Title: MATTER OF McMASTER
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12726
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 26, 1974

No. 12726 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1974 I N THE M A T T E R O F PATRICK JOHN McMASTER, A Juvenile Delinquent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Oscar Hendrickson argued, Chinook, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas J. Beers, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana William Solem, County Attorney, argued, Chinook, Montana Submitted: September 10, 1974 DEC 2 6 1974 Filed: - M r . Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a f i n a l judgment a f t e r a jury t r i a l i n the d i s t r i c t court, Blaine County, finding appellant Patrick John McMaster, guilty of f i r s t degree burglary and adjudicated him a delinquent. The facts are: Appellant and three of h i s acquaintances, Rod Olson, Mike Turbovitz and Johnny Johnson, w e r e stopped by a Chinook c i t y police officer, Robert Flynn, a t 3:00 a.m., September 30, 1973. When asked what they were doing parked where they were, they replied they were just s i t t i n g there. The officer then followed the young men and observed them park the car a t Rod Olsonls grandmother's house and walk back t o town to Rod Olson's apartment. Around 4:00 a.m., Robert Stanley, a mechanic, observed appellant and Mike Turbovitz walking down an alley, which runs behind Martens Drug Store, the burglarized store. Stanley l a t e r saw appellant and Turbovitz climbing down from ~ o b ' s Drapery shop's roof, a building located a few stores down from Martens Drug Store. A t that time Stanley attempted t o c a l l the police,but was unable t o reach them. Stanley t e s t i f i e d he l a t e r saw appellant and Turbovitz walk out of the alley, cross the s t r e e t , and go up t o a patch of weeds where Turbovitz deposited something i n the weeds. Stanley then t e s t i f i e d appellant and Turbovitz went t o a parked car. Turbovitz got i n t o the car; appellant l i f t e d the hood of the car and began looking under it when Officer Flynn approached them. Officer Flynn t e s t i f i e d t h a t when he approached appellant and Turbovitz a t the parked car, Turbovitz a t f i r s t claimed he owned the car, but l a t e r admitted that neither he nor appellant had any business being i n the car. H e then t e s t i f i e d that Stanley waved for him t o come over t o the garage where Stanley was working. Flynn told appellant and Turbovitz t o stay where they were, but when Officer Flynn drove off t o t a l k t o Stanley, they l e f t . Stanley then related to Flynn the actions of appellant and Turbovitz. Flynn proceeded to investigate the buildings down the alley where Stanley had observed appellant and Turbovitz walking and climbing on the roof. When Officer Flynn approached Martens Drug Store, Johnny Johnson stuck his head out the back door, saw Flynn, and fled out the front door. Flynn pursued Johnson, but was unable to apprehend him. Flynn then notified the county sheriff, a fellow police officer, and the owner of the drug store. The investigating officers found several sacks of drugs from the drug store in the approximate vicinity of the weeds where Stanley saw Turbovitz stash something. They also found a wastepaper basket half full of drugs, and a stack of records from the display rack at the front of the store were found at the back of the store. The window in the front door had been broken. The back door had no signs of being broken into, but was unlocked from the inside. Because of his previous companionship with Johnny Johnson; because of his close proximity to the drug store when he was ob- served by the mechanic. Stanley and Officer Flynn; and, because he was with Turbovitz when Stanley saw Rrr.bovitz stash something in the weeds, appellant was arrested and charged with first degree burglary. Although appellant makes four assignments of error the issues for consideration could more succinctly be stated as: ( 1 ) Were the exhibits and the testimony by the state's witnesses relevant and material and therefore admissible? (2) Was there sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict? Considering the first issue---were the exhibits and testimony by the state's witnesses relevant and material? Appellant objected to the introduction of certain photographs of the scene of the burglary, paper sacks which were found containing drugs stolen during the burglary, and certain containers filled with drugs, into evidence on the grounds that there was no proper foundation laid, and that the material was irrelevant and immaterial and not connected in any way t o appellant. Appellant also objected t o the testimony of one Larry Martens, owner of the burglarized drug store, on the grounds there was no connection of the burglary of the premises tied t o appellant. A l l of these objections were overruled by the d i s t r i c t court and a l l the evidence and testimony was admitted. The d i s t r i c t court acted correctly. A s stated in State v. Sanders, 158 Mont. 113, 117, 118, 489 "A fundamental principle applicable t o a l l criminal proceedings is that 'evidence must be relevant t o the facts i n issue i n the case on t r i a l and tend t o prove or disprove such facts, evidence of collateral or other facts which a r e incapable of affording any reasonable presumption o r inference a s t o a principal fact or matter i n d i s Ute, or e v i d e n ~ e which i s too remote, is irrekevant an $ inadmissible. 29 Am.Jur.2dY Evidence 5 298, p. 342. Evidence is relevant only i f it 'naturally and logically tends to establish a fact in issue.' Brion v. Brown, 135 Mont. 356, 363, 340 P.2d 539, 543, quoting from 1 Jones on Evidence, 5th Ed., 5 151, p. 270." The fact of whether or not a burglary had taken place was i n issue. The evidence and testimony objected t o by appellant es- tablished the fact that a burglary had taken place and the evidence w a s therefore relevant and admissible. Appellant's second issue is whether there was sufficient circumstantial evidence t o support the guilty verdict? A s t h i s Court stated i n State v. Cor, 144 Mont. 323, 326, 396 P.2d "circumstantial evidence i s not always inferior i n quality nor i s it necessarily relegated t o a 'second class status' i n the consideration t o be given it. The very fact it is circumstantial i s not a sufficient allegation t o justify a reversal of the judgment for such evidence may be and frequently is, most convincing and satisfactory. In any criminal case, evidence that i s material, relevant and corn etent w i l l be admitted, 'nothing more and nothing h test is whether the facts and circumstances a r e of such a quality and quantity as t o legally justify a jury i n determining g u i l t beyond a reasonable doubt. I f such be the case, then the court should not, indeed cannot, set aside the solemn findings of the trier of the facts." Application of t h i s principle t o the instant case leads directly and convincingly t o the conclusion that appellant's g u i l t has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. This conclusion r e s u l t s from an examination of the e n t i r e record and from a consideration of a l l of the evidence: 1. Appellant was identified by Officer Flynn a s being with Johnny Johnson and two other men on the night the burglary took place. Johnny Johnson was caught inside Martens Drug Store by Officer Flynn. 2. M r . Stanley t e s t i f i e d t o seeing appellant and Mike Turbovitz walking down the alley behind Martens Drug Store. H e also t e s t i f i e d he saw the two men on the roof of ~ o b ' s Drapery, a store located a few stores down from Martens Drug Store. M r . Stanley l a t e r saw appellant and Mike Turbovitz come out of the alley, walk across the s t r e e t t o a patch of weeds where Turbovitz stashed something i n the weeds. 3. When appellant and Turbovitz saw Officer Flynn, they quickly went t o a parked car. Turbovitz a t f i r s t claimed ownership of the car and then acknowledged that neither he nor appellant owned the car nor had any business being in the car. They could offer no explanation t o Officer Flynn for being i n the car other than t o check the o i l . 4. Appellant and Turbovitz were told t o stay a t the car whenthe officer went t o t a l k t o M r . Stanley; instead they both fled. 5. Several sacks of drugs stolen from Martens Drug Store were found hidden i n the same vicinity that Stanley stated Turbovitz stashed something. A l l of the above evidence i s not sufficient to place appellant on the actual premises of Martens Drug Store, which i s an essential element of the crime of burglary. However, it is sufficient t o prove that appellant aided and abetted i n the commission of the crime, thereby making appellant a principal and guilty of that crime i t s e l f . 5 5 94-203, 94-204, R.C.M. 1947. The court i n its Z n s t r u c t i o n ~ b e r 12 instructed the jury a s t o aiding and abetting. Although objected t o by appellant on the grounds there was no evidence that appellant aided o r abetted anyone i n the commission of the burglary, we f e e l the objection was properly overruled. A s w e have stated, there was ample evidence of aiding and abetting. Appellant also objected t o the c o u r t ' s instruction on intent. W e find there was sufficient evidence presented to establish intent, which would allow the court t o give Instruction number 10 over appellant's objection that there was no such evidence. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court is affirmed. , Justice / W e Concur: -------------------------------- Chief Justice