Title: Ex parte City of Montgomery, K.C. Bentley, and Ron Cook. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Gwendolyn P. McQuirter and Charles E. McQuirter v. City of Montgomery, K.C. Bentley, and Ron Cook)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1071621
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 20, 2009

REL: 03/20/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1071621
____________________
Ex parte City of Montgomery, K.C. Bentley, and Ron Cook
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Gwendolyn P. McQuirter and Charles E. McQuirter
v.
City of Montgomery, K.C. Bentley, and Ron Cook)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-07-900089)
MURDOCK, Justice.
The City of Montgomery ("the City") and Montgomery Police
Department ("MPD") officers K.C. Bentley ("Officer Bentley")
1071621
2
and Ron Cook ("Lt. Cook") petition this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to enter a
summary judgment in their favor on claims of negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel per se,
slander per se, invasion of privacy, and loss of consortium
pursued by Gwendolyn P. McQuirter and Charles E. McQuirter,
based on the assertion of the defenses of State-agent and
statutory immunity by Officer Bentley, Lt. Cook, and the City.
For the reasons discussed herein, we grant the petition and
issue the writ.
I.  Factual and Procedural Background
On September 15, 2006, the special-operations division of
the MPD conducted a prostitution sting in the area of the
Mobile Highway and West South Boulevard in Montgomery.  That
day, undercover MPD officers arrested 10 women, who were taken
to a predetermined location for processing.  Officer Bentley
was part of the processing team responsible for completing an
incident/offense report, performing warrant checks on the
individuals arrested, and preparing affidavits from the
statements of the arresting officers.  Officer Bentley also
had to prepare a daily activity report for her superiors,
1071621
Officer Bentley had never seen or had any prior dealings
1
with Riley before her arrest on September 15, 2006.  
Riley had been friends with McQuirter for several years
2
and may have occasionally lived in the McQuirters' home.
3
which included booking photographs of each person arrested,
the person's name, the date of the person's arrest, the
location of the arrest, the specific charge, and the person's
criminal history as retrieved from the National Crime
Information Center ("NCIC").
One of the women arrested as a result of the prostitution
sting was Tiffany Riley.  Riley sat near Officer Bentley as
Officer Bentley took information from Riley for the processing
paperwork.   Officer Bentley asked Riley for her name, and
1
Riley responded by giving Officer Bentley the name Gwendolyn
McQuirter and correctly spelling the name.   Officer Bentley
2
asked Riley's date of birth, and Officer Bentley testified
that Riley provided Gwendolyn McQuirter's correct date of
birth.  In an affidavit Riley filed in the trial court,
however, Riley stated that she provided her own date of birth
to Officer Bentley.  When Officer Bentley asked for Riley's
address, 
Riley 
provided 
Gwendolyn 
McQuirter's 
correct 
address.
Officer Bentley also asked for Riley's Social Security number.
1071621
4
Officer Bentley testified that Riley stated that she could not
recall her Social Security number, although Riley stated in
her affidavit that she provided her son's Social Security
number.  As Riley provided the information, Officer Bentley
entered it into a police computer system that, according to
Officer Bentley, verified McQuirter's address and date of
birth as provided by Riley, so Officer Bentley had no reason
to suspect that Riley was not Gwendolyn McQuirter. 
In the course of preparing the daily activity report for
September 15, 2006, Officer Bentley waited for booking
photographs to include in the report, but for some unknown
reason, none were placed in the MPD's computer system.  As a
result, Officer Bentley decided to use file photographs of
each of the arrested women so that she could timely submit the
daily activity report to her superiors.  All the women, except
McQuirter, had booking photographs on file because they had
been previously arrested.  To obtain a photograph of
McQuirter, Officer Bentley accessed the Law Enforcement
Tactical System ("LETS"), a computerized system that contains
data from the records of several different agencies, including
the Department of Public Safety, from which Officer Bentley
1071621
5
obtained Gwendolyn McQuirter's driver's license photograph.
Officer Bentley testified that MPD officers often use LETS to
obtain 
information, 
including 
photographs, 
as 
an 
investigative
tool and for other law-enforcement purposes.  She also
testified that at the time she pulled Gwendolyn McQuirter's
photograph from LETS, it did not occur to her that the person
in the photograph looked substantially different than Riley.
Officer Bentley completed her daily activity report and
delivered it to her superiors, one of whom was Lt. Pat
Crockett.  Lt. Crockett then contacted Lt. Cook and informed
him that arrest information and photographs from the
prostitution sting operation were ready to be disseminated to
the media.  Lt. Cook, a detective, also serves as an on-call
public information officer ("PIO").  The PIO disseminates
information from the MPD to the media, typically through press
releases.  The MPD uses the PIO when it feels an incident is
of significant public interest, if it is seeking to expose a
public-safety issue via the media, or if it is actively
seeking a criminal suspect.  Lt. Cook was the acting PIO on
the weekend of the prostitution sting operation.  Upon
receiving the call from Lt. Crockett, Lt. Cook immediately
1071621
6
picked up the information and accompanying photographs from
him and prepared a press release.  Lt. Cook testified that he
did not find it abnormal that McQuirter's photograph was not
a booking photograph like the rest of the photographs because
it was not unusual to have different kinds of photographs
submitted in police reports.  
On September 16, 2006, Lt. Cook issued a press release
announcing the details of the sting operation, including the
names and photographs of the 10 women arrested the previous
day.  The list included the name Gwendolyn McQuirter, and her
name was accompanied by her driver's license photograph.  The
press release was distributed to several Montgomery television
stations, to the Associated Press, and to the Montgomery
Advertiser, a local newspaper.  Two Montgomery television
stations ran stories about the prostitution sting operation in
broadcasts airing on September 17, 18, and 19, 2006; the
broadcasts 
showed 
Gwendolyn 
McQuirter's 
photograph 
and
identified her by name as 1 of the 10 women arrested for
prostitution.  The Montgomery Advertiser published a story
regarding the arrests on September 17, 2006; the story
1071621
7
directed readers to view photographs of the suspects, which
included a photograph of Gwendolyn McQuirter, on its Web site.
On September 19, 2006, Charles McQuirter contacted
Lt. Cook in reference to the release to the media of the
photograph of his wife, and, upon further checking, the MPD
discovered that Riley had falsely identified herself during
her processing following her arrest.  As a result, Riley was
charged with, and on September 20, 2006, pleaded guilty to,
giving a false name to a law-enforcement officer.  
In February 2007, the McQuirters sued the City and
several other defendants in the Montgomery Circuit Court.
They subsequently amended their complaint.  As ultimately
amended, the complaint contained state claims alleging
negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
libel per se, slander per se, invasion of privacy, and loss of
consortium, and claims alleging violation of the Driver
Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725, and a
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  In a second amended complaint,
the McQuirters added Officer Bentley and Lt. Cook ("the
officers") as defendants.  The defendants removed the case to
federal court.  On February 12, 2008, the federal district
1071621
8
court entered a summary judgment in favor of all the
defendants on the federal claims and declined to extend
jurisdiction to hear the state-law claims.  The federal
district court then remanded the action to the Montgomery
Circuit Court.
On May 29, 2008, the City and the officers filed a
renewed motion for a summary judgment based on statutory and
State-agent immunity.  The trial court denied the motion.
Thereafter, the City and the officers petitioned this Court
for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to set aside
its order denying their motion for a summary judgment and to
enter an order granting the motion.  
II.  Standard of Review
"'"While the general rule is that the
denial of a motion for summary judgment is
not reviewable, ... the denial of a motion
for summary judgment grounded on a claim of
immunity is reviewable by petition for writ
of mandamus."  Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d
911, 912 (Ala. 2000).  A writ of mandamus
is an extraordinary remedy available only
when there is: "(1) a clear legal right to
the order sought; (2) an imperative duty
upon the respondent to perform, accompanied
by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the
properly 
invoked 
jurisdiction 
of 
the
court."  Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823
So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001).'"
1071621
9
Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1280 (Ala. 2008) (quoting
Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541, 543 (Ala. 2003)) (emphasis
omitted).
III.  Analysis
A.  Claims Against the Officers
The officers contend that the trial court erred when it
denied their motion for a summary judgment as to the
McQuirters' claims because, they argue, they are entitled to
immunity in this case based on State-agent immunity and the
statutory immunity for law-enforcement officers provided by
§ 6-5-338, Ala. Code 1975.  
"State-agent immunity protects state employees, as agents
of the State, in the exercise of their judgment in executing
their work responsibilities."  Ex parte Hayles, 852 So. 2d
117, 122 (Ala. 2002).  A plurality of this Court clarified the
parameters of State-agent immunity in Ex parte Cranman, 792
So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000), and this Court adopted the Cranman
test later the same year in Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173
(Ala. 2000).  In Cranman, this Court stated:
"A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity when the
conduct made the basis of the claim against the
agent is based upon the agent's
1071621
10
"(1) formulating plans, policies, or
designs; or
"(2) exercising his or her judgment in
the administration of a department or
agency of government, including, but not
limited to, examples such as:
"(a) making administrative
adjudications;
"(b) allocating resources;
"(c) negotiating contracts;
"(d) 
hiring, 
firing,
transferring, 
assigning, 
or
supervising personnel; or
"(3) discharging duties imposed on a
department or agency by statute, rule, or
regulation, insofar as the statute, rule,
or regulation prescribes the manner for
performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
"(4) 
exercising 
judgment 
in 
the
enforcement of the criminal laws of the
State, including, but not limited to,
law-enforcement 
officers' 
arresting 
or
attempting to arrest persons; or
"(5) 
exercising 
judgment 
in 
the
discharge of duties imposed by statute,
rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners,
counseling or releasing persons of unsound
mind, or educating students."
Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405. 
1071621
11
As noted, the officers also rely on § 6-5-338(a), Ala.
Code 1975, which states:
"Every peace officer, except constables, who is
employed or appointed pursuant to the Constitution
or statutes of this state, whether appointed or
employed as such peace officer by the state or a
county or municipality thereof, or by an agency or
institution, 
corporate 
or 
otherwise, 
created
pursuant to the Constitution or laws of this state
and authorized by the Constitution or laws to
appoint or employ police officers or other peace
officers, and whose duties prescribed by law, or by
the lawful terms of their employment or appointment,
include the enforcement of, or the investigation and
reporting of violations of, the criminal laws of
this state, and who is empowered by the laws of this
state to execute warrants, to arrest and to take
into custody persons who violate, or who are
lawfully charged by warrant, indictment, or other
lawful process, with violations of, the criminal
laws of this state, shall at all times be deemed to
be officers of this state, and as such shall have
immunity from tort liability arising out of his or
her conduct in performance of any discretionary
function within the line and scope of his or her law
enforcement duties."
Although § 6-5-338(a) addresses immunity in terms of
"discretionary functions," this Court, in Blackwood v. City of
Hanceville, 936 So. 2d 495 (Ala. 2006), concluded that the
test for determining whether an officer is entitled to
immunity under § 6-5-338(a) is the one articulated in Cranman.
See Blackwood, 936 So. 2d at 504 (quoting Howard v. City of
Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 203 (Ala. 2003), for the proposition
1071621
12
that 
this 
Court 
"'will 
address 
the 
applicability 
of
peace-officer immunity under the principles set forth in
Cranman'").  This Court has also stated:  
"Despite this Court's holding in Blackwood,
there remained the fact that the scope of immunity
for law-enforcement officers as articulated in
§ 6-5-338(a) was broader than category (4) of the
Cranman test seemed to allow.  In Hollis v. City of
Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300, 309 (Ala. 2006), this
Court 
eliminated 
that 
apparent 
difference 
by
expanding the scope of immunity as stated in
category (4) of the Cranman test:
"'Given the divergence between the
scope 
of 
the 
immunity 
granted 
by
§ 6-5-338(a) -- "conduct in performance of
any discretionary function within the line
and scope of his or her law enforcement
duties" -- and summarized in category (4)
of the Cranman restatement -- "exercising
judgment in the enforcement of the criminal
laws of the State ...." -- we conclude that
immune 
category 
4 
of 
the 
Cranman
restatement should be expanded to restate
the law of immunity in this area so as to
reflect § 6-5-338(a).
"'Because the peace officers' immunity
statute does not limit the availability of
immunity to "enforcement of the criminal
laws," we today modify category (4) of
Cranman to read as follows:
"'"A State agent shall be
immune from civil liability in
his or her personal capacity when
the conduct made the basis of the
claim against the agent is based
upon the agent's
1071621
13
"'"....
"'"(4) exercising judgment
in 
the 
enforcement 
of 
the
criminal 
laws 
of 
the 
State,
including, but not limited to,
l a w - e n f o r c e m e n t  
o f f i c e r s '
arresting or attempting to arrest
persons, or serving as peace
officers 
under 
circumstances
entitling 
such 
officers 
to
i m m u n i t y  
p u r s u a n t  
t o
§ 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code 1975."'"
Kennedy, 992 So. 2d at 1282 (final emphasis in Kennedy
indicates additional language).
Moreover, 
"'[t]his 
Court 
has 
established 
a
"burden-shifting" process when a party raises the
defense of State-agent immunity.'  Ex parte Estate
of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).  A
State agent asserting State-agent immunity 'bears
the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff's
claims arise from a function that would entitle the
State agent to immunity.'  946 So. 2d at 452.
Should the State agent make such a showing, the
burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that one
of the two categories of exceptions to State-agent
immunity recognized in Cranman is applicable."  
Kennedy, 992 So. 2d at 1282.  Those two categories of
exceptions are:
"(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws,
rules, or regulations of this State enacted or
promulgated for the purpose of regulating the
1071621
14
activities 
of 
a 
governmental 
agency 
require
otherwise; or
"(2) when the State agent acts willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his
or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation
of the law."
Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405.  
In the present case, we have no difficulty concluding
that the officers carried their burden of demonstrating that,
at the times relevant to this matter, they were engaged in
law-enforcement functions for which statutory and State-agent
immunity are available, unless one of the two categories of
exceptions to immunity recognized in Cranman applies.  The
facts the parties have placed before this Court on this
mandamus petition demonstrate: (1) that the officers were
attempting, generally, to enforce the criminal laws of the
State; and (2) that the actions Officer Bentley took in
booking Riley and Lt. Cook took in disseminating information
about the arrests resulting from the prostitution sting
involved the exercise of discretion within the line and scope
of their law-enforcement duties, either, in the case of
Officer Bentley, as a member of the processing team
responsible for booking the 10 women arrested on September 15,
1071621
The McQuirters cite Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705 (Ala.
3
2002), for authority that the officers have not shifted the
burden by demonstrating that their actions fall under one of
the Cranman categories entitling them to State-agent immunity.
Wood is inapposite for at least two reasons.  First, this
Court rejected the mandamus petition of the director of the
Department of Youth Services in Wood asserting State-agent
immunity  specifically because the director had failed to
include in his affidavit "any significant facts relating to
his personal involvement in the actions giving rise to the
claims asserted against him."  852 So. 2d at 710.  That is
simply not the case here.  Detailed facts were provided to the
trial court with regard to the actions of both Officer Bentley
and Lt. Cook in regard to the McQuirters' claims.  Moreover,
as this Court explained in Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So.
2d 300, 309 (Ala. 2006), § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code 1975, expands
the categories of State-agent immunity for police officers in
a way not available to education officials.
15
2006, and preparing the necessary paperwork documenting the
arrests, or, in the case of Lt. Cook, as the on-call PIO who
was responsible for disseminating information to the media
about the prostitution sting operation.  Given this showing,
to defeat the summary-judgment motion asserting State-agent
immunity as to the officers, the McQuirters had the burden of
demonstrating that one of the exceptions to immunity applied.3
In other words, the McQuirters had the burden of presenting
evidence indicating that an issue of material fact existed as
to Officer Bentley's and/or Lt. Cook's conduct, such that that
conduct fell within one of the two Cranman exceptions.
1071621
16
Based on the materials before us, we conclude that the
McQuirters failed to present any evidence or legal authority
to the trial court that might support the conclusion that Lt.
Cook's conduct fell within either of the aforementioned
exceptions.  Thus, as to Lt. Cook, the trial court erred by
not entering a summary judgment in his favor.
As to Officer Bentley, the McQuirters have relied on this
Court's holding that one of the ways in which a plaintiff can
show that "[a] State agent acts beyond [his or her] authority
and is therefore not immune [is by proffering evidence proving
that the State agent] 'fail[ed] to discharge duties pursuant
to detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated on a
checklist.'"  Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052
(Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d at 178).  The
McQuirters first contend that Officer Bentley failed to follow
an MPD policy that required her to obtain Riley's name, date
of birth, and Social Security number and run that information
through the NCIC to determine whether Riley had any
outstanding warrants. They contend that in light of this
policy, Officer Bentley had no discretion in carrying out
these duties, i.e., they contend that she acted beyond her
1071621
The 
petitioners 
include the unredacted deposition
4
testimony in their reply brief.  The McQuirters have filed a
motion to strike the portion of the petitioners' reply brief
that includes the unredacted deposition testimony on the
ground that the testimony was not before the trial court.  The
pertinent 
portion 
of 
Lt. Cook's unredacted deposition
testimony, however, was, in fact, read in full to the trial
court in the hearing on the motion for a summary judgment.
Thus, we deny the motion to strike.  We also note that the
unredacted testimony merely provides more context for the
answers provided by Lt. Cook; the redacted answers do not
establish the existence or exact nature of the alleged policy
any more definitively than does the full testimony.  
The redacted portions of the testimony (the parts omitted
5
by the McQuirters, but read to the trial court) are indicated
by the emphasized language in brackets.
17
authority by not acting in accordance with detailed rules or
regulations of the MPD.  The McQuirters attempt to demonstrate
the existence of such a policy from redacted deposition
testimony of Lt. Cook they have attached as an exhibit to
their brief in this Court.   The pertinent portion of Lt.
4
Cook's deposition states:5
"Q:
Is there a policy within the police department
that upon arresting somebody, an officer is
supposed to verify by some means the identity
of the person arrested?
"A:
Yes.
["Q:  Is that a written policy?
"A:
Well, you learn in the academy what you're
supposed to do when you make contact with a
person.]
1071621
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"Q:
And what are you supposed to do?
"A:
You get their -- gather their information, run
that information through NCIC.
["Q:  When you say gather the person's information,
what information does that consist of?
"A:
You're going to ask him the name and possibly
the date of birth.  If at all possible, you
might get their Social Security number.
"Q:
Any other information?
"A:
No.]
"Q:
And then you said you run that through the
NCIC?
"A:
Which would be channel 2.
"Q:
And what happens next after you run it through
NCIC?
"A:
After you run it through NCIC, the dispatcher
will come back and let you know whether this
person has warrants or anything on them or not.
["Q:  Okay.  Under this policy, we're talking about,
are there any other steps an officer is
supposed to take to confirm an individual's
identity?
"A:
Not to my knowledge.]
"....
"Q:
And let me go back for just a minute.  I sort
of got sidetracked on the -- when I was asking
you about the policy to learn the identity of a
person that's arrested, let me make sure I
understood.  The only policy that you're aware
1071621
19
of is that an officer needs to ask the name,
date of birth, Social Security number of the
person they're arresting; is that right?
"A:
Yes.
"....
"Q:
Well, when you were supervising the patrol
division, was that still the policy back then?
"A:
Yes.
"Q:
Well, if somebody commits a crime across the
street there today, can you go arrest them?
"A:
Yes.
"Q:
And if you go over there and arrest somebody
today, how are you going to confirm the
identity according to the policy that's in
place today?
"A:
Just like I told you right here, that I'm going
to get the name, date of birth, possibly the
Social Security number."
Even if the foregoing testimony were deemed to establish
that a policy exists in the MPD generally requiring officers
to obtain an arrested person's name, birth date, and possibly
Social Security number, it does not establish the exact
processing steps that an officer must follow to obtain this
information.  It does not indicate what steps an officer must
take to verify the accuracy of information received orally
from an arrested person or what an officer must do if he or
1071621
20
she receives conflicting information from the arrested person.
Moreover, the testimony provides no information about the
steps an officer must take for obtaining photographs of
arrested persons if the MPD does not have a booking photograph
on file or whether any steps should be taken to verify that an
arrested person appears to be the person in the photograph
that is included in the daily activity report.  Under these
circumstances, we cannot conclude that the MPD "policy"
regarding the verification of an arrestee's identity includes
"detailed rules or regulations" that Officer Bentley violated
in this case so as to support a conclusion that she acted
beyond her authority.
On the facts before the trial court, it appears that
Officer Bentley followed the MPD policy, if there is one,
because she asked for Riley's name, her birth date, her Social
Security number, and even her address.  At least some, perhaps
even most, of the information Riley provided in response to
Officer Bentley's questions indicated that she was the person
she represented herself to be to Officer Bentley, i.e.,
Gwendolyn McQuirter.  Thus, in Officer Bentley's judgment,
nothing was amiss.  Officer Bentley then used her judgment in
1071621
The McQuirters have offered nothing to the contrary.  The
6
record does not disclose how much time elapsed in this case,
or generally does elapse, between the time an officer takes
information from an arrested person and the time he or she
obtains a photograph to attach to the daily activity report.
Thus, it is unclear whether an officer can make an immediate
comparison between an arrested person and the photograph that
is being attached to the daily activity report.  In any event,
the record before us contains no indication that requiring the
processing officer to include in his or her daily activity
report the arrested person's photograph is imposed for
verification of identity purposes, as opposed to assuring a
complete record of the arrest.  A fortiori, the McQuirters
have not demonstrated the existence of an MPD policy that
required Officer Bentley to visually confirm that the person
arrested was the person depicted in the photograph attached to
the daily activity report. 
21
accessing LETS to obtain Gwendolyn McQuirter's driver's
license photograph, an action that both Officer Bentley and
Lt. Cook indicated was not unusual when the MPD does not have
a booking photograph on file.  According to her testimony,
Officer Bentley did not notice a distinct difference between
the image in the photograph and whatever recollection she had
of the person she previously had seen, a judgment that for all
that appears is one within her discretion.   On the whole, we
6
cannot conclude that Officer Bentley did not operate within
her discretion as she performed her tasks as a processing
officer in questioning Riley and assembling the daily activity
report.
1071621
22
Based on the foregoing, the McQuirters have not met their
burden of proffering evidence of a detailed policy that either
of the officers violated in the course of his or her duties
that would lift the cloak of State-agent immunity.  In other
words, the McQuirters failed to demonstrate that either
Lt. Cook or Officer Bentley acted beyond his or her authority
in 
the 
course 
of 
processing 
Riley 
and 
disseminating
information to the public about the prostitution sting
operation.  At most, the facts demonstrate that a mistake was
committed in the course of ordinary law-enforcement duties, a
mistake that was caused ultimately by Riley's criminal
actions.  Accordingly, we conclude that Officer Bentley and
Lt. Cook are entitled to State-agent immunity and that the
trial court erred by not granting their motion for a summary
judgment.  
B. Claims Against the City
The McQuirters' sole argument for liability against the
City relied upon the conclusion that Officer Bentley and
Lt. Cook are not entitled to State-agent immunity.  Because we
have concluded that the officers are entitled to State-agent
immunity, this argument falls of its own weight.  See
1071621
23
§ 6-5-338(b), Ala. Code 1975 ("extend[ing] immunity ... to
peace officers and governmental units or agencies authorized
to appoint peace officers").  
IV.  Conclusion
We conclude that Officer Bentley and Lt. Cook are
entitled to State-agent immunity and, therefore, that the
trial court erred when it denied their motion for a summary
judgment.  Because the McQuirters' sole argument against the
City relied on the liability of Officer Bentley and Lt. Cook,
the trial court erred when it denied the motion for a summary
judgment as to the City.  Thus, we issue the writ. 
The 
McQuirters' 
motion 
to 
strike 
the 
unredacted
deposition testimony that is attached to the petitioners'
reply brief is denied (see note 4, supra).
MOTION TO STRIKE DENIED; PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and Shaw, JJ.,
concur.
Lyons, J., concurs in the result.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.