Title: State v. Bruce Solberg
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP000299-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-0299-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Bruce Solberg, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  203 Wis. 2d 459, 553 N.W.2d 842 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 1, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 28, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
La Crosse 
 
JUDGE: 
John J. Perlich 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bradley, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
  Abrahamson, C.J., joins 
 
Dissented: 
Bablitch, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
John M. Brinckman, and John Brinckman & Associates, LaCrosse and 
oral argument by John M. Brinckman. 
 
 
 
 
 
For Potential Victims who would object to In 
Camera inspection of Medical or Mental Health Records by Trial or 
Appellate Courts there was a brief and oral argument by Christine 
M. Wiseman, Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. 
 
 
 
 
No. 95-0299-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-0299-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Bruce Solberg, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded to the court of appeals. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case is before this court on 
a petition for review filed by the State of Wisconsin.  The 
State seeks review of a published opinion of the court of 
appeals, State v. Solberg, 203 Wis. 2d 459, 533 N.W.2d 842 (Ct. 
App. 1996).  A jury found Bruce Solberg guilty of one count of 
third degree sexual assault in violation of Wis. Stat. § 
940.225(3)(1995-96).
1  Solberg filed a motion for a new trial 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.  The Circuit Court 
for La Crosse County, John J. Perlich, Judge, denied Solberg's 
motion.  Solberg appealed his judgment of conviction.  He 
alleged that the circuit court erred in failing to disclose the 
                     
1 
Unless 
otherwise 
indicated, 
all 
future 
statutory 
references are to the 1995-96 volume. 
No. 95-0299-CR 
 
2 
complainant's, E.H., medical records to him, and in not allowing 
him access to police reports concerning a prior sexual assault 
investigation involving E.H. On appeal, Solberg also alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The court of appeals 
reversed the conviction and remanded to the circuit court to 
determine whether the victim, E. H., had consented to the 
court's in camera examination of her medical and psychiatric 
records.  We reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶2 
On review, we consider: (1) whether the court of 
appeals had the authority to conduct an in camera review of the 
privileged medical and psychiatric records; and (2) whether the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
in 
determining that the records should not be disclosed to Solberg. 
 We hold that the trial court, and, thus, the court of appeals, 
had the authority to conduct an in camera review of E. H.'s 
medical and psychiatric records and that the circuit court did 
not erroneously exercise its discretion in determining that the 
records should not be disclosed to Solberg.  
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Solberg and E. 
H. met at St. Francis Hospital.  E. H. had been admitted for a 
drug overdose and Solberg was employed at the hospital as an 
aide.  They subsequently engaged in a sexual relationship 
lasting from early 1992 through December of 1992.  On January 4, 
1993, they renewed this relationship.  On January 13, 1993, 
Solberg visited E. H. at her apartment.  During this visit 
Solberg and E. H. engaged in anal intercourse.  Based on E. H.'s 
allegation that she did not consent to this intercourse, Solberg 
No. 95-0299-CR 
 
3 
was charged with one count of third degree sexual assault 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3). 
¶4 
Before trial, Solberg filed a "Motion for Release of 
Medical Records."  In this motion, Solberg requested medical and 
psychiatric records regarding E. H.'s admission to the St. 
Francis Hospital Psychiatric Unit on December 25, 1991, and her 
treatment during that period.  Solberg alleged that these 
records were necessary for him to establish a partial alibi and 
to impeach E. H.'s credibility.  The motion also made a general 
request for medical and counseling records without specifying 
the time frame or health care provider.  Solberg alleged that 
such records would have verified that E. H. had made prior false 
accusations of sexual assault.  Finally, Solberg sought access 
to counseling records in which E. H. discussed the incident 
resulting in the sexual assault allegations against Solberg with 
Nancy Todd and Pauline Jackson. 
¶5 
In a written response to this motion, the prosecutor 
conceded that Solberg had made the preliminary showing of 
materiality established in State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 
499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993), to entitle him to an in camera 
review by the circuit court of E. H.'s records.  In this letter, 
the prosecutor also represented that E. H. had informed her 
"that she will sign a release allowing the medical and 
psychiatric records to be provided to the court in a sealed 
envelope for an in camera review."   
¶6 
On July 9, 1993, the circuit court held a hearing on 
this motion.  At that hearing, the court stated: 
 
No. 95-0299-CR 
 
4 
Well, it's my understanding the State has agreed that 
they will obtain the records from the victim, that she 
apparently has already signed or has agreed to sign a 
release so that they can get the records.  
 
. . . I would ask that the State get the records.  
File them in a sealed envelope with my secretary for 
an in camera inspection . . . .  I expect to be 
getting back some time that weekend and will probably 
have some time to review them that weekend, although 
it may take a bit longer. 
 
¶7 
Prior to a hearing on September 7, 1993, the circuit 
court inspected the medical records that had been filed for its 
review.  These records related to Dr. Krummel's treatment of E. 
H.  Based on its review, the court concluded that "99 percent of 
them are basically and totally irrelevant and immaterial."  The 
court further stated: 
 
There is one thing, however, that may be relevant.  
There is a comment in the discharge summary of the 
Saint Francis Medical Center, and I believe it occurs 
one other or maybe two other places.  It's the same 
comment, quote "She has been developing a lot of 
flashbacks of sexual abuse she suffered at the hands 
of blank, as well as a sexual assault that occurred at 
age 19."  Quoting again, "She started having a lot of 
flashbacks . . ." 
 
I don't know if its relevant or not.  And I don't know 
if I'm even competent to decide the relevancy of that. 
 
The court declined to make a determination on the relevancy of 
these references.  The circuit court instead made the following 
proposal: 
 
My solution would seem to be that the State contact 
the physician, ask for more information on that direct 
point as to how it may relate to this incident, or 
even elaborate a little bit more about what the doctor 
meant by flashbacks. 
 
At that point I may or may not disclose it to the 
defense. 
No. 95-0299-CR 
 
5 
The court gave both counsel the opportunity to consider the 
proposal. 
¶8 
At the next hearing, on November 1, 1993, the circuit 
court agreed to go through the record again and have the copies 
of those portions that referred to flashbacks provided to 
counsel.  The prosecutor also disclosed that the State had in 
its possession police reports concerning a prior sexual assault 
investigation in which E. H. was the alleged victim.
2  The 
prosecution filed this report with the court and asked the court 
to review it in camera.  The court agreed.  On November 8, 1993, 
the court sent both counsel copies of those portions of E. H.'s 
medical records that referred to flashbacks, blocking out all 
other material. 
¶9 
On November 12, 1993, another hearing was held at 
which defense counsel stated that although she had received the 
limited 
records 
relating 
to 
flashbacks, 
Dr. 
Krummel 
was 
unwilling to discuss the records without a court order.  The 
circuit court asked the State's position on whether the court 
could issue an order authorizing Dr. Krummel to discuss 
flashbacks with defense counsel.  The prosecutor responded that 
she wanted to discuss it with the victim: 
 
                     
2 The State indicates in its brief that on February 20, 
1997, it learned that the prosecutor had in her possession some 
of the medical and psychiatric records.  The material was 
apparently appended to police reports concerning a prior 
incident involving the victim, which the trial court found did 
not have to be disclosed to the defense.  We do not consider 
whether the circuit court should have allowed Solberg access to 
the police report.  Accordingly, we also do not consider whether 
the records which are attached to those police reports should 
have been disclosed to Solberg. 
No. 95-0299-CR 
 
6 
I'm thinking the victim should have something to say 
about it.  I think when I speak with her she will 
probably agree as long as there are safeguards. 
 
Id.  
¶10 At the next hearing on November 17, 1993, the 
prosecutor advised the circuit court that the victim would 
prefer to have the court or a State agent interview Dr. Krummel: 
 "If the Court thinks that the Shiffra rationale requires the 
victim to give up her right to privacy and allow her doctors to 
be questioned, then the victim would prefer that the Court or a 
State agent interview the doctor."  Accordingly, the court 
stated that it would interview Dr. Krummel to determine whether 
the references to flashbacks in the medical records would be of 
any benefit to Solberg: 
 
I will contact the doctor for the sole and exclusive 
purpose of determining whether or not his references 
in the medical records to quote "flashbacks" unquote 
may have any benefit to the defendant whatsoever. 
 
The court allowed the defendant to submit questions that the 
court would ask Dr. Krummel if it deemed them relevant: 
 
To assist me in that, I will give the defense 48 hours 
to deliver a list of questions or areas that the 
defense wishes me to explore, and I will explore them 
with the doctor, if in fact, I find them to be 
relevant. 
 
¶11 At the November 17, 1993, hearing, the court also 
clarified its initial conclusions regarding E. H.'s records: 
 
Let's not go too much farther here without redefining 
what the Court said.  I reviewed all of the medical 
records.  There was nothing in any of those medical 
records that in any way helps or assists this 
defendant. 
 
No. 95-0299-CR 
 
7 
The only thing in the medical records was the minimal 
reference on, I think perhaps two occasions, that she 
was having flashbacks about sexual abuse. 
 
There has not been, up to this point in time, a shred 
of evidence that connects the flashbacks to anything 
that occurred here, and I'm not competent to do that. 
 
¶12 On December 13, 1993, the circuit court stated that it 
had asked all of the questions submitted by defense counsel.  
The court concluded that nothing in the records could be of 
assistance to the defense, and described the conversation with 
Dr. Krummel as follows: 
 
In essence, she was experiencing a flashback, which 
means that a person is reexperiencing a past event. 
 
At times she would report a past sexual assault of a 
particular person -- or by a particular person, and 
she reported that particular person.  There was no 
triggering event, although he did indicate that it's 
possible 
that 
sexual 
contact 
could 
trigger 
a 
flashback.  It's speculative, but not out of the realm 
of possibility. 
 
The part that I found most important was Question 
Number 8, that is, How would this affect a patient's 
perception of reality?  And in the doctor's opinion, 
she would know reality at all times.  She would be 
able to identify the flashback, identify that it was a 
flashback, and recognize it as such.  During that time 
she would perceive reality at all times.  She would be 
kind of anxious and upset and would curl up into a 
ball and would report that she was having a flashback. 
 She would be given support and perhaps medication, 
and it would pass in a short time, perhaps half an 
hour. 
 
As to Questions Number 10 and 11, he couldn't say, 
that is, Is it possible that the patient believed that 
she said no out loud and really didn't? 
 
No opinions regarding some of the other questions, 
speculative at best. 
 
Number 16, it's possible that a person might not know 
that she was experiencing a flashback.  Another 
person, a third person, might not know she was 
experiencing a flashback, but she would know. 
 
No. 95-0299-CR 
 
8 
So as I see it, she knew full well when she was having 
a flashback.  She was able to tell reality from the 
flashback. 
 
I don't see anything with that explanation, in her 
prior medical records that in any way helps or assists 
the defense.  
Accordingly, the circuit court did not allow Solberg access to 
the records and ordered them sealed. 
¶13 E. H. testified at trial.  Defense counsel did not 
attempt to use the information concerning flashbacks in any way. 
 The jury found Solberg guilty as charged.  On September 2, 
1994, Solberg filed a motion for a new trial, alleging 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  The circuit court 
denied Solberg's motion. 
¶14 Solberg subsequently filed a notice of appeal from the 
judgment of conviction.  On appeal, he alleged that the trial 
court erred in failing to disclose E. H.'s medical records and 
the police reports to the defense. He also alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  The court of appeals found that the 
record did not contain sufficient evidence of E. H.'s consent to 
review of her otherwise privileged medical and psychiatric 
records.  The court of appeals did not reach the issues of 
whether Solberg was entitled to a new trial due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel or whether Solberg should have had access 
to the police reports of a prior uncharged sexual assault. 
 
I. 
¶15 The first issue that we consider is whether the court 
of appeals lacked the authority to conduct an in camera review 
of E. H.'s records.  The court of appeals concluded that it did 
not have the authority to conduct such an inspection: 
No. 95-0299-CR 
 
9 
 
To determine whether the trial court erred in not 
providing 
defense 
counsel 
with 
Elizabeth's 
psychological records, we would need to independently 
review them.  However, because it is not apparent from 
the record that Elizabeth voluntarily consented to the 
court's 
review 
of 
the 
psychological 
records 
in 
question, 
we 
are 
statutorily 
prohibited 
from 
conducting our own in camera review of the records to 
determine whether they are relevant or exculpatory. 
Solberg, 203 Wis. 2d at 462-63 (footnote omitted).  The court of 
appeals made this determination because it did not believe that 
the trial record adequately demonstrated that E. H. had 
consented to the circuit court's review of her records: 
 
From our review of the trial court record, we did not 
discover either a written consent form or an on-the-
record authorization from Elizabeth stating that she 
waived her privilege with regard to Dr. Krummel's 
records.  Although it is implicit in the record that 
Elizabeth signed some sort of release, we decline to 
infringe upon Elizabeth's privilege without express 
consent to do so. 
Id. at 466.
3  Based on its decision that it did not have the 
authority to examine the records, the court of appeals never 
opened the sealed envelopes. 
¶16 Whether the court of appeals had the authority to 
examine E. H.'s records is dependent on whether the circuit 
court appropriately conducted an in camera inspection of the 
records.  If the circuit court had the authority to review the 
                     
3 The State suggests that the court of appeals held that it 
did not have authority to review the records because there was 
not a separate authorization for review by E. H. for the court 
of appeals.  We do not believe that this was the holding of the 
court of appeals.  In either case, we see no basis to require 
separate authorization for the circuit court, the court of 
appeals, and this court.  So long as the circuit court has the 
authority to conduct an in camera review, the court of appeals 
and this court must also be able to review the records.  To hold 
otherwise would preclude appellate courts from reviewing the 
decision of a circuit court. 
No. 95-0299-CR 
 
10
privileged records, then the court of appeals also had the 
authority to do so.  A circuit court should conduct an in camera 
review of privileged medical records when the defendant makes a 
"preliminary showing that the sought-after evidence is material 
to his or her defense,"
4 and the privilege holder consents to 
review of those records.  In this case, the prosecutor conceded 
that Solberg had made the preliminary showing required to gain 
an in camera inspection by the circuit court.  Accordingly, we 
must determine whether E. H. consented to review of her records.  
¶17 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 905.04(2) a patient has the 
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent others from 
disclosing confidential communications made for purposes of 
diagnosis or treatment.
5  "A privilege holder waives the 
privilege if he or she voluntarily discloses or consents to 
disclosure 
of 
any 
significant 
part 
of 
the 
matter 
or 
communication."  State v. Speese, 191 Wis. 2d 205, 217-18, 528 
                     
4 Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 605 (citations omitted). 
5 Wis. Stat. § 905.04(2) provides:  
 
(2) GENERAL RULE OF PRIVILEGE.  A patient has a privilege to 
refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from 
disclosing 
confidential 
communications 
made 
or 
information 
obtained or disseminated for purposes of diagnosis or treatment 
of the patient's physical, mental or emotional condition, among 
the patient, the patient's physician, the patient's registered 
nurse, the patient's chiropractor, the patient's psychologist, 
the patient's social worker, the patient's marriage and family 
therapist, the patient's professional counselor or persons, 
including members of the patient's family, who are participating 
in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the 
physician, registered nurse, chiropractor, psychologist, social 
worker, marriage and family therapist or professional counselor. 
No. 95-0299-CR 
 
11
N.W.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 199 Wis. 2d 
597, 545 N.W.2d 510 (1996). 
¶18 The State contends that E. H. consented to the circuit 
court's review of her records and that proof of this consent can 
likely be found in the sealed records.  In a motion to 
reconsider filed with the court of appeals, in its briefs with 
this court, and at oral argument, the State repeatedly asserted 
that the sealed records were likely to contain the required 
release from E. H.  In support of this contention, the State 
submitted an "Authorization for Release of Information" form 
that was signed by E. H.  This form authorized St. Francis 
Medical Center to release E. H.'s health care records to the 
circuit court.  The form stated: "This authorization will expire 
120 days from the date below."  According to the State, this 
form was found in the prosecutor's files.  The State asserted 
that another copy of this form could likely be found in the 
sealed records. 
¶19 We believe that in determining whether a patient has 
consented to the circuit court's review of privileged records, 
it is appropriate for an appellate court to open the sealed 
documents and ascertain whether the required release is sealed 
inside.  Accordingly, we opened the sealed records for the 
purpose of determining whether they contained a release.  We 
found that they did in fact contain a copy of the release that 
the state attached to its brief.  This release, signed by E. H., 
evinces the consent necessary for the circuit court's review of 
the privileged medical records.  See Steinberg v. Jensen, 194 
Wis. 2d 439, 459, 534 N.W.2d 361 (1995)("the patient is deemed 
No. 95-0299-CR 
 
12
to own the privilege and, accordingly, only the plaintiff may 
waive the privilege.")(footnote omitted).
6  The authority of the 
circuit court to review the records is also applicable to 
appellate courts reviewing those records in the same case. 
 
II. 
¶20 The second issue that we consider is whether the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
in 
determining that the records should not be disclosed to Solberg. 
 The circuit court's materiality decision is reviewed under the 
clearly erroneous standard.  Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 605-06, 
                     
6 In reaching this conclusion, we do not approve such a 
release as the best means of attaining a victim's consent to 
review privileged documents.  The better practice is to have the 
circuit court interview the victim on the record and thereby 
make a determination of the victim's voluntary consent.  In the 
alternative, the release should show that the victim's consent 
is voluntary by using language designed to notify the victim 
that they need not sign the release. 
To ensure that the interests of potential victims were 
represented in this case, we appointed Christine Wiseman, 
Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School, to advocate 
their rights.  In this capacity, Professor Wiseman filed a brief 
on behalf of potential victims and presented their case at oral 
argument.  Although we take into account the interests of 
victims generally in this case, E. H. has at no time objected to 
the circuit court's review of her medical records or to its 
conversation with Dr. Krummel. 
The trial record in this case leaves unanswered questions 
concerning the scope and nature of E. H.'s consent for review of 
her 
medical 
records 
and 
disclosure 
of 
confidential 
communications. 
 
Although 
we 
are 
troubled 
by 
these 
uncertainties, there is no issue presented as to E. H.'s 
consent. Therefore, having found E. H.'s release for the circuit 
court's review of her medical records, we do not further 
scrutinize the scope of this consent. 
 
No. 95-0299-CR 
 
13
citing State v. Turner, 136 Wis. 2d 333, 343-44, 401 N.W.2d 827 
(1987); see also State v. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158, 191, 453 
N.W.2d 127 (1990), cert. denied, Wisconsin v. Walker, 498 U.S. 
962 (1990).  The decision to exclude evidence lies within the 
sound discretion of the circuit court.  State v. Lindh, 161 Wis. 
2d 324, 348-49, 468 N.W.2d 168 (1991).  A circuit court properly 
exercises its discretion when it applies the relevant law to the 
applicable facts and reaches a reasonable conclusion.  State v. 
Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d 315, 330, 431 N.W.2d 165 (1988). 
¶21 Solberg contends that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in not disclosing E. H.'s records to 
him.  Solberg primarily bases this contention on what is known 
and what is not know about the circuit court's discussion of 
flashbacks with Dr. Krummel.  Solberg points out that the 
circuit court disclosed that Dr. Krummel stated "it is possible 
that a person might not know that she is experiencing a 
flashback," and that he indicated that sexual contact could 
trigger a flashback.  Solberg further asserts that without a 
more complete record of the conversation it is not possible to 
evaluate Dr. Krummel's statement to the circuit court that E. H. 
would know when she was having a flashback and that she could 
distinguish between a flashback and reality.  
¶22 In conducting an in camera inspection of an alleged 
victim's privileged records, the circuit court must determine 
whether the records contain any relevant information that is 
"'material' to the defense of the accused."  Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 (1987).  If the circuit court 
determines that the records contain such information, it should 
No. 95-0299-CR 
 
14
be disclosed to the defendant if the patient consents to such a 
disclosure.  If the records do not contain relevant information 
material to the defense, the circuit court must not disclose the 
records to the defendant. 
¶23 Such 
a procedure 
strikes 
an appropriate balance 
between the defendant's due process right to be given a 
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense
7 and the 
policy 
interests 
underlying 
the 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
904.05(2) 
privilege.  We described the public policy behind the privilege 
in Steinberg, 194 Wis. 2d 439.  In that case, we stated: 
 
The 
public 
policy 
underpinning 
the 
privilege 
is 
to 
encourage patients to freely and candidly discuss medical 
concerns with their physicians by ensuring that those concerns 
will not unnecessarily be disclosed to a third person. 
Id. at 459.  We believe that giving the defendant an opportunity 
to have the circuit court conduct an in camera review of the 
privileged records, while still allowing the patient to preclude 
that review, addresses both the interests of the defendant and 
the patient. 
¶24 We must determine whether the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion when it determined that E. H.'s records 
were not material to Solberg's defense.  After conducting our 
own in camera review, we are unable to conclude that the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion when it determined 
that the information contained in E. H.'s records, including the 
flashback information, would not have assisted Solberg in his 
                     
7 See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984). 
No. 95-0299-CR 
 
15
defense.  Accordingly, we must uphold the decision of the 
circuit court. 
¶25 We reach this conclusion despite the approach employed 
by the circuit court in ruling on the materiality of the medical 
records.  It is clear that the circuit court was initially 
skeptical about the materiality of the flashback references.  
This is readily apparent when on November 17, 1993, the circuit 
court stated: 
 
The only thing in the medical records was the minimal 
reference on, I think perhaps two occasions, that she 
was having flashbacks about sexual abuse. 
 
There has not been, up to this point in time, a shred 
of evidence that connects the flashbacks to anything 
that occurred here, and I'm not competent to do that. 
Despite its apparent misgivings, the circuit court gave Solberg 
the benefit of the doubt and interviewed Dr. Krummel to obtain 
more information on whether the flashback information could be 
material to Solberg's case. 
¶26 Although we do not endorse the circuit court's failure 
to record its conversation with Dr. Krummel, we believe that it 
provides a satisfactory basis to conclude that the circuit court 
did not erroneously exercise its discretion.  The circuit court 
described its conversation with Dr. Krummel and indicated the 
significance it placed on various comments.  The circuit court 
placed particular importance on Dr. Krummel's statement that 
despite the flashbacks, E. H. would have known the difference 
between the flashbacks and reality at all times.  Accordingly, 
we do not believe that the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion when it concluded: "I don't see anything with 
No. 95-0299-CR 
 
16
that explanation, in her prior medical records that in any way 
helps or assists the defense." 
¶27 As we do not consider whether the defendant should 
have been allowed access to the police reports that the 
prosecution turned over to the circuit court and whether 
Solberg's trial counsel was ineffective, we remand to the court 
of appeals for a determination of these issues.  Thus, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the 
court of appeals for further proceedings. 
 
By the Court.— the decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals. 
 
 
No. 95-0299.AWB  
 
1 
¶28 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Concurring).  I concur.  I 
write 
separately 
because 
I 
believe 
that 
the 
majority 
unnecessarily and unwisely reaches out to answer a question in 
this complex case while leaving in limbo related questions of 
equal or greater importance.  The result of the majority's 
approach is the piecemeal resolution of issues with far-reaching 
implications. 
¶29 This case comes to us in an unusual posture.  As a 
basis for appealing his conviction in the circuit court, Solberg 
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.  However, the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not before us and was 
not even briefed.  Rather, the State challenges the court of 
appeals' holding that the record did not contain sufficient 
evidence of E.H.'s consent to the court of appeals' review of 
her medical and psychological records.  As it reaches this 
court, the case has blossomed into a myriad of factual, 
constitutional, statutory, and public policy issues.  These 
issues center on the tension between a patient's statutory right 
to deny access to his or her medical and psychological records 
on the one hand, and a defendant's constitutional right to 
present a defense on the other.    
¶30 The issues presented are important, complex, and 
interrelated.  Defense counsel noted at oral argument "the 
issues we are here on today are extremely important . . . and 
this court will no doubt, whatever its decision, be having quite 
an effect in the future on the course of the law."  The 
Assistant Attorney General stated that "this is probably the 
 
 
No. 95-0299.AWB  
 
2 
most difficult area of law quite honestly that I've ever 
confronted in my twenty-some years doing appellate work, because 
there are so many strands . . . ."  I agree, and believe that 
this court would benefit greatly from the court of appeals' 
prior consideration of the issues presented in this important 
and unusually complex case. 
¶31 Like the majority, I conclude that the court of 
appeals should have searched for, and would have found, the 
requisite consent by E.H. to an in camera review of her medical 
and psychological records.  E.H.'s consent to the circuit 
court's in camera viewing of her records also constitutes 
consent for the same viewing in the appellate courts because a 
contrary rule would effectively preclude appellate review of 
circuit court rulings based on privileged records. 
¶32 Unlike the majority, I would stop after resolving the 
threshold issue of consent.  The majority offers no reason for 
reaching beyond the consent issue to deal with relevance while 
declining to deal with other significant issues.  The result is 
this court's piecemeal consideration of interrelated issues that 
might be resolved as a whole by the court of appeals after full 
briefing.  The majority's installment approach to this case runs 
the risk of unintentionally deciding one issue by addressing 
another related issue.   
¶33 Having determined that E.H. consented to an in camera 
review of her records, I would remand to the court of appeals, 
not merely on the limited issues identified by the majority, but 
for a full consideration of Solberg's ineffective assistance of 
 
