Title: New Jersey v. J.L.G.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: July 31, 2018

New Jersey v. J.L.G. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Defendant J.L.G. was tired for: first-degree aggravated sexual assault; third-degree aggravated criminal sexual contact; second-degree endangering the welfare of a child; and third-degree witness tampering. Defendant’s stepdaughter, “Bonnie,” testified at trial about an escalating pattern of sexual abuse that defendant carried out against her for roughly eighteen months, from when she was fourteen and defendant was about thirty-two. Defendant pointed a gun at Bonnie and threatened to hurt her, her mother, or her brother if word got out. Bonnie told no one about the abuse. A close friend of Bonnie’s mother visited the family apartment and found defendant lying on top of Bonnie. When Bonnie’s mother heard about the incident, she threatened to kill defendant. Bonnie was afraid her mother would follow through and denied any sexual activity. Although Bonnie claimed she wanted to tell her mother, she also did not “want her to do anything for her to get locked up.” The jury convicted defendant of all four counts. On appeal, defendant challenged the admissibility of the CSAAS testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that expert testimony about CSAAS in general, and its component behaviors other than delayed disclosure, may no longer be admitted at criminal trials. "Evidence about delayed disclosure can be presented if it satisfies all parts of the applicable evidence rule." In particular, the State must show that the evidence is beyond the understanding of the average juror. "That decision will turn on the facts of each case. Here, because the victim gave straightforward reasons about why she delayed reporting abuse, the jury did not need help from an expert to evaluate her explanation." The expert testimony about CSAAS introduced at trial was harmless, and the Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s convictions. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State v. J.L.G. (A-50-16) (078718)Argued April 24, 2018 -- Decided July 31, 2018RABNER, C.J., writing for the Court. The Court considers whether the “Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome” (CSAAS) has a sufficiently reliable basis in science to be the subject of expert testimony. Defendant J.L.G. went to trial on the following charges: first-degree aggravated sexual assault; third-degree aggravated criminal sexual contact; second-degree endangering the welfare of a child; and third-degree witness tampering. Defendant’s stepdaughter, “Bonnie,” testified at trial about an escalating pattern of sexual abuse that defendant carried out against her for roughly eighteen months, from when she was fourteen and defendant was about thirty-two. Defendant pointed a gun at Bonnie and threatened to hurt her, her mother, or her brother if word got out. Bonnie told no one about the abuse, which she found embarrassing. A close friend of Bonnie’s mother visited the family apartment and found defendant lying on top of Bonnie with an erection. When Bonnie’s mother heard about the incident, she said, with a knife in hand, she would kill defendant. Bonnie was afraid her mother would follow through and denied any sexual activity. Although Bonnie claimed she wanted to tell her mother, she also did not “want her to do anything for her to get locked up.” In May or June of 2012, Bonnie used her iPhone to record the last episode of sexual abuse. The State introduced the audio recording at trial and played it during Bonnie’s testimony. The jury heard very descriptive, at times graphic, language about sexual acts. After an argument, Bonnie told her mother that defendant had “been raping [her] for the past year and a half.” Bonnie made a statement to the prosecutor’s office and placed two phone calls to defendant under the guidance of detectives. During the recorded conversations, defendant offered to give Bonnie money after he asked her to withdraw the allegations. The State presented the above evidence at trial through various witnesses. Defense counsel highlighted the absence of physical evidence and challenged Bonnie’s credibility. The defense did not dispute the authenticity of the recording Bonnie made and told the jury that defendant “pleads guilty” to the child endangerment charge as a result. Central to this appeal is the CSAAS evidence. Defendant tried to bar the testimony in advance. In a written opinion, the trial court denied defendant’s pretrial motion. Dr. Lynn Taska, a clinical psychologist, testified as an expert on CSAAS. Immediately before, the trial court gave the jury detailed instructions about how to consider her testimony; the court’s charge closely followed the model jury charge. Dr. Taska testified before Bonnie did. The 1 prosecution referenced her testimony in summation and argued that “just because” child victims of sexual assault “don’t report the abuse, that doesn’t mean they shouldn’t be believed.” In the final instructions to the jury, the trial court again recited the model charge on CSAAS. The jury convicted defendant of all four counts. On appeal, defendant challenged the admissibility of the CSAAS testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The Court granted defendant’s petition for certification limited to “whether the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of the State’s expert regarding CSAAS,” and remanded to the trial court for a hearing “to determine whether CSAAS evidence meets the reliability standard of N.J.R.E. 702, in light of recent scientific evidence.”229 N.J. 606, 607 (2017). The Honorable Peter F. Bariso, Jr., A.J.S.C., presided over the hearing on remand. Four experts submitted reports and testified, and dozens of exhibits were introduced, including multiple published scientific articles. Judge Bariso found that the State failed to show general acceptance of CSAAS in the relevant scientific community, and concluded that there was consensus only as to delayed disclosure. Judge Bariso concluded that CSAAS evidence did not meet the standard for admissibility under N.J.R.E. 702.HELD: The Court finds continued scientific support for only one aspect of CSAAS -- delayed disclosure -- because scientists generally accept that a significant percentage of children delay reporting sexual abuse. Expert testimony about CSAAS in general, and its component behaviors other than delayed disclosure, may no longer be admitted at criminal trials. Evidence about delayed disclosure can be presented if it satisfies all parts of the applicable evidence rule. See N.J.R.E. 702. In particular, the State must show that the evidence is beyond the understanding of the average juror. That decision will turn on the facts of each case. Here, because the victim gave straightforward reasons about why she delayed reporting abuse, the jury did not need help from an expert to evaluate her explanation. However, if a child cannot offer a rational explanation, expert testimony may help the jury understand the witness’s behavior. The Court asks the Committee on Model Jury Charges to develop an appropriate instruction on delayed disclosure. In this appeal, there was overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. As a result, the expert testimony about CSAAS introduced at trial was harmless, and defendant’s convictions are affirmed.1. N.J.R.E. 702 governs the admission of expert testimony. The proponent of expert evidence must establish three things: (1) the subject matter of the testimony must be “beyond the ken of the average juror”; (2) the field of inquiry “must be at a state of the art such that an expert’s testimony could be sufficiently reliable”; and (3) “the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the” testimony. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208 (1984). Consistent with the remand order, the hearing before Judge Bariso focused primarily on the reliability prong. In criminal cases, the Court has continued to rely on the Frye standard to assess reliability. The test requires trial judges to determine whether the science underlying the proposed expert testimony has “gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). (pp. 15-17) 2 2. CSAAS originated from the work of Dr. Roland Summit. In 1983, he published an article in which he described the syndrome he outlined as “a common denominator of the most frequently observed” behaviors of child sexual abuse victims: secrecy; helplessness; entrapment and accommodation; delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure; and retraction. He described the first two categories as “preconditions” to sexual abuse, and the remaining three as “sequential contingencies” of sexual assault. Nine years later, Dr. Summit published a follow-up paper. He revisited the original piece and its origin to address “subsequent distortions that court misuse has imposed,” and acknowledged the “misunderstanding” that stemmed from his use “of the word syndrome.” (pp. 17-22)3. The following year, the Court found that CSAAS had a “sufficiently reliable scientific basis” to be presented to a jury. State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 556 (1993). The Court relied extensively on Dr. Summit’s initial 1983 article. The Court concluded that CSAAS is not “evidence of guilt or innocence” and cannot be used as direct proof that abuse occurred. Id. at 571, 574, 578. Rather, the Court allowed its use to help juries understand “traits often found in children who have been abused,” which might otherwise be counterintuitive. Id. at 582. In response to J.Q., the Model Criminal Jury Charge Committee developed an instruction on CSAAS. The trial court in this case recited the model charge nearly verbatim -- both before Dr. Taska testified and before the jury began deliberating. Since J.Q., the Court has restated and refined certain principles about the use of CSAAS testimony but has not reassessed the scientific underpinning of CSAAS evidence. Forty other states and the District of Columbia allow CSAAS testimony for some purpose. A few states bar CSAAS evidence. (pp. 22-30)4. The remand hearing provided an opportunity to test the principles underlying CSAAS in an adversarial setting. The evidence at the hearing identified a number of shortcomings about the concept of a child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. First, the label “syndrome” itself raises serious questions. Second, CSAAS and its five component behaviors are not easy to define with precision. Third, there is disagreement as to how the behaviors relate to one another. Fourth, experts debated the import of the five behaviors at the hearing. Finally, CSAAS stems from observations made in clinical practice -- not systematic scientific study. Based on the record, it does not appear that CSAAS’s five- category theory has been tested and empirically validated as a whole. (pp. 30-35)5. The Court thus considers relevant evidence for each of the five behaviors. (1) Dr. Summit explained secrecy by noting that “[t]he average child never asks and never tells.” In short, victims keep abuse a secret by not talking about it. (2) Dr. Summit identified helplessness as a “precondition[]” to abuse, not a behavior. The concept appears to state the obvious. (3) Accommodation refers to the coping mechanism by which a child adjusts to sexual abuse. It encompasses all possible behaviors from the most resilient to the most self-destructive, and all victims fall under the broad construct in one way or another. (4) Judge Bariso found that delayed disclosure is generally accepted among the scientific community. The record supports that finding. (5) Retraction occurs when a victim truthfully discloses abuse and then recants. Evidence presented at the hearing revealed that only a minority of victims recant truthful allegations of abuse and that experts do not agree on the rate of recantation. 3 The Court also observed that there does not appear to be a consensus among the experts, or in the scientific literature, on the subject of false denials. (pp. 35-45)6. To assess the reliability prong of N.J.R.E. 702, the Court considers whether CSAAS has achieved general acceptance in the scientific community. The evidence presented at the remand hearing answers that question. Judge Bariso found that there is consensus for only one type of behavior -- delayed disclosure. The Court agrees. Because evidence about CSAAS as a whole and the other four categories does not satisfy the Frye standard, experts may not present evidence on those topics at trial. When the other prongs of Rule 702 are met, the State may present expert evidence on delayed disclosure among victims of child sexual abuse -- and only that evidence -- to a jury. When expert evidence on delay is introduced, trial courts should provide limiting instructions to the jury -- both before an expert witness testifies and as part of the court’s final charge. The Court asks the Committee on Model Criminal Jury Charges to draft appropriate instructions limited to delayed disclosure as soon as practicable. The Court also invites the parties and amici to submit proposed charges to the Committee and provides guidance about the charge. (pp. 47-52)7. Proponents of expert evidence on delayed disclosure must satisfy all three parts of Rule 702, including that the testimony concerns a subject beyond the ken of the average juror. Expert testimony is not appropriate to explain what a jury can understand by itself. By contrast, issues that are beyond the understanding of the average juror may call for expert evidence. Trial judges, as gatekeepers, decide that threshold question. Whether a victim’s delayed disclosure is beyond the ken of the average juror will depend on the facts of the case. In this case, no juror needed help from an expert to understand and evaluate Bonnie’s testimony. (pp. 52-54)8. Applying the above findings to this case, it was error to admit testimony about CSAAS -- both as to the theory in general and the behaviors that are not generally accepted by the scientific community. There are also serious concerns about the admissibility of expert testimony on delayed disclosure in this case because Bonnie, a teenager, gave reasons for the delay that were not beyond the ken of the average juror. Nonetheless, those errors are harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. In light of the evidence presented -- in particular, the testimony of the victim combined with a graphic audio recording of an act of sexual abuse -- there is not a sufficient possibility that the admission of CSAAS evidence led the jury to an unjust verdict or one it might otherwise not have reached as to Counts One and Two. During closing argument, defense counsel conceded that there was sufficient evidence to support Count Three. Finally, the CSAAS evidence had little if any bearing on the witness tampering charge. The admission of the CSAAS evidence in this case was harmless. (pp. 54-56) MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. 4 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 50 September Term 2016 078718STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.J.L.G., a/k/a J.L.J., Defendant-Appellant. Argued April 24, 2018 – Decided July 31, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Lauren S. Michaels, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Lauren S. Michaels and Joseph J. Russo, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs). Najma Q. Rana, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney; Najma Q. Rana and Stephanie Davis Elson, Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs). John J. Zefutie, Jr., argued the cause for amicus curiae The Last Resort Exoneration Project at Seton Hall University School of Law (Duane Morris and The Last Resort Exoneration Project at Seton Hall University School of Law, attorneys; John J. Zefutie, Jr., of counsel and on the briefs, and D. Michael Risinger, on the briefs). Brian J. Neary argued the cause for amicus curiae The Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Law Offices of Brian 1 J. Neary, attorneys; Brian J. Neary, on the brief). Alexi Machek Velez argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Alexi Machek Velez, Alexander Shalom, Edward L. Barocas, and Jeanne M. LoCicero, on the brief). Sarah E. Elsasser, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah E. Elsasser, of counsel and on the brief). Theo Mackey Pollack submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children (The Law Office of Theo Mackey Pollack, and Munger, Tolles & Olson, attorneys). Laura Sunyak, Assistant Mercer County Prosecutor, submitted a letter brief on behalf of amicus curiae County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey (Richard T. Burke, President, attorney; Laura Sunyak and Joseph Paravecchia, Assistant Mercer County Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). Herbert I. Waldman submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey Association For Justice (Javerbaum Wurgaft Hicks Kahn Wikstrom & Sinins, attorneys; Herbert I. Waldman and Rubin M. Sinins, on the brief).CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court. 2 I. Introduction Thirty-five years ago, Dr. Roland Summit, M.D., a clinicalpsychiatrist, identified five categories of behavior that werereportedly common in victims of child sexual abuse: secrecy;helplessness; entrapment and accommodation; delayed, conflicted,unconvincing disclosure; and retraction. Dr. Summit drew onvarious sources, including his own clinical practice, andasserted that the five behaviors comprised a syndrome -- the“Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome” (CSAAS). Courts across the nation embraced Dr. Summit’s findings,which paved the way for experts to testify about the syndrome incriminal sex abuse trials. In 1993, this Court found that CSAASevidence was sufficiently reliable to be admitted. State v.J.Q., 130 N.J. 554 (1993). In the decades since Dr. Summit’s article first appeared,neither the American Psychiatric Association nor the AmericanPsychological Association has recognized CSAAS. The syndromedoes not appear in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorders (DSM-5), the mental health field’sauthoritative list of mental disorders. And the notion of achild abuse accommodation “syndrome” has been examined,critiqued, and undermined by a number of scientific studies. Defendant challenged the CSAAS evidence introduced attrial. To better assess defendant’s claim, we remanded the 3 matter for a hearing before the trial court. Four expertstestified at the hearing, and the parties introduced anddiscussed numerous scientific studies. We rely heavily on the record developed at the hearing.Based on what is known today, it is no longer possible toconclude that CSAAS has a sufficiently reliable basis in scienceto be the subject of expert testimony. We find continuedscientific support for only one aspect of the theory -- delayeddisclosure -- because scientists generally accept that asignificant percentage of children delay reporting sexual abuse. We therefore hold that expert testimony about CSAAS ingeneral, and its component behaviors other than delayeddisclosure, may no longer be admitted at criminal trials.Evidence about delayed disclosure can be presented if itsatisfies all parts of the applicable evidence rule. SeeN.J.R.E. 702. In particular, the State must show that theevidence is beyond the understanding of the average juror. That decision will turn on the facts of each case. Here,because the victim gave straightforward reasons about why shedelayed reporting abuse, the jury did not need help from anexpert to evaluate her explanation. However, if a child cannotoffer a rational explanation, expert testimony may help the juryunderstand the witness’s behavior. We therefore ask the 4 Committee on Model Jury Charges to develop an appropriateinstruction on delayed disclosure. In this appeal, there was overwhelming evidence ofdefendant’s guilt. Among other things, the victim made an audiorecording of an act of sexual abuse that took place severalweeks before she spoke with the police. As a result, we findthat the expert testimony about CSAAS introduced at trial washarmless, and we affirm defendant’s convictions. II. Facts and Procedural History A. Facts A Hudson County Grand Jury charged defendant J.L.G. in anine-count indictment in 2012. After the trial court severedfour of the counts and the State dismissed a fifth, defendantwent to trial on the following charges: first-degree aggravatedsexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a); third-degree aggravatedcriminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a); second-degreeendangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a); andthird-degree witness tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a).Defendant’s stepdaughter, whom we refer to by the fictitiousname “Bonnie” to protect her identity, testified at trial aboutan escalating pattern of sexual abuse that defendant carried outagainst her for roughly eighteen months. We rely on the trialrecord to recount the facts. 5 Defendant began dating Bonnie’s mother around 1996, whenBonnie was an infant. He moved in with them months later andassumed the role of Bonnie’s father. According to Bonnie, the sexual abuse began in 2011, whenshe was fourteen and defendant was about thirty-two. One day,defendant called Bonnie into the living room and showed her hisexposed penis. Over the course of the next year and a half,defendant had Bonnie record him masturbating, ejaculated on herchest area, touched her, had her masturbate him, performed oralsex on her, digitally penetrated her, and had vaginalintercourse with her four or five times. Bonnie said the sexual abuse occurred on a daily basis,always against her wishes. After each incident, defendant putmoney on her dresser. At one point, he gave her an iPhone. Healso instructed her not to say anything and threatened her;defendant pointed a gun at Bonnie and threatened to hurt her,her mother, or her brother if word got out. Bonnie told no oneabout the abuse, which she found embarrassing. A close friend of Bonnie’s mother visited the familyapartment one day in or around 2011 and found defendant lying ontop of Bonnie. Although defendant wore jeans, the friendnoticed that he had an erection. When Bonnie’s mother heardabout the incident, she questioned her daughter. With a knifein hand, the mother said she would kill defendant “if he’s doing 6 something.” Bonnie was afraid her mother would follow throughwith the threat and denied any sexual activity. Although Bonnieclaimed she wanted to tell her mother, she also did not “wanther to do anything for her to get locked up.” In May or June of 2012, Bonnie used her iPhone to recordthe last episode of sexual abuse. She felt that she could nolonger “stick it out” at home until age 18 and wanted to haveproof when the abuse eventually came to light. Bonnie testified that defendant performed oral sex on herand also tried to penetrate her on this occasion. The Stateintroduced the audio recording at trial and played it duringBonnie’s testimony. The jury heard very descriptive, at timesgraphic, language about sexual acts. At one point, Bonnierefused to follow defendant’s directive about how to positionherself. At another, defendant said, “I’m not [ejaculating] inyou” and cursed at Bonnie. Throughout the recording, Bonnierepeatedly stated that “[t]his is going to be the last thing.” After an argument with defendant on June 13, 2012, Bonnietold her mother that defendant had “been raping [her] for thepast year and a half.” Bonnie added that she had proof andtried to play the iPhone recording. According to Bonnie’smother, defendant tried to take away the phone, turned “white asa ghost,” and left the apartment after she decided to call thepolice. 