Title: COLLIFLOWER v FORT BELKNAP COMMUNI
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-275
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: May 28, 1981

No. 8 0 - 2 7 5 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 1 MADELINE COLLIFLOWER, P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , V S . THE FORT BELKNAP COMMUNITY COUNCIL, THE FORT BELKNAP T R I B E OF INDIANS and THE FORT BELKNAP COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM, D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s . A p p e a l f r o m : D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e T w e l f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of B l a i n e . H o n o r a b l e B. W. T h o m a s , Judge presiding. C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For A p p e l l a n t : Spangelo L a w F i r m , H a v r e , M o n t a n a J a m e s Spangelo argued, H a v r e , M o n t a n a For R e s p o n d e n t s : F r a n c i s X. L a m e b u l l argued, H a r l e m , M o n t a n a S u b m i t t e d : A p r i l 2 4 , 1 9 8 1 5 ' gg- s/ D e c i d e d : , C l e r k M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Madeline Colliflower, an e n r o l l e d member of t h e F o r t Belknap ~ r i b e , appeals from an order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Blaine County, granting t h e respondents1 motion t o dismiss and rendering moot her motion f o r summary judgment. Respondents1 motion t o dismiss was made a f t e r i t s answer and, t h e r e f o r e , i s considered a motion f o r judgment on t h e pleadings. Rule 1 2 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P. Additionally the a p p e l l a n t ' s complaint f a i l e d t o s p e c i f i c a l l y a l l e g e j u r i s d i c t i o n , however, we a r e a b l e t o glean s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s from the pleadings t o resolve t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i s s u e . The a p p e l l a n t was h i r e d by t h e F o r t Belknap Tribe ( t r i b e ) i n May of 1972 a s d i r e c t o r of t h e F o r t Belknap Indian Community Action Program (CAP). The program w a s funded under a g r a n t from t h e Office of Native American Programs of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and was intended f o r t h e promotion of t r i b a l economic s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . The a p p e l l a n t was f i r e d June 23, 1976, follow- i n g a hearing before t h e F o r t Belknap Community Council concerning a l l e g a t i o n s of o f f i c i a l neglect and gross m i s - managemen t. The a p p e l l a n t f i r s t sued t h e respondents i n f e d e r a l c o u r t , a l l e g i n g wrongful termination of employment. On January 19, 1979, t h e case was dismissed. The f e d e r a l c o u r t held t h e a c t i o n of t h e F o r t Belknap Community council was i n a "wholly governmental capacity", and t h e r e f o r e , they were immune from s u i t . The a p p e l l a n t then f i l e d a complaint i n t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , which i s t h e b a s i s of t h i s appeal, a l l e g - i n g breach of c o n t r a c t , t o r t and d e n i a l of due process. The lower c o u r t dismissed the a c t i o n i n i t s order of J u l y 7, "The Court concludes t h a t t h e a c t i v i t i e s w e d e a l with here a r e governmental functions of t h e t r i b a l e n t i t y ; t h a t t h e F o r t Belknap Indian Community and i t s agencies who a r e defendants i n t h i s a c t i o n a r e immune from s u i t i n t h e absence of an express waiver; t h a t t h e r e has been no such waiver a s t o t h e t r i b a l e n t i t y . Consequently, defendant's mo- t i o n t o dismiss should be granted. P l a i n t i f f ' s motion w i l l thereby be rendered moot." The i s s u e s presented a r e (1) whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court's finding of purely governmental a c t i v i t y by t h e t r i b e i s supported by t h e record and ( 2 ) whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court properly r e j e c t e d a p p e l l a n t ' s claim of an implied waiver of t r i b a l immunity. W e agree with t h e D i s t r i c t Court and a f f i r m i t s order. Before discussing t h e m e r i t s of t h i s appeal, we must b r i e f l y explain t h e i n t e r n a l organization of t h e F o r t Belknap Tribe. Under a u t h o r i t y of t h e Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, Ch. 576, 48 S t a t . 984, - a s amended, 25 U.S.C., § § 461-479, Indians were authorized t o organize f o r purposes of l o c a l self-government through t h e adoption of c o n s t i t u - t i o n s ( s e c t i o n 16) and corporate c h a r t e r s ( s e c t i o n 1 7 ) . The F o r t Belknap Tribe r a t i f i e d both. Its c o n s t i t u t i o n was r a t i - f i e d i n 1935, and i t s corporate c h a r t e r i n 1937. The general d i f f e r e n c e between c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and corporate e n t i t i e s was discussed i n an opinion of t h e S o l i - c i t o r , Department of the I n t e r i o r : "The purpose of Congress i n enacting Section 16 of t h e Indian Reorganization Act was t o f a c i l i t a t e and t o s t a b i l i z e t h e t r i b a l organization of Indians r e s i d i n g on t h e same r e s e r v a t i o n , - f o r t h e i r common welfare. I t provided t h e i r p o l i t i c a l organi-za- t i o n . The purpose of Congress i n enacting Section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act w a s t o empower t h e Secretary t o i s s u e a c h a r t e r of business i-ncorporation t o such t r i b e s t o enable them t o conduct business through t h i s modern device, which c h a