Title: Stroud v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc.
Citation: 112 Ariz. 403, 112 Ariz. 574, 542 P.2d 1102, 544 P.2d 1089
Docket Number: 11735
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: January 16, 1976

112 Ariz. 403 (1975) 542 P.2d 1102 Morris A. STROUD and Marjorie Stroud, husband and wife, Appellants, v. DORR-OLIVER, INC., a Delaware Corporation, and E.L. Farmer Construction Company, Inc., an Arizona Corporation, Appellees and Appellants, v. ALLISON STEEL MANUFACTURING CO., a corporation, Appellee. No. 11735. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. November 13, 1975. Rehearing Denied January 13, 1976. With Supplemental Opinion, January 16, 1976. *405 Langerman, Begam &amp; Lewis, by Robert G. Begam, Samuel Langerman and William T. Keane, Phoenix, for appellants Stroud. O'Connor, Cavanagh, Anderson, Westover, Killingsworth &amp; Beshears, by John H. Westover, Phoenix, for appellee and appellant Dorr-Oliver. Maupin &amp; Wilson, by Donald R. Wilson and William G. Fairbourn, Phoenix, for appellee and appellant E.L. Farmer. Moore &amp; Romley, by Kenneth J. Sherk and Roger T. Hargrove, Phoenix, for appellee Allison Steel. Robert K. Park, Chief Counsel, by J. Victor Stoffa, Phoenix, for State Compensation Fund, amicus curiae. With Supplemental Opinion, January 16, 1976. see 544 P.2d 1089. CAMERON, Chief Justice. Appellants, plaintiffs below, Morris A. Stroud and Marjorie Stroud, brought suit against the defendants below, Dorr-Oliver, Inc. and E.L. Farmer Construction Company, Inc., for industrial injuries sustained by Morris A. Stroud during construction of a sewage treatment plant for the City of Phoenix. From a defense verdict plaintiffs appeal, contending errors in the conduct of the trial. Defendant Dorr-Oliver filed a third party complaint seeking indemnity from Allison Steel Manufacturing Company. E.L. Farmer Construction filed a cross-claim against Allison Steel for indemnity. Allison filed a motion for summary judgment which was denied. Allison then filed a petition for special action in the Court of Appeals, see Allison Steel Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Court, 20 Ariz. App. 185, 511 P.2d 198 (1973). As a result of that opinion, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Allison and against Farmer and Dorr-Oliver. From this summary judgment Dorr-Oliver and Farmer Construction appeal. Allison Manufacturing Company filed an answering brief to the appeal of Farmer Construction Company and Dorr-Oliver, as well as a motion to dismiss.[1] We must answer the following questions on appeal: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. The City of Phoenix awarded a contract to build a sewage treatment plant to E.L. Farmer Construction Company. Farmer subcontracted with Dorr-Oliver, Inc., to design and fabricate the metal parts of the top of a gas digester unit. Farmer then subcontracted with Allison Steel Company to do the actual erection of the unit. The gas digester unit consisted of a cylindrical concrete building approximately 45 feet high and 100 feet in diameter. It was topped by a domed metal cap which looked somewhat like an opened umbrella resting on top of the concrete cylinder. A metal tension ring was at the bottom of the cap while a compression ring, about 12 feet in diameter, was at the top. Heavy metal arms spaced every ten degrees were connected at the bottom to the large ring and at the top to the smaller one. There was considerable dispute as to whose errors and mistakes led to the accident. Dorr-Oliver and Farmer contend that Allison, by negligently placing the compression ring upside down on the top of the unit, caused the cap to fall. Allison as well as plaintiffs contends that the plans and specifications given to Allison by Farmer and Dorr-Oliver were not the final and corrected plans, but were preliminary shop drawings for the purpose of bidding only and that the defective plans thus caused Allison to place the compression ring on the structure upside down. It is also contended that the compression ring was not adequately marked. The metal tension ring was almost 100 feet in diameter and metal gusset plates were welded to the ring at 10 degree intervals. There is some testimony that because the compression ring was placed upside down, the metal beams would not fit and the gusset plates on the compression ring were partially cut to allow proper fit. There is no denying that while under construction the parts of the cap came crashing down and Morris Stroud, an employee of Allison, was severely injured. Stroud recovered from his employer, Allison, under workmen's compensation, and brought suit against Farmer and Dorr-Oliver. The jury found for the defendants Farmer and Dorr-Oliver. RIGHT OF INDEMNITY Dorr-Oliver filed a third party complaint against Allison seeking indemnity from Allison for any judgment that might be entered against it in the Stroud litigation. Farmer sought indemnity from Allison by way of a cross-claim. Allison filed a motion for summary judgment, both as to the third party complaint of Dorr-Oliver and as to the cross-claim of Farmer. This motion was denied by the trial court and Allison took a petition for special action to the Court of Appeals which, on 26 June 1973, decided in favor of Allison stating, first as to Dorr-Oliver: The Court of Appeals then held that the facts do not support liability by Allison on the basis of the "active negligence-passive negligence" doctrine of Busy Bee Buffet v. Ferrell, 82 Ariz. 192, 310 P.2d 817 (1957); Transcon Lines v. Barnes, 17 Ariz. App. 428, 498 P.2d 502 (1972). But Dorr-Oliver contends that Allison's negligence was so gross that Allison should be compelled to indemnify Dorr-Oliver pursuant to the Restatement of Restitution, § 97. We believe the Court of Appeals correctly answered this contention as follows: As to Farmer, the Court of Appeals stated: The Court of Appeals also noted that there was a contract of indemnification between Allison and Farmer, but the Court of Appeals correctly noted that this did not give Farmer the right to indemnification for Farmer's negligence. Royal Properties, Inc. v. Arizona Title Ins. and *408 Trust Co., 13 Ariz. App. 376, 476 P.2d 897 (1970). The Court of Appeals then reaffirmed its previous order directing the trial court to dismiss the third party complaint of Dorr-Oliver and the cross-complaint of Farmer. Rehearing was denied by the Court of Appeals 6 August 1973 and this court denied review on 2 October 1973. The matters are before us on appeal. After reviewing the complete record, we do not perceive any reason why we should deviate from the decision of the Court of Appeals in Allison v. Superior Court, supra. The defendants Dorr-Oliver and Farmer are charged by plaintiffs with separate active negligence which allegedly caused the complained of injuries. Allison is at most a joint tortfeasor and Dorr-Oliver and Farmer are not entitled to contribution or indemnity from Allison. The order of the trial court in dismissing the third party complaint of Dorr-Oliver and the cross-claim of Farmer is affirmed. The motion of Allison Steel in this court to dismiss is thereby rendered moot. DOES ALLISON STEEL HAVE A LIEN ON STROUD'S JUDGMENT? Our statute, A.R.S. § 23-1023, provides that an injured workman may take the benefits of workmen's compensation from his employer or his insurance carrier and still pursue his remedy against negligent third parties. Section C of A.R.S. § 23-1023 reads in part as follows: The law in Arizona in this regard has been succinctly stated by the Court of Appeals as follows: Appellants Dorr-Oliver and Farmer would have us hold as do a minority of states that where the employer is negligent then he or his workmen's compensation carrier is not entitled to a lien as to any judgment received by the injured workman but that the recovery of the workman against the negligent third parties would be reduced by the value of benefits he has already received under workmen's compensation. Appellants cite the case of Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 366 P.2d 641 (1961) for this proposition. In Witt v. Jackson, supra, an on-duty policeman Witt in his automobile was tail-ended by Jackson's car. Officer Witt received benefits from the City of Los Angeles' workmen's compensation insurer. When Officer Witt sued Jackson, the city intervened *409 in order to obtain a lien on any judgment against Jackson. At trial it was brought out that both Witt and Jackson were negligent in the operation of their vehicles. Officer Witt's contributory negligence was attributed to his employer, the City of Los Angeles. Jackson contended that since Los Angeles was contributorily negligent the city should be prevented from obtaining a lien on the judgment. The California Supreme Court per Justice Traynor concurred with Jackson. The primary rationale for the California decision denying a lien to the employer is that one should not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. Justice Traynor also stated as to the injured workman: Under this interpretation, any recovery against Dorr-Oliver and Farmer would be reduced by the amount already paid under Allison's workmen's compensation policy. This approach would reduce the amount Dorr-Oliver and Farmer would have to pay to Stroud and would be an amount that Allison would not receive as reimbursement. While this may not be called contribution, the net effect is the same and we have long held that there is no contribution among joint tortfeasors. Blakely Oil v. Crowder, 80 Ariz. 72, 292 P.2d 842 (1956). The holding in Witt, supra, is a minority position represented by only three jurisdictions: California, Witt v. Jackson, supra; North Carolina, Brown v. Southern Ry. Co., 204 N.C. 668, 169 S.E. 419 (1933), Poindexter v. Johnson Motor Lines, 235 N.C. 286, 69 S.E.2d 495 (1952); and Pennsylvania, Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940). The majority position is represented by 22 states and Arizona. There is no persuasive reason why we should adopt the minority position. There is no provision in A.R.S. § 23-1023(C) to deny an employer a lien even if the employer was contributorily negligent. The right of an employer, or its workmen's compensation carrier, to enforce its lien under A.R.S. § 23-1023(C) against any judgment recovered by an employee in a third party action is not dependent on the employer's freedom from concurrent negligence contributing to the injury and the third party cannot assert such negligence as a defense or ask for indemnification from said employer or his carrier. We agree with the Georgia court which, in construing a similar statute, stated: INTRODUCTION OF PHOTOGRAPHS The first objection made by appellant Stroud is to the introduction of certain photographs. Some of the photographs admitted were taken by an engineer who was not present in court to testify and others were among many pictures taken by the designer of the collapsed metal structure. The witness had some difficulty in identifying the photographs. Appellant first contends that there was no foundation for a proper identification of the photographs. The following pretrial stipulation, however, was agreed to by the parties as follows: But Stroud further contends that the pictures did not accurately portray the corners of the gusset plates of the compression ring and therefore should not have been admitted. There was testimony that in putting on the roof there had been difficulty because the compression ring was upside down. The holes in the gusset plates and the rafter would not align. The workmen had to use sledge hammers, wedges and com-a-longs. This forced the ring to rotate and resulted in the accident. Expert testimony indicated that the gusset plate corners had been cut off with a torch contrary to the terms of the contract and contrary to good erection practices. We believe the pictures were admissible to show that some of the gusset plates were cut away at the corners: The photographs were properly admitted into evidence. EVIDENCE OF ALLISON'S NEGLIGENCE As part of Dorr-Oliver's and Farmer's defense, they attempted to show that it was Allison's sole negligence or superseding intervening negligence which caused the accident. The Strouds contend that the jurors were confused in that the court instructed the jury concerning Allison's negligence without making it clear that the jury could find Allison negligent and still find for the plaintiff against the defendants Dorr-Oliver and Farmer. It is, of course, a proper defense in a negligence action to show that the injury was the result of the superseding intervening negligence of a third party, City of Phoenix v. Schroeder, 1 Ariz. App. 510, 405 P.2d 301 (1965), and, of course, evidence to support the claim that the third party's negligence was the sole cause of the accident is also admissible. Viewing the evidence on the issue of negligence in a light most favorable to the party who prevailed in the trial court, Sax v. Kopelman, 96 Ariz. 394, 396 P.2d 17 (1964), we find no error generally in allowing the defendants to attempt to place the blame on Allison. With this in mind, we will consider Stroud's objection to certain evidence admitted during trial. *411 a. Jury Instructions Appellant Stroud complains of instructions to the jury on matters of proximate cause and intervening force (or cause). The judge's instruction on proximate cause complied with our definition in Pacht v. Morris, 107 Ariz. 392, 489 P.2d 29 (1971), which is also MARJI No. 9 (revised) with some further elaboration. It was correct. Regarding the matter of intervening cause, the instruction was: Our Court of Appeals has stated: Assuming for the purpose of argument that Dorr-Oliver and Farmer were negligent, could they have reasonably anticipated that Allison would have tried to erect the covering with the compression ring upside down? We think not. We believe that Allison's conduct is the type of extraordinary conduct from which a jury could find that it was a superseding cause. City of Phoenix v. Schroeder, supra; see also Herzberg v. White, 49 Ariz. 313, 66 P.2d 253 (1937). We find no error in these instructions. b. Instruction on Strict Liability (No. 18) The defendant Dorr-Oliver was not only the designer but the fabricator, i.e., *412 manufacturer, of the steel. There was evidence that the plaintiff Stroud did not look at first to ascertain whether the compression ring was upside down or not, but that after welding the two halves together he noted that the compression ring was upside down and on two occasions reported this fact to his superintendent. When settling the instructions, the trial court indicated it did not intend to give an instruction on assumption of risk. He approved and gave the following instruction over Stroud's objection: We have stated: We believe that the facts in this case could support an instruction on assumption of risk and that it would not have been error to give that instruction. Also paragraph number one appears to be an instruction on assumption of risk and paragraph two on unanticipated use or misuse. Both paragraphs are supported by the evidence. We find no error. c. Special Interrogatories Rule 49(h) of our Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., allows a trial court to submit written interrogatories to a jury together with explanations or instructions which may be necessary for the jury to make answers thereto and to also render a general verdict. Over objections by appellant Stroud the following interrogatories were given: The jury found for the defendant and did not answer Interrogatory No. 1. We find no error in Interrogatory No. 1. In light of our holding herein, that there is no right of contribution or indemnity by Allison unless Allison was the sole cause or superseding intervening cause, Instructions 2 and 3 standing alone could have been confusing to the jury. However, any confusion that might have arisen by submitting these interrogatories was, we believe, cured by the following instruction: From a reading of the instructions as a whole, the jury was still properly instructed as to the negligence of Dorr-Oliver and Farmer and could have found against them under the facts of the case and the instructions given and still answered interrogatories in the same manner. We do not find any error to be prejudicial. EVIDENCE OF SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF PROJECT During the first erection the dome had been held up by a crane which was removed prior to the accident. At the trial an ironworker, who worked on both the first and second erections of the dome, was called to testify by Stroud. On cross-examination by the attorney for Farmer's, the following transpired: On appeal attorney for the appellant states: We have reviewed the record and we find no vigorous objection and in fact we find no objection at all. Even assuming that the evidence of the second erection was not within the exception to the general rule, that evidence of repair or a second successful construction is not admissible to prove negligence of the original construction, see Daggett v. Atchison, T. &amp; S.F. Ry. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 655, 313 P.2d 557, 64 A.L.R.2d 1283 (1957) and Annotation at 1296; Slow Development Co. v. Coulter, 88 Ariz. 122, 353 P.2d 890 (1960), we believe the plaintiff Stroud waived the right to bring this matter on appeal by failing to object in the trial court. Not only did Stroud not object when the question of the second successful erection arose, but his attorney further questioned the witness on redirect concerning this subject. We find no error. DEPOSITION OF E.L. FARMER At the trial portions of the deposition of E.L. Farmer were read to the jury. The reading of the deposition itself was not objected to, but certain comments by Mr. Farmer in the deposition about an investigative report not in evidence were objected to by the attorney for Stroud, and failure to sustain these objections is assigned as error on appeal. For example, at the trial the following was read from Mr. Farmer's deposition: This testimony was objected to and the trial court stated: Once a deposition is admitted the rules of evidence will be applied as if the witness were then present and testifying. 8 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2143, page 452; Rule 32(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S. In the instant case, E.L. Farmer, as the President of E.L. Farmer Construction Company, was an adverse party as to Dorr-Oliver and subject to cross-examination. If he had been testifying in person we believe it would have been error to try and impeach him with this report not in evidence and which was not a known treatise by a recognized authority. The cautionary instruction was not adequate. As to the plaintiff Stroud it would appear, considering the testimony, that the report was adverse to Allison, Dorr-Oliver, the party presenting the testimony, and Farmer. With the exception of showing that Allison was negligent, it was not damaging to Stroud. We find no prejudice to Stroud. REFERENCE TO WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Prior to trial the Superior Court granted a motion by appellant Stroud which excluded from the proceedings any reference to the fact that Stroud had received benefits under workmen's compensation. In his opening statement before trial the attorney for Dorr-Oliver stated that his client's position would be that: There was an immediate objection by Stroud's attorney. In his summation to the jury Dorr-Oliver's attorney stated: *416 While we do not favor this type of "linemanship" on the part of counsel, we do not find that this remark necessarily infers that Stroud recovered under workmen's compensation. As we said once under similar circumstances, "It is too speculative." Layton v. Rocha, 90 Ariz. 369, 372, 368 P.2d 444, 446 (1962). The reference is not necessarily one to the forbidden topic of workmen's compensation, but rather a statement that Allison was negligent and not Dorr-Oliver. Judgments affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and HOLOHAN, J., concurring. [1] All of these matters were filed in the Court of Appeals, but the consolidated file was transferred to this court pursuant to Rule 47(e)(5), Rules of the Supreme Court, 17A A.R.S. [2] Stroud cites from another Court of Appeals opinion, however, in support of his position, Santanello v. Cooper, 12 Ariz. App. 123, 468 P.2d 390 (1970). That case has been vacated by this court. See Santanello v. Cooper, 106 Ariz. 262, 475 P.2d 246 (1970). Once an opinion of the Court of Appeals has been vacated by this court, it is of no force and effect and is not authority.