Title: Lilly v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 972385
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 1998

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
BENJAMIN LEE LILLY 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record Nos. 972385, 972386 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.  
 
 
 
April 17, 1998 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY 
Ray W. Grubbs, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we review the capital murder conviction and 
death sentence imposed by a jury on Benjamin Lee Lilly (Lilly).  
Lilly was also convicted of lesser offenses arising out of the 
same occurrence, but does not directly challenge the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support his convictions for the lesser 
offenses. 
I. 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
 
On April 1, 1996, indictments were returned against Lilly 
charging that on December 5, 1995, Lilly abducted and robbed 
Alexander V. DeFilippis, Code §§ 18.2-47 and 18.2-58, carjacked 
DeFilippis’ vehicle, Code § 18.2-58.1, and subsequently murdered 
DeFilippis as part of the commission of the robbery, Code § 
18.2-31(4).  Lilly was also charged with use of a firearm in the 
principal offenses and for possession of a firearm after having 
previously been convicted of a felony.  Code §§ 18.2-53.1 and 
18.2-308.2(A)(i). 
 
Lilly filed pre-trial motions to exclude evidence of a 
statement he made to Pearisburg Police Chief William Whitsett, 
to permit voir dire of jurors concerning parole ineligibility 
issues,1 to exclude evidence of Lilly’s refusal to submit to a 
paraffin gunpowder residue test, and for a bill of particulars.  
Lilly also sought to exclude from evidence statements made by 
Mark Lilly, Lilly’s brother and a co-participant in these 
crimes, asserting that their admission would be a violation of 
the hearsay rule and of the confrontation clause.  The trial 
court denied all of these motions.  Lilly also filed a motion 
for a change of venue, which the trial court took under 
advisement pending selection of the jury. 
Lilly also filed a discovery request seeking, inter alia, 
“[a]ll alleged confessions or statements of any kind made by the 
Defendant or any alleged co-conspirator . . . in every media in 
which each such confession or statement may exist.”  The trial 
court granted the discovery motion and the Commonwealth supplied 
Lilly with, among other items, transcripts of the tape-recorded 
statements of Mark Lilly.  
Jury selection began on October 15, 1996 and continued over 
four days.  Trial commenced on October 21, 1996 and proceeded 
                     
1In addition, Lilly sought to argue parole ineligibility as 
a mitigating factor and to submit jury instructions on this 
issue during the penalty phase.  The trial court granted these 
portions of the motion. 
 
2
for five days, concluding with a jury verdict finding Lilly 
guilty on all counts of the indictments.  The penalty phase of 
the trial occurred on October 28, 1996, concluding with a jury 
recommendation of a sentence of death for the capital murder 
charge and two life terms plus a total of 27 years for the 
lesser offenses.  The trial court entered judgment on the jury’s 
verdict and imposed the sentences by final order dated March 7, 
1997. 
II. 
EVIDENCE 
 
We will review the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth.  Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 84, 472 
S.E.2d 263, 265, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 972 
(1996).  Gary Wayne Barker, the Commonwealth’s principal 
witness, shared a room with Mark Lilly.  Barker testified that 
on the day before the murder, he, Lilly, and Mark Lilly were at 
Lilly’s home “drinking” and smoking marijuana.  Later, the three 
men drove to a friend’s house to “drink a little bit with him.”  
When they discovered that the friend was not at home, the three 
men broke into the house and stole several guns, a safe, and a 
quantity of liquor.  They subsequently broke open the safe and 
divided its contents.  
 
The three men then drove to Radford where they tried 
unsuccessfully to trade the stolen guns for marijuana.  They 
 
3
then went to stay at the home of an acquaintance in Blacksburg.  
During this time they continued to drink and smoke marijuana.  
The following morning, the three men drove over the back 
roads in the vicinity of Shawsville and Elliston, stopping to 
fire the stolen guns at some geese and killing one, which they 
put in the trunk of the car.  They again attempted to trade the 
guns for marijuana at a trailer park and a bar in Blacksburg.  
Near Heathwood, the car in which the three men were 
travelling broke down in the vicinity of a convenience store.  
They removed the liquor and guns from the car.  DeFilippis, who 
had driven to the store with a friend, was inspecting a tire on 
his vehicle while his friend went into the store.  Lilly, 
carrying one of the stolen guns, confronted DeFilippis and 
called for Barker and Mark Lilly to join him.  Lilly ordered 
DeFilippis into DeFilippis' car and Mark Lilly and Barker also 
got into the vehicle.  Lilly then drove the vehicle away from 
the store and ordered DeFilippis to surrender his wallet.  
Lilly drove DeFilippis’ car to an isolated point on the 
bank of the New River near Whitethorne, stopped the car, and 
ordered DeFilippis to get out.  Mark Lilly was carrying one of 
the stolen guns, a pistol.  The other guns were left in the car.  
Lilly ordered DeFilippis to strip to his underwear and walk away 
from the car.  After throwing DeFilippis’ clothing into the 
river, the three men returned to the car.  Lilly took the pistol 
 
