Title: LINDER v SMITH
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-019
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 1981

N o . 8 0 - 1 9 I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 1 BRUCE LINDER, P l a i n t i f f , C. W. SMITH, M.D. ; ROGER MURRAY, M.D. ; and t h e MONTANA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, a M o n t a n a corporation, D e f e n d a n t . ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For P l a i n t i f f : H o n . M i k e G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , M o n t a n a D o u g l a s R. D r y s d a l e , B o z e m a n , M o n t a n a R. P. R y a n argued, B i l l i n g s , M o n t a n a For D e f e n d a n t s : G e r a l d N e e l y argued, B i l l i n g s , M o n t a n a B r u c e T o o l e , B i l l i n g s , M o n t a n a For A m i c u s C u r i a e : L u x a n and M u r f i t t L a w F i r m , H e l e n a , M o n t a n a S u b m i t t e d : M a r c h 23, 1981 D e c i d e d : dull 10 Filed: dpk!$.Oa8l r n M , O & M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . P l a i n t i f f Linder s e e k s a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l i t y of t h e Montana Medical M a l p r a c t i c e Panel A c t , sect i o n s 27-6-101 e t s e q . , MCA. T h i s Court accepted o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e c a u s e i n a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment proceeding. W e f i n d t h a t t h e act is c o n s t i t u t i o n a l w i t h one e x c e p t i o n as h e r e a f t e r noted. P l a i n t i f f Linder a l l e g e d l y s u f f e r e d an i n j u r y w h i l e he w a s a p a t i e n t of D r . Roger Murray. H i s claim a g a i n s t t h e d o c t o r c o n s t i t u t e s a " m a l p r a c t i c e claim" w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n of sect i o n 27-6-103(2), MCA, and by s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t should have been f i l e d w i t h t h e p a n e l . S e c t i o n 27-6-105, MCA. P l a i n t i f f r e f used t o submit h i s claim to t h e p a n e l , a r g u i n g t h a t t h e Panel A c t is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l on its f a c e . The panel was c r e a t e d by t h e 1977 l e g i s l a t u r e and is com- posed of t h r e e lawyers and t h r e e h e a l t h care p r o v i d e r s . The a r t i c u l a t e d purposes of t h e panel are t o s c r e e n m a l p r a c t i c e claims i n o r d e r to p r e v e n t t h e f i l i n g i n c o u r t of a c t i o n s which d o n o t "permit a t least a r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e of m a l p r a c t i c e " and to promote s e t t l e m e n t of m e r i t o r i o u s claims. S e c t i o n 27-6-102, MCA. A c l a i m a n t must submit h i s claim to t h e panel p r i o r to f i l i n g i n c o u r t , s e c t i o n 27-6-301, MCA, b u t t h e c l a i m a n t is n o t bound by t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e p a n e l , s e c t i o n 27-6-606, MCA, n o r is t h e d e c i s i o n a d m i s s i b l e i n a s u b s e q u e n t j u d i c i a l a c t i o n , s e c t i o n 27-6-704, MCA. P l a i n t i f f c h a l l e n g e s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e act on its f a c e , a l l e g i n g v i o l a t i o n s o f : (1) t h e r i g h t to a j u r y t r i a l ; ( 2 ) t h e r i g h t of access to t h e c o u r t s ; ( 3 ) s u b s t a n t i v e and p r o c e d u r a l due p r o c e s s ; ( 4 ) t h e p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t s p e c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n ; ( 5 ) e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e laws; ( 6 ) t h e p r i n c i p l e of s e p a r a t i o n of powers; ( 7 ) t h e t a x i n g powers; ( 8 ) t h e r i g h t of p u b l i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n and t h e r i g h t to know; ( 9 ) freedom of speech and freedom from l i b e l . P l a i n t i f f ' s f i r s t c o n t e n t i o n is t h a t t h e mandatory sub- m i s s i o n of c l a i m s to t h e panel u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n t e r f e r e s w i t h h i s r i g h t to t r i a l by j u r y , a s guaranteed by 1972 Mont. Const., A r t 11, § 26. Defendants a r g u e t h a t a c l a i m a n t is f r e e t o con- t i n u e to j u r y t r i a l no matter what t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e p a n e l , and t h e j u r y remains t h e f i n a l d e t e r m i n e r of f a c t . F u r t h e r , t h e p a n e l d e c i s i o n is n o t b i n d i n g , nor is it a d m i s s i b l e a t t r i a l . Thus, t h e r e is no i n t e r f e r e n c e with t h e j u r y t r i a l p r o c e s s . Defendants argue t h a t submission to t h e panel is m e r e l y a per- m i s s i b l e d e l a y i n t h e p a t h to t h e u l t i m a t e j u r y v e r d i c t . W e a g r e e . The Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n g u a r a n t e e s t h e l i t i g a n t t h e r i g h t t o t r i a l by j u r y . T h i s Court has h e l d t h a t t h e r i g h t t o t r i a l by j u r y i n t h i s state is t h e same as t h a t guaranteed by t h e Seventh Amendment. C o n s o l i d a t e d Gold & S a p p h i r e Mining Co . v . S t r u t h e r s ( 1 9 1 0 ) , 41 Mont. 565, 571, 1 1 1 P. 152, 155. I n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e e x t e n t of t h i s r i g h t , t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have focused on pre- s e r v i n g t h e r i g h t of t r i a l by j u r y , r a t h e r t h a n t h e i n c i d e n t s i n v o l v e d i n c a r r y i n g o u t t h a t r i g h t ; it is a matter of s u b s t a n c e , r a t h e r t h a n form. Colgrove v. B a t t i n ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 413 U.S. 149, 155-156, 93 S.Ct. 2448, 2452, 37 L.Ed.2d 522, 528. The purpose of t h e j u r y i n c i v i l c a s e s is to a s s u r e a f a i r and e q u i t a b l e r e s o l u t i o n of f a c t u a l i s s u e s . Colgrove , s u p r a , 413 U.S. a t 157, 93 S.Ct. a t 2453, 37 L.Ed.2d a t 529. T h e r e f o r e , changes which a f f e c t t h e form, b u t n o t t h e s u b s t a n c e of t h e r i g h t may p a s s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l muster. J u s t i c e Brandeis, i n approving t h e use of an a u d i t o r to narrow t h e i s s u e s of f a c t f o r a j u r y and t o e x p r e s s an o p i n i o n on t h e f a c t s , noted: "The command of t h e 7 t h Amendment t h a t ' t h e r i g h t o f t r i a l by j u r y s h a l l be p r e s e r v e d ' does not r e q u i r e t h a t o l d forms of p r a c t i c e and procedure be r e t a i n e d . Walker v. New Mexico & S o u t h e r n P a c i f i c R. R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596. Compare Twining v. New J e r s e y , 211 U.S. 78, 101. It does not p r o h i b i t t h e i n t r o d u c - t i o n of new methods f o r d e t e r m i n i n g what f a c t s are a c t u a l l y i n i s s u e , n o r does it p r o h i b i t t h e i n t r o d u c - t i o n of new r u l e s of e v i d e n c e . Changes i n t h e s e may b e made. New d e v i c e s may be used to a d a p t t h e a n c i e n t i n s t i t u t i o n to p r e s e n t needs and to make of it an e f f i c i e n t i n s t r u m e n t i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e . Indeed, such changes are e s s e n t i a l to t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of t h e r i g h t . The l i m i t a t i o n imposed by t h e Amendment is merely t h a t enjoyment of t h e r i g h t o f t r i a l by j u r y be n o t o b s t r u c t e d , and t h a t t h e u l t i m a t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of i s s u e s of f a c t by t h e j u r y b e n o t i n t e r f e r e d with." Ex parte P e t e r s o n ( 1 9 2 0 ) , 253 U.S. 300, 309-310, 40 S.Ct. 543, 546, 64 L.Ed 919, 923-924. The Montana Court and o t h e r c o u r t s have approved v a r i o u s p r e t r i a l p r o c e d u r e s which burden t h e c l a i m a n t i n h i s e f f o r t s t o g e t i n t o c o u r t . The r e q u i r e m e n t of a p r e t r i a l c o n f e r e n c e d o e s n o t v i o l a t e t h e j u r y t r i a l r i g h t . S t a t e ex re1 . Kennedy v. D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 1 2 1 Mont. 320, 194 P.2d 256; s u b m i t t i n g a c a s e t o a master p r i o r to g i v i n g it to t h e j u r y does n o t v i o l a t e t h e Seventh Amendment. C r a t e o , I n c . v . Intermark, I n c . ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 6 ) , 536 F.2d 862, 867-868, c e r t . d e n i e d 429 U.S. 896, 97 S.Ct. 259, 50 L.Ed.2d 180; Rule 53, M.R.Civ.P. S e v e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n s have addressed t h e problem of a l l o w i n g t h e p a n e l ' s f i n d i n g s i n t o e v i d e n c e i n a s u b s e q u e n t t r i a l , q u e s t i o n i n g whether t h i s p r a c t i c e i n t e r f e r e s w i t h t h e j u r y ' s f a c t - f i n d i n g role. A New York Supreme Court determined t h a t t h e j u r y is s t i l l t h e f i n a l a r b i t e r , w i t h t h e p a n e l ' s opin- i o n being t r e a t e d a s merely a n o t h e r e x p e r t o p i n i o n . Comiskey v. A r l e n ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S. 122, 127-128. See a l s o Woods v. Holy Cross H o s p i t a l ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 9 ) , 591 F. 2d 1164, 1179-1180. I n Montana, t h e panel I s d e c i s i o n is n o t a d m i s s i b l e , t h u s p r e c l u d i n g t h e claim t h a t t h e r e is any u s u r p a t i o n of t h e j u r y f u n c t i o n . W e f i n d no v i o l a t i o n of t h e r i g h t to a j u r y t r i a l . Claimant g e t s a f u l l and f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of h i s claim i n a j u r y t r i a l s e t t i n g . Requiring p l a i n t i f f to begin t h e p r o c e s s by s u b m i t t i n g h i s c l a i m t o t h e panel is a p e r m i s s i b l e i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h t h e j u r y t r i a l r i g h t . See North C e n t r a l S e r v i c e s , I n c . v Hafdahl ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont . , 625 P.2d 56, 58-59, 38 St.Rep. 372, 374-375. See also Woods, s u p r a ; Johnson v. S t . V i n c e n t H o s p i t a l , I n c . ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Ind . , 404 N.E.2d 585, 591-593; E a s t i n v. Broomfield ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 116 A r i z . 576, 570 P.2d 744, 748-749; Paro v. Longwood H o s p i t a l ( 1 9 7 7 ) , Mass. , 369 N.E.2d 985, 991. P l a i n t i f f n e x t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e Panel A c t d e n i e s him h i s r i g h t of access to t h e c o u r t s , i n v i o l a t i o n of 1972 Mont. Const. A r t . 1 1 16. Defendants argue t h a t t h e d e l a y s and costs are n o t s o s u b s t a n t i a l so as to deny access, and t h a t t h e d e l a y s and costs a r e imposed f o r r a t i o n a l r e a s o n s . Many o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s have c o n s i d e r e d t h i s q u e s t i o n , and w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e Missouri A c t , a l l o t h e r panel acts have been upheld a g a i n s t t h i s c h a l l e n g e . See P a r o , s u p r a , 369 N.E.2d a t 989-990; S t a t e ex rel. Strykowski v. W i l k i e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 8 1 Wis.2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434, 444; P r e n d e r g a s t v. Nelson ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657, 663-664; Woods, s u p r a , 591 F.2d a t 1173, f n . 16; Johnson, s u p r a , 404 N.E.2d a t 592, and 593-596; Carter v. Sparkman ( 1 9 7 6 ) , F l a . - , 335 So.2d 802, 805-806. The c o u r t s a d d r e s s i n g t h i s i s s u e have noted t h a t access to t h e c o u r t s is n o t an independent fundamental r i g h t ; access is o n l y g i v e n such a s t a t u s when a n o t h e r fundamental right--such as t h e r i g h t to d i s s o l v e t h e marital r e l a t i o n s h i p - - i s a t i s s u e , and no a l t e r n a t i v e forum e x i s t s i n which to e n f o r c e t h a t r i g h t . M dcx44-e v. C o n n e c t i c u t ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 401 U.S. 371, 9 1 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113. In cases n o t i n v o l v i n g a fundamental r i g h t , access may be hindered i f t h e r e e x i s t s a r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r doing so. Woods, s u p r a ; P a r o , s u p r a ; Ortwein v. Schwab ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 410 U.S. 656, 93 S.Ct. 1172, 35 L.Ed.2d 572. Thus t h e panel acts have been upheld a g a i n s t t h e access c h a l l e n g e , because t h e c o u r t s have found f i n d a r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r t h e d e l a y s and expense. I n a l l i n s t a n c e s , t h e a r t i c u l a t e d b a s i s f o r t h e panel acts h a s been t h e m a l p r a c t i c e crisis e x i s t i n g i n many states, w i t h t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n intended a s a means to l i m i t m a l p r a c t i c e f i l i n g s t o t h o s e which a r e c l e a r l y m e r i t o r i o u s . W e f i n d t h a t t h e Montana A c t was e n a c t e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e f o r t h e same r e a s o n . Because of t h e complexity of t h i s case, and i n view of t h e f a c t t h a t we accepted o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n , w e appointed a Master to act as f a c t - f i n d e r f o r t h i s Court. H e heard t e s t i m o n y and accepted e x h i b i t s , and i s s u e d f i n d i n g s which were sub- s e q u e n t l y adopted by t h i s Court. H i s r e p o r t shows t h a t a medical m a l p r a c t i c e crisis e x i s t s i n t h e S t a t e of Montana, n o t i n g t h a t Montana's i n s u r a n c e r a t e is c i t e d a s 1 7 t h h i g h e s t i n t h e United S t a t e s , and t h a t t h e r e is an enormous i n c r e a s e i n p h y s i c i a n s c a r r y i n g no i n s u r a n c e . H e determined t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t i o n w a s e n a c t e d i n response to t h i s crisis and to g u a r a n t e e q u a l i t y h e a l t h care to Montanans. A d d i t i o n a l l y , we n o t e t h a t i n 1976 t h e l e g i s l a t u r e a u t h o r i z e d an i n t e r i m l e g i s l a t i v e committee to r e p o r t t o t h e 1977 l e g i s l a t u r e on t h e medical s i t u a t i o n i n Montana. T h a t committee compiled a r e p o r t i n d i c a t i n g t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e medical s i t u a t i o n i n Montana "appears t o be less c r i t i c a l t h a n i n many o t h e r states," y e t premium costs are e v e r i n c r e a s i n g and t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of coverage is of " p r e s s i n g concern." The h e a r i n g s o f t h e 1977 l e g i s l a t u r e i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e panel a c t w a s e n a c t e d i n r e s p o n s e t o t h i s s i t u a t i o n . The f i n d i n g s of t h e Master and t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d to the l e g i s l a t u r e c o n v i n c e s us t h a t t h e Panel A c t is a r e a s o n a b l e r e s p o n s e t o t h e medical s i t u a t i o n i n Montana. Because t h e d e l a y s and expense a r e n o t unreasonable i n l i g h t of t h e aims of t h e sta- t u t e w e f i n d no i m p e r m i s s i b l e burden on access. T h i s Court h a s upheld v a r i o u s o t h e r l e g i s l a t i v e e n a c t m e n t s which d e l a y o r burden t h e r i g h t of access. Without d e f i n i n g t h e s t a t u s of t h e r i g h t of a c c e s s , n o r s p e c i f i c a l l y s e t t i n g o u t t h e p e r m i s s i b l e l e g i s l a t i v e r e a s o n s f o r r e s t r i c t i n g a c c e s s , t h i