Title: State v. Wilkerson
Citation: 363 N.C. 382
Docket Number: 170A07
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: August 28, 2009

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GEORGE THOMAS WILKERSON
No. 170A07
FILED: 28 AUGUST 2009
1.
Constitutional Law–-substantive due process--alleged false testimony by
State’s witness--consideration or sentence reduction for testimony
The trial court did not violate defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to
substantive due process in a double first-degree murder case by failing to correct alleged false
testimony given by a State’s witness when she stated that she had not been promised any
additional consideration or sentence reduction from the prosecutor in exchange for her testimony
against defendant because: (1) the witness accurately testified that she had no assurance of an
additional reduction in her sentence when the prosecutor’s agreement to inform federal
authorities of the witness’s truthful testimony did not, and could not, guarantee that her sentence
would be reduced, nor could the communication of the information to the federal prosecutor
directly result in the filing of a motion to reduce her sentence; and (2) to the extent that her
testimony may have led jurors mistakenly to believe that she could not receive a benefit from her
testimony against defendant, any misunderstanding was corrected by her subsequent admission
during cross-examination that she hoped her sentence would be further reduced.
2.
Constitutional Law–-effective assistance of counsel--failure to object
Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel in a double first-degree
murder case based on defense counsel’s failure to object to or correct a State witness’s alleged
false testimony and later by affirmatively stating during closing argument that the prosecutor had
not entered into a deal with the witness because: (1) the record indicated that defense counsel
extensively cross-examined the witness about her federal charges and the benefits she had
received in federal court for her cooperation; and (2) the Court of Appeals already determined
that there was no quid pro quo between the State and the witness, and any ambiguity created by
the witness’s direct testimony was corrected on cross-examination.
3.
Evidence-–detective--opinion testimony--whether evidence implicated
another perpetrator
The trial court did not commit plain error in a double first-degree murder case by
permitting a detective to give alleged improper opinion testimony as to whether any evidence
implicated another individual in the murders because: (1) the detective’s testimony that she had
no evidence implicating the individual was not necessarily an opinion when the statement
described the results of her investigation and her interpretation of those results; (2) the
detective’s exclusion of the pertinent individual did not ipso facto implicate defendant when, as
here, multiple perpetrators acted in concert and one suspect’s involvement does not necessarily
vitiate the culpability of another; and (3) assuming arguendo that the detective’s testimony was
an otherwise inadmissible opinion, it was properly admitted under the circumstances in this case
to explain or rebut evidence elicited by the defendant which, if unexplained, was likely to
mislead the jury. 
4.
Evidence--opinion testimony--personal knowledge–reason for actions
The trial court did not err in a double first-degree murder case by overruling
defendant’s objection when defendant’s girlfriend testified that the reason she removed
contraband from her apartment the morning after the murders was because she believed
defendant had killed someone, even though defendant contends it was impermissible opinion
testimony, because: (1) this information explaining why the witness acted as she did was within
the witness’s personal knowledge and was admissible to clarify evidence elicited by defense
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counsel on cross-examination; and (2) the witness’s explanation of her motivation was not an
opinion as to defendant’s guilt.
5.
Evidence--cross-examination--defendant was ringleader--plain error analysis
The trial court did not commit plain error in a double first-degree murder case by
permitting an eyewitness to testify during cross-examination that he knew in his heart who shot
the two victims and that defendant was the ringleader, even though defense counsel attempted to
establish the eyewitness did not know defendant was at the mobile home since he did not actually
see the faces of the two men who committed the murders, because: (1) even though the transcript
demonstrated the witness was hostile toward defendant and resisted defense counsel’s attempts to
control cross-examination, defense counsel effectively established that the witness was unable to
see the face of either assailant and impeached the witness by confronting him with a prior
inconsistent statement to police in which the witness failed to name defendant as a possible
perpetrator of the crimes, thus, diminishing the force of the witness’s nonresponsive statements;
and (2) the trial court’s failure to strike this evidence ex mero motu was not plain error in light of
the other evidence of guilt presented by the State. 
6.
Constitutional Law--effective assistance of counsel--failure to move to strike
testimony--failure to show prejudice
Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel in a double first-degree
murder case based on defense counsel’s failure to move to strike an eyewitness’s volunteered
statements that he knew in his heart who shot the two victims and that defendant was the
ringleader because: (1) defense counsel elicited the witness’s concession that he did not see the
face of either perpetrator and also impeached the witness with a prior inconsistent statement to
investigators in which the witness did not identify defendant as a participant, thus significantly
undercutting the impact of the witness’s opinion as to the assailant’s identity; (2) other evidence
established that defendant armed himself, went to one victim’s home to avenge a perceived
wrong, and later told his girlfriend that “it was easy. . . . just like in a damn movie”; and (3) it
cannot be said that the eyewitness’s alleged inadmissible testimony probably resulted in the jury
returning a different verdict than it would have reached had the evidence not been admitted.
7.
Evidence--testimony--defendant purchased drugs and guns on day of
murders
The trial court did not err in a double first-degree murder case by permitting a
witness to testify that defendant purchased drugs and guns from her husband on the day of the
murders because: (1) although the evidence supporting the witness’s assumption that her husband
sold drugs to defendant was not based upon personal knowledge or perception and her inference
that a drug deal occurred was a supposition based largely on guesswork and speculation, in light
of the other evidence against defendant and the relative insignificance of this evidence of one
purported drug sale, the error was not prejudicial; (2) in regard to the witness’s testimony that her
husband sold one or more firearms to defendant, although she did not witness a complete
transaction in that she did not see money change hands, N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 701 permits a lay
witness to testify to an inference that is rationally based on the perception of the witness and
helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and her
natural inference that a sale took place was supported by her perceptions; (3) even if the
witness’s testimony that her husband sold the weapons to defendant was improper, any error in
its admission was not prejudicial since the gravamen of her testimony was that defendant
obtained from her husband weapons with which to kill “some people” who had stolen from him,
and whether defendant obtained the weapons through a sale was immaterial; and (4) there was no
reasonable possibility that had the error in question not been committed, a different result would
have been reached at trial.
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8.
Evidence--hearsay--excited utterance exception--defendant threatened to kill
victim 
The trial court did not err in a double first-degree murder case by permitting a
victim’s brother to testify over defendant’s objection, under the excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule, that the victim told him defendant had threatened them both in a telephone call
because: (1) the brother’s testimony established that receiving the call surprised the victim, who
became visibly upset during the call and immediately afterwards related to his brother that
defendant had made the call and had threatened to kill the victim; and (2) the victim believed
defendant wrongfully accused him of stealing cocaine and was disturbed enough to telephone a
friend and ask for transportation, and the victim’s statements represented a spontaneous reaction
to an event that was sufficiently startling to suspend his reflective thoughts.
9.
Evidence--911 call--plain error analysis
The trial court did not err or commit plain error in a double first-degree murder
case by admitting the entire tape recording of the call to 911 by the victim’s brother just before
the shooting requesting police officers to come to his house, including the statement that “more
than likely they’ll rob us,” because: (1) the statement was relevant to explain to the dispatcher
why the brother felt threatened by defendant and why he called 911; (2) the brother related in the
911 call the threatening defendant caller’s own statement concerning his motive, and in context,
the statement may be understood as a threat to take thirty dollars from the brother and the victim
at gunpoint or, in other words, as a threat to commit armed robbery; (3) the brother’s comment
that it was more than likely they were going to commit a robbery merely clarified and restated
this evidence, to which defendant did not object; and (4) the probative value of the disputed
evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
10.
Evidence--hearsay--cell phone number--failure to show prejudice
The trial court did not err in a double first-degree murder case by admitting the
police report created at the time of the arrest of the man who sold defendant weapons, for the
purpose of establishing the man’s cellular telephone number which was provided by the man
upon his arrest and was the same number defendant dialed while hiding under the tractor-trailer
on Highway 220 immediately after the pertinent shooting, because: (1) defendant conceded that
the primary document, the arrest report, was an admissible business record; (2) although the
telephone number contained in the report memorialized an assertion made by the man at the time
of his arrest and was therefore hearsay, in light of the entire case presented by the State,
defendant has not established that there was a reasonable possibility that had the error in question
not been committed, a different result would have been reached by the jury given other
substantial evidence presented by the State that established defendant’s intent to shoot the victim,
his purchase and possession of the murder weapons, his presence in the mobile home at the time
of the shooting, his attempt to cover up his actions, and his inculpatory statements made while
awaiting trial; (3) the State offered other evidence from which jurors could conclude defendant
called the man after the murders; and (4) although defendant argued that admission of this
hearsay violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the man, defendant waived this argument
by failing to object on this basis at trial.
11.
Evidence--testimony--victim’s reputation for peacefulness--harmless error
The trial court committed harmless error in a double first-degree murder case by
admitting over defendant’s objection a witness’s testimony as to the reputation of one of the
victims for peacefulness because: (1) defendant acknowledged in his brief that all admissible
evidence indicated the victim did not provoke the attack, and, in fact, no evidence indicated that
any aspect of the victim’s character played any role in the pertinent events; (2) any prejudicial
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effect arising from the admission of this inadmissible character evidence was de minimis when
there was no reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached at trial had the
disputed testimony been excluded; and (3) after reviewing the witness’s testimony in context and
considering the entirety of the State’s evidence, this disputed testimony did not encourage jurors
to convict defendant out of sympathy for the victim.
12.
Criminal Law--prosecutor’s argument--reasonable inference drawn from
evidence--acting in concert
The trial court did not err in a double first-degree murder case by failing to
intervene ex mero motu during the prosecutor’s closing arguments, including when the
prosecutor told the jury the reason a man advised defendant’s girlfriend that defendant and a
coparticipant had shot someone was that defendant had given the man this information in a
telephone call following the shootings, when the prosecutor said that the man knew to clean out
the girlfriend’s apartment because of defendant’s supposed call to the man, and also when the
prosecutor told jurors that the coparticipant would also be tried for involvement in the killings
while discussing the theory of acting in concert, because: (1) the prosecutor’s argument that the
man knew about the murders because defendant told him about them is a reasonable inference
that can be drawn from evidence introduced through telephone records and the testimony of a
detective indicating that defendant’s cellular telephone was used to make several calls to the
man’s cellular telephone around the time the murders were committed, and the prosecutor’s
argument that the man thus knew to advise the girlfriend to clean out her apartment may be
inferred from the same evidence; and (2) the prosecutor’s argument that defendant and a
coparticipant would be equally guilty was an accurate statement of law applicable to the State’s
theory of the case, which was that defendant and the coparticipant acted in concert to commit the
murders.
13.
Criminal Law--prosecutor’s argument--personal belief--credibility
The trial court did not err in a double first-degree murder case by failing to
intervene ex mero motu when the prosecutor allegedly expressed personal opinions during
closing arguments in the guilt-innocence phase of defendant’s trial by vouching for the credibility
of two witnesses, or by arguing his personal belief in defendant’s guilt under the theory of acting
in concert, because: (1) as to the first witness, the prosecutor did not personally vouch for her
veracity but instead provided jurors reason to believe the witness by arguing that her testimony
was truthful because it was corroborated; (2) as to defendant’s girlfriend, the prosecutor pointed
out that her testimony was consistent with the evidence; the prosecutor conceded weaknesses by
acknowledging that the girlfriend was not a likeable person and that some of the girlfriend’s
statements such as her statements about another man’s footwear, did not fit the State’s theory of
the case; and while the prosecutor’s passing comment that he believed the girlfriend was telling
the truth violated section 15A-1230(a), the comment was made while admitting weaknesses in
her testimony; and (3) as to the prosecutor’s argument that defendant and a coparticipant were
equally culpable for the murders of the two victims, our Supreme Court already concluded that
the prosecutor correctly explained the legal theory of acting in concert.
14.
Criminal Law--motion for new trial--cumulative effect of errors
Although defendant contends the cumulative effect of the errors in a double first-
degree murder case were sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial, including the admission of
hearsay in the form of a man’s cell phone number, the admission of a witness’s opinion
testimony concerning a victim’s reputation for peacefulness, the admission of a witness’s
assumption that her husband sold drugs to defendant in their back bedroom, and the prosecutor’s
personal vouching for a witness’s veracity, a review of the record revealed that after comparing
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the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt with the evidence improperly admitted, taken
together, these errors did not deprive defendant of his due process right to a fair trial.
15.
Burglary and Unlawful Breaking or Entering; Homicide--first-degree
burglary--felony murder--motion to dismiss--sufficiency of evidence
The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges of
felony murder and first-degree burglary, even though defendant contends that the State failed to
present sufficient evidence that he possessed the felonious intent that is an essential element of
first-degree burglary when he broke and entered into the pertinent residence, because: (1) the
State’s evidence showed that defendant threatened to kill a victim over thirty dollars worth of
cocaine that defendant believed the victim had stolen; defendant acknowledged to a detective that
he was inside the mobile home at the time of the murders and that he searched the victims’
pockets; investigators found the victim’s wallet next to his body on the couch and a twenty dollar
bill on the gravel driveway outside the home; and although a detective did not mention the
twenty dollar bill to defendant, during a statement to a detective made two days later, defendant
volunteered that the money was not his, explaining that a coparticipant probably dropped the bill
when running from the home; and (2) although defendant interpreted other evidence introduced
in this case to support his arguments either that the murders were committed solely for the
purpose of preserving the perpetrators’ reputations as drug dealers or that the perpetrators had
abandoned their intent to rob the victim by the time they broke into the mobile home, any
contradictions or conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the State when ruling on a
motion to dismiss, and evidence unfavorable to the State is not considered.
16.
Confessions and Incriminating Statements--Miranda warnings--motion to
suppress--post-arrest statements--knowing and voluntary waiver
The trial court did not commit prejudicial error when it denied defendant’s motion
to suppress his post-arrest statements to investigators even though defendant was only given the
Miranda warnings prior to his first interview by officers but was not re-Mirandized prior to other
inverviews conducted by officers over a four-hour period, or when it found that defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda, because: (1) the trial court found
that no evidence in the record indicated that defendant stated that he was under the influence of
an impairing substance while being questioned; (2) there was no evidence in the record that
defendant ever requested to terminate the interview, nor did defendant request counsel at any
time during any of the interviews; (3) although defendant occasionally trailed off in the middle of
his sentences, he did not exhibit any confusion or slur his words during the interviews; (4) the
trial court’s finding of fact was largely based on the interviewing detectives’ testimony that
defendant appeared to be impaired but was able to respond to questioning coherently and
logically, and this testimony, combined with other similar evidence, fully supported the trial
court’s finding of fact that defendant comprehended his rights at the time that he executed the
waiver; and (5) the evidence showed that the police employed a nonconfrontational interview
method, and there was no evidence of the type of coercive police activities required to render a
confession involuntary.
17.
Search and Seizure--motion to suppress--results of search of cellular
telephone
The trial court did not err in a double first-degree murder case by denying
defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the search of his cellular telephone, because the
seizure was pursuant to defendant’s lawful arrest. 
18.
Sentencing--death penalty--proportionality
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Sentences of death imposed in a double first-degree murder case were not
disproportionate where: (1) the jury found the aggravating circumstances under N.C.G.S. § 15A-
2000(e)(5) that each murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of
first-degree burglary and under N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(11) that each murder was part of a
course of conduct in which defendant engaged and that included the commission by defendant of
other crimes of violence against other persons; (2) our Supreme Court has never found a sentence
of death disproportionate in a case where a defendant was convicted of murdering more than one
victim; (3) the murders occurred inside the home of one of the victims, and a murder in one’s
home is particularly shocking, not only because a life was senselessly taken, but because it was
taken at an especially private place where a person has a right to feel secure; (4) defendant was
convicted of first-degree murders both under the felony murder rule and on the basis of malice,
premeditation, and deliberation; and (5) these murders involved the use of at least two
semiautomatic assault rifles and a pistol against young, unarmed victims, resulting in multiple
close range gunshot wounds to each victim’s head or neck.  
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from
judgments imposing a sentence of death entered by Judge V.
Bradford Long on 20 December 2006 in Superior Court, Randolph
County, upon jury verdicts finding defendant guilty of two counts
of first-degree murder.  Heard in the Supreme Court 15 December
2008.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by John H. Watters,
Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Barbara S.
Blackman, Assistant Appellate Defender; and Thomas K.
Maher for defendant-appellant.
EDMUNDS, Justice.
Defendant George Thomas Wilkerson was indicted for the
first-degree murder of Casey Dinoff and for the first-degree
murder of Christopher VonCannon.  Defendant was also indicted for
one count of first-degree burglary.  He was tried by jury and on
15 December 2006, was convicted of both counts of first-degree
murder on the basis of malice, premeditation, and deliberation
and also under the felony murder rule.  In addition, defendant
was convicted of first-degree burglary, but because the burglary
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was the felony underlying the felony murder convictions, it
merged with the felony murders for sentencing purposes. 
Following a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended a
sentence of death.
Defendant appealed his capital convictions to this
Court.  We conclude that defendant’s trial and capital sentencing
proceeding were free from prejudicial error and that defendant’s
sentence of death is not disproportionate.
Defendant, who sold drugs illegally, lived with his
girlfriend Kimberly Kingrey in her apartment in Asheboro, North
Carolina.  Defendant’s source of illicit prescription drugs was
William Davis (hereinafter, Mr. Davis), while his source of
marijuana and cocaine was Josh Allred.  In addition, defendant
purchased firearms from Mr. Davis.  Defendant’s friend Logan
Malanowski sold drugs for defendant and delivered them to
defendant’s buyers.  Defendant’s friend Joe Ferguson also sold
drugs, and Malanowski and Ferguson often stayed with defendant
and Kingrey in her apartment.
Victim Casey Dinoff and his brother Corey Wyatt lived
with their parents in a mobile home at 6975 Adams Farm Road in
Randleman, North Carolina.  Adams Farm Road is a two-lane road
that runs parallel to North Carolina Highway 220, a four-lane
divided highway.  A gravel driveway that could be barred by a
cattle gate ran from Adams Farm Road to the mobile home. 
Nighttime illumination was provided by a porch light near the
home’s front door and a street lamp in the yard facing the
driveway.
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The parents of Dinoff and Wyatt were long-distance
truck drivers who were away from home on 10 January 2005.  That
morning, Dinoff called Malanowski to purchase Oxycontin. 
Malanowski drove Kingrey’s silver Ford Taurus to the mobile home
to make the delivery, arriving between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m. 
Malanowski was high and had forgotten to bring the Oxycontin, so
he unsuccessfully attempted to sell Dinoff and Wyatt a silver
nine millimeter handgun with a laser sight instead.  Between 4:00
and 5:00 p.m., Dinoff left with Malanowski to retrieve the
Oxycontin from Kingrey’s apartment.  Malanowski returned about
forty-five minutes later, dropping Dinoff off with the Oxycontin. 
Dinoff and Wyatt began ingesting the Oxycontin and smoking
marijuana.
That same afternoon, defendant, who was carrying a
black Heckler & Koch pistol whose serial number had been filed
off, purchased an AK-type rifle and at least one SKS rifle from
Mr. Davis.  Mr. Davis had modified the AK-type rifle by adding an
automatic trigger mechanism.  However, the modification was
unsuccessful and the weapon never fired more than eight rounds
before jamming.  Mr. Davis had also added a folding stock to the
SKS.  During the transaction, defendant and Malanowski posed with
the firearms and defendant, who appeared inebriated, high on
drugs, or both, said in a joking manner that he was going to kill
some people who had stolen from him.  Malanowski agreed that he
and defendant planned to kill somebody because “people can’t be
stealing from us.”
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During the evening of 10 January 2005, defendant,
Malanowski, Ferguson, and Allred consumed drugs at a party in
Kingrey’s apartment.  Defendant was using cocaine and smoking
marijuana; Ferguson ingested a large quantity of prescription
drugs; and Kingrey used cocaine, smoked marijuana, and took Xanax
and Clonopin.  At about 8:00 or 9:00 p.m., defendant became
frustrated and anxious because he could not find his cocaine. 
After he and Malanowski searched the apartment for the missing
drugs, defendant began to make threatening telephone calls to
Dinoff, accusing him of stealing the cocaine, which was worth
thirty dollars.  Defendant claimed that the cocaine had been laid
out in Kingrey’s apartment to “test” Dinoff, and he threatened to
shoot Dinoff unless he received thirty dollars.  Defendant
continued to call and threaten Dinoff during the course of the
evening.
At least three rifles and two handguns were in
Kingrey’s apartment at the time of the party.  Kingrey described
one handgun as black and having no serial number, while the other
was silver with a laser sight.  Kingrey saw defendant “playing”
with the firearms during the party, and after Kingrey went to
bed, she heard someone shooting a firearm from the porch.  She
came out of her bedroom and, believing that defendant had fired
the shot, told him to leave and take the guns with him.
Before defendant departed, Kingrey overheard him
speaking on the phone, threatening loudly that he was “coming to
get” the person to whom he was speaking.  Defendant, wearing a
black leather jacket, black T-shirt, and black corduroy pants,
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drove away in Kingrey’s silver Ford Taurus.  After defendant
left, Kingrey noticed that one of the rifles and both handguns
were no longer in the apartment.  Defendant’s favorite grey
striped stocking cap was also missing from the apartment after
that night.  A surveillance video camera at a Quik-Chek in
Asheboro, North Carolina, recorded defendant wearing such a hat
at 12:12 a.m.
In response to defendant’s repeated threats to shoot
Dinoff, between 8:00 and 10:00 p.m. Dinoff and Wyatt began
calling their friends, including Jason Sharpe and Christopher
VonCannon, asking that someone drive to their home and pick them
up.  Wyatt also called 911.  However, when one of Dinoff’s
friends arrived with his wife, Dinoff sent them away after
deciding that he and Wyatt could remain at home.
Randolph County Sheriff’s Deputy Todd Blakely responded
to Wyatt’s 911 call and arrived at the residence around 11:00
p.m.  Dinoff and Wyatt met Deputy Blakely at the driveway’s
cattle gate and explained that defendant had repeatedly
threatened to shoot Dinoff over a dispute involving thirty
dollars.  Deputy Blakely advised Dinoff and Wyatt to swear out a
warrant at the magistrate’s office, then drove approximately one
and one-half miles back down Adams Farm Road to the nearest exit
and parked where any vehicle approaching Dinoff and Wyatt’s
residence would have to pass him.  After waiting for twenty to
twenty-five uneventful minutes, Deputy Blakely cleared the call
and went about his other duties.
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Sharpe drove with VonCannon out to the Adams Farm
residence around midnight and parked at the cattle gate, where
Wyatt met them.  Wyatt explained that he and Dinoff had recently
received another phone call in which Malanowski said that the
missing drugs had been found and that they were coming to share a
quarter bag of marijuana with Dinoff and Wyatt as a “peace
offering.”  Wyatt, Sharpe, and VonCannon began to walk back up
the gravel driveway.  The porch light was on and a street lamp in
the yard lit the driveway.
As they approached the mobile home, they saw two men
standing on the porch.  The first man, who was wearing a black
leather coat and a cap, held a handgun.  The second man was
wearing a grey sweatshirt with the hood up and carrying a rifle. 
Wyatt yelled out Logan Malanowski’s name.  The first man looked
up, then kicked open the front door and went inside.  Sharpe
observed this individual silhouetted against the light in the
home and saw that he was carrying a rifle at his side.  Wyatt
also saw this man enter the home, then immediately afterward
heard gunfire and saw flashes of light through the home’s
windows.  Sharpe also heard gunfire.  Both Sharpe and Wyatt
testified that they saw one man enter the house and heard two
types of gunshots.
The second man stepped off the porch and walked toward
Wyatt, VonCannon, and Sharpe.  Sharpe observed this man standing
in the yard in the light of the street lamp, looking at Wyatt,
VonCannon, and him.  Although Wyatt briefly saw the face of the
second man from a distance, he was unable to identify him. 
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However, VonCannon called out either “Logan” or “Joe” and
approached the second man, while Wyatt stood in the driveway as
Sharpe ran to unlock his car.  Sharpe then returned for Wyatt,
and the two ran to Sharpe’s car.  The last time either Wyatt or
Sharpe saw VonCannon alive, he was standing in the front yard
talking to the second man.  Wyatt last saw Dinoff alive in
Dinoff’s bedroom in the mobile home.
Sharpe drove to the nearest pay telephone, where Wyatt
called 911.  When reporting the shooting, Wyatt identified
defendant, Malanowski, and Ferguson as the perpetrators. 
Although Sharpe had not seen the face of either man at the scene,
he encouraged Wyatt to identify defendant because of defendant’s
repeated threats in the preceding hours to kill Dinoff.
At about 1:00 a.m., a telephone call from defendant
awoke Kingrey.  Defendant, who was screaming and difficult to
understand, instructed Kingrey to report her car stolen.  At that
time, Kingrey saw that Ferguson was asleep on her couch.  Kingrey
placed a 911 call to report that her car was not where she parked
it, but added that she did not want to press charges.  Shortly
thereafter, Kingrey received a call from Allred, who told her
that he was coming to her apartment and to pack up everything
illegal because police were on their way to “kick [her] door in.” 
In response to Allred’s phone call, Kingrey wrapped in a sheet
the two rifles defendant had left in her apartment and threw them
into the bushes behind her house.  However, when Allred arrived,
he helped Kingrey retrieve the rifles from the bushes and pack up
the drug paraphernalia.  Allred told Kingrey he had driven by
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Adams Farm Road, where he saw an ambulance at Dinoff’s home and
Kingrey’s Taurus parked on the roadside.  Before leaving, Kingrey
and Allred shook and slapped Ferguson in an attempt to awaken
him, but “he didn’t budge.”  Allred then drove Kingrey to the
sheriff’s office, stopping on the way to dispose of the
contraband at a friend’s house.
Deputy Blakely and Randolph County Sheriff’s Deputies
Williams and Creason were dispatched to the Adams Farm Road
residence in response to the shooting.  They arrived at
approximately 1:08 a.m. and discovered that telephone wires into
the home had been cut.  Inside the home, they found Dinoff lying
on a couch and VonCannon lying on the floor at the entrance to
the kitchen.  Both were dead.  Dinoff had suffered a close range
gunshot wound to the left side of his face, a second close range
gunshot wound slightly to the left of his nose, a gunshot wound
to the front of his right shoulder, two gunshot wounds to his
left forearm, and a reentry wound to his chest.  A bullet
recovered from his body had been fired by the AK-style rifle.  A
black leather wallet lay on the couch next to Dinoff’s right hip. 
One spent nine millimeter pistol casing and three spent Wolf
brand 7.62x39 caliber rifle casings were found in the same room. 
VonCannon had suffered two gunshot wounds to his neck.  A bullet
recovered from his body had been fired from the nine millimeter
handgun later recovered with the rifles.  One spent Winchester
brand nine millimeter caliber pistol casing was found in the
kitchen.  Two additional spent 7.62x39 caliber rifle casings were
also found in the area.
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In the south bedroom of the mobile home, crime scene
specialist Kelly Cummings observed two bullet holes in a closet
door and two spent 7.62x39 caliber rifle casings.  In the hallway
outside the north bedroom, Cummings located a spent 7.62x39
caliber rifle casing and observed a hole in the bedroom door from
a bullet that had passed through the striker plate.  Inside the
north bedroom, Cummings observed two bullet holes in the mattress
and located an additional spent 7.62x39 caliber rifle casing. 
Cummings also found multiple live 7.62x39 caliber rounds
throughout the home.
Outside, officers found a twenty dollar bill lying in
the center of the driveway.  At the tree line across Adams Farm
Road and northeast of the crime scene, officers located a 7.62
millimeter caliber SKS-style rifle with a scope and a black
aftermarket folding pistol grip stock, and a 7.62 millimeter
caliber AK-type rifle with a wood butt stock and black pistol
grip.  The rifles were concealed together under pine needles and
leaves.  Nearby, officers also recovered several torn sets of
latex gloves and a loaded Heckler & Koch nine millimeter
semiautomatic pistol, model USP.  The pistol’s serial number had
been filed off.
Defendant was apprehended at approximately 1:00 a.m. on
11 January 2005 by Randolph County Sheriff’s Deputy Joe LaRue. 
Deputy LaRue was driving northbound on North Carolina Highway 220
in response to the 911 shooting call when he observed an eighteen
wheel tractor-trailer with its parking lights on parked on the
shoulder of the northbound lane.  As he approached, Deputy LaRue
-15-
saw a person he later identified as defendant hiding in the
truck’s tandem tires.  He shone his high beam lights and
spotlight on the wheels and ordered defendant to lie on the
ground.
After being taken into custody, defendant told Deputy
LaRue that he had been walking to his father’s house along
Highway 220 and hid under the tractor-trailer after hearing
gunshots.  When Officer LaRue patted defendant down, he found a
set of car keys.  Defendant explained that the keys belonged to
his girlfriend, whose silver Ford Taurus had broken down and was
parked across the road on the shoulder of southbound Highway 220.
Malanowski was apprehended in Randleman, North
Carolina, at 8:00 a.m. on 11 January 2005 at a pay telephone in a
Lowe’s Foods store.  A search incident to Malanowski’s arrest
yielded a pair of wire cutters in one of his pockets.
After defendant’s arrest, he gave a series of
statements to Detective Aundrea Azelton.  When the detective
began the interview by attempting to administer defendant’s
Miranda warnings, defendant responded that he understood his
rights and said, “No, I don’t need a lawyer.  Yeah, I’ll talk to
you.”  Defendant then signed a printed waiver of his Miranda
rights.  In his first statement, given at 2:54 a.m., defendant
denied any involvement in the murders.  He related that he left
Kingrey’s apartment in her car and drove to see his father, who
lived near Adams Farm Road.  However, he experienced car trouble
and, although he turned around to return to Kingrey’s, the car
broke down on Highway 220.  Defendant said he then “heard five
-16-
blasts, maybe more, but a series of explosions, one after
another.”  He said that “[i]t sounded like land mines or
grenades” and “[w]hen I looked over toward the wooded area, I saw
flashes of light.”  Defendant explained that he saw a mobile home
through the woods and that the porch light was on.  According to
defendant, two white men ran out of the home and drove away. 
Defendant hid to avoid being injured by shrapnel, believing that
he was safest between the truck’s tires.  While giving this
statement, defendant received a call on his cellular telephone
from Mr. Davis.  Defendant told Mr. Davis that he was at the
sheriff’s office and was being questioned.  Detective Azelton did
not want defendant to receive information from outside the
interview room, so she seized the phone at the conclusion of
defendant’s first statement.
Detective Azelton then confronted defendant with
information her colleagues had received from Kingrey, telling
defendant that Kingrey said he left the apartment with someone
else in the car.  Defendant responded by giving a second
statement in which he said that he had driven Malanowski to
Dinoff and Wyatt’s residence to sell marijuana.  Defendant
explained that Malanowski paid him twenty dollars to take him
there, but that he made Malanowski walk to the house alone when
Kingrey’s car broke down.  Defendant said he did not think
Malanowski had a gun, adding that Sharpe was probably the shooter
and may have kidnapped Malanowski.  Defendant told Detective
Azelton that
Jason[] [Sharpe’s] favorite thing to do is,
or his MO, Modus Operandi, is he will cut
-17-
someone’s phone lines, kick the door in and
go in shooting. . . .  Logan said he wanted
to go up to Casey[] [Dinoff’s] house and get
him back.  He said he wanted to go kill him. 
Logan had a handgun with him, a nine
millimeter. . . .  It must have been him and
Jason that did the shooting.
Defendant added that he had fired Malanowski’s pistol two days
earlier.  When a Randolph County Sheriff’s detective later
collected gunshot residue from defendant, he said the residue on
his hands was from that previous incident.
Defendant then changed his statement again, saying that
he had driven both Malanowski and Ferguson to the mobile home
because they told him they intended to share a bag of marijuana
with Dinoff, whom they had falsely accused of stealing Ferguson’s
cocaine.  According to defendant, Malanowski and Ferguson went up
to the mobile home while he stayed in the car.
At that point, Detective Azelton took a break to sort
out the names defendant had given her and to consult with other
investigators.  Based upon additional information received from
Kingrey, Detective Azelton returned and confronted defendant,
telling him it was unlikely Ferguson left Kingrey’s apartment. 
In response, defendant gave another statement.  In this statement
defendant said that he and Malanowski went to Dinoff’s house
intending to scare Dinoff.  Because Kingrey’s car broke down,
they walked through the wooded area to the front door.  Defendant
said that Malanowski carried a nine millimeter handgun and an
AK-type rifle.  According to defendant, Malanowski cut the
telephone lines, then went to the front porch and kicked in the
door.  Malanowski entered the house and started shooting, and
-18-
defendant ran away to his car.  Defendant stated that Ferguson
and Kingrey were not present and Malanowski was the only shooter. 
Defendant signed this statement and Detective Azelton took it to
the other investigators.
Lieutenant Davis and Detective Julian returned to the
interview room with Detective Azelton and, when Lieutenant Davis
asked defendant what had happened, defendant admitted that he
went to the front door of the mobile home with Malanowski but ran
away when the shooting started.  However, when Lieutenant Davis
and Detective Julian left the room, defendant told Detective
Azelton that he went inside the mobile home and searched the
pockets of Dinoff and VonCannon while Malanowski held them at
gunpoint with the SKS rifle.  Defendant said that Malanowski
“unloaded the rifle” into Dinoff because Dinoff did not have any
money.  Defendant said that VonCannon asked to go home, but
Malanowski “shot him right in the face” after stating that there
could be “no witnesses.”  Defendant further revised his
statement, saying that Malanowski carried two rifles and a
handgun.  Defendant added that Malanowski wore gloves but he did
not.  Defendant offered to show Detective Azelton where
Malanowski had left the weapons.  The weapons and several pairs
of torn latex gloves were recovered in the area defendant
identified.
While removing defendant’s handcuffs before
interviewing him, Detective Azelton observed a narrow rubber ring
encircling defendant’s wrist.  After the interview, she noticed
the ring was missing.  Detective Azelton replaced defendant’s
-19-
handcuffs and, while patting him down, located the ring in
defendant’s coat pocket.  She seized the ring, which later was
found to be consistent with a torn latex glove recovered with the
firearms.
Two days later, on 13 January 2005, Detective Azelton
encountered defendant at the jail.  Although defendant had said
nothing to her earlier about the twenty dollar bill found in
Dinoff’s driveway, defendant volunteered that the money was not
his.  Defendant added that “he had told us that it was his, but
what he meant was that the twenty dollars was probably the money
[Malanowski] was supposed to pay him for taking him up there.  He
said that [Malanowski] probably dropped it as he was running from
the house.”  Later that same day, defendant made a written
request to speak with Detective Azelton.  In his request,
defendant stated that if he was allowed to meet with Kingrey
first, he would tell investigators “everything” and “the
statement I told earlier is a complete and total lie.  [T]here
were three people, not two.”  However, when Detective Azelton and
Lieutenant Davis met with defendant in person, he declined to
talk to them in the absence of Kingrey.
Defendant made another request to speak with Lieutenant
Davis.  On 15 January 2005, defendant told the lieutenant that he
had consumed cocaine the Friday before the shooting and LSD the
Saturday before the shooting and had difficulty distinguishing
what really happened.  He said that he and Malanowski drove to
the mobile home, with Ferguson following, and that Malanowski
told defendant to wait in the car, then left with some guns. 
-20-
Defendant told Lieutenant Davis that his next memory was being in
a police car.
While in custody after his arrest, defendant made a
series of recorded telephone calls to Kingrey and Ferguson. 
During a call made at 8:54 p.m. on 13 January 2005, defendant
apologized to Ferguson “for all the trouble” he had caused him,
told Ferguson that he wished Ferguson, or somebody, had stopped
him from going out that night, agreed that Ferguson was so high
he “couldn’t move,” and encouraged Ferguson to make a statement
incriminating Sharpe.  In another call made on 19 January 2005 at
7:53 p.m., defendant told Kingrey that he and Malanowski were “in
this together.”  He also stated:
I looked everybody in the eye, that’s what
scares me . . . is that I had damn — I had a
lot more heart than I thought I did. . . . 
And do you know what scares me even more?
K. Kingrey:  What?
G. Wilkerson:  That it was easy.  There
was no second thoughts, no f---ing
hesitation, no nothing.  It was just like in
a damn movie.
During this same conversation, defendant told Kingrey, “If the
car would have started, I would have got away clean.”  Later, in
a conversation with Kingrey on 28 January 2005, defendant said he
was going to “tell them that Joe [Ferguson] was the third
person,” but was dissuaded when Kingrey responded that Ferguson
was going to be a State’s witness who would testify on her
behalf.
At trial, Ferguson testified for the State that he had
purchased the SKS rifle from Mr. Davis at the same time defendant
purchased the AK-style rifle.  Defendant did not present evidence
-21-
but sought to establish through cross-examination that he was not
involved in the shootings and that Ferguson, Malanowski, and
possibly Allred were the perpetrators.
Additional facts will be set forth as necessary for the
discussion of specific issues.
GUILT-INNOCENCE PHASE
[1] Defendant raises eighteen issues.  In his first
argument, defendant contends that the State violated his
Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process by failing
to correct false testimony given by its witness Kimberly Davis. 
She is the wife of William Davis, who allegedly provided drugs to
defendant for resale and sold firearms to him.  Mrs. Davis
testified that, shortly before the murders, defendant and
Malanowski came to her home to purchase at least one SKS rifle
and an AK-type rifle from her husband.  She saw defendant and
Malanowski “posing” with the firearms that were sold and
testified that defendant “said he was going to go and kill some
people because they had stolen from him” and that defendant and
Malanowski were “going back and forth about yeah, we’re going to
go kill somebody, people can’t be stealing from us.”  Mrs. Davis
identified State’s exhibit number one as the Heckler & Koch
pistol defendant was carrying when he arrived at her house,
State’s exhibit number two as an SKS rifle that her husband sold
to defendant and Malanowski, and State’s exhibit number three as
an AK-type rifle similar to the one that her husband sold to the
two men.  Both the SKS rifle and the AK-type rifle were recovered
across Adams Farm Road, not far from the scene of the shootings. 
-22-
Thus, Mrs. Davis’ testimony supported the State’s theory that the
murders of Dinoff and VonCannon were premeditated revenge
killings carried out, at least in part, by defendant.
Prior to defendant’s trial, Mrs. Davis was convicted in
federal court of maintaining a dwelling for the sale of
controlled substances and possession of a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime.  Mrs. Davis elected to become a
cooperating witness and assisted federal authorities in
prosecuting her husband and two of his associates for multiple
gun and drug crimes.  As a result of her substantial assistance,
Mrs. Davis’ federal sentence was reduced to thirty-five months’
imprisonment.
At the time of defendant’s trial, Mrs. Davis was
serving her federal sentence.  Defendant contends that Mrs. Davis
gave false testimony when she stated that she had not been
promised any additional consideration or sentence reduction from
the state prosecutor in exchange for her testimony against
defendant.  In particular, defendant states that a letter of
understanding sent by the state prosecutor to Mrs. Davis’ defense
attorney establishes that Mrs. Davis expected to receive an
additional sentence reduction in exchange for her testimony
against defendant.  Defendant argues that the State was obligated
to correct her false testimony.
As to Mrs. Davis’ trial testimony, she denied during
her direct examination that she had been promised any reduction
in her federal sentence:
Q.
Okay.  Now Ms. Davis, you said you were
in federal custody.  Are you testifying
-23-
here today under the promise of any
consideration?
A.
No.
Q. 
Okay.  Have you already been sentenced
in federal court?
A.
Yes, I have.
Q. 
Have you been told that your attorney
would be made aware of your cooperation?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay.  Anything been promised to you
specifically about your federal
sentence?
A. 
No.
The letter in question, which was not made available to
the jury but is part of the record, was sent by the state
prosecutor to Mrs. Davis’ defense attorney in her federal case. 
The letter provides:
This letter pertains to your client Kimberly
Davis and her testimony in the capital murder
cases against George Wilkerson. . . .  This
letter will set forth the agreement we have
regarding Ms. Davis’ testimony.  I will
provide a copy of this letter to Wilkerson’s
defense attorneys.
At this point I do expect to call Ms. Davis
as a State witness.  In exchange for her
complete and honest testimony I will commit
to making the Federal Court aware of her
cooperation and the value in prosecuting
Wilkerson.  I will do this in any manner
required of me, including a letter,
deposition, or testimony.  I understand that
my disclosure may form the basis of a motion
to reduce Ms. Davis’ federal sentence she is
currently serving, and may result in a
sentence reduction if the judge rules in her
favor.
Ms. Davis should understand that if she is
not completely forthright or I find she
testifies untruthfully, I will also notify
the Federal prosecutors of this fact as well. 
I reserve the right to subject Ms. Davis to a
polygraph if I believe it to be necessary.
I have dismissed the state charges brought
against Ms. Davis.  This dismissal is because
she was prosecuted federally for these
-24-
offenses.  (I have also dismissed the state
charges against the other defendants in the
matter who were prosecuted federally.)  These
dismissals are not contingent upon Ms. Davis’
cooperation in the Wilkerson case.  The
dismissals were taken because after talking
with [Assistant United States Attorney]
Kearns Davis, I believe your client was
sentenced appropriately and see no need for
subsequent state prosecution.  AUSA Davis is
of the opinion that your client was truthful
and that her cooperation was material and
very helpful in the prosecution of the other
defendants prosecuted federally.
This letter details the full and complete
nature of my agreement and expressed intent
regarding Kimberly Davis.  If you believe
that something else was promised or implied
and is not stated in this letter or is stated
incorrectly, you must notify me in writing
immediately so that we can clear it up. 
Wilkerson’s attorneys have a right to know
the full extent of any agreement between the
State and Ms. Davis before she testifies.  To
my knowledge this letter states that
completely and accurately.  Please let me
know if you believe otherwise.
A copy of this letter was contemporaneously provided by the
State’s prosecutor to defendant’s attorney.
When the State obtains a conviction through the use of
evidence that its representatives know to be false, the
conviction violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 3 L. Ed. 2d
1217, 1221 (1959); accord State v. Boykin, 298 N.C. 687, 693-94,
259 S.E.2d 883, 887-88 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 911, 64
L. Ed. 2d 264 (1980).  “The same result obtains when the State,
although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go
uncorrected when it appears.”  Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 3 L. Ed.
2d at 1221.  If the false evidence is material in the sense that 
there is “any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony
-25-
could have affected the judgment of the jury,” the defendant is
entitled to a new trial.  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
103, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 349-50 (1976); accord State v. Sanders,
327 N.C. 319, 336, 395 S.E.2d 412, 424 (1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1051, 112 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1991).  Evidence that affects the
jury’s ability to assess a witness’ credibility may be material. 
See, e.g., Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 3 L. Ed. 2d at 1221
(explaining that “[t]he jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and
reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt
or innocence”).
A state prosecutor has no authority to file a motion in
federal court seeking the reduction of a federal sentence imposed
upon anyone convicted of a federal crime.  See Fed. R. Crim. P.
35(b)(1).  At most, a state prosecutor may notify federal
authorities that a federal defendant has cooperated in a state
prosecution, with the understanding that the notification may
lead a federal prosecutor to move in federal court for a
reduction in the defendant’s federal sentence on the basis of the
defendant’s “substantial assistance” in the state prosecution. 
Id.  A federal prosecutor’s decision whether to make such a
motion is discretionary.  Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181,
185, 118 L. Ed. 2d 524, 531 (1992) (holding, in part, that a
federal prosecutor has “a power, not a duty, to file a motion
when a defendant has substantially assisted”).  If the federal
prosecutor makes the motion, the decision whether to allow it and
reduce a defendant’s sentence lies with the United States trial
-26-
court.  18 U.S.C.A. § 5K1.1 (Thomson/West 2007) (Federal
Sentencing Guidelines).
Accordingly, the state prosecutor’s agreement to inform
federal authorities of Mrs. Davis’ truthful testimony did not,
and could not, guarantee that Mrs. Davis’ sentence would be
reduced, nor could the communication of the information to the
federal prosecutor directly result in the filing of a motion to
reduce Mrs. Davis’ sentence.  She accurately testified that she
had no assurance of an additional reduction in her sentence. 
There was no quid pro quo and no inaccuracy in her testimony for
the prosecutor to correct.
To the extent that Mrs. Davis’ testimony may have led
jurors mistakenly to believe that she could not receive a benefit
from her testimony against defendant, any misunderstanding was
corrected by her subsequent admission during cross-examination
that she hoped her sentence would be further reduced.
Q.
Okay.  And I know by your earlier
answers, you’re saying nothing’s been
promised to you in this case, correct?
A.
Correct.
Q.
As far as your coming in here and taking
the stand and cooperating, is that
correct?
A. 
That is.
Q.
But by testifying in this case you are
hoping to get even more hope [sic] on
your federal sentence, aren’t you?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay.  You’re not just in here because
you’re a good citizen, correct?  You
want something in exchange.
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay.  And you’re hoping to get your
thirty-five (35) month jail sentence
reduced even further, is that correct?
A.
Yes.
-27-
Q.
And you’re hoping that you may even get
your jail sentence reduced to the point
that you get out of jail?
A.
I don’t think that’s possible.
Q.
Is that what you’re hoping?
A.
I guess it’s always good to hope.
Because this exchange accurately explained Mrs. Davis’ motive for
testifying and her interest in defendant’s prosecution, jurors
had ample evidence with which to assess her credibility.  In
addition, the State’s closing argument acknowledged the
possibility of an additional reduction when the prosecutor
stated:  “There’s no deal with her other than she came in here to
tell the truth, and the deal was if she tells the truth then the
federal authorities can do whatever they do.”  Accordingly, the
State did not obtain defendant’s conviction through the use of
false testimony, nor did the State permit false testimony to go
uncorrected.  These assignments of error are overruled.
[2] Defendant’s next two arguments are related to his
Napue claim.  Defendant’s second contention is that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to
object to or correct Mrs. Davis’ false testimony and later
affirmatively misstated during closing argument that the
prosecutor had not entered into a “deal” with Mrs. Davis.  Third,
defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to
intervene ex mero motu when the prosecutor told the jury during
closing argument that Mrs. Davis did not testify pursuant to a
“deal.”  The record indicates that defense counsel extensively
cross-examined Mrs. Davis about her federal charges and the
benefits she had received in federal court for her cooperation. 
As detailed above, there was no quid pro quo between the State
-28-
and Mrs. Davis, and any ambiguity created by Mrs. Davis’ direct
testimony was corrected on cross-examination.  Accordingly,
defendant’s second and third assignments are overruled.
[3] Fourth, defendant argues that the trial court
committed plain error by permitting Detective Azelton to give
improper opinion testimony as to whether any evidence implicated
Joe Ferguson in the murders.  The testimony in question was
elicited by the prosecutor during redirect examination of
Detective Azelton after defense counsel attempted during cross-
examination to establish that Kingrey, who corroborated
Ferguson’s alibi, had changed her story about Ferguson’s
whereabouts on the night of the murders.  Specifically, Kingrey
testified on direct examination that she found Ferguson asleep in
her apartment when defendant woke her with a telephone call
instructing her to report that her car had been stolen.  On
cross-examination, she testified that Ferguson was wearing tennis
shoes before she went to bed but was wearing boots when
defendant’s call awakened her about an hour later.  She added
that, during the following week, Ferguson cleaned those boots
every day, focusing on a dark spot that Kingrey thought might be
blood.  She confirmed under cross-examination that she had not
been able to awaken Ferguson after defendant called.  When
defense counsel asked Kingrey if she later entered into a sexual
relationship with Ferguson, Kingrey denied it.  Defense counsel
did not ask Kingrey if she had ever changed her story relating to
Ferguson’s behavior the night of the shootings.
-29-
Detective Azelton testified thereafter about her
investigation of the murders.  Defense counsel cross-examined her
as to Kingrey’s truthfulness.  While under cross-examination,
Detective Azelton acknowledged that Kingrey admitted being
untruthful to police in aspects of her first statements. 
However, Detective Azelton further testified under
cross-examination that Kingrey had consistently related that
Ferguson was asleep in her apartment at the time of defendant’s
telephone call.  Detective Azelton concluded from Kingrey’s
statements that “[i]f Joe [Ferguson] was at [Kingrey’s] apartment
and he was asleep, then he wasn’t with [defendant]” at the time
of the murders.
While being cross-examined, Detective Azelton also
denied that Kingrey had told her either that Ferguson had changed 
from tennis shoes to work boots that night or that Ferguson was
obsessed with scrubbing a spot out of the work boots.  Detective
Azelton added that Ferguson arrived at the police station the
morning after the murders wearing tennis shoes and in a
photograph of Ferguson taken the morning after the murders, he
can be seen wearing tennis shoes.
Thereafter, during redirect examination of Detective
Azelton, the prosecutor asked about her investigation of
Ferguson’s possible involvement in the murders.
Q.
. . . [Defense counsel] asked you a lot
of questions about Joe Ferguson.  As the
lead investigator in this case, what is
the sum total of the evidence that you
have implicating Joe Ferguson in the
murders of Casey Dinoff and Chris
VonCannon?
A. 
None. 
-30-
. . . .
Q.
Is there any reason if you had any
evidence against Joe Ferguson why you
wouldn’t have charged him with first-
degree murder?
A.
None whatsoever.
Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error by
admitting Detective Azelton’s lay opinion that she had no
evidence implicating Ferguson.  Defendant contends that
Ferguson’s possible involvement was the “crucial question to be
resolved by the jury from the evidence.”  Jones v. Bailey, 246
N.C. 599, 601-02, 99 S.E.2d 768, 770 (1957) (indicating that a
witness could not express an opinion as to an opinion or
conclusions that “invaded the province of the jury”).
Initially, we note that Detective Azelton’s testimony
that she had no evidence implicating Ferguson is not necessarily
an opinion.  The statement describes the results of her
investigation and her interpretation of those results.  See
generally 2 Kenneth S. Broun, Brandis & Broun on North Carolina
Evidence § 175, at 3 (6th ed. 2004) (recognizing that “[t]here is
no precise definition of either ‘facts’ or ‘opinions,’ and no
precise line is drawn between them”).  Nor is it obvious that her
testimony about Ferguson invaded the province of the jury to
determine the ultimate issue of defendant’s guilt.  When, as
here, multiple perpetrators act in concert, one suspect’s
involvement does not necessarily vitiate the culpability of
another.  State v. Thomas, 325 N.C. 583, 595, 386 S.E.2d 555, 561
(1989).  Detective Azelton’s exclusion of Ferguson did not ipso
facto implicate defendant.  Therefore, we conclude that Detective
-31-
Azelton’s statement that she did not possess evidence against
Ferguson was not equivalent to a statement that she believed
defendant was guilty.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Detective Azelton’s
testimony was an otherwise inadmissible opinion, it was properly
admitted under the circumstances presented here.  We have
observed that “the law wisely permits evidence not otherwise
admissible to be offered to explain or rebut evidence elicited by
the defendant himself” in circumstances in which evidence,
otherwise unexplained, is likely to mislead the jury.  State v.
Albert, 303 N.C. 173, 177, 277 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1981) (reasoning
that the defendant’s testimony that he had volunteered to take a
lie detector test, if “unexplained, could well lead the jury to
believe that the State had refused to give [the] defendant such a
test, or that [the] defendant had taken the test with favorable
results”).  “Such evidence is admissible to dispel favorable
inferences arising from [the] defendant’s cross-examination of a
witness.”  State v. Johnston, 344 N.C. 596, 605-06, 476 S.E.2d
289, 294 (1996).  Defendant’s cross-examination of Detective
Azelton elicited the possibilities that Kingrey was untruthful,
that Ferguson shot the victims, and that Detective Azelton failed
properly to evaluate Ferguson as a suspect.  In so doing,
defendant opened the door to redirect examination establishing
both that Azelton had considered these possibilities and the
reason she excluded them.  The trial court did not commit plain
error in allowing this testimony.  This assignment of error is
overruled.
-32-
[4] Fifth, defendant argues that the trial court erred
by overruling his objection when Kingrey testified that the
reason she removed contraband from her apartment the morning
after the murders was because she believed defendant had killed
someone.  Defendant argues the testimony was inadmissible because
Kingrey did not personally know that defendant killed someone
and, as a result, the testimony was an impermissible opinion as
to his guilt.
As detailed above, Kingrey’s testimony on direct
examination established that defendant, Malanowski, and Ferguson
ingested drugs at a party in Kingrey’s apartment on the night of
the murders and that when defendant left in Kingrey’s car, he
took at least one rifle and two handguns with him.  Before he
departed driving Kingrey’s car, defendant made a phone call,
during which Kingrey heard defendant loudly say that he was
“coming to get” the person he had called.  At about 1:00 a.m., an
obviously upset defendant called Kingrey from his cell phone and
told Kingrey to report her car stolen.  Shortly thereafter, Josh
Allred, who supplied defendant with cocaine and marijuana for
resale, called Kingrey to say that he was coming to the
apartment.  Kingrey wrapped the two remaining rifles in a sheet
and threw them into bushes behind her apartment.  When Allred
arrived, he helped Kingrey retrieve the rifles and pack up the
drug paraphernalia.  Allred then drove Kingrey to the sheriff’s
department, stopping to dispose of the contraband on the way.
Defense counsel’s cross-examination questions of
Kingrey appeared to implicate Allred by emphasizing his knowledge
-33-
of the murders and his role in cleaning up Kingrey’s apartment. 
After acknowledging that Allred had been charged as an accessory
and that he always carried a gun, Kingrey confirmed that Allred
telephoned to tell her to pack up everything illegal because
police were on their way to “kick [her] door in” and that Allred
asked for the guns as soon as he arrived.  Kingrey also confirmed
that Allred told her that he had been to Adams Farm Road where he
saw an ambulance at Dinoff’s home, that Kingrey’s Taurus had been
parked on the roadside, and that someone had been shot.
Defense counsel further elicited that defendant did not
tell Kingrey to hide the rifles.  This line of questioning
included the following exchange:
Q. 
And he [Allred] told you you needed to
quote, pack your shit, didn’t he?
A. 
Yes, he did.
Q. 
By that, what did he mean you needed to
pack?
A. 
Anything that was illegal.
. . . .
Q. 
And is that why you took the guns and
wrapped them in the blanket and put them
in the bushes?
A. 
No, sir.  They were already in the
bushes when I had done that.  He asked
me to go outside and get them back out
of the bushes and bring them in so he
could take them.
Q. 
All right.  Why did you put the guns in
a blanket and go outside and put them in
a bush then?
A. 
I was scared.  I didn’t want them in my
house.
Q. 
All right.  What were you scared of?
A. 
I heard [defendant] acting erratically
on the telephone and I knew something
had gone wrong.
On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Kingrey to explain
her testimony:
-34-
Q. 
[Defense counsel] asked you a bunch of
questions about why you cleaned the
apartment out, why you did those things. 
He never asked you the ultimate
question.  Why were you doing those
things?  What did you think George
[defendant] had done?
A.
Uh —
[Defense Counsel]:  We’ll object as
to what she thought he had done.
[Prosecutor]:  I think the door’s
been opened by the extensive
questioning on that.
[Defense Counsel]:  Not on that
issue.
The Court:  Overruled.  Ask
the question again, please.
Q.
[Prosecutor:]  What did you think George
[defendant] had done when you were
cleaning out the apartment?
A. 
I thought that he probably had killed
somebody because he left with guns and
he was on drugs that really altered his
perception.
Generally, “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible.” 
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 402 (2007).  “Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”  Id. Rule
403 (2007).  Even though a defendant may open the door to
otherwise inadmissible testimony, as explained above, “[a]
witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced
sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of
the matter.”  Id. Rule 602 (2007). 
A witness is testifying from personal knowledge when
she describes her own state of mind and explains the thoughts
motivating her own behavior.  Kingrey’s redirect testimony
explained why she removed the guns and drugs from her apartment. 
This testimony showed that she, acting alone, made the decision
to hide the guns because she knew defendant had left the
-35-
apartment with firearms and under the influence of drugs and, as
a result of what she had seen and heard, feared that he had shot
someone.  This information explaining why she acted as she did
was within Kingrey’s personal knowledge and was admissible to
clarify evidence elicited by defense counsel on cross-
examination.  Kingrey’s explanation of her motivation was not an
opinion as to defendant’s guilt.  These assignments of error are
overruled.
[5] Sixth, defendant argues that the trial court
committed plain error when it permitted eyewitness Jason Sharpe
to testify during cross-examination that he knew in his heart who
shot Dinoff and VonCannon and that defendant “was the ringleader
of everything.”  Defendant argues that this testimony was
inadmissible because Sharpe was unable to identify either of the
two individuals he saw at Dinoff’s home during the murders, and
therefore, Sharpe did not have personal knowledge that defendant
was the shooter.  Defendant argues that, as a result, this
testimony was an impermissible opinion as to defendant’s guilt. 
Defendant did not move to strike Sharpe’s testimony at trial.
Sharpe’s direct examination testimony established that
he was standing in Dinoff’s driveway at the time of the murders. 
Sharpe had driven to the mobile home with VonCannon to pick up
Dinoff and Wyatt, whom they believed to be “in fear of their
lives” after receiving threats from defendant.  Sharpe knew
defendant was angry because defendant believed Dinoff had stolen
drugs from him earlier that day.
-36-
Wyatt met Sharpe and VonCannon at the entrance to
Dinoff’s driveway, where Wyatt told Sharpe that, although
defendant and Malanowski had made threats, “one of them called
back” to say they found the missing drugs.  According to Wyatt,
defendant and Malanowski were on their way to Dinoff’s home to
“make up” by sharing a quarter bag of marijuana with Dinoff and
Wyatt.  Sharpe testified that he thought this “sudden” change in
defendant’s and Malanowski’s moods was “weird.”
Sharpe walked toward the mobile home and, as he
approached, heard a loud noise, like the sound of a door being
kicked in, and saw a person standing in the doorway, holding a
rifle in one hand.  Sharpe heard VonCannon shout at a second
person who was standing off to the left side of the home.  Then
Sharpe noticed that the first person had gone inside the home. 
Gunfire ensued, and Sharpe described hearing two distinct types
of gunshots.  He then drove Wyatt to a service station where
Wyatt called 911.
During cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to
establish that Sharpe did not know defendant was at the mobile
home because he did not actually see the faces of the two men who
committed the murders.  Although Sharpe twice conceded that he
could not testify that he saw defendant’s face, in answering
subsequent questions Sharpe volunteered that he believed both
that the murders were not random and that they were committed by
defendant because defendant had threatened Dinoff and Wyatt. 
Additional cross-examination clarified that Sharpe knew the
threats were made by a “clique group” that included Malanowski
-37-
and Ferguson, as well as defendant.  When defense counsel asked
Sharpe to confirm again that he could not identify the shooter,
Sharpe responded:  “I didn’t see his face.  But I know in my
heart one hundred percent without a doubt that I know the person
that shot them.”  Defense counsel did not move to strike Sharpe’s
response.
Thereafter, during recross-examination, defense counsel
attempted to establish that Sharpe’s initial statement to police
included Malanowski and Ferguson as possible perpetrators, but
not defendant.  When confronted with his previous statement,
Sharpe responded in part:  “I don’t know why I wouldn’t have
mentioned George Wilkerson’s [defendant’s] name.  I mean because
pretty much, he was the ringleader of everything. . . . 
[Defendant] was the main one person that I do believe had the
main thing to do with it.”  Again, counsel did not move to strike
Sharpe’s response.
Defendant argues that because Sharpe was not able to
identify either intruder he saw at Dinoff’s home, he lacked
personal knowledge that defendant was the shooter, and therefore,
his testimony was an impermissible opinion as to defendant’s
guilt.  The State responds that if the disputed testimony was
improper, the error was invited because the testimony was
elicited by defense counsel during cross-examination.  N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1443(c) (2007) (“A defendant is not prejudiced . . . by
error resulting from his own conduct.”).  For the reasons stated
below, we conclude that defense counsel did not invite Sharpe’s
-38-
nonresponsive outburst but that admission of the testimony did
not amount to plain error.
A witness’ testimony is nonresponsive if it exceeds the
scope of the question or fails to answer the question.  See State
v. Peele, 281 N.C. 253, 258-59, 188 S.E.2d 326, 330-31 (1972). 
Here, defense counsel asked Sharpe two narrow questions:  (1)
“[Y]ou didn’t see the person as so [sic] you can identify who it
is, did you?” and (2) “You never mentioned George Wilkerson, did
you? . . .  Would you like to look at your statement?”  Sharpe’s
responses that he knew in his heart who killed Dinoff and
VonCannon and that defendant was “the ringleader of everything”
were neither within the scope of defense counsel’s questions nor
given in response to a question.  Thus, these answers were
nonresponsive.  Moreover, these answers were not based upon
Sharpe’s personal knowledge, as required by N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule
602.  Therefore, Sharpe’s answers were improper and inadmissible.
Nevertheless, even if a cross-examination answer is
nonresponsive, a defendant must move to strike the answer or the
objection is waived.  State v. Chatman, 308 N.C. 169, 177-78, 301
S.E.2d 71, 76-77 (1983).  Because defendant did not make such a
motion, we review admission of this evidence for plain error. 
N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4); State v. Mitchell, 328 N.C. 705, 711,
403 S.E.2d 287, 290 (1991).
Plain error is error “so fundamental as to amount to a
miscarriage of justice or which probably resulted in the jury
reaching a different verdict than it otherwise would have
-39-
reached.”  State v. Bagley, 321 N.C. 201, 213, 362 S.E.2d 244,
251 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 99 L. Ed. 2d 912 (1988).
“We find plain error ‘only in exceptional cases where, after
reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is
a fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so
lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done.’” 
State v. Hammett, 361 N.C. 92, 98, 637 S.E.2d 518, 522 (2006)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The transcript demonstrates that Sharpe was hostile
toward defendant and resisted defense counsel’s attempts to
control cross-examination.  Even so, defense counsel effectively
established that Sharpe was unable to see the face of either
assailant and impeached Sharpe by confronting him with a prior
inconsistent statement to police in which Sharpe failed to name
defendant as a possible perpetrator of the crimes.  Thus, defense
counsel elicited information that diminished the force of
Sharpe’s nonresponsive statements.  In light of other evidence
presented by the State, we do not believe the trial court
committed plain error by not striking this evidence ex mero motu. 
These assignments of error are overruled.
[6] Seventh, defendant argues that defense counsel’s
assistance was rendered ineffective by his failure to move to
strike Sharpe’s volunteered statements.  To prevail on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show
that (1) defense counsel’s “performance was deficient,” and (2)
“the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”  Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984);
-40-
accord State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 562-63, 324 S.E.2d 241,
248 (1985).  Counsel’s performance is defective when it falls
“below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693.  A defendant is prejudiced by
deficient performance when there is “a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”  Id. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d
at 698; see also Braswell, 312 N.C. at 563, 324 S.E.2d at 248. 
“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698.
As detailed above, defense counsel elicited Sharpe’s
concession that he did not see the face of either perpetrator. 
Counsel also impeached Sharpe with a prior inconsistent statement
to investigators in which Sharpe did not identify defendant as a
participant.  In so doing, counsel significantly undercut the
impact of Sharpe’s opinion as to the assailant’s identity.  Other
evidence, recited in detail above, established that defendant
armed himself, went to Dinoff’s home to avenge a perceived wrong,
and later told his girlfriend that “it was easy. . . . just like
in a damn movie.”  On this record, we cannot say that Sharpe’s
inadmissible testimony probably resulted in the jury returning a
different verdict than it would have reached had the evidence not
been admitted.  Because defendant was not prejudiced, his counsel
was not ineffective in failing to strike Sharpe’s inadmissible
testimony.  This assignment of error is overruled.
-41-
[7] Eighth, defendant argues that the trial court erred
by permitting Mrs. Davis to testify that defendant purchased
drugs and guns from her husband on the day of the murders. 
Defendant asserts that the testimony was inadmissible because
Mrs. Davis did not actually witness the purported sales and could
not testify from personal knowledge that the sales took place. 
Mrs. Davis’ testimony was admitted over defendant’s objection.
Mrs. Davis testified that Mr. Davis had robbed two
pharmacies and sold the stolen prescription drugs from their
home.  The drugs were kept in the back bedroom and all sales were
made in that room as well.  According to Mrs. Davis, her friend
Marcos Cruz brought defendant to her house either on the day of
the murders or the day before.  Defendant spoke with Mr. Davis,
and the two then went into the back bedroom together.  Mrs. Davis
understood that Cruz had brought defendant to the house for the
purpose of buying drugs and concluded that the reason her husband
took defendant into the back bedroom was to sell defendant
prescription drugs.
On the day of the murders, defendant telephoned Mr.
Davis.  After speaking with defendant, Mr. Davis left the house
and later returned with three SKS rifles that he placed on the
dining room table, along with an AK-style rifle.  Defendant
thereafter arrived with Malanowski and the two began joking,
posing with the guns to determine who looked better with which
weapon.  Mrs. Davis heard defendant say that he was going to kill
some people because they had stolen from him, though he appeared
inebriated and spoke in a joking manner.  The entire transaction
-42-
lasted between twenty and thirty minutes, during which time Mrs.
Davis was sitting in an adjoining room.  Mrs. Davis testified
that after defendant left, the AK-style rifle and at least one
SKS rifle were gone and her husband then had more than one
thousand dollars in cash.  Based upon what she had heard and
seen, Mrs. Davis testified that defendant bought and paid for the
AK-47.  Defendant objected to Mrs. Davis’ testimony that
defendant purchased drugs and guns from her husband.
As discussed above, “[a] witness may not testify to a
matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a
finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter.”  N.C.G.S.
§ 8C-1, Rule 602.  However, “‘personal knowledge is not an
absolute but may consist of what the witness thinks he knows from
personal perception.’”  Id. cmt. (quoting advisory committee’s
note).  In addition, a witness who is not testifying as an expert
may testify to an opinion or inference that is “(a) rationally
based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in
issue.”  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 701 (2007).
As to the alleged drug transaction, although N.C.G.S.
§ 8C-1, Rule 701 allows a lay witness to offer an opinion
rationally based upon her perceptions, in this instance Mrs.
Davis’ perception was simply that her husband sold drugs out of
the back bedroom and that he went into the back bedroom with
defendant.  She did not hear defendant ask for drugs or see any
drugs.  Because the evidence supporting Mrs. Davis’ assumption
that her husband sold drugs to defendant is not based upon
-43-
personal knowledge or perception, and because her inference that
a drug deal occurred is a supposition based largely on guesswork
and speculation, we conclude that the trial court erred in
overruling defendant’s objection to this testimony.
Even so, evidentiary error does not necessitate a new
trial unless the erroneous admission was prejudicial.  State v.
Alston, 307 N.C. 321, 339-40, 298 S.E.2d 631, 644 (1983); see
also State v. Hickey, 317 N.C. 457, 473, 346 S.E.2d 646, 657
(1986) (stating that “erroneous admission of hearsay is not
always so prejudicial as to require a new trial”).  A defendant
is prejudiced by evidentiary error “when there is a reasonable
possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a
different result would have been reached at the trial out of
which the appeal arises.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (2007).  “The
burden of showing . . . prejudice under [subsection 15A-1443(a)]
is upon the defendant.”  Id.; accord State v. Milby, 302 N.C.
137, 142, 273 S.E.2d 716, 720 (1981).  In light of the other
evidence against defendant and the relative insignificance of
this evidence of one purported drug sale, we further conclude
that the error was not prejudicial.
Turning next to Mrs. Davis’ testimony that her husband
sold one or more firearms to defendant, although she did not
witness a complete transaction in that she did not see money
change hands, Rule 701 permits a lay witness to testify to an
inference that is “(a) rationally based on the perception of the
witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony
or the determination of a fact in issue.”  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule
-44-
701.  When Mrs. Davis testified that she observed that her
husband had procured firearms after speaking with defendant; that
when defendant and Malanowski arrived, Mr. Davis showed the
weapons to defendant; that she heard defendant explain his need
for a firearm; that she noticed that weapons were missing from
the house after defendant departed; and that afterwards she saw
that her husband had a substantial amount of cash, we conclude
that Mrs. Davis’ natural inference that a sale took place is
supported by her perceptions and is admissible under Rule 701. 
See generally 2 Kenneth S. Broun, Brandis & Broun on North
Carolina Evidence § 175, at 2-4 (6th ed. 2004).
Moreover, even if Mrs. Davis’ testimony that her
husband sold the weapons to defendant was improper, any error in
its admission was not prejudicial.  The gravamen of her testimony
was that defendant obtained from her husband weapons with which
to kill “some people” who had stolen from him.  Whether or not
defendant obtained them through a sale is immaterial. 
Accordingly, there is no “reasonable possibility that, had the
error in question not been committed, a different result would
have been reached at the trial.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a).  These
assignments of error are overruled.
[8] Defendant’s ninth argument is that the trial court
erred by permitting Wyatt to testify over defendant’s objection
that Dinoff told him defendant had threatened them both in a
telephone call.  Defendant argues that Dinoff’s statement to
Wyatt was inadmissible hearsay and that the State failed to
-45-
establish a foundation for admission of the statement under the
excited utterance exception in section 8C-1, Rule 803(2).
Wyatt testified that on the day of the murders, Dinoff
called Malanowski to purchase some Oxycontin.  When Malanowski
arrived, he had forgotten the drugs and instead unsuccessfully
attempted to sell Wyatt and Dinoff a handgun.  Dinoff left with
Malanowski and the two returned forty-five minutes later with the
Oxycontin.  After Malanowski dropped Dinoff off, Wyatt and Dinoff
began smoking marijuana and taking Oxycontin.
Shortly after Malanowski left, Dinoff received a
telephone call.  Wyatt testified that Dinoff was visibly upset by
the call.  Dinoff told Wyatt that defendant had accused him of
stealing cocaine worth thirty dollars when he went with
Malanowski to get the Oxycontin.  Dinoff told Wyatt that
defendant said the cocaine had been “laid out” to “test” him. 
According to Wyatt, Dinoff said defendant threatened to kill him. 
Thereafter, Dinoff continued to receive additional calls from a
person purportedly making the same accusations and threats.  As a
result of receiving the threats, Wyatt and Dinoff telephoned
friends to come and pick them both up.  Wyatt also called 911. 
Defendant objected to Wyatt’s testimony about the conversation
between defendant and Dinoff, arguing that Dinoff’s description
of the contents of the calls was inadmissible hearsay and that
the State did not lay a proper foundation for its admission under
the excited utterance exception.
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
-46-
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”  Id. § 8C-1,
Rule 801(c) (2007).  Although hearsay is generally not
admissible, “[a] statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by the event or condition” is not excluded by
the hearsay rule.  Id. Rule 803(2) (2007).  Whether a statement
is an excited utterance is determined by the state of mind of the
speaker.  State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 86-87, 337 S.E.2d 833, 841
(1985).  To fall within the exception, the proponent must
establish that there was “(1) a sufficiently startling experience
suspending [the declarant’s] reflective thought and (2) a
spontaneous reaction, not one resulting from reflection or
fabrication.”  Id. at 86, 337 S.E.2d at 841.
Wyatt’s testimony established that receiving the call
surprised Dinoff, who became visibly upset during the call and
immediately afterwards related to Wyatt that defendant had made
the call and had threatened to kill Dinoff.  Dinoff believed
defendant wrongfully accused him of stealing cocaine and was
disturbed enough to telephone a friend and ask for
transportation.  Dinoff’s statements represented a spontaneous
reaction to an event that was sufficiently startling to suspend
his reflective thoughts.  Accordingly, we conclude that Wyatt’s
testimony laid a sufficient foundation for admission of Dinoff’s
statements as excited utterances.  These assignments of error are
overruled.
[9] Tenth, defendant argues that the trial court
committed plain error by admitting the entire tape recording of
-47-
Wyatt’s call to 911 just before the shooting.  During the call,
Wyatt told the 911 dispatcher that:
some people have just called and threatened
my life and my family and stuff and told me
that my brother stole something from them. 
And that — they said that if they come up
here and they don’t get their money and
stuff, that they’re gonna shoot us. . . . 
And I need — I need like someone to patrol my
area, like, down my road and stuff.
After providing his name, address, and telephone number, Wyatt
continued:
It’s a guy named George, and there’s a —
there’s another guy — The other two guys, I
know their full names.  It’s Logan Malanowski
and Joe Ferguson.  And they’re driving a
silver Ford Taurus.
. . . .
911:  Do you think they’re on their way?
C. Wyatt:  He told me that they’d be
here in 15 minutes, and we need a car up
here.  And we’re possibly — we’re possibly
gonna leave.  But more than likely they’ll
rob us.
. . . .
911:  Do you think they’ll have weapons?
C. Wyatt:  Yeah.  He told — they got
guns.  I know they got guns.  They got guns
with little laser pointers on them.  They got
.09 millimeters.
. . . .
911:  . . .  And they stated they would
kill you?
C. Wyatt:  They told me that if — you
know, if they did not get thirty bucks, that
they were going to shoot anyone who came
across them.
Defendant argues that the trial court should not have
admitted Wyatt’s statement that “more than likely they’ll rob us”
because Wyatt was speculating about defendant’s intention. 
Defendant contends that the prejudicial effect of this statement
substantially outweighed any probative value it may have had. 
The trial court overruled defendant’s initial request to redact
-48-
the statement.  Because defendant did not renew this objection
when the tape was played and the transcript published to the
jury, defendant correctly asserts only that admission of the
statement constitutes plain error.
“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.”  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 401
(2007).  “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice . . . .”  Id. Rule 403.  “‘Unfair prejudice,’ as
used in Rule 403, means ‘an undue tendency to suggest decision on
an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, as an
emotional one.’”  State v. DeLeonardo, 315 N.C. 762, 772, 340
S.E.2d 350, 357 (1986) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 403 cmt.).
Here, Wyatt’s statement was relevant to explain to the
dispatcher why he felt threatened by defendant and why he called
911.  Defendant argues that the statement was nevertheless
unfairly prejudicial because armed robbery was the predicate
felony supporting the charges of burglary and first-degree
murder.  Defendant contends that Wyatt’s statement in the 911
call encouraged jurors to conclude that defendant intended to
commit armed robbery when in fact, Wyatt was only speculating. 
According to defendant, admission of the statement deprived him
of a fair trial.  However, Wyatt related in the 911 call the
threatening caller’s own statement concerning his motive:  “They
told me that if — you know, if they did not get thirty bucks,
-49-
that they were going to shoot anyone who came across them.”  In
context, this statement may be understood as a threat to take
thirty dollars from Wyatt and Dinoff at gunpoint or, in other
words, as a threat to commit armed robbery.  Wyatt’s comment that
it was more than likely they were going to commit a robbery
merely clarifies and restates this evidence, to which defendant
did not object.  For the reasons stated above, we conclude that
the probative value of the disputed evidence was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
Admission of the statement was not error, plain or otherwise.  
This assignment of error is overruled.
[10] Defendant’s eleventh argument is that the trial
court erred by admitting the police report created at the time of
Mr. Davis’ arrest.  The report was admitted for the purpose of
establishing Mr. Davis’ cellular telephone number.  At
defendant’s trial, the State showed that the cell phone number,
which was provided by Mr. Davis upon his arrest, was the same
number defendant dialed while hiding under the tractor-trailer on
Highway 220 immediately after the shooting.  The State called as
a witness the cell phone report’s record creator, Randolph County
Sheriff’s Department Captain Barry Bunting, and moved to admit
the police report as a business record.  Defendant objected,
conceding that the report was an admissible business record but
arguing that the information contained within that business
record was information constituting inadmissible hearsay.  The
trial court overruled defendant’s objection and admitted the
report as substantive evidence.  In so doing, the court concluded
-50-
that the reliability of Mr. Davis’ statements to police was a
question of weight, not admissibility, and that “the reliability
of that information is subject to cross examination . . . of [the
arresting officer] by defendant’s counsel.”  On appeal, defendant
also argues that admission of this hearsay evidence violated his
Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, namely
Mr. Davis.
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”  N.C.G.S.
§ 8C-1, Rule 801(c).  Here, as at trial, defendant concedes that
the primary document, Mr. Davis’ arrest report, is an admissible
business record.  However, defendant contends the telephone
number contained in the report memorializes an assertion made by
Mr. Davis at the time of his arrest and is therefore hearsay. 
The State does not argue that the phone number meets any
statutory hearsay exception, nor do we see any applicable
exception.  Hearsay statements that do not meet a statutory
exception are presumptively unreliable and inadmissible.  Id.
Rule 802 (2007).  Accordingly, the trial court erred by admitting
the portion of Mr. Davis’ arrest report that contained his cell
phone number.
As explained previously, evidentiary error does not
necessitate a new trial unless the error was prejudicial. 
Alston, 307 N.C. at 339-40, 298 S.E.2d at 644.  Defendant argues
that erroneous admission of Mr. Davis’ cell phone number was
prejudicial because defendant’s telephone contact with Mr. Davis
-51-
was important circumstantial evidence that tended to show
defendant was the shooter.  However, in light of the entire case
presented by the State, defendant has not established that “there
is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not
been committed, a different result would have been reached” by
the jury.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a).  Other substantial evidence
presented by the State established defendant’s intent to shoot
Dinoff, his purchase and possession of the murder weapons, his
presence in the mobile home at the time of the shooting, his
attempt to cover up his actions, and his inculpatory statements
made while awaiting trial.  In addition, the State offered other
evidence from which jurors could conclude defendant called Mr.
Davis after the murders, including Mrs. Davis’ testimony that Mr.
Davis received a telephone call at approximately 1:00 a.m. on the
night of the murders, defendant’s cell phone records, which
showed he made multiple calls shortly after the murders, and Mr.
Davis’ call to defendant’s cell phone during defendant’s
interview with Detective Azelton.  Accordingly, the trial court’s
erroneous admission of Mr. Davis’ phone number was not
prejudicial.
Although defendant also argues that admission of this
hearsay violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront Mr. Davis,
defendant did not object on this basis before the trial court. 
“[C]onstitutional error will not be considered for the first time
on appeal.”  State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 366, 611 S.E.2d 794,
822 (2005); see also N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1) (“In order to
preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have
-52-
presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or
motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party
desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not
apparent from the context.”).  Because defendant did not raise
this constitutional issue at trial, he has failed to preserve it
for appellate review and it is waived.  Chapman, 359 N.C. at 366,
611 S.E.2d at 822.  Accordingly, this assignment of error is
overruled.
[11] Twelfth, defendant argues that the trial court
erred by admitting over his objection Jason Sharpe’s testimony as
to the reputation of victim VonCannon for peacefulness.  When the
prosecutor asked Sharpe, “What was his [VonCannon’s] reputation
for peacefulness?,” Sharpe responded:
For peacefulness?  He wasn’t a violent
person, I know that.  I mean, yeah, he’s a
little crazy, you know, like we all were, you
know, I mean we were young punks, you know,
you know, you know, I mean we do drugs and
stuff, but I mean he wasn’t the type of
person to just maliciously, you know, just
want to create random acts on people and you
know, get in fights with people and stuff
like that.  He was always an easygoing laid
back kind of guy.
Evidence of a victim’s character is inadmissible during
the guilt-innocence phase of a capital trial unless offered by
the accused to show a “pertinent trait of character of the victim
of the crime” or by the State “to rebut the same.”  N.C.G.S. §
404(a)(2) (2007).  Therefore, “the State cannot introduce
evidence of the victim’s peacefulness until after defendant has
put forward evidence that the victim was the first aggressor.”
State v. Faison, 330 N.C. 347, 356, 411 S.E.2d 143, 148 (1991). 
-53-
Here, there was no such evidence, and the State concedes that the
trial court erred by admitting the testimony.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, evidentiary error
does not require reversal unless the error was prejudicial,
Alston, 307 N.C. at 339-40, 298 S.E.2d at 644, and the burden of
showing prejudice is on the defendant, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a);
Milby, 302 N.C. at 142, 273 S.E.2d at 720.  For purposes of
section 15A-1443(a), prejudice means “a reasonable possibility
that, had the error in question not been committed, a different
result would have been reached at the trial out of which the
appeal arises.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a).
The prejudicial effect of character evidence is usually
understood to be its tendency to persuade jurors that the person
being described acted in conformity with his or her reputation
for having a certain character trait.  See, e.g., id. § 8C-1,
Rule 404 cmt. (“‘Character evidence is susceptible of being used
for the purpose of suggesting an inference that the person acted
on the occasion in question consistently with his character.’” 
(quoting advisory committee’s note)).  Accordingly, the
prejudicial effect of Sharpe’s testimony that VonCannon was not a
violent person would be its tendency to persuade jurors that
VonCannon was not violent on the night he was killed.  After
reviewing the record as a whole, we are satisfied that defendant
was not prejudiced by this testimony.  Other evidence showed that
two men armed with at least two semiautomatic assault rifles and
a pistol murdered the unarmed victims.  Defendant acknowledges in
his brief that all admissible evidence indicates VonCannon did
-54-
not provoke the attack, and, in fact, no evidence indicates that
any aspect of VonCannon’s character played any role in the events
of 10 and 11 January 2005.  Accordingly, we conclude that any
prejudicial effect arising from the admission of this
inadmissible character evidence was de minimis.  There is no
reasonable possibility that a different result would have been
reached at trial had the disputed testimony been excluded.
Defendant nevertheless argues that the prejudicial
effect of the evidence was to “engender undue sympathy for a
person having simply been in the wrong place at the wrong time.” 
However, Sharpe’s description of VonCannon is a genuinely mixed
bag, on the one hand characterizing him as “crazy,” a “young
punk,” and a drug user, while on the other hand depicting him as
not violent or malicious, and “easygoing.”  This testimony does
not paint a particularly appealing picture and would not
necessarily generate sympathy for VonCannon.  Moreover, this
short testimony was given in response to a single question. 
After reviewing Sharpe’s testimony in context and considering the
entirety of the State’s evidence, we conclude that this disputed
testimony did not encourage jurors to convict defendant out of
sympathy for VonCannon.  This assignment of error is overruled.
[12] Thirteenth, defendant argues that the trial court
erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu during the
prosecutor’s guilt-innocence phase closing argument. 
Specifically, defendant contends that the prosecutor argued facts
not in evidence when he told the jury the reason Allred advised
Kingrey that defendant and Malanowski had shot someone was that
-55-
defendant had given Allred this information in a telephone call
following the shootings.  Defendant also contends that the
prosecutor improperly argued that Allred knew to clean out
Kingrey’s apartment because of defendant’s supposed call to
Allred:
And do you know that Josh Allred, the
testimony is, shows up at the apartment and
what does he say according to Kimmey Kingrey? 
He says George and Logan done shot somebody. 
We gotta get this sh-t out of the apartment. 
Now how did he know that?  How does Josh
Allred know that?  He knows it because on the
side of the road George Wilkerson called him
and said man, go clean my apartment out. 
Kimmey’s got no car, because the car is right
there.  I gotta deal with my car and I gotta
deal [with] my apartment, so clean them guns
and the dope out of the apartment.
Defendant emphasizes that the State did not call Allred as a
witness to testify to the substance of the phone call.
Defendant further argues that the prosecutor, while
discussing the theory of acting in concert, improperly told
jurors that Malanowski would also be tried for involvement in the
killings.  Defendant states that this argument “minimized the
importance for the jury in determining whether the evidence
supported Wyatt’s identification of Malanowski or supported the
State’s contention that [defendant] fired the shots.”
In a closing argument in a criminal trial, “an attorney
may not . . . make arguments on the basis of matters outside the
record except for matters concerning which the court may take
judicial notice.”  Id. § 15A-1230(a) (2007).  “Counsel may,
however, argue to the jury the law, the facts in evidence, and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.”  State v. Alston, 341
-56-
N.C. 198, 239, 461 S.E.2d 687, 709-10 (1995) (citing State v.
Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 398, 428 S.E.2d 118, 144 (1993)), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1148, 134 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1996).  “The standard
of review for assessing alleged improper closing arguments that
fail to provoke timely objection from opposing counsel is whether
the remarks were so grossly improper that the trial court
committed reversible error by failing to intervene ex mero motu.” 
State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 133, 558 S.E.2d 97, 107 (2002).
