Title: In re Estate of Dicksion
Citation: 2011 OK 96
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: November 15, 2011

In re Estate of Dicksion Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Appellee/Counter-appellant, Archie Dicksion filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of his brother. Subsequently, Thomas Powell asserted that he was a pretermitted heir of the deceased. With the family's cooperation, DNA genetic testing was conducted and the tests determined that Powell was indeed the son of the decedent. The trial court determined that Powell was an unintentionally omitted child and entitled to his statutory share of the estate. Powell and his half-sister, the decedent's daughter, also challenged the admittance of the holographic will to probate and to Appellant's appointment as the personal representative of the estate. A motion for new trial was denied. Both Powell and the Appellant appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the application of paternity testing to intestate and probate proceedings. Upon review, the Court held that: (1) under the facts presented, the objections to admission of the holographic will were not untimely; (2) the paternity statute, 84 O.S. 2001 sec. 215, applies to intestate and probate proceedings; and (3) 58 O.S. 2001 sec. 122 prohibits the appointment of a business partner as personal representative only when the proceedings are intestate or when the business partner is not named personal representative in a will. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Oklahoma Supreme Court? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Oklahoma Supreme Court. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF DICKSION 2011 OK 96 Case Number: 107295 Decided: 11/15/2011 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF VALATUS MERRAL DICKSION THOMAS POWELL and KOLLEEN M. MAILLOUX, Appellants/Counter-Appellees, v. ARCHIE DICKSION, Appellee/Counter-Appellant. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS DIVISION IV Honorable John A. Blake, Trial Judge ¶0 The appellee/counter-appellant, Archie Dicksion (Dicksion/personal representative) filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of his brother in the District Court of Garvin County, Oklahoma. Subsequently, Thomas Powell (Powell/son) asserted that he was a pretermitted heir of the deceased. With the family's cooperation, DNA genetic testing was conducted and the tests determined that Powell was the son of the decedent. The trial court determined that Powell was an unintentionally omitted child and entitled to his statutory share of the estate. Powell and his half-sister, the decedent's daughter, also challenged the admittance of the holographic will to probate and the personal representative's appointment. The motion for new trial was denied. Both Powell and the personal representative appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded. We granted certiorari to address the application of paternity testing to intestate and probate proceedings. We hold that: 1) under the facts presented, the objections to admission of the holographic will were not untimely; 2) the paternity statute, 84 O.S. 2001 §215, applies to intestate and probate proceedings; and 3) 58 O.S. 2001 §122 prohibits the appointment of a business partner as personal representative only when the proceedings are intestate or when the business partner is not named personal representative in a will. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; CAUSE AFFIRMED IN PART/REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED. Yasodhara M. Means, Norman, Oklahoma, for Appellants/Counter-Appellees. James W. Carlton, Jr., Brett Agee, Pauls Valley, Oklahoma, for Appellee/Counter-Appellant. Cameron L. Miller, Denton, Texas, Pro se. Jeanie Mendes, Wailuki, Hawaii, Interested Party. KAUGER, J., ¶1 The three dispositive issues presented by this appeal and counter-appeal are whether: 1) the objection to admission of the holographic will was timely;1 2) the paternity statute, 84 O.S. 2001 §215,2 applies to intestate and probate proceedings; and 3) 58 O.S. 2001 §1223 prohibits the appointment of a business partner as personal representative when the will does not make any provisions for such an appointment. We hold that: 1) under the facts presented, the objection to the admission of the holographic will was not untimely; 2) 84 O.S. 2001 §215 applies to intestate and probate proceedings; and 3) 58 O.S. 2001 §122 prohibits the appointment of a business partner as personal representative only when the proceedings are intestate or when the business partner is not named personal representative in a will. FACTS ¶2 On December 20, 2006, the appellee/counter-appellant, Archie M. Dicksion, (Dicksion/personal representative) filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of his brother, Valatus Merral Dicksion, in the District Court of Garvin County, Oklahoma. The will was written in ink on four pages of heavily stained notebook paper. The provision naming his daughter as administrator of the estate was marked out. The will was partially dated and purportedly signed by the decedent.4 ¶3 On January 18, 2007, the will was admitted to probate and Dicksion was appointed personal representative of his brother's estate. According to the petition for probate, the heirs of the decedent consisted of a deceased wife, Estella G. Dicksion, and two adult daughters, Kolleen Mailloux of Los Angeles, California, and Kelli Laine, of Corona, California (Maillox/Laine). The petition does not mention the decedent's adult son, Thomas Powell of Shreveport, Louisiana (Powell/son). The son was born out of wedlock to Inex Wahlstrom and the decedent in California in 1952 and placed for adoption one year later.5 ¶4 On February 8, 2007, Mailloux, objected to any further proceedings until the proposed sale of certain real property had been appraised and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the alleged holographic will had been fully and fairly litigated. On March 8, 2007, the trial court determined that the real property in question was not an asset of the estate, but rather belonged to Whispering Pines Ranch, L.L.C. as the record owner. Consequently, it determined that it had no jurisdiction over the sale of the real property. On March 9, 2007, the personal representative filed an application to determine heirs, noting that Powell alleged that he was the son of the decedent and entitled to his share of the estate. The application requested that the court make a determination as to whether the son was the legal heir of the deceased. ¶5 On March 29, 2007, Powell filed the application for his share of the estate as an unintentionally omitted child alleging that he was the biological son of the deceased. DNA genetic testing was conducted and the tests determined that Powell was the son of the decedent. On July 3, 2007, at the hearing on Powell's application, the court granted the application finding that Powell was an pretermitted heir and entitled to his statutory share of the estate. ¶6 On December 4, 2007, the personal representative filed a petition for an order allowing a final account of the estate, a determination of heirship, and a petition for final decree of distribution and discharge. On January 10, 2008, the appellants, Powell and Mailloux, filed objections to the final accounting and included a list of concerns regarding the estate and the transfer of various properties from the estate. ¶7 At this stage of the proceeding, several continuances were granted, objections to a final accounting were filed by additional heirs and the heirs of the deceased's widow, and ultimately the trial court added Whispering Pines L.L.C. and the personal representatives as parties to the probate proceeding. Whispering Pines L.L.C., was owned in half by the decedent and his wife and half by the personal representative/brother. The trial court determined that the assets of the company were so intertwined with the estate assets that the company had to be included as a party to the proceedings. ¶8 By November 3, 2008, the objections had been overruled, the final accounting was approved for distribution according to the terms of the will, with the exception of Powell who was awarded his share as an unintentionally omitted heir. The final probate order was filed on December 9, 2008. Two days later, Powell asked for an extension of time and stay of the final accounting so that he could secure a new lawyer. ¶9 On December 29, 2008, Powell filed a motion for new trial pro se challenging the December 9, 2008, order. Subsequently, on January 20, 2008, Powell, through his new lawyer, filed an amended motion for new trial arguing that: 1) the accounting of the assets of the estate was erroneous; 2) the Court had never ruled on the objections to the holographic will; and 3) the personal representative, as a business partner of the decedent should not have been appointed as personal representative. ¶10 On May 26, 2009, the motion for new trial was denied and an order reflecting the ruling was filed on June 8, 2009. On June 11, 2009, the trial court denied the personal representative's oral motion to tax Powell for additional attorney fees incurred by the estate. Instead, it allowed the Powell's attorney fees from his previous lawyer to be paid from Powell's share of the estate. ¶11 Powell appealed the trial court's denial of the new trial motion on July 8, 2009, asserting that the trial court committed reversible error: 1) by admitting the holographic will; 2) by appointing the brother/partner as personal representative; and 3) in its valuation and distribution of the estate. Two days later, the personal representative filed a counter-appeal alleging that the trial court erred when it: 1) determined that Powell was an omitted heir; 2) awarded Powell a portion of the estate; and 3) awarded Powell attorney fees instead of imposing fees against Powell. ¶12 The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded both appeals for further proceedings, determining that trial court erred when it allowed post-death determination of paternity as a basis for inheritance. On September 8, 2010, Powell filed a petition for certiorari and we granted the petition on December 14, 2010. I. ¶13 UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, THE OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL WAS NOT UNTIMELY. ¶14 The personal representative argues that no timely objection to the admission of the holographic will was made because the document that the objection was contained in did not conform to the requirements of 58 O.S. 2001 §61.6 The son insists that the objection was timely; but no evidentiary hearing was ever held regarding the will contest or the will's admission. ¶15 We note at the outset that this is not a case in which an unintentionally omitted heir appeared and attempted to contest a will which had already been probated. Had this been the case, 58 O.S. 2001 §2427 which provides that if