Title: Blake v. Jossart
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2012AP002578
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 2016

2016 WI 57 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2578 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Sonja Blake, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Debra Jossart, Kerry Milkie and Racine County 
Human Services Department, 
          Defendants, 
Department of Children and Families and Eloise 
Anderson, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 364 Wis. 2d 526, 868 N.W.2d 198) 
(Ct. App. 2015 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 24, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Shelley J. Gaylord 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. and BRADLEY, A. W., J. dissent 
(Opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Sheila Sullivan, Jill M. Kastner, and Legal Action of 
Wisconsin, 
Inc., 
Milwaukee, 
and 
oral 
argument 
by 
Sheila 
Sullivan. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents, the cause was argued by 
Maura F.J. Whelan, assistant attorney general with whom on the 
brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2016 WI 57
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP2578   
(L.C. No. 
2010CV1048) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Sonja Blake, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Debra Jossart, Kerry Milkie and Racine County 
Human Services Department, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Department of Children and Families and Eloise 
Anderson, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming a circuit 
court order rejecting constitutional challenges to Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.685(5)(br)5. (2013-14).1 
                                                 
1 Blake v. Jossart, No. 2012AP2578, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. June 11, 2015) (per curiam). 
(continued) 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
2 
¶2 
In late 2009 the Wisconsin Legislature approved 2009 
Wis. Act 76, which substantially changed the circumstances under 
which the Department of Children and Families (DCF) may license 
and certify childcare providers in Wisconsin.  One provision in 
the new law, Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5., "imposes a lifetime 
ban on licensure" and certification for persons who have been 
convicted of specific crimes.  Jamerson v. DCF, 2013 WI 7, ¶2, 
345 Wis. 2d 205, 824 N.W.2d 822. 
¶3 
After the Act took effect, the Racine County Human 
Services Department (Racine County) revoked the childcare 
certification previously issued to Sonja Blake (Blake) because 
she had a 1986 conviction for misdemeanor welfare fraud.  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5., the 1986 conviction made Blake 
ineligible 
for 
certification. 
 
Blake 
raised 
various 
constitutional challenges to the statute in the Dane County 
Circuit Court and in the court of appeals.  She did not prevail. 
¶4 
Before 
this 
court, 
Blake 
renews 
the 
three 
constitutional arguments she raised in the courts below.  First, 
she contends that the lifetime prohibition on certification 
creates an arbitrary and irrational classification that denies 
her equal protection of the law.  Second, she claims that the 
prohibition deprives her of a liberty interest by abridging an 
alleged substantive due process right to practice her chosen 
profession as a state-regulated childcare provider.  Finally, 
                                                                                                                                                             
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
3 
she argues that the prohibition creates an "impermissible 
irrebuttable presumption."  For the reasons discussed below, we 
disagree with each of her arguments and affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Children's Code and 2009 Wis. Act. 76 
¶5 
DCF licenses childcare centers and certifies childcare 
providers under Chapter 48 of the Wisconsin Statutes.2  "To 
obtain a license . . . to operate a child care center, a person 
must . . . meet the requirements specified in s. 48.685."3  To 
receive certification as a childcare provider, a person must, 
among other prerequisites, "meet the minimum requirements for 
certification established by the department under s. 49.155(1d)" 
and "meet the requirements specified in s. 48.685."4 
¶6 
A person need not obtain a license to operate a 
childcare center if the center provides care and supervision for 
less than 4 children under the age of 7.5  However, only a 
licensed 
childcare 
center 
or 
a 
person 
with 
a 
childcare 
                                                 
2 See Wis. Stat. §§ 48.65, 48.651. 
3 Wis. Stat. § 48.65(1) ("A license . . . is valid until 
revoked 
or 
suspended, 
but 
shall 
be 
reviewed 
every 
2 
years . . . ."). 
4 Wis. Stat. § 48.651(1). 
5 See Wis. Stat. § 48.65(1) ("No person may for compensation 
provide care and supervision for 4 or more children under the 
age of 7 for less than 24 hours a day unless that person obtains 
a license to operate a child care center from the department."). 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
4 
certification "may receive payment for providing child care 
services for an individual who is determined eligible for a 
child care subsidy under s. 49.155."6 
¶7 
The Wisconsin Shares program detailed in Wis. Stat. 
§ 49.155 
provides 
subsidies 
to 
families 
meeting 
certain 
financial eligibility requirements.  These subsidies eventually 
reach childcare centers and childcare providers, so long as they 
are 
licensed 
or 
certified.7 
 
To 
acquire 
a 
license 
or 
certification, a person must meet the requirements set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 48.685.  If a person fails to obtain a license or 
certification because the person is ineligible under § 48.685, 
the person is ineligible to receive Wisconsin Shares dollars. 
¶8 
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.685 provides for an extensive 
search of childcare providers' backgrounds for any record of 
criminal history or child abuse.  The section places a lifetime 
prohibition on licensure or certification for people with 
certain criminal convictions on their records, as subdivision 
5., at issue in this case, demonstrates: 
                                                 
6 Wis. Stat. § 48.651(1) ("[N]o person, other than a child 
care center licensed under s. 48.65 . . . , may receive payment 
for providing child care services for an individual who is 
determined eligible for a child care subsidy under s. 49.155 
unless the person is certified . . . ."). 
7 DCF 
provides 
vouchers 
to 
Wisconsin 
Shares-eligible 
parents, and parents use the vouchers to "obtain child care 
services stipulated in that voucher from [an authorized] 
provider."  Wis. Admin. Code § DCF 201.04(2)(a) (Feb. 2016).  
Authorized childcare providers accept the vouchers and receive 
payment from DCF.  Wis. Admin. Code § DCF 201(1), (2g) (Feb. 
2016). 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
5 
(br)  For purposes of licensing a person to 
operate a child care center under s. 48.65[ or] 
certifying 
a 
child 
care 
provider 
under 
s. 48.651, . . . no person who has been convicted or 
adjudicated delinquent on or after his or her 12th 
birthday 
for 
committing 
any 
of 
the 
following 
offenses . . . may be permitted to demonstrate that he 
or she has been rehabilitated: 
. . . . 
5.  An offense involving fraudulent activity as a 
participant in the Wisconsin Works program under 
ss. 49.141 to 49.161, including as a recipient of a 
child care subsidy under s. 49.155, or as a recipient 
of aid to families with dependent children under 
s. 49.19, 
medical 
assistance 
under 
subch. IV 
of 
ch. 49, food stamps benefits under the food stamp 
program under 7 USC 2011 to 2036, supplemental 
security income payments under s. 49.77, payments for 
the support of children of supplemental security 
income recipients under s. 49.775, or health care 
benefits under the Badger Care health care program 
under s. 49.665.8 
¶9 
Subdivisions 
6. 
and 
7. 
prohibit 
licensure 
and 
certification based on convictions for other offenses, but the 
prohibitions apply only "if the person completed his or her 
sentence, 
including 
any 
probation, 
parole, 
or 
extended 
supervision, or was discharged by the department of corrections, 
less than 5 years before the date" of the background check.9 
¶10 These 
lifetime 
and 
five-year 
prohibitions 
on 
eligibility under Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br) stand in contrast 
to the prohibitions listed in § 48.685(4m)(a)-(b).  Although 
§ 48.685(4m)(a) and (b) also disqualify from licensure or 
                                                 
8 Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. 
9 Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)6.-7. 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
6 
certification 
people 
with 
certain 
criminal 
convictions, 
§ 48.685(5)(a) 
allows 
for 
licensure 
or 
certification 
notwithstanding prior conviction "if the person demonstrates to 
the department . . . by clear and convincing evidence . . . that 
he or she has been rehabilitated." 
¶11 The 
legislature 
created 
the 
paragraph (br) 
prohibitions in Section 24 of 2009 Wis. Act. 76, which followed 
a series of articles in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel detailing 
extensive fraud and abuse by childcare providers receiving funds 
through Wisconsin Shares.10  Prior to Act 76, the law contained a 
rebuttable 
presumption 
of 
ineligibility 
for 
licensure 
or 
certification if a person had a specified criminal conviction, 
but it did not permanently bar people from eligibility based on 
any prior conviction.11 
B.  Blake's Childcare Certification 
¶12 Blake received her childcare provider certification 
from Racine County in October 2001.  She then began operating a 
childcare business from her own home.  Starting with her eldest 
daughter's two children, Blake soon grew her childcare business 
into caring for the children of her daughter's and her son's 
friends.  By 2006 Blake provided childcare for approximately 12 
                                                 
10 To access a collected archive of the articles in the 
investigative series, for which reporter Raquel Rutledge won a 
Pulitzer Prize for Local Reporting, see Cashing in on Kids, 
Milwaukee  J.  Sentinel,  http://www.jsonline.com/news/38617217.
html (last visited June 24, 2016). 
11 See Wis. Stat. § 48.685(4m)-(5) (2007-08). 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
7 
children, with about 4 to 6 children in her home at any one 
time. 
¶13 Operating 
the 
childcare 
business 
became 
Blake's 
primary source of income.  Rather than charging parents for her 
childcare 
services, 
Blake 
received 
Wisconsin 
Shares 
reimbursement 
payments 
from 
the 
Racine 
County 
Workforce 
Development Center because of her status as a certified 
provider.  Funds from the Wisconsin Shares program represented 
Blake's sole source of income for her childcare services.  
During the period between 2001 and 2006, Blake estimated that 
she received payments totaling 
approximately $26,000 from 
Wisconsin Shares each year. 
¶14 Racine County revoked Blake's childcare certification 
in 2006 for failure to disclose that her son lived in her home 
and failure to submit a form disclosing information about his 
background.  Without a certification permitting her to receive 
payments from Wisconsin Shares-eligible parents, Blake stopped 
running her home childcare business.  She worked full time as a 
caregiver in an assisted living home for adults while waiting to 
reapply for certification. 
¶15 When 
she 
became 
eligible 
again 
in 
2008, 
Blake 
reapplied for and received a new childcare certification.  With 
a new certification valid from June 6, 2008, to June 6, 2010, 
Blake left her job at the assisted living home to restart her 
childcare 
business. 
 
