Title: Ame Aicher v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund
Citation: 2000 WI 98
Docket Number: 1998AP002955
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2000

2000 WI 98 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-2955 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Ame Aicher, minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, 
Gerald LaBarge, Esq. and Kathy Goelz, mother of 
Ame Aicher,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund and 
Wisconsin Health Care Liability Insurance Plan,  
 
Defendants-Appellants, 
Primecare Health Plan, Inc. and Waukesha County 
Department of Health and Social Services,  
 
Defendants. 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 12, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
May 25, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit Court 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
James R. Kieffer 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BABLITCH, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For defendants-appellants there were briefs by 
Michael P. Russart and Hinshaw & Culbertson, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Michael P. Russart. 
 
 
For plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief (in 
the court of appeals) by Timothy J. Aiken, James C. Gallanis and 
 
2 
Aiken & Scoptur, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Timothy J. 
Aiken. 
 
2000 WI 98 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-2955  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Ame Aicher, minor, by her Guardian ad  
Litem, Gerald LaBarge, Esq. and Kathy  
Goelz, mother of Ame Aicher,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund and  
Wisconsin Health Care Liability Insurance  
Plan,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
Primecare Health Plan, Inc. and Waukesha  
County Department of Health and Social  
Services,  
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, James R. Kieffer, Circuit Court Judge.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification by the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.61 (1993-94).1  Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund 
                     
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-
94 volumes unless indicated otherwise.  
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
2 
and Wisconsin Health Care Liability Insurance Plan (Insurers) 
seek review of a decision of the Waukesha County Circuit Court, 
James R. Kieffer, Judge.  The circuit court denied the Insurers' 
motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action 
filed on behalf of Ame Aicher by her Guardian ad Litem (Aicher).  
¶2 
Aicher alleged that she became blind in her right eye 
as a result of medical malpractice committed during her newborn 
examination on December 10, 1982.  Aicher maintains that she did 
not discover the condition until September 10, 1993, after she 
reached her tenth birthday.  Aicher initiated this action in 
1996, when she was 13 years old. 
¶3 
The Insurers filed a motion to dismiss and then sought 
summary judgment, invoking Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(1)(b)2 and 
                     
2 Wisconsin Stat. §  893.55(1) provides: 
Medical malpractice; limitation of actions; limitation 
of damages; itemization of damages.  (1)  Except as 
provided by subs. (2) and (3), an action to recover 
damages for injury arising from any treatment or 
operation performed by, or from any omission by, a 
person who is a health care provider, regardless of 
the theory on which the action is based, shall be 
commenced within the later of: 
 
(a) Three years from the date of the injury, or 
 
(b) One year from the date the injury was discovered 
or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have been discovered, except that an action may not be 
commenced under this paragraph more than 5 years from 
the date of the act or omission. 
 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
3 
893.56.3 
 
Section 
893.55(1)(b) 
establishes 
a 
statute 
of 
limitations for medical malpractice actions of one year from the 
date of discovery of the injury.  The provision also operates as 
a statute of repose, tolling at five years from the date of the 
act or omission.  Section 893.56, another statute of repose, 
extends the time for minors to initiate medical malpractice 
claims to the tenth birthday. 
¶4 
The circuit court denied the summary judgment motion, 
holding that the statutes of repose were unconstitutional as 
applied to the factual circumstances of Aicher's case.  The 
court relied on Estate of Makos v. Wisconsin Health Care Fund, 
211 Wis. 2d 41, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997), in which the court's lead 
                                                                  
Section 893.55(1)(a) is not at issue in this case.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(1) provides that a person may file 
within the later time period of either subsection (a) or (b).  
The Insurers did not allege that § 893.55(1)(a) precluded 
Aicher's claim.  As explained below, Aicher's injury accrued 
when she was six months old, and § 893.55(1)(a), read alone, 
would have tolled when she was three years and six months old.  
Sections 893.55(2) and (3) are not at issue in this case. 
3  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.56 states: 
Health care providers; minors actions.  Any person 
under the age of 18, who is not under disability by 
reason 
of 
insanity, 
developmental 
disability 
or 
imprisonment, shall bring an action to recover damages 
for injuries to the person arising from any treatment 
or operation performed by, or for any omission by a 
health care provider within the time limitation under 
s. 893.55 or by the time that person reaches the age 
of 10 years, whichever is later.  That action shall be 
brought by the parent, guardian or other person having 
custody of the minor within the time limit set forth 
in this section. 
 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
4 
opinion found Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) unconstitutional.  The 
circuit court held that §§ 893.55(1)(b) and 893.56 violate 
procedural due process and the right to remedy because the 
statutes foreclose some claims before a plaintiff even has the 
opportunity to know that an injury occurred.  The court observed 
that the statutes gave Aicher zero days to file her action and 
thereby denied her an opportunity to be heard in court. 
¶5 
The Insurers appealed.  The court of appeals certified 
two issues to this court:  (1) Does the Makos plurality opinion 
represent a consensus of the majority of the justices that is 
binding on the courts of this state?  (2) If Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(b) is considered unconstitutional under Makos, can 
the time limitation for the discovery of a medical malpractice 
injury be severed from the repose portion of the statute? 
¶6 
We do not answer the first question certified by the 
court of appeals because our decision today expressly overrules 
Makos.  We hold that Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(1)(b) and 893.56 are 
constitutional for three reasons.  First, the statutes do not 
violate 
the 
right-to-remedy 
provision 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Second, §§ 893.55(1)(b) and 893.56 do not offend 
equal protection because the classification of minor medical 
malpractice claimants is related rationally to the legitimate 
legislative objectives of reducing health care costs.  Third, 
the statutes do not violate Aicher's right to procedural due 
process because an unaccrued cause of action is not a property 
interest.  Because we sustain the constitutionality of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 893.55(1)(b) and 893.56, we do not reach the second 
No. 
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5 
certified question.  Accordingly, we hold that §§ 893.55(1)(b) 
and 893.56 preclude Aicher's cause of action, and we reverse the 
decision of the circuit court. 
FACTS 
¶7 
Most of the relevant facts are not in dispute.  On 
September 10, 1993, when Aicher was three months shy of her 
eleventh birthday, she underwent a routine eye examination in 
anticipation of her transfer to a new school.  The examination 
revealed that she had an untreatable cataract in her right eye 
that caused permanent blindness.  The cataract appeared because 
a muscle in her right eye failed to develop properly as a result 
of a condition known as "poor red reflex."  A physician told 
Aicher's mother that if the condition had been treated within 
six months after Aicher's birth, the problem would have been 
correctable.  The parties do not dispute that the condition 
resulted in an injury during the first six months of Aicher's 
life.  Aicher is now blind in her right eye.  
¶8 
Aicher was born on December 10, 1982.  Dr. Beryl 
Harris, who performed Aicher's newborn examination, made a 
notation in her medical record that she had "poor red reflex on 
the right eye."  Aicher contends that Dr. Harris conducted no 
follow-up treatment for the eye condition, and he never spoke 
with Aicher's mother about further testing or treatment.  
Aicher's mother testified at her deposition that Aicher had a 
red spot in her eye since birth.  Aicher displayed several 
instances of unexplained clumsiness in her childhood.  She fell 
a few times and split her chin open twice.  After these 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
6 
incidents, neither the treating doctors nor hospitals suggested 
to Aicher's mother that anything was wrong with Aicher's vision. 
 There is no evidence that Aicher's mother sought medical 
attention to uncover the cause of these episodes.  In addition, 
Aicher testified that she cheated during some of her eye 
examinations in school by looking at the eye chart with her good 
eye when her right eye was being tested.  Dr. Harris died on 
April 26, 1986, ten years before Aicher sought recovery in this 
action.   
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶9 
Aicher initiated this claim on April 30, 1996, 
alleging that Dr. Harris committed malpractice when he performed 
her newborn examination.  The Insurers initially filed a motion 
to dismiss, arguing that Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55 and 893.56 bar 
Aicher's action.  
¶10 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 893.55(1)(b) and 893.56 set forth 
the statutes of repose at issue in this case.  Section 
893.55(1)(b) provides that a medical malpractice claim must be 
filed within one year of the date of discovery of the injury 
(the one-year-after-discovery statute of limitations), provided 
that five years have not passed since the act or omission (the 
five-year statute of repose).4  Section 893.56 extends the filing 
                     
4 Two types of medical malpractice claims are exempted from 
these limitations.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(2) provides: 
If a health care provider conceals from a patient a 
prior act or omission of the provider which has 
resulted in injury to the patient, an action shall be 
commenced within one year from the date the patient 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
7 
time for minors pursuing medical malpractice claims, allowing 
recovery if the minor initiates the lawsuit before reaching the 
age of 10 (the 10-year statute of repose for minors).   
¶11 The interplay between both statutes of repose operated 
to preclude this suit.  Under the broader provisions of Wis. 
Stat. § 893.56, Aicher would have had to file the malpractice 
claim by her tenth birthday, roughly nine months before she 
claims to have discovered her condition.  When governed only by 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b), Aicher's action tolled when she was 
five years old, or just under six years before the discovery.  
This time line illustrates the critical dates in this action: 
 
December 10, 1982:  
Aicher born. 
 
December 10, 1982: Dr. Harris performed the newborn 
examination. 
 
June 10, 1982: End of six-month period during which 
Aicher's injury accrued. 
 
