Title: State v. Daimon Von Jackson, Jr.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP002383-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 12, 2023

2023 WI 37 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP2383-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Daimon Von Jackson, Jr., 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 400 Wis. 2d 542, 970 N.W.2d 571 
(2022 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 12, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 29, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Mark F. Nielsen & Faye M. Flancher   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
Per curiam. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined and in which HAGEDORN, 
J., joined except for ¶3. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which DALLET, J., joined.    
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Melinda A. Swartz and the Law Office of Melinda Swartz, 
LLC, Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Melinda A. Swartz. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Lisa E.F. Kumfer, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Lisa E.F. Kumfer, assistant attorney general.  
 
 
 
2023 WI 37 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2019AP2383-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2014CF1721) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Daimon Von Jackson, Jr., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 12, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Dismissed as 
improvidently granted.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Daimon Von Jackson, Jr. petitioned for 
review of a court of appeals decision that affirmed a circuit 
court order denying his postconviction motion, in which he 
argued, 
among 
other 
things, 
that 
his 
trial 
counsel 
was 
ineffective.  State v. Jackson, No. 2019AP2383-CR, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2021).  After reviewing the 
record and the briefs, and after hearing oral arguments, we 
conclude that this matter should be dismissed as improvidently 
granted. 
No. 
2019AP2383-CR   
 
2 
 
By the Court.——The review of the decision of the court of 
appeals is dismissed as improvidently granted. 
No.  2019AP2383-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶2 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with this court's decision to dismiss the petition for review as 
improvidently granted.  I write in concurrence only to respond 
to the dissent, which insinuates that by dismissing the 
petition, this court maintains a miscarriage of justice.  Not 
so.  The dissent also inaccurately portrays this court's recent 
history regarding dismissed petitions. 
¶3 
Lobbing an alarming accusation, the dissent declares:  
"[w]ithout a decision in this case, we leave a conviction intact 
without 
examining 
the 
circumstances 
that 
led 
to 
what 
a 
[dissenting] judge of the court of appeals referred to as a 
failure of both the court and the entire justice system."  
Dissent, ¶24 (citing 
State v. Jackson, No. 2019AP2383-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶88 (Reilly, J., dissenting)).  This 
statement underrates the work of the three-judge panel that 
heard the appeal.  After a thorough review, two of those three 
judges voted to affirm the decision made by the circuit court 
judge.  As noted in the majority opinion, the dissenting judge 
largely raised issues neither presented to the circuit court nor 
argued 
on 
appeal. 
 
Jackson, 
No. 2019AP2383-CR, 
¶50 
n.23 
(majority op.).  The majority criticized the dissenting judge's 
"advocacy," reiterating the uncontroversial axiom that the court 
of appeals is not a defense attorney.  Id.  Damion Von Jackson's 
right to an appeal was fully satisfied when the court of appeals 
addressed the arguments he actually made.  Just because a single 
judge at one point in this case's procedural history "perceived" 
No.  2019AP2383-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
a "failure" of the justice system does not entitle Jackson to 
further review.  See dissent, ¶24. 
¶4 
The dissent also makes the unsupported assertion that 
"[a]n examination of recent dismissals as improvidently granted 
reveals a largely inconsistent practice with regard to whether 
this court provides any explanation for its dismissals."  Id., 
¶15.  The dissent's own examples illustrate its error.  The 
dissent states: 
 
For examples of dismissals without explanation, 
see Slamka[  v. Gen. Heating and Air Conditioning 
Inc., 2022 WI 68], 404 Wis. 2d 586[, 980 N.W.2d 957]; 
Cobb v. King, 2022 WI 59, 403 Wis. 2d 198, 976 
N.W.2d 410; Fond du Lac County v. S.N.W., 2021 WI 41, 
396 Wis. 2d 773, 958 N.W.2d 530; State v. Kloss, 2020 
WI 26, 390 Wis. 2d 685, 939 N.W.2d 564; Waukesha 
County v. J.J.H., 2020 WI 22, 390 Wis. 2d 531, 939 
N.W.2d 49; Halbman v. Barrock, 2017 WI 91, 378 
Wis. 2d 17, 902 N.W.2d 248.  
 
In 
contrast, 
for 
examples 
of 
explanations 
provided by the court for a dismissal as improvidently 
granted, see Smith v. Anderson, 2017 WI 43, 374 
Wis. 2d 715, 893 N.W.2d 790; Michael J. Waldvogel 
Trucking, LLC v. LIRC, 2012 WI 28, 339 Wis. 2d 248, 
810 N.W.2d 811; Nedvidek v. Kuipers, 2009 WI 44, 317 
Wis. 2d 340, 766 N.W.2d 205; State v. Welda, 2009 WI 
35, 317 Wis. 2d 87, 765 N.W.2d 555; State v. Gajewski, 
2009 WI 22, 316 Wis. 2d 1, 762 N.W.2d 104; State v. 
Townsend, 2007 WI 31, 299 Wis. 2d 672, 728 N.W.2d 342. 
Id., ¶15 n.2.  The year in each citation is telling.  The 
dissent cites five cases from the most recent five years in 
which no explanation was offered.  The dissent's sampling does 
not include a sixth case in which this court did the same during 
this period.  See State v. Lee, 2022 WI 32, ¶1, 401 Wis. 2d 593, 
973 N.W.2d 764 (per curiam).  In contrast, the dissent cites a 
single case from the past decade containing an explanation.  
No.  2019AP2383-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
Notably, two justices did not participate in that case, which 
may explain why it is an outlier.1  Smith, 374 Wis. 2d 715, ¶10.  
The remainder of the cases cited in which this court offered an 
explanation are from more than a decade ago, and one case is 
from 2007——about 16 years ago. 
 
¶5 
Far 
from 
establishing 
a 
"largely inconsistent 
practice," the dissent's thorough examination of these "recent" 
examples establishes a no-explanation trend.  Dissent, ¶15.  The 
dissent quibbles over the definition of "recent," characterizing 
my concept of what is recent as too limited.  Id., ¶15 n.1.  The 
irony, of course, is that this writing simply applies the very 
definition of "recent" the dissent uses.  The dissent's "recent" 
examples show the opposite of the point the dissent is trying to 
make.  The dissent may lament the no-explanation trend, but 
calling the court's practice "inconsistent" flies in the face of 
the facts. 
 
¶6 
This court's recent practice is in accord with the 
traditional approach.  When courts of last resort dismiss a 
petition, they customarily do not explain why, although courts 
have at times exercised their discretion to make exceptions to 
this practice on a case by case basis.  5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate 
Review § 347 (updated Feb. 2023) ("Ordinarily, no opinion 
                                                 
1 As I have previously explained, "[c]itizens of the state 
deserve to have the entire supreme court decide all cases unless 
extreme circumstances require otherwise."  Wis. Judicial Comm'n 
v. Woldt, 2021 WI 73, ¶56 n.2, 398 Wis. 2d 482, 961 N.W.2d 854 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring/dissenting) (quoting 
State v. Herrmann, 2015 WI 84, ¶154, 364 Wis. 2d 336, 867 
N.W.2d 772 (Ziegler, J., concurring)). 
No.  2019AP2383-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
accompanies the dismissal of a . . . [petition] as improvidently 
granted.  However, the Court may issue an opinion per curiam 
defending the dismissal, especially where the Court wants to 
refute the arguments of some justices dissenting from the 
dismissal."); see also Rice v. Sioux City Mem'l Park Cemetery, 
349 U.S. 70, 77 (1955) ("We have taken this opportunity to 
explain . . . [why the petition is being dismissed], when 
normally, for obvious reasons in view of our volume of business, 
no opinion accompanies dismissal of a writ as improvidently 
granted[.]").  The United States Supreme Court, for example, 
typically dismisses a petition in a mere one-sentence order.  
E.g., In re Grand Jury, 598 U.S. __, 143 S. Ct. 543 (2023) (per 
curiam).  The dissent does not suggest this case warrants an 
exception to our practice; it argues explanations should 
accompany all dismissals. 
 
¶7 
In decrying our custom, the dissent examines its 
possible underlying rationales only in passing and only in 
response to the concerns raised in this writing.  As the 
proponent of discarding a customary practice, the dissent bears 
the burden of examining why the practice exists and then 
explaining why it should be rejected: 
In the matter of reforming things, as distinct from 
deforming 
them, 
there 
is 
one 
plain 
and 
simple 
principle; a principle which will probably be called a 
paradox.  There exists in such a case a certain 
institution or law; let us say, for the sake of 
simplicity, a fence or gate erected across a road.  
The more modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it 
and says, "I don't see the use of this; let us clear 
it away."  To which the more intelligent type of 
reformer will do well to answer:  "If you don't see 
the use of it, I certainly won't let you clear it 
No.  2019AP2383-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
away.  Go away and think.  Then, when you can come 
back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may 
allow you to destroy it." 
G.K. Chesterton, The Thing:  Why I am Catholic 27 (Dodd, Mead 
and Co. 1930); cf. Bartlett v. Evers, 2020 WI 68, ¶203, 393 
Wis. 2d 172, 945 N.W.2d 685 (Kelly, J., concurring/dissenting) 
(explaining the purpose of precedent is "[t]o remind us that 
those who came before were diligent and capable in their work, 
and that in doubtful matters it is best to leave settled things 
settled unless there is a clear and present need to do 
otherwise"). 
 
¶8 
Perhaps the tradition should be discarded; however, a 
cursory dissent in which "recent" history is misused to support 
a 
preconceived 
outcome 
is 
insufficient 
to 
justify 
that 
conclusion.  The tradition may serve many purposes, including 
the preservation of limited judicial resources.  See Rice, 349 
U.S. at 77.  For example, if this court determines the lower 
court reached the correct outcome, further review can be a waste 
of time.  Lee, 401 Wis. 2d 593, ¶2 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
concurring).  Under that circumstance, this court may conclude 
further review would not only waste judicial resources but also 
cause an unwarranted delay in a case's final resolution.  
Additionally, the tradition may stem from the principle of 
judicial restraint.  If this court declines to decide an issue, 
explaining the avoidance could inadvertently create persuasive 
authority on the issue, thereby nonsensically undermining the 
very decision not to decide it.   
 
¶9 
The dissent attempts to dispel these concerns by 
suggesting a single-sentence order dismissing the petition 
No.  2019AP2383-CR.rgb 
 
6 
 
because its resolution "will not lead to any further development 
of the law[.]"  Dissent, 
¶15 n.1 (quoting 
Slamka, 404 
Wis. 2d 586, ¶5 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring)).  The 
dissent claims this minimal explanation would neither consume 
judicial resources nor decide any issue but would foster 
transparency.  This proposal presupposes a majority of this 
court in a particular case would agree on why a petition should 
be dismissed.  Often, no such majority exists.  If two or three 
justices dissent from the dismissal, forming a majority on 
rationale may be challenging.  Some justices may disagree with 
the majority's reasoning, leading to separate writings, which in 
turn may prompt other justices to write separately in response.  
A broadly-worded order without a specific reason for dismissal 
facilitates joinder.  The issue of judicial resources is more 
complicated than the dissent implies.   
 
¶10 The dissent does not recognize that merely declaring a 
petition lacks law-developing potential is itself a holding with 
law-developing potential.  Even if not binding, it hints this 
court would not distinguish or overrule an existing precedent.  
Perhaps such a dismissal should not be read that way, but this 
court's decisions are often misconstrued.  Cf. Trump v. Evers, 
No. 2020AP1971-OA, unpublished order, 4 (Wis. Dec. 3, 2020) 
(Roggensack, C.J., dissenting) ("I also am concerned that the 
public will misunderstand what our denial of the petition means.  
Occasionally, members of the public seem to believe that a 
denial of . . . a case signals that the petition's allegations 
are either false or not serious.  Nothing could be further from 
No.  2019AP2383-CR.rgb 
 
7 
 
the truth."); O'Bright v. Lynch, No. 2020AP1761-OA, unpublished 
order, 2 (Wis. Oct. 29, 2020) (Roggensack, C.J., concurring) ("I 
write separately to clarify that our denial of the petition for 
an original action should not be construed as an endorsement to 
disregard Wisconsinites' fundamental right to vote."). 
 
¶11 Finally, it is unclear whether the dissent's proposal 
would actually give the public more than an order simply 
declaring the case dismissed.  Without some explanation as to 
why the court's review of the case would not develop any law, 
the conclusory order recommended by the dissent would not 
promote transparency.2  
 
¶12 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this concurrence and that Justice BRIAN 
HAGEDORN joins this concurrence except for ¶3.  
                                                 
2 The dissent also states, "[this court] dismisses a case 
that it at one point in time thought worthy of our review," 
castigating this court's supposed "about-face."  Dissent, ¶15.  
The dissent does not acknowledge that a petition for review 
needs only three votes (less than a majority of the full court) 
to be granted.  Wis. S. Ct. IOP III.B.1 (Feb. 28, 2023). 
No.  2019AP2383-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶13 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
I 
write 
separately for two reasons.  First, as I have stated previously, 
I believe that this court should explain to the litigants and 
the public the reason for a dismissal as improvidently granted.  
At the very least, the court should give the litigants a 
reasoned justification for leaving the questions unanswered 
given that they have expended substantial effort and resources 
to argue this case before us. 
¶14 Second, in my view, the issues in this case are worthy 
of this court's review.  Although the degree of law development 
is limited, Judge Reilly's dissent in the court of appeals 
raises substantial questions about whether Daimon Von Jackson 
received 
constitutionally 
adequate 
representation 
and 
even 
refers to this case as a "fail[ure]" of the "entire justice 
system."  State v. Jackson, No. 2019AP2383-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶88 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2021) (Reilly, J., dissenting).  
Because I believe we should address the issues presented, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶15 The court disposes of this case as improvidently 
granted in a terse, two-sentence per curiam opinion.  It 
dismisses a case that it at one point in time thought worthy of 
our review, offering no insight for either these litigants or 
future litigants as to the court's rationale for its about-face.  
An examination of recent dismissals as improvidently granted 
No.  2019AP2383-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
reveals a largely inconsistent practice1 with regard to whether 
this court provides any explanation for its dismissal.2   
¶16 The result of this inconsistent practice is a lack of 
guidance for potential litigants and the public, as well as an 
                                                 
1 The concurrence asserts that there has been the emergence 
of a "no-explanation trend" over the past five years such that 
it 
should 
now 
be 
the 
accepted 
practice 
of 
the 
court.  
Concurrence, ¶5.  Regardless of whether an examination of 
"recent" history encompasses a shorter or longer trajectory, the 
court five years ago (without explanation) stopped offering 
explanations.  Such a change does not transform an alleged 
"custom" into an entrenched practice entitled to the patina of 
precedential weight.  See id., ¶7.   
Further, the rationales offered by the concurrence for 
adhering to this purported new "tradition" of offering no 
explanation are easily dispatched.  The preservation of scarce 
judicial resources and the inadvertent resolution of an issue 
are certainly worthy of consideration.  But a single sentence 
stating that a "review should be deemed improvidently granted 
because the issue for which we took this case will not lead to 
any further development of the law," as I have offered in the 
past, neither consumes a great deal of resources nor decides any 
issue in controversy.  See Slamka v. Gen. Heating and Air 
Conditioning Inc., 2022 WI 68, ¶5, 404 Wis. 2d 586, 980 
N.W.2d 957 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring). 
2 For examples of dismissals without explanation, see 
Slamka, 404 Wis. 2d 586; Cobb v. King, 2022 WI 59, 403 
Wis. 2d 198, 976 N.W.2d 410; Fond du Lac County v. S.N.W., 2021 
WI 41, 396 Wis. 2d 773, 958 N.W.2d 530; State v. Kloss, 2020 WI 
26, 390 Wis. 2d 685, 939 N.W.2d 564; Waukesha County v. J.J.H., 
2020 WI 22, 390 Wis. 2d 531, 939 N.W.2d 49; Halbman v. Barrock, 
2017 WI 91, 378 Wis. 2d 17, 902 N.W.2d 248.   
In contrast, for examples of explanations provided by the 
court for a dismissal as improvidently granted, see Smith v. 
Anderson, 2017 WI 43, 374 Wis. 2d 715, 893 N.W.2d 790; Michael 
J. Waldvogel Trucking, LLC v. LIRC, 2012 WI 28, 339 Wis. 2d 248, 
810 
N.W.2d 811; 
Nedvidek 
v. 
Kuipers, 
2009 
WI 
44, 
317 
Wis. 2d 340, 766 N.W.2d 205; State v. Welda, 2009 WI 35, 317 
Wis. 2d 87, 765 N.W.2d 555; State v. Gajewski, 2009 WI 22, 316 
Wis. 2d 1, 762 N.W.2d 104; State v. Townsend, 2007 WI 31, 299 
Wis. 2d 672, 728 N.W.2d 342. 
No.  2019AP2383-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
effective negation of the numerous hours of work and sums of 
money spent seeking a decision on the merits.  Because there is 
a strong public policy rationale behind providing reasons for a 
dismissal as improvidently granted, the court's general practice 
should be to provide an explanation for such a dismissal.  Its 
"we don't have to tell you, so we won't" approach serves only to 
undermine transparency and accountability, while compounding the 
alleged systemic failures in this case. 
II 
¶17 I not only take issue with the majority's lack of 
explanation of its decision, but I also disagree with the 
decision itself.  The issues raised in this case revolve around 
whether Jackson's fourth trial counsel, Attorney Scott Anderson, 
was constitutionally ineffective.3  Jackson asserts that Attorney 
Anderson was ineffective for failing to communicate a plea offer 
to him, and for failing to meet with him as trial approached.  
Jackson also contends that the circuit court should have 
followed up to ensure that his attorney had met with him.  
¶18 Jackson 
pleaded 
guilty 
to 
second-degree 
reckless 
homicide as a result of an incident where the victim was killed 
during a robbery.  The plea was not as party to a crime (PTAC).  
See Wis. Stat. § 939.05 (2013-14).4  This piece of information is 
                                                 
3 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) 
(setting forth that a defendant must demonstrate both deficient 
performance and prejudice to be successful on a claim of 
ineffective assistance). 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2019AP2383-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
important for two reasons.  First, a previous plea offer, which 
the prosecutor said would remain open until the date of trial, 
included a plea as PTAC.  Second, Jackson has maintained 
throughout the case that he was not the shooter, but was merely 
a lookout for the robbery that resulted in the shooting.  
Jackson argues that he would have been treated more favorably at 
sentencing if he pleaded as PTAC, which would have allowed him 
to credibly assert that he was the lookout rather than the 
shooter.   
¶19 The record contains evidence supporting the claim that 
Jackson was the lookout.  Most compelling is that an eyewitness 
described 
the 
clothes 
the 
two 
assailants 
were 
wearing.   
Surveillance video from a casino shows that later on the day of 
the homicide, Jackson and two other men were gambling.  The two 
other men were wearing the clothes the eyewitness described, and 
Jackson was not.  Further, a co-defendant's fingerprints were 
found on the gun magazine.  
¶20 Attorney Anderson certainly made some mistakes, and 
although the State did not agree that Anderson's representation 
was constitutionally deficient, it conceded at oral argument 
that mistakes were made.  This court apparently agreed with such 
an assessment when it imposed discipline on Anderson for 
violations of the rules of professional conduct in the course of 
his representation of Jackson.  See Matter of Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Anderson, 2020 WI 82, 394 Wis. 2d 190, 950 
N.W.2d 191.   
No.  2019AP2383-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
¶21 Although our precedent indicates that a violation of 
the rules of professional conduct does not necessarily mean that 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective, State v. Cooper, 2019 
WI 73, ¶¶21-22, 387 Wis. 2d 439, 929 Wis. 2d 192, Judge Reilly's 
dissent in the court of appeals gives me enough pause to 
conclude that we should review the issues presented in this 
case.  The sheer number and magnitude of the alleged errors 
contribute to a lack of confidence in the outcome that should be 
addressed by this court. 
¶22 For example, Judge Reilly concluded that Jackson was 
"coerced into becoming the 'shooter'" due to constitutionally 
ineffective representation, the State's breach of a pretrial 
offer for Jackson to plead as PTAC, and the circuit court's 
defective plea colloquy.  Jackson, No. 2019AP2383-CR, at ¶62 
(Reilly, J., dissenting).  The mistakes Judge Reilly observed 
were recounted in a litany of errors: 
 "A 
'reasonably 
competent 
attorney' 
would 
have 
corrected the circuit court at both the final pretrial 
hearing and the trial/plea date that Jackson was not 
facing forty-six years in prison on an armed robbery 
charge if he went to trial."  Id., ¶63 (Reilly, J., 
dissenting) (footnote omitted).  
 "A reasonably competent attorney would have challenged 
the State's breach of its plea offer."  Id.  
 "A reasonably competent attorney would have understood 
that a second-degree reckless homicide charge is 
No.  2019AP2383-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
materially different from a charge of second-degree 
reckless homicide as a party to the crime."  Id.   
 "A reasonably competent attorney would have provided 
his client with a pretrial offer and discussed the 
offer with his client prior to the day of trial."  Id.  
 "A reasonably competent attorney would have met with 
and prepared both his client and witnesses prior to 
the trial date."  Id.  
 "A reasonably competent attorney would have procured, 
produced, and argued evidence that Jackson was not the 
'shooter' but was blocks away when Bobby Henderson 
shot Carter."  Id.  
¶23 In 
Judge 
Reilly's 
view, 
the 
"objective 
facts . . . show that Jackson was the lookout rather than the 
shooter."  Id., ¶64.  It is true that that there is no 
difference in the level of felony or permissible sentencing 
range for a conviction as a principal as opposed to a conviction 
as PTAC.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 939.05(2), 940.06.  But "[f]or 
anyone to suggest that a judge at sentencing would treat a cold-
blooded killer the same as a 'lookout' is sorely lacking in the 
understanding of what a judge at sentencing is tasked with 
doing."  Jackson, No. 2019AP2383-CR, at ¶81 (Reilly, J., 
dissenting). 
¶24 Jackson seeks from this court a remand to the circuit 
court for additional fact-finding.  This court should decide 
whether he is entitled to this remedy.  Without a decision in 
this case, we leave a conviction intact without examining the 
No.  2019AP2383-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
circumstances that led to what a judge of the court of appeals 
referred to as a failure of both the court and the entire 
justice system.  See id., ¶88 (Reilly, J., dissenting).  Such a 
perceived "failure" should surely be worthy of our review. 
¶25 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶26 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET joins this dissent. 
No.  2019AP2383-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1