Title: Holles v. Sunrise Terrace Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 980482
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 8, 1999

Present:  All the Justices 
 
CAROL M. HOLLES, ADMINISTRATRIX 
OF THE ESTATE OF ROSEMARY LOUISE BRABAND 
 
v.  Record No. 980482   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
January 8, 1999 
SUNRISE TERRACE, INC. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Leslie M. Alden, Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in entering judgment for a defendant provider of management 
services at an "adult care residence" on counts of breach of 
contract and negligence, which arose from an attack by an 
intruder on the plaintiff's decedent, a tenant in the facility. 
 
In May 1994, Sunrise Terrace, Inc. (Sunrise) provided food 
and management services to the residents of the Lincolnian 
Senior Center (the Center) under a contract with Fairfax County.  
Various Fairfax County agencies operate the Center to provide 
services and programs for senior citizens.  The Center includes 
an adult care residence licensed under Code § 63.1-175, 
consisting of two different types of housing for senior 
citizens.  The second floor of the Center has semi-private rooms 
for residents who require assistance with such daily activities 
as eating, bathing, and dressing, but who do not require the 
medical services of a nursing home.  The residences on the third 
floor are efficiency apartments for residents who are capable of 
performing all activities of daily living without assistance 
from the facility's staff.  Third floor residents cook their own 
food, leave the building whenever they choose, have overnight 
guests, and otherwise lead independent lives. 
 
In May 1994, the plaintiff's decedent, Rosemary Louise 
Braband, was a tenant of the Center in a third floor efficiency 
apartment.  Braband leased the apartment from the Fairfax County 
Redevelopment and Housing Authority. 
 
The contract between Sunrise and the County consisted of a 
Request for Proposal issued by the County and a Proposal 
submitted by Sunrise in response, along with several amendments.  
In the Request for Proposal, the County provided:  "The 
management firm should indicate its plan to ensure the physical 
security of the residents, particularly those in the second 
floor Assisted Living portion."  In its Proposal, Sunrise 
specified that it would have an employee present at the front 
desk during the times that the front door was unlocked.  
Sunrise's proposal further provided:  "All other doors are kept 
locked at all times." 
 
Sometime before 8:00 a.m. on the morning of May 25, 1994, 
before the Center's front door was unlocked for the day, a man 
later identified as Byron C. Pooler went to the door of 
Braband's apartment and identified himself as a maintenance 
 
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worker.  Thinking that Pooler had come to repair her air 
conditioner, Braband allowed him to enter her apartment. 
 
Pooler placed a kitchen knife at Braband's throat and 
demanded money, but Braband only had three dollars in her 
wallet.  Pooler then raped Braband and demanded that she write 
him a check for fifty dollars.  Prior to this attack on Braband, 
there had been no criminal acts committed on any Center 
resident. 
 
Pooler later was arrested for rape and robbery.1  In a 
statement made to Detective Charles Arnone of the Fairfax County 
Police Department, Pooler said that he gained entrance to the 
Center by waiting until a side door was opened from within and 
then walking through the doorway past the person who had opened 
the door. 
 
In Count I of the amended motion for judgment, Carol M. 
Holles, the administratrix of Braband's estate,2 alleged that 
Braband was a third party beneficiary of Sunrise's contract with 
Fairfax County, and that Sunrise breached the contract by failing 
                     
 
1Pooler pleaded guilty to the rape and robbery of Braband.  
He received a sentence of life imprisonment on the rape charge 
and twenty years' imprisonment on the robbery charge. 
 
 
2This action originally was brought by Rosemary Braband.  
After Braband's death while the action was pending, Carol 
Holles, administratrix of Braband's estate, was substituted as 
plaintiff.  Holles stipulated that Braband's death was not 
causally related to Pooler's assault on Braband. 
 
 
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to provide adequate security at the Center.  In Count II, Holles 
alleged that Sunrise was negligent in allowing Pooler to gain 
entrance to the Center, and that this negligence was a proximate 
cause of the assault on Braband. 
 
A jury heard the above evidence in a four-day trial.  The 
court took under advisement Sunrise's motion to strike the 
evidence on the negligence count, in which Sunrise asserted that 
it did not owe a common law duty of care to Braband, but owed 
only those obligations assumed in its contract with Fairfax 
County.  At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court 
instructed the jury on both contract and negligence theories.  
Over Sunrise's objection, the trial court instructed the jury 
that Sunrise, as manager of an adult care residence for the 
elderly, "has undertaken a duty to use ordinary care to prevent 
criminal acts of third persons which could be reasonably 
foreseen or anticipated."  The jury returned a verdict in favor 
of Sunrise on the count alleging breach of contract, and in 
favor of Holles on the negligence count, awarding damages of 
$388.50. 
 
Both parties moved to set aside the jury's verdict.  The 
trial court granted Sunrise's motion to set aside the verdict on 
the negligence count, and denied Holles' motion to set aside the 
verdict on the contract count.  On the negligence count, the 
court agreed with Sunrise's argument that there was no "special 
 
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relationship" between Sunrise and Braband, stating that Sunrise 
was "neither the owner of the property, nor Ms. Braband's 
landlord; Sunrise was merely a provider of services to the 
Center pursuant to the terms of its contract with Fairfax 
County."  Thus, the court concluded that "Sunrise's duty to Ms. 
Braband, if any, was governed by the contractual provisions and 
not by the common law of negligence."  The court entered final 
judgment in favor of Sunrise on both counts. 
 
On appeal, Holles first argues that the trial court erred 
in refusing to allow Priscilla R. Joyner, a registered nurse, to 
testify as an expert witness on "rape trauma syndrome" and its 
effects on the victims of such crimes.  Holles contends that, 
although she failed to proffer the substance of Joyner's 
qualifications and proposed testimony, she is entitled to a new 
trial on this issue because the trial court summarily refused to 
admit the evidence on the grounds that Joyner was not a medical 
doctor.  We disagree. 
 
When testimony is excluded before it is presented, the 
record must reflect a proper proffer showing what the testimony 
would have been.  Chappell v. Virginia Elec. Power Co., 250 Va. 
169, 173, 458 S.E.2d 282, 285 (1995); see Williams v. Harrison, 
255 Va. 272, 277, 497 S.E.2d 467, 471 (1998).  Without such a 
proffer, we cannot determine the admissibility of the proposed 
testimony and, if admissible, whether the court's exclusion of 
 
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that evidence prejudiced Holles.  Thus, we are unable to 
consider Holles' first assignment of error. 
 
Holles next argues that the trial court erred in granting 
Sunrise's motion to strike the evidence on the negligence count.  
Holles contends that the contract between Sunrise and Fairfax 
County established a "special relationship" between Sunrise and 
the Center residents, imposing on Sunrise a common law duty to 
protect the residents from the foreseeable criminal acts of 
third parties.  Holles asserts that Sunrise's breach of this 
alleged duty is actionable under common law negligence 
principles.  We disagree with Holles' argument. 
 
To establish a cause of action for negligence, the duty 
alleged to have been tortiously breached must be a common law 
duty, not a duty arising between the parties solely by virtue of 
a contract.  Foreign Mission Bd. v. Wade, 242 Va. 234, 241, 409 
S.E.2d 144, 148 (1991).  Therefore, for Holles to maintain a 
negligence claim against Sunrise, she must identify a common law 
duty owed by Sunrise to her, which arose separate and apart from 
any duty imposed by Sunrise's contract with Fairfax County. 
 
The issue whether Sunrise owed a common law duty of care to 
Braband is a question of law.  See A.H. v. Rockingham Publishing 
Co., 255 Va. 216, 220, 495 S.E.2d 482, 485 (1998); Burns v. 
Johnson, 250 Va. 41, 45, 458 S.E.2d 448, 451 (1995).  Before any 
duty of care can arise to control the conduct of third persons, 
 
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there must be a special relationship between the defendant and 
either the plaintiff or the third person.  A.H., 255 Va. at 220, 
495 S.E.2d at 485; accord, Burdette v. Marks, 244 Va. 309, 312, 
421 S.E.2d 419, 420 (1992).  We have recognized a special 
relationship between a defendant and a plaintiff in cases 
involving a common carrier and its passenger, a business 
proprietor and its invitee, and an innkeeper and its guest.  
A.H., 255 Va. at 220, 495 S.E.2d at 485; Klingbeil Management 
Group Co. v. Vito, 233 Va. 445, 448, 357 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1987).  
However, these are not exclusive examples of a special 
relationship.  A.H., 255 Va. at 220, 495 S.E.2d at 485; Gulf 
Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 158, 207 S.E.2d 841, 844 
(1974). 
 
