Title: Board of Sup. Fairfax Cty. v. Bd. of Zoning of Fairfax
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 051269
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 3, 2006

Present:  All the Justices 
 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF FAIRFAX 
COUNTY, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 051269  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         March 3, 2006 
BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS OF FAIRFAX 
COUNTY, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Randy I. Bellows, Judge 
 
The primary issue in this appeal concerns the 
timeliness of a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by 
the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors (the Supervisors) 
and the Fairfax County Zoning Administrator (the Zoning 
Administrator) (collectively the County), seeking review of 
a final decision of the Fairfax County Board of Zoning 
Appeals (the BZA).  Because the 30-day filing requirement 
set forth in Code § 15.2-2314 is not an aspect of the 
circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal, the County’s failure to timely file its petition 
for a writ of certiorari cannot be raised for the first 
time before this Court. 
This appeal also involves the interpretation of a 1941 
zoning ordinance and whether a garage apartment built over 
50 years ago presently qualifies as a lawful nonconforming 
use.  Because the relevant zoning ordinance permitted only 
 
2
one principal dwelling on a single lot, we will reverse the 
judgment of the circuit court. 
I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Donald J. and Jaki S. McCarthy (the McCarthys) own 
approximately 1.475 acres of real estate located in Fairfax 
County.  The property is currently situated in a 
residential zoning district known as R-1, meaning that 
there cannot be more than one dwelling unit on any one lot 
nor can “a dwelling unit be located on the same lot with 
any other principal building.”  Fairfax County Zoning 
Ordinance (Zoning Ordinance) § 2.501.  The property is 
developed with a single-family dwelling, built in 1945, and 
a two-story detached garage that contains an apartment on 
the second floor.  The garage apartment was constructed in 
1950. 
On February 5, 2004, a zoning inspector informed the 
McCarthys that the existence of the garage apartment 
violated Zoning Ordinance § 2.501.1  The McCarthys appealed 
the violation notice to the BZA.  They claimed that the 
garage apartment was a qualified nonconforming use on the 
basis that it was lawfully established under the 1941 
Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance (1941 Ordinance). 
 
3
In 1941, the subject property was zoned as 
agricultural.  In the “Agricultural District,” permitted 
uses included any use that was allowed in the “Rural 
Residence District.”  1941 Ordinance § III(A)(2).  
Permitted uses in the Rural Residence District included a 
“[s]ingle family detached dwelling” and a “[p]rivate garage 
which shall not be used to house more than two vehicles in 
excess of those used by the residents of the premises on 
which the garage is located.”  Id. at §§ IV(A)(1), 
IV(A)(7).  The term “single-family dwelling” was defined as 
“[a] dwelling constructed to accommodate only one family, 
and containing only one housekeeping unit.”  Id. at § I(6).  
The 1941 Ordinance defined the term “garage” as “[a] 
building used for the housing or storing of motor driven 
vehicles” and listed it as an example of an “accessory 
building” in the definition provided for that term.  Id. at 
§§ I(1), I(9).  No structure in the agricultural district 
could be erected “on a lot or building site containing an 
area of less than one-half . . . acre.”  Id. at 
§ III(C)(1). 
At a public hearing before the BZA held on May 25, 
2004, the McCarthys argued that there was nothing in the 
                                                             
1 The zoning inspector advised the McCarthys of other 
violations of the Zoning Ordinance, but those alleged 
 
4
1941 Ordinance prohibiting “a property from having two 
dwelling units.”  They presented testimony from the 
daughter of the original owner of the subject property.  
She stated that the “apartment was built with the specific 
intended use as a dwelling. . . . The apartment was built 
in accordance with the Zoning Ordinance in effect at that 
time.  It has been continually operated as a rental 
apartment ever since.” 
After hearing the evidence, the BZA agreed with the 
McCarthys and voted to overturn the decision of the Zoning 
Administrator.  One member of the BZA noted that the 
language in the 1941 Ordinance was ambiguous.  Another 
member stated, “it sounds to me like, as long you [sic] had 
enough room, a half-acre per structure, you could still do 
a structure on something other than a lot.”  Since the 1941 
Ordinance specifically said “one or more,” the member 
reasoned that the second dwelling would have been allowed.  
The perceived ambiguity in the 1941 Ordinance, coupled with 
the fact that the garage apartment had been continually 
used since it was built, led the BZA to find in favor of 
the McCarthys. 
In a letter to the McCarthys, the BZA confirmed its 
May 25, 2004 action but advised the McCarthys that the date 
                                                             
violations are not before us in this appeal. 
 
5
of the BZA’s final decision was June 2, 2004.  On July 1, 
2004, the County petitioned the circuit court, pursuant to 
Code § 15.2-2314, for a writ of certiorari to review the 
BZA’s decision.  The circuit court granted the writ and 
ordered the BZA “to make a verified return of its record.”  
The circuit court subsequently heard the appeal and 
affirmed the decision of the BZA.  The court concluded that 
the BZA had not “applied erroneous principles of law [or] 
that its decision was plainly wrong.” 
The County appealed from the circuit court’s judgment 
to this Court.  In the opening brief, the County admits 
that, under the Court’s decision in West Lewinsville 
Heights Ass’n v. Board of Supervisors, 270 Va. 259, 618 
S.E.2d 311 (2005), its petition for a writ of certiorari 
seeking review of the BZA’s final decision was not timely 
filed.  The County, however, argues the timeliness of the 
petition for a writ of certiorari cannot be raised for the 
first time before this Court.  The BZA did not participate 
in the proceedings before the circuit court, nor did the 
McCarthys question the timeliness of the petition in the 
circuit court.  The BZA, however, entered an appearance in 
this Court to address the issue of timely filing. 
 
6
II. ANALYSIS 
 
We will first address the issue concerning the 
timeliness of the County’s petition for a writ of 
certiorari and whether that issue can be raised for the 
first time in this Court.  We will then consider the merits 
of the County’s assignments of error challenging the 
decision of the circuit court finding that the McCarthys’ 
garage apartment is a lawful nonconforming use. 
1. Timeliness 
 
The provisions of Code § 15.2-2314 govern appeals from 
a final decision of a board of zoning appeals to a circuit 
court.  In pertinent part, the statute states: 
Any person or persons jointly or severally 
aggrieved by any decision of the board of zoning 
appeals, or any aggrieved . . . department, board 
or bureau of the locality, may file with the 
clerk of the circuit court for the county or city 
a petition specifying the grounds on which 
aggrieved within 30 days after the final decision 
of the board. 
 
Code § 15.2-2314.  Thus, under the terms set forth by the 
General Assembly, the County had 30 days from the BZA’s 
final decision to file a petition for a writ of certiorari. 
 
Even though the County admits that it did not file its 
petition within that 30 days, the question that remains is 
whether the timeliness of the petition for a writ of 
certiorari can be questioned for the first time before this 
 
7
Court.  Stated differently, is the failure to file the 
petition within the required 30-day period a defect in the 
circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction and therefore a 
claim not capable of being waived?  See Earley v. 
Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 371, 514 S.E.2d 153, 156 (1999) 
(“[t]he lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised 
at any time during a proceeding,” including on appeal). 
 
We have not previously determined the nature of the 
30-day period specified in Code § 15.2-2314 for filing a 
petition for a writ of certiorari to review the final 
decision of a board of zoning appeals.  The County, 
however, asserts that we decided this issue in Board of 
Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Board of Zoning Appeals of 
Fairfax County, 225 Va. 235, 302 S.E.2d 19 (1983).  We do 
not agree. 
There, the question was “whether the successful 
applicant before the board of zoning appeals must be made a 
party to the certiorari proceeding within the thirty-day 
period prescribed by” former Code § 15.1-497 (now Code 
§ 15.2-2314).  Id. at 237, 302 S.E.2d at 20.  We concluded 
that, because the statute required 
only that an aggrieved person file a petition for 
certiorari within the prescribed thirty-day 
period and that the petition specify the grounds 
upon which the petitioner is aggrieved. . . . no 
action other than the filing of a proper petition 
 
8
within the prescribed period [was] necessary to 
complete the institution of the proceeding. 
 
Id. at 238, 302 S.E.2d at 21.  Until the board of zoning 
appeals made a return on the writ of certiorari, “the only 
necessary parties [were] the aggrieved person and the 
board.”  Id.  Unlike the present case, the aggrieved party 
in Board of Supervisors had timely filed the petition for a 
writ of certiorari in the circuit court. 
In order to decide whether the County’s failure to 
timely file the petition for a writ of certiorari can be 
raised for the first time before this Court, we must 
revisit the term “jurisdiction.”  “Jurisdiction . . . is 
the power to adjudicate a case upon the merits and dispose 
of it as justice may require.”  Shelton v. Sydnor, 126 Va. 
625, 629, 102 S.E. 83, 85 (1920).  In order for a court to 
have the power to adjudicate a particular case upon the 
merits, i.e., to have “active jurisdiction,” Farant Inv. 
Corp. v. Francis, 138 Va. 417, 427-28, 122 S.E. 141, 144 
(1924), several elements are needed.  See also Morrison v. 
Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 169, 387 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1990).  
Those elements are 
subject matter jurisdiction,[2] which is the 
authority granted through constitution or statute 
                     
2 Subject matter jurisdiction is sometimes referred to 
as “potential jurisdiction”, i.e. “ ‘the power granted by 
the sovereignty creating the court to hear and determine 
 
9
to adjudicate a class of cases or controversies; 
territorial jurisdiction, that is, authority over 
persons, things, or occurrences located in a 
defined geographic area; notice jurisdiction, or 
effective notice to a party or if the proceeding 
is in rem seizure of a res; and “the other 
conditions of fact must exist which are demanded 
by the unwritten or statute law as the 
prerequisites of the authority of the court to 
proceed to judgment or decree.” 
 
Id. (quoting Farant Inv. Corp., 138 Va. at 427-28, 122 S.E. 
at 144) (footnote added).  All these elements “are 
necessary to enable a court to proceed to a valid 
judgment.”  Morrison, 239 Va. at 169, 387 S.E.2d at 755.  
There is, however, a fundamental distinction between the 
element of subject matter jurisdiction and the “other 
‘jurisdictional’ elements.”  Id. 
 
Jurisdiction of the subject matter can only be 
acquired by virtue of the Constitution or of some 
statute.  Neither the consent of the parties, nor 
waiver, nor acquiescence can confer it.  Nor can the 
right to object for a want of it be lost by 
acquiescence, neglect, estoppel or in any other 
manner. . . . and the want of such jurisdiction of the 
trial court will be noticed by this court ex mero 
motu. 
 
Humphreys v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 765, 772-73, 43 S.E.2d  
890, 894 (1947) (citation omitted); accord Morrison, 239 
Va. at 169, 387 S.E.2d at 755.  Furthermore, the lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction can be initially raised at any 
                                                             
controversies of a given character.’ ”  Farant Inv. Corp., 
138 Va. at 427, 122 S.E. at 144 (citation omitted). 
 
10
point during the proceedings, including on appeal.  
Morrison, 239 Va. at 170, 387 S.E.2d at 756. 
In Code § 17.1-513, the General Assembly granted 
circuit courts appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the 
judgments and proceedings of inferior tribunals in such 
civil and criminal cases as the General Assembly may 
provide.  The General Assembly granted authority to circuit 
courts specifically to review any final decision of a board 
of zoning appeals in Code § 15.2-2314.  Together, those two 
statutes confer upon circuit courts subject matter 
jurisdiction over the class of cases consisting of appeals 
from the final decisions of boards of zoning appeals. 
The provisions of Code § 15.2-2314, however, demand 
another “condition[] of fact [to] exist . . . as the pre-
requisites of the authority of the court to proceed to 
judgment or decree.”  Farant Inv. Corp., 138 Va. at 427-28, 
122 S.E. at 144.  The aggrieved person must file in the 
circuit court a petition for a writ of certiorari 
“specifying the grounds on which aggrieved within 30 days 
after the final decision of the board.”  Code § 15.2-2314.  
The 30-day filing requirement set by the General Assembly 
does not define the class of cases, i.e. the subject matter 
jurisdiction, over which the circuit court has authority to 
adjudicate.  Instead, as noted above, that class of cases 
 
11
is established in Code §§ 17.1-513 and 15.2-2314 as appeals 
from final decisions of boards of zoning appeals.  In other 
words, the 30-day filing requirement is not an aspect of 
subject matter jurisdiction, but rather is a statutory 
prerequisite for a circuit court to proceed to adjudicate 
an appeal from a final decision of a board of zoning 
appeals.3  See Morrison, 239 Va. at 169, 387 S.E.2d at 755; 
Farant Inv. Corp., 138 Va. at 427-28, 122 S.E. at 144. 
We made a similar distinction in Nelson v. Warden of 
Keen Mountain Corr. Ctr., 262 Va. 276, 552 S.E.2d 73 
(2001).  There, we distinguished between subject matter 
jurisdiction granted by constitution or statute and the 
statutory requirements that enable a court to exercise its 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. at 282, 552 S.E.2d at 76.  
We concluded that a statutory requirement of notice to 
parents was not jurisdictional but procedural in nature and 
could be waived by a failure to raise a timely objection to 
the lack of notice.  Id. at 285, 552 S.E.2d at 78. 
                     
3 The 30-day filing requirement could also be viewed as 
“notice jurisdiction, or effective notice to a party.”  
Morrison, 239 Va. at 169, 387 S.E.2d at 755.  The purpose 
of a time limitation for filing an appeal “is not to 
penalize the appellant but to protect the appellee.  If the 
required papers are not [timely] filed . . . the appellee 
is entitled to assume that the litigation is ended, and to 
act on that assumption.”  Avery v. Brunswick County Sch. 
Bd., 192 Va. 329, 333, 64 S.E.2d 767, 770 (1951). 
 
 
12
Likewise, in Morrison we concluded that a 90-day 
waiting period for filing a medical malpractice action was 
a mandatory procedural requirement and did not involve 
subject matter jurisdiction.  239 Va. at 173, 387 S.E.2d at 
757-58.  The failure to comply with the requirement, 
therefore, did “not divest the [circuit] court of [its] 
subject matter jurisdiction.”  Id. at 173, 387 S.E.2d at 
758.  In reaching that decision, we pointed out that the 
General Assembly had, by statute, granted subject matter 
jurisdiction to circuit courts to decide cases and 
controversies involving torts and that medical malpractice 
actions are tort claims.  Id. at 172, 387 S.E.2d at 757; 
cf. Sabre Constr. Corp. v. County of Fairfax, 256 Va. 68, 
72, 501 S.E.2d 144, 147 (1998) (ten-day requirement for 
filing appeal from decision of public body to award a 
contract was “a special limitation” on the “substantive 
right to file an action against a county” or a “condition 
precedent to maintaining the claim”); Commonwealth v. 
Brunson, 248 Va. 347, 353, 448 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1994) 
(failure to file an information for forfeiture within 90 
days of the date when the Commonwealth seized property 
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the 
information).4 
                     
4  We did not decide in Sabre or Brunson whether the 
 
13
In many cases where time limitations for filing 
appeals were at issue, we referred to those filing 
requirements as “jurisdictional.”  For example, to perfect 
an appeal from a circuit court to this Court, Rule 5:9 
states that “[n]o appeal shall be allowed unless, within 30 
days after the entry of final judgment or other appealable 
order or decree, counsel for the appellant files with the 
clerk of the trial court a notice of appeal.”  Rule 5:9(a).  
A timely-filed notice of appeal is necessary to confer 
jurisdiction upon this Court to hear the appeal.  See Super 
Fresh Food Mkts. v. Ruffin, 263 Va. 555, 563, 561 S.E.2d 
734, 739 (2002) (since notice of appeal was filed after the 
30-day time period, the “Court lack[ed] jurisdiction to 
consider [it]”); School Bd. of the City of Lynchburg v. 
                                                             
filing requirement at issue in each case was an aspect of 
subject matter jurisdiction and thus capable of being 
raised at any time, nor did we need to do so.  In both 
instances, the issue had been timely raised in the trial 
court.  Sabre, 256 Va. at 70, 510 S.E.2d at 146; Brunson, 
248 Va. at 349, 448 S.E.2d at 395.  However, in Cunningham 
v. Smith, 205 Va. 205, 135 S.E.2d 770 (1964), we allowed a 
defendant, in a collateral attack on his conviction, to 
claim that his conviction was void because the orders of 
conviction did not show the concurrence of the 
Commonwealth's Attorney in waiving a trial by jury as 
required by the Constitution of Virginia.  Id. at 206, 135 
S.E.2d at 771.  We concluded that compliance with the 
mandatory provision of the Constitution of Virginia was 
essential to the trial court’s jurisdiction to try the 
defendant without a jury and that, without compliance, 
jurisdiction was not obtained.  Id. at 208, 135 S.E.2d at 
773. 
 
14
Caudill Rowlett Scott, Inc., 237 Va. 550, 556, 379 S.E.2d 
319, 323 (1989) (this Court lacked “jurisdiction to 
entertain the appeal on its merits because no notice of 
appeal was filed with the clerk of the trial court within 
30 days after entry of the final order”); cf. Hurst v. 
Ballard, 230 Va. 365, 367, 337 S.E.2d 284, 285 (1985) 
(failure to pay writ tax within prescribed time limit 
divests circuit court of jurisdiction because this Court 
has consistently “held that the failure to comply with 
rules governing appeals precludes ‘the exercise of the  
jurisdiction of the circuit court over the proceedings’ ” 
(citation omitted)). 
 
Similarly, in the Administrative Process Act, the 
General Assembly provided a procedure for court review of 
certain actions taken by administrative agencies.  Code 
§ 2.2-4026.  To obtain such a review, Rule 2A:2 requires 
that “[a]ny party appealing from a regulation or case 
decision shall file, within 30 days . . . of the final 
order in the case decision, with the agency secretary a 
notice of appeal.”  The timely filing of that notice of 
appeal is jurisdictional.  See State Water Control Bd. v. 
Crutchfield, 265 Va. 416, 423, 578 S.E.2d 762, 766 (2003) 
(“[b]ecause the petitioners’ notice of appeal and original 
petition for appeal were timely filed within the 30-day 
 
15
time periods specified . . . the circuit court had 
jurisdiction”); Virginia Retirement Sys. v. Avery, 262 Va. 
538, 542, 551 S.E.2d 612, 614 (2001) (“the circuit court 
had jurisdiction over the appeal because [appellee] had 
perfected it by filing her notice of appeal and her 
petition for appeal within the times specified”); Occoquan 
Land Dev. Corp. v. Cooper, 239 Va. 363, 368, 389 S.E.2d 
464, 467 (1990) (finding that “the county failed to perfect 
its appeal in a timely manner, . . . the trial court was 
without jurisdiction to hear the case”); see also Sours v. 
Virginia Bd. for Architects, Prof’l Eng’rs, Land Surveyors 
and Landscape Architects, 30 Va. App. 313, 318, 516 S.E.2d 
712, 715 (1999) (“the timely filing of a petition for 
appeal of an agency decision is jurisdictional”); cf. 
Bendele v. Virginia Dep’t of Med. Assistance Servs., 29 Va. 
App. 395, 400, 512 S.E.2d 827, 829-30 (1999) (“because the 
appellant concedes that she did not comply with Rule 2A:4, 
the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear this 
administrative appeal”).  In all these cases, we did not, 
however, state that the time requirements for the appellate 
filings at issue were an aspect of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  That question was not before us because, in 
each case, any concern about compliance with the respective 
time period for filing the appeal had been timely raised, 
 
16
and we therefore did not need to decide whether the issue 
had been or could have been waived. 
Like the statutory provisions in Morrison and Nelson, 
the 30-day filing requirement in Code § 15.2-2314 does not 
involve the subject matter jurisdiction of a circuit court 
to adjudicate the matter in controversy.  As such, the 
filing requirement is an “other ‘jurisdictional’ element[]” 
subject to waiver if not properly raised.  Morrison, 239 
Va. at 169, 387 S.E.2d at 755.  Thus, we hold that the 
County’s failure to file the petition for a writ of 
certiorari under Code § 15.2-2314 within 30 days of the 
final decision of the BZA did not divest the circuit court 
of its subject matter jurisdiction.  The issue of timely 
filing is therefore waived since it was not raised in the 
circuit court.  See Rule 5:25.  We turn now to the merits 
of the assignments of error presented by the County. 
2. Nonconforming Use 
The sole remaining issue is whether the garage 
apartment was a lawful nonconforming use.  We have defined 
such a use as “ ‘a lawful use existing on the effective 
date of the zoning restriction and continuing since that 
time in non-conformance to the ordinance.’ ”  C. & C., Inc. 
v. Semple, 207 Va. 438, 439 n.1, 150 S.E.2d 536, 537 n.1 
(1966) (citation omitted); see also Code § 15.2-2307.  When 
 
17
a locality challenges a use as illegal, the locality “has 
the initial burden of producing evidence to show the uses 
permitted in the zoning district in which the land is 
located and that the use of the land is not a permitted 
use.”  Masterson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 233 Va. 37, 
47, 353 S.E.2d 727, 734 (1987).  The burden then shifts to 
the landowner to establish that the use is a lawful 
nonconforming use.  Id.  The landowner “has both the burden 
of initially producing evidence tending to prove a lawful 
nonconforming use and the burden of persuading the fact-
finder.”  Knowlton v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Virginia, 
Inc., 220 Va. 571, 574, 260 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1979). 
The final decision of a board of zoning appeals with 
regard to “an order, requirement, decision or determination 
of a zoning administrator . . . in the administration or 
enforcement of any ordinance . . . [is] presumed to be 
correct” on appeal to a circuit court.  Code § 15.2-2314; 
accord Lamar Co., LLC v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 270 Va. 
540, 545, 620 S.E.2d 753, 755-56 (2005).  “The appealing 
party may rebut that presumption by proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence . . . that the board of 
zoning appeals erred in its decision.”  Code § 15.2-2314. 
The “preponderance of the evidence” standard, however, 
pertains only to questions about the sufficiency of the 
 
18
record to prove a particular fact.  Lamar, 270 Va. at 546, 
620 S.E.2d at 756.  When, as in the case before us, the 
issue is a question of law, i.e., the interpretation of the 
1941 Ordinance, the appealing party must show that the 
board either applied “ ‘erroneous principles of law’ ” or 
that its decision was “ ‘plainly wrong and in violation of 
the purpose and intent of the zoning ordinance.’ ”  Id. at 
545, 620 S.E.2d at 756 (quoting City of Suffolk v. Board of 
Zoning Appeals, 266 Va. 137, 142, 580 S.E.2d 796, 798 
(2003)).  On appeal to this Court, a circuit court’s 
determination affirming the final decision of a board of 
zoning appeals is accorded the same presumption of 
correctness.  Patton v. City of Galax, 269 Va. 219, 229, 
609 S.E.2d 41, 46 (2005). 
The 1941 Ordinance was a permissive zoning ordinance.  
County of Fairfax v. Parker, 186 Va. 675, 688, 44 S.E.2d 9, 
15 (1947).  Under such an ordinance “ ‘only those uses 
which are specifically named are permitted, and so the 
burden is on the property owner to show that the use he 
proposes is one that is included or permitted.’ ”  Id. at 
684, 44 S.E.2d at 13 (citation omitted).  Thus, in order to 
prevail, the McCarthys had to show that the 1941 Ordinance 
permitted, in the Agricultural District, multiple single-
family dwellings on a lot.  In order to determine if the 
 
19
garage apartment was permitted on the subject property 
under the 1941 Ordinance, the definition of the term “lot” 
must be examined: 
A piece or parcel of land abutting on a 
street whose area, in addition to the parts 
thereof occupied or which may hereafter be 
occupied by a building and buildings accessory 
thereto, is sufficient to furnish the yards, and 
minimum area required for compliance with this 
ordinance.  The word lot shall include building 
site. 
 
1941 Ordinance § I(13). 
We agree with the County’s argument that, under the 
definition of the term “lot” in the 1941 Ordinance, only 
one principal dwelling was permitted on a single lot.  The 
critical portion of the definition is the clause “in 
addition to the parts thereof occupied or which may . . . 
be occupied by a building and buildings accessory thereto.”  
(Emphasis added.)  This clause limited the number of 
principal buildings permitted on a single lot to one 
building but permitted more than one accessory building.  
Thus, a lot consisted of a piece of land abutting on a 
street whose area, in addition to the area occupied by a 
building and accessory buildings, met the yards and minimum 
area requirements of the 1941 Ordinance.  Although the term 
“building site” is not defined in the 1941 Ordinance, the 
definition of the term “lot” specifically included a 
 
20
building site.  The McCarthys overlook this portion of the 
definition in their argument that the term “building site” 
is separate and distinct from the term “lot.” 
We agree with the McCarthys’ argument that the use of 
the word “parts” in the definition meant that lots could 
have different parts or areas occupied by buildings.  That 
conclusion, however, does not change the clear language of 
the 1941 Ordinance permitting only one principal building 
on a lot.  The word “parts” merely referenced the fact 
that, if a lot had a principal building and one or more 
accessory buildings, “parts,” as opposed to a “part,” of 
the lot would be occupied by buildings. 
This interpretation of the 1941 Ordinance is 
consistent with the interpretation given to it by officials 
charged with its enforcement.  At the BZA hearing, it was 
pointed out that such officials had “consistently allowed 
one dwelling unit per lot or building site under the 
Ordinance since [19]41.”  Furthermore, a member of the BZA 
who had worked in Fairfax County under the 1941 Ordinance 
stated, “I know of no circumstance at all where legally two 
structures, residential, two units, residential units, were 
permitted on one lot.”  “A consistent administrative 
construction of an ordinance by the officials charges with 
its enforcement is entitled to great weight.”  Masterson, 
 
21
233 Va. at 44, 353 S.E.2d at 733; accord Board of 
Supervisors v. Robertson, 266 Va. 525, 538, 587 S.E.2d 570, 
578 (2003). 
Finally, we point out that the only evidence offered 
by the McCarthys to show that the garage apartment is a 
lawful nonconforming use was the testimony of the original 
landowner’s daughter.  But, she merely opined that the 
garage apartment was built in accordance with the 1941 
Ordinance.  Neither she nor the McCarthys presented any 
facts or documents to substantiate that opinion.  That 
evidence alone was not sufficient to carry the McCarthys’ 
burden of persuading the fact-finder that the garage 
apartment was permitted under the 1941 Ordinance and is now 
a lawful nonconforming use.  See Knowlton, 220 Va. at 574, 
260 S.E.2d at 235. 
Thus, we conclude that the BZA’s final decision was 
“plainly wrong and in violation of the purpose and intent 
of the zoning ordinance.”  Masterson, 233 Va. at 44, 353 
S.E.2d at 733; Alleghany Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of 
Zoning Appeals of the City of Covington, 217 Va. 64, 67, 
225 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1976).  We will therefore reverse the 
judgment of the circuit court. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
22
For these reasons, we hold the 30-day period for 
filing a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review 
of a final decision of a board of zoning appeals is a 
statutory prerequisite or “condition[] of fact” that 
enables a circuit court to exercise its authority to review 
the final decision of a board of zoning appeals.  Farant 
Inv. Corp., 138 Va. 427-28, 122 S.E. at 144; see also 
Nelson, 262 Va. at 284-85, 552 S.E.2d at 77.  The filing 
requirement is not an aspect of the circuit court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Thus, the failure to file the 
petition within the required 30 days is waived if not 
timely raised during the proceedings.  Since the County’s 
failure to timely file its petition for a writ of 
certiorari was first raised in this Court, the issue is 
waived and we will not address it.5 
Furthermore, since the 1941 Ordinance permitted only 
one principal dwelling on a lot, the County has overcome 
the presumption of correctness afforded the BZA’s final 
decision.  The BZA’s decision that the garage apartment is 
a lawful nonconforming use was “plainly wrong and in 
violation of the purpose and intent of the zoning 
ordinance.”  Masterson, 233 Va. at 44, 353 S.E.2d at 733. 
                     
5 In light of our decision, it is not necessary to 
address the County’s argument that our decision in West 
 
23
In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the 
BZA’s expressed concern about displacing the garage 
apartment after approximately 54 years of use.  Equitable 
concerns, however, cannot be a basis for the BZA’s decision 
in this case.  See Foster v. Geller, 248 Va. 563, 570, 449 
S.E.2d 802, 807 (1994) (legislative bodies “have authorized 
the use of equitable considerations only when the issue is 
whether to grant a special use permit”). 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and enter final judgment in favor of the 
County. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
                                                             
Lewinsville should be applied only prospectively.