Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Thor Templin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2015AP000284-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 29, 2016

2016 WI 18 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP284-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against  
Thor Templin, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Thor Templin, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST TEMPLIN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 29, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J.  
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 18
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP284-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Thor Templin, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Thor Templin, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 29, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report and recommendation 
of Referee Hannah C. Dugan that the license of Attorney Thor 
Templin be suspended for a period of six months for professional 
misconduct and that he pay the full costs of this proceeding, 
which are $7,564.50 as of October 19, 2015.  The referee also 
recommends that Attorney Templin be required to make restitution 
totaling $500 to two clients and that he be required to complete 
six hours of continuing legal education (CLE), concentrating on 
No. 
2015AP284-D   
 
2 
 
civil procedure and/or appellate practice and approved by the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR), as a precondition to 
reinstatement. 
¶2 
Upon careful review of the matter, we adopt the 
referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We agree 
that a six-month suspension of Attorney Templin's license is an 
appropriate sanction for his misconduct.  We also conclude that 
the full costs of the proceeding should be assessed against him, 
and we also agree that he should be required to make restitution 
totaling $500 to two clients and that he should be required to 
complete six hours of CLE. 
¶3 
Attorney Templin was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 2008 and practices in Milwaukee.  His disciplinary 
history consists of a consensual private reprimand for failing 
to act diligently and failing to communicate appropriately in a 
client matter, and for failing to return files.  Private 
Reprimand 2011-04.   
¶4 
On February 12, 2015, the OLR filed a complaint 
alleging that Attorney Templin committed 12 counts of misconduct 
involving four clients.   
¶5 
Attorney Templin filed an answer to the complaint on 
March 13, 2015.  Referee Dugan was appointed on March 31, 2015.  
On July 2, 2015, the parties sent the referee a stipulation that 
included a withdrawal of Attorney Templin's answer and his plea 
of no contest to all counts of misconduct.  The parties sent the 
referee an amended stipulation on July 6, 2015.  The amended 
stipulation provided that the referee could use the factual 
No. 
2015AP284-D   
 
3 
 
allegations of the complaint as an adequate basis in the record 
for a determination of misconduct as to all 12 counts.   
¶6 
The parties jointly recommended that the referee 
determine that a recommended sanction in the matter be a four-
month suspension of Attorney Templin's Wisconsin law license.  
The parties further stipulated that Attorney Templin should be 
required to make restitution to two clients in the total amount 
of $500 and that he be required to complete six hours of CLE 
concentrating on civil procedure and/or appellate practice, with 
the coursework to be approved by the OLR, as a precondition to 
his reinstatement.  Attorney Templin represented that he fully 
understands 
the 
misconduct 
allegations; 
that 
he 
fully 
understands his right to contest the matter; that he fully 
understands the ramifications of his entry into the stipulation; 
that he fully understands that he has the right to counsel and 
has chosen to represent himself; and that his entry into the 
stipulation is made knowingly and voluntarily and is not the 
product of plea-bargaining.   
¶7 
The referee issued her report and recommendation on 
September 29, 2015.  The referee found that the OLR had met its 
burden of proof with respect to all counts of misconduct alleged 
in the complaint.   
¶8 
Counts 1-5 of the OLR's complaint arose out of 
Attorney Templin's representation of J.S.  J.S. was divorced 
from M.S. in July 2008.  Attorney Templin commenced his 
representation of J.S. in December 2008.  In August 2011, 
approximately three years after the divorce judgment, Attorney 
No. 
2015AP284-D   
 
4 
 
Templin filed a notice of motion and motion for relief from the 
judgment of divorce or, in the alternative, to set aside the 
judgment of divorce for fraud on the court.  Attorney Templin's 
motion challenged M.S.'s financial disclosures.   
¶9 
On October 10, 2011, M.S.'s attorney sent a letter to 
Attorney 
Templin, 
which 
included 
a 
motion 
for 
sanctions 
requesting 
that 
Attorney 
Templin 
withdraw 
his 
frivolous 
pleadings.  The motion was based on legal grounds that included 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07, requiring a motion for relief from judgment 
to be filed within one year of the judgment.   
¶10 On October 25, 2011, Attorney Templin filed an amended 
notice of motion and motion for relief from the judgment of 
divorce or to set aside the judgment of divorce for fraud on the 
court or, in the alternative, to create a trust under Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.125(5).  On November 1, 2011, a hearing was held before 
Calumet County Family Court Commissioner James Fitzgerald.  The 
court commissioner determined that Attorney Templin's motion was 
not timely filed; that at least one of Attorney Templin's 
arguments involved "great leaps of reasoning that did not make 
sense;" and that there was no basis in fact for most of the 
allegations made by J.S. and that such allegations were 
frivolous.  Accordingly, Attorney Templin's amended motion was 
dismissed with prejudice. 
¶11 Attorney Templin filed a request for a de novo 
hearing.  A hearing was conducted before Judge Wilber Warren III 
on March 27, 2012.  Judge Warren issued a decision in August 
2012 denying the motion to reopen the judgment and also denying 
No. 
2015AP284-D   
 
5 
 
the imposition of a constructive trust.  Judge Warren found the 
claims for relief to be frivolous.  In a September 10, 2012 
order, Judge Warren ordered J.S. and/or Attorney Templin to pay 
$6,526.22 in attorneys fees to M.S.   
¶12 J.S. filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in April 
2014, attempting to discharge the "attorneys fees" sanction.  
Attorney Templin's firm represented J.S.  M.S.'s new attorney 
advised 
that 
the 
attorneys 
fees 
obligation 
was 
not 
a 
dischargeable debt under bankruptcy laws. 
¶13 M.S. filed a grievance against Attorney Templin with 
the OLR.  Attorney Templin repeatedly failed to respond to the 
OLR's requests for a response to the grievance.  Attorney 
Templin did finally respond on September 12, 2013.  
¶14 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Templin's representation of 
J.S.: 
[Count 1]  By filing a motion (and amended 
motion) for relief from a divorce judgment years after 
the applicable time limits had passed and advancing 
arguments devoid of factual or legal support, Templin 
violated SCR 20:1.1.1 
[Count 2]  By knowingly filing a motion (and 
amended motion) for relief from a divorce judgment 
years after the applicable time limits had passed and 
advancing arguments unwarranted under existing law, 
with no good faith argument existing for an extension, 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.1 provides that "[a] lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client.  Competent representation 
requires 
the 
legal 
knowledge, 
skill, 
thoroughness 
and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." 
No. 
2015AP284-D   
 
6 
 
modification, or reversal of existing law, Templin 
violated SCR 20:3.1(a)(1).2 
[Count 3]  By filing a motion (and amended 
motion) for relief from a divorce judgment years after 
the applicable time limits had passed and advancing 
arguments devoid of factual or legal support, by later 
filing a bankruptcy action on behalf of the client 
seeking to discharge his own sanction obligations 
imposed by the trial court, and by filing the 
bankruptcy action one day prior to a scheduling 
hearing on a Contempt/Show Cause proceeding on the 
underlying 
sanction 
order, 
Templin 
took 
multiple 
actions on behalf of his client when he knew or when 
it was obvious that such action would serve merely to 
harass or maliciously injure another, in violation of 
SCR 20:3.1(a)(3).3 
[Count 4]  By failing to comply with the 
September 
10, 
2012 
trial 
court 
sanction 
order 
requiring 
Templin 
and 
his 
client 
(jointly 
and 
severally) to pay $6,526.22 to the client's former 
husband within 30 days of the order, Templin knowingly 
disobeyed an obligation of a tribunal, in violation of 
SCR 20:3.4(c).4 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:3.1(a)(1) provides that, in representing a client, 
a lawyer shall not "knowingly advance a claim or defense that is 
unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may 
advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good 
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of 
existing law." 
3 SCR 20:3.1(a)(3) provides that, in representing a client, 
a lawyer shall not "file a suit, assert a position, conduct a 
defense, delay a trial or take other action on behalf of the 
client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such an 
action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure 
another." 
4 SCR 20:3.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall not "knowingly 
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for 
an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation 
exists." 
No. 
2015AP284-D   
 
7 
 
[Count 5]  By failing to provide relevant 
information to OLR in a timely fashion, Templin 
violated SCR 22.03(2),5 which is enforceable under the 
Rules of Professional Conduct through SCR 20:8.4(h).6 
¶15 Counts 6-8 of the OLR's complaint arose out of 
Attorney Templin's representation of A.H.  In 2009, the State of 
Wisconsin filed a petition to terminate A.H.'s parental rights 
to his son.  Following a dispositional hearing in February 2011, 
A.H. involuntarily lost his parental rights to his son.  
Following an appeal and a subsequent trial on remand, the trial 
court entered an order terminating A.H.'s parental rights to his 
son.  A.H. appealed this order.  His appointed appellate counsel 
filed a no-merit brief on A.H.'s behalf. 
                                                 
5 SCR 22.03(2) provides: 
Upon commencing an investigation, the director 
shall notify the respondent of the matter being 
investigated unless in the opinion of the director the 
investigation of the matter requires otherwise. The 
respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts 
and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct 
within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a 
request for a written response. The director may allow 
additional time to respond. Following receipt of the 
response, 
the 
director 
may 
conduct 
further 
investigation and may compel the respondent to answer 
questions, 
furnish 
documents, 
and 
present 
any 
information deemed relevant to the investigation. 
6 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 
or SCR 22.04(1)." 
No. 
2015AP284-D   
 
8 
 
¶16 On December 5, 2012, the court of appeals entered an 
order summarily affirming the trial court's order terminating 
A.H.'s parental rights. 
¶17 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.24(1), a motion for 
reconsideration of a court of appeals' decision must be filed 
within 20 days of the court of appeals' order.  Pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 808.10(1), a petition for review must be filed with 
this court within 30 days of the court of appeals' decision.  A 
failure to comply with the 30-day deadline for filing a petition 
for review deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction.   
¶18 On January 4, 2013, A.H. met with Attorney Templin and 
paid him $300 in cash to review his case file for purposes of 
possibly filing a petition for review.  A.H. believed he had 
until January 7, 2013, to file a petition for review.  In fact, 
the filing deadline was January 4, 2013.  Attorney Templin 
failed to advise A.H. that, subsequent to January 4, 2013, 
nothing further could be done on the case. 
¶19 A.H. attempted to reach Attorney Templin in January 
and February of 2013 without success.  In March 2013, A.H. 
submitted documents to Attorney Templin in an attempt to show 
his continued efforts to see his son.  In April 2013, Attorney 
Templin met with A.H., returned his files, and stated there was 
nothing further to be done in the matter. 
¶20 A.H. filed a grievance with the OLR against Attorney 
Templin.  Attorney Templin failed to respond to the OLR's 
requests for a response to the grievance. 
No. 
2015AP284-D   
 
9 
 
¶21 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Templin's representation of 
A.H.: 
[Count 6]  By failing to respond promptly to 
[A.H.'s] multiple requests for information regarding 
his case, Templin failed to comply with reasonable 
requests by [A.H.] for information, in violation of 
SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).7 
[Count 7]  By failing to explain to [A.H.] that 
the deadline for filing a Petition for Review with the 
Supreme Court, or that all other applicable appellate 
deadlines, had expired on or before January 4, 2013, 
Templin failed to explain matters to [A.H.] in a way 
that would permit him to make informed decisions about 
his representation, in violation of SCR 20:1.4(b).8 
[Count 8]  By accepting a $300 fee to review 
[A.H.'s] file for purposes of a potential appeal to 
the Supreme Court, on the same day as the deadline for 
filing any kind of appeal or petition for review 
expired, thereby precluding any meaningful action in 
the case, Templin charged an unreasonable fee, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.5(a).9 
                                                 
7 SCR 20:1.4(a)(4) provides that a lawyer shall "promptly 
comply with reasonable requests by the client for information." 
8 SCR 20:1.4(b) provides that "[a] lawyer shall explain a 
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client 
to make informed decisions regarding the representation." 
9 SCR 20:1.5(a) provides: 
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, 
or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 
amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the 
following:  
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly;  
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP284-D   
 
10 
 
¶22 Count 9 of the OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney 
Templin's representation of V.K., who retained Attorney Templin 
in May 2013 to commence a divorce action.  Attorney Templin 
prepared legal papers purportedly for the purpose of commencing 
the divorce action and mailed them to the Racine County Clerk of 
Court for filing.  The clerk of court returned the divorce 
pleadings, unfiled, to Attorney Templin with a note indicating 
that the family court commissioner would not accept the 
documents for filing because Attorney Templin also needed to 
file an order to show cause and affidavit for temporary relief.  
¶23 Attorney Templin prepared an order to show cause and 
affidavit for temporary relief and mailed the documents to the 
clerk of court.  The documents were again returned with a 
statement that Attorney Templin had failed to properly follow 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer;  
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services;  
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or 
by the circumstances;  
(6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client;  
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and  
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
No. 
2015AP284-D   
 
11 
 
local Racine County court rules.  Thereafter, Attorney Templin 
downloaded the court documents that are accessible online for 
pro se litigants and filled out the information necessary to 
initiate the divorce action on behalf of V.K.  Those documents 
were submitted to the clerk of court and were once again 
rejected.  V.K. fired Attorney Templin via email on or about 
July 22, 2013. 
¶24 The OLR's complaint alleged the following count of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Templin's representation of 
V.K.:   
[Count 9]  By failing to properly prepare and file 
[V.K.'s] Petition for Divorce in Racine County Circuit 
Court, 
Templin 
failed 
to 
provide 
competent 
representation to his client, in violation of SCR 
20:1.1. 
¶25 Counts 10-12 of the OLR's complaint arose out of 
Attorney Templin's representation of C.B., a veteran who had a 
history 
of 
receiving 
medical 
care 
from 
the 
Veterans 
Administration (VA).  In June 2008, C.B. was involved in a 
serious auto accident which resulted in him being flown to 
Froedtert Memorial Lutheran Hospital (Froedtert) where he 
remained for approximately three months.  After payment of 
certain amounts by the VA, the amount owing from C.B. to 
Froedtert was $79,442.07.   
¶26 On August 28, 2012, Froedtert filed a summons and 
complaint against C.B. in Milwaukee County circuit court.  C.B. 
met with Attorney Templin on September 21, 2012, and discussed 
No. 
2015AP284-D   
 
12 
 
the need to file an answer and a third party summons and 
complaint against the VA.   
¶27 Attorney Templin filed an answer and affirmative 
defenses on September 24, 2012.  A pretrial conference was held 
on November 5, 2012.  The scheduling order issued that day 
imposed a December 5, 2012 deadline for filing amendments to the 
pleadings, including the naming of any additional parties.  The 
scheduling order imposed a deadline of March 5, 2013, for the 
parties to file all dispositive motions, imposed deadlines to 
identify witnesses and damage claims, and imposed a deadline for 
discovery, as well as a deadline to complete mediation. 
¶28 On December 5, 2012, Attorney Templin filed a third 
party summons and complaint against the VA.  Despite apparent 
efforts to obtain service on the VA, service was never obtained.  
Attorney Templin never filed a witness list on behalf of C.B. 
¶29 On March 5, 2013, Froedtert filed a motion for summary 
judgment with supporting memorandum and affidavit.  Attorney 
Templin did not file any responsive pleadings.  On April 22, 
2013, Attorney Templin sent an email to Froedtert's counsel 
indicating he never received the summary judgment motion.  
Another copy of the motion was sent to Attorney Templin. 
¶30 On April 22, 2013, Attorney Templin sent a letter 
asking the judge for an adjournment of the April 24, 2013 
summary judgment motion hearing.  Attorney Templin's request was 
denied.   
No. 
2015AP284-D   
 
13 
 
¶31 The scheduling order had also required the parties to 
complete mediation before April 4, 2013.  The attorneys never 
communicated over the subject of mediation. 
¶32 On 
April 
24, 
2013, 
the 
circuit 
court 
granted 
Froedtert's motion for summary judgment.  Attorney Templin never 
adequately advised C.B. about the pending summary judgment 
motion or various legal options available to him concerning the 
motion.  C.B. received no communication or contact from Attorney 
Templin after April 24, 2013.  Ultimately, C.B. filed bankruptcy 
in 2014 and the judgment in favor of Froedtert was discharged.   
¶33 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Templin's representation of 
C.B.: 
[Count 10]  By failing to properly serve the VA; 
by failing to submit a witness list or detailed damage 
claims; and/or by failing to respond to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed by the plaintiff in the case, 
Templin failed to provide competent representation to 
his client, in violation of SCR 20:1.1. 
[Count 11]  By failing to secure service on a 
third-party defendant, file a witness list as required 
in the Scheduling Order, pursue mediation, or file any 
dispositive 
motions, 
Templin 
failed 
to 
provide 
diligent representation to his client, in violation of 
SCR 20:1.3.10 
[Count 12]  By failing to advise [C.B.] of the 
pending Motion for Summary Judgment, or the subsequent 
entry of a judgment against him, as well as failing to 
discuss the options available to him regarding his 
case, Templin failed to explain matters to [C.B.] 
                                                 
10 SCR 20:1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
No. 
2015AP284-D   
 
14 
 
sufficiently to enable him to make informed decisions 
regarding his representation, in violation of SCR 
20:1.4(b), and failed to keep his client reasonably 
informed about the status of the matter, in violation 
of SCR 20:1.4(a)(3).11 
¶34 By entering into the amended stipulation, Attorney 
Templin admitted the facts underlying all 12 counts of the OLR's 
complaint.  The referee concluded that the OLR met its burden of 
proof as to all 12 counts.  The referee further agreed with the 
parties' amended stipulation that Attorney Templin be required 
to make restitution in the amount of $300 to A.H. and $200 to 
V.K.  The referee further agreed with the parties' amended 
stipulation that Attorney Templin be required to complete six 
hours of CLE, concentrating on civil procedure and/or appellate 
practice and approved by the OLR, as a precondition to 
reinstatement. 
¶35 Turning 
to 
the 
appropriate 
sanction, 
while 
the 
parties' amended stipulation jointly recommended a four-month 
suspension, the referee concluded that a six-month suspension 
was appropriate.  The referee commented that the one mitigating 
factor in the case was Attorney Templin's lack of an extensive 
disciplinary history.  The referee identified a number of 
aggravating factors, including multiple offenses, a pattern of 
misconduct, an intentional failure to comply with rules or 
orders of the disciplinary agency, and vulnerability of the 
victims.   
                                                 
11 SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) provides that a lawyer shall "keep the 
client reasonably informed about the status of the matter." 
No. 
2015AP284-D   
 
15 
 
¶36 The referee noted that Attorney Templin is a staff 
attorney employed at a nonprofit law firm directing services for 
economically disadvantaged clients who have few or no lawyer 
retention options.  The referee also found a lack of remorse or 
acceptance of responsibility for Attorney Templin's actions, as 
well as a significant number of violations occurring in a 
relatively short period of time since he was licensed to 
practice law.  The referee also expressed concern about Attorney 
Templin's understanding of his violation of supreme court rules, 
the seriousness of the violations, the inappropriateness of his 
conduct, and the effect of his violations of the rules.  The 
referee noted that, while the disciplinary proceeding was 
pending, Attorney Templin attempted to voluntarily resign from 
the State Bar.  His resignation request was held in abeyance 
pending the outcome of this disciplinary proceeding.  The 
referee also commented that she was concerned about Attorney 
Templin's 
understanding 
and 
attitude 
towards 
meeting 
the 
professional standards imposed on a member of the bar, and said 
his 
"conduct 
during 
these 
proceedings 
raises 
substantial 
concerns about [his] understanding of and attitude toward court 
proceedings and toward future clients' needs and expectations." 
¶37 The referee concluded that a six-month suspension was 
necessary for Attorney Templin to understand and accept the 
responsibilities of the legal profession and the ethical 
constraints placed upon its practice.  She said the resultant 
full reinstatement proceeding, pursuant to SCRs 22.29-22.33, is 
necessary for the court to be certain that Attorney Templin has 
No. 
2015AP284-D   
 
16 
 
complied with the supreme court rules during the term of his 
suspension and that he is prepared to comply with the standards 
of professional practice and the expectations of clients served 
under a Wisconsin law license. 
¶38 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless 
clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Eisenberg, 
2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  The court may 
impose whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of the 
referee's recommendation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.   
¶39 There is no showing that any of the referee's findings 
of fact are clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, we adopt them.  We 
also agree with the referee's conclusions of law that Attorney 
Templin violated the supreme court rules set forth above.   
¶40 With respect to the appropriate level of discipline, 
upon careful review of the matter, we agree with the referee's 
recommendation for a six-month suspension of Attorney Templin's 
license to practice law in Wisconsin.  Although no two 
disciplinary proceedings are identical, a six-month suspension 
is generally consistent with the sanction imposed in In re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Hartigan, 
2005 
WI 
3, 
277 Wis. 2d 341, 690 N.W.2d 831 (attorney's license suspended 
for six months for six counts of misconduct involving two client 
matters) and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyd, 
2009 WI 59, 318 Wis. 2d 281, 767 N.W.2d 226 (attorney's license 
No. 
2015AP284-D   
 
17 
 
suspended for six months for 13 counts of misconduct arising out 
of five client matters). 
¶41 We agree with the referee's recommendation, based upon 
the parties' stipulation, that Attorney Templin be required to 
make restitution to A.H. in the amount of $300 and to V.K. in 
the amount of $200.  We further agree that, as a precondition of 
license reinstatement, Attorney Templin be required to complete 
six hours of CLE, concentrating on civil procedure and/or 
appellate practice, as approved by the OLR.  We also find it 
appropriate to impose the full costs of this disciplinary 
proceeding on Attorney Templin. 
¶42 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Thor Templin to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of six 
months, effective May 3, 2016. 
¶43 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as a condition of the 
reinstatement of his license to practice law in Wisconsin, Thor 
Templin shall successfully complete six hours of continuing 
legal 
education, 
concentrating 
on 
civil 
procedure 
and/or 
appellate practice, as approved by the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation. 
¶44 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Thor Templin shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $7,564.50. 
¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Thor Templin shall make restitution in the amount 
of $300 to A.H. and in the amount of $200 to V.K. 
No. 
2015AP284-D   
 
18 
 
¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the restitution specified 
above is to be completed prior to paying costs to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation. 
¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Thor Templin shall comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of an 
attorney whose license to practice law has been suspended. 
¶48 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.29(4)(c). 
 
 
No.  2015AP284-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶49 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
per curiam.  I write separately, however, to discuss a 
procedural issue posed in the instant case relating to current 
OLR 
practice: 
 
How 
should 
the 
OLR 
address 
multiple 
investigations of a lawyer during substantially the same time 
period?  Should the OLR propose disciplining an attorney in one 
disciplinary proceeding only to support a different discipline 
or suspension of the license in the near future in another 
proceeding? 
¶50 To understand the procedural issue, I state key dates 
relating to OLR's case against Attorney Thor Templin. 
¶51 OLR's complaint in the instant matter was filed on 
February 15, 2015.  OLR and Attorney Templin entered into a 
stipulation on July 6, 2015.  The referee issued her report on 
September 29, 2015. 
¶52 While the court was considering the instant OLR matter 
against Attorney Templin, on December 16, 2015, the OLR advised 
the court that it was investigating Attorney Templin on another 
matter.  Notice of this other investigation is an open, public 
record. 
  
¶53 This kind of issue arose in In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Osicka, 2014 WI 33, ¶36, 353 Wis. 2d 656, 
847 N.W.2d 343.  There the referee commented critically about 
the OLR's filing two complaints within about a year of each 
other complaining about conduct in which the attorney engaged 
during approximately the same period.  The referee explained: 
No.  2015AP284-D.ssa 
 
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It is unclear why the matters involving [Attorney 
Osicka] resulted in the filing of two separate 
cases. . . . [E]verything else charged in the present 
Complaint . . . pre-dated the filing, on January 11, 
2012, of the earlier complaint in 2012AP60–D, and the 
OLR had knowledge of all the violations at least 
several months before January 11, 2012 when the 
earlier Complaint was filed. . . . The point is, there 
should have been only one Complaint. 
¶54 The instant case raises an anomaly similar to one the 
referee raised in the Osicka case.  This anomaly and other 
issues in the OLR's procedures have been brought to the 
attention of the court.  Several issues to be addressed have 
been described.1     
¶55 In this regard, I suggested that the court should 
institute a review of the OLR system, which is about 15 years 
old.2  Others have joined me in this suggestion.  Since October 
                                                 
1 In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Winkel, 2015 WI 
68, ¶55, 363 Wis. 2d 786, 866 N.W.2d 642 (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring), I wrote that Attorney Winkel's suggestion that 
bifurcating the hearing to address the merits of the charged 
violation and then determine the discipline should be part of 
the proposed OLR study. 
See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Johns, 
2014 WI 32, ¶69, 353 Wis. 2d 746, 866 N.W.2d 642 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., dissenting).  See also In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Hicks, 2016 WI 9, ¶13, 366 Wis. 2d 512, ___ N.W.2d ___ 
(issue that has arisen with temporary suspensions).  
2 See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka, 
2014 WI 33, ¶37, 353 Wis. 2d 656, 847 N.W.2d 343 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., concurring); 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Osicka, 2014 WI 34, ¶38, 353 Wis. 2d 675, 847 N.W.2d 333 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Johns, 2014 WI 32, ¶71-76, 353 Wis. 2d 746, 847 
N.W.2d 179 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Kratz, 2014 WI 31, ¶¶73-75, 353 Wis. 2d 696, 
851 N.W.2d 219 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP284-D.ssa 
 
3 
 
2013, Keith Sellen, Director of the OLR, and Justices Ann Walsh 
Bradley, N. Patrick Crooks, and David Prosser expressed interest 
in such a proposal.3  Justice Prosser commented at an open rules 
conference on January 20, 2015, that he favored a "top down" 
review of the OLR. 
¶56 To put this suggestion before the court, I filed Rule 
Petition 15-01 on February 6, 2015, asking the court to create 
supreme court rules establishing a Lawyer Regulation Review 
Committee to undertake a comprehensive review of the Rules of 
Professional 
Conduct 
for 
Attorneys 
and 
the 
organization, 
operation, and procedures of the lawyer discipline system.4  
                                                                                                                                                             
See also In re the Petition for Reinstatement of Attorney 
Jeffrey P. Neterval, unpublished order, ¶¶3-7 (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring) (Mar. 22, 2016); In re the Petition for Reactivation 
of David W. Klaudt's License to Practice Law in Wisconsin, 
unpublished order, ¶¶6-10 (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (Mar. 22, 
2016).   
3 Johns, 
353 
Wis. 2d 746, 
¶¶71-76 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting). 
 
See 
also 
Kratz, 
353 
Wis. 2d 696, 
¶73-75 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
Justice Prosser wrote in Kratz as follows in supporting an 
impartial, objective review of OLR's practices and procedures: 
From time to time every government agency would 
benefit from an impartial, objective review of the 
agency's practices and procedures. There is increasing 
evidence of the need for such an evaluation of the 
Office 
of 
Lawyer 
Regulation 
(OLR). 
This 
case 
highlights some of the problems facing the agency and 
why an objective review would be desirable. 
Kratz, 353 Wis. 2d 696, ¶76 (Prosser, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).   
4 S. 
Ct. 
Order 
15-01 
(issued 
Dec. 
21, 
2015), 
¶37 
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
No.  2015AP284-D.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶57 All commentators were supportive of the petition.  
Nevertheless, after treating the petition as a valid rule 
petition for almost a year, on November 16, 2015, five justices 
voted to dismiss the petition on the ploy that it was an 
improper subject matter for a rule petition:  David T. Prosser, 
Patience Roggensack, Annette K. Ziegler, Michael J. Gableman, 
and Rebecca G. Bradley.5 
¶58 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and I dissented from the 
dismissal. 
¶59 The order dismissing the petition states that the 
dismissal does not necessarily end prospects for the appointment 
of a committee.  Unfortunately, however, decisions about whether 
a committee will be established, the composition of the 
committee, the mission of the committee, and how the committee 
will function will be made behind closed doors.  Yet lawyer 
discipline is of great importance to the court, to the lawyers 
of the state, and to the public.   
¶60 I write separately to address an anomaly that was 
revealed in Osicka and to repeat my commitment to try to keep 
the bench, the bar, and the public generally informed as best I 
can about what progress (or lack thereof) is made in the 
appointment of the committee.  As of this date, no progress has 
been made to create the committee. 
                                                 
5 For a fuller explanation, please read the order of 
dismissal of Rule Petition 15-01 and my dissent, available at 
http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/rulhear/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=p
df&seqNo=158416. 
No.  2015AP284-D.ssa 
 
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¶61 For the reasons set forth, I concur but write 
separately. 
 
 
No.  2015AP284-D.ssa 
 
 
 
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