Title: S. W. v. DUNCAN
Citation: 2001 OK 39, 24 P.3d 846, 72OBJ1479
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: May 8, 2001

S. W. v. DUNCAN Annotate this Case S. W. v. DUNCAN 2001 OK 39 24 P.3d 846 72 OBJ 1479 Case Number: 94358 Decided: 05/08/2001 S. W., D. W. AND D. W. Petitioners v. The Honorable Jacqueline Duncan, Judge of the District Court of Custer County, Respondent and S.R.G. and T.G., Real Parties In Interest APPLICATION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF ¶0 The custodial parent, Mother, died shortly after the divorce. The non-custodial parent, Father, removed the child to Kansas and immediately instituted a proceeding for placing custody of the child with paternal relatives residing in that state. The maternal relatives commenced proceedings in the District Court of Custer County Oklahoma for the purpose of being appointed temporary custodians and/or guardians of the child. The District Court, Hon. Jacqueline Duncan, appointed the maternal relatives to be guardians and/or custodians of the child. Father and paternal relatives appealed that determination. The Court was requested to retain the appeal. The motion to retain was previously granted. We recast the appeal as an application for extraordinary relief, and hold that upon the death of the custodial parent the non-custodial parent has legal custody of the child, after the death of the custodial parent the jurisdiction of a divorce court continues for child custody matters, and when simultaneous proceedings to modify an initial custody determination by an Oklahoma court are pending in different states the Oklahoma court may proceed if in compliance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (U.C.C.J.E.A.), and if the other court does not possess jurisdiction in substantial conformity with the U.C.C.J.E.A. APPLICATION TO ASSUME ORIGINAL JURISDICTION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; WRIT OF PROHIBITION DENIED M. Eileen Echols, C. Thomas Kite, David W. Echols and Associates, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioners Douglas Loudenback, Loudenback Associates, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Real Parties in Interest SUMMERS, J. [24 P.3d 848] ¶1 Here we have a child custody dispute between a divorced father and the family of the divorced, but now deceased mother. The primary questions are whether the state which granted the divorce, Oklahoma, retains child custody jurisdiction after the death of the custodial parent, and whether the Oklahoma modification proceeding properly continued to exercise jurisdiction although a simultaneous Kansas modification proceeding had been commenced before the Oklahoma one. We conclude that the Oklahoma court making the initial custody determination in a divorce proceeding retains jurisdiction to modify custody after the death of the custodial parent, and that the Oklahoma modification proceeding was proper. ¶2 The facts are that the mother (V. W.) and father (S. W.) resided in Custer County, Oklahoma. On October 21, 1999 the decree of divorce gave custody of the little girl, J.P.W., to Mother. Father was awarded "restricted visitation," specifically "[s]aid restricted visitation shall be a maximum of three afternoon visitations per week, each being a maximum of 3 hours in length . . . ." On January 11, 2000, Mother died as a result of a car accident. ¶3 On January 23, 2000, the child was in Weatherford, Custer County, Oklahoma, and being cared for by G.G., the maternal grandmother, and S.G. and T.G., the maternal uncle and aunt. The maternal grandmother resides in Weatherford. On that day, the maternal aunt took the child to her father's home in Weatherford for visitation pursuant to the divorce decree. When she returned at 6:00 p.m. she found the home locked and Father's note taped to the door. The note stated in its entirety: "I'm exercising my right to custody and moving J... to Norton to live with [paternal uncle and aunt D. W. and D.W.] Will call when I get to Norton. [S. W.]" At approximately 6:45 p.m. she was informed by telephone that the child was in Norton, Kansas. ¶4 Father's brother and sister-in-law, D. W. and D. W., reside in Norton, Kansas, and they had arranged for a private plane to fly Father and child to Norton on January 23 ¶5 Two days later, on January 26 ¶6 Upon presentation of the application for an emergency ex parte order the Oklahoma District Court heard testimony from the maternal aunt. She testified as to finding the Father's note, where the Father [24 P.3d 849] resided, and why, in her view, Father's visitations with the child were restricted by the divorce decree. She testified that the maternal grandmother had been a primary care giver for the child when Mother was working. She stated that J.P.W. was in Kansas with the paternal relatives, that the Kansas relatives had seen J.P.W. approximately once per year, and that she and her husband had more contact with the child and the deceased mother.She also testified that the child was five years old and attended kindergarten in Weatherford, ¶7 The Oklahoma court made findings that: 1. The child had been removed from the State by a non-custodial party; 2. Harm could result to the child unless custody was awarded to the maternal grandmother (G. G.); 3. The best interests of the child required giving the maternal grandmother temporary custody; 4. Oklahoma was the home state of the child; and 5. The District Court had jurisdiction "over this situation". The court ordered that the child should not be removed from Oklahoma until the child's best interests could be determined. The court appointed independent counsel for the child. ¶8 After the hearing was held and order issued on January 26 ¶9 The Oklahoma court then held its scheduled hearing on the application for temporary custody/guardianship on February 3 ¶10 The first issue we must examine is whether the order of the District Court is immediately appealable to this Court. The District Court's jurisdiction was invoked to modify the custody/guardianship of the child. The judge construed the application as requesting a modification of the divorce decree. The District Court proceeded on an application for temporary custody. The notice of the hearing stated that it was for the purpose of hearing the application requesting "temporary Custody/Guardianship" of the child. The District Court did not make a final adjudication on the application for custody/guardianship. The order awarding custody was temporary in that it serves to name custodians of the child pending the final adjudication of the application to modify custody. ¶11 Generally, temporary orders are interlocutory orders and not immediately appealable, unless made so by statute. Renbarger v. Renbarger, 1994 OK 140, 889 P.2d 1250 , 1251; Kantor v. Kantor, 1994 OK 132, 886 P.2d 480 ; Elliott v. Elliott, 1954 OK 356, 279 P.2d 328 . No statute creating such appellate jurisdiction is cited by the parties. Interlocutory orders may be reviewed on appeal from the judgment or final order in the case, LCR, Inc. v. Linwood Properties, 1996 OK 73, n. 19, 918 P.2d 1388 , 1393, and temporary custody orders are no exception to this rule. ¶13 When deciding to recast a proceeding we have considered whether the issue before us is one of first impression. Ellison v. Ellison, 1996 OK 64, 919 P.2d 1 , 2. The first impression issue presented is whether our prior opinions have been modified by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (U.C.C.J.E.A.), 43 O.S.Supp.1998 §§ 551-101 to 551-402, inclusive. When deciding to recast we have also considered whether the content of the petition, i.e., the issue presented, is one that has been historically recognized by this Court as proper for extraordinary relief. In the Matter of B.C., supra. One party to this dispute challenges the jurisdiction and authority of an Oklahoma court to hear a child custody dispute because of a pending child custody proceeding in a different state involving the same child. This Court has assumed original jurisdiction in circumstances where child custody proceedings were pending in two states. Holt v. Dist. Court for the Twentieth Judicial Dist., 1981 OK 39, 626 P.2d 1336 . We also recognize that prohibition is a proper remedy to prevent an inferior court from proceeding in a cause without authority or in excess of its jurisdiction. Dowell v. Powers, 1960 OK 246, 357 P.2d 954 . We thus recast the petition in error as an application to assume original jurisdiction and petition to issue a writ of prohibition. We assume original jurisdiction pursuant to Article 7 § 4 of the Oklahoma Constitution on Petitioners' challenges to the District Court's authority and jurisdiction, but decline to issue the writ for the reasons we now explain. ¶14 First, we need not address the preclusive effect, if any, of the proceedings in the Kansas court; there is no"full faith and credit" argument before us. [24 P.3d 851] ¶15 The maternal uncle and aunt came to court invoking the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act, 30 O.S.1991 §1-101 - § 4-903, Oklahoma's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 43 O.S.Supp.1998 §§ 551-101 to 551-402, and 10 O.S.1991 § 9 . ¶16 This Court has recognized a non-custodial father's "preferential right" to be appointed guardian of his children upon the death of the custodial parent. Buxton v. Wilson, 1982 OK 138, ¶¶10-11, 654 P.2d 1048 , 1049. Buxton is consistent with the result in Hood v. Adams, 1964 OK 217, 396 P.2d 483 , where we affirmed an order appointing a non-custodial father as guardian after the death of the custodial parent. Buxton's result was based upon a statutory preference for parents being appointed guardians of their children. Buxton relied upon 58 O.S.1971 § 569, and that statute is now codified, as amended, at 30 O.S.1991 § 2-106 . ¶17 Father claims that upon the death of a custodial parent the non-custodial parent is immediately vested with legal custody of their children. He relies upon Turley v. Turley, 1981 OK 161, 638 P.2d 469 , where we said the following: In Ingles v. Hodges, Okl., 562 P.2d 845 (1977), this Court held: "Upon the death of the parent into whose custody children are placed by a decree of divorce, the children stand, with relation to the surviving parent and all the world, as if no decree of divorce had been entered." The rationale behind this rule is that when a divorce decree gives custody of children to one parent, as opposed to the other, it is effective only as between the parties to the divorce, and upon the death of one, the right of custody inures automatically to the surviving parent. This position states the majority view and we know of no reason to recede therefrom. Turley In our case today, Father had not been judicially determined to be unfit for custody prior to the death of Mother, and his parental rights had not been terminated. We thus agree that Father obtained custody rights of [24 P.3d 852] his child upon the death of the custodial parent. Turley v. Turley, supra. However, because of a recent statutory enactment the Oklahoma District Court of Custer County was not divested of custody jurisdiction over this child upon the death of the mother. ¶18 In 1980 the Legislature enacted 10 O.S.Supp.1980 §§ 1601 -1627, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (U.C.C.J.A.), and as both originally enacted and later amended, it contained no provision specifying the duration of a district court's jurisdiction in a particular custody matter. In 1998 the U.C.C.J.A. was repealed and the new Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (U.C.C.J.E.A.), 43 O.S.Supp.1998 §§ 551-101 to 551-402, inclusive, was enacted. 4. "Child custody proceeding" means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear. The term does not include a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation, or enforcement under Article 3 of this act; 43 O.S.Supp.1998 § 551-102 (4). Guardianships and divorces are child custody matters within the scope of the Act, and exceptions to applying the Act are not applicable here. A motion or other request for relief made in a child custody proceeding or to enforce a child custody determination which was commenced before the effective date of this act is governed by the law in effect at the time the motion or other request was made. 43 O.S.Supp.1998 § 551-402 . The relief in the Oklahoma custody/guardianship matter was requested after the effective date of the Act. Thus, the guardianship is subject to the Act. The custody jurisdiction in the divorce proceeding predates the Kansas proceedings and is an exercise of initial child custody jurisdiction. The subsequent Oklahoma proceeding was a modification proceeding simultaneous with a Kansas modification proceeding. The Kansas modification proceeding was commenced prior to the Oklahoma modification proceeding, but the Kansas court did not have jurisdiction in substantial compliance with the U.C.C.J.E.A., and the Oklahoma modification proceeding was thus proper. ¶21 We have recognized that a court exercising jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding is possessed with a continuing jurisdiction over child custody matters. Bailey v. Bailey, 1994 OK 6, ¶ 3, 867 P.2d 1267 , 1269. In the context of the death of a parent we have explained that the custodial rights of the surviving parent exist as if no divorce had occurred. Turley v. Turley, supra. The Legislature enacted a statute for how custody should be determined upon the death of a parent, but did not, at that time, expressly provide for the divorce jurisdiction of a district court to continue after the death of one of the parties. Title 10 O.S. § 21.1 provides that upon the death of the custodial parent a court may decline to award custody to the non-custodial parent because of that parent's failure to support the child, abandonment, or because custody by the surviving parent would harm the child. ¶22 The U.C.C.J.E.A. states: EXCLUSIVE, CONTINUING JURISDICTION A. Except as otherwise provided in Section 16 of this act, a court of this state which has made a child custody determination consistent with Section 13 or 15 of this act has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until: 1. A court of this state determines that neither the child, the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or 2. A court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state. B. A court of this state which has made a child custody determination and does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under Section 13 of this act. 43 O.S.Supp.1998 § 551-202 , (emphasis added). [24 P.3d 854] Thus section 551-202 provides for exclusive and continuing jurisdiction of a divorce court in custody matters until certain events occur as specified in that section. ¶23 Assuming, but without deciding, that § 551-402 is applicable for determining the scope of § 551-202, we look at the date the request for custodial relief was made. The dates the divorce proceeding and custody motions therein were filed are not part of the record before us. However, the transcript of the telephonic proceedings involving the Kansas and Oklahoma judges shows a statement by the Oklahoma judge that in October 1999 the divorce had been pending less than one year, and that in December 1998 some temporary custody orders were issued by agreement of the parties. Later in the conversation the Oklahoma judge states that she had been "exercising continuing jurisdiction over this child since at least December 1998." The Oklahoma trial judge concluded that the Act applied, and according to Petitioners, the trial judge "treated the guardianship as if it were a modification of the Decree of Divorce." We conclude that § 551-202 applied to the divorce proceeding and that proceeding resulted in an initial custody determination under the U.C.C.J.E.A. Language in Turley is thus modified by statute. We agree that the request for custody filed as part of the guardianship proceeding should be construed as a request to modify the divorce decree. ¶24 The Kansas court applied Turley v. Turley, supra, and the U.C.C.J.A. (not the U.C.C.J.E.A.), and concluded that no Oklahoma court had jurisdiction of a child custody proceeding when the Kansas proceeding was filed. ¶25 Simultaneous custody proceedings, except for temporary emergency jurisdiction proceedings, are prevented by requiring a court exercising jurisdiction to first determine if a custody proceeding has been commenced in another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with the Act. 43 O.S.Supp.1998 § 551-206 (A). ¶26 First, the Kansas court explained Kansas law as holding that the State that issued the initial custody decree, here the Oklahoma divorce, has "continuing exclusive jurisdiction". 32. In the Matter of the Marriage of Mosier, 251 Kan. 490, 836 P.2d 1158 (1992) the Supreme Court of Kansas stated that "under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and its state counterpart, [the] state that issued the initial custody decree generally has continuing exclusive jurisdiction. K.S.A. 38-1303, 38-1314(a), (a)(1); Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, §§ 3, 14(a)." Memo. Decision, Conclusion of Law No. 32, Dist. Crt. Norton Cnty., Kan. The Kansas court then characterized the dispute as between courts attempting to exercise initial custody with Oklahoma as the home state and Kansas as the state where the child had connections. 39. Here, as in the Donaldson [Guardianship of Donaldson, 178 Cal. App. 3d 477 , 223 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1986)] case, we have two state courts, both seeking to exercise initial jurisdiction in substantial conformity with the UCCJA. Oklahoma under the "home state" section (K.S.A. 38-1303(a)(1) and Kansas under the "significant connection" section (K.S.A. 38-1303(a)(2). Memo. Decision, Findings No. 32, Dist. Crt. Norton Cnty., Kan., (citation added). The Kansas Court recognized that courts possess continuing jurisdiction after the initial decree, but characterized the Kansas proceeding as an exercise of initial custody [24 P.3d 856] jurisdiction, instead of what it really is, an exercise of modification jurisdiction to modify an Oklahoma initial custody order. ¶27 The Kansas court did not attempt to exercise modification jurisdiction, and more specifically, did not attempt to exercise modification jurisdiction in substantial conformity with § 203 of the Uniform Act codified at 43 O.S.Supp.1998 § 551-203 . ¶28 The Kansas court determined that Oklahoma was the home state, and thus for a modification determination that court needed to determine if Oklahoma had "declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground" that a Kansas court was a more convenient forum. The Oklahoma court had not declined to exercise jurisdiction. The Kansas court did not have "jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this act" and the Oklahoma court was correct in proceeding with its simultaneous modification proceeding. ¶29 Father and Kansas relatives argue that there is no need for an Oklahoma guardianship because a Kansas proceeding is pending. Of course, the opposite may be said; there is no need for a Kansas proceeding with one pending in Oklahoma. The issue here is whether the Oklahoma court possessed child custody jurisdiction prior to, and at the time of, the Kansas court proceeding. In sum, because of our conclusions that the District Court of Custer County continued to have jurisdiction for the purpose of child custody determinations and the District Court stated that it was proceeding on that [24 P.3d 857] basis, and that the Kansas modification proceeding did not involve a court having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with the U.C.C.J.E.A., we need not address further the argument on the lack of needing an Oklahoma proceeding because of a then pending Kansas proceeding. ¶30 Having determined that Father obtained legal custody upon the death of the custodial parent, and that the District Court of Custer County was possessed of continuing jurisdiction in the divorce proceeding to modify custody of the child, Father argues here that he could nevertheless transport the child out of state for the purpose of relinquishing custody to his relatives. Father relies upon the general proposition that he was the custodial parent upon the death of Mother. Turley v. Turley, supra. Authority cited by Father on the issue of a non-custodial parent obtaining custodial rights upon the death of the custodial parent does not address substantive and procedural rights involved in parental relinquishment of custody. Father does not rely upon or cite any Oklahoma or Kansas statute relating to a parent relinquishing custody, or authority to relinquish parental rights, or transferring custody of his child in a Kansas court when the child is subject to the continuing jurisdiction of an Oklahoma child custody proceeding. ¶31 In an appeal we need not consider assignments of error unsupported by convincing argument or authority, unless it is apparent without further research that they are well taken. Beets v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 1999 OK 15, ¶ 9, 995 P.2d 1071 , 1074. In this original jurisdiction proceeding we see no reason why we should consider a challenge to a District Court's authority when the challenge is unsupported by convincing argument or authority, unless it is apparent without further research that the challenge is proper. The correctness of Father's challenge based upon a right to relinquish custody is not facially apparent, and we thus decline to address it further. ¶32 The Oklahoma District Court order stated that Father, "the Defendant, S__. W __., by reason of said uncontroverted testimony, is not a fit and proper person to have custody or control of the minor child . . . ." Father claims that the evidence was insufficient to show that he is unfit. Generally, prohibition is not used to review the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a District Court adjudication. Klutts v. Blackbird, 1946 OK 266, 174 P.2d 361 , 362. ¶33 A claim that the evidence is insufficient or the trial court ruling contrary to the weight of the evidence is usually reviewed on an appeal from the divorce decree or final order. See, e.g., Kahre v. Kahre, 1995 OK 133, ¶ 19, 916 P.2d 1355 , 1360; Johnson v. Johnson, 1983 OK 117, n. 19, 674 P.2d 539 , 546; Brown v. Fraser, 1970 OK 50, ¶ 19, 467 P.2d 464 , 469. Nothing before us suggests that the remedy by appeal is inadequate to review Father's claims. Prohibition cannot be had when the ordinary and usual remedies are available, and the writ cannot take the place of, or be substituted for, an appeal. Watchorn Basin Association. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 1974 OK 27, 525 P.2d 1357 , 1359 . In this extraordinary writ proceeding we decline to review the sufficiency of the evidence used in adjudicating Father's fitness for temporary custody. We decline to assume original jurisdiction on this claim. ¶34 We recast the petition in error to an application to assume original jurisdiction [ 24 P.3d 858 ] and petition for writ of prohibition. We assume original jurisdiction on Petitioners' claims challenging the jurisdiction and authority of the District Court. We decline to issue the writ because we conclude that the District Court made an initial child custody determination at the time of the divorce, and although the subsequent Oklahoma modification proceeding was commenced after the simultaneous Kansas modification proceeding, the Kansas court was not attempting to exercise modification jurisdiction and that court did not have jurisdiction in substantial conformity with the U.C.CJ.E.A.. We decline to assume original jurisdiction on the non-jurisdictional challenges to the District Court's order of temporary custody because they are beyond the ordinary scope of prohibition, and an adequate remedy exists for their review. ¶35 HARGRAVE, C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, KAUGER, SUMMERS, BOUDREAU, WINCHESTER, JJ. - Concur ¶36 OPALA, J. - Concurs in part, dissents in part. ¶37 WATT, V.C.J. - Dissents FOOT