Title: Durkee v. Kirk
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 276, 2004
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: January 7, 2005

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
DAVID DURKEE,                       
           
Petitioner Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
RHODA KIRK, 
     
 
 
     
Respondent Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
   No. 276, 2004 
 
   Court Below---Family Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for New Castle County  
   File No. CS02-04208 
   Petition No. 03-14576                  
 
Submitted:  October 29, 2004  
Decided:  
January 7, 2005  
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R1 
 
 
This 7th day of January 2005, upon consideration of the appellant’s amended 
opening brief and the record below, it appears to the Court that:2 
 
(1) 
The petitioner-appellant, David Durkee, filed an appeal from the 
Family Court’s June 1, 2004 order accepting the Family Court Commissioner’s 
December 3, 2003 decision denying Durkee’s petition to set aside a judgment of 
paternity.  We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM.  
 
(2) 
On November 19, 2003, following the filing of Durkee’s petition, a 
hearing was held before a Family Court Commissioner.  The respondent-appellee, 
                                                 
1 The Court has sua sponte assigned pseudonyms to the parties.  Supr. Ct. R. 7(d). 
2 By Order dated September 21, 2004, the Court ordered this case to be decided on the basis of 
the amended opening brief and the record below. 
 
 
-2-
Rhoda Kirk, and Durkee both appeared.  Durkee was represented by counsel. The 
testimony at the hearing established the following.  Durkee and Kirk met in 
November 2000.  Kirk, who was pregnant at the time, gave birth to a daughter, 
Katie, in March 2001.  Durkee was present at Katie’s birth.  After several months, 
Durkee moved in with Kirk and Katie.   
 
(3) 
While Durkee lived with Kirk and Katie, he paid all of their living 
expenses, including the rent.  Kirk used Durkee’s credit cards to pay down certain 
personal debts with Durkee’s permission.  Durkee testified, however, that he 
discovered a substantial unauthorized withdrawal from his bank account and 
several unauthorized charges on the credit cards.  When he questioned Kirk about 
this, she denied responsibility.  Several months later, Durkee learned that, without 
his authorization, Kirk had opened a secondary credit card under his name.  
Despite knowing this, Durkee co-signed a car loan for Kirk.         
 
(4) 
Durkee assisted Kirk in caring for Katie.  He changed her diapers, 
held her and fed her.  According to Durkee, Kirk was the disciplinarian and he was 
the one Katie went to for comfort.  Even though Durkee developed affection for 
Katie, he knew he was not her biological father and never held himself out as such.   
 
(5) 
In December 2001, the Division of Child Support Enforcement 
(“DCSE”) sought a finding of paternity and an award of child support on behalf of 
 
 
-3-
Katie against a man named “Mike,” whose name had been given to DCSE by Kirk.  
According to Durkee, after a child support mediation attended by Kirk and “Mike,” 
“Mike” threatened to seek custody of and visitation with Katie.  Kirk, who had told 
Durkee that “Mike” was a “shady guy,” sought to have DCSE drop its lawsuit 
against “Mike.”  On March 19, 2002, Durkee and Kirk signed an 
acknowledgement of paternity of Katie.  Durkee did not consult an attorney or 
contact DCSE before doing so.   
 
(6) 
The acknowledgement of paternity contained a “Notice of Rights and 
Responsibilities” which stated the following:  “When this Acknowledgement . . . is 
properly signed, it conclusively establishes the man’s paternity of this child, unless 
either parent . . . rescinds the acknowledgement within 60 days of when it was 
signed.”  It also stated: “This Acknowledgement establishes the duty of both 
parents to support the child.  Based on this Acknowledgement the Court may order 
either parent to pay child support . . . .”  Finally, it stated the following in bolded 
capital letters:  “IF EITHER OF YOU IS NOT ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT 
THIS MAN IS THE BIOLOGICAL FATHER OF THIS CHILD, YOU 
SHOULD NOT SIGN THIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PATERNITY.”  In 
addition, above the signature line where Durkee signed his name, there was an 
 
 
-4-
acknowledgement that the signer is the biological father of the child, that he 
accepts responsibility for child support and that he waives genetic testing.   
 
(7) 
After completing the acknowledgement of paternity, Durkee and Kirk 
hand delivered it to the Family Court in Georgetown, Delaware.  The document 
then was filed with the Delaware Office of Vital Statistics.  Subsequently, DCSE 
dropped its lawsuit against “Mike.”  Durkee testified that he signed the 
acknowledgement of paternity because Kirk told him that was the only way DCSE 
would drop its lawsuit against “Mike.”  He also testified that Kirk stated she would 
never seek child support from him on behalf of Katie.   
 
(8) 
In the fall of 2002, Durkee and Kirk ended their relationship and 
Durkee moved out of their residence.  According to Durkee, Kirk told him not to 
contact Katie any more.  In January 2003, Durkee was served with a petition for 
child support that Kirk filed on behalf of Katie.  In September 2003, Durkee, who 
was represented by counsel, requested discovery from Kirk regarding the 
identification of Katie’s biological father.  In October 2003, the Family Court 
ordered Kirk to comply with the discovery request.  However, Kirk represented 
that she was unable to recall “Mike’s” last name.  No further action was taken with 
respect to this issue by either the Family Court or the parties.  
 
 
-5-
 
(9) 
On December 3, 2003, the Commissioner issued an order dismissing 
Durkee’s petition to set aside a judgment of paternity on the basis that the 
acknowledgement of paternity had not been rescinded in a timely manner, there 
was no evidence that a fraud had been perpetrated on Durkee, and there was no 
evidence that Durkee had signed the acknowledgement of paternity under duress.  
On June 1, 2004, the Family Court issued an order accepting the order of the 
Commissioner.  
 
(10) In this appeal, Durkee claims that the Commissioner erred by: a) 
failing to provide “Mike” with notice of the petition to set aside the judgment of 
paternity and make him a party to the proceedings; b) failing to nullify the 
fraudulently-obtained judgment of paternity; and c) finding that Durkee’s decision 
to acknowledge paternity was not the result of undue influence by Kirk.  Durkee 
further claims that the Family Court erred and abused its discretion by accepting 
the Commissioner’s order.     
 
(11) The Family Court reviews de novo those portions of a 
Commissioner’s order to which objection is made and may accept, reject or modify 
the order in whole or in part, and may receive further evidence or remand the 
matter to the Commissioner with instructions.3  This Court’s review of appeals 
                                                 
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 915(d) (1); Fam. Ct. Civ. Proc. R. 53.1 (e). 
 
 
-6-
from the Family Court extends to review of the facts and the law.4  If the Family 
Court has applied the law correctly, the standard of review is abuse of discretion.5 
 
(12) The governing statute makes clear that an acknowledgement of 
paternity, such as the one signed by the parties in this case,6 “shall be final, 
binding, conclusive and determinative of the child’s paternity for all purposes, 
unless timely rescinded . . . [within] 60 days from the date on which an 
acknowledgement of paternity was signed by the parents. . . .”7  The statute further 
states that in the absence of a timely rescission, an acknowledgement of paternity 
may be set aside only upon a finding of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact.8   
 
(13) The language of the governing statute does not support Durkee’s first 
claim that the individual named “Mike” had to be made a party to the proceedings 
on Durkee’s petition to set aside the acknowledgement of paternity.  To the 
contrary, the only issues to be determined in the proceedings were whether there 
was a timely rescission, and, if not, whether the acknowledgement of paternity 
should be set aside due to fraud, duress or material mistake of fact.   
 
(14) Durkee’s other two claims are also without merit.  We have reviewed 
carefully the record in this case, including the transcript of the hearing before the 
                                                 
4 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
5 Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185, 186 (Del. 1991). 
6 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 804(a) (5) (1999). 
7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 804(c) (1999). 
8 Id. 
 
 
-7-
Commissioner, the Commissioner’s order and the Family Court’s order accepting 
the order of the Commissioner.  The Commissioner’s determination that there was 
no basis upon which to set aside the acknowledgement of paternity was clearly 
supported by the evidence presented at the hearing.9  Moreover, there was no error 
or abuse of discretion by the Family Court in accepting that determination. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d at 1204.