Title: Va. Marine Res. Comm’n v. Chincoteague Inn
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 130239
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 2014

Present:  All the Justices 
 
VIRGINIA MARINE RESOURCES COMMISSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 130239 
 
   JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.
 
     
 
 
               April 17, 2014 
CHINCOTEAGUE INN, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in holding that the Virginia Marine Resources Commission 
lacked authority under Virginia law to regulate the expansion 
of the Chincoteague Inn's restaurant operations onto a floating 
platform secured alongside its building and situated partially 
over state-owned subaqueous bottomland. 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings 
A. 
Relevant Facts 
The Chincoteague Inn is a restaurant that sits adjacent to 
the Chincoteague Channel in the town of Chincoteague, Virginia.  
In late April and early May 2010, the Inn lashed together two 
steel barges, held the barges in place, and connected those 
barges to the Inn by way of a gangway to create a floating 
platform.  Later, in June 2010, the Inn removed one of those 
barges and the floating platform was resituated alongside the 
Inn.  The Inn intended to keep the floating platform positioned 
alongside its building to be used as part of the Inn's 
 
2 
restaurant sitting and dining area for approximately four 
months until September 2010. 
The Inn's plans were interrupted when an unidentified 
competitor complained to the Virginia Marine Resources 
Commission that the Inn had added a "large floating platform" 
alongside the Inn's building structure.  On June 11, Commission 
staff member George H. Badger followed up on this tip and 
conducted an onsite inspection.  Mr. Badger ascertained that, 
while a portion of the floating platform was situated above a 
man-made boat basin, a 54-foot long by 13.6-foot wide portion 
of the floating platform was situated above state-owned 
subaqueous bottomland. 
Based on Mr. Badger's determination that a portion of the 
floating platform was situated over state-owned subaqueous 
bottomland, the Commission concluded that it had jurisdiction 
over that portion of the platform.  Further, the Commission 
categorized this 54-foot by 13.6-foot portion of the floating 
platform as unauthorized and requiring removal.  The Commission 
notified the Inn of this determination by a written Notice to 
Comply and demanded immediate removal of the unauthorized 
portion within 10 days.  The Notice further warned the Inn that 
failure to comply would result in the matter being placed 
before the full Commission for an enforcement action, and that 
monetary penalties may be imposed. 
 
3 
The Inn, through its manager Raymond Britton, responded to 
the Commission's letter by submitting a joint permit 
application that requested an after-the-fact permit for the 
entire floating platform.  The Commission, believing it 
inappropriate to act upon this application while a violation 
was ongoing, sent a letter to the Inn that again demanded 
removal of the unauthorized portion of the platform.  On June 
28, the Commission undertook another site inspection and found 
that the 54-foot by 13.6-foot portion of the floating platform 
had not been removed. 
B. 
Relevant Proceedings 
The full Commission heard the enforcement action against 
the Inn, voted in favor of the enforcement request, and found 
that the 54-foot by 13.6-foot portion of the floating structure 
constituted an unlawful use of state-owned submerged lands 
pursuant to Code § 28.2-1203.  The Commission directed removal 
of that portion of the floating platform within 10 days. 
The Inn timely appealed the Commission's decision to the 
Circuit Court of Accomack County pursuant to Code § 2.2-4026, 
Rule 2A:2, and Rule 2A:4.  The Inn challenged the Commission's 
decision on three points: (1) that the Commission failed to 
make express findings of fact required to allow a court to 
review an agency's actions, (2) that the Commission failed to 
make findings of fact based on the required substantiality of 
 
4 
the evidence, and (3) that the Commission lacked jurisdiction 
over the floating platform under Virginia state law, and that 
federal maritime law governed the floating platform. 
The circuit court focused on this third argument to 
dispose of the case.  In a final decree, the circuit court 
found that the floating platform was a "vessel" and that the 
Commission lacked jurisdiction to require removal of the 
floating platform.  The final decree was unclear about whether 
this decision rested upon a determination that Virginia state 
law does not authorize the Commission to exercise jurisdiction 
over the floating platform, or upon a determination that 
federal maritime law preempts any such Virginia state law.  The 
circuit court then set aside the Commission's decision, 
dismissed with prejudice the Commission's enforcement action, 
and awarded approximately $14,000 in fees and costs to the Inn. 
The Commission timely appealed to the Court of Appeals.  A 
three judge panel concluded that the Commission admitted that 
it failed to preserve the issue about whether the floating 
platform was a "vessel," and noted that the Commission had 
conceded that the structure was indeed a "vessel."  Virginia 
Marine Res. Comm'n v. Chincoteague Inn, 60 Va. App. 585, 590, 
731 S.E.2d 6, 8 (2012).  The panel, however, also held that 
under the facts of this case federal maritime law did not 
preempt the Commission's authority to order the removal of the 
 
5 
floating platform over state-owned submerged lands.  Id. at 
599, 731 S.E.2d at 12.  The panel therefore reversed the 
circuit court, vacated the award of fees and costs because the 
parties agreed that the court's award of fees and costs to the 
Inn "rises or falls" with the resolution of the other issues on 
appeal, and remanded the case back to the circuit court to 
determine whether Virginia state law authorized the Commission 
to issue its enforcement decision.  Id. at 591 n.2, 599, 731 
S.E.2d at 8 n.2, 12-13. 
The Court of Appeals granted the Inn's petition for a 
rehearing en banc and stayed the panel decision's mandate.  
Virginia Marine Res. Comm'n v. Chincoteague Inn, 60 Va. App. 
719, 720, 732 S.E.2d 45, 46 (2012) (en banc).  In its en banc 
opinion, the Court of Appeals observed that the Commission 
conceded the issue that the floating platform was a "vessel."  
Virginia Marine Res. Comm'n v. Chincoteague Inn, 61 Va. App. 
371, 375 n.1, 735 S.E.2d 702, 704 n.1 (2013) (en banc).  Thus, 
the Court of Appeals first addressed the preliminary issue of 
whether Virginia state law authorized the Commission to 
exercise jurisdiction over the floating platform before 
reaching the subsequent issue of federal preemption, and held 
that the Commission could not exercise jurisdiction over the 
Inn's floating platform pursuant to Code § 28.2-1203.  Id. at 
380-81, 385-87, 735 S.E.2d at 707, 709-10.  The en banc 
 
6 
decision by the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
determination that the Commission lacked jurisdiction and 
accordingly affirmed the circuit court's award of fees and 
costs to the Inn.  Id. at 387, 735 S.E.2d at 710. 
The Commission timely filed a petition for appeal with 
this Court. 
C. 
Assignments of Error 
Upon appeal, our review considers three logically distinct 
legal issues.  First, whether Code § 28.2-1203(A) permits the 
Commission to regulate the floating platform.  Second, whether 
federal maritime law applies to the floating platform because 
it is a "vessel" under 1 U.S.C. § 3.  Third, whether, if both 
Code § 28.2-1203(A) and federal maritime law apply to the 
floating platform, state and federal law may simultaneously 
govern that floating platform or if federal maritime law 
preempts Code § 28.2-1203(A).  The Court of Appeals in its en 
banc decision addressed the first two of these issues.  It did 
not reach the third issue of federal preemption.  Virginia 
Marine, 61 Va. App. at 387, 735 S.E.2d at 710. 
In this appeal we address the assignments of error and the 
arguments of the parties to the extent they direct us to 
evaluate the following: 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining 
that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to regulate 
the floating platform under Code § 28.2-1203(A). 
 
7 
2. Whether the Commission can withdraw its concession 
that the floating platform is a "vessel" as defined 
under 1 U.S.C. § 3. 
II. Discussion 
A. 
Standard of Review 
This appeal requires us to resolve issues of 
constitutional interpretation and statutory construction.  We 
resolve these purely legal issues de novo.  L.F. v. Breit, 285 
Va. 163, 176, 736 S.E.2d 711, 718 (2013). 
This appeal involves an administrative agency.  Typically, 
we give deference to the decisions of administrative agencies 
when those decisions "fall within an area of the agency's 
specialized competence."  Virginia Dep't of Health v. NRV Real 
Estate, LLC, 278 Va. 181, 185, 677 S.E.2d 276, 278 (2009).  
"However, when an issue involves a pure question of statutory 
interpretation, that issue does not invoke the agency's 
specialized competence but is a question of law to be decided 
by the courts."  Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Commonwealth 
Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 270 Va. 423, 442, 621 S.E.2d 78, 88 
(2005).  For those same reasons, we hold that no agency has 
specialized competence in the purely legal issue of 
interpreting the Constitution of Virginia.  See Browning-Ferris 
Indus. v. Residents Involved in Saving the Env't, 254 Va. 278, 
284 492 S.E.2d 431, 434 (1997); Sims Wholesale Co. v. Brown-
Forman Corp., 251 Va. 398, 404, 468 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1996).  We 
 
8 
therefore afford the Commission's determination no deference 
when resolving the issues in this appeal. 
B. 
The Commonwealth's Sovereign Authority Over State-Owned 
Subaqueous Bottomland 
The focus of this appeal is the operation of Code § 28.2-
1203(A).  It is our "duty" to "constru[e] a statute to avoid 
any conflict with the Constitution" of Virginia and the United 
States Constitution.  Commonwealth v. Doe, 278 Va. 223, 229, 
682 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2009); Jeffress v. Stith, 241 Va. 313, 
317, 402 S.E.2d 14, 16 (1991); see also Town of Victoria v. 
Victoria Ice Light & Power Co., 134 Va. 134, 139, 114 S.E. 92, 
93 (1922) ("Of course [a] statute must be construed as 
subordinate to . . . pertinent sections of the Constitution 
[that are] inconsistent therewith.").  This is true even when 
the statute's plain language is unambiguous and not absurd.  
See, e.g., Elizabeth River Crossings OpCo, LLC v. Meeks, 286 
Va. 286, 319-20 & n.7, 749 S.E.2d 176, 193 & n.7 (2013).  It is 
therefore pertinent to review the constitutional context in 
which Code § 28.2-1203(A) arises before addressing the plain 
language of that statute. 
1. The Basis for the Commonwealth's Sovereign Authority Over 
State-Owned Subaqueous Bottomland 
Under the common law of England, the sovereign Crown held 
title to and exercised dominion over all tidal waters and tidal 
bottomland below the high water line located within England's 
 
9 
geographic jurisdiction.  Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-14 
(1894).  The geographic scope of this authority expanded as 
English colonists began to claim land on the North American 
continent, so that the Crown's title and dominion extended to 
the tidal waters and tidal bottomland in America.  Id. at 14. 
After the American Revolution, this title and dominion 
formerly belonging to the English sovereign was claimed by the 
individual Thirteen Colonies who had, through the 
Constitutional Convention, become sovereign states.  See id. at 
14-16; see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714-15 (1999) 
(discussing the "residuary and inviolable sovereignty" retained 
by the states pursuant to this Nation's constitutional design).  
However, in light of this Nation's unique system of dual 
sovereignty, the scope of the Commonwealth's sovereign 
authority over subaqueous bottomland is no longer governed, or 
necessarily informed, by the common law of England.  See Martin 
v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410-11 (1842) ("A 
grant [of subaqueous bottomland to a private entity] made by [a 
state sovereign] must therefore manifestly be tried and 
determined by different principles from those which apply to 
grants of the British [C]rown, when the title is held by a 
single individual in trust for the whole nation."); see, e.g., 
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 285-86 (1997) 
(distinguishing English common law and recognizing that state 
 
10 
sovereign authority extends to waterways and subaqueous 
bottomland regardless of whether those environs are affected by 
the tide). 
As a state sovereign, the Commonwealth retains an 
"absolute right to all [its] waters, and the soils under them, 
for [its] own common use."  Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410.  
Indeed, the title to and dominion over subaqueous bottomland is 
"an essential attribute" of the Commonwealth's state 
sovereignty.  Idaho, 521 U.S. at 283; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1311 
(confirming that state sovereigns retain title to and dominion 
over "the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries 
of the respective States, and the natural resources within such 
lands and waters").  This sovereign power is limited only by 
that authority surrendered to the federal sovereign in the 
United States Constitution.  Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410. 
2. The Scope of the Commonwealth's Sovereign Authority Over 
State-Owned Subaqueous Bottomland 
The Constitution of Virginia directs the General Assembly 
to "undertake the conservation, development, or utilization of 
lands or natural resources of the Commonwealth, . . . and the 
protection of its atmosphere, lands, and waters from pollution, 
impairment, or destruction."  Va. Const. art. XI, § 2.  The 
General Assembly has affirmed the continued existence of the 
Commonwealth's sovereign authority over state-owned subaqueous 
 
11 
bottomland, as that authority derives from the English common 
law.  See Code § 1-200.  Moreover, the General Assembly has 
defined the scope of that sovereign authority so that it 
extends to "[a]ll the beds of the bays, rivers, creeks[,] and 
the shores of the sea within the jurisdiction of the 
Commonwealth" unless such subaqueous bottomland has been 
"conveyed by special grant or compact according to law."  Code 
§ 28.2-1200.1  As we previously explained, the Commonwealth's 
sovereign authority over public environments, including 
subaqueous bottomland, has two facets. 
First, the Commonwealth retains the right of jus publicum, 
"the right of jurisdiction and dominion for governmental 
purposes."  Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 158 Va. 521, 
546, 164 S.E. 689, 696 (1932).  This is the Commonwealth's 
sovereign authority to hold the public domain "for the interest 
or benefit . . . of the public."2  G. L. Webster Co. v. 
                     
1 The Commonwealth has ceded its sovereign authority to the 
owners of subaqueous bottomland that rests above the mean low-
water mark, and to the owners of subaqueous bottomland beneath 
creeks and rivers comprised within the limits of a lawful 
survey.  Code § 28.2-1202.  Also, we have previously observed 
that the General Assembly "chose not to include 'lakes' in its 
designation of bodies of water whose beds remain the property 
of the Commonwealth in the absence of a special grant or 
compact."  Smith Mountain Lake Yacht Club, Inc. v. Ramaker, 261 
Va. 240, 246, 542 S.E.2d 392, 395 (2001). 
2 The right of jus publicum has sometimes been termed the 
"trust" or "public trust" theory by other courts and 
commentators.  Although we have sometimes used that 
 
12 
Steelman, 172 Va. 342, 357, 1 S.E.2d 305, 311 (1939).  The jus 
publicum contains within it, as "inherent" and "inseparable 
incidents thereof," certain "rights of the people."  Newport 
News, 158 Va. at 546, 164 S.E. at 696-97. 
Second, the Commonwealth retains the right of jus 
privatum, "the right of private property" retained by the 
Commonwealth because it is "proprietor" of the public domain 
that has not been lawfully conveyed.  Id. at 546, 164 S.E. at 
696.  This is the Commonwealth's authority to act "in a 
proprietary capacity" because it also has "the right and title 
of a private owner."  G. L. Webster Co., 172 Va. at 357, 1 
S.E.2d at 311. 
The Commonwealth retains "a most solemn duty to [both] 
administer the jus privatum of the [Commonwealth] and to 
exercise its jus publicum for the benefit of the people."  City 
of Newport News, 158 Va. at 549, 164 S.E. at 697.  In the 
exercise of its right of jus privatum, it is a constitutional 
imperative that the Commonwealth cannot "relinquish, surrender, 
alienate, destroy, or substantially impair" the right of jus 
publicum, or the rights of the people inherent to the jus 
                                                                 
terminology, using it in today's opinion would not clarify the 
analysis.  City of Newport News, 158 Va. at 539-40, 164 S.E. at 
695 ("It is questionable whether the interposition of the 
conception of a trust in these cases serves any useful purpose 
or tends to clarity of thinking or correctness of decision."). 
 
13 
publicum, except as authorized by the Constitution of Virginia.  
Id. at 546-49, 164 S.E. at 696-97.3 
However, whether an activity is a right of the people 
inherent to the jus publicum is a matter of Virginia common law 
subject to the Constitution of Virginia and the General 
Assembly's modification by statute.  See, e.g., id. at 549-52, 
164 S.E. at 698-99 (ascertaining whether fishery is a public 
right inherent to the jus publicum under Virginia common law); 
Stokes & Smith v. Upper Appomatox Co., 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 318, 
337 (1831) (Brooke, J.) (observing that a particular activity 
was a public right inherent to the jus publicum because it was 
"expressly granted" by legislative acts of the General 
Assembly); see also Kraft v. Burr, 252 Va. 273, 276-77, 476 
S.E.2d 715, 716-17 (1996) (state law determines to what degree 
the jus publicum restricts a sovereign's right to convey 
subaqueous bottomland to a private party). 
It is within this constitutional context that we construe 
the plain language of Code § 28.2-1203(A). 
                     
3 This imperative arose by implication from the 1902 
Constitution of Virginia.  City of Newport News, 158 Va. at 
546-47, 164 S.E. at 696-97.  Nothing suggests that the 1971 
Constitution of Virginia disposed of that constitutional 
implication, and it survives today. 
 
14 
C. 
Whether Code § 28.2-1203(A) Allowed the Commission to 
Regulate the Floating Platform 
1. Construing Code § 28.2-1203(A) 
The Commission's geographic jurisdiction includes "the 
Commonwealth's territorial sea and extend[s] to the fall line 
of all tidal rivers and streams except in the case of state-
owned bottomlands where jurisdiction extends throughout the 
Commonwealth."  Code § 28.2-101.  The Commission's jurisdiction 
therefore extends to the state-owned subaqueous bottomland over 
which the Inn's floating platform was situated.  The question 
before us is whether the General Assembly empowered the 
Commission to regulate the Inn's floating platform because that 
platform was engaging in either a "trespass" or 
"encroach[ment]" under Code § 28.2-1203(A). 
The General Assembly has made it "unlawful for any person 
to build, dump, trespass[,] or encroach upon or over 
[subaqueous bottomland that is] the beds of the bays, ocean, 
rivers, streams, or creeks which are the property of the 
Commonwealth, unless such act is performed pursuant to a permit 
issued by the Commission or is necessary for" various 
enumerated exceptions.  Code § 28.2-1203(A).4  Engaging in such 
                     
4 Code § 12.2-1203(A) is a valid exercise of the right of 
jus privatum as falling within the Commonwealth's proprietary 
capacity as the entity retaining the right and title to the 
subaqueous bottomland.  See Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 
833, 835, 37 S.E. 841, 842 (1901) (owner of private property 
 
15 
an unlawful act is a Class 1 misdemeanor.  Code § 28.2-1203(B).  
The Commission has authority to undertake inspections, issue 
orders, and apply for injunctions to ensure compliance with 
this statutory prohibition of unlawful building, dumping, 
trespassing, or encroaching upon or over the Commonwealth's 
subaqueous bottomland.  Code §§ 28.2-1211; 28.2-1212. 
Code § 28.2-1203(A) is not ambiguous.  See Brown v. 
Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985) (listing 
factors indicating that statutory language is ambiguous).  
Accordingly, we apply the plain language of the statute.  
Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227, 623 S.E.2d 922, 925-26 
(2006).  Additionally, because the statute's terms are 
undefined, those words are given their "ordinary meaning," in 
light of "the context in which [they are] used."  Lawlor v. 
Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 237, 738 S.E.2d 847, 875 (2013). 
"Encroach" means "[t]o enter by gradual steps or stealth 
into the possessions or rights of another; to trespass or 
intrude," and "[t]o gain or intrude unlawfully upon another's 
lands, property, or authority."  Black's Law Dictionary 607 
(9th ed. 2009).  "Trespass" means "[a]n unlawful act committed 
against the person or property of another[, especially] 
wrongful entry on another's real property."  Id. at 1642.  We 
                                                                 
has the legal right to order others off of that property, and, 
upon refusal, the legal right to use proper force to expel such 
others). 
 
16 
recognize an overlap between these terms, and therefore 
construe them so that neither is surplusage.  Travelers Prop. 
Cas. Co. of Am. v. Ely, 276 Va. 339, 345, 666 S.E.2d 523, 527 
(2008).  A Code § 28.2-1203(A) "trespass" occurs when a person 
occupies the space "upon or over" state-owned subaqueous 
bottomland while simultaneously violating other law.  A Code 
§ 28.2-1203(A) "encroach[ment]" would be found when a person 
occupies the space "upon or over" state-owned subaqueous 
bottomland without violating any other law.  These ordinary 
meanings of the plain language make sense in the context of 
Code § 28.2-1203(A). 
However, we must construe these terms so that they do not 
contravene the Constitution of Virginia.  Doe, 278 Va. at 229, 
682 S.E.2d at 908; Town of Victoria, 134 Va. at 139, 114 S.E. 
at 93.  The only applicable constitutional limitation is the 
right of jus publicum.  Specifically, we must decide whether 
the Inn, in using the floating platform above state-owned 
subaqueous bottomland, was engaging in an activity that is a 
public right inherent to the jus publicum.  If so, the 
Constitution of Virginia prohibits construing "trespass" or 
"encroach[ment]" as applying to the floating platform because 
enforcing Code § 28.2-1203(A) would "relinquish, surrender, 
alienate, destroy, or substantially impair" a constitutionally 
 
17 
protected "right[] of the people."  City of Newport News, 158 
Va. at 546-47, 164 S.E. at 697.5 
2. 
Code § 28.2-1203(A) and the Constitution of Virginia 
The interplay between Code § 28.2-1203(A) and the 
constitutional protection of the public rights inherent to the 
jus publicum manifests in the following three-step analysis. 
a. Did the Plain Language of Code § 28.2-1203(A) Apply 
to the Floating Platform? 
First, the analysis questions whether the floating 
platform was subject to Code § 28.2-1203(A) because it was 
committing a "trespass" or "encroach[ment] upon or over" state-
owned subaqueous bottomland.  The clear answer is yes. 
It is evident from the record that a 54-foot by 13.6-foot 
portion of the floating platform occupied the physical space 
over the Commonwealth's subaqueous bottomland.  The Inn was not 
violating any other law when it had the floating platform 
occupy the space above the Commonwealth's subaqueous 
bottomland.  Thus, the floating platform was an "encroach[ment] 
upon or over" the Commonwealth's subaqueous bottomland.  On the 
                     
5 On this point the Court of Appeals erred by inverting the 
jus publicum.  The jus publicum is a constitutional doctrine 
that simultaneously empowers and limits the actions of the 
Commonwealth, not private individuals.  See City of Newport 
News, 158 Va. at 546-49, 164 S.E. at 696-97.  Consequently, 
because a private individual cannot violate the jus publicum, 
the Court of Appeals erred in construing the terms appearing in 
Code § 28.2-1203(A) as being defined by a private individual's 
violation of the jus publicum.  Virginia Marine, 61 Va. App. at 
385-86, 735 S.E.2d at 709. 
 
