Title: Green v. Virginia State Bar
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 060558
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 2006

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and 
          Agee, JJ., and Carrico S.J. 
 
WALTER FRANKLIN GREEN, IV 
 
v.  Record No. 060558  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   November 3, 2006 
VIRGINIA STATE BAR 
 
FROM THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD 
 
 
 
This case is an appeal of right by an attorney from a 
ruling of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board 
(Disciplinary Board).  Because we conclude that the 
Disciplinary Board abused its discretion in refusing to 
admit certain evidence in mitigation of a sanction, we will 
reverse the Disciplinary Board’s order imposing a 60-day 
suspension of the attorney’s license to practice law in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia. 
RELEVANT PROCEEDINGS AND FACTS 
In an order dated September 16, 2005, this Court 
affirmed the Disciplinary Board’s order finding that Walter 
Franklin Green, IV, had violated Rules 8.4(b) and 1.3(a) of 
the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct (the 
Disciplinary Rules).  Green v. Virginia State Bar, Record 
No. 050289 (September 16, 2005).  This Court, however, 
concluded that the evidence did not support the 
Disciplinary Board’s additional finding that Green’s 
“pattern” of failing to appear in court violated 
Disciplinary Rule 1.3(a).  Id.  Accordingly, we vacated the 
sanction suspending Green’s license to practice law in this 
Commonwealth for 60 days and remanded the case to the 
Disciplinary Board for reconsideration of an appropriate 
sanction.  Id. 
On remand, the Disciplinary Board advised Green that 
it would convene a hearing via telephonic conference call 
to reconsider what sanction to impose for his violations of 
the Disciplinary Rules.  In a pleading filed with the 
Disciplinary Board, Green objected to the telephonic 
conference call and asserted that it was “a procedurally 
inadequate substitute for a hearing” and was not “a 
suitable forum for the reception of evidence.”  At the 
beginning of the hearing, Green again objected to the 
hearing being conducted via telephonic conference call.  
Green claimed that he wished to introduce documents and 
witness testimony from his office staff to substantiate the 
adverse economic impact on his legal practice caused by an 
allegedly untimely press release by the Virginia State Bar 
(Bar) on November 22, 2004.  In that press release, the Bar 
announced that on November 19, 2004, the Disciplinary Board 
had suspended Green’s license to practice law in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia for a period of 60 days.  The 
 
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press release further stated the Disciplinary Board had 
concluded that Green “failed to act diligently and 
committed a wrongful act reflecting adversely on his 
fitness to practice law during his representation of two 
brothers in a narcotics case.”1  The Disciplinary Board 
overruled Green’s objection and proceeded with the hearing 
telephonically. 
Prior to and at the hearing, Green submitted various 
documents that he wished to introduce in mitigation of a 
sanction pursuant to the Rules of this Court, Part 6, § IV, 
Para. 13(I)(2)(f)(2).2  The documents included the 
Disciplinary Board’s 2004 press release and two newspaper 
articles, both of which discussed the suspension of his 
license to practice law.  One of the articles appeared in 
the November 24, 2004 edition of a newspaper circulated in 
the area where Green resides, and the other article was 
from the Virginia Lawyer Register. 
                                                 
1  The Disciplinary Board’s press release preceded 
issuance of its order of suspension dated December 21, 2004 
and its summary order dated January 7, 2005. 
 
2  Paragraph 13(I)(2)(f)(2) provides, “If the 
[Disciplinary] Board concludes that there has been 
presented clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent 
has engaged in Misconduct, after considering evidence and 
arguments in aggravation and mitigation, the [Disciplinary] 
Board shall impose one of the following sanctions . . . .”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
3
In an order dated January 3, 2006, the chairman of the 
Disciplinary Board panel hearing Green’s case ruled that 
certain documents Green submitted prior to the hearing were 
irrelevant and inadmissible.  Those documents included the 
Disciplinary Board’s 2004 press release.  That order, 
however, allowed Green to present evidence and argument 
relevant to the imposition of an appropriate sanction.  At 
the beginning of the telephonic hearing held on January 10, 
2006, the Disciplinary Board overruled the January 3, 2006 
order in part and ruled it would hear only argument with 
regard to an appropriate sanction.3  The Disciplinary Board 
decided to base its reconsideration of the sanction solely 
on the record from the prior disciplinary proceedings held 
on November 19, 2004 and the order of this Court remanding 
the case to the Disciplinary Board.  After deciding it 
would hear only argument, the Disciplinary Board, on the 
other hand, ruled neither Green’s documents nor the 
testimony he wanted to offer were admissible. 
                                                 
3  Pursuant to the Rules of this Court, Part 6, § IV, 
Para. 13(B)(5)(b)(5), “[t]he [Disciplinary] Board shall 
have [the power] to act through its Chair or one of the 
Vice Chairs (an officer) on any non-dispositive pre-hearing 
matters . . . where all parties are in agreement, subject 
to the following qualification and exception: (1) any pre-
hearing ruling on a non-dispositive matter made by an 
officer of the Board shall be subject to being overruled by 
a majority vote of the Panel which actually hears the 
matter.” 
 
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Upon hearing argument of counsel for the Bar and 
argument of Green, in proper person, the Disciplinary Board 
concluded that “the seriousness of the two charges of 
misconduct affirmed by the . . . Court” and Green’s 
“extensive disciplinary record” merited the previously 
imposed sanction, a 60-day suspension of Green’s license to 
practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia.  Green 
appeals from the Disciplinary Board’s order of suspension 
dated January 24, 2006. 
ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Green first challenges the Disciplinary 
Board’s refusal to admit evidence he proffered regarding 
the Bar’s November 2004 press release and the devastating 
impact it had on his law practice and family.  Green claims 
that the publicity “ruined his law practice and reputation” 
and was tantamount to a “defacto” suspension.  He asserts 
this evidence was in mitigation of a sanction and that he 
had a right to present it pursuant to the Rules of this 
Court, Part 6, § IV, Para. 13(I)(2)(f)(2). 
In response, the Bar contends that it afforded Green 
an opportunity to present relevant evidence and argument in 
mitigation of a sanction, but that he failed to do so.  The 
Bar argues Green’s evidence was irrelevant and that the 
 
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Disciplinary Board therefore did not abuse its discretion 
in making its evidentiary rulings. 
Like a trial court, the Disciplinary Board’s decision 
to admit or exclude evidence is a discretionary matter and 
will not be overturned on appeal unless the record shows an 
abuse of that discretion.  See Rose v. Jaques, 268 Va. 137, 
154, 597 S.E.2d 64, 74 (2004); May v. Caruso, 264 Va. 358, 
362, 568 S.E.2d 690, 692 (2002).  In this instance, we 
conclude that the Disciplinary Board did abuse its 
discretion.  Green’s proffered evidence regarding the 
adverse impact on his law practice and reputation resulting 
from the public dissemination of the Disciplinary Board’s 
findings that he had violated the Disciplinary Rules and 
its suspension of his license to practice law was relevant 
to the question whether the Disciplinary Board should 
lessen the severity of the sanction to be imposed for 
Green’s professional misconduct.  While the Disciplinary 
Board would determine what weight, if any, to give to such 
evidence, it was nevertheless relevant evidence in 
mitigation of a sanction, and therefore, admissible.  
“‘Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove or disprove, or 
is pertinent to, matters in issue.’”  Velocity Express Mid-
Atlantic v. Hugen, 266 Va. 188, 205, 585 S.E.2d 557, 566 
 
