Title: A. W. v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 23S-JV-00040
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: March 12, 2024

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 23S-JV-40 
A.W., 
Appellant (Respondent below), 
–v– 
State of Indiana, 
Appellee (Petitioner below). 
Argued: May 4, 2023 | Decided: March 12, 2024 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court 
No. 49D09-2107-JD-5869 
The Honorable Geoffrey A. Gaither, Judge 
The Honorable Duane E. Merchant, Magistrate 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
22A-JV-150 
Opinion by Justice Massa 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Slaughter and Molter concur. 
Justice Goff concurs in the judgment with separate opinion.  
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Mar 12 2024, 10:08 am
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Massa, Justice. 
Does Indiana double jeopardy law apply to a juvenile in possession of a 
firearm with a novel Glock switch feature that turns it into a machine 
gun?1 We know that “[c]onfusion over double jeopardy is not new.” 
Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 59 (Ind. 1999) (Boehm, J., concurring in 
result). More than three years ago, this Court in Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 
227 (Ind. 2020), attempted to clarify double jeopardy by overturning the 
constitutional tests announced in Richardson, which itself sought to 
institute a “single comprehensive rule” that combined a “statutory 
elements” test with an “actual evidence” test for resolving “substantive” 
double jeopardy claims; in other words, claims based on multiple 
punishments for the same act in a single proceeding, not multiple trials. 
Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 240–41. But Richardson ultimately proved to be 
unworkable in practice—in part, because it presented an “either/or” 
option for courts to apply one test over another. Id. at 241. This reflected a 
checkered form of “double jeopardy double talk,” see Akhil Amar, Double 
Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 Yale L.J. 1807, 1807 (1997), that engendered 
“a patchwork of conflicting precedent and inconsistent standards,” Wadle, 
151 N.E.3d at 235. In response, Wadle introduced a three-part test focused 
on statutory interpretation. Id. at 248. Courts have since wrestled with 
applying the Wadle framework, and at times have misapplied its 
instructions by resurrecting a version of the “actual evidence” test from 
Richardson—first in dicta, see Phillips v. State, 174 N.E.3d 635, 646–47 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2021), which then became part of a published decision, see Harris 
v. State, 186 N.E.3d 604, 611–12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). We disapprove any 
 
1 Subsequent to this adjudication, the Governor signed into law House Enrolled Act 1365, Pub. 
L. No. 80-2023, which expanded—for purposes of an enhancement and certain criminal 
offenses—the definition of “[m]achine gun,” to include a weapon “designed to shoot . . . 
automatically more than one (1) shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the 
trigger.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-190(a)(2) (2023). Under the law, subsection (b) further defines 
the meaning of machine gun to include “(1) the frame or receiver of a weapon described in 
subsection (a); (2) a: (A) part designed and intended solely and exclusively; or (B) 
combination of parts designed and intended; for use in converting a weapon into a machine 
gun; and (3) any combination of parts from which a machine gun can be assembled if such 
parts are in the possession or under the control of a person.” Id. § -190(b)(1)–(3). 
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opinion that relies on this principle and reiterate the Wadle test for 
resolving substantive double jeopardy claims, albeit with a small but 
crucial adjustment at Step 2, where courts will now construe ambiguities 
from charging instruments in favor of defendants.  
But first, we have a case to resolve. A.W. challenges his multiple 
juvenile adjudications for possession of a machine gun, a Level 5 felony if 
committed by an adult, and dangerous possession of a firearm, a Class A 
misdemeanor.2 We reach three conclusions about these adjudications. 
First, we find that A.W.’s exclusive possession of a handgun—one with a 
Glock switch attached, which transformed the semiautomatic gun into a 
fully-automatic one—coupled with his abrupt flight, supports the finding 
that he “knowingly or intentionally” possessed a machine gun in violation 
of Indiana Code section 35-47-5-8. Second, we clarify that while Article 1, 
Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution could apply in juvenile 
proceedings, constitutional avoidance counsels against deciding that issue 
today. Third, we hold that possession of a dangerous firearm is a “lesser-
included” offense of possession of a machine gun, and thus violated 
A.W.’s right to be free from substantive double jeopardy under Wadle.  
Accordingly, we affirm the sufficiency of the evidence, but reverse the 
adjudication that A.W. committed dangerous possession of a firearm. 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
A.W., a seventeen-year-old, fled on foot from a traffic stop for speeding. 
While A.W. ran, officers noticed a gun in his hand. Indianapolis police 
officer Scott Highland ordered A.W. to get on the ground several times, 
 
2 “Juvenile adjudication” is now the preferred term of art for what was commonly called a 
“true finding,” the juvenile law equivalent of a guilty verdict on a particular count in adult 
criminal court. The case today involves multiple juvenile adjudications in the same case, 
triggering a Wadle substantive double jeopardy analysis. It does not involve successive 
juvenile adjudications, which could implicate Article 1, Section 14’s procedural double 
jeopardy protections. See infra at Section II. 
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but he continued to run. A.W. tripped, and as he started to fall to the 
ground, he threw the gun away. 
Officer Highland arrested A.W., and, during a pat down search, found 
a phone and a “large sum of money” in his pockets. Tr. at 11. The other 
officer at the scene, Sergeant Kyle Hodges, recovered the gun—a nine 
millimeter Glock 17 handgun with a 30-round extended magazine and a 
laser pointer. Officer Highland noticed the Glock was “essentially” the 
same as his own firearm, except something was “different” about this 
Glock, as it had a modifying device attached. Id. at 12. 
The State filed a delinquency petition against A.W., alleging that he had 
committed acts which, if committed by an adult, amount to three Class A 
misdemeanors: (1) carrying a handgun without a license, (2) resisting law 
enforcement, and (3) criminal mischief. The State also alleged that A.W. 
committed (4) dangerous possession of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor 
applying to mere possession of a firearm by a juvenile. A fellow officer 
assigned to work with the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives task force, discovered the device attached to the weapon 
was a “Glock switch,” which transforms the weapon “from a 
semiautomatic to an automatic handgun,” id. at 21, and explained that 
these modifications have “been around for a few years” and that “we’re 
seeing more and more of them,” id. at 28, 30.  
With this information, the State amended its delinquency petition to 
add another count—possession of a machine gun, a Level 5 felony if 
committed by an adult. After a factfinding hearing, the juvenile court 
concluded that A.W. committed each of the offenses as alleged in the 
amended petition and thus entered separate juvenile adjudications for 
each offense. The trial court placed A.W. on probation and released him to 
his father’s custody. A.W. appealed.  
In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the 
sufficiency of the evidence but reversed in a 2–1 decision on substantive 
double jeopardy grounds. A.W. v. State, 192 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2022), vacated. First, the panel concluded that A.W.’s exclusive possession 
of the Glock as modified was sufficient evidence that he “knowingly or 
intentionally” possessed a machine gun in violation of Indiana Code 
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section 35-47-5-8. Id. at 231. Second, the majority held that (1) dangerous 
possession of a firearm and (2) possession of a machine gun—as charged 
and proven at A.W.’s hearing—violated substantive double jeopardy 
under Wadle, because the “same firearm was the means used to commit 
both offenses,” thus making them factually included offenses. Id. at 232. 
The majority reversed the juvenile court’s adjudication that A.W. 
committed dangerous possession of a firearm. Id. A dissenting opinion, 
however, concluded that the two offenses were not factually included 
because while the charges overlap in that A.W. possessed a firearm, they 
do not amount to multiple punishment because “one requires proof that 
he had the status of a minor” and the other requires proof that he 
“possessed a machine gun, which no person may lawfully possess, minor 
or not.” Id. at 233 (Bradford, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  
A.W. sought transfer on the sufficiency of the evidence issue, and the 
State submitted a brief in response. The State also filed its own transfer 
petition solely on the double jeopardy question. A.W. did not respond.  
We granted transfer, 205 N.E.3d 190 (Ind. 2023), thus vacating the 
appellate opinion, Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).  
 
Standards of Review 
This challenge to the trial court’s multiple juvenile adjudications has 
two layers of review. First, A.W.’s sufficiency of the evidence argument 
“implicate[s] a deferential standard of review.” Carmack v. State, 200 
N.E.3d 452, 459 (Ind. 2023) (cleaned up). When reviewing sufficiency 
claims in the special context of a juvenile adjudication, such as here, “we 
do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility,” but appraise 
“only the evidence favorable to the judgment and the reasonable 
inferences supporting it.” B.T.E. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ind. 2018) 
(citing K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 543 (Ind. 2006)). We will affirm a 
juvenile adjudication “if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the 
[respondent] was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing Moran v. 
State, 622 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ind. 1993)). And second, A.W.’s double 
jeopardy challenge—(1) whether Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana 
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Constitution applies in juvenile proceedings; and (2) whether his multiple 
adjudications violated his right to be free from substantive double 
jeopardy—involves controlling questions of law that we review de novo. 
Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 237; Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262 (Ind. 2020).  
 
Discussion and Decision 
I. 
A.W.’s exclusive possession of the firearm, 
which contained a Glock switch feature, was 
sufficient evidence that he “knowingly or 
intentionally” possessed a machine gun. 
A.W. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the juvenile 
court’s adjudication of possession of a machine gun. He argues that he did 
not know the Glock switch converted the firearm from a semiautomatic 
weapon to a machine gun, and therefore his “mere possession” of this 
feature was insufficient evidence to establish his mens rea. A.W. Pet. to 
Trans. at 6. The trial court considered the facts and found that A.W. 
“knowingly or intentionally” possessed a modified machine gun. Tr. at 60.  
The statutory mens rea requirement imposes the following burden on 
the State: in order to prove that A.W. committed the machine gun offense, 
it must show that he “knowingly or intentionally own[ed] or possesse[d] a 
machine gun . . . .” I.C. § 35-47-5-8. A.W. admits the evidence established 
exclusive possession but claims the State could not show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he knew the Glock switch feature attached to the 
slide converted the Glock to a machine gun. We respectfully disagree.  
Admittedly, it is hard to get inside head of the defendant: “[k]nowledge 
and intent are both mental states and, absent an admission by the 
defendant, the trier of fact must resort to the reasonable inferences from 
both the direct and circumstantial evidence[.]” Stokes v. State, 922 N.E.2d 
758, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. So given this real-world 
constraint, a defendant’s mens rea may be proven by “circumstantial 
evidence,”—that is, it may be reasonably “inferred from a defendant’s 
conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct 
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logically and reasonably points.” Id. Reasonable inferences are 
foundational to criminal law. In Indiana, courts have found that exclusive 
possession of contraband supports an inference that the person “knows of 
the contraband’s presence and of its forbidden character.” Carnes v. State, 
480 N.E.2d 581, 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), trans. denied. Rightfully so. 
Applying Indiana’s exclusive possession precedent to A.W., we 
conclude that his exclusive possession of the gun while the officers were 
chasing him for at least thirty seconds supplied the trial court with a 
reasonable inference that he knew the gun was, in fact, a modified 
machine gun. See id. And the juvenile court finding that his corresponding 
conduct—his abrupt flight from the traffic stop—also supports a 
reasonable inference that he knew the gun was a machine gun. See Stokes, 
922 N.E.2d at 764. We acknowledge this presents a close call, but our 
standard of review requires that we reject any invitation to the contrary 
today because it would amount to an impermissible reweighing of 
evidence. See J.C. v. State, 131 N.E.3d 610, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). We thus 
affirm the juvenile court’s finding that A.W.’s exclusive possession of the 
weapon, coupled with his abrupt flight, is sufficient evidence that he 
“knowingly or intentionally” possessed a machine gun.  
 
