Title: Walter Energy, Inc. v. Audley Capital Advisors, LLP
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1131104
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 20, 2015

REL: 02/20/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
____________________
1131104
____________________
Walter Energy, Inc.
v.
Audley Capital Advisors LLP et al.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-13-425)
STUART, Justice.
Walter Energy, Inc., appeals the order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court dismissing claims it had asserted against
investor Julian A. Treger, his firm Audley Capital Advisors
LLP, and other associated investment entities (hereinafter
1131104
referred to collectively as "the Audley defendants" ) stemming
1
from their alleged involvement in a scheme to improperly
manipulate the share price of Walter Energy stock.  We affirm.
I.
In late 2010, Birmingham-based Walter Energy agreed to
purchase Western Coal Corporation, a Canadian energy company
in which the Audley defendants held a significant minority
stake.  Between then and April 1, 2011, when the acquisition
closed, the Audley defendants exchanged millions of shares of
Western Coal stock for approximately $770 million in cash and
Walter Energy stock.  Walter Energy asserts that the Audley
defendants thereafter conspired to execute a "pump and dump"
scheme to drive up the price of Walter Energy stock and to
further profit from Walter Energy's purchase of Western Coal.2
Besides Treger and Audley Capital Advisors, the Audley
1
defendants also include Audley European Opportunities Master
Fund Limited, Audley Natural Resources Master Fund, Audley
Capital Management Limited, and Audley Investment Management
Limited.  Treger and Audley Capital Advisors are based in
London, England; the other entities are based in Guernsey and
the Cayman Islands.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
2
Circuit has succinctly described a pump and dump scheme as
follows:
"A pump and dump scheme involves artificially
inflating the price and volume of an owned stock ––
2
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Walter Energy alleges that the Audley defendants
initiated their scheme on July 17, 2011, when Treger sent a
letter to Walter Energy stating that Audley Capital Advisors
had directed an investment bank to gauge various third
parties' interest in acquiring Walter Energy and intimating
that Walter Energy could be sold at double its then current
share price.  The letter also advised that other large
institutional 
shareholders 
in 
Walter 
Energy 
had 
been 
contacted
and that they would support an acquisition of the company at
the appropriate price.  The letter, marked "private &
confidential," requested a response from Walter Energy by
August 5, 2011; however, Audley Capital Advisors publicly
released the letter on July 18, 2011, before receiving any
response from Walter Energy.  
The share price of Walter Energy stock, which trades
publicly on the New York Stock Exchange, thereafter spiked,
and, in the days and weeks that followed, the Audley
by promotional or trading activity –– to sell the
stock at a higher price.  Once the overvalued shares
are dumped, the price and volume of shares plummet
and unsuspecting investors lose their money."
United States v. Curshen, 567 Fed. App'x 815, 816 (11th Cir.
2014) (not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter).
3
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defendants sold approximately 900,000 shares of Walter Energy
stock.  In September 2011, The Times, a London newspaper,
reported that another mining company was considering 
making 
an
offer to purchase Walter Energy and that it had in fact
already arranged financing to do so.  Shares of Walter Energy
again spiked, and the Audley defendants sold approximately
300,000 more shares of Walter Energy stock that month.  In
October 2011, there were more media reports that various
mining and energy companies were targeting Walter Energy for
a takeover, and the Audley defendants sold approximately
200,000 shares of Walter Energy stock that month.  Finally, in
December 2012, the Daily Mail in London reported that an
Australian mining company was poised to make an offer to
acquire Walter Energy.
To date, however, no company has made a formal bid to
acquire Walter Energy or has attempted any other sort of a
takeover.  Walter Energy now asserts that all the media
reports indicating that an acquisition of Walter Energy was
imminent were false and that they were generated by the Audley
defendants in an attempt to create interest in Walter Energy
stock so the share price would rise and the Audley defendants
4
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could sell their shares of Walter Energy stock at the new
artificially high price.  
Walter Energy further argues that the Audley defendants
perpetuated the idea that the board of directors of Walter
Energy was declining merger opportunities based on the
directors' own self interest.  On March 22, 2013, the Audley
defendants gave notice that they would present their own slate
of directors at the April 25, 2013, annual meeting of Walter
Energy shareholders by filing the required information with
the Securities and Exchange Commission and distributing a
letter to all Walter Energy shareholders seeking support for
their proposed slate of directors.  However, Walter Energy
alleges that, in fact, the intent of the March 22 letter was
to hinder Walter Energy's attempt to raise $350 million by way
of a debt offering.  Although neither the Audley defendants'
proposed slate of candidates nor the attempt to stop the debt
offering 
was 
ultimately 
successful, 
Walter 
Energy 
alleges 
that
both efforts were part of a continued effort to manipulate the
share price of Walter Energy stock.
In May 28, 2013, Walter Energy sued the Audley defendants
in the Jefferson Circuit Court seeking damages based upon
5
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their alleged improper manipulation of the share price of
Walter Energy stock, as well as an injunction barring any
further attempts to do so.   As eventually amended, Walter
3
Energy's 
complaint alleged 
violations of the 
Alabama
Securities Act, § 8-6-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975; various
species of fraud; felonious injury; conspiracy; intentional
interference 
with 
contractual 
or 
business 
relations; 
negligent
misrepresentation; and unjust enrichment.  Following the
filing of Walter Energy's initial complaint, and again
following the filing of three amended complaints, the Audley
defendants moved the trial court to dismiss all the claims
asserted against them on Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
grounds.  On May 20, 2014, the trial court granted the Audley
defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed with prejudice all
the claims asserted against them by Walter Energy.  On June
Walter Energy also named as defendants Scoggin Capital
3
Management, 
LLC, 
and 
related 
entities 
("the 
Scoggin
defendants") that Walter 
Energy 
alleged had made an investment
in Walter Energy to assist the Audley defendants in their
attempt to replace the board of directors of Walter Energy and
that had entered into an agreement with the Audley defendants
to give them a percentage of any profit the Scoggin defendants
ultimately made on their investment in Walter Energy. 
However, the Scoggin defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction was eventually granted by the trial
court, and Walter Energy has not appealed their dismissal.
6
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30, 2014, Walter Energy filed its notice of appeal to this
Court.
II.
We explained the standard of review applicable to an
appeal of a trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss
in Crosslin v. Health Care Authority of Huntsville, 5 So. 3d
1193, 1195 (Ala. 2008):
"In 
considering 
whether 
a 
complaint 
is
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., a court 'must accept
the allegations of the complaint as true.'  Creola
Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke Housing, L.L.C., 828
So. 2d 285, 288 (Ala. 2002) (emphasis omitted). 
'"The appropriate standard of review under Rule
12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is whether, when the
allegations of the complaint are viewed most
strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that the
pleader could prove any set of circumstances that
would entitle [it] to relief."'  Smith v. National
Sec. Ins. Co., 860 So. 2d 343, 345 (Ala. 2003)
(quoting Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299
(Ala. 1993)).  In determining whether this is true,
a court considers only whether the plaintiff may
possibly prevail, not whether the plaintiff will
ultimately prevail.  Id.  Put another way, '"a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of the claim that would entitle the
plaintiff to relief."'  Id. (emphasis added)." 
Thus, we afford the trial court's order of dismissal no
presumption of correctness, and we review the sufficiency of
Walter Energy's complaint de novo.  See also DGB, LLC v.
7
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Hinds, 55 So. 3d 218, 223 (Ala. 2010) (quoting Nance v.
Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993)) ("'On appeal, a
dismissal is not entitled to a presumption 
of 
correctness.'").
Although the trial court dismissed all the claims Walter
Energy had asserted against the Audley defendants, Walter
Energy challenges only the trial court's dismissal of its
Alabama 
Securities 
Act 
claim 
and 
its 
intentional-interference-
with-contractual-or-business-relations claim, arguing that
those claims were adequately pleaded and not due to be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).  We first consider Walter
Energy's claim 
that the Audley defendants violated 
the 
Alabama
Securities Act.
III.
Walter Energy specifically argues that the Audley
defendants violated § 8-6-17(a), Ala. Code 1975, a provision
of the Alabama Securities Act, which provides:
"It is unlawful for any person, in connection with
the offer, sale, or purchase of any security,
directly or indirectly, to:
"(1) Employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud;
"(2) Make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make
8
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the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading; or
"(3) Engage in any act, practice or
course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person."
The facts as alleged by Walter Energy in its third and final
amended complaint, which we must accept as true at this stage
of the proceedings, do indicate that the Audley defendants
engaged in conduct that appears to fall within the list of
activities prohibited by § 8-6-17(a).  Indeed, although it
appears that the Audley defendants will dispute whether they
actually engaged in such conduct at a later time if the need
to do so arises, their arguments in support of the trial
court's order of dismissal do not include an argument that
their alleged conduct, 
if 
proven, would 
not constitute conduct
prohibited by the terms of § 8-6-17(a).  
Rather, the Audley defendants argue that § 8-6-17(a) does
not apply to any of their activities in connection with the
sale of Walter Energy stock because, they argue, § 8-6-12(a),
Ala. Code 1975, provides that the Alabama Securities Act
applies only "to persons who sell or offer to sell
[securities] when (1) an offer to sell is made in this state,
9
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or (2) an offer to buy is made and accepted in this state." 
Subsection 8-6-12(c) further provides that "[a]n offer 
to 
sell
or to buy is made in this state, whether or not either party
is then present in this state, when the offer (1) originates
from this state, or (2) is directed by the offeror to this
state and received at the place to which it is directed." 
There has been no allegation that there was an offer to buy in
this case, and the Audley defendants argue that they have
never made any offer to sell Walter Energy stock in Alabama.  
4
More importantly at this stage of the proceedings, the Audley
defendants argue that Walter Energy has failed even to allege
that any offer to sell was made in Alabama.  The Audley
defendants argue that Walter Energy's failure to allege that
the Audley defendants made an offer to sell Walter Energy
stock in Alabama requires the dismissal of the § 8-6-17(a)
We note that the petitioner in Ex parte Kohlberg Kravis
4
Roberts & Co., L.P., 78 So. 3d 959, 977-79 (Ala. 2011),
similarly argued that the Alabama Securities Act did not apply
to certain transactions because none of the offers to sell or
offers to buy the subject securities occurred in Alabama;
however, this Court ultimately declined to consider that
argument, holding instead that mandamus review of the trial
court's decision denying a motion to dismiss on that ground
was inappropriate.
10
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claim in the trial court and is now a sufficient basis for
this Court to affirm that dismissal.
In its third amended complaint, Walter Energy never
directly alleges that the Audley defendants made an offer to
sell anything in Alabama.  However, Walter Energy does state
four times, in paragraphs 45, 55, 59, and 120 of the
complaint, that the Audley defendants' sales of Walter Energy
stock "occurred on the New York Stock Exchange, and the offers
to sell were directed to Alabama."  An allegation that an
offer to sell securities was directed to Alabama can be
sufficient to constitute an allegation that an offer to sell
was made in Alabama for purposes of the Alabama Securities Act
if that allegation is accompanied by an allegation that the
offer to sell was also received in Alabama.  See § 8-6-12(c)
("An offer to sell ... is made in this state ... when the
offer ... is directed by the offeror to this state and
received at the place to which it is directed ...." (emphasis
added)).  However, Walter Energy has failed to make any
allegation regarding the receipt of an offer in Alabama.  For
this reason, the trial court 
dismissed Walter 
Energy's 
Alabama
Securities Act claim, stating:
11
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"[Section] 8-6-17 does not apply because Walter
Energy has not alleged that the Audley defendants
sold Walter Energy stock in Alabama, see § 8-6-12(a)
stating that Article I of the [Alabama Securities]
Act, which includes § 8-6-17, applies only 'to
persons who sell or offer to sell when ... an offer
to sell is made in this state'), or that the Audley
defendants directed an offer to sell Walter Energy
stock to Alabama that was received 'at the place to
which it [was] directed,' see § 8-6-12(c) ('An offer
to sell ... is made in this state ... when the offer
(1) originates from this state, or (2) is directed
by the offeror to this state and received at the
place to which it is directed (or at any post office
in this state ....').
"Walter 
Energy 
seeks 
to 
overcome 
these
requirements by alleging that the Audley defendants'
sales of Walter Energy stock 'occurred on the New
York Stock Exchange, and the offers to sell were
directed to Alabama.'  This allegation concerning
transactions on the New York Stock Exchange is a
legal conclusion, not a factual allegation.  In any
event, even assuming that this allegation is
effectual, Walter Energy still has not alleged that
any offer was actually received in Alabama 'at the
place to which it [was] directed.'  See § 8-6-12(c). 
As a result, no matter how it is construed, Walter
Energy's claim under the [Alabama] Securities Act
fails to satisfy the two-pronged requirement of § 8-
6-17 that the offers be both (1) directed to persons
located in Alabama and (2) received by the persons
located in Alabama to which the offers were
directed."
We agree with the conclusion of the trial court and similarly
hold that Walter Energy has failed to plead a claim for which
relief can be granted under the Alabama Securities Act.  We
further note that the argument Walter Energy is essentially
12
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making –– that every transaction that occurs on the New York
Stock Exchange or, presumably, any other national securities
exchange, is within the scope of the Alabama Securities Act ––
has not previously been accepted by this Court, and Walter
Energy has cited no cases from other jurisdictions that have
adopted a version of the Uniform Securities Act in which a
state securities act has been read so expansively.  To the
contrary, it has been noted that the drafters of the Uniform
Securities Act intended for it to have a limited scope.  See
Lintz v. Carey Manor Ltd., 613 F. Supp. 543, 550 (W.D. Va.
1985) (quoting Joseph C. Long, Blue Sky Law Handbook § 3-6
(1985)) ("'[I]t is clear that the draftsmen of the Uniform
[Securities] Act consciously elected to limit the scope of the
Uniform [Securities] Act to those transactions which 
took part
at least partially within the state.'").5
Moreover, we also note that the mere fact that the
transactions in question involve the stock of 
an 
Alabama-based
corporation is an insufficient basis upon which to apply the
Walter Energy potentially could have asserted a claim
5
against the Audley defendants based on similar federal
securities-regulation 
statutes; 
however, 
it 
has 
elected 
not 
to
do so, stating in its complaint that "the claims asserted
herein are based entirely on Alabama law, and no claims are
asserted under any federal law."
13
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Alabama Securities Act.  As one leading commentator on state
securities laws has explained:
"A major question under the blue sky laws of
most 
states 
involves 
their 
jurisdictional
provisions.  The statutes generally are directed at
the locus where the securities are offered for sale,
regardless of the issuer's state of incorporation,
state of organization, or principal place of
business."
2 Thomas L. Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities
Regulation § 8.1[1][F] (5th ed. 2005) (footnote omitted). 
Because the Alabama Securities Act claim made by Walter Energy
in its third amended complaint does not allege that the Audley
defendants made an offer to sell Walter Energy stock in
Alabama or, in the alternative, that this case involves an
offer to buy Walter Energy stock that was made and accepted in
Alabama, an essential element of an Alabama Securities Act
claim, the trial court's dismissal of that claim is due to be
affirmed.   See Belcher v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 474
6
Our holding on this issue obviates the need to review the
6
trial court's alternate basis for dismissing Walter Energy's
Alabama 
Securities 
Act 
claim, 
specifically, 
that 
Walter 
Energy
lacks standing to pursue such a claim because it has not
alleged that it purchased any shares of Walter Energy stock
following the Audley defendants' alleged scheme to manipulate
the share price.  See, e.g., Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that a party that was neither a
purchaser nor a seller of the securities involved lacked
standing to seek injunctive relief under the federal
14
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So. 2d 1063, 1068 (Ala. 1985) (affirming the dismissal of a
claim where "the appellants did not sufficiently allege the
requisite elements"), and Lloyd v. Community Hosp. of
Andalusia, Inc., 421 So. 2d 112, 113 (Ala. 1982) ("[W]hen the
complaint is devoid of averments of the requisite elements of
any legal claim upon which plaintiff might be entitled to
relief, the motion is to be granted.").
IV.
We next consider the trial court's dismissal of Walter
Energy's 
claim 
of 
intentional 
interference 
with 
contractual 
or
business relations.  In fact, this appears to be a two-part
claim because Walter Energy alleges that the 
Audley 
defendants
improperly interfered with (1) its relationship with its 
other
shareholders and (2) its relationship with lenders 
inasmuch 
as
the Audley defendants' March 22 letter announcing that they
would be sponsoring a new slate of directors at the upcoming
shareholders meeting was allegedly timed to interfere with
Walter Energy's plans announced that same day to complete a
$350 million debt offering.   In White Sands Group, L.L.C. v.
7
counterpart to § 8-6-17).
Walter Energy does not explain in its complaint how the
7
Audley defendants allegedly interfered with its relationship
15
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PRS II, LLC, 32 So. 3d 5, 14 (Ala. 2009), this Court restated
the elements of a claim of intentional interference with
contractual or business relations, explaining that, "properly
stated, the elements of the tort are (1) the existence of a
protectible business relationship; (2) of which the defendant
knew; (3) to which the defendant was a stranger; (4) with
which 
the 
defendant 
intentionally 
interfered; 
and 
(5) 
damage." 
This appeal hinges on the third element –– Walter Energy
asserts that the Audley defendants were strangers to its
relationships with its other shareholders and lenders, while
the Audley defendants argue that the undisputed facts
conclusively establish that they were not strangers to those
relationships.  For the reasons that follow, we agree with the
Audley defendants.
The seminal case discussing the "stranger" requirement of
an 
intentional-interference-with-contractual-or-business-
relations claim is Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors
with other Walter Energy shareholders.  In its brief to this
Court, Walter Energy explains that the reports of an upcoming
sale or merger spread by the Audley defendants were untrue,
"but shareholders believed 
them, 
and when Walter Energy failed
to act on any of the purported acquisition offers,
shareholders justifiably assumed that Walter Energy's board
and management were resistant to change and indifferent to
shareholder' interests."  Walter Energy's brief, p. 25.
16
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Life Insurance Co., 875 So. 2d 1143 (Ala. 2003).  After noting
that a party to a contract or business relationship clearly
cannot be liable for tortious interference with that
relationship, this Court in Waddell & Reed explained that a
defendant need not be a signatory to the subject contract or
one of the primary actors in the business relationship to
effectively be a party to it, but that "[a] defendant is a
party in interest to a relationship if the defendant has any
beneficial or economic interest in, or control over, that
relationship."  875 So. 2d at 1154.  The Court relied on cases
applying Georgia law to articulate its position:
"We also find support in ... LaSonde v. Chase
Mortgage Co., 259 Ga. App. 772, 577 S.E.2d 822
(2003), in which the Court of Appeals of Georgia
stated:
"'In 
order 
to 
be 
liable 
for
interference with a contract, a defendant
must be a stranger to both the contract and
the business relationship giving rise to
and underpinning the contract.  One is not
a stranger to the contract just because he
is not a party to the contract.  A tortious
interference claim requires, among other
things, wrongful conduct by the defendant
without 
privilege; 
"privilege" 
means
legitimate 
economic 
interests 
of 
the
defendant or a legitimate relationship of
the defendant to the contract, so that he
is not considered a stranger, interloper,
or meddler.  A person with a direct
17
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economic interest in the contract is not a
stranger to the contract.  Parties to an
interwoven contractual arrangement are not
liable for tortious interference with any
of 
the 
contracts 
or 
business
relationships.'
"259 Ga. App. at [773], 577 S.E.2d at 824 (emphasis
added; footnotes omitted)."
Waddell & Reed, 875 So. 2d at 1157.  See also Britt/Paulk Ins.
Agency, Inc. v. Vandroff Ins. Agency, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1575,
1584 (N.D. Ga. 1996) ("[A] defendant is not a 'stranger' to a
contract or business relationship when: (1) the defendant is
an essential entity to the purported injured relations; (2)
the allegedly injured relations are inextricably a part of or
dependent upon the defendant's contractual or business
relations; (3) the defendant would benefit economically from
the alleged injured relations; or (4) both the defendant and
the plaintiff are parties to a comprehensive interwoven set of
contracts or relations.").  Ultimately, the Waddell & Reed
Court summarized its analysis of the stranger requirement as
follows:
"For the sake of clarity, we adopt the term
'participant' to describe an individual or entity
who is not a party, but who is essential, to the
allegedly injured relationship and who cannot be
described as a stranger.  One cannot be guilty of
interference with a contract even if one is not a
18
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party to the contract so long as one is a
participant in a business relationship arising from
interwoven contractual arrangements that include the
contract.  In such an instance, the participant is
not a stranger to the business relationship and the
interwoven contractual arrangements define the
participant's rights and duties with respect to the
other individuals or entities in the relationship. 
If a participant has a legitimate economic interest
in and a legitimate relationship to the contract,
then the participant enjoys a privilege of becoming
involved without being accused of interfering with
the contract."
875 So. 2d at 1157.
In applying Waddell & Reed to this case, the trial court
concluded that the Audley defendants had sufficient interests
in the relationships in which they are alleged to have
interfered 
to 
render 
them 
participants 
in 
those 
relationships,
stating:
"As shareholders of Walter Energy, the Audley
defendants had direct beneficial and economic
interests in Walter Energy's business and its
relationships with its other shareholders and its
lenders.  The Audley defendants had the right to
participate in Walter Energy's affairs by engaging
in the 2013 proxy contest and to influence the
business decisions made by Walter Energy's directors
and management, even to challenge those decisions
privately and publicly.  The Audley defendants are
not 'strangers' to Walter Energy's relationships
with its shareholders and lenders and cannot be
liable for intentional interference with business
and contractual relations."
19
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We agree.  A decision made by a corporation's board of
directors to issue debt securities is presumably made in the
best interest of the corporation's shareholders, and any gain
or loss resulting from such a business decision will
ultimately be for those shareholders' benefit or to their
detriment.  See, e.g., Massey v. Disc Mfg., Inc., 601 So. 2d
449, 457 (Ala. 1992) 
(explaining that corporate directors have
a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders).  Thus, as relates to the
facts alleged in this case, the Audley defendants, as
shareholders in Walter Energy, have a direct interest in any
business relationships Walter Energy has with its lenders;
accordingly, they are not strangers to those relationships.  
Similarly, the shareholders of a corporation literally
share ownership of the corporation with each other, and their
economic interests are necessarily interwoven.  Every
shareholder has the same rights and privileges, and the
corporation's board of directors and officers owe all the
shareholders the same fiduciary duties.  How any specific
shareholder votes on corporate matters, such as the election
of directors, amendment of bylaws, or approval of significant
20
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mergers and acquisitions, necessarily affects the other
shareholders, and even a shareholder's decision to buy, hold,
or sell stock can affect other shareholders inasmuch as
trading activity affects share price and the actions of
management.  Thus, each shareholder has a beneficial or
economic interest in its fellow shareholders' relationship
with the corporation they jointly own.  Those relationships
are necessarily interwoven, and we conclude that the Audley
defendants are participants in the relationships with which
they are alleged to have interfered and that the stranger
requirement cannot be met.  Accordingly, the trial court
correctly dismissed Walter 
Energy's intentional-interference-
with-contractual-or-business-relations claim.
V.
Walter Energy sued the Audley defendants alleging various
claims stemming from their alleged involvement in a "pump and
dump" scheme to manipulate the share price of Walter Energy
stock.  After affording Walter Energy three opportunities to
amend its complaint, the trial court dismissed all the claims
on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds.  Walter Energy thereafter appealed
the dismissal of two of its claims to this Court; however,
21
1131104
upon review, we conclude that the dismissal of those claims
was proper, and the judgment of the trial court is accordingly
affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Moore, C.J., and Parker, Shaw, and Wise, JJ., concur.
22