Title: Cleburne County Commission et al. v. Jack E. Norton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1060135
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 17, 2007

Rel 08/17/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 SPECIAL TERM, 2007
_________________________
1060135
_________________________
Cleburne County Commission et al.
v.
Jack E. Norton
Appeal from Cleburne Circuit Court
(CV-05-79)
PER CURIAM.
The Cleburne County Commission and commissioners Ryan
Robertson, 
Bobby 
Brooks, 
Tracy 
Lambert, 
Dwight 
Williamson, 
and
Joel Robinson (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the
Commission") appeal from a summary judgment entered by the
1060135
In Cleburne County, the probate judge also serves as the
1
ex-officio chairman of the Cleburne County Commission.
2
Cleburne Circuit Court in favor of Jack E. Norton, a
supernumerary sheriff in Cleburne County.  In entering the
summary judgment, the trial court held §§ 11-2A-1 through -8,
Ala. Code 1975, unconstitutional 
and ordered 
the 
Commission to
pay Norton "all salary adjustments, cost of living expenses or
other salary increases as the remuneration of the Sheriff of
Cleburne County, Alabama, has increased since the year 2000 as
provided by § 36-22-62(a) and (b), Ala. Code 1975."  We
reverse and remand.
I.  Background
The facts are undisputed.  On April 2, 1992, Norton, who
had previously served as the sheriff of Cleburne County,
notified then Governor Guy Hunt and Cleburne County Probate
Judge Mac Smith  of his election to participate in the
1
supernumerary sheriffs' program as provided in § 36-22-60 et
seq., Ala. Code 1975.  On April 8, 1992, Governor Hunt
notified 
Norton 
of 
his 
appointment 
as 
supernumerary 
sheriff 
of
Cleburne County effective April 10, 1992, and on April 20,
1060135
3
1992, Probate Judge Smith administered the oath of office to
Norton. 
On January 10, 1987, while he was serving as sheriff,
Norton had paid $7,500 to Cleburne County to purchase prior
service credit pursuant to § 36-22-63, Ala. Code 1975.
Thereafter, until his retirement as sheriff of Cleburne
County, an amount equal to six percent of his salary was
deducted from Norton's salary in accordance with § 36-22-61,
Ala. Code 1975. 
After Norton was appointed as supernumerary sheriff, he
received the proscribed salary of a supernumerary sheriff.
Section 36-22-62(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent
part, that a supernumerary sheriff "shall be entitled to
receive an amount equal to 50 percent of the monthly salary
paid such person at the time of the completion of his service
in office, and shall be entitled to receive an additional
amount equal to two percent of such person's said monthly
salary for each additional year of service up to a maximum of
65 percent of such monthly salary ...."  In addition, § 36-22-
62(b), Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"Those persons eligible under either subdivisions
(1) or (2) of Section 36-22-60, that may elect to
1060135
4
become a supernumerary sheriff shall be entitled to
receive 
a 
cost-of-living 
increase 
as 
the
remuneration of the office of sheriff increases from
which the supernumerary sheriff elected to vacate.
Said cost-of-living increase shall be equal to the
percentage allowed said supernumerary sheriff of the
present sheriff's remuneration."
During its 2000 Regular Session, the Alabama Legislature
enacted Act No. 2000-108, which is codified at §§ 11-2A-1
through -8, Ala. Code 1975.  Section 11-2A-2 provides, in
pertinent part:
"Effective 
October 
1, 
2000, 
the 
annual
compensation which a county shall pay to a county
commissioner, a judge of probate, a sheriff, a tax
assessor, a tax collector, a revenue commissioner,
a license commissioner, and an elected assistant tax
assessor or collector shall be as set out below:
"(1) SHERIFF. The annual minimum
compensation for each sheriff shall be
fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) which
shall be in lieu of any salary and expense
allowance currently provided to a sheriff
receiving total compensation less than the
minimum. Beginning with the next term of
office for each sheriff, 
except as provided
in Section 11-2A-4, the salary herein
provided shall be the minimum compensation
payable to the sheriff in lieu of any
salary, 
expense 
allowance, 
or 
other
compensation provided by law.