 
No. 95-0299.AWB  
 
3 
counsel claim, as well as any other outstanding issues.  Among 
the questions that the court of appeals might consider after 
full briefing are the following:  
• Is the Wis. Stat. § 905.04 privilege absolute?   
• May a person waive the privilege as to a judge's in camera 
review of records, while still preserving the right to refuse 
release of the records to a defendant?   
• If the privilege holder does not consent to the release of 
relevant information to the defendant, to what, if any, 
remedies is the defendant entitled?   
• Does a privilege holder's consent to an in camera review of 
records extend to a court's conversations with the holder's 
doctor conducted after the period of time specified in the 
consent has passed?   
• To what extent does release of privileged records to law 
enforcement agents constitute waiver of the privilege?   
The court of appeals' answers to these questions would go a long 
way toward resolving the many troubling issues raised in cases 
like the present one. 
¶34 Finally, the majority has compounded its improvident 
consideration of the circuit court's relevance ruling by 
conducting a superficial review of the issue.  The majority's 
analysis of the relevance issue is limited to a one-sentence 
adoption of the circuit court's ruling on the matter: 
 
"After conducting our own in camera review, we believe 
that the records do not contain information sufficient 
to contradict the circuit court's decision." 
 
 
No. 95-0299.AWB  
 
4 
Majority op. at 15.  After reviewing the majority's relevance 
analysis, I am left wondering whether the treatment given by the 
majority to the circuit court's ruling is sufficient to dispose 
of the relevance issue.  The issues presented in this case are 
significant, intricate, and intertwined, and deserve more than 
cursory treatment and a piecemeal approach.        
¶35 For the foregoing reasons, I concur. 
¶36 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson joins this opinion.   
 
 
No. 95-0299-WAB   
 
1 
¶37 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (Dissenting).   This case 
is not a close call.  Despite that, the majority accedes to 
the discretionary call of the circuit court.  They do this 
without benefit of review of the single most determinative 
factor in Judge Perlich’s decision:  his conversation with 
Dr. Krummel regarding the medical records of the alleged 
victim.  The judge, in refusing to turn over the records to 
the defendant, relied heavily on his conversation with Dr. 
Krummel.  Unfortunately, we are unable to review that 
conversation and what it revealed.  We are forced to depend 
on the judge’s memory of that conversation.  It was not 
recorded. 
¶38 The significance of Dr. Krummel’s statements was 
profound.  I conclude that Judge Perlich’s failure to 
record his conversation with Dr. Krummel was plain error.  
See State v. Sonnenberg, 117 Wis. 2d 159, 177, 344 N.W.2d 
159 (1984).  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶39 After an in camera review of E.H.’s records, 
Judge Perlich concluded that he was not competent to make a 
determination of materiality.  He advised the parties that 
he would like to discuss E.H.’s records with Dr. Krummel, 
commenting that he would make a record of “some sort” of 
the conversation.  The parties agreed.  Defense counsel 
submitted a list of questions for Judge Perlich to ask Dr. 
Krummel. 
¶40 After his conversation with Dr. Krummel, Judge 
Perlich summarized the conversation for the parties and 
 
 
No. 95-0299-WAB   
 
2 
concluded that the information in E.H.’s records was not 
relevant.  The only thing available for appellate review is 
Judge Perlich’s summary of that conversation. 
¶41 Judges are human, therefore fallible.  Although 
we have the utmost respect for Judge Perlich and other 
circuit court judges, it is incumbent upon us to recognize 
the fallibility of human memory.  Just last month, in State 
v. Ramos, 94-3036-CR (Wis. June 20, 1997), this court 
reviewed a record that revealed that a judge erred in 
recalling the words of a juror.  During voir dire, the 
prospective juror had stated that she did not think she 
could be fair to the defendant.  Moments later, the judge 
concluded that she had stated that she could be fair.  We 
reviewed the record.  The judge erred.  The error would not 
have been revealed nor corrected without benefit of a 
recorded transcript.   
¶42 Ramos was a relatively simple case.  The case 
before us today is much more complex.  Solberg claims that 
E.H.’s psychological and medical records will reveal that 
she has an impaired ability to perceive and relate the 
truth.  R.60:2.  He also claims that E.H. has a history of 
reporting sexual abuse by men with whom she has had a 
consensual sexual relationship. 
¶43 In 
determining 
whether 
E.H.’s 
medical 
and 
psychological records had any independent probative value, 
Judge Perlich was called upon to review and analyze pages 
and pages of medical and psychological notes and reports.  
 
 
No. 95-0299-WAB   
 
3 
He then questioned Dr. Krummel about the records, asking 
his own questions, and questions submitted by the defense. 
 Finally, he summarized this conversation for the parties: 
 
First of all, counsel, I did have a conversation 
with the doctor.  I’d like to put on the record 
what we discussed.  
 
I did ask him all of the  questions that [defense 
counsel] had asked me to ask in her November 19th 
letter. 
 
I’ll 
try 
and 
summarize 
this 
as 
succinctly as possible what was discussed. 
 
In essence, she was experiencing a flashback, 
which means that a person is re-experiencing a 
past event.   
 
At times she would report a past sexual assault 
of a particular personor by a particular person, 
and she reported that particular person.  There 
was no triggering event, although he did indicate 
that it’s possible that sexual contact could 
trigger a flashback.  It’s speculative, but not 
out of the realm of possibility. 
 
The part that I found most important was Question 
Number 8, that is, How would this affect the 
patient’s perception of reality?  And in the 
doctor’s opinion, she would know reality at all 
times.  She would be able to identify the 
flashback, identify that it was a flashback, and 
recognized it as such.  During that time she 
would perceive reality at all times.  She would 
be kind of anxious and upset and would curl up 
into a ball and would report that she was having 
a flashback.  She would be given support and 
perhaps medication, and it would pass in a short 
time, perhaps half an hour. 
 
As to Question Number 10 and 11, he couldn’t say, 
that is, Is it possible that the patient believed 
that she said no out loud and really didn’t? 
No 
opinions 
regarding 
some 
of 
the 
other 
questions, speculative at best. 
 
Number 16, it’s possible that a person might not 
know that she was experiencing a flashback.  
Another person, a third person, might not know 
that she was experiencing a flashback, but she 
would know. 
 
 
No. 95-0299-WAB   
 
4 
So, as I see it, she knew full well when she was 
having a flashback.  She was able to tell reality 
from the flashback.   
 
I don’t see anything, with that explanation, in 
her prior medical records that in any way helps 
or assists the defense. . . . I see nothing that 
requires disclosure. 
R.64:2-5.  This summary of Dr. Krummel’s explanation of 
E.H.’s condition, at the very least, fails to explain 
evidence in the alleged victim’s medical records that E.H. 
did not always perceive reality. 
¶44 Notes from her counselor reveal a very troubled 
past, some of it coterminous with her relationship with the 
defendant.  The sealed medical records reveal serious 
mental health issues including the “flashback” information 
that had been revealed to the defense before the trial.  
While I do not wish to disclose, in the context of this 
opinion, the contents of those records, they point to 
mental 
health 
problems, 
including 
disassociation 
from 
reality, that very well may have been required to be 
disclosed to the defense under Shiffra, depending on the 
specific answers of the doctor during his private interview 
with the judge.  Much seems irreconcilable with what the 
judge related regarding his conversation with Dr. Krummel. 
  
¶45 Dr. Krummel’s explanation of the medical records 
is of great importance to this case.  E.H. is the sole 
complaining witness.  Solberg does not deny having anal 
intercourse with her on the date in question; his only 
defense against her accusation is consent.  Essentially, 
 
 
No. 95-0299-WAB   
 
5 
this is a case of “he said/she said”; Solberg claims that 
E.H. consented,  and E.H. claims that she did not consent. 
 Yet, the sealed record reveals that E.H. has experienced 
whole tracts of time without connection to reality, and 
that she has experienced auditory flashbacks to episodes of 
sexual abuse.  Without some explanation on the record from 
Dr. Krummel, it is exceedingly difficult to conclude other 
than that the flashbacks and “lost time” episodes are 
relevant and material, and that the circuit court erred in 
denying Solberg access to them. 
¶46 Adequate review of this record compels a review 
of that conversation in its entirety, not a judge’s 
recollection of it.  We need a transcript.  There is none. 
 We have none to review.   
¶47 I would hold that in this case, given the 
profound significance of that conversation, it was plain 
error to fail to have it recorded.  
¶48 We cannot do justice to this case without it.  A 
serious miscarriage of justice might be present here, and 
as a court we have no way of determining that without a 
complete record.  I dissent.