Title: CUSTODY OF DALLENGER
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13493
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 22, 1977

No. 13493 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA I N RE T H E C U S T O D Y O F S U Z A N N E DAWN D A L L E N G E R and CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL D A L L E N G E R Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable R.D. McPhillips, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: S c o t t , L i n n e l l , N e i l l & Newhall, Great F a l l s , Montana Kenneth R. N e i l l argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Swanberg, Koby, Swanberg & Matteucci, Great F a l l s , Montana Arthur G. Matteucci appeared, Great F a l l s , Montana John Albe argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: March 15, 1977 Decided : AUG 2 2 1977 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from an order of the d i s t r i c t court, Cascade County, granting respondent's p e t i t i o n for modif ica- t i o n of the decree a s t o custody of the p a r t i e s ' two children. Appellant Ronald Dallenger was awarded custody of the children, Suzanne and Christopher, pursuant t o a decree of divorce entered May 24, 1974. Appellant has since remarried and presently l i v e s i n Great F a l l s , Montana. Respondent, Martha Herren, a l s o i s remarried and resides i n Florida. O n February 20, 1976, respondent f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r modification of custody. She f i l e d an amended p e t i t i o n t o the same e f f e c t on March 25, 1976. The matter was referred t o the court of conciliation f o r investi- gation and hearing was held June 30, 1976, on the modification issue. After the hearing the d i s t r i c t court granted respondent's p e t i t i o n f o r modification and awarded custody of the children t o her. The court expressed the standards it employed i n these findings and conclusions: "* * * Without going into the nature and p a r t i c u l a r s of a l l such testimony, the Court finds a s a matter of f a c t , t h a t Suzanne's and Christopher's physical, mental, moral and emotional health would be best served i f Herren had the care, custody and control of said children subject t o reasonable r i g h t s of v i s i t a t i o n by Dallenger a t reasonable times, places and i n t e r v a l s a s f u l l y s e t f o r t h i n the order herein. A change i n custody would serve said children's b e s t i n t e r e s t . "Martha F. Herren (Dallenger) has shown by a preponderance of the evidence introduced herein t h a t the physical, mental, moral and emotional health are best served by she acquiring custody of Suzanne and Christopher Dallenger, and t h a t t o change custody arrangements forthwith is t o the environ- mental benefit of said children." Appellant urges two specifications of e r r o r : (1) The d i s t r i c t court applied incorrect standards i n i t s decision t o change custody of the children t o respondent. (2) That even i f the proper standards were applied, the decision was not supported by the evidence. W e hold the f i r s t specification of e r r o r requires a reversal of the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s order and new hearing, therefore we express no opinion regarding the sufficiency of the evidence presented a t the p r i o r hearing. The action f o r modification of custody a r i s e s under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, section 48-339, R.C.M. 1947, it provides : "(1) N o motion t o modify a custody decree may be made e a r l i e r than two (2) years a f t e r i t s date, unless the court permits it t o be made on the b a s i s of a f f i d a v i t s t h a t there is reason t o believe the c h i l d ' s present en- vironment may endanger seriously h i s physical, mental, moral, o r emotional health. "(2) The court s h a l l not modify a p r i o r custody decree unless it finds, upon the basis of f a c t s t h a t have a r i s e n since the p r i o r decree o r t h a t were unknown t o the court a t the time of entry of the p r i o r decree, t h a t a change has occurred i n the circumstances of the child or h i s custodian, and t h a t the modification i s necessary t o serve the b e s t i n t e r e s t of the child. I n applying these standards the court s h a l l r e t a i n the custodian appointed pursuant t o the p r i o r decree unless: "(a) the custodian agrees t o the modification; "(b) the child has been integrated i n t o the family of the p e t i t i o n e r with consent of the custodian; o r "(c) the c h i l d ' s present environment endangers seriously h i s physical, mental, moral, o r emotional health, and the harm l i k e l y t o be caused by a change of environment i s out- weighed. by i t s advantages t o him. "(3) Attorney fees and costs s h a l l be assessed against a party seeking modification i f the court finds t h a t the modification action i s vexatious and constitutes harassment. I f Section 48-339 requires a showing of a change i n circum- stances and that modification i s necessary t o serve the best interests of the child. The statute i s specific, however, i n pointing out how these standards are t o be applied. N o change i n custody may be made unless subsections (a), (b) , o r (c) under section 48-339(2) are satisfied. Here only sub- section 2(c) i s applicable, and it requires: (1) the physical, mental, moral, o r emotional health of the child be endangered i n i t s present environment; and (2) the advantages t o the child of a change i n custody outweigh :the harm likely t o be caused by such a change. This burden put on the party seeking a change i n custody was developed' intentionally t o further the policy that custody ought t o be d i f f i c u l t t o change a f t e r a decree is made. The Comment of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, quoted by t h i s Court i n Holm v.i-'Holm, Mont . , 560 P.2d 905, 908, 34 St.Rep. 118, 121, s t a t e s i n part: "Most experts who have spoken t o the problems of post-divorce adjustment of children believe that insuring the decree's f i n a l i t y i s more important than determining which parent should be the custodian. See Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Pfoblems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 Syracuse L.Rev. 55 (1969). This section i s designed t o maximize f i n a l i t y (and thus assure continuity for the child) without jeopardizing the child's interest. * * *" I n light of these policy considerations i n addition t o the clear language of the statute, we cannot hold the statute i s satisfied where the court finds only that the interests of the children would be "best served" by a change in custody, and that such a change would be "to the environmental benefit" of the children. For the court in t h i s case t o have j u r i s d i c t i o n t o modify a custody decree under section 48-339, there must be a finding of danger t o the physical, mental, moral, o r emotional health of the children i n t h e i r present environment, and a finding t h a t the harm l i k e l y t o be caused by such a change i s outweighed by i t s advantages t o them. Here, there simply were no such findings. Respondent argues the ultimate determination under the s t a t u t e i s s t i l l the b e s t i n t e r e s t s of the c h i l d and a finding to t h a t e f f e c t necessarily includes a finding t h a t one of the subsections t o section 48-339(2) i s s a t i s f i e d . W e agree the f i n a l decision remains the t r a d i t i o n a l "best interests" decision. Eoss v. Leifer, Mont . , 550 P.2d 1309, 33 St.Rep. 528; Erhardt v. Erhardt, - Mont . - 2 554 P.2d 758, 33 St.Rep. 883. But the subsections t o section 48-339(2) a r e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l prerequisites t o modification which were placed there t o serve the basic policy behind the e n t i r e section, the policy of custodial continuity. To allow these c r u c i a l issues t o be resolved merely by references t o the b e s t i n t e r e s t s of the children would seriously weaken the s t a t u t e . W e hold the d i s t r i c t court did not comply with the correct statutory standards s e t out i n section 48-339(2)(c), R.C.M. 1947. The order granting modification of the custody decree is reversed. The case i s remanded t o the d i s t r i c t court f o r a new hearing i n compliance with t h i s opinion. We Concur: i , I \ Chief Justice