Title: Container Life Cycle Management, LLC v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Resources
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP001007
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 23, 2022

2022 WI 45 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1007 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Container Life Cycle Management, LLC, 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS   
Reported at 397 Wis. 2d 242, 959 N.W.2d 76 
 (2021 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 23, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 6, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Stephanie Rothstein   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which ROGGENSACK, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by David M. Lucey, Linda E. Benfield, Peter A. Tomasi, 
Anne-Louise T. Mittal, and Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee. There 
was an oral argument by David M. Lucey.  
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Gabe Johnson-Karp, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Gabe Johnson-Karp. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Scott E. Rosenow and 
WMC Litigation Center, Madison, for Wisconsin Manufacturers & 
Commerce, Inc.  
 
 
 
2022 WI 45 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP1007 
(L.C. No. 
2019CV313) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Container Life Cycle Management, LLC, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 23, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which ROGGENSACK, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Container Life 
Cycle Management, LLC (CLCM), seeks review of a per curiam 
decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's 
dismissal of its petition for judicial review of two letters 
issued by the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in December 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
2 
 
of 2018.1  The court of appeals determined that the letters at 
issue were not final agency decisions subject to judicial 
review. 
¶2 
CLCM argues that the December 14 letter2 adversely 
affects its substantial interests and is subject to judicial 
review regardless of whether it constitutes a "final" decision 
of DNR.  Further, CLCM contends that even if there is a 
"finality" requirement for judicial review pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 227.52 (2019-20),3 the December 14 letter is sufficiently 
final to warrant judicial review.  In response, DNR asserts that 
the December 14 letter does not affect CLCM's substantial 
interests and that CLCM's petition for judicial review is an 
untimely attempt to seek review of an earlier letter. 
¶3 
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the 
December 14 letter does not adversely affect CLCM's substantial 
interests.  As a result, the letter is not subject to judicial 
review and the circuit court properly dismissed CLCM's petition. 
¶4 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
                                                 
1 Container Life Cycle Mgmt., LLC v. DNR, No. 2019AP1007, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) 
(affirming order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, 
Stephanie Rothstein, Judge). 
2 Although CLCM initially sought judicial review of two 
letters, dated December 14 and December 26, its argument in this 
court focuses on the December 14 letter only. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
3 
 
I 
¶5 
CLCM is engaged in the business of refurbishing used 
chemical containers.  At its facility in St. Francis, it 
receives and cleans industrial containers such as steel and 
plastic drums.  The St. Francis facility is a source of air 
emissions subject to DNR's regulation. 
¶6 
Understanding the factual background of this case 
requires a short foray into the governing law and the 
terminology it creates.  DNR regulates CLCM through the issuance 
of air permits under the federal Clean Air Act,4 Wisconsin's 
analogous air pollution statutes,5 and related DNR regulations6 
regarding emissions of air contaminants from stationary sources.7   
¶7 
The applicable statutes recognize two main categories 
of stationary sources, major sources and minor sources.  A major 
source is one that is capable of emitting a greater amount of 
contaminants than the law permits, and a minor source is a 
stationary source that is not a major source.8  As relevant here, 
regulations also recognize a "synthetic minor source," which is 
                                                 
4 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. 
5 Wis. Stat. ch. 285. 
6 Wis. Admin. Code chs. NR 405 (July 2016) and NR 406 (Sept. 
2020). 
7 A 
"stationary 
source" 
is 
"any 
facility, 
building, 
structure or installation that directly or indirectly emits or 
may emit an air contaminant only from a fixed location."  Wis. 
Stat. § 285.01(41). 
8 Wis. Stat. § 285.01(24), (25). 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
4 
 
a source that has the capability to emit more contaminants than 
permitted by law, but accepts permit conditions that keep its 
emissions below the major source level.9 
¶8 
Generally, a construction permit is required to 
construct a new emissions source or modify an existing source.10  
In areas of the country with relatively good air quality, the 
permitting framework centers on the prevention of significant 
deterioration of air quality, referred to as "PSD."11  Major 
sources are subject to PSD requirements, which means that 
specifications in a construction permit must be based on maximum 
pollution control achievable with the best available pollution 
control technology, or "BACT."12 
¶9 
In 2017, both DNR and the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency notified CLCM of a violation of an air permit 
it had been issued in 2014.  The source of the violation was 
odors and air emissions from the St. Francis facility.  Seeking 
to remedy the violation, in February 2018, CLCM sought a permit 
                                                 
9 Wis. Admin. Code § NR 407.02(9) (Feb. 2022). 
10 See Wis. Stat. § 285.60(1)(a)1. 
11 Both regulators and those in the industry use a variety 
of acronyms.  For ease of reference, we set forth the relevant 
acronyms: 
PSD:  Prevention of significant deterioration 
BACT:  Best available control technology 
VOC:  Volatile organic compound 
12 See Sierra Club v. DNR, 2007 WI App 181, ¶2, 304 
Wis. 2d 614, 736 N.W.2d 918. 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
5 
 
to install a regenerative thermal oxidizer as a means of 
controlling odors and emissions.  DNR responded that it needed 
additional information. 
¶10 On June 7, 2018, CLCM submitted a revised construction 
permit application.  In addition to the regenerative thermal 
oxidizer, the revised application sought the installation of a 
new emissions source, removal of existing equipment, and the 
revision of existing permit emission limits.  CLCM requested a 
"commence construction waiver" for the regenerative thermal 
oxidizer and new emissions source that would allow construction 
to begin before the permit was issued. 
¶11 DNR responded to the revised application with a letter 
dated June 26, 2018.  In the June letter, DNR denied the 
commence construction waiver on the basis that "the facility is 
a PSD major source" and stated that it "may not grant a waiver" 
for such a source.  The June letter also stated that previous 
projects undertaken at CLCM's facility should have been subject 
to PSD permitting and that the facility required "an after-the-
fact PSD permit to address . . . emissions not previously 
disclosed."  Additionally, the June letter stated that the 
revised application was incomplete and requested that CLCM 
address several issues to finish the application. 
¶12  Among the several issues, the June letter stated:  
Because the facility is a major PSD source of 
[volatile organic compounds (VOCs)], it is important 
to allocate the total VOC emissions to each emission 
unit to understand, for each unit, the applicability 
of permitting under ch. NR 405, Wis. Adm. Code.  
Please provide maximum theoretical and potential VOC 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
6 
 
emission calculations for each significant unit at the 
facility . . . .   
In addition, for the units subject to major-source review, "the 
facility will be expected to provide additional information in 
support of a BACT determination, as applicable." 
¶13 The June letter also observed that the "revised 
construction permit application indicates the facility would 
like to be a synthetic minor for VOC emissions."  DNR expressed 
concern "that the nature of the operations at the facility do 
not 
allow 
for 
practical 
enforceability" 
of 
the 
proposed 
limitation that would make CLCM's facility a synthetic minor 
source.  Accordingly, DNR asked CLCM to "[p]lease explain how 
the facility can demonstrate compliance with this limitation." 
¶14 Finally, the June letter indicated that it was "not a 
complete review of the . . . construction permit application 
request or the operation permit application submitted at the 
same time."  However, it contained a notice of appeal rights and 
applicable deadlines, stating:  "If you believe that you have a 
right to challenge this construction waiver decision, you should 
know that Wisconsin statutes establish time periods within which 
requests to review Department decisions must be filed."  As 
relevant here, the letter set forth:  "For judicial review of a 
decision pursuant to §§ 227.52 and 227.53, Wis. Stats., you have 
30 days after the decision is mailed, or otherwise served by the 
Department, to file your petition with the appropriate circuit 
court and serve the petition on the Department . . . ." 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
7 
 
¶15 CLCM neither petitioned for judicial review of the 
June letter, nor did it provide all of the additional 
information DNR requested.  Rather, CLCM submitted revised 
calculations 
and 
technical 
memoranda 
in 
an 
attempt 
to 
demonstrate that its facility was not a major source. 
¶16 DNR responded to CLCM's revised calculations with a 
letter dated December 14, 2018.  According to the December 14 
letter, 
DNR 
still 
considered 
CLCM's 
application 
to 
be 
incomplete.  It also explicitly stated that it disagreed with 
CLCM's assertions that the facility was not a major source and 
that it was not subject to an after-the-fact PSD permit.  DNR 
"once more" requested that CLCM submit BACT analyses. 
¶17 Additionally, the December 14 letter raised the issue 
of CLCM's request to be considered a synthetic minor source.  It 
set forth:   
[T]he department has determined that such a permitting 
approach is not approvable in an after-the-fact PSD 
situation.  In accordance with long-standing US EPA 
and department policy, DNR cannot issue a construction 
permit for existing equipment for which a facility 
failed to obtain a PSD permit without placing BACT or 
BACT-equivalent controls on the equipment in question. 
¶18 The December 14 letter then listed emissions units 
subject to BACT review, stating that DNR "requests again that 
CLCM 
provide[] 
additional 
information 
for 
the 
units 
identified . . . as well as any other modified or new emissions 
units that are sources of VOC emissions, sufficient for the 
department to make a BACT determination for each unit."  It 
additionally reiterated that information requested in the June 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
8 
 
letter remained outstanding.  DNR specifically stated that it 
"again requests that CLCM provide additional information to 
explain how it proposes to demonstrate compliance with its 
proposed VOC cap" as would be necessary for CLCM to be 
classified as a synthetic minor source. 
¶19 As the June letter did, the December 14 letter advised 
that it was "not a complete review" of either the construction 
permit application or operation permit application and that 
"[a]dditional information or revisions of the application 
materials may be needed as the review proceeds."  The December 
14 letter did not contain any notice of appeal rights. 
¶20 After CLCM followed up with a letter, DNR responded 
with another letter of its own on December 26, 2018.  In the 
December 26 letter, DNR took the position that "a joint meeting 
between the department, CLCM, the City of St. Francis, and 
elected officials would not be a productive discussion as the 
department has not changed its position regarding CLCM's 
permitting obligations."  The December 26 letter also stated 
that "the department has consistently indicated since June of 
2018 that there was reason to believe the facility should have 
been permitted as a PSD major source since at least 2014" and 
again requested that CLCM submit the information requested in 
both the June and December 14 letters. 
¶21 On January 11, 2019, CLCM filed a petition for 
judicial review in the circuit court.  In the petition, CLCM 
requested the court to review the December 14 and December 26 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
9 
 
"determinations" that it is subject to PSD standards and 
permitting requirements. 
¶22 DNR moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the 
December letters contain only preliminary agency decisions and 
are thus not subject to judicial review.  It further contended 
that the final decision on the PSD determination was the June 
letter, not the December letters, and characterized CLCM's 
petition as an untimely challenge to the June letter. 
¶23 The circuit court agreed with DNR and dismissed the 
petition.  In reaching its conclusion, the circuit court 
determined that "as to the Department's designation of CLCM as a 
major source, clearly and definitively the Department advised 
the company with the June 26 letter of its determination."  
Additionally, the circuit court stated with regard to the June 
letter:  "Clearly and unequivocally the Department stated its 
position and advised CLCM of its appeal rights and how it could 
proceed going forward with regard to that determination that 
they were a major source."  In contrast, the December letters 
"did not make a final determination . . . that satisfies the 
Court that a substantial right or interest of the company here, 
the petitioner, has been conclusively determined."  CLCM moved 
for reconsideration, which the circuit court denied. 
¶24 CLCM appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court, determining that "the [December] letters are not 
final agency decisions subject to judicial review."  Container 
Life Cycle Mgmt., LLC v. DNR, No. 2019AP1007, unpublished slip 
op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam).  After 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
10 
 
observing that the permitting process is ongoing, the court of 
appeals stated that "[e]ven assuming for the sake of argument 
that a PSD major source designation is immediately subject to 
judicial review, that designation was not made in the December 
letter."  Id., ¶18.  Instead, such a determination arose from 
the June letter, and "[i]f there was a time to seek judicial 
review of the PSD major source designation, it was when CLCM 
received the June letter for which judicial review is no longer 
available."  Id., ¶¶18-19.  CLCM petitioned for this court's 
review. 
II 
¶25 We are asked to determine whether the December 14 
letter issued by DNR is subject to judicial review.13  Whether an 
administrative decision is subject to judicial review is a 
question 
of 
law, 
which 
we 
review 
independently 
of 
the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  Kimberly Area Sch. Dist. v. LIRC, 2005 WI App 262, ¶9, 
288 Wis. 2d 542, 707 N.W.2d 872. 
                                                 
13 Although CLCM raised the December 26 letter in its 
petition for judicial review, it did not develop an argument 
related to the December 26 letter at the court of appeals.  
Container Life Cycle Mgmt., No. 2019AP1007, at ¶12 n.2.  The 
court of appeals determined that "given that the December 26 
letter reiterates the DNR's same position from the December 14 
letter, the December 26 letter suffers from the same defects and 
is not a final agency decision subject to judicial review."  Id.  
Here, CLCM again argues exclusively based on the December 14 
letter and we thus need not address the December 26 letter in 
our analysis.  See Sw. Airlines Co. v. DOR, 2021 WI 54, ¶32 
n.10, 397 Wis. 2d 431, 960 N.W.2d 384 (explaining that "we 
generally do not address undeveloped arguments"). 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
11 
 
¶26 In our review, we interpret Wis. Stat. § 227.52.  
Statutory interpretation likewise presents a question of law 
this court reviews independently of the determinations of the 
circuit court and court of appeals.  State ex rel. Anderson v. 
Town of Newbold, 2021 WI 6, 
¶13, 395 Wis. 2d 351, 954 
N.W.2d 323. 
III 
¶27 We begin by setting forth the framework for analysis 
regarding whether an administrative decision is subject to 
judicial review.  Subsequently, we apply that framework to the 
facts of this case. 
A 
¶28 Generally, the State is entitled to sovereign immunity 
and cannot be sued without its consent.  PRN Assocs. LLC v. DOA, 
2009 WI 53, ¶51, 317 Wis. 2d 656, 766 N.W.2d 559.  For purposes 
of sovereign immunity, a suit against a state agency constitutes 
a suit against the State.  Id.  As such, "orders of 
administrative agencies are not reviewable unless made so by 
statute."  Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 128 Wis. 2d 59, 87, 
381 N.W.2d 318 (1986).  If an attempt is made to appeal from a 
nonappealable order, the court lacks jurisdiction for any 
purpose, except to dismiss the action.  Friends of the Earth v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 78 Wis. 2d 388, 404, 254 N.W.2d 299 (1977). 
¶29 The applicable statute here is Wis. Stat. § 227.52, 
which sets forth the general rule regarding the reviewability of 
administrative agency decisions, as well as several exceptions.  
As relevant here, § 227.52 states:  "Administrative decisions 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
12 
 
which adversely affect the substantial interests of any person, 
whether by action or inaction, whether affirmative or negative 
in 
form, 
are 
subject 
to 
review 
as 
provided 
in 
this 
chapter . . . ." 
¶30 The issue raised in this case implicates what it means 
for a decision to "adversely affect the substantial interests" 
of a party.  This case does not represent this court's first 
dalliance with this phrase or its statutory predecessor. 
¶31 In Pasch v. DOR, 58 Wis. 2d 346, 206 N.W.2d 157 
(1973), 
we 
addressed 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.15 
(1973-74), 
the 
predecessor statute to § 227.52.  That statute provided that 
administrative decisions were reviewable if they "directly 
affect the legal rights, duties or privileges of any person."  
Id. at 351 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 227.15 (1973-74)). 
¶32 Addressing 
"an 
order 
which 
determined 
that 
the 
commission had the authority to proceed to a hearing and 
determination upon the merits," id. at 355, the Pasch court 
concluded that such an order was not subject to judicial review.  
Specifically, it determined that "[t]he order of the commission 
finding jurisdiction in the commission to proceed to a hearing 
upon merits of the controversy does not directly affect the 
legal rights, duties or privileges of the appellant."  Id. at 
357.  It characterized the order as "interlocutory" rather than 
"final" because "the substantial rights of the parties involved 
in the action remain undetermined and . . . the cause is 
retained for further action."  Id. at 354. 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
13 
 
¶33 In reaching this determination, the court observed 
that courts "are averse to review interim steps in an 
administrative 
proceeding." 
 
Id. 
(citation 
omitted).  
Ultimately, the court set forth: 
The ultimate test of reviewability is not to be found 
in an overrefined technique, but in the need of the 
review 
to 
protect 
from 
the 
irreparable 
injury 
threatened in the exceptional case by administrative 
rulings which attach legal consequences to action 
taken in advance of other hearings and adjudications 
that may follow. 
Id. at 356 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys. v. United States, 316 
U.S. 407, 425 (1942)). 
¶34 Two years after Pasch, the legislature amended the 
subject statute.  § 19, ch. 414, Laws of 1975.  In doing so, it 
discarded the "legal rights, duties or privileges" language and 
utilized 
verbiage 
that 
closely 
follows 
that 
in 
Pasch:  
"substantial interests."  Id. 
¶35 Subsequent cases have consequently continued to look 
to Pasch for guidance.  See, e.g., Waste Mgmt., 128 Wis. 2d at 
88-89; Sierra Club v. DNR, 2007 WI App 181, ¶¶13-16, 304 
Wis. 2d 614, 736 N.W.2d 918.  We do the same here, and emphasize 
Pasch's indication that although "finality" is a consideration 
in determining whether "substantial interests" are affected, it 
is not the sole indicator of reviewability. 
¶36 Case law additionally demonstrates that other factors 
are taken into account in determining whether substantial 
interests are affected such that an agency action is reviewable.  
For example, we have stated that generally "[t]he legislative 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
14 
 
declaration 
that 
decisions 
of 
administrative 
agencies 
be 
reviewed . . . envisions a review of a decision which must be 
supported by a record and be based upon findings of fact and 
conclusions of law."  Wis.'s Env't Decade, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n, 93 Wis. 2d 650, 658, 287 N.W.2d 737 (1980).  In our 
review, we are guided by the overarching principle that it is 
the substance of the order, and not its form or label, that is 
the focus.  Sierra Club, 304 Wis. 2d 614, ¶14. 
B 
¶37 With this background and framework of analysis in 
hand, we focus our review on the December 14 letter.  CLCM 
asserts that the December 14 letter is amenable to judicial 
review because it adversely affects CLCM's substantial interests 
in that the letter subjects CLCM to more burdensome PSD 
permitting requirements.14   
¶38 In contrast, DNR contends that judicial review is 
available for those agency decisions that conclusively determine 
legal rights only, and not for preliminary determinations in an 
ongoing permitting process.  In DNR's view, the December 14 
letter did not conclusively determine any of CLCM's substantial 
interests, and the petition for judicial review of the December 
                                                 
14 CLCM additionally argues that past cases have instituted 
a "finality" requirement for review of administrative decisions, 
and that there is no basis for such a requirement in the text of 
Wis. Stat. § 227.52.  As set forth above, existing precedent 
indicates that there is no such "finality" requirement and we 
need not address this argument further. 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
15 
 
14 letter is really an untimely attempt to challenge the PSD 
determination made in the June letter. 
¶39 We agree with DNR that the December 14 letter does not 
affect CLCM's substantial interests.  As a result, the letter is 
not subject to judicial review and the circuit court properly 
dismissed CLCM's petition. 
¶40 Like the order at issue in Pasch, the December 14 
letter is unreviewable because "the substantial rights of the 
parties involved in the action remain undetermined and . . . the 
cause is retained for further action."  Pasch, 58 Wis. 2d at 
354.  The letter itself emphasized that it "is not a complete 
review" of the permit applications at issue.   
¶41 It 
further 
advised 
that 
DNR 
considered 
CLCM's 
application 
to 
be 
incomplete 
and 
requested 
additional 
information to remedy the defects.  This is another indication 
of an ongoing review where the "cause is retained for further 
action" by the agency.  Rather than "a decision . . . supported 
by 
a 
record 
and . . . based 
upon 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law," Wis.'s Env't Decade, 93 Wis. 2d at 658, the 
letter indicates that it is seeking information to build such a 
record.  Additionally, although not dispositive, we also observe 
that the December 14 letter did not contain a statement of 
appeal rights. 
¶42 Contrary to CLCM's argument, the December 14 letter 
did not determine that CLCM's facility is a major source subject 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
16 
 
to PSD permitting requirements.15  Instead, the December 14 
letter merely referenced the June letter:  "In a letter dated 
June 26, 2018, the department informed CLCM that the St. Francis 
facility 
required 
an 
after-the-fact 
PSD 
permit . . . ."  
Although the June letter is not a model of clarity, it was in 
that letter that DNR set forth:  "The department has determined 
that . . . the facility is a PSD major source."   
                                                 
15 For this reason, the federal cases cited by CLCM are 
inapposite.  CLCM seeks support in Puerto Rican Cement Co., Inc. 
v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 889 F.2d 292 (1st Cir. 
1989), and Hawaiian Electric Co., Inc. v. U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 723 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1984). 
In Puerto Rican Cement, the petitioner sought a "non-
applicability determination" that would allow it to avoid PSD 
permitting requirements for construction of a new kiln.  Puerto 
Rican Cement, 889 F.2d at 294.  EPA denied the non-applicability 
determination and the petitioner sought judicial review.  The 
First 
Circuit 
concluded 
that 
EPA's 
denial 
of 
the 
non-
applicability determination was reviewable, stating that "the 
legal question at issue——the applicability of PSD review——is 
plainly separable from, and therefore collateral to, all the 
matters that the agency would consider in a PSD review itself."  
Id. at 295. 
Hawaiian Electric Co. also involved an EPA determination 
that 
a 
new 
PSD 
permit 
was 
required 
due 
to 
a 
"major 
modification."  Hawaiian Elec. Co., 723 F.2d at 1442.  The Ninth 
Circuit held that such a determination was subject to judicial 
review.  It reasoned:  "although the application of the major 
modification definition is an interim step in the PSD permitting 
process, 
it 
has 
immediate 
legal 
consequences, 
i.e., 
the 
requirement of PSD review."  Id. 
CLCM contends that these two cases together "stand for the 
proposition that a decision regarding the applicability of PSD 
permitting 
requirements 
is 
sufficiently 
final 
to 
warrant 
judicial review."  However, the December 14 letter made no 
decision 
regarding 
the 
applicability 
of 
PSD 
permitting 
requirements.  CLCM's invocation of Puerto Rican Cement and 
Hawaiian Electric Co. is therefore unpersuasive. 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
17 
 
¶43 Additionally, 
the 
December 
14 
letter 
did 
not 
conclusively 
determine 
that 
CLCM's 
facility 
cannot 
be 
a 
synthetic minor source.  Conversely, it requested additional 
information from CLCM "to explain how it proposes to demonstrate 
compliance with its proposed VOC cap" as is required for it to 
be classified as a synthetic minor source.  The letter contains 
no decision regarding whether CLCM qualifies as a synthetic 
minor source, which makes sense given its request for additional 
information so it may make such a determination. 
¶44 The fact that the December 14 letter requested 
additional information, leading to a possible increase in CLCM's 
costs, does not transform it into a reviewable decision.  CLCM 
contends that the practical effect of the December 14 letter is 
to subject it to costs that it cannot recover if DNR ultimately 
decides that CLCM is a minor source or synthetic minor source.  
However, a permit is required for CLCM to do business.  Having 
already notified CLCM of its "determin[ation]" that "the 
facility is a PSD major source" in the June letter, DNR advising 
CLCM of the next steps in the December letter resolves nothing 
regarding CLCM's rights.  Instead, it is an indication that the 
process is ongoing.  Thus, a letter indicating that CLCM simply 
must comply with the process to get a permit, which may accrue 
some cost to CLCM, does not adversely affect CLCM's substantial 
interests.   
¶45 Our determination that CLCM's substantial interests 
are not adversely affected is based upon a review of the record 
and is informed by existing precedent.  In Pasch, the appellant 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
18 
 
argued that the issue should be decided before the appellant was 
put to the expense of a lengthy proceeding.  Pasch, 58 
Wis. 2d at 357.  In response to this argument the court declined 
to consider the increased cost that may be placed on the 
appellant: 
We are mindful of the fact that much time and expense 
might be saved if the courts would decide at this time 
that the commission had exceeded its jurisdiction; 
however, this consideration is outweighed by the 
resultant delay that would accompany review of these 
agency determinations and the disruption of the 
agency's orderly process of adjudication in reaching 
its ultimate determination. 
Id.; see also State v. WERC, 65 Wis. 2d 624, 630-33, 223 
N.W.2d 543 (1974); Sierra Club, 304 Wis. 2d 614, ¶16. 
¶46 Further, allowing entities to challenge administrative 
decisions just because the decision would cause the entity to 
incur substantial costs would create an arbitrary and unworkable 
system.  For example, how much money expended would be enough to 
secure judicial review?  Where would such a line be drawn? 
¶47 Reaching 
the 
conclusion 
that 
CLCM 
seeks 
would 
essentially allow an entity to challenge any decision in the 
administrative process if it caused them to incur costs.  This 
would greatly expand the world of decisions subject to review 
and it is hard to imagine an administrative decision that would 
not be reviewable under such a standard.  CLCM's argument would 
thus lead to an unreasonable result because it would allow 
parties to challenge virtually any step in the permitting 
process.  See Brown County v. Brown Cnty. Taxpayers Ass'n, 2022 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
19 
 
WI 13, ¶29, 400 Wis. 2d 781, 971 N.W.2d 491 (explaining that 
statutes must be interpreted "to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results").  This would be burdensome on courts, agencies, and 
parties and would significantly delay permitting processes and 
interrupt business operations. 
¶48 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 578 
U.S. 590 (2016), cited by CLCM, does not compel a different 
result.  In that case, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued a 
jurisdictional determination that certain property contained 
"water of the United States."  Id. at 596.  Hawkes challenged 
the determination, and the Corps contended that the revised 
jurisdictional determination was not a final agency action.  Id. 
at 597.   
¶49 The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the 
Corps.  Observing the principles guiding its decision as to 
whether an agency decision is "final" for purposes of the 
Administrative Procedure Act,16 it wrote, "First, the action must 
mark the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process——it 
must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature.  And 
second, the action must be one by which rights or obligations 
have been determined, or from which legal consequences will 
flow."  Id.  Applying these principles, the Court determined 
                                                 
16 Unlike in Wisconsin, federal courts follow a "finality" 
requirement when determining reviewability under the federal 
Administrative Procedure Act.  See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 
154, 175 (1997) ("The APA, by its terms, provides a right to 
judicial review of all 'final agency action for which there is 
no other adequate remedy in a court' . . . ."); 5 U.S.C. § 704. 
No. 
2019AP1007   
 
20 
 
that the jurisdictional determination was sufficiently final to 
be subject to judicial review:   
[W]hile no administrative or criminal proceeding can 
be brought for failure to conform to the approved 
[jurisdictional 
determination] 
itself, 
that 
final 
agency determination not only deprives respondents of 
a five-year safe harbor from liability under the Act, 
but warns that if they discharge pollutants onto their 
property without obtaining a permit from the Corps, 
they do so at the risk of significant criminal and 
civil penalties.   
Id. at 600.  
¶50 Here, in contrast, the December 14 letter does not 
subject 
CLCM 
to 
liability 
as 
did 
the 
jurisdictional 
determination at issue in Hawkes.  As explained above, it is not 
the consummation of the decisionmaking process but instead is 
just a step along the way. 
¶51 In sum, we conclude that the December 14 letter does 
not adversely affect CLCM's substantial interests.  As a result, 
the letter is not subject to judicial review and the circuit 
court properly dismissed CLCM's petition. 
¶52 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶53 REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
"The 
availability of judicial review is the necessary condition, 
psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative 
power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid."  Louis 
L. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review I, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 401 
(1958).  In accordance with this principle, the legislature has 
afforded judicial review for "[a]dministrative decisions which 
adversely affect the substantial interests of any person, 
whether by action or inaction, whether affirmative or negative 
in form," subject to certain exceptions.1  Wis. Stat. § 227.52 
(2019–20).  The December 14 decision by the Department of 
Natural Resources (the Department) to foreclose a particular 
permitting approach "adversely affect[s]" Container Life Cycle 
Management, Inc.'s (CLCM) "substantial interests" by forcing 
CLCM to undergo a more time-consuming, expensive, and burdensome 
permitting process.   
¶54 In reviewing CLCM's challenge, the majority applies a 
finality requirement despite agreeing the law does not impose 
one, thereby denying CLCM its statutorily available review.  The 
majority 
determines 
nothing 
in 
the 
December 
14 
letter 
constitutes a reviewable agency decision, minimizing the letter 
as merely "a step along the way" in CLCM's permit application 
process.2  This is not an accurate representation; the letter 
                                                 
1 Standing 
to 
bring 
the 
challenge 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.53(1), a separate threshold for judicial review, is not 
contested in this case. 
2 Majority op., ¶50. 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
2 
 
unequivocally decides a proposed permitting approach "is not 
approvable." 
 
Contrary 
to 
the 
majority's 
decision, 
a 
determination on the availability of a particular permitting 
process meets the criteria of Wis. Stat. § 227.52.  Even 
applying an express finality requirement, federal courts have 
deemed this type of determination subject to judicial review.  
Whether properly applying the plain terms of the statute or 
improperly applying the precedent developed under its prior 
language, CLCM is entitled to judicial review of the December 14 
determination on the applicability of a permitting approach.  
Because the majority unlawfully denies CLCM judicial review, I 
dissent. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
A. 
The Department Letters 
¶55 As 
the 
majority 
acknowledges, 
multiple 
potential 
permitting options cover the contaminants at issue; they are 
outlined in Wis. Admin. Code chs. NR 405, 406, and 407.  CLCM 
argues its facility should be covered by permitting requirements 
under chapters NR 406 and 407, which apply to natural minor and 
synthetic minor sources, as opposed to the more burdensome PSD 
permitting requirements under chapter NR 405, which apply to 
major sources.  Accordingly, CLCM frames its case as resting on 
which of the "possible permitting regimes" the Department 
determines 
governs——one 
of 
which 
is 
"more 
costly 
and 
protracted." 
¶56 CLCM's St. Francis facility was permitted as a minor 
source since 2015; in 2018, however, the Department told CLCM 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
3 
 
this permitting classification had been made in error.  CLCM 
submitted a pre-construction air pollution permit application in 
February 2018 to install a Regenerative Thermal Oxidizer (RTO) 
for purposes of reducing air emissions, which the Department 
authorized the next month under an exemption provided in Wis. 
Admin. Code § NR 406.04(2).3  On June 7, CLCM submitted a revised 
air pollution permit application in addition to a commence 
construction waiver request related to a different project.   
¶57 The 
Department's 
June 
26 
letter 
addressed 
both 
applications.  The letter denied the commence construction 
waiver because the Department deemed the facility a major source 
under Wis. Admin. Code ch. NR 405, which does not allow such 
waivers.  The letter gave notice of the right to appeal this 
decision. 
 
The 
letter 
also 
declared 
the 
revised 
permit 
application incomplete and requested additional information. 
¶58 Among four requests in the June 26 letter, the 
Department sought information to aid its assessment of whether 
the facility could be permitted as a synthetic minor source 
under Wis. Admin. Code ch. NR 407.  That request explained: 
The revised construction permit application indicates 
the facility would like to be a synthetic minor for 
VOC emissions under ch. NR 407, Wis. Adm. Code.  The 
facility is currently proposing an emission limitation 
equivalent to 99.5 tons per year.  The department is 
                                                 
3 "This 
section 
does 
not 
provide 
an 
exemption 
from 
construction permit requirements for a source that is required 
to obtain a permit under ch. NR 405 [governing Prevention of 
Significant 
Deterioration] 
or 
408 
[governing 
construction 
permits for direct major sources in nonattainment areas] or s. 
NR 446.03(2)(a) [governing mercury emission limits]."  Wis. 
Admin. Code § NR 406.04. 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
4 
 
concerned that the nature of the operations at the 
facility do not allow for practical enforceability of 
this proposed limitation.  Please explain how the 
facility 
can 
demonstrate 
compliance 
with 
this 
limitation, given that a significant portion of VOC 
emissions from the facility are considered fugitive. 
The 
Department 
expressed 
"concern[]" 
that 
this 
emissions 
limitation related to the synthetic minor designation could not 
be enforced, but requested an explanation on how the facility 
could comply.  Logically, the framing of the Department's 
inquiry establishes it had not yet determined whether CLCM could 
obtain the synthetic minor permitting designation; the June 26 
letter left that possibility open. 
¶59 In response to the June 26 letter, CLCM prepared and 
submitted additional analyses to the Department on August 9 and 
September 24, 2018, to show the facility was not a major source.  
On October 18 and November 12, 2018, the Department met with 
CLCM regarding the 18-RAB-029 construction permit, during which 
meeting the Department suggested it could consider as a 
"possible permitting approach . . . a facility-wide cap on VOC 
emissions of 40 tons per year (TPY) . . . as a PSD-avoidance 
limit for the proposed capacity increase for the scrubber-
controlled wash processes."  CLCM submitted a revised permit 
application on November 28, seeking approval as a synthetic 
minor source.   
¶60 In contrast to the June 26 letter, the December 14 
letter terminated the inquiry into whether the "possible 
permitting approach discussed during [the November 12, 2018] 
meeting . . . could be considered as a PSD-avoidance limit for 
the proposed capacity increase for the scrubber-controlled wash 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
5 
 
processes."  The letter states, "[u]pon further consideration, 
the department has determined that such a permitting approach is 
not approvable in an after-the-fact PSD situation."  The 
Department explained it could not approve this permitting 
approach because it "cannot issue a construction permit for 
existing equipment for which a facility failed to obtain a PSD 
permit without placing BACT or BACT-equivalent controls on the 
equipment in question."  The Department concluded "[t]he 
scrubber-controlled wash processes were clearly modified by 
construction permit 14-RSG-142 and therefore require BACT or 
BACT-equivalent controls."4  In other words, the Department 
                                                 
4 That portion of the letter provided, in full:  
On November 12, 2018, DNR staff and representatives of 
CLCM held a meeting to discuss CLCM's application for 
construction 
permit 
18-RAB-029. 
 
One 
possible 
permitting approach discussed during that meeting was 
whether a facility-wide cap on VOC emissions of 40 
tons per year (TPY) could be considered as a PSD-
avoidance limit for the proposed capacity increase for 
the scrubber-controlled wash processes.  During this 
meeting, DNR cautioned CLCM that such a plan was 
complicated by the unresolved concerns over PSD status 
of the 2014 project.  Upon further consideration, the 
department has determined that such a permitting 
approach is not approvable in an after-the-fact PSD 
situation.  In accordance with long-standing US EPA 
and department policy, DNR cannot issue a construction 
permit for existing equipment for which a facility 
failed to obtain a PSD permit without placing BACT or 
BACT-equivalent controls on the equipment in question.  
The scrubber-controlled wash processes were clearly 
modified 
by 
construction 
permit 
14-RSG-142 
and 
therefore require BACT or BACT-equivalent controls.   
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
6 
 
concluded CLCM needed to install BACT or BACT-equivalent 
controls to conduct its refurbishing business.  Under these 
facts, 
the 
majority's 
decision 
to 
foreclose 
statutorily 
prescribed judicial review is in error.   
B. 
Judicial Review Under Wis. Stat. § 227.52 
¶61 In 1943, the legislature created Chapter 227 to govern 
administrative procedure and review.  § 1, ch. 375, Laws of 
1943; see also Ralph M. Hoyt, The Wisconsin Administrative 
Procedure Act, 1944 Wis. L. Rev. 214.  As relevant to this case, 
the Act provided for judicial review of "[a]dministrative 
decisions in contested cases, whether affirmative or negative in 
form," subject to certain exceptions.  Wis. Stat. § 227.15 
(1943–44).5  The Act defined "[c]ontested case" as "a proceeding 
in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific 
parties are required by law to be determined by decisions or 
orders addressed to them or disposing of their interests, after 
opportunity for hearing."  Wis. Stat. § 227.01(3) (1943–44).  In 
1945, the language concerning the "legal rights, duties or 
privileges" was added directly to the judicial review statute 
under § 227.15.  See § 18, ch. 511, Laws of Wis. 1945. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Department sent another letter on December 26, in which 
it concluded it "has not changed its position regarding CLCM's 
permitting obligations or the operation of the [RTO]."  The 
Department emphasized, "With regards to the source status of the 
facility, the department has consistently indicated since June 
of 2018 that there was reason to believe the facility should 
have been permitted as a PSD major source since at least 2014."  
The Department further requested CLCM submit the required 
information "to keep the permitting process moving forward." 
5 Wis. Stat. § 227.15 was renumbered to Wis. Stat. § 227.52 
in 1986.  See 1985 Wis. Act 182, § 35. 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
7 
 
¶62 In Pasch v. DOR, 58 Wis. 2d 346, 353, 206 N.W.2d 157 
(1973), this court interpreted Wis. Stat. § 227.15 to require 
finality, a conclusion it grounded in what it perceived to be a 
"legislative 
intent . . . to 
limit 
judicial 
review 
of 
administrative agency 'decisions' to final orders of the 
agency."  Pasch embraced consequentialist reasoning for its 
atextual conclusion, emphasizing the "resultant delay that would 
accompany 
review 
of 
these 
agency 
determinations 
and 
the 
disruption of the agency's orderly process of adjudication in 
reaching its ultimate determination."  Id. at 357.  A finality 
requirement is nowhere to be found in the statutory language. 
¶63 1976 brought a significant reworking of Wisconsin's 
Administrative Procedure Act.  The legislature replaced the 
"directly affect the legal rights, duties or privileges" 
language with the requirement that an administrative decision 
"adversely affect" "substantial interests."  § 19, ch. 414, Laws 
of 1975.  Despite these statutory changes, Wisconsin courts have 
continued to apply the prior language as construed in Pasch.  
This case gave the court an opportunity to apply the text of the 
amended statute, ending our inappropriate reliance on the so-
called "legislative intent" supposedly motivating the prior 
statutory text.  The majority takes a pass, perpetuating a 
misinterpretation of the statutes governing judicial review 
grounded in the majority's concerns over the consequences of its 
decision rather than what the law commands.     
II. DISCUSSION 
A. 
Wis. Stat. § 227.52 Does Not Require Finality 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
8 
 
¶64 The majority correctly concludes Wis. Stat. § 227.52 
does not require finality and accurately recites the statutory 
standard, which subjects administrative decisions to judicial 
review if they "adversely affect the substantial interests of 
any person[.]"  Nevertheless, the majority imposes a de facto 
finality requirement in concluding the Department's decision 
does not adversely affect CLCM's substantial interests because 
it "did not conclusively determine that CLCM's facility cannot 
be a synthetic minor source."6  In so concluding, the majority 
smuggles into its analysis the defunct language from an earlier 
version 
of 
the 
statute 
and 
relies 
on 
faulty 
precedent 
interpreting it. 
¶65 The majority maintains "existing precedent indicates 
that there is no . . . 'finality' requirement."7  Existing 
precedent (although wrong) belies the majority's assertion; the 
court of appeals consistently applies a finality requirement 
under Wis. Stat. § 227.52.  See, e.g., Friends of the Black 
River Forest v. DNR, 2021 WI App 54, ¶9, 964 N.W.2d 342 
("Although Wis. Stat. § 227.52 does not use the term 'final,' 
'case law has established that the legislative intent was to 
                                                 
6 Majority op., ¶43; see also, id., ¶44 ("[A] letter 
indicating that CLCM simply must comply with the process to get 
a permit, which may accrue some cost to CLCM, does not adversely 
affect CLCM's substantial interests."); 
id., ¶47 ("CLCM's 
argument would thus lead to an unreasonable result because it 
would allow parties to challenge virtually any step in the 
permitting process. . . .  This would be burdensome on courts, 
agencies, and parties and would significantly delay permitting 
processes and interrupt business operations."). 
7 Id., ¶37 n.14. 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
9 
 
limit judicial review to final [decisions] of [an] agency.'"); 
Sierra Club v. DNR, 2007 WI App 181, ¶13, 304 Wis. 2d 614, 736 
N.W.2d 918) ("Although this statute does not require that an 
administrative decision be 'final' in order to be subject to 
judicial review, case law has established that the legislative 
intent was to limit judicial review to 'final orders of the 
agency.'"); Kimberly Area Sch. Dist. v. LIRC, 2005 WI App 262, 
¶13, 288 Wis. 2d 542, 707 N.W.2d 872 ("Here, the Commission's 
decision is not final and, therefore, it is not subject to 
judicial review."); Deering v. LIRC, No. 2011AP803, unpublished 
slip op., ¶11 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2012) ("While there is no 
express requirement in these provisions that an agency order 
must be final in order to be subject to judicial review, case 
law has established that Wis. Stat. ch. 227 limits judicial 
review to agency orders that are final. . . .  A final order 
'directly affects the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a 
person.'" (quoting Pasch, 58 Wis. 2d at 356)).  The majority's 
refusal to acknowledge the decisive role finality has played in 
judicial review perpetuates confusion in this area of the law. 
¶66 The historical backdrop against which the legislature 
amended Wis. Stat. § 227.52 confirms the law never required 
finality and the judiciary imposed it in an inappropriate 
exercise of judicial policymaking.  The period from the 1960s to 
the 1970s produced "accelerated" change in administrative law.  
See Bernard Schwartz, Some Recent Administrative Law Trends:  
Delegations and Judicial Review, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 208, 209.  
"By the 1960's, the administrative law issues that were crucial 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
10 
 
in 1940 seemed as though drawn from another world."  Id.; see 
also Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: 
Administrative Law and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 
1945–1970, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1389 (2000).  One commentator 
suggested "a potent critique of the administrative state that 
emerged at the beginning of the 1960s" recognized agencies were 
"arbitrary, 
inefficient, 
and 
inevitably 
captured 
by 
the 
interests they were supposed to regulate," leading in part to 
"increased judicial scrutiny of administrative action."  Reuel 
E. Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise:  Administrative Law and Legal 
Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 1139, 1142 
(2001).  In 1971, the D.C. Circuit observed, "We stand on the 
threshold of a new era in the history of the long and fruitful 
collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing courts."  
Env't Def. Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971).            
¶67 On the heels of this expanding administrative state 
and a corresponding increase in scrutiny over its actions, the 
legislature in 1976 broadened the types of decisions afforded 
judicial review.  See § 19, ch. 414, Laws of 1975.  Governor 
Lucey vetoed the bill implementing these changes——which the 
legislature overrode——because he was concerned it "enhances the 
rights of potential litigants against the state," "will increase 
litigation against the state, the expense of which must be 
born[e] by all our citizens," and that "the burden on our 
state's courts, particularly the Supreme Court, will increase."  
Veto Message of Governor Lucey to 1975 Assembly Bill 163, May 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
11 
 
28, 1976.  The majority assuages the former Governor's concerns—
—it has no intention of shouldering that burden.  Instead, the 
majority claims opening the door to administrative review based 
on "substantial costs" would be "absurd" and "would greatly 
expand the world of decisions subject to review[.]"8  Expanding 
the types of decisions subject to review, however, is precisely 
what the legislature accomplished via its statutory revisions.  
This court stymies the statute by closing the courthouse doors 
to litigants seeking relief from financially consequential 
effects of agency decisions. 
¶68 Even under existing precedent imposing a finality 
requirement, 
the 
Department's 
December 
14 
decision 
is 
reviewable.  In Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 128 
Wis. 2d 59, 
90, 
381 
N.W.2d 
318 
(1986), we 
concluded 
our 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 227.15 in Pasch and Wis. Env't 
Decade, 
Inc. 
v. 
Pub. 
Serv. 
Comm'n, 
93 
Wis. 2d 650, 
287 
N.W.2d 737 (1980), authorizes "judicial review of agency actions 
which are final, in the sense that they determine the further 
legal rights of the person seeking review."  Although Waste 
Mgmt. applies the former statutory language, under its reasoning 
the December 14 letter qualifies as a reviewable decision even 
under the stricter "legal rights" framework.  In Waste Mgmt., 
the Department of Natural Resources modified Waste Management's 
plan of operation at its Omega Hills site by 
imposing 
requirements for ground water monitoring, treatment of toxic 
liquids, and other aspects of the site.  Waste Mgmt., 128 
                                                 
8 Id., ¶¶46–47. 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
12 
 
Wis. 2d at 83.  "Notwithstanding the modifications, the approval 
remained conditioned upon the fulfillment of the requirements."  
Id.  We held § 227.15 "affords Waste Management the right to 
judicial review of the DNR's decisions to modify requirements 
contained in the initial approval of the plan of operation for 
Omega Hills."  Id. at 80.  We concluded the Department of 
Natural Resources' modifications to Waste Management's operation 
plan requirements determined Waste Management's "legal rights" 
because "[u]nless Waste Management complies with the DNR's 
requirements, it risks denial, suspension or revocation of its 
license[.]" 
 
Id. 
at 
90. 
 
Further, 
"[a]bsent 
judicial 
review . . . , Waste Management faces possible 'irreparable 
injury' to its interest in its investment, in that it must incur 
the 
full 
costs 
of 
compliance 
regardless 
of 
whether 
the 
requirements 
are 
properly 
imposed 
under 
the 
[statutory] 
standards[.]"  Id.    
¶69 The December 14 determination that the permitting 
approach "is not approvable" is subject to judicial review under 
Pasch, Wis. Env't Decade, and Waste Mgmt. because (1) it is a 
"consummation of the decisionmaking process"9 with respect to 
whether CLCM can pursue the proposed permitting approach, 
forcing CLCM onto a different permitting path with higher costs, 
increased delays, and greater burdens; (2) it "determine[s] 
[CLCM's] 'legal rights' because '[u]nless [CLCM] complies with 
the DNR's [alternative permitting process], it risks denial, 
suspension, or revocation" of its legal ability to operate; and 
                                                 
9 Id., ¶50. 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
13 
 
(3) "[a]bsent judicial review," it will result in "irreparable 
injury" in the form of imposing the full and unrecoverable costs 
of complying with the permitting process "regardless of whether 
the requirements are properly imposed" or the alternative 
process should have been approved.  See Waste Mgmt., 128 
Wis. 2d at 90.   
B. 
The December 14 Decision "Adversely Affect[s]" CLCM's 
"Substantial Interests" 
¶70 The December 14 decision "adversely affect[s]" CLCM's 
"substantial interests," within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.52.  As CLCM explained in its petition for judicial 
review, in the December 14 letter the Department "rescinded its 
proposal to accept the location-wide cap on VOC emissions, 
discussed at the November 12th meeting, and requested CLCM 
provide information required for the [D]epartment to issue a 
major source permit covering the location."  CLCM asserted the 
"December Determinations represent the culmination of the 
agency's decision with respect to the applicability of the PSD 
standards and permitting requirements to the CLCM Location, and 
directly impacts CLCM's rights going forward with respect to 
which permitting and enforcement regimes the CLCM Location is 
subject."  CLCM challenged the Department's determination that 
it "lacks authority under the facts of this case to issue a 
minor source permit to CLCM restricting emissions to less than 
40 [TPY] of VOC emissions."    
¶71 Multiple statements in the December 14 letter indicate 
the Department did not merely reiterate a previous determination 
or leave all decisions unresolved.  First, the letter itself 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
14 
 
indicates the decision was in response to a meeting held on 
November 12, 2018——well after the June 26 letter.  Second, the 
Department explained that "[u]pon further consideration," it 
"determined" the approach (1) "is not approvable," so (2) it 
"cannot issue a construction permit" for the equipment, and (3) 
the scrubber-controlled wash processes "therefore require BACT 
or BACT-equivalent controls."  The language of the December 14 
letter distinguishes it from the June 26 letter; unlike the 
Department's ongoing consideration of the issue in June, its 
determination in December forced CLCM to proceed with a more 
burdensome permitting process.  CLCM could not pursue its chosen 
course of business without complying with this permitting 
decision.  Even if the Department were to reverse course at some 
point in the future, CLCM will have incurred sunk costs, 
unrecoverable from the Department or otherwise.  
¶72 CLCM 
identified 
specific 
substantial 
interests 
adversely affected by the December 14 letter, which it construed 
as a "determination that [its] facility must comply with the PSD 
permitting requirements of chapter NR 405, as opposed to the 
more flexible and streamlined requirements that apply to 
'natural minor' and 'synthetic minor' sources under ch. NR 406 
and 407[.]"  The determination in the December 14 letter that 
BACT analyses are required under the more burdensome PSD 
permitting requirements is a decision independent of the final 
permit review on the merits; it is instead a threshold question 
of whether CLCM must conduct the analyses in the first place.  
CLCM noted this decision "substantially increases the costs and 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
15 
 
delay associated with permitting" because the required BACT 
analyses under this permitting regime can take months and 
involve 
"$50,000 
to 
$100,000 
or 
more" 
for 
a 
facility.  
Additionally, the Department's review can cost up to $80,000 and 
may take more than 18 months before it issues the permit.  Once 
a company has expended the funds required for permitting, these 
cannot be recouped.  The threat of incurring such costs renders 
the order triggering them judicially reviewable.  See Env't Def. 
Fund, 439 F.2d at 592 ("A threat of economic injury has always 
been regarded as sufficient . . . for the purpose of finding an 
order final and reviewable.").  The majority's evasive sidestep 
around perceived line-drawing problems undermines the statutory 
text and does not make CLCM's interests any less substantial.10    
¶73 Even federal courts applying an express finality 
requirement 
have 
determined 
decisions 
on 
PSD 
permitting 
applicability 
are 
reviewable. 
 
Despite 
the 
majority's 
acknowledgement 
that 
"federal 
courts 
follow 
a 
'finality' 
requirement"11——and its insistence that Wisconsin courts do not12—
—the majority reaches a conclusion even more restrictive than 
under federal law.    
¶74 In U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
concluded 
an 
approved 
jurisdictional 
determination 
regarding 
the 
discharge 
of 
pollutants into "the waters of the United States" was reviewable 
                                                 
10 Id., ¶46. 
11 Id., ¶49 n.16. 
12 Id., ¶37 n.14. 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
16 
 
because it "clearly 'mark[s] the consummation' of the [U.S. 
Army] Corps' decisionmaking process on that question."  578 U.S. 
590, 597 (2016) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 
(1997)) (emphasis added).  The Court reasoned the decision was 
reviewable because "that final agency determination . . . warns 
that if [respondents] discharge pollutants onto their property 
without obtaining a permit from the Corps, they do so at the 
risk of significant criminal and civil penalties."  Id. at 600.  
The Court emphasized that "the permitting process can be 
arduous, expensive, and long."  Id. at 601 (citing Rapanos v. 
United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (plurality op.)).  In 
that case, the respondents "would have to submit numerous 
assessments 
of 
various 
features 
of 
the 
property, 
which 
respondents estimate would cost more than $100,000."  Id. at 
596.   
¶75 In Puerto Rican Cement Co., Inc. v. U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 889 F.2d 292, 294–95 (1st Cir. 1989), the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals determined a company's challenge 
to a decision of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
requiring the company to obtain a special kind of EPA approval 
was ripe for judicial review, notwithstanding the availability 
of a review process at the agency level.  The court reasoned 
that "to withhold review would work considerable hardship on the 
Company, forcing it either to abandon its building plans, to 
compromise them by agreeing to emissions limitations, or to 
engage in a long, costly PSD review process."  Id. at 295.  
Based on those immediate consequences of the EPA’s decision, the 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
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court rejected the idea that further proceedings before the EPA 
rendered judicial review premature:   
[T]he applicability of PSD review . . . is plainly 
separable from, and therefore collateral to, all the 
matters that the agency would consider in a PSD review 
itself.  The collateral nature of the issue diminishes 
the likelihood that further agency proceedings will 
make it unnecessary for a court to decide the issue[.]  
Id.  Similarly, in Hawaiian Electric Co., Inc. v. U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 723 F.2d 1440, 1442 (9th Cir. 
1984), the Ninth Circuit determined "the application of the 
major modification definition is an interim step in the PSD 
permitting process" subject to judicial review because "it has 
immediate legal consequences, i.e., the requirement of PSD 
review."  Specifically, the court recognized the company had "an 
affirmative 
obligation 
imposed 
upon 
it" 
and 
"must 
take 
additional 
affirmative 
actions 
in 
terms 
of 
supplying 
information" 
to 
relieve 
itself 
of 
that 
agency-imposed 
obligation.  Id. at 1443.  Additionally, the company was 
"potentially 
subject 
to 
even 
more 
stringent 
affirmative 
obligations through the BACT provisions" leaving judicial review 
"the only feasible route available" to the company "to achieve 
modification of the requirements presently imposed on it."  Id.  
Accordingly, the court concluded such "intermediate actions are 
reviewable" by the judiciary "in order to avoid forcing [the 
company] to comply with a ruling it believes unlawful."  Id. at 
1444. 
¶76 The majority's citation of Hawkes in support of its 
conclusion that the December 14 letter "is not the consummation 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
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of the decisionmaking process but instead is just a step along 
the way"13 omits an important qualifier.  Under a proper 
application of Hawkes, the Department's determination is the 
"'consummation' of . . . [the] decisionmaking process on that 
question" of which permitting approach applies.  Hawkes, 578 
U.S. at 597 (emphasis added).  Contrary to the majority's 
characterization of this case, CLCM does not challenge "a step 
along the way" of a permitting process, but rather a threshold 
applicability decision.  "[O]n that question" of whether CLCM 
can pursue the permitting approach discussed at the November 12, 
2018 meeting, the Department determined the approach "is not 
approvable."  As a result, the Department informed CLCM it would 
need to provide BACT analyses for that process to legally engage 
in CLCM's chosen course of business; the costs and delays 
associated 
with 
those 
analyses 
"adversely 
affect" 
CLCM's 
"substantial interests."  As Puerto Rican Cement, Hawaiian 
Electric, and Hawkes all illustrate, the threshold decision 
concerning permitting applicability is distinct from a decision 
concerning the merits of the permit application; it is a fork in 
the road preceding any "step along the way."  Additionally, that 
"an earlier judicial review might avoid the expense and 
inconvenience of further administrative proceedings" is distinct 
from a collateral decision imposing time-consuming hurdles, 
costly construction modifications, and substantial permitting 
costs.  See Sierra Club, 304 Wis. 2d 614, ¶16.   
                                                 
13 Id., ¶50. 
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19 
 
¶77 This 
case 
illustrates 
the 
risk 
of 
allowing 
administrative goal-post shifting to thwart judicial review.  
The letters at issue are no paragons of clarity; this case 
revolves as much around what constitutes the decision as it does 
whether the decision is reviewable under Wis. Stat. § 227.52.  
The Department argues the June 26 letter was the final decision 
that CLCM should have challenged, but this argument ignores the 
subsequent meetings and letters leaving open the possibility of 
a PSD-avoidance limit, as well as the notice and appeal 
referencing only the "construction waiver decision."  CLCM 
argues the December letter contains a reviewable determination.  
The majority points to the December 14 letter's request for 
additional information on how CLCM "proposes to demonstrate 
compliance with its proposed VOC cap,"14 but in doing so reduces 
the letter to a notice "indicating that CLCM simply must comply 
with the process to get a permit[.]"15  To the extent this 
request for more information contradicts its decision on the 
scrubber-controlled wash processes, the Department shifts the 
goal post and injects administrative uncertainty into the 
analysis, making judicial review illusive if not altogether 
unattainable.  The broad language of Wis. Stat. § 227.52 does 
not permit this. 
¶78 The majority's erroneous application of the statute 
governing judicial review of agency decisions would be puzzling 
but for the majority's transparent revelation of the results-
                                                 
14 Id., ¶43. 
15 Id., ¶44. 
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oriented motivations underlying its opinion:  the avoidance of 
what the majority deems to be an "absurd" or "unreasonable 
result."16  The majority misapplies the absurd or unreasonable 
results canon of statutory construction, for at least the second 
time this term.  "It is a misuse of the canon to invoke it as a 
tool for discarding the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute 
in favor of an interpretation" the court prefers.  Brown County 
v. 
Brown 
Cnty. 
Taxpayers 
Ass'n, 
2022 
WI 
13, 
¶84, 
400 
Wis. 2d 781, 
971 
N.W.2d 491 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting.).   
¶79 Although the absurd or unreasonable results canon 
applies only rarely and in rather narrow circumstances, many 
courts cannot resist the temptation to invoke it to justify a 
preferred outcome.  "The absurdity doctrine applies only to 
textual errors that may be fixed 'by changing or supplying a 
particular word or phrase whose inclusion or omission was 
obviously a technical or ministerial error.'"  Schwab v. Schwab, 
2021 WI 67, ¶44 n.1, 397 Wis. 2d 820, 961 N.W.2d 56 (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan 
A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 238 
(2012)); see also State ex rel. Associated Indem. Corp. v. 
Mortensen, 224 Wis. 398, 272 N.W. 457, 458 (1937) (the absurdity 
canon "does not . . . justify a court in amending the statute or 
giving it a meaning to which its language is not susceptible 
merely to avoid what the court believes are inequitable or 
unwise results").  "Just because a court dislikes the outcome 
                                                 
16 Id., ¶47. 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
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does not mean it is absurd."  Schwab, 397 Wis. 2d 820, ¶44 n.1 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing Mellen Lumber 
Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of Wisconsin, 154 Wis. 114, 142 N.W. 187, 
189 (1913) ("The statute in question may be inequitable, but 
this does not make it absurd.")).  Misapplication of the canon 
disturbs the constitutional allocation of power among the 
branches of government.  "If courts ignored the law every time 
they deem a result unreasonable, the rule of law would be 
supplanted by the rule of judges."  Id.    
¶80 Setting aside the impropriety of allowing judicial 
policy goals to override a statute, the majority's attempt to 
circumvent an increased burden on the judicial system will 
ironically produce the opposite effect.  Those subject to 
adverse agency determinations will rush to the courts upon 
receipt of any communication that could conceivably be construed 
as a decision, lest the agency and court later deny review of a 
challenge deemed untimely.  The majority's decision in this case 
will leave regulated entities and individuals uncertain of 
whether courts will dismiss early challenges as premature or 
reject later suits as tardy. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶81 Recognizing 
the 
power 
wielded 
by 
administrative 
agencies over the people and entities they regulate, the 
legislature 
in 
1976 
expanded 
judicial 
review 
to 
include 
administrative decisions which "adversely affect the substantial 
interests of any person[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 227.52.  Flouting this 
legislative directive, Wisconsin courts continue to keep the 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
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courthouse doors shut to regulated entities and individuals 
alike.  The December 14 decision by the Department foreclosing a 
particular 
permitting 
process 
"adversely 
affect[s]" 
CLCM's 
"substantial interests" because it subjects CLCM to a more 
costly and time-consuming permitting process, collateral to a 
merits determination on the permit application itself.  Federal 
courts recognize the impact on a party's "substantial interests" 
of such a threshold permitting applicability determination, even 
in the face of an express finality requirement omitted from our 
judicial review statute.   
¶82 Dismissing the impact of the Department's decision on 
CLCM as "just a step along the way" of the permitting process, 
the majority misguidedly ignores the adverse effects CLCM will 
irreparably suffer as a result, and for which Wisconsin law 
affords CLCM judicial review before the damage is done.  The 
majority misinterprets Wis. Stat. § 227.52 for the express 
purpose 
of 
sparing 
the 
courts 
the 
burden 
of 
ensuring 
administrative agencies follow the law.  In doing so, the 
majority "leaves Americans at the mercy" of administrative 
agencies, which have been endowed with "a nearly freestanding 
coercive power" making the agencies "rulers of a sort unfamiliar 
in a republic, and the people must jump at their commands." 
Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 335 (2014).  
"[T]he judiciary risks the liberty of all citizens if it 
abdicates its constitutional responsibility to check executive 
interpretations of the law."  Operton v. LIRC, 2017 WI 46, ¶80, 
375 Wis. 2d 1, 894 N.W.2d 426 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
No.  2019AP1007.rgb 
 
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concurring).  Because the majority refuses to serve as a check 
on the exercise of coercive administrative agency power in this 
case, I dissent. 
¶83 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this dissent. 
 
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