"....
"(4) 
Any 
laws 
to 
the 
contrary
notwithstanding, 
no 
person 
holding
supernumerary office shall be entitled to
1060135
5
any increases in compensation or expenses
as a result of the implementation of any
salary adjustments provided for in this
chapter."
The Cleburne County Commission has denied Norton salary
adjustments since June 1, 2000, the effective date of Act No.
2000-108, based on § 11-2A-2(4).
In 2005, Norton filed an action in the Cleburne Circuit
Court, 
seeking 
a 
judgment 
declaring 
§ 
11-2A-2(4)
unconstitutional and ordering the County to pay him all salary
increases he argues are due him under § 36-22-62(b) since
2000.  Norton submitted to the Commission a request for
admission of facts, and the Commission failed to respond
within 30 days; thus the facts were deemed admitted pursuant
to Rule 36, Ala. R. Civ. P.  Based on the admitted facts,
Norton filed a motion for a summary judgment, which the trial
court granted on September 29, 2006.  The Commission appeals.
II.  Standard of Review
"We review a summary judgment de novo.  Williams
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So. 2d 72, 74
(Ala. 2003).  We apply the same standard of review
as the trial court applied.  Specifically, we must
determine whether the movant has made a prima facie
showing that there exists no genuine issue of
material fact and that the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.  Rule 56(c), Ala. R.
Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v.
1060135
6
Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952 (Ala. 2004).  In
making such a determination, we must review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant.  Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758
(Ala. 1986).  Once the movant makes a prima facie
showing that he is entitled to a summary judgment,
the burden shifts to the nonmovant to produce
'substantial evidence' creating a genuine issue of
material fact.  Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12; Bass v.
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797-98 (Ala. 1989).  'Substantial evidence' is
'evidence 
of 
such 
weight 
and 
quality 
that
fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial
judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the
fact sought to be proved.'  West v. Founders Life
Assurance Co. of Fla., 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.
1989)."
Turner v. Westhampton Court, L.L.C., 903 So. 2d 82, 87 (Ala.
2004). 
III.  Analysis
In its summary-judgment order, the trial court found as
follows:
"Act 2000-108, codified as Section 11-2A-1 through
-8, Code of Alabama, 1975, as amended, contravenes
Section 22 of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901,
and is unconstitutional as it applies to [Norton] in
that [Norton] had a solemn binding contract with the
[Commission] when he was appointed supernumerary
sheriff on April 10, 1992, under the provisions of
Section 36-22-60, Code of Alabama, 1975, and is
entitled to the salary provided in Section 36-22-
62(a) and is further entitled to the salary
adjustments as provided in Section 36-22-62(b) of
the Code."
1060135
7
The Commission asserts that the trial court erred in declaring
§§ 11-2A-1 through -8 unconstitutional because, it argues, no
"solemn binding contract" existed between Norton and the
Commission.  Norton, however, argues that the supernumerary-
sheriff program is a thinly disguised retirement plan to which
he contributed as well as purchased prior service credit and
in which he has a vested interest.  Therefore, he contends
that §§ 11-2A-1 through -8 violate Art. I, § 22, Ala. Const.
of 1901, which states that no law may be enacted impairing the
obligations of a contract. 
In Johnson v. Board of Control of Employees' Retirement
System of Alabama, 740 So. 2d 999 (Ala. 1999), Justice Shores
detailed the history of supernumerary officials in Alabama:
"By constitutional provision, Alabama has
historically denied the legislature the authority to
provide for retirement benefits for state officers,
including, by implication, judges.  This restriction
on the legislative power is currently found in
Article IV, § 98, of the Alabama Constitution of
1901:
"'The legislature shall not retire any
officer on pay, or part pay, or make any
grant to such retiring officer.'
"This 
constitutional 
prohibition 
against
providing pensions for state officials led to
legislation over the years creating supernumerary
positions for certain state officials who met the
1060135
8
statutory requirements for such positions.  These
statutes creating supernumerary positions were
enacted to compensate certain public officials who
had served the state for a number of years (as
prescribed by statute) and who had reached a certain
age (also prescribed by statute), provided that the
official entering upon the supernumerary office
performed 
certain 
duties 
prescribed 
by 
the
legislature.  See James v. Thompson, 392 So. 2d 1178
(Ala. 1981).  Because Article IV, § 98, of the
constitution prohibited laws granting retirement
benefits to such state officials, the validity of
these statutes depended upon the fact that these
supernumerary officials 
performed certain 
duties and
responsibilities [related to] the supernumerary
office created.  Although these statutes may have
been 
drafted 
deliberately 
to 
evade 
the
constitutional 
prohibition 
against 
legislation
granting retirement pay to state officials, it is
clear that the compensation provided was in exchange
for 
services 
performed 
by 
the 
supernumerary
officials, as opposed to compensation for past
service to the state.
"For example, by Act No. 357, Ala. Acts 1979 (§
36-22-60 et seq., Ala. Code 1975), the legislature
created the office of supernumerary sheriff.  This
act permitted a sheriff who had served for at least
16 years in law enforcement, 12 as sheriff, and who
had reached 55 years of age to elect to become a
supernumerary sheriff, subject to call to active
duty by the Governor."
740 So. 2d at 1003.
As the Court of Civil Appeals has noted:  "The law in
Alabama is clear that a supernumerary plan is not a retirement
plan."  Board of Control of Employees' Ret. Sys. of Alabama v.
1060135
9
Hadden, 854 So. 2d 1165, 1168 n. 4 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002).
This Court has further explained:
"The legislature, in creating a supernumerary
program for elected sheriffs in Alabama, necessarily
created 
the 
office 
of 
supernumerary 
sheriff.
Although the duties of such office are limited in
scope and the performance of such duties [is]
contingent and narrowly defined, the statutorily
prescribed position and function of a supernumerary
sheriff is that of a public office -- an 'office of
trust [and] profit.'  Otherwise, the compensation
provisions of [Act No. 79-357] clearly would run
afoul of § 98 of our State Constitution, which
proscribes any legislative grant of retirement pay
to public officers.
"Moreover, 
our 
disposition 
of 
the 
instant 
appeal
is aided by the literal meaning of the word
'supernumerary.'  The word is derived from two Latin
words –- super, above or beyond; and numerus, a
number.  Thus, these two words, when used in
combination 
and 
translated, 
mean 
exceeding 
a
prescribed number.  The legislative employment of
this term, as a means of providing compensation to
public officials conditioned upon age and length of
service, created an office of public trust with
duties and responsibilities concomitant with its
purpose and design.  While its members are above and
beyond the numbers prescribed for active sheriffs,
and its duties are limited and contingent by its
nature, its character is not reduced to something
less than that of a public office.  Indeed, the Act
provides that each supernumerary sheriff shall take
the oath of office prescribed for sheriffs."
James v. Thompson, 392 So. 2d 1178, 1180 (Ala. 1981) (some
emphasis added).  Because a supernumerary sheriff holds an
"office of trust [and] profit," Norton's remuneration for
1060135
10
serving as supernumerary sheriff cannot be considered
retirement 
pay. 
 
Thus, 
Norton's 
argument 
that 
the
supernumerary-sheriff program is in essence a retirement plan
in which he has a vested contractual interest fails.
We next address the question of whether the legislature
may enact legislation limiting the compensation of a State
official without impairing the obligation of contract as
guaranteed by the Ala. Const. of 1901, i.e., whether the
enactment of §§ 11-2A-1 through -8 contravenes Art. I, § 22,
Ala. Const. of 1901, which provides "[t]hat no ex post facto
law, nor any law, impairing the obligations of contracts, or
making any irrevocable or exclusive grants of special
privileges or immunities, shall be passed by the legislature;
and every grant or franchise, privilege, or immunity shall
forever remain subject to revocation, alteration, 
or
amendment."  
Our consideration of this issue must begin with the
observation that this Court gives great deference to the acts
of the legislature.
"'[I]n passing upon the constitutionality
of a legislative act, the courts uniformly
approach 
the 
question 
with 
every
presumption and intendment in favor of its
1060135
11
validity, and seek to sustain rather than
strike down the enactment of a coordinate
branch of the government.  All these
principles are embraced in the simple
statement that it is the recognized duty of
the court to sustain the act unless it is
clear beyond reasonable doubt that it is
violative of the fundamental law.'"
Monroe v. Harco, Inc., 762 So. 2d 828, 831 (Ala. 2000)
(quoting Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1,
9, 18 So. 2d 810, 815 (1944)).  
Previously, this Court has noted that "the salary of a
public officer is not a contract, and that the office, if
statutory, 
may 
be 
abolished 
without 
infringing 
upon 
the 
rights
of the officer."  Downs v. City of Birmingham, 240 Ala. 177,
183, 198 So. 231, 235 (1940).  Further, this Court held in
City of Birmingham v. Penuel, 242 Ala. 167, 174, 5 So. 2d 723,
728 (1942):
"The rule enunciated by this court in Dale v.
Governor, [3 Stew. 387 (Ala. 1831)]; Benford v.
Gibson, [15 Ala. 521 (1849)]; [and] Helms v. Alabama
Pension Commission, [231 Ala. 183, 163 So. 807
(1935)], was recently affirmed in Downs v. City of
Birmingham, 240 Ala. 177, 186, 198 So. 2d 231
[(1940)], and the holdings are to the effect that
the 
legislature 
may, 
without 
impairing 
the
obligation of contract, reduce the compensation of
an official who is capable of and willing to devote
all of his energy and time to the performance of his
statutory duties."
1060135
12
Because the salary of a public officer is not based upon a
contract and the legislature may therefore limit or reduce
such salary without violating § 22, it follows that §§ 11-2A-1
through -8, Ala. Code 1975, are not unconstitutional as an
impairment of contractual rights.  
We further note that the statutes creating the office of
supernumerary sheriff and providing for the salary of the
office, § 36-22-60 et seq., were enacted by the legislature in
1979 and were amended in 1982.  The statutes upon which the
Commission relies –- §§ 11-2A-1 through -8 -- were enacted by
the legislature in 2000.  "'The well-settled principle is that
the last expression of the legislative will is the law in case
of conflicting provisions of the statute on the same subject,
and the last enacted in point of time prevails.'" State v.
Gaines, 932 So. 2d 118, 122 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (quoting
Middleton v. General Water Works & Elec. Corp., 25 Ala. App.
455, 456, 149 So. 351, 352 (1933)).  Thus, because § 11-2A-
2(4) is the last expression of the legislative will, its
provisions take precedence over the earlier, and less
specific, provisions of § 36-22-62(b). 
1060135
13
Norton argues that by statute he has a vested interest in
his status as a supernumerary sheriff.  He cites § 36-22-61,
Ala. Code 1975, which states, in pertinent part:
"If any sheriff, subject to the provisions of this
article, shall end his tenure of office prior to
having reached [the] age of 55 years, but having had
16 years of service as a law enforcement officer, 12
of which have been as sheriff, his supernumerary
allowance as set out in Section 36-22-62, shall be
vested and held in the general fund of the county
until he attains the age of 55, at which time, or
any time thereafter, he may elect to become a
supernumerary sheriff as set out in Section
36-22-60. ..."
When interpreting a statute, this Court is bound to look to
the plain meaning of the words used by the legislature.
"'In determining the meaning of a
statute, this Court looks to the plain
meaning of the words as written by the
legislature. As we have said:
"'"Words used in a statute must
be given their natural, plain,
ordinary, and commonly understood
meaning, and where plain language
is used a court is bound to
interpret that language to mean
exactly what it says.  If the
language 
of 
the 
statute 
is
unambiguous, then there is no
room for judicial construction
and the clearly expressed intent
of the legislature must be given
effect."
1060135
14
"'Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Nielsen, 714
So. 2d 293, 296 (Ala. 1998) (quoting IMED
Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602
So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992)) ....'"
Tolar Constr., LLC v. Kean Elec. Co., 944 So. 2d 138, 149
(Ala. 2006).  No definition for the term "allowance" used in
§ 36-22-61 is provided in Chapter 22 of Title 36.  However,
Black's Law Dictionary defines "allowance" as "[a] share or
portion, esp. of money that is assigned or granted."  Black's
Law Dictionary 84 (8th ed. 2004).  Thus, given the plain
meaning of the word "allowance," it is apparent that the use
of that word in § 36-22-61 refers to the supernumerary
sheriff's being vested as to the pay he or she shall receive
upon entering the office of supernumerary sheriff, i.e., 50
percent of his or her most recent monthly salary before
leaving the office of sheriff as set forth in § 36-22-62(a),
and not to the cost-of-living increase provided for in § 36-
22-62(b).  Norton thus received his "vested" allowance once he
received his salary after taking the oath of office of
supernumerary sheriff.
Finally, we consider whether the adoption of §§ 11-2A-1
through -8 supersedes § 36-22-62(b), which provides for a
cost-of-living allowance and which states:
1060135
15
"Those persons eligible under either subdivisions
(1) or (2) of Section 36-22-60, that may elect to
become a supernumerary sheriff shall be entitled to
receive 
a 
cost-of-living 
increase 
as 
the
remuneration of the office of sheriff increases from
which the supernumerary sheriff elected to vacate.
Said cost-of-living increase shall be equal to the
percentage allowed said supernumerary sheriff of the
present sheriff's remuneration."
Section § 11-2A-4(a) provides:
"Beginning with the fiscal year commencing on
October 1, 2001, the local officials covered by this
chapter shall be entitled to the same uniform
increases in compensation, including cost-of-living
increases, longevity increases, merit raises, and
bonuses that are granted to county employees by the
county commission at the time of the approval of the
county budget.  The increases shall be in the same
amount or percentage, as the case may be, as that
amount or percentage increase provided to the
county's employees ...."
This section must be read in conjunction with § 11-2A-2(4),
which provides:
"Any laws to the contrary notwithstanding, no person
holding supernumerary office shall be entitled to
any increases in compensation or expenses as a
result 
of 
the 
implementation 
of 
any 
salary
adjustments provided for in this chapter."
(Emphasis added.)  Because "we presume that the Legislature
knows the meaning of the words it uses in enacting
legislation," Ex parte Jackson, 614 So. 2d 405, 407 (Ala.
1060135
16
1993), we must consider § 11-2A-2(4) as applicable to the
whole chapter and not only to § 11-2A-2.
The legislature did not define the term "salary
adjustments" as used in § 11-2A-2(4), and this Court must
therefore 
address 
the 
question 
whether 
cost-of-living
increases, merit raises, and bonuses constitute "salary
adjustments."  "When a court construes a statute, '[w]ords
used in [the] statute must be given their natural, plain,
ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain
language is used a court is bound to interpret that language
to mean exactly what it says.'"  Ex parte Berryhill, 801 So.
2d 7, 10 (Ala. 2001) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g
Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992)).  Section 11-
2A-4(a) specifically mentions a "cost-of-living adjustment"
when it states:  "If the implementation of any cost-of-living
adjustment increases 
the salary of an 
incumbent 
office holder,
the increase shall be paid as provided in subdivision (5) of
Section 11-2A-2."  (Emphasis added.)  Likewise, the
legislature in 1981 passed a local act affecting the town of
Fort Payne and providing additional compensation of $150 per
month for police officers.  The act provided, in pertinent
1060135
17
part:  "Such compensation shall in no way affect or restrict
the regular cost of living, merit or longevity salary
adjustments to which such persons may be entitled."  Act No.
81-915, Ala. Acts 1981 (emphasis added).  Although this Court
held Act No. 81-915 unconstitutional on other unrelated
grounds, the wording of the act indicates that the legislature
has historically considered a cost-of-living increase to be a
"salary adjustment."  See Johnson v. City of Fort Payne, 485
So. 2d 1152 (Ala. 1986).  We therefore conclude that the
legislature 
intended 
to 
include 
cost-of-living 
increases 
in 
it
reference to "salary adjustments."  It follows that the plain
language of § 11-2A-2(4) prohibits a supernumerary sheriff
from receiving cost-of-living adjustments contemporaneously
with other county employees.  Similarly, to the extent that
§§ 11-2A-2(4) and 11-2A-4 conflict with § 36-22-62(b), for
purposes of the circumstances of this case, §§ 11-2A-2(4) and
11-2A-4, as the more recent expressions of the legislature,
control.  See Gaines, supra.
IV. Conclusion
The office of supernumerary sheriff is an "office of
trust [and] profit."  As such, the legislature may limit or
1060135
18
reduce the salary of supernumerary sheriffs without violating
§ 22, Ala. Const. of 1901.  Thus, the Cleburne Circuit Court
incorrectly 
held unconstitutional §§ 
 
11-2A-1 through -8, Ala.
Code 1975.  We therefore reverse the summary judgment in favor
of Norton, and we remand the case for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Woodall, and Bolin, JJ.,
concur.
Stuart, Parker, and Murdock, JJ., dissent.
1060135
19
PARKER, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the main opinion's reversal
of the trial court's summary judgment in this case.
After the enactment of Act No. 2000-108, codified as Ala.
Code 1975, § 11-2A-1 et seq., the Cleburne County Commission
denied 
cost-of-living 
increases 
to 
Cleburne 
County
Supernumerary Sheriff Jack E. Norton.  In 2005 Nort 
o 
n 
  filed
a declaratory-judgment action seeking payment of those cost-
of-living increases.  The trial court granted Norton's motion
for a summary judgment, from which the Cleburne County
Commission and the commissioners appealed.  
Former sheriffs who have statutorily prescribed years-of-
service credit are eligible to become supernumerary sheriffs.
§ 36–22-60, Ala. Code 1975.  The pay for supernumerary
sheriffs is based on their monthly salary at the time they
completed their service as sheriffs. Section 36-22-60, Ala.
Code 1975, provides:
"(a) 
Those 
persons 
eligible 
under 
either
subdivisions (1) or (2) of Section 36-22-60, who
have 16 years of creditable service as a law
enforcement officer, 12 of which were served as
sheriff, shall be entitled to receive an amount
equal to 50 percent of the monthly salary paid such
person at the time of the completion of his service
in office, and shall be entitled to receive an
1060135
20
additional amount equal to two percent of such
person's said monthly salary for each additional
year of service up to a maximum of 65 percent of
such monthly salary, but in no event shall any
person receive payments pursuant to both the
supernumerary 
and 
disability 
supernumerary
provisions simultaneously. All such payments shall
be paid from the general fund of the county in which
said eligible person is serving upon his election to
become a supernumerary sheriff or to become a
supernumerary sheriff due to a disability."
Section 36-22-62(b) provides that supernumerary sheriffs are
entitled to cost-of-living increases:
"(b) 
Those 
persons 
eligible 
under 
either
subdivisions (1) or (2) of Section 36-22-60, that
may elect to become a supernumerary sheriff shall be
entitled to receive a cost-of-living increase as the
remuneration of the office of sheriff increases from
which the supernumerary sheriff elected to vacate.
Said cost-of-living increase shall be equal to the
percentage allowed said supernumerary sheriff of the
present sheriff's remuneration."
(Emphasis added.)
Act No. 2000-108, § 2(a), codified as Ala. Code 1975, §
11-2A-2(1), established a new base pay for sheriffs:
"(1) SHERIFF. The annual minimum compensation
for each sheriff shall be fifty thousand dollars
($50,000) which shall be in lieu of any salary and
expense allowance currently provided to a sheriff
receiving total compensation less than the minimum.
Beginning with the next term of office for each
sheriff, except as provided in Section 11-2A-4, the
salary 
herein 
provided 
shall 
be 
the 
minimum
compensation payable to the sheriff in lieu of any
1060135
21
salary, expense allowance, or other compensation
provided by law."
Section 11-2A-2(4), which is crucial to this case, provides:
"(4) Any laws to the contrary notwithstanding,
no person holding supernumerary office shall be
entitled to any increases in compensation or
expenses as a result of the implementation of any
salary adjustments provided for in this chapter."
I read § 11-2A-2(4) as prohibiting supernumerary sheriffs
from getting the new base pay established for sheriffs in §
11-2A-2(1).  The compensation for supernumerary sheriffs is
based upon their monthly salary at the time they completed
their service in law enforcement, § 36-22-62(a).  Section 11-
2A-2(4) makes it clear that supernumerary sheriffs are not
eligible for this new base pay or to have their pay as
supernumerary sheriffs calculated based on the new base pay
established in § 11-2A-2(1).  
The prohibition in § 11-2A-2(4), however, does not affect
cost-of-living increases for supernumerary sheriffs.  Section
11-2A-2(4) applies to "salary adjustments provided in this
chapter."  The cost-of-living increases for supernumerary
sheriffs are not provided "in this chapter" –- i.e., Chapter
2A of Title 11 -- but, instead, are provided in Chapter 22 of
Title 36.  Thus, the prohibition in § 11-2A-2(4) does not
1060135
22
apply to cost-of-living increases for supernumerary sheriffs.
This interpretation of the statutes at issue here is
reinforced by Act No. 2000-108, § 4, codified as section 11-
2A-4, which allows for cost-of-living increases on the new
base pay:
"(a) Beginning with the fiscal year commencing
on October 1, 2001, the local officials covered by
this chapter shall be entitled to the same uniform
increases in compensation, including cost-of-living
increases, longevity increases, merit raises, and
bonuses that are granted to county employees by the
county commission at the time of the approval of the
county budget. The increases shall be in the same
amount or percentage, as the case may be, as that
amount or percentage increase provided to the
county's 
employees; provided, however, no tax
assessor, 
tax 
collector, 
revenue 
commissioner,
license 
commissioner, 
elected 
assistant 
tax
assessor, or elected assistant tax collector shall
receive 
an 
expense 
allowance 
as 
provided 
in
subdivision (3) of Section 11-2A-2, and an increase
under this subsection in the same fiscal year.
"Except as otherwise provided herein, officials
in Category 2 [counties with a population from
350,001 to 449,999] shall be eligible for the
cost-of-living increases beginning on October 1,
2000. If the implementation of any cost-of-living
adjustment increases the salary of an incumbent
office holder, the increase shall be paid as
provided in subdivision (5) of Section 11-2A-2. The
base compensation for the purposes of implementation
of this subsection shall be that compensation
established on October 1, 2000, and shall remain
those respective amounts until increased as provided
under the provisions of this chapter.
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23
"(b) Any provision of this chapter to the
contrary notwithstanding, the Legislature, by local
law, may increase the compensation for local
officials covered under this chapter. However, if a
local law increases the compensation of a local
official, such local official shall not be entitled
to any cost-of-living adjustments pursuant to the
procedure in subsection (a), until such time as the
total compensation he or she would have received
under subsection (a) is equal to or exceeds the
increase provided by the local law."
Subsection (b) provides an exception to the availability of
cost-of-living increases when a local act increases the
compensation of a local official.  This exception is
specifically referenced in the provision establishing the new
base pay for sheriffs, § 11-2A-2(1).  But this exception does
not come into effect here because supernumerary sheriffs are
not entitled to the new base pay nor is their compensation
affected by a local act.
In contrast to the main opinion, I do not read § 11-2A-4
as providing for cost-of-living increases, in the terminology
used in § 11-2A-2(4).  Instead, I read § 11-2A-4 as allowing
for cost-of-living increases provided for elsewhere and
establishing rules to be applied to those cost-of-living
increases.
1060135
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Therefore, I believe that the trial court correctly
granted Norton's motion for a summary judgment.  Accordingly,
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
1060135
25
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
Clearly, 
§ 
11-2A-2(4), 
Ala. 
Code 
1975, 
prevents
supernumerary sheriffs from receiving a pro rata share of the
one-time "salary adjustment" provided for in § 11-2A-2(1).  I
am not persuaded, however, that the term "salary adjustment"
was intended as a reference to the "cost-of-living increases"
contemplated by § 11-2A-4, so as to prevent supernumerary
sheriffs from receiving the ongoing cost-of-living increases
contemplated by the statutory scheme governing supernumerary
sheriffs contained in Art. 3, Ch. 22, Title 36, Ala. Code
1975.