Title: Commonwealth v. Rodriguez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11814
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 22, 2015

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SJC-11814 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ELIVETTE RODRIGUEZ. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     March 5, 2015. - September 22, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Marijuana.  Threshold Police Inquiry.  Search and Seizure, 
Threshold police inquiry, Reasonable suspicion.  
Constitutional Law, Investigatory stop, Reasonable 
suspicion. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the New Bedford Division 
of the District Court Department on April 27, 2012. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Joseph 
I. Macy, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Gants, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to 
the Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court on its own 
initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
John L. Calcagni, III, for the defendant. 
 
Corey T. Mastin, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  This case, in which the defendant appeals 
from the denial of her motion to suppress, centers on a motor 
vehicle stop based on a police officer's detection of an odor of 
burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle.  It requires us to 
evaluate further the impact of G. L. c. 94C, §§ 32L-32N, 
inserted by St. 2008, c. 387, §§ 2-4, which decriminalized 
possession of one ounce or less of marijuana.  For the reasons 
discussed hereafter, we conclude that at least in a stop such as 
this one, where there was at best reasonable suspicion to 
believe that a civil marijuana infraction was occurring, but not 
probable cause, the stop was impermissible.  Accordingly, the 
order denying the defendant's motion to suppress must be 
reversed. 
 
1.  Background.  To provide context, we summarize the 
evidence presented at the hearing on the defendant's motion to 
suppress.1  On the evening of April 26, 2012, Detective Daniel 
Amaral of the New Bedford police department was driving an 
unmarked police cruiser assisting a narcotics surveillance team 
of police officers when he came upon a motor vehicle that he had 
                     
 
1 At the evidentiary hearing, one witness testified, 
Detective Daniel Amaral of the New Bedford police department.  
Following the hearing, the motion judge wrote a brief memorandum 
of decision, but it does not include specific factual findings.  
The information summarized in the text is taken from the 
testimonial evidence presented.  This factual information does 
not appear to be disputed, and it is not inconsistent with the 
motion judge's decision.  See Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 
Mass. 429, 436-438 (2015). 
3 
 
stopped once before.  During the earlier stop, Amaral had 
arrested the woman who normally drove that vehicle for heroin 
possession.  He knew that the surveillance team was interested 
in the vehicle because of its connection to the earlier drug-
related arrest.  Accordingly, he followed the vehicle and 
thereafter received instruction from the surveillance team to 
pull it over.2 
 
As Amaral followed the vehicle, he detected an odor of 
burnt marijuana coming from it.3  Based on the odor, and without 
having seen the driver of the vehicle commit any traffic 
violations, Amaral pulled the vehicle over and approached the 
driver's side.  The driver, a male, held in his right hand what 
Amaral recognized as a marijuana cigar.  Amaral asked the driver 
whether the cigar was what was causing the odor, and the driver 
responded that it was.  Amaral then confiscated the cigar and 
asked for the driver's license and registration.  The stop 
                     
 
2 The background that led to the instruction was the 
following:  the surveillance team that night saw the vehicle 
stop in front of a "home of interest"; the driver of the vehicle 
went into the home, at which point the team instructed Amaral 
that if the driver did not remain in the residence long, the 
vehicle should be stopped and the driver questioned.  Minutes 
after the driver went into the home, the driver returned to the 
vehicle and drove away. 
 
 
3 Both Amaral and the vehicle driver had their windows down, 
allowing Amaral to smell the odor.  In addition, Amaral had 
significant experience in narcotics investigation and 
interdiction, and we assume without deciding that he was 
qualified to identify the odor as that of burnt marijuana. 
4 
 
continued, and in the course of it, police discovered a plastic 
bag in the vehicle containing sixty Percocet pills.4  The 
defendant, a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the stop, 
was charged with possession with intent to distribute a class B 
substance in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (a),5 conspiracy to 
violate the drugs laws under G. L. c. 94C, § 40, and a drug 
violation near a school or park under G. L. c. 94C, § 32J -- all 
in connection with the pills. 
 
On November 30, 2012, the defendant moved to suppress 
evidence of the pills.  The motion judge held an evidentiary 
hearing on May 3, 2013; the only issue addressed was the 
propriety of the motor vehicle stop.  Following the hearing, the 
judge concluded that the odor of burnt marijuana, coupled with 
other "suspicious activity implicating but not rising to drug 
activity" involving the vehicle, justified the stop.  A single 
justice of this court granted the defendant's request for leave 
to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the order denying the 
motion to suppress, and directed the appeal to be heard in the 
                     
 
4 The defendant's attorney represented during oral argument 
before us that the manner in which the bag of pills was 
discovered was the subject of a separate motion to suppress that 
remains pending in the District Court.  The record in this case 
contains no information concerning how the pills were 
discovered, but the issue is not relevant to our analysis here. 
 
 
5 The defendant was originally charged with cocaine 
trafficking in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b).  That 
charge was eventually reduced to possession with intent to 
distribute a class B substance. 
5 
 
Appeals Court.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as appearing 
in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996); G. L. c. 211, § 4A.  We transferred 
the case from the Appeals Court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  "When reviewing a motion to suppress 
evidence, we adopt the motion judge's subsidiary findings of 
fact absent clear error, but we independently determine the 
correctness of the judge's application of constitutional 
principles to the facts as found."  Commonwealth v. Catanzaro, 
441 Mass. 46, 50 (2004).  See Commonwealth v. Craan, 469 Mass. 
24, 26 (2014). 
 
In 2008, as a result of an initiative petition adopted by 
the voters, possession of one ounce or less of marijuana changed 
from being a criminal to a civil offense in the Commonwealth.  
See G. L. c. 94C, §§ 32L-32N.  See also Commonwealth v. Cruz, 
459 Mass. 459, 470 (2011).  As a consequence of the change, this 
court has concluded that once police have validly stopped a 
vehicle for a reason independent of marijuana, the odor of burnt 
marijuana alone does not create probable cause or even a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify 
ordering the vehicle's occupants to get out of the vehicle.  See 
Cruz, supra at 472, 476.  We also have concluded that the odor 
of either burnt or unburnt marijuana does not support a finding 
of probable cause to search a vehicle without a warrant.  See 
Commonwealth v. Overmyer, 469 Mass. 16, 23 (2014); Cruz, supra 
6 
 
at 475-476.  See also Craan, 469 Mass. at 29-35; Commonwealth v. 
Daniel, 464 Mass. 746, 751-757 (2013).  Recognizing the changed 
status of possession of small quantities of marijuana, the 
Commonwealth concedes that in the present case, the odor of 
burnt marijuana, even when combined with the other limited 
indicia of a drug transaction that preceded the vehicle stop, 
did not amount to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that 
would have justified the police in stopping the vehicle for 
investigative purposes.  Nonetheless, because c. 94C, § 32L, 
simply decriminalizes the possession of one ounce or less of 
marijuana and replaces the criminal penalty with a civil penalty 
for such possession,6 the Commonwealth analogizes the stop that 
occurred here to routine stops of automobiles for civil traffic 
violations.  Pursuing the analogy, the Commonwealth urges us to 
affirm the order denying the defendant's motion to suppress on 
the ground that, just as an officer may stop a motor vehicle to 
                     
 
6 General laws c. 94C, § 32L, provides, in pertinent part: 
 
 
"Notwithstanding any general or special law to the 
contrary, possession of one ounce or less of marihuana 
shall only be a civil offense, subjecting an offender who 
is eighteen years of age or older to a civil penalty of one 
hundred dollars and forfeiture of the marihuana, but not to 
any other form of criminal or civil punishment or 
disqualification." 
7 
 
issue a citation for a civil traffic offense, an officer may do 
so in order to issue a civil citation for marijuana possession.7 
 
Because both the Commonwealth and the defendant premise 
much of their arguments on the statutes that establish 
procedures for issuing citations for traffic violations and for 
civil marijuana infractions, we begin our analysis with a review 
of those statutes.  General Laws c. 90C, §§ 2 and 3 (A), 
authorize police to issue citations for motor vehicle traffic 
violations, including civil infractions.8,9  The Commonwealth 
                     
 
7 Recognizing that this argument differs from the basis on 
which the District Court motion judge denied the defendant's 
motion to suppress, the Commonwealth argues that we may 
nevertheless affirm the denial "on grounds different from those 
relied on by the motion judge if the correct or preferred basis 
for affirmance is supported by the record and the findings."  
Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe, 425 Mass. 99, 102 (1997). 
 
 
8 General Laws c. 90C, § 2, provides, in pertinent part: 
 
 
"[A]ny police officer assigned to traffic enforcement 
duty shall, whether or not the offense occurs within his 
presence, record the occurrence of automobile law 
violations upon a citation . . . and [indicate] thereon 
. . . whether the citation shall constitute a written 
warning and, if not, whether the violation is a criminal 
offense for which an application for a complaint as 
provided by [G. L. c. 90C, § 3 (B)] shall be made, whether 
the violation is a civil motor vehicle infraction which may 
be disposed of in accordance with [G. L. c. 90C, §  3 (A)], 
or whether the violator has been arrested in accordance 
with [G. L. c. 90, §  21].  Said police officer shall 
inform the violator of the violation and shall give a copy 
of the citation to the violator.  Such citation shall be 
signed by said police officer and by the violator, and 
whenever a citation is given to the violator in person that 
fact shall be so certified by the police officer.  The 
8 
 
argues, and the defendant agrees, that although these statutes 
contain no express language regarding police authority to stop 
moving vehicles for the purpose of issuing citations for civil 
traffic violations, such stops have been permitted.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bacon, 381 Mass. 642, 644 (1980) ("Where police 
have observed a traffic violation, they are warranted in 
stopping a vehicle").  See also Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 445 
Mass. 72, 75 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1187 (2006) 
(permitting vehicle stop based on inoperable headlight); 
                                                                  
violator shall be requested to sign the citation in order 
to acknowledge that it has been received. . . . 
 
 
"A failure to give a copy of the citation to the 
violator at the time and place of the violation shall 
constitute a defense in any court proceeding for such 
violation, except where the violator could not have been 
stopped or where additional time was reasonably necessary 
to determine the nature of the violation or the identity of 
the violator, or where the court finds that a circumstance, 
not inconsistent with the purpose of this section to create 
a uniform, simplified and non-criminal method for disposing 
of automobile law violations, justifies the failure.  In 
such case the violation shall be recorded upon a citation 
as soon as possible after such violation and the citation 
shall be delivered to the violator or mailed to him at his 
residential or mail address or to the address appearing on 
his license or registration as appearing in registry of 
motor vehicles records." 
 
 
9 General laws c. 90C, § 3 (A) (1), provides, in pertinent 
part: 
 
 
"If a police officer observes or has brought to the 
officer's attention the occurrence of a civil motor vehicle 
infraction, the officer may issue a written warning or may 
cite the violator for a civil motor vehicle infraction 
. . . ." 
 
9 
 
Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205, 207 (1995) (permitting 
stop for defective taillight).10  The Commonwealth contends that, 
similar to these traffic violation statutes, G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32N,11 provides a mechanism for issuing civil citations for 
marijuana possession -- specifically, through G. L. c. 40, 
§ 21D, which governs noncriminal disposition of certain 
municipal enactments12 -- and that this mechanism should be 
                     
 
10 The parties did not identify, nor did we find, any case 
that directly discusses whether G. L. c. 90C, §§ 2 and 3 (A), 
authorize police officers to stop moving automobiles in order to 
issue traffic citations.  However, cases citing these statutes 
suggest that the statutes have been read as authorizing vehicle 
stops.  See Commonwealth v. Goewey, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 429, 432 
(2007), S.C., 452 Mass. 399, 405 (2008) (citing G. L. c. 90C, 
§ 3 [A] [1], as support for conclusion that traffic stop was 
valid).  See also Commonwealth v. Correia, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 
780, 786 (2013) (mentioning G. L. c. 90C, § 2). 
 
11 See G. L. c. 94C, § 32N, first par. ("The police 
department serving each political subdivision of the 
Commonwealth shall enforce [G. L. c. 94C, § 32L,] in a manner 
consistent with the non-criminal provisions of [G. L. c. 40, 
§ 21D]"). 
 
 
12 General Laws c. 40, § 21D, provides, in pertinent part: 
 
 
"Any city or town may by ordinance or by-law not 
inconsistent with this section provide for non-criminal 
disposition of violations of any ordinance or by-law or any 
rule or regulation of any municipal officer, board or 
department the violation of which is subject to a specific 
penalty. 
 
"Any such ordinance or by-law shall provide that any 
person taking cognizance of a violation of a specific 
ordinance, by-law, rule or regulation which he is empowered 
to enforce, hereinafter referred to as the enforcing 
person, as an alternative to initiating criminal 
proceedings shall, or, if so provided in such ordinance or 
10 
 
understood as also authorizing police to stop vehicles to issue 
civil marijuana citations.  Furthermore, the Commonwealth notes 
that in order for a police officer to be able to issue a 
citation for marijuana possession to a person in a moving 
automobile and still comply with the requirements of c. 40, 
§ 21D, the officer must be able to order the car to stop.13 
                                                                  
by-law, may, give to the offender a written notice to 
appear before the clerk of the district court having 
jurisdiction thereof at any time during office hours, not 
later than twenty-one days after the date of such 
notice. . . .  Such notice shall be signed by the enforcing 
person, and shall be signed by the offender whenever 
practicable in acknowledgment that such notice has been 
received. 
 
 
"The enforcing person shall, if possible, deliver to 
the offender a copy of said notice at the time and place of 
the violation.  If it is not possible to deliver a copy of 
said notice to the offender at the time and place of the 
violation, said copy shall be mailed or delivered by the 
enforcing person, or by his commanding officer or the head 
of his department or by any person authorized by such 
commanding officer, department or head to the offender's 
last known address, within fifteen days after said 
violation.  Such notice as so mailed shall be deemed a 
sufficient notice, and a certificate of the person so 
mailing such notice that it has been mailed in accordance 
with this section shall be prima facie evidence thereof." 
 
13 General Laws c. 40, § 21D, like G. L. c. 90C, § 2, in the 
automobile law context, directs the officer issuing a citation 
in accordance with these statutes to give the offender a copy of 
the notice of the offense "at the time and place of the 
violation" if possible.  (See notes 8 and 12, supra.)  The 
Commonwealth argues that compliance with this requirement would 
never be possible if the offender were in a moving automobile 
that the officer had no authority to stop.  Moreover, it would 
be likely that the officer could not even obtain the offender's 
name and address, as c. 40, § 21D, requires, while the offender 
is in a moving automobile. 
11 
 
 
Focusing first on our traffic violation statutes, we agree 
with the position of both the Commonwealth and the defendant 
that because many of these laws pertain specifically to moving 
vehicles, and G. L. c. 90C, § 2, requires an officer to give a 
copy of a traffic citation to the violator and to ask that 
person to sign the citation, c. 90C, §§ 2 and 3 (A), implicitly 
authorize police officers to stop motor vehicles in order to 
issue traffic citations.  Otherwise, it would be impossible for 
police to issue citations for moving traffic violations.  
Moreover, many of the traffic violation laws serve a public 
safety purpose, and allowing police to stop moving vehicles that 
are violating them in order to issue traffic citations is one 
mechanism of promoting safety on our roads.  The parties' 
reading of c. 90C, §§ 2 and 3 (A), is consistent with this 
purpose. 
 
Like G. L. c. 90C, §§ 2 and 3 (A), neither G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32N, nor G. L. c. 40, § 21D, says anything about police 
authority to stop moving vehicles for the purpose of issuing 
citations -- they are simply silent on this point.  But in 
contrast to c. 90C, §§ 2 and 3 (A), the marijuana possession 
decriminalization statutes do not directly relate to moving 
vehicles or to traffic safety.  We need not resolve here, 
however, the question whether, and if so, in what circumstances, 
c. 94C, § 32N, and c. 40, § 21D, authorize police to stop a 
12 
 
motor vehicle in order to enforce the civil penalties for 
marijuana possession under G. L. c. 94C, § 32L.  This is so 
because quite apart from these statutes, there are 
constitutional considerations that must first be taken into 
account, and in the end, these constitutional considerations 
carry the day. 
 
A police stop of a moving automobile constitutes a seizure, 
and therefore, any such stop, whatever its purpose, must comply 
with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
with art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 430 Mass. 577, 579 (2000).  See also 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810 (1996); Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).  We recognize that in the 
civil traffic law violation context, appellate decisions in 
Massachusetts have deemed constitutionally permissible stops 
that factually appeared to satisfy either the probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion standard.14  See Santana, 420 Mass. at 206-
207; Commonwealth v. Baez, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 115, 118 (1999).  
See also Bacon, 381 Mass. at 643-644.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
                     
 
14 Other courts have allowed under the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution stops based on reasonable 
suspicion of traffic offenses.  See United States v. Fox, 393 
F.3d 52, 59 (1st Cir. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 429 F.3d 
316 (2005).  See also United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 
392, 396-397 (3d Cir. 2006) (reviewing Federal Circuit Courts of 
Appeals that have allowed stops to enforce traffic laws based on 
reasonable suspicion). 
 
13 
 
Washington, 459 Mass. 32, 38-39 & n.14 (2011).15  Nevertheless, 
for the reasons discussed infra, similar stops to enforce the 
civil penalty for marijuana possession are constitutionally 
distinct, and warrant their own Fourth Amendment and art. 14 
analysis. 
 
In undertaking that analysis here, the first task is to 
determine whether we are dealing with an issue of probable cause 
or reasonable suspicion.  In Commonwealth v. Garden, 451 Mass. 
43 (2008), we stated that the "odor of marijuana is sufficiently 
distinctive that it alone can supply probable cause to believe 
that marijuana is nearby."  Id. at 48.  See Commonwealth v. 
Lawrence L., 439 Mass. 817, 823 (2003) ("odors alone may be 
sufficient to satisfy the probable cause requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment").  However, that decision preceded the 
decriminalization of possession of one ounce or less of 
marijuana.  See Garden, supra at 43.  Since then, we have 
"reconsider[ed] our jurisprudence in light of the change to our 
laws."  See Cruz, 459 Mass. at 464 & n.8.  In particular, our 
analysis of the meaning that can be derived from the odor of 
marijuana alone has evolved, such that, as indicated previously, 
we no longer consider the "strong" or "very strong" smell of 
                     
 
15 This is so even though the standards of probable cause 
and reasonable suspicion are tied to the investigation of 
criminal conduct, not infractionary conduct.  See Commonwealth 
v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 465-466 (2011). 
14 
 
unburnt marijuana to provide probable cause to believe that a 
criminal amount of the drug is present, see Overmyer, 469 Mass. 
at 23; nor is such a determination of probable cause appropriate 
based on the smell of burnt marijuana combined with the presence 
of two small bags totaling less than one ounce.  See Daniel, 464 
Mass. at 747, 751-752.  Although we have not explicitly 
addressed since the passage of the decriminalization statute 
whether the odor of marijuana alone creates probable cause to 
believe that any amount of the drug is present, these cases 
remind us that in reevaluating what inferences may now be drawn 
from evidence that suggests the possible presence of marijuana, 
we must also keep in mind the varied and occasionally complex 
contexts in which such evidence presents itself. 
 
With this principle in mind, Garden's conclusion that the 
odor of marijuana alone creates probable cause to believe that 
the drug is still present is insufficiently nuanced, because it 
fails to account for the significant possibility that the odor 
of burnt marijuana may be present on a person or in a vehicle, 
but the drug itself is not.  As we noted in Garden itself, where 
the occupants of a vehicle wore clothes that smelled like 
marijuana but a patfrisk of these persons produced no drugs, the 
odor of burnt marijuana in this context may have "suggest[ed] 
that the defendant, or others in the car, had been smoking 
marijuana in the not too distant past."  Id. at 52.  We add here 
15 
 
another possibility:  that the individuals who smelled like 
marijuana could have been at a social gathering where others 
smoked marijuana.  See Daniel, 464 Mass. at 747, 756 (interior 
of vehicle smelled of burnt marijuana; driver attributed this 
smell to being at party where others smoked).  These examples 
illustrate the point that although the occupants of a vehicle, 
or the vehicle's interior, might smell like burnt marijuana, 
that does not necessarily mean that an occupant of the vehicle 
currently possesses any amount of marijuana.  Therefore, upon 
further consideration of these possibilities, and keeping in 
mind that probable cause determinations turn on "probabilities," 
including "factual and practical considerations of everyday 
life," see Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 895 (1990) 
(citation omitted), we conclude that in a case such as the 
present one, where the only factor leading an officer to 
conclude that an individual possesses marijuana is the smell of 
burnt marijuana, this factor supports a reasonable suspicion 
that that individual is committing the civil offense of 
possession of a small quantity of marijuana, but not probable 
cause to believe that he or she is committing the offense.  
Therefore, the question in this case is whether the Fourth 
Amendment and art. 14 permit police to stop a vehicle where they 
have reasonable suspicion, but not probable cause, to believe 
16 
 
that a civil, infractionary offense of marijuana possession is 
occurring or has occurred. 
 
"[T]he 'ultimate touchstone of both the Fourth Amendment 
. . . and art. 14 . . . is reasonableness.'"  Overmyer, 469 
Mass. at 20, quoting Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 
213 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 945 (2013).  Thus, to 
evaluate the permissibility of particular law enforcement 
practices, including police stops of moving vehicles where there 
is no probable cause to suspect the vehicle's involvement in 
criminal activity, courts have balanced the intrusiveness of the 
police activities at issue against any legitimate governmental 
interests that these activities serve.  See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 
654, 658-661 (prohibiting vehicle stops without any evidence of 
traffic or equipment violation).  See also Whren, 517 U.S. at 
817-818 (where police lack probable cause for vehicle stop, 
detailed balancing of interests has determined stop's 
reasonableness).  Cf. Catanzaro, 441 Mass. at 56 ("There is no 
ready test for reasonableness [under art. 14] except by 
balancing the need to search or seize against the invasion that 
the search or seizure entails").  In balancing these factors, we 
keep in mind that "art. 14 may provide greater protection than 
the Fourth Amendment against searches and seizures."  Rodriguez, 
430 Mass. at 584. 
17 
 
 
Regardless of the reason for it, a police stop of a moving 
vehicle can be "humiliating, frightening, and embarrassing" for 
the vehicle's occupants, and can raise the possibility of arrest 
and incarceration for a crime unrelated to the original reason 
for the stop, as the present case illustrates.  See Woods, 
Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops, 
62 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 672, 713 (2015).  Cf. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 
657 (random vehicle stops to check documents "generally entail 
law enforcement officers signaling a moving automobile to pull 
over to the side of the roadway, by means of a possibly 
unsettling show of authority[,] . . . interfere with freedom of 
movement, are inconvenient, . . . consume time . . . [and] may 
create substantial anxiety").  However, in the automobile law 
context, allowing police to make these stops serves a 
significant governmental interest.  As discussed previously, 
many of our traffic violation statutes regulate moving cars and 
relate directly to the promotion of public safety; even those 
laws that have to do with maintaining a vehicle's equipment in 
accordance with certain standards may also be safety-related.  
See id. at 658 (recognizing States' "vital interest" in vehicle 
inspection and registration requirements, which ensure that all 
vehicles are "fit for safe operation").  Permitting stops based 
on reasonable suspicion or probable cause that these laws may 
have been violated gives police the ability to immediately 
18 
 
address potential safety hazards on the road.  Thus, although a 
vehicle stop does represent a significant intrusion into an 
individual's privacy, the governmental interest in allowing such 
stops for the purpose of promoting compliance with our 
automobile laws is clear and compelling. 
 
No similar governmental interest supports allowing police 
to stop a vehicle based on reasonable suspicion that someone in 
the vehicle possesses an ounce or less of marijuana in violation 
of G. L. c. 94C, § 32L.  Although vehicle stops to investigate 
civil marijuana infractions serve a general law enforcement 
purpose, there is no obvious and direct link between enforcement 
of the civil penalty for marijuana possession and maintaining 
highway safety.16  Moreover, particularly because possession of 
one ounce or less of marijuana was decriminalized through a 
ballot initiative, our analysis of the governmental interests 
                     
 
16 It is important to distinguish simple marijuana 
possession, which is at issue here, from the offense of 
operating a vehicle while under the influence of marijuana.  
Driving while under the influence of marijuana is a serious 
offense that may well present safety hazards requiring the 
immediate involvement of police.  See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) 
(1) (prohibiting driving while under influence of substances, 
including marijuana).  However, the mere fact that a vehicle 
driver or passenger possesses marijuana does not mean that the 
driver has been operating while impaired.  Thus, we have 
rejected the suggestion that evidence that a driver possessed a 
noncriminal amount of marijuana, without any evidence of the 
driver's impairment, created probable cause to believe the 
driver was operating while under the influence of marijuana and 
justified searching the vehicle.  Commonwealth v. Daniel, 464 
Mass. 751, 754-757 (2013). 
19 
 
served by allowing police to stop vehicles in order to enforce 
the civil penalty under this law "must give effect to the clear 
intent of the people of the Commonwealth in accord with art. 14 
. . . and the Fourth Amendment."  See Cruz, 459 Mass. at 464-
465.  We have determined that the people's intent in 
decriminalizing possession of this small quantity of marijuana 
was to establish that this offense was no longer "a serious 
infraction worthy of criminal sanction," and that those who 
commit this offense should be treated differently from other 
drug offenders.  Id. at 471.  In particular, we have identified 
three policy goals that c. 94C, § 32L, was intended to serve:  
"to reduce the direct and collateral consequences of possessing 
small amounts of marijuana, to direct law enforcement's 
attention to serious crime, and to save taxpayer resources 
previously devoted to targeting the simple possession of 
marijuana."  Commonwealth v. Jackson, 464 Mass. 758, 765 (2013).  
See Cruz, supra at 471-472.  Permitting police to stop a vehicle 
based on reasonable suspicion that an occupant possesses 
marijuana does not serve these objectives.  Rather, it 
encourages police to continue to investigate and to pursue 
individuals suspected of this offense in the same manner as 
before decriminalization, it does not refocus police efforts on 
pursuing more serious crime, and it subjects individuals who 
20 
 
police merely suspect may be committing a nondangerous, civil 
offense to all of the potential consequences of a vehicle stop. 
 
Although marijuana possession remains illegal, the present 
case is not one in which a police officer actually observed an 
infraction -- such as a person walking through a park smoking 
what appeared to be a marijuana cigar or cigarette -- and 
stopped the offender for the purpose of issuing a citation and 
confiscating the offending item.  Rather, here, an officer 
smelled burnt marijuana, nothing more, and stopped a vehicle to 
investigate further whether a citation was appropriate.  (It was 
only after the stop had been made that Amaral observed the 
driver's marijuana cigar.)  Because stops based on reasonable 
suspicion of a possible civil marijuana infraction do not 
promote highway safety and run contrary to the purposes of G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32L, we are disinclined to extend the rule that allows 
vehicle stops based on reasonable suspicion of a civil motor 
vehicle offense to stops to enforce the civil penalty for 
possession of one ounce or less of marijuana.  Such stops are 
unreasonable; therefore, the stop in this case violated art. 14. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion 
to suppress is reversed.  The case is remanded to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.   
 
 
 
 
 
CORDY, J. (dissenting, with whom Spina, J., joins).  "An 
Act establishing a sensible State marijuana policy," codified at 
G. L. c. 94C, §§ 32lL-32N, did not legalize the possession of 
marijuana; it merely decriminalized the possession of small 
amounts.  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 464 (2011).  
Such possession remains a civil offense and, as with other civil 
offenses, subjects the offender to a civil penalty and 
forfeiture of the marijuana.  G. L. c. 94C, § 32L. 
 
The novel issue presented here is whether reasonable 
suspicion of a civil marijuana violation occurring in a motor 
vehicle is sufficient to justify stopping the motor vehicle for 
purposes of confirming or dispelling that suspicion and, if 
necessary, for purposes of issuing a citation.1  The court, after 
employing a balancing test weighing the level of intrusion of a 
motor vehicle stop against the legitimate governmental interest 
at stake in the enforcement of the marijuana laws, concludes 
that reasonable suspicion is not sufficient to justify such a 
stop.  For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully dissent. 
                     
 
1 It is important to note that in order to issue a citation 
for a civil traffic violation, an officer must possess at least 
probable cause.  See Commonwealth v. Washington, 459 Mass. 32, 
39 & n.14 (2011).  This, however, does not mean that an officer 
must have probable cause to stop a person suspected of a civil 
traffic violation.  Rather, "an officer's reasonable suspicion 
of a possible, but unconfirmed, motor vehicle violation 
sufficiently justifies an investigatory traffic stop in order to 
verify or dispel that suspicion."  Id. at 39 n.14. 
2 
 
 
 
It is undisputed that a motor vehicle stop conducted by a 
police officer constitutes a seizure for purposes of both the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 430 Mass. 577, 579 (2000), citing Michigan Dep't of 
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990).  It is well 
settled, however, that reasonable suspicion that a civil traffic 
offense has been committed is constitutionally sufficient to 
justify a motor vehicle stop.  See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 663 (1979) (officer must have "at least articulable and 
reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an 
automobile is not registered, or that the vehicle or an occupant 
is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law"); 
Commonwealth v. Washington, 459 Mass. 32, 39 & n.14 (2011) 
("officer's reasonable suspicion of a possible, but unconfirmed, 
motor vehicle violation sufficiently justifies an investigatory 
traffic stop in order to verify or dispel that suspicion").  See 
also Commonwealth v. Baez, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 115, 118 (1999) 
(reasonable suspicion that window is illegally tinted sufficient 
to justify stopping motor vehicle to ascertain whether civil 
violation had occurred).  In my view, there is no 
constitutionally based reason to distinguish stops for civil 
marijuana violations (occurring in motor vehicles) from stops 
3 
 
 
for civil motor vehicle violations.  Reasonable suspicion of a 
civil violation is enough. 
  
 The court, however, concludes that a detailed balancing 
inquiry is required when a motor vehicle stop is conducted in 
the absence of probable cause.  The cases on which the court 
relies in support of this conclusion, however, concern police 
activities conducted without any individualized suspicion.  For 
example, Prouse, 440 U.S. at 650-651, concerned the 
constitutionality of a motor vehicle stop that was conducted 
without any suspicion of a traffic or equipment violation, 
solely to check the driver's license and automobile 
registration.  In determining the stop's reasonableness, the 
Supreme Court employed a balancing inquiry because the officers 
possessed no individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.  
See id. at 654-659. 
 
Likewise, the central issue addressed by the Supreme Court 
in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996), was not the 
quantum of proof necessary to effectuate a motor vehicle stop 
for a traffic violation, but whether the (allegedly racial) 
subjective motivation of the police officer conducting the motor 
vehicle stop was relevant to the stop's reasonableness.  The 
Court declined to engage in a detailed balancing inquiry to 
determine the stop's reasonableness, concluding that such 
balancing is not necessary when a motor vehicle stop is 
4 
 
 
conducted with individualized suspicion, id. at 817-819, in that 
case, probable cause to believe a civil motor vehicle infraction 
had occurred.   Id. at 819.  Here, there is also individualized 
suspicion, albeit at least reasonable suspicion.2 
 
Finally, the court relies on Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 430 
Mass. 577, 580-581 (2000), to support its balancing inquiry.  
The Rodriguez case, however, addressed the constitutionality of 
a police roadblock set up for the purpose of interdicting 
illegal drugs.  Id. at 585-586.  This court noted that except 
for a few narrowly defined public safety intrusions, a police 
officer must possess at least reasonable suspicion to justify a 
motor vehicle stop.  Id. at 580, quoting United States v. 
Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547, 553 (6th Cir. 1998).  Again, a motor 
vehicle stop conducted as part of a suspicionless roadblock is 
                     
 
2 In my view, there is also probable cause.  Our 
jurisprudence in Commonwealth v. Garden, 451 Mass. 43, 48 
(2008), remains relevant and instructive.  In that case, we 
concluded that the "odor of marijuana is sufficiently 
distinctive that it alone can supply probable cause to believe 
that marijuana is nearby."  Id.  Nothing has occurred that 
warrants a reconsideration of this common-sense conclusion.  
What has occurred is a change in the law making the possession 
of small amounts of marijuana a civil rather than criminal 
offense.  That there is probable cause to believe some amount of 
marijuana is nearby remains logical and really beyond debate.  
The notion of someone having marijuana odor on their clothes 
(and none in their possession) remains possible -- but does not 
defeat probable cause. Indeed, the odor of marijuana streaming 
out of a moving vehicle seems totally inconsistent with the 
court's hypothetical scenario. 
5 
 
 
markedly different from a motor vehicle stop made on reasonable 
suspicion of a civil marijuana violation. 
 
