Title: Robidoux v. Oliphant
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 91072
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2002

Docket No. 91072-Agenda 25-November 2001.
SHIRLEY ROBIDOUX, Indiv. and as Ex'r of the Estate of Harvey
Robidoux, 
 Deceased, Appellee, v. URETZ J.
OLIPHANT,
								M.D., et al. (Uretz J. Oliphant, M.D., et al., Appellants).
Opinion filed June 20, 2002.
	 
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	This appeal stems from the death of Harvey Robidoux, who
was injured in a motorcycle accident on July 15, 1995, and was
subsequently taken to the Carle Foundation Hospital (the Hospital)
in Urbana. While there, he was treated by, inter alia, defendant
Uretz J. Oliphant, M.D., an employee of defendant Carle Clinic
Association (the Clinic). Harvey Robidoux died at the Hospital the
same day. In June 1997, plaintiff Shirley Robidoux, Harvey's
widow, sued Oliphant and the Clinic, along with several others
who are not parties to this appeal, in the circuit court of
Champaign County. In 1999, following defendants' motions for
summary judgment, plaintiff filed a response to which she
attached the affidavit of David Richards, M.D., plaintiff's expert
witness. On October 4, 1999, Oliphant filed a supplemental reply
to plaintiff's response and a motion to strike Richards' affidavit.
The next day, October 5, the trial court granted Oliphant's motion
to strike, as well as his "unrefuted" motion for summary judgment.
The trial court subsequently granted the Clinic's motion for
summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court
reversed. No. 4-00-0105 (unpublished order under Supreme Court
Rule 23). We allowed defendants' petition for leave to appeal. 177
Ill. 2d R. 315. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the
judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	The following facts are taken from the pleadings and other
materials of record, including Richards' affidavit and Oliphant's
deposition. On July 15, 1995, plaintiff's decedent, Harvey
Robidoux (decedent), was injured in a motorcycle accident and
was taken to the Hospital. He arrived at the emergency room
shortly after 12 p.m. Oliphant, the head of the Hospital's trauma
division, was not in the emergency room when decedent arrived,
and took no part in his initial care and treatment. At 12:32 p.m., it
was ordered that decedent undergo a computed tomography (CT)
scan. During this scan, decedent went into cardiac arrest. Oliphant,
who arrived at the emergency room about this time, ordered the
CT scan halted, and decedent was taken to the operating room.
	Oliphant, who is a board-certified general surgeon, began
operating on decedent at about 1:15 p.m. He testified in his
deposition that he found a large, ruptured hematoma, or blood clot,
extending from decedent's pelvis upward and spreading over half
his abdomen. Oliphant determined that decedent's iliac vein(1) was
completely severed, and he believed that all of decedent's iliac
vessels on one side were torn. Decedent died a short time later.
According to Oliphant, the cause of death was intra-abdominal
bleeding from the severed or injured iliac vessels.
	In his deposition, Oliphant was asked if alternative measures,
including starting surgery earlier, might have saved decedent's
life. Oliphant answered that because of the severity of decedent's
injuries, he did not believe it would have made any difference.
Oliphant also stated that his treatment of decedent on July 15,
1995, was within the appropriate standard of care.
	In counts I through III of her fourth amended complaint,
plaintiff alleged that Oliphant was negligent in failing timely to (1)
institute appropriate fluid resuscitation therapy, (2) diagnose
internal bleeding, (3) treat internal bleeding, and (4) diagnose an
unstable pelvic fracture. In counts X through XII plaintiff sought
to hold the Clinic, Oliphant's employer, vicariously liable for
Oliphant's actions.
	Oliphant and the Clinic filed motions for summary judgment.
In Oliphant's motion, to which he attached excerpts from his
deposition, Oliphant asserted that he was not involved in the initial
treatment of decedent and there was no negligence in his
subsequent treatment of decedent. Plaintiff's response was filed
seven days after the initial deadline set by the trial court, but
within an extended deadline that was set by the court sua sponte.(2)
Plaintiff asserted in her response that there were genuine issues of
material fact as to whether Oliphant acted within the standard of
care. Attached to plaintiff's response was Dr. Richards' signed
affidavit, which stated in full:
			"The undersigned, being first duly sworn under oath,
deposes and states as follows:
			1. I am a physician licensed to practice medicine in the
State of Ohio and a board certified general surgeon;
			2. I have been treating trauma patients with injuries
similar to those of Harvey Robidoux and have practiced
in the same area of health care medicine that is at issue in
this case in excess of six years;
			3. I have reviewed the records of Ford-Baier
Ambulance Service and Carle Foundation Hospital, as
well as various depositions, including the deposition of
Urtez [sic] J. Oliphant, M.D.;
			4. That in my opinion, based upon a reasonable degree
of medical certainty, the care and treatment provided by
Dr. Oliphant to Harvey Robidoux at Carle Foundation
Hospital on July 15, 1995, fell below the standard of care.
In my opinion, Dr. Oliphant failed to recognize in a timely
fashion that the patient had a[n] unstable pelvic fracture
that was the most probable source of the bleeding, failed
to take appropriate measures to provide adequate fluid
resuscitation therapy and failed to take appropriate
measures to immobilize and repair the damages [sic]
blood vessels;
			5. In my opinion, based upon a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, had the patient received appropriate
fluid resuscitation in a timely manner, and appropriate
treatment to immobilize and repair the damage to blood
vessels in the pelvic region, it is more probably true than
not that the patient would have survived.
			6. This affidavit is based on my education, training and
experience, as well as my review of the various materials
referenced herein and that, if sworn as a witness, I can and
will testify competently to the facts and opinions stated
herein, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty."
	Oliphant filed a supplemental reply to plaintiff's response and
a motion to strike Richards' affidavit. In his motion, Oliphant
alleged that Richards' affidavit was improper and in violation of
Supreme Court Rule 191 (145 Ill. 2d R. 191). Oliphant asserted
that the affidavit was undated and unverified, and therefore did not
contravene Oliphant's summary judgment motion, which was
supported by his sworn deposition testimony. According to
Oliphant, there was no indication in Richards' affidavit "of
verification or swearing under oath by any proper official or notary
public." Oliphant added that Richards' affidavit consisted of
"vague conclusions" and contained no admissible facts, and thus
did not comply with Supreme Court Rule 191, which requires that
such affidavits set forth with particularity "the facts" upon which
the affiant relied. 145 Ill. 2d R. 191. In addition, Oliphant pointed
to a Rule 191 requirement that sworn or certified copies of all
papers upon which the affiant relies must be attached to the
affidavit. No such papers were attached to Richards' affidavit.
	The trial court granted Oliphant's motion to strike, explaining
that Richards' affidavit "is not verified and does not comport with
the requisites of Supreme Court Rule 191." The court then granted
Oliphant's motion for summary judgment, which the court held
"stands unrefuted in effect." Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider,
to which she attached Richards' supplemental affidavit. Oliphant
filed a response to plaintiff's motion to reconsider and a motion to
strike Richards' supplemental affidavit.
	Because the original judge who granted Oliphant's motion for
summary judgment had since retired, a different judge presided
over a joint hearing on plaintiff's motion to reconsider, Oliphant's
motion to strike Richards' supplemental affidavit, and the Clinic's
motion for summary judgment. Despite finding that Richards'
supplemental affidavit was "adequate to create a genuine issue of
material fact," the trial court nevertheless granted Oliphant's
motion to strike, "not because [the affidavit] is defective under
Rule 191, but because it is not timely." The court therefore denied
plaintiff's motion to reconsider and held that the summary
judgment in favor of Oliphant remained "in full force and effect."
The court also granted the Clinic's motion for summary judgment.
Finally, the court found, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a)
(155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) that, as to all of these rulings, there was no
just reason to delay enforcement or appeal.
	Plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court reversed and
remanded. No. 4-00-0105 (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23). The appellate court first held that the striking of
an affidavit for noncompliance with Rule 191 should be reviewed
de novo and not under the "abuse of discretion" standard. The
court then found that, while Richards' original affidavit might
have violated Rule 191 in a technical sense, it was nevertheless
substantively in compliance and should not have been stricken.
This affidavit, the appellate court further held, presented a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Oliphant's treatment of
decedent fell below the standard of care. Accordingly, the
appellate court determined that the trial court improperly granted
summary judgment in favor of Oliphant and the Clinic. We
allowed defendants' petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS
	The question before us is one of statutory construction. We
are asked to determine the precise scope of the requirements set
forth in Rule 191(a). It is well settled that the construction of our
rules is comparable to this court's construction of statutes. The
committee comments to Supreme Court Rule 2 state that "the
same principles that govern the construction of statutes are
applicable to the rules." 134 Ill. 2d R. 2, Committee Comments;
cf. Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (1995) (supreme court
rules are neither aspirational nor are they suggestions; "[t]hey have
the force of law, and the presumption must be that they will be
obeyed and enforced as written"). As is the case with statutes, our
primary task in construing a rule is to ascertain and give effect to
the intent of its drafters. In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395,
404-05 (1998). "The most reliable indicator of intent is the
language used, which should be given its plain and ordinary
meaning." Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d  at 405. The construction of a statute
is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. In re Estate of
Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 330 (2000). We therefore review the
interpretation of Rule 191(a) de novo.
 	Rule 191(a) states in pertinent part:
		"Affidavits in support of and in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment under section 2-1005 of the Code of
Civil Procedure *** shall be made on the personal
knowledge of the affiants; shall set forth with particularity
the facts upon which the claim, counterclaim, or defense
is based; shall have attached thereto sworn or certified
copies of all papers upon which the affiant relies; shall not
consist of conclusions but of facts admissible in evidence;
and shall affirmatively show that the affiant, if sworn as
a witness, can testify competently thereto." 145 Ill. 2d R.
191(a).
	Plaintiff directs our attention to this court's decision in Wilson
v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186 (1981), and argues that, in light of this
decision, the requirements of Rule 191(a) cannot be given literal
effect. We disagree.
	In Wilson, this court adopted Rules 703 and 705 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence pertaining to an expert's testimony at trial. Rule
703 states in pertinent part:
			"The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be
admitted." Fed. R. Evid. 703.
The court in Wilson noted that, in a trial context, "[b]oth Federal
and State courts have interpreted Federal Rule 703 to allow
opinions based on facts not in evidence." Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d  at 193. 	Rule 705 states:
			"The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference
and give reasons therefor without first testifying to the
underlying facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to
disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination." Fed. R. Evid. 705.
	In accordance with Rule 705, we held in Wilson that, at trial,
"an expert may give an opinion without disclosing the facts
underlying that opinion." Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d  at 194. "Under Rule
705 the burden is placed upon the adverse party during cross-examination to elicit the facts underlying the expert opinion."
Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d  at 194. We explained in Wilson that our
"following of Federal Rules 703 and 705 comports with the
modern trend liberalizing certain trial procedures." Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d  at 195. Thus, under Wilson, an expert testifying at trial may
offer an opinion based on facts not in evidence, and the expert is
not required on direct examination to disclose the facts underlying
the expert's opinion.
	Plaintiff at bar argues in essence that there is an inconsistency
between Wilson and the plain language of Rule 191(a). As noted,
under Wilson, an expert's opinions may be offered at trial in the
form of conclusions. However, under the plain language of Rule
191(a), an expert's affidavit in support of or in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment must consist not of conclusions but
of facts admissible in evidence, and it must set forth these facts
with particularity. Plaintiff thus appears to contend that we should
construe Rule 191(a) not according to its plain language, but rather
in conformity with the more relaxed standard established in
Wilson.
	The difficulty with plaintiff's contention is that Wilson deals
with an expert's testimony at trial, while Rule 191(a) deals with
affidavits in support of or in opposition to motions for summary
judgment. As was explained by our appellate court in Kosten v. St.
Anne's Hospital, 132 Ill. App. 3d 1073 (1985), these two
procedural settings are very different. In Kosten, the plaintiff
raised the same argument as does plaintiff at bar, contending that,
in light of this court's decision in Wilson, her expert's affidavit
"need not state any facts but may set forth only conclusions."
Kosten, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 1080. In rejecting this argument, our
appellate court explained:
			"Wilson has no relevance to summary judgment
procedure. An affidavit utilized in summary judgment
procedure is totally different from testimony at trial. The
affidavit cannot be cross-examined as can a witness at
trial.
			Supreme Court Rule 191 is specific in mandating that
affidavits cannot consist of conclusions but must set forth
facts admitted in evidence. [Citation.] Wilson did not
overrule or modify Rule 191." Kosten, 132 Ill. App. 3d at
1080.
Accord Landeros v. Equity Property &amp; Development, 321 Ill. App.
3d 57, 63 (2001); Woolums v. Huss, 323 Ill. App. 3d 628, 636
(2001); Northrop v. Lopatka, 242 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8 (1993).(3)
	We agree with the reasoning of the court in Kosten. Summary
judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 735
ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1998); Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal
Hospital, 156 Ill. 2d 511, 517-18 (1993). The purpose of summary
judgment is not to try a question of fact, but to determine if one
exists. Gilbert, 156 Ill. 2d  at 517. Although a plaintiff is not
required to prove his case at the summary judgment stage, in order
to survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party
must present a factual basis that would arguably entitle the party
to a judgment. Allegro Services, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Pier &amp;
Exposition Authority, 172 Ill. 2d 243, 256 (1996). An affidavit
submitted in the summary judgment context serves as a substitute
for testimony at trial. Fooden v. Board of Governors of State
Colleges &amp; Universities, 48 Ill. 2d 580, 587 (1971). Therefore, it
is necessary that there be strict compliance with Rule 191(a) "to
insure that trial judges are presented with valid evidentiary facts
upon which to base a decision." Solon v. Godbole, 163 Ill. App. 3d
845, 851 (1987).
	Further support for the position taken by the court in Kosten
can be found in the federal court of appeals decision in Hayes v.
Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 8 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 1993), which
addressed an issue similar to the Rule 191-Wilson question. In
Hayes, the court considered the interplay between Rule 705 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence (one of the rules adopted in Wilson) and
Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(e), a
subsection of the federal rule governing motions for summary
judgment in federal court, is similar to our Rule 191(a). Rule 56(e)
states in pertinent part:
			"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto
or served therewith." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
	The plaintiffs in Hayes raised essentially the same argument
as did the plaintiff in Kosten and plaintiff in the case at bar, i.e.,
that under Federal Rule of Evidence 705, the conclusory assertions
made in their experts' affidavits were sufficient to withstand a
motion for summary judgment. The court in Hayes disagreed, and
affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment.
According to the Hayes court, such affidavits submitted in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment must meet the
standards of Rule 56(e), which "requires that the nonmoving party
'set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.' " Hayes, 8 F.3d  at 92, quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The
court added that the plaintiffs' reliance upon Rule 705 was
"largely inapposite" because that rule "was designed to apply in
the context of a trial, where cross-examination provides an
opportunity to probe the expert's underlying facts and data and to
test the conclusions reached by the expert." Hayes, 8 F.3d  at 92.
	The court in Hayes further stated:
		"The evidentiary rules regarding expert testimony at trial
were 'not intended *** to make summary judgment
impossible whenever a party has produced an expert to
support its position.' [Citation.] We are not willing to
allow the reliance on a bare ultimate expert conclusion to
become a free pass to trial every time that a conflict of
fact is based on expert testimony. As with all other
evidence submitted on a motion for summary judgment,
expert affidavits must be reviewed in light of [Rule] 56."
Hayes, 8 F.3d  at 92.
See also Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 673
(D.C. Cir. 1977) ("To hold that Rule 703 prevents a court from
granting summary judgment against a party who relies solely on an
expert's opinion that has no more basis *** than *** theoretical
speculations would seriously undermine the policies of Rule 56.
We are unwilling to impose the fruitless expenses of litigation that
would result from such a limitation on the power of a court to
grant summary judgment"); Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) (concluding that Rules 703 and 705
"do not alter the requirement of [Rule] 56(e) that an affidavit must
set forth specific facts in order to have any probative value").
	In light of these authorities, we conclude that Rule 191(a)
should be construed according to the plain and ordinary meaning
of its language. Its requirements should be adhered to as written.
See Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (1995). If we were to
lessen these requirements and interpret Rule 191(a) in conformity
with the more relaxed standard established in Wilson, we would be
making "summary judgment impossible whenever a party has
produced an expert to support its position." Merit Motors, 569 F.2d  at 673. We decline to construe Rule 191(a) in this manner. 	Notwithstanding the foregoing, plaintiff points to the special
concurrence in Woolums v. Huss, 323 Ill. App. 3d 628 (2001),
which asserts an essential equivalence between expert opinion
testimony at trial and an expert's affidavit in a summary judgment
context. The special concurrence argues that, given this court's
decision in Wilson, "the admission of an expert opinion under
Rule 191 at the summary judgment stage requires a greater
showing of foundation than is required for admission of the same
expert opinion at trial." Woolums, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 642
(Steigmann, P.J., specially concurring). According to the special
concurrence, this is an inconsistency for which there is no sound
basis.
	We find this argument unconvincing. As noted, Federal Rules
703 and 705 were designed to apply to an expert's testimony at
trial. Rule 191, on the other hand, was drafted to apply to pretrial
proceedings, including summary judgment. For purposes of our
analysis, there is no equivalence between these two procedural
contexts. Accordingly, there is no inconsistency in having one
standard for admission of an expert's testimony at trial and a
different, more stringent standard for admission of an expert's
affidavit in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment. As noted, such an affidavit serves as "a substitute for
testimony taken in open court." Fooden v. Board of Governors of
State Colleges &amp; Universities, 48 Ill. 2d 580, 587 (1971). Given
that cross-examination is unavailable as a means to test an
affidavit, it is not surprising that the standard for admission of an
affidavit in a summary judgment context would be higher than for
the admission of an expert's opinion at trial. Cf. Solon v. Godbole,
163 Ill. App. 3d 845, 851 (1987) ("strict compliance with Supreme
Court Rule 191(a) is necessary to insure that trial judges are
presented with valid evidentiary facts upon which to base a
decision").
	For the reasons set forth above we conclude that Wilson is
inapplicable to a summary judgment situation. Therefore, an
expert's affidavit in support of or in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment must adhere to the requirements set forth in
the plain language of Rule 191(a).
	Plaintiff next argues that even if Wilson does not apply, and
Rule 191(a) therefore is construed according to its plain meaning,
the rule's provision requiring that supporting documents be
attached to the affidavit need not be strictly followed. According
to plaintiff, the failure to attach such papers to the affidavit is
merely a technical violation of the rule and should be disregarded
if the affiant is competent to testify at trial. We disagree.
	We have already held that Rule 191(a)'s requirements are to
be construed according to the plain language of the rule. Here, the
plain language clearly requires that such papers be attached to the
affidavit. Moreover, supreme court rules, like statutes, should be
construed as a whole, with individual provisions interpreted in
light of other relevant provisions. See Michigan Avenue National
Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). The Rule
191(a) provisions barring conclusionary assertions and requiring
an affidavit to state facts with "particularity" would have little
meaning were we to construe the attached-papers provision as
merely a technical requirement that could be disregarded so long
as the affiant were competent to testify at trial.
	In support of her position, plaintiff relies upon Beals v.
Huffman, 146 Ill. App. 3d 30 (1986), which held that the failure to
attach to an affidavit the papers on which an affiant relies is a
technical violation of Rule 191(a). According to the court in Beals,
such technical interpretations are not favored, and technical
insufficiencies such as the failure to attach documents should be
disregarded if it appears that the affiant would be a competent
witness at trial. Beals, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 39. For the reasons set
forth above, we decline to construe the attached-papers provision
in this manner. As we stated in Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204,
210 (1995), the rules of this court neither are aspirational nor are
they mere suggestions; "[t]hey have the force of law, and the
presumption must be that they will be obeyed and enforced as
written."
	Plaintiff next urges that an affidavit need not be notarized in
order to comply with the requirements of Rule 191(a). We agree. 	We note initially that there is no express requirement in Rule
191(a) that an affidavit be notarized. As was noted in Northrop v.
Lopatka, 242 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7 (1993), "Supreme Court Rule 191
does not expressly require that affidavits include evidence of the
administration of an oath to the affiant." What is required is that
the "affidavit must be signed by the deponent or his name must
appear therein as the person who took the oath." Northrop, 242 Ill.
App. 3d at 7.
	The signed affidavit at issue in Northrop recited that the
affiant, " 'after being duly sworn upon [his] oath[,] depose[s] and
state[s] as follows.' " Northrop, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 7. The court in
Northrop held that this affidavit was "minimally sufficient, as the
deponent's name appears as one having taken an oath." Northrop,
242 Ill. App. 3d at 7. In the instant case, Richards' affidavit, which
was also signed, presents a similar recitation, stating that "[t]he
undersigned, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and states
as follows." The appellate court below relied upon Northrop in
concluding that Richards' affidavit did not violate Rule 191(a),
even though the affidavit lacked notarization. We agree with this
interpretation of the rule.
	Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendants argue that in order
to comply with Rule 191(a), an affidavit must appear to have been
sworn to before an officer of the court. In support, defendants
point to decisions by our appellate court in People v. Smith, 22 Ill.
App. 3d 377 (1974), and Hough v. Weber, 202 Ill. App. 3d 674
(1990). Defendants' reliance upon these decisions is misplaced.
	Smith contains an assertion that an affidavit must appear to
have been sworn to before an officer. The court in Hough cites to
Smith in making essentially the same assertion. However, neither
of these decisions involves Rule 191(a), which by its terms applies
to "[a]ffidavits in support of and in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment under section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, affidavits submitted in connection with a motion for
involuntary dismissal under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and affidavits submitted in connection with a special
appearance to contest jurisdiction over the person, as provided by
section 2-301(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure."(4) 145 Ill. 2d R.
191(a).
	In Smith, the "affidavit" in question stated, allegedly falsely,
that the person named in an accompanying ballot application was
"physically incapable of being present at the polls on election
day." Smith, 22 Ill. App. 3d at 378. This affidavit was the
centerpiece of an indictment charging the defendants, including
the physician who signed the affidavit, with conspiracy to commit
perjury. The affidavit did not fall within the scope of Rule 191(a).
It was not filed in support of or in opposition to a summary
judgment motion, nor was it submitted in connection with a
special appearance to contest jurisdiction over the person or in
connection with a section 2-619 motion to dismiss. The same is
true of Hough, which dealt with a dispute between a widow and
her husband's adult children over the disinterment of the
husband's remains. The widow sued to prevent the disinterment,
and the trial court issued a preliminary injunction in her favor. The
defendants subsequently filed a motion for rehearing and a motion
to preserve the evidence, both of which were denied. The affidavit
in question was submitted in support of the motion to preserve
evidence. As was the case in Smith, this affidavit was not within
the scope of Rule 191(a). These decisions provide no support for
defendants' argument that Rule 191(a) requires an affidavit to be
notarized. 	
	Defendants also attempt to distinguish Northrop v. Lopatka,
242 Ill. App. 3d 1 (1993), where, as noted, an affidavit was found
to be "minimally sufficient" under Rule 191 even though the
affidavit was not notarized. Defendants note that the affiant in
Northrop, unlike Richards in the instant case, "had already given
sworn deposition testimony, but had thereafter filed a defective
affidavit." The appellate court below rejected this same argument,
correctly concluding that "[t]he fact that Richards had not yet been
deposed is irrelevant." As the appellate court noted, "[t]he court
[in Northrop] actually found the affidavit sufficient because the
affiant had taken an oath, not because he had been deposed." This
conclusion by the appellate court below is supported by the
language used by the court in Northrop, which stated: "We
nevertheless conclude that the affidavit here was minimally
sufficient, as the deponent's name appears as one having taken an
oath." Northrop, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 7.
