Title: State v. Joel R. Zarnke
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP001664-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 26, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1664-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Joel R. Zarnke,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  215 Wis. 2d 71, 572 N.W.2d 491 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 26, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 7, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire 
 
JUDGE: 
Benjamin D. Proctor 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Prosser, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by Michael R. Cohen and Wachowski, Johnson & Cohen, 
S.C. Eau Claire and oral argument by Michael R. Cohen. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued 
by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1664-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Joel R. Zarnke,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
FEB 26, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded to the circuit court with directions. 
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.    The issue before the court  
is 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.05 
prohibiting 
the 
sexual 
exploitation of a child violates the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 3 
of the Wisconsin Constitution for failing to require that the 
State prove that a distributor of sexually explicit materials 
had knowledge of the minority of the person(s) depicted in the 
materials.  We hold that the statute does violate the federal 
and state constitutions as it applies to distributors of such 
materials, and decline to save the statute insofar as it applies 
to those accused of the proscribed activities of § 948.05(1)(c) 
which do not entail a personal meeting between the minor 
depicted and the accused. 
I 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
2 
¶2 
The defendant was charged with, among other felonies, 
two counts of sexual exploitation of a child contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 948.05(1)(c) (1995-96)1 for his reproduction and/or 
distribution of photographs, electronically stored images, and 
other pictorial reproductions of a child engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct. Section 948.05 states in relevant part as 
follows:   
 
(1) Whoever does any of the following with knowledge 
of the character and content of the sexually explicit 
conduct involving the child is guilty of a class C 
felony.   
 
. . . 
 
(c) Produces, performs in, profits from, promotes, 
imports into the state, reproduces, advertises, sells, 
distributes or possesses with intent to sell or 
distribute, 
any 
undeveloped 
film, 
photographic 
negative, photograph, motion picture, videotape, sound 
recording or other reproduction of a child engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.   
 
. . .  
 
(3) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for a 
violation of this section if the defendant had 
reasonable cause to believe that the child had 
attained the age of 18 years, and the child exhibited 
to the defendant, or the defendant's agent or client, 
a draft card, driver's license, birth certificate or 
other 
official 
or 
apparently 
official 
document 
purporting to establish that the child had attained 
the age of 18 years.  A defendant who raises this 
affirmative defense has the burden of proving this 
defense by a preponderance of the evidence.   
(emphasis added.)   
                     
1 All references are to the 1995-96 version of the statutes 
unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
3 
¶3 
The defendant moved to dismiss the sexual exploitation 
charges on several grounds, including, as is relevant here, that 
Wis. Stat. § 948.05 is unconstitutional because it does not 
require that the State prove that the defendant had knowledge of 
the minority of the person(s) depicted in the sexually explicit 
materials, but instead impermissibly allocates to the defendant 
the burden to prove lack of such knowledge by a preponderance of 
the evidence as an affirmative defense.  The circuit court 
agreed with the defendant, and basing its decision on United 
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994), ruled that 
§ 948.05 was unconstitutional in its entirety and dismissed the 
two charges. 
¶4 
The State appealed and the court of appeals reversed. 
 State v. Zarnke, 215 Wis. 2d 71, 572 N.W.2d 491 (Ct. App. 
1997).  On appeal, the defendant conceded that the decision of 
the circuit court for Eau Claire County, Honorable Benjamin D. 
Proctor, 
holding 
the 
entirety 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.05 
unconstitutional, was in error as to those portions of the 
statute which regulate the production of sexually explicit 
materials 
involving 
minors 
and which, 
presumably, involve 
personal interaction between the child-victim and the accused.  
However, 
the 
defendant 
maintained 
that 
the 
portion 
of 
§ 948.05(1)(c) addressing the distribution of sexually explicit 
materials involving minors, and which did not involve the 
personal interaction between the child-victim and the accused, 
was unconstitutional.   
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
4 
¶5 
The State agreed with the defendant that the statute 
was 
constitutional 
as 
applied 
to 
the 
production, 
but 
unconstitutional as applied to the distribution, of sexually 
explicit materials involving children.  The State presented the 
issue for review as one centered upon the extent to which the 
statute could be saved to avoid dismissal of the charges against 
the defendant. 
¶6 
The court of appeals agreed with both parties that 
when an accused did not have the opportunity to personally meet 
the child-victim, the State must carry the burden to prove, as 
an element of the offense under Wis. Stat. § 948.05, that a 
defendant distributor had knowledge of the minority of the 
child-victim depicted in the sexually explicit material in 
issue.  It based this conclusion on X-Citement Video.  However, 
the court wrote that § 948.05 did in fact place that necessary 
burden upon the State, and, therefore, was not unconstitutional. 
 The court provided further that in the alternative, the statute 
could be saved by first severing the offending portions and then 
reading into those same offending portions the requirement that 
the State prove all the elements of the offense, which would 
include proof of the defendant's knowledge of the minority of 
the child-victim. 
¶7 
The defendant appealed and we granted his petition for 
review.  We now reverse the court of appeals' decision.  We hold 
that Wis. Stat. § 948.05 on its face does not set forth the 
requirement that the State carry the burden to prove that the 
defendant had knowledge of the minority of the child-victim 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
5 
depicted in the sexually explicit materials for which the 
prosecution is being brought.  Therefore, the statute as written 
is unconstitutional as it applies to the distribution of 
sexually explicit material depicting minors, as well as to the 
other prohibited conduct which does not entail a personal 
interaction between the accused and the child-victim.   
II 
¶8 
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of 
law that we review de novo.  State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 
301, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).  Ordinarily, there is a presumption 
of constitutionality for a legislative enactment.  Id.  In most 
circumstances, those challenging the constitutionality of a 
statute 
have 
the 
burden 
to 
prove 
that 
the 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  Norquist v. Zeuske, 
211 Wis. 2d 241, 250, 564 N.W.2d 748 (1997).  However, because 
Wis. Stat. § 948.05 implicates First Amendment rights,2 the State 
                     
2 "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment requires that regulation by 
the States of obscenity conform to procedures that will ensure 
against 
the 
curtailment 
of 
constitutionally 
protected 
expression, which is often separated from obscenity only by a 
dim and uncertain line."  Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 
U.S. 58, 66 (1963).  Here we are not considering an obscenity 
statute, but an analogous demarcation between protected and 
unprotected speech is involved.  The First Amendment is 
implicated in this question because the "age of the performers 
is the crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful 
conduct."  United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 
73.  "[N]onobscene, sexually explicit 
materials 
involving 
persons over the age of 17 are protected by the First 
Amendment,"  Id. at 72, while nonobscene, sexually explicit 
materials involving persons under the age of 18 are not. 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
6 
has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
statute is constitutional.  State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 
523, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994); City of Madison v. Baumann, 162 
Wis. 2d 660, 668-69, 470 N.W.2d 296 (1991). 
¶9 
The 
State 
does 
not 
argue 
that 
the 
statute 
is 
constitutional as it applies to distributors of sexually 
explicit materials involving children, but rather concedes that 
it is unconstitutional and argues for saving it.  Regardless, we 
believe that the statute's constitutional infirmities merit our 
discussion. 
A 
¶10 Both parties to this appeal agree that the statute 
places the burden as to the question of the defendant's 
knowledge of the minority of one or more of the persons depicted 
in the sexually explicit materials upon the defendant as an 
affirmative 
defense. 
 
However, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
independently 
concluded that 
for 
distributors 
of sexually 
explicit materials, the burden to prove this knowledge was 
placed on the State. 
¶11 The court of appeals held that the legislature did not 
intend 
the 
affirmative 
defense 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.05(3) 
to 
apply 
to 
the 
violations 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.05(1)(c) that do not involve a face-to-face involvement 
with the child-victim.  In so holding, the court began with the 
premise that the legislature has always intended to prevent 
conviction under § 948.05, and its predecessor in Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.203 (1987-88) (repealed effective July 1, 1989), of one 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
7 
who was reasonably ignorant of the minority of persons depicted 
in sexually explicit material.   
¶12 The court believed that when, in 1987, Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.203 was renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 948.05 and amended by 
the legislature to shift the burden of proof of knowledge from 
the State to the defendant, the legislature did not change its 
underlying policy that those free of guilty knowledge could not 
be punished for sexual exploitation of a child.  Zarnke, 215 
Wis. 2d at 78.  Because the legislature knew that guilty 
knowledge had been, and continued to be, an element of the 
offense, the court of appeals believed that the legislature 
could not have intended the affirmative defense to apply to the 
instant case because to do so would be unreasonable and 
absurdwhere 
the 
defendant 
did 
not 
have 
a 
face-to-face 
involvement with the victim, it would be impossible for the 
defendant to satisfy the defense.  The court agreed with the 
defendant 
that 
one 
who 
is 
not 
involved 
in 
face-to-face 
exploitation could never satisfy the requirement under the 
affirmative defense that the child produced suitable documentary 
evidence of his or her majority.  Construing the statute to 
avoid an unreasonable or absurd result, Schwartz v. DILHR, 72 
Wis. 2d 217, 222, 240 N.W.2d 173 (1976), the court concluded 
that 
the 
affirmative 
defense 
could 
apply 
only 
to 
those 
categories of criminal activity in which it is reasonable to 
conclude that the defendant could have had the opportunity to 
meet the child-victim face-to-face. 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
8 
¶13 While we agree with the court of appeals that the 
affirmative defense set out in Wis. Stat. § 948.05(3) is a 
practical impossibility for distributors of sexually explicit 
materials, we decline to follow its reasoning and agree instead 
with both parties that as currently written, the statute does 
provide the defendant with an affirmative defense as to all the 
crimes chargeable in this statute. 
¶14 The statute unambiguously places the burden of proving 
lack of knowledge on the defendant in the affirmative defense 
provided by Wis. Stat. § 948.05(3).  Subsection (3) neither 
explicitly, nor implicitly, places the burden of proof of the 
defendant's knowledge upon the State.  To the contrary, the 
statute clearly burdens the defendant with proving his or her 
reasonable cause to believe that the person depicted had reached 
the age of majority.  Any other reading, no matter how tempting, 
ignores the plain language of the statute.  Therefore, we find 
that the statute on its face does not allocate to the State the 
burden to prove that the defendant had knowledge of the minority 
of the child-victim.  Because the statute is clear on its face, 
without any ambiguity, statutory construction is not appropriate 
in the first instance. State v. Chrysler Outboard Corp., 219 
Wis.2d 130, 167, 580 N.W.2d 203 (1998). 
B 
¶15 Our finding does not resolve the more fundamental 
question, assumed by the parties and the courts below but not 
discussed: that is, whether as a constitutional matter, the 
legislature may define a statute in which the defendant's 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
9 
knowledge of minority is not an element of the offense as it has 
done so here.3  We hold that it may not. 
¶16 It is well-established that "the Due Process Clause 
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which he is charged."  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
364 (1970).  It is equally true that the State may offer a 
defendant an affirmative defense to a crime charged, and place 
upon that defendant the burden to prove that defense, so long as 
the defense does not in fact work to negate one of the elements 
of the crime charged.  See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 
(1977); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987). 
¶17 Prior to 1987, the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 948.05 
were embodied in Wis. Stat. § 940.203 (1985-86).  Under the 
earlier section, the State was burdened with proving that a 
defendant had knowledge of the minority of those involved in the 
                     
3 The legislature explicitly removed knowledge as an element 
of the offense and provided the defendant with an opportunity to 
prove lack of knowledge as an affirmative defense.  See 
Legislative Council Note, 1987 Wis. Act 332, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 
948.05 (West 1996).  Therefore, lack of knowledge is not now an 
element of the offense.  "There is a clear distinction [] 
between the elements of [an] offense and the elements of an 
affirmative defense.  United States v. Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. 
1207, 1214 (D. Alaska 1995) (citation omitted).  The defendant 
in the instant case must disprove knowledgeand the government 
is not required to prove knowledge as an element of its case.  
Cf. id. (where the defendant has the opportunity to disprove 
knowledge and consent as an affirmative defense, knowledge and 
consent are not elements of the crime which the government must 
prove to establish its case). 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
10
pornography.  See Wis. Stat. § 940.203 (1985-86).  In 1987, the 
legislature passed 1987 Wis. Act 332, which among other actions 
involving 
crimes against 
children 
generally, 
renumbered § 
940.203 to the current § 948.05 and amended its language to 
shift the burden of proof as to the knowledge of the minority of 
the child-victim from the State to the defendant.  See 
Legislative Council Note, 1987 Wis. Act 332, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 
948.05 (West 1996).   
¶18 While legislatures are presumed to pass constitutional 
statutes, Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 301, there are "constitutional 
limits beyond which the States may not go" in reallocating 
"burdens of proof by labeling as affirmative defenses at least 
some elements of the crimes" that have been defined in their 
statutes.  Patterson, 432 U.S. 197, 210.  In this regard, the 
Court in Patterson noted the following: 
 
"[I]t is not within the province of a legislature to 
declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty 
of a crime."  McFarland v. American Sugar Rfg. Co., 
241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916).  The legislature cannot 
"validly command that the finding of an indictment, or 
mere proof of the identity of the accused, should 
create a presumption of the existence of all the facts 
essential to guilt."  Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 
463, 469 (1943).  See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 
U.S., at 523-525.  Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 
(1934), also makes the point with sufficient clarity. 
Id.  With Wis. Stat. § 948.05, the legislature has indeed 
unconstitutionally allocated to the defendant a burden which 
must be placed upon the State. 
¶19 The United States Supreme Court has held that a State 
may impose strict or absolute criminal liability by defining 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
11
criminal offenses without any element of scienter.  Smith v. 
California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959).  However, the State is 
limited in its use of strict liability statutes, particularly so 
in the area of expression where "an elimination [of the scienter 
requirement] may tend to work a substantial restriction on the 
freedom of speech and of the press."  Id.  Further, while some 
legal doctrines are usually consistent with the Constitution, at 
times they "cannot be applied in settings where they have the 
collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom of expression, by 
making the individual the more reluctant to exercise it."  Id. 
at 151.  Strict liability is one such doctrine.  Id. at 150-51; 
see also Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 510 (1965) ("The 
Constitution requires proof of scienter to avoid the hazard of 
self-censorship of constitutionally protected material and to 
compensate for the ambiguities inherent in the definition of 
obscenity."); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 
(1987) ("[A] rule that would impose strict liability on a 
publisher for false factual assertions would have an undoubted 
'chilling' effect on speech . . . that does have constitutional 
value.")   The same is true of laws regulating the sexual 
exploitation of children.  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 
(1982).  "[C]riminal responsibility may not be imposed [upon 
those involved with nonobscene, sexually explicit materials 
depicting minors] without some element of scienter on the part 
of the defendant."  Id. 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
12
¶20 The 
Court 
in 
Smith 
explained 
the 
constitutional 
problems associated with strict liability offenses in the area 
of speech: 
 
The appellee and the court below analogize this strict 
liability penal ordinance to familiar forms of penal 
statutes which dispense with any element of knowledge 
on the part of the person charged, food and drug 
legislation being a principal example.  We find the 
analogy instructive in our examination of the question 
before us.  The usual rationale for such statutes is 
that the public interest in the purity of its food is 
so great as to warrant the imposition of the highest 
standard of care on distributors—in fact an absolute 
standard which will not hear the distributor's plea as 
to the amount of care he has used. [citations omitted] 
 His ignorance of the character of the food is 
irrelevant.  There is no specific constitutional 
inhibition against making the distributors of food the 
strictest 
censors 
of 
their merchandise, 
but the 
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of speech and 
of the press stand in the way of imposing a similar 
requirement on the bookseller. 
Smith, 361 U.S. at 152-53;  See also State v. Collova, 79 
Wis. 2d 473, 484-85, 255 N.W.2d 581 (1977)(strict liability 
statutes have been applied in Wisconsin in "'regulatory criminal 
statutes'" where "[t]he persons to whom the regulations are 
directed are generally in a position to exercise [a] high degree 
of care."). 
¶21 With its decision in X-Citement Video, the Supreme 
Court suggested strongly that some level of scienter as to the 
minority of the child-victim was constitutionally required where 
there was no reasonable expectation of a face-to-face meeting 
between an accused and the minor.  It wrote that age of minority 
possessed the status of an elemental fact because "nonobscene, 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
13
sexually explicit materials involving persons over the age of 17 
are protected by the First Amendment."  X-Citement Video, 513 
U.S. at 72 (citations omitted).  "[O]ne would reasonably expect 
to be free from regulation when trafficking in sexually 
explicit, 
though not obscene, materials involving adults.  
Therefore, the age of the performers is the crucial element 
separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct."  Id. at 73.  
We agree that the age of the performer is an elemental fact, and 
based upon the Court's decision in Smith, find that the 
government must prove some level of scienter as to the 
performer's minority.  Therefore, to escape our finding that the 
statute is unconstitutional, a defendant who is in no position 
to garner the age of the minor may not be held strictly liable 
where the individual depicted is in fact a minor. 
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.05 is not a strict liability 
statute, for it is possible for a defendant to escape liability 
under § 948.05 by proving a lack of knowledge.  Strictly 
speaking, a strict liability offense is one which affords an 
individual no opportunity to prove a lack of knowledge.  
However, the current § 948.05, as it applies to distributors, is 
indistinguishable from a strict liability statute, since it is 
virtually impossible for a defendant as a distributor to meet 
his or her burden. 
¶23 A distributor of pornography may be one step, or many 
steps, removed from its production, and the further removed the 
more 
difficultthe 
closer 
to 
impossibleit 
is 
for 
the 
distributor to garner the identification required of Wis. Stat. 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
14
§ 948.05(3).  We agree with the Supreme Court's observation that 
"[t]he opportunity for reasonable mistake as to age increases 
significantly once the victim is reduced to a visual depiction, 
unavailable for questioning by the distributor or receiver."  X-
Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72 n.2.  Here, a defendant who is a 
distributor is never in the position to have the child-victim 
exhibit to him or her an "official document" that is required of 
the affirmative defense.  We find that this affirmative defense 
which could never be proved by most of the actors in 
§ 948.05(1)(c) essentially reduces the statute to one which is 
in effect strict liability.  Therefore, we hold that the statute 
is unconstitutional as it applies to those activities which do 
not include some interaction between the accused and the child-
victim. 
¶24 While we find that the affirmative defense as provided 
in Wis. Stat. § 948.05 does not provide the constitutionally 
required element of scienter, we stop short of addressing the 
level of scienter that would withstand scrutiny. 
¶25 We hold that an essential element of the crime 
specified in Wis. Stat. § 948.05 must be an accused's knowledge 
of the minority of the child-victim, that the State must bear 
the burden of proving some level of scienter as to that 
essential element where an accused's conduct does not entail a 
personal meeting with the minor, and that as currently drafted, 
the 
legislature 
has 
not 
constitutionally 
allocated 
that 
necessary burden.   
III 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
15
¶26 "Although 
this 
court 
will 
strive 
to 
construe 
legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack, it 
must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the 
purpose of a statute."  State v. Hall, 207 Wis. 2d 54, 82, 557 
N.W.2d 778 (1997). 
¶27 The State would have us save Wis. Stat. § 948.05 for 
application against the defendant by severing the offending 
portions and then saving those same portions by imposing on them 
the required State burden.  Specifically, the State suggests 
that 
we 
sever 
the 
following 
emphasized 
language 
from 
§ 
948.05(1)(c):   
 
"Produces, 
performs 
in, 
profits 
from, 
promotes, 
imports into the state, reproduces, advertises, sells, 
distributes, or possesses with intent to sell or 
distribute, 
any 
undeveloped 
film, 
photographic 
negative, photograph, motion picture, videotape, sound 
recording or other reproduction of a child engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct."   
(emphasis supplied.)  We understand the parties' objections to 
the emphasized language arising from their recognition that none 
of these activities will generally entail a face-to-face meeting 
between the accused and the child-victim. 
¶28 Severance of the offending language of the statute 
requires a rule of construction specifically authorized by Wis. 
Stat. § 990.001(11): 
 
The provisions of the statutes are severable.  The 
provisions of any session law are severable.  If any 
provision of the statutes or of a session law is 
invalid, or if the application of either to any person 
or circumstance is invalid, such invalidity shall not 
affect other provisions or applications which can be 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
16
given 
effect 
without 
the 
invalid 
provision 
or 
application. 
¶29 We recognize that we have the authority to sever the 
above-emphasized language as the State asks.  However, the State 
does not ask us to sever this language to save the remaining 
provisions.  Instead, it makes the unusual request that we sever 
the language to save the statute as it applies to those same 
severed provisions.  To do this, the State asks that we reinsert 
into the statute this severed language, first imposing upon that 
language an appropriate element of scienter.  In the State's 
view, 
by 
so 
acting 
we 
would 
read 
into 
the 
statute 
a 
constitutional requirement that is not now explicitly present. 
¶30 In X-Citement Video, the Supreme Court supported its 
construction of a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2822, to require 
that the government prove the defendant's knowledge of the 
minority 
of 
the 
person(s) 
depicted 
in 
sexually 
explicit 
materials with its "cases interpreting criminal statutes to 
include broadly applicable scienter requirements, even where the 
statute by its terms does not contain them."  X-Citement Video, 
513 U.S. at 70.  This court has similarly supplied statutory 
deficiencies by court rule in order to save a statute.  See 
State ex rel. Chobot v. Circuit Court, 61 Wis. 2d 354, 212 
N.W.2d 690 (1973) (saving a deficient statute regulating 
obscenity by judicially defining the term "obscene");  State v. 
Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995) (saving a deficient 
statute to construe it to include the right to request a jury 
for discharge hearings under Wis. Stat. § 980.09 and 980.10). 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
17
¶31 While when necessary, we have at times severed 
portions of a statute's language, and at other times have read 
into a deficient statute a constitutional requirement, the 
State's request that we save all of Wis. Stat. § 948.05 would 
require this court to combine two distinct saving doctrines, 
which we are not inclined to do under the circumstances of this 
case.  During oral arguments the State suggested that this court 
did combine these two saving measures in City of Madison v. 
Nickel, 66 Wis. 2d 71, 223 N.W.2d 865 (1974) and should do so 
again here.  We will not extend our actions in Nickel to this 
case. 
¶32 In Nickel, this court was called upon to determine the 
constitutionality of a Madison city 
ordinance 
proscribing 
obscenity.  As enacted, the ordinance defined obscenity in 
accord with the then-current constitutional standards, a point 
which this court considered to be "an obvious attempt by the 
Madison 
Common 
Council 
to 
create 
an 
obscenity 
ordinance 
consonant with the then-controlling judicial definition of 
obscenity within constitutional limits."  Id. at 80.  When the 
constitutional standards were subsequently redefined by Miller 
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the ordinance was called into 
question. 
¶33 In saving the ordinance, this court severed the 
portion of the ordinance that, following Miller, provided an 
unconstitutional definition of obscenity.  Id. at 80.  We then 
supplemented the ordinance using the court's "authoritative 
judicial construction" and held that the now undefined term 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
18
"obscene" encompassed the court's definition of the term 
"obscene" in Chobot.  Id. at 80-81. 
¶34 Nickel is distinguishable from the instant case.  When 
the Supreme Court repudiated the definition of obscenity that 
had been constitutional prior to Miller, the Court stated that 
regulation 
of 
depictions 
of 
sexual 
conduct 
needed 
to 
specifically define the conduct through "applicable state law, 
as written or authoritatively construed."  Nickel, 66 Wis. 2d at 
75 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 24). 
¶35 Following Miller, this court in Chobot confronted 
Wisconsin's obscenity statute and found that it was deficient 
under Miller only in that it did not contain an express 
definition of obscenity as required by that case.  Chobot, 61 
Wis. 2d at 366.  In facing the question of whether this court 
could 
"save 
the 
section 
by 
interpretation 
and 
supply 
a 
constitutional definition of obscenity," id., we found that we 
had the power to do so, relying upon precedent supporting the 
supplementation of deficiencies to save a statute, id. at 367, 
and upon the Miller Court's proposition that a state court could 
"authoritatively construe" the statute. 
¶36 Nickel presented a more difficult problem than did 
Chobot, for unlike the state statute in Chobot which contained 
no obscenity definition, the ordinance in Nickel did define 
obscenity, albeit in a manner no longer consistent with the 
constitution.  As noted, this court removed the unconstitutional 
definition, thereby leaving the ordinance without a definition. 
 It then relied on Chobot as support for its authority to supply 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
19
the now-deficient ordinance with a definition that fell within 
the boundaries of the constitution. 
¶37 The instant case differs in two significant ways from 
this court's actions in Nickel.  First, severing the offending 
language will not leave the statute constitutionally deficient 
as was the case in Nickel.  Following severance, we will not 
need to fill a deficiency in order to save the remainder of the 
statute. 
¶38 Second, the decision in Chobot, from which Nickel 
finds its authority, was subsequently called into question.  
State v. Princess Cinema of Milwaukee, 96 Wis. 2d 646, 292 
N.W.2d 807 (1980).  In Princess Cinema, we found that the same 
state 
statute 
considered 
and 
saved 
in 
Chobot 
was 
now 
unconstitutionally overbroad, albeit based upon a question not 
reached in the earlier case.  Recognizing first that we had the 
authority to rectify the continuing constitutional infirmities, 
we declined, "[a]s a matter of policy . . . to further act to 
rectify the deficiencies in [the] statute[, for the] problems of 
public policy and the regulation of criminal conduct are for the 
legislature."  Id. at 661.  This court emphasized that we were 
"not 
simply 
'giving 
up' 
on 
the 
establishment 
of 
a 
constitutionally permissible scheme for regulating obscenity.  
We [were] recognizing that our job is one of interpreting 
statutes, not redrafting them."  Id. at 662. 
¶39 Given that in the Nickel decision we satisfied a 
deficiency in a statute that resulted from a severance, where no 
such deficiency will follow our severance here, and that Nickel 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
20
itself was based upon a case which we later refused to make 
aright by the same authority which the State now urges us to 
invoke, we believe that that case does not control our actions 
here. 
¶40 Nor do we believe that X-Citement Video controls.  In 
X-Citement Video, the Court supported its interpretation that a 
federal statute did require proof as to the defendant's 
knowledge of the minority of a performer with what it found to 
be legislative silence on the matter.  That is, the Court would 
"presume a scienter requirement in the absence of express 
contrary intent."  Id. at 71-72. 
¶41 Quite the contrary is true here, as the language of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.05 is not silent on the scienter requirement, 
as it explicitly allocates the burden regarding knowledge to the 
defendant. 
 
In 
addition, 
legislative 
history 
explicitly 
demonstrates a legislative intent to burden the defendant with 
proof of his or her lack of knowledge.  See Legislative Council 
Note, 1987 Wis. Act 332, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 948.05 (West 1996).  
To read into the statute the requirement that the State bear the 
burden to prove the defendant's knowledge of minority would be 
contrary to the legislature's explicit intentions. 
¶42 At oral argument, the State suggested that the 
legislature's explicit intent as evinced by legislative history 
is not what appears to be most clear from a reading of that 
history.  Instead, the State suggests that we should consider 
the legislature's implicit intent, which it believes was really 
an intent to enact legislation that would allow it to legislate 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
21
to the limits of the constitution.  As its argument goes, when 
Wis. Stat. § 948.05 was passed in 1987, the Supreme Court's 
decision in Ferber was the last word on the constitutionality of 
statutes governing sexual exploitation of children, and that the 
legislature believed in good faith that Ferber permitted placing 
upon the defendant the burden to prove lack of knowledge of the 
minority of a person depicted in sexually explicit materials.  
Because 
the 
legislature 
enacted 
a 
statute 
that 
was 
constitutional then, we should assume that the legislature would 
intend to place the burden of the defendant's knowledge on the 
State when that burden is constitutionally required.   
¶43 We might agree with the State that the legislature's 
implicit intent was to draft a statute that went to the limits 
of the constitution.  However, that the legislature intends to 
pass statutes which are constitutional is always our starting 
point in such an inquiry as this.  See State v. Janssen, 219 
Wis. 2d 362, 580 N.W.2d 260 (1998)(ordinarily, a statute is 
presumed to be constitutional).  But were we to rewrite a 
statute whenever it failed constitutional muster in order to 
save it, using any means possible, the legislature would soon 
realize that it need not be concerned with constitutional 
limitations: the judiciary could always be relied upon to mend 
and mold its language to fit within constitutional constraints. 
  
¶44 "While a statute should be held valid whenever by any 
fair 
interpretation 
it 
may 
be 
construed 
to 
serve 
a 
constitutional purpose, courts cannot go beyond the province of 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
22
legitimate construction to save it, and where the meaning is 
plain, words cannot be read into it or out of it for the purpose 
of saving one or other possible alternative."  Hall, 207 Wis. 2d 
at 82 (citations omitted). It is well-established that "[w]here 
the language used in a statute is plain, the court cannot read 
words into it that are not found . . . even to save its 
constitutionality, because this would be legislation and not 
construction."  Mellen Lumber v. Industrial Comm., 154 Wis. 114, 
120, 142 N.W. 187 (1913), citing Rogers-Ruger Co. v. Murray, 115 
Wis. 267, 91 N.W. 657 (1902). 
¶45 Finally, "'[a]lthough this Court will often strain to 
construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional 
attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of . . 
.' judicially rewriting it".  X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 86 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Commodity Futures Trading 
Com'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986)).  "Otherwise, there 
would be no such thing as an unconstitutional statute."  X-
Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 86 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
¶46 In view of the above discussion, we believe that 
severing the offending portions of the statute, and then reading 
into 
those 
same 
portions 
a 
burden 
that 
the 
legislature 
explicitly rejected, would be an act of legislation.  The 
legislature can draft a permissible and constitutionally valid 
statute.  It has shown that it has the ability to do so in 
drafting former Wis. Stat. § 940.203 (1985-86) and in drafting 
current Wis. Stat. § 948.12.  In § 948.12, for instance, the 
legislature did enact, as an element to be proven by the State, 
No.  97-1664-CR 
 
23
the requirement that the defendant knew or should have known the 
minority of the child-victim depicted in the material at issue. 
The legislature could have done so here as well, if it so 
intended.  To this extent, it is the legislature's job, not this 
court's, 
to 
amend 
the 
invalid 
portion 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§  948.05(1)(c) to conform to the constitutional dictates of the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
§ 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶47 The severed portion of Wis. Stat. § 948.05(1)(c) 
cannot be saved.  Accordingly, the two counts against the 
defendant Zarnke which are based on his distribution of sexually 
explicit materials involving a minor are to be dismissed, for 
§ 948.05(1)(c) cannot be applied in a constitutional manner to 
the defendant. 
¶48 With 
the 
removal 
of 
the 
offending 
language, 
§ 948.05(1)(c) now reads: 
 
Produces 
or 
performs 
in 
any 
undeveloped 
film, 
photographic negative, photograph, motion picture, 
videotape, sound recording or other reproduction of a 
child engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 
We explicitly reserve the question of whether this remaining 
portion of § 948.05(1)(c) is constitutional. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
97-1664-CR.dtp 
 
1 
¶49 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.    (Dissenting).   The issue in 
this case is whether Wis. Stat. § 948.05(1)(c) may be construed 
to require the state to prove that a person charged with 
distributing photographs or other reproductions of a child 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct knew that the child was a 
child, i.e., knew that the person in the pictures had not 
attained the age of 18 years.  The majority concludes that such 
a 
construction 
may 
not 
be 
given 
to 
§ 948.05(1)(c) 
and 
"decline[s] to save" portions of the statute, instead holding 
them unconstitutional.  I disagree and respectfully dissent. 
I. 
¶50 When the constitutionality of a statute is challenged 
in court, there is normally a strong presumption that the 
enactment is constitutional, Treiber v. Knoll, 135 Wis. 2d 58, 
64, 398 N.W.2d 756 (1987); State v. Cissel, 127 Wis. 2d 205, 
214, 378 N.W.2d 691 (1985), and the party seeking to overcome 
the presumption must prove the statute unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  State v. Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, 370, 580 
N.W.2d 260 (1998); State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 263, 541 
N.W.2d 105 (1995).  However, the burden shifts to the proponent 
of the statute when the statute infringes on the exercise of 
First Amendment rights.  State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 522-
23, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994); State v. Kevin L.C., 216 Wis. 2d 166, 
184, 576 N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1997). 
¶51 Nonetheless, courts have a duty to uphold statutes 
when they reasonably can.  In Demmith v. Wisconsin Judicial 
Conference, 166 Wis. 2d 649, 664 n.13, 480 N.W.2d 502 (1992), we 
97-1664-CR.dtp 
 
2 
asserted that "The court must interpret a statute, if at all 
possible, in a manner that will preserve the statute as a 
constitutional enactment."  In Browne v. Milwaukee Bd. of School 
Directors, 83 Wis. 2d 316, 332, 265 N.W.2d 559 (1978), we said 
that when a legislative enactment is attacked "the cardinal rule 
of statutory construction is to preserve a statute and to find 
it constitutional if it is at all possible to do so."  In State 
ex rel. Harvey v. Morgan, 30 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 139 N.W.2d 585 
(1966), we declared that "the duty of this court is not to 
impugn the motives of the legislature, but rather, if possible, 
to so construe the statute as to find it in harmony with 
accepted constitutional principles."  In Harvey, we approvingly 
quoted State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 265 Wis. 558, 565, 61 
N.W.2d 903 (1953), for the proposition that "Our search must be 
for a means of sustaining the act, not for reasons which might 
require its condemnation."  Harvey, 30 Wis. 2d at 13. 
¶52 Again, in State ex rel. Chobot v. Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, 61 Wis. 2d 354, 367, 212 N.W.2d 690 (1973), we 
stated, "[T]his court has the duty to uphold the statute if it 
can and in the past has supplied deficiencies to save a statute. 
 See Huebner v. State (1967), 33 Wis. 2d 505, 147 N.W.2d 646, 
where this court granted a judicial hearing in sex deviate cases 
not provided for by the statute in order to save the statute."  
This was also our approach in State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 
329, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995), where the court said, "This court 
has 
previously 
construed 
deficient 
statutes 
to 
include 
constitutionally required procedures," and afforded the right to 
97-1664-CR.dtp 
 
3 
request a jury for discharge hearings under §§ 980.09 and 
980.10.4 
¶53 The court's duty was summed up in State ex rel. 
Carnation M.P. Co. v. Emery, 178 Wis. 147, 160, 189 N.W. 564 
(1922):  "If there is any reasonable basis upon which the 
legislation may constitutionally rest, the court must assume 
that the legislature had such fact in mind and passed the act 
pursuant thereto. . . .  All facts necessary to sustain the act 
must be taken as conclusively found by the legislature, if any 
such facts may be reasonably conceived in the mind of the 
court." 
¶54 We all understand, in the wake of United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994), that portions of 
§ 948.05(1)(c) would be unconstitutional if the statute were not 
construed to require the state to prove that a defendant who had 
never personally interacted with the exploited child knew that 
the child had not attained the age of 18 years.  This scienter 
element is indispensable.  The question then is whether it is 
"at all possible" to interpret or construe the statute to 
require this indispensable element, because, if it is "at all 
possible," this court has a duty to construe the statute 
accordingly. 
 
                     
4 See also State ex rel. Terry v. Schubert, 74 Wis. 2d 487, 
498, 247 N.W.2d 109 (1976); State ex rel. Farrell v. Stovall, 59 
Wis. 2d 148, 168, 207 N.W.2d 809 (1973); State ex rel. Matalik 
v. Schubert, 57 Wis. 2d 315, 327, 204 N.W.2d 13 (1973); State ex 
rel. Garner v. Gray, 55 Wis. 2d 574, 589, 201 N.W.2d 163 (1972).  
97-1664-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
II. 
¶55 In X-Citement Video, the United States Supreme Court 
was required to interpret Title 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1988 ed. and 
Supp. V) which provided, in relevant part: 
 
(a) Any person who— 
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate 
or foreign commerce by any means including by computer 
or mails, any visual depiction, if— 
 
(A) 
the 
producing 
of such 
visual 
depiction 
involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct; and 
 
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; 
(2) 
knowingly 
receives, 
or 
distributes, 
any 
visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been 
shipped or transported 
in interstate 
or 
foreign 
commerce, or which contains materials which have been 
mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means 
including by computer, or knowingly reproduces any 
visual depiction for distribution in interstate or 
foreign commerce or through the mails, if— 
 
(A) 
the 
producing 
of such 
visual 
depiction 
involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct; and 
 
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; 
 
. . . . 
 
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of 
this section. (Emphasis added). 
 
¶56 The Court stated that "The critical determination 
which we 
must make is 
whether the 
term 
'knowingly' in 
subsections (1) and (2) modifies the phrase 'the use of a minor' 
in subsections (1)(A) and (2)(A)."  X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 
at 68.  The Court acknowledged that the most natural grammatical 
reading suggested that the term "knowingly" modified only the 
surrounding verbs:  transports, ships, receives, distributes, or 
97-1664-CR.dtp 
 
5 
reproduces.  "Under this construction," the Court admitted, "the 
word 'knowingly' would not modify the elements of the minority 
of the performers. . . ."  Id. (emphasis added).  However, the 
Court construed the statute to provide that linkage "because of 
the respective presumptions that some form of scienter is to be 
implied in a criminal statute even if not expressed, and that a 
statute is to be construed where fairly possible so as to avoid 
substantial constitutional questions."  Id. at 69 (emphasis 
added). 
¶57 Because "the age of the performers is the crucial 
element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct," id. 
at 73, the Court concluded that "the term 'knowingly' in § 2252 
extends both to the sexually explicit nature of the material and 
to the age of the performers."  Id. at 78 (emphasis added). 
¶58 X-Citement Video is the source of the constitutional 
determination that a defendant in certain prosecutions must know 
that the person in certain sexually explicit pictures is a 
child.  But X-Citement Video is also a model for how courts 
should 
interpret 
statutes 
to 
preserve 
them 
against 
constitutional attack. 
¶59 Another model is State v. Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d 530, 
468 N.W.2d 676 (1991).  In Petrone, this court was called upon 
to interpret Wis. Stat. § 940.203 (1987-88), the predecessor to 
§ 948.05, which is the very statute under scrutiny here.  The 
defendant 
was 
charged 
with 
violating 
§ 940.203(2), 
which 
provided: 
 
97-1664-CR.dtp 
 
6 
No person may photograph, film, videotape, record the 
sounds of or display in any way a child engaged in 
sexually explicit conduct. 
¶60 Section 940.203(2) 
did 
not 
expressly 
embody 
the 
element of scienter.  With that omission, subsection (2) was 
markedly different from subsections (1), (3), and (4) of the 
statute because each of those subsections contained the word 
"knowingly," whereas subsection (2) did not.  Hence, the 
subsection was described by the defendant as deliberately 
eliminating the constitutionally-required element of scienter.  
The state disagreed, contending that either the legislature 
intended scienter to be an element of the crime or the court 
will supply this deficiency in the statute to uphold its 
constitutionality.  Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d at 550-51. 
¶61 This court agreed, stating that, "The court has 
interpreted 
statutes 
to 
save 
them 
from 
being 
declared 
unconstitutional." Id. at 551-52 n.12, citing State ex rel. 
Chobot v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 61 Wis. 2d at 367. 
¶62 Then the court added:  "We agree with the parties that 
scienter is a constitutionally required element of the offense 
charged.  We need not decide for purposes of this case whether 
the legislature intended the statute to include the element of 
scienter or whether this court would read the element of 
scienter into the statute to enable the statute to pass 
constitutional muster."  Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d at 552. 
¶63 The most recent model for this court is the court of 
appeals decision in this case.  State v. Zarnke, 215 Wis. 2d 71, 
97-1664-CR.dtp 
 
7 
572 N.W.2d 491 (1997).  The court of appeals reviewed the 
arguments and stated: 
 
Scienter, or guilty knowledge, has always been an 
element 
of 
criminal 
sexual 
exploitation. 
 
More 
precisely, it has always been the legislature's intent 
to prevent conviction under § 948.05, STATS., of one 
who was reasonably ignorant of the actor's minority. 
Id. at 78. 
 
¶64 The court of appeals cited as authority for this 
statement a drafter's note in § 55 of 1987 Wis. Act 332, the 
section which created § 948.05. It wrote:  "The drafter's note 
states that the new law retains knowledge as an element of the 
crime.  It also notes that New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 
(1982), holds that criminal responsibility may not be imposed 
for the acts prohibited by the exploitation statute without some 
element of scienter on the part of the defendant."  Zarnke, 215 
Wis. 2d at 78.  This is the same note cited by this court in 
Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d at 551 n.11, where the court said,  "[A] 
recent recodification of sec. 940.203 suggests that scienter was 
always an element of the offense. . . .  The drafter's note to 
sec. 948.05 declares that the new law 'does retain' knowledge as 
an element of the crime, thereby implying that sec. 940.203 
included an element of scienter or knowledge."5 
                     
5 Following the decision of the court of appeals in Zarnke, 
the Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions Committee approved Wis 
JICriminal 2122 in April, 1998.  The jury instruction states: 
97-1664-CR.dtp 
 
8 
                                                                  
Sexual exploitation of a child, as defined in 
§ 948.05(1)(c) of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, is 
committed by one who distributes any undeveloped film, 
photographic negative, photograph, motion picture, 
videotape, sound recording or other reproduction of a 
child 
engaged 
in 
sexually explicit conduct 
with 
knowledge of the character and content of the sexually 
explicit conduct involving the child. 
Before you may find the defendant guilty of this 
offense, the State must prove by evidence which 
satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
following three elements are present. 
The first element requires that the defendant 
distributed 
any 
(undeveloped 
film) 
(photographic 
negative) (photograph) (motion picture) (videotape) 
(sound recording) (or other reproduction) of [a child] 
[ name of child ] engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct. 
[Consent by  (name of child)  is not a defense.] 
"Sexually 
explicit 
conduct" 
means 
actual 
or 
simulated 
(sexual 
intercourse) 
(bestiality) 
(masturbation) (sexual sadism or sexual masochistic 
abuse) (lewd exhibition of the genitals or pubic 
area). 
The second element requires that [the child]     
 [ (name of child) ] had not attained the age of 18 
years. 
The third element requires that the defendant 
knew that the child in the _______ was engaged in 
_______ and knew that the child had not attained the 
age of 18 years. 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant distributed any (undeveloped film) 
(photographic negative) (photograph) (motion picture) 
(videotape) (sound recording) (or other reproduction) 
of [a child] [ (name of child) ] engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct, that the defendant knew that the 
child was engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and 
knew that the child had not attained the age of 18 
years, you should find the defendant guilty. 
97-1664-CR.dtp 
 
9 
¶65 
To sum up, X-Citement Video, Petrone, and the court of 
appeals decision in Zarnke are three models for how this court 
should address the scienter issue in child pornography cases in 
the face of an arguably-deficient statute. 
III. 
¶66 This brings us to the matter at hand.  In 1988, the 
legislature recodified a number of statutes relating to crimes 
and civil offenses against children.  1987 Wisconsin Act 332.  
Section 940.203 from the 1987-88 session was repealed and 
recreated in a revised form as § 948.05.  The relevant parts of 
the new statute read as follows: 
 
948.05 Sexual exploitation of a child.  (1) Whoever 
does any of the following with knowledge of the 
character and content of the sexually explicit conduct 
involving the child is guilty of a Class C felony: 
 
 . . . 
 
(b) Photographs, films, videotapes, records the sounds 
of or displays in any way a child engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct. 
 
(c) Produces, performs in, profits from, promotes, 
imports into the state, reproduces, advertises, sells, 
distributes or possesses with intent to sell or 
distribute, 
any 
undeveloped 
film, 
photographic 
negative, photograph, motion picture, videotape, sound 
recording or other reproduction of a child engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct. . . . 
 
(3) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for 
violation of this section if the defendant had 
reasonable cause to believe that the child had 
attained the age of 18 years, and the child exhibited 
                                                                  
If you are not so satisfied, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. 
97-1664-CR.dtp 
 
10
to the defendant, or the defendant's agent or client, 
a draft card, driver's license, birth certificate or 
other 
official 
or 
apparently 
official 
document 
purporting to establish that the child had attained 
the age of 18 years.  A defendant who raises this 
affirmative defense has the burden of proving this 
defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 
¶67 The question is whether this overall statutory scheme 
permits § 948.05(1)(c) to be construed to require the state to 
prove that a defendant charged with distributing a photograph or 
other reproduction of a child engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct knew that the child had not attained the age of 18 
years.  I conclude that it does. 
A. 
¶68 In this case, the substance of the offense is the 
distribution of child pornography.  If pornography is obscene, 
it can be lawfully prosecuted under an obscenity statute.  If it 
is not obscene, it is illegal only when it involves the sexually 
explicit conduct of a child.  The same sexually explicit conduct 
involving an adult is not illegal because the adult cannot be 
viewed as an exploited victim.  In X-Citement Video, the Supreme 
Court declared that "[a]ge of minority in § 2252 indisputably 
possesses 
the 
same 
status 
as 
an 
elemental 
fact 
because 
nonobscene, sexually explicit materials involving persons over 
the age of 17 are protected by the First Amendment. . . .   
Therefore, the age of the performers is the crucial element 
separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct."  X-Citement 
Video, 513 U.S. at 72-73. 
97-1664-CR.dtp 
 
11
¶69 The legislature understood this analysis.  At the same 
time that § 948.05 was created, the legislature also created 
§ 948.12, which reads as follows: 
 
948.12 Possession of child pornography.  Whoever 
possesses any undeveloped film, photographic negative, 
photograph, 
motion 
picture, 
videotape 
or 
other 
pictorial reproduction of a child engaged in sexually 
explicit 
conduct 
under 
all 
of 
the 
following 
circumstances is guilty of a Class E felony: 
(1) The person knows that he or she possesses the 
material. 
(2) The person knows the character and content of the 
sexually explicit conduct shown in the material. 
(3) The person knows or reasonably should know that 
the child engaged in sexually explicit conduct has not 
attained the age of 18 years.  (Emphasis added) 
The Legislative Council Note following this section reads in 
part: 
 
Under the sexual exploitation of a child statute, as 
revised in this bill [s. 948.05], it is unlawful to be 
involved in the production or distribution of child 
pornography, but mere possession, without intent to 
sell or distribute, is not unlawful.  In recognition 
that pedophiles and other users of child pornography 
(the "fruits" of child sexual exploitation) often 
acquire, transfer and exchange these materials outside 
the commercial marketplace, in ways not fully covered 
by the child sexual exploitation statute, the new 
statute contains a total ban on the intentional 
possession of child pornography.  This prohibition 
against possession is intended to supplement the 
restrictions in the child sexual exploitation statute 
and thereby more effectively deter and penalize the 
sexual abuse of children than is possible under 
current law. 
 
Under the new statute, if the defendant knowingly 
possesses the pornographic material, with knowledge of 
its character and content and under circumstances in 
which the defendant knew or should have known that the 
child was younger than 18 years of age, the defendant 
97-1664-CR.dtp 
 
12
is guilty of a Class E felony.  Criminal intent, as an 
element of the crime, is indicated by the "knowledge" 
requirement.  Under the criminal code, knowledge 
requires only that the actor believes that a specified 
fact exists [s. 939.23(2)]. 
Legislative Council Note, 1987, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 948.05 (West 
1996). 
¶70 In § 948.12 – possession of child pornography – the 
legislature made it clear that knowledge "that the child engaged 
in sexually explicit conduct has not attained the age of 18 
years" is a fundamental element of the offense.  The note makes 
it clear that §§  948.12 and 948.05 should be read in pari 
materia.  That being so, it is very hard to imagine that the 
legislature intended that simple possession of child pornography 
- a Class E felony - requires knowledge of age but distribution 
of child pornography - a Class C felony - does not require 
knowledge of age.  Our legislature must have understood, as the 
Supreme 
Court 
observed 
in 
X-Citement 
Video, 
that 
"The 
opportunity 
for 
reasonable 
mistake 
as 
to 
age 
increases 
significantly once the victim is reduced to a visual depiction, 
unavailable for questioning by the distributor or receiver."  X-
Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72 n.2.  It is unreasonable to 
attribute to the legislature a desire to ensnare persons who 
lack guilty knowledge.  Therefore, the element of scienter as to 
age should be read into the statute not only to enable the 
statute to pass constitutional muster but also to reflect the 
intent of the legislature. 
B. 
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¶71 The majority argues that this scienter element cannot 
be read into this statute because of a note to § 948.05.  
Majority op. at 9 n.3, 20.  The note to § 948.05 states: 
 
NOTE: Revises the sexual exploitation of children 
statute [s. 940.203] to: . . . 
 
