Title: Davis v. Campbell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S43896
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: October 22, 1998

Filed: October 22, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

HARVEY and WENDY DAVIS,

	Respondents on Review,

	v.

DUNCAN CAMPBELL,

	Petitioner on Review.

(CC 94CV0255; CA A87714; SC S43896)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted September 5, 1997.

	Lisa A. Maybee, of Arnold, Gallagher, Saydack, Percell &amp;
Roberts, P.C., Eugene, argued the cause and filed the petition
for petitioner on review.

	Michael R. Stebbins, of Stebbins &amp; Coffey, North Bend,
argued the cause and filed the response for respondents on
review.

	Annette E. Talbott, Portland, filed a brief for amicus
curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.**

	VAN HOOMISSEN, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.	

	*Appeal from Coos County Circuit Court,

	 Robert F. Walberg, Judge.

	 144 Or App 288, 925 P2d 1248 (1996).

	**Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision.

		VAN HOOMISSEN, J.

		This case involves a claim for damages under the Oregon
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (RLTA), ORS 90.100 et seq.
(1991).  The issue is whether a tenant, who seeks damages for an
alleged violation of the RLTA's habitability requirements, must
prove that the landlord knew or should have known of the alleged
violation.  The circuit court concluded that the tenant must
prove that the landlord knew or should have known of the
violation.  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the RLTA
imposes statutory liability on the landlord, even if the landlord
had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the violation. 
Davis v. Campbell, 144 Or App 288, 925 P2d 1248 (1996).  For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

		Plaintiffs rented a house from defendant in 1991.  In 
1993, heat transmitting through chimney bricks in a fireplace
caused a fire that destroyed the house.  At the time of the fire,
neither plaintiffs nor defendant had experienced any problems
with the fireplace and neither party was aware that its condition
presented a fire hazard.

		Plaintiffs brought this action asserting two claims,
one under the RLTA and one for common-law negligence.  In support
of their RLTA claim, plaintiffs alleged that the "fire was a
direct result of the defendant's failure to maintain the
residence in a habitable condition in that the residence
substantially lacked safety from the hazards of fire."  
Defendant denied that allegation and, after discovery, moved for
summary judgment on both claims.  Plaintiffs then stipulated to
the dismissal of their negligence claim.  

		On the RTLA claim, defendant argued that plaintiffs had
to "set forth evidence that the Defendant knew, or should have
known, that there was a latent defect in the fireplace chimney
which created a fire hazard."  Because, in defendant's view,
plaintiffs had not made such a showing, he argued that their
statutory claim failed.  Plaintiffs responded that
"foreseeability is not a necessary element where the plaintiffs
have plead [sic] a [statutory] violation * * * and this violation
resulted in an injury to the very people the statute was designed
to protect." 

		The circuit court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the RTLA claim.  Plaintiffs appealed from the
resulting judgment and from a supplemental judgment for costs and
attorney fees.  The Court of Appeals reversed.  144 Or App at
293. 

		The parties do not dispute the material facts. 
Therefore, we must determine whether the undisputed facts entitle
defendant to judgment as a matter of law.  Lane Transit District
v. Lane County, 327 Or 161, 167, 957 P2d 1217 (1998).  To answer
that question, we must construe several provisions of the 1991
version of the RLTA, the version of the act in effect at the time
of the events in question.  Our task is to discern the
legislature's intent.  ORS 174.020; see PGE v. Bureau of Labor
and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993)
(explaining metholology).  In doing so, "the text of the
statutory provision itself is the starting point for
interpretation and is the best evidence of the legislature's
intent," and we give words of common usage their "plain, natural,
and ordinary meaning."  Id. at 610-11.  At the first level of
analysis, the court examines the provision in context, "which
includes [among other considerations] other provisions of the
same statute and other related statutes."  Ibid.  Case law
interpreting the statute also is considered at our first level of
analysis.  State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 532, ___ P2d ___ (1998). 
If the legislature's intent is clear based on a textual and
contextual inquiry, further analysis is unnecessary.  Ibid. 

		This court has stated that the RLTA, which the
legislature enacted in 1973, was intended to clarify and restate
the rights and obligations of tenants and landlords.  L &amp; M
Investment Co. v. Morrison, 286 Or 397, 405, 594 P2d 1238
(1979).(1)  One of the RLTA's most important provisions requires
landlords to maintain a dwelling in a "habitable condition." 
Ibid.  As relevant here, that provision, ORS 90.320(1)(j) (1991),
provided:

		"A landlord shall at all times during the tenancy
maintain the dwelling unit in a habitable condition. 
For purposes of this section, a dwelling unit shall be
considered unhabitable if it substantially lacks:

		"* * * * *

		"(j) Safety from the hazards of fire[.]"  

		ORS 90.360 (1991) stated the remedies for a violation
of the RLTA's habitability requirements and provided, in part:

		"[With exceptions that do not apply here,] the
tenant may recover damages and obtain injunctive relief
for any noncompliance by the landlord with the rental
agreement or ORS 90.320."  ORS 90.360(2) (1991).(2)

We must determine whether those two statutes required that
landlords be held liable for habitability violations, even if
they had no actual or constructive knowledge of the violation. 

		We begin with a textual analysis of the remedy
provision, ORS 90.360(2) (1991).  That statute is unambiguous. 
As the Court of Appeals explained:

	"There is no mention of a landlord's knowledge as a
condition of recovery under ORS 90.360(2).  The statute
says that 'the tenant may recover damages * * * for any
noncompliance' with the habitability requirements of
ORS 90.320 [(1991)].  The statute does not say 'any
negligent noncompliance.'  Nor does it refer to
'noncompliance after notice from the tenant' or
'noncompliance when the landlord knew or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known' of the
nonhabitable condition.  It simply says that a tenant
may bring an action for damages for 'any noncompliance'
with the habitability requirements of the RLTA,
regardless of the landlord's knowledge or lack of
knowledge of the condition of the premises."  Davis,
144 Or App at 293-94 (emphasis in original).

We agree.  In construing a statute, we may not "insert what has
been omitted, or * * * omit what has been inserted * * *."  ORS
174.010; PGE, 317 Or at 611 (same).  Defendant's proffered
construction would have us do just that.

		We similarly discern no textual ambiguity in the
habitability requirement, ORS 90.320(1)(j) (1991).  As this court
noted in Napolski v. Champney, 295 Or 408, 415, 667 P2d 1013
(1983), referring to what later became ORS 90.320 (1991):  "[T]he
act affirmatively obligates residential landlords to maintain
rental properties in 'habitable condition' * * *."  (Emphasis
added.)  Under the plain terms of the statute, a landlord fails
to fulfill that affirmative obligation if, at any time during the
tenancy, the dwelling unit substantially lacks safety from the
hazards of fire.  ORS 90.320(1)(j) (1991).  The statute did not
provide that a dwelling unit shall be considered uninhabitable
only if the tenant is able to prove that the landlord either knew
or should have known that the unit was unsafe from fire.  The
fact that a dwelling unit substantially lacks safety from fire --
without regard to a landlord's knowledge, actual or constructive
-- is sufficient to establish a statutory violation.  To adopt
defendant's contrary construction of ORS 90.320(1)(j) (1991)
would require us to insert text into the statute. 

		Accordingly, when read together, the statutes textually
provided that, if at any time during a tenancy, the dwelling unit
substantially lacks safety from the hazards of fire, i.e., there
has been a "noncompliance" by the landlord for purposes of ORS
90.360(2) (1991), then the tenant may "recover damages and obtain
injunctive relief."  We see nothing in the text of either statute
that suggests that the legislature intended to include actual or
constructive knowledge as a prerequisite to landlord liability.   

		Turning to the context of the statutes, other remedy
provisions in the RLTA -- which specifically address a landlord's
state of mind -- lend support to our textual conclusion that ORS
90.320(1)(j) (1991) and 90.360(2) (1991) did not impose an actual
or constructive knowledge requirement.  For example, the RLTA
(with text that has not varied substantially since its enactment
in 1973) prohibits the use of certain provisions in rental
agreements:

	"If a landlord deliberately uses a rental agreement
containing provisions known by the landlord to be
prohibited and attempts to enforce such provisions, the
tenant may recover in addition to the actual damages of
the tenant an amount up to three months' periodic
rent."  ORS 90.245(2) (emphasis added).

Also, with respect to the provision of essential services, the
RLTA has provided that if "the landlord deliberately refuses or
is grossly negligent in failing to supply" such services, the
tenant is entitled to seek certain, specified remedies.  ORS
90.365 (emphasis added).

		Further, the RLTA has provided that

		"If a landlord * * * willfully diminishes or
seriously attempts or seriously attempts or seriously
threatens unlawfully to diminish services to the tenant
by interrupting or causing the interruption of heat,
running water, hot water, electric or other essential
service, the tenant may * * * terminate the rental
agreement and recover an amount up to two months'
periodic rent or twice the actual damages sustained by
the tenant, whichever is greater."  ORS 90.375.

		Finally, with respect to a landlord storing a tenant's
abandoned personal property, the RLTA originally provided as
follows: 

		"The landlord shall not be responsible for any
loss to the tenant resulting from storage unless the
loss was caused by the landlord's deliberate or
negligent act.  In the event of deliberate and
malicious violation the landlord shall be liable for
twice the actual damages sustained by the tenant."  ORS
91.840(4) (1973) (emphasis added).(3)

	We believe that the foregoing examples demonstrate that

	"when the legislature wanted to incorporate elements of
common-law negligence as conditions of a tenant's
remedies, it did so.  It did not do so in ORS 90.360
[(1991)], which provides that a tenant may recover
damages for a landlord's violation of habitability
standards without reference to the landlord's knowledge
of the condition of the premises."  Davis, 144 Or App
at 294.

	     Against that textual and contextual analysis, defendant
contends that the result we reach today is inconsistent with
section 358 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), which he
asserts "was not overruled by the enactment of the RLTA" and "has
been adopted in Richards v. Dahl, 289 Or 747, 618 P2d 418
(1980)."(4)  Oregon generally has looked to the Restatement when
considering common-law landlord and tenant claims.  See, e.g.,
Richards, 289 Or at 749 ("We have previously stated that the
principles announced in the Restatement of Torts (Second) reflect
our views of the law governing the liability of a landlord to a
tenant.").  But see Park v. Hoffard, 315 Or 624, 629, 847 P2d 852
(1993) (stating that the Restatement will continue to apply
except when its rules "are based on outmoded understandings of
legal relationships").  Defendant's assertion, however, does not
advance his claim.  Unlike Richards, this appeal does not involve
a negligence action.  Plaintiffs dismissed their negligence claim
in circuit court.  Rather, we are concerned here only with
statutory liability.

		Given the lack of contrary legislative intent, a tenant
may choose to maintain claims of common-law negligence and
statutory liability against a landlord in the same action.  See
Bellikka v. Green, 306 Or 630, 638, 762 P2d 997 (1988) ("The RLTA
does not supersede the common law in all aspects of personal
injury liability.").  Accordingly, the fact that section 358
might apply to a common-law negligence claim brought by a tenant
says nothing about whether the legislature intended that legal
standard to apply to a statutory claim under the RLTA.  See
Gattman v. Favro, 306 Or 11, 15, 757 P2d 402 (1988) ("if a
statutory tort is created, foreseeability may be immaterial or
has been determined by the legislature").  The text and context
of ORS 90.320(1)(j) (1991) and 90.360(2) (1991) demonstrate that
the legislature did not intend that a landlord's liability under
the RLTA's habitability provisions be conditioned on the landlord
having actual or constructive knowledge of the condition of a
dwelling unit.  Simply because a different standard might apply
in an action for common-law negligence arising from the same
event does nothing to alter that conclusion.

		Based on an examination of the text and context of the
statutes at issue, we conclude that the legislature's intent is
clear.  A tenant is not required to prove that a landlord had
either actual or constructive knowledge of an uninhabitable
condition under ORS 90.320(1)(j) (1991) to prevail on a statutory
claim for damages under ORS 90.360(2) (1991).  The trial court
erred in drawing a contrary conclusion and in allowing
defendant's motion for summary judgment.  The Court of Appeals
correctly reversed the judgment of the trial court.

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.	

1. 	For a discussion of the history of the RLTA's
enactment, including its judicial and legislative precursors, see
John H. Van Landingham, IV, Comment, The Evolution of the Oregon
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 56 Or L Rev 655 (1977).  See
also Mark W. Cordes, Comment, Landlord-Tenant Reform in Oregon: 
The Impact of L &amp; M Investment Co. v. Morrison and Brewer v.
Erwin, 16 Willamette L Rev 835 (1980) (discussing the RLTA and
its early interpretations); Napolski v. Champney, 295 Or 408,
414-15, 667 P2d 1013 (1983) (providing a history of landlord and
tenant law).

2. 	The legislature amended ORS 90.360 in 1997, after the
Court of Appeals issued its decision in this case.  ORS 90.360(2)
now provides:

		"Except as provided in this chapter, the tenant
may recover damages and obtain injunctive relief for
any noncompliance by the landlord with the rental
agreement or ORS 90.320.  The tenant shall not be
entitled to recover damages for a landlord
noncompliance with ORS 90.320 if the landlord neither
knew nor reasonably should have known of the condition
that constituted the noncompliance and:

		"(a)  The tenant knew or reasonably should have
known of the condition and failed to give actual notice
to the landlord in a reasonable time prior to the
occurrence of the personal injury, damage to personal
property, diminution in rental value or other tenant
loss resulting from the noncompliance; or

		"(b)  The condition was caused after the tenancy
began by the deliberate or negligent act or omission of
someone other than the landlord or a person acting on
behalf of the landlord."

		This decision involves only the 1991 version of ORS
90.360(2), not its 1997 formulation.

3. 	For the subsection's present formulation, see ORS
90.425(13) (1997) and its surrounding statutory counterparts. 

4. 	Restatement (Second) of Torts § 358 (1965) provides:

		"(1) A lessor of land who conceals or fails to
disclose to his lessee any condition, whether natural
or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk of
physical harm to persons on the land, is subject to
liability to the lessee and others upon the land with
the consent of the lessee or his sublessee for physical
harm caused by the condition after the lessee has taken
possession if, 

		"(a) the lessee does not know or have reason to
know of the condition or the risk involved, and 

		"(b) the lessor knows or has reason to know of the
condition, and realizes or should realize the risk
involved, and his reason to expect that the lessee will
not discover the condition or realize the risk.

		"(2) If the lessee actively conceals the
condition, the liability stated in Subsection (1)
continues until the lessee discovers it and has
reasonable opportunity to take effective precautions
against it.  Otherwise the liability continues only
until the vendee has had reasonable opportunity to
discover the condition and to take such precautions."