Title: P. v Wilkinson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S111028
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 29, 2004

Filed 7/29/04 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
S111028 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
) 
Ct.App. 2/1 No. B145982 
 
 
) 
JALEH WILKINSON, 
) 
County of Los Angeles 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SA 035468 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
) 
In re 
 
) 
 
 
) 
          JALEH WILKINSON 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/1 No. B154520 
 
On Habeas Corpus 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Defendant Jaleh Wilkinson was convicted at trial of the offenses of battery 
on a custodial officer, driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, and failing 
to stop at the scene of an accident.  The Court of Appeal reversed defendant’s 
convictions on two unrelated grounds, concluding that (1) the statutory scheme 
pertaining to battery on a custodial officer violates equal protection principles 
because the statutes allow battery on a custodial officer without injury to be 
punished more severely than battery on a custodial officer with injury, and (2) the 
trial court erred in denying defendant a hearing, pursuant to the Kelly/Frye 
doctrine (People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24; Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir. 
1923) 293 F. 1013), regarding the admissibility of polygraph evidence to support 
 
2
defendant’s claim that her commission of the charged offenses resulted from her 
unknowing and involuntary ingestion of drugs. We granted review to consider the 
Court of Appeal’s resolution of both issues. 
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that (1) the statutory 
provisions pertaining to battery on a custodial officer do not violate the equal 
protection clause of the state or federal Constitution, and (2) in light of the 
categorical prohibition on the admission of polygraph evidence in Penal Code 
section 351.1, the trial court did not err in declining to hold a Kelly/Frye hearing 
regarding the evidence proffered by defendant.  Accordingly, we shall reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal.   
I 
Defendant was charged by information with the offenses of battery on a 
custodial officer (Pen. Code, § 243.1), a felony, and with driving a vehicle under 
the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) and failing to stop at the 
scene of an accident (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)), both misdemeanors.  At trial, 
the prosecution presented evidence that, in the early morning hours of 
February 27, 1999, a motorist observed defendant driving erratically on a street in 
the City of Santa Monica.  Defendant’s vehicle crossed over the center divider, 
struck a parked car, and continued down the street, swerving between lanes.  
Defendant eventually stopped her car at a curb and placed her head on the front 
passenger seat.  After the motorist telephoned the police, officers responded and 
tapped on the window of defendant’s parked car, whereupon defendant looked at 
one of the officers and drove off.  The police gave chase for three blocks before 
defendant stopped.  Defendant, who smelled strongly of alcohol and exhibited 
slurred speech, indicated she had consumed some drinks but not many.  She could 
not complete a field sobriety test and did not respond when told she was required 
to submit to a blood or breath test for alcohol.   
 
3
Officers transported defendant to the police station.  She was belligerent 
during booking and resisted a patsearch.  At one point, defendant grabbed a 
custodial officer’s arm with both hands, causing a visible welt.  When taken to a 
holding cell, defendant charged at an officer and yelled, kicked, and banged at the 
door.  After the police reminded defendant that she would have to submit to a 
blood or breath test, defendant covered her ears, stated “I can’t hear you,” and 
began running around inside the cell.  An officer testified defendant appeared to be 
under the influence of alcohol but not of drugs.   
Defendant testified in her own defense as follows.  On the night in 
question, defendant, a bank vice-president, went to a bar, where she met a man 
who offered to buy her a drink.  She accepted and eventually consumed two 
glasses of wine.  The man invited defendant to dinner, and they agreed to meet at a 
Santa Monica restaurant.  At the restaurant, defendant consumed three alcoholic 
beverages over the course of three hours while she waited for the man, but he 
never arrived.  She left her drink several times to use the restroom and to smoke a 
cigarette outside.  She eventually left the restaurant, driving away without feeling 
any signs of intoxication.  The next thing she remembered was waking up in jail, 
with no recollection of her encounter with the officers.  After her release from 
custody, defendant filed a police complaint alleging she had been drugged.   
A toxicologist, testifying on behalf of the defense, expressed the opinion 
that on the night in question defendant was under the influence of alcohol and 
gamma hydroxy butyrate (hereafter GHB), commonly known as a “date rape” 
drug, basing his opinion on a review of the police report and a videotape of 
defendant’s conduct in the holding cell.  GHB depresses the nervous system, 
exaggerates the effects of alcohol, and may cause drowsiness and memory loss.  
Depending upon a person’s personality, the drug may make a person more 
emotional and combative.  The toxicologist also suggested that if defendant was 
 
4
not under the influence of GHB, she must have been visibly drunk when she left 
the restaurant in order for her to exhibit the effects of intoxication so long after her 
last drink.  A City of Concord police officer, testifying for the defense as a drug 
recognition expert, stated  that defendant’s symptoms appeared much more severe 
than what would be expected of someone who had consumed five alcoholic drinks 
over the course of several hours.   
Prior to trial, defendant sought admission of evidence establishing that she 
had submitted to a polygraph examination and that, in the opinion of the polygraph 
examiner, she had “passed” the exam, responding truthfully (in the negative) to 
queries regarding whether she knowingly consumed more than five drinks on the 
night in question, knowingly ingested GHB or any other drug, or knowingly 
attacked an officer in a detention cell.  Defendant requested a Kelly/Frye hearing, 
making an offer of proof that the polygraph examination technique employed by 
the examiner had been generally accepted in the scientific community and that the 
examiner employed proper procedures in administering the test.  The trial court 
declined to hold an evidentiary hearing, citing Penal Code section 351.1.   
The jury convicted defendant as charged, and the trial court placed 
defendant on formal probation for three years.  The Court of Appeal reversed 
defendant’s convictions, determining by a two-to-one vote that the statutory 
scheme pertaining to battery on a custodial officer violates equal protection 
principles, and unanimously concluding that the trial court erred by failing to hold 
a Kelly/Frye hearing regarding the admissibility of defendant’s proffered 
polygraph evidence.  We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review as to 
both issues.1   
                                                          
 
1  
Defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the Court of 
Appeal considered concurrently with her appeal.  She claimed in that petition that 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
5
II 
A 
Defendant was convicted of violating Penal Code section 243.1,2 which 
states in full:  “When a battery is committed against the person of a custodial 
officer as defined in Section 831 of the Penal Code, and the person committing the 
offense knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a custodial officer 
engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and the custodial officer is 
engaged in the performance of his or her duties, the offense shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison.”  Section 831, subdivision (a), in turn, defines a 
“custodial officer” as “a public officer, not a peace officer, employed by a law 
enforcement agency of a city or county who has the authority and responsibility 
for maintaining custody of prisoners and performs tasks related to the operation of 
a local detention facility used for the detention of persons usually pending 
arraignment or upon court order either for their own safekeeping or for the specific 
purpose of serving a sentence therein.”  Because section 243.1 provides for a 
punishment of imprisonment in state prison, but does not otherwise specify the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by counseling her to reject a plea 
agreement that would have allowed her to plead guilty to two misdemeanor counts 
and serve no jail time, by rejecting a plea offer without consulting defendant, and 
by misinforming her regarding the admissibility of evidence.  Defendant declared 
she faced deportation to Iran as a result of her felony conviction.  The Court of 
Appeal issued an order to show cause in the habeas corpus matter, returnable 
before the trial court.  Because no issue has been presented here regarding 
defendant’s habeas corpus claims, we do not address them.   
2  
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated.   
 
Because section 243.1 was amended without substantive change after the 
commission of the present offenses, we consider the current version of that statute. 
 
6
term of imprisonment, under section 18 the offense is punishable “by 
imprisonment in any of the state prisons for 16 months, or two or three years . . . .” 
At the time section 243.1 was enacted in 1976, section 243 prescribed the 
punishment (1) for simple battery (which section 243 made punishable as a 
misdemeanor), (2) for battery against a person who the defendant knew or should 
have known was a “peace officer or fireman engaged in the performance of his 
duties” (which section 243 made punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor, 
commonly known as a “wobbler”), and (3) for battery resulting in the infliction of 
“serious bodily injury” (which section 243 also made punishable as a wobbler, 
prescribing a punishment of two, three, or four years’ imprisonment for a felony 
violation).3  (Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, § 150.5, pp. 5104-5105.) 
In 1981, the Legislature divided section 243 into subdivisions, with 
subdivision (a) covering simple battery  (punishable as a misdemeanor with a 
maximum jail sentence of six months), subdivision (b) covering battery on a 
person who the defendant knows or should know is a peace officer, firefighter, etc. 
                                                          
 
3  
Section 243 then stated in relevant part:  “A battery is punishable by fine of 
not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail 
not exceeding six months, or by both.  When it is committed against the person of 
a peace officer or fireman, and the person committing the offense knows or 
reasonably should know that such victim is a peace officer or fireman engaged in 
the performance of his duties, and such peace officer or fireman is engaged in the 
performance of his duties, the offense shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
county jail not exceeding one year or by imprisonment in the state prison.  When it 
is committed against a person and serious bodily injury is inflicted on such person, 
the offense shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not 
more than one year or imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four 
years.”  (Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, §150.5, p. 5104.)  Section 243 later was amended 
to provide expressly that a felony violation involving a peace officer or fireman 
could be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months or two or 
three years.  (Stats. 1980, ch. 1340, §2.2, p. 4719.)   
 
7
(punishable as a misdemeanor with a maximum jail sentence of one year), 
subdivision (c) covering battery on a peace officer, firefighter, etc., that results in 
the infliction of injury (a wobbler with a possible state prison term of 16 months, 
two years, or three years), and subdivision (d) covering battery that results in 
serious bodily injury (a wobbler with a possible prison term of two, three, or four 
years).  (Stats. 1981, ch. 678, § 2, pp. 2476-2477.)  The following year, in 1982, 
the Legislature added a reference to custodial officers to subdivisions (b) and (c) 
of section 243, defining custodial officers by reference to section 831.  (Stats. 
1982, ch. 1353, § 2, pp. 5048-5050; see current § 243, subd. (f)(6).)  Thus, as 
amended in 1982, section 243, subdivision (b), provided that battery on a person 
who the defendant knows or reasonably should know is a custodial officer is 
punishable as a misdemeanor with a maximum imprisonment of one year in 
county jail, and section 243, subdivision (c), provided that when such a battery 
results in injury to the custodial officer, the offense is punishable as a wobbler 
with possible imprisonment in state prison for 16 months, two years, or three 
years.  Although the Legislature subsequently designated former section 243, 
subdivision (c), as current section 243, subdivision (c)(1) (with section 243, 
subdivision (c)(2), now covering battery on a peace officer or security guard with 
injury), the scheme of section 243 with respect to battery on a custodial officer has 
not been substantively changed since 1982.4   
                                                          
 
4  
Section 243, like section 243.1, was amended without substantive change 
subsequent to the commission of the present offenses.  In its current form, section 
243, subdivision (b) provides in full:  “When a battery is committed against the 
person of a peace officer, custodial officer, firefighter, emergency medical 
technician, lifeguard, process server, traffic officer, code enforcement officer, or 
animal control officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties, whether on 
or off duty, including when the peace officer is in a police uniform and is 
concurrently performing the duties required of him or her as a peace officer while 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
8
                                                                                                                                                                             
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
also employed in a private capacity as a part-time or casual private security guard 
or patrolman, or a nonsworn employee of a probation department engaged in the 
performance of his or her duties, whether on or off duty, or a physician or nurse 
engaged in rendering emergency medical care outside a hospital, clinic, or other 
health care facility, and the person committing the offense knows or reasonably 
should know that the victim is a peace officer, custodial officer, firefighter, 
emergency medical technician, lifeguard, process server, traffic officer, code 
enforcement officer, or animal control officer engaged in the performance of his or 
her duties, nonsworn employee of a probation department, or a physician or nurse 
engaged in rendering emergency medical care, the battery is punishable by a fine 
not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail 
not exceeding one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.”   
 
Section 243, subdivision (c)(1) currently provides:  “When a battery is 
committed against a custodial officer, firefighter, emergency medical technician, 
lifeguard, process server, traffic officer, or animal control officer engaged in the 
performance of his or her duties, whether on or off duty, or a nonsworn employee 
of a probation department engaged in the performance of his or her duties, whether 
on or off duty, or a physician or nurse engaged in rendering emergency medical 
care outside a hospital, clinic, or other health care facility, and the person 
committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a 
nonsworn employee of a probation department, custodial officer, firefighter, 
emergency medical technician, lifeguard, process server, traffic officer, or animal 
control officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties, or a physician or 
nurse engaged in rendering emergency medical care, and an injury is inflicted on 
that victim, the battery is punishable by a fine of not more than two thousand 
dollars ($2,000), by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by 
both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 
months, or two or three years.”  “Injury” is defined as “any physical injury which 
requires professional medical treatment.”  (§ 243, subd. (f)(5).)   
 
Section 243, subdivision (d) currently provides:  “When a battery is 
committed against any person and serious bodily injury is inflicted on the person, 
the battery is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year 
or imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years.”  “Serious bodily 
injury,” for purposes of this provision, is defined as “a serious impairment of 
physical condition, including, but not limited to, the following:  loss of 
consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted loss or impairment of 
function of any bodily member or organ; a wound requiring extensive suturing; 
and serious disfigurement.”  (§ 243, subd. (f)(4).)   
 
9
B 
On appeal, defendant contended in relevant part that the current statutory 
scheme pertaining to battery on a custodial officer is “irrational” and violates the 
federal and state guarantees of equal protection because one who commits the 
“lesser” offense of battery on a custodial officer without injury can receive felony 
punishment under section 243.1 while a person committing the “greater” offense 
of battery on a custodial officer with injury can be convicted of a wobbler offense 
under section 243, subdivision (c)(1) and can receive a misdemeanor sentence.   
A majority of the Court of Appeal below agreed with defendant, reasoning:  
“If the battery on custodial officer statutes included only two options, a straight 
felony under section 243.1 or a straight misdemeanor under section 243, 
subdivision (b), both of which have identical elements, prosecutorial discretion to 
choose different punishment between offenders engaging in similar conduct would 
not violate equal protection . . . .  [¶]  What is troubling about our scheme, 
however, is its inclusion of a third charging option, the wobbler under section 243, 
subdivision (c)(1), which contains the additional requirement of infliction of an 
injury. . . .  This third option raises the specter of complete irrationality in the 
scheme, because the more serious offense of battering a custodial officer with 
injury could be punished less seriously (an alternative felony/misdemeanor) than 
battering a custodial officer without injury (a straight felony under section 243.1).”  
Because the “greater” offense can be punished less severely, the majority found 
the scheme “is not even rationally related to a scheme which would give 
prosecutors the entire range of punishments” and “encourages arbitrary, irrational 
charging” because prosecutors have an incentive to prove the “lesser” offense in 
order to obtain the greater punishment.   
The dissent found no equal protection violation, questioning whether there 
is substantial evidence that the custodial officer here suffered an “injury” so as to 
 
10
allow a wobbler charge under section 243, subdivision (c)(1).  The dissent also 
questioned whether a battery without injury necessarily was a less serious offense 
than battery with injury such that greater punishment for the former offense could 
not be imposed without violating equal protection principles.   
C 
We begin our discussion with an overview of relevant case authority.  
Although the precise issue before us has not previously been addressed, at least 
two cases have discussed the legislative history surrounding the statutory scheme 
pertaining to battery on a custodial officer.  In In re Rochelle B. (1996) 49 
Cal.App.4th 1212, the juvenile court sustained a wardship petition, finding true the 
allegation that the minor committed battery on a custodial officer under section 
243.1.  The minor challenged the finding on appeal, contending that a juvenile 
probation counselor was not a “custodial officer” within the meaning of sections 
831 and 243.1.  The Court of Appeal described in detail the legislative history of 
section 243.1, as well as the inclusion of “custodial officers” within section 243.  
The court observed:  “A report of the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice 
suggested the bill ‘should be amended to delete Section 243.1 of the Penal Code 
which is a special section referring only to custodial officers,’ apparently to avoid 
the resulting duplication in provisions setting out aggravated penalties for batteries 
against ‘custodial officers.’  [Citation.]  This suggestion was evidently ignored, 
with the result that two separate statutes now provide somewhat different 
punishments for batteries against custodial officers.”  (In re Rochelle B., supra, 49 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1217, fn. omitted.)   
In People v. Chenze (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 521, 525 (Chenze), the 
defendant contended that he was improperly charged and convicted under section 
243.1 because that provision had been “impliedly repealed” when the Legislature 
amended section 243 to include references to custodial officers.  The defendant 
 
11
urged that the two statutes were in “irreconcilable conflict” since “[t]he older 
statute, section 243.1, provides that any battery against a custodial officer is a 
felony,” whereas “the more recent statute [i.e., section 243, subdivision (c)(1)] 
permits felony treatment only if injury is inflicted.”  (Chenze, supra, 97 
Cal.App.4th at p. 526.)   
The Court of Appeal in Chenze disagreed that the two statutes were in 
irreconcilable conflict and thus rejected the claim of implied repeal.  The court 
cited an enrolled bill report prepared by the California Youth and Adult 
Correctional Agency, which explained the need for an amendment to section 243 
to include references to custodial officers notwithstanding the existence of section 
243.1:  “ ‘According to the bill’s sponsors, simple battery charges against 
custodial officers are rarely pursued by local prosecutors because the present law 
only provides for felony charges with imprisonment in a state prison.  Thus, these 
violators are rarely, if ever, punished.  [¶]  By providing for the option of county 
jail and/or fine for such violations, proponents hope that simple battery charges 
will be prosecuted more vigorously.  Felony battery charges can still be pursued 
for the more serious cases.’  [Citation.]”  (Chenze, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 
527.)  In light of this legislative history, the court in Chenze rejected the 
defendant’s claim of irreconcilable conflict, reasoning:  “In view of the fact that 
the Legislature amended section 243 to include custodial officers when it was 
aware of section 243.1, it is apparent the Legislature intended to give prosecutors a 
full panoply of prosecutorial options for a battery on a custodial officer.  Under 
section 243, the offense may be punished as a misdemeanor (§ 243, subd. (b)), or a 
misdemeanor or felony if injury is inflicted (§ 243, subd. (c)(1)).  But the 
Legislature also apparently envisioned that there might be circumstances under 
which no or only slight injury was inflicted, but felony charges would nonetheless 
still be appropriate.  Accordingly, it did not repeal section 243.1, and has very 
 
12
recently amended it.”  (Ibid.)  Although the defendant in Chenze pointed out that 
under section 243.1 all batteries on custodial officers are punished as felonies 
while under section 243, subdivision (c)(1), only batteries involving injury may be 
so punished, the Court of Appeal observed that “‘[i]t is axiomatic the Legislature 
may criminalize the same conduct in different ways . . . ’” and the “prosecutor has 
discretion to proceed under either of two statutes that proscribe the same conduct, 
but which prescribe different penalties.  (United States v. Batchelder (1979) 442 
U.S. 114, 123-125 [99 S.Ct. 2198, 2203-2205, 60 L.Ed.2d 755] [(Batchelder)]”  
(Chenze, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 528.)   
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Batchelder, supra, 442 U.S. 
114, cited in Chenze, concluded that the defendant properly could be sentenced 
under one federal firearms statute, although an almost identical statute prescribed a 
lesser punishment.  In Batchelder, the court took note of legislative history 
indicating that Congress “intended to enact two independent gun control statutes, 
each fully enforceable on its own terms . . . .”  (Batchelder, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 
119.)  The court in Batchelder then stated that “[t]his Court has long recognized 
that when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may 
prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of 
defendants” (id. at pp. 123-124).  The high court concluded that the statutory 
scheme at issue fell under this rule:  “[T]here is no appreciable difference between 
the discretion a prosecutor exercises when deciding whether to charge under one 
of two statutes with different elements and the discretion he exercises when 
choosing one of two statutes with identical elements.  In the former situation, once 
he determines that the proof will support conviction under either statute, his 
decision is indistinguishable from the one he faces in the latter context.  The 
prosecutor may be influenced by the penalties available upon conviction, but this 
 
13
fact, standing alone, does not give rise to a violation of the Equal Protection or 
Due Process Clause.”  (Id. at p. 125.)   
We recently applied Batchelder in Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 537 (Manduley), in rejecting an equal protection challenge to Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d)) as amended by Proposition 21.  In 
relevant part, section 707, subdivision (d) was amended to expand the 
circumstances under which the prosecution may file criminal charges directly in 
adult court without first filing a wardship petition in the juvenile court and having 
that court conduct a fitness hearing to determine whether the matter should remain 
in juvenile court.  The minors alleged that the amended provision violated equal 
protection principles because “minors of the same age and charged with the same 
crime under the circumstances enumerated in section 707 [subdivision (d)] are 
subject either to the juvenile court law or to the criminal justice system, based 
solely upon a prosecutorial decision that is unguided by any statutory standards.”  
(Manduley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 567.)   
In Manduley we rejected this claim, reasoning in part:  “[A]ll minors who 
meet the criteria enumerated in [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 707 
[, subdivision] (d) equally are subject to the prosecutor’s discretion whether to file 
charges in criminal court.  Any unequal treatment of such minors who commit the 
same crime under similar circumstances results solely from the decisions of 
individual prosecutors whether to file against particular minors a petition in 
juvenile court or instead an accusatory pleading in criminal court.  Although, as 
petitioners assert, a prosecutor’s decision in this regard can result in important 
consequences to the accused minor, so does a decision by a prosecutor to initiate 
criminal charges against any individual, including an adult.”  (Manduley, supra, 
27 Cal.4th at p. 568.)  We explained in Manduley that “petitioners cannot establish 
a violation of their right to the equal protection of the laws by showing that other 
 
14
minors in circumstances similar to those of petitioners can be prosecuted under the 
juvenile court law” (id. at p. 570), likening a prosecutor’s discretion to file adult 
criminal charges (instead of a juvenile court petition) to a prosecutor’s discretion 
to bring charges under statutes proscribing similar conduct but with differing 
penalties (see id. at pp. 569-570).  Accordingly, our decision in Manduley 
concluded that the “prosecutor’s discretion to select those statutorily eligible cases 
in which to seek a criminal disposition against a minor — based upon permissible 
factors such as the circumstances of the crime, the background of the minor, or a 
desire to show leniency, for example — does not violate the equal protection 
clause.”  (Id. at p. 571.)   
D 
The Attorney General contends the statutory scheme before us does not 
violate equal protection principles because all persons who commit battery on a 
custodial officer are subject to the same statutory scheme and are not treated 
differently.  He asserts that any possible disparate treatment results from charging 
decisions of prosecutors that, under Batchelder and Manduley, do not violate equal 
protection principles.  The Attorney General further argues that in resolving the 
equal protection issue, we should conduct so-called rational basis review and find 
that there exists a rational basis for the statutory scheme at issue.   
Defendant argues, in contrast, that so-called strict scrutiny should apply to 
the equal protection question at issue, because the present classification involves 
the “fundamental interest” of the “right to liberty.”  Further, defendant contends 
that even assuming that rational basis review applies, the Court of Appeal majority 
properly concluded that the statutory scheme before the court was irrational 
because it allows one who commits the “greater” offense (battery on a custodial 
officer with injury) to be punished less severely than one who commits the 
“lesser” offense (battery on a custodial officer without injury).   
 
15
It is a fundamental principle that, “[t]o succeed on [a] claim under the equal 
protection clause, [a defendant] first must show that the state has adopted a 
classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal 
manner.”  (Manduley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 568; In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 
522, 530.)  “In considering whether state legislation violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . we apply different levels of scrutiny to 
different types of classifications.  At a minimum, a statutory classification must be 
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.  [Citations.]  
Classifications based on race or national origin . . . and classifications affecting 
fundamental rights . . . are given the most exacting scrutiny.  Between these 
extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate 
scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based 
on sex or illegitimacy.  [Citations.]”  (Clark v. Jeter (1988) 486 U.S. 456, 461; see 
also Manduley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 571 [“equal protection provisions in the 
California Constitution ‘have been generally thought . . . to be substantially 
equivalent of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.’ ”  (Fn. Omitted.)].)   
Defendant relies upon People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236 and its 
progeny for her claim that the strict scrutiny standard applies in the situation 
before us.  The court in Olivas considered an equal protection challenge to a 
statute that granted a trial court discretion to commit a defendant who was 
convicted in an adult criminal prosecution, and was between 16 and 21 years of 
age, to the California Youth Authority for a term longer than he or she would have 
received had the defendant been sentenced as an adult.  Concluding that “personal 
liberty” constitutes a fundamental right that triggers application of the strict 
scrutiny standard, Olivas stated:  “No reason has been suggested, nor can we 
conceive of any, why the concern for personal liberty implicit in both the 
 
16
California and federal Constitutions is any less compelling in defendant’s case.  
We believe that those charters are no less vigilant in protecting against continuing 
deprivations of liberty than are their due process clauses in protecting against the 
initial deprivation of that liberty.  We conclude that personal liberty is a 
fundamental interest, second only to life itself, as an interest protected under both 
the California and United States Constitutions.”  (Id. at pp. 250-251; see also 
People v. Jacobs (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 797, 800-801 [following Olivas and 
applying strict scrutiny to an equal protection challenge to a prior-prison-term 
enhancement statute]; People v. Gonzalez (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 274, 277 [citing 
Olivas for the proposition that “[c]lassifications which deal with restraints upon 
personal liberty are subject to the strict scrutiny test applicable to equal protection 
of fundamental interests.”].) 
The language in Olivas could be interpreted to require application of the 
strict scrutiny standard whenever one challenges upon equal protection grounds a 
penal statute or statutes that authorize different sentences for comparable crimes, 
because such statutes always implicate the right to “personal liberty” of the 
affected individuals.  Nevertheless, Olivas properly has not been read so broadly.  
As the court observed in People v. Davis (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 250:  “It appears 
. . . that the Olivas court did not want to increase substantially the degree of 
judicial supervision of the Legislature’s criminal justice policies.  Such a highly 
intrusive judicial reexamination of legislative classifications is not merited by a 
close reading of Olivas.  There is language in the Olivas opinion that emphasizes 
the narrowness of the holding.  For instance, the court noted that [the statute in 
question] was constitutionally infirm because persons committed under the statute 
had been ‘prosecuted as adults, adjudged by the same standards which apply to 
any competent adult, and convicted as adults in adult courts.’  (17 Cal.3d at 
pp. 242-243.)  This language requires only that the boundaries between the adult 
 
17
and juvenile criminal justice systems be rigorously maintained.  We do not read 
Olivas as requiring the courts to subject all criminal classifications to strict 
scrutiny requiring the showing of a compelling state interest therefor.”  (Davis, 
supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 258.)  Other courts similarly have concluded that a 
broad reading of Olivas, as advocated by defendant here, would “intrude[] too 
heavily on the police power and the Legislature’s prerogative to set criminal 
justice policy.”  (People v. Bell (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1049; see People v. 
Owens (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 798, 802 [“California courts have never accepted 
the general proposition that ‘all criminal laws, because they may result in a 
defendant’s incarceration, are perforce subject to strict judicial scrutiny,’ ” quoting 
People v. Silva (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1167]; People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 
Cal.App.4th 783, 796 [“Determining gradations of culpability . . . does not 
implicate the strict scrutiny test for equal protection purposes.”].)   
We find the rational basis test applicable here.  Defendant contends that the 
statutory scheme regarding battery on a custodial officer violates equal protection 
principles because it allows the “lesser” offense of battery without injury to be 
punished more severely than the “greater” offense of battery with injury.  A 
defendant, however, “does not have a fundamental interest in a specific term of 
imprisonment or in the designation a particular crime receives.”  (People v. Flores 
(1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 74, 88; see People v. Alvarez (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1110, 
1116 [finding the rational basis test applicable to equal protection challenge 
involving “an alleged sentencing disparity”].)  Defendant makes no claim that the 
classification here at issue involves a suspect class, nor does her claim implicate 
any interest akin to that at issue in Olivas, in which an individual faced a longer 
period of confinement if treated as a juvenile rather than as an adult.  Application 
of the strict scrutiny standard in this context would be incompatible with the broad 
 
18
discretion the Legislature traditionally has been understood to exercise in defining 
crimes and specifying punishment.   
Turning to the merits of defendant’s claim, we find it unpersuasive.  
Batchelder instructs us that neither the existence of two identical criminal statutes 
prescribing different levels of punishments, nor the exercise of a prosecutor’s 
discretion in charging under one such statute and not the other, violates equal 
protection principles.  (Batchelder, supra, 442 U.S. at pp. 124-125.)  Thus, 
defendant may not complain that she was charged with a felony violation under 
section 243.1 even though section 243, subdivision (b) is an identical statute 
prescribing a lesser punishment.  As we observed in Manduley, numerous factors 
properly may enter into a prosecutor’s decision to charge under one statute and not 
another, such as a defendant’s background and the severity of the crime, and so 
long as there is no showing that a defendant “has been singled out deliberately for 
prosecution on the basis of some invidious criterion,” that is, “ ‘one that is 
arbitrary and thus unjustified because it bears no rational relationship to legitimate 
law enforcement interests[,]’ ” defendant cannot make out an equal protection 
violation.  (Manduley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 568-569.)  Defendant “does not 
allege that [her] prosecution was motivated by improper considerations.”  
(Batchelder, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 125, fn. 9.)   
Defendant, citing section 243, subdivision (c)(1), claims that the statutory 
scheme is irrational, based on her assertion that under the current scheme the 
“lesser” offense of battery on a custodial officer without injury may be punished 
more severely than the “greater” offense of battery on a custodial officer with 
injury.  Defendant’s assertion is based upon the questionable premise that battery 
on a custodial officer without injury always is a less serious offense than battery 
with injury, so as to warrant inevitably a lesser punishment.  The dissent below 
questioned whether a hypothetical defendant “who, in the course of grabbing the 
 
19
arm of a correctional officer, inflicts a puncture wound with her fingernail that 
requires medical attention” would be more culpable “than a defendant who 
repeatedly hits and kicks the correctional officer, intending to cause serious injury 
but does not do so through no lack of effort.”  As recounted by the court in 
Chenze, the Legislature amended section 243 to include references to custodial 
officers while simultaneously not repealing section 243.1.  The legislative history 
of the amendment suggests the amendment was intended to allow misdemeanor 
prosecutions of batteries committed on custodial officers, and the Legislature did 
not repeal section 243.1 to allow felony prosecutions for more serious cases, even 
if no injury was inflicted.  (See Chenze, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 527.)  The 
Legislature’s actions tend to demonstrate it contemplated that the ostensible 
“lesser” offense of battery without injury sometimes may constitute a more serious 
offense and merit greater punishment than the “greater” offense of battery 
accompanied by injury.   
Another premise underlying defendant’s claim of irrationality  that the 
current statutory scheme allows battery on a custodial officer, without injury, to be 
punished “more severely” than battery with injury  appears somewhat 
questionable.  As noted, a person who commits battery on a custodial officer, 
without injury, faces the same maximum imprisonment under section 243.1 as one 
who commits battery on a custodial officer with injury under section 243, 
subdivision (c)(1), namely state imprisonment for 16 months, two years, or three 
years.5  Similarly, a person who does not inflict injury may be prosecuted under 
section 243, subdivision (b) and receive a misdemeanor sentence, the same 
                                                          
 
5  
A person prosecuted under section 243, subdivision (c)(1) faces an 
additional fine of up to $2,000 which that person would not face under section 
243.1.   
 
20
sentence that a person who does inflict injury may receive under section 243, 
subdivision (c)(1).  The only difference between sections 243.1 and 243, 
subdivision (b) on the one hand, and section 243, subdivision (c)(1) on the other, 
is that, because section 243, subdivision (c)(1) is a wobbler, a trial court has 
discretion at sentencing either to impose misdemeanor punishment or grant 
probation and later, upon the defendant’s successful completion of probation, 
declare the offense to be a misdemeanor.  (§17, subd. (b)(1), (3).)  A magistrate 
also has discretion at the preliminary hearing to determine that a wobbler offense 
is a misdemeanor.  (§17, subd. (b)(5).)6   
The circumstance that the Legislature did not grant to the trial court the 
same discretion in prosecutions under section 243.1 to reduce the charge to a 
misdemeanor as it did for prosecutions under section 243, subdivision (c) does not 
render the statutory scheme unconstitutional.  A rational basis for these statutes 
exists; the Legislature reasonably could have concluded that reduction of the 
section 243.1 offense is not appropriate in cases of a battery on a custodial officer 
that is deemed serious enough by the prosecutor to warrant felony prosecution 
under the latter statute.  As the Legislature properly may eliminate a trial court’s 
discretion to dismiss an action or strike an allegation in furtherance of justice (see 
                                                          
 
6  
Section 17, subdivision (b) states in relevant part:  “When a crime is 
punishable, in the discretion of the court, by imprisonment in the state prison or by 
fine or imprisonment in the county jail, it is a misdemeanor for all purposes under 
the following circumstances:  [¶] (1) After a judgment imposing a punishment 
other than imprisonment in the state prison.  [¶]  . . .  [¶] (3) When the court grants 
probation to a defendant without imposition of sentence and at the time of granting 
probation, or on application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter, the 
court declares the offense to be a misdemeanor.  [¶]  . . .  [¶] (5) When, at or before 
the preliminary examination . . . the magistrate determines that the offense is a 
misdemeanor, in which event the case shall proceed as if the defendant had been 
arraigned on a misdemeanor complaint.”   
 
21
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 518; People v. Thomas 
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 206, 209-214), so too may it  by defining an offense as a 
straight felony  deny a trial court discretion to reduce an offense to a 
misdemeanor.  “It is the prerogative, indeed the duty, of the Legislature to 
recognize degrees of culpability when drafting a Penal Code.”  (Michael M. v. 
Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 608, 613 [rejecting an equal protection challenge 
against the statutory rape law].)  As stated in People v. Flores, supra, 178 
Cal.App.3d 74:  “The decision of how long a particular term of punishment should 
be is left properly to the Legislature.  The Legislature is responsible for 
determining which class of crimes deserves certain punishments and which crimes 
should be distinguished from others. As long as the Legislature acts rationally, 
such determinations should not be disturbed.”  (Id. at p. 88 [finding the Legislature 
did not violate equal protection principles by not dividing the crime of attempted 
murder into degrees].)  Because a rational basis exists for the statutory scheme 
pertaining to battery on a custodial officer, these statutes are not vulnerable to 
challenge under the equal protection clause.  (See People v. Romo (1975) 14 
Cal.3d 189, 196-197 [rejecting equal protection challenge based upon the claim 
that assault could be punished more severely than the greater offense of assault 
with intent to commit murder].)7   
                                                          
 
7  
In arguing that the existing statutory scheme is irrational and violates equal 
protection principles, the concurring and dissenting opinion states that prosecutors 
would have no incentive to charge a defendant with a wobbler under section 243, 
subdivision (c), because that provision requires proof of the additional element of 
injury and prescribes a “lesser” penalty than that provided for a violation of the 
straight felony of section 243.1.  This point misjudges the significance of the 
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Batchelder, supra, 442 U.S. 114, 123-
125, that the existence of two statutes, covering the same criminal conduct but 
carrying different penalties, does not violate either equal protection or due process 
principles, even though a prosecutor may be influenced by the different penalties 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
22
                                                                                                                                                                             
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
available upon conviction in determining under which statute to charge a 
defendant.  Defendant in the present case cannot point to any harm that she 
suffered by virtue of the circumstance that section 243, subdivision (c), applies 
only to battery on a custodial officer with injury, inasmuch as she properly could 
have been charged under section 243.1 (even if section 243, subdivision (c), 
applied to battery on a custodial officer without injury) and persons who commit 
battery on a custodial officer with injury may be charged and punished under 
section 243.1.  Further, the concurring and dissenting opinion’s argument ignores 
the observation in Chenze, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th 521, 527, that the Legislature 
added the references to custodial officers in section 243 precisely to allow for 
prosecutions involving lesser punishments.   
 
The concurring and dissenting opinion’s observation that the prosecutor in 
this case twice offered to dismiss the section 243.1 charge pursuant to a plea 
agreement does not call into question our conclusion that the Legislature properly 
can eliminate a trial court’s discretion to reduce a charge in cases deemed by the 
prosecutor to warrant felony treatment.  Such offers may reflect the prosecutor’s 
judgment regarding the benefits of avoiding the administrative burden and expense 
of a trial rather than reflecting an assessment by the prosecutor regarding the 
seriousness of the offense.  In any event, the circumstance that a prosecutor may 
engage in plea negotiation regarding a section 243.1 offense does not establish that 
no rational basis exists for the Legislature to provide an alternative that does not 
afford a trial court discretion to reduce a charge when such plea negotiation fails.  
Further, because any battery on a custodial officer, whether with or without injury, 
may be prosecuted under section 243.1, the concurring and dissenting opinion’s 
argument  that no rational basis exists for eliminating the trial court’s discretion 
to reduce the charge when a defendant is prosecuted for a straight felony under 
section 243.1  misses the mark.   
 
In addition, contrary to the suggestion in the concurring and dissenting 
opinion, the present case does not involve any issue regarding necessarily included 
offenses, because there is no claim that section 243.1 is a necessarily included 
offense of section 243, subdivision (c), so that a jury must be instructed on section 
243.1 when a defendant is charged under section 243, subdivision (c).  Defendant 
was charged and the jury was instructed only under section 243.1.  If a jury were 
to be instructed on a lesser necessarily included offense in a case in which the 
defendant is charged under the wobbler provision of section 243, subdivision (c), 
it appears that the lesser necessarily included offense that the jury would be 
instructed upon would be the misdemeanor offense prescribed by section 243, 
subdivision (b), rather than the felony offense prescribed by section 243.1.   
 
23
III 
A 
With regard to the second issue before us, the Attorney General contends 
the Court of Appeal erred by remanding for a Kelly/Frye hearing, because 
Evidence Code section 351.1 establishes a categorical prohibition on the 
admission of polygraph evidence in criminal cases absent a stipulation.  
Subdivision (a) of section 351.1, which was enacted in 1983, provides:  
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph 
examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to 
take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted 
into evidence in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction 
motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, 
whether heard in juvenile or adult court, unless all parties stipulate to the 
admission of such results.”   
As noted, prior to trial defendant filed a written motion seeking an 
evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence tending to establish 
that she had “passed” a polygraph examination.  Defendant indicated that at such 
hearing she would present testimony by “one or more experts” proving that 
polygraph examinations now were generally accepted in the scientific community 
within the meaning of the Kelly/Frye test.  As an offer of proof, defendant 
explained that the polygraph expert who examined her utilized the “control 
question” method;8 that defense experts would testify this method is accepted in 
                                                          
 
8  
“The control question technique involves basically two types of questions; 
control or comparison questions and relevant questions that specifically concern 
the investigation at hand.  The control questions are designed to arouse the 
concern of the innocent subject and it is expected that the subject will react more 
strongly to them than to the relevant questions.  The control questions deal with 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
24
the scientific community, as established by scientific studies; and that proper 
procedures were employed in administering the test under this method.  Defendant 
also asserted that other jurisdictions have found polygraph evidence to be accepted 
in the scientific community.  Defendant attached as an exhibit to her motion an 
issue of the journal Polygraph  a publication of the American Polygraph 
Association (APA)  discussing the United States Supreme Court case of United 
States v. Scheffer (1998) 523 U.S. 303 (still pending at the time this issue of the 
journal was published) and including the parties’ briefs in Scheffer as well as an 
amicus curiae brief filed in that case by the APA.  Defendant acknowledged that 
Evidence Code section 351.1 bars the admission of polygraph evidence in criminal 
proceedings unless all parties stipulate to its admission, but argued that this 
statutory provision improperly interfered with her federal constitutional right to 
present a defense.  The trial court, declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing, 
held that under section 351.1 “the evidence is inadmissible, period, Kelly or 
otherwise.”   
                                                                                                                                                                             
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
acts that are similar to the issue of the investigation.  However, they are more 
general, cover long periods of time in the life history of the subject, and are 
deliberately vague.  During the pretest review of the control questions, the 
examiner carefully introduces the control questions to the subject so that in 
answering these questions on the test the subject is likely to be deceptive or 
uncertain as to the truthfulness of his answers.  In this way, the innocent subject 
will react more strongly to the control questions than to the relevant questions.  On 
the other hand, guilty subjects who answer the relevant questions deceptively will 
be more concerned about being detected in that deception than with the control 
questions.  Thus, it is the comparative reactivity rather than the absolute reactivity 
to a particular question that forms the basis for determining truth or deception.”  
(United States v. Galbreth (D.N.M. 1995) 908 F.Supp. 877, 884.)   
 
25
On appeal, defendant contended that, notwithstanding the apparent 
categorical prohibition of Evidence Code section 351.1, she was entitled to a 
Kelly/Frye hearing to determine the admissibility of her proposed polygraph 
evidence under the reasoning of this court’s decisions in People v. Jackson (1996) 
13 Cal.4th 1164 (Jackson), and People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075 (Fudge) 
(discussed below).  The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that she had 
“made a sufficient offer of proof to entitle her to a [Kelly/Frye] hearing” under the 
reasoning of Jackson and Fudge, observing that “we do not see what more such an 
offer would need to meet the threshold required to convene such a hearing.”  The 
court, concluding that the denial of a Kelly/Frye hearing prejudiced defendant, 
remanded the case to the trial court with directions to conduct such a hearing and 
to set aside defendant’s convictions in the event the trial court “concludes the 
polygraph evidence is admissible.” 
B 
Prior to the enactment of Evidence Code section 351.1, the admission of 
polygraph evidence in California was governed by the test of Frye v. United 
States, supra, 293 F. 1013.  Under that test, one who seeks the admission of 
evidence based upon a new scientific technique must make “a preliminary 
showing of general acceptance of the new technique in the relevant scientific 
community.”  (Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30; see id. at p. 32 [“reaffirm[ing] our 
allegiance” to the Frye “ ‘general acceptance’ ” test for new scientific techniques]; 
see also People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 593-604 [retaining the Kelly/Frye 
test as the applicable California standard and declining to adopt the new federal 
standard set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 
U.S. 579].)  Relying upon Frye and its progeny, a long line of California decisions 
has held or recognized that the results of a polygraph examination are inadmissible 
at trial absent a stipulation by the parties.  (See People v. Carter (1957) 48 Cal.2d 
 
26
737, 752 [“Lie detector tests do not as yet have enough reliability to justify the 
admission of expert testimony based on their results”]; People v. Adams (1975) 53 
Cal.App.3d 109, 111-119 [concluding results of polygraph test inadmissible at 
trial under doctrine of stare decisis and also because insufficiently reliable]; 
People v. York (1959) 174 Cal.App.3d 305, 311-312 [refusing to reexamine 
holdings of prior cases finding polygraph examination results inadmissible]; 
People v. Porter (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 461, 470 [the trial court did not err in not 
ordering a lie detector test because the results were inadmissible at trial]; People v. 
Porter (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 506, 510-511 [same case]; People v. Wochnick 
(1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 124, 127-128 [following Frye and finding that the “systolic 
blood pressure deception test” has “not yet gained such standing and scientific 
recognition as to justify the admission of expert testimony . . . .”]; see also People 
v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 763 [noting “the results of [a polygraph] test 
are not admissible evidence in a court of law”]; People v. Jones (1959) 52 Cal.2d 
636, 653 [“The courts have consistently held that whether the test is a polygraph 
test, or a sodium amytal or sodium pentothal test, the results are not such as to be 
admissible for or against the defendant because of a lack of scientific certainty 
about the results.”]; People v. Schiers (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 102, 108; People v. 
Adams (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 27, 33 [noting “the established rule that the results 
of lie detector tests are not admissible in evidence”]; People v. Parrella (1958) 
158 Cal.App.2d 140, 147 [“There can be no doubt that evidence about the results 
of the lie detector test was inadmissible.”]; People v. Aragon (1957) 154 
Cal.App.2d 646, 658 [stating of polygraph examinations that “we know of no 
appellate decision sustaining its use in the trial of a criminal case in the absence of 
a stipulation”].)   
The legal landscape in California changed with the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion in Witherspoon v. Superior Court (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 24 
 
27
(Witherspoon).  The majority in Witherspoon criticized the judicial rule that 
consistently excludes polygraph evidence as “an almost ‘knee jerk’ response” 
“based more on considerations of policy rather than any demonstrated lack of 
reliability or acceptance of the test”  considerations that the majority felt “are 
more properly matters for legislative rather than judicial determination.”  (Id. at 
pp. 29, 31.)  The majority, not finding any provision in the Evidence Code 
expressly barring the admission of polygraph evidence, concluded the defendant 
was entitled to a hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence, suggesting 
that the polygraph evidence should be admitted so long as the evidence was 
relevant (Evid. Code, § 210), its probative value was not substantially outweighed 
by the probability of undue prejudice (id., § 352), and the defendant could satisfy 
the requirements for the admission of expert testimony (id., § 801 [expert opinion 
testimony]; see also id., § 720 [qualification of expert witness]; id., § 405 
[determination of preliminary fact]).  (Witherspoon, supra, at pp. 30-35.)   
“It was in reaction to Witherspoon that the Legislature enacted Evidence 
Code section 351.1.”  (People v. Kegler (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 72, 85 (Kegler); In 
re Kathleen W. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 68, 72.)  The Assembly Committee on 
Criminal Law and Public Safety’s analysis of the bill that became section 351.1 
expressly stated the bill was “ ‘intended to overrule [Witherspoon] and to create an 
exception to the truth-in-evidence section of Proposition 8 that bars exclusion of 
any relevant evidence.’  (Assembly Com. on Crim. Law and Pub. Safety, staff 
comments on Sen. Bill. No. 266 as amended Mar. 16, 1983 (1983-1984 Reg. 
Sess.), for hg. on June 8, 1983, p. 2.)”  (Kegler, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 84.)  
Legislative history materials expressed concerns that (1) the Witherspoon 
procedure would “ ‘substantially increase trial time by requiring courts to litigate 
collateral issues regarding the reliability of the particular test and qualifications of 
the specific polygraph examiner in every case,’ ” (2) polygraph testing procedures 
 
28
lack standardization and cannot be tested for accuracy, and (3) jurors would 
“ ‘assign too much credence to the results of a polygraph examination.’ ”  (Kegler, 
supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 89.)   
As past decisions make clear, the Kelly/Frye test constitutes a judicially 
created rule relating to the admissibility of certain types of evidence  and, as 
such, a rule that is subject to legislative revision.  (See, e.g., People v. Leahy, 
supra, 8 Cal.4th 587, 604 [taking note of legislative failure to abrogate or modify 
the general Kelly/Frye standard]; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
supra, 509 U.S. 579, 585-589 [Frye test superseded in federal courts by the 
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence].)  By enacting Evidence Code section 
351.1, the Legislature abrogated the Kelly/Frye rule with respect to the admission 
of polygraph evidence in criminal cases.  As noted, the Legislature enacted section 
351.1 to overrule the then recently decided appellate court decision in 
Witherspoon, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d 24, which had criticized the routine 
application of the Frye test to exclude polygraph evidence and had suggested that 
such evidence could be admitted if the proponent made a showing of admissibility 
under certain provisions of the Evidence Code.  Thus, in adopting Evidence Code 
section 351.1, the Legislature effectively codified the rule set forth in the pre-
Witherspoon California cases involving polygraph evidence, namely that such 
evidence is categorically inadmissible in the absence of the stipulation of all 
parties. 
This understanding of Evidence Code section 351.1 is consistent with 
numerous cases that subsequently have interpreted the statute to exclude 
polygraph evidence categorically in criminal cases, absent the stipulation of the 
parties.  (See In re Aontae D. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 167, 173; Kegler, supra, 197 
Cal.App.3d at p. 84; In re Kathleen W., supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 72.)  
Defendant concedes that this is the import of section 351.1, but she argues she 
 
29
nonetheless was entitled to a Kelly/Frye hearing under this court’s precedents, in 
particular the decisions in Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1164, and Fudge, supra, 7 
Cal.4th 1075.  Insofar as section 351.1’s categorical exclusion is applied to 
deprive her of the opportunity to demonstrate the current reliability of proffered 
polygraph evidence under the Kelly/Frye standard, defendant claims the statute 
infringes upon her right to present a defense at trial, in violation of the federal 
Constitution.9   
C 
We first address defendant’s claim that she was entitled to a Kelly/Frye 
hearing notwithstanding Evidence Code section 351.1.  We begin with a review of 
the relevant portions of the decisions in Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1164, and 
Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1075, upon which defendant relies.  In Jackson, the 
defendant, at the guilt phase of a capital trial, sought to present evidence that he 
had “passed” a polygraph test and had stated truthfully in the polygraph session 
that he had not killed the victim.  (Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1212.)  The 
defendant in Jackson contended he was entitled to a Kelly/Frye hearing 
notwithstanding section 351.1, arguing that the statute’s exclusion of such 
                                                          
 
9  
Although defendant’s brief in this court contains a fleeting reference to “her 
rights to federal and state due process” in the heading of the brief’s argument 
relating to the exclusion of polygraph evidence, her brief fails to cite any authority 
or present any argument relating to state constitutional due process principles.  
“[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the 
points made.  If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as 
waived, and pass it without consideration.  [Citations.]”  (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure 
(4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 594, p. 627; see also People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 
764, 793; Cal. Rules of Court rules 14, subd. (a)(1)(B), 29.1, subd. (b)(1).)  
Because defendant’s “unelaborated citation[]” to the state due process clause 
“add[s] nothing to [her] argument” (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 118), 
we “‘pass it without consideration’” (Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793). 
 
30
“reliable exculpatory evidence” denied him his right to due process of law under 
the federal Constitution.  (Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1212.)  We rejected this 
claim, reasoning:  “Even if defendant’s argument were true in the abstract, he has 
failed to make the proper offer of proof under Kelly/Frye that the polygraph is now 
viewed in the scientific community as a reliable technique.  ‘ “. . . Having failed to 
make the proper offer of proof, defendant is in no position to assign error in the 
trial court’s ruling.” ’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1122.)   
In Fudge, the defendant attempted to present evidence at the penalty phase 
of a capital trial that he had “passed” a polygraph examination, arguing that 
Evidence Code section 351.1 unconstitutionally deprived him of his right to 
present “relevant mitigating evidence.”  (Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1121, 
1122.)  Fudge rejected this claim:  “Defendant, however, failed to present an offer 
of proof that polygraph evidence was generally accepted in the scientific 
community.  We have previously held that such an offer of proof is necessary to 
preserve the issue for appeal.  (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 193.)  ‘ 
“Absent an offer of proof that the polygraph is now accepted in the scientific 
community as a reliable technique, the evidence was presumptively unreliable and 
inadmissible.” ’ ”  (Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1122, quoting People v. Harris 
(1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1094-1095.)  Other cases similarly have rejected federal 
constitutional challenges to section 351.1 because of the defendant’s failure to 
make an offer of proof regarding the reliability of polygraph evidence.  (See 
People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 870-871; People v. Koontz (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 1041, 1090; People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 264; People v. Price 
(1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 419; see also People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 413-
414 (Maury) [exclusion of polygraph evidence did not impair ability to present a 
defense].)   
 
31
As the foregoing decisions demonstrate, defendant is correct in observing 
that, even after the enactment of Evidence Code section 351.1, we have required, 
as a prerequisite to preserving the claim for appeal, that a challenge to the 
constitutionality of this statute include an offer of proof that the proffered 
polygraph evidence is generally accepted under the Kelly/Frye standard.  The 
constitutional challenges to section 351.1 raised in the foregoing cases generally 
have involved claims that the exclusion of polygraph evidence deprived a 
defendant of his or her right to present “reliable exculpatory evidence” at the guilt 
phase of a capital trial (see Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1212-1213), “relevant 
mitigating evidence” at the penalty phase (see Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1122-
1123; see also People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1090), or impeachment 
evidence (see People v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 870-871; People v. 
Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 264; People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 419).  
Because the constitutional challenges to section 351.1’s exclusion of polygraph 
evidence rest on the premise that the statute would abridge a defendant’s federal 
and state constitutional rights to due process and to present a defense only if the 
proffered evidence were shown to be reliable, we have required those who would 
challenge section 351.1 on these grounds to make an adequate offer of proof 
regarding the reliability of polygraph evidence.  And because the defendants in 
those prior cases failed to make the requisite offer of proof regarding the reliability 
of the proffered polygraph evidence, we did not have the occasion to decide the 
substantive merits of the constitutional claims regarding the exclusion of 
polygraph evidence under section 351.1.   
The Court of Appeal correctly concluded in the present case that defendant 
had preserved her constitutional challenge to section 351.1 by making her offer of 
proof regarding the reliability of polygraph evidence under Kelly/Frye.  The court, 
however, went further and remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a 
 
32
Kelly/Frye hearing, directing the trial court to set aside the judgment if that court 
found the polygraph evidence to be “admissible” under the Kelly/Frye standard, 
that is, if defendant demonstrated at the hearing that the polygraph technique 
employed was generally accepted in the scientific community.   
Although our past cases have determined that an offer of proof regarding 
the reliability of polygraph evidence is a prerequisite for raising a constitutional 
challenge against Evidence Code section 351.1’s categorical exclusion, we never 
have held that such proof is sufficient by itself to make out such a claim, that is, 
we never have suggested that evidence that satisfies the Kelly/Frye test must, as a 
constitutional matter, be admitted in evidence notwithstanding the statutory 
provision barring such admission.  Indeed, in our recent decision in People v. 
Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th, 833, we cautioned:  “Before a criminal defendant can 
establish a federal due process right to use the results of a polygraph examination, 
it is necessary (although perhaps not sufficient) to offer proof that the technique 
has become generally accepted in the scientific community.”  (Id. at p. 871, italics 
added.)  Thus, the Court of Appeal erred by remanding the case for a Kelly/Frye 
hearing without specifically addressing the question whether section 351.1’s 
categorical exclusion of polygraph evidence would be unconstitutional in the event 
defendant is able to satisfy the Kelly/Frye test.  Because defendant has preserved 
her federal constitutional challenge to section 351.1, we now address that issue.   
D 
The Attorney General contends that under the reasoning of United States v. 
Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. 303, the categorical exclusion of polygraph evidence 
mandated by Evidence Code section 351.1 does not violate the federal 
Constitution.  In that case, the United States Supreme Court rejected a 
 
33
constitutional challenge to Military Rules of Evidence, rule 707, subdivision (a), 
which bans polygraph evidence in military trials.10  The defendant, an airman who 
faced a military court-martial for alleged drug use, sought the admission of 
evidence that he had “passed” a polygraph examination, in order to bolster his 
testimony that he innocently had ingested the drugs.  In a portion of the opinion 
authored by Justice Thomas and joined by seven other justices,11 the high court 
noted that “there is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable,” 
observing that this lack of consensus is “reflected in the disagreement among state 
and federal courts concerning both the admissibility and the reliability of 
polygraph evidence.”  (United States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 309-311 
(lead opn. of Thomas, J.).)  In light of this circumstance, the court concluded that 
the per se exclusion of polygraph evidence “is a rational and proportional means 
of advancing the legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence” and that 
“[i]ndividual jurisdictions therefore may reasonably reach differing conclusions as 
to whether polygraph evidence should be admitted.  We cannot say, then, that 
presented with such widespread uncertainty, the President acted arbitrarily or 
disproportionately in promulgating a per se rule excluding all polygraph 
evidence.”  (Id. at p. 312.)   
                                                          
 
10  
Military Rules of Evidence, rule 707, subdivision (a) provides:  
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph 
examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to 
take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted 
into evidence.” 
11  
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined this portion of Justice Thomas’s opinion in Scheffer.  
(See United States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 309-311 (lead opn. of 
Thomas, J.); id. at p. 318 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).)   
 
34
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion joined by three other justices,12 
commented that the “continuing, good-faith disagreement among experts and 
courts on the subject of polygraph reliability counsels against our invalidating a 
per se exclusion of polygraph results,” and “[g]iven the ongoing debate about 
polygraphs, I agree the rule of exclusion is not so arbitrary or disproportionate that 
it is unconstitutional.”  (United States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 318 (conc. 
opn. of Kennedy, J.).)  Justice Kennedy, however, expressed doubt “that the rule 
of per se exclusion is wise, and some later case might present a more compelling 
case for introduction of the testimony than this one does.”  (Ibid.)   
We recently applied Scheffer in Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th 342, in which the 
defendant sought the admission of evidence that he had “ ‘passed’ ” a polygraph 
examination, in order to bolster his claim that someone else had killed the victim.  
(Id. at p. 413.)  We concluded that in light of Scheffer, “[e]xcluding such evidence 
does not violate defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense.”  (Ibid.)  
Noting that “[i]mplicit in the Legislature’s passage of Evidence Code section 
351.1 is the conclusion that ‘[L]ie detector tests themselves are not considered 
reliable enough to have probative value’  [Citation.],” and quoting Scheffer, we 
concluded that a “per se rule excluding polygraph evidence is a ‘rational and 
proportional means of advancing the legitimate interest in barring unreliable 
evidence.’  (Scheffer, supra, at p. 312.)”  (Ibid.)   
We reach the same conclusion here.  Scheffer noted that “the scientific 
community remains extremely polarized about the reliability of polygraph 
techniques.”  (United States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 309 (lead opn. of 
Thomas, J.).)  With respect to the reliability of the “control question technique” 
                                                          
 
12  
Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion.   
 
