Title: State v. Burton
Citation: 2013 WI 61
Docket Number: 2011AP000450-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 10, 2013

2013 WI 61 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP450-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Julius C. Burton, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
Reported at 340 Wis. 2d 497, 812 N.W.2d 539 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Unpublished)     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 10, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Patricia McMahon/Kevin E. Martens   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there briefs by 
Esther Cohen Lee and Hall, Burce and Olson, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Esther Cohen Lee.    
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Sally 
L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
  
 
 
2013 WI 61
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2011AP450-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2009CF2823) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Julius C. Burton, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 affirming a 
judgment of conviction and an order of the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court denying Julius C. Burton's (Burton) postconviction 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  The case involves the 
merits of this postconviction motion.2 
                                                 
1 State v. Burton, No. 2011AP450-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2012).   
2 The Honorable Patricia D. McMahon accepted Burton's pleas 
and imposed sentence.  The Honorable Kevin E. Martens denied the 
motion for postconviction relief.   
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
2 
 
¶2 
Burton pled guilty to two counts of attempted first-
degree intentional homicide.  Initially, he had entered pleas of 
not guilty and then not guilty by reason of mental disease or 
defect (NGI),3 but later he withdrew his not guilty pleas as part 
of a plea agreement.  After he was sentenced to lengthy 
consecutive periods of initial confinement, however, Burton 
moved to withdraw his guilty pleas.   
¶3 
For purposes of this review, Burton's postconviction 
motion stated two grounds for plea withdrawal.  First, Burton 
alleged that his two trial counsel were ineffective for 
permitting him to withdraw his NGI pleas inasmuch as there was 
no evidence in the record that counsel had informed him of the 
possibility of a bifurcated plea with the right to a jury trial 
focused solely on the issue of his mental responsibility.   
¶4 
Second, Burton alleged that the circuit court erred in 
not advising him of the bifurcated plea and trial option during 
the plea colloquy, so that Burton's resulting pleas were not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.   
¶5 
The first ground alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel is usually categorized as a Nelson/Bentley motion.4   The 
second ground alleging a defective plea colloquy is usually 
described as a Bangert motion.5  The circuit court denied both 
                                                 
3 The terms "not guilty by reason of mental disease or 
defect," "NGI," and "insanity defense" are used interchangeably 
in this opinion.   
4 Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 195 N.W.2d 629 (1972); 
State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).   
5 State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
3 
 
grounds 
of 
Burton's 
single 
motion 
without 
conducting 
an 
evidentiary hearing, and the court of appeals affirmed.  We now 
affirm the court of appeals. 
¶6 
We 
conclude, 
first, 
that 
Burton's 
Nelson/Bentley 
motion was insufficient.  The motion asserted that Burton's two 
trial counsel were ineffective in not pursuing an NGI or 
"insanity" defense.  The motion claimed that Burton's explicit 
withdrawal of that defense as part of a plea agreement must have 
been based upon a failure by trial counsel to inform Burton that 
he had the option of pleading guilty to the crimes but also not 
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.  Significantly, 
Burton's motion never alleged that his trial counsel failed to 
inform Burton of this option.  Instead, it merely pointed to the 
absence of evidence in the record that indicated that counsel 
had explained this option to Burton.  The absence of record 
evidence in this situation is not enough.  A defendant must 
affirmatively plead facts that, if true, would constitute 
deficient performance of counsel.  Moreover, even if deficient 
performance had been properly pled, Burton's motion did not 
affirmatively assert that if trial counsel had informed him of 
the option of a trial focused solely upon mental responsibility, 
he would have chosen that option and why he would have chosen 
it. 
¶7 
The sufficiency of a Nelson/Bentley motion is critical 
because 
the 
defendant 
has 
the 
burden 
of 
proof 
in 
a 
Nelson/Bentley 
hearing. 
 
A 
Nelson/Bentley 
hearing 
is 
an 
evidentiary hearing in which a defendant is permitted to prove a 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
4 
 
claim 
that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective, 
producing a manifest injustice.  It is not a fishing expedition 
to try to discover error. 
¶8 
We conclude, second, that Burton's claim of a Bangert 
violation also was insufficient.  Burton failed to state that, 
due to a defect in the plea colloquy, he did not enter his pleas 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  Because Burton did 
not allege his lack of personal understanding about some aspect 
of the plea process, no evidentiary hearing was necessary.  In 
any event, we do not find any defect in the plea colloquy.  The 
circuit court properly inquired as to whether Burton was 
entering 
his 
guilty 
pleas 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily.  The circuit court's inquiry not only followed 
standard procedure, but also asked whether Burton was knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily withdrawing his NGI plea and 
giving up the right to present an insanity defense. 
¶9 
We reject Burton's claim of a Bangert violation 
because defendants do not have a fundamental right to an 
insanity plea, and it is not essential to conduct an extensive 
colloquy about NGI procedure before a defendant withdraws his 
plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.  
Looking forward, we do think it is better practice for circuit 
courts to conduct a personal colloquy on the bifurcated NGI plea 
and trial option to confirm the defendant's understanding of the 
law and to head off later claims of a Bangert violation or 
ineffective assistance of counsel.   
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
5 
 
 
¶10 The underlying facts of this case are undisputed.  On 
June 9, 2009, Milwaukee Police Officers Graham Kunisch (Officer 
Kunisch) and Bryan Norberg (Officer Norberg) were on routine 
patrol in the area of 3rd Street and West National Avenue on the 
southeast side of Milwaukee.  As the officers drove their marked 
police van6 eastbound on National Avenue, they spotted 18-year-
old Burton riding his bicycle on the sidewalk, in violation of a 
Milwaukee city ordinance.  They did not suspect that Burton was 
carrying a concealed weapon. 
 
¶11 Because of the ordinance violation, the officers 
decided to stop Burton and conduct a field interview.  Officer 
Norberg called out to Burton to stop, but after making brief eye 
contact with them, he turned away and continued riding his 
bicycle.  Officer Norberg exited the vehicle, followed Burton, 
and continually asked him to stop, while Officer Kunisch 
followed in the police van.   
 
¶12 Officer Norberg caught up to Burton after he turned 
onto South 2nd Street.  Officer Norberg grabbed Burton from 
behind to gain control of him.  Officer Kunisch got out of the 
police van to help, as Burton was resisting.  While Kunisch was 
trying to gain control of Burton to perform a pat-down search, 
Burton pulled out a pistol and shot Officer Norberg in the face 
from a distance of about six inches.  The bullet went through 
Officer Norberg's lip, under his left nostril, through bone and 
                                                 
6 Both officers testified that in addition to driving a 
marked police van, they were attired in their Milwaukee Police 
uniforms with badges.   
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
6 
 
teeth, and exited out his face.  A second and third bullet 
wounded his shoulder and grazed his right knee.   
 
¶13 Burton also shot Officer Kunisch several times.  
Officer Kunisch suffered gunshot wounds to his left hand, right 
shoulder, and the back of his neck.  More serious, Burton shot 
Officer Kunisch in his face, destroying his left eye and causing 
severe damage to the left side of his skull.   
 
