Title: George Mason University v. Floyd
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 062603
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 2008

Present:  All the Justices 
 
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 062603 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
January 11, 2008 
ROBERT D. H. FLOYD 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
R. Terrence Ney, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we review a circuit court judgment 
reversing a university’s denial of in-state tuition charges 
requested by one of its students. 
BACKGROUND 
 
After completing a graduate degree program at a university 
in the State of Indiana, Robert D. H. Floyd (Floyd) moved to the 
Commonwealth of Virginia on May 15, 2004.  He leased an 
apartment and obtained “several small jobs” prior to 
matriculating at the George Mason University (GMU) School of Law 
on August 16, 2004.  During this time, Floyd titled and 
registered his motor vehicle in Virginia, registered to vote, 
and obtained a Virginia driver’s license.  Floyd was admitted to 
the law school, for purposes of tuition charges, as an 
independent out-of-state student.  During his first academic 
year of enrollment at the law school, he supported himself 
through income from his summer employment and federal student 
loans and filed a “part-year resident” state income tax return 
in Virginia for the 2004 tax year. 
 
2
 
Prior to the commencement of his second academic year as a 
student at the law school, Floyd filed a Domicile Petition for 
Continuing Students with GMU’s Office of the Registrar on August 
4, 2005, seeking reclassification for in-state tuition status.  
Question No. 5 of the pre-printed form petition asked the date 
that the petitioner moved to Virginia, the reason for the move, 
and whether the petitioner intended to remain in Virginia in the 
future.  Floyd responded to this question by declaring that he 
had located to the Commonwealth on “May 15, 2004 . . . to attend 
law school.  I have a job in a VA law firm and intend to stay in 
the future.”  
On August 26, 2005, the Office of the Registrar denied 
Floyd’s petition for reclassification as an in-state student.  
Floyd subsequently filed an appeal with the Office of the 
Registrar on September 16, 2005.1  Question No. 7 of the appeal 
form asked “when and why did you initially move to Virginia?”  
Once again, Floyd responded “May 15, 2004,” and completed the 
                     
1 There are three levels of administrative appellate review 
offered to a student seeking domicile reclassification at GMU.  
Upon rejection of the student’s original petition by the Office 
of the Registrar, a student wishing to seek further review of 
the Registrar’s reclassification decision can do so by 
requesting review with the Intermediate Level Domicile Appeals 
Committee within fifteen business days from receipt of the 
original rejection.  If a student then wishes to appeal the 
decision of the Intermediate Level Domicile Appeals Committee, 
he may do so by subsequently petitioning for review of this 
decision with the Third Level Domicile Appeals Committee, again 
within fifteen days of receipt of the previous response. 
 
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“Reason” section by stating that he had moved to Virginia in 
order “[t]o attend law school and seek employment.” 
 
The Intermediate Level Domicile Appeals Committee denied 
Floyd’s appeal by letter on October 28, 2005.  Floyd filed a 
Request for Reconsideration, which permitted submission of “new 
objective information,” wherein he attached a letter dated 
September 20, 2005 from the law firm where he had interned, 
stating that he had now been “hired [as a] law clerk.”  GMU 
again denied Floyd’s petition, stating that he had “not 
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that [he had] 
established and maintained a Virginia domicile for the entire 
one-year period prior to the start of classes for Fall 2005.” 
 
Floyd filed yet another appeal on December 15, 2005, which 
was denied on February 3, 2006, and confirmed by letter on April 
12, 2006.  Pursuant to Code § 23–7.4:3 and 8 V.A.C. § 40–120–
280, Floyd subsequently sought a review of GMU’s final 
administrative decision in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County.  
On appeal, the circuit court reversed GMU’s decision, ruling 
that the decision was “arbitrary, capricious, [or] otherwise 
contrary to law.”  This appeal followed. 
DISCUSSION 
We consider two issues raised by this appeal.  The first 
issue, raised sua sponte by this Court, is whether GMU, as an 
entity making decisions pursuant to Title 8 of the Virginia 
 
4
Administrative Code, is an administrative agency whose decisions 
fall within the scope of Code § 17.1-405 so as to properly 
render this appeal within the original jurisdiction of the Court 
of Appeals of Virginia.  We have not previously addressed this 
issue and do so presently in order to resolve the issue for 
cases that may arise in the future.  The second issue we 
consider is whether the circuit court erred in reversing GMU’s 
determination that Floyd was not an in-state student so as to 
qualify him for reduced tuition charges.  We will address these 
issues in that sequence. 
Code § 8.01-670, which addresses the civil appellate 
jurisdiction of this Court, provides in pertinent part that: 
A. Except as provided by [Code] § 17.1-405, any person 
may present a petition for an appeal to the Supreme Court 
if he believes himself aggrieved . . . .  (3) By a final 
judgment in any other civil case. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  In comparison, Code § 17.1-405, providing for 
the civil jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, provides in 
pertinent part that: 
Any aggrieved party may appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from: 
 
1. Any final decision of a circuit court on appeal 
from (i) a decision of an administrative agency. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Because the Code has not defined 
“administrative agency” for purposes of Code § 17.1-405, we must 
resolve whether the determination of eligibility for in-state 
 
5
tuition by a state-affiliated university, such as GMU, is a 
decision of an “administrative agency.”  
It is clear that GMU qualifies as an agency of the 
Commonwealth.  Under the Administrative Process Act, an “Agency” 
is defined as “any authority, instrumentality, officer, board or 
other unit of the state government empowered . . . to make 
regulations or decide cases.”  Code § 2.2-4001 (emphasis added).  
To this effect, Code § 23-14 states that all state-affiliated 
four-year universities are “governmental instrumentalities;” 
Code § 23-9.2:3 supplies the “governing body of every 
educational institution” with the power to promulgate certain 
necessary “rules and regulations.”  Perhaps most significantly, 
Title 8 of the Virginia Administrative Code actually denominates 
George Mason University within its text as the Commonwealth’s 
“Agency No. 35.”  8 V.A.C. 35, Agency Introduction. 
There is, however, a difference between an administrative 
agency, and an agency with the power to make administrative 
decisions.  Cf. Virginia Beach Beautification Comm'n v. Board of 
Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 415, 417, 344 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1986) 
(stating that former Code § 17-116.05(1), as the predecessor of 
Code § 17.1-405, “deal[t] with a decision made by an 
administrative agency and not with an administrative decision 
made by some entity that is not purely an administrative 
agency”).  Considering “the nature of the entity making the 
 
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decision rather than the substance of the decision itself,” it 
is obvious that GMU is not “purely an administrative agency.”2  
Id.  The primary goal of every university is to educate, not 
regulate, its students.  This conclusion is further supported by 
Code § 23-7.4:3, which expressly provides that the 
Administrative Process Act shall not apply to the “appeals 
process for those students who are aggrieved by decisions 
regarding eligibility for in-state or reduced tuition charges 
pursuant to §§ 23-7.4 and 23-7.4:2.” 
Under Code § 17.1-405, the Court of Appeals only has 
jurisdiction over an appeal from an administrative agency, not 
over an administrative decision made by an entity that is not 
purely an administrative agency.  The Court of Appeals thus 
lacks jurisdiction over a circuit court decision on appeal from 
the determination of a state university pursuant to Code § 23-
7.4.  Appellate jurisdiction of such cases properly lies in this 
Court under Code § 8.01-670(A)(3). 
We now turn to consider whether the circuit court erred in 
reversing GMU’s decision denying Floyd’s request for in-state 
tuition charges.  
                     
2 Similarly, in Rector and Visitors of the University of 
Virginia v. Carter, 267 Va. 242, 245, 591 S.E.2d 76, 78 (2004), 
this Court held in a sovereign immunity context that the 
university is “an agency of the Commonwealth.”  Beyond question, 
this university is not purely an administrative agency of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
7
In order to qualify for in-state tuition charges at a 
public institution of higher education in Virginia, Code § 23-
7.4(B) requires a student to “establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that for a period of at least one year immediately 
prior to the date of the alleged entitlement, he was domiciled 
in Virginia and had abandoned any previous domicile, if such 
existed.”  Code § 23-7.4(B).  Furthermore, the statute 
additionally provides that: 
In determining domiciliary intent, all of the 
following applicable factors shall be considered:  
continuous residence for at least one year prior to 
the date of alleged entitlement, state to which income 
taxes are filed or paid, driver’s license, motor 
vehicle registration, voter registration, employment, 
property ownership, sources of financial support, 
military records, a written offer and acceptance of 
employment following graduation, and any other social 
or economic relationships with the Commonwealth and 
other jurisdictions. 
 
 
Domiciliary status shall not ordinarily be 
conferred by the performance of acts which are 
auxiliary to fulfilling educational objectives or are 
required or routinely performed by temporary residents 
of the Commonwealth.  Mere physical presence or 
residence primarily for educational purposes shall not 
confer domiciliary status.  A matriculating student 
who has entered an institution and is classified as an 
out-of-state student shall be required to rebut by 
clear and convincing evidence the presumption that he 
is in the Commonwealth for the purpose of attending 
school and not as a bona fide domiciliary. 
 
Id. 
A student wishing to challenge a university’s decision 
pursuant to Code § 23-7.4(B) has the right to appeal the case to 
 
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the circuit court in the jurisdiction in which the institution 
is located.  Code § 23-7.4:3(A).  Upon appeal to the circuit 
court, no decision shall be reversed unless the school’s 
decision is deemed “arbitrary, capricious or otherwise contrary 
to law.”  Id. 
This Court has addressed a university’s determination 
pursuant to Code § 23-7.4 once before.  In Ravindranathan v. 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 258 Va. 269, 519 S.E.2d 618 
(1999), an “out-of-state” medical student filed an application 
requesting in-state tuition charges at a state-affiliated 
university.  In her application, the student stated that she 
intended to remain indefinitely in Virginia based primarily upon 
her boyfriend’s plan to settle in the Commonwealth, and that 
this intent was further demonstrated by the fact that she was 
registered to vote in Virginia, possessed a Virginia driver’s 
license, owned a car registered in Virginia, had checking and 
savings accounts with financial institutions in Virginia, filed 
a Virginia state resident income tax return the year preceding 
her application, and had not filed state income tax returns in 
any other state for three years after filing her application.  
Id. at 271, 519 S.E.2d at 618-19. 
 
The university rejected Ravindranathan’s application for 
in-state tuition charges, and upon appeal, the circuit court 
affirmed.  This Court upheld the circuit court’s decision, 
 
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stating that the facts upon which Ravindranathan relied to 
support her claim of Virginia domicile under Code § 23-7.4(B) 
could be “deemed auxiliary to fulfilling her educational 
objectives or are routinely performed by temporary residents of 
[Virginia].”  Id. at 275, 519 S.E.2d at 621. 
As in Ravindranathan, the university in the present case 
determined that in consideration of the totality of evidence 
presented to its appeals committees, Floyd’s acts were auxiliary 
to his primary educational purpose for residing in Virginia.  On 
appeal, this Court is limited to considering only whether the 
circuit court erred in finding that GMU’s decision to deny Floyd 
in-state tuition charges was “arbitrary, capricious, [or] 
otherwise contrary to law.”  In light of the presumption 
established in Code § 23-7.4(B) that an out-of-state student be 
required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he 
entered the Commonwealth for a primary purpose other than an 
educational purpose, we hold that the circuit court was plainly 
wrong in finding that the decision made by GMU was arbitrary, 
capricious, or otherwise contrary to law.  Code § 8.01-680.  
Floyd himself admitted on more than one occasion that he had 
relocated to Virginia for the primary purpose of attending law 
school.  Moreover, as in Ravindranathan, the many facts upon 
which Floyd relies to support his purported Virginia domicile 
could likewise be deemed auxiliary to fulfilling his educational 
 
10
objectives or are routinely performed by temporary residents of 
this Commonwealth.3  
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
Circuit Court of Fairfax County reversing George Mason 
University’s decision denying the application for Robert D. H. 
Floyd for in-state tuition charges and we will enter final 
judgment for George Mason University. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
                     
3 To the extent that Floyd relies upon the September 20, 
2005 letter from the law firm as evidence that he had received 
permanent employment with the firm, that evidence is not 
relevant to the year immediately prior to August 22, 2005, which 
marked the beginning of classes for the fall semester.  See Code 
§ 23-7.4(B).