Title: Bowie v. Murphy
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 050728
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 2006

Present:  All the Justices 
 
DAVID M. BOWIE 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 050728 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
January 13, 2006 
JAMES T. MURPHY, JR., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Jane M. Roush, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred in sustaining demurrers to plaintiff’s assault claim 
and defamation claims against the pastor and other members 
of plaintiff’s church. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Since this appeal comes to us from a circuit court’s 
decision sustaining a demurrer, we “recite as true the 
well-pleaded facts in the motion for judgment.”1  Sanchez v. 
Medicorp Health Sys., 270 Va. 299, 301 n. 1, 618 S.E.2d 
331, 332 n. 1 (2005) (citing Thompson v. Skate America, 
Inc., 261 Va. 121, 124-25, 540 S.E.2d 123, 124 (2001)). 
 
As alleged in the motion for judgment, David M. Bowie 
is a member of the Board of Deacons of Greater Little Zion 
                     
1 As is explained infra, the circuit court ruled that Bowie 
failed to state a cause of action for assault in his motion for 
judgment, but granted Bowie leave to file an amended motion for 
judgment on his assault claim.  The relevant facts are 
essentially the same in the motion for judgment and the amended 
motion for judgment. 
 
 
2 
Baptist Church (the Church), a congregational church 
located in Fairfax County.  James T. Murphy, Jr. became 
pastor of the Church in 1990.  The Church experienced 
“divisiveness and strife” under Murphy’s leadership.  
Ultimately, in 2003, the strife became so pervasive that 
members of the congregation, in accordance with the Church 
constitution, petitioned the Board of Deacons for the 
removal of Murphy as pastor. 
 
Upon receiving the petition, the Board of Deacons sent 
a letter to the congregation on June 6, 2003 informing the 
church members that a vote on whether to retain Murphy as 
pastor would take place on June 21, 2003.  The vote took 
place at the Church as scheduled.  Supporters of Murphy, 
including Audrey Thornton, attended the meeting to disrupt, 
intimidate, harass, and coerce congregation members who 
were trying to vote.  Thornton brought two of her children 
to help her disrupt the vote, and she used Church computers 
and printers to produce placards and posters reflecting her 
support of Murphy.  Thornton’s children placed the placards 
around the designated voting area while Thornton was in an 
upstairs area.  When members of the Board of Deacons 
removed the placards, Thornton’s daughter went to the 
upstairs area and informed Thornton, who became “enraged.” 
 
 
3 
 
At this time, Bowie and another Deacon were standing 
at the base of some steps directly adjacent to the voting 
area. Thornton, displaying an “extraordinary and visibly 
angry look on her face,” charged down the stairs past Bowie 
and the other Deacon, both of whom had been assigned to 
provide security to the voting area.  Thornton, carrying a 
large camera in her right hand, forcefully opened the door 
to the voting area.  The door automatically closed behind 
her.  Bowie observed bright flashes of light and opened the 
door.  Once inside the voting area, Bowie saw Thornton 
taking pictures and writing down the names of poll workers, 
voters, and staffers. 
 
Bowie approached Thornton, who had her back to Bowie, 
and asked Thornton what she was doing.  However, apparently 
due to noise in the room, Thornton did not hear Bowie.  
Bowie then “gently touched the right shoulder of Thornton 
in order to gain her attention and again called her by 
name.”  Thornton looked back over her right shoulder, 
realized it was Bowie, and cursed him.  Thornton then 
attempted to strike Bowie with the camera she held in her 
right hand. 
 
In order to protect himself from being struck, Bowie 
grasped Thornton’s right wrist.  Thornton “violently pushed 
 
 
4 
back and forth” to free her wrist, which caused Bowie to 
take several steps backward into a hallway.  In the 
hallway, Bowie released Thornton’s wrist and verbally tried 
to calm her.  Upon her release, Thornton put the camera in 
her left hand and struck Bowie in the chest with her right 
hand. 
 
Bowie immediately called the Fairfax County Police 
Department.  Police arrived and took statements from a 
number of people.  Thornton “willfully, falsely, and with 
malice” told police and Church members, including Murphy, 
that Bowie had assaulted her.  She also solicited others 
who were not witnesses to the incident to provide false 
information and statements to the Fairfax County police. 
 
Thereafter, on July 1, Murphy called a Church meeting 
while  Bowie was on vacation.  At the meeting, Murphy told 
the congregation that Bowie had assaulted Thornton.  Murphy 
also called for a motion to have Bowie dismissed as a 
deacon and to have Bowie’s church membership demoted from 
“full” status to “watch care.”  Vivian Pace made the motion 
based on Bowie’s “alleged assault” of Thornton.  LaJuanna 
Russell seconded the motion “on the same basis.”  On July 
10, Murphy sent a letter to the congregation accusing Bowie 
of assault against Thornton.  Subsequently, David Pace and 
 
 
5 
Vivian Pace sent e-mails to “numerous” third parties 
accusing Bowie of assaulting Thornton. 
 
On June 17, 2004, Bowie filed a motion for judgment in 
the Circuit Court of Fairfax County against Murphy, Vivian 
Pace, David Pace, LaJuanna Russell, and Audrey Thornton 
(collectively, the defendants).  The motion for judgment 
included one count for assault, three counts for 
defamation, and one count for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.2  The assault claim was directed against 
Thornton for striking Bowie in the chest.3  The defamation 
claims stemmed exclusively from the defendants’ accusations 
that Bowie assaulted Thornton, which Bowie asserted were 
made with knowledge of the falsity of the allegation or 
reckless disregard for the truth. 
                     
2 The circuit court subsequently sustained a demurrer to 
Bowie’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 
because Bowie failed to allege that the defendants engaged in 
conduct sufficient to constitute a cause of action.  Bowie does 
not assign error to this decision.  Bowie’s motion for judgment 
also included a claim under the Virginia Computer Crimes Act, 
Code § 18.2-152.12.  However, Bowie later conceded that he had 
no cause of action under this section.  Accordingly, these 
claims are not at issue in this appeal. 
 
3 Bowie conflated the tort of assault and the tort of 
battery in his motion for judgment.  These are two separate 
torts.  See Koffman v. Garnett, 265 Va. 12, 16, 574 S.E.2d 258, 
261 (2003).  However, Bowie distinguishes between the two torts 
in his amended motion for judgment. 
 
 
6 
 
The defendants filed a demurrer and special plea in 
bar asserting that the circuit court did not have subject 
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Cha v. Korean Presbyterian 
Church, 262 Va. 604, 610-12, 553 S.E.2d 511, 513-15 (2001), 
because the allegations of defamation involved matters of 
church governance and doctrine.  The demurrer also asserted 
that since Bowie initiated contact with Thornton, his 
assault claim must fail.  Additionally, the demurrer 
asserted that as a consequence of Bowie’s initiating 
contact with Thornton, his claims of defamation must fail 
as well, because truth is an absolute defense to 
defamation. 
 
The circuit court held a hearing on the defendants’ 
demurrer and on a motion filed by Bowie for leave to amend 
his motion for judgment.  By order entered on October 21, 
2004, the circuit court sustained the defendants’ demurrer 
on the defamation counts without granting leave to amend.  
The court reasoned that the defamation counts “clearly fall 
under the Cha case” because any “defamatory statements 
. . . were made in connection with the church’s business” 
and, thus, the court did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Bowie objected to the court’s order on the 
defamation counts. 
 
 
7 
 
The circuit court also sustained the defendants’ 
demurrer to Bowie’s assault claim, accepting their 
assertion that Bowie failed to state a cause of action for 
assault because he failed to allege a physical injury.  The 
circuit court, however, granted Bowie leave to amend the 
assault claim within 21 days.  Although Bowie did not 
object to the court’s ruling on the assault claim at the 
hearing or in the court’s order, Bowie filed an amended 
motion for judgment for assault on October 29, 2004. 
 
