Title: Commonwealth v. Camblin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11774
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 8, 2017

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SJC-11774 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KIRK P. CAMBLIN. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     September 7, 2017. - December 8, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, 
JJ. 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence.  Evidence, 
Breathalyzer test, Scientific test. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Ayer Division of the 
District Court Department on April 28, 2008. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 471 Mass. 639 (2015), a 
motion to exclude evidence as scientifically unreliable was 
heard by Mark A. Sullivan, J. 
 
 
 
Andrew W. Piltser Cowan for the defendant. 
 
Casey E. Silvia, Assistant District Attorney (Cyrus Y. 
Chung & Laura S. Miller, Assistant District Attorneys, also 
present) for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In Commonwealth v. Camblin, 471 Mass. 639, 
640, 651 (2015) (Camblin I), we remanded this case to the 
District Court to conduct a hearing on the scientific 
reliability of a particular model of breathalyzer, the Alcotest 
2 
 
 
7110 MK III-C (Alcotest), while retaining jurisdiction of the 
case.  After conducting a Daubert-Lanigan hearing, a District 
Court judge found that the Alcotest was capable of producing 
scientifically reliable breath test results, and denied the 
defendant's motion to exclude this evidence at his trial for 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.  
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) 
(Daubert); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15 (1994).  The 
judge returned his findings to this court, and both sides filed 
supplemental briefing, prior to renewed oral argument before us.  
The defendant now contends that the judge abused his discretion 
in finding that the Alcotest satisfies the Daubert-Lanigan 
standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence.  We 
conclude that there was no abuse of discretion and affirm the 
denial of the defendant's motion to exclude the Alcotest 
results. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Prior proceedings.  In 2008, a 
District Court complaint issued charging the defendant with 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor 
(OUI), in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).  Before 
trial, the defendant moved to exclude admission of breath test 
evidence generated by the Alcotest; he argued that errors in the 
device's computer source code, and other deficiencies, rendered 
3 
 
 
its results unreliable.1  A District Court judge denied the 
defendant's motion without conducting a Daubert-Lanigan hearing.  
The judge determined that because the Alcotest utilizes infrared 
spectroscopy technology, and the Legislature had prescribed a 
statutory and regulatory framework for the admissibility of 
"infrared breath-testing devices," see G. L. c. 90, 
§§ 24 (1) (e), 24K; 501 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 2.00 (2006), the 
results of an infrared breathalyzer are admissible, pursuant to 
the statute, without the need for a hearing to determine the 
reliability of these tests. 
 
The defendant then filed a petition pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, in the county court, challenging the denial of his 
motion to exclude the Alcotest test results.  A single justice 
denied the defendant's request for interlocutory relief, and the 
case proceeded to a jury trial.  At trial, the defendant did not 
introduce evidence challenging the reliability of the Alcotest 
breathalyzer results.  The jury found the defendant guilty of 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level of or 
exceeding 0.08 per cent.  See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).  
The defendant appealed from his convictions, and we allowed his 
                     
 
1 The Chief Justice of the District Court specially assigned 
the case, and sixty-one other cases in which OUI defendants 
challenged the reliability of the Alcotest's source code, to a 
particular judge of that court. 
4 
 
 
application for direct appellate review.  See Camblin I, 471 
Mass. at 640-644. 
 
In Camblin I, supra, the defendant primarily challenged the 
reliability of the Alcotest on the ground of asserted errors in 
the source code for its computer programs.  In doing so, the 
defendant relied upon, among other things, affidavits from two 
expert witnesses and a report that he had submitted in support 
of his motion to exclude.  One of the experts averred that he 
had scanned the Alcotest's source code, utilizing an "industry 
standard source code analysis tool," and had found more than 
7,000 errors and 3,000 warning signals.  Id. at 651.  A 
different expert averred that the Alcotest is incapable of 
measuring accurately the amount of ethanol in a breath sample 
because the device does not exclude other "interfering 
substances" that might be present in the sample.2  Id. at 652-
                     
 
2 According to the National Safety Council, an "interfering 
substance" is a "non-ethanol substance" able "to produce a 
significant response on any breath alcohol testing instrument."  
To qualify as an interfering substance, the substance must: 
 
"1.  Be a volatile organic compound capable of appearing in 
the breath of a living, conscious human being. 
 
"2.  Be present in sufficiently high concentration to be 
measured by the instrument after a 15 to 20 minute pretest 
observation period. 
 
"3.  Be able to produce a response on the instrument that 
is indistinguishable from ethanol." 
 
National Safety Council, Committee on Alcohol and Other Drugs, 
5 
 
 
653.  In addition, the report that the defendant submitted 
suggested that the calibration test used with the Alcotest does 
not ensure accurate results.  Id. at 654.  We remanded the 
matter to the District Court for a hearing to consider three 
issues:  (1) the reliability of the Alcotest source code; 
(2) whether the Alcotest is capable of testing exclusively for 
ethanol; and (3) whether any source code errors affect the 
ability of the Alcotest to calculate a subject's blood alcohol 
content (BAC).  Id. at 651-655. 
 
b.  Proceedings on remand.  On remand, the judge conducted 
a Daubert-Lanigan hearing, at which experts for the defendant 
and the Commonwealth testified about the reliability of the 
Alcotest.  After the hearing, the judge issued a decision 
containing his comprehensive findings of fact, and remitted them 
to this court.  With respect to the defendant's challenge to 
reliability of the source code, the judge concluded that 
"despite the minor flaws in the source code, the Alcotest 
provides a reliable measure of BAC."  These minor source code 
flaws, he found, "pose a very remote chance of returning a 
falsely high BAC result, on the magnitude of a million to 
one. . . .  The error rate here is well within an acceptable 
range necessary to make the Alcotest BAC results scientifically 
                                                                  
Report on the Specificity of Breath Alcohol Analyzers (Feb. 22, 
2010). 
6 
 
 
reliable." 
 
In this appeal, the defendant has chosen not to pursue his 
arguments concerning the source code as the primary basis for 
the asserted lack of reliability in the Alcotest.  Rather, the 
current focus of the defendant's challenge to the reliability of 
the Alcotest is that it cannot distinguish ethanol from other 
"interfering" substances that might be present in a breath 
sample.  The following facts were adduced at the Daubert-Lanigan 
hearing. 
 
The Alcotest is an evidential breath-testing device 
manufactured by Draeger Safety Diagnostics, Inc. (Draeger).  
Draeger describes the Alcotest as a "dual sensoric instrument" 
because it utilizes both infrared spectroscopy and 
electrochemical fuel cell sampling to analyze alcohol content in 
a breath sample.  The subject blows air into the device through 
a tube connected to a chamber.  An infrared light source at one 
end of the chamber generates energy in the 9.5 micron range,3 and 
a detector on the opposite end of the chamber receives the 
energy from the infrared source.  Because infrared energy is 
absorbed by ethanol molecules, any such molecules that are 
present in a breath sample effectively "soak up" the infrared 
energy, and that portion of it does not reach the detector.  The 
Alcotest is designed to measure a subject's breath alcohol 
                     
 
3 A micron is one millionth of a meter. 
7 
 
 
content based on the amount of infrared energy that reaches the 
detector as compared to the amount of energy detected when the 
chamber has been cleared and is filled simply with ambient air.  
In other words, the reduction in infrared energy (which has been 
absorbed by the ethanol molecules) from one end of the chamber 
to the other is equivalent to the concentration of alcohol 
present in the chamber. 
 
In a dual-sensor Alcotest device, at the same time that the 
infrared energy is passing through the main chamber, a small 
portion of the breath sample enters a fuel cell sensor for a 
second measurement of breath alcohol.  The fuel cell is an 
electrochemical device that essentially operates like a battery.  
It generates an electrical current from energy produced by a 
chemical reaction between any ethanol and the oxygen contained 
within the breath sample.  The fuel cell is designed to measure 
the "footprint" of the chemical reaction and to compare that 
footprint to a baseline footprint created by a known ethanol 
sample.  To produce a valid BAC test result, the infrared energy 
reading and the fuel cell reading must be in agreement with one 
another.  The Alcotest reports only the infrared reading to the 
operator; the fuel cell reading is intended to operate as a 
double check on the accuracy of the infrared measurement. 
 
Both sides presented expert witness testimony on the 
question whether the Alcotest is capable of testing exclusively 
8 
 
 
for ethanol, while excluding interfering substances.  The 
defendant introduced testimony by Dr. Donald J. Barry, Ph.D., an 
astronomer with a substantial background in infrared 
spectrometry technology, as well as a background in chemistry.  
Barry testified that, where interfering substances are present, 
the Alcotest is incapable of testing exclusively for ethanol, 
and therefore its results can be tainted by the presence of 
interfering substances in the sample.  Barry explained that the 
Alcotest's infrared spectroscope identifies a carbon-oxygen 
molecule that is emitted at a 9.5 micron wavelength.  Several 
organic compounds other than ethanol, including acetone4 and 
methanol, also emit energy within the 9.5 micron range of the 
electromagnetic spectrum, and would similarly be detected by the 
Alcotest's spectroscope.  Barry concluded that, as a result, the 
Alcotest could not reliably isolate and identify ethanol in a 
subject's breath to the exclusion of other interfering 
substances sharing a similar molecular structure. 
Barry was not familiar with the particular fuel cell 
technology used in the Alcotest.  He opined generally, however, 
that, for this type of application, fuel cells are a suspect 
measuring technology for several reasons, including diminishing 
performance over time.  He testified that he was aware of no 
                     
 
4 Acetone is one of the most significant interfering 
substances, as it is naturally produced in the body, and can be 
found in people who are diabetic or who are dieting. 
9 
 
 
scientific support for Draeger's assertion that the Alcotest 
fuel cell sensor is independently capable of detecting alcohol 
as opposed to other compounds. 
 
The Commonwealth introduced expert testimony by Hansueli 
Ryser, a Draeger vice-president with a thirty-four year 
background in engineering evidential breath test devices.  Ryser 
had been involved in the engineering and development of the 
Alcotest.  He testified that there were two primary means by 
which the device distinguished between ethanol and other 
substances that absorb infrared energy within a narrow range of 
the 9.5 micron wavelength.  First, most interfering substances 
actually absorb slightly different wavelengths of infrared 
energy, or at slightly different intensities.  The Alcotest's 
infrared measurement system identifies small differences in the 
absorption of energy and thereby is able to distinguish most 
nonethanol substances.  In addition, while most breathalyzers 
use a frequency of 3.4 microns, the Alcotest was designed 
specifically to operate at a frequency of 9.5 microns in order 
to account for the "strong overlap of the [infrared] spectra" 
between acetone and ethanol at 3.45 microns.  According to Ryser, 
at 9.5 microns one "would not see any interference that the 
acetone would add to the ethanol reading."  The judge noted, 
                     
 
5 A frequency of 3.4 microns had been common in earlier 
breathalyzer machines. 
10 
 
 
"Apparently, it is almost impossible to distinguish ethanol and 
acetone at 3.4 microns, which is why Draeger abandoned its 
reliance on that range in earlier machines." 
 
Ryser agreed that some substances, like methanol, do absorb 
energy at a similar rate and wavelength to ethanol.  
Nonetheless, Ryser stated that differences in energy absorption 
rates would allow the Alcotest to distinguish between the two 
substances, due to the substances' differences in intensity. 
 
Second, Ryser testified that the fuel cell sensor in an 
Alcotest machine functions as a fail-safe to distinguish between 
ethanol and other interfering substances.  He noted that the 
fuel cell measures the flow of electrical current produced by 
the chemical reaction and registers a "kinetic reactivity" 
"footprint" for the breath sample.  The Alcotest compares this 
footprint to the footprint created by the flow of electrical 
current generated by the known ethanol sample contained in a 
calibrated simulator solution.  The Alcotest identifies 
interfering substances based on whether there are disparities 
between the two footprints.  Finally, the Alcotest compares the 
infrared spectrometry and electrochemical fuel cell test 
results.  If the two components produce substantially different 
measurements of a subject's BAC level, the Alcotest is designed 
to flag the differences as caused by an interfering substance, 
and thereafter to abort the test. 
11 
 
 
 
After the hearing,6 the judge concluded that the Alcotest 
"reliably distinguishes ethanol from other substances found in 
human breath, and therefore returns reliable BAC results based 
solely on ethanol."  He determined that there was no evidence 
"of any substance that (1) could be present in human breath; (2) 
could be absorbed at the 9.5 micron range at the same intensity 
level as ethanol; and (3) . . . would also produce the same 
kinetic reactivity footprint in the fuel cell as ethanol." 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  The admission of 
scientific testimony is governed by what has come to be known as 
the Daubert-Lanigan standard.  Commonwealth v. Senior, 433 Mass. 
453, 458 (2001), citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-595, and 
Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 25-26.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 702 & 
comments (2017).  The judge, acting as gatekeeper, is 
responsible for "mak[ing] a preliminary assessment whether the 
theory or methodology underlying the proposed testimony is 
sufficiently reliable to reach the trier of fact."  Commonwealth 
v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 761 (2010).  We review a judge's 
decision to admit expert testimony as reliable under the abuse 
of discretion standard.  Id. at 762, citing Canavan's Case, 432 
                     
 
6 The judge generally credited Dr. Donald J. Barry's expert 
testimony.  He found that Dr. Barry's relative lack of knowledge 
about fuel cell technology, and unfamiliarity with the use of 
fuel cells to detect substances such as ethanol, went to the 
weight of his opinion, rather than to admissibility.  The judge 
found that Hansueli Ryser's "experience with and knowledge 
of . . . dual sensor technology is ample and compelling." 
12 
 
 
Mass. 304, 312 (2000). 
 
In Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 25-26, we adopted, in part, the 
United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Daubert, governing 
the admissibility of expert testimony based on a scientific 
theory.  We did not, however, entirely abandon our prior test to 
determine the admissibility of scientific evidence, which 
focused on "whether the community of scientists involved 
generally accepts the theory or process."  Lanigan, supra at 24, 
quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  
Rather, we held that "general acceptance in the relevant 
scientific community will continue to be the significant, and 
often the only, issue," but "that a proponent of scientific 
opinion evidence may demonstrate the reliability or validity of 
the underlying scientific theory or process by some other 
means."  See Lanigan, supra at 26. 
 
Under the Daubert-Lanigan standard, a judge considering a 
motion to introduce expert testimony initially considers a 
nonexclusive list of five factors.  See Commonwealth v. Powell, 
450 Mass. 229, 238 (2007).  Among these factors are "whether the 
scientific theory or process (1) has been generally accepted in 
the relevant scientific community; (2) has been, or can be, 
subjected to testing; (3) has been subjected to peer review and 
publication; (4) has an unacceptably high known or potential 
rate of error; and (5) is governed by recognized standards."  
13 
 
 
Id.  A judge has "broad discretion" to weigh these factors and 
to apply varying methods to assess the reliability of the 
proffered testimony, depending upon the circumstances of a 
particular case; in some instances, certain factors may be 
inapplicable.  See Palandjian v. Foster, 446 Mass. 100, 111 
(2006).  "Differing types of methodology may require judges to 
apply differing evaluative criteria to determine whether 
scientific methodology is reliable."  Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. 
at 314 n.5.  Because the admissibility of expert testimony is a 
preliminary question of fact, the proponent's burden of proof to 
demonstrate the reliability of the expert opinion is by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 
432 Mass. 124, 126-127 (2000), citing Care & Protection of 
Laura, 414 Mass. 788, 792 (1993).  See also Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 104(a) (2017) (in deciding preliminary questions of fact court 
is not bound by rules of evidence with exception of privilege). 
 
b.  Reliability of the Alcotest.  Turning to the judge's 
decision in this case, we consider whether he abused his 
discretion in finding that the Alcotest breathalyzer had been 
subject to sufficient independent testing to establish its 
reliability.  In reaching his decision that the reliability of 
the Alcotest had been sufficiently established, the judge relied 
upon testimony by Ryser and testing conducted by two agencies:  
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and 
14 
 
 
the Organisation Internationale de Métrologie Légale (OIML), an 
agency that regulates the use of alcohol breath-testing devices 
in Europe.  The judge also noted that the Alcotest had been 
approved by the Australian International Laboratory of 
Spectroscopy and the Forensic Science Academy in Ottawa, Canada. 
The judge's reliance on NHTSA testing did not constitute an 
abuse of discretion.  "NHTSA certification is widely accepted by 
courts as evidence of a device's reliability."  United States v. 
Ahlstrom, 530 Fed. Appx. 232, 239 (4th Cir. 2013), citing 
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 & n.9 (1984), and 
United States v. Brannon, 146 F.3d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir. 1998).  
See People v. Vangelder, 58 Cal. 4th 1, 33-34 (2013), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2839 (2014) (noting that devices which meet 
NHTSA evidential breath-testing specifications produce 
sufficiently reliable results within California's regulatory 
scheme). 
Indeed, under G. L. c. 90, § 24K, the Secretary of Public 
Safety is required to promulgate regulations regarding 
"satisfactory methods, techniques and criteria" for the use of 
infrared breath-testing devices.  In accordance with this 
statutory mandate, the Executive Office of Public Safety 
promulgated 501 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 2.00; this regulation 
requires that approved breathalyzers appear on the NHTSA's 
published conforming products list for evidential breath-testing 
15 
 
 
equipment.  See 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.38 (2006).7  The 
Alcotest appears on the NHTSA's published list as having met 
specific performance criteria.  See 58 Fed. Reg. 48,705, 48,708 
(1993) (NHTSA certification of Alcotest breathalyzer as 
conforming product).  As part of its certification process, 
NHTSA tested whether, and to what extent, the Alcotest's 
infrared and fuel cell sensors were able to detect interfering 
substances.  Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion in the 
judge's decision to rely on the agency statutorily required to 
certify breathalyzers in the Commonwealth. 
In reaching his determination that "the Alcotest [infrared] 
and [electrochemical] features were tested independently for 
their ability to detect non-ethanol substances and both 
components met the NHTSA specifications," the judge relied on 
testimony by Ryser, which he credited explicitly, concerning the 
two-test comparison standard that the Alcotest employs.  The 
judge noted also that each of the Alcotest's two sensors have 
been found compliant with the NHTSA specifications when operated 
individually.  The judge noted that this independent, dual 
testing capability further "assures the device's ethanol 
specificity testing capability."  If the results from either of 
the tests differ by more than a specified threshold, the test is 
rejected and testing ceases.  At the time that the evidentiary 
                     
  
7 As it then existed. 
16 
 
 
hearing was held on remand, no other breathalyzer used a dual-
sensor system. 
Likewise, the judge's reliance on the OIML test 
specifications and certifications was within his discretion.  
The OIML's certification requirements generally are viewed as 
being much more stringent than those applicable in the United 
States.  Ryser explained that, because of the wavelength at 
which it operates, and the precision of its sensor, the Alcotest 
was even able to meet the certification requirements of the OIML 
"draft three" set of specifications.  The draft three 
certifications were so stringent that the testing agency itself 
decided to remove some of those requirements from the "draft 
four" specification level, the most recent set of certification 
standards.  In large part, the reduced stringency involved the 
use of a smaller number of interfering substances that a 
breathalyzer must be able to handle, rather than the vastly 
expanded list of substances in the draft three version.  The 
Alcotest also has been examined and certified on this less 
stringent draft four standard. 
In sum, the judge was warranted in crediting Ryser's 
testimony that the NHTSA and the OIML certifications further 
demonstrated that the Alcotest was capable of testing 
exclusively for ethanol. 
The defendant contends that the specification testing 
17 
 
 
conducted by the NHTSA and the OIML was deficient because 
neither agency utilized mixed samples in evaluating the 
Alcotest's ability to distinguish between ethanol and 
interfering substances.  According to the defendant's expert 
witness, adequate testing requires challenging the device with a 
wide variety of "physiologically important" substances, as well 
as studying how the properties of the fuel cell change over 
time.  We discern no error.  The judge was well within his 
discretion in relying upon the NHTSA and OIML reports, based on 
their standard and widely accepted protocols regarding mixed 
sample testing.  While the judge generally credited Barry's 
testimony, there was no abuse of discretion in the judge's 
decision to reject Barry's specific criticisms of the testing 
methodology.  See Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. at 312 (judge is 
qualified to determine questions of credibility concerning 
proposed scientific expert testimony). 
We turn to whether the technology underlying the Alcotest 
has been subjected to peer review and publication, another of 
the factors in the Daubert-Lanigan analysis.  The peer-review 
prong of the Daubert-Lanigan standard serves a function similar 
to the general acceptance test; in essence, it requires a judge 
to determine whether the scientific theory underlying the 
disputed evidence has been accepted by the relevant scientific 
community.  See Commonwealth v. Senior, 433 Mass. 453, 460-461 
18 
 
 
(2001).  At the hearing in this case, the Commonwealth submitted 
a single peer-reviewed article that surveyed the history of 
breath-testing devices; the article mentioned that the 
Alcotest's use of an infrared detector operating at 9.5 microns 
and an electrochemical fuel cell "is a highly desirable feature 
for medicolegal purposes."8  The judge found that support for the 
peer-review factor of the Daubert-Lanigan analysis "is 
admittedly thin." 
 
On appeal, the Commonwealth submitted to this court a 
number of additional peer-reviewed articles addressing the 
reliability of the Alcotest.9  We have considered scientific 
studies that arise following the denial of initial Daubert-
Lanigan hearings where necessary to ensure an accurate decision 
concerning the reliability of scientific evidence.  See 
                     
 
8 See Jones, Measuring Alcohol in Blood and Breath for 
Forensic Purposes -- A Historical Review, 8 Forensic Sci. Rev. 
13, 31, 36 (June 1996). 
 
 
9 See Hodgson & Taylor, Evaluation of the Dräger Alcotest 
7110 MKIII Dual C Evidential Breath Alcohol Analyzer, 34 Can. 
Soc. Forensic Sci. J. 95, 101 (2001) (Alcotest able to 
distinguish other potentially interfering substances, including 
acetone and methanol, from ethanol); Laakso, Pennanen, Himberg, 
Kuitunen, & Himberg, Effect of Eight Solvents on Ethanol 
Analysis by Dräger 7110 Evidential Breath Analyzer, 49 J. 
Forensic Sci., no. 5 (Sept. 2004) (Alcotest was able to detect 
most of potential interfering common substances, such as 
acetone, in concentration levels which did not significantly 
affect ethanol analysis, but significant concentration of 
chemical propanol, which can only be obtained by drinking high 
amounts of denatured alcohol, interfered with ethanol analysis). 
 
19 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 837-840 (2011) 
(citing subsequent report on ballistics evidence to further 
support judge's decision); Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 
715, 724-727 (2010) (considering newly released report in appeal 
challenging fingerprint evidence); Commonwealth v. Fowler, 425 
Mass. 819, 826-828 (1997) (relying on recently released report 
to resolve judge's concerns about deoxyribonucleic acid 
analysis).  We also have considered scientific studies that were 
not before a lower court judge to further our understanding of 
the social science underlying a legal ruling.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 473 Mass. 594, 600 (2016); Commonwealth 
v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 239 n.15 (2014); Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 
612, 622 (2010); Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 737 
(2005).  We see no reason to ignore the peer-reviewed articles 
submitted by the Commonwealth, which indicate that the Alcotest 
is capable of distinguishing between ethanol and common 
interfering substances. 
In addition to considering whether the Alcotest had been 
subject to adequate testing and peer review, the judge also 
found "abundant evidence that the Alcotest and its underlying 
technology" had satisfied the other nonexclusive factors in the 
Daubert-Lanigan analysis:  it has been generally accepted in the 
scientific community, it does not have an unacceptably high 
20 
 
 
known or potential rate of error, and it is governed by 
recognized standards.  There was no abuse of discretion in the 
judge's determination that these factors had been met. 
Finally, we briefly address an issue raised by the 
defendant regarding general acceptance in the scientific 
community.10  The defendant contends that the Alcotest could not 
have been generally accepted in the scientific community at the 
time of his trial; he points out that the device uses 
proprietary technology, including its computer source code, and 
that Draeger exclusively sells its breathalyzers to law 
enforcement agencies.  He further argues that the approval of 
                     
 
10 Draeger offers an optional sensor that measures a 
subject's breath temperature as a means to assist in evaluating 
breathalyzer test results.  Massachusetts law enforcement 
agencies declined to purchase this option.  The defendant 
contends that the absence of a temperature sensor diminishes the 
accuracy of the Alcotest, and further demonstrates that it is 
not reliable.  The defendant did not raise this issue in his 
original appeal from the denial of his motion to exclude the 
breath test results, and we did not ask the judge to consider it 
on remand.  The judge made no factual finding regarding the 
significance of installing a breath temperature sensor. 
 
 
Because the defendant did not raise the issue in his 
original appeal, we consider it to be waived.  See Commonwealth 
v. Pisa, 384 Mass. 362, 365-367 (1981).  We also are persuaded 
by the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding in State v. Chun, 194 
N.J. 54, 105-106, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 825 (2008), that there 
is insufficient scientific study on the impact of a breath 
temperature measurement on the accuracy of the results.  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court concluded in that case that the absence of 
a temperature sensor did not render the Alcotest unreliable.  
Id. at 107-108.  The court commented that, to the extent that 
variation in breath temperature has an effect on breathalyzer 
test results, this went to the weight of the evidence and not to 
its admissibility.  See id. at 108-109. 
21 
 
 
the Alcotest for use in other countries and in other 
jurisdictions in the United States does not indicate general 
acceptance, because these governmental actors do not constitute 
scientific communities for purposes of the Daubert-Lanigan 
standard.  We do not agree.  Governmental standard-setting 
agencies, such as the NHTSA, routinely conduct investigations, 
evaluate new and developing technologies, and set relevant 
scientific standards.  See Powell, 450 Mass. at 239-240, citing 
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 643 (2005). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order denying the motion to exclude 
evidence as scientifically unreliable is affirmed.  The judgment 
of conviction is also affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.