Title: Massachusetts v. Herndon
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11702
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 26, 2016

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revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11702 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  FRANKIE HERNDON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 11, 2016. - August 26, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, & Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Evidence, Identification.  Identification.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Sequestration of 
witnesses, Public trial.  Constitutional Law, Public trial. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 19, 2011. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Patrick F. Brady, J. 
 
 
 
Theodore F. Riordan (Deborah Bates with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney (Joseph F. 
Jimezic, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  A Superior Court jury found the defendant, 
Frankie Herndon, guilty of murder in the first degree of Derrick 
Barnes on the theory of deliberate premeditation and of 
                     
 
1 Justices Spina and Cordy participated in the deliberation 
on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
possession of a firearm without a license.  On appeal, the 
defendant challenges (1) the failure of the judge to instruct 
the jury on eyewitness identification in accordance with the 
defendant's requested instruction that was created after State 
v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011), and that presaged this 
court's provisional eyewitness identification instructions set 
forth in Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352 (2015); (2) the 
admission in evidence, through the testimony of two police 
officers, of an alleged out-of-court identification of the 
defendant and his codefendant, Frederick Henderson, by a witness 
although that witness did not testify concerning that alleged 
identification; and (3) the naming of the defendant's sister as 
a witness, which resulted in her sequestration from the court 
room.  We affirm the defendant's convictions. 
 
Background.  From the evidence presented, the jury could 
have found the following facts.  At some point before moving 
with their family to a town outside Boston, the victim and his 
brother Darryl Barnes (Darryl) had lived on Fayston Street in 
the Dorchester section of Boston.  On August 27, 2011, Darryl 
and the victim returned there to visit people they knew from 
childhood and who were participating in a festival in Boston.  
Between approximately 5 and 5:30 P.M., Darryl parked his 
automobile on the street.  The victim and Darryl left the 
vehicle and walked along the street, where they met their cousin 
3 
 
 
Rondale Williams.  The victim, Darryl, and Williams continued to 
walk and stopped in front of one house on the street.  After a 
few minutes, Darryl left to drive another cousin home.  Shantee 
Griffin, who stayed with her mother next door, approached where 
the victim and Williams were talking, and the victim introduced 
himself to Griffin. 
 
At some point, the victim and Williams moved to the area of 
a front porch directly across the street.2  Williams was on the 
porch while the victim was standing on the stairs leading up to 
the porch with another man and a woman.  At 7:05 P.M., the 
defendant and Henderson walked along the street and stopped at 
the porch steps.  Words were exchanged among the defendant, 
Henderson, and the victim for less than a minute, but long 
enough for the victim to say, "I'm saying, mother, you want to 
holler at me, holler at me then" and for the defendant to say, 
"[N]ow, what's up with that rattin' shit?"  After this exchange, 
the defendant and Henderson each drew a gun and fired multiple 
shots at the victim,3 and the victim fell.  The defendant turned 
                     
 
2 The police obtained video footage from cameras that had 
captured images of the street around the time of the shooting.  
The images showed two men approach the porch steps around 7:05 
P.M. and the victim being shot multiple times by at least one of 
the two men.  However, the identities of the shooters could not 
be determined from the video. 
 
 
3 Shantee Griffin testified that the defendant shot the 
initial shots; Rondale Williams stated Henderson fired the 
initial shot. 
4 
 
 
and began to walk away but then turned back to the stairs of the 
porch, and as the victim put his arm up, the defendant shot the 
victim again.  The defendant then put away the gun he was 
holding and "walked off like normal." 
 
Williams ran from the porch to a nearby house and 
telephoned 911.  Griffin, who was on the sidewalk in front of 
another nearby house during the shooting, also telephoned 911.  
She handed the telephone to a resident of Fayston Street, 
proceeded to where the victim was lying, and applied pressure on 
his chest in an attempt to stop the bleeding.  Darryl returned 
minutes after his brother had been shot and ran to where the 
victim was lying.  Minutes later, Boston police and emergency 
medical services responded to the scene.  The victim, who was 
alert but unable to respond, was transported to a hospital, 
where he was pronounced dead not long after his arrival.  He had 
received five gunshot wounds, including fatal wounds to the head 
and in the area of his right lower leg.  Ballistic examination 
of shell casings found at the scene revealed that two different 
guns were used in the shooting. 
 