4
from Mark Lilly, ran up to DeFilippis, turned him around, and 
shot him four times, fatally striking him three times in the 
head and once in the arm.  
Lilly returned to the car, leaving DeFilippis’ body in the 
road.  Barker and Mark Lilly asked Lilly why he had shot 
DeFilippis.  He replied that DeFilippis had seen Lilly’s face 
and that “I ain’t going back” to the penitentiary.  
The three men bought beer with the money they had stolen 
from DeFilippis and then drove to the McCoy River where they 
disposed of “anything that might have our prints on it,” 
although they retained the murder weapon and the other guns.  
They then drove to "a little market" in Giles County, where they 
robbed the owners of cash and some merchandise.   
Determining that the money from this robbery was not 
sufficient “[t]o get us out of . . . town,” they drove to 
another store, also in Giles County.  Barker and Mark Lilly 
entered that store and attempted to rob the clerk.  They were 
interrupted by the owner who grabbed Barker.  Barker broke free 
and the two men fled to the car.  The owner followed them as 
Lilly drove away.  Barker fired one of the guns into the air to 
let the owner know that they were armed, and he ended his 
pursuit.  
A short time later, the car broke down.  As the three men 
were removing the stolen merchandise from the car, police 
 
5
officers arrived.  The three men fled on foot, with Barker and 
Lilly being captured almost immediately.  
One of the officers responding to the report of these 
robberies was Police Chief Whitsett.  While Lilly was sitting in 
a police car and Whitsett was standing nearby, Lilly asked 
Whitsett to place his shotgun in Lilly’s mouth and pull the 
trigger.  Whitsett refused and asked Lilly “if I looked like a 
murderer?”  In reply to a comment made by Lilly, Whitsett then 
asked, “what does a murderer look like anyway?”  Lilly replied, 
“me.”  
Barker and Mark Lilly both told the police about the 
DeFilippis murder in their statements.  In his initial statement 
to police, Lilly did not mention the murder and maintained that 
the other two men had forced him to participate in the 
robberies.  
We will recite other relevant facts and proceedings within 
the discussion of the assignments of error. 
III. 
ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED 
 
Lilly has assigned error to the trial court’s failure to 
order the Commonwealth to provide a general bill of particulars 
prior to trial, as well as a bill of particulars of the 
aggravating factors upon which the Commonwealth would rely 
during the penalty phase of the trial.  Lilly has further 
 
6
assigned error to the trial court’s finding that the Virginia 
death penalty statute is not unconstitutional.  The arguments 
raised in these assignments of error have been thoroughly 
addressed and rejected in numerous prior capital murder cases.  
We find no reason to modify our previously expressed views on 
these issues.  Clagett, 252 Va. at 85-86, 472 S.E.2d at 266-67. 
IV. 
JURY SELECTION 
 
 
Lilly assigns error to the trial court’s refusal to allow 
him to depart from the trial court’s approved list of questions 
during voir dire.  The record shows that the trial court and 
counsel for the defense and the Commonwealth conferred 
extensively in advance of the voir dire concerning the questions 
to be asked of potential jurors.  Lilly has failed to identify 
any question he was not allowed to ask or to show that any 
potential juror was not fully questioned.  A party must have a 
full and fair opportunity to examine the venire, but the trial 
court retains discretion to determine when a defendant has had 
such an opportunity.  Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 
401, 384 S.E.2d 757, 764 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063 
(1990).  Lilly has failed to demonstrate that he was in any way 
prejudiced by the trial court’s limiting of the questions which 
could be put to prospective jurors, and we will not disturb the 
trial court’s determination in this matter.  Id.  
 
7
 
Lilly further asserts that the trial court erred in 
refusing to permit him to “educate” the jurors on the issue of 
parole ineligibility of defendants upon whom life sentences are 
imposed in capital murder cases.  He contends that the 
requirement of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 162 
(1994), that the trial court instruct the jury on parole 
ineligibility requires that the venire be informed on this issue 
at the outset of trial and that individual jurors may be 
questioned on their views of this issue.  We disagree.   
The clear import of Simmons is that, once a defendant is 
convicted of a capital crime, he has, as a matter of due 
process, the right to have the jury informed of his 
ineligibility for parole in order that this factor may be 
weighed by the jury against the finding of his further 
dangerousness to society.  Nothing in Simmons even remotely 
suggests that knowledge of parole ineligibility rules and 
exploration of potential jurors’ opinions on that subject would 
be a proper topic for voir dire.2  The probable confusion and 
prejudice such an inquiry would cause in the minds of jurors is 
self-evident.  Accordingly, we reject Lilly’s contention that he 
                     
2The record reflects that the jury was properly instructed 
on parole ineligibility during the penalty phase of the trial 
and that Lilly was permitted to argue that his parole ineligible 
status militated in favor of a life sentence.  
 
8
should have been permitted to “educate” and examine the venire 
on this issue. 
Lilly assigns error to the trial court’s dismissal for 
cause of six members of the venire.  Each of the prospective 
jurors expressed strong moral or religious reservations about 
her ability to impose a sentence of death.  Three of the jurors, 
Connie Huffman, Kristina Mitchell, and Ollie Jones, ultimately 
agreed, but with some continuing equivocation, that they could 
follow the trial court’s instructions.   
In asserting that these jurors should not have been 
excused, Lilly confines his argument to a discrete portion of 
the examination of each of them.  We must consider the voir dire 
as a whole, not just isolated statements.  Mackall v. 
Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 252, 372 S.E.2d 759, 767 (1988), 
cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989).   
The trial court’s decision whether to strike a prospective 
juror for cause is a matter submitted to its sound discretion 
and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears from the 
record that the trial court’s action constitutes manifest error.  
Stockton v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192, 200, 402 S.E.2d 196, 200, 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902 (1991).  In the present case, the 
trial court had the opportunity to observe each juror’s demeanor 
when evaluating the juror’s responses to the questions of 
counsel and the questions of the trial court.  Nothing in the 
 
9
record suggests that the trial court abused its discretion in 
striking these jurors from the venire for cause despite the 
attempts of the defense to rehabilitate them. 
The trial court found that the other three prospective 
jurors, Ann Mumaw, Leona Wallace, and Janet Matheson, were 
adamant in their personal opposition to capital punishment and 
could not impose a death sentence.  Lilly contends that by 
excluding them from the venire, he was denied the opportunity of 
having a jury of his peers.  Where a juror has clearly indicated 
that she will be unable to follow the trial court’s instructions 
and consider all the available penalties that might be imposed, 
it is appropriate for the trial court to excuse the juror for 
cause.  Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 334, 356 S.E.2d 157, 
168, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987).  The elimination of such 
jurors from the venire “does not violate the right of a 
defendant in a capital case to be tried by an impartial jury 
selected from a representative cross-section of the community.”  
Id. at 335, 356 S.E.2d at 169; see also Poyner v. Commonwealth, 
229 Va. 401, 413-14, 329 S.E.2d 815, 825 (1985). 
Lilly assigns error to the retention of three members of 
the venire over his motion that they be excused for cause.  
James Rakes stated during voir dire that he was acquainted with 
Chief Whitsett and that he might give more credence to 
Whitsett’s testimony as a result.  Upon further examination, 
 
10
Rakes stated that he could set aside his acquaintance with 
Whitsett and consider the testimony of all the witnesses on an 
equal plane.   
Samuel Shumate stated during voir dire that he was a second 
cousin and “real good friend” of Investigator Ron Hamblin, a 
prospective witness for the Commonwealth.  Shumate testified 
that his relationship and friendship with Hamblin would not be a 
factor in considering Hamblin’s testimony against that of other 
witnesses. 
Lilly also asserts that an unidentified juror was permitted 
to remain on the jury panel after having “read a newspaper 
article about Mr. Lilly’s past.”  Lilly initially objected to 
the seating of any juror who had been exposed to specific 
newspaper articles, and this assignment of error apparently 
relates to a member of the venire who had read one of the 
articles and was actually seated on the final jury panel.  In 
addressing the issue immediately prior to trial, the trial court 
reiterated that it accepted the juror’s testimony that the 
article had not prejudiced her. 
As noted above, the decision to retain or excuse a juror 
rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.  Here, the 
trial court had the opportunity to observe these three jurors 
and evaluate their responses to the questions put to them.  
Nothing in the record suggests that the refusal to strike these 
 
11
jurors constitutes manifest error by the trial court, and we 
will not disturb the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in 
these instances.  Stockton, supra. 
Lilly further maintains that juror Shumate should have been 
excused on the ground that Shumate was related to a “party” to 
the suit.3  Code § 8.01-358; Rule 3A:14(1).  With respect to the 
application of this rule in criminal cases, we have held that, 
even though the victim is not a party to the proceeding, a 
person is disqualified from serving as a juror if he is related 
to the victim.  Jaques v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 690, 
695 (1853); see also Gray v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 591, 593-94, 
311 S.E.2d 409, 410 (1984).   
Lilly asserts that Investigator Hamblin is a “party” to 
this criminal proceeding.  Lilly apparently bases this assertion 
on the fact that this officer’s role in the investigation of the 
crimes in question was significant to the prosecution’s case.  
Although we have not previously addressed this issue, we hold 
                     
3The Commonwealth asserts that Lilly did not raise this 
issue below and should be barred from raising it for the first 
time on appeal.  Rule 5:25.  However, in noting his objection to 
the trial court's retention of Shumate, Lilly's counsel stated, 
“This is a relative and this is a friend.”  “It is the duty of 
the trial court, through the legal machinery provided for that 
purpose, to procure an impartial jury to try every case.”  
Salina v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 92, 93, 225 S.E.2d 199, 200 
(1976).  The objection noted the family relationship and was 
sufficiently clear to raise the issue of whether the juror could 
“stand indifferent to the cause.”  Code § 8.01-358. 
 
