Title: PEOPLE OF MI V MOBILE LUNDY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 120825
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: September 17, 2002

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Cross-Appellee  
v  
No. 120825  
MOBILE LUNDY,  
Defendant-Appellee, 
Cross-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
A 
jury 
convicted 
defendant 
of 
first-degree 
felony 
murder,  
MCL 750.316(1)(b).1  The Court of Appeals determined that  
there was insufficient evidence of the underlying felony of  
1MCL 750.316(1) provides:  
A person who commits any of the following is 
guilty of first degree murder and shall be punished 
by imprisonment for life:  
(b) Murder committed in the perpetration of, 
or attempt to perpetrate . . . larceny of any kind 
. . . .  
 
larceny and remanded the case to the circuit court for entry  
of a conviction of second-degree murder and resentencing.2  
Finding the evidence of larceny sufficient, we reverse the  
judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate defendant’s  
first-degree felony-murder conviction.  
I  
This case arose out of the robbery and stabbing death of  
Reginald May.  The prosecutor’s theory was that defendant and  
his girlfriend, Debra Hart, were alone with the victim in an  
apartment when defendant saw he had some money, stabbed him to  
death, and took the money.  
Defendant testified that he, Hart, the victim, and two  
others had been drinking beer and vodka and smoking crack  
cocaine.  He said he went to use the bathroom when the two  
others left to get more crack cocaine.  Defendant indicated  
that, when he came out of the bathroom, Hart said the victim  
had been bothering her.  He explained that he stabbed the  
victim to protect Hart and himself from the victim during a  
struggle.3  Defendant said that the victim’s money was not  
related to the stabbing, that he did not see the victim with  
2Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 9, 2001 
(Docket No. 220100).  
3The medical examiner testified that the victim had been  
stabbed nine times.  
2 
 
money before the altercation, and that Hart took the money  
from the victim after the stabbing as they were leaving the  
apartment.
 However, defendant acknowledged during cross­
examination that he had made a prior inconsistent statement to  
the effect that he had seen the victim with money before the  
stabbing.  
After considering all the evidence, the jury returned a  
verdict of first-degree felony murder.  
II  
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the basis  
that defendant’s prior inconsistent statement, that he had  
seen the victim with money before the stabbing, had been  
improperly considered as substantive evidence, rather than  
just for impeachment purposes.  In reaching this conclusion  
the Court of Appeals relied upon People v Jenkins, 450 Mich  
249, 260-261; 537 NW2d 828 (1995).  
Judge Zahra dissented, indicating that he believed the  
evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.  
III  
The prosecution has applied to this Court for leave to  
appeal.  Defendant has filed a cross-appeal regarding other  
issues that the Court of Appeals rejected.  
The prosecution contends, and we agree, that the Court of  
Appeals erred in applying People v Jenkins to defendant’s  
3  
 
 
  
prior inconsistent statement.  Jenkins stands for the general  
proposition that prior unsworn statements of a witness are  
mere hearsay and are generally inadmissible as substantive  
evidence.  
However, 
Jenkins is inapplicable because it related  
to impeachment of a prosecution witness with an inconsistent  
statement, 
whereas 
this 
case 
concerns 
defendant’s 
out-of-court  
statement.  Admissions by a party are specifically excluded  
from hearsay and, thus, are admissible as both impeachment and  
substantive evidence under MRE 801(d)(2).4  Thus, properly  
understood, Jenkins only applies to nonparty witnesses.  
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the  
evidence, this Court analyzes the evidence presented in the  
light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether  
any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential  
elements of the crime charged were proven beyond a reasonable  
doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992)  
mod 441 Mich 1201 (1992).  The element in dispute here is  
whether the defendant, at the time he stabbed the victim, was  
committing or attempting to commit a larceny or helping Hart  
4MRE 801(d) provides:  
A statement is not hearsay if—  
(2) . . . The statement is offered against a party and is 
(A) the party’s own statement . . . .  
4  
 
commit a larceny.5  
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the  
prosecution, 
including 
defendant’s 
prior 
inconsistent  
statement that he had seen the victim with money before the  
stabbing, we hold that the evidence of the underlying larceny  
was sufficient. As Judge Zahra indicated, from the evidence  
the jury could conclude that defendant or Hart knew that the  
victim had money and decided to seize the moment to rob and  
murder the victim.  Slip op at 1. 
The jury was free to  
discount testimony suggesting that defendant or Hart formed  
the intent to take the money only after the stabbing.6  
It is for these reasons that we reverse the judgment of  
the Court of Appeals and reinstate defendant’s first-degree  
5The trial court correctly instructed the jury that, in 
order to find defendant guilty, it had to find that, at the 
time defendant did the act that caused the victim’s death, he 
was committing, or attempting to commit, or helping someone 
else commit the crime of larceny.  
6  
[A]ppellate courts are not juries, and even 
when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, 
they must not interfere with the jury's role:  
[An appellate court] must remember that the 
jury is the sole judge of the facts. It is the 
function of the jury alone to listen to testimony, 
weigh the evidence and decide the questions of 
fact. . . . Juries, not appellate courts, see and 
hear witnesses and are in a much better position to 
decide the weight and credibility to be given to 
their testimony. [Wolfe, supra at 514-515].  
5  
 
 
 
 
felony-murder conviction.  With regard to the defendant's  
cross-appeal, we deny leave to appeal.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, 
KELLY, TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.  
6