An essential characteristic of a special relationship is 
that it provides a right of protection to a plaintiff by a 
defendant from the criminal acts of third persons that can be 
reasonably foreseen or anticipated.  See Klingbeil, 233 Va. at 
447-48, 357 S.E.2d at 201; Gulf Reston, 215 Va. at 158, 207 
S.E.2d at 844.  In Klingbeil and Gulf Reston, we held that there 
generally is no special relationship between a landlord and a 
tenant that would impose a common law duty on the landlord to 
protect the tenant from an intentional criminal act of an 
unknown third person.  See id.
 
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As the trial court properly recognized in this case, 
Sunrise did not even have the common law status of a landlord, 
but was present on the premises solely pursuant to its 
management services contract with Fairfax County.  Therefore, we 
conclude that Sunrise did not have a special relationship with 
Braband, a resident of the "independent living" floor of the 
Center, because there was no right of protection inherent in 
their relationship separate and apart from any duties imposed by 
Sunrise's contract with the County.  Accordingly, we hold that 
the trial court did not err in dismissing the negligence count.3
 
Holles' remaining assignments of error, which concern her 
breach of contract action, are procedurally defaulted for 
various reasons.  Holles argues that the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury regarding incidental beneficiaries to a 
contract.  Instruction No. DD, which was offered by Sunrise, 
provided:  "A person who benefits only incidentally from a 
contract between others cannot sue upon the contract." 
 
After Sunrise offered this instruction, Holles' counsel 
stated:  "We don't object to the instruction."  The instruction 
was given to the jury along with two instructions defining third 
party beneficiaries and their rights under a contract.  These 
three instructions placed before the jury the issue whether 
                     
 
3Based on this holding, we do not address Holles' assignment 
of error that she was entitled to a new trial on the issue of 
 
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Braband was a third party beneficiary of Sunrise's contract with 
Fairfax County.  Although Holles argued in her motion to set 
aside the verdict that she had objected to the incidental 
beneficiary instruction offered by Sunrise, the record discloses 
that she did not.  Since Holles did not raise a timely objection 
to Instruction No. DD, we will not consider her objection to 
that instruction on appeal.  Rule 5:25; see Morgen Indus., Inc. 
v. Vaughan, 252 Va. 60, 67-68, 471 S.E.2d 489, 493 (1996); 
Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 537, 450 S.E.2d 365, 372 
(1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1161 (1995). 
 
We also do not reach the merits of Holles' contention that 
the trial court erred in refusing "to declare the Plaintiff's 
Decedent a third party beneficiary as a matter of law."  We 
observe the general rule that, when an issue has been submitted 
to a jury under instructions given without objection, such 
assent constitutes a waiver of any contention that the trial 
court erred in failing to rule as a matter of law on the issue.  
See Spitzli v. Minson, 231 Va. 12, 17-19, 341 S.E.2d 170, 173-74 
(1986); Hilton v. Fayen, 196 Va. 860, 866-67, 86 S.E.2d 40, 43 
(1955).  Thus, in agreeing to submit to the jury the issue 
whether Braband was an incidental or a third party beneficiary 
of the contract, Holles waived her argument that the trial court 
erred in refusing to declare Braband a third party beneficiary 
                                                                  
damages only on the negligence count. 
 
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as a matter of law.  See Rule 5:25; Spitzli, 231 Va. at 17-18, 
341 S.E.2d at 173; Hilton, 196 Va. at 866-67, 86 S.E.2d at 43. 
 
We next note that although Holles contends the trial court 
erred in refusing to instruct the jury "that the failure to keep 
the rear entry door closed and locked was a breach of contract 
as a matter of law," Holles failed to request such an 
instruction during the trial.  Therefore, we do not address this 
matter.  Rule 5:25. 
 
Finally, although Holles assigns error to the trial court's 
refusal to set aside the verdict for Sunrise on the third party 
beneficiary breach of contract claim, she does not discuss this 
assignment of error in her brief.  Thus, she has abandoned that 
issue.  See Williams, 248 Va. at 537, 450 S.E.2d at 372; Durham 
v. National Pool Equip. Co. of Va., 205 Va. 441, 445, 138 S.E.2d 
55, 58 (1964). 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court's 
judgment. 
Affirmed.
 
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