7 Bonnie made a statement to the prosecutor’s office andplaced two phone calls to defendant under the guidance ofdetectives. During the recorded conversations, defendantrepeatedly said he was “sorry,” at Bonnie’s urging, but he didnot specify the reason or admit to any sexual misconduct. Healso offered to give Bonnie money, pay for her phone, and“[e]ven buy [her] a car” -- after he asked her to withdraw theallegations. Soon after, the police located defendant at a friend’shouse and arrested him. They also retrieved a pair of shortsthat Bonnie claimed she wore during the last sexual encounterwith defendant. The shorts contained a small amount of maleDNA. Although defendant was not identified as the source, hecould not be excluded as a possible contributor. B. Trial The State presented the above evidence at trial throughvarious witnesses including Bonnie, her mother, the mother’sfriend, an expert on DNA, and a number of police officers. Defendant did not testify. In his defense, counselhighlighted the absence of physical evidence in support ofBonnie’s accusations. Counsel also challenged Bonnie’scredibility in a number of ways: inconsistencies in her accountof events; a pending criminal charge against Bonnie thatarguably influenced her cooperation with the prosecutor’s 8 office; Bonnie’s delay in reporting acts of abuse for more thana year after they allegedly began; poor performance and behaviorproblems at school; and other issues. The defense did not dispute the authenticity of therecording Bonnie made on her own. Counsel told the jury insummation that the conversation should not have happened, andthat defendant “pleads guilty” to the child endangerment chargeas a result of the recording. Counsel argued, however, that theState presented no physical proof of penetration in the case. Central to this appeal is the CSAAS evidence that surfacedat various points during trial. Defendant tried to bar thetestimony in advance. In a written opinion, the trial courtdenied defendant’s pretrial motion. The court found that theevidence was relevant because it would help the jury evaluate“the significance of the victim’s delayed disclosure.” Inaddition, the trial judge concluded that the probative value ofthe evidence was not outweighed by the risk of undue prejudicebecause the testimony would not be offered to prove defendant’sguilt, would be subject to cross-examination, and would beaccompanied by appropriate limiting instructions. The courtalso found that the testimony satisfied the admissibilityrequirements for scientific evidence under N.J.R.E. 702. Inthat regard, the trial judge relied on this Court’s settled caselaw. 9 Dr. Lynn Taska, a clinical psychologist, testified as anexpert on CSAAS. Immediately before, the trial court gave thejury detailed instructions about how to consider her testimony;the court’s charge closely followed the model jury charge. Dr. Taska has a Ph.D. in clinical psychology andspecializes in the area of child sexual abuse. She hastestified as an expert witness on CSAAS more than thirty times. Dr. Taska testified before Bonnie did. Her testimony fillsthirty pages in the trial transcript. At the outset, Dr. Taskastated that she knew nothing about the facts of the case. Shealso explained that CSAAS was not a diagnostic tool and did notoffer proof that sexual abuse actually happened. Instead, itwas “a description of a collection of behaviors” “meant toeducate us about how children . . . who have been sexuallyabused typically behave.” Dr. Taska described Dr. Summit’s article on CSAAS anddiscussed in detail the five factors that comprise the syndrome.Throughout her testimony, she referred to various studies aboutCSAAS and summarized a number of them for the jury. She toldthe jury that, in her judgment, “there is an enormous body ofliterature supporting elements of” CSAAS. Dr. Taska critiquedtwo studies critical of CSAAS and countered that “there arehundreds of studies that support” it. 10 The prosecution referenced Dr. Taska’s testimony insummation and argued that “just because” child victims of sexualassault “don’t report the abuse, that doesn’t mean theyshouldn’t be believed.” The prosecution also recounted Bonnie’sreasons for not disclosing the abuse: defendant had threatenedher with a gun, and she was scared of how her mother mightreact. In the final instructions to the jury, the trial courtagain recited the model charge on CSAAS. The court stressedthat Dr. Taska’s testimony could not be considered as proof thatdefendant sexually abused Bonnie. Instead, the testimony couldbe considered to “explain[] certain behavior of the allegedvictim of child sexual abuse. . . . The accommodation syndrome,if proven, may help explain why a sexually abused child maydelay reporting.” The full text of the model charge appearslater. C. Verdict and Appellate History The jury convicted defendant of all four counts. Defendantwas sentenced to an aggregate term of twenty-three years inprison, subject to an eighty-five percent period of paroleineligibility on the aggravated sexual assault count. SeeN.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The court dismissed the severed charges atsentencing. 11 Among other arguments on appeal, defendant challenged theadmissibility of the CSAAS testimony. The Appellate Divisionaffirmed the convictions but vacated a penalty for the Sex CrimeVictim Treatment Fund so that the trial court could assess thecorrect penalty amount on remand. As to the CSAAS issue, thepanel appropriately observed that “[t]he admissibility of CSAASexpert testimony is well settled.” The panel cited J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, for support. The Appellate Division also noted thatthe trial court provided proper limiting instructions and thatDr. Taska acknowledged CSAAS evidence was not meant to determinewhether sexual abuse occurred in any individual case. The panelconcluded that the testimony was relevant to explain Bonnie’sdelayed disclosure and determine her credibility. We granted defendant’s petition for certification limitedto a single issue: whether the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of the State’s expert regarding CSAAS, on the grounds that CSAAS testimony was irrelevant to defendant’s trial, that its admission was unduly prejudicial to defendant, and that CSAAS testimony is not sufficiently reliable to meet the standard of N.J.R.E. 702. [ 229 N.J. 606, 607 (2017).] Because we lacked an adequate factual record to considerthe issue, we remanded to the trial court for a hearing “to 12 determine whether CSAAS evidence meets the reliability standardof N.J.R.E. 702, in light of recent scientific evidence.” Ibid. D. Remand Hearing The Honorable Peter F. Bariso, Jr., A.J.S.C., presided overthe hearing on remand. It was held in July 2017 and lasted fourdays. Four experts submitted reports and testified: Dr.Anthony D’Urso, Psy.D., and Dr. Thomas Lyon, J.D., Ph.D., forthe State; and Dr. Charles Brainerd, Ph.D., and Dr. MaggieBruck, Ph.D., for defendant. Dozens of exhibits wereintroduced, including multiple published scientific articles. Dr. D’Urso is the section chief and supervisingpsychologist at the Audrey Hepburn Children’s House, alegislatively mandated regional child abuse diagnostic center inthe State. He is also an associate professor of psychology atMontclair State University, where he teaches courses in clinicaland forensic psychology. Dr. Lyon is a professor at the University of SouthernCalifornia Gould School of Law, where he holds an endowed chairin law and psychology. His research is designed “to identifymethods for interviewing children that maximize children’swillingness to disclose negative events while minimizingsuggestibility and error.” Dr. Brainerd is an experimental and developmentalpsychologist. He is a tenured professor at Cornell University 13 in the College of Human Ecology, the Department of HumanDevelopment, and the Graduate Fields of Cognitive Science,Psychology, and Human Development. He is the Chair of theDepartment of Human Development and Director of the Laboratoryof Memory and Neuroscience. He also directs Cornell’s DualPh.D./J.D. Program and the Ph.D. Program in Law, Psychology, andHuman Development. Dr. Bruck is a part-time professor in the Division of Childand Adolescent Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry andBehavioral Science, at Johns Hopkins University School ofMedicine. She is also an adjunct professor of psychology atMcGill University. She previously served as a full professor atboth universities. Dr. Bruck specializes in cognitive anddevelopmental psychology, with a particular focus onautobiographical memory and the capabilities of young children. Judge Bariso granted leave to participate as amicus curiaeto the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU), theAmerican Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, theAssociation of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey, theAttorney General of New Jersey, the County ProsecutorsAssociation of New Jersey, the Last Resort Exoneration Projectat Seton Hall University School of Law, and the New JerseyAssociation for Justice. 