Blake 
resumed 
providing 
care 
for 
approximately 12 different children at various times throughout 
the week.  Over the ensuing year, however, nearly all the 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
8 
children for whom Blake provided care began receiving childcare 
elsewhere, eventually leaving Blake with only 2 children.  With 
business 
disappearing, 
Blake 
took 
a 
part-time 
job 
at 
a 
children's learning center in 2009. 
¶16 In January 2010, Racine County notified Blake that it 
would permanently revoke her childcare certification, effective 
February 1, 2010.  To comply with Act 76's changes to the law 
regarding childcare certifications, the County had conducted a 
review of providers' criminal backgrounds to determine whether 
the new law affected any certified providers in the county. 
¶17 Blake's background check revealed a 1986 conviction 
for public assistance fraud.  According to the Judgment of 
Conviction issued by the Racine County Circuit Court on December 
19, 1986, Blake pled no contest to misdemeanor welfare fraud, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 49.12(9) (1983-84).  Blake pled to the 
misdemeanor after originally facing a felony charge for failing 
to report as assets a car and a motorcycle that she owned.  At 
the time, she thought she did not have to report the car as an 
asset because it was a gift and it did not run.  As a result of 
the conviction, she served two years probation and paid $294 in 
restitution for the excess welfare payment she received. 
¶18 Racine County determined that, as a conviction related 
to public benefits fraud, her 1986 conviction fell within the 
category of offenses for which Act 76 required permanent 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
9 
revocation under new Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5.12  After the 
County revoked her certification, Blake again closed her home 
childcare business.  She also lost her job at the children's 
learning center upon informing her employer that the County 
revoked her certification. 
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶19 Blake commenced this action on March 1, 2010, to 
challenge revocation of her childcare certification.  She 
claimed 
under 
42 
U.S.C. 
§ 1983 
that 
revocation 
of 
her 
certification interfered with rights secured by the United 
States Constitution.13  She sought a declaratory judgment holding 
                                                 
12 An email dated February 3, 2010, from DCF to certifying 
agents in Racine, Marathon, and Eau Claire Counties explained 
that not all convictions under Chapter 49 automatically qualify 
for permanent revocation as "[a]n offense involving fraudulent 
activity" under Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5.  The email provided 
the following guidance: 
To determine whether a conviction under ch. 49 is 
fraudulent, first look at the actual conviction.  Was 
the person convicted of "fraud".  If the title of the 
conviction includes, fraud, then it would be a 
permanent 
bar. 
 
However, 
if 
the 
title 
of 
the 
conviction does not include the word "fraud" then the 
facts of the conviction need to be examined. 
13 Initially, Blake also claimed that Racine County and DCF 
violated due process by revoking her certification without 
conducting an administrative hearing.  After Blake filed her 
complaint, Racine County allowed her an administrative hearing 
on the revocation.  A hearing examiner determined that her 1986 
conviction provided grounds for revocation, and the circuit 
court upheld that decision.  But the court of appeals reversed, 
concluding that Racine County considered insufficient evidence 
to conclusively determine that Blake's conviction was an offense 
involving fraudulent activity.  Blake v. Racine Cty. Human 
Servs. Dep't, 2013 WI App 45, ¶¶1-2, 347 Wis. 2d 499, 831 
(continued) 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
10 
that Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. unconstitutionally violated 
her right to equal protection, violated her right to due 
process, and created an impermissible irrebuttable presumption.  
She argued that, facially and as applied to her, the statute's 
new list of disqualifying offenses denied her constitutional 
rights by completely barring her from eligibility for licensure 
or certification. 
¶20 Both parties filed for summary judgment, and the Dane 
County 
Circuit 
Court14 
rejected 
Blake's 
constitutional 
challenges.  Disposing of Blake's facial challenge to the Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.685(5)(br)5. 
prohibition 
on 
certification, 
the 
circuit court relied on Brown v. State Department of Children 
and Families, 2012 WI App 61, 341 Wis. 2d 449, 819 N.W.2d 827, 
in which the court of appeals determined that the new caregiver 
law passed the rational basis test and did not, on its face, 
violate the equal protection guarantee.  In particular, the 
circuit court relied on Brown's reasoning that the law "serves a 
legitimate purpose of preventing further fraud in the Wisconsin 
Shares program" and that "the legislature did not apply an 
irrational or arbitrary classification in passing the law." 
                                                                                                                                                             
N.W.2d 439 (citing Jamerson v. DCF, 2013 WI 7, ¶72, 345 
Wis. 2d 205, 
824 
N.W.2d 822). 
 
On 
remand, 
Racine 
County 
presented additional evidence and once again upheld revocation; 
both the circuit court and the court of appeals affirmed.  Blake 
v. 
Racine 
Cty. 
Human 
Servs. 
Dep't, 
No. 2014AP1229-FT, 
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2014). 
14 Shelley J. Gaylord, Judge. 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
11 
¶21 The circuit court further concluded that Blake failed 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.685(5)(br)5. 
was 
unconstitutional as applied to her.  Again relying on Brown, the 
court first concluded that Blake overstated her liberty interest 
by asserting a right to provide subsidized childcare.  Rather, 
the court asked whether Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. denied 
Blake the opportunity to make a living in childcare in general——
and the court answered that it did not.  The circuit court 
observed that, to prevail on her as-applied challenge, Blake 
would need to provide facts supporting her claim that the 
statute constituted a de facto deprivation of her ability to 
provide childcare.  She failed to make that showing.  Indeed, 
the court said, Blake's efforts to continue working in childcare 
after loss of her certification had "been nil or virtually nil." 
¶22 Blake appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.  
Blake v. Jossart, No. 2012AP2578, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. June 11, 2015) (per curiam).  First, the court of appeals 
declined to address Blake's facial equal protection challenge 
because, as Blake acknowledged in a footnote of her brief, Brown 
controlled on that issue and the court of appeals could not 
overrule its own decision.  Id., ¶3.  The court also declined to 
consider her as-applied equal protection argument, reasoning 
that she had failed to cite "any case law or legal standard 
relevant to such an analysis."  Id., ¶4. 
¶23 Next, the court turned to Blake's claim that Act 76 
created 
an 
impermissible 
irrebuttable 
presumption 
that 
individuals 
convicted 
of 
an 
offense 
involving 
fraudulent 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
12 
activity are permanently unfit for certification.  Id., ¶¶5-6.  
Appreciating 
Blake's 
"acknowledge[ment] 
that 
the 
current 
vitality 
of 
the 
irrebuttable 
presumption 
concept 
is 
questionable," 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
found 
her 
argument 
unpersuasive because she did "not cite any case law in which an 
occupational-regulation statute such as this one ha[d] been held 
unconstitutional for relying on such a presumption."  Id., ¶6. 
¶24 Finally, to consider Blake's substantive due process 
argument, the court of appeals assumed that Blake had a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in working in "the 
field of state-regulated child care."  Id., ¶¶7-9.  Turning 
again to Brown, the court of appeals concluded that "barring 
persons convicted of 'crimes involving fraudulent use of funds 
from enumerated government programs is rationally related to a 
legitimate interest in preventing further fraud' to the child 
care subsidy program."  Id., ¶9 (citing Brown, 341 Wis. 2d 449, 
¶40).  Blake failed to demonstrate that "this relationship 
becomes irrational or arbitrary" when the individual's past 
offense "was a de minimis example of fraudulent activity."  Id. 
¶25 On July 29, 2015, Blake filed a petition for review, 
which this court granted on November 4, 2015. 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶26 A statute's constitutionality is a question of law 
that this court reviews de novo.  Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wis. 
Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶18, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 
N.W.2d 849 (citing Riccitelli v. Broekhuizen, 227 Wis. 2d. 100, 
119, 595 N.W.2d 392 (1999)).  To succeed on a claim that a law 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
13 
is unconstitutional on its face, the challenger must demonstrate 
that the State cannot enforce the law under any circumstances.  
State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶13, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63 
(citing Olson v. Town of Cottage Grove, 2008 WI 51, ¶44 n.9, 309 
Wis. 2d 365, 749 N.W.2d 211).  If the challenger succeeds, then 
the law is void for all purposes.  Id.  (citing State ex rel. 
Comm'rs of Pub. Lands v. Anderson, 56 Wis. 2d 666, 672, 203 
N.W.2d 84 (1973)).  An as-applied challenge, in contrast, 
focuses on the facts of the challenger's case, and if the court 
determines that the law actually violates the challenger's 
rights, then "the operation of the law is void as to the party 
asserting the claim."  Id. (first citing State v. Hamdan, 2003 
WI 113, ¶43, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785; then citing 
Anderson, 56 Wis. 2d at 672). 
¶27 We presume that statutes are constitutional, Wood, 323 
Wis. 2d 321, ¶15, and if any doubt exists about the statute's 
constitutionality, the court must resolve that doubt in favor of 
upholding the statute,  Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶18 (citing 
State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 
46–47, 205 N.W.2d 784 (1973)).  A party challenging a statute 
overcomes the strong presumption of constitutionality only by 
demonstrating that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id., ¶19 (citing State v. Hezzie R., 219 
Wis. 2d 848, 863, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998)).  "It is not sufficient 
for the challenging party merely to establish doubt about a 
statute's constitutionality, and it is not enough to establish 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
14 
that a statute probably is unconstitutional."  Id.  (citing 
Hammermill Paper Co., 58 Wis. 2d at 46–47). 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
¶28 According to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, "No state shall . . . deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws."  Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
further provides: "All people are born equally free and 
independent, and have certain inherent rights; among these are 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness . . . ."  As a 
general principle, this court treats these provisions of the 
United States and Wisconsin Constitutions as consistent with 
each 
other 
in 
their 
due 
process 
and 
equal 
protection 
guarantees.15 
¶29 Blake raises three constitutional challenges to the 
absolute bar on childcare licensure and certification for people 
convicted of certain criminal offenses, as provided by Wis. 
Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5.  She argues that revocation of her 
                                                 
15 See Winnebago Cty. v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, ¶35 
n.18, 366 Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 109 ("[T]he United States 
Constitution 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
provide 
substantively similar due process guarantees." (citing State v. 
Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶17 n.9, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63)); 
Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 261, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998) 
("This court applies the same interpretation to the state Equal 
Protection Clause as that given to the equivalent federal 
provision." (citing State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 317 n.21, 
541 N.W.2d 115 (1995))). 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
15 
certification under this statute (1) denies her equal protection 
of the law, (2) violates her right to due process, and (3) 
creates an impermissible irrebuttable presumption.  We consider 
each of these three arguments in turn. 
A.  Equal Protection 
¶30 To show that a statute unconstitutionally denies equal 
protection of the law, a party must demonstrate that the statute 
treats members of similarly situated classes differently.  
Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 261, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998).  
"The right to equal protection does not require that such 
similarly situated classes be treated identically, but rather 
requires that the distinction made in treatment have some 
relevance to the purpose for which classification of the classes 
is made."  State v. West, 2011 WI 83, ¶90, 336 Wis. 2d 578, 800 
N.W.2d 929 (citing State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 321, 541 
N.W.2d 115 (1995)). 
¶31 "In cases where a statutory classification does not 
involve 
a 
suspect 
class 
or 
a 
fundamental 
interest, 
the 
classification will be upheld if there is any rational basis to 
support it."  State v. Burgess, 2003 WI 71, ¶10, 262 
Wis. 2d 354, 665 N.W.2d 124 (citing Milwaukee Brewers v. DHSS, 
130 Wis. 2d 79, 98, 387 N.W.2d 254 (1986)).  Only when a statute 
"impinges on a 'fundamental right' or creates a classification 
that 'operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class'" 
will the court engage in strict scrutiny analysis.  Aicher, 237 
Wis. 2d 99, ¶56 (quoting Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 261–62). 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
16 
¶32 Under 
rational 
basis 
analysis, 
a 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional if the legislature applied an irrational or 
arbitrary classification when enacting the provision.  Burgess, 
262 Wis. 2d 354, ¶32; Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶57.  Therefore, 
the court will uphold a statute unless "it is 'patently 
arbitrary' and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate 
government interest."  Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶57 (quoting 
Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 264).  Though classifications may be 
imperfect and might create inequities, the court seeks to 
determine 
whether 
a 
classification 
rationally 
advances 
a 
legislative objective.  Id.  To do so, the court must identify 
or, 
if 
necessary, 
construct 
a 
rationale 
supporting 
the 
legislature's 
determination. 
 
Metro. 
Assocs. 
v. 
City 
of 
Milwaukee, 2011 WI 20, ¶62, 332 Wis. 2d 85, 796 N.W. 2d 717.  
"Once the court identifies a rational basis for a statute, the 
court must assume the legislature passed the act on that 
basis . . . ."  Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. 
Fund, 2005 WI 125, ¶75, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440.16 
                                                 
16 The dissent reminds us of the admonition from the Supreme 
Court of the United States that the "rational-basis standard is 
'not a toothless one.'"  Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 
(1981) (quoting Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)), 
quoted in dissent, ¶69.  However, rational basis review does not 
"allow us to substitute our personal notions of good public 
policy for those of" the legislature.  See Schweiker, 450 U.S. 
at 234.  As the Supreme Court has explained, 
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State 
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely 
because the classifications made by its laws are 
imperfect.  If the classification has some "reasonable 
(continued) 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
17 
¶33 A legislative classification satisfies the rational 
basis standard if it meets the following five criteria: 
(1) All classification[s] must be based upon 
substantial distinctions which make one class really 
different from another. 
(2) The classification adopted must be germane 
to the purpose of the law. 
(3) The classification must not be based upon 
existing circumstances only.  [It must not be so 
constituted as to preclude addition to the numbers 
included within a class.] 
(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must 
apply equally to each member thereof. 
(5) That 
the 
characteristics 
of 
each 
class 
should be so far different from those of other classes 
as to reasonably suggest at least the propriety, 
                                                                                                                                                             
basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply 
because 
the 
classification 
"is 
not 
made 
with 
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results 
in inequality."  Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 
220 U.S. 61, 78.  "The problems of government are 
practical ones and may justify, if they do not 
require, rough accommodations——illogical, it may be, 
and unscientific."  Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of 
Chicago, 
228 
U.S. 
61, 
69-70. 
 
"A 
statutory 
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of 
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."  
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426. 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).  The dissent 
identifies alternative means by which the legislature might have 
structured the law to prevent fraud against Wisconsin Shares.  
See, e.g., dissent, ¶¶88-91.  But the mere existence of 
alternative policy proposals does not negate the rational 
relationship between the objective of preventing fraud and the 
legislature's chosen policy of prohibiting licensure for anyone 
with a conviction for fraud against a government benefits 
program. 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
18 
having regard to the public good, of substantially 
different legislation. 
Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶58 (alterations in original) (quoting 
Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 272-73); accord Metro. Assocs., 332 
Wis. 2d 85, ¶64; Nankin v. Village of Shorewood, 2001 WI 92, 
¶39, 245 Wis. 2d 86, 630 N.W.2d 141. 
¶34 Blake 
concedes 
that 
her 
equal 
protection 
claim 
involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right; 
therefore, rational basis analysis is appropriate in this case.  
She characterizes Act 76 as creating three classes of people 
with prior convictions: (1) people permanently barred for life 
from eligibility for licensure or certification; (2) people 
absolutely barred from eligibility for five years, after which 
time they remain barred but may prove rehabilitation; and (3) 
people presumptively barred for life but eligible to prove 
rehabilitation. 
 
These 
classifications 
deny 
her 
equal 
protection, she argues, because they are incoherent and lack 
distinguishing features.  Depending on the offense committed, a 
person convicted of a crime of violence, a crime against 
children, or a dishonesty-related offense might fall into any of 
the three classifications, which do not necessarily match the 
severity of the underlying offense. 
¶35 DCF counters that the appropriate class to focus on 
"consists of persons like Blake who have been convicted of 'an 
offense involving fraudulent activity as a participant' in 
specified public benefits programs."  That classification 
rationally 
achieves 
the 
legislature's 
objective 
of 
"the 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
19 
elimination of fraud in the Wisconsin Shares program and the 
protection of the public's scarce financial resources." 
¶36 In Brown, the court of appeals rejected facial and as-
applied challenges to Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. that relied 
on equal protection grounds.  Brown, 341 Wis. 2d 449, ¶¶40, 43.  
Also applying rational basis analysis, the court of appeals 
first reasoned that the challenger had not demonstrated facial 
unconstitutionality because, "[r]egardless of whether the law is 
rationally related to the goal of protecting children, the law 
is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of prohibiting 
individuals who dishonestly benefitted from government welfare 
in the past from obtaining government funding in the form of 
childcare subsidies."  Id., ¶40.  Turning to the as-applied 
argument, the court of appeals acknowledged that "Brown's 
particular situation——[loss of certification because she had] a 
single welfare conviction for events occurring more than two 
decades ago——[was] unfortunate," but the court declined to hold 
the statute unconstitutional as applied because Brown "point[ed] 
to no evidence that she was treated differently from any 
similarly-situated childcare provider whose license was revoked 
under the new law."  Id., ¶43. 
¶37 Examining Blake's facial challenge, we conclude that 
Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. passes rational basis review on its 
face.  We begin our analysis by noting the legislature's 
organizational structure for paragraph (br), which sets forth 
seven subdivisions defining categories of people barred from 
licensure and certification.  The class we evaluate for equal 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
20 
protection purposes consists of people permanently ineligible 
for licensure or certification on the grounds that their record 
contains a conviction for "[a]n offense involving fraudulent 
activity as a participant" in one of the various government 
benefits programs delineated in subdivision 5. 
¶38 The classification satisfies the first of the five 
Aicher prongs if "substantial distinctions" demonstrate that the 
class is truly different from others.  Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 
¶58.  Subdivision 5. contains a comprehensive list of public 
benefits programs and disqualifies from eligibility people who 
have convictions for fraudulent activity pertaining to one or 
more of these programs. 
¶39 Other 
subdivisions 
under 
paragraph 
(br) 
create 
lifetime prohibitions for people with convictions for crimes 
against children, certain crimes against life and bodily 
security, and various crimes involving misappropriation of 
identity or property.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)1.-4.  
These 
subdivisions 
arguably 
have 
purposes 
different 
from 
subdivision 5., such as protecting children, protecting the 
families of children, and protecting private employers in 
childcare. 
¶40 Subdivision 
5. 
imposes 
ineligibility 
based 
on 
convictions for fraudulent activity related to public assistance 
programs, meaning that it focuses on a distinct category of 
criminal activity.  Regardless of its merits, Blake's normative 
argument that the legislature could better achieve the objective 
of protecting children by developing classifications focused on 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
21 
the severity of the underlying offense does not defeat the fact 
that the legislature did create a coherent, though broad, 
classification based on public benefits fraud convictions.  
Because subdivision 5. targets a cognizable group of individuals 
whose characteristics are distinct from other classifications in 
the statute, Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. meets the first prong. 
¶41 Furthermore, Blake's three-tiered characterization of 
subsection (5)'s classifications does not disprove the existence 
of substantial distinctions between classes.  Focusing on the 
impact 
that 
different 
convictions 
have 
on 
a 
person's 
eligibility, Blake argues that the legislature did not have a 
cogent justification for barring some people for life, allowing 
some people to overcome a lifetime prohibition by proving 
rehabilitation, and barring others for five years but permitting 
them to prove rehabilitation after that time.  In particular, 
she observes that "[a]ll three classes include individuals 
convicted of crimes of violence, offenses against children, and 
dishonesty-related offenses."  The legislature, however, could 
reasonably determine that creating different outcomes for people 
with different underlying convictions would most efficaciously 
advance the objective of preventing fraud against Wisconsin 
Shares.  Because public benefits fraud is the particular type of 
fraud that the legislature sought to prevent, the legislature 
could reasonably determine that public benefits fraud offenses 
warranted 
a 
stricter 
prohibition 
than 
other 
underlying 
convictions. 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
22 
¶42 To succeed under the second Aicher prong, Blake must 
prove that the classification is not germane to the law's 
purpose.  See Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶58.  She contends that 
barring eligibility under Wis. Stat. §  48.685(5)(br)5. "[f]or 
purposes of . . . permitting a person to be a . . . caregiver 
specified in sub. (1)(ag)1.a. of a child care center or child 
care provider" sweeps too broadly by prohibiting people with 
public 
assistance 
fraud 
convictions 
from 
working 
in 
any 
regulated facility——even those facilities that do not receive 
public assistance from Wisconsin Shares.  Yet even that 
expansive prohibition cuts to the law's purpose of eliminating 
fraudulent activity in the Wisconsin Shares program.  A 
caregiver employee with a record of fraudulent conduct could 
conspire with the operator of a licensed facility to alter 
records or otherwise defraud the Wisconsin Shares program, 
particularly if the facility is small and employs only a few 
caregivers.17  Moreover, the fact that a licensed facility does 
                                                 
17 One article from the Journal Sentinel's Cashing in on 
Kids series illustrates how a provider might coordinate with 
employees to defraud Wisconsin Shares.  The article describes a 
Milwaukee daycare center run by Latasha Jackson: 
Nearly 
two-thirds 
of 
the 
children 
enrolled 
belonged to employees of Jackson's center, according 
to documents obtained by the newspaper.  Such an 
arrangement is a red flag for regulators because it is 
designed with the sole purpose of tapping into child-
care funds.  Parents don't actually have to report to 
work.  They can stay home and take care of their 
children and still get paid. . . .  
(continued) 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
23 
not receive funds through Wisconsin Shares at a given time does 
not make the prohibition any less germane to the purpose of 
preventing fraudulent activity.  If a facility possesses 
appropriate credentials to accept Wisconsin Shares payments, it 
always has the option of doing so in the future, thus giving the 
State a rational basis for always holding the facility to the 
high standard of never employing people with convictions related 
to public assistance fraud. 
¶43 As DCF observes in its brief, Blake implicitly 
conceded the third and fourth Aicher factors by declining to 
argue them in her brief.  Regarding the third factor, Blake 
clearly has not proven that the classification is based solely 
upon existing circumstances.  On the contrary, the permanent 
lifetime prohibition applies to anyone convicted of one or more 
of the listed public benefits fraud offenses——a group that will 
presumably continue to expand indefinitely as new people are 
convicted of crimes in the future.  Similar logic demonstrates 
that Blake has not proven that Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. 
fails under the fourth prong——equal application——because every 
person convicted of a public benefits fraud offense listed in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Records show Jackson . . . almost always hired 
parents who have at least four or five children, 
making the set-up more lucrative.  Each child is 
typically worth close to $200 a week in subsidies, 
depending on the age and number of hours of care 
authorized. 
Raquel Rutledge, Private Fortune, Public Cash, Milwaukee J. 
Sentinel (Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.jsonline.com/watchdog/watch
dogreports/56121342.html. 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
24 
subdivision 5. receives a lifetime ban on eligibility for 
licensure 
or 
certification, 
so 
there 
is 
no 
inconsistent 
application within the class. 
¶44 Finally, under the fifth prong of the Aicher analysis, 
we conclude that a rational basis exists for creating a specific 
classification for people convicted of offenses involving public 
assistance fraud because the classification addresses a distinct 
aspect of the childcare system.  See Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 
¶58.  Blake argues that it is "irrational in relation to the 
public good to elevate the goal of protecting the purse over 
that of protecting children" by allowing rehabilitation for 
people convicted of some crimes against children but barring for 
life people with convictions for public assistance fraud.  But 
her analysis improperly focuses on the relative merits of 
various 
objectives——protecting 
public 
finances, 
protecting 
children——that Act 76 sought to advance.  Rather, the fact that 
each objective is a reasonable goal for the State to pursue 
through the licensure and certification system justifies the 
existence of separate legislation for each class.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. advances the objective of preventing 
abuse of the Wisconsin Shares program by permanently barring 
licensure and certification for people convicted of public 
assistance fraud.  At the same time, it advances the objective 
of protecting children by permanently barring licensure and 
certification for people convicted of some violent offenses 
while allowing rehabilitation for others.  As DCF observes in 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
25 
its 
brief, 
"The 
statute 
has 
multiple 
policy 
goals, 
and 
rationally achieves each of them." 
¶45 Because Blake has not presented evidence sufficient 
under any of the Aicher prongs to call into question Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.685(5)(br)5.'s 
lifetime 
prohibition 
on 
licensure 
and 
certification for people convicted of public assistance fraud 
offenses, she has failed to prove that the classification is 
unconstitutional on its face beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
permanent prohibition rationally advances the State's objective 
of eliminating fraud against the Wisconsin Shares program and 
therefore withstands equal protection review on its face. 
¶46 We 
further 
decline 
to 
hold 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.685(5)(br)5. unconstitutional as applied to Blake.  She 
argues 
that 
revocation 
of 
her 
certification 
without 
an 
opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation denies her equal 
protection of the law because people with convictions for other 
"dishonesty 
related 
offenses" 
do 
not 
suffer 
permanent 
ineligibility.  Once again, though, she misidentifies the proper 
scope for evaluating the classification.  Like the childcare 
provider in Brown, Blake "points to no evidence that she was 
treated 
differently 
from 
any 
similarly-situated 
childcare 
provider whose license was revoked under the new law."  Brown, 
341 Wis. 2d 449, ¶43.  Indeed, since enactment of Act 76, this 
is the third published case involving a childcare provider 
facing revocation based on a public assistance fraud conviction.  
See Jamerson v. DCF, 2013 WI 7, ¶23, 345 Wis. 2d 205, 824 
N.W.2d 822; Brown, 341 Wis. 2d 449, ¶43.  Like Milwaukee County 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
26 
reviewing the credentials at issue in Jamerson and Brown, Racine 
County revoked Blake's license upon learning of her forbidden 
conviction.  Brown, 341 Wis. 2d 449, ¶43 ("[T]he facts of 
Jamerson show that the Department treated [Brown] almost 
identically to other individuals whose licenses were revoked.").  
Because Racine County treated Blake in a manner consistent with 
the treatment of similarly situated providers in published cases 
and Blake has not presented evidence to the contrary, her as-
applied equal protection claim fails. 
B.  Substantive Due Process 
¶47 The 
substantive 
component 
of 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause "addresses 'the content of what 
government may do to people under the guise of law.'"  Wood, 323 
Wis. 2d 321, ¶17 (quoting Dane Cty. DHS v. P.P., 2005 WI 32, 
¶19, 279 Wis. 2d 169, 694 N.W.2d 344).  "It protects against 
governmental action that either 'shocks the conscience . . . or 
interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.'"  P.P., 279 Wis. 2d 169, ¶19 (alteration in original) 
(quoting State v. Jorgensen, 2003 WI 105, ¶33, 264 Wis. 2d 157, 
667 N.W.2d 318).  "A court's task in a challenge based on 
substantive 
due 
process 
'involves 
a 
definition 
of 
th[e] 
protected constitutional interest, as well as identification of 
the conditions under which competing state interests might 
outweigh it.'"  Wood, 323 Wis. 2d 321, ¶18 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 220 
(1990)); see also Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
27 
(1997) 
(requiring 
"careful 
description" 
of 
constitutional 
interest asserted in certain substantive due process cases). 
¶48 As in the equal protection context, the "threshold 
question" when reviewing a substantive due process claim "is 
whether a fundamental right is implicated or whether a suspect 
class is disadvantaged by the challenged legislation."  State v. 
Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶12, 323 Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90.  Because 
Blake's substantive due process argument involves neither a 
fundamental right nor a suspect class, we once again conduct a 
rational basis review to evaluate whether "the statute is 
rationally related to achieving a legitimate governmental 
interest."  State v. Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶76, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 
863 N.W.2d 592. 
¶49 Blake's assertion that permanent ineligibility for 
certification violates her substantive due process rights is no 
more availing than her equal protection claim.  In her reply 
brief, Blake makes clear that she questions not the facial 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. but rather its 
constitutionality as applied to her.  Quoting Schware v. Board 
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1956), she contends that 
the statute "violates substantive due process as applied to her 
because her past criminal conviction has no 'rational [non-
arbitrary] 
connection 
with 
[her] 
fitness 
or 
capacity 
to 
practice' the profession of state-regulated childcare provider."  
(Alterations in original.)  However, even if we were to 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
28 
determine that she possessed a liberty interest in practicing 
"the profession of state regulated childcare provider,"18 we 
would conclude that she has not met her burden of demonstrating 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the permanent bar on eligibility 
in Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. irrationally or arbitrarily 
infringes on such an interest. 
¶50 To prevent fraud against the Wisconsin Shares program, 
the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5., which 
instituted a broad prohibition on licensure and certification 
for 
people 
with 
a 
conviction 
for 
an 
"offense 
involving 
fraudulent activity as a participant" in various public benefits 
                                                 
