Title: Love v. Hammersley Motors Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 010351
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 2002

Present:  All the Justices 
 
BONITA M. LOVE 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 010351 
January 11, 2002 
 
KENNETH HAMMERSLEY MOTORS INCORPORATED 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG 
J. Michael Gamble, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a purchaser of a car, 
who revoked her acceptance of the car and sought monetary 
damages as permitted by Code § 8.2-608, properly filed her 
claim as an action at law. 
 
Bonita M. Love filed her motion for judgment against 
Kenneth Hammersley Motors, Inc. (Hammersley Motors).  She 
alleged that she purchased a 1994 Lexus ES300 car from 
Hammersley Motors, which was unable to cure certain defects in 
the car.  She sought damages and attorney's fees. 
 
Hammersley Motors filed responsive pleadings and a motion 
requesting that the circuit court require that the plaintiff 
elect between her claim for "all monies paid for the vehicle, 
in effect, a [rescission] of contract, and . . . for an award 
of damages proximately incurred by plaintiff as a result of 
defendant's breach of [contract]."  The court required the 
plaintiff to make an election, and she chose to pursue her 
claim for monetary damages.  At the conclusion of a trial, the 
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and awarded 
her monetary damages in the amount of $21,174.89. 
 
Hammersley Motors filed a post-verdict motion and 
requested, among other things, that the circuit court set the 
jury verdict aside because the plaintiff's claim was in the 
nature of "rescission" and, therefore, should have been 
prosecuted in equity as opposed to at law.  The circuit court 
granted Hammersley Motors' motion and ordered a new trial in 
equity.  At the conclusion of the proceeding in equity, the 
chancellor entered a decree in favor of the plaintiff and 
awarded her damages in the amount of $8,780.61.  The 
chancellor also awarded her a portion of her requested 
attorney's fees and entered a final decree.  The plaintiff 
appeals. 
 
Hammersley Motors does not challenge on appeal the 
following facts that were considered by the jury in the law 
proceeding.  The plaintiff purchased a 1994 Lexus car from 
Hammersley Motors on August 17, 1998.  The purchase price of 
the car was $19,508.90.  When the plaintiff purchased the car, 
she received a three-month or 3,000-mile power train warranty 
at no additional cost, and she purchased an extended service 
contract.  Pursuant to the terms of the extended service 
contract, Hammersley Motors agreed to "make repairs or 
replacement as a result of failure . . . to any part" of the 
 
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car covered by the warranty, including the engine and all 
internally lubricated engine parts. 
 
The day after the plaintiff purchased the car, it began 
to malfunction.  The car emitted large quantities of "white 
smoke" from the exhaust pipe.  The car consumed "a quart to 
two quarts of oil every week."  The plaintiff returned the car 
to Hammersley Motors at least five or six times for repair of 
the defects, but Hammersley Motors was unable to correct them.  
Even though Hammersley Motors eventually installed a new 
engine in the car, the car continued to malfunction.  The car 
continued to emit white smoke and would not accelerate 
properly.  Ultimately, the plaintiff returned the car and keys 
to Dirk W. Beasley, Hammersley Motors' general manager, and 
requested that she receive a refund of the purchase price.  
Beasley refused to refund the purchase price to her. 
 
The plaintiff argues that she was entitled to file her 
motion for judgment on the law side of the circuit court 
because she only sought a recovery of monetary damages.  
Responding, Hammersley Motors contends that the plaintiff 
sought the equitable remedy of rescission and, therefore, she 
was required to file her claim in chancery.  Hammersley Motors 
relies upon our decision in Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., 
227 Va. 154, 313 S.E.2d 384 (1984), in support of its 
position.  We disagree with Hammersley Motors. 
 
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As the litigants correctly recognize, Virginia has 
maintained a longstanding distinction between law and 
chancery.  And, "[t]he marked distinction between law and 
chancery, a product of the English legal system, continues to 
exist in the Commonwealth."  Wright v. Castles, 232 Va. 218, 
222, 349 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1986).  When a party seeks solely 
monetary damages "caused by another's tortious conduct, he 
must bring his action on the law side of the court, and either 
party has a right to a jury trial."  Id.; see Stanardsville 
Vol. Fire Co. v. Berry, 229 Va. 578, 583, 331 S.E.2d 466, 469-
70 (1985); O'Brien v. Snow, 215 Va. 403, 405, 210 S.E.2d 165, 
167 (1974). 
 
The plaintiff based her cause of action on Code § 8.2-
608, a part of Virginia's Uniform Commercial Code, which 
permitted her to revoke her acceptance of the car at issue in 
this appeal.  This statute states: 
 
"(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a 
lot or commercial unit whose non-conformity 
substantially impairs its value to him if he has 
accepted it 
 
 
 
"(a) on the reasonable assumption that its 
nonconformity would be cured and it has not been 
seasonably cured; or 
 
 
 
"(b) without discovery of such nonconformity if 
his acceptance was reasonably induced either by the 
difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the 
seller's assurances. 
 
 
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"(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within 
a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or 
should have discovered the ground for it and before 
any substantial change in condition of the goods 
which is not caused by their own defects.  It is not 
effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it. 
 
"(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights 
and duties with regard to the goods involved as if 
he had rejected them." 
 
 
Code § 8.2-711, which is also a part of Virginia's 
Uniform Commercial Code, enumerates a buyer's remedies upon 
revocation of acceptance: 
 
"(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or 
repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or 
justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to 
any goods involved, and with respect to the whole if 
the breach goes to the whole contract (§ 8.2-612), 
the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done 
so may in addition to recovering so much of the 
price as has been paid 
 
 
 
"(a) 'cover' and have damages under the next 
section [§ 8.2-712] as to all the goods affected whether 
or not they have been identified to the contract; or 
 
 
 
"(b) recover damages for nondelivery as 
provided in this title (§ 8.2-713). 
 
 
"(2) Where the seller fails to deliver or 
repudiates the buyer may also 
 
 
 
"(a) if the goods have been identified recover 
them as provided in this title (§ 8.2-502); or 
 
 
 
"(b) in a proper case obtain specific 
performance or replevy the goods as provided in this 
title (§ 8.2-716). 
 
 
"(3) On rightful rejection or justifiable 
revocation of acceptance a buyer has a security 
interest in goods in his possession or control for 
any payments made on their price and any expenses 
 
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reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, 
transportation, care and custody and may hold such 
goods and resell them in like manner as an aggrieved 
seller (§ 8.2-706)." 
 
 
The plaintiff, relying upon these provisions, filed her 
motion for judgment, and she sought damages at law and 
attorney's fees pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 2301, et seq.  She sought no equitable remedies.  
Code §§ 8.2-608 and -711 permit a buyer, such as the 
plaintiff, to recover monetary damages upon revocation of 
acceptance, which may include the purchase price.  Therefore, 
we hold that the plaintiff properly filed her motion for 
judgment on the law side of the court, and the circuit court 
erred when it set aside the jury verdict that awarded damages 
to her. 
 
Contrary to Hammersley Motors' contention, our decision 
in Gasque does not compel a different conclusion.  In Gasque, 
the buyers of an automobile filed a suit in equity against a 
retail car dealership and the manufacturer of the car.  The 
buyers alleged that they purchased a new car from the 
dealership and that after delivery, they discovered numerous 
defects in the car.  The dealer made several attempts to 
correct the defects without success, and the buyers demanded 
rescission of the sale and the return of the purchase price or 
replacement of the car.  In their bill of complaint, the 
 
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buyers sought cancellation of the sale and return of the 
purchase price or, alternatively, replacement of the car with 
a new one of similar model.  227 Va. at 157, 313 S.E.2d at 
387. 
 
In Gasque, the circuit court heard evidence ore tenus and 
ruled that the buyers failed to establish certain elements 
required by Code § 8.2-608.  The court concluded that the 
buyers failed to prove that the car suffered substantial 
impairment of value by reason of the defects and that the 
buyers failed to revoke their acceptance within a reasonable 
time.  Id.  The circuit court did not consider, and was not 
requested to consider, whether the proceeding was filed 
properly in chancery. 
 
On appeal, we held that the buyers did not effectively 
revoke their acceptance of the car because they drove the car 
2,600 miles after they gave their purported notice of 
revocation of acceptance.  Id. at 161-62, 313 S.E.2d at 389-
90.  We pointed out in Gasque that "[a]lthough the U.C.C. 
'Official Comment' appended to [Code § 8.2-608] makes clear 
that the buyer is no longer required to elect between 
rescission and damages for breach, the buyers in this case did 
so by their pleading.  The prayer of the bill is purely for a 
restoration of the parties to the status quo ante, including 
 
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such incidental damages as would accomplish that purpose."  
Id. at 159, 313 S.E.2d at 388. 
 
In the present case, there is no dispute that the 
plaintiff satisfied each of the elements necessary to 
establish that she properly revoked her acceptance as required 
by Code § 8.2-608.  And, unlike the buyers in Gasque, the 
plaintiff filed her motion for judgment for monetary damages 
on the law side of the court, and she contested the circuit 
court's post-trial ruling that her case should have been tried 
in chancery. 
 
Accordingly, we will reinstate the jury verdict that 
awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount of 
$21,174.89.  Hammersley Motors does not dispute that the 
plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.  Therefore, we will remand this 
case to the circuit court so that it can enter an award of 
attorney's fees for the plaintiff.  The attorney's fees award 
should include the attorney's fees that the plaintiff incurred 
during the initial jury trial, the proceeding in equity, and 
on appeal. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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