Title: Douglas M. Jackson Sr. v. Florida Deparment of Corrections
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC92-827
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 18, 1999

Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. 92,827
____________
DOUGLAS M. JACKSON, SR.,
Petitioner,
vs.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
[November 18, 1999]
PER CURIAM.
Douglas M. Jackson, Sr., petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus.  We
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.
FACTS
Jackson is a prisoner currently serving a life sentence for multiple murders
committed in 1981.  On April 20, 1998, Jackson filed a petition for writ of
mandamus against the Florida Department of Corrections ("the Department")
seeking an order from this Court requiring that the Department pay him money for
the duties and tasks he performs while incarcerated.  On April 23, 1998, this Court
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granted Jackson's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.  However, upon
further review, it came to this Court's attention that Jackson had not complied with
the requirements of section 57.085(7), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides in
full:
A prisoner who has twice in the preceding 3 years been adjudicated
indigent under this section, certified indigent under s. 57.081, or
authorized to proceed as an indigent under 28 U.S.C. s. 1915 by a
federal court may not be adjudicated indigent to pursue a new suit,
action, claim, proceeding, or appeal without first obtaining leave of
court.  In a request for leave of court, the prisoner must provide a
complete listing of each suit, action, claim, proceeding, or appeal
brought by the prisoner or intervened in by the prisoner in any court or
other adjudicatory forum in the preceding 5 years.  The prisoner must
attach to a request for leave of court a copy of each complaint,
petition, or other document purporting to commence a lawsuit and a
record of disposition of the proceeding.
Accordingly, on September 18, 1998, this Court vacated its earlier order
granting in forma pauperis status to Jackson.  This Court instructed Jackson that
the denial was without prejudice to his filing another motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis, conforming to the requirements of section 57.085(7).  
Jackson has filed a new motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. In
that motion, Jackson indicates that he has been adjudicated indigent at least twice
in the last three years, but has not provided copies of any of the documents
required in section 57.085(7).  In the space provided for listing the prior cases,
1 We note, however, that there may be situations in which the Department has had to limit
an inmate's storage space.  The statute does not address the potential problem that an inmate may
not be able to provide copies of the required pleadings because he has had to dispose of them. 
Further, if an inmate does allege that he has been forced to dispose of his prior pleadings, the
courts are placed in the difficult situation of either simply believing the inmate, which could lead
to the creation of a rather large loophole in the statute, or attempting to confirm the inmate's
assertion.  This could lead to a complicated, drawn-out proceeding in which the Department might
have to verify that the pleading had indeed been disposed of.  An inquiry would then be required
to determine whether the prison had actually required the destruction of the pleadings or whether
the inmate had unnecessarily disposed of the pleadings.  While this particular petitioner has not
alleged that he was forced to dispose of his pleadings, we alert the Legislature to these potential
procedural problems associated with this statute. 
2 This Court has not been specifically advised of Jackson's pleadings in other courts. 
However, based on an examination of this Court's records, from 1992 when this Court reversed
Jackson's death sentence, see Jackson v. State, 599 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1992)(No. 79,970), to just
prior to filing the instant petition, he has filed or taken part in thirteen petitions in this Court.  See
Coleman [and Jackson] v. Florida Dep't of Corrections, 717 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1998)(No. 92,828);
Jackson v. Florida Dep't of Corrections, 718 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1998)(No. 92,793); Jackson v.
Singletary, 717 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1998)(No. 92,121); Coleman  v. Florida Dep't of Corrections,
717 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1998)(No. 92,116); Jackson v. Department of Corrections, 717 So. 2d 533
(Fla. 1998)(No. 92,114); Jackson v. Davis, 705 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1997)(No. 91,796); Jackson v.
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Jackson has inserted the following notation:   "Note unable to List All/Each
Action, provide copy, etc. as File being Closed/Ended Destroyed.  But the Courts
litigated before were: 11th Cir. Ct. Appeal; U.S. Dist. Cts; Fla. Supreme Ct.; U.S.
Supreme Ct; 1st DCA; Fla. DOC; 2nd DCA, 4th DCA, 2nd Cir, 8th Cir., 17th Cir.;
to the best of my memory.  This is the best info I can provide."  
ANALYSIS
Jackson's answer is inadequate and does not justify his failure to comply
with the statute and this Court's order.1  Jackson has, until recently, been able to
avoid the requirements of section 57.085,2 and thus has not come to terms with the
Department of Corrections, 707 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 1997)(No. 91,381); Vega [and Jackson] v.
Singletary, 704 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1997)(No. 90,021); Jackson v. McAndrew, 687 So. 2d 1303 (Fla.
1997)(No. 89,675); Jackson v. Schapiro, 680 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1996)(No. 88,860); Jackson v.
Singletary, 675 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1996)(No. 87,961); Jackson v. Singletary, 670 So. 2d 938  (Fla.
1996)(No. 87,372); Jackson v. Department of Corrections, 617 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1993)(No.
81,061).  Seven of those petitions were for writ of mandamus filed against the Department of
Corrections or employees of the prison.  
As a general rule, Jackson's petitions against the Department concern the manner in which
it conducts prison affairs and how it disciplines its inmates.  In each of the petitions listed above,
Jackson was granted in forma pauperis status and thus was not required to pay the filing fee. 
Jackson paid no filing fee in his two petitions for review filed in this Court, and he paid no filing
fee for the four habeas petitions filed here since there is no filing fee for such petitions.
 Since the filing of the instant petition against the Department on April 20, 1998, Jackson
has filed eleven additional petitions against the Department which are either still pending, were
transferred, or were dismissed.  See Jackson v. Department of Corrections, No. 93,227 (Fla.
petition filed May 6, 1998)(pending); Jackson v. Singletary, No. 94,196 (Fla. petition filed Oct.
26, 1998)(pending); Jackson v. Department of Corrections, No. 94,195 (Fla. petition filed Oct.
26, 1998)(pending); Jackson v. Department of Corrections, No. 94,234 (Fla. petition filed Nov. 3,
1998)(pending); Jackson v. Department of Corrections, No. 94,271 (Fla. petition filed Nov. 9,
1998)(pending); Jackson v. Moore, No. 95,700 (Fla. petition filed June 1, 1999)(pending);
Jackson v. Moore, No. 95,891 (Fla. Jul. 19, 1999)(transferred); Jackson v. Moore, No. 95,931
(Fla. Jul. 19, 1999)(transferred);Stridison [and Jackson] v. Moore, No. 95,992 (Fla. Jul. 23,
1999)(transferred); Jackson v. Moore, No. 96,321 (Fla. petition filed Aug. 19, 1999)(pending);
Stridison [and Jackson] v. Moore, No. 96,382 (Fla. Aug. 31, 1999)(dismissed).  In all likelihood,
Jackson will have filed more petitions in this Court before this decision is published.
3 See art. V, § 2, Fla. Const.
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reality that maintaining an "active" pro se litigation practice is both time-
consuming, and costly.  
This Court is not at liberty to ignore the statutes enacted by the Legislature. 
While formulating procedures for granting in forma pauperis status is the exclusive
province of the Supreme Court pursuant to rulemaking authority vested in it by the
Florida Constitution,3 the existence of a right for indigents to proceed without
payment of costs is a substantive one and is properly provided for by the
4 We note, however, that even if a statute may be considered substantive, this Court retains
its judicial prerogative to find that the application of the statute may be unconstitutional under
some circumstances.  Nevertheless, since Petitioner Jackson has failed to raise this issue, we
decline to address it at this time.  
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Legislature.  See Amos v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. 416 So. 2d
841 (Fla. 1st DCA), review dismissed, 421 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1982).4   
The right to proceed as an indigent is a statutory right created by section
57.081.  See Kleinschmidt v. Estate of Kleinschmidt, 392 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 3d DCA
1981)(asserting that the purpose of rule 9.430 was "not to expand the substantive
right of an indigent  .  .  .  but merely to provide a vehicle for enforcement of the
right" created under section 57.081).  Further, prior to 1980, it had been held that
section 57.081 only applied to trial courts, not appellate courts.  See Lee v. City of
Winter Haven, 386 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Hillman v. Federal Nat'l
Mortgage Ass'n, 375 So. 2d 336, 337 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).  In chapter 80-348,
Laws of Florida, however, the Legislature created a statutory right for an indigent
person to gain access to Florida's appellate courts as well.  See, e.g. Kleinschmidt,
392 So. 2d at 67.  That substantive right was codified in what is now section
57.081(1), Florida Statutes (1997).  However, due to the costly administrative
problems caused by repeated frivolous inmate filings, the Legislature recently
created a separate statute for inmate proceedings and removed a prisoner's absolute
right to repeatedly proceed without payment of the filing fee and provided for only
5 The statute also provides for circumstances under which a court may determine that an
inmate is only partially indigent.  In such circumstances, the court may require the inmate to pay a
reduced payment at the time of filing, and then make periodic payments toward the full payment
of the filing fee.  See § 57.085(4), Fla. Stat. (1997).
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a limited right to proceed, under certain circumstances, without paying the fee in
advance.5  See § 57.085, Fla. Stat. (1997).  Further, even if a court determines that
an inmate may proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, that inmate must
contribute toward the costs of his or her lawsuit and ultimately pay for the lawsuit
in full, if he or she subsequently becomes able to do so.  See § 57.085(5), Fla. Stat.
(1997).
Although the photocopy requirements of section 57.085(7) present litigious
prisoners with some procedural hurdles in seeking indigency status, the practical
effect of the statute is merely that the more litigious a prisoner becomes, the more
time-consuming and costly it will be for that prisoner to continue along the same
path.  If a prisoner has filed four or five prior lawsuits, it will require some effort
on the prisoner's part to file another lawsuit (because he or she will have to obtain
photocopies of the documents in those cases).  Since Jackson has filed a large
number of lawsuits in many courts, it is particularly cumbersome for him to
continue at the same exhaustive pace.     
In enacting section 57.085, the Legislature made express findings regarding
the financial and administrative burdens that frivolous indigent prisoner lawsuits
6  Section 57.085, Florida Statutes (1997), was created pursuant to chapter 96-106, Laws
of Florida.  At the beginning of the act, the legislature provided a preamble in which it set forth
the basis or reasons for the act.  The preamble provided, in pertinent part:
WHEREAS, frivolous inmate lawsuits congest civil court dockets and delay the
administration of justice for all litigants, and
 
WHEREAS, each year self-represented indigent inmates in Florida's jails and
prisons file an ever-increasing number of frivolous lawsuits at public expense
against public officers and employees, and
  
WHEREAS, state and local governments spend millions of dollars each year
processing, serving, and defending frivolous lawsuits filed by self-represented
indigent inmates, and
WHEREAS, the overwhelming majority of civil lawsuits filed by self-represented
indigent inmates are frivolous and malicious actions intended to embarrass or
harass public officers and employees, and
WHEREAS, under current law frivolous inmate lawsuits are dismissible by the
courts only after considerable expenditure of precious taxpayer and judicial
resources .  .  .  .
Ch. 96-106, preamble, Laws of Fla. 
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place on the state judicial system.  See ch. 96-106, preamble, at 92-93, Laws of
Fla.6  Subsection (7) of the statute attempts to ameliorate this problem by providing
courts with a mechanism to review a prisoner’s recent litigation history and
determine whether to allow the prisoner the opportunity to again seek a waiver of
prepayment of filing fees where that prisoner has already proceeded twice as an
indigent in any court within the last three years.  By reviewing the prisoner's prior
filings, the court may be able to determine whether the prisoner has raised the same
claims before or has repeatedly filed pleadings showing no possible entitlement to
relief.  Such filings are specifically listed as types of frivolous actions which are
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not permitted under the statute.  See § 57.085(9), Fla. Stat. (1997).  Section 57.085
and the preamble of the act creating the statute also discuss the improper filing of
malicious suits or suits intended only to harass public officers and employees.  See
§ 57.085(6)(d), Fla. Stat. (1997).  An examination of the prisoner's prior pleadings
could help a court determine whether the prisoner has previously filed those types
of improper actions as well. 
Thus, underlying section 57.085 is the concept that judicial labor should be
spent analyzing meritorious matters and issues which have not already been
reviewed by another court.  This purpose is accomplished by allowing the courts to
review the prisoner's prior pleadings.  If the prisoner does not provide those
pleadings, that purpose is frustrated.  
Conserving judicial labor is further accomplished by increasing such
litigants' commitment of time and resources since it is the prisoner's responsibility
to keep appropriate records as to how many cases he or she has filed, the case
numbers, the dispositions of those cases, and copies of the requisite documents
from those cases.  This being the case, strict enforcement of the statute may cause
prisoners to consider more carefully whether to file a claim in court and to refrain
from filing excessive, successive, or frivolous lawsuits. 
 This Court has recognized that "[t]he resources of our court system are finite
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and must be reserved for the resolution of genuine disputes." Rivera v. State, 728
So. 2d 1165, 1166 (Fla. 1998).  The United States Supreme Court itself has
restrained indigent petitioners who have abused the system in order to allocate the
resources of the Court "in a way that promotes the interests of justice,"  In re
McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989), and in a decision addressing adequate prison
law libraries, it held that the constitutional right of access to courts does not
"guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating
engines."  Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996)(emphasis added).  Jackson's
lawsuits against the Department of Corrections have become so numerous that one
could describe him similarly.  We agree with the Supreme Court's assertion that
"paupers filing pro se petitions are not subject to the financial considerations . . . 
that deter other litigants from filing frivolous petitions" and that "[e]very paper
filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires
some portion of the institution’s limited resources."  489 U.S. at  184.  Therefore,
we find that we must restrain Jackson's ability to monopolize this Court's resources. 
While this Court could completely deny Jackson indigency status altogether
as the Supreme Court has done in some cases, that option is not necessary at this
time.  However, in order to give effect to section 57.085, this Court must require
that Jackson strictly comply with the disclosure provisions of subsection (7).  Since
7  Section 57.085 does not, however, cover petitions for writ of habeas corpus because in
this State, "[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall be grantable of right, freely and without cost."  See
art. I, § 13, Fla. Const.  Accordingly, a petitioner seeking habeas relief would not need to seek
leave to proceed without payment of any filing fee. 
Section 57.085 does not prevent a prisoner from challenging his conviction or sentence by
means of a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 or
3.850.  Section 57.085 does not cover postconviction motions because they are collateral criminal
proceedings, which are specifically excluded from the statute.  See § 57.085(10), Fla. Stat.
(1997)("This section does not apply to a criminal proceeding or a collateral criminal
proceeding."); see also Ferenc v. State,  697 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)(finding that a
3.850 motion is a collateral criminal proceeding). 
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Jackson has not done so after having been given more than one chance to do so,
this petition is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a new petition along
with the appropriate filing fee or a proper motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis that includes a list of all legal actions he has filed in the last five years and
copies of the documents commencing and disposing of those actions.
See § 57.085(7),  Fla. Stat. (1997).  Furthermore, if Jackson wishes to proceed as
an indigent in any cases now pending in this Court or in any new petitions, cases or
other legal actions covered by the section 57.085, he must either submit a motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in strict compliance with section 57.085(7)
or submit the requisite filing fee.7  Should Jackson file a motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis which does not comply with this order in connection
with any future pleadings or petitions, the motion shall immediately be denied and
Jackson will be required to pay the requisite filing fee or have his case dismissed. 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONCERNS
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Having resolved this particular petitioner's case, we must point out what we
perceive to be the extremely burdensome administrative requirements the statute
has imposed on this Court and, most probably, the Department.  From our
experience with the statute over the last few years, it appears to us that any judicial
labor saved by potentially reducing the number of frivolous lawsuits is nearly
outweighed by the tremendous administrative burdens created by the statute.  
First, as discussed above, the more litigious inmates must provide
photocopies of their prior pleadings.  These inmates, however, often have
insufficient funds to pay for these copies.  Nevertheless, the Department is still
required to make photocopies of the relevant pleadings for these inmates.  See         
Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-602.405(4) (previously 33-3.0051(4)).  Further, it is not
uncommon for an inmate's prior pleadings to consist of several hundred pages and,
at times, thousands of pages.  Clearly, this requirement must be a tremendous
burden on the Department  and, ultimately, on the taxpayer.
 Further, since only a small portion of the average balance of an inmate's
trust account may be deducted monthly to pay for the cost of the copies and the
lawsuit, this statute imposes a huge burden both on the court clerk's offices and,
most probably, the Department's accounting office.  At such small amounts, the
paperwork could continue for years.  This Court has already had to hire additional
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staff to handle the administrative burden caused by this statute.  
While it seems logical that requiring inmates to take a financial stake in their
lawsuits would likely reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits filed in the long run,
a single one-time reduced filing fee for partially indigent inmates would probably
have the same preventive effect without the costly administrative processing
currently required under the statute. 
Furthermore, once a litigious inmate has actually complied with the statute 
by sending in his or her thousands of pages of prior pleadings, this Court's clerk
must place it with the court file and, due to its tremendous size and weight, literally
wheel the file up to each justice's office, where the stacks of pleadings must be
reviewed.  Ultimately, once the case is completed, the storage of these large files
also poses problems.  Therefore, we strenuously urge the Legislature to further
review this statute in an attempt to remedy what has truly become an administrative
nightmare for Florida's court system.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., and
OVERTON, Senior Justice, concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - Mandamus
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Douglas M. Jackson, Jr., pro se, Starke, Florida,
for Petitioner
Louis A. Vargas, Florida Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent