Title: State v. Sellars
Citation: 363 N.C. 112
Docket Number: 547A05-2
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: March 20, 2009

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RANDY LEE SELLARS
No. 547A05-2
FILED: 20 MARCH 2009
1.
Sentencing–aggravating factors–insanity–independent determinations
A jury’s determination that a defendant is not insane does not resolve the
presence or absence of the statutory aggravating factor of use of a weapon hazardous to the lives
of more than one person.  Nor does it automatically render any Blakely error harmless. While
evidence relevant to an insanity defense and this aggravating factor might overlap, the
determinations are independent and neither controls the other.
2.
Sentencing–aggravating factors–use of weapon hazardous to more than one
person–Blakely error–harmlessness
 
The evidence that defendant knowingly set out to use a weapon in a manner that
created a risk of death to more than one person was overwhelming where defendant used a
semiautomatic firearm and fired multiple shots at three police officers, and acknowledged that he
planned to fire the weapon in the hope of drawing return fire and ending his suffering. 
Therefore, the trial court’s finding of this aggravating factor was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the
decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 191 N.C.
App. ___, 664 S.E.2d 45 (2008), which, upon defendant’s appeal
from judgments entered on 25 September 2003 by Judge James C.
Spencer, Jr. in Superior Court, Alamance County, and upon being
ordered by this Court to reconsider its decision remanding the
case to the trial court for resentencing in light of State v.
Blackwell, 361 N.C. 41, 638 S.E.2d 452 (2006), cert. denied, 550
U.S. 948, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1114 (2007), found no error in the
judgments.  Heard in the Supreme Court 24 February 2009.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Daniel P. O’Brien,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Jarvis John Edgerton, IV for defendant-appellant. 
PER CURIAM.
[1] We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals that
found no error in defendant’s trial and sentence.  However, we
-2-
reject the implication in that decision that a jury’s
determination that a defendant is not insane resolves the
presence or absence of the statutory aggravating factor:  “The
defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than
one person by means of a weapon or device which would normally be
hazardous to the lives of more than one person.”  N.C.G.S. §
15A-1340.16 (d)(8) (2007).  It does not.  Nor does a jury’s
finding that a defendant is not insane automatically render any
Blakley error on this aggravating factor harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt pursuant to State v. Blackwell, 361 N.C. 41,
passim, 638 S.E.2d 452, passim, (discussing application of
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004)). 
While evidence relevant to an insanity defense and the section
15A-1340.16(d)(8) aggravating factor might overlap, the
determinations are independent and neither controls the other.  
[2] This aggravating factor may be imposed when the
evidence shows that the defendant’s weapon “in its normal use is
hazardous to the lives of more than one person” and that “a great
risk of death was knowingly created.”  State v. Rose, 327 N.C.
599, 605, 398 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1990) (citing State v. Carver, 319
N.C. 665, 356 S.E.2d 349 (1987)).  Here, the evidence that
defendant knowingly set out to use a weapon in a manner that
created a great risk of death to more than one person was
overwhelming.  Defendant’s admitted use of a semiautomatic
firearm satisfies the first part of this analysis.  State v.
Bruton, 344 N.C. 381, 393, 474 S.E.2d 336, 345 (1996) (citing
Carver, 319 N.C. at 667-68, 356 S.E.2d at 351).  As to the second
-3-
prong, which requires that defendant have acted knowingly,
defendant fired multiple shots at three police officers who
confronted him in the public parking lot of a convenience store
and returned fire.  At his 2003 resentencing hearing, defendant
acknowledged that he planned to fire the weapon into the air at
the convenience store because a police substation was located
nearby.  Defendant stated that he hoped to draw return fire from
officers to “take [him] out” and end his suffering.  Based on the
evidence presented, we conclude that the trial court’s finding of
this aggravating factor was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.