Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Michael G. Trewin
Citation: 2014 WI 111
Docket Number: 2012AP001949-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: October 7, 2014

2014 WI 111 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP1949-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against  
Michael G. Trewin, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael G. Trewin, 
          Respondent-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST TREWIN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
October 7, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 9, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs and oral 
argument by Michael G. Trewin, New London. 
 
 
For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief and oral 
argument by Julie M. Spoke of the Office of Lawyer Regulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 111
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP1949-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michael G. Trewin, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael G. Trewin, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
OCT 7, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
revoked.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Michael G. Trewin has appealed 
from the report of the referee, Reserve Judge Robert E. Kinney, 
which concluded that Attorney Trewin had committed ethical 
violations as alleged in 14 counts of the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation's (OLR) complaint and recommended the revocation of 
Attorney Trewin's license to practice law in Wisconsin.  The 
referee also recommended that Attorney Trewin be ordered to pay 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
2 
 
the full costs of this proceeding, which were $33,145.83 as of 
April 24, 2014. 
¶2 
Having heard oral argument and having fully reviewed 
this matter, we determine that the referee was correct in 
concluding, after a three-day evidentiary hearing, that Attorney 
Trewin had committed 14 counts of professional misconduct.  Many 
of those counts of misconduct fall into the same pattern of 
using knowledge of clients' financial weaknesses to take 
advantage of those clients in business transactions with them.  
We therefore determine that Attorney Trewin's license to 
practice law in this state must be revoked.  Given the disarray 
in Attorney Trewin's records, we are unable to impose specific 
restitution amounts in this disciplinary proceeding, although we 
note that two sets of clients have pursued civil actions against 
Attorney Trewin.  Finally, we require Attorney Trewin to pay the 
full costs of this proceeding. 
¶3 
Attorney Trewin was admitted to the practice of law in 
Wisconsin in June 1985.  He has maintained a law practice in New 
London.  He has historically focused his practice on bankruptcy 
and debt reorganization.   
¶4 
Attorney Trewin has been the subject of professional 
discipline on two prior occasions.  In 2004 this court suspended 
Attorney Trewin's law license for a period of five months.  In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Trewin, 
2004 WI 116, 
275 Wis. 2d 116, 684 N.W.2d 121 (Trewin I).  The misconduct that 
led 
to 
that 
suspension 
included 
(1) 
entering 
into 
loan 
transactions with at least seven clients without obtaining 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
3 
 
written, 
informed 
conflict 
waivers, 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 20:1.8(a); (2) entering into such loan transactions without 
having 
advised 
his 
clients 
of 
the 
potential 
adverse 
consequences, in violation of SCR 20:1.7(b); (3) having engaged 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty 
or 
misrepresentation 
by 
assigning his interest in a loan to his brother-in-law in order 
to avoid disclosing that he was the real party in interest, in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c); (4) failing to file timely income 
tax returns, in violation of prior case law and SCR 20:8.4(f); 
and (5) having deposited a client check into his business 
account rather than his client trust account, in violation of 
SCR 20:l.15(a).  In our Trewin I decision, we quoted the 
referee's comment that the frequency and magnitude of Attorney 
Trewin's loan and business transactions with his clients were 
such common occurrences that they made it "look as though he was 
more of a banker than a lawyer."  275 Wis. 2d 116, ¶40. 
¶5 
In 2006 Attorney Trewin received a public reprimand 
with his consent.  The misconduct underlying that reprimand 
consisted of failing to list all of his pending matters in the 
affidavit he was required to file with the OLR following his 
2004 disciplinary suspension, failing to notify courts and 
opposing counsel of his disciplinary suspension, and engaging in 
a conflict of interest by representing two clients in a 
bankruptcy proceeding when that representation was directly 
adverse to the interests of another client.  Public Reprimand of 
Michael G. Trewin, No. 2006-6. 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
4 
 
¶6 
The 
present 
disciplinary 
proceeding 
relates 
to 
Attorney Trewin's relationships and business transactions with 
three married couples:  (1) R.V.S. and B.V.S. (collectively, Mr. 
and Mrs. V.S. or the V.S.s); (2) D.H. and M.H. (collectively, 
Mr. and Mrs. H. or the H.s); and (3) Francis and Karen Groshek 
(collectively, the Grosheks).1  The referee in this matter issued 
a thorough 58-page report with detailed findings of fact and 
conclusions 
of 
law 
regarding 
Attorney 
Trewin's 
actions 
concerning each of the three sets of clients.  We will not 
repeat all of those factual findings in this opinion.  It is 
sufficient here to summarize the pattern that Attorney Trewin 
generally followed in dealing with the three couples whose 
grievances led to this disciplinary proceeding and to set forth 
the rule violations that arose from that conduct. 
¶7 
The referee found that Attorney Trewin had attorney-
client relationships with all three couples during the relevant 
                                                 
1 This court's general practice is to use the initials of 
clients in attorney disciplinary opinions to protect their 
privacy to some extent since they did not ask to be the alleged 
victims of attorney misconduct.  We use the Grosheks' full names 
in this opinion because they were already named parties in a 
civil action they pursued against Attorney Trewin, which 
ultimately resulted in a published decision and order from this 
court. 
 
Groshek 
v. 
Trewin, 
2010 WI 51, 
325 Wis. 2d 250, 
784 N.W.2d 163.  The OLR and Attorney Trewin stipulated that the 
referee could use the record of that litigation as the factual 
record for the counts relating to the Grosheks in this 
disciplinary proceeding.  Since citation to this court's 
decision in that civil case would disclose their names in any 
event, there is no reason to use the Grosheks' initials rather 
than their names in this opinion. 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
5 
 
time periods.  The attorney-client relationships with Mr. and 
Mrs. V.S. and with Mr. and Mrs. H. were long-standing ones, 
stretching back to points before the filing of the complaint in 
Trewin I.  Indeed, the referee found that Attorney Trewin's 
attorney-client relationship with Mr. and Mrs. H. extended back 
to 1991.  The referee made clear in his report, however, that he 
was not considering any specific facts that pre-dated the filing 
of the complaint in Trewin I.   
¶8 
The referee found that each of the three couples was 
financially unsophisticated, which caused them to rely on 
Attorney Trewin's recommendations.  He stated that Attorney 
Trewin had followed a similar pattern of conduct with respect to 
each client couple.   
¶9 
Each couple initially retained Attorney Trewin when 
they were facing legal problems regarding their debts, either in 
the 
context 
of 
a 
foreclosure 
proceeding 
or 
a 
possible 
bankruptcy.  Because of each couple's financial problems, they 
had difficulty obtaining loans in traditional credit markets—
i.e., from banks, credit unions, etc.   
¶10 Attorney Trewin usually loaned the couples money, 
often at relatively high interest rates (12-14%), starting with 
fairly small amounts and increasing the amount of the loans over 
time as the couples needed additional funds.  The referee 
further found that because Attorney Trewin was not constrained 
by standard banking regulations, the clients did not receive 
many of the pieces of information and the warnings that they 
would have received when borrowing from traditional lenders.  
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
6 
 
Moreover, there were many errors in the documentation of the 
loans and the tracking of payments.   
¶11 In some instances, either there were no signed 
promissory notes and conflict waivers, or Attorney Trewin lost 
those documents since he was unable to produce them during this 
disciplinary proceeding.  In at least one other instance, the 
date on the conflict waiver was months apart from the date of 
the purportedly corresponding promissory note.  Also, when 
Attorney Trewin was able to produce a signed document purporting 
to be a conflict waiver, the description of the transaction in 
the conflict waiver was, at times, not even consistent with the 
loan terms set forth in the promissory note.  Further, the 
referee specifically found that the conflict waivers did not 
disclose all of the true facts regarding the transactions, did 
not provide any meaningful explanation of the disadvantages of 
entering into these transactions with the clients' lawyer, and 
did not include a discussion of the alternatives available to 
the clients.   
¶12 Attorney Trewin's haphazard manner of handling these 
transactions left the clients confused about which loans were 
outstanding, what payments they had made toward which loans, and 
the balances of their loans.  For example, both Mr. and 
Mrs. V.S. and Mr. and Mrs. H. repeatedly asked Attorney Trewin 
for an accounting, but he did not provide them with one.  When 
counsel for the OLR asked Attorney Trewin at the evidentiary 
hearing whether he had ever produced an accounting to Mr. and 
Mrs. V.S., he responded that he did not know.  He claimed that 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
7 
 
he had a spreadsheet on his computer that showed a running tally 
or documentation of the loans to Mr. and Mrs. V.S.  Attorney 
Trewin then referenced an exhibit, which he claimed was a 
printed version of this spreadsheet.  The referee, however, 
found 
that 
the 
exhibit 
"is 
replete 
with 
omissions 
and 
unexplained entries, and is essentially undecipherable, even by 
[Attorney Trewin]."  When Attorney Trewin was asked at another 
point during the evidentiary hearing how much money he had 
loaned Mr. and Mrs. V.S., he did not provide an answer but 
promised he would provide the information to the referee the 
following day after putting all of their payments into a 
spreadsheet.  No further documentation on this subject was 
provided by Attorney Trewin during the proceedings before the 
referee.  Since Attorney Trewin was not subject to regulations 
imposed on commercial lenders, these practices and errors were 
not corrected over rather lengthy periods.   
¶13 The referee found that the clients usually did not 
negotiate 
with 
Attorney 
Trewin 
regarding 
their 
business 
transactions because they viewed him as their attorney.  They 
relied on his expertise and judgment, and believed that he was 
acting in good faith and looking out for their best interests.   
¶14 When the clients fell behind on their loan payments, 
Attorney Trewin's practice was not to telephone the clients, to 
deliver a notice of delinquency, or to sue the clients for 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
8 
 
eviction or a money judgment.2  The referee found that Attorney 
Trewin operated in this manner because he intentionally and 
consistently wanted to avoid judicial scrutiny of his conduct.  
Instead of attempting to enforce the terms of the existing notes 
and mortgages, Attorney Trewin's preferred course of action was 
to create another loan to those clients.  Often the new loan was 
a mixture of existing indebtedness and new money.  When prior 
loans were paid off or replaced by a new loan, Attorney Trewin 
did not return the promissory notes for the prior loans.   
¶15 Ultimately, when the couples had difficulties making 
their payments to Attorney Trewin or to another creditor, he 
would persuade the couple to transfer their property over to 
him, with the promise that he would lease the property back to 
them and they could reacquire the property if they were current 
on their payments to him and could also pay a specified amount 
to him for their property.  The couples, however, were not in a 
financial condition where they could ever regain ownership of 
their property.  Nonetheless, because of Attorney Trewin's 
actions, some couples continued to hold the mistaken belief that 
they really did retain ownership or control of the property even 
after they had transferred ownership of it to Attorney Trewin.  
In the end, Attorney Trewin ended up with the title to the 
clients' real property. 
                                                 
2 Even when Mr. and Mrs. V.H. and Mr. and Mrs. H. stopped 
making 
payments 
to 
Attorney 
Trewin 
years 
before 
this 
disciplinary proceeding, the referee noted that Attorney Trewin 
had never sued them.   
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
9 
 
¶16 The referee was particularly moved by one of the 
exhibits in the Groshek case.  The exhibit contained excerpts 
from three letters that Attorney Trewin wrote to three different 
recipients within a span of ten days around the time he was 
entering into an agreement to buy the Grosheks' property in 
August 2004, just prior to his law license being suspended.  In 
the first letter, which was sent to the bank from which he was 
seeking financing for the transaction, Attorney Trewin said that 
he had negotiated a purchase price for the Grosheks' property 
that was below the appraised value of the land and well below 
what he believed was the fair market value of the land.  He 
further indicated that he intended to sell 40 acres of the land 
for an amount that was twice the appraised value to some 
neighbors of the Grosheks immediately after buying the land from 
the Grosheks.  Finally, he stated that his intention for the 
rest of the land was to subdivide most of it into large lots and 
to rent a small portion, including the existing farmhouse, to 
the Grosheks.  When Attorney Trewin wrote to the Grosheks just 
three days later, however, he stated that he would be willing to 
buy their land for enough money to pay off their existing bank 
loans, sell approximately 40 acres to the neighbors, and then 
give them a lease on all the rest of the land with an option to 
repurchase it.  There was no mention of the sale price being 
well below fair market value or of subdividing most of the land 
into lots that would be sold to third parties.  Finally, in the 
third letter, Attorney Trewin told the Grosheks' current lender 
that he would be willing to pay that bank for either an 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
10 
 
assignment of their judgment against the Grosheks or a complete 
release of the bank's claims.  He also claimed (1) that the 
commitment letter from his own bank referred to the transaction 
as a purchase of the Grosheks' real property by Attorney Trewin 
because that was simply his lender's practice and (2) that he 
really intended to sell the real estate back to the Grosheks.  
Thus, Attorney Trewin gave three different versions of what 
would happen in the transaction to three different parties 
involved in the transaction, depending on what he thought they 
wanted to hear.   
¶17 With respect to two of the client couples, Attorney 
Trewin contacted them after learning that they had filed 
grievances against him with the OLR.  Mr. V.S. testified that 
during a couple of telephone calls, Attorney Trewin stated that 
he was suicidal and asked Mr. V.S. to sign a "waiver," which 
Mr. V.S. understood to mean that he would not pursue his 
grievance against Attorney Trewin.  Mr. H. described Attorney 
Trewin's demeanor during a post-grievance telephone call with 
him as "ugly."  Mr. and Mrs. V.S. refused to sign any "waiver" 
of the grievance, but Mr. and Mrs. H. did sign a document 
drafted by Attorney Trewin, which stated that they agreed that 
"the amount owed under the note is $109,643.25" and that they 
had an option to purchase their former real property for 
$50,000.00.  Mr. and Mrs. H. signed the document, even though 
they did not know whether it was accurate, because they felt 
sorry for Attorney Trewin.   
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
11 
 
¶18 Attorney Trewin also failed to provide documents and 
information 
requested 
by 
the 
OLR 
during 
its 
grievance 
investigation concerning Mr. and Mrs. H.  This occurred both 
when the OLR wrote letters to Attorney Trewin asking for certain 
information and when a member of a district committee tried to 
meet with Attorney Trewin.  Attorney Trewin cancelled the 
meeting, claiming that he was sick.  When the district committee 
member 
subsequently 
wrote 
to 
Attorney 
Trewin 
asking 
for 
documentation of his various transactions with Mr. and Mrs. H., 
Attorney Trewin asked for an extension of time to respond to the 
request, but he never followed through with providing the 
requested documents during the investigation.   
¶19 The referee concluded that the OLR had proven four 
counts of misconduct arising out of Attorney Trewin's actions 
with respect to Mr. and Mrs. V.S.  On Count One, the referee 
concluded that Attorney Trewin had failed to fully disclose the 
terms of the various transactions with Mr. and Mrs. V.S. in a 
manner that they could reasonably understand, in violation of 
former SCR 20:1.8(a).3  On Count Two, the referee found that 
                                                 
3 Former SCR 20:1.8(a), in effect prior to July 1, 2007, 
provides: 
A 
lawyer 
shall 
not 
enter 
into 
a 
business 
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an 
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary 
interest adverse to a client unless: 
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer 
acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the 
client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in 
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
12 
 
Attorney Trewin's ongoing representation of Mr. and Mrs. V.S. 
while he had adverse personal interests as a result of his 
business transactions with them, without obtaining proper 
waivers, constituted an improper conflict of interest under both 
former SCR 20:1.7(b)4 and current SCR 20:1.7(a)(2).5  On Count 
                                                                                                                                                             
writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood 
by the client; 
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity 
to seek the advice of independent legal counsel in the 
transaction; and 
(3) the client consents in writing thereto. 
4 Former SCR 1.7(b), in effect prior to July 1, 2007, 
provides:  
 
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client may be materially 
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another 
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own 
interests, unless: 
(1) 
The 
lawyer 
reasonably 
believes 
the 
representation will not be adversely affected; and 
(2) 
The 
client 
consents 
in 
writing 
after 
consultation.  When representation of multiple clients 
in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation 
shall include explanation of the implications of the 
common representation and the advantages and risks 
involved. 
5 SCR 1.7(a)(2) provides: 
(a) Except as provided in par. (b), a lawyer 
shall not represent a client if the representation 
involves 
a 
concurrent 
conflict 
of 
interest. 
A 
concurrent conflict of interest exists if: 
. . . . 
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
13 
 
Three, the referee determined that by having Mr. and Mrs. V.S. 
sign over the deed to their real property when he believed there 
had been no meeting of the minds, Attorney Trewin had engaged in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).6  On Count 
Four, the referee concluded that Attorney Trewin's attempt to 
persuade Mr. and Mrs. V.S. to cease cooperating with the OLR's 
investigation had violated SCRs 22.03(6)7 and 21.15(4),8 which 
are enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(h).9   
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) 
there 
is 
a 
significant 
risk 
that 
the 
representation 
of 
one 
or 
more 
clients 
will 
be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to 
another client, a former client or a third person or 
by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
6 SCR 8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct for 
a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
7 SCR 22.03(6) provides that "[i]n the course of the 
investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance." 
8 SCR 21.15(4) 
provides 
that 
"[e]very 
attorney 
shall 
cooperate 
with 
the 
office 
of 
lawyer 
regulation 
in 
the 
investigation, 
prosecution 
and 
disposition 
of 
grievances, 
complaints filed with or by the director, and petitions for 
reinstatement.  An attorney's wilful failure to cooperate with 
the office of lawyer regulation constitutes violation of the 
rules of professional conduct for attorneys." 
9 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 
or SCR 22.04(1)." 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
14 
 
¶20 The referee further concluded that the OLR had proven 
professional misconduct by Attorney Trewin on eight of the nine 
counts in the complaint that related to Mr. and Mrs. H.10  Five 
of those eight counts concern Attorney Trewin's multiple 
business transactions with Mr. and Mrs. H.  On Count Five, the 
referee 
determined 
that 
Attorney 
Trewin 
had 
violated 
SCR 20:1.8(a) by disbursing funds to himself as both creditor 
and 
attorney 
from 
a 
May 
2003 
transaction 
without 
fully 
disclosing his adverse interests and without obtaining a written 
consent for the conflict and the transaction.  On Count Six, the 
referee found that Attorney Trewin had violated both former and 
current SCR 20:1.8(b)11 by using in subsequent loan transactions 
with Mr. and Mrs. H. information regarding their finances that 
he had gained from representing them as their lawyer.  On Count 
Seven, the referee concluded that Attorney Trewin had violated 
SCR 20:1.7(a)(2) by continuing to represent Mr. and Mrs. H. when 
                                                 
10 The referee determined that the OLR had failed to meet 
its burden of proving misconduct by clear, satisfactory, and 
convincing evidence on Count Ten.  That count alleged that 
Attorney Trewin had violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by providing false 
information to the OLR during its initial evaluation of the 
grievance filed by Mr. and Mrs. H.   
11 Former SCR 20:1.8(b), in effect prior to July 1, 2007, 
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not use information relating to 
representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client 
unless the client consents after consultation." 
Current SCR 20:1.8(b) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not 
use information relating to representation of a client to the 
disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed 
consent, except as permitted or required by these rules." 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
15 
 
he had a personal interest in their finances and property, by 
"representing" them in a sale of real property to third parties 
when he had not obtained a written conflict waiver of his 
personal interests, by paying himself $83,000 in "anticipated 
taxes" out of the proceeds of a real estate transaction when he 
never paid those taxes, and by assigning a value to their option 
to repurchase their land when he had never obtained a prior 
written agreement with them concerning such a value.  On Count 
Eight, the referee determined that Attorney Trewin had engaged 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c), including 
(1) having Mr. and Mrs. H. deed their farm to him when he knew 
that many of the terms of the sale were incomplete and the 
transaction was invalid under the Statute of Frauds, (2) paying 
them far less than the value of the property, and (3) reselling 
the property at a profit for himself.  On Count Nine, the 
referee 
found 
that 
Attorney 
Trewin 
had 
also 
violated 
SCR 20:8.4(c) when he had claimed that the deed of the H.s' land 
was exempt from the real estate transfer tax and had not paid 
any such tax to the government, but had still collected the 
amount of the tax from Mr. and Mrs. H. and had subsequently 
refused to return it.   
¶21 The final three counts regarding Mr. and Mrs. H. 
involve 
Attorney 
Trewin's 
misconduct 
after 
they 
filed 
a 
grievance with the OLR.  On Count Eleven, the referee concluded 
that Attorney Trewin had violated SCRs 22.03(6) and 21.15(4), 
which are enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(h), when he had attempted 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
16 
 
to persuade Mr. and Mrs. H. to withdraw their grievance or cease 
cooperating with the OLR's investigation.  On Count Twelve, the 
referee determined that Attorney Trewin's failure to provide 
information requested by the district committee had violated 
SCR 22.04(1).12  On Count Thirteen, the referee found that 
Attorney Trewin had again violated SCR 22.03(6), enforced via 
SCR 20:8.4(h), when he had failed to provide information and 
documents requested by the OLR in a timely manner.   
¶22 The OLR's complaint alleged only two counts related to 
Attorney Trewin's conduct concerning the Grosheks.  On Count 
Fourteen, the referee concluded that Attorney Trewin had 
violated former SCR 20:1.8(a) by engaging in multiple business 
transactions with the Grosheks and acquiring their property when 
(1) the terms of the transactions were not fair and reasonable 
to the Grosheks, (2) Attorney Trewin had failed to fully and 
clearly disclose the terms of the proposed transactions to the 
Grosheks in writing and in a manner they could reasonably 
understand, and (3) Attorney Trewin had failed to obtain the 
Grosheks' voluntary written consent to each transaction after 
consultation.  On Count Fifteen, the referee found that by 
engaging in a course of conduct that involved dishonesty, fraud, 
                                                 
12 SCR 22.04(1) provides that "[t]he director may refer a 
matter 
to 
a 
district 
committee 
for 
assistance 
in 
the 
investigation.  A respondent has the duty to cooperate specified 
in SCR 21.15(4) and 22.03(2) in respect to the district 
committee.  The committee may subpoena and compel the production 
of documents specified in SCR 22.03(8) and 22.42." 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
17 
 
deceit, or misrepresentation in order to serve his own interests 
rather than the interests of his clients, Attorney Trewin had 
again violated SCR 20:8.4(c).   
¶23 With respect to the proper level of discipline, the 
referee stated that he had considered Attorney Trewin's prior 
disciplinary 
history, 
his 
pattern 
of 
misconduct 
in 
this 
proceeding, prior precedent, this court's discussions of the 
concept of progressive discipline, and both aggravating and 
mitigating factors.  The result of the referee's analysis was a 
conclusion that Attorney Trewin was unfit to practice law in 
this state and a recommendation that his license should be 
revoked.   
¶24 The referee believed that, in light of the fact that 
this court has described restitution as the payment of money, 
see SCR 21.16(2m), monetary restitution would not be appropriate 
here.  The referee agreed with the OLR that monetary restitution 
is not readily ascertainable in this matter "[d]ue to the mess 
that [Attorney Trewin] has created."   
¶25 Under our longstanding standards for reviewing referee 
reports in attorney disciplinary proceedings, we will affirm the 
referee's findings of fact unless they are found to be clearly 
erroneous, but we review the referee's conclusions of law on a 
de novo basis.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 
2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We determine 
the appropriate level of discipline to impose given the 
particular facts of each case, independent of the referee's 
recommendation, but benefiting from it.  In re Disciplinary 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
18 
 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 
660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶26 Attorney Trewin challenges most of the referee's 
conclusions of misconduct in his appeal.  Although he claims 
that he is challenging the referee's conclusions of law, many of 
Attorney Trewin's appellate arguments are focused on criticizing 
the way in which the referee viewed the facts of this case. 
¶27 For example, Attorney Trewin contends that the referee 
erred on Counts One, Five, and Fourteen in determining that he 
had violated SCR 20:1.8(a), which prohibits a lawyer from 
entering into business transactions with clients except in 
certain specified circumstances.  Attorney Trewin contends that 
the "basic facts" regarding these alleged violations have been 
undisputed throughout this proceeding.  He then proceeds, 
however, to describe the facts as he believes them to be rather 
than as found by the referee.  Specifically, he asserts, based 
on his own testimony, that he put the terms of every transaction 
into writing, gave that writing to the clients, and then advised 
the clients through a separate conflict of interest document 
that they had a right to seek independent counsel.  He further 
asserts that both R.V.S. and D.H. also testified that conflict 
waivers were signed for every transaction.   
¶28 The referee specifically discounted the oral testimony 
in this respect.  He agreed with Attorney Trewin that both 
R.V.S. and D.H. gave muddled, contradictory, and unreliable 
testimony on many issues, including what documents they had 
signed.  Although Attorney Trewin claimed that he always had 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
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clients sign conflict waivers (or consents), the referee noted 
that 
his 
testimony 
was 
also 
contradictory 
and 
that 
he 
acknowledged that he could not find conflict waivers for some 
transactions and that he was not sure they were prepared for 
other transactions.   
¶29 Moreover, 
the 
referee 
correctly 
noted 
that 
SCR 20:1.8(a) 
requires 
written 
notices 
providing 
certain 
information to the client and then a written consent to the 
transaction that is signed by the client.  The referee concluded 
that Attorney Trewin's self-serving testimony that his practice 
after 2002 was always to provide written conflict waivers was 
not enough to demonstrate that he had complied with the 
requirements of SCR 20:1.8(a) on a substantial number of 
transactions.   
¶30 In addition, merely claiming that the clients always 
signed conflict waivers does not establish what was in those 
conflict waivers or that the contents of those waivers provided 
all of the required information.  The referee specifically 
concluded that even for the conflict waivers produced by 
Attorney Trewin, they did not contain an adequate explanation of 
the risks of entering into the business transactions with 
Attorney Trewin while continuing to be represented by him.   
¶31 We find no basis to overturn the referee's findings of 
fact regarding the conflict waivers, or lack thereof.  We also 
agree with the referee's analysis that Attorney Trewin failed to 
adequately consult with his clients about the risks attendant to 
the transactions and the conflicts of interest and to prepare a 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
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sufficient writing containing the information required by 
SCR 20:1.8(a). 
¶32 Attorney Trewin also argues that the referee erred in 
finding violations of former and current SCR 20:1.8(b) in Count 
Six.  He focuses on the referee's reference to the fact that he 
did not provide to the clients the normal safeguards that are 
provided by commercial lending institutions to their customers.  
Attorney Trewin further claims that he did, in fact, explain the 
transactions to D.H. in a way he could understand.  The referee, 
however, found that there was no record of Attorney Trewin 
orally discussing with D.H. certain matters related to a 
transaction.  The referee also found D.H. to be credible when he 
testified that he was baffled by the transaction.   
¶33 We again find no basis to overturn any of the 
referee's factual findings with respect to Attorney Trewin's 
transactions with Mr. and Mrs. H.  Attorney Trewin's argument 
focusing on the lack of banking safeguards misses the point of 
the violation found by the referee.  The crux of the violation 
of SCR 20:1.8(b) was that Attorney Trewin used the information 
he had gained from his representation of Mr. and Mrs. H. to 
their disadvantage by engaging in a series of transactions that 
ultimately led to Attorney Trewin owning their property.  We 
conclude that Attorney Trewin did violate both former and 
current SCR 20:1.8(b). 
¶34 Attorney 
Trewin 
also 
challenges 
the 
referee's 
conclusions that he violated SCR 20:8.4(c) on Counts Three, 
Eight, Nine, and Fifteen.  His arguments in this regard again 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
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rely in large part on his view of the facts surrounding various 
transactions with each of the three client couples.  Attorney 
Trewin's arguments do not rise to the level of demonstrating 
clear error in the referee's view of the relevant facts. 
¶35 Attorney Trewin acknowledges that he claimed an 
exemption from the transfer tax and did not pay any such tax to 
the applicable government entity, but he still collected the 
amount of the tax from Mr. and Mrs. H.  He also acknowledges 
that he did not return the money when he was confronted with 
this discrepancy.  He attempts to excuse his act of collecting 
money to which he was not entitled and then refusing to return 
it by claiming that he was ultimately entitled to offset that 
amount against the amount Mr. and Mrs. H. owed him.  He 
conveniently omits from his argument, however, that there was no 
finding of fact that he did offset the amount he improperly 
collected against their indebtedness or that he notified Mr. and 
Mrs. H. of such an offset.  His after-the-fact excuse does not 
convince us that the referee erred in concluding that this 
conduct violated SCR 20:8.4(c).   
¶36 Attorney Trewin also contends that the referee erred 
in concluding that he had violated SCR 20:8.4(c) when he had 
Mr. and Mrs. H. deed over their land to him despite the 
transaction failing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds and when 
the value of their property exceeded what Attorney Trewin was 
paying them for it.  We need not conduct a detailed analysis of 
the Statute of Frauds.  Attorney Trewin acknowledges that he 
testified to a value of the land that was in excess of what he 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
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paid his clients for it.  He contends that the referee erred in 
relying on this testimony because he did not say what someone 
would have needed to do to the land to raise it to that value.  
His 
attempt 
to 
claim 
that 
his 
valuation 
testimony 
was 
conditioned in some undisclosed manner is unavailing.  We 
conclude that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that 
Attorney Trewin engaged in dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or 
misrepresentation when he purchased the property of Mr. and 
Mrs. H. 
¶37 His challenge to the violation found on Count Three 
also is based on his view of what the evidence showed.  The 
referee 
determined 
that 
Attorney 
Trewin 
had 
violated 
SCR 20:8.4(c) by having Mr. and Mrs. V.S. deed a piece of their 
land to him when there had been no meeting of the minds on the 
overall transaction.  Attorney Trewin claims that the referee 
should have found a meeting of the minds because Mr. and 
Mrs. V.S. subsequently paid rent to him for that land, which was 
consistent with his view that they had signed a "life lease" as 
part of the transaction.  He ignores the referee's findings that 
Mr. and Mrs. V.S. denied ever signing a "life lease" and that no 
such document was ever produced or introduced into evidence.  
Relying on one piece of evidence while ignoring other findings 
of fact does not convince us that the referee erred in either 
his findings of fact or his conclusion of law on this count.  We 
agree 
with 
the 
referee's 
conclusion 
of 
a 
violation 
of 
SCR 20:8.4(c). 
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¶38 With respect to the finding of a violation of 
SCR 20:8.4(c) on Count Fifteen regarding his purchase of the 
Grosheks' property, Attorney Trewin again relies on his version 
of what occurred.  He ignores the transaction documents he had 
the Grosheks sign just before his license suspension was to take 
effect in August 2004 and claims that they were represented by 
separate counsel when the only valid transaction took place 
later in the fall.  He disregards, however, the finding of the 
circuit court in the civil action that the other attorney 
retained by the Grosheks acted merely as a scrivener.  Moreover, 
there is no dispute that Attorney Trewin did have the Grosheks 
sign 
sale 
documents 
in 
August 
at 
a 
time 
when 
he 
was 
characterizing the transaction to them in a manner that was 
contradictory to what he was telling other people and that he 
never made them aware at that time of the various stories he was 
telling to others.  Whether or not the transaction was 
ultimately modified at a later date, there is no doubt that 
Attorney Trewin's conduct prior to his suspension violated 
SCR 20:8.4(c).   
¶39 Attorney 
Trewin 
also 
challenges 
the 
referee's 
conclusions that he interfered with the OLR's investigation by 
attempting to persuade Mr. and Mrs. V.S. and Mr. and Mrs. H. to 
withdraw their grievances and cease cooperating with the OLR.  
The referee found, however, based on the testimony of R.V.S., 
that Attorney Trewin wanted him to sign a "waiver" that he would 
not pursue a grievance against Attorney Trewin.  The referee 
likewise found that Attorney Trewin persuaded Mr. and Mrs. H. to 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
24 
 
sign a document stating their agreement to an amount owed to 
Attorney Trewin even though they did not know whether that 
amount 
was 
accurate 
or 
inaccurate. 
 
These 
findings 
are 
sufficient to support the conclusion of improper interference 
with an ongoing grievance investigation. 
¶40 We do not find it necessary to address every claim and 
argument by Attorney Trewin in this opinion.  To the extent we 
have not addressed arguments here, it is sufficient to say that 
we have considered them and have rejected them. 
¶41 We now turn to the issue of the proper level of 
discipline.  We conclude that the revocation of Attorney 
Trewin's license to practice law in this state is appropriate 
and required.  Attorney Trewin was already put on notice of the 
perils of engaging in transactions with clients in the Trewin I 
disciplinary proceeding.  He nonetheless continued to engage in 
such transactions without meeting the very strict requirements 
that protect clients from overreaching by more sophisticated 
attorneys.  Moreover, he used the knowledge he had gained from 
handling 
the 
clients' 
legal 
matters 
to 
structure 
those 
transactions in a manner that ensured he would benefit and the 
clients would not.  Those transactions ultimately resulted in 
Attorney Trewin acquiring the clients' property and enriching 
himself at their expense.  It is clear that the public needs to 
be protected from this type of conduct and that, as the referee 
commented, Attorney Trewin is unfit to engage in the practice of 
law in this state. 
No. 
2012AP1949-D   
 
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¶42 We do not include a restitution award in our order.  
As noted by the OLR and the referee, there is not a basis in the 
record of this proceeding to readily ascertain what amount of 
money should be paid to the three client couples to make them 
whole.   
¶43 Finally, we impose the full costs of this proceeding 
on Attorney Trewin.  Attorney Trewin has been found to have 
engaged in multiple counts of misconduct.  He clearly has 
litigated this matter aggressively, which has necessitated the 
expenses incurred by the OLR and the referee.  Consequently, we 
find no basis to depart from our general policy of imposing the 
full costs on an attorney who has been found guilty of 
misconduct.  See SCR 22.24(1m). 
¶44 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Michael G. Trewin to 
practice law in Wisconsin is revoked, effective November 7, 
2014. 
¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Michael G. Trewin shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael G. Trewin shall 
comply with the requirements of SCR 22.26 pertaining to the 
duties of a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin 
has been revoked. 
 
 
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