¶14 Burton fled the scene and was later arrested after a 
local homeowner reported that someone might be hiding in his 
basement.  The homeowner left his residence when he heard the 
commotion from the shooting, and Burton likely entered an open 
basement door while the homeowner was absent.  Police ordered 
Burton out of the basement, found a pistol magazine with bullets 
on his person, and discovered a semi-automatic pistol in the 
basement.  After the police took Burton into custody, and after 
Burton was advised of his Miranda rights, he confessed to 
shooting Officers Norberg and Kunisch.  A videotape from the 
scene of the shooting corroborated Burton's account.   
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶15 Burton was charged with two counts of attempted first-
degree intentional homicide by use of a dangerous weapon, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 939.32, 
939.63(1)(b), 
and 
940.01(1)(a).7  At the initial appearance, upon the request of 
Burton's counsel, the court ordered that Burton's competency be 
                                                 
7 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
7 
 
evaluated.  Dr. Kenneth Smail prepared an initial report 
recommending further evaluation.  The subsequent evaluation, 
conducted by Dr. Tracy Luchetta at the Winnebago Mental Health 
Institute, determined that Burton was competent to stand trial.  
Neither Burton's newly retained trial counsel, Attorneys Julius 
Kim (Kim) and Jonathan LaVoy (LaVoy), nor Burton himself 
objected to the evaluation's conclusion.8   
¶16 Following a preliminary hearing at which Officers 
Norberg and Kunisch testified, the State filed an Information 
charging the same counts stated in the Complaint.  Defense 
counsel entered a 
plea of not guilty to both charges.  
Approximately one month later, defense counsel added pleas of 
not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.   
¶17 Dr. Smail, a psychologist, again was appointed to 
examine Burton.  Dr. Smail's report9 did not support Burton's NGI 
plea.   
                                                 
8 The competency evaluator, Dr. Tracy Luchetta of the 
Winnebago Mental Health Institute, noted that Burton "presents a 
complicated 
combination 
of 
current 
and 
past 
behavioral, 
perceptual, cognitive, and mood disturbances."  Nevertheless, 
Dr. Luchetta found Burton competent to stand trial.  In 
particular, 
Dr. 
Luchetta 
determined 
that 
Burton 
was 
"exaggerating the subjective severity of his symptoms. . . .  
Mr. Burton's apparent perceptual disturbances do not interfere 
with his accurate perception of reality."   
9 As part of his report, Dr. Smail personally interviewed 
Burton, reviewed Burton's health and mental health records, his 
competency evaluation, his academic reports, and various other 
materials related to Burton's case.   
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
8 
 
¶18 Dr. Smail reported that Burton had a history of mental 
health problems starting at age seven, when Burton was treated 
for hearing voices.  Dr. Smail noted that Burton was treated as 
recently as April 2009 at the Milwaukee County Mental Health 
Complex.  This treatment was less than two months before the 
attempted homicides.10  At various times over the years Burton 
had 
been 
diagnosed 
with 
Attention 
Deficient/Hyperactivity 
Disorder, 
Oppositional 
Defiant 
Disorder, 
"mood 
disorder," 
Bipolar Disorder, and Personality Disorder.  After his arrest 
for the attempted homicides, Burton's medical records at the 
Milwaukee jail indicate that he had a diagnostic history of 
schizophrenia and Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder.   
¶19 Ultimately, Dr. Smail concluded that while Burton 
suffered 
from 
"emotional 
and 
behavioral 
disturbances, . . . there is not much objective evidence in his 
record to substantiate a diagnosis that may reflect psychosis."  
With regard to the attempted homicides, Dr. Smail concluded: 
                                                                                                                                                             
Dr. Smail noted in his report that as part of his interview 
with Burton he explained the purpose of his mental health 
assessment of Burton.  In particular, Dr. Smail "described the 
issue of exculpatory mental disease" and "described a bifurcated 
trial process."  After further discussion about the evaluation, 
Dr. Smail noted that Burton "did appear to understand the nature 
and purpose of the assessment."   
10 On April 25, 2009, Burton was taken to the Mental Health 
Complex by his family, but he insisted upon being discharged the 
following day.  He was told to take certain medication and to 
meet with a therapist at Acacia Clinic.  He met with the 
therapist on May 11 and on June 4, 2009, five days before the 
shootings. 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
9 
 
I do not believe that there is any evidence to 
reasonably sustain a diagnosis that would reflect a 
psychosis of any sort for Mr. Burton when he had the 
altercation with the police officers. . . .  
It 
is 
also 
my 
opinion 
that 
the 
evidence 
ultimately fails to indicate that Mr. Burton, at the 
time of the offense, was substantially unable to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform 
his conduct to the requirements of the law. 
 
¶20 Burton's two counsel retained Dr. Dianne Lytton to 
evaluate Burton as a defense expert and to determine whether the 
evidence supported his NGI plea.  Dr. Lytton disagreed with the 
conclusions reached by Dr. Smail and concluded that, "at the 
time of the alleged criminal events, Mr. Burton experienced 
symptoms of psychotic disorder. . . .  [I]n my opinion, he is 
most appropriately diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder."  
Dr. Lytton noted Burton's long history of mental illness and his 
family's history of mental illness.  Dr. Lytton also disagreed 
with the opinions of Drs. Luchetta and Smail that Burton was 
malingering, or intentionally faking his symptoms.   
 
¶21 The State offered a plea agreement to Burton in which 
he would plead guilty to the two counts of attempted first-
degree intentional homicide while armed with a dangerous weapon.  
In 
exchange, 
the 
State 
would 
make 
a 
global 
sentence 
recommendation of 50 years in confinement and no specific 
recommendation on extended supervision.  The State would be free 
to argue aggravating and mitigating circumstances, Burton would 
be free to argue mitigating circumstances at sentencing, and the 
victims 
would 
be 
free 
to 
make 
their 
own 
sentencing 
recommendations.   
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
10 
 
¶22 Burton accepted the State's plea offer.  On January 
14, 2010, he signed a plea questionnaire/waiver of rights form 
acknowledging the charges to which he was pleading guilty, the 
constitutional rights he was waiving, and his understanding of 
the maximum penalties that the court could impose.  Burton also 
signed an addendum to the plea questionnaire/waiver of rights 
form, which stated, "I understand that by pleading I am giving 
up defenses such as alibi, intoxication, self-defense, [and] 
insanity."  (Emphasis added.)  One week later, on January 21, 
2010, the circuit court held a plea hearing.   
 
¶23 At the plea hearing, the court conducted a thorough 
plea colloquy with Burton.  Burton was sworn in and Milwaukee 
County Circuit Judge Patricia McMahon informed him that at any 
time he could stop the colloquy and talk to his attorneys.  The 
judge confirmed that Burton understood the two charges to which 
he was pleading guilty and the maximum penalty on each charge, 
including the maximum period of initial confinement and the 
maximum period of extended supervision.  The judge also informed 
Burton that the court was not bound by the plea agreement and 
could impose up to the maximum penalty.   
 
¶24 The court confirmed that Burton had time to meet with 
his attorneys and discuss his case with them, that he was making 
the decision to plead guilty "freely and voluntarily," and that 
he had signed and understood the plea questionnaire/waiver of 
rights form and the addendum to the form.  The court noted the 
constitutional rights Burton was waiving by agreeing to plead 
guilty.   
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
11 
 
¶25 The court then conducted a personal colloquy with 
Burton regarding his decision to withdraw his NGI plea: 
THE COURT: You are also giving up the right to raise 
certain defenses such as alibi or intoxication or 
self-defense or insanity.  Correct? 
MR. BURTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: You talked with your attorney about 
entering, in fact I believe you did enter a plea of 
not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.  
Correct? 
MR. BURTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: You are withdrawing that plea at this time.  
Correct? 
MR. BURTON: Yes. 
 
¶26 The court also engaged Burton and his defense counsel 
in an extensive discussion as to Burton's understanding of the 
charges to which he was pleading guilty and the consequences of 
those pleas: 
THE COURT: And counsel, are you satisfied that your 
client understands the nature of the charges, the 
effects of his plea and is making his plea freely and 
voluntarily? 
MR. LaVOY: Yes. The Sheriff's Department provided both 
myself and Mr. Kim quite a bit of access to Mr. 
Burton.  We have met with him a number of times about 
defenses, the trial issues, N.G.I. issues, motions.  I 
believe that he's making this decision of his own free 
will. 
 
We have explained to Mr. Burton [that] we 
retained experts and the experts are prepared to 
testify, if necessary.  But he's informed us he wishes 
to accept responsibility by entering the pleas, so I 
believe that he is doing this of his own free will. 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
12 
 
THE COURT: Mr. Burton, did your attorney describe what 
your 
conversation, 
general 
summary 
of 
your 
conversation . . . with your attorney? 
MR. BURTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: So, you talked about this with your 
attorneys for the time they represented you since the 
very beginning of this case.  Correct? 
MR. BURTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: And they came and talked with you and 
talked about your various options in this case.  
Correct? 
MR. BURTON: Yes. 
 
¶27 The 
prosecutor, 
Assistant 
District 
Attorney 
Mark 
Williams, also spoke on the record to note that the defense had 
an expert ready to testify that Burton was not guilty by reason 
of mental disease or defect, but that Burton was waiving the 
right to present that defense: 
MR. 
WILLIAMS: 
Judge, 
there 
is 
a 
doctor 
that . . . would render [the] opinion that Mr. Burton 
was not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.  
I'm assuming that Mr. Burton read that report, knows 
that report is available and that he has two competent 
lawyers that would present that if the matter [went] 
to trial. 
 
There also is at least one doctor that finds Mr. 
Burton . . . did understand what he was doing at the 
time and would contradict that opinion.  But Mr. 
Burton is aware that there is an opinion from a doctor 
that he . . . was not guilty by mental disease or 
defects at the time and he is waiving that right to 
present that defense. 
THE COURT: Counsel, have you had that discussion with 
your client? 
MR. LaVOY: Yes.  The doctor that the State's referring 
to is Dr. Lytton.  That is the doctor we retained.  I 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
13 
 
had reviewed that report word for word with Mr. 
Burton.  He is aware of her opinion and he is aware 
that she would be prepared to testify, if necessary at 
trial.  But he indicated to me that he wishes to 
again, accept responsibility and [forgo] that issue. 
 
He's also aware of the other opinions that have 
been presented by the other doctors referenced by the 
State.  So, it is my opinion that his position is that 
he wishes to resolve the case with a plea today. 
THE COURT: So, the not guilty by reason of mental 
disease or defect plea would be withdrawn at this time 
too? 
MR. LaVOY: That is correct. 
THE COURT: Mr. Burton, you heard what the State said 
and your counsel said.  Do you disagree with anything 
that they have said so far? 
MR. BURTON: No. 
THE COURT: And they have had, your attorneys [have] 
had that conversation with you.  Correct? 
MR. BURTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you have gone through, there is a lot 
of information here.  So, they have spent a lot of 
time with you, haven't they? 
MR. BURTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you specifically talked about your 
right to raise that particular defense of mental 
disease or defect.  Correct? 
MR. BURTON: Yes. 
 
¶28 The circuit court used the criminal complaint, the 
preliminary hearing, and security videotape of the attempted 
homicides as the factual basis for Burton's guilty pleas.  Given 
the factual basis, and its finding that Burton was entering his 
pleas "freely," "intelligent[ly]," and "voluntarily," the court 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
14 
 
accepted Burton's guilty pleas and found him guilty of both 
counts.   
 
¶29 At sentencing, the State explained that it thought the 
plea bargain was fair, that it would spare the officers and 
their families the burdens of going through a trial, and that it 
would protect the public by ensuring that Burton would spend 
much of the rest of his life in confinement.  The State 
acknowledged Burton's history of mental illness, but maintained 
that Burton knew that the shootings were wrong.   
 
¶30 Defense counsel pointed to Burton's long history of 
mental illness.  Nevertheless, defense counsel reminded the 
court that Burton chose to forgo the insanity defense and 
decided to accept responsibility for the attempted homicides.  
Counsel contended that by forgoing the defense and accepting 
responsibility, Burton should be credited for sparing the 
officers and their families the burdens of a trial and perhaps 
receive a sentence that would allow him to get out of 
confinement at some point in his life.   
 
¶31 In imposing sentence, Judge McMahon considered the 
extreme seriousness of Burton's offenses, the devastating impact 
of the shootings on the officers and their families, and the 
risks that Burton posed to the community.  Judge McMahon also 
took into account Burton's history of mental illness and 
credited him for sparing the officers and their families a 
trial.  Ultimately, the court sentenced Burton to 40 years of 
initial confinement and ten years of extended supervision on 
each count, to be served consecutively.   
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
15 
 
 
¶32 On January 12, 2011, Burton's postconviction counsel, 
Attorney Esther Cohen Lee (Attorney Lee), filed a motion to 
withdraw Burton's guilty pleas and vacate his convictions.11  
 
¶33 Burton's postconviction motion asserted three claims, 
only two of which are relevant in this review.12  First, Burton 
alleged that trial counsel was ineffective "since it was obvious 
from . . . the record of this matter, . . . that counsel failed 
to pursue" an NGI defense and instead counseled Burton to enter 
pleas of guilty.  Burton's motion also claimed that "there is 
nothing in the record to indicate that defense counsel had ever 
advised 
[Burton] 
of 
the 
possibility 
of 
entering . . . a 
bifurcated plea."  The motion also claimed that:  
[I]f the defendant had been made to understand that 
the jury could certainly have accepted Dr. Lytton's 
expert opinions in this matter and, therefore, that 
the jury could have found him not guilty by reason of 
mental disease or defect, and if he had been advised 
that he could have had the jury consider that 
affirmative defense even if he had pled guilty to 
having committed the crimes charged, there is a 
reasonable probability that he would have not pled 
guilty to the crimes.  For that reason, defense 
                                                 
11 The circuit court did not accept Attorney Lee's initial 
motion to withdraw Burton's guilty pleas and convictions dated 
December 28, 2011, because it was in excess of 20 pages, 
contrary to Rule 4.17(B) of the Local Rules of the First 
Judicial District.  The circuit court granted a one-time partial 
exception to the rule, allowing Burton to file a 25-page motion. 
12 Burton's postconviction motion also claimed that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that the 
circuit court was unlikely to follow the State's sentencing 
recommendation.  That claim was not before the court of appeals 
and is not before this court.   
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
16 
 
counsel's 
deficient 
performance 
prejudiced 
the 
defendant . . . . 
 
¶34 Second, Burton contended that the circuit court failed 
to advise him at the plea hearing that "he had the right to a 
bifurcated jury trial . . . and that he could choose to plead 
guilty to the crimes and still have a jury trial" on the issue 
of mental responsibility.  Burton claimed that because the 
circuit court failed to inform him of this right to bifurcation, 
his pleas were not "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently 
made," resulting in manifest injustice.  
 
¶35 Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Kevin E. Martens denied 
Burton's postconviction motion without a hearing.  Judge Martens 
noted that there was a "very extensive record made during the 
plea hearing about the defendant's desire to withdraw his 
original [NGI] plea."  Noting the relevant portions of the plea 
hearing transcript, Judge Martens concluded that there was 
"nothing which demonstrates that [Burton] was forced into 
entering 
guilty 
pleas . . . or 
that 
his 
original 
[NGI] 
plea . . . was abandoned without reason."  Judge Martens added 
that Judge McMahon "had no duty to advise [Burton] of the 
possibility of a bifurcated trial on his original plea when he 
was entering guilty pleas to both charges. . . .  [Judge 
McMahon] fulfilled her duties during the guilty plea colloquy."  
 
¶36 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the 
circuit court properly denied Burton's postconviction motion 
without an evidentiary hearing on either claim.  State v. 
Burton, No. 2011AP450-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
17 
 
App. Feb. 14, 2012).  The court of appeals rejected Burton's 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as inadequately pled 
because the motion failed to allege both deficient performance 
and prejudice.  Id., ¶¶12–14.  As to the claim of a Bangert 
violation, the court of appeals agreed with the circuit court 
that Burton failed to allege a deficiency in the plea colloquy 
or that his pleas were, in fact, not entered knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.  Id., ¶¶17–18.   
 
¶37 Burton petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on September 27, 2012. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶38 In this case, Burton presents two issues for review.  
The first issue is whether Burton's postconviction motion is 
sufficient on its face to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing 
on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and 
whether the circuit court erred in denying Burton an evidentiary 
hearing.13  Whether a motion alleges sufficient facts that, if 
true, would entitle a defendant to relief is a question of law 
that this court reviews de novo.  State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, 
¶9, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433 (citing State v. Bentley, 
201 Wis. 2d 303, 309–10, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996)).  The circuit 
court must hold an evidentiary hearing if the defendant's motion 
raises such facts.  Id.  (citing Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 310; 
                                                 
13 This opinion uses the term "trial counsel" to refer to 
Attorneys Julius Kim and Jonathan LaVoy, even though Burton's 
case never went to trial.  Attorneys Kim and LaVoy did not 
represent Burton at his initial appearance. 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
18 
 
Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 497, 195 N.W.2d 629 (1972)).  
"However, if the motion does not raise facts sufficient to 
entitle the movant to relief, or presents only conclusory 
allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the 
defendant is not entitled to relief, the circuit court has the 
discretion to grant or deny a hearing."  Id. (citations 
omitted).   
¶39 The second issue is whether Burton's postconviction 
motion is sufficient on its face to entitle him to an 
evidentiary hearing on his claim of a Bangert violation, and 
whether the circuit court erred in denying Burton a hearing.  
Whether a defendant has properly alleged "deficiencies in the 
plea colloquy that establish a violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 
or other mandatory duties at a plea hearing is a question of law 
we review de novo."  State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶21, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906 (citing State v. Brandt, 226 
Wis. 2d 610, 618, 594 N.W.2d 759 (1999)).  Whether a defendant 
has sufficiently alleged that "he did not know or understand 
information that should have been provided at the plea hearing" 
also is a question of law that we review de novo.  Id. (citing 
Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 310).   
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
¶40 In this case, Burton's motion alleges a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, which is subject to the 
Nelson/Bentley 
standard 
for 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing. 
 
In 
addition, Burton alleges a Bangert violation because of a 
purported deficiency in the plea colloquy and implies that he 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
19 
 
did 
not 
enter 
his 
pleas 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily. 
 
"A 
defendant 
may 
invoke 
both 
Bangert 
and 
Nelson/Bentley in a single postconviction motion to withdraw a 
plea of guilty or no contest."  State v. Howell, 2007 WI 75, 
¶73, 
301 
Wis. 2d 350, 
734 
N.W.2d 48 
(citing 
Brown, 
293 
Wis. 2d 594, ¶42).   
¶41 Although a defendant may invoke both types of claims 
in a single postconviction motion, the pleading standards for 
the two claims are different.  Id.  We will examine the pleading 
standards for each type of claim and apply them to Burton's 
motion.  
We 
begin our analysis, however, with a brief 
explanation of the NGI plea. 
A. Entry of and Trial Upon an NGI Plea 
 
¶42 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.15 provides criminal defendants 
with an affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of mental 
disease or defect.  This is known in common parlance as the 
"insanity" defense.  It requires that a defendant establish to a 
reasonable 
certainty, 
by 
the 
greater 
weight 
of 
credible 
evidence, that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or 
defect, "lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his . . . conduct or conform his . . . conduct 
to the requirements of law."  Wis. Stat. § 971.15(1), (3).  
 
¶43 A defendant may enter a plea of not guilty by reason 
of mental disease or defect in conjunction with a plea of not 
guilty.  Wis. Stat. § 971.06(1)(d).  If the NGI plea is not 
joined with a plea of not guilty, the plea admits that but for 
lack of mental capacity the defendant committed all the 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
20 
 
essential elements of the offenses charged.  Id.  Then——when 
there is a substantive basis for finding the crimes charged——the 
court will find the defendant guilty of the elements of the 
crimes, and the NGI plea will be left for trial.  See State v. 
Langenbach, 
2001 
WI 
App 
222, 
¶19, 
247 
Wis. 2d 933, 
634 
N.W.2d 916 ("[A] defendant can only be found not guilty by 
reason of mental disease or defect if he or she first admits to 
the criminal conduct or is found guilty.").   
¶44 Conversely, if the defendant pleads not guilty in 
conjunction with an NGI plea, Wis. Stat. § 971.165(1) provides 
for the bifurcation of the guilt and mental responsibility 
phases of trial: 
(1) If a defendant couples a plea of not guilty 
with a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease 
or defect:  
(a) There shall be a separation of the 
issues with a sequential order of proof in a 
continuous trial.  The plea of not guilty shall 
be determined first and the plea of not guilty by 
reason of mental disease or defect shall be 
determined second.  
(b) If the plea of not guilty is tried to a 
jury, the jury shall be informed of the 2 pleas 
and that a verdict will be taken upon the plea of 
not guilty before the introduction of evidence on 
the plea of not guilty by reason of mental 
disease or defect. No verdict on the first plea 
may be valid or received unless agreed to by all 
jurors.  
(c) If both pleas are tried to a jury, that 
jury shall be the same . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 971.165(1) (emphasis added).   
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
21 
 
¶45 The bifurcated trial for determining guilt and mental 
responsibility was first enunciated by this court in State ex 
rel. La Follette v. Raskin, 34 Wis. 2d 607, 150 N.W.2d 318 
(1967).  In Raskin, the court addressed whether the insanity 
defense statute at that time14 allowed for bifurcation.  Raskin, 
34 Wis. 2d at 614.  The Raskin court held that a defendant was 
entitled to a sequential order of proof at trial——guilt first 
and then the issue of criminal responsibility——"to avoid 
confusion and prejudice to the jury from inculpatory statements 
which were not given or intended to be used on the issue of 
guilt."15  Id. at 614, 623; see also State v. Murdock, 2000 WI 
App 170, ¶23, 238 Wis. 2d 301, 617 N.W.2d 175.   
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 957.11(1) (1967–68), the then-insanity 
defense statute, read as follows: 
(1) No plea that the defendant indicted or 
informed against was insane or feeble-minded at the 
time of the commission of the alleged crime shall be 
received unless it is interposed at the time of 
arraignment and entry of a plea of not guilty unless 
the court for cause shown otherwise orders.  When such 
plea is interposed the special issue thereby made 
shall be tried with the plea of not guilty; and if the 
jury finds that the defendant was insane or feeble-
minded or that there is reasonable doubt of his sanity 
or mental responsibility at the time of the commission 
of the alleged crime, they shall find the defendant 
not guilty because insane or feeble-minded. 
15 This court reiterated the policy of avoiding confusion 
and prejudice in State v. Leach, 124 Wis. 2d 648, 370 N.W.2d 240 
(1985): 
The issue of not guilty by reason of mental 
disease or defect is tried separately from the 
question of whether the defendant committed the acts 
which constitute a criminal offense.  The principal 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
22 
 
¶46 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.175 (1969)16 codified Raskin's 
bifurcated trial process.  See § 63, ch. 255, Laws of 1969.  In 
1987 the legislature replaced section 971.175 with Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.165, 
which 
maintained 
"the 
basic 
bifurcated 
trial 
procedure 
with 
its 
sequential 
order 
of 
proof 
as 
first 
established in Raskin."  Murdock, 238 Wis. 2d 301, ¶23.  See 
also 1987 Wis. Act 86.   
B. Burton's Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶47 The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel.  State v. Balliette, 2011 
WI 79, ¶21, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334 (citing Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)).  A defendant's claim 
                                                                                                                                                             
purpose of bifurcation is to withhold from the jury, 
while it debates the question of guilt or innocence, 
evidence which is not legally relevant to that 
question.  This permits the defendant to fully 
litigate the issue of mental responsibility without 
compromising his ability to contest the issue of 
guilt.  Bifurcation protects both the defendant and 
the state from having to confront evidence which if 
introduced in the guilt phase, could confuse the jury 
or appeal to its prejudice or sympathy. 
Id. at 662 (citations omitted).   
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.175 (1969) read in part: 
When a defendant couples a plea of not guilty 
with a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease 
or defect, there shall be a separation of the issues 
with a sequential order of proof before the same jury 
in a continuous trial.  The guilt issue shall be heard 
first and then the issue of the defendant's mental 
responsibility. 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
23 
 
of ineffective assistance has two components.  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687.  First, a "defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient."  Id.  Second, a defendant must show 
that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  
Id.   
 
¶48 A defendant does not show the element of deficient 
performance "simply by demonstrating that his counsel was 
imperfect or less than ideal."  Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶22.  
Rather, "the proper standard for attorney performance is that of 
reasonably effective assistance" by a "reasonably competent 
attorney."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  "The benchmark for 
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a 
just result."  Id. at 686.  When a court considers this issue, 
"counsel 
is 
strongly 
presumed 
to 
have 
rendered 
adequate 
assistance" to the defendant, id. at 690; thus, "the law affords 
counsel the benefit of the doubt."  Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 
¶27. 
 
¶49 As a general rule, a defendant who shows deficient 
performance of counsel cannot presume prejudice.  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 692–93.17  Instead, a defendant must affirmatively 
                                                 
17 There are some exceptions to the rule.  "Actual or 
constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is 
legally presumed to result in prejudice."  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).  In addition, actual 
conflict of interest will result in a "similar, though more 
limited, presumption of prejudice."  Id.  See also Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 350 (1980).   
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
24 
 
prove prejudice by "show[ing] that particular errors of counsel 
were unreasonable" and that those errors "had an adverse effect 
on the defense."  Id. at 693.  Therefore, the proper test for 
prejudice in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  
Id. at 694; Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶24.   
 
¶50 To 
establish 
prejudice 
in 
the 
context 
of 
a 
postconviction motion to withdraw a guilty plea based upon 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must allege 
that "but for the counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."  Bentley, 201 
Wis. 2d at 312 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 
(1985)).   
 
¶51 Ineffective assistance of trial counsel may be raised 
in a postconviction motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.02.  The 
evidentiary hearing evaluating counsel's effectiveness is widely 
referred to as a Machner hearing.  State v. Machner, 92 
Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).18   
                                                 
18 In State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. 
App. 1979), the court of appeals explored the hearing that 
results "where a counsel's conduct at trial is questioned."  Id. 
at 804.  The term "Machner hearing" appears to have been 
extended to include all hearings challenging the effectiveness 
of trial counsel or preconviction counsel.  A Nelson/Bentley 
hearing is one subset of a Machner hearing.  A Bangert hearing, 
which involves an alleged deficiency on the part of a judge, is 
not a subset of a Machner hearing. 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
25 
 
¶52 Generally, a motion must "[s]tate with particularity 
the grounds for the motion and the order or relief sought."  
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.30(2)(c). 
 
This 
court 
has 
developed 
particularized standards for Nelson/Bentley motions to secure an 
evidentiary hearing on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel.   
 
¶53 In Nelson, the court rejected the defendant's argument 
that an evidentiary hearing must be held whenever a defendant 
moves to withdraw a plea of guilty, unless the defendant's 
motion is patently frivolous.  Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 495.  
Instead, the Nelson court held:   
[I]f a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after judgment 
and sentence alleges facts which, if true, would 
entitle the defendant to relief, the trial court must 
hold an evidentiary hearing.  However, [1] if the 
defendant fails to allege sufficient facts in his 
motion to raise a question of fact, or [2] presents 
only conclusionary allegations, or [3] if the record 
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not 
entitled to relief, the trial court may in the 
exercise of its legal discretion deny the motion 
without a hearing.  It is incumbent upon the trial 
court to form its independent judgment after a review 
of the record and pleadings and to support its 
decision by written opinion. 
Id. at 497–98 (footnote omitted). 
¶54 In Bentley, a defendant sought to withdraw his guilty 
pleas on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 307.  Bentley noted that a defendant may 
withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing "only upon a showing of 
'manifest injustice' by clear and convincing evidence."  Id. at 
311 
(citing 
State 
v. 
Rock, 
92 
Wis. 2d 554, 
558–59, 
285 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
26 
 
N.W.2d 739 (1979)).  The "manifest injustice" requirement is met 
if a defendant is denied the effective assistance of counsel.  
Id. (citations omitted).  The Bentley court relied on Nelson for 
the criteria in determining whether a hearing is required on a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea, but restated the Nelson 
holding as a two-part test: 
If the motion on its face alleges facts which would 
entitle the defendant to relief, the circuit court has 
no discretion and must hold an evidentiary hearing.  
Whether a motion alleges facts which, if true, would 
entitle a defendant to relief is a question of law 
that we review de novo. 
 
However, if the motion fails to allege sufficient 
facts, the circuit court has the discretion to deny a 
postconviction motion without a hearing based on any 
one of the three factors enumerated in Nelson.  When 
reviewing a circuit court's discretionary act, this 
court uses the deferential erroneous exercise of 
discretion standard.   
Id. at 310–11 (citations omitted.)  
 
¶55 The Bentley court continued: 
 
This 
court 
has 
long 
held 
that 
the 
facts 
supporting plea withdrawal must be alleged in the 
petition and the defendant cannot rely on conclusory 
allegations, 
hoping 
to 
supplement 
them 
at 
a 
hearing . . . . 
The nature and specificity of the required supporting 
facts will necessarily differ from case to case.  
However, a defendant should provide facts that allow 
the reviewing court to meaningfully assess his or her 
claim.   
Id. at 313–14 (citations omitted).   
 
¶56 Howell clarified the Bentley restatement of the Nelson 
test.  "The correct interpretation of Nelson/Bentley is that an 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
27 
 
evidentiary hearing is not mandatory if the record as a whole 
conclusively demonstrates that defendant is not entitled to 
relief, even if the motion alleges sufficient nonconclusory 
facts."  Howell, 301 Wis. 2d 350, ¶77 n.51. 
 
¶57 State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 
N.W.2d 14, and Allen fleshed out the requirement for sufficient 
facts that would allow a court to meaningfully assess a 
defendant's claim in a postconviction motion.   
¶58 In Hampton, we discussed the difference between 
Bangert claims of a defective plea colloquy and Nelson/Bentley 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Hampton, 274 
Wis. 2d 379, ¶¶50–65.  While Bangert-type claims require a 
defendant to point to a specific deficiency in the plea colloquy 
and assert an unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary plea 
because of that deficiency, Nelson/Bentley-type claims are 
different in that they assert a legal conclusion.  Id., ¶¶57–58.  
"[Nelson/Bentley-type] legal conclusions cry out for supporting 
facts, and these supporting facts must be alleged to satisfy the 
defendant's burden for an evidentiary hearing."  Id., ¶58.  
Hampton continued: 
[T]he 
Bentley 
court 
explained 
that 
normally 
a 
defendant is entitled to withdraw a guilty plea after 
sentencing only upon a showing of "manifest injustice 
by clear and convincing evidence."  When, for example, 
the basis for this injustice is an allegation that 
defendant involuntarily entered a plea because of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel, his claim raises 
questions 
about 
both 
deficient 
performance 
and 
prejudice.  To establish deficient performance, a 
defendant must necessarily provide the factual basis 
for the court to make a legal determination.  To show 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
28 
 
prejudice, a defendant must do more than merely allege 
that he would have pleaded differently but for the 
alleged deficient performance. He must support that 
allegation with "objective factual assertions."   
Id., ¶60 (citations omitted).   
¶59 Hampton added that "[i]n Bentley–type cases, the 
defendant has the burden of making a prima facie case for an 
evidentiary hearing . . . .  The defendant must prove the 
linkage between his plea and the purported defect."  Id., ¶63.  
Ultimately, "[t]he defendant's proof must add up to manifest 
injustice."  Id.   
¶60 The Allen court noted that "the sufficiency standard 
for postconviction motions requires more from a defendant" than 
for pretrial motions where a defendant has the "opportunity to 
develop the factual record." Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶11 
(citations omitted).  Thus, the Allen court offered a practical 
blueprint 
for 
specificity 
in 
postconviction 
motions, 
recommending that: 
postconviction motions sufficient to meet the Bentley 
standard allege the five 'w's' and one 'h'; that is, 
who, what, where, when, why, and how.  A motion that 
alleges, within the four corners of the document 
itself, . . . material factual objectivity . . . will 
necessarily include sufficient material facts for 
reviewing courts to meaningfully assess a defendant's 
claim.   
Id., ¶23 (footnote omitted). 
C. Nelson/Bentley Standard Applied to Burton's Motion 
¶61 Against this background, we turn to the allegations of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in Burton's postconviction 
motion.   
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
29 
 
 
¶62 Burton's motion alleged that his trial counsel was 
ineffective under both prongs of the Strickland test.  Burton 
alleged that trial counsel's performance was deficient "since it 
was obvious from . . . the record of this matter, . . . that 
counsel failed to pursue" an NGI defense and instead counseled 
Burton to enter pleas of guilty.  Burton's motion also claimed 
that "there is nothing in the record to indicate that defense 
counsel had ever advised [Burton] of the possibility of 
entering . . . a bifurcated plea."  Burton's motion alleged 
prejudice to the defendant in that if he had known of the 
possibility of a bifurcated trial on mental responsibility, 
"there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pled 
guilty to the crimes."   
 
¶63 We conclude that Burton's motion was insufficient 
because it did not adequately plead deficient performance by 
Burton's trial counsel.  Burton's motion pointed to the record 
and suggested that because the record did not show that counsel 
informed Burton of the possibility of a bifurcated trial, 
Burton's 
counsel 
must 
not 
have 
informed 
Burton 
of 
the 
possibility of a bifurcated trial.  This is a shaky inference at 
best, inasmuch as virtually all meetings between attorneys and 
clients are not "on the record."  Burton's motion did not allege 
that his counsel never informed him that he had the option to 
plead guilty to the crimes and have a jury determine his mental 
responsibility.  We suspect that Burton's attorney crafted 
Burton's motion the way she did to push his arguments as far as 
the facts allowed.   
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
30 
 
 
¶64 But it is not enough for the postconviction motion to 
allege that the record does not show that Burton was told about 
his options.  To obtain an evidentiary hearing based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel, Burton was required to assert 
that his counsel in fact failed to tell him this information.  
He was also required to assert that this failure to inform him 
of his prerogatives was so serious an error that it fell below 
the standard of reasonable performance by reasonable counsel, 
such that counsel was not functioning as counsel, as guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  Burton's 
motion failed to make this elementary allegation of deficient 
performance.  Burton's motion is conclusory and lacks sufficient 
material facts to establish a failure to inform.  The motion 
presents a hypothesis, not an offer of proof.   
 
¶65 The record in this case does not reveal all the 
information that trial counsel provided to Burton in regard to 
his plea option, nor should it.  As the State observed, a 
criminal record does not contain all the information that trial 
counsel provides to a defendant.  At a plea hearing, a record is 
made to establish that a defendant enters his plea knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.  Trial counsel must provide 
enough information to a defendant that any plea is made with a 
constitutionally-required 
degree 
of 
understanding 
and 
willingness.  However, the record is not likely to contain a 
detailed recitation of all information that trial counsel 
provided to the defendant throughout counsel's representation.   
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
31 
 
 
¶66 Here, 
the 
plea 
hearing 
transcript 
reveals 
that 
Burton's counsel  communicated with him about "N.G.I. issues," 
retained experts who were ready to testify should Burton go to 
trial on an NGI plea, talked to Burton about "[his] various 
options in this case," and "specifically talked about [his] 
right to raise that particular defense of mental disease or 
defect."  These statements in the record permit inferences about 
the information provided to Burton that are very different from 
the inferences that Burton's motion urges the court to draw. 
 
¶67 A complete record was made of Burton's decision to 
forgo an NGI defense and enter a plea of guilty.  Burton cannot 
now allege a purported gap in the record as justification to 
turn a requested evidentiary hearing into a fishing expedition.  
Either Burton's two counsel told him about the possibility of a 
bifurcated trial on mental responsibility or they did not.  If 
trial counsel did not tell him, Burton should have alleged this 
failure on the basis of his personal knowledge.  In the absence 
of such an allegation, there is an insufficient factual basis 
for investigating deficient performance of counsel in an 
evidentiary hearing.19   
¶68 Even if we were to conclude that Burton's allegation 
of deficient performance was sufficient, Burton was still 
required to allege sufficient facts to show that the deficient 
                                                 
19 Moreover, Burton's motion did not allege that he did not 
know 
that 
he 
could 
have 
a 
bifurcated 
trial 
on 
mental 
responsibility, another claim necessary to sufficiently allege 
deficient performance of counsel. 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
32 
 
performance prejudiced his defense.  Burton's motion fails in 
this regard, too, because it does not assert how the option of 
bifurcation on mental responsibility would have caused him to 
decline the plea bargain and proceed to trial.   
 
¶69 Burton's motion alleged that had he known about the 
option of bifurcation on mental responsibility, "there is a 
reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty to the 
crimes."  This is speculation, not assertion.  The State's 
proffered sentencing recommendation was not especially generous 
but the charges were so serious that the State could have argued 
for much more time.  Had Burton not accepted the plea agreement, 
he would likely have pled guilty to the charged crimes——with no 
sentence recommendation——and taken his chances with a jury on 
the issue of mental responsibility.   
 
¶70 Burton's motion asserted that he could have presented 
the report of his retained expert, Dr. Lytton, and her 
assessment of his mental health at the mental responsibility 
phase of a bifurcated trial.  Essentially, Burton contended that 
had he known of the option to a bifurcated trial on mental 
responsibility, he could have presented this mental illness 
evidence to the jury and the lack of opportunity to do so 
constituted prejudice to his defense.  On the other hand, the 
State would have presented contrary evidence from Dr. Smail and 
Dr. Luchetta, the competency evaluator.  The jury would have had 
to find Dr. Lytton's opinion more persuasive than the other 
experts.  Burton would have had to convince a jury "to a 
reasonable certainty by the greater weight of the credible 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
33 
 
evidence" that, at the time he admittedly attempted to kill two 
police officers, his conduct was the result of mental disease or 
defect.  Wis. Stat. § 971.15(3).   
 
