Title: Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 88623
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: July 26, 2001

Docket No. 88623-Agenda 19-September 2000.
MICHAEL DUBINA et al. v. MESIROW REALTY 
DEVELOPMENT, INC., et al., Appellants (Litgen Concrete
Cutting and Coring Company, Appellee.)
Opinion filed July 26, 2001.
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in this case is whether settlement of a tort action for
property damage can meet the good-faith requirement of the Joint
Tortfeasor Contribution Act (the Act) (740 ILCS 100/2(c) (West
1994)) when the plaintiffs, as a condition of their settlement
agreement, assign their causes of action to a group of the settling
defendants. The circuit court of Cook County answered this
question in the affirmative and concluded that the settlement
reached by the parties was in good faith. The appellate court
reversed. 308 Ill. App. 3d 348. We granted the settling defendants'
petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
	The dispute which gave rise to this appeal arose from a fire in
April of 1989, which destroyed a building that housed several
Chicago art galleries. The fire occurred while the building was
undergoing extensive renovation. Numerous works of art were
destroyed.
	In the wake of the fire, owners of the art galleries who leased
space in the building, artists who exhibited work in the galleries,
and their insurers, brought a total of 35 separate actions containing
the damage claims of 112 separate plaintiffs, in the circuit court of
Cook County, to recover for property loss. Most of the actions
named as defendants the owners and managers of the building, the
general contractors hired to do the renovation work, and their
subcontractors. The parties to this appeal include the building
owner, Mesirow Realty Development (Mesirow); the general
contractor, CCL of Chicago, Inc. (CCL); and the subcontractors,
Creative Construction, Ltd. (Creative), Economy Mechanical
Industries, Inc. (EMI), K&amp;S Automatic Sprinklers (K&amp;S), and
Litgen Concrete Cutting and Coring Company, Inc. (Litgen).
	As we noted when this case previously was before us (Dubina
v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 178 Ill. 2d 496, 499 (1997)
(Dubina I)), plaintiffs' complaints alleged, in general, that the
various defendants had been negligent in either causing the fire or
contributing to the spread of the fire. Defendants filed answers
denying liability. Defendants also filed third-party claims for
contribution against one another.
	Eventually, plaintiffs' actions were consolidated for discovery
and trial. Prior to trial, all of the plaintiffs settled with all of the
defendants except two: Litgen and Gelick Foran Associates, Inc.
(Gelick Foran). Gelick Foran subsequently obtained summary
judgment in its favor and is not involved in this appeal.
	The settling defendants entered into 29 separate agreements
with plaintiffs. Each agreement required plaintiffs to assign their
claims against Litgen and Gelick Foran to certain of the settling
defendants. Some also named as additional assignees several
insurance companies and other nonparties. See 308 Ill. App. 3d at
350-51.
	The particular assignees varied from agreement to agreement.
In each case, however, the assignees included settling defendants.
Under the terms of the agreements, the settling defendants agreed
to pay plaintiffs a particular amount in settlement and a separate
but equal amount in exchange for the assignment of plaintiffs'
causes of action against Litgen and Gelick Foran. The total amount
paid for settlement was approximately $4.5 million. An equal
amount was paid for the assignments. Pursuant to the agreements,
plaintiffs agreed to cooperate with the assignees in the assignees'
litigation against Litgen and Gelick Foran, and the assignees
agreed to reimburse plaintiffs for the cost of that cooperation.
	Over the course of a series of hearings in June and July of
1994, the circuit court found that each of the 29 settlement
agreements had been made in good faith within the meaning of
section 2(c) of the Act (740 ILCS 100/2(c) (West 1994)). The
circuit court found no evidence of collusion or fraudulent conduct,
and characterized Litgen's position as "drag[ging] their feet and
obstruct[ing] the process." The circuit court noted Litgen's
objection to the settling defendants' motion for a good-faith
finding, but stated that Litgen's position would not promote
compromise or settlement. The trial court also concluded that
Litgen was in the same position it would have been in even if there
had been no assignment of claims.
	The circuit court thereupon entered orders dismissing
plaintiffs' claims against the settling defendants and dismissing all
of the defendants' contribution claims against one another,
including the contribution claims asserted by Litgen. Only
plaintiffs' actions against Litgen and Gelick Foran remained.
	The settling defendants subsequently substituted their
attorneys for plaintiffs' attorneys, and moved for voluntary
dismissal of plaintiffs' claims against Litgen and Gelick Foran.
Their motion was granted on July 28, 1994. Litgen then appealed,
contending that the circuit court should not have found the
settlement agreements to have been made in good faith and should
not have dismissed its contribution claims.
	While Litgen's appeal was pending, the settling defendants,
who had taken plaintiffs' claims by assignment, refiled those
claims against Litgen in the circuit court. The appellate court
thereupon dismissed Litgen's appeal in this case for lack of
jurisdiction (Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 283 Ill.
App. 3d 36 (1996)). This court subsequently concluded that the
appellate court did have jurisdiction and should not have
dismissed Litgen's appeal. We therefore reversed and remanded
the cause to the appellate court for further proceedings. Dubina I,
178 Ill. 2d 496.
	On remand, Litgen again argued that the circuit court had
abused its discretion when it found the settlement agreements had
been made in good faith. As grounds for this contention, Litgen
asserted that the agreements violated the Act by allowing the
settling defendants to seek indirectly a remedy they could not seek
directly, namely, contribution. In addition, Litgen claimed that the
portion of the settlement funds designated for assignments
deprived Litgen of a setoff in that amount. Litgen further claimed
that the assignments contravened the public policy behind the Act,
which is to encourage settlement and the equitable sharing of
damages.
	The appellate court agreed with Litgen and reversed the
circuit court's finding that the settlement agreements had been
made in good faith. Guided by this court's decision in In re
Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d 153 (1994), the appellate court
found the settlement agreements to be antithetical to the Act. 308
Ill. App. 3d at 357. The appellate court concluded that the circuit
court had erred in finding the settlements agreements to be in
compliance with the Act's good-faith requirement, and also had
erred in dismissing Litgen's claims for contribution. 308 Ill. App.
3d at 358.
	The settling defendants now appeal the appellate court's
decision. Appellate briefs have been filed on behalf of Mesirow,
K&amp;S, EMI, and CCL, Creative and Fireman's Fund Insurance
Company (hereinafter "the CCL defendants"). The arguments of
the settling defendants fall into two general categories: first, that
the appellate court erred in relying on Babb because this case is
distinguishable from Babb; and second, that even if Babb applies,
the instant agreements are valid because they were entered into
prior to the Babb decision.
	In reviewing the appellate court's judgment, we must begin
with the provisions of the Act itself. The Act provides that where
two or more persons are potentially liable in tort for the same
injury or the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution
among them. 740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 1994). This right, which
exists only in favor of a tortfeasor which has paid more than its
pro rata share of damages to the injured party (740 ILCS 100/2(b)
(West 1994)), is subject to an important limitation. Under the
terms of the statute, no contribution can be obtained by or from a
tortfeasor with whom the injured party has settled in good faith. If
a tortfeasor settles in good faith, that tortfeasor is not entitled to
recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability is not
extinguished by the settlement (740 ILCS 100/2(e) (West 1994)),
and any contribution liability the tortfeasor might otherwise have
had to any other tortfeasor is thereby discharged (740 ILCS
100/2(d) (West 1994)).
	The requirement of "good faith" is the only limitation which
the Act places upon the parties' right to settle and thereby
extinguish contribution liability. Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 161. What
constitutes "good faith" under the Act is not defined by the statute
itself. Whether a settlement was made in good faith is a matter to
be determined by the trial court after consideration of all of the
surrounding circumstances. Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 162. This totality-of-the-circumstances approach allows trial courts to give effect to
the strong public policy favoring the peaceful settlement of claims,
and at the same time allows trial courts to be on guard for any
evidence of unfair dealing, collusion, or wrongful conduct by the
settling parties. Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 162. A trial court's
determination as to the good faith of a settlement is a matter within
that court's discretion and will be reversed on appeal only if the
trial court abused its discretion. Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 162. However,
a settlement agreement that conflicts with the terms of the Act
and/or is not consistent with the policies underlying the Act cannot
satisfy the good-faith requirement of the Act and cannot thereby
discharge the settling tortfeasor from contribution liability. Babb,
162 Ill. 2d  at 170.
	As noted, in finding that the settlement agreements were not
made in good faith, the appellate court relied upon this court's
decision in Babb. In Babb, this court considered whether loan-receipt agreements were good-faith settlements under the Act.
Babb, 162 Ill. 2d 153. In a loan-receipt agreement, a plaintiff
typically receives an interest-free loan (the settlement money) from
a settling tortfeasor, who then is dismissed from the plaintiff's tort
action. Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 168. The terms of the loan-receipt
agreement generally provide that the plaintiff is obligated to repay
the settlement monies (the loan) received from the settling
tortfeasor out of any judgment or settlement that the plaintiff
receives from the nonsettling tortfeasors. Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 168.
	In finding that loan-receipt agreements violated the good-faith
portion of the Act, this court in Babb noted that the loan-receipt
agreements allowed a settling tortfeasor to accomplish indirectly
that which is expressly forbidden by the Act. Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at
171-72. The Act prohibits a settling tortfeasor from recovering
contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability is not
extinguished by the settlement. 740 ILCS 100/2(e) (West 1994).
We noted that:
		"Loan-receipt agreements, however, allow a settling
tortfeasor to subvert this portion of the Act by allowing
the settling tortfeasor to obtain contribution indirectly
from the nonsettling tortfeasor. The settling tortfeasor
obtains indirect contribution because the plaintiff uses
damages recovered from the nonsettling tortfeasor to
repay the loan to the settling tortfeasor." Babb, 162 Ill. 2d 
at 172.
	Because the loan-receipt agreements allowed a settling
tortfeasor to achieve indirectly that which it could not do directly,
we found that loan-receipt agreements were collusive and not in
good faith. Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 172. In addition, we noted that
loan-receipt agreements like the one in Babb violated the terms of
the Act because the loan-receipt agreements attempt to deprive
nonsettling tortfeasors of their right to a setoff, which protects
nonsettling defendants from paying more than their pro rata share
of the final damage judgment. Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 172-73. Thus,
the loan-receipt agreement not only violated the terms of the Act
by depriving the nonsettling defendants of a setoff, it also violated
the purpose of the Act, which was to "equitably distribut[e] among
all joint tortfeasors the burden of compensating an injured
plaintiff." Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 175.
	Finally, we also found that loan-receipt agreements frustrated
another purpose of the Act, that of encouraging the settlement of
claims. Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 176. The settlement of claims was
frustrated because, in Babb, the plaintiff's estate was required to
obtain the City's approval of any settlement between the plaintiff's
estate and any nonsettling defendants. Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 176.
This court observed that requiring the City's approval of any
settlement made any future settlement with other tortfeasors
unlikely if not impossible, because the City could veto any
proposed settlement, and because the other tortfeasors would be
unlikely to settle a claim on terms dictated by another tortfeasor.
Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 177. Consequently, this court concluded that
loan-receipt agreements violated the terms of and the policies
underlying the Act, such that loan-receipt agreements could not be
considered "good-faith" settlements within the meaning of the Act.
Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 180.
	The appellate court in this case acknowledged that the
settlement agreements and assignments were not loan-receipt
agreements, but found that the principles underlying Babb applied
to bar a finding of good faith. Mesirow, K&amp;S, EMI and the CCL
defendants each argue that the appellate court erred in failing to
consider the defendants' settlement with the plaintiffs as a separate
transaction from the plaintiffs' assignment of their claims. The
settling defendants note that the trial court found that $4.5 million
was an appropriate settlement amount and was made in good faith.
Further, in Illinois, a plaintiff may assign his right of recovery in
a property damage action. The settling defendants contend that
when they received the assignment of plaintiffs' claims, they were
no longer "tortfeasors" under the Act, but for all purposes stood in
the shoes of plaintiffs from whom they took the assignments. As
plaintiffs, the settling defendants are free to pursue their actions
against Litgen. The settling defendants argue that because the
assignment transaction is entirely separate from the settlement
transaction, the settlements in this case differed from the loan-receipt agreements in Babb and were not contrary to the language
and policies underlying the Act.
	The settling defendants are correct that an assignment of a
cause of action for property damage generally is valid in Illinois.
See 735 ILCS 5/2-403 (West 1994). In this case, however, we
cannot look at the assignment of plaintiffs' claims in a vacuum,
but must consider the assignments in conjunction with the
settlement agreements. As the appellate court observed, the
assignments were a condition precedent to the settlement
agreements. 308 Ill. App. 3d at 356. Although the circuit court
found $4.5 million to be a good-faith settlement amount, it is clear
from the record that the parties would not have settled without the
additional $4.5 million and the assignments. Consequently, the
assignments must be considered in reviewing the totality of
circumstances surrounding a good-faith finding.
	Upon review and considering the totality of the circumstances,
we affirm the appellate court's finding that the settlement
agreements and assignments are contrary to the terms of, and the
policies underlying, the Act. The settlement agreements in this
case violate the terms of the Act because they deprive Litgen of its
statutory right to a setoff. When a settlement is reached in good
faith, the amount a plaintiff receives on any claim against any
other nonsettling tortfeasors is to be reduced by the amount stated
in the settlement agreement, or the amount of consideration
actually paid by the settling tortfeasor, whichever is greater. 740
ILCS 100/2(c) (West 1994). This provision protects nonsettling
defendants from paying more than their pro rata share of the final
damage judgment and reflects a public policy of protecting the
financial interests of nonsettling tortfeasors. See Babb, 162 Ill. 2d 
at 173.
	Here, $4.5 million was allocated as payment toward the
settlement, while another $4.5 million was allocated as payment
for the assignments, so that Litgen would be entitled to a setoff of
only $4.5 million, even though the settling defendants had paid,
and plaintiffs had received, consideration totaling $9 million. The
settling defendants respond that the circuit court found that $4.5
million was a good-faith settlement, so that Litgen was not
deprived of its setoff despite the amount paid for the assignments.
As noted, however, the fact remains that the settlement agreements
would not have been entered into absent the additional $4.5
million consideration. The fact that the settling defendants were
willing to pay an additional $4.5 million for an assignment of the
plaintiffs' causes of action certainly calls into question whether a
setoff of only $4.5 million would result in Litgen's paying more
than its pro rata share of the final damage judgment.
	The settlement agreement in this case also defeats the Act's
purpose of equitably distributing among all joint tortfeasors the
burden of compensating an injured plaintiff. In receiving the
assignment of plaintiffs' causes of action, the settling defendants
stand to recoup $4.5 million of their settlement payment (the
portion paid for the assignment), as well as any damages
exceeding $9 million. For example, if Litgen is found liable for
$12 million in damages, it is entitled to a setoff of $4.5 million,
with the result that the settling defendants are reimbursed $4.5
million and receive a windfall of $3 million. Such a result simply
cannot be reconciled with the Act's purpose to equitably distribute
among all joint tortfeasors the burden of compensating an injured
plaintiff. For that reason, the settlement agreements in this case are
contrary to the purpose of the Act.
	The settlement agreements and assignments also violate the
Act because they allow the settling defendants to accomplish
indirectly that which they could not do directly-recover
contribution from Litgen. As noted, the Act prohibits a settling
tortfeasor from recovering contribution from another tortfeasor
whose liability is not extinguished by the settlement. 740 ILCS
100/2(e) (West 1994). Here, the plaintiffs assigned their causes of
action to the settling defendants, thereby allowing the settling
defendants, in the guise of plaintiffs, to indirectly recover
contribution from Litgen. By incorporating an agreement to obtain
an object forbidden by law, such agreements may be regarded as
collusive. See Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 172.
	For these reasons, we find that the settlement agreements at
issue in this case violate both the terms of, and the policies
underlying, the Act. Because the settlement agreements violate
both the terms of and the policies underlying the Act, the
settlement agreements do not satisfy the good-faith requirement of
the Act.
	K&amp;S makes the additional argument, as it did in the appellate
court, that even if the settlement agreements and assignments are
viewed as one transaction, the transaction constitutes a loan-receipt agreement. K&amp;S observes that in Babb, this court validated
loan-receipt agreements entered into prior to September 29, 1994.
Because the agreements in this case were entered into prior to
September 29, 1994, K&amp;S maintains that the agreements are valid
loan-receipt agreements.
	The appellate court found that the settlement agreements and
assignments in this case did not fit the definition of loan-receipt
agreements. 308 Ill. App. 3d at 354-55. The appellate court's
finding was correct. Although K&amp;S points out that no decision
ever has defined a loan-receipt agreement, we cannot construe the
instant agreements as loan-receipt agreements. There is no loan in
this case. Even if the ultimate recovery against Litgen is less than
$9 million, plaintiffs are not required to reimburse the settling
defendants for the amount paid in settlement and assignment.
Absent some type of "loan" component to this transaction, there
is no basis for finding the settlement agreements and assignments
to be loan-receipt agreements.
	Finally, we note that EMI raises the additional argument that
this court should affirm the circuit court's good-faith finding as to
EMI's settlement agreement with the plaintiffs. EMI points out
that it did not take an assignment from plaintiffs. Accordingly,
EMI contends that even if this court finds that the assignments
were improper under the Act, this court should affirm the trial
court's good-faith finding as to EMI.
	Here, too, we agree with the appellate court, which in
addressing this issue, found that because the settling defendants
settled as a group, EMI's payment toward the settlement fund was
part of the combined fund used to pay for the settlement and the
assignment. 308 Ill. App. 3d at 358. It appears from the record that
the funds contributed by the settling defendants were part of one
settlement fund, which then was used toward the settlement
payments and the assignment, without any specific allocation of
funds. In addition, the settlement payment was contingent upon the
assignment. Given the interrelationship of the settlement
agreements and the assignments, as well as the intermingling of
the contributions by all the settling defendants, this court cannot
assume that EMI's contribution was allocated exclusively for
settlement. Consequently, we cannot make a good-faith finding as
to EMI.
	In conclusion, then, we find that the settlement agreements
between the plaintiffs and the settling defendants were not made
in "good faith" within the meaning of the Act. We further find that
the settlement agreements and assignments were not loan-receipt
agreements, which would be considered valid under Babb.
Therefore, we affirm the appellate court's decision reversing the
circuit court's finding that the settlement agreements were made
in good faith, reversing the dismissal of Litgen's contribution
claims, and remanding for further proceedings.
Affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	Whether the settlement agreements at issue here were made
in good faith within the meaning of section 2(c) of the
Contribution Act (740 ILCS 100/2(c) (West 1994)) was a matter
for the trial court's discretion. In re Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d 153, 162 (1994). Unlike, my colleagues, I do not believe that
the trial court abused its discretion when it held that the settlement
agreements challenged by Litgen were made in good faith. I would
therefore affirm the trial court's judgment and reverse the
judgment of the appellate court.
	When a settling tortfeasor can establish that the settlement
was supported by consideration, that is prima facie evidence of the
settlement's good faith. See Solimini v. Thomas, 293 Ill. App. 3d
430, 437 (1997). Once a preliminary showing of good faith is
made, a presumption arises that the settlement is valid. The burden
then shifts to the party challenging the settlement to show that it
was not made in good faith. Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 308, 318-19 (1989). As the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth
Districts of the appellate court have each held, the absence of good
faith must be established by clear and convincing evidence. See
Warsing v. Material Handling Services, Inc., 271 Ill. App. 3d 556,
560 (2d Dist. 1995); Alvarez v. Fred Hintze Construction, 247 Ill.
App. 3d 811, 816 (3d Dist. 1993); Bunge Corp. v. Northern Trust
Co., 252 Ill. App. 3d 485, 505 (4th Dist. 1993); Higginbottom v.
Pillsbury Co., 232 Ill. App. 3d 240, 249 (5th Dist. 1992).
	The settling tortfeasors in this case clearly made a prima facie
showing of good faith. The settlement agreements were supported
by millions of dollars in consideration. Those agreements were
therefore presumptively valid, and the burden was on Litgen to
establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the agreements
had not, in fact, been made in good faith.
	In assessing good faith under the totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis, a court should consider whether the agreement is
consistent with the terms of and the policies underlying the
Contribution Act. An agreement that conflicts with Act's
provisions or its underlying policies will not satisfy the good-faith
requirement and cannot discharge the settling tortfeasor from
contribution liability. Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 170.
	Our court has recognized two policies that support the
Contribution Act: (1) the promotion of settlement, and (2) the
equitable sharing of damages. Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 171. Litgen
asserts that the assignment provisions in the agreements at issue
here, for which the settling defendants paid nearly $4.5 million in
additional compensation, defeat both policies. They do not.
	Nothing about any aspect of the contested assignments can
fairly be claimed to have discouraged litigants from coming to the
bargaining table and resolving their differences prior to trial. For
all parties, the effect of the assignments was to facilitate rather
than impede the settlement process. By affording plaintiffs the
opportunity to obtain additional sums in exchange for assignment
of their causes of action against the nonsettling defendants, the
agreements provided an extra inducement for plaintiffs to settle.
By giving defendants an opportunity they would not otherwise
have had to recover money damages from their nonsettling
codefendants, the agreements offered defendants additional
incentive to settle. From each side, the assignments thus promoted
settlement.
	There is likewise no merit to the contention that the
assignment agreements will apportion the burden of damages
among defendants in a way which is not equitable.
	Although the agreements may ultimately enable the settling
defendants to recover damages from Litgen, their ability to recover
is contingent on the outcome of trial. If Litgen prevails and they
lose, their recovery will be nothing and they, rather than Litgen,
will bear the full weight of plaintiffs' loss. Even if they do prevail,
the recovery will scarcely constitute a windfall. To the extent that
the settling defendants succeed in obtaining any money damages,
it will be because they were willing to bear the full risk and
expense of prosecuting the claims and paid millions of dollars in
advance, without recourse, for the right to do so.		
	There is no unfairness in this for Litgen. Litgen could have
settled too, but chose not to, as was its right. While the company
still faces litigation, its position is no different than it would have
been had the settlements not included the assignments and
plaintiffs prosecuted their claims against it directly. In either
instance, Litgen would not be permitted to recover contribution
from the settling defendants, but would be able to claim a setoff
against any judgment entered against it for the amount stated in the
settlement agreements between plaintiffs and the settling
defendants or the actual amount paid by the settling defendants in
consideration for the release of the settling defendants from
liability, whichever is greater. 740 ILCS 100/2(c) (West 1996).
Litgen would be entitled to such a setoff and will be entitled to
such a setoff if judgment is ultimately entered against it even if the
resultant monetary award is thereby reduced to zero dollars.
Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering, 166 Ill. 2d 337, 368
(1995).
	My colleagues' concern that Litgen's potential setoff might be
inadequate is premature. Whether Litgen is entitled to any setoff
is dependent upon the outcome of the trial, which has yet to occur.
If Litgen's defense is unsuccessful and it needs to claim a setoff
against the judgment entered against it, the amount of the setoff
will be a matter for the trial court to determine. If Litgen is
dissatisfied by the amount of the setoff allowed by the trial court,
it can raise the issue by appeal at that time.
	Even if the adequacy of the potential setoff were properly
before us, my colleagues' concerns would be misguided. The
problem with their analysis is that it overlooks the clear and
unambiguous wording of section 2(c) of the Act. While the terms
of the settlement agreements at issue here allocate only half of the
total consideration paid to the settlement, section 2(c) makes clear
that the phrasing of the agreements is not controlling. If the trial
court ultimately determines that the full $9 million should be
attributed to the settlement and therefore represents "the amount
of consideration actually paid," it may allow the full $9 million as
a setoff, notwithstanding the fact that the terms of the agreements
purport to allocate only $4.5 million to the settlement.
	For Litgen, the principal risk of being the sole remaining
nonsettling defendant is that even after setoff for the amounts paid
by the other defendants in settlement, the judgment could be so
large that it will end up paying an amount disproportionally higher
than its actual comparative fault. Again, however, that potential
result is unrelated to the fact that plaintiffs have assigned their
causes of action to settling defendants. It would exist even if
plaintiffs retained their claims and prosecuted them personally.
	The settlement agreements in this case are not subject to
challenge based on this court's decision in Babb, 162 Ill. 2d 153
(1994). Babb held that a settlement agreement could not be
regarded as having been made in good faith within the meaning of
the Contribution Act where it was the product of collusion and
included a loan-receipt provision. Our opinion expressly noted that
we were overturning the trial court's finding of good faith based
on "the unique facts of th[e] case" (Babb, 162 Ill. 2d at 163). We
further held that "our conclusion that loan-receipt agreements may
not be considered good-faith settlements" applied only to that case
and to settlement agreements executed after September 29, 1994,
the date the opinion was filed.
	The matter before us today involves assignments of causes of
action for property damage, not loan-receipt agreements in a
personal injury case, and Illinois law has long recognized the
validity of assignments of claims for compensatory damages for
damage to property. Grunloh v. Effingham Equity, Inc., 174 Ill.
App. 3d 508, 518 (1988). The agreements here were all executed
and approved before the September 29 date specified in Babb, 162 Ill. 2d  at 179. In addition, there is nothing in this case comparable
to the collusion condemned in Babb. Unlike Babb, this litigation
was underway when the good-faith finding was sought, no effort
was made here to misrepresent the terms of the agreements to the
court, and opposing counsel were fully involved in the hearings on
the agreements' good faith.
	For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the circuit court
did not abuse its discretion when it held that the settlement
agreements at issue here had been made in good faith. The
judgment of the appellate court should therefore be reversed, and
the judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed.