Title: ROBERT F DESHAMBO V CHARLES W ANDERSON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 122939
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 23, 2004

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 23, 2004 
ROBERT F. DESHAMBO, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
and 
Nos. 122939-122940 
JENNIFER M. GRANHOLM, Attorney General
of the State of Michigan, and MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH, 
 
Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
NORMAN R. NIELSEN and PAULINE NIELSEN, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
CHARLES W. ANDERSON, 
Defendant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, C.J.   
In this case, we consider whether the inherently 
dangerous activity doctrine has been properly extended to 
impose liability on landowners for injuries to employees of 
 
 
                                                 
independent contractors performing dangerous work. We hold 
that the Court of Appeals has improperly extended the 
doctrine, contrary to its original purpose, to include 
injuries to those involved in the performance of dangerous 
work. 
The purpose of the doctrine is to protect innocent 
third parties injured as a result of an inherently 
dangerous undertaking. 
Because plaintiff was an employee 
of an independent contractor rather than a third party, the 
doctrine does not apply in this case. 
We thus reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendants Norman and Pauline Nielsen1 own and reside 
on a 130-acre farm in Leelanau County, Michigan. 
The land 
is used primarily to farm corn and operate a cherry 
orchard. A neighbor manages the cherry tree operation, and 
defendants are not involved in pruning or cutting the 
trees. Defendants hired an independent contractor, Charles 
Anderson, to fell and delimb small poplar trees and to 
clean up the tops of trees that a previous logger had left 
on the property. 
Anderson, an experienced timber cutter, 
1 Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims against
defendant Charles W. Anderson. 
Because Anderson is not a 
party to this appeal, the term “defendants” refers only to
the Nielsens. 
2  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
had previously performed woodcutting for defendants. Under 
the arrangement between defendants and Anderson, Anderson 
would keep the tree tops for firewood and pay defendants 
for the poplar that he cut. 
The parties did not discuss 
how the felling and delimbing was to be performed. 
Anderson hired plaintiff Robert DeShambo to help him 
with the work on defendants’ property. 
On plaintiff’s 
first day of work, he was delimbing trees when he heard 
someone yelling. 
Plaintiff turned around and saw a tree 
falling toward him as Anderson felled it. 
The tree hit 
plaintiff on the shoulder and then struck some logs on the 
ground, causing one log to spin, strike him in the back, 
and pin him between the log and the fallen tree. 
The 
incident has left plaintiff paralyzed. 
Plaintiff filed a negligence action against defendants 
and Anderson, but subsequently dismissed his claims against 
Anderson.2
 Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that defendants 
were liable for Anderson’s negligence because timber 
cutting was an inherently dangerous activity. 
Defendants 
moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff could 
not establish liability under any recognized exception to 
2 The state of Michigan also intervened to recover
funds 
paid 
through 
Medicaid 
for 
plaintiff’s 
medical 
treatment. 
3  
 
 
 
                                                 
the general rule precluding the liability of a landowner 
for injuries that an independent contractor negligently 
causes. 
The trial court granted summary disposition for 
defendants, ruling that logging was not an inherently 
dangerous 
activity 
and 
that 
defendants 
were 
not 
sophisticated 
landowners 
knowledgeable 
of 
the 
risks 
inherent in cutting timber. The Court of Appeals reversed, 
concluding that a question of fact existed regarding 
whether 
defendants 
reasonably 
anticipated 
the 
risks 
inherent in logging.3
 The Court reasoned that defendants 
had previously hired logging companies to conduct tree 
removals on their property and that defendant Norman 
Nielsen had admitted that logging was risky. 
The Court 
further stated that because plaintiff presented evidence of 
the hazardous elements of logging, the determination 
whether logging is inherently dangerous is a jury question. 
We granted defendants’ application for leave to 
appeal, directing the parties to address “whether the 
‘inherently 
dangerous 
activity’ 
doctrine 
has 
been 
appropriately extended beyond its original application to 
3 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 22,
2002 (Docket Nos. 233853, 233854). 
4  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
only third parties to extend liability to landowners and 
general 
contractors 
for 
injuries 
to 
employees 
of 
independent contractors doing dangerous work.”4 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the “inherently dangerous activity” doctrine 
has been properly extended to include injuries to employees 
of independent contractors who are injured while performing 
dangerous work is a question of law that this Court reviews 
de novo. 
Likewise, we review de novo a lower court’s 
decision on a summary disposition motion. Quality Products 
& Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 364; 
666 NW2d 251 (2003). 
III. ANALYSIS 
It has been long established in Michigan that a person 
who hires an independent contractor is not liable for 
injuries that the contractor negligently causes. 
Lake 
Superior Iron Co v Erickson, 39 Mich 492, 496 (1878); 
DeForrest v Wright, 2 Mich 368, 370 (1852). 
Over time, 
exceptions to this general rule have developed, including 
4 469 Mich 947 (2003). 
We ordered that this case be 
submitted together with Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc, 471
Mich ___ ; ___ NW2d ___ (2004), which involves the 
relationship between the “common work area” and “retained
control” doctrines and the effect of those doctrines on the 
general rule of nonliability for owners and independent
contractors. 
5  
 
 
 
 
the “inherently dangerous activity” doctrine. The class of 
persons protected under the doctrine has undergone a 
transformation since the doctrine’s inception. 
A. Application of the Inherently Dangerous Activity 
Doctrine to Third Parties 
Early cases giving rise to the inherently dangerous 
activity doctrine limited the exception to injuries to 
third parties. 
In Rogers v Parker, 159 Mich 278; 123 NW 
1109 (1909), this Court first discussed an exception to the 
general rule of nonliability for damages caused to a third 
party by an independent contractor’s performance of an act 
likely to do harm to that third party. The question before 
this Court was whether a landowner who employed an 
independent contractor to clear farmland was liable for 
damages to neighboring property resulting when a fire that 
the contractor had set spread to neighboring land. 
This 
Court 
resolved 
the 
issue 
on 
statutory 
grounds, 
but 
discussed in obiter dictum the common-law principles that 
would have applied, stating: 
[T]he rule relieving the employer where the
work 
has 
been 
committed 
to 
an 
independent
contractor is subject to the well-established 
exceptions that: 
“If the thing to be done is in itself 
unlawful, or if it is per se a nuisance, or if it
cannot be done without doing damage, he who 
causes it to be done by another, be the latter
servant, agent, or independent contractor, is as 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
much liable for injuries which may happen to 
third persons from the act done as though he had
done the act in person. 
So it is the duty of
every person who does in person, or causes to be
done by another, an act which from its nature is
liable, unless precautions are taken, to do 
injury to others, to see to it that those 
precautions are taken, and he cannot escape this
duty by turning the whole performance over to a 
contractor.” 
[Id. at 282-283 (some emphases 
added).] 
In Inglis v Millersburg Driving Ass’n, 169 Mich 311; 
136 NW 443 (1912), this Court elaborated on the above 
common-law exception. 
In that case, agents of the 
defendant association had set fires on fairgrounds property 
in the defendant’s possession to clear it, and the fires 
spread to the plaintiff’s adjoining land, causing damage. 
This Court held that the defendant was estopped to argue 
that 
independent 
contractors, 
rather 
than 
the 
unincorporated association itself, were responsible for the 
damage, because it had not pleaded that defense or argued 
it at trial. 
Id. at 317-318. This Court opined in obiter 
dictum, however, that an exception would have applied to 
the general rule of nonliability of landowners for the 
actions of independent contractors. While this Court cited 
its decision in Rogers and various other formulations of 
the rule, perhaps the best articulation of the principle 
was as follows: 
7  
 
 
 
The 
doctrine 
of 
independent 
contractor,
whereby one who lets work to be done by another,
reserving no control over the performance of the
work, is not liable to third persons for injuries
resulting from negligence of the contractor or
his servants, is subject to several important
exceptions. 
One of these . . . is where the 
employer is, from the nature and character of the
work, under a duty to others to see that it is
carefully performed. 
It cannot be better stated 
than in the language used by Cockburn, C.J., in
Bower v. Peate, 1 Q.B. Div. 321, 326, a leading
and well-considered case. It is, ‘that a man who
orders a work to be executed, from which, in the
natural course of things, injurious consequences
to his neighbor must be expected to arise, unless
means are adopted by which such consequences may
be averted, is bound to see the doing of that
which is necessary to prevent mischief, and 
cannot relieve himself of his responsibility by
employing some one else——whether it be the 
contractor employed to do the work from which the
danger arises, or some independent person——or to
do what is necessary to prevent the act he has
ordered done from becoming unlawful.’ . . . This
does not abrogate the law as to independent
contractor. 
It still leaves abundant room for 
its proper application. ‘There is,’ as stated by
Cockburn, 
‘an 
obvious 
difference 
between 
committing work to a contractor to be executed,
from which, if properly done, no injurious
consequences can arise, and handing over to him
work 
to 
be 
done 
from 
which 
mischievous 
consequences 
will 
arise 
unless 
precautionary
measures are adopted.’ 
“The weight of reason and authority is to
the effect that, where a party is under a duty to 
the public, or third person, to see that work he
is about to do, or have done, is carefully
performed, so as to avoid injury to others, he
cannot, by letting it to a contractor, avoid his
liability, in case it is negligently done to the
injury of another." 
Covington, etc., Bridge Co. 
v. Steinbrock & Patrick, 61 Ohio St. 215 (55 N.E.
618 [1899], and cases cited.” [Inglis at 320-321 
(citations omitted, emphasis added).] 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, the above rule, which has come to be known as 
the “inherently dangerous activity exception,” is founded 
on the existence of a duty on behalf of the landowner, or 
employer of an independent contractor, and the duty must be 
of the type that is nondelegable. 
The employer or 
landowner must also be aware that the danger exists and 
that it necessarily involves danger to others. 
Notably, 
the type of danger contemplated by the Inglis Court was 
danger to third parties and not to those involved in the 
dangerous activity. 
Over the next several decades, this Court reaffirmed 
that, under this doctrine, the landowner must itself owe 
some duty to the specific third party, that the negligent 
act that causes the injury cannot be collateral to the work 
contracted for, and that the injury that occurs must be 
reasonably expected by the landowner. 
See Cary v Thomas, 
345 Mich 616; 76 NW2d 817 (1956); Barlow v Kreighoff Co, 
310 Mich 195; 16 NW2d 715 (1944); Grinnell v Carbide & 
Carbon Chemicals Corp, 282 Mich 509; 276 NW 535 (1937); 
Tillson v Consumers Power Co, 269 Mich 53; 256 NW 801 
(1934); Watkins v Gabriel Steel Co, 260 Mich 692; 245 NW 
801 (1932); Wight v H G Christman Co, 244 Mich 208; 221 NW 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
314 (1928). 
Notably, under this Court’s precedent, the 
doctrine applied only to third parties. 
B. Expansion of the Inherently Dangerous Activity
Doctrine to a Contractor’s Employees 
In Vannoy v City of Warren, 15 Mich App 158; 166 NW2d 
486 (1968), the Court of Appeals purported to expand the 
scope of the inherently dangerous activity doctrine to hold 
a landowner liable not to a third party, but to the estate 
of a deceased employee of an independent contractor. 
The 
Court expressly rejected the landowner’s argument that the 
doctrine applied only to third parties and not to the 
employees of an independent contractor engaged in the 
inherently dangerous activity. 
Id. at 164-165. 
The Court 
stated that limiting the exception to third persons 
“violate[d] the absolute character of the duty . . . .” 
Id. at 164. 
In McDonough v Gen Motors Corp, 388 Mich 430; 201 NW2d 
609 (1972), a plurality of this Court reversed a directed 
verdict for the defendant landowner, concluding that the 
inherently dangerous activity exception could be applied to 
impose 
liability 
on 
the 
owner 
for 
injuries 
to 
a 
subcontractor’s employee. 
The plurality quoted Justice 
COOLEY’s formulation of the rule that this Court cited in 
Inglis: 
10  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
“‘If I employ a contractor to do a job of
work for me which, in the progress of its 
execution, obviously exposes others to unusual
perils, I ought, I think, to be responsible, * *
* for I cause acts to be done which naturally
expose others to injury.’” 
[McDonough at 438,
quoting Inglis, supra at 319, quoting 2 Cooley
Torts (3d ed), p 109.] 
Without 
explanation, 
the 
plurality 
assumed 
that 
the 
“others” quoted above included the contractor’s employees 
and not only third parties. 
Justice 
BRENNAN 
dissented,5 
contending 
that 
the 
inherently 
dangerous 
activity 
exception 
protects 
“strangers” and does not apply to “a plaintiff who was 
himself actively engaged in the inherently dangerous 
activity.” McDonough at 453. His dissent stated: 
The 
application 
of 
this 
well 
settled 
exception is clear in cases where the injured
person is a stranger to the inherently dangerous
activity. 
In Inglis [supra], the inherently
dangerous activity was burning, and the plaintiff
was a neighboring landowner; in Grinnell [supra],
the 
danger 
was 
explosion, 
the 
plaintiff 
a 
purchaser of a stove; in Watkins [supra], the
dangerous 
activity 
was 
elevated 
steel 
construction, the plaintiff a mason contractor;
in Olah v Katz, 234 Mich 112 [207 NW 892] (1926),
the danger was an open pit, the plaintiff a
neighboring child; in Detroit v Corey, 9 Mich 165
(1861), the danger was an open ditch, the 
plaintiff 
a 
passer-by; 
in 
Darmstaetter 
v 
Moynahan, 27 Mich 188 (1873), the danger was a
wall of ice in the roadway, the plaintiff a
sleigh rider; in McWilliams v Detroit Central 
5 Justice T. G. KAVANAGH joined Justice BRENNAN’s dissent. 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mills Co, 31 Mich 274 (1875), the danger was a
railroad switching operation, the plaintiff a 
passer-by. . . . 
Indeed, there are almost no cases which have
come to notice in which the suit is brought by or
on behalf of a plaintiff who was himself actively
engaged in the inherently dangerous activity. 
Those few precedents which are cited seem to
be founded upon other grounds. 
* * * 
[T]he rule of liability is designed to 
protect innocent third parties injured by the
execution of an inherently dangerous undertaking.
The rule is not designed, nor was it ever 
intended to benefit the contractor who undertakes 
the dangerous work, or his employees. 
Thus, if I employ a contractor to remove a
tree stump from my yard by use of explosives, I
am liable to my neighbor whose garage is damaged
by the concussion. 
This is because it is I who 
have set the project in motion; it is I who have
created the unusual peril; it is for my benefit
that the explosives were used. As between myself
and my neighbor, I ought not to be permitted to
plead that it was the contractor's negligence and
not my own which damaged his property. 
But if the contractor should blow up his own
truck, I should not be liable. 
He is the expert
in explosives and not me [sic]. 
I had neither 
the legal right nor the capability to supervise
his work. 
The same would be true if the 
contractor's workman had injured himself, or been
injured by the carelessness of a fellow workman
or the negligence of his employer. 
Neither the 
contractor nor his employees are "others", as
contemplated in Cooley's statement of the rule.
Indeed, they are privy to the contract which
creates the peril. 
The mischief of today's decision is not its
result, but its logic. 
One assumes that a 
company like General Motors has no want of access 
12  
 
 
 
to expertise. 
It may well have safety engineers
on its payroll far more knowledgeable about 
structural steel than the decedent's employer.
But to predicate liability here on the Inglis,
Olah, Wight and Watkins line of cases is to 
impose upon many, many other, less sophisticated
defendants the same burden to attend to the 
safety 
of 
the 
employees 
of 
independent
contractors. [McDonough, supra at 453-456.] 
In Bosak v Hutchinson, 422 Mich 712, 724; 375 NW2d 333 
(1985), this Court relied on Vannoy and McDonough for the 
proposition 
that 
the 
inherently 
dangerous 
activity 
exception has, on occasion, been applied to employees of 
contractors performing dangerous work. 
This Court did not 
provide further analysis of this issue, however, given its 
holding that assembling a crane after hours, the activity 
involved in that case, did not constitute a dangerous 
activity, but a routine construction activity. Id. at 728. 
Further, in Justus v Swope, 184 Mich App 91; 457 NW2d 
103 (1990), on which the trial court in the instant case 
relied, the Court of Appeals stated, “The inherently 
dangerous activity doctrine has, thus far, been found to 
impose liability in cases involving owners fully capable of 
recognizing the potential danger.” 
Id. at 96, citing 
McDonough, Vannoy, and others. 
The Court declined to 
impose liability on “mere homeowners,” id. at 96, for 
injuries that an employee of an independent contractor 
sustained while removing a dead tree from the homeowners’ 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
yard. 
The Court stated that it was unreasonable to expect 
the homeowners to be cognizant of the particular risks 
inherent in tree removal. 
Id. at 97-98. 
Thus, the Court 
seemingly would have imposed liability if the homeowners 
had been aware of such risks. 
The Court opined that 
imposing liability in that case, however, was exactly the 
fear that Justice BRENNAN expressed in his dissent in 
McDonough. 
C. Analysis 
The analysis in Justice BRENNAN’s McDonough dissent is 
persuasive and consistent with the longstanding common-law 
principles discussed in our case law. 
When a landowner 
hires an independent contractor to perform work that poses 
a peculiar danger or risk of harm, it is reasonable to hold 
the landowner liable for harm to third parties that results 
from the activity. 
If an employee of the contractor, 
however, negligently injures himself or is injured by the 
negligence of a fellow employee, it is not reasonable to 
hold the landowner liable merely because the activity 
involved is inherently dangerous. 
As Justice BRENNAN 
recognized, the inherently dangerous activity doctrine was 
designed to protect third parties, not those actively 
involved in the dangerous activity. 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Restatement of Torts echoes the above principle. 
2 Restatement of Torts, 2d, § 416 provides: 
One who employs an independent contractor to
do work which the employer should recognize as 
likely to create during its progress a peculiar
risk of physical harm to others unless special
precautions are taken, is subject to liability
for physical harm caused to them by the failure
of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to 
take such precautions, even though the employer
has provided for such precautions in the contract
or otherwise. [Emphasis added.] 
Similarly, 2 Restatement of Torts, 2d, § 427 states: 
One who employs an independent contractor to
do work involving a special danger to others 
which the employer knows or has reason to know to
be inherent in or normal to the work, or which he
contemplates or has reason to contemplate when
making the contract, is subject to liability for
physical harm caused to such others by the 
contractor’s 
failure 
to 
take 
reasonable 
precautions 
against 
such 
danger. 
[Emphasis
added.] 
The text of the above provisions applies to “others.”  The 
term “others” necessarily refers to persons other than 
those directly involved in the dangerous activity. 
Moreover, all the illustrations in the Restatement 
pertaining to §§ 416 and 427 involve injuries to innocent 
third parties and not to those directly involved in the 
activity. 
For example, the first illustration under § 416 
provides: 
1. A employs B, an independent contractor,
to erect a building upon land abutting upon a
public highway. 
The contract entrusts the whole 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
work of erection to B, and contains a clause
requiring the contractor to erect a sufficient
fence around the excavations necessary for the
erection of the building. 
It contains also a 
clause by which the contractor assumes all 
liability for any harm caused by his work. 
B 
digs the excavation but fails to erect a fence.
In consequence, C, while walking along the 
highway at night, falls into the cellar and is
hurt. A is subject to liability to C. 
In the above illustration, C is an innocent third party and 
is not directly involved in the dangerous activity. 
Similarly, C in the following illustration under § 427 is 
an innocent third party: 
3. A employs B, an independent contractor,
to excavate a sewer in the street. 
B leaves the 
trench unguarded, without warning lights, and C
drives his automobile into it in the dark. 
The 
danger is inherent in the work, and A is subject
to liability to C. 
Although a plurality of this Court in McDonough cited §§ 
416 and 427 of the Restatement when discussing the 
inherently dangerous activity exception, the plurality 
failed to recognize that the term “others” refers to third 
parties, and not to those persons involved in the dangerous 
activity. 
The Court of Appeals in Vannoy improperly extended the 
inherently dangerous activity doctrine to include employees 
of independent contractors. 
We thus overrule the Court of 
Appeals holding in Vannoy. 
We also reject this Court’s 
obiter dictum in Bosak to the extent that it approved of 
16  
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
Vannoy’s extension of the doctrine. 
As our longstanding 
precedent, before McDonough, and the Restatement make 
clear, the inherently dangerous activity exception is 
limited to third parties.6 
Further, as Justice BRENNAN recognized in McDonough, 
allowing liability to be imposed on landowners for injuries 
resulting to an independent contractor’s employees will 
necessarily result in liability imposed not only on large 
corporations fully capable of assessing and providing 
safety precautions, but also on “less sophisticated” 
landowners who may be unaware of such dangers or unable to 
provide precautionary measures to avoid the inherent risk. 
Indeed, in many situations it may be the risk itself that 
prompts a landowner to hire an independent contractor in 
the first instance. 
A contractor who may specialize and 
routinely engage in the activity would likely be better 
able to perform the activity in a safe manner. 
Likewise, 
the contractor is probably better able to implement 
6 Our concurring colleague opines that an exception to
this rule exists where a landowner retains control over the 
work performed and is in a position to ensure that the
independent contractor takes adequate safety precautions.
Post at 2. 
Because these circumstances are not presented
in this case, we express no opinion regarding whether a
landowner who has retained control over the dangerous work
may be subject to liability for injuries to a contractor’s
employee caused by the contractor’s negligence. 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reasonable safety precautions for the protection of its 
employees who perform the dangerous work, and this duty 
accordingly lies with the contractor. 
We thus adhere to 
the established common-law principle that this Court had 
consistently followed before McDonough. 
Because the inherently dangerous activity exception 
does not apply when the injured party is an employee of an 
independent contractor rather than a third party, the 
exception does not apply in the instant case. Accordingly, 
the trial court properly granted summary disposition for 
defendants. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the inherently dangerous activity 
exception is limited to third parties and does not apply to 
employees 
of 
independent 
contractors 
injured 
while 
performing dangerous work. 
Because plaintiff was an 
employee of an independent contractor rather than a third 
party, 
the 
doctrine 
is 
inapplicable 
in 
this 
case. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ROBERT F. DESHAMBO, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
and 
Nos. 122939-122940 
JENNIFER M. GRANHOLM, Attorney
General of the State of Michigan,
and MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMUNITY HEALTH, 
 
Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
NORMAN R. NIELSEN and PAULINE 
NIELSEN, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
CHARLES W. ANDERSON, 
Defendant. 
KELLY, J. (concurring in result only). 
I agree with the result reached by the majority in 
this case. 
However, I write separately to point out that 
the majority takes no cognizance of the effect of its 
analysis when read together with its decision in Ormsby v 
Capital Welding, Inc, 471 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2004). I 
believe that our jurisprudence requires that a landowner 
 
       
                                                 
 
 
retaining control over the performance of inherently 
dangerous work should be liable for an injury to an 
independent contractor's employee. 
The decision in this 
case, when read with the decision in Ormsby, suggests 
otherwise.1 
A landowner is generally not liable to the employee of 
a contractor for injuries caused by the contractor’s 
negligence. 
Ante at 5. 
An exception has been made where 
the landowner retained control of the job site and 
inherently hazardous activities were undertaken. 
The Court holds today that a landowner is not liable 
for a contractor’s negligence that injures the contractor's 
employee engaged in an inherently dangerous activity. Ante 
at 14. 
The Court adopts Justice Brennan’s dissenting 
analysis in McDonough v Gen Motors2 and holds that the 
landowner has “'neither the legal right nor the capability 
to supervise [the independent contractor’s] work.'” 
Ante 
at 12, quoting McDonough at 456. The landowner here is not 
alleged to have retained control of the job site. 
1 I dissented from the decision in Ormsby on the ground
that the inherently dangerous activity doctrine and the
retained control doctrine are distinct theories of tort 
liability. 
2 McDonough v Gen Motors Corp, 388 Mich 430; 201 NW2d
609 (1972). 
2  
 
 
 
 
As previously indicated, a landowner is liable to a 
contractor's employee if he retained control over hazardous 
work and was positioned to ensure that the contractor took 
adequate precautions. Funk v General Motors Corp, 392 Mich 
91, 105; 220 NW2d 641 (1974), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Hardy v Monsanto Enviro-Chem Systems, Inc, 414 
Mich 29; 323 NW2d 270 (1982). 
The retained control doctrine is a distinct theory of 
liability. 
It applies where the entity engaging the 
services of the independent contractor has the legal right 
and the capability to supervise the work. 
Plummer v 
Bechtel Constr Co, 440 Mich 646, 659; 489 NW2d 66 (1992) 
(opinion by Levin, J). 
The doctrine is applicable 
regardless of whether the employer is a landowner or a 
general contractor. 
This case was argued and submitted together with 
Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc.  The Court in Ormsby holds 
that the retained control doctrine, applied to general 
contractors who utilize subcontractors, is merely an 
element of the common work area doctrine.  It is not an 
independent theory of liability. Ormsby at ___. 
If Ormsby is held to apply to landowners, the 
decisions here and in Ormsby, read together, could have 
unfortunate unintended results in future cases. 
The 
3  
 
                                                 
inference to be drawn from them is this: 
a landowner who 
retains control of inherently dangerous work on a job site 
will not be liable for injuries to a contractor's employee 
unless the injury occurred in a common work area. 
The 
majority denies the validity of this inference. 
Id. at 
___, n 13. However, the opinion’s language strongly belies 
that denial. 
Under the tort-reform statutes, liability is almost 
always several only and not joint. 
MCL 600.2956. 
Legal 
liability is distinct from fault, although it is based on 
fault. 
Fault is determined by the trier of fact3 who 
assigns it, regardless of whether a party can be held 
legally liable. 
MCL 600.6304(1). 
However, an injured 
party can recover only from a party that can be held 
legally liable. 
Under the preceding tort-reform statutes, the trier of 
fact can assign fault to a landowner who has directed the 
actions 
of 
an 
independent 
contractor 
engaged 
in 
an 
inherently dangerous activity. 
The Court’s opinions in 
DeShambo and Ormsby could be interpreted to hold that such 
a negligent landowner could escape all liability for injury 
caused to the employee of his contractor. 
The landowner 
3 MCL 600.2957(1). 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
cannot be held liable under the inherently dangerous 
activity doctrine. 
DeShambo. 
Neither can he be held 
liable under the retained control doctrine. Ormsby. 
I believe that this result would be inconsistent with 
principles underlying the common law. 
Moreover, it would 
be 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
intent 
of 
the 
tort-reform 
statutes. 
A negligent actor is intended to be legally 
liable 
for 
his 
actions. 
The 
majority 
potentially 
undermines this principle with the holdings in these two 
cases. 
Absent language correcting this problem, the 
analysis in the majority opinion is unacceptable to me and 
I concur only in the result reached by the majority. 
Marilyn Kelly 
5