Title: Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility v. Ralph A. Kalal
Citation: 2002 WI 45
Docket Number: 2000AP001070-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 2, 2002

2002 WI 45 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1070-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Ralph A. Kalal, Attorney at Law: 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility,  
 
Complainant-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Ralph A. Kalal,  
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST KALAL 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 2, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
November 9, 2001   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BABLITCH, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
CROOKS, J., joins concurrence. 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by Steven M. 
Glynn and Glynn, Fitzgerald & Albee, S.C., Milwaukee, and Ralph 
A. Kalal and Kalal & Associates, Madison. 
 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief by Robert 
G. Krohn and Roethe, Krohn, Pope, McCarthy & Haas, LLP, 
Edgerton. 
 
 
2002 WI 45 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  00-1070-D  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Ralph A. Kalal, Attorney at Law: 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional  
Responsibility,  
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Ralph A. Kalal,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 2, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   This 
attorney 
disciplinary 
matter 
involves an attorney's misrepresentation of fact during oral 
argument to this court, in violation of SCR 20:3.3,1 which 
imposes upon attorneys the obligation of candor toward the 
tribunal.  We emphasize at the outset that an attorney's duty of 
                                                 
1 SCR 
20:3.3(a)(1) 
provides: 
"(a) A 
lawyer 
shall 
not 
knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a 
tribunal." 
No. 
00-1070-D   
 
2 
 
candor toward the tribunal is central to the truth-seeking 
function of any court, including, obviously, this one.  Oral 
argument is not an opportunity for deception.  This court makes 
its decisions, albeit tentatively, immediately following oral 
argument, relying in part on information supplied by counsel in 
response to the court's questions.  This is a critical part of 
the court's decision-making process.  Attorney Ralph Kalal 
knowingly made false statements to this court during oral 
argument, in response to questions from members of the court.  
Under these circumstances, only a strong, unmistakable and 
public sanction will reinforce the attorney's obligation of 
truthfulness and candor in court and deter the sort of 
gamesmanship that Attorney Kalal's conduct represents.  We 
conclude that the gravity of this misconduct requires at least a 
public reprimand.  
¶2 
Attorney Kalal appealed from the report of the 
referee, Cheryl Rosen Weston, finding that Attorney Kalal 
knowingly made a false statement of fact to this court during 
oral argument and recommending the issuance of a private 
reprimand.  Attorney Kalal argues that the Board of Attorneys 
No. 
00-1070-D   
 
3 
 
Professional Responsibility (Board)2 has failed to prove by 
evidence that is clear, satisfactory, and convincing that he 
knowingly made a false statement of fact to this court.  We 
conclude that the referee's findings in this regard are 
supported by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence, and 
we adopt them.  As noted above, however, we determine that the 
seriousness 
of 
Attorney 
Kalal's 
misconduct 
warrants 
the 
imposition of a public, rather than a private, reprimand. 
¶3 
Attorney Kalal was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1973 and practices in Madison.  He has not 
previously been the subject of a disciplinary proceeding.  
Between 1996 and 1998 he had between one and three associates 
working for him, including Attorneys Tracey Wood and Stephen 
Mays.   
¶4 
Attorney Kalal represented Ralph D. Smythe in Sauk 
County Circuit Court on a charge of operating a motor vehicle 
while intoxicated.  Smythe's operating privileges were revoked 
in a refusal proceeding brought under Wisconsin's implied 
consent law.  Attorney Kalal appealed the final order of 
revocation to District IV of the Court of Appeals.  The opening 
                                                 
2 Effective 
October 
1, 
2000, 
Wisconsin's 
attorney 
disciplinary process underwent a substantial restructuring.  The 
name of the body responsible for investigating and prosecuting 
cases involving attorney misconduct was changed to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and the supreme court rules applicable 
to the lawyer regulation system were also revised.  Since the 
conduct giving rise to the complaint occurred prior to October 
1, 2000, the investigative body will be referred to as "the 
Board."  Unless otherwise stated, references to supreme court 
rules will be to those in effect prior to October 1, 2000. 
No. 
00-1070-D   
 
4 
 
brief in the case was due on December 29, 1997.  On that day 
Attorney Kalal filed a motion requesting an extension of five 
working days from that date within which to file the brief.  The 
motion stated that the attorney assigned responsibility for 
preparation of the brief, Michelle Tjader, was on a previously 
planned vacation and had been able to complete only a draft of 
the brief prior to the vacation.3 
¶5 
By order dated January 2, 1998, the court of appeals 
denied the motion and dismissed the appeal as a sanction for 
failure to file the brief.  On January 6, 1998, the date 
requested in Attorney Kalal's motion to extend the time to file 
the brief, the brief was filed.  On the same day Attorney Kalal 
filed a renewed motion to extend the time to file the brief.  By 
order of January 9, 1998, the court of appeals denied the 
motion, refused to accept the brief for filing, and confirmed 
its earlier order of dismissal.   
¶6 
Attorney Kalal appealed the dismissal in Smythe to 
this court.  Oral argument was held on November 11, 1998.  
During oral argument, the following colloquy took place: 
 
JUSTICE CROOKS:  I have a question, however.  During 
the two years preceding the action that was taken in 
the Smythe case, had either you or your firm in any 
way been sanctioned by the court of appeals, by 
District IV, for the filing of briefs on a rather 
regular late basis? 
 
ATTORNEY KALAL:  No.  There was one case and I believe 
it is referred to in Judge Dykman's second order in 
                                                 
3 State v. Smythe, 225 Wis. 2d 456, 460, 592 N.W.2d 628 
(1999).   
No. 
00-1070-D   
 
5 
 
which they declined to allow us to file a reply brief 
and decided the case without the benefit of that 
brief. 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE ABRAHAMSON:  Is that the 1996 case? 
 
ATTORNEY KALAL:  Mosel.   
 
CHIEF JUSTICE ABRAHAMSON:  Pardon me? 
 
ATTORNEY KALAL:  That 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE ABRAHAMSON:  It's referenced here, 
Mosel.   
 
ATTORNEY KALAL:  Yes. 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE ABRAHAMSON:  In an order dated the 18th 
of September. 
 
ATTORNEY KALAL:  Correct. 
 
JUSTICE CROOKS:  Was there some warning when that 
action was taken?   
 
ATTORNEY KALAL:  No. 
 
JUSTICE BABLITCH:  Just to follow that up, if I may, 
Justice.  On page, appendix 6, in Judge Dykman's first 
order, he states, "We have advised counsel," which I 
presume is you, "that extension motions based on 
counsel's heavy workload fail to make the showing of 
good cause when they become routine" and then on page 
19 of this, which is Judge Dykman's second order, he 
states: "We have made it clear that we have concluded 
our 
normal procedures 
are inadequate 
to 
address 
appellate 
counsel's," 
which 
I 
assume 
is 
you, 
"excessive extension motions."  I was led to believe 
by those somehow that they have gotten the word to you 
or your firm that, "hey, you've pushed the envelope 
too far."   
 
ATTORNEY KALAL:  I think that it would be fair to say 
that in a couple of their orders they indicated that 
good cause is shown, but have indicated essentially 
that they were reluctant because they viewed that 
there had been more requests than they would like.  I 
No. 
00-1070-D   
 
6 
 
will not dispute that.  I would not say that they 
have, with the clarity that is suggested by Judge 
Dykman's orders said "you do this again, you're going 
to be wasted."   
¶7 
This court concluded that the court of appeals 
improperly based its decision to dismiss the Smythe appeal, in 
part, on past, unrelated extension practices by Attorney Kalal 
in other cases not involving Smythe.  It reversed the order of 
dismissal and remanded the case for reconsideration.   
¶8 
On April 19, 2000, the Board filed a complaint against 
Attorney Kalal alleging that he knowingly made a false statement 
of fact to this court during oral argument, thus violating SCR 
20:3.3.  The complaint also alleged that Attorney Kalal's 
failure to file the Smythe brief when due in the court of 
appeals, rather than filing a motion for an extension of time on 
the brief's due date, violated SCR 20:1.3.4   
¶9 
The Board notes that during the two years preceding 
the Smythe case, the court of appeals penalized or strongly 
cautioned Attorney Kalal or his firm for excessive extension 
motions in orders issued in the following cases:  
 
1. 
State v. Lesavage, No. 95-3364-CR.  Counsel of record 
in the case was Kalal's associate, Tracey Wood.  On 
February 14, 1996, the court of appeals granted Wood's 
motion for an extension of time to file a brief but 
said,  
 
[t]he 
motion 
does 
not 
show 
a 
workload . . . sufficient 
to 
justify 
an 
extension.  Nor does it show good cause for 
an 
extension 
of 
the 
length 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:1.3 provides: "Diligence. A lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."   
No. 
00-1070-D   
 
7 
 
requested. . . . Counsel should not assume 
extension motions will be granted, or that 
short extensions will be granted even when 
the 
motion 
does 
not 
show 
good 
cause.  
Failure to file the brief timely may result 
in a sanction against counsel. 
 
2. 
County of Dane v. Chamberlain, No. 95-2706.  The 
defendant was represented by Kalal.  On February 21, 
1996, the court of appeals granted Kalal's motion for 
a one-week extension of time to file a reply brief.  
The order explained,  
 
[a]n extension motion on the ground of 
counsel's 
heavy 
workload 
makes 
a 
less 
satisfactory showing of good cause when the 
workload appears so perpetually heavy that 
extension motions are routine. . . . Counsel 
should not assume extensions will be granted 
or, if granted, that they will be for the 
length requested. . . . As for the present 
motion, we reluctantly conclude good cause 
is shown. 
 
3. 
State v. Gaulrapp, No. 96-1094-CR.  Defendant was 
represented by Kalal.  By order dated July 23, 1996, 
the court of appeals granted a motion for extension of 
time to file a brief but imposed a $100 monetary 
penalty on Kalal.  The order said,  
 
[i]t is not clear why counsel waited until 
the date the brief was due to file the 
motion for a stay of proceedings.  We 
caution appellant's counsel not to assume 
that motions filed on the due date will be 
granted, or that additional time to complete 
the brief will be provided if the motion is 
denied.  We also caution counsel not to 
assume that a financial sanction is the only 
penalty the court is prepared to impose for 
failure to file a brief timely.  Dismissal 
is also a sanction available under Rule 
809.83(2), Stats. 
 
4. 
Village of Oregon v. Mark Feiler, No. 96-1202.  
Defendant was represented by Kalal's associate, Tracey 
Wood.  By order dated July 23, 1996, the court of 
No. 
00-1070-D   
 
8 
 
appeals granted a repeated motion for an extension of 
time to file a brief but imposed a $100 monetary 
penalty on Attorney Wood.  The order stated,  
 
[w]e caution appellant's counsel not to 
assume that motions filed on the due date 
will be granted, or that additional time to 
complete the brief will be provided if the 
motion is denied.  We also caution counsel 
not to assume that a financial sanction is 
the only penalty the court is prepared to 
impose for failure to file a brief timely.  
Dismissal is also a sanction available under 
Rule 809.83(2), Stats. 
 
5. 
State v. Timothy Kuklinski, No. 96-1266.  Defendant 
was represented by Kalal's associate, Tracey Wood.  By 
order dated August 14, 1996, the court of appeals 
granted a motion for extension of time filed the day a 
brief was due.  The order stated,  
 
[e]xtension 
motions 
on 
the 
ground 
of 
counsel's 
heavy 
workload 
make 
a 
less 
convincing showing of good cause when the 
workload at counsel's firm is so perpetually 
heavy that such motions are routine.  We so 
advised another member of counsel's firm as 
long ago as February 1996.  Since then, we 
have imposed financial penalties several 
times 
against 
counsel 
at 
the firm for 
failure to file a brief timely. . . . In 
view of our previously expressed concern, 
counsel's firm had ample opportunity to 
arrange 
for 
the 
timely 
filing 
of 
brief. . . .  
 
6. 
State v. Mosel, No. 96-1432-CR.  Defendant was 
represented by Kalal.  On September 18, 1996, the 
court of appeals denied a motion for a one-day 
extension of time to file a brief.  The order stated,  
 
[i]n February 1996, in an unrelated appeal, 
we 
advised 
Mosel's 
attorney 
that 
an 
extension motion on the ground of counsel's 
heavy workload makes a less satisfactory 
showing of good cause when the workload 
appears so perpetually heavy that extension 
No. 
00-1070-D   
 
9 
 
motions are routine.  We stated that counsel 
should 
not 
assume 
extensions 
will 
be 
granted.  In the months following that 
order, we imposed a monetary penalty against 
counsel several times for failure to file a 
brief timely.   
 
In July 1996, in another unrelated appeal, 
we again advised counsel not to assume that 
extension motions will be granted, or to 
assume that additional time to complete the 
brief will be provided if the motion is 
denied.  We further cautioned counsel not to 
assume that a financial sanction is the only 
penalty the court is prepared to impose.  We 
noted that dismissal is also a sanction 
available under Rule 809.83(2), Stats. 
 
We have reviewed the files of appeals by 
appellant's 
counsel. 
 
We 
have 
received 
briefs in 26 such appeals in 1996.  In 19 of 
those 26 appeals appellant's counsel sought 
an extension of the time to file his brief.   
 
Counsel's proclivity for extension motions 
wastes the resources of this court and 
causes unnecessary delays.  We have advised 
counsel of our dissatisfaction, and warned 
him 
that 
an 
appeal 
may 
be 
dismissed.  
Counsel has had ample time to adjust his 
practice so 
that such 
motions 
are not 
routine.  We conclude the present motion 
does not show good cause, and therefore we 
deny it. 
 
7. 
State 
v. 
Size, 
No. 
96-2070-CR. 
 
Defendant 
was 
represented by Kalal associates Stephen Mays and 
Tracey Wood.  On October 15, 1996, the court of 
appeals granted a motion to extend the time to file a 
brief.  After citing the occasions in which attorneys 
in Kalal's firm were advised that they should not 
assume extension motions would routinely be granted, 
the court said, "[u]ntil now, first requests for short 
extensions have usually been handled by the clerk of 
this court without review by the court.  As a result 
of counsel's abusive extension motions, all such 
No. 
00-1070-D   
 
10 
 
motions by members of appellant's law firm will now be 
reviewed by the court." 
¶10 The referee found that Attorney Kalal's responses at 
oral argument were false, in violation of SCR: 20:3.3 in three 
respects.   
¶11 First, the referee pointed to the following exchange: 
 
JUSTICE CROOKS: During the two years preceding the 
action that was taken in the Smythe case, had either 
you or your firm in any way been sanctioned by the 
Court of appeals, by District IV, for the filing of 
briefs on a rather regular late basis? 
 
ATTORNEY KALAL: No. There was one case.  
The "one case" referred to was Mosel, in which the court of 
appeals refused to accept a late-filed brief as a sanction for a 
late-filed extension motion.  The referee concluded that 
Attorney Kalal's answer was false because it ignored the $100 
monetary penalties imposed in Gaulrapp and Feiler.  
¶12 The second statement identified by the referee as 
false arose out of the following exchange:  
 
JUSTICE CROOKS: Was there some warning when that 
action [the court of appeals' refusal to allow an 
extension of time to file a reply brief in Mosel] was 
given? 
ATTORNEY KALAL: No. 
The referee concluded that the answer "no" was clearly false 
because the Mosel order attached the court of appeals' previous 
orders in Gaulrapp and Chamberlain which cautioned Attorney 
Kalal that he should not assume extension motions would be 
granted, particularly when they were filed on the date the brief 
No. 
00-1070-D   
 
11 
 
was due, nor should he assume additional time to complete the 
brief would be provided if the motion was denied.  
¶13 The third statement identified by the referee as false 
arose out of the following exchange:  
 
JUSTICE BABLITCH: Just to follow that up if I may, 
Justice. On page, appendix 6, in Judge Dykman's first 
order, he states: "We have advised counsel," which I 
presume is you, "that extension motions based on 
counsel's heavy workload fail to make the showing of 
good cause when they become routine" and then on page 
19 of this, which is Judge Dykman's second order, he 
states: "We have made it clear that we have concluded 
our 
normal procedures 
are inadequate 
to 
address 
appellate 
counsel's" 
which 
I 
presume 
is 
you, 
"excessive extension motions." I was led to believe by 
those that somehow they have gotten the word to you or 
your firm that "hey, you've pushed the envelope too 
far." 
 
ATTORNEY KALAL: I think it would be fair to say that 
in a couple of their orders they have indicated that 
good cause is shown, but have indicated essentially 
that they were reluctant because they viewed that 
there had been more requests than they would like. I 
will not dispute that. I would not say that they have, 
with the clarity that is suggested by Judge Dykman's 
orders said "you do this again, you're going to be 
wasted."  
While the referee said Attorney Kalal's remark might be an 
accurate characterization of the order in Chamberlain, where the 
court of appeals reluctantly concluded good cause for an 
extension was shown, the remark was inconsistent with the fact 
that monetary sanctions had been imposed prior to Smythe, in 
Gaulrapp and Feiler, and it also ignored the fact that the court 
of appeals refused to allow the late filing of a brief in Mosel. 
No. 
00-1070-D   
 
12 
 
¶14 Attorney Kalal justified the statements he made during 
the Smythe oral argument in two ways. 
¶15 With respect to orders directed at other members of 
his firm, he claimed to be unaware of such orders.  The referee 
found this position not to be credible given the small size of 
Attorney Kalal's law office and the fact that he and Attorney 
Wood were sanctioned by the same court, in the same way, for the 
same reason, on the same day.   
¶16 With respect to cases in which Attorney Kalal admitted 
personal knowledge, he said that at the time of the Smythe oral 
argument hearing, he forgot what had happened in those other 
cases.  The referee said this assertion was also difficult to 
believe since Attorney Kalal did remember being sanctioned by 
the court of appeals in Mosel, and the sanction in Mosel was 
based on the court's recitation of previous incidents.  Thus, 
the referee concluded that Attorney Kalal violated SCR 20:3.3. 
¶17 The referee found that the Board had failed to prove a 
violation of SCR 20:1.3. 
¶18 The Board sought a private reprimand based on the 
absence of any prior discipline and the fact that Attorney 
Kalal's misleading statements were not central to the facts 
needed to resolve the Smythe case.  The referee recommended the 
imposition of a private reprimand as discipline for Attorney 
Kalal's misconduct.  The referee also recommended that, having 
prevailed in one of the two counts alleged in the Board's 
complaint, Attorney Kalal be required to pay one-half the costs 
of the proceeding. 
No. 
00-1070-D   
 
13 
 
¶19 Attorney Kalal asserts that he gave an accurate and 
truthful answer to this court's question whether he or his firm 
had in any way been sanctioned by the court of appeals for 
filing briefs on a rather regularly late basis.  He contends 
that the truthful answer to that question was, "no."  He says 
that rather than filing briefs late, he sought extensions 
precisely for the purpose of assuring that the briefs would not 
be late.  He also says that because the court of appeals granted 
most of his extension requests, the briefs filed were in fact 
not late.  Attorney Kalal also argues that the $100 penalties 
imposed in the Feiler and Gaulrapp cases were not penalties for 
"rather regularly filing briefs late," and even if they were, 
the vintage of those penalties (two and one-half years before 
the Smythe oral argument) hardly suggests that those cases 
should have come instantly to Attorney Kalal's mind when faced 
with a question from the bench addressing matters outside the 
record in the Smythe case. 
¶20 Attorney Kalal asserts that the referee's repeated 
emphasis on the small size of the Kalal law firm betrays the 
referee's ignorance of practice in a small firm, as well as an 
ignorance of the norms of oral argument before an appellate 
court.  Attorney Kalal argues that this court took the Smythe 
case to decide the power of the court of appeals to dismiss 
cases as a sanction for the late filing of briefs.  He asserts 
that given the issue and the record, there is no reason why he 
should have sought out the record of past orders issued by the 
No. 
00-1070-D   
 
14 
 
court of appeals concerning extension motions filed in other 
cases.   
¶21 The Board asserts that a review of the court of 
appeals' orders discussed above reveals that Attorney Kalal's 
responses during oral argument were both incomplete and untrue.  
The Board contends that the referee fairly inferred from the 
evidence presented that in a small office such as Attorney 
Kalal's, he must have been aware of the sanction to his 
associate issued in the same way, for the same reason, and on 
the same day Attorney Kalal himself received an identical 
sanction. 
¶22 The Board argues that this court was entitled to 
receive full and fair responses to its inquiries relating to 
sanctions and warnings issued to Attorney Kalal and his firm by 
the court of appeals prior to the Smythe argument.  The Board 
asserts Attorney Kalal's responses to this court were incomplete 
and designed to minimize the extent to which measures had been 
taken to deter Attorney Kalal and his firm from making tardy 
filings.  The Board asserts the regularity with which Attorney 
Kalal and his firm had been sanctioned and warned by the court 
of appeals for untimely filings prior to Smythe indicates that 
Attorney Kalal was not merely mistaken in describing his history 
with the court of appeals; he was in fact intentionally trying 
to obscure that history both by what he offered to this court at 
oral argument and by what he did not offer.  
¶23 A referee's findings of fact on a disciplinary matter 
will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.  Disciplinary 
No. 
00-1070-D   
 
