Title: Doucet v. FCA US LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13354
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2023

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13354 
 
AMY DOUCET1 & another2  vs.  FCA US LLC3 & another.4 
 
 
 
Essex.     February 8, 2023. - June 8, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Jurisdiction, Personal, Long-arm statute, Nonresident.  Due 
Process of Law, Jurisdiction over nonresident.  Practice, 
Civil, Motion to dismiss. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
May 17, 2021. 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Janice W. Howe, J.; a 
motion for reconsideration was considered by her, and entry of 
separate and final judgment was ordered by her. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
1 As guardian of Paul Gregory Doucet. 
 
2 Denise Sutton, as guardian of Paul Gregory Doucet. 
 
3 Formerly known as Chrysler Group LLC. 
 
4 Sudbay Chrysler Dodge, Inc. 
2 
 
Deepak Gupta, of the District of Columbia (Andrew D. 
Nebenzahl, Carly J. LaCrosse, & Matthew W.H. Wessler also 
present) for the plaintiffs. 
 
Peter M. Durney (Christopher J. Hurst also present) for FCA 
US LLC. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Ben Robbins & Daniel B. Winslow for New England Legal 
Foundation. 
Jeffrey R. White & Robert S. Peck, of the District of 
Columbia, Peter J. Ainsworth, Thomas R. Murphy, Kevin J. Powers, 
& Kyle A. Camilleri for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys 
& another. 
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Charles W. Rhodes, & Linda 
Sandstrom Simard, pro se. 
Larry E. Coben, of Pennsylvania, Michael Brooks, of the 
District of Columbia, & Michael K. Gillis for Center for Auto 
Safety & another. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  Paul Doucet was rendered incapacitated by an 
automobile accident in New Hampshire in 2015.  His guardians 
(the plaintiffs) have brought a tort suit against the 
manufacturer of the car in which he was a passenger, FCA US LLC 
(FCA US), and the Massachusetts distributor-dealership, Sudbay 
Chrysler Dodge, Inc. (Sudbay).5  The car in question, a 2004 
Chrysler Sebring, was first sold by Sudbay in Massachusetts and 
later purchased in New Hampshire by Doucet, a New Hampshire 
resident.  At issue is whether Massachusetts has personal 
jurisdiction over one of the defendants, FCA US, under the 
Commonwealth's long-arm statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and the due 
 
 
5 Sudbay, which is incorporated in and maintains a principal 
place of business in Massachusetts, is not involved in this 
appeal. 
3 
 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  We conclude that it does, and we vacate the trial 
court's dismissal of FCA US as a party to this case.6 
 
1.  Background.  At this stage of the proceedings, we 
"accept[] the allegations in the complaint as true and draw[] 
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor."  Harrington 
v. Costello, 467 Mass. 720, 724 (2014).  FCA US is a Delaware 
limited liability company with its principal place of business 
in Michigan.  FCA US's predecessor in interest7 manufactured the 
Sebring around which this case revolves. 
 
A dealership in Rhode Island first received the Sebring 
from the manufacturer before transferring it to Sudbay, a 
dealership in Gloucester.  Sudbay initially leased the car to a 
Massachusetts resident in 2003.  The car was then purchased by a 
Massachusetts resident in 2006, and it subsequently was sold to 
two other Massachusetts residents, before a New Hampshire 
resident purchased the vehicle in 2011.  This resident then sold 
 
6 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by New England 
Legal Foundation; Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys and 
American Association for Justice; civil procedure and Federal 
courts professors; and Center for Auto Safety and Attorneys 
Information Exchange Group. 
 
 
7 FCA US is the successor in interest to Chrysler Group LLC 
and inherited certain of its liabilities, including the products 
liability claim at issue.  Previously, FCA US argued that it did 
not acquire liability for the claims brought by the plaintiffs, 
but it has since abandoned that argument. 
4 
 
it in a private sale to Doucet, also a New Hampshire resident, 
in 2013. 
 
In 2015, Doucet was riding in the front passenger's seat of 
the Sebring when it was involved in a front-end collision in New 
Hampshire.  He suffered a traumatic brain injury after the 
passenger's side A-pillar (windshield and roof support) struck 
his head.  Consequently, the plaintiffs first brought a products 
liability action solely against FCA US in the Superior Court in 
New Hampshire.  FCA US removed the case to the United States 
District Court for the District of New Hampshire, where a judge 
ruled in FCA US's favor that New Hampshire lacked personal 
jurisdiction over it, and dismissed the case. 
 
The plaintiffs then filed their suit in the Superior Court 
in Suffolk County against both FCA US and Sudbay (collectively, 
the defendants).  Again, FCA US removed the case to the Federal 
District Court in the State in which the plaintiffs had filed 
suit -- this time, the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts.  The Federal District Court judge 
ruled that Massachusetts has personal jurisdiction over FCA US 
but remanded the matter to the Superior Court for lack of 
subject matter diversity jurisdiction in the Federal court, as 
the inclusion of the defendant Sudbay as a Massachusetts 
corporation prevented complete diversity. 
5 
 
 
FCA US then filed a motion to dismiss for want of personal 
jurisdiction and improper venue in the Superior Court in Suffolk 
County.  The motion judge transferred the case to the Superior 
Court in Essex County, the county in which Sudbay operates its 
sole place of business.  There, after a hearing on the motion, 
the judge ultimately concluded that Massachusetts lacked 
personal jurisdiction over FCA US under both the Commonwealth's 
long-arm statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and the Federal 
Constitution's due process clause.8  The judge dismissed FCA US 
as a party to the case, and the plaintiffs appealed.9  We 
transferred the case sua sponte from the Appeals Court. 
 
2.  Discussion.  "Jurisdictional questions are questions of 
law, which we review de novo."  Bask, Inc. v. Municipal Council 
of Taunton, 490 Mass. 312, 316 (2022).  "For a nonresident to be 
subject to the authority of a Massachusetts court, the exercise 
of jurisdiction must satisfy both Massachusetts's long-arm 
statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and the requirements of the due 
 
 
8 In evaluating personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal 
due process, the judge in the Superior Court in Essex County 
found that the plaintiffs failed to establish "relatedness"; 
therefore, the judge did not consider other components of this 
analysis. 
 
 
9 The plaintiffs first filed a motion for reconsideration 
or, in the alternative, entry of separate and final judgment on 
two counts of their complaint against FCA US.  The trial court 
denied the former and allowed the latter, paving the way for 
this appeal. 
6 
 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ."  Exxon Mobil 
Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 479 Mass. 312, 314 (2018), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 794 (2019) (Exxon Mobil).  The plaintiffs argue that 
these requirements are satisfied with respect to FCA US, a 
nonresident of Massachusetts, while FCA US maintains that they 
are not.  We address each argument in turn, beginning with our 
long-arm statute to "avoid unnecessary consideration of 
constitutional questions."  SCVNGR, Inc. v. Punchh, Inc., 478 
Mass. 324, 325 (2017) (SCVNGR).  We conclude that Massachusetts 
has personal jurisdiction over FCA US, pursuant to both State 
and Federal law, vis-à-vis the plaintiffs' claims.  We therefore 
reverse the motion judge's dismissal of FCA US as a defendant to 
this case and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.10 
 
a.  Long-arm statute.  "General Laws c. 223A, § 3, sets out 
a list of specific instances in which a Massachusetts court may 
acquire personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant."  
Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 416 Mass. 763, 767 (1994).  Among the 
enumerated options provided is "transacting any business in this 
commonwealth."  G. L. c. 223A, § 3 (a).  We routinely have 
 
 
10 The plaintiffs have requested that, should we conclude 
they have not demonstrated personal jurisdiction on the facts 
before us, we grant them jurisdictional discovery.  Because we 
conclude that personal jurisdiction exists on these facts, we 
need not reach that issue. 
7 
 
construed this clause broadly.  Tatro, supra.  To meet this 
criterion, a plaintiff must allege facts that "satisfy two 
requirements -- the defendant must have transacted business in 
Massachusetts, and the plaintiff's claim must have arisen from 
the transaction of business by the defendant."  Id. 
 
Here, the plaintiffs argue that their claims arose from FCA 
US's predecessor's transaction of business in the Commonwealth 
as demonstrated by a Massachusetts distributor-dealership first 
leasing and selling the Sebring, all in the stream of commerce.  
In response, FCA US counters that neither it nor its predecessor 
in interest "transact[ed] any business" in connection with the 
plaintiffs' claims.  First, the Sebring was initially sent to a 
Rhode Island -- not a Massachusetts -- dealership, and second, 
the assumption of liability as a successor in interest does "not 
qualify as" the transaction of business.  Furthermore, FCA US 
argues, even if it has transacted business in Massachusetts, the 
plaintiffs' claims did not arise from any such transactions 
because Doucet did not purchase the Sebring in Massachusetts. 
 
We first consider whether FCA US, through its predecessor 
in interest, transacted business in the Commonwealth.  "Although 
an isolated (and minor) transaction with a Massachusetts 
resident may be insufficient, generally the purposeful and 
successful solicitation of business from residents of the 
8 
 
Commonwealth, by a defendant or its agent, will suffice to 
satisfy this requirement."  Tatro, 416 Mass. at 767. 
 
In Exxon Mobil, 479 Mass. at 317-318, we concluded that 
Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon) had transacted business in the 
Commonwealth when it executed franchise agreements with "a 
franchise network of more than 300 retail service stations" in 
Massachusetts.  Business deals with "Massachusetts-based limited 
liability compan[ies] . . . represent[ed] Exxon's 'purposeful 
and successful solicitation of business from residents of the 
Commonwealth."  Id. at 318, quoting Tatro, supra.  Similarly, 
FCA US, formerly known as Chrysler Group LLC, contracts with 
former Chrysler dealerships, like Sudbay, throughout 
Massachusetts, to conduct business under the FCA US name.  
Through these preexisting and ongoing business agreements with 
Sudbay and other FCA US dealerships in Massachusetts, FCA US 
engages in the "purposeful and successful solicitation of 
business from residents of the Commonwealth," Exxon Mobil, 
supra, by distributing cars manufactured by FCA US and Chrysler 
as FCA US's predecessor in interest.  We conclude, therefore, 
that FCA US has transacted business in Massachusetts. 
 
We turn next to whether the plaintiffs' claims arise from 
FCA US's transaction of business in Massachusetts.  To make this 
determination, we employ a "but for" causation test.  See Tatro, 
416 Mass. at 770-771 (comparing proximate and "but for" cause 
9 
 
interpretations across several jurisdictions).  The "but for" 
causation test requires us to consider whether the distribution 
of the Sebring in Massachusetts by FCA US's predecessor in 
interest is "the first step in a train of events that results in 
the personal injury."  Id. at 770.  We conclude that it is. 
 
In Tatro, 416 Mass. at 765-768, the defendant, a California 
hotel, contracted with a national organization to provide 
accommodations at a special rate for an upcoming conference, and 
the plaintiff, a Massachusetts resident and member of the 
national organization, booked a room directly with the hotel 
based on the mailing she received from the organization, 
advertising the conference rate.  During her stay, she fell and 
was allegedly injured in her room.  Id. at 766.  We recognized 
that, "but for the defendant's solicitation of business in 
Massachusetts," id. at 771, including the hotel's contract with 
the organization and "arrangements with several Massachusetts 
corporations," id. at 766, "and its agreement to provide the 
plaintiff with hotel accommodations in . . . California, the 
plaintiff would not have been injured in a room of the hotel," 
id. at 771-772.  The fact that the injury occurred out of State 
did not mean the injury did not arise from those business 
transactions in Massachusetts, see id. at 771, and so "the 
requirements of G. L. c. 223A, § 3 (a) [were] satisfied," id. at 
774. 
10 
 
 
Recently, in von Schönau-Riedweg v. Rothschild Bank AG, 95 
Mass. App. Ct. 471, 472, 474 (2019), the plaintiff, a Swiss 
citizen, sought relief against a Swiss bank based on the actions 
of its agent, a director at the bank, for significant monetary 
losses stemming from the director's advice.  The director had 
advised the plaintiff to invest in "two Massachusetts-based 
companies" with whom he had extensive business transactions.  
Id. at 472, 489-490.  Although the trial court dismissed the 
bank for lack of personal jurisdiction under the long-arm 
statute, the Appeals Court remanded for a hearing after 
concluding that the plaintiff met her prima facie burden that 
jurisdiction existed, should the director be an agent of the 
bank.  Id. at 473-474, 490-491.  If the director was acting as 
the bank's agent, then "a direct line [could] be drawn from his 
Massachusetts contacts and [his] advice, such that 'but for' 
[his] actions in Massachusetts" the plaintiff would not have 
invested in the Massachusetts businesses.  Id. at 490, quoting 
Tatro, 416 Mass. at 771. 
 
We conclude that the "but for" causation requirement is 
satisfied in the instant case.  The automobile was first sold in 
Massachusetts and remained here for several years before it was 
sold to a resident of a neighboring State.  But for the first 
sale here, the Sebring would not have ended up with Doucet.  FCA 
US argues, however, that "the only connection to Massachusetts 
11 
 
is a highly tangential one," because its predecessor initially 
shipped the car to a Rhode Island dealership, and second, once 
FCA US's distributor placed the Sebring into the stream of 
commerce in Massachusetts with the initial lease and sale, 
several others purchased it in Massachusetts and New Hampshire 
before Doucet's purchase and injury in New Hampshire.  Although 
there are multiple links in the factual chain, our decision in 
Tatro supports personal jurisdiction.  But for FCA US's 
extensive business transactions in Massachusetts, which included 
distributing the Sebring through the Massachusetts dealership, 
Doucet would not have been injured in New Hampshire, making FCA 
US's distribution in Massachusetts "the first step in a train of 
events that results in the personal injury."  See Tatro, 416 
Mass. at 770.  Consistent with our broad construction of G. L. 
c. 223A, § 3 (a), see id. at 767, we conclude that Doucet's 
claims arose from FCA US's transaction of business in the 
Commonwealth, in satisfaction of our long-arm statute. 
 
b.  Federal due process.  Having first established 
jurisdiction under our long-arm statute, we now consider whether 
specific personal jurisdiction over FCA US in Massachusetts 
comports with due process under the Federal Constitution.  See 
SCVNGR, 478 Mass. at 325.  "The Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause limits a [S]tate court's power to exercise 
jurisdiction over a defendant."  Ford Motor Co. v. Montana 
12 
 
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (Ford 
Motor).  "The primary focus of" the Federal "personal 
jurisdiction inquiry is the defendant's relationship to the 
forum State."  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of 
Cal., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017) (Bristol-Myers). 
 
This long-standing constitutional requirement for personal 
jurisdiction "depends on the defendant's having such 'contacts' 
with the forum State that 'the maintenance of the suit' is 
'reasonable, in the context of our [F]ederal system of 
government,' and 'does not offend traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.'"  Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1024, 
quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-
317 (1945) (Int'l Shoe).  Defendants, as well as plaintiffs, 
must be treated "fairly," and the principles of "interstate 
federalism" must be respected "to ensure that States with 
'little legitimate interest' in a suit do not encroach on States 
more affected by the controversy."  Ford Motor, supra at 1025, 
quoting Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 263. 
 
The plaintiffs assert that they have demonstrated these 
requirements, whereas FCA US contends that the trial court 
correctly determined that personal jurisdiction fails on the 
ground that the plaintiffs' claims are not sufficiently related 
to FCA US's contacts in the forum, especially in light of recent 
United States Supreme Court decisions. 
13 
 
In analyzing these due process requirements, we focus our 
attention on the case-specific facts, particularly the extensive 
business FCA US undertakes in Massachusetts, as well as the 
nexus between the plaintiffs' claims and FCA US's business in 
Massachusetts -- specifically the sale of the automobile first 
in Massachusetts, and then to Doucet in the neighboring State of 
New Hampshire, where he was eventually injured.  In this 
circumstance, where FCA US engages in extensive business 
dealings in Massachusetts, and a causal relationship between 
those dealings and the plaintiffs' claims exists, we conclude 
that Massachusetts's exercise of personal jurisdiction over FCA 
US, with regard to the plaintiffs' claims, satisfies Federal due 
process. 
 
i.  Purposeful availment.  We begin with "the contacts 
needed for" specific personal jurisdiction, which "often go by 
the name 'purposeful availment.'"  Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 
1024, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 
(1985) (Burger King).  To satisfy this prong of the due process 
inquiry for personal jurisdiction, the plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that FCA US "has purposefully avail[ed] itself of 
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, 
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws" 
(quotation omitted).  Knox v. MetalForming, Inc., 914 F.3d 685, 
691 (1st Cir. 2019), quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 
14 
 
253 (1958).  Accord Ford Motor, supra at 1024-1025.  This 
"requirement ensures that the exercise of jurisdiction is 
essentially voluntary and foreseeable, and is not premised on a 
defendant's random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts" 
(quotation and citations omitted).  Knox, supra.  Accord Burger 
King, supra.  Foreseeability means "the defendant's conduct and 
connection with the forum State are such that he should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there," World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (World-
Wide Volkswagen), while "[v]oluntariness requires that the 
defendant's contacts with the forum [S]tate proximately result 
from actions by the defendant himself" (quotation and citation 
omitted), PREP Tours, Inc. v. American Youth Soccer Org., 913 
F.3d 11, 20 (1st Cir. 2019) (PREP Tours).  Ultimately, 
foreseeability and voluntariness ensure that the plaintiff's 
"unilateral activity" does not form the basis for jurisdiction 
over the defendant.  Id., quoting Burger King, supra at 474.  
They also lend "a degree of predictability to the legal system" 
by "allow[ing] potential defendants to structure their primary 
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct 
will and will not render them liable to suit."  PREP Tours, 
supra, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, supra. 
 
In the instant case, this requirement is readily satisfied.  
In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that FCA US "transacts 
15 
 
business and contracts to supply services and/or things in this 
Commonwealth and has derived substantial revenue therefrom."  
That business includes the distribution of automobiles into the 
stream of commerce within Massachusetts, including the Sebring 
in the instant case.  The defendant Sudbay, a Massachusetts 
corporation, "operat[es] a car dealership that distributes FCA 
[US] vehicles into the stream of commerce within the 
Commonwealth," including the Sebring at issue.  The plaintiffs 
allege that FCA US and Sudbay are also both involved in the 
"inspecting, . . . selling, advertising, and marketing" of these 
automobiles.  The plaintiffs further allege that Sudbay 
initially sold or leased the Sebring "to a Massachusetts 
resident in May 2003," and that Sudbay, and other Massachusetts 
dealerships, serviced the vehicle up until it was "sold to a New 
Hampshire resident in April of 2011."  FCA US also has a 
registered agent in the Commonwealth. 
 
The plaintiffs have thus clearly alleged that FCA US, 
through these ongoing distribution, maintenance, and marketing 
channels, "has purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within" Massachusetts as "the forum State, 
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Knox, 914 F.3d at 691.  See 
Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1028 (purposeful availment where 
automobile manufacturer's "dealers . . . regularly maintain and 
16 
 
repair" its cars).  Massachusetts's exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over FCA US, therefore, results from FCA US's 
"voluntary" acts and their "foreseeable" consequences and is not 
premised on "random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts" 
(citation omitted).  Knox, supra.11 
 
ii.  Relatedness.  Although FCA US's extensive, voluntary 
business transactions in Massachusetts are a significant part of 
the due process analysis, they are not dispositive, as there 
must also be a relationship between the actions voluntarily 
undertaken in the jurisdiction and the plaintiffs' claims.  See 
Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1025.  After the plaintiffs 
demonstrate that the defendant "'exploit[ed] a market' in the 
forum State," id., quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 
(2014), they must also show that their claims "'arise out of or 
relate to the defendant's contacts' with the forum," Ford Motor, 
supra, quoting Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 262.  Known as 
relatedness, this prong of the due process analysis requires a 
 
11 Plus, FCA US has already faced a products liability suit 
for a car purchased from another Chrysler dealership in 
Massachusetts, Costa v. FCA US LLC, 542 F. Supp. 3d 83, 90 (D. 
Mass. 2021), without "rais[ing] personal jurisdiction 
objections" in that suit, further "bolster[ing]" a "finding of 
purposeful availment," Tom's of Me. v. Acme-Hardesty Co., 565 F. 
Supp. 2d 171, 182 (D. Me. 2008).  Literally speaking, FCA US has 
already been "haled into court" in this forum State.  See World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
17 
 
"demonstrable nexus" between the claim and "the defendant's 
forum contacts."  Knox, 914 F.3d at 691. 
In the context of a company doing extensive business in the 
forum State, this requirement is most clearly articulated in the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Bristol-Myers, 582 
U.S. 255.  In that case, the Supreme Court determined that a 
California State court lacked personal jurisdiction over 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (BMS), id. at 268, "a large 
pharmaceutical company . . . incorporated in Delaware and 
headquartered in New York," for the nonresident plaintiffs'[12] 
claims for "injuries allegedly caused by" one of the 
prescription drugs manufactured and sold by BMS, id. at 258-259. 
 
In so holding, the Court noted that "[t]he nonresident 
plaintiffs did not allege that they obtained [the drug] through 
California physicians or from any other California source; nor 
did they claim that they were injured by [the drug] or were 
treated for their injuries in California."  Bristol-Myers, 582 
U.S. at 259.  The nonresident plaintiffs also did not allege 
that the drug "was designed and developed in BMS's California 
research facilities" (citation and alteration omitted).  Id. at 
260-261.  Instead, they relied on the claims raised by resident 
 
 
12 BMS did not argue against personal jurisdiction for the 
claims brought by California residents in that mass tort action.  
See Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 259. 
18 
 
plaintiffs who "prescribed, obtained, and ingested [the drug] in 
California," id. at 265, seemingly in an attempt to forum shop 
in a favorable State, Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1031. 
 
Thus, the nonresident plaintiffs' claims had no actual 
connection to the forum State because "all the conduct giving 
rise to the nonresidents' claims occurred elsewhere."  Bristol-
Myers, 582 U.S. at 265.  Simply, there was no "adequate link 
between the [forum] State and the nonresidents' claims."  Id. at 
264.  Specific personal jurisdiction over BMS for these claims, 
therefore, was inappropriate in California, regardless of BMS's 
"extensive forum contacts that [were] unrelated to those 
claims," because, as the Court explained, "a defendant's general 
connections with the forum are not enough."  Id. 
 
In the instant case, unlike in Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 
264, not only did FCA US engage in extensive business dealings 
in the forum, but there is also a causal connection between its 
business dealings and the injury, albeit an indirect one, as the 
automobile was first sold in Massachusetts and eventually 
purchased by Doucet, a resident of a neighboring State.  As 
explained supra in our discussion of personal jurisdiction under 
the Commonwealth's long-arm statute, "but for" the first sale of 
the automobile in Massachusetts, Doucet would not have ended up 
purchasing, driving, and being injured in the automobile in the 
neighboring State of New Hampshire.  FCA US, nonetheless, claims 
19 
 
that this causal connection is too attenuated to support 
jurisdiction in Massachusetts. 
In evaluating this attenuation argument, and whether these 
facts are sufficient to establish the necessary nexus between 
the defendant's contacts and the plaintiff's claims, both 
parties turn to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ford 
Motor, 141 S. Ct. 1017, for guidance, as do we.  In that case, 
the plaintiffs brought separate products liability suits against 
Ford Motor Company (Ford) in the courts of two States where 
serious car accidents occurred and where the victims resided.  
Id. at 1022-1023.  Ford had argued that the State courts lacked 
personal jurisdiction "because the particular car involved in 
the crash was not first sold in the forum State, nor was it 
designed or manufactured there."  Id. at 1022.13 
 
The court, as well as the concurring opinions, rejected 
this analysis as unduly constrictive.  See Ford Motor, 141 S. 
Ct. at 1026; id. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment); id. at 1039 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the 
 
 
13 Thus, Ford was making the exact opposite argument of the 
one being made by the automobile company here:  that is, that 
due process required jurisdiction in the State of first sale, 
not the State in which the injury occurred.  See Ford Motor, 141 
S. Ct. at 1022-1023.  Indeed, FCA US successfully made the same 
argument, albeit before the issuance of Ford Motor, when the 
plaintiffs first sought to bring this suit in New Hampshire.  As 
a result, in this case, the plaintiffs have been placed in a 
Kafkaesque procedural predicament by the defense. 
20 
 
judgment).  They all concluded that the combination of extensive 
business dealings in the forum State and an injury in that State 
was sufficient to confer jurisdiction.  In so holding, none of 
the opinions expressly ruled out that the combination of 
extensive dealings in the forum State and the first sale of the 
automobile at issue in the forum State would be sufficient.  
Nonetheless, FCA US argues here that such an interpretation is 
implicit in the Court's and the concurrences' reasoning.  We 
disagree. 
In upholding jurisdiction, Justice Kagan, writing for the 
Court, rejected Ford's strict "causation-only approach" as 
unnecessarily narrowing the bounds of specific personal 
jurisdiction.  Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1026.  In so doing, she 
emphasized that causation is one -- but not the only -- way to 
satisfy the "arise out of or relate to" requirement, which may 
be read in two parts.  Id.  "The first half of that standard 
asks about causation; but the back half, after the 'or,' 
contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction 
without a causal showing."  Id.  In other words, the "relate to" 
clause captures more conduct than the "arise out of" clause, 
which hews more closely to "proof of causation -- i.e., proof 
that the plaintiff's claim came about because of the defendant's 
in-[S]tate conduct."  See id.  Furthermore, in evaluating how 
Ford's "conduct" in the forum States "relate[d] to the claims" 
21 
 
presented by forum State resident plaintiffs, the Court 
explained that the plaintiffs' suits "ar[ose] from . . . car 
accident[s] in" States where Ford "advertised, sold, and 
serviced" the allegedly defective car models (emphases added).  
Id. at 1028.  The Court concluded, therefore, that this behavior 
established "a strong relationship among the defendant, the 
forum, and the litigation -- the essential foundation of 
specific jurisdiction" (quotations and citation omitted).  Id. 
 
As stated supra, the Court did not rule out jurisdiction 
where the first sale of the automobile at issue occurs in the 
State.  Rather, the thrust of the opinion was to expand, not 
contract, jurisdiction, beyond requiring "but for" causation.  
See Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1026.  Nevertheless, FCA US argues 
here that that was the Court's intent.  It does so based mostly 
on the discussion between the Court and Justice Gorsuch's 
concurring opinion, particularly the footnote addressing the 
concurrence written by Justice Gorsuch.  See id. at 1027 n.3.  
In that footnote, the Court wrote, 
"In thus reiterating this Court's longstanding approach, we 
reject Justice Gorsuch's apparent (if oblique) view that a 
[S]tate court should have jurisdiction over a nationwide 
corporation like Ford on any claim, no matter how unrelated 
to the State or Ford's activities there.  See [id.] at 
1039.  On that view, for example, a California court could 
hear a claim against Ford brought by an Ohio plaintiff 
based on an accident occurring in Ohio involving a car 
purchased in Ohio.  Removing the need for any connection 
between the case and forum State would transfigure our 
specific jurisdiction standard as applied to corporations.  
22 
 
"Case-linked" jurisdiction, see [id.] at 1024-1025, would 
then become not case-linked at all." 
 
Id. at 1027 n.3.  See id. at 1035 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
We reject this interpretation by FCA US of that footnoted 
discussion and of the Court's decision as a whole.  Where a 
first sale of the automobile that caused the injury occurred in 
the State, there is a relationship between the claim stemming 
from that injury and the defendant's contacts in the forum.  See 
Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1026.  There are not only extensive 
business dealings by the defendant in the State in which 
jurisdiction is sought, but also business dealings related to 
the automobile that is the subject of the litigation.  See id. 
at 1022, 1026.  Consequently, there is a "strong relationship 
between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Id. at 1028.  See id. at 1035 (Gorsuch, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (State in which allegedly 
defective automobile at issue in suit is sold has "strong 
interest in ensuring [it does not] become marketplace[] for 
unreasonably dangerous products").14 
 
 
14 Our interpretation of Ford Motor is consistent with those 
of Federal and other State courts that have applied Ford Motor 
since its recent issuance.  For example, in the United States 
District Court for the District of Idaho, the court found 
relatedness stemming from a "but for" causation relationship in 
which a foreign corporation sold and shipped products to a 
distributor in Idaho, who then sold the defective product to 
23 
 
 
iii.  Reasonableness and interstate federalism.  Lastly, 
"[o]nce it has been decided that a defendant purposefully 
established minimum contacts within the forum State, these 
contacts may be considered in light of other factors to 
determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would 
comport with 'fair play and substantial justice,'" Burger King, 
471 U.S. at 476, quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320, and the 
principles of interstate federalism, Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 
1025, 1030.  We conclude that specific personal jurisdiction in 
 
Pennsylvania plaintiffs, causing injury to them there in their 
State of residence.  See McHugh vs. Vertical Partners W., LLC, 
U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 2:20-cv-00581-DCN, slip op. at 2, 11-12 (D. 
Idaho Apr. 19, 2021).  Like this case, the plaintiffs brought 
their suit not in their State of residence, but in the State 
where the defective product was first sold.  Id. at 2.  Unlike 
this case, however, the plaintiffs purchased the item directly 
from the forum State distributor.  Id.  Regardless, "but for" 
the foreign corporation first sending its defective product to 
the forum State distributor, the injury would not have occurred 
out of State.  See id.  That is the same scenario presented 
here:  but for FCA US sending the Sebring to a Massachusetts 
dealership-distributor, Doucet's injury would not have occurred 
in New Hampshire. 
 
 
In a products liability case this year, the First District 
Appellate Court of Illinois recognized personal jurisdiction 
over a South Korean corporation, which manufactured a battery 
that allegedly exploded inside another product and caused injury 
to the plaintiff.  Kothawala v. Whole Leaf, LLC, 2023 IL App 
(1st) 210972, ¶¶ 1, 4, 6.  The court reasoned that "given that a 
finding of relatedness requires something short of but-for 
causation under Ford [Motor], it [was] difficult to see how 
anyone could plausibly argue that [the] plaintiff's claims 
[were] not at least 'related to'" the foreign corporation's 
"activities in" the forum State, id. at ¶ 54, based on the 
corporation's "direct shipment of battery packs to a distributor 
for resale," id. at ¶ 51, in the forum State. 
24 
 
Massachusetts over FCA US LLC for the plaintiffs' claims is 
consistent with these "two sets of values."  See id. at 1025, 
citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293. 
 
As an initial matter, we emphasize that "a defendant who 
has purposefully directed [its] activities at" the forum "must 
present a compelling case that the presence of some other 
considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable."  Burger 
King, 471 U.S. at 477.  As discussed supra, and conceded by FCA 
US at the motion hearing, there is no question that FCA US 
"purposefully directed" its activities at Massachusetts.  See 
id.  Indeed, those contacts are significant and widespread.  The 
first sale of the automobile in question also provides a causal 
connection between those activities and the automobile in 
question.  See Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1026.  That automobile 
also remained on the streets and highways of Massachusetts for 
eight years before it was sold to Doucet in a neighboring State. 
 
Although the Court in Ford Motor, and perhaps Justice Alito 
in his concurrence in that case, may suggest that the connection 
to the litigation is stronger in the State in which the injury 
occurred (New Hampshire) than in the State in which the first 
sale occurred (Massachusetts), both are strong enough where the 
defendant does substantial business in the State at issue to 
satisfy the requirements of due process.  See Ford Motor, 141 S. 
Ct. at 1030; id. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring in the 
25 
 
judgment).  "When minimum contacts exist, due process demands no 
more than a reasonable forum."  O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel 
Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 325 (3d Cir. 2007).  It does not demand 
"the best forum."15  Just because "principles of 'interstate 
federalism' support jurisdiction" over the plaintiffs' suit in 
the State in which Doucet was injured and lives does not mean 
these principles do not also support jurisdiction in the State 
of first sale when substantial business is done in that State.  
See Ford Motor, supra at 1029-1030. 
As emphasized by Justice Gorsuch in his concurrence in Ford 
Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1035, a State has a significant interest in 
protecting itself against the sale of defective products within 
its borders.  Accordingly, FCA US's purposefully directed 
activities within Massachusetts enhance the Commonwealth's 
interest in this litigation, where the allegedly defective 
automobile at issue remained in Massachusetts for eight years 
prior to its sale to a resident of a neighboring State, and 
 
 
15 Of additional consideration in this instance is the 
presence of two defendants:  Sudbay, which is "at home" only in 
Massachusetts, and FCA US, which is not at home in either 
Massachusetts or New Hampshire.  See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 
U.S. 117, 134-139 (2014).  Although Massachusetts may exercise 
its general personal jurisdictional powers over Sudbay, see id., 
the plaintiffs would have to demonstrate that Sudbay has the 
minimal contacts related to this suit in New Hampshire to bring 
this suit against it there, see Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1024.  
Massachusetts, therefore, provides an efficient forum for the 
resolution of this case.  World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 
(discussing importance of "efficient" forum). 
26 
 
where there may be other defective vehicles within our borders, 
by virtue of FCA US's ongoing contacts.  Finally, there is no 
issue of the plaintiffs bringing a suit in a State to which 
their claims have no connection as a means of forum shopping, as 
there was in Bristol-Myers.  See Ford Motor, supra at 1031; 
Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 265-266.  The plaintiffs originally 
filed their suit in New Hampshire, the State of residence and 
injury, and only brought this suit in the State of first sale 
after the defendants argued, and the Federal District Court in 
New Hampshire concluded, prior to the Ford Motor decision, that 
jurisdiction did not lie in the State in which the injury 
occurred.  As the defendants are now arguing the exact opposite 
position, and the plaintiffs have been bounced from court to 
court for years, the values of "fair play and substantial 
justice," as well as interstate federalism, clearly now support 
jurisdiction in Massachusetts.  See Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 
1024, 1030, quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; Burger King, 
471 U.S. at 476. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude 
that personal jurisdiction exists in Massachusetts over FCA US 
for these claims, pursuant to both the Commonwealth's long-arm 
statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  We therefore vacate the judgment 
27 
 
dismissing FCA US as a party to the case and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.