Title: Williams v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 150, 2011
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 29, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CHARLESTON S. WILLIAMS, 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 150, 2011 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr. ID 0908020419 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  December 21, 2011 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  December 29, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Jan A. T. van Amerongen, Jr., Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for 
appellant. 
 
James T. Wakley, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
The defendant-appellant, Charleston S. Williams (“Williams”), 
appeals from his conviction for Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree, 
a lesser-included offense of Rape in the First Degree.  Williams raises one 
claim on appeal.  William contends that his conviction should be reversed 
because the prosecutor improperly prodded the victim to cry in front of the 
jury.  We have concluded that the record evidence does not support that 
contention.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court must be 
affirmed. 
Facts 
 
At approximately 4:00 a.m. on August 21, 2009, M.F. was in her 
apartment in Wilmington, Delaware smoking crack cocaine when Williams 
began knocking on her door.  M.F. knew Williams from prior encounters.  
After an initial exchange about M.F.’s crack pipe, Williams left.   
Williams returned minutes later.  When M.F. opened the door, he 
grabbed her by her throat and pushed her toward the couch.  Williams 
tightened his grip on her neck as they struggled on the couch.  Williams 
eventually forced her to the ground and raped her.   
At some point Williams released M.F. and instructed her to come to 
the front room of the apartment.  M.F. disregarded that instruction and was 
able to escape, while naked, to her parent’s home.  M.F. was evaluated at 
3 
 
Christiana Care later that day for sexual assault.  DNA analysis was 
consistent with M.F.’s account that Williams had raped her. 
Williams was charged with Rape in the First Degree.  The matter 
proceeded to a four-day jury trial.  During M.F.’s testimony, the following 
relevant exchanges occurred:  
Re-Direct Examination: 
 
State: Is there any doubt [] in your mind today as you testify 
that the defendant choked you and raped you?  Yes or no, 
ma’am? 
 
M.F.: No. 
 
(Pause.) 
 
State: Why are you crying? 
 
M.F.: I’m just so angry at him.  He didn’t have to do what he 
done.  I’m sorry. 
 
State: That’s okay. . . . 
 
Re-Cross Examination: 
 
Defense: Do you remember in that meeting with [the prosecutor 
and the detective] and the social worker about a week ago that 
you were told it would be okay to cry in front of the jury? 
 
M.F.: Yes. 
 
Defense: Yeah.  Do you remember that you were told they’ll 
[sic] be a point where you can cry in front of the jury? 
 
M.F.: Yes. 
 
4 
 
Re-Direct Examination: 
 
State: Are you crying because I told you you should cry? 
 
M.F.: I’m crying – that’s how I feel, that I shouldn’t have been 
hurt. 
 
State: Is this the first time you cried in front of me? 
 
M.F.: No, it isn’t. 
 
 
After additional re-cross-examination and an attempt at re-direct 
examination, the trial judge excused the jury and witness and sua sponte 
called a sidebar conference regarding the above exchange.  The trial judge 
described it as “the oddest exchange I’ve seen in 20 years on the bench and 
35 years as a member of the [B]ar . . . .”  The trial judge and counsel 
discussed the exchange at length.  Ultimately, the judge determined a 
curative instruction was unnecessary. 
 
Williams was found guilty of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First 
Degree.  The trial judge sentenced Williams to eight years imprisonment at 
level V, with credit for time served, suspended after six years with 
decreasing levels of supervision.   
Misconduct Issue Waived 
 
 
The State contends that Williams is barred from bringing his claim on 
appeal for plain error review because Williams expressly waived any 
objection for prosecutorial misconduct at trial.  This Court has previously 
5 
 
found that defense counsel’s failure to object at trial, despite inquiry by the 
trial judge, may give rise to a waiver.  In Hickman v. State, the defendant 
claimed on appeal that the trial judge committed reversible error by failing 
to provide a Getz instruction.1   We found that he had forfeited that claim, 
stating: 
[T]he record plainly shows that, when the trial judge raised the 
issue of a potential Getz instruction, defense counsel 
affirmatively waived his right to one, noting that he was making 
a tactical decision intended to minimize the jury’s courtroom 
exposure to Hickman’s alleged drug distribution. Hickman’s 
unequivocal waiver of his right to a Getz instruction at trial 
forfeits any claim for plain error review on appeal.2 
 
In MacDonald v. State, defense counsel acknowledged that “slips” occurred 
at trial when the prosecutor and a witness referred to the defendant’s prior 
trial—but, defense counsel did not object or request that the witness’s 
response be stricken from the record.3   We found that “because MacDonald 
waived his right to object to the ‘slips,’ or to strike these references to his 
first trial, he is precluded from any claim of plain error on appeal.”4 
 
In this case, defense counsel engaged in an extended colloquy with the 
trial judge and prosecutor about the conduct challenged on appeal.  The 
discussion occurred because the trial judge raised the issue sua sponte during 
                                          
 
1 Hickman v. State, 2002 WL 1272154, at *1 (Del. June 7, 2002). 
2 Id.  
3 MacDonald v. State, 816 A.2d 750, 756 (Del. 2003). 
4 Id. 
6 
 
sidebar, not because defense counsel objected.  In fact, defense counsel 
stated to the trial judge: 
Your honor, I would like to say I do not dispute [the 
prosecutor’s] representation to the court in any way that she did 
not tell this witness to cry.  I have never known her in any way 
to even have a reputation for underhanded tactics or anything 
like that.  However, what I interpreted to be going on was an 
attempt to elicit the emotional reaction.  I do not think she told 
this witness or instructed this witness to cry when I put you on 
the stand. 
 
 
The trial judge then asked whether the attorneys would like to add 
anything to the record.  Defense counsel apologized, and did not raise a 
claim of prosecutorial misconduct, request a mistrial, or pursue a curative 
instruction.   Accordingly, we hold that Williams’ claim on appeal for 
prosecutorial misconduct was waived. 
No Plain Error 
 
Alternatively, if we consider Williams’ claim for plain error,5 it also 
fails.   Williams concedes that he failed to raise a timely objection below.  
The trial judge intervened during the re-direct examination and admonished 
both parties for the unnoticed, persistent questioning about M.F.’s crying.  
But the trial judge did not directly rule on the issue of prosecutorial 
misconduct, stating to Williams’ trial attorney “[y]ou’ve been given the 
opportunity to, I guess, preserve the record to the extent you needed to 
                                          
 
5 Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 148 (Del. 2006). 
7 
 
preserve it.  I’m not making any finding or any ruling or issuing any 
sanction.”  The trial judge also decided that a jury instruction was 
unnecessary. 
 
In Baker v. State, this Court restated the applicable standards of 
review for claims of prosecutorial misconduct.6  We explained “the first step 
in the plain error review of prosecutorial misconduct mirrors that in the 
review for harmless error: we examine the record de novo to determine 
whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred. If we determine that no 
misconduct occurred, our analysis ends.”7  If there was misconduct, we 
apply the Wainwright standard. 8 
 
On appeal, Williams alleges that the prosecutor engaged in 
misconduct by “preparing an alleged victim to cry in front of a jury and then 
provoking that crying[.]”  In this case, the inquiry ends at the first step 
because Williams has not shown prosecutorial misconduct.  Williams’ claim 
directly contradicts the defense attorney’s statements to the trial judge 
during sidebar, when he stated, “I do not think [the prosecutor] told this 
witness or instructed this witness to cry. . . .”  Additionally, Williams has not 
                                          
 
6 Id. at 150. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
8 
 
shown that the prosecutor’s “preparation” was improper.  At sidebar, the 
prosecutor explained to the trial judge: 
Your honor, I can just for the record indicate during my 
interview in trial preparation for [M.F.] when she was crying [I] 
told her that it would be ok if she did that.  I inform every 
victim because sometimes they’re embarrassed and they 
apologize for crying.  There’s nothing wrong with them crying.  
That was the only thing that I told her about crying.  I don’t 
ever prompt a victim at a certain time in trial you should cry at 
this point.  And that’s my only communication.  
 
 
The prosecutor produced her notes from the interview to the trial 
judge.  They state, “[i]f don’t understand just let me know.  Must be upfront 
– know that you have been forthright.  It is okay to cry – there will be a point 
when[.]”  The notes could be construed as instructing M.F. that it is 
permissible to cry at a certain point in the proceedings.  But, the notes do not 
provide a sufficient basis for finding prosecutorial misconduct.  In Webb v. 
State, this Court stated: 
The fact that the prosecutor questioned the victim in preparation 
for trial, or that the prosecutor typed up the questions and the 
answers, does not mean that the prosecutor improperly coached 
the victim. Nothing in this record suggests that the victim was 
told how to answer the questions or told to be anything but 
completely honest.9 
 
Similarly, in this case, the record does not indicate that M.F. was told to 
feign emotions at any point in the trial.  
                                          
 
9 Webb v. State, 2006 WL 2959891, at *1 (Del. Oct. 18, 2006). 
9 
 
 
The record also does not support that the prosecutor “prodded” M.F. 
to cry during the trial itself.   M.F. began crying after the prosecutor asked 
her if she had any doubt that the defendant choked and raped her.  Williams 
has not identified any line of questioning that was improper or outside the 
proper scope of examination given the charges.  While the direct and cross 
examination that occurred about M.F.’s crying was unusual, the line of 
questioning that led up to that emotional response does not suggest 
misconduct.  Accordingly, we hold that the record does not reflect plain 
error. 
Conclusion 
 
 
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.