Title: Weibrecht v. Treasurer of Mo. as Custodian of Second Injury Fund
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC99493
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: January 10, 2023

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
GARY M. WEIBRECHT, 
) 
Opinion issued January 10, 2023 
 
) 
Appellant, 
) 
 
) 
v. 
) 
 
No. SC99493 
 
) 
TREASURER OF MISSOURI AS 
) 
CUSTODIAN OF SECOND INJURY 
) 
FUND, 
) 
Respondent. 
) 
  
APPEAL FROM THE LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION 
 
Gary Weibrecht appeals the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s 
(“Commission”) decision affirming and adopting the administrative law judge’s (ALJ’s) 
final award denying his claim for benefits from the Second Injury Fund (“Fund”).  On 
appeal, Weibrecht challenges the ALJ’s denial of his post-hearing motions to reopen the 
record and submit additional evidence after this Court handed down its opinion in Cosby 
v. Treasurer of Missouri, 579 S.W.3d 202 (Mo. banc 2019), interpreting section 
287.220.1  Because the Commission did not abuse its discretion in affirming the ALJ’s 
                                              
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016. 
2 
 
denial of Weibrecht’s post-hearing motions to reopen the record and submit additional 
evidence, the Commission’s decision is affirmed. 
Background 
In 2013, the legislature amended section 287.220, which governs Fund liability, 
“to limit the number of workers eligible for fund benefits because the Fund was 
insolvent.”  Treasurer of Mo. v. Parker, 622 S.W.3d 178, 181 (Mo. banc 2021).  Section 
287.220.2 retained the pre-amendment framework for Fund liability for compensable 
work-related injuries that occurred before January 1, 2014.  Id.  Section 287.220.3, which 
governs compensable work-related injuries that occurred after January 1, 2014, 
eliminated Fund liability for permanent partial disability (“PPD”) claims and limited 
Fund liability for permanent total disability (“PTD”) claims by requiring that the 
claimant’s preexisting disabilities be medically documented, equal at least 50 weeks of 
PPD, and meet one of the criteria listed in section 287.220.3(2)(a)a(i)-(iv).  Id.   
The primary injury giving rise to this case was a lower back injury Weibrecht 
suffered in July 2016.  After settling his workers’ compensation claim with his employer, 
Weibrecht filed a claim against the Fund, alleging his preexisting injuries to his lower 
back in 2005 and 2009 and right shoulder in 2014, combined with his primary injury, 
rendered him permanently and totally disabled.  He asserted the Fund was liable under 
section 287.220.2 for PTD benefits or, in the alternative, PPD benefits.  A hearing was 
held before the ALJ in May 2019, after which the ALJ closed the record and ordered 
proposed awards to be filed within 30 days.   
3 
 
Before the ALJ issued her final award, this Court handed down its opinion in 
Cosby v. Treasurer of Missouri, 579 S.W.3d 202 (Mo. banc 2019).  Prior to Cosby, the 
court of appeals had held in Gattenby v. Treasurer of Missouri, 516 S.W.3d 859, 862 
(Mo. App. 2017), that section 287.220.3 applied only when the preexisting and primary 
injuries both occurred after January 1, 2014.  But Cosby reached a different interpretation 
of section 287.220.3.  Under the statutory definition of “injury” and the plain and 
ordinary language of section 287.220, Cosby found subsection 2 applies when all injuries 
occurred prior to January 1, 2014, and subsection 3 applies when any injury occurred 
after January 1, 2014.  579 S.W.3d at 206-08.  Cosby further directed that, to the extent 
Gattenby holds otherwise, it “should no longer be followed.”  Id. at 208 n.5. 
After conclusion of the hearing but before the ALJ’s final award, Weibrecht filed a 
motion to reopen the record for a supplemental hearing, contending that Cosby changed 
the law and that his claim was now governed by section 287.220.3 rather than section 
287.220.2.  Weibrecht averred he had prepared evidence only for a claim under section 
287.220.2 based on the court of appeals’ decision in Gattenby.  He argued that, under the 
circumstances, the ALJ had the authority to reopen the record and hold a supplemental 
hearing prior to issuing an award.  The Fund posited that, while the ALJ has the authority 
to reopen the record in certain situations, doing so was not warranted under the facts of 
this case and Weibrecht should not be given a “second bite” at proving his claim under 
section 287.220.3. 
 
On July 2, 2019, the ALJ overruled Weibrecht’s motion , “The parties did not cite 
statutory authority allowing the ALJ to reopen the record after the hearing was 
4 
 
concluded.  After applying strict construction, [the] ALJ found no statutory basis 
allowing her authority to reopen the record.” 
Weibrecht filed a motion to reconsider, citing section 287.610.5 and 8 C.S.R. 
50-2.010 as authority for the ALJ to take additional post-hearing evidence before 
rendering a decision.  He also requested an opportunity to make an offer of proof as to the 
evidence he would submit at an additional hearing.  The ALJ again overruled 
Weibrecht’s motion, this time without explanation.  Weibrecht then filed a third motion 
again asking the ALJ to reopen the record for the purposes of making an offer of proof 
and submitting additional evidence for the ALJ’s consideration.  The ALJ once again 
overruled his motion without explanation and issued her final award denying Weibrecht 
compensation.   
In her award, the ALJ determined that, because the primary injury in this case 
occurred after January 1, 2014, section 287.220.3 applied.  She concluded Weibrecht’s 
PPD claim was not compensable and denied his PTD claim because he had not proven 
any of his preexisting disabilities equaled at least 50 weeks of PPD or met any of the 
criteria listed in section 287.220.3(2)(a)a(i)-(iv).  Weibrecht appealed to the Commission, 
challenging the ALJ’s rulings on his requests to reopen the record and the final award.  
The Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ’s final award with a supplemental 
opinion, finding it was supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in 
accordance with the law.  The Commission also affirmed the ALJ’s decisions not to 
5 
 
reopen the record “for reasons cited in [the ALJ’s] July 2, 2019, minute entry.”  
Weibrecht now appeals the Commission’s decision.2 
Standard of Review 
The Commission’s decision must be “supported by competent and substantial 
evidence upon the whole record.”  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 18.  On appeal, the 
Commission’s factual findings shall be conclusive and binding in the absence of fraud, 
and no additional evidence shall be heard.  Section 287.495.1.  This Court also defers to 
the Commission’s determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses and the weight 
given to conflicting evidence.  Annayeva v. SAB of TSD of St. Louis, 597 S.W.3d 196, 
198 (Mo. banc 2020).  On appeal, this Court: 
shall review only questions of law and may modify, reverse, remand for 
rehearing, or set aside the award upon any of the following grounds and no 
other: 
 
(1) That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers; 
 
(2) That the award was procured by fraud; 
 
(3) That the facts found by the commission do not support the award; 
 
(4) That there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant 
the making of the award. 
 
Section 287.495.1(1)-(4). 
 
 
                                              
2 After an opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer.  Mo. Const. art. V, 
sec. 10. 
6 
 
Analysis 
The issue in this case is whether the Commission erroneously affirmed the ALJ’s 
overruling of Weibrecht’s post-hearing motions to reopen the record and submit 
additional evidence.  Weibrecht argues the ALJ abused her discretion by overruling those 
motions.  He contends this Court’s decision in Cosby changed his burden of proof, which 
he argues constituted “good cause” under 8 C.S.R. 50-2.010(11)3 to reopen the record.  
Without the opportunity to submit additional evidence, Weibrecht disputes he had a full 
and complete hearing. 
An ALJ’s evidentiary decisions affirmed by the Commission will not be 
overturned absent an abuse of discretion.  Otwell v. Treasurer of Mo., 634 S.W.3d 850, 
857 (Mo. App. 2021).  An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision “is clearly against 
the logic of the circumstances and is so unreasonable as to indicate a lack of careful 
consideration.”  Mitchell v. Kardesch, 313 S.W.3d 667, 675 (Mo. banc 2010) (internal 
quotations omitted).   
“Workers’ compensation law is entirely a creature of statute.”  Templemire v. W & 
M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 381 (Mo. banc 2014).  In interpreting it, this Court 
                                              
3 8 C.S.R. 50-2.010 (11) provides: 
 
(11) All parties shall be prepared to introduce all relevant evidence when the 
case is heard. Continuances to file additional evidence will only be granted 
for good cause shown, when the administrative law judge who has conducted 
the hearing decides that additional evidence is necessary for a full and 
complete hearing.  
 
 
7 
 
“must ascertain the intent of the legislature by considering the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the terms.”  Id.  Sections 287.220.2 and 287.220.3, as amended in 2013, went 
into effect January 1, 2014.  Weibrecht’s contention that Cosby “changed his burden of 
proof” is incorrect.  Rather, section 287.220.3, by its plain language, has governed since 
its January 1, 2014 effective date.  While Gattenby previously interpreted sections 
287.220.2 and 287.220.3,4 prior to Weibrecht’s hearing, this Court had yet to address the 
interpretation of sections 287.220.2 and 287.220.3.  In fact, at the time of Weibrecht’s 
hearing, Cosby was pending before this Court.5  Because the issue continued to be 
litigated in Cosby and other cases, nothing precluded Weibrecht from making alternative 
arguments under both sections for Fund liability pursuant to the plain language of the 
statute.  Indeed, nothing prohibited Weibrecht from presenting evidence under both 
sections 287.220.2 and 287.220.3 at his hearing.  It was not clearly against the logic of 
the circumstances and so unreasonable to indicate a lack of careful consideration for the 
ALJ to conclude there was no good cause to reopen the record when this Court had not 
previously interpreted sections 287.220.2 and 287.220.3 and nothing precluded 
                                              
4 Generally, changes in decisional law apply retrospectively.  Sumners v. Sumners, 701 
S.W.2d 720, 723 (Mo. banc 1985).  This Court, however, has authority to declare 
whether such decisions apply retrospectively or prospectively.  Wainwright v. Stone, 414 
U.S. 21, 23-24 (1973).  Retrospective or prospective application need not be addressed, 
however, because Weibrecht never raised this issue before the ALJ, the Commission, or 
this Court.  “Appellate courts are merely courts of review for trial errors, and there can be 
no review of a matter which has not been presented to or expressly decided by the trial 
court.”  City of Aurora v. Spectra Comms. Grp., LLC, 592 S.W.3d 764, 789 (Mo. banc 
2019).  
5 This Court granted transfer in Cosby on July 2018; it was argued before this Court in 
October 2018 and handed down June 25, 2019.  Weibrecht’s hearing was in May 2019.   
8 
 
Weibrecht, at the time of his hearing, from making alternative arguments under the plain 
language of the statute.  Accordingly, the ALJ did not abuse her discretion.   
Weibrecht alternatively asserts the Commission erred in affirming the ALJ 
overruling his motions to reopen the record and submit additional evidence because the 
ALJ never reached the merits of his motions to consider whether there was good cause 
but, rather, erroneously concluded she lacked any statutory authority to reopen the record. 
 Weibrecht is correct that, when the ALJ initially overruled his post-judgment 
motion to reopen the record and submit additional evidence, the ALJ did not exercise her 
discretion to sustain or overrule his motion but, rather, erroneously believed she lacked 
authority to sustain the motion.  In her ruling, she expressly stated the parties did not cite 
authority allowing the ALJ to reopen the record and she found “no statutory basis 
allowing her authority” to do so.  Thereafter, Weibrecht filed two successive motions to 
reconsider, requesting the ALJ reopen the record to allow him to make an offer of proof 
and submit additional evidence and citing 8 C.S.R. 50-2.010(11).  Throughout briefing 
with respect to Weibrecht’s motions, the Fund agreed with Weibrecht that the ALJ had 
such authority but argued Weibrecht failed to show a basis for exercising that authority in 
this case.  When the ALJ overruled Weibrecht’s subsequent motions, the ALJ did not 
repeat that she lacked authority to reopen the record. There is no evidence the ALJ’s later 
rulings were a product of an erroneous belief she lacked authority.   
It is presumed the ALJ ultimately exercised her discretion to rule on Weibrecht’s 
motion and simply determined he failed to establish good cause for reopening the record 
under 8 C.S.R. 50-2.010(11).  See Tate v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 18 S.W.3d 3, 6 (Mo. App. 
9 
 
2000) (“An administrative law judge’s decision is presumed correct and the burden in 
challenging such a decision is heavy.”)  As explained above, it would be reasonable for 
the ALJ to conclude there was no good cause to reopen the record and submit additional 
evidence.  Weibrecht’s argument fails.  The Commission correctly affirmed the ALJ’s 
rulings.   
Finally, Weibrecht asserts that, in affirming the overruling of Weibrecht’s post-
hearing motions to submit additional evidence, the Commission violated “basic principles 
of fairness.”  Weibrecht relies on Dietz v. Humphreys, 507 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. banc 1974), 
and Tharp v. St. Luke’s Surgicenter-Lee Summit, LLC, 587 S.W.3d 647 (Mo. banc 2019).  
Both cases, however, are distinguishable from the instant case.   
In Dietz, the circuit court based its ruling on this Court’s two most recent cases 
interpreting joint account statutes.  507 S.W.2d at 391-92.  While Dietz was pending on 
appeal, this Court decided a case holding the prior construction of the joint account 
statutes—the construction applied by the circuit court—was erroneous.  Id. at 391.  Dietz 
declined to finally dispose of the case, choosing instead to remand the case for further 
proceedings.  Id. at 392.  This Court reasoned “it would be improper and unfair to the 
parties, to decide this case on the record made when all the parties . . . were operating 
pursuant to the rule announced in the [older] cases.”  Id.   
Unlike Dietz, here, Cosby did not overrule prior opinions from this Court.  Rather, 
prior to Cosby, the interpretation of sections 287.220.2 and 287.220.3 was not settled. 
Dietz is not controlling.   
10 
 
In Tharp, this Court set forth the elements of a prima facie case for negligent 
credentialing for the first time.  587 S.W.3d at 663.  Because Tharp did not know what 
evidence was required to make a submissible case for negligent credentialing prior to his 
appeal, the case was remanded for a new trial.  Id. at 662-63.  In reaching its conclusion, 
this Court applied a two-part test to determine if failing to remand would violate the 
“basic principles of fairness.”  Id. at 659.  This test requires, first, “the plaintiff must 
actually possess sufficient evidence to make a submissible case upon retrial.”  Id.  
“Second, the plaintiff must convince the appellate court he or she was justified in failing 
to present the evidence during the trial.”  Id.  
Here, unlike in Tharp, Weibrecht should have been aware of what evidence was 
required to make a submissible case for PTD.  The plain language of sections 287.220.2 
and 287.220.3 set forth the necessary evidence to make a submissible claim.  Tharp is not 
controlling.  Weibrecht’s argument fails.   
Conclusion 
The Commission did not abuse its discretion in affirming the overruling of 
Weibrecht’s post-hearing motions to reopen the record and submit additional evidence.  
The Commission’s decision is affirmed.  
______________________________ 
Mary R. Russell, Judge 
 
 
Wilson, C.J., Powell, Fischer, Ransom and Draper, JJ., concur; 
Breckenridge, J., dissents in separate opinion filed. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
GARY M. WEIBRECHT, 
) 
 
) 
Appellant, 
) 
 
) 
v. 
) 
 
No. SC99493 
 
) 
TREASURER OF MISSOURI AS 
) 
CUSTODIAN OF SECOND 
) 
INJURY FUND, 
) 
 
) 
Respondent. 
) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
I dissent from the principal opinion because I do not concur in its analysis and 
conclusion.  I agree with the principal opinion that the administrative law judge (ALJ) had 
authority to sustain Gary Weibrecht’s motions to reopen the record so he could present 
evidence to prove his claim against the Second Injury Fund under section 287.220.3.1  In 
contrast to the holding of the principal opinion, however, I would find the ALJ’s overruling 
of Mr. Weibrecht’s motions was an abuse of the ALJ’s discretion because justice and 
fairness necessitates a full and complete hearing on Mr. Weibrecht’s claim against the fund.  
Accordingly, I do not concur in the principal opinion’s holding that the ALJ did not abuse 
                                              
1 All statutory references are to Revised Statutes of Missouri 2016. 
2 
 
her discretion by overruling Mr. Weibrecht’s motion to reopen the record and instead, 
would vacate the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s decision and remand the 
case to the commission with instructions for it to remand the case to the ALJ for the ALJ 
to sustain Mr. Weibrecht’s motion and receive additional evidence regarding his claim.  
Mr. Weibrecht presented his case before the ALJ in reliance on the only judicial 
interpretation of subsections 2 and 3 of section 287.220 available at that time – Gattenby 
v. Treasurer of Missouri, 516 S.W.3d 859 (Mo. App. 2017).  Consistent with the court of 
appeals’ interpretation of section 287.220 in Gattenby, Mr. Weibrecht presented his case 
pursuant to subsection 2 of section 287.220.  Before the ALJ issued her decision, however, 
this Court handed down Cosby v. Treasurer of Missouri, 579 S.W.3d 202 (Mo. banc 2019).  
In that decision, the Court overruled Gattenby and clarified cases like Mr. Weibrecht’s, in 
which the primary work-related injury occurred after January 1, 2014, fall under subsection 
3 of section 287.220.  Id. at 207.   
In light of Cosby, Mr. Weibrecht filed a motion to reopen the record and submit 
additional evidence relevant to sustaining his burden of proof under subsection 3.  The ALJ 
overruled the motion in a July 2, 2019 minute entry that read:  “The parties did not cite 
statutory authority allowing the ALJ to reopen the record after the hearing was concluded.  
After applying strict construction, ALJ found no statutory basis allowing her authority to 
reopen the record.”  In response to that ruling, Mr. Weibrecht filed a motion to reconsider 
in which he asserted section 287.610.5 and 8 C.S.R. 50-20.010 provided authority for the 
ALJ to receive and consider additional evidence before rendering a decision.  Additionally, 
he requested he be given the opportunity to make an offer of proof of the evidence he 
3 
 
intended to present if the record were reopened.  The ALJ overruled the motion to 
reconsider without stating a basis for the ruling.  Mr. Weibrecht then filed a third motion, 
requesting the ALJ reopen the record to allow him to make an offer of proof and to submit 
additional evidence in support of his claim.  The ALJ again overruled the motion without 
stating a basis for the ruling.   
Thereafter, the ALJ issued an award finding section 287.220.3 applied to 
Mr. Weibrecht’s July 2016 injury and his evidence was insufficient to prove he was 
permanently and totally disabled because he did not prove any of his preexisting injuries 
equaled at least 50 weeks of permanent partial disability or met the criteria of section 
287.220.3(2)(a)a(i)-(iv).  Mr. Weibrecht appealed the ALJ’s decision to the commission, 
which affirmed the ALJ’s decisions not to reopen the record for the reasons stated in the 
ALJ’s July 2, 2019 minute entry.  It also affirmed and adopted the ALJ’s final award, which 
it found was supported by competent and substantial evidence.  
Contrary to the decision of the commission, the ALJ had authority under 8 C.S.R. 
50-2.010(11) to sustain Mr. Weibrecht’s motion so long as he showed “good cause” to file 
additional evidence and the additional evidence is necessary for a full and complete 
hearing.  I would find the overruling of Gattenby – the only judicial interpretation of section 
287.220.2-.3 at the time of Mr. Weibrecht’s hearing – is “good cause” for his failure to 
present evidence that was irrelevant to his claim under Gattenby’s interpretation of the 
statute.  Evidence relating to subsection 3 of section 287.220 was not relevant when 
Mr. Weibrecht’s claim was heard, and he acted in reliance on the only judicial 
interpretation of section 287.220 available.  Justice requires that Mr. Weibrecht be allowed 
4 
 
to present evidence to satisfy the governing legal standard as clarified after his case was 
heard.  Under the circumstances, a full and complete hearing regarding Mr. Weibrecht’s 
entitlement to second injury fund benefits can be had only if Mr. Weibrecht is permitted to 
file additional evidence relevant to that claim.  I do not agree with the principal opinion 
that this Court’s holdings in Dietz v. Humphreys, 507 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. banc 1974), and 
Tharp v. St. Luke’s Surgicenter-Lee Summit, LLC, 587 S.W.3d 647 (Mo. banc 2019), can 
properly be distinguished.  
Because Mr. Weibrecht was not afforded a full and complete hearing, the Court 
should vacate the commission’s decision and remand the case with instructions that the 
commission, in turn, remand the case to the ALJ to sustain Mr. Weibrecht’s motion to 
reopen the record under 8 C.S.R. 50-2.010(11).  
___________________________________ 
PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE