Title: SSC Selma Operating Company, LLC, d/b/a Warren Manor Health & Rehabilitation Center; Bernard Turk; and Sava Senior Care Administrative Services, LLC v. Ethel Gordon, administratrix of the estate of Jimmy Lee Gordon
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1080396
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 13, 2010

Rel 08/13/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2010
_________________________
1080396
_________________________
SSC Selma Operating Company, LLC, d/b/a Warren Manor Health
& Rehabilitation Center; Bernard Turk; and Sava Senior Care
Administrative Services, LLC
v.
Ethel Gordon, administratrix of the estate of Jimmy Lee
Gordon
Appeal from Dallas Circuit Court
(CV-08-900087)
PER CURIAM.
SSC Selma Operating Company, LLC, doing business as
Warren Manor Health & Rehabilitation Center ("SSC"); Bernard
Turk, 
the 
administrator 
of 
Warren 
Manor 
Health 
&
1080396
2
Rehabilitation Center ("Warren Manor"); and Sava Senior Care
Administrative Services, LLC ("Sava"), the entity that manages
Warren Manor (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the
defendants"), appeal from the trial court's order denying
their motion to compel arbitration.  
Facts and Procedural History
Jimmy Lee Gordon was admitted to Warren Manor on December
7, 2006.  It is undisputed that Ethel Gordon, Mr. Gordon's
wife, signed the following documents on Mr. Gordon's behalf
upon his admittance to Warren Manor: "Authorization Form of
Release 
of 
Information"; 
"Advance 
Directives/Medical 
Treatment
Decisions/Acknowledgment of Receipt"; "Podiatry/Consent to
Treat"; and "Consent to Photograph."  The defendants allege
that Mrs. Gordon also signed a separate "Agreement for
Arbitration" on Mr. Gordon's behalf.  Mrs. Gordon denies that
she signed the arbitration agreement.  
Mr. Gordon died on December 30, 2006, while a resident of
Warren Manor.  Following Mr. Gordon's death, Ethel Gordon, in
her capacity as the administratrix of his estate, sued the
defendants, alleging "wrongful death -– medical malpractice"
and "combined and concurring negligence."  Mrs. Gordon
1080396
3
demanded a trial by jury in her complaint.  
In response to Mrs. Gordon's complaint, SSC and Turk
filed a motion to compel arbitration based on the arbitration
agreement they allege Mrs. Gordon signed on Mr. Gordon's
behalf.  SSC and Turk attached to their motion a copy of the
arbitration agreement purportedly signed by Mrs. Gordon and
the affidavit of Turk, the administrator of Warren Manor,
stating that the underlying transaction did affect interstate
commerce.  Turk also states in his affidavit that the 
"[i]nformation in this affidavit is based on my
personal knowledge. ... Ethel Gordon signed a
Dispute 
Resolution 
Agreement 
('the 
Agreement')
during the process of admitting Jimmy Lee Gordon to
Warren Manor.  Ms. Ethel Gordon executed the
agreement as the legal representative of Jimmy Lee
Gordon. A true and correct copy of the Agreement is
attached [to the motion] as Exhibit B."
Subsequently, Sava also filed a motion to compel arbitration.
Mrs. Gordon filed a response to the defendants' motions to
compel arbitration.  Attached to Mrs. Gordon's response to the
motions to compel arbitration was her affidavit, in which she
states that she did not sign an arbitration agreement.  On
October 30, 2008, SSC and Turk filed a reply to Mrs. Gordon's
response.  Attached to SSC and Turk's reply was the affidavit
of Richard A. Roper, Ph.D., a certified forensic document
1080396
We note that November 3, 2008, was a Monday; Mrs. Gordon
1
was obviously referring to two business days.  
4
examiner, in which Roper opined that the signature on the
arbitration agreement alleged to be Mrs. Gordon's was "very
probably" Mrs. Gordon's.  
On November 3, 2008, the trial court held a hearing on
the defendants' motions to compel arbitration.  On that same
day, Mrs. Gordon filed a motion to strike Roper's affidavit
testimony, stating in her motion the following reasons for
striking Roper's affidavit:
"1. The affidavit is untimely in that it was
filed less than two (2) days prior to the time set
for the hearing.[ ]
1
"2. There has been no adequate foundation laid
for the opinion stated in the affidavit.
"3. The opinions in the affidavit are based upon
unauthenticated documents.
"4. The opinions stated in the affidavit are not
admissible under Frye [v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923),] or the Alabama Rules of Evidence.
"5. The opinions are based upon documents which
Richard A. Roper was allowed access to by the
Defendants in violation of HIPAA [Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act]."
On November 10, 2008, the defendants filed an "Opposition to
[Mrs. Gordon's] Motion to Strike" Roper's affidavit testimony
1080396
5
and a "[s]upplemental reply to [Mrs. Gordon's] opposition to
[the defendants'] motion to compel arbitration."  The
defendants attached a second affidavit of Roper's to their
supplemental reply in which Roper explained the term "very
probably" as he had used that term in his first affidavit.
On November 10, 2008, the trial court granted Mrs.
Gordon's motion to strike, thereby refusing to consider
Roper's affidavit testimony.  The trial court also denied the
defendants' motions to compel arbitration.  The trial court
did not provide an order explaining the reasoning behind
either of its decisions.  On December 19, 2008, the defendants
filed a notice of appeal to this Court.  
On December 22, 2008, while the case was pending on
appeal, the defendants filed in the trial court a "Motion to
Reconsider," asking the trial court to reconsider its
decisions to grant Mrs. Gordon's motion to strike and to deny
the defendants' motions to compel arbitration.  The trial
court held a hearing on the defendants' motion to reconsider
on January 5, 2009.  On January 6, 2009, the defendants
submitted 
to 
the 
trial 
court 
a 
document 
entitled
"[s]upplemental authority in support of [the defendants']
1080396
6
motion to reconsider."  The supplemental authority included
the affidavit testimony of Gail Ezelle, the admissions
director of Warren Manor, and exhibits, in an attempt to
authenticate the arbitration agreement.  On January 7, 2009,
the trial court purported to deny the defendants' motion to
reconsider.  
Standard of Review
The legal principles guiding this Court's review of a
ruling on a motion to compel arbitration are well settled:
"'This Court's review of an order
granting or denying a motion to compel
arbitration is de novo. First American
Title Ins. Corp. v. Silvernell, 744 So. 2d
883, 886 (Ala. 1999); Crimson Indus., Inc.
v. Kirkland, 736 So. 2d 597, 600 (Ala.
1999); Patrick Home Ctr., Inc. v. Karr, 730
So. 2d 1171 (Ala. 1999).'
"United Wisconsin Life Ins. Co. v. Tankersley, 880
So. 2d 385, 389 (Ala. 2003). Furthermore:
"'"A motion to compel arbitration
is analogous to a motion for
summary judgment. TranSouth Fin.
Corp. v. Bell, 739 So. 2d 1110,
1114 
(Ala. 
1999). 
The 
party
seeking to compel arbitration has
the 
burden 
of 
proving 
the
existence of a contract calling
for arbitration and proving that
that 
contract 
evidences 
a
transaction affecting interstate
commerce. Id. 'After a motion to
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7
compel arbitration has been made
and supported, the burden is on
the 
non-movant 
to 
present
evidence 
that 
the 
supposed
arbitration 
agreement 
is 
not
valid or does not apply to the
dispute in question.'"
"'Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Bruno, 784 So.
2d 277, 280 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Jim Burke
Auto., Inc. v. Beavers, 674 So. 2d 1260,
1265 n.1 (Ala. 1995) (emphasis omitted)).'
"Vann v. First Cmty. Credit Corp., 834 So. 2d 751,
753 (Ala. 2002)."
Cartwright v. Maitland, 30 So. 3d 405, 408-09 (Ala. 2009).  
Discussion
Initially, we note that the defendants' motion to
reconsider, which appears to be, in substance, a Rule 59(e),
Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to alter, amend, or vacate the
judgment, was untimely.  This Court held in George v. Sims,
888 So. 2d 1224, 1227 (Ala. 2004):
"Generally, a trial court has no jurisdiction to
modify or amend a final order more than 30 days
after the judgment has been entered, except to
correct clerical errors. See Rule 59(e) and Rule 60,
Ala. R. Civ. P.; Cornelius v. Green, 477 So. 2d
1363, 1365 (Ala. 1985) (holding that the trial court
had no jurisdiction to modify its final order more
than 30 days after its final judgment); Dickerson v.
Dickerson, 885 So. 2d 160, 166 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)
(holding that, absent a timely postjudgment motion,
the trial court has no jurisdiction to alter, amend,
or vacate a final judgment); and Superior Sec.
1080396
8
Serv., Inc. v. Azalea City Fed. Credit Union, 651
So. 2d 28, 29 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) ('It is well
settled that after 30 days elapse following the
entry of a judgment, the trial court no longer has
authority to correct or amend its judgment, except
for clerical errors.')."
Therefore, the trial court's ruling purporting to deny the
defendants' motion to alter, amend, or vacate is a nullity and
has no bearing on this appeal.  Consequently, this Court
cannot consider any of the evidentiary material attached to
the defendants' motion to alter, amend, or vacate, because
that material was not before the trial court when it entered
its judgment denying the defendants' motions to compel
arbitration or when the defendants filed their notice of
appeal.  
In reviewing the trial court's judgment denying the
defendants' motions to compel arbitration, we must first
determine whether an arbitration agreement existed between SSC
and Mrs. Gordon. 
As set forth above, the defendants must
first satisfy their burden to provide substantial evidence
that a contract between SSC and Mrs. Gordon calling for
arbitration existed.  
In response to Mrs. Gordon's complaint, SSC and Turk
filed their motion to compel arbitration and attached to the
1080396
9
motion a copy of an "Agreement for Arbitration" allegedly
signed by Mrs. Gordon and Turk's affidavit stating that, based
on his personal knowledge, the copy of the arbitration
agreement was a "true and correct copy."  Mrs. Gordon
specifically argues for the first time on appeal that the
arbitration agreement was not properly authenticated and that
it should not have been admitted into evidence in the trial
court.  
A motion to compel arbitration is analogous to a motion
for a summary judgment, Ex parte Caver, 742 So. 2d 168, 172
n.4 (Ala. 1999); thus, the rules governing the admission of
affidavits supporting or opposing a motion for a summary
judgment as stated in Rule 56(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., apply to
affidavits supporting or opposing a motion to compel
arbitration.  See TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 739 So. 2d
1110, 1114 (Ala. 1999) ("A motion to compel arbitration is
analogous to a motion for a summary judgment.").  Concerning
affidavits and exhibits offered in support of or in opposition
to a motion for a summary judgment, this Court has stated:
"Rule 56(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., generally requires
that '[s]worn or certified  copies' of documents
referred to in an affidavit offered supporting or
opposing a motion for a summary judgment be attached
1080396
10
to the affidavit. However, if an affidavit or the
documents attached to an affidavit fail to comply
with this rule, the opposing party must object to
the admissibility of the affidavit or the document
and move to strike. Ex parte Elba Gen. Hosp. &
Nursing Home, Inc., 828 So. 2d 308, 312-13 (Ala.
2001) (noting that a party must object to evidence
submitted in support of a motion for a summary
judgment that does not comply with Rule 56(e), Ala.
R. Civ. P.); Chatham v. CSX Transp., Inc., 613 So.
2d 341, 344 (Ala. 1993) ('A party must move the
trial court to strike any nonadmissible evidence
that violates Rule 56(e). Failure to do so waives
any objection on appeal and allows this Court to
consider the defective evidence.')."  
Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Cato, 968 So. 2d 1, 4-5 (Ala. 2007)
(footnote and emphasis omitted); see also Ex parte Unitrin,
Inc., 920 So. 2d 557, 560 (Ala. 2005) (citing Berry Mountain
Mining Co. v. American Res. Ins. Co., 541 So. 2d 4 (Ala.
1989), for the proposition that "defendants' failure to move
to strike unauthenticated documents attached to plaintiff's
motion for a summary judgment waived any objections to the
trial court's reliance on those documents").  
Mrs. Gordon raises many arguments on appeal concerning
the admissibility of the arbitration agreement, none of which
she raised in the trial court.  In Mrs. Gordon's "response to
[the defendants'] motion to compel arbitration" filed with the
trial court, Mrs. Gordon argued that she did not sign the
1080396
11
arbitration agreement, but she did not argue that the copy of
the arbitration agreement attached to the motion was not
admissible.  Mrs. Gordon also made a general allegation in her
motion to strike Roper's affidavit that Roper based his
analysis on "unauthenticated documents."  However, Mrs. Gordon
did not specify which documents she was alleging were
unauthenticated.  A thorough review of the record does not
reveal that Mrs. Gordon specifically objected to the
admissibility of the copy of the arbitration agreement
attached to SSC and Turk's motion to compel arbitration.
Moreover, 
even 
if 
Mrs. 
Gordon 
had 
objected 
to 
the
admissibility of the copy of the arbitration agreement, it is
undisputed that Mrs. Gordon did not file a motion to strike
the arbitration agreement.  Therefore, we will consider the
evidence.  
In order to satisfy their burden of proof, the defendants
must present evidence that a contract calling for arbitration
exists and that the "contract evidences a transaction
affecting interstate commerce."  Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v.
Bruno, 784 So. 2d 277, 280 (Ala. 2000) (citing TranSouth Fin.
Corp. v. Bell, 739 So. 2d 1110, 1114 (Ala. 1999)).  The
1080396
12
arbitration agreement itself constituted substantial evidence
that a contract calling for arbitration existed between SSC
and Mrs. Gordon.  Mrs. Gordon concedes in her appellate brief
before this Court that SSC "[is] engaged in interstate
commerce."  (Mrs. Gordon's appellate brief, at 25 n.9.)  Thus,
the defendants satisfied their burden of proof.  
Once the defendants satisfied their burden of producing
substantial evidence that an arbitration agreement exists, the
burden then shifted to Mrs. Gordon to produce sufficient
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the arbitration agreement is valid.  This Court stated
in Ex parte Meadows, 782 So. 2d 277, 280 (Ala. 2000):
"'"To make a genuine issue entitling the
[party seeking to avoid arbitration] to a
trial 
by 
jury 
[on 
the 
arbitrability
question], an unequivocal denial that the
agreement had been made [is] needed, and
some evidence should [be] produced to
substantiate the denial."'
"[Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851,
854 (11th Cir. 1992)] (quoting T & R Enters. v.
Continental Grain Co., 613 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir.
1980))."   
In the present case, Mrs. Gordon filed a response to the
defendants' motions to compel arbitration and attached to the
response her affidavit, in which she denied that she had
1080396
13
signed an arbitration agreement with SSC.  Under Meadows, Mrs.
Gordon's affidavit constitutes sufficient evidence that the
arbitration agreement did not exist.  Therefore, a genuine
issue of material fact has been raised concerning the
existence of the arbitration agreement.  "If the party
opposing arbitration presents sufficient evidence to create a
fact question as to the existence of a valid arbitration
agreement, then the issue must be resolved by the trial court
or by a jury, if one is requested."  Ex parte Caver, 742 So.
2d at 172 n.4.
Based on Mrs. Gordon's demand in her complaint for a
trial by jury, the issue whether an arbitration agreement
existed between SSC and Mrs. Gordon should have been tried
before a jury.  See Rule 39(a), Ala. R. Civ. P.  However, the
trial court denied the defendants' motions to compel
arbitration 
without 
submitting 
the 
issue 
to 
a 
jury.
Therefore, the trial court's order denying the defendants'
motions to compel is reversed, and the case is remanded for a
jury trial to determine whether an arbitration agreement
existed between SSC and Mrs. Gordon.   
The defendants also raise arguments concerning the trial
1080396
14
court's order granting Mrs. Gordon's motion to strike Roper's
affidavit testimony.  This issue is moot in light of our
decision to reverse the trial court's order and remand the
case for a jury trial to determine whether an arbitration
agreement exists.  
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court's
order and remand this case for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.  
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Smith, Parker, and Shaw, JJ.,
concur.