Title: McCalley v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company
Citation: 265 So. 2d 11
Docket Number: 41687
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 1972

265 So. 2d 11 (1972)
W.D. McCALLEY, Petitioner,
v.
SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a Virginia Corporation, Respondent.
No. 41687.

Supreme Court of Florida.
June 7, 1972.
Rehearing Denied August 23, 1972.
Alan R. Schwartz of Horton, Schwartz &amp; Perse and Henry &amp; Stroemer, Miami, for petitioner.
Harlan Tuck, of Giles, Hedrick &amp; Robinson, Orlando, for respondent.
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reported at 252 So. 2d 275. Jurisdiction is based on conflict between the decision sought to be reviewed and Gaymon v. *12 Quinn Menhaden Fisheries of Tex., Inc.[1] and McCloskey v. Louisville &amp; Nashville Railroad Co.[2] and Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Barrett.[3]
Plaintiff, W.D. McCalley, petitioner herein, brought suit against defendant railroad, respondent herein, for damages based on the railroad's alleged violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 2, which provides as follows:
On September 11, 1969, petitioner was working as a trainman-brakeman for the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company at the Seaboard station in Taft, Orange County, Florida. He had been employed by the railroad for three years and one of his jobs was uncoupling railroad cars. The cars were equipped with automatic couplers, devices connecting railroad cars which couple and uncouple without the necessity of men climbing between the cars. The uncoupling is properly accomplished by the trainman pulling a "cut-lever" or uncoupling pin while standing safely outside the cars. On the day in question, petitioner tried unsuccessfully to uncouple a string of piggyback flat cars from the remainder of the freight train by pulling several times on the "cut-lever" or uncoupling pin. When he was unable to activate the cut-lever, petitioner climbed between the cars to get a different angle to pull the pin. As he did so, he fell from the draw-head onto the ground tearing several ligaments in his leg and seriously injuring himself.
At the trial there was conflicting evidence as to whether there was sufficient slack to allow the uncoupling device to operate properly at the time petitioner tried to activate the cut-lever. There was also conflict on whether petitioner called to the engineman for slack. The railroad contended that the failure of the cut-lever to operate did not demonstrate that it was defective and that petitioner's conduct in attempting to climb between the cars was the sole proximate cause of the accident.
The jury returned a verdict for the railroad and the District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that questions of defect in the coupler and causal connection were for the jury and that the jury instructions, taken as a whole, adequately stated the law.
The sole question presented here is whether the giving of the following instructions to the jury constituted reversible error:
In McCloskey v. Louisville &amp; Nashville Railroad Co., supra, an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for the defendant railroad, in an order finding:
The District Court of Appeal, First District, reversed and remanded, holding:[4]
In the earlier decision of Gaymon v. Quinn Menhaden Fisheries of Texas, supra, the First District stated that under the F.E.L.A. "it is not necessary to show that employer negligence was the proximate cause of the injury or death complained of...."[5]
This Court in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Barrett, supra, affirmed a judgment for the employee under the F.E.L.A., holding:[6]
The McCloskey, Gaymon and Barrett cases are properly cited for conflict although they arose under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, § 51 et seq. of Title 45 and the decision sought to be reviewed arose under the Federal Safety Appliance Act, Subsections (1) through (16) of Title 45. It is conceded that the same rule regarding causation is applicable to both Title 45 actions. This is explained by the United States Supreme Court in Crane v. Cedar Rapids and Iowa City Railroad Co.,[7] as follows:
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Conner v. Butler,[8] affirmed the trial court's order directing a verdict for the defendant railroad, holding:
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Conner case, holding:[9]
The landmark case on causation in F.E.L.A. actions is Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.,[10] decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1957. The "Rogers rule" on the question of causation is stated as "whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought."[11] This Court in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Barrett, *15 supra, recognized the Rogers rule and quoted extensively from that case. The Rogers case is generally interpreted as either departing from or entirely eliminating the common-law concept of proximate cause from F.E.L.A. actions.[12] Decisions from Federal and State courts under F.E.L.A., decided prior to the Rogers case and referring to proximate causation, are of doubtful validity today. An example of such a pre-Rogers decision is Chicago, M. St. P. &amp; P.R.R. Co. v. Linehan,[13] decided by the Circuit Court of Appeal, Eighth Circuit in 1933. The trial court's instruction to the jury in the instant case was taken in part from the Linehan decision.[14]
Clearly, the concept of proximate cause no longer has any place in an action under the Federal Safety Appliance Act. The use of the term "proximate cause" in the trial court's instruction in the instant case was erroneous. The question remains whether the error was of sufficient magnitude to require reversal. We hold that it was. It is true that portions of the instruction on liability were correct, but, considering the charge as a whole and in view of the close factual situation in the instant case, the repeated use of the term "proximate cause" coupled with the final paragraph of the instructions set out supra, taken from a 1933 pre-Rogers decision, constitutes reversible error.
Accordingly, certiorari is granted, the decision of the District Court is quashed and the cause remanded with directions to remand to the trial court for a new trial.
It is so ordered.
ERVIN, ADKINS and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
ROBERTS, C.J., dissents.
[1]  118 So. 2d 42 (Fla.App.1st 1960).
[2]  122 So. 2d 481 (Fla.App.1st 1960).
[3]  101 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1958).
[4]  McCloskey v. Louisville &amp; Nashville Railroad Co., 122 So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. App.1st 1960).
[5]  Gaymon v. Quinn Menhaden Fisheries of Texas, 118 So. 2d 42, 46 (Fla.App.1st 1960).
[6]  Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Barrett, 101 So. 2d 37, 49 (Fla. 1958).
[7]  395 U.S. 164, 166, 89 S. Ct. 1706, 1708, 23 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1969).
[8]  109 So. 2d 183, 184 (Fla.App.3rd), cert. den. 113 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1959).
[9]  361 U.S. 29, 80 S. Ct. 21, 4 L. Ed. 2d 10 (1959).
[10]  Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S. Ct. 443, 1 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1957).
[11]  Id. at 506, 77 S. Ct.  at 448.
[12]  98 A.L.R.2d 653, 657 (1964).
[13]  66 F.2d 373 (C.C.A.8th 1933).
[14]  Id. at 378: "[A]n employee cannot recover under the Safety Appliance Act if the failure to comply with its requirements is not a proximate cause of the accident which results in his injury, but merely creates an incidental condition or situation in which the accident, otherwise caused, results in such injury;... ."