Title: State v. Harris
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 104565
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: August 16, 2013

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 104,565 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
KATRON HARRIS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, an appellate 
court's standard of review is whether, after reviewing all the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution, the reviewing court is convinced a rational factfinder could 
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate courts do not 
reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make determinations regarding 
witness credibility. 
 
2. 
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction of robbery by threat of bodily harm 
if it supports reasonable inferences that the defendant threatened the victim and that the 
threat made the taking of property possible. 
 
3. 
K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c) permits a trial court to declare a mistrial if there was 
prejudicial conduct inside or outside the courtroom that makes it impossible to proceed 
without injustice to a defendant or the prosecution. To follow the statute, a trial court 
 
2 
 
 
 
must engage in a two-step analysis. It must (a) decide whether there was some 
fundamental failure of the proceeding, and (b) if so, determine whether it is possible to 
continue without an injustice. This second step requires assessing whether the damaging 
effect of any prejudicial conduct may be removed or mitigated through an admonition,  
jury instruction, or other action. If that is not possible because the degree of prejudice 
would result in an injustice, a mistrial is necessary.  
 
4. 
An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision denying a motion for mistrial 
under an abuse of discretion standard. A district court abuses its discretion when its 
action is:  (a) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have 
taken the view adopted by the trial court; (b) based on an error of law, i.e., if the 
discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (c) based on an error of fact, i.e., 
if substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a 
prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based. 
 
5. 
Appellate review of a mistrial issue considers two questions:  (1) Did the trial 
court abuse its discretion when deciding whether there was a fundamental failure in the 
proceeding? and (2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion when deciding whether the 
conduct resulted in prejudice that could not be cured or mitigated through jury 
admonition or instruction, resulting in an injustice? 
 
6. 
When reviewing a district court's denial of a mistrial motion based on allegations 
of prosecutorial misconduct, the appellate court decides (1) whether the prosecutor's 
comments were outside the wide latitude the prosecutor is allowed in presenting evidence 
 
3 
 
 
 
and arguing the case, and (2) if so, whether the comments prejudiced the jury against the 
defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. 
 
7. 
The legislature did not intend to create alternative means of committing felony 
murder under K.S.A. 21-3401(b) by providing that felony murder occurs when there is a 
death in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous 
felony. Instead, the phrase "in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from" 
describes factual circumstances sufficient to establish a material element of felony 
murder. 
 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; J. DEXTER BURDETTE, judge. Opinion filed August 16, 
2013. Affirmed.  
 
Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief 
for appellant.  
 
Sheryl L. Lidtke, deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and Jerome A. Gorman, district 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  Katron Harris appeals his convictions of aggravated robbery and first-
degree felony murder based on the underlying felony of aggravated robbery. He argues:  
(1) The State presented insufficient evidence to prove the aggravated robbery was 
accomplished by "threat of bodily harm," which was how the crime was charged; (2) the 
district court abused its discretion in denying his request for a mistrial based on 
prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) the phrase "in the commission of, attempt to commit, 
or flight from an inherently dangerous felony" in the felony-murder statute, K.S.A. 21-
 
4 
 
 
 
3401(b), creates alternative means of committing the crime and the evidence was 
insufficient to support each means. We affirm. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The State charged Harris with felony murder, alleging he and two others 
intentionally killed Phillip Martin in the perpetration, attempt to perpetrate, or flight from 
the inherently dangerous felony of aggravated robbery. In charging the aggravated 
robbery, the State alleged Harris and the others took money and drugs from Martin 
exclusively by "threat of bodily harm" while armed with a handgun. The circumstantial 
evidence supporting this threat of bodily harm element is our principal focus.  
 
On October 6, 2008, police officers responded to a 911 call at a home in Kansas 
City, Kansas. The officers found the garage door half open, the door into the house from 
the garage open, and Martin lying dead on his stomach in a small kitchen. Shell casings 
from two different caliber firearms surrounded Martin's body. Martin had a loaded .22 
caliber semi-automatic handgun, with a bullet chambered, and $600 cash in his pants 
pockets. It appeared he had been cooking crack cocaine (powder cocaine mixed with 
baking soda and water) in the kitchen at the time he died. The kitchen faucet was running 
when police arrived. 
 
Over the course of several days detectives investigating the crime learned Harris 
was involved and detained him. In his first police interview, Harris said he did not know 
Martin, had nothing to do with the crime, and was staying at a hotel in Johnson County 
with his girlfriend and his mother when the killing occurred. The detectives ended the 
interview, booked Harris, and placed him on a 48-hour hold. The next evening detectives 
interviewed Harris again. This time, Harris changed his story. 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
He told detectives he met Kelvin Gibson, Jr., the night of the killing. He and 
Gibson took a walk and met Demarcus Blakeney. Harris said the three men walked to 
Martin's house and Gibson went inside. Gibson came out and said he was going to rob 
Martin. Harris said he did not believe Gibson and did not want to rob anyone, so he stood 
across the street. Gibson instructed Harris to let him and Blakeney know if Harris heard 
anything. Gibson and Blakeney went into the house. 
 
Harris said he heard approximately 12 gunshots in quick succession after about 5 
minutes. He said Blakeney ran out, handed Harris a gun, and told Harris he had to go into 
the house and "put in [his] work" so that he would not "snitch" on them. Harris said he 
entered the house and saw Martin lying motionless on the floor. Gibson then told Harris 
to shoot Martin, which Harris did one time. Harris said Gibson went through the house 
because he knew where Martin's things were, and got a box of money. The three then ran. 
Harris said Gibson gave him $100. 
 
The State charged Harris with felony murder with aggravated robbery as the 
underlying felony, and with aggravated robbery by threat of bodily harm. 
 
At trial, the State established that Martin sold drugs out of his home. When 
customers came to buy drugs, they entered through the garage and often were met by a 
doorman. If there was no doorman, customers knocked on the door. Martin put his 
proceeds in two shoeboxes. The State presented testimony that 2 days before the murder 
one shoebox contained $1,900 and the other one contained $3,200. At the crime scene, 
police found only one shoebox with approximately $2,000. The State also established 
Gibson was often at Martin's home and ran errands for Martin in exchange for money, 
gas, and marijuana.   
 
 
6 
 
 
 
Christina Woody testified she bought marijuana from Martin at 8:45 p.m. on the 
night of Martin's death. When she entered Martin's house, a man she did not know but 
later identified as Gibson was sitting on the living room couch. Martin was cooking crack 
cocaine in his kitchen. After purchasing the marijuana, Woody left. 
 
Brian Houston, Martin's friend, also testified. Houston spent time with Martin 
nearly every day. He said he called Martin a little after 9 p.m. on the night of the killing, 
but the call went straight to Martin's voicemail. Houston said he went to Martin's house 
around 9:30 p.m., exited his car, and saw Gibson wandering around outside. Houston said 
it was strange that Gibson's car was not at Martin's house. Houston walked up and Gibson 
gestured for him to come toward the garage. As Houston ducked under the garage door, 
Gibson stood between Houston and the door to the house and told Houston, "[A]in't 
nothing going on right now." Houston testified Gibson usually said something like this 
when Martin was conducting drug business. Houston also noticed Gibson was very 
fidgety and that Martin's house was unusually quiet because normally Martin played 
videos and talked on the phone. Houston left without going inside. Houston continued to 
call Martin until 11 p.m. but never got an answer. 
 
Martin's sister, Angela Martin, testified she spoke with Martin for 3 to 4 minutes 
by phone at 10 p.m. She heard several male voices in the house, but nothing struck her as 
out of the ordinary during the conversation. 
 
Martin's neighbor from down the street testified she heard three gunshots the night 
Martin was murdered. She said it sounded like the shots came from a vacant house next 
door. She looked out the window. About 4 or 5 minutes after the shots she saw three 
black men running down the street. Each wore a black hooded sweatshirt and black pants. 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
Daneasha Connor testified she found Martin dead at approximately 9 p.m. and 
called police. Conner concluded Martin knew his killer because he did not usually allow 
others in the house while cooking drugs and would not turn his back to someone he did 
not know. Conner also testified she took a gun from Martin's back pocket. She believed 
Martin trusted the person in his home because he did not use the guns he carried. 
 
An investigating detective testified there was no forced entry into the house and 
that Martin was shot multiple times. The detective thought Martin was comfortable with 
the perpetrator(s) being in his home. He also testified Gibson provided Harris' and 
Blakeney's names to police. 
 