18 
face of the statute, Code § 28.2-1203(A) applied to the 
floating platform. 
b. Was the Inn's Activity Issued a Permit by the Commission or 
Exempted by a Statutory Exception? 
Second, the analysis questions whether (1) the Commission 
issued a permit for the floating platform, or (2) the Inn's 
floating platform was exempted from Code § 28.2-1203(A) by 
satisfying a statutory exception.  The clear answer to both 
questions is no. 
It is evident from the record that the floating platform's 
encroachment was neither authorized by permit nor exempted from 
Code § 12.2-1203(A) by a statutory exception.  The floating 
platform's encroachment therefore violated Code § 28.2-1203(A). 
c. Was the Inn's Activity a Public Right Inherent 
to the Jus Publicum? 
Third, the analysis questions whether the Inn, in using 
the floating platform above state-owned subaqueous bottomland, 
was engaging in an activity that is a public right inherent to 
the jus publicum.  The clear answer is no. 
The General Assembly has modified the jus publicum to 
include the public's right to use the Commonwealth's subaqueous 
bottomland to "fish[], fowl[], hunt[], and tak[e] and catch[] 
oysters and other shellfish."  Code § 28.2-1200; see also 
Bradford v. Nature Conservancy, 224 Va. 181, 194-97, 294 S.E.2d 
 
19 
866, 872-74 (1982).  The record reflects that the Inn was not 
engaged in any of these activities. 
We have acknowledged that the jus publicum includes the 
public right to navigate the Commonwealth's waters.  James 
River & Kanawha Power Co. v. Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp., 
138 Va. 461, 470, 122 S.E. 344, 347 (1924).  The right of 
navigation, for purposes of the public right inherent to the 
jus publicum, is "the right to move and transport goods from 
place to place over the great natural highways provided by the 
navigable waters of the State without let or hindrance from or 
charge by any private person or corporation."  City of Newport 
News, 158 Va. at 550, 164 S.E. at 698 (emphasis added).  
Although this right undoubtedly includes some cessation of 
movement upon the water, as incident to the right of 
navigation, it does not include all cessations of movement. 
This necessarily follows from the fact that determining 
what activity the Inn was engaged in requires evaluating the 
totality of the circumstances.  See id. at 550-51, 164 S.E. at 
698 (distinguishing between engaging in navigation, which 
includes "mov[ing] from place to place," and the right of 
fishery, which as a matter of practicality may require some 
degree of movement across water).  Regardless of the length of 
time a structure has stopped moving, we must evaluate the 
 
20 
circumstances surrounding that cessation of movement to 
determine just what activity is being undertaken. 
The record reveals that the Inn's floating platform 
occupied the space over the Commonwealth's subaqueous 
bottomland for approximately two months before the Commission 
conducted its site inspection in June 2010.  The Inn intended 
for the floating platform to occupy that space for a total time 
period of approximately four months.  Although the Inn 
interrupted the floating platform's fixed nature for a 32-
minute trip down the Chincoteague Channel in July 2010, this 
momentary engagement in the right of navigation does not 
obviate the facts showing that the floating platform was 
otherwise stationary for at least two months. 
Moreover, those months of being stationary were not 
incident to the right of navigation.  When the floating 
platform was supported by two barges, the Inn placed a bar and 
tables on the floating platform for its restaurant patrons.  
When one of those barges was taken away, the Inn refitted the 
floating platform with a new deck and handrails, and two 
gangways led from the Inn to the barge so that restaurant 
patrons could use the bar area and have outdoor seating on the 
water.  The Health Department permitted the Inn to conduct this 
additional restaurant activity on the barge.  Underscoring the 
point, the Inn admitted to the full Commission during the 
 
21 
enforcement proceeding that the barge was being used as a 
restaurant. 
Restaurant operations are not incident to the right of 
navigation.  Indeed, using the floating platform for restaurant 
operations "convert[ed] the public property," that is, the 
waters above the Commonwealth's subaqueous bottomland, "pro 
tanto to a use which is essentially private, whether it [was] 
exercised for pleasure or profit."  City of Newport News, 158 
Va. at 551, 164 S.E. at 698-99.  Much like the use of the 
Commonwealth's water and subaqueous bottomland for "pleasure 
purposes" and fisheries, see id. at 531, 551-52, 164 S.E. at 
691, 698-99, the Inn's placement of the floating platform 
alongside its restaurant was not a right of the public inherent 
to the jus publicum. 
Thus, the Constitution of Virginia does not restrict the 
plain language of Code § 28.2-1203(A) from applying to the 
Inn's floating platform, and therefore the Commission may 
regulate that floating platform as an "encroach[ment] upon or 
over" state-owned subaqueous bottomland.6 
                     
6 It is important to recognize what this appeal does not 
address.  It does not address facts where an individual docks 
his boat, as necessary to disembark after traveling across the 
water, at a pier situated above state-owned subaqueous 
bottomland.  It does not address facts where an individual 
lives in a floating structure situated above state-owned 
subaqueous bottomland.  Determining whether those factual 
situations involve activities incident to the right of 
 
22 
D. 
Whether the Commission Can Withdraw Its Concession That 
the Floating Platform Is a "Vessel" Under 1 U.S.C. § 3 
The Commission asks to withdraw its concession that the 
floating platform is a "vessel" as defined under 1 U.S.C. § 3.  
The Commission relies upon the fact that the United States 
Supreme Court published its opinion in Lozman v. City of 
Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013), shortly 
after the Court of Appeals issued its en banc decision in this 
case.  The Commission contends that because Lozman modified the 
definition of "vessel" for purposes of applying 1 U.S.C. § 3, 
the Commission should not be bound by its earlier concession 
that the floating platform is a "vessel." 
Had the Commission conceded only the legal issue, we would 
not be bound by that concession of law.  This is because an 
"issue [which] is a question of law . . . is not subject to a 
concession binding on this Court."  Wright v. Commonwealth, 278 
Va. 754, 760 n.3, 685 S.E.2d 655, 658 n.3 (2009); see also 
Cofield v. Nuckles, 239 Va. 186, 194, 387 S.E.2d 493, 498 
(1990) ("A party can concede the facts but cannot concede the 
law."). 
But the Commission did more than concede a legal issue.  
The Commission also conceded that it did not preserve the issue 
of whether the floating platform was a "vessel."  Such a 
                                                                 
navigation, or are themselves a public right inherent to the 
jus publicum, is beyond the scope of today's appeal. 
 
23 
concession was appropriate because the Commission did, in fact, 
fail to preserve the issue by failing to assign error to the 
circuit court's determination that the floating platform was a 
"vessel."  Thus, under the law of the case doctrine, the 
floating platform is a "vessel" as defined under 1 U.S.C. § 3 
for purposes of this appeal.  See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-
Jenkins, 276 Va. 19, 26-27, 661 S.E.2d 822, 826 (2008). 
It is important to note, however, that whether the 
floating platform was engaged in the public right of navigation 
inherent to the jus publicum, and whether the floating platform 
is a "vessel" under 1 U.S.C. § 3, are separate inquiries.  The 
definition of "vessel" under 1 U.S.C. § 3 does require that a 
structure be "in navigation."  Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 
543 U.S. 481, 496 (2005).  But the "in navigation" requirement 
prescribed by a definition within a federal statute is not 
synonymous with the "right of navigation" protected by the 
Constitution of Virginia. 
Our definition of the "right of navigation" inherent to 
the jus publicum focuses on the active and immediate moving 
across the navigable waters.  See City of Newport News, 158 Va. 
at 550, 164 S.E. at 698.  In contrast, the "in navigation" 
requirement in 1 U.S.C. § 3 allows for the mere "possibility" 
that a structure could engage in movement across the navigable 
waters.  Stewart, 543 U.S. at 496.  And as the United States 
 
24 
Supreme Court made clear, a "vessel" as defined in 1 U.S.C. § 3 
need not be actively "carrying people or things over water."  
Lozman, 568 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 740-41.  Additionally, 
in light of the longstanding authority discussed in Part II.B., 
a federal statute cannot dictate how we understand the right of 
jus publicum under the Constitution of Virginia.  See Michigan 
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983). 
For these reasons, although the Commission failed to 
preserve the issue of whether the floating platform is a 
"vessel" under 1 U.S.C. § 3, that legal definition does not 
dictate our analysis of whether the floating platform was 
engaged in the public's "right of navigation" inherent to the 
jus publicum. 
III. Conclusion 
This appeal involves a restaurant placing a floating 
platform over the Commonwealth's subaqueous bottomland without 
a permit or statutory exception in violation of Code § 28.2-
1203(A).  Moreover, the floating platform was used to undertake 
restaurant operations, and therefore was not protected by the 
Constitution of Virginia as a public right inherent to the jus 
publicum.  For these reasons, we hold that the Court of Appeals 
erred in interpreting the scope of the Commission's authority 
under Code § 28.2-1203(A).  Further, we hold that the 
 
25 
Commission failed to preserve the issue of whether the floating 
platform is a "vessel" under 1 U.S.C. § 3. 
For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the Court of 
Appeals' en banc decision.  Although the Court of Appeals' 
panel opinion addressed the issue of federal preemption, the 
Court of Appeals vacated that panel opinion upon granting en 
banc review.  See Moore v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 747, 755, 668 
S.E.2d 150, 155 (2008) (recognizing that the Court of Appeals 
considers panel decisions to be vacated in toto upon grant of 
en banc review).  Because the Court of Appeals' en banc opinion 
did not address the issue of federal preemption, that issue 
remains outstanding.  We therefore remand the case to the Court 
of Appeals to resolve all remaining issues, including whether 
application of Code § 28.2-1203(A) to the floating platform is 
preempted by federal maritime law. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE McCLANAHAN joins, dissenting. 
 
I agree with the majority that the dispositive question in 
this case is whether the Inn, in using the barge1 above state-
                     
 
1 Unlike the majority, I believe that the term “floating 
platform” is a misnomer.  In reality, the “floating platform” 
was simply one or two work barges with new decking installed.  
The majority, however, implies otherwise, as demonstrated by 
the majority’s subsequent description that “the floating 
platform was supported by two barges.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
26 
owned subaqueous bottomlands, was engaging in an activity that 
is a public right inherent in the jus publicum.  However, I 
disagree with the majority’s decision to disregard the 
importance of the barge’s designation as a vessel.  It is 
readily apparent to me that a vessel “in navigation” is 
necessarily engaging in the “right of navigation.”  As a result 
of the majority’s failure to give the barge’s status as a 
vessel the proper consideration, the application of the Code 
§ 28.2-1203(A) yields an absurd result.  Accordingly, I must 
respectfully dissent. 
 
In my opinion, the VMRC’s concession that the barge is a 
vessel is dispositive in this case.  The majority, however, 
disregards the importance of this designation, holding that 
“the ‘in navigation’ requirement prescribed by a definition 
within a federal statute is not synonymous with the ‘right of 
navigation’ protected by the Constitution of Virginia.”  The 
majority’s holding is rendered erroneous by the fact that the 
law has changed significantly since 1932 when this Court 
decided Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 158 Va. 521, 550, 
164 S.E. 689, 698 (1932), the case upon which the majority 
relies to establish its definition for the right of navigation 
                                                                 
The use of the term “floating platform” is, in my opinion, an 
unsuccessful attempt by the majority to downplay the ultimate 
effect this opinion will have on all watercraft. 
 
27 
inherent to the jus publicum.2  Notably, it has since been well-
established that Congress is the ultimate arbiter of what 
activities are encompassed by the right of navigation, not the 
Constitution of Virginia. 
 
As an initial matter, it is important to note that 
navigation is a subset of commerce.  See Gilman v. 
Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713, 724 (1866) (“Commerce includes 
navigation.”).  Accordingly, 
The Commerce Clause confers a unique position upon 
the Government in connection with navigable waters.  
“The power to regulate commerce comprehends the 
control for that purpose, and to the extent 
necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United 
States . . . . For this purpose they are the public 
property of the nation, and subject to all the 
requisite legislation by Congress.”  Gilman, [70 
U.S.] 713, 724-25.  This power to regulate navigation 
confers upon the United States a “dominant 
servitude,” FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 
U.S. 239, 249 (1954), which extends to the entire 
stream and the stream bed below ordinary high-water 
mark. 
United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 122-23 (1967). 
 
Indeed, this Court acknowledged Congress’s power over 
navigation in City of Newport News, stating: 
By the adoption of the Constitution of the United 
States the State of Virginia to a limited extent, 
defined by the Constitution itself, relinquished a 
portion of its sovereignty to the United States.  In 
                     
 
2 Additionally, the majority fails to address the fact that 
this definition was dicta.  In City of Newport News, the issue 
before the Court was whether the Constitution of Virginia 
includes the public right of fishery, not the definition of the 
right of navigation.  158 Va. at 533-34, 164 S.E. at 692. 
 
28 
so doing it imposed upon itself the limitation that 
it may not so dispose of or appropriate to uses its 
tidal waters and their bottoms as to interfere with 
the power and right granted to the United States to 
regulate and control the navigation thereof, so far 
as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce 
with foreign nations and among the States. 
Id. at 543-44, 164 S.E. at 695-96 (emphasis added). 
 
In 1932, when City of Newport News was decided, however, 
it was believed that Congress’ power over navigation was 
strictly limited to those navigable streams involved in 
interstate and international commerce.  See id.  Implicitly, 
this meant that power over intrastate commerce fell to the 
individual states.  Thus, at that time, the Constitution of 
Virginia was the starting point for determining the activities 
encompassed by the right of navigation. 
 
However, in 1942, the United States Supreme Court 
effectively eliminated the distinction between intrastate and 
interstate commerce with regard to Congress’ power under the 
Commerce Clause. 
The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to 
the regulation of commerce among the states.  It 
extends to those activities intrastate which so 
affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the 
power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of 
them [the] appropriate means to the attainment of a 
legitimate end, the effective execution of the 
granted power to regulate interstate commerce. . . . 
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is 
plenary and complete in itself, may be exercised to 
its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations 
other than are prescribed in the Constitution. . . . 
It follows that no form of state activity can 
 
29 
constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted 
by the commerce clause to Congress.  Hence the reach 
of that power extends to those intrastate activities 
which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct 
the exercise of the granted power. 
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 
(1942); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 
(1942) (extending Congress’ power over interstate commerce to 
include intrastate activities that may have an indirect effect 
on interstate commerce); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 
(2005). 
 
In 1953, Congress ceded “title to and ownership of the 
lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the 
respective States, and the natural resources within such lands 
and waters.”  Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1311.  
However, in ceding title and ownership of the subaqueous 
bottomlands, Congress specifically retained “all its 
navigational servitude and rights in and powers of regulation 
and control of said lands and navigable waters for the 
constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national 
defense, and international affairs.”  43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) 
(emphasis added).  Moreover, Congress specifically established 
that its rights in and powers of regulation and control over 
the subaqueous bottomlands “shall be paramount to” the rights 
and powers of the respective states.  Id. 
 
30 
 
While the majority is correct that “a federal statute 
cannot dictate how we understand the right of jus publicum 
under the Constitution of Virginia,” it ignores the Supremacy 
Clause which specifically states that the “Constitution, and 
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”  U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. (emphasis 
added).  It is readily apparent that Congress has deemed that 
the starting point for determining what activity is encompassed 
by the “right of navigation” inherent in the jus publicum is no 
longer found in the Constitution of Virginia; rather, the 
starting point is federal law. 
 
Consequently, I believe that the determination that the 
barge is a vessel under 1 U.S.C. § 3 is dispositive, as 
Congress has deemed that all vessels are, by definition, “in 
navigation.”  As a necessary corollary, any watercraft that is 
“removed from navigation for extended periods of time,” is no 
longer a vessel.  Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 
735, 751 (2013).  Therefore, it is axiomatic that the use of a 
watercraft in navigation (i.e., as a vessel) invokes the right 
of navigation under federal law. 
 
31 
 
Additionally, the determination that the barge is a vessel 
obviates the need for any examination of how the vessel is 
used.  As the United States Supreme Court explained, 
the “in navigation” requirement is an element of the 
vessel status of a watercraft.  It is relevant to 
whether the craft is “used, or capable of being used” 
for maritime transportation.  A ship long lodged in a 
drydock or shipyard can again be put to sea, no less 
than one permanently moored to shore or the ocean 
floor can be cut loose and made to sail.  The 
question remains in all cases whether the 
watercraft's use “as a means of transportation on 
water” is a practical possibility or merely a 
theoretical one. 
Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 496 (2005). 
 
Thus, the majority’s examination of the Inn’s use of the 
barge is moot.  Indeed, by examining the issue of how the barge 
is used, the majority effectively disregards the barge’s 
designation as a vessel.  It cannot be disputed that the barge 
in the present case is a vessel.  Therefore, in my opinion, it 
similarly cannot be disputed that the Inn was engaging in its 
public right of navigation through its use of the barge. 
 
Furthermore, to hold that the VMRC has jurisdiction to 
enforce Code § 28.2-1203(A) with regard to vessels would yield 
an absurd result.  This Court has recognized that “when the 
language of an enactment is free from ambiguity, resort to 
legislative history and extrinsic facts is not permitted 
because we take the words as written to determine their 
meaning.”  Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 
 
32 
87 (1985).  However, our jurisprudence makes it clear that 
there are certain, limited exceptions to this rule. 
In construing statutes, courts are charged with 
ascertaining and giving effect to the intent of the 
legislature.  That intention is initially found in 
the words of the statute itself, and if those words 
are clear and unambiguous, we do not rely on rules of 
statutory construction or parol evidence, unless a 
literal application would produce a meaningless or 
absurd result. 
Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Hill, 254 Va. 88, 91, 488 S.E.2d 
345, 346 (1997) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  The term 
“absurd result” describes “situations in which the law would be 
internally inconsistent or otherwise incapable of operation.”  
Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227 n.9, 623 S.E.2d 922, 926 
n.9 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
It is readily apparent that the majority’s definition of 
the right of navigation would render Code § 28.2-1203(A) 
incapable of operation.  The majority’s definition of the right 
of navigation would give the VMRC jurisdiction to require every 
watercraft not used for commercial purposes to get a permit 
every time it is over state-owned subaqueous bottomlands.  This 
is not such a far-fetched proposition, as the VMRC has 
unequivocally indicated that it would embrace such a ruling, as 
demonstrated by its statement, which the majority quoted, that 
anything that floats over state-owned subaqueous bottomland “is 
an encroachment because it entered into the rights and 
 
33 
authority of the Commonwealth without its permission.”  As the 
Court of Appeals correctly noted, it would be impossible for 
the VMRC to implement such a requirement because “vessels can 
move and stop over the bottomlands numerous times in one day.”  
Virginia Marine Res. Comm’n v. Chincoteague Inn, 61 Va. App. 
371, 386, 735 S.E.2d 702, 710 (2013). 
 
Additionally, the majority’s approach results in the de 
facto criminalization of the act of temporarily mooring non-
commercial vessels.  As stated above, every vessel not used for 
commercial purposes would be required to get a permit every 
time it is moored over state-owned subaqueous bottomlands.  The 
failure to acquire such a permit from the VMRC would subject 
the owner of the vessel to prosecution for a Class 1 
misdemeanor, Code § 28.2-1203(B), and a fine of up to $25,000 
per day.  Code § 28.2-1213(A). 
 
The problem lies in the fact that the VMRC does not have 
the authority to issue the required permit.  Under Code § 28.2-
1207(A), the VMRC may approve permits “to trespass upon or over 
or encroach upon subaqueous beds which are the Commonwealth's 
property.”  (Emphasis added.)  Notably absent is the authority 
to approve permits for encroachments over state-owned 
subaqueous bottomlands.  Under the maxim expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius, the mention of a specific item in a statute 
implies that the “omitted items were not intended to be 
 
34 
included.”  Virginian-Pilot Media Cos. v. Dow Jones & Co., 280 
Va. 464, 468-69, 698 S.E.2d 900, 902 (2010).  Thus, the General 
Assembly’s omission of “over” with regard to permits to 
encroach implies that it did not intend to give the VMRC the 
authority to grant such permits.  Clearly, the General Assembly 
never intended to outlaw all recreational activities over 
state-owned subaqueous bottomlands.  However, that is the 
natural result of the majority’s application of Code § 28.2-
1203(A). 
 
It is readily apparent that the majority recognizes these 
inherent flaws in its opinion as demonstrated by its decision 
to address what this “appeal” does not address in footnote 6.  
The majority is correct: the VMRC’s “appeal” does not address 
any of the situations listed.  However, the majority ignores 
the fact that its holding would still be dispositive of those 
factual situations.  Although the majority implies that docking 
a boat used for purposes of personal travel or living on a 
houseboat over state-owned subaqueous bottomlands would somehow 
require a different result from the present case, it offers no 
indication of how.  Nor could it, as neither of these 
activities involves the movement or transportation of goods 
from place to place.  Indeed, if today’s holding does not apply 
to those factual situations, then the majority must acknowledge 
that it is not defining the public right of navigation; rather, 
 
35 
it is defining the right of navigation as it applies solely to 
the Inn. 
 
Such a subjective approach can only lead to abuse.  
Indeed, I find it particularly telling that, at oral argument, 
the VMRC conceded that a boat that is moored for a majority of 
the year and used primarily as a guesthouse would not be 
subject to Code § 28.2-1203(A), because its use is incident to 
navigation.  However, the barge in the present case, which is 
only moored for four months of the year and then actively used 
as a work barge for the remaining eight months would be subject 
to Code § 28.2-1203(A).  The majority, however, tacitly 
approves of such an arbitrary distinction. 
 
Allowing the VMRC to enforce Code § 28.2-1203(A) with 
regard to vessels, whether temporarily moored or otherwise, 
would necessarily result in the relinquishment, surrender, 
alienation, destruction or substantial impairment of the right 
of navigation, a clear violation of the jus publicum.  
Moreover, the application of Code § 28.2-1203(A) to vessels 
renders the statute incapable of operation and ripe for abuse.  
Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision 
finding that the VMRC does not have jurisdiction to enforce 
Code § 28.2-1203(A).