Title: Orgain v. Butler
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 970622
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 9, 1998

PRESENT: Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and Kinser, JJ., 
and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
JOHN BARBOUR ORGAIN, III 
 
v.  Record No. 970622 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
                                            January 9, 1998 
NORVELL ORGAIN BUTLER 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
 
Timothy J. Hauler, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal from a decree of sale entered in a partition 
suit, we consider whether the chancellor abused his discretion in 
ordering the property sold at public auction, rather than through 
a real estate broker as recommended by the commissioner in 
chancery. 
 
John Barbour Orgain, III, and Norvell Orgain Butler are 
siblings who own as tenants in common a 40-acre tract of land 
located in Chesterfield County (the property).  Butler filed a 
bill of complaint seeking partition or sale of the property, and 
the chancellor referred the case to a commissioner in chancery. 
 
Based on an appraisal received in evidence, the commissioner 
determined that the fair market value of the property is 
$803,000.  The commissioner also found that the property is 
unique in nature because it is one of the last large undeveloped 
parcels on Huguenot Road in Chesterfield County.  The 
commissioner noted that neither party had offered to purchase the 
other party's interest in the property. 
 
Orgain and Butler rejected two private offers to purchase 
the property.  One offer was in the amount of the appraised 
value.  The other offer, in the amount of $1,200,000, was 
acceptable to Butler but was rejected by Orgain because of 
certain attached conditions.  After reviewing all the evidence, 
the commissioner filed a report recommending "that since the 
property . . . is unique in . . . nature, it should be publicly 
marketed through a reputable commercial real estate brokerage 
firm agreed to by the parties."  Neither party filed exceptions 
to the commissioner's report.   
 
The record does not show that any evidence was taken before 
the chancellor.  After the chancellor heard argument of counsel 
concerning the commissioner's report, he rejected the 
commissioner's recommendation that the property be sold 
privately.  The chancellor noted that the parties already had 
refused two private offers, and he ruled that a public auction 
was "the only alternative," due to the "likelihood that the 
parties will be unable to agree upon any price or method for 
conducting a private sale." 
 
On appeal, Orgain argues that there was no evidence to 
support the chancellor's conclusion that the parties could not 
agree on the method and terms for a private sale of the property. 
 Orgain further contends that the chancellor improperly rejected 
the commissioner's report, since the chancellor did not find that 
the report was unsupported by the evidence.  Finally, Orgain 
asserts that the chancellor's ruling is contrary to the parties' 
best interests. 
 
In response, Butler argues that the chancellor did not abuse 
his discretion in ordering the property sold at public auction.  
Butler contends that the commissioner's recommendation was merely 
advisory and that once the chancellor concluded that an agreement 
between the parties was unlikely, "it was absolutely within the 
[chancellor's] discretion to order the public sale."  We disagree 
with Butler's arguments. 
 
Although the report of a commissioner in chancery does not 
carry the weight of a jury verdict, Code § 8.01-610, the report 
should be sustained unless the chancellor concludes that the 
commissioner's findings are not supported by the evidence.  
Yeskolski v. Crosby, 253 Va. 148, 152, 480 S.E.2d 474, 476 
(1997); Hill v. Hill, 227 Va. 569, 576-77, 318 S.E.2d 292, 296 
(1984).  This rule applies with particular force to findings of 
fact that are based on evidence taken in the commissioner's 
presence, but does not apply to pure conclusions of law contained 
in the commissioner's report.  Morris v. United Virginia Bank, 
237 Va. 331, 337-38, 377 S.E.2d 611, 614 (1989); Hill, 227 Va. at 
577, 318 S.E.2d at 296. 
 
Code § 8.01-610 gives the chancellor substantial discretion 
in the manner of reviewing the commissioner's report.  While the 
recommendations of the commissioner are merely advisory, Hill, 
227 Va. at 579, 318 S.E.2d at 298, the statute does not allow the 
chancellor to ignore the commissioner's report or portions 
thereof.  Gulfstream Bldg. Assocs. v. Britt, 239 Va. 178, 185, 
387 S.E.2d 488, 492 (1990).  The chancellor is required to 
consider the commissioner's factual findings.  See id.; 
Yeskolski, 253 Va. at 152-53, 480 S.E.2d at 476; Hill, 227 Va. at 
576-77, 318 S.E.2d at 296.  When the chancellor has disapproved 
the commissioner's findings, we must review the evidence and 
determine whether, under a correct application of the law, the 
evidence supports the commissioner's findings or the conclusions 
of the chancellor.  See Firebaugh v. Hanback, 247 Va. 519, 525, 
443 S.E.2d 134, 137 (1994); Morris, 237 Va. at 338, 377 S.E.2d at 
614.   
 
In a partition suit, when partition of the subject property 
cannot be conveniently made, the chancellor may order a sale of 
the entire property if such sale will promote the interests of 
the parties who are entitled to the subject property or its 
proceeds.  Code § 8.01-83; Shannon v. Hall, 235 Va. 360, 364, 368 
S.E.2d 695, 698 (1988); Sensabaugh v. Sensabaugh, 232 Va. 250, 
258, 349 S.E.2d 141, 146 (1986).  A sale of property in a 
partition proceeding must be made in a manner that will bring the 
best price obtainable.  Austin v. Dobbins, 219 Va. 930, 934, 252 
S.E.2d 588, 591 (1979); see Schweitzer v. Stroh, 182 Va. 842, 
848, 30 S.E.2d 689, 692 (1944); Federal Land Bank v. Parks, 170 
Va. 240, 242, 196 S.E. 627, 628 (1938).  Thus, in the present 
case, the chancellor was required to order such method of sale as 
would obtain the highest price for the property, unless the 
evidence showed that the parties' conduct or other circumstances 
made use of that method unachievable. 
 
The commissioner's recommendation, that the highest price 
for the property could only be obtained through public marketing 
by a real estate broker, was based entirely on his factual 
finding that the property was unique in nature because of its 
size and location.  The record does not show that the chancellor 
considered this factual finding.  Moreover, the record contains 
no evidence to support the chancellor's conclusion that the 
parties likely would be "unable to agree on any price or method 
for conducting a private sale."  The record shows only that the 
chancellor assumed that the parties would be unable to agree on 
the method and terms of a private sale because they had not 
reached an agreement on any other matter during the course of the 
proceedings.   
 
The chancellor reached this conclusion despite his 
acknowledgement that the method of sale recommended by the 
commissioner would be the most advantageous to the parties.  
Thus, the chancellor abused his discretion because he ordered a 
sale at public auction in the absence of any evidence that the 
parties' interests would be promoted by this method of sale, or 
that the parties were unable to agree on terms for listing the 
property through a licensed real estate broker. 
 
Since the evidence does not support the chancellor's 
conclusions, we will reverse the chancellor's decree, enter final 
judgment here confirming the commissioner's report, and remand 
the case to the chancellor for further proceedings. 
                                                  Reversed,
 
final judgment,
                                                  and remanded.