Title: Hoennicke v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 145, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 30, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
RONALD HOENNICKE, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 145, 2010 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0903025054 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  November 3, 2010 
Decided:  December 30, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Nicole M. Walker, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware for 
appellant. 
 
 
John Williams, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
2 
 
 
 
A jury convicted Ronald Hoennicke of twelve counts of Unlawful Sexual 
Contact Second Degree.  Sentenced to six years in prison, Hoennicke now appeals 
his conviction.  He contends that the applicable statute of limitations bars his 
prosecution or, alternatively, that the State presented insufficient evidence to 
sustain a guilty verdict.  Because the statute of limitations did not bar this 
prosecution and the record supports a guilty verdict, we AFFIRM. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In 2009, 29-year-old Karl Hoennicke reported to the police that between 
1988 and 1992 his father, Ronald, sexually assaulted him regularly.  Karl alleged 
that his father would wake him up early on some weekends so that the two could 
wrestle naked and then shower together.  Karl also claimed that his father washed 
Karl’s genitals one time in the shower and, on a different occasion, attempted to 
manually and orally stimulate Karl. 
After Karl reported this alleged misconduct in 2009, the Delaware State 
Police contacted Ronald Hoennicke and requested that he speak with a detective at 
the police station.  Hoennicke went to the station voluntarily on March 31, 2009, 
and gave a taped statement.  He admitted that he and Karl had wrestled naked and 
that he had shown Karl how to clean himself, but he adamantly denied ever 
3 
 
intentionally touching Karl sexually.  He also vehemently denied ever trying to 
manually or orally stimulate his son. 
On May 4, 2009, the State indicted Hoennicke on several counts of 
Unlawful Sexual Contact, Unlawful Sexual Intercourse, and Incest.  The only 
evidence presented at Hoennicke’s three-day trial was Karl’s testimony and 
Hoennicke’s taped statement to the police.  At the conclusion of the trial, the jury 
returned a guilty verdict on twelve counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact Second 
Degree, and the judge sentenced Hoennicke to six years in prison. 
On appeal, Hoennicke makes two arguments.  First, he claims that his 
prosecution was time barred.  Specifically, he argues that when the General 
Assembly amended 11 Del. C. § 205(e) in 2003 to eliminate the statute of 
limitations for certain enumerated sexual offenses, it “replaced” the old limitations 
period instead of “extending” it, and consequently eliminated completely all 
prosecutions that were still available under the previous statute of limitations 
described by pre-amendment Section 205(e).  In the alternative, he argues that the 
application of the unlimited limitations period to his prosecution violates the Ex 
Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.  Second, Hoennicke claims 
that the judge improperly denied his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal because the 
4 
 
State presented insufficient evidence that Karl’s testimony did not derive from 
memories recovered by psychotherapy. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
A. 
The Statute of Limitations Did Not Bar Hoennicke’s Prosecution. 
During the period between 1988 and 1992, when Hoennicke’s alleged sexual 
misconduct against Karl was ongoing, the applicable statute of limitations that 
encompassed the misconduct was Delaware’s general statute of limitations for 
felony offenses, which is five years.1  On July 15, 1992, the General Assembly 
amended 11 Del. C. § 205 by adding subsection (e), which permitted prosecution 
of delineated sexual offenses after the expiration of the five year general limitation 
period if the prosecution commenced within 2 years of the initial disclosure of 
misconduct to an appropriate law enforcement agency.2  The parties agree that this 
extension applied to Hoennicke.3 
                                          
 
1 11 Del. C. § 205(b)(1). 
 
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, prosecutions for other offenses are 
subject to the following periods of limitation: 
(1) A prosecution for any felony except murder, of any class A felony, or any 
attempt to commit said crimes, must be commenced within 5 years after it is 
committed; 
 
 
. . . 
 
2 68 Del. Laws ch. 397 §§ 1–2 (1992).  See also Bryant v. State, 781 A.2d 692, 2001 WL 
433452, at *2 (Del. Apr. 25, 2001) (TABLE). 
 
3 Op. Br. at 8–9; Ans. Br. at 8–9. 
5 
 
On June 24, 2003, the General Assembly struck the text of subsection (e) in 
its entirety and replaced it.4  As of that date, the law provided for an unlimited 
limitations period for sexual offenses, including those that Hoennicke allegedly 
committed.5  When the General Assembly passed the unlimited limitations period 
in 2003, Hoennicke was still within the two year “extended disclosure” limitations 
period of the previous subsection (e) because Karl had not yet disclosed 
Hoennicke’s alleged misconduct. 
 
The issue of whether the unlimited limitations period of amended Section 
205(e) applies to Hoennicke in this case requires us to interpret Section 205(e).  
We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo.6  We also review claims of 
constitutional error de novo.7 
                                          
 
4 74 Del. Laws ch. 56 § 1 (2003). 
5 11 Del. C. § 205(e). 
(e) Notwithstanding the period prescribed by subsection (b) of this section, a prosecution 
for any crime that is delineated in Subpart D of Subchapter II of Chapter 5 of this title, or 
is otherwise defined as a “sexual offense” by § 761 of this title except §§ 763, 764 or 765 
of this title, or any attempt to commit said crimes, may be commenced at any time. No 
prosecution under this subsection shall be based upon the memory of the victim that has 
been recovered through psychotherapy unless there is some evidence of the corpus delicti 
independent of such repressed memory. This subsection applies to all causes of action 
arising before, on or after July 15, 1992, and to the extent consistent with this subsection, 
it shall revive causes of action that would otherwise be barred by this section. 
 
6 Wright v. State, 980 A.2d 372, 377 (Del. 2009). 
7 Dickerson v. State, 975 A.2d 791, 795 (Del. 2009). 
6 
 
 
When interpreting a statute, we aim to “ascertain and give effect to the intent 
of the legislature.”8  When the unambiguous language of a statute clearly reflects 
the intent of the legislature, then that language controls.9  Here, the 2003 
amendment to Section 205(e) plainly states that prosecutions for specified sexual 
offenses, which include those that Hoennicke allegedly committed, “may be 
commenced at any time.”10  With respect to the conduct that Hoennicke allegedly 
committed, the 2003 amendment clearly extended the previous limitations period 
of two years after reporting, to an unlimited period.   
Here, Hoennicke allegedly committed sexual abuse between 1988 and 1992.  
Under the five year limitations period in effect at that time, the absolute earliest bar 
to his prosecution would have been 1993.  Before his prosecution became time 
barred, however, the General Assembly added the “first disclosure” clause.  That 
amendment extended the limitations period for crimes that occurred within five 
years of its enactment,11 which included Hoennicke’s alleged offenses in this case.  
Under the “first disclosure” limitations period of Section 205(e), Hoennicke’s 
                                          
 
8 Bryant, 2001 WL 433452, at *1 (quoting Ingram v. Thorpe, 747 A.2d 545, 547 (2000)). 
9 Id. at *1 (citing Spielberg v. State, 558 A.2d 291, 293 (1989)). 
10 § 205(e). 
11 See Bryant, 2001 WL 433452, at *2. 
7 
 
prosecution was not time barred on the date of the 2003 amendment that extended 
the limitations period indefinitely, because Karl had not yet reported the abuse to 
any law enforcement agency.  Under the logic of Bryant v. State12 the unlimited 
limitations period of post-2003 Section 205(e) applies to Hoennicke, and the 
statute did not time bar his prosecution. 
Hoennicke argues that the amendment creating the unlimited limitations 
period is unconstitutionally ex post facto.  He cites Stogner v. California13 for 
support.  Stogner, however, is inapposite.  In Stogner, the United States Supreme 
Court held that a state violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 
Constitution by passing an extended limitations period that revives prosecutions 
for which the previous limitations period has already expired.14  Here, the 
limitations period governing Hoennicke’s prosecution had never expired.  His 
prosecution was not yet time barred when the General Assembly extended the 
limitations period indefinitely in 2003.  Therefore, the unlimited limitations period, 
as applied to Hoennicke’s prosecution, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
                                          
 
12 See n.2, supra. 
13 539 U.S. 607 (2003). 
14 Id. at 610. 
8 
 
 
B. 
The State Properly Alleged the Tolling Provisions of Section 205(e) in 
the Indictment, and the Judge Properly Denied Hoennicke’s Motion for 
Judgment of Acquittal. 
 
In any prosecution under Section 205(e), the State must affirmatively allege 
the tolling provisions of Section 205(e) in the indictment.15  Once the State does 
this, “the[] [provisions] then become elements of the offense.”16  In the context of 
Section 205(e), one of the tolling provisions the State must affirmatively allege is 
that “[n]o prosecution under this subsection shall be based upon the memory of the 
victim that has been recovered through psychotherapy unless there is some 
evidence of the corpus delicti independent of such repressed memory.”17  In this 
                                          
 
15 See 11 Del. C. § 205(j). 
(j) In any prosecution in which subsection (c), (d), (e), (h) or (i) of this section is sought 
to be invoked to avoid the limitation period of subsection (b) of this section, the State 
must allege and prove the applicability of subsection (c), (d), (e), (h) or (i) as an element 
of the offense. 
 
16 State v. Baker, 679 A.2d 1002, 1007 (Del. Super. 1996).  See also 11 Del. C. § 232. 
11 Del. C. § 232.  Definition relating to elements of offense. 
“Elements of an offense” are those physical acts, attendant circumstances, results and 
states of mind which are specifically included within the definition of the offense or, if 
the definition is incomplete, those states of mind which are supplied by the general 
provisions of this Criminal Code. Facts establishing jurisdiction and venue and 
establishing that the offense was committed within the time period prescribed in § 205 of 
this title must also be proved as elements of the offense. 
(emphasis added). 
17 § 205(e). 
9 
 
case, the State properly alleged in the indictment, independently for each count, 
that the prosecution was “not based upon a memory of the victim recovered 
through psychotherapy.”18  That then became an element of the offense which the 
State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. 
After the State finished its case in chief, Hoennicke filed a Motion for 
Judgment of Acquittal, in part citing the State’s failure to prove that Karl’s 
testimony was not the product of the psychotherapeutic recovery of repressed 
memories.  After discussion with counsel for both parties, the judge denied 
Hoennicke’s motion.  At the conclusion of the trial, the judge properly instructed 
the jury that the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
prosecution was not based upon Karl’s memory, recovered through psychotherapy 
unless there was some independent evidence of the crime.19  The jury, having 
implicitly determined that the State had carried its burden, found Hoennicke guilty 
of 12 counts.  On appeal, Hoennicke argues that the judge should have granted his 
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. 
We review the denial of a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal de novo to 
determine whether any rational finder of fact, viewing the evidence in the light 
                                          
 
18 Appendix to Op. Br. at A5–A16. 
19 Appendix to Op. Br. at A63; A65; A67. 
10 
 
most favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.20  We do not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence.21 
The record before us offers minimal evidence to the effect that Karl’s 
memories were not repressed nor recovered by psychotherapy.  Indeed, the only 
evidence on point appears to be a brief exchange between Karl and the prosecutor 
on direct examination: 
[Prosecutor]: And it’s been a number of years since this happened to 
you.  Why did you come forward at this point? 
 
[Karl Hoennicke]: I was trying to protect somebody else from having 
it happen to them.22 
At no point in the record does any participant in the trial—not the judge, 
prosecutor, defense counsel, defendant, nor witnesses—mention anything about 
repressed memories or psychotherapy. 
 
While the affirmative evidence in this case is minimal and circumstantial, 
our review is strict.  We make no distinction between direct and circumstantial 
evidence, we view this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and we 
reverse only if no rational trier of fact could find Hoennicke guilty beyond a 
                                          
 
20 Gibson v. State, 981 A.2d 554, 557 (Del. 2009). 
21 Id. 
22 Appendix to Op. Br. at A23. 
11 
 
reasonable doubt on this evidence.  Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State, we conclude that Karl’s stated motivation for reporting the 
abuse—to protect others—is to the exclusion of alternative reasons, involving 
repression and recently, revived memory through the aid of psychotherapy.  
Otherwise, Karl would have cited that latter reason.  A rational trier of fact hearing 
this testimony could have decided that the State had proved the lack of 
psychotherapy beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
To be sure, the prosecutor could have more directly addressed this issue on 
direct examination by asking a more specific, pointed question.  For whatever 
reason, however, he did not.  We hesitate to announce a position, the essence of 
which involves the Court directing practitioners with respect to the precise 
semantics required to prove the elements of their cases.  We are particularly 
hesitant to do so under the strict standard of review here. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The Statute of Limitations did not bar Hoennicke’s prosecution, the State 
needed to and did plead the tolling provisions in the indictment, and on the record 
before us, the trial judge properly denied Hoennicke’s Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal.  For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the Superior Court.