Title: State v. Arthur Jones
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-98-02
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 2004

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARTHUR J. JONES, a/k/a, JAMIE MATTHEWS, JAIMIE ART, ARKEEM JONES, JAMIE JONES, JAMES ARTHUR and JAMES MATTHEWS, Defendant-Respondent. Argued January 6, 2004 Decided April 21, 2004 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 358 N.J. Super. 420 (2003). Johanna A. Barba, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Sandra L. Manning and Evan S. Goddard, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for respondent (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney; Ms. Manning, on the briefs). JUSTICE ZAZZALI delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal presents two questions for our consideration. The first is whether three controlled purchases of suspected cocaine at a single-family dwelling from persons with prior drug-related arrests and convictions establish probable cause sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant when the confidential informant who supplied the initial tip is of unknown reliability. The second is whether a suspect s seven-year-old arrest for assault against a police officer and a weapons-related crime justifies a no-knock entry in the totality of the circumstances. The Appellate Division held that the State did not demonstrate probable cause for the search warrant and that the facts did not support a departure from the knock-and-announce requirement. We conclude that the totality of the circumstances did establish probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. We also hold that, because the police had a reasonable, particularized suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence in the circumstances presented would threaten their safety, the issuance of a no-knock warrant was proper. We therefore reverse. [(Emphasis added.)] The municipal court granted Shelton s application and authorized a no-knock entry. Although the exact time is not clear from the record, it appears that right before the police executed the warrant on June 23, 2001, they had the informant perform a confidence buy, following the same procedures of the three prior controlled purchases. Generally, police conduct a confidence buy to confirm the continued presence of drugs at the location about to be searched. After the informant returned with suspected cocaine, the police executed the no-knock warrant. They found defendant in the residence, seated in front of a table. A bag of cocaine and drug paraphernalia were on the table. During a search of defendant s person, the officers found two of the twenty-dollar bills used in prior controlled purchases and two bags of cocaine. The grand jury issued a nine-count indictment against defendant, charging him with numerous drug-related offenses, including third-degree possession of cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1). See footnote 2 Defense counsel moved to suppress the cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and marked money as the products of an illegal search warrant. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the three controlled purchases established probable cause to issue the warrant. Concluding that a prior charge of assault on a police officer by a suspect named in the warrant application formed a sufficient basis to issue a no-knock warrant, the court stated: One of the defendants . . . , Darryl Jones, had been charged with an assault on a police officer. That charge is a basis, better than most, for the issuance of a no-knock warrant. It s really not of particular consequence that he ended up pleading to something less than that or that the actual conviction may have been a fourth-degree possession of a weapon. What was of concern to the officers, and understandably so, is their safety. Someone with that kind of a charge in their past, when joined with the unfortunate marriage that often occurs between drugs and weapons, was a sufficient basis for the magistrate to have issued the no-knock provision of the warrant. Pursuant to a negotiated plea-agreement, defendant pled guilty to third-degree possession of cocaine and was sentenced to a four-year term of incarceration. Appropriate penalties were also imposed. Thereafter, he appealed the ruling on his motion to suppress and challenged his sentence. The Appellate Division, disagreeing with the trial court, ruled that the search warrant was unlawful because of the absence of probable cause and because there were insufficient facts set forth in the affidavit to support the no-knock entry provision. State v. Jones, 358 N.J. Super. 420, 425 (2003). With respect to the search warrant in general, the panel relied on this Court s holding in State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204 (2001), for the proposition that a controlled buy does not conclusively establish probable cause. Jones, supra, 358 N.J. Super. at 428. The appellate court also noted that the police officers failed to confirm that the suspects, Darryl Jones, Kenneth Powell[, and] Stephanie Williams, lived in or were otherwise connected to the residence. Ibid. Further, the panel emphasized that the warrant application gave no indication that the police made any effort to confirm that the substance purchased by the informant was actually cocaine. Id. at 429. In view of those alleged defects, the court concluded that probable cause did not exist to issue the warrant. Stating that a stale prior arrest does not justify a no-knock warrant, the panel also concluded that the warrant was invalid because the officers did not articulate a sufficient reasonable suspicion to authorize entry of the home without first knocking and announcing their presence. Id. at 434-35. In view of its holding, the Appellate Division did not address defendant s argument respecting his sentence. Id. at 436 n.5. We granted the State s petition for certification. 177 N.J. 224 (2003). [Id. at 619.] Because the validity of the warrant before us turns on officer safety, we limit our discussion in the present appeal to that exception. See footnote 3 The objective facts that, in the totality of the circumstances, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of a heightened risk to officer safety depend on the particular circumstances of each case; boilerplate police concerns are insufficient. State v. Bilancio, 318 N.J. Super. 408, 416-17 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 160 N.J. 478 (1999). For example, in Johnson the police applied for a search warrant based on an informant s tip and a controlled buy performed at the defendant s apartment. 168 N.J. at 612-13. At the end of his oral testimony, the officer applying for the warrant stated that he was requesting a no knock search warrant for officers[ ] safety and it means that the narcotics can be easily [] destroyed . . . . Id. at 613 (alterations in original). On appeal, we concluded that the officer s one-sentence justification for a no-knock warrant was insufficient to establish a particularized suspicion that officer safety would have been compromised if the police had been required to announce their presence before entering the defendant s dwelling. Id. at 620-23. However, we noted for future guidance that information concerning defendant s criminal history or background . . . might have supported the conclusion that defendant had a propensity for violence. Id. at 624-25. Specifically, we explained that the defendant s prior aggravated manslaughter offense cited within his pre-sentence report, but not disclosed to the court that issued the no-knock warrant, might have been used to support a reasonable suspicion to believe that officer safety would be compromised without a no-knock entry. Ibid. In analogous circumstances we have acknowledged that a defendant s prior criminal history may give rise to a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify protective measures taken by the police. In the context of protective searches performed during investigatory stops, we have recognized that knowledge of a suspect s violent criminal behavior or information that a suspect has carried weapons in the past may support an objectively reasonable suspicion justifying a protective frisk. State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673, 684 (1988). Although we have noted that a suspect s criminal history, without more, is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of danger to the police to justify a frisk of a suspect, we also have held that an officer s knowledge of a suspect s prior criminal activity in combination with other factors may lead to a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. Valentine, supra, 134 N.J. at 547. Because the same test for reasonable and particularized suspicion applies to both protective frisks and no-knock entries, we conclude that a suspect s criminal history may be used as part of the totality of the circumstances analysis to justify a no-knock entry. See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir.) (upholding no-knock provision of warrant where defendant had record of violent convictions, police knew defendant was recently involved in armed action, and police suspected defendant was aware of police investigation), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1029, 119 S. Ct. 566, 142 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1998); United States v. Bates, 84 F.3d 790, 795 (6th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that threats to an officer s safety, a criminal record reflecting violent tendencies, or a verified reputation of a suspect s violent nature can be enough to provide law enforcement officers with justification to forego the necessity of knocking and announcing their presence ). As we recognized in Johnson, the showing required to justify an unannounced entry is not high[.] 168 N.J. at 624 (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394-95, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1422, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615, 624 (1997)). In the unique circumstances of each case, the nature of the prior criminal behavior and the passage of time are especially important factors that will often dictate what additional showing to the court may be required. For example, a three-year-old conviction for aggravated manslaughter raises considerable concerns for officer safety and would likely require far less additional information, if any, to justify an unannounced entry than would a fifteen-year-old arrest for stalking. Several factors, alone or in combination, may provide sufficient justification to dispense with the knock-and-announce requirement where a suspect has a known incident of violence in his or her criminal history. For instance, an informant s tip may reveal the presence of weapons at the scene of a proposed search that suggests an increased threat to officer safety. Johnson, supra, 168 N.J. at 624; United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S. Ct. 992, 997, 140 L. Ed. 2d 191, 198 (1998). Alternatively, an officer may know that a suspect has a violent criminal history and learn from an informant that he or she has continued to exhibit a propensity for violence during the course of controlled drug buys. State v. Henderson, 629 N.W.2d 613, 623 (Wis.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1033, 122 S. Ct. 574, 151 L. Ed. 2d 446 (2001). As another example, the layout of an apartment may justify a no-knock entry where one or more of the occupants has a violent criminal past. United States v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 541, 549-50 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 949, 115 S. Ct. 363, 130 L. Ed. 2d 316 (1994). Those examples are by no means exhaustive. Additionally, in appropriate circumstances, some of those factors may by themselves be of sufficient concern to raise a reasonable suspicion of danger to officer safety without any evidence of a defendant s prior criminal acts. See, e.g., United States v. Gambrell, 178 F.3d 927, 929 (7th Cir.) (holding no-knock provision of warrant justified where confidential informant involved in controlled buy indicated that suspects carried guns on their persons while inside apartment), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 920, 120 S. Ct. 281, 145 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1999). But see Bates, supra, 84 F.3d at 796 (refusing to ratify no-knock entry where, despite information that gun was in apartment, there was no indication that defendants were violent and likely to use a weapon if confronted by law enforcement personnel and in absence of any evidence that defendants had a criminal history of violence or a reputation indicating they were likely to be violent ). As with all tests for reasonable and particularized suspicion, we reiterate that it is incumbent upon a reviewing court to evaluate the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State s interest in effective law enforcement against the individual s right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions. State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986). Such an evaluation is necessarily fact-intensive. The lower courts are thereby charged with resolving, on a case-by-case basis, the circumstances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under our federal and state constitutions. In short, we cannot require police officers, when they confront suspects who have a significant history of criminal activity, some of which directly suggests a tendency for violence towards the police, to treat those suspects as they would non-violent offenders whom they encounter for the first time. The evaluation of the reasonableness of a no-knock warrant application cannot be made in a theoretical vacuum. The determination is highly fact sensitive and requires a balancing of risks. Among those factors the court must take into account are the practical risks to the officers lives and safety, which are of especial concern when a warrant is to be executed in a home. As the United States Supreme Court has observed: The risk of danger in the context of an arrest in the home is as great as, if not greater than, it is in an on-the-street or roadside investigatory encounter. . . . [A]n in-home arrest puts the officer at the disadvantage of being on his adversary s turf. An ambush in a confined setting of unknown configuration is more to be feared than it is in open, more familiar surroundings. [Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1098, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276, 285 (1990).] Society has a weighty interest in officer safety . . . . Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413, 117 S. Ct. 882, 885, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 47 (1997). As the front line against violence, law-enforcement officers are particularly vulnerable to violence[,] often becoming its victims. Valentine, supra, 134 N.J. at 545. That observation, made over a decade ago, holds just as true today. In 2002, 3296 of this State s law enforcement officers were assaulted in the line of duty. Uniform Crime Report: State of New Jersey (2002) at 188. Nationally, 58,066 law enforcement officers were assaulted in the line of duty, and 56 of those assaulted were feloniously killed in 2002. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (2002) at 5, 73. Of the sixty-one known assailants responsible for causing the felonious deaths of those law enforcement agents, seventy-nine percent had prior criminal arrests, fifty-nine percent had been convicted of prior criminal charges, and thirty percent had been previously arrested for crimes of violence. Id. at 7. Sixteen percent of those murder assailants had prior arrests for assaulting an officer or resisting arrest and thirty-one percent had prior arrests for weapon violations. Ibid. Those statistics demonstrate that law enforcement officers face a high risk of violence in the performance of their duties. Moreover, as the Attorney General argued, the data suggests that recidivism has a predictive value because of an apparent correlation between prior criminal activity and the threat posed to police officers when they face those same individuals again. As we acknowledged in Valentine, supra, [g]iven the volatile times in which we live, we certainly cannot require police officers to ignore the fact that a suspect whom they are confronting has a history of criminal behavior . . . . 134 N.J. at 550. Our view allows police officers seeking a no-knock warrant to apply the same considerations that the judiciary considers in like circumstances. Thus, judges may consider arrests and the actual circumstances of the offense when assessing the threat that a defendant poses to society during imposition of a sentence. State v. Green, 62 N.J. 547, 571 (1973) (noting sentencing judge may consider record of adult arrests that did not result in convictions). Sentencing judges must fully assess the totality of circumstances surrounding a defendant s actual criminal offense. Marzolf, supra, 79 N.J. at 180; see also State v. Brooks, 175 N.J. 215, 230-31 (2002) (condoning use of arrests and dismissed offenses to determine defendant s eligibility for admission into pretrial intervention program). Just as the case law requires a judge to consider a defendant s violent nature when sentencing in order to protect society, so too a judge should evaluate a defendant s violent history, including arrests, in determining whether to vest the police officer with both the advantage and protection of surprise in executing a warrant when safety considerations are present. Finally, there is additional evidence in Agent Shelton s affidavit that demonstrates, in the totality of the circumstances, that a no-knock entry was appropriate in this case. Based on the affidavit, the municipal court judge was aware that there was probable cause to believe the suspects named in the warrant were engaged in ongoing criminal activity. As noted by the trial court when it denied the motion to suppress, the unfortunate marriage that often occurs between drugs and weapons is a factor that should be considered when a defendant has a criminal history suggesting violence towards the police. In addition to the ongoing drug sales, the judge was aware that multiple offenders were involved in the drug activity. At least one of those offenders, Powell, had several prior drug-related arrests and had two convictions for drug distribution. Because those convictions would have made Powell eligible for an extended sentence, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f), the imposition of which is generally the norm for a repeat offender, State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 32 (1992), it would not have been unreasonable to conclude that Powell had a strong incentive to resist capture by the police. Faced with the possibility of encountering multiple offenders engaged in ongoing criminal activity, one of whom had a criminal history suggesting an assault of a police officer and another who had a strong incentive to evade capture, it was reasonable to conclude that knocking and announcing the police presence at the Wildwood residence would pose a heightened risk to officer safety. In sum, we conclude that the no-knock provision of the warrant issued on the basis of Agent Shelton s affidavit was valid. According the appropriate deference to the issuing court, we hold that Darryl Jones s prior arrest for assault on a police officer, which was itself highly probative of the potential for violence during the execution of the search warrant, when coupled with the ongoing drug activities of multiple individuals facing the potential for enhanced sentences, provided a particularized, reasonable suspicion that officer safety would be compromised unless the police were permitted to dispense with the knock-and-announce requirement. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARTHUR J. JONES, a/k/a, JAMIE MATTHEWS, JAIMIE ART, ARKEEM JONES, JAMIE JONES, JAMES ARTHUR and JAMES MATTHEWS, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED April 21, 2004 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Zazzali CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY