Title: State v. Curry
Citation: 263 So. 2d 36
Docket Number: N/A
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: May 18, 1972

263 So. 2d 36 (1972) STATE of Louisiana v. J. C. CURRY. No. 51453. Supreme Court of Louisiana. May 18, 1972. Rehearing Denied June 13, 1972. *37 Paul Henry Kidd, Robert P. McLeod, Monroe, George M. Strickler, Jr., New Orleans, for defendant-appellant. Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., Harry H. Howard, George H. Robinson, Asst. Attys. Gen., Hal R. Henderson, Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee. SANDERS, Justice. By Bill of Information, the State charged J. C. Curry with aggravated criminal damage to property in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:55. The court overruled the defendant's motions to quash the petit jury venire and for a change of venue. After trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The judge sentenced the defendant to a term of 12 years in the Louisiana State Penitentiary.[1] The defendant has appealed, relying upon four bills of exceptions reserved in the trial court. The background facts may be briefly summarized. During 1970, several incidents of racial violence erupted at Homer, Louisiana. On the night of June 12, 1970, Lynn Albritton drove his automobile into the Rose Oil Station at Homer. In the automobile with him were Marion Keene and Steve Middleton. Although the service station attendant had already begun to close for the night, he moved toward the automobile. When he had reached a point between the right door and hood, several shots were fired from behind the service station, striking the automobile. Keene *38 and Middleton were hit by shotgun pellets. Albritton quickly drove away. The three reported the incident to the police and sought medical attention. Law enforcement officers later arrested J. C. Curry, the present defendant, and several others for the offense. Defendant filed a motion to quash the petit jury venire, on the ground that the names for the general venire were taken from the Voter Registration Rolls, that the Rolls did not adequately reflect a proper percentage of "the classes to which defendant belonged," and that women were excluded from the jury bodies. The trial judge held an evidentiary hearing and overruled the motion. Fairness in the selection of jury bodies is a fundamental requirement of both the state and federal constitutions. In the trial of a negro defendant, the jury must be selected without discrimination against members of the defendant's race. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 92 S. Ct. 1221, 31 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1972); State v. Rideau, 249 La. 1111, 193 So. 2d 264 (1966), cert. den. 389 U.S. 861, 88 S. Ct. 113, 19 L. Ed. 2d 128; State v. Mack, 243 La. 369, 144 So. 2d 363 (1962), cert. den. 373 U.S. 917, 83 S. Ct. 1306, 10 L. Ed. 2d 416. In State v. Mack, supra, this Court stated: The order convening the Jury Commission in the present case directed the Commission to select the general venire of three hundred from the Registration Rolls in the following manner: The record reflects that the system was faithfully followed. Clearly, no racial discrimination was practiced in the selection of the names from the Registration Rolls for the general venire. No racial discrimination occurred in the formation of the petit jury venire or panel. The names for the petit jury venire were drawn from the general venire "indiscriminately and by lot." See LSA-C. Cr.P. Art. 416. In selecting the trial jury panel, the names were drawn "indiscriminately and by lot in open court." See LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 784. The sole question is whether or not the use of the Voter Registration Rolls as the source of names for the general venire rendered the jury bodies unrepresentative and discriminatory. The defendant contends that the use of the Registration Rolls undermines the fairness of the petit jury bodies, because the rolls did not adequately reflect the racial composition of the parish. The State, on the other hand, asserts that no showing has been made of racial discrimination in voter registration, that the Registration Rolls represent a rough cross-section of the community, and that the jury bodies are not constitutionally discriminatory merely because they do not reflect the exact racial percentages of the general population. The record discloses that the Voter Registration Rolls were composed of 66% white voters and 34% Negro voters. The names of 2,768 Negroes appeared on the rolls. The 1970 projected census for Claiborne Parish shows that 48.3 percent of the population are Negroes. Among the adult males, 44.6 percent are Negroes. Seven Negroes were on the petit jury venire of thirty for defendant's case. We have often held that, absent a showing of racial discrimination in voter registration, that the Voter Registration Roll is a proper source of names for the general venire. See State v. Poland, 255 La. 746, 232 So. 2d 499 (1970); State v. Rideau, supra. In State v. Poland, supra, we reviewed the jurisprudence and stated: We know of no constitutional requirement that the jury lists be a perfect mirror of the racial composition of the general population. Recently in State v. Grey, 257 La. 1070, 245 So. 2d 178 (1971), we stated: Equally without merit is the allegation that the exclusion of women from the jury bodies deprived the defendant of his constitutional rights. *41 The State concedes that women were excluded, but the defendant has made no showing that any of them filed a declaration for jury service as required by law. Article 402 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides: In Hoyt v. State of Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 82 S. Ct. 159, 7 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1971), the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of such a provision. We have also upheld the constitutionality of the provision. See State v. Pratt, 255 La. 919, 233 So. 2d 883 (1970); State v. Copeland, 255 La. 91, 229 So. 2d 710 (1969); State v. Comeaux, 252 La. 481, 211 So. 2d 620 (1968); State ex rel. Barksdale v. Dees, 252 La. 434, 211 So. 2d 318 (1968). We conclude that the motion to quash the petit jury venire is without merit. The defendant filed a motion for a change of venue, alleging that it was impossible for him to receive a fair trial in Claiborne Parish. The trial judge held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, during which the court heard more than thirty witnesses. The testimony disclosed that there had been several burnings and shooting at Homer with racial overtones. A number of State Highway Policemen were assisting the Claiborne Parish Sheriff in an effort to prevent further incidents. From the testimony offered, the trial judge overruled the motion. In his Per Curiam, the trial judge states: To warrant a change of venue, the burden is upon the defendant to establish that he cannot obtain a fair trial in the parish where the prosecution is pending. State v. Washington, 256 La. 233, 236 So. 2d 23 (1970); State v. Poland, 255 La. 746, 232 So. 2d 499 (1970). We have reviewed the testimony. Several of the major witnesses called by the defense conceded that a fair trial could be had. The contradictory testimony is weak and unimpressive. In its totality, the testimony falls far short of satisfying the requirements for a change of venue. We conclude that the trial judge properly denied the motion. Defendant reserved Bill of Exceptions No. 6, after the court refused to allow defense counsel to call as a witness George Robinson, the Assistant Attorney General who was prosecuting the case for the State. Defense counsel announced that his purpose in calling the Assistant Attorney General was to show that David Crew, the State's witness, had been granted immunity from prosecution. We find no error in this ruling. The Assistant Attorney General announced in open court, out of the presence of the *42 jury, that David Crew had been granted immunity from his part in the crime.[2] David Crew admitted on cross-examination that he had been granted immunity.[3] Since the prosecutor had announced the grant in open court, other witnesses were available to establish the grant of immunity, if testimony other than the admission of David Crew were desired. We find no reversible error in the ruling of the trial judge. In his closing argument to the jury, the prosecuting attorney made the following statement: Defense counsel objected, requested that the jury be removed, and thereafter moved for a mistrial. The trial judge denied the mistrial and the jury returned to the courtroom. The trial judge instructed the jury to disregard the statement insofar as it may have represented an expression of opinion of the prosecuting attorney. Article 774 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides: When the prosecutor's statement is read as a whole, as must be done, it is apparent that it is no expression of an unsupported personal opinion of guilt. Rather, it represents a conclusion based upon the evidence. As such, the argument was proper. In State v. Sercovich, 246 La. 503, 165 So. 2d 301 (1964), we set forth the controlling law as follows: Defendant concedes that the foregoing decision would be dispositive of this case, but submits that United States Supreme Court in Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 85 S. Ct. 546, 13 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1965) has abrogated the prior jurisprudence. We find Turner v. Louisiana inapposite. In that case, the United States Supreme Court reversed the state conviction because two major state witnesses, deputy sheriffs, were placed in charge of the jury and had "close and continual association" with them during the three-day trial. *43 Defendant also relies upon Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 87 S. Ct. 468, 17 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1966). This case is also distinguishable. There, the United States Supreme Court set aside a criminal conviction, because a bailiff remarked to certain members of the jury that the defendant was guilty, that he was a "wicked fellow", and that the Supreme Court would correct any error. We conclude that the bill of exceptions lacks merit. For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. DIXON, J., concurs, being of the opinion that the ruling in Bill of Exceptions No. 6 might have been error, but harmless nevertheless. [1] The trial judge sentenced defendant to an additional 197 days but gave him credit on the sentence for the 197 days in custody prior to trial. [2] Tr. 960, 963. [3] Tr. 976, 983.