Title: Amstutz v. Everett Jones Lumber Corp.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 040134
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 5, 2004

Present:  All the Justices 
MARY ANN E. AMSTUTZ, ET AL. 
v.  Record No. 040134  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 5, 2004 
EVERETT JONES LUMBER CORPORATION, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY 
William H. Ledbetter, Jr., Judge 
 
The dispositive issue in this case is whether there 
was credible evidence to support the circuit court’s 
finding, under the clear and convincing evidentiary 
standard, of continuous use of a road sufficient to 
establish a prescriptive easement for purposes of forestry, 
timbering, or logging.  Finding each claimant’s use of the 
road insufficient to give notice to the servient landowner 
that an adverse property right was being exercised, we will 
reverse the judgment of the circuit court granting a 
prescriptive easement. 
I.  PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
 
Everett Jones Lumber Corporation (“Jones”) filed a 
bill of complaint to enjoin Mary Ann E. and David E. 
Amstutz1 (“Amstutz”) from interfering with Jones’ use of a 
portion of a roadway known as “Brightwell Road” located in 
Spotsylvania County.  The disputed section of Brightwell 
                     
1 David E. Amstutz was not originally named as a 
defendant but was later added as a necessary party to the 
proceedings. 
 
2
Road runs in an easterly direction from a parcel of real 
estate owned by Jones across property owned by Amstutz to 
State Route 612.2  Jones alleged that Amstutz blocked the 
road by erecting a fence, placing obstacles across the 
roadway, and verbally denying permission to use the 
roadway, thereby preventing Jones from accessing its 
property from State Route 612. 
Amstutz subsequently filed a bill of complaint against 
Elizabeth L. Thomas (“Thomas”) seeking declaratory judgment 
as to whether Thomas had a right to use the same disputed 
section of Brightwell Road to access from State Route 612 a 
parcel of real estate owned by Thomas.3  By a decree of 
reference, the circuit court “combined” the two suits and 
referred them to a commissioner in chancery.  The issues 
before the commissioner were whether Jones and/or Thomas 
enjoyed an easement for ingress and egress over the Amstutz 
property to their respective properties and if so, the 
nature, extent, and description of the easement. 
                                                             
 
2 The portion of Brightwell Road not in dispute in this 
appeal runs in a southwesterly direction across the Jones 
parcel and other tracts of real estate. 
 
3 Initially, only Mary Ann E. Amstutz filed the bill of 
complaint against Thomas.  David E. Amstutz was later added 
as a party plaintiff. 
 
3
In his report, issued after hearing evidence ore tenus 
and viewing the disputed roadway, the commissioner in 
chancery found that both Jones’ and Thomas’ use of the road 
had been uninterrupted for more than twenty years.  The 
commissioner further concluded that the use had been 
continuous in that each one had utilized the “road over the 
Amstutz parcel when needed” to tend and harvest their 
respective tracts of timber.  Finally, the commissioner 
found that Jones’ and Thomas’ use of the road had been 
open, visible, obvious, exclusive as to each one, adverse, 
and under a claim of right.  Based on his view of the 
easement, the commissioner described the roadway as 
“obvious, with some significant shoulder banking, 
suggesting age.”  He noted that it was “a dirt road . . . 
located in a rural area that has not seen residential or 
commercial development.” 
 
Regarding the width of the easement, the commissioner 
in chancery concluded that it was sufficient to allow one 
lane of travel by a tractor trailer hauling timber logs, 
but that the “specific width varie[d] and [was] greater at 
curves than on straightaways.”  Although testimony about 
the width of the easement varied, the commissioner 
concluded “that 15 feet [was] the general width, but that 
[it] expand[ed] or fan[ned] out to a sufficiently wider 
 
4
dimensions [sic] at the intersection with [State] Route 612 
and at curves to permit the passage of timber harvest 
trucks.” 
Amstutz filed exceptions to the report by the 
commissioner in chancery.  After considering those 
exceptions, the circuit court, in an opinion letter, 
approved and confirmed the commissioner’s report except in 
one respect: the court added footage to the width of the 
easement in order to accommodate equipment used to harvest 
timber.  In its final order, the circuit court enjoined 
Amstutz and their successors from “interfering with the use 
for agricultural purposes to-wit: forestry, timbering or 
logging purposes” by Jones and Thomas and “their respective 
successors in title, of the roadway crossing the property 
of Amstutz, . . . which roadway is established hereby as a 
prescriptive easement appurtenant to the properties” of 
Jones and Thomas, “the width of said roadway being 
clarified to be fifteen (15) feet together with temporary 
turns at the bends in the road and at the entrance of the 
public road sufficient to accommodate equipment appropriate 
for the removal of timber, not to exceed twenty (20) 
additional feet.”  Thereafter, Amstutz filed this appeal. 
II. FACTS 
A. AMSTUTZ PROPERTY 
 
5
In 2000, Amstutz acquired approximately 29.77 acres of 
real estate that border State Route 612 in Spotsylvania 
County.4  The parcel is the acreage through which the 
disputed section of Brightwell Road passes and lies 
between the Jones and Thomas parcels and the public road.  
According to Amstutz’s estimation, the length of the road 
from State Route 612 across the 29.77-acre parcel to the 
Jones property is 1100 feet. 
During the period from 1951 until 1999, the Amstutz 
property was owned by an entity referred to as 
“Chesapeake”.5  An individual who had managed Chesapeake’s 
land from 1983 until 1995 testified the company had always 
assumed that there was a “prescriptive” right-of-way across 
Chesapeake’s property from State Route 612 for the benefit 
of the parcels situated to the west.  According to the land 
manager, the road now in dispute was obvious upon visual 
inspection and was the only access to both the Jones and 
Thomas tracts.  Although he never saw anyone using the 
                     
4 Prior to this purchase, Amstutz already owned a 
larger tract of property adjacent to the 29.77 acres. 
 
5 Various exhibits in this case reference Chesapeake 
Forest Products Company, The Chesapeake Corporation of 
Virginia, The Chesapeake Corporation, Chesapeake 
Corporation, and Chesapeake Forest Products Company, LLC.  
The relationship between those entities is not relevant to 
this appeal.  They will be referred to collectively as 
Chesapeake, as did the witnesses. 
 
6
road, he observed evidence of “truck traffic” because “the 
road was rutted.”  At one point while Chesapeake owned the 
property, a gate was installed on the road to keep people 
from “dumping on the property.”  This was done with Jones’ 
permission, and Jones was given a key to the gate. 
B. JONES PROPERTY 
Jones owns approximately 63 acres of real estate that 
it acquired by deed in 1952.  The deed described the tract 
as “lying on both sides of Brightwell [R]oad.”  The 
property lies adjacent to and south of the Thomas parcel, 
and adjacent to and west of the Amstutz property over which 
the disputed roadway traverses. 
The president of Jones testified that, since the 
acquisition of its property, the company has used the road 
in question from time to time “[f]or the purpose of 
inspecting the timber, checking lines, disease control —
bugs,” and determining when to cut the timber and reforest 
the area.  The only access to the Jones property was via 
the road across the property now owned by Amstutz, 
according to Jones’ president.  The company had never been 
denied use of the roadway until Amstutz blocked the route. 
The timber on the Jones property was harvested in the 
late 1950s or early 1960s.  Daniel F. Mastin, Sr., age 76, 
testified that he had harvested timber during the same time 
 
7
period but on property located adjacent to the Jones 
property.  Mastin had been familiar with the disputed 
roadway all his life and had used it when he cut timber on 
the adjacent property.  However, he stated that, during his 
timber harvest, only empty logging trucks exited via the 
road over the property now owned by Amstutz while the 
loaded trucks exited in the opposite direction on 
Brightwell Road. 
Several other witnesses testified as to their use of 
the disputed road.  One had traveled over the roadway to 
reach the Jones property in 1973 for the purpose of 
conducting a land and timber appraisal for the company.  
Others had accessed the Jones property via the disputed 
road at various times during the last 30 years in order to 
inspect growing timber, prepare a timber management plan, 
or “flag” the property lines.  In fact, records from the 
Virginia Division of Forestry showed that seed trees had 
been marked on the Jones property in 1956.  However, a 
natural resource specialist who had worked on both the 
Jones and Thomas parcels testified that he had permission 
from Chesapeake’s foresters to travel across Chesapeake’s 
land (now owned by Amstutz) when he had inspected the Jones 
tract.  Other testimony also revealed that hunters had used 
the road for many years.  The witnesses generally agreed 
 
8
that the only access to the Jones property was by way of 
the disputed road across the Amstutz property. 
C. THOMAS PROPERTY 
Thomas owns approximately 51 acres of real estate 
situated north of the Jones parcel and west of the Amstutz 
property.  The Thomas tract does not abut Brightwell Road 
because a portion of the Jones tract lies between it and 
the road.  However, the president of Jones acknowledged 
that Thomas has the “right to come over [the Jones 
property] for ingress and egress.”  As with Jones, the 
issue is whether Thomas has an easement over that portion 
of Brightwell Road that traverses the Amstutz property. 
Thomas acquired her property in approximately 1957 as 
an investment.  The intent was to replant the area and 
allow a stand of timber to grow.  After the replanting, 
Thomas received periodic reports from a forester about the 
timber growth.  Thomas’ husband also inspected the timber 
about twice a year.  Thomas was not aware of any access to 
her property except by traveling over the disputed portion 
of Brightwell Road.  Thomas never asked permission from 
anyone to use the road. 
Starting in 1994, Charles T. Wright, a consultant 
forester, used the disputed road to access the Thomas 
property for the purpose of locating and marking the 
 
9
boundary lines, cruising the timber, conducting a sale of 
the timber, monitoring the timber harvest, and coordinating 
the reforestation of the Thomas property.  Wright testified 
that, when he first traveled over the disputed road, “it 
had several mud holes” with “fresh ruts in [them],” 
indicating vehicular traffic on the roadway.  There were no 
trees or shrubs growing in the road.  Wright further stated 
that, during the timber harvest on the Thomas property, the 
road was improved and equipment used to harvest the timber 
traveled over the road.  The logger who actually cut the 
timber stated that trucks loaded with logs exited the 
Thomas property via the disputed road. 
Before the Thomas timber was harvested, an agreement 
was entered into between Thomas and Chesapeake (the owner 
of the Amstutz property at that time), which granted a 
temporary right-of-way over the now disputed portion of 
Brightwell Road to State Route 612.  The stated purpose of 
the right-of-way was to transport timber from and to 
reforest the Thomas property.  However, Wright testified 
that, at the time the agreement was made, no one voiced any 
objection to using the road; the agreement was mainly to 
provide for maintenance of the road during the timber 
harvest on the Thomas parcel.  Chesapeake’s former land 
 
10
manager also agreed that the purpose of the agreement was 
for road maintenance. 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
When a circuit court approves a report by a 
commissioner in chancery who heard evidence ore tenus, we 
will affirm the court’s decree unless it is plainly wrong 
or without evidence to support it.  Shepherd v. Davis, 265 
Va. 108, 117, 574 S.E.2d 514, 519 (2003); Snyder Plaza 
Properties, Inc. v. Adams Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 259 
Va. 635, 641, 528 S.E.2d 452, 456 (2000); Ward v. Harper, 
234 Va. 68, 70, 360 S.E.2d 179, 181 (1987).  Thus, we look 
at the commissioner’s conclusions, as approved by the 
circuit court, and determine whether the conclusions are 
supported by credible evidence.  Chaney v. Haynes, 250 Va. 
155, 158, 458 S.E.2d 451, 453 (1995). 
B. PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT 
An easement is “ ‘a privilege without profit, which 
the owner of one tenement has a right to enjoy in respect 
of that tenement in or over the tenement of another person; 
by reason whereof the latter is obliged to suffer, or 
refrain from doing something on his own tenement for the 
advantage of the former.’ ”  Stevenson v. Wallace, 68 Va. 
(27 Gratt.) 77, 87 (1876) (quoting Goddard on Easements, 
 
11
page 2); accord Brown v. Haley, 233 Va. 210, 216, 355 
S.E.2d 563, 567-68 (1987); Bunn v. Offutt, 216 Va. 681, 
684, 222 S.E.2d 522, 525 (1976).  The claimant of a 
prescriptive easement over the property of another must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that “the claimant’s 
use of the roadway in question was adverse, under a claim 
of right, exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted, and with 
the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner of the land 
over which it passes, and that the use has continued for at 
least 20 years.”6  Martin v. Moore, 263 Va. 640, 645, 561 
S.E.2d 672, 675 (2002); accord McNeil v. Kingrey, 237 Va. 
400, 404, 377 S.E.2d 430, 432 (1989); Pettus v. Keeling, 
232 Va. 483, 485-87, 352 S.E.2d 321, 323-24 (1987).  As we 
have previously explained, clear and convincing evidence is  
that degree of proof which produces in the mind 
of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction 
upon the allegations sought to be established.  
It is intermediate proof, more than a mere 
preponderance but less than proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  It does not mean clear and 
unequivocal. 
 
Oberbroeckling v. Lyle, 234 Va. 373, 379, 362 S.E.2d 682, 
685 (1987); accord Fred C. Walker Agency v. Lucas, 215 Va. 
535, 540-41, 211 S.E.2d 88, 92 (1975).  The dispositive 
issue in this appeal is whether there was “credible 
                     
6 In this case, Jones and Thomas each had to establish, 
by clear and convincing evidence, the elements of a 
 
12
evidence” to support the circuit court’s finding that both 
Jones and Thomas had established by clear and convincing 
evidence continuous use of the road in question.  Chaney, 
250 Va. at 158, 458 S.E.2d at 453. 
With regard to the requirement of continuous use, 
Amstutz argues that there was no evidence that the disputed 
road was ever used to haul logs from either the Jones or 
Thomas parcels to State Route 612, except with the express 
permission of Amstutz’s predecessor in title when the 
Thomas timber was harvested.  Thus, according to Amstutz, 
the infrequent use of the disputed road to access the 
Thomas and Jones parcels for purposes of checking timber 
growth, preparing reports, and marking boundaries was not 
sufficiently continuous as to give reasonable notice of an 
adverse claim being exercised against the owner of the 
servient estate. 
Jones and Thomas counter that the road was used “as 
needed” to facilitate the growth, management, and harvest 
of timber on their respective parcels.  Jones points to the 
fact that 11 witnesses testified that there was no access 
to either parcel other than by traveling on the road in 
question and argues that the road was therefore necessarily 
used to harvest its timber in the late 1950s or early 
                                                             
prescriptive easement. 
 
13
1960s.  To show continuous use of the road, Thomas relies 
primarily on the periodic inspections of her timber after 
the property was reseeded in the late 1950s and the harvest 
of that timber in the mid 1990s. 
In Pettus and Ward, we explained that, for a use to be 
continuous, it did not need to be “daily, weekly, or even 
monthly.”  Ward, 234 Va. at 72, 360 S.E.2d at 182 (citing 
Pettus, 232 Va. at 488-89, 352 S.E.2d at 325).  Instead, to 
determine continuity, “the nature of the easement and the 
land it serves, as well as the character of the activity 
must be considered.”  Id.; accord McNeil, 237 Va. at 404, 
377 S.E.2d at 432.  The use must “be of such frequency and 
continuity as to give reasonable notice to the landowner 
that [such a] right is being exercised against him.”  
McNeil, 237 Va. at 404, 377 S.E.2d at 432 (quoting 2 
Frederick D.G. Ribble, Minor on Real Property § 990, at 
1274 (2d ed. 1928)). 
 
In Ward, we held that use of the road in question by 
Dwight Harper, the dominant owner, had been continuous for 
a period of 29 years.  234 Va. at 72, 360 S.E.2d at 182.  
The evidence showed that Harper, his parents, and 
grandparents had hauled “ ‘several hundred thousand feet’ ” 
of timber over the road once or twice each year.  Id. at 
71-72, 360 S.E.2d at 182.  At times, the timbering included 
 
14
using the road in question to take machinery to the 
property to skid the trees and to remove the logs with 
trucks.  Id. at 72, 360 S.E.2d at 182.  Harper also stated 
that, as he used the road, he frequently saw the owners of 
the servient parcel and that, in addition to using the road 
for logging operations, he also traveled over the road on 
many occasions to reach his property.  Id.  Thus, we 
rejected the servient owner’s contention that the use had 
not been continuous.  Id. 
Similarly in Pettus, the dominant owners had used the 
road in question “periodically” over a span of 21 years for 
logging operations, including hauling pulpwood over the 
road at issue in both “single-axle trucks and large 
‘tractor-trailers.’ ”  232 Va. at 488, 352 S.E.2d at 325.  
We concluded that, “[c]onsidering the nature of the 
easement and the uninhabited land which it served, the lack 
of daily, weekly, or even monthly use for the required 
period of time did not . . . interrupt the continuity 
necessary to establish the easement.”  Id. at 488-89, 352 
S.E.2d at 325.  In other words, the road in question had 
been used as needed by the dominant owners.  Id.; see also 
Willis v. Magette, 254 Va. 198, 203-04, 491 S.E.2d 735, 738 
(1997) (continuity shown by constant use of the road in 
question to reach a dwelling house until it burned and by 
 
15
seasonal use for farming, logging, and recreational 
purposes); McNeil, 237 Va. at 402-03, 377 S.E.2d at 431 
(dominant owners used a dirt road “two to three times a 
month to carry feed to their chickens and hogs, twice a 
year to butcher hogs for themselves and others, twice a 
year to remove a hay crop, and two times annually 
thereafter to spray and harvest the apples from trees”). 
In contrast to the evidence in Pettus and Ward, there 
was not “credible evidence” in the present case to support 
the circuit court’s finding that both Jones and Thomas had 
established, under the clear and convincing evidentiary 
standard, a continuous use of the disputed road sufficient 
to give reasonable notice to the servient owner that a 
right adverse to its property rights was being exercised.  
Chaney, 250 Va. at 158, 458 S.E.2d at 453.  As to Jones, 
the evidence was undisputed that the timber on its property 
was harvested in the late 1950s or early 1960s.  However, 
no one testified as to whether the logging trucks and 
equipment needed to harvest the Jones timber used the 
portion of Brightwell Road in dispute or, instead, traveled 
over Brightwell Road in the opposite direction, as was done 
when the timber on an adjacent parcel was harvested during 
the same time period.  The remaining evidence demonstrated 
only a sporadic use of the road by Jones just for purposes 
 
16
of checking timber growth, preparing management reports and 
appraisals, and marking boundary lines. 
As to Thomas, her use of the disputed road, prior to 
the harvest of her timber, had been similar in frequency 
and purpose to that made by Jones.  When the Thomas timber 
was harvested, the road was used but it was with the 
permission of Chesapeake, the servient landowner at that 
time.  Witnesses on Thomas’ behalf stated that the purpose 
of the written agreement between Thomas and Chesapeake was 
to provide for maintenance of the road, but that document, 
within its four corners, clearly granted her a temporary 
right-of-way for the purpose of transporting timber from 
and reforesting her property.  See Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 
Va. 184, 187-88, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984) (a court must 
construe a contract as written). 
 
We acknowledge that the road in question was visible 
even before the Thomas timber was harvested.  However, the 
fact that the road was used by persons for various purposes 
does not mean that there was a sufficiently continuous use 
by Jones or Thomas of such a nature as to establish a 
prescriptive easement for “agricultural purposes to-wit: 
forestry, timbering or logging purposes,” as decided by the 
circuit court.  Continuity must be determined by looking at 
“the nature of the easement and the land it serves, as well 
 
17
as the character of the activity.”  Ward, 234 Va. at 72, 
360 S.E.2d at 182.  There is no question that, in order to 
establish a prescriptive easement for forestry, timbering 
or logging purposes, use of a road need not be daily, 
weekly, or monthly.  To carry out those sorts of 
activities, which are generally seasonal in nature, does 
not require such frequent use of a road.  But, the use must 
nevertheless be of sufficient continuity, in terms of the 
character of the activity and frequency, to give reasonable 
notice to a servient landowner that an adverse property 
right is being exercised.  See McNeil, 237 Va. at 404, 377 
S.E.2d at 432. 
The necessary continuity was present in Ward where 
timber was hauled over the road in question once or twice 
each year, and machinery was taken over the road from time 
to time.  234 Va. at 72, 360 S.E.2d at 182.  Similarly, in 
Pettus, the road in question was used for logging 
operations “periodically” over a span of 21 years.  232 Va. 
at 488, 353 S.E.2d at 325.  Here, there was no timber 
harvested on either the Jones or Thomas parcels for over 35 
years.  So, for more than three decades, the only use of 
the disputed road was for sporadic visits to each of the 
parcels to check timber growth, prepare management plans or 
appraisals, and mark boundary lines.  That limited use of 
 
18
the road was not sufficiently continuous to give the 
servient owner notice that a right was being exercised 
against its property interests. 
 
“[T]he law is jealous of a claim to an easement.”  
Eagle Lodge, Inc. v. Hofmeyer, 193 Va. 864, 877, 71 S.E.2d 
195, 202 (1952).  That is so because “[t]he imposition of a 
prescriptive easement is the taking of a property right of 
the servient owner without payment of compensation.”  
McNeil, 237 Va. at 406, 377 S.E.2d at 433.  It is also one 
of the reasons why this Court decided that a claimant must 
establish a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Pettus, 232 Va. at 486-87, 352 S.E.2d at 324. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that there was not 
“credible evidence” to support the circuit court’s finding 
that both Jones and Thomas had established, under the clear 
and convincing evidentiary standard, a prescriptive 
easement over the road in question.  Chaney, 250 Va. at 
158, 458 S.E.2d at 453.  Neither Jones’ nor Thomas’ use of 
the road was of sufficient continuity to give notice to the 
servient landowner that each one of them was exercising a 
right to an easement “for agricultural purposes to-wit: 
 
19
forestry, timbering or logging purposes.”  Therefore, we 
will reverse the judgment of the circuit court.7 
Reversed and final judgment. 
                     
7 In light of our decision, it is not necessary to 
address Amstutz’s remaining assignments of error.