Title: People v. Morelos
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S051968
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 11, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
VALDAMIR FRED MORELOS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S051968 
 
Santa Clara County Superior Court 
169362 
 
 
August 11, 2022 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, 
Jenkins, and Guerrero concurred. 
 
Justice Liu filed a dissenting opinion. 
1 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
S051968 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
Following a bench trial, Valdamir Fred Morelos was 
convicted of Kurt Anderson’s first degree murder.  (Pen. Code,1 
§ 187.)  The trial court found true that Morelos used a firearm 
in the commission of the murder (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 1203.06) 
and that three special circumstance allegations applied:  murder 
in the commission or attempted commission of robbery (§ 190.2, 
subd. (a)(17)(A)); murder in the commission or attempted 
commission of specified sexual acts (sodomy and oral copulation) 
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(7)(D), (F)); and intentional murder involving 
the infliction of torture (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)).  The trial court 
further found true two prior serious felony enhancements (§ 667, 
subd. (a)) and two prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5).   
After a penalty phase bench trial, the trial court returned 
a verdict of death, and imposed that sentence.  The court also 
imposed a consecutive prison term of 15 years, consisting of five 
years each for the firearm and two prior serious felony 
enhancements.  The sentences for the prior prison terms under 
section 667.5, subdivisions (a) (three-year enhancement) and (b) 
(one-year enhancement) were stayed pursuant to section 654.  
This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).) 
 
1  
All further undesignated statutory references are to the 
Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
 
We affirm the trial court’s guilt determination, except as 
modified to strike the prior prison term enhancement under 
section 667.5, subdivision (b).  We affirm the judgment of death.  
The prison sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for 
the trial court to consider whether to exercise its newly 
conferred discretion under Senate Bill Nos. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. 
Sess.) and 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) to strike the firearm and 
prior serious felony enhancements, respectively. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Guilt Phase Evidence 
Morelos waived jury at both the guilt and penalty phases.  
The guilt phase of the bench trial commenced on January 3, 
1996.  The prosecution presented evidence that Morelos forcibly 
sodomized, tortured, and murdered Anderson.  Morelos, 
representing himself, testified at the guilt phase.   
Neal Picklesimer, Morelos’s former roommate, testified 
that, on October 17, 1992, he picked Morelos up from the Arena 
Hotel in San Jose, where Morelos was staying.  The two went to 
several gay bars in San Jose:  Renegades, Gregg’s, Bucks, and 
Tinker’s Damn.  About an hour before closing time, the two left 
Tinker’s Damn and went back to Renegades.  Before Picklesimer 
left the bar, Morelos and Picklesimer made plans to get together 
the next day to see the air show at Moffett Field.  On October 
18, 1992, Picklesimer and Morelos attended the air show and 
Picklesimer dropped Morelos back off at the Arena Hotel 
between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.   
Morelos testified that, after Picklesimer dropped him off 
at the Arena Hotel, he went to Renegades with the goal of 
robbing someone to obtain transportation and money.  He was 
armed with two firearms, a .45 and a .38, as well as a knife.  
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
 
Morelos met Anderson at Renegades and told Anderson he 
wanted to show him something.  Morelos took Anderson to an 
enclosed area, showed him the guns, and told Anderson to leave 
with him.  Morelos testified that he intended to get as much 
money as he could out of Anderson and stated that Anderson 
owed him about $40.  Morelos had Anderson drive him to the 
Arena Hotel, where he then took the keys to Anderson’s Jeep 
and led Anderson back to his room.  Morelos instructed 
Anderson to take his clothes off, then gagged and tied Anderson 
up using the sheets and towels from the hotel room.  Morelos 
took Anderson’s wallet, watch, and ATM card.  Then Morelos 
sexually assaulted Anderson for approximately 45 minutes, 
penetrating his anus and mouth and forcing Anderson to orally 
copulate him.  Morelos testified that he tied Anderson’s hands 
behind his back and kept a knife drawn against Anderson in 
case Anderson tried to assault him.   
Several hours later, Morelos hog-tied Anderson’s feet and 
hands together and then used a strip of cloth to tie Anderson’s 
feet to his neck.  Morelos tied another piece of cloth around 
Anderson’s neck and secured that to the ceiling fan.  Then 
Morelos tied strips of cloth around Anderson’s testicles and tied 
them to the ceiling fan in order to inflict extreme pain to force 
Anderson to give him the correct personal identification number 
for his ATM card.  After getting Anderson’s personal 
identification 
number, 
Morelos 
gagged 
and 
blindfolded 
Anderson and left the hotel room. 
Morelos testified that he briefly left Anderson in the hotel 
room to access a nearby ATM machine.  Although Anderson had 
two accounts, a checking and a savings account, both were low 
on funds and Morelos ultimately did not bother wasting his time 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
 
to get money out of the accounts.  He was extremely angry when 
he found out Anderson did not have any money.   
Morelos went back to the hotel room, took the gag and 
blindfold off Anderson, then yanked the bindings on Anderson’s 
neck and testicles while questioning and hitting Anderson.  
Anderson said the money in his bank accounts must have gone 
to rent through automatic transfer.  Morelos testified that he 
was then done with Anderson, so at around 4:00 a.m. on October 
19th, Morelos dressed Anderson in a pair of jeans and a T-shirt, 
walked him outside, and then down to the Jeep.  Armed with the 
three guns and extra ammunition, Morelos drove Anderson up 
to Mount Hamilton Road.  Morelos told Anderson he was going 
to tie Anderson to a tree and leave him there.  When Morelos 
found a bushy, camouflaged area, he directed Anderson in that 
direction then told him to stop.  Morelos explained to Anderson 
that he was not going to tie Anderson to a tree so that Anderson 
would believe he was going to be set free.  Then Morelos shot 
Anderson in the head.  Morelos testified that the gunshot did 
not kill Anderson; he fell down but was still alive.  So Morelos 
shot him again, but the second shot did not kill Anderson.  
Morelos left Anderson there, reasoning that he would die 
eventually. 
Morelos’s sister testified that, at approximately 6:00 a.m. 
on October 19, 1992, Morelos drove to her house in a brown Jeep 
and told her that he had shot and killed someone.  He told her 
that he had been in a motel with a man, tied him up, tied 
something around the man’s genitals, and tied him to a ceiling 
fan.  At first she did not believe him but then he showed her a 
handgun.  Morelos told his sister that he had two guns, money, 
and the Jeep belonging to the man he killed.  Morelos also told 
her that he shot the man behind the head somewhere up in the 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
 
hills where they would never find the body.  His sister, a 
probationer, told Morelos that she was expecting a visit from her 
probation officer and instructed him to leave.   
According to Picklesimer’s testimony, Morelos then called 
Picklesimer and asked if he could stay with Picklesimer for a 
while and Picklesimer agreed.  When Picklesimer got home that 
night, Morelos was spray painting a Jeep black.  Morelos told 
Picklesimer that he had picked up someone at a bar the night 
before, went back to his hotel room and had sex with him.  
Morelos described tying this person up, tying him to a ceiling 
fan, taking his ATM card and trying to get money from the ATM 
card.  Morelos said that early the next morning he untied the 
man from the ropes and tied his hands behind his back, then 
took him in the Jeep up into the hills.  Morelos told Picklesimer 
that the man was crying and pleading for his life and that 
Morelos shot him in the head.  The man fell to the ground but 
was still alive, so Morelos shot him again.  Morelos showed 
Picklesimer three guns he had in his possession:  a .45 automatic 
pistol, a .357 revolver, and a small revolver.  He also showed 
Picklesimer a Halston watch that Morelos said belonged to the 
man.   
The next morning, on October 20, 1992, Picklesimer called 
Menlo Park Police to report what Morelos had told him.  An 
officer spoke with Picklesimer and then told him that the Santa 
Clara Police Department had jurisdiction.  Picklesimer spoke 
with Sergeant Zaragoza at the Santa Clara Police Department 
and did a drive by of his home with officers.  Officers waited 
outside Picklesimer’s house and Morelos was arrested when he 
returned to Picklesimer’s home in the Jeep.  When officers 
searched Morelos at booking they found an ATM card with the 
name of Kurt Anderson.   
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
 
Before interviewing Morelos, law enforcement officers 
informed him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 
384 U.S. 436.  Morelos waived his rights and signed a Miranda 
waiver.  His confession was audio and video recorded.  Portions 
of the videotaped confession and the audio tapes of Morelos’s 
interview were played at trial.  Morelos directed officers to the 
site of the murder, approximately six miles southeast of Alum 
Rock Avenue on Mount Hamilton Road.  There, officers 
recovered Anderson’s body.  Officers found .45-caliber cartridge 
casings and slugs near Anderson’s body.   
Forensic 
pathologist 
Dr. 
Parviz 
Pakdaman, 
who 
performed the autopsy on Anderson, testified that there was 
bruising on the shaft of Anderson’s penis and on his scrotum.  
He further testified that a hard projectile entered Anderson’s 
head and caused massive destruction to his brain.  Soot and 
powder surrounded the entrance wound, indicating that the 
projectile was fired from a very close range, less than one inch 
from the skull.   
Morelos testified as to his prior convictions.  He was 
convicted in 1988 of robbery (§ 211) and first degree burglary 
(§§ 459, 460.1), for which he was sentenced to five years four 
months in prison.  Morelos was also convicted of assault with a 
deadly weapon and infliction of great bodily injury for a stabbing 
he committed in the California Youth Authority (CYA) and was 
sentenced to three years in prison.   
The trial court found Morelos guilty of the first degree 
murder of Anderson, and found true the personal use of a 
firearm allegation.  The court also found true the special 
circumstance, 
prior 
conviction, 
and 
prior 
prison 
term 
allegations.   
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
 
B.  Penalty Phase Evidence 
The penalty phase bench trial commenced on January 10, 
1996.   
The People called several witnesses to testify.  John E. 
testified regarding an incident with Morelos that occurred on or 
about March 9, 1988.  John E. and Morelos had been in a 
relationship and living together and Morelos wanted another 
man to move into their trailer.  John E. refused and Morelos 
assaulted John E., hitting him in the face repeatedly.  John E. 
required over 300 stitches for the injuries Morelos caused.  
Morelos stole money from John E. and the friend John E. was 
staying with, and also stole John E.’s television.  John E. 
reported the incident to the police and Morelos was eventually 
convicted of robbery and first degree burglary.   
Thomas S. testified that Morelos hit him over the head 
with a baseball bat, causing a concussion and eight lacerations 
that each required six to 14 stitches.  Harold T. also testified 
that Morelos picked up the bat and hit Thomas S., splitting his 
head open.  The assault was not prosecuted.   
Timothy F. testified that Morelos offered to orally copulate 
him and, when he refused, Morelos threatened him with a knife 
and told him that he had “raped guys before” and would do it 
again.   
R.G., a San Jose Police Sergeant, testified that Morelos 
shot at him and his partner in 1977, when Morelos was about 16 
years old.   
Robert  L. testified that he rented a room from Morelos’s 
mother in 1992.  Morelos forcibly sodomized Robert L. and did 
so with several guns within his reach.   
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
 
Kenneth M. testified that Morelos nearly hit him while 
driving a getaway vehicle for a woman who had shoplifted from 
the store where Kenneth M. worked as security.  Morelos drove 
the vehicle directly towards Kenneth M. and attempted to run 
him down.  Had Kenneth M. not jumped behind a pole, Morelos 
would have hit him with the vehicle.   
James C. testified that Morelos sexually assaulted him in 
1992.  Morelos stripped him of his clothes and locked him in his 
bedroom for six hours.  Morelos hit James C. in the face and 
twisted his arm behind his back, threatening to break it.  
Morelos forcibly sodomized James C. and forced James C. to 
orally copulate him.  Morelos later went to James C.’s home and 
demanded that he return a clock.  Morelos repeatedly 
threatened to kill James C. 
Morelos only called one witness to testify before his own 
testimony.  He recalled John E. to the stand, for whom he had 
previously reserved cross-examination.  Morelos elicited 
testimony about an incident between himself and a person 
nicknamed “Danger” that occurred in the garage at John E.’s 
grandmother’s house.  John E. witnessed Morelos and Danger 
sparring in the garage before leaving the two alone.  The next 
day, Morelos told John E. he had forced himself on Danger.  John 
E. also confirmed that his trailer was broken into after the 
assault by Morelos about which he had previously testified.  
John E. also remembered Morelos selling drugs at the Arena 
Hotel. 
Morelos testified and provided a narrative history of his 
life, describing running away from home as a child, the marital 
problems between his mother and her husband, his father’s 
drinking problems, and his time in juvenile hall, on juvenile 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
 
probation, and at the CYA.  Morelos further testified to 
assaulting a former boyfriend, Anthony Z., committing robberies 
and armed robberies around Sacramento, and sexually 
assaulting other inmates at the CYA.  Although it went beyond 
the scope of his direct testimony, on cross-examination Morelos 
testified about forcibly sodomizing a man in Oregon while armed 
with a .38-caliber gun.  He further testified that he killed two 
people in Oregon in preparation for the murders he planned to 
commit in San Jose.  The court excluded the alleged Oregon 
murders and all evidence upon which there was no evidence 
presented by the actual victims of the particular offenses.   
Weighing the relevant factors, the court concluded the 
factors in aggravation substantially outweighed the factors in 
mitigation.  Based on the totality of the evidence, the facts 
presented, and the testimony of the witnesses, the court 
determined the appropriate penalty was death.  The court also 
sentenced Morelos to a consecutive prison term of 15 years, 
consisting of five years for each of his prior serious felony 
enhancements and five years for the firearm enhancement.  The 
court stayed the punishment for his prison priors pursuant to 
section 654.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Defendant’s Exercise of his Sixth Amendment 
Right To Represent Himself at the Guilt and 
Penalty Phases  
Morelos contends the trial court erred when it granted his 
motion to represent himself at his capital trial.  Morelos claims 
the right to self-representation recognized in Faretta v. 
California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta) does not apply in 
capital cases.  He further asserts that the trial court erred by 
failing to revoke his pro se status at the penalty phase, and that 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
 
the trial court’s failure to provide him counsel violated his Sixth 
and Eighth Amendment rights under the federal Constitution 
such that his conviction, special circumstance findings, and 
death sentence must be reversed.   
1.  Background 
The Santa Clara Public Defender’s Office was appointed 
to represent Morelos on October 23, 1992.  The first amended 
complaint charged Morelos in Count 1 with first degree murder 
with malice aforethought and alleged Morelos personally used a 
firearm in the commission of the crime.  It also alleged three 
special circumstances:  murder in the course of a felony; murder 
in the commission of sodomy and oral copulation; and 
intentional 
murder 
involving 
the 
infliction 
of 
torture.  
Represented by counsel, Morelos entered a plea of not guilty as 
to all charges on November 30, 1992.   
On January 16, 1993, Morelos requested a hearing under 
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 to replace his counsel.  
The municipal court denied the request on February 22, 1993 
after a hearing on the matter.  On June 14, 1993, Morelos 
requested a second Marsden hearing.  This matter was 
continued when the municipal court requested an evaluation of 
Morelos to determine whether any evidence of mental 
incompetence might lead to doubt pursuant to section 1368; the 
court appointed Dr. Robert Burr to conduct the examination.  
Based on Dr. Burr’s recommendation and the representations of 
defense counsel, the municipal court declared a doubt as to 
Morelos’s competency on August 23, 1993.  The municipal court 
suspended proceedings, appointed Dr. David Echeandia to 
evaluate Morelos, and certified Morelos to superior court for a 
hearing and examination to determine his competency.  On 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
 
September 22, 1993, the superior court found Morelos 
competent and remanded him back to municipal court for 
further hearings. 
On October 4, 1993, Morelos notified the judge that he 
wanted to withdraw his Marsden motion.  Defense counsel 
explained that she understood that Morelos wished to withdraw 
the Marsden motion, waive his right to a preliminary hearing, 
plead guilty, and proceed to the penalty phase.  Defense counsel 
explained that her “conflict” with Morelos came down to her 
refusal to agree to Morelos entering a guilty plea.  Counsel 
argued that section 1018, which prohibits a capital defendant 
from pleading guilty without the consent of counsel, precluded 
Morelos from proceeding in the manner he desired.  The court 
encouraged the parties to brief the section 1018 issue and set 
the matter for a hearing.   
Defense counsel submitted a brief arguing that under 
section 1018 and People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739 (Chadd), 
a defendant is barred from pleading guilty in a capital case 
unless defense counsel agrees.  After the court ruled that 
Morelos could not plead guilty because his counsel would not 
consent, Morelos agreed to proceed to a preliminary hearing.  
Morelos was represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing, 
which began on December 13, 1993.   
On July 19, 1995, Morelos filed a petition to proceed in 
propria persona, relying on Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at page 806.  
The trial court heard Morelos’s motion the same day.  At the 
hearing, Morelos affirmed that he wished to represent himself.  
He affirmed that his motion was not due to any feeling that he 
was being denied effective representation of counsel.  And he 
testified that he understood he had a right to a public and 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
 
speedy trial and trial by jury.  The trial court stated, “I’m sure 
that everybody, including your lawyer, and I don’t know your 
family or — certainly I’d like to add my strong urging to you to 
utilize an attorney that has been appointed to represent you.  
You’re not in a position where you’re finding any fault with the 
particular attorney that you have, but for whatever value, again, 
it is for me to state, the particular attorney you have is one that 
is highly experienced, well-regarded, competent, and totally — 
and I’m speaking for you now, Mr. Cavagnaro, I assume you’re 
ready, willing, and able to represent the defendant in these 
proceedings.”  The court informed Morelos that he would not 
receive any special consideration from the court, the judge 
assigned to his case would treat him the same as an individual 
represented by an attorney, and would hold him to the same 
standard of conduct and the same knowledge of the law.  
Morelos responded that he understood.  Additionally, the court 
emphasized that Morelos’s decision to represent himself “could 
not be of a more serious nature” since the charges “are as serious 
as they can be under the law.”  In his petition to proceed in 
propria persona, Morelos indicated his understanding that the 
prosecutor was seeking the death penalty, and the minimum 
sentence was life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  
Morelos confirmed his understanding and with that knowledge 
still requested the court authorize him to represent himself.    
The court then inquired whether the prosecution or 
defense counsel had any evidence that Morelos lacked the 
mental capacity to reach his decision freely and voluntarily.  The 
prosecutor responded he had no information from any source 
that would indicate Morelos was not competent to represent 
himself.  And defense counsel cited the examinations conducted 
by Drs. Echeandia and Burr assessing Morelos’s competency to 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
 
stand trial.  Both doctors opined that Morelos was competent, 
and the trial court found him competent to stand trial.  Having 
met with Morelos on numerous occasions, defense counsel 
testified that he believed Morelos was competent to stand trial 
and to represent himself as required by Godinez v. Moran (1993) 
509 U.S. 389. 
The court then stated it had reviewed the applicable law 
and determined there was no legal impediment to granting 
Morelos pro per status.  But the court stated:  “I do this with 
extreme reluctance, and I’m urging you and I’ll be happy, if you 
wish me to do so, to continue this matter to allow you further 
reflection on the issue, but it is most likely that once this 
decision is made it may well be irrevocable absent some showing 
that I’m not able to make at this time.  But if you would like me 
to continue this matter to allow you to think further on the 
gravity of the act I’ll be happy to do so, or do you wish me to 
grant this petition at this time?”  Morelos responded:  “Yes.  I 
wish you to grant it right now, please.”  The prosecutor then 
asked Morelos if he understood that by representing himself he 
faced a “very strong likelihood of being convicted” and of facing 
the death penalty.  Morelos responded “yes” and confirmed that 
he still desired to represent himself.  The court then granted the 
motion, finding that Morelos had made a sufficient showing that 
he was competent to represent himself and aware of the 
consequences of that decision.   
2.  Analysis 
A defendant has a federal constitutional right to the 
assistance of counsel during all critical stages of a criminal 
prosecution.  (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 807; People v. Mickel 
(2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 205 (Mickel).)  A defendant may 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
 
nonetheless waive that right, as long as the waiver is timely and 
valid.  (Mickel, at p. 205; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 
1219–1220 (Bloom).)  “The requirements for a valid waiver of 
the right to counsel are (1) a determination that the accused is 
competent to waive the right, i.e., he or she has the mental 
capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings 
against him or her; and (2) a finding that the waiver is knowing 
and voluntary, i.e., the accused understands the significance 
and consequences of the decision and makes it without 
coercion.”  (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1069–1070.)  
We review a Faretta waiver de novo, examining the entire 
record to determine the validity of a defendant’s waiver.  (Id. at 
p. 1070.) 
Here, Morelos does not contend his request was untimely, 
nor does he argue that the record demonstrates it was equivocal, 
likely because the record shows Morelos explicitly affirmed that 
he understood his constitutional rights and his request was of 
his own volition.  The record shows that the trial court made 
clear to Morelos the risks of self-representation and Morelos — 
fully apprised of the possible dangers — requested the court 
grant his request immediately.   
Rather, Morelos contends more broadly that the right to 
self-representation must be limited to noncapital cases.  
According to Morelos, the Eighth Amendment requires 
substantive and procedural safeguards for capital defendants 
and that assistance of counsel is one such procedural protection.  
Permitting a capital defendant to represent himself or herself at 
a capital trial, he asserts, presents too much of a risk that any 
resulting death penalty will be imposed in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner, rendering it unreliable.  Morelos’s theory is 
that the right to self-representation must yield in favor of the 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
 
state’s interest in the integrity of a capital trial, so the trial court 
erred by permitting him to represent himself at his capital trial.  
Morelos further asserts that the trial court erred when it failed 
to revoke his pro se status at the penalty phase. 
We have previously contemplated and rejected similar 
claims and we do so again here.  As Morelos concedes, our case 
law makes clear that Faretta applies in capital cases.  We have 
consistently held that the Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation is not limited to defense during the guilt phase 
of trial, but also extends to the penalty phase of a capital trial.  
(People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 865; People v. Blair 
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 736–737 (Blair); People v. Bradford 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1364; Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at 
pp. 1222–1224.)  We decline Morelos’s invitation to reconsider 
our case law on this point.   
B.  Defendant’s Waiver of Counsel in Violation of 
Section 686.1 
For similar reasons, Morelos asserts that his death verdict 
must be reversed because section 686.1 requires that defendants 
in capital cases be represented by counsel.  Although Morelos 
acknowledges our precedent that section 686.1 may only be 
applied where Faretta is not implicated, he nonetheless argues 
that we should “now give effect to section 686.1.” 
Section 686.1 requires defendants in capital cases “be 
represented by counsel during all stages of the preliminary and 
trial proceedings.”  Enacted by the Legislature in 1971, section 
686.1 predates the United States Supreme Court’s 1975 decision 
in Faretta.  When the Legislature adopted section 686.1, it found 
“that persons representing themselves cause unnecessary 
delays in the trials of charges against them; that trials are 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
 
extended by such persons representing themselves; and that 
orderly trial procedures are disrupted.  Self-representation 
places a heavy burden upon the administration of criminal 
justice without any advantages accruing to those persons who 
desire to represent themselves.”  (Stats. 1971, ch. 1800, § 6, 
p. 3898; see People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 519, 526.)  But 
California law is subject to the United States Constitution and 
the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation.  We have 
held that section 686.1 can only be given effect when it is not 
inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation established in Faretta.  (Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th 
at p. 209; People v. Burgener (2016) 1 Cal.5th 461, 474; Johnson, 
at p. 526.)  Morelos provides no persuasive reason to revisit our 
prior holdings on this issue. 
C.  Denial of Defendant’s Request for Advisory 
Counsel 
Morelos claims the trial court erred in denying his request 
for advisory counsel.  Representing himself, Morelos filed an 
application for “assistant counsel,” and now argues that the trial 
court’s failure to exercise its discretion to grant or deny his 
request was error.  He asserts that a ruling to deny his request 
for advisory counsel would have been an abuse of discretion, so 
reversal is required, and his sentence must be set aside. 
1.  Background 
 
After the trial court granted Morelos’s Faretta motion on 
July 19, 1995, he represented himself in proceedings throughout 
the subsequent five months.  On December 8, 1995, Morelos filed 
an application to appoint “assistant counsel” as a “second 
attorney,” citing Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424 
(Keenan) and section 987, subdivision (d).  The court scheduled 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
 
a hearing for December 20, 1995 to place the matter on the 
record and permit Morelos to further amplify his request.  At the 
hearing, the court explained that it understood that Morelos’s 
motion was seeking “what is commonly called Keenan counsel,” 
which the court described as a form of “extra help” that “is not 
in any way to be construed as co-counsel or standby counsel.”  
Noting that Morelos had been represented by the public 
defender’s office, the court further explained that “since they 
apparently cannot claim a conflict of interest in this matter I am 
bound by law only to, in effect, appoint them.  I don’t have the 
ability to appoint extra — some conflicts attorney or someone 
else, so long as you’re legally able to be represented by the public 
defender’s office.”  The court then emphasized to Morelos “the 
problem I want to make sure you understand is that the public 
defender will not — I repeat not — agree to act in that capacity.”  
Morelos responded that he wanted “to have somebody in the 
capacity of adviser,” but “not really with the court, though.  I’m 
asking Judge Hastings for expert witnesses and psychologists 
and psychiatrists and —.”  The court interjected and explained:  
“Well, you see, those applications are properly before Judge 
Hastings, and this, of course, came to Judge Hastings and he 
sent it back to me because I granted your Faretta motion, and 
he thought that it was appropriate — and I agreed with him — 
that I would hear this application and try to explain to you 
what’s involved.  Because Keenan counsel is not a synonym for 
expert witnesses or investigation or anything of that nature.  It 
is solely limited — none of these are involved in your case.”   
The court further explained, “[t]he Keenan counsel that 
you’re requesting is simply not — it isn’t what you want.  It isn’t 
what you need.  And probably I don’t have the ability to comply 
with your request.”  Morelos then stated, “I would like to have it 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
 
withdrawn, then, withdraw the motion, if it’s —.”  And the court 
responded:  “Well, I can do that, Mr. Morelos.  I — again I’m 
trying to plead with you, I guess, to take advantage of what I 
believe to be fine representation that’s ready, willing, and able 
to aid you in this.”  Morelos represented himself at trial in both 
the guilt and penalty phases. 
2.  Analysis 
As an initial matter, it is important to clarify that neither 
Keenan nor section 987, subdivision (d) is implicated here.  
While Morelos cited both in his application to appoint “assistant 
counsel” and the trial court referenced “Keenan counsel,” 
Keenan is shorthand for section 987, subdivision (d)’s distinct 
authorization to a court to “appoint an additional attorney as a 
cocounsel upon a written request of the first attorney 
appointed.”  (Italics added; see Keenan, supra, 31 Cal.3d at 
p. 430.)  Since Morelos represented himself, he could not ask for 
a second appointed attorney.  (See People v. Moore (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 1104, 1122 (Moore) [“section 987, subdivision (d) does 
not apply when a defendant is proceeding in propria persona”]; 
ibid. [“A defendant proceeding in propria persona simply is not 
‘the first attorney appointed’ ”].)  Rather, Morelos asserts he was 
entitled to advisory counsel.  Advisory counsel, by contrast, is 
available to assist a pro se defendant, but does not represent the 
defendant.  (People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 692–693.)    
As we explained in People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 
833, 861 (Crandell), “California courts have discretion to 
appoint advisory counsel to assist an indigent defendant who 
elects self-representation.  (People v. Bigelow [(1984)] 37 Cal.3d 
731, 742.)  When a defendant requests appointment of advisory 
counsel, a court’s failure to exercise its discretion is serious error 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
 
and its denial of a request for advisory counsel in a capital case 
may constitute an abuse of discretion.  (Id. at p. 743.)  We held 
in Bigelow that failure to exercise discretion on a request for 
advisory counsel in circumstances where a refusal to grant the 
request would be an abuse of discretion requires automatic 
reversal of a resulting conviction because of the inherent 
difficulty in assessing prejudice.  (Id. at pp. 744–746.)”  If the 
failure to appoint counsel would not be an abuse of discretion, 
“the consequences of the error are properly assessed by 
employing 
the 
Watson 
harmless 
error 
standard.  
(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].)”  
(Crandell, at pp. 864–865.)  Applying Watson, we inquire 
whether it is “reasonably probable that different verdicts would 
have been returned had defendant received the assistance of 
advisory counsel.”  (Id. at p. 866.) 
The Attorney General asserts that Morelos withdrew his 
application for “assistant counsel.”  But before Morelos 
expressed his desire to withdraw the motion, the trial court 
stated, “probably I don’t have the ability to comply with your 
request.”  We will assume, without deciding, that the trial court 
had the authority to appoint the public defender as advisory 
counsel notwithstanding the public defender’s apparent 
representation that he would refuse such appointment.  Further 
assuming that the trial court erroneously failed to recognize its 
discretion to grant Morelos’s request, per se reversal is 
unwarranted because a refusal to grant Morelos’s request would 
not have been an abuse of discretion, and any error was 
harmless under Watson.   
A defendant seeking appointment of advisory counsel 
“must make a showing of need and the decision to grant or deny 
the request rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.”  
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
 
(Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 862.)  We determine “on a case-
by-case basis” whether denial of a request for advisory counsel 
would have been an abuse of discretion.  (Id. at p. 863)  “ ‘[A]s 
long as there exists a reasonable or even fairly debatable 
justification, under the law, for the action taken, such action will 
not be here set aside . . . . [Citations.]’ ”  (Moore, supra, 
51 Cal.4th at p. 1120, quoting People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 
41, 111.)   
We have previously described the factors a court may 
consider in exercising its discretion on a motion for advisory 
counsel.  These encompass defendant’s reasons for seeking 
advisory counsel, defendant’s background, education, and 
demonstrated legal abilities, and the complexity of the issues 
involved.  (Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 863.)  If a defendant 
seeks advisory counsel to obstruct or delay proceedings, this 
weighs against the request.   
Morelos’s background, education, and demonstrated legal 
abilities, as well as the belated timing of his request for advisory 
counsel, support the conclusion that the trial court would not 
have abused its discretion by denying the request.   
In Bigelow, where we concluded the trial court’s failure to 
consider appointing advisory counsel was reversible error, the 
defendant was a Canadian national with no familiarity with 
California law.  And although he had previously been in court, 
he was represented by counsel on all but one occasion when he 
pled guilty to a minor offense.  (People v. Bigelow, supra, 
37 Cal.3d at pp. 743–744.)  In contrast, the record shows that 
Morelos is not a foreign national.  Rather, he attended high 
school through the 10th grade, completed his GED, had one year 
of general education from a community college, took a business 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
 
course in prison, and “use[d] [the] law library daily for 1 yr 
1993–1994.”  Morelos pled guilty to felony offenses in California 
in 1982 and 1988.  In the current matter, Morelos represented 
himself for nearly five months before asking for advisory 
counsel; he had already prepared and submitted numerous legal 
filings to the trial court.  And Morelos made his request for 
advisory counsel on December 8, 1995, just weeks before his 
trial was scheduled to begin.  Granting his request for advisory 
counsel would likely have necessitated a delay in the 
proceedings.  Considering all of these factors, we conclude it 
would not have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
deny his motion.  As such, the deprivation of advisory counsel 
was not per se prejudicial.   
For similar reasons, Morelos fails to establish prejudice 
under Watson.  Morelos made his request for advisory counsel 
to help with “expert witnesses and psychologists and 
psychiatrists.”  It appears he was referring to the mental health 
professionals who were previously appointed to evaluate him.  
Morelos ultimately chose not to call any mental health witnesses 
to testify, and instead submitted the written reports of Drs. Burr 
and Echeandia, as well as a third doctor, during the penalty 
phase of his trial.   
During Morelos’s penalty phase testimony, when the court 
asked him why he did not call Dr. Jay Jackman to testify, 
Morelos said he did not “care who testified” and only wanted to 
cover the “competency issue” to “make sure there [weren’t] 
grounds” for reversal of his conviction on appeal.  Morelos’s 
testimony thus suggests that he had no intention of eliciting 
mitigating testimony from the mental health experts, which 
belies his contention that the failure to appoint advisory counsel 
to assist with these expert witnesses was prejudicial.  On this 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
 
record, it is not reasonably probable that different verdicts 
would have been returned had Morelos received assistance in 
securing and preparing “expert witnesses and psychologists and 
psychiatrists.” 
D.  Section 1018 and the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments 
Morelos represented himself at trial and waived his right 
to a jury trial at both the guilt and penalty phases.  At the guilt 
phase, he waived his opening statement, declined to cross-
examine nine of the prosecution’s witnesses, testified against 
himself, and waived his closing statement.  At the penalty 
phase, Morelos again waived his opening statement.  He called 
one prosecution witness, cross-examined two others, took the 
stand and gave his own testimony, and again waived his closing 
statement.  Under these circumstances, Morelos argues he was 
allowed to effectively accomplish what section 1018 prohibits —
to plead guilty in a capital case “without the consent of the 
defendant’s counsel.”  (Ibid.)  According to Morelos, “to say that 
[he] did not plead guilty because the court and parties went 
through the motions of a trial is to elevate form over substance 
in a manner that cannot be countenanced by section 1018.”  In 
Morelos’s view, this alleged breach of section 1018 deprived him 
of his right to reliable proceedings under the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.   
1.  Background 
In October 1993, when the Santa Clara County Public 
Defender’s Office represented him, Morelos asserted his desire 
to waive his right to a preliminary examination.  Morelos also 
indicated his interest in a negotiated settlement with the 
district attorney to dismiss one of the special circumstances and 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
 
was prepared to plead guilty to the underlying charge and the 
other special circumstance.  His attorney refused to agree to any 
of these requests.  Defense counsel asserted her understanding 
that under section 1018, a capital defendant cannot plead guilty 
without counsel’s consent and specified that she refused to 
accept or agree to a guilty plea.  The prosecution agreed.  The 
trial court set the matter for a future hearing and encouraged 
the parties “to submit some sort of Points and Authorities for 
the Court’s consideration” in the interim.  Defense counsel 
submitted a memorandum of points and authorities identifying 
our precedent regarding section 1018 and argued that it was 
error for a trial court to accept a defendant’s guilty plea without 
being represented by, and without the consent of, counsel.  
Along with this filing, defense counsel submitted a letter to the 
court written by Morelos that explained his desire to, and 
rationale for, pleading guilty.  On October 27, 1993, the trial 
court, citing Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d 739 and section 1018, 
ruled that Morelos could not enter a plea of guilty without the 
consent of his attorney.  After the trial court informed Morelos 
that he could waive a preliminary examination against his 
counsel’s consent, Morelos stated that he wanted a preliminary 
hearing.  At the subsequent preliminary hearing, Morelos 
waived arraignment and pled not guilty.   
On July 19, 1995, the trial court granted Morelos’s petition 
to proceed in propria persona.  Morelos waived his right to a jury 
trial and proceeded to trial unrepresented.  At the guilt phase of 
trial, Morelos waived his opening statement.  He declined to 
cross-examine nine of the prosecution’s witnesses and after the 
court advised him of his right to testify, Morelos took the stand 
and asked if he could be questioned by the prosecution.  Morelos 
affirmed he wanted to testify and provided a narrative 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
 
description of the events culminating in Anderson’s murder.  
Morelos detailed his sexual assault of Anderson, which he said 
lasted approximately 45 minutes and included Morelos forcing 
copulation and sodomy upon Anderson.  He also recounted how 
he restrained Anderson, inflicted extreme pain upon him, and 
subsequently tortured him.  Morelos testified that he took 
Anderson to Mount Hamilton and shot him in the head, but the 
shot did not kill Anderson immediately.  So he shot Anderson 
again and left him there to die.  Morelos also testified to two 
prior offenses that he had been convicted of in 1988:  the robbery 
and burglary of John E., with enhancements for great bodily 
injury.  After testifying, Morelos rested his case and waived his 
closing argument.   
Morelos again waived his opening statement at the 
penalty phase.  Morelos recalled John E. to testify.  Morelos 
asked John E. to describe the incident between Morelos and 
Danger that occurred at John E.’s grandmother’s house.  John 
E. testified that, to his knowledge, Morelos and Danger sparred 
in the garage.  The next day, Morelos told John E. that he had 
forced himself on Danger.  Morelos also asked John E. if he 
recalled Morelos ever selling drugs at the Arena Hotel.  John E. 
did.   
Morelos also cross-examined the prosecution’s witness 
Timothy F.  On direct examination, Timothy F. testified that 
Morelos offered to orally copulate him and, when he refused, 
Morelos threatened him with a knife and told him that he had 
“raped guys before” and would do it again.  On cross-
examination, Morelos asked if Timothy F. believed that Morelos 
would have stabbed him had Morelos’s mother not been home.  
Timothy F. said he believed Morelos would have.  Morelos asked 
Timothy F. if he believed that Morelos would have shot him had 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
25 
 
they been alone.  Timothy F. said he did.  And Morelos asked if 
Timothy F. believed that Morelos would have “raped” him.  
Timothy F. said “yes.”   
Morelos briefly cross-examined Kenneth M., who had 
testified that Morelos nearly hit him while driving a getaway 
vehicle for a woman who had shoplifted from the store where 
Kenneth M. worked as security.  Morelos made an offer of proof 
that the incident in which he nearly hit Kenneth M. with his car 
went to a preliminary hearing, but there “was no holding at the 
preliminary hearing” and Morelos was discharged.  Kenneth M. 
testified that he did not recall the preliminary hearing in that 
matter.   
Morelos then testified.  He provided, in narrative form, a 
social history of his life.  He also testified to his past crimes, 
which included numerous sexual assaults he committed at the 
CYA, additional sexual assaults, and two murders in Oregon.  
He answered affirmatively when asked if he “enjoy[ed] raping 
people.” 
Morelos stated that he had “no thought about” killing 
Anderson, but he was “sorry that [he] didn’t kill [James C.] and 
Harold [T.].”  He said, “I don’t have any remorse or [sic] over any 
of my actions, no.”  When the prosecutor asked Morelos why 
Judge Creed should give him the death penalty, Morelos 
explained, “Well, if I don’t get the death penalty, I’ll be going to 
another court because it’s a matter of time I’ll have a cellie and 
I’ll eventually kill somebody else and then I will receive the 
death penalty.  Killing somebody in custody, I believe it’s death 
penalty, almost certain.”  He felt the death penalty was 
appropriate since he killed and had the capacity to keep killing 
and “the state has a right to retribution.”   
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
26 
 
Morelos testified that he wanted to plead guilty, but his 
public defender refused to consent and also refused his request 
to waive a jury trial.  He testified:  “I know what I’m doing.  I 
made a rational decision and I wanted to commit a bunch of 
murders, and that’s what I did.  Regardless of the psychology of 
it, and I think is bullshit because I could get ten different 
psychologists and psychiatrists and they will all come up with 
different reasons.”  He further testified:  “That’s the way I am 
and that’s the way I’ll always be.  I’ll always rape all the people 
and I will continue to kill people.  That’s the way I am.”  When 
asked if he wanted to add anything else, Morelos said, “I don’t 
believe so.”  The court asked if Morelos had any witnesses to call 
or any evidence to present and he declined.  Morelos did not 
make a closing argument but requested immediate transfer 
after a speedy sentence.  
Before announcing the penalty, the court described this as 
“an unusual case because the defendant has wished to plead 
guilty since the proceedings began and has wanted to admit the 
special circumstances.  Defendant stated he believes the 
appropriate penalty for his crimes is death.  We have gone 
through a court trial which the court would characterize as a 
slow plea.”  Although the court was “troubled by the procedure” 
it specified that it sought guidance from Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d 
1194.  The court explained that “Morelos has offered no defense 
to the charges.  He has offered no mitigation in the penalty 
phase of the trial.  In fact, the defendant has exercised his 
constitutional right to testify and has taken the stand and under 
oath admitted his crimes, admitted the enhancement, the 
special circumstances, and he has given testimony to justify the 
finding for the court to impose the death penalty.” 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
27 
 
 
Morelos argues that his self-representation and his tactics 
at trial were tantamount to a guilty plea or a slow plea in 
violation of section 1018’s consent-of-counsel requirement.  He 
seeks reversal of his conviction and death sentence, arguing that 
the proceedings below contravened section 1018 and were so 
unreliable as to violate the Eighth Amendment. 
2.  Analysis 
Pursuant to section 1018, “[n]o plea of guilty of a felony for 
which the maximum punishment is death, or life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole, shall be received from a 
defendant who does not appear with counsel, nor shall that plea 
be received without the consent of the defendant’s counsel.”  We 
have recognized that the state has a strong interest in reducing 
the risk of mistaken judgments in capital cases, and section 
1018’s requirement of consent of counsel is an effort to eliminate 
arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty.  (People v. 
Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 967, 982 (conc. & dis. opn. of 
Cuéllar, J.) (Daniels) [expressing the opinion of the entire 
court2]); People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, 1300 (Alfaro); 
Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 750.)  We have found reversible 
error where trial courts have failed to follow section 1018, 
permitting defendants to plead guilty to capital charges against 
the advice of their attorneys.  (Chadd, at pp. 754–755; People v. 
Massie (1985) 40 Cal.3d 620, 622.) 
Morelos contends that his collective actions as a self-
represented defendant — repeatedly demonstrating his wish to 
 
2  
See Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at page 967 (Justice 
Cuéllar’s “lead opinion . . . expresses the opinion of the entire 
court on all issues [in Daniels] except part II.D.,” on pages 986 
through 1005). 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
28 
 
plead guilty, assisting the prosecution in making its case, and 
building a case against himself — were, in effect, equivalent to 
a “slow plea” or a guilty plea without the consent of counsel.  
Thus, Morelos argues, just as it was error for the trial courts to 
accept guilty pleas from the capital defendants in Chadd and 
Massie without counsel’s consent, it was similarly error under 
section 1018 for the trial court here to condone his actions.   
However, the cases Morelos relies on, finding reversible 
error under section 1018 when trial courts have accepted pleas 
from capital defendants against counsel’s advice, are inapposite.  
The proceedings below were not tantamount to a guilty plea and 
therefore did not implicate section 1018 nor its attendant, 
constitutionally 
protected 
interest 
in 
reliable 
capital 
proceedings.  
We have defined a slow plea as an “ ‘ “agreed-upon 
disposition . . . which does not require the defendant to admit 
guilt but results in a finding of guilt . . . usually, for a promised 
punishment.” ’ ”  (Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 983 (conc. & 
dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.) [expressing the opinion of the entire 
court].)  A recognizable example of a slow plea “is a bargained-
for submission on the transcript of a preliminary hearing in 
which the only evidence is the victim’s credible testimony, and 
the defendant does not testify and counsel presents no evidence 
or argument on defendant’s behalf.”  (People v. Wright (1987) 
43 Cal.3d 487, 496 (Wright).)  This type of submission is 
tantamount to a guilty plea because the defendant’s guilt is 
apparent on the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing 
and conviction is a foregone conclusion as no defense is mounted.  
(Ibid.)  A submission occurs when the defendant gives up his or 
her right to a jury trial, the right to present additional evidence 
as part of a defense and agrees the court can decide the case on 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
29 
 
the basis of the transcript of prior proceedings.  (People v. 
Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 39–40.)  And a submission is 
defined by the fundamental protections and rights a defendant 
surrenders, such as the right to a jury, the right to confront 
witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination.  
(Daniels, at pp. 983–984 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.); 
Robertson, at p. 40; Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 748.)    
The trial court’s passing characterization of the 
proceedings below “as a slow plea” misdescribes their true 
nature.  As we explained in Daniels¸ “a trial, even one where a 
defense is voluntarily forgone, is fundamentally different from a 
guilty plea.”  (Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 983 (conc. & dis. 
opn. of Cuéllar, J.) [expressing the opinion of the entire court].)  
At trial, the state is put to its burden of proof as to the charges, 
whereas a plea “ ‘serves as a stipulation that the People need 
introduce no proof whatever to support the accusation’ and ‘ “is 
itself a conviction.” ’  (Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 748.)”  
(Ibid.)  While Morelos waived his right to a jury trial in favor of 
a court trial, there is no indication that his waiver was the result 
of a negotiated agreement about the punishment or the evidence 
the prosecution would present; the prosecution was held to its 
burden of proof at the guilt and penalty phases.  (See id. at 
p. 984 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)  The record shows that 
Morelos affirmed that no one promised him anything or used 
any force, threats, or pressure to induce his decision to waive his 
right to a jury trial.   
Nor does the record suggest Morelos gave up the 
opportunity to exercise his right to confront witnesses or 
challenge the evidence at trial.  Although Morelos declined to 
cross-examine nine of the prosecution’s witnesses, he did not 
waive his right of confrontation.  Morelos reserved the right to 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
30 
 
call a witness who had testified against him and cross-examined 
three prosecution witnesses.  Although he now argues he did so 
only to elicit aggravating evidence, his questioning of these 
witnesses demonstrates that he exercised, rather than 
relinquished, his right of confrontation.  Morelos’s decision not 
to cross-examine all of the prosecution’s witnesses was not an 
express waiver of his right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses required as part of a submission.  (Wright, supra, 
43 Cal.3d at p. 497.) 
Morelos did not preserve the privilege against self-
incrimination and instead chose to testify at both the guilt and 
penalty phases.  At the guilt phase, Morelos asked the court if 
he could take the stand and be questioned by the prosecution.  
At the penalty phase, the personal narrative and social history 
he provided in his testimony included details of childhood abuse 
and family struggles that could be assessed as mitigating 
factors.  And while section 1018 advances the purpose of 
ensuring reliable judgments in capital cases, the concern for 
reliability does not require or justify forcing a defendant to 
present an affirmative defense in a capital case.  (Bloom, supra, 
48 Cal.3d at p. 1228.)  Requiring a defendant to present a 
defense or prohibiting a defendant from testifying would 
contravene the autonomy and dignity interests underlying the 
Sixth Amendment right to self-representation.  (Mickel, supra, 
2 Cal.5th at pp. 181, 210; Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 686, 
738.)  And as we have acknowledged, requiring a pro se 
defendant to present a vigorous defense “would produce 
perverse incentives, encouraging defendants who wish to avoid 
the death penalty to decline to present any defense, knowing 
that their sentence will be reversed on appeal.”  (Daniels, supra, 
3 Cal.5th at p. 985 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.) [expressing 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
31 
 
the opinion of the entire court]; see also Bloom, at pp. 1227–
1228.)  In sum, Morelos’s actions at trial did not amount to an 
unreliable slow plea in violation of section 1018.    
E.  Section 1018 and the Sixth Amendment  
 
Morelos alternatively argues that section 1018’s consent-
of-counsel requirement violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to control the prerogative of his or her defense, a right 
recently underscored by the United States Supreme Court in 
McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 584 U.S. __ [138 S.Ct. 1500] (McCoy).  
Morelos recognizes that this argument and his claim, ante, that 
his trial court proceedings violated section 1018 are mutually 
exclusive since they require us to either enforce section 1018 or 
invalidate it, but he nevertheless asks us to accept either 
argument. 
 
As explained, on October 27, 1993, the trial court 
precluded Morelos from pleading guilty after “review[ing] Penal 
Code section 1018, as well as the cases that relate to that code 
section, specifically People versus Chadd, 28 Cal.3d. 739.” 
In Chadd, we read Faretta’s conclusion that self-
representation is “an independent right implied by the 
structure . . . of the Sixth Amendment” as not affecting the 
Legislature’s “authority to condition guilty pleas in capital cases 
on the consent of defense counsel.”  (Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at 
pp. 751, 750.)  We observed that Faretta addressed a defendant’s 
“right to ‘make a defense’ in ‘an adversary criminal trial,’ ” and 
concluded, “[n]othing in Faretta, either expressly or impliedly, 
deprives the state of the right to conclude that the danger of 
erroneously imposing a death sentence outweighs the minor 
infringement of the right of self-representation resulting when 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
32 
 
defendant’s right to plead guilty in capital cases is subjected to 
the requirement of his counsel’s consent.”  (Id. at p. 751.)   
Over 25 years after we decided Chadd, we again held 
section 1018 constitutional in Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th 1277.  
There, “the defendant accepted complete responsibility for the 
offenses in a videotaped confession on the day of her arrest.”  
(People v. Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 992 (Frederickson), 
citing Alfaro, at p. 1295.)  Ten days before jury selection began, 
defense counsel informed the trial court that the defendant 
wanted to plead guilty “ ‘against [his] vigorous, vigorous 
advice.’ ” (Alfaro, at p. 1296)  The court explained that under 
section 1018 the defendant could not plead guilty against her 
attorney’s advice.  (Ibid.)  The prosecutor “argued during the 
penalty 
phase 
that 
the 
defendant 
had 
not 
accepted 
responsibility and lacked remorse, and the jury did not hear 
evidence [reflecting] that [she] had attempted to enter a guilty 
plea.”  (Frederickson, at p. 992, citing Alfaro, at pp. 1296–1297.) 
Our Alfaro decision acknowledged the defendant’s 
argument that “a defendant has the ultimate, fundamental 
right to control his or her own defense,” but concluded that 
section 1018 was “one of several exceptions to the general rule 
recognizing ‘ “the need to respect the defendant's personal 
choice on the most ‘fundamental’ decisions in a criminal case.” ’ ”  
(Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1298.)  We noted that “[t]he 
statute constitutes [a] legislative recognition of the severe 
consequences of a guilty plea in a capital case, and provides 
protection against an ill-advised guilty plea and the erroneous 
imposition of a death sentence.”  (Id. at p. 1300.)   
After these decisions by our court, in McCoy, supra, 
584 U.S. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1500], the United States 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
33 
 
Supreme Court considered whether the Sixth Amendment 
precluded defense counsel from admitting the defendant’s guilt 
before a jury over the defendant’s objection.  There, “the 
defendant vociferously insisted that he did not engage in the 
charged [murders] and adamantly objected to any admission of 
guilt,” but his attorney thought the best strategy was to admit 
the crimes during the guilt phase and seek mercy during the 
penalty phase.  (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at 
p. 1505].)  The trial court denied the defendant’s request to 
remove his counsel and defense counsel’s request to be relieved 
if the defendant secured another attorney.  (Id. at p. __ 
[138 S.Ct. at p. 1506])  The court told counsel to decide how to 
proceed.  (Ibid.)  Defense counsel acknowledged during his 
opening statement that the evidence unambiguously showed the 
defendant committed the three murders, while the defendant 
thereafter testified he was innocent.  (Id. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at 
p. 1507].)  The jury found the defendant guilty and returned 
three death verdicts.  (Ibid.)   
“The [McCoy] defendant, represented by new counsel, 
unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on the ground that the 
court had violated his constitutional rights by allowing counsel 
to concede his guilt over his objection.”  (Frederickson, supra, 
8 Cal.5th at p. 993, citing McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. __ 
[138 S.Ct. at p. 1507].)  The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court’s ruling, concluding that defense counsel had 
authority to make such a concession against the defendant’s 
wishes “because defense counsel reasonably believed that 
admitting guilt offered the defendant the best chance to avoid a 
death sentence.”  (Frederickson, at p. 993, citing McCoy, at p. __ 
[138 S.Ct. at p. 1507].) 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
34 
 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment.  
(McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1512].)  It 
explained that “[t]he trial court’s allowance of [defense 
counsel’s] admission of McCoy’s guilt despite McCoy’s insistent 
objections was incompatible with the Sixth Amendment.”  (Id. 
at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1512].)  “While some decisions, such as 
trial management, are best left to counsel, ‘[s]ome decisions . . . 
are reserved for the client — notably, whether to plead guilty, 
waive the right to a jury trial, testify in one’s own behalf, and 
forgo an appeal.’ ”  (Frederickson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 993, 
quoting McCoy, at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1508], italics added by 
McCoy.)  Counsel can make “strategic choices about how best to 
achieve a client’s objectives,” but the defendant chooses the 
objectives, such as an objective to “maintain innocence of the 
charged criminal acts.”  (McCoy, at pp. __ [138 S.Ct. at pp.  1508, 
1509])   
Most recently, in Frederickson, supra, 8 Cal.5th 963, the 
capital defendant, like Morelos, raised a constitutional 
challenge to section 1018.  We directed the parties to file 
supplemental briefs addressing the relevance, if any, of McCoy 
on the issue.  Ultimately, our Frederickson opinion detailed the 
decision in McCoy, but we had no need to decide its bearing on 
the defendant’s claim because the defendant forfeited his 
constitutional challenge to section 1018 by failing to adequately 
present it to the superior court.  (Frederickson, at pp. 993–994.)  
In 1996, when the Frederickson defendant attempted to plead 
guilty in the municipal court, “the judicial officers before whom 
he appeared were not acting as judges; rather, they were sitting 
as magistrates” and they lacked statutory authority to accept 
guilty pleas in a capital case.  (Id. at p. 995.)  As we explained, 
“[i]f defendant wanted to challenge the constitutionality of 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
35 
 
section 1018, whether on the ground that it precluded him from 
using a guilty plea to lay the foundation for a penalty phase 
remorse argument or on some other ground, he needed to 
request to plead guilty in the superior court and ask that court 
to make a ruling based on section 1018, thus preserving the 
issue on appeal.  He never did so.”  (Id. at p. 994.)  Moreover, 
“[a]t no point did the municipal court rule that, based on section 
1018, it would not accept defendant’s guilty plea.”  (Id. at p. 996.) 
Like in Frederickson, at the time Morelos sought to plead 
guilty, the municipal court was not authorized to receive a guilty 
plea in a capital case and Morelos never requested to plead 
guilty in superior court.  However, unlike in Frederickson, there 
is no doubt that defendant secured a ruling from the municipal 
court that he could not plead guilty under section 1018.  After 
encouraging briefing from the parties on the question, the 
municipal court concluded that section 1018 and our decision in 
Chadd prevented it from taking a guilty plea from Morelos 
absent his counsel’s consent.  By contrast, the Frederickson 
defendant’s requests to plead guilty in municipal court were 
denied on bases unrelated to section 1018.  (Frederickson, supra, 
8 Cal.5th at p. 996.)  Here, since the municipal court itself 
appears to have overlooked its own jurisdictional limitations in 
making its ruling, which was expressly premised on section 
1018, we will assume arguendo that Morelos preserved his 
claim.  Under these circumstances, we will address the merits 
of Morelos’s constitutional challenge to section 1018. 
Proceeding to the merits, we decline to read into McCoy’s 
passing dictum a credible basis for overruling our longstanding 
precedent upholding the constitutionality of section 1018.  Like 
the defendants in Chadd and Alfaro, Morelos makes no claim 
that he sought to plead guilty in hopes of a more favorable 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
36 
 
outcome during the penalty phase.  (See Chadd, supra, 
28 Cal.3d at p. 753 [the defendant wanted “the state to help him 
commit 
suicide”]; 
Alfaro, 
supra, 
41 Cal.4th 
at 
p. 1300 
[“defendant desired to plead guilty in order to avoid testifying 
against” someone she and her family had reason to fear].)  
Accordingly, as in those cases, we have no occasion to consider 
here whether a defense strategy to plead guilty in hopes of a 
more favorable outcome during the penalty phase should 
override the protective provisions of the statute.  (Alfaro, at 
pp. 1299–1300.)    
Moreover, McCoy is the factual inverse of this case.  McCoy 
was a jury trial case in which defense counsel overrode the 
defendant’s express objective to maintain his innocence.  It did 
not consider a defendant’s wish to admit guilt, let alone whether 
states can preclude a capital defendant from pleading guilty 
without counsel’s consent in order to advance the state’s strong 
interest in reliable capital convictions.  As we have previously 
discussed, a guilty plea has unique consequences.  (See ante, at 
pp. 28–29.)  “Indeed, it serves as a stipulation that the People 
need introduce no proof whatever to support the accusation: the 
plea ipso facto supplies both evidence and verdict.”  (Chadd, 
supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 748.)  While McCoy’s dictum that “[s]ome 
decisions . . . are reserved for the client — notably, whether to 
plead guilty” (McCoy, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at 
p. 1508], italics added) certainly reiterates the critical 
importance of a defendant’s autonomy interests, absent a 
clearer directive, we are not convinced it renders section 1018 
unconstitutional.  Indeed, long before McCoy was decided, the 
high court said essentially the same thing in Jones v. Barnes 
(1983) 463 U.S. 745, 751, and we nevertheless upheld section 
1018 in Alfaro.  (See Jones v. Barnes, at p. 751 [“It is also 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
37 
 
recognized that the accused has the ultimate authority to make 
certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether 
to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or 
take an appeal” (italics added)].)  McCoy’s dictum does not 
change the legal landscape that was before us when we decided 
Chadd and Alfaro.   
In sum, in view of the high stakes consequences for a 
defendant in a capital case, we are unpersuaded that McCoy’s 
passing dictum precludes the state from concluding “that the 
danger of erroneously imposing a death sentence outweighs the 
minor infringement of the right of self-representation resulting 
when defendant’s right to plead guilty in capital cases is 
subjected to the requirement of his counsel’s consent.”  (Chadd, 
supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 751.)  
F.   
Defendant’s Waiver of His Constitutional Right 
to a Jury Trial 
Morelos contends the record fails to establish a valid 
waiver of his right to a jury trial at the guilt, special 
circumstance, and penalty phases of his trial, requiring reversal. 
1.  Background 
On July 27, 1995, the prosecutor told Judge Ball that he 
had spoken with Morelos and that they “would be likely to waive 
jury on this case both as to the penalty and guilt phase.”  
Morelos confirmed, “Yes, that’s correct.”  Judge Ball responded 
that while he was “prepared to take a jury waiver on the guilt 
phase issues,” he was “not convinced that it’s either in the 
interest of justice to take a jury waiver on the penalty phase” 
and that if the parties agreed, he would “be willing to take a 
waiver of a jury as to the guilt phase and merely select a jury for 
purposes of penalty.”  The prosecutor explained that he 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
38 
 
preferred to have a court trial all the way through to avoid the 
necessity of going through voir dire on a jury with a self-
represented defendant.  Judge Ball stated that he had 
“considered the matter long and hard” and researched the issue.  
He again stated that he determined “the interest of justice can 
best be served by a waiver of a jury as to the guilt phase and a 
selection of a jury for purposes of the penalty phase.”   
At the subsequent hearing on August 2, 1995, Judge Ball 
inquired if the parties had considered his previously stated 
position that he would accept a jury waiver as to the guilt phase, 
but not the penalty phase.  The prosecutor responded that “it is 
still Mr. Morelos’ [sic] wish and my wish to have a judge sitting 
without jury decide the penalty of this case.”  He continued, “I 
know you’ve indicated the way you feel Mr. Morelos and I feel 
that we would like to have a judge decide this” and inquired as 
to the possibility of having the case assigned to another judge.  
Judge Ball stated that the parties “may have to inquire as to 
other judges whether or not they are willing to accept a jury 
waiver on the penalty phase” and that he had no hesitation in 
referring the matter to another judge to inquire “if there is any 
judge that is willing to accept the jury waiver on the penalty 
phase.”  If no judge was willing to take a penalty phase waiver, 
the prosecutor indicated that Judge Ball’s department would be 
his first choice; Morelos agreed.   
At the August 9, 1995 hearing, Judge Ball stated that he 
discussed the jury waiver matter with the presiding judge of his 
division and was advised that Judge Creed was amenable to a 
waiver of trial by jury as to both guilt and penalty and the case 
would be assigned to him.  On August 11, 1995, Morelos agreed 
to waive time until Judge Creed was available to try his case.  
Judge Ball then explained that the supervising judge suggested 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
39 
 
that he could take a specific jury waiver for Judge Creed and 
then assign the matter directly to him.  The parties agreed and 
Judge Ball took Morelos’s jury waiver.  Morelos was self-
represented.   
“THE COURT:  Now, you understand that you have an 
absolute constitutional right to trial by a jury.  In other 
words, 12 individuals to make the factual determination 
both as to your guilt and in the event that that jury would 
find you guilty and determine one or more special 
circumstances to be true, that you would have a 
constitutional right to a jury to determine the penalty for 
which the crimes would be punishable. 
Now, that’s been explained to you and you 
understand that, correct. 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.  That’s been explained and I do 
understand it.  
“THE COURT:  And you — at this time, it’s my 
understanding based upon that understanding, you wish 
to freely and voluntarily waive those rights to those jury 
trials, provided that Judge Daniel Creed will make this 
specific to this particular judge, is agreeable to hear your 
trial; is that correct? 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I waive jury.  
“THE COURT:  Now, has anybody promised you anything, 
used any force, threats, pressure on you of any kind to get 
you to make that decision? 
“THE DEFENDANT:  No, no one.  
“THE COURT:  In other words, you’ve made that decision 
freely and voluntarily based on your own knowledge and 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
40 
 
understanding of the facts, and that the law that has been 
explained to you and that you understand? 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.  
“THE COURT:  All right.  The People wish to join in that 
jury waiver, Mr. Schon? 
“MR. SCHON:  Yes, your Honor.  
“THE COURT:  All right.  Based upon the fact that the 
defendant has so indicated, the Court will find that the 
defendant freely, knowingly and intelligently has, in fact, 
waived his right to a jury trial both as to the penalty and 
the guilt phase of the Information.  And that waiver is 
limited specifically to the availability of Judge Daniel 
Creed hearing the matter.”   
Having so found, Judge Ball assigned the matter to Judge 
Creed.   
At the start of trial on January 3, 1996, Judge Creed asked 
Morelos several questions regarding his decision to waive a jury 
trial.  
“THE COURT:  At this time you want to go forward 
representing yourself? 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
“THE COURT:  You also do understand that you have an 
absolute constitutional right to have a trial by jury? 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.  
“THE COURT:  And you understand that right? 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
“THE COURT:  And do you give up that right at this time? 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, your Honor, I do.”   
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
41 
 
At the beginning of the penalty phase, Judge Creed again 
asked Morelos about his desire to waive his right to a jury trial.  
“THE COURT:  Mr. Morelos, we have ended phase one, 
which is the guilt phase of the trial.  We’re about to begin 
phase two, which is the penalty phase.  Let me clarify 
something.  At this particular time if you so desire we 
could break the trial if you decided, one, you wanted to be 
represented by an attorney, or two, if you decided you 
wanted to go to the second phase with the jury, you could 
make that request at this time and I would grant that 
request.  Is that what you want to do? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  No, sir, I do not.  
 
“THE COURT:  You want to continue on as a court trial? 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I do.”   
2.  Analysis 
A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to a jury 
trial.  (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; People 
v. 
Sivongxxay (2017) 
3 Cal.5th 
151, 
166 
(Sivongxxay).)  
However, a defendant may waive this fundamental right to a 
jury trial by a personal and express waiver in open court and by 
consent of both parties.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; People v. 
Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 308 (Collins); People v. Hovarter 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1026.)  To be valid, the record must show 
the defendant’s waivers of the right to a jury are knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.  (Collins, at p. 305.)  In making such 
a determination, we examine “the totality of the circumstances” 
unique to each case.  (Sivongxxay, at p. 167.) 
Morelos acknowledges that he agreed, during the waiver 
colloquy, that his right to a jury trial at the guilt and penalty 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
42 
 
phases had been explained to him and that he understood that 
right.  However, he contends Judge Ball inadequately explained 
the contours of the jury trial right; specifically, the judge’s 
“statement may have illuminated the size of a jury (12 
individuals), but it did not elaborate on what a jury trial entails, 
how a jury is selected, that jury members must be impartial and 
their verdict unanimous, or that a judge alone would decide his 
fate.”   
We take this opportunity to reemphasize “the value of a 
robust oral colloquy in evincing a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of a jury trial.”  (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th 
at p. 169.)  In Sivongxxay, we recommended “that trial courts 
advise a defendant of the basic mechanics of a jury trial in a 
waiver colloquy, including but not necessarily limited to the 
facts that (1) a jury is made up of 12 members of the community; 
(2) a defendant through his or her counsel may participate in 
jury selection; (3) all 12 jurors must unanimously agree in order 
to render a verdict; and (4) if a defendant waives the right to a 
jury trial, a judge alone will decide his or her guilt or innocence.”  
(Ibid.)  Indeed, a thorough record of a jury trial waiver aids 
meaningful appellate review.  However, our guidance in 
Sivongxxay was simply that, it was “not intended to limit trial 
courts to a narrow or rigid colloquy” and “[u]ltimately, a court 
must consider the defendant’s individual circumstances and 
exercise judgment in deciding how best to ensure that a 
particular defendant who purports to waive a jury trial does so 
knowingly and intelligently.”  (Id. at p. 170; see Daniels, supra, 
3 Cal.5th at pp. 992–993 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.) [“We 
continue to eschew any rigid rubric for trial courts to follow in 
order to decide whether to accept a defendant’s relinquishment 
of this right”]; id. at p. 1018 (conc. & dis. opinion of Corrigan, J.) 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
43 
 
[“We have consistently eschewed any rigid formula or particular 
form of words that a trial court must use to ensure that a jury 
trial waiver is knowing and intelligent”].) 
Here, the relevant circumstances demonstrate that 
Morelos’s waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.  
Looking first at the colloquy itself, Judge Ball advised Morelos 
that he had “an absolute constitutional right to a trial by a jury.”  
Morelos was also told that a jury trial means “12 individuals to 
make the factual determination . . . as to your guilt.”  He was 
further informed that should the jury “find you guilty and 
determine one or more special circumstances to be true,” he 
“ha[s] a constitutional right to a jury to determine the penalty.”  
Four separate times, the trial court asked Morelos if he 
understood the right he was giving up.  As quoted in full above, 
Morelos was first asked:  “Now, that’s been explained to you and 
you understand that, correct[?]”  He replied, “Yes.  That’s been 
explained and I do understand it.”  Judge Ball then asked 
Morelos if he wished to waive his jury trial rights and have a 
specific judge, Judge Creed, hear his trial.  Morelos said, “Yes, I 
waive jury.”  Morelos was then asked to confirm that he “freely 
and voluntarily” waived his right to a jury trial.  Morelos was 
thereafter asked to confirm that no one “promised you anything, 
used any force, threats, pressure on you of any kind to get you 
to make that decision.”  He then was asked to confirm that 
“you’ve made that decision freely and voluntarily based on your 
own knowledge and understanding of the facts, and that the law 
that has been explained to you.”  Morelos answered in the 
affirmative each time.  Thereafter, Judge Creed first, prior to 
the commencement of the guilt phase, confirmed with Morelos 
that he understood he had “an absolute constitutional right to 
have a trial by jury,” and then asked Morelos to separately 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
44 
 
confirm that he understood the right and wished to give up the 
right, which he did.  Then prior to the commencement of the 
penalty phase, Judge Creed informed Morelos that he could now 
“break the trial” to enable Morelos to choose to have counsel 
represent him and/or have a jury empaneled for the penalty 
phase, and Morelos again declined.  At no point in these 
colloquies did Morelos indicate confusion or ask any questions. 
Thus, the trial court’s colloquies were not in any way 
“devoid of meaningful advisement” or “threadbare.”  (Dis. opn. 
of Liu, J., post, at pp.  2, 9.)  Morelos waived a jury three 
different times before two different judges, and was expressly 
told that he had a constitutional right to a jury, that the jury 
would be comprised of 12 individuals, that the jury would make 
a factual determination as to his guilt, and that he had a 
separate constitutional right to a jury at his penalty trial.  The 
court then asked Morelos repeatedly if he was making his 
decision freely and voluntarily and he confirmed each time that 
he was.  In short, Morelos was substantively advised about the 
core nature of a jury trial and the consequences of waiving such 
a trial:  that his entire case — including any penalty phase — 
would be tried before a judge, specifically Judge Creed.3    
 
3 
Though our dissenting colleague concedes “that we have 
not insisted on a rigid rubric of advisements, nor have we 
required advisement of every one of the[] four [jury trial 
attributes cited in Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at page 169] in 
order to uphold a jury trial waiver” (dis. opn. of Liu. J., post, at 
p. 2), he repeatedly focuses on three purported omissions from 
the jury waiver colloquies:  that Morelos was not told “he could 
participate in jury selection, that the jury must be unanimous 
in order to render a verdict, or that a judge alone would decide 
his guilt and the appropriate penalty in the absence of a jury.”  
 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
45 
 
Moreover, while Judge Ball did not explicitly reference 
Morelos’s right to participate in jury selection during the 
colloquy, Judge Ball otherwise made mention of jury selection 
prior to the waiver hearing, and spoke about how jury selection 
might affect the timing of trial should the parties fail to secure 
a judge willing to take a penalty phase jury waiver.  For 
instance, at the August 2, 1995 hearing, Judge Ball stated, “I 
haven’t discussed with you both scheduling and just when you 
perceive this matter would be ready for trial, and at what time, 
what stage juries would be impanelled [sic] and the attendant 
issues in terms of jury selection.”  At a different hearing, the 
prosecutor, in the presence of Morelos, stated that a court trial 
was preferred to “avoid the necessity of going through voir dire 
on a jury with a pro per.”  The dissent notes that this discussion 
“provide[s] no meaningful information about how a jury is 
selected or Morelos’s right to participate in that process.”  (Dis. 
opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 12.)  But the fact remains that multiple 
references in two separate hearings to jury selection (including 
 
(Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 5; see also id. at pp. 2, 10.)  We 
have never suggested that the failure to advise on these three 
points renders a jury waiver unknowing and unintelligent.  To 
the contrary, we have emphasized that we must examine “the 
totality of the circumstances.”  (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 
p. 167; see Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 991 (conc. & dis. opn. 
of Cuéllar, J.).)  And we have rejected claims that jury trial 
waivers were invalid because of a trial court’s failure to 
explicitly mention many of the same jury trial attributes that 
the dissent now relies on here.  (See Sivongxxay, at p. 168 
[“under the totality of the circumstances standard,” the failure 
to mention juror unanimity and impartiality did not render the 
“defendant’s waiver constitutionally infirm”]; Weaver, supra, 53 
Cal.4th at pp. 1072–1074 [the failure to advise the defendant of 
his right to participate in jury selection did not render his jury 
trial waiver invalid].)  
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
46 
 
reference to timing concerns related to jury selection and to 
concerns about conducting jury selection with a self-represented 
defendant) are relevant to our assessment of the “totality of 
circumstances” of Morelos’s understanding of his right to a jury.  
(Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 167.) 
Consistent with the conclusion that Morelos knowingly 
waived his right to a jury trial, Morelos’s pretrial conduct and 
actions at trial made clear his desire to have his guilt and 
penalty adjudicated expeditiously.  More than two years prior to 
the commencement of trial, Morelos repeatedly expressed a 
desire to plead guilty.  On October 4, 1993, Morelos’s attorney 
pointedly told the court that defendant wanted “to enter a plea 
of guilty to the charges, and to proceed to the penalty phase.”  A 
few weeks later, in a letter to the court, Morelos explained that 
he “was looking for a way to plead guilty.”  After he could not 
plead guilty, Morelos moved to represent himself.  During the 
hearing on his Faretta motion, Morelos testified that he 
understood he had a right to a trial by jury; he initialed his 
Faretta form to indicate his understanding of the same.  During 
his penalty phase testimony, Morelos told the court, “I tried to 
have a speedy trial.  [. . .] [¶] I wish to plead guilty.”  As 
explained ante, during Morelos’s penalty phase testimony, when 
the court asked him why he did not call a psychiatrist to testify, 
Morelos said he did not “care who testified” and only wanted to 
cover the “competency issue” to “make sure there [weren’t] 
grounds” for reversal of his conviction on appeal.  It is apparent 
from this record that Morelos’s choice to waive his jury trial 
right was part of a deliberate, overall strategy spanning years 
to quickly obtain reliable, appeal-proof verdicts.   
In arguing that Morelos’s waiver was invalid, Morelos and 
the dissent emphasize the fact that Morelos was self-
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
47 
 
represented at the time of his waiver.  It is correct that the 
absence of counsel may be “a relevant factor” in determining 
whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waives his 
right to a jury trial.   (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 6.)  
“Nonetheless, it is well established that a self-represented 
defendant may validly waive a jury trial without the guiding 
hand of counsel.”  (Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1024 (conc. & 
dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.).)  On the record here, the absence of 
counsel did not render Morelos’s waiver unknowing and 
unintelligent.    
It is true that at the moment Morelos waived his right to 
a jury, he was without counsel.  But, it is relevant that, as noted 
ante, Morelos exhibited some legal knowledge, submitting 
filings with citations to relevant authority on numerous issues.  
More significantly, Morelos was represented by counsel in his 
case for over two and a half years before he moved to represent 
himself; he was represented up until less than a month before 
he entered his jury waiver.  Indeed, defendant confirmed during 
his penalty phase testimony that he had discussed waiving a 
jury with his attorneys.  He testified that he “asked to waive jury 
trial” and “[t]hey” —  meaning his attorneys — “refused that.”  
While we need not rely on this testimony in light of the strength 
of the record otherwise, as it was not before the trial court at the 
time it accepted Morelos’s jury trial waiver, it does offer unique 
insight into Morelos’s thought processes and supports the 
conclusion that his waiver was voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent.   
Furthermore, prior to Morelos’s jury trial waiver, the 
prosecutor explained to the court that he and Morelos had 
multiple conversations concerning Morelos’s desire to waive a 
jury.  In fact, at the July 27, 1995 hearing, Morelos said it was 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
48 
 
“correct” that he “would be likely to waive jury on this case both 
as to the penalty and guilt phase.”  That hearing concluded with 
the prosecutor indicating that he and Morelos should discuss 
Judge Ball’s proposal to only accept a waiver for the guilt phase.  
At the August 2, 1995 hearing, the prosecutor, in the presence 
of Morelos, explicitly referenced “Mr. Morelos’ [sic] wish . . . to 
have a judge sitting without jury decide the penalty of this case” 
and acknowledged “I know you’ve indicated the way you feel Mr. 
Morelos.”  Though the dissent accuses the majority of drawing 
“speculative inferences” (dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 14), it is 
the dissent who speculates here, suggesting that the prosecutor 
somehow pressured Morelos into waiving a jury.  While the 
dissent asserts that this is not the intended suggestion (id. at 
p. 9), it nonetheless goes to great lengths to emphasize that the 
prosecutor “drove,” “pursued,” was “insistent in,” was “intent 
on,” “pushed,” and was “determined” to have a court trial.  (Id. 
at pp. 7, 8, 9.)  We can only assume these word choices were 
intentional.  But there is nothing in the record to reflect that the 
prosecution “drove” or “pushed” Morelos to waive a jury.  And 
again, the dissent ignores that we must look at the “totality of 
the circumstances” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 167); the 
fact that Morelos willingly waived his right to a jury trial after 
having multiple conversations with the prosecutor about 
waiving a jury trial is a relevant data point in our analysis.    
Finally, Morelos’s jury waiver was contemplated over an 
extended period of time.  Morelos consistently persisted in his 
desire to waive his penalty phase jury despite Judge Ball’s 
resistance and the seeming inconvenience of having to find a 
judge who would agree to accept a waiver as to both the guilt 
and penalty phases of trial.  He agreed to waive his speedy trial 
rights because doing so was necessary to ensure Judge Creed 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
49 
 
could hear his entire trial.  And at the beginning of the guilt and 
penalty phases, Judge Creed confirmed Morelos’s desire to 
proceed without a jury.   
The dissent “do[es] not understand how [the fact that 
Morelos’s waiver was considered over “an extended period of 
time” (ante, at p. 48)] sheds any light on what Morelos knew 
about a jury trial [waiver].”  (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 14.)  
But the timeline here proves to be an important part of “the 
totality of the circumstances” surrounding Morelos’s waiver.  
(Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 167.)  During the time 
leading up to his waiver, Morelos was able to talk to the 
prosecutor and engage with the court.  He was willing to delay 
the start of his trial to make sure that Judge Creed, who would 
accept a jury waiver at the guilt phase, could hear his case.  
Months later, Judge Creed confirmed with Morelos that he 
wished to waive his jury trial rights.  Morelos did not have to 
make his waiver decision rashly or without time to reflect.  This 
factor further supports our conclusion that Morelos’s jury 
waiver was knowing and intelligent. 
These circumstances stand in stark contrast to those in 
Daniels, upon which Morelos principally relies, wherein a 
majority of this court upheld the defendant’s jury trial waiver 
for the guilt phase, but found the defendant’s penalty phase 
waiver constitutionally infirm.  In Daniels, it was the judge who 
introduced the idea of a jury trial waiver, and he did so on the 
same day the waiver was taken; “[u]p until that point, Daniels 
never explicitly requested or referenced a court trial.”  (Daniels, 
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 993 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)  In 
contrast to this rushed, judge-driven sequence of events in 
Daniels, Morelos’s desire to waive jury was expressed to the trial 
court nearly three weeks before his waiver was accepted and 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
50 
 
months before trial.  Morelos confirmed his desire to waive jury 
on three separate occasions, in front of two different judges.  
Unlike the Daniels judge who prompted the defendant’s waiver, 
Judge Ball repeatedly expressed reluctance to accept a jury 
waiver at the penalty phase.  Judge Ball’s ongoing concern that 
a jury trial waiver at the penalty phase would not serve “the 
interest of justice” almost certainly conveyed to Morelos the 
importance of the jury trial right, and the potential 
disadvantages of waiving it.   
The waiver colloquy here was also more substantial than 
in Daniels.  The court in Daniels did not orally advise Daniels 
that a jury is comprised of 12 individuals, or ask him if he 
understood what the jury trial right entailed.  (Daniels, supra, 
3 Cal.5th at pp. 986–988 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)  As 
stated, here, Judge Ball advised Morelos that his jury would be 
made up of 12 individuals and that a waiver meant Judge Creed 
would decide his guilt and penalty.  Judge Ball also confirmed 
that the jury trial right had been explained to Morelos and that 
he understood it.  There was no comparable exchange in Daniels.  
We therefore disagree with the dissent that “the record of 
advisement here leaves as much doubt about the validity of the 
waiver as the record in Daniels.”  (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at 
p. 5.)  
More generally, the dissent concludes “the record provides 
no indication that Morelos waived a jury trial ‘ “ ‘ “ with a full 
awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and 
the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” ’ ” ’ ”  (Dis. opn. 
of Liu, J., post, at p. 15.)  We read the record quite differently.  
The dissent asserts that our conclusion that Morelos was 
adequately advised about the substance of his jury trial right 
relies on “loose conjecture” and “speculative inferences.”  (Dis. 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
51 
 
opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 14.)  But our holding relies on neither 
speculation nor conjecture.  It is based on uncontested facts.  To 
summarize, Morelos was:  (1) advised that he had a 
constitutional right to a jury, that the jury would be comprised 
of 12 individuals, that the jury would make a factual 
determination as to his guilt, and that he had a separate 
constitutional right to a jury at his penalty trial; (2) he 
ultimately waived jury three separate times before two separate 
judges; (3) in waiving his right to counsel, Morelos affirmed 
orally and in writing that he understood he had a right to a trial 
by jury; (4) jury selection was discussed at two separate hearings 
in Morelos’s presence before he waived jury; (5) Morelos had 
multiple conversations with the prosecutor about his jury trial 
waiver; (6) Morelos testified at his penalty trial that he had 
discussed waiving jury with his lawyers, stating that he “asked 
to waive jury trial” and “[t]hey” — meaning his attorneys — 
“refused that”; (7) Morelos exhibited some legal knowledge in 
pretrial proceedings, including submitting filings with citations 
to relevant authority on numerous issues; and (8) Judge Ball 
told Morelos that he was concerned that a jury trial waiver at 
the penalty phase would not serve “the interest of justice,” 
thereby conveying to Morelos the importance of a jury and the 
potential disadvantages of waiving a jury trial.  These facts are 
not in dispute.  Given this record, we simply disagree with the 
dissent that Morelos’s jury trial waiver was constitutionally 
infirm because Morelos was not also advised that “he could 
participate in jury selection, that the jury must be unanimous 
in order to render a verdict, or that a judge alone would decide 
his guilt and the appropriate penalty in the absence of a jury.”  
(Id. at p. 5.)  Instead, we repeat that there is not “any rigid 
formula or particular form of words that a trial court must use 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
52 
 
in taking a jury waiver” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169) 
and “[u]ltimately, a court must consider the defendant’s 
individual circumstances and exercise judgment in deciding how 
best to ensure that a particular defendant who purports to waive 
a jury trial does so knowingly and intelligently” (id. at p. 170).  
The totality of the circumstances here establish a sound and 
“affirmative[]” basis (Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 310) to 
conclude that Morelos provided a knowing and intelligent 
waiver of his right to a jury trial at the guilt, special 
circumstance, and penalty phases of his trial.   
G.  Statutory Jury Trial Waiver Requirements 
Morelos argues that the court committed statutory error 
by failing to take a separate jury trial waiver for the special 
circumstance allegations, as required under People v. Memro 
(1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 700–704.   
 
Section 190.4, subdivision (a) requires a “ ‘separate, 
personal waiver’ of the right to a jury for a special circumstance 
allegation, above and beyond the standard guilt phase and 
penalty phase waiver.”  (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 176.)  
This requirement is satisfied if the record shows the defendant 
is aware that the waiver applies to guilt, special circumstances, 
and penalty.  It does not require a separate enunciated waiver 
by the defendant.  (Ibid.)  In Sivongxxay, we held that the 
statute was violated where “the term ‘special circumstance’ was 
never mentioned at all” during the waiver colloquy.  (Id. at 
p. 178.)   
Here, by contrast, the trial court told Morelos that he was 
entitled to “12 individuals to make the factual determination 
both as to your guilt and in the event that that jury would find 
you guilty and determine one or more special circumstance to be 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
53 
 
true, that you would have a constitutional right to a jury to 
determine the penalty for which the crimes would be 
punishable.”  This express reference to a jury finding on the 
special circumstance allegations shows that Morelos was “aware 
that the waiver applie[d] to each of these aspects of trial.”  
(People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 565; accord, People v. 
Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056, 1075 (Weaver); People v. Wrest 
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1103–1104.)  There was no need for a 
separate interrogation about the special circumstance jury trial 
rights.  (Wrest, at p. 1105.)  
H.  Fundamental Fairness, Reliability, and Eighth 
Amendment Standards 
Morelos presents several arguments challenging the 
fairness and reliability of his capital trial and sentence and 
asserts that his conviction, death eligibility finding, and death 
verdict must be reversed.  These arguments largely restate 
Morelos’s prior challenges to the trial court’s rulings under a 
more general unfairness rubric.  Specifically, Morelos contends 
that because he lacked two necessary protections in the criminal 
justice system — defense counsel and a jury — the adversarial 
process broke down and his trial failed to satisfy due process 
standards, as well as the state’s independent interest in the 
fairness, integrity, and heightened reliability of capital 
proceedings.  However, having concluded Morelos validly 
exercised his right to self-representation and waived his right to 
a jury trial, as well as his right to remain silent, these claims 
similarly fail.   
“Ordinarily, criminal defendants may waive rights that 
exist for their own benefit.  ‘Permitting waiver . . . is consistent 
with the solicitude shown by modern jurisprudence to 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
54 
 
the defendant’s prerogative to waive the most crucial of rights.’ ”  
(Cowan v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 371.)   
Morelos broadly asserts that he could not waive his right 
to due process and a fair trial, nor could he waive the “interest 
of the justice system and community in reliable punishment.”  
However, he did not do so.  As explained ante, the trial court 
ensured a valid waiver of his right to counsel and to a jury trial.  
We have recognized that “[t]he tension between the right of self-
representation and the interest in ensuring a fair trial was a 
matter of dispute in Faretta itself, and it persists to this day.  
The rule announced by the Faretta majority, however, remains 
the law of the land.  [Citation.]  This court, of course, may not 
adopt an alternative view of what the Sixth Amendment 
requires.”  (People v. Butler (2009) 47 Cal.4th 814, 824, fn. 
omitted.)  Having knowingly and intelligently chosen to exercise 
his constitutional right to self-representation and waived his 
right to a jury trial, Morelos cannot now complain that his 
choices compounded to deprive him of a fair trial.   
Morelos claims “the prosecutor’s work with [him] to shape 
his testimony in the prosecution’s favor constituted misconduct 
and a due process violation.”  In Morelos’s view, “the trial was a 
performance directed by the prosecutor” during which the 
prosecutor was permitted to present an untested, misleading 
view of the evidence.  While Morelos concedes that the 
prosecutor was permitted to communicate with him, he asserts 
“the prosecutor went far beyond any permissible line regarding 
communication with a pro [se] defendant when he shaped 
appellant’s inculpatory guilt phase testimony.”  As Morelos 
explains, the defense portion of the guilt phase began with him 
taking the stand and the following exchange: 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
55 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Well, I’d like to let the prosecution 
question me.  We discussed yesterday that a line of 
questioning that we both more or less agreed on that 
would cover issues not already covered.   
“THE COURT:  Well, he can only cross-examine you about 
things that you have testified to on direct.  Mr. Schon, you 
waive any question and answer format and let the 
defendant —  
“THE PROSECUTOR:  Yes, I do.  And I’d like to state for 
the record Mr. Morelos discussed with me yesterday 
whether he wanted to testify.  I indicated it was up to him 
to testify.  I can’t advise him of it.  But if he did testify, 
there are certain areas I would like to cover concerning the 
torture aspects of the case with him and various factors 
about the crime itself I would ask him questions about.  
But his testifying is up to him.  Right, Mr. Morelos?  
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.  
“THE COURT:  He can only cross-examine you on areas 
you covered in your direct.  He waived the formality of 
question and answer.  So narrative, if you just want to tell 
us what you want to tell us, that’s fine with me.” 
Morelos then began his narrative testimony, describing, 
inter alia, his  intent to inflict “great bodily pain” upon 
Anderson, his “intent to kill” Anderson, and clarifying that he 
“raped” Anderson using “extreme force” even though he had 
previously told police that he and Anderson had consensual sex.   
Morelos claims that, “although the exact contents of the 
discussion between appellant and the prosecutor the day before 
appellant testified are unknown, the impact of the discussion 
was to lighten the prosecution’s burden of proof at the guilt 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
56 
 
phase.”  Morelos points to the distinctions between his pretrial 
admissions to police and his trial testimony, asserting that such 
changes were meant to fill evidentiary gaps identified by the 
prosecution. 
“While a pro se litigant may divide the duties or 
representation as would any other lawyer, she may not insulate 
herself from contact by the court or adversary counsel.”  
(McMillan v. Shadow Ridge at Oak Park Homeowner’s Assn. 
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 960, 967.)  Thus, the prosecutor did not 
commit misconduct by engaging with Morelos the day before he 
took the stand.  Notably, Morelos admits to otherwise initiating 
communication with the prosecutor.  On the day in question, it 
was arguably necessary for Morelos and the prosecutor to confer 
about some of the unique logistics that can arise when a self-
represented defendant testifies in his or her own defense.  For 
instance, a conversation between the prosecutor and Morelos 
about Morelos testifying in narrative form could have benefitted 
Morelos, and Morelos fails to establish misconduct based on his 
mere communication with the prosecutor.  Moreover, Morelos 
does not show that any alleged overstepping by the prosecutor 
affected his decision to waive his right against self-
incrimination.  The prosecutor told the trial court that “Morelos 
discussed with me yesterday whether he wanted to testify” and 
“I indicated it was up to him to testify.”  There is nothing from 
the exchange to indicate that the prosecution acted improperly.  
Indeed, to the contrary, the prosecutor repeatedly stated that he 
had advised Morelos that he could not give him legal advice as 
to whether to testify and that the decision to testify was up to 
Morelos and then asked him to confirm the same on the record, 
which he did.  Having made the choice to testify, Morelos was 
free to admit guilt during his trial testimony.  (Bloom, supra, 
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57 
 
48 Cal.3d at p. 1222.)  On this record, Morelos’s accusations of 
prosecutorial misconduct prove unpersuasive.   
Morelos also accuses the prosecutor of presenting 
“incomplete, misleading testimony regarding the marks on the 
victim’s genitals, which was relevant to the torture special 
circumstances.”  He points out that, at the preliminary hearing, 
Dr. Pakdaman testified on direct examination that bruise marks 
on Anderson’s genitals were partially “superimposed by . . . 
postmortem lividity,” meaning the natural pooling of blood that 
occurs after death.  During cross-examination at the 
preliminary hearing by then-appointed defense counsel, Dr. 
Pakdaman conceded it was difficult to decipher how many of the 
genital markings were caused by bruising versus lividity; “there 
is some bruising plus lividity, which are sort of mixed.”  At 
Morelos’s bench trial, the prosecutor elicited similar testimony 
regarding the bruising on Anderson’s genitals, explaining that 
bruising “is usually discoloration of the skin while an individual 
is alive,” but Dr. Pakdaman provided no testimony regarding 
lividity.  The prosecutor’s trial questions focused on the 
“extensiveness of the bruising in relation to the pain.”   
Morelos argues that the prosecutor’s selective questioning 
presented an impermissibly “misleading version of the facts” 
that was central to the torture-murder special-circumstance 
allegation. 
Morelos did not object to the prosecutor’s questioning of 
Dr. Pakdaman regarding the bruising on Anderson’s genitals.  
As a general rule, a defendant waives a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct absent a timely and specific objection unless an 
objection would be futile.  (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 
820.)  Nevertheless, Morelos’s claim lacks merit.  The 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
58 
 
prosecutor’s examination of Dr. Pakdaman regarding bruising 
did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct.  Dr. Pakdaman’s 
testimony that bruising was evident on Anderson’s genitalia 
was neither false nor misleading; it was entirely consistent with 
his preliminary hearing testimony.  The prosecutor did not 
commit misconduct by failing to explore how many of the genital 
markings were caused by bruising versus lividity.  Morelos, like 
his counsel at the preliminary hearing, was free to question Dr. 
Pakdaman about lividity to fill in any perceived evidentiary 
gaps or inconsistencies for the trial court.   
Morelos faults the trial court for not sufficiently 
maintaining a fair, adversarial trial process at both the guilt 
and penalty phases, allowing Morelos’s “testimony to become a 
free-for-all,” but this claim also fails.  He claims the trial court 
should not have permitted the prosecution to ask Morelos 
leading questions on cross-examination because Morelos was 
essentially a prosecution witness.  (See Evid. Code, §§ 767, subd. 
(a) [except under “special circumstances,” leading questions may 
only be asked on cross-examination], 773, subd. (b) [“The cross-
examination of a witness by any party whose interest is not 
adverse to the party calling him is subject to the same rules that 
are applicable to the direct examination”].)  However, when 
questioned by the prosecution, Morelos was being cross-
examined.  The fact that he provided testimony favorable to the 
prosecution did not convert him into a nonadverse party.  As 
stated, during the defense case, Morelos was free to waive his 
right against self-incrimination and testify in incriminating 
narrative form; the fact that he did so did not deprive the 
prosecution of its right to ask him leading questions on cross-
examination.   
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
59 
 
Morelos contends the procedural requirements articulated 
in Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1194 were not met and his 
convictions 
and 
sentence 
must 
be 
overturned 
as 
unconstitutionally unreliable.  In Bloom, the defendant opted to 
represent himself during the penalty phase and urged the jury 
to return a death verdict.  (Id. at pp. 1215–1216, 1218.)  On 
appeal, he argued in part that the failure to present mitigating 
evidence during the penalty phase, combined with his personal 
request for a death verdict, “offended the state’s interest in 
ensuring the reliability of capital penalty determinations.”  (Id. 
at p. 1218.)  We rejected the argument.  We observed that “[t]he 
threat of appellate reversal would be not merely ineffective but 
counterproductive” under these circumstances.  (Id. at p. 1227.)  
“A knowledgeable defendant desiring to avoid the death penalty 
could make a timely request for self-representation under 
Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, and then decline to present any 
mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, secure in the 
knowledge that any death judgment would be reversed by this 
court, while a defendant genuinely desiring death could 
circumvent the rule by presenting a bare minimum of mitigating 
evidence.”  (Ibid.)  Instead, “the required reliability is attained 
when the prosecution has discharged its burden of proof at the 
guilt and penalty phases pursuant to the rules of evidence and 
within the guidelines of a constitutional death penalty statute, 
the death verdict has been returned under proper instructions 
and procedures, and the trier of penalty has duly considered the 
relevant mitigating evidence, if any, which the defendant has 
chosen to present.  A judgment of death entered in conformity 
with these rigorous standards does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment reliability requirements.”  (Id. at p. 1228.)   
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
60 
 
Morelos does not meaningfully distinguish his defense 
strategy during the guilt and penalty phases from the 
defendant’s penalty phase strategy in Bloom and we therefore 
reject his assertion that his trial lacked the procedural 
protections required by Bloom.  While Morelos represented 
himself throughout his trial and testified during both the guilt 
and penalty phases, providing incriminating details of his 
crimes, it was within his rights to do so.  As we stated in Bloom, 
a court cannot compel a defendant to put on mitigating evidence.  
(Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1227.)  Moreover, Morelos’s 
strategy did not ensure the outcome of his trial nor compromise 
the trial court’s duty to hold the prosecution to its burden of 
proof.  The court was free to reject Morelos’s testimony and did 
so, in part.  Before announcing its penalty verdict, the trial court 
noted that it “sought guidance from the California Supreme 
Court in the case of People versus Bloom that can be found at 
48 Cal.3d 1194.”  The trial court thereafter refused to consider 
prior offenses Morelos claimed to have committed that could not 
be proved by independent evidence.  On this record, like in 
Bloom, the required reliability was obtained at both the guilt 
and penalty phases of Morelos’s trial.   
In contending his trial was an unreliable “empty charade,” 
Morelos also points to the fact that he was denied advisory 
counsel and the court characterized his trial as a “slow plea.”  
However, we have determined that the denial of Morelos’s 
request for “assistant counsel” did not affect the outcome of his 
trial.  And we have rejected Morelos’s claim that the trial 
proceedings amounted to a slow plea in violation of section 1018.  
This derivative claim is made no more persuasive by its 
reframing.   
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I.  Meaningful Review of the Penalty 
Determination 
Morelos contends his death sentence must be vacated 
because he was denied independent review of the penalty 
verdict.  He insists that we must read into section 190.4, 
subdivision (e) “a mechanism for independent review of a trial 
court’s penalty verdict and remand this case so that the review 
can take place, or the Court must declare the California statute 
unconstitutional as applied to cases in which a jury trial has 
been waived.”  According to Morelos, to satisfy due process 
standards, a second judge must review the sentencing judge’s 
penalty verdict.  Furthermore, if section 190.4, subdivision (e) is 
read not to apply to judge-sentenced defendants, Morelos 
contends it unconstitutionally deprives him of equal protection 
of the laws. 
Under section 190.4, subdivision (e), when a verdict of 
death has been rendered, “the defendant shall be deemed to 
have made an application for modification of such verdict or 
finding . . . .  In ruling on the application, the judge shall review 
the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in Section 
190.3, and shall make a determination as to whether the jury’s 
findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances 
outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or 
the evidence presented.  The judge shall state on the record the 
reasons for his findings.”  “[T]his court and the United States 
Supreme Court have cited the provisions of section 190.4, 
subdivision (e), as an additional safeguard against arbitrary and 
capricious imposition of the death penalty in California.”  
(People v. Lewis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 214, 226.)   
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62 
 
At the conclusion of the penalty phase of Morelos’s trial, 
the trial court detailed its findings as to each factor relevant to 
a penalty determination of death enumerated in section 190.3.  
(See § 190.3, factors (a)–(k).)  The court then determined the 
“factors in aggravation substantially outweigh the factors in 
mitigation.”  As such, the court determined the penalty should 
be death.  The court thereafter explained to Morelos his right to 
file a motion for a new trial and his right to move to modify the 
judgment.  The court then set a date for any such motions.  At 
the subsequent proceedings, the trial court addressed Morelos 
as follows, “This is the time if you so desire that you could make 
a motion for the court to reconsider the weighing of the factors 
in aggravation against the factors in mitigation.  Do you wish 
the court to do that?”  Morelos answered “No,” and the court 
proceeded to sentencing without objection.   
Morelos’s claims are similar to those we rejected in 
Weaver, supra, 53 Cal.4th 1056.  In Weaver, before accepting a 
jury trial waiver, the trial court advised the defendant that he 
would not be entitled to a modification hearing under section 
190.4.  (Id. at p. 1090.)  The defendant indicated he understood.  
(Ibid.)  After imposing a penalty of death, the trial court, out of 
“ ‘an abundance of caution’ ” conducted a hearing under section 
190.4, reviewing the mitigating and aggravating evidence but 
declining to modify the verdict.  (Id. at pp. 1090–1091.)  We were 
unpersuaded by the defendant’s claim that he did not receive a 
proper hearing under section 190.4, subdivision (e).   
First, we determined that the Weaver defendant forfeited 
his statutory claim by failing to object at trial.  (Weaver, supra, 
53 Cal.4th at p. 1091.)  We nevertheless proceeded to reject his 
argument on the merits.  We pointed out that “ ‘ “[w]e have 
never decided whether a defendant who waives a jury trial on 
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63 
 
the issue of penalty is entitled to a modification hearing under 
section 190.4, subdivision (e).” ’  [Citation.]. . . .  In Horning, the 
trial court had given a detailed statement of reasons for its 
penalty phase verdict, and we observed that ‘[n]othing in section 
190.4 suggests the court must state its reasons twice.’ ”  (Ibid., 
quoting People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 912 (Horning).)  
Since the trial court in Weaver stated its reasons twice, there 
was no conceivable error.  (Weaver, at p. 1091.)  Nor did the 
Weaver defendant persuade us “that because section 190.4, 
subdivision (e), does not logically apply to a court trial, the 
California death penalty scheme is ‘unconstitutional in that it 
fails to provide a mechanism for an independent review of a trial 
court's penalty phase verdict.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Observing that the 
defendant cited no supportive authority, we declined to conclude 
that a defendant who waives a jury trial has a constitutional 
right to independent review of the court’s verdict.  (Ibid.)  In 
sum, the Weaver defendant made the decision to waive a jury 
and forgo a section 190.4 hearing; “[p]ermitting him to make 
that decision did not violate his rights.”  (Id. at p. 1091.) 
Morelos, like the defendant in Weaver, waived any claim of 
error under section 190.4 by expressly refusing the trial court’s 
offer to review its penalty verdict.  (See Weaver, supra, 53 Cal.4th 
at p. 1091; see also Horning, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 912.)  Indeed, 
Morelos acknowledges that we have previously deemed such claims 
of error under section 190.4 waived by the failure to object.  As for 
Morelos’s constitutional claim, we are not persuaded that 
independent review of his penalty verdict at the trial court level 
was constitutionally mandated by due process or equal protection 
principles.  Like in Weaver, Morelos “cites no authority holding that 
a defendant who waives a jury has a constitutional right to an 
independent review of the court’s verdict.”  (Weaver, at p. 1091.)  
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
64 
 
Moreover, the trial court clearly stated its reasons for Morelos’s 
penalty phase verdict on the record and Morelos fails to explain 
how an additional trial level review by a second judge would 
increase the reliability of his verdict, which is subject to our 
automatic review (§ 1239, subd. (b)).  Nor has Morelos shown that 
it is impermissible for the state to distinguish, for purposes of the 
review contemplated by section 190.4, subdivision (e), between a 
penalty determination rendered by a jury and one rendered by a 
judge.  Morelos shows no greater entitlement to relief than the 
defendant in Weaver.  Similar to the Weaver defendant, having 
validly waived his right to a jury trial and declined the trial court’s 
offer to reconsider his penalty verdict, Morelos fails to persuade us 
that his rights were violated.  (Weaver, at p. 1091.)    
J.  California’s Death Penalty Statute Does Not 
Violate the United States Constitution 
Morelos offers several constitutional challenges to 
California’s death penalty scheme, acknowledging that we have 
previously rejected them.  Morelos provides no persuasive 
reason for us to either reconsider our decisions in those cases or 
draw a sufficient distinction between the scope of those decisions 
and the facts in this case.  We reiterate our prior decisions.   
Morelos asserts that the special circumstances contained 
in section 190.2 fail to meaningfully narrow the class of death-
eligible murderers in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  
This claim is meritless.  (See People v. McDaniel (2021) 
12 Cal.5th 97, 155 (McDaniel); People v. Steskal (2021) 
11 Cal.5th 332, 379; People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 
1012–1013 (Capers); People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 
291 (Ghobrial).)  Nor does section 190.3, factor (a), permitting 
the sentencer to consider the “circumstances of the crime” when 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
65 
 
making its penalty determination, result in the arbitrary and 
capricious imposition of the death penalty.  (McDaniel, at p. 155; 
Steskal, at p. 379; Capers, at p. 1013; Ghobrial, at p. 291.) 
Morelos contends his death sentence is unconstitutional 
because it did not require findings beyond a reasonable doubt, 
“not only that the factual bases for its decision are true, but that 
death is the appropriate penalty.”  “ ‘Neither the federal nor the 
state Constitution requires that the penalty phase jury find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh 
mitigating factors before determining whether or not to impose 
a death sentence,’ and the United States Supreme Court’s Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence, including Apprendi [v. New Jersey 
(2000)] 530 U.S. 466, does not demand such a requirement.  
(People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184, 1232 [218 Cal.Rptr. 3d 
315, 395 P.3d 208].)”  (Ghobrial, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 291–
292.) 
 
Moreover, 
the 
death 
penalty 
statute 
is 
not 
unconstitutional because “ ‘it does not require . . . findings 
beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance 
(other than Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (b) or (c) evidence) has 
been proved, that the aggravating factors outweighed the 
mitigating factors, or that death is the appropriate sentence.’ ”  
(People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 267; see also McDaniel, 
supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 155–156.)  
Contrary to Morelos’s arguments, as we have repeatedly 
stated, intercase proportionality review is not constitutionally 
required in capital cases.  (McDaniel, supra, 12 Cal.5th at 
p. 157; Capers, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1016–1017; Ghobrial, 
supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 293.)  Nor does California’s death penalty 
scheme violate equal protection principles by treating capital 
defendants and noncapital defendants differently.  “Because 
capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
66 
 
defendants, California does not deny capital defendants equal 
protection by providing certain procedural protections to 
noncapital defendants that are not provided to capital 
defendants.”  (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 87 (Jones); see 
also McDaniel, at p. 157.)   
Finally, Morelos’s allegation that California’s use “of the 
death penalty as a regular form of punishment” violates 
international law is meritless.  “ ‘California does not employ 
capital punishment in such a manner.’ ”  (Jones, supra, 
54 Cal.4th at p. 88; see also McDaniel, supra, 12 Cal.5th at 
p. 157; Ghobrial, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 293.)  
K.  Newly Conferred Discretion on the Firearm and 
Serious Felony Enhancements 
1.  Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) 
Morelos contends, and the Attorney General agrees, that 
Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 
620), which was enacted after Morelos was sentenced, applies 
retroactively to his case.   
On January 1, 2018, Senate Bill No. 620 became effective.  
(Stats. 2017, ch. 682, §§ 1 & 2.)  The bill vested courts with 
authority to exercise their discretion to strike or dismiss firearm 
enhancements imposed under section 12022.5 (see § 12022.5, 
subd. (c), as amended by Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 1).  Prior to the 
enactment of Senate Bill No. 620, these enhancements were 
mandatory.  (§ 12022.5, former subd. (c).)  
 
We agree with the parties that a limited remand is 
appropriate to allow the trial court to consider its newly 
conferred discretion to strike Morelos’s five-year section 
12022.5, subdivision (a) firearm enhancement.   
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
67 
 
2.  Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) 
 
Morelos similarly contends, and the Attorney General 
agrees, that Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate 
Bill No. 1393) requires his case to be remanded so the trial court 
can consider whether to strike his two 5-year prior serious felony 
enhancements.   
 
At the time Morelos was sentenced, the court was required 
under section 667, subdivision (a), to enhance the sentence 
imposed for conviction of a serious felony by five years for each 
qualifying prior serious felony conviction.  On September 30, 
2018, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 1393 (effective 
January 1, 2019), amending sections 667, subdivision (a) and 
1385, subdivision (b) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1, 2)  to permit a 
trial court to exercise discretion to strike or dismiss prior serious 
felony enhancements “in the furtherance of justice.”  (§ 1385, 
subd. (b)(1), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, § 2.)   
The Attorney General concedes that the amendments 
apply retroactively to Morelos’s case.  We agree with the parties 
that a limited remand is appropriate for the trial court to 
consider whether to exercise its recently conferred discretion.   
L.  Prior Prison Term Enhancements 
 
Morelos asserts, and the Attorney General concedes, that 
recently enacted Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) 
(Senate Bill No. 136), which narrowed who is eligible for the one-
year enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b), applies 
retroactively to his case.  As stated, the court found that Morelos 
served one prior prison term for assault with a deadly weapon 
by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury within the 
meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (a), which provides for a 
three-year enhancement.  The court also found Morelos to have 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
68 
 
served a prior prison term for first degree burglary within the 
meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b), which provides for a 
one-year enhancement.  The court stayed punishment for these 
enhancements.   
 
On October 8, 2019, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 
136, which amended section 667.5, effective January 1, 2020.  
(Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.)  Senate Bill No. 136 narrowed 
eligibility for the one-year prior prison term enhancement to 
those who have served a prior prison sentence for a sexually 
violent offense.  (§ 667.5, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2019, 
ch. 590, § 1.)4 
 
Morelos’s prior prison term for first degree burglary was 
not for a sexually violent offense.  (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 
6600, subd. (b) [defining “Sexually violent offense”].)  Therefore, 
the parties agree, as do we, that Morelos’s one-year prior prison 
term enhancement should be stricken.  
 
However, the parties disagree over a related question.  
Namely, whether, if on remand the court again imposes the five-
year section 667, subdivision (a) serious felony enhancement for 
the assault with a deadly weapon, the trial court must stay or 
strike the remaining three-year prior prison term enhancement 
stemming from the same offense.  Since this question will only 
arise if the trial court declines to strike the serious felony 
enhancement at issue, we need not consider it at this time.    
 
4  
Section 667.5 was amended again in 2021 (Stats. 2021, ch. 
626, § 28), but those amendments have no bearing on the 
analysis of the issue before us. 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
69 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
For the reasons stated above, we vacate as unauthorized 
the one-year prior prison term enhancement imposed under 
former section 667.5, subdivision (b) and remand to the trial 
court for resentencing consistent with this opinion (see ante, pts. 
II.K. and II.L.).  Following resentencing, the trial court is 
directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and 
forward 
it 
to 
the 
Department 
of 
Corrections 
and 
Rehabilitation.  In all other respects, the judgment (including 
the judgment of death) is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
S051968 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
A trial court may not accept a criminal defendant’s waiver 
of the constitutional right to a jury trial unless the waiver is 
“knowing and intelligent, that is, ‘ “ ‘made with a full awareness 
both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the 
consequences of the decision to abandon it.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. 
Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 305 (Collins); see U.S. Const., 6th 
Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.)  A reviewing court may uphold 
the validity of a jury trial waiver only “ ‘if the record 
affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and intelligent under 
the totality of the circumstances.’ ”  (Collins, at p. 310, italics 
added.)  Applying these standards, I cannot conclude on the 
record before us that defendant Valdamir Fred Morelos validly 
waived his right to a jury trial in this capital case.  I respectfully 
dissent from today’s affirmance of the judgment. 
I. 
The record before us presents three significant concerns.  
The first is the spare nature of the waiver colloquy.  We have 
emphasized “the value of a robust oral colloquy in evincing a 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of a jury trial.”  
(People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 169 (Sivongxxay).)  
And we have urged trial courts to “advise a defendant of the 
basic mechanics of a jury trial in a waiver colloquy, including 
but not necessarily limited to the facts that (1) a jury is made up 
of 12 members of the community; (2) a defendant through his or 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
2 
 
her counsel may participate in jury selection; (3) all 12 jurors 
must unanimously agree in order to render a verdict; and (4) if 
a defendant waives the right to a jury trial, a judge alone will 
decide his or her guilt or innocence.”  (Ibid.)  It is true that we 
have not insisted on a rigid rubric of advisements, nor have we 
required advisement of every one of these four points in order to 
uphold a jury trial waiver.  But the record in this case is so 
devoid of meaningful advisement that there is no sound basis to 
infer — much less any “affirmative[]” indication (Collins, supra, 
26 Cal.4th at p. 310) — that Morelos knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to a jury trial. 
At a hearing on August 11, 1995, after a discussion among 
the prosecutor, Morelos, and Judge Ball regarding the jury 
waiver, Judge Ball said the case would be reassigned to Judge 
Creed because Judge Ball was unwilling to accept a jury waiver 
for both the guilt and penalty phases.  Judge Ball then engaged 
Morelos in a waiver colloquy.  Judge Ball told Morelos that he 
had a right to a jury of 12 individuals, but he did not explain 
that the jurors had to be unanimous, that Morelos would 
participate in jury selection, and that the jurors would be 
selected from members of the community.  He did not explain 
that without a jury, Judge Creed alone would make all 
determinations about Morelos’s guilt, special circumstances, 
and penalty.  Judge Ball then accepted Morelos’s waiver.   
Once the matter was reassigned to Judge Creed, Judge 
Creed confirmed Morelos’s waiver.  Judge Creed did not explain 
any features of a jury trial.  He merely confirmed that Morelos 
knew he had an “absolute constitutional right” to a jury and that 
he understood that right.  After the guilt phase, Judge Creed 
again confirmed that Morelos did not want to empanel a jury for 
the penalty phase but again did not explain the jury right. 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
3 
 
These three colloquies — one with Judge Ball and two 
with Judge Creed — were more lacking in substance, either 
individually or collectively, than any colloquies we have 
considered in upholding a jury trial waiver.  In People v. Weaver 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056 (Weaver), the defendant waived his right 
to a jury trial by completing a written waiver explaining that 
the court would determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence 
and that if the court found the defendant guilty and found a 
special circumstance to be true, the court would determine the 
appropriate penalty.  (Id. at p. 1070.)  In court, the trial judge 
again explained that he alone would determine “ ‘all legal 
findings,’ ” including the special circumstance.  (Ibid.)  He 
further emphasized that the defendant had a right to a 
unanimous jury.  (Ibid.)  We held that the defendant’s waiver 
was knowing and intelligent, even though the defendant was not 
expressly advised of his right to participate in jury selection. 
In People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609 
(Cunningham), the defendant waived his right to a guilt phase 
jury trial.  (Id. at p. 636.)  The trial judge informed the defendant 
of his right to a unanimous jury and that in the absence of a 
jury, the judge alone would make a determination of guilt or 
innocence.  (Ibid.)  He further advised the defendant that “it 
could be easier for the prosecution to convince only one person, 
as opposed to 12.”  (Ibid.)  We held that this waiver was knowing 
and intelligent and that the trial court’s colloquy was “a full 
explanation . . . of the right and the consequences of the waiver.”  
(Id. at p. 637.) 
In Sivongxxay, the defendant waived his right to a jury at 
a pretrial hearing.  (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 164.)  The 
trial judge informed the defendant that he had a right to a trial 
by jury, that the jury would be made up of 12 members of the 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
4 
 
community, that he would participate in the selection of the 
jury, and that the judge would determine his guilt or innocence 
and any penalty in the absence of a jury.  (Id. at p. 167.)  We 
held that this colloquy was sufficient and that it was not 
necessary 
to 
inform 
the 
defendant 
of 
the 
unanimity 
requirement.  (Id. at p. 168.)  The court also held that the trial 
judge’s failure to specifically mention that the judge would 
determine the presence of special circumstances did not make 
the defendant’s waiver invalid.  (Id. at p. 171.)  “There is no 
additional constitutional requirement that a defendant be 
specifically advised of the specific charges, enhancements, 
allegations, or other issues to which a general jury waiver will 
apply.”  (Ibid.; but see id. at p. 206 (conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J.); 
id. at p. 219 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).) 
In People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961 (Daniels), the 
defendant sought to waive his right to a jury trial at the guilt 
and penalty phases of trial.  (Id. at p. 986 (conc. & dis. opn. of 
Cuéllar, J.).)  The trial judge engaged the defendant in a 
colloquy explaining that he would determine the defendant’s 
guilt or innocence, the presence of special circumstances, and 
the penalty.  (Id. at pp. 987–989.)  The defendant repeatedly, 
even emphatically, affirmed his intent to waive a jury trial.  (Id. 
at p. 995.)  However, the trial judge never explained that a jury 
is made up of 12 members of the community, that the jury must 
be unanimous, or that the defendant would have the right to 
participate in jury selection.  (Id. at p. 994.).  We upheld the jury 
waiver with respect to the guilt phase but not with respect to 
the penalty phase.  (Id. at pp. 966–967 (per curiam).) 
In this case, neither Judge Ball nor Judge Creed informed 
Morelos that he could participate in jury selection, that the jury 
must be unanimous in order to render a verdict, or that a judge 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
5 
 
alone would decide his guilt and the appropriate penalty in the 
absence of a jury.  At the very least, the record of advisement 
here leaves as much doubt about the validity of the waiver as 
the record in Daniels, where we refused to uphold the waiver 
with respect to the penalty phase.  Even if it were true that 
“[t]he waiver colloquy here was . . . more substantial than in 
Daniels” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 50), that is not saying much.  (Cf. 
Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 994 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, 
J.) [“The court did not, prior to accepting the waiver, elaborate 
on what a jury trial entails, other than that it is not the same 
thing as a trial before a judge.  The court did not explain 
anything about the nature of the jury — for example, what 
constitutes a jury, how a jury is selected, or that jury members 
must be impartial and their verdict unanimous.”].)  Whatever 
daylight there is between Daniels and this case, the colloquies 
here, as in Daniels, leave us in the dark as to whether Morelos’s 
jury trial waiver was knowing and intelligent. 
Second, Morelos was self-represented.  In prior cases, the 
role of counsel has played an important role in our analysis.  In 
Weaver, the defendant was represented by counsel and stated 
on the record that his attorney had explained the meaning of a 
jury trial versus a court trial.  (Weaver, supra, 53 Cal.4th at 
p. 1070.)  One of his attorneys explained that they had discussed 
the jury waiver for “about two hours” the day before.  (Id. at 
p. 1071.)  And the trial judge gave the defendant “ample time 
. . . to discuss [the jury waiver] with counsel.”  (Id. at p. 1075.)  
We held that “the court and defense counsel fully explained to 
defendant what he was waiving.”  (Id. at p. 1074.)  Similarly, the 
defendant in Cunningham was represented by counsel and had 
discussed the jury waiver with counsel.  (Cunningham, supra, 
61 Cal.4th at p. 636.) 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
6 
 
In Sivongxxay, the defendant was represented by counsel, 
although there was no evidence that the defendant ever 
discussed his jury waiver with counsel.  (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 
Cal.5th at p. 205 (conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J.).)  Nevertheless, 
this court considered the mere fact that the defendant was 
represented by counsel as one of the circumstances that 
confirmed that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and 
intelligent.  (Id. at p. 173, fn. 8.) 
In Daniels, the defendant was not represented by counsel 
at the time of his jury waiver, nor did he have any conversations 
with any counsel about his waiver.  (Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 
p. 997 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)  This was a relevant 
factor in the ultimate determination that the defendant did not 
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a penalty phase 
jury trial.  (See id. at p. 1029 (conc. opn. of Kruger, J.); see also 
id. at p. 1024 (conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.) [noting that lack 
of counsel is “undoubtedly . . . relevant” because counsel “may 
explain the features of a jury trial, the nuances of jury selection, 
how a jury is likely to view the facts of the case, and the 
possibility of a mistrial”].)  While a jury waiver is not 
automatically presumed valid because a defendant has counsel, 
lack of counsel is “one less assurance that [the defendant 
underst[ands] the nature of the right he [is] relinquishing and 
the effects of doing so.”  (Id. at p. 997 (conc. & dis. opn. of 
Cuéllar, J.).) 
Here, as in Daniels, the trial judges did not ask whether 
Morelos ever received any information about waiving his jury 
right.  (See Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1029 (conc. opn. of 
Kruger, J.); id. at p. 997 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.) [“we 
decline the People’s invitation to speculate as to possible 
discussions with counsel which would have had no bearing on 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
7 
 
decisions made or topics even mentioned on the record during 
the course of counsel’s representation”].)  Morelos’s lack of 
counsel makes it even more concerning that the waiver 
colloquies were so devoid of substance. 
To be sure, a defendant’s independent legal knowledge is 
relevant, and Morelos had experience with the criminal justice 
system and “exhibited some legal knowledge” in his filings in 
this case.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 51.)  But in our past cases, there 
was evidence that the defendants had heard express 
explanations of their right to a jury in previous encounters with 
the criminal justice system.  (Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 
p. 1023 (conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.) [prior explanation of 
the unanimity requirement]; Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 
p. 167 [prior written jury waiver].)  Here, there is no evidence of 
what Morelos was told about his jury rights in his prior cases.  
There is no evidence that he was ever adequately informed of 
the nature of the jury trial right in any of his prior prosecutions.  
While he did enter guilty pleas in past cases, those pleas were 
eight and 14 years before the jury waiver in this case. 
Third, I am concerned about the extent to which the 
prosecutor drove the process of presenting the issue of jury 
waiver to the court.  The prosecutor initially brought up the idea 
of proceeding with a court trial, saying he had spoken with 
Morelos and that they “would be likely to waive jury.”  The 
prosecutor asked Morelos if that was his understanding, and 
Morelos responded without elaboration that it was.  When the 
trial judge expressed hesitation as to the penalty phase jury 
waiver, the prosecutor pushed back, saying he preferred a court 
trial on both phases to avoid going through voir dire with a pro 
se defendant.  At the following hearing, the judge asked whether 
the parties intended to pursue a court trial, and the prosecutor 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
8 
 
again responded in the affirmative and inquired about having 
the case reassigned.  Aside from his comment confirming the 
prosecutor’s first statement, Morelos did not participate in these 
conversations, although he was present. 
Today’s opinion says this case is unlike Daniels, where “it 
was the judge who introduced the idea of a jury trial waiver.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 49.)  But how does the fact that the waiver 
here was prosecutor-driven instead of “judge-driven” (ibid.) in 
any way suggest it was knowing and intelligent? 
The only other case of which I am aware in which the 
record shows the prosecutor made the first reference to 
proceeding with a court trial is Cunningham.  However, the 
record there was not clear whether the prosecutor had been the 
first to raise the idea of proceeding without a jury; the 
prosecutor only stated that “he had discussed with defense 
counsel the possibility of having a bench trial for the guilt 
phase.”  (Cunningham, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 636.)  Notably, 
defense counsel confirmed this and brought the issue up again, 
unprompted, at a later hearing after speaking to the defendant 
and obtaining a written jury waiver.  (Ibid.)  Then, at a third 
hearing, the trial judge asked the defendant to further confirm 
his intent to waive a jury for the guilt phase.  (Ibid.)  The 
defendant did so and confirmed that he had discussed the 
matter with his attorney.  (Ibid.)  Only then, and after engaging 
the defendant in a colloquy, did the trial judge accept the 
defendant’s jury waiver.  (Ibid.)  Even if the prosecutor initially 
raised the issue, the repeated confirmations by both defense 
counsel and the defendant, along with the defendant’s 
conversations with counsel and the relatively thorough colloquy, 
made the prosecutor’s initial suggestion less of a concern. 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
9 
 
The prosecutor in this case was far more involved and 
insistent in seeking a court trial.  The prosecutor pursued this 
topic through multiple preliminary hearings, actively offered 
justifications for a court trial instead of a jury trial, and even 
proposed that the case be reassigned to a different trial judge 
who would be less hesitant to proceed with a full court trial.  The 
prosecutor’s desire to avoid going through jury selection with a 
self-represented defendant has no bearing on whether Morelos’s 
waiver was informed; it simply suggests the prosecutor, not 
Morelos, was determined to have a court trial.  It is true that 
Morelos appeared intent on pleading guilty, but the record 
indicates that it was the prosecutor, not Morelos, who drove the 
jury waiver process, to the point of getting the case reassigned 
to a different judge specifically for this purpose.  The concern is 
not that Morelos was pressured into waiving a jury or that his 
waiver was involuntary.  It is that “multiple conversations” 
between Morelos and a prosecutor intent on avoiding a jury trial 
(maj. opn., ante, at p. 47) provide no basis to infer that Morelos 
was properly informed about the nature of a jury trial.  
II. 
In reaching a contrary holding, today’s decision first looks 
to Judge Ball’s waiver colloquy.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 43.)  But 
that colloquy is threadbare.  At an August 11, 1995 hearing, 
Judge Ball said the following:  “Now, you understand that you 
have an absolute constitutional right to a trial by a jury.  In 
other words, 12 individuals to make the factual determination 
both as to your guilt and in the event that that jury would find 
you guilty and determine one or more special circumstances to 
be true, that you would have a constitutional right to a jury to 
determine the penalty for which the crimes would be 
punishable.  Now, that’s been explained to you and you 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
10 
 
understand that, correct?”  Morelos answered in the affirmative.  
The court then asked, “In other words, you’ve made that decision 
freely and voluntarily based upon your own knowledge and 
understanding of the facts, and the law that’s been explained to 
you and that you understand?”  Again, Morelos answered in the 
affirmative. 
That was the entirety of the advisement provided to 
Morelos.  No other information was provided, and there was no 
other discussion about the mechanics of or right to a jury trial.  
Notwithstanding the extensive parsing of these colloquies in 
today’s opinion (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 43‒44), the sum total of 
the information Morelos received from the colloquies was that a 
jury is composed of 12 individuals who make a factual 
determination as to guilt and decide on the penalty.  This, 
according to today’s opinion, conveys “the core nature of a jury 
trial” (id. at p. 44) — never mind the requirement of jury 
unanimity, the defendant’s right to participate in jury selection, 
the fact that jurors are chosen from members of the community, 
and the fact that waiving the jury means a judge alone would 
decide guilt and penalty. 
The court suggests that Morelos agreed twice in that 
colloquy that the jury right had been explained to him and that 
he understood it.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 43.)  But the first of the 
two questions posed to Morelos — “Now, that’s been explained 
to you and you understand that, correct” — refers to the 
information the court just provided.  The second question — “In 
other words, you’ve made that decision freely and voluntarily 
based upon your own knowledge and understanding of the facts, 
and the law that’s been explained to you and that you 
understand” — simply asked Morelos to confirm that he was 
entering his waiver based on whatever information had been 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
11 
 
provided to him and whatever he may have understood about 
that information.  It provides no indication of what information 
had been conveyed to Morelos and what, if anything, he 
understood about that information. 
Second, the court notes that both Judge Ball and the 
prosecutor referred to jury selection in a prior hearing.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 45.)  Specifically, in the July 27, 1995 hearing 
at which the prosecutor introduced the idea of jury waiver, the 
prosecutor stated in Morelos’s presence that a court trial was 
preferred to “avoid the necessity of going through voir dire on a 
jury with a pro per.”  In the next hearing, conducted August 2, 
1995, Judge Ball made two passing references to jury selection, 
both in the context of calendar planning.  First, he said, “I 
haven’t discussed with you both scheduling and just when you 
perceive this matter would be ready for trial, and at what time, 
what stage juries would be impanelled and the attendant issues 
in terms of jury selection.”  Second, seven pages later in the 
reporter’s transcript, Judge Ball spoke hypothetically about 
potential scheduling conflicts if no department was willing to 
take both a jury and penalty phase waiver and if he (Judge Ball) 
ultimately determined guilt and had to proceed to a penalty 
phase jury trial.  In that context, Judge Ball said, “[T]hen the 
question would be the timing of the selection of the penalty 
phase jury.”  These two passing comments — made in two 
separate hearings that span more than 22 pages of transcript 
and address topics ranging from telephone access to 
scheduling — provide no meaningful information about how a 
jury is selected or Morelos’s right to participate in that process.   
Third, the court reaches back in time more than two years 
to observe that “Morelos’s pretrial conduct and actions at trial 
made clear his desire to have his guilt and penalty adjudicated 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
12 
 
expeditiously.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 46.)  But Morelos’s interest 
in pleading guilty and his desire to avoid issues on appeal shed 
no light on what he understood about his right to have his guilt 
and penalty determined by a jury. 
Fourth, the court notes that during the hearing on 
Morelos’s Faretta motion, Morelos testified that he understood 
he had a right to a trial by jury, and he initialed his Faretta form 
to indicate that he so understood.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 46; see 
Faretta v. California (1975) 433 U.S. 806.)  At that hearing, the 
trial court said, “You understand that you have a right to a 
public, speedy trial and trial by a jury, you understand clearly 
that right?”  Morelos replied, “Yes, sir.”  The preprinted form 
signed by Morelos said the following:  “I understand that I have 
the right to a speedy and public trial and that is a right to a trial 
by jury.”  In addition, among the six pages of advisements 
concerning the rights and responsibilities of a self-represented 
litigant, Morelos initialed to indicate agreement with the 
following:  “I understand that if I am permitted to represent 
myself, it will be necessary for me, WITHOUT THE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, to conduct my own trial 
consisting of (but not limited to),” among other things, 
“Impanelment of jury” and “Preparing a presenting to the Court 
proposed jury instructions.”  Morelos attached a list of 11 cases 
with brief descriptions of how they relate to the right of self-
representation, but neither the listed cases nor Morelos’s brief 
descriptions address the jury trial right.  Again, none of these 
facts provide any indication of what Morelos understood that 
right to entail. 
Fifth, today’s opinion speculates that Morelos must have 
discussed the jury right with his former attorneys during their 
two and a half years of representation, which ended less than a 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
13 
 
month before he waived his jury right.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 47.)  
The court refers to testimony from Morelos during the penalty 
phase — after the trial court accepted his jury waiver — that he 
“ ‘asked to waive jury trial’ ” and “ ‘[t]hey — meaning his 
attorneys — ‘refused that.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Even if we credit this 
testimony, which was not before the trial court at the time it 
accepted his waiver, the record does not indicate — and it is 
mere guesswork — what Morelos’s former attorneys told him 
about the jury trial right. 
Sixth, the court asserts that the prosecutor told the court 
that he and Morelos had “multiple conversations concerning 
Morelos’s desire to waive a jury.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 47.)  The 
record indicates that the prosecutor and Morelos spoke at least 
three times in the weeks leading up to the waiver.  On July 21, 
1995, the prosecutor informed the court, “Mr. Morelos has 
already spoken to me, given me communication today, and I 
think his wish is to have a court trial.”  On July 27, 1995, the 
prosecutor said,  “Well, I’ve talked to Mr. Morelos he called me 
the day before yesterday in the afternoon hours.  We talked for, 
what, about half an hour or so on the telephone, maybe longer. 
We discussed various issues.  Mr. Morelos was interested in 
pleading guilty to the guilt portion of the trial.”  The prosecutor 
then added, “Mr. Morelos and I have talked about this, and I 
think we would be likely to waive jury on this case both as to the 
penalty and guilt phase if that issue came up; is that correct, 
Mr. Morelos?”  Morelos affirmed, without elaboration.  Then, at 
a hearing on August 9, 1995, the prosecutor said, “What does 
the file reflect on the time waiver?  Mr. Morelos talked about it 
with me on the telephone this morning.”  That is all we know 
about these conversations.  The mere fact that the prosecutor 
and Morelos discussed a jury waiver at various times provides 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
14 
 
no basis to infer that the prosecutor adequately informed 
Morelos of what a jury trial entails. 
Finally, the court suggests that “Morelos’s jury waiver was 
contemplated over an extended period of time.”  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 48.)  I do not understand how this sheds any light on what 
Morelos knew about a jury trial. 
III. 
In sum, I agree with today’s opinion that Morelos was 
advised that a jury is comprised of 12 individuals who make a 
factual determination as to guilt and decide on the penalty.  But 
whatever else Morelos knew about the substance of the jury 
right is loose conjecture.  Where does the record in this case 
“ ‘affirmatively show[] that [Morelos’s waiver was] voluntary 
and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances’ ”?  
(Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 310, italics added.)  The record 
before us does not satisfy this standard.  I fear that today’s 
opinion, in concluding otherwise, once again lowers the bar for 
a valid waiver.  (Cf. Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 214 (conc. 
& dis. opn. of Liu, J.) [“We have never upheld a penalty phase 
jury trial waiver on a record of advisement as thin as the one 
here.”].)  One is left to wonder what set of circumstances, in light 
of the speculative inferences this court is willing to draw, could 
fall below the minimum required to show a knowing and 
intelligent waiver. 
“For the average reader (or writer) of judicial opinions, it 
is perhaps elementary what a jury is and how it functions in a 
criminal trial.  But we cannot assume such knowledge among 
the general populace . . . .”  (Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1007 
(conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J.).)  Many studies have shown the 
troubling state of civic literacy in our nation, and “I would not 
PEOPLE v. MORELOS 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
15 
 
assume that despite these glaring gaps in civic literacy, the 
average American nonetheless has a clear understanding of the 
right to a jury trial.”  (Id. at pp. 1007‒1008.)  “The jury’s role in 
a capital case is particularly likely to be unfamiliar. . . .  The 
jury’s normative function as sentencer in a capital trial is 
unusual and especially unlikely to be a matter of common 
understanding.”  (Id. at pp. 1008‒1009.) 
Because the record provides no indication that Morelos 
waived a jury trial “ ‘ “ ‘with a full awareness both of the nature 
of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the 
decision to abandon it’ ” ’ ” (Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 305), 
the judgment cannot stand.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Morelos 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S051968 
Date Filed:  August 11, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Santa Clara 
Judge:  Daniel E. Creed 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek and Mary K. McComb, State Public Defenders, 
under appointments by the Supreme Court, Kathleen M. Scheidel, 
Assistant State Public Defender, Sara Theiss and Caroline P. Cincotta, 
Deputy State Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, 
Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Michael Farrell, Acting Chief Assistant Attorney General, 
Ronald S. Matthias and James William Bilderback II, Assistant 
Attorneys General, Glenn R. Pruden, Catherine A. Rivlin, Sarah J. 
Farhat and Alice B. Lustre, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Caroline P. Cincotta 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, Suite 1000 
Oakland, CA 94607 
(510) 267-3300 
 
Catherine A. Rivlin 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 510-3850