Title: People v. Tran
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S165998
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 29, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
RONALD TRI TRAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S165998 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
01HF0193 
 
 
August 29, 2022 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, 
Groban, Jenkins, and Guerrero concurred. 
 
1 
 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
S165998 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
A jury convicted defendant Ronald Tri Tran of first degree 
murder for the killing of Linda Park.  (Pen. Code, § 187, 
subd. (a); all statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 
otherwise specified.)  The jury found true the special 
circumstances of robbery murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)), 
burglary murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(G)), and torture murder 
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)).  It also found true the enhancement that 
Tran committed the murder for the benefit of, at the direction 
of, or in association with a criminal street gang.  (§ 186.22, 
subd. (b)(1).)  Following the penalty phase, the jury returned a 
verdict of death on November 5, 2007.  The trial court denied 
Tran’s motions for a new trial and for reduced punishment, 
denied the automatic motion to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, 
subd. (e)), and sentenced Tran to death. 
This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We strike 
the gang enhancement but otherwise affirm the judgment. 
I. 
 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Tran was tried jointly with Noel Plata.  Both were 
sentenced to death.  Plata died on December 14, 2020, and we 
ordered proceedings as to Plata abated, so we confine our review 
to Tran’s claims only. 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
A. Guilt Phase 
1. Prosecution Case 
a. 
The November 9, 1995, Robbery of the Park 
Residence and Linda’s Death 
In November 1995, Linda Park lived in Irvine with her 
family:  Sunhwa Park, her father; Dong Park, her mother; and 
Janie Park, her older sister.  Sunwha typically worked from 
about 6:00 or 7:00 a.m. to about 8:00 p.m., while Dong typically 
worked from about 4:00 p.m. to about 10:00 p.m.  On November 
9, 1995, Sunhwa spoke to Linda by telephone around 5:00 p.m. 
to tell her that he would be home for dinner around 8:00 p.m. 
After Linda spoke with Sunhwa, she spoke with Danny 
Son, her classmate, by telephone between 6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.  
That evening, Linda was recording a greeting on Son’s pager 
when someone arrived at the front door of the Park home.  Son 
testified that Linda told him to wait and that she put her phone 
down.  Linda seemed to be speaking to someone, Son recalled, 
but he could not make out their voice, only hers.  Son testified 
that he heard Linda say, “What’s wrong?  What’s your problem?  
You need help?”  Son thought that Linda might be speaking to 
her sister, decided to hang up, and called her back about 30 
minutes later, though only reached an answering machine.   
Around 8:05 p.m., Sunhwa returned home.  He noticed 
that the front door was already unlocked and, upon entering the 
home, discovered Linda in the living room.  Linda was lying 
prone with her hands and feet tied behind her, Sunhwa testified.  
Sunhwa tried to call 911 but could not locate the telephone, so 
he eventually ran to the home of his neighbor, Marilyn Fox, and 
she called 911.   
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Law enforcement officers arrived soon after.  One officer, 
Rolf Parkes, discovered Linda lying prone in the living room and 
observed that her ankles and wrists were bound behind her back 
with a nylonesque cord, that a grey electrical cord was wrapped 
around her neck and connected to the nylonesque cord, and that 
her vital signs were negative.   
b. 
Crime Scene and Forensic Evidence 
Sunhwa testified about valuables that were kept in their 
home.  He testified that he typically stored cash in a brown 
jacket that was stored in a closet in their master bedroom.  Janie 
and Linda knew where the jacket was kept, and Sunhwa 
allowed them to retrieve cash from it as needed.  On November 
9, 1995, Sunhwa said he had stored about $700 to $800 in this 
jacket.  Sunhwa also explained how his wife, Dong, typically 
stored her jewelry inside boxes in the drawer of her makeup 
table in the master bedroom, including on November 9, 1995.  
Sunhwa also testified about his actions after he discovered 
Linda’s body that evening.  He ran to the master bedroom, where 
he noticed his brown jacket on the closet floor.   
Parkes retrieved this jacket later and confirmed with 
Sunhwa that it was the jacket that typically contained money.  
There was no money in the jacket when he found it, Parkes 
testified.  Parkes also explained how he observed two jewelry 
boxes atop a coffee table in the living room where Linda was 
found.  An empty tray that looked like it belonged in one jewelry 
box was also on this table.  And another living room table had 
various plants placed atop it, including a potted cactus that was 
lying on its side.  Parkes also testified that the rest of the home 
was in a “very orderly, almost emaculate [sic] condition,” 
without evidence of ransacking, including in the master 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
bedroom.  Nor was there evidence of a forced entry into the 
home. 
David Stoermer, a crime-scene investigator for the Irvine 
Police Department, testified about various items in the Park 
home and the attempt to collect fingerprints from it.  He testified 
that the electrical cord around Linda’s neck had a thermostat 
device on it and that the cord had been cut on one end with 
scissors or a knife.  An empty heating pad box was found in the 
TV room.  This box displayed a picture of a heating pad and an 
attached electrical cord that looked like the cord around Linda’s 
neck, Stoermer testified.  Yet no heating pad was found in the 
home or in the garage.  The twine with which Linda was bound 
was not found in the home, there was no duct tape found there 
either, and a pair of scissors and Linda’s pager were missing 
from there too.  Nor were any fingerprints recovered, including 
from places like door-jambs and handles as well as from the 
jewelry boxes found atop the coffee table.   
Mary Hong, a forensic scientist with the Orange County 
Sheriff’s Department, testified about DNA analysis that she had 
performed for this case.  She tested the electrical cord found on 
Linda’s neck and did not discover any DNA relating to Tran or 
Plata.  Yet a portion of the twine that was used to bind Linda 
showed a mixture of DNA from at least three people that was 
consistent with Linda and Tran being contributors.   
c. 
Linda’s Autopsy 
Dr. Richard Fukumoto, a pathologist, testified that an 
autopsy showed that Linda died by asphyxiation due to ligature 
strangulation.  The electrical cord was wrapped twice around 
her neck.  Among other injuries, Linda had indentations, 
abrasions, and contusions on her neck, wrists, and feet; 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
hemorrhaging and a bruise on her left cheek below her eye; and 
two overlapping slash wounds on her neck.  The injuries on her 
left cheek, Fukumoto testified, could have been caused by a fist, 
the palm of a hand, or the back of a hand.  The injuries on her 
wrists indicated that Linda tried to escape the binding, 
Fukumoto continued.  And the slash wounds could have been 
caused by a knife or scissors and were not deep enough to kill 
Linda immediately, though would have done so eventually.  
Fukumoto testified that the facial injuries, the slash wounds, 
and the binding would have happened before Linda was 
strangled.  Fukumoto also testified that pain is associated with 
strangulation and that pain or stress can result in someone 
urinating on themselves. 
d. 
Tran’s and Plata’s Statements to Friends 
Jin Ae Kang, Tien Tran, and Linda Le testified about 
statements made by Tran and Plata.  Some months after Linda’s 
death, Kang learned that Tran told Tien Tran that he was 
involved in murdering a girl in Irvine, that the girl had 
recognized him, that she was bound, and that some cash and 
gold items were taken from the girl’s home.  At trial, Trien Tran 
testified that he vaguely remembered that Tran had told him he 
had killed somebody. 
In an interview in January 2000, Linda Le told the police 
about statements by Plata.  There, Le told law enforcement 
officers that she had overheard a conversation about “the 
incident” between Plata and her boyfriend, Terry Tackett, in 
which Tackett asked Plata if he had cleaned the knife.  Le told 
law enforcement officials that, a few days after the conversation 
between Plata and Tackett, Plata was sad and upset and told 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
her that he did not mean to do it and that he had robbed a house 
and the girl was home.   
e. 
Tran’s and Plata’s Conversations with Qui Ly 
Qui Ly was a well-respected member of the V gang, a gang 
allied with the VFL gang, and he testified about his various 
conversations with Tran and Plata.  In a conversation in a 
Vietnamese restaurant, Plata told Ly about the murder of a 
young girl in Irvine.  Ly testified that, while Ly and Tran were 
housed together at Anaheim City Jail from October 20, 1997, to 
November 21, 1997, Tran told him about a murder of a young 
girl in Irvine.   
Later, Ly was convicted in 1999 for residential burglary 
and faced a potential sentence of 31 years to life in prison 
because of his prior strikes, so he decided to provide information 
to law enforcement about criminal activities throughout 
Southern California “to get some consideration on [his] 
sentence.”  In October 1999, Ly told Ronald Seman, an 
investigator on the Orange County District Attorney’s Office’s 
regional gang enforcement team, about Tran’s and Plata’s 
statements.   
Based on this information, Seman arranged to place Ly in 
a cell in the Santa Ana jail so that he could speak with Tran and 
Plata separately.  On February 28, 2001, Ly was first placed in 
a cell with Tran and then placed in one with Plata.  Microphones 
were hidden behind a toilet paper holder in the cell, and the 
conversations were recorded.  Portions of these conversations 
were played for the jury, and we discuss them below. 
f. 
Joann Nguyen’s Testimony 
Joann Nguyen was Tran’s girlfriend in 1995 and testified 
about Linda, Tran, Plata, and the robbery.  Nguyen was friends 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
with Linda in high school, and they attended Irvine Valley 
College, where they drifted apart.  When Tran asked if Nguyen 
knew anyone with money or jewelry, Nguyen said that Linda 
had some, and she drove Tran by Linda’s home after he said that 
he was going to rob Linda.  Nguyen said that Linda had never 
told her where her father kept money or her mother kept 
jewelry.   
On November 9, 1995, Tran arranged to switch cars with 
Nguyen at a parking lot, telling her that his car would look too 
suspicious in the Parks’ neighborhood.  Tran and Plata drove off 
in Nguyen’s car around 7:00 p.m. that night and returned a few 
hours later, around 9:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.  When they returned, 
Nguyen noticed that Tran and Plata moved a blanket from her 
car to Tran’s car and that Tran and Plata appeared anxious and 
hyper.  Tran told Nguyen that they had robbed and killed Linda.   
Later, Tran told Nguyen that Linda was killed because 
Tran did not want her to identify him, and Tran told Nguyen 
that money and jewelry were taken from the Park home.  After 
Linda’s death, Tran received a new tattoo on the side of his neck, 
which he told Nguyen said “forgive me” in Korean.   
g. 
Gang Evidence 
At the guilt phase, the prosecutor called Mark Nye to 
testify as a gang expert about gang culture, the VFL gang, 
Tran’s and Plata’s membership in the VFL, and how a 
hypothetical robbery like this one may support a criminal street 
gang.  Vietnamese gangs, Nye testified, are not turf oriented 
because their members typically do not live in the same area.  
“Most of the Asian gangs are in it for the economic gain,” Nye 
said, and he explained how each gang member has an assigned 
role during a crime that they are expected to fulfill.   
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
The VFL gang, Nye continued, was formed in the early 
1990s and began by committing petty crimes, though became 
affiliated with the “V” gang, a violent gang that specialized in 
home-invasion robberies.  Eventually, VFL members began 
robbing homes and cars, sold weapons, possessed narcotics, 
extorted business throughout the Gardena and Hawthorne area, 
and murdered or attempted to murder rival gang members.  Nye 
opined that the VFL was a criminal street gang in November 
1995, with about 20 to 30 members, whose primary activities 
were residential burglary, attempted murder, and murder.  In 
reaching this opinion, Nye relied on documents and reports 
about crimes committed by certain VFL members. 
Nye also opined that Tran and Plata were members of and 
actively participated in the VFL in November 1995.  In 
answering the prosecutor’s question about a hypothetical case 
like this one, Nye opined that both individuals would be 
expected to support one another during the crime and that 
robbery, burglary, and murder would have been done for the 
benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with that 
criminal street gang.  The gang supports itself with proceeds 
from criminal activity, and crimes enhance the gang’s and the 
gang members’ reputations. 
2. Defense Case 
Neither Tran nor Plata called any witnesses to testify 
during the guilt phase of their trial, though both challenged the 
testimony of various witnesses via cross-examination.  
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
B. Penalty Phase 
1. Prosecution Case 
a. 
Prior Bad Acts 
On June 24, 1992, David Schonder, who lived in Mission 
Viejo, reported that jewelry, camera equipment, a telephone, 
and a video camera were missing from his home.  Three latent 
fingerprints recovered from his home were identified as Tran’s, 
and Tran admitted an allegation in a juvenile petition that he 
had committed this residential burglary.   
On June 26, 1992, a California Highway Patrol officer 
detained Tran and David Du after arriving at the scene of a car 
accident and hearing that one of the people involved in the 
accident had dropped a metal box in the trash.  The metal box 
contained paperwork belonging to David Nesthus.  Tran was 
taken to an Orange County Sheriff’s station, where he told an 
officer that he and two others stole a television, a camcorder, 
about 150 quarters from a coin-filled jug, some fake jewelry, and 
a Nintendo video game from the Nesthus home.  Tran later 
admitted an allegation in a juvenile petition that he had 
committed this residential burglary.   
On April 19, 1994, Darin Urabe discovered that a Smith 
Corona word processor, a computer, and a camcorder were 
missing from his Huntington Beach home.  The home’s garage 
door was open, and a baby seat and a spare tire that did not 
belong to the Urabes was in the garage.  The day after, on April 
20, 1994, Tran and Linda Vu were arrested after a car chase 
prompted by an Orange County detective’s discovery that Tran 
and Vu were in a stolen car.  During this car chase, Tran drove 
against traffic, ran a red light, drove about 45 to 50 miles per 
hour in a store parking lot, and drove about 90 miles an hour in 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
a residential area.  The trunk of the car that Tran had driven 
contained stereos, a Smith Corona word processor, and 
amplifiers, among other items.  For this, Tran was convicted of 
residential burglary (§ 459) and evading a police officer (Veh. 
Code, §§ 2800.2, 10851).   
b. 
Victim Impact Evidence 
At the penalty phase, the prosecutor called Sunhwa, 
Linda’s father; Janie, her sister; and Fox, her neighbor, to testify 
about the impact of Linda’s death.  Their testimony was 
sometimes accompanied by photographs or videos of Linda or 
her personal items, as discussed below.  (Post, pt. IV.C.) 
 
2.  Defense Case 
a. 
Cultural Expert 
Tran’s counsel called Jeanne Nidorf, a cultural expert and 
consultant with a background in psychology and public health, 
to testify about Tran from his childhood to his adulthood.  Tran 
was born in a refugee camp in Arkansas before moving with his 
family to California.  Tran’s father is a machinist; his mother, 
an electronic assembler.  Nidorf said that Tran’s parents’ 
relationship was confrontational, explaining that Tran’s 
mother, Cam, was “a sort of verbally abusive, somewhat cruel, 
sometimes bizarre, self-centered, histrionic woman.”  Nidorf 
recounted how Tran’s mother would discipline him as a child, 
including by holding him over a tub filled with hot water and 
threatening to drop him in if he did not behave.  Cam often drew 
comparisons between Tran and his older brother, Hung Tran, 
who Cam thought had achieved more.  Nidorf said that Tran 
called his family life “gloomy,” and she explained how Tran was 
attracted to the VFL because it allowed him to escape family 
pressures.   
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
Nidorf also discussed Tran’s actions following Linda’s 
death.  After her death, Tran attended a motivational seminar 
and became more respectful to his parents.  In 1998 or 1999, 
Tran met Kathy Nguyen, and they had a son together.  Nidorf 
explained that Tran changed after his son was born; he 
remained employed and was not involved in criminal activity.  
And Nidorf asked Tran why he got the tattoo on the side of his 
neck that said “forgive me”; she said that “he looked down and 
he said ‘I — I don’t know why.’ ”   
b. 
Testimony of Family and Friends 
Hung Tran, Tran’s older brother, testified about their 
upbringing and Tran’s character.  They were “latchkey kids” 
because their parents worked so much, Hung remarked, though 
they grew apart as they grew older and their interests diverged.  
In 1996, Hung gifted Tran the opportunity to attend the 
motivational seminar.  After the birth of Tran’s son, Tran was 
“very responsible” and “was at home almost all the time,” Hung 
said.   
Besides Hung, 10 other family or friends testified about 
their experiences with Tran and his positive qualities.  For 
instance, Thu Thi Tran, Tran’s cousin, testified that she had 
known Tran all her life and that he had always “been a 
sweetheart” and had “a lot of respect” for her.  Thao McGrath, 
Tran’s cousin, testified that Tran “was a normal kid” who had 
“never got into fights.”  And Tony Bui, Tran’s uncle, recalled that 
Tran was “very friendly” and a “nice person” and that Cam loved 
Tran “but [didn’t] know how to raise him.”   
 
3.  Juror No. 7’s Typewritten Document 
After the jury returned its penalty determinations, a 
three-page typewritten document was found in the jury room in 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
a folder containing the jury instructions.  This document was 
written by the penalty foreperson, Juror No. 7, and we discuss 
it below.  
II. 
PRETRIAL ISSUES 
A. Removing Prospective Jurors by Stipulation 
Tran first claims that the trial court improperly allowed 
the parties to remove prospective jurors from the jury pool by 
allowing the parties to stipulate to their removal based on their 
answers to a written questionnaire.   
1. Facts 
During jury selection, the prosecutor prepared a written 
questionnaire for prospective jurors to complete.  Neither Tran’s 
nor Plata’s counsel objected to this questionnaire.  After counsel 
reviewed the questionnaires, they identified 20 prospective 
jurors whom they agreed to excuse for cause without 
questioning them.  The prosecutor read the prospective jurors’ 
numbers aloud in court, counsel stipulated to their removal, and 
the court excused them.   
2. Analysis 
Tran argues that excusing these 20 prospective jurors in 
this way violates the random-selection provisions of Code of 
Civil Procedure section 222, the initial-examination provisions 
of Code of Civil Procedure section 223, and the jury-trial policy 
of Code of Civil Procedure section 191.  
Under Code of Civil Procedure, section 222, subdivision 
(a), courts must “randomly select the names of the jurors for voir 
dire, until the jury is selected or the panel is exhausted.”  (See 
People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 383 (Flores).)  Under Code 
of Civil Procedure section 223, subdivision (a), trial judges “shall 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
conduct an initial examination of prospective jurors” “[t]o select 
a fair and impartial jury in a criminal jury trial.”  (See Flores, at 
p. 383.)  And Code of Civil Procedure section 191 spells out 
California’s jury-trial policy:  Among other things, jurors must 
be randomly selected, all qualified persons must have an equal 
opportunity to be considered for jury service, and all qualified 
persons must serve as jurors when summoned.  (See People v. 
Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 38.) 
We “have consistently rejected similar challenges to the 
excusal of jurors under similar mutually 
agreed-upon 
prescreening procedures.  ‘A court may allow counsel to screen 
juror questionnaires and stipulate to juror dismissals.’  
[Citations.]  Further, ‘a stipulation to the excusal of jurors 
forfeits any subsequent objection to their omission from the jury 
pool.’ ”  (Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 384; see also id. at pp. 383–
384 [rejecting argument that defendant had not forfeited 
challenge to prospective juror prescreening procedure despite 
defendant’s invocation of Civ. Code, § 3513].)  Because Tran 
agreed to this questionnaire procedure below, he has forfeited 
his claim here. 
Even if Tran’s claim was preserved, it lacks merit.  
“Contrary to defendant’s argument, neither Code of Civil 
Procedure section 222 nor section 223, subdivision (a) forbids 
the prescreening procedure employed in this case.  Section 222 
requires random selection of prospective jurors for voir dire but 
says nothing about prescreening through a questionnaire.  
Section 223, subdivision (a), which requires the trial court to 
conduct an initial examination of prospective jurors, does not 
bar the court from exercising its discretion to allow counsel to 
prescreen jurors and stipulate to dismissals.”  (Flores, supra, 9 
Cal.5th at p. 384.) 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
Nor do Tran’s remaining arguments fare any better.  He 
contends that the questionnaire procedure used here “allows the 
parties to trade discriminatory removal of potential jurors.”  But 
he “has not alleged that any of the stipulated removals were 
discriminatory.”  (Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 384.)  
He asserts that this procedure undermines his right to a 
jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community.  But he 
has not “adequately explain[ed] how permitting him to stipulate 
to the dismissal of certain jurors could have undermined his 
right to trial by a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the 
community.”  (Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 384.) 
And Tran argues that this procedure “frustrates the public 
policy requiring that voir dire be open to the public.”  But “voir 
dire in this case was open to the public; the trial court simply 
permitted the parties to stipulate to the removal of certain 
jurors based on their written questionnaire responses.  Having 
agreed to this procedure, defendant may not now complain that 
it violated his right to a public trial.”  (Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th 
at p. 384.)   
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err by 
excusing prospective jurors according to the parties’ stipulation 
to remove jurors based on their responses to this written 
questionnaire. 
B. Challenge to the “Substantial Impairment” 
Standard 
Next, Tran claims that the so-called substantial 
impairment standard used to excuse prospective jurors for their 
views on capital punishment is inconsistent with the impartial-
jury guarantees under the state and federal Constitutions.  Tran 
asserts that the trial court “presumably” excused Prospective 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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Jurors No. 112, 158, 214, and 234 for cause because of their 
views on the death penalty.   
“The state and federal Constitutions guarantee a criminal 
defendant the right to a trial by an impartial jury.”  (People v. 
Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 425.)  “ ‘ “A prospective juror 
may be challenged for cause based upon his or her views 
regarding capital punishment only if those views would 
‘ “prevent or substantially impair” ’ the performance of the 
juror’s duties as defined by the court’s instructions and the 
juror’s oath.” ’ ”  (People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 137 
(Suarez); see also Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412; 
Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510.) 
Tran does not challenge how the standard was applied 
here; he does not argue that the standard was wrongly applied 
to excuse a prospective juror who should not have been excused 
under the standard.  Rather, Tran asks us to reconsider the 
substantial-impairment standard itself primarily in light of the 
founding-era history of the guarantee to an impartial jury, as 
the high court has done in the context of other Sixth Amendment 
doctrines in decisions from Jones v. United States (1999) 526 
U.S. 227 to Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296.  This 
history, Tran says, reveals that the framers intended the 
impartial-jury guarantee to prohibit the excusal of prospective 
jurors because of their views on the death penalty.  
Tran did not object to the excusal of Prospective Jurors No. 
112, 158, 214, and 234, but the Attorney General does not argue 
he has forfeited the claim.  A challenge to the substantial 
impairment standard would have been futile in any event 
because at the time of Tran’s trial, as now, the substantial 
impairment standard was supported by binding precedent.  We 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
typically excuse failures to raise futile objections.  (People v. 
Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 837, fn. 4.)  Regardless, we 
decline to reconsider our decisions here.  Tran recognizes that 
we have rejected this challenge in People v. Rices (2017) 4 
Cal.5th 49 (Rices).  There, we rejected defendant’s argument 
that the substantial-impairment standard should be abandoned 
and “replaced with a new rule prohibiting the trial court from 
excusing prospective jurors due to their views on the death 
penalty.”  (Rices, at pp. 79–80.)  But the high court, we 
explained, “developed that standard and has recently reiterated 
it.  [Citation.]  If that standard is to be abandoned or modified, 
and death qualifying the jury prohibited, it is up to that court to 
do so.”  (Id. at p. 80; see also Suarez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 138 
[“ ‘We may not depart from the high court ruling as to the United 
States Constitution’ ”].)  And as recently as last year, “we have 
considered and rejected claims that the death qualification 
process is unconstitutional.”  (Suarez, at p. 138; see id. at 
pp. 137–140 [summarizing and rejecting many constitutional 
challenges to the death-qualification process].) 
Nor do we accept Tran’s request to revisit the substantial-
impairment standard in light of the jury-trial right under article 
I, section 16, of the California Constitution.  We “have long 
adopted the Witt rule as also stating the standard under the 
California Constitution.”  (Rices, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 80, citing 
People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 767 [“Because we think 
Witt’s review standard and underlying rationale make good 
sense, and because California courts have generally followed the 
teachings of the high court in determining when a prospective 
juror properly may be excused for cause because of his views 
regarding capital punishment, we adopt the Witt standard.”].)   
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
As Tran recognizes, “past California cases make clear ‘that 
the state constitutional right to a jury trial “is the right as it 
existed at common law in 1850, when the [California] 
Constitution was first adopted.” ’ ”  (Shaw v. Superior Court 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 983, 994–995.)  Tran relies on founding-era 
materials, relating to the federal Constitution, to support his 
state constitutional claim, but fails to persuade us that these 
materials reflected the state of the common law as it existed in 
1850.   
In sum, we reject Tran’s challenge to the substantial-
impairment standard. 
III. GUILT PHASE CLAIMS 
A. Motion To Sever and Limiting Instruction 
Tran argues that the trial court erroneously decided 
against severing his case from Plata’s.  Tran’s argument centers 
on out-of-court statements that Plata made.  Some of these 
statements incriminated Plata but implied that Tran had 
actually killed Linda.  Others incriminated Plata and implied 
that Plata was the actual killer.  Yet the guilt jury was 
instructed to consider Tran’s and Plata’s out-of-court statements 
“only against the defendant making the statements and not 
against the other defendant.”  The admission of these 
statements together with this limiting instruction, Tran 
contends, violated the Aranda-Bruton doctrine, rendered his 
trial fundamentally unfair, and requires reversal of his 
conviction and sentence.   
1. Facts 
Before trial, Tran moved to sever his case from Plata’s 
partly over concerns that the prosecutor would introduce certain 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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statements that Plata made before trial.  But the trial court 
denied this motion.   
Later, during the guilt phase of the trial, the trial court, 
defense counsel, and the prosecutor discussed the prosecutor’s 
plan to have Qui Ly testify.  The prosecutor explained that he 
intended to introduce conversations between Ly and Plata and 
between Ly and Tran.  These conversations happened on 
February 28, 2001 before either the complaint or the 
information had been filed against Tran or Plata and while Ly, 
Tran, and Plata were incarcerated in the Santa Ana jail.   
The trial court decided to allow the jury to hear these 
conversations and, at the end of the guilt phase, to instruct the 
jury with a version of CALCRIM No. 305.  This instruction said:  
“You have heard evidence that each of the two defendants made 
statements out of court and before the trial.  You may consider 
that evidence only against the defendant making the statements 
and not against the other defendant.”  Tran’s counsel did not 
request this instruction at the penalty phase, nor was it 
otherwise given. 
In light of the trial court’s decision to allow the jury to hear 
these statements by Plata, Tran’s counsel believed that the trial 
court’s “other remedy is to declare a mistrial as to Mr. Tran and 
allow him to have a separate trial” and moved for a mistrial, 
which the trial court denied.   
So Ly testified about, and the jury heard, his recorded 
jailhouse conversations with Tran.  In these conversations, Tran 
told Ly that he had been arrested for a murder in Irvine.  Ly 
asked:  “They got you for this murder, you think they got you 
good?”  Tran replied:  “I don’t know dog.  You know I don’t even 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
know what they got on me.  You know if Noel’s talking you know, 
I’m screwed, that’s all I got to say.  That’s the only way.”   
Ly then asked:  “But who killed her, you or him?”  Tran 
did not respond verbally.  Ly testified that Tran had pointed to 
himself and nodded his head.  Then Ly replied:  “Man, you idiot.”  
Tran replied:  “Yeah, I know, I know man.  Now I gotta live with 
it.”  Ly testified that Tran’s gesture was why he had replied 
with, “Man, you idiot.”  Ly later asked:  “Man.  What the fuck, 
fuck, you take her out for, you idiot?”  Tran replied:  “I don’t 
know what to say, man.  Tie ’em up, you know.  What can you 
do?”   
Ly also asked:  “Was it worth it?”  Tran replied:  “Nah.”  “It 
was supposed to be worth it,” Tran said, explaining that it was 
supposed to be worth “about ten.”  “[T]en was attractive to a 
nineteen year old dog” “driving a 1979 beat up car,” Tran stated.  
“No matter what, you know what I’m saying?  No matter what 
happens, you know, ‘Co Chai Co Chieu[.]’  That’s the way 
America is dog.  I got to accept it.  Can’t live in denial dog,” Tran 
continued.  Ly responded:  “If you do it, you have to accept it.”  
Tran replied:  “Yeah, I can handle it dog.”  The prosecutor asked 
Ly what “Co Chai Co Chieu” meant; Ly testified that it was a 
Vietnamese saying that meant, “You play, you pay and accept.”  
Later, when Ly said, “They don’t, you don’t have none of that 
girl’s property at your house do you,” Tran laughed and said, 
“Dude, come on now, it’s all good, it’s all good.”   
Ly also testified about, and the jury heard some of, his 
recorded jailhouse conversations with Plata.  Besides these 
snippets that the jury heard, the prosecutor also asked Ly about 
parts of his jailhouse conversation with Plata that had not been 
played for the jury.  “Mr. Ly,” the prosecutor said, “in your taped 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
conversation with Mr. Plata” — which the jury had not heard — 
“did Mr. Plata tell you that he was there in Irvine at the 
residence; he was involved in the robbery but he did not do this 
murder?”  “Yes,” Ly replied.   
The prosecutor then asked:  “Did Mr. Plata tell you that 
he was there in Irvine for the robbery but he did not strangle 
the victim?”  “Yes,” Ly replied.   
The prosecutor continued:  “In your conversation with Mr. 
Plata, in reference to the murder, did he say something to you 
that there was nothing he could do in connection with the 
murder of Linda Park?”  “Yes,” Ly replied.   
And the prosecutor asked:  “Did he tell you in connection 
with the murder of Linda Park and what he did, that he was 
pissed off, and that he had to go back inside the house to take 
something off?”  “Yes,” Ly replied.   
On recross-examination, Tran’s counsel asked Ly about a 
conversation between Ly and Plata that happened in a 
restaurant in 1996, which Plata had later reported to law 
enforcement.  Ly testified that he had remembered telling law 
enforcement that he had asked Plata during this conversation if 
Plata had killed Linda and that “Plata admitted to him that 
[Plata] had killed the Korean girl.”  Ly also testified that he 
remembered telling law enforcement that Plata told him “that 
he[, Plata,] had to do it.”   
On redirect examination, Ly stated Plata had said that he 
“was involved in it” and “was there,” from which Ly “initially 
assumed that he’s the one that did it.”  
In another recorded conversation, Plata told Ly that 
Tran’s neck tattoo — which Tran had received after Linda’s 
death — was meant to convey “blow me” or “suck me.”  Later, 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
the parties stipulated that this tattoo’s Korean-to-English 
translation was “forgive.”   
2. Analysis 
Although section 1098 expresses a general preference that 
codefendants be tried jointly, a trial court may try such 
defendants 
separately 
if 
one 
defendant’s 
incriminating 
confession implicates a codefendant, if a joint trial seriously 
risks compromising one defendant’s trial right, or if a joint trial 
seriously risks preventing the jury from reliably determining 
the defendants’ guilt or innocence, among other reasons.  (People 
v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 848 (Homick).)  Underlying 
Tran’s arguments about severance is an argument that he was 
constitutionally entitled to severance to preserve his Sixth 
Amendment confrontation rights.  Whether our review is de 
novo (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901; People v. 
Washington (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 19, 26 [reviewing de novo 
claims that the defendant was entitled to severance under 
Aranda-Bruton and due process]) or for abuse of discretion, we 
find no error.  
Tran and Plata “were ‘charged with having committed 
“common crimes involving common events and victims,” ’ 
presenting a ‘ “ ‘classic case’ ” for a joint trial.’ ”  (Homick, supra, 
55 Cal.4th at p. 849.) 
Still, Tran argues that the admission of Plata’s statements 
to Ly that implied that Tran actually killed Linda violated his 
Sixth Amendment confrontation clause rights under the 
Aranda-Bruton doctrine.  (People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 
518; Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123.)   Recall that 
Plata had allegedly said that he was involved in the Irvine 
robbery but “did not do this murder,” “did not strangle the 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
victim,” could do “nothing” “in connection with the murder of 
Linda Park,” and “was pissed off.”  (Ante, pt. III.A.1.)  The 
Aranda-Bruton doctrine “addresses a specific issue that arises 
at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-
court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates 
a codefendant,” and prevents such a statement’s admission even 
if a limiting instruction is given to the jury.  (People v. 
Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 869 (Capistrano).) 
As the Attorney General persuasively argues, however, 
the confrontation clause issues addressed by the Aranda-Bruton 
doctrine only applies to testimonial statements after Crawford 
v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 and its successors.  In 
Crawford, “the United States Supreme Court held that the 
confrontation clause of the federal Constitution generally bars 
the admission of what it termed ‘testimonial’ hearsay when 
offered by the prosecution against a criminal defendant without 
a showing of witness ‘unavailability and a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.’ ”  (People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 
830 (Valencia).)   
The Crawford court “ ‘dramatically departed’ ” from 
confrontation clause precedent, which had generally permitted 
statements of unavailable witnesses to be admitted at trial so 
long as these statements were reliable enough.  (People v. 
Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 462.)  Although it took no firm 
stand on the matter in Crawford, “the high court has 
nonetheless emphasized that only hearsay statements that are 
‘testimonial’ are subject to the confrontation clause.”  (People v. 
Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 168 (Fayed).)  In Davis v. 
Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 824 (Davis), the high court 
explained that testimonial statements “must fairly be said to 
mark out not merely” the “ ‘core’ ” of the confrontation clause, 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
“but its perimeter.”  And about a year later, in Whorton v. 
Bockting (2007) 549 U.S. 406, 420, the high court remarked that 
“the Confrontation Clause has no application” to nontestimonial 
statements. 
The upshot of this departure is that the Sixth Amendment 
protections under the Aranda-Bruton doctrine, whatever their 
reach before, are confined to testimonial statements now.  We 
have said as much before.  In People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 
101, 129, the defendant argued that the trial court’s admission 
of a codefendant’s statements to a witness that incriminated the 
defendant “violated her Sixth Amendment right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses,” mainly relying on Bruton.  But we 
rejected this argument because Bruton “involved a nontestifying 
codefendant’s hearsay statement” that was inadmissible under 
traditional rules of evidence, whereas this codefendant’s 
statement was admitted as a statement against penal interest.  
(Cortez, at p. 129.)  We also observed that “the high court 
unequivocally held ‘that the confrontation clause applies only to 
testimonial hearsay statements and not to [hearsay] statements 
that are nontestimonial.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting People v. Geier (2007) 
41 Cal.4th 555, 603.) 
Other courts, state and federal alike, have said as much 
too.  Our Courts of Appeal have held that Crawford narrowed 
confrontation clause rights under the Aranda-Bruton doctrine 
to testimonial statements only.  (E.g., People v. Gallardo (2017) 
18 Cal.App.5th 51, 69; People v. Arceo (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 
556, 575.)  Every federal court of appeals that has confronted 
this issue has concluded that Bruton is inapplicable to 
nontestimonial hearsay after Crawford.  (U.S. v. Figueroa-
Cartagena (1st Cir. 2010) 612 F.3d 69, 85 (Figueroa-Cartagena); 
U.S. v. Williams (2d Cir. 2007) 506 F.3d 151, 156; U.S. v. Berrios 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
(3d Cir. 2012) 676 F.3d 118, 128; U.S. v. Benson (4th Cir. 2020) 
957 F.3d 218, 233; U.S. v. Vasquez (5th Cir. 2014) 766 F.3d 373, 
378–379; U.S. v. Johnson (6th Cir. 2009) 581 F.3d 320, 325; U.S. 
v. Avila Vargas (8th Cir. 2009) 570 F.3d 1004, 1008–1009; 
Lucero v. Holland (9th Cir. 2018) 902 F.3d 979, 988 (Lucero); 
U.S. v. Clark (10th Cir. 2013) 717 F.3d 790, 815–816; U.S.  v. 
Wilson (D.C. Cir. 2010) 605 F.3d 985, 1016.)  And other 
jurisdictions 
have 
concluded 
similarly. 
 
(Fisher 
v. 
Commonwealth (Ky. 2021) 620 S.W.3d 1, 8; State v. Nieves (Wis. 
2017) 897 N.W.2d 363, 366; State v. Wilcoxon (Wash. 2016) 373 
P.3d 224, 229; Burnside v. State (Nev. 2015) 352 P.3d 627, 643; 
State v. Payne (Md. 2014) 104 A.3d 142, 162; State v. Gurule 
(N.M. 2013) 303 P.3d 838, 848–849; Thomas v. U.S. (D.C. 2009) 
978 A.2d 1211, 1224–1225.) 
Even so, Tran asserts that the Aranda-Bruton doctrine 
continues to apply to nontestimonial hearsay statements 
because this doctrine has “fundamentally different purposes” 
than Crawford.  Crawford, Tran says, concerns the admissibility 
of hearsay, whereas Bruton concerns the prejudicial effect of 
inadmissible hearsay on a jury.  But “both Bruton and Crawford 
have the same origins — the importance placed on cross-
examination in the Confrontation Clause, and the prejudice 
defendants face when they are unable to cross-examine 
‘powerfully incriminating’ statements.”  (Lucero, supra, 902 F.3d 
at p. 987.)  “Crawford,” as the Ninth Circuit has explained, 
“concluded after a historical analysis that the Confrontation 
Clause was concerned only with certain kinds of out-of-court 
statements — those derived from interrogations and other 
forms of ‘the civil-law mode of criminal procedure.’ ”  (Ibid.)  
“Bruton’s narrower focus,” on the other hand, “was on whether 
statements that would otherwise violate the Confrontation 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
Clause may be introduced in a joint trial.  Its holding — 
essentially, that such statements may not be introduced if the 
defendant is identifiable — does not define, or redefine, the 
basic scope of the Confrontation Clause’s protections.”  (Ibid.) 
But even if Tran’s characterization of the respective 
purposes of Crawford and Bruton is sound, his argument comes 
up short:  The fact that the confrontation clause may serve 
different purposes — even fundamentally different ones — does 
not answer the question of whether its protections apply in the 
first place.  (See Figueroa-Cartagena, supra, 612 F.3d at p. 85 
[“The threshold question in every case is whether the challenged 
statement is testimonial.”].) 
In sum, because the confrontation clause applies only to 
testimonial hearsay statements, the Aranda-Bruton doctrine’s 
Sixth Amendment protections likewise apply only to testimonial 
hearsay statements.  “Generally speaking, a declarant’s hearsay 
statement is testimonial if made ‘with a primary purpose of 
creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.’ ”  (Fayed, 
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 168.) 
Here, none of Plata’s challenged statements are 
testimonial.  Plata and Ly’s recorded jailhouse conversations 
were not testimonial because Plata did not know that Ly was a 
confidential informant and because he did not anticipate that 
his statements would be used in a criminal proceeding.  Under 
these circumstances, such “[p]rivate communications between 
inmates are not testimonial . . . .”  (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 
58 Cal.4th 1144, 1214 (Hajek and Vo); see also Davis, supra, 547 
U.S. at p. 825 [observing that statements made unwittingly to a 
Government informant “were clearly nontestimonial”]; U.S. v. 
Smalls (10th Cir. 2010) 605 F.3d 765, 778 [defendant’s “recorded 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
statement to [the confidential informant], known to [defendant] 
only as a fellow inmate, is unquestionably nontestimonial”].)  
Nor was Plata and Ly’s 1996 conversation in a restaurant 
testimonial, for “ ‘a person who makes a casual remark to an 
acquaintance’ ” — like two acquaintances conversing in a 
restaurant — does not bear testimony “ ‘in a sense’ ” that “ ‘[a]n 
accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers’ ” 
does.  (Davis, at p. 824; see also People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 
Cal.5th 735, 790 (Armstrong).) 
Separate and apart from his Aranda-Bruton claim, Tran 
argues that the trial court’s limiting instruction violated state 
law and federal due process.  Had his case been severed, Tran 
asserts, he would have been able to admit Plata’s self-
incriminating statements as declarations against penal interest 
under Evidence Code section 1230, thereby advancing his 
argument that Plata was the actual killer without being 
hampered by a limiting instruction like the one used here.  So 
the trial court should have severed his case or, failing that, 
modified the limiting instruction to allow the jury to consider 
Plata’s self-incriminating statements in determining whether 
Tran was the actual killer.  But Tran neither moved for 
severance on this ground nor objected to or requested a 
modification of this limiting instruction below, so he has 
forfeited these challenges here.  (People v. Nieves (2021) 11 
Cal.5th 404, 433, 436–437 (Nieves).)   
Lastly, Tran cursorily argues that admitting Plata’s 
statements implying that he was not the actual killer and that 
Tran was unremorseful violated the Eighth Amendment’s 
heightened reliability requirement in capital cases.  But Tran 
did not object to their admission for this reason below, so he has 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
27 
forfeited this constitutional claim here.  (Nieves, supra, 11 
Cal.5th at p. 433.)   
B. Instructional Errors 
Tran argues that four of the trial court’s instructions to 
the guilt jury concerning the testimony of an in-custody 
informant and of an accomplice — versions of CALCRIM Nos. 
301, 
335, 
336, 
and 
358 — 
prejudicially 
violated 
his 
constitutional rights to present a defense and to proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.   
1. Facts 
As noted, the prosecutor called Qui Ly, the in-custody 
informant, and Joann Nguyen, the accomplice, to testify at the 
guilt phase.  Ly testified about conversations between him and 
Plata and between him and Tran, among other testimony.  Ly 
testified about conversations between him and Plata while both 
were incarcerated in 2001 and while they were in a restaurant 
in 1996.  As noted, some of Plata’s statements in these 
conversations implied that Plata actually killed Linda, while 
others implied that Tran was the actual killer.  Ly testified that 
Plata told him that Tran’s neck tattoo meant “blow me” or “suck 
me.”  And Ly testified about recorded jailhouse conversations 
between him and Tran, in which Tran seemingly pointed to 
himself and nodded his head when Ly asked him who had killed 
Linda. 
Nguyen testified about a conversation between her and 
Tran, in which Tran discussed his neck tattoo that he had 
received after Linda’s death.  The prosecutor asked Nguyen:  
“[W]hat did Mr. Tran tell you that this tattoo says?”  Nguyen 
answered: “Forgive me,” and testified that Tran told her that the 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
28 
tattoo was written in Korean.  Later, counsel stipulated that this 
tattoo’s Korean-to-English translation “means ‘forgive.’ ”   
The trial court instructed the guilt jury with versions of 
CALCRIM Nos. 301, 335, 336, and 358, among other 
instructions.  CALCRIM No. 301 said in relevant part:  “Except 
for the testimony of Joanne Nguyen, which requires supporting 
evidence, the testimony of only one witness can prove any fact.”   
CALCRIM No. 335, concerning accomplice testimony, 
stated in relevant part:  “You may not convict the defendant of 
Murder or find any of the special circumstances or enhancement 
to be true based on the testimony or statement of an accomplice 
alone.”  Such a statement or testimony could be used for these 
purposes only if that statement or testimony was “supported by 
other evidence that you believe,” was “independent of the 
accomplice’s testimony or statement,” and “tend[ed] to connect 
the defendant to the commission of the crime.”  This instruction 
also said:  “Any testimony or statement of an accomplice that 
tends to incriminate the defendant should be viewed with 
caution.”   
CALCRIM No. 336, concerning in-custody informants, 
instructed the jury that Qui Ly was an in-custody informant.  It 
also said in relevant part:  “The testimony of an in-custody 
informant should be viewed with caution and close scrutiny.”  
And CALCRIM No. 358, concerning statements by 
defendants, stated in relevant part:  “You have heard evidence 
that the defendant made oral or written statements before the 
trial. . . .  It is up to you to decide how much importance to give 
to such statements.”  This instruction also said:  “You must 
consider with caution evidence of a defendant’s oral statement 
unless it was written or otherwise recorded.”   
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
29 
Neither Tran’s nor Plata’s counsel objected to these jury 
instructions.   
2. Analysis 
“In assessing a claim of instructional error or ambiguity, 
we consider the instructions as a whole to determine whether 
there is a reasonable likelihood the jury was misled.”  (People v. 
Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 696.)  Defense counsel did not object 
to CALCRIM Nos. 301, 335, 336, and 358.  Yet to the extent that 
Tran “argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury in 
a way that affected his substantial rights,” Tran’s “argument 
may still be heard on appeal.”  (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 
Cal.5th 983, 1000 (Ramirez).) 
Tran argues that these instructions prejudicially violated 
his constitutional rights to present a defense and to proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt under Cool v. United States (1972) 409 U.S. 
100 (Cool).  This is so, Tran asserts, because CALCRIM Nos. 
335, 336, and 358 instructed the jury to view certain statements 
with caution (so-called cautionary instructions) and because 
CALCRIM No. 335 instructed the jury that an accomplice’s 
inculpatory statement testimony must be supported by 
independent evidence (a so-called corroboration instruction).   
But Tran overreads Cool.  There, the high court held 
unconstitutional a jury instruction that directed the jury to give 
an accomplice’s testimony “ ‘the same effect as you would to a 
witness not in any respect implicated in the alleged crime’ ” if 
“ ‘the testimony carries conviction and you are convinced it is 
true beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  (Cool, supra, 409 U.S. at 
p. 102.)  Because such an instruction allowed “the jury to convict 
despite its failure to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” the 
high court explained, it improperly burdened the defense.  (Id. 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
30 
at p. 103.)  “No constitutional problem is posed when the judge 
instructs a jury to receive the prosecution’s accomplice 
testimony ‘with care and caution,’ ” the high court observed, but 
“there is an essential difference between instructing a jury on 
the care with which it should scrutinize certain evidence in 
determining how much weight to accord it and instructing a 
jury, as the judge did here, that as a predicate to the 
consideration of certain evidence, it must find it true beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (Id. at pp. 103, 104.) 
Here, unlike in Cool, none of the challenged instructions 
required the jury to find certain evidence true beyond a 
reasonable doubt before it may be considered alongside other 
evidence.  The cautionary instructions simply instructed the 
guilt jury “on the care with which it should scrutinize certain 
evidence in determining how much weight to accord it.”  (Cool, 
supra, 409 U.S. at p. 104.)  We have discerned “no conflict” 
between cautionary instructions and “the requirement of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 
1176, 1184; see also People v. Bivert (2011) 52 Cal.4th 96, 118–
121.)  Nor did Cool address corroboration instructions, and we 
have upheld them regularly (e.g., People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 
892, 946) while rejecting Cool-based challenges to accomplice 
instructions (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 161–162). 
Cool aside, Tran also argues that these versions of 
CALCRIM Nos. 301, 335, 336, and 358 did not properly direct 
the jury on how to consider the “useful and supportive 
testimony” of Ly and Nguyen.  Tran says this is so for three 
reasons.  First, Tran contends that the trial court should have 
sua sponte instructed the jury that exculpatory statements or 
testimony by accomplices or in-custody informants need not be 
corroborated.  But CALCRIM No. 335 properly instructed the 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
31 
jury on the corroboration requirement for inculpatory 
accomplice testimony or statements (see People v. Howard 
(2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1022 [juries must be instructed that they 
“cannot convict a defendant on the testimony of an accomplice 
alone”]) and no corroboration requirement for inculpatory in-
custody informant testimony or statements existed at the time 
of Tran’s trial (see People v. Huggins (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 
715, 718).  Having so instructed the jury, the trial court was not 
obligated to further instruct the jury that exculpatory testimony 
or statements need not be corroborated. 
Next, Tran asserts that CALCRIM Nos. 336 and 358 
should have been modified to instruct the jury that it need not 
have viewed with caution Plata’s exculpatory statements, 
relayed through Ly and Nguyen, that implied that Plata was the 
actual killer.  We find no error because there was ample reason 
for the jury to treat Plata’s statements with caution.  Plata’s 
accounts were inconsistent given that they contained conflicting 
statements as to the roles Plata and Tran played in the murder.   
Telling jurors to exercise caution in the face of such conflicting 
statements from the same individual aligns with the generic, 
commonsense instructions on how to assess witness testimony.  
(See People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 142 [finding no 
harm from instructions that were “supported by common sense, 
which many jurors are likely to indulge even without an 
instruction”].) 
Finally, Tran contends that CALCRIM Nos. 301 and 335 
erroneously 
instructed 
the 
jury 
to 
consider 
Nguyen’s 
exculpatory testimony regarding the meaning of Tran’s tattoo 
only if it was corroborated by other evidence.  Any alleged error 
is harmless.  Nguyen’s testimony — testifying that Tran told her 
that his tattoo said, “Forgive me” — revealed nothing that the 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
32 
parties’ stipulation (that the tattoo means “forgive”) did not 
reveal.  Nguyen did not testify about Tran’s intent behind the 
tattoo or what it connoted; she simply testified about what it 
said.   
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not violate 
Tran’s constitutional rights to present a defense and to proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt by instructing the guilt jury with 
versions of CALCRIM Nos. 301, 335, 336, and 358. 
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Special 
Circumstance 
Tran argues that the torture-murder special circumstance 
must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence that 
he “specifically intended to inflict extreme pain for purpose of 
revenge, extortion, persuasion, or a sadistic reason.”   
1. Facts 
As noted, the prosecutor called Dr. Richard Fukumoto and 
Joann Nguyen to testify at the guilt phase.  Fukumoto testified 
about how Linda died.  He was a pathologist who had personally 
conducted thousands of autopsies during his decades-long 
career, and he testified that he had reviewed Linda’s autopsy 
report, the photographs taken during her autopsy, and the 
testimony of the doctor who had prepared the report, Dr. Joseph 
Halka, a doctor who had worked for Fukumoto’s medical group 
at the time of the trial. 
Based on the materials he reviewed, Fukumoto opined 
that Linda died from asphyxiation by being strangled with an 
electrical cord that had been wrapped around her neck twice.  
The autopsy documents showed that Linda was bound by her 
wrists and feet before she died, Fukumoto continued, explaining 
that abrasions near her wrists and feet indicated that she 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
33 
attempted to remove the bindings.  He testified that Linda was 
conscious when she was strangled.  And these documents 
showed that her lungs contained edema — fluid in the air sacs 
that is not ordinarily present — indicating that she did not die 
instantaneously, Fukumoto said.   
Fukumoto also testified that there “were two slash, sharp 
instrument injuries” on Linda’s neck.  These slash wounds, he 
testified, overlapped one another, were inflicted before she was 
strangled and died, and would have been caused by a sharp 
instrument like a knife or scissor’s edge.   
Yet Fukumoto also testified that these slash wounds were 
“not deep enough to cause immediate death.”  Though these 
slash wounds were “potentially fatal” without medical aid 
because “a person who suffers this type of wound could die 
eventually,” dying from them would “take time,” Fukumoto said.   
Later, during guilt phase closing argument, the prosecutor 
mentioned Fukumoto’s testimony while arguing that the jury 
should find the torture-murder special circumstance true.  This 
testimony, the prosecutor said, proved that Tran intended to 
inflict extreme physical pain and suffering on Linda while she 
lived, stating:  “You heard the testimony of Dr. Fukumoto about 
when she was alive, when she was conscious.  She was conscious 
up to the moment they started strangling her, and she was still 
struggling and fighting as Tran was strangling.”  According to 
the prosecutor, this testimony proved that Tran intended to 
inflict such pain and suffering for the calculated purpose of 
extortion, persuasion, or any other sadistic reason:  “It’s not 
about revenge, but all the other ones apply.  Extortion, to get 
her to tell them where the money and jewelry is.  Persuade, to 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
34 
tell them where the money and jewelry is.  And if that’s not 
sadistic, nothing is.  If that was not sadistic, nothing is.”   
Tran’s counsel argued during guilt phase closing 
argument that “[t]here’s no indication that they tried to do 
anything but kill her” and that there were “two reasonable 
interpretations” of the evidence, one of which was “that this was 
just a really inept way to kill somebody.”   
2. Analysis 
“On review, we examine the entire record in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational 
jury could have found the circumstance true beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (Armstrong, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 792.)  To 
prove a torture-murder special circumstance, the prosecutor 
must prove that a defendant both intended to kill and intended 
to torture, the latter of which means “ ‘ “to cause extreme pain 
or suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or 
another sadistic purpose.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  The intent to torture “ ‘is a 
state of mind which, unless established by the defendant’s own 
statements (or by another witness’s description of a defendant’s 
behavior in committing the offenses), must be proved by the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense 
[citations], which include the nature and severity of the victim’s 
wounds.’ ”  (People v. Smith (2015) 61 Cal.4th 18, 52.) 
Considering these circumstances in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could have found 
the torture-murder special circumstance true beyond a 
reasonable doubt because it could infer that Tran intended to 
kill Linda and intended to torture her so that she would divulge 
the location of the money and jewelry in the Park home.  As 
noted, Nguyen testified that Linda never told her where money 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
35 
and jewelry were located at the Park home.  Sunhwa testified 
that he typically stored money in a jacket in their master 
bedroom’s closet and that his wife, Dong, typically stored her 
jewelry inside boxes in the drawer of her makeup table in the 
same room.  Rolf Parkes, the Irvine police officer, testified that 
when he arrived at the Park home on the night of Linda’s death, 
he discovered this jacket but found no money inside it and 
discovered two empty jewelry boxes atop a coffee table in the 
living room where Linda’s body was found.  And he testified that 
the rest of the home was in a “very orderly” condition and had 
not been ransacked.  From this evidence, a reasonable jury could 
infer that Tran and Plata did not know where these valuables 
were located before they entered the Park home but learned it 
from Linda instead. 
In addition, a reasonable jury could infer that Tran and 
Plata coaxed this information from Linda by binding her and 
slashing her neck.  Although evidence of binding alone is 
insufficient to prove an intent to cause extreme pain or suffer 
for a sadistic purpose, “it is appropriate to consider whether the 
victim was bound and gagged, or was isolated from others, thus 
rendering the victim unable to resist a defendant’s acts of 
violence.”  (Hajek and Vo, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1188.)  Linda’s 
wrists and feet were bound behind her back, and she struggled 
to escape unsuccessfully, indicating that she had little if any 
way to defend herself against Tran or Plata.  Plus, the “nature 
and placement” of the slash wounds — two overlapping slash 
wounds on her neck — allow a reasonable jury to infer that 
“these wounds could not have been inflicted inadvertently.”  
(People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 141.)  These slash 
wounds also “appear to have preceded” the fatal injury (ibid.), 
and they were not immediately fatal but caused such severe 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
36 
bleeding that they would have killed Linda eventually.  Indeed, 
Linda died not from these or other slash wounds but from 
another injury entirely:  strangulation.  A reasonable jury could 
infer that Tran bound Linda and slashed her neck twice to cause 
extreme pain or suffering so that Linda would divulge the 
location of the money and jewelry.  (Cf. People v. Turville (1959) 
51 Cal.2d 620, 632; see also People v. Steger (1976) 16 Cal.3d 
539, 547.) 
Citing People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, Tran 
argues that a jury may conclude that a defendant intended to 
cause extreme pain or suffering for a sadistic purpose “only 
when the evidence showed ‘the defendant deliberately inflicted 
nonfatal wounds or deliberately exposed the victim to prolonged 
suffering.’ ”  But Mungia involved a torture-murder special 
circumstance finding based not on contentions that a 
“ ‘defendant 
was 
motivated 
by 
revenge, 
extortion, 
or 
persuasion,’ ” but on a contention that the defendant sadistically 
intended “ ‘ “ ‘to cause the victim to suffer pain in addition to the 
pain of death’ ” ’ merely on the basis of the defendant’s delivery 
of repeated blows to the victim’s head.”  (People v. Powell (2018) 
5 Cal.5th 921, 947–948, quoting Mungia, at p. 1136.)  Because 
“nothing in the nature of the injuries [suggested] that defendant 
inflicted any of them in an attempt to torture [the victim] rather 
than to kill her,” even though the killing was “brutal and 
savage,” we held that the evidence did not suffice to support the 
torture-murder special circumstance finding.  (Mungia, at 
p. 1137.) 
The torture-murder special circumstance here, by 
contrast, could have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt 
based on evidence that Tran tortured Linda to persuade her to 
divulge the location of the money and jewelry.  A reasonable jury 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
37 
could infer that the slash wounds on Linda’s neck were not 
inflicted only for the purpose of killing her.  Linda was 
strangled, not slashed, to death.  She may have died from the 
slash wounds eventually, but such a death would “take time.”  A 
reasonable jury could have concluded that these slash wounds 
were meant to torture her so that she would reveal the location 
of the money and jewelry. 
Tran also disputes the conclusions drawn from the 
evidence.  He argues that no evidence directly proves Tran and 
Plata asked Linda about the money and jewelry, and that “the 
insides of both a man’s jacket and a woman’s dressing table are 
quite logical places to find valuables in a home, and thus, no 
specialized knowledge from Linda would necessarily have been 
required.”  But “ ‘[w]e “must accept logical inferences that the 
jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.” . . .  
Where the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s 
findings, a reviewing court’s conclusion [that] the circumstances 
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does 
not warrant the judgment’s reversal.’ ”  (People v. Clark (2016)  
63 Cal.4th 522, 625–626, citations omitted.)  Indeed, Tran’s 
counsel argued that the evidence proved nothing other than 
Tran and Plata’s ineptitude in killing Linda.  Yet the jury could 
have, and did, reject this view of the evidence.  
In sum, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have 
found the torture-murder special circumstance true beyond a 
reasonable doubt, so reversal of this special circumstance is 
unwarranted. 
D. Amendments to Gang Enhancement Statute 
Tran argues that recent amendments to the gang 
enhancement statute require reversal of the jury’s true finding 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
38 
of the section 186.22 gang enhancement, his guilt verdict, and 
the death judgment.  
1. Facts 
As noted, the prosecutor called Mark Nye to testify as a 
gang expert about gang culture, the VFL gang, Tran’s and 
Plata’s VFL membership, and how a hypothetical robbery like 
this one may support a criminal street gang.   
In formulating his opinion about the VFL, Nye testified 
that he reviewed documents and reports relating to convictions 
and crimes committed by members of the VFL.  These records 
concerned Se Hoang, Phi Nguyen, and Anthony Johnson.  They 
comprised felony complaints, guilty pleas, minute orders, and 
other court documents.  And they showed that Hoang, Phi 
Nguyen, and Johnson had pleaded guilty to various crimes, like 
first degree residential burglary, attempted residential 
burglary, or attempted murder, and that they were members of 
the VFL or had committed these crimes for its benefit.  Nye 
discussed these records while he testified.   
Later, the trial court instructed the guilt jury on the 
criminal street gang enhancement under section 186.22, 
subdivision (b).  Among other things, the trial court instructed 
the jury that a “pattern of criminal gang activity” means “[t]he 
commission of, or attempted commission of, or conspiracy to 
commit, or conviction of, . . . any combination of two or more 
crimes.”   
At guilt phase closing argument, the prosecutor discussed 
the “gang enhancement.”  Saying he was “not going to go 
through it in detail,” he reminded the jury that he “introduced 
the prior conviction of Se Hoang, . . . and Phi Nguyen and 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
39 
Anthony Johnson.”  He continued:  “You might be saying, ‘Why 
did he introduce that?’  Because that is one of the elements.”   
In a general verdict for Tran, the jury found true the 
section 186.22, subdivision (b) gang enhancement.  
2. Analysis 
“In 1988, the Legislature enacted the California Street 
Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP Act; § 186.20 
et seq.) to eradicate ‘criminal activity by street gangs.’ ”  
(Valencia, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 828.)  Among other things, the 
STEP Act created “a sentencing enhancement for a felony 
committed ‘for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association 
with any criminal street gang’ (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).”  
(Valencia, at p. 829.)   
In 2021, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 333 ( 
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333), which became 
effective on January 1, 2022.  Assembly Bill 333 made the 
following changes to the law on gang enhancements:  First, it 
narrowed the definition of a “criminal street gang” to require 
that any gang be an “ongoing, organized association or group of 
three or more persons.”  (§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics added.)  
Second, whereas section 186.22, former subdivision (f) required 
only that a gang’s members “individually or collectively engage 
in” a pattern of criminal activity in order to constitute a 
“criminal street gang,” Assembly Bill 333 requires that any such 
pattern have been “collectively engage[d] in” by members of the 
gang.  (§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics added.)  Third, Assembly Bill 
333 also narrowed the definition of a “pattern of criminal 
activity” by requiring that (1) the last offense used to show a 
pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three years of 
the date that the currently charged offense is alleged to have 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
40 
been committed; (2) the offenses were committed by two or more 
gang “members,” as opposed to just “persons”; (3) the offenses 
commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses 
establishing a pattern of gang activity must be ones other than 
the currently charged offense.  (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1), (2).)  
Fourth, Assembly Bill 333 narrowed what it means for an 
offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring 
that any “common benefit” be “more than reputational.”  
(§ 186.22, subd. (g).)   
Finally, Assembly Bill 333 added section 1109, which 
requires, if requested by the defendant, a gang enhancement 
charge to be tried separately from all other counts that do not 
otherwise require gang evidence as an element of the crime.  If 
the proceedings are bifurcated, the truth of the gang 
enhancement may be determined only after a trier of fact finds 
the defendant guilty of the underlying offense.   
 
Tran argues that the amendments made to the elements 
of a section 186.22 gang enhancement require reversal of his 
gang enhancement finding.  Tran also argues that the failure to 
bifurcate the adjudication of his gang enhancement charge and 
the rest of his charges, as newly enacted section 1109 directs 
upon a defendant’s request, requires reversal of his guilt 
verdicts and death judgment.  We conclude that reversal of the 
gang enhancement is required but not reversal of the guilt 
verdicts or death judgment.   
 
Starting with the changes to the elements of a section 
186.22 gang enhancement, the Attorney General concedes that 
the rule of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada) applies, 
and we agree.  Estrada “stand[s] for the proposition that (i) in 
the absence of a contrary indication of legislative intent, (ii) 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
41 
legislation that ameliorates punishment (iii) applies to all cases 
that are not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.”  
(People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 675.)  Estrada applies 
to statutory amendments “which redefine, to the benefit of 
defendants, conduct subject to criminal sanctions.”  (Tapia v. 
Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 301.)  Here, “Assembly Bill 
333 essentially adds new elements to the substantive offense 
and enhancements in section 186.22 — for example, by 
requiring proof that gang members ‘collectively engage’ in a 
pattern of criminal gang activity, that the predicate offenses 
were committed by gang members, that the predicate offenses 
benefitted the gang, and that the predicate and underlying 
offenses provided more than a reputational benefit to the gang 
. . . .”  (People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 479; see also 
People v. Delgado (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1087; People v. 
Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 666–667;  People v. Vasquez 
(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1021, 1032–1033; People v. Lopez (2021) 
73 Cal.App.5th 327, 344.)  These changes have the effect of 
“increas[ing] the threshold for conviction of the section 186.22 
offense and the imposition of the enhancement,” with obvious 
benefit to defendants like Tran.  (Lopez, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 344.)   
 
When a substantive change occurs in the elements of an 
offense and the jury is not instructed as to the proper elements, 
the omission implicates the defendant’s right to a jury trial 
under the Sixth Amendment, and reversal is required unless “it 
appears beyond a reasonable doubt” that the jury verdict would 
have been the same in the absence of the error.  (People v. Flood 
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504.)  Here, the Attorney General 
concedes reversal, reasoning that the evidence presented at trial 
failed to establish that the gang members “collectively” engaged 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
42 
in a pattern of criminal gang activity, as required by section 
186.22 as newly amended.  We agree.  We need not resolve the 
contours of Assembly Bill 333’s collective engagement 
requirement.  Instead, because the jury was not presented with 
any discernible theory as to how VFL members “collectively 
engage[d] in” these predicate crimes (§ 186.22, subd. (f)), we 
merely hold, on this record, that the reversal of the gang 
enhancement is required.  As the Attorney General requests 
(without objection from Tran), we vacate the enhancement 
without remand.   
Next, Tran argues that newly enacted section 1109, which 
requires the trial court to bifurcate the adjudication of the 
underlying offense and the gang enhancement upon a 
defendant’s request, applies retroactively and requires reversal 
of the guilt verdicts and death judgment.    
As an initial matter, we note that Tran raised this section 
1109 claim only in his supplemental reply brief.  Generally, 
“arguments made for the first time in a reply brief will not be 
entertained because of the unfairness to the other party.”  
(People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075.)  However, because 
the appellate authority holding that section 1109 applies 
retroactively was only issued after the time had passed for Tran 
to file his supplemental brief and the Attorney General has since 
been given the opportunity to respond to Tran’s claim, the usual 
concerns regarding unfairness have been mitigated.  The 
Attorney General does not argue forfeiture, and we proceed to 
the merits of Tran’s section 1109 claim.  
The question of whether section 1109 applies retroactively 
is the subject of a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal.  
(See e.g., People v. Burgos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 550, 566–567; 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
43 
People v. Ramos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1131; People v. 
Ramirez (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48, 65.)  We decline to resolve 
this split here because we conclude that any asserted error in 
failing to bifurcate was harmless as to Tran’s guilt verdicts and 
penalty judgment.  
We first reject Tran’s contention that the failure to 
bifurcate constitutes structural error.  Errors may be deemed 
structural according to “ ‘three broad rationales’ ”:  where “ ‘the 
right at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from 
erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest,’ ” 
“ ‘where the effects of the error are simply too hard to measure,’ ” 
or 
where 
“ ‘the 
error 
always 
results 
in 
fundamental 
unfairness.’ ”  (In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, 
1077.)  None of these reasons apply.  First, the stated purpose of 
section 1109 is to reduce the prejudicial impact of gang evidence 
and 
to 
protect 
defendants 
from 
erroneous 
conviction.    
(Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2,  subd. (d)(6) [section 1109 is designed 
to prevent the “further perpetuat[ion]” of “unfair prejudice in 
juries and convictions of innocent people”].)  Second, errors 
relating to wrongful admission of evidence are traditionally 
subject to harmless error review (People v. Schultz (2020) 10 
Cal.5th 623, 661 (Schultz)), demonstrating that the effects of 
these types of errors are not “simply too hard to measure” 
(Christopher L. at p. 1077).  Finally, although the admission of 
gang evidence may sometimes result in fundamental unfairness 
(see, e.g., People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 232), 
this is not always the case.  We have held that gang evidence, 
even if not admitted to prove a gang enhancement, may still be 
relevant and admissible to prove other facts related to a crime.  
(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 194.)  Additionally, 
the fact that section 1109 requires bifurcation only upon a 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
44 
defendant’s request suggests there are circumstances where a 
single trial remains appropriate. 
We also reject Tran’s argument that the Chapman v. 
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 standard for federal constitutional 
error should apply when reviewing his guilty verdicts.  “[T]he 
admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results 
in a due process violation only if it makes the trial 
fundamentally unfair.”  (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 
439 (Partida).)  Such prejudice did not occur in this case.  To 
establish Tran’s guilt, the prosecutor relied mainly on the 
testimony and prior statements of a few key witnesses.  As 
noted, Qui Ly’s testimony was particularly damaging; he 
testified that both Tran and Plata told him about their 
involvement in the murder, and tapes of these conversations 
were played to the jury.  Additionally, Joanna Nguyen, Tran’s 
girlfriend, testified that shortly after the murder, Tran told her 
that he and Plata had killed the victim because they did not 
want her to identify him if she was questioned about the 
robbery.  
In addition to this testimony, the prosecutor relied on the 
gang circumstances of the case to strengthen the case for guilt 
in two ways, neither of which rendered the trial fundamentally 
unfair.  First, the prosecutor argued that any inconsistencies 
between the witnesses’ trial testimony and their prior 
statements could be explained by the fact that they were 
members of the gang and feared retaliation.  We have held that 
a trial court is entitled to admit evidence demonstrating a fear 
of testifying.  (See People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 137.)  
Second, the prosecutor also relied on the gang circumstances of 
the crime when arguing why Plata should be found guilty as an 
aider and abettor of Tran’s act of killing the victim.  Specifically, 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
45 
while the evidence tended to show that Tran was the actual 
killer, the prosecutor argued that Plata should be found guilty 
as an aider and abettor because “in a gang case” it could be 
inferred that Plata would assist Tran in the murder as a fellow 
gang member.  Whatever effect this had on Plata’s case, it is 
hard to see how the prosecutor’s argument was fundamentally 
unfair to Tran; the prosecutor’s theory was that Tran was the 
actual killer, so there was no need for any gang evidence to 
demonstrate that he was guilty as an aider and abettor.  
Because the prosecutor’s use of the gang evidence here did not 
render the trial “fundamentally unfair,” the Chapman standard 
for federal constitutional error does not apply.  (Partida, supra, 
37 Cal.4th at p. 439.) 
Applying the People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 
standard for state-law error, we find that Tran has failed to 
demonstrate prejudice as to his guilt verdicts.  Tran argues that 
if the trials were bifurcated, the trial court might have exercised 
its discretion to exclude gang evidence.  However, apart from 
describing the general risk of prejudice that may result from the 
admission of gang evidence, Tran does not explain how the 
exclusion of gang evidence in this case would have been 
reasonably likely to change the jury’s verdict of guilt as to the 
underlying murder.  The case for guilt here was strong, with 
multiple witnesses testifying that Tran had told them about his 
involvement in the killing.  In the face of this evidence, defense 
counsel did not dispute that Tran and Plata had committed the 
robbery and murder, going so far as to argue that “[t]here’s no 
indication that they tried to do anything but kill her” and that 
“[t]hese two guys apparently . . .  went to do a robbery and they 
got terrible.”  Given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and lack 
of any credible defense theory in response, it is not reasonably 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
46 
likely that a bifurcated trial would have changed the jury’s 
verdict. 
Similarly, we find it is not reasonably likely that the 
exclusion of gang evidence would have affected the jury’s true 
findings on the robbery, burglary, and torture special 
circumstances.  Tran argues that the gang evidence could have 
skewed the jury to find that Tran acted with the intent to kill or 
with reckless indifference to human life for purposes of the 
robbery or burglary special circumstance, or that he intended to 
inflict extreme physical pain and suffering for purposes of the 
torture murder special circumstances.  Again, apart from 
pointing to the general risk of prejudice, Tran does not explain 
how the gang evidence here was likely to have influenced the 
jury’s specific findings.  When making the case for these special 
circumstances in closing arguments, the prosecutor did not 
mention Tran’s or Plata’s gang membership.  Instead, the 
prosecutor relied on other facts that were conceptually distinct 
from the issue of gang membership — namely, the actual 
circumstances of the robbery and the autopsy evidence of the 
victim’s injuries.  It is not reasonably likely that exclusion of 
gang evidence would have affected the jury’s findings on these 
special circumstances. 
As to whether the failure to bifurcate was prejudicial as to 
Tran’s death judgment, we ask if “ ‘there is a reasonable 
possibility such an error affected the verdict,’ ” a standard that 
is “ ‘the same, in substance and effect’ ” as the standard set out 
in Chapman.  (People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 218, 
fn. 15.)  We find no such reasonable possibility.  Section 1109 
only requires bifurcation as to “[t]he question of the defendant’s 
guilt of the underlying offense” and the “truth of the 
enhancement.”  (Id., subd. (a)(1), (2).)  It makes no change to the 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
47 
manner in which the penalty phase of capital proceedings 
should be conducted.  Given the usual rule that any evidence 
admitted at the guilt phase may be considered at the penalty 
phase (People v. Garton (2018) 4 Cal.5th 485, 522), any evidence 
admitted in a bifurcated trial, including any gang evidence, 
could have been considered during Tran’s penalty phase.  
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that there was a reasonable 
possibility that a bifurcated trial at the guilt phase would have 
affected the penalty phase decision. 
In sum, we conclude that the amendments made to the 
gang enhancement law by Assembly Bill 333 require reversal of 
the jury’s true finding of the gang enhancement, but not reversal 
of the guilt verdicts or death judgment. 
IV. 
PENALTY PHASE CLAIMS 
A. Inadmissible Hearsay in Gang Expert Testimony 
Tran argues that during the guilt phase, Nye relied on 
inadmissible hearsay when testifying as to Plata’s gang 
membership, Tran’s gang membership, and Tran’s lack of 
remorse.  Tran further argues that the prosecutor relied on 
these three factual assertions in arguing for the death penalty 
and that these errors require reversal of the death judgment.  
1. Facts 
As noted, during the guilt phase, gang expert Nye testified 
as to his opinion that Plata and Tran were VFL members.   
In reaching his opinion that Plata was a VFL member, 
Nye considered letters between Plata and other VFL members, 
a 1996 field identification card showing that Plata had admitted 
to his gang membership, a 1993 report where Plata admitted 
that he was a VFL member, and statements by other individuals 
to the police that Plata had told them he was a VFL member. 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
48 
As to Tran’s gang membership, Nye considered a police 
contact in 1993 where Tran admitted that he was a member of 
VFL.  Nye also considered eight to ten other contacts between 
law enforcement and Tran, and a book that Tran had in his 
house that contained handwritten notes including “Scrappy,” 
“Viets for Life,” and “Fuck T.R.G.” with “T.R.G.” crossed out. 
Nye also considered Tran’s numerous tattoos, which 
included a map of Vietnam, the words “In loving memory of 
Viet,” the years that Tran was incarcerated, his nickname 
“Scrappy,” a “V” surrounded by rays, a Vietnamese saying that 
translates to “no good deed has been returned by my father and 
other by me,” and Korean characters, translated as “Forgive.”   
As for the tattoo of the Vietnamese saying, Nye claimed based 
on his general experience with “thousands of gang members” 
that “a lot of Asian gang members get that tattoo,” which is 
intended to mean “I disrespected my mom and dad” and to 
convey their willingness to participate in criminal activity.  As 
to the “Forgive” tattoo, Nye testified that such a tattoo would be 
seen “within the gang subculture” as indicating that Tran was 
“taking credit for” the murder of a Korean.  This opinion was 
“reinforced by” Nye’s consideration of the taped jailhouse 
conversation between Plata and Ly, wherein Plata said that 
Tran intended for the tattoo to mean “blow me or suck me.”  
Probation officer Timothy Todd also testified that Tran’s 
“Forgive” tattoo was a form of bragging.  In formulating this 
opinion, Todd took into consideration his general “training and 
experience” as well as the jailhouse conversation between Plata 
and Ly. 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
49 
2. Analysis 
In People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 686 (Sanchez), 
we held that “[w]hen an expert relates to the jury case-specific 
out-of-court statements, and treats the content of those 
statements as true and accurate to support the expert’s opinion, 
the statements are hearsay.”  Typically, the standard for 
evaluating whether Sanchez error is prejudicial turns on 
whether the statement is testimonial.  (Valencia, supra, 11 
Cal.5th at p. 840 [stating that Watson “ordinarily” applies but 
that Chapman applies if the improperly admitted hearsay is 
testimonial such that its admission also violates the 
confrontation clause].)  However, because Tran asserts prejudice 
as to his death judgment, we ask if “ ‘there is a “reasonable (i.e., 
realistic) possibility”  the error affected the verdict.’ ”  (People v. 
Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 163.)  Applying this standard, 
we find each of Tran’s asserted errors harmless.   
First, regarding Plata’s gang membership, while Tran is 
correct that some of the evidence relied upon by the expert, such 
as the field identification card and police reports, constitutes 
inadmissible hearsay based on our reasoning in Sanchez, there 
was independent admissible evidence that Plata was a member 
of the VFL.  In particular, the jury heard testimony by Linda Le 
and Qui Ly, both of whom unequivocally testified that Plata was 
a member of the VFL.   
Second, any Sanchez error regarding Tran’s gang 
membership was also harmless.  As Tran concedes, Nye was 
entitled to rely on the authenticated photographs of his tattoos.  
Nye was further entitled to rely on his generalized knowledge, 
gained from his experience with thousands of gang members, to 
offer an opinion as to the meaning of the tattoos and why they 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
50 
indicated membership in the VFL.  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 
at p. 677 [an expert is “allowed to give an opinion that the 
presence of a diamond tattoo shows the person belongs to the 
gang”].)  Additionally, the jury heard from multiple witnesses 
that Tran was a member of the VFL.  Indeed, Tran’s attorney 
told the trial judge, while discussing evidentiary issues, that the 
defense was “not contesting that he’s a VFL.”  Any Sanchez error 
specific to Tran’s gang membership was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
Third, any Sanchez error related to the meaning of Tran’s 
“forgive” tattoo was also harmless.  On this point, Tran argues 
Nye’s and Todd’s reliance on Plata’s statements in the jailhouse 
interview violated Sanchez and that this error was prejudicial 
as to the death judgment because it was used to demonstrate a 
lack of remorse.  Tran argues that the prosecutor’s “main theme” 
during the penalty phase closing arguments was that Tran 
“bragged about the crime and showed no remorse.”  Tran notes 
that defense counsel also “focused on remorse” and argued that 
the tattoos demonstrated that Tran was “really profoundly 
affected by” his crime.  
At the outset, we recognize that some prejudice obviously 
arises when a gang expert testifies that a tattoo, literally 
translated as “Forgive,” should instead be understood to mean 
“suck me” or “blow me.”  But any Sanchez error is harmless for 
two reasons.  For one, the experts’ opinion regarding the general 
meaning of the tattoo was supported by independently 
admissible evidence — namely, the experts’ generalized 
knowledge of gang subculture, gleaned from conversations with 
gang members regarding the meaning of such tattoos.  (Sanchez, 
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 677.)  Additionally, while Tran is correct 
in observing that the prosecutor focused on rebutting Tran’s 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
51 
assertions of remorse during the penalty phase closing 
arguments, the prosecutor never mentioned the tattoos during 
the penalty phase.  Instead, the prosecutor focused exclusively 
on other evidence to demonstrate Tran’s alleged lack of remorse.  
This evidence was substantial; it included Tran’s repeated 
criminal actions and Tran’s taped conversations with a jailhouse 
informant that suggested callousness about the murder. 
On this record, we hold that any Sanchez error based on 
the experts’ reliance on Plata’s jailhouse statements regarding 
the meaning of Tran’s tattoos was harmless. 
B.  Admission of Speculative Expert Testimony 
 
In response to our request for supplemental briefing, 
which was limited to the Assembly Bill 333 and Sanchez issues, 
Tran also argues that reversal of the death judgment is 
warranted because the trial court failed to uphold its 
gatekeeping duty under Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of 
Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747 (Sargon).  Tran 
argues that the trial court should have excluded speculative 
gang expert testimony regarding Tran’s and Plata’s gang 
membership, the gang status of the VFL, and the fact that the 
charged offense was committed for the benefit of the VFL. 
 
Tran has forfeited this claim.  A challenge to the 
admissibility of expert testimony under Sargon is a challenge to 
the reliability and foundation of the evidence, and whether the 
subject of the testimony is admissible as expert testimony.  (See 
Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 771–772.)  These objections 
were available to Tran at the time of his trial, before we decided 
Sargon.  (See People v. Gardeley (1997) 14 Cal.4th 605, 617–
619).  It is not evident that any objection on such grounds would 
have been “ ‘ “futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
52 
then in existence.” ’ ”  (People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 8, 
quoting People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 92.)  Even if Tran 
were excused from raising a claim under sections 801 and 802 
at trial because Sargon significantly developed the law, the 
original 2017 briefing in this appeal post-dates Sargon by five 
years.  Tran had the opportunity to raise this Sargon concern 
then, and his failure to do so results in forfeiture.  (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 8.520(d)(1) [supplemental brief must be “limited to 
new authorities, new legislation, or other matters that were not 
available in time to be included in the party’s brief on the 
merits”]; People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 990 [finding 
forfeited claim first raised at oral argument and in subsequent 
supplemental reply brief].)   
C. Victim Impact Evidence 
Tran argues that the trial court violated state and federal 
law by admitting certain evidence about the impact of Linda’s 
death. 
1. Facts 
As noted, the prosecutor called Sunhwa, Janie, and Fox to 
testify at the penalty phase.  Their testimony spanned about 35 
pages of transcript, and while they testified, the prosecutor 
sometimes showed the jury photographs or videos of or about 
Linda, along with Linda’s personal items.  
a. 
Sunhwa Park 
Sunhwa, Linda’s father, testified about Linda as a child 
and as a teenager.  As a child, Linda “received a lot of adoration 
and love from our family” because Sunhwa was the only one with 
two daughters.  As a teenager, Sunhwa continued, Linda had 
many friends and attended church regularly.  The prosecutor 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
53 
showed Sunhwa photos of Linda, including one of her as a child 
in a “Korean traditional outfit.” 
Sunhwa also recounted the impact of Linda’s death on her 
mother, Dong Park.  Dong “came home and basically passed out” 
when she discovered what happened to Linda, Sunhwa recalled.  
Since then, Dong would “be in Linda’s room crying every day.”  
Dong suffered so much that Sunhwa thought that he could ease 
her pain “by letting her die or killing her.”  Sunhwa testified that 
he once entered Dong’s room “to kill her with a knife,” but his 
brother prevented him from doing so.  Another time, Sunhwa 
poured gasoline around their home to set themselves on fire “so 
we [could] die” because Linda’s death “was too much for us to 
bear, and we couldn’t really go on living without her.”  But Janie, 
his eldest daughter, fetched their neighbors, the Foxes, and 
together they prevented him from doing so.  Sunhwa also 
testified that Dong fainted when she was first meant to appear 
in court for this case and that she still visited and cleaned 
Linda’s graveyard weekly.   
Sunhwa also testified about the impact of Linda’s death on 
himself.  After she died, Sunhwa wrote on Linda’s bedroom 
walls:  “Linda, I love you.  Linda, I miss you.  Linda, I am so 
sorry.”  Sunhwa explained how he could not “live a day without 
drinking some alcohol in [his] system” after Linda’s death and 
how he overcame his addictions “through faith” after realizing 
that he had to care for Janie.   
b. 
Marilyn Fox 
Fox was the Parks’ longtime next door neighbor when 
Linda died.  Fox testified about the evening that Linda was 
killed.  She explained how she followed Sunhwa to the Park 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
54 
home and told him not to touch anything inside, returned to her 
home, and called the police.   
Fox also testified about Linda herself.  “She was a quiet 
girl and a very beautiful little girl,” Fox recalled, observing that 
Linda “was always respectful” when Fox visited the Park home.   
And Fox testified about how Linda’s family underwent “a 
dramatic change” after her death.  Fox testified about how 
Sunhwa would visit her home and “for probably about an hour 
he would just sit and talk with us, and then it would be — he 
would get the strength to go home to his house.”  This behavior 
“went on for a very long time, months,” Fox remarked.   
c. 
Janie Park 
Janie, Linda’s older sister, testified about Linda and how 
her death impacted their family and community.  While Janie 
testified, the prosecutor showed her Linda’s 1994 yearbook, 
three videos about Linda, and notes that Linda had written, 
among other things.   
Janie recalled how Linda “would always follow me around” 
and how Linda “was incredibly close with my parents.”  Janie 
also testified about how Linda “would write little sticky post-it 
notes everywhere reminding herself that she had to do this for 
the next day, remind someone to do this.”  When the prosecutor 
showed Janie some of Linda’s notes, Janie remarked that 
“normal people wouldn’t write [this] kind of stuff down” but that 
“innocent people” would.   
Janie then testified about how Linda’s death affected her 
and the community.  Janie explained how she took her son and 
daughter to visit Linda’s grave and “pretty much explained that 
this is their aunt.”  The prosecutor then played two videos:  one 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
55 
of Linda’s 14th birthday party and the other of her one-year 
anniversary memorial service.   
Janie further testified about how Linda’s death affected 
her parents.  Janie testified that Sunhwa “became very self-
destructive,” remarked how “every time he went into the 
bathroom, he would scream, bang the walls,” and opined that 
Sunhwa is “never, ever going to be the same.”  And Janie 
testified that watching Dong “just fall apart” “was very 
devastating” and recalled how Dong faints whenever she sees a 
police officer approach.   
d. 
Juror No. 1 
After Sunhwa and Fox testified but before Janie took the 
stand, Juror No. 1 informed the trial court that she was unsure 
whether she could continue serving on the jury.  The trial court 
then questioned Juror No. 1 in open court with counsel and Tran 
and Plata present.   
Juror No. 1 said:  “I believe in the law, and I believe in 
being fair, and I believe that I have to be courageous enough to 
say I don’t think I have an open mind anymore.”  After the trial 
court observed that an interpreter had cried during Sunhwa’s 
testimony, Juror No. 1 replied, “I was shaking all night long.  I 
will do, with all due respect, whatever you want.  Out of fairness 
to everyone involved, everyone involved, I thought I owed it to 
all of you to be honest enough to say I’m not coping.”   
 
Because of this, defense counsel sought to excuse Juror 
No. 1, the prosecutor did not object to her excusal, and the trial 
court did not “have any problem excusing her.”  So the trial court 
excused Juror No. 1 and replaced her with another juror.   
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
56 
e. 
Jury Instructions and Closing Argument 
Later, the trial court instructed the penalty jury with 
CALCRIM Nos. 761 and 763, among other instructions.  
CALCRIM No. 761 tasked the jury with disregarding the 
instructions given during the guilt phase of the trial, following 
the instructions given during this phase of the trial, and 
deciding “whether each defendant will be sentenced to death or 
life in prison without the possibility of parole,” among other 
things.  It also said:  “Do not allow bias, prejudice, or public 
opinion to influence your opinion in any way.”  And it said:  
“Words or phrases not specifically defined in these instructions 
are to be applied using their ordinary, everyday meanings.”  
Defense counsel did not object to CALCRIM No. 761, nor did 
they request an additional instruction about how the jury should 
consider victim impact evidence.  
CALCRIM No. 763 instructed the jury that “[u]nder the 
law, you must consider, weigh, and be guided by specific factors, 
some of which may be aggravating and some of which may be 
mitigating,” and it then enumerated six factors to consider.  
Defense counsel objected to CALCRIM No. 763 on equal 
protection grounds, but the trial court overruled the objection.  
Defense counsel did not request an additional instruction on 
how the jury should consider victim impact evidence. 
At penalty phase closing argument, the prosecutor 
remarked to the jury that the victim impact evidence felt like a 
“tidal wave.”  But this tidal wave, he continued, “becomes a drop 
in the ocean of what [the Parks] go through” and “what they live 
with every day.”  Defense counsel did not object to the 
prosecutor’s penalty phase closing argument.   
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
57 
2. Analysis 
“ ‘Unless it invites a purely irrational response, evidence 
of the effect of a capital murder on the loved ones of the victim 
and the community is relevant and admissible under [Penal 
Code] section 190.3, factor (a) as a circumstance of the crime.  
[Citation.]  The federal Constitution bars victim impact evidence 
only if it is so unduly prejudicial as to render the trial 
fundamentally unfair.’  [Citation.]  We have repeatedly held that 
‘ “[a]dmission of testimony presented by a few close friends or 
relatives of each victim, as well as images of the victim while he 
or she was alive,” ’ is constitutionally permissible.”  (People v. 
Steskal (2021) 11 Cal.5th 332, 369 (Steskal).)  “We review the 
trial court’s admission of victim impact evidence for abuse of 
discretion.”  (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 138 (Simon).) 
We have previously “upheld testimony by a physician, 
three law enforcement officers, and five family members who 
discussed the victim’s ‘childhood hardships, his lifelong desire to 
be a police officer, his achievements, his engagement and future 
plans, his death, his funeral service, and the aftereffects of his 
death.’ ”  (Steskal, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 369, quoting People v. 
Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 573.)  We have also upheld 
testimony from a mother and an older sister of a murder victim 
and “a notebook containing 53 photographs taken throughout 
[the victim’s] life, a report card, a group of letters, and a 
Christmas list [the victim] gave her mother shortly before the 
murder.”  (People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 463 
(Winbush).)  And we have upheld testimony from seven people 
across about 73 pages along with four photographs of the 
murder victim.  (People v. Spencer (2018) 5 Cal.5th 642, 676–680 
(Spencer).) 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
58 
Tran’s claim is unavailing because this victim impact 
evidence was not unduly prejudicial.  The witnesses properly 
described their relationships with Linda, how they learned 
about Linda’s death, and how Linda’s death impacted their 
lives.  (See Spencer, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 676 [“Evidence 
relating to a murder victim’s personal characteristics and the 
impact of the crime on the victim’s family is relevant to show the 
victim’s ‘ “uniqueness as an individual human being” ’ and 
thereby ‘the specific harm caused by the defendant.’ ”].)  While 
Sunhwa and Janie testified, they were shown photos of Linda as 
a baby, child, or teenager, and personal items of hers, just like 
other victim impact witnesses have been shown photos or items 
of a victim in other cases.  (See Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 
462.)  And neither the number of witnesses (three) nor the 
amount of testimony (about 35 pages) was excessive.  (See 
Spencer, at pp. 676–680.) 
Plus, the videos of Linda’s birthday party, her graduation, 
and her one-year anniversary memorial service were not 
impermissible.  Victim impact evidence presented via video may 
be relevant to the penalty determination, but “ ‘no bright-line 
rule pertaining to the admissibility of videotape recordings of 
the victim at capital sentencing hearings’ ” exists.  (People v. Bell 
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 128.)  We have reviewed the videos, and 
they resemble other videotape evidence held permissible.  All 
three videos resemble “ ‘home movie[s]’ more than . . . 
professional production[s].”  (Ibid.)  They are “ ‘not enhanced by 
narration, background music, or visual techniques designed to 
generate emotion.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Nor do they “ ‘convey outrage or call 
for vengeance or sympathy.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
Nor does the victim-impact evidence invite a purely 
irrational response from the jury.  “We have consistently 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
59 
observed that the emotional trauma suffered by close friends 
and relatives is a permissible subject of victim impact 
testimony” and “ ‘[e]motional testimony is not necessarily 
inflammatory.’ ”  (Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 465.)  Tran 
says the evidence was “devastating,” seemingly pointing to 
Juror No. 1’s distress and the interpreter’s crying as proof, “but 
that is to be expected when loved ones have been brutally 
murdered.”  (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 140.)  That the 
interpreter cried does not, by itself, require a conclusion that the 
evidence invites a purely irrational response.  (Cf. People v. 
Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1204 (Linton) [“That some jurors 
may have reacted to the testimony by crying does not require a 
conclusion that the evidence invited a purely irrational response 
by the jury in deciding the appropriate penalty or otherwise 
rendered defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.”].) 
Besides, Tran’s argument relying on Juror No. 1’s actions 
rests on the notion that Juror No. 1’s reaction impliedly means 
that the remaining jurors were purely irrational.  But we 
presume that jurors are impartial.  (See People v. Mora and 
Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 482–485.)  And Juror No. 1’s 
actions signal something other than pure irrationality.  Rather 
than remaining on the jury, Juror No. 1 reported that she could 
no longer keep an open mind, and defense counsel sought her 
excusal.  In other words, Juror No. 1 acted just as we presume 
that a juror would act.  So Juror No. 1’s actions do not allow us 
to draw the negative inference against the jury that Tran would 
have us draw. 
Tran’s remaining arguments are unpersuasive.  First, 
Tran argues that the pre-enactment history of section 190.3 
means that the phrase “circumstances of the crime” excluded 
victim impact evidence absent a showing that a defendant 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
60 
intended the specific harm caused by committing the crime, 
mainly relying on People v. Love (1960) 53 Cal.2d 843, or that 
this phrase only referred to evidence that was part of the crime 
itself, not victim impact evidence of the sort presented here, 
mainly relying on People v. Nye (1969) 71 Cal.2d 356 and People 
v. Morse (1969) 70 Cal.2d 711.   
But we have rejected an almost identical argument 
founded on Love in People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293.  
There, the defendant argued that we had not considered “the 
actual meaning of the statutory phrase ‘circumstances of the 
crime’ ” in light of our “interpretation of the same phrase” in 
Love.  (Seumanu, at p. 1366.)  But Love, we explained, “did not 
purport to interpret the meaning of the statutory phrase in 
question to reach its decision,” “has no bearing on the meaning 
of section 190.3, factor (a) as presently written,” and “did not 
purport to give the phrase ‘circumstances surrounding the 
crime’ ” — the phrase used in earlier statutes — “a narrow 
interpretation so as to preclude evidence of the crime’s impact 
on surviving family and friends.”  (Seumanu, at pp. 1367–1368.) 
Tran concedes as much but asserts that we have not 
considered the import of Nye and Morse here.  Yet Tran’s 
argument falters for a more fundamental reason:  In People v. 
Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, we held that evidence about “the 
impact of the murder on the victim’s family” — in other words, 
the victim-impact evidence presented here — was admissible as 
“circumstances of the crime” under section 190.3 because the 
“usual, ordinary import” or the “commonly understood” meaning 
of the phrase “circumstances of the crime” encompassed such 
evidence.  (Edwards, at pp. 833, 836.)  In other words, our 
holding in Edwards rested on the unambiguous plain meaning 
of the phrase “circumstances of the crime.”  Generally, we 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
61 
consult extrinsic sources, like a statute’s history, to interpret a 
statute only when its language is ambiguous.  (See People v. 
Walker (2002) 29 Cal.4th 577, 581.)  By asking us to consider 
extrinsic sources that predated section 190.3, Tran thus 
implicitly asks us to read ambiguity into the phrase 
“circumstances of the crime.”  But we have long held that this 
phrase lacks any (see Edwards, at pp. 833–836), and we see no 
reason to reconsider our decision today. 
Second, Tran asserts that the trial court should have 
instructed the jury to limit its consideration of victim-impact 
evidence “to a rational inquiry into the culpability of the 
defendant, not ‘an emotional response to the evidence.’ ”  But he 
concedes that we have rejected a similar argument before.  At 
any rate, Tran’s claim lacks merit.  The penalty jury was 
instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 761 and 763, among others.  
CALCRIM instructions are “approved by the Judicial Council,” 
are “the official instructions for use in the state of California,” 
and are intended to “accurately state the law in a way that is 
understandable to the average juror.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
2.1050(a); see also Ramirez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1008 & fn. 5.)  
Here, CALCRIM Nos. 761 and 763 are substantially identical 
for present purposes to their predecessors, CALJIC Nos. 8.84.1 
and 8.85.  (Compare CALCRIM No. 761 [“Do not allow bias, 
prejudice, or public opinion to influence your opinion in any 
way.”] and CALCRIM No. 763 [enumerating aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances for jury to consider] with CALJIC No. 
8.84.1 [“You must neither be influenced by bias nor prejudice 
against the defendant, nor swayed by public opinion or public 
feelings.”] and CALJIC No. 8.85 [enumerating aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances for jury to consider like CALCRIM No. 
763].) 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
62 
In Simon, we held that CALJIC Nos. 8.84.1 and 8.85 are 
“sufficient to address a defendant’s concerns about the proper 
use of victim impact evidence, and [are] consistent with his or 
her federal and state constitutional rights to due process, a fair 
trial, and a reliable penalty determination.”  (Simon, supra, 1 
Cal.5th at p. 143.)  In so holding, we rejected the argument that 
the trial court should have sua sponte instructed that penalty 
phase jury to limit its consideration of that victim impact 
evidence “to a rational inquiry into the culpability of the 
defendant, not an emotional response to the evidence.”  (Id. at 
p. 142.)  Like the Simon defendant’s argument, Tran’s argument 
is similarly unavailing. 
Third, Tran argues that CALCRIM Nos. 761 and 763 fail 
to instruct the jury that its “pure emotional response to the 
evidence should not influence its decision at all” and that victim 
impact evidence is “a ‘circumstance’ of the crime.”  But 
CALCRIM No. 761 instructs the jury to not allow bias or 
prejudice to influence its opinion in any way, so to the extent 
that Tran asserts that a pure emotional response is an 
impermissible bias or prejudice, any instruction along the lines 
that Tran suggests “would not have provided the jurors with any 
information they did not otherwise learn” from CALCRIM No. 
761.  (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 369.)  And to the 
extent that Tran asserts that “a juror’s ‘emotional response’ to 
the evidence may play no part in the decision to vote for the 
death penalty,” he is mistaken:  “[J]urors may, in considering 
the impact of a defendant’s crimes, ‘exercise sympathy for the 
defendant’s murder victim[] and . . . [her] bereaved family 
members.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
In addition, CALCRIM No. 763 instructs the jury to 
“consider and weigh” the “circumstances” “shown by the 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
63 
evidence.”  Victim impact evidence, as noted, is admissible as a 
“circumstance of the crime” under section 190.3 — as a matter 
of that phrase’s plain meaning.  Because CALCRIM No. 761 also 
instructed the jury to apply words or phrases not specifically 
defined in the instructions “using their ordinary, everyday 
meanings,” we may infer that the jury understood that victim 
impact evidence was a circumstance of the crime, even if no 
instruction explicitly said as much.  (Cf. People v. Lewis (2001) 
25 Cal.4th 610, 669 [rejecting argument that “the various uses 
of the term ‘circumstances’ in the standard jury instructions at 
the penalty phase misled and confused the jury, in violation of 
the due process clause and other federal constitutional 
guarantees”].) 
Fourth, Tran observes that the prosecutor took “full 
advantage” of the victim impact evidence at the penalty phase 
closing argument.  To the extent that he wishes to challenge 
these remarks, he has forfeited it by failing to object to them 
below.  (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 251–252.)  In 
any event, “a prosecutor may rely upon the impact of the victim’s 
death on his or her family.  The prosecutor in the present case 
merely commented upon evidence we have determined was 
admissible, as he was entitled to do.  [Citation.]  Although the 
prosecutor’s 
argument 
had 
emotional 
impact, 
it 
was 
permissible.  We have acknowledged that emotion need not be 
eliminated from the penalty determination.  Although emotion 
‘ “ ‘must not reign over reason,’ ” ’ it ‘ “ ‘need not, indeed, cannot, 
be entirely excluded from the jury’s moral assessment.’ ” ’ ”  
(People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 787.) 
Finally, Tran argues that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to request a clarifying instruction limiting the use of 
victim impact evidence.  But the penalty jury was properly 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
64 
instructed, so Tran’s counsel did not act unreasonably by failing 
to request a clarifying instruction.  (See People v. Benavides 
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 92–94.) 
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by allowing the jury to consider this victim impact 
evidence, nor did admitting this evidence render the trial 
fundamentally unfair to Tran or otherwise unconstitutional. 
D. Admission of Juvenile Criminal Offenses 
Tran argues that the trial court violated the Eighth 
Amendment by admitting evidence of his juvenile offenses 
during the penalty phase. 
1. Facts 
As noted, the prosecutor called certain witnesses to testify 
about two residential burglaries committed in June 1992.  At 
the time of both of these residential burglaries, Tran was 17 
years old.  
On June 24, 1992, David Schonder reported that jewelry, 
camera equipment, a telephone, and a video camera were 
missing from his home.  Later, three latent fingerprints 
recovered from his home were identified as Tran’s.  Counsel then 
stipulated that Tran, on May 5, 1993, “admitted an allegation in 
a juvenile petition accusing him of committing a residential 
burglary on June 24, 1992 in connection with the Schonder 
residence.”   
On June 26, 1992, a California Highway Patrol officer 
detained Tran and David Du following a car accident.  At an 
Orange County Sheriff’s station, Tran told an officer that he and 
two others stole a television, a camcorder, about 150 quarters 
from a coin-filled jug, some fake jewelry, and a Nintendo video 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
65 
game from a home belonging to David Nesthus the day before, 
on June 25, 1992.  Tran also told the officer that he quickly 
became nervous after entering the home because he thought its 
inhabitants would return.  One inhabitant, Jacqueline Nesthus, 
testified that she discovered a butcher knife lying in their 
bedroom closet that seemed to have been removed from a knife 
block in the kitchen.  Counsel then stipulated that on November 
30, 1992, “Tran admitted an allegation in a juvenile petition 
accusing him of committing a residential burglary on June 25, 
1992 in connection with the Nesthus residence.”   
During his penalty phase closing argument, the 
prosecutor relied on this evidence in part to urge the jury to 
determine that the appropriate penalty for Tran was death.   
2. Analysis 
“ ‘Section 190.3, factor (b), permits the penalty phase jury 
to consider “[t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the 
defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or 
violence or the express or implied threat to use force or 
violence.” ’  [Citations.]  ‘ “ ‘Evidence of prior criminal behavior 
is relevant under section 190.3, factor (b) if it shows “conduct 
that demonstrates the commission of an actual crime, 
specifically, the violation of a penal statute. . . .” ’ ” ’ ”  
[Citations.]  Accordingly, ‘although the fact of a juvenile 
adjudication is inadmissible as a factor in aggravation’ because 
juvenile adjudications ‘are not “prior felony convictions” within 
the meaning of section 190.3, factor (c),’ such adjudications may 
be admissible under factor (b), which ‘involves evidence of 
violent conduct other than the capital crimes, regardless of 
when the misconduct occurred or whether it led to a criminal 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
66 
conviction.’ ”  (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 341–342 
(Rivera).) 
As an initial matter, the Attorney General concedes that 
no evidence showed that the Schonder burglary “involved the 
use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or 
implied threat to use force or violence,” so “it appears that this 
burglary does not qualify as [section 190.3,] factor (b) evidence.”   
But Tran neither objected to this evidence below nor raises this 
issue here.  (Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 434.)  Even 
assuming that Tran did not forfeit a challenge to this evidence, 
its inclusion was harmless by any applicable standard in light 
of the other aggravating evidence against Tran.  (See People v. 
Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 316.)   
Evidence of the Schonder burglary aside, the evidence 
concerning the Nesthus burglary is admissible under section 
190.3, factor (b).  “Residential burglary is entering a residence 
with the intent to steal or to commit any other felony.  
[Citations.]  Force or violence against a person thus is not an 
essential element of residential burglary.  However, a burglary 
perpetrated in a violent or threatening manner may be 
considered under section 190.3, factor (b).”  (People v. Cowan 
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 496.)  Evidence of the Nesthus burglary 
was admissible under § 190.3, factor (b) because the jury could 
reasonably infer that Tran had employed force or violence 
during the burglary.  (Cowan, at p. 497; see also People v. Clair 
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 676–677 [holding evidence admissible 
under § 190.3 as criminal activity employing force or violence 
where defendant broke into a then-unoccupied apartment, was 
captured lying in the apartment occupant’s bed, and had 
brought a butcher knife that was found in the bathroom].) 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
67 
While conceding we have rejected the argument before, 
Tran argues that reliance on evidence of his juvenile criminal 
activity violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments in light of the high court’s decisions in Roper v. 
Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 
U.S. 48, Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, and Hall v. 
Florida (2014) 572 U.S. 701.   
“ ‘It is well established the federal Constitution does not 
bar 
consideration 
of 
unadjudicated 
criminal 
offenses.’  
[Citation.]  ‘Roper does not compel exclusion of such evidence.’  
[Citation.]  ‘That case holds that the execution of individuals 
who were under 18 years of age at the time of their capital 
crimes 
is 
prohibited 
by 
the 
Eighth 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments.  It says nothing about the propriety of permitting 
a capital jury, trying an adult, to consider evidence of violent 
offenses committed when the defendant was a juvenile.  An 
Eighth Amendment analysis hinges upon whether there is a 
national consensus in this country against a particular 
punishment.  [Citations.]  Defendant’s challenge here is to the 
admissibility of evidence, not the imposition of punishment.’  
[Citation.]  We have also observed that the same reasoning 
applies to Miller v. Alabama and Graham v. Florida.  We 
concluded these cases ‘do not address the question of whether 
evidence of juvenile misconduct can be considered on the 
question of what punishment a defendant may receive for crimes 
committed as an adult.’  [Citation.]  We also observed that the 
high court’s more recent decision in Hall v. Florida was ‘even 
further afield from this question’ because the United States 
Supreme Court ‘never suggested that evidence of juvenile 
misconduct may not be admitted in deciding the proper 
punishment for crimes an adult commits.’ ”  (Rivera, supra, 7 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
68 
Cal.5th at pp. 342–343.)  We see no reason here to reconsider 
these decisions. 
Apart from his Roper-based Eighth Amendment claim, 
Tran also argues that the Eighth Amendment’s heightened 
reliability requirement in capital cases forbids courts from 
admitting juvenile convictions obtained without the right to a 
jury trial as evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial.  But 
there were no juvenile convictions introduced below; there were, 
however, two stipulations containing two admissions to 
allegations from separate juvenile petitions.  This evidence, at 
least as to the Nesthus burglary, was admissible under section 
190.3, factor (b), as Tran concedes.  Moreover, Tran “waived his 
claim by his counsel’s decision to enter the stipulation.”  (People 
v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 195.)  And further still, we have 
held that evidence of juvenile misconduct admissible under 
section 190.3, factor (b) does not violate a defendant’s “rights 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal 
Constitution to a reliable, nonarbitrary sentencing decision, to 
a sentence proportionate to his culpability, and to due process of 
law.”  (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 648.) 
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err by 
allowing the penalty jury to consider this evidence to determine 
the appropriate punishment for Tran. 
E. Denial of Allocution Request 
Tran argues that the trial court violated his federal due 
process rights by denying him the opportunity to allocute 
without being cross-examined during the penalty phase of the 
trial, even though he recognizes that “ ‘we have repeatedly held 
there is no right of allocution at the penalty phase of a capital 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
69 
trial.’ ”  (People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 426, quoting 
People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 717.)   
“ ‘In legal parlance, the term “allocution” has traditionally 
meant the trial court’s inquiry of a defendant as to whether 
there is any reason why judgment should not be pronounced.  
[Citations.]  In recent years, however, the word “allocution” has 
often been used for a mitigating statement made by a defendant 
in response to the court’s inquiry.’ ”  (People v. Tully (2012) 54 
Cal.4th 952, 1057, fn. 39, quoting People v. Evans (2008) 44 
Cal.4th 590, 592, fn. 2 (Evans).)  The traditional understanding 
is embodied in section 1200.  “Under that section, the trial court 
must ask a defendant, before imposing sentence, whether there 
is ‘any legal cause to show why judgment should not be 
pronounced against him.’  (§ 1200.)”  (Tully, at p. 1057.) 
Here, the trial court asked whether there was “any legal 
cause as to why [the] sentence should not be imposed” during its 
“automatic review of the jury’s recommended sentence.”  Tran’s 
counsel replied, “No.”  That satisfies section 1200.  Tran thus 
appears to argue that he has a federal due process right to make 
a mitigating statement.  In so arguing, Tran asks us to 
reconsider our decisions here in light of Boardman v. Estelle (9th 
Cir. 1992) 957 F.2d 1523 (Boardman).   
We have already considered and rejected this Boardman-
based invitation in People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1036.  
The Boardman court held that the failure to allow a noncapital 
defendant who requests to address the court before sentencing 
is a denial of federal due process.  (Boardman, supra, 957 F.2d 
at p. 1525.)  But because a defendant during the sentencing 
phase of a capital trial “ ‘is allowed to present evidence as well 
as take the stand and address the sentencer,’ ” we have 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
70 
discerned no constitutional “ ‘ “right to address the sentencer 
without being subject to cross-examination” in capital cases.’ ”  
(Clark, at p. 1037, quoting People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 
867, 889; see also Evans, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 600 [California 
statutory law “gives a criminal defendant the right at 
sentencing to make a sworn personal statement in mitigation 
that is subject to cross-examination by the prosecution.  This 
affords the defendant a meaningful opportunity to be heard and 
thus does not violate any of defendant’s rights under the federal 
Constitution.”].) 
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err by 
denying Tran the opportunity to allocute without being cross-
examined during the penalty phase. 
F. Juror Misconduct 
Tran argues that juror misconduct during the penalty 
phase requires reversal or remand.  In particular, Tran claims 
that the trial court mistakenly denied his motion for a new trial 
founded on the penalty jury receiving extraneous information 
about the death penalty, which requires reversal; that the trial 
court’s investigation to determine the extent of juror misconduct 
was inadequate, which requires remand; and that the trial court 
did not determine whether a previously undisclosed part of a 
juror’s 
typewritten 
document 
evinces 
prejudicial 
juror 
misconduct, which also requires remand. 
1. Facts 
After the penalty jury returned its verdicts, a three-page 
typewritten document was found in the jury room in a folder 
containing the jury instructions.  It was titled “Life, or Death?” 
and written by the penalty foreperson, Juror No. 7.  The trial 
court described this document as “a thought-process thing” — 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
71 
“nothing more than [Juror No. 7] putting down his thoughts” — 
but the court believed one paragraph merited inquiry.  That 
paragraph said:  “I cannot allow the fact that the American Bar 
Association has recently resumed its campaign for a national 
moratorium on the death penalty to influence my judgment in 
this case.  Likewise, I cannot consider the fact that the U.S. 
Supreme Court has agreed to review a case challenging the 
legality of execution by lethal injunction as cruel and unusual 
punishment as I judge this case.” 
The trial court called Juror No. 7 into court, swore him in, 
and questioned him.  Juror No. 7 admitted that he had written 
the typewritten document.  It was “a written summary of my 
personal private deliberations in the case,” Juror No. 7 said, 
explaining that expressing issues “that are very complex and 
also very important” in writing “enforces clarity of thought.”  He 
wrote it “toward the end of the trial” and brought it on the last 
day of deliberations so that he could “refer to it personally, 
privately,” and leaving it behind “was absolutely accidental and 
unintentional.”  Juror No. 7 did not read any of it to his fellow 
jurors.  Although the trial court allowed him to choose whether 
to share the typewritten document with counsel, Juror No. 7 
preferred that it remained private.   
Then, the trial court asked Juror No. 7 about the 
paragraph discussing the moratorium campaign and the high 
court news.  Juror No. 7 explained that “the story about the 
Supreme Court’s action broke” during the trial and that it was 
“the lead story in the Los Angeles Times that day,” was “the top 
story on all the television news broadcasts,” and was “all over 
the internet.”  This story “wasn’t something I sought out” but 
“something I simply happened to see,” he said.   
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
72 
Next, the trial court asked Juror No. 7 whether the jurors 
discussed the news about the moratorium campaign or the high 
court.  Juror No. 7 said that another juror “brought the Supreme 
Court news item up,” so he wrote about it in his document 
because he felt obliged, as the foreperson, “to make sure that if 
somebody else brought that up, that everyone was reminded 
that we could not allow that in any way to influence our 
deliberations.”  Juror No. 7 reiterated that he reminded “the 
other jurors that we could not allow either of those facts to affect 
our judgment in the case.”  Juror No. 7 also recalled that this 
“was not discussed again” after his reminder.  Juror No. 7 also 
said that the discussion of the news article “was really very 
brief,” thought that another male juror brought up the news 
article, and recalled that this male juror had mentioned that he 
had seen this article in a newspaper.   
After this, the trial court excused Juror No. 7.  “I have 
reviewed the document,” the trial court told the juror before 
excusing him, “and it confirms my opinion that this is a 
recitation of your thought process.  From what I’ve heard so far, 
I don’t see anything that was improper, so rest easy.  At this 
point there doesn’t appear to be anything, to me, anyway, that 
is untoward at all.”   
Based on Juror No. 7’s responses, Tran moved to access 
every juror’s identifying information according to Code of Civil 
Procedure section 237.  The prosecutor thought that soliciting 
information from the other male jurors would be helpful, so he 
suggested that the trial court summon and question them about 
the moratorium campaign and the high court news.  Although 
the trial court did not “see enough to order jurors in,” it agreed 
to notify all jurors and to hold a hearing according to Code of 
Civil Procedure section 237.  The trial court’s notice informed 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
73 
jurors that they would be asked to discuss whether “their 
decision in the penalty phase of the trial was affected by 
discussions of matters that were not presented by way of 
evidence or the law upon which the jury was instructed” if they 
appeared at this hearing.  It also informed jurors that they could 
personally appear at the hearing to protest the disclosure of 
their information, that they could contact the clerk to protest 
the disclosure of their information, or that they could notify the 
trial court of their desire not to be contacted by defense counsel.   
About four months after the penalty jury determined that 
the appropriate sentence for Tran was death, the trial court held 
this hearing.  Juror No. 2 believed that a moratorium on lethal 
injection was “brought up” as an aside but did not believe that 
it was “used as any part of the decision making.”  He also 
recalled that the “head juror said at the time that ‘we are not 
supposed to consider that’ ” and that the entire discussion lasted 
about 15 seconds.  He could not recall who mentioned the 
moratorium or whether anyone consulted any extraneous 
written material.   
Juror No. 3 did not recall anyone saying anything about 
“any moratorium on lethal injections for executions.”  Nor could 
she remember whether the foreperson admonished them not to 
discuss the moratorium, whether anyone discussed the 
American Bar Association’s (ABA) stance on the death penalty 
or the high court’s decision to review a case involving a lethal-
injection moratorium, or whether they received any extraneous 
information.  Yet she thought that she herself had heard 
something about a moratorium on the death penalty.  But she 
was unsure whether she heard about this while the jury 
deliberated; she said she did not think so because she “didn’t 
watch a lot of T.V. or read newspapers or anything.”  Although 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
74 
she did not object to her identifying information being disclosed 
to counsel, Juror No. 3 did not want her information 
disseminated any further.   
Juror No. 7, who returned for this hearing, said much the 
same as he had before.  He could not remember who mentioned 
the moratorium campaign but recalled that “when it came up,” 
he “immediately said, ‘We cannot allow that — any of that to 
influence our thinking.’ ”  He thought that the moratorium 
campaign had been mentioned on the first day of deliberations, 
did not remember any other discussion of it, and reiterated that 
he did not show his “notes” to anyone else.   
And Juror No. 9 did not recall any discussion about either 
a moratorium on lethal injections or the ABA’s stance on the 
death penalty.  Nor did she recall anyone bringing in paperwork 
that was not part of the evidence into deliberations.  Yet she 
recalled “hearing something about the suspension of executions, 
not necessarily that it was lethal injection, but I don’t recall if it 
was during — before or after the trial.”   
After these jurors were questioned, defense counsel moved 
the trial court to release the identifying information of the jurors 
who did not appear, but the trial court denied this motion, 
stating:  “I can see nothing that’s been presented to this court to 
lead this court to believe that there was anything improper 
rising to the level of juror misconduct.  In fact, it sounds like 
things were handled appropriately.”  To investigate further, “I 
would have to disbelieve what these jurors have already told this 
court in the hope that throwing the line in the water would 
somehow grab some fish, and that is not the purpose of this 
proceeding,” the trial court continued.  Besides denying this 
request to investigate further, the trial court also declined to 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
75 
disclose all of Juror No. 7’s typewritten document, explaining 
that it “was completely his thought process.”  Tran 
unsuccessfully challenged the trial court’s denial of his request 
for additional juror information before the Court of Appeal and 
before this court.   
Tran then moved for a new trial on juror misconduct 
grounds.  The trial court denied this motion at a hearing.  “The 
issue of juror misconduct,” the trial court said, “was considered.  
It was investigated, it was litigated.  There was no juror 
misconduct.  The court invited all jurors to discuss the issue.  I 
believe, if I’m not mistaken, five — four chose to appear.”  Juror 
No. 7’s typewritten document, it continued, “is merely a note to 
oneself as to the thought process of a juror in making a 
determination.”   
At Tran’s request, we ordered unsealed all of Juror No. 7’s 
typewritten document.  Besides the aforementioned paragraph, 
this document stated in relevant part:  “I must follow the law 
and the judge’s instructions as they are given to me.  [¶] . . .  
Simple but sound logic leads to the conclusion that no juror 
should project his or her personal religious value and moral code 
onto this case.”  It continued:  “The defendants in this case do 
not fit my definition of ‘penitent.’  I think their remorse may be 
genuine, but the fact that they did not voluntarily submit 
themselves to the law and confess their crimes taints their 
remorse, and disqualifies them as truly penitent in my view.  
They may be sorry for killing Linda Park, but they are also sorry 
they were caught and convicted.”   
It also said:  “I feel compelled to ask:  Is forgiveness mine 
to give in the form of a jury vote and verdict?  I am not the one 
who has been victimized.  I must remember that while I may 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
76 
consider the impact of the crime on the victim’s family, I do not 
represent them as I judge.  My duty is to be impartial and 
dispassionate.”  It went on:  “These defendants are not illiterate 
or ignorant.  Their moral compasses are not defective; they know 
what they did is terribly evil.  The crime required sustained 
murderous intent.  If either of them feels remorse, it may be 
genuine, but it is not pure and it is too little too late.  Remorse 
merely signifies that your moral compass is working.  Remorse 
is but the first step in true penitence.  I am sure they are both 
sorry the police caught up with them; if they were truly penitent 
they would have turned themselves in, confessed, and 
attempted to make some kind of effort at restitution.  I doubt 
they would have done so by now if the police had [sic] caught 
them.  Mr. Ciulla stated in court that mercy was something 
freely given, without price.  I believe otherwise; the price of 
mercy is genuine penitence, which consists of remorse, 
confession, forsaking, and restitution.  Would the defendants 
still be free men today, keeping their secrets, if the police had 
not detected them?”  
The document concluded:  “Bottom line:  neither of the 
defendants was raised in crushing poverty and/or a sociopathic 
family environment.  No one forced them to join a street gang.  
They were old enough to know that criminal activity is morally 
wrong and can carry severe punishment.  They entered the Park 
residence with criminal intent.  While there, they improvised a 
murder weapon and used it to take the life of a completely 
innocent young girl in the sanctum of her own home for two 
reasons:  to insure their financial benefit from the robbery, and 
to prevent her from identifying them after the robbery.  From 
the start, their motives were entirely selfish.  The crime they 
committed is repulsive in its motivation and heinous in its 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
77 
execution.  Their remorse for killing her may be genuine, but so 
is their remorse for being caught and convicted.  Remorse alone 
is insufficient, in my opinion, to merit mercy.  There are no 
mitigating circumstances in this case that even come close to 
counterbalancing the gravity of the defendants’ actions.”  
2. Analysis 
“ ‘A defendant accused of a crime has a constitutional right 
to a trial by unbiased, impartial jurors.’  [Citation.]  ‘Juror 
misconduct, such as the receipt of information about a party or 
the case that was not part of the evidence received at trial, leads 
to a presumption that the defendant was prejudiced thereby and 
may establish juror bias.’  [Citation.]  Even a juror’s ‘inadvertent 
receipt of information that had not been presented in court falls 
within the general category of “juror misconduct.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 601 (Miles); see also § 1181.) 
To determine whether juror misconduct involving jurors 
receiving information from extraneous sources is prejudicial, we 
review the entire record and set aside the judgment only if we 
conclude that a substantial likelihood of juror bias exists.  
(Miles, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 601.)  “ ‘Such bias can appear in 
two different ways.  First, we will find bias if the extraneous 
material, judged objectively, is inherently and substantially 
likely to have influenced the juror.’ ”  (Ibid.)  “ ‘Second, we look 
to the nature of the misconduct and the surrounding 
circumstances to determine whether it is substantially likely the 
juror was actually biased against the defendant.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
“ ‘We emphasize that before a unanimous verdict is set 
aside, the likelihood of bias under either test must be 
substantial.’  [Citation.]  ‘Jurors are not automatons.  They are 
imbued with human frailties as well as virtues.  If the system is 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
78 
to function at all, we must tolerate a certain amount of 
imperfection short of actual bias.  To demand theoretical 
perfection from every juror during the course of a trial is 
unrealistic.’ ”  (Miles, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 601–602.) 
“In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, ‘[w]e accept the trial 
court’s credibility determinations and findings on questions of 
historical fact if supported by substantial evidence.  [Citations.]  
Whether prejudice arose from juror misconduct, however, is a 
mixed question of law and fact subject to an appellate court’s 
independent determination.’ ”  (Miles, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 
602.) 
Although the Attorney General acknowledges the penalty 
jury receiving news of the moratorium campaign and the high 
court’s decision to review the legality of execution via lethal 
injection likely constitutes juror misconduct and results in a 
presumption of prejudice, we need not decide whether that is so, 
for no substantial likelihood of juror bias exists here.  This is 
because the extraneous material is not inherently prejudicial or 
substantially likely to have influenced the jury, nor is it 
substantially likely that jurors were actually biased against 
Tran. 
Extraneous material is inherently prejudicial when its 
introduction at trial would have warranted reversal of the 
judgment.  (In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 653.)  Because 
Tran had already been found guilty by the time that the jury 
received this information, our inquiry focuses on whether the 
introduction of this information during the penalty phase would 
have warranted reversal of the penalty determination.  (See id. 
at pp. 647–655.)  Had this extraneous material been introduced 
at the penalty phase, it would not have warranted reversal of 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
79 
the penalty determination because this extraneous material did 
not directly concern Tran’s trial.  People v. Hardy (1992) 2 
Cal.4th 86 (Hardy) is instructive.  There, we held nonprejudicial 
newspaper articles about “ ‘cases and jury selections’ ” — one of 
which discussed a particular trial of the judge that oversaw the 
defendants’ trial, another of which quoted this judge 
commenting on court reform and displayed a photo of him, and 
the third of which neither quoted the judge nor referenced 
defendants’ trial — that defendants alleged that 10 out of 12 
jurors and every alternate juror had read, because these articles 
did not “contain[] accounts of defendants’ trial” and “presented 
generalized arguments concerning the criminal justice system 
as a whole.”  (Id. at pp. 175, 176.) 
The same is true here.  There is no evidence that the news 
of the moratorium campaign or of the high court “contain[] 
accounts of defendants’ trial.”  (Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at 
p. 176; see also People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 924 
[“As the trial court found, on its face the [news article about a 
different, unrelated capital defendant] had absolutely nothing 
to do with defendant’s case.”].)  There is no evidence that the 
moratorium 
campaign 
presented 
anything 
other 
than 
“generalized arguments concerning the criminal justice system 
as a whole.”  (Hardy, at p. 176.)  Nor is there evidence that this 
extraneous information misled the jurors into thinking that 
responsibility for deciding how to punish Tran lay elsewhere.  
(See Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 330–341; 
Romano v. Oklahoma (1994) 512 U.S. 1, 10; People v. Ledesma 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 733 [“Caldwell simply requires that the 
jury not be misle[d] into believing that the responsibility for the 
sentencing decision lies elsewhere.”].)   
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
80 
In addition, it is not substantially likely that the jurors 
were actually biased against Tran in light of “the nature of the 
misconduct and the surrounding circumstances.”  (Miles, supra, 
9 Cal.5th at p. 601.)  In this context, “actual bias” means “ ‘the 
existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference 
to the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror 
from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to 
the substantial rights of any party’ ” and “may include a state of 
mind resulting from a juror’s actually being influenced by 
extraneous information about a party.”  (People v. Nesler (1997) 
16 Cal.4th 561, 581, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 225, 
subd. (b)(1)(C).)   
Here, it is not substantially likely that the jurors were 
actually biased against Tran considering how quickly and 
superficially the jurors discussed this extraneous material and 
how speedily Juror No. 7 admonished against discussing it 
further.  The trial court found, and substantial evidence 
supports, that the discussion about the extraneous information 
lasted about 15 seconds, Juror No. 7 immediately admonished 
the jury against considering this information further, and no one 
discussed the information again after this admonishment.  
When a juror reminds his fellow jurors of the trial court’s 
instruction and no evidence exists to question the reminder’s 
effectiveness, the reminder is “strong evidence that prejudice 
does not exist.”  (People v. Lavender (2014) 60 Cal.4th 679, 687; 
see also id. at pp. 687–692.)  Although Juror No. 3 and Juror No. 
9 could not recall whether this discussion even happened, this 
lack of recollection is not inconsistent with a seconds-long 
discussion of a topic that was not discussed again. 
In sum, because the jury received news that was not about 
Plata or Tran, discussed this news only for a brief period of about 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
81 
15 seconds, were immediately admonished against considering 
it further, and did not do so, we conclude that no substantial 
likelihood of juror bias exists. 
Alternatively, Tran claims that the trial court’s inquiry 
into the moratorium campaign and the high court news was 
inadequate.  According to Tran, further inquiry is needed to 
determine which juror mentioned this extraneous information 
during the penalty jury’s deliberations, “along with any details 
of the exposure of the news stories to this juror and the 
remaining jurors.”  There is little reason, Tran asserts, for us to 
“believe that this unknown juror” — the juror who mentioned 
the extraneous information — “followed Juror [No.] 7’s 
admonition to rely only on evidence presented in court.”   
But “the trial court acted well within its considerable 
discretion in deciding that no further inquiry was necessary” 
under these circumstances.  (Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at 
p. 1214.)  To allow Tran further investigation would require us 
“to disbelieve what these jurors” — Jurors No. 2, 3, 7, and 9 — 
“have already told [the trial] court in the hope that throwing the 
line in the water would somehow grab some fish.”  Because Tran 
“is not entitled to conduct a ‘ “ ‘fishing expedition’ ” ’ for possible 
misconduct,” we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by preventing him from embarking on one.  (Linton, 
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1214.) 
Finally, Tran asserts that the undisclosed portion of Juror 
No. 7’s typewritten document evinces misconduct beyond the 
claimed misconduct about the moratorium campaign and high 
court news, which requires remand to allow the trial court to 
investigate further.  In particular, Tran argues that this 
undisclosed portion of Juror No. 7’s typewritten document shows 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
82 
that Juror No. 7 disregarded the trial court’s instructions to 
consider only the evidence presented at trial, not to deliberate 
unless and until all 12 jurors are in the jury room, and not to 
draw any adverse inferences against Tran for his decision not to 
testify. 
Tran agrees that the undisclosed portion of the document 
is inadmissible to prove that while the penalty jury deliberated, 
Juror No. 7 thought that Tran lacked remorse because he did 
not testify or confess to his crimes.  Rather, Tran asserts that 
the undisclosed portion of the document is admissible to prove 
that Juror No. 7 “actually made the statements that Mr. Tran’s 
silence and failure to confess evidenced a lack of remorse.”  In 
other words, Tran alleges that Juror No. 7 in fact said aloud 
during deliberations that he thought Tran’s silence and failure 
to confess reflected a lack of remorse, thereby disregarding the 
trial court’s instructions.   
Tran’s argument amounts to a request for the trial court 
to investigate whether Juror No. 7 said certain statements aloud 
based on the contents of the undisclosed portions of Juror No. 
7’s typewritten document.  But a hearing to determine the truth 
or falsity of allegations of jury misconduct “should be held only 
when 
the 
defense 
has 
come 
forward 
with 
evidence 
demonstrating a strong possibility that prejudicial misconduct 
has occurred.”  (People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 419.)   
Even assuming that the undisclosed portion of Juror No. 
7’s typewritten document is admissible and that his alleged oral 
statement constitutes misconduct, the typewritten document 
does not demonstrate a strong possibility that Juror No. 7 
actually said the alleged statement aloud.  Nothing in the 
undisclosed portion of the typewritten document indicates that 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
83 
Juror No. 7 did so.  The trial court credited Juror No. 7’s remarks 
that the typewritten document was for his personal, private 
reference; that he did not read any of it to his fellow jurors; and 
that leaving it behind was an accident and unintentional.  On 
this record, we have no basis to infer from a document that Juror 
No. 7 intended to keep private that he said aloud the very things 
he wished to shield.  Plus, given that Juror No. 7 mentioned the 
moratorium campaign and the high court news and cautioned 
himself against considering them, one might think the 
document would mention any improper statement that he 
uttered aloud, especially since Juror No. 7 did not expect others 
to view this document.  But no such mention exists.  Altogether, 
the undisclosed portion of the typewritten document does not 
demonstrate a strong possibility that Juror No. 7 in fact uttered 
this alleged statement. 
In sum, we reject Tran’s claim that the undisclosed portion 
of Juror No. 7’s typewritten document requires remand. 
G. Death Penalty for Crimes Committed by a 20 
Year Old 
Tran was 20 years old when he committed these crimes, 
and he argues that imposing the death penalty on persons for 
crimes committed while they were 18 to 20 years old violates the 
state and federal Constitutions because it is cruel and unusual 
punishment and because a death sentence cannot be reliably 
imposed on such youthful offenders like Tran.  In support of this 
claim, he cites Roper and related decisions.   
We have recently rejected these arguments and decline to 
revisit them today.  We have observed that “the high court in 
Roper recognized that the ‘ “ ‘qualities that distinguish juveniles 
from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18,’ ” ’ 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
84 
but nonetheless held that the ‘ “ ‘age of 18 is the point where 
society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and 
adulthood’ ” ’ and is ‘ “ ‘the age at which the line for death 
eligibility ought to rest.’ ” ’ ”  (Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 429, 
quoting People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 191, 192.)  Nor 
are death sentences inherently unreliable “for those ages 18 to 
21.”  (Flores, at p. 430.) 
Tran “does point to various developments from the past 
few years, including a 2018 resolution from the American Bar 
Association House of Delegates urging the prohibition of the 
death penalty for those ages 21 and under (Res. No. 111 (Feb. 
2018)); a nonprecedential opinion from a trial court in Kentucky 
declaring the death penalty unconstitutional for this same 
group (Commonwealth v. Bredhold (Ky.Cir.Ct., Aug. 1, 2017, 
No. 14-CR-161) 2017 WL 8792559); and the California 
Legislature’s expansion of Penal Code section 3051, subdivision 
(a)(1), which provides ‘youth offender parole hearing[s]’ to 
inmates who were 25 or younger at the time of their 
commitment offense.”  (Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 429.)  But 
“these developments do not establish the ‘national consensus’ 
necessary to justify a categorical bar on the death penalty for 
individuals between the ages of 18 and 21 at the time of their 
offenses.  [Citation.]  Nor has defendant presented much in the 
way of new scientific evidence that might be relevant to the 
issue.”  (Ibid.) 
H. Miscellaneous Challenges to the Death Penalty 
Tran presents many challenges to the constitutionality of 
California’s death penalty scheme, while acknowledging that we 
have rejected them before.  We decline to revisit the following 
precedent: 
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
85 
“Penal Code section 190.3, factor (i) (the age of the 
defendant) is not unconstitutionally vague.”  (Rices, supra, 4 
Cal.5th at p. 94.)  
“There is no federal constitutional requirement, either 
under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments, that 
the jury make unanimous findings regarding the aggravating 
factors or the truth of the unadjudicated criminal activity 
admitted under section 190.3, factor (b).”  (Schultz, supra, 10 
Cal.5th at p. 683.)  
“Allowing a jury that has convicted the defendant of first 
degree murder to decide if he has committed other criminal 
activity does not violate the right to an unbiased decision maker 
under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
federal Constitution.”  (People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 
201.)   
“The trial court’s instructions need not ‘delete inapplicable 
sentencing 
factors, 
delineate 
between 
aggravating 
and 
mitigating circumstances, or specify a burden of proof either as 
to aggravation (except for other crimes evidence) or the penalty 
decision.’  [Citation.]  ‘Nor are potentially mitigating factors 
unconstitutionally limited by the adjectives “extreme” and 
“substantial” . . . .’  [Citation.]  The sentencing factors are not 
vague and ill-defined.”  (Suarez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 191.)  
Nor need the trial court “instruct the jury that life without 
parole was presumed the appropriate sentence; ‘[t]here is no 
requirement jurors be instructed there is a “ ‘ “presumption of 
life” ’ ” or that they should presume life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole is the appropriate sentence.’ ”  (People v. 
Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 589 (Mitchell).)  
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
86 
“The death penalty statute as construed by this court does 
not fail to perform the narrowing function required by the 
Eighth Amendment.”  (Suarez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 190.)   
“The federal constitution does not require intercase 
proportionality review among capital cases.  [Citations.]  
‘California’s death penalty law does not violate equal protection 
by treating capital and noncapital defendants differently.’ ”  
(Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 589–590.)   
“Consideration of the circumstances of the crime during 
the penalty phase pursuant to section 190.3, factor (a), does not 
result in an arbitrary and capricious application of the death 
penalty and does not violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.”  (Mitchell, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 587.)   
“The jury need not make findings beyond a reasonable 
doubt that aggravating factors . . . outweighed the mitigating 
factors . . . .”  (Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 588.)  This is so 
even after Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, Ring v. 
Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, and Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 
U.S. 92.  (People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 45.)   
“ ‘California’s use of the death penalty does not violate 
international law, the federal Constitution, or the Eighth 
Amendment’s 
prohibition 
against 
cruel 
and 
unusual 
punishment in light of “evolving standards of decency.” ’ ”  
(Steskal, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 380.)   
I. Cumulative Error 
Tran contends that the cumulative effect of errors at the 
guilt and penalty phases requires reversal.   
PEOPLE v. TRAN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
87 
We have either assumed or found error but concluded it 
was harmless regarding the jury instructions concerning 
Nguyen, Ly, and Plata (ante, pt. III.B.2), the failure to bifurcate 
in accordance with section 1109 (ante, pt. III.D), the admission 
of hearsay through gang expert testimony (ante, pt. IV.A.2), and 
the evidence of the Schonder burglary (ante, pt. IV.C.2).  We 
strike Tran’s gang enhancement but this does not require 
reversal of the guilt verdicts or death judgment.  (See People v. 
Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 556.)  Considering the cumulative 
effect of these errors, we reach the same conclusion.  And we 
have discerned no other basis for reversing Tran’s convictions or 
sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
We strike the gang enhancement and affirm the judgment 
in all other respects. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Tran 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S165998 
Date Filed:  August 29, 2022  
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Orange 
Judge:  William R. Froeberg 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Catherine White, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler 
and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Julie L. 
Garland, Ronald S. Matthias and James William Bilderback II, 
Assistant Attorneys General, Holly D. Wilkens and Christine Y. 
Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Catherine White 
Law Office of Catherine White, APC 
4833 Santa Monica Avenue #70220 
San Diego, CA 92107 
(619) 980-3867 
 
Christine Y. Friedman 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9050