Title: Sands v. Menard, Jr.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2015AP000870, 2012AP002377
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 29, 2017

2017 WI 110 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Debra K. Sands, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
John R. Menard, Jr., Menard Thoroughbreds, Inc., 
Webster Hart as Trustee of the John R. Menard, 
Jr. 2002 Trust and Related Trusts, Angela L. 
Bowe as Trustee of the John R. Menard, Jr. 2002 
Trust and Related Trusts and Alphons Pitterle as 
Trustee of the John R. Menard , Jr. 2002 Trust  
and Related Trusts, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
Midwest Manufacturing Co., Wood Ecology Inc., 
Countertops Inc., Team Menard Inc., Menard 
Engine Group, Menard Competition Technologies 
LTD, MC Technologies Inc., Menard Engineering 
LTD, UltraMotive LTD and Merchant Capital LLC, 
          Defendants, 
Menard, Inc., 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross Petitioner. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Debra K. Sands, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
     v. 
John R. Menard, Jr. and Menard Thoroughbreds, 
Inc., 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross-
Appellants, 
Webster Hart as Trustee of the John R. Menard, 
Jr. 2002 Trust and Related Trusts, Angela L. 
Bowe as Trustee of the John R. Menard, Jr. 2002 
Trust and Related Trusts, Alphons Pitterle as 
Trustee of the John R. Menard , Jr. 2002 Trust  
and Related Trusts, Midwest Manufacturing Co., 
Wood Ecology Inc., Countertops Inc., Team Menard 
Inc., Menard Engine Group, Menard Competition 
Technologies LTD, MC Technologies Inc., Menard 
Engineering LTD, UltraMotive LTD  
and Merchant Capital LLC, 
          Defendants, 
Menard, Inc., 
           
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant-
Cross Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 372 Wis. 2d 126, 887 N.W.2d 94 
 
 
2 
PDC No: 2016 WI App 76 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 29, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 12, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 COURT: 
Circuit 
 COUNTY: 
Eau Claire 
 JUDGE: 
Paul J. Lenz 
  
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 CONCURRED: 
      
 DISSENTED: 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: 
      
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs and dissents, joined by 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. (opinion filed). 
 NOT PARTICIPATING: 
         
  
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent-petitioner, 
there were briefs filed by Charles K. Maier, Daniel R. Shulman, 
Richard C. Landon, and Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, 
P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, with whom on the briefs were Mel 
C. Orchard, III, and The Spence Law Firm, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming.  
There was an oral argument by Daniel R. Shulman. 
 
For 
the 
defendant-respondent-cross-appellant-cross 
petitioner, there were briefs filed by G. Richard White and Weld 
Riley, S.C., Eau Claire, with whom on the briefs were Michael D. 
Freeborn, Brian P. Norton, Andrew C. Nordahl, and Freeborn & 
Peters, LLP, Chicago, Illinois.  There was an oral argument by 
Brian P. Norton. 
 
For the defendants-respondents, there was a brief by G. 
Richard White and Weld Riley, S.C., Eau Claire, with whom on the 
brief were Todd Wind and Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, 
Minnesota.  There was an oral argument by Todd Wind.  
 
 
 
3 
For the defendants-respondents-cross-appellants, there was 
a brief filed by there was a brief filed by G. Richard White and 
Weld Riley, S.C., Eau Claire, with whom on the briefs were 
Michael D. Freeborn, Brian P. Norton, Andrew C. Nordahl, and 
Freeborn & Peters, LLP, Chicago, Illinois.   
 
 
2017 WI 110
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.  2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
(L.C. No. 
2008CV990) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Debra K. Sands, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
John R. Menard, Jr., Menard Thoroughbreds, 
Inc., Webster Hart as Trustee of the John R. 
Menard, Jr. 2002 Trust and Related Trusts, 
Angela L. Bowe as Trustee of the John R. 
Menard, Jr. 2002 Trust and Related Trusts and 
Alphons Pitterle as Trustee of the John R. 
Menard, Jr. 2002 Trust and Related Trusts, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Midwest Manufacturing Co., Wood Ecology Inc., 
Countertops Inc., Team Menard Inc., Menard 
Engine Group, Menard Competition Technologies 
LTD, MC Technologies Inc., Menard Engineering 
LTD, UltraMotive LTD and Merchant Capital LLC, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Menard, Inc., 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross 
          Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 29, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Debra K. Sands, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent- 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
John R. Menard, Jr. and Menard Thoroughbreds, 
Inc., 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants, 
 
Webster Hart as Trustee of the John R. Menard, 
Jr. 2002 Trust and Related Trusts, Angela L. 
Bowe as Trustee of the John R. Menard, Jr. 2002 
Trust and Related Trusts, Alphons Pitterle as 
Trustee of the John R. Menard, Jr. 2002 Trust 
and Related Trusts, Midwest Manufacturing Co., 
Wood Ecology Inc., Countertops Inc., Team 
Menard Inc., Menard Engine Group, Menard 
Competition Technologies LTD, MC Technologies 
Inc., Menard Engineering LTD, UltraMotive LTD  
and Merchant Capital LLC, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Menard, Inc., 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant- 
          Cross Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals, affirming the circuit court's1 grant of 
summary judgment dismissing Debra Sands' claims and Menard, 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Paul J. Lenz of Eau Claire County, presided. 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
3 
 
Inc.'s counterclaim.  Debra Sands and John Menard, Jr., were 
involved in a romantic relationship from late 1997 to April 
2006.2  Sands alleges that from 1998 until 2006 she cohabitated 
with Menard and they engaged in a "joint enterprise" to work 
together and grow Menard's businesses for their mutual benefit.  
Menard and his affiliated entities argue that by failing to 
comply with Supreme Court Rule 20:1.8(a), which regulates 
business transactions between lawyers and their clients, Sands 
is precluded from seeking an ownership interest in any of 
Menard's various business ventures. 
¶2 
We review four issues.  First, we consider whether 
Sands has pleaded facts sufficient to establish what she styled 
as an unjust enrichment claim under Watts v. Watts, 137 
Wis. 2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 305 (1987), thereby necessitating a 
remand to the circuit court for a full hearing on the merits.  
Second, we consider whether the court of appeals properly 
concluded that SCR 20:1.8(a) may be raised as a defense to an 
unjust enrichment claim.  Third, we consider whether the court 
of appeals properly granted summary judgment to Sands on Menard, 
Inc.'s counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty.  And fourth, 
                                                 
2 Debra Sands appeals from a judgment of the court of 
appeals, affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment 
dismissing Sands' claims against John Menard, Jr. ("Menard"), 
Menard, Inc., and Menard Thoroughbreds, Inc. ("collectively, the 
Menard Defendants") and against the trustees of the John R. 
Menard, Jr. 2002 Trust and related trusts ("the Trustees").  The 
Menard Defendants appeal from an order affirming summary 
judgment to Sands on Menard, Inc.'s counterclaim for breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
4 
 
we consider whether the court of appeals properly granted 
summary judgment to the Menard Trustees. 
¶3 
As to the claim she has characterized as a Watts 
unjust enrichment claim, we conclude that Sands has failed to 
allege facts which, if true, would support her legal conclusion 
that she and Menard had a joint enterprise that included 
accumulation of assets in which both she and Menard expected to 
share equally.  On the second issue, for the reasons explained 
below, we conclude that SCR 20:1.8(a) may guide courts in 
determining required standards of care generally; however, it 
may not be used as an absolute defense to a civil claim 
involving an attorney.3  And finally, we also conclude that the 
court of appeals properly granted summary judgment to Sands on 
Menard, Inc.'s counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty, and to 
the Trustees on their motion for summary judgment dismissing 
Sands' claim.   
¶4 
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.    
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
Menard is the founder, president, and CEO of Menard, 
Inc., a privately held chain of home improvement stores that 
began in Eau Claire, Wisconsin.  In November 1997, nearly 40 
years after starting his business, Menard began dating Sands, a 
lawyer licensed to practice in the state of Minnesota, who at 
                                                 
3 We do not consider whether Menard or the Menard Defendants 
waived, ratified, or may be estopped to assert Sands' alleged 
non-compliance with SCR 20:1.8(a). 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
5 
 
the time was directing several business ventures with her sister 
in St. Paul.  Sands claims that she moved in with Menard in the 
summer of 1998, and they became engaged later that year.  Menard 
admits that he and Sands were engaged, but denies that they ever 
lived together.   
¶6 
During their relationship, Sands alleges she made a 
number of business and personal contributions to both Menard and 
his companies, including Menard, Inc. and Menard Thoroughbreds, 
Inc.  Although the parties agree that Sands made certain 
contributions, they do not agree as to the nature of those 
contributions, when they began, or who was the recipient at any 
given time.  Sands describes her contributions to Menard and his 
companies as follows: 
She was Menard's life partner, social companion, and 
manager 
and 
hostess 
of 
his 
households. 
 
