Title: Levin v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC19935
State: Connecticut
Issuer: Connecticut Supreme Court
Date: August 14, 2018

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JILL K. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATRIX (ESTATE OF
MARGARET ROHNER) v. STATE
OF CONNECTICUT
(SC 19935)
McDonald, Robinson, Mullins, Kahn and Vertefeuille, Js.*
Syllabus
The plaintiff, the administratrix of the estate of a woman who was fatally
stabbed by her son, R, filed a notice of claim with the claims commis-
sioner, pursuant to the statute (§ 4-160 [b]) governing claims of malprac-
tice against the state, seeking permission to bring an action against the
defendant, the state, for medical malpractice. At the time of the stabbing,
R had been on an approved home visit from a residential mental health-
care facility operated by the Department of Mental Health and Addiction
Services. The claims commissioner granted permission to the plaintiff
to bring an action limited to that portion of the plaintiff’s claim alleging
medical malpractice. The plaintiff subsequently brought an action
against the state, alleging that the health-care facility was negligent in
its diagnosis, care, treatment and custody of R, and that its level of care
was below that of a reasonably prudent health-care provider. The state
filed a motion to strike the plaintiff’s complaint. The trial court granted
the motion, noting that its subject matter jurisdiction was predicated
on the claim’s character as a medical malpractice claim, and that the
claim failed in light of the holding in this court’s decision in Jarmie v.
Troncale (306 Conn. 578) that a medical malpractice action can be
brought only by a patient against a health-care provider. The trial court
also noted that, even if the complaint could be construed as asserting
a common-law negligence claim, the court would lack subject matter
jurisdiction because there was no basis for finding that the claims com-
missioner authorized a negligence claim. The trial court granted the
plaintiff’s motion for judgment in favor of the state and rendered judg-
ment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed, claiming that Jarmie
did not control because she was alleging medical negligence, and there
was no meaningful difference between her negligence claim and the
medical malpractice claim presented to and authorized by the claims
commissioner. Held that the trial court properly granted the defendant’s
motion to strike the complaint, as that court lacked jurisdiction over
the plaintiff’s action: it was undisputed that the woman on whose behalf
the action was brought was not a patient of the state, and, because
there is no legally cognizable cause of action in Connecticut for medical
malpractice by a nonpatient against a health-care provider, and the claim
presented to and authorized by the claims commissioner was solely one
of medical malpractice, the plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim was
barred by Jarmie; moreover, even if the plaintiff’s claim was construed
as sounding in negligence, the trial court would have lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to consider such a claim, as the claims commission-
er’s waiver of sovereign immunity on behalf of the state was for a claim
of medical malpractice rather than negligence.
Argued November 16, 2017—officially released August 14, 2018
Procedural History
Action to recover damages for the wrongful death of
the plaintiff’s decedent as a result of the defendant’s
alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where
the court, Elgo, J., granted the defendant’s motion to
strike; thereafter, the court, Shapiro, J., granted the
plaintiff’s motion for judgment and rendered judgment
for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed.
Affirmed.
Steven L. Seligman, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Nicole A. Demers, assistant attorney general, with
whom were Linsley Barbato, assistant attorney general,
and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney general, and
Michael R. Bullers, assistant attorney general, for the
appellee (defendant).
Opinion
KAHN, J. The sole question presented in this appeal
is whether an action authorized by the claims commis-
sioner, limited to medical malpractice, may survive a
motion to strike where the plaintiff was not a patient
of the defendant, as required by Jarmie v. Troncale,
306 Conn. 578, 587, 50 A.3d 802 (2012). The plaintiff,
Jill K. Levin, administratrix of the estate of Margaret
Rohner (decedent), appeals1 from the judgment ren-
dered in favor of the defendant, the state of Connecticut,
after the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to
strike. The plaintiff argues that Jarmie does not control
in the present case because she is not alleging medical
malpractice but, rather, ‘‘medical negligence,’’ resulting
from the care, treatment, and custody of a patient, and
from a failure to warn the decedent of the patient’s
dangerous propensities. Simultaneously, the plaintiff
asserts that there is no meaningful difference between
her negligence claim and the medical malpractice claim
presented to, and authorized by, the claims commis-
sioner. The defendant counters that the trial court prop-
erly struck the plaintiff’s claim under Jarmie, because
it is a medical malpractice action filed by a nonpatient
plaintiff. Alternatively, the defendant contends that,
even if the plaintiff’s claim is one sounding in negli-
gence, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because the claims commissioner granted permission
to bring an action only for medical malpractice. We
agree with the defendant and affirm the trial court’s
judgment in favor of the defendant rendered following
the granting of the defendant’s motion to strike.
