Title: Schroeder v. Vellianitis
Citation: 570 So. 2d 1220
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 28, 1990

570 So. 2d 1220 (1990)
Euna Lee SCHROEDER, as executrix of the estate of Karl F. Schroeder, deceased
v.
Sherry C. VELLIANITIS, as executrix of the estate of John Vellianitis, deceased.
89-645.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 28, 1990.
Rehearing Denied November 9, 1990 with Dissenting Opinion Issued November 16, 1990.
*1221 Richard L. Watters of Howell, Johnston, Langford and Watters, Mobile, for appellant.
Wanda J. Cochran of Silver &amp; Voit, Mobile, for appellee.
KENNEDY, Justice.
Euna Lee Schroeder, as executrix of the estate of Karl F. Schroeder, sued Sherry C. Vellianitis, executrix of the estate of John Vellianitis, alleging that Schroeder's estate was the holder of an unpaid $10,000 promissory note executed by John Vellianitis in return for a $10,000 loan from Mr. Schroeder to Mr. Vellianitis, and demanding payment. Schroeder appeals from a summary judgment for the defendant.
Sherry Vellianitis's summary judgment motion was based on a contention that the debt evidenced by the note had been satisfied. In support of her contention, Ms. Vellianitis offered the affidavit of Jennifer Bodiford, the bookkeeper for the late Mr. Vellianitis. In pertinent part, that affidavit read as follows (all exhibits being omitted):
*1222 The back of the $8,065.46 check had written on it the words "For deposit only" along with an eight-digit account number that the defendant alleges was that of Mr. Schroeder.
The total of the two checks was $11,500; that is the total amount, with interest, that Mr. Vellianitis had agreed to pay Mr. Schroeder.
In opposition to the summary judgment motion, the plaintiff's attorney filed the following affidavit the day prior to the hearing on the summary judgment motion:
This affidavit was the only evidence offered in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
Under Rule 56(e), "evidence offered in response to the motion, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, must be more than a mere verification of the allegations contained in the pleadings, and must present facts that would be admissible into evidence.... Hearsay cannot create an issue of fact." Black v. Reynolds, 528 So. 2d 848, 849 (Ala.1988).
If the affidavit clearly violates Rule 56(e)'s standard ("made on personal knowledge"), the judgment of the trial court will not be reversed for the court's failure to consider it, even in the absence of an objection or motion to strike. If, on the other hand, the evidence submitted is otherwise admissible, formal defects are waived in the absence of a motion to strike or other objection. See Wright, Miller, and Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2738, pp. 507-09 (1983).
In examining the affidavit that was offered by counsel for the plaintiff, along with its attachments, that being the only evidence offered in opposition to the motion, we conclude that it did not comport with Rule 56(e) and was insufficient to create a material issue of fact so as to warrant a denial of the motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is due to be, and it is hereby, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES, ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., dissents.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
The affidavit found by the majority to be insufficient under the provisions of Rule 56(e), A.R.Civ.P., was made on personal knowledge, and the documents attached to the affidavit and mentioned in the affidavit, in my opinion, were sufficiently authenticated for the purpose of being considered in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The majority, I believe, incorrectly determines that the affidavit is insufficient; therefore, I dissent.
KENNEDY, Justice.
APPLICATION OVERRULED; NO OPINION.
HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES, ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON, STEAGALL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., dissents.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
On application for rehearing, Schroeder points out that the affidavit from her attorney was not, as the majority opinion states, the only evidence offered in opposition to Vellianitis's motion for summary judgment. Schroeder herself also made an affidavit based upon her personal knowledge, and that affidavit had attached to it the promissory note in issue. Attached to this opinion as appendices are Schroeder's affidavit and the note. I am still of the opinion, especially in light of Schroeder's affidavit, that the trial court erred in entering the summary judgment for Vellianitis.
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