Title: State v. Prado
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP000308-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 2021

2021 WI 64 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP308-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Dawn M. Prado, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 393 Wis. 2d 526, 947 N.W.2d 182 
PDC No:2020 WI App 42 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 18, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 18, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
David T. Flanagan, III   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  ROGGENSACK, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined.   
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Anthony Jurek and AJ Attorney, the Law Office of Anthony 
Jurek, Middleton. There was an oral argument by Anthony Jurek. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Michael C. Sanders.  
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Douglas Hoffer, assistant 
city attorney, Stephen C. Nick, city attorney and City of Eau 
Claire, Eau Claire.  
 
 
 
2021 WI 64 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP308-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF859) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Dawn M. Prado, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross 
Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 18, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, 
in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined.  ROGGENSACK, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J., joined.  
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Both the State of Wisconsin and 
Dawn Prado seek review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals, which determined that Wisconsin's incapacitated driver 
provision contained within the implied consent statute, Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
2 
 
§ 343.305 (2017-18),1 is unconstitutional.2  However, the court of 
appeals additionally determined that under the facts of this case, 
the application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule allows for the admission of the blood test evidence Prado 
sought to suppress. 
¶2 
The State asks us to review the court of appeals' 
determination 
that 
the 
incapacitated 
driver 
provision 
is 
unconstitutional.  Prado requests review of the court of appeals' 
application of the good faith exception and its conclusion that 
the evidence need not be suppressed despite the constitutional 
violation. 
¶3 
We conclude that the incapacitated driver provision is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  The provision's 
"deemed" consent authorizes warrantless searches that do not 
fulfill any recognized exception to the warrant requirement and 
thus the provision violates the Fourth Amendment's proscription of 
unreasonable searches.     
¶4 
However, we further conclude that under the facts of 
this case, law enforcement drew Prado's blood in reasonable 
reliance on a statute that had not been determined to be 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated.  As the court of 
appeals did, we refer to Wis. Stat. § 343.305 as the "implied 
consent" statute and the several subsections that pertain to 
incapacitated drivers as the "incapacitated driver provision." 
2 State v. Prado, 2020 WI App 42, 393 Wis. 2d 526, 947 
N.W.2d 182 (reversing order of the circuit court for Dane County, 
David T. Flanagan, III, Judge). 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
3 
 
unconstitutional.  Consequently, the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule applies and the evidence resulting from the draw 
of Prado's blood need not be suppressed. 
¶5 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶6 
On the evening of December 12, 2014, law enforcement was 
called to a serious two-vehicle crash in Fitchburg.  An initial 
investigation revealed that a black minivan had crossed the center 
line and struck a red Pontiac.  Upon arrival, police found one 
person deceased; one person, later identified as Prado, ejected 
from a vehicle; and a third person, later identified as Deshonn 
Banks, standing near one of the involved vehicles. 
¶7 
Fitchburg police officer Andre Poehnelt made contact 
with Banks, who stated that he had been sleeping at the time of 
the crash and was not the driver.  He further indicated that "Dawn" 
was driving. 
¶8 
Dawn Prado had been thrown from her vehicle and was found 
lying in a ditch.  An off-duty firefighter who came upon the scene 
rendered aid to her.  He rolled Prado over and upon doing so 
smelled the odor of intoxicants on her breath. 
¶9 
Ultimately, Prado was transported to a nearby hospital.  
Officer Johnathan Parker was sent to the hospital to make contact 
with Prado.  Upon Officer Parker's arrival at the hospital, he 
found Prado intubated and unconscious. 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
4 
 
¶10 Despite Prado's unconscious state, Officer Parker read 
to Prado the statutory "Informing the Accused" form.3  Being 
unconscious, Prado did not respond.  Officer Parker then instructed 
a nurse to conduct a draw of Prado's blood.  He did not apply for 
a warrant and he testified that it did not occur to him to do so 
because the incapacitated driver provision applied.  A subsequent 
test of Prado's blood revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.081 
percent, over four times Prado's legal limit, which due to her 
prior convictions was set at 0.02 percent.4 
¶11 Prado was ultimately charged with nine separate counts 
arising from the crash.5  She moved to suppress the blood test 
results, arguing that the incapacitated driver provision sets 
forth an unconstitutional per se exception to the warrant 
requirement in cases where a driver is unconscious.   
                                                 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4). 
4 See Wis. Stat. § 340.01(46m)(c). 
5 Initially, Prado was charged with:  (1) homicide by 
intoxicated use of a vehicle while having a prior intoxicant-
related conviction contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a) and 
(1c)(b); (2) homicide by use of a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol 
concentration while having a prior intoxicant-related conviction 
contrary to § 940.09(1)(b) and (1c)(b); (3) operating while 
intoxicated causing injury as a second and subsequent offense 
contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 346.65(3p) and 346.63(2)(a)1.; (4) 
operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration causing injury 
as a second and subsequent offense contrary to §§ 346.65(3p) and 
346.63(2)(a)2.; (5) operating while intoxicated as a fourth 
offense contrary to §§ 346.63(1)(a) and 346.65(2)(am)4.; and (6) 
operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration as a fourth 
offense contrary to §§ 346.63(1)(b) and 346.65(2)(am)4.  Three 
counts related to driving while having a detectable amount of a 
restricted controlled substance in her blood were later added. 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
5 
 
¶12 Agreeing with Prado, the circuit court granted the 
motion to suppress.  It determined that the blood draw was taken 
without Prado's consent and without the authority of a search 
warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Further, it declined 
to apply the good faith exception, concluding that Missouri v. 
McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013), clearly required a warrant and "the 
claim of good faith cannot carry the day when a warrant was just 
a phone call away and had been so available for well over a year." 
¶13 The State appealed, and the court of appeals reversed 
the circuit court's decision.  State v. Prado, 2020 WI App 42, 393 
Wis. 2d 526, 947 N.W.2d 182.  Although its ultimate mandate was to 
reverse, the court of appeals agreed with the circuit court 
regarding the unconstitutionality of the incapacitated driver 
provision.  Specifically, the court of appeals concluded that 
"because the incapacitated driver provision purports to authorize 
warrantless searches that do not fit within any exception to the 
warrant requirement, the searches it authorizes will always 
violate the Fourth Amendment, unless the searches are justified by 
a separate warrant exception."  Id., ¶64.   
¶14 Further, the court of appeals reasoned that even if a 
separate exception to the warrant requirement applied in a given 
case, 
"that 
does 
not 
save 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
incapacitated driver provision."  Id.  In the court of appeals' 
view, this is because "[i]f a court ultimately determines that 
such a search is constitutional in any given case, it will be on 
the basis of an exception such as exigent circumstances, not on 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
6 
 
the basis of anything set forth in the implied consent statute 
itself."  Id.   
¶15 Where the court of appeals diverged from the circuit 
court was in its application of the good faith exception.  Contrary 
to the circuit court, the court of appeals determined that "the 
State has met its burden to show that the officer who ordered the 
warrantless blood draw acted in objective good-faith reliance on 
the incapacitated driver provision."  Id., ¶73.  Accordingly, it 
concluded that the blood test results need not be suppressed.  Id., 
¶74. 
¶16 Both the State and Prado petitioned for review of the 
court of appeals' decision.  The State asked this court to review 
the court of appeals' conclusion that the incapacitated driver 
provision is unconstitutional, while Prado sought review of the 
court of appeals' determination that the good faith exception 
applies and precludes suppression of the blood test evidence.  This 
court granted both petitions. 
II 
¶17 This 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
first 
determine 
the 
constitutionality of the incapacitated driver provision.  The 
constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law we decide 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit court 
and court of appeals.  State v. Weidner, 2000 WI 52, ¶7, 235 
Wis. 2d 306, 611 N.W.2d 684.  A party challenging a statute as 
unconstitutional must demonstrate that it is unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶15, 323 
Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63. 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
7 
 
¶18 We are also asked to determine whether the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule applies in this case.  The 
application of the good faith exception is likewise a question of 
law we review independently of the decisions of the circuit court 
and court of appeals.  State v. Scull, 2015 WI 22, ¶17, 361 
Wis. 2d 288, 862 N.W.2d 562. 
III 
¶19 We begin by setting forth the statutory provisions on 
which our analysis centers.  Next, we recount the history of the 
issue now before us in previous litigation before the court of 
appeals, this court, and the United States Supreme Court.  With 
this background in hand, we then address the constitutionality of 
the incapacitated driver provision.6  Finally, we turn to the 
application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 
A 
¶20 In an effort to curb the devastating effects of drunk 
driving on Wisconsin roads, this state (like all others) has passed 
laws prohibiting operating while intoxicated and operating with a 
prohibited alcohol concentration.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1).  
Further, Wisconsin has passed an implied consent law, which is 
                                                 
6 Prado contends that the State lacks standing to petition 
for review of the court of appeals' determination that the 
incapacitated driver provision is unconstitutional because the 
court of appeals' decision was not adverse to the State.  We 
disagree.  A decision that is "partially adverse to the State" is 
sufficient to allow the State to appeal.  State v. Bentdahl, 2013 
WI 106, ¶21, 351 Wis. 2d 739, 840 N.W.2d 704.  Although the court 
of appeals ultimately decided in the State's favor, it also 
determined 
that 
the 
incapacitated 
driver 
provision 
is 
unconstitutional——a determination adverse to the State.  
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
8 
 
designed to facilitate the gathering of evidence to remove drunk 
drivers from the road.  State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39, 41, 403 
N.W.2d 427 (1987). 
¶21 The implied consent statute, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2), 
provides:  
Any person who . . . drives or operates a motor vehicle 
upon the public highways of this state . . . is deemed 
to have given consent to one or more tests of his or her 
breath, blood or urine, for the purpose of determining 
the presence or quantity in his or her blood or breath, 
of alcohol, controlled substances, controlled substance 
analogs or other drugs, or any combination [thereof], 
when requested to do so by a law enforcement officer 
under sub. (3)(a) or (am) or when required to do so under 
sub. (3)(ar) or (b). 
¶22 When a law enforcement officer requests a specimen 
pursuant to the implied consent law, the officer is required to 
read to the suspect the "Informing the Accused" form.7  Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
7 The "Informing the Accused" form provides: 
You have either been arrested for an offense that 
involves driving or operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, or you 
are the operator of a vehicle that was involved in an 
accident that caused the death of, great bodily harm to, 
or substantial bodily harm to a person, or you are 
suspected of driving or being on duty time with respect 
to a commercial motor vehicle after consuming an 
intoxicating beverage. 
This law enforcement agency now wants to test one or 
more samples of your breath, blood or urine to determine 
the concentration of alcohol or drugs in your system.  
If any test shows more alcohol in your system than the 
law permits while driving, your operating privilege will 
be suspended.  If you refuse to take any test that this 
agency requests, your operating privilege will be 
revoked and you will be subject to other penalties.  The 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
9 
 
§ 343.305(4).  The form is "designed to inform drivers of the 
rights and penalties applicable to them."  State v. Piddington, 
2001 WI 24, ¶18, 241 Wis. 2d 754, 623 N.W.2d 528 (quoting Cnty. of 
Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d 269, 279, 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 
1995)).   
¶23 It sets forth the consequences of refusing the test, 
which include revocation of operating privileges, and the 
consequences of consenting to the test, i.e., that the results can 
be used against the suspect in court.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4).  
Essentially, the implied consent statute gives those who are 
capable of responding a choice:  submit to the test and risk that 
the results are presented in court, or refuse the test and face 
license revocation and other civil penalties.  See § 343.305(9).  
The court of appeals has described the operation of the implied 
consent statute as follows: 
                                                 
test results or the fact that you refused testing can be 
used against you in court. 
If you take all the requested tests, you may choose to 
take further tests.  You may take the alternative test 
that this law enforcement agency provides free of 
charge.  You also may have a test conducted by a 
qualified person of your choice at your expense.  You, 
however, will have to make your own arrangements for 
that test. 
If you have a commercial driver license or were operating 
a commercial motor vehicle, other consequences may 
result from positive test results or from refusing 
testing, such as being placed out of service or 
disqualified. 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4). 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
10 
 
[T]he implied consent law is explicitly designed to 
allow the driver, and not the police officer, to make 
the choice as to whether the driver will give or decline 
to give actual consent to a blood draw when put to the 
choice between consent or automatic sanctions.  Framed 
in the terms of "implied consent," choosing the "yes" 
option affirms the driver's implied consent and 
constitutes actual consent for the blood draw.  Choosing 
the "no" option acts to withdraw the driver's implied 
consent and establishes that the driver does not give 
actual consent.  Withdrawing consent by choosing the 
"no" option is an unlawful action, in that it is 
penalized by "refusal violation" sanctions, even though 
it is a choice the driver can make. 
State v. Padley, 2014 WI App 65, ¶39, 354 Wis. 2d 545, 849 
N.W.2d 867. 
¶24 When a suspect is unconscious or incapacitated, that 
person obviously cannot respond to the choice presented by the 
"Informing the Accused" form.  Accordingly, officers are not 
required to read the form to an unconscious person because such an 
exercise would be "useless."  State v. Disch, 129 Wis. 2d 225, 
233-34, 385 N.W.2d 140 (1986).   
¶25 Addressing this scenario, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b) 
provides:  "A person who is unconscious or otherwise not capable 
of withdrawing consent is presumed not to have withdrawn consent 
under this subsection . . . ."  As a result, if a law enforcement 
officer has probable cause to believe that an incapacitated person 
has violated the OWI statutes, the statute indicates that the 
officer may take blood from the person for testing without a search 
warrant.  § 343.305(3)(b). 
¶26 Thus, as the court of appeals in this case set forth, 
"on its face, the incapacitated driver provision purports to 
authorize blood draws of incapacitated drivers solely based on 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
11 
 
statutorily implied consent."  Prado, 393 Wis. 2d 526, ¶18.  The 
instant case is not the first time we have wrestled with this 
attribute of the incapacitated driver provision, and it is this 
history to which we turn next.  
B 
¶27 The issue we address today has taken a long and winding 
road to get here.  It begins in 1993 with this court's decision in 
State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993).  In 
Bohling, the court determined that the dissipation of alcohol in 
a person's bloodstream is a sufficient exigency so as to justify 
a warrantless blood draw from a person arrested for a drunk driving 
offense under ordinary circumstances.  Id. at 547-48.  This per se 
exigency rule was the law in this state for 20 years.  State v. 
Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ¶28, 359 Wis. 2d 454, 856 N.W.2d 834. 
¶28 In 2013, the United States Supreme Court fundamentally 
"changed the landscape of warrantless blood draws in Wisconsin" 
and around the country with its decision in McNeely, 569 U.S. 141.  
State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶42, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 857 
N.W.2d 120.  The McNeely Court spurned the notion that the 
dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream constitutes a per se 
exigency and instead determined that "[w]hether a warrantless 
blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be 
determined 
case 
by 
case 
based 
on 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances."  McNeely, 569 U.S. at 156. 
¶29 The United States Supreme Court followed McNeely with 
its decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. 
Ct. 2160 (2016).  There, the Court considered whether a law making 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
12 
 
"it a crime for a motorist to refuse to be tested after being 
lawfully arrested for driving while impaired" violates the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 2166-67.  In its analysis, the Court centered 
on the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant 
requirement.  Drawing a distinction between a breath test and a 
blood test, the Court concluded that "the Fourth Amendment permits 
warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving."  
Id. at 2184.  
¶30 The Court, however, indicated that a blood test is a 
wholly separate matter.  Having previously recognized that a blood 
test is an "intrusion[] beyond the body's surface" that implicates 
"interests in human dignity and privacy[,]" Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966), the Birchfield Court 
explained that the privacy interests that attend a blood test are 
greater than those involved in a breath test.8  Birchfield, 136 S. 
Ct. at 2178.  As such, it concluded that although the 
administration of a breath test is permissible as a search incident 
                                                 
8 A blood test can provide a much greater amount of 
information than a simple breath test:   
[A] blood test, unlike a breath test, places in the hands 
of law enforcement authorities a sample that can be 
preserved and from which it is possible to extract 
information beyond a simple BAC reading.  Even if the 
law enforcement agency is precluded from testing the 
blood for any purpose other than to measure BAC, the 
potential remains and may result in anxiety for the 
person tested.   
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 
(2016). 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
13 
 
to arrest for drunk driving, the administration of a blood test is 
not.  Id. at 2185. 
¶31 Of particular note, the Birchfield court acknowledged 
that "prior opinions have referred approvingly to the general 
concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and 
evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply."  Id. 
at 2185.  Yet, the Court further concluded that criminal penalties 
may not be imposed for a refusal.  Id.  In reaching this 
determination, it emphasized:  "There must be a limit to the 
consequences to which motorists may be deemed to have consented by 
virtue of a decision to drive on public roads."  Id. 
¶32 The change in the United States Supreme Court's approach 
to warrantless breath and blood tests on drunk driving suspects as 
manifested in McNeely and Birchfield gave rise to several 
challenges in Wisconsin that reached this court.  First, in State 
v. Howes, 2017 WI 18, 373 Wis. 2d 468, 893 N.W.2d 812, the court 
of appeals certified to this court the very question we now 
address:  the constitutionality of the incapacitated driver 
provision.  The Howes court ultimately upheld the search at issue 
in that case in a split decision.  Nevertheless, the court issued 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
14 
 
no majority opinion declaring any law with regard to the 
constitutionality of the incapacitated driver provision.9   
¶33 Subsequent to this court's decision in Howes, the court 
of appeals again certified to this court a case raising the 
constitutionality of the incapacitated driver provision, State v. 
Mitchell, 2018 WI 84, 383 Wis. 2d 192, 914 N.W.2d 151.  Again, 
this court did not issue a majority opinion declaring any law with 
regard to the provision's constitutionality.  As in Howes, the 
search at issue in Mitchell was upheld, but no rationale garnered 
a majority vote.10  After Mitchell, the court of appeals again 
attempted to certify the issue to this court, but we ultimately 
denied the certification.  State v. Hawley, No. 2015AP1113-CR, 
                                                 
9 Then-Chief Justice Roggensack's lead opinion, joined by 
Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Justice Kelly, determined that 
the search was permissible due to exigent circumstances.  State v. 
Howes, 2017 WI 18, ¶3, 373 Wis. 2d 468, 893 N.W.2d 812 (lead 
opinion).  Justice Gableman's concurrence, joined by Justice 
Ziegler, concluded that the incapacitated driver provision is not 
facially unconstitutional.  Id., ¶57 (Gableman, J., concurring).  
Justice Abrahamson dissented, joined by Justice Ann Walsh Bradley 
and joined in part by Justice Kelly, determining that the 
incapacitated driver provision is unconstitutional.  Id., ¶93 
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
10 Then-Chief Justice Roggensack's lead opinion, joined by 
Justice Ziegler and Justice Gableman, determined that the 
incapacitated driver provision passes constitutional muster.  
State v. Mitchell, 2018 WI 84, ¶3, 383 Wis. 2d 192, 914 N.W.2d 151 
(lead opinion).  Justice Kelly, joined by Justice Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, disagreed with the lead opinion's constitutional analysis 
but upheld the search on other grounds.  Id., ¶67 (Kelly, J., 
concurring).  Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, joined by Justice 
Abrahamson, dissented, concluding that the incapacitated driver 
provision is unconstitutional.  Id., ¶89 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., 
dissenting). 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
15 
 
unpublished certification (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2018), 
certification denied 2019 WI 98, 389 Wis. 2d 33, 935 N.W.2d 680. 
¶34 Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Mitchell.  As the court of appeals in the instant 
case stated, when it did so "the natural expectation was that the 
court would resolve the constitutionality of the incapacitated 
driver provision."  Prado, 393 Wis. 2d 526, ¶27.  Indeed, the case 
squarely presented the issue and the State had expressly conceded 
that exigent circumstances were not present. 
¶35 However, the resulting opinion did not resolve the 
question and, like this court's opinions on the subject, did not 
produce 
a 
majority 
opinion. 
 
Instead 
of 
addressing 
the 
constitutionality of the incapacitated driver provision, a four-
justice plurality opinion, authored by Justice Alito, determined 
that exigent circumstances "almost always" permit a blood draw 
without a warrant from an unconscious drunk driving suspect.  
Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2531 (2019).  
Specifically, the plurality set forth:   
When police have probable cause to believe a person has 
committed a drunk-driving offense and the driver's 
unconsciousness or stupor requires him to be taken to 
the hospital or similar facility before police have a 
reasonable 
opportunity 
to 
administer 
a 
standard 
evidentiary breath test, they may almost always order a 
warrantless blood test to measure the driver's BAC 
without offending the Fourth Amendment.  We do not rule 
out the possibility that in an unusual case a defendant 
would be able to show that his blood would not have been 
drawn if police had not been seeking BAC information, 
and that police could not have reasonably judged that a 
warrant application would interfere with other pressing 
needs or duties.  Because Mitchell did not have a chance 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
16 
 
to attempt to make that showing, a remand for that 
purpose is necessary. 
Id. at 2539.11  Ultimately, the case was remanded to the circuit 
court for further proceedings. 
C 
¶36 With this necessary background in hand, we turn now to 
address the issue raised in several of the above-cited cases and 
the 
instant 
case, 
namely 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
incapacitated driver provision. 
¶37 A party who challenges the constitutionality of a 
statute bears a significant burden.  We presume that a statute is 
constitutional and the challenger must demonstrate that the 
statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  Wood, 323 
Wis. 2d 321, ¶15. 
¶38 Prado asserts that the incapacitated driver provision 
violates the Fourth Amendment.12  This Amendment to the United 
States Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and 
                                                 
11 Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, but did not join 
the plurality's reasoning.  Instead, he concluded that exigent 
circumstances will always be present in the case of an unconscious 
driver due to the dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream and 
that the Court should do an about face from its holding in McNeely.  
Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2539 (Thomas, 
J., concurring). 
12 Although Prado does not specify with particularity whether 
her challenge to the incapacitated driver provision is a facial 
challenge or an as-applied challenge, like the court of appeals we 
understand it to be a facial challenge.  See Prado, 393 
Wis. 2d 526, 
¶30 
n.9. 
 
A 
party 
challenging 
a 
law 
as 
unconstitutional on its face must demonstrate that the law cannot 
be constitutionally enforced under any circumstances.  State v. 
Roundtree, 2021 WI 1, ¶17, 395 Wis. 2d 94, 952 N.W.2d 765 (citing 
Michels v. Lyons, 2019 WI 57, ¶11, 387 Wis. 2d 1, 927 N.W.2d 486). 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
17 
 
seizures.13  State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, ¶38, 383 Wis. 2d 147, 914 
N.W.2d 120.  A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable 
unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies.  Id.   
¶39 Prado argues that consent implied by statute does not 
constitute actual consent sufficient for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Because the incapacitated driver provision purports to 
create a statutory exception to the warrant requirement where 
actual consent has not been obtained, Prado asserts that it 
violates the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable 
searches. 
¶40 Conversely, the State contends that the court of appeals 
should have applied the determination of the United States Supreme 
Court's plurality opinion in Mitchell, i.e., that a warrantless 
search of an unconscious drunk driving suspect is almost always 
permissible under the exigent circumstances exception to the 
warrant requirement and that it is up to the defendant to 
demonstrate that the "unusual case" exception applies.  It further 
argues that the incapacitated driver provision is constitutional 
                                                 
13 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution sets 
forth: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath of affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
18 
 
because, pursuant to Mitchell, the blood draws it authorizes are 
almost always justified. 
¶41 We agree with Prado that the incapacitated driver 
provision 
cannot 
be 
constitutionally 
enforced 
under 
any 
circumstances and is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  
In arriving at this conclusion, we begin with the premise that 
consent and exigent circumstances are two separate and distinct 
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.  Indeed, 
this court has previously set forth that "[t]wo of the carefully 
delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement are consent 
searches and searches based on exigent circumstances."  State v. 
Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, ¶24, 255 Wis. 2d 98, 648 N.W.2d 385. 
¶42 The State's essential argument in this case boils down 
to an assertion that the incapacitated driver provision is 
constitutional because exigent circumstances may have been 
present.  This argument conflates the consent and exigent 
circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement.  The 
incapacitated driver provision of the implied consent statute is 
not focused on exigent circumstances.  As the moniker "implied 
consent" connotes, the statute addresses consent, which is an 
exception to the warrant requirement separate and apart from 
exigent circumstances.   
¶43 Thus, the determination of whether there were exigent 
circumstances 
does 
not 
involve 
any 
application 
of 
the 
incapacitated driver provision.  In other words, if the State 
relies on exigent circumstances to justify a search, it is not 
relying on the statute.  See Prado, 393 Wis. 2d 526, ¶64 ("If a 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
19 
 
court ultimately determines that such a search is constitutional 
in any given case, it will be on the basis of an exception such as 
exigent circumstances, not on the basis of anything set forth in 
the implied consent statute itself.").  Searches of unconscious 
drivers may almost always be permissible as the State contends, 
but then they are almost always permissible under the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement pursuant to the 
Mitchell plurality, not under the statute.  
¶44 In the context of warrantless blood draws, consent 
"deemed" by statute is not the same as actual consent, and in the 
case of an incapacitated driver the former is incompatible with 
the Fourth Amendment.  Generally, in determining whether 
constitutionally sufficient consent is present, a court will 
review whether consent was given in fact by words, gestures, or 
conduct.  State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶30, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 786 
N.W.2d 430.  This inquiry is fundamentally at odds with the concept 
of "deemed" consent in the case of an incapacitated driver because 
an unconscious person can exhibit no words, gestures, or conduct 
to manifest consent. 
¶45 Under the incapacitated driver provision, we ask 
"whether the driver drove his car" and nothing more.  State v. 
Brar, 2017 WI 73, ¶¶64-65, 376 Wis. 2d 685, 898 N.W.2d 499 (Kelly, 
J., concurring).  The statute thus reduces a multifaceted 
constitutional inquiry to a single question in a manner 
inconsistent with this court's precedent regarding what is 
constitutionally required to establish consent. 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
20 
 
¶46 The constitution requires actual consent, not "deemed" 
consent.14  Indeed, consent for purposes of a Fourth Amendment 
search must be "unequivocal and specific."  State v. Reed, 2018 WI 
109, ¶8, 384 Wis. 2d 469, 920 N.W.2d 56.  Consent that is "deemed" 
by the legislature through the incapacitated driver provision is 
neither of these things.  It cannot be unequivocal because an 
incapacitated person can evince no words, gestures, or conduct to 
demonstrate such an intent, and it is generalized, not specific. 
¶47 Further, a person has a constitutional right to refuse 
a search absent a warrant or an applicable exception to the warrant 
requirement.  See Dalton, 383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶61.  The incapacitated 
driver provision does not even afford a driver the opportunity to 
exercise the right to refuse such a search.  Under the statute, 
the constitutional right to refuse a warrantless search is 
transformed into simply a matter of legislative grace.  Such a 
transformation is incompatible with the Fourth Amendment. 
¶48 United States Supreme Court precedent further supports 
the determination that actual consent and "deemed" consent are 
separate and distinct concepts that must be treated differently 
under the Fourth Amendment.  The concept of a statutory per se 
                                                 
14 Courts in several other states have reached similar 
conclusions regarding statutes allowing warrantless blood draws on 
unconscious drivers.  See Bailey v. State, 790 S.E.2d 98, 104-05 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2016), overruled on other grounds by Welbon v. State, 
799 S.E.2d 793 (Ga. 2017); Commonwealth v. Dennis, 135 N.E.3d 1070, 
1078-79 (Mass. App. Ct. 2019); State v. Vargas, 404 P.3d 416, 422 
(N.M. 2017); State v. Romano, 800 S.E.2d 644, 652 (N.C. 2017); 
Stewart v. State, 442 P.3d 158, 162 (Okla. Crim. App. 2019); State 
v. Ruiz, 581 S.W.3d 782, 786-87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).  
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
21 
 
exception to the warrant requirement violates both McNeely and 
Birchfield.  To explain, in McNeely, the Court concluded that 
"[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is 
reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality 
of the circumstances."  569 U.S. at 156.  A statutory per se 
exception is antithetical to the case by case determination McNeely 
mandates.15 
¶49 As to Birchfield, the fundamental holding of that Court 
was that a blood test cannot be administered as a search incident 
to arrest for drunk driving.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185.  Yet 
what the State seeks through the incapacitated driver provision is 
just what Birchfield disallowed——a per se exception essentially 
allowing a blood test on an unconscious driver as a search incident 
to an arrest for drunk driving.  Further, in Birchfield the United 
States Supreme Court addressed the situation we encounter here.  
Specifically, it set forth: 
It is true that a blood test, unlike a breath test, may 
be administered to a person who is unconscious (perhaps 
as a result of a crash) or who is unable to do what is 
needed to take a breath test due to profound intoxication 
                                                 
15 We recognize that McNeely was an exigent circumstances case 
and not a consent case.  However, subsequent case law has hinted 
at a broad application of the case by case determinations McNeely 
requires.  In Aviles v. Texas, 571 U.S. 1119 (2014), the Court 
vacated a judgment upholding a warrantless blood draw based solely 
on consent derived through Texas's implied consent statute and 
remanded to the Texas court of appeals for further consideration 
in light of McNeely.  On remand, the Texas appellate court 
concluded that the Texas implied consent statute "flies in the 
face of McNeely's repeated mandate that courts must consider the 
totality of the circumstances of each case."  Aviles v. State, 443 
S.W.3d 291, 294 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014). 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
22 
 
or injuries.  But we have no reason to believe that such 
situations are common in drunk-driving arrests, and when 
they arise, the police may apply for a warrant if need 
be. 
Id. at 2184-85 (emphasis added).  Such a warrant application is 
thus necessary unless another recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement applies.   
 
¶50 The Birchfield Court additionally opined:  "There must 
be a limit to the consequences to which motorists may be deemed to 
have consented by virtue of a decision to drive on public roads."  
Id. at 2185.  A warrantless search on an unconscious person that 
is justified only by statutorily "deemed" consent and no recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement lies beyond that limit. 
¶51 Contrary to the State's argument, the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell does not change this 
conclusion.  The plurality's determination in Mitchell said 
nothing about the constitutionality of the incapacitated driver 
provision, but simply said that exigent circumstances will almost 
always be present in the situation that the statute addresses.  
Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2531.  Because Mitchell addressed exigent 
circumstances and not consent, reliance on Mitchell does not equate 
to reliance on the statute and that case thus does not affect our 
determination.  As the court of appeals put it:   
[E]ven if a separate warrant exception may often 
apply . . . that does not save the constitutionality of 
the incapacitated driver provision.  If a court 
ultimately 
determines 
that 
such 
a 
search 
is 
constitutional in a given case, it will be on the basis 
of an exception such as exigent circumstances, not on 
the basis of anything set forth in the implied consent 
statute itself.   
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
23 
 
Prado, 393 Wis. 2d 526, ¶64. 
¶52 We recognize that our determination in the instant case 
is inconsistent with the court of appeals' conclusion in State v. 
Wintlend, 2002 WI App 314, 258 Wis. 2d 875, 655 N.W.2d 745.  In 
Wintlend, the court of appeals concluded that drivers give implied 
consent to the type of search at issue here when they apply for a 
Wisconsin driver's license, and that such consent is consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment.  Id., ¶¶13, 17.  In other words, the 
Wintlend court determined that actual consent provided at the scene 
of an accident or arrest is irrelevant because the driver already 
gave consent through the act of applying for a license.  See Prado, 
393 Wis. 2d 526, ¶35. 
¶53 This result cannot stand given our conclusion in the 
present case.  To the extent that Wintlend rested on a premise 
that a driver consents to a search through the simple act of 
applying for a driver's license, it must be overruled.  Such a 
conclusion does not take into account the constitutionally 
significant difference between "deemed" and actual consent we 
explain above. 
¶54 Accordingly, we conclude that the incapacitated driver 
provision is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
provision's "deemed" consent authorizes warrantless searches that 
do not fulfill any recognized exception to the warrant requirement 
and 
thus 
the 
provision 
violates 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment's 
proscription of unreasonable searches.   
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
24 
 
IV 
¶55 The 
determination 
that 
the 
incapacitated 
driver 
provision is unconstitutional does not end our inquiry.  We turn 
next to the applicability of the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule.  The application of the good faith exception is 
examined on a case by case basis.  See United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 918 (1984).   
¶56 Evidence obtained through an unlawful search is 
ordinarily excluded at trial.  State v. Blackman, 2017 WI 77, ¶68, 
377 Wis. 2d 339, 898 N.W.2d 774.  However, the exclusionary rule 
bar is not absolute, instead requiring the weighing of pertinent 
interests.  Kennedy, 359 Wis. 2d 454, ¶36 (citing State v. Eason, 
2001 WI 98, ¶43, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625).  As such, courts 
have crafted some exceptions to the rule where exclusion of the 
evidence would not serve the exclusionary rule's purpose. 
¶57 "[T]he exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, 
reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances 
recurring or systemic negligence."  Herring v. United States, 555 
U.S. 135, 144 (2009).  "To trigger the exclusionary rule, police 
conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can 
meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such 
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system."  Id.   
¶58 While the exclusionary rule serves to protect the 
constitutional rights of defendants, as a necessary consequence it 
also "interfere[s] with the criminal justice system's truth-
finding function."  Leon, 468 U.S. at 907.  "Particularly when law 
enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or their 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
25 
 
transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit 
conferred on . . . guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the 
criminal justice system."  Id. at 907-08. 
¶59 With these competing principles in mind, the United 
States Supreme Court and this court have recognized a good faith 
exception providing limited circumstances in which evidence 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not excluded at 
trial.  See Blackman, 377 Wis. 2d 339, ¶70.  First, "[t]he good 
faith exception has generally been applied when a law enforcement 
officer has reasonably and objectively relied on settled law 
(whether statute or binding judicial precedent) that was 
subsequently overruled."  Id. (citation omitted).  Second, the 
exception is applicable when law enforcement relies on "a warrant 
that was subsequently invalidated or that was based on erroneous 
information resulting from isolated police negligence attenuated 
from the arrest."  Id. (citations omitted). 
¶60 The court of appeals in the instant case applied the 
good faith exception and determined that the evidence obtained as 
a result of the unconstitutional blood draw need not be suppressed.  
It reasoned that "the State has met its burden to show that the 
officer who directed the warrantless blood draw acted in objective 
good-faith reliance on the incapacitated driver provision."  
Prado, 393 Wis. 2d 526, ¶71.  "At the time that Prado's blood was 
drawn, the incapacitated driver provision had been on the books 
for decades, and its constitutionality had not been challenged in 
any published appellate decision."  Id. 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
26 
 
¶61 Prado contends that the court of appeals' application of 
the good faith exception was in error.  She asserts that the law 
surrounding the incapacitated driver provision was not well-
settled so as to justify law enforcement's reliance on it.  
Additionally, Prado argues that use of the exclusionary rule should 
be expanded beyond mere deterrence of police misconduct, and should 
be applied as a remedy for constitutional violations. 
¶62 We disagree with Prado's argument on this point.  First, 
accepting Prado's argument would run afoul of the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).  
In Krull, the Court considered whether the good faith exception 
"should be recognized when officers act in objectively reasonable 
reliance upon a statute authorizing warrantless administrative 
searches, but where the statute is ultimately found to violate the 
Fourth Amendment."  Id. at 342. 
¶63 Answering this question in the affirmative, the Court 
stated:  "The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress 
evidence obtained by an officer acting in objectively reasonable 
reliance on a statute would have as little deterrent effect on the 
officer's actions as would the exclusion of evidence when an 
officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant."  
Id. at 349.  The Court further explained:   
Unless a statute is clearly unconstitutional, an officer 
cannot be expected to question the judgment of the 
legislature that passed the law.  If the statute is 
subsequently 
declared 
unconstitutional, 
excluding 
evidence obtained pursuant to it prior to such a judicial 
declaration will not deter future Fourth Amendment 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
27 
 
violations by an officer who has simply fulfilled his 
responsibility to enforce the statute as written. 
Id. at 349-50.  This court has echoed such a maxim, referencing a 
statute as "settled law" for purposes of the exclusionary rule.  
Blackman, 377 Wis. 2d 339, ¶70.   
¶64 These principles apply here.  We can discern no reason 
for applying the good faith exception based on objectively 
reasonable reliance on a warrant or court decision, but not on a 
statute.  At the time of the search at issue, the incapacitated 
driver provision remained in effect and had not been declared 
unconstitutional.  Officer Parker testified that it never occurred 
to him to attempt to procure a search warrant due to the existence 
of the statute.16 
¶65 Even accepting arguendo Prado's contention that court 
decisions had muddied the status of the incapacitated driver 
provision, what is clear is that no court had explicitly declared 
it to be unconstitutional until now.  It would be unreasonable to 
expect a police officer to synthesize the relevant case law to 
divine that the statute was unconstitutional when no court had 
clearly said so. 
¶66 We also are compelled to decline Prado's invitation to 
redefine the breadth of the exclusionary rule.  Prado seeks to 
apply the exclusionary rule not as a deterrent to police 
                                                 
16 Although our good faith inquiry is objective, when 
examining whether a reasonably well trained officer would have 
known that a search was illegal in light of all the circumstances, 
we recognize that those circumstances "frequently include a 
particular officer's knowledge and experience."  Herring v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009). 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
28 
 
misconduct, but as a remedy in and of itself to constitutional 
violations. 
¶67 Adherence to the principle of stare decisis dictates 
that we reject Prado's argument.  Stare decisis, the principle 
that courts must stand by things decided, is fundamental to the 
rule of law.  Hinrichs v. DOW Chem. Co., 2020 WI 2, ¶66, 389 
Wis. 2d 669, 937 N.W.2d 37 (citation omitted).  Any departure from 
stare decisis requires "special justification."  Schultz v. 
Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶37, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 N.W.2d 266.  
¶68 Just three years ago, a majority of this court in State 
v. Kerr, 2018 WI 87, ¶6, 383 Wis. 2d 306, 913 N.W.2d 787, 
circumscribed the breadth of the exclusionary rule, emphasizing 
that police misconduct is the essence of the inquiry.  Prado has 
not provided a compelling "special justification" that would cause 
us to revisit this recent determination.   
¶69 We therefore conclude that under the facts of this case 
law enforcement drew Prado's blood in reasonable reliance on a 
statute that had not been determined to be unconstitutional.  
Accordingly, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
applies and the evidence resulting from the draw of Prado's blood 
need not be suppressed. 
V 
¶70 In sum, we conclude that the incapacitated driver 
provision is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
provision's "deemed" consent authorizes warrantless searches that 
do not fulfill any recognized exception to the warrant requirement 
No. 
2016AP308-CR   
 
29 
 
and 
thus 
the 
provision 
violates 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment's 
proscription of unreasonable searches.   
¶71 However, we further conclude that under the facts of 
this case, law enforcement drew Prado's blood in reasonable 
reliance on a statute that had not been determined to be 
unconstitutional.  Consequently, the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule applies and the evidence resulting from the draw 
of Prado's blood need not be suppressed. 
¶72 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2016AP308-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶73 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.  (concurring).  Although 
I agree with the bottom line of the majority opinion, i.e., 
affirming the court of appeals decision that permitted use of the 
results of Dawn Prado's blood test in her trial, I do not agree 
with the majority opinion because its reasoning does not follow 
the direction of the United States Supreme Court in regard to the 
evaluation of unconscious drivers.1   
¶74 I also write to emphasize that there is nothing in the 
majority opinion that precludes law enforcement from relying on 
the legal standard set out in Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 
2525 (2019), to obtain a blood sample from an unconscious driver 
for whom law enforcement has probable cause to believe drove while 
intoxicated when "it is very likely that the driver would be taken 
to an emergency room and that his blood would be drawn for 
diagnostic purposes."  Id. at 2531.   
¶75 Therefore, while the majority opinion reaches a bottom 
line result with which I agree, I do not join the opinion.  
Accordingly, I concur in mandate only.    
                                                 
1 The majority opinion also does not apply a reasoned 
statutory interpretation that presumes the constitutionality of 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305.  I do not address that failure in this 
concurrence because I apply Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525 
(2019), to uphold the search of Prado's blood. 
No.  2016AP308-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
I.  BACKGROUND2 
¶76 The vehicle Prado was driving crossed the centerline and 
collided with an oncoming vehicle, killing the other driver and 
injuring Prado's passenger and herself.  A first responder saw 
Prado lying in a ditch near the crash and smelled the odor of 
intoxicants on her breath when he approached her.  Prado, who had 
three prior OWI convictions, was transported to a hospital.  
Officer Parker met the unconscious Prado in the hospital.  He read 
her the Informing the Accused form and then ordered that Prado's 
blood be drawn and tested.  Her blood test revealed that she had 
a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC) of 0.081 and that her 
blood also contained benzoylecgonine, the major metabolite of 
cocaine.3 
¶77 Prado was charged with:  homicide by intoxicated use of 
a motor vehicle, while having a prior OWI-related conviction; 
homicide by use of a motor vehicle, while having a PAC; homicide 
by use of a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted 
controlled substance; causing injury by operation of a motor 
vehicle while intoxicated as a second or subsequent offense; 
causing injury by use of a motor vehicle with detectable amount of 
a restricted controlled substance as a second or subsequent 
                                                 
2 The majority opinion ably sets forth the factual background, 
so I recount only that which is necessary to understand the 
discussion that follows. 
3 Benzoylecgonine is the major metabolite of cocaine.  A.W. 
Jones et al., Concentrations of Cocaine and its Major Metabolite 
Benzoylecgonine in Blood Samples From Apprehended Drivers in 
Sweden, Forensic Sci. Int'l, May 20, 2008.  
No.  2016AP308-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
offense; operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant as a 4th offense and three other related counts.   
¶78 She moved to suppress the results of her blood test, 
claiming that the unconscious driver provisions in Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(b) and (ar) were unconstitutional, facially and as 
applied to her.  The circuit court granted suppression because 
Prado's blood was drawn without a warrant, and the circuit court 
concluded that the lack of a warrant violated her Fourth Amendment 
right to be free from unreasonable searches.   
¶79 The State appealed.  The court of appeals reversed, in 
reliance on the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.  
State v. Prado, 2020 WI App 42, ¶66, 393 Wis. 2d 526, 947 N.W.2d 
182.  However, the court of appeals chose not to apply the legal 
standard set out by the Supreme Court in Mitchell.  This choice is 
interesting because the District IV panel that decided Prado had 
two out of three judges who were the same judges as decided State 
v. Richards, 2020 WI App 48, ¶12, 393 Wis. 2d 772, 948 N.W.2d 359, 
where Mitchell's legal standard for blood draws from an unconscious 
driver was employed.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶80 We review a grant or denial of a suppression motion 
grounded in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and Article, I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution as a 
question of constitutional fact.  State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18, ¶17, 
373 Wis. 2d 468, 893 N.W.2d 812.  To answer that question, we 
employ a two-step inquiry.  Id. 
No.  2016AP308-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
¶81 First, we review the circuit court's findings of 
historical facts, which we will affirm unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Id., ¶18.  Second, we independently determine whether 
the historical facts establish circumstances sufficient to justify 
a warrantless search.  Id.    
B.  General Principles 
¶82 A blood draw is a search of the person within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.  State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶31, 359 
Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120.  Both "[t]he Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution protect the right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures."  Id., ¶29 (internal quotations and citation 
omitted).    
¶83 However, the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 
do not proscribe all searches, only those that are "unreasonable."  
State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶24, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 
463.  "An action is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, 
regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, 'as long as 
the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.'"  
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (quoting Scott v. 
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). 
¶84 The Fourth Amendment does not mention securing a warrant 
prior to a search.  However, in part to protect against 
unreasonable searches, we have held that "[a] warrantless search 
is presumptively unreasonable."  Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶30.  
Nevertheless, there are well-established exceptions to the warrant 
No.  2016AP308-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
requirement.  State v. Brar, 2017 WI 73, ¶16, 376 Wis. 2d 685, 898 
N.W.2d 499.  Exigent circumstances, which include a risk that 
evidence will be destroyed, have created exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.  Howes, 373 Wis. 2d 468, ¶24.  
¶85 When exigent circumstances are present in an OWI case, 
there are four additional considerations that bear on the 
reasonableness of the search.   
(1) The blood draw is taken to obtain evidence of 
intoxication from a person lawfully arrested for a 
drunk-driving related violation or crime, (2) there is 
a clear indication that the blood draw will produce 
evidence of intoxication, (3) the method used to take 
the blood sample is a reasonable one and performed in a 
reasonable manner, and (4) the arrestee presents no 
reasonable objection to the blood draw.   
Id., ¶25 (quoting State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ¶17, 359 Wis. 2d 
454, 856 N.W.2d 834).  "[C]lear indication" is supported by the 
same facts that yield probable cause to arrest.  Howes, 373 Wis. 2d 
468, ¶25.   
¶86 The 
required 
legal 
standard 
for 
addressing 
the 
unconscious driver is set out in Mitchell.  As explained by the 
plurality, when there is probable cause that an unconscious driver 
is under the influence of intoxicants and likely would be treated 
at a medical facility for which blood would be drawn for diagnostic 
purposes, obtaining a blood sample does not require a warrant.  
Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2531.   
¶87 Justice Clarence Thomas would have gone farther than the 
plurality and concluded that the Court should apply the per se 
rule he proposed in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013).  
"Under that rule, the natural metabolization of alcohol in the 
No.  2016AP308-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
blood stream 'creates an exigency once police have probable cause 
to believe the driver is drunk,' regardless of whether the driver 
is conscious."  Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2539 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
¶88 I note that based on Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 
188, 193 (1977), the plurality opinion written by Justice Alito in 
Mitchell has the narrowest grounds supporting the judgment of the 
Court, and therefore, it sets the legal standard in regard to 
obtaining blood samples from unconscious drivers.  In Richards, 
393 Wis. 2d 772, the court of appeals applied the Mitchell standard 
in a published opinion.   
¶89 There, a sheriff's deputy found Donnie Gene Richards 
behind the wheel of a motor vehicle at the scene of an accident.  
Id., ¶1.  He was unconscious and severely injured.  Id.  The deputy 
determined there was probable cause to believe Richards had been 
operating the vehicle while intoxicated and that his injuries were 
so serious that he would soon be transported by helicopter to a 
hospital approximately fifty miles away.  Id.  Therefore, the 
deputy ordered that blood be drawn from Richards before he was 
placed in the helicopter.  Id.  
¶90 Richards was charged with OWI, 12th offense.  Id., ¶2.  
He moved to suppress the results of the blood test4 because his 
blood was drawn without a warrant.  Id.  The circuit court denied 
suppression, finding there were exigent circumstances, which the 
court concluded obviated the need for a warrant.  Id.  On appeal, 
                                                 
4 Richards had a PAC of 0.196.  State v. Richards, 2020 WI 
App 48, ¶12, 393 Wis. 2d 772, 948 N.W.2d 359.   
No.  2016AP308-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
the court of appeals affirmed, "[a]pplying the factors set forth 
in Mitchell."  Id.   
C.  Prado's Blood Draw 
¶91 Prado fitted within the category of exigent circumstance 
cases for which no warrant was needed to obtain a sample of her 
blood to test for alcohol and other intoxicants.  Law enforcement 
had probable cause to believe that she drove while intoxicated; 
she was unconscious; blood was likely to be drawn for medical 
procedures to assist in her care and obtaining a blood sample to 
test for intoxicants was compelling because PAC evidence was 
"dissipating" and "some other factor create[d] pressing health, 
safety or law enforcement needs that would take priority over a 
warrant application."  Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2537.5  Here, it 
was Prado's own health and safety that set law enforcement's 
priorities.    
¶92 Further, 
my 
evaluation 
of 
the 
four 
additional 
considerations that we have reviewed when exigent circumstances 
are said to exist confirms that obtaining a sample of Prado's blood 
without a warrant was reasonable.  First, the parties stipulated 
that there was probable cause to believe that Prado was driving 
while intoxicated at the time of the accident.  Second, there was 
probable cause to believe that the blood sample would yield 
evidence of intoxicants due to the stipulation and the smell of 
                                                 
5 Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. at 2539, left open a 
possibility that a warrant might have been required if blood were 
not likely to be drawn for medical reasons.  However, that 
possibility does not apply here, nor does Prado argue that it 
applies.   
No.  2016AP308-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
intoxicants about Prado.  Third, Prado was unconscious, so there 
was no opportunity for an evidentiary breath test.6  Fourth, her 
blood sample was taken at a hospital, by hospital staff who had 
been securing blood for Prado's medical requirements.  Obtaining 
a blood sample to test for intoxicants was compelling based on 
metabolic evidence destruction.  Accordingly, the blood draw was 
reasonable and the results of the blood test should not be 
suppressed at Prado's trial. 
D.  Impaired Driver Concerns 
¶93 In the case before us, Prado had three OWI convictions 
prior to the accident that took the life of the driver of the 
vehicle she struck while intoxicated.  Drunk drivers causing death 
and disarray on Wisconsin's roads are not new phenomenons.  
Recently, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel had a front page article 
about a young man who had served five tours of duty in Vietnam 
where he was a helicopter pilot.  He received more than 100 medals 
because of his bravery and dedication to our country.  He survived 
the war, but shortly after returning home to Wisconsin, he was 
killed by a drunk driver.  Somehow Wisconsin has to get this 
problem under control.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶94 Although I agree with the bottom line of the majority 
opinion, i.e., affirming the court of appeals decision that 
                                                 
6 Blood tests are important for conscious as well as 
unconscious drivers because it is only with a blood test that a 
driver's use of cocaine will be detected.  Prado would have avoided 
a charge of driving after ingesting a prohibited substance, e.g., 
cocaine, without a blood test. 
No.  2016AP308-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
permitted use of the results of Dawn Prado's blood test in her 
trial, I do not agree with the majority opinion because its 
reasoning does not follow the direction of the United States 
Supreme Court in regard to the evaluation of unconscious drivers.   
¶95 I also write to emphasize that there is nothing in the 
majority opinion that precludes law enforcement from relying on 
the legal standard set out in Mitchell to obtain a blood sample 
from an unconscious driver for whom law enforcement has probable 
cause to believe drove while intoxicated when "it is very likely 
that the driver would be taken to an emergency room and that his 
blood would be drawn for diagnostic purposes."  Id. at 2531.   
¶96 Therefore, while the majority opinion reaches a bottom 
line result with which I agree, I do not join the opinion.  
Accordingly, I concur in mandate only.    
¶97 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this concurrence. 
  
No.  2016AP308-CR.pdr 
 
 
 
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