Title: People v. Lyles
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 98357
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 1, 2005

Docket No. 98357-Agenda 3-September 2005.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ENICE 							LYLES, JR., Appellant.
Opinion filed December 1, 2005.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	We granted leave to appeal in this case in order to consider
petitioner's challenge to the appellate court's dismissal of his appeal
for want of prosecution. Pursuant to our supervisory authority, we
now reinstate the appeal and remand the cause to the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
	In 1982 a Cook County jury convicted petitioner Enice Lyles, Jr.,
of one count of voluntary manslaughter and two counts of first degree
murder for the deaths, respectively, of Mary Thigpen and her sons
Robert and Roderick Nichols, aged four and five. After a separate
hearing he was sentenced to death for the murders and 14 years'
imprisonment for voluntary manslaughter. On appeal this court
affirmed his convictions but vacated his death sentence and remanded
for a new sentencing hearing because of prosecutorial misconduct
during the sentencing hearing. People v. Lyles, 106 Ill. 2d 373 (1985).
On remand the circuit court sentenced petitioner to natural life
imprisonment for the murders and the same 14-year term for the
manslaughter conviction.
	Petitioner filed a pro se postconviction petition in 1991, arguing
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The circuit court
dismissed the petition and the appellate court affirmed that dismissal.
People v. Lyles, No. 1-92-0464 (1994) (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23).
	In 2001 petitioner brought the instant action by filing a second
postconviction petition, this time alleging that his sentence violated
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). On August 30, 2001, the circuit court dismissed the
petition as untimely and without merit. Petitioner filed a notice of
appeal, and on September 28 the office of the State Appellate
Defender was appointed to represent him in his appeal.
	After first obtaining an extension of time for filing the record on
appeal, the Appellate Defender sought and was granted four
extensions of time for filing petitioner's appellate brief between
January and August 2002. The last such extension resulted in a due
date of October 11, 2002.(1) The Appellate Defender did not file an
appellate brief or any other motion by October 11, however, and on
April 18, 2003, the appellate court dismissed the appeal for want of
prosecution.
	On May 23, 2003, 35 days after the appellate court dismissed the
appeal, the Appellate Defender filed a "Motion to Reinstate and to
Allow a Brief to be Filed Instanter." The State did not respond to the
motion. The appellate court granted the motion, reinstated the appeal
and permitted petitioner to file his appellate brief instanter.
	In the State's response brief in the appellate court, the State
argued that the appellate court was without jurisdiction to reinstate
the appeal. The State maintained that the appellate court lost
jurisdiction in the case when the court's order of dismissal became
final, which, according to Supreme Court Rule 367(a), was 21 days
from the date of the order's entry.
	The appellate court agreed with the State, vacated its order
reinstating the appeal, and dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. 347 Ill. App. 3d 100. After noting that Rule 367(a) gives
a party only 21 days to file a petition for rehearing after a reviewing
court's judgment is filed (155 Ill. 2d R. 367(a)), the court then
referred to two decisions of this court, Woodson v. Chicago Board of
Education, 154 Ill. 2d 391 (1993), and People v. Moore, 133 Ill. 2d 331 (1990). In Woodson, this court held that the appellate court lost
jurisdiction of an appeal when no petition for rehearing was filed
within 21 days after the court had dismissed the appeal for want of
prosecution. In Moore, by contrast, this court held that a criminal
defendant ought not to lose his right to a direct appeal as the result of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and that reviewing courts
should reinstate direct criminal appeals which had been dismissed for
want of prosecution as the result of appellate counsel's misconduct or
neglect. Moore, 133 Ill. 2d 331. The appellate court distinguished
Moore from the present case on the ground that Moore involved a
direct criminal appeal and that, in such circumstances, due process
required the effective assistance of counsel. 347 Ill. App. 3d 100. The
court noted that petitioner's appeal here was not a direct appeal from
a criminal conviction but, rather, an appeal from a collateral,
postconviction challenge to a criminal conviction, a proceeding which
does not guarantee the same constitutionally driven right to effective
assistance of counsel found in the direct appeal situation. 347 Ill. App.
3d 100. In light of this distinction, the appellate court concluded that
the instant case was more akin to Woodson than Moore and,
accordingly, dismissed the appeal.
	Justice Hall dissented. She argued, first, that the appellate court
retained jurisdiction because the court never issued its mandate after
the April dismissal order, citing Whitcanock v. Nelson, 81 Ill. App. 3d
186 (1980). The dissent suggested that Woodson may have erred in
failing to recognize the jurisdictional significance of issuance of the
mandate. Second, the dissent argued that due process considerations
supported reinstatement of the appeal even if the court had lost
jurisdiction due to passage of time after the decision was rendered.
	This court granted petitioner leave to appeal. See 155 Ill. 2d R.
315(a).
ANALYSIS
	Petitioner urges this court to reverse the appellate court and
reinstate his appeal. He maintains that he bears no fault in the
dismissal of his appeal and that his right to appeal should not be lost
solely on the basis of his appellate counsel's deficient performance. He
argues that counsel's performance was so inadequate as to have
effectively deprived him of the representation guaranteed him by this
court's rules (petitioner acknowledges that he has "no constitutional
right to counsel in post-conviction appeal"). The State counters that
the appellate court had no choice but to dismiss the appeal, because
the appellate court's jurisdiction is conditional on compliance with the
time limits set out by this court's rules.
	The two competing considerations in this case are immediately
apparent. On the one hand, our rules unambiguously require that a
petition for rehearing in the appellate court must be filed within 21
days after the judgment is filed, unless the time for filing is extended
on motion. 155 Ill. 2d R. 367(a). This rule applies to criminal and
postconviction appeals as well as civil appeals. See 177 Ill. 2d R.
612(p) (civil appeals provisions for petitions for rehearing in the
appellate court apply in criminal appeals "insofar as appropriate"); 134
Ill. 2d R. 651(d) (postconviction appeals are to follow the rules
applicable to criminal appeals, "as near as may be"). On the other
hand, because this is an appeal from the dismissal of a postconviction
petition, it involves a claim of a deprivation of constitutional rights in
a criminal proceeding, and possibly an erroneous deprivation of
liberty. In such proceedings, petitioners are entitled to an appeal (134
Ill. 2d R. 651(a)), and they are entitled to appellate counsel (134 Ill.
2d R. 651(c)), who must provide at least "a reasonable level of
assistance." People v. Johnson, 192 Ill. 2d 202, 207 (2000).
	However, these are not interests which the appellate court can
balance. As this court has repeatedly stated, and as the appellate
majority correctly held, the appellate and circuit courts of this state
must enforce and abide by the rules of this court. The appellate court's
power "attaches only upon compliance with the rules governing
appeals." People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 308 (2003). "[N]either
the trial court nor the appellate court has the 'authority to excuse
compliance with the filing requirements of the supreme court rules
governing appeals.' " Mitchell v. Fiat-Allis, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 143, 150
(1994), quoting In re Smith, 80 Ill. App. 3d 380, 382 (1980). "While
the appellate court may exercise significant powers on review of a
criminal case (see 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)), it does not possess the same
inherent supervisory authority conferred on our court by article VI,
section 16, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §16)."
Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d  at 308, citing People v. Harvey, 196 Ill. 2d 444,
453-54 (2001) (McMorrow, J., specially concurring, joined by
Freeman, J.). Thus, as we held in Woodson, the appellate court loses
jurisdiction of an appeal 21 days after it has been dismissed, unless
within that time a litigant files a petition for rehearing or a motion to
extend the time for filing the same. Woodson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 397; 155
Ill. 2d R. 367(a).
	The appellate court therefore acted entirely correctly in rendering
the decision it did. Indeed, the court had no other choice. Once the
time for filing a petition for rehearing had elapsed, the appellate court
was without jurisdiction to take any further action in the case. The
appellate court's jurisdiction turns on litigants' compliance with our
rules, specifically including the timelines established therein. Mitchell,
158 Ill. 2d  at 150. Issuance of the mandate does not enter into the
equation, and to the extent that Whitcanock, 81 Ill. App. 3d 186,
relied on by the appellate court dissent, held otherwise, Woodson has
long since overruled it sub silentio.
	Nevertheless, although the appellate court had no discretion to
take any action other than dismissing the appeal, that does not end the
matter so far as this court is concerned. For although the appellate
court must abide by this court's rules, this court possesses supervisory
authority over the Illinois court system. In oral argument on this case,
the State correctly acknowledged that this court could reinstate
petitioner's appeal pursuant to our supervisory authority if we were
so inclined. Indeed, our supervisory authority is a broad and unusual
power, which is " 'unlimited in extent,' " " 'undefined in character' "
and grants jurisdiction without " 'pretend[ing] to intimate its
instruments or agencies.' " McDunn v. Williams, 156 Ill. 2d 288, 302
(1993), quoting Attorney General v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 317, 325
(1853). Thus, in Moore, we reinstated a criminal defendant's direct
appeal from his conviction, lost because of his appellate counsel's
ineffective assistance, even though nearly 10 years had passed
between the time of the dismissal (July 1980) and our decision
reinstating it (January 1990). See Moore, 133 Ill. 2d  at 334.
	We believe that it is appropriate to reinstate the appeal in the
instant case because of the tension between our general rules
governing petitions for rehearing and our rule providing counsel in
postconviction proceedings. Although petitioner through counsel did
fail to file a petition for rehearing in the appellate court within 21 days
after the judgment (see 155 Ill. 2d R. 367(a)), it is also clear that
petitioner was effectively deprived of the counsel he was promised on
appeal (see 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c)). After receiving four extensions of
time, appellate counsel still failed to file a timely brief, took no action
on the case at all as months passed after the brief was due, and then
after the appeal was dismissed, failed even to file a motion to
reconsider the dismissal within 21 days. This is not the "reasonable
level of assistance" (Johnson, 192 Ill. 2d at 207) that our rules extend
to a postconviction petitioner on appeal. Indeed, it is fair to say that
petitioner did not merely fail to receive a reasonable level of
assistance of counsel, he received no assistance. In Johnson, a
postconviction appeal, we held that appellate counsel's completely
inadequate briefing constituted failure to provide a reasonable level of
assistance (as required by Rule 651), and that this failure on counsel's
part was a sufficient reason not to enforce against the client the failure
to comply with Rule 341(e)(7). As appellate counsel in this case
pointed out in oral argument, "at least he [appellate counsel in
Johnson] filed a brief, ok-at least he attempted to file a brief in that
case. In this case, defendant didn't file-defendant's appointed counsel
filed no brief whatsoever." (Emphasis added.)
	The State attempts to distinguish Moore as well as other cases
which predate it (see, e.g., People v. Aliwoli, 60 Ill. 2d 579 (1975),
People v. Brown, 39 Ill. 2d 307 (1968)) on the basis that they were
direct criminal appeals, a different class of proceedings than
postconviction appeals. As previously noted, the appellate majority
found this other authority inapposite because petitioner here, unlike
the defendants in the above cases, was not entitled to appellate
counsel as a matter of due process, but rather by our rules. This
distinction has no force, however, insofar as our supervisory authority
is concerned. The appellate court's decision to dismiss the appeal may
not have deprived petitioner of due process, but it is our responsibility
to oversee court proceedings in this state, and in this case there is no
question that it was the failure of counsel to provide petitioner that
level of assistance which our rules require which caused petitioner's
failure to comply with the rules governing appeals. We believe the
appropriate remedy is to reinstate the appeal under the unusual
circumstances of this case.
	The State also contends that rather than reinstating petitioner's
appeal, petitioner could file a successive postconviction petition
arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in the instant
proceeding. This is true, but it is not the remedy we preferred in
Moore. Our reasoning there was that it wastes judicial resources to
require a defendant to institute a new action, requiring a trial court to
assess the matter anew through the filter of the effectiveness of
appellate counsel in the prior proceeding, which decision would itself
certainly be appealed, when the matter could so much more simply be
resolved by reinstating the first appeal, which was lost through no
fault of defendant's. See Moore, 133 Ill. 2d  at 339-40. We find that
reasoning compelling in the instant case as well.(2)
	Accordingly, pursuant to our supervisory authority over the
Illinois courts (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §16), we order that
petitioner's appeal be reinstated in the appellate court. We believe it
is worth noting that we are not holding that the appellate court is
henceforth empowered to take it upon itself to excuse violations of
our rules regarding appeals in future cases, even when the court
believes that a failure to follow the rules is due to ineffective
assistance of counsel. Rather, the appellate court must enforce the
rules as written. Any decision regarding competing interests between
our rules must be made by this court, and if future cases arise
following a procedural fact pattern similar to the instant case, it will
be incumbent on the appellate court to act as the appellate court
correctly did in the instant case, dismissing the appeal and leaving it
to this court to determine whether the appeal ought to be reinstated.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons above, we vacate the appellate court's order
dismissing petitioner's appeal and remand to that court with direction
that it reinstate petitioner's appeal.
	Appellate court judgment vacated;
cause remanded with directions.
1. ï»¿ 1Before this court both parties state that the 
appellate court denied the
Appellate Defender's fourth motion for extension of time. However, both the
appellate court's published opinion (see 347 Ill. App. 3d 100) and the
appellate court's internal records reflect that the court granted the fourth
motion as well as the first three. The record before this court does not appear
to contain a copy of the actual ruling on the August motion for extension of
time. We trust the appellate court to have recorded the proceedings correctly,
but in any event this factual dispute does not affect the issues before this
court because there is no question that the Appellate Defender failed to file
a timely brief, the appellate court dismissed the appeal for want of
prosecution, and the Appellate Defender failed to file a timely motion to
reconsider the dismissal.
2.  ï»¿2 Like Moore, our 
decision in this case is extremely unlikely to be
exploited in the future. As we noted in Moore, defendants will be reluctant
to elongate their stay in prison by engaging in appellate shenanigans. See
Moore, 133 Ill. 2d  at 341. We believe additionally that appellate attorneys
will be extremely reluctant to run the very real risk of referral to the 
Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission by intentionally engaging in
conduct so wholly inefficacious as to permit an appeal to be reinstated under
our decision today, even if counsel thought that some hypothetical and
speculative benefit could somehow inure to their client by doing so.