Title: Commonwealth v. Caldwell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12907
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 6, 2021

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SJC-12907 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CLIFTON CALDWELL. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     December 2, 2020. - May 6, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Rape.  Evidence, Disclosure of evidence, Exculpatory, 
Credibility of witness.  Witness, Credibility.  Practice, 
Criminal, Disclosure of evidence, New trial. 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 10, 2000. 
 
A motion for a new trial, filed on March 22, 2018, was 
heard by Angel Kelley, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Lisa M. Kavanaugh, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for the defendant. 
Carolyn A. Burbine, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Karen A. Newirth, of New York, Radha Natarajan, Debra 
Loevy, & Robert M. Bloom, for Exoneration Project & others, 
amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  The defendant, Clifton Caldwell, appeals from a 
Superior Court judge's denial of his motion for a new trial on 
2 
 
an indictment for aggravated rape of which he was convicted in 
2002.  Among other arguments, the defendant contends that his 
motion should have been granted because his defense was 
prejudiced by the Commonwealth's failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence concerning a key witness -- the defendant's former 
cellmate, who testified at trial that the defendant had 
confessed his participation in the charged offense.  We agree, 
and therefore conclude that the defendant is entitled to a new 
trial.1 
 
Factual background.  We summarize the relevant facts as 
found by the motion judge, supplemented with evidence from the 
records of the motion hearing and trial.  In 1999, the 
defendant's niece (victim) alleged that eight years earlier, 
when she was four years old, she had been raped by her father 
with the assistance of his two brothers, one of whom was the 
defendant.  All three brothers subsequently were indicted for 
aggravated rape of a child under the age of fourteen years. 
 
Several days before the defendant's trial in December 2002, 
the Commonwealth informed the judge that it intended to present 
testimony from a witness as to statements that the defendant had 
made when the witness and the defendant were being held together 
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Exoneration Project, the New England Innocence Project, and 
Robert M. Bloom. 
3 
 
in a house of correction.  At that time, the Commonwealth also 
moved to sever the defendant's trial from that of his two 
brothers.  See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968) 
(admission of codefendant's confession in joint trial violates 
defendant's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses under 
Sixth Amendment to United States Constitution).  The defendant's 
brothers thereafter were tried together and were acquitted. 
 
Prior to trial, the defendant's trial counsel had requested 
the witness's criminal record and filed a motion seeking 
information concerning any threats, rewards, inducements, or 
promises made to the witness, but received no response prior to 
the start of the trial.  On the first day of jury selection, the 
prosecutor disclosed at sidebar that although the witness "might 
have" requested favorable treatment in connection with his 
testimony, there had been no offers of rewards, promises, or 
inducements to the witness.  The Commonwealth also disclosed 
that the witness's father had raped his sister, his girlfriend 
was a victim of sexual abuse, and the witness had no sympathy 
for rapists.  Trial counsel also had access to a police report 
from 2000, which stated only that the witness had cooperated 
with police in the past. 
 
At the defendant's trial, the victim testified that her 
father had sexually assaulted her several times in 1991, 
including one incident when her father vaginally penetrated her 
4 
 
while the defendant held her arms and her other uncle held her 
legs.  During her testimony the victim admitted that, in 1999, 
after having accused her father and uncles of rape, she falsely 
accused one of the two uncles (the defendant's brother) of 
physically assaulting her on a separate occasion, and that she 
had falsely testified under oath in her uncle's ensuing criminal 
trial that he had assaulted her. 
The Commonwealth also presented testimony from the witness 
who had been held in custody with the defendant at a house of 
correction.  This witness testified that while he was serving a 
sentence for violation of probation, he had been held in a two-
man cell with the defendant in November or December of 1999.  
According to the witness, the defendant said that he should not 
be in prison because "all he did was hold his niece's arms down" 
when his brothers penetrated the victim.  The witness further 
testified that despite the stigma against "snitches" in prison, 
he spoke to police about the defendant's confession because 
"someone who commits an act like this doesn't deserve to be on 
the street."  He also testified that he had not been offered any 
rewards or promises of leniency in exchange for his testimony, 
and that there was "nothing in it" for him. 
On cross-examination, the witness admitted that he hated 
rapists and had a bias against them, and that once he learned of 
the rape charge against the defendant, he attempted to extract a 
5 
 
confession from the defendant.  The witness denied asking anyone 
from the Commonwealth about getting preferential treatment, such 
as receiving early probation or having pending criminal charges 
against him dropped.  A detective who interviewed the witness 
about his conversations with the defendant also testified that 
the witness did not request leniency and that she did not offer 
him any inducements. 
The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to from 
twenty-seven to thirty-five years in prison. 
 
Motion for a new trial.  In 2018, the defendant filed his 
third motion for a new trial.2  At the evidentiary hearing, 
defense counsel presented testimony that the witness had been a 
long-time police informant who had received unusually lenient 
sentences for previous crimes.3  In connection with testimony 
from an investigator, defense counsel introduced a handwritten 
note that the trial prosecutor had created during a pretrial 
meeting with the witness, which stated: 
"[witness's name] 
-- met all 3 in Plymouth holding 
-- [name of State police trooper] -- called 
-- testified for Comm before in Bristol -- 
   got kid to write down what happened" 
 
 
2 The defendant had filed motions for a new trial in 2004 
and 2007.  Both were denied by the trial judge, and on appeal 
the denials were affirmed by the Appeals Court. 
 
3 The witness died in 2016. 
6 
 
This note had been produced posttrial by the Commonwealth in 
response to court-ordered discovery requested by the defendant. 
 
The investigator opined -- and the motion judge agreed -- 
that the last two lines of this note referred to the witness's 
involvement in the 1985 prosecution case of Michael Rancourt for 
rape.  See Commonwealth v. Rancourt, 399 Mass. 269 (1987).  In 
that case, the same cellmate-witness who testified against the 
defendant in the instant case had met Rancourt in a house of 
correction.  Id. at 272.  Rancourt spoke freely about the 
charges pending against him and admitted that he had raped the 
victim in that case.  Id.  The witness then spoke with an 
officer to whom he previously had provided information, and the 
officer told the witness that he would arrange a meeting with 
the prosecutor handling Rancourt's case.  Id.  Thereafter, the 
witness sent Rancourt an internal prison letter imploring 
Rancourt to tell him the details of the rape so that he could 
help Rancourt create an alibi.  Id. at 273.  Rancourt sent the 
witness a letter detailing the rape, and the witness turned the 
letter over to police.  Id.  The witness later was granted early 
release from incarceration to minimize the risks of testifying 
against a fellow inmate.  Id. at 274 & n.6. 
Rancourt moved to suppress the letter he wrote, arguing 
that the witness was an agent of the Commonwealth.  Id. at 271-
272.  The judge disagreed, finding that although the witness 
7 
 
hoped to gain favorable treatment, he did not coerce Rancourt 
into writing the letter and did not act as an agent of the 
Commonwealth.  Id. at 273.  We upheld that ruling on appeal.  
Id. at 274-275. 
At the hearing in the present case, the defendant's trial 
counsel testified that he had been unaware of the witness's 
involvement in the Rancourt case and thus had not cross-examined 
the witness about it.  The motion judge nevertheless denied the 
defendant's motion for a new trial, finding that the defendant 
had established neither that the witness was a long-time police 
informant nor that, as a result, he received lenient treatment.  
The judge also found that there was no credible evidence that 
there was a correlation between the witness's cooperation with 
police in the defendant's case4 and the final disposition of the 
cases the witness had pending at the time of his cooperation.  
Finally, the judge noted that defense counsel cross-examined the 
witness concerning whether he had asked for preferential 
treatment with regard to his then-pending cases.  The judge 
concluded that the failure5 or inability to impeach the witness 
 
4 The judge found that the witness did not receive any 
reduction in his sentence or favorable treatment for any other 
criminal charges for cooperating with police in the defendant's 
case. 
 
5 The motion judge also concluded that the resolution of the 
witness's prior cases and his involvement in the Rancourt case 
were not newly discovered evidence, as they reasonably were 
8 
 
regarding his involvement in the Rancourt case, or with other 
alleged instances of the witness's cooperation with the 
government,6 did not merit a new trial. 
The defendant appealed, and we granted his application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  As a general matter, we review a judge's 
denial of a defendant's motion for a new trial to determine 
whether there has been a significant error of law or other abuse 
of discretion.  Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369, 380 
(2017).  Where, as here, the motion judge was not the trial 
judge, we accept findings made by the judge based on testimony 
at the evidentiary hearing, and do not disturb them unless they 
clearly are erroneous.  Commonwealth v. Drayton, 479 Mass. 479, 
486 (2018).  However, we review independently findings made by 
the motion judge based entirely on documentary evidence.  Id.  
Further, we "make an independent determination as to the 
correctness of the judge's application of constitutional 
 
discoverable through due diligence at the time of trial, and 
that defense counsel's failure to impeach the witness with this 
evidence did not deprive the defendant of an otherwise available 
substantial ground of defense. 
 
6 At the hearing, the defendant presented testimony that the 
witness's lengthy criminal history report showed an "unusually 
lenient" string of guilty filed dispositions and suspended 
sentences, and that a retired State police trooper had 
identified the witness as one of his "snitches." 
9 
 
principles to the facts as found."  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 
460 Mass. 199, 205 (2011). 
 
In criminal prosecutions, the government constitutionally 
is obligated to disclose material exculpatory evidence, even if 
it is not requested by the defendant.  Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 
380, citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).  
See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (iii), as amended, 444 
Mass. 1501 (2005); Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (d), as appearing in 
473 Mass. 1301 (2016).7  Where the government fails to comply 
with this duty to turn over exculpatory evidence to the defense, 
a convicted defendant may be entitled to a new trial.  "To 
obtain a new trial on the basis of nondisclosed exculpatory 
evidence, a defendant must establish (1) that 'the evidence 
[was] in the possession, custody, or control of the prosecutor 
or a person subject to the prosecutor's control,' (2) 'that the 
evidence is exculpatory,' and (3) 'prejudice.'"  Sullivan, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Murray, 461 Mass. 10, 19, 21 
(2011). 
 
7 The prosecution's constitutional obligation to disclose 
exculpatory evidence to the defendant, and our related 
procedural and ethical rules embodying that obligation, were all 
in effect before this case was tried in 2002.  See Commonwealth 
v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 404-405 (1992); Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 
(a) (1) (C), 378 Mass. 874 (1979); Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (d), 
426 Mass. 1397 (1998). 
10 
 
 
Here, it is undisputed that the nondisclosed evidence was 
in the possession of the prosecutor at the time of trial because 
it consisted of the prosecutor's own notations concerning the 
witness.  We therefore turn to the question whether the note was 
exculpatory and, if so, whether the defendant was prejudiced by 
the nondisclosure of that evidence. 
1.  Whether the undisclosed evidence was exculpatory.  
"Evidence is exculpatory if it 'provides some significant aid to 
the defendant's case, whether it furnishes corroboration of the 
defendant's story, calls into question a material, although not 
indispensable, element of the prosecution's version of the 
events, or challenges the credibility of a key prosecution 
witness.'"  Commonwealth v. Watkins, 473 Mass. 222, 231 (2015), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Daniels, 445 Mass. 392, 401-402 (2005). 
Here, the prosecutor's note indicated that the witness had 
testified about a jailhouse confession extracted from a then-
fellow inmate in a previous case.  Further investigation of the 
case referenced in the note likely would have led defense 
counsel to discover the witness's significant role in the 
prosecution of Rancourt.  See Rancourt, 399 Mass. 269.   While 
the two men were in custody in a house of correction, Rancourt 
told the witness that he was being detained because he had raped 
a woman.  The witness contacted a State police trooper to whom 
he supplied information from time to time relaying the substance 
11 
 
of his conversation with Rancourt.  The witness thereafter 
extracted a written confession from Rancourt, which the witness 
shared with the trooper.  Id. at 272-273.  The judge who heard 
Rancourt's motion to suppress found that the witness had hoped 
to gain favorable treatment in exchange for the information that 
he had provided to the trooper.  Id. at 273.  After providing 
the information, the witness's sentence was revised and he was 
released two and one-half months before his previously scheduled 
release date as a protective measure, although there was no 
evidence that law enforcement officers made any promises to the 
witness.  Id. at 274 & n.6. 
If the defendant's trial counsel had known about the 
witness's previous involvement in the Rancourt case, he could 
have used it to challenge the witness's claim that he had broken 
the jailhouse "code of silence" to testify against the defendant 
with no expectation of any benefit for himself.  Defense counsel 
could have argued that the witness once again was motivated by a 
desire to secure favorable treatment in his pending cases.8  See 
Commonwealth v. Birks, 435 Mass. 782, 787 n.4 (2002), S.C., 484 
Mass. 1014 (2020) (witnesses' subjective hopes and expectations 
 
 
8 The witness had open cases against him when he first 
approached law enforcement about the defendant in January 2000, 
when he testified before the grand jury in March 2000, and when 
he testified at trial in December 2002.  The witness faced 
different open charges at each stage of his cooperation with law 
enforcement in the defendant's case. 
12 
 
that their testimony might benefit them in disposition of their 
own cases "are obviously relevant to the questions of bias and 
motivation and are also fair game for cross-examination").  
Additionally, defense counsel might have used the witness's 
involvement in the Rancourt case, which also involved a rape 
charge, to bolster the defense theory that the witness was so 
biased against individuals accused of rape that he would go to 
any lengths to convict them. 
Thus, the prosecutor's note was exculpatory in that it 
could have led to evidence that would have called into question 
the witness's credibility.  See generally Murray, 461 Mass. at 
19, quoting Commonwealth v. Healy, 438 Mass. 672, 679 (2003) 
("'Exculpatory' in this context is not a narrow term connoting 
alibi or other complete proof of innocence, . . . but rather 
comprehends all evidence 'which tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused . . . or, stated affirmatively, supporting the innocence 
of the defendant'" [quotations omitted]). 
2.  Whether nondisclosure of the note was prejudicial.  We 
now turn to the question whether nondisclosure of the 
prosecutor's note prejudiced the defendant's defense.  In 
assessing the prejudicial impact of undisclosed exculpatory 
evidence, we have applied two different standards depending on 
whether the evidence was subject to a specific discovery request 
by the defendant.  Where the exculpatory evidence at issue has 
13 
 
been requested specifically, "a defendant need only demonstrate 
that a substantial basis exists for claiming prejudice from the 
nondisclosure."  Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 412 
(1992).  Alternatively, where the defendant has made no request, 
or only a general request for exculpatory evidence, we ask 
"whether there is a substantial risk that the jury would have 
reached a different conclusion" if the evidence had been 
disclosed, or, in other words, "[w]ould it have been a real 
factor in the jury's deliberations?"  Id. at 413.  Here, we 
apply the second standard because the defendant did not make a 
specific discovery request that encompassed the prosecutor's 
note.9  But even under this more stringent standard, we conclude 
that the defendant was prejudiced by the nondisclosure of this 
note. 
 
9 To be considered specific, a request must "provide the 
Commonwealth with notice of the defendant['s] interest in a 
particular piece of evidence."  Commonwealth v. Gallarelli, 399 
Mass. 17, 22 (1987), quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, 388 Mass. 
98, 110 (1983).  In arguing that he made such a specific 
request, the defendant cites his pretrial discovery requests for 
the witness's probation record and for information concerning 
any threats, rewards, inducements, or promises made to the 
witness, but the prosecutor's note does not fall within any of 
the categories of information sought by the defendant.  Further, 
because this case was indicted and tried prior to the amendment 
of Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 in 2004, the defendant was not entitled 
to rely on the automatic discovery obligations currently imposed 
on the prosecution in Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (i), 
(ii), & (iv)-(ix), to give the prosecution notice of a specific 
interest in the prosecutor's note.  Compare Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez-Nieves, 487 Mass. 171, 179 n.12 (2021). 
14 
 
As the motion judge recognized, the witness was "critical" 
to the case against the defendant "because [the victim] suffered 
from credibility problems arising from the delay in disclosure 
and her admitted perjury against [her uncle] in another case."  
The witness provided essential corroboration for the victim's 
testimony, without which the jury might not have convicted the 
defendant.  Significantly, as mentioned supra, in the separate 
joint trial of the defendant's brothers, at which the witness 
did not testify, both brothers were acquitted. 
Disclosure of the prosecutor's note, which referenced the 
witness's role in a separate prosecution, would have provided 
the defendant with the strongest available basis for impeaching 
the credibility of this critical witness.  As we have explained 
supra, the fact that the witness had hoped to gain favorable 
treatment for his testimony in Rancourt; that he ultimately 
received a shortened sentence after testifying in that case; and 
that he had previously shared information with a State police 
trooper from time to time, could have been used to contradict 
the witness's testimony about his purported general reluctance 
to snitch and his representation that he had come forward in the 
present case only because of his dislike for rapists, without 
any expectation of personal benefit. 
For these reasons, we reject the Commonwealth's contention 
that the information revealed by the prosecutor's note is merely 
15 
 
cumulative because the Commonwealth had turned over the police 
report that noted the witness's previous cooperation with law 
enforcement, about which defense counsel did not question the 
witness at trial.  The specific facts relating to the witness's 
cooperation in Rancourt, including his hope for favorable 
treatment and the reduction of his sentence, would have made 
that evidence far more compelling for a jury than the generic 
reference to the witness's prior police cooperation contained in 
the police report. 
We are unpersuaded that the potential force of evidence 
concerning the witness's role in Rancourt would have been 
blunted because the witness had not been promised anything in 
exchange for his testimony in that case.  Regardless of whether 
he had been offered any inducements, the witness's subjective 
hope for favorable treatment for assisting the prosecution in 
Rancourt, and the fact that his sentence was revised after he 
provided information to the police, could have provided an 
effective basis for cross-examining him regarding his motive for 
testifying at the defendant's trial.10  See Commonwealth v. 
 
10 For this reason, we reject the conclusion that disclosure 
of the witness's role in Rancourt might have worked to the 
defendant's disadvantage because it would have enhanced the 
witness's credibility regarding his professed dislike of 
rapists.  Indeed, evidence that the witness may have hoped to 
benefit from his testimony in this case as he had in the 
Rancourt case would have given the jury a reason to question the 
witness's purported altruism. 
16 
 
Henson, 394 Mass. 584, 587 (1985) ("The possibility that a 
prosecution witness is hoping for favorable treatment on a 
pending criminal charge is sufficient to justify inquiry 
concerning bias, even if the Commonwealth has offered no 
inducements to the witness").  We further note that our 
conclusion in Rancourt that the witness was not acting as an 
agent of law enforcement when he induced Rancourt to commit his 
confession to writing has limited relevance, if any, to whether 
the witness's testimony was motivated by self-interest. 
Conclusion.  Because the witness's testimony was critical 
to the Commonwealth's case against the defendant, and because 
evidence of the witness's prior cooperation with law enforcement 
in the Rancourt case, as revealed by the prosecutor's note, 
would have provided the strongest available basis for impeaching 
the witness's credibility, we conclude that evidence of the 
witness's role in Rancourt would have been a real factor in the 
jury's deliberations at the defendant's trial.  See Tucceri, 412 
Mass. at 414 ("If . . . the undisclosed evidence is more 
credible than any other evidence on the same factual issue and 
bears directly on a crucial issue before the jury, such as the 
credibility of an important prosecution witness, that evidence 
would have been a real factor in the jury's deliberations 
. . .").  The defendant was therefore prejudiced by the 
17 
 
nondisclosure of the prosecutor's note and is accordingly 
entitled to a new trial.11,12 
The order denying the defendant's motion for a new trial is 
reversed.  The defendant's conviction of aggravated rape is 
vacated, the verdict is set aside, and the case is remanded to 
the Superior Court for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
11 Although newly discovered evidence that tends merely to 
impeach the credibility of a witness will not ordinarily be the 
basis for granting a new trial, see Commonwealth v. Drayton, 479 
Mass. 479, 490 (2018), the situation is different where the 
Commonwealth's case depends heavily on the testimony of a 
particular witness and new evidence seriously undermines the 
credibility of that witness, see Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 
Mass. 607, 621 (2015). 
 
 
12 As we conclude that the defendant is entitled to a new 
trial based on the Commonwealth's failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence, we need not consider the defendant's claim 
that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because 
of trial counsel's failure to (1) discover and investigate the 
key witness's full criminal record and history as a police 
informant, and (2) present expert testimony to explain the 
phenomenon of false memories.