r t e r cannot be revoked o r surrendered except by Act of Congress. This corporation, a l - though composed of the same members a s the p o l i - t i c a l body, i s t o be a separate e n t i t y , and thus more capable of obtaining c r e d i t and otherwise expediting t h e business of the Tribe . . ." No. M-36515, 65 I n t . Dec. 483 (November 20, 1958). See generally, Comment, T r i b a l Self-Government and t h e Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 Mich.L.Rev. 955 (1972). The governmental e n t i t y of t h e F o r t Belknap Tribe r e t a i n s i t s sovereign immunity t o t h e e x t e n t not expressly waived o r r e s t r i c t e d by Congress. The corporation, however, i s empowered: "To sue and t o be sued i n c o u r t s of competent j u r i s d i c t i o n within t h e United S t a t e s ; b u t t h e g r a n t o r e x e r c i s e of such power t o sue and t o be sued s h a l l n o t be deemed a consent by the Community o r by t h e United S t a t e s t o t h e levy of any judgment, l i e n o r attachment upon the property of the Community o t h e r than income o r c h a t t e l s s p e c i a l l y pledged o r assigned." Cor- p o r a t e Charter of t h e F o r t Belknap Indian Com- munity of t h e F o r t Belknap Indian Reservation, r a t i f i e d August 25, 1937. While recognizing t h e general p r i n c i p l e s of Indian immunity, a p p e l l a n t argues the F o r t Belknap Tribe no longer enjoys the p r i v i l e g e . The argument i s n o t supported by evidence of a c t u a l corporate a c t i v i t y b u t r a t h e r a speculative l e g a l theory. Appellant contends t h a t by adopting a business corporation pursuant t o s e c t i o n 17 t h e governmental e n t i t y merged with the corporate e n t i t y , thereby completely waiving t h e t r i b e ' s immunity . The D i s t r i c t Court considered a p p e l l a n t ' s merger theory and r e j e c t e d it concluding: "Here, the showing is t h a t t h e Community Action program was developed through t h e Native American Programs a s a r e s u l t of the s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p which e x i s t s between t h e f e d e r a l government and Indians and Indian t r i b e s f o r t h e purpose of ad- vancing t h e welfare of the Indians. Agreed t h a t a p r i n c i p a l purpose was t o improve t h e economic and s o c i a l conditions of t h e Community, t h a t pur- pose i s a proper governmental function. Conceiv- ably, c e r t a i n business p r o j e c t s might r e s u l t d i - r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y from the program, and i f such p r o j e c t s should be undertaken by t h e Commun- i t y , the corporate e n t i t y might w e l l be involved. N o commercial o r business a c t i v i t y i s involved here. " The judgment must be affirmed. F i r s t , a p p e l l a n t has f a i l e d t o c a r r y her burden of proof regarding t h e claim t h a t t h e Community Council was a c t i n g under c o l o r of i t s corporate c h a r t e r . The record contains no a f f i r m a t i v e evidence t o support such a contention. Second, a p p e l l a n t ' s merger theory i s n o t supported by any a u t h o r i t y reviewed by t h i s Court and, i n f a c t , c o n f l i c t s with c u r r e n t Indian l a w p r i n c i p l e s . The theory rests upon t h e untenable foundation of an implied waiver of immunity. I n Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978), 436 U.S. 49, 56 L.Ed.2d 106, 98 S.Ct. 1670, the Supreme Court decided whether a f e d e r a l c o u r t may pass on t h e v a l i d i t y of a t r i b a l ordinance denying membership t o the c h i l d r e n of female members who married o u t s i d e the t r i b e . The a c t i o n w a s I L brought under T i t l e of t h e Indian C i v i l Rights Act of 1968 ( I C R A ) , 25 U.S.C., 8 5 1301-1303. I n holding the Act d o e s n ' t impliedly authorize such a c t i o n s , the c o u r t discussed t h e nature of t r i b a l immunity: "Indian t r i b e s have long been recognized a s pos- s e s s i n g t h e common-law immunity from s u i t t r a d i - t i o n a l l y enjoyed by sovereign powers. Turner v. United S t a t e s , 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919); United S t a t e s v. United S t a t e s F i d e l i t y & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512-513 (1940); Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Dept. of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172-173 (1977). This a s p e c t of t r i b a l sovereignty, l i k e a l l o t h e r s , i s s u b j e c t t o t h e superior and plenary c o n t r o l of Congress. But 'without congressional a u t h o r i z a t i o n , ' t h e ' Indian Nations a r e exempt from s u i t . ' United S t a t e s v. United S t a t e s F i d e l i t y & Guaranty Co., supra, a t 512. "It -- i s s e t t l e d -- t h a t a waiver of sovereign immunity 'cannot be - implied --- b u t must b e u n e q u i v o c a l l y ex- oressed.' -United S t a t e s v. Testan, 4 2 4 U.S. 392, , . 399 (1976), quoting, United S t a t e s v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)." (Emphasis added.) Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. a t 58. I n summary, w e f i n d t h e Community Council acted s o l e l y i n i t s governmental capacity i n t h e termination of t h e a p p e l l a n t and concur with t h e r e j e c t i o n of t h e notion t h a t t r i b a l r a t i f i c a t i o n of a s e c t i o n 17 corporate c h a r t e r sub- sumes, and thereby merges, an e x i s t e n t s e c t i o n 1 6 t r i b a l sovereign. A n implied waiver i s impermissible; t h e waiver must be express. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. W e concur: Chief J u s t i c