The following procedural background is relevant to
our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff alleges that
Robert O. Rankin fatally attacked and stabbed the dece-
dent, Rankin’s mother, while on an approved home visit
from River Valley Services (River Valley), a residential
mental health-care facility operated by the Department
of Mental Health and Addiction Services. The plaintiff
thereafter filed a notice of claim with the Office of the
Claims Commissioner, seeking permission to bring an
action against the defendant for medical malpractice
based on mental health services and treatment given
to Rankin. The claims commissioner thereafter issued
his finding and order, granting permission to the plain-
tiff to bring an action against the defendant under Gen-
eral Statutes § 4-160 (b).2 The order specified that ‘‘[t]his
grant of permission to sue is limited to that portion of
the ‘claim alleging malpractice against the [defendant],
a state hospital or a sanitarium or against a physician,
surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor, or all other
licensed
health-care
providers
employed
by
the
[defendant].’ ’’
The plaintiff subsequently brought this action, alleg-
ing that River Valley was negligent in its diagnosis, care,
treatment, and custody of Rankin, and that its level of
care was below that of a reasonably prudent health-
care provider. Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that
River Valley failed to secure psychiatric hospitalization
for Rankin despite being aware of his emotional deterio-
ration, allowed Rankin to visit the decedent unsuper-
vised despite knowing that he was acting in an
increasingly threatening manner toward her, reassured
the decedent that it was safe to have Rankin visit despite
knowing otherwise, and failed to warn the decedent
that Rankin posed a threat to her safety.
The defendant filed a motion to strike the complaint,
contending that Connecticut does not recognize medi-
cal malpractice claims brought by nonpatient third par-
ties. The trial court granted the motion to strike,
observing in its memorandum of decision that ‘‘the
plaintiff’s argument suffers from a dual dilemma.’’ First,
the trial court noted that its ‘‘subject matter jurisdiction
is predicated on the claim’s character as a medical
malpractice action, which then fails in light of . . .
Jarmie. Second, even if the complaint could be con-
strued as a common-law negligence action, then the
court would be forced to consider and ultimately deter-
mine that it is without subject matter jurisdiction
[because] there is no basis for finding that the [c]laims
[c]ommissioner specifically authorized it as such.’’ Fol-
lowing the trial court’s ruling granting the motion to
strike, the plaintiff sought to appeal rather than file a
new pleading. Thus, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-
44, the plaintiff moved for judgment in favor of the
defendant on the stricken complaint. Accordingly, the
trial court rendered judgment for the defendant. This
appeal followed.
The issue presented is whether Jarmie prohibits an
action, limited by the claims commissioner to medical
malpractice, where the plaintiff was not a patient of
the defendant. We begin by setting forth the standard of
review, which in the context of ‘‘an appeal challenging
a trial court’s granting of a motion to strike is well
established. A motion to strike challenges the legal suffi-
ciency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no
factual findings by the trial court. As a result, our review
of the court’s ruling is plenary. . . . We take the facts
to be those alleged in the [pleading] that has been
stricken and we construe the [pleading] in the manner
most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jarmie v. Troncale,
supra, 306 Conn. 583.
‘‘We have long held that because [a] determination
regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a
question of law, our review is plenary. . . . Moreover,
[i]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and
review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any
time. . . . Subject matter jurisdiction involves the
authority of the court to adjudicate the type of contro-
versy presented by the action before it. . . . [A] court
lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over
which it is without jurisdiction . . . . The subject mat-
ter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any
party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court
sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including
on appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ajadi
v. Commissioner of Correction, 280 Conn. 514, 532–33,
911 A.2d 712 (2006).
The limitation that the claims commissioner placed
on his authorization of the plaintiff’s action—restricting
that authorization to the plaintiff’s medical malpractice
claim—created a quandary for the plaintiff. On the one
hand, Connecticut does not permit medical malpractice
actions to be brought by a nonpatient against a health-
care provider. See Jarmie v. Troncale, supra, 306 Conn.
