Title: ARMON v STEWART
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12424
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 1973

No. 12424 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T OF THE STATE O F MONTANA 1973 H A R O L D E. ARMON, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - DrnTAYN L. STEWART, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Truman G. Bradford, Judge presiding, Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Dola N. Wilson, Jr. argued, Great F a l l s , Montana. For Respondent : Swanberg, Koby, Swanberg & Matteucci, Great F a l l s , Montana. Gorham Swanberg argued, Great F a l l s , Montana. Submitted: May 30, 1973 Decided : J@#' - 8 Im Filed : JUW - 8 1973 Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal by defendant Dewayn L. Stewart from the denial of h i s motion for change of venue entered i n the d i s t r i c t court of Cascade County on September 27, 1972. Suit was brought by Harold E. Armon against Stewart i n Cascade County on August 17, 1972. The subject matter of the s u i t was a "cattle shares agreement'' allegedly breached by Stewart. On September 6 , 1972, a motion for change of venue from Cascade County t o Toole County was filed, In h i s affidavit accompanying the motion, Stewart stated: "That the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted and best served by changing the place of t r i a l from the County of Cascade t o the County of Toole, wherein defendant resides and conducts h i s businesses. I I In response, p l a i n t i f f Armon f i l e d an affidavit i n opposi- tion which stated i n pertinent part: h hat a t the time said agreement was signed it was the intention of a l l parties that the lease would be performed i n either Cascade County, Montana, or Chouteau County, Montana, That i n fact, the lease was performed i n Cascade County, Montana, i n that the c a t t l e mentioned i n said lease w e r e transported t o a ranch owned by Dola Wilson, which I was leasing near Fort Shaw, Montana, a town i n Cascade County, and affiant performed the agree- ment and wintered the c a t t l e on said property i n Cascade County, Montana. II The "cattle shares agreement" provided the expenses of trucking the c a t t l e from stewart's ranch t o Armon's ranch were t o be shared equally and also that the c a t t l e were not t o be removed from Cas- cade o r Chouteau counties without stewart's consent, O n the basis of the allegations i n the complaint a.nd the affidavits, the court denied the motion, stating i n i t s order: It* * * It appears t o the court that the contract was t o be performed on the p l a i n t i f f ' s property; that the affidavit on f i l e shows that the plain- t i f f ' s property was i n Cascade County, and that the contract was performed there. It further appears t o the court that most of the witnesses t o appear a t the t r i a l w i l l be residents of Cascade County, 11 The issue here is whether it was error for the district court to deny the change of venue. Defendant Stewart maintains that under section 93-2904, R.C,M. 1947, the proper venue is in Toole County, the residence of defendant. Section 93-2904, R,C.M. 1947, reads in part: ' " n all other cases the action shall be tried in the county in which the defendants, or any of them, may reside at the commencement of the action * * , Actions upon contracts may be tried in the county in which the contract was to be performed * * *," Stewart argues that the last sentence of section 93-2904 is not applicable to this case because of this Court's holding in McGregor v, Svare, 151 Mont. 520, 524, 445 P,2d 571, There we held the test for determining whether a contract action should be tried in a county other than the county of the defendant's residence to be: 1' 1 To maintain suit in another county than that of defendant's residence lai in tiff must clearlv show the facts relied on to bring the case within one of the exceptions to the rule and the contract must state so clearly that it is to be performed in another county than that of defendant's resi- dence that no other fair construction can be placed upon it. "' Stewart is in error in his assertion that Armon did not meet this test. The allegations in the complaint and those contained in Armon's affidavit clearly show that the contract was to be per- formed either in Chouteau County or Cascade County and the contract until the time of the alleged breach was performed in Cascade County. There are no facts contained in Stewart's affidavit to contradict Armon's statements. The district court and this Court must accept the facts in those affidavits as being true. Cormier Bros., Inc, V, Willcutt, 154 Mont. 297, 299, 462 P . 2 d 889; Fraser v . Clark, 128 Mont, 160, 273 P, 2d 105. The district court did not commit error in denying the motion for change of venue, Its ruling comes squarely within the holding of this Court in Cormier Bros. where we held: "'This performance exception, however, applies only to such actions as are based upon contracts which plainly show, either (a) by their express t e r m s , or (b) by necessary implication therefrom, that the contracting parties, a t the time of contracting, did mutually agree upon a particular county, other than that of defendant's residence, wherein they intended that t h e i r contract was t o be performed, "' O n the basis of the information contained i n the affidavit and the contract which was made a part of the complaint, the d i s t r i c t court could determine by necessary implication that the parties mutually agreed to perform the contract i n Cascade County o r Chouteau County. Because the contract was t o be performed i n Cascade County and the plaintiff chose that county t o bring s u i t , have Stewart does notlthe right t o remove it. A s t h i s Court stated i n Cormier Bros,, c i t i n g from Love v. Mon-0-Co O i l Corp., 133 Mont. 56, 61, 319 P.2d 1056: "'* * * the s t a t u t e means that either the county of defendant's residence, o r the county where the con- t r a c t was t o be performed, i s the proper county for the t r i a l of the action, and i f the plaintiff chooses either of those counties, defendant may not have it removed * * *. "' For the affirmed . Concur : foregoing reasons, the judgment of the n / / Chief ~ u s t i 6 e ~ s s h c i a t e Justices