Title: STATE v COOL
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13655
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 31, 1977

No. 13655 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 THE STATE OF B I O F J T A N A , Plaintiff and Appellant, -vs- ELONE ELAINE COOL, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Fontana Charles A. Graveley argued, County Attorney, Helena, Montana Michael McCabe argued, Deputy County Attorney, Helena, Montana For Respondent: David N. Hull argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: May 31, 1977 Decided : QCG ; ; , 1- ; ; z L -aa 9 Cle Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. A criminal complaint was filed May 17, 1976, in the district court, Lewis and Clark County, charging defendant Elone Elaine Cool with the crime of theft, a felony, in violation of section 94-6- 302 (1) (a), R.C.M. 1947. Trial commenced November 8, 1976 and at the close of the state's case-in-chief, the defense moved for acquittal alleging the state failed to prove a prima facie case against defendant. That motion was denied. The defense went forward with its case and at the close of all evidence made a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal for the reason the evidence as presented by the state was insufficient as a matter of law to allow it to go to the jury. The judge granted that motion and dismissed the case. The state filed a notice of appeal on November 10, 1976. On April 20, 1977, defendant's counsel filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds it violated the double jeopardy clause, Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution, and on May 18, 1977, counsel filed an amended motion to dismiss the appeal adding the ground that this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the state's appeal. The controlling question here is whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear the state's appeal of a district court's judgment of acquittal. Section 95-2403, R.C.M. 1947, controls the appeals the state may take in a criminal proceeding, it provides: "Scope of appeal. (a) Except as authorized by this code, the state may not appeal in a criminal case. " (b) The state may appeal from any court order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in: " (1) dismissing a case; "(2) modifying or changing the verdict as provided in section 95-2101 (c) (3) ; " (3) granting a new trial; "(4) quashing an arrest or search warrant; " (5) suppressing evidence ; "(6) suppressing a confession or admission; or "(7) granting or denying change of venue." Here the state contends the state of Montana has a statutory right to appeal under section 95-2403(b)(l). It argues the district court's ruling was in fact a dismissal. Defendant argues this was a motion for acquittal and such a motion does not constitute a dis- missal of the case as contemplated in section 95-2403(b) (1). We find no merit in the state's argument in relation to section 95-2403 (b) (1) , because subsection (b) (1) simply does not apply to the instant fact situation, no matter how the state tortures the language used by the district court. The court very clearly and with precision informed the state in reference to the evidence: "I am just saying that it's insufficient." There can be no question from the record before this Court that the district court's dismissal was an acquittal in substance as well as form. The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L ed 300 and Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 82 S.Ct. 671, 7 L ed 2d 629, emphasized that what constitutes an acquittal is not to be controlled by the form of the judge's action. Rather, this Court must determine whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. This Court in State v. Peck, 83 Mont. 327, 330, 271 P. 707, stated that statutes granting the right of appeal to the state in criminal actions must be strictly construed and the right limited to the instances mentioned; if the right is not clearly and unequivocably conferred, an action does not lie, nor can the right, if conferred, be enlarged by construction of the statute. In an early Montana case, Territory of Montana v. Philip Laun, 8 Mont. 322, 20 P. 652, the district court directed the jury to find a verdict of acquittal and the state appealed contending that the action was in effect a dismissal of the case and thus appeal- able under the precurser to section 95-2403. This Court disagreed stating that an acquittal is not appealable by the state. This rule is still the law in Montana. Perhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of criminal jurisprudence has been that a verdict of acquittal cannot be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting a defendant twice in jeopardy and therefore violating the Fifth Amendment, United States Constitu- tion. United States v. Ball, supra. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment has been applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L ed 2d 707, the United States Supreme Court stated: " * * * the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage, and that it should apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. " See also: United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., No. 76-120, 21 Crim. L.R. 3001, 45 United States Law Week 4337, April 4, 1977. For the foregoing reasons defendant's amended motion to dismiss the state's appeal is granted. ,lLx Justice i We Concur: qmbdb Chief Justice i i Justices State of Montana v. Elone Elaine Cool ---No. 13655 M r . Justice Daniel J. Shea separately concurring: I concur in the result of t h i s case but I do not agree with the implications of t h i s decision holding that a d i s t r i c t court has the power t o dismiss a criminal case before it goes t o the jury on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence. Whether the d i s t r i c t judge was right or wrong i n dismissing t h i s case, it is clear double jeopardy would prevent defendant from again being t r i e d for the same offense. Whether it was an acquittal or dismissal for insufficiency of the evidence it makes no difference. Double jeopardy attaches. I a m not convinced however, that a d i s t r i c t judge has the right t o take a case away from a jury on the grounds of insuffi- ciency of the evidence, whether the motion be one t o acquit or one t o dismiss. I n relying on Territory of Montana v. Philip Laun, 8 Mont. 322, 327, 20 P. 652 (1889), the court s t a t e s that t h i s case has never been overruled and is s t i l l the law i n Montana. While it has not been overruled, it is no longer the law in Montana. I n Laun, the Court stated: "The practice of directing an acquittal whenever the evidence, i n the discretion of the judge, f a i l s t o support the charge, is well recognized as a proper order i n criminal procedure. * * * There is no law i n our statutes, express or implied, which forbids the exercise of t h i s power i n the t r i a l judge * * *." (Emphasis added.) 