Title: Davis v. Davis
Citation: 498 P.2d 674
Docket Number: 9348
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 1972

498 P.2d 674 (1972) Elton Ray DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Justina DAVIS, Defendant-Appellee. No. 9348. Supreme Court of New Mexico. June 30, 1972. Catron, Catron &amp; Donnelly, Santa Fe, for appellant. Bigbee, Byrd, Carpenter &amp; Crout, Harl D. Byrd, Paul D. Gerber, Santa Fe, for appellee. COMPTON, Chief Justice. This is an appeal from an order of the District Court changing custody of three minor children from the father, appellant, to the mother, appellee. Suit was initially filed by appellant in Santa Fe County, seeking a divorce from appellee, for the custody of the three children of the parties, and for a division of the community property. During pendency of the Santa Fe proceeding, appellee filed suit for divorce in California in which she sought the custody of the children. The California court awarded custody of the children, pendente lite, to the appellant. Upon returning the children to New Mexico appellant was granted a divorce, a division of the community property, and was awarded the custody and control of the children. Some eight months later appellee filed a petition seeking a change of custody of the children from the appellant to her. Following a hearing on the petition, *675 the court ordered the change of custody to appellee. Appellant superseded the ruling of the court pending the outcome of this appeal. The trial court found: Appellant contends (a) that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence, (b) that the court erred in admitting hearsay evidence and (c) that he was denied the right of cross-examination of a witness. At the outset it should be restated that the paramount issue before this court is the best interests and welfare of the children. This premise and the fact that the trial court has great discretion in matters of this type, is the point from which we proceed. Terry v. Terry, 82 N.M. 113, 476 P.2d 772. In Bell v. Odil, 60 N.M. 404, 292 P.2d 96, our court stated: See also, Urzua v. Urzua, 67 N.M. 304, 355 P.2d 123. Though there is no statutory requirement that a change of circumstances must be shown before a custody decree will be modified or changed, it is well settled in this jurisdiction that a showing of changed circumstances is a prerequisite to modification or change of custody. Tuttle v. Tuttle, 66 N.M. 134, 343 P.2d 838. The change of circumstance must be shown to be of a material nature before a modification or change is justified. Edington v. Edington, 50 N.M. 349, 176 P.2d 915; Tuttle v. Tuttle, supra, and the burden of showing a material change of circumstances rests upon the moving party. Edington v. Edington, supra. Compare Kerley v. Kerley, 69 N.M. 291, 366 P.2d 141, and Fox v. Doak, 78 N.M. 743, 438 P.2d 153. From our review of the record, we are convinced that the appellee has sustained the burden required for a change of custody. The testimony of a psychiatrist, coupled with the testimony of other witnesses introduced by appellee, constitutes substantial evidence and supports the order of the court. In Tapia v. Panhandle Steel *676 Erectors Co., 78 N.M. 86, 428 P.2d 625, this court defined substantial evidence as: As to appellant's second contention the court admitted into evidence certain letters relating to appellee's standing in California. We agree the admission of the letters violated the hearsay rule, but the error was harmless when viewed in light of all the evidence. There was other substantial evidence which would sustain the findings of the court; the letters were merely cumulative. In Keil v. Wilson, 47 N.M. 43, 133 P.2d 705, this court, citing with approval 5A C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1724, said: Keil, supra, citing Radcliffe v. Chaves, 15 N.M. 258, 110 P. 699, further stated: The burden of establishing prejudicial error was upon the appellant, Keil v. Wilson, supra, and he has failed in that regard. As to appellant's contention that he was denied the right to cross-examine a witness, we again do not agree. The trial court announced that he was going to call a witness for examination. Thereupon the appellant stated that he reserved the right to cross-examine the witness. After the court had questioned the witness, appellant did not request an opportunity to cross-examine the witness but instead asked if he could present some authority to the court. Appellant can not now be heard to say that he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The order should be affirmed. It is so ordered. McMANUS and STEPHENSON, JJ., concur.