¶71 We conclude that Burton failed to allege sufficient 
material facts to support a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and the circuit court did not err in denying Burton's 
motion without an evidentiary hearing. 
D. Burton's Claim of a Bangert Violation 
¶72 Burton's motion also alleged a Bangert violation.  
Burton alleges that he had a right to plead guilty to the crimes 
and to have a jury determine whether he suffered from mental 
disease or defect.  Burton contends that the circuit court 
failed to advise him of this right during the plea colloquy, and 
consequently his pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.  Burton contends, in essence, that the plea colloquy 
outlined in Brown20 must be substantially modified whenever a 
defendant contemplates withdrawal of an NGI plea. 
                                                 
20 To ensure a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea, a 
court must, at a plea hearing and on the record, address the 
defendant personally and: 
(1) Determine the extent of the defendant's education and 
general comprehension so as to assess the defendant's capacity 
to understand the issues at the hearing; 
(2) Ascertain whether any promises, agreements, or threats 
were made in connection with the defendant's anticipated plea, 
his appearance at the hearing, or any decision to forgo an 
attorney; 
(3) Alert the defendant to the possibility that an 
attorney may discover defenses or mitigating circumstances that 
would not be apparent to a layman such as the defendant; 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
34 
 
¶73 The duties of the court established in Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08 and in Bangert and its progeny are designed to ensure 
that a defendant's guilty or no contest plea is knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily entered.  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 
¶23; Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶21.  "When a defendant pleads 
guilty or no contest, he or she waives several constitutional 
rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(4) Ensure the defendant understands that if he is 
indigent and cannot afford an attorney, an attorney will be 
provided at no expense to him; 
(5) Establish the defendant's understanding of the nature 
of the crime with which he is charged and the range of 
punishments to which he is subjecting himself by entering a 
plea; 
(6) Ascertain personally whether a factual basis exists to 
support the plea; 
(7) Inform the defendant of the constitutional rights he 
waives by entering a plea and verify that the defendant 
understands he is giving up these rights; 
(8) Establish personally that the defendant understands 
that the court is not bound by the terms of any plea agreement, 
including recommendations from the district attorney, in every 
case where there has been a plea agreement; 
(9) Notify the defendant of the direct consequences of his 
plea; and 
(10) Advise the defendant that "If you are not a citizen of 
the United States of America, you are advised that a plea of 
guilty or no contest for the offense [or offenses] with which 
you are charged may result in deportation, the exclusion from 
admission to this country or the denial of naturalization, under 
federal law," as provided in Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c). 
State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶35, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 
N.W.2d 906 (footnotes omitted). 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
35 
 
right to a trial by jury, and the right to confront one's 
accusers."  Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶22 (citing Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)).  Waiving constitutional 
rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary acts "done 
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and 
likely consequences."  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 
(1970) (footnote omitted).  Thus, before a court accepts a plea 
of guilty or no contest, it must "[a]ddress the defendant 
personally and determine that the plea is made voluntarily with 
understanding of the nature of the charge and the potential 
punishment if convicted."  Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a).   
¶74 If a circuit court fails to fulfill one of these 
duties at the plea hearing, and the defendant "did not 
understand an aspect of the plea because of the omission," the 
defendant may move to withdraw his plea, alleging a Bangert 
violation.  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶36.   
¶75 The procedure for filing a Bangert motion has been 
explained as follows: 
The defendant must file a postconviction motion under 
Wis. Stat. § 809.30 or other appropriate statute.  The 
motion must (1) make a prima facie showing of a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) or other court-
mandated duties by pointing to passages or gaps in the 
plea hearing transcript; and (2) allege that the 
defendant did not know or understand the information 
that should have been provided at the plea hearing.  
Id., ¶39 (citing Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274) (emphasis added).   
 
¶76 In Brown, the defendant's motion stated that the 
record failed to demonstrate that he actually understood the 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
36 
 
elements of the crimes to which he pled guilty.  Brown's motion 
did not make a direct allegation.  Id., ¶61.  Consequently, this 
court was concerned with the lack of a direct allegation that 
the defendant did not know or understand some aspect of his 
plea.  Id., ¶62.  We explained: 
[I]f the defendant is unwilling or unable to assert a 
lack of understanding about some aspect of the plea 
process, 
there 
is 
no 
point 
in 
holding 
a 
hearing. . . .  In the absence of a claim by the 
defendant that he lacked understanding with regard to 
the plea, any shortcoming in the plea colloquy is 
harmless.   
Id., ¶63.   
¶77 The Brown court cautioned that in the ordinary case, 
defense counsel should plead with particularity a defendant's 
lack of understanding.  Id., ¶67.  
 
¶78 Only 
if 
"the 
motion 
establishes 
a 
prima 
facie 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or other court-mandated duties 
and makes the requisite allegations" must the court hold an 
evidentiary Bangert hearing.  Id., ¶40.  Thus, the initial 
burden rests with the defendant to show a defective plea 
colloquy and allege that he did not know or understand 
information that should have been provided during the plea 
colloquy.  Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶46. 
 
¶79 In this case, Burton's motion was insufficient to 
require an evidentiary hearing.  Burton's motion did not allege 
that at the time his pleas were entered, he did not know or 
understand that he had the option of a bifurcated trial on the 
issue of mental responsibility after pleading guilty to the 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
37 
 
crimes.  Rather, Burton asserted in his motion that there was 
nothing in the record that indicated he was ever made aware of 
his "right" to a bifurcated trial on mental responsibility; 
thus, his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  
Burton failed to plead with particularity that he entered his 
plea unknowingly, unintelligently, and involuntarily because he 
did not understand his procedural rights.   
 
¶80 More important, Burton's motion failed to identify a 
real deficiency in the plea colloquy.  Neither Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08, nor the procedures mandated by Bangert and its 
progeny, require a court to inform a defendant during a plea 
colloquy that he may plead guilty to a crime and still have a 
jury trial on the issue of mental responsibility.  Because the 
trial court was not required to inform Burton of this option, 
there was no deficiency in the plea colloquy.   
 
¶81 The issue of whether a circuit court must engage the 
defendant in a personal colloquy on the option of a bifurcated 
trial on mental responsibility was carefully analyzed in State 
v. Francis, 2005 WI App 161, 285 Wis. 2d 451, 701 N.W.2d 632.  
In Francis, a defendant initially pled not guilty to several 
criminal charges and concurrently entered an NGI plea.  Id., ¶6.  
After a mental health examination concluded that the defendant's 
psychopathology would not support an NGI plea, the State offered 
the defendant a plea bargain that she accepted.  Id., ¶¶8–11.  
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant withdrew her not 
guilty and NGI pleas and then pled guilty and no contest to 
several charges.  Id., ¶11.  In her postconviction motion, the 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
38 
 
defendant alleged, inter alia, that "the circuit court erred 
when it accepted her pleas of guilty and no contest without 
ascertaining via a personal colloquy that [the defendant] 
intended to abandon her earlier NGI plea."  Id., ¶12.  The 
circuit court denied the motion in all respects.  Id., ¶13.   
 
