Title: P. v. Walker
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S097725
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: December 12, 2002

1
Filed 12/12/02 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S097725 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C030891 
DANIEL WALKER, 
) 
 
 
) 
Placer County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) Super. Ct. Nos. 62-344, 62-2191 
___________________________________) 
 
In this case, we are asked to determine whether a defendant who is 
convicted of the felony of willfully failing to appear in court as required while on 
bail, a violation of section 1320.5 of the Penal Code,1 is subject, in addition to 
the sentence that statute prescribes, to a consecutive two-year sentence 
enhancement under section 12022.1.  Section 12022.1 applies generally if a 
defendant charged with a felony is released on bail, is subsequently arrested for 
committing a second felony while on bail, and is convicted of both felony 
offenses.  Application of settled rules of statutory construction leads us to 
conclude that the Legislature intended section 12022.1 to apply where, as here, 
the only felony the defendant commits while released on bail is a failure to 
appear in violation of section 1320.5.  We further conclude that, because a 
section 12022.1 sentence enhancement is not based on the same act or omission 
                                             
 
1  
Unless otherwise specified, all further statutory references are to this code. 
 
2
for which punishment is authorized under section 1320.5, sentencing under both 
statutes may be imposed without violating section 654’s bar against multiple 
punishment. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The facts relevant to the legal issues presented are undisputed. 
In February of 1998, defendant Daniel Walker was charged in case No. 
62-344 with three counts of first degree residential burglary (§ 459) and one 
count of grand theft of a firearm (§ 487, subd. (d)).  Defendant was released on 
bail and ordered to appear in court on April 2, 1998. 
Defendant failed to appear in court as required and was charged in case 
No. 62-2191 with the offense of willful failure to appear in court while released 
on bail.  (§ 1320.5.)  The information in case No. 62-2191 also alleged, as a basis 
for enhancing defendant’s sentence under section 12022.1, that defendant 
committed the failure-to-appear offense while he was released from custody on 
bail in case No. 62-344.  Defendant subsequently was apprehended. 
In case No. 62-344, the prosecution successfully moved to amend to add 
one count of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), and a jury subsequently 
convicted defendant of all of the burglary, grand theft, and stolen property 
charges.  In case No. 62-2191, defendant pleaded guilty to the failure-to-appear 
charge and admitted as true the enhancement allegation that he committed that 
offense while released on bail.  As relevant here, defendant’s sentence included a 
term of eight months (one-third the middle term) for the failure-to-appear offense 
(§ 1320.5), plus a consecutive sentence of two years for the sentence 
enhancement (§ 12022.1). 
The Court of Appeal, in a split decision, upheld defendant’s sentence 
insofar as it imposed punishment under section 1320.5 and section 12022.1. 
We granted defendant’s petition for review. 
 
3
DISCUSSION 
Defendant contends the imposition of enhanced punishment under section 
12022.1 is inappropriate for two reasons.  As a matter of statutory construction, 
he argues, section 12022.1 does not apply when a defendant’s only on-bail 
offense is a willful failure to appear in violation of section 1320.5.  In any event, 
he asserts, the imposition of punishment under both sections 1320.5 and 12022.1 
violates section 654’s prohibition against multiple punishment of an act or 
omission, i.e., the single act of failing to appear in court while released on bail.  
We address these contentions in order. 
A.  Legislative Intent 
Does the two-year sentence enhancement provided in section 12022.1 
apply when a defendant’s only on-bail offense is a willful failure to appear in 
court as required, in violation of section 1320.5? 
In this part of our analysis, we must ascertain what the Legislature 
intended when it enacted sections 1320.5 and 12022.1.  We begin by examining 
the words of the respective statutes; if the statutory language is not ambiguous, 
then we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the 
language governs.  (Allen v. Sully-Miller Contracting Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 222, 
227 (Allen); People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 151 (Coronado).)  If, 
however, the statutory language lacks clarity, we may resort to extrinsic sources, 
including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.  (Ibid.)  
In such situations, we strive to select the construction that comports most closely 
with the Legislature’s apparent intent, with a view to promoting rather than 
defeating the statutes’ general purposes.  (Ibid.)  We will avoid any interpretation 
that would lead to absurd consequences.  (Ibid.) 
 
4
Section 1320.5 defines a substantive criminal offense and the punishment 
therefor as follows:  “Every person who is charged with or convicted of the 
commission of a felony, who is released from custody on bail, and who in order 
to evade the process of the court willfully fails to appear as required, is guilty of 
a felony.  Upon a conviction under this section, the person shall be punished by a 
fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or by imprisonment in the state 
prison, or in the county jail for not more than one year, or by both the fine and 
imprisonment.  Willful failure to appear within 14 days of the date assigned for 
appearance may be found to have been for the purpose of evading the process of 
the court.”  As reflected by its terms, section 1320.5 specifies no limitation 
whatsoever on the circumstances of its operation. 
Unlike section 1320.5, section 12022.1 does not define a criminal offense; 
instead, it identifies circumstances under which a defendant charged with a 
substantive offense is subject to a sentence enhancement.  Specifically, section 
12022.1 provides that if a person charged with a felony (the primary offense) is 
released on bail or on his or her own recognizance and subsequently is arrested 
for committing another felony (the secondary offense) while released from 
custody on the primary offense, and if that person is convicted of both offenses, 
he or she “shall be subject to a penalty enhancement of an additional two years in 
state prison which shall be served consecutive to any other term imposed by the 
court.”  (§ 12022.1, subds. (a), (b), (d).)2 
                                             
 
2  
Section 12022.1 provides in pertinent part:  “(a) For the purposes of this 
section only:  [¶] (1) ‘Primary offense’ means a felony offense for which a 
person has been released from custody on bail or on his or her own recognizance 
. . . .  [¶] (2) ‘Secondary offense’ means a felony offense alleged to have been 
committed while the person is released from custody for a primary offense.  [¶] 
(b) Any person arrested for a secondary offense which was alleged to have been 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
5
The language of section 12022.1 provides no exception to its application 
in the event that the defendant’s only secondary offense is a violation of section 
1320.5.  To the contrary, section 12022.1 is phrased in unqualified terms stating 
that “[a]ny person arrested for a secondary offense which was alleged to have 
been committed while that person was released from custody on a primary 
offense shall be subject to a penalty enhancement of an additional two years in 
state prison which shall be served consecutive to any other term imposed by the 
court.”  (Id., subd. (b), italics added.)  The plain meaning of these terms strongly 
suggests that the Legislature intended section 12022.1 to apply to secondary 
felony offenses of any kind without restriction, including violations of section 
1320.5.  Fairly read, the broad and compulsory nature of the language appears to 
require courts to impose the two-year enhancement no matter what type of 
secondary felony offense the defendant commits, so long as the defendant is 
convicted of both the primary and the secondary offenses.  (§ 12022.1, subd. (b); 
see also id., subds. (a), (d).) 
                                                                                                                                    
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
committed while that person was released from custody on a primary offense 
shall be subject to a penalty enhancement of an additional two years in state 
prison which shall be served consecutive to any other term imposed by the court.  
[¶] (c) The enhancement allegation provided in subdivision (b) shall be pleaded 
in the information or indictment which alleges the secondary offense . . . .  [¶] (d) 
Whenever there is a conviction for the secondary offense and the enhancement is 
proved, and the person is sentenced on the secondary offense prior to the 
conviction of the primary offense, the imposition of the enhancement shall be 
stayed pending imposition of the sentence for the primary offense.  The stay shall 
be lifted by the court hearing the primary offense at the time of sentencing for 
that offense and shall be recorded in the abstract of judgment.  If the person is 
acquitted of the primary offense the stay shall be permanent.” 
 
6
Not only do section 1320.5 and section 12022.1, by their own terms, 
apply without restriction when their respective statutory requirements are 
satisfied, but the legislative history confirms that the two provisions serve 
distinct purposes and authorize punishment for different reasons. 
With respect to section 1320.5, the legislative history states explicitly that 
its purpose is “to deter bail jumping.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Sen. 
Bill No. 395 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) p. 1; Sen. Republican Caucus, analysis of 
Sen. Bill No. 395 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess. ) as amended June 16, 1983, p. 1.)  The 
language and history of section 1320.5 also reflect the Legislature’s view that 
fulfillment of this purpose requires punishment whether or not the defendant 
ultimately is convicted of the charge for which he or she was out on bail when 
failing to appear in court as ordered.  (§ 1320.5 [every person who is “charged 
with or convicted of” commission of a felony while released from custody on 
bail is subject to conviction (italics added)]; Assem. Com. on Crim. Law & Pub. 
Safety, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 395 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) p. 2 [observing that 
the proposed legislation would subject a defendant who failed to appear on an 
underlying felony charge to conviction and sanctions, “even if the defendant was 
the victim of misidentification or was acquitted on the underlying charge”].) 
The legislative history, however, indicates that the purpose of section 
12022.1 extends beyond mere deterrence of bail jumping.  Notably, one 
legislative analysis observed that the bill would create another status-based 
enhancement, somewhat similar to section 667.5’s enhancement for prior prison 
terms, that would not focus on the circumstances of the crime.  (Sen. Com. on 
Judiciary, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 692 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
Jan. 25, 1982, p. 5.)  Another legislative report observed that those who opposed 
enactment of the statute did so partly because “no meaningful study of on-bail 
 
7
recidivism has ever been conducted.”  (Sen. Democratic Caucus, Rep. on 3d 
Reading of Assem. Bill No. 692 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) p. 2.) 
As these reports reflect, the Legislature evidently views those who qualify 
under section 12022.1 — defendants convicted of both the primary felony and 
the secondary felony — as being particularly deserving of increased punishment 
for their on-bail recidivism.  Indeed, defendants who willfully fail to appear in 
court as required for felony charges of which they ultimately are convicted are 
more blameworthy than defendants who willfully fail to appear for felony 
charges that ultimately are dismissed or reduced, or result in acquittal.  
Application of both statutes, therefore, leads to the rational result that the more 
culpable offenders receive the greater punishment.  This construction is 
consistent with our prior recognition that “the purpose and intent behind a 
section 12022.1 enhancement, generally speaking, is . . . to penalize recidivist 
conduct with increased punishment.”  (People v. McClanahan (1992) 3 Cal.4th 
860, 868; see also People v. Warinner (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1352, 1356 [“The 
legislative intent of section 12022.1 was to punish recidivists with additional 
penalties.”].) 
The legislative history further indicates that the Legislature was cognizant 
of an analogous failure-to-appear offense (§ 1320, added by Stats. 1979, ch. 873, 
§ 13, p. 3043 [defining misdemeanor and felony offenses for failure to appear 
while released on one’s own recognizance]) when it enacted section 12022.1 in 
1982 (added by Stats. 1982, ch. 1551, § 2, p. 6050).3  Specifically, an analysis of 
the bill proposing section 12022.1’s enactment commented:  “Failure to Appear.  
                                             
 
3  
Section 1320.5 was not enacted until 1983.  (Stats. 1983, ch. 403, § 1, pp. 
1669-1670 [making it a misdemeanor for a person charged with a felony and 
released on bail to fail to appear].) 
 
8
Current law provides for criminal sanctions for failure to appear after being 
released on one’s own recognizance or on 10% deposit (for a misdemeanor).  
Would this bill provide for double punishment for these crimes?”  (Assem. Com. 
on Crim. Justice, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 692 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) p. 3.)  
Although the bill analysis contained no response to this question, the Legislature 
ultimately selected statutory language that stands unqualified and unrestricted in 
its application to felony offenses.  These circumstances provide yet another basis 
for inferring that the Legislature did not intend to disallow section 12022.1’s 
application to a failure-to-appear offense. 
In urging we should not presume that the Legislature meant what it said 
when enacting the subject statutes, the dissent cites In re Shull (1944) 23 Cal.2d 
745 (Shull).  The dissent contends that Shull provides analogous support for 
interpreting section 12022.1 as being inapplicable when the only secondary 
offense of which the defendant is convicted is a violation of section 1320.5.  The 
proffered analogy fails to persuade. 
In Shull, the issue was whether a defendant who was convicted of the 
crime of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245) and received a 10-year sentence 
for that offense, also was subject to an additional five- to 10-year sentence under 
section 3 of the Deadly Weapons Act.  (Shull, supra, 23 Cal.2d at pp. 747-748.)  
Shull concluded that the Legislature had not intended the additional sentence 
authorized by the Deadly Weapons Act to apply to a defendant convicted of 
assault with a deadly weapon.  (Id. at p. 751.)  Shull inferred this lack of intent 
from the fact that the essential factors of the substantive crime4 and the sentence 
                                             
 
4  
Shull contrasted the substantive crime of assault with a deadly weapon 
with the substantive crime of simple assault, observing that the only difference 
between the two, and the only basis for the authorization of increased 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
9
enhancement were effectively identical and turned solely on the defendant’s 
being armed with a deadly weapon:  “[T]he Legislature has fixed the punishment 
for an assault where a deadly weapon is used, a particular crime, and it is not to 
be supposed that for the same offense without any additional factor existing the 
added punishment should be imposed.”  (Shull, supra, 23 Cal.2d at p. 751.)  
Accordingly, Shull found that the enhancement was not intended to apply where 
the only substantive offense at issue was an assault with a deadly weapon. 
The statutes before us present no parallel or similar situation.  Here, the 
most that can be said is that the substantive crime (§ 1320.5) and the sentence 
enhancement (§ 12022.1) share a common element insofar as both statutes seek 
to punish a defendant who commits a crime while released on bail.  But as 
discussed, the gravamen of section 1320.5 is the defendant’s act of jumping bail 
and consequent evasion of the court’s process, while section 12022.1 turns on the 
defendant’s on-bail recidivism.5  Because the two statutes have distinct aims and 
punish for different reasons, the dissent’s attempt to analogize to Shull fails. 
In a similar vein, defendant argues that punishment should not be imposed 
under both statutes because section 1320.5 is a “specific” or “special” statute 
                                                                                                                                    
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
punishment for the former, is use of a deadly weapon as a factor.  (Shull, supra, 
23 Cal.2d at p. 750.) 
5  
As People v. McClanahan, supra, 3 Cal.4th 860, explained, a section 
12022.1 enhancement addresses a “form of recidivism” (McClanahan, at p. 868), 
based not on a prior conviction, but on “the defendant’s commission of a new 
felony offense while released from custody on an earlier felony of which he is 
ultimately convicted,” even if the conviction of the earlier felony (the primary 
offense) occurs after both commission and conviction of the new felony (the 
secondary offense) (id. at p. 871). 
 
10
proscribing bail jumping that applies to the exclusion of section 12022.1, a 
“general” statute authorizing additional punishment for the same conduct. 
We recently stated that “[t]he ‘special over the general’ rule . . . does not 
apply . . . unless ‘each element of the “general” statute corresponds to an element 
on the face of the “specific” . . . statute’ or ‘it appears from the entire context that 
a violation of the “special” statute will necessarily or commonly result in a 
violation of the “general” statute.’ ”  (Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 153-
154, citing People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 502.)  The rule is not one of 
constitutional or statutory mandate, but serves as an aid to judicial interpretation 
when two statutes conflict.  (See In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651, 654.) 
Plainly, the terms of sections 1320.5 and 12022.1 are not identical; section 
12022.1 contains a significant requirement that has no counterpart in section 
1320.5, i.e., the defendant must be convicted of the primary offense before 
punishment can be imposed.  Although section 12022.1, strictly speaking, does 
not appear to make the defendant’s conviction of the primary offense an element 
of the enhancement in order to prove the enhancement, the statute makes crystal 
clear that imposition of the enhancement requires conviction of the primary 
offense at some stage of the proceedings.  (§ 12022.1, subds. (b), (c), (d); see 
People v. McClanahan, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 869-871.) 
A review of the legislative history discloses that the Legislature crafted 
section 12022.1 in this manner because the enhancement posed “some 
difficulties of application because of the contingent nature of the triggering 
event, i.e., conviction for the first felony.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of 
Assem. Bill No. 692 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 25, 1982, p. 2.)  
Because defendants who commit primary and secondary offenses in different 
counties often would be tried on their primary offense after a trial on their 
secondary offense (id. at pp. 2-3), and because defendants could be acquitted on 
 
11
the primary offense after being found guilty on the secondary offense, section 
12022.1 was structured to stay imposition of the enhancement pending 
imposition of the sentence for the primary offense and to stay imposition of the 
enhancement permanently on a defendant’s acquittal of the primary offense 
(§ 12022.1, subds. (b), (c), (d)).  But because a conviction on the primary offense 
is an essential prerequisite to the imposition of punishment under section 
12022.1, it must be taken into account for purposes of applying the special-over-
general rule in the context of this case. 
With this understanding, we conclude defendant has not shown 
satisfaction of the special-over-general rule here.  First, he cannot show that the 
primary offense conviction requirement of section 12022.1 corresponds to any 
element on the face of section 1320.5.  (See Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 
154; People v. Jenkins, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 502.) 
Second, the record before us contains no evidence indicating that a 
violation of section 1320.5 will necessarily or commonly result in the imposition 
of punishment under section 12022.1.  (See Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 
154; People v. Jenkins, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 502.)  Indeed, as the People point 
out, a charge on a primary offense can fail in any number of ways to result in a 
felony conviction and defeat section 12022.1’s application.  For example:  (1) the 
prosecutor might move to dismiss the felony charge for insufficient evidence or 
after suppression of the evidence (§§ 1385, 1538.5); (2) the court might dismiss 
the charge or set aside the indictment or information (§§ 871, 995, 1385) or enter 
a judgment of acquittal before submission of the case to the jury (§ 1118.1); (3) 
the prosecutor might move to dismiss the charge in the interests of justice or 
reduce it to a misdemeanor as part of a plea bargain; (4) the court might reduce 
the charge to a misdemeanor (§ 17, subd. (b)); (5) the jury might acquit the 
 
12
defendant; or (6) the conviction might be reversed or dismissed on a state or 
federal writ of habeas corpus. 
Legislative history further undermines the suggestion that defendants 
convicted and punished under section 1320.5 will necessarily or commonly 
receive punishment under section 12022.1.  For instance, when the Legislature 
amended section 1320.5 in 1985 to make the failure-to-appear offense a felony 
rather than a misdemeanor, a number of legislative reports explained:  
“According to the Los Angeles District Attorney, the sponsor of this bill, failure 
to appear (FTA) when released on bail is occurring with alarming frequency in 
Los Angeles County.  Because a conviction in an FTA case results in 
misdemeanor penalties, the sponsor claims that defendants accused of felonies 
with harsh penalties will fail to appear in order to postpone hearings and waste 
time, hoping that witnesses will disappear or forget what happened.”  (Assem. 
Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1393 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended May 6, 1985, p. 1; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1393 
(1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 6, 1985, p. 2; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of 
Sen. Floor Analyses, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1393 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended May 6, 1985, p. 1.)  At least one of these reports noted the following 
statistic provided by the Los Angeles District Attorney:  “ ‘There are 
approximately 200 cases a year in Los Angeles County where defendants jump 
bail, are subsequently apprehended, but the underlying felony cannot be 
prosecuted due to the unavailability or poor recollection of witnesses.’ ”  (Assem. 
Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1393 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended May 6, 1985, p. 1; see also Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Republican 
analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1393 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 6, 1985, 
p. 1 [“It often times pays to fail to appear.  The memories of the victims fail or 
they move”].)  If anything, this legislative history indicates that bail jumpers 
 
13
often are successful in avoiding convictions on the underlying felonies charged 
against them (i.e., the primary offenses to which section 12022.1 refers). 
In sum, we conclude the Legislature intended the enhanced punishment of 
section 12022.1 to apply even where the only secondary offense at issue is a 
willful failure to appear in court in violation of section 1320.5.  The statutory 
language admits no ambiguity on the point, and the legislative history 
affirmatively supports this construction.  Put another way, because nothing in the 
statutory language or history reflects a legislative purpose to disallow additional 
punishment under section 12022.1 when the only secondary offense is a violation 
of section 1320.5, the construction that comports most closely with the 
Legislature’s apparent intent is one that gives effect to section 12022.1 under 
such circumstances.  (See Allen, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 227; Coronado, supra, 
12 Cal.4th at p. 151.) 
B.  Section 654 
Section 654 provides in pertinent part:  “An act or omission that is 
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished 
under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, 
but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one 
provision.  An acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a 
prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.”  (Id., subd. (a).)  In 
this part of our opinion, we determine whether section 654 prohibits imposition 
of both the sentence for the failure-to-appear offense (§ 1320.5) and the sentence 
enhancement (§ 12022.1) because, in defendant’s view, they are based on the 
same act or omission, for which defendant cannot be punished more than once. 
Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th 145, is instructive.  That decision observed, 
“there are at least two types of sentence enhancements:  (1) those which go to the 
 
14
nature of the offender; and (2) those which go to the nature of the offense.”  (Id. 
at p. 156.)  Coronado explained that the first category of enhancements is 
“attributable to the defendant’s status as a repeat offender” (e.g., § 667.5, subd. 
(b)), while, by contrast, the second category of enhancements “arise[s] from the 
circumstances of the crime and typically focus on what the defendant did when 
the current offense was committed” (e.g., §§ 12022.5, 12022.7).  (Coronado, 
supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 156-157.) 
Coronado reasoned that recidivist enhancements, such as prior prison 
term enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision (b), are attributable to the 
defendant’s status as a repeat offender.  (Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 156.)  
Because such enhancements “are not attributable to the underlying criminal 
conduct which gave rise to the defendant’s prior and current convictions,” they 
do not implicate multiple punishment of an act or omission.  (Id. at p. 158.)  
Coronado applied such reasoning to hold that “a single prior conviction and 
resulting prison term may be used both to elevate a violation of Vehicle Code 
section 23152 to a felony under Vehicle Code section 23175 and to enhance the 
sentence therefor under section [667.5, subdivision (b)] without violating section 
654’s bar against multiple punishment of an act or omission.”  (Coronado, supra, 
12 Cal.4th at p. 159, fn. omitted.) 
Turning to the enhancement statute before us, we find that section 
12022.1 authorizes the imposition of additional punishment whenever it is 
established that a defendant is a felony recidivist who committed a secondary 
offense while released on bail pending proceedings on a primary offense.  Like a 
prior prison term enhancement, then, a section 12022.1 enhancement turns on the 
status of a defendant as a repeat offender, not on what the defendant did when 
committing the current crime, i.e., the secondary offense.  (People v. Warinner, 
supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 1356; see People v. McClanahan, supra, 3 Cal.4th at 
 
15
p. 868 [“the purpose and intent behind a section 12022.1 enhancement, generally 
speaking, is . . . to penalize recidivist conduct with increased punishment”]; Sen. 
Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 692 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended Jan. 25, 1982, p. 5 [“This bill would add another status enhancement of 
two years for committing any felony while out on bail”]; see also People v. 
McClanahan, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 870-871 [acknowledging the correctness of 
People v. Tassell (1984) 36 Cal.3d 77, 90, insofar as it described section 12022.1 
as an enhancement that goes to the nature of the offender].)  Because a section 
12022.1 enhancement does not punish a defendant for his or her conduct while 
committing an offense (here, willfully failing to appear in court as required in 
violation of section 1320.5), but rather punishes the defendant for his or her 
status as a repeat offender while on bail, the enhancement does not constitute 
punishment of an act or omission within the meaning of section 654. 
Consistent with the reasoning of Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th 145, we 
hold that a sentence enhancement under section 12022.1 is not based on the same 
act or omission for which a defendant is subject to punishment under section 
1320.5.  Accordingly, section 654’s bar against multiple punishment does not 
preclude the imposition of sentencing under both statutes. 
 
16
DISPOSITION 
In this consolidated proceeding, defendant sustained convictions for at 
least one primary offense (§ 459, burglary) and one secondary offense (§ 1320.5, 
failure to appear) within the meaning of section 12022.1.  Because section 
1320.5 and section 12022.1 serve different purposes and do not punish defendant 
more than once for a single act or omission, punishment under both statutes is 
appropriate. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY GEORGE, C.J. 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
This case presents the question whether a defendant who is convicted of 
the felony of willfully failing to appear in court while on bail, a violation of 
Penal Code section 1320.5,1 is subject, in addition to the sentence prescribed by 
that statute, to a consecutive two-year sentence enhancement under section 
12022.1, commonly referred to as the “on-bail” enhancement provision, which 
applies generally to a person who commits any felony while on bail.  Unlike the 
majority, I conclude that the general on-bail enhancement provision of section 
12022.1 does not apply when the defendant’s only on-bail offense is a violation 
of section 1320.5. 
 
As I shall explain, past cases analyzing similar issues establish that when a 
specific substantive offense and a more general sentencing enhancement share 
common elements, a court, in determining whether the sentencing enhancement 
may be imposed in addition to the punishment for the substantive offense, must 
adopt “ ‘the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of 
the Legislature’ ” (People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 155 [quoting 
People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 246]; see also In re Shull (1944) 23 
Cal.2d 745, 749-751), and must consider, among other factors, whether a 
                                             
 
1  
Unless otherwise specified, subsequent section references are to the Penal 
Code. 
2 
violation of the specific substantive offense “will necessarily or commonly” 
bring into play the more general enhancement provision.  (People v. Jenkins, 
supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 502; People v. Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 154.) 
 
With regard to the statutes involved in the present case, I believe it is clear 
that a violation of section 1320.5 will “commonly” (albeit not necessarily or 
invariably) bring into play the on-bail enhancement established by section 
12022.1.  Furthermore, although the Legislature clearly intended the increased 
punishment mandated by the general on-bail enhancement to apply to the great 
bulk of felonies (for example, robbery, burglary, or rape) that may be committed 
by persons who may or may not be on bail and whose punishment for such 
crimes does not already take into account whether the crime was committed by a 
person while released on bail, I believe that it is most reasonable to conclude 
that the Legislature did not intend the general on-bail enhancement provision to 
apply to an offense, like the one set forth in section 1320.5, that can be 
committed only by a defendant who is on bail and whose prescribed punishment 
already takes into account the circumstance that the offense was committed by a 
defendant while on bail. 
In my view, the majority’s contrary conclusion runs counter to common 
sense, and improperly authorizes the unreasonable “piling on” of a sentence 
enhancement in a manner that the Legislature almost certainly did not intend.  
Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
I begin with a review of the terms of both statutes. 
 
Section 1320.5 provides that a person charged with or convicted of a 
felony and released on bail who, in order to evade the process of the court, 
3 
willfully fails to appear as required, is guilty of a felony.2  Because section 
1320.5 does not designate a specific state prison term, under section 18 a 
violation of section 1320.5 is punishable by imprisonment in state prison “for 16 
months, or two or three years.”3 
 
Section 12022.1, unlike section 1320.5, does not define a distinct criminal 
offense, but instead sets forth a sentence enhancement specifying circumstances 
under which a defendant convicted of a substantive offense will have his or her 
sentence “enhanced,” i.e., increased.  Section 12022.1 provides that if a person 
charged with a felony (referred to in the section as “the primary offense”) is 
released on bail or on his or her own recognizance, and subsequently is arrested 
for having committed another felony (referred to as “the secondary offense”) 
while released from custody on the primary offense, he or she “shall be subject to 
a penalty enhancement of an additional two years in state prison which shall be 
served consecutively to any other term imposed by the court.”  (Id., subd. (b).)  
The statute further provides that whenever the person is sentenced on the 
secondary offense prior to conviction on the primary offense, the imposition of 
the enhancement must be stayed pending imposition of sentence on the primary 
                                             
 
2  
Section 1320.5 provides in full:  “Every person who is charged with or 
convicted of the commission of a felony, who is released on bail, and who in 
order to evade the process of the court willfully fails to appear as required, is 
guilty of a felony.  Upon a conviction under this section, the person shall be 
punished by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or by 
imprisonment in the state prison, or in the county jail for not more than one year, 
or by both the fine and imprisonment.  Willful failure to appear within 14 days of 
the date assigned for appearance may be found to have been for the purpose of 
evading the process of the court.” 
3  
Section 18 provides in pertinent part:  “Except in cases where a different 
punishment is prescribed by any law of this state, every offense declared to be a 
felony . . . is punishable by imprisonment in any of the state prisons for 16 
months, or two or three years . . . .” 
4 
offense, and that the stay shall become permanent if the person is acquitted of the 
prior offense.4 
II 
 
Defendant initially contends that punishing an individual under both of 
these statutes when the charged offense and the sentencing enhancement arise 
from a single act of failing to appear in court while released on bail violates the 
terms of section 654, subdivision (a) which provides in pertinent part: “An act or 
omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall 
be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of 
imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more 
than one provision.”  In my view, however, there is no need to reach the question 
of the proper application of section 654 to the two statutes here at issue, because 
                                             
 
4  
Section 12022.1 provides in pertinent part:   
 
“(a)  For the purpose of this section only: 
 
“(1)  ‘Primary offense’ means a felony offense for which a person has 
been released from custody on bail or on his or her own recognizance . . . . 
 
“(2)  ‘Secondary offense’ means a felony offense alleged to have been 
committed while the person is released from custody for a primary offense. 
 
“(b)  Any person arrested for a secondary offense which was alleged to 
have been committed while that person was released from custody on a primary 
offense shall be subject to a penalty enhancement of an additional two years in 
state prison which shall be served consecutive to any other term imposed by the 
court. 
 
“(c)  The enhancement allegation provided in subdivision (b) shall be 
pleaded in the information or indictment which alleges the secondary offense 
. . . . 
 
“(d)  Whenever there is a conviction for the secondary offense and the 
enhancement is proved, and the person is sentenced on the secondary offense 
prior to the conviction of the primary offense, the imposition of the enhancement 
shall be stayed pending imposition of the sentence for the primary offense.  The 
stay shall be lifted by the court hearing the primary offense at the time of 
sentencing for that offense and shall be recorded in the abstract of judgment.  If 
the person is acquitted of the primary offense the stay shall be permanent.” 
5 
this case may be resolved on the basis of a threshold legal question that logically 
precedes the section 654 issue.  Section 654 comes into play only when two 
separate statutory provisions actually authorize the imposition of punishment in a 
given situation.  For the reasons discussed below, I conclude that the two-year 
on-bail sentence enhancement set forth in section 12022.1 was not intended, and 
should not be interpreted, to apply when a defendant’s only on-bail offense is a 
failure to appear while on bail in violation of section 1320.5.  Accordingly, the 
question of the proper application of section 654 need not be addressed in this 
case.5 
III 
 
As already noted, in a number of past cases our court has been called upon 
to determine whether, when a statute setting forth a specific substantive offense 
shares common factors with a more general sentence enhancement provision, the 
statute establishing the sentence enhancement properly should be interpreted to 
apply to, and increase the sentence pertaining to, the more specific substantive 
offense. 
 
The early case of In re Shull, supra, 23 Cal.2d 745 presented the issue in a 
context somewhat analogous to the case before us.  In Shull, this court addressed 
the question whether a defendant who was convicted of the crime of assault with 
a deadly weapon, a pistol (§ 245), and who received a 10-year sentence for that 
offense, also was subject to an additional five-to-10-year sentence by virtue of 
the provisions of section 3 of the Deadly Weapons Act.  That statute provided in 
                                             
 
5  
As this court has observed in prior decisions, the Courts of Appeal are 
divided on the general question of whether section 654 applies to sentence 
enhancements.  (See, e.g., People v. Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th 145, 157; 
People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142, 1152.)   
6 
relevant part:  “ ‘If any person shall commit or attempt to commit any felony 
within this state while armed with any of the weapons mentioned in section one 
thereof or while armed with any pistol, revolver or other firearm . . . , he shall in 
addition to the punishment prescribed for the crime of which he has been 
convicted, be punishable by imprisonment in a state prison for not less than five 
nor for more than ten years.  Such additional period of imprisonment shall 
commence upon the expiration or other termination of the sentence imposed for 
the crime of which he stands convicted and shall not run concurrently with such 
sentence.’ ”  (In re Shull, supra, 23 Cal.2d at p. 748, italics omitted.)  The trial 
court in Shull imposed an additional five-year term on the defendant under 
section 3 of the Deadly Weapons Act, but on appeal this court, in a unanimous 
decision, held that the Legislature had not intended the additional sentence 
mandated by the Deadly Weapons Act to apply to a defendant convicted of 
assault with a deadly weapon. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, this court explained:  “We do not believe . . . 
that the Legislature intended that section 3 of the Deadly Weapons Act should be 
applied where the felony of which the person stands convicted is that of assault 
with a pistol under section 245 of the Penal Code. . . .  It is apparent that section 
245 of the Penal Code is a specific provision.  It defines and determines the 
punishment for a specific kind of crime, assault with a deadly weapon, in the 
instant case, a pistol.  On the other hand, section 3 of the Deadly Weapons Act 
which imposes the additional penalty refers to no particular crime, but purports 
to require an added punishment for felonies generally where the one committing 
the same is armed with a pistol or the other weapons designated therein and in 
section 1.  It is the general rule that a special statute controls over a general 
statute. [Citation.]  It is not unreasonable to suppose that the Legislature believed 
that for felonies in which the use of a gun was not one of the essential factors, 
7 
such as rape, larceny, and the like, an added penalty should be imposed by reason 
of the fact that the defendant being armed with such a weapon would probably be 
more dangerous because of the probability of death or physical injury being 
inflicted by the weapon.  Hence, such a condition would be reasonable grounds 
for increasing the penalty where felonies are involved which do not include as a 
necessary element being armed with a pistol.  The Legislature has by other acts 
imposed an additional punishment where the only additional factor, being armed 
with a deadly weapon, is present.  The only difference between a simple assault 
and one with a deadly weapon is the latter factor.  The commission of a simple 
assault is declared to be a misdemeanor, and the punishment therefor is a fine of 
not over $500 or imprisonment in the county jail for six months, or by both. 
[Citation.]  When there is added to the assault the use of a deadly weapon, the 
punishment is increased to imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding ten 
years . . . .  [T]he Legislature has fixed the punishment for an assault where a 
deadly weapon is used, a particular crime, and it is not to be supposed for the 
same offense without any additional factor existing the added punishment should 
be imposed.  In felonies where a deadly weapon is not a factor in the offense, the 
additional punishment is imposed by section 3 of the Deadly Weapons Act, 
because of the additional factor of a deadly weapon being involved.”  (In re 
Shull, supra, 23 Cal.2d at pp. 749-751; see also, e.g., People v. Ford (1964) 60 
Cal.2d 772, 794 [applying Shull to hold that when a prior conviction is an 
element of an offense, the same conviction may not be used to augment the 
punishment for that offense]; People v. Edwards (1976) 18 Cal.3d 796, 800 
[same].) 
 
As applied to the two statutes at issue in the present case, the reasoning in 
Shull supports the conclusion that the sentence enhancement mandated by the 
general on-bail enhancement provision of section 12022.1 should not be 
8 
interpreted to apply when the only on-bail offense of which the defendant is 
convicted is the offense of failing to appear while on bail in violation of section 
1320.5.  Like the punishment for the offense of assault with a deadly weapon at 
issue in Shull, the punishment for the crime of failing to appear while on bail 
under section 1320.5 already takes into account the circumstance that the offense 
was committed by the defendant while on bail.  The Legislature intended that, in 
general, the on-bail enhancement of section 12022.1 should increase the sentence 
imposed upon persons who commit felonies while on bail, but that objective 
reasonably applies only to offenses whose punishment does not already take into 
account the circumstance whether the crime was committed by a person while 
released on bail, and does not apply to a crime, like that proscribed by section 
1320.5, in which the on-bail element already is reflected in the basic punishment 
for the offense.  Thus, as in Shull, it is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature 
did not intend the enhancement set forth in section 12022.1 to apply to, and 
increase the sentence for, a defendant convicted under section 1320.5 of failing 
to appear while on bail. 
IV 
 
In opposition to this conclusion, the People maintain that more recent 
decisions of this court, decided after In re Shull, supra, 23 Cal.2d 745, have 
defined more narrowly the circumstances under which a “general” enhancement 
statute will be found inapplicable to a “specific” or “special” substantive offense.  
As the People point out, in a number of recent opinions we have stated that “[t]he 
‘special over the general’ rule . . . does not apply . . . unless ‘each element of the 
“general” statute corresponds to an element on the face of the “specific” . . . 
statute’ or ‘it appears from the entire context that a violation of the “special” 
statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the “general” 
statute.’ ”  (People v. Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th 145, 153-154 [quoting 
9 
People v. Jenkins, supra, 28 Cal.3d 494, 502].)  The People claim that under this 
formulation,  the enhancement set forth in section 12022.1 properly may be 
applied in addition to the punishment prescribed by section 1320.5. 
 
Although it is true that the terms of section 1320.5 and 12022.1 are not 
identical, the overlap of the two statutes is more substantial than the People 
suggest.  Contrary to the People’s assertion and to the assumption of the Court of 
Appeal, section 12022.1 does not make the defendant’s conviction of the primary 
offense (i.e., the felony on which the defendant has been released on bail) an 
element of the enhancement.  In setting forth the elements of the enhancement, 
section 12022.1, subdivision (b) provides in full: “Any person arrested for the 
secondary offense which was alleged to have been committed while that person 
was released from custody on a primary offense shall be subject to a penalty 
enhancement of an additional two years in state prison which shall be served 
consecutive to any other term imposed by the court.”  Section 12022.1, 
subdivision (d) then provides:  “Whenever there is a conviction for the secondary 
offense and the enhancement is proved, and the person is sentenced on the 
secondary offense prior to the conviction of the primary offense, the imposition 
of the enhancement shall be stayed pending imposition of the sentence for the 
primary offense.  The stay shall be lifted by the court hearing the primary offense 
at the time of sentencing for that offense and shall be recorded in the abstract of 
judgment.  If the person is acquitted of the primary offense the stay shall be 
permanent.”   
 
Thus, section 12022.1 provides that an enhancement under that section 
may be alleged and “proved” even if the defendant has not been convicted of the 
primary offense.  (See People v. McClanahan, supra, 3 Cal.4th 860, 870.)  The 
statute specifies that if the defendant thereafter is acquitted of the primary 
offense, the imposition of sentence on the enhancement is permanently stayed, 
10 
but the statute does not provide for the striking or vacation of the true finding on 
the enhancement itself.  Accordingly, given the terms of section 12022.1, a 
violation of the failure-to-appear offense set forth in section 1320.5 will 
“necessarily or commonly” result in an enhancement set forth in section 12022.1, 
although sentence on the on-bail enhancement will not be “imposed unless the 
defendant is ultimately convicted of the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ offenses.”  
(People v. McClanahan, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 869.)  Moreover, contrary to the 
majority’s assertion, even if the appropriate focus is upon whether the increased 
sentence prescribed by the on-bail enhancement actually is imposed upon a 
defendant who is convicted of failing to appear on bail, rather than upon whether 
the on-bail enhancement statute is violated (see People v. Coronado, supra, 12 
Cal.4th 145, 154; People v. Jenkins, supra, 28 Cal.3d 494, 502), the 
circumstance that there will be some instances in which the increased sentence 
provided by the sentence enhancement will not be imposed  where a defendant 
who jumps bail is not convicted of the charge upon which he or she was released 
on bail  certainly does not mean that a defendant who is convicted of jumping 
bail under section 1320.5 will not commonly also be subject to an increased 
sentence by virtue of the provisions of section 12022.1.  In light of the overlap of 
the two statutes, I believe that the “necessarily or commonly” standard set forth 
in People v. Jenkins, supra, 28 Cal.3d 494, 502, and People v. Coronado, supra, 
12 Cal.4th 145, 154, is satisfied. 
V 
 
Moreover, both In re Shull and our more recent decisions recognize that 
the entire special/general doctrine is, in essence, simply “a rule designed to 
ascertain and carry out legislative intent.”  (People v. Jenkins, supra, 28 Cal.3d 
494, 505, fn. omitted; see also People v. Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th 145, 155 
[adopting “ ‘the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent 
11 
of the Legislature’ ”].)  In my view, both the language and the legislative history 
of section 12022.1 indicate that the principal purpose underlying that enactment 
was to increase the punishment imposed upon defendants who commit a felony 
while released on bail.6  In light of this purpose, it is not reasonable to conclude 
that the Legislature intended this enhancement to apply to increase the sentence 
of an offense, like section 1320.5, whose punishment already takes into account 
the circumstance that the crime was committed while the defendant was on bail.7 
 
The People contend, however, that punishment under both statutes is 
proper because the statutes in fact serve different goals.  The People assert, in 
this regard, that “[w]hile the object of section 1320.5 is to punish defendants who 
violate the court’s trust by willfully failing to appear (People v. Jimenez [(1993)] 
19 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1178), section 12022.1 was enacted primarily to punish 
recidivists (People v. McClanahan, supra, 3 Cal.4th 860, 868.)”  Although the 
majority agree with this contention, in my view it is not persuasive. 
                                             
 
6  
A committee report on the bill that ultimately enacted section 12022.1 
stated in this regard:  “The purpose of the bill is to attempt to deter the 
commission of felonies by accused felons released on bail, and to punish such 
conduct.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 692 (1981-1982 
Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 25, 1982, p. 2.)   
7  
As the majority note, one committee report on the bill that ultimately 
enacted section 12022.1, after describing the purpose of the bill as “to provide 
extra punishment for committing crimes while out on bail or [own 
recognizance],” stated that “[c]urrent law provides for criminal sanctions for 
failure to appear after being released on one’s own recognizance or on 10% 
deposit (for a misdemeanor),” and then posed the question “Would this bill 
provide for double punishment for these crimes?”  (Assem. Com. on Crim. 
Justice, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 692 (1981-1982), p. 3.)  Nothing in the 
legislative history of the measure, however, indicates that the Legislature 
answered this question in the affirmative.  (Cf. People v. Jenkins, supra, 28 
Cal.3d 494, 506-508.) 
12 
 
The majority apparently view the primary purpose of the on-bail 
enhancement as targeting recidivism, as distinguished from deterring and 
punishing the breach of the court’s trust that is demonstrated when a defendant 
commits an offense while released on bail, because section 12022.1 contains a 
section that provides that imposition of the enhancement is to be permanently 
stayed if the defendant is not convicted of the crime with which he or she was 
initially charged and placed on bail.  (§ 12022.1, subd. (d).)  As we explained in 
In re Jovan B. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 801, however, this portion of section 12022.1 
“appears principally intended to establish with judicial certainty that the charges 
leading to release on bail or O.R. [own recognizance] were valid.  In other 
words, the Legislature has declined to apply the bail/O.R. enhancement to an 
offense unless a court has also sustained the charge on which the offender was 
released when he committed it.”  (In re Jovan B., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 814, 
italics added, fn. omitted.)  Although this aspect of section 12022.1 does limit the 
circumstances under which the on-bail enhancement may be imposed, I believe 
the majority is mistaken in viewing this incidental, ameliorative feature of the 
statute as fundamentally altering the nature and primary purpose of the on-bail 
enhancement.   
 
Indeed, although the majority rely on People v. McClanahan, supra, 3 
Cal.4th 860, to support their argument that the purpose of section 12022.1 is 
different from the breach-of-trust purpose underlying section 1320.5, in 
McClanahan this court specifically agreed with the proposition that an on-bail 
enhancement is “imposed for the violation or breach of the court’s trust involved 
when the defendant commits a new felony offense while released from custody 
on bail or on his or her own recognizance on an earlier felony” (McClanahan, 
supra, at p. 871, italics added), observing that the conduct that brings into play 
the on-bail enhancement  committing a new crime while the defendant is 
13 
released on bail or on his or her own recognizance  “plainly constitutes a 
breach of the releasing court’s trust and the terms of any release agreement.”  
(Ibid., italics added.)  Thus, the focus of both sections 1320.5 and 12022.1 is on 
punishing the particular type of breach of trust demonstrated when a defendant 
commits a new offense while released on bail.8 
 
The majority also maintain that it is appropriate to impose punishment 
under the two statutes because the specific purpose of the failure-to-appear 
offense is to deter “bail-jumping,” whereas the purpose of the on-bail 
enhancement extends beyond the deterrence of bail jumping.  The majority 
emphasize in this regard that the legislative history of the failure-to-appear 
statute makes it clear that the Legislature believed it was important to impose 
punishment for bail jumping whether or not the defendant is ultimately convicted 
of the offense for which he or she was released on bail, whereas the on-bail 
enhancement may be imposed only when the defendant actually is convicted of 
the primary offense.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 5-7.)  Although the two statutes do 
differ in this respect, this difference does not support the majority’s conclusion 
that the Legislature intended the on-bail enhancement to increase the punishment 
                                             
 
8  
In People v. McClanahan, supra, 3 Cal.4th 860, the court did state that the 
purpose behind a section 12022.1 enhancement, “generally speaking, is . . . to 
penalize recidivist conduct with increased punishment” (McClanahan at p. 868), 
but the court at the same time explained that the “particular form of recidivism” 
to which the statute was directed was “the commission of a new felony offense 
while released on bail or on one’s own recognizance.”  (Id. at pp. 868, 869.)  The 
court’s reference to, and discussion of, recidivism in McClanahan was made in 
the course of an analysis  and rejection  of the People’s argument in that 
case that the on-bail enhancement was exempt from the double-the-base-term 
limitation of Penal Code section 1170.1, by virtue of a provision of Proposition 8 
providing that “[a]ny prior felony conviction . . . shall . . . be used without 
limitation for purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any 
criminal proceeding.”  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f).) 
14 
for the crime of failure to appear whenever a defendant is convicted of the 
primary offense. 
 
As the majority observe, the substantive crime of failure to appear while 
on bail, set forth in section 1320.5, applies whether or not the defendant is 
convicted of the charges on which he or she has been released on bail.  Thus, a 
defendant who “jumps” bail in order to impede the judicial process cannot 
escape punishment under section 1320.5 even if he or she is not convicted of the 
primary offense, just as a defendant who commits robbery while on bail cannot 
escape punishment for the robbery even when the on-bail enhancement may not 
be imposed because he or she is not convicted of the charges on which he or she 
had been released on bail.  The circumstance that the Legislature has determined 
that the on-bail enhancement should not be imposed unless the defendant is 
convicted of both the secondary and primary offenses, however, does not support 
the majority’s conclusion that when the sentence for the defendant’s secondary 
offense already takes into account the circumstance that that offense was 
committed by the defendant while on bail, the Legislature intended that that 
sentence should be increased by imposition of the on-bail enhancement simply 
because the defendant has been convicted of the earlier charge. 
 
As discussed above, the fundamental purpose of the on-bail enhancement 
is to increase the punishment received by those felons whose culpability is 
greater (because they have committed the new secondary felony while on bail) 
than that of other felons who commit the same secondary offense.  That objective 
is not served, however, when — because being on bail is an element of the 
secondary offense — all persons who commit the secondary offense by 
definition were on bail when they committed the offense.  Imposing the on-bail 
enhancement when the sentence for the secondary offense already takes into 
account the circumstance that the offense was committed by the defendant while 
15 
on bail appears on its face to constitute an unwarranted form of double 
punishment that the Legislature very likely did not intend.  
 
Of course, the Legislature, if it so chose, could provide explicitly that a 
defendant who violates section 1320.5 is subject to both the sentence prescribed 
for that offense and, in addition, the sentence enhancement embodied in section 
12022.1.  (Cf. Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subds. (a), (b), (c).)  In the 
absence of any persuasive indication that the Legislature actually intended the 
on-bail enhancement of section 12022.1 to apply to, and substantially increase, 
the sentence for an offense whose punishment already takes into account the 
circumstance that the crime was committed while the defendant was on bail, 
however, I conclude that section 12022.1 should not be interpreted to apply to 
such an offense. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
1 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Walker 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 88 Cal.App.4th 227 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S097725 
Date Filed: December 12, 2002 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Placer 
Judge: Joe O’Flaherty 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Susan D. Shors, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for  Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, W. Scott Thorpe, Wayne K. Strumpfer, Janis Shank 
McLean and Matthew L. Cate, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Susan D. Shors 
1795 Union Street, 3d Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94123 
(415) 749-1642 
 
Matthew L. Cate 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 323-6693