The Commonwealth's theory of the case was that the 
defendant and Henderson shot the victim because in 2009 the 
victim had testified, revealing information contrary to the 
defendant's "no snitching code."  According to the defendant, 
"bad things" happen to snitches and they could get shot.  
5 
 
 
Although the defendant and the victim grew up together and were 
together almost every day until 2009, after 2009 they "stopped 
hanging out." 
 
The evidence pointing to the defendant and Henderson as the 
two men who shot and killed the victim primarily consisted of 
identifications allegedly made by Griffin and Williams.  The 
Commonwealth called both Griffin and Williams to testify at 
trial, but neither of them identified the defendant or Henderson 
as a shooter in their trial testimony.  Rather, the evidence of 
identifications, in Griffin's case, consisted of the following:  
(1) testimony by Sergeant Detective James J. Wyse that he spoke 
with Griffin by telephone on the night of the shooting and she 
identified "Jigga" (the defendant) and "Drano" (Henderson) as 
being the two men involved in the shooting and Jigga as the 
shooter;4 (2) evidence of Griffin's recorded statements to Wyse 
and Detective Jeramiah Benton a few days after the shooting 
where she identified the defendant and "Drano" as the two men 
who approached the porch steps and the defendant as the man who 
                     
 
4 Two other officers who spoke with Griffin on the night of 
the shooting also testified at trial.  While still at the scene 
of the shooting, Griffin told one officer that she heard gunfire 
but saw nothing.  Another officer also spoke with Griffin at the 
scene, and she told him that she was in front of her house when 
the shooting happened and that she saw one shooter.  She further 
stated that she did not want to speak with him at that moment 
but provided him with her telephone number and told him that he 
could telephone her. 
6 
 
 
shot the victim several times;5 and (3) Griffin's grand jury 
testimony -- about which she was questioned at trial and a 
redacted copy of which was introduced as an exhibit again 
identifying the defendant and Henderson as being at the scene of 
the shooting and the defendant as the shooter.6,7 
 
As for Williams, the evidence of his identifications 
consisted of testimony by the two Boston police detectives, 
Benton and Wyse, about statements Williams made during an 
unrecorded interview they conducted of him on September 2, 2012, 
in the apartment of Williams's mother.  According to the 
detectives' testimony, Williams identified "Drano" as firing the 
first shot and "Jigga" as firing subsequent shots. 
 
The defendant testified.  He stated that on the day in 
question, he was at a festival where he met friends, including 
Thell Valentine.  He then left with Valentine and went to 
Valentine's apartment around 5 P.M.  They stayed at Valentine's 
apartment for a while and then drove around until about 11:30 
P.M.  Valentine's testimony corroborated this timeline and more 
                     
 
5 The interview was tape recorded and the recording was 
admitted in evidence as an exhibit. 
 
 
6 At trial, Griffin claimed that she felt pressured to 
answer questions a certain way during police questioning and at 
the grand jury. 
 
 
7 Although Griffin testified before the grand jury that she 
was directly across the street when the shots occurred, the 
surveillance video shows Griffin farther down the street. 
7 
 
 
specifically explained that he and the defendant were still at 
his apartment at the time of the shooting and left his apartment 
around 8 P.M.8 
 
The defendant was sentenced to life in prison on the murder 
charge and a concurrent term of from four to five years in 
prison for unlawful possession of a firearm.9  The defendant 
filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 
Discussion.  a.  Eyewitness identification instruction.  
The defendant requested an instruction on eyewitness 
identification that was essentially identical to the instruction 
that was developed after the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision 
in State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. at 298-299.  See Gomes, 470 
Mass. at 357 n.10.  The judge declined to give the defendant's 
requested instruction, stating that he would use the model 
instruction provided in Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 
296, 310-311 (1979) (Appendix), S.C., 419 Mass. 1006 (1995).10  
                     
 
8 Henderson similarly presented an alibi defense, but did 
not testify. 
 
 
9 The second offense and armed career criminal portions of 
the conviction of possession of a firearm were dismissed on 
motion of the Commonwealth and with the defendant's assent. 
 
10 The judge further responded to the defendant's requested 
identification instruction by stating, "I read it.  I considered 
it.  Maybe good, maybe considered better, but not by me.  I'm 
just going with what I have [the Rodriguez instructions]."  The 
judge clarified, however, that "[t]hat doesn't mean that 
[defense counsel] can't argue numerous other factors that may 
have affected the ID." 
 
8 
 
 
The defendant claims that the judge erred by giving the model 
instruction in Rodriguez, rather than the instruction he 
requested, especially in light of this court's recent adoption 
of the more inclusive instructions provisionally adopted in 
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. at 376.11  See id. at 379-388 
(Appendix).  Because the defendant objected to the judge's 
eyewitness identification instruction, we review for prejudicial 
error.  See Commonwealth v. Meas, 467 Mass. 434, 454, cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 150 (2014).  We conclude that the judge did 
not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant's proposed 
instruction and therefore that there was no prejudicial error.  
See Gomes, supra at 359. 
 
Similar to the instruction adopted in Gomes, the 
defendant's requested instruction contained various principles 
regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification and human 
memory that were not included in the Rodriguez instruction:  (1) 
human memory is not like a video recording; (2) a witness's 
level of confidence may not be an indication of the reliability 
of the identification; (3) the accuracy of the identification 
may be affected by a witness's stress at the time of the crime, 
the presence of a weapon distracting the witness's focus, and 
                     
 
11 Following our decision in Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 
Mass. 352, 376 (2015), we approved a new model instruction on 
eyewitness identification that includes some revisions to the 
Gomes provisional instruction.  See Model Jury Instructions on 
Eyewitness Identification, 473 Mass. 1051 (2015). 
9 
 
 
any influence of alcohol or drugs; and (4) information provided 
to a witness by other witnesses or outside sources may affect 
the reliability of the witness's identification.  Each of the 
factors raised by the defendant's alternative instruction is 
supported by the scientific principles regarding eyewitness 
identification summarized in the Report and Recommendations of 
the Superior Judicial Court Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence 
(report);12 the report served as the impetus for the provisional 
instructions in Gomes and the Model Jury Instructions on 
Eyewitness Identification, 473 Mass. 1051 (2015).  As we 
recently noted in Commonwealth v. Navarro, 474 Mass. 247 (2016), 
however, the report itself does not represent a binding 
statement of governing law, and neither the provisional nor the 
new model eyewitness identification instructions were in 
existence at the time of the defendant's trial.  See id. at 253.  
Thus, despite the alignment of the defendant's proposed 
instruction with the report's conclusions and our new 
instructions, we look to the law in effect at the time of the 
defendant's trial, and the judge acted well within his 
discretion in using the Rodriguez instruction.  See Navarro, 
supra at 251. 
                     
 
12 Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on Eyewitness 
Evidence:  Report and Recommendations to the Justices (July 25, 
2013), http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/eyewitness-
evidence-report-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/WY4M-YNZN]. 
10 
 
 
 
Like the defendant here, the defendant in Gomes requested a 
more expansive eyewitness identification instruction than the 
Rodriguez model instruction, based on the New Jersey Supreme 
Court's analysis in the Henderson decision.  Although the 
provisional instruction we adopted in Gomes included most of the 
points or principles relating to eyewitness identification 
instruction that were discussed in Henderson, 208 N.J. at 245-
276, 298-299, we did so explicitly on a prospective basis, 
Gomes, 470 Mass. at 376.  We concluded that the judge in that 
case did not err in declining the defendant Gomes's instruction 
request and using the model Rodriguez charge, where the 
defendant had failed to provide the judge "with any expert 
testimony, scholarly articles, or treatises that would 
reasonably have enabled the judge to determine whether the 
principles in the defendant's proposed instruction were 'so 
generally accepted' that it would be appropriate to instruct the 
jury regarding them."  Gomes, supra at 359-360.  The defendant 
in the present case is in the same position as the defendant in 
Gomes, having presented no evidence to demonstrate that the 
principles in his requested instruction were so generally 
accepted that the judge was obliged to give that instruction; 
defense counsel's reference to instructions sparked by the 
Henderson case alone did not satisfy this requirement.  See 
Gomes, supra at 357 n.10.  The judge here did not abuse his 
11 
 
 
discretion or otherwise err in declining to give the defendant's 
requested eyewitness identification instruction and giving 
instead a version of the model Rodriguez instruction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 18 (2015).13 
 
The defendant alternatively argues that the judge declined 
to adopt the defendant's proposed eyewitness identification 
instruction because the judge incorrectly believed he had no 
authority to do so.  He avers that the judge's failure to give 
the proposed instruction based on this legally erroneous belief 
                     
 
13 The defendant claims that, despite the explicit directive 
for prospective application of the provisional instruction in 
Gomes, this court nonetheless may apply the instruction 
retrospectively.  The defendant relies on Commonwealth v. 
Brescia, 471 Mass. 381, 392 (2015), and Commonwealth v. Rivera, 
82 Mass. App. Ct. 839, 844-848 (2012), to make his point.  The 
two cited cases presented different issues from those in this 
case.  In Brescia, we concluded that the motion judge properly 
granted a new trial not because of a retrospective application 
of a new rule of law adopted after the defendant's trial, but 
because, given that the defendant had suffered a stroke during 
his trial, "the fairness of [the] trial was hampered by an 
extraordinary confluence of factors."  Brescia, supra at 392.  
In Rivera, the Appeals Court applied instructions announced by 
this court in Commonwealth v. Berry, 457 Mass. 602, 617-618 
(2010), S.C., 466 Mass. 763 (2014), a case decided after the 
trial in Rivera, in order to prevent a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice, where the change in instructions went 
to the heart of the defendant's case.  Rivera, supra at 847-848.  
The instructions provided to the jury in the defendant's case 
neither threatened the integrity of the trial nor caused a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Further, 
the provisional eyewitness identification instruction announced 
in Gomes did not create a "new rule" of constitutional law, 
warranting application to pending cases or those on direct 
appeal at the time Gomes was decided.  Compare Commonwealth v. 
Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 256-257 (2014), S.C. 470 Mass. 837 
(2015), and 472 Mass. 448 (2015), and cases cited. 
12 
 
 
constituted reversible error, citing Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 
Mass. 714, 728-729 (2005).  The record does not support the 
claim that the judge operated under the mistaken belief that he 
lacked authority to adopt the requested instruction.  To the 
contrary, the judge read and considered the proposed 
instruction, but ultimately denied the request because he 
preferred to use the model Rodriquez charge. 
 
b.  Introduction of Williams's pretrial statement of 
identification through detectives.  i.  Additional facts.  
During the presentation of its case, the Commonwealth called 
Williams as a witness.  Toward the end of his testimony, the 
prosecutor asked him: 
 
Q.:  "Mr. Williams, did you speak with homicide 
detective on the 2nd of September of 2011?" 
 
 
A.:  "Don't know the exact date." 
 
 
Q.:  "Did you speak with homicide detectives in the 
afternoon some day shortly after Derrick Barnes was 
murdered?" 
 
 
A.:  "Not that I recall." 
 
The prosecutor did not ask Williams any further questions about 
the meeting with the homicide detectives.  Similarly, defense 
counsel did not ask any questions about such a meeting during 
his cross-examination of Williams.  The Commonwealth then called 
Benton as a witness.  Benton testified that he and Wyse met with 
13 
 
 
Williams on September 2, 2011.14  He said that during the 
meeting, Williams identified Drano and Jigga as having walked up 
to the front of the porch on August 27, that Drano drew a gun 
and fired the first shot at the victim, and that subsequently 
Jigga also shot the victim.  At a later point, Wyse similarly 
testified about statements Williams made to him and Benton 
identifying Jigga and Drano as the men who shot the victim. 
 
The defendant objected to this evidence of Williams's 
identification, arguing that it was hearsay and could only be 
admitted for purposes of impeachment, and that the manner in 
which the evidence was being presented violated his 
constitutional right to confrontation.  His counsel made the 
particular point that by failing to question Williams himself 
about the identification while Williams was testifying as a 
trial witness, the Commonwealth had deprived the defendant of 
his right to cross-examine Williams about it.  The judge 
overruled the objection, and referencing Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(3)(C) (2016), the judge ruled that the evidence of 
Williams's identification reflected in Benton's testimony was 
admissible substantively.  The judge suggested that the 
defendant was free to recall Williams as part of the defense 
case in order to further question him about the identification, 
                     
 
14 The interview with Williams was not recorded.  Wyse, whom 
the Commonwealth called as a witness following Benton, testified 
that Williams had declined to be recorded. 
14 
 
 
but that the judge would not require the Commonwealth to recall 
the witness for this purpose. 
 
ii.  Analysis.  In this appeal, the defendant renews his 
argument that his right to confrontation under the United States 
and Massachusetts Constitutions was violated where the 
Commonwealth introduced evidence of Williams's alleged 
identification through third parties without first asking 
Williams, during the prosecutor's direct examination of 
Williams, about the identification.  He claims that the 
constitutional error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and that he is entitled to a new trial as a result.15 
For evidence of a witness's prior identification of a 
defendant (or another person) to be presented by a third party 
and admissible as substantive evidence at trial, it is essential 
that the identifying witness himself or herself be available to 
testify and subject to cross-examination about the alleged 
identification statement.  See Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le, 444 
Mass. 431, 437-439 (2005); Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(C).  See 
also United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559-560 (1988).  
                     
 
15 Because the jury found Henderson guilty of murder in the 
first degree, the defendant argues that the jury must have 
credited Williams's identification given that his 
identification, as testified to by Benton and Wyse at trial, was 
the only evidence that identified Henderson as a shooter.  
Griffin, who provided the only other identification evidence at 
trial, implicated only the defendant as having shot the victim, 
not Henderson. 
15 
 
 
Neither Cong Duc Le nor any subsequent case, however, has 
considered the question whether, before a third party is 
permitted to testify about an identification witness's alleged 
prior identification, the identification witness must first be 
called to testify about the circumstances of that earlier 
identification and be subject to cross-examination.  We conclude 
that this ordering of presentation of witnesses is not 
constitutionally required, but in the trial of criminal cases 
after this case, as a matter of criminal procedure, the 
Commonwealth shall be required to question a putative 
identification witness concerning an alleged prior 
identification before it seeks to introduce substantive evidence 
of that identification through a third party, thereby providing 
direct notice to the defendant of the issue and an opportunity 
for the defendant to cross-examine the putative identification 
witness in a timely manner.  In this case, however, the fact 
that the prosecutor did not inquire specifically of Williams 
about his alleged prior identification during the interview the 
detectives conducted on September 2, before Benton and Wyse 
testified on that topic, did not constitute reversible error. 
In Cong Duc Le, we adopted Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(1)(C), which provides that statements of identification 
are admissible substantively so long as "[t]he declarant 
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
16 
 
 
examination concerning the statement," regardless of whether the 
witness admits, denies, or does not remember the statement.  
Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. at 436, quoting Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(1)(C).  Accord Commonwealth v. Spray, 467 Mass. 456, 
470 (2014) ("Testimony by a third party, such as a police 
officer, regarding a witness's extrajudicial identification is 
substantively admissible if the identifying witness is unable or 
unwilling to make an identification in court and is available 
for cross-examination" [citation omitted]).16 
This evidentiary rule undoubtedly implicates a defendant's 
constitutional right to confrontation.  See Cong Duc Le, 444 
Mass. at 437-439.  See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 
155-158 (1970).  This court and the Supreme Court of the United 
States have made clear that the confrontation clause requires 
that a full opportunity be available to cross-examine the 
declarant witness about the statement.  See Owens, 484 U.S. at 
559 (defendant must have full and fair opportunity to bring out 
                     
 
16 The proposed evidence rule set out in Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(1)(C) (2016) applies to an out-of-court identification 
based on a witness's familiarity with the person identified and 
is not limited to identifications made through a photographic 
array, show-up, or other formal identification procedure.  See 
Commonwealth v. Adams, 458 Mass. 766, 770-772 (2011).  Further, 
the proposed rule is not intended to render a witness's entire 
statement admissible, but only those parts of the statement 
necessary to provide a reasonable context for the 
identification.  Id. at 772.  The trial judge adhered to this 
limitation. 
 