15 
 
Proceedings Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 243, 562 N.W.2d 137 
(1997).  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Carroll, 2000 WI 130, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 675, 
636 N.W.2d 718.   
¶24 The referee's finding that Attorney Kalal's response 
to 
Justice 
Crooks' 
questions 
were 
false 
is 
not 
clearly 
erroneous.  The "one case" referred to by Attorney Kalal in the 
first exchange with Justice Crooks was Mosel, in which the court 
of appeals denied a motion for a one-day extension of time to 
file a brief and refused to accept the brief for filing.  In 
addition to Mosel, the court of appeals also imposed a $100 
monetary penalty on Attorney Kalal in Gaulrapp, and on the same 
day it imposed a $100 monetary penalty on Attorney Kalal's 
associate, Tracey Wood, in Feiler.  Thus, Attorney Kalal's 
statement during the Smythe oral argument that there had only 
been one occasion in which he or his firm had been sanctioned by 
the court of appeals was patently false.   
¶25 Attorney Kalal's response to Justice Crooks' second 
question regarding whether there was some warning prior to the 
court of appeals refusing to extend the time to file a reply 
brief in Mosel was also false since the court of appeals did 
provide warning, in all of the previous cases listed above, that 
Attorney Kalal should not assume extensions would be granted or 
that a financial sanction was the only penalty the court was 
prepared to impose for failure to file a brief in a timely 
manner.   
No. 
00-1070-D   
 
16 
 
¶26 The referee's finding that Attorney Kalal's false 
statement of fact in response to Justice Crooks' questions 
during the Smythe oral argument was knowingly made is also not 
clearly erroneous.  The notion that Attorney Kalal would have 
remembered the court of appeals' refusal to grant him a briefing 
extension in Mosel yet would not have remembered the $100 
monetary penalty imposed in Gaulrapp is incredible on its face.  
The referee's finding that under the circumstances presented 
here in a small law firm consisting of no more than three 
associates, it is not credible for Attorney Kalal to claim that 
he was unaware of the $100 monetary penalty imposed on Attorney 
Tracey Wood in the Feiler case the same day the $100 penalty was 
imposed against Attorney Kalal in Gaulrapp, is also not clearly 
erroneous. 
¶27 In addition, Attorney Kalal's colloquy with Justice 
Bablitch during the Smythe oral argument was, if not patently 
false, at least knowingly misleading.  
¶28 In Lesavage, Chamberlain, Kuklinski, and Size, the 
court of appeals cautioned Attorney Kalal and his firm that 
extension motions would not be routinely granted, that failure 
to file briefs on time might result in a sanction against 
counsel, and that all extension motions filed by the Kalal firm 
would be reviewed by the court. The only reasonable reading of 
the orders issued in Lesavage, Chamberlain, Kuklinski, and Size 
is that the court of appeals was warning Attorney Kalal that he 
and his law firm had in fact "pushed the envelope too far" with 
respect to its filing of extension motions, that close scrutiny 
No. 
00-1070-D   
 
17 
 
would be applied to future motions, and that sanctions were 
possible.  Attorney Kalal's response to Justice Bablitch during 
the 
Smythe 
oral 
argument 
thus 
appears 
to 
be 
at 
least 
deliberately misleading, if not actually false.  Even though 
this statement, standing alone, would perhaps not support a 
finding that SCR 20:3.3 was violated, it reinforces the 
conclusion that Attorney Kalal's answers to Justice Crooks' 
questions were false and knowingly made. 
¶29 Since the referee's findings that Attorney Kalal 
knowingly made false statements of fact to this court during the 
Smythe oral argument have not been shown to be clearly 
erroneous, we adopt them.   
¶30 The Board sought, and the referee recommended, that a 
private reprimand be issued as discipline for Attorney Kalal's 
misconduct.  We conclude that the seriousness of Attorney 
Kalal's misconduct warrants the imposition of a public, rather 
than a private, reprimand.  
¶31 The referee also recommended that Attorney Kalal be 
required to pay one-half of the costs and fees associated with 
this proceeding.  Attorney Kalal has filed an objection to the 
bill of costs filed by the Board and has also filed a motion 
seeking the imposition of costs and sanctions against the Board 
and its counsel personally.   
¶32 Current SCR 21.19 states, in part, that "the director, 
staff, . . . [and] retained counsel, . . . shall be immune from 
suit for any conduct in the course of their official duties."  
In addition, this court has previously declined to award 
No. 
00-1070-D   
 
18 
 
attorneys defense costs in disciplinary proceedings, whether the 
attorney prevails on some or all counts.  See Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Marcus & Tepper, 107 Wis. 2d 560, 320 N.W.2d 
806 (1982).  Consequently, we deny Attorney Kalal's motion for 
costs and sanctions. 
¶33 Although the referee recommended that Attorney Kalal 
be required to pay one-half of the costs and fees associated 
with the proceeding because the referee concluded that the Board 
had proved only one of the two counts alleged in its complaint, 
this 
court 
has 
previously 
rejected 
objections 
to 
full 
assessments of costs based on an apportionment of the number of 
misconduct allegations established.  See, e.g., Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Pangman, 216 Wis. 2d 440, 460, 574 N.W.2d 
232 (1998); Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Johnson, 165 
Wis. 2d 14, 20, 477 N.W.2d 54 (1991).  We follow that past 
practice here and conclude that Attorney Kalal should be 
required to pay the full costs and fees associated with this 
proceeding. 
¶34 IT IS ORDERED that Ralph Kalal is publicly reprimanded 
for his professional misconduct. 
¶35 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ralph Kalal's motion for 
costs and sanctions against the Board and its counsel is denied. 
¶36 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ralph Kalal be required to 
pay the costs and expenses of this disciplinary proceeding.  If 
the costs are not paid within 90 days of the date of this order, 
and absent a showing to this court of his inability to pay the 
No. 
00-1070-D   
 
19 
 
costs, the license of Ralph Kalal to practice law in Wisconsin 
shall be suspended until further order of this court.  
 
No.  00-1070-D.ssa 
 
 
 
1
¶37 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring).  
It seems to me that there's more to this case——and less to this 
case——than meets the eye.  As I studied the case, three texts 
kept coming to mind.   
¶38 First, I recalled a decision by my wise former law 
partner, Federal District Court Judge James E. Doyle, sentencing 
Ben Masel for spitting in the face of U.S. Senator Henry M. 
Jackson at the Dane County Regional Airport in Madison, 
Wisconsin, on March 30, 1976.  Masel was demonstrating his 
disapproval of the Senator's alleged relationship with the 
armament industry.5  Judge Doyle wrote that he pondered whether 
to treat the crime as a minor, petty offense or as an important 
case.  Judge Doyle decided to sentence Masel to 15 days in jail, 
concluding that Masel deserved "a pinch of deserved condemnation 
for an ignoble, small performance."6 
¶39 The other two texts were cartoons about lying and 
honesty.  The cartoon about lying is cynical:  A father, while 
driving the family car, says to his young son, "Everyone lies, 
son, but there are different pay scales."7 
¶40 The cartoon about honesty is more philosophical:  A 
father, sitting in his easy chair in the living room, says to 
                                                 
5 United States v. Masel, 563 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1977). 
6 A Pinch of Deserved Condemnation, Capital Times, Jan. 5, 
1977 (a complete text of Judge Doyle's sentencing statement). 
7 Donald Reilly, The New Yorker, Feb. 18 & 25, 2002, at 160. 
No.  00-1070-D.ssa 
 
 
 
2
his young son, "Honesty is a fine quality, Max, but it isn't the 
whole story."8 
¶41 This case, which raises issues addressed in the three 
texts, bothers me.  
* * * * 
¶42 Old hands on appellate courts look into each other's 
eyes, knowingly nod, and wisely say, "garbage in, garbage out."  
This short-hand phrase means that judges rely on lawyers to keep 
us informed about a case.  Sure, judges (and law clerks) do 
research and read the record, but the better the briefs and the 
better the oral argument, then the better the chances are for a 
good, sound decision.  That is why lawyer competence and candor 
are so important to the proper working of the legal system.  
¶43 The per curiam opinion in the present case puts it 
more grandly: "[C]andor toward the tribunal is central to the 
truth-seeking function of any court.  . . .  This court makes 
its decisions, albeit tentatively, immediately following oral 
argument, relying in part on information supplied by counsel in 
response to the court's questions."9   
¶44 Whether cast in colloquial or grand terms, this case 
touches on the importance of providing accurate information to 
the courts. 
                                                 
8 Robert Weber, The New Yorker, March 18, 2002, at 124. 
9 Per curiam op. at ¶1. 
No.  00-1070-D.ssa 
 
 
 
3
¶45 Kalal's comments, which are the subject of this 
disciplinary proceeding, were uttered when he was arguing the 
Smythe case before this court on November 11, 1998.10  The 
questions asked at oral argument in Smythe were about sanctions 
and warnings in prior cases.  These questions and Kalal's 
subsequent responses, quoted in the per curiam opinion, were not 
material to the decision in Smythe.  
¶46 The issue before the supreme court in Smythe was 
whether Judge Dykman could penalize Smythe on the basis of 
Kalal's conduct in other cases.  When Kalal requested a five-day 
extension from the court of appeals to file his appellate brief 
in Smythe (the first request for an extension in that case), 
Judge Dykman (sitting as a single judge) dismissed the Smythe 
appeal on the ground that Kalal had repeatedly requested time 
extensions in other prior cases not involving the Smythe case.  
This court held that Kalal's conduct in other cases was not 
relevant to whether Smythe should be dismissed and that the 
court of appeals had erred in dismissing Smythe.11   
¶47 As Kalal's brief in this disciplinary matter puts it, 
"This Court took the Smythe case to decide that issue [about 
using Kalal's motions in other cases as grounds to dismiss 
                                                 
10 State v. Smythe, 225 Wis. 2d 456, 592 N.W.2d 628 (1999). 
11 "[A] court of appeals decision to dismiss an appeal may 
be reversed when there is compelling evidence that that court 
based its decision, in part, on the past practices of counsel in 
unrelated matters."  Smythe, 225 Wis. 2d at 459. 
No.  00-1070-D.ssa 
 
 
 
