Title: Pickett v. State
Citation: 443 So. 2d 796
Docket Number: 53680
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: March 30, 1983

443 So. 2d 796 (1983) Larry PICKETT, Alias Larry Barnes v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 53680. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 30, 1983. Rehearing Denied January 18, 1984. Alfred Lee Felder, Mack Brabham, McComb, for appellant. Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Amy D. Whitten, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before PATTERSON, BOWLING and DAN M. LEE, JJ. DAN M. LEE, Justice, for the Court: This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Pike County wherein Larry Pickett, alias Larry Barnes, appellant, was indicted, tried and convicted for the March 28, 1980, forcible rape of Ruby Marie Hood, a female over the age of twelve. Upon conviction, appellant was sentenced to serve a term of twenty-four years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. We affirm. *797 On March 27, 1980, Ruby Marie Hood, prosecutrix, a nineteen-year-old female, went with a friend, Benevelyn Andrews, to a nightspot in McComb known as the Bird Cage. They arrived at the Bird Cage at approximately 9:30 p.m. While there, the prosecutrix danced with the appellant once or twice. At approximately 11:45 p.m., the two girls started to leave the lounge. The prosecutrix stopped to talk with a friend while Benevelyn proceeded outside where she was confronted by the appellant who asked if he could talk with her (Benevelyn's) friend. When the prosecutrix came outside, appellant caught her by the arm. Benevelyn continued walking and informed the prosecutrix she would wait in her car. Appellant pulled the prosecutrix over by a car and then pushed her inside and locked the door. Ray Charles Jackson, who was seated in the back seat of the vehicle, held the door locked while appellant got inside. Appellant tried to kiss the prosecutrix and when she resisted, he slapped her. She began blowing the horn on the automobile, whereupon he slapped her again. Appellant jerked the prosecutrix between the front two seats, whereupon she screamed again only to be slapped by appellant. She then rolled down the car window and stuck one leg out trying to escape therefrom. While in the process of trying to escape, she lost one of her shoes. Appellant warned her not to scream or try to fight him. Otherwise he would kill her. Philamon Moore then entered the car on the driver's side, started the engine and then killed it. Appellant told Moore if he didn't want to be any part of it, he could get out. Moore then started the car again and drove to the Camellian Motel. While enroute to the motel, there was some discussion about a $100 bill. Jackson passed the bill to appellant. The prosecutrix did not know what the money was for or what happened to the money thereafter. When they stopped at a traffic light, the prosecutrix screamed again. Appellant told her if she didn't shut up, he would blow her head off. She saw him pulling something from underneath the seat which she believed to be a gun. They arrived at the motel at approximately 12:30 a.m. Appellant put his hand around the prosecutrix's throat and told her if she screamed or ran he would kill her. The prosecutrix was pushed into a room. However, Moore did not get out of the automobile and left the scene. When they got inside, appellant tried to pull the prosecutrix's clothes off, but she pulled away. The prosecutrix then disrobed and appellant slapped her on the bed. Appellant and Jackson undressed. Jackson then allegedly raped the prosecutrix. At this point, two other men entered the motel room and forcibly had sexual relations with the prosecutrix. Appellant then allegedly raped her. She was also forced to perform various other sexual acts with Jackson. After everyone but appellant had left, he began pleading with the prosecutrix not to tell anyone. She dressed and was then taken to another room at the motel where Jackson and the other two men were asleep. Appellant offered to call the prosecutrix a cab; however, she persuaded him to allow her to call Benevelyn. Appellant put $6 in her shoe for gas. The prosecutrix then left the motel room to wait on Benevelyn. It was around daybreak at this time. Benevelyn picked up the prosecutrix shortly thereafter. She was crying and shaking. Her hair was messed up and her face beaten up. She was taken to Benevelyn's boy friend's house where her mother was called and told to meet them at the police station. The prosecutrix's mother corroborated Benevelyn's testimony as to her emotional state as well as her physical appearance. Dr. Benjamin Cranford, III, testified that the prosecutrix was crying, hysterical, and having difficulty speaking at the time of her examination. His findings were consistent with the history given by the prosecutrix. Valium was prescribed to control her anxiety and hysteria. *798 Appellant's witnesses admitted the sexual acts; however, they denied such was done against the prosecutrix's consent. According to Ray Charles Jackson, the prosecutrix was paid for her services. Jackson testified he got the $100 bill out of the prosecutrix's purse and it was only because she had stayed out so late that she became upset. Jackson denied that any violence was involved. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged, whereupon the appellant was sentenced to serve a term of twenty-four years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. In rebuttal, the state produced two ministers who testified that the prosecutrix's reputation in the community for truth and veracity was good. Appellant contends such was error because appellant did not directly attack the prosecutrix's character for truth and veracity during the trial. In Tiner v. State, 214 Miss. 551, 59 So. 2d 287 (1952), this Court stated: Appellant argues that the mere contradiction of the prosecutrix's testimony by his witnesses was insufficient to justify the admission of testimony in support of her reputation for truth, honesty and integrity. Tiner, supra, and 81 Am.Jur.2d, Witnesses § 639 (1976). While we agree with the appellant that the mere contradiction of a witness's testimony is insufficient to justify the admission of testimony of general reputation for truth, honesty and integrity, an examination of the record leads us to conclude that the prosecutrix's character for truth and veracity was directly assailed by defense witness Ray Charles Jackson. Jackson testified as follows: This was not a case where appellant denied that the alleged incident occurred. Rather his whole defense was predicated on the fact that the sexual acts complained of were engaged in voluntarily by the prosecutrix in return for money. Appellant's witness went much farther than merely contradicting the prosecutrix's testimony. Jackson asserted she (prosecutrix) was lying. *799 Upon these facts we believe the trial court properly admitted the testimony as to the prosecutrix's reputation in the community for truth and veracity because her character for such was directly attacked by the appellant. Appellant objected to the racial composition of the special venire, prior to trial, contending that of the twenty-three jurors who were present, eighteen were white, which was not a fair representation of the racial balance in Pike County. The court overruled appellant's motion, reciting that the special venire was drawn in open court indiscriminately as the law provided. On motion for new trial, appellant alleged that the makeup of the jury was unfair in that once the special venire was exhausted, the jurors presented to the appellant were not from a random panel, but instead were a series of jurors excluded from previous cases and who had not yet served on the jury. In overruling appellant's motion, the trial court stated: Only one juror, aside from the alternate juror, was selected from the regular panel. In Arnold v. State, 171 Miss. 164, 157 So. 247 (1934), we held: See also Fermo v. State, 370 So. 2d 930 (Miss. 1979) (holding a challenge to selection of grand jury foreman on grounds of racial discrimination made after trial untimely); Watkins v. State, 262 So. 2d 422 (Miss. 1972) (holding an acceptance of jury precluded challenge to its composition); and Holloway v. State, 242 So. 2d 454 (Miss. 1970) (holding the failure to voice an objection until jury selection had been completed and jury was seated in box ready for trial to begin effectively waived any challenge thereto). Appellant has failed to show any prejudice he may have suffered from the manner in which the jury was selected nor has he alleged fraud in the manner that the jury was selected. Appellant, therefore, effectively waived any irregularity, if any, in the manner in which the array of jurors was presented to appellant for selection by failure to make a proper and timely objection. There is no merit in this assignment of error. Instruction S-2 stated: Appellant contends this instruction should not have been given because it announced a purely abstract principle of law, was unsupported by the evidence and amounted to an improper comment upon the evidence. Appellant does not contend that instruction S-2 was an incorrect statement of the law. While abstract instructions are generally condemned where such an instruction could not have confused or misled the jury, the granting of such does not constitute reversible error. Kitchens v. State, 300 So. 2d 922 (Miss. 1974). The instruction, when read, is not confusing or misleading. Moreover, it was somewhat couched in terms of the facts in the present case and cannot be said to be totally abstract. While a more proper instruction might have been drafted, we do not believe the granting of instruction S-2 constituted reversible error. Appellant also contends that the instruction was unsupported by the evidence because the proof showed that appellant was subjected to a great deal of physical brutality while S-2 told the jury physical force was unnecessary if the prosecutrix submitted to sexual intercourse because of fear arising out of great bodily harm. The evidence presented clearly supported such an instruction. The prosecutrix was slapped, choked and threatened with her life if she did not succumb to the wishes of her assailants. She repeatedly testified she submitted to sexual intercourse because she was afraid due to appellant's threats to kill her. We find no merit in this argument. Finally, appellant contends instruction S-2 was an improper comment on the evidence which emphasized specific portions of the testimony. Appellant failed to object at trial to instruction S-2 on this ground. In Daumer v. State, 381 So. 2d 1014 (Miss. 1980), this Court stated: The failure to object to instruction S-2 on this ground at trial precludes review of such on appeal. Based on the foregoing, appellant's conviction and sentence are hereby affirmed. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and BROOM, P.JJ., and ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING, HAWKINS, PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur. Petition for rehearing denied. ROY NOBLE LEE, J., and WALKER and BROOM, P.JJ., dissent. ROY NOBLE LEE, Justice, dissenting: I think the lower court erred in permitting testimony as to the prosecutrix's reputation in the community for truth and veracity, and, therefore, I dissent from the majority opinion which holds that the lower court did not err in admitting such testimony. Appellant Larry Pickett and Ray Charles Jackson were separately indicated for the forcible rape of Ruby Marie Hood, a 19-year-old *801 female. Appellant's trial was held beginning April 3, 1981, which resulted in his conviction. Jackson's trial was held April 9, 1981, and he was convicted likewise. Pickett did not testify at his trial, but Jackson was called as a witness and voluntarily testified in Pickett's behalf. The prosecutrix contended that she was forcibly abducted and raped by Pickett and Jackson, while Jackson's testimony was to the effect that she voluntarily accompanied them from the Bird Cage Lounge to the Camellian Motel where she voluntarily entered into sexual acts with them and was paid for her services. There is a sharp conflict in the testimony of the prosecutrix and Jackson upon which testimony the respective sides depended for their cases. The following facts are uncontradicted in the record:[1] 1. Pickett, Jackson and the prosecutrix got into an automobile outside the Bird Cage Lounge in a public place. 2. They went to the Camellian Motel, a public place, left the vehicle, and entered a room in the motel. 3. The prosecutrix disrobed. 4. Pickett, Jackson and at least one other person engaged in sexual acts with the prosecutrix during the evening. When Jackson testified, he denied that force, threats, or violence were used against the prosecutrix. He stated that she voluntarily entered into the sex acts with him, Pickett and another individual. On cross-examination of Jackson, the prosecuting attorney asked questions and received responses as follows: BY MR. STARRETT: It is obvious that the prosecuting attorney had set a trap for the witness. If Jackson had denied the prosecuting witness was lying, he would have been admitting that Pickett and he forcibly raped her. In all of his testimony previous to that question, he had denied that they raped her and he simply answered the prosecuting attorney's question in the affirmative and emphatically so. The dissenting opinion characterizes the testimony of Jackson as an affirmative charge that the prosecuting witness was lying and that it constituted a direct attack on the character of the prosecutrix. If such were true, every denial by a witness of another witness's testimony would amount to a character attack. On the basis of Jackson's answer to the prosecuting attorney's question, the lower court permitted the State, over objection, to introduce two ministers whose testimony obviously was for the sole purpose of bolstering the testimony of the prosecutrix. Reverend Herman Abraham testified as follows: Reverend J.M. Varnado testified as follows: In my opinion, the rebuttal testimony of the ministers was irregular, inadmissible, highly prejudicial, and constitutes reversible error. In McEwen v. State, 132 Miss. 338, 96 So. 690 (1923), a similar question was presented in a forcible rape trial, and this Court said the following: In Tiner v. State, 214 Miss. 551, 59 So. 2d 287 (1952), the Court considered an error which was not objected to on the trial where rebuttal testimony as to the truth and veracity of a witness was offered when the witness's reputation had not been previously attacked just as in the present case. The Court said: In Brewer v. Mullins, 97 Miss. 353, 52 So. 257 (1910), which was a replevin suit involving the possession of a mule, the testimony was in sharp conflict, as in the case sub judice. On cross-examination by the attorney for Mullins, the latter was asked, over objection, whether Mullins was a truthful man, to which he answered that he was. In reversing the case, the Court said: The legal principle now before the Court has been long established and well recognized. It remains the law today. The violation and disregard of that principle should require reversal of the conviction and judgment entered here. Therefore, I would sustain the petition for rehearing, withdraw the majority opinion, and reverse and remand the case for a new trial, and I dissent from the majority opinion. Jackson v. State, 443 So. 2d 803 (Miss. 1983), a companion case to Pickett, was affirmed April 6, 1983, by an unpublished opinion stating that the decision was controlled by Pickett. In my opinion, Jackson should be reversed and remanded on petition for rehearing for the same reason as Pickett and my views expressed herein apply to Jackson. WALKER and BROOM, P.JJ., join this dissent. [1] However, the State contends that force was used in each instance, while appellant contends that the prosecutrix acted voluntarily.