17 
 
 
witness's bad memory and other facts tending to discredit his 
testimony such as "witness'[s] bias, his lack of care and 
attentiveness, his poor eyesight"); Cong Duc Le, supra at 438 
(requirement under Mass. G. Evid. § 801[d][1][C] "would be 
satisfied as long as the witness is placed on the stand, under 
oath, and responds willingly to questions" [quotation and 
citation omitted]).  But this court has never required that a 
full opportunity to cross-examine must follow a prosecutor's 
asking the witness about the alleged identification on direct 
examination.17  A meaningful opportunity to cross-examine does 
not "guarantee a 'cross-examination that is effective in 
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish,'" 
Cong Duc Le, supra at 438, quoting Owens, supra at 559. 
Where a defendant retains the opportunity to recall the 
declarant witness, a number of other States are in accord that 
                     
 
17 In Commonwealth v. Machorro, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 379-
381 (2008), the Appeals Court held that an officer's testimony 
about a witness's extrajudicial identification was admissible 
even though the witness had not testified at trial specifically 
about the identification.  Although the facts in Machorro are 
distinguishable from this case -- the declarant witness there 
"testified at trial that she was 'pretty sure' the man who was 
arrested was the same man who had assaulted her," id. at 381, 
and therefore defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-
examine the witness as to the basis for this belief -- the 
Appeals Court's decision illustrates the shift toward the 
admissibility of extrajudicial identifications as substantive 
evidence, a substantial change from cases decided by the Appeals 
Court before our decision in Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le, 444 
Mass. 431 (2005).  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Seminara, 20 Mass. 
App. Ct. 789, 796 (1985). 
18 
 
 
there is no violation of a defendant's constitutional right of 
confrontation if the prosecutor fails to ask the identifying 
witness about the identification on direct examination.  See 
People v. Lewis, 223 Ill. 2d 393, 402-403 (2006) (based on plain 
language of criminal statute permitting prior identifications to 
be admitted in evidence substantively, no requirement that 
declarant testify about out-of-court identification before third 
party may testify about identification); Jones v. State, 410 Md. 
681, 700 (2009) (where tape-recorded interview was offered in 
evidence substantively pursuant to State criminal statute 
permitting out-of-court statements of child victims, and 
defendant had opportunity to recall declarant for further cross-
examination regarding taped interview but did not, defendant was 
not entitled to new trial); State v. Hoch, 189 Vt. 560, 562-563 
(2011) (testimonial hearsay statement admitted after declarant 
testified did not violate confrontation clause where defense 
counsel was free to recall declarant witness for further cross-
examination).  But see Smith v. State, 669 A.2d 1, 7-8 (Del. 
1995) (under State criminal statute permitting use of prior 
statements as substantive evidence where declarant is subject to 
cross-examination, "the statement must be offered into evidence 
no later than at the conclusion of the direct examination of the 
declarant"). 
19 
 
 
Although not constitutionally required, we conclude that, 
moving forward, it is appropriate to require that the 
Commonwealth inquire directly of the alleged identifying witness 
about the alleged prior identification before introducing 
evidence of that alleged identification through a third-party 
witness.  Cf. Smith v. State, 669 A.2d at 7-8.  This sequence 
will provide the defendant specific notice of the prior 
identification, information that will permit the defendant to 
fully cross-examine the alleged declarant.  The opportunity to 
recall the declarant witness after the statement has been 
introduced through a third party is too limited, and 
inappropriately places a "strategic burden on the non-offering 
party."  Id. at 8.  Further, the approach we adopt may reduce 
confusion for the jury by providing them with both versions of 
the events in a timely fashion, "leaving it to the jury to 
resolve the conflicting claims concerning that prior 
identification."  Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. at 440.18 
                     
 
18 We appreciate that this procedural rule is easier to 
state than it will be to apply in every instance.  As the 
present case illustrates, the alleged identification witness may 
not recall the circumstances when he was alleged to have made a 
prior identification or, even if the witness recalls the 
circumstances, may not recall having made the alleged 
identification or may deny having done so.  Here, despite the 
fact that Williams professed a lack of recall about meeting with 
Benton and Wyse soon after the shooting incident, it would have 
been appropriate for the prosecutor to have asked Williams 
specifically whether he recalled identifying Drano and Jigga as 
20 
 
 
For the reasons just summarized -- and as stated in note 
17, supra -- it would have been preferable for the prosecutor 
explicitly to question Williams during direct examination about 
the identification of the defendant and Henderson that Williams 
was alleged to have made during his interview by Benton and Wyse 
-- i.e., before the Commonwealth presented evidence of the 
identification through the testimony of the two detectives.  
Nonetheless, the ordering of the witnesses in this case did not 
constitute an error warranting reversal.  First, the record 
demonstrates clearly that the defendant's trial counsel knew 
before trial of Williams's alleged statement identifying the 
defendant and Henderson because he had received a copy of a 
police report in which the identification was apparently set 
out.  Second, Williams, of course, did testify at trial and was 
available for full cross-examination by the defense; there is 
nothing in the record to suggest that Williams was unable or 
unwilling to answer questions.  Finally, the judge offered the 
defendant the opportunity to recall Williams in order to inquire 
about the alleged identification that was presented to the jury 
through the detectives' testimony. 
In sum, the fact that the prosecutor did not inquire 
specifically of Williams about his alleged prior identification 
                                                                  
both having come to the porch on August 27, and as both having 
shot the victim. 
21 
 
 
of the defendant and Henderson before Benton and Wyse testified 
about the identification did not deprive the defendant of the 
ability to cross-examine Williams on this issue.  Although we 
recognize that the introduction of the identification evidence 
through the detectives without having first questioned Williams 
about the identification was perhaps ill-advised, in the 
circumstances of this case it cannot be deemed improper, and 
does not warrant reversal of the defendant's convictions. 
 
c.  Sequestration of the defendant's sister.  On the first 
day of trial, the Commonwealth presented to the judge a 
photograph that a Boston police detective discovered on a page 
of the Web site Facebook,19 on which the photograph appeared of 
Sudara Herndon (Sudara), the defendant's sister.  The 
photograph, taken that day inside the court room, showed the 
defendant and Henderson in court and the Facebook page referred 
to them by their nicknames, Jigga and Drano.  The prosecutor 
explained to the judge at a sidebar conference that the Facebook 
post "has reference to a number of things . . . that will be 
evidence in this case."  Consequently, the prosecutor added 
Sudara to the Commonwealth's witness list, thereby making her 
subject to a sequestration order that was in place for all 
                     
 
19 Facebook is a social networking Internet site that allows 
members to develop personalized profiles in order to interact 
and share information with other members.  Commonwealth v. 
Walters, 472 Mass. 680, 688 n.19 (2015). 
22 
 
 
witnesses and prohibiting her from coming into the court room 
during the trial.  The defendant argues that the judge abused 
his discretion by allowing the Commonwealth to add Sudara as a 
witness because this was a pretext to exclude her from the court 
room in violation of his constitutional right to an open court 
room.  We disagree. 
 
The rule of criminal procedure governing the sequestration 
of witnesses provides that "[u]pon his own motion or the motion 
of either party, the judge may, prior to or during the 
examination of a witness, order any witness or witnesses other 
than the defendant to be excluded from the court room."  Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 21, 378 Mass. 892 (1979).  A judge has "broad 
discretionary power to sequester witnesses."  Reporters' Notes 
to Rule 21, Mass. Ann. Laws, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 
1597 (LexisNexis 2015).  The judge reasonably found that the 
Facebook post of the photograph of the defendant and Henderson 
and referencing the two by nickname was enough to justify adding 
Sudara as a potential witness and thereby necessitating her 
exclusion, given that the nicknames were an issue at trial, and 
Sudara's Facebook page presented potentially probative evidence 
about it.  The judge did not abuse his broad discretion in 
permitting the prosecutor to add Sudara to the Commonwealth's 
23 
 
 
witness list and thereby subject her to the general witness 
sequestration order.20 
 
Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Based on a thorough 
review of the record in this case in accordance with our 
obligation under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we conclude that there is 
no basis to grant the defendant a new trial or other relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
                     
 
20 The defendant claims that because the Commonwealth 
already had overwhelming evidence of the nicknames alleged to 
have been used by the defendant and Henderson, any evidence from 
Sudara's Facebook page was unnecessary to prove its case.  We 
are not persuaded.  The addition of Sudara to the Commonwealth's 
witness list was made at the very outset of the trial.  Whether 
the Commonwealth's evidence of the nicknames was "overwhelming" 
may well not have been clear at that juncture.  Moreover, a 
party generally is permitted to introduce evidence that is 
relevant, even if other evidence exists on the same point.