Title: State v. Veleta (Unpublished Opinion)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S-1-SC-38169
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: August 14, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 Opinion Number: __________________ 2 Filing Date: August 14, 2023 3 NO. S-1-SC-38169 4 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 5 Plaintiff-Appellee, 6 v. 7 JAIME VELETA, 8 Defendant-Appellant. 9 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 10 Cindy Leos, District Judge 11 Harrison & Hart, LLC 12 Nicholas T. Hart 13 Carter B. Harrison IV 14 Ramon A. Soto 15 Albuquerque, NM 16 for Appellant 17 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 18 Walter M. Hart, III, Assistant Attorney General 19 Santa Fe, NM 20 for Appellee 21 The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Chief Clerk of the Supreme Court. Once an opinion is selected for publication by the Court, it is assigned a vendor-neutral citation by the Chief Clerk for compliance with Rule 23-112 NMRA, authenticated and formally published. The slip opinion may contain deviations from the formal authenticated opinion. OPINION 1 VARGAS, Justice. 2 {1} This case comes to the Court on direct appeal pursuant to Rule 12-102(A)(1) 3 NMRA. Defendant Jaime Veleta appeals his conviction for willful and deliberate 4 first-degree murder, claiming the district court made several evidentiary errors, 5 improperly instructed the jury, permitted the entry of inconsistent verdicts, and 6 violated his double jeopardy rights by allowing the inconsistent verdicts to stand. 7 Defendant presents a novel argument that a verdict convicting him of first-degree 8 murder but acquitting him of the lesser-included offenses of second-degree murder 9 and voluntary manslaughter is legally inconsistent. We take this opportunity to 10 address New Mexico law on inconsistent verdicts to explain that only inconsistent 11 convictions and not inconsistent verdicts are reviewed. When the evidence is 12 sufficient to support the verdict of conviction,1 we will not speculate as to why the 13 jury acquitted a defendant of other charges. To examine the verdict of acquittal 14 requires that either we rule based on pure speculation or we inquire into the jury’s 15 deliberations, neither of which we are willing to do. 16 1This opinion uses verdict of conviction to refer to the jury’s guilty verdict on a charge, giving rise to the district court’s conviction on that charge. Similarly, we use verdict of acquittal to refer to the jury’s not guilty verdict on a charge, giving rise to the district court’s acquittal on that charge. 2 I. BACKGROUND 1 {2} In January 2008, Defendant and four others went to the house of Danny Baca 2 (Victim) to confront him about a missing car that contained drugs. After discovering 3 that the car had been stripped and the drugs were missing, Defendant and the other 4 men took Victim from his home. Eventually, Defendant and two of his accomplices, 5 Jose and Mario Talavera, drove Victim out to the mesa where Defendant shot Victim 6 at least eighteen times, killing him, before lighting his body on fire. Shortly after 7 killing Victim, Jose and Mario took Defendant to the bus depot where Defendant 8 boarded a bus to Mexico. Defendant was charged with the murder of Victim in 2011 9 but was not extradited to New Mexico until 2018. 10 {3} At trial, Jose and another of Defendants’ accomplices, Gerardo Nuñez, 11 testified at length about Defendant’s involvement in Victim’s murder. At the 12 conclusion of the trial, the jury entered verdict forms convicting Defendant of willful 13 and deliberate first-degree murder, felony murder in the first-degree, kidnapping, 14 conspiracy, and tampering with evidence. The jury also entered verdict forms 15 acquitting Defendant of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. The 16 district court vacated his felony murder conviction, merging it into his conviction 17 for willful and deliberate first-degree murder, and sentenced him to life in prison. 18 Defendant appealed directly to this Court. N.M. Const. art. VI, § 2 (“Appeals from 19 3 a judgment of the district court imposing a sentence of death or life imprisonment 1 shall be taken directly to the supreme court.”); Rule 12-102(A)(1). 2 II. DISCUSSION 3 {4} Defendant asks this Court to vacate his convictions, alleging the district court 4 (1) abused its discretion when it permitted the introduction of evidence that 5 Defendant fled the country following the murder of Victim, (2) erred when it 6 improperly limited Defendant’s cross-examination of two witnesses, violating his 7 right to confrontation, (3) erred when it improperly instructed the jury with regard 8 to the stepdown instruction and the lesser-included offenses of first-degree murder 9 leading to a legally inconsistent verdict, and (4) erred when it entered his conviction 10 for first-degree murder despite his implied acquittal. Defendant further claims that 11 he is entitled to the reversal of his convictions and requests that the case be remanded 12 to the district court for a new trial. He argues, however, that retrial for first-degree 13 murder, second-degree murder, or voluntary manslaughter is barred by double 14 jeopardy. Finally, Defendant claims cumulative error. Concluding that there was no 15 error, we affirm the district court. 16 A. Claims of Evidentiary Error 17 {5} Defendant claims that the district court made evidentiary errors requiring 18 reversal by (1) admitting evidence of Defendant’s flight from New Mexico to 19 4 demonstrate consciousness of guilt, (2) denying Defendant the opportunity to cross- 1 examine Gerardo about his uncle’s federal drug charges, and (3) limiting 2 Defendant’s cross-examination of Jose about his cooperation with law enforcement. 3 “The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court. 