Title: State v. Genous
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP000435-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 4, 2021

2021 WI 50 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP435-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
James Timothy Genous, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 392 Wis. 2d 382,944 N.W.2d 359 
(2020 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 4, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 3, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis R. Cimpl   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 
JJ., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Scott E. Rosenow, assistant attorney general; with whom 
on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Scott E. Rosenow. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by Leon 
W. Todd, assistant state public defender. There was an oral 
argument by Christopher P. August. 
 
 
2021 WI 50 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP435-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2016CF3891) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
James Timothy Genous, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 4, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., 
joined.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   The question in this case is 
whether a vehicle stop was supported by reasonable suspicion of 
drug activity.  Examining the totality of the circumstances, we 
hold the stop was lawful and reverse the court of appeals.1 
 
                     
1 See State v. Genous, No. 2019AP435-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2020). 
No. 
2019AP435-CR 
 
2 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
At 3:36 a.m. on August 28, 2016, James Genous sat in a 
parked, running vehicle on a residential street in West Allis with 
its headlights turned on.  Genous momentarily turned off the 
headlights, and a woman emerged from the house he was parked in 
front of.  She entered the vehicle through the front passenger 
door and remained in the car for 10 to 15 seconds.  The woman then 
exited the vehicle and ran back into the house.  A few seconds 
later, the vehicle's headlights turned back on and the car pulled 
away. 
¶3 
West Allis Patrol Officer Adam Stikl watched these 
events from an unmarked squad car half a block away.  Two weeks 
prior, he received an intra-department email regarding K.S., a 
resident of the single-family home Genous was parked in front of.  
K.S. was a known heroin and narcotics user who previously worked 
with the department.  The email explained that the department was 
no longer working with K.S. and that officers were to "keep an eye 
on her because she does obviously still use."  After receiving the 
email, Officer Stikl looked up K.S.'s physical description on his 
department's local system.  As Officer Stikl watched the brief, 
nighttime interaction when the events leading to this case took 
place, he observed that the woman entering and exiting Genous' car 
matched K.S.'s physical description.  He also knew from 
communications within his department that this area had a 
reputation for high drug-trafficking activity. 
¶4 
Based on this context and his training, Officer Stikl 
suspected he had witnessed a drug transaction.  As Genous drove 
No. 
2019AP435-CR 
 
3 
 
away, Officer Stikl followed him for about three blocks and 
executed a traffic stop.  During the stop, officers discovered a 
handgun in Genous' vehicle.  Genous was arrested and later charged 
with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. 
¶5 
Genous filed a motion to suppress the firearm evidence 
in part on the basis that Officer Stikl lacked reasonable suspicion 
to stop Genous' vehicle.  The circuit court2 denied the motion 
following a hearing.  The court of appeals reversed, and we granted 
the State's petition for review. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶6 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides:  "The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated."  Genous and the State agree that Officer Stikl 
seized Genous by executing the traffic stop, but they disagree on 
whether the stop complied with the Fourth Amendment. 
¶7 
An investigatory stop, also known as a Terry stop, 
"usually involves only temporary questioning and thus constitutes 
only a minor infringement on personal liberty."  State v. Young, 
2006 WI 98, ¶20, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729.  It allows police 
officers to briefly detain someone to "investigat[e] possible 
criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make 
an arrest."  State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 55, 556 N.W.2d 681 
                     
2 The Honorable Dennis R. Cimpl of the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2019AP435-CR 
 
4 
 
(1996).  This type of limited stop complies with the Fourth 
Amendment "if the police have reasonable suspicion that a crime 
has been committed, is being committed, or is about to be 
committed."  Young, 294 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20. 
¶8 
Reasonable suspicion must be supported by specific and 
articulable facts.  Id., ¶21.  While it is a low bar, a mere hunch 
is insufficient.  Id.; State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶19, 245 
Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.  Yet "officers are not required to 
rule out the possibility of innocent behavior before initiating a 
brief stop."  State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 84, 454 N.W.2d 763 
(1990).  The question is, "What would a reasonable police officer 
reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience?"  
Id. at 83-84; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) 
("[A] 
trained 
officer 
draws 
inferences 
and 
makes 
deductions . . . that might well elude an untrained person."). 
¶9 
A reasonable suspicion determination is based on the 
totality of the circumstances.  State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶18, 
301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634.  We focus not on isolated, 
independent facts, but on "the whole picture" viewed together.  
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18; see also United States v. Sokolow, 490 
U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989) ("Indeed, Terry itself involved a series of 
acts, each of them perhaps innocent if viewed separately, but which 
taken 
together 
warranted 
further 
investigation." 
(internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
¶10 Therefore, our task is to consider everything observed 
by and known to the officer, and then determine whether a 
reasonable officer in that situation would reasonably suspect that 
No. 
2019AP435-CR 
 
5 
 
criminal activity was afoot.  Whether reasonable suspicion was 
present is a legal question we analyze independently, but we accept 
the circuit court's findings of historical fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶8. 
¶11 In this case, Officer Stikl suspected that the 
interaction he witnessed in Genous' car was a drug deal.  The facts 
show that his suspicion was objectively reasonable.  Informed by 
his training, experience, and department communications, Officer 
Stikl could reasonably infer quite a bit about the events he 
observed that night.  He knew that drug transactions often occur 
during brief exchanges in vehicles, which was consistent with the 
10-15 second contact in Genous' car.3  He also knew that a brief 
meeting in a vehicle at 3:36 a.m., immediately after the vehicle's 
headlights are turned off, and in an area with a reputation for 
drug-trafficking, are potential indicators of illegal activity.4  
                     
3 Officer Stikl testified that based on his training and 
experience, "a lot of these drug cars will come into our city, 
park in front of a house where they are going to sell their drugs 
to, make the deal inside their vehicle in front of the house and 
then leave." 
4 Genous disputed the strength of the evidentiary basis 
offered by Officer Stikl in support of the assertion that this was 
an area with high drug-trafficking activity.  Genous asks us to 
employ 
our 
supervisory 
authority 
to 
create 
evidentiary 
prerequisites for circuit courts considering this factor. 
No. 
2019AP435-CR 
 
6 
 
And perhaps most significantly, Officer Stikl had good reason to 
believe that the woman Genous met in his vehicle was a known drug 
user with whom his department had a documented history.  All these 
factors, viewed collectively in the eye of a trained and 
experienced law enforcement officer, support the conclusion that 
Officer Stikl reasonably suspected a drug transaction had 
occurred. 
¶12 Genous contests this conclusion largely by isolating 
various factors, attacking them one by one, and then excluding 
each factor from the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.   We 
reject "this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis."  United States 
v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002).  It is true that a citizen 
visiting a vehicle at night does not automatically constitute 
grounds for law enforcement to intervene, nor do officers have a 
green light to detain and question anyone who has a short 
conversation with a known drug user.5  But the reasonable suspicion 
                     
"Our supervisory authority is not to be invoked lightly," and 
we decline to do so here.  Koschkee v. Evers, 2018 WI 82, ¶12, 382 
Wis. 2d 666, 913 N.W.2d 878.  Although its weight will vary from 
case to case, it is well-settled that an area's reputation for 
criminal activity is one of many relevant considerations in a 
reasonable suspicion inquiry.  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 
124 (2000); State v. Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d 200, 210-13, 539 
N.W.2d 887 (1995).  Like other factual matters in a totality-of-
the-circumstances analysis, an area's reputation for criminal 
activity is properly entrusted to circuit courts in the first 
instance, and challengeable on appeal as clearly erroneous.  See 
State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶8, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634.  That 
has long been the law, and we see no need to depart from it now. 
5 See State v. Young, 212 Wis. 2d 417, 429-32, 569 N.W.2d 84 
(Ct. App. 1997). 
No. 
2019AP435-CR 
 
7 
 
test is not an exercise in evaluating individual details in 
isolation.  It is the whole picture, evaluated together, that 
serves as the proper analytical framework.  See Sokolow, 490 
U.S. at 9 ("Any one of these factors is not by itself proof of any 
illegal conduct . . . .  But we think taken together they amount 
to reasonable suspicion."). 
¶13 Considering the totality of the circumstances, we hold 
that a reasonable law enforcement officer knowing what Officer 
Stikl knew and seeing what he saw would reasonably suspect that 
the short-term contact he witnessed in Genous' car was a drug 
transaction.  His investigatory stop of Genous' vehicle therefore 
complied with the Fourth Amendment.  We reverse the court of 
appeals' conclusion to the contrary and remand to the court of 
appeals to address Genous' additional arguments not presented to 
this court.6 
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals. 
                     
6 Before the court of appeals, Genous argued that officers 
unlawfully searched his car as well as his shoes and socks.  The 
court of appeals did not reach these issues because it concluded 
that the initial stop was unlawful.  Neither party asked us to 
consider these questions, nor were they briefed.  Therefore, it is 
proper to remand these questions to the court of appeals. 
No.  2019AP435-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶14 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  The record 
contains insufficient particular facts, as opposed to generalized 
suspicions and hunches, that Genous had committed or was about to 
commit a crime.  It appears that Genous's presence in an alleged 
"high-drug-trafficking area" played a disproportionate role in the 
circuit court's reasonable-suspicion analysis, coloring those 
general hunches as concrete suspicions.  Allowing that designation 
to so heavily influence the analysis——particularly when it is 
unsupported by any empirical evidence——continues a troubling 
erosion 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment's 
particularized-suspicion 
requirement.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶15 An officer may conduct an investigatory traffic stop, 
akin to a Terry stop,1 only if the officer has a "reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot."  Illinois 
v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, 
¶¶10-12, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634.  An officer must be able 
to point to concrete, particularized facts that warrant suspicion 
of a particular defendant; "inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion[s] or 'hunch[es]'" are insufficient.  Wardlow, 528 U.S. 
at 123-24 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)); Post, 
301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶10. 
¶16 The circuit court here found the following facts: 
 
Genous was in a "high-drug-trafficking area" 
at 3:30am; 
                     
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
No.  2019AP435-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
 
after idling for some unknown period of time, 
Genous turned off his car along with the car's 
headlights; 
 
Genous had "short-term contact" with a female 
in front of her house; and 
 
a female who is a "known drug user" lived in 
that house.2 
As the court of appeals correctly concluded, these facts are not 
"particularized" to Genous.  State v. Genous, No. 2019AP435-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶15 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2020) (quoting 
State v. Young, 212 Wis. 2d 417, 433, 569 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. 
App. 1997)).  Rather, they describe the conduct of "large numbers 
of law-abiding citizens in a residential neighborhood, even [one] 
that has a high incidence of drug trafficking."  See Young, 212 
Wis. 2d at 430. 
¶17 Likewise, the majority opinion's analysis identifies no 
fact particular to Genous to give Officer Stikl reasonable 
suspicion that Genous was engaged in criminal activity.  Rather, 
it asserts that a collection of generic facts, including that 
Genous was present in what Officer Stikl called a "high-drug-
trafficking area," makes it reasonable for Officer Stikl to infer 
that Genous was trafficking drugs. 
                     
2 Officer Stikl also noted that a contributing factor for why 
he stopped Genous was that Genous's car was registered in "another 
city."  The majority opinion wisely omits this fact from its 
analysis since the "other city" in which Genous's car was 
registered was Milwaukee, mere blocks from where Genous was stopped 
in West Allis. 
No.  2019AP435-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
¶18 The 
record 
evidence, 
however, 
undermines 
that 
conclusion.  Regarding the generic fact that "drug transactions 
often occur during brief exchanges in vehicles," Officer Stikl 
testified that neither he nor the West Allis Police Department had 
any information that Genous's car was "used to transport drugs," 
"used by a known drug dealer," or connected to a known drug user.  
As for this alleged "exchange," Officer Stikl testified that he 
could not "see what was going on inside" Genous's car.  He 
testified that he saw no "physical contact" of any kind between 
Genous and the woman who got into his car, let alone an "exchange" 
that would resemble a drug transaction.  Officer Stikl stated that 
he did not see the woman carrying anything on her way to or from 
Genous's car.  He further admitted that drug transactions do not 
occur only at certain hours.  See State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 
96, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999) (noting the absence of case-
law support for the proposition that drugs are more likely to be 
trafficked by car at night than at any other time of day). 
¶19 Even Officer Stikl's "identification" of the woman as 
K.S., a "known drug user," is more generic than particular to 
Genous.  Officer Stikl testified that, prior to this night, he had 
had no prior personal contact with K.S.——he had not even seen her 
picture.  He testified that he "recognized" the woman as K.S. based 
on her "physicals" and that her address matched the house in front 
of which Genous had parked.  It is unclear what Officer Stikl meant 
by "physicals," but the only specific identifying information he 
testified to was that K.S. was a "white female."  He also testified 
that he did not know whether K.S. was the only white female who 
No.  2019AP435-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
lived in her house.  And so the only "particular" fact on which 
Officer Stikl relied——that the woman who got into Genous's car was 
a drug user——was not a fact at all; it was just a hunch.3  Thus, 
none of the individual facts reveals anything particular to Genous 
that gives rise to reasonable suspicion. 
¶20 Even assessed collectively, these facts reveal nothing 
concrete and articulable suggesting that Genous engaged in 
criminal behavior.  See United States v. See, 574 F.3d 309, 313-14 
(6th Cir. 2009) (holding that "contextual factors" alone, without 
particularized behavior, are insufficient to warrant reasonable 
suspicion); State v. Evans, No. 2020AP286-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶¶39-47 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2021) (concluding there was 
no reasonable suspicion because the generic evidence regarding 
drug transactions did "not show that the officer observed [this 
defendant] exhibiting conduct consistent with drug cases").  The 
Fourth Amendment does not give the police "free license to 
stop . . . anyone" who shows up at the house of a person who 
previously used drugs.  United States v. James, 62 F. Supp. 3d 605, 
610-14 (E.D. Mich. 2014); see also United States v. Black, 707 
F.3d 531, 542 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that defendant's presence 
at night in "high-crime area" with a convicted criminal 
insufficient for reasonable suspicion); State v. Weyand, 399 
P.3d 530, 535 (Wash. 2017) (holding that "merely visiting" a house 
known to police "because of the residents' histories of drug 
                     
3 The record contains no information suggesting that the 
police ever learned exactly who got into Genous's car.  Officer 
Stikl testified that neither he nor, as far as he knew, any other 
officer followed up with K.S. 
No.  2019AP435-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
possession and use, not for a history of selling or distributing" 
did not amount to reasonable suspicion).  The Fourth Amendment 
requires particularized suspicion and we have none here. 
II 
¶21 Genous's case illustrates two problems with the label 
"high-crime area."  First, the label can cloak general hunches as 
particularized 
suspicion. 
 
In 
this 
way, 
a 
location's 
characteristics may play a disproportionate role in a reasonable-
suspicion analysis, thus running afoul of Wardlow.  See Wardlow, 
528 U.S. at 124 (holding that a location's characteristics, while 
relevant, cannot be determinative).  And second, it is unclear 
what the term "high-crime area" actually means, making it difficult 
for circuit courts to know how much weight to give a location's 
characteristics in any particular analysis.  We should therefore 
adopt objective criteria for evaluating an assertion that an area 
is high in crime. 
¶22 Both problems were on display here.  The only evidence 
in the record that this area of West Allis was a high-drug-
trafficking area is Officer Stikl's testimony that there had been 
a single recent incident of "drug activity" two blocks south and 
five blocks west of where he stopped Genous.4  One incident of an 
unknown nature occurring roughly half a mile away hardly qualifies 
this area as a high-drug-trafficking area.  Yet that may be all it 
                     
4 Officer Stikl testified that this other incident was 
included in his arrest report, but that report is not in the 
record.  His testimony also alludes to "assemblies" and "briefings" 
identifying this area of West Allis as a high-drug-trafficking 
area.  The details of those briefings, including dates, however, 
are also not in the record. 
No.  2019AP435-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
took to cast Genous' conduct as suspicious.  And, as discussed 
above, nothing about Genous' conduct alone was reasonably 
suspicious.  Genous briefly met in his car with a woman who may 
have been a drug user, in front of that woman's house.  The police 
saw nothing that resembled an exchange and they had no information 
that Genous or Genous's car had been involved in any drug 
transaction.  Thus, the record evidence suggests that Genous's 
location was more than just a "relevant" factor for whether his 
behavior was suspicious; it was determinative. 
¶23 It is of little help, however, to just say that the 
circuit court may have given too much weight to Genous's location 
or that his location was improperly labeled.  After all, under 
Wardlow, a person's location may be relevant to a reasonable-
suspicion analysis.  But for courts to know exactly how a person's 
location is relevant in a particular case, they must consider how 
that location is defined, especially when considering a vague term 
such as "high-crime area."  What is the "area" the court is 
considering?  Is it five blocks?  Ten?  As for what it means to be 
"high crime," how many incidents of crime were there and how 
recently did those incidents take place?  See State v. Fisher, 
2006 WI 44, ¶41, 290 Wis. 2d 121, 714 N.W.2d 495 (reasoning that 
a neighborhood could not "realistically be considered" a high-
crime area because its crime rate was equal to other areas; 
characterizing it as such an area "would erase any meaningful 
distinction between a truly high-crime area and any other area").  
Without a generally accepted understanding of what "high-crime 
area" means, its definition (and its boundaries) will shift from 
No.  2019AP435-CR.rfd 
 
7 
 
court to court.  See Andrew G. Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the 
Fourth Amendment, 63 Hastings L.J. 179, 203-05 (2011).  Such a 
fluid concept injects ambiguity into an inquiry that "looks for 
the exact opposite"; what is needed for reasonable suspicion is 
"objective and particularized indicia of criminal activity."  See 
United States v. Beauchamp, 659 F.3d 560, 571 (6th Cir. 2011). 
¶15 It is therefore important for circuit courts to 
critically assess claims that a particular area is high in crime 
so as not to give that label undue weight in a reasonable-suspicion 
analysis.  To that end, some courts and commentators have 
established or proposed criteria for assessing whether an area 
qualifies as a high-crime area.  The First Circuit Court of Appeals 
has established a three-factor test for analyzing whether a trial 
court's high-crime-area finding is clearly erroneous.  See United 
States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2007).  First, there 
must be some "nexus" between the type of crime at issue in a 
particular case and the type of crime that forms the basis for the 
high-crime designation.  Id.; see also United States v. Tinnie, 
629 F.3d 749, 758 (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that courts must find a "reasonable connection between 
the neighborhood's higher crime rate and the facts relied upon" to 
justify the stop).  For example, a Terry stop based on a suspected 
drug transaction in an area with a high number of arrests for drug 
transactions.  Wright, 485 F.3d at 53-54.  Second, the area must 
be defined by "limited geographic boundaries."  Id.  General claims 
that an entire city is a high-crime area are insufficient.  And 
third, the stop in question must be close in time to reports of 
No.  2019AP435-CR.rfd 
 
8 
 
heightened criminal activity in that area, preventing an area from 
being perpetually designated "high crime" without continuing 
evidence.  Id.  The First Circuit allows evidence on these factors 
to include "a mix of objective data and the testimony of police 
officers," and it leaves open the possibility that other factors 
may be relevant in certain cases.  See id. (noting that these 
factors will be relevant in "most cases"); see also United States 
v. Gorham, 317 F. Supp. 3d 459, 464-65 (D.D.C. 2018) (applying a 
similar test). 
¶16 Some commentators have proposed a test that closely 
tracks the First Circuit's.  See Andrew G. Ferguson & Damien 
Bernache, The "High-Crime Area" Question, 57 Am. U. L.R. 1587, 
1628-40 (2008).  Ferguson and Bernache's framework also includes 
three factors——nexus, geography, and timing——but they give 
empirical data a larger role in the analysis.  Even if an officer 
geographically defines a high-crime area, they argue that courts 
should not accept that claim without objective, statistical 
evidence to support it.  See id. at 1629-30.  Requiring such 
evidence is "in line with Terry" in that a judge can meaningfully 
evaluate reasonable suspicion only if such claims are subjected to 
"detached, neutral scrutiny."  Id. at 1630 (quoting Terry, 392 
U.S. at 21).  Whatever the criteria, this court should develop an 
objective test under which circuit courts can evaluate testimony 
that a particular place is a high-crime area.  At the very least, 
circuit courts should not give determinative weight to unverified 
assertions that an area is high in crime when evaluating whether 
the totality of the circumstances evinces reasonable suspicion.  
No.  2019AP435-CR.rfd 
 
9 
 
See e.g., People v. Harris, 957 N.E.2d 930, ¶¶13-15 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2011) (holding that unsupported statements without further 
inquiry are "insufficient" to warrant "consideration for purposes 
of justifying a Terry stop"); State v. Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d 
200, 218-19, 539 N.W.2d 887 (1995) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) 
(rejecting as irrelevant an officer's claim that an area was high 
in crime because the officer failed to justify that claim). 
III 
¶24 It is often difficult to assess the impact of this 
court's decisions at the time they are made.  Cases like this one 
often seem small in the law-developing context, just another fact-
based decision.  But the Fourth Amendment's protections are eroded 
"not in dramatic leaps but in small steps, in decisions that seem 
'fact-bound,' case-specific, and almost routine."  Tinnie, 629 
F.3d at 754 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).  Accepting without 
scrutinizing a claim that an area is a "high-crime area" 
unwittingly makes all residents and visitors in such areas more 
susceptible to searches and searches, thereby treating them as 
though they are "less worthy of Fourth Amendment protection."  
United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 331 (4th Cir. 2020).  We 
must guard against such unequal treatment and ensure that the 
Fourth Amendment offers the same protection to everyone, no matter 
their location.  See Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. ___, 136 
S. Ct. 2056, 2069-70 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
¶25 Because there is no reasonable, particularized suspicion 
that Genous was committing a crime, and because an unsupported 
claim that Genous was in a "high-drug-trafficking area" played a 
No.  2019AP435-CR.rfd 
 
10 
 
disproportionate role in the circuit court's reasonable-suspicion 
analysis, I respectfully dissent. 
¶26 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this dissent. 
 
No.  2019AP435-CR.rfd 
 
1