Title: DeCosmo v. Blue Tarp Redevelopment, LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13031 & SJC 13060
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 23, 2021

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13031 
SJC-13060 
 
TED DeCOSMO1  vs.  BLUE TARP REDEVELOPMENT, LLC.2 
 
A. RICHARD SCHUSTER3 & another4  vs.  WYNN RESORTS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
& others.5,6 
 
 
 
Hampden.  Suffolk.     April 7, 2021. - June 23, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Gaming.  Regulation.  Administrative Law, Regulations, Agency's 
interpretation of regulation. 
 
 
 
 
1 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. 
 
 
2 Doing business as MGM Springfield, LLC. 
 
 
3 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. 
 
4 Robert Ranson, individually and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated. 
 
5 Wynn MA, LLC; and Wynn Resorts, Ltd. 
 
 
6 These cases were consolidated at oral argument.  The 
arguments of the parties in both cases have been considered 
together, but the final dispositions are written separately in 
order to properly address the procedural differences between the 
two cases. 
2 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 29, 2019. 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by John S. Ferrara, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
Certification of a question of law to the Supreme Judicial 
Court by the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts. 
 
 
Joshua N. Garick for A. Richard Schuster & another. 
Wayne F. Dennison for the defendants. 
Jeffrey S. Morneau, for Ted DeCosmo, was present but did 
not argue. 
 
Matt Cameron, for Stop Predatory Gambling Foundation, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
David S. Mackey & Melissa C. Allison, Special Assistant 
Attorneys General, for Massachusetts Gaming Commission, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  According to the wise gambling proverb, "If you 
must play, decide upon three things at the start:  the rules of 
the game, the stakes, and the quitting time."  The gamblers 
challenging the rules of the game and the stakes here 
(plaintiffs) were blackjack players at the Encore Boston Harbor 
Casino, operated by Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC, Wynn MA, LLC, 
and Wynn Resorts, Ltd. (Encore); and the MGM Springfield casino, 
operated by Blue Tarp Redevelopment, LLC (MGM).  They played at 
tables requiring smaller bets and paying out a winning 
"blackjack" at six dollars for every five dollars bet (6:5), 
rather than three dollars for every two dollars bet (3:2) as at 
3 
 
the more expensive tables.  The plaintiffs sat down at tables 
with the basic rules and 6:5 payouts printed on the felt of the 
table, were dealt blackjacks, and won. 
 
With the advice of counsel, they now contend that they are 
entitled to 3:2, not 6:5, payouts, because the Massachusetts 
Gaming Commission's (commission's) blackjack rules, particularly 
rule 7(d), do not clearly authorize payouts of 6:5 except with 
games played by dealing rules different from those used at the 
plaintiffs' tables.  Unfortunately, rule 7(d) is at least 
somewhat ambiguous.  In response to the plaintiffs' claims, the 
commission has consistently interpreted rule 7(d) to authorize 
the 6:5 payout option at issue. 
 
In a case brought by A. Richard Schuster and Robert Ranson, 
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, a 
Federal District Court judge nonetheless denied Encore's motion 
to dismiss and certified a question of law to this court.  In a 
separate case brought by Ted DeCosmo, on behalf of himself and 
all others similarly situated, a Superior Court judge agreed 
with the casinos and the commission and allowed MGM's motion to 
dismiss.  We conclude that the plaintiffs understood the rules 
and the stakes, and that deference is due to the commission's 
4 
 
interpretation.  Therefore, the plaintiffs lose this last bet.  
They should have quit while they were ahead.7 
 
1.  Gaming and blackjack in Massachusetts.  Commercial 
gambling is illegal in Massachusetts except where expressly 
authorized by the Commonwealth.  See G. L. c. 271, § 2; G. L. 
c. 23K.  "Only those table games and their rules authorized by 
the [c]ommission and posted on the [c]ommission's website . . . 
may be offered for play in a gaming establishment."  205 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 147.02 (2018).  New games or game variations may 
not be offered until they are approved by the commission in 
accordance with the process set out in the regulations, which 
requires independent certified testing, field trials, public 
comment, and review.  205 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 147.02, 147.04 
(2018). 
 
Blackjack is a card game in which players total the value 
of their cards and attempt to get more points than the dealer 
without going over a combined value of twenty-one.  Initially, 
all players and the dealer are dealt two cards.  If a player's 
first two cards include one ace and one card with a value of ten 
(which includes a ten, jack, queen, or king), that player has 
been dealt a blackjack. 
 
 
7 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted in Schuster and 
Ranson's case by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission and the 
Stop Predatory Gambling Foundation. 
5 
 
 
The commission has written and published detailed rules of 
blackjack, which govern game play, equipment, wagers, and 
payouts.  The rules expressly refer to "blackjack" and "the 6 to 
5 blackjack variation" (6:5 variation).  The 6:5 variation is 
not the 6:5 option at issue in these cases.  The major 
differences between standard blackjack and the 6:5 variation are 
as follows:  standard blackjack uses six or eight decks of cards 
that are dealt face up from a dealing shoe, whereas the 6:5 
variation uses one or two decks that are dealt face down from 
the dealer's hand.  In standard blackjack, blackjacks receive 
3:2 payouts, whereas in the 6:5 variation, blackjacks receive 
6:5 payouts.8  The payouts in standard blackjack are more 
favorable for the player, but the higher number of decks are 
more favorable for the house.  The same is not true of the 6:5 
variation:  the payouts are less favorable for the player, but 
using fewer decks increases the player's advantage. 
 