4
Smythe].  It didn't take the case to express an opinion about 
the conduct of either [the] lawyer or appeals court judge."12   
¶48 Supreme Court Rule 20:3.3 appears to allow zero 
tolerance for false statements of fact or law regardless of 
their materiality.  But shouldn't materiality play a role in 
determining the discipline to be imposed? 
¶49 So what is the false statement of fact in the present 
case?  According to the per curiam opinion, Kalal misstated two 
facts: (1) His statement that his firm had been sanctioned in 
only one case was false.  See per curiam op. at ¶11.  (2) His 
statement that his firm had not been warned in the Mosel case 
was false.  See per curiam op. at ¶12.   
¶50 This is the entire case against Kalal. 
¶51 Kalal claims that he gave an accurate response to 
Justice Crooks' question, which was about late filings.  Justice 
Crooks' question did not, according to Kalal, relate to motions 
to extend the time for filing a brief.  See per curiam op. at 
¶19.  Lame excuse?  Or plausible explanation? 
¶52 The per curiam opinion shies away from the referee's 
finding that Kalal's response to Justice Bablitch was false, but 
uses Kalal's response to Justice Bablitch to reinforce the 
referee's findings regarding the two falsehoods to Justice 
Crooks.  The per curiam opinion declares that while Kalal's 
                                                 
12 Kalal's Brief at 23. 
No.  00-1070-D.ssa 
 
 
 
5
response to Justice Bablitch "standing alone, would perhaps not 
support a finding that former SCR 20:3.3 was violated, it 
reinforces the conclusion that Attorney Kalal's answers to 
Justice Crooks' questions were false and knowingly made."13    
¶53 So the disciplinary decision in the present case rests 
on Kalal's misstating two facts that were not central to the 
oral 
argument 
in 
Smythe. 
 
There 
are 
fine 
lines 
here:  
Forgetfulness is okay.  Spin is okay.  False statements of 
facts, material or not, are not okay.   
¶54 Another referee might have been persuaded that Justice 
Crooks' question was not clear enough or could have been 
interpreted in a different way or that Kalal had forgotten at 
the Smythe oral argument that two and one-half years earlier 
$100 sanctions were imposed in two cases.  However, a different 
view of the facts is not important because this referee's 
finding is determinative.  Applying a standard of review that 
gives deference to the referee's findings, I must conclude that 
the statements were knowingly false.  But don't the nature and 
frequency of the false statements play a role in determining the 
discipline to be imposed? 
¶55 Courts also have an obligation to state the facts 
accurately.  In an August 14, 1996, order and in a September 18, 
                                                 
13 Per curiam op. at ¶28.  The per curiam opinion further 
states:  "Kalal's colloquy with Justice Bablitch during the 
Smythe oral argument was, if not patently false, at least 
knowingly misleading."  See per curiam op. at ¶27. 
No.  00-1070-D.ssa 
 
 
 
6
1996, order, the court of appeals concluded that after February 
1996, it "imposed a monetary penalty against [Kalal] several 
times for failure to file a brief timely."  (Emphasis added.)   
¶56 However, the record before this court shows that only 
two——not several——monetary penalties were imposed from February 
1996 to September 18, 1996.  It is possible that the full record 
of Kalal's 1996 motions and sanctions were not introduced into 
evidence and that the court of appeals' assertion of several 
monetary sanctions may be correct.  Trivial observation?  
Irrelevant?  Perhaps.  But my point is simple:  Courts as well 
as lawyers must use care to state the facts accurately.  And we 
all err.  
¶57 What is to be done in the future?  Apparently the 
court of appeals concluded that Kalal had asked for too many 
extensions of time to file appellate briefs.  The court of 
appeals therefore announced that it would examine Kalal's 
requests differently from the way it examined other attorneys' 
requests.  It will be interesting to see whether the practice of 
singling out an attorney for special, personal treatment for his 
or her motions continues.  Perhaps Smythe puts an end to the 
court of appeals using special rules to deal with the motions 
presented by a particular attorney, rather than deciding each 
motion in each case on its merits.  
No.  00-1070-D.ssa 
 
 
 
7
¶58 But let's look at the bigger picture.  Smythe is but 
one case and Kalal is but one lawyer in a vast sea of motions 
seeking an extension of the time allowed for filing briefs.  
These motions are a growing cottage industry.  Approximately 
3500 new appeals are filed in the court of appeals each year.  
In 1996, 1,960 motions for extension of time were filed in the 
court of appeals, and in 1997, 2,056 such motions were filed.14  
Although these motions were not exclusively motions to extend 
the time for filing briefs, a random sampling of 11% of the 1996 
motions by the office of the clerk of the court of appeals 
indicates that 95% were requests for extensions of time for 
filing briefs.  A similar sampling of 9% of the 1997 motions 
indicates that 85% were requests for extensions of time for 
filing briefs.   
¶59 A conservative estimate that 80% of the motions for 
extension filed in the court of appeals are requests to extend 
the time for filing briefs means that the court of appeals 
receives approximately 1600 such motions a year, over 130 a 
month, 
to 
extend 
the 
time 
for 
filing 
briefs. 
Only 
an 
insignificant number and percentage of these are attributable to 
Kalal or his firm!   
¶60 That's a lot of paper in and out of the office of the 
clerk of the court of appeals.  And that's a substantial amount 
                                                 
14 Wis. Stat. § 809.82 (1999-2000).  See also Smythe, 225 
Wis. 2d at 466. 
No.  00-1070-D.ssa 
 
 
 
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of staff time devoted to motions to extend the time for filing 
briefs.  Does extending the time for filing briefs delay or 
interfere with decision-making in the court of appeals? 
¶61 Perhaps the court of appeals should consider a change 
in its procedures to reduce staff time used for this purpose and 
to reduce conflicts with attorneys about these motions.  The 
court of appeals might publish its procedures for granting and 
denying these motions so that its procedures are clear to all 
attorneys.  And this court, with a much smaller motion practice, 
should consider doing the same.   
¶62 Back to the present and this case.  So what to do 
about this case?  Is it petty or important?  Lying at different 
pay scales?  Honesty not the full story?  No discipline?  
Private reprimand?  Public reprimand?  Suspension?   
¶63 I am going along with the court's imposition of a 
public reprimand rather than a private reprimand in this matter, 
but not without some misgivings.  This case makes me very 
uncomfortable.  
 
No.  00-1070-D.wab 
 
1 
 
¶64 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   (concurring).  In nearly 19 
years on this bench, I have been privileged to hear many 
outstanding attorneys argue forcibly and well for their clients.  
Perhaps I am naïve, but I have never felt, until this case, that 
an attorney has deliberately misled or lied to our court.   
¶65 I would have opted for a harsher penalty, but my 
colleagues did not agree.  I bend to their wisdom.   
¶66 I am concerned that Mr. Kalal still doesn't get it.  
At various times throughout his briefs, Kalal repeatedly points 
accusing fingers at the appeals court judge and at the referee.  
Mr. Kalal would be well advised to reconsider and take a long 
look at himself.  His defense, technical to the extreme, amounts 
to no defense at all.  He is obviously a bright, intelligent, 
articulate attorney, capable of representing his clients ably.  
He does himself, this court, and the bar a disservice by this 
conduct. 
¶67 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this opinion. 
No.  00-1070.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶68 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  I join the per 
curiam opinion without reservation.  I write separately to 
address a gap in this court's analysis that ought to be 
explained. 
¶69 On January 2, 1998, the court of appeals denied 
Attorney Kalal's motion to extend the time for filing a brief 
and dismissed the appeal of Kalal's client, Ralph Smythe, 
because his brief was not timely filed.  See State v. Smythe, 
225 Wis. 2d 456, 460, 592 N.W.2d 628 (1999).  In a second order 
dated January 9, 1998, the court of appeals denied a renewed 
motion to extend time.  Id. at 461.  This court later granted a 
petition for review, and we heard oral argument in the Smythe 
case on November 11, 1998.  Id. at 456.  Attorney Kalal's 
representations to the court in that oral argument are the 
source of this disciplinary proceeding.  PER CURIAM op. at ¶6. 
¶70 The per curiam opinion states that "[D]uring the two 
years preceding the Smythe case, the court of appeals penalized 
or strongly cautioned Attorney Kalal or his firm for excessive 
extension motions in orders issued in the following cases[.]"  
The opinion then describes seven cases dating from February 14, 
1996, to October 15, 1996.  Id. at ¶9.  However, the opinion 
lists no cases between October 15, 1996, and Kalal's December 
29, 1997, motion in the Smythe case, a gap of 14 months. 
¶71 The opinion cites no cases from this 14-month period 
because none were disclosed in the record presented to this 
court.  However, no inference should be drawn that Attorney 
No.  00-1070.dtp 
 
2 
 
Kalal made no extension requests during this period or that he 
was not admonished by the court of appeals during this period. 
¶72 In its January 2, 1998, order in the Smythe case, the 
court of appeals said: 
 
Appellant's counsel's firm has a long history of 
extension motions in this court, and we have in the 
past issued stern warnings and taken other actions to 
attempt to reduce their number.  We have noted the 
toll these motions take on this court's time and 
resources.  We have advised counsel that extension 
motions based on counsel's heavy workload fail to make 
the showing of good cause required by Rule 809.82(2), 
Stats., when they become routine.  In the past, such 
motions were routine.  For much of this past year, 
counsel's firm has been reasonable in its requests for 
extensions.  However, we have again noted an increase 
in such motions.  That increase, combined with this 
motion's complete absence of any showing of why the 
brief could not be completed during the five weeks 
before counsel's vacation, leads us to conclude that 
good cause has not been shown.  Therefore, we deny the 
motion. 
See Smythe, 225 Wis. 2d at 460 (emphasis added). 
¶73 In his renewed motion for extension in early 1998, 
Kalal acknowledged that he had filed 15 motions for extension in 
1997.  See id. at 461.   
¶74 At my request, this court independently examined 
public records of Kalal's 1997 extension motions to determine 
the basis for the court of appeals' stated concern.  We 
discovered that Kalal filed an extension motion in December 1997 
in State of Wisconsin ex rel. Ronald E. Patten v. David H. 
Schwartz, No. 97-2927.  This motion resulted in a December 26, 
1997, order allowing an extension but imposing a financial 
penalty of $100 on Kalal because good cause for delay had not 
been shown.  On or about December 29, 1997, Kalal filed a motion 
No.  00-1070.dtp 
 
3 
 
to extend time in In re Refusal of James P. Sullivan: Dane 
County v. James P. Sullivan, No. 97-2143.  This motion was 
denied in an order dated January 2, 1998. 
¶75 These two cases were fresh in the mind of the court of 
appeals when it issued its Smythe orders in January 1998.  The 
Patten case was clearly covered by Justice Crooks's question 
later in the year. 
¶76 The two cases found outside the record have had no 
bearing whatever on the discipline imposed here.  They are 
included in this concurring opinion solely to explain the 
apparent gap in this court's analysis.  It would not be fair for 
this court to place the court of appeals in a false light by 
failing to explain what actually transpired during the 14-month 
period. 
No.  00-1070.dtp 
 
 
 
1