Title: Renfro v. State
Citation: 1990 WY 2, 785 P.2d 491
Docket Number: 
State: Wyoming
Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court
Date: January 10, 1990

Renfro v. State Annotate this Case Renfro v. State 1990 WY 2 785 P.2d 491 Case Number: 89-105 Decided: 01/10/1990 Supreme Court of Wyoming WILLIAM HENRY RENFRO, A/K/A MACO RENFRO, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). Appeal from the District Court, Teton County, Robert B. Ranck, J. Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, PDP, Steven E. Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public Defender, PDP, and Donald K. Slaughter, Student Intern, PDP, for appellant. Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen Byrne, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and H. Frank Gibbard, Student Intern, for appellee. Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ. URBIGKIT, Justice. [¶1] This case again presents the quintessential dispute within Wyoming criminal appeals to consider whether credit for incarceration upon pre-trial failure to post bond should be granted against either or both the minimum and maximum sentence entered under the Wyoming indeterminate sentencing statutes. A second issue presented is the recurring question of restitution computation. [¶2] Appellant William Henry Renfro (Renfro), age twenty, after involvement in a serious course of crime in Teton County, was arrested and charged with five offenses. He copped a plea to the most serious, aggravated robbery, in consideration of dismissal of the other four charges. [¶3] The sentence entered included penitentiary imprisonment for a period of not less than seven years and not more than fourteen years, a fine in the amount of $10,000 and "[t]hat the defendant pay restitution to the Clerk of the District Court on behalf of Farmer Jacks [the grocery store business victim] in the amount of $11,581.00." [¶4] The trial court did not state and the sentence did not reflect any decision about credit on the 138 days spent by Renfro in jail prior to sentencing.1 Issues presented on appeal include indigency incarceration status of presentence jail time2 and requirements to properly establish restitution amounts.3 [¶5] In first addressing restitution, we find the State to agree with Renfro that the restitution amount was improperly established to provide compliance with the applicable statute, W.S. 7-9-103, since no special finding was made and no documentary support provided for determination of the amount. (a) If the court requires restitution of a defendant, then at the time of sentencing it shall fix a reasonable amount as restitution owed to each victim for actual pecuniary damage resulting from the defendant's criminal activity, and shall include its determination of the pecuniary damage as a special finding in the judgment of conviction. (b) To satisfy the order the clerk upon request of the victim or the district attorney, may issue execution against the defendant for any assets including wages subject to attachment in the same manner as in a civil action. (c) The court's determination of the amount of restitution owed under this section is not admissible as evidence in any civil action.[4] W.S. 7-9-103. [¶6] Reversal or remand of the restitution award is not an issue, but only whether reversal or remand for recomputation by adequate proof should be ordered.5 We will follow our current decision on attorney's fees and proof of damages in general to determine that restitution should, in accord with the statute, be established in amount by some credible evidence, Petty-Ray Geophysical, Div. of Geosource, Inc. v. Ludvik, 718 P.2d 9 (Wyo. 1986), and then delineated within the special finding requirement of W.S. 7-9-103. Proof of the offense from which restitution may be required is an intrinsic element of the proof of the crime and consequently requires the "beyond a reasonable doubt" character of evidence. Proof of the restitution amount as a question of sentence need only be proved by credible evidence, by a preponderance, or burden of the evidence. Com. v. Nawn, 394 Mass. 1, 474 N.E.2d 545 (1985). [¶7] We are required to address the specific issue presented of whether remand for a second chance to prove should be granted or, failing to provide sufficient evidence to prove the amount, whether the decision is reversed on the basis of inadequate evidence to sustain the decision. In order to provide a uniform approach with the present posture now developed for attorney's fees and generally for proof of damages and in order to also simplify the number of appeals with which this court is presented, we will follow the principle that where the initial computation of the amount of restitution was the result of a failure of proof, we will not normally remand for a recomputation unless we are remanding for other sentencing changes as well. See Kaess v. State, 748 P.2d 698 (Wyo. 1987). Accord Albrecht v. Zwaanshoek Holding En Financiering, B.V., 762 P.2d 1174 (Wyo. 1988) and Miles v. CEC Homes, Inc., 753 P.2d 1021 (Wyo. 1988). See also UNC Teton Exploration Drilling, Inc. v. Peyton, 774 P.2d 584 n. 6 (Wyo. 1989). Restitution in the criminal case joins other elements of the offense for proper proof by prosecution. Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270 (Wyo. 1977). See also Keller v. State, 771 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1989). [¶8] The general principle that proper proof is required to validate an ordered restitution and that remand does not necessarily occur unless other reasons for reversal may exist is a well-supported status within this developing category of criminal appeals. The principle of proof of amount for restitution was finitely addressed in Kaess, 748 P.2d 698 . See also Holtzheimer v. State, 766 P.2d 1177 (Alaska App. 1989) and State v. Vinyard, 50 Wn. App. 888, 751 P.2d 339 (1988), where the items were deleted which were not properly proved. See likewise People v. Cheatum, 148 A.D.2d 986, 539 N.Y.S.2d 222, 222 (N.Y.A.D. 1989), which stated that "[b]ecause the court ordered restitution without holding a hearing and relied solely upon the probation report, we modify the sentence by deleting the provision for restitution." Cheatum cites the same insufficiency of proof rule from presentence investigation report, United States v. Watchman, 749 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1984). [¶9] A case similar in other requirements was State v. Blanchard, 409 A.2d 229 , 237 (Me. 1979), where initially the restitution claim was not properly proven in accord with statute. The court then struck the restitution as unrealistic when followed by a long period of incarceration. See likewise State v. Fleming, 125 N.H. 238, 480 A.2d 107 (1984); State v. Madril, 105 N.M. 396, 733 P.2d 365 (1987); Matter of Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-96304, 147 Ariz. 153, 708 P.2d 1344 (1985); and Rodriguez v. State, 710 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. App. 1986), where unproven amounts were deleted. [¶10] An example of proper proof for malicious mischief damage to a building is provided by Lee v. State, 166 Ga. App. 485, 304 S.E.2d 446, 448 (1983): There was extensive evidence as to the nature of the property damage fully documented by pictures and estimates. This was uncontested except for certain speculation as to who might have been responsible for the damage other than that to which the appellants explicitly admitted. It is apparent, therefore, that the trial court had competent evidence as to the damage, the amount of the damage, and the complicity of the three appellants in the causing of that damage. * * * * * * The trial court had the authority to believe the appellants were not solely involved or that they were being untruthful in their limited admissions of damage. The credibility of witnesses is a matter of resolution by the trier of fact, in this case the trial court. * * * We must conclude on the basis of the evidence developed that the trial court was warranted fully in its conclusion that the appellants alone caused the $34,600 in damages and we are satisfied that any reasonable trier of fact could have found so beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. State v. Halsen, 111 Wn.2d 121, 757 P.2d 531 (1988), where the amount was computed by the appellate court from an admission of the parties in documentary record. Specifically, we do not adopt the notion presented in Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 Harv.L.Rev. 931, 944 (1984) that restitution, as a punitive sanction, is not limited by the amount of harm the offender inflicted on the victim or that the amount of restitution ordered, like the magnitude of any other sanction, bears only upon the degree of deprivation that the offender will suffer. This rule of adequacy of proof of amount required for restitution was directly addressed by our decision in Kaess, 748 P.2d at 699 as the approach which we now continue. [¶11] The reason for this requirement of damage proof is highlighted here. If the amount stated in the sentence were to be approved and the millennium subsequently arrives so that all of it was to be "repaid," Farmer Jacks would receive money which, by reasoned computation within this record, never was taken or ultimately lost.6 The record provides no evidence of the total loss. Comments of the prosecuting attorney, unless identifying trial evidence or directing attention to file documentation or other credible evidence, cannot be substituted for proof. [¶12] The second issue presented of frequent concern to this court is credit upon the sentence for presentence incarceration. This court is convinced that rules should now be finitely established that end opportunity or obligation for further appeals on this subject. [¶13] From Jones v. State, 602 P.2d 378 (Wyo. 1979) (Jones I) to Jones v. State, 771 P.2d 368 (Wyo. 1989) (Jones II), there were eight cases, and this is ninth where this court has addressed presentence incarceration credit against sentences. In review of these nine cases, we seek to establish rules which should bring this course of continued appeals to an end for this category of litigation by finite criteria for a determinable result. [¶14] In Jones I, 602 P.2d at 381 the holding as limited was stated: The law in jurisdictions which lack a statute governing credit for pre-sentence detention appears to be predominantly that the trial judge has discretion to award or deny credit for time spent in pre-sentence detention. * * * However, there is some authority that this discretion exists only in cases in which the sum of the pre-sentence detention plus the sentence given does not exceed the maximum allowable sentence. [¶15] Next followed Pote v. State, 695 P.2d 617 , 628 (Wyo. 1985), where it was reflected on this issue: The seventh issue raised by appellant is governed by our holding in Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378 , 381 (1979): "* * * We hold that a trial judge has discretion to deny or grant credit for time served in pre-sentence custody where: (1) the pre-sentence custody is not due to the defendant's indigency, and (2) the sum of the time spent in pre-sentence custody plus the sentence does not exceed the maximum allowable sentence." We will not be concerned with whether appellant was indigent prior to sentencing. The trial court found specifically that he was not, yet he was represented at trial and on appeal by the office of the public defender. Our concern is whether the sum of the time spent in pre-sentence custody plus the sentence exceeds the maximum allowable sentence. [¶16] Since the trial court had imposed a single maximum sentence in remand, the trial court was directed to give appellant credit for the presentence incarceration on the maximum sentence time. [¶17] In Hedge v. State, 696 P.2d 51 (Wyo. 1985), an "unlawful sentence" was originally imposed and then corrected by the trial court to give credit against the maximum. In recognizing the decision of Jones I, the court held that with credit against the maximum, the sentence was within state limits and credit against the minimum was not required without regard for appellant's indigency. Hedge was rapidly followed by Munden v. State, 698 P.2d 621 , 627 (Wyo. 1985), where again the court required credit against the maximum in stating: As to the credit for presentence detention, we have recently set out the applicable test. In Hedge v. State, Wyo., 696 P.2d 51 (1985), we stated that it is within the trial court's discretion to grant or deny credit for time served in presentence detention if (1) the detention is not due to the defendant's indigency, and (2) the sum of the time spent in presentence detention plus the sentence given upon conviction does not exceed the maximum allowable sentence. See Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378 (1979). The State acknowledges that appellant was indigent and his presentence confinement was due to his indigency, and then wisely concedes that appellant must be given credit against his maximum sentences for his presentence detention. The record reflects appellant was arrested on January 17, 1984, and his judgment and sentence was filed on June 7, 1984. Accordingly, he should receive credit of 142 days against his maximum sentence. [¶18] A year later, the issue again reappeared where appellant was indigent and was in presentence confinement for sixty days with a sentence given for the maximum without credit. Again, this court reversed to require credit against the maximum but not against the minimum. In Heier v. State, 727 P.2d 707 , 709-10 (Wyo. 1986), this court stated: As an indigent, appellant is entitled to credit for sixty days off the maximum sentence. Pote v. State, supra. Otherwise, the time spent in presentence confinement plus the ten year sentence would exceed the statutory maximum of ten years. * * * * * * A minimum sentence need not be reduced by the time spent in presentence detention. This is within the discretion of the judge and we will reverse only when there is an abuse of discretion. [¶19] In Harley v. State, 737 P.2d 750 , 756 (Wyo. 1987), we were again required to address the subject and change the sentence: It is clear from Heier v. State, supra, and Hedge v. State, supra, that the credit must be applied to the maximum sentence imposed. If the maximum sentence plus the pre-sentence confinement time exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, it is illegal, Heier v. State, supra, and it is simply discretionary with the trial court whether it also wishes to credit presentence confinement on the minimum sentence. [¶20] Lightly v. State, 739 P.2d 1232 (Wyo. 1987) followed where the defendant was specifically denied credit against the maximum with another argument presented that the presentence confinement need not be considered because if he had posted bond, he might have been retained in jail as a federal prisoner. Concluding on the record that he was a state prisoner, this court again remanded for failure to give credit against the maximum sentence of eighty-five days presentence confinement. This court in Lightly, 739 P.2d at 1233-34 stated: Recently, in Harley v. State, Wyo., 737 P.2d 750 (1987), we held that Harley was entitled to credit for pre-sentence confinement against his maximum sentence and relied upon the rule expressed in Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378 , 381 (1979), that: "* * * [A] trial judge has discretion to deny or grant credit for time served in pre-sentence custody where: (1) the presentence custody is not due to the defendant's indigency, and (2) the sum of the time spent in pre-sentence custody plus the sentence does not exceed the maximum allowable sentence."[1] If Lightly was in custody because of his indigency or if the sum of his time in pre-sentence confinement plus the sentence exceeds the maximum allowable term, he is entitled to relief. On this record, both of those things occurred. [1] Prior applications of this test have treated it as conjunctive. E.g., Harley v. State, Wyo., 737 P.2d 750 (1987); Heier v. State, 727 P.2d 707 (1986). Further reflection on Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378 (1979), has convinced us that the test should be perceived as disjunctive. Different concerns are raised by each prong of the test. Indigency invokes the constitutional requirements of equal protection; imprisonment in excess of the term set by statute raises jurisdictional concerns. [¶21] The eighth case which followed was Jones II, 771 P.2d 368 . Actually, the issue was more complex since the ninety percent Duffy rule was implicated which arose by statutory changes after Duffy v. State, 730 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 1986), requiring that the minimum cannot be more than ninety percent of the maximum. Jones II also presented the issue about the effect if the trial court did not state whether credit was considered and granted or denied. [¶22] This court stated: When an indigent is incarcerated for a period, including the presentence time, which exceeds the maximum penalty for his offense, it is unquestionable that he has been punished more severely than one who could afford to obtain presentence release. The sentencing court in such an instance, by violating a defendant's right to equal protection, has clearly abused its discretion. Matthews v. Dees, 579 F.2d 929, 931 (5th Cir. 1978). However, when a sentence is within the statutory range, it is difficult to say which factors formed the basis for the sentencing court's decision to determine whether credit was actually given for time served. There is division among the appellate courts that have encountered this difficulty as to whether they should presume that sentencing courts adhered to their constitutional duties and granted such credit. Godbold v. Wilson, 518 F. Supp. 1265 , 1267 n. 5 (D.Colo. 1981). Appellant urges us to follow the lead of those courts who refuse to grant that presumption on review. We find no mandated advantage in selection of this application. For example, the court in Godbold, pursuant to a federal habeas corpus petition, declared that sentencing courts would be required to explicitly credit defendants with presentence time served when that incarceration occurred solely because of indigence. Absent an express reference to the credit in the sentencing orders, that court indicated it would find such sentences unconstitutional. That court freely admitted, however, that the sentencing court could, through the legitimate exercise of its discretionary power, merely increase sentences so as to avoid the intended effect of the decision. Id. at 1269. We anticipate that trial courts adhere to constitutionally limiting criteria and apply the presumption of compliance on an appeal challenging length of sentence. In constitutional perspective, the sentencing court was required separately to credit presentence time served to the minimum term of appellant's sentence. This is the mandatory, not discretional issue of confinement credit application. Jones II, 771 P.2d at 371 (footnote omitted). [¶23] Jones II was published March 21, 1989, and now in this case, Renfro appeared for sentencing on April 12, 1989, with a written judgment and sentence entered on April 18, 1989. Obviously, the sentencing judge chose not to state what consideration, if any, he gave to the requested credit except, in effect, to deny its application. In the face of the specific request that credit be given and the direct result that it was not done, we are not justified in applying the presumption of constitutional compliance addressed in Jones II for disposition of this case.7 [¶24] We will approach this task on a basis of rules which should be sufficient to resolve the effects of presentence confinement on sentences previously entered and a prospective rule to apply for sentences which will be hereafter rendered. [¶25] Rules for existing sentences are: 1. Granting or denying presentence confinement credit against either or both minimum or maximum sentences rests in the sentencing discretion of the trial court unless the maximum actually entered plus presentence confinement time exceeds the statutory maximum. 2. Additionally, the minimum with whatever credit is given should not be over ninety percent of the maximum with whatever credit is given to it if the sentence was entered after May 22, 1987. Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157 (1987). 3. If the defendant is indigent, the trial court is not vested with discretion to deny credit for presentence confinement and, in such instances, the credit automatically will be afforded against both the minimum and maximum sentence. 4. If the trial court did not elect to clarify on sentencing record or in the final sentence as entered whether the credit will be given presentence incarceration, credit will automatically be applied in favor of both the minimum and maximum sentence. The documentary record of presentence confinement time shall be used by the warden of the penitentiary and the parole board to determine length of sentence and appropriateness of release dates if nothing is provided in the judgment and sentence as to the grant or denial of presentence confinement incarceration.8 [¶26] The prospective rule for sentences entered following the publication date of this opinion is: [¶27] Credit will be automatically granted for presentence incarceration time on all sentences. We will presume that in imposing the stated sentence, the trial court, in its exercise of discretion, considered presentence confinement. Consequently, without regard for what is or is not stated in the sentence, credit for presentence confinement will be applied to reduce the length of remaining incarceration under the sentence. As long as the maximum and minimum terms remain within statutory limits, discretion of the trial court continues to establish the periods which obviously include recognition of presentence confinement.9 [¶28] We adopt the goal of the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice for "the purpose * * * to end * * * technical distinctions by granting a comprehensive credit that treats all periods of confinement attributable to the underlying criminal transaction as equivalent, no matter what label is attached to such incarceration. To this end, [we would] require[] the credit to be offset against both the minimum and maximum terms imposed, * * *." III ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 18.310 (2d ed. 1980).10 [¶29] This resolution provides certainty of result, clarity of rules, and preservation of equal protection of constitutional interests. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 , 90 S. Ct. 2018, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1970). See Berger, Equal Protection and Criminal Sentencing: Legal and Policy Considerations, 71 Nw.U.L.Rev. 29 (1976); Schornhorst, Presentence Confinement and the Constitution: The Burial of Dead Time, 23 Hastings L.J. 1041 (1972); Stacy, Constitutional Right to Sentence Credit for Pre-Trial Incarceration, 41 U.Cin.L.Rev. 823 (1972); Comment, Prisoners' Rights and Equal Protection, 20 Am.U.L.Rev. 482 (1970-71); Note, Sentence Crediting for the State Criminal Defendant - A Constitutional Requirement, 34 Ohio St.L.J. 586, 593 n. 35 (1973); and Note, Constitutional Law - Sentencing - Withholding Good Time Credit From Prisoners Awaiting Appeal. Pruett v. Texas, 468 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'd en banc, 470 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1973), 51 Tex.L.Rev. 348 (1973). [¶30] Reversal of the restitution order by virtue of this decision does not determine that cash or any other assets properly claimable by the victims should not be returned to the rightful owner. This decision, as a consideration of criminal responsibility, does not determine civil liabilities. Fleming, 480 A.2d 107. [¶31] Reversed and remanded for an entry of a judgment in conformity herewith. FOOT