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(2003) (quoting Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 257, 546 
S.E.2d 728, 730 (2001)). 
In Cummings v. Virginia State Bar, 233 Va. 363, 355 
S.E.2d 588 (1987), this Court addressed a similar issue 
regarding the admissibility of mitigating evidence.  Eric 
L. Cummings was disbarred from practicing law in the 
District of Columbia.  Id. at 366, 355 S.E.2d at 590.  The 
Disciplinary Board then issued an order directing Cummings 
to show cause why his license to practice law in the 
Commonwealth should not be permanently revoked in light of 
the proceedings in the District of Columbia.  Id.  Cummings 
filed an answer to the show cause order and sought to 
introduce evidence in support of his answer at a hearing 
before the Disciplinary Board.  Id.  The Disciplinary Board 
ruled that Cummings had failed to allege any grounds that 
would authorize the Disciplinary Board to impose a sanction 
other than that imposed in the District of Columbia and 
accordingly refused to hear any evidence in support of 
Cummings’ answer.  Id.
On appeal, we agreed that Cummings could not 
relitigate any issues of fact decided in the District of 
Columbia.  Id. at 367, 355 S.E.2d at 591.  This Court, 
however, concluded Cummings was entitled to present 
evidence “which might have the effect of mitigating the 
 
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sanctions to be imposed in Virginia by showing that under 
the existing circumstances a repetition of the same 
discipline would result in a grave injustice.”  Id.  
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Likewise, Green was 
entitled to present evidence tending to mitigate the 
sanction to be imposed by showing to what extent he had 
already suffered adverse consequences because of the public 
dissemination of the Disciplinary Board’s findings that he 
had violated the Disciplinary Rules and the suspension of 
his license to practice law.4  See El-Amin v. Virginia State 
Bar, 257 Va. 608, 619, 514 S.E.2d 163, 169 (1999) 
(mitigating evidence included fact of wife’s and daughter’s 
illnesses, revision of office procedures, and partial 
refund of client’s retainer). 
Green also assigns error to the Disciplinary Board’s 
decision to conduct the January 10, 2006 hearing by 
telephonic conference call.  Green argues, as he did before 
the Disciplinary Board, that such a hearing impeded his 
ability to present evidence effectively and had a chilling 
effect on his right to be heard on the issue of an 
appropriate sanction.  The Bar counters that the Rules of 
                                                 
4  To the extent that the Disciplinary Board overruled 
the January 3, 2006 order and decided to hear only argument 
relevant to the imposition of an appropriate sanction, such 
a ruling violated the provisions of the Rules of this 
Court, Part 6, § IV, Para. 13(I)(2)(f)(2). 
 
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the Supreme Court of Virginia do not prohibit the use of a 
telephonic hearing to determine an appropriate sanction and 
that Green was afforded a full opportunity to present 
relevant evidence and argument in mitigation of a sanction. 
It is correct that the Rules of this Court, Part 6, § 
IV, Para. 13, do not specifically require the Disciplinary 
Board to conduct the hearing at issue in person as opposed 
to using a telephonic conference call.  Green made his 
objection to the telephonic conference call known to the 
Disciplinary Board both in a written pleading and orally at 
the beginning of the hearing.  The record also shows that 
Green, while participating in the telephonic hearing from 
his office in Harrisonburg, asserted that he wished to have 
his office staff testify as to the “economic impact of the 
press release, and, in fact, call witnesses to testify what 
the press release has done to [his] practice.”  Based on 
that limited proffer, the Disciplinary Board determined the 
testimony was irrelevant.  Green, however, never stated 
exactly whom he wished to call as witnesses, where those 
persons were at that time, i.e., in his office or 
elsewhere, or about what they would testify other than the 
“economic impact of the press release.”  Thus, given the 
record in this case, we cannot determine whether Green was 
prejudiced by the Disciplinary Board’s decision to overrule 
 
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his objection to the telephonic conference call and are 
therefore constrained to conclude the Disciplinary Board 
did not err in its ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the Disciplinary 
Board’s order of January 24, 2006, vacate the sanction 
imposed, and remand this case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion to determine an appropriate 
sanction.5
 
 
 
 
  Reversed, vacated, and remanded. 
                                                 
5  In light of our decision, it is not necessary to 
address Green’s other assignments of error. 
 
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