Title: Peterson v. McCarney
Citation: 254 N.W.2d 438
Docket Number: 9289
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: June 2, 1977

254 N.W.2d 438 (1977) Willard PETERSON, Appellant, v. Elizabeth McCARNEY, Elvern Lund, Robert P. McCarney, and Jerry Spaedy, Appellees. Civ. No. 9289. Supreme Court of North Dakota. June 2, 1977. *439 Pearce, Anderson, Thames &amp; Durick, Bismarck, for appellant; argued by B. Timothy Durick, Bismarck. Lundberg, Conmy, Nodland, Rosenberg, Lucas &amp; Schulz, Bismarck, for appellees; argued by A. William Lucas, Bismarck. *440 SAND, Justice. Peterson, the plaintiff, appealed from a judgment in his favor against Elizabeth McCarney, defendant-appellee, issued by the district court, Burke County, fifth judicial district. Originally, in 1957 Peterson entered into an oral lease with Huttner, the father of Mrs. McCarney, and farmed his land on a crop share basis. Elizabeth McCarney, appellee (hereinafter McCarney), acquired title to this land in 1967. She continued the oral lease with Peterson to farm the land on a one-half crop share basis. In accordance with the oral lease, McCarney paid one-half of the expenses for combining, grain hauling, spraying, and fertilizing, and all of the expenses for seed. Peterson customarily informed McCarney on or about 1 December as to the crop grown, grain sold, and expenses incurred for the crop year. This arrangement continued until the latter part of 1973 when McCarney requested an accounting from Peterson as to the number of acres seeded, yield, etc. McCarney, at about the same time, also caused a check to be made in the elevators in the community regarding the sale of grain, and also caused the grain bins to be padlocked. After several contacts and exchanges by letter, telephone, etc., between the parties (McCarney, through her agents) Mr. Peterson was advised in writing by McCarney's attorney, in a letter dated 17 April 1974, in response to Peterson's letter dated 9 April 1974, not to assume anything regarding renewal of the lease. This was followed by a letter dated 29 April 1974 notifying Peterson that he was not to farm the McCarney land during the 1974 crop season. Thereafter Peterson instituted legal action seeking a restraining order against McCarney for quiet possession and the right to farm the land in question, or, in the alternative, damages. The trial court, after a hearing, denied the request for the restraining order but ordered judgment against McCarney for conversion of grain, crop expenses, and for the amount expended in pursuit of the converted grain, plus costs.[1] Peterson's principal contention is that McCarney was required by law to give him written notice of her intention not to renew the oral lease and the trial court erred by not concluding such notice was necessary under the circumstances of the case and for not allowing damages for lost profits for the crop year 1974 allegedly caused by nonrenewal of the lease. Peterson's counsel, during oral argument, in addition to the principal argument, urged that the case be remanded to the district court for additional findings of fact. However, he made no motion prior to the appeal pursuant to Rule 52(b), North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, for amended or other findings of fact. We must assume he considered the findings of fact adequate when he decided to appeal rather than attempt to have them enlarged. Under these circumstances we do not believe the question should be considered in the posture of this appeal. Peterson otherwise has not challenged the trial court's findings of fact. The pertinent findings are as follows: Both conclusions of law Nos. I and II may be considered a mixed question of law and fact. In Jahner v. Jacob, 233 N.W.2d 791 (N.D.1975), we said: The oral lease under consideration involved only the cropland. It did not apply to buildings on the land or the right to *442 graze cattle on the land or to cut hay for his personal use. The buildings and the other property on the land were leased to a Mr. Lund. Peterson, during the crop year, lived on his own farm near the McCarney land but during the winter he lived in Fargo, from where he returned generally in the middle of April to start the farming operation. Peterson's brief states that he has no quarrel with the court's findings that the lease expired automatically but disagrees with McCarney's position that the expiration of the leasehold interest on December 31 also relieves the landlord of giving notice to the tenant of his intention to terminate the landlord-tenant relationship. Peterson predicates his contention in part upon § 47-17-01, North Dakota Century Code, which provides that: An examination of the history of Chapter 47-17, NDCC, discloses that it was first adopted as Chapter 2 of Title 2, Part 2 of the Civil Code of 1877 with the title "Termination of Estates." In 1943 the Code Commission, without explanation, changed the title to "Termination of Estates at Will," and in the Century Code it is again entitled "Termination of Estates." Chapter titles are entitled to consideration in the construction of a code section included thereunder if the section is ambiguous or otherwise unclear. See, Udgaard v. Schindler, 75 N.D. 625, 31 N.W.2d 776, 780 (1948). In Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Sampson, 61 N.D. 611, 239 N.W. 245 (1931), this court said: In the instant case, the trial court found as follows: In addition, the trial court in its memorandum opinion, stated: Also, with reference to a letter written by Peterson to Mrs. McCarney on April 9, in which he stated "I am getting ready for spring work and must assume from previous conversation with you that I am still to farm your lands but a meeting is necessary beforehand," the court observed in its memorandum opinion: The evidence and the findings by the trial court clearly illustrate that Peterson had no expressed nor implied permission to continue as a tenant of the farm land. We further observe that Peterson was not in possession of the land as is normally understood in that he did not reside on the farm land, but, rather, resided on his own farm nearby for the farm season and resided in the city of Fargo in the winter months. These facts cannot establish a tenancy at will. Consequently, § 47-17-01, NDCC, has no application to the instant case. The Court, in the case of Foster v. National Tea Company, 74 N.D. 37, 19 N.W.2d 760 (1945), said: This statement does not support a conclusion that the lessee was converted into a tenant at will. The statement is merely that the tenant did not have a greater right than a tenant at will but it does not establish that he is, in fact, a tenant at will which requires the giving of certain notices. In Wilson v. Divide County, 76 N.W.2d 896 (N.D.1956), the Court said: then made reference to 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant, § 89. The Court continued by saying: 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant, § 89, page 279, now provides as follows: 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant, § 89(3), provides, in part, as follows: As an example of the statute requiring notice, Iowa has provided for such in § 562.6: We have already concluded that the tenancy in question here was not or did not convert into a tenancy at will so as to put into application the provisions of Chapter 47-17, NDCC. In examining other statutory provisions relating to leasing of real property, we find that § 47-16-05, NDCC, provides that: Custom and usage must be proved as any other fact. See, First National Bank of Fargo v. Minneapolis &amp; Northern Elevator Co., 11 N.D. 280, 91 N.W. 436 (1902). In Tong v. Borstad, 231 N.W.2d 795 (N.D.1975), the court had under consideration *444 a question relating to summer-fallow in which usage and custom were recognized. The court in effect held that where custom or usage on a subject are prevalent they are impliedly incorporated into the agreement to measure the rights of the parties. However, here no evidence was introduced as to usage or custom in the area. The trial court did not, nor was it requested to, take judicial notice of any usage. Consequently reliance upon usage and custom is not appropriate in this instance. The appellant has not contended that usage and custom applies or controls. It would necessarily follow that the reference to usage in § 47-16-05, NDCC, supra, would not apply in this instance. Peterson also argued that he had an automatic renewal under § 47-16-06, NDCC, which provides that: As has been mentioned earlier, the lessee, Peterson, was not in the usual customary possession, nor did the lessor, McCarney, accept or receive rent from him. The rent was on a share basis. To invoke the provisions of a statute its terms must be met. Even if the terms are met, it does not require the giving of notice. In Merchants State Bank v. Reutell, 12 N.D. 519, 97 N.W. 853 (1903), the question involved the amount of rent due and owing on a farm lease. Reutell had a lease in writing for one year for the sum of $200 to be paid in advance. The owner of the property sold the land and assigned the lease. The new owner notified defendant Reutell that it had possession of the land and if he desired to lease it for another year to so advise. There were interviews thereafter with reference to the leasing of the land but the parties failed to come to any agreement because the defendant claimed he was entitled to the use of the land for another year under the special proviso of the lease giving him an option to extend the lease for another year. The court held that the defendant knew he had no new contract with the bank, the new owner of the land. The court followed the rule laid down in McAdam on Landlord &amp; Tenant, Vol. 1 (3d Ed.) § 32, which stated as follows: The court further observed and concluded that the owner treated the lessee holding over as a tenant and that the option of how the holding over lessee is to be treated rested with the owner and not with the holding over lessee. In Knutson v. Knutson, 76 S.D. 473, 80 N.W.2d 871 (1957), the court had under consideration an oral lease. The oral lease was between father and son. From 1951 until June 18, 1955, the father's death, the son rented the crop and pastured the land under this oral lease. The will of the father was probated and in September 1955 the court set aside the land in question to the second wife of the father. The son claimed that the second wife orally agreed to lease the land to him for the crop year of 1956. He claimed that on the day the will was admitted to probate he twice asked the second wife of his father if he could have the farm again and she indicated her consent. Thereafter he plowed some 50 acres of the land. In a subsequent conversation in September the son claimed that his father's second wife indicated that he could have the land the following year. However, in October the second wife rented the premises to another person for the year 1956, whereupon this action was instituted. Amongst other things, the son contended that he was a tenant from year to year and *445 that such tenancy could not be terminated without thirty days' notice. The court observed that there was no evidence showing the duration of the son's original tenancy, and in the absence of such showing it was presumed that the lease was for a period of one year. The court then made reference to the statutory provision, which is identical to our § 47-16-06, NDCC, and stated: The rationale expressed here applies to the instant case. In Banbury v. Sherin, 4 S.D. 166, 56 N.W. 67, the court, in discussing the South Dakota statute which is identical to § 47-16-06, NDCC, said, "If no notice was necessary to terminate the first lease, then no notice was necessary to terminate the second lease." By referring to the second lease the court had reference to the renewal under the statute. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in Nichols v. Callaway, 200 Okl. 328, 193 P.2d 294 (1948), had under consideration the same language as we have in § 47-16-06, NDCC, by reason that the Oklahoma statute was adopted from the Dakota statute. The Oklahoma court followed the reasoning of and adopted the conclusions reached by the South Dakota court. The constructions placed upon the statutory provisions such as those found in § 47-16-06 by South Dakota, Oklahoma, and our Court, clearly show that a notice is not required on the basis that the lease terminates under its own provision and that a renewal, if any exists under the statute, does not acquire any greater status than the original lease. We therefore conclude that the lease in question here did not require a notice of termination on the ground that the lease expired on its own terms. Section 47-16-15, NDCC, provides as follows: This section has no application to the instant case because it has a term, a one year lease, so specified by the parties by implication. The oral lease was for a year and is, therefore, not for an unspecified term. In addition, § 47-16-15 relates to a deemed renewal as provided for in § 47-16-06, which we have already pointed out does not apply. Consequently, § 47-16-15 does not apply. In this respect, Peterson concedes that the North Dakota statute of frauds, § 9-06-04(4), NDCC, limits Peterson's interest in the property to a period of one year, and that the lease for the year 1973 would terminate as of the date found by the court, December 31, 1973. The provisions of § 47-16-20, NDCC, which provides that is not of much help in this instance because the rental was only on a crop sharing basis, with each party standing certain expenses. An examination of the record discloses that the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. We agree with the trial court that under the circumstances the lease terminated without any further notice. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and PAULSON, VOGEL and PEDERSON, JJ., concur. [1] The complaint also was against Elvern Lund, Robert P. McCarney, and Jerry Spaedy but was dismissed with prejudice and with costs as taxed and allowed by the clerk of court. The judgment also included damages from McCarney's causing a padlock to be put on the grain bin in which the previous year's crop was stored. It covered the damages sustained by Peterson for conversion as well as McCarney's share of the costs for seed, harvesting, and other incidentals relating to the crop year pursuant to the oral agreement. These items are not a part of the appeal, which is limited primarily to the renewal question or the giving of notice before termination of the oral lease.