Title: Com. v. Perillo
Citation: 376 A.2d 635, 474 Pa. 63
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: August 17, 1977

474 Pa. 63 (1977) 376 A.2d 635 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Salvatore PERILLO, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued January 18, 1977. Decided August 17, 1977. *64 Nino V. Tinari, Stephen P. Patrizio, Philadelphia, for appellant. F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Dist. Atty., Steven H. Goldblatt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., William J. Stevens, Jr., Philadelphia, for appellee. Before EAGEN, C.J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ. EAGEN, Chief Justice. Salvatore Perillo was convicted by a jury in Philadelphia of murder of the first degree. Post-verdict motions were denied and judgment of sentence of life imprisonment was imposed. This appeal followed. Perillo advances seven assignments of error as grounds for the grant of a new trial.[1] Of the seven assignments of error, five involve alleged prosecutorial misconduct at various stages of the proceedings, one involves the trial court's instructions to the jury concerning proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and one involves the manner in which the Commonwealth proved Perillo's prior criminal record. Initially, we must determine if the assignments of error now advanced are properly preserved for review since the Commonwealth maintains they are waived because Perillo failed to assert them in written post-verdict motions. See Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975). Written post-verdict motions of the "boiler-plate" variety were filed on February 6, 1975 and contained the following: Thereafter, on June 2, 1975, at the time of argument on post-verdict motions, Perillo filed a brief setting forth specifically each and every assignment of error now advanced and legal argument in support thereof. The court en banc entertained and considered each and every one of these assignments of error. Under the circumstances, we believe the requirement, that post-verdict motions and all assignments *66 of error be in writing, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123, has been substantially complied with.[2] Since it is clear from the record that the prosecuting attorney was guilty of misconduct which precluded a fair trial and the rendition of an objective decision by the jury, we will order a new trial on this basis without reaching the other assignments of error. The relevant facts are as follows: On July 28, 1973, at approximately 11:45 a.m., John Benkert was fatally wounded by a gunshot while seated in his car at a highway intersection in south Philadelphia. At trial, two eyewitnesses identified Perillo as the person who shot Benkert. Perillo was also connected to the killing through a fingerprint, and through ballistic tests which compared cartridge casings of bullets found at the scene of the crime with cartridge casings of bullets fired from a .25 caliber pistol owned by Perillo and seized by police pursuant to a search warrant. The defense disputed the validity of the Commonwealth's evidence concerning the fingerprint and the validity of the conclusions which were drawn from the ballistics tests. Additionally, the defense presented various witnesses in an attempt to establish Perillo was not at the scene of the crime at the time Benkert was shot. In this connection, the defense called Daniel Murtha who testified, in effect, that he saw a person with a gun fleeing the scene of the killing and that Perillo was not this person. During cross-examination of Murtha, the following occurred: [Emphasis added.] The Commonwealth concedes, as it must, that the above quoted questions were improper because they implied the witness had been bribed to perjure himself. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lipscombe, 455 Pa. 525, 317 A.2d 205 (1974); Commonwealth v. Potter, 445 Pa. 284, 285 A.2d 492 (1971). But the Commonwealth argues that: 1) the trial court's instructions were adequate to dispel any possible prejudice which resulted from the improper questions; and/or 2) the improper questions by the Commonwealth's attorney[3] were: a) in response to equally improper conduct by defense counsel, such as, statements of personal opinion as to the credibility of witnesses and conduct calculated to irritate and annoy the court and the prosecuting attorney; *71 and, b) in response to efforts made on behalf of Perillo to bribe certain witnesses and to pressure a witness.[4] As to the Commonwealth's first argument, "[t]he effect of such remarks depends upon the atmosphere of the trial . ., and the proper action to be taken is within the discretion of the trial court." [Citations omitted.] Commonwealth v. Stoltzus, 462 Pa. 43, 61, 337 A.2d 873, 882 (1975). After reviewing the entire record of this trial, we are regrettably forced to conclude that, in the words of the trial judge, the atmosphere of this trial was that of a "circus." The record is replete with disregard of rulings by the court by counsel for the Commonwealth and for the defense. Indeed, in at least two instances, the trial court, after admonishing counsel for disregarding its rulings and for engaging in shouting matches, found it necessary to threaten to use its contempt powers and to refer the record to our disciplinary board. The trial court opined counsel entertained "personal feelings" of animosity toward one another, and that animosity is clearly indicated by the behavior of counsel in referring to one another, in effect, as liars. Furthermore, the remarks quoted above were of a highly prejudicial nature in that they not only suggested the witness was lying, but also attributed to Perillo participation in bribery. We must, therefore, conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting a mistrial. This case is *72 controlled by Commonwealth v. Potter, supra, 445 Pa. at 287, 285 A.2d at 494 (1971) and