35
employed in the present case, Scheffer observed that studies ran the gamut from 
showing an 87 percent accuracy rate to a rate “ ‘little better than could be obtained 
by the toss of a coin, that is, 50 percent.’ ”  (Id. at p. 310.)  This disagreement in 
the scientific community in turn has been reflected “in the disagreement among 
state and federal courts concerning both the admissibility and the reliability of 
polygraph evidence.”  (Id. at pp. 310-311.)   
Defendant cannot persuasively contend that between the time of the 
Scheffer decision and defendant’s trial, a span of two and one-half years, the deep 
division in the scientific and legal communities regarding the reliability of 
polygraph evidence, as recognized by Scheffer, had given way to a general 
acceptance that would render the categorical exclusion of polygraph evidence “so 
arbitrary or disproportionate that it is unconstitutional.”  (United States v. Scheffer, 
supra, 523 U.S. at p. 318 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).)  Indeed, defense counsel 
conceded at oral argument that the disagreement within the scientific community 
regarding the reliability of polygraph evidence had not been significantly altered 
in that time period.  Further, defendant’s offer of proof in the trial court regarding 
the reliability of polygraph evidence consisted of a publication of the APA that 
outlined the studies and briefing presented in the Scheffer case — materials which 
the United States Supreme Court expressly considered and cited in Scheffer in 
concluding there existed no scientific consensus on the reliability of polygraph 
evidence in general and the control question technique in particular.  Likewise, the 
legal authorities cited by defendant in the trial court as indicative of a “major 
reevaluation of the admissibility of polygraph evidence by the federal courts” all 
predate the Scheffer decision and, in any event, did not consider the 
constitutionality of a categorical exclusion of polygraph evidence.  (See United 
States v. Cordoba (9th Cir. 1997) 104 F.3d 225, 227-229 [holding that the Ninth 
Circuit’s per se ban on polygraph evidence, based upon Frye, was overturned by 
 
36
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 509 U.S. 579, which 
concluded the Federal Rules of Evidence superceded the Frye “general 
acceptance” test in federal courts]; United States v. Piccinonna (11th Cir. 1989) 
885 F.2d 1529, 1532-1537 [concluding there was no per se ban on polygraph 
evidence in the Eleventh Circuit]; United States v. Galbreth, supra, 908 F.Supp. 
877, 890-896 [holding polygraph evidence admissible under the Daubert 
standard]; United States v. Crumby (D.Ariz. 1995) 895 F.Supp. 1354, 1358-1365 
[same].)  In light of the continuing division of opinion regarding the reliability of 
polygraph evidence, as recognized by Scheffer, the California Legislature has not 
acted “arbitrarily or disproportionately in promulgating [and retaining] a per se 
rule excluding all polygraph evidence.”  (Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 312 (lead 
opn. of Thomas, J.); see In re Aontae D., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 177 
[exclusion of polygraph evidence under Evidence Code section 351.1 does not 
deny due process]; Kegler, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 89 [same].)   
Defendant contends the polygraph evidence she proffered was “critical to 
her defense” and thus exclusion of this evidence deprived her of the constitutional 
right to present a defense, citing Rock v. Arkansas (1987) 483 U.S. 44 and 
Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284.  In Rock, the United States Supreme 
Court concluded that a per se rule excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony 
infringed upon the defendant’s constitutional right to testify, where the rule 
prevented the defendant from testifying regarding the circumstances underlying 
the charged killing, including whether it was accidental.  (Rock v. Arkansas, supra, 
483 U.S. at pp. 56-62.)  The court in Chambers held that the defendant’s 
constitutional right to present a defense was impaired by Mississippi’s “voucher” 
rule, which prevented the defendant from impeaching a defense witness whom he 
alleged had committed the charged killing, coupled with application of the hearsay 
rule to exclude testimony that the witness had confessed to three persons.  
 
37
(Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. at pp. 294-303; see also Green v. 
Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95, 96-97 [due process denied by exclusion of hearsay 
evidence that a codefendant had confessed to committing the crime alone].)   
These decisions do not assist defendant.  Scheffer distinguished Rock and 
Chambers, finding that “unlike the evidentiary rules at issue in those cases, [the 
rule excluding polygraph evidence] does not implicate any significant interest of 
the accused.”  (United States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 316-317 (lead opn. 
of Thomas, J.).)  The use of polygraph evidence proposed at defendant’s trial was 
indistinguishable from that proposed in Scheffer.  Defendant sought the admission 
of polygraph evidence to bolster her testimony that she was not under the 
influence of alcohol prior to leaving the restaurant and driving home, and to 
corroborate evidence suggesting that her subsequently inebriated state (which led 
to her erratic driving and assault of a custodial officer) could have been caused by 
someone placing a drug in the drinks she consumed at the restaurant.  Similarly, 
the airman in Scheffer sought to introduce polygraph evidence to bolster his claim 
of “ ‘innocent ingestion’ ” of drugs.  (Id., at p. 306.)  Scheffer held that the 
exclusion of such evidence did not abridge the defendant’s right to present a 
defense, because the defendant was not prevented from presenting “the relevant 
details of the charged offense from the perspective of the accused” or from 
“introducing any factual evidence.”  (Id. at p. 317.)  Defendant in the present case 
testified to her version of the events and presented the testimony of a toxicologist 
and a police officer in support of her claim of having been drugged.  As in 
Scheffer, defendant “was barred merely from introducing expert opinion testimony 
to bolster [her] own credibility.”  (Ibid.; Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 414 
[concluding the “defense was not significantly impaired by exclusion of the 
polygraph examination results”].)   
 
38
IV 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.  Because no issue has 
been presented to us concerning defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
(see fn. 1, ante), we express no opinion on that matter.   
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
I join the majority in holding polygraph evidence inadmissible.  I disagree, 
however, with its conclusion upholding the constitutionality of the statutory 
provisions concerning battery on a custodial officer. 
Two statutory provisions concerning battery on a custodial officer are at 
issue here:  Penal Code section 243.1 makes battery on a custodial officer a felony, 
whether or not the battery caused injury to the custodial officer.
1  (For 
convenience, I sometimes refer to the offense defined by section 243.1 as battery 
on a custodial officer without injury, because injury is not an element of the 
offense.)  Subdivision (c) of section 243 (hereafter section 243(c)), by comparison, 
makes a battery on a custodial officer that results in injury to the custodial officer 
an offense punishable either as a felony or as a misdemeanor.  (For convenience, I 
sometimes refer to this offense as battery on a custodial officer with injury.)  
Although battery on a custodial officer with injury is on its face more egregious 
that battery on a custodial officer without injury, it carries a lesser minimum 
penalty (it may be punished as a misdemeanor) and the same maximum penalty.  
In this respect, the statutory scheme lacks any rational basis, in my view, and 
thereby violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 
                                                          
 
1  
Statutory citations are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise noted. 
 
 
2
I 
 
“ ‘The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection 
clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or 
more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.’ ”  (Cooley v. Superior 
Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253, quoting In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530; 
accord, People v. Wutzke (2002) 28 Cal.4th 923, 943.)  In this case, persons who 
commit the same illegal act – a battery on a custodial officer causing injury – are 
in that respect similarly situated, but they are treated differently depending on 
whether they are charged under section 243.1, which does not require proof of 
injury, or under section 243(c), which does.  The Attorney General’s assertion that 
persons who commit identical acts with the identical mental states but are charged 
under different statutes are not similarly situated is incorrect when the equal 
protection issue is the constitutionality of the distinction between the two statutes.  
(People v. Nguyen (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 705, 714-715.) 
As the majority observes (maj. opn., ante, at p. 17), under the federal and 
state equal protection clauses the constitutionality of the statutory scheme at issue 
turns on whether there is a rational basis for the distinction it draws between 
persons prosecuted under section 243.1 (battery on a custodial officer without 
injury) and section 243(c) (battery on a custodial officer with injury).
2  (See Kasler 
v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 514 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)  The 
equal protection clause “does not forbid classifications,” but it does forbid  
                                                          
 
2  
If two groups are not similarly situated, then any “equal protection claim 
cannot succeed, and does not require further analysis.”  (People v. Nguyen, supra, 
54 Cal.App.4th at p. 714.)  Thus, by applying a rational basis test, the majority 
here implicitly acknowledges that the two groups—persons charged under section 
243.1 and those charged under section 243(c)—are similarly situated. 
 
 
3
“government decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all 
relevant respects alike.”  (Nordlinger v. Hahn (1992) 505 U.S. 1, 10; see Kasler v. 
Lockyer, supra, at p. 515 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) 
II 
The relevant statutory provisions are these:  
Section 243.1 declares that battery “committed against the person of a 
custodial officer” is a felony when the person committing the battery “knows or 
reasonably should know that the victim is a custodial officer engaged in the 
performance of his or her duties.” 
Section 243, subdivision (b), makes the same conduct a misdemeanor.  It 
prescribes misdemeanor punishment for a battery “committed against the person 
of a . . . custodial officer . . . engaged in the performance of his or her duties . . . 
and the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that the 
victim is a . . . custodial officer . . . .” 
Section 243(c) describes more egregious conduct.  It requires a battery 
“committed against a custodial officer . . . engaged in the performance of his or 
her duties” when “the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should 
know that the victim is a . . . custodial officer . . . and an injury is inflicted on that 
victim.”  (Italics added.)  Violation of section 243(c) is punishable as either a 
felony or a misdemeanor, in the discretion of the trial court.  (Such crimes are 
colloquially referred to as “wobblers.”)   
Finally, section 243, subdivision (d), not directly relevant here, describes an 
even more serious crime:  battery on a custodial officer resulting in serious bodily 
injury.  Violation of this provision too can be punished as either a felony or a 
misdemeanor.  
Traditionally, California’s sentencing laws have punished crimes that cause 
injury more harshly than similar crimes that do not.  The statutory scheme at issue 
 
 
4
here, however, goes against this pattern.  As the Court of Appeal majority 
observed, “[t]he current scheme encourages arbitrary, irrational charging.”  In the 
case of a battery on a custodial officer that causes injury, there would be no 
incentive for the prosecutor to charge the defendant under section 243(c) (battery 
on a custodial officer with injury).  By ignoring the injury and charging the 
defendant under section 243.1 (battery on a custodial officer without injury), the 
prosecutor is spared the burden of proving the injury and the trial court is 
precluded from treating the offense as a misdemeanor, an option that would be 
available to the court if the defendant had been charged with, and convicted of a 
violation of section 243(c) (battery on a custodial officer with injury).
3 
Other consequences of the statutory scheme are even more perplexing, as 
illustrated by the problems involved in instructing a jury in the trial of a defendant 
charged with a violation section 243(c) (battery on a custodial officer with injury).  
A trial court must instruct the jury on a lesser included offense when the evidence 
raises a question whether all of the elements of the charged crime are present, and 
the evidence would support a conviction of the lesser offense.  (People v. Bradford 
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055.)  “[A] lesser offense is necessarily included in a 
greater offense if either the statutory elements of the greater offense, or the facts 
actually alleged in the accusatory pleading, include all the elements of the lesser 
offense, such that the greater cannot be committed without also committing the 
lesser.”  (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 117.)  Because a defendant cannot  
                                                          
 
3  
Although the prosecutor has no incentive to charge a defendant with battery 
on a custodial officer with injury (§ 243(c)), there would still be an incentive to 
charge a defendant with battery causing serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) 
because that offense, although a wobbler, has a higher maximum penalty than of 
offense defined by section 243.1 (battery on a custodial officer without injury). 
 
 
5
commit battery on a custodial officer with injury (§ 243(c)) or battery on a 
custodial officer causing serious bodily injury (§ 243, sub. (d)) without 
committing all elements of battery in violation of section 243.1 (battery on a 
custodial officer without injury), the latter is an offense necessarily included in the 
crimes of battery on a custodial officer with injury or with serious bodily injury.  
Consequently, when a defendant is charged with a battery on a custodial officer 
with injury or serious bodily injury, and there is a question whether the injury 
occurred, the trial court must instruct on the necessarily included offense of 
battery in violation of section 243.1 (battery on a custodial officer without injury).  
If the jury then found the defendant guilty as charged of a battery on a custodial 
officer causing injury (§ 243(c)), the court would have discretion to impose a 
misdemeanor sentence.  But if the jury, because it entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the battery had caused an injury to the custodial officer, found the defendant 
guilty only of the necessarily included offense of battery on a custodial officer 
(§ 243.1), the trial court would be required to sentence the defendant as a felon. 
I can perceive no rational basis for this rather startling statutory scheme.  
The majority does, however.  
The majority first questions whether the offense defined in section 243.1 
(battery on a custodial officer without injury) is actually less serious than the 
offense defined in section 243(c) (battery on a custodial officer with injury).  It 
observes that if we compare two different batteries, it is possible that a particular 
battery without injury could be more heinous than another battery that did cause 
an injury.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 18-19.)  By the same reasoning, however, a 
particular petty theft could, depending on the circumstances, be more serious than 
a particular grand theft, and a particular grand theft could be more serious than a 
particular robbery, and so forth.  Under this reasoning, the legal classification of 
crimes as inherently “greater” or “lesser” becomes meaningless and a rational 
 
 
6
ordering of crimes and punishment in the penal law becomes impossible.  In 
deciding which of two crimes is the greater, the only meaningful comparison is 
between the elements of each crime, as I discussed on pages 3-4, ante, not the 
particular circumstances of their commission. 
The majority also questions defendant’s claim that the statutory scheme 
allows a battery on a custodial officer without injury to be punished more severely 
than one with injury.  The majority points out that the maximum punishment under 
both section 243.1 (battery on a custodial officer without injury) and section 
243(c) (battery on a custodial officer with injury) is the same—three years.  (See 
maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)  But the majority cites neither authority nor reason for 
the proposition that when comparing statutes for the purpose of equal protection 
analysis a court should examine only the maximum punishment and ignore 
everything else.  Here the minimum punishment specified under section 243.1 
(battery on a custodial officer without injury) is 16 months in state prison (§ 18) 
while the minimum punishment under section 243(c) (battery on a custodial officer 
with injury) is “a fine of not more than two thousand dollars ($2000) [or] 
imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year.”  When, as here, the 
defendant’s crime could reasonably be treated as a misdemeanor, it is the 
minimum punishment that is more important. 
The majority holds that section 243.1 (battery on a custodial officer without 
injury) does not violate the principle of equal protection of the laws because the 
Legislature could have rationally concluded that reduction of this offense to a 
misdemeanor is not appropriate whenever the prosecutor deems the offense 
serious enough for felony prosecution.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20.)  This reasoning 
misses the point.  Equal protection analysis requires comparing two statutes—here 
section 243.1 (battery on a custodial officer without injury) and section 243(c) 
 
 
7
(battery on a custodial officer with injury).  The majority offers no rational basis 
for the distinction between them.
4 
I perceive no rational basis for giving trial courts the power to punish as a 
misdemeanor a charge of battery on a custodial officer with injury, but to deny 
that power as to battery on a custodial officer without injury under section 243.1.  
Could the Legislature rationally believe that some batteries without injury are so 
serious that the prosecutor must be given unfettered, unreviewable power to ensure 
that they are prosecuted as felonies, but that this is not the case for batteries 
causing injury?  Conversely, could the Legislature rationally believe that the 
courts could be trusted to determine when batteries causing injury should be 
treated as felonies rather than misdemeanors, but could not be trusted to make the 
same determination as to batteries that did not cause injury?  The answer is 
inescapable:  the statutory distinction has no rational basis, thus denying defendant 
the equal protection of the laws.  
The allegations of defendant’s petition for habeas corpus filed in  
                                                          
 
4  
The majority mistakenly relies on United States v. Batchelder (1979) 442 
U.S. 114, a case involving a federal statutory scheme that defined two crimes with 
essentially the same elements but different penalties.  The United States Supreme 
Court concluded that the federal scheme did not deny equal protection to a 
defendant convicted of the crime carrying the greater penalty.  (Id. at pp. 124-
125.)  The court was not faced with a statutory scheme like the one at issue here, 
which defines two closely related crimes and permits lesser punishment for the 
crime that differs only in requiring one additional aggravating element.  The high 
court in Batchelder thus had no occasion to decide whether a statutory scheme 
with those irrational features violated the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection of the laws.  I note, moreover, that the Colorado Supreme Court found 
the reasoning in Batchelder unpersuasive and declined to follow it in construing 
the equal protection clause of its own state constitution.  (People v. Estrada (Colo. 
1979) 601 P.2d 619, 621.) 
 
 
 
8
conjunction with defendant’s appeal, if true,
5 belie the majority’s assumption that 
prosecutors will charge the felony offense of battery on a custodial officer without 
injury under section 243.1 only when they deem the offense serious enough to 
warrant felony punishment.  Here, after charging defendant with a felony battery 
under section 243.1, the prosecutor offered to dismiss the felony charge if 
defendant would plead guilty to a misdemeanor battery, which would be further 
reduced to an infraction if she successfully completed probation.  Defense counsel 
refused the offer.  The prosecutor then offered to dismiss the battery charge if 
defendant would plead guilty to the misdemeanor of driving under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs (Veh. Code, § 23152).  Defense counsel rejected this offer as 
well.  The case was then prosecuted as a felony.  The trial court expressed dismay 
that the case had not been settled, and, after the jury found defendant guilty as 
charged, the court placed defendant on probation instead of sending her to prison 
for the felony conviction.   
If true, these facts show that the prosecutor did not consider defendant’s 
conduct so egregious as to require felony punishment.  A prosecutor taking that 
view would not have been so eager to induce defendant to plead guilty to crimes 
punishable only as misdemeanors.  But because defendant was charged under 
section 243.1, a mandatory felony, the trial court was prevented from exercising 
the discretion the Legislature gave it to treat the more serious crime of battery on a 
                                                          
 
5  
The truth of these allegations may be determined at an evidentiary hearing 
ordered by the Court of Appeal on the habeas corpus petition defendant filed in 
conjunction with her appeal.  At issue there is whether defense counsel failed to 
consult with defendant before rejecting the prosecution’s offers to dismiss the 
felony charge if defendant would plead guilty to either of two misdemeanors, 
battery or driving under the influence. 
 
 
9
custodial officer with injury (§ 243(c)) as a misdemeanor.  This kind of injustice is 
the predictable result of the current irrational statutory scheme. 
I would affirm the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Wilkinson 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 102 Cal.App.4th 72 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S111028 
Date Filed: July 29, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Steven C. Suzukawa 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Anthony J. Dain, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Eric R. Larson for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. 
Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. De Nicola, Jaime L. Fuster and Thomas C. Hsieh, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Tony Rackauckas, District Attorney (Orange), Brian N. Gurwitz, Deputy District Attorney; Jan Scully, 
District Attorney (Sacramento), Albert C. Locher, Assistant Chief Deputy District Attorney; Steve Cooley, 
District Attorney (Los Angeles), George M. Palmer, Head Deputy District Attorney; and David R. LaBahn 
for California District Attorney’s Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Anthony J. Dain 
1010 Second Avenue, Suite 2300 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 238-5575 
 
Eric R. Larson 
1010 Second Avenue, Suite 2300 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 238-5575 
 
Thomas C. Hsieh 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 576-1335