Title: Target Media Partners Operating Company, LLC, and Ed Leader v. Specialty Marketing Corporation d/b/a Truck Market News
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1091758
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 6, 2013

Rel: 09/06/2013
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 SPECIAL TERM, 2013
_________________________
1091758
_________________________
Target Media Partners Operating Company, LLC,
and Ed Leader
v.
Specialty Marketing Corporation d/b/a Truck Market News
Appeal from Calhoun Circuit Court
(CV-07-900201)
On Second Application for Rehearing
PER CURIAM.
This Court's no-opinion order of affirmance of April 19,
2013, is withdrawn, 
and the 
following 
is substituted therefor. 
1091758
Target Media Partners Operating Company, LLC ("Target
Media"), and Specialty Marketing Corporation d/b/a Truck
Market News ("Specialty Marketing"), both publishers of
magazines directed to long-haul truck drivers and to the
truck-driving industry, have litigated a commercial-contract
dispute since 2007 in which each party alleged breach-of-
contract claims against the other.  Specialty Marketing, a
plaintiff in the trial court, also alleged fraudulent-
misrepresentation and promissory-fraud claims against Target
Media and Ed Leader, Target Media's vice president of
trucking, and sought punitive damages in addition to
compensatory damages.  The litigation culminated in a jury
trial that lasted several days.  The jury returned a verdict
in favor of Specialty Marketing on its breach-of-contract and
promissory-fraud claims against Target Media, in favor of
Leader on the promissory-fraud claim against him, in favor of
Specialty Marketing on its fraudulent-misrepresentation claim
against Target Media and Leader, and in favor of Target Media
on its breach-of-contract counterclaim against Specialty
Marketing.  Target Media and Leader appeal from that aspect of
the judgment entered on the jury verdict in favor of Specialty
2
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Marketing on its claims against Target Media and Leader. 
Specialty Marketing does not appeal the judgment insofar as it
found in favor of Target Media on Target Media's counterclaim. 
We affirm the trial court's order denying Target Media's and
Leader's postjudgment motion, but we remand the cause to the
trial court to review the punitive-damages award.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
Target Media, which sometimes does business as "Target
Distribution Partners" or "Target Media Partners," publishes
a number of magazines that contain advertisements for items of
interest to truck drivers and the trucking industry, such as
driver recruitment and sales of commercial trucks 
and 
products
used by truck drivers.  It distributes the magazines
nationally to truck stops, rest stops, and similar locations
frequented by truck drivers.  These magazines are free of
charge.   Target Media has a major distribution hub for these
magazines in Oxford.  
Specialty Marketing also publishes a free magazine
directed to the truck-driving industry called Truck Market
News 
that 
is 
published 
monthly 
and 
that 
contains
advertisements for products such as new and used commercial
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trucks, parts, and trailers.  Specialty Marketing distributes
Truck Market News to many of the same locations where Target
Media distributes its magazines.  Specialty Marketing is a
family business headquartered in Dallas, Texas, that has been
in operation for over 35 years.  It is run by Terry W. Davis
and his sister, Kathleen Daniels, who have continued the
business started by their father and who together own all the
stock in Specialty Marketing.  
In 2000, Target Media purchased two businesses in Calhoun
County, Pollard Publishing and J.B. Scott, that published free
magazines for distribution to truck drivers.  Target Media
then employed Gordon Adams and his brother Wallace Adams, both
of whom had formerly worked for Pollard Publishing.   After
the purchases, Leader relocated to Oxford where, in addition
to heading the trucking division of Target Media, he was also
in charge of the distribution hub the company operated in
Oxford.  
In the fall of 2002, Jack Humphreville, Target Media's
vice president of acquisitions, contacted Davis to discuss
whether Davis and Daniels would be interested in selling
Specialty Marketing to Target Media.  When Davis and Daniels
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decided against selling Specialty Marketing, Davis and
Humphreville began to discuss a business venture between the
companies pursuant to which Target Media would distribute
Truck Market News for Specialty Marketing.  Davis testified
that Humphreville told him he felt that Specialty Marketing
could increase its advertising revenue by 20% annually if it
used Target Media's distribution services.  Humphreville put
Davis in touch with Gordon Adams, who was at that time Target
Media's distribution manager in Oxford, and Davis and Gordon
Adams negotiated a contract they executed on November 21, 2002
("the 2002 distribution contract").  However, Gordon Adams
testified that he had to obtain the approval of Ed Leader, the
vice president of trucking, of the terms of the 2002
distribution contract before it could be executed.  
The contract stated:
"Target Distribution Partners (TDP) is pleased to
bid on delivery of Truck Market News.  TDP has
carved out a niche in the highly competitive truck
stop delivery market because of our High Response
Delivery System.  As such, TDP can help you maximize
your advertising, marketing, and magazine movement
needs by:
"Hand Delivery and display nationwide
5
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"Documentation that includes proof of delivery,
returned (non-picked up) magazines, store stamps and
photos upon request
"Delivery twice a month
"Guaranteed prominent display at each location
"Use of Target Media Partners Circulation, Sales and
Distribution program (TMPCSD) for hand delivery
locations only
"We have priced our delivery services of Truck
Market News on a per stop basis.  This price
includes all slotting fees and hand delivery.  This
price also includes distribution in our racks and
four quad boxes.  The price does not include any
costs associated with shipments of your product to
our warehouses.  This will also afford you the same
cost even when your magazine adds more pages.  We
believe that this all-inclusive pricing structure is
easier to understand than a structure based on price
per pound plus various add-ons.
"Your price structure is identified on Exhibit A
attached hereto.  
"The above is contingent on your gaining approval,
if necessary, from each Truck Stop chain or
location.  We will be glad to assist you in gaining
these approvals.
"As a partner with TDP, you will be able to use our
proprietary TMPCSD software program to further
enhance the benefits of our High Response Delivery
System.  With the help of the information provided
by TMPCSD, you are able to adjust various parameters
(such as the number of [magazines] placed at
individual locations and the return factor) that
influence the draw algorithm, which in turn helps
you improve or optimize the number of [magazines]
that you print.  This can result in savings or
6
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better utilization of your printing dollars.  This
service is unmatched by any other truck stop
distribution company.  
"Truck Market News agrees to supply TDP's warehouses
with the magazines in a form and time acceptable to
TDP.  TDP's delivery cycle begins on the 28th and
15th of each month and all shipments must be in our
warehouses by those dates.
  
"Truck Market News agrees to pay for all deliveries
and services provided for or paid for by TDP within
10 days upon receipt of invoice.  We anticipate a
monthly billing cycle.
"Truck Market News agrees to endorse TDP as its
recommended Delivery Company for Truck Market News
and agrees to let TDP advertise Truck Market News as
a preferred customer.  Truck Market News agrees not
to use any misleading statements to customers, that
may confuse or misrepresent the actual duties
performed for Truck Market News, by TDP.
"Either party for any reason upon 60 days prior
written notice may amend by agreement of both
parties or terminate this agreement. 
"This contract is subject to periodic review for
customer compliance.
"We want to be more than a delivery company for you. 
We want to be a business partner.  One that delivers
your product, gives you accesses [sic] to thousands
of locations and gives you accurate information to
help you optimize your printing and distribution
costs.
"....
"Exhibit A
# of
Pocket
Monthly
"Location
Locations
Rate
Cost   
"Petro Shopping Centers
27
 $55
$1,485
7
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"Travel Centers of 
53
 $55
$2,915
America
"Williams Travel Centers
41
 $45
$1,845
"AMBEST
41
 $35
$1,435
"Independent Truck Stops
113
 $25
$2,825
"Total
275
    $10,505"
The 2002 distribution contract was signed by Gordon Adams as
"General Manager" of "Target Distribution Partners" and by
Davis as the "Publisher" of "Truck Market News."  The parties
subsequently agreed to adjust the total paid to Target Media 
per month by Specialty Marketing from $10,505 to $9,750.  
The monthly delivery process under the 2002 distribution
contract began when Trend Offset Printing ("Trend") in Dallas
printed the magazines published by Target Media and Specialty
Marketing.  Trend printed between 36,000 and 42,000 copies of
Truck Market News each month.  Trend shipped most of Target
Media's magazines and approximately 7,500 copies of Truck
Market News to Target Media's Oxford facility.  A certain
number of both Target Media's magazines and Truck Market News
were shipped directly from Trend to more than 60 terminals and
warehouses operated by Con-way, Inc., nationwide for the
delivery drivers' use in restocking along their routes.  Davis
himself picked up several hundred copies of Truck Market News
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and delivered those to small "mom-and-pop" truck stops in the
area around Dallas that were not covered by Target Media's
delivery routes.  The remainder of Target Media's magazines
and Truck Market News remained at Trend for route delivery. 
Target Media contracted with an independent driver in Dallas,
Bonnie Hargis, to pick up and distribute those magazines. 
Hargis employed additional personnel to assist her in picking
up and delivering the magazines.  They all made several trips
to Trend each month to load all the magazines they were
employed to deliver.  
When a monthly shipment from Trend was received at Target
Media's Oxford facility, the magazines were unloaded at the
warehouse.  Thereafter, the process called for Target Media's
delivery drivers to pick up the various magazines, load their
vehicles, and deliver the magazines to the stops on each
delivery route, where they placed the various magazines into
display racks located at each stop.  Some drivers made
multiple trips to the Oxford warehouse to pick up magazines
for delivery.  A certain number of magazines were left at the
warehouse for the drivers to pick up in the middle of the
month when they traveled their routes a second time to
restock.  At the beginning of the next month, the drivers
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would remove any copies of the previous month's magazines
remaining in the racks on their routes and replace them with
current magazines, then dispose of the old magazines.  The
drivers were not allowed to return any of the previous month's
magazines to the warehouse.  
Several former Target Media employees at the Oxford
facility testified in the trial.  Gordon Adams, who was
ultimately in charge of magazine distribution in Oxford, in
Dallas, and at the Con-way locations, worked for Target Media
from 2000 until September 2004.  Wallace Adams took over for
his brother as acting manager of distribution until January
2006, when Target Media decided against promoting Wallace
Adams to the manager's position and hired someone else for the
job.  Tommy Fowler also worked in Oxford for Target Media as
its audit manager.  
These three former Target Media employees testified that
Target Media did not comply with the delivery requirements of
the 2002 distribution contract from the beginning.  Gordon
Adams, Wallace Adams, and Fowler all testified that Target
Media discarded most of the Truck Market News magazines before
the magazines were ever loaded onto Target Media's delivery
trucks and vans.  Often, they stated, the magazines that were
10
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thrown away were still in the plastic wrap in which they had
been delivered from Trend, with the bands holding bundles of
magazines still in place.  Occasionally whole pallets of Truck
Market News magazines were taken to a nearby recycling plant
without being unloaded at the Oxford facility at all.  Gordon
Adams, Wallace Adams, and Fowler also testified that when
Target Media's delivery personnel picked up magazines for
distribution, they were under company orders to load all of
Target Media's magazines into their delivery vehicles first
and to load magazines delivered for other companies, such as
Truck Market News, only if there was room in the vehicle after
Target Media's magazines were loaded.  The three former Target
Media employees testified that often there was no room left in
the delivery vehicles for any magazines other than the ones
published by Target Media, so other magazines were simply
thrown away or delivered to the recycling plant.  
