 
Campaign 
Finance, 
Constitution 
Daily 
(July 
21, 
2015), 
http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2015/07/constitution-check-
whats-the-next-big-controversy-on-campaign-finance/ 
(last 
visited Nov. 5, 2015) (describing the Third Circuit's decision 
and the Wisconsin John Doe trilogy as conflicting).   
8 The majority opinion affirmed the court of appeals' 
decision, leaving the Special Prosecutor's appointment and 
authority intact.  Majority op., ¶132 ("Because the Unnamed 
Movants have not established that Reserve Judge Kluka violated a 
plain legal duty in appointing the special prosecutor, we deny 
their petition for a supervisory writ and affirm the court of 
appeals."); see also majority op., ¶137.    
9 Per curiam, ¶11.  The Special Prosecutor's authority to 
act as special prosecutor "is prospectively voidable . . . ." 
Per curiam, ¶12 n.5. 
The per curiam intimates that the Special Prosecutor may 
seek reconsideration or review of this aspect of the per curiam 
decision terminating his authority.  Per curiam, ¶16 n.6.     
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¶67 The per curiam has painted itself into a corner 
without a way out by eliminating representation for the 
prosecution and State in John Doe II proceedings from today on.  
And there are many matters to be decided in the John Doe II 
proceedings still before the court.      
¶68 In February 2014, Three Unnamed Petitioners alerted 
the court that if the Unnamed Petitioners prevailed on their 
argument that the Special Prosecutor's appointment was invalid, 
the five district attorneys would need to be parties in order to 
continue proceedings in the Special Prosecutor's absence.10  A 
copy of the Three Unnamed Petitioners' motion to add the five 
district attorneys as parties is attached hereto as Attachment 
C.   
¶69 The four justices joining the per curiam ignored the 
Three Unnamed Petitioners' admonitions and denied the motion 
without explanation on December 16, 2014.11   
¶70 Now, more than a year and a half after the motion was 
made, almost one year after the motion was denied, and more than 
four months after the July 16, 2015 majority opinion ordered the 
investigation closed, the per curiam is desperately trying to 
find someone other than the Special Prosecutor who can represent 
the State's interests so the court can conduct adversarial 
                                                 
10 See Attachment C, attached, at 4.   
11 See December 16, 2014 order granting review, at 7; see 
also December 16, 2014 order granting review, at ¶4 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., concurring) ("[T]he five district attorneys . . . , in my 
opinion, should be made parties as requested.").   
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proceedings on the many remaining issues.  The per curiam has 
thus far failed in this endeavor.   
¶71 Third, the per curiam modifies the majority opinion's 
mandate, by eliminating the "search and destroy" mission that 
the majority opinion ordered.12   
¶72 The majority opinion directed the "special prosecutor 
and the district attorneys involved in this investigation [to] 
cease all activities related to the investigation, return all 
property seized in the investigation from any individual or 
organization, and permanently destroy all copies of information 
and other materials obtained through the investigation."13   
¶73 The "search and destroy" mandate in the majority 
opinion is so broad and difficult to understand and implement 
that parties on both sides of the "v." have proposed a variety 
of ways of clarifying and modifying the mandate or remanding the 
implementation of the majority opinion to the John Doe Judge.    
¶74 The per curiam modifies the majority opinion by 
ordering the Special Prosecutor to undertake a "clear and hold" 
mission.14 
 
Thus, 
the 
per 
curiam 
modifies 
the 
Special 
                                                 
12 Per curiam, ¶¶28-29.   
13 Majority op., ¶135.   
14 During the Vietnam War, United States forces employed two 
counterinsurgency strategies.  The first involved "search and 
destroy" missions, whereby forces would be inserted into hostile 
territory to search out the enemy, attack them and their 
supplies, and quickly withdraw.  The second strategy involved 
efforts to "clear and hold."  They focused on maintaining 
control of important agricultural areas and population centers.  
See Gordon L. Rottman, Vietnam Infantry Tactics 61-62 (2011).   
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Prosecutor's rules of engagement.  The Special Prosecutor and 
the "prosecution team" must divest themselves of the documents 
and electronic files from the John Doe investigations and submit 
them under seal to the Clerk of the Supreme Court.15   
¶75 The per curiam constructs the new "clear and hold" 
mandate out of whole cloth, without sufficient information about 
what and where the materials are to be "cleared and held."  The 
per curiam is entering an order in a factual vacuum.  The four 
justices joining the per curiam do not know the full extent and 
nature of the items and material gathered in the course of the 
investigation.  Moreover, the four justices joining the per 
curiam do not know whether this mandate can be implemented 
within the times they allotted.16  Simply put, the four justices 
are issuing the per curiam mandate in the dark.   
¶76 Consequently, implementing the per curiam's mandate 
will pose difficulties.  Moreover, after the per curiam is 
                                                 
15 Per curiam, ¶¶28-37.   
16 The per curiam sets forth specific times by which the 
Special Prosecutor must implement various aspects of the new 
"clear and hold" mandate.   
Computer hardware and other items of "tangible personal 
property" are to be returned to their owners within 30 days of 
the per curiam's release.  Per curiam, ¶31.  Written notice must 
also be provided within 30 days of the per curiam "to all 
individuals and organizations whose documents or electronic data 
were obtained by the prosecution . . . ."  Per curiam, ¶37.  The 
remainder of the per curiam's "clear and hold" mandate must be 
implemented within 30 days of the completion of proceedings in 
the United States Supreme Court or 30 days after the deadline to 
file a petition for writ of certiorari, if no petition is filed.  
Per curiam, ¶29.    
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released many issues remain unresolved and will dominate this 
court's work for a long time to come.         
¶77 Fourth, by modifying the majority opinion's mandate, 
the per curiam effectively grants the Special Prosecutor's 
motion for a stay of the majority opinion's "search and destroy" 
mandate, at least pending review by the United States Supreme 
Court.17  In modifying the majority opinion, the per curiam 
provides that documents and electronic data will not be 
destroyed until further order of the court.18  But the four 
justices joining the per curiam say nothing about when such an 
order might be issued and what it might say. 
¶78 I concur in the concept of a stay.  The stay the per 
curiam grants does not, however, appear to preserve John Doe 
materials to use in future criminal prosecutions.  Nor does the 
per curiam assure that the materials will be preserved and 
available for use by the Special Prosecutor and others in their 
defense of presently pending civil litigation relating to the 
John Doe trilogy.19   
                                                 
17 Per curiam, ¶29. 
18 Per curiam, ¶37. 
19 The John Doe investigations have spawned a number of 
lawsuits alleging, among other things, civil rights violations 
by the prosecutors and law enforcement officers, and unlawful 
activities by the Government Accountability Board.  See, e.g., 
O'Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 2311 (2015); Archer v. Chisholm, No. 15-cv-922-LA 
(E.D. Wis.); O'Keefe v. Wis. Gov't Accountability Bd., No. 
2014CV1139 (Waukesha Cnty. Cir. Ct.). 
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¶79 The per curiam states that materials "could also 
potentially be available for use in related civil proceedings, 
if there is a request and a determination that such use is 
proper under the circumstances."20  This cryptic aside does not 
assure that the materials will actually be available for use in 
related litigation, let alone that the materials will be 
preserved until the relevant statutes of limitations on civil 
litigation have run.  Nor does the per curiam explain how the 
Special Prosecutor or others may access the materials except 
through a "request," or what uses are "proper under the 
circumstances."21  According to various reports, similar future 
litigation has been threatened.22   
¶80 Fifth, the per curiam modifies the functions of the 
Special Prosecutor from this date forward.  The per curiam 
terminates the authority of the Special Prosecutor to act as 
special prosecutor and assigns him new tasks without giving the 
                                                 
20 Per curiam, ¶38.   
21 The per curiam does not explain whether making materials 
available for use in related litigation is consistent with the 
revised John Doe statutes.  See Wis. Stat. § 968.26(4)(a)-(b) 
(2015).  Unnamed Movant No. 2's motion argues that Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.26(4)(b) bars at least John Doe Judges Peterson and 
Nettesheim from authorizing the disclosure of materials going 
forward.  Nonetheless, Unnamed Movant No. 2's motion also 
suggests that this court may allow the use and production of 
certain materials, like investigators' notes or memoranda, in 
civil litigation.   
22 See, e.g., Collin Levy, The Wisconsin Targets Tell Their 
Story, Wall St. J., July 22, 2015; M.D. Kittle, John Doe Horror 
Stories: 
'I 
felt 
completely 
helpless 
in 
my 
own 
home,' 
WisconsinWatchdog.org, 
July 
23, 
2015, 
available 
at 
http://watchdog.org/230683/john-doe-deborah-jordahl-raids/. 
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Special 
Prosecutor 
(who 
is 
a 
private 
practitioner), 
any 
resources or payment for his services.23   
¶81 The John Doe investigation is based in large part on 
the idea of "follow the money."24  Here, it is unclear where the 
money to support the per curiam's orders will come from.  The 
four justices have imposed an "unfunded mandate" on someone.  
But on whom?  The Special Prosecutor personally?  The State?  A 
county?  Which one?        
¶82 Sixth, as stated previously, the per curiam is silent 
regarding what modifications, if any, will be needed to the July 
16, 2015 majority opinion and to the per curiam in light of the 
recent statutory revisions to the John Doe statutes and the 
related filings.25  For example, one non-statutory provision of 
2015 Wis. Act 64, Section 12j, states that John Doe secrecy 
orders "in effect on the effective date of this subsection may 
apply only to" John Doe judges, district attorneys, other 
prosecuting attorneys, law enforcement personnel, interpreters 
and court reporters.26  Under Section 12j, secrecy orders 
                                                 
23 Per curiam, ¶¶28-36.      
24 See All the President's Men (Warner Bros. 1976).   
25 See 2015 Wis. Act 64; 2015 Wis. Act 55.     
This part of the revisions of the John Doe statutes raises 
the question of whether Section 12j terminates the secrecy 
orders entered in John Doe I and John Doe II, and if so, whether 
Section 12j violates the separation of powers doctrine.   
26 2015 Wis. Act 64, Section 12j states in full:  
"A secrecy order entered under section 968.26 of the 
statutes that is in effect on the effective date of 
(continued) 
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16 
 
covering other individuals are "terminated on the effective date 
of this subsection."27  The effective date of 2015 Wis. Act 64 is 
October 25, 2015.  The court leaves these and other important 
issues for another day although they are fully briefed and of 
immediate significance.   
¶83 I turn now to examining the flaws in the per curiam in 
the following order: 
1. 
The motion for reconsideration is veiled in secrecy.  The 
per curiam may be open to challenge on First Amendment 
and state grounds.  The per curiam also does not address 
leaks of sealed information.  See ¶¶84-91, infra. 
2. 
The per curiam overreaches to terminate the Special 
Prosecutor's authority to act as special prosecutor from 
this date forward.  See ¶¶92-109, infra. 
3. 
In terminating the authority of the Special Prosecutor, 
the per curiam unfairly leaves the prosecution and the 
State unrepresented from this date forward and deprives 
the Special Prosecutor, prosecutors, and law enforcement 
of 
the 
opportunity 
to 
preserve 
materials 
from 
destruction.  See ¶¶110-125, infra.     
                                                                                                                                                             
this subsection may apply only to persons listed in 
section 968.26(4)(a) of the statutes, as created by 
this act.  A secrecy order covering persons not listed 
in section 968.26(4)(a) of the statutes, as created by 
this act, is terminated on the effective date of this 
subsection."   
See also Wis. Stat. § 968.26(4)(a).   
27 2015 Wis. Act 64, § 12j.   
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17 
 
4. 
The question remains whether the per curiam is impeding 
review by the United States Supreme Court by terminating 
the authority of the Special Prosecutor.  See ¶¶126-130, 
infra. 
5. 
Based on its erroneous conclusion that the Special 
Prosecutor 
never 
presented 
evidence 
of 
illegally 
coordinated express advocacy to the John Doe Judge, the 
per curiam erroneously concludes that the investigation 
into coordinated express advocacy cannot continue.  See 
¶¶131-144, infra. 
6. 
The per curiam constructs the "clear and hold" mandate in 
a factual vacuum and the mandate will require further 
clarification.  Indeed the Unnamed Movants do not agree 
in 
their 
recommendations 
to 
the 
court 
about 
the 
disposition of the materials.  See ¶¶145-149, infra. 
7. 
The per curiam is unclear about whom it binds.  See ¶150, 
infra. 
8. 
The per curiam ignores the Special Prosecutor's argument 
that evidence obtained through the subpoenas and search 
warrants 
should 
be 
retained 
under 
the 
good 
faith 
exception in Fourth Amendment suppression jurisprudence.  
See ¶¶151-152, infra. 
9. 
The 
per 
curiam 
leaves 
many 
foreseeable 
questions 
unanswered.  See ¶¶153-155, infra. 
* * * * 
1. 
The motion for  reconsideration is veiled in secrecy.  The 
per curiam may be open to challenge on First Amendment and state 
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18 
 
grounds.  The per curiam also does not address leaks of sealed 
information. 
¶84 Thirty-three 
filings, 
including 
the 
motion 
for 
reconsideration (and responses) and nearly every other filing in 
this court since July 16, 2015, are sealed.  For a listing of 
the 33 sealed filings since July 16, 2015, see Attachment A, 
attached.28  Thus, the parties' factual and legal arguments are 
closed to the public.29   
¶85 Why the secrecy?  And by whose order?  All the filings 
were automatically sealed, without any review by this court and 
without any instruction or order from this court.  
¶86 To illustrate the excessive sealing of material since 
July 16, 2015, I note two particularly egregious examples.30   
¶87 First, both the complaint and amended complaint in the 
federal case entitled Archer v. Chisholm, No. 15-cv-922-LA (E.D. 
                                                 
28 The only documents not under seal are Justice Prosser's 
separate writing explaining his rationale for denying a motion 
for his recusal, and documents that I filed.     
In addition to the new filings placed under seal, some 
redactions relating to documents filed before July 16, 2015, 
still remain unresolved, even after the court released many 
other redacted documents in the lead-up to the July 16, 2015 
opinions. 
29 At least redacted versions of the parties' briefs and 
other documents were publicly available relating to the July 16, 
2015 majority opinion.   
30 Another example is the Special Prosecutor's motion for 
reconsideration.  The motion makes predominantly legal arguments 
and does not disclose the identity of the Unnamed Movants, the 
specific contents of any document or information obtained in the 
John 
Doe 
investigation, 
or 
any 
information 
that 
appears 
objectionable to either the prosecution or the Unnamed Movants. 
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19 
 
Wis.) are appended to proposed intervenors' sealed motions.  The 
Archer complaints are not under seal in the federal court.  How 
can this court justify the sealing of complaints that are open 
in federal court?  It cannot.   
¶88 Second, the Special Prosecutor filed a letter stating 
that he intends to respond to Unnamed Movant 2's "notice of 
statutory changes."  Although the letter explicitly stated that 
it was not being filed under seal; that it does not contain any 
confidential information; and that no redactions are needed, the 
letter was automatically sealed without any review by the court 
and without any instruction or order from the court.       
¶89 The 
general 
rule 
is 
that 
court 
filings 
are 
presumptively open for public inspection.  Placing filings under 
seal is the exception to the rule.31  In the face of virtually 
total secrecy of filings since July 16, 2015, the public cannot 
understand the basis for the four justices' decisions.  "The 
crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice 
cannot function in the dark; no community catharsis can occur if 
justice is 'done in a corner [or] in any covert manner.'"32   
                                                 
31 See, e.g., Press-Enters. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 
U.S. 501, 508-10 (1984); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
448 U.S. 555, 580 & n.17 (1980); In re Providence Journal Co., 
293 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2002); Grove Fresh Distrib., Inc. v. 
Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994); Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 710 F.2d 1165, 
1177-81 (6th Cir. 1983).   
32 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 
(1980) (quotation omitted) (alteration in original). 
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¶90 The automatic sealing of virtually all filings since 
July 16, 2015 without explanation raises significant First 
Amendment, state constitutional, statutory, and common law 
issues, and may be challenged as erroneous.33  Any need to 
maintain the secrecy of portions of any filings should have been 
addressed promptly by the participating justices and material 
redacted for the public if necessary. 
¶91 My primary concern to this point has been that this 
court continues to seal too much from public view.  The court 
has failed to release documents that need not be sealed or that 
are already publicly available.34  At the same time, the court's 
failure to enforce its sealing orders has, unfortunately, 
allowed a growing tide of leaks, flouting the court's orders 
without fear of consequences.35  This situation does not engender 
                                                 
33 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Fed. Trade 
Comm'n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1176 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[W]e conclude that 
the District Court erred by failing to state findings or 
conclusions which justify nondisclosure to the public.  The 
order of the District Court sealing the documents in the case 
is, therefore, vacated.").   
34 Unnamed Movant No. 2's filing points out that much of the 
material filed under seal has been released by court orders and 
suggests that a substantial amount of the materials under seal 
in this court may be unsealed consistent with concerns about 
revealing the names of the Unnamed Movants or others who were 
investigated.  See also my concurrence/dissent to the majority 
op., ¶¶501-506.   
35 See, e.g., Jason Stein & Mary Spicuzza, More Documents 
Leaked in John Doe Case, Milwaukee J. Sentinel (Sept. 17, 2015); 
Molly Beck, Emails raise questions of impartiality, suggest 
Scott Walker was target of John Doe, Wis. State J. (Aug. 29, 
2015); Editorial, We 'the Sheeple', Wall St. J. (Aug. 27, 2015).   
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confidence in the transparency or sealing of the proceedings, in 
the rule of law, or in this court's ability or willingness to 
enforce its orders.   
2. 
The per curiam overreaches to terminate the Special 
Prosecutor's authority to act as special prosecutor from 
this date forward. 
¶92 The per curiam immediately goes astray when it states 
that "[b]ecause we are presented with [the Special Prosecutor's] 
continued filings . . . we now must address the underlying legal 
question of [the Special Prosecutor's] authority to act as the 
special prosecutor . . . ."36  "Now?"  "Must?"  Really?  The 
issue of the Special Prosecutor's authority was addressed by the 
court of appeals and this court in the supervisory writ action 
by three Unnamed Movants.   
¶93 Addressing the issue of the Special Prosecutor's 
appointment and authority, the July 16, 2015 majority opinion 
affirmed the court of appeals, holding that John Doe Judge 
Kluka's appointment of the Special Prosecutor did not violate a 
plain legal duty.37  Thus, the Special Prosecutor's authority 
remained intact.    
¶94 A majority of the justices joined the part of Justice 
Prosser's concurrence concluding that "Judge Kluka's appointment 
of the Special Prosecutor was invalid."38  
                                                 
36 Per curiam, ¶8.   
37 Majority op., ¶¶132, 137.    
38 Justice Prosser's concurrence to majority op., ¶239.   
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22 
 
¶95 The per curiam is correct that Justice Gableman's 
majority opinion controls.39    
¶96 By joining both Justice Gableman's majority opinion 
and Justice Prosser's concurrence, four justices created at 
least two sets of votes that logically do not align:  The four 
justices held that the Special Prosecutor's appointment was 
simultaneously valid and invalid.  Compare majority op., ¶¶132 
n.43, 137, Justice Ziegler's concurrence to majority op., ¶¶309, 
340, and Justice Prosser's concurrence to majority op., ¶¶149, 
239, 306.   
¶97 The four justices attempt to mask this logical 
inconsistency.  The per curiam creates an artificial distinction 
between the "legal ruling" in Justice Gableman's July 16, 2015 
majority opinion that John Doe Judge Kluka's appointment of the 
Special Prosecutor did not violate a plain legal duty and the 
"reality shown" by the "legal conclusion" in Justice Prosser's 
concurrence that the Special Prosecutor's appointment was 
invalid.40  These labels, "legal ruling," "legal conclusion," and 
"reality shown," are devoid of any meaning and should not 
obscure the fact that in the opinions issued on July 16, 2015, 
four justices voted that the Special Prosecutor's appointment 
was simultaneously valid and invalid, or that the per curiam 
reverses the July 16, 2015 majority opinion's conclusion 
regarding the validity of the Special Prosecutor's appointment 
and authority.    
                                                 
39 Per curiam, ¶7 & n.3. 
40 See per curiam, ¶¶7-9.   
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23 
 
¶98 These conflicting votes of the four justices resulted, 
I believe, from a change in this court's internal operating 
procedures for processing and mandating opinions.  Since the 
change was adopted in September 2014, the court no longer 
discusses draft opinions in conference unless a majority of 
justices votes to do so.41  From September 2014 to June 2015, no 
in person court conference was held on any draft opinion, 
including the drafts in the John Doe trilogy.   
¶99 Thoughtful discussion and careful collegial review of 
the draft opinions in the John Doe trilogy would have revealed 
the internally contradictory nature of the several opinions 
joined in different parts by four justices.    
¶100 Although the July 16, 2015 majority opinion applied 
the correct, limited standard of review for a writ proceeding,42 
the per curiam does an about-face.  The per curiam overreaches 
and "makes a legal ruling"43 that the Special Prosecutor lacks 
authority to act as special prosecutor from the date of the per 
curiam forward.44   
                                                 
41 The procedure adopted in September 2014 for processing 
opinions is set forth in full in State v. Gonzalez, 2014 WI 124, 
¶30-31, 
359 
Wis. 2d 1, 
856 
N.W.2d 580 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring).   
42 Majority op., ¶¶127-28 & n.41.   
43 Per curiam, ¶12.   
44 Per curiam, ¶¶2, 11.  In contrast, the per curiam relies 
on the limited standard of review in writ proceedings to hold 
that the Special Prosecutor could not prevail on his argument 
that the John Doe investigation should proceed as to coordinated 
express advocacy.  Per curiam, ¶27.    
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24 
 
¶101 This conclusion is misguided for several reasons. 
¶102 First, the per curiam reargues an issue already argued 
and considered.  A motion for reconsideration "is not intended 
to be an opportunity to reargue issues already argued and 
considered.  Rather, the primary purpose [of reconsideration] is 
to alert the court to errors or omissions in its decision."45  
The per curiam does not assert that any error or omission 
appears in the majority opinion's conclusion that the Special 
Prosecutor's appointment remains intact. 
¶103 Second, under the per curiam's logic, the Special 
Prosecutor's authority to proceed would still be intact if he 
had not brought a motion for reconsideration.46  Does this make 
sense?  Not to me.   
¶104 Third, only Unnamed Movants 2, 6, and 7 challenged the 
appointment and authority of the Special Prosecutor.47  The other 
Unnamed Movants did not raise this issue.  Why does the per 
curiam not hold that the other Unnamed Movants forfeited the 
argument that the Special Prosecutor lacked authority?  The per 
curiam does not even consider this question.  In contrast, the 
per curiam is quick to hold that the Special Prosecutor 
                                                 
45 See 
Michael 
S. 
Heffernan, 
Appellate 
Practice 
and 
Procedure in Wisconsin § 22.4 (2014).   
46 See per curiam, ¶16.   
47 See my concurrence/dissent to the majority op., ¶¶542, 
554. 
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25 
 
forfeited his argument that the John Doe II investigation should 
continue into investigating coordinated express advocacy.48  
¶105 Fourth, the per curiam applies two different rules to 
the two petitions for supervisory writs.  In the petition 
brought by three Unnamed Movants for a supervisory writ 
invalidating the appointment and authority of the Special 
Prosecutor, the per curiam "'transform[s] the writ into an all-
purpose alternative to the appellate review process . . . .'"49 
by concluding that the Special Prosecutor's appointment is 
invalid without regard to the limited nature of this court's 
review of a decision on a supervisory writ.   
¶106 In contrast, relying on the limited nature of the writ 
proceeding,50 the per curiam bars relief 
to the Special 
                                                 
48 Per curiam, ¶¶23-24. 
49 Majority op., ¶137 (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit 
Court, 
2004 
WI 
58, 
¶24, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
681 
N.W.2d 110). 
The per curiam relies on Kalal to justify its decision on 
the underlying legal issue, namely that the appointment of the 
Special Prosecutor was invalid.  Kalal is inapposite.  The Kalal 
court held that the Kalals failed to establish the existence of 
a plain legal duty and were not entitled to a supervisory writ.  
271 Wis. 2d at ¶26.  The Kalal court went on to discuss the 
statutory interpretation question presented but did not change 
its result, that is, the court's conclusion remained that the 
Kalals were not entitled to a supervisory writ because no plain 
legal duty existed.  271 Wis. 2d at ¶57.   
In the instant case, the July 16, 2015 majority opinion 
declared that the parties were not entitled to a supervisory 
writ because no plain legal duty existed.  Majority op., ¶137.  
The per curiam decides the underlying legal issue and now 
reverses the majority opinion's denial of the supervisory writ.   
50 Per curiam, ¶27. 
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26 
 
Prosecutor on his petition for a supervisory writ to reverse the 
John Doe Judge's decision to quash the subpoenas and search 
warrants.   
¶107 These two approaches seem inconsistent and result-
oriented.  
¶108 In addition to faulty "analysis," the per curiam fails 
to provide any assistance, resources, or compensation to the 
Special Prosecutor when he is implementing the new "clear and 
hold" mandate and fulfilling his new functions.  The four 
justices impose an unfunded mandate on someone, but we do not 
know who that someone is.  The record is unclear whether the 
Special Prosecutor has been compensated for all his work and 
whether he is now being compensated.   
¶109 In sum, the per curiam's rationale simply seems 
invented to justify the pre-ordained desired result. 
3. 
In terminating the authority of the Special 
Prosecutor, the per curiam unfairly leaves the prosecution 
and the State unrepresented from this date forward and 
deprives the Special Prosecutor, prosecutors, and law 
enforcement officers of the opportunity to preserve 
materials from destruction. 
¶110 The per curiam recognizes that its ruling that the 
Special Prosecutor cannot continue to act in his official 
capacity "has the potential to create problems with respect to 
who may act on behalf of the prosecution in this court or 
elsewhere going forward."51  The four justices should have seen 
                                                 
51 Per curiam, ¶16.   
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this problem coming, but they did not.  Now, the per curiam does 
next to nothing to resolve it.        
¶111 The per curiam suggests that one or more of the five 
district 
attorneys 
whose 
petitions 
to 
commence 
John 
Doe 
proceedings started this investigation might seek to intervene 
to represent the prosecution and State in future proceedings.52  
The per curiam assures the reader that such a motion to 
intervene would receive prompt attention, but does not assure 
that such a motion would be granted.53   
¶112 The four justices have already explicitly denied a 
motion to add the five district attorneys as parties, even 
though the Three Unnamed Petitioners warned more than a year and 
a half ago that if the five district attorneys were not joined 
and the court concluded that the Special Prosecutor could not 
continue to act in his official capacity, the prosecution would 
be left entirely unrepresented.54  As the Three Unnamed 
Petitioners 
wrote 
(see 
Attachment 
C), 
the 
five 
district 
attorneys had an interest in the outcome of the John Doe trilogy 
and would incur significant expenses depending on the outcome:  
[I]f the petitioners are correct on the merits, the 
appointment of the special prosecutor was improper at 
the outset and is unsustainable now.  Each of the five 
                                                 
52 Per curiam, ¶19.  
53 Per curiam, ¶19. 
54 See December 16, 2014 order granting review, at 7 
(denying a motion to make the district attorneys parties); see 
also December 16, 2014 order granting review, at ¶4 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., concurring) ("[T]he five district attorneys . . . in my 
opinion, should be made parties as requested.").   
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district attorneys would have to proceed without him 
and without the state Department of Administration 
shouldering much of the prosecutorial costs of these 
proceedings. 
 
Accordingly, 
these 
five 
district 
attorneys 
necessarily 
have 
an 
actual 
and 
non-
speculative interest in the outcome of this case.  
That interest is distinct from the interests of all 
other parties.55   
¶113 Now, despite the Three Unnamed Petitioners' clear 
warnings, the per curiam engages in revisionist history, stating 
that "at that point in time there was no need to add the 
district attorneys as parties because the prosecution was 
represented by . . . the special prosecutor."56  But the need was 
clear and the problem was foreseeable.  Now, at this late date, 
after the majority opinion has terminated the investigation, 
even if one or more of the district attorneys were allowed to 
intervene, an overwhelming amount of materials would have to be 
scrutinized and absorbed in order for a district attorney to get 
up to speed on this legally and factually complex case.  The 
learning curve to assume responsibility for challenging past 
orders and opinions of this court and for representing the State 
in all future legal proceedings would be steep and time 
consuming.  Such intervention might impose significant expenses 
on the counties.   
¶114 Even though no one represents the prosecution and 
state going forward, an order issued today (in which I dissent) 
refuses to allow investigators and a law enforcement officer to 
                                                 
55 See Petitioners' Motion to Add Five Respondents 4 (Feb. 
19, 2014).   
56 Per curiam, ¶17.   
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intervene 
for 
the 
limited 
purpose 
of 
preserving 
certain 
materials from the John Doe investigations from destruction.57  A 
third motion to intervene for the same limited purpose filed by 
a district attorney and two assistant district attorneys is 
being ignored, without explanation.     
¶115 The per curiam errs in denying the motions for limited 
intervention. 
¶116 Limited intervention is required to protect rights.  
Denying the motions for limited intervention, especially when 
the 
Special 
Prosecutor 
cannot 
continue 
acting 
as 
such, 
demonstrates 
hostility 
to 
the 
Special 
Prosecutor, 
the 
"prosecution team," and the State on the part of the four 
justices.  The July 16, 2015 majority opinion is critical of the 
conduct 
of 
the 
Special 
Prosecutor, 
prosecutors, 
and 
law 
enforcement officers, including their conduct in execution of 
the search warrants.  The criticism is piled on even though 
there is no evidence or factual findings in the record to 
support this criticism or to describe the execution of the 
search warrants.58  Baseless attacks by this court on the Special 
Prosecutor, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers (or on 
anyone else) are, in my opinion, inexcusable. 
                                                 
57 See the order of even date denying motions for limited 
intervention.   
58 The majority opinion and Justice Ziegler's concurrence to 
the majority opinion relied on facts that were not in the 
record, citing blogs and media reports as authoritative sources 
on how the search warrants were executed.  See, e.g., majority 
op., ¶¶28, 68; Justice Ziegler's concurrence to the majority 
op., ¶¶320 & n.10, 326-29 & nn.12-22.   
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¶117 Since July 16, 2015, these attacks in the majority 
opinion 
have 
been 
cited 
as 
verifying 
that 
the 
Special 
Prosecutor, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers in the 
John Doe investigations were engaged in misconduct.  For 
example, the Amended Complaint in Archer v. Chisholm, No. 15-cv-
922-LA (E.D. Wis.), Docket No. 17, describes the July 16, 2015 
majority opinion as "finding" and "holding" that the Special 
Prosecutor, 
prosecutors, 
and 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
"instigated 'a perfect storm of wrongs that was visited upon the 
innocent' targets 'and those who dared to associate with 
them.'"59   
¶118 The Amended Archer Complaint, under the heading "The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court's Repudiation of the Investigation," 
also alleges that the July 16, 2015 majority opinion "found that 
the targets of the investigation were victims of 'the tyrannical 
retribution of arbitrary or capricious government prosecution'"60 
and "found" that they "subjected targets to 'paramilitary-style 
home invasions conducted in the pre-dawn hours' in retaliation 
for their free speech . . . ."61 
                                                 
59 Archer v. Chisholm, No. 15-cv-922-LA (E.D. Wis.), Dkt. 
No. 17, at ¶96 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
majority op., ¶133).  
60 Archer v. Chisholm, No. 15-cv-922-LA (E.D. Wis.), Dkt. 
No. 17, at ¶¶95-96 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
majority op., ¶133). 
61 Archer v. Chisholm, No. 15-cv-922-LA (E.D. Wis.), Dkt. 
No. 17, at ¶97 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
majority op., ¶68). 
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¶119 In contrast, the material released from John Doe files 
apparently has proved helpful to prosecutors and law enforcement 
officers in cases in which their conduct has been challenged.  
See, e.g., O'Keefe v. Schmitz, No. 14-C-139, 2014 WL 1379934, at 
*8 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 8, 2014), rev'd in part sub nom. O'Keefe v. 
Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
2311 (2015) (citing sealed material from John Doe II in 
discussing immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).   
¶120 The use of released John Doe I materials in the Archer 
case has apparently caused a modification of the claims of 
abusive behavior by those who executed the search warrants.62 
¶121 Now, the very same four justices who criticized the 
prosecutors and law enforcement officers for their participation 
in the John Doe II investigation deny the movants (who are 
government officers and employees) the opportunity to intervene 
for the limited purpose of preserving materials, including audio 
recordings, that they assert reveal the truth about the John Doe 
II investigation, including execution of the search warrants.   
¶122 Instead, the per curiam suggests that the materials to 
be held by the Clerk of the Supreme Court "could also 
                                                 
62 See Archer v. Chisholm, No. 15-cv-922-LA (E.D. Wis.), 
Dkt. No. 17; Daniel Bice, Audio of John Doe Raid Contradicts 
Claims by Longtime Scott Walker Aide, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, 
Aug. 
4, 
2015, 
available 
at 
http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/320568172.html; Scott Bauer,  
Audio contradicts Scott Walker aide's description of raid, Wis. 
State 
J., 
Aug. 
5, 
2015, 
available 
at  
http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/audio-
contradicts-scott-walker-aide-s-description-of-
raid/article_64e5ec3a-3b65-57e8-bc2c-f9a0dc37e505.html.  
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potentially be available for use in related civil proceedings, 
if there is a request and a determination that such use is 
proper under the circumstances."63  This aside is yet another 
"too little, too late" aspect of the per curiam.   
¶123 The per curiam's aside is too little: it gives no 
assurance that the materials to be held by the Clerk will be 
available for prosecutors and law enforcement officers' defenses 
in civil proceedings stemming from the John Doe investigations 
at all, let alone that they will be preserved until the 
applicable statutes of limitations have run.  The per curiam 
also gives too little direction to non-parties on how to request 
access to the materials and what requests would be "proper under 
the circumstances."64   
¶124 The per curiam is too late:  Now that the prosecution 
is totally unrepresented in future proceedings in these cases, 
and limited intervention has been denied, nobody is left to 
advocate for the preservation of these materials for use in 
proceedings stemming from the John Doe investigations.    
¶125 Will this aspect of the per curiam be subject to 
challenge as due process gone awry?    
4. 
The question remains whether the per curiam is impeding 
review by the United States Supreme Court by terminating the 
authority of the Special Prosecutor.   
                                                 
63 Per curiam, ¶38.   
64 Per curiam, ¶38.   
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¶126 On another topic relating to the termination of the 
authority of the Special Prosecutor, the per curiam explicitly 
addresses the issue of who may seek review in the United States 
Supreme Court.  The per curiam declares that its "decision to 
terminate [the Special Prosecutor's] authority is not meant to 
interfere with the ability of the prosecution team to seek 
Supreme Court review."65  Who is the "prosecution team?"  The per 
curiam uses the phrase "prosecution team" 32 times.  The phrase 
is never defined.  Isn't the Special Prosecutor a member of the 
"prosecution team," and thus eligible to seek Supreme Court 
review under the per curiam's approach?     
¶127 The per curiam recasts my point about the inability to 
identify members of the prosecution team as "implying that there 
was no group of prosecutors, investigators and others who 
prosecuted the John Doe II investigation, and that [the Special 
Prosecutor] worked alone in prosecuting the John Doe II."66  
Clearly there were prosecutors, investigators, and others 
involved in the John Doe II investigation.  Obviously the 
Special 
Prosecutor 
did 
not 
work 
alone. 
 
However, 
the 
"prosecution team" is nowhere depicted as a static group of 
people.  Didn't people serve with the Special Prosecutor and 
then leave the task?  Didn't new people periodically join the 
Special Prosecutor?  The per curiam does not say who the members 
of the prosecution team are or who may replace the Special 
                                                 
65 Per curiam, ¶16 (emphasis added).   
66 Per curiam, ¶18 n.7.   
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Prosecutor for numerous purposes, including United States 
Supreme Court review.          
¶128 The per curiam further declares that it wants to 
"avoid[] impeding in any way the ability of the prosecution team 
to seek certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court."67  
Nevertheless, the Special Prosecutor is the only person named in 
the John Doe trilogy as representing the prosecution.       
¶129 I agree with the four justices joining the per curiam 
that in the interests of federalism, comity, and the supremacy 
of federal law,68 the per curiam should not place roadblocks in 
the way of federal review of the decisions in the John Doe 
trilogy.     
¶130 What a mess this court has wrought! 
5. 
Based on its erroneous conclusion that the Special 
Prosecutor never presented evidence of illegally coordinated 
express advocacy to the John Doe Judge, the per curiam 
erroneously concludes that the investigation into coordinated 
express advocacy cannot continue. 
¶131 The Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration 
seeks an order permitting the John Doe investigation to continue 
as to coordinated express advocacy——a valid legal theory even 
under the majority opinion's flawed, absolutist interpretation 
that "Anything Goes" with regard to issue advocacy.69 
                                                 
67 Per curiam, ¶29 (emphasis added). 
68 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
69 See my concurring/dissenting opinion to the majority op., 
¶348.   
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¶132 The late Justice N. Patrick Crooks and I dissented 
from the July 16, 2015 majority opinion, in part because the 
majority opinion failed to consider this evidence.70  The per 
curiam, like the majority opinion, avoids addressing this issue, 
this time hiding behind the doctrine of forfeiture and applying 
a limited standard of review to the Special Prosecutor's 
petition for a supervisory writ.71  
¶133 The record demonstrates that the investigation of 
coordinated 
express 
advocacy 
should 
proceed. 
 
Unlawful 
coordination, not merely unlawful coordinated issue advocacy, 
has been the focus of the John Doe investigation from the very 
beginning.   
¶134 For example, on May 31, 2013, Wisconsin Attorney 
General J.B. Van Hollen wrote to the Milwaukee County District 
Attorney declining to participate in the John Doe investigation.  
The letter describes the John Doe investigation as "relating to 
potential 
campaign 
finance 
violations 
involving 
campaign 
coordination."72  The letter explains elsewhere that the specific 
area of campaign finance law that may be applicable to the 
                                                 
70 See Justice Crooks' concurrence/dissent to the majority 
opinion, ¶¶559-63; see also my concurrence/dissent to the 
majority op., ¶352 n.11.   
71 See per curiam, ¶¶25-26.  In contrast, this very limited 
standard of review is ignored, as I have stated, by the per 
curiam in terminating the Special Prosecutor's appointment and 
authority from this date forward.  Per curiam, ¶¶6, 7. 
72 See App'x to Response Brief of Special Prosecutor, vol. 
1, at 090 (emphasis added).   
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investigation is "coordination."73  No reference is made in this 
letter to either issue advocacy or express advocacy.  Rather, 
coordination is the prominent theme of the letter discussing the 
investigation.       
¶135 Another example showing that coordination, not merely 
coordinated issue advocacy, was the focus of the investigation 
is the August 10, 2012 petition to commence the John Doe 
proceedings.  The petition focuses on coordination, and is not 
limited to express or issue advocacy.  The petition states that 
the investigation will focus on violations of Wis. Stat. ch. 11, 
and in particular on the coordination of personal political 
campaign committees and '501(c)(4)' organizations to circumvent 
the restrictions of ch. 11.74   
¶136 Likewise, the affidavits underlying search warrants 
and subpoenas addressed evidence of coordination, not limited to 
evidence of coordinated issue advocacy or coordinated express 
advocacy.75     
                                                 
73 See App'x to Response Brief of Special Prosecutor, vol. 
1, at 090. 
74 A 501(c)(4) is described in the record as an organization 
able to involve itself in express advocacy, provided that 
"supporting 
or 
opposing 
candidates" 
does 
not 
become 
the 
organization's primary purpose. 
75 Affidavits for search warrants and subpoenas state that 
the use of the 501(c)(4)s was alleged to be for the purpose of 
circumventing the reporting and contribution provisions of Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 11.10(4), 
11.06(1), 
and 
11.27(1), 
which 
would 
constitute a violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 11.26, 11.27, and 
11.61(1)(b). 
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¶137 That no distinction was made between coordinated 
express advocacy and coordinated issue advocacy in these 
documents is not surprising.  The emphasis on investigating 
coordination, regardless of whether the coordination was of 
issue advocacy or express advocacy, was supported by federal and 
Wisconsin law at the time.  The law did not establish an 
inflexible distinction or set up a rigid barrier between 
coordinated issue advocacy and coordinated express advocacy for 
all purposes.76 
¶138 In granting review in the John Doe trilogy, this court 
asked the parties to address "[w]hether the records in the John 
Doe proceedings provide a reasonable belief that Wisconsin law 
was violated by a campaign committee's coordination with 
independent advocacy organizations that engaged in express 
advocacy speech.  If so, which records support such a reasonable 
belief?"77   
                                                 
76 See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 193 (2003) 
(stating there is no "rigid barrier between express advocacy and 
so-called 
issue 
advocacy"); 
Wis. 
Coalition 
for 
Voter 
Participation v. State Elections Bd., 231 Wis. 2d 670, 682, 605 
N.W.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating "we think the [State 
Elections] Board was correct in observing . . . that '[i]f the 
mailing and the message were done in consultation with or 
coordination with the Justice Wilcox campaign, the [content of 
the 
message] 
is 
immaterial") 
(quotation 
omitted) 
(some 
alterations in original). 
It is the majority opinion that erroneously erected a rigid 
barrier between coordinated issue advocacy and express advocacy 
on July 16, 2015, long after the investigation began.   
77 See December 16, 2014 order granting review at #10. 
(continued) 
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¶139 According to the record, evidence of coordinated 
express advocacy on which the Special Prosecutor relies was 
presented both to the John Doe Judge and to this court.  The per 
curiam errs in concluding that the Special Prosecutor forfeited 
his argument that the search warrants and subpoenas were valid 
because they sought evidence of coordinated express advocacy.78 
¶140 I agree with the following statements in Justice 
Crooks' concurring and dissenting opinion to the July 16, 2015 
majority opinion, stating at ¶561 as follows: 
It is also imperative to note that the majority 
conveniently 
overlooks 
the 
special 
prosecutor's 
secondary argument of criminal activity in [the 
majority's] effort to end this John Doe investigation.  
Specifically, 
the 
special 
prosecutor 
seeks 
to 
investigate whether particular express advocacy groups 
coordinated 
their 
spending 
with 
candidates 
or 
candidate committees in violation of their sworn 
statement of independence under Wis. Stat. § 11.06(7).  
Despite the fact that the special prosecutor utilizes 
a significant portion of his brief to present evidence 
                                                                                                                                                             
Care must be taken when reading the word "independent" in 
such 
phrases 
as 
"independent 
organizations," 
"independent 
disbursement committees," or "independent advocacy organization" 
in the December 16, 2014 court order granting review, the July 
16, 2015 majority opinion and the per curiam.  The word 
"independent" should be considered to be in quotation marks 
"because the Special Prosecutor suspected that the group's 
independence is ostensible rather than real."  O'Keefe v. 
Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936, 937 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 2311 (2015). 
78 Moreover, even if a party forfeits an issue by failing to 
raise it first in a prior proceeding, "we have discretion to 
disregard alleged forfeiture or waiver and consider the merits 
of any issue because the rules of forfeiture and waiver are 
rules of 'administration and not of power.'"  State v. Beamon, 
2013 WI 47, ¶49, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681 (quoting State 
v. Riekkoff, 112 Wis. 2d 119, 124, 332 N.W.2d 744 (1983)).   
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of such illegal coordination, the majority [opinion] 
determines, without explanation, that the John Doe 
investigation is over. 
¶141 The John Doe Judge made clearly erroneous factual 
findings when he stated that the "State is not claiming that any 
of the independent organizations expressly advocated,"79 and 
"[t]here is no evidence of express advocacy"80 justifying the 
issuance of a supervisory writ.      
¶142 After the John Doe Judge accepted the Unnamed Movants' 
arguments distinguishing between coordinated express advocacy 
and coordinated issue advocacy, the Special Prosecutor raised 
the issue of coordinated express advocacy in his court of 
appeals petition for supervisory writ.  This court granted 
bypass to review the issue.81 
 
¶143 The 
legal 
arguments 
and 
evidence 
the 
Special 
Prosecutor presented to the John Doe Judge and to this court 
provide "reason to believe" a crime was committed by coordinated 
express advocacy.  The Special Prosecutor need not prove a 
criminal 
violation 
at 
the 
inception 
of 
the 
John 
Doe 
investigation and need not demonstrate probable cause at the 
outset.  All that the Special Prosecutor must demonstrate is a 
"reason to believe" a crime was committed.82  He has done so.   
                                                 
79 Majority op., ¶34. 
80 Majority op., ¶34.   
81 See December 16, 2014 order granting review on the issue 
of express advocacy, #10. 
82 State ex rel. Reimann v. Circuit Court, 214 Wis. 2d 605, 
623, 571 N.W.2d 385 (1997) (citing Wis. Stat. § 968.26).   
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¶144 Accordingly, reconsideration should be granted and the 
investigation into coordinated express advocacy should continue.      
6. 
The per curiam constructs the "clear and hold" mandate 
in a factual vacuum and the mandate will require further 
clarification.  Indeed the Unnamed Movants do not agree in 
their recommendations to the court about the disposition of 
the materials. 
¶145 The per curiam's "clear and hold" mandate is built on 
a shaky foundation.  It will not hold up under the stress of 
implementation.  The per curiam constructs its new mandate out 
of whole cloth by piecing together information about what 
investigative materials exist and their location from the 
parties' filings, without any guarantee that these facts and 
arguments are correct or exhaustive.  Simply put, the four 
justices do not have the facts.  They are writing in a factual 
vacuum, issuing the per curiam mandate in the dark.   
¶146 The per curiam compounds this error by crafting its 
new mandate without notice to the parties and without giving 
them an opportunity to address what materials should be 
"cleared" and how they should be "held."   
¶147 Ignoring the Special Prosecutor's admonition about the 
risks of issuing an order not fully understanding the items and 
materials at issue, the per curiam offers explicit instructions 
for different types of materials.   
¶148 The court does not have access to all these materials 
and lacks full knowledge about each of them or their value to 
the Special Prosecutor, the "prosecution team," the Unnamed 
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Movants, or the "universe of individuals" of which the per 
curiam writes.  Especially significant is that the Unnamed 
Movants do not agree in their recommendations to the court about 
what should be done with different kinds of materials.  Parties 
on both sides of the "v." disagree about the materials involved.  
¶149 Given this disagreement and uncertainty about the 
materials involved, it is likely that the per curiam's "clear 
and hold" mandate, like the July 16, 2015 majority opinion's 
"search and destroy" mandate, cannot be implemented without 
further interpretation, clarification, and modification.   
7. 
The per curiam is unclear about whom it binds. 
¶150 The per curiam imposes obligations not only on the 
Special Prosecutor but also on unnamed persons, including the 
undefined "prosecution team."83  As I have stated previously, the 
per curiam uses the undefined phrase "prosecution team" 32 
times.  To what extent does the majority opinion or per curiam 
bind anyone other than the two Unnamed Movants who filed the 
original action or the eight Unnamed Movants and the Special 
Prosecutor?  Not clear!84     
8. 
The per curiam ignores the Special Prosecutor's argument 
that evidence obtained through the subpoenas and search warrants 
                                                 
83 See, e.g., per curiam, ¶¶31-32, 34, 36.   
84 The original action was brought by Two Unnamed Movants.  
A question arises whether the Special Prosecutor's investigation 
of individuals and organizations that are not parties to the 
original action is affected by the majority opinion and per 
curiam.  See my concurrence/dissent to the majority op., ¶352 
n.11; Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2013 WI 91, ¶20, 351 
Wis. 2d 237, 839 N.W.2d 388 (limiting the scope of a judgment).     
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should be retained under the good faith exception in Fourth 
Amendment suppression jurisprudence. 
¶151 The 
per 
curiam 
recognizes 
that 
the 
Special 
Prosecutor's authority was intact when the subpoenas and search 
warrants were issued.85  The subpoenas and search warrants were 
based on the campaign finance laws existing at that time 
regulating coordinated advocacy.86   
¶152 The 
per 
curiam 
does 
not 
address 
the 
Special 
Prosecutor's reliance on the "good faith exception" in Fourth 
Amendment suppression jurisprudence to support retention of John 
Doe evidence that need not be suppressed in subsequent criminal 
proceedings.  
9. 
The per curiam leaves many foreseeable questions 
unanswered. 
¶153 Some of the foreseeable but unanswered questions are 
as follows:  
• How will the parties and interested non-parties be able to 
access the materials to be maintained under seal by the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court?87   
• At least one federal civil rights lawsuit arising out of 
the John Doe investigations is currently pending and others 
                                                 
85 Per curiam, ¶13.   
86 See, e.g., Wis. Coalition for Voter Participation, Inc. 
v. State Elections Bd., 231 Wis. 2d 670, 605 N.W.2d 654 (Ct. 
App. 1999); Wis. El. Bd. Op. 00-2 (reaffirmed Mar. 26, 2008).      
87 Per curiam, ¶38.   
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will likely be filed in the future.88  How will the court 
address the interests of persons involved in these lawsuits 
if they seek access to or use of these materials?  Will 
these materials be preserved until the applicable statutes 
of limitations have run?  What effect, if any, do the 
recent statutory revisions to the John Doe statutes have on 
these questions?89  
• What continuing authority, if any, do the two John Doe 
Judges have?  May materials continue to be filed before the 
John Doe Judges or only in this court?  What is the 
authority of the John Doe Judge over materials, including 
motions, filed with the John Doe Judge after the records 
were sent to this court in January 2015?90  May the John Doe 
judge continue to issue orders authorizing the release of 
                                                 
88 See, e.g., Archer v. Chisholm, No. 15-cv-922-LA (E.D. 
Wis.).  
The authority of the Government Accountability Board is 
also being challenged in a proceeding arising out of these 
investigations.  See O'Keefe v. Wis. Gov't Accountability Bd., 
No. 2014CV1139 (Waukesha Cnty. Cir. Ct.). 
89 See Wis. Stat. § 968.26(1b)(b).   
90 Records filed with the John Doe Judge after the records 
were transmitted to this court in January 2015 were ordinarily 
not transmitted to this court.  For example, a motion was filed 
by Unnamed Movants with the John Doe Judge on July 17, 2015 (the 
day after the majority opinion was released) seeking relief from 
the John Doe Judge.  The motion included confidential material 
that Waukesha County Circuit Court Judge Lee Dreyfus (presiding 
in O'Keefe v. Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, No. 
2014CV1139 (Waukesha Cnty. Cir. Ct.)) apparently authorized to 
be released to the John Doe Judge.  This confidential material 
has been filed under seal in this court.        
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materials seized in the investigations for use in the 
defense of pending lawsuits?  What effect, if any, do the 
recent statutory revisions to the John Doe statutes have on 
these questions?91   
• To what extent does the majority opinion or per curiam bind 
anyone other than the two Unnamed Movants who filed the 
original action or the eight Unnamed Movants and the 
Special Prosecutor?   
• What is the significance of the secrecy and record 
inspection provisions of Wis. Stat. § 968.26(3) (2013-14) 
in these proceedings? 
• How will the court address present and future matters 
before the court (of which there are many) in the absence 
of any representation for the prosecution and State?  
¶154 These 
questions 
are 
not 
merely 
hypothetical 
or 
conjectural; they are immediately relevant to the majority 
opinion, the per curiam, and motions and other filings currently 
pending before the court.  The per curiam's attempts to resolve 
issues are piecemeal, superficial, and temporary.  The per 
curiam ensures that the John Doe trilogy will continue to 
dominate the court's work immediately and for a long time to 
come.   
¶155 I 
repeat, 
in 
response 
to 
the 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, the per curiam significantly modifies the July 
16, 2015 majority opinion by creative writing devoid of 
                                                 
91 See Wis. Stat. § 968.26(1b)(b).   
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supporting legal authority.  Furthermore, events subsequent to 
the motion for reconsideration have overtaken the per curiam.  
In sum, the per curiam embraces confusing and conflicting 
positions, 
all 
the 
while 
leaving 
many 
important 
issues 
unresolved, including those posed by events subsequent to the 
motion for reconsideration.   
¶156 For the reasons set forth, I concur in part, dissent 
in part, and write separately.   
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ATTACHMENT A: All Sealed Filings After 7/16/15 
 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
 
2 
 
 
Party or 
Sender 
Document 
Date 
Filed 
1. 
Special 
Prosecutor 
Motion 
for 
reconsideration, 
stay, 
or 
clarification 
of 
mandate 
8/4/15 
2. 
Unnamed Movant 
2 
Letter to court  
8/6/15 
 
3. 
Unnamed Movant 
2 
Letter 
to 
Chief 
Justice 
8/7/15 
 
4. 
Chief Justice 
E-mail exchange 
8/7/15 
5. 
Unnamed Movant 
7 
Letter 
to 
Chief 
Justice  
8/7/15 
6. 
Judge 
Neal 
Nettesheim 
Letter 
to 
Chief 
Justice  
8/10/15 
7. 
Unnamed 
Movants 4 and 
5 
Letter 
to 
Chief 
Justice 
8/10/15 
8. 
Unnamed Movant 
7 (joined by 
Unnamed Movant 
2) 
Letter 
to 
Chief 
Justice 
8/10/15 
9. 
Special 
Prosecutor 
Letter to Supreme 
Court Clerk  
8/11/15 
10. 
Unnamed Movant 
2 
E-mail 
to 
Chief 
Justice 
8/12/15 
11. 
Judge 
Gregory 
Peterson 
E-mail to counsel 
for Unnamed Movant 
2 
8/12/15 
12. 
Judge 
Neal 
Nettesheim 
E-mail 
to 
Chief 
Justice 
8/12/15 
13. 
Unnamed Movant 
1 
Response to motion 
for reconsideration 
8/13/15 
14. 
Judge 
Neal 
Nettesheim 
E-mail 
to 
Chief 
Justice 
8/13/15 
15. 
Special 
Prosecutor 
Letter to Justices 
of Supreme Court 
8/14/15 
16. 
Unnamed Movant 
7 
Letter to Justices 
of Supreme Court 
8/14/15 
17. 
Unnamed 
Movants 2, 3, 
6, 7, & 8 
Response to motion 
for reconsideration 
8/14/15 
18. 
Unnamed 
Movants 4 & 5 
Response to motion 
for reconsideration 
8/14/15 
19. 
Investigators 
Motion for limited 
intervention 
8/19/15 
20. 
Special 
Prosecutor 
Motion 
to 
strike 
portions of Unnamed 
Movants 2, 3, 6, 7, 
& 8's response to 
the 
motion 
for 
reconsideration or, 
alternatively, for 
leave 
to 
file 
a 
reply 
8/25/15 
21. 
Unnamed Movant 
2
(joined
by
Response to motion 
for intervention
8/28/15 
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ATTACHMENT B 
 
No.  2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2508-W.ssa 
 
2 
 
 
 
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3 
 
 
 
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ATTACHMENT C 
 
 
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5 
 
 
 
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6 
 
 
 
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7 
 
 
 
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ATTACHMENT D 
 
 
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9 
 
 
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10 
 
 
 
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11 
 
 
 
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12 
 
 
 
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13 
 
 
 
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15 
 
 
 
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ATTACHMENT E 
 
 
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18 
 
 
 
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19 
 
 
 
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20 
 
 
 
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21 
 
 
 
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25 
 
 
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