Here, the prosecutor’s argument that Allred knew about
the murders because defendant told him about them is a reasonable
inference that can be drawn from evidence introduced through
telephone records and the testimony of Detective Azelton
indicating that defendant’s cellular telephone was used to make
several calls to Allred’s cellular telephone around the time the
murders were committed.  Similarly, the prosecutor’s argument
that Allred thus knew to advise Kingrey to clean out her
apartment may be inferred from the same evidence.  State v. Frye,
341 N.C. 470, 498, 461 S.E.2d 664, 678 (1995) (“Prosecutors may,
in closing arguments, create a scenario of the crime committed as
long as the record contains sufficient evidence from which the
scenario is reasonably inferable.”), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1123,
134 L. Ed. 2d 526 (1996).  The prosecutor’s arguments drew
reasonable inferences from this evidence and were not improper,
let alone grossly improper.
Moreover, the prosecutor’s argument that defendant and
Malanowski would be equally guilty was an accurate statement of
law applicable to the State’s theory of the case, which was that
-57-
defendant and Malanowski acted in concert to commit the murders. 
“Under the doctrine of acting in concert when two or more persons
act together in pursuance of a common plan or purpose, each is
guilty of any crime committed by any other in pursuance of the
common plan or purpose.”  Thomas, 325 N.C. at 595, 386 S.E.2d at
561; see also State v. Joyner, 297 N.C. 349, 356-57, 255 S.E.2d
390, 395 (1979).  The trial court instructed the jury on the
State’s theory after determining that the State presented
sufficient evidence from which jurors could find that defendant
and Malanowski acted in concert.  Because section 15A-1230(a)
permits counsel to argue applicable law, the prosecutor’s
argument was not improper.  These assignments of error are
overruled.
[13] Fourteenth, defendant argues that the trial court
erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu when the prosecutor
expressed personal opinions during closing arguments in the
guilt-innocence phase of defendant’s trial.  Specifically,
defendant states that the prosecutor committed gross impropriety
by vouching for the credibility of Mrs. Davis and Kimberly
Kingrey when he argued:
Did you hear on cross-examination him damage
[Mrs. Davis’] credibility one bit?  She was
matter of fact, she told the truth, and what
she said is corroborated, and I’ll get to
some of that later.
. . . .
[Kimberly Kingrey] does get into some bizarre
testimony that she thinks that Josh Allred is
wearing boots.  But I told you the pictures
[sic] that he’s not wearing boots when he’s
taken to — down to be questioned.  He’s
wearing skateboarder tennis shoes.  What’s
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Kimmey Kingrey talking about?  I don’t know. 
I put Kimmey Kingrey up as my witness because
I think she’s telling the truth, but is she
or was she at the time someone that is a
likeable person?  No, she’s not.  I don’t
pretend that she is.  But I do know that the
evidence is consistent with her testimony.
(Emphasis added.)
Defendant further avers that the prosecutor improperly argued his
personal belief in defendant’s guilt when he said:
If two or more persons join in a common
purpose to commit murder, each of them if
actually or constructively present is not
only guilty of that crime if the other person
commits the crime but is also guilty of any
other crime committed by the other in
pursuance of the common purpose to commit
murder or as a natural or probable
consequence thereof.  Common sense.  If you
and I form the intent and yet I’m
constructively present or actually present,
but you do all the acts, we’re both guilty,
and that’s why Logan Malanowski’s day is
coming in that seat.  Even though he has
admitted killing both of these victims and
the evidence is overwhelming that he did,
Logan Malanowski is charged, you’ve heard the
evidence, and he’s going to be sitting there
soon.  Because under this theory of acting in
concert, he’s just as guilty as [defendant].
(Emphasis added.)
As above, “[t]he standard of review for assessing alleged
improper closing arguments that fail to provoke timely objection
from opposing counsel is whether the remarks were so grossly
improper that the trial court committed reversible error by
failing to intervene ex mero motu.”  Jones, 355 N.C. at 133, 558
S.E.2d at 107.
“During a closing argument to the jury an attorney may
not . . . express his personal belief as to the truth or falsity
of the evidence or as to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. . . .”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1230(a).  However, “prosecutors
-59-
are allowed to argue that the State’s witnesses are credible.” 
State v. Augustine, 359 N.C. 709, 725, 616 S.E.2d 515, 528
(2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 925, 165 L. Ed. 2d 988 (2006).  As
to Mrs. Davis, the prosecutor did not personally vouch for her
veracity but instead provided jurors reason to believe Mrs. Davis
by arguing that her testimony was truthful because it was
corroborated.  Somewhat similarly, as to Kingrey, the prosecutor
pointed out that her testimony was consistent with the evidence. 
In so doing, the prosecutor conceded weaknesses by acknowledging
that Kingrey is not a likeable person and that some of Kingrey’s
statements, such as her statements about Ferguson’s footwear, did
not fit the State’s theory of the case.  While the prosecutor’s
passing comment that he believed Kingrey was telling the truth
violated section 15A-1230(a), the comment was made while
admitting weaknesses in her testimony.  Taken in context, we do
not believe this argument about Kingrey was so grossly improper
that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to
intervene ex mero motu.
As to the prosecutor’s argument that defendant and
Malanowski are equally culpable for the murders of Dinoff and
VonCannon, we concluded above that the prosecutor correctly
explained the legal theory of acting in concert.  The
prosecutor’s statement that “[Malanowski]’s just as guilty as
[defendant]” was part of this argument, pointing out that the law
allows two people to be found guilty of one crime.  Because the
prosecutor’s depiction of the law was accurate, the argument was
proper.  These assignments of error are overruled.
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[14] Fifteenth, defendant argues that, should this
Court conclude that no single error identified in the guilt phase
of his trial was prejudicial, the cumulative effect of the errors
nevertheless was sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial. 
Cumulative errors lead to reversal when “taken as a whole” they
“deprived [the] defendant of his due process right to a fair
trial free from prejudicial error.”  State v. Canady, 355 N.C.
242, 254, 559 S.E.2d 762, 768 (2002).  Although defendant has
contended to this Court that numerous errors were made during
trial, we have found error only in the admission of (1) hearsay
in the form of Mr. Davis’ cell phone number, (2) Sharpe’s opinion
testimony concerning VonCannon’s reputation for peacefulness, and
(3) Mrs. Davis’ assumption that her husband sold drugs to
defendant in their back bedroom.  In addition, the prosecutor’s
personal vouching for Kingrey’s veracity was improper.  However,
these errors, individually or collectively, do not fatally
undermine the State’s case.  We have reviewed the record as a
whole and, after comparing the overwhelming evidence of
defendant’s guilt with the evidence improperly admitted, we
conclude that, taken together, these errors did not deprive
defendant of his due process right to a fair trial.  This
assignment of error is overruled.
[15] In his sixteenth argument, defendant contends that
the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the
charges of felony murder and first-degree burglary. 
Specifically, defendant contends that the State failed to present
sufficient evidence that he possessed the felonious intent that
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is an essential element of first-degree burglary, see State v.
Maness, 321 N.C. 454, 461, 364 S.E.2d 349, 352 (1988), when he
broke and entered into Dinoff and Wyatt’s residence.  “When
considering a motion to dismiss, the trial court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the
State the benefit of all reasonable inferences.”  State v.
Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 161, 604 S.E.2d 886, 904 (2004), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 830, 163 L. Ed. 2d 79 (2005).  “If substantial
evidence exists to support each essential element of the crime
charged and that defendant was the perpetrator, it is proper for
the trial court to deny the motion.”  Id.  “Substantial evidence
is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.”  State v. Miller, 363 N.C. 96,
99, 678 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2009) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).  Supporting evidence may be “direct,
circumstantial, or both.”  State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358,
368 S.E.2d 377, 383 (1988).  Moreover, “evidence of what a
defendant does after he breaks and enters a house is evidence of
his intent at the time of the breaking and entering.”  State v.
Gray, 322 N.C. 457, 461, 368 S.E.2d 627, 629 (1988); accord State
v. Williams, 330 N.C. 579, 585, 411 S.E.2d 814, 818 (1992).
Here, the State’s evidence showed that defendant
threatened to kill Dinoff over thirty dollars worth of cocaine
that defendant believed Dinoff had stolen.  In a 911 call made
shortly after receiving the threats, Wyatt stated:  “He told me
that they’d be here in fifteen minutes” and “[t]hey told me that
if — you know, if they did not get thirty bucks, that they were
-62-
going to shoot anyone who came across them.”  In one of his 11
January 2005 statements to Detective Azelton, defendant
acknowledged that he was inside the mobile home at the time of
the murders and that he searched Dinoff’s and VonCannon’s
pockets.  Defendant added that Dinoff was shot when it became
apparent that he did not have any money, though he named
Malanowski as the shooter.  Investigators found Dinoff’s wallet
next to his body on the couch and a twenty dollar bill on the
gravel driveway outside the home.  Although Detective Azelton did
not mention the twenty dollar bill to defendant, during a
statement to Detective Azelton made two days later, defendant
volunteered that the money was not his, explaining that
Malanowski probably dropped the bill when running from the home. 
From this substantial evidence the jurors could find that
defendant broke and entered into Dinoff and Wyatt’s residence
with intent to commit felony larceny therein.
Defendant interprets other evidence introduced in this
case to support his arguments either that the murders were
committed solely for the purpose of preserving the perpetrators’
reputations as drug dealers or that the perpetrators had
abandoned their intent to rob Dinoff by the time they broke into
the mobile home.  However, “[w]hen ruling on a motion to dismiss
for insufficient evidence . . . . [a]ny contradictions or
conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the State and
evidence unfavorable to the State is not considered.”  Miller,
363 N.C. at 98, 678 S.E.2d at 594 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, these assignments of error are overruled.
-63-
[16] Seventeenth, defendant contends the trial court
committed prejudicial error when it denied his motion to suppress
his post-arrest statements to investigators.  Defendant argues
that these statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), because his
statements “were involuntary” and because he was unable to waive
his rights “knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.”  The gist
of defendant’s arguments is first, that he was intoxicated and
thus unable to waive his rights consistent with Miranda and
second, that the statements resulted from improper official
coercion.  Defendant claims that the admission of his statements
at trial violated his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Sections 18, 19, 23, 24, and 27 of the North Carolina
Constitution.
Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress his
statements, and the trial court conducted a voir dire hearing on
the motion.  After hearing evidence from Detective Azelton and
Lieutenant Davis and considering the arguments of counsel, the
trial court made extensive oral findings of fact.  In those
findings, the trial court determined that the evidence showed
defendant was apprehended at approximately 1:00 a.m. on 11
January 2005, and Detective Azelton was assigned to interview
him.  Defendant appeared relieved when Detective Azelton entered
the interrogation room, and although defendant refused to speak
to Sheriff Hurley, he agreed to talk to Detective Azelton.
-64-
The trial court further found that Detective Azelton
observed that defendant’s pupils were dilated and his eyes were
red and glassy.  While defendant appeared to have been smoking
marijuana, Detective Azelton had interviewed him on previous
occasions, and she noted that his manner of speech was the same
as during the prior interviews.  Defendant acknowledged that he
had smoked marijuana, used cocaine, and drunk alcohol some time
before the incident under investigation.  Nevertheless,
defendant’s answers to Detective Azelton’s questions were
responsive, articulate, cogent, logical, and clear, even though
these responses were not always consistent with the evidence the
investigators were finding.  When defendant stated that he was
“high,” he used this term in the past tense and only to explain
why he might be unable to remember the events that occurred
earlier in the evening.  Defendant did not use the term to refer
to his present ability to understand and answer the
investigators’ questions.  The trial court found that no evidence
in the record indicated that defendant stated that he was under
the influence of an impairing substance while being questioned.
The trial court further found that once Sheriff Hurley
left the room, Detective Azelton read defendant his Miranda
rights as follows:
Question:  Do you understand each of
these rights I have explained to you.
The Defendant’s response:  Yes.
[Question]:  Two.  Having read the
rights in mind, do you wish to answer
questions.
[Answer]:  Yes.  Defendant’s answer.
[Question]:  Three.  Do you now wish to
answer questions without a lawyer present?
-65-
Defendant’s answer:  No, I don’t need a
lawyer.  Yeah I’ll talk to you.
The Miranda warning form was then executed by defendant.
Detective Azelton let defendant tell his story, then
asked him to repeat the story, wrote down his statement, read the
statement back to defendant to check its accuracy, and had
defendant sign and date the statement.  During the initial
interview, defendant answered a call on his cell phone from his
friend “Will.”  The first portion of the interview concluded at
approximately 3:42 a.m.
Detective Azelton then left defendant in the interview
room for approximately ten minutes.  When she returned, she
informed defendant that she did not believe he was being truthful
and, without again administering Miranda warnings, asked
defendant several more questions that defendant answered without
objection.  As before, Detective Azelton wrote out defendant’s
statements, read them back to him for clarity, and had him sign
the statements.
Detective Azelton left the room for a second time for
approximately twenty-three minutes, then returned with Lieutenant
Davis and Detective Julian.  Lieutenant Davis, who did not
re-advise defendant of his Miranda rights, interviewed defendant
for approximately twenty minutes.  Defendant did not object to
the presence of the new detectives, and the final interview ended
at approximately 7:12 a.m.  In all, defendant was interviewed for
approximately four hours.
Defendant also volunteered to assist Detective Azelton
by drawing a map that marked areas where specific evidence could
-66-
be found and then offered to lead investigators to the location
of some of the evidence.  Defendant was placed in the back of a
patrol car and driven to the scene.  While investigators were
searching for the evidence at approximately 8:00 a.m. on 11
January 2005, defendant fell asleep in the patrol car.
As noted, defendant was not re-Mirandized after
Detective Azelton initially read defendant his Miranda rights. 
However, there is no evidence in the record that defendant ever
requested to terminate the interview, nor did defendant request
counsel at any time during any of the interviews.  Although
defendant occasionally trailed off in the middle of his
sentences, he did not exhibit any confusion or slur his words
during the interviews.  Based upon these findings of fact, the
trial court concluded as a matter of law that defendant’s
statements were given voluntarily pursuant to a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights and that
the Miranda warnings initially given by Detective Azelton were
sufficient to allow admission of all defendant’s statements made
the morning of 11 January 2005.
A trial court’s findings of fact regarding the
voluntary nature of an inculpatory statement are conclusive on
appeal when supported by competent evidence.  State v. Parton, 
303 N.C. 55, 69, 277 S.E.2d 410, 420 (1981), overruled in part on
other grounds by State v. Freeman, 314 N.C. 432, 437-38, 333
S.E.2d 743, 746-47 (1985).  However, a trial court’s
determination of the voluntariness of a defendant’s statements
“is a question of law and is fully reviewable on appeal.”  State
-67-
v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 339, 572 S.E.2d 108, 124 (2002)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied,
538 U.S. 1040, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1074 (2003).  Conclusions of law
regarding the admissibility of such statements are reviewed de
novo.  State v. Hyatt, 355 N.C. 642, 653, 566 S.E.2d 61, 69
(2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1133, 154 L. Ed. 2d 823 (2003).
To be valid, a waiver of Miranda rights must be (1) 
given voluntarily “in the sense that it was the product of a free
and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
deception,” and (2) “made with a full awareness of both the
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it.”  Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 89
L. Ed. 2d 410, 421 (1986).  When determining the validity of a
Miranda waiver, the reviewing court applies a totality-of-
circumstances test.  Id.
As to defendant’s claim that he was under the influence
of drugs when he made his statements, “intoxication is a
circumstance critical to the issue of voluntariness.”  State v.
McKoy, 323 N.C. 1, 22, 372 S.E.2d 12, 23 (1988), sentence vacated
on other grounds, 494 U.S. 433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990).  The
trial court did not find defendant was intoxicated or under the
influence of a controlled substance when he gave his statements,
but even if he was, “[t]he fact that [the] defendant was
intoxicated at the time of his confession does not preclude the
conclusion that defendant’s statements were freely and
voluntarily given.”  State v. Oxendine, 303 N.C. 235, 243, 278
S.E.2d 200, 205 (1981), superceded by statute, N.C.G.S. § 8C-1,
-68-
Rule 607 (1983), on other grounds as recognized in State v.
Covington, 315 N.C. 352, 357, 338 S.E.2d 310, 314 (1986).  “An
inculpatory statement is admissible unless the defendant is so
intoxicated that he is unconscious of the meaning of his words.” 
Id.; see also Parton, 303 N.C. at 69-70, 277 S.E.2d at 420
(finding no error in trial court’s denial of the defendant’s
motion to suppress his confession to murder given after receiving
Miranda warnings when the trial court found the statements to be
voluntary, even though the arresting officer believed the
defendant to be intoxicated but the defendant was not staggering
and was coherent).  Here, the trial court’s finding of fact was
largely based on the interviewing detectives’ testimony that
defendant appeared to be impaired but was able to respond to
questioning coherently and logically.  This testimony, combined
with other similar evidence, fully supports the trial court’s
finding of fact that defendant comprehended his rights at the
time that he executed the waiver.  Therefore, the trial court’s
findings of fact support the court’s conclusion of law that
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under
Miranda.
Defendant also argues that his statements were the
result of improper police coercion.  To be admissible, a
defendant’s statement must be “the product of an essentially free
and unconstrained choice by its maker,” Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568, 602, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1037, 1057 (1961), and the State
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant’s
confession was voluntary, State v. Perdue, 320 N.C. 51, 59, 357
-69-
S.E.2d 345, 350 (1987).  A court “determine[s] whether a
statement was voluntarily given based upon the totality of the
circumstances.”  State v. Walls, 342 N.C. 1, 30, 463 S.E.2d 738,
752 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1197, 134 L. Ed. 2d 794
(1996).
In Colorado v. Connelly, the United States Supreme
Court held that “coercive police activity is a necessary
predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”  479 U.S. 157, 167, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473, 484 (1986). 
Coercive police activities on which the court should focus
include:  “extensive cross-questioning,” “undue delay in
arraignment,” “failure to caution a prisoner,” and “refusal to
permit communication with friends and legal counsel at stages in
the proceeding when the prisoner is still only a suspect,”
Culombe, 367 U.S. at 601, 6 L. Ed. 2d at 1057, as well as “the
duration and conditions of detention (if the confessor has been
detained), the manifest attitude of the police toward [the
defendant,] his physical and mental state, [and] the diverse
pressures which sap or sustain his powers of resistance and
self-control,” id. at 602, 6 L. Ed. 2d at 1057.  The
voluntariness of a defendant’s statements “is a question of law
and is fully reviewable on appeal.”  Barden, 356 N.C. at 339, 572
S.E.2d at 124 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the evidence shows that the police employed a
nonconfrontational interview method.  From the time defendant was
taken into custody until the questioning ended, defendant never
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objected to police questioning, never requested counsel, and was
cooperative with detectives, even if not consistently truthful. 
The authorities initially permitted defendant outside contact
with friends when defendant answered his cell phone during the
course of the interviews and was allowed to converse with the
caller.  In short, there is no evidence of the type of coercive
police activities required to render a confession involuntary. 
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s post-arrest statements
were not coerced.
For the reasons stated above, we determine that
defendant validly waived his Miranda rights and that defendant’s
post-Miranda statements were voluntarily given.  The trial court
did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress his
post-arrest statements.  These assignments of error are
overruled.
[17] In his eighteenth argument, defendant contends
that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the
results of the search of his cellular telephone.  Defendant
maintains that the trial court erroneously ruled that defendant
consented to the seizure of the phone and that the subsequent
search of the phone while he was in police custody was improper.
Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the
evidence relating to the seizure of his cell phone.  The court
conducted an evidentiary hearing during which Detective Azleton
testified that defendant received a call on the phone while in
custody.  When the detective asked defendant who the caller was,
he answered that it was his friend “Will.”  Detective Azleton
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asked who else had called defendant that morning, and defendant
scrolled through his cell phone’s log, showing her the numbers of
the telephones that had called his phone and the times the calls
were made.  Detective Azleton testified that she then told
defendant, “George, we’re going to need to take that.  And he
said okay and gave it to me.”  When questioned specifically
whether defendant consented to her taking his cell telephone,
Detective Azelton answered, “Yes.”  Defendant declined the
court’s offer to be heard as to the legality of the seizure.  The
trial court made oral findings
that the cell phone was seized subject to the
arrest of the Defendant.  
The Court further finds that the
Defendant, after having received a telephone
call while being interviewed by Detective
Azelton, voluntarily surrendered the
telephone to Detective Azelton at her
request.
The Court therefore finds:
One — or concludes that One, the
telephone was seized subject to a valid
arrest of the Defendant and further, the
Court concludes that the Defendant consented
to the seizure of his phone by the Sheriff’s
Department.
It is therefore ordered that the Motion
to Suppress Evidence as to the seized call
[sic] phone is denied.
At trial, the cell phone was admitted into evidence over
defendant’s renewed objections.  The State used the serial
number, located inside the cell phone, to prove that this phone
was used to make calls to Allred around the time of the murders.
When reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, this
Court determines whether the trial court’s findings of fact are
supported by competent evidence and whether the findings of fact
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support the conclusions of law.  State v. Haislip, 362 N.C. 499,
499, 666 S.E.2d 757, 758 (2008) (per curiam).  If supported by
competent evidence, the trial court’s findings of fact are
conclusive on appeal, even if conflicting evidence was also
introduced.  State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d
823, 826 (2001) (citations omitted).  However, conclusions of law
regarding admissibility are reviewed de novo.  Hyatt, 355 N.C. at
653, 566 S.E.2d at 69.
The trial court correctly found that the seizure was
pursuant to defendant’s arrest.
[O]nce the accused is lawfully arrested and
is in custody, the effects in his possession
at the place of detention that were subject
to search at the time and place of his arrest
may lawfully be searched and seized without a
warrant even though a substantial period of
time has elapsed between the arrest and
subsequent administrative processing, on the
one hand, and the taking of the property for
use as evidence, on the other.
United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807, 39 L. Ed. 2d 771,
778 (1974).  “Nor is there any doubt that clothing or other
belongings may be seized upon arrival of the accused at the place
of detention and later subjected to laboratory analysis or that
the test results are admissible at trial.”  Id. at 803-04, 39
L. Ed. 2d at 776; see, e.g., State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227,
240-41, 536 S.E.2d 1, 9-10 (2000) (the defendant’s clothing was
seized pursuant to a lawful arrest and could be searched six days
later because the effects in the defendant’s possession at the
time he was lawfully in custody could be seized and searched
without a warrant; any question of the defendant’s consent to the
search was irrelevant), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167, 148 L. Ed.
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2d 997 (2001).  Similarly, in the case at bar, the seizure and
the search of the telephone were properly accomplished pursuant
to a lawful arrest.  The trial court did not err in denying
defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the
search of defendant’s cell phone.  These assignments of error are
overruled.
PRESERVATION ISSUES
Defendant raises three additional issues that he
concedes have previously been decided by this Court contrary to
his position.  First, defendant argues that the trial court erred
by permitting the prosecutor to comment about defendant’s lack of
remorse during closing argument of the capital sentencing
proceeding.  We have held that such comments are permissible as
long as the prosecutor does not argue that lack of remorse is an
aggravating circumstance.  See, e.g., Augustine, 359 N.C. at
734-35, 616 S.E.2d at 533.  Here, the prosecutor expressly told
jurors that lack of remorse is not an aggravating circumstance. 
Second, defendant argues that the trial court committed plain
error by permitting each murder to be submitted as an aggravating
circumstance of the other murder when it submitted the (e)(11)
aggravating circumstance to the jury.  See N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-2000(e)(11) (2007) (“The murder for which the defendant
stands convicted was part of a course of conduct in which the
defendant engaged and which included the commission by the
defendant of other crimes of violence against another person or
persons.”).  This Court has consistently held that when a
defendant is convicted of two murders, each murder may be used to
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aggravate the other without violating the defendant’s double
jeopardy rights.  See, e.g., State v. Boyd, 343 N.C. 699, 719-20,
473 S.E.2d 327, 338 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1096, 136
L. Ed. 2d 722 (1997).  Last, defendant argues that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgments of conviction
against him because the short-form murder indictments failed to
allege all elements of the offenses for which he was charged. 
This Court has repeatedly held that short-form murder indictments
satisfy the requirements of our state and federal constitutions. 
See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 357 N.C. 257, 278, 582 S.E.2d 593, 607,
cert. denied, 539 U.S. 985, 156 L. Ed. 2d 702 (2003).  We have
considered defendant’s arguments on these issues and decline to
depart from our prior holdings.  These assignments of error are
overruled.
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
[18] As required by section 15A-2000(d)(2), we next
consider whether the record supports the aggravating
circumstances found by the jury, whether the death sentence “was
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary factor,” and whether the death sentence “is excessive
or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-
2000(d)(2) (2007).
Following defendant’s capital sentencing proceeding,
the trial court submitted two aggravating circumstances for the
jury’s consideration:  (1) the murder was committed while
defendant was engaged in the commission of first-degree burglary,
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pursuant to section 15A-2000(e)(5), and (2) the murder was part
of a course of conduct in which defendant engaged and that
included the commission by defendant of other crimes of violence
against other persons, pursuant to section 15A-2000(e)(11).  The
jury found both of these aggravating circumstances to exist
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Our review of the record indicates
that both circumstances are fully supported by the evidence
presented at trial.  Moreover, we find no indication that the
sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.
In conducting our proportionality review, we determine
whether the death sentence “is excessive or disproportionate to
the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime
and the defendant.”  Id. § 15A-2000(d)(2).  We compare this case
to those in which we have determined the death penalty was
disproportionate.  This Court has held the death penalty to be
disproportionate in eight cases:  State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C.
446, 573 S.E.2d 870 (2002); State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372
S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653
(1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483
S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997),
and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988);
State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v.
Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant,
309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); and State v. Jackson, 309
-76-
N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).  We conclude that this case is
not substantially similar to any of these cases.
Here, defendant committed two murders.  “This Court has
never found a sentence of death disproportionate in a case where
a defendant was convicted of murdering more than one victim.” 
State v. Meyer, 353 N.C. 92, 120, 540 S.E.2d 1, 17 (2000), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 839, 151 L. Ed. 2d 54 (2001).  In addition, the
murders occurred inside the home of one of the victims.  We have
previously observed that a murder in one’s home is particularly
shocking, “not only because a life was senselessly taken, but
because it was taken [at] an especially private place, one
[where] a person has a right to feel secure.”  State v. Brown,
357 N.C. 382, 394, 584 S.E.2d 278, 285-86 (2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1194, 158 L. Ed.
2d 106 (2004).  Moreover, defendant was convicted of first-degree
murder both under the felony murder rule and on the basis of
malice, premeditation, and deliberation.  “Although a death
sentence may properly be imposed for convictions based solely on
felony murder, a finding of premeditation and deliberation
indicates a more calculated and cold-blooded crime for which the
death penalty is more often appropriate.”  State v. Taylor, 362
N.C. 514, 563, 669 S.E.2d 239, 276 (2008) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).  We also consider the brutality of the
murders.  State v. Duke, 360 N.C. 110, 144, 623 S.E.2d 11, 33
(2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 855, 166 L. Ed. 2d 96 (2006). 
These murders involved the use of at least two semiautomatic
assault rifles and a pistol against young, unarmed victims,
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resulting in multiple close range gunshot wounds to each victim’s
head or neck.  Finally, this Court has determined that the
section 15A-2000(e)(11) aggravating circumstance, standing alone,
is sufficient to support a death sentence.  State v. Polke, 361
N.C. 65, 77, 638 S.E.2d 189, 196 (2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___, 169 L. Ed. 2d 55 (2007).
This Court also compares the present case with cases in
which we have found the death penalty to be proportionate.  State
v. al-Bayyinah, 359 N.C. 741, 762, 616 S.E.2d 500, 515 (2005),
cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1076, 164 L. Ed. 2d 528 (2006).  After
carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that this case is
more analogous to cases in which we have found the sentence of
death proportionate than to the cases in which we have found it
disproportionate or to the cases in which juries have
consistently recommended sentences of life imprisonment. 
Although defense counsel presented evidence of several mitigating
circumstances, including circumstances related to defendant’s
childhood and substance addiction, and although at least one or
more jurors found several of these mitigating circumstances to
exist, we are nonetheless convinced that the sentence of death
here is not disproportionate.
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant received a fair
trial and capital sentencing proceeding, free from prejudicial
error, and the death sentence recommended by the jury and imposed
by the trial court is not disproportionate.
NO ERROR.