Title: In re Care & Protection of Zeb
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13178
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 2022

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SJC-13178 
 
CARE AND PROTECTION OF ZEB.1 
 
 
 
Bristol.     January 10, 2022. - June 7, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Department of Children & Families.  Parent and Child, Dispensing 
with parent's consent to adoption, Custody, Care and 
protection of minor. 
 
 
 
 
 Petition filed in the Bristol County Division of the 
Juvenile Court Department on July 16, 2019.   
 
 
The case was heard by John S. Spinale, J.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Sherrie Krasner for the mother. 
 
Jennifer L. Kernan for Department of Children and Families. 
 
Susan E. Taylor for the child. 
 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  A Juvenile Court judge terminated the mother's 
parental rights to Zeb and granted permanent guardianship to the 
 
1 A pseudonym.  
2 
 
child's paternal grandmother.  We transferred the mother's 
appeal from the Appeals Court sua sponte to determine whether 
the Juvenile Court properly exercised its authority in 
terminating the mother's parental rights where the Department of 
Children and Families (department) did not have physical custody 
of the child when they petitioned for termination.  For the 
reasons explained infra, we affirm the decree terminating the 
mother's parental rights and the order awarding permanent 
custody to the grandmother.    
 
Background.  We present the facts as found by the trial 
judge, reserving some details for later discussion.  The mother 
was raised by her maternal grandmother after her own mother died 
of an overdose when the instant mother was less than two years 
old.  As a child, she was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, 
depression, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.  The 
mother began using marijuana daily at age twelve and began using 
other drugs at age seventeen.   
The department first became involved with the mother in 
2015 during her pregnancy with Zeb's older sibling.  The 
department filed a care and protection petition on behalf of 
Zeb's sibling in 2017, and the mother's parental rights were 
terminated in 2019.  During the majority of her pregnancy with 
Zeb, the mother used from three to four bags of heroin daily.  
On discovering she was pregnant, the mother began buying 
3 
 
Suboxone2 on the street but used heroin three days before giving 
birth when she had no Suboxone.   
On the day the mother gave birth to Zeb in July 2019, her 
blood tests were positive for cocaine, opiates, Suboxone, 
fentanyl, and marijuana.  Hospital staff maintained a nurse in 
the delivery room at all times due to concerns that both parents3 
appeared to be under the influence.  Zeb tested positive for 
fentanyl, exhibited signs of opiate withdrawal, and was placed 
on a morphine drip for eight days.  Based on these observations, 
hospital staff contacted the department to report suspected 
abuse and neglect of Zeb. 
 
A department response worker met with the mother at the 
hospital four days after Zeb's birth to discuss the abuse and 
neglect allegations and subsequently filed a petition requesting 
custody of Zeb while he still was hospitalized.  A Juvenile 
Court judge granted the department temporary custody despite the 
 
2 Suboxone is the brand name of a medically based treatment 
product containing buprenorphine and naloxone, prescribed for 
the treatment of opioid dependence.  United States Food and Drug 
Administration, Information About Medication-Assisted Treatment, 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/information-drug-class/information-
about-medication-assisted-treatment-mat [https://perma.cc/7AMX-
6LQU]. 
 
3 At all relevant times, actions concerning the care and 
protection of Zeb and termination of parental rights sought 
against the mother were equally sought against the father.  The 
father did not file notice challenging the decree and is not a 
party to this appeal.  Thus, this opinion only recounts facts 
relating to the mother and her claims on appeal. 
4 
 
mother's request at the hospital that Zeb be placed with his 
paternal grandmother.  The mother appeared in court a few days 
later, signed an action plan with the department, and again 
requested that Zeb be placed in the grandmother's care.  The 
judge placed Zeb into unrestricted foster care.  The mother 
waived her right to a custody hearing on August 26 and 
stipulated that the grandmother be given conditional custody as 
Zeb's primary caretaker pending a final hearing on the care and 
protection matter.    
 
On January 13, 2020, when Zeb was still in the 
grandmother's custody, the department filed a notice of intent 
to request that the Juvenile Court terminate the mother's 
parental rights pursuant to G. L. c. 210, § 3.  A trial on the 
underlying care and protection petition proceeded on February 
27.  Although the mother's counsel was present, the mother did 
not appear.  At trial, the department requested that the judge 
terminate the mother's parental rights and award permanent 
custody to the grandmother.  The mother's counsel requested that 
the judge grant permanent guardianship to the grandmother 
without termination of rights.  On July 15, 2020, the judge 
issued a decree terminating the mother's parental rights after 
finding her unfit and ordered conditional permanent custody to 
the grandmother.  
5 
 