the "only appropriate relief" given the atmosphere and the "highly prejudicial" nature of the remarks was for the court to have declared a mistrial. Commonwealth v. Cannon, 458 Pa. 374, 327 A.2d 45 (1974), cited by the Commonwealth, is distinguishable in numerous respects. In that case, we affirmed the judgment of sentence, where the prosecutor "exhibited his disappointment with the testimony of [a] witness by requesting, in the presence of the jury, that the witness be held for the crime of perjury," Commonwealth v. Cannon, supra, 458 Pa. at 376, 327 A.2d at 46, because we found the court's instructions adequate to dispel any possible prejudice to the accused. But there, unlike here, no connection between the accused and the alleged perjury was included in the remark, the remark may have aided the defense because it was made about a Commonwealth's witness, and there was no suggestion that the atmosphere at trial was one of a "circus." As to the Commonwealth's second argument, it must also be rejected. We have ruled a comment that an accused's testimony was "unbelievable" did not constitute reversible error where it was "motivated by, and was commensurate with, . . . prior attacks upon the credibility of" two Commonwealth witnesses. Commonwealth v. Stoltzus, supra, 462 Pa. at 62, 337 A.2d at 882 (1975). But instantly, the remarks of the Commonwealth's attorney are far more inflammatory than the remark made in Commonwealth v. Stoltzus, supra. Furthermore, many of remarks made by defense counsel, which the Commonwealth has brought to our attention and which it asserts motivated the remarks of the Commonwealth's attorney, occurred subsequent to the above quoted remarks by the Commonwealth's attorney. Furthermore, the remarks made prior to the above quoted remarks, to which we are referred by the Commonwealth, are far less inflammatory than the quoted remarks, e.g., defense counsel suggested on two occasions that he was only seeking the truth while the Commonwealth was not. Finally, *73 the trial atmosphere in Commonwealth v. Stoltzus, supra, did not even approach the "circus" atmosphere involved instantly, and thus the possibility that prejudice resulted in this trial is far greater than in Commonwealth v. Stoltzus, supra. The judgment of sentence is reversed and a new trial is granted. ROBERTS, J., filed a concurring opinion. NIX, J., dissents. JONES, former C.J., and POMEROY, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. ROBERTS, Justice, concurring. I join the majority in holding that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for a mistrial. See Commonwealth v. Potter, 445 Pa. 284, 285 A.2d 492 (1971). I am constrained to write to emphasize that improper conduct on the part of an attorney can never justify impropriety on the part of his or her adversary. Retaliatory conduct by counsel has no place in a courtroom. It is the trial court's duty to ensure that the trial takes place in a dignified atmosphere, conducive to the fair and effective administration of justice. The American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge § 6.3 (Approved Draft, 1972) [ABA Standards] provide: Section 6.5 further provides: Where an attorney causes a significant disruption, the trial court should correct the abuse and discipline the attorney, where necessary. The ABA Standards propose that the following sanctions be employed when necessary to maintain proper courtroom decorum: ABA Standards, § 6.5, supra.[*] Thus, the trial court has sufficient power to respond to an attorney's improper conduct. There is no reason for an attorney to retaliate to his or her adversary's unprofessional conduct. Such retaliation is highly improper. [1] Perillo does not argue that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, but an independent review of the record reveals sufficient evidence to support the verdict of murder of the first degree. [2] This is not to suggest that we approve the procedure followed instantly. Additional or supplemental assignments of error should be filed expeditiously and sufficiently prior to the date of argument to afford both sides the opportunity to make an adequate presentation of the issues before the post-verdict motions court. However, where as here, the court accepts additional assignments of error at the time of argument in the form of a written supplemental motion or a written brief and considers the merits of these assignments of error in disposing of the post-verdict motions, we will not rule that the issues have been waived. [3] The Commonwealth also concedes the impropriety of a remark made in closing argument by the Commonwealth's attorney which expressed the opinion that the investigating and prosecuting authorities knew the "truth," but argues that remark does not warrant reversal for the same reasons set forth above. [4] The Commonwealth had included in its brief an appendix containing two statements. One was given by Gary Paul Giordano, a defense witness at trial, who testified that he did not see a little boy at the scene of the crime. The boy referred to is Anthony Helmer, who appeared for the Commonwealth at trial and testified that he was present at the scene of the crime and that Perillo was the person who shot Benkert. This statement contains admissions which suggest Giordano's trial testimony was perjured as a result of inducements offered by an investigator working on behalf of Perillo. The other statement was given by Anthony Helmer's mother, Theresa Helmer, and suggests the same investigator told her that Anthony was the only witness to the killing and that Anthony would alone bear the responsibility of putting Perillo "behind bars." She opined the investigator was attempting to pressure Anthony into not testifying. Both statements were given to authorities subsequent to trial. [*] This Court has established the Disciplinary Board to ensure that all attorneys in the Commonwealth maintain the highest standards of professional conduct.