Title: State v. Thomas J. Koskovich
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-22-99
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 2001

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). VERNIERO, J., writing for a majority of the Court. On April 19, 1997, Koskovich, an 18-year-old high school student, and 17-year-old Jayson Vreeland carried out their plans to lure a pizza delivery person to an abandoned property and kill him. They ordered pizzas from Tony's Pizza, requesting delivery to an abandoned house on Scott Road in Franklin Borough, Sussex County. When twenty-two-year-old Jeremy Giordano and twenty-five-year-old Giorgio Gallara drove up to the property with the pizza delivery, Koskovich and Vreeland pulled out their handguns and shot them numerous times. After hearing about the killings the next day, Christine Slater, a friend of Koskovich's, contacted the police. The day before the homicides, Koskovich had shared with Slater his plan to kill a pizza delivery person. In addition, a resident of Scott Road who had seen Koskovich's automobile on that Road the evening of the murders also contacted police after he observed the same vehicle parked at Koskovich's residence. During the early morning hours of April 21, 1997, the State Police executed a warrant for Koskovich's arrest at his home. The officers searched Koskovich and found a pouch containing Fiorcet pills, a prescription drug comprised of acetaminophen, caffeine, and a barbiturate. Koskovich eventually confessed to his role in the killings, and gave a forty-six minute taped interview. A grand jury indicted Koskovich of purposeful or knowing murder of Giordano by his own conduct, murder of Gallara as an accomplice, first-degree armed robbery, felony murder, and other offenses. The State informed Koskovich that it would seek the death penalty by establishing that the murder of Giordano involved depravity of mind (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(c)) and that the murder was committed while Koskovich was committing a felony (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(g)). Koskovich was not eligible for the death penalty for the Gallara murder because he did not commit the homicidal act by his own conduct. (Forensic evidence revealed that Vreeland had fired the fatal shot that caused Gallara's death.) Koskovich pleaded not guilty to all charges. At the guilt phase of Koskovich's trial, the State presented overwhelming evidence of his guilt. Friends of Koskovich testified that he had told them about his plans to kill a pizza delivery person because he wanted to join the Mafia as a hitman. Residents of Scott Road testified to the presence of Koskovich's car in that location on the night of the murder. Investigators testified that they had discovered the murder weapons stashed outside the Koskovich home. The defense presented the testimony of a clinical psychologist with expertise in substance abuse. He detailed Koskovich's history of drug and alcohol abuse, especially his use of Fiorcet. The expert concluded that Koskovich had a substance-abuse disorder, that at the time of the offenses he was under the influence of Fiorcet, and that, based on Koskovich's use of that drug, his capacity to commit the offenses knowingly and purposely was significantly diminished. In rebuttal, the State called a forensic psychiatrist who disagreed with that conclusion. He noted that Koskovich's memory of the events was excellent, and concluded that his ability to act with knowledge and purpose was not affected by the use of Fiorcet. The jury found Koskovich guilty of purposeful or knowing murder of Giordano and Gallara, felony murder, first-degree robbery, and other offenses. Vreeland was tried separately. The State did not seek the death penalty against Vreeland because he was a juvenile at the time of the murders. At the penalty phase of the trial, the State sought to establish the depravity-of-mind and felony-murder aggravating factors. In furtherance of that objective, it relied on the evidence produced during the guilt phase, with minor exceptions. In response, the defense produced numerous witnesses to support certain mitigating factors. A social worker and mitigation specialist provided extensive testimony concerning Koskovich's family and background. She testified that his family was plagued by domestic violence, substance abuse, and suicide attempts. She expressed the opinion that Koskovich was raised in a home without boundaries or structure and was subjected to emotional neglect and abuse when his parents left him to be raised by his grandparents. The expert also expressed the view that Koskovich's suicide attempt, which occurred while he was awaiting trial, illustrated the remorse that he felt. Koskovich called another expert in forensic psychology who testified that Koskovich was mentally ill, had a tenuous grasp on reality, and was a developing paranoid schizophrenic. Still another expert testified that Koskovich was emotionally ill and was affected by mental and emotional disturbances on the date of the crimes. Mrs. Giordano, the victim's mother, read a victim-impact statement. On cross-examination, she stated that her family was not in favor of the death penalty. Eleven jurors voted in favor of the depravity-of-mind aggravating factor, and one voted against it. Because aggravating factors must be found unanimously, that no vote served as the entire jury's rejection of the depravity- of-mind factor. However, the jury unanimously found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the felony-murder aggravating factor. A varying number of jurors found numerous mitigating factors. However, the jury unanimously determined that the felony-murder aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors. The trial court sentenced Koskovich to death on May 7, 1999. Koskovich appeals to this Court as of right. The State has cross-appealed on two issues. HELD: There were no errors during the guilt phase that warrant reversal of defendant's capital convictions. In the penalty phase, however, the trial court's erroneous jury instructions in three areas - evaluation of the victim-impact evidence, defendant's likely non-capital sentences, and the balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors - collectively warrant reversal of defendant's death sentence. 1. The writings seized from Koskovich's bedroom, which referred to weapons and a willingness and desire to kill, were admissible to prove motive and intent, given the State's theory that Koskovich murdered to experience the thrill of killing. The gun magazines were relevant to establish Koskovich's experience and proficiency with weapons, and that he intentionally and purposefully murdered the victims. Koskovich has not made the strong showing of prejudice required to justify exclusion of the disputed evidence. (Pp. 23-37) 2. The prosecutor's suggestion in summation that there could have been a third homicide victim if another pizza restaurant had agreed to deliver to Scott Road did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. (Pp. 37-40) 3. The trial court's instruction on the own conduct requirement properly stressed that for defendant to be eligible for the death sentence, the jury had to find unanimously that he committed the murder by his own conduct. It also informed the jury that it need not be unanimous on the own conduct issue, and that if at least one juror found that defendant did not commit the murder by his own conduct, then he would be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. (Pp. 40-51) 4. The trial court's instruction to the jury concerning its evaluation of the victim impact statement directed the jury to balance the victim's background to that of Koskovich. This was akin to asking the jury to balance the worth of Koskovich against the worth of his victim, and as such, impermissibly increased the risk that the death sentence would be imposed arbitrarily. The Court agrees the claim raised by the State in its cross-appeal that it was error to allow the mother of the victim to express her personal opposition to the death penalty. (Pp. 51-78) 5. The trial court stated to counsel, but not the jury, that if Koskovich did not get the death penalty, the court would almost certainly impose consecutive sentences on the two murder convictions. The court should have informed the jurors of its intent that Koskovich remain in prison for the remainder of his life so that the jury was fully informed of the range of sentencing options. (Pp. 78-88) 6. The jury instruction on the consideration of aggravating and mitigating was flawed because it did not inform the jurors that if the jury as a whole did not unanimously find an aggravating factor, no one juror could consider that factor in balancing the remaining aggravating factor and the mitigating factors. (Pp. 89-103) 7. The Supreme Court rejects Koskovich's other challenges to his death penalty. The three errors in the trial court's jury instructions during the penalty phase identified above collectively warrant reversal of Koskovich's death sentence. Their combined effect was clearly capable of affecting the sentence. (Pp. 103-127) Koskovich's capital and non-capital convictions are AFFIRMED. The death sentence is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED for a new penalty proceeding. Koskovich's proportionality claims are preserved. JUSTICE ZAZZALI has filed a separate, concurring opinion, expressing the view that Koskovich's age, viewed in the context of his stunted emotional development, his traumatic childhood, and his condition at the time of the crime, raise the question whether the death penalty as applied to him is cruel and unusual punishment. JUSTICE STEIN has filed a separate opinion concurring and dissenting, agreeing with the majority opinion in all aspects except one; he is of the view that the victim impact statement prepared by the victim's mother contained comments intended to appeal primarily to the jury's emotions, and should have been excluded. JUSTICE COLEMAN has filed a separate opinion, concurring and dissenting, agreeing with the majority's holding that Koskovich's convictions should be affirmed, but expressing the view that the decision to vacate the death sentence because of alleged inadequate jury instructions concerning the use of a rejected aggravating factor is misguided. JUSTICE LONG has filed a separate opinion, concurring and dissenting, agreeing with the majority's reversal of the death sentence, but expressing her disagreement with the conclusion that the issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty has been resolved. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA has filed a separate opinion, concurring and dissenting, agreeing with the majority's conclusions concerning the guilt phase, but expressing the view that no reversible error occurred, either individually or collectively, in the penalty proceeding. JUSTICES STEIN, LONG and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE VERNIERO's opinion. JUSTICE ZAZZALI has filed a separate, concurring opinion, in which JUSTICE LONG joins. JUSTICE STEIN has filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. JUSTICE COLEMAN has filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICE LaVECCHIA join. JUSTICE LONG has filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA has filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICE COLEMAN join. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. THOMAS J. KOSKOVICH, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. Argued September 26, 2000 -- Decided June 7, 2001 On appeal and cross-appeal from judgment of conviction and sentence of death in the Superior Court, Law Division, Sussex County. Stephen W. Kirsch and Susan Brody, Assistant Deputy Public Defenders, argued the cause for appellant and cross-respondent (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). Bennett A. Barlyn, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent and cross- appellant (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by VERNIERO, J. In this capital case, defendant appeals his conviction and death sentence, claiming numerous errors by the trial court in both the guilt and penalty phases of trial. Further, he asserts that absent any trial errors, the sentence is disproportionate when compared to similar cases and should thus be vacated. We affirm the capital and non-capital convictions but agree with defendant that certain errors committed during the penalty phase warrant reversal of the death sentence. In view of that conclusion, we remand for a new sentencing proceeding and do not address defendant's proportionality claims. We are satisfied that the court in this case properly instructed the jury on the own-conduct requirement. Initially, the court described to the jury the elements of knowing or purposeful murder and explained that a guilty finding on that issue had to be unanimous. As noted, that question is distinct from the own-conduct question, and the trial court properly separated the two inquiries for the jury. The court indicated to the jury that if it unanimously found defendant guilty of knowing or purposeful murder, only then was it to consider whether defendant had committed the murder by his own conduct. Furthermore, the trial court emphasized that in order for defendant to be eligible for the death sentence, the jury had to find unanimously that defendant committed the murders by his own conduct. The court also stressed that if less than all of the jurors agreed, the jury had to return a no verdict on the own- conduct issue. The verdict list itself explicitly indicated to the jury that if it voted no on that issue, the case would not proceed to a penalty phase. Thus, consistent with Feaster, the trial court properly informed the jury that it need not be unanimous on the own-conduct issue. The court also informed the jury about the sentencing consequences of the own-conduct finding. Accordingly, defendant was not deprived of a legitimate opportunity to receive a non-unanimous own-conduct verdict. [I]f you choose to spare Mr. Koskovich's life, you should not, for one minute, think that he will not be punished. It is, if you accept what the prosecutor says, clear evidence of how horrible it must be to know you're going to spend the rest of your life in prison. Clearly, if you believe the prosecutor, it's so horrible [defendant] would rather die. . . . . If you picture _ go in that jury room, and you go in that bathroom, and you close that door, and realize that essentially you are never, ever coming out, that is what you are going to be doing for the rest of your life, that would be the better existence than Thomas Koskovich is looking at if he spends the rest of his life in prison. The simple pleasures that we probably take for granted, walking on the beach, looking at the stars at night, or getting a cup of coffee and reading the New York Times in bed, he's never, ever going to do. He will eat when and what someone tells him. He will sleep in the same place where he is told and when he is told. And he will be surrounded, I suggest, by people who are not really all that nice. And he will be confined, most of the time, to a very, very small space. He will, if you spare his life, be significantly and seriously punished. In its penalty phase instruction, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: Also want to have you keep in mind, in a certain sense, that there are other crimes that have been involved in this case with respect to which sentences will be imposed by me. In this penalty phase, of course, you're dealing with just one of the crimes that is involved in this case, and, you know, fundamentally, in your decision you're focusing just on the murder of Jeremy Giordano. That's the one that gives rise to the penalty phase. There will be some references to other crimes as part of one of the aggravating factors. But your basic task here is to decide what the penalty should be for the knowing and purposeful murder of _ of Jeremy Giordano. Mr. Koskovich will be sentenced for all of the other crimes. He will be sentenced by me for the murder of [Giorgio] Gallara. He will be sentenced by me for the crime of robbery. He will be sentenced by me for the crime of unlawful _ of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. He will be sentenced by me for the burglary of the Adventure Stores _ Adventure Sports Store, and for the theft from that store. I'll probably do that about three weeks from now. I'm not sure what sentence I will impose. I have a considerable amount of discretion as to what the sentence will be for some of those crimes. And I have _ have considerable discretion with respect to whether I make those sentences concurrent or overlapping, or whether I make them consecutive, which means they're added one after another. So I'm not sure precisely what I will do about _ about those. I can tell you there will be a sentence for each of those crimes. And I can tell you that[.] Let me just stop for a moment and say that if, of course, you sentence the _ you determine that the defendant should be sentenced to death for the murder of Jeremy Giordano there will be a sentence in which it really doesn't matter what happens for the other crimes, because if he were _ if he were put to death that _ that _ that would be the end of any sentencing process. The other sentences would not be served. But if Mr. Giordano _ if Mr. Koskovich does not get the death penalty for the death of Jeremy Giordano, then the other sentences will be important. And without committing myself in advance to precisely what they will be, I can tell you that they will be sufficient to make sure that society is fully protected from the risk of any further violence from the defendant. So when you decide what the penalty should be in this case, decide it in terms of what you think the appropriate penalty is for this crime of the knowing and purposeful murder of Jeremy Giordano. Don't be worried that _ that if you do not sentence the defendant to death or direct the defendant be sentenced to death for this crime, that he will be out on the street in the near future. That will not occur. So you do not have to worry that _ that if you fail to impose the death penalty society will not be protected from further acts of violence by Mr. Koskovich, because it will be. The point is decide in terms of what is the appropriate penalty for this case, whether the penalty should be death or less than death. Now, we are now dealing with, fundamentally, the one very, very, very serious crime of the knowing and purposeful murder of Jeremy Giordano by the direct conduct of the defendant, Thomas Koskovich. And you've already found the _ the defendant guilty of that crime. And now you are going to decide whether the penalty for that should be the death penalty, or whether it should be something less than the death penalty. If you do not vote to impose the death penalty unanimously, then I will sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment which may go up to life imprisonment for this crime, and it must be at least 30 years without any possibility of parole. Defense counsel objected to that charge. The court overruled the objection, explaining that: I've made very ample statement about what is going to happen on the other crimes. The charge is long enough as it goes, probably, you know, the _ the difficulty is there are a lot of things that have to be covered, and so we have to cover them, but _ but it _ it gets to be sort of mind boggling in terms of what people have to absorb. Fortunately, we do have a verdict list that helps to structure it. But I _ I have told them, very, very clearly, not only that other sentences are available, but I've indicated, rather strongly, in a way that _ that _ that I _ I've indicated, rather strongly, what the result of the other sentencing will be. . . . . The jury's decision should not be influenced by [the potential sentences that could be imposed for the other crimes] and the way of trying to take it out of influence is to assure them that it will be handled adequately. . . . . I don't know any more needs to be said. Trial courts are obligated to inform penalty-phase juries about the potential sentences that a defendant could receive for non-capital convictions arising from the same trial as the capital murder conviction. In State v. Martini, supra, 131 N.J. at 313, we held that when defense counsel or the jury requests instructions on the potential sentences a defendant will receive for convictions arising from the same trial as his capital- murder conviction, such information should be provided by the trial court. The jurors should be informed of the sentencing options available to the judge, and that the determination of sentence had not yet been made. In addition, the trial court should explain that the sentence may or may not run consecutively to that for murder, but that the determination is left to the court. Finally, the court should inform the jury that defendant's possible sentence for the other convictions should not influence its determination regarding the appropriateness of a death sentence on the murder count. We clarified those requirements in State v. Loftin, supra, 146 N.J. at 372. In that case, we held that if the court, based on the evidence presented believes that there is a realistic likelihood that it will impose a sentence to be served consecutively to any of defendant's prior sentences, in the event the jury does not return a death sentence, the jury should be so informed. Ibid. See also State v. Timmendequas, supra, 161 N.J. at 636; State v. Feaster, supra, 156 N.J. at 90-91. Those obligations are premised on our belief that a capital sentencing jury should be fully informed about its responsibility in deciding the appropriateness of the death penalty. State v. Loftin, supra, 146 N.J. at 370. As we have explained, [t]o hide from the jury the full range of its sentencing options, thus permitting its decision to be based on uninformed and possibly inaccurate speculation, is to mock the goals of rationality and consistency required by modern death penalty jurisprudence. State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 311. Failing to inform jurors about other sentences undermines their responsibility and invites speculation concerning those sentences, thereby risking a death verdict based on a jury's unwarranted fear of the defendant's premature release from prison. State v. Bey, 129 N.J. 557, 602 (1992). Moreover, the Court has emphasized that [w]hen a jury is choosing between life and death, it should not be misled into treating the case as one that it is not. State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 505 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1114, 119 S. Ct. 890, 142 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1999). With those principles in mind, we turn to defendant's argument that the trial court should have instructed the jury that the court was likely to impose consecutive sentences. The court did not explicitly inform the jury during the penalty phase that it planned to impose consecutive sentences. If the court held that belief and failed to so inform the jury, an error in the charge would have resulted. We must thus determine whether the court believed that there was a realistic likelihood that it would impose such sentences prior to its charge. to the jury its final instructions, addressing the jury's consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors: As a general proposition you know aggravating factors are those which would tend towards imposing the death penalty, and mitigating factors are those which would tend towards the sentence of imprisonment. The factors have to do with the circumstances of the crime and the personal traits, qualities and background of the defendant. Your task is not merely to decide the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors. That's an important part of your task. But really the more complicated part of your task probably will be to evaluate those factors, if you find them to _ to exist on both sides of the _ of the evaluation, to evaluate them and to make a unique, individualized judgment about the appropriateness either of the death penalty or imprisonment, acts of punishment for this _ this defendant. Now, aggravating factors are tightly controlled as to what can be an aggravating factor. There's a rather short statutory list of aggravating factors. And the [S]tate, in this case, has alleged that two of them are present. So those two aggravating factors, which we'll discuss in some detail, are the only two which can be considered in this penalty phase. The jury can't think of other aggravating factors that it believes might be appropriate. You can't do that. You're limited to the two which the [S]tate has claimed exist. So you have to focus, when you get to aggravating factors, on whether either or both of them, aggravating factors, exist. The fact that some of us might think that perhaps another factor could have been applied here, there or the other place, a _ an aggravating factor, that's irrelevant. Two have been claimed. And that is what you are limited to in deciding whether an aggravating factor is present. The burden of proof in the penalty phase _ the burden of proof _ the first burden of proof that the State has is to show, by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or more aggravating factors exist. The second burden of proof that the [S]tate has, if it passes that first one, is to show by evidence, beyond a [reasonable] doubt, that the aggravating factor or factors proven to exist outweigh the mitigating factor or factors. Now, the State has the burden of proving the exist[e]nce of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. The court proceeded to define proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court then directed the jury's attention to the verdict sheet and stressed that, to consider whether the death penalty was appropriate, the jury first had to find unanimously that at least one of the two alleged aggravating factors was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the court stated: [A]s part of that concept that the imposition of the death penalty is unusual and rare, the [S]tate is required not just to _ if the death penalty is to be imposed, it's not _ it's required not just to prove that there is a knowing and purposeful murder. That has already been proven in this case. But in addition to that, it has to show that there is one of a limited number of aggravating factors in addition to the murder which make it appropriate to impose the death penalty in a case. So proving an aggravating factor is absolutely indispensable to the possibility that a death penalty might actually be imposed. Turning to the depravity-of-mind aggravating factor, the court informed the jury in part: Now, if you find that the murder was random, entirely pointless and senseless, if you find that unanimously, beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should _ you should say that this aggravating factor is present. jury's consideration of the felony-murder aggravating factor. The court further instructed the jury that: Now, your first task, before you get into mitigating factors, your first task is to see whether or not any aggravating factors exist. If you answer no to all the aggravating factors, if your answer to the first three questions we ask you on the jury verdict list is no, then your work is done. That's the end of the case. If no aggravating factors are present, then the death penalty does not apply, and you check no and _ on aggravating factor one and on the two subsections of aggravating factor two, and you return to the jury _ to the courtroom and hand me that jury list. And if that's what you have decided, you've answered no to all three of those questions, that's the end of the case. . . . That would be the end of the case. Now, if you do find that at least one aggravating factor is present, then you get to the mitigating factors. After describing the mitigating factors, the court instructed the jury on how to balance the aggravating and mitigating factors: The balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors, as I mentioned during jury selection, is not mechanical or numerical in nature. It's not a question of counting up the factors and the higher number wins. My guess would be if you get to balancing, there will be more mitigating factors than aggravating factors, just because of the nature of the case. But it's not just a . . . question of counting up the numbers. The _ you don't just count them. You have to consider the factors qualitatively. Some of the factors may be much more significant than the others. And you have to consider that and make a judgment about that. One aggravating factor may be found to outweigh, beyond a reasonable doubt, numerous mitigating factors, may be even all mitigating factors. And similarly one or two aggravating factors, two aggravating factors, that's the most you could find in this case, two aggravating factors, might be overcome by just one mitigating factor, depending on how you size up the factors and what weight you _ you _ you give to them. So you _ you are _ are asked, as you weigh these _ weigh these factors, to take a hard look at _ at the evidence. And what you are being asked to do is figure what the weight is and how do they relate to each other. And when all is said and done, does the aggravating factor or factors, beyond a reasonable doubt, outweigh the mitigating factors that are shown to be in the case _ that _ that are found to be in the case. That is what you have to do. You _ you _ you have to decide this _ this matter. And it comes down to being an individualized judgment by each juror as to the appropriateness of the death penalty or imprisonment as punishment for the defendant as you weigh those factors. Now, if you look at the _ at the final part of the verdict list, it's the section called Result of Balancing of Factors , you're asked to answer a number of questions. And first one is if the jury has unanimously found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that at least one aggravating factor exists, it must answer this question. Does the jury unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that any aggravating factor or factors proven to exist outweigh the mitigating factor or factors. You're asked to answer that yes or no. Now, in order to answer the question yes all 12 jurors must agree that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the aggravating factor or factors outweigh the mitigating factors. All 12 of you must agree. If less than 12 agree, if anywheres [sic] from 1 to 12 think the answer is no, then the answer is no, and we ask you to indicate, in that case, if the answer is no, we ask you to indicate the breakdown of yes or no votes. the prosecutor stated: This has been a long, it has been a difficult, . . . it has been a somewhat stressful trial for everyone involved. And the trial is the matter of State of New Jersey versus Thomas Koskovich. It is not the case of Thomas Koskovich versus Bertha Lippencott. This is the matter of the State of New Jersey versus Thomas Koskovich. The prosecutor also remarked: When you begin your deliberations you will be talking about death. It's a topic that none of us likes to talk about, yet it is something that we all face. And I ask that you face it in that jury room, as you must, with respect to your deliberations in this matter, with the same courage, with the same dignity, and with the same discipline that, for instance, a terminal cancer patient faces death. [Defense counsel], in her opening statement, in the guilt phase of this trial, back a month ago, talked to you about some of the responsibilities of citizenship that we all have. Potential for military service, potential for jury service. She compared those two. And in military service we ask our soldiers, who are summoned to face life and death decisions on a regular basis, often times without the opportunity to deliberate, to consult with others before acting. In jury service we're certainly going to ask you to deliberate, to consult with each other before reaching a decision. And I ask you to face the decision that you must make as a soldier called to service to his country would, with that same courage and dignity and discipline with respect to a topic that admittedly we don't like to talk about. Before the trial court, defendant argued that those comments were improper. More specifically, defendant objected to the prosecutor's reference to Bertha Lippencott, contending that the prosecutor inappropriately suggested to the jury that defendant attempted to blame others, namely, his grandmother, for his crimes. The trial court disagreed, explaining that the prosecutor's reference was a fair comment based on the evidence defendant presented to the jury. Defendant also objected to the State's soldier and cancer- patient analogy, contending that the prosecutor improperly asked the jury to have the courage to impose the death penalty. Defendant asserted that in doing so, the prosecutor improperly minimized the importance of the jury's responsibility. Again, the trial court disagreed. The trial court indicated that, although the prosecutor's analogy was not the reference I might have chosen myself, it was broadly appropriate. Defendant repeats both objections in this appeal. In reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct at the guilt phase of a capital trial, we utilize the same standards that are used to review allegations of misconduct in the penalty phase. Timmendequas, supra, 161 N.J. at 589. See also State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 565 (1990) ( The 'fair trial' standard applies to alleged prosecutorial misconduct in both the guilt . . . and penalty phases of a capital trial[.] ). Thus, we incorporate by reference our discussion found in Section II.B. Ante at ___ (Slip op. at 37). We first address defendant's argument that the prosecutor impermissibly suggested to the jury that defendant tried to blame others for his actions. A similar argument was made in State v. Feaster, supra, 156 N.J. at 85. There, the prosecutor remarked in summation that the defendant 'should be required to accept the ultimate responsibility for that act and that's the death penalty.' Ibid. The defendant claimed that the prosecutor's comment impermissibly characterized the mitigating evidence as the defendant's attempt to escape responsibility for his conduct. Id. at 86. Although we determined that the prosecutor's comments were tantamount to characterizing the mitigating evidence as an excuse, we concluded that defense counsel's argument to the jury and the trial court's instructions about the role of aggravating factors made the jury well aware of their responsibility and the proper role mitigating evidence was to play in the discharge of that responsibility. Id. at 87. We conclude similarly in the present case. The prosecutor in the present case did not state that defendant blamed others for his actions, nor did the prosecutor encourage the jury to impose the death penalty as a method of forcing defendant to accept responsibility for his actions. In mitigation, defendant presented a considerable amount of testimony about his difficult background, much of which focused on his grandmother. Within that context, the prosecutor's statement about Bertha Lippencott merely focused the jury's attention on the central issues involved in the penalty phase. We are satisfied that the prosecutor's comments did not have the capacity to distract the jury from its duties and thus did not deprive defendant of a fair penalty-phase hearing. We turn next to the prosecutor's comments concerning soldiers and terminal cancer patients. A decision of the United States Supreme Court, Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1985), provides a useful analytical framework within which to review those comments. In that case, the prosecutor suggested that the ultimate responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the death sentence rested with appellate courts, not the jury itself. Id. at 323, 105 S. Ct. at 2636, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 235-36. Emphasizing the important duty and role of the jury in death penalty cases, the Court observed that its capital punishment jurisprudence was premised on the assumption that a capital sentencing jury recognizes the gravity of its task and proceeds with the appropriate awareness of its 'truly awesome responsibility.' Id. at 341, 105 S. Ct. at 2646, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 247. The Court overturned the death sentence, concluding [b]ecause we cannot say that [the State's effort to minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death] had no effect on the sentencing decision, that decision does not meet the standard of reliability that the Eighth Amendment requires. Ibid. See also State v. Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 478 (concluding that prospective jurors who expressed strong desire to avoid responsibility for decision resulting in death were properly excluded from jury). Like the United States Supreme Court, we also assume that capital-sentencing jurors recognize the gravity and significance of their responsibility. In that regard, the State must in no way minimize the importance or significance of the jury's role. Viewing the prosecutor's statement within that framework, we do not believe that the statement had the capacity to dispel the jury's sense of responsibility. To the contrary, the prosecutor's comments tended to convey to the jury the seriousness of its task. We also reject defendant's argument that the prosecutor impermissibly suggested to the jurors that they needed the courage to impose a penalty of death. Our review of the record persuades us that the prosecutor's statement emphasized to the jury that it should deliberate with courage and dignity. Such encouragement is not inconsistent with our capital jurisprudence. The prosecutor's comments reinforced to the jurors that they had a grave task, and did not impermissibly minimize the importance of the jury's decision. We add this brief cautionary note. In State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565, 622-26, corrected by, 164 N.J. 553 (2000), we recently observed the frequency with which some prosecutors approach the bounds of propriety by their remarks to jurors. Although the prosecutor's remarks at issue here were not improper, we emphasize that prosecutors must avoid prejudicial and overly emotional or extraneous references at all stages of the criminal process, especially in capital proceedings. For present purposes, we are satisfied that defendant's right to have the jury deliberate fairly in the penalty phase was not violated by the prosecutor's remarks in summation. I just want to thank you all for listening to me. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. THOMAS J. KOSKOVICH, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. ZAZZALI, J., concurring. I concur in the majority's thoughtful opinion, which concludes that three errors committed during the penalty phase warrant reversal of the death penalty imposed on Thomas Koskovich. Those errors involved instructions to the jury that were identified in a record containing hundreds, if not thousands, of correct decisions by the trial court. Although we cannot expect a trial court to nuance a charge to perfection, those errors require reversal. The decision so to do is a close one. I believe that the presence of other circumstances reinforces and validates the decision to reverse. We must continue to be acutely sensitive to the possibility of prejudicial error in capital cases. I write separately to focus attention on other factors that I believe present serious constitutional concerns with respect to the imposition of the death penalty in this and in similar cases. In my view, defendant's young age, viewed in the context of his stunted emotional development, his traumatic childhood, and his condition at the time of the crime, raises the question whether the death penalty, as applied to him, is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Article I, paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution. [Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 396, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2989, 106 L. Ed. 2d 306, 335 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).] By prohibiting the execution of juveniles, the Legislature has expressed a generalization regarding the maturity of those eighteen and over. That in no way rules out the possibility that exceptions to the general rule exist. Just as there are certain to be seventeen-year-olds who are as mature as the average adult, there are undoubtedly eighteen-year-olds who are less mature. The Legislature has acknowledged such exceptions by shifting the responsibility to the criminal justice system to review each defendant as an individual. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(c), age of the offender may be considered as a mitigating factor in a murder trial even when a defendant is not automatically precluded from receiving the death penalty due to his or her youth. Even when the jury rejects the c(5)(c) mitigating factor, this Court has held that a defendant's age may still play a role in the jury's evaluation of the c(5)(h) (catch-all) mitigating factor. State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 360 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164, 115 S. Ct. 1131, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1093 (1995). I therefore infer from the actions of the Legislature that the citizens of New Jersey do not condone the execution of those who lack the maturity of adults. Against that backdrop, and in view of the circumstances described below, I believe that the execution of Thomas Koskovich may be contrary to contemporary standards of decency. Concerning the third question, I believe that the death sentence in this case would go beyond what is necessary to accomplish a legitimate penological objective. Any retributive value to be gained from an execution is surely reduced where the offender lacks sufficient maturity to be considered fully culpable. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 836-37, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2699-70, 101 L. Ed. 2d 702, 719-20 (1988). Although I am of the view that the death penalty has a deterrent effect in some circumstances, I doubt seriously that imposition of the death penalty in this case would deter other such hopeless individuals. I also fail to see the deterrent value in executing an individual who is likely to retain the impulsiveness and feelings of invulnerability generally associated with childhood and adolescence. Stanford, supra, 492 U.S. at 404-05, 109 S. Ct. at 2993-94, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 340-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He hasn't had the nurturing, loving raising that we would like everyone to have. And he does have, I think, a lot of emotional and psychological burdens that have weighed heavily upon him and which in part explain why he acted in the way in which he did. And one can, in observing Mr. Koskovich, see some good things and see that perhaps this is a young man in different circumstances who would have had a very different result and would not have been tempted to act in the way in which he did act. So I must say I feel terribly sorry for Thomas Koskovich and I . . . sort of maybe wish I had met him under different circumstances then years before or even earlier and something might have been done to steer him along a more constructive path. At heart, and at the least, Koskovich was a sad, disturbed, immature boy involved in a scheme with consequences perhaps beyond his mental grasp. At worst, he was, as the trial judge observed, a basket case. In either case, for all of the above reasons, Article I, paragraph 12 of the Constitution would, in my view, forbid his execution.See footnote 22 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-22/ 23 September Term 1999 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. THOMAS J. KOSKOVICH, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. STEIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-22/ 23 September Term 1999 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. THOMAS J. KOSKOVICH, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. __________________________ I concur in the Court's holding in all respects except for the three reasons stated by the Court for vacating the death sentence. I concur in the opinion of Justice LaVecchia finding no reversible error related to the victim-impact testimony or the trial court's statement to the jury regarding the potential sentences it would impose on the non-capital convictions. I write separately to express the reasons why I believe the decision to vacate the death sentence because of alleged improper or inadequate jury instructions concerning the use of a rejected aggravating factor is misguided. I also disagree with the Court's response to the Public Defender's assertion that the jury should have been instructed to disregard evidence admitted to support a rejected aggravating factor. . . . . Now, aggravating factors are tightly controlled as to what can be an aggravating factor. There's a rather short statutory list of aggravating factors. And the state, in this case, has alleged that two of them are present. So those two aggravating factors, which we'll discuss in some detail, are the only two which can be considered in this penalty phase. The jury can't think of other aggravating factors that it believes might be appropriate. You can't do that. You're limited to the two which the state has claimed exist. So you have to focus, when you get to aggravating factors, on whether either or both of them, aggravating factors, exist. The trial court instructed the jury that aggravating factors have to do with the circumstances of the crime. [The] most complicated part of [the jury's] task probably will be to evaluate [the aggravating and mitigating factors] . . . to make a unique, individualized judgment about the appropriateness of either the death penalty or imprisonment for this defendant. The jury was instructed that in New Jersey, the imposition of the death penalty is rare. . . . [After the State has proven a capital murder by the defendant], the State has to [establish beyond a reasonable doubt] that there is one of a limited number of aggravating factors. The jury also was instructed that you are . . . to consider [in the penalty phase] all of the evidence in the case, . . . to take a fresh look at all the evidence . . . related to . . . defendant murdering Jeremy Giordano. . . . [Y]ou should take a fresh look at the evidence in the context of seeing [whether] it establishes the existence of an aggravating factor . . . or a mitigating factor. The jury also was instructed that the State relied almost exclusively on the guilt-phase evidence to prove the aggravating factors while defendant presented a substantial amount of evidence in the penalty phase concerning mitigating evidence which the jury was to consider. The jury also was given a verdict sheet, which first asked: Does the murder of Jeremy Giordano involve depravity of mind on the part of Thomas Koskovich in that it was random, entirely pointless and senseless. In defining the meaning of the depravity alleged in this case, the judge explained: Now, the depravity of mind alleged here is that these victims were not victims because either of them had done anything in any way to the defendant, or because they interacted with them in any way which might have, in some sense, triggered or provoked an attack upon them. One of the claims is that the _ the victims were purely random victims. Now, the evidence in this case indicates that there's a certain sense in which they were not random. There was -_ there was a kind of methodology to _- to trying to have someone show up at the Scott Road house, where the murders took place, but there was a randomness as to, the state alleges, and the evidence can support that finding, depending upon how you analyze it, there may have been a randomness in the sense that the identity of the victims really didn't matter. It turns out, incidently, that Mr. Giordano was known to Jason Vreeland, and there was some effort made not to have him be the first one to show up, because he was known. But under the State's analysis, and you have to see whether you agree with it or not, under the state's analysis and claim the _- the killing of Jeremy Giordano was random in a sense that he simply happened to be the person who showed up there, and it could have been Suzy Brown or Joe Smith; that it was simply a randomness of personality. And the legal point of that is that that, in a sense, might make it worse because it _- it _- it makes it just _- just so out of _- out of even the normal character of people who commit murders. So there's that element of randomness that might be present. And you have to see whether you agree it is. Then it's also urged that it's entirely pointless; that there's no real reason for having murdered Jeremy Giordano; that it was literally entirely pointless; and it was senseless. The same idea. Just didn't make any sense, didn't have any point to it. Now, if you find that the murder was random, entirely pointless and senseless, if you find that unanimously, beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should _- you should say that this aggravating factor is present. I want to point out that one of the things you have to consider in this case is whether this might not have been something that basically was meant to be a robbery, and then turned out to be something else in a way in which the defendant did not calculate that it was. You have to make a fine distinction, I think, and look carefully at the evidence in the case. If someone started out to do a robbery, and something goes wrong in the course of the robbery where, as I indicated earlier, meets with resistance, where someone tries to run away or the victim counter- attacks, something like that, and the situation escalates, and there's a murder that results, that _- that would not be a random, pointless, senseless murder as required by this aggravating factor. On the other hand, the fact that robbery may have been a motive in inviting the victims to the Scott Road site does not necessarily mean that this may not have been a random, entirely senseless and pointless murder. And there _ and the reason is this. Forget this case for a moment. Just put this aside and go to a hypothetical case. If somebody's way of committing a robbery is simply to start out by shooting someone, without asking him for his money or asking him for his car, or asking him for his jewelry, whatever you want to get from him, if your _- if a defendant's way to rob somebody is to shoot them first, without warning, and then take the property from _- from the _- the dead victim, that's a robbery. But _- but that's not the usual robbery. That's, in a sense, a robbery preceded by a murder. So even though there _- there was a _- a motive to commit robbery in that case, the fact that a murder was built in at the start of the robbery could make it not a robbery in terms of this aggravating factor, but could, indeed, make it a random, entirely pointless and senseless killing. So you have to take _- shifting to our case _- you have to look carefully at what occurred, and how it occurred, and why it occurred to decide whether or not this aggravating factor is present. The trial court then informed the jury that the second aggravating factor was felony murder. The verdict sheet also inquired: [D]oes the jury unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder of Jeremy Giordano was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of (a) the murder of Giorgio Gallara, or (b) the robbery of Giorgio Gallara or Jeremy Giordano. After the court concluded its discussion of the two aggravating factors and the fourteen specified mitigating factors plus the catchall mitigating factors, the court discussed how the balancing process was to be conducted. In doing so, the court referred to the verdict sheet that included questions to be answered based on the balancing process. The court informed the jury that it could weigh only the aggravating factor or factors found by it against mitigating factors found to exist. That concept was reinforced by the verdict sheet, which asked: Does the jury unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that any aggravating factor or factors proven to exist outweigh the mitigating factor or factors? The clear implication of the charge, when viewed as a whole, is that the jury could not consider an aggravating factor for any purpose unless it first unanimously agreed that that aggravating factor had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was expressly informed that a vote of eleven to one meant a rejection of that aggravating factor, which could not then be considered for any purpose. Depravity as an aggravating factor focuses on the defendant's state of mind, not the victim's mental or physical pain suffered. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 207-08 (1987), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 947, 113 S. Ct. 2433, 124 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1993); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 137 (1991); State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 173 (1988), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164, 115 S. Ct. 1131, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1093 (1995). It distinguishes those who murder for a purpose from those who murder for no purpose. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 209. In the present case, the depravity was based on the allegation that the murder served no purpose for defendant beyond the pleasure of killing. See id. at 211. Depravity is frequently viewed as one of the emotions associated with murder. State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 383 (1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1084, 120 S. Ct. 809, 145 L. Ed. 2d 681 (2000); Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 211. Here, as in Cooper, the jury most likely rejected depravity as an aggravating factor because it found another motive for the murder, namely robbery. Indeed, the trial court instructed the jury that this could have been a planned robbery in which the murder would precede the robbery and then property would be taken from the victim's body. Unlike the majority, I find that the trial court properly informed the jury that if it rejected one of the two proposed aggravating factors, the jury could not consider that rejected aggravating factor for any purpose. The jury was instructed that among the two aggravating factors involved, a single vote of no on either meant a rejection of that factor. The court further informed the jury that if either or both of the aggravating factors were found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury had to then engage in the process of weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors. In arriving at the conclusion that the jury was instructed properly, I have examined the jury instructions in accordance with the settled legal principle that the charge must be viewed as a whole rather than as isolated parts. State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 374 (1996); State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 304 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S. Ct. 203, 133 L. Ed. 2d 137 (1995). Thus, under the plain error standard, defendant has not demonstrated that the jury instructions were clearly erroneous and caused the jury to reach a verdict it otherwise would not have reached. State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997). In addition, the evidence that established the felony-murder aggravating factor was overwhelming and that alone precludes the alleged plain error from rising to the level of reversible error. Contrary to this Court's decisions in other death penalty cases, the majority is willing to speculate that despite the trial court's instruction to the jury to weigh only unanimously agreed-upon aggravating factors, some jurors might have considered the rejected depravity aggravating factor when weighing the aggravating against the mitigating factors. In State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 502 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129, 116 S. Ct. 949, 133 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1996), the Court held that even if submission of [the escape-detection] aggravating factor . . . was in error, the error would have been harmless because the jury did not find [that] aggravating factor . . . unanimously. Even more compelling are the Court's observations in State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454 (1988). There, the State relied on the depravity-of-mind factor as one of the three aggravating factors submitted to the jury. Id. at 474-75. Although the jury rejected the depravity-of-mind factor, the defendant argued that it should not have been submitted to the jury and that he had been prejudiced by its inclusion. Id. at 529. We agreed with the defendant that there was insufficient evidence to submit the depravity factor to the jury, but we rejected the contention that its inclusion had prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 531-533. In rejecting that contention the Court stated: [T]he jury's function in the penalty phase of a capital case is first to assess, independently of each other, the sufficiency of proof of the aggravating and mitigating factors. Its rejection of one such [aggravating] factor neither compels nor inhibits its determination that another [aggravating] factor exists. We also note on this record that there was overwhelming proof of the existence of aggravating factors c(4)(f) and c(4)(h). Hence, it would be highly speculative to conclude that the erroneous submission to the jury of aggravating factor c(4)(c), a factor rejected by the jury, prejudicially affected this jury's deliberations concerning the remaining aggravating factors, the mitigating factors, and its weighing process. The same is true in the present case. Even if the jury should have been given an additional instruction in anticipation of the chance that it would reject one of the aggravating factors, the jury was clearly informed that it independently had to assess the remaining aggravating factor it found to have been established. The jury's rejection of the depravity aggravating factor did not affect its weighing of the felony-murder aggravating factor against the mitigating factors. Hence, I reject the Court's speculation that one or more jurors mistakenly may have relied on the rejected depravity factor in concluding that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors. [State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 158 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929, 113 S. Ct. 1306, 122 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1993).] Consistent with that principle, we have permitted nonstatutory aggravating and mitigating factors . . . [to be] presented to the sentencing jury [because those factors] are likely to influence a jury's sentencing decision. State v. Chew, 159 N.J. 183, 210 (1999), cert. denied, U.S. , 120 S. Ct. 593, 145 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1999). That principle was reaffirmed in In re Proportionality Review Project (II), 165 N.J. 206, 218-19 (2000). Permitting the jury to consider evidence presented solely to establish a rejected aggravating factor does not mean that rejection of that factor becomes meaningless. Rejection of an aggravating factor means that the State has one less statutory basis to support a sentence of death. But that may or may not be beneficial to the State. In his Special Master's Report to the Court concerning our Death Penalty Proportionality Review Project, Judge Baime found that death-sentencing rates in cases with two or more aggravating factors were lower than for those cases with one aggravating factor. In re Proportionality Review Project (I), 161 N.J. 71, 88 (1999) (emphasis added). I also reject the Public Defender's argument that a jury should be instructed that if it rejects an aggravating factor, then all the evidence probative of that rejected factor should be disregarded by the jury. Here, as in most cases, evidence admitted during the guilt phase was admissible not only to establish the depravity aggravating factor, but also to establish the mental culpability related to the robbery, the homicide, and the other crimes. Defendant's level of premeditation in planning and executing his criminal scheme is probative of knowing or purposeful conduct. All of that evidence is relevant to the jury's sentencing function because [o]ur system of criminal laws is predicated usually on the imposition of punishment based on the defendant's intent. . . . Society's concern, the community's concern, the Legislature's concern, is to punish most harshly those who intend to inflict pain, harm, and suffering__in addition to intending death. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 207-08 (emphasis omitted). Based on all of the foregoing principles, I am persuaded that the failure of the trial court to give the jury the two jury instructions urged by the Public Defender, based on an assumption that depravity might be rejected as an aggravating factor, did not constitute error, plain or otherwise. See State v. Morton, 165 N.J. 235, 242 (2000), cert. denied, U.S. , 121 S. Ct. 1380, L. Ed.2d (2001); State v. Harvey, 159 N.J. 277, 287-88 (1999); State v. Cooper, 159 N.J. 55, 67 (1999), certif. denied, 528 U.S. 1084, 120 S. Ct. 809, 145 L. Ed. 2d 681 (2000); Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. 382. For all of those reasons, I would not vacate defendant's sentence of death. Chief Justice Poritz and Justice LaVecchia join in this opinion. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. THOMAS J. KOSKOVICH, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. __________________________ LONG, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the majority's reversal of the death sentence imposed on Thomas J. Koskovich. I write separately to express my disagreement with the conclusion, expressed in Point IV of the Court's opinion, that because the death penalty was declared constitutional in State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123 (1987), that issue is resolved. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. THOMAS J. KOSKOVICH, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. __________________________ The majority's opinion thoroughly analyzes numerous claims of error in the guilt and penalty phases of the trial of Thomas Koskovich. I concur in all of the majority's conclusions concerning the guilt phase and write only to express my disagreement on three issues arising in the penalty phase. Based on those three errors, viewed collectively, the majority finds reversible error requiring a new penalty proceeding. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 52). Because I am not persuaded that reversible error occurred, individually or collectively, I would not disturb the jury determination. Immediately after the challenged segment, the trial court stated: And it's - it's to be considered in relation to those - those mitigating factors, 6 through 14, and any others you may find. And it's not to be considered in terms of boosting an aggravating factor. . . . It's only meant to effect [sic] your determination of the weight of those certain mitigating factors. NO. A-22 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. THOMAS J. KOSKOVICH, Defendant-Appellant, DECIDED June 7, 200 Chief Justice Poritz CHECKLIST NO. A-23 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant, v. THOMAS J. KOSKOVICH, Defendant-Cross-Respondent. DECIDED June 7, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz