Title: State of Florida v. Paul Vanbebber
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC01-2558
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 8, 2003

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC01-2558
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
PAUL VANBEBBER,
Respondent.
[May 8, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review the decision in State v. VanBebber, 805 So. 2d 918 (Fla.
2d DCA 2001), which certified conflict with the decision in State v. Warner, 721
So. 2d 767 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), approved on other grounds, 762 So. 2d 507 (Fla.
2000), on the issue of whether the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida
Statutes (Supp. 1998), is available to support a downward departure from a
sentence for a driving under the influence (DUI) conviction.  We have jurisdiction. 
See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained below, we hold the
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mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is available to support a downward departure
from a sentence for a felony DUI conviction.  Accordingly, we approve the Second
District's decision in VanBebber, and disapprove Warner to the extent it conflicts
with this decision.
BACKGROUND
The Second District summarized the facts of this case as follows:
On May 23, 1999, Paul VanBebber was driving home after a
party at which he had consumed sufficient alcohol that his faculties
were impaired.  He failed to stop at a stop sign and collided with
another vehicle that contained a family of six:  two parents, a
six-year-old son, a four-year-old daughter, a four-week-old daughter,
and the father’s brother who was visiting from Columbia.  The three
children suffered injuries and their uncle was killed in the crash.  The
State charged VanBebber with one count of DUI with property
damage, three counts of DUI with personal injury, one of them with
serious bodily injury, and one count of DUI/manslaughter. 
VanBebber, exhibiting extreme and sincere remorse while recognizing
his fault, pleaded nolo to all offenses as charged.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard from members of
the victim’s family as well as VanBebber’s, including VanBebber
himself.  Each side outlined the devastating effect the accident has had
on the families.  Defense counsel argued for a downward departure
from the guidelines sentence of 175.9 to 240 months based on the
statutory mitigator of “offense was committed in an unsophisticated
manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has
shown remorse.” § 921.0026(2)(j), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998).  The trial
court agreed that the evidence fulfilled the requirements of section
921.0026(2)(j) and imposed a downward departure.  It sentenced
VanBebber to 200 months' incarceration for the counts of
DUI/manslaughter and DUI with serious personal injury, but
suspended it upon completion of fifteen years' probation with special
1.  The State contends this is a slight misstatement.  The mitigator at issue in
this case has three parts–the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner
and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse.  See §
921.0026(2)(j), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998).  The State agreed that the offense was an
isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse, but disputed whether
the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner.
2.  §§ 921.002-921.0027, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998).
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conditions.  The State does not dispute that the evidence presented at
the sentencing hearing supported the mitigator,[1] although the trial
court did observe with some puzzlement that it was unsure how one
would commit this crime in a sophisticated manner.  The State
objected to the downward departure, thus preserving this issue, which
it then appealed.
VanBebber, 805 So. 2d at 919 (footnotes omitted).  The Second District affirmed
the decision of the trial court and held the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is
available to support a downward departure from a sentence for a DUI conviction,
but certified conflict with Warner on this issue.  See VanBebber, 805 So. 2d at 921. 
DISCUSSION
Section 921.0026 is part of the Florida Criminal Punishment Code2 and
provides, in relevant part:  
  921.0026 Mitigating circumstances.-- This section applies to any
felony offense, except any capital felony, committed on or after
October 1, 1998.
  (1)  A downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence, as
calculated according to the total sentence points pursuant to s.
3.  The Second District buttressed its conclusion with State v. Sachs, 526
So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1988), where, before the current Florida Criminal Punishment Code
was instituted, this Court found the manner of committing the offense, the fact that
it was an isolated incident, and the fact that the defendant had shown remorse were
valid reasons for a downward departure in a DUI case.  See VanBebber, 805 So.
-4-
921.0024, is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that
reasonably justify the downward departure.  Mitigating factors to be
considered include, but are not limited to, those listed in subsection 
(2).  The imposition of a sentence below the lowest permissible
sentence is subject to appellate review under chapter 924, but the
extent of downward departure is not subject to appellate review.
  (2)  Mitigating circumstances under which a departure from the
lowest permissible sentence is reasonably justified include, but are not
limited to:
  . . . .
  (j)  The offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and
was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse.
  . . . . 
  (3)  The defendant’s substance abuse or addiction, including
intoxication at the time of the offense, is not a mitigating factor under
subsection (2) and does not, under any circumstances, justify a
downward departure from the permissible sentencing range.
§ 921.0026, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998).  In concluding that the mitigator in section
921.0026(2)(j) is available to support a downward departure from a sentence for a
DUI conviction, the Second District reasoned:  (1) section 921.0026 states
unequivocally, “This section applies to any felony offense, except any capital
felony, committed on or after October 1, 1998,” and (2) cognizant of the public
policy against drunk driving, the Legislature still did not exempt DUI crimes from
application of section 921.0026(2)(j).  VanBebber, 805 So. 2d at 920.3
2d at 920-21.
4.  As noted above, section 921.0026(2)(j) is part of the Florida Criminal
Punishment Code.  See §§ 921.002-921.0027, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998).  The
introduction to the Code also provides: “The Criminal Punishment Code shall
apply to all felony offenses, except capital felonies, committed on or after October
1, 1998.”  § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998).
5.  The offense in this case was committed on May 23, 1999.
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We agree with the Second District's reasoning.  Section 921.0026 plainly
states, “This section applies to any felony offense, except any capital felony,
committed on or after October 1, 1998.”4  Because the mitigator in section
921.0026(2)(j) applies to any felony offense, except any capital felony, committed
on or after October 1, 1998,5 it is available to support a downward departure from
a felony DUI conviction.  The fact that the Legislature specifically exempted only
capital felonies is further support for the conclusion that section 921.0026(2)(j)
applies to felony DUI convictions.  Legislative intent must be determined primarily
from the language of the statute.  See Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294, 297 (Fla.
2000).  “[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys
a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of
statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and
obvious meaning.”  Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984).
The State argues this Court should resolve the certified conflict by adopting
6.  Section 921.0016(4) was repealed effective October 1, 1998, with the
implementation of the Florida Criminal Punishment Code.  See §§ 921.002-
921.0026, Florida Statutes (1997).  Section 921.0026 was enacted effective
October 1, 1998.  The mitigators listed in sections 921.0016(4) and 921.0026(2) are
identical.  
7.  In Warner, it appears the Fourth District mistakenly cited 921.0016(3)(j)
instead of 921.0016(4)(j), Florida Statutes (1995), when discussing this mitigator.
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the Fourth District’s decision in Warner.  In Warner, the defendant pleaded guilty
to three counts of driving under the influence arising out of one episode.  See 721
So. 2d at 768.  The trial court accepted the plea and entered a downward departure
sentence based on three mitigating factors in section 921.0016(4), Florida Statutes
(1995).6  One of the grounds for departure was that the offense was committed in
an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant
had shown remorse.  On appeal, the Fourth District agreed with the State's
assertion that there was an insufficient basis in the record to sustain the departure
because the trial court based the downward departure on proffered evidence and
erred in not taking evidence.  Warner, 721 So. 2d at 769.  
The Fourth District also concluded that on remand, the mitigator of "the
offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident
for which the defendant has shown remorse" would not be available to support a
downward departure of the defendant's sentence.  Id.7  As to this issue, the Fourth
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District stated: 
Given the state’s strong public policy against DUI, we conclude that
this reason for departure is not available in this case.  If this DUI could
be considered an isolated incident, then all first DUI’s by people
having clean records could be considered such.  Nor do we think that
drunk driving can be “committed in an unsophisticated manner.” 
Id.  See also State v. Beck, 763 So. 2d 506, 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ("We also
note that drunk driving cannot be committed in an unsophisticated manner.").  
Although we fully recognize the State's strong public policy against DUI, we
find that the issue in this case, whether the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is
available to support a downward departure from a DUI conviction, is resolved by
the clear and unambiguous statutory language of section 921.0026.  Because the
statute states that the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) applies to any felony
offense, except any capital felony, committed on or after October 1, 1998, we
hold that the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is available to support a downward
departure from a felony DUI conviction.  
The State also argues, however, that to hold section 921.0026(2)(j)
applicable to felony DUI convictions would create conflict with section
921.0026(3), which provides:
  (3)  The defendant’s substance abuse or addiction, including
intoxication at the time of the offense, is not a mitigating factor under
subsection (2) and does not, under any circumstances, justify a
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downward departure from the sentence recommended under the
sentencing guidelines.
We find that no conflict is created by holding section 921.0026(2)(j) applicable to
felony DUI convictions.  Under subsection (3), intoxication at the time of the
offense cannot be used as a mitigating factor to support a downward departure
from a sentence under the sentencing guidelines.  There is no prohibition, however,
against using the mitigators listed in section 921.0026(2) in cases where the offense
is intoxication.  In this case the trial court imposed a downward departure on the
fact that VanBebber was remorseful for an isolated incident committed in an
unsophisticated manner.  Again, if the Legislature intended to specifically exempt
felony DUI offenses from this statutory scheme this Court must presume that it
would have explicitly done so in the statute.  As the Second District noted, “we
shall not judicially legislate and interpret the law to negate the clear language used
by the legislature.”  VanBebber, 805 So. 2d at 920.  
Finally, the State argues that the Second District improperly relied on State
v. Sachs, 526 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1988), to buttress its conclusion that section
921.0026(2)(j) is available in this case.  In Sachs, the defendant pleaded guilty to
two charges of DUI manslaughter and was sentenced to four years of community
control, which was a downward departure from the guidelines recommendation. 
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See id. at 49.  The trial court gave five reasons for the downward departure,
including that the defendant would continue to suffer a great deal of remorse and
shame.  This Court affirmed the reasons relied on by the trial court where they
were supported by clear and convincing proof.  See id. at 51.  The State now
argues that when this Court considered the reasons for departure in Sachs, it was
looking at the possible lack of moral culpability in an otherwise strict liability
criminal statute, not the “unsophisticated manner” in which the crime was
committed.  However, by relying on Sachs, the Second District merely intended to
show that this Court previously found the same reasons for departure valid in a
case involving a DUI offense, even before the reasons were codified as a mitigator
in the Florida Statutes.  Therefore we find that the Second District did not err by
relying on Sachs.  
CONCLUSION
Section 921.0026 is clear and unambiguous and provides that the mitigators
found therein are applicable to all felony offenses except capital felonies.  The
offense of DUI is a noncaptial felony offense.  Therefore, we hold that the
mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is available to support a downward departure
from a sentence for a felony DUI conviction.  We approve the decision of the
district court of appeal and disapprove Warner to the extent it conflicts with this
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decision.  
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., and SHAW, Senior Justice,
concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs.
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which WELLS, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., concurring.
I write to express my agreement with the majority and elaborate on my
reasons for concurring.  Section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes (2002), allows the
trial court to impose a downward departure sentence if the trial court finds that the
offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident
for which the defendant has shown remorse.  If the dissent is correct that the
departure reason is inapplicable, then the trial court in this case would have been
required to impose a Criminal Punishment Code prison sentence of no less than
175.9 months (14.65 years) up to 240 months (20 years) in prison.  
The evidence presented in the trial court establishes the basis for a
downward departure pursuant to section 921.0026(2)(j): this was an isolated
instance and the defendant exhibited "extreme and sincere remorse while
recognizing his fault."  These facts are more fully detailed in Judge Altenbernd's
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concurrence: 
Mr. VanBebber is twenty-five years old.  At the time of this
offense, he was employed as a plumber.  He has a wife and an infant
child.  He has no criminal record.  Mr. VanBebber has never
previously been arrested for DUI.  His driving record includes only a
few minor traffic infractions.  He had not had a drink for six months
prior to the night of this accident.  He had a blood alcohol level of
about .16% at the time of the accident.  He stopped at the scene and
administered CPR to one of the victims.  He pleaded guilty to these
offenses with no promise as to the sentence he would receive.  He is
a religious man, who has repeatedly stated that he wishes that he
could have been the person who died in this accident.
State v. VanBebber, 805 So. 2d 918, 921 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (Altenbernd,
A.C.J., concurring).
Section 921.0026(2)(j) appears to have been written exactly for a defendant
such as VanBebber.  Nothing in the wording of this statute indicates that the
Legislature intended to preclude the trial court from using this subsection as a
basis for exercising its discretion to impose a sentence less than the Criminal
Punishment Code minimum in a case of DUI involving death or serious injury.  As
this Court explained recently in addressing a similar issue regarding whether the
trial court was precluded as a matter of law from imposing a downward departure
sentence:
There is no question that the Legislature has the authority to preclude
a trial judge from imposing a downward departure sentence . . . .  Our
role, however, is limited to determining whether the Legislature
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intended to do so.  Accordingly, it is not this Court's function to
substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature as to the wisdom or
policy of a particular statute.  
When construing a statutory provision, legislative intent is the
polestar that guides the Court's inquiry.  Legislative intent is
determined primarily from the language of a statute.  When faced with
an unambiguous statute, the courts of this state are without power to
construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend,
modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious
implications.  To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power. 
This principle is not a rule of grammar; it reflects the constitutional
obligation of the judiciary to respect the separate powers of the
legislature.
State v. Rife, 789 So. 2d 288, 292 (Fla. 2001) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). 
Regarding the position taken in the dissent that this mitigator is unavailable in
this case because DUI cannot be committed in an unsophisticated manner and
does not involve planning, there is no support for the view that the Legislature
intended to give the trial courts discretion to depart downward only for crimes that
are capable of being committed in a sophisticated manner.  Instead, when all of the
phrases of this statutory mitigator are read together, the more reasonable view is
that unless the crime involves some sophistication, this mitigator may be used if
the trial court finds that the offender has shown remorse and the offense was an
isolated incident.  Indeed, it is logical to conclude that the Legislature intended to
withhold the benefit of this statutory mitigator from a defendant who, although he
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or she has demonstrated remorse for an offense that was an "isolated" incident,
nonetheless committed the crime in a sophisticated manner either in its planning or
execution.  As the Second District succinctly stated in this case:
First, section 921.0026, which lays out certain mitigating
circumstances, states unequivocally:  "This section applies to any
felony offense, except any capital felony, committed on or after
October 1, 1998."   There is no exception provided for DUI offenses,
as was done for a capital felony.  Thus, the legislature did not
preclude mitigation if the crime is DUI and was an isolated incident,
committed in an unsophisticated manner, for which the defendant has
shown remorse.  We must, of course, strictly construe penal statutes.
VanBebber, 805 So. 2d at 920.
Regarding the presumption under the Criminal Punishment Code that a
lengthy prison term is appropriate for VanBebber's offenses, I concur in Judge
Altenbernd's observations as to the sentencing discretion of the trial judge in a
tragic case such as this:
I write to encourage the legislature to consider authorizing more
discretion for trial courts to impose adequate alternative punishments
for DUI manslaughter.  The victim injury points that are automatically
included in a scoresheet for this offense always result in a lengthy
prison sentence.  There are some occasions when it is not a wise
expenditure of tax dollars to impose lengthy prison terms for this
offense.
. . . .
If Mr. VanBebber had run this stop sign with no other car in
the intersection, the police would have arrested him for simple DUI. 
His likely penalty would have been a $500 fine.  See § 316.193(2)(a),
Fla. Stat.  (2000).  He was not so fortunate.  There is no denying that
8.  A very thoughtful recent law journal article urges the adoption of DUI
drug courts, modeled on the highly successful drug courts that have been shown to
substantially reduce recidivism. See Gail Sasnett-Stauffer & E. John Gregory, A
Drug by any Other Name is Still a Drug: Why the Florida Judiciary Should Start
Treating DUI as any Other Drug Offense, 13 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 299 (2002). 
I agree that this idea has merit and I know of several county court judges who have
attempted to incorporate the drug court model into DUI adjudications.  This issue
should be more fully explored jointly by all three branches of government since our
experience with drug courts in Florida has shown that a cooperative approach has
been most successful.  Other stakeholders should be brought into this discussion,
including representatives of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), the public
defenders and the state attorneys.  
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the tragedy for his victims cannot be described in words or measured
by days in prison.  But it is the injuries in this automobile accident
alone that have caused his recommended penalty to jump from a $500
fine to twenty years' imprisonment.  Twenty years' imprisonment for
this man would cost Florida's taxpayers nearly $1,000,000.  His wife
and child would have no one to support them.  Given that this crime
is primarily the result of terribly bad judgment rather than an evil
criminal mind, one questions whether this is the best way to deter
future offenses or punish Mr. VanBebber.
The sentence actually imposed in this case will force Mr.
VanBebber to spend 600 hours over the next fifteen years repeatedly
telling teenagers how he killed Ivan Bjazevic.  Over and over again, he
will be forced to relive in his own words the awful consequences of
his bad judgment.  Without a driver's license, it seems highly unlikely
that this religious man will ever drive intoxicated again.  With some
luck, maybe his story will encourage a few teenagers to avoid the
conduct that created victims in this case.
I might prefer a system that allowed trial judges the option to imprison
defendants like Mr. VanBebber every weekend for twenty years.  The
current system, however, incarcerates people who are not always dangerous
to society.  I suspect that the tax dollars that we are spending on
incarceration due to mandatory victim injury points could be used more
effectively in other programs addressing the very serious and real problem
of DUI.8 
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I likewise urge the Legislature to examine whether a prison term under the
guidelines must necessarily be imposed for this type of offense in the absence of
one of the twelve grounds for a downward departure under section 921.0026.  Not
only would lengthy incarceration cost the State and its taxpayers upwards of one
million dollars in this case, but the defendant's child would suffer both emotionally
and financially from being denied a father.  
I understand that there are those who might urge that in light of our State's
strong public policy against drunk drivers, this defendant deserves a lengthy prison
term.  We cannot restore the life lost or heal the injuries suffered in the tragedy
caused by the defendant's act, which I neither condone nor excuse.  In this case,
however, the trial court crafted an appropriately onerous penalty that retains the
prospect for lengthy incarceration if at any time during the next fifteen years the
defendant violates the terms and conditions of his probation. 
VanBebber received 200 months' incarceration that will remain suspended
only if he successfully completes fifteen years' probation with special conditions,
including one year in the Collier County jail.  The other special conditions are: 
[N]o possession or use of any form of alcohol, controlled substance,
or unprescribed medication;  random drug and alcohol screens;  forty
hours of community service each year with groups involved in
preventing teenage alcohol consumption;  permanent loss of driver's
license;  restitution; court costs and fines; the costs of supervision
9.  In this case, a lengthy prison term would satisfy only the goal of
retribution. On the other hand, a balanced and restorative justice approach views
crime as "more than a violation of the criminal law" but also as a disruption "in a
three-dimensional  relationship of victim, community and offender."  See Leena
Kurki, U.S. Department of Justice, Incorporating Restorative and Community
Justice Into American Sentencing and Corrections 2 (1999).  It further recognizes
that because crime "harms the victim and the community, the primary goals should
be to repair the harm and heal the victim and the community."  Id.  The goal of any
case disposition should be to promote public safety, competency development,
and accountability.  Further, sentencing that has been based on restorative justice
principles has shown higher rates of compliance with payment of restitution
amounts and in completion of community service.  See generally Gordon
Bazemore, A Vision for Community Juvenile Justice, 49 Juv. & Fam. Ct. J. 55 (Fall
1998).
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were waived until the restitution and court costs were paid.
VanBebber, 805 So. 2d at 920 n.2.  Thus, if the defendant violates any conditions
of probation, including the special conditions, he may be incarcerated for up to
16.6 years, less credit for time previously served.  He will be required as part of
his forty hours of community service for the next fifteen years to speak to groups
involved in preventing teenage drinking.  What a powerful message VanBebber will
be able to deliver based on what occurred in this case.  Consequences that will
remain in place for the rest of his life include the permanent loss of his driver's
license.  These substantial sanctions fashioned by the trial court are tailored to fit
the crime and offender, and also serve in some way to attempt to repair the
damage caused by his terrible act.9
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For all these reasons, I agree with the majority's conclusion that the trial
court in this case was permitted to use section 921.0026(2)(j) to support a
downward departure sentence for a felony DUI conviction.  
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs.
QUINCE, J., dissenting.
I disagree with the majority that because section 921.0026, Florida Statutes
(Supp. 1998), provides that the mitigators in that section are applicable to all
felonies except capital felonies, that the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is
applicable to the felony of driving under the influence (DUI).  I would affirm the
view espoused by the Fourth District in State v. Beck, 763 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2000), and State v. Warner, 721 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), that the
mitigating factor in section 921.0026(2)(j) is not applicable to DUI convictions.
In Beck, the Fourth District reversed a trial court's downward departure
from the sentencing guidelines.  One of the reasons given for the departure was the
section 921.0026(2)(j) mitigating factor.  In rejecting that factor the court said:
     The final ground for departure given by the trial court was that the
offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner for which the
defendant has shown remorse.  In State v. Warner, 721 So. 2d 767
(Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. granted, 732 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1999), this
court recognized that given the state's strong public policy against
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DUI, this reason for departure is not valid.  We also note that drunk
driving cannot be committed in an unsophisticated manner.
Beck, 763 So. 2d at 508.  I believe the Fourth District is correct in its reasoning
because the crime of driving while under the influence is not capable of being
committed in a sophisticated manner.
This mitigating factor contemplates that the crime that has been committed
is one that can be done in at least two ways, sophisticated or unsophisticated.  If
the crime is one that is not capable of being committed in a sophisticated manner,
then logically, it cannot be committed in an unsophisticated manner.  As the Fourth
District held, DUI is a crime which cannot be committed in a sophisticated or
unsophisticated manner.
This reading of section 921.0026(2)(j) does not run afoul of the general
provision that the mitigators in this section are applicable to all noncapital felonies. 
Even with that general principle as a guide, we must be ever mindful of the fact that
not every mitigating factor can be applied to every noncapital felony.  In
determining whether a mitigating factor is applicable, the sentencing court must
look at the facts and circumstances of the offense as well as the type of crime that
was committed.  When the facts and circumstances and the type of crime are
considered in this case, I reach the conclusion that section 921.0026(2)(j) is not
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applicable to the crime of DUI.
WELLS, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Second District - Case No. 2D00-4857
(Collier County)
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Robert J. Krauss, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Chief of Criminal Law, and Ronald Napolitano, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Petitioner
Joshua Faett and Rexford Darrow of the Law Offices of Casassa, Mangone, Miller
and Faett, Naples, Florida,
for Respondent