Rule 7(d) contains the only direct reference to playing by 
standard blackjack rules with a 6:5 payout: 
"If the licensee chooses the option to pay a blackjack at 
odd [sic] of 6 to 5 and doesn't use the 6 to 5 variation, 
then Section 7(c) is void.  If the licensee uses this 
 
 
8 To illustrate, if a player wins a one hundred dollar wager 
in standard blackjack, the 3:2 payout is $150.  If a player wins 
a one hundred dollar wager in the 6:5 variation, the 6:5 payout 
is $120. 
6 
 
option on 6 or 8 deck games, this variation's rules must be 
displayed on the layout in plain sight."9 
 
 
2.  Facts and procedural history.  a.  Schuster matter 
(SJC-13060).  Encore does not offer the 6:5 variation.  Encore 
does, however, offer a version of blackjack that uses eight 
decks of cards dealt face up (as in standard blackjack) and that 
pays 6:5 for a blackjack (as in the 6:5 variation).  We will 
refer to this game as 6:5 payout blackjack.  Tables offering 6:5 
payout blackjack displayed the following rules:  "Blackjack pays 
6 to 5.  Dealer must draw to 16 and soft 17[10] and stand on hard 
17's and all 18's.  Insurance pays 2 to 1."  Encore offers 6:5 
payout blackjack on the main casino floor, which is open to the 
general public.  Encore also offers standard blackjack (with a 
3:2 payout) on the upper level of the casino, which is reserved 
for Encore's "high rollers." 
 
Schuster and Ranson played 6:5 payout blackjack at Encore, 
were dealt one or more blackjacks, and received 6:5 payouts.  On 
July 15, 2019, Schuster commenced a proposed class action suit 
in the Superior Court, which Encore removed to the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts.  The District 
 
 
9 Section 7(c) refers to an even-money payout option for 
insurance wagers, which are explained in note 13, infra. 
 
 
10 A "soft 17" is a hand containing an ace with a total 
point value of seventeen when the ace is counted as eleven in 
value. 
7 
 
Court judge denied Encore's motion to dismiss as to the 
blackjack dispute.  See Schuster v. Encore Boston Harbor, 471 F. 
Supp. 3d 411, 426 (D. Mass. 2020).  After reviewing "the 
language of [rule] 7(d) in context," a preliminary decision from 
the commission's investigation and enforcement bureau (IEB) that 
Encore was in compliance with the rules, and a transcript of the 
commission's discussion of that decision, the District Court 
judge concluded that Schuster "made a plausible claim as to 
Encore's potential violation of the [commission]'s rules 
regarding the appropriate payout odds on 'a blackjack,' or, in 
the alternative, Encore's failure to comply with the notice 
requirements of [rule] 7(d) regarding even-money insurance 
wagers."  Id. at 422.  After the complaint was thereafter 
amended to add Ranson as a plaintiff, the judge, upon the joint 
motion of the parties, then certified the following question to 
this court: 
"Did the February 11, 2019 version of the Rules of 
Blackjack that were published by the [commission] and 
posted on its website in accordance with [205 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 147.02] permit a Massachusetts casino to pay 6:5 
odds to a player who was dealt a winning Blackjack hand, 
while not otherwise playing by the '6 to 5 Blackjack 
Variation' rules that were articulated in Rule 6a of the 
February 11, 2019 version of the Rules of Blackjack?" 
 
8 
 
 
b.  DeCosmo matter (SJC-13031).  Like Encore, MGM offered 
6:5 payout blackjack and publicized the 6:5 payout on the felt.11  
DeCosmo played 6:5 payout blackjack at MGM, was dealt a 
blackjack, and received a 6:5 payout.  On July 29, 2019, he 
brought a proposed class action in the Superior Court.  MGM's 
motion to dismiss was granted, and DeCosmo appealed.  We 
thereafter granted MGM's application for direct appellate 
review. 
 
c.  Commission revisions.  In the time since these cases 
were commenced, the commission has revised both the blackjack 
rules and the applicable blackjack table regulations.  This case 
therefore only applies to the limited period of time between the 
commencement of these cases in July 2019 and the revision of the 
rules in October 2020. 
 
3.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  As to the DeCosmo 
matter, this court reviews an order on a motion to dismiss de 
novo.  See, e.g., Dunn v. Genzyme Corp., 486 Mass. 713, 717 
(2021).  The Schuster matter came to us as a certified question 
of law.  See S.J.C. Rule 1:03, as appearing in 382 Mass. 700 
(1981).  Although the procedural postures of these cases are 
different, the legal questions therein and our analysis of them 
are essentially identical.  Therefore, we address them together. 
 
 
11 This court does not have information as to what else was 
printed on the felt at MGM. 
9 
 
 
b.  Game authorization.  These cases require us to 
interpret the commission's rules of blackjack and equipment 
regulations.  As an initial matter, the plaintiffs contend that 
the regulations carry more legal weight than the rules of 
blackjack, and thus any conflict between the regulations and the 
rules should be resolved in favor of the regulations.  We 
disagree.  In these cases, the blackjack rules and regulations 
carry equal weight, as they are proposed and approved through 
similarly rigorous processes. 
 