Furthermore, testimony reflected that Target Media had
prepared a schematic for its employees directing the 
placement
of magazines in the racks at its delivery destinations.  In
many instances, the racks had room for only Target Media
magazines, so the magazines for which there was no room in the
racks were thrown away at the truck stops or other delivery
11
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points.  Gordon Adams, Wallace Adams, and Fowler all testified
that they knew it was wrong to dispose of new magazines before
delivery had ever been attempted but that they followed orders
from Leader in order to keep their jobs.  They testified that,
at times, approximately 90% of the copies of Truck Market News
that were shipped to the Oxford facility were thrown away at
the beginning of the month, meaning that only 10% of the
magazines shipped to Oxford were delivered to Specialty
Marketing's intended readers.  
Glynis Ford, a former clerical employee with Target
Media, testified that her job was to enter figures from the
delivery drivers' route sheets into Target Media's computer
system.  For each magazine title, the drivers were supposed to
note on their route sheets the number of magazines loaded for
delivery at the first of the month, the number restocked at
the middle of the month, and the number of undelivered
magazines ("returns") disposed of at the end of the month. 
Ford testified that she was ordered by Leader and her other
superiors at Target Media to make up numbers if the drivers
had not supplied numbers.  She said she was instructed to
supply numbers that would make the delivery and return results
"look good."  Ford further testified that falsifying numbers
12
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for the reports "bothered" her but that she needed her job and
therefore did what she was told.  
From February 2003 through August 2004, Target Media
provided Specialty Marketing with spreadsheets that contained
delivery data for Truck Market News from the Oxford facility. 
The spreadsheets were designed to report the locations to
which Truck Market News was delivered, the total number of
magazines delivered to each location, and the total number of
returns at the end of the month.  It was undisputed that
disposing of the returns was proper procedure because once a
new monthly magazine was published, the previous month's
publication was no longer of any use.  It was also undisputed,
however, that disposing of new magazines, still banded and
encased in plastic, was highly improper.  Davis testified that
one of the reasons he agreed to pay Target Media to deliver
Truck Market News was its promise that it would report the
number of deliveries and returns to him so that he could
maximize his printing costs, having more magazines shipped to
locations where they moved well and fewer delivered to
locations where more magazines were returned at the end of the
month.  Davis testified that, during the time he was receiving
the spreadsheets, he was not aware that most of the numbers in
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the reports had been fabricated by the Target Media employees
in Oxford.  
Steve Burt was employed by Target Media from the fall of
2002 until February 2007, when he resigned to deliver Truck
Market News for Specialty Marketing.  Burt had taken
photographs at Target Media's request during his delivery
routes, which the company used as proof of magazine delivery
and as a method to audit its drivers by reviewing photographs
taken of magazines placed in the display racks.  Burt
initially purchased disposable cameras but later began taking
the photographs with a digital camera.  At some point, Burt
began to photograph various new magazines, including Truck
Market News, that were being thrown into dumpsters or left on
the loading dock of a nearby recycling plant.  Sometime in
late 2006, Burt learned from Hargis that Davis had asked her
to check the racks in the truck stops on her delivery routes
in Dallas and to let him know if a magazine published by a
competitor other than Target Media was replacing Truck Market
News in the racks.  She contacted Burt because she thought he
might have some photographs that would shed light on the
problem.  
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In January 2007, Burt traveled to Dallas to meet with
Davis and Daniels.  Burt testified that he told them that the
competitor's magazine was not their problem but that Target
Media was.  Burt showed Davis and Daniels his photographs of
the magazines that were being thrown away every month at
Target Media, including numerous photographs depicting
packages of Truck Market News, still banded and wrapped in
plastic, on the warehouse docks at Target Media, in dumpsters,
and at the recycling facility that accepted many of Target
Media's magazines for disposal.  He admitted to Davis and
Daniels that he was guilty of throwing away their new
magazines and told them that only a small percentage of Truck
Market News shipped to the Oxford facility was being delivered
by Target Media drivers.  After this meeting, Davis decided to
end his contract with Target Media, and he hired Burt to
deliver his magazines.  On January 19, 2007, Specialty
Marketing and Burt executed a three-year contract under which
Burt agreed to deliver Truck Market News for $9,500 per month. 
Davis testified that he and Daniels were stunned and
shocked when they talked with Burt and saw his photographs. 
They knew that their business had not sustained the growth
Humphreville had estimated they would see if they employed
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Target Media to deliver Truck Market News but had not realized
that only a small percentage of their magazines entrusted to
Target Media in Oxford were being delivered.  Davis testified
not only as to the money Specialty Marketing had paid Target
Media for delivery of copies of Truck Market News that were
instead being thrown away, but also as to the monthly cost of
printing Truck Market News and the monthly delivery fees
necessary to have thousands of copies of the magazine
delivered to Target Media's Oxford facility.  
Davis 
calculated
that Specialty Marketing had paid Target Media approximately
$430,000 in fees under the 2002 distribution contract and that
Specialty Marketing had incurred over $900,000 in printing
costs from December 2002 through January 2007 for magazines
most of which had been discarded.  
On October 5, 2007, Specialty Marketing, Davis, and
Daniels sued Target Media,  Leader, Gordon Adams, Wallace
1
Adams, Fowler, and Paul Bannister (a former manager with
Target Media), alleging breach of contract, promissory fraud,
intentional interference with business relations, negligence
In addition to Target Media Partners Operating Company,
1
LLC, Specialty Marketing also sued Target Media Partners,
Inc., and Target Media Partners Operating Company.  After
learning that Target Media's 
correct 
corporate name is "Target
Media Partners Operating Company, LLC," Specialty Marketing
proceeded with the lawsuit against only that entity. 
16
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and wantonness, and fraudulent misrepresentation.  Specialty
Marketing, Davis, and Daniels sought punitive damages as well
as compensatory damages in their complaint.  Target Media
later filed a counterclaim against Specialty Marketing,
alleging breach of contract and money owed on an open account. 
Shortly after litigation began, Specialty Marketing,
Davis, and Daniels dismissed Bannister as a defendant.  All
remaining parties actively pursued their claims and 
engaged 
in
extensive discovery.  They also filed summary-judgment
motions, but the trial court denied all of those motions. 
Before trial, the trial court dismissed Davis and Daniels as
plaintiffs 
and 
dismissed 
Specialty 
Marketing's 
claims 
alleging
negligence and wantonness and intentional interference with
business relations.  The case proceeded to a jury trial
beginning on May 3, 2010, on Specialty Marketing's breach-of-
contract, promissory-fraud, and fraudulent-misrepresentation
claims and on Target Media's counterclaim.  During the trial,
the court dismissed Gordon Adams, Wallace Adams, and Fowler as
defendants.  Target Media and Leader moved for a judgment as
a matter of law ("JML") as to Specialty Marketing's claims at
the close of Specialty Marketing's evidence, and all parties
moved for a JML at the close of all the evidence.  The trial
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court prepared separate verdict forms that required the jury
to make a determination of liability as to each of Specialty
Marketing's claims--breach of contract against Target Media,
promissory fraud against Target Media, promissory fraud
against Leader, fraudulent misrepresentation against Target
Media, 
and 
fraudulent 
misrepresentation 
against 
Leader, 
and 
as
to Target Media's claims--breach of contract and open account
against Specialty Marketing.  The forms required the jury to
return a separate compensatory-damages award for each claim
and counterclaim and allowed the jury to award punitive
damages to Specialty Marketing as to its promissory-fraud and
fraudulent-misrepresentation claims if the jury found such
damages appropriate. 
The jury returned verdicts in favor of Specialty
Marketing 
on 
its 
breach-of-contract 
claim, 
awarding
compensatory damages of $851,552; in favor of Target Media on
its breach-of-contract counterclaim, awarding compensatory
damages of $48,800; in favor of Specialty Marketing and
against 
Target 
Media 
on 
Specialty 
Marketing's 
promissory-fraud
claim, awarding compensatory damages of $210,000 and punitive
damages of $630,000; in favor of Leader on Specialty
Marketing's promissory-fraud claim; and in favor of Specialty
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Marketing and against Target Media and Leader on Specialty
Marketing's fraudulent-misrepresentation 
claim, 
awarding
compensatory damages of $167,800 and punitive damages of
$503,400.  
The trial court entered a judgment on the verdicts on May
13, 2010.  On June 11, Target Media filed a postjudgment
motion to alter or amend the judgment to reflect its correct
corporate name, Target Media Partners Operating Company, LLC,
instead of "Target Media" as the judgment referred to it.  On
June 14, Target Media and Leader filed a postjudgment motion 
renewing their motion for a JML and requesting a new trial
and/or a remittitur; in addition, they filed a separate motion
on June 14 asking the court to allow them to submit their
financial statements under seal.  On August 30, the trial
court entered an order amending the judgment to reflect the
correct corporate name for Target Media.  Also on August 30,
the trial court entered an order denying the postjudgment
motion for a JML, new trial, and/or remittitur filed by Target
Media and Leader.  On September 2, Specialty Marketing filed
a motion asking the trial court to amend its August 30 order
denying Target Media and Leader's postjudgment motion 
to 
state
the factors the court considered when it denied the motion. 
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On September 7, Target Media and Leader filed a response to
Specialty Marketing's motion in which they "again request[ed]
a hearing on their post trial motions including all hearings
required by Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala.
1986) and Alabama Code [§]6-11-23 (1975)."  On September 13,
the trial court set all pending motions for a hearing on
November 9.   On September 21, Target Media and Leader
2
appealed.  Specialty Marketing did not cross-appeal from the
judgment against it on Target Media's counterclaim.  
3
II. Standard of Review
A. Motion for a JML
"When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML,
this Court uses the same standard the trial court  
used initially in deciding whether to grant or deny
the motion for a JML.  Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v.
Crawford, 689 So. 2d 3 (Ala. 1997).  Regarding
questions of fact, the ultimate question is whether
the nonmovant has presented sufficient evidence to
allow the case to be submitted to the jury for a
On November 8, the trial court canceled the hearing set
2
for November 9 because, it said, as a result of the filing of
a notice of appeal on September 21, 2010, it was "without
jurisdiction to rule on any pending motions at this time due
to the appellate status of this case."  
After this Court issued our opinion on original
3
submission affirming in part and reversing in part the trial
court's 
judgment, 
Specialty 
Marketing 
filed 
an 
application 
for
rehearing, and, on application for rehearing, we withdrew our
December 21, 2012, opinion and entered a no-opinion order of
affirmance on April 19, 2013.  Target Media then filed the
application for rehearing that is now before this Court.
20
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factual resolution.  Carter v. Henderson, 598 So. 2d
1350 (Ala. 1992).  The nonmovant must have presented
substantial evidence in order to withstand a motion
for a JML.  See § 12-21-12, Ala. Code 1975; West v.
Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d
870, 871 (Ala. 1989).  A reviewing court must
determine whether the party who bears the burden of
proof has produced substantial evidence creating a
factual dispute requiring resolution by the jury.
Carter, 598 So. 2d at 1353.  In reviewing a ruling
on a motion for a JML, this Court views the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and
entertains such reasonable inferences as the jury
would have been free to draw.  Id.  Regarding a
question of law, however, this Court indulges no
presumption of correctness as to the trial court's
ruling.  Ricwil, Inc. v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So.
2d 1126 (Ala. 1992)."  
Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins. Co., 875
So. 2d 1143, 1152 (Ala. 2003).  
B. Motion for a New Trial
"In discussing the standard of review in an
appeal from a judgment based on a jury verdict where
the trial court has denied a motion for a new trial,
this Court has stated:
"'"Jury 
verdicts 
are 
presumed 
correct,
and this presumption is strengthened by the
trial court's denial of a motion for a new
trial.  Therefore, a judgment based on a
jury verdict will not be reversed unless it
is 'plainly and palpably' wrong."'
"Tanksley v. Alabama Gas Corp., 568 So. 2d 731, 734
(Ala. 1990) (quoting Davis v. Ulin, 545 So. 2d 14,
15 (Ala. 1989))."
Petty-Fitzmaurice v. Steen, 871 So. 2d 771, 773 (Ala. 2003).
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III. Analysis
We first address Specialty Marketing's argument that
Target Media and Leader's appeal should be dismissed as being
from a nonfinal judgment.  We then address whether the trial
court properly denied Target Media and Leader's postjudgment
motion.  
A. The Judgment
Specialty Marketing argues that the trial court's August
30, 2010, order denying Target 
Media 
and Leader's postjudgment
motion was not a final order because, it argues, the August 30
order did not completely adjudicate 
all 
matters in controversy
between the parties.  Therefore, Specialty Marketing argues,
because the appeal is taken from a nonfinal judgment, this
Court should dismiss the appeal.  In response, Target Media
and Leader argue that the August 30 order was final and that
they filed a timely notice of appeal within 42 days of the
issuance of the August 30 order.  We agree.  
The trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdicts
on May 13, 2010.  On June 14, Target Media and Leader filed a
timely postjudgment motion pursuant to Rules 50(b) and 59(a)
and (f), Ala. R. Civ. P., renewing their motion for a JML,
requesting a new trial, and/or requesting a remittitur of the
punitive-damages awards.  They also filed a separate motion to
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allow them to submit their financial statements under seal. 
Target Media and Leader requested a hearing on their
postjudgment motion, and the portion of the motion requesting
a remittitur specifically included a request for a hearing on
the issue of punitive damages pursuant to this Court's
decisions in Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala.
1986), and Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala.
1989).  According to Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P., such a
postjudgment motion suspends the time in which a party must
appeal from a final judgment: 
"The filing of a post-judgment motion pursuant to
Rules 50, 52, 55 or 59 of the Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure ([Ala. R. Civ. P.]) shall suspend the
running of the time for filing a notice of appeal. 
In cases where post-judgment motions are filed, the
full time fixed for filing a notice of appeal shall
be computed from the date of the entry in the civil
docket of an order granting or denying such motion. 
..."
When the trial court entered its order on August 30 denying
Target Media and Leader's postjudgment motion, they then had
42 days from August 30 in which to appeal.   
Even though the trial court's order of August 30 disposed
of all motions then pending, Specialty Marketing filed a
motion on September 2 asking the trial court to amend its
August 30 order to state the factors on which the court relied
in denying the postjudgment motion.  Then, on September 7,
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Target Media and Leader renewed their motion for a hearing on
their postjudgment motion, including a Hammond/Green Oil
hearing on punitive damages.  Specialty Marketing relies on
the pendency of these two motions in arguing that the August
30 order was not final.  Specialty Marketing also argues that
Target Media's June 14 motion seeking to file its financial
records under seal remained pending after the trial court
entered its August 30 order because, it argues, it is not the
kind of motion that can be denied by operation of law pursuant
to Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P.  Because these three motions
were still pending, Specialty Marketing argues, the August 30
order was not final because, it says, the trial court did not
"completely adjudicate all matters in controversy between the
parties."  Specialty Marketing's brief, at 28.  
This Court considered a similar situation in Southeast
Environmental Infrastructure, L.L.C. v. Rivers, 12 So. 3d 32
(Ala. 2008).  In that case the losing party at trial, 
Southeast Environmental Infrastructure ("SEI"), filed a
postjudgment motion together with a motion for a remittitur
and requested a Hammond/Green Oil hearing.  The trial court
scheduled a hearing, but informed the parties that it would
consider all other postjudgment motions at the hearing and
that it would schedule another hearing on the motion for a
24
1091758
remittitur.  Instead, the trial court entered an order denying
SEI's postjudgment motions for a new trial, a JML, and a
remittitur.  The winning party, Rivers, then filed a motion
for the court to hold a hearing on SEI's remittitur motion. 
SEI opposed Rivers's motion, arguing that the trial court's
denial of its postjudgment motions left the trial court
without jurisdiction to hold a hearing on its motion for a
remittitur.  SEI contended that its only remedy was to appeal
the order denying its postjudgment motions.  The trial court
rejected SEI's arguments and held that SEI had waived its
right to a remittitur hearing or had invited any error
resulting from the absence of such a hearing.  This Court
agreed with SEI that, after the trial court denied SEI's
postjudgment motions, the trial court "lost jurisdiction to
'reconsider' those postjudgment motions."  12 So. 3d at 49. 
The Court continued:
"In Ex parte Allstate Life Ins. Co., 741 So. 2d
1066, 1070 (Ala. 1999), this Court stated:
"....
"... 'This Court has clearly warned
the bench and the bar not to attempt to use
a Rule 59 or Rule 60 motion as a substitute
for an appeal.  "In view of the fact that
this case presents to us that situation, we
take this opportunity to point out to the
bench and bar that the Rules of Civil
Procedure do not authorize a movant to file
25
1091758
a motion to reconsider the trial judge's
ruling on his own post-judgment motion." 
[Ex parte Dowling,] 477 So. 2d [400,] 404
[(Ala. 1985)].  Just recently, this Court
has reiterated: "[I]f a party has his own
post-judgment motion denied, the review of
that denial is by appeal.  The rules do not
provide for a 'motion to reconsider' the
denial of one's own post-judgment motion." 
Ex parte Mutual Savings Life Ins. Co., [765
So. 2d 649, 651 (Ala. 1998)].  
"'The Court of Civil Appeals has also
stated that the rule that a trial court
cannot entertain a motion to "reconsider"
its previous order denying a post-judgment
motion is more than a mere "technicality"
under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure,
but is based on the court's loss of
jurisdiction over the case.  Package
Express Center, Inc. v. Motley, 717 So. 2d
378 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).'
"See also Pinkerton Sec. & Investigation Servs.,
Inc. v. Chamblee, 961 So. 2d 97, 101-02 (Ala. 2006),
in which this Court stated:
"'A motion to reconsider the trial court's
denial of a postjudgment motion is barred
because after the denial the trial court
loses jurisdiction over the action.  Ex
parte Allstate Life Ins. Co., 741 So. 2d
1066, 1070 (Ala. 1999) ....
"'Thus, "'when a post-judgment motion
is denied, the review of that denial is by
appeal, not by a motion to reconsider.'" 
Ex parte Mutual Sav. Life Ins. Co., 765 So.
2d 649, 651 (Ala. 1998) (quoting McAlister
v. Deatherage, 523 So. 2d 387, 389 (Ala.
1988)).'
"Accordingly, SEI was correct in arguing that, after
its 
December 
11, 
2006, 
order 
denying 
the
postjudgment motions, the trial court did not have
26
1091758
jurisdiction to hold a hearing on SEI's motion for
a remittitur."
12 So. 3d at 49-50 (footnote omitted).  
Applying Southeast Environmental Infrastructure to the
facts of this case, we conclude that, after the trial court
entered its order of August 30, 2010, it lost jurisdiction
over the case.  The motions filed on September 2 and September
7 
by 
Specialty Marketing and Target Media, respectively, were,
in effect, motions to "reconsider" and were therefore
ineffective.  Furthermore, the trial court had no authority to
enter the order of September 13 purporting to schedule a
hearing on the remittitur motion.  The August 30 order denying
Target Media and Leader's postjudgment motions was clearly a
final order, and Target Media and Leader properly filed their
notice of appeal.  We conclude that the notice of appeal filed
on September 21 was timely and that this appeal was taken from
a final judgment. 
B. Breach of Contract
Target Media first argues that it did not breach the 2002
distribution contract.  In order to establish that the breach
of contract alleged in its complaint occurred, Specialty
Marketing needed to prove "'(1) the existence of a valid
contract binding the parties in the action, (2) [Specialty
27
1091758
Marketing's] own performance under the contract, (3) [Target
Media's] nonperformance, and (4) damages.'"  Employees'
Benefit Ass'n v. Grissett, 732 So. 2d 968, 975 (Ala. 1998)
(quoting Southern Med. Health Sys., Inc. v. Vaughn, 669 So. 2d
98, 99 (Ala. 1995) (citations omitted)).  
4
As to the first element, it is undisputed that a valid
contract--the 2002 distribution contract--existed.  Under the
contract, Target Media agreed to:
•
Hand deliver the magazine Truck Market News and display
it nationwide.
•
Provide documentation (proof of delivery, magazines not
picked up, etc.).
•
Deliver the magazine twice a month to approximately 275
locations.
•
Prominently display the magazine at each location.
•
Allow Specialty Marketing to use a proprietary software
program to enhance the benefits of Target Media's "High
Response Delivery System."
Under the contract, Specialty Marketing agreed to:
•
Deliver magazines to Target Media's warehouses (7,500 to
the Oxford facility, remainder stayed in Dallas).
•
Pay Target Media $9,750 per month for delivery services.
Because Specialty Marketing did  not cross-appeal the
4
judgment in favor of Target Media on its counterclaim, we need
not discuss how Target Media needed to establish that the
breach of contract alleged in its counterclaim occurred.  
28
1091758
The written contract was offered in evidence, and the jurors
were able to read the contract for themselves.  
As to the second element, Specialty Marketing produced
copies of the checks by which it paid for Target Media's
delivery services from 2002 through most of 2006, from which
the jury could have concluded that Specialty Marketing proved
its performance under the contract, except for approximately
five months when Specialty Marketing did not pay the invoices
from Target Media.  
As to the third element, Specialty Marketing's witnesses
testified as to the destruction of large numbers of new
magazines published by Specialty Marketing, as to Target
Media's orders to its delivery drivers that Truck Market News
was to be loaded and delivered only if there was room left in
their vehicles after Target Media's magazines had been 
loaded, and as to Target Media's schematics of the display
racks that left no room for Truck Market News.  Specialty
Marketing presented photographs of magazines still banded and
encased in plastic that had been thrown into dumpsters or
taken to a recycling plant and presented Ford's testimony that
she "made up" the numbers necessary to complete distribution
reports that were forwarded to Specialty Marketing.  Target
Media introduced testimony that Gordon 
Adams 
and Wallace Adams
29
1091758
were responsible for the destruction of magazines and
explaining the instructions to Target Media employees to
invent numbers for reports and Leader's testimony that he
never ordered employees to destroy new magazines.  Target
Media attacked Burt, portraying him as an opportunist who
staged the photographs he showed Davis and Daniels in order to
obtain a lucrative delivery contract for himself and
emphasizing his admission that he had destroyed thousands of
copies of Truck Market News.  The jury had ample evidence from
which it could have determined either that the Adams brothers,
Fowler, and Burt were credible witnesses or that Leader was a
credible witness.  The jury apparently believed Specialty
Marketing's witnesses and determined that Target Media had
failed to perform under the 2002 distribution contract.  
Finally, as we will discuss hereinafter, the jury heard
ample evidence from which it could have found harm to
Specialty Marketing as a result of the breach of contract. 
Therefore, the trial court properly submitted Specialty
Marketing's breach-of-contract claim, based on an alleged
breach of the 2002 distribution contract, to the jury. 
Moreover, after reviewing the terms of the 2002 distribution
contract and the evidence presented at trial, we find
30
1091758
substantial evidence from which the jury could have found that
Target Media breached the contract.  
Target Media next notes that the trial court instructed
the jury, without objection, that Specialty Marketing claimed
a breach of contract because, Target Media says, "all" the
copies of Truck Market News were not delivered each month. 
Target Media then argues that Specialty Marketing did not
prove a breach of contract because, it argues, Davis testified
that, under the 2002 distribution contract, he did not, in
fact, expect Target Media to deliver "all" the copies of Truck
Market News.  Target Media contends that unchallenged jury
instructions become the law of the case, citing Louisville &
Nashville R.R. v. Atkins, 435 So. 2d 1275, 1278-79 (Ala.
1983), and that the jury must follow the trial court's
instructions even if they are erroneous, citing Lee v. Gidley,
252 Ala. 156, 157-58, 40 So. 2d 80, 82 (1949). 
In response, Specialty Marketing argues that it presented
overwhelming evidence that Target Media breached the 2002
distribution contract and that Target Media is wrong when it
argues that the trial court's use of the word "all" in its
jury instruction means that Specialty Marketing could not
prove a breach of contract.  Citing Treadway v. Brantley, 437
So. 2d 93, 97 (Ala. 1983), Specialty Marketing says that
31
1091758
Target Media's argument "ignores the record and unjustly
twists a part of the larger set of jury instructions which
must be read and considered in their entirety."  Specialty
Marketing's brief, at 48.  
The trial court charged the jury as follows:
"Now, 
ladies 
and 
gentlemen, 
... 
the 
first 
charge
in the complaint is that for breach of contract.  So
let me talk to you for a minute about breach of
contract.  
"Now, ... the plaintiff in this case, Specialty
Marketing, has said ... that Specialty Marketing and
the defendant, which is Target Media, entered into
a contract for the distribution of Truck Market
News, the magazines.  
"And the plaintiff in this case, Specialty
Marketing, says that the defendant, Target Media,
breached or broke this contract by failing to
deliver all of the magazines.  The defendant in this
case, which is Target Media, denies these claims.
"Now, the contract, what is a contract and what
are the elements of a contract?  The plaintiff here
... says that the parties had a contract and the
contract is simply an agreement to do or not do a
certain thing.  Here it was a contract to do a
certain thing which we've talked about[;] the
contract[] [has] been introduced.  You can look at
that.
"....
"In this action, Specialty Marketing claims
damages of Target Media that result [from] a breach
of contract that was entered into by Specialty
Marketing and Target Media on November 21, 2002,
whereby Specialty Marketing agreed to provide its
magazines for delivery and pay $9,750 per month to
32
1091758
Target Media for this service.  Target Media agreed
to deliver the magazines to 275 locations.  
"Specialty Marketing contends that it has
performed its part of the contract but that Target
Media has breached the contract by failing to
deliver all the magazines.  Specialty Marketing
alleges it was damaged as a result of the breach.  
"Target Media admits entering into the contract
with Specialty Marketing, but in defense of
Specialty 
Marketing's 
claim, 
contend[s] 
that
Specialty Marketing should not recover because
Target 
Media 
delivered 
Specialty 
Marketing's
magazines pursuant to the terms of the contract.
"Additionally, 
Target 
Media 
has 
filed 
a
counterclaim against Specialty Marketing whereby
Target Media seeks damages from Specialty Marketing
as a result of Specialty Marketing's failing to pay
for that delivery.  
"The contract, being admitted by both parties,
it will be your duty to determine from the evidence
whether either party breached the contract, and if
so, the amount of damages, if any, suffered by the
other party as a result thereof. 
"Now, a contract is breached or broken when a
party does not do what was promised to do in the
contract.  To recover damages from the defendant in
this case, from Target Media, for breach of
contract, Specialty Marketing must prove to your
reasonable satisfaction all the following:
"That Specialty Marketing and Target Media
entered into a contract;
"That Specialty Marketing did all the things
that the contract required [it] to do;
"That Target Media failed to do the things that
the contract required [it] to do;
33
1091758
"And that 
Specialty Marketing was 
harmed 
by 
that
failure.
"....
"Now, there's been partial performance of a
contract when performance has been commenced but has
not 
been 
substantially 
completed. 
 
Where 
a
contractor has partially performed a contract but
has not performed all the important parts of the
contract, if the failure to perform the balance of
the contract is not excused, the contractor cannot
recover for partial performance on the contract. 
"Substantial performance ... of a contract ...
is performance of all its important parts but does
not require a full or exact performance of every
slight or unimportant detail. 
"If you decide that Specialty Marketing has
proved [its] claim against Target Media for breach
of contract, you also must decide how much money
will reasonably compensate Specialty Marketing for
the harm caused by the breach.  This compensation is
called damages.  The purpose for such damages is to
put Specialty Marketing in as good a position as
[it] would have been had Target Media not broken the
contract."
"In reviewing the trial court's instruction to the jury,
this Court reads and considers the entire charge as a whole." 
Cooper & Co. v. Lester, 832 So. 2d 628, 641 (Ala. 2000). 
Viewing the entire jury charge as a whole, we cannot say that
the trial court's use of the word "all" when describing
Specialty 
Marketing's 
argument 
forecloses 
recovery 
by
Specialty Marketing for breach of the 2002 distribution
contract.  The trial court described the contract, the
34
1091758
elements of a breach-of-contract claim, and the parties'
arguments.  Moreover, the contract itself was admitted into
evidence and was made available to the jury, so the jurors
were able to look at the contract for themselves when
deliberating on the breach-of-contract claim.  Therefore, we
conclude that the trial court's statement to the jury that
Specialty Marketing's breach-of-contract claim alleged that
Target Media "did not deliver all the magazines" was not a
error warranting our overturning the jury's verdict as to
Specialty Marketing's breach-of-contract claim.  
Target Media also argues that Specialty Marketing was not
damaged by any alleged breach of contract.  Our review of the
record reflects otherwise.  The evidence before the jury
indicates 
that 
Specialty 
Marketing 
paid Target 
Media
approximately $400,000 over a four-year period for delivery
services that, if the jury believed Specialty Marketing's
witnesses, were not performed; that Specialty Marketing paid
approximately $900,000 in printing costs over a four-year
period, approximately $200,000 of which the jury could have
attributed to printing magazines that were thrown away in
Oxford, and that Specialty Marketing lost business and
profits.   
35
1091758
In addition, Target Media argues that the damages awarded
by the jury were excessive.  Target Media contends that there
was no evidence from which the jury could have computed
compensatory damages for breach of contract in the amount of
$851,552.  
"'"'It is well settled that damages awarded for
breach of contract should return the injured party
to the position he would have been in had the
contract been fully performed.'"'  Mannington Wood
Floors, Inc. v. Port Epes Transp., Inc., 669 So. 2d
817, 822 (Ala. 1995) (quoting Med Plus Props. v.
Colcock Constr. Group, Inc., 628 So. 2d 370, 375
(Ala. 1993), quoting in turn Cobb v. Fred Burgos
Constr. Co., 477 So. 2d 335, 338 (Ala. 1985)).  The
Mannington Wood Floors Court also recognized:
"'In computing damages for breach of
contract, 
a 
jury 
need 
not 
achieve
"mathematical precision."  Indeed, "'the
uncertainty which prevents a recovery is
uncertainty as to the fact of the damage
and not as to its amount.'"  Thus, a
"'plaintiff 
will 
not 
be 
denied 
a
substantial recovery if he has produced the
best 
evidence 
available 
and 
it 
is
sufficient to afford a reasonable basis for
estimating his loss.'"'
"669 So. 2d at 822 (citations omitted)."
Parsons v. Aaron, 849 So. 2d 932, 949 (Ala. 2002).  Davis
testified that from late 2002 through late 2006 his costs for
printing thousands of copies of Truck Market News and then
shipping those magazines to Oxford, in addition to the amount
he paid Target Media for delivery services, were in excess of
36
1091758
$1.5 million, and the jury could well have determined the
damages awarded based on a percentage of the magazines it
determined had been thrown away instead of being delivered. 
We conclude that the trial court properly upheld the damages
award to Specialty Marketing on its breach-of-contract claim. 
Finally, Target Media argues that the jury's verdict in
favor of Specialty Marketing on its breach-of-contract claim
cannot be sustained because, it argues, the verdict is
inconsistent with the jury's verdict in favor of Target Media
on its counterclaim alleging breach of contract.  The jury's
verdict form on the breach-of-contract claim stated:
"Breach of Contract
"Specialty 
Marketing[,] 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
Target
Media[,] Defendant
"WE, THE JURY, FIND:
"in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
and assess plaintiff's damages at Eight Hundred & 
Fifty One Thousand, Five Hundred Fifty Two dollars
[($851,552.00)].
"We further find in favor of the defendant & against
the plaintiff on the defendant's counterclaim and
assess damages at Forty Eight Thousand & Eight
Hundred dollars [($48,800.00)]."
We agree that on its face the verdict form allowing the jury
to find in favor of both parties on their breach-of-contract
claims 
is 
inconsistent.  Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that
37
1091758
the inconsistent verdicts constitute reversible error because
none of the parties objected to the use of the verdict form.
After the trial court charged the jury and before the
jury began deliberations, the following exchange occurred:
"THE COURT:  Now, ladies and gentlemen, before I
send you back with all the exhibits and with my
verdict forms [which the trial court read to the
jury during its charge], I need to check with each
side and see if they are satisfied with my charge,
give them that opportunity.  And so first for the
plaintiff, I need to ask, is the plaintiff satisfied
with the charge?
"SPECIALTY MARKETING'S ATTORNEY: With the exception
of the defendant's requested jury charge number 4,
Your Honor.  We expressed that earlier.
"THE COURT: That's fine.  That one is reserved. 
Anything from the defendants?
"TARGET MEDIA'S AND LEADER'S ATTORNEY: Yeah, we have
no objections to the charge." 
In order to preserve the inconsistent-verdict issue for
review, Target Media's counsel should have objected to the
verdict form that is now being challenged as inconsistent
after the trial court read it to the jury and provided the
written verdict form to the jury.  Counsel was presented with
an opportunity to do so after the trial court instructed the
jury; however, he not only failed to object to the verdict
form, but also stated that he was satisfied with it.  When
counsel is presented with an opportunity at the end of the
38
1091758
trial court's charge to the jury to state any objection he or
she has to the charge as given and does not do so, no error as
to that charge is preserved for appellate review.  Empiregas,
Inc. of Ardmore v. Hardy, 487 So. 2d 244 (Ala. 1986). 
Therefore, the trial court's order denying Target Media's
postjudgment motion as to Specialty Marketing's breach-of-
contract claim is due to be affirmed.  
C. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
We first address Target Media and Leader's argument that
Specialty Marketing's fraudulent-misrepresentation claim was
barred by § 6-2-38(l), Ala. Code 1975, Alabama's two-year
statute of limitations for fraud claims.  Target Media and
Leader allege that Specialty Marketing was aware of facts
between February 2003 and August 2004 that put it on notice
that its magazines were not being properly distributed, facts
disclosed by the spreadsheets provided to it by Target Media. 
Nevertheless, Target Media and Leader argue, Specialty
Marketing failed to act until October 2007, more than three
years after it had received the last spreadsheet.  
In a fraud action, the running of the limitations period
is tolled pursuant to the "discovery rule" found in § 6-2-3,
Ala. Code 1975.  Section 6-2-3 states:  "In actions seeking
relief on the ground of fraud where the statute has created a
39
1091758
bar, the claim must not be considered as having accrued until
the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting
the fraud, after which he must have two years within which to
prosecute his action."  Target Media and Leader acknowledge
that when a plaintiff discovered facts that would put it on
notice of fraud "can be" a jury question, but they argue that
this Court has determined in certain circumstances that it is
appropriate to enter a JML as to the discovery issue, citing
Dickinson v. Land Developers Construction Co., 882 So. 2d 291,
298 (Ala. 2003).  As stated in Dickinson, however, this Court
has held that "'"'[t]he question of when a party discovered or
should have discovered the fraud is generally one for the
jury.'"'  Potter v. First Real Estate Co., 844 So. 2d 540, 546
(Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex parte Seabol, 782 So. 2d 212, 216
(Ala. 2000), quoting in turn Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
Parker, 703 So. 2d 307, 308 (Ala. 1997))."  882 So. 2d at 298. 
Under the facts of this case, we conclude that the question of
when Specialty Marketing discovered the facts that would have
put it on notice of Target Media's and Leader's alleged fraud
was a question appropriately resolved by the jury.  Because
the jury returned a verdict for Specialty Marketing as to its
fraud claim, it is apparent that the jury concluded that
40
1091758
Specialty Marketing's fraudulent-misrepresentation claim was
not barred by the statute of limitations.  
We now turn to Target Media and Leader's argument that
Specialty Marketing did not meet its burden of proof as to the
fraudulent misrepresentations allegedly made by Target Media
and Leader, and, therefore, that the trial court should have
granted their motion for a JML and should not have submitted
the fraudulent-misrepresentation claim to the jury.  In order
to prove a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, Specialty
Marketing needed to establish "(1) that [Target Media and
Leader] 
made 
a 
false 
representation, 
(2) 
that 
the
misrepresentation 
involved 
a 
material 
fact, 
(3) 
that
[Specialty 
Marketing] 
relied 
on 
the 
misrepresentation, 
and 
(4)
that the misrepresentation damaged [Specialty Marketing]." 
AmerUs Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 5 So. 3d 1200, 1207 (Ala.
2008). 
In assessing whether the trial court properly denied
Target Media and Leader's motion for a JML as to Specialty
Marketing's 
fraudulent-misrepresentation 
claim, 
it 
is
important to first take note of the various ways in which
Target Media and its principals committed the fraud in
question.  These included:
41
1091758
•
Monthly Invoices from the defendants in which Target
Media billed Specialty Marketing each month for the full
amount due under the 2002 distribution contract.  In
other words, each month, from the very beginning of the
contract until its end, Target Media sent a written
statement 
to 
Specialty 
Marketing 
that 
implicitly
represented that all of Specialty Marketing's magazines
due to be distributed by Target Media during the prior
month had in fact been distributed by Target Media.
•
Target Media periodically sent to Specialty Marketing
"route sheets," represented by Target Media to have been
filled out by its agents or employees, again representing
that all of Specialty Marketing's magazines were being
distributed to the appropriate retail establishments.
•
Target 
Media 
periodically 
provided 
to 
Specialty 
Marketing
"summaries" 
indicating 
delivery 
of 
all 
Specialty
Marketing's magazines.
•
Between 2003 and December 2006, Specialty Marketing was
repeatedly assured orally by defendants Leader, Wallace
Adams, and Gordon Adams that all of its magazines were
being distributed appropriately.
The record contains substantial evidence that during much
of, if not all, the contract term, the above-described
representations were false and that they were knowingly made
by Target Media and its principals as false representations. 
It cannot be disputed in this case that the jurors reasonably
could have found that Target Media and its principals made
fraudulent misrepresentations, that those misrepresentations
involved material facts, and that those misrepresentations
damaged Specialty Marketing.
42
1091758
The only remaining question for our review is whether
there was substantial evidence from which the jurors could
have inferred that Specialty Marketing relied on these
representations and whether its reliance was reasonable.  In
this regard, Specialty Marketing argues as follows:
"The representations to Terry Davis, as the
owner of Specialty Marketing, were material.  His
reliance on them was reasonable, given the values
involved, the importance of the activities to his
company, 
Target 
Media's 
status 
as 
a 
major
distribut[or], and its apparent expertise at the
activities--of which Target Media and its employees
assured him.  Only an insider of the Defendant could
have known that the representations and promises
were false."
Specialty Marketing's brief, at 49.  The jury found Specialty
Marketing's position entirely plausible, as does this Court. 
Indeed, the record contains substantial evidence, including
Davis's express testimony regarding Specialty Marketing's
reliance upon some of, if not all, the misrepresentations
described above, from which the jury could have inferred that
Specialty 
Marketing 
reasonably 
relied 
on 
these 
representations
to pay Target Media's invoices month after month and to
continue its contractual relationship with Target Media.
Davis explicitly testified to his reliance on the so-
called "spreadsheets."  The jury was free to believe that,
although the spreadsheets stopped coming at some point,
43
1091758
Specialty Marketing and Davis reasonably could have relied
upon, and did rely upon, those spreadsheets to make payments
to Target Media during the period that Target Media provided
them spreadsheets.  Furthermore,  Target Media and its
principals made other misrepresentations as described above,
including the implicit misrepresentations by Target Media,
through its invoices, that all of Specialty Marketing's
magazines were being distributed each month.  These other
misrepresentations 
by 
Target 
Media 
clearly 
continued 
until 
the
end of the contract term.
The jury was free to infer that Specialty Marketing's
reliance on all these misrepresentations, including the
monthly invoices, was reasonable.  Davis testified that he
trusted Target Media and its principals and that "it never
crossed [his] mind" that Target Media was repeatedly lying to
him.  Davis further testified that he had no reason to believe
that his company's declining income was caused by Target Media
because all the feedback he received from Target Media
indicated that Specialty Marketing's magazines were being
distributed to the display sites and that customers were
picking up the magazines at those sites.  The jury heard Davis
testify that he had to rely upon "the people I'm paying the
money to, that I have to trust somebody" and that he "did what
44
1091758
I thought was right and I thought they were doing their job
... I would never have thought that Target Media had anything
to do with this."  
If this Court were to reverse the judgment entered on the
jury's verdict on the fraudulent-representation claim in this
case, as Target Media and Leader urge us to do, we would need
to hold, as a matter of law, that the circumstances with which
Davis and Specialty Marketing were faced required them to
assume that Target Media and its various principals were all
lying to Davis and Specialty Marketing on a regular basis,
despite the lack of evidence that this was the case.  We
reject Target Media and Leader's argument that Specialty
Marketing did not "reasonably" rely on Target Media's and
Leader's 
continual 
misrepresentations 
simply 
because 
Davis 
and
Daniels were aware that Specialty Marketing's income was
declining.  To so hold would impose an unfair burden on a
plaintiff.  As a Supreme Court in a sister state has observed:
"'A party to a contract cannot rationally calculate
the 
possibility 
that 
the 
other 
party 
will
deliberately misrepresent terms critical to that
contract.' (Tourek et al., Bucking the 'Trend': The
Uniform Commercial Code, the Economic Loss Doctrine,
and Common Law Causes of Action for Fraud and
Misrepresentation (1999) 84 Iowa L. Rev. 875, 894.)
No rational party would enter into a contract
anticipating that they are or will be lied to.
'While parties, perhaps because of their technical
expertise and sophistication, can be presumed to
45
1091758
understand and allocate the risks relating to
negligent product design or manufacture, those same
parties cannot, and should not, be expected to
anticipate 
fraud 
and 
dishonesty 
in 
every
transaction.' (Id. at p. 909.)."
Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 979, 993,
102 P.3d 268, 275-76 (2004).
It is not this Court's job to decide the credibility of
or to assign weight to testimony and other evidence of fraud
and the reliance that purportedly occurred in this case.  It
was for the jury to decide whether it was reasonable for
Specialty Marketing to rely upon Target Media's and Leader's
continual misrepresentations throughout the four-year term of
the 2002 distribution contract.  Given the evidence before us,
we conclude that the jury could have found that Specialty
Marketing reasonably relied upon Target Media's invoices,
route sheets, summaries, and the regular oral assurances of
its principals to continue its contractual relationship with
Target Media and to continue paying Target Media's invoices
each month.  Therefore, the trial court's order denying Target
Media and Leader's motion for a JML as to Specialty
Marketing's fraudulent-misrepresentation claim is due to be
affirmed.  
D. Promissory Fraud
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1091758
Target Media argues that the verdict against it on
Specialty Marketing's promissory-fraud claim cannot stand
because, it argues, the jury's verdict in favor of Leader on
that promissory-fraud claim precludes a judgment against
Target Media.  Target Media relies on Alfa Life Insurance
Corp. v. Jackson, 906 So. 2d 143, 154 (Ala. 2005) ("'"'[W]hen
[a] principal and his agent are sued in [a] joint action in
tort for misfeasance or malfeasance of the servant, and his
liability for the conduct of said servant is under the rule of
respondeat superior, a verdict in favor of the servant
entitles the master to have the verdict against him set
aside.'"'"  (quoting Barlow v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
708 So. 2d 168, 173 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997), quoting in turn
Larry Terry Contractors, Inc. v. Bogle, 404 So. 2d 613, 614
(Ala. 1981), quoting in turn Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Maddox, 236 Ala. 594, 600, 183 So. 849, 853 (1938))). Target
Media maintains that it cannot be held liable for a tort
committed by its agent, Leader, when the jury did not find
Leader 
liable 
on 
Specialty 
Marketing's 
promissory-fraud 
claim. 
However, the jury heard evidence indicating that Jack
Humphreville, Target Media's vice president of acquisitions,
initiated contract discussions with Davis and that Gordon
Adams and Leader both negotiated the contract with Davis.  
47
1091758
This Court found an argument similar to that of Target
Media to be well taken in Stevenson v. Precision Standard,
Inc., 762 So. 2d 820, 827 (Ala. 1999), in which Stevenson sued
her employer and her supervisor 
alleging 
sexual harassment and
the jury returned a verdict in favor of the supervisor, but
against the employer.  The Stevenson Court determined that the
verdicts were inconsistent, and stated:
"'A jury verdict for an agent as defendant cannot be
reconciled with a verdict against the agent's
principal if the only claim against the principal is
based on the underlying negligence of the agent.' 
Owens v. Lucas, 604 So. 2d 389, 391 (Ala. 1992)."
762 So. 2d at 827.  The Court in Stevenson went on to consider
the 
question 
of 
the 
appropriate 
disposition 
of 
the
inconsistent verdicts: 
"Ordinarily, 
in 
a 
civil 
case 
involving 
two
inconsistent jury verdicts--one on a direct claim
and one on a derivative claim, or one on a direct
claim and one on a claim based on vicarious
liability--on a proper motion both must be set
aside.  [Owens, 604 So. 2d] at 391.  However,
because Stevenson did not appeal from the judgment
in favor of Windsor, that judgment has become final;
therefore, the doctrine of res judicata bars a new
trial on the issue of Windsor's liability.  Because
the judgment against Windsor must stand, a judgment
must be entered in favor of Pemco.  See de Feliciano
v. de Jesus, 873 F.2d 447 (1st Cir. 1989) (in light
of an inconsistent verdict, corporate codefendant
was held entitled to a judgment, where plaintiffs
did not appeal from judgment in favor of codefendant
president 
of 
corporation); 
see, 
also, 
United
Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO-CLC v. O'Neal, 437
So. 2d 101, 103 (Ala. 1983) (on a claim directly
48
1091758
against an agent, and against the principal solely
on the theory of respondeat superior, 'a verdict in
favor of the agent works an automatic acquittal of
the principal so that [the] verdict against [the
principal] must be set aside'); and Perry v. Costa,
97 A.D.2d 655, 469 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1983) (doctrine of
res judicata barred new trial on question of
employer's liability, based on final judgment in
favor 
of 
employee; 
judgment 
against 
employer
reversed)."
762 So. 2d at 827 (footnote omitted).  In this case, the
verdicts 
on 
Specialty 
Marketing's 
promissory-fraud 
claims 
 
are
not necessarily inconsistent because Humphreville and Gordon
Adams, as well as Leader, also acted as agents for Target
Media.  The jury heard evidence indicating that Humphreville
made the initial representations, and Leader and Gordon Adams
each testified that they intended to perform the contract when
they entered into it.  The distinction between this case and
Stevenson is that Humphreville and Gordon Adams were also
agents for Target Media and there is record evidence
indicating that Gordon Adams and Leader both acted on behalf
of Target Media in negotiating the 2002 distribution contract
with Davis.  Therefore, Target Media is not entitled to a JML
in its favor as to Specialty Marketing's promissory-fraud
claim against it based upon the jury's exoneration of Leader. 
Target Media also argues that the verdict against it on
Specialty Marketing's promissory-fraud claim cannot stand
49
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because, it argues, Specialty Marketing did not prove the
required elements of promissory fraud.  
"To state a claim of promissory fraud, the plaintiff
must 
allege 
facts 
showing 
'(1) 
a 
false
representation; (2) of an existing material fact;
(3) that is [reasonably] relied upon; (4) damage
resulting as a proximate cause[; (5) that] at the
time of the misrepresentation, the defendant had the
intention not to perform the promised act[;] and
(6) that the defendant had an intent to deceive.'"
Bethel v. Thorn, 757 So. 2d 1154, 1159 (Ala. 1999) (quoting
Pinyan v. Community Bank, 644 So. 2d 919, 923 (Ala. 1994)).
Target Media argues that Specialty Marketing failed to
present evidence indicating that Target Media intended not to
perform under the 2002 distribution contract and intended to
deceive Specialty Marketing at the time it negotiated the 2002
distribution contract. In making this argument, Target Media
relies on testimony from Target Media executives Leader and
Gordon 
Adams, 
noting that both essentially testified that they
intended to perform the contract when they entered into it
and, specifically, that neither of them testified that he had
an intent not to perform or an intent to deceive at the time
the contract was formed.
Target Media's argument overlooks the fact that the jury
was free to, and did, assign little or no credibility or
weight to the testimony of Leader and Gordon Adams.  The
50
1091758
absence of an admission of an intent to deceive by one who
harbors an intent to deceive cannot be the sine qua non of a
viable promissory-fraud action.   By focusing on the lack of
an 
admission 
by 
the 
alleged 
tortfeasors, 
and 
their
protestations of innocence, Target Media overlooks the
substantial circumstantial evidence of promissory fraud.
Circumstantial evidence can be used to establish an
intent not to perform and an intent to deceive.  Indeed,
because proof of an alleged tortfeasor's thoughts is, by its
nature, difficult, circumstantial evidence often is the only
way to prove promissory fraud.  
"'While the mere failure to perform the
promised act is not by itself sufficient
evidence 
of 
fraudulent 
intent, 
for 
purposes
of 
a 
promissory-fraud 
claim, 
"the
factfinder may consider that failure,
together with other circumstances, in
determining whether, at the time the
promise was made, the promisor intended to
deceive."'
"Ex parte Grand Manor, Inc., 778 So. 2d 173, 182
(Ala. 2000) (quoting Murphy v. Droke, 668 So. 2d
513, 516 (Ala. 1995)). A defendant's intent to
deceive can be established through circumstantial
evidence that relates to events that occurred after
the alleged misrepresentations were made. Vance v.
Huff, 568 So. 2d 745, 750 (Ala. 1990)."
Byrd v. Lamar, 846 So. 2d 334, 343 (Ala. 2002).  
The circumstantial evidence that warranted submission of
the promissory-fraud claim to the jury and upon which the jury
51
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reasonably could have inferred an intent on Target Media's
part not to perform the promised undertakings includes the
following: 
•
Target Media was engaging in the practice of failing to
distribute other publishers' magazines  leading up to and
at the time it negotiated and entered into its contract
with Specialty Marketing. Target Media warehouseman
Justin Thurman testified concerning Target Media's
practices during the months leading up to Specialty
Marketing's contracting with Target Media.  He stated
that Target Media had a preexisting practice of throwing
away large quantities of customers' current magazines
before they were ever delivered.
•
The jury could have inferred that, from the very
beginning of the contract period, Target Media engaged in
a practice of prioritizing the loading and delivery of
its magazines over the loading and delivery of Specialty
Marketing's magazines.  Gordon Adams, Wallace Adams, and
Fowler testified that when Target Media's delivery
personnel picked up magazines for distribution, they were
under company orders to load all of Target Media's
magazines into their delivery vehicles first and to load
magazines delivered for other companies, such as
Specialty Marketing, only if there was room left in the
delivery vehicle.  The Target Media employees testified
that often there was no room left in the delivery
vehicles for any magazines other than the ones published
by Target Media, so other magazines were simply thrown
away or delivered to the recycling plant.  Specialty
Marketing notes in its brief that "[t]he schematics Ed
Leader approved, by which [magazines] were loaded for
delivery 
and 
display, 
never 
included 
[Specialty
Marketing's magazines], and the practice of throwing away
new [magazines] which never had been loaded was in place
at the time of the promises."  Specialty Marketing's
brief, p. 53. 
  
Gordon Adams testified that the schematics--which
were essentially blueprints telling truckers in what
order to load the deliveries on their truck and what
layout was to be used for magazine displays at the
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1091758
delivery 
locations--did 
not 
include 
Speciality
Marketing's magazine.  Burt likewise testified that the
schematics 
never 
included 
Specialty 
Marketing's 
magazine. 
Given that these schematics existed from the start of the
contract, this testimony constitutes evidence indicating
that Target Media never intended to fulfill its contract
with Speciality Marketing.  
•
Target 
Media 
failed 
to 
perform 
its 
contractual
obligations beginning during the first year of the 2002
distribution contract.
•
Burt also testified that he was instructed by Target
Media to falsify route sheets to show that magazines had
been delivered that in fact had not been delivered. 
Other witnesses also testified that Target Media had a
practice of instructing their drivers to falsify their
route reports to make the numbers look good. 
•
The jury had before it substantial evidence of Target
Media's business practices and general willingness to
deceive Specialty Marketing for its own gain. 
The foregoing constitutes substantial circumstantial
evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Target
Media engaged in promissory fraud, i.e., it was "evidence of
such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the
exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer" that
Target Media made its promises to Specialty Marketing without
ever having had an intent to keep them.  See West v. Founders
Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.
1989).  Therefore, the trial court's order denying Target
Media's motion for a JML as to Specialty Marketing's
promissory-fraud claim is due to be affirmed.  
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E. Disposition of Target Media and Leader's Motion for a JML
We have concluded that Specialty Marketing offered
substantial evidence showing that Target 
Media 
and Leader made
false representations and that Target 
Media 
and its principals
made representations with the intention not to perform the act
promised.  Because the evidence supports a finding of
fraudulent misrepresentation and promissory fraud, we have
concluded that the trial court properly denied Target Media
and Leader's motion for a JML as to Specialty Marketing's
fraudulent-misrepresentation claim and Target Media's motion
for a JML as to the promissory-fraud claim.  Therefore, those
claims were properly submitted to the jury, and, as noted,
that portion of the trial court's order denying Target Media
and Leader's motion for a JML as to Specialty Marketing's
fraudulent-misrepresentation and promissory-fraud claims is
due to be affirmed.
As to Specialty Marketing's breach-of-contract claim,
however, we conclude that Specialty Marketing offered
substantial evidence that Target Media breached the contract;
therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Target
Media's motion for a JML as to Specialty Marketing's breach-
of-contract claim, and that claim was properly submitted to
the jury.
54
1091758
F. Motion for a New Trial 
We next address whether the trial court should have
granted Target Media's motion for a new trial as to Specialty
Marketing's breach-of-contract claim.  Because we hold that
the trial court properly submitted the breach-of-contract
claim to the jury based on Target Media's failure to object to
the trial court's use of the verdict form that allowed the
jury to return inconsistent verdicts, we conclude that the
judgment entered on those jury's verdicts in favor of
Specialty Marketing as to its breach-of-contract claim and in
favor 
of 
Target 
Media 
as 
to 
its 
breach-of-contract
counterclaim is due to be affirmed.  We likewise conclude that
sufficient evidence was presented to support the jury's
damages awards for breach of contract.  Therefore, the trial
court properly denied Target Media's motion for a new trial as
to the breach-of-contract claim.  
G. Motion for a Remittitur
Finally, Target Media and Leader argue that they are
entitled to a hearing on that portion of their postjudgment
motion requesting a remittitur of the punitive-damages awards
and to an order detailing the trial court's findings as a
result of that hearing.  Section 6-11-23(b), Ala. Code 1975,
states:
55
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"In all cases wherein a verdict for punitive damages
is awarded, the trial court shall, upon the motion
of any party, either conduct hearings or receive
additional evidence, or both, concerning the amount
of punitive damages."  
In their postjudgment motion, Target Media and Leader
requested a Hammond/Green Oil hearing, but the trial court
summarily 
denied 
their 
postjudgment 
motion 
without 
holding 
the
requested hearing to consider Target Media and Leader's
argument that the punitive-damages awards were excessive.  
This Court has clearly held that a defendant is entitled
to a Hammond/Green Oil hearing if the defendant requests such
a hearing.  In Southeast Environmental Infrastructure, this
Court held:  "In its postjudgment motion for a remittitur, SEI
timely requested a hearing on that motion.  Therefore, SEI was
entitled to such a hearing, and the trial court erred in not
conducting a hearing on SEI's remittitur motion before it
denied the motion."  12 So. 3d at 50.  In Lifestar Response of
Alabama, Inc. v. Lemuel, 908 So. 2d 207, 225 (Ala. 2004), this
Court held that Lifestar would have been entitled to a
Hammond/Green Oil hearing if it had properly requested one. 
Here, the trial court did not hold the hearing Target Media
and Leader requested in their 
postjudgment 
motion; instead, it
denied that motion without explanation.  When Specialty
Marketing asked the trial court to enter an order explaining
56
1091758
the reasons it had denied the postjudgment motion and Target
Media and Leader again requested a Hammond/Green Oil hearing,
the trial 
court 
responded by scheduling 
the requested hearing,
but the scheduled date was outside the time in which Target
Media and Leader were required to appeal from the judgment. 
Moreover, as we held in Section III.A. of this opinion, the
trial court lost jurisdiction to hold such a hearing after it
denied Target Media and Leader's postjudgment motion.  
"This 
Court 
and 
the 
Legislature 
have 
established
a constitutionally appropriate system for reviewing
a contention that a punitive-damages award is
excessive.  See Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.
2d 1374 (Ala. 1986), and Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby,
539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989); and § 6-11-23(b), Ala.
Code 1975.  Additionally, the United States Supreme
Court has established various 'guideposts' and
considerations 
for 
assessing 
whether 
punitive
damages are excessive, in a series of cases
including, most notably, BMW of North America, Inc.
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d
809 (1996)."
Lifestar Response, 908 So. 2d at 225.  
In Williford v. Emerton, 935 So. 2d 1150, 1156 (Ala.
2004), this Court explained the reasoning behind the
requirement of a Hammond/Green Oil hearing, as well as the
requirement that the trial court enter an order containing its
findings as a result of that hearing.  
"[W]ithout a written statement of the reasons for
that denial [of a defendant's postjudgment motion
challenging an award of punitive damages,] the
57
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requirements of Hammond have not been satisfied.  As
we explained in Love v. Johnson, 775 So. 2d 127,
127-28 (Ala. 2000), such a written statement is
necessary before this Court can conduct a proper
review on appeal:
"'In Hammond [v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.
2d 1374 (Ala. 1986)], this Court required
that a trial court "reflect in the record
the reasons for interfering with a jury
verdict, or refusing to do so, on the
grounds of excessiveness of the damages." 
493 So. 2d at 1379; see also ALFA Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Brewton, 554 So. 2d 953 (Ala. 1989). 
In Hammond, this Court stated the reason
for the requirement:
"'"[T]he trial judge is better
positioned to decide whether the
verdict 
is 
... 
flawed 
[as
excessive].  He has the advantage
of observing all of the parties
to 
the 
trial--plaintiff 
and
defendant and their respective
attorneys, as well as the jury
and its reaction to all of the
others.  There are many facets of
a 
trial 
that 
can 
never 
be
captured in a record, so that the
appellate courts are at a special
disadvantage when they are called
upon 
to 
review 
[a] 
trial
[court's] 
action 
in 
this
sensitive area...."
"'493 So. 2d at 1378-79.'
"When a trial court fails to put in writing its
reasons 
for 
denying 
a 
motion 
to 
review 
a
punitive-damages award for excessiveness, this
Court's practice has been to remand the cause for
the trial court to enter an order in compliance with
Hammond.  See, e.g., Love, 775 So. 2d at 128;
Spencer v. Lawson, 815 So. 2d 502 (Ala. 2001);
Southern Pine Elec. Coop. v. Burch, 878 So. 2d 1120
58
1091758
(Ala. 2003).  We therefore remand this case to the
trial court for the entry of an order that complies
with the requirements of Hammond.  On return to
remand, the Willifords will have the opportunity to
renew their argument that the punitive-damages award
is outside the constitutional parameters set forth
in Gore and Hammond/Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539
So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989), should they still wish to do
so."
935 So. 2d at 1156.  Accordingly, we remand this case to the
trial court for that court to conduct a Hammond/Green Oil
hearing concerning the jury's punitive-damages award against
Target Media and Leader as to Specialty Marketing's
fraudulent-misrepresentation claim and the punitive-damages
award against Target Media as to Specialty Marketing's
promissory-fraud claim and to enter an order stating its
reasons for granting or denying Target Media's and Leader's
motion for a remittitur of those punitive-damages awards.  On
return to remand, Target Media and Leader can renew their
argument to this Court, if they so desire, that the punitive
damages awards are excessive.  The trial court shall make a
return to this Court within 90 days from the date this opinion
is released.  
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's order denying Target Media's
motion for a JML and/or for a new trial as to Specialty
Marketing's breach-of-contract claim and as to Target Media's
59
1091758
breach-of-contract counterclaim.   Moreover, we affirm the
trial court's order denying Target Media and Leader's motion
for 
a 
JML 
as 
to 
Specialty 
Marketing's 
fraudulent-
misrepresentation and promissory-fraud claims, but we remand
the cause for the trial court to hold a Hammond/Green Oil
hearing and to make a return to this Court within 90 days of
the date of the filing of the remittitur.
APPLICATION GRANTED; NO-OPINION ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE OF
APRIL 19, 2013, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; AFFIRMED IN
PART; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 
Parker and Wise, JJ., concur.  
Moore, C.J., and Shaw and Bryan, JJ., concur in the
result.  
Murdock, J., concurs in the rationale in part and concurs
in the result.  
Stuart, Bolin, and Main, JJ., concur in part and  dissent
in part.
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MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the rationale in part and
concurring in the result).
I concur in Parts III.C., III.E., and III.F. of the main
opinion, and I otherwise concur in the result reached by that
opinion.  As to Part III.D., I question whether Target Media's
liability for promissory fraud is properly viewed as based on
principles of respondeat superior or vicarious liability
rather than direct liability. 
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1091758
MAIN, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
I concur in the main opinion's conclusion that the
judgment appealed from was a final judgment and in its
affirmance of the trial court's order denying Target Media's
postjudgment motion for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML")
as to Specialty Marketing Corporation's breach-of-contract
claim.  However, I respectfully dissent from the main
opinion's affirmance 
of 
the trial court's order denying Target
Media Partners Operating Company, LLC ("Target Media"), and 
Ed Leader's postjudgment motion for a judgment as to Specialty
Marketing's 
fraudulent-misrepresentation 
claim 
and 
its
promissory-fraud claim.  I would reverse the trial court's
order as to those claims and remand the case for the trial
court to enter a JML in favor of Target Media and Leader as to
Specialty Marketing's fraudulent-misrepresentation claim and
promissory-fraud claim.  
A. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
I find persuasive Target Media's argument that Specialty
Marketing's reliance upon the representations made by Target
Media and Leader was unreasonable as a matter of law.  In
order to prove a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation,
Specialty Marketing needed to establish "(1) that [Target
Media and Leader] made a false representation, (2) that the
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misrepresentation 
involved a 
material 
fact, (3) 
that
[Specialty 
Marketing] 
relied 
on 
the 
misrepresentation, 
and 
(4)
that the misrepresentation damaged [Specialty Marketing]." 
AmerUs Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 5 So. 3d 1200, 1207 (Ala.
2008).  This Court has held that "for a plaintiff to state a
fraud claim, he must show that a misrepresentation induced him
to act in a way that he would not otherwise have acted, that
is, that he took a different course of action because of the
misrepresentation."  Hunt Petroleum Corp. v. State, 901 So. 2d
1, 5 (Ala. 2004).  
Moreover, a plaintiff must prove that he or she
reasonably relied on the defendant's misrepresentation in
order to recover damages for fraud.  AmerUs, 5 So. 3d at 1207. 
Specialty Marketing alleged in its complaint that,
"[i]n or about November 2002 until early 2007,
[Specialty Marketing] delivered its newly printed
magazine to the defendants on a monthly basis for
distribution by the defendants to truck stops and/or
retail establishments across the United States. 
Each month, [Specialty Marketing] received an
invoice from the defendants in the amount of
$9,750.00.  This amount represented the amount due
to the defendants for delivery of all of [Specialty
Marketing's] magazines.  In addition to the
invoices, 
[Specialty 
Marketing] 
periodically
received 
copies 
of 
'route 
sheets' 
from 
the
defendants.  These 'route sheets' were represented
to [Specialty Marketing] to have been filled out by
agents or employees of the defendants who were
responsible for the actual distribution of the
magazines.  These 'route sheets' indicated that all
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of [Specialty Marketing's] magazines were being
distributed 
to 
the 
appropriate 
retail
establishments.  In addition to the 'route sheets'
the 
[Specialty 
Marketing] 
[was] 
periodically
provided summaries of the distribution of [Specialty
Marketing's] magazines.  These summaries also
indicated delivery of all of [Specialty Marketing's]
magazines.  In addition to the documents, between
2003 and December 2006, [Specialty Marketing] [was]
assured by Defendants Wallace Adams, Gordon Adams,
and Ed Leader that all of [Specialty Marketing's]
magazines were being distributed appropriately."
Target Media and Leader contend that Specialty Marketing
failed to offer substantial evidence that either of them
represented that all the Truck Market News magazines had been
or were being delivered or that the information contained in
the spreadsheets was false.  Specialty Marketing argues that
it presented sufficient evidence to support its fraudulent-
misrepresentation claim, including evidence indicating that
Target Media and Leader represented to it that its magazines
were moving well when, in fact, they were not and evidence
indicating that many of the numbers on the spreadsheets had
been fabricated to make the information "look good."  To the
extent that Specialty Marketing argues that the inaccurate
information and documentation Target Media provided were
misrepresentations, I cannot agree.  Without question, the
2002 distribution contract required Target Media to provide
documentation on its delivery of Truck Market News, and it was
64
1091758
reasonable 
for 
Specialty 
Marketing 
to 
expect 
that
documentation to be accurate.  Nevertheless, although Target
Media's failure to provide accurate documentation and other
information can properly be considered a breach of contract,
it does not necessarily follow that a party's failure to
perform under a contract is fraudulent. 
I would focus in this case on Specialty Marketing's
contention that its reliance on Target Media's and Leader's
representations was reasonable.  In its brief to this Court,
Specialty Marketing argues: 
"The representations to Terry Davis, as the
owner of Specialty Marketing, were material.  His
reliance on them was reasonable, given the values
involved, the importance of the activities to his
company, 
Target 
Media's 
status 
as 
a 
major
distribution [sic], and its apparent expertise at
the activities--of which Target Media and its
employees assured him.  Only an insider of the
Defendant could have known that the representations
and promises were false." 
Specialty Marketing's brief, at 49.  Other than its brief
explanation of its contention that Davis's reliance on Target
Media's representations was reasonable, however, Specialty
Marketing did not discuss the reliance issue further.  
During the trial, in response to questions asked by
Specialty Marketing's attorney regarding Davis's receipt of
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1091758
the 
documentation 
discussed 
in 
the 
2002 
distribution 
contract,
Davis testified:
"Q.
Are [the exhibits Davis was examining] copies
of the spreadsheets that you received from
Target? 
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
And do you recognize them as that? 
"A.
Yes, sir.
"Q.
Do you remember receiving them?
"A.
I remember receiving some.
"Q.
Well, the ones that are in your hands?
"A.
Yes, sir.
"Q.
Do you know, Terry, these are the only ones we
have copies of, and you provided these to me.
Do you know if there were others that you
received that we just don't have copies of here
today?
"A.
No. This is all.
"....
"Q.
... What information, Terry, did you try to
get?  Why did you look at them?  What did you
learn from these spreadsheets?
"A.
I wanted to see how our [magazines] were
moving.  I wanted to see what was left in those
racks.  
"Q.
So the 'return' column was important to you?
"A.
It was the most important.
"Q.
Whether it was mid month or any time?
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1091758
"A.
That's right.
"Q.
And did you rely, Terry, on these spreadsheets
in determining how your [magazine] was doing as
it was being distributed by Target?
"A.
Oh, yeah.
"Q.
Now, we said that you received those from '[0]3
till '04, some time in August of '04, I
believe.  Did you receive any after that time
frame or after that day?
"A.
No.
"Q.
Did you ask for it? 
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
Did you ask for something?
"A.
Well, I kept asking, my sister and I both asked
Gordon and then Wally [Adams], we'd ask for
sheets and they just said they were behind."
Despite the fact that Davis testified that he relied on the
spreadsheets provided by Target Media, however, the record
reflects that Specialty Marketing continued to work with
Target Media for more than two years after Davis received the
last spreadsheet.  Although Davis testified that he asked
Gordon Adams and Wallace Adams for the documentation required
by the 2002 distribution contract, there is no evidence in the
record indicating that Davis or Daniels ever made any inquiry
as to the reason Target Media was not sending the information
on which Davis testified they relied.  
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Later during the trial, in response to questions asked by
Specialty Marketing's attorney regarding the company's sales
during the years the 2002 distribution contract was in place,
Davis testified:  
"Q.
... Terry, ... during the time that you were
with Target [Media], did Truck Market News or
did your business, in fact, grow?  Did your
sales increase from year to year?
"A.
From the time I was with Target [Media]?
"Q.
Yes.
"A.
No.  
"Q.
In fact, during those years, your sales
remained fairly flat, didn't they? 
"A.
Um-hum.
"....
"Q.
... Is that number on each of the tax returns,
Terry, the number that you refer to as your
sales for the year?
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
And is that number the one that you were
hoping, 
expecting 
to 
grow 
during 
your
relationship with Target [Media]?
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
What, from your perspective, and I don't want
you to tell me what anybody said to you, but
what, from your perspective, Terry Davis,
selling adds for Truck Market News during that
four-year period or so to five, what changed? 
What was different, if anything, between before
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you and Target [Media] during the time frame
that you were with Target [Media]?
"A.
Well, we had to--the biggest problem we had was
that, with the phone calls not coming in.
"Q.
From your advertisers?
"A.
From the advertisers.
"Q.
What did you do when you weren't just getting
phone calls, what did you have to do to find
people?
"A.
We had to cut deals, we had to ... give them a
half page for a full page--a full page for a
half-page price or two pages price of one,
things like that.
"Q.
And am I correct at saying that the whole time
you've been with Target [Media], you had to cut
deals to some extent?
"A.
Oh, yeah, we cut deals to--everybody cuts
deals.
"Q.
Did you find yourself having to work harder?
"A.
Yes, 
to 
convince 
these 
people 
to 
run
[advertisements].
"Q.
Traditionally, Terry, ... was Truck Market News
able to make enough money each month to pay for
the next month or did you borrow money as you
went along?
"A.
We had to start borrowing money.
"Q.
Before you were with Target [Media], did you
borrow money at all?
"A.
No, no, not at all."
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The evidence in the record shows that, with the exception
of one year, Specialty Marketing's income was decreasing
during the years it was associated with Target Media.  Despite
that fact, however, Davis did not testify that he or Daniels
ever investigated the reasons for the decrease in income.  In
fact, Davis testified as follows on cross-examination:
"Q.
Okay.  Now, you mentioned when we first started
this that you -- like, [Target Media's] failure
to do the things that they were promising you
that they were going to do had resulted in your
business fall-off; true?
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
Did you ever have any conversations with anyone
at Target [Media] about that?
"A.
Yeah, I had it with Gordon and Wally [Adams]
both, but ... it never crossed my mind that the
problem was with Target [Media]....
"....
"A.
I was told that [Truck Market News] was moving
great by Gordy and Wally [Adams], and even Ed
[Leader] told me that the [magazine] was moving
well.
"Q.
You have to use your own common sense, don't
you, Mr. Davis?
"A.
No, I have to use the sense of the people I'm
paying the money to, that I have to trust
somebody.
"Q.
And so you don't use your own common sense at
all?
"A.
What did you expect me to do, call them liars?
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"Q.
No, sir.  I'm just asking you, in any business
transaction, should you also be required to use
your own common sense?
"A.
I did what I thought was right and I thought
they were doing their job ....  I would never
have thought that Target Media had anything to
do with this."
In light of the foregoing testimony, it cannot be said
that Specialty Marketing reasonably relied on Target Media's
representations.  As this Court stated in Torres v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co., 438 So. 2d 757, 759 (Ala. 1983):  "[T]he
right of reliance comes with a concomitant duty on the part of
the plaintiffs to exercise some measure of precaution to
safeguard their 
interests."  Here, Specialty Marketing took no
precautions to safeguard its interests.  If nothing else,
Target Media's failure to provide the spreadsheets after
August 2004 and Specialty Marketing's continued decline in
business and income should have provoked inquiry or an
investigation of the facts by Davis and Daniels.  There is no
evidence indicating that Davis or Daniels ever made any effort
beyond occasional telephone inquiries to investigate Target
Media's distribution facility or its procedures during the
entire four years they worked with Target Media.  Based upon
the record before us, I would conclude that Specialty
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Marketing took no precautions to safeguard its own interests
but, instead, blindly trusted Target Media's representations. 
Specialty Marketing and Target Media, both corporations,
negotiated the 2002 distribution contract on equal footing. 
From my review of the record, it is clear that they should be
viewed as equals in fact and in the eyes of the law.  The
negotiations between the corporations culminated in Davis's
and Gordon Adams's executing the contract on behalf of
Specialty 
Marketing 
and 
Target 
Media 
d/b/a 
Target 
Distribution
Partners, 
respectively. 
 
The 
contract 
is 
clear 
and
unambiguous.  It sets out Target Media's promise to deliver
Truck Market News monthly to 275 locations, its guarantee to
prominently display Truck Market News, and its promise to
provide documentation 
of 
the delivery and display to Specialty
Marketing.  Because the jury could have concluded that Target
Media threw away large portions of Truck Market News each
month without attempting to deliver most of the magazines,
much less prominently display them, and, in addition, stopped
providing 
documentation 
to 
Specialty 
Marketing 
after
approximately two years, this Court holds in the main opinion,
a holding with which I concur, that the jury properly
considered whether Target Media breached the contract. 
However, I am unable to find any evidence to suggest that
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Specialty 
Marketing's 
reliance 
on 
Target 
Media's
representations 
was 
reasonable 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
law. 
Consequently, I must conclude that, as a matter of law,
Specialty 
Marketing's 
fraudulent-misrepresentation 
claim
should not have been submitted to the jury.  I respectfully
dissent as to the main opinion's affirmance of the trial
court's order denying Target Media and Leader's motion for a
JML as to the fraudulent-misrepresentation claim.  
B. Promissory Fraud
I now turn to Specialty Marketing's promissory-fraud
claim.  "A claim of promissory fraud is 'one based upon a
promise to act or not to act in the future.'" Ex parte
Michelin North America, Inc., 795 So. 2d 674, 678 (Ala. 2001)
(quoting Padgett v. Hughes, 535 So. 2d 140, 142 (Ala. 1988)). 
"The law places a heavier burden upon the plaintiff in
promissory-fraud cases than in ordinary fraud cases."  Heisz
v. Galt Indus., Inc., 93 So. 3d 918, 928 (Ala. 2012).   
"'The elements of fraud are (1) a
false representation (2) of a material
existing fact (3) reasonably relied upon by
the plaintiff (4) who suffered damage as a
proximate 
consequence 
of 
the
misrepresentation.  To prevail on a
promissory fraud claim such as that at
issue here, that is, one based upon a
promise to act or not to act in the future,
two additional elements must be satisfied:
(5) proof that at the time of the
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misrepresentation, the defendant had the
intention not to perform the act promised,
and (6) proof that the defendant had an
intent to deceive.'"
Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins. Co., 875
So. 2d 1143, 1160 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Padgett v. Hughes, 535
So. 2d at 142).
In response to questions from Specialty Marketing's
attorney 
during 
his 
direct 
examination, 
Gordon 
Adams 
testified
as follows about his negotiations with Davis resulting in the
execution of the 2002 distribution contract.
"Q.
Now, was it your intention, as the general
manager of Target Distribution Partners in
November 2002, assuming Specialty Marketing
accepted your terms, to live up to this
contract?
"A.
It was my intentions, yes, sir.
"Q.
And 
you 
were 
acting 
on 
behalf 
of 
the
corporation?
"A.
Corporation?  Target Distribution.
"Q.
Target Distribution Partners?
"A.
Yes, sir.  
"....
"Q.
Then there was also a promise there would be
documentation that includes proof of delivery.
When you wrote this contract and signed it and
you signed it and then sent it to Terry for him
to sign it; correct?
"A.
Yes, sir.
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"Q.
When you wrote it and signed it, were you
serious on behalf of Target Distribution
Partners that the customer, if he accepted this
contract, was going to be given documentation
to prove delivery?
"A.
Yes.
"....
"Q.
... Would it be fair to say that you, as the
general manager, negotiating in this agreement
for Target Distribution Partners, intended for
the customer to believe that you would perform
what you were doing and not mislead them?
"A.
True.
"Q.
You wanted the customer to rely on you, didn't
you? 
"A.
Yes, sir."
Furthermore, Leader, who was Gordon Adams's supervisor
and who provided input concerning the contract negotiations,
testified as follows in response to questions from Specialty
Marketing's attorney about the 2002 distribution contract:
"Q.
Now, the next item is delivery twice a month;
correct?
"A.
On the contract, sir?
"Q.
Yes.
"A.
Yes, I believe so. ...
"....
"Q.
... Now, the next item is guaranteed prominent
display of each location; correct?
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"A.
That is correct.
"Q.
What does the word 'guaranteed' mean to you?
"A.
That it's guaranteed.
"Q.
That means no exceptions, doesn't it?
"A.
Yeah.
"....
"Q.
So your company was serious about making that
promise?
"A.
Yes."
Specialty Marketing had the burden of proving that, when 
Gordon Adams and Leader negotiated the 2002 distribution
contract on behalf of Target Media, they intended not to
perform under the contract as promised and they intended to
deceive Specialty Marketing.  Their testimony at trial,
however, clearly shows that Specialty Marketing did not meet
its burden.  Even though the evidence at trial showed that
Target Media did not, in fact, perform as promised, this Court
has said that a defendant's failure to perform is not enough
to show a present intent not to perform.  Heisz, 93 So. 3d at
925.  Consequently, I conclude that, as a matter of law,
Specialty Marketing's promissory-fraud claim should not have
been submitted to the jury.  I respectfully dissent as to the
main opinion's affirmance of the trial court's order denying
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Target Media's motion for a JML as to the promissory-fraud
claim.  
Stuart and Bolin, JJ., concur.
77