Discussion.  The mother argues that the judge exceeded his 
statutory authority in terminating her parental rights because 
the department did not have care or custody of Zeb at the time 
of filing for termination; thus, the petition was not properly 
before the judge.  In the alternative, she argues that the 
termination of her rights was reversible error.   
1.  Statutory framework for termination of parental rights.  
When it appears that a child is not receiving adequate care and 
protection, the department may file a petition with the Juvenile 
Court to summons the child's parent "to show cause why the child 
should not be committed to the custody of the department or why 
any other appropriate order should not be made."  G. L. c. 119, 
§ 24.  If a judge in the Juvenile Court finds that parental 
unfitness has been demonstrated by clear and convincing 
evidence, the judge is authorized to "adjudge that the child is 
in need of care and protection," and to "make any other 
appropriate order . . . about the care and custody of the child 
as may be in the child's best interest."  G. L. c. 119, 
§ 26 (b).  See Adoption of Nancy, 443 Mass. 512, 516 (2005), and 
cases cited.  This includes the termination of parental rights 
under G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b) (4), where the judge determines 
that "the parent's unfitness is such that it would be in the 
child's best interests to end all legal relations between parent 
and child."  Id. at 515.  To do so, the judge must "consider the 
6 
 
ability, capacity, fitness and readiness of the child's parents 
. . . to assume parental responsibility, [as well as] the plan 
proposed by the department or other agency initiating the 
petition."  G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c).4   
 
2.  Analysis.  a.  Judicial authority to terminate parental 
rights.  The mother argues that termination of her parental 
rights was erroneous because the department failed to follow the 
proper procedures pursuant to G. L. c. 210, § 3, which provides 
for the adoption of children without parental consent.  
Specifically, the mother asserts that in order for the 
department to petition for the termination of parental rights, 
it must have "care or custody" of the child:   
"The department of children and families . . . may commence 
a proceeding, independent of a petition for adoption, . . . 
to dispense with the need for consent of any person named 
in [G. L. c. 210, § 2,] to adoption of the child in the 
care or custody of the department" (emphasis added).  
 
G. L. c. 210, § 3 (b).  The mother argues that because the 
department did not have "care or custody" of Zeb when it 
petitioned to terminate her parental rights, the issue was not 
properly before the court and, thus, the judge did not have 
authority to act on the request.5  This argument fails.   
 
4 Section 26 (b) (4) instructs judges to refer to and apply 
the legal test set forth in G. L. c. 210, § 3.   
 
5 The mother refers to this alleged misstep as the 
department's failure to meet one of the "standards" required for 
termination of rights pursuant to G. L. c. 210, § 3.  As 
7 
 
Although G. L. c. 210, § 3, enumerates certain procedures 
the department must follow in some instances when petitioning a 
judge to terminate parental rights, it is not the provision that 
gives a judge presiding over a care and protection petition the 
authority to terminate parental rights.  Instead, as discussed 
supra, that power derives from G. L. c. 119, § 26.  Even 
assuming that the better practice in this case would have been 
for the department to have sought termination by amending its 
original petition under G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b), the issue is 
ultimately moot because the judge here had authority to 
terminate the mother's parental rights notwithstanding any 
specific request to do so.6  See G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b).  
b.  Correctness of the judge's decision.  The mother 
contends that even if the judge had the authority to terminate 
her parental rights, he erred in doing so because the 
department's permanency plan lacked detail and because the judge 
did not properly assess the mother's future potential to care 
for Zeb.   
 
explained supra, § 3 specifically references the well-known 
"best interests of the child" standard.  See Petition of the New 
England Home for Little Wanderers to Dispense with Consent to 
Adoption, 367 Mass. 631, 641-644 (1975) (discussing "best 
interests" standard of G. L. c. 210, § 3).  
 
6 We do not reach any conclusions as to the necessary and 
proper procedures that may apply for a petition to terminate 
parental rights outside of a concurrent care and protection 
proceeding, such as pursuant to G. L. c. 210, § 3 (a) or (b). 
8 
 
i.  Permanency plan.  The mother attacks the department's 
plan for Zeb, which calls for permanent guardianship to be 
awarded to the grandmother, as "deficient" and "utterly devoid 
of specifics."  This argument is unavailing. 
To begin, as the mother failed to raise an objection to the 
permanency plan at trial, the matter is waived.  See Adoption of 
Willow, 433 Mass. 636, 651 (2001); Adoption of Carla, 416 Mass. 
510, 515 (1993).  Moreover, the mother had supported placing Zeb 
from his birth with the grandmother.  This sentiment was 
reaffirmed through her counsel at trial:   
"[C]learly the best interest of the child is with the 
paternal grandmother where that child is.  The paternal 
grandmother wants guardianship, and hopefully the court 
approves that guardianship. . . .  The guardianship should 
be allowed."   
 
Indeed, the mother makes clear in her brief that it is the 
termination of her parental rights to which she truly objects, 
not the grandmother's appointment as Zeb's permanent guardian.   
Furthermore, the department's plan appropriately was 
detailed.  The plan, along with the voluminous exhibits and the 
grandmother's testimony, demonstrated Zeb's close bond with the 
grandmother, his progress made with early intervention services, 
and the grandmother's appropriate exercise of judgment regarding 
Zeb's medical care and safety.  The department also submitted a 
proposed adoption plan, should the grandmother unexpectedly 
become unable to maintain guardianship.  The judge did not err.  
9 
 
Cf. Adoption of Willow, 433 Mass. at 652 ("The [permanency] plan 
need not be fully developed to support a termination order; it 
need only provide sufficient information about the prospective 
[permanent] placement 'so that the judge may properly evaluate 
the suitability of the department's proposal'" [citation 
omitted]).   
 
ii.  Potential fitness to parent Zeb.  The mother does not 
dispute that Zeb was in need of care and protection at the time 
of trial.  However, she essentially contends that the judge's 
determination to sever her legal ties to Zeb was hasty where 
termination occurred only seven months after the initial filing 
of the care and protection petition and there was inadequate 
evidence of her future unfitness such that it was in Zeb's best 
interest to terminate her parental rights.  We disagree.   
 
We acknowledge that "there is a significant difference in 
impact on both the parent and the child between an award of 
custody in a care and protection proceeding, which primarily 
addresses only current fitness and is reviewable every six 
months . . . , and the 'extreme step' of terminating the parent 
and child's legal relationship."  Adoption of Carlos, 413 Mass. 
339, 350 (1992).  As such, "it is appropriate for a judge to 
consider whether, on the basis of credible evidence, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the parent's unfitness at the time of 
trial may be only temporary."  Id.  "Because childhood is 
10 
 
fleeting, a parent's unfitness is not temporary if it is 
reasonably likely to continue for a prolonged or indeterminate 
period."  Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 60 (2011). 
 
Here, the judge thoughtfully considered the mother's future 
potential for fitness and properly concluded that there "is a 
strong indication that [her] shortcomings will continue 
undiminished in the future with an attendant harmful effect on 
the child."  In support of this conclusion, the judge made 
detailed findings relating to the mother's criminal record, 
mental illness, and substance abuse.  In addition, the judge 
found that not only did the mother demonstrate an inability to 
acknowledge her mental health needs and address her substance 
use disorder, but also over the course of the previous seven 
months, the mother demonstrated minimal engagement with Zeb and 
noncompliance with supportive programming designed to address 
her deficiencies.  Even assuming that some of the judge's 
subsidiary factual findings are not entirely accurate,7 there was 
 
7 We note that the judge made a finding that Zeb was 
"abandoned," which is defined in G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c), as 
"being left without any provision for support and without any 
person responsible to maintain care, custody and control because 
the whereabouts of the person responsible therefor is unknown 
and reasonable efforts to locate the person have been 
unsuccessful."  The record does not support a finding that Zeb 
was abandoned within the meaning of § 3 (c).  However, as 
discussed supra, the over-all record amply supports the judge's 
conclusion that termination of the mother's parental rights is 
in Zeb's best interest.  Adoption of Helen, 429 Mass. 856, 859-
860 (1999).  
11 
 
overwhelming evidentiary support for the finding that the mother 
continued to "engage in . . . self-destructive behavior" and 
failed to make "any efforts to further engage in treatment or 
services with the [d]epartment."  See Adoption of Nancy, 443 
Mass. at 514-515 (judge's findings shall not be disturbed unless 
clearly erroneous).  The mother's arguments to the contrary 
amount to little more than a general objection to the judge's 
failure to adopt her view of the evidence.  See Adoption of 
Quentin, 424 Mass. 882, 886 n.3 (1997).  
 
Where the judge's detailed findings based on the evidence 
support the conclusion that the mother likely would not become 
fit to parent in the future,8 the judge was warranted in 
terminating the mother's parental rights.  See Adoption of 
Elena, 446 Mass. 24, 30-31 (2006), and cases cited (standard of 
review for termination of parental rights is abuse of discretion 
or clear error of law).  
 
We emphasize that the intent is not to punish the mother 
for her shortcomings (especially given the widespread 
 
 
8 The mother contends that based on certain of the findings 
and conclusions, the judge impermissibly shifted the burden to 
her to prove that her parental rights should remain intact.  We 
disagree.  The department presented an abundance of evidence of 
the mother's present unfitness, as well as evidence that the 
situation unlikely was to be temporary.  Where the mother 
stipulated to her lack of fitness, the judge merely observed 
that the mother additionally chose not to present evidence of 
her potential future fitness to parent.  
12 
 
acknowledgment that the path to sobriety is rarely linear, nor 
is it achieved overnight).  But a judge considering termination 
also must consider the child's unqualified right to permanency 
and stability and cannot hinge predictions of future fitness 
determinations on a "faint hope" that the parent will become fit 
at some indeterminate time.  Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 59-
60. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons explained supra, we affirm the 
decree terminating the mother's parental rights and the order 
awarding permanent custody to the grandmother. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.