18 The prospect that we would recognize a liberty interest 
articulated in that manner is unlikely.  Among other possible 
problems for such a claim, any liberty interest that she might 
have in working as a childcare provider likely would not extend 
to receipt of Wisconsin Shares funds distributed for the benefit 
of families in need.  Licensure or certification from DCF makes 
childcare providers eligible to receive payments from families 
that receive childcare funding through Wisconsin Shares——a 
benefit program for the families, not for the childcare 
provider.  The Supreme Court has indicated that a State may not 
contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses when 
denying a person the ability to perform a chosen profession.  
See Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957).  
However, the Seventh Circuit has expressed skepticism about 
identifying 
"a 
liberty 
interest 
in 
a 
private 
party's 
participation in a government assistance program designed to 
provide benefits for a third party."  Khan v. Bland, 630 F.3d 
519, 534 (7th Cir. 2010).  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. 
makes Blake ineligible to receive Wisconsin Shares payments from 
families, but it does not prohibit her from providing childcare 
under all circumstances.  The statute eliminates her ability to 
participate in a public benefit meant for third parties but does 
not entirely eliminate her ability to pursue her occupation as a 
childcare provider. 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
29 
programs.  A conviction provides documented evidence that a 
person engaged in proscribed conduct and faced a penalty for 
doing so.  The legislature could reasonably conclude that an 
effective means for limiting abuse of the Wisconsin Shares 
program would be to render ineligible for Wisconsin Shares funds 
people who have received such formal sanction for engaging in 
fraudulent conduct in the past.  This strict prohibition not 
only prevents fraud against Wisconsin Shares but also deters 
other fraudulent conduct by creating a disincentive for existing 
or 
potential 
Wisconsin 
Shares-eligible 
providers 
against 
engaging in any fraudulent activities. 
¶51 Like every other person with a conviction related to 
public benefits fraud, Blake is not eligible for licensure or 
certification.  No doubt, the law's effect on her is harsh: her 
criminal record of fraudulent conduct consists of a single 
misdemeanor conviction 30 years ago, and the $294 illegal 
benefit that gave rise to her conviction pales in comparison to 
the millions of dollars worth of fraud uncovered in the Journal 
Sentinel stories that preceded the amendments to the childcare 
laws.  But drawing attention to the distant nature of her 
conviction and the relative insignificance of the fraud involved 
does not prove that the legislature acted irrationally or 
arbitrarily in making people with such convictions ineligible to 
receive childcare payments through a public benefit program.  
Eliminating eligibility for all people with a record of public 
benefits fraud (no matter the circumstances) may be a severe 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
30 
response to rampant fraud in the Wisconsin Shares program, but 
it is not an irrational response. 
C.  Irrebuttable Presumption 
¶52 The irrebuttable presumption doctrine derives from a 
series of cases in which the Supreme Court concluded that "a 
statute creating a presumption which operates to deny a fair 
opportunity to rebut it violates the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment."  Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 
(1973) (quoting Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 329 (1932)); see 
Cleveland Bd. of Edu. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); U.S. 
Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 
(1971).19 
¶53 In Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), the 
Supreme Court distinguished its irrebuttable presumption cases 
from 
"constitutional 
challenges 
to 
classifications 
in . . . social welfare legislation."  Salfi, 422 U.S. at 770.  
Because Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. creates a classification 
related 
to 
social 
welfare 
legislation 
analogous 
to 
the 
                                                 
19 A contemporary Note summarizing the doctrine for Harvard 
Law Review characterized it as "ill-founded": "There appears to 
be 
no 
justification 
for 
the 
irrebuttable 
presumption 
doctrine. . . .  [I]t . . . is susceptible to the criticisms 
made of interventionist equal protection——that it rests upon 
subjective value judgments which lack clear constitutional 
basis."  Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1534, 1556 (1974).  More 
recently, the Seventh Circuit has questioned "whether the 
'irrebuttable presumption' doctrine has any continued vitality."  
Estate of Ekins v. Comm'r, 797 F.2d 481, 486 (7th Cir. 1986). 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
31 
classification at issue in Salfi, we conclude that it does not 
create an impermissible irrebuttable presumption. 
¶54 Salfi involved a challenge to a federal statute that 
denied Social Security benefits to widows and stepchildren "who 
had their respective relationships to a deceased wage earner for 
less than nine months prior to his death."  Salfi, 422 U.S. at 
753-54.  After the Social Security Administration denied 
benefits based on the duration-of-relationship requirement, a 
three-judge district court held that the requirement created an 
unconstitutional 
conclusive 
presumption 
under 
the 
Supreme 
Court's irrebuttable presumption cases.  Id. at 754-55, 767-68. 
¶55 The 
Supreme 
Court 
began 
its 
discussion 
of 
the 
constitutional 
challenge 
to 
the 
duration-of-relationship 
requirement by discussing two lines of cases.  First, the Court 
quoted at length from its decisions in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 
U.S. 603 (1960); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); and 
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).  According to the 
Court, those cases stood for the proposition that "[a] statutory 
classification in the area of social welfare is consistent with 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it is 
'rationally based and free from invidious discrimination.'"  Id. 
at 768-70 (quoting Richardson, 404 U.S. at 81, which had quoted 
Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 487). 
¶56 Second, 
it 
summarized 
its 
recent 
irrebuttable 
presumption cases: 
Stanley v. Illinois held that it was a denial of 
the equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
32 
Amendment for a State to deny a hearing on parental 
fitness to an unwed father when such a hearing was 
granted to all other parents whose custody of their 
children was challenged. . . . 
In Vlandis v. Kline, a statutory definition of 
"residents" for purposes of fixing tuition to be paid 
by students in a state university system was held 
invalid.  The Court held that where Connecticut 
purported to be concerned with residency, it might not 
at the same time deny to one seeking to meet its test 
of residency the opportunity to show factors clearly 
bearing on that issue.  412 U.S., at 452. 
In LaFleur the Court held invalid, on the 
authority 
of 
Stanley 
and 
Vlandis, 
school 
board 
regulations requiring pregnant school teachers to take 
unpaid maternity leave commencing four to five months 
before the expected birth. 
Salfi, 422 U.S. at 771. 
¶57 The Court then explained the distinction between the 
two sets of cases and their relevance to the duration-of-
relationship requirement: 
We hold that [the irrebuttable presumption] cases 
are not controlling on the issue before us now.  
Unlike the claims involved in Stanley and LaFleur, a 
noncontractual claim to receive funds from the public 
treasury enjoys no constitutionally protected status, 
Dandridge 
v. 
Williams, 
supra, 
though 
of 
course 
Congress may not invidiously discriminate among such 
claimants on the basis of a "bare congressional desire 
to harm a politically unpopular group," U.S. Dept. of 
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973), or on 
the basis of criteria which bear no rational relation 
to 
a 
legitimate 
legislative 
goal. 
 
Jimenez 
v. 
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 636 (1974); U.S. Dept. of 
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 513-514 (1973).  
Unlike the statutory scheme in Vlandis, 412 U.S., at 
449, the Social Security Act does not purport to speak 
in terms of the bona fides of the parties to a 
marriage, but then make plainly relevant evidence of 
such bona fides inadmissible. . . .  [T]he benefits 
here are available upon compliance with an objective 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
33 
criterion, one which the Legislature considered to 
bear a sufficiently close nexus with underlying policy 
objectives to be used as the test for eligibility. 
Id. at 771-72 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 
528, 534 (1973)). 
¶58 Further, the Court expressed concern that "extension 
of the holdings of Stanley, Vlandis, and LaFleur to the 
eligibility requirement . . . would turn the doctrine of those 
cases into a virtual engine of destruction for countless 
legislative judgments which have heretofore been thought wholly 
consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution."  Id. at 772. 
¶59 Pivoting from the irrebuttable presumption argument, 
the Court articulated an alternative standard for government 
benefits classifications: 
The question is whether Congress, its concern having 
been reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse 
which 
it 
legitimately 
desired 
to 
avoid, 
could 
rationally have concluded both that a particular 
limitation or qualification would protect against its 
occurrence, 
and 
that 
the 
expense 
and 
other 
difficulties of individual determinations justified 
the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule. 
Id. at 777.  Distinguishing "programs for the distribution of 
social insurance benefits" from "criminal prosecutions, or the 
custody proceedings at issue in Stanley v. Illinois," the Court 
concluded by observing that benefits "programs do not involve 
affirmative Government action which seriously curtails important 
liberties cognizable under the Constitution."  Id. at 785. 
¶60 Just as Congress permissibly painted with a broad 
brush in excluding certain widows and stepchildren from Social 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
34 
Security 
benefits 
under 
the 
duration-of-relationship 
requirement, Wisconsin's legislature has created an expansive 
prohibition to eliminate fraud against the Wisconsin Shares 
program.  Only those who satisfy the objective criterion of not 
having a conviction for public benefits fraud are eligible to 
receive the benefit of payments through Wisconsin Shares.  
Blake's is not a case in which the legislature has declared 
certain facts about her to be true and then denied her any 
opportunity to present evidence disproving the truth of the 
State's declaration.  Instead, the State merely has rendered 
ineligible for payment through Wisconsin Shares people who share 
an 
objective 
characteristic——a 
conviction 
for 
an 
offense 
pertaining to public benefits fraud.  As discussed at length 
already, that classification bears a rational relationship to 
the reasonable legislative objective of preventing fraud in the 
Wisconsin Shares program. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶61 Each of the constitutional claims that Blake raises in 
this case ultimately requires the court to look to the interest 
that the legislature sought to advance when it revised the 
childcare provider laws.  The legislature enacted Act 76 shortly 
after investigative reporting revealed rampant abuse within the 
Wisconsin Shares program.  Among other reasonable objectives, 
Act 76 advances the goal of reducing and eliminating systemic 
fraud.  Thus, Act 76's creation of a prohibition on eligibility 
for licensure and certification for people convicted of an 
"offense involving fraudulent activity as a participant in" 
No. 
  2012AP2578 
35 
various public benefits programs rationally relates to this 
fraud reduction objective.  No doubt, the sweeping nature of the 
law creates harsh results for people such as Blake who have a 
conviction on their record that is distant in time and involved 
a relatively small amount of money.  Nevertheless, the law 
rationally advances the legislature's fraud reduction objective 
in a manner that outweighs any interest that Blake might have in 
eligibility to receive payments through Wisconsin Shares.  It is 
for the legislature, not the court, to reexamine the policy 
determinations incorporated into this statute.  Because we 
conclude that Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. denies Blake neither 
due process nor equal protection of the law, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶62 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  At issue in 
the instant case is the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.685(5)(br)5. (2013-14),1 which permanently bars individuals 
convicted of, among other things, "[a]n offense involving 
fraudulent activity as a participant" in various federal and 
Wisconsin welfare programs from becoming a state certified 
childcare provider.   
¶63 The consequences of being unable to become a certified 
childcare provider are substantial.  Childcare providers who 
provide care for four or more children or for children over the 
age of seven must be certified.2  Only certified childcare 
providers are eligible to provide services to individuals in the 
Wisconsin Shares program, a childcare subsidy program for low-
income individuals.   
¶64 As a result of Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5., Sonja 
Blake is permanently barred from being a certified childcare 
provider.  The basis for the permanent bar is Sonja Blake's 1986 
misdemeanor conviction for obtaining $294 in benefits to which 
she was not entitled through a federal public assistance program 
unrelated to childcare.  Sonja Blake obtained the $294 in excess 
benefits by failing to report as assets a motorcycle and a car 
that did not run.  
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 See Wis. Stat. § 48.65; Brown v. DCF, 2012 WI App 61, ¶40, 
341 Wis. 2d 449, 819 N.W.2d 827.   
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶65 Blake satisfied the requirements of her conviction.  
She served two years' probation and paid $294 in restitution.  
Since 1986 she has had no trouble with the law.  She has been a 
Wisconsin certified childcare provider for nearly a decade.  She 
has never faced complaints of fraud, abuse, or neglect.3   
¶66 This personal history is strong evidence of Blake's 
rehabilitation and that she is no danger to the public.  
Empirical evidence demonstrates that the risk of recidivism 
declines as time passes.4  Wisconsin's public policy favors 
rehabilitation 
of 
offenders 
and 
their 
reintegration 
into 
society.5  Nevertheless, after the enactment of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.685(5)(br)5. (2009 Wis. Act 76), Racine County, which had 
                                                 
3 Blake's certification was revoked in 2006 and reinstated 
in 2008.  See majority op., ¶¶14-15.   
4 See, 
e.g., 
Alfred 
Blumstein 
& 
Kiminori 
Nakamura, 
"Redemption" in an Era of Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nat'l Inst. of Justice (June 2009), 
http://www.nij.gov/journals/263/pages/redemption.aspx 
("It 
is 
well 
known——and 
widely 
accepted 
by 
criminologists 
and 
practitioners alike——that recidivism declines steadily with time 
clean.").   
5 Wisconsin case law recognizes that a goal of sentencing is 
imposing 
the 
minimum 
sentence 
consistent 
with 
"the 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant."  See State v. Gallion, 
2004 WI 42, ¶44, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197 (quotation 
omitted); see also State v. Paske, 163 Wis. 2d 52, 62, 471 
N.W.2d 55 (1991) ("The three primary factors which a sentencing 
judge must consider are the gravity of the offense, the 
character and rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and the 
need to protect the public."); Wis. Dep't of Corrections, 
Reentry 
at 
2 
(Mar. 
2012), 
http://doc.wi.gov/Documents/WEB/ABOUT/OVERVIEW/Reentry%20Unit/Re
entry%20Communications%20Document%202012.pdf (stating that the 
Wisconsin Department of Corrections "strives to rehabilitate and 
successfully reintegrate [offenders] into society").   
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
3 
 
previously granted and renewed Blake's childcare certification, 
permanently revoked her certification.  
¶67 Although the majority opinion recognizes that "the 
sweeping nature" of Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. "creates harsh 
results 
for 
people 
such 
as 
Blake 
who 
have 
a 
conviction . . . that 
is 
distant 
in 
time 
and 
involved 
a 
relatively small amount of money," the majority opinion holds 
that § 48.685(5)(br)5. does not violate equal protection, 
substantive 
due 
process, 
or 
the 
irrebuttable 
presumption 
doctrine.6   
¶68 I disagree with the majority opinion for two reasons.   
¶69 First, whether analyzed under the equal protection or 
the due process clauses of the United States and Wisconsin 
Constitutions, Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. is not rationally 
related to legitimate state purposes.  Although rational basis 
scrutiny may be deferential, it is not "toothless."7 
¶70 The permanent bar against obtaining a childcare 
certification for individuals convicted of an "offense involving 
fraud as a participant" in various public assistance programs 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. is not rationally 
related to the purposes of "preventing fraud against Wisconsin 
                                                 
6 See majority op., ¶61.   
7 Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981) (quoting 
Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).   
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
4 
 
Shares" or "protecting children, protecting the families of 
children, and protecting private employers in childcare."8   
¶71 Because I would hold that Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. 
is unconstitutional under the equal protection and due process 
clauses, I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals in 
the instant case and overrule the court of appeals' decision in 
Brown v. Department of Children & Families, 2012 WI App 61, 341 
Wis. 2d 449, ¶40, N.W.2d 827.9   
¶72 Second, the majority opinion's decision upholding the 
draconian sanction imposed by Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. 
raises the constitutional issue of whether the statute is an 
unconstitutional ex post facto law.  A statutory interpretation 
that does not raise constitutional issues is preferable to one 
that does.  See Jankowski v. Milwaukee Cnty., 104 Wis. 2d 431, 
439, 312 N.W.2d 45 (1981) ("'[S]tatutes should be construed so 
as to avoid constitutional objections.'") (quoting Niagara of 
Wis. Paper Corp. v. DNR, 84 Wis. 2d 32, 50, 268 N.W.2d 153 
(1978)).   
                                                 
8 See majority op., ¶¶39, 41, 60.   
9 Brown upheld Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. against a 
constitutional challenge somewhat similar to that raised in the 
instant case.  Brown concluded that Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. 
was constitutional under the equal protection and due process 
clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  See 
Brown, 341 Wis. 2d 449, ¶¶33-34, 40.   
Although 
I 
limit 
my 
conclusion 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.685(5)(br)5., as does the majority opinion, my conclusion 
may apply with equal force to other parts of the classification 
system created by Wis. Stat. § 48.685(4m)(a)-(b) and (5)(br).    
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶73 For the reasons set forth, I dissent and write 
separately.   
I 
 
¶74 I disagree with the majority opinion's analysis and 
conclusions under both the equal protection and due process 
clauses that Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. is rationally related 
to a legitimate state purpose.   
 
¶75 I begin with the equal protection clause.  Under the 
equal protection clause, the legislature may not adopt arbitrary 
or irrational classifications.10   
¶76 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 48.685(4m)(a)-(b) 
and 
(5)(br) 
classify various felony and misdemeanor offenses into three 
categories.   
¶77 Each of the three categories of offenses created by 
Wis. Stat. § 48.685(4m)(a)-(b) and (5)(br) has a different 
consequence for childcare certification.  These three categories 
are: (1) offenses that result in a permanent bar from obtaining 
a 
childcare 
certification 
with 
no 
opportunity 
to 
show 
rehabilitation; (2) offenses that result in a bar for five years 
after the completion of the sentence (including probation, 
parole, or extended supervision); and (3) offenses that result 
in a bar that may be lifted at any time upon a showing of 
rehabilitation.     
                                                 
10 See State v. Burgess, 2003 WI 71, ¶32, 262 Wis. 2d 354, 
665 N.W.2d 124; Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wis. Patients Comp. 
Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶57, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849.   
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶78 It is difficult to discern what, if any, organizing 
principles 
the 
legislature 
followed 
in 
classifying 
which 
offenses fall into each of these three categories, let alone 
their relationship to the legislative purposes of "preventing 
fraud against Wisconsin Shares"11 or "protecting children, 
protecting the families of children, and protecting private 
employers in childcare."12     
¶79 For example, some fraudulent activities result in a 
permanent bar.  Individuals convicted of "an offense involving 
fraudulent 
activity 
as 
a 
participant" 
in 
various 
public 
assistance 
programs——even 
fraudulent 
activity 
in 
trifling 
amounts——are permanently barred from obtaining a childcare 
certification.13  Not all crimes of dishonesty or fraud, however, 
result 
in 
a 
permanent 
bar 
from 
obtaining 
a 
childcare 
certification. 
 
Rather, 
offenses 
like 
making 
fake 
IDs, 
impersonating government agents, or forging prescriptions result 
in 
only 
a 
five 
year 
bar 
from 
obtaining 
a 
childcare 
certification.   
¶80 Likewise, although convictions for several serious 
felonies like first degree intentional homicide, kidnapping, and 
sexual assault result in a permanent bar from obtaining a 
childcare certification, not all serious felonies result in a 
permanent bar.  Homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle or 
                                                 
11 See majority op., ¶¶41, 60.   
12 See majority op., ¶39.   
13 See Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5.   
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
7 
 
firearm or providing alcoholic beverages to children resulting 
in death or great bodily harm result in a five-year bar.  
Offenses 
like 
sexual 
exploitation 
by 
a 
therapist, 
human 
trafficking, or misdemeanor neglect of a child merely result in 
a bar against obtaining a certification that may be lifted upon 
a showing of rehabilitation.  Yet these offenses pose serious 
danger to children or families of children. 
¶81 These inconsistencies demonstrate that the three-part 
classification system in Wis. Stat. § 48.685 is not rationally 
related to the State's purposes of "preventing fraud against 
Wisconsin Shares"14 or "protecting children, protecting the 
families of children, and protecting private employers in 
childcare."15      
 
¶82 The State argues that analyzing the rationality of the 
three-part classification system adopted by the legislature is 
misguided. 
 
According 
to 
the 
State, 
the 
only 
relevant 
classification to be examined in the instant case is that of 
individuals convicted of offenses involving fraudulent activity 
as recipients in various public assistance programs.  In the 
State's view, all persons, including Blake, convicted of 
offenses involving fraudulent activity as recipients in public 
benefits programs are treated the same.    
¶83 The 
majority 
opinion 
adopts 
this 
view 
without 
analysis, explanation, or citation to authority, stating: "The 
                                                 
14 See majority op., ¶¶41, 60.   
15 See majority op., ¶39.   
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
8 
 
class we evaluate for equal protection purposes consists of 
people permanently ineligible for licensure or certification on 
the grounds that their record contains a conviction for '[a]n 
offense involving fraudulent activity as a participant' in one 
of the various government benefits programs delineated in" Wis. 
Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5.16   
 
¶84 By 
evaluating 
only 
the 
class 
of 
individuals 
permanently barred from being certified childcare providers on 
account 
of 
convictions 
for 
offenses 
involving 
fraudulent 
activity as participants in a public assistance program, the 
majority opinion's review is "a mere tautological recognition of 
the fact that [the legislature] did what it intended to do."  
U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).   
¶85 "The Equal Protection Clause requires more of a state 
law than nondiscriminatory application within the class it 
establishes."17  I conclude that "[t]his Court . . . has an 
obligation to view the classificatory system, in an effort to 
determine whether the disparate treatment accorded the affected 
classes is arbitrary."18   
 
¶86 Looking to the entire classification system in the 
statute, I conclude that the three categories created by Wis. 
                                                 
16 See majority op., ¶37; see also majority op., ¶46.   
17 See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308 (1966).   
18 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 441 (1982) 
(Blackmun, J., writing separately joined by three justices) 
(emphasis in original).   
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
9 
 
Stat. § 48.685 are irrational and arbitrary; they are not based 
upon substantial distinctions that make the classes really 
different from one another, and the classifications adopted are 
not germane to the purposes of the law.19   
¶87 The 
majority 
opinion 
concludes 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.685(5)(br)5. 
and 
the 
permanent 
bar 
for 
individuals 
convicted of public assistance fraud is rational because "[t]he 
legislature . . . could 
reasonably 
determine 
that 
creating 
different 
outcomes 
for 
people 
with 
different 
underlying 
convictions would most efficaciously advance the objective of 
preventing fraud against Wisconsin Shares.  Because public 
benefits fraud is the particular type of fraud that the 
legislature sought to prevent, the legislature could reasonably 
determine that public benefits fraud offenses warranted a 
stricter prohibition than other underlying convictions."20 
¶88 This 
conclusion, 
however, 
ignores 
three 
facts 
demonstrating that Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5.'s permanent bar 
on obtaining a childcare certification for individuals convicted 
of public assistance fraud does not advance the purpose of 
"eliminating 
fraudulent 
activity 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
Shares 
program."21   
¶89 First, childcare providers who provide care for four 
or more children or for children over the age of seven must be 
                                                 
19 See Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶58.   
20 See majority op., ¶41 (emphasis in original).   
21 See majority op., ¶42.   
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
10 
 
certified,22 regardless of whether those providers receive funds 
from Wisconsin Shares.  More than half of the facilities whose 
employees must be certified childcare providers receive no money 
from Wisconsin Shares whatsoever.23  In other words, individuals 
like Blake are barred from ever working for a childcare provider 
whose employees must be certified, even though working for that 
childcare provider might not present an opportunity to defraud 
Wisconsin Shares.   
¶90 Second, the permanent bar on being a certified 
childcare provider based on public assistance fraud is not 
limited to individuals who defrauded Wisconsin Shares.  Instead, 
individuals (like Blake) who 30 years ago illegally obtained a 
small amount of benefits from a federal program not related to 
childcare24 are subject to the same permanent bar received by 
individuals who illegally obtained significant amounts of 
benefits from Wisconsin Shares.25   
                                                 
22 See Brown, 341 Wis. 2d 449, ¶40.   
23 See Pet'r's App. at 032. 
24 See Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. (barring individuals 
convicted of "[a]n offense involving fraudulent activity as a 
participant in the Wisconsin Works program" as well as federal 
programs like AFDC, food stamps, or other state programs like 
Badger Care).   
25 See, e.g., Raquel Rutledge, Private Fortune, Public Cash, 
Milwaukee 
J. 
Sentinel 
(Aug. 
31, 
2009), 
available 
at 
http://www.jsonline.com/watchdog/watchdogreports/56121342.html 
(describing a woman who received nearly $3 million from the 
Wisconsin Shares program over more than a decade).   
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶91 Third, the permanent bar against obtaining a childcare 
certification for individuals convicted of offenses involving 
fraudulent activity in a public benefits program does not apply 
to bookkeepers for regulated childcare facilities, or to other 
individuals who may have access to Wisconsin Shares' funds.  
Given that Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5.'s purpose is eliminating 
fraud in the Wisconsin Shares program, prohibiting individuals 
from working as caregivers while allowing individuals to work as 
bookkeepers for childcare facilities receiving Wisconsin Shares 
funds is not rationally related to the legislative purpose.        
¶92 Viewing the entire classification system in the 
statute, I conclude that the classifications created by Wis. 
Stat. § 48.685 are irrational and arbitrary.  Accordingly I 
would hold that Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. violates the equal 
protection 
clauses 
of 
the 
United 
States 
and 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions.    
¶93 Now I turn to the due process clause.  I conclude that 
Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. is unconstitutional under the due 
process clause because the statute shocks the conscience and, as 
explained above, is not rationally related to a legitimate state 
purpose.   
¶94 As the majority opinion states, the due process clause 
protects "'against governmental action that either shocks the 
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
12 
 
conscience or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.'"26 
¶95 Simply put, Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. shocks the 
conscience.   
¶96 The means by which the legislature chose to further 
its legitimate interest in protecting the public fisc and 
deterring fraud against Wisconsin Shares is arbitrary and smacks 
of retribution.  The permanent bar on obtaining a childcare 
certification imposed by Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. is a 
draconian and disproportionate deterrent for the kind of fraud 
the legislature sought to prevent.  
¶97 Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. is so broad 
that it arbitrarily, irrationally, and significantly impedes the 
ability of law-abiding people like Blake to earn a living in 
their chosen profession, childcare.  The permanent bar is based 
on a 30-year-old conviction for obtaining $294 in excess 
benefits under a federal public assistance program totally 
unrelated to Wisconsin Shares——the program which the legislature 
sought to protect by enacting Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5.  This 
result should shock the conscience.  It does mine.     
¶98 "[T]he right to work for a living in the common 
occupations of the community is the very essence of the personal 
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the 
[Fourteenth] Amendment to secure."  Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 
                                                 
26 Majority op., ¶47 (quoting Dane Cnty. DHS v. P.P., 2005 
WI 
32, 
¶19, 
279 
Wis. 2d 169, 
694 
N.W.2d 344) 
(internal 
alterations and quotation marks omitted).   
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
13 
 
41 (1915); see also Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 
239-39 (1957); majority op., ¶49 n.18.   
¶99 In my view, Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. is so 
"'brutal' and 'offensive'" that it does not "comport with 
traditional 
ideas 
of 
fair 
play 
and 
decency . . . ."27  
Accordingly, Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. violates substantive 
due process.   
 
¶100 The majority opinion recognizes, in effect, the 
disproportionate, draconian, and "brutal" nature of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.685(5)(br)5.  As the majority opinion puts it, "the 
sweeping nature" of Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. "creates harsh 
results 
for 
people 
such 
as 
Blake 
who 
have 
a 
conviction . . . that 
is 
distant 
in 
time 
and 
involved 
a 
relatively small amount of money."28   
 
¶101 Reinforcing this point, both this court and the court 
of appeals have previously recognized the harshness of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.684(5)(br)5.'s permanent bar on obtaining a childcare 
certification for individuals convicted of offenses "involving 
fraudulent activity as a participant in" public assistance 
programs.29   
                                                 
27 See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957) 
(quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952)).  
28 See majority op., ¶61.   
29 See, e.g., Jamerson v. DCF, 2013 WI 7, ¶¶2 & n.3, 72, 345 
Wis. 2d 205, 824 N.W.2d 822 (twice describing the permanent bar 
on obtaining a childcare certification as a "harsh penalty"); 
Brown, 341 Wis. 2d 449, ¶40 (noting that the plaintiff was 
"undoubtedly correct in highlighting the harshness of the new 
law . . . .").   
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
14 
 
II 
 
¶102 Recognizing 
the 
harshness 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.685(5)(br)5. but concluding that the law is nevertheless 
constitutional under the equal protection and due process 
clauses raises a further question:  Whether the law is so 
"harsh" and "punitive" that it violates the ex post facto 
clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  The 
parties have not briefed or argued this point.  Without briefs 
or argument, I discuss but do not decide this issue.   
¶103 One commentator has argued that the retroactive and 
permanent punitive effect of Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. 
violates the ex post facto clause.  See Courtney Lanz, Comment, 
Caregivers Uncared For: How to Fix Wisconsin's Ex Post Facto 
Caregiver Law, 2013 Wis. L. Rev. 1067, 1081 (asserting that the 
"punitive effect" of Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. "is sufficient 
to outweigh any stated civil intent and thus violates the Ex 
Post Facto clause.").   
 
¶104 Relevant to the instant case, the ex post facto clause 
prohibits laws making "more burdensome the punishment for a 
crime, after its commission . . . ."30   
 
¶105 Without analysis of Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. it 
appears that the statute is a regulatory civil statute.  A 
regulatory civil statute nonetheless may violate the ex post 
facto clause if it is "'so punitive either in purpose or effect' 
                                                 
30 State v. Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 703, 524 N.W.2d 641 
(1994) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) 
(quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990)).    
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
15 
 
as to 'transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy 
into a criminal penalty.'"31  
 
¶106 For several reasons, the permanent bar on obtaining a 
childcare 
certification 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.685(5)(br)5. may be so punitive in purpose and effect that 
the otherwise regulatory civil statute may be transformed into a 
criminal penalty.   
 
¶107 First, Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. permanently bars 
individuals 
convicted 
of 
"offense[s] 
involving 
fraudulent 
activity as a participant" in various social welfare programs 
from 
obtaining 
a 
childcare 
certification 
and 
prohibits 
individuals 
from 
demonstrating 
rehabilitation.32 
 
In 
this 
respect, the law appears to be punitive——it imposes a sanction 
that cannot be lifted no matter the circumstances.   
 
¶108 Second, the permanent bar (with no opportunity to show 
rehabilitation) imposed by Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. applies 
regardless of when the "offense involving fraudulent activity" 
occurred, no matter how minor the fraud was, and no matter which 
                                                 
31 See In re Commitment of Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ¶33, 254 
Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762 (quoting Hudson v. United States, 
522 U.S. 93, 99 (1996)) (alteration in Rachel).   
In analyzing whether a statute violates the ex post facto 
clause, courts apply the "intent-effects" test derived from 
Hudson and repeated in our cases.  See Rachel, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 
¶39; State v. Scruggs, 2015 WI App 88, ¶7, 365 Wis. 2d 568, 872 
N.W.2d 146 (citation omitted).   
32 See Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br) ("[N]o person who has been 
convicted . . . may be permitted to demonstrate that he or she 
has been rehabilitated."); majority op., ¶8.   
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
16 
 
public benefits program was defrauded.  Thus, an individual like 
Blake, who committed an offense and was convicted 30 years ago 
of obtaining $294 by fraud from a federal program unrelated to 
childcare and unrelated to the Wisconsin Shares program, is 
treated identically to an individual who recently stole millions 
from Wisconsin Shares.33  Imposing the same permanent bar against 
individuals under Blake's circumstances appears, in light of the 
legislature's purposes of protecting children and families and 
preventing fraud against Wisconsin Shares, punitive.   
 
¶109 Third, Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. appears to further 
"the 
traditional 
aims 
of 
punishment——retribution 
and 
deterrence . . . ," factors used to identify ex post facto 
laws.34  As stated before, Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. appears 
retributive 
because 
it 
gives 
individuals 
convicted 
of 
"offense[s] involving fraudulent activity as a participant" in 
public 
benefits 
programs 
no 
opportunity 
to 
demonstrate 
rehabilitation and imposes the same sanction regardless of when 
the fraud occurred, what program was defrauded, and how minimal 
or serious the fraud was.  As the majority opinion states, this 
"strict prohibition" is tied to the legislative purposes of 
"prevent[ing] 
fraud 
against 
Wisconsin 
Shares 
[and] 
also 
                                                 
33 See, e.g., Rutledge, supra note 25 (describing a woman 
who received nearly $3 million from the Wisconsin Shares program 
over more than a decade).   
34 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963); 
see also Commitment of Rachel, 254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶33 (quoting 
this factor and others identified in Mendoza-Martinez).   
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
17 
 
deter[ring] other fraudulent conduct . . . ."35  General and 
specific deterrence are traditional aims of punishment.   
¶110 Finally, the circumstances under which Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.685(5)(br)5. was adopted also support the conclusion that 
the law may be punitive and retributive.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 48.685(5)(br)5. was adopted by the legislature after an 
investigation by the 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel 
uncovered 
significant fraud against the Wisconsin Shares program.36  The 
bill creating Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. was introduced on 
October 2, 2009 and passed both houses of the legislature 
unanimously a little more than a month later.  This haste 
suggests that the legislature's "sudden and strong passions" may 
have been aroused by fraud uncovered against the Wisconsin 
Shares program.  One purpose of the ex post facto clause is to 
prevent "sudden and strong passions" from transforming well-
intentioned 
regulations 
into 
arbitrary 
and 
punitive 
legislation.37   
 
¶111 The prohibition on ex post facto laws stems from basic 
considerations of fairness and fair warning.38  There is no 
fairness 
or 
fair 
warning 
here. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 48.685(5)(br)5. permanently bars individuals like Blake from 
                                                 
35 Majority op., ¶50.   
36 See majority op., ¶¶11, 51.   
37 See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-38 
(1810).  
38 See 
State 
v. 
Kurzawa, 
180 
Wis. 2d 502, 
513, 
509 
N.W.2d 712 (1994).   
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
18 
 
ever obtaining a childcare certification based on a decades-old 
misdemeanor conviction.  Imposing a draconian penalty decades 
after a misdemeanor conviction without notice to the individual 
at the time of conviction raises the question of whether Wis. 
Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. makes "more burdensome the punishment 
for a crime, after its commission . . . ."39   
 
¶112 Under the circumstances of the instant case and the 
interpretation adopted by the majority opinion, the majority has 
exposed the application of Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. to Blake 
to a challenge as an unconstitutional ex post facto law.   
¶113 For the reasons set forth, I dissent and write 
separately. 
¶114 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
                                                 
39 Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d at 703 (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 
37, 42 (1990)).    
No.  2012AP2578.ssa 
 
 
 
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