587. On the other hand, the plaintiff did not receive
authorization to pursue a general negligence claim.
In Jarmie, this court held that ’’a cause of action
alleging medical malpractice must be brought by a
patient against a health care provider because the lan-
guage of the statute specifically provides that the
alleged negligence must have occurred in the care or
treatment of the claimant.’’ (Emphasis in original; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Thus, there is no
legally cognizable cause of action in Connecticut for
medical malpractice by a nonpatient against a health-
care provider.
The present case is exactly the sort of nonpatient
medical malpractice action that Jarmie forbids. It is
undisputed that the decedent was not the defendant’s
patient. That the plaintiff’s claim sounds in medical
malpractice is evident from the way the claim was pre-
sented to, and authorized by, the claims commissioner.
First, in her notice of claim to the claims commissioner,
the plaintiff described the basis of the claim as ‘‘medical
malpractice.’’ Second, the plaintiff filed the notice of
claim pursuant to § 4-160 (b), together with the requisite
certificate of good faith. The plaintiff’s decision to file
under that subsection of the statute is notable because
§ 4-160 (b) governs claims of ‘‘malpractice against the
state,’’ and requires the claims commissioner to ‘‘autho-
rize suit’’ if a certificate of good faith is filed. By con-
trast, if the plaintiff had intended to bring an action
against the defendant for negligence, she would have
filed a notice of claim pursuant to § 4-160 (a). Section
4-160 (a) gives the claims commissioner discretion to
‘‘authorize suit against the state on any claim [that]
. . . presents an issue of law or fact under which the
state, were it a private person, could be liable,’’ assum-
ing that the action is deemed ‘‘just and equitable’’ by
the claims commissioner.3 That is, § 4-106 (a) governs,
inter alia, claims sounding in common-law negligence
that are brought against the state. Thus, the plaintiff
designated the action as one of medical malpractice,
by filing a notice of claim and good faith certificate
pursuant to the subsection governing medical malprac-
tice actions, § 4-160 (b), rather than the subsection gov-
erning negligence actions, § 4-160 (a).
Accordingly, the claims commissioner understood
the plaintiff to be bringing a medical malpractice action
and authorized it as such. This is evident in the claims
commissioner’s order permitting the plaintiff to bring
an action pursuant to § 4-160 (b), ‘‘limited to that portion
of the ‘claim alleging malpractice against the [defen-
dant], a state hospital or a sanitarium or against a physi-
cian, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor, or all
other licensed health care providers employed by the
state.’ ’’4 Therefore, the claim presented to, and author-
ized by, the claims commissioner was solely one of
medical malpractice, which is barred by Jarmie.
If the plaintiff’s action does not sound in medical
malpractice but, rather, negligence, as the plaintiff
asserts, then the trial court lacked subject matter juris-
diction over the claim.5 ‘‘It is well established that,
[w]hen the doctrine of sovereign immunity is applica-
ble, the state must consent to be sued in order for a
claimant to pursue any monetary claim against the state.
. . . The claims commissioner may waive that immu-
nity pursuant to . . . § 4-160 (a) and consent to suit,
but until that occurs, the Superior Court has no jurisdic-
tion to hear any such monetary claim.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Chief Information Officer v.
Computers Plus Center, Inc., 310 Conn. 60, 91, 74 A.3d
1242 (2013). ‘‘Thus, a claimant who seeks to bring an
action for monetary damages against the state must
first obtain authorization from the claims commis-
sioner. . . . [T]he Superior Court does not have the
authority to waive sovereign immunity on behalf of the
state . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
91–92. Furthermore, ‘‘[a]ny statutory waiver of immu-
nity must be narrowly construed . . . and its scope
must be confined strictly to the extent the statute pro-
vides.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housatonic
Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services,
301 Conn. 268, 289, 21 A.3d 759 (2011). In the present
case, the waiver granted by the claims commissioner
was for a claim of medical malpractice only. Therefore,
the Superior Court would have lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to consider a negligence claim6 because
it would have been beyond the scope of the action
authorized by the claims commissioner under § 4-160
(b).
The plaintiff attempts to resolve this dilemma by
arguing that there was no material variance between
the claim presented to the claims commissioner and
the negligence claim actually brought. We reject this
theory. For the reasons previously discussed, the claim
presented to, and authorized by, the claims commis-
sioner was one of medical malpractice, which is distinct
from the negligence claim the plaintiff now claims she
is maintaining.7
Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the
defendant’s motion to strike. Either the plaintiff’s claim
is one of medical malpractice by a nonpatient, in which
case it is barred by Jarmie, or it is a negligence claim
that the claims commissioner did not authorize, in
which case the trial court would not have subject matter
jurisdiction. It fails either way.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
* The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
1 The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate
Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General
Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
2 General Statutes § 4-160 (b) provides: ‘‘In any claim alleging malpractice
against the state, a state hospital or against a physician, surgeon, dentist,
podiatrist, chiropractor or other licensed health care provider employed by
the state, the attorney or party filing the claim may submit a certificate of
good faith to the Office of the Claims Commissioner in accordance with
section 52-190a. If such a certificate is submitted, the Claims Commissioner
shall authorize suit against the state on such claim.’’
We note that although § 4-160 has been amended by the legislature since
the events underlying the present case; see Public Acts 2016, No. 16-127,
§ 19; that amendment has no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the
interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
3 Thus, § 4-160 (b) presents a marked departure from the discretion
afforded to the claims commissioner under § 4-160 (a). Indeed, ‘‘the effect
of § 4-160 (b) was to deprive the claims commissioner of his broad discre-
tionary decision-making power to authorize suit against the state in cases
where a claimant has brought a medical malpractice claim and filed a
certificate of good faith. Instead, § 4-160 (b) requires the claims commis-
sioner to authorize suit in all such cases. In other words, the effect of the
statute was to convert a limited waiver of sovereign immunity to medical
malpractice claims, subject to the discretion of the claims commissioner,
to a more expansive waiver subject only to the claimant’s compliance with
certain procedural requirements.’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.)
D’Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 622, 872 A.2d 408 (2005). Thus, in the
present case, the plaintiff could have sought permission to bring an action
pursuant to § 4-160 (a), but the authority to bring the action would have
been subject to the discretion of the claims commissioner. By filing pursuant
to the requirements of § 4-160 (b), the plaintiff bypassed this discretion, but
the result was authorization to bring an action limited to medical malpractice
as dictated by that statutory subsection.
4 Although the claims commissioner’s use of qualifying language—the
phrase ‘‘limited to that portion of the ‘claim alleging malpractice’ ’’—might
suggest that he thought that the plaintiff’s filing included claims other than
malpractice, our review of the record does not support that conclusion.
5 Given our conclusions that (1) this claim is one of medical malpractice,
and (2) the trial court would not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider
the merits of a negligence claim, we need not address the plaintiff’s argu-
ments supporting the substantive merits of such a claim, including her
comparison of the present case to Fraser v. United States, 236 Conn. 625,
674 A.2d 811 (1996). Fraser addressed the duty of psychotherapists to control
outpatients in the context of negligence jurisprudence. Id., 629–30.
6 The plaintiff asserts that the trial court improperly considered this lack
of subject matter jurisdiction in the context of a motion to strike, because
that evaluation goes beyond the legal sufficiency of the complaint and
is therefore within the purview of a motion to dismiss. This argument is
unpersuasive for two reasons. First, ‘‘[t]he subject matter jurisdiction
requirement . . . may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any
stage of the proceedings, including on appeal.’’ (Emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 280
Conn. 533. Indeed, ‘‘[a] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a
case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . .’’ Id. Second, the trial court
granted the motion to strike because of its conclusion that the medical
malpractice claim was barred by Jarmie, and specifically did not rule on
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. It merely observed that were the
claim to be construed as a medical negligence claim, as the plaintiff asserts,
‘‘the court would be forced to consider and ultimately determine that it is
without subject matter jurisdiction . . . .’’
7 The plaintiff’s argument that the claims commissioner was cognizant of
the negligence claim because he was apprised of the facts and theory on
which the plaintiff would proceed is completely undercut by the plaintiff’s
own submission to the claims commissioner, which characterized this claim
as one of medical malpractice.