Title: Harvey v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC17-790
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 15, 2018

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-790 
____________ 
 
HAROLD LEE HARVEY, Jr., 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
November 15, 2018 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Harold Lee Harvey, Jr., appeals the summary denial of his successive 
postconviction motion to vacate his sentences of death under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  
Because we find that the record conclusively demonstrates that Harvey is not 
entitled to relief, we find that the postconviction court properly summarily denied 
Harvey’s motion. 
 
Harvey was convicted in 1986 for the murders of Ruby and William Boyd.  
His crimes are detailed in Harvey v. State, 529 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1988).  We 
affirmed Harvey’s convictions and sentences.  Id.  His death sentences became 
 
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final on February 21, 1989, when the United States Supreme Court denied 
certiorari review.  See Harvey v. Florida, 489 U.S. 1040 (1989).  We denied 
habeas relief in Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1995), and affirmed the 
denial of Harvey’s initial postconviction motion in Harvey v. State, 946 So. 2d 
937, 940 (Fla. 2006).  In the instant appeal, Harvey argues that the postconviction 
court erred in denying his intellectual disability claim without an evidentiary 
hearing and in denying his claim for relief under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 
(2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016).   
A postconviction court’s decision on whether to grant an evidentiary hearing 
on a postconviction motion is a pure question of law, reviewed de novo.  Mann v. 
State, 112 So. 3d 1158, 1162 (Fla. 2013).  “If the motion, files and records in the 
case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, the motion may be 
denied without an evidentiary hearing.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B).   
Harvey’s motion was filed December 20, 2016.  Harvey, who had never 
before raised an intellectual disability claim, argues that his claim was timely 
because he filed two months after this Court decided Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340 
(Fla. 2016).  We have previously held that a similarly situated defendant’s claim 
was untimely because he failed to raise a timely intellectual disability claim under 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  See Rodriguez v. State, 250 So. 3d 616 
 
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(Fla. 2016).  Accordingly, the record conclusively shows that Harvey’s claim is 
untimely, and he is not entitled to relief. 
Harvey also contends that he is eligible for Hurst relief.  This Court has 
repeatedly held that Hurst relief does not extend to cases final before the United 
States Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  See, e.g., 
Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216, 217 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 
(2017).  Harvey’s case became final when the United States Supreme Court denied 
certiorari review of our opinion on direct appeal on February 21, 1989.  See 
Harvey v. Florida, 489 U.S. 1040 (1989).1   Accordingly, the record conclusively 
demonstrates that he is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the postconviction court’s summary 
denial of Harvey’s motion. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs in result. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
                                          
 
 
1.  This is true despite the fact that, in an opinion that never became final, we 
briefly vacated Harvey’s convictions and remanded for a new trial in Harvey v. 
State, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S513, S513-15 (Fla. July 3, 2003) (citing Nixon v. 
Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1995)).  In light of the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004), we withdrew that 
opinion on rehearing, rejected Harvey’s ineffective assistance claim, and affirmed 
his death sentence.  See Harvey v. State, 946 So. 2d 937, 940 (Fla. 2006).   
 
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ANY MOTION FOR REHEARING OR CLARIFICATION MUST BE FILED 
WITHIN SEVEN DAYS.  A RESPONSE TO THE MOTION FOR 
REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MAY BE FILED WITHIN FIVE DAYS 
AFTER THE FILING OF THE MOTION FOR REHEARING/CLARIFICATION.  
NOT FINAL UNTIL THIS TIME PERIOD EXPIRES TO FILE A 
REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result. 
 
I agree that Harvey is not entitled to relief on his intellectual disability claim 
because he “failed to raise a timely . . . claim under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304 (2002).”  Per curiam op. at 2.  However, as I have explained several times, I 
would apply Hurst2 retroactively to Harvey’s case.  See Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 
3d 216, 222-23 (Fla.) (Pariente, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017); 
see also Asay v. State (Asay V), 210 So. 3d 1, 32-36 (Fla. 2016) (Pariente, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 41 (2017).   
Applying Hurst to Harvey’s case, the jury’s nonunanimous 
recommendations for death by votes of eleven to one indicate that the Hurst error 
is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Harvey v. State, 946 So. 2d 937, 941 
(Fla. 2006); see Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 175 (Fla. 2016).  In addition, as 
Justice Anstead argued and I agreed in 2006, Harvey’s counsel failed to present 
significant evidence of mitigation: 
[D]ue to counsel’s blatant neglect in heeding the psychologist’s 
advice, none of this powerful mitigating evidence was ever 
                                          
 
 
2.  Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
2161 (2017); see Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
 
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investigated, developed, or presented.  As our death penalty 
jurisprudence makes clear, counsel’s duty is to thoroughly investigate 
first, and then evaluate in order to develop a sound defense strategy. 
We have a clear breach of counsel’s duty here and substantial 
prejudice as a result.  In the face of an almost apologetic case for 
mitigation, the jury’s recommendation for death was virtually a 
certainty. 
 
Harvey, 946 So. 2d at 951 (Anstead, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
joined by Pariente, C.J.) (emphasis added).  The “evidence of several important 
statutory mitigators and extensive nonstatutory mitigation” in Harvey’s case 
included “numerous and serious mental problems, including organic brain 
damage . . . growing out of the defendant’s deprived and abusive childhood, and at 
least two major traumatic events.”  Id.  Thus, Justice Anstead concluded: 
I would hold that we cannot have confidence in the outcome of 
proceedings so infected by trial counsel’s neglect and ineffectiveness. 
While counsel’s neglect may ultimately have made no difference in 
the establishment of his guilt, the record in this case clearly 
establishes that the adversarial testing mandated by Strickland did not 
take place in the penalty phase proceedings of this case.  We should 
remand for a new penalty phase, so that this essential adversarial 
testing can take place before a reasoned and informed judgment is 
rendered on life or death. 
 
Id. at 952.  Counsel’s deficient representation, as explained by Justice Anstead, 
directly affected what we now know to be Hurst-relevant inquiries, specifically the 
weighing of aggravation and mitigation.  See Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 44.   
Accordingly, I would apply Hurst to Harvey’s case, vacate Harvey’s 
sentences of death, and remand for a new penalty phase. 
 
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Okeechobee County,  
Robert L. Pegg, Judge - Case No. 471985CF000075CFAXMX 
 
Ross B. Bricker of Jenner & Block, LLP, Chicago, Illinois, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Lisa-Marie Lerner and 
Donna M. Perry, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee