Title: Turner v. Johnson Controls
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 561, 2011
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANNETTE TURNER,  
 
Employee/Appellant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
JOHNSON CONTROLS, 
 
           Employer/Appellee Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 561, 2011 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, in and 
§  for New Castle County 
§  C.A. No. N10A-12-002 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                        Submitted: April 6, 2012 
 
Decided:  
April 20, 2012 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 20th day of April 2012, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) The appellant, Annette Turner, filed an appeal from the Superior 
Court’s September 26, 2011 order affirming the November 12, 2010 
decision of the Industrial Accident Board (the “Board”), which denied 
Turner’s petition for worker’s compensation benefits.  We find no merit to 
the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) The record reflects that Turner worked for Johnson Controls from 
June 2000 through September 2008.  Turner worked at a machine that 
produced lead batteries.  In October 2000, she complained of chest pain and 
 
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congestion and her primary care physician, Dr. Andrew Ferguson, diagnosed 
her with bronchitis.  In 2004, Turner again suffered a bout of chest pain and 
congestion and was hospitalized.  Ultimately, she was prescribed an 
Albuterol inhaler.  In September 2008, Turner, complaining of chest 
congestion, cough and blood-tinged sputum, saw Dr. Ferguson, who 
diagnosed her with bronchitis and reactive airway disease.  Dr. Ferguson 
referred her to a pulmonologist, Dr. Maheshwari, who also diagnosed 
reactive airway disease.  On instructions from her physicians, Turner did not 
return to work at Johnson Controls. 
 
(3) On September 1, 2009, Turner filed a Petition to Determine 
Compensation Due claiming total disability benefits for the period 
September 10, 2008 through December 17, 2008.  The claim Turner 
presented to the Board was that her job aggravated her pre-existing medical 
conditions by exposing her to “toxic fumes.”  Throughout the course of this 
litigation, the parties have disputed which standard should be applied to 
Turner’s claim.  Turner argues in favor of a “but for” standard of causation,1 
                                                 
1 Reese v. Home Budget Center, 619 A.2d 907, 910 (Del. 1992) (“[a] preexisting disease 
or infirmity, whether overt or latent, does not disqualify a claim for worker’s 
compensation if the employment aggravated, accelerated, or in combination with the 
infirmity produced the disability.”) 
 
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whereas Johnson Controls argues that the occupational disease standard 
governs.2   
 
(4) We have carefully reviewed the record in this case, including the 
transcript of the Board hearing as well as the various submissions of the 
parties and the written decisions of the Board and the Superior Court.  While 
the Board determined that the Anderson standard governed Turner’s petition 
for benefits, and the Superior Court agreed, we do not find it necessary to 
decide the correctness of that determination in this appeal.  We conclude 
that, under either the standard enunciated in Reese or the standard 
enunciated in Anderson, Turner failed to carry her burden of proof on the 
issue of her entitlement to benefits, for the following reasons. 
 
(5) Under Delaware worker’s compensation law, the claimant bears 
the ultimate burden of proof to establish that his or her injury is work-
related.3  This Court has held that an employer can successfully defend a 
petition for worker’s compensation benefits by merely rebutting the 
claimant’s allegation that the injury is work-related.4  The employer need not 
                                                 
2 Anderson v. General Motors Corp., 442 A.2d 1359, 1360-61 (Del. 1982) (“for an 
ailment to be found to be a compensable occupational disease, evidence is required that 
the employer’s working conditions produced the ailment as a natural incident of the 
employee’s occupation. . . .”) 
3 Hoffecker v. Lexus of Wilmington, Del. Supr., No. 523, 2011, Ridgely, J. (Feb. 1, 2012) 
(citing Strawbridge & Clothier v. Campbell, 492 A.2d 853, 854 (Del. 1985)). 
4 Id. 
 
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establish an alternative theory of causation for the injury.5  Moreover, in 
order to prove the necessary causal link between the claimant’s injury and 
his or her employment, the claimant must provide medical testimony 
establishing causation “within a reasonable degree of medical probability.”6 
 
(6) We have carefully reviewed the testimony of Dr. Ferguson, 
Turner’s primary care physician, upon whose opinion Turner relies for her 
claim that her employment at Johnson Controls caused an exacerbation of 
her pre-existing medical condition.  Dr. Ferguson testified that “[Turner’s] 
occupational exposure may have exacerbated her breathing status.”  He also 
testified, responding to a question about what “fumes” Turner was exposed 
to at Johnson Controls, that, “[t]hat was never relevant in my treatment [of] 
Ms. Turner” and “that is out of my realm of expertise.”  Finally, in answer to 
a question about whether Turner’s symptoms were work-related, Dr. 
Ferguson stated, “They may have been.”  
 
(7) We review a decision of the Board in order to determine whether 
substantial evidence exists to support the Board’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.7  “Substantial evidence” consists of such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
                                                 
5 Id. 
6 Diamond Fuel Oil v. O’Neal, 734 A.2d 1060, 1066 (Del. 1999); Rhodes v. Diamond 
State Port Corp., Del. Supr., No. 79, 2010, Jacobs, J. (July 29, 2010) (citing General 
Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688-89 (Del. 1960)). 
7 Person-Gaines v. Pepco Holdings, Inc., 981 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Del. 2009). 
 
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conclusion.8  This Court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions 
of credibility or make its own factual findings.9  The standard of review for a 
decision of the Board is abuse of discretion.10 
 
(8) In its decision denying Turner’s petition for benefits, the Board 
concluded that Turner had failed to carry her burden of proof with respect to 
her entitlement to worker’s compensation benefits.11  We find upon careful 
review of this matter, utilizing the standard of review appropriate to this 
Court’s review of a decision of the Board, that there was substantial record 
evidence supporting the Board’s conclusion.  As such, the decision of the 
Board denying Turner’s worker’s compensation claim must be affirmed. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
         Justice  
 
                                                 
8 Id. (citing Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981)). 
9 Id. (citing Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del. 1965)). 
10 Hoffecker v. Lexus of Wilmington, Del. Supr., No. 523, 2011, Ridgely, J. (Feb. 1, 
2012). 
11 To the extent that the Board utilized an incorrect standard in reaching that conclusion, 
we find any such error to be harmless.  Hoffecker v. Lexus of Wilmington, Del. Supr., No. 
523, 2011, Ridgely, J. (Feb. 1, 2012).