Title: City of Gulf Shores v. Coyote Beach Sports, LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC-2023-0637, SC-2023-0839, SC-2024-0164, SC-2024-0167
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 12, 2024

Rel: April 12, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0637 
_________________________ 
 
City of Gulf Shores 
 
v. 
 
Coyote Beach Sports, LLC 
 
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court 
(CV-21-900648) 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0839 
_________________________ 
 
City of Gulf Shores 
 
v. 
 
SC-2023-0637 and SC-2023-0839 
2 
 
Coyote Beach Sports, LLC 
 
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court 
(CV-21-900648) 
 
SELLERS, Justice. 
 
 Following a series of complaints and accidents involving motor 
scooters, the City of Gulf Shores ("the City") passed a municipal 
ordinance 
regulating 
the 
motor-scooter-rental 
business. 
Section 
22-101(a) of that ordinance -- Ordinance No. 2013 -- states, in relevant 
part: 
"Without regard to the person who may be the nominal rental 
customer, no rented motorcycle or motor-driven cycle shall be 
provided for operation by any person who is under the age of 
eighteen (18) years or who does not personally possess and produce 
for copying at the time of rental a valid current Alabama Class M 
motorcycle license or Class M license endorsement or, if a resident 
of a state other than Alabama, a valid current license from the state 
of residence expressly authorizing the operation of a motorcycle by 
the person in the person's state of residence." 
 
Coyote Beach Sports, LLC ("Coyote"), is a Louisiana-based limited-
liability company that has rented motor scooters -- deemed motor-driven 
cycles under state law, see § 32-1-1.1(36), Ala. Code 1975 -- in Gulf Shores 
since 2014. According to Coyote, its business effectively ceased when the 
City approved Ordinance No. 2013 because most customers, past and 
potential, did not have the required Class M license endorsement and 
SC-2023-0637 and SC-2023-0839 
3 
 
were thus not licensed to operate a motor-driven cycle under Alabama 
law.  
After its business ground to a halt, Coyote filed in the Baldwin 
Circuit Court a complaint against the City on June 15, 2021, requesting 
a judgment declaring the ordinance invalid, monetary damages, and 
attorney fees and costs. The City timely filed an answer denying Coyote's 
claims. 
After discovery, a jury trial commenced on August 14, 2023. 
Following the close of evidence on August 17, 2023, the trial court 
declared Ordinance No. 2013 preempted by state law. Thereafter, the 
jury awarded Coyote $200,416.12 in compensatory damages. The trial 
court entered a final judgment on all claims, and the City timely filed its 
notice of appeal of the trial court's judgment on September 6, 2023. On 
September 28, 2023, Coyote filed a motion for attorney fees, and, on 
November 6, 2023, the trial court, without having held a hearing, entered 
an order, which contained no written findings, awarding Coyote $59,320 
in attorney fees. The City timely appealed that order, and we 
consolidated the prior appeal with the appeal of the order containing the 
attorney-fee award. 
SC-2023-0637 and SC-2023-0839 
4 
 
Standard of Review 
The issue of the preemption of a municipal ordinance by state law 
involves a pure question of law; therefore, we apply a de novo standard 
of review. See Alabama Recycling Ass'n v. City of Montgomery, 24 So. 3d 
1085, 1088 (Ala. 2009). 
Discussion 
Although the City raises several arguments on appeal, the only 
question we need address is whether the trial court erred in ruling that 
state law preempted the City's municipal ordinance. We conclude that it 
did, and we reverse.  
Given state constitutional and statutory constraints on the ability 
of municipalities to pass ordinances inconsistent with state laws, this 
Court has recognized three circumstances under which municipal 
ordinances are preempted by state law. See Breland v. City of Fairhope, 
337 So. 3d 741, 753 (Ala. 2020). First, "[a] state statute may preempt a 
municipal ordinance expressly when the statute defines the extent to 
which its enactment preempts municipal ordinances." Ex parte Tulley, 
199 So. 3d 812, 821 (Ala. 2015). Second, a municipal ordinance may be 
preempted "when [it] attempts to regulate conduct in a field that the 
SC-2023-0637 and SC-2023-0839 
5 
 
legislature intended the state law to exclusively occupy." Id. Finally, a 
municipal ordinance may be preempted "when [it] permits what a state 
statute forbids or forbids what a statute permits." Id. The trial court ruled 
as a matter of law that Ordinance No. 2013 was preempted under either 
the second or third theory of preemption. We hold that the ordinance is 
not preempted under any of these theories.  
I. 
Alabama's Motorcycle-Licensure Statutes Do Not Preempt 
the Field of Motorcycle-Rental Regulations 
 
"For state law to preempt an entire field, '"'"an act must make 
manifest a legislative intent that no other enactment may touch upon the 
subject in any way."'"'" Breland, 337 So. 3d at 753 (quoting Peak v. City 
of Tuscaloosa, 73 So. 3d 5, 19-20 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011), quoting in turn 
other cases). Before reviewing "the text of the relevant statutes," id. 
(citing Ex parte Waddail, 827 So. 2d 789, 794 (Ala. 2001)), in search of 
clear preemptive intent, we must ensure that the "conduct in [the] field 
that the legislature intended the state law to exclusively occupy," Ex 
parte Tulley, 199 So. 3d at 821, is the same type of conduct regulated by 
the ordinance.  
Coyote directs our attention to §§ 32-5A-240 and 32-12-22, Ala. 
Code 1975, which establish the licensure requirements for Alabama 
SC-2023-0637 and SC-2023-0839 
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residents operating motorcycles in Alabama and for Alabama residents 
operating motor-driven cycles in Alabama, respectively. Conversely, 
§ 22-101(a) of Ordinance No. 2013 establishes requirements for 
regulating the rental of motorcycles or motor-driven cycles in Gulf 
Shores. Thus, even if we were to assume that the statutes Coyote 
references do preempt the field of licensure requirements for the 
operation of motorcycles and motor-driven cycles in Alabama, there 
would be no preemptive effect on Ordinance No. 2013 because the conduct 
it regulates -- the renting of motorcycles and motor-driven cycles -- is not 
the same conduct regulated by the aforementioned statutes. There is a 
distinct difference between the state's requiring a license for a citizen to 
operate a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle in Alabama and a 
municipality's adopting an ordinance to regulate the rental of 
motorcycles or motor-driven cycles within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, 
Ordinance No. 2013 is not preempted under the theory of field 
preemption. 
II. 
The City's Ordinance Does Not Conflict with State Law 
 
For similar reasons, Ordinance No. 2013 does not conflict with state 
law because it neither "permits what a state statute forbids [n]or forbids 
SC-2023-0637 and SC-2023-0839 
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what a statute permits." Ex parte Tulley, 199 So. 3d at 821. Coyote 
contests this, believing Alabama to have "a detailed statutory scheme 
regarding the licensure requirements of individuals operating motor 
vehicles within the state." Coyote's brief at 20. But, as explained above, 
the conduct licensed by state law is the operation of motorcycles and 
motor-driven cycles, not the rental of them. Indeed, Coyote can point to 
no statute in Alabama concerning the rental of motorcycles or motor-
driven cycles, and we can find no state law addressing that issue. If there 
exists no statute specifically regulating, forbidding, or permitting the 
rental of motorcycles or motor-driven cycles, then there can be no 
inconsistency between Ordinance No. 2013 and state law such that the 
ordinance is thereby preempted. See Alabama Recycling Ass'n, 24 So. 3d 
at 1088-89. Thus, Ordinance No. 2013 does not conflict with state law 
such that the ordinance is preempted.   
Conclusion 
Therefore, because the City's Ordinance No. 2013, regulating the 
rental of motorcycles and motor-driven cycles, is not preempted by any 
state law, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and, consequently, 
SC-2023-0637 and SC-2023-0839 
8 
 
the order awarding Coyote attorney fees is also reversed; these matters 
are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
SC-2023-0637 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
SC-2023-0839 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
Parker, C.J., and Wise, Stewart, and Cook, JJ., concur.