June 9, 1985: Tolling 
date 
for 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(a), 
under 
which 
plaintiffs file no later than 
                                                                  
discovers the concealment or, in the exercise of 
reasonable 
diligence, 
should 
have 
discovered 
the 
concealment or within the time limitation provided by 
sub. (1), whichever is later. 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(3) states: 
When a foreign object which has no therapeutic or 
diagnostic purpose or effect has been left in a 
patient's body, an action shall be commenced within 
one year after the patient is aware or, in the 
exercise of reasonable care, should have been aware of 
the presence of the object or within the time 
limitation provided by sub. (1), whichever is later. 
 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
8 
three years from the date of 
injury. 
 
December 9, 1987: 
Tolling 
date 
for 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(b), the five-year 
statute 
of 
repose, 
that 
precludes 
actions 
brought 
"more than 5 years from the 
date of the act or omission." 
 
December 10, 1992: Aicher turns 10 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.56, 
the 
ten-year 
statute of repose for minors, 
bars her claim. 
 
September 10, 1993: Aicher discovers the injury. 
 
September 9, 1994: If 
the 
one-year-after-discovery 
statute 
of 
limitation 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(b) were severable 
from the § 893.55(1)(b) five-
year statute of repose, this 
is tolling date for filing 
suit. 
 
April 30, 1996: 
Aicher files this action. 
¶12 After the Insurers filed the motion to dismiss, this 
court decided Makos, 211 Wis. 2d 41, a case that addressed the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b).  The Insurers 
sought 
summary 
judgment, 
maintaining 
that 
"the 
fractured 
majority" of Makos found § 893.55(1)(b) unconstitutional only as 
to the particular facts of that case.  
¶13 The circuit court, relying on the lead opinion in 
Makos, denied the summary judgment motion.  The court held that 
§§ 893.55(1)(b) and 893.56 were unconstitutional when applied to 
the unique factual circumstances of Aicher's case.  The court 
reasoned that the statutes violated procedural due process by 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
9 
denying Aicher an opportunity to be heard "because the doors of 
the courtroom were closed before she even discovered she was 
injured."  The court likened Aicher to the claimant in Makos, 
concluding that it was fundamentally unfair to allow the statute 
to toll on a claim before the plaintiff knew or could have known 
about the injury.  The circuit court found that granting summary 
judgment was inappropriate because the case presented a question 
of fact for the jury, namely whether Aicher should have 
discovered her injury before her tenth birthday.5  
¶14 The 
circuit 
court 
also 
held 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 893.55(1)(b) and 893.56 were unconstitutional because they 
violated the "right to remedy" clause of art. I, § 9 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, a provision that "guarantees that every 
person shall be afforded a remedy for wrongs committed against 
his or her person, property or character."  Noting that the 
right-to-remedy provision "entitles Wisconsin residents to their 
day in court," the court concluded that the statutes deprived 
Aicher of a remedy for a wrong that she did not and could not 
discover.  
¶15 The 
circuit 
court 
declined 
to 
address 
Aicher's 
argument that the two statutes violated her equal protection and 
substantive due process rights, because it had found the 
                     
5 As we explain below in ¶¶ 29-30, a minor has an absolute 
right to file a medical malpractice claim before the age of 10 
years.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.56, read alone, contains no 
discovery provision. 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
10
statutes unconstitutional on the grounds of procedural due 
process and the right-to-remedy clause.  
¶16 The court of appeals certified the Insurers' appeal to 
this court, highlighting the disputed interpretations generated 
by Makos.  The court suggested that "[t]his appeal is the 
appropriate case for the Wisconsin Supreme Court to fashion 
guidelines" about the precedential value of plurality opinions. 
 In addition, the court of appeals asked this court to address 
whether 
the 
five-year 
statute 
of 
repose 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(b), if unconstitutional, can be severed from the 
one-year-after-discovery statute of limitations for filing a 
medical malpractice claim.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶17 Although this case comes before the court as the 
result of a summary judgment decision, the issue we address 
requires us to determine the constitutionality of two statutes. 
 
¶18 The constitutionality of a statute is a question of 
law that we review de novo.  Riccitelli v. Broekhuizen, 227 
Wis. 2d 100, 119, 595 N.W.2d 392 (1999).  Statutes are 
presumptively constitutional.  Id.  The court indulges every 
presumption to sustain the law if at all possible, and if any 
doubt exists about a statute's constitutionality, we must 
resolve that doubt in favor of constitutionality.  State ex rel. 
Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 46-47, 205 
N.W.2d 784 (1973).   
¶19 To 
overcome 
this 
strong 
presumption, 
the 
party 
challenging a statute's constitutionality must demonstrate that 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
11
the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  
State v. Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 863, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998). 
 It is not sufficient for the challenging party merely to 
establish doubt about a statute's constitutionality, and it is 
not 
enough 
to 
establish 
that 
a 
statute 
probably 
is 
unconstitutional.  Hammermill Paper Co., 58 Wis. 2d at 46-47. 
¶20 The presumption of statutory constitutionality is the 
product of our recognition that the judiciary is not positioned 
to make the economic, social, and political decisions that fall 
within the province of the legislature.  See State ex rel. 
Carnation Milk Prods. Co. v. Emery, 178 Wis. 147, 160, 189 N.W. 
564 (1922).  The duty of the court is only to determine if the 
legislation clearly and beyond doubt offends a provision of the 
state constitution that specifically circumscribes legislative 
action.  Hammermill Paper Co., 58 Wis. 2d at 46-47; Chicago & 
N.W. Ry. Co. v. La Follette, 27 Wis. 2d 505, 521, 135 N.W.2d 269 
(1965).   
¶21 Under this standard of review, we recognize that 
statutes of limitation are policy considerations best suited to 
the legislative branch of government.  See Tomczak v. Bailey, 
218 Wis. 2d 245, 253-54, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998).  We also 
acknowledge that the legislature was aware of the policy issues 
underpinning medical malpractice actions when it enacted these 
statutes.  Miller v. Kretz, 191 Wis. 2d 573, 580, 531 N.W.2d 93 
(Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted). 
BACKGROUND 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
12
 
¶22 In 1975 the Wisconsin Legislature enacted a series of 
statutes 
governing 
the 
procedures 
for 
bringing 
medical 
malpractice actions.  Ch. 37, Laws of 1975.  These statutes 
targeted: 
 
[A] sudden increase in the number of malpractice 
suits, in the size of awards, and in malpractice 
insurance premiums, and identified several impending 
dangers: 
 
increased 
health 
care 
costs, 
the 
prescription 
of 
elaborate 
"defensive" 
medical 
procedures, the unavailability of certain hazardous 
services and the possibility that physicians would 
curtail their practices. 
State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 508, 261 
N.W.2d 434 (1978).  Two years later, the legislature addressed 
medical malpractice actions brought by minors.  Ch. 390, Laws of 
1977.  The legislature found that the number of suits and 
damages arising from medical malpractice actions commenced by 
minor claimants had "increased tremendously."  Id. at § 1(a).  
These increases led to higher insurance premiums for health care 
providers and resulted in higher charges to consumers for health 
care services and facilities.  Id. at § 1(c).  The legislature 
concluded that the interests of minor children could be 
protected adequately by requiring children to initiate medical 
malpractice suits in the same time limitation as adults, "except 
in the case of very young children."  Id. at § 1(d).  To that 
end, the legislature decided that the interests of very young 
children could be "fully protected by extending the time limits 
in which actions may be brought to age 10."  Id. at § 1(e).  
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
13
These legislative findings supported the passage of what is now 
Wis. Stat. § 893.56:6 
 
Health care providers; minors actions.  Any person 
under the age of 18, who is not under disability by 
reason 
of 
insanity, 
developmental 
disability 
or 
imprisonment, shall bring an action to recover damages 
for injuries to the person arising from any treatment 
or operation performed by, or for any omission by a 
health care provider within the time limitation under 
s. 893.55 or by the time that person reaches the age 
of 10 years, whichever is later.  That action shall be 
brought by the parent, guardian or other person having 
custody of the minor within the time limit set forth 
in this section. 
 
¶23 In 1979 the legislature undertook a general revision 
of the statutes of limitations.  Ch. 323, Laws of 1979.  These 
revisions were in part a response to this court's admonitions to 
the legislature that the existing time limitation periods for 
medical malpractice actions were too short.  Claypool v. Levin, 
209 Wis. 2d 284, 292-93, 562 N.W.2d 584 (1997).   
¶24 Before the law 
took 
effect, medical 
malpractice 
claimants were required to file suit within three years of the 
injury.  Id.  At that time the legislature did not recognize a 
"discovery rule" that otherwise establishes the time limitation 
period for commencing an action based on the date on which a 
claimant discovered the injury.  After encountering several 
cases in which the three-year rule precluded relief before a 
plaintiff 
discovered 
the 
injury, 
this 
court 
urged 
the 
                     
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.56 originally was enacted as Wis. 
Stat. § 893.235 as a result of 1977 Assembly Bill 705.  See Ch. 
390, Laws of 1977.  Effective July 1, 1980, it was renumbered as 
Wis. Stat. § 893.56.  See Ch. 323, Laws of 1979. 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
14
legislature 
to 
amend 
the 
medical 
malpractice 
statute 
of 
limitations: 
 
We conclude that this is a matter peculiarly for 
legislative determination.  Because of the numerous 
cases in which the present three-year requirement for 
commencing an action by a party who is the victim of 
medical 
malpractice 
is 
too 
short, 
we 
strongly 
recommend to the legislature that the basic three-year 
statute 
for 
negligence 
actions 
due 
to 
medical 
malpractice be amended. 
Id. at 292 n.2 (quoting Peterson v. Roloff, 57 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 203 
N.W.2d 699 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, Hansen v. A.H. 
Robbins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983)). 
¶25 The 
legislature 
followed 
our 
recommendation 
and 
created Wis. Stat. § 893.55,7 which states, in part: 
                     
7 As we noted in Claypool v. Levin, 209 Wis. 2d 284, 293 
n.3, 562 N.W.2d 584 (1997): 
The drafting record for this law reveals that the 
medical malpractice section was designed to address 
the outcome of "Olson v. St. Croix."  See Olson, 55 
Wis. 2d 628, 201 N.W.2d 63 (1972). 
 
In Olson, the plaintiff alleged that she was given the 
wrong type of blood in a blood transfusion that she 
received in 1962.  Olson, 55 Wis. 2d at 630.  On 
December 1, 1966, the plaintiff gave birth to a child 
that died seven hours later.  Id.  On December 9, 
1969, she delivered a stillborn child.  Id.  The 
plaintiff alleged that the deaths of the children were 
the result of negligence by the hospital and that she 
did not discover that the wrong type of blood had been 
given to her until the still birth of the second 
child.  Id. at 630-31.  The relevant statute of 
limitations provided that the action must be brought 
within three years of the injury.  Id. at 631.  This 
court first concluded that the alleged injury occurred 
at the time of the blood transfusion.  Id. at 632-33. 
 The court then declined to adopt the discovery and 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
15
 
Medical malpractice; limitation of actions; limitation 
of damages; itemization of damages.  (1)  Except as 
provided by subs. (2) and (3), an action to recover 
damages for injury arising from any treatment or 
operation performed by, or from any omission by, a 
person who is a health care provider, regardless of 
the theory on which the action is based, shall be 
commenced within the later of: 
 
(a) Three years from the date of the injury, or 
 
(b) One year from the date the injury was discovered 
or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have been discovered, except that an action may not be 
commenced under this paragraph more than 5 years from 
the date of the act or omission. 
¶26 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 893.55(1) and 893.56 both set forth 
statutes of repose.  Statutes of repose are different from 
statutes of limitations.  A statute of limitations usually 
establishes the time frame within which a claim must be 
initiated after a cause of action actually accrues.  A statute 
of repose, by contrast, limits the time period within which an 
action may be brought based on the date of the act or omission. 
 Statutes of repose thus bear no relation to the accrual of a 
                                                                  
thus held that suit was barred by the statute of 
limitations.  Id. at 633-34. 
 
In so holding this court stated:  "While, as we 
pointed out in McCluskey, there may be merit to the 
discovery rule, the state of the facts presented 
herein is not conducive to modification of the present 
holdings of this court."  Id. at 633. 
  
The McCluskey case referred to in Olson is McCluskey v. Thranow, 
31 Wis. 2d 245, 142 N.W.2d 787 (1966), another situation in 
which the court ruled that an action for malpractice must be 
started within three years of the negligent act. 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
16
cause of action and can toll before an injury is discovered or 
even before an injury has occurred.8  
¶27 Statutes 
of 
limitation 
and 
statutes 
of 
repose 
represent legislative policy decisions that dictate when the 
courthouse doors close for particular litigants.  See Tomczak, 
218 Wis. 2d at 253-54.  Statutes of limitation, which "are found 
and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence," 
articulate the principle that it is more just to put the 
adversary on notice to defend a claim within a specified period 
of time than to permit unlimited prosecution of stale claims.  
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979).  Statutes of 
limitation promote fair and prompt litigation and protect 
defendants from stale or fraudulent claims "brought after 
memories have faded or evidence has been lost."  Korkow v. 
General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin, 117 Wis. 2d 187, 198, 344 N.W.2d 
108 (1984) (citation omitted).  As our courts recognize, 
"Defendants have a constitutional right to rely upon statutes of 
limitations to limit the claim against them."  Westphal v. E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 192 Wis. 2d 347, 373, 531 N.W.2d 386 
(Ct. App. 1995) (citing Haas v. Sawicki, 20 Wis. 2d 308, 311-12, 
121 N.W.2d 876 (1963)).  Statutes of repose operate similarly to 
                     
8  See Scott A. DeVries, Note, Medical Malpractice Acts' 
Statutes of Limitation as They Apply to Minors:  Are They 
Proper?, 28 Ind. L. Rev. 413, 414-15 (1995); Christopher J. 
Trombetta, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Medical Malpractice 
Statutes of Repose:  Judicial Conscience Versus Legislative 
Will, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 397, 400-01 (1989); Susan C. Randall, 
Comment, Due Process Challenges to Statutes of Repose, 40 Sw. 
L.J. 997, 1002-03 (1986). 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
17
protect both plaintiffs and defendants from litigating claims in 
which the truth may be obfuscated by death or disappearance of 
key witnesses, loss of evidence, and faded memories.  Kubrick, 
444 U.S. at 117; Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d  at 272. 
¶28 In the medical malpractice arena, the interplay among 
the statutes of limitations and statutes of repose established 
by Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(1) and 893.56, and the special discovery 
provisions of § 893.55(2) and (3), can be perplexing, resulting 
in different tolling times depending upon the date of injury, 
the nature of the injury, and the age of the child.  Examined 
alone, 
§ 893.55(1) 
presents 
two 
alternative 
points 
for 
determining when a medical malpractice action must be initiated. 
 The prospective plaintiff must choose the later of these two 
alternative points as the marker for when to file suit.  Section 
893.55(1)(a) provides that a medical malpractice claim must be 
filed within three years of the date of injury.  Section 
893.55(1)(b) extends the deadline for filing to within one year 
following the discovery of injury.  This subsection, however, 
requires plaintiffs who seek to file within one year of 
discovery to initiate their claims no later than five years 
after the date of the act or omission.  Under this statute, 
someone injured at birth would be required to commence the 
action either:  (1) by the age of three, or (2) within one year 
after the date of discovery of the injury, but before the age of 
five. 
¶29 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.56 overlaps with Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(1) to give minors additional time in which to initiate 
No. 
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medical malpractice actions.  Like Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1), 
§ 893.56 provides the claimant with the benefit of the latest 
tolling date available under the statutory scheme.  Section 
893.56 allows minors to commence medical malpractice claims 
within the period before the child reaches the age of 10 years. 
 When read together with § 893.55(1), § 893.56 creates a 
situation in which a child injured at birth must file at the 
latest of the following dates:  (1) by the age of three; (2) 
within one year after the date of discovery of the injury, but 
before the age of five; or (3) before the child reaches the age 
of 10 years.  Thus, a minor pursuing a medical malpractice cause 
of action always has until the age of 10 to file suit, no matter 
when the act or omission occurred.  After the child reaches age 
10, the action must be initiated either within three years of 
the date of injury or within one year of discovery, provided 
that not more than five years have passed since the act or 
omission. 
¶30 The medical malpractice statutes do not automatically 
extinguish a minor's claim when the minor reaches the age of 10. 
 Whether a cause of action survives that age depends upon the 
date of the act, omission, or injury.  A child injured at age 9, 
for instance, must file within the later of three years (age 
12), one year from the date of discovery but not more than five 
years after the date of the act or omission (age 14), or before 
the child's tenth birthday. 
¶31 All these limitations are overridden when the two 
special situations outlined in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(2) and (3) 
No. 
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come into play.  These subsections constitute nearly open-ended 
discovery rules for situations in which a health care provider 
conceals a prior act or omission that has resulted in injury to 
the patient and when a non-therapeutic foreign object has been 
left in a patient's body.9 
 
¶32 Because, by their nature, statutes of repose can 
sometimes arbitrarily extinguish a prospective plaintiff's cause 
of action, they often are the subject of constitutional debate.10 
 Although this court has never addressed the constitutionality 
of Wis. Stat. § 893.56, we last examined the constitutionality 
of Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) in Makos. 
¶33 In Makos, a patient filed a medical malpractice 
action, 
alleging 
that 
a 
physician 
had 
misdiagnosed 
her 
metastatic malignant melanoma.  The physician examined a growth 
on the patient's leg and declared that it was not malignant.  
Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 45.  Nine years later, doctors reexamined 
the growth and found that it was malignant.  Id.  The patient 
filed a claim approximately 11 months and one week after she 
received the melanoma diagnosis. 
                     
9 Our brief discussion of these statutory implications 
illustrates how complicated the interrelation between Wis. Stat. 
§§ 893.55 and 893.56 is.  Practitioners should take cautious 
note of the potential impact of these tolling deadlines for 
their clients.  
10 See 
generally, 
Josephine 
Herring 
Hicks, 
Note, 
The 
Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose:  Federalism Reigns, 38 
Vand. L. Rev. 627 (1985).  
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
20
 
¶34 The combination of these facts meant that when the 
patient initiated her action, the Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) one-
year-after-discovery statute of limitations did not preclude the 
action, but the five-year statute of repose acted as a bar 
because she sought recovery "more than 5 years from the date of 
the act or omission," namely nine years after the initial 
misdiagnosis.  
 
¶35 The decision in Makos resulted in four opinions.  
Justice Donald W. Steinmetz, author of the lead opinion, held 
that Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b), as applied to the particular 
facts at hand, violated the plaintiff's constitutional right to 
procedural due process and violated the right-to-remedy clause 
of art. I, § 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  211 Wis. 2d at 
44. 
 
¶36 Justice William A. Bablitch, joined by Justice Jon P. 
Wilcox, concurred only in the judgment and did not join in the 
lead opinion's rationale.  Justice Bablitch found that it was 
not necessary to reach the constitutional issues because the 
case could be decided by means of statutory interpretation:  
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) did not cover the plaintiff's claim 
because the statute addresses only "treatment," not "diagnosis." 
 Id. at 55-57. 
 
¶37 Justice N. Patrick Crooks concurred separately and 
agreed 
with 
the 
lead 
opinion 
insofar 
as 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(b) offended the right-to-remedy clause under art. I, 
§ 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Justice Crooks did not 
address the procedural due process issue.  Id. at 59-60. 
No. 
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21
 
¶38 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, joined by Chief Justice 
Shirley S. Abrahamson, dissented.  Justice Bradley concluded 
that Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) properly barred the plaintiff's 
action and found that the statute was not unconstitutional on 
any grounds raised by the defendants.  Id. at 68. 
 
¶39 Justice Janine P. Geske did not participate in Makos. 
¶40 We recognize that this court has not spoken with 
clarity about the constitutionality of statutes of repose and 
the right-to-remedy provision of the Wisconsin Constitution.  We 
also acknowledge that there has been considerable discussion 
about 
the 
precedential 
effect 
of 
Makos. 
 
Upon 
careful 
consideration, we have examined Makos sufficiently to determine 
that it carries no precedential weight, and we have decided to 
overrule it.  Our decision today adopts much of Justice 
Bradley's dissent in Makos. 
RIGHT TO REMEDY 
¶41 Aicher contends that Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(1)(b) and 
893.56 are constitutionally infirm because they precluded her 
right to seek remedy for a wrong.  Article I, § 9 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution provides: 
 
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the 
laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive 
in his person, property, or character; he ought to 
obtain justice freely, and without being obligated to 
purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly 
and without delay, conformably to the laws. 
¶42 Article I, § 9 is something of a constitutional 
enigma.  Our decisions trace its origin to Paragraph 40 of the 
Magna Carta, which states:  "To none will we sell, to none will 
No. 
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22
we deny, or delay, right or justice."  Vol. I Wisconsin Statutes 
1898, Sanborn and Berryman's Annotations at 9.  The purpose of 
the clause was explained by Justice Marshall in Christianson v. 
Pioneer Furniture Co., 101 Wis. 343, 347-48, 77 N.W. 174, 77 
N.W. 917 (1898).11  "[E]very subject . . . may take his remedy by 
                     
11 As Justice Marshall explained: 
That provision is very old.  Its history dates back to 
the days of Magna Carta.  It was designed to prevent a 
species of official exactions made as the price of 
delaying or expediting justice.  From the lowest 
officer to the king himself, in the olden times, 
bribes were freely demanded and taken to procure the 
benefits of the laws.  They bore no relation whatever 
to our system of exactions for expenses of litigation, 
called costs, or the charge as a tax on suits, imposed 
under laws which bear equally upon all; but they were 
arbitrary exactions sanctioned by the manners of the 
times, that went to the personal benefit of the 
judicial head or body controlling the execution of the 
law, or to servants or officers connected therewith.  
It was such abuse, among others, that the barons of 
England forced King John to abolish by granting the 
Magna Carta.  It contained the following as one of the 
guaranteed limitations upon kingly prerogatives:  "We 
will not sell the right and justice to anyone, nor 
will we refuse it, or put it off."  Says Sir Edward 
Coke, "The king, in the judgment of the law, is ever 
present and repeating in all his courts, 'Nulli 
vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus rectum vel 
justitiam,' and therefore every subject, for injury 
done him 'in bonis, in terris, vel persona,' by any 
other subject, be he ecclesiastical or temporal, 
without any exceptions, may take his remedy by the 
course of the law and have justice and right for the 
injury done to him, freely without sale, fully without 
any denial, and speedily without delay."  So the right 
thus obtained as a concession from sovereign power has 
come down to us through the centuries that have 
passed, and been preserved in all its integrity in 
substantially all state constitutions.  They do not 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
23
the course of the law and have justice and right for the injury 
done to him, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and 
speedily without delay."  Id. at 348.  Marshall asserted that 
state constitutional provisions incorporating this principle "do 
not grant the right" of remedy but rather preserve remedies that 
existed at common law.12  Id.   
¶43 It is possible to mine the pronouncements of Wisconsin 
courts for evidence that art. I, § 9 creates rights, or that it 
authorizes 
courts 
to 
fashion 
rights. 
 
In 
its 
recent 
interpretation of the provision, however, this court has stated 
that art. I, § 9 confers no legal rights.  Roberta Jo W. v. 
Leroy W., 218 Wis. 2d 225, 238, 578 N.W.2d 185 (1998); Tomczak, 
218 Wis. 2d at 262;  Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 79 (Bradley, J., 
dissenting); Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 
189-90, 290 N.W.2d 276 (1980).  Rather, art. I, § 9 applies only 
when a prospective litigant seeks a remedy for an already 
existing right.  In Makos, Justice Bradley described this right 
as a "legislatively recognized right:"  "The Mulder court 
emphasized that its prior Wis. Const. art. I, § 9 analysis in 
Kallas stood for no more than the proposition that the 'remedy 
for wrongs' section might have 'possible application . . . where 
                                                                  
grant the right, but guarantee the preservation of one 
that existed under the constitution of England. 
  
Christianson v. Pioneer Furniture Co., 101 Wis. 343, 347-48, 77 
N.W. 174, 77 N.W. 917 (1898). 
12 Article 
XIV, 
§ 13 
explicitly 
recognizes 
legislative 
authority to alter or suspend common law.  
No. 
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24
a remedy is sought for a 'legislatively recognized right.'"  
Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 79 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Mulder, 95 Wis. 2d at 189-90 n.3).  The right-to-remedy clause 
thus preserves the right "to obtain justice on the basis of the 
law as it in fact exists."  Mulder, 95 Wis. 2d at 189.   
¶44 What is the "law as it in fact exists?"  One of the 
common-law rights recognized by the legislature is the right to 
bring a medical malpractice claim.  Martin v. Richards, 192 
Wis. 2d 156, 206-09, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995).  Between 1975 and 
1979, the legislature modified the terms under which persons can 
initiate medical malpractice actions.  Among these changes were 
statutes of limitations that were more restrictive than those 
laid out for other tort actions, as well as the statutes of 
repose 
at 
issue 
here. 
 
These 
legislative 
determinations 
circumscribed the remedy for medical malpractice.  These 
legislative actions defined how the law in fact exists. 
¶45 From time to time, this court has suggested that art. 
I, § 9 is inconsistent with legislation barring a suit before an 
injury actually occurs.  Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 52-54 (lead 
opinion); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 
393, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975); Rosenthal v. Kurtz, 62 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 
213 N.W.2d 741 (1974).  On occasion, this court has argued that 
such legislation is unconstitutional.  But we find no decision 
from this court, not even Rosenthal, squarely invalidating a 
statute on this ground.  Courts may shudder at the unfairness 
visited by statutes of repose, but we generally acknowledge the 
policies underlying these limiting statutes.  For instance, in 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
25
Rosenthal, a case in which this court struck down a statute of 
repose because of suspect classification, the court raised 
serious questions about art. I, § 9, but we admitted:  "Some 
statute of repose is obviously desirable as a matter of public 
policy."  62 Wis. 2d at 11.   
¶46 The question of what the statute of limitations or the 
statute of repose for a particular action should be is a 
fundamental question of public policy.  The legislature has 
recognized the importance of prompt litigation of claims and a 
need to protect defendants from fraudulent or stale claims.  
Statutes of limitations and statutes of repose bring finality to 
disputes, at least in the respect that they close judicial 
tribunals to the prosecution of claims.  Pritchard vs. Howell, 1 
Wis. 131, [118], [123] (1853).  A statute of limitations "takes 
the action away altogether. . . . [I]t annihilates the remedy." 
 Id. 
¶47 Although art. I, § 9 "guarantees a suitor a day in [ ] 
court," a statute of limitations may preclude a plaintiff's 
action, and a defendant may rely on the statutory bar, even if 
the plaintiff did not discover the injury.  Rod v. Farrell, 96 
Wis. 2d 349, 355-56, 291 N.W.2d 568 (1980) (per curiam), rev'd 
on other grounds, Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d 550; CLL Assoc. v. 
Arrowhead Pacific Corp., 174 Wis. 2d 604, 614-15, 497 N.W.2d 115 
(1993); Halverson v. Tydrich, 156 Wis. 2d 202, 214-16, 456 
N.W.2d 852 (Ct. App. 1990). 
¶48 This court has worked to soften the effect of these 
consistent rulings by recognizing a common-law discovery rule 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
26
for actions sounding in tort that are not covered by other 
statutory discovery rules.  Claypool, 209 Wis. 2d at 294.  In 
Hansen, we held that a statute of limitations begins to run for 
tort claims when the plaintiff discovers the injury.  113 
Wis. 2d  at 560.  In Hansen, however, the court did not disturb 
the constitutional holdings of Rod v. Farrell as to art. I, § 9. 
 CLL Assoc., 174 Wis. 2d at 614 n.4; Hartland-Richmond Ins. v. 
Wudtke, 145 Wis. 2d 682, 694, 429 N.W.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1988), 
rev'd on other grounds, Funk v. Wollin Silo & Equip., Inc., 148 
Wis. 2d 59, 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989). 
¶49 Last term, this court ruled that a woman's right to 
pursue a medical malpractice claim from 1979 was barred because 
she failed to file a notice of claim with a government entity 
within 120 days of the injury-causing event, even though she did 
not discover the injury until 1995, more than 15 years later.  
Snopek v. Lakeland Med. Ctr., 223 Wis. 2d 288, 588 N.W.2d 19 
(1999). 
 
Although 
our 
Snopek 
decision 
did 
not 
examine 
constitutional 
issues, 
we 
applied 
a 
former 
legislative 
determination that a notice of claim must be filed with a 
governmental unit as a prerequisite to litigation. 
¶50 We see no distinction between closing the doors to the 
courtroom for claimants when an injury has not been discovered 
within a fixed period of time after some act or omission and 
closing the doors to the courtroom for a person whose injury has 
not yet occurred within a fixed period of time after some act or 
omission.  The effect of extinguishing a remedy in court is the 
same.  This court has concluded many times that the legislature 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
27
may sever a person's claim by a statute of limitations or a 
statute of repose when the person has had no possibility of 
discovering the injurywhen the person has been blameless in 
every respect.  These decisions represent judicial deference to 
the stated policy of the legislature.  Protecting the interests 
of those who must defend claims based on old acts or omissions 
is a policy concern that legislative bodies have weighed for 
centuries.  Even persons who intentionally commit criminal 
batteries 
and 
other 
crimes 
benefit 
from 
these 
policy 
considerations.  John v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 183, 194, 291 N.W.2d 
502 (1980).13 
¶51 The 
legislature 
formulates 
the statutory law of 
Wisconsin, 
pursuant 
to 
constitutional 
authority. 
 
The 
legislature's authority includes the power to define and limit 
causes of action and to abrogate common law on policy grounds. 
¶52 This court itself has determined that sound public 
policy may justify limitations on liability.  Rolph v. EBI Cos., 
159 Wis. 2d 518, 464 N.W.2d 667 (1991); Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 
                     
13 In John v. State, we observed: 
The criminal statutes of limitations serve a number of 
functions but the primary purpose is to protect the 
accused from having to defend himself against charges 
of remote misconduct.  A corollary purpose is to 
ensure that criminal prosecutions will be based on 
evidence that is of recent origin.  It also assures 
that law enforcement officials will act promptly to 
investigate and prosecute criminal activity.  This 
helps to preserve the integrity of the decision-making 
process in the trial of criminal cases. 
 
John v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 183, 194, 291 N.W.2d 502 (1980). 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
28
Wis. 2d 526, 541, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976); Dumer v. St. Michael's 
Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 774, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975); Rieck v. 
Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 517, 219 N.W.2d 242 
(1974); Hass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 48 Wis. 2d 321, 179 
N.W.2d 885 (1970).  In other words, we ourselves have placed 
limitations on people's rights to recover for personal injury in 
order to advance the overall interest of justice.  Article I, 
§ 9 does not empower this court to substitute its views for 
legislative policy any more than art. I, § 9 prevents this court 
from using sound policy to influence tort law.   
¶53 Statutes limiting the time period for filing actions 
historically have been policy decisions within the province of 
the legislature.  See Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 254.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) recognizes a right for medical malpractice 
claims only when the plaintiffs seek recovery either within 
three years of the injury or within one year of discovery, 
provided that five years have not passed since the act or 
omission.  Section 893.56 extends the limitation period for 
minors to the age of 10 years.  These provisions reflect the 
legislature's view that prompt litigation ensures fairness to 
the parties.  A case such as this one, in which the physician 
allegedly responsible for the malpractice is deceased and no 
longer able to defend himself, illustrates precisely the type of 
stale claim that statutes of limitations and statutes of repose 
are designed to ameliorate. 
¶54 We remain persuaded that the time limitation periods 
articulated 
by 
statutes 
of 
repose 
inherently 
are 
policy 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
29
considerations 
better 
left 
to 
the 
legislative 
branch 
of 
government.  Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 254.  No right to remedy 
resides here because the legislature expressly chose not to 
recognize a right based on a claim discovered more than five 
years after the allegedly negligent act or omission or after the 
child reaches the age of 10.  We cannot preserve a right to 
obtain justice where none in fact exists.  See Mulder, 95 
Wis. 2d at 189-90.  Were we to extend a right to remedy outside 
the limits of these recognized rights, we effectively would 
eviscerate the ability of the legislature to enact any statute 
of repose. 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
 
¶55 Having found that Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(1)(b) and 
893.56 do not violate the right-to-remedy clause of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, we next consider whether the statutes 
offend the equal protection provisions of the Wisconsin or 
United States Constitutions.14  The issue we must analyze here is 
                     
14  Article I, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides:  
"Equality; inherent rights.  Section 1.  All people are born 
equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights; 
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to 
secure these rights, governments are instituted, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed." 
Amendment XIV, § 1 of the United States Constitution 
provides:  "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
30
whether treating minor medical malpractice claimants differently 
from other tort claimants violates equal protection. 
 
¶56 Parties seeking to challenge the constitutionally of a 
statute on equal protection grounds must demonstrate that the 
statute 
treats 
members 
of 
a 
similarly 
situated 
class 
differently.  Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 261 (citing State v. Post, 
197 Wis. 2d 279, 318, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995)).  Usually, this 
court will uphold a statute under equal protection principles if 
we 
find 
that 
a 
rational 
basis 
supports 
the 
legislative 
classification.  State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 468, 484 
N.W.2d 138 (1992).  We engage in strict scrutiny analysis only 
when a statute impinges on a "fundamental right" or creates a 
classification that "operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a 
suspect class."  Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 261-62 (quoting Annala, 
168 Wis. 2d at 468).  Because the rights guaranteed by art. I, 
§ 9 are not "fundamental," we employ the rational basis test to 
examine the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(1)(b) and 
893.56.15  Id. at 262. 
 
¶57 Under 
the 
rational 
basis 
test, 
a 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional if the legislature applied an irrational or 
arbitrary classification when it enacted the provision.  Omernik 
                                                                  
We apply the same interpretation to the equal protection 
provisions of both the Wisconsin Constitution and the federal 
constitution.  Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 261, 578 
N.W.2d 166 (1998). 
15 The parties agree that an equal protection challenge to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(1)(b) and 893.56 should be reviewed under 
the rational basis test.  
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
31
v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 6, 18-19, 218 N.W.2d 734 (1974).  The task 
of 
drawing 
lines 
between 
different 
classifications 
is 
a 
legislative one in which perfection "is neither possible nor 
necessary."  Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 75 (Bradley, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 
307, 314 (1976)).  It is not our role to determine the wisdom or 
rationale underpinning a particular legislative pronouncement.  
Tomczak, 
218 
Wis. 2d at 
265 
(quoting 
Sambs 
v. City of 
Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 371, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980)).  This 
court therefore must sustain a statute unless we find that "it 
is 'patently arbitrary' and bears no rational relationship to a 
legitimate government interest."  Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 264 
(quoting State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 131, 447 N.W.2d 654 
(1989)).  Recognizing that classifications often are imperfect 
and can produce inequities, our goal is to determine whether a 
classification 
scheme 
rationally 
advances 
a 
legislative 
objective.  Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 75 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 In so doing, we are obligated to locate or, in the alternative, 
construct a rationale that might have influenced the legislative 
determination.  Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 264.   
 
¶58 A legislative classification satisfies the rational 
basis test if it meets five criteria: 
 
(1) 
All 
classification[s] 
must 
be 
based 
upon 
substantial distinctions which make one class really 
different from another. 
 
(2) The classification adopted must be germane to the 
purpose of the law. 
 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
32
(3) The classification must not be based upon existing 
circumstances only.  [It must not be so constituted as 
to preclude addition to the numbers included within a 
class]. 
 
(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply 
equally to each member thereof. 
 
(5) That the characteristics of each class should be 
so far different from those of other classes as to 
reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having 
regard to the public good, of substantially different 
legislation. 
Id. at 272-73 (quoting Dane County v. McManus, 55 Wis. 2d 413, 
423, 198 N.W.2d 667 (1972)).  Aicher contends that the 
classification system established by Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(1)(b) 
and 893.56 fails under four of these five factors. 
 
¶59 The statutory scheme governing general malpractice 
actions has survived previous challenges under the five-pronged 
criteria.  See Miller, 191 Wis. 2d at 582; Strykowski, 81 
Wis. 2d at 508-09.16  Our courts, however, have not explored in 
                     
16 See also American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 
683 P.2d 670, 677 n.10 (Cal. 1984) (observing that 23 states and 
three federal circuits have found that medical malpractice 
statutes of repose and limitations are related rationally to the 
legitimate 
legislative 
objective 
of 
controlling 
medical 
malpractice insurance costs, and finding that classifications 
created by the statutes withstand equal protection challenges).  
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
33
detail 
whether 
the 
application 
of 
medical 
malpractice 
legislation to minors satisfies the rational basis test.17 
 
¶60 To overcome the first prong, Aicher must show that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 893.55(1)(b) 
and 
893.56 
are 
not 
based 
on 
substantial distinctions that make one class different from 
another.  She is unable to do so for three reasons.  First, the 
distinct nature of the medical malpractice arena itself sets it 
apart from other forms of litigation.  See Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 
75-76 
(Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting). 
 
The 
Judicial 
Council 
Committee's Notes to § 893.55 provide that, "This section has 
been created to precisely set out the time periods within which 
an action to recover damages for medical malpractice must be 
commenced."  Judicial Council Committee Note, 1979, § 893.55, 
Stats.  Second, both statutes of repose are substantially 
distinct from the limitation periods established for other tort 
claims.  For instance, the discovery rule adopted in Hanson 
applies to certain tort suits but not to medical malpractice 
actions.  Third, § 893.56 creates a substantial distinction 
between minor malpractice claimants and adult claimants, giving 
minors up to the age of 10 to initiate a suit, as opposed to a 
                     
17 The court of appeals addressed an equal protection 
challenge by a minor in Halverson v. Tydrich, 156 Wis. 2d 202, 
456 N.W.2d 852 (Ct. App. 1990).  In Halverson, the plaintiff 
argued that he was deprived of his claim because his mother 
failed to bring the action.  Id. at 215.  The court of appeals 
concluded that the plaintiff's minority was irrelevant under the 
facts of that facts because both the plaintiff and his mother 
discovered the injury after the five-year statute of repose 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) elapsed.  Id. at 215-16.   
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
34
maximum of only five years from the date of the act or omission 
for adults.   
 
¶61 Affording 
different 
treatment 
to 
children 
who 
generally are less able during their early years to articulate 
concerns and protect their interests is not novel.  Moreover, 
the legislature found a statistical basis for distinguishing 
children from adults in medical malpractice actions.  As Justice 
Bradley noted in her Makos dissent, findings in 1976 indicated 
that 98.9 percent of adult medical malpractice claimants and 95 
percent of minor medical malpractice claimants filed actions 
within five years of the alleged act or omission.  Makos, 211 
Wis. 2d at 73 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing Staff Paper #10, 
Analysis of Statistical Data and Recent Wisconsin Cases on 
Statutes of Limitations, Malpractice Committee, Legislative 
Council Staff, Sept. 21, 1976).  Allowing minors additional time 
in which to file claims comports with these statistics. 
 
¶62 Under the second prong, Aicher has the burden of 
showing that the statutes are not germane to the purpose of the 
law.  This is a difficult burden to surmount.  Our courts have 
recognized that the legislature was cognizant of the policy 
issues surrounding medical malpractice actions.  See e.g., 
Miller, 191 Wis. 2d at 580.  The legislature designed Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(b) to address a perceived crisis in the health care 
field by providing a degree of immunity from the otherwise "long 
tail" of tort liability.  Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 76 (Bradley, J., 
dissenting). 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
35
 
¶63 We are able to locate a rationale and purpose 
underlying the enactment of both Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(1)(b) and 
893.56 in the legislative history of the provisions.  Materials 
generated in support of the medical malpractice legislation 
reveal that the drafters of the statute balanced both the 
continuing liability of health care providers and the rising 
costs of malpractice premiums.  Staff Paper #10, Analysis of 
Statistical Data and Recent Wisconsin Cases on Statutes of 
Limitation, Malpractice Committee, Legislative Council Staff, 
Sept. 21, 1976.  Whether the perception of a malpractice crisis 
was inflated or illusory makes little difference because the 
perceived 
crisis 
led 
the 
legislature 
to 
make 
a 
policy 
determination about the costs of health care.  Moreover, the 
enactment 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(b), 
which 
created 
a 
discovery rule for medical malpractice, was in response to this 
court's pointed recommendation that a three-year rule based on 
injury alone was too short to cover many claims.  Claypool, 209 
Wis. 2d at 292-93.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(2) and (3) also 
created new discovery rules for specific claims. 
¶64 The chapter that created Wis. Stat. § 893.56, the ten-
year statute of repose for minors, included a legislative 
finding that the "number of suits and claims for damages arising 
from professional patient care has increased tremendously in the 
past 
several 
years 
and 
the 
size 
of 
judgments 
and 
settlements . . . has 
increased 
even 
more 
substantially, 
especially in the case of minors."  Ch. 390, Laws of 1977, 
§ 1(a).  The legislature expressed concern that increasing 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
36
judgments and settlements in lawsuits brought by and on behalf 
of minors contributed to rising insurance and health care costs. 
Id. at § 1(b)-(c).  The legislature further stated that "the 
interests of minor children can be adequately and fully 
protected by adopting the same time limit for bringing actions 
as applies to adults, except in the case of very young 
children," and concluded that the interests of very young minor 
children were protected adequately by extending the statute of 
repose up to the age of ten years.  Id. at § 1(d)-(e). 
 
¶65 Aicher contends that Wis. Stat. § 893.56 is irrational 
because 
the 
legislature 
articulated 
no 
sound 
reason 
for 
selecting the age of 10 as the limitation period for the statute 
of repose for minors.  She correctly notes that Assembly Bill 
705 first utilized the age of eight and subsequently considered 
the ages of 13, 10, and 15 before ultimately selecting 10.  
Aicher argues that these variations reflect the arbitrariness of 
the legislature's choice.  Although the legislative history is 
silent about why these choices were made, we must indulge every 
presumption favoring the validity of the statute.  Tomczak, 218 
Wis. 2d at 261.  We can presume that the several redrafts of the 
bill that culminated with the designation of the age of 10 were 
the product of careful legislative debate and consideration.  We 
similarly can presume that at some point, the legislature 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
37
determined that the age of 10 best suits the meaning of "very 
young children" who require extra protection.18 
¶66 Legislation must be sustained when we can conceive of 
any facts upon which the legislation reasonably could be based. 
 Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d at 506.  Admittedly, different persons 
might set the age for "very young child" at different stages.  
But 
the 
classification 
scheme 
rationally 
advances 
the 
legislative purpose of providing extra protection for young 
children.  We therefore "disregard the existence of other 
methods of allocation that we, as individuals, perhaps would 
have preferred."  Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 75 (Bradley, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 
(1981)). 
¶67 The allocation here is reasonable.  The legislature 
could have concluded that by the age of 10, most children will 
have been in school for at least four years.  Children, at age 
10, will have been observed by teachers, counselors, parents, 
and other adults outside their own families.  They will have 
been in contact with the types of children prone to notice 
distinguishing characteristics.  Children at this age likely 
                     
18 In those states in which the legislature has shortened 
the time limitation periods for minors, there generally is a 
minimal tolling age allowed for very young children.  The ages 
vary from age six to age 19.  The American Medical Association, 
"the foremost advocate of reform in this area," recommends that 
a minimum tolling period should run until age six or eight.  See 
Rob M. Alston, Comment, Utah's Statute of Limitation Barring 
Minors 
from 
Bringing 
Medical 
Malpractice 
Actions: 
Riding 
Roughshod Over the Rights of Minors?, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 929, 
939-40, 970-71.  
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
38
will have had other contacts with the health care system.  By 
the age of 10 years, they probably will have developed an 
ability to communicate their concerns, an ability that will have 
advanced markedly from their early childhood.   
¶68 Aicher has failed to show that the statutes of repose 
are not germane to the purpose of the law.  The legislature took 
account of the important policy considerations of health care 
and insurance costs and made a determination to ensure the 
timely litigation of malpractice claims.  The legislature also 
reckoned with the extra protection very young children might 
require.  While recognizing the harsh results that statutes of 
repose sometimes create for potential litigants, we must uphold 
the legislative determination that public policy is best 
fulfilled by setting a finite termination for minor medical 
malpractice claims within either five years of the act or 
omission or the date the minor reaches the age of 10, whichever 
is later.  See Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 73-74 (Bradley, J., 
dissenting). 
 
¶69 Aicher does not dispute that the statutes meet the 
third prong of the rational basis criteria, namely that the 
classification is not based upon existing circumstances only and 
is constituted in a way that does not preclude addition to the 
numbers 
included 
within 
a 
class. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§§ 893.55(1)(b) and 893.56 both allow expansion of the class to 
include additional minors.   
 
¶70 Under the fourth prong, however, Aicher argues that 
the classification scheme is irrational because it does not 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
39
treat minors equally.  In particular, she contends that the 
legislation harms developmentally disabled minors who require 
the most protection.  Aicher explains that whereas non-
developmentally disabled minors have one year from the date of 
discovery to file malpractice actions, limited by a maximum of 
five 
years 
from 
injury 
or 
until 
the 
tenth 
birthday, 
developmentally disabled minors must file within the narrower 
time limits established for adults.   
 
¶71 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.56 has remained unchanged from 
July 1, 1980, until the present.  It provides in part that, "Any 
person under the age of 18, who is not under disability by 
reason of insanity, developmental disability or imprisonment, 
shall bring an action . . . within the time limitation under s. 
893.55 or by the time that person reaches the age of 10 years, 
whichever is later" (emphasis added).   
¶72 Until late 1998, Wis. Stat. § 893.16 provided in part: 
 
Person under disability.  (1)  If a person entitled to 
bring an action is, at the time the cause of action 
accrues, either under the age of 18 years, except for 
actions against health care providers; or insane, or 
imprisoned on a criminal charge the action may be 
commenced within 2 years after the disability ceases, 
except that where the disability is due to insanity or 
imprisonment, the period of limitation prescribed in 
this chapter may not be extended for more than 5 
years. 
 
¶73 Aicher correctly reads Wis. Stat. § 893.56 to exclude 
the developmentally disabled, and she also correctly notes that 
Wis. Stat. § 893.16 does not provide the developmentally 
disabled with an extension for filing medical malpractice 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
40
actions.  We suspect that this discrepancy is the result of 
oversight rather than purposeful discrimination.  It is likely 
that the legislature's intent was to extend the period of filing 
for persons with developmental disabilities, not reduce it.19  In 
any event, Aicher is not developmentally disabled, and she is 
not poised to attack the statutes from the perspective of a 
class of which she is not a part.  Our courts disfavor statutory 
challenges that are not based on the plaintiff's actual status 
because "constitutional rights are personal and may not be 
asserted vicariously."  State v. Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, 371, 
580 N.W.2d 260 (1998) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 
601, 610 (1973)). 
 
¶74 Aicher also maintains that the statutes of repose 
irrationally create 
disparate 
treatment 
between 
minors of 
different ages because a child injured at the age of two has 
more time in which to file than a child injured when eight.  We 
"cannot conclude that such a time-based classification is 
irrational, since by their nature, every statute of limitations 
and statute of repose must make such a distinction."  Makos, 211 
Wis. 2d at 78 (Bradley, J., dissenting).  Were we to accept 
Aicher's challenge on these grounds, we would have to conclude 
that every statute of limitation and every statute of repose is 
                     
19 In creating then Wis. Stat. § 893.235, which is now Wis. 
Stat. § 893.56, 1977 Assembly Bill 705 tracked precisely then 
Wis. Stat. § 893.33, entitled "Persons under disability," until 
the Senate approved a handwritten floor amendment adding the 
phrase "developmental disability."  Senate Amendment 2, 1977 
A.B. 705.  
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
41
unconstitutional. 
 
Such 
a 
result 
would 
contradict 
our 
traditional view that statutes establishing time limitation 
periods are policy considerations within the province of the 
legislature.  Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 254 (citing Miller, 191 
Wis. 2d at 580). 
 
¶75 Finally, under the fifth prong of the rational basis 
test, 
we 
find 
that 
a 
need 
for 
substantially 
different 
legislation arises because the class of minors is reasonably 
distinct from other medical malpractice claimants.  The need for 
finality is particularly acute in minor medical malpractice 
actions.  In the case of minors, recollection of an act or 
omission can fade more rapidly, the onset of maturity can affect 
the nature of a condition, and medical advances can modify 
whether a particular condition is treatable.20  Moreover, when, 
as here, a minor alleges that the act or omission occurred at a 
very young age, there is a greater likelihood that the health 
care provider, an essential witness to the occurrence, will be 
deceased or retired.  If malpractice carriers were required to 
defend such stale claims, there would be a substantial increase 
in the cost of health care.  These are precisely the types of 
results the legislature attempted to alleviate. 
 
¶76 We conclude our examination of the equal protection 
question by observing that similar statutes of repose and 
statutes of limitations have withstood challenges in the state 
                     
20 See Scott A. DeVries, Note, Medical Malpractice Acts' 
Statutes of Limitation as They Apply to Minors:  Are They 
Proper?, 28 Ind. L. Rev. 413, 419 (1995).  
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
42
courts of other jurisdictions.  These courts hold that under the 
rational basis test, a classification that treats minors 
pursuing medical malpractice actions differently from persons 
with claims for other torts is related rationally to the 
legitimate legislative objective of reducing health care costs 
and malpractice insurance premiums.21  Significantly, the age at 
                     
21 See Estate of McCarthy v. Montana Second Judicial Dist. 
Court, Silverbow County, 994 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Mont. 1999) 
(sustaining statute of repose that requires minors to file cause 
of action by the age of eight for injuries sustained before the 
age of four); Plummer v. Gillieson, 692 N.E.2d 528 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1998) (statute of repose that extinguishes claims of minor 
malpractice claimants at age six fulfills legislative objective 
of reducing cost of medical malpractice insurance); Partin v. 
St. Francis Hosp., 694 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (statute 
of repose prohibiting medical malpractice lawsuit for injury to 
minor brought more than eight years after the act or omission 
did not violate minor's equal protection rights under rational 
basis test); Bonin v. Vannaman, 929 P.2d 754 (Kan. 1996) (eight-
year statute of repose for claims of persons under legal 
disability does not violate equal protection as it affects 
minors and has a rational basis to goals of ameliorating rapidly 
rising costs of medical malpractice insurance); Brubaker v. 
Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying Kansas law 
and holding that statute requiring both minors and adults to 
bring a cause of action within four years after the act or 
omission does not suffer an equal protection infirmity); Kite v. 
Campbell, 191 Cal. Rptr. 363, 366-67 (Cal. App. 1983), rev'd on 
other grounds, 718 P.2d 909 (1986) (statute requiring minors 
under the age of six to file a medical malpractice action either 
within three years or prior to the eighth birthday did not 
violate equal protection principles); Reese v. Rankin Fite Mem. 
Hosp., 
403 
So.2d 
158 
(Ala. 
1981) 
(statute 
of 
repose 
extinguishing claims of minors at age of eight for alleged 
negligence committed before the age of four survived equal 
protection challenge); Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 413 N.E.2d 891 
(Ind. 1980) (statute of limitations requiring minors to file 
medical malpractice actions within two years from the date of 
the alleged act or omission, except that minors under the full 
age of six have until the eighth birthday in which to file, does 
not violate equal protection). 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
43
which other states set the statute of repose often is less than 
the age of 10 ultimately chosen by our legislature. 
¶77 We recognize that other courts, like this one, have 
not spoken with one voice as to the constitutionality of 
statutes of repose and statutes of limitations.  See Corkill v. 
Knowles, 
955 
P.2d 
438, 
445-47 
(Wyo. 
1998) 
(Thomas, 
J., 
concurring); Scott A. DeVries, Note, Medical Malpractice Acts' 
Statutes of Limitation as They Apply to Minors:  Are They 
Proper?, 28 Ind. L. Rev. 413 (1995); Christopher J. Trombetta, 
Note, The Unconstitutionality of Medical Malpractice Statutes of 
Repose:  Judicial Conscience Versus Legislative Will, 34 Vill. 
L. 
Rev. 
397 
(1989); 
Josephine 
Herring 
Hicks, 
Note, 
The 
Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose:  Federalism Reigns, 38 
Vand. L. Rev. 627 (1985).  Nonetheless, we conclude that the 
cases that strike down statutes of repose for minor claimants 
are distinguishable.  Those decisions explore the different 
legislative purposes underpinning the statutes, undertake the 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
44
equal protection analysis under heightened scrutiny, or strike 
down the statutes on other constitutional grounds.22 
¶78 Taming the costs of medical malpractice and ensuring 
access to affordable health care are legitimate legislative 
objectives.  We therefore hold that the statutes of repose for 
minor medical malpractice actions satisfy the rational basis 
                     
22 See Lyons v. Lederle Laboratories, 440 N.W.2d 769 (S.D. 
1989) (finding that legislative objective was not reduction in 
health care costs but rather desire to reduce the number of 
malpractice claims initiated by minor plaintiffs;  statute 
limited malpractice claims by minors to general three-year 
statute of limitations but allowed child until the age of eight 
to seek recovery for injuries that occur before the age of six); 
Torres v. County of Los Angeles, 257 Cal. Rptr. 211 (Cal. App. 
1989) (finding that a statute of limitations that, for minors 
runs from the date of the alleged act, and for adults runs from 
the date of discovery, violates minors' equal protection); 
Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7, 12 n.9 (Mo. 1986) 
(striking down statute that gave minors until the age of 10 to 
commence actions and afterwards, only two years from the alleged 
malpractice.  Court applied open courts analysis and expressly 
stated that it did not rule on equal protection grounds); Barrio 
v. San Manuel Div. Hosp., Magma Copper, 692 P.2d 280 (Ariz. 
1984) (applying strict scrutiny analysis on the basis of a 
statute that creates a "fundamental right" to recover damages 
for acts of negligence); Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 
452 N.E.2d 1337 (Ohio 1983) (finding violation of equal 
protection under the rational basis test without examining the 
statute's legislative history or rationale and overturning 
statute that required minors over the age of ten to file claims 
within one year of the alleged malpractice);  Sax v. Votteler, 
648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983) (statute allowing minors until the 
age of eight for malpractice committed before the age of six 
violates open courts provision where Texas law dictates that the 
right to recover for medical costs incurred on behalf of a minor 
is a cause of action belonging to the parents); Carson v. 
Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980) (analyzing statute that 
subjected minors to the same two-year limitation period as 
adults, court assessed constitutionality of statute on more 
stringent, middle-tier "fair and substantial" scrutiny).  
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
45
test because they evince a rational relationship between the 
classification scheme and a legitimate governmental objective.  
Accordingly, we hold that Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(1)(b) and 893.56 
do not violate the equal protection provisions of the Wisconsin 
and United States Constitutions. 
DUE PROCESS 
 
¶79 Having concluded that Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(1)(b) and 
893.56 withstand an equal protection challenge, we next examine 
whether the statutes offend due process principles.  Although 
the parties do not present direct arguments about this question, 
we address it because the circuit court ruled in part on the 
basis of procedural due process. 
 
¶80 The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution and art. I, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
prohibit government actions that deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.  "In procedural 
due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a 
constitutionally protected 
interest 
in 
'life, 
liberty, or 
property' 
is 
not 
in 
itself 
unconstitutional; 
what 
is 
unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without 
due process of law."  Casteel v. McCaughtry, 176 Wis. 2d 571, 
579, 500 N.W.2d 277 (1993).  When examining whether there has 
been a violation of procedural due process, this court engages 
in a two-step analysis.  Id.  First, we examine whether the 
person 
has 
established 
that 
a 
constitutionally 
protected 
property or liberty interest is at issue.  Id.; Board of Regents 
of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).  Second, we 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
46
consider whether the procedures attendant with the deprivation 
of the interest were sufficient.  Casteel, 176 Wis. 2d at 579.  
If we determine that the claimant has not been deprived of a 
constitutionally protected interest, we do not reach the second 
step of the analysis.  See id. 
 
¶81 In this case the property interest at issue is 
Aicher's medical malpractice claim.  The constitution does not 
create property interests; rather, they are established and 
defined "by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law-rules or understandings 
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of 
entitlement to those benefits."  Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at 
577.  A right to due process is not violated simply because a 
statute extinguishes a cause of action before a claimant 
discovers the injury.  CLL Assoc. v. Arrowhead Pacific Corp., 
174 Wis. 2d 604, 614, 497 N.W.2d 115 (1993) (citations omitted). 
 Rather, the due process analysis focuses on whether the 
claimant has a vested property interest in the cause of action. 
 
¶82 In Wisconsin, a cause of action is a vested property 
right only if it has accrued.  Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 70 
(Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing Hunter v. School Dist. of 
Gale-Etrrick-Trempealeau, 97 Wis. 2d 435, 445-46, 293 N.W.2d 515 
(1980)).  In tort claims, a cause of action "accrues" when the 
claimant "discovers" the injury.  Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 560.  
"If a statute of repose has run, no legally recognized cause of 
action can accrue and, therefore, no right can vest."  Susan C. 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
47
Randall, Comment, Due Process Challenges to Statutes of Repose, 
40 Sw. L.J. 997, 1007 (1986). 
¶83 In this case Aicher's cause of action accrued when she 
discovered her injury, after she had reached her tenth birthday. 
 At 
that 
point, 
the 
statutes 
of 
repose, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 893.55(1)(b) and 893.56, had run and combined to extinguish 
her cause of action.  The statutes ceased to recognize the 
property interest "before it ever became a property right."  
Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 70-71 (Bradley, J., dissenting).   
¶84 We therefore determine that Aicher has not been 
deprived of a constitutionally protected interest.  Having so 
found, we do not address the question whether the procedures 
attendant with the deprivation of a property interest were 
sufficient. 
CONCLUSION 
¶85 We 
find 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 893.55(1)(b) 
and 
893.56 
constitutional, despite the harsh results they yield in this 
case.  We hold that §§ 893.55(1)(b) and 893.56 do not violate 
the right-to-remedy clause because a prospective claimant does 
not have a legislative right to pursue a medical malpractice 
action if the injury is discovered after the statutory time 
limitation period elapses.  We conclude that §§ 893.55(1)(b) and 
893.56 do not offend equal protection principles because the 
classifications created by the statutes are rationally based on 
legitimate legislative objectives.  We also find that the 
statutes did not violate Aicher's right to procedural due 
process because an unaccrued cause of action does not constitute 
No. 
98-2955  
 
 
48
a constitutionally protected property interest.  Because we 
sustain the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(1)(b) and 
893.56, we do not address whether the one-year-after discovery 
statute of limitations can be severed from the five-year statute 
of repose.  We therefore find that §§ 893.55(1)(b) and 893.56 
bar Aicher's cause of action, and we reverse the decision of the 
circuit court. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed. 
 
 
98-2955.npc 
 
1 
¶86 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  The doors of 
the courthouse have again been closedthis time to children.  
The result of the majority's decision is to deny children such 
as Ame Aicher the opportunity to have their day in court.  This 
result is untenable.  I conclude that the statutes at issue are 
unconstitutional 
as 
applied 
to 
the 
facts 
of 
this 
case.  
Accordingly, I would affirm the circuit court's decision.   
¶87 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) is, in part, a statute 
of repose that extends the deadline for filing a medical 
malpractice action to one year from the date of the injury's 
discovery, but no later than five years after the date of the 
act or omission.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.56 is a statute of 
repose extending the time for minors to initiate a medical 
malpractice claim until they are 10 years old.  The majority 
holds that these two statutes are constitutional because they do 
not violate the right-to-remedy provision of Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 9.  Majority op. at ¶6.  The majority also concludes that the 
statutes do not violate equal protection or procedural due 
process.  Id.  I disagree with the majority's conclusion that 
the statutes are constitutional under art. I, § 9. 
¶88 In Estate of Makos v. Wisconsin Masons Health Care 
Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 67, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997) (Crooks, J., 
concurring), a case presenting an almost identical situation, I 
suggested three principles that I believe a court should 
consider when deciding if a person has been denied the right to 
a remedy, contrary to Wis. Const. art. I, § 9: 
 
98-2955.npc 
 
2 
(1) whether the legislature modified, reduced, or 
eliminated 
a 
post-constitutional 
cause 
of 
action 
created by the legislature itself; (2) whether the 
legislature modified, reduced, or eliminated a common 
law or pre-constitutional statutory cause of action 
and 
provided 
a 
reasonable 
alternative; 
and 
(3) 
whether, 
if 
the 
legislature 
did 
not 
provide 
a 
reasonable alternative, it has established that an 
overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of 
such right exists, and that no reasonable alternative 
exists. 
I concluded in Makos that under these principles, and taking 
into consideration "the unique nature of medical malpractice 
actions," § 893.55(1)(b) violated art. I, § 9.  Id.  Cheryl 
Makos, the plaintiff in that case, filed her medical malpractice 
action within § 893.55(1)(b)'s one-year discovery rule, but 
after the expiration of the five-year statute of repose in 
§ 893.55(1)(b).  Id. at 45.  I joined in the lead opinion's 
conclusion that the statute, as applied in the Makos case, 
violated the right-to-remedy provision in art. I, § 9.  Makos 
did not discover her injury, nor could she have done so, until 
after the statute of repose had run.  Id. at 59.  The right to 
bring a medical malpractice claim was present at common law.  
The legislature, therefore, could not freely eliminate the right 
to bring such a claim.  Id. at 64.  Further, the legislature did 
not provide a reasonable alternative, but completely barred her 
from a remedy.  Id. at 65.  Finally, because the legislature had 
already addressed the "medical malpractice crisis" of the 1970s 
with the enactment of Wis. Stat. ch. 655, there was no need to 
eliminate Makos' right to remedy through § 893.55(1)(b).  Id.  I 
"concluded 
that 
there 
are 
circumstances 
under 
which 
the 
98-2955.npc 
 
3 
legislature cannot eliminate a plaintiff's right to bring a 
cause of action pursuant to a statute of repose without 
violating Wis. Const. art. I, § 9."  Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 
2d 245, 282, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998) (Crooks, J., concurring) 
(citing Makos). 
 
¶89 Other jurisdictions have examined this issue and 
concluded that the harm to children outweighs any legislative 
interest in reining in economic and social costs associated with 
medical malpractice.  The Missouri Supreme Court invalidated a 
statute requiring plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases to 
bring a claim within two years of the injury, unless the 
plaintiff was less than 10 years old, in which case the 
plaintiff had until his or her twelfth birthday to bring a 
claim.  Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Mo. 1986) 
(citing § 516.105, RSMo 1978)).  The Missouri court found that 
the statute violated Mo. Const. art. I, § 14, which is an 
analogous provision to Wis. Const. art. I, § 9.23  The court 
explained that putting such limitations on the ability of 
children to bring claims "plainly ignores the disabilities and 
limitations that childhood, familial relationships, and our 
legal system place upon a minor of tender yearswho has little 
if any understanding of the complexities of our legal system."  
Id. at 10.  Faced with a similar statutory provision and state 
                     
23 Missouri Const. art. I, § 14 states "that the courts of 
justice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy 
afforded for every injury to person . . . ."  Strahler v. St. 
Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7, 8-9 (Mo. 1986).  
98-2955.npc 
 
4 
constitution, the Texas Supreme Court also concluded that the 
limitations period violated the Texas Constitution's right to 
redress provision.  Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 
1983).      
 
¶90 In this case Aicher did not discover her eye condition 
until after her tenth birthday, and did not file a claim through 
her guardian ad litem until she was 13, after the time periods 
in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) and Wis. Stat. § 893.56 had 
expired.  For the same reasons as I found the application of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) to be unconstitutional in Makos, I 
find the application of the statutes to be unconstitutional 
here.  The statutes are unconstitutional as applied to Ame 
Aicher because the time for filing an action on her behalf 
expired before she even discovered her injury.  The courthouse 
door has been closed to her completely, and she has been denied 
her right to a remedy in violation of art. I, § 9. 
 
¶91 I also address the majority's summary conclusion that 
Makos carries no precedential weight, and the majority's 
subsequent reliance on the Makos dissent.24  Majority op. at ¶40. 
 This court has already adopted the United State Supreme Court's 
treatment of plurality opinions in applying the holdings of that 
Court.  Lounge Management v. Town of Trenton, 219 Wis. 2d 13, 
                     
24 I further note the majority's inconsistency in finding 
that the Makos decision has no precedential value, and then 
repeatedly seeming to refer to the Makos dissent as precedent.  
One wonders why the majority finds it necessary to overrule 
Makos if indeed it has no precedential value.  Majority op. at 
¶40.  
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21-22, 580 N.W.2d 156 (1998).  In a plurality "'the holding of 
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.'"  Id. 
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 [] (1976) 
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).  See also Marks 
v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).  This court should 
apply the plurality decision in Makos to this case and should 
continue to acknowledge its precedential weight. 
 
¶92 In sum, I would apply the three-part test I discussed 
in Makos and reiterated in Tomczak to the facts of this case and 
hold that the statutes of repose involved§§ 893.55(1)(b) and 
893.56are unconstitutional as applied to Ame Aicher.  To do 
otherwise closes the door of the courthouse to young children 
such as Ame Aicher and denies them the right to a remedy in 
violation of Wis. Const. art. I, § 9.  For these reasons, I 
respectfully dissent.   
 
¶93 I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH joins this dissent.  
 
 
 
 
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