Title: Matthew Marshall v. Julie L. Jones, etc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC16-779
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 4, 2017

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-779 
____________ 
 
MATTHEW MARSHALL,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[May 4, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Petitioner Matthew Marshall has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 
challenging the constitutionality of his death sentence, which was based upon a 
judicial override.  See Marshall v. State, 604 So. 2d 799, 802 (Fla. 1992).  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.  Because Marshall’s sentence 
became final before Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), was decided, he is not 
entitled to relief.  See Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016).  Accordingly, we 
deny the petition. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result. 
 
 
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LABARGA, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, C.J., dissenting. 
 
I dissent from the decision of the majority to deny Matthew Marshall habeas 
corpus relief.  Although his sentence admittedly became final prior to the issuance 
of Ring, this Court has “the power to reconsider and correct erroneous rulings in 
exceptional circumstances and where reliance on the previous decision would 
result in manifest injustice, notwithstanding that such rulings have become the law 
of the case.”  State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 720 (Fla. 1997).  Marshall’s death 
sentence, which was based upon a judicial override, constitutes an injustice that 
should be remedied. 
The standard for review of a judicial override was articulated in Tedder v. 
State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975), abrogated by Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 
(Fla. 2016): 
A jury recommendation under our . . . death penalty statute should be 
given great weight.  In order to sustain a sentence of death following a 
jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death 
should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person 
could differ. 
This elevated standard “honors the underlying principle that [the] jury’s advisory 
sentence reflected the ‘conscience of the community’ at the time of . . . trial.”  
Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263, 283 (Fla. 2000).  The key focus under Tedder is 
 
 
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whether there exists a “reasonable basis in the record to support the jury’s 
recommendation of life.”  San Martin v. State, 717 So. 2d 462, 471 (Fla. 1998).  
This is distinctly different from the weighing process that a trial court performs 
after a jury issues a recommendation of death.  The recommendation of life 
“changes the analytical dynamic and magnifies the ultimate effect of mitigation on 
the defendant’s sentence.”  Keen, 775 So. 2d at 285.  For example, with respect to 
the life recommendation in Keen, this Court noted that “[w]hile any of us might or 
might not have come to the same conclusion . . . had we been jurors, that is not the 
legal standard by which we must evaluate the override of the jury’s 
recommendation.”  Id. at 286 (emphasis added). 
Marshall killed fellow inmate Jeffrey Henry at a correctional facility in 
Martin County.  Marshall, 604 So. 2d at 802.  Although the jury recommended life 
imprisonment, the trial court overrode that recommendation and imposed a 
sentence of death.  Id.  The court found four aggravating circumstances: 
(1) Marshall was under a sentence of imprisonment; (2) prior violent felony;1 
(3) the murder occurred while Marshall was engaged in the commission of, or an 
attempt to commit, a burglary;2 and (4) the murder was especially heinous, 
                                          
 
 
1.  Marshall had a “record of violent felonies consisting of kidnapping, 
sexual battery, and seven armed robberies.”  Id. at 806. 
 
2.  According to the decision on direct appeal: 
 
 
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atrocious, or cruel.  Id. at 802.  In mitigation, the trial court found that Marshall 
behaved acceptably during trial, and he entered prison at a young age.  Id.  The 
court rejected as mitigation that Marshall’s older brother led him astray to “run the 
streets” and engage in illegal conduct, and his mother caused him to believe that 
there would be no negative consequences for his behavior.  Id.  In overriding the 
jury recommendation, the trial court cursorily stated: 
Sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in 
section 921.141(5), and there are insufficient mitigating circumstances 
to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.  The facts supporting this 
conclusion are so clear and convincing that no reasonable person 
could differ. 
On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Marshall’s death sentence by a bare 
majority vote.  Id. at 806.  Chief Justice Barkett, in a concurring in part and 
                                          
 
Marshall claimed that Henry was a “muscle man” for several inmates 
who operated a football pool.  When Marshall tried to collect his 
winnings from the inmates, they told him to get the money from 
Henry.  Marshall claims he entered Henry’s cell only to collect his 
winnings but that Henry refused to pay, and that Henry then attacked 
him, so he fought back. 
Id. at 802.  The Court later stated: 
[W]e find the circumstance of murder committed during the course of 
a burglary to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Even if 
Marshall initially entered Henry’s cell with consent for the purpose of 
collecting a gambling debt, the only reasonable inference apparent 
from Marshall’s reentering the cell was that he intended to resume his 
attack on the victim. 
Id. at 805. 
 
 
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dissenting in part opinion that was joined by Justices Shaw and Kogan, concluded 
that a reasonable basis for the jury’s recommendation of life existed, and the trial 
court abused its discretion when it overrode that recommendation: 
 
In addition to considering the stipulated testimony of 
Marshall’s father, the jury could have reasonably viewed the evidence 
of the murder in a light more favorable to Marshall.  In his closing 
argument to the jury, defense counsel conceded that the aggravating 
circumstances of murder committed while under a sentence of 
imprisonment and previous conviction of a violent felony were 
established, but strongly argued against the existence of the other 
aggravators presented by the State.  He argued that the death penalty 
should be reserved only for the worst murderers and worst 
aggravation.  He pointed out that the evidence showed that Marshall 
and Henry had no prior problems with each other and had socialized 
together at the prison.  Defense counsel emphasized that the 
circumstances of the crime indicate no prior plot or plan to kill since 
Marshall entered the cell unarmed and the murder was committed 
with a battery pack belonging to and found within the cell of the 
victim.  He argued that offensive wounds on Henry’s hands showed 
that the murder occurred during the course of a fight and that Henry 
was a violent person.  He also noted that Henry’s skull was not 
fractured and his facial bones weren’t broken, indicating that Marshall 
did not intend to torture the victim or inflict additional injuries once 
he was rendered unconscious.  Defense counsel also pointed out that 
the murder was not committed for financial gain.  Finally, defense 
counsel argued that Marshall’s age and background mitigate the 
offense as well.  He pointed out that a life sentence of 25 years on top 
of the sentence of 46 years that Marshall was already serving would 
keep Marshall in prison for a substantial period of time. 
. . . 
While the jury may not have believed that Marshall acted in self 
defense to excuse the killing, it could have reasonably inferred from 
the evidence that a fight erupted between Marshall and Henry and that 
Marshall killed Henry in a fit of rage.  It is also likely that the jury 
rejected some of the aggravators found by the judge or assigned them 
minimal weight.  Additionally, the jury could have reasonably found 
 
 
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mitigation in Marshall’s family background and determined, based on 
the nature of the crime and the circumstances surrounding it, that the 
death penalty was not the appropriate penalty in this case. 
 
Id. at 806-07 (citations omitted) (Barkett, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
I agree with Chief Justice Barkett’s well-reasoned conclusion that under 
Tedder, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to override the jury 
recommendation.  It cannot be said the facts of this case so clearly suggest a 
sentence of death “that virtually no reasonable person could differ.”  Tedder, 322 
So. 2d at 910.  The fact that three members of this Court dissented to the 
affirmance of the override demonstrates just the opposite is true. 
I do not dispute that this was a violent murder.  Matthew Marshall may be a 
violent person who deserves to be in prison for the rest of his life.  However, in my 
opinion, the trial court failed to conduct the proper analysis under Tedder, and this 
Court failed to honor the “conscience of the community” when it affirmed the 
override in this case.  Keen, 775 So. 2d at 283.  The time has come to correct that 
erroneous ruling and afford Marshall what he is entitled to under the law—the 
sentence recommended by the jury who heard, considered, and carefully weighed 
the evidence presented. 
Therefore, I dissent. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs. 
 
 
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Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Neal Andre Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Todd G. Scher, 
Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Jessica Houston, Staff 
Attorney, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Lisa-Marie Lerner, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent