Title: Rowe v. Sisters of the Pallottine Missionary Society  (concurring)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 29161
State: west-virginia
Issuer: west-virginia Supreme Court
Date: December 12, 2002

No. 29161 - Brian W. Rowe v. Sisters of the Pallottine Missionary Society, a non­ profit corporation FILED RELEASED December 12, 2001 December 12, 2001 RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA OF WEST VIRGINIA Davis, J., concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part: The majority opinion addressed the Hospital’sassignment of error involving the refusal of the trial court to give a comparative negligence instruction. I fully concur with the majority’s resolution of thatissue. However, the Hospital also assigned as error the closing argument statements made by plaintiff’s counsel. The majority opinion has not addressed that assignment of error on its merits. It is from this part of the opinion that I dissent. I believe the Hospital was entitled to a new trial based upon improper remarks made by the plaintiff’s counsel during closing argument. A. The Million Dollar Racehorse Argument Was Prejudicial During the first half of plaintiff’s closing argument, the following remarks were made to the jury by plaintiff’s counsel: Andlike I said, the value of loss of enjoyment of life is something that we don’t value. People don’t have any way. You can’t go to the store. But I know one thing, if Brian Rowe was horse, I could come in hereand say, well, that horse’s leg’s worth---a Kentucky Derby winner, millions and millions of dollars. You wouldn’t have any problem. This young man is certainly worth as much as a horse. The hospital contends that it properly objected, and that the statement was reversible error. 1 1. The issue was preserved for appellate review. The majority opinion contends that a proper objection to the above statement was not presented. However, the record reflects differently. Immediatelyafter plaintiff’s counsel concluded the first half of closing argument, defense counsel approached the bench and motioned for a mistrial. For reasons not apparent in the record, the initial discussion of this matter was off the record. However, once the jury retired to deliberate, the issue was placed on the record as follows. Judge: . . . Mr. Farrell, you made an objection at the conclusion ofthe opening part of Mr. Levine’s closing argument. Do you--I will state that that was done after the comment. Of course, the comments are always made before you can object, but it was made at the closing of his argument and not at the time of the comments. Do you have any motions or things to say in that regard? DefenseCounsel: Yes, your Honor. I would like to place on the record my objection that at the conclusion of the first half of Mr. Levine’s closing argument, I approached the Court and informed the Court that I objected to Mr. Levine’s argument concerning urging the jury to award damages based uponhis comparison of what a Kentucky Derby winning horse and the horse’s leg would be worth. Judge: Speak up a little. Defense Counsel: I’m trying not to talk so loud that the jury may hear. Using the analogy of a Kentucky Derby winning horse, that if it had a damaged leg would be worth millions, and urgingthe jury to award to the plaintiff in this case likewise. Webelieve that is reversible error and I want to preserve my objection for it. The manner in which defense counsel objected in this case was consistent with Rule 23.04(b) of the West Virginia Trial Court Rules, which states in part that “[c]ounsel shall not be interrupted 2 in argument by opposing counsel, except as may be necessary to bring to the court’s attention objection to any statement to the jury made by opposing counsel and to obtain a ruling on such objection.” Rule 23.04(b)relaxes the general requirement of contemporaneous objection for closing argument purposes. See Lacy v. CSX Transp. Inc., 205 W. Va. 630, 639, 520 S.E.2d 418, 427 (1999) (“Rule 23.04 . . . disfavors objections by counsel during closing arguments.”). Therefore, this issue was properly preserved for appellate review and should have been addressed by the majority opinion. 2. The racehorse argument constituted reversible error. Our cases have indicated “that this Court reviews rulings by a trial court concerningthe appropriateness of argument by counsel before the jury for an abuse of discretion.” Lacy, 205 W. Va. at 639, 520 S.E.2d at 427. Moreover, “‘[t]he discretion of the trial court in ruling on the propriety of argument by counsel before the jury will not beinterfered with by the appellate court, unless it appears that the rights of the complaining party have beenprejudiced, or that manifest injustice resulted therefrom.’” Syl. pt. 9, State v. Flint, 171 W. Va. 676, 301 S.E.2d 765 (1983) (quoting Syl. pt. 3, State v. Boggs, 103 W. Va. 641, 138 S.E. 321 (1927)). In this case, the Hospital hasargued that the trial judged abused its discretion in denying a new trial because of the improper closing remarks by plaintiff’s counsel. The issue presented by the Hospital was addressed by the Court in Roberts v. Stevens Clinic Hosp., Inc., 176 W. Va. 492, 345 S.E.2d791 (1986). Roberts was a wrongful death case in which a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $10,000,000. The defendant appealed. One of the issues raised was that the plaintiff 3 improperly suggested a verdictamount to the jury. Specifically, “[c]ounsel argued that if a $10,000,000 racehorse had been killed through the negligence of a veterinary hospital, the measure of damages would be exactly $10,000,000.” Roberts, 176 W. Va. at 499, 345 S.E.2d at 799. We recognized in Roberts that suggesting a verdict amount to the jury through a racehorse analogy was prejudicial and therefore reversible error. Unfortunately, the defendant in Roberts did not object to the statement during closing arguments. Consequently, the Court declined to reverse the jury verdict and award a new trial. However, because the Court foundthe error to be so egregious, relief was granted by reducing the jury’s award from $10,000,000 to $3,000,000. In this case, plaintiff’s counsel used an analogy to suggesta verdict amount to the jury that was expressly disapproved in Roberts. Here, the majority opinion has taken great liberty to protect the verdict by refusing to squarely address the issue on its merits. I cannot accept the majority’s position of simply ignoring the issue. The issue was properly preserved. Under Roberts, the Hospital was entitled to a new trial. Moreover, in syllabus point 7 of Bennett v. 3 C Coal Co., 180 W. Va. 665, 379 S.E.2d 388 (1989), we held, in part, that suggesting a verdict amount to a jury for noneconomic damages will “result in reversible error where the verdict is obviously influenced by such statement.” The million dollar racehorse argument, without question, influenced the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $880,186.00. Therefore, I concur, in part, and dissent, in part to the majority opinion. I am authorized to state that Justice Maynard joins me in this concurring and dissenting opinion. 4