The plaintiffs rely on Northbridge v. Natick, 394 Mass. 70, 
76 (1985), in which this court stated that "internal guidelines" 
and "policy statements" set by an agency "without going through 
the procedures required for the promulgation of a regulation 
. . . do not have the legal force of a statute or regulation" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  See Biogen IDEC MA, Inc. v. 
Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 454 Mass. 174, 186 (2009) (Biogen) 
("courts give the force of law only to formal agency 
regulations" even though "agencies must abide by their own 
internally promulgated policies" [citation omitted]).  However, 
the blackjack rules differ significantly from the internal 
guidelines and policies discussed in Northbridge and Biogen.  
The blackjack rules are promulgated not only to guide the 
commission's activities and enforcement, but also to regulate 
licensees' activity.  See McGuiness v. Department of Correction, 
10 
 
465 Mass. 660, 662 n.4 (2013) ("having promulgated a rule or 
regulation," agency "is bound to respect and enforce the rule as 
long as it remains extant" [citation omitted]); 205 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 147.02 (rules govern which games licensee may offer).  
Table game rules undergo a thorough approval process more 
similar to the promulgation of regulations than a simple 
internal policy.  See Northbridge, supra; G. L. c. 30A, §§ 2-5 
(requirements for regulations); 205 Code Mass. Regs. § 147.04 
(requirements for table game rules).  In fact, the blackjack 
rules, although not true regulations, largely match the 
statutory definition of a regulation in the administrative 
procedure statute.  G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (defining regulation as 
"the whole or any part of every rule, regulation, standard or 
other requirement of general application and future effect . . . 
adopted by an agency to implement or interpret the law enforced 
or administered by it").12  Therefore, we read the regulations 
and the blackjack rules together, as we would different sections 
of regulations, and we interpret both "in the same manner as a 
statute, and according to traditional rules of construction."  
Massachusetts Fine Wines & Spirits, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages 
Control Comm'n, 482 Mass. 683, 687 (2019) (Fine Wines), quoting 
 
 
12 General Laws c. 30A, § 1, contains certain exceptions 
inapplicable to the blackjack rules. 
11 
 
Warcewicz v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 410 Mass. 548, 550 
(1991). 
 
Thus, "[a]s with any question of statutory interpretation, 
our starting point is the . . . text."  Commonwealth v. Vega, 
449 Mass. 227, 230 (2007).  "[L]anguage should be given effect 
consistent with its plain meaning.  If the language is clear and 
unambiguous, it must be interpreted as written" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Boss v. Leverett, 484 Mass. 553, 557 (2020).  
Where the plain text of the rules and regulations is ambiguous, 
an agency's reasonable interpretation of them is generally 
entitled to deference.  Carey v. Commissioner of Correction, 479 
Mass. 367, 371 (2018). 
 
i.  Blackjack rules and regulations.  Rule 7(d) is an 
interpretative challenge.  It expressly states that the licensee 
may "choose[] the option to pay a blackjack at odd [sic] of 6 to 
5" and does not need to "use the 6 to 5 variation" to do so.  
The rule's text therefore plainly contemplates the possibility 
of a licensee using 6:5 payout blackjack in some authorized way.  
It also appears from the second sentence of rule 7(d) that 6:5 
payout blackjack is permissible if the rules are displayed on 
the layout in plain sight.  As we discuss at length infra, the 
key rules of the game were displayed or, in the case of rules 
regarding dealing procedures, obvious to a player at the table.  
There is no indication that the casinos attempted to deceive 
12 
 
players as to the rules of the game or the stakes they were 
playing. 
 
Unfortunately, the rest of rule 7(d) is confusing.  Its 
cross reference to rule 7(c), declaring it void, seems 
unnecessary because, as the plaintiffs correctly point out, an 
even-money payout for insurance wagers is a mathematical 
impossibility when playing with 6:5 odds.13  Further garbling its 
 
 
13 Insurance wagers may occur when the player is dealt a 
blackjack and the dealer's face up card is an ace.  In these 
circumstances, pursuant to rule 9, a player may place an 
insurance wager, which is a bet that the dealer will also have a 
blackjack.  Winning insurance wagers are paid at odds of 2:1.  
Under rule 7(c), if a player has a blackjack, he or she may opt 
for an even-money payout (to be paid at odds of 1:1 on the 
blackjack wager) instead of making an insurance wager.  This 
option essentially shortcuts the result of an insurance wager in 
standard blackjack:  if the player has blackjack and places an 
insurance wager, whether the dealer has blackjack or not, the 
player is paid the same amount of money.  When playing with 6:5 
odds, the player may place an insurance wager, but it is not 
mathematically possible to achieve this even-money result, 
because the player would receive less for his or her blackjack 
wager. 
 
 
The illustration of a one hundred dollar wager and a fifty 
dollar insurance bet is helpful to understand even-money 
payouts.  When playing with a 3:2 payout (as one must for even 
money), assume the player places a one hundred dollar original 
wager, and a fifty dollar insurance wager.  If the dealer has 
blackjack, the player neither wins nor loses any money on the 
one hundred dollar wager, but the fifty dollar insurance bet 
wins and is paid at odds of 2:1.  The player is paid one hundred 
dollars on the insurance bet, and nothing on the original bet; 
therefore, the player receives one hundred dollars -- a 1:1 
payout or "even money" to the original wager.  If the dealer 
does not have blackjack, the player loses the fifty dollar 
insurance bet but wins the original one hundred dollar wager and 
is paid at 3:2 -- $150.  The total payout is $150, but the 
player has lost the fifty dollars spent on the insurance wager, 
13 
 
meaning, rule 7(d) describes 6:5 payout blackjack as both an 
"option" and a "variation," thereby somewhat confusing it with 
the 6:5 variation. 
 
Rule 7(d) is also an outlier in rules mostly devoted to 
standard blackjack and the 6:5 variation.  The plaintiffs argue 
that to conclude that rule 7(d) authorizes 6:5 payout blackjack 
would run contrary to and nullify portions of the rest of the 
blackjack rules and regulations.  See, e.g., Vega, 449 Mass. at 
230.  The rules do not, as the plaintiffs imply, directly state 
that 6:5 payouts are impermissible when playing by standard 
blackjack rules, but they do include mandatory, encompassing 
language that expressly requires payout of 3:2 odds for 
blackjacks and only includes express exceptions for the 6:5 
variation.  Rule 3(e), for example, states that "standard 
blackjack . . . shall be paid at odds of 3 to 2, or at odds of 6 
to 5 for the 6 to 5 blackjack variation."  Rule 7(a) states that 
if a player has blackjack, the dealer "shall . . . pay the 
blackjack at odds of 3 to 2," and rule 7(b) states that "the 
player having blackjack shall be paid at odds of 3 to 2."  
Likewise, the regulations' blackjack layout requirements only 
directly authorize displaying 6:5 odds for the 6:5 variation.  
 
and so, again, the player receives one hundred dollars, "even 
money" to the original wager.  This outcome is not possible when 
playing with a 6:5 payout because the player would only receive 
$120 if the dealer does not have blackjack. 
14 
 
205 Code Mass. Regs. § 146.13(14) (2018)14 ("Blackjack pays 6 to 
5" shall appear on layout "[i]f a gaming licensee offers the 6 
to 5 blackjack variation").  Apart from this provision specific 
to the 6:5 variation, the regulations state that "Blackjack pays 
3 to 2" "shall appear on the blackjack layout."  205 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 146.13(3) (2018).15 
 
These rules mandating either 3:2 payouts or the 6:5 
variation are in apparent conflict with rule 7(d)'s express 
reference to the "option" to offer 6:5 payout blackjack.  Where 
provisions appear to conflict with each other, we must first 
"endeavor to harmonize" them (citation omitted).  Donis v. 
American Waste Serv., LLC, 485 Mass. 257, 260 (2020).  We must 
avoid an interpretation that renders any provision entirely 
superfluous.  See, e.g., Wheatley v. Massachusetts Insurers 
Insolvency Fund, 456 Mass. 594, 601 (2010), S.C., 465 Mass. 297 
(2013); Vega, 449 Mass. at 231. 
 
 
14 Unless otherwise noted, we refer to the version of 205 
Code Mass. Regs. § 146.13 operative at all relevant times for 
these lawsuits, prior to the amendments in 2021. 
 
 
15 The regulations also contain a provision for "blackjack 
rule variations," which requires a display that correlates only 
to a 1:1 payout blackjack variation.  See 205 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 146.13(4) (2018) ("If a gaming licensee offers blackjack rule 
variations, the blackjack layout shall have imprinted on it 
. . . Blackjack pays 1 to 1 . . .").  Although the use of the 
plural "variations" indicates that there might be multiple 
variations to blackjack, this regulation only authorizes display 
of 1:1 payouts, implying that the drafters did not consider 6:5 
payout blackjack an authorized variation. 
15 
 
 
Concluding, as the plaintiffs contend we should, that rule 
7(d) just stands for the mathematical reality that even-money 
payouts are impossible when playing the 6:5 variation both runs 
contrary to the plain text of the rule and renders most of the 
rule "inoperative" or superfluous (citation omitted).  Vega, 449 
Mass. at 231.  See Boss, 484 Mass. at 557.  However, Encore and 
MGM's contention that rule 7(d) is an express authorization of 
6:5 payout blackjack or a direct exception to the rest of the 
blackjack rules is not entirely clear from the text. 
 
As explained supra, the rest of the rules and regulations 
do not expressly prohibit 6:5 payout blackjack, but they do set 
forth general requirements for blackjack that appear to conflict 
with the "option" referenced in rule 7(d).  See Retirement Bd. 
of Stoneham v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 476 Mass. 
130, 138 (2016), quoting Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 Mass. 607, 609 
(1983) ("The word 'shall' is ordinarily interpreted as having a 
mandatory or imperative obligation").  Likewise, the language of 
rule 7(d) does not exempt 6:5 payout blackjack from other 
requirements in the rules, but the statement that a licensee may 
"choose[]" to offer the "option" or "variation" of 6:5 payout 
blackjack appears permissive even in the face of the other 
rules.  See RCA Dev., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Brockton, 
482 Mass. 156, 160–161 (2019) (use of permissive language 
reflects "intent to grant discretion or permission to . . . 
16 
 
authorize an act" [citation omitted]).  See also McDonough's 
Case, 448 Mass. 79, 84 (2006) (where wording creates exception, 
exception exists even though at odds with over-all provision). 
 
Complete harmonization of these conflicting provisions is 
thus difficult to achieve.  The text of rule 7(d) contemplates 
6:5 payout blackjack as a legitimate option for licensees.  
However, the lack of clarity in the way rule 7(d) itself is 
written, the fact that its reference to 6:5 payout blackjack is 
an outlier in the rules, and the apparent conflict between rule 
7(d)'s permissive language and the mandatory language in other 
parts of the rules leave the reader with some ambiguity as to 
the meaning of rule 7(d).  Given this ambiguity, we turn to the 
doctrine of administrative deference. 
 
ii.  Administrative deference.  The practice of deferring 
to an agency's reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous 
regulations, commonly known in Federal courts as Auer deference, 
is long standing in both Massachusetts and Federal case law.16  
See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997); Craft Beer 
Guild, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 481 Mass. 506, 
527 (2019); Finkelstein v. Board of Registration in Optometry, 
 
 
16 As discussed supra, the blackjack rules, although not 
true regulations, are functionally analogous to regulations.  
Therefore, we treat the commission's interpretation of the rules 
with the same deference we would its interpretation of its own 
regulations. 
17 
 
370 Mass. 476, 478 (1976).  In deciding whether deference is due 
to an agency's interpretation, both this court and the United 
States Supreme Court consider whether (1) the regulatory 
language is plain or ambiguous;17 (2) the agency's interpretation 
is reasonable;18 (3) the interpretation is the agency's official 
or authoritative position;19 (4) the interpretation draws on the 
agency's technical and substantive expertise;20 and (5) the 
agency's interpretation is based on fair and considered 
judgment.21  In the instant cases, all of these considerations 
 
 
17 See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414 (2019) 
("possibility of deference can arise only if a regulation is 
genuinely ambiguous"); Finkelstein, 370 Mass. at 478 (guiding 
"principle is one of deference, not abdication, and courts will 
not hesitate to overrule agency interpretations of rules when 
those interpretations are . . .  inconsistent with the plain 
terms of the rule itself"). 
 
 
18 See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (requiring agency's reading 
to be reasonable); Warcewicz, 410 Mass. at 550-552 (rejecting 
unreasonable interpretation of regulation). 
 
 
19 See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416 (requiring agency's 
interpretation to be authoritative or official position rather 
than any more ad hoc statement); Costa v. Fall River Hous. 
Auth., 453 Mass. 614, 620 n.9 (2009) (addressing which of 
agency's conflicting interpretations should be considered 
official and therefore receive deference). 
 
 
20 See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2417 (requiring agency's 
interpretation to implicate its substantive expertise); Dental 
Serv. of Mass., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 479 Mass. 304, 
310 n.12 (2018) (giving weight to agency's relevant substantive 
expertise and specialized knowledge). 
 
 
21 See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2417-2418 (requiring agency's 
interpretation to be product of its "fair and considered 
judgment" [citation omitted]); Mullally v. Waste Mgt. of Mass., 
18 
 
support the application of deference to the commission's 
interpretation. 
 
A.  Regulation's text plain or ambiguous.  If the 
regulation is plain and unambiguous, it should be interpreted 
according to its terms.  See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 
2400, 2415 (2019); Fine Wines, 482 Mass. at 687 ("First, we look 
to the text of the regulation, and will apply the clear meaning 
of unambiguous words unless doing so would lead to an absurd 
result"); Carey, 479 Mass. at 369-370 (interpretation must be 
consistent with plain text); Goldberg v. Board of Health of 
Granby, 444 Mass. 627, 636 (2005), citing Christensen v. Harris 
County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (deference to agency 
interpretation not appropriate where meaning of regulation 
unambiguous).  Courts can perform this function without the 
assistance of, or deference to, the agency.  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court will not even consider the issue of deference unless the 
regulation is what the Court describes as "genuinely ambiguous," 
"[a]nd before concluding that a rule is genuinely ambiguous, a 
court must exhaust all the traditional tools of construction" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Kisor, supra at 2414-2415.22 
 
Inc., 452 Mass. 526, 533 & n.13 (2008) (contrasting deference 
owed to long-standing interpretations with those developed 
shortly before and in response to litigation). 
 
 
22 Although we consider many of the same factors as the 
Supreme Court in deciding whether to defer to an agency's 
19 
 
 
As explained supra, the regulatory regime at issue in these 
cases is ambiguous, thereby implicating the issue of 
administrative deference.  We have attempted to interpret the 
rules, but we have concluded that it is difficult to entirely 
harmonize the apparent conflict in the provisions.  Thus, we 
decide that rule 7(d) is ambiguous, requiring consideration of 
administrative interpretation and deference. 
 
