Title: Gibbs v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 91, 2015
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 2015

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
OTTO GARY GIBBS 
 
 
§  
(a.k.a. BOBBY MILLER), 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 91, 2015 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 9605001774 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 23, 2015 
Decided: 
June 18, 2015  
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
This 18th day of June 2015, upon consideration of the appellant‟s 
opening brief and the appellee‟s motion to affirm under Supreme Court Rule 
25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Otto Gary Gibbs,1 filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court‟s denial of his second motion for postconviction relief under 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The State of Delaware moved to affirm 
the Superior Court‟s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face 
                                          
 
1 The defendant was arrested under the name Gary Gibbs, but it was later discovered that 
his real name is Bobby Miller.  See State v. Gibbs, 2014 WL 6670676, at *1 (Del. Super. 
Nov. 12, 2014) (Comm‟r Order and Opinion). 
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of Gibbs‟ opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and 
affirm. 
(2) 
In 1997, Gibbs was tried in the Superior Court on one count of 
unlawful sexual intercourse in the second degree.2  At trial, Gibbs‟ defense 
was that the sexual intercourse was consensual.  The evidence against Gibbs 
included testimony from the police detective who took photographs of “what 
appeared to be blood” on the floor of the crime scene, the bathroom of 
Gibbs‟ motel room, as well as testimony from the victim and the victim‟s 
friend who had accompanied her to Gibbs‟ room.3  The record reflects that 
the police detective‟s testimony and the relevant photographs were admitted 
into evidence without objection from the defense. 
(3) 
Gibbs was convicted by the jury and sentenced in October 1997 
to twenty years at Level V, suspended after fifteen years for decreasing 
levels of supervision.  This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on 
direct appeal in 1998.4  In 1999, Gibbs filed a series of motions seeking the 
appointment of counsel for assistance in filing his first motion for 
postconviction relief.  The Superior Court denied the motions on the basis 
                                          
 
2 11 Del C. § 774(1) (1996) (repealed 1998) (defining second degree unlawful sexual 
intercourse as intentionally engaging in sexual intercourse without the victim‟s consent 
and inflicting physical, mental or emotional upon the victim). 
3 See State v. Gibbs, 2014 WL 6670676, at *2 (Del. Super. Nov. 12, 2014) (Comm‟r 
Order and Opinion) (citing Testimony of Brandi Stocks, Tr. Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 93). 
4 Gibbs v. State, 1998 WL 977116 (Del. Nov. 19, 1998). 
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that there is no right to counsel when seeking postconviction relief, and that 
Gibbs had not demonstrated good cause why counsel should be appointed. 
(4) 
Gibbs filed his first motion for postconviction relief in 2001.  
He claimed, in relevant part, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object to the admission of the police detective‟s testimony and 
photographs “of what appeared to be blood” at the crime scene.  In its order 
denying his postconviction motion, dated January 7, 2002, the Superior 
Court ruled that Gibbs failed to show that his trial counsel‟s alleged errors 
were prejudicial.  On appeal, this Court affirmed the Superior Court‟s 
judgment.5 
(5) 
In 2003, Gibbs raised a similar claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel in a habeas corpus petition filed in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Delaware.6  By memorandum opinion dated June 17, 2004, the 
U.S. District Court dismissed the petition as time-barred.7 
(6) 
In March 2013, Gibbs filed his second motion for 
postconviction relief in the Superior Court.8  Gibbs claimed that, under the 
                                          
 
5 Gibbs v. State, 2002 WL 2008163 (Del. Aug. 28, 2002). 
6 Gibbs v. Carroll, 2004 WL 1376588, at *2 (D. Del. June 17, 2004). 
7 Id., at *4. 
8 The record reflects that the motion was originally filed in November 2011, but was 
returned as illegible.  In the letter returning the motion, the Superior Court advised Gibbs 
that he could “redraft it and resubmit it in a more readable form.”  Gibbs resubmitted the 
motion in March 2013.     
4 
 
U.S. Supreme Court‟s decision in Martinez v. Ryan,9 he was entitled to the 
appointment of counsel to relitigate the claims raised in his first motion for 
postconviction relief.  He also recited the same claims of ineffective 
assistance he asserted in his first motion.10 
(7) 
The Superior Court appointed counsel to review and evaluate 
Gibbs‟ second motion for postconviction relief in August 2013.  On April 
28, 2014, Gibbs‟ appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw along with a 
supporting memorandum under Superior Court Rule 61(e)(2).11  Gibbs‟ 
counsel represented that he had carefully analyzed the claims raised in 
Gibbs‟ second postconviction motion and determined that they were without 
merit and that there were no other potentially meritorious grounds for relief. 
(8) 
The Superior Court then appointed a Superior Court 
Commissioner to evaluate Gibbs‟ claims and his counsel‟s motion to 
withdraw.  The Commissioner issued a report on November 12, 2014, 
recommending that Gibbs‟ second motion for postconviction relief be 
denied, and that Gibbs‟ counsel be granted leave to withdraw.12  The 
Commissioner determined that Gibbs‟ claim of a right to counsel based on 
                                          
 
9 Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). 
10 See State v. Gibbs, 2014 WL 6670676, at *3 (Del. Super. Nov. 12, 2014) (Comm‟r 
Order and Opinion) (“Defendant‟s claim is an almost verbatim quote of the exact same 
claim he raised in his 2001 motion.”). 
11 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(2) (2013) (now renumbered (e)(6)). 
12 State v. Gibbs, 2014 WL 6670676 (Del. Super. Nov. 12, 2014) (Comm‟r Order and 
Opinion). 
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the Martinez decision was without merit, and that his ineffective counsel 
claims were procedurally barred as formerly adjudicated under Rule 
61(i)(4).13  By order dated February 5, 2015, the Superior Court accepted the 
Commissioner‟s report and recommendation, denied Gibbs‟ postconviction 
motion, and granted his counsel‟s motion to withdraw.14  This appeal 
followed. 
(9) 
On appeal, we review the denial of postconviction relief for 
abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.15  Having carefully 
considered the parties‟ positions on appeal and the record before the 
Superior Court, we conclude that the Superior Court‟s judgment should be 
affirmed.  First, as the Superior Court determined, this Court has rejected the 
argument that Martinez v. Ryan entitles a defendant who proceeded without 
counsel in his first postconviction proceeding to be appointed counsel to “re-
do” that proceeding.16  Second, we agree with the Superior Court that Gibbs‟ 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim was procedurally barred as formerly 
adjudicated under Rule 61(i)(4).17  “[A] defendant is not entitled to have a 
                                          
 
13 Id., at *3. 
14 State v. Gibbs, 2015 WL 544887 (Del. Super. Feb. 5, 2015) adopting 2014 WL 
6670676 (Del. Super. Nov. 12, 2014) (Comm‟r Order and Opinion). 
15 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 
16 Frazier v. State, 2014 WL 259434, at ¶ 4 (Del. Jan. 21, 2014); Riley v. State, 2014 
WL98643, at ¶ 5 (Del. Jan. 9, 2014). 
17 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) (2013) (barring formerly adjudicated claim). 
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court reexamine an issue that has been previously resolved „simply because 
the claim is refined or restated.‟”18  
(10) Furthermore, this Court finds no basis to reconsider his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims “in the interest of justice.”19  “This 
Court has held that „[i]n order to invoke the „interest of justice‟ provision of 
Rule 61(i)(4) to obtain relitigation of a previously resolved claim a movant 
must show that subsequent legal developments have revealed that the trial 
court lacked the authority to convict or punish him.‟”20  There have been no 
such “subsequent legal developments” since Gibbs‟ 1997 trial, as Martinez 
does not require reconsideration of a previously adjudicated claim,21 and 
Gibbs has cited no other relevant “legal developments.”  The “interests of 
justice” exception to Rule 61(i)(4) was always intended to be narrow,22 
                                          
 
18 Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 1992) (quoting Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 
719, 721 (Del. 1990)). 
19 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) (2013) (permitting reconsideration of a formerly 
adjudicated claim “in the interest of justice”). 
20 Weedon v. State, 750 A.2d 521, 527 (Del. 2000) (quoting Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 
736, 746 (Del. 1990)). 
21 Evans v. State, 77 A.3d 271 (Del. 2013) (“We reject Evans‟ contention that Martinez v. 
Ryan required the Superior Court to consider the merits of his formerly adjudicated 
claims.”). 
22 See Weedon, 750 A.2d at 528 (discussing the scope of the “interests of justice” 
exception); see also Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 986 (Del. 2014) (discussing the 
distinction between the “interests of justice” exception to Rule 61(i)(4) and the 
“miscarriage of justice” exception contained in Rule 61(i)(5), and observing that a claim 
barred by Rule 61(i)(4) can only be considered in the interests of justice). 
7 
 
which recent amendments to the Rule make clear.23  In that regard, we note 
that Gibbs has not come forward with any new evidence of his actual 
innocence.  In fact, Gibbs does not even now contend that he had any 
reasonable basis to assert that the photographs were not of blood, much less 
that he gave his trial counsel any rational basis on which to object to the 
characterization of the photographs on the ground that they depicted 
something other than blood. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the State‟s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
 
Chief Justice 
                                          
 
23 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2) (2014) (providing that “any second or subsequent 
postconviction motion will be summarily dismissed unless the movant was convicted 
after a trial and the motion either: (i) pleads with particularity that new evidence exists to 
establish the movant‟s actual innocence in fact; or (ii) pleads with particularity that a 
new, retroactively applicable constitutional rule applies to the movant‟s case and renders 
a conviction or death sentence invalid.”); Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) (2014) 
(eliminating interest of justice exception).