Title: Chambers v. State
Citation: 339 So. 2d 204
Docket Number: 47888
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 1976

339 So. 2d 204 (1976)
Glen Stark CHAMBERS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 47888.

Supreme Court of Florida.
November 4, 1976.
Gerald C. Surfus of Stinnett, Surfus &amp; Martin, Sarasota, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and A.S. Johnston, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on direct appeal to review the judgment of guilty of murder in the first degree and sentence of death. Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.
Appellant was indicted for the first degree murder of Connie Weeks in that he unlawfully and from premeditated design to effect her death did strike, assault, and mortally injure her. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged, and after sentencing hearing, recommended that appellant be sentenced to life imprisonment since the jury found that sufficient mitigating circumstances existed so as to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. However, the *205 trial judge determined that under the circumstances, the death penalty was appropriate. In his judgment and sentence, the trial judge explained:
The facts leading up to the death of Connie Weeks are as follows. Appellant and the victim had been living together for several months. On the evening of January 22, 1975, appellant dragged the victim from the car in which she was sitting in the parking lot of her place of employment, across the parking lot and commenced to beat her. At this time, he was arrested, taken to the Sarasota County jail, and charged with two counts of assault. Later that same evening, the victim went to the police department to bond appellant out. The victim returned with him to their residence where appellant apparently informed her that he was leaving. A vehement argument ensued and the victim was so severely beaten that she died five days later as a result of said beating from cerebral and brain stem contusion. She was bruised all over the head and legs, had a deep gash under her left ear; her face was unrecognizable, and she had several internal injuries.
Appellant contends that a verdict should have been directed for him since the evidence was legally insufficient to prove premeditation. With this contention, we cannot agree. The record before us is more than adequate to support the jury's finding of premeditation. The State posits that the record contains competent sufficient evidence to find that appellant inflicted the mortal wounds with the requisite premeditated intent existing several hours prior to the successful conclusion of his criminal design.
Brenda Austin testified:
Joan Berryman, the victim's employer, testified:
Colleen Cole testified:
As the State submits, appellant by his own testimony admits the terrible beating of the victim and his sole defense is that he did not intend to kill her. Thus the question requiring resolution by this Court is whether there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial, direct or circumstantial, to prove premeditation on the part of appellant at the time he inflicted the mortal wounds. We find that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination of premeditation. Although appellant admits the beating which resulted in the death of Connie Weeks, he submits that his capacity to form premeditation was diminished by the fact that he was under the *207 influence of illegal drugs. The mental condition of appellant at the time of the crime and prior thereto on the day of the crime was thoroughly dealt with in the testimony of State's witnesses at the time appellant made the numerous threats to kill the deceased. The record contains sufficient evidence to contradict appellant's contention that he was under the influence of drugs. As this Court stated in Songer v. State, 322 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1975), wherein defendant alleged that he was so intoxicated by drugs as to negate his ability to premeditate the murder:
In Dawson v. State, 139 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1962), this Court opined:
Most recently in Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1975), this Court reiterated:
The majority of the points raised on appeal sub judice are directed to the imposition of the death penalty by the trial court in light of the particular facts of this case. Although, we do not agree with appellant that Florida's death penalty statute constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or is violative of the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution of the United States, we do find that the totality of the circumstances existent in the instant cause, and the weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances do not warrant imposition of the death penalty. Rather, we must determine that the jury's *208 recommendation of a life sentence was appropriate.
Having considered the other points raised on appeal by appellant, we find none of them so meritorious as to constitute reversible error.
We have listened carefully to oral argument, examined and considered the record in light of the assignments of error and briefs filed, and we have also, pursuant to Rule 6.16(b), Florida Appellate Rules, reviewed the evidence to determine whether the interests of justice require a new trial, with the result that we find no reversible error is made to appear and the evidence in the record before us does not reveal that the ends of justice require that a new trial on the issue of guilt be awarded.
Accordingly, appellant's conviction for murder in the first degree is affirmed; however, the order of the trial court sentencing appellant to death is quashed and the trial judge is directed to sentence Glenn Stark Chambers to life imprisonment.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, C.J., and ROBERTS, ADKINS, BOYD, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.
ENGLAND, J., concurs with an opinion, with which ADKINS and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.
ENGLAND, Justice (concurring).
I fully concur in the Court's disposition of this case, but I believe it appropriate to state more specifically why I consider the death penalty inappropriate on the facts of this case.
Contrary to the recommendation of the jury, the trial judge in this case imposed the death penalty on the ground there existed one aggravating circumstance  that the murder was committed in a heinous, atrocious and cruel manner  without any significant offsetting mitigating circumstance.[1] Although the trial judge found appellant to have been under the influence of some mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crime, he rejected that factor as a mitigating circumstance because the condition was self-induced by the use of illegal drugs.[2] I believe it essential to articulate our reconciliation of this factual circumstance with other death penalty cases.[3]
In Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975), we emphasized the weight to be given jury recommendations in capital cases and held that a death penalty is inappropriate following a jury recommendation of life imprisonment unless the facts suggesting death were so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ. The considerations underlying that decision were further explained in Cooper v. State, 336 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 1976), a case involving a jury recommendation of death. There we elaborated on the respective functions of the judge and jury in death penalty cases, explaining that the judge's role is primarily to insure the jury's adherence to law and to protect against a sentence resulting from passion rather than reason. Our directive there that the jury's advisory function may not be distorted by the omission of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance (absent acquiescence by all parties) was a calculated step to insure that a jury and judge could never reach differing conclusions on a sentence as a result of misunderstanding the law or applying different standards to the peculiar facts before them.
Tedder and Cooper espouse the same guidelines. Where a jury and a trial judge reach contrary conclusions because the facts derive from conflicting evidence, or where they have struck a different balance between *209 aggravating and mitigating circumstances which both have been given an opportunity to evaluate, the jury recommendation should be followed because that body has been assigned by history and statute the responsibility to discern truth and mete out justice. Given that the imposition of a death penalty "is not a mere counting process of X number of aggravating circumstances and Y number of mitigating circumstances, but rather a reasoned judgment ...",[4] both our Anglo-American jurisprudence and Florida's death penalty statute favor the judgment of jurors over that of jurists.
On the record before us, it does not appear that the jury struck an impassioned and unreasoned balance when it recommended life imprisonment. Our death penalty statute lists as mitigating circumstances the fact that a defendant "was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance",[5] as to which there was conflicting evidence, and the fact that the victim consented to the act causing death.[6] The jury had evidence in abundance that appellant and Connie Weeks had voluntarily shared a long-standing sado-masochistic relationship which included severe and disabling beatings. They also knew that Connie Weeks had herself obtained appellant's release from jail on the very day he had beaten and dragged her through the streets in an unholy rage. In light of the Legislature's enumeration of the factors to be weighed before effecting state executions, the facts suggesting a sentence of death in this case are not so clear and convincing that reasonable people could not believe life imprisonment justified.
ADKINS and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.
[1]  This weighing of circumstances is directed in these cases by Section 921.141, Fla. Stat. (1975). State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
[2]  The Court here correctly notes that the evidence regarding appellant's alleged use of drugs was conflicting.
[3]  Proffitt v. State, ___ U.S. ___, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 49 L. Ed. 2d 913 (1976).
[4]  State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973).
[5]  Section 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1975).
[6]  Section 921.141(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (1975).