Title: Armstrong v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 011948
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 19, 2002

Present:  All the Justices 
 
ERIC WAYNE ARMSTRONG 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 011948 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
April 19, 2002 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia correctly determined that in a prosecution for 
violation of Code § 18.2-308.2, which provides that it is 
unlawful for a person previously convicted of a felony “to 
knowingly and intentionally possess . . . any firearm,” the 
Commonwealth is not required to prove as an element of the 
offense that the object possessed by the defendant was an 
“operable” firearm. 
BACKGROUND 
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
the prevailing party in the trial, granting to it all reasonable 
inferences fairly deducible therefrom.  Dowden v. Commonwealth, 
260 Va. 459, 461, 536 S.E.2d 437, 438 (2000). 
On February 12, 1998, the Sheriff of Highland County, 
assisted by several other law enforcement officers, executed a 
search warrant at the home of Eric Wayne Armstrong.  Following 
the seizure of suspected illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia, 
Armstrong was placed under arrest.  During the search, the 
Sheriff and several of the other officers each observed a semi-
automatic .22 caliber rifle inside a gun cabinet.  The rifle was 
not examined in any detail at that time because the gun cabinet 
was locked and Armstrong did not have the key to it. 
Armstrong, who had a prior felony conviction, was later 
charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm in 
violation of Code § 18.2-308.2.  At a subsequent preliminary 
hearing, Armstrong’s counsel delivered the rifle to the Sheriff.  
However, the Sheriff did not cause the rifle to be inspected or 
test-fired while it was in his possession. 
At trial, the rifle was introduced into evidence.  Melvin 
Eugene Armstrong, Armstrong’s cousin, testified that the rifle 
belonged to him, but that he had unintentionally left the rifle 
at Armstrong’s home during a prior hunting season.  He testified 
that he had purchased the rifle in October 1997 and produced a 
receipt with a serial number matching the serial number on the 
rifle.  He further testified that the rifle “wouldn’t fire 
. . . .  You could pull the trigger but the gun won’t go off 
. . . .  [T]he firing pin ain’t hitting the casing so I assume 
it’s got something to do with the spring in there or the firing 
pin one.”  He stated that while he was hunting “it just stopped 
shooting.” 
 
2
Armstrong did not dispute his prior felony conviction or 
his possession of the rifle.  Rather, his defense was based 
solely on his assertion that the rifle was not a “firearm” 
within the meaning of Code § 18.2-308.2 because it was 
inoperable.  The trial court rejected Armstrong’s assertion and 
found him guilty of a violation of this statute.  The trial 
court sentenced Armstrong to two years’ imprisonment, suspending 
all but seven months of that sentence.1
Armstrong noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals, 
asserting that the trial court had erred in finding that 
possession of an inoperable firearm constituted a violation of 
Code § 18.2-308.2.  In an unpublished opinion, a panel of the 
Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, affirmed 
Armstrong’s conviction.  Armstrong v. Commonwealth, No. 1388-9-3 
(November 21, 2000) (hereinafter Armstrong I).  Quoting Williams 
v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 796, 807, 537 S.E.2d 21, 26 (2000), 
decided the same day as Armstrong I, the panel majority held 
that Code § 18.2-308.2 “ ‘prohibits felons from possessing 
actual firearms that are presently operable or that can readily 
or easily be made operable or capable of being fired with 
                     
1 Armstrong was also convicted of misdemeanor possession of 
marijuana and received a fine of $150 for that offense.  Due to 
an apparent clerical error, the sentencing order imposes this 
fine in addition to the prison time for the firearm offense and 
fails to impose a sentence for the marijuana charge. 
 
3
minimal effort and expertise.’ ”  Armstrong I, slip op. at 3 
(emphasis added).  Relying on this latter requirement of proof, 
the panel majority held that “while currently inoperable, the 
only defect in [Armstrong’s rifle] was that the ‘firing pin’ 
would not hit the ‘casing,’ a condition that ‘could be readily 
or easily restored to [one] of operability.’ ”  Id. at 4.  The 
dissenting judge, while concurring that the issue was controlled 
by Williams, was of opinion that the Commonwealth’s evidence had 
failed to show that the rifle could be made operable “‘on a 
moment’s notice.’ ”  Id. at 6 (Frank, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Timmons v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 196, 200-01, 421 S.E.2d 
894, 897 (1992)). 
Armstrong filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which was 
granted.  Following argument before the full Court of Appeals, a 
majority, with one judge dissenting, affirmed Armstrong’s 
conviction.  Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 312, 549 
S.E.2d 641 (2001) (en banc) (hereinafter Armstrong II). 
The en banc majority, however, rejected the view adopted by 
the majority in the panel decision and reached its decision on 
grounds not asserted by either Armstrong or the Commonwealth in 
the appeal.  Rather, the majority opined that the prior panels 
in both Williams and Gregory v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 393, 
504 S.E.2d 886 (1998), a decision relied upon by the panel in 
Williams, had misconstrued the holding of Jones v. Commonwealth, 
 
4
16 Va. App. 354, 429 S.E.2d 615, aff’d on reh’g en banc, 17 Va. 
App. 233, 436 S.E.2d 192 (1993), a case which had previously 
construed the term “firearm” as used in Code § 18.2-308.2.  
Gregory affirmed the conviction of a felon in possession of an 
unloaded rifle; Williams reversed the conviction of a felon in 
possession of an inoperable, rusty pistol. 
The majority began its analysis by noting that Code § 18.2-
308.2 does not define the term “firearm” and that in Jones the 
Court had applied a “traditional” definition of firearm in 
concluding that this statute did not prohibit the possession of 
a BB handgun.2  The majority then opined that in Gregory the 
Court had “diverted from the holding in Jones” by requiring the 
Commonwealth, pursuant to this statute, to prove that the weapon 
is designed or intended to expel projectiles by the discharge or 
explosion of gunpowder and that it is capable of doing so.  
Continuing, the majority noted that the Court in Williams had 
“reiterated” these elements of proof by requiring the 
Commonwealth to prove that the accused possessed an object 
manufactured for the purpose of expelling a projectile by an 
                     
2 The traditional definition of firearm applied by the Court 
in Jones was any weapon from which a shot is discharged by 
gunpowder.  16 Va. App. at 356, 429 S.E.2d at 616 (citing 
Webster’s Third International Dictionary 854 (1981)).  The Court 
in Jones concluded that a BB handgun propels a projectile by 
pneumatic pressure rather than by gunpowder. 
 
 
5
explosion and that the object is presently operational or can 
readily or easily be made operational or capable of being fired 
with minimal effort and expertise.  Armstrong II, 36 Va. App. at 
315-16, 549 S.E.2d at 643. 
The majority reasoned that the “presently operational,” or 
“ready capability,” element of proof was contrary to the 
language of Code § 18.2-308.2 and had caused confusion.  The 
majority further reasoned that the focus of the analysis in 
Jones had been on the distinction between those instances where 
a broad definition of the term is applied to statutes that 
criminalize the use of a firearm, see, e.g., Code § 18.2-53.1 
(use of a firearm in the commission of a felony), and those in 
which the more narrow, traditional definition suffices to 
promote the purpose of a statute, such as Code § 18.2-308.2, 
that criminalizes the simple possession of a firearm.  The 
majority noted that in the former instance, the purpose of the 
statute is to deter the perpetration of crimes that put the 
victim in fear of harm as the result of the perception that a 
firearm is being used, while the act of firearm possession 
involves no perception element by a victim.  Armstrong II, 36 
Va. App. at 317 and n.4, 549 S.E.2d at 643 and n.4. 
The majority concluded that Code § 18.2-308.2 expressed a 
“legislative intent of keeping firearms out of the hands of 
convicted felons,” id. at 318, 549 S.E.2d at 644, and, further, 
 
