Title: Douglas v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co.
Citation: 405 So. 2d 107
Docket Number: 52782
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: October 14, 1981

405 So. 2d 107 (1981) Mary DOUGLAS v. The GREAT ATLANTIC &amp; PACIFIC TEA COMPANY. No. 52782. Supreme Court of Mississippi. October 14, 1981. Gaston H. Hewes, Jr., Gulfport, for appellant. Bryant &amp; Stennis, Grier J. Gregory, David B. Strain, Gulfport, for appellee. En Banc. *108 PATTERSON, Chief Justice, for the Court: In the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Harrison County, the jury returned a verdict for A &amp; P grocery store, the defendant, in a slip and fall negligence action brought by appellant, Mary Douglas, for damages. Douglas appeals from the verdict, assigning several errors, combined herein as two. On July 3, 1979, Mary Douglas went to the A &amp; P in Gulfport to buy two weeks supply of groceries. It being a holiday eve, the store was quite crowded. She had one more aisle to go and was standing near the frozen food case with a basket full of groceries when she slipped and fell on something wet. When she attempted to get up, she experienced a sharp, burning pain. Curtis Fairley, the manager of the A &amp; P, saw Douglas at about 1:00 p.m. immediately after the accident and observed about a gallon or so of water on the floor adjacent to the frozen food case. He did not know how long the water had been there, but was sure it came from the frozen food case. He prepared an accident report on July 3, describing the defective condition as water on the floor caused by the "frozen food case leaking water on the floor." To Fairley's personal knowledge, the floor had last been cleaned six or seven hours before the accident. Fairley further testified he walks the aisles about fifteen or twenty times each day, and on the morning of the accident, he walked through the store about 6 to 8 times. He walked aisle nine, site of the accident, about five times and did not notice any water in the aisle. He last walked aisle nine at 11:30 a.m., an hour and a half *109 before Douglas slipped and fell. Prior to July 3, the frozen food case had not leaked. The porter of the A &amp; P, Bill Hickman, whose duties include sweeping and scrubbing the aisles on the night shift testified he spent six to eight hours on the night of July 2 and the early hours of July 3 sweeping and scrubbing the floors. He observed no water pooling in aisle nine while working and had never seen any in the past. He also testified that water occasionally comes off the frozen food case and collects on the floor, but that it is wiped dry as soon as observed. He also stated the floor should ideally be swept every three hours. Hickman and Fairley both admitted no sweeper's log was kept because of laziness or indifference. Bobby Beeson, in charge of stocking the frozen food case, testified the case was stocked from 6:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. on July 3. The last time he went down aisle nine was 12:10 p.m. Beeson noticed no water pooling in the aisle nor was there a problem with leakage from the frozen food case. The evidence on damages, not the primary issue on appeal showed Mary Douglas sustained back injuries from her fall in the A &amp; P which required medical care, hospitalization, and absenteeism from work. This brings us to appellant's assignment of error that Instructions P-1 and P-2, peremptory instructions, were erroneously refused by the trial court. We think, the trial court properly refused these based on the conflicting evidence of negligence. See Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d 812 (Miss. 1972). Also much of the evidence is circumstantial and such a case should rarely be taken from the jury. Davis v. Flippen, 260 So. 2d 847 (Miss. 1972). We are also of the opinion Instructions P-3, P-7, P-9, and P-13 were correctly refused. These instructions are quoted herein: The primary reason these jury instructions were refused, and properly so, in our opinion, was the failure to require plaintiff to prove the proprietor had actual or constructive notice of the wet condition. The applicable rules concerning proof of notice are stated in Winn Dixie v. Hughes, 247 Miss. 575, 584, 156 So. 2d 734, 736 (1963) as follows: Here there was not a scintilla of evidence a third party created the wet hazardous condition; moreover, there was no proof the proprietor created the wet condition. Thus it was the plaintiff's burden to prove either actual or constructive notice on the part of the proprietor of the dangerous wet condition of the floor in front of the frozen food case. In Helveston v. Gibson Products Company of Hattiesburg, Inc., 192 So. 2d 389 (Miss. 1966), we affirmed a jury verdict for defendant wherein plaintiff slipped and fell on a puddle of liquid in Gibson's. There we held proof of actual or constructive notice is required where there is no proof the dangerous condition is the result of an affirmative act of the store proprietor or any of his employees. Here, appellant also failed to prove the wet hazardous condition was a result of an affirmative act of the proprietor or his employees so plaintiff had the burden of proving notice; thus the jury must be properly instructed as to notice. It is possible to reasonably infer from circumstantial evidence presented at trial that the water originated from the adjacent frozen food case; however, even if this be *111 so, proof of the water's presence on the floor for a sufficient amount of time to give reasonable notice to the proprietor is required. This the appellant did not prove. A similar case to the present is Hill v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 42 N.C. App. 442, 257 S.E.2d 68 (1979) where plaintiff slipped and fell on some water next to a vegetable bin in a supermarket. There was no evidence to indicate the source of the water or how long the water had been there, and plaintiff's testimony that she guessed the water came from the vegetable bin was viewed by the North Carolina Court as speculation and conjecture. In affirming the directed verdict for the proprietor, that court reasoned as follows: While it is quite true the frozen food case was under the superior control of the A &amp; P, we recognize the well settled rule which disallows the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to slip and fall cases. Daniels v. Morgan &amp; Lindsay, Inc., 198 So. 2d 579 (Miss. 1967); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Stokes, 191 So. 2d 411 (Miss. 1966); Sears, Roebuck &amp; Co. v. Tisdale, 185 So. 2d 916 (Miss. 1966). Turning to appellant's assertion the jury verdict is against the weight of the credible evidence so as to evince passion and prejudice, we again are of the opinion this is without merit. We exercise with the utmost care the power to set aside a jury verdict and grant a new trial. Williams v. Hood, 237 Miss. 355, 114 So. 2d 854 (1959). Here the appellant failed to sustain her burden of proving actual or constructive notice so the jury verdict, we find, is in accord with the evidence. AFFIRMED. SMITH, P.J., ROBERTSON, P.J., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, LEE and HAWKINS, JJ., concur. BOWLING, J., takes no part.