Title: State Ex Rel. Brosman v. Whitley Cir. Ct.
Citation: 198 N.E.2d 3, 245 Ind. 259
Docket Number: 30,247
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: January 7, 1963

245 Ind. 259 (1963)
198 N.E.2d 3
STATE EX REL. BROSMAN ET AL.
v.
WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT.
No. 30,247.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed January 7, 1963.
Rehearing denied April 28, 1964.
*260 James F. Dumas, Kennerk, Dumas &amp; Burke, of Fort Wayne, and John H. Daily of Indianapolis, for relators.
Lowell L. Pefley, pro se.
John H. Whiteleather, Benton E. Gates and Gates &amp; Gates, all of Columbia City, for respondents.
LANDIS, C.J.
This is an original action in this Court for a writ of mandate directing respondent court to grant a change of venue from the county in a certain will contest action brought by relator and others in respondent court. We issued the alternative writ. The Court's previous opinion herein which has been vacated by the granting of a rehearing herein appears in 186 N.E.2d 881.
From the petition before us it appears that the will contest action was filed on November 16, 1961, and summons was served on the defendants on November 25 and November 27, 1961, to appear on December 11, 1961. On November 28, 1961, a general appearance was entered for the defendants by counsel. No further pleadings were filed nor were further entries made in the cause until April 11, 1962, when relators filed affidavit for change of venue from the county. The change of venue was denied and relators' petition for writ of mandate in this Court followed. Relators contend respondent court should have granted a change of venue under Rule 1-12B providing:
Respondents have filed return to the writ contending that will contests are not governed by the rules pertaining to civil procedure generally, and that the issues were closed by operation of law without the necessity of defendants filing any pleading.
The statutes pertaining to will contests provide as follows:
It will be noted that there is no provision for the filing of pleadings in will contest actions other than "... allegations in writing [of the contestor] verified by affidavit...." There is no specific provision for the filing of an answer nor is there provision to the effect that actions to contest wills are governed by the rules of procedure in civil actions.
Actions to contest wills are purely statutory proceedings, Blanchard v. Wilbur (1899), 153 Ind. 387, 392, 55 N.E. 99, 101; The Evansville, etc., Co. et al. v. Winsor, by Next Friend (1897), 148 Ind. 682, 686, 48 N.E. 592, 593, and we are therefore *263 governed by the apparent intent of the legislature to indicate that while formal pleadings may be permitted in will contests, as in ordinary civil actions, such formality in the formation of issues is not necessary. See: Bartlett et al. v. Manor et al. (1897), 146 Ind. 621, 45 N.E. 1060; The Evansville, etc., Co., et al. v. Winsor, by Next Friend (1897), supra, 148 Ind. 682, 690, 48 N.E. 592, 595; State v. Marion Juvenile Court (1962), 243 Ind. 209, 212, 184 N.E.2d 20, 21.
We believe the situation here presented is somewhat comparable to numerous proceedings concerning decedent's estates, as for example, petitions to determine heirship. In State ex rel. Crawford, et al. v. Howard Circuit Court (1962), 242 Ind. 593, 598, 181 N.E.2d 18, 20, 21, we recently stated:
It is true in the case before us relators have alleged that at the time of the filing of the motion for change of venue there was no entry in the court's order book setting the cause for trial. However, it should be *264 noted that Rule 1-12B, supra, does not give a party ten days after the setting of the cause for trial within which to file his change of venue petition. It provides the "... application ... shall be filed ... if the issues are closed without answer by operation of law, ... not later than ten (10) days after the party has knowledge the cause is ready to be set for trial...." (Italics supplied.)
The record in the case before us discloses that no formal pleadings were filed in the will contest action below except for the contestors' written allegations or complaint although it had been pending for a period of four months. We are compelled to come to the conclusion that there has been no affirmative showing by relators in this case that the issues in the instant will contest action were not closed by operation of law nor that relators did not have knowledge the cause was ready to be set for trial. Yet such showing must be made if relators' action for writ of mandate in this Court is to prevail.
It is well settled that the burden of proof in actions of mandate is on the party having the affirmative of the issue and that this rule applies to original actions for mandate in this Court. State ex rel. Rooney et al. v. Lake C.C., etc. (1957), 236 Ind. 345, 346, 140 N.E.2d 217, 218; State ex rel. Wall v. Cass C.C. etc. (1954), 233 Ind. 192, 194, 117 N.E.2d 126, 127; West's I.L.E., "Mandate and Prohibition," § 123.
The alternative writ of mandate heretofore issued is dissolved and the permanent writ denied.
Arterburn and Achor, JJ., concur. Myers, J., not participating. Jackson, J., dissents with opinion.
JACKSON, J.
The majority opinion as now written is, in my opinion, erroneous, and I dissent thereto.
This is an original action for a writ of mandate directing the respondent court to grant a change of venue from the county in the case of Mary Jane Bigler, et al. v. The Farmers Loan and Trust Company, Exr. etc., being cause No. 17458 on the dockets of respondent court. We issued an alternative writ on April 26, 1962.
From the petition before us it appears that the will contest action was filed on November 16, 1961, summons was served on the defendants on November 25th and November 27, 1961, to appear on December 11, 1961. On November 28, 1961, a general appearance was entered for the defendants by counsel. No further pleadings were filed nor were further entries made in the cause until April 11, 1962, when relator filed affidavit for change of venue from the county. The change of venue was denied and relator's petition for writ of mandate in this court followed. Relator contends respondent court should have granted a change of venue under Rule I-12B.[1]
Respondent filed return to the writ contending that will contests are not governed by the rules pertaining to civil procedure generally, and that the issues were closed by operation of law without the necessity of defendants filing any pleadings.
*266 One of the determinates in this action is whether or not an action to contest a will is a "civil action" within the meaning of Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 38, § 1, p. 240; 1911, ch. 157, § 1, p. 415, being § 2-101, Burns' 1946 Replacement, which reads as follows:
The courts in Indiana have defined a "civil action" by quoting with approval a decision of the Supreme Court of Montana, which says:
It has long been held that a proceeding to revoke and set aside the probate of a will is a civil action. Lowes' Rev., Works' Ind. Pract., Vol. 1, § 1.1, 1.2, 1.3; *267 Goodbud v. The Estate of Hornung (1891), 127 Ind. 181, 185, 26 N.E. 770; Evans v. Evans (1886), 105 Ind. 204, 5 N.E. 24; Fort v. White (1913), 54 Ind. App. 210, 220, 101 N.E. 27; McConahey's Estate v. Foster (1899), 21 Ind. App. 416, 419, 52 N.E. 619.
Thus, there can be no doubt that a will contest is a civil action within the meaning of Acts 1911, ch. 157, § 1, p. 415, being § 2-101, Burns' 1946 Replacement.
The fact that a procedure is statutory is relatively unimportant. If such statutory proceeding provides its own procedure it must be followed. Where it is only partly provided, the civil code of procedure steps in and provides the rest. The fact that the provision for contest of a will does not say that it shall be governed by the civil code is not important, as all cases and authorities say it will.
Issues must be formed in all civil cases. This means complaint and answer. The case is not at issue until an answer or demurrer is filed.
The question of the time for filing a change of venue in a will contest is after the answer has been filed.
The temporary writ heretofore issued should be made permanent.
I further dissent to the granting of the petition for rehearing in this cause for the reason that at the time the former majority opinion (see 186 N.E.2d 881 for opinion and concurring opinion) was written, the same had been written, voted on and approved prior to 9:30 a.m., January 7, 1963, the time it was handed down to the clerk's office. The delivery of the opinion to the clerk's office at that time had no more effect than if it had been delivered there at 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. on Friday, January 4, 1963. If so called late or delayed handing down of a case is the criteria by which the validity of the opinion is to be determined, then several recent decisions of the Appellate Court are suspect. Decker v. Rev. Board of Ind. Employ. Sec. Div. (1963), 124 Ind. App. 164, 186 N.E.2d 890; Elberson v. Tokheim Corp. (1963), 135 Ind. App. 688, 186 N.E.2d 894.
NOTE.  Reported in 198 N.E.2d 3.
[1]  Acts 1953, ch. 112, § 717, p. 295.
[2]  Acts 1953, ch. 112, § 718, p. 295.
[3]  Acts 1953, ch. 112, § 719, p. 295.
[4]  Acts 1953, ch. 112, § 720, p. 295.
[5]  Acts 1953, ch. 112, § 721, p. 295.
[1]  "In any action except criminal no change of judge or change of venue from the county shall be granted except within the time herein provided. Any such application for change of judge or change of venue shall be filed not later than ten (10) days after the issues are first closed on the merits, or if the issues are closed without answer by operation of law, ... not later than ten (10) days after the party has knowledge the cause is ready to be set for trial."