 
12
that when the officer’s sole role in a criminal prosecution is 
as a witness, he is not a “party” within the meaning of Code § 
8.01-358 and Rule 3A:14(1).  Thus, a juror’s relationship to 
such a police officer-witness does not require per se dismissal 
of that juror from the venire, and the juror may be retained if 
the trial court is satisfied that the juror can set aside 
considerations of the relationship and evaluate all the evidence 
fairly.  See State v. Lee, 559 So. 2d 1310, 1317 (La. 1990); 
State v. Hunt, 558 A.2d 1259, 1267-68 (N.J. 1989); Arner v. 
State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo. 1994). 
V. 
VENUE 
 
After the jury panel was selected, the trial court, which 
had deferred consideration of the motion, denied Lilly’s motion 
for a change of venue made on the theory that pre-trial 
publicity had potentially prejudiced the members of the venire.  
The trial court noted that the selection of the jury panel had 
not proved difficult, with fewer than half of the jurors stating 
that they had heard or read about the case, and with none 
showing particular bias as a result of the pre-trial publicity.  
Lilly asserts that the trial court erred in not granting the 
change of venue.  We disagree. 
A presumption exists that the defendant will receive a fair 
trial in the jurisdiction in which the offense occurred.  
 
13
Stockton, 227 Va. at 137, 314 S.E.2d at 379-80.   In order to 
overcome that presumption, the defendant must demonstrate that 
the citizens of the jurisdiction feel such prejudice against him 
that it is reasonably certain he cannot receive a fair trial.  
Id.   Accordingly, the decision whether to grant a change of 
venue lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.  
George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 274, 411 S.E.2d 12, 18 
(1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 973 (1992).   
The fact that there have been media reports about the 
accused and the crime does not necessarily require a change of 
venue.  Buchanan, 238 Va. at 407, 384 S.E.2d at 767-68.  The 
trial court should consider “the difficulty encountered in 
selecting a jury” as a significant factor in determining whether 
actual prejudice has resulted from the publicity.  Mueller v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386, 398, 422 S.E.2d 380, 388 (1992), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1043 (1993).  The record here adequately 
reflects that the trial court acted well within its sound 
discretion in denying a change of venue in light of the ease 
with which a qualified jury panel was selected. 
VI. 
GUILT PHASE 
A. Commonwealth’s Use of Photographs and Videotape
During its opening statement, the Commonwealth displayed an 
enlarged “in life” photograph of the victim to the jury.  At the 
 
14
conclusion of that opening statement, Lilly made a motion for a 
mistrial, asserting that the photograph showing the victim alive 
was inherently prejudicial because it tended to invoke sympathy 
for the victim.  The trial court found that there was no 
prejudice to the defendant as a result of the use of the 
photograph and overruled the motion, but directed that the 
Commonwealth remove the photograph from further display.  Lilly 
assigns error to the trial court’s failure to grant a mistrial. 
Lilly cites no authority for the proposition that 
photographs of the victim taken before his death are inherently 
prejudicial, an issue not previously addressed in this 
Commonwealth.  Those jurisdictions that have considered the 
issue have held that there is no inherent prejudice in the use 
of in life photographs of the victim, especially where the jury 
will also view crime scene photographs showing the victim.  See, 
e.g., State v. Broberg, 677 A.2d 602, 610 (Md. 1996).  Thus, the 
use of in life photographs is a matter committed to the 
discretion of the trial court unless clearly prejudicial.  Id.; 
State v. Brett, 892 P.2d 29, 41 (Wash. 1995); cf. Commonwealth 
v. Story, 383 A.2d 155, 158 (Pa. 1978)(in life photographs of 
victim with his handicapped daughter were prejudicial).  We hold 
that it was within the sound discretion of the trial court to 
determine that Lilly was not prejudiced by the limited display 
 
15
of the in life photograph of the victim, and we find no abuse of 
that discretion in this instance. 
 
Lilly assigns error to the admission of certain other 
photographs and the trial court’s denial of his request that 
black-and-white photographs be substituted for color 
photographs.  These photographs depicted the crime scene of the 
murder, including graphic images of the victim. 
A graphic photograph is admissible so long as it is 
relevant and accurately portrays the scene of the crime.  Clozza 
v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 124, 135, 321 S.E.2d 273, 280 (1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985).  The admission into evidence 
of photographs of the body of a murder victim is left to the 
sound discretion of the trial court and will be disturbed only 
upon a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.  Williams v. 
Commonwealth, 234 Va. 168, 177, 360 S.E.2d 361, 367 (1987), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988).   
The record shows that the trial court reviewed the 
photographs proffered as potential exhibits by the Commonwealth 
and excluded the autopsy photographs, which it found excessively 
graphic.  We find no abuse of discretion in the admission of the 
crime scene photographs, since these accurately depicted the 
scene of the crime.  Similarly, it was within the sound 
discretion of the trial court to determine whether the probative 
 
16
value of color photographs outweighed the potential prejudice of 
their content. 
Lilly also assigns error to the admission of a videotape of 
the crime scene of the murder.  Videotapes showing the crime 
scene and the victim are admissible to show motive, intent, 
method, malice, premeditation, and the atrociousness of the 
crime.  Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 312, 384 S.E.2d 
785, 796 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990); Stamper v. 
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 270-71, 257 S.E.2d 808, 816 (1979), 
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).  If the videotape accurately 
depicts the crime scene, it is not rendered inadmissible simply 
because it is gruesome or shocking.  Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 
Va. 442, 459, 470 S.E.2d 114, 126, cert. denied, 519 U.S. ___, 
117 S.Ct. 222 (1996).  As with other photographic evidence, the 
admission of a crime scene videotape rests within the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision 
will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of that 
discretion.  Id.  We find no abuse of discretion in the 
admission of crime scene videotape here. 
B. Admission of Mark Lilly’s Statement
 
At trial, Mark Lilly was called as a witness for the 
Commonwealth, but invoked his right against self-incrimination 
under the Fifth Amendment.  Asserting that Mark Lilly was 
unavailable as a witness, the Commonwealth sought to introduce 
 
17
his pre-trial statements to police as declarations against his 
penal interest.  Lilly objected on the ground that these 
statements did not fall within this hearsay exception because 
they were self-serving and tended to exculpate Mark Lilly by 
shifting responsibility to Lilly and Barker for the majority of 
the criminal acts the three men committed. 
 
In his statements, Mark Lilly contended that he stole only 
liquor during the breaking and entering of the house of Lilly’s 
friend, but that Lilly and Barker “got some guns or something.”   
He further directly implicated Lilly as the instigator of the 
carjacking, saying that Lilly “wanted to get him another car.”   
In the statements, Mark Lilly directly implicated Lilly as the 
triggerman in the murder and asserted that he and Barker “didn’t 
have nothing to do with the shooting [of DeFilippis].”  
 
To be admissible as a declaration against penal interest, 
an out-of-court statement must be made by an unavailable 
declarant.  Ellison v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 404, 408, 247 
S.E.2d 685, 688 (1978).  "The law is firmly established in 
Virginia that a declarant is unavailable if the declarant 
invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent."  Boney 
v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 638, 643, 432 S.E.2d 7, 10 (1993); 
see also Newberry v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 445, 462, 61 S.E.2d 
318, 326 (1950).   
 
18
To be considered as being against the declarant’s penal 
interest, it is not necessary that the statement be sufficient 
on its own to charge and convict the declarant of the crimes 
detailed therein.  Chandler v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 270, 278-
79, 455 S.E.2d 219, 224-25, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 889 (1995).  
Rather, the statement’s admissibility is based upon the 
subjective belief of the declarant that he is making admissions 
against his penal interest and upon other evidence tending to 
show that the statement is reliable.  Id.
 
Lilly concedes that statements of a declarant unavailable 
at trial are admissible if they qualify under the exception to 
the rule for declarations against penal interest.  He asserts, 
however, that prior to Chandler, this exception was used only to 
permit the introduction of exculpatory evidence proffered by the 
defendant.  In Lilly’s view, Chandler improperly enlarged the 
exception to permit the Commonwealth to introduce statements of 
a co-participant which, though nominally against penal interest, 
actually seek to limit the declarant’s culpability by 
implicating others, and, thus, are inherently unreliable.  
Accordingly, Lilly urges that Chandler was wrongly decided and 
should be overturned.  We disagree. 
 
We recognize that Ellison, Newberry, and other cases that 
applied this hearsay exception prior to Chandler involved the 
admission of such statements proffered by defendants for their 
 
19
exculpatory value.  However, as we said in Ellison, the 
admission of such statements 
must be left to the sound discretion of the trial 
court, to be determined upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case.  But, in any case, once it 
is established that a third-party confession has been 
made, the crucial issue is whether the content of the 
confession is trustworthy.  And determination of this 
issue turns upon whether, in the words of Hines [v. 
Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 748, 117 S.E. 843, 849 
(1923)], the case is one where “there is anything 
substantial other than the bare confession to connect 
the declarant with the crime.” 
 
219 Va. at 408-09, 247 S.E.2d at 688 (emphasis added). 
 
 
Thus, in determining the admissibility of a statement 
against penal interest made by an unavailable declarant, whether 
offered by the Commonwealth or the defendant, the crucial issue 
to be resolved by the trial court is the reliability of the 
statement in the context of the facts and circumstances under 
which it was given.  Here, the record clearly shows that Mark 
Lilly was cognizant of the import of his statements and that he 
was implicating himself as a participant in numerous crimes for 
which he could be charged, convicted, and punished.  Elements of 
Mark Lilly’s statements were independently corroborated by 
Barker’s testimony, by the physical evidence, and by the 
correspondence between Mark Lilly’s account and the accounts of 
other persons acquired by law enforcement authorities.  Thus, 
the statements were clothed in the necessary indicia of 
reliability to overcome the hearsay bar, and their admission 
 
20
rested well within the trial court’s sound discretion.  That 
Mark Lilly’s statements were self-serving, in that they tended 
to shift principal responsibility to others or to offer claims 
of mitigating circumstances, goes to the weight the jury could 
assign to them and not to their admissibility. 
 
Lilly further asserts that the admission of Mark Lilly’s 
statements violated his right of confrontation since he was 
denied the right to cross-examine the declarant.  We disagree. 
The right of confrontation is not absolute.  A statement 
sufficiently clothed with indicia of reliability is properly 
placed before a jury even though there is no confrontation with 
the declarant.  Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).   
 
[W]here proffered hearsay has sufficient 
guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly 
rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the 
Confrontation Clause is satisfied. 
 
. . . . 
To exclude such probative statements under the 
strictures of the Confrontation Clause would be the 
height of wrongheadedness, given that the 
Confrontation Clause has as a basic purpose the 
promotion of the “‘integrity of the factfinding 
process.’”  . . .  [A] statement that qualifies for 
admission under a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception is 
so trustworthy that adversarial testing can be 
expected to add little to its reliability.   
 
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992)(citations 
omitted).  As noted above, admissibility into evidence of the 
statement against penal interest of an unavailable witness is a 
 
21
“firmly rooted” exception to the hearsay rule in Virginia.  
Thus, we hold that the trial court did not err in admitting Mark 
Lilly’s statements into evidence.4  See Randolph v. Commonwealth, 
24 Va. App. 345, 353, 482 S.E.2d 101, 105 (1997); Raia v. 
Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 546, 552, 478 S.E.2d 328, 331 (1996). 
Lilly further asserts that the Commonwealth was permitted 
to play tape recordings of Mark Lilly’s statements to the jury, 
whereas it had only supplied Lilly with transcripts of those 
statements in response to Lilly’s discovery request.  The record 
reflects that the trial court offered defense counsel the 
opportunity to review the recordings before they were played to 
the jury.  Assuming, without deciding, that the discovery motion 
and subsequent order of the trial court required disclosure of 
duplicate tapes rather than transcripts, we hold that Lilly was 
not prejudiced by the failure of the Commonwealth to do so.  
Having been supplied with accurate transcripts of the tape 
recordings prior to trial and having had an adequate opportunity 
to review them before they were played to the jury, there is no 
reasonable probability that the proceeding would have been 
different had duplicates of the tapes been provided to Lilly 
                     
4Lilly further argues that he was unfairly prejudiced by the 
comments of the police contained within Mark Lilly’s statements 
which he contends placed emphasis on Mark Lilly’s truthfulness.  
However, the record shows that the officers merely encouraged 
Mark Lilly to tell them the truth. 
 
 
22
prior to trial.  See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 
(1985); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 151, 341 S.E.2d 
159, 164 (1986); Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 563, 576, 273 
S.E.2d 57, 65 (1980). 
C. Admission of Lilly’s Statement to Chief Whitsett
 
Lilly assigns error to the admission of Chief Whitsett’s 
testimony that Lilly said “me” when Whitsett asked Lilly “what 
does a murderer look like anyway?”  Lilly asserts that 
Whitsett’s conversation with him constituted a custodial 
interrogation prior to Lilly’s having been informed of his right 
to counsel and his right against self-incrimination.   
“Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any 
compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. 
. . . Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the 
Fifth Amendment.”  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).  
Lilly’s statement was clearly not the result of a custodial 
interrogation in that he initiated the conversation and the 
statement was voluntary.  We hold, therefore, that the trial 
court did not err in permitting this statement into evidence.  
Massie v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 429, 431-32, 177 S.E.2d 615, 617 
(1970). 
Lilly further asserts that Whitsett’s testimony was 
unreliable since in preliminary testimony Whitsett testified 
only that he “thought” Lilly had said “me.”  Whitsett testified 
 
23
at trial that he was certain of what Lilly said.  Lilly was not 
prohibited from cross-examining Whitsett concerning his 
certainty as to the statement.  Thus, it was a matter for the 
jury to weigh and determine.  Johnson v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 
525, 528, 298 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1982). 
D. Miscellaneous Evidentiary Rulings
 
Over Lilly’s objection, Lieutenant Gary Price of the Giles 
County Sheriff’s Office was permitted to testify that Lilly 
declined to submit to a gunpowder residue test and then began 
rubbing his hands together.  Price testified that since he 
believed a gunpowder residue test constituted a search requiring 
a warrant or the consent of the suspect, he had informed Lilly 
that the test was voluntary.  Price further testified that 
Lilly’s rubbing his hands together would get rid of gunpowder 
residue.   
Lilly concedes that he could have been required to take the 
test.  However, Lilly contends that, because he was told that 
the test was “voluntary,” the evidence of his refusal amounts to 
a use of a defendant’s silence as an admission of guilt. 
 
We will assume, without deciding, that evidence of a 
defendant’s refusal to submit to a gunpowder residue test after 
having been informed, erroneously, that the test was voluntary, 
is inadmissible as a violation of the Fifth Amendment right 
 
24
against self-incrimination.5  Under the circumstances of this 
case, however, that error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The record shows that Lilly fired one or more of the 
guns taken in the breaking and entering prior to the murder.  
Thus, the gunpowder residue test would have been positive for 
that reason alone, and the jury was aware of that circumstance.  
In addition, we hold that Lilly’s act of rubbing his hands 
together in an apparent attempt to destroy any gunpowder residue 
on his hands was a nonverbal act that went beyond the mere 
refusal to submit to the test and, as such, was not subject to 
exclusion under the right against self-incrimination.  Accord 
Salster v. State, 487 So. 2d 1020, 1021 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1986)(defendant’s nonverbal conduct in secreting contraband was 
not constitutionally protected); see also Stevenson v. 
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 462, 465, 237 S.E.2d 779, 781 
(1977)(nonverbal conduct may be treated as an assertion). 
 
Lilly also assigns error to the admission of evidence that 
dried blood was found on the back of his pant leg.  Lilly 
contends that the location of the bloodstain was inconsistent 
                     
5See Herring v. State, 501 So. 2d 19, 21 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1986)(informing defendant that gunpowder residue test is 
voluntary permits defendant to refuse test).  But see Wilson v. 
State, 596 So. 2d 775, 777-78 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992)(criticizing 
and distinguishing Herring); State v. Odom, 277 S.E.2d 352, 355 
(N.C. 1981)(permitting evidence that defendant refused to submit 
to gunpowder residue test without attorney present).   
 
 
25
with its having resulted from the murder because the 
Commonwealth alleged Lilly was facing the victim at the time 
Lilly shot the victim.  Lilly further asserts that no test was 
conducted to determine whether the blood was of human origin, 
and that it is as likely that this blood came from the geese 
that the men shot earlier in the day.  Therefore, he asserts 
that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this 
evidence.  We disagree. 
The presence of bloodstains on Lilly’s clothing was 
probative, however slightly, of his involvement in the murder.  
The lack of a scientific determination that the blood was from a 
human source was a matter of the weight and credibility, if any, 
of that evidence for the jury to consider.  The record does not 
show that Lilly was prohibited from questioning the 
Commonwealth’s witnesses on this matter.  Accordingly, we hold 
that admission of this evidence was not error. 
Lilly objected to the introduction of the medical 
examiner’s report on the ground that it contained references to 
tests not performed by the proponent of the report.  The 
Commonwealth responds that the trial court excluded from 
evidence a local medical examiner’s report, admitting only the 
report prepared by the proponent or his staff.  To the extent, 
if any, that the contents of the report admitted fell outside 
the exception to the hearsay rule provided for medical 
 
26
examiners’ reports under Code § 19.2-188, we hold that Lilly has 
failed to show how any of that material was prejudicial and not 
merely cumulative of properly admitted evidence, and that in 
light of the other proof in the record, its admission was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Fitzgerald v. 
Commonwealth, 223 Va. 615, 630, 292 S.E.2d 798, 807 (1982), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228 (1983). 
Lilly assigns error to the trial court’s refusal to admit a 
statement made by Barker to a friend to the effect that Barker 
would be able to kill his best friend and feel no remorse.  The 
record reflects, however, that Lilly initially objected to the 
statement’s admission, then later sought its admission over the 
Commonwealth’s objection.  After the Commonwealth subsequently 
withdrew its objection, the trial court reversed its ruling to 
exclude the statement, but Lilly failed to recall the witness.  
Accordingly, we hold that this issue was not properly preserved 
for review. 
E. Witness Sequestration Issue
 
Barker, who had not been present when the trial court 
admonished the other witnesses to refrain from reading or 
observing media reports about the trial, testified that he had 
read a newspaper article the morning before he testified.  The 
trial court reviewed the article and questioned Barker, who 
testified that nothing in the article affected his testimony.  
 
27
Lilly assigns error to the trial court’s refusal to strike 
Barker’s testimony. 
 
Sequestration of witnesses is not a right, but a power 
wholly within the discretion of the trial court.  Hampton v. 
Commonwealth, 190 Va. 531, 553-54, 58 S.E.2d 288, 297 (1950).  
We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to strike the evidence of a witness who was not aware 
of the sequestration order and testified that the exposure to 
the newspaper article did not affect his testimony. 
F. Jury Instruction Issue
 
Lilly assigns error to the trial court’s refusal to grant 
his proposed instruction on voluntary intoxication.  The facts, 
however, did not warrant the proposed instruction. 
Generally, voluntary intoxication is not an 
excuse for any crime.  The only exception to this 
general rule is in cases involving deliberate and 
premeditated murder.  Mere intoxication will not 
negate premeditation.  However, when a person 
voluntarily becomes so intoxicated that he is 
incapable of deliberation or premeditation, he cannot 
commit a class of murder that requires proof of a 
deliberate and premeditated killing. 
 
Wright v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 627, 629, 363 S.E.2d 711, 712 
(1988)(citations omitted). 
 
Here, Lilly was able to operate an automobile both before 
and after the murder.  During his flight immediately after the 
murder, he committed robberies to facilitate his continued 
flight and took steps to deliberately conceal his involvement in 
 
28
the murder.  All of these actions suggest that he was fully in 
command of his faculties and acted with deliberation.  Nothing 
in the evidence suggests that he was so intoxicated as to be 
unable to form the requisite intent to commit premeditated 
murder.  Accordingly, the trial court properly refused the 
proffered instruction on voluntary intoxication. 
G. Prosecutorial Misconduct
 
Lilly assigns error to the trial court’s refusal to grant a 
mistrial after the Commonwealth’s Attorney allegedly pointed the 
murder weapon at Lilly and his counsel during closing argument.  
After making a cursory statement that the action of the 
prosecutor was prejudicial, Lilly addresses the remainder of his 
argument to the trial court’s statement, “[T]hat’s ridiculous.  
[The gun is] not pointed at you . . . nor is it pointed at 
anyone in this Courtroom,” contending that it was an intentional 
disparagement of Lilly’s counsel.  This argument was not raised 
below, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.  Rule 
5:25. 
VII. 
PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
Lilly assigns error to the trial court’s refusal to grant a 
penalty phase instruction directing the jury to consider 
“residual doubt” of guilt in considering the sentence.  We have 
previously held that such an instruction is inappropriate.  
 
29
Stockton, 241 Va. at 211, 402 S.E.2d at 207.  Lilly also sought 
an instruction directing the jury to “impose the lower grade” of 
punishment if there was a reasonable doubt as to the grade of 
punishment to be imposed.  The trial court properly ruled that 
this instruction was both confusing and redundant of an 
instruction already accepted by the trial court which directed 
the jury that the Commonwealth was required to present evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of one or both of the 
aggravating factors necessary for imposition of the death 
penalty. 
VIII. 
SENTENCE REVIEW 
 
Under Code § 17-110.1(C)(1) and (2), we are required to 
determine “[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the 
influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor” 
and “[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime and the defendant.”   
 
Lilly makes no particularized argument that passion, 
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor influenced the jury’s 
decision, and we find nothing in the record that would support 
such a finding. 
In conducting our proportionality review, we must determine 
“whether other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction generally 
 
30
impose the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes, 
considering both the crime and the defendant.”  Jenkins v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 461, 423 S.E.2d 360, 371 (1992), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1036 (1993).  We have examined the 
records of all capital murder cases reviewed by this Court, 
including those cases in which a life sentence was imposed.  We 
have given particular attention to those cases in which, as 
here, the death penalty was based on both the “future 
dangerousness” and the “vileness” predicates. 
Based on this review, we conclude that Lilly’s death 
sentence is not excessive or disproportionate to penalties 
generally imposed by other sentencing bodies in the Commonwealth 
for comparable crimes.  See, e.g., Gray, 233 Va. at 354, 356 
S.E.2d at 180; Stout v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 126, 137, 376 
S.E.2d 288, 294, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989). 
IX. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
We find no reversible error in the judgment of the trial 
court.  Having reviewed Lilly’s death sentence pursuant to Code 
§ 17-110.1, we decline to commute the sentence of death.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court’s judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Affirmed. 
 
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