14 As discussed further below, Judge Bariso found that theState failed to show general acceptance of CSAAS in the relevantscientific community and concluded that there was consensus onlyas to delayed disclosure. He also found “great controversywithin the scientific community” about “the tenets of CSAAS.”Judge Bariso concluded that CSAAS evidence did not meet thestandard for admissibility under N.J.R.E. 702. To better understand the remand hearing and the parties’arguments, we first consider the appropriate legal framework toassess expert testimony in a criminal case and then provide anoverview of CSAAS and its history. III. Legal Framework N.J.R.E. 702 governs the admission of expert testimony.The rule provides that “[i]f scientific . . . knowledge willassist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or todetermine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert byknowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testifythereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” N.J.R.E. 702. To satisfy the rule, the proponent of expert evidence mustestablish three things: (1) the subject matter of the testimonymust be “beyond the ken of the average juror”; (2) the field ofinquiry “must be at a state of the art such that an expert’stestimony could be sufficiently reliable”; and (3) “the witnessmust have sufficient expertise to offer the” testimony. State 15 v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208 (1984). Consistent with the Court’sremand order, the hearing before Judge Bariso focused primarilyon the reliability prong. In criminal cases, this Court has continued to rely on theFrye standard to assess reliability. The test requires trialjudges to determine whether the science underlying the proposedexpert testimony has “gained general acceptance in theparticular field in which it belongs.” Frye v. United States,293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); accord State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 170 (1997); see also State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554,568 (2005). The Last Resort Exoneration Project asks the Court todepart from Frye in criminal cases and adopt the Daubert testthat federal courts use. Under Daubert, trial judges perform a“preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodologyunderlying the testimony is scientifically valid” and “whetherthat reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to thefacts in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 592-93 (1993). Under Daubert, general acceptance can still“have a bearing on the inquiry” but “is not a necessaryprecondition” to admissibility. Id. at 594, 597. Neither party asks us to make this change in the law, andwe regularly decline to reach issues raised only by amici. See 16 State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393, 421 (2017). We prefer to wait fora case in which the parties raise and litigate the issue. In any event, there are three ways to establish generalacceptance under Frye: expert testimony, authoritativescientific and legal writings, and judicial opinions. State v.Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 491 (2006); Harvey, 151 N.J. at 170;Kelly, 97 N.J. at 210. Although we look for wide support withinthe relevant scientific community, complete agreement is notrequired for evidence to be admitted. Harvey, 151 N.J. at 171. IV. Overview and History of CSAAS CSAAS originated from the work of Dr. Roland Summit, aclinical psychiatrist and advocate for child victims of sexualabuse. In 1983, he published an article in the journal ChildAbuse and Neglect titled “The Child Sexual Abuse AccommodationSyndrome” (Summit I).1 The purpose of Dr. Summit’s paper was “to provide a vehiclefor a more sensitive, more therapeutic response to legitimatevictims of child sexual abuse and to invite more active, moreeffective clinical advocacy for the child within the family andwithin the systems of child protection and criminal justice.”Summit I, at 179-80. Dr. Summit believed that the behavior ofchild sexual abuse victims is “self-camouflaging” and “self-1 Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 Child Abuse & Neglect 177 (1983). 17 stigmatizing.” Id. at 179. Adult beliefs, meanwhile, “aredominated by an entrenched and self-protective mythology thatpasses for common sense.” Id. at 178. Too often, adults foundfault in the “emotionally distraught child” who accused arespectable adult. Ibid. Dr. Summit proposed CSAAS to better understand and acceptthe child victim’s position; to challenge adult prejudices; andto “offer[] the child a right to parity with adults in thestruggle for credibility and advocacy.” Id. at 179, 191. Dr. Summit described the syndrome he outlined as “a commondenominator of the most frequently observed” behaviors of childsexual abuse victims: secrecy; helplessness; entrapment andaccommodation; delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure;and retraction. Id. at 180-81. He described the first twocategories as “preconditions” to sexual abuse, and the remainingthree as “sequential contingencies” of sexual assault. Id. at181. According to Dr. Summit, each category contradicts “themost common assumptions of adults.” Ibid. As to secrecy, Dr. Summit observed that “[t]he averagechild never asks and never tells.” Ibid. Contrary to what Dr.Summit asserted is the “general expectation that the victimwould normally seek help, the majority of the victims inretrospective surveys had never told anyone during theirchildhood.” Ibid. According to Dr. Summit, they feared 18 reprisal and faced “an adult conspiracy of silence anddisbelief” if they spoke up. Ibid. About helplessness, Dr. Summit wrote that most victims ofchild sexual abuse face “an overpowering adult” who “is often ina trusted and apparently loving position.” Id. at 182-83. That“only increases the imbalance of power and underscores thehelplessness of the child.” Id. at 183. “[T]he child victim isexpected to forcibly resist, to cry for help and to attempt toescape,” even though, “no matter what the circumstances, thechild had no choice but to submit quietly.” Ibid. Dr. Summitadded that “[c]linical experience and expert testimony canprovide advocacy for the child” and “translate the child’s worldinto an adult-acceptable language.” Ibid. On accommodation, Dr. Summit wrote that if sexual abuse isnot stopped after the first incident, “[t]he healthy, normal,emotionally resilient child will learn to accommodate to thereality of continuing sexual abuse.” Id. at 184. Accommodationmechanisms vary widely, according to Dr. Summit. The “survivalskills” of a sexually abused child can include “domesticmartyrdom, splitting of reality, altered consciousness,hysterical phenomena, delinquency, sociopathy, projection ofrage, even self-mutilation.” Id. at 186. “An alternativeaccommodation pattern exists” as well, “in which the childsucceeds in hiding any indications of conflict. Such a child 19 may be unusually achieving and popular, eager to please bothteachers and peers.” Ibid. The spectrum of accommodation,thus, includes both “suicidal” and “perfectly well-adjusted”children. Id. at 187. For delayed disclosure, Dr. Summit wrote that “[m]ostongoing sexual abuse is never disclosed, at least not outsidethe immediate family.” Id. at 186. If a “family conflicttriggers disclosure, it is usually only after some years ofcontinuing sexual abuse.” Ibid. Dr. Summit also noted thatvictims “tend[] to remain silent until . . . adolescence.”Ibid. When a child of any age discloses abuse after a period ofdelay, however, she is unlikely to be believed. Ibid. Finally, on retraction, Dr. Summit wrote that “[w]hatever achild says about sexual abuse, she is likely to reverse it.”Id. at 188. “Unless there is special support for the child andimmediate intervention to force responsibility on the father,”he continued, “the girl will follow the 'normal’ course andretract her complaint.” Ibid. In Dr. Summit’s view, “[t]hissimple lie carries more credibility than the most explicitclaims of incestuous entrapment” because “[i]t confirms adultexpectations that children cannot be trusted.” Ibid. It alsoteaches the authorities “not to believe rebellious children whotry to use their sexual power to destroy well-meaning parents.”Ibid. 20 Dr. Summit stated that CSAAS was based on “[c]linical studyof large numbers of children and their parents in proven casesof sexual abuse.” Id. at 179. He also drew on (1)“statistically validated assumptions regarding prevalence, agerelationships and role characteristics of child sexual abuse,”and (2) “correlations and observations that have emerged asself-evident within an extended network of child abuse treatmentprograms and self-help organizations.” Id. at 180. Among them,he wrote, is the “maxim among child sexual abuse interventioncounselors and investigators that children never fabricate thekinds of explicit sexual manipulations they divulge incomplaints or interrogations.” Id. at 191. Dr. Summit addedthat he tested the validity of CSAAS “over a period of fouryears in [his] practice, which specializes in communityconsultation to diverse clinical and para-clinical sexual abuseprograms.” Id. at 180. Nine years later, in 1992, Dr. Summit published a follow-uppaper (Summit II).2 Dr. Summit noted that CSAAS has been “bothelevated as gospel and denounced as dangerous pseudoscience.”Summit II at 153. He revisited the original piece and itsorigin to address “subsequent distortions that court misuse hasimposed.” Id. at 154.2 Roland C. Summit, Abuse of the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 1 J. Child Sexual Abuse 153 (1992). 21 Dr. Summit stressed that CSAAS is “not a laboratoryhypothesis” or “study of a defined population”; it is a “summaryof diverse clinical consulting experience.” Id. at 156. “CSAASis a clinical opinion, not a scientific instrument,” he wrote.Ibid. Dr. Summit noted that he relied on his “own broadconsulting experience throughout Los Angeles County” along with“personal discussions” with “national visionaries” to compile alist of factors that “were both most characteristic of childsexual abuse” and counterintuitive to adults. Id. at 154. Dr. Summit acknowledged the “misunderstanding” that stemmedfrom his use “of the word syndrome.” Id. at 157. “I mightbetter have chosen a name like the Child Sexual AbuseAccommodation Pattern to avoid any pathological or diagnosticimplications.” Ibid. The following year, in J.Q., this Court found that CSAAShad a “sufficiently reliable scientific basis” to be presentedto a jury. 130 N.J. at 556. The Court relied extensively onDr. Summit’s initial 1983 article, which it called “the mostconcise and seemingly most authoritative statement of CSAAS.”Id. at 566-67. The Court observed that the article stemmed from“a scientific study of child-sexual-abuse victims,” id. at 567,and described “the most frequently observed victim behaviors,”id. at 568 (quoting Summit I, at 180). The Court recounted the 22 bases for Dr. Summit’s observations and detailed the fivecategories of behavior discussed above. Id. at 568-70. The Court in J.Q. noted that the behavioral studies of CSAAS are designed not to provide certain evidence of guilt or innocence but rather to insure that all agencies, including the clinician, the offender, the family, and the criminal justice system, offer “the child a right to parity with adults in the struggle for credibility and advocacy.” Id. at 571 (quoting Summit I, at 191).CSAAS achieves those goals, the Court explained, “by providing a'common language’ for analysis and a more 'recognizable map’ tothe understanding of child abuse.” Ibid. (quoting Summit I, at191). The Court next analyzed CSAAS in light of the standard forthe admission of expert evidence under Kelly and other case law.Id. at 572. It concluded that “[t]here does not appear to be adispute about acceptance within the scientific community of theclinical theory that CSAAS identifies or describes behavioraltraits commonly found in child-abuse victims.” Id. at 573. Forsupport, the Court cited a law review article by Professor John 23 E. B. Myers and others,3 as well as a note by Chandra LorraineHolmes.4 Myers and his coauthors devoted part of an extended articleto CSAAS. See, e.g., Myers et al., at 66-69. They describedCSAAS; noted that some professionals “misinterpreted” thearticle and believed “Summit had discovered a 'syndrome’ thatcould diagnose sexual abuse”; and discussed how various statecourts had responded to CSAAS evidence. Id. at 67-68. TheMyers article, however, does not cite scientific studies orarticles that support Dr. Summit’s five-factor syndrome. Thearticle does conclude that “[t]he accommodation syndrome has aplace in the courtroom” because it “helps explain why manysexually abused children delay reporting their abuse, and whymany children recant allegations . . . and deny that anythingoccurred.” Id. at 68. Holmes concluded that “CSAAS is a misnomer” because of itsuse of the term “syndrome,” Holmes, at 157, and recognized that“[t]he methods underlying CSAAS are imperfect,” id. at 169.Nonetheless, “[b]ecause the need for this type of testimony is3 John E.B. Myers, Jan Bays, Judith Becker, Lucy Berliner, David L. Corwin & Karen J. Saywitz, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 1 (1989).4 Chandra Lorraine Holmes, Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Curing the Effects of a Misdiagnosis in the Law of Evidence, 25 Tulsa L.J. 143 (1989). 24 compelling,” the author concluded that courts should limit butallow CSAAS testimony “to explain a child’s inconsistentbehavior.” Ibid. Holmes cautioned that the testimony should beaccompanied by appropriate limiting instructions. Id. at 168-69. The J.Q. Court concluded that CSAAS is not “evidence ofguilt or innocence” and cannot be used as direct proof thatabuse occurred. 130 N.J. at 571, 574, 578. Rather, the Courtallowed its use to help juries understand “traits often found inchildren who have been abused,” which might otherwise becounterintuitive. Id. at 582. The Court added that judges areto hold pretrial hearings to vet the qualifications of proposedexpert witnesses, upon a defendant’s request, and give properlimiting instructions to the jury. Id. at 583-84. In response to J.Q., the Model Criminal Jury ChargeCommittee developed an instruction on CSAAS. The currentversion of the jury charge reads as follows: The law recognizes that stereotypes about sexual assault complaints may lead some of you to question [complainant’s] credibility based solely on the fact that [he/she] did not complain about the alleged abuse earlier. You may or may not conclude that his/her testimony is untruthful based only on his/her [silence/delayed disclosure] [CHOOSE APPLICABLE TERM]. You may consider the [silence/delayed disclosure] along with all other evidence including [complainant’s] explanation for his/her silence/delayed disclosure in deciding how much weight, if 25 any, to afford to complainant’s testimony. You may also consider the expert testimony that explained that silence/delay is one of the many ways in which a child may respond to sexual abuse. Accordingly, your deliberations in this regard should be informed by the testimony presented concerning the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. You may recall evidence that (NAME) [failed to disclose, or recanted, or acted or failed to act in a way addressed by the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome]. In this respect, Dr. [A], Ph.D., testified on behalf of the State [and Dr. [B], Ph.D., testified on behalf of the defendant]. Both witnesses were qualified as experts as to the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome. You may only consider the testimony of these experts for a limited purpose, as I will explain. You may not consider Dr. [A]’s testimony as offering proof that child sexual abuse occurred in this case. [Likewise, you may not consider Dr. [B]’s testimony as proof that child sexual abuse did not occur]. The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome is not a diagnostic device and cannot determine whether or not abuse occurred. It relates only to a pattern of behavior of the victim which may be present in some child sexual abuse cases. You may not consider expert testimony about the Accommodation Syndrome as proving whether abuse occurred or did not occur. Similarly, you may not consider that testimony as proving, in and of itself, that ______, the alleged victim here, was or was not truthful. Dr. [A]’s testimony may be considered as explaining certain behavior of the alleged victim of child sexual abuse. As I just stated, that testimony may not be considered as proof that abuse did, or did not, occur. The Accommodation Syndrome, if proven, may help explain why a sexually abused child may [delay reporting and/or recant allegations of 26 abuse and/or deny that any sexual abuse occurred]. To illustrate, in a burglary or theft case involving an adult property owner, if the owner did not report the crime for several years, your common sense might tell you that the delay reflected a lack of truthfulness on the part of the owner. In that case, no expert would be offered to explain the conduct of the victim, because that conduct is within the common experience and knowledge of most jurors. Here, Dr. [A] testified that, in child sexual abuse matters, [SUMMARIZE TESTIMONY]. This testimony was admitted only to explain that the behavior of the alleged victim was not necessarily inconsistent with sexual abuse. [CHARGE, IF APPLICABLE: here, Dr. [B] testified that, in child sexual abuse matters, [SUMMARIZE TESTIMONY]. This testimony was admitted only to explain that the behavior of the victim was not necessarily consistent with sexual abuse.] The weight to be given to Dr. [A]’s [or Dr. [B]’s] testimony is entirely up to you. You may give it great weight, or slight weight, or any weight in between, or you may in your discretion reject it entirely. You may not consider the expert testimony as in any way proving that [defendant] committed, or did not commit, any particular act of abuse. Testimony as to the Accommodation Syndrome is offered only to explain certain behavior of an alleged victim of child sexual abuse.[Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome” (rev. May 16, 2011) (footnotes omitted).] 27 The trial court in this case recited the model charge nearlyverbatim -- both before Dr. Taska testified and before the jurybegan deliberating. On a number of occasions since J.Q., the Court has restatedand refined certain principles about the use of CSAAS testimony.In State v. P.H., for example, the Court reversed a convictionafter the trial court combined the charge on CSAAS with themodel charge on “fresh complaint.” 178 N.J. 378, 383 (2004).The latter charge informed the jury that it could “not considerthe child’s failure to complain as evidence weighing against thecredibility of the child.” Ibid. The Court found that the twocharges, in combination, could confuse the jury, and offeredguidance to reconcile the concepts. Id. at 399. The following year, in State v. R.B., the Court cautionedthat CSAAS experts should not list specific attributes of thesyndrome that may track the behavior of the child victim in thecase. 183 N.J. 308, 327-28 (2005). The Court again reviewedexpert testimony on CSAAS in State v. Schnabel and found noerror in how it was presented. 196 N.J. 116, 133-34 (2008). InState v. W.B., the Court directed that CSAAS experts may notquantify the percentage of children who lie about sexual abuse.205 N.J. 588, 613-14 (2011). Just last term, in State v. J.R., the Court again observedthat experts should not discuss behaviors exhibited by the 28 alleged victim in the trial when they describe conduct byconfirmed victims of child sexual abuse. 227 N.J. at 416. Toavoid confusion, experts should also not invoke highlypublicized child sexual abuse scandals in their testimony.Ibid. In addition, the Court observed that because CSAASevidence is meant to counter inferences about a child’s delayeddisclosure, experts should not testify before the victim attrial, as a general rule. Id. at 416-17. In none of those cases, however, did the Court reassess thescientific underpinning of CSAAS evidence. Forty other states and the District of Columbia allow CSAAStestimony for some purpose. See King v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.3d 523, 535 (Ky. 2015) (Abramson, J., dissenting)(collecting cases). Many, like New Jersey, allow experts toexplain common traits of abuse victims in general. See id. at535 & n.15. Some limit CSAAS testimony to cases in which “thevictim exhibit[s] a specific trait of the syndrome.” See id. at535 & n.16. Others permit the testimony to rehabilitate awitness’s credibility. See id. at 535 & n.17. The Eighth andNinth Circuits also allow the evidence. See id. at 535 n.15. A few states bar CSAAS evidence. See King, 472 S.W 3d at528-30 (Kentucky); State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557 , 562 (Tenn.1993); see also Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573 , 577 (Fla. 1997)(noting CSAAS had not “been found to be generally accepted”). 29 The Second Circuit has similarly cast doubt on CSAAS evidence.Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 157 n.9 (2d Cir. 2010) (callingevidence “highly controversial”). The Supreme Court of Kentucky in King explained that noparty in Kentucky had ever tried “to establish the validity ofthe CSAAS theory under either” Frye or Daubert. 472 S.W 3d at529. In its 2015 ruling, the Court observed that “[t]hevalidity of the theory was not self-evident in 1985 and it isnot self-evident today.” Id. at 530. V. Scientific Review of CSAAS The remand hearing provided an opportunity to test theprinciples underlying CSAAS in an adversarial setting. Thehearing benefitted not only from the testimony of authoritativeexperts but also from scientific evidence that has developed inthe more than twenty years since J.Q. Throughout theproceedings, both counsel and the experts highlighted a numberof relevant scientific studies and articles. We turn next tothat body of evidence as it relates to CSAAS as a whole and toits five individual categories. A. CSAAS in general The evidence at the hearing identified a number ofshortcomings about the concept of a child sexual abuseaccommodation syndrome. 30 First, the label “syndrome” itself raises seriousquestions. Stedman’s Medical Dictionary defines “syndrome” as“[t]he aggregate of symptoms and signs associated with anymorbid process, together constituting the picture of thedisease.” 1888 (28th ed. 2006); see also Oxford EnglishDictionary (3d ed. 2009; updated June 2018) (defining “syndrome”as “[a] concurrence of several symptoms in a disease”). The“Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome,” though, despite itsoriginal description, is not a syndrome. It does not describe adisease, is “not a scientific instrument,” and does not have“any pathological or diagnostic implications.” Summit II, at156-57. The term “syndrome,” however, can suggest just theopposite -- even though the parties agree that CSAAS cannotdetermine or gauge how likely it is that sexual abuse hasoccurred. One of the State’s experts, Dr. Lyon, “deliberatelyrefrained from using the term 'syndrome.’” Even Dr. Summit, inhis 1992 follow-up article, acknowledged that he would havechosen a different label had he foreseen how “CSAAS” could bemisunderstood. Summit II, at 157. Second, CSAAS and its five component behaviors are not easyto define with precision. Dr. D’Urso testified that the“constructs” of CSAAS “overlap all the time” and that “manythings . . . can be subsumed under the five categories.” See 31 also O’Donohue & Benuto,5 at 23 (“There is considerable, butindeterminate, overlap among the five key constructs.”). Third, there is disagreement as to how the behaviors relateto one another. Dr. Summit described the five behaviors as a“logical pattern and sequence of interaction.” Summit II, at155. Yet Dr. D’Urso testified they are not “sequential” andindeed need not all occur. Fourth, experts debated the import of the five behaviors atthe hearing. Dr. Summit originally wrote that CSAAS represented“a common denominator of the most frequently observed” behaviorsof sexually abused children. Summit I, at 180. On a somewhatdifferent but related point, other experts have explained that“there are no gold standard psychological symptoms specific tosexual abuse.” London et al. (2005),6 at 194. In fact, the fivebehaviors can also be found in non-abused children. That causedJudge Bariso to question CSAAS’s value as an educational tool“if its core characteristics are potentially equally prevalentamong non-abused children or children who have suffered othertypes of trauma.”5 William O’Donohue & Lorraine Benuto, Problems with Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 9 Sci. Rev. Mental Health Prac. 20 (2012).6 Kamala London, Maggie Bruck, Stephen J. Ceci & Daniel W. Shuman, Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse: What Does the Research Tell Us About the Ways that Children Tell?, 11 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 194 (2005). 32 Comments by other experts do not resolve the issue. Dr.Lyon noted that the categories of behavior could still benoteworthy “by comparing the relevant proportion in both theabused and non-abused population.” Yet, according to Dr. Bruck,some CSAAS symptoms -- recantation and denial -- “may be morecommon in non-abused children than in abused children.” Seealso Elliott & Briere,7 at 273 (finding no behaviors or symptomsthat “reliably distinguish an abused child from a nonabusedone”). Finally, it is important to note that CSAAS stems fromobservations made in clinical practice -- not systematicscientific study. Summit I, at 179-80. Dr. Summit’s seminal1983 article reflected the conclusions of a clinicalpsychiatrist and advocate for victims of child sexual abuse, andnot a body of empirical data. Clinical wisdom is valuable, but it must be examined withcare and objectively tested. When Dr. Summit’s article firstappeared, though, it was not subject to peer review. Eventoday, Judge Bariso found that expert testimony reveals a “lackof data supporting CSAAS.” As Judge Bariso also noted, CSAAS isnot recognized in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of7 Diana M. Elliott & John Briere, Forensic Sexual Abuse Evaluations of Older Children: Disclosures and Symptomatology,12 Behav. Sci. & L. 261 (1994). 33 Mental Disorders and has not been accepted by the AmericanPsychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association,or the American Psychological Society. The record contains limited scientific support for a five-part syndrome. Dr. D’Urso defended CSAAS and asserted that itenjoys “general acceptance within the professional community.”Others disagree. For example, Dr. Bruck testified that “there’sempirical support that some children show some of [the CSAAS]symptoms some of the time, but that’s about it.” Dr. Brainerd surveyed the scientific literature in hisexpert report. In his view, the authoritative articles by Drs.Bruck, Ceci, and London, discussed below, reveal a lack ofempirical support for CSAAS -- and demonstrate a lack ofconsensus. Based on the literature and other expert opinions,Dr. Brainerd could “not see how any reasonable scientist couldfail to conclude that CSAAS is very, very far from” havingachieved “a general consensus” in the scientific community. Another study outlined twenty-one problems with CSAAS --including that it is vague and has not been scientificallytested -- and described it “as an exemplar of junk science” that“should not be used in any way in any context (particularly inlegal settings, where impactful decisions are being made).” 34 O’Donohue & Benuto, at 22-27; see also Zajac et al.,8 at 2.(“[T]here is no scientific evidence of a syndrome-like clusterof symptoms or patterns of disclosure among abused children.”). Based on the record, it does not appear that CSAAS’s five-category theory has been tested and empirically validated as awhole. We now consider relevant evidence for each of the fivebehaviors. B. Individual Components of CSAAS 1. Secrecy Dr. Summit explained secrecy by noting that “[t]he averagechild never asks and never tells.” Summit I, at 181. He notedthat child abuse is a secretive reality for victims: “Ithappens only when the child is alone with the offending adult,and it must never be shared with anyone else.” Ibid. Dr. Taskaoffered a number of reasons why children do not disclose abuse:obedience, threats, gifts and bribes, and fear, among othercauses. In short, victims keep abuse a secret by not talking aboutit. Delayed disclosure and false denials are other ways ofkeeping abuse secret. Because Dr. Summit did not consider themunder the secrecy prong, we consider them separately below.8 Rachel Zajac, Maryanne Garry, Kamala London, Felicity Goodyear-Smith & Harlene Hayne, Misconceptions About Childhood Sexual Abuse and Child Witnesses: Implications for Psychological Experts in the Courtroom, 21 Memory 1 (2013). 35 2. Helplessness Dr. Summit identified helplessness as a “precondition[]” toabuse, not a behavior. Ibid. The concept appears to state theobvious -- that young children cannot defend themselves againstadults. It does not present a scientific finding. 3. Accommodation Accommodation refers to the coping mechanism by which achild adjusts to sexual abuse. Dr. Summit wrote that victimscan accommodate abuse by “hiding any indications of conflict”and being “unusually achieving and popular” -- “the honorstudent or the captain of the football team,” “eager to pleaseboth teachers and peers.” Summit I, at 186-87. Yet they canalso accommodate with “[p]athological dependency, self-punishment, self-mutilation, selective restructuring of realityand multiple personalities.” Id. at 184. As Dr. Taska explained at trial, those “mechanisms” include“the whole range of symptoms” from being “really good . . .really obedient . . . really good . . . in school” to “self-injuring,” “using drugs and alcohol,” “acting out,” “tortur[ing]animals,” and “set[ting] fires.” Accommodation thus is not a discrete behavior. Itencompasses all possible behaviors from the most resilient tothe most self-destructive. Under that definition, which the 36 record reflects, all victims fall under the broad construct inone way or another. 4. Delayed disclosure Evidence presented at the hearing confirmed that childrenoften delay reporting sexual abuse. Judge Bariso found thatdelayed disclosure is generally accepted among the scientificcommunity. The record supports that finding. Indeed, there is consistent and long-standing support inthe scientific literature that most child victims of sexualabuse delay disclosure. A 1994 study found that 74.9% ofvictims did not disclose abuse “within the year that it firstoccurred, and 17.8% . . . waited more than 5 years.” Elliott &Briere, at 268. A 2005 study that criticized aspects of CSAASnonetheless found empirical support for the principle thatdelayed disclosure “is very common.” London et al. (2005), at220. In a 2008 follow-up to that study, Dr. London and her co-authors found that 55 to 69% of adults reported “that they nevertold anyone about the sexual abuse during childhood,” a findingthe authors found “remarkably consistent” across the studiesthey surveyed. London et al. 2008,9 at 31.9 Kamala London, Maggie Bruck, Daniel B. Wright & Stephen J. Ceci, Review of the Contemporary Literature on How Children Report Sexual Abuse to Others: Findings, Methodological Issues, and Implications for Forensic Interviews, 16 Memory 29 (2008). 37 Other studies support that conclusion. See DiPietro etal.,10 at 134 (“[F]ew children purposefully disclose abuse duringchildhood . . . .”); Dubowitz et al.,11 at 691 (“[O]nly 21% ofthe children assessed as moderately or highly likely to havebeen abused had fully disclosed such abuse and had examinationresults indicative of abuse.”); Lyon, False Denials,12 at 42(surveying studies that reveal low rates of disclosure anddelays in disclosure). Some studies found higher rates of disclosure amongchildren who were older when they were first abused. See Londonet al. (2005), at 201-02 (discussing studies); see also Gordon &Jaudes,13 at 321 (“Preschool children are considered the groupmost underreported for sexual abuse.”). Studies in this area often rely on retrospective memory --that is, researchers ask about claims of abuse years after the10 Elisabeth Kahl DiPietro, Desmond K. Runyan & Doren D. Fredrickson, Predictors of Disclosure During Medical Evaluation for Suspected Sexual Abuse, 6 J. Child Sexual Abuse 133 (1997).11 Howard Dubowitz, Maureen Black & Donna Harrington, The Diagnosis of Child Sexual Abuse, 146 Am. J. Diseases Child. 688 (1992).12 Thomas D. Lyon, False Denials: Overcoming Methodological Biases in Abuse Disclosure Research, in Child Sexual Abuse: Disclosure, Delay and Denial 41 (Margaret-Ellen Pipe et al., eds. 2007) (Lyon, False Denials).13 Stacy Gordon & Paula K. Jaudes, Sexual Abuse Evaluations in the Emergency Department: Is the History Reliable?, 20 Child Abuse & Neglect 315 (1996). 38 fact. Experts point to shortcomings with that approach. Dr.Brainerd, for example, noted that memories can be falsifiedbetween childhood and adulthood, and victims may simply forgetthat they disclosed earlier. See also London et al. (2008), at34. The ACLU contends that the scientific literature should bediscounted because it does not expressly show that child sexualabuse causes delayed disclosure. But the case law in this areadoes not require such a showing in the setting of this matter.To establish reliability under Rule 702 and satisfy Frye’sgeneral acceptance test in criminal cases, the focus properlybelongs on whether there is a consensus among scientists that asignificant percentage of children who have actually been abuseddo, in fact, delay disclosure. See Harvey, 151 N.J. at 170; seealso Torres, 183 N.J. at 568; Kelly, 97 N.J. at 210. 5. Retraction Retraction occurs when a victim truthfully discloses abuseand then recants. Dr. Summit believed that recantation is thenorm: “Whatever a child says about sexual abuse, she is likelyto reverse it.” Summit I, at 188. According to Dr. D’Urso,however, recantation is “perhaps the most debated” of the fiveCSAAS factors. A 1991 article reported that recantation is “a recognizedphenomenon” in child sex abuse cases, “particularly cases of 39 incest.” Sorensen & Snow,14 at 14. According to a study done bythe authors, children recanted in 22% of cases, and 92% of thosechildren later reaffirmed their allegations. Id. at 11. Dr.London and her co-authors identified a number of questions aboutthe study: (1) how the authors selected the sample cases, manyof which were chosen from their private psychological practice;(2) what type of therapeutic methods the authors used to elicitdisclosures; and (3) the “high probability” that the sampleincluded children who were involved in now-discredited “satanicritual abuse” cases.15 London et al. (2005), at 212-13. Dr. London’s 2005 article also surveyed seven studies doneafter 1990, which showed recantation rates that ranged from 4 to27%. Id. at 216. “[T]he highest rates of recantation,”according to the publication, came from “studies that ha[d] theleast certain diagnoses of sexual abuse.” Ibid. A 2008 updatethat reviewed ten studies reached the same conclusion. Londonet al. (2008), at 35-36. The authors concluded that recantationis uncommon and occurs in only a minority of cases, id. at 35;14 Teena Sorensen & Barbara Snow, How Children Tell: The Process of Disclosure in Child Sexual Abuse, 70 Child Welfare 3 (1991).15 For an overview of prosecutions of daycare workers and others for child sexual abuse supposedly tied to satanic or occult activity, see Richard Beck, We Believe the Children: A Moral Panic in the 1980s (2015). 40 London et al. (2005), at 217, and that higher rates may stemfrom “highly suggestive interview methods” and “studies ofchildren who made allegations of ritualistic abuse,” London etal. (2008), at 44. A 2007 study of 257 substantiated cases of child sexualabuse found a recantation rate of 23.1%. Malloy et al.,16 at165. The study stressed the need to consider a “range offactors that may influence recantation,” including familialpressures and whether a sample involved substantiated cases ofabuse. Id. at 167. A more recent publication concluded that retraction“appear[s] to be the exception rather than the rule.” Zajac etal., at 4 (published in 2013); see also McGuire & London,17 at187 (recognizing dispute about rate of recantation butconcluding “recantation is extremely rare”). Disagreement among the experts reflected the ongoingdebate. Dr. D’Urso testified that Dr. Summit “overstated thefrequency of recantation.” In his expert report, Dr. D’Ursoalso acknowledged that “[r]etraction rates vary among16 Lindsay C. Malloy, Thomas D. Lyon & Jodi A. Quas, Filial Dependency and Recantation of Child Sexual Abuse Allegations, 46 J. Am. Acad. Child Adolescent Psychiatry 162 (2007).17 Katherine McGuire & Kamala London, Common Beliefs About Child Sexual Abuse and Disclosure: A College Sample, 26 J. Child Sexual Abuse 175 (2017). 41 researchers.” Dr. Lyon co-authored the study that found a 23%recantation rate. Malloy et al., at 165. Dr. Brainerd observedthat children who are suspected of being abuse victims inprospective interview studies “rarely recant.” Dr. Bruck, whoco-authored a number of studies in the record, wrote in herexpert report that only a “small proportion” of victims recant.She also found that “children are more likely to take back afalse accusation than a true” one. In short, evidence presented at the hearing revealed thatonly a minority of victims recant truthful allegations of abuseand that experts do not agree on the rate of recantation. C. Denial The hearing also addressed the extent to which childrenfalsely deny abuse when they are questioned. Denial is arguablya sub-set of “secrecy”; it is a way to maintain a secret.Recantation can also be considered a form of denial. BecauseDr. Summit did not analyze denial under CSAAS, we brieflyconsider the topic on its own. Denial is another heavily debated subject. Some expertsbelieve that victims often deny abuse. The 1991 study bySorenson and Snow found that 72% of children who eventuallydisclosed sexual abuse denied the abuse when they were firstquestioned. Sorensen & Snow, at 14. For reasons noted earlier, 42 however, experts have questioned the reliability of the study.See London et al. (2005), at 212-13. Dr. Lyon reviewed 21 studies of children with gonorrheaconducted from 1965 to 1993 and found “significant rates offalse denials.” Lyon, False Denials, at 43. He noted that therate of disclosure, excluding children younger than three yearsold, was 42% -- or a corresponding rate of denial of 58%. Id.at 48. Many victims disclosed their abuse incrementally,sometimes only after multiple interviews. Id. at 53-54. In his expert report, Dr. Lyon conceded that children withsexually transmitted diseases are likely not representative ofabused children in general. In addition, the relatively datedstudies involved -- most from the 1960s and 1970s -- did notfollow a standard interview practice, and suggestive questioningmay have affected the results. See id. at 52. Moreover, Dr.Lyon’s expert report adjusted for studies that includedteenagers, who might “have acquired gonorrhea through consensualsex.” Id. at 48 n.2. That increased the rate of disclosure to53% and thus decreased the rate of denial. Dr. Lyon also described studies his lab conducted in whichchildren who were four to nine years old “play[ed] with afriendly stranger,” and “two toys appear[ed] to break in thechildren’s hands” while they were playing. The stranger thenasked the child “to keep the breakage a secret.” Dr. Lyon found 43 that roughly one-third of the children kept the secret, evenafter they were asked directly about the breaking. The State,however, acknowledged that the toy study, while relevant, is nota perfect analogy to sexual abuse cases. Other experts concluded that most children do not denyabuse. Dr. London’s 2005 article examined 17 studies and foundthat “when directly questioned in a formal setting, only a smallpercentage of abused children” deny abuse. London et al.(2005), at 217, 220. Most disclose in the first or secondinterview. Id. at 217. In her expert report, Dr. Bruck, a co-author of the London studies, noted that rates of denial “inassessment interviews were highly variable” and ranged from 4 to76%. See London et al. (2008), at 35. In her judgment, weakerstudies -- that involved children later found to have made falseallegations or children who may have been subjected tosuggestive techniques, for example -- produced higher rates ofdenial. Studies with better methodologies produced low rates.See also Zajac et al., at 3-4 (“[D]enial . . . during formalinvestigation appear[s] to be the exception . . . .”); McGuire &London, at 180-81 (reviewing studies and noting that “majorityof abused children who come before authorities will disclosewhen questioned directly”). Dr. Brainerd also noted in his report that children who aresuspected victims of sexual abuse “overwhelmingly disclose that 44 they have been abused” when they participate in forensicinterviews. There does not appear to be a consensus among the experts,or in the scientific literature, on the subject of falsedenials. VI. Parties’ Arguments The State argues that CSAAS is scientifically reliable andthat expert testimony about it should continue to be allowed inchild sexual abuse cases. The State submits that the scientificcommunity generally accepts that delay, denial, and recantationoccur. According to the State, CSAAS evidence is not meant toshow “how all or even a majority of child sexual abuse victimsbehave”; it instead explains how the behavior of victims “is notinconsistent with having been molested.” The “value” of CSAAStestimony, the State contends, is “to explain a child’ssometimes counterintuitive post-abuse behavior or rehabilitate achild whose credibility has been attacked” on account of delayeddisclosure, denial, or recantation. In the State’s view, disagreements about CSAAS can behighlighted at trial through cross-examination. The Statedisagrees with the notion that jurors understand how victims ofchild sexual abuse behave. Various amici support the State’s arguments. The AttorneyGeneral maintains that the hearing produced ample evidence that 45 CSAAS is generally accepted within the scientific community.“All that matters,” the Attorney General contends, “is thatthere is reliable evidence that some sexually abused childrendelay and recant.” CSAAS is thus not only appropriate,according to the Attorney General, but also necessary to dispelmisconceptions and common myths. The American ProfessionalSociety on the Abuse of Children and the County ProsecutorsAssociation of New Jersey ably amplify those arguments. Defendant argues that CSAAS evidence is wholly inadmissibleunder Rule 702 because CSAAS is unreliable and not generallyaccepted within the relevant scientific community. Even theState’s experts, defendant submits, concede that there is agenuine dispute about CSAAS evidence among scientists.Defendant asserts that the State cannot satisfy its burden byclaiming that CSAAS evidence simply “educates” the jury. Defendant offers an independent reason to exclude CSAASevidence as well. He claims that what CSAAS purports to explainis not beyond the ken of the average juror. Defendant contendsthat juror beliefs about child sexual abuse are more favorableto the State than what is supported by scientific findings.Defendant also argues that CSAAS is inadmissible because itimproperly intrudes on the jury’s role as factfinder. Finally,defendant argues that the admission of CSAAS testimony in hiscase was not harmless and requires a new trial. 46 The ACLU contends that CSAAS is not a scientific conceptand that no part of Dr. Summit’s theory satisfies Rule 702. TheACLU also argues that CSAAS evidence is unduly prejudicial. TheAssociation of Criminal Defense Lawyers adds that trial courtsshould not use the model jury charge on CSAAS. As noted earlier, the Last Resort Exoneration Project urgedthe Court to adopt the Daubert test in criminal cases. The NewJersey Association for Justice submits that the Daubert criteriaare helpful to assess reliability. Both groups argue that CSAASis not reliable under Daubert’s principles. VII. Legal Conclusions We consider the evidence introduced at the remand hearingunder N.J.R.E. 702. Courts generally defer to a trial court’scredibility findings about the testimony of expert witnesses.See State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 247 (2011). We accept thecourt’s factual “findings to the extent that they are supportedby substantial credible evidence in the record” but “owe noparticular deference to the” court’s legal conclusions. Statev. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, 93 (2008). Whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to beadmissible under N.J.R.E. 702 is a legal question we review denovo. See Harvey, 151 N.J. at 167. To assess the reliabilityprong of the rule, we apply the Frye test and consider whetherCSAAS has achieved general acceptance in the scientific 47 community. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014; see also Torres, 183 N.J.at 568; Harvey, 151 N.J. at 170; Kelly, 97 N.J. at 210. The evidence presented at the remand hearing answers thatquestion. Judge Bariso found that the State had not met itsburden to demonstrate general acceptance of CSAAS as a whole,and that there is consensus for only one type of behavior --delayed disclosure. We agree. Based on the expert testimony and body of evidence from thehearing, which are summarized above, the record sustains thefollowing findings. There is limited scientific support for theoverall five-part syndrome known as CSAAS. In fact, CSAAS doesnot describe a “syndrome.” See Stedman’s Medical Dictionary1888. As described more fully in section V.A., CSAAS’scomponent behaviors are neither precise nor specific to victimsof sexual abuse. Also, the original study -- based on clinicalobservations -- has not been empirically validated as a whole.Studies in the record as well as testimony at the hearingconfirm that CSAAS as a whole does not enjoy general acceptancewithin the scientific community. As to the five individual features, we find consistent andlong-standing support in the scientific literature and amongexperts only for the proposition that a significant percentageof victims of child sexual abuse delay disclosure. 48 None of the other features that comprise CSAAS haveachieved sufficient acceptance in the scientific community to beconsidered reliable evidence under Rule 702. Two features, infact, do not describe behavioral traits. Dr. Summit calledsecrecy and helplessness “preconditions” to sexual abuse.Summit I, at 181. The notion of secrecy overlaps with delayeddisclosure, which is considered below. Helplessness is plainlynot a behavior; it states the obvious fact that young childrencannot defend themselves against adults. Accommodation encompasses the full spectrum of behaviors --from well-adjusted young adults who are high-achievers to self-destructive children who are failing. The theory is not basedon scientific data; it describes the straightforward realitythat all child victims cope with sexual abuse in one way oranother. That is undoubtedly true, but by defining“accommodation” so broadly that it includes all forms ofbehavior, the category both proves too much and very little atthe same time. For the reasons discussed in sections V.B.5. and V.C., wedo not find general acceptance in the scientific community abouteither retraction or false denial. Experts vary widely in theirviews about how often victims of child sexual abuse retractallegations or falsely deny them. Some conclude that thebehaviors rarely occur; others find that roughly one-fourth of 49 victims recant and as many as three-fourths falsely deny abuse.The hearing identified a number of concerns about studies thatfound higher rates. In any event, the record reveals a lack ofconsensus about the prevalence of recantation and false denialamong victims of abuse. See also Kelly, 97 N.J. at 210 (notingthat reliability turns on ability of expert’s “mode of analysis. . . to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results”grounded in science). To satisfy the reliability prong of Rule 702, it is notenough to state that certain behaviors can be observed in somevictims some of the time -- or that those behaviors are notinconsistent with abuse. That is not the type of “state of theart” evidence the case law requires. See id. at 208. Nor it is sufficient for the State to claim that expertevidence is being admitted only to educate jurors and dispelmisconceptions, and not as a diagnostic or predictive tool. Theunderlying claims of the syndrome must themselves be reliable tobe admitted under Rule 702. In short, the expert testimony mustsatisfy Frye’s reliability test and find general acceptance inthe scientific community. Because evidence about CSAAS as a whole and the above fourcategories does not satisfy that standard, experts may notpresent evidence on those topics at trial. Like the trialcourt, we reach a different conclusion about delayed disclosure. 50 As discussed in section V.B.4., both experts in the field andthe relevant scientific literature confirm that children oftendelay reporting sexual abuse. The authoritative studies and thetestimony at the hearing reveal a consensus within thescientific community on this point: most child victims delaydisclosing acts of sexual abuse. To be clear, when the other prongs of Rule 702 are met, theState may present expert evidence on delayed disclosure amongvictims of child sexual abuse -- and only that evidence -- to ajury. Trial judges must exercise care to limit the testimonyand bar any reference to “CSAAS,” an abuse “syndrome,” otherCSAAS “behaviors” aside from delayed disclosure, or causes fordelayed disclosure. The testimony should not stray fromexplaining that delayed disclosure commonly occurs among victimsof child sexual abuse, and offering a basis for that conclusion. When expert evidence on delay is introduced, trial courtsshould provide appropriate limiting instructions to the jury --both before an expert witness testifies and as part of thecourt’s final charge. We ask the Committee on Model CriminalJury Charges to draft appropriate instructions limited todelayed disclosure as soon as practicable. We also invite theparties and amici to submit proposed charges to the Committee. Jury instructions should explain that delay is notnecessarily inconsistent with abuse. Evidence about delay is 51 not proof of abuse; nor is it proof that the victim testifiedtruthfully. But it can dispel misconceptions about delayedreporting and may be considered in assessing a witness’scredibility. Parts of the current charge on battered womansyndrome,18 as well as the charge on CSAAS, may help inform theCommittee. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Battered WomanSyndrome -- Purposes Other Than Defenses” (June 4, 2007); ModelJury Charges (Criminal), “Battered Woman Syndrome -- Defenses”(June 4, 2007); Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Child SexualAbuse Accommodation Syndrome.” VIII. Rule 702’s “Beyond-the-Ken” Requirement Proponents of expert evidence on delayed disclosure have tosatisfy all three parts of Rule 702. They must not only presentsufficient proof that the evidence is reliable, and that thewitness has sufficient expertise, but must also show that thetestimony “concern[s] a subject matter that is beyond the ken ofthe average juror.” Kelly, 97 N.J. at 208. As the Rule states,expert testimony may be admitted if it “will assist the trier offact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact inissue.” N.J.R.E. 702.18 This Court has addressed the permitted uses of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Townsend, 186 N.J. at 490-98; State v. B.H., 183 N.J. 171, 182-202 (2005); Kelly, 97 N.J. at 209-14. We do not in any way question those rulings today. 52 Under the Rule, expert testimony is not appropriate toexplain what a jury can understand by itself. See State v.Cain, 224 N.J. 410, 427 (2016). Matters “within the competenceof the jury” are for the collective wisdom of the jury toassess. See State v. Sowell, 213 N.J. 89, 99 (2013). Bycontrast, issues that are beyond the understanding of theaverage juror may call for expert evidence. Trial judges, asgatekeepers, decide that threshold question. Ibid. Whether a victim’s delayed disclosure is beyond the ken ofthe average juror will depend on the facts of the case. If achild witness cannot offer a rational explanation for the delayin disclosing abuse -- which may happen during the pretrialinvestigative phase or on the witness stand -- expert evidencemay be admitted to help the jury understand the child’sbehavior. In this context, we do not accept that jurors caninterpret and understand an explanation that is not offered. On the other hand, a young teenager’s explanation from thewitness stand may fall within the ken of the average juror andmight be assessed without expert testimony. In this case,Bonnie gave sound reasons for the delay. She testified that shedid not tell her mother about the abuse sooner because (a)defendant threatened her with a gun, (b) she was embarrassed bythe degrading experiences, and (c) she feared that her motherwould kill defendant and be sent to prison, based on how her 53 mother reacted when a friend spotted defendant lying on top ofBonnie on a prior occasion. No juror needed help from an expert to understand andevaluate Bonnie’s testimony. In a case like this one, experttestimony is not called for to “assist the trier of fact.” SeeN.J.R.E. 702. Counsel, of course, may still argue to the juryabout a victim’s delayed disclosure based on the evidence,reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, and commonsense. IX. Application The jury in this case heard about CSAAS at various pointsin the trial. In addition to Dr. Taska’s detailed testimony,counsel referred to CSAAS in opening argument and summation, andthe trial court used the model jury charge to instruct the jurytwice on CSAAS evidence. Applying the above findings to this case, it was error toadmit testimony about CSAAS -- both as to the theory in generaland the behaviors that are not generally accepted by thescientific community. We also have serious concerns about theadmissibility of expert testimony on delayed disclosure in thiscase because Bonnie, a teenager, gave reasons for the delay thatwere not beyond the ken of the average juror. Nonetheless, we find those errors harmless in light of theoverwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. An error is 54 harmless unless, in light of the record as a whole, there is a“possibility that it led to an unjust verdict” -- that is, apossibility “sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt” that “theerror led the jury to a result it otherwise might not havereached.” State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335-36 (1971). The jury heard powerful evidence of defendant’s guilt onall four counts for which he was convicted. The victimtestified about a series of escalating acts of sexual abuse.She explained that she used her iPhone to record an encounterduring which defendant sexually abused her. The recordingcorroborated her testimony. Explicit and disturbing languagecaptured on the recording -- in words defendant admits were hisown -- graphically confirm the victim’s description of an act ofsexual abuse by defendant. Law enforcement also monitored phoneconversations between the victim and defendant in which heoffered her money and other items after asking her to retracther accusations. The jury heard as well from a friend of thevictim’s mother who once visited the family apartment and founddefendant lying on top of the victim, clothed but noticeablyerect. Count One of the indictment charged first-degree aggravatedassault and alleged that defendant committed “an act of sexualpenetration.” Count Two charged third-degree aggravatedcriminal sexual contact and accused defendant of committing “an 55 act of sexual contact.” In light of the evidence presented --in particular, the testimony of the victim combined with agraphic audio recording of an act of sexual abuse -- we do notfind a sufficient possibility that the admission of CSAASevidence led the jury to an unjust verdict or one it mightotherwise not have reached. Ibid. We note that the recordingcaptured an event that took place only weeks before the victimrevealed the alleged abuse to her mother and the police. Thatfact lessened the impact of the CSAAS evidence in this case. During closing argument, defense counsel conceded thatthere was sufficient evidence to support Count Three, second-degree endangering the welfare of a child. Counsel’s strategicconcession was no doubt influenced by the strength of theevidence, including the iPhone recording. Finally, the CSAAS evidence had little if any bearing onthe third-degree witness tampering charge. To prove Count Nine,the State relied not only on Bonnie’s testimony but also on therecorded phone conversations in which defendant offered hermoney and gifts to withdraw her accusations. CSAAS evidence didnot likely affect that conviction. For all of those reasons, we find that the admission of theCSAAS evidence in this case was harmless. 56 X. Judgment Allegations of child sexual abuse are particularlysensitive and can be difficult to prove. They also carry apowerful stigma and can be hard to defend against. In this and all areas, the Judiciary must ensure thatproceedings are fair to both the accused and the victim. Trialjudges partly fulfill that responsibility by serving as agatekeeper. In that role, they must assess whether experttestimony is sufficiently reliable before it can be presented toa jury. In 1983, the concept of a Child Sexual Abuse AccommodationSyndrome was introduced in Dr. Summit’s article. This Courtadopted CSAAS in 1993, like most courts in the nation. Today,we have the benefit of more critical and thorough scientificanalysis of CSAAS, which cautions against its continued use.Based on the record before the Court, we conclude that CSAASdoes not satisfy a basic standard of admissibility --reliability -- because it is not generally accepted by thescientific community. Expert testimony about CSAAS thereforemay no longer be presented to juries. Only testimony aboutdelayed disclosure can be admitted in appropriate cases. Inthis appeal, however, the evidence was harmless in light ofoverwhelming proof of defendant’s guilt. 57 For all of those reasons, we modify the judgment of theAppellate Division and affirm defendant’s convictions. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. 58