Title: P. v. Moye
Citation: 47 Cal. 4th 537
Docket Number: S157980
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 24, 2009

1 
Filed 8/24/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
S157980 
 
v. 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
Ct.App. 2/8 B192331 
ALEXANDER MOYE, 
 ) 
 
 
 )  
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 )  
Super. Ct. No. KA074073 
 
 
 ) 
 
Defendant, who bludgeoned his victim to death with a baseball bat, was 
convicted of second degree murder.  The jury was instructed on, and rejected, both 
a justifiable homicide defense based on reasonable self-defense, and unreasonable 
or imperfect self-defense, which would have supported conviction of the lesser 
included offense of voluntary manslaughter.  The trial court refused a defense 
request to further instruct the jury on a sudden quarrel/heat of passion theory of 
voluntary manslaughter.  The Court of Appeal disagreed with this ruling, found the 
instructional error prejudicial, and on that basis reversed defendant‘s murder 
conviction. 
We conclude the evidentiary record supports the trial court‘s determination 
that there was insubstantial evidence to warrant instruction on a sudden 
quarrel/heat of passion theory of voluntary manslaughter.  In particular, substantial 
evidence was lacking that defendant killed while subjectively under the actual 
influence of ―a strong passion aroused by a ‗provocation‘ sufficient to cause an 
 
2 
‗ ―ordinary [person] of average disposition . . . to act rashly or without due 
deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than from judgment.‖  
[Citation.]‘  [Citations.]‖  (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163 
(Breverman).)  Defendant‘s own uncontested testimony established he did not act 
rashly, or without due deliberation and reflection, or from strong passion rather 
than from judgment, when he claimed to have used the bat defensively to allegedly 
fend off an attack from the homicide victim. 
In a murder case, trial courts are obligated to instruct the jury on defenses 
supported by substantial evidence that could lead to conviction of the lesser 
included offense of voluntary manslaughter, even where the defendant objects, or is 
not, as a matter of trial strategy, relying on such a defense.  (Breverman, supra, 19 
Cal.4th at pp. 162-163.)  But no principle of law required the trial judge below to 
disregard all the evidence bearing on defendant‘s state of mind at the time of the 
killing in order to find the jury should consider whether he subjectively killed 
under the heat of passion, when no substantial evidence supported that theory of 
manslaughter, and the only evidence actually introduced on the point, the 
defendant‘s own uncontested testimony, was plainly to the contrary. 
Assuming arguendo it was error to fail to instruct on heat of passion 
voluntary manslaughter on this factual record, we find any such error harmless 
under the applicable Watson test (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 
(Watson)).  Here, the jury considered virtually all of the defense evidence bearing 
on defendant‘s state of mind and the question whether he harbored malice when it 
entertained his claim of unreasonable or imperfect self-defense.  Having rejected 
that claim, the jury likewise rejected the factual basis for a finding of provocation 
legally necessary to support a heat of passion/voluntary manslaughter defense.  
Upon examining the entire cause, including the evidence (Cal. Const., art. VI, 
§ 13), it is not ―reasonably probable‖ defendant would have obtained a ―more 
 
3 
favorable‖ outcome had the instructional error not occurred.  (Watson, supra, at 
p. 836.)  Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeal will be reversed. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Defendant Alexander Moye and codefendants Daniel Avendano and 
George Lopez were jointly tried for the murder of Mark Urrutia.  The jury 
convicted defendant of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 
further finding that he personally used a deadly weapon (a baseball bat) in the 
commission of the murder.  (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)2  In a bifurcated court trial, 
defendant‘s prior felony convictions of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, 
subd. (a)), alleged as a serious felony within the meaning of the ―Three Strikes‖ 
law (§ 667, subds. (a)-(i)), and receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), were 
found true.  Defendant was sentenced to state prison for 15 years to life for second 
degree murder, doubled under the Three Strikes law (§ 667, subds. (a)-(i)), with a 
five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony allegation and a consecutive 
one-year enhancement for use of a deadly weapon, for a total term of 36 years to 
life. 
The Fight on Saturday Evening 
On Saturday evening, February 11, 2006, defendant was living with his 
girlfriend, Kandie Sanchez, her mother, and her daughter, Jessica, at the Sanchez 
residence on Paso Real in Rowland Heights.  According to defendant, he got into 
an argument with Kandie‘s mother, who wanted him to leave.  He then started 
arguing with Jessica, who commented that she was going to summon her 
boyfriend, Ronnie Urrutia.  Ronnie had a brother, Mark Urrutia, the homicide 
                                              
1  
All references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 
2  
Codefendants Avendano and Lopez were acquitted of all charges. 
 
4 
victim in this case.  Ronnie and Mark lived approximately one block from the 
Sanchez residence. 
At some point in the evening, Ronnie received a phone call from his 
girlfriend, Jessica, informing him that defendant was bothering her.  She then 
called back to tell Ronnie that defendant was waiting to fight him in front of the 
Sanchez residence.  Ronnie went to the Sanchez house with his brother Mark and 
three friends, Carlos, Ruben and Rudy.  Upon the group‘s arrival, defendant and 
Ronnie got into an argument that quickly escalated into a fistfight on the 
neighbor‘s front lawn.  At one point Ronnie‘s brother Mark got involved, twice 
hitting or tapping defendant in the back with a silver and blue aluminum baseball 
bat he had retrieved from their car.  Two of defendant‘s associates were also 
present, codefendants Avendano and Lopez.  Although they did not become 
directly involved in the fistfight, with their assistance defendant came into 
possession of a kitchen knife and began chasing Ronnie with the knife, prompting 
Ronnie‘s friend Carlos to hit defendant twice in the arm with a ski pole.  When 
someone yelled that the police were coming, the fight ended and Ronnie, Jessica, 
Mark and their friends drove back to the Urrutia residence. 
Sheriff‘s deputies arrived after the fight was over and spoke with defendant 
in front of the Sanchez residence.  Defendant characterized it as a minor argument 
and declined any medical attention or interest in reporting a crime because he was 
on felony probation and did not want to get into further trouble.  He did not appear 
seriously injured to the officers.  One deputy testified recalling seeing a slight 
blood residue on his lip, but observed no other injuries, and no swollen or black eye. 
The Homicide on Sunday Morning 
The next morning, Sunday, February 12, 2006, Carlos, his brother Jose, and a 
friend, Santos, walked past the Sanchez residence on Paso Real looking for Carlos‘s 
eyeglasses.  They saw defendant, codefendants Avendano and Lopez, and others in 
 
5 
the front yard, and heard one of the men, possibly defendant, make threatening 
remarks as they walked by.  A white car was parked in the Sanchez driveway.  Carlos 
and the others kept walking past the house.  Carlos then used his cell phone to call 
Mark, who, together with his friend Ruben, was going to meet up with Carlos and the 
others on foot.  Carlos told Mark not to walk down Paso Real because defendant and 
his companions had been seen on the street and were looking for him.  Carlos agreed 
they would meet Mark and Ruben on Desire Street, a private street adjacent to Paso 
Real. 
Meanwhile, defendant drove alone to a nearby liquor store to buy cigars.  En 
route he saw Mark, whom he thought was Ronnie.  Upon returning to the Sanchez 
residence, defendant told Avendano and Lopez to get into his car, and the three 
began driving around looking for ―Ronnie.‖ 
Carlos and his companions took a shortcut or path through the grounds of a 
nursery as they headed to meet Mark and Ruben on Desire Street.  While walking 
down the path they saw defendant drive past them and turn onto Desire.  Carlos 
and his companions ran back down the path.  Carlos then tried calling Mark again 
several times to warn him to avoid Desire Street.  He got no answer. 
When they emerged from the path, Carlos‘s group saw defendant‘s car 
stopped on Desire Street with all of its doors open.  They saw defendant and one 
of his companions jumping over a fence and heading back to the car.  Defendant 
was holding two bats, or a bat and another long object, which he threw into the 
car.  Defendant and his companions seemed nervous as they jumped into the car 
and left the scene.  Carlos then received a call on his cell phone from Ronnie, who 
said that his brother Mark was dying. 
Ruben testified that despite his and Mark‘s best efforts to avoid defendant, 
he, Avendano and Lopez spotted them, sped toward them in the white car as if 
trying to run them down, then abruptly stopped the car in the middle of the street, 
 
6 
jumped out and began chasing them.  Ruben explained that after Mark had received 
the cell phone call from Carlos, he had retrieved the silver and blue aluminum bat 
for protection.  Ruben heard defendant say, ―Come on, let‘s go, let‘s get these 
motherfuckers.‖  Mark and Ruben ran for a chain link fence.  Mark jumped the 
fence first; Ruben tried to jump over it but his hands and sweater got caught on the 
fence.  He managed to roll over the fence and saw Mark, who had kept running.  
Ruben thought he saw Mark drop his bat as he jumped over the fence.  Defendant 
and his codefendants also jumped over the fence; defendant and Avendano chased 
Mark while Lopez chased Ruben.  Mark was running ahead of Ruben as they split 
up. 
Ruben ran to a nearby shed for cover and soon heard voices nearby, 
thumping sounds, then running and yelling and car doors slamming as defendant 
and his companions drove off. 
When Ruben and the others found Mark, he was facedown on the ground, 
bleeding badly with his breathing labored.  His front upper teeth were broken off, 
as if he had been hit hard in the mouth.  They saw Mark‘s ―brains hanging out of his 
head and — he didn‘t look right,‖ and they could tell he was dying. 
An autopsy revealed that Mark sustained at least four blows to the head and 
three more to other areas of his body.  In one area of his head, the force of a blow 
had shattered his skull into multiple small fragments.  The cause of death was blunt 
force trauma to the head. 
No weapons were found in the backyard near where Mark was found lying.  
Mark‘s aluminum bat was later recovered from a storm drain a short distance away.  
DNA analysis of blood samples taken from the bat matched defendant‘s and Mark‘s 
DNA profiles.  Defendant‘s blood was found on the handle of the bat; the victim‘s 
blood was found on the barrel or upper portion of the bat. 
 
7 
Christine Lopez was standing outside her home on Honore Street on the 
Sunday morning in question when she saw a white car carrying three men that she 
did not know drive by.  Christine recalled that the car was moving fast and the 
men appeared to be laughing or joking loudly.  As the car drove past her, she 
thought she saw the men throw something out of the car against the curb, and she 
heard a metallic noise.  The storm drain from which the bat was recovered is in 
front of Christine‘s house.  She also heard one of the men say they had ―lit him 
up,‖ or words to that effect.  Christine identified defendant and Avendano as two 
of the three men she had seen in the white car as it drove by. 
Defendant’s Testimony 
The defense consisted primarily of defendant testifying in his own behalf.  
He admitted killing Mark Urrutia with a baseball bat.  He claimed that just prior to 
the murder, he saw Mark and Ruben, mistakenly thought Mark was his brother 
Ronnie, and drove up to them in order to talk, try to resolve things, and avoid a 
continuing conflict, since Ronnie was dating defendant‘s girlfriend‘s daughter 
Jessica and defendant and Ronnie were likely to see each other again.  Defendant 
asked Avendano and Lopez to accompany him to talk with Ronnie (i.e., Mark) and 
Ruben because he did not want the two men ―jumping [him]‖ while he was alone. 
Defendant claimed that as he, Avendano and Lopez pulled up to the two 
men, Mark kicked his car, after which Mark and Ruben jumped over a fence.  
Defendant testified, ―They jumped over the fence and I exited my car, you know, 
because I was looking to see if there was any damage done to my car.  I got kind 
of upset he kicked my car.  So I wanted to see where he was going so that way I 
could call the police and tell them, you know, this guy kicked my car.‖  Defendant 
testified he only went over the fence intending ―to see where he [Mark] went.‖  
Defense counsel asked defendant on direct examination, ―And at some point 
in time did you catch up with Mark in the field?,‖ to which defendant replied, 
 
8 
―Yes.‖  When asked, ―And what happens at that point?,‖ defendant gave the 
following account of events: 
―[Defendant]  As soon as I approach [Mark] I‘m within probably three to 
four feet of him and he turns around real fast and had kind of like a smirk on his 
face and [he] said, ‗Yeah, now I got you,‘ and he had a bat in his hands. 
―[Counsel]  Is that the first time you noticed the bat? 
―[Defendant]  Yes. 
―[Counsel]  And what happens at that point? 
―[Defendant]  He attacked me with the bat. 
―[Counsel]  And did he hit you again with the bat? 
―[Defendant]  Yes, he hit me several times. 
―[Counsel]  And where on your person did you get hit? 
―[Defendant]  On my left forearm, because I was blocking.  I didn‘t want to 
get hit in the face.  And like on the side of my arms, and then my hands. 
―[Counsel]  And what happens at that point? 
―[Defendant]  After a couple like four or five, six swings, he — I grabbed 
the bat from him, I got the bat from him, and then right when I got it from him, 
that‘s when he tried to rush me, like, to attack me. 
―[Counsel]  And what happens then? 
―[Defendant]  I hit him with the bat. 
―[Counsel]  And do you know where you hit him with the bat? 
―[Defendant]  In his arm.  He put his arm up. 
―[Counsel]  And what happens at that point? 
―[Defendant]  He still tries to attack me. 
―[Counsel]  And he keeps coming at you? 
―[Defendant]  Yeah.  Every time he came at me I hit him again with the bat. 
―[Counsel]  And about how many times total do you think that you hit him? 
 
9 
―[Defendant]  Honestly, when he was hitting me I, like, wasn‘t, like, in the 
right state of mind.  I was worried about getting hit.  I didn‘t want to get beat down 
and possibly be killed, so I was just worried about getting hit.  And then when I got 
the bat from him, I was worried about getting hit again, because he kept coming at 
me.  So I kept hitting him until he fell. 
―[Counsel]  And when he fell what happened? 
―[Defendant]  When he fell I noticed — I didn‘t hit him anymore but I 
noticed he was bleeding, and when I seen him bleeding, I got kind of scared. 
―[Counsel]  And did you run back to the car at that time? 
―[Defendant]  Yes. 
―[Counsel]  Did you take the bat with you? 
―[Defendant]  Yes. 
―[Counsel]  And when you got back, did you go back over the fence? 
―[Defendant]  Yes. 
―[Counsel]  When you got back to the car, were [codefendants] Danny and 
George there or were they — 
―[Defendant]  They were standing by the car. 
―[Counsel]  And what happens at that point? 
―[Defendant]  We all got back into the car and I threw the bat on the 
passenger side floor.‖ 
Defendant testified he was driving as the three left the scene; that he was 
―kind of shook up about everything that happened‖; and that he threw the bat from 
the car into a gutter at ―the first spot I seen to throw [it]‖ before dropping off 
Avendano and Lopez at a friend‘s house. 
The Trial Court’s Ruling 
The trial court explained its reasons for refusing the requested instructions 
on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter in these terms:  ―I just don‘t see it as 
 
10 
being heat of passion.  I see it as a self-defense.  But from your own client‘s mouth 
he says, ‗I want to make peace, I‘m not angry, I know everything is fine.  I know 
I‘m going to have to deal with this guy because he‘s hooked up with the female 
that I‘m going to be seeing, I‘m going to be around, whether I like it or not.  I‘m 
trying to make everything right.  The only reason I have my buddies with me is so 
that if I‘m assailed I will not be without recourse.‘  And the only hint of anger is 
when he says, ‗The guy [Mark] slapped [sic] my car.‘ ‖ 
The court explained further, ―I‘m not trying to be a juror here.  But when I 
say ‗viable,‘ it‘s not my job to decide exactly in those terms.  I don‘t think that 
there is substantial or even nontrivial, put it that way, evidence of a reduced degree 
of culpability based on that [heat of passion] theory.  [¶]  I just — listening 
carefully to Mr. Moye‘s testimony which will provide the only basis for that.  He 
didn‘t say it.  He could have.  He didn‘t.  If he had said, ‗I became enraged, I 
became emotional,‘ et cetera, ‗I became hot blooded,‘ that‘s what the heat of 
passion is.  He said none of those things.  [¶]  He said, ‗I was defending my life.  
That‘s what I was doing.  I thought he was going to kill me so I hit him until he 
stopped moving.‘  That‘s self-defense.  That‘s not heat of passion.  [¶]  He didn‘t 
say, ‗I became angry because he hit [sic] my car or because he beat me up the 
night before.‘  That‘s not what he did.  I‘m not saying you can‘t make reference to 
those facts and they certainly can play into whether he was reasonable in his belief 
that he was going to be hurt.  And it‘s also true that the beating of the night before 
and all those things can play into whether he is honest about his fear.  [¶]  But they 
don‘t get you to heat of passion when he says, ‗I don‘t have any heat of passion.  
I‘m self-defense.‘ ‖ 
The jury convicted defendant of second degree murder, finding that he 
personally used a deadly weapon (a baseball bat) in the commission of the offense.  
Defendant appealed, arguing the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct 
 
11 
on a sudden quarrel/heat of passion theory of voluntary manslaughter.  The Court 
of Appeal agreed, reversed defendant‘s murder conviction, and thereafter denied 
the People‘s petition for rehearing.  We granted the People‘s petition for review. 
DISCUSSION 
Instructional Error 
Defendant argues the voluntary manslaughter instructions the trial court 
gave were incomplete because they did not include instruction on sudden 
quarrel/heat of passion despite support for that theory of manslaughter in the 
evidence.  The trial court instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter in 
connection with imperfect or unreasonable self-defense, but found insubstantial 
evidence to further instruct on sudden quarrel/heat of passion as requested by the 
defense.  The People, in contrast, urge that the trial court‘s rejection of heat of 
passion instructions was proper given the state of the evidence at the close of the 
evidentiary phase.  Assuming arguendo it was error to refuse such instructions, the 
People argue further such error was nonprejudicial under the applicable Watson 
harmless error test. 
―In criminal cases, even absent a request, the trial court must instruct on 
general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence.  (People v. 
Breverman [, supra,] 19 Cal.4th [at p.] 154.)  This obligation includes giving 
instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question 
whether all the elements of the charged offense were present, but not when there is 
no evidence the offense was less than that charged.  (Ibid.)  The trial court must so 
instruct even when, as a matter of trial tactics, a defendant not only fails to request 
the instruction, but expressly objects to its being given.  (Ibid.; see also People v. 
Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 196, 199-203 [trial court must instruct on heat of 
passion and unreasonable self-defense theories of manslaughter, if supported by 
 
12 
evidence, even when defendant objects on the basis that such instructions would 
conflict with his defense].)‖  (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1085.) 
― ‗Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice 
aforethought.  (§ 187, subd. (a).)  A defendant who commits an intentional and 
unlawful killing but who lacks malice is guilty of . . . voluntary manslaughter.  
(§ 192.)‘  (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 199 (Barton).)  Generally, the 
intent to unlawfully kill constitutes malice.  (§ 188; People v. Saille (1991) 
54 Cal.3d 1103, 1113; see In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 778-780 
(Christian S.).)  ‗But a defendant who intentionally and unlawfully kills lacks 
malice . . . in limited, explicitly defined circumstances:  either when the defendant 
acts in a ―sudden quarrel or heat of passion‖ (§ 192, subd. (a)), or when the 
defendant kills in ―unreasonable self-defense‖ — the unreasonable but good faith 
belief in having to act in self-defense (see []Christian S.[, supra, ]7 Cal.4th 768; 
[People v. ]Flannel [(1975)] 25 Cal.3d 668).‘  (Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at 
p. 199.)  Because heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense reduce an 
intentional, unlawful killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter by negating 
the element of malice that otherwise inheres in such a homicide (ibid.), voluntary 
manslaughter of these two forms is considered a lesser necessarily included 
offense of intentional murder (id. at pp. 201-202).‖  (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 
at pp. 153-154.) 
―[N]either heat of passion nor imperfect self-defense is an element of 
voluntary manslaughter‖ that must be affirmatively proven.  (People v. Rios (2000) 
23 Cal.4th 450, 454.)  Rather, they are ―theories of partial exculpation‖ that reduce 
murder to manslaughter by negating the element of malice.  (People v. Sinclair (1998) 
64 Cal.App.4th 1012, 1016.) 
A heat of passion theory of manslaughter has both an objective and a 
subjective component.  (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 584; People 
 
13 
v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1252 (Steele); People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 
Cal.3d 307, 326-327 (Wickersham).) 
― ‗To satisfy the objective or ―reasonable person‖ element of this form of 
voluntary manslaughter, the accused‘s heat of passion must be due to ―sufficient 
provocation.‖ ‘  (People v. Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 326.)‖  (People v. 
Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1144.)  ―[T]he factor which distinguishes the 
‗heat of passion‘ form of voluntary manslaughter from murder is provocation.  
The provocation which incites the defendant to homicidal conduct in the heat of 
passion must be caused by the victim (see In re Thomas C. (1986) 183 Cal. 
App. 3d 786, 798), or be conduct reasonably believed by the defendant to have 
been engaged in by the victim.  (See People v. Brooks (1986) 185 Cal. App. 3d 
687, 694; see also 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) Crimes 
Against the Person, § 512, p. 579.)  The provocative conduct by the victim may be 
physical or verbal, but the conduct must be sufficiently provocative that it would 
cause an ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly or without due 
deliberation and reflection.  (People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515; People v. 
Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 139.)‖  (People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 59 
(Lee).) 
To satisfy the subjective element of this form of voluntary manslaughter, 
the accused must be shown to have killed while under ―the actual influence of a 
strong passion‖ induced by such provocation.  (Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 
p. 327.)  ―Heat of passion arises when ‗at the time of the killing, the reason of the 
accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to such an extent as would cause the 
ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition to act rashly and without 
deliberation and reflection, and from such passion rather than from judgment.‘  
[Citations.]‖  (People v. Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 201.)  ― ‗However, if 
sufficient time has elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion 
 
14 
to subside and reason to return, the killing is not voluntary manslaughter . . . .‘  
(Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 327.)‖  (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 
p. 163.) 
The jury in this case was instructed both on justifiable homicide based on 
reasonable self-defense, which is a complete defense to murder, and on 
manslaughter based on unreasonable or imperfect self-defense, which reduces 
murder to voluntary manslaughter.  (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 153-154.)  
At the close of evidence, the defense also requested an instruction on sudden 
quarrel/heat of passion voluntary manslaughter.  The trial court refused to give the 
instruction, explaining, ―If there is evidence — sufficient, nontrivial evidence of 
heat of passion provoked by the victim in such a way that a reasonable person 
would be thrown into a killing rage, you have a voluntary manslaughter.  I 
understand that [theory].  I just don‘t believe it‘s been shown here.‖ 
The trial court went on to explain why it would also not be giving an 
instruction on the ―cooling-off period‖ that can negate a heat of passion voluntary 
manslaughter defense.  The court pointed out that defendant himself had testified 
he was only looking for Ronnie that morning to ―make peace‖ because Ronnie 
was the boyfriend of Jessica, defendant‘s girlfriend‘s daughter (defendant testified 
he mistakenly thought Mark was Ronnie when he encountered Mark on the street).  
The court also saw no evidence of anger or passion in defendant spilling over from 
the fight the previous evening into the next day.  The trial court did make clear in 
its ruling, however, that the impact of the previous evening‘s fight on defendant‘s 
state of mind the following morning was relevant on the question whether he 
reasonably or unreasonably believed in the need to defend himself against Mark, 
and thus on the ultimate question whether he harbored malice. 
Defense counsel argued an instruction on sudden quarrel/heat of passion 
manslaughter was required in light of defendant‘s testimony that Mark kicked his 
 
15 
car when defendant and his companions confronted Mark and Ruben on the street.  
Counsel argued, ―Just imagine the affront when . . . [w]hen you are going there to 
make peace and before you have an opportunity to do so the person attacks your 
vehicle.‖  When counsel next suggested defendant‘s car could be considered just 
an extension of himself, the court remarked, ―I‘m going to save you the 
embarrassment of making that argument.  We‘re smiling at one another, the record 
should reflect.  We‘re both semi serious here.  At least I am.  I don‘t see the facts, 
but again I‘ll give you every opportunity to convince me.‖ 
We agree with the People that evidence of the fight on Saturday evening in 
which Mark and defendant were both involved did not itself constitute legally 
sufficient provocation to require instruction on sudden quarrel/heat of passion 
voluntary manslaughter in connection with the killing of Mark the following day.  
Defendant himself testified that by Sunday morning he had ―cooled off‖ and was 
no longer upset about the previous evening‘s fight.  (See People v. Dixon (1995) 32 
Cal.App.4th 1547, 1551-1552.)  Both the trial court and Court of Appeal 
recognized that the evidence of the fight on the previous evening, standing alone, 
would not constitute sufficient legal provocation to support a heat of passion 
defense. 
We further agree with the People that the victim‘s asserted act of kicking 
defendant‘s car on Sunday morning just before defendant and his codefendants gave 
chase likewise did not itself constitute legally sufficient provocation to cause an 
ordinarily reasonable person to act out of a heat of passion and kill Mark in 
response.  (In re Christian S., supra, 7 Ca1.4th at p. 779, fn. 3; People v. Najera 
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 212, 226.)  Indeed, defendant himself testified Mark‘s 
conduct at most aroused in him a desire to report the car-kicking incident to the 
police; he testified he chased Mark over the fence only to ―see where he went‖ so 
he could relate that information to the police.  Here too, both the trial court and the 
 
16 
Court of Appeal recognized that the alleged car-kicking incident, if viewed in 
isolation, would not constitute sufficient legal provocation to support a heat of 
passion defense. 
In short, neither the fight on the previous night, nor the car-kicking incident on 
Sunday morning shortly before the homicide, themselves constituted sufficient legal 
provocation without the necessary cooling off period to warrant a heat of passion 
instruction.  Both courts also agreed that nothing in the record, including 
defendant‘s own narrative of events leading up to the homicide, suggested he was 
actually, subjectively, under the influence of a ―strong passion‖ resulting from either 
of those occurrences when he killed Mark.  (Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 
p. 327.)3 
The Court of Appeal‘s determination that a heat of passion instruction was 
required in this case turned solely on what assertedly occurred when, according to 
defendant, he caught up with Mark after chasing him over the fence and through a 
field and Mark turned and ―attacked‖ him.  Ruben, who had split up from Mark and 
testified he was himself being chased by one of the codefendants, was not a 
percipient witness to the fatal altercation.  Defendant himself was the only living 
eyewitness to his final encounter with the victim. 
According to defendant, when he caught up to Mark and first noticed Mark 
was holding a bat, Mark turned, and with a smirk on his face stated, ―Yeah, now I 
got you,‖ as he attacked defendant with the bat, hitting him on his arms and hands 
as defendant sought to defend himself and avoid being hit in the face.  After four or 
five swings, defendant managed to grab the bat from Mark.  At that point Mark 
rushed at defendant, so defendant hit him with the bat, striking him on his arm.  
                                              
3  
Indeed, defendant testified that at the time he first encountered Mark and 
Ruben on Sunday morning, he had the calm presence of mind to be driving slowly in 
a school zone in case school was in session (it was a Sunday). 
 
17 
Mark came at him again; according to defendant, each time he did so, defendant hit 
him again in self-defense.  True, defendant did at one point in his testimony state 
he was not ―in the right state of mind.‖  But he immediately explained what he 
meant by that statement — he was worried about getting hit by Mark because he 
did not want to ―get beat down and possibly be killed.‖  Holding the bat with two 
hands, defendant met each advance by Mark with a defensive swing of the bat 
until the victim fell to the ground and could attack him no longer. 
The Court of Appeal nonetheless concluded on this record that defendant‘s 
testimony, together with the events that transpired after defendant chased and 
caught Mark and Mark turned and attacked him, required the giving of an 
instruction on sudden quarrel/heat of passion voluntary manslaughter.  The court 
reasoned, ―Nevertheless, the final incident with Mark wielding the bat, could 
qualify as adequate provocation. . . .  [S]ufficient provocation may be verbal or 
physical.  According to [defendant‘s] testimony [the] victim turned to [him] with 
bat in hand and said, ‗Yeah, now I‘ve got you.‘  The victim‘s demeanor and words 
along with the fact that he was carrying a bat and attacked [defendant] with the bat 
is sufficiently provocative to cause an ordinary person of average disposition to act 
rashly and without due deliberation or reflection.  Regarding whether the 
subjective element was satisfied, [defendant] testified, ‗I was defending my life.  
That‘s what I was doing.  I thought he was going to kill me so I hit him until he 
stopped moving.‘  [Defendant‘s] testimony shows he was mainly concerned with 
defending himself.  ‗I didn‘t want to get beat down and possibly killed, so I was 
just worried about getting hit.  And then when I got the bat from him, I was 
worried about getting hit again, because he kept coming at me.  So I kept hitting 
him until he fell.‘  If believed, it is evident that [defendant] was in fear for his life 
at the time he was hitting Mark with the bat.‖  (Italics added.) 
 
18 
We cannot agree with the Court of Appeal‘s conclusion that instruction on 
a sudden quarrel/heat of passion theory of voluntary manslaughter was required on 
the facts of this case.  As the trial court correctly concluded, substantial evidence 
that defendant acted while under ―the actual influence of a strong passion‖ 
(Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 327) in response to legally sufficient 
provocation, such as caused him to ― ‗act rashly or without due deliberation and 
reflection, and from this passion rather than from judgment‘ ‖ (id. at p. 326) was 
lacking in this case. 
―As our prior decisions explain, the existence of ‗any evidence, no matter 
how weak‘ will not justify instructions on a lesser included offense, but such 
instructions are required whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty only of the 
lesser offense is ‗substantial enough to merit consideration‘ by the jury.  (Flannel, 
supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12, original italics; see also People v. Bacigalupo 
(1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 127; People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 582.)  
‗Substantial evidence‘ in this context is ‗ ―evidence from which a jury composed 
of reasonable [persons] could . . . conclude[]‖ ‘ that the lesser offense, but not the 
greater, was committed.  (Flannel, supra, at p. 684, quoting People v. Carr (1972) 
8 Cal.3d 287, 294; accord, Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th 186, 201, fn. 8 [‗evidence 
that a reasonable jury could find persuasive‘].)‖  (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 
p. 162.) 
In the face of defendant‘s own testimony, no reasonable juror could 
conclude defendant acted ― ‗ ―rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, 
and from this passion rather than from judgment‖ ‘ [citations]‖ (Breverman, supra, 
19 Cal.4th at p. 163) when, according to defendant, he responded to Mark‘s attack 
with the baseball bat by grabbing the bat from him and using it to defend himself 
from Mark‘s continuing advances.  The thrust of defendant‘s testimony, in every 
particular, was that he approached Mark and Ruben with peaceful intentions, 
 
19 
thinking Mark was his brother Ronnie, intending to talk things out and resolve any 
lingering hostility that might have carried over from the previous evening‘s 
altercation.  Although defendant did testify he was not in a ―right state of mind‖ 
when Mark thereafter turned and attacked him after the chase, he immediately 
explained he was referring to his thought processes being caught up in the effort to 
defend himself from Mark.  Defendant took great pains in his testimony to justify 
each blow he landed on Mark with the bat as a direct, defensive response to 
successive advances by Mark during his attack on defendant.  Defendant testified, 
―Every time he came at me I hit him again with the bat.‖ 
In short, the thrust of defendant‘s testimony below was self-defense — both 
reasonable self-defense (a complete defense to the criminal charges), and 
unreasonable or imperfect self-defense (a partial defense that reduces murder to 
manslaughter).  There was insubstantial evidence at the close of the evidentiary 
phase to establish that defendant ―actually, subjectively, kill[ed] under the heat of 
passion.‖ (Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1252; Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 
pp. 326-327.)  The only testimonial evidence on the point, substantial or 
otherwise, came from defendant himself given his decision to take the stand and 
testify in his own defense.  His only claim was that he acted out of self-defense in 
using the bat to thwart Mark‘s continuing advances.  He provided a blow-by-blow 
recounting of events in which he characterized every swing he took with the bat as 
a defensive response to each of Mark‘s successive advances. 
A trial court has a duty to instruct on general principles of law that are 
―closely and openly connected to the facts before the court and that are necessary 
for the jury‘s understanding of the case.‖  (People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 
1027, 1047.)  But no principle of law required the trial judge below to disregard the 
evidence in order to find that the jury should consider whether defendant 
subjectively killed in the heat of passion, when no substantial evidence supported 
 
20 
that theory of manslaughter, and the evidence actually introduced on the point—the 
defendant‘s own testimony—was to the contrary. 
Nothing in this court‘s decision in Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142, 
warrants a different conclusion.  The facts of Breverman are distinguishable from 
those here before us.  In that case, an angry group of at least a dozen men ―taunted 
the defendant, then used a baseball bat and other implements to batter his 
automobile, which was parked in the driveway near his front door.  Defendant 
fired several shots through a window pane in the front door, then came outside and 
fired further shots toward the fleeing vandals.  One bullet from this second volley 
fatally wounded a member of the group.‖  (Id. at p. 148.)  We concluded on those 
facts that it was error not to give instructions on both heat of passion and 
unreasonable self-defense theories of manslaughter.  With regard to heat of 
passion, we explained, ―there was evidence that a sizeable group of young men, 
armed with dangerous weapons and harboring a specific hostile intent, trespassed 
upon domestic property occupied by [the] defendant and acted in a menacing 
manner.  This intimidating conduct included challenges to the defendant to fight, 
followed by use of the weapons to batter and smash defendant‘s vehicle parked in 
the driveway of his residence, within a short distance from the front door.  
Defendant and the other persons in the house all indicated that the number and 
behavior of the intruders, which defendant characterized as a ‗mob,‘ caused 
immediate fear and panic.  Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could 
infer that defendant was aroused to passion, and his reason was thus obscured, by 
a provocation sufficient to produce such effects in a person of average 
disposition.‖  (Id. at pp. 163-164, fn. omitted.) 
Nothing in Breverman suggests an instruction on heat of passion is required 
in every case in which the only evidence of unreasonable self-defense is the 
circumstance that a defendant is attacked and consequently fears for his life.  In 
 
21 
Breverman there was affirmative evidence that the defendant panicked in the face 
of an attack on his car and home by a mob of angry men and had come out 
shooting, and continued shooting, even after the group had turned and ran.  ―At 
one point in his police statement, defendant suggested that he acted in one 
continuous, chaotic response to the riotous events outside his door.‖  (Breverman, 
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 164, italics added, fn. omitted.)  Here, in contrast, 
defendant testified he acted deliberately in seeking to defend himself from each 
successive advance by the victim who, defendant claimed, turned and attacked 
him once defendant chased him down and cornered him.  With regard to evidence 
of the actor‘s state of mind bearing on the question of malice, the facts of 
Breverman and this case are inapposite. 
―[N]o fundamental unfairness or loss of verdict reliability results from the 
lack of instructions on a lesser included offense that is unsupported by any 
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could rely.‖  (People v. Holloway (2004) 
33 Cal.4th 96, 141.) 
Prejudice 
Assuming arguendo that it was error for the trial court to fail to instruct the 
jury on a heat of passion theory of voluntary manslaughter in addition to the 
instructions that were given on imperfect self-defense manslaughter, the People 
urge us to find such error harmless under the Watson test (Watson, supra, 46 
Cal.2d at p. 836), made applicable to instructional errors of this sort in California 
trials by Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pages 177-178.  We agree that even if it 
was error to fail to instruct on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter on this 
record, any such error was harmless as it is not reasonably probable defendant 
would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the jury been so instructed.  
(Id. at p. 178.) 
 
22 
As was explained in Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142, ―the sua sponte 
duty to instruct on a lesser included offense arises if there is substantial evidence 
the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense, but not the charged offense.  (Flannel, 
supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 684-685.)  This standard requires instructions on a lesser 
included offense whenever ‗ ―a jury composed of reasonable [persons] could . . . 
conclude[]” ’ that the lesser, but not the greater, offense was committed.  (Id. at 
p. 684, , italics added, quoting People v. Carr, supra, 8 Cal.3d 287, 294.)  In 
deciding whether evidence is ‗substantial‘ in this context, a court determines only 
its bare legal sufficiency, not its weight.  (See Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 684; 
see also Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d 307, 324.) 
―Appellate review under Watson, on the other hand, takes an entirely 
different view of the evidence.  Such posttrial review focuses not on what a 
reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence 
of the error under consideration.  In making that evaluation, an appellate court 
may consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing 
judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome 
is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which 
the defendant complains affected the result.  Accordingly, a determination that a 
duty arose to give instructions on a lesser included offense, and that the omission 
of such instructions in whole or in part was error, does not resolve the question 
whether the error was prejudicial.  Application of the Watson standard of appellate 
review may disclose that, though error occurred, it was harmless.‖  (Breverman, 
supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 177-178, fn. omitted.) 
In employing the Watson standard of review here, it is reasonable to 
assume the jury considered all of the defense evidence bearing on defendant‘s state 
of mind and the question whether he harbored malice when it entertained and 
rejected his claims of reasonable and unreasonable (or imperfect) self-defense.  
 
23 
Ruben testified that despite his and Mark‘s best efforts to avoid defendant, 
defendant spotted them, sped toward them as if trying to run them down, then 
abruptly stopped the car and jumped out, along with Avendano and Lopez, leaving 
the vehicle in the middle of the street with its doors open, as they began chasing the 
two.  Ruben testified he heard defendant say, ―Come on, let‘s go, let‘s get these 
motherfuckers.‖  Mark and Ruben quickly scaled a chain link fence.  Ruben 
testified he thought he saw Mark drop his bat at the beginning of the chase as he 
was going over the fence.  Defendant immediately followed Mark over the fence 
and chased him a considerable distance before cornering him in a field or large 
backyard. 
Ruben and Mark became separated during the chase.  When Ruben heard 
defendant and the others leaving the area he looked for Mark and found him face 
down on the ground, bleeding badly, with his breathing labored.  His front upper 
teeth were broken off, as if he had been hit hard in the mouth, and his ―brains [were] 
hanging out of his head.‖  An autopsy revealed that Mark sustained at least four 
blows to the head and three more to other areas of his body.  In one area of his head, 
the force of a blow was so strong it shattered his skull into multiple small fragments.  
Moments after fleeing the crime scene, defendant had enough sense and composure 
to dispose of the bloodied murder weapon in a nearby storm drain. 
Once the jury rejected defendant‘s claims of reasonable and imperfect self-
defense, there was little if any independent evidence remaining to support his 
further claim that he killed in the heat of passion, and no direct testimonial 
evidence from defendant himself to support an inference that he subjectively 
harbored such strong passion, or acted rashly or impulsively while under its 
influence for reasons unrelated to his perceived need for self-defense.  To the 
contrary, the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
located the victim and Ruben the morning after the fistfight, enlisted the assistance 
 
24 
of Avendano and Lopez, chased the victim over a chain link fence and through a 
field, caught him and bludgeoned him to death with a baseball bat, after which 
defendant disposed of the bloodied murder weapon in a nearby storm drain.  
Defendant‘s claim — that the victim kicked his car before trying to run for safety, 
and that he only chased the victim to ―see where he was going‖ so he could report 
the alleged car-kicking incident to the police4 — was ultimately rejected by the 
jury when it considered such evidence and found that he had killed with malice. 
Moreover, the jury having rejected the factual basis for the claims of 
reasonable and unreasonable self-defense, it is not reasonably probable the jury 
would have found the requisite objective component of a heat of passion defense 
(legally sufficient provocation) even had it been instructed on that theory of 
voluntary manslaughter. 
Upon examining the entire cause, including the evidence (Cal. Const., 
art. VI, § 13), we conclude it is not ―reasonably probable‖ defendant would have 
obtained a more favorable outcome at trial had a heat of passion instruction been 
given.  (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)5 
                                              
4  
Once defendant elected to take the stand, the jury learned he had been 
convicted of assault with a firearm in 2004 and was on felony probation for that 
offense at the time he committed this homicide. 
5  
Justice Kennard disagrees with the prejudice test mandated by our state 
constitution and found applicable to this category of instructional error by a 
majority of this court in Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 142, 178.  (Dis. opn. 
of Kennard, J., post, at pp. 7-9.)  As in Breverman, defendant has not raised the 
claim advanced by Justice Kennard — that the lesser-included offense instructions 
given below were defective under federal law because they incompletely defined 
the malice element of murder, requiring application of the prejudice test for 
federal constitutional errors set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 
18, 24.  (Breverman, at p. 170, fn. 19.)  Accordingly, the claim must properly 
await a case in which it has been clearly raised and fully briefed.  (Ibid.) 
 
25 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the matter remanded 
to that court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C.J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
I concur in the judgment on the ground that any error in refusing to instruct 
on heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter was, on the particular facts of this case, 
harmless under the standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.  As 
the majority opinion explains, the jurors, disbelieving defendant‘s testimony to the 
extent of rejecting his claims of reasonable and unreasonable self-defense, were 
not reasonably likely to accept that same testimony as showing defendant killed 
Mark Urrutia in a heat of passion provoked by Urrutia‘s attack on him.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at pp. 21-24.) 
I write separately because I believe the question whether the record 
contains substantial evidence justifying the requested instruction is closer than the 
majority allows.  Defendant‘s testimony that Urrutia attacked him with a baseball 
bat, hitting him several times, and that defendant ―wasn‘t, like, in the right state of 
mind‖ as he wrested the bat from Urrutia and struck the fatal blows, arguably 
would have permitted a rational juror to find defendant killed ―upon sudden 
quarrel or heat of passion.‖  (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a).)  This is so even though, 
as the majority stresses, the thrust of defendant‘s testimony was to show he acted 
in self-defense, rationally responding to the victim‘s attack.  As we explained in 
People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, instructions on voluntary manslaughter 
should be given when supported by substantial evidence, notwithstanding the 
defendant‘s ―protestations of innocence.‖  (Id. at p. 196.)  ―The trial court must 
2 
instruct on lesser included offenses when there is substantial evidence to support 
the instruction, regardless of the theories of the case proffered by the parties.‖  (Id. 
at p. 203.)  Nor did the trial court‘s instruction on the unreasonable self-defense 
theory of voluntary manslaughter excuse it from instructing on heat of passion as 
well if the evidence supported both theories.  (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 
Cal.4th 142, 162.) 
Although not as strong as in People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 
pages 163-164, or People v. Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at page 202, there was in 
this case evidence of heat of passion.  Defendant testified to a sudden attack by the 
victim that put him in an excited state — not ―in [his] right state of mind‖ — 
leading to a struggle that ended in the victim‘s death.  As the failure to give the 
requested instruction was clearly harmless, unlike the majority I would not decide 
the difficult question of whether this testimony constitutes substantial evidence 
defendant killed in a heat of passion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J.  
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
In a murder case, when there is substantial evidence that the killing 
occurred ―upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion‖ (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)), 
or that the killing resulted from the defendant‘s unreasonable belief that self-
defense was necessary (People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 664; People 
v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 680-683), the trial court must instruct the jury on 
voluntary manslaughter, which is a lesser offense of murder.  Here, the trial court 
instructed the jury on the latter theory, but it refused the defense request to instruct 
on the former theory.  In upholding that ruling, the majority describes as 
―insubstantial‖ (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1) the evidence tending to show that the 
killing occurred in the heat of passion.  I disagree. 
I 
Defendant and his girlfriend Kandie Sanchez lived in the home of Kandie‘s 
mother in Rowland Heights, an unincorporated community in Los Angeles 
County.  Also living there was Kandie‘s 20-year-old daughter, Jessica Sanchez. 
On the night of February 11, 2006, Kandie‘s mother and daughter quarreled 
with defendant; they wanted him to move out.  After saying that her boyfriend 
could ―kick [defendant‘s] ass,‖ Jessica called her boyfriend, Ronnie Urrutia, and 
asked him to come over. 
At the time, Ronnie Urrutia was at a party in Fontana with his brother Mark 
(the victim) and three friends (Carlos Munoz, Ruben Ibarra, and a man named 
2 
Rudy, whose last name does not appear in the record).  All five had been drinking.  
After Jessica‘s call, they went to the Sanchez home, where they encountered 
defendant and codefendants Daniel Avendano and Jorge Lopez.  A fistfight ensued 
between defendant and Ronnie.  The two struggled on the ground.  When 
defendant got on top of Ronnie, the latter‘s friends Munoz and Ibarra kicked 
defendant, and Mark hit defendant twice in the back with a baseball bat while 
Ronnie held defendant down.  Ibarra, who was intoxicated, threw a bottle at 
defendant.  After the fight ended, defendant, who was still angry, chased Ronnie 
with a kitchen knife as Ronnie and Jessica were leaving; to protect Ronnie, Munoz 
hit defendant in the arm with a broken ski pole. 
The next day, Carlos Munoz discovered that he had lost his glasses during 
the fight.  He then walked over to the Sanchez house to look for them.  With him 
were his brother Jose and a friend, Santos Buenrostros.  They saw defendant, 
Avendano, and Lopez, and heard them talk:  One asked if the three men (Carlos, 
Jose, and Buenrostros) were ―them‖ (presumably referring to Mark and his brother 
Ronnie); another replied, ―that‘s not them,‖ to which the first responded, ―Oh, 
good, because if it was I was about to do something.‖  Defendant, Avendano, and 
Lopez got into a white car and drove off.  Carlos called Mark, who was with his 
friend Ruben Ibarra, and warned him that defendant and his friends were looking 
for Mark.  Mark suggested meeting a couple of blocks away.   
As Mark and Ibarra were on their way, Ibarra saw a white car driving fast 
towards them.  The car stopped abruptly and out came defendant, Avendano, and 
Lopez.  Ibarra heard defendant say, ―Come on, . . . let‘s get these motherfuckers.‖  
Ibarra and Mark, who was carrying a baseball bat, climbed a fence and split up.  
While defendant and Avendano chased Mark, Lopez pursued Ibarra, who ran to a 
shed.  When the coast was clear, Ibarra found Mark lying 100 yards from the 
fence, with serious head injuries.   
3 
About that time, Carlos, Jose, and Buenrostros came upon defendant‘s 
white car, which was parked with all its doors open.  Moments later, defendant, 
Avendano, and Lopez were seen jumping over a fence.  They looked nervous.  
Defendant was carrying two baseball bats, which he put in the trunk of the car.  
Defendant and his two companions then drove off.  Later that morning, Christine 
Lopez was in front of her home, not far from the scene of the killing, when she 
saw a white car carrying three men she did not know; the men were laughing 
loudly.  She saw them throw something out of the car.  One of the men said they 
had ―lit him up‖ or ―lighted up.‖  At trial, she identified two of the men as 
defendant and Avendano.  Police recovered Mark‘s baseball bat in a storm drain 
near the area where Christine Lopez had seen the men in the white car.  
Bloodstains on the handle of the bat matched defendant‘s DNA profile, while 
bloodstains on the barrel matched Mark‘s DNA profile. 
Mark died of his injuries.  He sustained at least four blows to the head and 
three to the rest of his body.  There were wounds on his hands that could have 
been defensive wounds, but also might have resulted from climbing the fence.   
According to Kandie Sanchez, after the killing defendant returned to the 
Sanchez home, looking ―all upset‖; he quickly departed, leaving his belongings 
behind.  She did not see him again until she testified at defendant‘s trial.  
Defendant was arrested three weeks after he killed Mark.   
Defendant testified that on the day of the killing he was driving to a store 
when he saw a man whom he believed to be Ronnie Urrutia (the boyfriend of his 
girlfriend‘s daughter) walking down the street with another man.  Defendant 
decided to talk to Ronnie about the previous night‘s fight, and he asked Avendano 
and Lopez to go with him for protection.  As they were driving down the street, 
defendant saw Mark (Ronnie‘s brother) with Ibarra.  When defendant stopped to 
talk to them, Mark kicked defendant‘s car, after which Mark and Ibarra fled over a 
4 
fence.  Upset that Mark had kicked his car, defendant chased Mark, catching up to 
him in a field.  When defendant was about four feet away, Mark turned and said, 
―yeah, now I got you.‖  Mark then attacked defendant with a baseball bat, hitting 
defendant‘s arms and hands, which defendant used to protect his face.  After Mark 
swung the bat four or five times, defendant managed to take it away.  Mark 
continued to come towards defendant, who then hit Mark‘s arm with the baseball 
bat.  Mark ―still trie[d] to attack‖ defendant, who, fearing that Mark would grab 
the bat back and injure him, kept hitting Mark until he fell.  At this point defendant 
got scared and ran off, carrying the baseball bat with him.  Later, he threw the bat 
in the gutter.  
II 
A defendant who unlawfully kills ―upon a sudden quarrel or heat of 
passion‖ (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)) lacks malice, and is therefore guilty not of 
murder but of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.  ―Heat of passion 
arises when ‗at the time of the killing, the reason of the accused was obscured or 
disturbed by passion to such an extent as would cause the ordinarily reasonable 
person of average disposition to act rashly and without deliberation and reflection, 
and from such passion rather than from judgment.‘ ‖  (People v. Barton (1995) 12 
Cal.4th 186, 201 (Barton).) 
―Heat of passion‖ will reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter only if 
there is adequate provocation.  The victim‘s conduct ―must be sufficiently 
provocative that it would cause an ordinary person of average disposition to act 
rashly or without due deliberation and reflection.  [Citations.]‖  (People v. Lee 
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 59.)   
A trial court must instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter arising from 
a sudden quarrel or heat of passion when there is evidence from which a jury of 
reasonable persons could conclude that the lesser offense of voluntary 
5 
manslaughter, but not the greater offense of murder, was committed.  (People 
v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 (Breverman).)  Any doubts on the 
sufficiency of the evidence to warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter 
should be resolved in the defendant‘s favor.  (People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 
935, 944; People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 685.). 
Here, defendant contends that the following three acts by victim Mark 
Urrutia constituted provocation that ―would cause an ordinary person of average 
disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection‖ (People v. Lee, 
supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 59):  (1)  The night before the killing, Mark hit defendant 
with a baseball bat; (2) shortly before the killing, Mark (according to defendant) 
angered defendant by kicking his car; (3) immediately before the killing, Mark 
(according to defendant) hit defendant with a baseball bat.   
The majority holds that neither the first nor the second of these three acts 
by the victim furnished the requisite provocation.  The majority points out that 
there was a long ―cooling off‖ period after the first act (hitting defendant with the 
baseball bat the night before the killing), and that the second act (kicking 
defendant‘s car on the day of the killing) was not sufficiently provocative to cause 
an ordinary person to act without due deliberation or reflection.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at pp. 15-16.)  I agree.   
The majority does not, however, decide whether the third act (hitting 
defendant with the baseball bat just before the killing) constituted adequate 
provocation.  It concludes that even if it was, there was no substantial evidence 
that defendant acted ―rashly or without due deliberation and reflection‖ (People 
v. Lee, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 59) when he killed Mark, and therefore the trial 
court was not required to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter arising from 
a ―sudden quarrel or heat of passion.‖  (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a).)  I disagree. 
6 
True, there was no direct evidence that defendant was acting in the heat of 
passion when he hit Mark with the baseball bat:  Defendant told the jury that he 
had killed Mark in self-defense, apparently in an attempt to gain a verdict of not 
guilty.  But as explained below, there was circumstantial evidence that defendant 
acted in the heat of passion.  The jury should not have to choose between believing 
defendant‘s self-serving testimony that he acted in self-defense — and therefore 
should not be found guilty — and accepting the prosecution‘s argument that the 
killing was murder.  ― ‗Our courts are not gambling halls but forums for the 
discovery of truth.‘  [Citation.]  Truth may lie neither with the defendant‘s 
protestations of innocence nor with the prosecution‘s assertion that the defendant 
is guilty of the offense charged, but at a point between these two extremes:  the 
evidence may show that the defendant is guilty of some intermediate offense 
included within, but lesser than, the offense charged.  A trial court‘s failure to 
inform the jury of its option to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense 
would impair the jury‘s truth-ascertainment function.‖  (Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th 
at p. 196.) 
Here, there was substantial circumstantial evidence from which the jury 
could have reasonably concluded that defendant killed Mark in a sudden quarrel or 
in the heat of passion.  There was evidence that when Mark hit defendant with a 
baseball bat the night before the killing, defendant became so angry that he chased 
Mark‘s brother Ronnie — who had been in a fight with defendant when Mark hit 
defendant with the bat — with a kitchen knife.  There was also evidence that 
defendant again became upset when Mark, according to defendant, kicked 
defendant‘s car shortly before the killing.  From this evidence the jury could have 
reasonably inferred that just before the killing defendant again became enraged 
when, according to defendant, Mark — as he had done the night before — hit 
defendant with a baseball bat.  Therefore, the trial court erred when it refused to 
7 
instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter arising from a sudden quarrel or heat 
of passion.   
I turn now to the complex question of whether this instructional error was 
prejudicial. 
III 
In Breverman, this court held that ―the trial court erred . . . when it failed to 
instruct . . . on heat of passion as a theory of voluntary manslaughter.‖  
(Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 164.)  To assess prejudice, the Breverman 
majority fashioned this general rule:  When a trial court fails to instruct the jury on 
―all lesser included offenses and theories thereof which are supported by the 
evidence‖ (id. at p. 178), the error is a violation of state law, not the federal 
Constitution (id. at p. 165), and is prejudicial only if ―it is reasonably probable that 
a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the 
absence of the error‖ (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836). 
I disagreed with that prejudice test.  My dissenting opinion in Breverman 
explained:  ―Given the manner in which California has structured the relationship 
between murder and voluntary manslaughter, the complete definition of malice is 
the intent to kill or the intent to do a dangerous act with conscious disregard of its 
danger plus the absence of both heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense.  
Where . . . there is sufficient evidence of heat of passion to support a voluntary 
manslaughter verdict, murder instructions that fail to inform the jury it may not 
find the defendant guilty of murder if heat of passion is present are incomplete 
instructions on the element of malice.‖  (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 189-
190 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)  Such a failure to instruct, I concluded, is ―federal 
constitutional error‖ (id. at p. 194 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.)), because it gives the 
jury an incomplete definition of malice, which is an element of the charged crime 
of murder. 
8 
The Breverman majority saw no need to respond to my dissent because, 
according to the majority, the theory underlying my dissenting opinion had not 
been raised by the defendant either in the Court of Appeal or in this court.  
(Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 170, fn. 19.)  I was of the view that the 
defendant had preserved the issue.  (Id. at pp. 191-194 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) 
This court has yet to resolve the issue I raised in my dissenting opinion in 
Breverman.  (See People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 113 [explaining that 
Breverman did not decide the question].)   
Here, defendant‘s argument on prejudice is premised on the applicability of 
the Watson harmless-error standard, which applies to state law violations.  
Applying that test, the majority concludes that ―even if it was error to fail to 
instruct on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter on this record, any such error 
was harmless as it is not reasonably probable defendant would have obtained a 
more favorable outcome had the jury been so instructed.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 21.)  In my view, however, the trial court‘s failure to instruct on the heat of 
passion theory of voluntary manslaughter was federal constitutional error ―because 
the trial court . . . inadequately instructed the jury on the elements of murder by 
failing to explain that the element of malice is not present when the defendant kills 
in the heat of passion.‖  (People v. Lasko, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 113.)1   
When an instruction violates the federal Constitution, prejudice is measured 
by whether the prosecution can show beyond a reasonable doubt that  
                                              
1  
I reach this conclusion notwithstanding defendant‘s failure to argue in this 
court that the trial court‘s instructional error violated the federal Constitution.  
(See maj. opn., ante, at p. 24, fn. 5 [noting that defendant has not raised the issue]; 
People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162, fn. 8 [―An appellate court is 
generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for 
review by a party. . . .  Whether or not it should do so is entrusted to its 
discretion.‖].) 
9 
the error was harmless.  (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)  Under 
that test, a reviewing court ―asks whether the record contains evidence that could 
rationally lead to a contrary finding‖ by the jury.  (Neder v. United States (1999) 
527 U.S. 1, 19.)  Here, as I have explained, the record contains substantial 
evidence that defendant was acting in the heat of passion when he killed Mark 
Urrutia.  Based on that evidence, the jury could have rationally concluded that 
defendant lacked malice and was guilty not of murder but of the lesser offense of 
voluntary manslaughter.  
I would affirm the Court of Appeal‘s judgment, which had reversed 
defendant‘s murder conviction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Moye 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 9/27/07 – 2d Dist., Div. 8 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S157980 
Date Filed: August 24, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Charles E. Horan 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Patricia A. Scott, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. 
Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Linda C. Johnson, Kristofer Jorstad and Elaine F. Tumonis, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Patricia A. Scott 
Post Office Box 12876 
Prescott, AZ  86304 
(928) 445-8380 
 
Elaine F. Tumonis 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2278