In his amended motion for judgment, Bowie alleged that 
Thornton’s attempt to strike him with the camera “placed 
[Bowie] in reasonable fear of physical injury and as such 
committed the offense of assault.”  Bowie also alleged that 
when Thornton struck him in the chest, it was in a “clear 
and unlawful attempt to inflict injury upon [Bowie]” and 
thus Thornton committed an assault.  Bowie did not allege 
in the amended motion for judgment that he suffered 
physical injury as a result of Thornton’s actions, even 
though failure to plead physical injury was the ground upon 
which the circuit court had sustained the demurrer to his 
assault claim in the original motion for judgment.  
Additionally, Bowie alleged that since Murphy “encouraged 
 
 
8 
the unlawful conduct” of Thornton, Murphy was also liable 
for assault.4 
 
The remaining defendants filed a demurrer to the 
amended motion for judgment on November 22, 2004, claiming 
that Bowie did not state a cause of action for assault 
because he once again failed to allege a physical injury.  
A hearing on the demurrer was scheduled.  Although Bowie 
was given notice of the hearing, he did not appear.  On 
January 7, 2005, the circuit court issued a final order 
sustaining the defendants’ demurrer.5  The order does not 
state the circuit court’s grounds for sustaining the 
demurrer.  Bowie filed a notice of appeal on January 19, 
2005. 
                     
4 In addition to his assault claims, Bowie included in his 
amended motion for judgment a claim for battery.  However, the 
circuit court’s October 21 order only granted Bowie leave to 
amend Count 1 of his motion for judgment, and Count 1 was 
clearly labeled “assault” in the motion for judgment.  
Accordingly, the inclusion of a battery claim exceeded the scope 
of the court’s leave to amend and is, therefore, barred. 
 
5 The day after the defendants filed their demurrer to 
Bowie’s amended motion for judgment, Bowie filed a motion for 
nonsuit.  The circuit court did not hold a hearing or issue an 
order regarding the nonsuit.  Although Code § 8.01-380 entitles 
Bowie to one nonsuit as a matter of right, the termination of 
litigation by nonsuit does not occur until a circuit court 
enters an appropriate order.  The record does not reflect that 
Bowie formally requested the circuit court to rule on his motion 
for a nonsuit.  See Nash v. Jewell, 227 Va. 230, 237, 315 S.E.2d 
825, 829 (1984). 
 
 
9 
 
We granted Bowie this appeal limited to the issues 
whether the circuit court erred in its October 21, 2004 
ruling that Bowie’s defamation claims are barred by our 
decision in Cha and in sustaining the defendants’ demurrer 
to Bowie’s amended motion for judgment for assault. 
DISCUSSION 
 
We first address whether the circuit court erred in 
sustaining the demurrer to Bowie’s defamation claims.  The 
circuit court sustained the demurrer solely on the ground 
that addressing these claims would necessarily involve 
issues of church governance.  The Cha case clearly bars 
courts from hearing such cases.  Thus, our analysis of this 
issue is limited to whether Cha, and the constitutional 
precepts upon which Cha is premised, bar the circuit court 
from hearing Bowie’s defamation claims.  
 
As a general rule, courts lack subject matter 
jurisdiction to resolve issues of church governance and 
disputes over religious doctrine.  This prohibition arises 
from the religion clauses of the Constitution of the United 
States and the Constitution of Virginia.  The First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
provides, in relevant part, that “Congress shall make no 
                                                             
 
 
 
10 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof.”  Similarly, the Constitution of 
Virginia, Article 1, § 16 provides that “religion or the 
duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of 
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and 
conviction, not by force or violence; and, therefore, all 
men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, 
according to the dictates of conscience.” 
 
First Amendment jurisprudence is clear, and we have 
stated, that “civil courts are not a constitutionally 
permissible forum for a review of ecclesiastical disputes.”  
Cha, 262 Va. at 610, 553 S.E.2d at 514; see Serbian Eastern 
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976); 
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).  While what 
is or is not an “ecclesiastical dispute” is often 
debatable, issues of church governance and matters of faith 
and doctrine are unquestionably outside the jurisdiction of 
the civil courts.  Reid v. Gholson, 229 Va. 179, 187, 327 
S.E.2d 107, 111-12 (1985).  When, as here, a case involves 
a quarrel among church members and/or leaders, a court must 
determine the likelihood that, in trying the issues 
presented to the court, the court will be confronted with 
 
 
11 
questions of religious governance or doctrine.  See Cha, 
262 Va. at 610, 553 S.E.2d at 514.  When the court properly 
determines that it will “become entangled in issues 
regarding the church’s governance as well as matters of 
faith and doctrine,” the court must, as in Cha, dismiss the 
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. at 613, 
553 S.E.2d at 515. 
 
The circuit court in this case determined that the 
resolution of Bowie’s defamation claims would involve 
issues and decisions properly left under the exclusive 
control of the Church.  However, we distinguish the issues 
presented here from those presented in Cha and hold that 
the circuit court may resolve Bowie’s defamation claims 
without running afoul of constitutional restrictions. 
 
In Cha, the plaintiff had served for two years as the 
educational and administrative pastor for the Korean 
Presbyterian Church.  262 Va. at 608-09, 553 S.E.2d at 512-
13.  The plaintiff met with church members who suspected 
that certain church officials were misusing church funds.  
Id.  When the plaintiff supported hiring an independent 
auditor to investigate the church’s finances, a church 
elder threatened to terminate the plaintiff’s employment.  
At a subsequent meeting another church official accused the 
 
 
12 
plaintiff of borrowing over $100,000 from the church, which 
he had not repaid.  Id.  The plaintiff was subsequently 
fired.  The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment claiming 
wrongful termination, tortious interference with his 
employment contract, and defamation.  Id. at 610, 553 
S.E.2d at 513. 
 
In affirming the circuit court’s ruling that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction, this Court concluded that if 
the circuit court tried the case, it would have “become 
entangled in issues regarding the church’s governance as 
well as matters of faith and doctrine.”  Cha, 262 Va. at 
613, 553 S.E.2d at 515. Specifically addressing the 
plaintiff’s defamation claims, the Court stated that  
 
we hold that the plaintiff’s allegations of 
defamation against the individual defendants cannot 
be considered in isolation, separate and apart from 
the church’s decision to terminate his employment.  
The individual defendants who purportedly uttered 
defamatory remarks about the plaintiff were church 
officials who attended meetings of the church’s 
governing bodies that had been convened for the 
purpose of discussing certain accusations against 
the plaintiff.  We can only conclude that if a civil 
court were to exercise jurisdiction of the 
plaintiff’s motion for judgment under these 
circumstances, the court would be compelled to 
consider the church’s doctrine and beliefs because 
such matters would undoubtedly affect the 
plaintiff’s fitness to perform pastoral duties and 
whether plaintiff had been prejudiced in his 
profession. 
 
Id. at 615, 553 S.E.2d at 516. 
 
 
13 
 
Unlike the circumstances in Cha, where the plaintiff’s 
defamation claims were so connected to his wrongful 
termination claim as to mix with “ecclesiastical decisions 
regarding the appointment and removal” of church officials, 
Bowie’s defamation claims do not involve matters of church 
governance.  See id. at 613, 553 S.E.2d at 515.   Rather, 
Bowie’s defamation claims arise solely from allegations 
made by the defendants that Bowie perpetrated an assault.  
The circuit court can evaluate these statements for their 
veracity and the impact they had on Bowie’s reputation the 
same as if the statements were made in any other, non-
religious context.  While it is clear that some of the 
allegedly defamatory statements were made at a church 
meeting in which Bowie’s status as deacon was the primary 
issue, Bowie pled his defamation claims in such a manner 
that the circuit court, unlike the trial court in Cha, can 
consider them in isolation, separate and apart from the 
church governance issue involved in Bowie’s status as a 
deacon. 
 
We have previously explained that “where church 
property and civil rights disputes can be decided without 
reference to questions of faith and doctrine, there is no 
constitutional prohibition against their resolution by the 
 
 
14 
civil courts.”  Reid, 229 Va. at 187, 327 S.E.2d at 112; 
see Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).  Thus, a circuit 
court’s determination “is simply whether the court can 
decide the case by reference to neutral principles of law, 
without reference to issues of faith and doctrine.”  Reid, 
229 Va. at 188, 327 S.E.2d at 112.  We hold that the 
circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over Bowie’s 
defamation claims because the claims can be decided without 
addressing issues of faith and doctrine.  Specifically, the 
circuit court need not become involved with the underlying 
dispute among the congregation of the church regarding 
Murphy as pastor. 
 
Next, we turn to the issue whether the circuit court 
erred in sustaining the defendants’ demurrer to Bowie’s 
assault claim.  In the January 7, 2005 order, the circuit 
court did not state its grounds for sustaining the 
defendants’ demurrer, although the demurrer was based on 
Bowie’s failure to allege that he suffered a physical 
injury.  We hold that the circuit court erred because Bowie 
sufficiently pled a cause of action for assault against 
Thornton in his amended motion for judgment. 
 
To prove assault, a plaintiff must show that the 
defendant “performed ‘an act intended to cause either 
 
 
15 
harmful or offensive contact with another person or 
apprehension of such contact, and that creates in the other 
person’s mind a reasonable apprehension of an imminent 
battery.’  There is no requirement that the victim of such 
acts be physically touched.”  Etherton v. Doe, 268 Va. 209, 
213, 597 S.E.2d 87, 89 (2004) (quoting Koffman v. Garnett, 
265 Va. 12, 16-17, 574 S.E.2d 258, 261 (2003)); see also 
Carter v. Commonwealth 269 Va. 44, 47, 606 S.E.2d 839, 841 
(2005) (an assault, “whether a crime or tort, occurs when 
an assailant engages in an overt act intended to inflict 
bodily harm and has the present ability to inflict such 
harm or engages in an overt act intended to place the 
victim in fear or apprehension of bodily harm and creates 
such reasonable fear or apprehension in the victim”). 
 
In the amended motion for judgment, Bowie alleged two 
separate instances of assault by Thornton.  Both of these 
allegations state a cause of action for the tort of assault 
under the definition of that tort in Etherton.  First, 
Bowie alleged that Thornton attempted to strike Bowie with 
a camera, placing Bowie in fear of physical injury.  This 
allegation of fact was sufficient to plead the elements of 
assault because both an attempt by Thornton to cause 
harmful contact and a reasonable apprehension by Bowie that 
 
 
16 
he would be struck were asserted.  Second, Bowie alleged 
that Thornton actually struck him in the chest while he 
verbally tried to calm her.  This allegation of fact was 
also sufficient to plead the elements of assault because it 
asserted that Thornton intended to strike Bowie in the 
chest and, since Bowie alleged he was speaking with 
Thornton when she struck him, it reasonably can be inferred 
that Bowie anticipated being struck.  The fact that 
Thornton actually completed the battery by making contact 
with Bowie does not negate the assault claim that arises 
from Bowie’s anticipation of the battery.  Assault and 
battery are two separate and independent torts.  See 
Koffman, 265 Va. at 16, 574 S.E.2d at 261. 
 
Finally, we note that Bowie’s failure to allege that 
he suffered a physical injury is of no import to the 
analysis of whether Bowie stated a cause of action for 
assault because physical injury is not an element of the 
tort of assault.  Carter, 269 Va. at 47, 606 S.E.2d at 841; 
see also Charles E. Friend, Personal Injury Law in 
Virginia, 6.3.1 at 183 (3d ed. 2003) (“No actual contact is 
required for assault.  Similarly, no physical injury need 
be involved.”).  Rather, the resulting injury from assault 
is that the “threatening gesture, creating the 
 
 
17 
apprehension, is . . . actionable without actual damage.  
It is, in effect, a form of mental injury which is being 
compensated.”  Id.  (Emphasis in original.) 
 
In his amended motion for judgment, Bowie also 
asserted assault claims against Murphy.  However, the 
circuit court, in its October 21 order, only gave Bowie 
leave to amend his assault claims in Count 1, which had 
been pled solely against Thornton.  Bowie did not object to 
that determination.  Bowie’s inclusion of assault claims 
against Murphy in his amended motion for judgment thus 
exceeded the scope of the circuit court’s grant of leave to 
amend.  Accordingly, Bowie’s claims for assault against 
Murphy were not properly asserted and we need not address 
them further.  See Mechtensimer v. Wilson, 246 Va. 121, 
122-23, 431 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1993) (purported amendment 
without permission was void). 
 
For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court 
sustaining the defendants’ demurrer will be reversed and 
the case remanded for further proceedings with regard to 
Bowie’s assault claims against Thornton and his defamation 
claims against the defendants. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
 
 
18 
JUSTICE AGEE, with whom JUSTICE KINSER joins, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I write separately because I find that our decision in 
Jae-Woo Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church, 262 Va. 604, 553 
S.E.2d 511 (2001), does bar David M. Bowie's defamation 
claims against Vivian Pace and LaJuanna Russell as stated 
in paragraphs 55 through 58 of Count II of the motion for 
judgment.  In all other respects, I concur with the 
majority's opinion that Cha does not operate to bar 
resolution of Bowie's other defamation claims against the 
defendants.  I also agree that Bowie's motion for judgment 
sufficiently stated a claim for assault against Audrey 
Thornton, and that Bowie's assault claims against Murphy 
alleged in his amended motion for judgment are not properly 
before this Court. 
 
Bowie alleges in Count II that Reverend James T. 
Murphy called a church meeting and "accuse[d] [Bowie] 
(verbally) . . . of having committed the crime of assault 
against defendant Thornton." In the concluding paragraphs 
of Count II, 55 through 58, Bowie alleges Vivian Pace and 
LaJuanna Russell also defamed him.  Specifically Bowie 
alleges Pace "made a motion to remove [Bowie] as a Deacon 
of the [church] and to reduce his membership status to that 
of watch care based on [his] 'alleged assault of defendant 
 
 
19 
Thornton.' "  LaJuanna Russell "seconded the motion of 
defendant Pace on the same basis."  In paragraph 56, Bowie 
identifies the act of defamation, as to both women, to be 
their "recommendations" regarding his office as Deacon and 
change in his church membership status "in a reckless 
disregard for the truth." 
 
We said in Cha that "civil courts are not a 
constitutionally permissible forum for a review of 
ecclesiastical disputes," 262 Va. at 610, 553 S.E.2d at 
514, and the majority correctly notes that "when . . . a 
case involves a quarrel among church members . . . a court 
must determine the likelihood that, in trying the issues 
presented to the court, the court will be confronted with 
questions of religious governance or doctrine."  Because I 
find that Bowie's defamation claims against defendants Pace 
and Russell in Count II necessarily implicate "questions of 
religious governance or doctrine," I respectfully dissent 
from that portion of the majority's opinion. 
 
Unlike the other defamation claims, Bowie's 
allegations against Pace and Russell in Count II are not 
that the two separately accused Bowie of assaulting 
Thornton, but that because of that accusation, they "made a 
motion to remove [Bowie] as a Deacon . . . and to reduce 
 
 
20 
his membership status [from "full"] to that of watch care."  
The trial court found this "motion" particularly 
significant in deciding to sustain the defendants' demurrer 
to Count II of Bowie's motion for judgment: 
[T]he only allegations against Ms. Russell . . . were 
[that] she seconded a motion made at the church 
meeting, and I think that's purely a matter of the 
church's governance that the Courts simply should not 
involve themselves in under the Cha case and other 
cases cited in the Cha case. 
I agree with the trial court on this point and believe that 
the majority's decision with regard to the claims against 
Pace and Russell in Count II contravenes our previous 
holding that "the decisions of religious entities about the 
appointment and removal of ministers and persons in other 
positions of similar theological significance are beyond 
the ken of civil courts." Id. at 612, 553 S.E.2d at 515 
(citing Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328, 331 (4th 
Cir. 1997)). 
 
In Cha, the plaintiff alleged that the defamatory 
accusations against him "imputed an unfitness to discharge 
his duties as a pastor at the Church [and] implied that he 
lacked integrity to be a pastor."  Id. at 614, 553 S.E.2d 
at 516.  We held in that case that the trial court 
correctly concluded "that adjudication of the plaintiff's 
claims would require that the court involve itself in 
 
 
21 
ecclesiastical concerns," Id. at 608, 553 S.E.2d at 512, 
because the defamation allegations "cannot be considered in 
isolation, separate and apart from the church's decision to 
terminate his employment."  Id. at 615, 553 S.E.2d at 516.  
Further, we noted that because the defamation defendants 
"attended meetings of the church's governing bodies that 
had been convened for the purpose of discussing certain 
accusations against the plaintiff," deciding the 
plaintiff's claim on the merits would compel a court "to 
consider the church's doctrine and beliefs [as] such 
matters would undoubtedly affect the plaintiff's fitness to 
perform pastoral duties."  Id. 
 
Similarly, Pace and Russell's allegedly defamatory 
statements took place at a church meeting at which Bowie's 
church membership status and position as deacon were 
debated.  According to the allegations in Bowie's pleading, 
Pace and Russell made recommendations to remove Bowie from 
the office of deacon and reduce his church membership 
status because of his alleged assault of Thornton, solely 
in the context of the church governance decision as to 
Bowie's church status.  Their alleged recitation of a 
defamatory statement cannot be considered in isolation from 
 
 
22 
the context in which uttered: the process of church 
governance regarding Bowie's status in the church. 
 
I can see no substantive distinction between the 
alleged defamatory statements by the defendants at the 
church meeting to remove Reverend Cha as a pastor and those 
made in the case at bar by Pace and Russell to remove Bowie 
as a deacon and to alter his membership status.  Whatever 
the basis of Pace and Russell in proposing the motion to 
change Bowie's status, the statements and action were an 
integral part of church governance and internal 
organization.  It is as true in this case as in Cha that 
[r]esolution of the plaintiff's claims by a civil 
court would have required that the circuit court 
adjudicate issues regarding the church's governance, 
internal organization, and doctrine, and such judicial 
intervention would have limited the church's right to 
select its religious leaders. 
 
Id. at 612, 553 S.E.2d at 515. 
Church membership and church leadership are clearly beyond 
the purview of the courts.  We have held that 
[the] right to choose ministers without government 
restriction underlies the well-being of religious 
community . . . for perpetuation of a church's 
existence may depend upon those whom it selects to 
preach its values, teach its message, and interpret 
its doctrines both to its own membership and to the 
world at large. Any attempt by government to restrict 
a church's free choice of its leaders thus constitutes 
a burden on the church's free exercise rights. 
 
 
 
23 
Id. at 611, 553 S.E.2d at 514 (citing Rayburn v. General 
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167-
68 (1985)). 
 
Clearly a congregation's decision to remove a church 
leader or determine a person's church membership status 
inescapably involves ecclesiastical governance matters that 
this Court has no authority to resolve.  "[A]ny attempt by 
civil courts to limit a church's choice of its religious 
representatives would constitute an impermissible burden 
upon that church's First Amendment rights."  Id. at 611, 
553 S.E.2d at 514. 
 
While I concur with the rest of the majority's 
opinion, I respectfully dissent from its resolution of the 
defamation claims against Pace and Russell in Count II, 
because it contravenes our long-standing jurisprudence as 
expressed in Cha.  Therefore, I would affirm the judgment 
of the trial court sustaining the demurrer as to Pace and 
Russell concerning paragraphs 55 through 58 of Count II of 
the motion for judgment.