Sands 
protected Menard from unwanted approaches by serving 
as a "gate-keeper."  She supervised his health care 
and medical needs; managed the remodeling of three 
residences; 
and 
advised 
on 
the 
acquisition 
of 
airplanes and their design and décor.  She provided 
ideas for new products and product lines for the 
Menard, Inc., stores, such as garden centers; and 
scouted and proposed new store locations, store 
layouts, and product displays.  She represented 
Menard, Inc., as a product buyer.  She reviewed and 
suggested changes and additions to Menard, Inc., 
marketing plans.  She assisted with government and 
public relations.  She participated in the redesign of 
store signs and logos.  She helped find new business 
and investment opportunities.  She assisted in the 
management of the Team Menard auto racing venture and 
newly-acquired businesses, including two engine design 
companies in England, a thoroughbred racing business, 
and a $400 million private equity fund.  She made her 
joint enterprise with Menard her focus, which occupied 
her every moment.  
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
6 
 
¶7 
Sands claims that Menard repeatedly promised her that 
in return for these contributions, he would give her an 
ownership interest in his various business ventures.  Menard 
denies ever making such promises, and states only that Sands 
provided certain legal services beginning in approximately 1997. 
¶8 
The 
parties 
also 
disagree 
as 
to 
whether 
Sands 
performed legal work for Menard or the Menard Defendants prior 
to the beginning of their romantic relationship.  Sands contends 
that there was never any attorney-client relationship with the 
Menard Defendants prior to 1998.  Conversely, the Menard 
Defendants assert that Sands began providing legal services in 
October 1997, before she and Menard began dating.   
¶9 
As evidence, the Menard Defendants submitted a May 28, 
1998, invoice from Prima Group, a company owned by Sands and her 
sister, in the amount of $49,635.84.  The invoice referenced a 
"client matter," listed as "Wisconsin Dept. of Natural Resources 
v. Menard, Inc."  The invoice further indicated it was for 
"Governmental relations & Legal services rendered Oct. 15, 1997 
– May 15, 1998."  Sands claims that the invoice was prepared at 
Menard's request, in response to his offer to pay off Sands' 
remaining student loans of $49,635.84.  Sands claims that Menard 
told her to send the invoice to Menard, Inc., so that the 
payment would be tax deductible as a business expense.  Menard, 
however, claims this invoice related to legal services that 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
7 
 
Sands provided in connection with a Wisconsin DNR investigation 
into Menard, Inc.'s disposal of wood ash.4  
¶10 Although the parties disagree as to the nature of the 
legal services provided prior to 2003, both concede that 
beginning in 2003 Sands began to provide significant legal 
services to Menard, Inc.5  Sands billed at an hourly rate of 
$145, and Menard, Inc. paid Sands a total of $152,105 for seven 
invoices.   
¶11 In early 2004, Sands assisted in the creation of a 
private equity fund ("the Fund").  Steve Hilbert, a businessman 
with money management experience and a long-time friend of 
Menard's, began to meet with Menard to discuss the Fund.  
According to Sands, Menard asked her to review documentation 
used to create the Fund.  Menard, Inc., however, asserts that 
from at least January 2005 through October 2005, Menard, Inc. 
had retained Sands as its outside legal counsel to represent it 
in the Fund transaction.  
                                                 
4 A similarly questionable transaction involving race car 
driver Robby Gordon began in September 1998.  The record 
reflects that Menard, Inc. paid Sands $3,000 on September 21, 
1999, for her work on the Gordon transaction.  Sands concedes 
that she performed some work as Menard's business advisor——not 
lawyer——but states that the payment was actually a reimbursement 
for wedding planning expenses.  Sands v. Menard, 2016 WI App 76, 
¶¶9-10, 372 Wis. 2d  126, 887 N.W.2d 94. 
5 The parties disagree as to whether Sands ever provided 
legal services to Menard personally.  According to Sands, Menard 
himself was never a client. 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
8 
 
¶12 Menard 
alleges 
that 
Sands 
was 
responsible 
for 
negotiating the terms of the transaction with Hilbert, in 
addition 
to 
reviewing 
and 
editing 
the 
Fund 
transaction 
documents.  Sands states that she was never asked and never did 
create invoices for her work for Menard, in part because she 
believed her efforts were part of her and Menard's "joint 
enterprise."  It was not until her relationship with Menard 
ended in 2006 that Menard instructed her to provide itemized 
invoices for all legal services for which she had not been paid, 
dating back to 2003.  Sands then submitted 190 separate invoices 
for work performed between February 2003 and April 2006, 
representing 7,487.10 hours of legal work at $145 per hour, for 
a total fee of $1,085,629.50. 
¶13 Sands met with Menard and Pete Liupakka, Menard, 
Inc.'s CFO, to discuss the invoices in October 2006.  Liupakka 
believed that the number of hours reflected on the invoices was 
excessive.  Nevertheless, Menard, Inc. offered to pay Sands 
$961,518——the amount claimed in the invoices minus payments that 
Menard, Inc. believed Sands had already received.  However, 
Menard, Inc. made receipt of this payment conditioned on Sands 
signing a one-page "release of all claims" that included a 
waiver of any "quasi-marital claims."  Sands refused to sign, 
prompting Menard, Inc. to offer an additional $100,000.  Sands 
again refused, and Menard, Inc. rescinded its offer to pay any 
portion of the fees reflected in the invoices.   
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
9 
 
¶14 On November 3, 2008, Sands filed suit against Menard, 
the Menard Defendants, and eleven other parties owned or 
controlled 
by 
Menard. 
 
She 
asserted 
claims 
for 
Unjust 
Enrichment, Implied Contract, Promissory Estoppel, Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress, Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress, Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Conversion, 
and Breach of Fiduciary Relationship.  On November 19, 2009, 
Sands filed an amended complaint, re-alleging her claims of 
unjust enrichment against Menard, asserting breach of contract 
and promissory estoppel claims against Menard, and claims for 
unjust enrichment against Menard, Inc., Menard Thoroughbreds, 
Inc., and MH Private Equity Fund LLC ("MH Equity").  A second 
amended complaint was filed on May 10, 2011, adding the Trustees 
as defendants.   
¶15 Shortly 
after 
Sands 
filed 
her 
second 
amended 
complaint, the Menard Defendants discovered evidence that Sands 
had a side agreement with Hilbert, prompting accusations that 
Sands had been attempting to obtain an ownership interest or 
employment with MH Equity while she was representing them in the 
Fund transaction.  Therefore, on May 25, 2011, the Menard 
Defendants asserted a counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty 
under SCR 20:1.8(a). 
¶16 On April 12, 2012, the Menard Defendants moved for 
summary judgment to dismiss all of Sands' claims by which she 
sought a portion of Menard's "net worth or assets, ownership 
interests in the Menard companies, or any part of the increase 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
10 
 
in value of the Menard Companies."  The Menard Defendants argued 
that SCR 20:1.8(a) barred Sands from recovering any portion of 
Menard's assets or an ownership interest in his companies 
because she had failed to comply with SCR 20:1.8(a), which 
regulates business transactions between attorneys and their 
clients.   
¶17 The Trustees also moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that Sands' theory of unjust enrichment failed as a matter of 
law because:  (1) even if Sands benefitted Menard or Menard, 
Inc., 
her 
claim 
would 
therefore 
be 
against 
the 
Menard 
Defendants, not the Trustees; (2) she did not allege facts, 
which if true, would show any benefit conferred to the Trustees; 
and 
(3) 
she 
failed 
to 
allege 
facts 
showing 
"unjust 
circumstances."  
¶18 Following an oral ruling on October 12, 2012, the 
circuit court entered summary judgment on October 22, 2012.  The 
court acknowledged that Sands had violated SCR 20:1.8(a),6 but 
declined to adopt a bright-line rule that SCR 20:1.8(a) 
prohibits an attorney from bringing what Sands has styled as a 
Watts unjust enrichment claim regarding past contributions.  
Rather, the court recognized an implicit exception to SCR 
20:1.8(a), such that it does not bar an attorney from bringing 
                                                 
6 The court found that:  (1) Sands is a lawyer and was a 
lawyer at all relevant times; (2) Sands performed legal services 
for Menard and the Menard Defendants; and (3) Sands did not 
obtain a written agreement to acquire any portion of the Menard 
Defendants' assets. 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
11 
 
an equitable claim for contributions provided in a romantic 
relationship if:  (1) the romantic relationship predates the 
attorney-client 
relationship; 
and 
(2) "the 
legal 
services 
rendered are merely ancillary or incidental to the larger joint 
enterprise of the parties."7 
¶19 As to the first requirement, the court focused on 
whether Sands' May 28, 1998, invoice for "Governmental relations 
& 
Legal 
services" 
established 
that 
her 
attorney-client 
relationship began before her romantic relationship with Menard.8  
Even accepting as true Sands' claim that the invoice was a 
fraudulent document submitted at Menard's request, the court 
stated that it would deny relief in equity due to Sands' 
admitted fraud regarding the invoice, which showed that she was 
in pari delicto9 with Menard and, thus, the court would "leave 
matters where they stand."10  
                                                 
7 During this hearing Judge Lenz focused on the legal 
services as opposed to Sands' general contributions because the 
proposed defense, namely, that SCR 20:1.8(a) barred Sands' 
claim, applies to attorney-client relationships and their 
attendant legal services. 
8 See 
Security 
Pac. 
Nat'l 
Bank 
v. 
Ginkowski, 
140 
Wis. 2d 332, 339, 410 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Ct. App. 1987) (Stating 
that for the concept of the clean hands doctrine to be applied, 
"it must be shown that the alleged conduct constituting 'unclean 
hands' caused the harm from which the plaintiff now seeks 
relief."). 
9 Latin for "in equal fault."  Black's Law Dictionary 911 
(10th ed. 2014). 
10 The 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
address 
the 
waiver, 
ratification, or estoppel arguments. 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
12 
 
¶20 Looking to the second element of the exception, the 
court found that no reasonable jury could find that Sands' legal 
services were "merely ancillary or incidental."  Therefore, 
because neither exception to its test applied, the court 
concluded that Sands' violation of SCR 20:1.8(a) barred her 
claims against the Menard Defendants.  The court then held that 
because Sands could not recover against Menard, she could not 
recover against the Trustees.  The circuit court then granted 
summary judgment to the Trustees.  Sands' claim against the 
Menard 
Defendants 
for 
compensation 
for 
services 
rendered 
remained.   
¶21 Sands appealed from the order regarding the Trustees 
and petitioned for leave to appeal from the order regarding the 
Menard Defendants.  The court of appeals denied Sands' motion, 
but stayed her appeal of the order regarding the Trustees 
pending the disposition of her remaining claims in circuit 
court.  Sands v. Menard, 2016 WI App 76, ¶21, 372 Wis. 2d 126, 
887 N.W.2d 94. 
¶22 After the circuit court granted partial summary 
judgment, Sands claimed that she was entitled to compensation 
for her non-legal services.  In support, she submitted extensive 
documentation of the various "non-legal" services she had 
provided, and for which she alleged she was entitled to receive 
compensation.  The Menard Defendants moved to strike, pointing 
to Sands' previous affidavit in which she stated that she never 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
13 
 
expected to be compensated for personal and family services.  
The court granted the motion.   
¶23 Refusing to concede that her only remaining claim was 
for compensation for legal services "at a rate of $145 per 
hour," Sands next asserted that she was entitled to the quantum 
meruit value of her legal services, which she claimed was 
between $355 and $640 per hour.  Again, the Menard Defendants 
moved to strike, arguing that Sands could not recover on a 
quasi-contract theory when she had an express contract with 
Menard to be paid $145 per hour for her legal services.  The 
court agreed, explaining that "even if [$145 per hour] was 
dictated by the client, Mr. Menard, this was clearly the agreed 
rate."  The circuit court distinguished unjust enrichment claims 
from quantum meruit, stating that while a plaintiff asserting a 
Watts unjust enrichment claim seeks to recover a fair portion of 
the increase in the couple's net worth, a quantum meruit claim 
seeks to recover the fair value of services performed based on a 
contract implied by law.  The dismissal of Sands' quantum meruit 
claim therefore did not affect her unjust enrichment claim.  The 
circuit court also stated that Sands' quantum meruit claims were 
barred because of her failure to comply with SCR 20:1.8(a).   
¶24 Sands moved for summary judgment on Menard, Inc.'s 
counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty.  The circuit court 
granted the motion, concluding that the counterclaim was barred 
by the applicable statute of limitations and that a reasonable 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
14 
 
person in Menard's situation would have further investigated his 
suspicions of Sands' disloyalty at an earlier date.  
¶25 On April 24, 2015, Sands filed a notice of appeal from 
the circuit court's final order, and Menard, Inc. cross-appealed 
from the order dismissing its counterclaim for breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
¶26 Proceedings at the court of appeals involved the 
consolidation of the direct appeal from the 2012 judgment 
disposing of all claims between Sands and the Trustees, and a 
direct appeal from the 2015 final judgment disposing of all 
claims between Sands, Menard, and the Menard Defendants.  The 
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, but on different 
grounds.    
¶27 Sands filed a petition for review on October 19, 2016, 
which was followed by a petition for cross-review filed by the 
Menard Defendants on November 18, 2016.  We granted review, and 
now affirm. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶28 We review a grant or denial of summary judgment 
independently, applying the same standards as employed by the 
circuit court, while benefitting from the discussions of the 
court of appeals and the circuit court.  Dufour v. Progressive 
Classic Ins. Co., 2016 WI 59, ¶12, 370 Wis. 2d 313, 881 
N.W.2d 678; Preisler v. General Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 135,  
¶16, 360 Wis. 2d 129, 857 N.W.2d 136.  Summary judgment is 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
15 
 
appropriate in cases where there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and the moving party has established his or her right to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2);11 Wadzinski 
v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 75, ¶10, 342 Wis. 2d 311, 818 
N.W.2d 819.  We review summary judgment submissions in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Id.  
B.  Unjust Enrichment Claim 
1.  General principles 
¶29 Sands asserts she has a claim against Menard for 
unjust enrichment.  She relies on her interpretation of Watts, 
where we concluded that public policy does not preclude 
unmarried, former cohabitants from raising "claims based upon 
unjust 
enrichment 
following 
the 
termination 
of 
their 
relationships where one of the parties attempts to retain an 
unreasonable amount of the property acquired through the efforts 
of both."  Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506 at 532-33.12   
                                                 
11 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
12 Plaintiff, Sue Ann Watts, asserted five legal theories to 
support her claim:  (1) Sue Ann and James, and their children, 
constituted a "family," thus entitling Sue Ann to bring an 
action for property division under Wis. Stat. § 767.02(1)(h) 
(1985-86), and to have the court divide their property pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 767.255 (1985-86); (2) James's words and conduct 
estopped him from asserting the lack of a legal marriage as a 
defense under Wis. Stat. § 767.255; (3) Sue Ann and James had a 
contract, either express or implied in fact, to share equally 
the property accumulated during their relationship; (4) unjust 
enrichment; and (5) partition.  The Watts court dismissed claims 
one and two, holding that divorce statutes were exclusively for 
those persons who were legally married, but concluded that all 
other legal remedies were available.  Watts v. Watts, 137 
(continued) 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
16 
 
¶30 The Watts court relied on the usual legal standard for 
unjust enrichment: 
[A] claim for unjust enrichment does not arise out of 
an agreement entered into by the parties.  Rather, an 
action for recovery based upon unjust enrichment is 
grounded on the moral principle that one who has 
received a benefit has a duty to make restitution 
where retaining such a benefit would be unjust.  
Id. at 530.  Unjust enrichment requires proof of three elements:  
(1) a benefit conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff; 
(2) appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; 
and (3) acceptance or retention of the benefit by the defendant 
under circumstances making it inequitable to do so.  Id. at 531.  
In order to plead an unjust enrichment claim, the party seeking 
judicial relief must allege facts that, if true, would be 
sufficient to satisfy a court that the above elements are 
present.  In Watts, we concluded that they were.  Id. at 533. 
¶31 Watts 
held 
that 
neither 
public 
policy 
nor 
the 
abolition 
of 
common-law 
marriage 
prohibited 
an 
unmarried 
cohabitant from asserting a contractual or quasi-contractual 
claim against another cohabitant.13  Sue Ann Watts sued James 
Watts over their respective interests in property accumulated 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wis. 2d 506, 511-12, 405 N.W.2d 305 (1987).  We focus our 
analysis on the decision's holding as to unjust enrichment. 
13 Common law marriage was abolished in Wisconsin by statute 
in 1917.  Meyer v. Meyer, 2000 WI 132, ¶63 n.1, 239 Wis. 2d 731, 
620 N.W.2d 382 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (citing § 21, ch. 218, 
Laws of 1917).  Watts did not preclude the remedy of unjust 
enrichment for parties——unmarried cohabitants——who may otherwise 
have been precluded from seeking judicial relief.   
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
17 
 
during their 12-year cohabitation.  Id. at 510.  Sue Ann assumed 
James' last name as her own, and together the couple raised two 
children, who also shared the Watts name.  They filed joint 
income tax returns and maintained joint bank accounts.  Sue Ann 
and James purchased real and personal property together; Sue Ann 
co-signed for the loans James obtained.  Watts, 137 Wis. 2d  at 
513-14. 
¶32 During this period Sue Ann managed the home front so 
that James could build Watts Landscaping.  She was a homemaker 
who cared for their children.  She cleaned, cooked, laundered, 
shopped, ran errands, and maintained the grounds surrounding the 
parties' home.  Id. at 513.  She contributed personal property 
that she owned at the beginning of the relationship, served as 
hostess for James at both social and business-related events, 
and for a time worked 20-25 hours per week at James' office, 
performing duties as a receptionist, typist and assistant 
bookkeeper.  Id. at 513-14. 
¶33 Sue Ann alleged that because of her personal and 
business contributions, the business and personal wealth of the 
couple increased.  Id. at 514.  Following the termination of 
their relationship, however, James refused to compensate Sue Ann 
for these contributions despite his indications that she would 
share equally in the increased wealth.  Id. 
¶34 In holding that Sue Ann had stated a claim for relief, 
we focused our analysis on principles of equity and fairness.  
Id. at 532-33.  Specifically, we concluded that regardless of 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
18 
 
the nature of the relationship, the court should enforce 
contract, quasi-contract, and property rights where "one party 
keeps all or most of the assets accumulated during the 
relationship, while the other party, no more or less 'guilty,' 
is deprived of property which he or she has helped to 
accumulate."  Id. at 526.   
¶35 In concluding that Sue Ann had stated a claim, we 
determined it would be unjust and inequitable to allow James to 
retain the entire benefit of their joint enterprise.  As to the 
three elements of unjust enrichment, we concluded:  (1) Sue Ann 
contributed property and services to the relationship; (2) the 
couple's assets increased as a result of these contributions; 
and (3) James' retaining all of the assets was inequitable.  
Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 533.   
¶36 Subsequent to our decision in Watts, unjust enrichment 
claims in the context of unmarried cohabitants have appeared 
before Wisconsin courts on an infrequent basis.14  Nevertheless, 
case law does provide some guidance on the scope of unjust 
enrichment claims and, in particular, the types of facts that 
must be pled in order to survive summary judgment.   
¶37 In Waage v. Borer, 188 Wis. 2d 324, 525 N.W.2d 96 (Ct. 
App. 1994), the court of appeals held that proof of the elements 
of unjust enrichment must be demonstrated by showing:  (1) an 
                                                 
14 Indeed, of the 171 cases citing to Watts, only a handful 
discuss Sue Ann's unjust enrichment claim, and fewer are 
published or authored decisions. 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
19 
 
accumulation of assets; (2) acquired through the efforts of the 
claimant and the other party; and (3) retained by the other 
party in an unreasonable amount.  Id. at 329-30.  At trial, 
Borer claimed money for her housekeeping efforts after Waage 
reneged on an alleged promise to marry her.  The court concluded 
that despite her cooking, cleaning, and childcare services, 
Borer failed to allege facts sufficient to meet the Watts unjust 
enrichment standard.  Specifically, the court held that only 
certain benefits will constitute "assets" or "property" for the 
purposes of unjust enrichment.  "Watts does not recognize 
recompense for housekeeping or other services unless the 
services are linked to an accumulation of wealth or assets 
during the relationship."  Id. at 330.  In alleging only that 
Waage retained a benefit from Borer's uncompensated housekeeping 
efforts made in contemplation of marriage, the court concluded 
that 
Borer 
had 
not 
met 
the 
unjust 
enrichment 
standard.  
Furthermore, the court explained that there is no cause of 
action for breaching an alleged promise to marry. 
¶38 In Ward v. Jahnke, 220 Wis. 2d 539, 583 N.W.2d 656 
(Ct. App. 1998), the court of appeals reemphasized that in order 
for a plaintiff to successfully demonstrate unjust enrichment he 
or she must present proof that the assets or property acquired 
during cohabitation were acquired as a result of a mutual 
undertaking or joint effort.  Id. at 552.  Sandra Ward and 
Dennis Jahnke had shared an apartment for nearly four years, 
during which time Ward paid rent and all other household 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
20 
 
expenses so that Jahnke could save money for a down payment on a 
house.  Jahnke eventually purchased a home, making the $11,000 
down payment and all mortgage and tax payments on the property.  
For the next nine years, Ward lived in the home rent-free, 
although she did pay utilities and purchased groceries.  All 
finances were kept separate.  Upon their separation, Ward 
claimed that Jahnke was unjustly enriched because he was able to 
accumulate a down payment while she paid for nearly all of their 
household expenses.  Id. at 544.  She also argued that because 
she moved into Jahnke's house and continued to pay certain 
expenses, the house itself was an asset accumulated through 
their joint efforts and retained by Jahnke in an unreasonable 
amount.  Id.  
¶39 Applying the elements of unjust enrichment to the 
facts, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
conclusion that Jahnke was unjustly enriched by Ward's efforts 
during the period of cohabitation in which she paid rent and all 
other household expenses.  Id. at 550.  "We agree that under 
these facts, Ward's assumption of the cost of the couple's 
living expenses was a benefit conferred on Jahnke which resulted 
in an accumulation of the asset — the [$11,000] down payment."  
Id.  However, the court reversed the circuit court's conclusion 
that Jahnke had been unjustly enriched following the purchase of 
the home.15  "Not only does Ward's claim lack a single Watts 
                                                 
15 At the circuit court, Ward had received a jury award of 
$45,000, or one-half of the equity in the house.  Ward v. 
Jahnke, 220 Wis. 2d 539, 544, 583 N.W.2d 656 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
21 
 
factor, her testimony as to their financial arrangements shows 
only that she and Jahnke were cohabitants who divided their 
household expenses in such a way that it made it easy to 
maintain 
separate 
finances 
and 
avoid 
commingling 
their 
individual resources."  Id. at 550-51.  
¶40 In so holding, the appeals court stated that it does 
not read the list of factors outlined in Watts as a checklist, 
but rather as "requiring a plaintiff to put forth facts which 
indicate a shared enterprise and some form of proof that the 
assets or property in dispute were 'acquired through the efforts 
of both.'"  Id. at 547-48 (quoting Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 533) 
(emphasis in original).16  It is only after a party can 
demonstrate the existence of a joint enterprise that the court 
may award equitable relief.  See Ulrich v. Zemke, 2002 WI App 
246, ¶12, 258 Wis. 2d  180, 654 N.W.2d 458.   
The proper legal standard requires the court to . . . 
analyze the character of the parties' relationship by 
inquiring 
whether 
the 
relationship 
was 
a 
joint 
enterprise 
which 
encompassed 
the 
accumulation 
of 
assets. 
 
A 
court 
makes 
this 
determination 
by 
considering the total circumstances of the parties' 
relationship, 
specifically 
whether 
the 
parties' 
contributed property and services to the relationship 
producing an increase in wealth. 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 533 n.21 (listing four 
out-of-state decisions in which a cohabitant's unjust enrichment 
claim was founded on specific facts that showed a mutual 
undertaking or joint effort); Ward, 220 Wis. 2d at 548 n.3 
(describing in further detail the footnote found in Watts). 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
22 
 
Id., ¶12.17 
¶41 Properly understood, Watts stands for a very simple 
proposition:  Wisconsin's public policy favoring marriage does 
not prohibit unmarried formerly cohabitating couples from 
asserting unjust enrichment claims against one another.  Watts, 
137 Wis. 2d at 532.  In such cases, the focus is on the benefit 
received by one party from the other party which would be 
inequitable to retain.  Boldt v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 566, 573, 
305 N.W.2d 133 (1981).  Therefore, the proper focus is on 
property accumulated, not on the type of personal relationship 
that existed between the parties.  Stated otherwise, a claim for 
unjust enrichment may lie when two people work together to 
acquire property "through the efforts of both," regardless of 
their personal relationship.  Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 533.   
¶42 That James and Sue Ann Watts were romantic cohabitants 
is not central to the merits of Sue Ann's unjust enrichment 
claim.  For example, if James, instead, had a joint enterprise 
to accumulate wealth with his sister, mom or next door neighbor 
who provided necessary child care, domestic services and part-
time office help, an unjust enrichment claim by that person 
would require the same proof as Watts required of Sue Ann.  
Watts simply provided that cohabitation between unmarried 
                                                 
17 In Ulrich v. Zemke, 2002 WI App 246, 258 Wis. 2d 180, 654 
N.W.2d 458, the court concluded that where a couple maintained a 
house together, raised four children, shared living expenses, 
and continually acquired real and personal property, they had 
acted as a joint enterprise. 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
23 
 
romantic partners is not a bar to an otherwise valid claim of 
unjust enrichment.  It did not provide that the romantic 
relationship created the claim for relief.  Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 
at 532-33.     
2.  Sands' pleadings 
¶43 To plead facts sufficient to support an unjust 
enrichment claim, Sands must demonstrate:  (1) a benefit 
conferred on Menard by Sands; (2) appreciation or knowledge by 
Menard of the benefit;18 and (3) acceptance or retention of 
assets arising from the benefit by Menard under circumstances 
making it inequitable for him to retain all of those assets.  
Stated 
otherwise, 
Sands' 
unjust 
enrichment 
claim 
must 
demonstrate that, viewed in their entirety, the contributions 
she made to a joint enterprise in which she and Menard were 
mutually engaged resulted in an accumulation of wealth that 
Menard unfairly retained.  Ward, 220 Wis. 2d at 552 (explaining 
the importance of a mutual undertaking or joint effort). 
¶44 Based on her allegations in the pleadings, which we 
accept as true for purposes of summary judgment, Sands made a 
variety of contributions to Menard, both professionally and 
personally.  Professionally, she offered business and legal 
advice, political consultation services, marketing and research 
expertise.  She was directly involved in decisions regarding 
                                                 
18 For purposes of our discussion it is undisputed that 
Menard was aware of Sands' contributions.  We therefore focus 
our analysis on the first and third prongs. 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
24 
 
Menards' Indycar and NASCAR racing sponsorships, and she advised 
Menard on numerous corporate matters.  In their personal 
relationship,19 Sands supervised Menard's health care and medical 
needs, planned and prepared meals, and assisted with gardening 
and other household tasks.  Sands advised about refurbishment 
and redecoration of three personal residences, acted as hostess 
of Menards' households, and provided both personal and family 
advice.  Sands contends that as a result of these and other 
contributions she is entitled to judgment in an amount equal to 
the fair and reasonable share of the property, wealth, and 
increased 
net 
worth 
acquired 
by 
Menard 
during 
their 
cohabitation.  We disagree. 
¶45 First, Watts and the cases that followed make clear 
that unjust enrichment by a former cohabitant is founded on the 
premise of a mutual undertaking or joint enterprise which 
results in an accumulation of assets in which the parties 
expected to share equally but which are unfairly retained by one 
party.  In Watts, we emphasized that as a direct result of Sue 
Ann's efforts, James' business grew and the parties' assets 
increased.     
                                                 
19 We again clarify that unjust enrichment claims do not 
require an intimate relationship; the emphasis is on the 
property acquired.  However, to the extent that Sands claims 
these personal contributions allowed Menard to focus his 
attention on his companies, they are relevant to her unjust 
enrichment claim, namely, whether any assets were acquired 
"through the efforts of both."  See Ward, 220 Wis. 2d at 549. 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
25 
 
¶46 In Ward, the court distinguished between the couple's 
initial, forty-four month cohabitation, during which time they 
lived in Ward's apartment where the $11,000 down payment was 
accumulated, and the latter period during which they lived in 
the house purchased by Jahnke.  The court affirmed the circuit 
court's finding that Ward's assumption of most household 
expenses during the initial forty-four months was "predicated on 
a mutual undertaking to accumulate a down payment on a house."  
Ward, 220 Wis. 2d at 550.  "The length of time this arrangement 
persisted, with undisputed testimony that Ward assumed nearly 
all of the couple's living expenses, coupled with the fact that 
Jahnke then made a substantial down payment on a house lends 
credibility to Ward's claim that this was a shared undertaking."  
Id.   
¶47 However, the court concluded that Ward had failed to 
satisfy the unjust enrichment standard for the period following 
the purchase of the home.  First, Jahnke had paid all closing 
costs associated with the house, and all mortgage and tax 
payments thereafter.  Second, although Ward did the cooking, 
cleaning, and laundry, as well as paid for groceries and 
utilities while living in the house, these contributions were 
offset by the fact that she did not pay rent, and that Jahnke 
took care of all maintenance work.  Finally, the evidence did 
not support the assertion of a joint enterprise after the house 
had been purchased.  Each maintained separate bank accounts and 
had individual insurance policies.  Each purchased, paid for, 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
26 
 
and maintained his or her own vehicle.  They never held joint 
savings or checking accounts, purchased items together, took on 
any joint debt, or loaned each other money.  Ward, 220 
Wis. 2d at 543.  Given these facts, the court concluded, "Ward 
cannot claim that her assumption of the costs of the utilities 
and groceries in a shared living arrangement, while living rent 
free, entitles her to share in the equity of a house titled in 
another's name.  Evidence of a mutual undertaking is completely 
lacking."  Id. at 552.  Comparing the facts and outcomes in 
Watts and Ward with the facts alleged by Sands, we conclude that 
Sands' and Menard's relationship more closely resembles that of 
Ward and Jahnke after the purchase of Jahnke's home. 
¶48 First, at the time Sands and Menard met, Menard, Inc. 
had been a business for almost forty years, and Menard was 
already a multi-millionaire.  Sands, meanwhile, was a graduate 
of law school operating at least three separate businesses with 
her sister in St. Paul, Minnesota.  Therefore, while Menard's 
net worth was undoubtedly higher than Sands', both parties had 
sufficient financial means and business acumen.  We therefore 
reject any comparison of Sands' contributions to those of Sue 
Ann Watts, who helped James Watts begin and grow his landscaping 
business, or to those of Sandra Ward, whose contributions 
allowed Dennis Jahnke to save $11,000 for the down payment on a 
house.  In each of those cases, the parties had very little, and 
it was only through their joint efforts that their assets or 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
27 
 
property increased.  Sands, however, did not support Menard as 
he built his empire; he already had it when they met. 
¶49 Second, we note the inherent differences between how 
Sue Ann and James Watts conducted themselves, and how Sands and 
Menard 
conducted 
themselves 
during 
their 
respective 
relationships.  Sands has not alleged that during their 
relationship she and Menard commingled finances, filed joint tax 
returns, or made joint purchases of real and/or personal 
property.  Sands did not obligate herself to any business or 
personal debt Menard incurred.  Given these undisputed facts, we 
conclude that Sands and Menard were not engaged in a "joint 
enterprise" as required under Watts.20   
¶50 Although 
we 
conclude 
that 
there 
was 
no 
"joint 
enterprise," we nonetheless turn to Watts' three-part unjust 
enrichment analysis to evaluate the underlying merits of Sands' 
unjust enrichment claim.  Under the first prong, Sands must 
allege sufficient facts which, if true, would prove that her 
contributions were material to increasing Menard's wealth.  
Here, despite the litany of contributions she made, see, e.g. 
                                                 
20 Once 
again, 
the 
precise 
nature 
of 
the 
underlying 
relationship is not the linchpin of our analysis.  However, we 
do consider the circumstances of the relationship relevant in 
helping us determine whether the elements of unjust enrichment 
have been met, particularly the second element under the Waage 
test, Waage v. Borer, 188 Wis. 2d 324, 329-30, 525 N.W.2d 96 
(Ct. App. 1994) (requiring "(1) an accumulation of assets; 
(2) acquired through the efforts of the claimant and the other 
party and (3) retained by the other party in an unreasonable 
amount."). 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
28 
 
supra ¶6, we cannot conclude that Sands' contributions were 
"material" given Menard's wealth and the success of his company 
when the parties met.  In particular, although Sands has listed 
a series of business transactions in which she "participated" or 
"assisted," she has alleged no facts from which we could 
conclude that her contributions caused an increase in Menard's 
assets or property.   
¶51 We are similarly disinclined to conclude that Sands 
has pled sufficient facts which, if true, would demonstrate that 
Menard's acceptance or retention of her contributions would be 
inequitable under the circumstances.  In particular, Sands must 
demonstrate that the benefits she conferred to Menard are not 
offset by the benefits she derived from him.  First, the record 
indicates that Sands enjoyed an expansive lifestyle as the 
companion of a wealthy man.21  Second, unlike the plaintiffs in 
Watts or Ward, Sands did receive compensation for some of her 
services.  Over the course of their eight-year relationship, 
Sands was paid $49,635.84 for the balance of her student loans,22 
$3,000 to compensate her for "wedding expenses," and $152,105 
for various legal services.   
                                                 
21 For example, the record reflects that Sands and Menard 
took multiple boating and skiing trips, vacations to St. Martin, 
London, and Italy, and that Menard gifted Sands with a Ford 
Mustang for Christmas in 2005.  They went to horse races, NASCAR 
events, and fashion shows, and met prominent political figures 
at that time. 
22 As referenced above, it is disputed whether this payment 
was for her student loans or for legal services in regard to the 
DNR matter. 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
29 
 
¶52 Sands 
argues, 
however, 
that 
because 
Menard 
"repeatedly" promised her that she would obtain a certain 
ownership interest in Menard, Inc., and because she made 
contributions "fully and faithfully and in reliance on the 
promises and representations of Menard," it would be inequitable 
to deny her an ownership interest in his property.  Given that a 
specific 
agreement 
is 
unnecessary 
under 
Watts, 
Sands' 
allegations that she was promised a certain ownership interest 
are not persuasive.  In short, we conclude that Sands has failed 
to allege facts which, if true, would support her legal 
conclusion that she and Menard had a shared enterprise that 
included accumulation of assets in which both she and Menard 
expected to share equally.23 
C.  Rules of Professional Conduct 
¶53 In light of our conclusion that Sands has failed to 
allege facts which, if true, would support what she has styled 
as a Watts unjust enrichment claim, analyzing whether her claim 
also is barred by SCR 20:1.8(a) may not seem necessary.  
Nonetheless, because the question of whether a Supreme Court 
Rule can be used as an absolute defense against an attorney in a 
civil action is an important issue, we address it here.  For the 
reasons stated below, we conclude:  (1) the court of appeals 
                                                 
23 We do not suggest that a former cohabitant may never 
plead facts sufficient to establish a "material benefit" 
unjustly obtained by a wealthy partner.  We simply hold that in 
this case, Sands did not plead facts sufficient to meet the 
criteria for unjust enrichment set forth in Watts. 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
30 
 
erred in holding SCR 20:1.8(a) created an absolute bar to Sands' 
unjust enrichment claim; and (2) although SCR ch. 20 may not be 
used as an absolute defense to a civil claim where an attorney 
is a party, SCR 20:1.8(a) may guide courts in determining 
whether those standards of care that generally are required of 
lawyers have been met.     
1.  General principles 
¶54 Supreme Court Rule ch. 20 sets forth the regulations 
governing professional conduct of attorneys licensed to practice 
law in the State of Wisconsin.  Attorneys not admitted to the 
State Bar of Wisconsin may be subject to the disciplinary action 
in Wisconsin "if the lawyer provides or offers any legal 
services in the state."  SCR 20:8.5(a).  We have the exclusive 
authority to define the "practice of law."  See Seitzinger v. 
Cmty. Health Network, 2004 WI 28, ¶39, 270 Wis. 2d 1, 676 
N.W.2d 426.  We have previously concluded that deciding whether 
one engaged in the "practice of law" is determined on a case-by-
case basis.  State ex rel. Junior Ass'n of Milwaukee Bar v. 
Rice, 236 Wis. 38, 53, 294 N.W. 550, 556 (1940).   
¶55 At all times relevant to the current litigation, 
attorneys licensed outside of Wisconsin who were acting as in-
house counsel in this state were not "practicing law" for the 
purposes of bar admission.  See Mostkoff v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 
2005 WI 33, ¶19, 279 Wis. 2d 249, 693 N.W.2d 748 (concluding 
Michigan attorney's legal services as corporate counsel were not 
the "practice of law" for purposes of admission to the State Bar 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
31 
 
of Wisconsin).  Therefore, because at that time an attorney who 
was not licensed to practice in Wisconsin, but who was 
nonetheless 
serving 
as 
in-house 
counsel 
for 
a 
Wisconsin 
corporation, was not eligible for bar admission based solely on 
in-house counsel services, he also was not subject to regulation 
by the State Bar of Wisconsin. 
¶56 As to all attorneys practicing law in this state, we 
have previously ruled that "[v]iolations of the Code of 
Professional 
Conduct 
are 
determined 
only 
by 
means 
of 
disciplinary action."  Foley-Ciccantelli v. Bishop's Grove 
Condo., 2011 WI 36, ¶2, 333 Wis. 2d 402, 797 N.W.2d 789.  
Indeed, as stated in preamble [20]24 to the Rules in effect 
during Sands' alleged cohabitation: 
Violation of a rule should not itself give rise to a 
cause of action against a lawyer nor should it create 
any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has 
been breached.  In addition, violation of a rule does 
not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary 
remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in 
pending litigation.  The rules are designed to provide 
guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for 
regulating 
conduct 
through 
disciplinary 
agencies.  
They are not designed to be a basis for civil 
liability.  Furthermore, the purpose of the rules can 
be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties 
as procedural weapons.  The fact that a rule is a just 
basis 
for 
a 
lawyer's 
self-assessment, 
or 
for 
sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a 
                                                 
24 The preamble was amended in 2007 to add the following 
concluding 
sentence: 
 
"Nevertheless, 
since 
the 
rules 
do 
establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation 
of a rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard 
of conduct."   
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
32 
 
disciplinary 
authority, 
does 
not 
imply 
that 
an 
antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction 
has standing to seek enforcement of the rule.  
¶57 The court of appeals has also endorsed the use of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct as guidelines or principles in 
civil litigation.  Gustafson v. Physicians Ins. Co., 223 Wis. 2d 
164, 176-78, 588 N.W.2d 363 (Ct. App. 1998).  In Gustafson, the 
plaintiffs' attorney in a medical malpractice case also agreed 
to represent the interests of the plaintiffs' subrogated health 
insurer in exchange for one-third of the health insurer's 
recovery.  Id. at 168.  After a jury rendered a verdict in favor 
of the defendants, the plaintiffs' attorney reached a settlement 
agreement with the defendants whereby the plaintiffs waived 
their right to appeal the judgment in exchange for the 
defendants' agreement not to seek taxable costs against them.  
Id. at 169.  However, the plaintiffs' attorney never consulted 
with the subrogated insurer about the settlement and it 
expressly left the defendants the option of taxing costs against 
the subrogated insurer, which they did.  Id.  The subrogated 
insurer appealed on the basis that the judgment was unfair 
because of the attorney's misconduct, whereupon the settlement 
was voided.  Id. 
¶58 In determining whether the judgment for taxable costs 
should be reversed due to the attorney's conduct, the court of 
appeals considered several of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
as guidelines or principles.  For example, SCR 20:1.16 was 
considered 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
plaintiffs' 
attorney 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
33 
 
properly withdrew from representing the subrogated insurer; SCR 
20:1.2 was considered to determine whether the attorney should 
have informed the subrogated insurer of the proposed settlement; 
and SCR 20:1.7 was reviewed to determine whether the attorney 
had an impermissible conflict of interest when he negotiated the 
settlement.  Id. at 176-78.  Taxable costs were reversed because 
the attorney failed to adequately protect his client.  Id. at 
182.  
2.  SCR 20:1.8(a) general principles 
¶59 Supreme Court Rule 20:1.8(a) applies to financial 
conflicts of interest that may arise when an attorney "enter[s] 
into 
a 
business 
transaction 
with 
a 
client 
or 
knowingly 
acquire[s] an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary 
interest adverse to a client."  SCR 20:1.8(a).  During the 
relevant time period, SCR 20:1.8(a) provided: 
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction 
with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, 
possessory, 
security 
or 
other 
pecuniary 
interest 
adverse to the client unless: 
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer 
acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the 
client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in 
writing to the client in a manner which can be 
reasonably understood by the client; 
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity 
to seek the advice of independent counsel in the 
transaction; and 
(3) the client consents in writing thereto. 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
34 
 
¶60 Supreme Court Rule 20:1.8(a) is grounded in the 
concern that "[a] lawyer's legal skill and training, together 
with the relationship of trust and confidence between lawyer and 
client, create the possibility of overreaching when the lawyer 
participates in a business, property or financial transaction 
with a client."  See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct r. 1.8 cmt. 
(Am. Bar Ass'n 2015).  The rule applies to all attorney-client 
relationships, and includes transactions in which an attorney 
seeks an ownership interest in the client's business as 
compensation for his or her legal services.  See id.  The 
existence of an attorney-client relationship "depends upon the 
intent of the parties and is a question of fact."  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kostich, 2010 WI 136, ¶16, 330 
Wis. 2d 378, 793 N.W.2d 494.  
3.  SCR 20:1.8(a) and Sands 
¶61 Both the circuit court and the court of appeals 
applied SCR 20:1.8(a) to Sands' Watts unjust enrichment claim.  
The circuit court formulated a two-part exception to Menard's 
proposed bright-line rule, namely, that SCR 20:1.8(a) is an 
absolute defense unless two conditions are met:  (1) the 
attorney and client had a romantic relationship that predated 
their attorney-client relationship; and (2) the legal services 
rendered by the attorney were "merely ancillary or incidental" 
to the larger joint enterprise.  The court of appeals went one 
step further, holding that a violation of SCR 20:1.8(a) is an 
absolute bar to recovery.  Sands, 372 Wis. 2d 126, ¶38.  As to 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
35 
 
both dispositions, we disagree, and conclude that while Supreme 
Court Rules may guide courts in determining required standards 
of care generally, they may not be employed as an absolute 
defense in a civil action involving an attorney. 
¶62 As Sands has repeatedly pointed out, the preamble to 
the Supreme Court Rules clearly demonstrates that alleged 
violations are to be determined in disciplinary proceedings, not 
civil litigation.  "The Preamble demonstrates that the purpose 
of the rules is not to provide remedies outside the realm of 
professional discipline."  Foley-Ciccantelli, 333 Wis. 2d 402, 
¶173 (Roggensack, J., concurring).  See also Nauga, Inc. v. 
Westel Milwaukee Co., Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 306, 318 n.5, 576 
N.W.2d 573, (Ct. App. 1998) ("Violation of a rule should not 
give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any 
presumption that a legal duty has been breached.  The rules are 
not designed to be a basis for civil liability.").   
¶63 The Menard Defendants argue that they have not invoked 
SCR 20:1.8(a) as a basis for civil liability, to obtain 
disciplinary sanctions, or as a procedural weapon.  Instead, 
they look to the language of the amended preamble "because it 
establishes the standards of conduct with which Sands needed to 
comply if she wanted to enforce such an arrangement."  Similar 
to Sands, the Menard Defendants ground their argument in the 
language of Foley-Ciccantelli.  However, while Sands focuses on 
the language cited above, the Menard Defendants focus on ¶86, 
which reads, in part: 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
36 
 
The resolution of the issue of disqualification in the 
present case is thus guided by our prior case law and 
the 
precepts 
of 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
Rules 
of 
Professional 
Conduct 
for 
Attorneys 
regarding 
an 
attorney's duties to former clients.  Appellate courts 
have often cited the Rules of Professional Conduct for 
guidance 
in 
non-disciplinary 
cases, 
including 
disqualification cases. 
Foley-Ciccantelli, 333 Wis. 2d 402, ¶86. 
¶64 The arguments of the Menard Defendants are not 
persuasive.  Foley-Ciccantelli arose from a disqualification 
motion, not from a claim that the lawyer's conduct violated SCR 
ch. 20.  Id., ¶91.   
¶65 Accordingly, we conclude that SCR ch. 20 does not 
apply here for at least two reasons.  First, Supreme Court Rules 
that regulate the ethical practice of law in Wisconsin cannot be 
used as an absolute defense in a civil action in which an 
attorney is a party.  In that regard, we clarify Foley-
Ciccantelli to so hold.  Second, Sands' provision of legal 
services was not the practice of law, as we defined the practice 
of law in Mostkoff; therefore, she was not entitled to 
membership in the State Bar of Wisconsin during the times 
relevant to her Watts claim.  Accordingly, she was not subject 
to SCR 20:1.8(a).    
D.  Menard, Inc.'s Counterclaim 
¶66 The court of appeals concluded that the accrual date 
for Menard, Inc.'s counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty was 
September 1, 2005, the date of closing for the Fund transaction.  
As we consider the court of appeals' conclusion, we note that 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
37 
 
the question presented is whether on September 1, 2005, Menard, 
as the president and CEO of Menard, Inc., knew or should have 
known that Sands' loyalty was questionable.  Hansen v. A.H. 
Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 560, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983) 
(concluding that a claim accrues "on the date the injury is 
discovered or with reasonable diligence should be discovered, 
whichever occurs first.").  To answer that question, we consider 
Menard's personal characteristics.   
¶67 Menard was a skilled businessman who had been involved 
in countless business transactions in his individual capacity 
and as the CEO of Menard, Inc.  On September 1, 2005, he had 
enough information to be required to investigate further.  As he 
said in regard to the closing of the transaction that created 
the Fund, "it was very difficult to tell whose side [she] was 
on, was she on [Hilbert's] side or my side."  He also said that 
he then believed that Sands was lying to him.  Although the 
degree of certainty of suspicion is variable, here, Menard was 
not a novice.  He was in charge of a multi-billion dollar 
corporation.  He also had outside advisors by his side.  His 
suspicion triggered the obligation to investigate further, and 
he had plenty of assistance to do so.  See Goff v. Seldera, 202 
Wis. 2d 600, 611, 550 N.W.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Awve v. 
Physicians Ins. Co., 181 Wis. 2d 815, 825, 512 N.W.2d 216 (Ct. 
App. 1994)).  Yet, he did nothing until after Sands sued him.   
¶68 Even with the tolling rule of Donaldson v. West Bend 
Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI App 134, ¶¶23-24, 321 Wis. 2d 244, 773 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
38 
 
N.W.2d 470, which makes the effective filing date November 3, 
2008, 
Menard, 
Inc.'s 
counterclaim 
was 
well 
outside 
the 
applicable statute of limitations.25  
E.  Claim Regarding Trustees 
¶69 Sands also appeals the court of appeals' dismissal of 
her claim against the Trustees, in which the court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the 
Trustees based on its earlier ruling granting partial summary 
judgment to the Menard Defendants.  The court stated, "since 
there is no avenue to recover against the Menard principal, 
there cannot be recovery against the [Trustees]."   
¶70 Before us, Sands' brief-in-chief asserted only what 
she styled as a Watts unjust enrichment claim, and in her 
combined response brief regarding the Menard Defendants and 
Trustees, Sands stated, "This Appeal is Solely a Watts v. Watts 
Unjust Enrichment Claim."   
¶71 Watts, as we have discussed above in some detail, does 
not preclude an unmarried cohabitant from bringing an unjust 
enrichment claim on equitable grounds when the cohabitants 
engaged in a joint enterprise to work together to accumulate 
wealth and one cohabitant has retained the accumulated wealth in 
an unjust amount.  Watts provides no support for an unjust 
enrichment claim made by a third party because unjust enrichment 
                                                 
25 We concur with the conclusion of the court of appeals on 
this matter, and largely adopt their factual narration as our 
own.  Sands, 372 Wis. 2d 126, ¶¶53-59. 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
39 
 
claims are premised on two people working towards a joint 
accumulation of property in which they both expect to share 
equally.   
¶72 However, we understand Sands' claim against the 
Trustees to be made under the theory that they are the 
repositories of significant property that once belonged to 
Menard.  Therefore, if Sands were to prevail on what she has 
styled as a Watts unjust enrichment claim against Menard, she 
would need to reach the Trustees to garner a share of Menard's 
property that they hold.  We offer no opinion on her theory of 
recovery from the Trustees because she has not prevailed on her 
unjust enrichment claim against Menard.  Accordingly, she can 
have no interest in any property that the Trustees hold.  
Therefore, Sands' claim against the Trustees was properly 
dismissed.    
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶73 There were four issues argued before this court on 
appeal.  First, we considered whether Sands has pled facts 
sufficient to show unjust enrichment.  We conclude that she has 
not.  Sands has failed to demonstrate facts which, if true, 
would support her legal conclusion that she and Menard had a 
joint enterprise that included accumulation of assets in which 
both she and Menard expected to share equally. 
¶74 Second, we considered whether the court of appeals 
properly concluded that SCR 20:1.8(a) may be raised as an 
absolute defense to what Sands has styled as a Watts unjust 
Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 
 
 
40 
 
enrichment claim arising from a long-term romantic relationship.  
We conclude that SCR 20:1.8(a) may guide courts in determining 
required standards of care generally; however, it may not be 
employed as an absolute defense to a civil claim involving an 
attorney.  
¶75 And finally, we also conclude that the court of 
appeals properly granted summary judgment to Sands on Menard, 
Inc.'s counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty, and to the 
Trustees on their motion for summary judgment dismissing Sands' 
claim.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
No.  2012AP2377 & 2015AP870.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶76 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Unlike the majority, I conclude that Debra 
Sands pleaded sufficient facts to establish an unjust enrichment 
claim under Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 303 
(1987), against John R. Menard, Jr.1  I would remand Sands' 
unjust enrichment claim against Menard to the circuit court for 
trial.  Accordingly, I dissent from the majority's contrary 
conclusion. 
I 
¶77 I begin by setting forth the applicable standard of 
review, which is muddied by the majority.  The supreme court 
reviews a grant of summary judgment independently, applying the 
same standards as employed by the circuit court.  Dufour v. 
Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 2016 WI 59, ¶12, 370 Wis. 2d 313, 
881 N.W.2d 678.  "There is a standard methodology which a trial 
court follows when faced with a motion for summary judgment."  
Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 314, 401 
N.W.2d 816 (1987). 
¶78 "The first step of that methodology requires the court 
to examine the pleadings to determine whether a claim for relief 
has been stated."  Green Spring Farms, 136 Wis. 2d at 315; see 
                                                 
1 I agree with the following conclusions of the majority: 
(1) SCR 20:1.8(a) may guide courts in determining required 
standards of care for attorneys generally, but may not be used 
as an absolute bar in a civil claim involving an attorney; (2) 
the court of appeals properly granted summary judgment to Sands 
on Menard, Inc.'s counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty; and 
(3) the court of appeals properly granted summary judgment to 
the Menard Trustees.  Majority op., ¶3. 
No.  2012AP2377 & 2015AP870.ssa 
 
2 
 
also Moya v. Aurora Healthcare, Inc., 2017 WI 45, ¶15, 375 
Wis. 2d 38, 894 N.W.2d 405.  This step tests the "legal 
sufficiency of the complaint."  Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg 
Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶11, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205.  
All facts alleged in the complaint, as well as all reasonable 
inferences from those facts, are accepted as true, and the 
complaint is given a liberal construction.  Ollerman v. O'Rourke 
Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 24, 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980).  
¶79 "If a claim for relief has been stated, the inquiry 
then shifts to whether any factual issues exist."  Green Spring 
Farms, 136 Wis. 2d at 315.  Summary judgment is only appropriate 
"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  
Wis. Stat. § 802.08.2  The evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences 
are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.  Burbank Grease 
Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 2006 WI 103, ¶40, 294 Wis. 2d 274, 
717 N.W.2d 781.  It is not the job of the court on summary 
judgment to "decide issues of credibility, weigh the evidence, 
or choose between differing but reasonable inferences from the 
undisputed facts."  Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics Co., 164 
Wis. 2d 639, 665, 476 N.W.2d 593 (Ct. App. 1991). 
II 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2012AP2377 & 2015AP870.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶80 I conclude that the facts alleged in Sands' complaint, 
taken as true (as we must), adequately state a claim for unjust 
enrichment against Menard.3 
¶81 An unjust enrichment claim has three elements: "(1) a 
benefit conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff, (2) 
appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit, and 
(3) acceptance or retention of the benefit by the defendant 
under circumstances making it inequitable for the defendant to 
retain the benefit."  Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 531. 
¶82 Watts 
did 
not 
change 
the 
elements 
of 
unjust 
enrichment. 
Nor 
did 
it 
create 
a 
sub-category 
of 
unjust 
enrichment 
claim. 
 
It 
merely 
recognized 
that 
unmarried 
cohabitants may state a claim for unjust enrichment where one 
party retains an unreasonable amount of property acquired 
through the efforts of both.  As the Watts court explained: 
Many courts have held, and we now so hold, that 
unmarried cohabitants may raise claims based upon 
unjust enrichment following the termination of their 
relationships where one of the parties attempts to 
retain an unreasonable amount of the property acquired 
through the efforts of both. 
In 
this 
case, 
the 
plaintiff 
alleges 
that 
she 
contributed both property and services to the parties' 
relationship.  She claims that because of these 
contributions the parties' assets increased, but that 
she was never compensated for her contributions.  She 
further alleges that the defendant, knowing that the 
plaintiff 
expected 
to 
share 
in 
the 
property 
accumulated, "accepted the services rendered to him by 
the plaintiff" and that it would be unfair under the 
                                                 
3 The operative complaint in the instant case is Sands' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
No.  2012AP2377 & 2015AP870.ssa 
 
4 
 
circumstances to allow him to retain everything while 
she receives nothing.  
Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 532-33. 
 
¶83 Additionally, nothing in 
Watts limits an unjust 
enrichment claim to two persons.  A claim for unjust enrichment 
may involve more than two persons so long as all those involved 
worked towards the joint accumulation of property or wealth in 
which they all expected to share.  Any contrary suggestion by 
the majority is unsupported.  See majority op., ¶71. 
¶84 In Watts, the plaintiff alleged that during her 
relationship with the defendant, she contributed both property 
and services to the parties' relationship with the expectation 
that she would enjoy equally with the defendant the wealth 
accumulated through their joint efforts.  Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 
513-14.  The plaintiff alleged: 
During their relationship, the plaintiff contributed 
childcare and homemaking services, including cleaning, 
cooking, laundering, shopping, running errands, and 
maintaining the grounds surrounding the parties' home.  
Additionally, 
the 
plaintiff 
contributed 
personal 
property to the relationship which she owned at the 
beginning of the relationship or acquired through 
gifts or purchases during the relationship.  She 
served as hostess for the defendant for social and 
business-related 
events. 
 
The 
amended 
complaint 
further asserts that periodically, between 1969 and 
1975, the plaintiff cooked and cleaned for the 
defendant and his employees while his business, a 
landscaping service, was building and landscaping a 
golf course. 
From 1973 to 1976, the plaintiff worked 20-25 hours 
per week at the defendant's office, performing duties 
as a receptionist, typist, and assistant bookkeeper.  
From 1976 to 1981, the plaintiff worked 40-60 hours 
per 
week 
at 
a 
business 
she 
started 
with 
the 
defendant's sister-in-law, then continued and managed 
No.  2012AP2377 & 2015AP870.ssa 
 
5 
 
the business herself after the dissolution of that 
partnership. 
Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 513-14. 
¶85 The Watts court held that the plaintiff stated a claim 
for unjust enrichment against her former cohabitant: 
In 
this 
case, 
the 
plaintiff 
alleges 
that 
she 
contributed both property and services to the parties' 
relationship.  She claims that because of these 
contributions the parties' assets increased, but that 
she was never compensated for her contributions.  She 
further alleges that the defendant, knowing that the 
plaintiff 
expected 
to 
share 
in 
the 
property 
accumulated, "accepted the services rendered to him by 
the plaintiff" and that it would be unfair under the 
circumstances to allow him to retain everything while 
she receives nothing.  We conclude that the facts 
alleged are sufficient to state a claim for recovery 
based upon unjust enrichment. 
Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 533. 
¶86 In the instant case, Sands pleaded extensive facts 
spanning approximately eight pages of her complaint supporting 
her unjust enrichment claim against Menard.  Sands alleges in 
her complaint as follows:  
[D]uring the eight-year period of Sands's cohabitation 
and engagement with Menard, the substantial and 
continuing efforts of Sands resulted directly in the 
acquisition 
of 
valuable 
property, 
wealth, 
and 
substantial increase in the net worth of Menard, who 
now attempts to retain not merely an unreasonable 
amount of property, wealth, and increased net worth 
acquired through the efforts of Sands, but all of the 
property, wealth, and increased net worth acquired 
through the efforts of Sands. 
Appendix to Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner Debra K. 
Sands, Volume I, at A061.   
¶87 Sands summarized her contributions as follows: 
Sands relied on Menard's promises, representations, 
and conduct, and devoted over eight years to working 
No.  2012AP2377 & 2015AP870.ssa 
 
6 
 
with and helping him in his business and personal 
matters.  Sands contributed to their enterprise in 
numerous ways.  She was Menard's life partner, social 
companion, and manager and hostess of his households.  
Sands protected Menard from unwanted approaches by 
serving as a "gate-keeper."  She supervised his health 
care and medical needs; managed the remodeling of 
three residences; and advised on the acquisition of 
airplanes and their design and décor.  She provided 
ideas for new products and product lines for the 
Menard, Inc., stores, such as garden centers; and 
scouted and proposed new store locations, store 
layouts, and product displays.  She represented 
Menard, Inc., as a product buyer.  She reviewed and 
suggested changes and additions to Menard, Inc., 
marketing plans.  She assisted with government and 
public relations.  She participated in the redesign of 
store signs and logos.  She helped find new business 
and investment opportunities.  She assisted in the 
management of the Team Menard auto racing venture and 
newly-acquired businesses, including two engine design 
companies in England, a thoroughbred racing business, 
and a $400 million private equity fund.  She made her 
joint enterprise with Menard her focus, which occupied 
her every moment. 
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, Debra K. Sands 14-15.   
¶88 Construing Sands' complaint liberally and taking all 
factual allegations as true (as the court must), I conclude that 
Sands alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for unjust 
enrichment. 
¶89 The majority concludes that Sands failed to adequately 
plead unjust enrichment by relying on inapposite cases and 
drawing distinctions that were not essential to the court's 
holding in Watts vis-à-vis the plaintiff's unjust enrichment 
claim. 
¶90 The 
majority 
relies 
on 
Waage 
v. 
Borer, 
188 
Wis. 2d 324, 525 N.W.2d 96 (Ct. App. 1994), and Ward v. Jahnke, 
220 Wis. 2d 539, 583 N.W.2d 656 (Ct. App. 1998), asserting that 
No.  2012AP2377 & 2015AP870.ssa 
 
7 
 
these cases shed light on "the types of facts that must be pled 
in order to survive summary judgment."  Majority op., ¶36.  They 
do not.  These cases do not support the majority's position. 
¶91 In Waage, the court of appeals held that under the 
particular facts of that case, the complainant could not recover 
on her unjust enrichment claim because "Watts does not recognize 
recompense for housekeeping or other services unless the 
services are linked to an accumulation of wealth or assets 
during the relationship."  Waage, 188 Wis. 2d at 330.   
¶92 Importantly, the Waage court did not conclude that the 
complainant had failed to adequately plead unjust enrichment.  
Rather, the unjust enrichment claim proceeded to trial, and the 
court of appeals held that the complainant did not present 
sufficient evidence of any assets accumulated during the 
relationship as a result of joint efforts:  "[Plaintiff] 
arguably alleged but did not set forth any evidence to satisfy 
[the elements of her unjust enrichment claim]. . . . [Plaintiff] 
presented absolutely no evidence of assets accumulated during 
their relationship."  Waage, 188 Wis. 2d at 330.  Simply stated, 
Waage has nothing to say about pleading requirements.   
¶93 The Ward case also did not analyze the sufficiency of 
the complaint.  In Ward, the question presented was the 
sufficiency of the evidence produced at trial. 
¶94 In Ward, the complainant recovered at trial her fair 
share of the down payment on the couple's house, but the court 
of appeals held that the defendant had not been unjustly 
enriched following the purchase of the home.  Ward, 220 
No.  2012AP2377 & 2015AP870.ssa 
 
8 
 
Wis. 2d at 544-50.  In so holding, the court of appeals pointed 
out that the plaintiff's own trial testimony established that 
after the couple moved into the home, the couple split household 
expenses as evenly as possible, so that a reasonable finder of 
fact could not find that the defendant had been unjustly 
enriched.  See Ward, 220 Wis. 2d at 550-53.   
¶95 In addition to relying on inapposite cases, the 
majority misunderstands what facts were relevant to the court's 
holding in Watts vis-à-vis the plaintiff's unjust enrichment 
claim.  The majority magnifies differences in Sands' and 
Menard's personal relationship and in the personal relationship 
of the parties at the center of Watts.4  For example, the 
majority points out that unlike in Watts, in which the plaintiff 
helped the defendant begin and grow his landscaping business, 
Menard was already a multi-millionaire and had been a successful 
businessman for almost 40 years when Sands and Menard met.  
Majority op., ¶48.  
¶96 This reasoning suggests that the court would not have 
allowed the unjust enrichment claim in Watts to proceed if the 
                                                 
4 The majority appears to acknowledge that the joint 
accumulation of property and wealth, not the nature of the 
relationship, is the focus of the unjust enrichment claim, see 
majority op., ¶¶33-34, 41-42, 44 n.19, 49 n.20, but nonetheless, 
the majority places great emphasis on these relationship 
differences, see majority op., ¶¶31, 48-49.  The majority 
disclaims any reliance on a "checklist" of similarities with the 
specific facts of Watts, majority op., ¶40, but that is exactly 
what the majority does.  What should readers rely upon for 
future cases:  what the majority opinion says or what the 
majority opinion does? 
No.  2012AP2377 & 2015AP870.ssa 
 
9 
 
defendant's business had already been established and profitable 
at the time the parties cohabitated, as opposed to being built 
from scratch by the efforts of both.  Watts does not support 
this suggestion.  The fact that Menard was already successful 
does not preclude Sands' unjust enrichment claim if Menard's 
assets became more valuable as a result of the parties' joint 
efforts.  
¶97 The majority also highlights that "Sands has not 
alleged that during their relationship she and Menard commingled 
finances, filed joint tax returns, or made joint purchases of 
real and/or personal property.  Sands did not obligate herself 
to any business or personal debt Menard incurred."  Majority 
op., ¶49.  These facts are not dispositive of unjust enrichment. 
¶98 In Watts, we detailed certain aspects of the parties' 
relationship, but those facts were not necessary to our holding 
on the unjust enrichment issue.  We explained: 
Early in 1969, the parties began living together in a 
"marriage-like" relationship, holding themselves out 
to the public as husband and wife.  The plaintiff 
assumed 
the 
defendant's 
surname 
as 
her 
own.  
Subsequently, she gave birth to two children who were 
also given the defendant's surname.  The parties filed 
joint income tax returns and maintained joint bank 
accounts asserting that they were husband and wife.  
The defendant insured the plaintiff as his wife on his 
medical insurance policy.  He also took out a life 
insurance policy on her as his wife, naming himself as 
the beneficiary.  The parties purchased real and 
personal property as husband and wife.  The plaintiff 
executed documents and obligated herself on promissory 
notes to lending institutions as the defendant's wife. 
Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 513. 
No.  2012AP2377 & 2015AP870.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶99 None of these facts reappears in the analysis of the 
plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim.  See Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 
530-533.  Rather, they were relevant to the plaintiff's claim 
that 
the 
plaintiff, 
the 
defendant, 
and 
their 
children 
constituted a "family," thus entitling her to bring an action 
for property division under Wisconsin's marriage dissolution 
statute.  Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 514-15.5 
III 
¶100 This matter is here on summary judgment.  Although the 
majority opinion is confusing, it purports to dismiss Sands' 
unjust enrichment claim as inadequately pleaded.  It nonetheless 
impermissibly ventures outside the pleadings to weigh the 
evidence, reaching the conclusion that Sands would not prevail 
on the merits of her unjust enrichment claim.6 
                                                 
5 In support, the plaintiff relied upon a Washington court 
of appeals case with similar facts, Warden v. Warden, 676 P.2d 
1037 (Wash. App. 1984).  The Washington court of appeals applied 
its marriage dissolution statute to divide property acquired by 
unmarried cohabitants in what was tantamount to a marital family 
except for a legal marriage.  We recognized that "Warden is 
remarkably similar on its facts to the instant case.  The 
parties in Warden had lived together for 11 years, had two 
children, held themselves out as husband and wife, acquired 
property together, and filed joint tax returns."  Watts, 137 
Wis. 2d at 516.  Thus, the plaintiff in Watts pleaded similar 
facts not to support her unjust enrichment claim, but because 
she was also arguing that her relationship with the defendant 
should be considered a "family" under Wisconsin's marriage 
dissolution statute. 
6 The majority concludes:  
[D]espite the litany of contributions she made, we 
cannot 
conclude 
that 
Sands' 
contributions 
were 
"material" given Menard's wealth and the success of 
his company when the parties met.  In particular, 
(continued) 
No.  2012AP2377 & 2015AP870.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶101 In contrast, I conclude that Sands pleaded sufficient 
facts to state a claim for unjust enrichment against Menard.  
After reviewing the summary judgment record, viewing all the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Sands, and drawing all 
reasonable inferences in her favor (as I must), I would hold 
                                                                                                                                                             
although Sands has listed a series of business 
transactions 
in 
which 
she 
"participated" 
or 
"assisted," she has alleged no facts from which we 
could conclude that her 
contributions caused an 
increase in Menard's assets or property. 
We are similarly disinclined to conclude that Sands 
has pled sufficient facts which, if true, would 
demonstrate that Menard's acceptance or retention of 
her contributions would be inequitable under the 
circumstances.  In particular, Sands must demonstrate 
that the benefits she conferred to Menard are not 
offset by the benefits she derived from him.  First, 
the record indicates that Sands enjoyed an expansive 
lifestyle as the companion of a wealthy man.  Second, 
unlike the plaintiffs in Watts or Ward, Sands did 
receive compensation for some of her services.  Over 
the course of their eight-year relationship, Sands was 
paid $49,635.84 for the balance of her student loans, 
$3,000 to compensate her for "wedding expenses," and 
$152,105 for various legal services.  
Majority op., ¶50-51 (footnotes omitted).  The majority noted 
specific examples of luxuries enjoyed by Sands as Menard's 
companion 
including 
"multiple 
boating 
and 
skiing 
trips, 
vacations to St. Martin, London, and Italy, and . . . a Ford 
Mustang for Christmas in 2005.  They went to horse races, NASCAR 
events, and fashion shows, and met prominent political figures 
at that time."  Majority op., ¶51 n.21. 
 
Clearly, the majority reaches beyond the pleadings and has 
substituted itself as the finder of fact in order to resolve 
genuine issues of material fact in favor of Menard.  At this 
stage, it is not the court's task to "decide issues of 
credibility, weigh the evidence, or choose between differing but 
reasonable inferences from the undisputed facts."  Fortier, 164 
Wis. 2d at 665. 
No.  2012AP2377 & 2015AP870.ssa 
 
12 
 
that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment.  
I would remand Sands' unjust enrichment claim to the circuit 
court for trial. 
¶102 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶103 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this separate writing. 
 
No.  2012AP2377 & 2015AP870.ssa 
 
1