8 Mont. 327. By t h i s language it is clear that in Laun the Court f e l t it was clearly within the power of the legislature t o expressly or impliedly take t h i s power away from the d i s t r i c t courts. I believe that subsequent statutes have taken that power away from d i s t r i c t courts, f i r s t expressly, and presently, by impli- cation. Section 94-7227, R.C.M. 1947, was enacted a f t e r Laun was decided and remained in effect u n t i l 1967, when the present statutes were adopted. It provided i n relevant part: 'I* * * I f , a t any t i m e a f t e r the evidence on either side is closed, the court deems it in- sufficient t o warrant a conviction, it may advise the jury t o acquit the defendant; but the jury is not bound by the advice. I I It is clear t h i s statute prevented a d i s t r i c t judge from taking a case away from the jury on the grounds of insuffi- cient evidence, or directing it t o find a verdict of not guilty because of insufficient evidence. H e could only advise that, i n h i s opinion, the jury should acquit because of insufficient evidence. Accordingly, when section 94-7227 went into effect, Laun was no longer the law. - Section 94-7227 remained i n effect u n t i l 1967. It is true that even while it was i n effect, it was held it did not apply t o situations where there was - no evidence t o support a conviction. State v. Labbitt, 117 Mont. 26, 35, 156 P.2d 163 (1945) ; State v. Widdicombe, 130 Mont. 325, 330, 301 P.2d 1116 (1956); State v. Perschon, 131 Mont. 330, 337, 310 P.2d 591 (1957). These cases distinguish between situations i n which the t r i a l court deems the evidence, although tending t o prove every element necessary t o constitute the crime charged, insufficient, and situations where there was a lack of any evidence on a material element of the crime charged. I n the f i r s t instance the d i s t r i c t court could not dismiss the case (section 94-7227,R.C.M. 1947), but in the second situation he could dismiss the case before it went t o the jury. Such was the s t a t e of the law when section 94- 7227 was repealed and section 95-2101, R.C.M. 1947, replaced it. Section 95-2101 details the powers of d i s t r i c t judges a f t e r the t r i a l of criminal actions and provides: "New Trial. (a) Definition and Effect. A new t r i a l is a -xamination of the issue in the same court, before another jury, a f t e r a verdict or finding has been rendered and the granting of a new t r i a l places the parties in the same position as i f there had been no t r i a l . " (b) Motion for a N e w Trial. "(1) Following a verdict or finding of guilty the court m a y grant the defendant a new t r i a l i f required in the interest of justice. '(2) The motion for a new t r i a l shall be in writing and shall be filed by the defendant within thirty (30) days following a verdict or finding of guilty. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the state. "(3) The motion for a new t r i a l shall specify the grounds therefor. " (c) Alternative Authority of the Court on Hearing Motion for N e w Trial. O n hearing the motion for a new t r i a l , i f justified.by law, and the weight of the evi- dence, the court may: "1. Deny the motion, "2. Grant a new t r i a l , or 3 Modify or change the verdict or finding by finding the defendant guilty of a lesser degree of the crime charged, finding the defendant guilty of a lesser included crime or finding the defendant not guilty .I' (Emphasis added. ) The underlined portion of the above quoted statute, I believe, was designed t o give the d i s t r i c t courts a l l the power they needed to correct an injustice caused by an erroneous jury verdict of guilty. The t r i a l judge can, among other things, either modify a jury verdict by changing it t o a lesser included offense, or he can find the defendant not guilty. The salient point, however, is that i f the d i s t r i c t court does this, and since it is a f t e r the t r i a l , the state has the right t o appeal as expressly provided i n section 95-2403, R.C.M. 1947. Section 95-2403(b) (2) provides: "(b) The s t a t e may appeal from any court order or judgment the substantive ef fect of which results in: 'I* * * "(2) modifying o r changing the verdict as provided i n section 95-2101(c) (3)". It is clear then that i f the court does nrodify or change the verdict, the s t a t e can appeal. Allowing the s t a t e t o appeal under these circumstances does not subject the defendant t o double jeopardy. I f the s t a t e loses the appeal, the d i s t r i c t court's order modifying the jury verdict or finding the defendant not guilty, stands and that is the end of the case. I f the s t a t e wins its appeal, the effect is that the guilty verdict is reinstated and de- fendant s t i l l has been subjected t o but one t r i a l . The only thing l e f t then is the sentencing. This s t a t u t e protects both the rights of the s t a t e and those of defendant. The s t a t e ' s right t o appeal is protected and the more important right of the defendant not t o be twice put i n jeopardy is protected. The majority decision did not deal a t a l l with t h i s problem and I can conceive its decision is going t o cause problems i n Montana. For the foregoing reasons, I would uphold the decision of the d i s t r i c t court i n dismissing --- solely f o r the reason that double jeopardy attached under the factual situation here. How- ever, I would also hold that a d i s t r i c t court has no right t o enter an order of dismissal o r an order of acquittal on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence. The remedy of defendant is provided i n section 95-2101. A