Title: State v. Bradley
Citation: 360 So. 2d 858
Docket Number: N/A
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: June 19, 1978

360 So. 2d 858 (1978) STATE of Louisiana v. Hayworth L. BRADLEY. No. 61549. Supreme Court of Louisiana. June 19, 1978. Rehearing Denied July 26, 1978. *859 Earnest L. Johnson, Baton Rouge, for defendant-respondent. William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., Marilyn C. Castle, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-relator. DIXON, Justice. On February 17, 1976 Hayworth L. Bradley was charged by bill of information with driving while intoxicated in violation of R.S. 14:98. He was tried on October 21, 1976 and, after the presentation of the State's evidence, was granted a directed verdict of acquittal.[1] Following his acquittal, Bradley filed a "motion to expunge criminal records under provisions of LSA-R.S. 44:9." The State objected to the motion on grounds that the statute specifically prohibits the expungement of arrests for D.W.I. At the hearing on the motion the defendant successfully argued that the exclusion of D.W.I. arrests from the expungement statute constituted a denial of equal protection. We granted the State's application for supervisory writs to review the trial court's judgment declaring the last *860 sentence of R.S. 44:9(A)(2) to be unconstitutional.[2] The clear language of the statute segregates only D.W.I. arrest records from those which may be expunged. The issue is whether the State may constitutionally accord different treatment to persons arrested but not convicted for driving while intoxicated from those with the same disposition of arrests for other misdemeanors. Neither the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor Art. 1, § 3 of the Louisiana Constitution of *861 1974 prevents the State in all cases from according different treatment to different classes. It is only when those classifications are not justified by valid State interests that a denial of equal protection may be found. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S. Ct. 251, 30 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1971); McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802, 89 S. Ct. 1404, 22 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1968); Succession of Robins, 349 So. 2d 276 (La.1977); Williams v. Williams, 331 So. 2d 438 (La.1976). Both the State and the defendant agree that in the present case, there being no "suspect classification" nor "fundamental right" involved, the proper constitutional analysis to be applied is whether the classification created by the legislature bears a rational relation to a legitimate State interest. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 96 S. Ct. 2488, 49 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1976); Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 94 S. Ct. 700, 38 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1974); McCormick v. Hunt, 328 So. 2d 140 (La.1976); Chabert v. Louisiana High School Athletic Assn., 323 So. 2d 774 (La.1975). The fact that a "privilege" is involved rather than a right is of no consequence. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S. Ct. 1848, 29 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1971); Chabert v. Louisiana High School Athletic Assn., supra. The general purposes of the expungement statute were recently discussed by this court in State v. Sims, 357 So. 2d 1095 (La.1978). While the discussion also dealt with a related construction of C.Cr.P. 894, it is nevertheless pertinent to the present issues: Two arguments have been advanced as justification for denying only those arrested for D.W.I. the benefits of expungement. The State first argues that D.W.I. arrest records must be retained so that they will be available for use in license revocation proceedings conducted by the Department of Public Safety under the provisions of R.S. 32:414. Specifically, the State refers to the provisions of R.S. 32:414(D)(4) and (5), which provide: The State's argument is faulty. Under our law evidence of an arrest is generally inadmissible because it constitutes nothing more than an accusation based upon the opinion of the arresting officer. Ruthardt v. Tennant, 252 La. 1041, 215 So. 2d 805 (1968); Davis v. Bankston, 192 So. 2d 614 (La.App.3d Cir. 1966); Pugh, Work of Appellate Courts, Evidence, 28 La.L.Rev. 436 (1968). The arrest record, therefore, could not be used against the license holder in a revocation proceeding, so the justification advanced by the State is without merit. The State next argues that it is justified in excluding D.W.I. arrests from the provisions of the expungement statute because of the effect of C.Cr.P. 894 on habitual motor vehicle offender proceedings *862 under R.S. 32:1472.[3] R.S. 32:1471-1478 prohibit driving by and licensing of persons convicted of certain numbers of certain offenses within a five year period. Under this article, if the defendant successfully completes the probation suspension period then the court may set the conviction aside and dismiss the prosecution. The dismissal in all respects has the effect of an acquittal except that it may be used as a first offense in later prosecutions. The article is clearly intended as a rehabilitative device which restores all of the defendant's civil rights and prevents the exploitation of a prior criminal record. State v. Sims, supra. Only when the defendant commits a later offense which makes him susceptible of prosecution as a multiple offender can his prior record be used against him. Department of Public Safety proceedings under R.S. 32:1472 are not "prosecutions;" they are civil proceedings (State v. Page, 332 So. 2d 427 (La.1976)). Therefore, an offense for which the imposition of sentence has been suspended under C.Cr.P. 894(B) and subsequently set aside cannot be used in a departmental habitual motor vehicle offender revocation action. Such conviction can only be used in a "subsequent prosecution of the party as a multiple offender." C.Cr.P. 894. The second justification offered by the State for the exclusion of D.W.I. arrest records from the expungement statute is also without basis. The State has failed to demonstrate any rational basis for the different treatment afforded D.W.I. misdemeanor arrests. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment declaring the last sentence of R.S. 44:9(A)(2) unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection is affirmed. [1] From the record before us it appears that the State was unable to prove that the defendant was the driver of the car at the time of the arrest. [2] It does not escape us that the beneficial effect of expungement will be somewhat limited for this defendant by the publication of this opinion. [3] It should be noted that only convictions, not acquittals, can be used under R.S. 32:1472, so no evidence of this defendant's arrest record would be available for use in such a proceeding.