	We now apply our construction of Rule 191(a) to Richards'
original affidavit, which, as previously indicated, was stricken by
the trial court. We note initially that, contrary to the trial court's
assertion that the affidavit was "not verified," we find that it
showed sufficient signs of verification to meet the requirements of
Rule 191(a). As discussed previously, an affidavit need not be
notarized in order to comply with Rule 191(a). Instead, it must be
signed by the affiant, or "his name must appear therein as the
person who took the oath." Northrop v. Lopatka, 242 Ill. App. 3d
1, 7 (1993). Here, Richards' affidavit was signed, and his name
appeared as one having taken an oath. Lack of notarization did not
render this affidavit insufficient.
	As to the requirement that facts be set forth with particularity
and that the affidavit consist not of conclusions but of facts
admissible in evidence, Richards' initial affidavit does appear to
be somewhat conclusionary. However, we are not convinced that
the affidavit is as devoid of factual support as defendants maintain.
In his affidavit Richards mentions, for example, decedent's
"unstable pelvic fracture," which, according to Richards, Oliphant
failed to recognize in a timely fashion as the most probable source
of bleeding. Richards also points to "damage to blood vessels in
the pelvic region," opining that there should have been
"appropriate treatment to immobilize and repair" such damage.
	Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the affidavit did not have
attached "sworn or certified copies of all papers upon which the
affiant relie[d]." 145 Ill. 2d R. 191(a). As noted, this requirement
is inextricably linked to the provisions requiring specific factual
support in the affidavit itself. It is not a mere technical
requirement. Were we to relax this attached-papers requirement
and construe it in conformity with the more lenient standard
established in Wilson, we would be lowering the bar and allowing
the avoidance of summary judgment whenever a party is able to
produce an expert to support its position. See Merit Motors, Inc.
v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1977). We are
unwilling to allow the simple production of an expert's conclusion
"to become a free pass to trial" in such a context. Hayes v.
Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 8 F.3d 88, 92 (1st Cir. 1993).
	Notwithstanding the foregoing, plaintiff asserts that the trial
court's decisions to strike Richards' initial affidavit and grant the
motion for summary judgment were taken without a hearing.
Plaintiff therefore argues that she "was deprived of any
opportunity to correct deficiencies in the original affidavit before
it was stricken or, most importantly, to submit a supplemental
affidavit prior to the trial court['s] ruling on the motion for
summary judgment."
	Plaintiff did not raise this issue in her motion to reconsider,
nor was it raised during the hearing on this motion. "Questions not
raised in the trial court cannot be argued for the first time on
appeal." Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 355 (1998). Plaintiff therefore has waived this issue. In
addition, under the local circuit court rules, "[t]he allowance of
oral arguments upon motions [is] discretionary with the court,"
which may "decide a motion without hearing oral arguments."  6th
Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 2.1(c) (eff. February 6, 1997). According to
these rules, it was within the court's discretion to grant the motion
to strike the affidavit and the motion for summary judgment
without conducting a hearing.
	For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that, under any
standard of review, Richards' initial affidavit clearly did not meet
the plain-language requirements of Rule 191(a). It was therefore
not error for the trial court to strike this affidavit and grant
summary judgment in favor of defendants.
	Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in striking
Richards' supplemental affidavit and denying plaintiff's motion
for reconsideration. We disagree.
	We note initially that while the supplemental affidavit states
that "copies of the records and depositions that [Richards]
reviewed and relied upon in support of [his] opinions are attached
hereto as Group Exhibit B," we could find no such Group Exhibit
B attached to the supplemental affidavit in the record. This exhibit
is referred to during the hearing on plaintiff's motion to
reconsider, but its absence from the record on appeal leaves us to
speculate as to whether the appropriate documents were attached
to the affidavit, as required by Rule 191(a).
	Plaintiff correctly notes that the judge at the hearing on the
motion to reconsider held that the supplemental affidavit was
adequate under Rule 191(a). The judge stated that "this time in the
supplemental affidavit Dr. Richards incorporates *** certain
specific facts upon which he's relying in arriving at his opinion,"
and the judge concluded that this affidavit "would be adequate to
create a genuine issue of material fact." However, the judge struck
the affidavit "not because it is defective under Rule 191, but
because it is not timely." The judge stated that "[t]here is simply
no explanation, much less a good one tendered, as to why the
supplemental affidavit *** was not submitted" prior to the trial
court's decision on the motion for summary judgment.
	In reaching this conclusion, the trial judge cited Gardner v.
Navistar International Transportation Corp., 213 Ill. App. 3d 242
(1991), where the court stated:
		"Trial courts should not permit litigants to stand mute,
lose a motion, and then frantically gather evidentiary
material to show that the court erred in its ruling. Civil
proceedings already suffer from far too many delays, and
the interests of finality and efficiency require that the trial
courts not consider such late-tendered evidentiary
material, no matter what the contents thereof may be."
(Emphasis in original.) Gardner, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 248-49.
	The judge also noted that "there has been a chronic pattern [of
tardiness] throughout this case which has truly infected these
proceedings." He then provided a chronology of plaintiff's
tardinesses in the case:
			"Two Motions for Judgment were filed by the defense
because the Plaintiff had not filed amended pleadings in
compliance with the time frames set by [the trial court].
The first Motion for Judgment was filed March 22nd,
1999, and [the trial court] granted the Plaintiff an
extension of time to respond and granted that extension
*** to April 13th of 1999. Again, the Plaintiff did not file
in a timely fashion, so a second Motion for Judgment was
filed April the 15th of 1999. Notwithstanding that, [the
trial court] granted leave to file a Third Amended
Complaint on May the 11th of 1999. On June 17th of
1999 another Motion for Extension of Time was allowed
the Plaintiff [by the trial court], this time to respond to a
Motion to Strike and Dismiss. Notwithstanding the
extension of time, the response for the Motion to Strike
and Dismiss was filed eight days late. On July 21st of
1999, nevertheless[,] the Plaintiff was given leave to
amend the complaint again. *** On September 13th of
1999 the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Fourth
Amended Complaint, quote 'belatedly,' closed quotes,
was granted by [the trial court] over the objection of the
Defendant, and the Plaintiff was given to September 22nd
of 1999 to file a response to the Motions for Summary
Judgment that I am being asked to reconsider today. On
[September] 27th of 1999, [the trial court], again,
apparently ex parte, afforded the Plaintiff an opportunity
to respond to September the 29th of 1999, and it was not
until October 5th of 1999 that Summary Judgment was
granted."
The judge concluded that "the sound exercise of the Court's
discretion dictates granting the Motion to Strike the Supplemental
Affidavit simply on the basis of timeliness or lack thereof."
	A ruling on a motion to reconsider is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of that discretion. Williams v. Covenant Medical Center,
316 Ill. App. 3d 682, 693 (2000); Higgens v. House, 288 Ill. App.
3d 543, 546 (1997). Given the circumstances in this case, and
given the sound policy reasons invoked by the trial judge, we
cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the judge to strike
the supplemental affidavit. The trial court therefore did not err in
striking the supplemental affidavit and in denying the motion for
reconsideration.

CONCLUSION

	For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Supreme
Court Rule 191(a) should be construed according to the plain and
ordinary meaning of its language. Its provisions should be adhered
to as written. In addition, an affidavit need not be notarized to
comply with Rule 191(a), so long as it is either signed by the
affiant or his name appears as one having taken an oath. We
conclude further that it was not error for the trial court to strike
Richards' original affidavit and grant the motions for summary
judgment, nor was it error for the trial court to strike Richards'
supplemental affidavit and deny plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration. We therefore reverse the judgment of the
appellate court, which reversed the judgment of the circuit court,
and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
	I respectfully dissent from the majority's sanctioning of
summary judgment in this case when the trial court failed to
comply with the mandates of section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2000)).
Specifically, the trial court granted summary judgment in this case
without the benefit of "the hearing" specifically contemplated by
the Code. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000).
	Before setting out my opposition to the fundamental,
procedural flaw in this case, I note my disagreement with the
majority's interpretation of Rule 191's attachment requirement as
it relates to the rule's particularity requirement. The linchpin of the
majority's ultimate conclusion is that plaintiff's original affidavit
failed because the plaintiff did not attach documents in support of
the affidavit. If all other matters were equal, the majority's
conclusion on that point would be correct. I contend, however, that
all else was not equal and that the plaintiff was not afforded a level
playing field.
	The attachment issue was first raised by the defendants after
plaintiff filed the original affidavit in opposition to the summary
judgment motion. The defendants' supplemental replies and
motions to strike alleged that the plaintiff's affidavit was improper
and in violation of Supreme Court Rule 191. The supplemental
pleadings in reply were filed the day before the trial judge granted
summary judgment. Without affording the plaintiff any
opportunity to respond to the new objections, the next day the trial
court struck plaintiff's affidavit. After striking plaintiff's affidavit,
the trial court then reasoned that summary judgment for defendant
was inescapable because plaintiff had, in effect, presented no
opposition to the summary judgment motion. In short, the trial
court permitted the defendants to blind-side the plaintiff by
ignoring the summary judgment hearing requirement and
depriving the plaintiff of the right to file a counteraffidavit or
otherwise respond to the defendants' supplemental filings.
	Section 2-1005 unequivocally contemplates a hearing on
summary judgment motions. Section 2-1005 provides that the
"opposite party may prior to or at the time of the hearing on the
motion file counteraffidavits." (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS
5/2-1005(c) (West 2000). If there is no hearing, how can the
deadline for filing counteraffidavits be established? Section
2-1005 plainly grants the opposing party the right to present
counteraffidavits at the time of the summary judgment hearing.
Here, the opposing party (plaintiff) did not receive the benefit of
a hearing where he might have cured any defects in the original
response and affidavit.
	The majority explains that the lack of a hearing in this case is
of no moment because the local circuit court rules permit oral
hearings on a discretionary basis and plaintiff waived the issue. I
disagree with both of these reasons. First, it is inexplicable how
the majority can countenance the usurpation of a statutory
requirement by a local circuit court rule. The procedural
requirements of section 2-1005 are plain and simple, legal
requirements, binding upon all Illinois trial courts.
	Second, on the issue of waiver, we may consider issues not
properly preserved by the parties in order to ensure a just result.
Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 514 (1994).
Summary judgment is a drastic means of disposing of litigation
and the court has a duty to construe the record strictly against the
movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. Gilbert v.
Sycamore Municipal Hospital, 156 Ill. 2d 511, 518 (1993).
Moreover, summary judgment should be entered only when the
right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. Gilbert, 156 Ill. 2d  at 518.
	In this case, waiver should not have been relied upon by the
majority because of the procedural irregularities that occurred
below. The trial court should have allowed plaintiff the
opportunity to respond to defendants' supplemental objections,
filed the day before it awarded summary judgment to defendant.
The trial court procedure used here is tantamount to blindfolding
the opponent and then asking the opponent to shoot at a moving
target. In addition, while plaintiff's arguments concerning the lack
of a hearing on the summary judgment motion were not raised in
a written motion, those arguments were raised before the trial
court by plaintiff during oral argument on the motion to
reconsider. Because plaintiff afforded the trial court the
opportunity to correct its own error, the rationale behind the
waiver rule is not present. See People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 253 (2000) (Rathje, J., specially concurring); In re Marriage
of Houghton, 301 Ill. App. 3d 775, 780 (1998); see also People v.
Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 85 (1996) (application of the waiver rule
is less rigid where the basis for the objection is the trial court's
conduct).
	Furthermore, I also disagree with the majority's decision
regarding Rule 191 because of the practical implications of the
majority's interpretation of the attachment requirement. Although
I agree with the majority that the attachment requirement is more
than a mere technicality, I do not believe that we should blindly
demand strict compliance. Rather, the attachment of documents
should be enforced with an eye towards the practicalities of
managing a court file. For instance, at oral argument, plaintiff's
counsel clarified that the same documents relied upon by the
plaintiff's doctor were already filed of record. Why then should we
require duplicative filings of the same documents relied upon by
multiple parties in support of or in opposition to a summary
judgment motion? A party should be permitted to comply with the
attachment provision by incorporating by reference the
identification of the pertinent papers.
	Finally, on a minor point of reference by the majority, I also
respectfully object to the notion that a litigant's right to trial could
be equated with a " 'free pass to trial' " (slip op. at 16, quoting
Hayes v. Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 8 F.3d 88, 92 (1st Cir. 1993)).
If anything, the "free pass" in this case is the unwarranted grant of
summary judgment and the defendants' pass from trial. Every
litigant is entitled to a trial and that right may only be denied by
summary judgment when the right of the moving party is clear and
free from doubt. Gilbert, 156 Ill. 2d  at 518.
	Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in this separate opinion,
I respectfully dissent.

	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON joins in this dissent.
1.      1The term "iliac vein" is defined as "any of three veins on each side
of the body corresponding to and accompanying the iliac arteries,"
which are themselves defined as "either of the large arteries supplying
blood to the lower trunk and hind limbs." Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 1125 (1993). The term "iliac" is derived from
"ilium," which is a bone in the pelvis. Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 1126 (1993).

2.      2Plaintiff was initially given until September 22, 1999, to respond to
the motions for summary judgment. On September 27, the trial court
extended the deadline to September 29, which is the date the response
was filed. 

3.      3This court has not directly addressed the issue of Rule 191 as it
relates to Wilson. However, in Majca v. Beekil, 183 Ill. 2d 407, 423-24
(1998), we affirmed the striking of an expert's affidavit on the ground
that it was conclusory rather than fact based and thus did not meet the
requirements of Rule 191. See also Bucheleres v. Chicago Park District,
171 Ill. 2d 435, 462-63 (1996) (upholding the striking of an expert's
affidavit for failure to comply with Rule 191, where affidavit was
challenged as being "merely conjectural").

4.     4Defendants also point to Hamer Holding Group, Inc. v. Elmore, 244
Ill. App. 3d 1069 (1993), which on its surface appears to implicate Rule
191(a). There, the court held that the affidavits in question "lacked ***
the seal of a notary and as such do not comport with Supreme Court
Rule 191(a)." Hamer, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 1084. However, this holding
was clearly judicial dictum, i.e., not essential to the decision. See
Black's Law Dictionary 465 (7th ed. 1999). In addition, it is
questionable whether these affidavits were of a type that is included
within the scope of Rule 191(a). Hamer dealt with the enforceability of
a covenant not to compete, and the affidavits in question were attached
to the defendant's petition seeking to bar enforcement of the covenant
on the ground of a change in circumstances. They were not filed in
support of or in opposition to a summary judgment motion, nor do they
appear to have been filed in connection with a special appearance to
contest jurisdiction over the person or in connection with a section
2-619 motion to dismiss.