In my view, no detailed balancing of interests is necessary 
where this court has already recognized that reasonable 
suspicion of a civil motor vehicle infraction is sufficient to 
justify an investigatory stop for purposes of confirming or 
dispelling that suspicion.  See Washington, 459 Mass. at 39 & 
n.14.  "[T]he reasonableness standard usually requires, at a 
minimum, that the facts upon which an intrusion is based be 
capable of measurement against 'an objective standard,' whether 
this be probable cause or a less stringent test" (footnotes 
omitted).  Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654.  That standard is met here 
and standing alone should be sufficient to justify an 
investigatory stop for the purpose of confirming a civil 
violation of the marijuana laws and issuing a citation just as 
reasonable suspicion of a civil traffic violation justifies such 
a stop.  See, e.g., People v. Brown, 62 Cal. App. 4th 493, 496-
497 (1998) (officer may stop individual suspected of violating 
California vehicle code in order to issue citation); State v. 
Brown, 694 A.2d 453, 453 (Me. 1997) ("In order to support a 
brief investigatory stop of a motor vehicle, . . . a police 
officer must have an articulable suspicion that criminal conduct 
or a civil violation has occurred, is occurring, or is about to 
occur . . ."); State v. Colstad, 260 Wis.2d 406, 414-415, cert. 
6 
 
 
denied, 540 U.S. 877 (2003) (reasonable suspicion that driver 
violated traffic ordinance justified investigatory stop).  The 
stop is investigative in nature, and its purpose is merely to 
confirm or dispel the officer's suspicion that a civil marijuana 
violation has occurred.3 
 
The court goes on to opine that because a civil marijuana 
violation generally has no bearing on traffic and automobile 
safety, a motor vehicle stop to enforce that law is different 
from a motor vehicle stop for purposes of enforcing the civil 
traffic laws, and, consequently, in the court's balance inquiry, 
probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion is necessary to 
justify such a stop.  While it may be true that not all civil 
marijuana violations have an impact on automobile safety, to the 
extent that such a consideration is of any constitutional 
relevance, it seems also true that civil marijuana violations 
occurring in motor vehicles do implicate concerns regarding 
                     
 
3 It is important to note that the authority to stop only 
extends to confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicion.  As 
this court has recognized, the smell of burnt or unburnt 
marijuana does not establish probable cause for purposes of 
arrests, see Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 472-476 
(2011); searches, see Commonwealth v. Craan, 469 Mass. 24, 35 
(2014); and exit orders, see Cruz, supra at 472, 476.  Thus, in 
order for an officer to go any further than issuing a civil 
marijuana citation, the officer must possess some additional 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause of criminal activity.  
See Cruz, supra at 472.  See also Commonwealth v. Daniel, 464 
Mass. 746, 752 (2013) ("Absent articulable facts supporting a 
belief that either occupant of the vehicle possessed a criminal 
amount of marijuana, the search was not justified by the need to 
search for contraband"). 
7 
 
 
traffic and automobile safety.4  Indeed, sending and receiving 
electronic messages has no bearing on traffic and automobile 
safety when done in a park.  When done while operating a motor 
vehicle, however, it presents enough of a safety risk that it is 
now prohibited by law.  See G. L. c. 90, § 13B.5 
 
Finally, the court concludes not only that probable cause 
is necessary, but also that probable cause can be established 
only if the police officer actually sees the illegal use of 
marijuana.  To my knowledge, we have not in the past concluded 
that probable cause can only be established in this manner.  
See, e.g., Washington, 459 Mass. at 40 (although officer did not 
actually see defendant riding in motor vehicle without seat 
belt, officer had probable cause sufficient to issue citation 
                     
 
4 This is not to say that the smell of marijuana alone is 
sufficient to establish either reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause that an individual is driving under the influence of 
marijuana in violation of G. L. c. § 24 (1) (a) (1).  See 
Daniel, 464 Mass. at 756 (smell of burnt marijuana without any 
indication that driver's capacity to operate motor vehicle was 
impaired not sufficient basis for belief driver was operating 
while under the influence).  Nevertheless, Daniel is 
distinguishable:  the officer smelled "freshly burnt" marijuana 
(which could have been attributable to previous use at a party) 
when he approached the stopped vehicle.  Id. at 749.  Here, the 
officer detected the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from a 
moving vehicle. 
 
 
5 It is also not clear under the court's analysis whether 
reasonable suspicion of a civil marijuana violation would be 
sufficient for stopping a pedestrian for purposes of confirming 
or dispelling that suspicion and issuing a citation if 
confirmed. 
8 
 
 
where defendant was not wearing seat belt very shortly after 
traffic stop). 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.