6
that “[t]he General Assembly included no language in the statute 
to circumscribe the absolute prohibition of a convicted felon’s 
possession of a firearm.  It matters not whether the gun’s 
current condition is ‘operable’ or ‘inoperable.’”  Id. at 320, 
549 S.E.2d at 645.  “When enacting Code § 18.2-308.2, the 
General Assembly’s intent was clear:  A felon cannot possess any 
firearm.”  Id. at 321, 549 S.E.2d at 645.   
Thus, the majority affirmed Armstrong’s conviction, holding 
that “[i]n a prosecution under Code § 18.2-308.2, once the 
Commonwealth proves the accused is a convicted felon who 
possessed an object made to ‘expel a projectile by the 
combustion of gunpowder or other explosive,’ then it has proven 
all the necessary elements of the crime based on the plain 
language of the statute.”  Id. at 320-21, 549 S.E.2d at 645.  In 
so holding, the majority, pursuant to Code § 17.1-402(D), stated 
that it was expressly overruling Gregory and Williams, and, to 
the extent that Jones could be read to establish a requirement 
of proof that the firearm was operable or could readily be made 
so, Jones also was overruled.  Id. at 321, 549 S.E.2d at 645-46. 
The dissenting judge took the view that in Jones the Court 
had held that proof that the “device has the actual capacity to 
do harm because of its ability to expel a projectile by the 
power of an explosion” was an element of the Commonwealth’s 
burden to establish that the defendant had possessed a “firearm” 
 
7
in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2.  Id. at 322-23, 549 S.E.2d at 
646 (Benton, J., dissenting) (quoting Jones, 16 Va. App. at 357, 
429 S.E.2d at 617).  Noting that the General Assembly had 
revised Code § 18.2-308.2 subsequent to Jones “without any 
indication that it has disagreed with” this statement in Jones, 
Armstrong II, 36 Va. App. at 323, 549 S.E.2d at 646, the dissent 
opined that the majority’s “only compelling feature is that it 
has garnered a sufficient number of votes to overrule our prior 
decisions.”  Id. at 325, 549 S.E.2d at 648.  Accordingly, citing 
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353 (1964), the dissent 
further opined that the majority had violated Armstrong’s due 
process rights by “a radical lowering of the threshold for 
[obtaining a] conviction” under Code § 18.2-308.2.  
Armstrong II, 36 Va. App. at 325, 549 S.E.2d at 647. 
By order dated November 14, 2001, we awarded Armstrong this 
appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
This Court has not previously construed the term “firearm” 
as used in Code § 18.2-308.2.3  As he did in the Court of 
                     
3 Gregory, one of the cases overturned by the Court of 
Appeals in Armstrong II, was the subject of a petition for 
appeal in this Court that was refused in an unpublished order.  
See Gregory v. Commonwealth, Record No. 982169 (December 17, 
1998).  As we have recently noted, while “the refusal of a 
petition for appeal is based upon the merits of the case . . . 
unless the grounds upon which the refusal is based is 
 
8
Appeals, Armstrong concedes that the .22 caliber rifle found in 
his home was originally designed and manufactured to expel a 
bullet by the explosion of gunpowder and that the evidence was 
sufficient to prove that the rifle was in his possession at the 
time of his arrest.  Because the rifle was not presently 
operable, Armstrong urges this Court to hold that the Court of 
Appeals, in overturning the established precedent of Gregory and 
Williams, violated his due process right to be adequately 
informed of the nature of the offense with which he had been 
charged.  In the alternative, Armstrong further urges that we 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals overruling Gregory 
and Williams, and, applying the rationale of those cases, that 
we adopt the view of the dissent in Armstrong I that the 
Commonwealth failed to carry its burden to produce sufficient 
evidence to show that the rifle in his possession was an 
operable firearm or could be readily and easily made so. 
Due Process Considerations 
Armstrong relies on Bouie, the United States Supreme Court 
opinion cited by the dissent in Armstrong II, for the 
                                                                  
discernable from the four corners of the Court’s order, the 
denial carries no precedential value.”  Sheets v. Castle, 263 
Va. 407, 412, 559 S.E.2d 616, 619 (2002).  Jones was decided 
adverse to the Commonwealth and predated the enactment of the 
statute permitting the Commonwealth to appeal adverse decisions 
of the Court of Appeals.  Williams, also decided adverse to the 
Commonwealth, was not appealed by the Commonwealth. 
 
9
proposition that the Court of Appeals’ rejection of Williams and 
Gregory was “an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal 
statute, applied retroactively, [which] operates precisely like 
an ex post facto law” in violation of the defendant’s due 
process rights.  Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353.  Thus, he contends that 
even if the Court of Appeals erred in those prior cases in 
requiring the Commonwealth to prove, under Code § 18.2-308.2, 
that the firearm was operable or could be readily made so, at 
the time of his trial that was nonetheless the state of the law 
which should be applied in his case. 
Armstrong’s reliance on Bouie is misplaced.  Bouie applies 
to changes in the interpretation of a criminal statute that are 
“indefensible by reference to the law that had been expressed 
prior to the conduct in issue.”  Id. at 354 (emphasis added).  
As the majority in Armstrong II noted, and as the record clearly 
establishes, the conduct which resulted in Armstrong being 
charged with a violation of Code § 18.2-308.2 antedates the 
Court of Appeals’ decisions in Gregory and Williams.  See United 
States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997); accord Rogers v. 
Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457-62 (2001). 
In addition, while published panel decisions of the Court 
of Appeals are precedent binding on other panels of that Court, 
the precedent remains subject to review by the Court of Appeals 
sitting en banc and by this Court on appeal.  Commonwealth v. 
 
10
Burns, 240 Va. 171, 173-74, 395 S.E.2d 456, 457 (1990).  By 
contrast, the concern expressed in Bouie related to “a State 
Supreme Court” using judicial construction to subvert due 
process, leaving the defendant with no avenue of redress from 
the state.  See Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353-54.  Such is not the case 
here.  Accordingly, there can be no implication that in 
overturning the panel decisions in Gregory and Williams, the en 
banc Court of Appeals violated Armstrong’s due process rights. 
Meaning of “Firearm” in Code § 18.2-308.2 
“[P]enal statutes must be ‘strictly construed against the 
State’ and  . . . ‘cannot be extended by implication or 
construction, or be made to embrace cases which are not within 
their letter and spirit.’ ”  Commonwealth, Dep’t of Motor 
Vehicles v. Athey, 261 Va. 385, 388, 542 S.E.2d 764, 766 (2001) 
(quoting Berry v. City of Chesapeake, 209 Va. 525, 526, 165 
S.E.2d 291, 292 (1969)).  However, although we construe statutes 
strictly in criminal cases, we will not apply “an unreasonably 
restrictive interpretation of the statute” that would subvert 
the legislative intent expressed therein.  Ansell v. 
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 761, 250 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1979). 
Consistent with these principles, we have recognized that 
when the legislature seeks to punish the use of a firearm as a 
criminal act, the term “firearm” must not be unreasonably 
restricted by judicial construction such that the legislative 
 
11
intent is thereby frustrated.  See, e.g., Holloman v. 
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 196, 198, 269 S.E.2d 356, 358 (1980) (per 
curiam) (holding that Code § 18.2-53.1, criminalizing use or 
display of a firearm in the commission of a felony, included use 
of “an instrument that gives the appearance” of being a 
firearm).  Similarly, when the nature of some other criminal act 
is defined by whether the defendant achieves his purpose through 
the use of a firearm, a narrow construction of the term is not 
warranted.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 291, 
296, 163 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1968) (charge that attempted robbery 
involved “ ‘presenting of firearms or other violence’ ” did not 
warrant jury instruction that the instrument displayed was an 
operable firearm).  The rationale underlying this interpretation 
of statutes prohibiting the use of a firearm in various contexts 
is the same.  As we succinctly stated in Holloman with respect 
to the construction of the term “firearm” in Code § 18.2-53.1: 
The purpose . . . is [not only] to deter violent 
criminal conduct . . . but also . . . to discourage 
criminal conduct that produces fear of physical harm.  
Such fear of harm results just as readily from 
employment of an instrument that gives the appearance 
of having a firing capability as from use of a weapon 
that actually has the capacity to shoot a projectile.  
The victim of a crime can be intimidated as much by a 
revolver that does not fire bullets as by one that 
does. 
 
Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 358; see also Kelsoe v. 
Commonwealth, 226 Va. 197, 199, 308 S.E.2d 104, 104 (1983) (per 
 
12
curiam) (gravamen of the offense of brandishing a firearm is the 
inducement of fear in another). 
By contrast, the conduct proscribed by Code § 18.2-308.2, 
being a felon in possession of a firearm, focuses on the General 
Assembly’s determination that certain individuals – felons – are 
unfit to possess firearms, even for lawful purposes.4  
Undoubtedly that determination is consistent with the view held 
by society in general.  Thus, we are of opinion that the 
legislative intent underlying Code § 18.2-308.2 is not directed 
toward proscribing “criminal conduct that produces fear of 
physical harm” to an individual victim and, accordingly, the 
offense has no element of perception by a victim that would 
warrant applying the same broad construction to the term 
“firearm” in that statute as is applicable to the same term in 
Code § 18.2-53.1.  Because the legislative intent of Code 
§ 18.2-308.2 is to prohibit convicted felons from possessing 
“any firearm” (emphasis added), we must consider what meaning of 
the term “firearm” will give effect to that intent without 
                     
4Similarly, the General Assembly has determined that other 
persons are unfit to possess firearms and other dangerous 
weapons.  Cf. Code §§ 18.2-308.1:1, 18.2-308.1:2, 18.2-308.1:3 
(prohibiting possession of firearms by certain persons 
adjudicated as mentally ill or incompetent), 18.2-308.2:01 
(prohibiting possession of certain firearms by illegal aliens), 
18.2-308.4 (prohibiting possession of firearms by persons in 
possession of certain controlled substances). 
 
 
13
improperly expanding or unreasonably restricting the meaning of 
the language used by the General Assembly. 
As noted by the Court of Appeals, Code § 18.2-308.2 
provides no express definition of the term “firearm.”  
Similarly, other statutes within Title 18.2 use the term 
“firearm” without providing an express definition of that term.  
See, e.g., Code 18.2-308.5.  However, other related statutes do 
provide definitions of that term.  Accordingly, we may look to 
the related statutes, reading them in pari materia with the 
statute under consideration, in order to give consistent meaning 
to the language used by the General Assembly.  Lucy v. County of 
Albemarle, 258 Va. 118, 129, 516 S.E.2d 480, 485 (1999). 
Code §§ 18.2-308.2:2 and 18.2–308.2:3 define a firearm as 
“any handgun, shotgun, or rifle which expels a projectile by 
action of an explosion.”  Code § 18.2-308(M) defines a “handgun” 
as an instrument “originally designed, made and intended to fire 
a projectile by means of an explosion of a combustible material 
from one or more barrels.”  Code § 18.2-433.1 defines a 
“Firearm” as “any weapon which is designed to or may readily be 
converted to expel any projectile by the action of an explosive; 
or the frame or receiver of any such weapon.”  Similar 
definitions of a firearm or a specific type of firearm may be 
found, for example, in Code §§ 18.2-287.4, 18.2-308.2:01, 18.2-
308.7, and 22.1-277.01(D). 
 
14
None of these statutory definitions reflect a legislative 
intent in a statute that prohibits the possession of a firearm 
to limit the term “firearm” to one that is presently operable.  
We are of opinion that the General Assembly intended to include 
any instrument designed, made, and intended to fire or expel a 
projectile by means of an explosion within the definition of a 
firearm, absent express language to the contrary.  And we are 
further of opinion that to read into Code § 18.2-308.2 by 
implication a requirement that the meaning of the term “firearm” 
includes an element of present capacity or operability would 
amount to an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of that 
term and subvert the intent of the General Assembly. 
We hold that in order to sustain a conviction for 
possessing a firearm in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2, the 
evidence need show only that a person subject to the provisions 
of that statute possessed an instrument which was designed, 
made, and intended to expel a projectile by means of an 
explosion.5  It is not necessary that the Commonwealth prove the 
                     
5 We observe that our holding today is consistent with the 
decisions of other jurisdictions that have considered this or a 
similar issue.  See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 
1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998) (reaching same conclusion with 
respect to federal felon in possession of a firearm statute and 
noting that all other federal circuits addressing the issue were 
in agreement); People v. Brown, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2002)(“a handgun need not be currently operable in order to 
qualify as a ‘firearm’ ” under felon in possession statute); 
 
15
instrument was “operable,” “capable” of being fired, or had the 
“actual capacity to do serious harm.”  Accordingly, we affirm 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Armstrong II to overrule 
Gregory and Williams, and in limiting the reading of Jones to 
any extent that it could be read as being inconsistent with the 
opinion expressed in Armstrong II. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
During the oral argument of this appeal, the Commonwealth 
conceded that an instrument originally designed, made, and 
intended to expel a projectile by force of an explosion could 
fall into a state of such significant disrepair or be altered in 
such a way that it would cease to be a “firearm” for purposes of 
applying Code § 18.2-308.2.6  Such a case, however, is not 
presented by this appeal.  The evidence that Armstrong’s rifle 
was inoperable indicates that it could have been repaired by the 
                                                                  
Thomas v. State, 36 S.W.3d 709, 711 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (felon 
in possession statute requires only proof of a device designed, 
made, or adapted to perform as a firearm, and not that it is 
presently capable of firing); State v. Rogers, 494 So.2d 1251, 
1254 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (firearm need not be operable at the 
time felon possessed it); State v. Baldwin, 237 S.E.2d 881, 882 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (state need not show weapon was operable). 
 
6 Common sense and experience leave no room for doubt that 
an instrument originally designed, made, and intended to expel a 
projectile by force of an explosion can lose this characteristic 
in many ways such that it would no longer be fairly considered a 
firearm.  However, we express no opinion here on the degree of 
disrepair or alteration that would cause an instrument to no 
longer qualify as a firearm under Code § 18.2-308.2. 
 
16
adjustment of the spring between the trigger and the hammer or 
by adjustment of the firing pin.  As such, the rifle was clearly 
not in so serious a state of disrepair that it had lost its 
characteristic as an instrument designed, made, and intended to 
expel a projectile by means of an explosion.  It is irrelevant 
that Armstrong may have lacked the requisite skill to effect the 
needed repair or that he might not have been able to render the 
rifle immediately operable.7  The evidence was clearly sufficient 
to establish that the rifle was designed, made, and intended to 
expel a projectile by means of an explosion, and that is all the 
Commonwealth need prove to establish that it was a firearm 
within the meaning of the statute.  Accordingly, we hold that 
the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming Armstrong’s 
conviction for having possessed a firearm in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-308.2. 
                     
7 We recognize that in Rogers v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 
774, 777-78, 418 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1992), the Court of Appeals 
held that a weapon missing a firing pin was a firearm under Code 
§ 18.2-308.2, since it could be made “completely operable . . . 
after a moment’s delay.”  Similarly, in Timmons, 15 Va. App. at 
200-01, 421 S.E.2d at 897, the Court of Appeals stated that an 
unloaded weapon can be made ready to function “on a moment’s 
notice” and, thus, was a firearm within the meaning of Code 
§ 18.2-308.4.  In neither instance, however, was there any doubt 
that the instrument in question was not one designed, made, and 
intended to expel a projectile by means of an explosion and, 
thus, the references to “a moment’s notice” and “a moment’s 
delay” may be considered dicta. 
 
17
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
will be affirmed.  However, we will remand the case to the Court 
of Appeals with instructions to remand the case to the trial 
court for the sole purpose of correcting, nunc pro tunc, the 
clerical error in the trial court’s sentencing order.  See note 
1, supra. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
 
18