Title: GODFREY v PILON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12681
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 23, 1974

No. 12681 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1974 LEE G O D F R E Y and VEGA GODFREY, husband and wife; MARINER B. B A L L A R D and GWEN 0. BALLARD, husband and wife; and DICK N E W T O N , P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, GENE H. PILON and THAIS PILON, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Frank E. Blair, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Schulz and Davis, Dillon, Montana Carl M. Davis argued and John Warren appeared, Dillon, Montana For Respondents : Frank M. Davis argued, Dillon, Montana Submitted: November 21, 1974 Decided :DEC 1 3 974 Filed : DEC 2 3 1974 Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This is an appeal by defendants, Gene and Thais Pilon, from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t court, County of Beaverhead, which quieted t i t l e t o an easement running across t h e land of defendants, i n the p l a i n t i f f s , Lee and Vega Godfrey; Mariner and Gwen Ballard; and Dick Newton. O n J u l y 18, 1972, p l a i n t i f f s f i l e d t h e i r complaint a l l e g i n g t h a t defendants had denied p l a i n t i f f s ' use of a road across defendants' property. P l a i n t i f f s requested and received from t h e c o u r t an injunction pendente l i t e ordering t h e Pilons t o remove a fence from t h e road and not t o i n t e r f e r e with plain- t i f f s ' use thereof, pending a hearing. Pilons immediately com- p l i e d with t h e order and f i l e d a motion t o d i s s o l v e injunction which was denied by the court. The injunction has s i n c e remained i n e f f e c t . Following a nonjury t r i a l , t h e c o u r t made and entered findings of f a c t s and conclusions of law i n favor of p l a i n t i f f s and a g a i n s t Pilons. Exceptions t o t h e findings and conclusions were duly f i l e d by Pilons, but refused by t h e court. Judgment i n favor of p l a i n t i f f s was entered, from which Pilons now appeal. The p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n own t r a c t s of land i n Section 5, T. 5 S., R. 1 2 W., M.P.M., near Elkhorn Hot Springs and t h e Rainy Mountain Ski H i l l i n Beaverhead County, approximately 34 m i l e s west of Dillon. T i t l e t o each t r a c t came from a common grantor, John Miller, who, i n 1962, commenced a program of sub- dividing and s e l l i n g t r a c t s of h i s land. None of t h e conveyances involved i n t h i s lawsuit contain any g r a n t o r reservation of an easement o r r i g h t of way. O n May 25, 1962, M i l l e r sold a t r a c t of land 100 f e e t wide by 150 f e e t deep t o H. J. Howard. This t r a c t , which w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o here a s t h e Howard t r a c t , was bounded on t h e w e s t by t h e National Forest and on t h e north by a f o r e s t s e r v i c e road. O n June 6, 1962, t h e Pilons, defendants i n t h i s a c t i o n , pur- chased by warranty deed t h e f e e simple t i t l e t o a t r a c t of land 1 0 0 f e e t wide by 150 f e e t deep fronting on t h e f o r e s t s e r v i c e road. Pilons' t r a c t was e a s t of and contiguous t o t h e Howard t r a c t . A t t h e t i m e of deed t o t h e Pilons, M i l l e r owned o t h e r land f r o n t i n g on t h e f o r e s t service road as w e l l a s o t h e r land south of t h e t r a c t s conveyed. Over a year l a t e r , on August 2 7 , 1963, M i l l e r sold a t h i r d t r a c t of land t o D r . McLaren ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e McLaren t r a c t ) . The McLaren t r a c t was a l s o bounded on t h e north by t h e f o r e s t service road. It w a s e a s t of and contiguous t o t h e Pilon t r a c t . A n examination of t h e Pilon deed and t h e McLaren deed confirms t h e f a c t t h a t t h e Pilons' e a s t l i n e w a s used a s t h e point of beginning f o r t h e w e s t l i n e i n t h e McLaren deed. These boundaries a r e i d e n t i c a l . The McLaren deed merely r e t r a c e s t h e metes and bounds of t h e Pilon deed i n order t o a r r i v e a t a p o i n t of beginning f o r t h e McLaren t r a c t . It then proceeds with t h e mates and bounds of t h e McLaren t r a c t , running south along t h e l i n e previously established as t h e e a s t boundary of t h e Pilon t r a c t . Miller, a layman with regard t o c i v i l engineering matters, prepared t h e metes and bounds d e s c r i p t i o n s t o t h e various tracts sold, and delivered t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s t o h i s attorney f o r t h e preparation of t h e deeds. I n J u l y 1968, Miller sold a d d i t i o n a l t r a c t s of land t o t h e Godfreys. These tracts were south of t h e t h r e e t r a c t s pre- viously sold. In t h e summer of 1968, Miller caused a road t o be constructed over t h e land he had sold t h e Pilons i n 1962 i n order t o provide access t o t h e lands he wished t o s e l l t h e Godfreys. This road, t h e subject of t h i s lawsuit, runs generally i n a north- south d i r e c t i o n over t h e e a s t edge of t h e Pilon t r a c t . P r i o r t o 1968, t h e r e was no road, t r a i l , path o r o t h e r way a c r o s s Pilonst land. The road was gouged o u t of a v i r g i n timbered h i l l s i d e by a bulldozer operated by one Wayne Stocks a t M i l l e r ' s d i r e c t i o n and without t h e P i l o n s l knowledge o r consent. Godfreys t e s t i f i e d they w e r e l e d t o believe t h a t access t o t h e lands they purchased was by a road over a s t r i p of land Miller had reserved between t h e McLaren and Pilon t r a c t s . Godfreys acknowledged t h a t t h e i r deeds contained no g r a n t of r i g h t of way o r easements. They a l s o acknowledged t h a t they had not checked t h e boundaries nor obtain- ed any p l a t o r survey of t h e property purchased from Miller, nor had any survey made t o determine t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e road u n t i l a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of t h i s s u i t . There is no claim o r finding of an easement by adverse use here, as t h e f i v e year requirement of section 93-2513, R.C.M. 1947, has not been met. The g r e a t e s t period of use p l a i n t i f f s could claim would be from J u l y 1968 t o J u l y 17, 1972, when Pilons fenced t h e road, o r a period of four years. After its i n i t i a l construction, t h e road was widened by Godfrey t o its present dimensions of 150 f e e t i n length by 1 0 t o 12 f e e t i n width, again without informing t h e Pilons o r obtain- ing t h e i r consent. The road i s within 20 t o 25 f e e t of t h e P i l o n s ' cabin. P l a i n t i f f s have used t h e road t o d r i v e heavy equipment t o t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s , t o operate snowmobiles and t o d r i v e t r a i l bikes and pickup trucks. A l l of t h e p a r t i e s have cabins on t h e i r t r a c t s which they use as second homes. Sometime p r i o r t o t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h i s s u i t , Gene Pilon advised the Godfreys t h a t t h e road was on P i l o n ' s land; Godfreys, however, claimed t h a t they had purchased a r i g h t of way between t h e Pilon and McLaren t r a c t s from Miller. Fearing con- tinued use of t h e road might ripen i n t o a r i g h t by adverse use, Pilons obtained a survey of t h e property which established t h a t t h e road was on t h e i r land and t h e r e was, i n f a c t , no space between t h e McLaren and Pilon t r a c t s . Gene Pilon t e s t i f i e d t h a t , p r i o r t o obtaining t h e survey, he thought it was only p a r t i a l l y on h i s land. Originally, Pilon did not o b j e c t t o t h e road. H e only appeared concerned with its width. H e waited almost a year, u n t i l a f t e r t h e Godfrey home was b u i l t , before even mentioning it t o h i s neighbor. Pilons t h e r e a f t e r presented t h e Godfreys with a copy of t h e survey and a l i c e n s e agreement t o use t h e road, revocable on 90 days notice. Godfreys refused t o execute t h e l i c e n s e , maintaining they owned t h e road. After t h i s , Pilons erected a fence across t h e disputed roadway so a s t o physically bar its use by p l a i n t i f f s . This a c t i o n ensued. The t r i a l judge, i n company with counsel, viewed t h e property. The c o u r t concluded: " * * * From t h a t inspection it is q u i t e c l e a r t h a t t h e r e was no o t h e r p r a c t i c a l access t o t h e p r o p e r t i e s held i n reserve by t h e common land owner a t t h e time he executed defendants1 deed * * *. There being no o t h e r access upon which an entrance could be b u i l t t o provide entrance t o t h e land held i n reserve by M r . Miller, ' n e c e s s i t y ' c l e a r l y appears, "The most impressive evidence was apparent on t h e Court's v i s i t t o t h e p r o p e r t i e s o u t of which t h i s lawsuit arose. A mountain s i d e , heavily timbered, is t h e s e t t i n g f o r t h e controversy. N o other access seems reasonably possible t o p l a i n t i f f s t land." The d i s t r i c t c o u r t , i n attempting t o resolve t h i s dispute, found t h a t John M i l l e r reserved an easement of r i g h t of way over and upon t h e Pilon property. The c o u r t f u r t h e r concluded t h a t even i f John Miller d i d not i n f a c t reserve t h e r i g h t of way easement i n question, t h a t p l a i n t i f f s a r e e n t i t l e d t o t h e r i g h t of way "on t h e equitable p r i n c i p l e s of necessity, estoppel and easement by implication". O n appeal t h r e e i s s u e s a r e presented: (1) Whether t h e evidence supports t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s holding t h a t M i l l e r d i d i n f a c t reserve an easement over t h e Pilon property f o r access to the remainder of the property he owned? (2) Whether the evidence supports the district court's holding that there was an implied reserved easement of necessity over the Pilon property for access to the remainder of the property Miller owned? (3) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to an easement on the equitable principle of estoppel? We find there is a total lack of evidence to support the district court's holding that Miller did in fact reserve an ease- ment over the Pilon property when he sold it to them in 1962. To support this holding, plaintiffs rely on this finding of the dis- tric t court: " * * * that at about the time Miller conveyed the parcels to Pilon and McLaren, he placed a marker, an MJB Coffee Can, at a point marked '2' on the attached plat, hpproximately 15 feet west of the Pilons' east boundary line, on the edge of the Forest Service Road], and the Court finds that the grantor Miller intended for this marker to indicate a reserved right of way over and upon which he thereafter constructed the road for access to the property he had reserved. That this MJB Coffee Can marker was in place from the date of the Miller conveyance to defend- ants Pilon, was seen and acknowledged by all parties to this action but which disappeared on or about July 12, 1972 ." (Bracketed material added) . There is absolutely no evidence of the coffee can or any other marker at the time Miller sold to either McLaren or Pilon. Mrs. Godfrey testified it had "been there ever since the first time we were ever up there" and that ''Jack always told us that this was the end of the Pilon property and that was where the road would go in when we bought it, that's where he showed us the road would go in that way." The evidence does not show that the coffee can was on the Pilons' land any earlier than 1968. This certain- ly does not support the intention to reserve a right of way across ground sold to the Pilons in 1962. The only other evidence having any bearing whatsoever on whether Miller reserved an easement across Pilons' land was the testimony plaintiffs to the effect that "Jack [Miller] said there was no problem because he had reserved a space between McLaren and Pilon for the road" and, it was their "impression" or "understanding" that they had a right of way into their land. Plaintiffs entire argument on the subject of an express reserved easement appears to be that Miller must have reserved an ease- ment since his failure to do so would have forever deprived him of access to his retained property. The conclusion does not neces- sarily follow. Neither do we find any evidence to support the district court's holding that there was an implied reserved easement of necessity over the Pilon property for access to the remainder of the property Miller owned. In Pioneer Min. Co. v. Bannack Gold Min. Co., 60 Mont. 254, 263, 264, 198 P. 748, this Court said: " * * * The parties are presumed to contract with reference to the condition of the property at the time of the sale, provided the marks are open and visible. [Citing cases]. "'In a sense no easement or quasi easement can well be absolutely necessary to any possible enjoy- ment of property. The most that can be required is that it be, in addition to being apparent and continuous, essential to use and enjoyment of the premises as permanently improved at the time of the conveyance of the servient estate. And this appears to be what is meant by the term "strict necessity," in defining easement reserved by implication.' (19 C.J. 920, note 75, Div.A.) "An easement is apparent when it may be discovered upon reasonable inspection." (Emphasis supplied). Although there may have been "necessity" for the easement, in the sense that Miller may have been effectively landlocked from the land which he retained (a point which we will discuss later), there is absolutely no evidence in the record that there was any apparent easement, path, "roadway of sorts", trail or "primative road" over the land sold to the Pilons until the sale to the Godfreys in 1968, more than six years after Pilons pur- chased their tract. All of the land was unimproved, timbered hillside and the witnesses all agreed and testified that the first visible sign of a roadway over the area of the claimed easement was in the summer of 1968. The trial court stated in its opinion: "There was a roadway of sorts, on the easement ground described in the Court's findings, at the time the Pilon family purchased the same." The only conceivable support for this statement would be the trial judge's view of the properties. However, if this was the case, we are unable to accept the district court's flat asser- tion without some explanation of how he was able to observe this "roadway of sorts" or "primative road" after a road 10 to 12 feet wide had been gouged out of the hillside by a bulldozer in The requirement that the implied reserved easement of necessity must be open and visible at the time of the conveyance is further supported by Montan's statute, section 67-1607, R.C.M. "A transfer of real property passes all easements attached thereto, and creates in favor thereof an easement to use other real property of the person whose estate is transferred in the same manner and to the same extent as such property was obviously and permanently used by the person whose estate is transferred, for the benefit thereof, at the time when the transfer was agreed upon or completed." (Emphasis supplied). In Spaeth v . Emmett, 142 Mont. 231,237, 383 P.2d 812, we applied the rules of that section to a situation where the servient tenement was conveyed creating an implied easement by reserva- tion. See also 28 C.J.S., Easements, 5 33(b), p. 693. Plaintiffs testified repeatedly that the road in question was "the only access" and "the only possible way" into plaintiffs' properties. The t r i a l judge viewed t h e land and s t a t e d i n h i s opinion : "From t h a t inspection it is q u i t e c l e a r t h a t t h e r e was no o t h e r p r a c t i c a l access t o t h e properties held i n reserve by t h e common land owner a t t h e t i m e he executed defendants' deed". W e would be w i l l i n g t o accept t h a t finding of "necessity" ( i n t h e sense t h a t Miller may have been e f f e c t i v e l y landlocked from t h e land which he retained) except f o r t h i s : A t t h e t i m e M i l l e r conveyed t h e Pilon t r a c t t o t h e Pilons, he retained t h e land t o t h e e a s t which l a t e r became t h e McLaren t r a c t . A s w e previously s t a t e d , quoting from Pioneer Min. Co., t h e "necessity" must appear " a t t h e time of t h e conveyance of t h e s e r v i e n t e s t a t e " . The east boundary of t h e Pilon t r a c t is i d e n t i c a l with t h e w e s t boundary of what l a t e r became t h e McLaren t r a c t . The road i n question is located adjacent t o t h e boundary, on t h e Pilon s i d e of t h e l i n e . There is nothing i n t h e t r a n s c r i p t o r i n t h e judge's reporting of h i s view t o i n d i c a t e why it would be 'hecessary" a t t h e t i m e of t h e conveyance t o Pilon, t o put t h e road on t h e Pilon s i d e of t h e l i n e r a t h e r than 1 0 t o 1 2 f e e t e a s t on t h e o t h e r s i d e of t h e boundary. From t h e photographs introduced, t h e t e r r a i n 1 0 t o 12 f e e t e a s t appears s i m i l a r t o t h e t e r r a i n upon which t h e road i s b u i l t . Because p l a i n t i f f s contend and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t found t h a t an easement had been created by estoppel, we have attempted t o set f o r t h a s many of t h e relevant f a c t s bearing on t h i s i n c i - d e n t a s possible. Suffice it t o say t h a t we do not f i n d any evidence t o support t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s holding t h a t p l a i n t i f f s are e n t i t l e d t o an easement on t h e equitable grounds of estoppel. The road w a s o r i g i n a l l y constructed and subsequently enlarged a l l without t h e knowledge o r consent of t h e Pilons. The most t h a t an be s a i d a g a i n s t t h e P ' l o n s i s t h tof four years, thinking &fiey passively acquiesced t o r a perlo$ only t h a t t h e road might be on t h e i r land, u n t i l they discovered t h e i r r i g h t s and acted t o prevent an easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n from a r i s i n g . There was no misrepresentation by t h e Pilons t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s , nor any detrimental r e l i a n c e on t h e p a r t of t h e p l a i n t i f f s , which a r e necessary f o r a finding of estoppel. Lind- blom v. Employers' L i a b i l i t y Assurance Corp., 88 Mont. 488, 295 P. 1007. I n t h e i r complaint, p l a i n t i f f s requested, i n t h e alter- n a t i v e , r e l i e f under t h e provisions of s e c t i o n s 93-9923 and 32- 1401, R.C.M. 1947, f o r t h e p r i v a t e condemnation of a r i g h t of way by necessity. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t indicated a t t h e hearing on t h e injunction pendente l i t e t h a t i f he held i n favor of t h e p l a i n t i f f s as t o t h e i r ownership of t h e easement, t h e r e would be no need t o make a r u l i n g on the condemnation cause of action. A s a r e s u l t , no r u l i n g was made by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n t h i s regard. Nothing w e have s a i d here precludes p l a i n t i f f s from proceeding with a p r i v a t e condemnation action. P i l o n s ' answer included a counterclaim t o q u i e t t i t l e t o t h e access road i n themselves. Finding p l a i n t i f f s ' claims t o t h e access road t o be without m e r i t , t i t l e t o t h e access road i s quieted i n t h e Pilons. Pilons a r e not e n t i t l e d t o damages s i n c e t h e i r prayer f o r damages only had r e l a t i o n t o t h e condemnation a c t i o n and such i s s u e has not been resolved. Pilons have asked f o r and a r e e n t i t l e d t o c o s t s and attorney f e e s pursuant t o sec- t i o n 93-4213, R.C.M. 1947, and our decision i n E l e c t r i c Co-op., Inc. v. Ferguson, 124 Mont. 543, 551, 227 P.2d 597. The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t is reversed and t h e m a t t e r is returned t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r t h e f i x i n g of reason- a b l e attorney fees. V J u s t i c e ,-- -. Wei concur: Chief Justice