B.  Reasonableness.  When a regulation is ambiguous, we are 
prepared to give what we have described as "considerable," 
"substantial," or "generous" deference to an agency's 
interpretation of the regulation so long as the interpretation 
is reasonable.  Fine Wines, 482 Mass. at 687 ("generous" 
deference required for reasonable interpretation of regulation 
[citation omitted]).  J.M. Hollister, LLC v. Architectural 
Access Bd., 469 Mass. 49, 55 (2014) (describing "considerable 
deference to the board's interpretation of . . . its own 
regulation" [citation omitted]).  Franklin Office Park Realty 
Corp. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 466 
Mass. 454, 460 (2013) (court grants "substantial deference" to 
 
interpretation, the Supreme Court appears to be somewhat more 
restrictive in its application of deference.  We are less 
hesitant to consider the agency's interpretation, see Kisor, 139 
S. Ct. at 2414-2415, and more "generous" in our deference 
(citation omitted), see Fine Wines, 482 Mass. at 687.  See infra 
for discussion of "considerable" and "generous" deference in 
Massachusetts case law. 
20 
 
"agency's particular expertise" unless "unreasonable" [citations 
omitted]).  We have emphasized that a party opposing the 
agency's interpretation bears a "formidable burden" to show that 
the interpretation is not reasonable (citation omitted).  Ten 
Local Citizen Group v. New England Wind, LLC, 457 Mass. 222, 228 
(2010).  See J.M. Hollister, LLC, supra.  That being said, such 
deference is not "unlimited."  Craft Beer Guild, LLC, 481 Mass. 
at 527. 
 
The commission concludes, based on its interpretation, that 
rule 7(d) should be given effect as authorizing 6:5 payout 
blackjack.  This interpretation is consistent, rather than 
inconsistent, with the plain meaning of the language of rule 
7(d) itself, which references the use of 6:5 payouts without 
using the 6:5 variation so long as the rules are displayed.  See 
Boss, 484 Mass. at 557 (language should be given plain meaning); 
Fine Wines, 482 Mass. at 687; Carey, 479 Mass. at 369-370 
(interpretation must be consistent with plain text).  The 
interpretation also lends meaning and purpose to rule 7(d), 
rather than rendering it largely superfluous, as the plaintiffs' 
interpretation would.  See, e.g., Wheatley, 456 Mass. at 601; 
Vega, 449 Mass. at 231.  Although the commission's failure to 
explain why 6:5 payout blackjack is not discussed expressly 
elsewhere in the rules or how the permissive language in rule 
7(d) should interact with the blackjack requirements in the rest 
21 
 
of the rules is troublesome, and reflective of the inherent 
ambiguity of the rule, it is not dispositive.  Cf. Biogen, 454 
Mass. at 187 (when interpreting statute, agency's interpretation 
must be "the product of reasoned rule making" to receive 
deference).  As evidenced by our attempt to harmonize the 
apparent conflict in the rules, the commission's conclusion is 
reasonable and consistent with the text of the rules and does 
not lead to an absurd result.  See, e.g., Fine Wines, 482 Mass. 
at 687; Carey, 479 Mass. at 369-370.  The interpretation is 
therefore ordinarily entitled to considerable or generous 
deference.  See Carey, supra; J.M. Hollister, LLC, 469 Mass. at 
55.23  Other factors that we have considered in evaluating 
whether deference is appropriate also confirm this 
determination. 
 
C.  Agency's authoritative, official position.  In 
evaluating deference, we also consider whether the agency's 
decision is an official statement made by those authorized to 
speak for the agency.  See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416.  Cf. 
Sullivan v. Sleepy's LLC, 482 Mass. 227, 232 n.11 (2019) 
(deferring to "agency's interpretation [of statute] contained in 
an opinion letter"), citing Swift v. AutoZone, Inc., 441 Mass. 
 
 
23 The Supreme Court has not adopted this formulation; it 
has also emphasized that "not every reasonable agency reading of 
a genuinely ambiguous rule should receive Auer deference." 
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416. 
22 
 
443, 450 (2004) (explaining deference with respect to opinion 
letter).  There is little doubt that the commission's amicus 
brief represents its "authoritative" or "official" position.  
Kisor, supra.  In the past, both the Supreme Court and this 
court have accepted an agency's amicus brief as authoritative.  
See Auer, 519 U.S. at 463–464 (deferring to interpretation 
advanced in Secretary of Labor's amicus brief); Costa v. Fall 
River Hous. Auth., 453 Mass. 614, 620 n.9 (2009) (accepting 
amicus brief's "present explicit statement about the intended 
meaning of this regulation" over agency's past statements).  The 
amicus brief here details the commission's formal decision and 
is easily distinguishable from interpretations cited as 
nonauthoritative.  See Kisor, supra at 2416-2417 ("speech of a 
mid-level official," "informal memorandum," and explicitly 
nonauthoritative guides are not official interpretations). 
 
D.  Implication of substantive expertise.  We accord "due 
weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized 
knowledge of the agency" (citation omitted).  Ten Local Citizen 
Group, 457 Mass. at 228.  Thus, in evaluating whether deference 
is appropriate, we have also considered it important that an 
interpretation be based in some way on this expertise or 
specialized knowledge.24  The commission's expertise is clearly 
 
 
24 See Dental Serv. of Mass., 479 Mass. at 310 n.12 (giving 
weight to agency's relevant substantive expertise and 
23 
 
implicated here, as its brief interprets specialized rules of 
blackjack that are written by the commission and implemented by 
licensees under the commission's regulation.  See G. L. c. 23K, 
§ 4. 
 
E.  Fair and considered judgment.  Finally, we evaluate 
whether an agency's interpretation reflects a "fair and 
considered judgment" to receive deference (citation omitted).  
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2417.  See Mullally v. Waste Mgt. of Mass., 
Inc., 452 Mass. 526, 533 & n.13 (2008) (discussing weight of 
interpretation made in shadow of litigation); Goldberg, 444 
Mass. at 636 ("arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious" 
interpretations not due deference [citation omitted]). 
 
To this end, "[a]dministrative interpretation developed 
during, or shortly before, the litigation in question is 
entitled to less weight than that of a long-standing 
administrative interpretation of administrative rules" (citation 
omitted).  Mullally, 452 Mass. at 533 n.13.  See Beverly Port 
Marina, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 
 
specialized knowledge); Franklin Office Park Realty Corp., 466 
Mass. at 460 (deferring to agency's "particular expertise"); 
Friends & Fishers of the Edgartown Great Pond, Inc. v. 
Department of Envtl. Protection, 446 Mass. 830, 837 (2006) ("We 
do not intrude lightly within the agency's area of expertise, as 
long as the regulations are interpreted with reference to their 
purpose . . ." [quotation and citation omitted]).  See also 
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2417 ("the agency's interpretation must in 
some way implicate its substantive expertise"). 
24 
 
84 Mass. App. Ct. 612, 620–621 (2013), quoting United States 
Gypsum Co. v. Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs, 69 Mass. App. 
Ct. 243, 249 n.16 (2007) ("our judicial deference 'may be 
tempered' when . . . the agency interpretation at issue is not 
one of long-standing or consistent application"); Crawford v. 
Cambridge, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 47, 49 (1987) (reasonable 
interpretation that is "consistently applied" entitled to 
deference).  See also Dinkins v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 486 
Mass. 605, 611 n.7 (2021) (in context of agency applying 
statute, "consistent, long continued administrative application" 
may merit "[s]ignificance in interpretation" [citation 
omitted]).  We distinguish considered and consistent 
interpretations from a "merely convenient litigating position or 
post hoc rationalization" (quotations, citation, and alteration 
omitted).  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2417. 
 
The interpretation advanced by the commission here is 
consistent with a past decision by the commission's IEB.  Just 
three days after the first complaint filed in these cases, the 
IEB "preliminarily found Encore to be in compliance with the 
[c]ommission's rules and regulations," and decided not to pursue 
an enforcement action.  In a later executive session, the 
commission determined that it did not take issue with the IEB's 
analysis and conclusions.  Admittedly, the IEB memorandum, like 
the amicus brief, fails to explain some of the apparent conflict 
25 
 
in the rules and the nature of rule 7(d) as an outlier.  The 
agency's interpretation of this question was not put forward 
until July 2019, when this litigation had already been 
initiated, and so it is not necessarily a "long-standing 
administrative interpretation."  Mullally, 452 Mass. at 533 
n.13.  Nonetheless, it is significant that various bodies of the 
commission have consistently come to the same conclusion since 
the first time the commission was notified of the difficulties 
in interpreting the rules.  See id. 
 
Further, in these cases, the fact that the commission is 
not a party to the litigation supports the notion that its 
interpretation is fair and considered, as the commission is less 
likely to offer a self-interested interpretation.  See Kisor, 
139 S. Ct. 2417 n.6, quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462 (where agency 
not party to litigation and expressed its views only in response 
to court's request, "no reason to suspect that the 
interpretation [did] not reflect the agency's fair and 
considered judgment on the matter"); Mullally, 452 Mass. at 533 
n.13 (addressing weight of interpretation made in shadow of 
litigation).  Even if, as one amicus brief suggests, the 
commission has a financial interest in the tax revenue generated 
by the casinos, that interest is not relevant here, where the 
commission is interpreting rules and regulations that are no 
longer operative.  The commission was approached about 
26 
 
submitting an amicus brief by defense counsel, but initially 
declined to do so to avoid the appearance "that it was anything 
but neutral when it came to its oversight of the industry."  The 
commission submitted the amicus brief only following this 
court's solicitation.  See Kisor, supra (agency submitting 
interpretation in response to court's request likely reflects 
fair and considered judgment).  There is nothing to suggest that 
the commission's interpretation is the product of unfairness, 
lacks consideration, is "arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious," 
Goldberg, 444 Mass. at 636, or was developed in the shadow of 
litigation, see Kisor, supra at 2417 & n.6; Mullally, supra. 
 
In sum, all of the relevant considerations weigh in favor 
of deference here.  As demonstrated by our attempt to harmonize 
the rules and regulations governing blackjack, rule 7(d) is 
ambiguous.  The commission's official interpretation is 
consistent with the text, is "reasonable," and "does not lead to 
an absurd result."  Fine Wines, 482 Mass. at 687.  See Kisor, 
139 S. Ct. 2415-2416 (interpretation must be "reasonable" or 
"within the zone of ambiguity the court has identified after 
employing all its interpretive tools" to receive deference); 
Carey, 479 Mass. at 369-370 (interpretation must be consistent 
with text of rules to receive deference).  The interpretation is 
also the commission's official position, implicates its 
substantive expertise, and reflects its fair and considered 
27 
 
judgment.  See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. 2416-2418; Rivas v. Chelsea 
Hous. Auth., 464 Mass. 329, 335 (2013); Costa, 453 Mass. at 620 
n.9; Mullally, 452 Mass. at 533 n.13.  Thus, we conclude that, 
per the commission's interpretation, rule 7(d) allows the 
licensees to offer 6:5 payout blackjack. 
 
c.  Blackjack layout.  The plaintiffs further argue that 
the layouts of the Encore's and MGM's 6:5 payout blackjack 
tables did not comply with the commission's rules and 
regulations.  Rule 7(d) requires that "[i]f the licensee uses 
this option [to pay 6:5 odds without playing the 6 to 5 
variation] on 6 or 8 deck games, this variation's rules must be 
displayed on the layout in plain sight."  Title 205 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 146.13 further specifies the layout requirements for 
blackjack and its variations. 
 
The commission's regulations as a whole are clearly 
designed to ensure that players have notice of the rules when 
they sit down to play a game.  See 205 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 146.13, 147.02, 147.03 (2018).  To this end, the equipment 
regulations specifically require blackjack tables to display, at 
a minimum, the following:  the payout for blackjack; when the 
dealer must draw, stand, or hit; and the payout for insurance.  
205 Code Mass. Regs. § 146.13(3) ("[t]he following inscriptions 
shall appear on the blackjack layout"), (14) (layout inscription 
requirements "[i]f a gaming licensee offers the 6 to 5 blackjack 
28 
 
variation").  The equipment regulations do not have an 
inscription requirement specific to 6:5 payout blackjack; only 
rule 7(d) references displaying the rules of 6:5 payout 
blackjack. 
 
Encore's tables offering 6:5 payout blackjack displayed the 
following rules:  "Blackjack pays 6 to 5.  Dealer must draw to 
16 and soft 17 and stand on hard 17's and all 18's.  Insurance 
pays 2 to 1."25 
 
Encore and MGM contend that rule 7(d)'s requirement that 
"this variation's rules must be displayed in plain sight" is 
only a requirement that the selected odds be displayed.  This is 
a clear misreading of the plain text of the rule:  payouts are 
merely one small portion of the blackjack rules of every 
variation.  As the Federal District Court judge correctly noted 
in her review of the rules, the words "payout" and "rule" are 
not used interchangeably.  Schuster, 471 F. Supp. 3d at 421. 
 
That said, it is clear from the layout requirements set out 
in the regulations that licensees are not required to imprint 
every page of the blackjack rules on their tables.  Rather, the 
regulations require a display of the odds, the rules the dealer 
 
 
25 Only the Encore table inscriptions appear in the record.  
DeCosmo alleges that the MGM tables displayed that blackjack 
pays at odds of 6:5.  DeCosmo has made no allegations, and this 
court does not have information, as to precisely what else was 
imprinted on MGM's tables.  MGM's arguments with regard to the 
table inscriptions are identical to Encore's. 
29 
 
must follow when competing against players, and the payment of 
insurance.  205 Code Mass. Regs. § 146.13(3), (14).  Encore's 
tables, although obviously displaying the 6:5 odds referenced in 
rule 7(d) instead of the 3:2 odds specifically required by the 
equipment regulations, did abide by these general requirements.26 
 
Importantly, the main differences between 6:5 payout 
blackjack and the 6:5 variation -- the number of decks and 
whether cards are dealt face up or face down -- are easily 
observable just by watching the game play, particularly given 
that the 6:5 variation is dealt by hand, rather than machine.  
Thus, any player familiar enough with the blackjack rules to 
know the differences between standard blackjack and the 6:5 
variation would have been able to observe the relevant features 
of 6:5 payout blackjack and know they were not playing the 6:5 
variation.  Although Encore and MGM chose to operate a house-
friendly game, they did not deceive players into believing it 
would be more player-friendly than it actually was. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that Encore's and MGM's layouts 
complied with rule 7(d)'s notification requirement that "this 
 
 
26 We do not have complete information as to what else was 
imprinted on MGM's tables.  See note 25, supra. 
 
30 
 
variation's rules must be displayed on the layout in plain 
sight."27 
 
4.  Conclusion.  a.  Schuster matter (SJC-13060).  We 
answer "yes" to the certified question, "Did the February 11, 
2019 version of the Rules of Blackjack that were published by 
the Massachusetts Gaming Commission and posted on its website in 
accordance with [205 Code Mass. Regs. § 147.02] permit a 
Massachusetts casino to pay 6:5 odds to a player who was dealt a 
winning Blackjack hand, while not otherwise playing by the '6 to 
5 Blackjack Variation' rules that were articulated in Rule 6a of 
the February 11, 2019 version of the Rules of Blackjack?" 
 
The Reporter of Decisions is to furnish attested copies of 
this opinion to the clerk of this court.  The clerk in turn will 
transmit one copy, under the seal of the court, to the clerk of 
the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, as the answer to the question certified, and also 
will transmit a copy to each party. 
 
 
27 The plaintiffs argue that this provision requires the 
defendants to post in plain sight that even-money insurance bets 
were void at 6:5 payout blackjack tables.  However, rule 7(d)'s 
statement about even-money insurance bets merely states a 
mathematical truth, not a rule.  The commission did not require 
licensees to display any information about even-money insurance 
bets at 6:5 variation tables.  205 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 146.13(14).  The impossibility of even-money insurance bets is 
a fact of blackjack played at 6:5 odds, not a free-standing 
rule. 
31 
 
 
b.  DeCosmo matter (SJC-13031).  Because we conclude that 
the rules authorized MGM to offer 6:5 payout blackjack, we 
affirm the Superior Court judge's order granting MGM's motion to 
dismiss. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.