Title: Reilly v. Shepherd
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 060966
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2007

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
K. C. REILLY 
             OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
v.  Record No. 060966  
           April 20, 2007 
 
JOSHUA B. SHEPHERD 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
Edward W. Hanson, Jr., Judge 
 
 
This appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a verdict awarding damages for malicious prosecution. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
The essential facts are undisputed.  Shortly before 4:00 
a.m. on August 2, 2003, Joseph B. Brannon, the driver of a 
taxicab in Virginia Beach, was struck on the back of the head 
with a hard object and robbed of cash by a passenger who said 
he had a gun.  The robber then left the taxi and fled the 
scene on foot. 
 
Several days later, the case was assigned for 
investigation to K. C. Reilly, a detective in the robbery 
squad of the Virginia Beach Police Department.  Reilly 
examined the report of the police officer who had interviewed 
the victim at the scene, the report of another detective who 
had made an initial investigation of the crime, the report of 
a crime scene technician who had examined the taxi within an 
hour after the event, and the analysis of latent fingerprints 
 
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the technician found on the taxi.  Reilly also personally 
interviewed Brannon, the victim. 
 
Brannon told Reilly that the robber was a white male in 
his mid to late twenties, five feet eight to five feet ten 
inches tall, weighing 150 to 160 pounds, with “dirty blond 
hair in dreadlocks that were long.”  The report of the 
detective who had responded to the scene on the night of the 
crime recorded Brannon’s description of the robber as “W/M 
5’7”-5’8” tall, 160-170 lbs. with dirty blond hair worn in 
DREADS . . . approximate age was mid to late twenties.”1 
 
The technician reported that four latent fingerprints had 
been taken from the taxi shortly after the crime but that only 
one of them had been found to match fingerprints on file.2  The 
technician told Reilly that he considered that fingerprint to 
be very recent because the taxi was wet with dew when he 
examined it less than an hour after the robbery and “the 
fingerprint would not have lasted with [those] conditions.” 
                     
1 The uniformed police officer who had responded to the 
scene on the night of the crime filed a report on a printed 
form in which had been entered the letter “B” in the space 
identifying the suspect’s race.  Reilly testified that he 
regarded this as a typographical error since all other 
information from the victim described the perpetrator as 
Caucasian. 
2 All four fingerprints were found on the right rear door, 
door frame, and window.  The print matching the print in the 
police files was found on the outside of the right rear 
window. 
 
3
 
Armed with that information, Reilly interviewed the 
victim again to ask whether he had any recollection that the 
robber had touched any part of the taxi.  Reilly testified 
that Brannon replied that “he remembered the suspect touching 
the outside of the window, which was exactly where the 
fingerprint was recovered from.”  Reilly recovered from the 
local police database the information that the identified 
fingerprint belonged to Joshua Blaine Shepherd.  Shepherd was 
described in the database as a white male, born July 1, 1977, 
(26 years old at the time of the offense), five feet nine 
inches tall, 150 pounds, with brown hair.  Reilly testified 
that he considered this to be a nearly exact match, “probably 
the best I’ve ever seen in my career,” to the description of 
the robber given by the victim. 
 
The database also reported Shepherd’s home address to be 
on “Gates Road,” which Reilly ascertained to be Gates Landing 
Road, Virginia Beach, less than two miles from the point where 
the crime had been committed.  Reilly considered this to be 
significant because the robber had fled the scene on foot, and 
“it’s been my experience that people don’t typically commit a 
robbery at their front door for fear of being identified.” 
 
Reilly testified that he had all the foregoing 
information by mid-September 2003, but that he waited until 
December to seek a warrant for Shepherd’s arrest because he 
 
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wanted an opportunity to interview him.  Reilly made three or 
four visits to the address on Gates Landing Road and spoke 
with a neighbor, but was unsuccessful in locating Shepherd.  
He contacted the Division of Motor Vehicles, but found that 
there was no record of a Virginia driver’s license or 
identification in Shepherd’s name, and therefore no photograph 
of him appeared in the DMV records.3  The fingerprint 
identification had been taken from an arrest record made eight 
years earlier in the City of Chesapeake.  Reilly sought a 
photograph from the Chesapeake police, but was informed that 
no such photograph was on file. 
 
On December 21, 2003, Reilly went before a magistrate in 
Virginia Beach and testified under oath to the facts 
substantially as stated above.  The magistrate made a finding 
of probable cause and issued warrants for Shepherd’s arrest on 
the charges of robbery and use of a firearm in the commission 
of robbery.  Later, Reilly testified that, having exhausted 
all leads to finding Shepherd, “I felt that my best resource 
at that time to contact or to get Mr. Shepherd into custody 
was to enlist the aid of all law enforcement by placing the 
warrants on file.” 
                     
3 The DMV records listed Shepherd as the owner of a 
vehicle bearing Virginia license plates.  The Gates Landing 
Road address was given as the “vehicle address” but an address 
 
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On July 16, 2004, Shepherd, who was then living and 
working near Blacksburg, Virginia, drove through Petersburg, 
intending to return to Virginia Beach for a visit.  He had no 
knowledge of the outstanding warrants.  A Petersburg police 
officer stopped him for speeding, ascertained that there were 
warrants outstanding, and arrested him.  He spent six days in 
jail before he was released on bail.  When the warrants came 
before the general district court for preliminary hearing, 
Brannon, the victim, was unable to identify Shepherd as the 
person who had robbed him on August 2, 2003.  The Commonwealth 
Attorney then entered a nolle prosequi as to both warrants. 
 
Shepherd filed this action for malicious prosecution 
against Reilly “personally and in his capacity as a police 
officer for the City Of Virginia Beach.”  The City filed a 
demurrer, which the circuit court sustained on the ground of 
sovereign immunity, and the case went to a jury trial against 
Reilly solely in his individual capacity.  At the close of 
Shepherd’s evidence, Reilly moved to strike on the ground that 
Shepherd had failed to prove two elements essential to the 
tort:  malice and a want of probable cause.  The circuit court 
denied the motion.  Reilly renewed the motion at the close of 
all the evidence, but the court again denied it.  The jury 
                                                                
in the area of Tampa, Florida, was given as “customer 
address.” 
 
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returned a verdict awarding Shepherd $123,000 in compensatory 
damages upon which the court entered judgment.  We awarded 
Reilly an appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
 
In an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff has 
the burden of proving four essential elements:  that the 
prosecution was (1) malicious, (2) instituted by or with the 
cooperation of the defendant, (3) without probable cause, and 
(4) terminated in a manner not unfavorable to the plaintiff. 
Baker v. Elmendorf 271 Va. 474, 476, 628 S.E.2d 358, 359 
(2006).  The second and fourth of these are not at issue in 
this appeal and Shepherd concedes that there is no contention 
that Reilly had any personal ill-will against him, or that 
Reilly had ever known or heard of him before the case was 
assigned to him for investigation.  Nor does Shepherd contend 
that Reilly failed to make a full, accurate and honest 
disclosure to the magistrate of all material facts supporting 
his conclusion that probable cause existed.  Rather, Shepherd 
contends that Reilly lacked probable cause to initiate the 
prosecution and that the jury could properly infer malice from 
the lack of probable cause. 
 
Actions for malicious prosecution arising from criminal 
proceedings are not favored in Virginia.  Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 
220 Va. 1080, 1082, 266 S.E.2d 108, 110 (1980).  The 
 
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requirements for maintaining such actions are more stringent 
than those applied to other tort cases, and are imposed to 
encourage criminal prosecutions in appropriate cases without 
fear of reprisal by civil actions, criminal prosecutions being 
essential to the maintenance of an orderly society.  Id. at 
1082-83, 266 S.E.2d at 110-11. 
 
Malice may be inferred from a lack of probable cause, but 
a lack of probable cause may not be inferred from malice.  
Bill Edwards Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Carey, 219 Va. 90, 100, 244 
S.E.2d 767, 773 (1978).  Accordingly, it is appropriate to 
begin by considering whether the evidence was sufficient to 
support a finding of probable cause.  In this context, we have 
defined probable cause as “knowledge of such a state of facts 
and circumstances as excite the belief in a reasonable mind, 
acting on such facts and circumstances, that the plaintiff is 
guilty of the crime of which he is suspected.”  Commissary 
Concepts Mgmt. Corp. v. Mziguir, 267 Va. 586, 589-90, 594 
S.E.2d 915, 917 (2004).  Whether probable cause existed is 
determined as of the time when the action complained of was 
taken.  Id. at 590, 594 S.E.2d at 917. 
 
When Reilly obtained the warrants, he acted on the facts 
and circumstances then known to him:  Shepherd matched, with 
remarkable accuracy, the detailed description of the robber 
given by the victim on the night of the crime; Shepherd’s 
 
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fingerprint was identified in the exact location where the 
victim had seen the robber touch the taxi; the technician had 
concluded, within an hour of the robbery, that the fingerprint 
had been placed on the taxi very recently; and Shepherd’s home 
was not far from the scene of the crime, from which the robber 
had fled on foot.  There were no circumstances known to Reilly 
pointing to any person other than Shepherd as the perpetrator.  
 
Because the facts relating to probable cause are not in 
dispute, on appeal the issue of their sufficiency to support 
the jury's determination is a question of law for 
determination by this Court.  Lee v. Southland Corp., 219 Va. 
23, 27, 244 S.E.2d 756, 759 (1978).  Here, we find that the 
circumstances known to Reilly and presented by him to the 
magistrate were sufficient to “excite the belief in a 
reasonable mind” that Shepherd had committed the robbery.  
Accordingly, Shepherd’s evidence was insufficient, as a matter 
of law, to warrant submission of the issue of the lack of 
probable cause to the jury.  Because Shepherd failed to prove 
the lack of probable cause, an essential element of the tort 
of malicious prosecution, it is unnecessary to address the 
issue of malice. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, the circuit court erred in 
denying the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s 
 
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evidence.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and enter final judgment here in favor of the 
defendant. 
Reversed and final judgment.