s C o u r t approved t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of a p r e t r i a l c o n f e r e n c e . C a r l i n v. District Court ( 1 9 4 5 ) , 118 Mont. 127, 164 P.2d 155. See also Souders v. District Court ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 92 Mont. 272, 1 2 P.2d 852, i n which t h i s Court approved t h e s t a t u t e r e q u i r i n g p l a i n t i f f to make a d e p o s i t w i t h t h e c o u r t b e f o r e pro- s e c u t i n g a t a x deed a c t i o n . Other states have noted t h a t it is r e a s o n a b l e t o r e q u i r e p a r t i e s t o seek a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e s o l u t i o n s b e f o r e going t o c o u r t , Strykowski, s u p r a , 261 N.W.2d a t 444, and t h a t a bond may be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r e q u i r e d b e f o r e a c l a i m a n t t a k e s a m a l p r a c t i c e claim t o c o u r t . P a r o , s u p r a 369 N.E. 2d a t 989-990. The F l o r i d a c o u r t determined i n Carter, s u p r a , t h a t t h e c o s t s and d e l a y s involved i n t h e panel procedure are p r i m a r i l y r e l a t e d to d i s c o v e r y and would be n e c e s s a r y i n p r e p a r i n g to go to c o u r t anyway, and t h u s are r e a s o n a b l e . The p l a i n t i f f urges t h i s Court to f o l l o w Madison v. Yunker ( 1 9 7 8 ) 1 Mont . , 589 P.2d 126, 35 St.Rep. 1311, i n which we found an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e n i a l of a c c e s s i n t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t a p l a i n t i f f demand a r e t r a c t i o n from an a l l e g e d l i b e l e r b e f o r e f i l i n g s u i t . W e f i n d t h a t case to be d i s t i n g u i s h - a b l e from t h e i n s t a n t case i n t h a t t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n pro- v i d e s e v e r y person w i t h an independent r i g h t of e x p r e s s i o n sub- ject to being r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a l l abuses of t h a t l i b e r t y . The s t a t u t e i n Madison a l s o changed t h e remedy f o r l i b e l which was provided e l s e w h e r e i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . 1972 Mont. Const., A r t . 11, S $ 7 and 16. The M a l p r a c t i c e Panel A c t does n o t of fend such c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s . One c o u r t h a s s t r u c k down its s t a t u t e f i n d i n g t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e act imposed " u s e l e s s and a r b i t r a r y d e l a y . " The M i s s o u r i c o u r t determined t h a t t h e d e l a y could d e s t r o y t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s remedies by a b r i d g i n g t h e r i g h t t o f i l e s u i t imme- d i a t e l y , which could r e s u l t i n loss of p e r s o n a l s e r v i c e o v e r d e f e n d a n t s . See S t a t e ex re1 . C a r d i n a l Glennon Memorial H o s p i t a l v. G a e r t n e r ( 1 9 7 9 ) , M o . , 583 S.W.2d 107, 110. P l a i n t i f f h e r e a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e could be problems w i t h t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s because of t h e n e c e s s i t y of f i l i n g w i t h t h e panel b e f o r e going to c o u r t . W e are n o t unmindful of t h e s e problems. However, w e do n o t f i n d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e s i n Montana would n e c e s s a r i l y b r i n g a b o u t t h e s e u n f o r t u n a t e r e s u l t s . S e c t i o n 27-6-702, MCA, states t h a t t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s is t o l l e d upon r e c e i p t of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e p a n e l and does n o t begin a g a i n u n t i l e n t r y of and s e r v i c e on t h e p a r t i e s of t h e p a n e l ' s d e c i s i o n . W e c o n s t r u e t h a t s t a t u t e t o a p p l y to d e f e n d a n t s both known and unknown a t t h e time t h e a p p l i c a t i o n is f i l e d w i t h t h e p a n e l . A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e Montana Rules of C i v i l Procedure allow t h e d e p o s i t i o n of a p o t e n t i a l w i t n e s s to be taken p r i o r to f i l i n g s u i t i n c o u r t . Rule 27, M.R.Civ.P. A p l a i n t i f f , f e a r i n g t h a t a d e f e n d a n t may l e a v e t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n , c a n p e t i t i o n t h e c o u r t f o r a n o r d e r a l l o w i n g him t o p r e s e r v e such testimony. I n sum, w e f i n d s u f f i c i e n t s a f e g u a r d s w i t h i n t h e a c t t o p r o t e c t t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t of access t o t h e c o u r t . The bur- d e n s imposed are r a t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h e aims of t h e act and t h e act c o n s t i t u t e s a r e a s o n a b l e response to t h e medical s i t u a t i o n . Next, p l a i n t i f f c h a l l e n g e s t h e act as being v i o l a t i v e of p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t s t o s u b s t a n t i v e and p r o c e d u r a l due p r o c e s s . H e d o e s n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y set f o r t h h i s due p r o c e s s c l a i m s b u t he a p p e a r s t o d i s p u t e t h a t any b a s i s was shown t o e x i s t which would j u s t i f y t h i s type of l e g i s l a t i o n . There is agreement among a l l c o u r t s c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n , s a v e North Dakota, t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t i o n was adopted t o meet a crisis i n medical care, and t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t i o n a p p e a r s to be a r a t i o n a l response to t h a t crisis. See Woods, s u p r a , 591 F. 2d a t 1175-1176; P r e n d e r g a s t , s u p r a , 256 N.W.2d a t 667-669. The North Dakota Supreme Court found t h a t no such crisis had been shown to e x i s t i n North Dakota, and i n v a l i d a t e d t h e s t a t e s t a t u t e i n p a r t on t h i s b a s i s . Arneson v. Olson ( 1 9 7 8 ) , N . D. , 270 N.W.2d 125, 136. The s t a n d a r d a r t i c u l a t e d by most c o u r t s i n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e l e g i s l a t i o n i n l i g h t of t h e s u b s t a n t i v e due p r o c e s s claim is t h e " r a t i o n a l b a s i s s t a n d a r d , " i.e., t h e l e g i s l a t i o n w i l l be upheld i f t h e laws have a r e a s o n a b l e r e l a t i o n to a p r o p e r l e g i s l a t i v e purpose. Woods, s u p r a , 591 F. 2d a t 1176; Nebbia v. New York ( 1 9 3 4 ) , 291 U . S . 502, 536-537, 54 S.Ct. 505, 515-516, 78 L.Ed. 940, 956-957. But see Arneson, s u p r a , 270 N.W.2d a t 132-133, u t i l i z i n g a s t a n d a r d f a l l i n g somewhere between "strict s c r u t i n y " and " r a t i o n a l b a s i s ." W e s u b s c r i b e to t h e r a t i o n a l b a s i s s t a n d a r d and f i n d t h a t t h e Panel A c t meets t h i s test i n l i g h t of t h e s i t u a t i o n e x i s t i n g i n Montana, as i d e n t i f i e d by t h e Master and t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . A s w e noted i n o u r d i s c u s s i o n above, w e are s a t i s f i e d t h a t s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e w a s c o n s i d e r e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n d e t e r - mining t h a t t h e r e w a s a n e a r - c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n i n Montana. W e w i l l n o t s u b s t i t u t e o u r judgment f o r t h a t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . Aside from t h e a c c e s s problem which is i n h e r e n t l y a proce- d u r a l due p r o c e s s problem, p l a i n t i f f asserts a d e n i a l of due pro- cess by r e a s o n of t h e e x i s t e n c e of d o c t o r s on t h e p a n e l . H e claims a b u i l t - i n b i a s i n t h e system, which p r e v e n t s a c l a i m a n t from r e c e i v i n g a f a i r h e a r i n g . W e n o t e a t t h e o u t s e t t h a t t h e Montana Panel A c t , u n l i k e t h e l e g i s l a t i o n i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s , p r e c l u d e s t h e i n t r o d u c - t i o n i n t o e v i d e n c e a t a subsequent t r i a l , of t h e panel I s f i n d i n g s o r d e c i s i o n s . Thus t h e o n l y e f f e c t of t h e p a n e l ' s d e c i s i o n on a p l a i n t i f f I s case would be to d i s c o u r a g e him from t a k i n g h i s claim t o c o u r t . Even i n t h o s e states i n which t h e d e c i s i o n is a d m i s s i b l e a t a l a t e r t r i a l , t h e c o u r t s c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s i s s u e have found an i n s u f f i c i e n t showing of b i a s or p r e j u d i c e t o amount t o a d e n i a l of due p r o c e s s . And, i n o r d e r to e f f e c t u a t e t h e pur- p o s e s of t h e p a n e l , it is a d v i s a b l e to have medical p e r s o n n e l on t h e p a n e l . Strykowski, s u p r a , 261 N.W.2d a t 446. A d d i t i o n a l l y , it is t o t a l l y s p e c u l a t i v e to a l l e g e t h a t a l l h e a l t h care provi- d e r s are i n c a p a b l e of r e n d e r i n g an unbiased d e c i s i o n , and a c l a i m a n t h a s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to d i s q u a l i f y any member who is i n f a c t s u b j e c t t o t h e c h a r g e of b i a s . S e c t i o n 27-6-404(2), MCA. See also Johnson, s u p r a , 404 N.E.2d a t 593; Hines v. E l k h a r t General H o s p i t a l (N.D. Ind. 1 9 7 9 ) , 465 F.Supp. 421, 429. W e f i n d c l a i m a n t ' s due p r o c e s s c o n t e n t i o n s to be w i t h o u t merit, p a r t i c u l a r l y when c o n s i d e r e d i n view of t h e l i m i t e d e f f e c t which t h e p a n e l ' s d e c i s i o n can have i n Montana i n s u b s e q u e n t l i t i g a t i o n . W e do a d d r e s s one i s s u e , though, which was n o t i n i - t i a l l y r a i s e d by t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e l i t i g a t i o n , b u t which came to o u r a t t e n t i o n d u r i n g t h e h e a r i n g i n t h i s case. S e c t i o n 27-6-704(2), MCA, p r o v i d e s t h a t " [no] s t a t e m e n t made by any p e r s o n d u r i n g a h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e panel may be used as impeaching e v i - dence i n c o u r t ." I n o r d e r t o uphold the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e p a n e l act, w e d e t e r m i n e t h a t t h i s s e c t i o n must be severed from t h e act. It is fundamental to o u r a d v e r s a r i a l system t h a t liti- g a n t s r e t a i n t h e r i g h t to impeach t h e sworn t e s t i m o n y of a w i t - n e s s t e s t i f y i n g a g a i n s t them. W e are mindful t h a t t h i s p r o v i s i o n was e n a c t e d t o a i d t h e f a c t - f i n d i n g by t h e panel and to p r e s e r v e t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of t h e proceedings. But we cannot s a y t h a t a l i t i g a n t w i l l r e c e i v e a f u l l and f a i r h e a r i n g i f he is unable to f u l l y cross-examine i n c o u r t t h e w i t n e s s e s t h a t t e s t i f i e d i n t h e p r i o r h e a r i n g . T h i s d e f e c t is n o t f a t a l to t h e act. W e f i n d t h a t t h e act 404 N.E.2d a t 596-597, c i t i n g R o y s t e r Guano C o . v . V i r g i n i a ( 1 9 2 0 ) , 253 U.S. 412, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989. W e a g r e e t h a t t h i s is t h e p r o p e r test to a p p l y i n t h i s case. There is no a l l e g a t i o n of a fundamental r i g h t a t s t a k e , nor is t h e r e a s u s p e c t c l a s s i f i c a - t i o n involved. T h e r e f o r e we need o n l y d e t e r m i n e whether t h e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n is r a t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d to a l e g i t i m a t e state i n t e r e s t . S t a t e v. C r a i g , s u p r a , 1 6 9 Mont. a t 155-157, 545 P.2d a t 652-653. The burden is on t h e p a r t y c h a l l e n g i n g t h e l e g i s l a t i o n to show t h a t t h e f a c t s do n o t s u p p o r t t h e l e g i s l a t i v e enactment. S t a t e v. C r a i g , s u p r a . W e w i l l presume a s t a t u t e ' s v a l i d i t y , u n l e s s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n is "clear and p a l p a b l e ." N o 1 1 & Kenneady v. Bozeman ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 166 Mont. 504, 507, 534 P.2d 880, 881. See also Paro, s u p r a , 369 N.E.2d a t 988. W e conclude h e r e t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t d i d n o t s u s t a i n h i s burden of p r o o f . Our pre- v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n of t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e Master and of t h e e v i - d e n c e p r e s e n t e d to t h e l e g i s l a t u r e c o n v i n c e s us t h a t t h e l e g i s l a - t u r e responded to a medical s i t u a t i o n i n a r a t i o n a l manner. W e f i n d t h a t t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s rest on d i s t i n c t i o n s between t h e g r o u p s of t o r t p l a i n t i f f s and tort d e f e n d a n t s involved which have a f a i r and r a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p to t h e o b j e c t of t h e l e g i s l a t i o n . The most p e r s u a s i v e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n arguments have been c h a l l e n g e s t o t h e l i m i t a t i o n s on recovery--a p r o v i s i o n n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h e Montana law. The I l l i n o i s c o u r t s t r u c k down a $500,000 l i m i t a t i o n , w h i l e Nebraska upheld t h e same l i m i t a g a i n s t a s p e c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n and e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c h a l l e n g e , a g a i n f i n d i n g a r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r t h i s l i m i t . See Wright v. C e n t r a l Du Page H o s p i t a l A s s o c i a t i o n ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 63 111.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 13L P r e n d e r g a s t , s u p r a , 256 N.W.2d a t 668-69. The o b j e c t i o n to s u c h a l i m i t a t i o n is t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e most s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e d p l a i n t i f f s are t h o s e who are being prevented from f u l l r e c o v e r y . is still complete i n i t s e l f and c a p a b l e of being executed i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . C l a i m a n t ' s n e x t c o n t e n t i o n is t h a t t h e Panel A c t c o n s t i t u - tes s p e c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n and t h a t it v i o l a t e s t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n g u a r a n t e e of t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment. H e does n o t p i n p o i n t t h e b a s i s of h i s c h a l l e n g e , b u t a p p a r e n t l y he is a r g u i n g t h a t t h e medical p r o f e s s i o n a s a group o f p o t e n t i a l tort d e f e n d a n t s is g e t t i n g s p e c i a l t r e a t m e n t not accorded t o o t h e r t o r t d e f e n d a n t s , and t h a t m e d i c a l l y - i n j u r e d p l a i n t i f f s are being s u b j e c t e d t o b a r r i e r s to t h e j u d i c i a l system, n o t p u t i n t h e way of o t h e r t o r t p l a i n t i f f s . T h i s Court h a s i n d i c a t e d t h a t r e a s o n a b l e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s o f p e r s o n s w i l l be upheld a g a i n s t a " s p e c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n " c h a l l e n g e , or a g a i n s t an e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c h a l l e n g e . S t a t e ex r e l . S p a r l i n g v. Hitsman ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 99 Mont. 521, 532, 44 P.2d 747, 752; S t a t e v. C r a i g ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 150, 156, 545 P.2d 649, 652-653. A l a w which o p e r a t e s i n t h e same manner upon a l l per- s o n s i n l i k e c i r c u m s t a n c e s is n o t " s p e c i a l " i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s e n s e . S p a r l i n g , s u p r a . Other c o u r t s c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s c h a l l e n g e have determined t h a t t h i s t y p e of l e g i s l a t i o n is n o t s p e c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n , n o r is it v i o l a t i v e of e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n , because it o p e r a t e s uniformly on a g i v e n class which h a s been d i s t i n g u i s h e d f o r r a t i o n a l r e a s o n s . E a s t i n , s u p r a , 570 P.2d a t 752; Johnson, s u p r a , 404 N.E.2d a t 596-597. Those c o u r t s c o n s i d e r i n g t h e s e q u e s t i o n s i n r e l a t i o n to t h e panel acts have d e a l t w i t h t h e s p e c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n and e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n arguments on a similar basis--looking f o r a r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s which rests on a ground of d i f - f e r e n c e having a f a i r and s u b s t a n t i a l r e l a t i o n t o t h e o b j e c t of t h e l e g i s l a t i o n . Leuthold v. Brandjord e t a l . ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 100 Mont. 96, 105, 47 P.2d 41, 45; P a r o , s u p r a , 369 N.E.2d a t 987-89 and f o o t n o t e 6; E a s t i n , s u p r a , 570 P.2d a t 750-751; Johnson, s u p r a , No such d i s c r i m i n a t i o n is p r e s e n t i n t h e Montana l a w . A l l p l a i n t i f f s may pursue t h e i r remedies t o t h e f u l l e s t , c o n d i t i o n a l o n l y on s u b m i t t i n g t h e claim t o t h e p a n e l . And, a g a i n , because t h e panel d e c i s i o n is n o t binding n o r even a d m i s s i b l e i n a sub- s e q u e n t c o u r t proceeding, t h e r e is no p o s s i b i l i t y of any i n f l u e n c e on t h e jury. H e a l t h c a r e p r o v i d e r s remain s u b j e c t to s u i t , and g a i n no advantage o v e r any o t h e r group of d e f e n d a n t s . A j u r y w i l l never be aware of any d e c i s i o n f o r o r a g a i n s t t h e s e d e f e n d a n t s by t h e p a n e l . Any d i s c r i m i n a t i o n comes o n l y from t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of d i s c o u r a g i n g s u i t , a r e s u l t which is r e a s o n a b l e i n l i g h t o f t h e medical s i t u a t i o n . W e f i n d no v i o l a t i o n of e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n or t h e p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t s p e c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n . One a d d i t i o n a l argument advanced by p l a i n t i f f is t h a t t h e P a n e l A c t v i o l a t e s t h e p r o h i b i t i o n s i n t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n a g a i n s t unlawful d e l e g a t i o n of j u d i c i a l and l e g i s l a t i v e power and i n f r i n g e s on t h e d o c t r i n e of s e p a r a t i o n of powers. 1972 Mont. Const. A r t . 111, § 1, A r t . V, § 1, A r t . V I I , § 1. P l a i n t i f f c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e panel h a s been g i v e n h e a r i n g and d e c i s i o n a l powers, b u t t h a t it cannot r e n d e r a j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n or u t i l i z e p r o t e c t i v e d i s c o v e r y procedures. T h i s , he c o n t e n d s , impedes h i s a c c e s s to t h e c o u r t s , and c o n s t i t u t e s an unlawful u s u r p a t i o n of power by non j u d i c i a l b o d i e s . Defendants contend t h a t t h e p a n e l is a t most an a d v i s o r y body and e x e r c i s e s no t r u e j u d i c i a l f u n c t i o n s . Thus t h e r e is no s e p a r a t i o n of powers problem and no unlawful d e l e g a t i o n of power. The Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n demands t h a t t h e t h r e e branches of government remain s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t , 1972 Mont . Cons t . , A r t . 1 1 , 1 , i n o r d e r t o keep each branch a c c o u n t a b l e t o t h e p e o p l e , and to p r e v e n t too much power from being lodged i n any one branch of government. O I N e i l l v. Yellowstone Irr. D i s t . e t a l . ( 1 9 1 2 ) , 44 Mont. 492, 505, 1 2 1 P. 283, 286. A similar p r o v i s i o n e x i s t s i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n s of most states, and most states c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s q u e s t i o n have upheld t h e panel acts i n t h e f a c e of t h i s c h a l l e n g e . E a s t i n , s u p r a , 570 P.2d a t 750; Johnson, s u p r a , 404 N.E.2d a t 597-598; P r e n d e r g a s t , s u p r a , 256 N.W.2d a t 666-667. But see Arneson, s u p r a , 270 N.W.2d a t 131-132, f o r a c o n t r a r y h o l d i n g . By t h e terms of most panel acts, t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e panel is a d m i s s i b l e i n c o u r t , b u t it is n o t b i n d i n g i n any way. Thus many c o u r t s have found no v i o l a t i o n of t h e d o c t r i n e of s e p a r a t i o n o f powers, because t h e a c t i o n s of t h e panel are a t most a d v i s o r y and t h e panel h a s no power to r e n d e r an e n f o r c e a b l e d e c i s i o n . The r e s u l t h a s no more weight t h a n an e x p e r t o p i n i o n . P r e n d e r g a s t , s u p r a ; E a s t i n , s u p r a . The Arizona Supreme Court n o t e d i n E a s t i n , s u p r a , t h a t " I [ j l u d i c i a l power is t h e power of t h e c o u r t to d e c i d e and pronounce a judgment and c a r r y it i n t o e f f e c t between p e r s o n s and p a r t i e s who b r i n g a case b e f o r e it f o r d e c i s i o n . " The Montana Court r e c o g n i z e s t h e same d e f i n i t i o n of j u d i c i a l power, and h a s upheld o t h e r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b o d i e s a g a i n s t t h i s c h a l l e n g e , where t h o s e b o d i e s are unable to r e n d e r e n f o r c e a b l e judgments. Shea v. North-Butte Min. Co. e t a1 . ( 1 9 1 9 ) , 55 Mont. 522, 536-537, 179 P. 499, 504. The d e c i s i o n of t h e Montana panel is n o t e n f o r c e a b l e , and u n l i k e t h e panel d e c i s i o n s i n most states, it is n o t even a d m i s s i b l e a t t r i a l . S e c t i o n s 27-6-606, 27-6-704 ( 2 ) , MCA. Consequently, w e f i n d no merit i n p l a i n t i f f ' s arguments. There are no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s under t h e Montana A c t . W e need n o t a d d r e s s t h e remaining i s s u e s r a i s e d by p l a i n t i f f . H e c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e panel act v i o l a t e s 1972 Mont. Const., A r t 11, S$ 7, 8 and 9 , which g i v e to t h e p u b l i c a r i g h t t o p a r t i c i p a t e , a r i g h t to know, and g i v e e v e r y person a r i g h t t o s u e f o r s l a n d e r o r l i b e l . H e a d d i t i o n a l l y a l l e g e s t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a s v i o l a t e d 1972 Mont. Const., A r t V I I I , §§ 1 and 2, which r e q u i r e t h a t t a x e s s h a l l be l e v i e d by g e n e r a l laws f o r p u b l i c p u r p o s e s , and which f o r b i d t h e l e g i s l a t u r e from s u r r e n - d e r i n g or c o n t r a c t i n g away t h e power to t a x . L i n d e r h a s n o t appeared b e f o r e t h e p a n e l . H e h a s n o t been s u b j e c t e d to t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of l i b e l or s l a n d e r , and he may n e v e r be. Thus w e f i n d t h a t t h i s q u e s t i o n is n o t p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h i s Court under t h e f a c t s of t h i s case. N o r can he assert t h a t t h e p u b l i c is denied t h e r i g h t t o p a r t i c i p a t e or t h e r i g h t t o know. The Master found: " P l a i n t i f f Linder h a s n o t y e t r e q u e s t e d and been d e n i e d any p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n panel p r o c e e d i n g s or a n y r e c o r d s of any p r o c e e d i n g s , n o r h a s p l a i n - t i f f Linder y e t i s s u e d and served upon t h e panel a subpoena f o r such r e c o r d s , n o r h a s p l a i n t i f f L i n d e r y e t r e q u e s t e d t h a t an o f f i c i a l t r a n s c r i p t b e made of t h e sworn t e s t i m o n y of any w i t n e s s or a n y proceeding b e f o r e t h e p a n e l , n o r h a s p l a i n - t i £ f Linder y e t been harmed or i n j u r e d by any f a i l u r e o r r e f u s a l of t h e panel or its admi- n i s t r a t i v e o f f i c e r s to so act." Finding No. 1 4 H e h a s n o t been a f f e c t e d by t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e s e s t a t u t e s and t h e r e f o r e he l a c k s s t a n d i n g to c h a l l e n g e them. Thompson v. Tobacco Root Co-op ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 1 2 1 Mont. 445, 453, 193 P.2d 811, 816. A d d i t i o n a l l y , f o r purposes of t h i s case , Linder is n o t a member o f t h e excluded p u b l i c . H e is a n e c e s s a r y p a r t i c i p a n t and t h u s is n o t i n a p o s i t i o n to assert t h i s r i g h t on b e h a l f of t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c . F i n a l l y , w i t h r e g a r d to p l a i n t i f f ' s a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t h e a l t h care p r o v i d e r s cannot be taxed i n o r d e r to fund t h i s p a n e l , s e c t i o n 27-6-206, MCA, we n o t e t h a t p l a i n t i f f is n o t a h e a l t h care p r o v i d e r . H e is n o t among t h o s e being t a x e d . The s t a t u t e i n q u e s t i o n does n o t a p p l y to him and he is n o t a f f e c t e d by it. H e is t h e r e f o r e n o t i n a p o s i t i o n to c h a l l e n g e its c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a l i d i t y on t h i s ground. Chovanak v. Matthews ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 120 Mont. 520, 527, 188 P.2d 582, 585. W e hold t h e Medical M a l p r a c t i c e Panel A c t to be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e f i r s t s e n t e n c e of sub- s e c t i o n 2, s e c t i o n 27-6-704. A f t e r s e v e r i n g t h a t s e c t i o n from t h e act, we f i n d t h a t t h e act remains complete and is c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Chief J u s t i c e