Title: Nelson v. EBI Companies
Citation: 296 Or. 246, 674 P.2d 596
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: January 10, 1984

674 P.2d 596 (1984)
296 Or. 246
In the matter of the Compensation of Patricia R. NELSON, Claimant. Patricia R. Nelson, Petitioner On Review,
v.
EBI COMPANIES, Respondent On Review.
No. 81-1037; CA A25536; SC 29918.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted December 6, 1983.
Decided January 10, 1984.
*597 Richard W. Condon, Salem, argued the cause and filed the petition and brief for petitioner on review.
James N. Westwood, Portland, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the brief were Donald P. Bourgeois and Miller, Nash, Yerke, Wiener &amp; Hager, Portland.
Before PETERSON, C.J., and LENT, LINDE, CAMPBELL, CARSON and JONES, JJ.
JONES, Justice.
Claimant appealed from an order of the Workers' Compensation Board that reversed a referee's order awarding her 25 percent unscheduled permanent partial disability and reinstated a determination order awarding her only 5 percent unscheduled disability. The Board held that claimant's failure to continue a weight-loss program recommended by her physicians was keeping her from recovering from her injury as fully as she otherwise would and down-rated her degree of permanent partial disability accordingly. The Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the Board. Nelson v. EBI Companies, 64 Or. App. 16, 666 P.2d 1360 (1983). We allowed claimant's petition to review the issue of which party bears the burden of proving whether claimant unreasonably failed to follow needed medical advice or otherwise to mitigate damages.
The Court of Appeals set out the history and facts of this case as follows:
The Board reversed the referee and reinstated the Determination Order, concluding that, "although claimant made some effort to lose weight, considering all the factors, it was not a reasonable effort." In reaching its conclusion, the Board reasoned as follows:
The Board then applied these principles to the rating of disability of a compensable injury affected by obesity and concluded:
*599 The Court of Appeals addressed an analogous problem in Clemons v. Roseburg Lumber Co., 34 Or. App. 135, 137-38, 578 P.2d 429 (1978), and identified
The Court of Appeals stated in Clemons that the rationale for reduction of benefits when treatment is unreasonably refused is that an employer should not be held responsible for the full extent of a claimant's permanent disability if there is significant likelihood that such disability is partly attributable to the claimant's unreasonable rejection of appropriate treatment. We agree with the test set forth in Clemons, 34 Or. App. at 139, 578 P.2d 429, for determining whether a permanent disability award should be adjusted because of the claimant's refusal to submit to recommended treatment. The test is "reasonableness" in this context:
In the present case, the Board commented on the applicability of ORS 656.325(4), which provides:
The Board said:
ORS 656.325 does not directly apply to this case. However, it indicates that a claimant who has suffered personal injury has a duty to minimize his or her damages in workers' compensation cases. An unreasonable failure to follow needed medical advice is a form of lack of minimization.
In the common law injury case of Zimmerman v. Ausland, 266 Or. 427, 432, 513 P.2d 1167 (1973), this court said:
In workers' compensation cases, we believe the allocation of the burden of proving a claimant unreasonably failed to mitigate damages should follow the common law. We, therefore, hold the Board erred in concluding "where a case involves the rating of disability and the issue is raised, the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he or she did not unreasonably fail to follow the medical advice [of her physician]." The law allocates to the employer the burden of proof to persuade the trier of fact that the worker unreasonably failed to follow needed medical advice or otherwise to mitigate her damages.
The Court of Appeals found in this case
It appears to us that the Court of Appeals did make its finding upon the preponderance of the evidence. We affirm.