 
II. 
Article 1, Section 14’s protective scope for 
procedural double jeopardy could apply in 
juvenile proceedings, but we decline to answer 
that question due to constitutional avoidance.  
We turn next to A.W.’s double jeopardy claim. The threshold issue is 
whether Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution—barring 
procedural double jeopardy—applies in juvenile proceedings.3 While we 
asked for supplemental briefing on this question,4 the doctrine of 
 
3 “No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” IND. CONST. art. 1, § 14. 
4 We thank the parties for their supplemental briefing on this constitutional question. 
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constitutional avoidance cautions answering it today. See Ind. Land. Tr. Co. 
v. XL Inv. Props., LLC, 155 N.E.3d 1177, 1182–83 (Ind. 2020) (explaining 
that “constitutional avoidance . . . weighs against deciding constitutional 
questions not absolutely necessary” to the merits (quotations omitted)).  
To be sure, there is an important doctrinal distinction in Indiana 
between procedural and substantive double jeopardy. In Wadle, this Court 
bifurcated the analysis for procedural and substantive double jeopardy 
claims, grounding the procedural strand in the state constitution and the 
substantive strand in the statutory law.5 For the former type, Wadle 
confirmed that the “protective scope” of Article 1, Section 14 is restricted 
to “successive prosecutions for the same offense.” 151 N.E.3d at 246 
(emphasis added). We acknowledge that same protective scope could 
apply in the juvenile context to restrain successive adjudications for the 
same offense. And yet while we are open to considering whether Article 1, 
Section 14—applicable to claims of procedural double jeopardy—applies 
to juveniles, we reserve that constitutional question for another day. 
 
5 We acknowledge our ongoing role in the confusion surrounding the term “double 
jeopardy.” In Wadle, we tried to clarify that, as a matter of constitutional law, it only bars 
successive prosecutions for the “same offense.” 151 N.E.3d at 246. We have referred to this 
principle as “constitutional” or “procedural” double jeopardy, id. at 245–46, and continue to 
use the term “substantive double jeopardy” to describe the law barring multiple punishments 
in a single proceeding, id. at 246–47, which is not necessarily of constitutional magnitude. Cf. 
at 250 (Wadle does “not suggest that protection from multiple punishments in a single 
prosecution falls beyond the constitutional pale,” as substantive double jeopardy safeguards 
in Indiana may “operate in harmony with, not in isolation from . . . supplemental 
constitutional protections”); see also Randall T. Shepard, Second Wind for the Indiana Bill of 
Rights, 22 Ind. L. Rev. 575, 576 (1989) (Indiana Bill of Rights erects a robust framework of 
constitutional protections enshrined to protect Hoosiers “from the excesses of government”). 
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We must now assess whether A.W.’s multiple adjudications are the 
“same offense” under Wadle, which we assume without deciding applies.6 
 
III. A.W.’s multiple adjudications violated his right 
to be free from substantive double jeopardy. 
Unlike procedural double jeopardy under Article 1, Section 14 (which 
bars successive prosecutions for the same offense), substantive double 
jeopardy refers to claims related to multiple convictions for the same 
offense in a single proceeding. Wadle, 151 N.E.2d at 246–47. We thus look 
to Wadle, which established a three-part test based on statutory sources to 
more faithfully determine whether A.W.’s multiple adjudications were for 
the “same offense.” Today, we apply Wadle step by step, and clarify 
perhaps misunderstood directions, while adding a modification at Step 2.  
A. Three-Step Approach to Substantive Double Jeopardy   
1. Interpret statutory language  
We start with the statutory language of the offenses. “If the language of 
either statute clearly permits multiple punishment, either expressly or by 
unmistakable implication, the court’s inquiry comes to an end and there is 
no violation of substantive double jeopardy.” Id. at 248 (footnote omitted). 
2. Apply included-offense statute 
If the statutory language does not clearly permit multiple punishments, 
“a court must then apply our included-offense statutes to determine 
statutory intent.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Collins v. State, 645 N.E.2d 
 
6 The issue of whether substantive double jeopardy applies in juvenile proceedings is a classic 
policy judgment best fit for the General Assembly. While some criminal-code protections 
apply to juveniles, see I.C. § 31-32-1-1 (criminal procedures apply to juveniles whenever the 
juvenile code does not provide otherwise), the statute for a court’s entry of a judgment and 
sentence when a defendant is convicted of both an offense and an included offense does not 
translate perfectly into the juvenile context of delinquency adjudications, see I.C. § 35-38-1-6. 
For this reason, and out of deference to the people’s branch, we leave this question for the 
legislature to decide if substantive double jeopardy applies in juvenile proceedings.  
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1089, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (highlighting that our included-offense 
statute helps courts ascertain “legislative intent”), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part on other grounds, 659 N.E.2d 509 (Ind. 1995)). An “included offense,” 
as defined by the General Assembly, is an offense  
(1) that “is established by proof of the same material elements or 
less than all the material elements required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged,”  
(2) that “consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an 
offense otherwise included therein,” or  
(3) that “differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a 
less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, 
or public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to 
establish its commission.”  
I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168. “If neither offense is an included offense of the other 
(either inherently or as charged), there is no violation of double jeopardy” 
and the analysis ends—full stop. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248. But if one 
offense is included in the other, the court must proceed to Step 3. See id. 
Confusion abounds about the meaning and application of two key 
phrases: “inherently” and “as charged.” We take this opportunity to 
bridge any analytical gaps. Wadle defined an “inherently included” 
offense as one that “may be established by proof of the same material 
elements or less than all the material elements defining the crime 
charged,” or if “the only feature distinguishing the two offenses is that a 
lesser culpability is required to establish the commission of the lesser 
offense.” Id. at 251 n.30 (quoting Young v. State, 30 N.E.3d 719, 724 (Ind. 
2015)). Wadle thus approved subsection (1) and the last part of subsection 
(3) of the included-offense statute to be within the inherently included 
inquiry. Id. Today, we clarify that this evaluation should be made under 
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all three subsections.7 Thus, to constitute an inherently included offense, it 
must fit within one of those enumerated subsections. I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168. 
Wadle does not define the meaning of “as charged.” See 151 N.E.3d at 
248. But this phrase makes more sense when analyzed at Step 2 within the 
factually included inquiry. These two concepts—as charged and factually 
included—should be treated as synonymous under Wadle: “the charging 
instrument alleges that the means used to commit the crime charged 
include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense.” Id. at 
251 n.30 (quoting Young, 30 N.E.3d at 724) (cleaned up).  
But that leaves us with another open question about the scope of the 
factually included inquiry at Step 2. We conclude that when assessing 
whether an offense is factually included, a court may examine only the 
facts as presented on the face of the charging instrument. This includes 
examining the “means used to commit the crime charged,” which must 
“include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense.” Id. Step 
2 has core constraints: it does not authorize courts to probe other facts, 
such as evidence adduced from trial. Cf. Phillips, 174 N.E.3d at 647. The 
factually included inquiry at this step is thus limited to facts on the face of 
the charging instrument. Otherwise, Step 2 would be another formulation 
of the now-retired Richardson approach. Richardson’s “either/or” regime 
was rejected because it gave courts options, which thus led to a selective 
application of “one test over another.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 241. Using 
their discretion, courts typically focused on actual evidence rather than 
the statutory elements, which led to a mélange of inconsistency. Compare 
Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1222 (Ind. 2015) (double jeopardy violation 
existed “because the facts establishing criminal confinement would also 
establish battery[,]” though the facts establishing the latter offense would 
not have established the former), with Carrico v. State, 775 N.E.2d 312, 314 
 
7  Our decision to bridge this analytical gap today finds support in Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 
563 (Ind. 1995), which left open the door for the first part of subsection (3) of the included-
offense statute—“differs from the offense charged only in respect that a less serious harm or 
risk of harm to the same person, property, or public interest”—to be “treated as an inherently 
included offense” under our double jeopardy analysis. Id. at 566 n.2. 
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(Ind. 2002) (no double jeopardy violation where evidence establishing 
murder established only one element of B felony robbery, even though 
evidence establishing the latter crime may have established the former).  
Inconsistency breeds confusion, and confusion imperils the rule of law. 
In addressing this axiom, Wadle attempted to combat any potential 
legitimacy concerns by restoring order to Indiana’s double jeopardy 
jurisprudence: it focused on the included-offense statute. See 151 N.E.3d at 
235. Wadle thus assigned the “underlying” factual inquiry—which 
includes evidence from trial—to Step 3. Id. at 249. In other words, Step 3 is 
authorized, but only if one offense is included in the other under Step 2. 
Wadle contains clear stopping points in its analytical sequence: if Step 2 is 
not met, the analysis ends. We thus conclude that courts must confine 
their Step 2 analysis to (1) the included-offense statute (whether the 
offenses are “inherently” included), and (2) the face of the charging 
instrument (whether the offenses “as charged” are factually included). 
The Step 2 analysis has produced confusion beginning with Phillips, 174 
N.E.3d 635, an appellate decision that resurrected the actual evidence test 
by importing similar language from Richardson. In Phillips, the Court of 
Appeals found that two offenses “could be factually included depending 
on the manner in which the State charged the defendant and the evidence 
produced at trial. In other words, a prosecutor cannot secure two 
convictions for the same act using the exact same evidence.” Id. at 647 
(emphasis added). Phillips determined the offenses were inherently 
included, but then observed in dicta that possession and dealing in 
methamphetamine were factually included based on the charging 
instrument and evidence at trial, the latter which included the State’s 
closing statements when explaining the evidence of the two offenses. Id. at 
646–47. Simply put, Phillips engrafted Richardson-style language onto Step 
2, and panels have since used phrases like “evidence produced at trial” 
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and “exact same evidence,” to revive an actual evidence test at this step.8 
But Phillips improperly conflates (a) facts on the face of the charging 
instrument and (b) evidence presented at trial, the former which is part of 
the factually included inquiry and the latter which reflects Richardson. 
The case before us today is a consequence of Phillips, as the panel cited 
Phillips for the proposition that two offenses “could be factually included 
depending on the manner in which the State charged the defendant and 
the evidence produced at trial.” A.W., 192 N.E.3d at 232 (emphasis 
added) (citing Phillips, 174 N.E.3d at 647). It also stated that “[a] 
prosecutor cannot secure two convictions for the same act using the exact 
same evidence.” Id. (emphasis added) (quotations omitted). We 
disapprove any opinion that relies on the Phillips interpretation.9 Step 2 
does not allow courts to examine evidence adduced at trial, but only facts 
presented in the charging instrument, including the “means used.” Wadle, 
151 N.E.3d at 251 n.30. 
We acknowledge, as Judge Vaidik did in Mills v. State, that this limited 
analysis under Step 2 “may produce harsh results.” 211 N.E.3d 22, 34 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2023). Indeed, the outcome of a double jeopardy claim could vary 
from case to case based on the degree to which prosecutors include or 
exclude facts in a charging instrument. Id. at 34 n.4. See, e.g., Demby v. 
State, 203 N.E.3d 1035, 1045 n.12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (concluding that 
convictions for attempted murder and aggravated battery violated Wadle 
because the offenses were included “as charged” based on the State’s 
factual allegations that both offenses involved the same firearm, but 
without this inclusion there likely would have been no violation). 
 
8 In Harris, a panel—citing Phillips—focused on evidence at trial instead of analyzing the facts 
on the charging instrument to determine that Level 5 felony intimidation with a deadly 
weapon and Level 6 felony pointing a firearm were “factually included.” 186 N.E.3d at 611–
12. The panel relied on trial testimony, which supported the offense of intimidation with a 
deadly weapon was the “same evidence” to support pointing a firearm. Id. at 612. 
9 We have focused primarily on published decisions citing Phillips for this view, but also 
acknowledge that at least two unpublished cases adopt a de facto actual evidence test at Step 
2. See, e.g., Zoeller v. State, 21A-CR-1012 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2022), trans. denied [4–1, Rush, 
C.J., voting to grant]; Marshall v. State, 21A-CR-1725 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2022).  
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Double jeopardy outcomes should not turn solely on the facts the 
prosecutor elects to include or exclude in the charging instrument. Step 2 
as currently understood confers an asymmetrical benefit to the State.10 
Indeed, this Court in Wadle removed Richardson’s arbitrariness that 
allowed judges to choose between the statutory elements test and the 
actual evidence test because it produced confusion and inconsistency in 
the application of double jeopardy. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 241. But by 
pulling on the strings of Richardson, Wadle loosened the bond of protection 
for defendants by swapping one form of arbitrariness for another: a 
prosecutor until today could unilaterally decide how much to include (or 
not include) in the charging instrument, which could decisively determine 
the outcome of a double jeopardy claim. See Mills, 211 N.E.3d at 34 n.4.  
Today, we eliminate this asymmetrical benefit to the State by holding 
that where ambiguities exist in a charging instrument about whether one 
offense is factually included in another, see Harris, 186 N.E.3d 604, courts 
must construe those ambiguities in the defendant’s favor, and thus find a 
presumptive double jeopardy violation at Step 2. In this event, the State 
can later rebut this presumption at Step 3.11 
A case illustration shows how our new rule would function and apply 
in practice. The Court of Appeals opinion in Harris, 186 N.E.3d at 604, 
which has been partially disavowed today, provides a useful example. In 
 
10 When determining whether one offense is factually included in another at Step 2, Wadle 
constructs an asymmetrical framework benefiting the State in introducing actual evidence. If 
the prosecutor does not include facts in the charging instrument establishing one offense is 
included in another, then there is an irrebuttable presumption that one offense is not factually 
included in another regardless of how clearly the evidence and arguments at trial reveal that 
it is included. But if the prosecutor does include facts indicating one offense is factually 
included in another, then there is only a rebuttable presumption of a double jeopardy 
violation. Thus, the reviewing court then proceeds to Step 3, where the State can rebut the 
presumption with tools the defendant could not employ at Step 2—that is, actual evidence.  
11 To be sure, this modification at Step 2 still allows the State to use actual evidence at Step 3 to 
rebut a presumptive double jeopardy violation. Because we have removed the asymmetrical 
benefit, the defendant would still be barred from relying on actual evidence to establish a 
double jeopardy violation at Step 2. But that concern is now mitigated because the defendant 
would not need evidence at Step 2 given the rebuttable presumption that flows from 
interpreting the charging instrument in the defendant’s favor rather than the State’s.  
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Harris, the defendant was convicted of Level 5 felony intimidation with a 
deadly weapon and Level 6 felony pointing a firearm at the same victim. 
The Level 6 felony pointing a firearm was factually included because “the 
means used to commit” the Level 5 felony intimidation with a deadly 
weapon—pointing a firearm—included “all the elements” of the Level 6 
pointing a firearm offense. Id. at 611; see also Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 251 n.30 
(defining a “factually included” offense).  
But at oral argument here, the State argued it was wrong to find a 
double jeopardy violation in Harris because it was only clear from the 
evidence at trial—not the charging instrument—that the victim was the 
same for both offenses and pointing a firearm was factually included in 
the intimidation with a deadly weapon offense.12 The State’s brief in Harris 
similarly argued that, while the “charging information alleged that Harris 
committed intimidation with a deadly weapon by communicating a threat 
to Mitchell, and while doing so, Harris did draw or use a handgun,” the 
“charge did not specify that a handgun was drawn or used by pointing 
the weapon at Mitchell.” Appellee’s Br. at 17–18 (quotations omitted). 
Based on the ambiguity in the charging information, it is conceivable that, 
while Harris was intimidating Mitchell with a deadly weapon by drawing 
his gun, he pointed the gun at someone else, such as a hostage. But the 
evidence at trial dissipated any doubt about alternate theories. The 
prosecutor convicted Harris by arguing to the jury that Harris “pointed 
that gun at Mr. Mitchell.” Harris, 186 N.E.3d at 612 (quotations omitted).  
If we applied our new rule to Harris, the ambiguity from the charging 
instrument at Step 2 would create a presumptive double jeopardy 
violation that would have been rebutted by the State using actual 
evidence at Step 3. In effect, this removes the need to rely on evidence at 
Step 2 by focusing exclusively on the State’s charging allegations. 
Otherwise, applying the Wadle framework would create unfair outcomes 
 
12 See Oral Argument at 22:39–23:05, A.W. v. State, 23S-JV-40, 
https://mycourts.in.gov/arguments/default.aspx?&id=2734&view=detail&yr=&when=5&page=
1&court=&search=&direction=%20ASC&future=True&sort=&judge=&county=&admin=False&
pageSize=20, archived at https://perma.cc/7ENN-TPL9. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-JV-40 | March 12, 2024 
Page 16 of 20 
based on an asymmetrical benefit to the State. If, for example, a charging 
instrument alleges both theft and robbery, but the prosecutor omits facts 
revealing the theft is not included in the robbery—that is, because the 
actions occurred on different days—the State alone gets a second chance 
at Step 3 to demonstrate the offenses occurred at different times by relying 
on actual evidence and arguments at trial. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249 n.27. 
But in a situation like Harris, if the prosecutor forgets to include—or 
perhaps even strategically omits—operative facts establishing that one 
offense is factually included in another, the defendant does not have any 
means to demonstrate the double jeopardy violation. This would 
undermine the fundamental objectives of Wadle in fashioning a neutral, 
coherent framework for analyzing substantive double jeopardy claims.  
Our adjustment to Wadle today aligns with how courts typically 
construe ambiguities in the criminal context against the State when the 
State is the drafter. See State v. Smith, 71 N.E.3d 368, 371 (Ind. 2017) 
(“Ambiguities are construed against the drafter; in this case that is the 
State, which prepared the plea agreement.”). And “the prohibition against 
cumulative punishment, absent clear statutory language to the contrary, 
corresponds with the principles of due process rooted in the constitutional 
rule of lenity.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249 n.28. The rule of lenity also 
executes a similar function in resolving ambiguities in the defendant’s 
favor rather than the State’s. Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1139 (Ind. 2022) 
(explaining that the rule of lenity “requires us to construe a penal statute 
strictly against the State while resolving any ambiguities in favor of the 
defendant”). In short, our decision today balances the scales by placing a 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-JV-40 | March 12, 2024 
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defendant’s rights “beyond the reach” of unfair prosecutorial discretion,13 
while securing the State’s opportunity to later rebut a violation at Step 3.14 
3.  Examine the facts underlying the statutory offenses 
We have now arrived at the final step in Wadle. If a court has found that 
one offense is included in the other—either inherently or as charged—the 
court must then (and only then) “examine the facts underlying those 
offenses, as presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at 
trial.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249 (emphasis added) (citing Bigler v. State, 602 
N.E.2d 509, 521 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied). Step 3 functions as a 
cabined version of Richardson’s actual evidence test, and it serves an 
important, practical role in our double jeopardy analysis: to facilitate the 
distinction between what would otherwise be two of the “same” offenses. 
See id. at 249 n.27. So, at this final step, a court may only then probe the 
underlying facts—as presented in the charging instrument and adduced at 
trial—to determine whether a defendant’s actions were “so compressed in 
terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to 
constitute a single transaction.” Id. at 249. If the underlying facts reveal the 
two offenses are indeed “separate,” there is no Wadle violation, “even if 
one offense is, by definition, ‘included’ in the other.” Id. That said, if the 
“facts show only a single continuous crime, and one statutory offense is 
 
13 We borrow this memorable phrase from Justice Robert H. Jackson’s prominent opinion in 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943): “The very purpose of a 
Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, 
to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal 
principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, 
a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be 
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.” Id. at 638 (emphasis added). 
14 We also point out that existing protections under our state constitution may alleviate 
potential unfairness from double jeopardy. See Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 250–53 (discussing 
“supplemental constitutional protections” with which “double-jeopardy protections in 
Indiana operate in harmony”). Article 1, Section 13 enshrines a defendant’s right, in “all 
criminal prosecutions,” to “demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him.” IND. 
CONST. art. 1, § 13. This safeguard entitles the defendant to “clear notice of the charge or 
charges against which the State summons him to defend” at trial. Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 565.  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-JV-40 | March 12, 2024 
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included in the other, then the prosecutor may charge these offenses only 
as alternative (rather than cumulative) sanctions.” Id.  
B. Application of Wadle to A.W.’s Multiple Adjudications  
A faithful application of Wadle shows a substantive double jeopardy 
violation occurred. Here, two statutes trigger double jeopardy: (1) 
possession of a machine gun and (2) dangerous possession of a firearm. 
The first offense: possession of a machine gun occurs when a “person . . . 
knowingly or intentionally owns or possesses a machine gun,” a Level 5 
felony. I.C. § 35-47-5-8. “Machine gun” is statutorily defined elsewhere in 
the Indiana Code as: “a weapon that: (1) shoots; (2) is designed to shoot; or 
(3) can be readily restored to shoot; automatically more than one (1) shot, 
without manually reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” I.C. § 35-
31.5-2-190. The second offense: a “child” commits dangerous possession 
of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor, if he “knowingly, intentionally, or 
recklessly possesses a firearm for any purpose other than a purpose 
described in Section 1[.]” I.C. § 35-47-10-5(a). This offense constitutes a 
“Level 5 felony if the child has a prior conviction under this section or has 
been adjudicated a delinquent for an act that would be an offense under 
this section if committed by an adult.” Id. 
Here, “neither statute clearly permits multiple punishments, either 
expressly or by unmistakable implication.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 254. And 
so because the statutory language is unclear, we must now analyze these 
two offenses under our included-offense statute, bringing us to Step 2. 
At Step 2, we reach two independent conclusions. First, we conclude 
that dangerous possession of a firearm is “inherently included” within 
possession of a machine gun. Here, subsection (3) of the included-offense 
statute supports this conclusion. See I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168(3). The State 
contends the two offenses address “separate” harms. See Appellee’s Br. at 
12–14. But being a juvenile in possession is “a less serious harm . . . to the . 
. . public interest” than possession of a machine gun. See Wadle, 151 N.E.3d 
at 254 (stating that OWI-SBI, a Level 5 felony, is the “same” offense of 
leaving the scene of an accident, a Level 3 felony). We thus conclude that 
dangerous possession is inherently included in machine gun possession.  
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Page 19 of 20 
Our second conclusion is equally supported. On review of the face of 
the charging instrument, these offenses are also “factually included” 
because they punish the same conduct as charged against A.W. in the 
juvenile delinquency proceeding. In Count V Possession of a Machine 
Gun, the State charged that “[A.W.] did knowingly or intentionally own 
or possess a machine gun, to-wit; fully automatic Glock firearm[.]” 
Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 61 (emphasis added). The State also charged in 
Count II Dangerous Possession of a Firearm that “[A.W.] did knowingly, 
intentionally, or recklessly possess a firearm for any purpose other than a 
purpose described in Indiana Code Section 35-47-10-1[.]” Id. at 60 
(emphasis added). Based on these charges, A.W. is both a “child” and a 
“person.” And “machine gun” is tucked within the broad category of 
“dangerous firearm.” These classifications overlap and thus punish the 
same conduct.15 The State even conceded at oral argument that a child 
who possesses a machine gun also possesses a dangerous firearm.16 It just 
theorized they were separate offenses with distinct harms. But that 
concession does not offset the fact that, as charged, a child who possesses 
a machine gun necessarily possesses a dangerous firearm. And the extent 
to which there is factual ambiguity about whether the “means used” as 
presented in the charging instrument was the same weapon—a machine 
gun—to commit dangerous possession, the lesser-included offense, see 
 
15 The dissent below posited that the multiple adjudications “do not amount to multiple 
punishments for one act, as one requires proof that he had the status of a minor who could 
not lawfully possess the firearm.” A.W., 192 N.E.3d at 233 (Bradford, C.J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (emphasis added). We disagree. The statutory language—“for any purpose 
other than a [lawful] purpose”—is not an essential element the State was required to prove, 
but rather an affirmative defense, which was not raised by A.W. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 
517 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind. 1987) (explaining possession of a license is an affirmative defense to 
the charge of carrying without a license). The State’s charges essentially establish that no one 
can possess a machine gun for any lawful purpose; thus, any juvenile who is charged with 
machine gun possession could always be charged with dangerous possession.  
16 See Oral Argument at 25:35–25:50, A.W. v. State, 23S-JV-40, 
https://mycourts.in.gov/arguments/default.aspx?&id=2734&view=detail&yr=&when=5&page=
1&court=&search=&direction=%20ASC&future=True&sort=&judge=&county=&admin=False&
pageSize=20, archived at https://perma.cc/7ENN-TPL9. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-JV-40 | March 12, 2024 
Page 20 of 20 
Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 251 n.30, we construe any ambiguity in favor of A.W. 
See Smith, 71 N.E.3d at 371. Thus, the offenses are factually included here.  
And that brings us to the final step of Wadle. Having determined that 
dangerous possession of a firearm is inherently and factually included 
within possession of a machine gun, Step 3 instructs that we examine the 
underlying facts to determine whether the two offenses are the same. 
Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248. Based on the facts in the charging instrument 
and facts adduced at the hearing, we conclude that A.W. possessed the 
same weapon—a fully automatic Glock—for at least thirty seconds, and is 
thus “compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and 
continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Id. at 253. 
Accordingly, we find this tight compression to show a Wadle violation.  
We thus hold that the juvenile court’s multiple adjudications violate the 
substantive prohibition against double jeopardy, and the adjudication that 
A.W. committed “dangerous possession of a firearm” must be vacated.  
 
Conclusion 
For these reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.  
Rush, C.J., and Slaughter and Molter, JJ., concur. 
Goff, J., concurs in the judgment with separate opinion.  
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N T  
Lisa M. Johnson 
Brownsburg, Indiana  
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Theodore E. Rokita 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Justin F. Roebel 
Supervising Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-JV-40 | March 12, 2024 
Page 1 of 6 
Goff, J., concurring in the judgment. 
Indiana’s criminal code forbids convicting a criminal defendant for 
both a greater offense and a lesser, included offense in the same 
proceedings. Not long ago, this Court laid out a three-step analysis 
implementing this protection, hoping to bring clarity to a vexed area of 
the law. Today, the Court strives to resolve lingering uncertainties. It 
succeeds only in part. Though well-intentioned, the Court’s opinion, in 
my view, modifies the included-offense analysis in a manner that 
introduces ambiguity and inconsistency. It also undermines the stability 
of the law. For these reasons, I concur only in the judgment. 
I. Wadle retired the actual-evidence test because,
over the decades, that standard proved
unworkable.
In 2020, this Court handed down its decision in Wadle v. State. Our 
opinion in that case aimed to clear away “a patchwork of conflicting 
precedent and inconsistent standards” defining the bar on “multiple 
convictions or punishments for the same offense in a single trial.” 151 
N.E.3d 227, 235 (Ind. 2020).1 In its place, we offered “clear guidance” to 
the bench and bar. Id. at 244. Wadle first held that the Indiana 
Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause protects only against “successive 
prosecutions” for the same offense. Id. at 246. Protection against multiple 
convictions for the same offense in a single prosecution, on the other 
hand, lay principally in code section 35-38-1-6, which bars convicting and 
sentencing a defendant for both an offense and an included offense. Id. at 
248. Code section 35-31.5-2-168, in turn, defines an “included offense” as
one established by proof of the “same material elements or less than all
the material elements” of the offense charged, as an “attempt to commit”
1 Specifically, Wadle addressed scenarios where “a single criminal act or transaction violates 
multiple statutes with common elements.” 151 N.E.3d at 247. The companion case of Powell v. 
State addressed scenarios where “a single criminal act or transaction violates a single statute 
but harms multiple victims.” Id. (citing 151 N.E.3d 256 (Ind. 2020)). 
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the offense charged, or as an offense distinguished from that charged only 
by “a less serious harm or risk of harm” or a “lesser kind of culpability.”2 
Id. (quoting the statute).  
To apply these statutory protections, we set out a three-step test. At 
step one, we look at the statutes creating the two offenses. If either 
“clearly permits multiple punishment,” the inquiry ends. Id. Otherwise, 
we proceed to step two, at which point we ask whether one offense is 
included in the other under code section 35-31.5-2-168 “either inherently 
or as charged.” Id. Finally, at step three, we ask whether all the facts 
“presented in the charging instrument” and “adduced at trial” show that 
the greater and included offenses constituted “a single transaction.” Id. at 
249 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Step two of the Wadle standard “substantially mirrors the analytical 
framework we use to determine whether a party is entitled to an included-
offense instruction at trial.” Id. at 249 n.25 (citing Wright v. State, 658 
N.E.2d 563, 567 (Ind. 1995)). As Wright explained, one offense may be 
“inherently” included in another based solely on their statutorily defined 
elements. 658 N.E.2d at 566. Alternatively, one offense may be “factually” 
included in another when the charging instrument alleges “the means 
used to commit the crime charged” in such a way as to “include all of the 
elements of the alleged lesser included offense.” Id. at 567. 
Wright’s included-offense analysis is hugely important in the context of 
jury instructions because the State cannot seek an instruction on an 
uncharged offense unless it was fairly included in the offense charged, 
thereby giving the defendant notice. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 251–52 (citing 
Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567); see also Young v. State, 30 N.E.3d 719, 723 (Ind. 
2015). If a prosecutor decides to “‘wield factual omissions as a sword to 
preclude lesser offenses,’” then the defendant may likewise “‘rely on them 
 
2 Unlike the Court, I would hold that the statutory bar on conviction for a greater and an 
included offense also bars adjudicating a juvenile for a greater and an included offense. See 
ante, at 9 & n.6. Although the juvenile law does not so provide, “the procedures governing 
criminal trials apply in all matters not covered by the juvenile law.” Ind. Code § 31-32-1-1. 
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as a shield to limit his defense’” to the offense charged. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d 
at 252 (quoting Young, 30 N.E.3d at 725). “Due process,” as the Wright 
Court emphasized, “will brook no confusion on the subject.” 658 N.E.2d at 
565. 
Included offenses in the Wadle and Wright contexts are two sides of the 
same coin. As we explained in Wadle, “the standard used to identify an 
included-offense at trial effectively delineates the scope of the double-
jeopardy protection on appeal.” 151 N.E.3d at 249 n.25 (citing Moore v. 
State, 698 N.E.2d 1203, 1208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)). Under Wadle, included 
offenses are analyzed the same way in both contexts, promoting 
consistency and minimizing confusion. 
Today, the Court helpfully clarifies a lingering uncertainty by 
explaining that the “as-charged” analysis at Wadle’s step two is limited to 
the facts as alleged by the State in charging the greater offense. Ante, at 11. 
Limiting the analysis to the facts pled in the charging instrument greatly 
simplifies the identification of included offenses, compared with the 
“shifting standards and inconsistent application of controlling tests” that 
came before. See Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 244. I would stop there and let the 
bench and bar apply our clear, consistent, and by now well-established 
standard. 
II. 
The new standard returns us to the actual-
evidence test and raises new uncertainty. 
The Court goes further, however. Its opinion modifies Wadle’s 
included-offense analysis, holding that “where ambiguities exist in a 
charging instrument about whether one offense is factually included in 
another,” the ambiguities must be construed “in the defendant’s favor,” 
resulting in a presumptive—though rebuttable—conclusion that one 
offense does include the other. Ante, at 14 (citation omitted). I appreciate 
the Court’s intent to alleviate by this change an element of unfairness in 
Wadle. I admit that the as-charged branch of step two allows the outcome 
to “vary from case to case based on the degree to which prosecutors 
include or exclude facts in a charging instrument.” Id. at 13 (citing Mills v. 
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State, 211 N.E.3d 22, 34 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)). Still, I cannot endorse the 
Court’s solution for this difficulty. 
My primary concern with the new rule is that it doesn’t merely tweak 
Wadle. Rather, in my view, it takes us back to the “actual evidence” test 
that we abrogated. See Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 241, 244 (citing Richardson v. 
State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999)). That test asked whether there was a 
“‘reasonable possibility’ that the jury used the same evidence to support 
two or more convictions.” Id. at 241 (quoting Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 53). 
Consider the Court’s example of how its new factual-inclusion analysis 
will work. A defendant is charged with intimidation using a deadly 
weapon. Ante, at 15. The information alleges he communicated a threat 
and drew or used a handgun while doing so. Id. The defendant is also 
charged with pointing a firearm at the same victim. Id. These allegations 
leave it ambiguous whether the intimidating use of a handgun was in fact 
the pointing of the firearm, so the majority’s presumption of inclusion 
kicks in unless the evidence at trial shows two separate acts. Id. 
But in what sense does the intimidation offense include the pointing-a-
firearm offense here, other than that both offenses are premised on the 
same act? One can draw or use a handgun without pointing it. The 
intimidation allegation did not specify that it was committed by means of 
pointing the handgun. All that remains is the simple fact that one act 
violated two statutes. 
An example of our own shows how broadly the new rule may sweep. 
Imagine a defendant kills a victim using a machine gun. The State charges 
murder and possession of a machine gun. See I.C. § 35-42-1-1(1); I.C. § 35-
47-5-8. The elements of murder do not inherently include possession of a 
machine gun. Nor, we assume, does the State expressly allege murder by 
machine gun. Yet, under the Court’s new rule, murder includes machine 
gun possession simply because the defendant committed murder by 
means of firing a machine gun. 
The new standard isn’t really asking, then, whether one offense 
includes the other. It’s asking whether the same evidence proves both 
offenses. The Court’s tweak reduces Wadle’s as-charged analysis virtually 
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to step three alone, merely asking whether the evidence shows that the 
same act or “transaction” supported more than one offense. 
It is unclear how workable the new test will be. Although it produces a 
commonsense outcome in the Court’s own intimidation-and-pointing 
example, its application to trickier scenarios raises questions. Consider a 
variation of the Court’s example so that the defendant both menacingly 
loaded the handgun with bullets and pointed it. Does that evidence 
sustain or rebut the presumption that the intimidation included the 
pointing? The question is reminiscent of the intractable evidence-based 
issues we meant to leave behind by focusing on the statutory elements 
and the facts actually pled. See Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 241–44. 
The announcement of the new rule also means that the included-
offense analysis in Wadle’s multiple-conviction context will no longer 
mirror the rule in Wright’s instructional context. Today, the Court holds 
that ambiguity favors a finding of inclusion. But, when there is doubt over 
whether to instruct a jury at the State’s request on a lesser, included 
offense, the ambiguity “‘must be resolved in favor of the defendant’”—i.e., 
against inclusion. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 251 (quoting Young, 30 N.E.3d at 
723). Setting up two different tests for included offenses, as I see it, can 
only breed confusion. 
III. 
This area of the law needs clarity and 
stability, not more change. 
My final concern is simply that the Court is once again changing the 
rules after we tried so recently to bring some stability to the law. Every 
time we make a change, we open precedential case-law to doubt and raise 
issues over which law applies to whom. Last year, in Hessler v. State, a 
Court of Appeals panel split over whether Wadle applies retroactively or 
not. 213 N.E.3d 511, 525 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023); id. at 528 (Vaidik, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Parties will soon be litigating 
and appealing the issue of whether Wadle or A.W. applies to their case. 
Fundamentally, defining when offenses are included or “the same” is a 
vexed problem. These concepts are “deceptively simple in appearance but 
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virtually kaleidoscopic in application.” See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 
684, 700 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The continual churn in our case-law 
proves it. See Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 240–44. It is safe to predict that today’s 
rule-change will trigger new and unforeseen dissatisfactions and 
problems, just as double-jeopardy rules always seem to. The best we can 
do is to give the bench and bar a clear, fixed standard. 
Rather than pursue an ever-receding perfect double-jeopardy rule, we 
should remember the other devices in the “legal toolbox.” Id. at 253. 
Appellate Rule 7(B) is available to “curb cumulative punishment in a 
single proceeding.” Id. Article One, Section Thirteen of the Indiana 
Constitution entitles the defendant to clear notice of the offenses charged, 
which may help detect included offenses and avoid multiple convictions. 
Id. at 250–51. Where a charging instrument leaves it unclear whether two 
alleged offenses arise from the same facts, a defendant may move for a 
“more definite statement” of the charges under Trial Rule 12(E). 
Alternatively, a defendant may prefer ambiguity over whether a charged 
offense includes other offenses or not, hoping to leave the door open to 
conviction on a lesser, included offense. 
In sum, I would clarify that Wadle’s step two is restricted to the 
statutory elements and the facts alleged in the charging instrument, ante, 
at 11, and otherwise leave the standard alone. Aside from that, I agree 
with the Court’s decision on the sufficiency of the evidence, id. at 6–7, and 
its ultimate conclusion that A.W. was wrongly adjudicated liable for the 
included offense of dangerous possession of a firearm, id. at 18–20. I 
therefore concur in the judgment.