Title: Jury v. Giant of Maryland
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 962341
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 12, 1997

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson,
* Lacy, Hassell, 
Keenan, and Koontz, JJ. 
 
CARLOTTA JURY 
 
v.    Record No. 962341 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                      September 12, 1997 
GIANT OF MARYLAND, INC., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
 
Michael P. McWeeny, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether Code § 18.2-105 
provides a merchant absolute immunity from civil liability for 
assault and battery, negligence, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress alleged to have occurred during the 
detention of a customer suspected of shoplifting. 
 
On January 23, 1993, 46-year-old Carlotta Jury went to a 
Giant Food store in Annandale, Virginia, to exchange a 
prescription for her niece and purchase some other items.  She 
left two of her children, ages three and ten, in her car.  
After exchanging the prescription and selecting some batteries 
and hair ties, she returned to the front of the store, ready to 
check out.  At that point, a man who did not identify himself 
approached her, grabbed her arm, and told her to accompany him. 
 When she refused, he hit her in the chest, causing her to fall 
backward into the aisle between the cash registers.  As Jury 
attempted to catch her breath, the man continued to lean over 
her and tried to jerk her up by pulling on her arm.  Another 
unidentified man approached and, along with the first man, took 
                     
     
*Justice Stephenson participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on July 1, 1997. 
 
 
 
 
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Jury to a storage area in the back of the store.  The first man 
twisted Jury's arm behind her back and shoved her while walking 
her to the back of the store.  Jury later discovered that the 
first man who approached her was Arthur Bridcott, a security 
guard for the Giant Food store, and the second man was James 
Parker, manager of the store.   
 
As the three reached the back of the store, one of the men 
kicked Jury in the back of the leg, knocking her to the floor. 
 Her face fell in a pile of dirt, and the men were "scrounging" 
her face in the dirt.  Jury tried to ask what was going on, but 
they told her to "[s]hut up," "[y]ou're a thief," and "[w]e're 
taking care of this and we're going to take care of you."  The 
men called Jury crude and obscene names and subjected her to 
similarly crude and obscene remarks and gestures.  Parker, the 
manager, picked Jury up off the floor by her hair, pulling some 
of it out of her head, and "stomped" on her foot.  The men 
refused to allow her to use the restroom, and when she tried to 
tell them that her children were in the car and she was worried 
about them, the men responded "we'll take care of that or 
Social Services will." 
 
Jury was detained in the back of the store for 
approximately one hour.  The security guard, Bridcott, told 
Jury that they would let her go if she provided a written 
confession and if she would not come back to the store.  She 
refused, stating that she had done nothing wrong.  Parker asked 
 
 
 
 
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Bridcott what merchandise Jury had concealed, and Bridcott 
responded that Jury had taken possession of batteries and hair 
ties.  The men handcuffed Jury and summoned the police.  Jury 
was arrested and escorted to the police station.  She was 
released later that evening and went to the hospital the next 
day.  At the hospital, Jury was treated, x-rayed, bandaged, 
given medication and a neck collar, and advised to see an 
orthopedic doctor.  
 
Jury was subsequently convicted of concealment of 
merchandise in the general district court.  That conviction was 
reversed on appeal to the circuit court.  
 
Jury filed a motion for judgment alleging assault and 
battery, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, against Giant of Maryland, Inc. and its employees 
involved in Jury's detention at the Giant Food store 
(collectively "Giant").  She sought recovery for injuries she 
sustained during her detention.  Prior to trial, Giant's motion 
for summary judgment on the assault and battery and negligence 
claims was granted and the claims were dismissed based on the 
trial court's determination that § 18.2-105 granted Giant 
immunity from civil liability for these claims.   
 
Following Jury's presentation of evidence on her 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the trial 
court granted Giant's motion to strike, holding that § 18.2-105 
also provided Giant with immunity from civil liability based on 
 
 
 
 
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this claim.  We awarded Jury an appeal and, because we concur 
with Jury's assertion that § 18.2-105 does not provide a 
merchant with absolute immunity, we will reverse the judgment 
of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. 
 
Code § 18.2-105 provides in pertinent part that:  
 
[a] merchant, agent or employee of the merchant, who 
causes the arrest or detention of any person . . .  
shall not be held civilly liable for unlawful 
detention, if such detention does not exceed one 
hour, slander, malicious prosecution, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, or assault and battery of 
the person so arrested or detained . . . provided 
that . . . the merchant, agent or employee . . . had 
at the time of such arrest or detention probable 
cause to believe that the person had shoplifted or 
committed willful concealment of goods or 
merchandise.  
 
We construed this statute in F.B.C. Stores, Inc. v. Duncan, 214 
Va. 246, 198 S.E.2d 595 (1973), as encompassing "virtually all 
of the intentional torts to person recognized at common law" 
and determined that the "scope" of the immunity "intended by 
the General Assembly was very broad."  Id. at 249, 198 S.E.2d 
at 598.  We also, however, reaffirmed the principle that, in 
construing statutes, "courts presume that the legislature never 
intends application of the statute to work irrational 
consequences."  Id. at 249-50, 198 S.E.2d at 598. 
 
Construing this statute to provide absolute immunity as 
the trial court has done, and as Giant urges here, requires the 
conclusion that the General Assembly intended to shield a 
merchant, its agents or employees, from any and all types of 
assaults and batteries.  Under this construction, a merchant 
 
 
 
 
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would not be civilly liable for breaking a suspected 
shoplifter's legs or for other extreme assaultive actions taken 
to detain a suspected shoplifter.  We cannot ascribe such an 
intent to the General Assembly. 
 
Because we have concluded that the immunity granted by 
§ 18.2-105 is not absolute, we must determine the scope of that 
immunity.  We are again guided by Duncan.  In that case, we 
stated that the statute represented the General Assembly's 
attempt to "strike a balance between one man's property rights 
and another man's personal rights."  Id. at 251, 198 S.E.2d at 
599.  The statute "enlarged" a merchant's rights to protect his 
property, but did not enlarge them "infinitely," and 
diminished, but did not extinguish, "the litigable rights of 
the public." 
 
As applied to the issue in this case, we conclude that the 
balance between personal and property rights in § 18.2-105 is 
achieved by providing immunity from civil liability based on a 
wide range of torts, but not extending such immunity in 
circumstances in which the tort is committed in a willful, 
wanton or otherwise unreasonable or excessive manner.  Under 
our construction, merchants, their agents or employees are 
shielded from civil liability for actions reasonably necessary 
to protect the owners' property rights by detaining suspected 
shoplifters.  But, individuals retain their "litigable rights" 
in the circumstances just noted.  This construction of the 
 
 
 
 
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statute is also consistent with the limitations imposed on 
other legislative grants of immunity from civil liability.  
See, e.g., §§ 8.01-220.1:1, -225, -225.1, -226.2, -226.3; 22.1-
303.1; 54.1-2502, -2907, -2908, -2922, -2923, -2924. 
 
In light of our construction of the statute, we conclude 
that dismissing Jury's motion for judgment on the basis that 
§ 18.2-105 provided Giant with absolute immunity from the 
claims asserted by Jury was error.  Accordingly, we will 
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for 
further proceedings, consistent with this opinion. 
 
Reversed and remanded.