Title: Ex parte Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS:CIVIL (In re: Linda Houston v. Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc.)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1090269
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 16, 2010

REL: 04/16/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010
_________________________
1090269
_________________________
Ex parte Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Linda Houston
v.
Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc.)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-06-1980)
LYONS, Justice.
Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc. ("Jackson Hospital"), the
defendant in a medical-malpractice lawsuit, has filed a
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2
petition for the writ of mandamus challenging the trial
court's authority to enter an order setting aside the summary
judgment it had entered for Jackson Hospital when the order,
which was in response to a motion filed by the plaintiff,
Linda Houston, to vacate the summary judgment, had been
pending for more than 90 days.  We grant the petition and
issue the writ. 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
    Houston sued Jackson Hospital in the Montgomery Circuit
Court seeking money damages in an unspecified amount for
alleged medical malpractice.  Jackson Hospital filed a motion
for a summary judgment in which it asserted that Houston had
failed to present sufficient evidence to support her claims by
means of expert testimony as required by § 6-5-548, Ala. Code
1975, a part of the Alabama Medical Liability Act, § 6-5-540
et al., Ala. Code 1975.  Jackson Hospital later filed a
supplemental motion for a summary judgment.  Those motions
were set for hearing on April 28, 2009.  Neither Houston nor
her attorney attended the April 28 hearing, but one hour after
the hearing she filed a response in opposition to Jackson
Hospital's summary-judgment motions.  Attached to the response
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was the affidavit of Minnie Pearl Holmes, offered by Houston
as an expert.  The trial court entered a summary judgment in
favor of Jackson Hospital on April 30, 2009.  
On June 2, 2009, Houston filed a motion to vacate or to
set aside the order entering the summary judgment.  Upon
review of the motion to vacate, Jackson Hospital first became
aware of Houston's response in opposition to its summary-
judgment motions because the response had not been served on
counsel for Jackson Hospital.  Jackson Hospital moved to
strike the response on the grounds that Holmes was not
qualified to testify as an expert and that the response was
untimely. 
The trial court set a hearing for July 20, 2009, on
Houston's motion to vacate or to set aside the summary
judgment. According to Houston, at the hearing, "the trial
court made it perfectly clear that the issues presented were
issue[s] to be tried by the jury."  Answer to petition, p. 6.
On October 5, 2009, the trial court entered an order
purporting to set aside the summary judgment.
 More than 90 days had elapsed from the time Houston
filed her motion to vacate or to set aside the summary
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judgment and the date the trial court entered its order
setting the summary judgment aside.  No extension of the 90-
day period within which the trial court had to rule on the
motion to set aside was agreed to by the parties or entered on
the record in the trial court.  
II. Standard of Review
A petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper method
for obtaining review of a trial court's authority to rule on
a posttrial motion beyond the time period set forth in Rule
59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P.  See Ex parte Chamblee, 899 So. 2d 244,
244-45 (Ala. 2004) (granting petitions for the writ of
mandamus that "implicate[d] the authority of the trial judge
under Rule 59.1 ....").  See also Ex parte Davidson, 782 So.
2d 237 (Ala. 2000), in which this Court issued the writ of
mandamus setting aside the trial court's order, entered after
posttrial motions had been denied by operation of law pursuant
to Rule 59.1, as void.  
III. Analysis
Houston attempts to supplement the materials before this
Court by setting forth in her answer to the petition remarks
attributed to the trial court at the hearing on July 20, 2009.
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She contends that the trial court did not exceed its
discretion in setting aside its prior order, but she cites no
authority in support of that contention.  Jackson Hospital
argues that nothing in the materials before this Court
supports Houston's statement in her answer to the petition
detailing what the trial court purportedly said at the July
20, 2009, hearing.  Jackson Hospital also argues that even if
the trial court did indicate at the July 20 hearing that "the
issues presented were issue[s] to be tried by the jury,"
answer to petition, p. 6, such an oral statement was not
sufficient to dispose of a pending postjudgment motion under
Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P.
Rule 59.1 provides:
"No postjudgment motion filed pursuant to Rules
50, 52, 55, or 59 shall remain pending in the trial
court for more than ninety (90) days, unless with
the express consent of all the parties, which
consent shall appear of record, or unless extended
by the appellate court to which an appeal of the
judgment would lie, and such time may be further
extended for good cause shown.  A failure by the
trial court to render an order disposing of any
pending 
postjudgment 
motion 
within 
the 
time
permitted hereunder, or any extension thereof, shall
constitute a denial of such motion as of the date of
the expiration of the period."
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(Emphasis added.)  No consent appears of record and no order
of this Court extended the time for the trial court to dispose
of Houston's motion to vacate or to set aside.
In Ex parte Chamblee, the respondent argued that it would
be contrary to the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure for this
Court to "'ignore oral determinations by the trial court and
interpret Rule 59.1 to require entry of a written opinion and
order.'"  899 So. 2d at 248.  This Court disagreed and took
the opportunity to "reaffirm that for purposes of Rule 59.1 a
trial judge disposes of a pending postjudgment motion only by
properly entering a ruling either denying or granting the
motion."  Id.  The Court concluded:  "Rule 59.1 must be read
in conjunction and in harmony with Rule 58, which simply does
not recognize an oral rendition of a judgment or order or an
oral entry of a judgment or order."  Id.  See also Ex parte
Johnson Land Co., 561 So. 2d 506 (Ala. 1990), in which this
Court declined to recognize an oral statement by the trial
court supported by an affidavit from its law clerk as
sufficient to constitute disposition of a postjudgment motion
within the time prescribed by Rule 59.1.  
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 Even if the trial court made the statement at the July
20, 2009, hearing that Houston relies upon in her answer to
the petition, that statement is insufficient to constitute a
disposition 
of 
Houston's 
pending 
postjudgment 
motion.
Houston's motion had already been denied by operation of law
when the trial court entered its written order purporting to
set aside the summary judgment.  The trial court's order was
void because it lost jurisdiction after the running of the 90-
day period prescribed by Rule 59.1.  Ex parte Chamblee, supra;
Ex parte Davidson, supra.  
IV. Conclusion
Jackson Hospital has shown a clear legal right to the
issuance of the writ.
The order entered on October 5, 2009,
setting aside the summary judgment entered on April 30, 2009,
is void.  
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ., concur.