no person contests a will within 60 days after a will has been admitted, the will is conclusive, would have prevented such a result. Rather, the pretermitted heir in the instant cause has been involved in this proceeding since the will was admitted to probate, and 58 O.S. 2001 §61 8 sets forth the time limits and form of contesting an admitted will to probate. It is true the precise petition provided by §61 was not filed. However, the meaning and effect of an instrument filed in court depends on its contents and substance rather than on the form or title given it by the author.9 The legal effect of any court filed paper depends on its substance rather than its form.10 ¶16 In one of the Court's earliest cases, Ginn v. Knight, 1924 OK 806 ¶4, 232 P. 936, an appeal was filed and the appellee moved to dismiss the appeal because the pleading which was the subject of the appeal was titled "motion of petition," when it was actually an application. However, the Court noted that the instrument was treated as a motion by the trial court throughout the proceedings. The Court held that "the nature of a pleading is not determined by the title given it by pleader, but by the subject-matter thereof." ¶17 Here, the document containing the objection was titled "Objection to Application for Sale of Real Estate" which was filed less than 90 days after the will was admitted. However, the objection was premised on the belief that the details and circumstances surrounding the execution of the will were such that the sale of estate property should be stayed until a further examination by the court could be made.11 A majority of the objection references the appellant's desire for a full examination of the will. The objection was not merely to the sale of estate property, but rather the sale of that property based on a potentially invalid will. Although the document was not titled as a petition to contest to the validity of the will and its admission to probate, the subject-matter shows that it was such and should have been treated accordingly. Nevertheless, to be clear, we reiterate that had the pretermitted heir attempted to claim an interest in the estate after probate been concluded the objection would have been untimely and the probate conclusive. II. ¶18 TITLE 84 O.S. 2001 §215 APPLIES TO INTESTATE AND PROBATE PROCEEDINGS. ¶19 The son argues that the probate court properly ordered and considered the DNA paternity test to determine that he was an heir. He also insists that the personal representative's challenge to the issue is waived because the personal representative agreed to and consented to the test. The personal representative argues that the probate court could not consider paternity testing in a probate proceeding and even if it could, the son did not establish that he was an heir entitled to inherit from the decedent. ¶20 Because we have determined that the challenge to the holographic will was not untimely, it is possible on remand that the will may be determined to be invalid and inadmissible. If this is the case, the matter will proceed under the intestate statutes. Consequently, we take this opportunity to address DNA testing as it applies to both intestate or probate proceedings. ¶21 The paternity of children born out of wedlock has been of concern since before statehood. Title 84 O.S. 1910 §215 was codified in 1910 and it remained the same as the territorial version of the law from 1890.12 The statute addressed inheritance by and from illegitimate children and provided: Every illegitimate child is an heir of the person who in writing, signed in the presence of a competent witness, acknowledges himself to be the father of such child; and in all cases is an heir of his mother; and inherits his or her estate, in whole or in part, as the case may be, in the same manner as if he had been born in wedlock; but he does not represent his father or mother by inheriting any part of the estate of his or her kindred, either lineal or collateral, unless before his death his parents shall have intermarried, and his father after such marriage, acknowledges him as his child, or adopts him into his family, in which case such child and all the legitimate children are considered brothers and sisters, and on the death of either of them, interstate, and without issue, the others inherit his estate, and are heirs, as hereinbefore provided, in like manner as if all the children had been legitimate; saving to the father and mother respectively, their rights in the estates of all the children in like manner as if all had been legitimate. The issue of all marriages null in law, or dissolved by divorce, are legitimate. ¶22 In 1940, the Court in Burns v. Lawson, 1940 OK 459, 107 P.2d 555 , addressed the sufficiency of proof as required under this statute. In Burns, the alleged heir commenced an action to be declared the sole heir of Lawson. A written acknowledgment of paternity was alleged to have existed, but neither copy of the instrument nor any witness who saw Lawson sign it was produced. The trial court submitted the question to the jury as to whether Lawson signed, in the presence of a competent witness, an acknowledgment in writing that he was the father. The unanimous verdict was no, and it was affirmed on appeal. ¶23 Section 215 remained unaltered for over 60 years until 1977 when the Legislature amended, 84 O.S. Supp. 1977 §215 to provide: For inheritance purposes, a child born out of wedlock stands in the same relation to his mother and her kindred, and she and her kindred to the child, as if that child had been born in wedlock. For like purposes, every such child stands in identical relation to his father and his kindred, and the latter and his kindred to the child, whenever: (a) the father, in writing, signed in the presence of a competent witness acknowledges himself to be the father of the child, (b) the father and mother intermarried subsequent to the child's birth, and the father, after such marriage, acknowledged the child as his own or adopted him into his family, (c) the father publicly acknowledged such child as his own, receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his family and otherwise treating it as if it were a child born in wedlock, or (d) the father was judicially determined to be such in a paternity proceeding before a court of competent jurisdiction. For all purposes, the issue of all marriages null in law, or dissolved by divorce, are deemed to have been born in wedlock. ¶24 In the Matter of Estate of King, 1990 OK 138, 837 P.2d 463 we addressed the constitutionality of this version of the statute. The father in King was deceased and his will had been presented to probate when his alleged child filed an action for a determination of heirship. After reviewing several United States Supreme Court decisions on sister states' statutes, we held that §215 was constitutional.13 ¶25 The King Court discussed the burden of proof necessary for the child born out of wedlock to inherit by intestate succession. In addressing the burden of proof, the Court noted that one method for a child born out of wedlock to inherit from his father was if "there was a judicial determination of paternity before the death of the father." The statute does not have this requirement written into it -- nor has it ever had such language. The Court quoted the statute as having required a paternity determination before the death of the father when no such requirement has ever existed. ¶26 In In the Matter of Estate of Gertrude Jo Geller, 1999 OK CIV APP 45, 980 P.2d 665 , the Court of Civil Appeals was presented with the argument that §215(d) would authorize a paternity proceeding against the father despite the fact that the father was deceased. The Court of Civil Appeals noted that: [T]he court in King stated that section 215(d) requires 'a judicial determination of paternity before the death of the father.' 1990 OK 138 at ¶12, 837 P.2d at 467 (emphasis added). We cannot agree with White's contention that the court's language is dicta. The Geller Court went on to hold that §215 "does not appear to contemplate post-death genetic testing, and the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that it does not." ¶27 Here, the Court of Civil Appeals also expressly relied on King's erroneous language which added the requirement that paternity be determined prior to the father's death. The statute does not have such a requirement written into it and to the extent King and Geller suggests that it does -- they should be overruled and are hereby overruled. ¶28 More than 30 years has passed since 1977, and §215 has not been updated. In the meantime the use of DNA testing has evolved exponentially. The Uniform Parentage Act, 10 O.S. Supp. 2006 §§ 7700-101 et seq., became effective in Oklahoma in 2006. The Act, expressly applies to parental determinations in this state. It states that all courts shall apply the law to determine parentage -- neither intestate nor probate proceedings are excluded from this requirement.14 Under the Act: 1) all children, whether born to parents who are married or not are treated the same;15 2) paternity testing applies for all purposes of establishing a parent-child relationship;16 and 3) paternity testing expressly includes DNA testing of deceased individuals.17 It is completely illogical to allow posthumous genetic DNA testing under the Uniform Parentage Act, but not to allow it in intestate and probate proceeding when the statute expressly allows an heir to prove heirship via paternity proceedings. ¶29 Section 215 merely requires a judicial determination of paternity. It does not limit that determination to paternity proceedings in which a parent is seeking child support or to any other proceeding in which paternity may be asserted. Rather, §215 is part of the probate code. The Legislature, when it updated §215 in 1977, must have known by the late 1970's that paternity testing had advanced since 1910, and would continue to advance. Clearly, the change in the statute was broad enough to encompass this evolution of paternity testing. Even if one were not inclined to overrule In the Matter of Estate of King, 1990 OK 138, 837 P.2d 463 and In the Matter of Estate of Gertrude Jo Geller, 1999 OK CIV APP 45, 980 P.2d 665 , the enactment of the 2006 Uniform Parentage Act has done so. ¶30 Courts have embraced DNA testing to determine heirship.18 Here, Powell alleged that he was the natural son of the decedent.19 His paternity was established with the use of DNA from his father's brother. If the Legislature decides to exclude intestate or probate proceedings from the current paternity testing laws, it may do so. Until then, posthumous paternity testing is expressly authorized by statute.20 The trial court's decision regarding his status as an unintentionally omitted child is affirmed. III. ¶31 TITLE 58 O.S. 2001 §122 PROHIBITS THE APPOINTMENT OF A BUSINESS PARTNER AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE ONLY WHEN THE PROCEEDINGS ARE INTESTATE OR WHEN THE BUSINESS PARTNER IS NOT NAMED PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IN A WILL. ¶32 Title 58 O.S. 2001 §12221 provides, in pertinent part, that ". . . If the decedent was a member of a partnership at the time of his decease, the surviving partner must in no case be appointed administrator of his estate." The personal representative is the decedent's brother, who was also a business partner with the decedent in "Whispering Pines Ranch, L.L.C.," a limited liability corporation. According to an application filed by the personal representative, the decedent was "owner of a 50% interest in" Whispering Pines LLC. ¶33 The will's only reference to an administrator and/or personal representative was to the decedent's daughter and it was crossed out. The business partner was not named anywhere in the will as the administrator and/or personal representative. Powell argues that because the personal representative was the decedent's business partner in the limited liability company, the trial court erred in appointing him to serve in that capacity. The personal representative contends that the statutory restrictions of 58 O.S. 2001 §12222 only preclude a business partner serving as personal representative when the decedent dies intestate, without a will. ¶34 He also contends that his appointment should not be disturbed because the objection was untimely. Title 58 O.S. 2001 §104,23 the statute governing objections to letters testamentary, does not provide a time limit to file an objection.24 Title 58 O.S. 2001 §129 provides that objections to the administrator on the grounds of incompetency be filed within 30 days after the administrator has been appointed.25 ¶35 The objection here is based on the administrator's status as a business partner with the decedent. While there may be causes in which an objection should be considered untimely, this cause is not one of them. Probate proceedings are equitable in nature.26 Here: 1) the parties have been objecting to the admission of the will and to the circumstances surrounding its execution since February 8, 2007; and 2) the personal representative did not reveal his status as a 50% interest owner in Whispering Pines Ranch., LLC., at the time of his appointment, but rather about a month later of January 31, 2007, when he filed the Application for Order Approving Sale of Real Estate.27 ¶36 Title 58 O.S. 2001 §12228 has not been amended since 1961. Since that time, this Court's case law has recognized the applicability of 58 O.S. 2001 §12229 to persons who die intestate as well as persons who die with valid wills. For instance, in In the Matter of the Estate of Haden K. Scott, 1979 OK 139 ¶6, 604 P.2d 846 , a case in which the deceased died leaving a will, the Court applied 58 O.S. 2001 §122 stating: We take the clear mandate of these provisions to be that in the appointment of administrator with will annexed, necessitated because of the death of the named executor, the order of preference is governed by 58 O.S. 1971 §122. The right of the party best entitled to that appointment under § 122, as a matter of statutory law is mandatory, if otherwise competent, binding on the court and not a matter of discretion. (Citations omitted.) ¶37 Although Estate of Scott involved the death of an administrator named in the will, the concern was the absence of an administrator to serve as a personal representative. In the absence of a named administrator, the probate court must appoint a personal representative pursuant to the requirements of 58 O.S. 2001 §122.30 Here, the will's only reference to an administrator and/or personal representative was crossed out. ¶38 As was the case in Estate of Scott, there was an absence of administrator to serve as personal representative and the trial court should have relied on the provisions of 58 O.S. 2001 §122 in appointing a suitable personal representative.31 Nevertheless, because we have determined that the challenge to the holographic will was not untimely, it may be determined on remand to be invalid and inadmissable and the provisions of §122 would apply regardless. Pursuant to those provisions, decedent's brother, the business partner of Whispering Pines, L.L.C. should have been prohibited from serving as personal representative. The trial court erred when it appointed the decedent's business partner as the personal representative. CONCLUSION ¶39 The pretermitted son of a decedent and his half sibling challenged the administration of a holographic will of their father by his brother and business partner who was appointed personal representative. After DNA testing confirmed the son's lineage, the trial court declared the son an unintentionally omitted heir and awarded him his statutory share. Nevertheless, the son filed a motion for new trial which was denied. Both the son and the personal representative appealed. We hold that: 1) under the facts presented, the objections to admission of the holographic will were not untimely; 2) the paternity statute, 84 O.S. 2001 §215, applies to intestate and probate proceedings; and 3) 58 O.S. 2001 §122 prohibits the appointment of a business partner as personal representative only when the proceedings are intestate or when the business partner is not named personal representative in a will. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; CAUSE AFFIRMED IN PART/REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.32 KAUGER, WATT, EDMONDSON, REIF, J.J., SUMMERS, S.J., concur. TAYLOR, C.J., COLBERT, V.C.J., WINCHESTER, COMBS, J.J.,, dissent. FOOT