3. Eliminate the knowledge of the age of the child as 
an element of the crime of child sexual exploitation, 
which the prosecution has the burden of proving, and 
recognize, instead, an affirmative defense based on 
knowledge of the age of the child, which the defendant 
must raise and prove.  Under sub. (3), the defendant 
has a defense to criminal liability for violation of 
the statute, if he or she had reasonable cause to 
believe that the child victim of sexual exploitation 
was 18 years of age or older and the child exhibited 
to the defendant, or the defendant's agent or client, 
a draft card, driver's license, birth certificate or 
other 
official 
or 
apparently 
official 
document 
purporting to establish that the child had attained 
the age of 18 years.  As an affirmative defense, the 
defendant has the burden of raising the defense and of 
proving 
the 
defense 
by 
a 
preponderance 
of 
the 
evidence.  This affirmative defense is comparable to 
the affirmative defense recognized in the exposing a 
child to harmful material statute, as revised in s. 
948.11 of this bill. 
Legislative Council Note, 1987, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 948.05 (West 
1996). 
¶72 Several responses may be made to this argument.  
First, the note under § 948.05 is completely accurate in 
circumstances where a defendant is photographing, filming, 
videotaping, or recording the sounds of a child engaged in 
sexually explicit conduct.  It is accurate in other situations 
where the defendant has been in personal contact with the child 
and may reasonably be required to ascertain the victim's age.  
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14
This is clear after one examines the final sentence of the 
Legislative Council Note as provided above:  "This affirmative 
defense is comparable to the affirmative defense recognized in 
the exposing a child to harmful material statute, as revised in 
s. 948.11 of this bill."   
¶73 Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a) (1995-96) provides: 
 
Whoever, with knowledge of the nature of the material, 
sells, rents, exhibits, transfers or loans to a child 
any material which is harmful to children, with or 
without monetary consideration, is guilty of a Class E 
felony. 
A defendant charged with violating § 948.11 has the burden of 
proving, as an affirmative defense, that he or she "had 
reasonable cause to believe that the child had attained the age 
of 18 years."  Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(c).6 
¶74 In State v. Kevin L.C., 216 Wis. 2d 166, 576 N.W.2d 62 
(Ct. App. 1997), the court of appeals faced a constitutional 
challenge to § 948.11.  As in this case, the defendant argued 
that the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in X-Citement Video 
required that the court declare § 948.11 unconstitutional for 
lack of a scienter requirement regarding age.  Although the 
                     
6 Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(c) provides as follows: 
(c)  It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for a 
violation of this section if the defendant had reasonable cause 
to believe that the child had attained the age of 18 years, and 
the child exhibited to the defendant a draft card, driver's 
license, birth certificate or other official or apparently 
official document purporting to establish that the child had 
attained the age of 18 years.  A defendant who raises this 
affirmative defense has the burden of proving this defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  
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15
court of appeals acknowledged that § 948.11(2)(a) does not 
require the state to prove that a defendant knew that the person 
to whom harmful materials are exhibited or transferred is a 
child, the court recognized that an element of scienter is not 
necessary when a "perpetrator confronts the underage victim 
personally and may reasonably be required to ascertain that 
victim's age."  Kevin L.C., 216 Wis. 2d at 186-87, quoting X-
Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72 n.2.  The court of appeals thus 
held:  
 
Because 
§ 948.11(2)(a), 
Stats., 
criminalizes 
acts 
where an individual personally confronts, or has the 
opportunity to personally confront, a specific child, 
thereby allowing the individual to easily ascertain 
the child's age, we conclude that the statute does not 
create an unreasonable burden on the individual's 
First Amendment rights. 
 
¶75 The 
Legislative 
Council 
Note 
following 
§ 948.05 
provides that the affirmative defense in the statute is 
comparable to the affirmative defense provided for in § 948.11. 
 Kevin L.C. correctly concludes that § 948.11 only criminalizes 
acts where an individual personally confronts a child, thereby 
allowing the individual to easily ascertain the child's age.  
Therefore, the application of the Legislative Council Note 
following § 948.05 should be limited to situations where the 
defendant has been in personal contact with the child and may 
reasonably be required to ascertain the victim's age.  The note 
does not constrain the court's interpretation of the statute 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
statute's 
criminalization 
of 
the 
distribution of photographs or other reproductions of a child 
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16
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.  Limiting the application 
of the note to situations where it makes sense is very different 
from ignoring or repudiating the note.7 
¶76 Second, the court of appeals shrewdly observed that it 
"is absurd and unreasonable to view the statutory scheme as 
intending to create a defense that one could never successfully 
assert."  Zarnke, 215 Wis. 2d at 79.  This observation is based 
on the fact that the affirmative defense, to be successfully 
raised, must establish not only that there is "reasonable cause" 
to believe that the child has attained the age of 18 years but 
also that the child produced suitable documentary evidence of 
majority for the defendant.  An inanimate photograph or other 
reproduction of a child will not produce "a draft card, driver's 
license, birth certificate or other official or apparently 
official document" to deceive the defendant into believing that 
the child depicted is an adult.  When viewing a photograph, what 
you see is what you get. 
¶77 Third, a blanket application of the note under 
§ 948.05 cannot be reconciled with the note under § 948.12.  
Possession normally precedes distribution.  The legislature has 
deemed trafficking in child pornography a more serious offense 
                     
7 In relying on the note as a binding interpretation of the 
affirmative defense in the statute, the majority apparently 
believes that the legislature consciously eliminated knowledge 
of the age of the child as an element of the crime of importing 
"into the state . . . any . . . sound recording . . . of a child 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct. . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.05(1)(c).  That the legislature intended such a result is 
highly implausible.  
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17
than possessing child pornography.  It is counterintuitive to 
suppose that the more serious offense has intentionally been 
made easier to prove than the less serious offense. 
¶78 Finally, an overbroad note which is not an official 
component of a statute cannot nullify this court's duty if "at 
all possible" to construe a statute to find it in harmony with 
accepted constitutional principles.  Only statutory language can 
create the impossibility of reasonable construction. 
¶79 As I see it, our duty is to read into the statute the 
element of scienter as to age of the child and to construe 
§ 948.05(3), the affirmative defense, to apply only to those 
situations in which there has been or could have been personal 
contact between the defendant and the child.  Those are the 
situations in which the defendant will "raise" the defense.  I 
do not see that the statutory language creates the impossibility 
of reasonable construction. 
IV. 
¶80 Section 948.05(1) reads: 
 
Whoever does any of the following with knowledge of 
the character and content of the sexually explicit 
conduct involving the child is guilty of a Class C 
felony: . . .   
There can be no dispute that this statute has a knowledge 
requirement with respect to "the character and content of the 
sexually explicit conduct."   
¶81 The 
subject 
under 
discussion 
here 
is 
"sexually 
explicit conduct" involving a child.  The character and content 
of photographs or other reproductions depicting the sexually 
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18
explicit conduct of small children or prepubescent children is 
quite different from the character and content of photographs 
depicting the sexually explicit conduct of adults.  One cannot 
have "knowledge" of the character and content of kiddie porn 
without knowledge that the "kiddies" involved have not attained 
the age of 18 years.  Knowledge of minority is inherent in 
knowledge of the character and content of kiddie porn. 
¶82 By contrast, sexually explicit images of young persons 
16 or 17 years of age may be difficult to distinguish from 
images of young adults.  Consequently, it is natural to include 
knowledge of minority as an element of distributing kiddie porn, 
and it is imperative to include knowledge of minority as an 
element when dealing with pictures of post-pubescent children. 
¶83 The majority's sanitized opinion does not mention that 
the defendant here was arrested and charged with reproducing, 
distributing, or possessing with intent to sell or distribute 
images of young juveniles, described in the criminal complaint 
as "visually estimated to be between 5 and 7 years old, involved 
in sexually explicit poses/conduct."  The complaint alleges that 
the defendant admitted to a 17-year-old boy, to whom he 
allegedly showed the pictures, that he knew the juveniles in the 
sexually explicit pictures or images were as young as 5 to 7 
years old. 
¶84 No defendant should be convicted of distributing child 
pornography without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant knew the minority of the children in the sexually 
explicit material.  But no defendant should escape prosecution 
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because this court declined to save the statute by giving it a 
reasonable construction. 
 
 
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