Title: Anderson v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC11-3
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 15, 2012

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-3 
____________ 
 
CANDIE MARIE ANDERSON,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA  
Respondent. 
 
[March 15, 2012] 
 
LEWIS, J. 
 
Candie Marie Anderson seeks review of the decision of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal in Anderson v. State, 48 So. 3d 1015 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010), on the 
basis that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decisions of Brown v. State, 
764 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), and Haygood v. State, 17 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2009), on a question of law.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. 
Const. 
Facts 
 
Candie Anderson entered a no contest plea to the charges of burglary of a 
dwelling, grand theft, and falsification of ownership to a pawnbroker.  The trial 
 
 
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court adjudicated her guilty of all three counts and sentenced her to five years 
imprisonment.  However, the court suspended her sentence on the condition that 
she complete two years of community control followed by probation.  The trial 
court also ordered her to pay monetary restitution to the victims of her crimes.   
 
Before a meeting between Anderson and her probation officer, an arrest 
warrant had been issued for Anderson based on an alleged violation of her 
probation resulting from a failure to pay restitution.  Due to Anderson’s failure to 
pay restitution, the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles 
(DHSMV) had also suspended her driver’s license.  One of the victims of 
Anderson’s crimes informed the probation officer she had seen Anderson driving 
while her license was suspended.  Based on this tip, the probation officer checked 
the driving record of Anderson and confirmed Anderson’s license suspension.   
 
Upon Anderson’s arrival at the meeting, the probation officer arrested her 
for violation of her probation due to her failure to pay restitution.  As the probation 
officer patted down Anderson, she discovered that Anderson had possession of 
automobile keys.  Anderson admitted to the probation officer that the keys 
belonged to her and that she had driven a vehicle to the meeting.  At the time 
Anderson drove the vehicle to the meeting, she allegedly did not have actual 
knowledge that her license was suspended, and she contended that she had not 
received a written notice of the suspension.  She was charged with driving with a 
 
 
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suspended license pursuant to section 322.34, Florida Statutes (2011).  After her 
arrest, Anderson paid the required restitution, and the DHSMV reinstated her 
license.  However, Anderson still faced a charge of violation of probation based 
upon the charge of driving with a suspended license. 
During Anderson’s violation of probation hearing, defense counsel 
contended that the trial court should not find a violation of probation because the 
State had failed to satisfy the requirements of section 322.34(2), as it had not 
proven that Anderson had actual knowledge of her suspended license before she 
drove to the meeting with her probation officer.  The driving record of Anderson 
indicated that the DHSMV mailed a written notice of the license suspension to the 
address on file for Anderson.  The mailing was confirmed when the State entered 
the driving record of Anderson into evidence, which reflected that the DHSMV 
sent notice that was in compliance with section 322.251(1), Florida Statutes 
(2011).   
Anderson testified that the address to which the DHSMV mailed the notice 
of suspension was her place of residence at the time of the license suspension and 
the DHSMV’s mailing.  Defense counsel, however, contended that the fact that the 
DHSMV had mailed a written notice to Anderson’s address could not sustain a 
finding of actual knowledge of suspension and, therefore, did not support a finding 
of a violation of probation for driving with a suspended license.  The trial court, 
 
 
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however, found that the mailing was sufficient to place Anderson on notice of her 
suspended license.  Therefore, the court held that she violated her probation, and it 
reinstated her original sentence that had been suspended. 
On appeal, the Fifth District affirmed.  See Anderson, 48 So. 3d at 1018-19.  
In reaching its decision, the Fifth District construed sections 322.34 and 
322.251(1) together.  See id. at 1018.  It explained that section 322.251(1) outlines 
the manner in which a notice of suspension is provided, and that those parameters 
apply to a charge of driving with a suspended license.  See id.  It also stated that 
section 322.251(1) permits notice either in person or by mail.  See id.  The district 
court then noted the rebuttable presumption of knowledge provided in section 
322.34(2), stated that this presumption was unavailable in this case, and held that 
the unavailability of the presumption did not alter the outcome of this case.  See id. 
at 1018-19.  That rebuttable presumption was not available because this case 
involved a suspension for failure to pay a traffic fine or financial responsibility.  
See § 322.34(2).  More specifically, the district court concluded that the State, even 
without the application of the rebuttable presumption, established the knowledge 
element when it presented evidence of the DHSMV’s mailing of written notice of 
Anderson’s license suspension to her correct address at the time of the mailing.  
See Anderson, 48 So. 3d at 1019.   
 
 
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This review followed.  At issue is whether the Fifth District misconstrued 
the knowledge requirement of section 322.34(2) in light of the decisions in Brown 
and Haygood.  In those decisions, the district courts held that, in instances where 
section 322.34(2)’s rebuttable presumption does not apply, the State must prove 
that an individual has actually received notice of a license suspension to establish 
knowledge of that suspension.  See Haygood, 17 So. 3d at 896; Brown, 764 So. 2d 
at 743-44. 
Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Construction 
 
This case concerns a matter of statutory interpretation and construction, 
which is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.  See City of Parker v. 
State, 992 So. 2d 171, 176 (Fla. 2008).  Legislative intent is the polestar that guides 
the interpretation and construction of a statute.  See E.A.R. v. State, 4 So. 3d 614, 
629 (Fla. 2009).  A court primarily discerns legislative intent by looking to the 
plain text of the relevant statute.  See id.  A court gives a statute its plain meaning 
when the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a definite 
meaning.  See Maddox v. State, 923 So. 2d 442, 450 (Fla. 2006).  When the 
meaning of a statute is ambiguous, a court may turn to the rules of statutory 
interpretation and construction.  See E.A.R., 4 So. 3d at 629.   
One rule of statutory construction is the doctrine of in pari materia.  See id.  
This principle requires courts to construe statutes that relate to the same subject 
 
 
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matter together to harmonize those statutes and give effect to legislative intent.  
See id.  Similarly, a statute is to be read as a consistent whole, and a court should 
accord meaning and harmony to all of its parts, with effect given to every clause 
and related provision.  See Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101, 106 (Fla. 2008).   
Applicable Statutes and Case Law 
 
Under section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (2011), any person who drives 
while his or her license is cancelled, suspended, or revoked, with knowledge of this 
fact, may be convicted of driving while a license is cancelled, suspended, or 
revoked, which is classified as either a misdemeanor or a felony of the third 
degree.  The text of section 322.34(2)-(4) is as follows:   
(2) Any person whose driver’s license or driving privilege has been 
canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons 
defined in s. 322.264, who, knowing of such cancellation, suspension, 
or revocation, drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this 
state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or 
revoked, upon: 
 
(a) A first conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second 
degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. 
 
(b) A second conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first 
degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. 
 
(c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the 
third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 
775.084. 
 
The element of knowledge is satisfied if the person has been 
previously cited as provided in subsection (1); or the person admits to 
knowledge of the cancellation, suspension, or revocation; or the 
 
 
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person received notice as provided in subsection (4). There shall be a 
rebuttable presumption that the knowledge requirement is satisfied if a 
judgment or order as provided in subsection (4) appears in the 
department’s records for any case except for one involving a 
suspension by the department for failure to pay a traffic fine or for a 
financial responsibility violation. 
 
(3) In any proceeding for a violation of this section, a court may 
consider evidence, other than that specified in subsection (2), that the 
person knowingly violated this section. 
 
(4) Any judgment or order rendered by a court or adjudicatory 
body or any uniform traffic citation that cancels, suspends, or revokes 
a person's driver's license must contain a provision notifying the 
person that his or her driver's license has been canceled, suspended, or 
revoked. 
 
(Emphasis added).  In section 322.251(1), Florida Statutes (2011), the Florida 
Legislature delineated what constitutes notice of a cancellation, suspension, or 
revocation: 
All orders of cancellation, suspension, revocation, or disqualification 
issued under the provisions of this chapter, chapter 318, chapter 324, 
or ss. 627.732-627.734 shall be given either by [1] personal delivery 
thereof to the licensee whose license is being canceled, suspended, 
revoked, or disqualified or [2] by deposit in the United States mail in 
an envelope, first class, postage prepaid, addressed to the licensee at 
his or her last known mailing address furnished to the department. 
Such mailing by the department constitutes notification, and any 
failure by the person to receive the mailed order will not affect or stay 
the effective date or term of the cancellation, suspension, revocation, 
or disqualification of the licensee’s driving privilege. 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
 
In 1999, the Fifth District reviewed a conviction under section 322.34 for 
driving with a revoked license, and specifically addressed what constitutes notice 
 
 
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under section 322.251.  See Fields v. State, 731 So. 2d 753, 753-54 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1999).  However, Fields pertained to the 1997 version of section 322.34, which did 
not contain the complete knowledge definition provided in the present version of 
section 322.34(2) that is the subject of this appeal.  See id.  Rather, in 1997, section 
322.34(2) only provided the following:  “The element of knowledge is satisfied if 
the person has been previously cited as provided in subsection (1); or the person 
admits to knowledge of the cancellation, suspension, or revocation; or the person 
received notice as provided in subsection (4).”  Ch. 97-300, § 40, at 5414, Laws of 
Fla.  In 1998, the Legislature amended section 322.34(2) and constructed the 
current definition, which the courts considered in Brown and Haygood, and which 
is at issue in the present case.  See ch. 98-223, § 12, at 2108-09, Laws of Fla.  
Compare § 322.34, Fla. Stat. (1997), with § 322.34(2), Fla. Stat. (1998 Supp.).  
Specifically, the 1998 Laws of Florida added the rebuttable presumption to the 
knowledge definition of section 322.34(2) and formulated the current statutory 
version.  The language added in 1998 as underlined below demonstrates:  
The element of knowledge is satisfied if the person has been 
previously cited as provided in subsection (1); or the person admits to 
knowledge of the cancellation, suspension, or revocation; or the 
person received notice as provided in subsection (4).  There shall be a 
rebuttable presumption that the knowledge requirement is satisfied if a 
judgment or order as provided in subsection (4) appears in the 
department’s records for any case except for one involving a 
suspension by the department for failure to pay a traffic fine or for a 
financial responsibility violation.    
 
 
 
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Ch. 98-223, § 12, at 2109, Laws of Fla.; see also § 322.34, Fla. Stat. (2011).  
In Fields, the defendant contended that the trial court erred when he was 
convicted of driving with a revoked license because the court should have 
instructed the jury that the State was required to establish that the defendant knew 
the DHSMV had revoked his license.  See Fields, 731 So. 2d at 753.  The State 
established that it sent written notice of the revocation to the defendant by mail.  
See id. at 754.  The Fifth District held that this satisfied the notice requirement of 
section 322.251 and, concomitantly, the knowledge requirement of section 322.34.  
See id.  The district court concluded that the scienter element of section 322.34 did 
not require actual knowledge.  See id. 
After Fields, the Fourth District Court of Appeal decided Brown, which 
applied the current version of section 322.34(2) that is applicable in this appeal.  
See Brown, 764 So. 2d at 742-43.  There, the defendant was convicted of driving 
with a suspended license.  See id. at 742.  At trial, the State introduced a copy of 
the driving record of the defendant into evidence.  See id.  The driving record listed 
the same address as the defendant’s license, stated that the license was suspended 
for failure to pay a traffic fine, and provided that the required statutory notice of 
suspension had been sent by mail.  See id. 
The Fourth District examined the text of section 322.34(2) and its 
knowledge definition.  See id. at 743.  The district court stated that, because the 
 
 
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case before it involved a suspension for failure to pay traffic fines, the plain text of 
section 322.34(2) removed the rebuttable presumption that the notice sent to the 
defendant’s address fulfilled the knowledge requirement of section 322.34(2).  See 
id.  It held that, absent the invocation of this presumption, the plain language of 
section 322.34(2) requires the State to prove the defendant actually received notice 
of the suspension.  See id. at 744.  The district court also noted that the only 
evidence presented by the State with regard to notice was the driving record of the 
defendant that reflected notice was mailed to the address of record, but that there 
was no evidence that Brown still resided at the same address when the notice was 
mailed.  See id.  The Fourth District concluded that the mailing of the notice itself, 
given the lack of application of the presumption of section 322.34(2), was 
insufficient to establish that the defendant actually received notice of his license 
suspension.  See id.  The court accordingly held that the State failed to establish 
that the defendant received notice and reversed his conviction for driving with a 
suspended license.  See id.   
After the Brown decision, the First District decided Haygood, which also 
applied the current version of section 322.34.  See Haygood, 17 So. 3d at 895-96.  
There, the defendant was convicted of driving with a suspended license.  See id. at 
895.  The First District reversed the conviction because the State presented 
insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the defendant had knowledge of his 
 
 
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license suspension.  See id.  As in Brown, the State introduced a copy of the 
driving record of the defendant into evidence, which reflected that the defendant’s 
driver’s license was suspended for failure to pay a traffic fine and child support.  
See id.  Unlike the driving record in Brown, however, the driving record for the 
defendant in Haygood failed to list the address of the defendant.  See id.  
Nonetheless, it did provide that, in compliance with section 322.251, notice of the 
suspension had been provided to the defendant.  See id.   
In rendering its decision, the First District agreed with and adopted the 
reasoning in Brown.  See id. at 896.  The district court held that the reasoning in 
Brown was in accord with the plain text of section 322.34.  See id.  The district 
court stated that according to the driving record of the defendant, the license 
suspension was due to failure to fulfill a financial responsibility.  See id.  It held 
that this negated the application of the rebuttable presumption in section 322.34(2) 
with regard to knowledge created by an entry in the DHSMV record, and thus 
required that the State present evidence that the defendant actually received notice 
of his license suspension.  See id.  The district court concluded that the State failed 
to satisfy this requirement because the mere fact that the driving record of the 
defendant listed his license suspension did not establish that the defendant actually 
received notice of that suspension.  See id.  It reversed the defendant’s conviction 
for driving while his license was suspended.  See id.   
 
 
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Decision Below 
In the decision below, the Fifth District correctly held that the State 
sufficiently established the knowledge requirement of the current version of 
section 322.34(2) because (1) the mailing of the written notice of suspension 
satisfied the notice requirement of section 322.251(1), and (2) the State proved that 
this was the address of Anderson at the time of the mailing.  This result is in accord 
with the plain language of sections 322.34 and 322.251(1), as construed together 
and taken as a whole.   
As provided by the Legislature, the knowledge requirement of section 
322.34(2) is fulfilled when an individual “received notice” of that suspension as 
contemplated in section 322.34(4).  (Emphasis added.)  Subsection (4) of 322.34 
mandates that any judgment or order rendered by a court or adjudicatory body or 
uniform traffic citation that results in the cancellation, suspension, or revocation of 
a license must contain a provision notifying the person of that action.  Section 
322.251(1), which concerns the same subject matter as section 322.34—i.e., 
driving while a license is cancelled, suspended, or revoked—explicitly outlines 
two mechanisms for delivery of a written notice of a license suspension, 
revocation, or cancellation under section 322.34.  See § 322.251(1).  The first 
mechanism is to provide the notice “by personal delivery.”  Id.  The second 
mechanism is to “deposit [the notice] in the United States mail in an envelope, first 
 
 
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class, postage prepaid, addressed to the licensee at his or her last known mailing 
address furnished to the [DHSMV].”  Id. (emphasis added). 
Here, the State sufficiently proved knowledge by verifying that the DHSMV 
sent notice of Anderson’s license suspension by mail and that Anderson received 
it.  More specifically, it established that it sent notice of the license suspension in 
accordance with section 322.251(1), i.e., it entered into evidence the driving record 
of Anderson, which illustrated that the DHSMV mailed written notice of 
Anderson’s license suspension to her last known address.  The State then 
established that Anderson received that notice, as evidenced by the testimony of 
Anderson that she resided at the address to which the DHSMV sent the notice at 
the time of the mailing.  Section 322.34(3) permits the consideration of this type of 
testimony as evidence of receipt of notification and knowledge of a license 
suspension.  See § 322.34(3) (permitting a court to consider evidence of 
knowledge, “other than that specified in subsection (2),” when it determines 
whether an individual knew of a license suspension).   
Anderson contends that, in cases such as hers—i.e., when an individual’s 
license is suspended due to failure to fulfill a financial responsibility—the 
rebuttable presumption in section 322.34(2) does not apply.  She asserts that the 
State, therefore, must prove that she actually received the notice and had actual 
knowledge of her suspension.   
 
 
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The Legislature, however, did not contemplate such an exacting burden of 
proving actual knowledge for the State, even in instances when the rebuttable 
presumption of knowledge in section 322.34(2) does not apply.  Rather, the plain 
language of section 322.34(2) permits the State, in instances of a suspension for a 
reason other than the failure to fulfill a traffic fine or some other financial 
responsibility, to invoke a rebuttable presumption of knowledge.  To do so, the 
State must only establish that a judgment or order of suspension as provided in 
section 322.34(4) has been entered on an individual’s driving record.  When, as in 
this case, the suspension is for failure to fulfill a traffic fine or financial 
responsibility, the plain language of section 322.34(2) negates the applicability of 
that presumption.  The language of that section, however, does not alter the 
requirement that the State, even without the invocation of the rebuttable 
presumption, must prove only that the individual received notice.  Here, the State 
fulfilled this burden by establishing that the DHSMV mailed Anderson written 
notice of her suspension to the address where she resided at the time of the 
mailing. 
Conclusion 
Accordingly, we hold that the Fifth District properly affirmed Anderson’s 
license suspension and the revocation of her probation.  We, therefore, affirm the 
 
 
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decision below.  We disapprove Brown and Haygood to the extent that those 
decisions conflict with the opinion of this Court. 
It is so ordered.  
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and 
PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5d09-4267 
 
 
(Citrus County) 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Michael S. Becker, Assistant Public 
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florid, Pamela J. Koller and 
Wesley Harold Heidt, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent