Title: ESTATE OF PALMER
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 84-167
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: October 21, 1985

No. 84-167 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M O N T A N A 1985 I N THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT R. PALMER, Deceased. APPEAL FROM: District C o u r t o f t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l District, I n and f o r t h e County o f P a r k , The Honorable Byron Robb, Judge p r e s i d i n g . COUNSEL OF RECORD: F o r A p p e l l a n t : Hooks & Budewitz; P a t r i c k F. Hooks a r g u e d , Townsend, Montana Moore, R i c e , O'Connell & R e f l i n g ; P e r r y J. Moore, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent: D r y s d a l e , McLean, S c r e n a r & D i R e ; Roger Scouten & James McLean a r g u e d , Bozeman, Montana - Submitted: May 2 3 , 1985 Decided: October 21, 1985 F i l e d : OCT 2.i j985 M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. A motion t o d e t e r m i n e t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a j o i n t tenancy was f i l e d i n t h e p r o b a t e p r o c e e d i n g s i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f Park County. An appeal was t a k e n from t h e o r d e r d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e checking a c c o u n t , c a t t l e , c a t t l e b r a n d s and broker- age a c c o u n t d i d n o t p a s s t o t h e s u r v i v i n g p a r t n e r i n h i s c a p a c i t y a s s u r v i v i n g j o i n t t e n a n t . W e a f f i r m t h e D i s t r i c t Court. The i s s u e s a r e : 1. Did t h e District Court err i n h o l d i n g t h a t t h e bank checking account i n t h e names o f William Palmer and Robert Palmer a s j o i n t t e n a n t s was p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y ? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n h o l d i n g t h a t t h e c a t t l e branded w i t h a brand r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e names o f " W i l - liam Palmer o r Robert Palmer" w e r e p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y ? 3 . Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n h o l d i n g t h a t a broker- age a c c o u n t , r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e name o f William Palmer f o r which Robert Palmer signed a document a s a j o i n t t e n a n t , was p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y ? Following a r e p e r t i n e n t f a c t s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e uncon- t e s t e d f i n d i n g s o f f a c t o f t h e District Court. Robert Palmer (Robert) d i e d on November 8 , 1981. F o r many y e a r s p r i o r t o R o b e r t ' s d e a t h , h e and h i s b r o t h e r , William, o p e r a t e d and conducted a p a r t n e r s h i p c a l l e d "Palmer B r o t h e r s . " The p a r t n e r s h i p was engaged i n t h e b u s i n e s s o f r a i s i n g l i v e s t o c k and f e e d , c o n d u c t i n g a f e e d l o t o p e r a t i o n , and buying and s e l l i n g c a t t l e on r a n c h l a n d s a b o u t 1 0 m i l e s n o r t h e a s t o f L i v i n g s t o n i n Park County, Montana. William and Mildred, h i s w i f e , r e s i d e d on t h e ranch f o r many y e a r s p r i o r t o R o b e r t ' s d e a t h , w h i l e Robert r e s i d e d i n L i v i n g s t o n . Robert married Constance on September 21, 1979, and Constance i s R o b e r t ' s s o l e h e i r a t law. F o r many v e a r s p r i o r t o R o b e r t ' s d e a t h , Robert and William owned a checking account i n F i r s t Bank Livingston, i n which t h e y deposited a31 re- c e i p t s and t h e proceeds from c a t t l e s a l e s and o t h e r income, and from which t h e y paid a l l p a r t n e r s h i p d e b t s and o b l i g a - t i o n s . Additional f a c t s w i l l be set f o r t h i n o u r d i s c u s s i o n of t h e checking account i s s u e . William and Brad Palmer, son of William, claimed t h e proceeds i n t h e checking account a t t h e time of R o b e r t ' s death a s s u r v i v i n g j o i n t t e n a n t s . Constance contends t h a t t h e b a l a n c ~ is a p a r t o f t h e p a r t n e r - s h i p a s s e t s and should be accounted f o r i n t h e p a r t n e r s h i p . Because o f t h e - o r brand c e r t i f i c a t e , William claims t h a t t h e brands and any c a t t l e c a r r y i n g them passed t o him a s surviv- i n g j o i n t t e n a n t , and t o Mildred a s h i s successor i n i n t e r - est. Constance claims t h e p r o p e r t y i s p a r t o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p ' s a s s e t s and should be accounted f o r i n t h e p a r t n e r s h i p . In 1979, William opened a commodity o r broker- age account w i t h M e r r i l l Lynch. William claims t h e Merrill Lynch account a s h i s s o l e p r o p e r t y , o r a s s u r v i v i n g j o i n t t e n a n t i f t h e account i s found t o be j o i n t , while Constance claims t h e account i s p a r t o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p a s s e t s . The D i s t r i c t Court pointed o u t t h a t William t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Robert was very c l o s e a n d t h e y g o t along w e l l both a s f r i e n d s and a s b u s i n e s s p a r t n e r s u n t i l t h e l a s t few y e a r s o f R o b e r t ' s l i f e , when h i s p e r s o n a l i t y changed and he d i d e r r a t i c t h i n g s . Constance t e s t i f i e d t h a t Robert and William w e r e n o t f r i e n d l y f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s b e f o r e Rob- ert ' s d e a t h , a lthough s h e acknowledged t h a t Robert named William a s personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n h i s 1977 w i l l . Another b r o t h e r , Maro Palmer, t e s t i f i e d t h a t Robert had t o l d him William was t r y i n g t o t a k e t h e b u s i n e s s away from him and t h a t Robert's behavior had n o t changed u n t i l a few weeks before death. Brad Palmer t e s t i f i e d t h a t William and Robert g o t along w e l l w i t h only normal disagreements u n t i l t h e l a s t y e a r o r s o when Robert became unable t o make d e c i s i o n s and l o s t h i s judgment. A neighboring rancher t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e b r o t h e r s g o t a l o n g w e l l and he never saw any disagreement. The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t t h e p a r t n e r s h i p income t a x r e t u r n s f o r 1972 through 1981, w i t h 1974 missing, showed t h a t t h e p a r t n e r s h i p paid a l l o f t h e expenses o f o p e r a t i n g t h e ranch, i n c l u d i n g huge sums f o r purchasing and f e e d i n g l i v e - s t o c k , i n t e r e s t on l o a n s , t a x e s , v e t c a r p and t r u c k i n g , from t h e Palmer Brothers' checking account; t h a t a l l p a r t n e r s h i p income, i n c l u d i n g p r o f i t s from c a t t l e s a l e s , was deposited i n t h a t account; and t h a t t h e p a r t n e r s s p l i t e q u a l l y any n e t p r o f i t s o r l o s s e s . The District Court f u r t h e r found t h a t n e i t h e r b r o t h e r had any i n d i v i d u a l source o f income. The evidence e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e bank account was opened i n j o i n t tenancy form i n 1947, and t h e Palmer Broth- ers' p a r t n e r s h i p commenced b u s i n e s s i n 1949. Following R o b e r t ' s d e a t h on November 8 , 1981, Rrad Palmer was appointed a s personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f h i s e s t a t e under Robert's w i l l o f February 7, 1977. Constance, a s s o l e h e i r o f Robert, p e t i t i o n e d t h e c o u r t t o t e r m i n a t e t h e ap- pointment o f Brad a s personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . She was ap- pointed a s personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e e s t a t e of Robert on February 24, 1982, and continued i n t h a t c a p a c i t y . William f i l e d a p e t i t i o n t o determine j o i n t t e n a n c i e s i n t h e p r o b a t e proceeding. A h e a r i n g was h e l d , testimony was submitted and evidence was introduced by both s i d e s . By Order Ruling on Motion dated March 7 , 1984, t h e D i s t r i c t Court denied t h e motion o f William t o determine t h e checking account, c a t t l e , c a t t l e brands and brokerage accounts passed t o him a s s u r v i v - i n g j o i n t t e n a n t . The c o u r t f u r t h e r determined t h a t a l l o f such i t e m s of personal p r o p e r t y were t h e p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y o f Palmer Brothers and w e r e t o be accounted f o r by William a s s u r v i v i n g p a r t n e r , o r h i s s u c c e s s o r s , t o Constance, t h e personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of R o b e r t ' s e s t a t e . William and Mildred, h i s w i f e and successor, appealed from t h e Order. The i s s u e s presented r e q u i r e u s t o c o n s i d e r t h e provi- s i o n s o f t h e Uniform P a r t n e r s h i p A c t a s adopted i n 1 9 4 7 . Because t h e r e a r e few Montana c a s e s which c o n s t i t u t e a u t h o r i - t y on t h e l e g a l i s s u e s b e f o r e u s , w e have found it necessary t o review t h e h i s t o r i c a l . background o f p a r t n e r s h i p s and p a r t n e r s h i p property. John Coll.yerls - A P r a c t i c a l T r e a t i s e on t h e Law o f P a r t - ----- n e r s h i p , o r i g i n a l l y published i n England i n 1 8 3 2 , c o n t a i n s an i l l u m i n a t i n g d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e law o f p a r t n e r - s h i p which was w e l l developed by c a s e s i n both England and t h e United S t a t e s by 1830. Based upon a number o f English and American c a s e s c i t e d i n t h e f o o t n o t e s , t h e t r e a t i s e d i s c u s s e s t h e t r e a t m e n t o f p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y upon t h e d e a t h o f one p a r t n e r . The a n a l y s i s i.s a c l e a r f o r e c a s t o f t h e Uniform P a r t n e r s h i p Act approach a s developed almost 1 0 0 y e a r s l a t e r : From what has been a l r e a d y observed a s t o t h e want o f s u r v i v o r s h i p among p a r t n e r s , it follows, t h a t , upon t h e decease o f one of s e v e r a l p a r t n e r s , h i s s h a r e o + t h e movable s t o c k and e f f e c t s o f t h e p a r t n e r - s h i p , s u b j e c t t o t h e p a r t n e r s h i p d e b t s , devolves t o h i s personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , who thereupon become, both a t law and i n e q u i t y , t e n a n t s i n common w i t h t h e sur- v i v i n g p a r t n e r s . Although, f o r t h e purpose o f encouraging t r a d e , it i s held t h a t t h e h a r s h d o c t r i n e o f t h e jus a c c r e s c e n d i , which i s an i n c i d e n t o f j o i n t tenancy a t t h e common law, does n o t apply t o t h e p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y , y e t on t h e decease o f one o f t h e p a r t n e r s , a s t h e s u r v i v i n g p a r t n e r s t a n d s chargeable w i t h t h e whole o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p d e b t s , t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e p a r t n e r s i n t h e p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y s h a l l be deemed s o f a r a j o i n t tenancy a s t o e n a b l e t h e s u r v i v i n g p a r t n e r t o t a k e t h e p r o p e r t y by s u r v i v o r s h i p , f o r a l l purposes o f holding and a d m i n i s t e r i n g t h e e s t a t e , u n t i l t h e e f f e c t s a r e reduced t o money and t h e d e b t s a r e paid. When t h e d e b t s a r e a l l p a i d , t h e e f f e c t s o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p reduced t o money, and t h e purposes o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p accomplished, t h e s u r v i v i n g p a r t n e r s h a l l be held t o account w i t h t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e deceased f o r h i s j u s t s h a r e o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p funds. J. C o l l y e r , A P r a c t i c a l T r e a t i s e on t h e Law of P a r t n e r s h i p - - - - - § 129, a t 117-18 ( 4 t h A m e r . ed. 1853) ( h e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d a s C o l l y e r ) . In substance, t h i s provides t h a t upon d e a t h o f a p a r t n e r , h i s s h a r e o f p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y , s u b j e c t t o p a r t - n e r s h i p d e b t s , p a s s e s t o h i s personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e who becomes a t e n a n t i n common w i t h t h e s u r v i v i n g p a r t n e r . F u r t h e r , because t h e s u r v i v i n g p a r t n e r i s chargeable w i t h t h e whole o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p d e b t s , t h e s u r v i v i n g p a r t n e r i s deemed t o t a k e t h e p r o p e r t y by s u r v i v o r s h i p i n o r d e r t o a d m i n i s t e r t h e p a r t n e r s h i p . F i n a l l y , when t h e d e b t s a r e p a i d and t h e p a r t n e r s h i p purpose i s accomplished, t h e s u r v i v i n g p a r t n e r must account t o t h e personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e deceased p a r t n e r f o r h i s j u s t s h a r e o f t h a t which remains. The c a s e s r e f e r r e d t o i n C o l l y e r emphasize t h e c o n t r a - d i c t i o n between t h e c a s e s decided i n e q u i t y c o u r t s , where forms o f ownership d i d n o t c o n t r o l , and c o u r t s o f law, where t h e form o f ownership o f p r o p e r t y a s t e n a n t s i n common o r a s j o i n t t e n a n t s w i t h r i g h t o f s u r v i v o r s h i p c o n t r o l l e d . I n a p a r t n e r s h i p , even though t h e p r o p e r t y was held a s j o i n t t e n a n t s , i n e q u i t y s u r v i v o r s h i p would n o t be allowed notwith- s t a n d i n g t h e form o f t h e deed. The t r e a t i s e s t a t e s a s follows: Where lands a r e conveyed t o c e r t a i n persons, a s j o i n t t e n a n t s , f o r t h e pur- poses o f a t r a d e o r an adventure, i n * e q u i t y t h e r e w i l l be no s u r v i v o r s h i p i n - - - such p r o p e r t y , notwithstanding t h e form o f t h e conveyance. C o l l y e r , S 134 a t 122 (emphasis s u p p l i e d ) . The t e x t d ~ v e l o p s t h i s t h e o r y f u r t h e r , s t a t i n g a t 5 135: The r u l e s and p r i n c i p l e s by which p a r t - n e r s hold r e a l e s t a t e , purchased by them with p a r t n e r s h i p funds and f o r p a r t n e r - s h i p purposes, have been c o n s i d e r a b l y discussed i n America, . . . Several l a t e d e c i s i o n s i n Massachusetts have e s t a b - l i s h e d t h e d o c t r i n e f o r t h a t S t a t e , t h a t when r e a l e s t a t e i s purchased by p a r t - n e r s , w i t h t h e p a r t n e r s h i p funds, f o r p a r t n e r s h i p use and convenience, although it i s conveyed t o them i n such a manner a s t o make them t e n a n t s i n common, y e t , i n t h e absence o f an e x p r e s s agreement, - - - - o r o f circumstances, showing an i n t e n t - that-such e s t a t e s h a l l be held f o r t h e i r - - - --- s e p a r a t e u s e , it w i l l be considered and - --- - t r e a t e d , i n e q u i t y , a s v e s t i n g i n them i n --- t h e i r parFnership c a p a c i t y , c l o t h e d w i t h an implied t r u s t , t h a t t h e y s h a l l hold it u n t i l - t h e purposes f o r which it was s o purchased s h a l l be accomplished, . . . Upon t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e p a r t n e r s h i p , by t h e d e a t h o f one o f t h e p a r t n e r s , t h e s u r v i v o r has an e q u i t a b l e l i e n on such r e a l e s t a t e f o r h i s indemnity a g a i n s t t h e d e b t s o f t h e f i r m , and f o r s e c u r i n g t h e balance t h a t may be due t o him from t h e deceased p a r t n e r , on s e t t l e m e n t o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p accounts between them; and t h e widow and h e i r s o f such deceased p a r t n e r have no b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t i n such r e a l e s t a t e , . . . u n t i l t h e surviv- i n g p a r t n e r i s s o indemnified. C o l l y e r , S 135 a t 123-24 (emphasis s u p p l i e d ) . The use of e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s t o d i s r e g a r d t h e l e g a l form o f j o i n t tenancy ownership o r tenancy i n common ownership was c l e a r l y s t a t e d i n t h e c a s e o f Hoxie v. C a r r (1832) , 1 Sumner 173, by M r . J u s t i c e Story: " I n c a s e s where t h e r e a l e s t a t e i s pur- chased f o r p a r t n e r s h i p purposes, and on p a r t n e r s h i p account, it i s wholly immate- r i a l , i n t h e view of a c o u r t o f e q u i t y , i n whose name o r names t h e purchase i s made, whether o f one p a r t n e r o r a l l ; whether i n t h e name of a s t r a n g e r , o r o f one o f t h e firm. I n e i t h e r c a s e , l e t t h e l e g a l t i t l e be vested i n whom it may, it i s i n e q u i t y deemed p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y , and t h e p a r t n e r s a r e t h e c e s t u i s que t r u s t . A c o u r t o f law may, nay, must, view it, i n g e v e r a l , o n l y according t o t h e l e g a l t i t l e . " See C o l l y e r , § 135, a t 1 2 5 . This d o c t r i n e t h a t r e a l p r o p e r t y acquired w i t h p a r t n e r s h i p funds w i l l be regarded i n e q u i t y a s p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y was affirmed i n Connecticut and Virgin- i a . The a u t h o r emphasizes t h a t t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s a r e founded on sound p o l i c y and obvious j u s t i c e and t h a t t h e i r c o r r e c t - ness appears i n c o n t e s t a b l e . Joseph S t o r y , i n h i s Commentaries on t h e Law o f Partner- ---- s h i p , s t a t e d t h e r u l e s under which p a r t n e r s h i p r e a l and p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y a r e held by t h e s u r v i v i n g p a r t n e r a s t r u s t - ee notwithstandinq l e g a l t i t l e : But, however t h e t i t l e may stand a t law, o r i n whosesoever name o r names it may be, t h e r e a l e s t a t e belonging t o t h e p a r t n e r s h i p w i l l i n e q u i t y he t r e a t e d , a s belonging t o t h e p a r t n e r s h i p , l i k e its persona1 funds, and d i s p o s a b l e and d i s - t r i b u t a b l e accordingly; and t h e p a r t i e s , i n whose names it s t a n d s , a s owners o f t h e l e g a l t i t l e , w i l l be held t o be t r u s t e e s o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p , and account- a b l e accordingly t o t h e p a r t n e r s , accord- i n g t o t h e i r s e v e r a l s h a r e s and r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s i n t h e p a r t n e r s h i p , a s c e s t u i s que t r u s t , o r b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f t h e same. Hence i n e q u i t y , i n c a s e o f * - t h e d e a t h o f one p a r t n e r , t h e r e i s no s u r v i v o r s h i p i n t h e r e a l e s t a t e o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p ; b u t h i s s h a r e w i l l go t o h i s proper r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . . . Upon t h i s p o i n t t h e r e has been a d i v e r s i - t y o f j u d i c i a l opinion, . . . some judges holding, t h a t i n such a c a s e it r e t a i n e d i t s o r i g i n a l c h a r a c t e r o f r e a l e s t a t e , and passed t o t h e h e i r s o r d e v i s e e s accordingly; and o t h e r s holding, t h a t it was t o be t r e a t e d throughout, a s p a r t n e r - s h i p p r o p e r t y , and t h e r e f o r e a s p e r s o n a l t y , and belonged t o t h e executor o r a d m i n i s t r a t o r . The d o c t r i n e under t h e s e circumstances must be considered, a s open t o many d i s t r e s s i n g doubts. J. S t o r y , Commentaries on t h e Law o f P a r t n e r s h i p §§ 93 & 94 ---- a t 138-40, (5th ed. 1859) ( h e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d a s S t o r y ) . A s i s apparent, t h e d o c t r i n e was n o t u n i v e r s a l l y accept- ed. Nonetheless Joseph Story f u r t h e r concluded t h a t t h e r e was no reason t o d i s t i n g u i s h between r e a l t y and personal p r o p e r t y s o f a r a s t h e p a r t n e r s a r e concerned: Nor i s t h e r e i n r e a l i t y , a s between t h e p a r t n e r s themselves, any d i f f e r e n c e , whether t h e p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y , held f o r t h e purposes o f t h e t r a d e o r busi- n e s s , c o n s i s t s o f personal o r movable p r o p e r t y , o r o f r e a l o r immovable proper- t y , o r o f b o t h , s o f a r a s t h e i r u l t i m a t e r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s t h e r e i n a r e concerned. S t o r y , $ 92 a t 137. This r a t i o n a l e was r e s t a t e d by James Kent i n 1873: ( 2 ) Stock i n Land--If p a r t n e r s h i p capi- t a l be i n v e s t e d i n land f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e company, though it may be a j o i n t tenancy i n law, y e t e q u i t y w i l l hold it t o be a tenancy i n common, and a s forming p a r t o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p fund; and t h e - - b e t t e r opinion would s e e m t o b e , t h a t - - - e q u i t y w i l l c o n s i d e r t h e person i n whom t h e l e g a l e s t a t e i s vested a s t r u s t e e f o r t h e whole concern, and t h e p r o p e r t y w i l l be e n t i t l e d t o be d i s t r i b u t e d a s personal e s t a t e . 3 J. Kent, Commentaries "37 (emphasis s u p p l i e d ) . I n o u r p r e s e n t c a s e , Will-iam based h i s claim p r i m a r i l y o n t h e form o f ownership o f t h e j o i n t tenancy checking ac- count and t h e wording contained i n a brand c e r t i f i c a t e . Had t h i s c a s e been considered i n England o r t h e United S t a t e s p r i o r t o 1900, t h e predominant view would have been t h a t l e q a l t i t l e alone could n o t c o n t r o l and t h a t e q u i t y would p r o p e r l y c o n s i d e r t h e a s s e t s t o be under t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e s u r v i v i n g p a r t n e r f o r purposes o f winding up t h e p a r t n e r s h i p , with William's claim being l i m i t e d t o h i s s h a r e o f t h e p a r t - n e r s h i p a s s e t s a f t e r t h e winding up and d i s s o l u t i o n . The foregoing i s a summary o f t h e law o f t h e United S t a t e s i n e x i s t e n c e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e promulgation o f t h e Uniform P a r t n e r s h i p A c t i n 1914. That A c t was adopted i n Montana i n 1947. W e w i l l now review t h e p e r t i n e n t p o r t i o n s of t h e Uniform P a r t n e r s h i p A c t a s adopted i n Montana. S e c t i o n 35-10-203, MCA, c o n t a i n s a c r i t i c a l d e f i n i t i o n o f p a r t n e r s h i p property: P a r t n e r s h i p property. (1) A l l p r o p e r t y o r i g i n a l l y brought i n t o t h e p a r t n e r s h i p s t o c k o r subsequently acquired by pur- chase o r otherwise on account of t h e p a r t n e r s h i p i s p a r t n e r s h i p property. (2) Unless t h e c o n t r a r y i n t e n t i o n ap- p e a r s , p r o p e r t y acquired w i t h p a r t n e r s h i p funds i s p a r t n e r s h i p property. Constance contends t h a t under t h i s s e c t i o n , a l l o f t h e prop- e r t y i n question was acquired w i t h p a r t n e r s h i p funds and i s t h e r e f o r e p a r t n e r s h i p property. Section 35-10-501, MCA, s p e l l s o u t t h e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s of a p a r t n e r : C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s of a p a r t n e r . The property r i g h t s o f a p a r t x n e r a r e : ( I ) h i s r i g h t s i n s p e c i f i c p a r t n e r s h i p property; (2) h i s i n t e r e s t i n t h e p a r t n e r s h i p ; and (3) h i s r i g h t t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e management. I t t h e n becomes necessary t o c o n s i d e r t h e n a t u r e o f a p a r t - n e r ' s i n t e r e s t i n s p e c i f i c p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y . The n a t u r e o f a p a r t n e r ' s r i g h t s i n s p e c i f i c p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y i s s p e l l e d o u t i n S 35-10-502, MCA: (1) A p a r t n e r i s co-owner w i t h t h e o t h e r p a r t n e r s o f s p e c i f i c p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y holding a s a t e n a n t i n p a r t n e r s h i p . (2) The i n c i d e n t s o f t h i s tenancy a r e such t h a t : ( a ) A p a r t n e r , s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s c h a p t e r and t o any agreement between t h e p a r t n e r s , h a s an equal r i g h t w i t h t h e o t h e r p a r t n e r s t o p o s s e s s spe- c i f i c p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y f o r p a r t n e r - s h i p purposes b u t h a s no r i g h t t o possess such p r o p e r t y f o r any o t h e r purpose without t h e consent o f t h e o t h e r p a r t n e r s . (d) On t h e d e a t h of a p a r t n e r t h a t p a r t n e r ' s r i g h t i n s p e c i f i c p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y vests i n t h e s u r v i v i n g p a r t n e r . . . . Such s u r v i v i n g p a r t n e r o r p a r t n e r s . . . has no r i g h t t o p o s s e s s t h e p a r t - n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y f o r any b u t a p a r t n e r - s h i p purpose. (e) Provided t h e proceeds o f a deceased p a r t n e r ' s interest a r e included i n t h e a s s e t s o f t h e d e c e d e n t ' s e s t a t e , such property i s n o t s u b j e c t t o a l i e n of t h e s u r v i v i n g spouse f o r h i s o r h e r elective s h a r e o r a l i e n f o r o r allowances t o s u r v i v i n g spouses, h e i r s , o r n e x t o f kin. The n a t u r e of t h e p a r t n e r ' s i n t e r e s t i n t h e p a r t n e r s h i p i s h i s s h a r e of p r o f i t s and s u r p l u s . S e c t i o n 35-10-503, MCA, provides : Nature of p a r t n e r ' s i n t e r e s t i n t h e p a r t n e r s h i p . A p a r t n e r ' s i n t e r e s t T n p a r t n e r s h i p i s h i s s h a r e of t h e p r o f i t s and s u r p l u s and t h e same i s personal property. The d i s s o l u t i o n and winding up o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p a r e a l s o c o n t r o l l e d by t h e A c t . S e c t i o n 35-10-602, MCA, s t a t e s : P a r t n e r s h i p - n o t terminated d i s s o l u - t i o n . O n d i s s o l u t i o n t h e Q a r t n e r s h i ~ i s n o t terminated b u t c o n t i n k e s u n t i l t h e winding up o f p a r t n e r s h i p a f f a i r s i s completed. With regard t o t h e causes o f d i s s o l u t i o n which a r e p e r t i n e n t f o r t h i s c a s e , S 35-10-603 ( 4 ) , MCA, s p e c i f i e s t h a t " t h e d e a t h of any p a r t n e r " i s a cause f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e p a r t n e r s h i p . I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e d e a t h of Robert caused a d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p . With regard t o t h e winding up o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p by William a s s u r v i v i n g p a r t n e r , S 35-10-609, MCA, s t a t e s : Right to wind 9. Unless otherwise aqreed, t h e p a r t n e r s who have n o t wronq- f u l l y dissofved t h e p a r t n e r s h i p o r t h e l e g a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e l a s t surviv- i n g p a r t n e r , n o t bankrupt, has t h e r i g h t t o wind up t h e p a r t n e r s h i p a f f a i r s . However, any p a r t n e r , h i s l e g a l represen- t a t i v e , o r h i s a s s i g n e e , upon cause shown, may o b t a i n winding up by t h e c o u r t . Following a d i s s o l u t i o n , a p a r t n e r has a r i g h t t o have p a r t - n e r s h i p property a p p l i e d t o discharge p a r t n e r s h i p l i a b i l i t i e s and t h e s u r p l u s paid i n cash t o t h e r e s p e c t i v e p a r t n e r s . S e c t i o n 35-10-610, MCA, s t a t e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : Rights of p a r t n e r s a f t e r d i s s o l u t i o n t o a ~ ~ l i c a t i o n o f ~ a r t n e r s h i ~ ~ r o ~ e r t v o r to -- cLhtinue busineks. (1) hhen ;'lissglution is caused i n any way, except i n contra- vention o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p agreement, each p a r t n e r a s a g a i n s t h i s c o p a r t n e r s and a i l persons claiming through-them i n r e s p e c t o f t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n t h e p a r t - n e r s h i p , u n l e s s otherwi-se agreed, may have <he p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y a p p l i e d t o discharge i t s l i a b i l i t i e s and t h e s u r p l u s applied t o pay i n cash t h e n e t amount owing t o t h e r e s p e c t i v e p a r t n e r s . . . . Section 35-10-612, MCA, sets f o r t h t h e r u l e s f o r set- t l i n g accounts and d i s t r i b u t i o n a f t e r d i s s o l u t i o n . I n sub- s t a n c e , a s h e r e a p p l i c a b l e , t h e a s s e t s o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p a r e t o be a p p l i e d f i r s t t o t h e c r e d i t o r s o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p , second t o any l i a b i l i t i e s owing t o t h e p a r t n e r s o t h e r than f o r c a p i t a l and p r o f i t s , t h i r d t o p a r t n e r s i n r e s p e c t of c a p i t a l and l a s t t o t h e p a r t n e r s i n r e s p e c t o f p r o f i t s . With t h i s background, we w i l l now c o n s i d e r t h e s p e c i f i c i s s u e s r a i s e d by t h e p a r t i e s . Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n holding t h a t t h e bank checking account i n t h e names o f William Palmer and Robert Palmer a s j o i n t t e n a n t s was p a r t n e r s h i p property? The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s show t h a t a t R o b e r t ' s d e a t h , FJil'l-iam and Robert owned a checking account i n which t h e y deposited a l l r e c e i p t s and proceeds from c a t t l e s a l e s and a l l o t h e r income and from which t h e y paid a l l p a r t n e r s h i p d e b t s and o b l i g a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g checks t o themselves f o r s a l a r y and o t h e r p r o f i t s . The checks and d e p o s i t s l i p s f o r t h e account were i d e n t i f i e d onlv a s "Palmer Brothers." The s i g n a t u r e card f o r t h a t account was signed by William and Robert i n 1947 upon forms showing t h a t t h i s was a j o i n t tenancy account w i t h r i g h t s of s u r v i v o r s h i p . The checking account was t h e s o l e hank account used by t h e p a r t n e r s h i p . Several y e a r s b e f o r e R o b e r t ' s d e a t h , Brad Palmer a l s o execut- ed t h e s i g n a t u r e card. A s a r e s u l t , t h e r e w e r e t h r e e signa- t u r e s shown on t h e card a t t h e t i m e of R o b e r t ' s death. I n arguing t h a t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n holding t h a t t h e bank account was n o t j o i n t tenancy p r o p e r t y , William argues t h a t under S t a t e Board o f Equalization v. Cole (1948), 122 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d 989, t h e s i g n i n g o f a j o i n t tenancy s i g n a t u r e card i s s u f f i c i e n t t o settle t h e i n t e n t on t h e p a r t o f t h e donor t o make a g i f t i n a j o i n t tenancy. Following t h a t c a s e , William relies upon Casagranda v. Donahue (1978), 178 Mont. 479, 585 P.2d 1286 i n which t h i s Court s t a t e d t h a t where i n t e n t i o n i s c l e a r l y expressed on t h e f a c e o f t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d , a d d i t i o n a l evidence i s unnecessary. William a l s o relies on t h e r e c e n t c a s e o f Anderson v. Eaker (1382), 196 Mont. 49, 641 P.2d 1035, where w e held t h a t s t a t e m e n t s on s i g n a t u r e c a r d s w e r e n o t conclusive where a d e p o s i t o r d u r i n g h e r l i f e t i m e r a i s e d t h e i s s u e o f t h e owner- s h i p o f t h e funds i n a j o i n t tenancy account. W e t h e r e f o r e concluded t h a t a d d i t i o n a l evidence may be examined t o a s c e r - t a i n t h e t r u e i n t e n t o f t h e p a r t i e s . I n Anderson, t h e depos- i t o r had made w r i t t e n demand f o r t h e r e t u r n o f t h e d e p o s i t books and had f i l e d s u i t t o q u i e t t i t l e t o t h e funds p r i o r t o t h e d e p o s i t o r ' s death. William then argues t h a t t h e proper conclusion should be t h a t t h e s i g n a t u r e card is d e t e r m i n a t i v e of i n t e n t t o c r e a t e a j o i n t tenancy u n l e s s one p a r t y r a i s e d t h e i s s u e by a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n d u r i n g h i s l i f e t i m e . William p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e record does n o t show any a f f i r m a t i v e a c t on t h e p a r t of Robert t o t e r m i n a t e t h e j o i n t tenancy p r i o r t o h i s d e a t h , and t h e r e f o r e concludes t h a t t h e j o i n t tenancy i n t h e checking account should be upheld. Constance i n t u r n contends t h a t t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t a 1 1 of t h e moneys i n t h e account w e r e p a r t n e r s h i p funds, and t h a t t h e account was used e x c l u s i v e l y f o r more than 30 y e a r s a s t h e only p a r t n e r s h i p account. C i t i n g Jensen v. Jensen (Mont. 1981), 629 P.2d 765, 38 St.Rep. 927, and Speer v. Speer (Mont. 19821, 654 P.2d 1001, 39 St.Rep. 2204, Constance argues t h a t t h e c o u r t w i l l n o t s u b s t i t u t e its judgment f o r t h e trier o f f a c t , and w e w i l l c o n s i d e r only whether substan- t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence s u p p o r t s t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s , leaving t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f w i t n e s s e s and weight accorded t o t h e i r testimony t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court. Our review o f t h e evidence d i s c l o s e s t h a t t h e r e i s c l e a r and s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e f i n d i n g s on t h e p a r t of t h e D i s t r i c t Court. A s a r e s u l t , w e agree w i t h t h e con- c l u s i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t t h e checking account was a p a r t n e r s h i p checking account and t h a t t h e funds i n t h e ac- count w e r e p a r t n e r s h i p funds. T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h § 35-10-203, MCA, which provides t h a t p r o p e r t y acquired w i t h p a r t n e r s h i p funds i s p a r t n e r s h i p property. A s a r e s u l t , we a l s o conclude t h a t t h e p a r t n e r s h i p account i s t o be c l a s s e d as s p e c i f i c p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of § 35-10-501, MCA, and following s e c t i o n s . William contends t h a t t h e evidence i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o overcome t h e j o i n t tenancy form o f t h e account a s c r e a t e d i n 1947 by t h e s i g n a t u r e card. W e do n o t a g r e e w i t h t h a t con- t e n t i o n . P a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y by i t s v e r y n a t u r e must be t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y t h a n p r o p e r t y o f i n d i v i d u a l s . Section 70-1-306, MCA, s t a t e s t h e r e a r e t h r e e t y p e s o f ownership o f p r o p e r t y by s e v e r a l persons: The ownership of p r o p e r t y by s e v e r a l persons i s e i t h e r o f : (1) j o i n t i n t e r e s t s ; ( 2 ) p a r t n e r s h i p i n t e r e s t s ; ( 3 ) i n t e r e s t s i n common. A s pointed o u t i n t h e h i s t o r y r e g a r d i n g p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y , t h e r u l e e s t a b l i s h e d i n c o u r t s o f e q u i t y a f t e r s e v e r a l hun- dred y e a r s of experience was t o d i s r e g a r d t h e form o f owner- s h i p o f property acquired by p a r t n e r s and t r e a t p r o p e r t y acquired by t h e p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h p a r t n e r s h i p funds a s proper- t y o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p . That c e r t a i n l y i s t h e foundation f o r p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e Uniform P a r t n e r s h i p A c t such a s S 35-10-203, MCA, which provides t h a t a l l p r o p e r t y acquired by purchase o r otherwise on account o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p i s p a r t n e r s h i p property. That conclusion i s strengthened by 5 35-10-502, MCA, which provides t h a t a p a r t n e r i s a co-owner o f s p e c i f i c p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y holding a s a t e n a n t i n p a r t n e r s h i p . In t h e p r e s e n t f a c t s i t u a t i o n , R o b e r t ' s s h a r e i n s p e c i f i c p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y v e s t e d i n William upon R o b e r t ' s d e a t h , and William had no r i g h t t o possess t h e p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y " f o r any b u t a p a r t n e r s h i p purpose." This c o n t r a d i c t s t h e suggestion t h a t t h e s u r v i v i n g p a r t n e r becomes t h e owner o f t h e p r o p e r t y by s u r v i v o r s h i p i n h i s own r i g h t and independent from t h e p a r t n e r s h i p . Succeeding s e c t i o n s s p e l l o u t how a s u r v i v i n g p a r t n e r must apply funds from a p a r t n e r s h i p account t o v a r i o u s l i a - b i l i t i e s o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p . A f t e r t h e p a r t n e r s h i p l i a b i l i - ties have been discharged, t h e s u r p l u s i s divided between t h e p a r t n e r s . In t h i s c a s e , t h e s u r p l u s would b e d i s t r i b u t e d one-half t o t h e persona1 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of R o b e r t ' s e s t a t e and t h e remaining one-half t o t h e successor i n i n t e r e s t of William. I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e i n c i d e n t s of t h e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s i n t h e bank account a s a t e n a n t i n p a r t n e r s h i p a r e d i r e c t l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y t o t h e r i g h t s which a j o i n t t e n a n t w i t h r i g h t of s u r v i v o r s h i p h a s i n a j o i n t tenancy account. Although 5 35-10-203, MCA, s p e c i f i e s t h a t p r o p e r t y acquired with p a r t n e r s h i p funds is c l a s s e d a s p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y " u n l ~ s s t h e c o n t r a r y i n t e n t i o n appears," we conclude t h a t t h e 1947 execution o f a j o i n t tenancy s i g n a t u r e c a r d does n o t c o n s t i - t u t e s u f f i c i e n t evidence o f a c o n t r a r y i n t e n t i o n . That would have been an a p p r o p r i a t e conclusion over 100 y e a r s ago and i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e Uniform P a r t n e r s h i p A c t today. W e a f f i r m t h e holding o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t t h e checking account d i d n o t p a s s t o William and Brad, a s t h e s u r v i v i n g j o i n t t e n a n t s . I11 Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n holding t h a t t h e c a t t l e branded w i t h a brand r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e names o f "William Palmer o r Robert Palmer" w e r e p a r t n e r s h i p property? William argues t h a t because t h e c a t t l e brands w e r e r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e name o f William - o r Robert, a j o i n t i n t e r e s t was c r e a t e d , r e s u l t i n g i n j o i n t tenancy ownership o f t h e c a t t l e themselves. I n its f i n d i n g s o f f a c t , t h e D i s t r i c t Court pointed o u t t h a t Robert and William owned two l i v e s t o c k brands which o r i g i n a l l y were r e g i s t e r e d t o William - and Robert. I n 1971, t h e brands w e r e changed t o William - o r Robert. The c o u r t found t h a t during R o b e r t ' s l i f e t i m e t h e p a r t n ~ r s branded a l l o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p c a t t l e w i t h one o r t h e o t h e r o f t h e s e two brands, and t h a t a l l o f t h e c a t t l e w e r e acquired through p a r t n e r s h i p funds. W e conclude t h a t t h e same r a t i o n a l e a p p l i e s h e r e a s w i t h t h e checking account. H e r e it i s c l e a r t h a t t h e c a t t l e w e r e acquired w i t h p a r t n e r s h i p funds and a r e t o be c l a s s e d a s p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y , u n l e s s a c o n t r a r y i n t e n t i o n appears. William Palmer contends t h a t h i s testimony e v i n c e s a c o n t r a r y i n t e n t i o n : Q. B i l l , what i s your understanding o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e ownership o f t h e s e brands t h a t you had w i t h Bob, d i d you hold them a s i o i n t t e n a n t s o r a s t e n a n t s i n common? A. J o i n t t e n a n t s . Q. What i s your understanding o f t h e e f f e c t o f a j o i n t tenancy ownership o f property? A. That w e had them, and i n c a s e one person, t h e s u r v i v o r , had t h e t o t a l . Q. Can you t e l l me what word o r words i n t h e r e g i s t r a t i o n c e r t i f i c a t e i n d i c a t e t o you t h a t t h e brands w e r e held a s j o i n t t e n a n t s r a t h e r t h a n t e n a n t s i n common? A. O r r a t h e r than and. Q. Can you t e l l m e how t h a t word came t o be t h e r e ? A. Yes. That was p u t t h e r e r a t h e r than and s o i f anything happened t o one o r t h e - o t h e r it would go t o t h e s u r v i v i n g person. Notwithsta-nding t h e wording o f t h e brand c e r t i f i c a t e , t h e District Court found William Palmer's testimony i n c o n s i s t e n t and unbelievable. Conclusion o f law E s t a t e s : It i s anomalous and i n c o n s i s t e n t f o r William Palmer t o contend: (1) t h a t t h e p a r t n e r s h i p a s s e t s o f l i t t l e v a l u e be- longed t o t h e f i r m , b u t t h a t t h o s e having any c o n s i d e r a b l e value w e r e owned a s j o i n t t e n a n t s w i t h r i g h t o f s u r v i v o r s h i p ; and ( 2 ) t h a t a s s e t s purchased with p a r t - n e r s h i p funds and used by t h e f i r m were n o t p a r t n e r s h i p property. The D i s t r i c t Court concluded t h a t it was t h e i n t e n t o f t h e p a r t n e r s t h a t t h e p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y would not p a s s t o t h e s u r v i v i n g j o i n t t e n a n t . Conclusion o f law C s t a t e s : It was t h e apparent i n t e n t o f t h e p a r t - n e r s , William and Robert Palmer, a s determined from t h e i r a c t i o n s and t h e use made o f t h e checking account, c a t t l e , c a t t l e brands and brokerage accounts, t h a t such p r o p e r t y was and continued t o be p a r t n e r s h i p a s s e t s , t h a t it d i d n o t p a s s t o William J. Palmer a s s u r v i v i n g j o i n t t e n a n t , b u t must be accounted f o r f o r t h w i t h t o t h e persona 1 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f R o b e r t ' s e s t a t e i n t h e winding up and d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p . W e hold t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e c o u r t ' s conclusions. W e a f f i r m t h e o r d e r o f t h e District Court which d e t e r - mined t h a t t h e c a t t l e and c a t t l e brands were p a r t n e r s h i p property. IV Did t h e District Court e r r j.n holding t h a t a brokerage account, r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e name o f William Palmer f o r which Robert Palmer signed a document a s a j o i n t t e n a n t , was p a r t - n e r s h i p property? William argues t h a t t h e opening information s h e e t f o r t h e brokerage account demonstrated t h a t William was t o be t h e owner. H e f u r t h e r p o i n t s o u t t h a t Robert and William's s i g n a t u r e s appeared on a "Authorization t o T r a n s f e r Custom- e r ' s Segregated Funds" i n j o i n t ownership form, i n d i c a t i n g an i n t e n t i o n on b o t h o f t h e i r p a r t s t h a t t h e brokerage accounts were t o be j o i n t accounts. W e f i n d it unnecessary t o s e t t l e t h i s f a c t u a l question. The District Court found t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l d e p o s i t s t o t h e o r i g i n a l account a s well a s a l l subsequent d e p o s i t s w e r e made w i t h funds withdrawn by William from t h e p a r t n e r s h i p checking account and n o t from any o f William's p e r s o n a l money. That f i n d i n g is n o t disputed. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e c o u r t found t h e r e was no evidence t o i n d i c a t e Robert e v e r made s i m i l a r o r equal withdrawals t o e s t a b l i s h brokerage accounts or o t h e r investments i n h i s i n d i v i d u a l name. W e again con- clude t h a t a s t o t h e brokerage account, a s p r o p e r t y acquired with p a r t n e r s h i p funds, it became p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y u n l e s s a c o n t r a r y i n t e n t i o n appears. William f a i l e d t o show such a c o n t r a r y i n t e n t i o n . W e conclude t h a t m e r e form o f ownership of t h e brokerage account, e i t h e r i n t h e name o f William a l o n e o r i n t h e name of William and Robert a s j o i n t t e n a n t s , would n o t be s u f f i - c i e n t t o show such a c o n t r a r y i n t e n t i o n . Following t h e r a t i o n a l e e s t a b l i s h e d f o r t h e o t h e r prop- e r t y , w e a f f i r m t h e o r d e r o f t h e District Court i n i t s d e t e r - mination t h a t t h e brokerage accounts w e r e p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y and d i d n o t p a s s t o William a s a s u r v i v i n g j o i n t t e n a n t . W e a l s o a f f i r m t h e holding o f t h e District Court t h a t a l l o f t h e above-described items of p r o p e r t y a r e determined t o be p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y o f Palmer Brothers which a r e t o be r e g u l a r l y accounted f o r by t h e s u r v i v i n g p a r t n e r , o r h i s successor i n i n t e r e s t , t o t h e personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e e s t a t e o f Robert. W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e Justices Chief Justice J. A. Turnage dissenting: I would reverse the District Court and hold that on November 8, 1981, the date of Robert Palmer's demise, his interest in the checking account, cattle and cattle brands passed to his brother, William Palmer, by right of survivorship. The majority opinion states that § 35-10-203, MCA, contains a critical definition of partnership property: Partnership property. (1) All property originally brought into the partnership stock or subsequently acquired by pur- chase or otherwise on account of the partnership is partnership property. (2) Unless the contrary intention 9- - pears, property acquired with partner- funds is partnership p _shie. . - roperty . [Emphasis supplied.] The provision set forth in subparagraph (2) , under the facts of this case, is not only critical but controls. The joint tenancy with right of survivorship checking account between Robert and William was established in 1947 and the two livestock brands were registered in the names of William or Robert as joint tenants with right of survivorship in 1971. There could be no clearer evidence that Robert and William intended to pass this property by right of survivor- ship. The provision of § 35-10-203(2), MCA, has clearly been satisfied and their contrary intention has been established. If the partners had intended to hold this property other than as joint tenants with right of survivorship they could have accomplished this by the simp1.e act of closing the bank account and reestablishing the account as one held by them as tenants in common; likewise, the livestock brands certifi- cates could. have been reissued designating them as tenants in common. In Montana holding title to property in joint tenancy with right of survivorship is not only common throughout the State but is also a very important and convenient manner in which owners of property may hold title thereto, and it provides a convenient method that offers certainty as to who will succeed to the property upon demise of a joint tenant as well as providing a less expensive means of transferring the decedent's property without expense of probate. Most cer- tainly, many owners of partnership ranch, farm and small business in Montana have utilized the joint tenancy with right of survivorship method of holding property. The majority opinion wil-1 invite uncertainty and doubt as to the right of ownership to this property upon the demise of one of the joint tenant with right of survivorship owners, which in turn will invite litigation that most. certainly will follow. This case should be reversed and remanded with di.rec- tions to enter an order determining that the checking ac- count, livestock and livestock brands passed by right of survivorship to William Palmer. Chikf Justice Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson: I join in the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Turnage. M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., d i s s e n t i n g : Counsel f o r a p p e l l a n t and respondent have focused on t h e q u e s t i o n of whether t h e a s s e t s h e r e involved a r e p a r t n e r s h i p a s s e t s . Such a determination i s n o t d i s p o s i t i v e . Because t h e p a r t i e s have presented t h e c a s e t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court on t h e i s s u e o f whether t h e d i s p u t e d p r o p e r t y was p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y o r j o i n t tenancy p r o p e r t y , t h e D i s t r i c t Court decided t h e c a s e without a d d r e s s i n g t h e t r u e i s s u e . This Court, i n i t s m a j o r i t y opinion, does d e a l w i t h t h e i s s u e upon which t h e c a s e t u r n s , b u t , i n m y o p i n i o n , erroneously relies upon a n c i e n t a u t h o r i t y . The q u e s t i o n involved i n t h i s c a s e i s whether p a r t n e r - s h i p a s s e t s can be placed i n a bank account s o t h a t , upon t h e d e a t h o f one p a r t n e r , t h e a s s e t s w i l l go by s u r v i v o r s h i p t o t h e o t h e r p a r t n e r . The c l e a r weight o f American a u t h o r i t y i s t h a t p a r t n e r s h i p a s s e t s can be passed by s u r v i v o r s h i p . I w i l l concede t h a t John C o l l y e r ' s , - A P r a c t i c a l T r e a t i s e -- on t h e Law o f P a r t n e r s h i p , o r i g i n a l l y published i n England i n 1832, -- i s g e n e r a l l y s u p p o r t i v e o f t h e m a j o r i t y ' s p o s i t i o n . F u r t h e r support may he found i n Hoxie v. Carr (1832), 1 Sumner 173, 12 Fed.Cas. 746. The t e x t u a l r e f e r e n c e and t h e c a s e a u t h o r i t y involve r e a l e s t a t e . However, t h e m a j o r i t y c o r r e c t l y n o t e s t h a t J. S t o r y , Commentaries on t h e Law of - - - - P a r t n e r s h i p , a s s e r t s t h a t t h e same law a p p l i e s t o p e r s o n a l t y . This t r e a t i s e , t h e most modern a u t h o r i t y c i t e d by t h e m a j o r i t y opinion, was published i n 1859. A t t h e t i m e t h a t m a j o r i t y ' s t r e a s u r e d t r e a t i s e s w e r e published, Blacks w e r e c h a t t e l s and women could n e i t h e r own nor convey r e a l e s t a t e . I f i n d it u s e f u l t o examine some c a s e s decided i n t h i s century. D i s t r i c t o f Columbia v. Riggs National Bank o f Washington, D.C. (D.C.App. 1975) , 335 A. 2d 238, s t a n d s f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y can h e l e f t by a s u r v i v o r s h i p . I n t h a t c a s e , Waverly and L u l i e Dickson, b r o t h e r and sister, formed a p a r t n e r s h i p i n 1935. Waverly p r e d e c e a s e d h i s sister by t h r e e y e a r s . When L u l i e d i e d , t h e p a r t n e r s h i p books c a r r i e d t h r e e s a v i n g s a c c o u n t s , w i t h d e p o s i t s t o t a l i n g $11,036.65, a s p a r t n e r s h i p a s s e t s . Those f u n d s were o n d e p o s i t i n t h e names o f L u l i ~ and Waverly, a s j o i n t t e n a n t s . I n h o l d i n g t h a t t h o s e a s s e t s became L u l i e ' s b y r i g h t o f s u r v i v o r s h i p on W a v e r l y ' s d e a t h , t h e D i s t r i c t o f Columbia C o u r t o f Appeals s t a t e d : The UPA sets f o r t h r u l e s f o r d i s t r i b u t i n g a p a r t n e r s h i p ' s p e r s o n a l t y . . . a f t e r d i s s o l u t i o n . D.C. Code 1973, S S 41-328 t o 41-342. The method set f o r t h t h e r e , however, i s n o t e x c l u s i v e . S u b j e c t t o t h e r i g h t s o f c r e d i t o r s , and i n t h e ab- s e n c e o f f r a u d , p a r t n e r s may a g r e e t o a d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y on d i s s o l u - t i o n which i s d i f f e r e n t from t h a t which would o b t a i n u n d e r t h e UPA i n t h e a b s e n c e o f an agreement. See E n s o r v. E n s o r , 270 Md. 549, 554, 3 1 2 X 2 d 286, 289 (1973) ; Anderson v . Anderson, 215 Md. 483, 488-89, 138 A.2d 880, 883 ( 1 9 5 8 ) ; W a l l n e r v . Schrnitz, 239 F i n n . 9 3 , 95-96, 57 N.W.2d 821, 823 ( 1 9 5 3 ) . I n t h i s c a s e , t h e r e i s a b s o l u t e l y n o e v i d e n c e t o r e f u t e t h e i n t e n t o f t h e p a r t n e r s t o l e a v e t h e i r f u n d s i n j o i n t t e n a n c y w i t h r i g h t o f s u r v i v o r s h i p . The a c c o u n t i t s e l f p r o v i d e s e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e y d i d i n f a c t i n t e n d t o l e a v e t h e f u n d s i n s u c h a manner. When t h e e v i d e n c e s t a n d s u n r e f u t e d , t h e s u r v i v o r s h i p d i s p o s i t i o n must b e r e s p e c t e d . The District of Columbia c o u r t , i n F.jjggs N a t i o n a l Bank, s u p r a , a d d r e s s e d t h i s q u e s t i o n and s a i d : W e c o n c l u d e t h a t i f p a r t n e r s m a i n t a i n s a v i n g s a c c o u n t s a s j o i n t t e n a n t s , and t h e r e i s e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e y u n d e r s t o o d t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f j o i n t t e n a n c y , e f f e c t w i l l b e g i v e n t o t h e r i g h t o f s u r v i v o r - s h i p . [ c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ] A l s o , t h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t L u l i e and Waverly--both a s t u t e b u s i n e s s people--did n o t u n d e r s t a n d and i n t e n d t h e s u r v i v o r s h i p c o n s e q u e n c e s o f j o i n t t e n a n c y . The c a s e o f S t r o h v. Dumas (Vt. 1 9 5 1 ) , 84 A.2d 408, i s f a c t u a l l y v e r y s i m i l a r t o t h e c a s e a t b a r . W i l l i a m P e l t o n and John Dumas formed a p a r t n e r s h i p t o e n g a g e i n t h e b u s i n e s s of b u y i n g and s e l l i n g c a t t l e . The i n i t i a l money f o r t h e p a r t n e r s h i p was p r o v i d e d b y P e l t o n i n 1 9 3 8 , and d e p o s i t e d i n a c h e c k i n g a c c o u n t e n t i t l e d l l W . H. P e l t o n , S p e c i a l Account." I n 1 9 4 3 , P e l t o n and Dumas s i g n e d a s i g n a t u r e c a r d s t a t i n g "W. H. P e l t o n ( S p e c i a l A c c t ) s u b j e c t t o w i t h d r a w a l o f e i t h e r and p a y a b l e t o s u r v i v o r W. H. P e l t o n , John H. Dumas J u n e 11, 1943. l1 The p a r t n e r s h i p c o n t i n u e d o v e r t h e n e x t s e v e r a l - y e a r s t o d e p o s i t its f u n d s i n and p a y its b i l 1 . s from t h a t a c c o u n t . Upon P e l t o n I s d e a t h , t h e Supreme C o u r t o f Vermont h e l d t h a t t h e c h e c k i n g a c c o u n t became t h e sole p r o p e r t y of t h e s u r v i v i n g p a r t n e r , Dumas, s t a t i n g : N o r i g h t s o f c r e d i t o r s a r e i n v o l v e d . As between t h e m s e l v e s , t h e p a r t n e r s had t h e r i g h t t o make s u c h d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y a s t h e y deemed f i t . 40 Am.Jur. 373; 47 C.J. 770; 68 C.J.S. P a r t n e r s h i p , 5 7 5 , p a g e 515; H u n t e r v. A l l e n , 174 Or. 261, 267, 284, 1 4 7 P.2d 213, 148 P.2d 936; O t t a v i a n o v. JJorenzo, 1-69 Md. 5 1 , 179 A. 530, 5 3 4 , 535; Green 17. Whaley, 271 M o . 636, 651, 1 9 7 S.W. 355; S a r g e n t v. B l a k e , 8 C i r . , 160 F. 5 7 , 6 4 , 17 L.R.A., N.S., 1040, 1046; Upson v. A r n o l d , I S Ga. 1 9 0 , 63 Am.Dec. 302; L e f e v r e ' s A p p e a l , 69 Pa. 219, 8 Am.Rep. 299, 233; C r a n e on P a r t n e r s h i p 392; G i l m o r e on P a r t n e r s h i p s 128. The Uniform P a r t n e r s h i p A c t r e c o g n i z e s t h i s r i g h t - and p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e i n t e n t i o n and a g r e e m e n t -- o f t h e p a r t i e s i s t o c o n t r o l . [ e m p h a s i s - - - - s u p p l i e d . ] O t h e r c a s e s which a r e g e n e r a l l y s u p p o r t i v e o f t h i s p o s i t i o n a r e H i r s c h v. B a r t e l s ( F l a . 1 9 5 0 ) , 49 So.2d 5 3 1 , and B a i l e s v. B a i l ~ s (Ark. 1977), 549 S.W.2d 69. I have been unable t o f i n d any American c a s e s i n t h e l a s t 100 years t h a t support t h e m a j o r i t y ' s p o s i t i o n here. T h i s c a s e should be reversed and remanded w i t h d i r e c - t i o n s t o e n t e r a d e c l a r a t o r y o r d e r determining t h a t t h e s u b j e c t j o i n t tenancy funds passed by r i g h t of s u r v i v o r s h i p .