Title: Hunter v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 239, 2000
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 30, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
RONALD L. HUNTER,
§
§
No. 239, 2000
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§
§
v.
§
Court Below: Superior Court
§
of the State of Delaware
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
in and for Kent County
§
Cr.A. Nos. IK99-03-0005
Plaintiff Below,
§
through 0009 and IK99-03-0011
Appellee.
§
through 0016
Submitted: September 24, 2002
Decided: December 30, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER, and STEELE,
Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED.
Andre M. Beauregard, Esquire (argued) and David W. Jones, Esquire, of Brown,
Shiels, Beauregard & Chasanov, Dover, Delaware, for Appellant.
John Williams, Esquire (argued), Robert J. O’Neill, Jr., Esquire, and Marie O’Connor
Graham, Esquire, of the Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for Appellee.
Per curiam:
1437 A.2d 559 (Del. 1981).
2
In this criminal appeal, we again consider the impact of a prosecutor’s improper
jury summation on a defendant’s right to a fair trial.  This Court has consistently and
repeatedly held that the State may not knowingly misstate the evidence; personally
vouch for the credibility of witnesses; or use inflammatory language designed to
appeal to the jurors’ passions and prejudices.  The prosecutor in this case forces us to
add another admonition to the list: do not disparage the “reasonable doubt” standard
that governs the jury’s determination of guilt.  Moreover, because our prior decisions
have not eliminated this problem, we conclude that we must modify our analysis of
the prejudicial effect of improper comments.  Accordingly, in addition to applying the
three part test announced in Hughes v. State,1 we will consider whether the
prosecutor’s statements are repetitive  errors that require reversal because they cast
doubt on the integrity of the judicial process.  Where, as here, several of the
prosecutor’s comments have been specifically identified as improper in past decisions,
we conclude that reversal is mandated.
Factual and Procedural Background
On December 10, 1998, a Special Investigations Unit of the Delaware State
Police was conducting surveillance on Ronald L. Hunter as part of a drug
investigation.  Two officers, driving in separate  police cars, were following Hunter
3
on Route 13 when they saw him commit a lane change violation.  Corporal Wayne
Warren, who was in an unmarked car,  activated his flashing emergency lights and
followed Hunter as he turned right, onto Route 10, and then immediately turned right
again, onto State Route 29.  Corporal Warren McGee, who was in a fully marked
police cruiser, also activated his emergency lights and joined the pursuit.  As Hunter
turned onto State Route 29, both officers saw a “white ball” come out of the passenger
side window of Hunter’s car.  Warren continued to chase Hunter, who collided with
another vehicle on State Route 29 and then attempted to flee on foot.  McGee stopped
to look for the “white ball,” and discovered a yellow paper napkin containing 14 small
blue plastic bags of crack cocaine.       
After Warren apprehended Hunter, McGee arrived and took him into custody.
At that time, Hunter refused to give McGee his name.  McGee found $4,399 in
Hunter’s pocket and a Massachusetts driver’s license in the name Anthony Jones.
McGee asked Hunter if he was Anthony Jones, and Hunter answered, “That’s what
the I.D. says, right?”  Later, the police ran Hunter’s fingerprints through the State
fingerprint identification system and came up with a match for the name Scottie
Brown.  McGee asked Hunter whether he was Scottie Brown and Hunter said yes.
Nonetheless, the fingerprints were sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation where
Hunter finally was identified.
4
Based on all of these events, Hunter was charged with tampering with physical
evidence, resisting arrest, criminal mischief, possession with intent to deliver cocaine,
maintaining a vehicle for keeping controlled substances, possession of drug
paraphernalia, two counts of criminal impersonation, refusal to provide pedigree
information and several traffic violations.  He was acquitted on the criminal mischief
charge and  convicted on all others.  The trial court denied his motion for a new trial
and this appeal followed.
Discussion
A.  Prosecutorial Misconduct
Hunter raises several arguments on appeal, the most important one being his
claim of prosecutorial misconduct.  He identifies nine instances of allegedly improper
comment during opening and rebuttal summations to the jury:
1. Misrepresentation of Evidence.  During opening summation, the prosecutor
said that Hunter told McGee that he was not employed.  In fact, the evidence shows
that Hunter refused to answer questions about his identity or employment, so the
officer who filled out the relevant form listed Hunter’s occupation as “None.”
2. Misrepresentation of Evidence.  During rebuttal summation, the prosecutor
said that Hunter “basically conceded that those drugs came from that car.”  In fact,
5
during Hunter’s summation, counsel said, “there is a reasonable doubt as to whether
or not this man threw anything out of the car.”
3. Misrepresentation of Evidence.  During opening summation, the prosecutor
pointed out that Hunter, Anthony Jones and Scott Brown were all the same person. He
then explained, “The evidence has shown this case is about a big dollar business,
drugs.  And when you’re in that business, deception is your friend.”  The false
identification evidence, however, only was introduced for the limited purpose of
establishing that Hunter committed the crime of criminal impersonation.
4. Misrepresentation of Evidence.  During rebuttal summation, the prosecutor
suggested that the fact that Hunter was under surveillance by a drug enforcement unit
raised an inference that Hunter was a drug dealer.  As above, the surveillance
information was allowed into evidence for the limited purpose of explaining how the
events that led to these charges unfolded.
5. Disparaging Defense Counsel.  Primarily during rebuttal summation, the
prosecutor accused defense counsel of trying to “fool” and “confuse” the jury.
6. Disparaging the “Reasonable Doubt” Standard.  Primarily during rebuttal
summation, the prosecutor told the jury that the “classic defense” is reasonable doubt,
and that the jury should not allow itself to be fooled into acquitting Hunter.
6
7. Misleading the Jury About The Burden of Proof.  During rebuttal sum-
mation, the prosecutor suggested that, in order to find Hunter not guilty, the jury
would have to disbelieve the State Police.
8. Referring to Evidence Not in the Record.  During rebuttal summation, the
prosecutor suggested that Hunter was a higher level of drug dealer than those who
deal “hand to hand” in open air drug markets, but there was no evidence presented at
trial about different levels of drug dealers. 
9. Expressing Personal Opinion/Vouching for Witnesses.  During rebuttal
summation, referring to Hunter’s argument about the criminal impersonation charges,
the prosecutor said, “I can’t quite buy that argument.”
Hunter objected only twice during the closing arguments.  Toward the end of
his rebuttal summation, the prosecutor said,  “Lastly, classic defense [that counsel]
raises, reasonable doubt.  If he can fool just one of you, that’s all that is needed, just
one.” Hunter objected; the prosecutor withdrew his statement; and the trial court
instructed the jury to disregard the comment.  The prosecutor then continued, “If the
defense attorney is successful in asserting this defense on reasonable doubt, then his
client walks.”  Hunter again objected, saying that reasonable doubt is the law in this
State.  The trial court made no ruling, but instructed the prosecutor to confine his
comments to the evidence and move on.
2 Brokenbrough v. State, 522 A.2d 851, 854 (Del. 1987).
3 Trump v. State, 753 A.2d 963, 969 (Del. 2000).
4 Williams v. State, 803 A.2d 927, 928 (Del. 2002).
5See Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214 (2002); Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 653 (Del. 2002);
Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281 (Del. 2002); Williams v. State, 803 A.2d 927 (Del. 2002).
6 Bennett v. State, 164 A.2d 442, 446 (Del. 1960). 
7 Sexton v. State, 397 A.2d 540, 544 (Del. 1979).
7
More than 15 years ago, this Court expressed “considerable concern” about
prosecutorial misconduct, and the fact that prior decisions had not succeeded in
improving the standards of trial conduct.2  Unfortunately, our recent decisions note
continued abuses: “Despite our repeated admonitions ..., prosecutors apparently have
failed consistently to heed these admonitions.  Prosecutors must resist the urge to win
at all costs....”3 “For over twenty years, this Court has been admonishing prosecutors
to follow ABA standards of conduct and refrain from making improper comments
during summation that could prejudice the defendant.”4  This is the fifth appeal in one
year where the Court found prosecutorial misconduct, and the third appeal this year
where that misconduct forces the Court to reverse a conviction.5
The law in this area is well settled.  The prosecutor “represents all the people,
including the defendant”6 and must “seek justice, not merely convictions.”7  In
pursuing both goals, the prosecutor should abide by the American Bar Association’s
8 Trump v. State, 753 at 967.
9Clayton v. State, 765 A.2d 940, 942 (Del. 2001).
10Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 653 (Del. 2002).
11Bowe v. State, 514 A.2d 408 (Del. 1986).
12Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214 (Del. 2002).
13 Warren v. State, 774 A.2d 246 (Del. 2001).
14 Williamson v. State, 1998 WL 138697 (Del. 1998).
15Brokenbraugh v. State, 522 A.2d 851 (Del. 1987).
8
standards governing prosecution and defense functions.8  Consistent with those
standards, the prosecutor should not : (i) express personal beliefs as to the credibility
of witnesses9; (ii) misrepresent the evidence presented at trial10; (iii) comment on the
fact that a defendant exercised his or her constitutional right to remain silent11; (iv)
denigrate the role of defense counsel12; (v) misrepresent the legal effect of defendant’s
statements13; (vi) appeal to the jury’s sense of personal risk or the level of safety in the
community14; or (vii) attempt to inflame the prejudices of the jury by name-calling or
other pejorative language.15
The prosecutor’s closing comments in this case violated several of these
admonitions.  First, the prosecutor misrepresented the evidence presented at trial by
stating that Hunter was unemployed and by saying that the defense “basically
conceded” that the drugs came from Hunter’s car.  Second, the prosecutor misused
evidence that was introduced for a limited purpose.  The evidence that Hunter
16 Walker v. State, 790 A.2d at 1219 - 20 (citations omitted.).
9
possessed a license in the name of Anthony Jones and that his fingerprints were on file
under the name Scott Brown was admitted for the limited purpose of establishing the
two charges of criminal impersonation.  Similarly, the fact that Hunter was under
surveillance by a task force conducting a drug investigation was admitted only to
explain to the jury how it happened that Hunter was pulled over.  Nonetheless, the
prosecutor used those facts for the prohibited purpose of suggesting Hunter’s bad
character and, therefore, his guilt on the drug charges.
The prosecutor’s second, and more serious, set of improper comments relate to
defense counsel’s role and the reasonable doubt standard.  This Court recently noted:
Although the prosecutor has wide latitude in summation, he or she
may not employ argument to denigrate the role of defense counsel “by
injecting his [or her] personal frustration with defense tactics.”... [T]he
prosecutor is expected to “refrain from impugning, directly or through
implication, the integrity or institutional role of defense counsel”....
*        *        *
It is impermissible for a prosecutor to discredit defense counsel in front
of the jury.  Even subsequent jury instructions to rectify that type of error
“may not ensure that [such] disparaging remarks have not already
deprived the defendant of a fair trial.”16 
In his opening summation, the prosecutor touched on what would be the thrust
of his rebuttal summation, when he closed with the comment, “The State suggests that
based upon the evidence you will not be fooled....”  Defense counsel then reviewed the
10
evidence for the jury and argued that, on the possession with intent to deliver charge,
the State did not meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In rebuttal, the
prosecutor emphasized the State’s view of the evidence and then said,
“If [defense counsel] can cast some smoke and some dust in your
eyes and you are confused about your job, then you may get hooked.
And that is the defense’s attempt to pursue their defense of a classic case
of reasonable doubt.  Don’t be fooled, ladies and gentlemen....”
 
The prosecutor warned the jury not to be fooled again a few minutes later and then
wound up his rebuttal by saying, “Lastly, classic defense [defense counsel] raises,
reasonable doubt.  If he can fool just one of you, that’s all that is needed, just one.”
After Hunter’s objection to this comment was sustained and the jury was instructed
to disregard it, the prosecutor’s next statement was, “If the defense attorney is
successful in asserting this defense on reasonable doubt, then his client walks.”
Defense counsel again objected and the court told the prosecutor to confine himself
to the evidence and move on. 
The prosecutor’s comments were entirely improper.  He denigrated the role of
defense counsel by saying that defense counsel’s job was to trick the jury into letting
Hunter go free.  He also strongly suggested that the reasonable doubt standard, itself,
should be viewed with suspicion.  By describing it as a “classic” defense that may
“hook” an unsuspecting juror, the prosecutor was challenging the jury to reject
17 See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“Lest there be any doubt about the
constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”).
18 509 A.2d 1106, 1112 (Del. 1986).
11
reasonable doubt as the standard of proof.  It is hard to imagine a more fundamental
aspect of due process than the presumption of innocence and the requirement that no
person be convicted except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.17   Yet the
prosecutor here would have the jury believe that reasonable doubt is the means by
which clever defense attorneys enable guilty defendants to go free.
The remaining challenges to the prosecutor’s comments touch on well-traveled
ground.  Prosecutors may not mislead the jury about the State’s burden of proof by
suggesting that the jury would have to disbelieve the police witnesses in order to
acquit.  As this Court explained in Fensterer v. State, 
[t]here need be no perjury by the State’s witnesses to acquit the
defendant.  Even if the jury believed the State’s witnesses, it could still
acquit the defendant if the evidence before it was insufficient to find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Or the jury could have
serious doubts about the credibility of both sides; in that case, the State
would have failed to satisfy the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.
The jury is not required to choose between the State’s and the
defendant’s version of the facts.18
This Court also has gone to some lengths to explain the problem with vouching for
witnesses or expressing personal opinions.  In Brokenbraugh v. State, the Court relied
19 522 A.2d at 858.
12
on both the ABA prosecution standards and the Delaware Rules of Professional
Conduct in condemning prosecutors’ expressions of personal belief:
[E]xpressions of personal beliefs by a prosecutor are a form of unsworn,
unchecked testimony intended to exploit the influence of his office and
undermine the objective detachment which should separate a lawyer
from the cause which he argues.19
This prosecutor ignored both of these admonitions.  He said, “If you don’t believe the
State Police, find [Hunter] not guilty.”  That comment impermissibly suggested to the
jury that, in order to find Hunter not guilty, the jury would have to disbelieve the
police witnesses.  At another point in the summation, the prosecutor interjected his
own view of the evidence by saying, in reference to defense counsel’s argument on
criminal impersonation, “I can’t quite buy that argument.”  Although the comment
was short and probably not terribly effective, it was improper under settled Delaware
standards.
Having found prosecutorial misconduct, the next step is to determine whether
that misconduct requires reversal.  In Hughes v. State, this Court adopted a three part
test to evaluate prosecutorial misconduct: “the closeness of the case, the centrality of
the issue affected by the (alleged) error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of
20 437 A.2d 559, 571 (Del. 1981) (quoting Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C.
1980).
21 Coyle v. State, 1992 WL 397485 at 3 (Del. 1992).
13
the error.”20  Here, the trial court found, and we agree, that it was not a close case.
Hunter was seen throwing something out of his car while being chased by police; the
object was recovered almost immediately and it contained 14 small plastic bags of
cocaine; and Hunter took the police on a high speed chase and then attempted to flee
on foot.  With respect to most of the improper comments identified above, the issues
that were affected were not central to the case and, even without any steps to mitigate
the errors, it would be difficult to say that the prosecutorial misconduct deprived
Hunter of a fair trial.  The comments about being “fooled” into acquitting Hunter
because of the “classic defense” of reasonable doubt, by contrast,  go to the very heart
of any criminal trial.  The trial court did respond to Hunter’s objection by instructing
the jury to disregard one of those comments, but others were not objected to and, thus,
were not the subject of any limiting instruction.
If we were reviewing this issue on a “clean slate,” it is not clear that we would
conclude that the improper comments “were so prejudicial as to compromise the
fairness of the trial process.”21  But, unfortunately, we are reviewing what can only be
described as a persistent pattern of prosecutorial misconduct.  As the Court pointed
out in 1987, “[a] repetition of the same type or category of errors adversely affects the
22 Brokenbraugh v. State, 522 A.2d at 864.
23 Hunter waived any claims concerning his traffic violations and related convictions because
he did not present any argument as to those convictions.  Accordingly, the convictions in Criminal
Action Numbers IK99030005, 99030006, 99030007 & 99030009 are affirmed.
14
integrity of the judicial process.”22  In this case, we find that the prosecutor’s improper
comments cover several of the specific categories of comment that have been
prohibited in past decisions.  Accordingly, we conclude that the integrity of the
judicial process was compromised by the prosecutor’s misconduct and that the
convictions appealed from must be reversed.23
B.  Evidentiary Rulings
We will address Hunter’s remaining claims briefly for guidance in the event of
a new trial.  Hunter argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that
suggested prior criminal activity and in failing to instruct the jury as to the limited
purpose for which the evidence was introduced.  Specifically, he complains that the
evidence of his fingerprints being on file with the FBI and the State fingerprint
directory, as well as the evidence that Hunter possessed a driver’s license in another
name, was highly prejudicial since it suggested that Hunter has a criminal record.
Similarly, Hunter argues that the fact that he was under police surveillance as part of
24 Seward v. State, 723 A.2d 365, 372 (Del. 1999).
25 Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560 (Del. 1995).
26 Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345, 1355 (Del. 1991).
15
a drug investigation was highly prejudicial and not necessary to explain how the
police apprehended him.
This Court reviews evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion,24 and we find
none.  The trial court properly considered the probative value of the evidence as
compared to its prejudicial effect and decided that the evidence was admissible.
Although it is not clear that the surveillance evidence really was necessary to “set the
stage” for the jury, this Court will not interfere with a trial court’s appropriate exercise
of discretion.  Moreover, the trial court offered to give the jury a limiting instruction
to help mitigate any prejudice, but Hunter never requested it.  Accordingly, we find
this claim to be without merit.
C.  Sufficiency of the Evidence
Finally, Hunter argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
conviction on the charge of possession with intent to deliver cocaine.  This claim was
not presented to the trial court and will be reviewed for plain error.25   An
insufficiency of evidence claim must fail if “any rational trier of fact, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.”26  Here, two police officers who have specialized training
16
and experience in narcotics investigations testified that the manner in which the
cocaine was packaged (14 plastic bags, each containing a relatively small quantity)
was consistent with the individual sale of each bag.  That evidence, together with the
large amount of cash found on Hunter, and the testimony that Hunter threw the bag
of cocaine out of his car while being chased by police, viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, is sufficient to support a guilty verdict.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Hunter’s convictions on the charges of tampering with
physical evidence, possession with intent to deliver cocaine, maintaining a vehicle  for
keeping controlled substances, possession of drug paraphernalia, two counts of
criminal impersonation, and refusal to provide pedigree information are REVERSED
and this matter is remanded to the Superior Court for further action in accordance with
this decision.