¶82 On review, the court of appeals concluded that circuit 
courts "engage in personal colloquies in order to protect 
defendants 
against 
violations 
of 
their 
fundamental 
constitutional rights."  Id., ¶1.  Because neither the federal 
constitution nor the Wisconsin Constitution confers a right to 
an insanity defense, a court has no obligation to personally 
address a defendant in regard to the withdrawal of an NGI plea.21  
Id.   
                                                 
21 The United States Supreme Court has never held that a 
defendant has a constitutional right to present an affirmative 
insanity defense.  See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 
437, 449 (1992) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536-37 
(1968) ("[W]e have not said that the Constitution requires the 
States to recognize the insanity defense."); see also 22 C.J.S. 
Criminal 
Law 
§ 501 
(2013) 
("There 
is 
no 
independent 
constitutional right to plead insanity as a defense to criminal 
charges.") (footnote omitted). 
Several state courts also have concluded there is no 
federal constitutional right to an insanity defense.  See, e.g., 
State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 851 (Kan. 2003), cert. denied 540 
U.S. 1006 (2003); State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 366 (Utah 
1995); State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 919 (Idaho 1990) (noting 
that neither the federal constitution nor the state constitution 
contains any language setting forth any right to an insanity 
plea); State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 999 (Mont. 1984) ("The 
United States Supreme Court has never held that there is a 
constitutional right to plead an insanity defense.").  See also 
Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817, 822 (Fla. 1970).  Idaho, 
Kansas, Montana, and Utah have virtually abolished the insanity 
defense.  State v. Delling, 267 P.3d 709, 711 n.1 (Idaho 2011). 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
39 
 
 
¶83 The Francis court did, however, offer this suggestion: 
While we hold that a personal colloquy is not 
required to withdraw an NGI plea, we believe it is 
nonetheless advisable for trial courts to engage in 
personal colloquy for at least two reasons: First, it 
helps satisfy the court that the defendant is aware 
and alert as to what is going on.  Second, the record 
is protected from later ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims where a convicted defendant might 
assert 
that 
counsel 
never 
discussed 
the 
NGI 
withdrawal. 
Id., ¶27 n.5. 
 
¶84 We agree.  We believe it is the better practice for 
courts to engage the defendant in a personal colloquy on his or 
her withdrawal of an NGI plea.  It is also advisable for both 
defense counsel and the State to help the court make a record of 
the 
defendant's 
NGI 
plea 
withdrawal 
and 
his 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary plea of guilty or no contest.22 
¶85 In this case, the court, defense counsel, and the 
prosecutor were very diligent and professional at the plea 
hearing.  All of them worked together to ensure a complete 
                                                 
22 One criminal practice manual suggests: 
The withdrawal of an NGI plea should be clearly 
noted on the record.  The court should question the 
defendant to ensure that the defendant agrees with the 
decision to withdraw the insanity defense and that the 
decision was based upon the advice of counsel.  A 
careful record of the plea's withdrawal will eliminate 
or 
minimize 
later 
time-consuming 
hearings 
on 
ineffective assistance of counsel or the assertion 
that the plea was withdrawn without the defendant's 
permission. 
Christine M. Wiseman & Michael Tobin, 9 Wis. Practice: Criminal 
Practice and Procedure § 17:33, at 534–35 (2d ed. 2008). 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
40 
 
record of Burton's knowing, intelligent, and voluntary entry of 
a guilty plea and withdrawal of an NGI plea.  The court engaged 
in a personal colloquy with Burton on whether he was making his 
plea voluntarily, whether he understood that he was waiving 
certain fundamental rights, and whether he was freely giving up 
his right to pursue an NGI defense.  Defense counsel went on 
record to establish that an expert had been retained who would 
support 
an 
NGI 
plea, 
but 
that 
Burton 
was 
accepting 
responsibility and pleading guilty.  The prosecutor also wanted 
the record to reflect that, despite having retained an expert on 
mental health and two competent defense attorneys, Burton was 
choosing to forgo an NGI defense and accept responsibility, a 
fact that Burton confirmed on the record.   
 
¶86 Although the plea colloquy was sound, we take this 
opportunity to emphasize the important issue of mental illness 
in our state correctional system.  As of June 2008, 31 percent 
of all inmates incarcerated in adult correctional facilities in 
Wisconsin were identified as mentally ill.  Inmate Mental Health 
Care, Report 09-4, at 25, Legislative Audit Bureau, Madison, 
Wis.  During the period from June 2006 to June 2008, the number 
of mentally ill inmates increased from 6,084 to 6,957, or 14.3 
percent.  Id. at 24.  While some mentally ill inmates are housed 
in specialized facilities, many are housed with other inmates.  
Id. at 33.  Trained staff who provide therapy to mentally ill 
inmates and the resources for helping them are limited; hence, 
troubled individuals may not always get the mental health 
treatment they need.  See id. at 37–38.  While this sobering 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
41 
 
information does not change our analysis or conclusion, it 
underscores the better practice of courts engaging in personal 
colloquies with defendants about the withdrawal of NGI pleas.23   
 
¶87 Because Burton did not specifically plead to his lack 
of knowledge or understanding at the plea colloquy, and because 
there was no deficiency in the plea colloquy, we conclude that 
the circuit court properly rejected Burton's Bangert motion 
without an evidentiary hearing. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶88 We 
conclude, 
first, 
that 
Burton's 
Nelson/Bentley 
motion was insufficient.  The motion asserted that Burton's two 
trial counsel were ineffective in not pursuing an NGI or 
"insanity" defense.  The motion claimed that Burton's explicit 
withdrawal of that defense as part of a plea agreement must have 
been based upon a failure by trial counsel to inform Burton that 
he had the option of pleading guilty to the crimes but also not 
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.  Significantly, 
Burton's motion never alleged that his trial counsel failed to 
inform Burton of this option.  Instead, it merely pointed to the 
                                                 
23 See generally Report of the Chief Justice's Task Force on 
Criminal Justice and Mental Health (Sept. 2010).  The Task 
Force's mission was "to develop models of research-based, cost-
effective intervention processes that can be implemented to 
improve responses of the criminal justice system to persons with 
mental illness."  Id. at 1.  The Task Force's report highlights 
current initiatives across the state that both "improve public 
safety and the plight of persons with mental illnesses who come 
into contact with the criminal justice system."  Id. at 5.  The 
report also inventories gaps in the criminal justice and mental 
health 
systems, 
and 
suggests 
programs 
and 
procedures 
to 
institute statewide.  Id.  
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
42 
 
absence of evidence in the record that indicated that counsel 
had explained this option to Burton.  The absence of record 
evidence in this situation is not enough.  A defendant must 
affirmatively plead facts that, if true, would constitute 
deficient performance of counsel.  Moreover, even if deficient 
performance had been properly pled, Burton's motion did not 
affirmatively assert that if trial counsel had informed him of 
the option of a trial focused solely upon mental responsibility, 
he would have chosen that option and why he would have chosen 
it. 
¶89 The sufficiency of a Nelson/Bentley motion is critical 
because 
the 
defendant 
has 
the 
burden 
of 
proof 
in 
a 
Nelson/Bentley 
hearing. 
 
A 
Nelson/Bentley 
hearing 
is 
an 
evidentiary hearing in which a defendant is permitted to prove a 
claim that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective; it is 
not a fishing expedition to try to discover error. 
¶90 We conclude, second, that Burton's claim of a Bangert 
violation also was insufficient.  Burton failed to state that, 
due to a defect in the plea colloquy, he did not enter his pleas 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  Because Burton did 
not allege his lack of personal understanding about some aspect 
of the plea process, no evidentiary hearing was necessary.  In 
any event, we do not find any defect in the plea colloquy.  The 
circuit court properly inquired as to whether Burton was 
entering 
his 
guilty 
pleas 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily.  The circuit court's inquiry not only followed 
standard procedure, but also asked whether Burton was knowingly, 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
43 
 
intelligently, and voluntarily withdrawing his NGI plea and 
giving up the right to present an insanity defense. 
¶91 We reject Burton's claim of a Bangert violation 
because defendants do not have a fundamental right to an 
insanity plea, and it is not essential to conduct an extensive 
colloquy about NGI procedure before a defendant withdraws his 
plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.  
Looking forward, we do think it is better practice for circuit 
courts to conduct a personal colloquy on the bifurcated NGI plea 
and trial option to confirm the defendant's understanding of the 
law and to head off later claims of a Bangert violation or 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  
 
¶92 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
No. 
  2011AP450-CR 
 
 
 
1