4 On appeal, the trial court’s decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” State v. 5 Hughey, 2007-NMSC-036, ¶ 9, 142 N.M. 83, 163 P.3d 470. “An abuse of discretion 6 arises when the evidentiary ruling is clearly contrary to logic” or when the district 7 court “misapplies or misapprehends the law.” State v. Pacheco, 2008-NMCA-131, 8 ¶ 34, 145 N.M. 40, 193 P.3d 587 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For 9 the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion 10 in any of the evidentiary rulings challenged by Defendant. 11 1. Flight evidence as consciousness of guilt 12 {6} Defendant contends the district court abused its discretion by admitting 13 evidence of his travel to Mexico immediately after Victim was killed as evidence of 14 consciousness of guilt because the State failed to show that he knew he was being 15 pursued by law enforcement at the time he left for Mexico. The State contends that 16 knowledge of law enforcement pursuit is not a prerequisite for admission of flight 17 evidence and asserts that “it is the contemporaneity of the occurrence of the crime 18 and the flight that creates the reasonable inference of consciousness of guilt.” 19 5 {7} We agree with the State. “Flight evidence is admissible because [it] tends to 1 show consciousness of guilt.” State v. Trujillo, 1979-NMCA-055, ¶ 4, 93 N.M. 728, 2 605 P.2d 236 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he prosecution is 3 not required to establish the reason for a defendant’s flight,” and “a defendant’s 4 knowledge that he was being pursued is not a predicate to the admission of flight 5 evidence.” Pacheco, 2008-NMCA-131, ¶ 37. Therefore, we determine there was no 6 abuse of discretion and instead defer to the district court’s determination that the 7 probative value of this evidence substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect. See 8 State v. Bailey, 2015-NMCA-102, ¶ 20, 357 P.3d 423 (explaining that Rule 11-403 9 NMRA gives the district court “much leeway” in deciding whether evidence’s 10 probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect (internal quotation 11 marks and citation omitted)), aff’d, 2017-NMSC-001, ¶ 26, 386 P.3d 1007 (“[T]he 12 task under Rule 11-403 is not to exclude all uniquely prejudicial evidence—just that 13 evidence having an unduly prejudicial impact on a defendant that far outweighs the 14 evidence’s probative effect.”). 15 2. Limitation on cross-examination of witnesses 16 {8} Defendant next contends that the district court abused its discretion by 17 limiting his cross-examination of two of the State’s witnesses and that this violated 18 the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 19 6 Defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it “prohibited 1 [Defendant] from cross-examining [Gerardo] regarding [Gerardo’s] uncle’s federal 2 charges” and limited his questioning of Jose regarding his cooperation with 3 authorities. However, the record reflects that the district court allowed Defendant to 4 cross-examine both witnesses thoroughly with minimal limitation. We hold that the 5 district court did not abuse its discretion or violate Defendant’s right to 6 confrontation.2 See State v. Sanders, 1994-NMSC-043, ¶ 23, 117 N.M. 452, 872 7 P.2d 870 (“The [district] court retain[s] wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation 8 Clause is concerned . . . . The Confrontation Clause merely guarantees an 9 opportunity for effective cross-examination . . . .” (second alteration in original) 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 11 {9} “[W]hile the scope of cross-examination usually lies within the sound 12 discretion of the district court, Confrontation Clause claims are issues of law that we 13 review de novo.” State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMSC-033, ¶ 22, 128 N.M. 44, 989 P.2d 14 419 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The Sixth Amendment to the 15 Constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to be 16 2We note that the State claims that Defendant did not properly preserve his Confrontation Clause claims. Because we conclude there has been no Confrontation Clause violation, we need not address the preservation issue. 7 confronted with the witnesses against him.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 1 (1974) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] primary interest secured 2 by [the Sixth Amendment] is the right of cross-examination.” Id. (internal quotation 3 marks and citation omitted). “Cross-examination of adverse witnesses is the primary 4 means for testing their truth and credibility and is essential to insure the integrity of 5 the fact-finding process.” Sanders, 1994-NMSC-043, ¶ 22. “Nevertheless, the right 6 of cross-examination of adverse witnesses is not absolute.” Id. ¶ 23. Rather, “[t]he 7 Confrontation Clause merely guarantees an opportunity for effective cross- 8 examination; it does not guarantee that the defense may cross-examine a witness in 9 whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Id. (internal 10 quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, “[r]easonable restrictions on the 11 exercise of a constitutional right are permissible.” State v. Herrera, 1978-NMCA- 12 048, ¶¶ 25, 40, 92 N.M. 7, 582 P.2d 384. With this framework in mind, we turn to 13 Defendant’s arguments regarding the testimony of Gerardo. 14 a. Gerardo Nuñez 15 {10} Defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion on two separate 16 grounds by prohibiting him from inquiring into federal drug charges made against 17 Gerardo’s uncle. Defendant asserts that the district court abused its discretion when 18 it excluded the testimony about the uncle’s drug charges as irrelevant and that the 19 8 exclusion violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. 1 Defendant explained that he sought to inquire into the uncle’s federal indictment for 2 drug trafficking to show that Gerardo was knowledgeable about drug trafficking. 3 Defendant claimed that this was part of his defense to show that it was Gerardo and 4 the other men who stole the drugs and needed someone to blame. The State objected 5 to Defendant’s inquiry on relevance grounds. 6 {11} The district court concluded that Gerardo’s uncle’s federal drug trafficking 7 charges had limited relevance to Gerardo’s knowledge of drug trafficking and 8 therefore that the value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its 9 prejudicial effect. See Bailey, 2015-NMCA-102, ¶ 20 (noting the district court’s 10 discretion to exclude evidence when the prejudicial impact substantially outweighs 11 the probative value). Although the district court did not allow Defendant to ask about 12 the federal indictment, it gave Defendant great latitude to ask questions regarding 13 the uncle’s status as a drug dealer and to inquire about the knowledge and experience 14 in the drug trafficking trade gained from his uncle, including the time frame during 15 which Gerardo received this information from his uncle. These questions gave 16 Defendant the “opportunity for effective cross-examination” of Gerardo about his 17 experience and knowledge of the drug trade. Sanders, 1994-NMSC-043, ¶ 23. The 18 district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the uncle’s drug 19 9 charges as irrelevant, and Defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated. See 1 State v. Meadors, 1995-NMSC-073, ¶¶ 26, 33, 121 N.M. 38, 908 P.2d 731 (holding 2 that the district court did not violate a defendant’s right to confrontation or abuse its 3 discretion by excluding testimony it deemed more prejudicial than probative as it 4 was not sufficiently indicative of the fact that the defendant sought to prove). 5 b. Jose Talavera 6 {12} Next, Defendant contends that the district court violated his right to confront 7 Jose Talavera and abused its discretion by limiting his cross-examination into Jose’s 8 cooperation with law enforcement. Defendant also asserts that the district court erred 9 by precluding him from impeaching Jose with sealed pleadings after Jose denied 10 cooperating with authorities. Defendant’s arguments lack merit because he was 11 permitted to inquire into Jose’s cooperation with both state and federal authorities, 12 and he was only precluded from inquiring into matters for which the district court 13 determined Jose lacked personal knowledge. 14 {13} To challenge a witness’s credibility before the jury, a defendant is allowed to 15 inquire into “whether a witness hoped to curry favor by cooperating with the 16 prosecution.” Gonzales, 1999-NMSC-033, ¶ 24 (internal quotation marks and 17 citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court has “recognized that the 18 exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of 19 10 the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 1 475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2 {14} Here, Defendant was permitted to inquire into whether Jose cooperated with 3 the State in exchange for a lighter sentence in this case and another unrelated federal 4 case. Defendant was also permitted to question Jose at length about his federal 5 indictment for drug trafficking. Accordingly, he received the opportunity to cross- 6 examine Jose effectively about his cooperation with authorities, and so his right to 7 confrontation was not violated. Sanders, 1994-NMSC-043, ¶ 23 (explaining that 8 when a defendant is given “an opportunity for effective cross-examination” of a 9 witness, there is no Confrontation Clause violation). 10 {15} Defendant further contends that he was denied the opportunity to impeach 11 Jose with evidence of sealed federal pleadings to show that Jose was lying about 12 cooperating with federal authorities. “Impeachment is crucial to effective cross- 13 examination because it gives a party the opportunity to discredit a witness, so the 14 jury properly has a way to determine whether a witness is untruthful or inaccurate.” 15 State v. Gomez, 2001-NMCA-080, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 118, 33 P.3d 669. However, 16 impeachment evidence is still subject to the rules of evidence and, as such, is 17 admitted or excluded at the discretion of the district court. See id. ¶¶ 12, 14 18 (explaining that the district court’s admission of impeachment evidence is reviewed 19 11 for an abuse of discretion and is subject to the rules of evidence). 1 {16} Defendant attempted to impeach Jose, after he denied being a federal 2 informant, by asking him why certain pleadings in the federal case were sealed, 3 theorizing that the pleadings were sealed because Jose was a federal informant. The 4 district court barred this line of questioning, concluding that Jose lacked the 5 appropriate knowledge to answer why the documents were sealed. Considering 6 Defendant’s thorough cross-examination into Jose’s charges, sentencing, and 7 potential status as an informant, Defendant was given “the opportunity to discredit 8 [the] witness.” Id. ¶ 12. Therefore, limiting Defendant’s impeachment of Jose due to 9 Jose’s lack of personal knowledge was not an abuse of discretion. Rule 11-602 10 NMRA (“A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient 11 to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”). 12 {17} Having addressed Defendant’s evidentiary challenges, we now turn to 13 Defendant’s contention that improper jury instructions require reversal. 14 B. Jury Instructions 15 {18} Defendant argues that the district court committed reversible error in issuing 16 its stepdown instruction to the jury, resulting in a “constitutionally infirm 17 conviction.” The infirmity, Defendant contends, manifested itself in two ways. First, 18 he alleges the district court erred by not complying with State v. Lewis, which 19 12 requires the jury to be informed that it may “consider both the greater and lesser 1 offenses under a count in any order it deems appropriate provided it return a verdict 2 of not guilty on the greater offense before the court may accept a verdict on the lesser 3 included offense,” 2019-NMSC-001, ¶ 1, 433 P.3d 276. Second, he contends the 4 jury instructions created “serious juror confusion” because they were internally 5 inconsistent and contained undefined terms. 6 1. Standard of review 7 {19} Preservation of a party’s argument generally determines which of two 8 pertinent standards of review will guide this Court’s reviews of claimed error in jury 9 instructions. State v. Sandoval, 2011-NMSC-022, ¶ 13, 150 N.M. 224, 258 P.3d 10 1016. “Under both standards of review, we determine whether a reasonable juror 11 would have been confused or misdirected by the jury instruction.” Id. (internal 12 quotation marks and citation omitted). Because we conclude that a reasonable juror 13 would not have been confused or misled and therefore that there was no error in the 14 first instance, we need not consider whether Defendant’s argument was preserved. 15 2. Compliance with Lewis 16 {20} In Lewis, this Court considered the “ambiguity in our existing jury instructions 17 regarding the order in which a jury must deliberate on counts which include both 18 greater and lesser included offenses.” 2019-NMSC-001, ¶ 1. Recognizing a 19 13 defendant’s interest in preventing jury deliberations from being improperly 1 restricted and the state’s interest “in requiring the jury to grapple with the prospect 2 of [a] defendant’s guilt of the greatest offense charged,” the Lewis Court adopted the 3 “modified acquit first approach,” providing that “juries shall be instructed that they 4 have discretion to choose the order in which they deliberate on the offenses within a 5 count but that they may not return a verdict on a lesser included offense unless they 6 unanimously find the defendant not guilty on the greater offense.” Id. ¶¶ 37-38, 40 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant claims that the district 8 court violated this holding in Lewis. The applicable instruction in this case provided 9 in relevant part: 10 You may not find the defendant guilty of an included offense until you 11 have unanimously decided that the defendant is not guilty of the offense 12 that includes the included offense. For example, you may not find the 13 defendant guilty of second degree murder until you have decided that 14 he is not guilty of first degree murder. However, you have the discretion 15 to choose the manner and order in which you deliberate on these 16 offenses. 17 {21} According to Defendant, the stepdown instruction did not comply with Lewis 18 because it did not “state that the jury must acquit of a greater offense before 19 rendering a verdict as to any lesser-included offense.” However, a close examination 20 of the first sentence of the given instruction reveals that it satisfies Lewis. This 21 sentence instructed the jury that it “may not find [D]efendant guilty of an included 22 14 offense until [the jury] ha[s] unanimously decided that [D]efendant is not guilty of 1 the offense that includes the included offense” (emphasis added). Similarly, under 2 the Lewis mandate, a jury cannot return a verdict on the lesser offense unless it first 3 “return[s] a unanimous verdict of not guilty on the greater offense.” 2019-NMSC- 4 001, ¶ 38. Though the given instruction uses the term “included offense” in place of 5 “lesser offense” and “offense that includes the included offense” in place of “greater 6 offense,” both iterations convey the same information to the jury, and therefore the 7 stepdown instruction complied with Lewis. It provided the language necessary to 8 prevent the jury from “grappl[ing] with the prospect of [a] defendant’s guilt of the 9 greatest offense charged.” Id. ¶ 37 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 10 Because the Lewis mandate is satisfied, we decline to reverse on this basis. 11 3. Juror confusion 12 {22} Defendant next argues that even if the Lewis mandate was satisfied, the 13 instructions confused the jury, resulting in error. To obtain reversal of his conviction, 14 Defendant must show that a reasonable juror would be “confused or misdirected” by 15 the given jury instructions. Sandoval, 2011-NMSC-022, ¶ 13 (internal quotation 16 marks and citation omitted). The determination of “juror confusion or misdirection 17 may stem not only from instructions that are facially contradictory or ambiguous, 18 but from instructions which, through omission or misstatement, fail to provide the 19 15 juror with an accurate rendition of the relevant law.” State v. Benally, 2001-NMSC- 1 033, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134. Defendant argues the jury instructions were 2 confusing in three ways: (1) they were inconsistent, (2) they used “the term ‘included 3 offense’ without defining it,” and (3) the curative instruction provided only that the 4 stepdown instruction applied to first-degree willful and deliberate murder, failing to 5 identify the stepdown instruction by instruction number. 6 {23} The stepdown instruction, Instruction No. 18, stated: 7 You have been instructed on the crimes of first degree murder, second 8 degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter. You must consider each 9 of these crimes. You should be sure that you fully understand the 10 elements of each crime before you deliberate further. 11 You will then discuss and decide whether the defendant is guilty of 12 murder in the first degree. If you unanimously agree that the defendant 13 is guilty of murder in the first degree, you will return a verdict of guilty 14 of murder in the first degree. If you do not agree, you should discuss 15 the reasons why there is a disagreement. 16 If, after reasonable deliberation, you do not agree that the defendant is 17 guilty of murder in the first degree you should move to a discussion of 18 murder in the second degree. If you unanimously agree that the 19 defendant is guilty of murder in the second degree, you will return a 20 verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree. If you do not agree 21 you should discuss the reasons why there is a disagreement. 22 If, after reasonable deliberation, you do not agree that the defendant is 23 guilty of murder in the second degree, you should consider whether the 24 defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter. If you unanimously 25 agree that the defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, you will 26 return a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter. If you do not agree, 27 you should discuss the reasons why there is a disagreement. 28 16 You may not find the defendant guilty of more than one of the foregoing 1 crimes. If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant 2 committed any one of the crimes, you must determine that he is not 3 guilty of that crime. If you find him not guilty of all of these crimes, 4 you must return a verdict of not guilty. 5 You may not find the defendant guilty of an included offense until you 6 have unanimously decided that the defendant is not guilty of the offense 7 that includes the included offense. For example, you may not find the 8 defendant guilty of second degree murder until you have decided that 9 he is not guilty of first degree murder. However, you have the discretion 10 to choose the manner and order in which you deliberate on these 11 offenses. 12 (Emphasis added.) 13 a. Internal inconsistency 14 {24} Defendant contends the stepdown instruction was internally inconsistent 15 because it prescribed the order in which the jury “must” consider the offenses then 16 later instructed the jury that it had the discretion to choose the order in which it 17 considered the offenses. However, the relevant portion of the instruction does not 18 use the word “must” as Defendant claims, but rather the term “should.” The term 19 “should,” similar to “may,” is permissive or suggestive—not mandatory. See 20 Cerrillos Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Santa Fe Cnty., 2004- 21 NMCA-096, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 247, 96 P.3d 1167 (“The word ‘may’ is permissive, and 22 is not the equivalent of “shall,’ which is mandatory.”), aff’d, 2005-NMSC-023, ¶ 12, 23 138 N.M. 126, 117 P.3d 932; see also, e.g., Aragon v. United States, 146 F.3d 819, 24 17 826 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that the use of the word “should” is suggestive 1 language, rather than mandatory language). Examining the instructions as a whole, 2 as the jury was instructed to do and as our caselaw requires, State v. Cabezuela, 3 2011-NMSC-041, ¶ 21, 150 N.M. 654, 265 P.3d 705, any permissive suggestion 4 regarding the order of consideration was clarified by the express instruction 5 informing the jury that it had the discretion to consider the offenses in any order it 6 wished. 7 {25} We see no internal inconsistency in the instruction that would confuse or 8 misdirect a reasonable juror. Furthermore, the stepdown instruction provided the 9 jury with an accurate rendition of the relevant law, as it recites the language of UJI 10 14-250 NMRA, the stepdown instruction for varying degrees of homicide in place 11 at the time of trial.3 12 b. Included offense not defined 13 {26} Defendant next claims the district court erred in failing to define “included 14 3The stepdown instruction was subsequently amended when we recognized an ambiguity in New Mexico’s prior uniform stepdown instructions in that it failed to explain “whether a jury may proceed to consideration of a lesser offense if it is unable to agree on the greater offense”—an issue that is not presented by this case. Lewis, 2019-NMSC-001, ¶¶ 1, 24. Following Lewis, our prior stepdown instructions were replaced with UJI 14-6002B NMRA, which “serve[s] as a single adaptable instruction” adopted to “clarify the process for the jury to deliberate and return verdicts on lesser-included offenses.” UJI 14-6002B comm. cmt. 18 offense” because it resulted in jury confusion. Defendant contends that a layperson 1 would not comprehend that second-degree murder is a lesser-included offense of 2 first-degree murder or that voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of 3 second-degree murder based on this instruction. 4 {27} We again apply the error analysis set out in Sandoval, 2011-NMSC-022, ¶ 15. 5 We are unpersuaded that the lack of a definition for “included offense” would 6 confuse or misdirect a reasonable juror because the jury was provided with an 7 example of a lesser-included offense. The jury was instructed that it could not find 8 Defendant guilty of second-degree murder without first finding him not guilty of 9 first-degree murder. Because the jury received this helpful example and because the 10 jury never requested a definition, see State v. Romero, 2009-NMCA-012, ¶ 25, 145 11 N.M. 594, 203 P.3d 125 (inferring that the jury was not confused because it did not 12 request a definition), we conclude that the instructions would not confuse or 13 misdirect a reasonable juror and that there is no error. See Sandoval, 2011-NMSC- 14 022, ¶ 13. 15 c. Curative instruction 16 {28} Defendant also asserts that the jury was confused by the curative instruction 17 given in response to its question about whether it could “charge both felony murder 18 and first-degree murder/second-degree murder/manslaughter” (emphasis added). 19 19 Addressing the jury’s question, the district court gave a curative instruction stating, 1 “The step-down instruction applies only to willful and deliberate murder.” 2 Defendant contends that the curative instruction confused the jury both because it 3 did not refer to the stepdown instruction by its number (eighteen), leaving the jury 4 with no way to know that the curative instruction applied to the stepdown instruction 5 and because the curative instruction only refers to willful and deliberate murder, 6 resulting in “an ambiguous limitation which could be reasonably read to limit” 7 application of the stepdown instruction to only first-degree murder. Defendant 8 claims that the jury’s not-guilty verdicts for second-degree murder and voluntary 9 manslaughter are clear evidence of this confusion. 10 {29} Again applying the Sandoval analysis to Defendant’s claimed error in the 11 curative instruction, this Court must first determine if the lack of reference to 12 Instruction No. 18 and the fact that the instruction was limited to the explanation that 13 the stepdown instruction applied only to willful and deliberate murder would 14 confuse or misdirect a reasonable juror. Sandoval, 2011-NMSC-022, ¶ 15. Here, the 15 jury did not express any confusion as to which instruction the curative instruction 16 applied. The jury also did not express any confusion in relation to whether its 17 consideration should be limited to first-degree murder. The jury’s lack of inquiry 18 suggests that it was not confused. See, e.g., Romero, 2009-NMCA-012, ¶ 25 19 20 (inferring that the jury was not confused because it did not request clarification). 1 While Defendant contends that this confusion is demonstrated by the jury returning 2 verdicts of not guilty for second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, the 3 jury’s act of expressly entering these not-guilty verdicts instead demonstrates that it 4 did not limit its consideration to first-degree murder and also understood the 5 stepdown instruction, which explained that the jury “may not find the defendant 6 guilty of more than one of the foregoing crimes.” These verdicts, along with the 7 jury’s conviction of felony murder, demonstrate that the jury connected the curative 8 instruction to the stepdown instruction. Therefore, we conclude that the jury was not 9 confused or misdirected by the curative instruction. 10 {30} Instead, the jury appeared confused as to whether it could convict on both 11 felony murder and the other homicide offenses charged, questioning whether it could 12 “charge both felony murder and first-degree murder/second-degree 13 murder/manslaughter” (emphasis added). The district court correctly interpreted the 14 jury’s question as confusion related to whether the jury could convict for felony 15 murder and one of the other charged homicide offenses. The district court noted that 16 the confusion was likely due to the stepdown instruction referring to first-degree 17 murder, but not differentiating between first-degree, felony murder and willful and 18 deliberate first-degree murder. The jury’s guilty verdicts for both felony murder and 19 21 willful and deliberate first-degree murder support that this was the point of confusion 1 and that the confusion was resolved by the curative instruction. Because any 2 confusion was cured, reversal is unwarranted. See State v. Parish, 1994-NMSC-073, 3 ¶¶ 4, 13, 118 N.M. 39, 878 P.2d 988 (explaining that a confusing instruction, in 4 contrast with a legally erroneous instruction, may be cured when examining the 5 instructions as a whole). 6 C. Inconsistent Verdicts 7 {31} Defendant next claims that reversal is warranted because the verdicts are 8 legally inconsistent. Defendant insists that the verdicts acquitting him of the lesser- 9 included offenses, but convicting him of first-degree murder are inconsistent 10 because the charged homicide offenses share the elements that (1) Defendant killed 11 Victim and (2) that this occurred in New Mexico on or about January 11, 2008. 12 Defendant argues that due to not-guilty verdicts for second-degree murder and 13 voluntary manslaughter, inconsistency is apparent in the guilty verdicts as to the 14 findings of mens rea. Defendant says “it is equally as possible that the jury 15 determined that there was not sufficient evidence to convict” on the shared essential 16 elements as it is that the jury’s verdict shows a rejection of the distinct elements— 17 the mens rea. Defendant reasons that the possibility that the jury found the shared 18 elements for first-degree murder but not for second-degree murder and voluntary 19 22 manslaughter renders the verdicts legally inconsistent. 1 {32} We disagree. This Court reviews inconsistent convictions, not inconsistent 2 verdicts. When the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict of conviction, we 3 will not speculate as to why the jury acquitted a defendant of other charges—even if 4 the conviction and acquittal are allegedly inconsistent. To examine the verdict of 5 acquittal would require us to rule based on pure speculation or else would require an 6 inquiry into the jury’s deliberations, both of which we decline to undertake. See 7 United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 66 (1984) 8 {33} Whether a legal inconsistency in a jury’s verdict requires acquittal is a matter 9 of law reviewed de novo. United States v. Pierce, 940 F.3d 817, 821 (2d Cir. 2019). 10 The general rule is that “[c]onsistency in the verdict is not necessary.” Dunn v. 11 United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932). The state must prove each element of a 12 charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) 13 (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon 14 proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 15 which he is charged.”). Where there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction, 16 reversal is not required. See State v. Fernandez, 1994-NMCA-056, ¶ 39, 117 N.M. 17 673, 875 P.2d 1104 (explaining that reversal of a conviction supported by sufficient 18 evidence is not required even if it is irreconcilable with an acquittal because appellate 19 23 courts review convictions—not acquittals). 1 {34} The rule set out in Dunn was upheld more than fifty years later in Powell, 469 2 U.S. at 69. In Powell, the defendant was both acquitted of the predicate offenses of 3 conspiracy to possess cocaine and possession of cocaine and convicted of the 4 compound offense of “using the telephone to facilitate those offenses.” Id. The 5 defendant in Powell, like Defendant in this case, asserted that the alleged 6 inconsistency between the convicted offense and acquitted offenses necessarily 7 required reversal. Id. at 60. The Powell Court disagreed, holding that any 8 inconsistency between acquittal and conviction did not require reversal because “[i]t 9 is equally possible that the jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its conclusion 10 on the compound offense, and then through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived 11 at an inconsistent conclusion on the lesser offense.” Id. at 65. It reasoned that “an 12 individualized assessment of the reason for the inconsistency would be based either 13 on pure speculation, or would require inquiries into the jury’s deliberations that 14 courts generally will not undertake.” Id. at 66. Instead, a criminal defendant, the 15 Powell Court explained, is sufficiently protected “against jury irrationality or error 16 by the independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence” as to those counts upon 17 which a defendant is convicted. Id. at 67. 18 24 {35} Even though New Mexico is not bound by Powell, see, e.g., State v. Halstead, 1 791 N.W.2d 805, 810 (Iowa 2010) (explaining that, because the Powell Court did 2 not base its decision on constitutional considerations, states are free to address 3 inconsistent verdicts as they see fit in state criminal proceedings), we are persuaded 4 by its reasoning and hereby expressly adopt it in New Mexico. Further, we view the 5 Powell approach as consistent with the approach taken by our lower courts over the 6 past fifty years. See, e.g., State v. Roper, 2001-NMCA-093, ¶ 24, 131 N.M. 189, 34 7 P.3d 133 (“We have frequently said that our business is to review the verdicts of 8 conviction, and not concern ourselves with any alleged acquittals, and thus we do 9 not entertain contentions alleging that the verdicts are irreconcilable.”); State v. 10 Leyba, 1969-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 36-37, 80 N.M. 190, 453 P.2d 211 (“The verdict of 11 acquittal is beyond our control. . . . Since we may only speculate as to why the jury 12 acquitted defendant . . . , that acquittal, even though irreconcilable with 13 conviction . . . , does not require the conviction to be set aside as a matter of law.”); 14 State v. Nichols, 2016-NMSC-001, ¶¶ 36-37, 363 P.3d 1187 (discussing inconsistent 15 verdicts in dicta and basing its “ultimate decision” not on any alleged inconsistency, 16 but upon insufficient evidence to support the conviction). Indeed, the majority of 17 jurisdictions have applied the rule announced in Dunn and reaffirmed in Powell. See, 18 e.g., State v. Davis, 466 S.W.3d 49, 72-74 (Tenn. 2015) (recognizing that 19 25 inconsistent verdicts can take multiple forms, and when there is an alleged 1 inconsistency between a conviction and an acquittal, the majority of jurisdictions 2 follow Dunn and Powell in declining to upset a conviction as long as there is 3 sufficient evidence); see also Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 649 (Ind. 2010) 4 (reasoning that a jury may return inconsistent verdicts for a number of reasons, and 5 “agree[ing] with and adopt[ing] the federal rule expressed by the United States 6 Supreme Court in Dunn and Powell, which has been for the most part the prevailing 7 rule of Indiana jurisprudence”). 8 {36} Applying Powell, Defendant has not presented this Court with inconsistent 9 convictions, and we decline to examine the jury’s rationale for acquitting Defendant 10 of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter while convicting him of 11 willful and deliberate first-degree murder because such an examination would 12 require that we rule based on pure speculation or else inquire into the jury’s 13 deliberations, both endeavors that we decline to undertake. See Powell, 469 U.S. at 14 66. As Defendant concedes and the record reflects, the State presented sufficient 15 evidence to support the conviction of willful and deliberate first-degree murder, and 16 we will not vacate that conviction. See Fernandez, 1994-NMCA-056, ¶ 39, 17 (declining to vacate a conviction supported by substantial evidence acknowledging 18 that “we review the verdict of conviction, not the verdict of acquittal”); see also 19 26 Powell, 469 U.S. at 69 (explaining that, when a defendant is given the benefit of 1 acquittal on certain counts, “it is neither irrational nor illogical to require [a 2 defendant] to accept the burden of conviction on the counts on which the jury 3 convicted”). 4 D. Implied Acquittal and Double Jeopardy 5 {37} We now turn to Defendant’s argument that his conviction for willful and 6 deliberate first-degree murder should be vacated under the implied acquittal doctrine 7 as this conviction violates his right to be free from double jeopardy. For the reasons 8 explained below, both the implied acquittal doctrine and double jeopardy are 9 inapposite here. 10 1. Implied acquittal doctrine 11 {38} Defendant contends that State v. Montoya, an implied acquittal case, supports 12 reversal. 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 25, 306 P.3d 426. In Montoya, we held that the 13 defendant, having been acquitted by a jury of the lesser offense of second-degree 14 murder, was constitutionally protected from subsequent prosecution for that offense 15 or for a related greater offense because acquittal of the lesser offense resulted in an 16 implied acquittal of the greater offense. Id. ¶¶ 25-27. 17 {39} Montoya is of no assistance to Defendant because the implied acquittal 18 doctrine has not been extended to cases where, as here, the jury was not silent on the 19 27 greater offense but rather expressly convicted the defendant of the greater offense.4 1 See United States v. Bordeaux, 121 F.3d 1187, 1192 (8th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the 2 application of the applied acquittal doctrine where the jury was not silent on the 3 greater offense); Saulsberry v. Lee, 937 F.3d 644, 649 (6th Cir. 2019) (explaining 4 that the implied acquittal doctrine only applies where “the jury remained silent in 5 the face of a free choice to convict”). Defendant concedes that there is no New 6 Mexico or federal authority to support his position that the implied acquittal doctrine 7 operates even where the jury has expressly convicted on the greater offense. And 8 where Defendant has not provided authority to support his position, we may assume 9 no such authority exists. Lee v. Lee (In re Doe), 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 10 764, 676 P.2d 1329 (noting that where a party fails to cite authority, this Court 11 assumes no such authority exists). 12 2. Double jeopardy 13 {40} Defendant also asserts that his conviction violates double jeopardy and that 14 4Defendant insists that Florida caselaw supports his position. The Florida cases Defendant cites are inapplicable because they did not hold that the implied acquittal doctrine is automatically invoked where the jury convicts on the greater offense. Instead, the Florida Supreme Court has made clear that the implied acquittal doctrine is limited to situations where the jury is silent on the greater offense. Greene v. City of Gulfport, 103 So. 2d 115, 116 (Fla. 1958) (precluding subsequent trial for the higher-grade offense “since the verdict convicting of one of the lower grades, but saying nothing as to the higher, necessarily implies a finding of not guilty of the higher offense”). 28 retrial for any of the homicide offenses would be barred by double jeopardy. “The 1 Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits double jeopardy and is 2 made applicable to New Mexico by the Fourteenth Amendment.” State v. Swick, 3 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 279 P.3d 747. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 4 Amendment guarantees that no person shall “be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb” 5 for the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V. Double jeopardy is implicated where 6 there is “(1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second 7 prosecution for the same offense after conviction, [or] (3) multiple punishments for 8 the same offense.” Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 23 (internal quotation marks and 9 citation omitted). Because this case does not involve any of the enumerated 10 protections, double jeopardy is not implicated. 11 {41} First, there has only been one prosecution, and while Defendant insists retrial 12 would be barred on double jeopardy grounds, as we determine no error below 13 warranting reversal, retrial is not contemplated. In addition, this is not a multiple 14 punishment case. Defendant was only left with one homicide conviction after his 15 felony murder conviction was merged, and he does not argue that his convictions for 16 conspiracy, evidence tampering, and kidnapping are punishments for the same 17 offense in violation of double jeopardy. Rather, Defendant insists that his right to be 18 free from double jeopardy is violated because he was simultaneously convicted of 19 29 willful and deliberate first-degree murder and acquitted of second-degree murder 1 and voluntary manslaughter. Defendant fails to make a justifiable double jeopardy 2 argument. 3 {42} For the first time at oral argument, Defendant argued that the language of the 4 New Mexico Constitution provides greater protection than its federal counterpart 5 and called upon this Court to expand the protections of the New Mexico Constitution 6 based on principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel to cases where, as here, a 7 defendant has been convicted on a greater offense but acquitted on a lesser-included 8 offense. However, under either constitution, double jeopardy and principles of res 9 judicata and collateral estoppel are simply not implicated where there has been 10 neither multiple punishments nor successive prosecutions. See State v. Gallegos, 11 2011-NMSC-027, ¶ 30, 149 N.M. 704, 254 P.3d 655 (providing that both state and 12 federal double jeopardy clauses are applicable when there have been successive 13 prosecutions or multiple punishments); Alba v. Hayden, 2010-NMCA-037, ¶ 6, 148 14 N.M. 465, 237 P.3d 767 (explaining that res judicata and collateral estoppel “only 15 apply to successive litigation and not to issues or claims raised in the same 16 proceeding”). Therefore, we do not further entertain Defendant’s double jeopardy 17 and estoppel arguments. 18 30 E. Cumulative Error 1 {43} Finally, Defendant asserts that, even if the claimed errors above individually 2 do not warrant reversal, cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial requiring 3 reversal. In light of our conclusion that the district court did not err, there can be no 4 cumulative error. See State v. Casillas, 2009-NMCA-034, ¶ 51, 145 N.M. 783, 205 5 P.3d 830. 6 III. CONCLUSION 7 {44} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 8 {45} IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice 11 WE CONCUR: 12 13 C. SHANNON BACON, Chief Justice 14 15 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice 16 17 DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice 18