Dr. Erik Mitchell performed Martin's autopsy. He concluded Martin died from 
gunshot wounds primarily due to blood loss. Mitchell testified Martin had 16 gunshot 
wounds from at least two weapons, although he could not ascertain the order in which the 
wounds were inflicted. He concluded none were immediately fatal. He said Martin had a 
gunshot wound to his foot, an entry wound on the back side of his left leg indicating the 
shooter was behind him, an entry wound on the back of his right thigh also indicating the 
shooter was behind him, an entry wound to his left hip with a direction of travel 
indicating the shooter was behind him, an entry wound on the back of his left forearm, 
nine entry wounds to his back, and two entry wounds to his front torso. 
 
The State argued Harris either actively participated in the crimes or aided and 
abetted Gibson and Blakeney in committing them. The jury found Harris guilty of felony 
murder and aggravated robbery. The district court imposed consecutive terms of life and 
72 months' imprisonment, with lifetime postrelease supervision. Harris timely appealed. 
Our jurisdiction arises under K.S.A. 22-3601 (life sentence). 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY BY THREAT OF BODILY HARM 
 
Harris argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of aggravated 
robbery, which served as the underlying crime for the felony-murder conviction. Harris 
contends the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravated robbery 
was accomplished by "threat of bodily harm" as specifically charged. Importantly, he 
notes, the State did not allege a taking of property by force.  
 
Standard of Review 
 
When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of 
review is whether, after reviewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, the appellate court is convinced a rational factfinder could have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, 
resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations. State v. Qualls, 
297 Kan. 61, Syl. ¶ 1, 298 P.3d 311 (2013). 
 
Analysis 
 
The district court properly instructed the jury on the following elements of 
aggravated robbery, modified from PIK Crim. 3d 56.31, based on the way the State 
charged the crime: 
 
"To establish [aggravated robbery], each of the following claims must be proved: 
 
"1. That the defendant or another intentionally took property, to-wit: 
money and/or drugs, from the person of or from the presence of Phillip 
A. Martin; 
"2. That the taking was by threat of bodily harm to Phillip A. Martin; 
 
9 
 
 
 
"3. That the defendant or another was armed with a dangerous weapon, 
to-wit: a handgun; and 
"4. That this act occurred on or about the 6th day of October, 2008, in 
Wyandotte County, Kansas." (Emphasis added.) 
 
"Robbery is the taking of property from the person or presence of another by force 
or by threat of bodily harm to any person." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 21-3426. The 
crime is aggravated when the robber is armed with a dangerous weapon or inflicts bodily 
harm upon any person in the course of the robbery. K.S.A. 21-3427; see State v. Phillips, 
295 Kan. 929, 941-42, 287 P.3d 245 (2012). 
 
K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 21-3110(25) defines "threat" as a "communicated intent to 
inflict physical or other harm on any person or on property." But verbally communicating 
a threat is not required—pointing a gun at the victim is enough. State v. Washington, 293 
Kan. 732, 738, 268 P.3d 475 (2012) (threat of bodily harm element established by 
testimony that persons involved were armed and pointed a gun at victim); State v. Calvin, 
279 Kan. 193, 200, 105 P.3d 710 (2005) (sufficient evidence of threat of bodily harm 
based on defendant's statement that accomplice pointed gun at the victim while trying to 
force his way inside victim's house). Moreover, the taking can occur after the threat of 
harm or the victim's death, as long as it is one continuous transaction. Cf. State v. Myers, 
230 Kan. 697, 703, 640 P.2d 1245 (1982) (inquiry is whether defendant's conduct "makes 
it possible for the defendant to take property from the victim's body without resistance"). 
 
Harris concedes there is sufficient evidence to support a charge of robbery by 
force. But he points out the State specifically charged him with taking property by threat 
of bodily harm, and the district court instructed the jury accordingly. Harris asks us to 
decide whether sufficient evidence supports the State's chosen theory that the taking was 
exclusively by "threat of bodily harm." 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
At oral argument, the State claimed it could not have proven robbery by force 
because there was no evidence of a struggle. And although we need not delve into 
whether the State's view is correct, we note we have previously held shooting someone is 
an act of force sufficient to prove aggravated robbery. See, e.g., State v. Deiterman, 271 
Kan. 975, 992-93, 29 P.3d 411 (2001) (sufficient evidence of aggravated robbery by 
force when defendant shot victim twice, took wallet, and entered getaway car); Myers, 
230 Kan. at 703 (shooting of victim was act of force in aggravated robbery).  
 
In this case, because Martin is dead, there is no direct evidence his shooter(s) 
communicated a threat to him, and none of Harris' accomplices testified. Therefore, we 
must determine whether circumstantial evidence supports one or more inferences that 
Martin was threatened with bodily harm. We have held a conviction "of even the gravest 
offense" may be based entirely on circumstantial evidence. If an inference is reasonable, 
the jury has the right to make it. State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 710-11, 245 P.3d 1030 
(2011). 
 
Harris told police Gibson and Blakeney were in Martin's house about 5 minutes 
before shooting erupted. This was more than enough time to communicate a threat or for 
Martin to realize he was being robbed at gunpoint, especially given the house's close 
quarters, as shown on the crime scene video. In addition, because Martin's torso sustained 
two front entry wounds, it was reasonable to infer both that the shooter(s) were in front of 
Martin and that Martin would have perceived the threat of gunshot before either wound 
was inflicted. And although the coroner could not determine the order of the bullet 
wounds, he did conclude no particular shot was immediately fatal, giving Martin time to 
understand what was happening even after the first or subsequent shots were fired. But 
there is more. 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
Martin was found lying on his stomach on the floor in a small kitchen. The crime 
scene video showed no blood smears on the floor around his body, which might have 
suggested he was rolled over onto his back so that he could be shot in the front. This 
makes it reasonable to infer that of Martin's 16 gunshot wounds, he sustained the front 
entry wounds sooner rather than later, and likely before he was lying face down on the 
floor. 
 
Also, the position of Martin's body and layout of the room in which it was found 
support the State's theory that Martin was shot while standing in a corner pressed 
between a door and his refrigerator. The crime scene video shows Martin lying with his 
feet by a door next to the refrigerator and his head by the sink. And from this, the jury 
could reasonably infer Martin was not standing at the sink with his back to the shooter 
when the shooting started because he could not have crumpled to the floor in that fashion. 
The video also supports a conclusion Martin was not escaping towards a second kitchen 
door and shot in the back because that door swings into the kitchen rather than outward, 
making any escape attempt far more cumbersome.  
 
In the end, the evidence supports inferences that provide a sufficient basis, based 
on our standard of review, for the jury to conclude Martin's shooter(s) threatened him 
with bodily harm. These circumstances further support a conclusion that the threatening 
act of shooting at Harris made the taking possible. 
 
We hold there is sufficient evidence Martin's shooter(s) threatened him with 
bodily harm for a rational jury to find Harris guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of 
aggravated robbery as charged. 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL 
 
Harris next argues the district court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after 
the prosecutor allegedly disparaged his attorney in the jury's presence. This issue arose at 
trial when the prosecutor asked a detective about an initial interview with Harris. Defense 
counsel objected, arguing the State had not notified her of any statement Harris gave to 
police other than a later recorded statement. The prosecutor responded to the objection by 
stating, "Judge, that's absolutely false." The prosecutor then began discussing an earlier 
Jackson v. Denno hearing, but the court interrupted and excused the jury, stating, 
"Obviously we have a matter we have to take up outside of your presence." 
 
The prosecutor and defense counsel argued their positions regarding the initial 
statement after the jury left. Defense counsel did not ask for a mistrial based on the 
prosecutor's "that's absolutely false" comment at that time. The court could not 
immediately resolve the matter and called a recess to allow itself and counsel time to 
review the Denno hearing. 
 
The next morning, the court summarized the substantive issue before it as notice 
that the State planned to use Harris' first statement to the police against him. The court 
overruled defense counsel's objection to the admission of Harris' first statement. Defense 
counsel then notified the court she wanted to argue a motion. And although the nature of 
the motion was not explicitly mentioned, the record discloses it was for a finding that the 
State caused an intentional mistrial. The court indicated it would provide defense counsel 
time to argue the motion and wanted to speak with counsel in chambers before the trial 
recommenced. When the trial reconvened, the prosecutor told the jury: 
 
"[Defense counsel], and ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I just wanted to make a 
statement to you to let you know that I apologize for making any statements yesterday 
 
13 
 
 
 
that may have impugned the integrity of [defense counsel]. And I believe—I just wanted 
you guys to know that and I wanted Court and counsel to know that as well."  
 
After this statement, the court thanked the prosecutor and told her to call her next 
witness. The court revisited the motion for mistrial near the end of the trial and found that 
the prosecutor's conduct did not require reversal, stating: 
 
 
"Well, obviously, K.S.A. 22-3423, statute regarding mistrials, controls this 
particular situation. But, frankly, even more important, the fact situation controls. 
  
 
"I had the court reporter review the incident and the prosecutor did make one 
statement in front of the jury that they heard and [defense counsel] had stood up to object 
to [the detective's] response to the State's inquiry as to the first contact and first statement 
given. She got up, she objected to this line of questioning. She indicated there's been 
testimony in this case that there was one recorded statement of her client taken. She 
indicated that that was the testimony of [a detective] at the Denno hearing. She indicated 
and gave her recollection of what [a detective] had testified to at that hearing in that his 
answers indicated there were no other statements taken from her client. And that based 
upon her reports, there's no documentation generated that there [were] any other 
statements taken. 
 
 
"[The prosecutor] said on the record and in front of the jury, Judge, that's 
absolutely false. The court said, okay. [The prosecutor] said, you were here at the Denno 
hearing and, at that point, the Court interrupted both counsel, said, hang on. I indicated to 
the jury, obviously we have a matter we need to take up outside outside [sic] your 
presence. We're gonna take a short recess, which we did. But they left. 
 
 
"So there was only one statement that the jury heard from [the prosecutor] 
regarding the character of counsel and that was, Judge, that's absolutely false. During the 
motion hearing, she did indicate and used the word liar or that's a lie, but that was not in 
front of the jury. 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
"Based upon the context, the fact that this is a serious case and that both counsel 
have been zealous in representations of their respective clients, I do not find that the 
prosecutor's comment, first of all, was intentional or intentionally made to impugn the 
character of defense counsel. I felt that it was—it was, in fact, in response to what coun—
your recollections, which later there was a middle road between both of your positions as 
far as the detective's testimony was concerned. But, frankly, the comment doesn't rise, in 
this Court's opinion, to intentional misconduct. 
 
 
"I don't find that it's impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to 
either the State or the defendant. I do not believe that one comment, Judge, that's 
absolutely false, rises to the level of justifying a mistrial in this case. 
 
 
"Motion for mistrial will be denied because the one comment in the context of 
the entire trial does not substantially prejudice the criminal rights of the defendant in this 
case. So motion will be denied. 
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
"However, and I'll say this, I have been disappointed with both counsel, 
specifically the State. You're both seasoned attorneys. You can have differences, but you 
can take care of those differences in a professional manner. I expect you both to do the 
same— 
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
"And frankly, you have after that particular incident. 
 
 
"Oh, and one other comment. The State did, in fact, cure in the Court's opinion, 
that one comment by apologizing to the jury, the Court, and [defense counsel]. And she 
didn't—she didn't have to do that, but I gave her the opportunity to do so and she took it. 
And I think if there were—if there was any prejudice, it was cured by that comment. 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
". . . There's no prejudice. There will be no mistrial and we'll proceed to the 
reading of the instructions and closing arguments."  
 
Standard of Review 
 
Under K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c) a trial court may declare a mistrial if prejudicial 
conduct, inside or outside the courtroom, makes it impossible for the trial to proceed 
without injustice to either the defendant or the prosecution. This statute creates a two-step 
analytical process. First, the trial court must determine if the proceeding suffered some 
fundamental failure. If so, the trial court then assesses whether it is possible to continue 
without an injustice. In other words, the trial court must decide if the prejudicial 
conduct's damaging effect can be removed or mitigated by an admonition, jury 
instruction, or other action. If not, it must determine whether the degree of prejudice 
results in an injustice and, if so, declare a mistrial. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 
P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012); see State v. Race, 293 Kan. 69, 80, 
259 P.3d 707 (2011). 
 
An appellate court reviews a district court's ruling on a motion for mistrial for 
abuse of discretion. Judicial discretion is abused if  
 
"judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person 
would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is based on an error of law, i.e., 
if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of 
fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a 
prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based." Ward, 292 Kan. at 
550.  
 
 
16 
 
 
 
In Ward, our court articulated this standard by dividing the appellate court's abuse of 
discretion inquiry into two parts:  (1) Did the district court abuse its discretion when 
deciding if there was a fundamental failure in the proceeding? and (2) Did the district 
court abuse its discretion when deciding whether the conduct caused prejudice that could 
not be cured or mitigated through jury admonition or instruction, resulting in an injustice? 
292 Kan. at 551. Because we conclude the district court did not err when it determined 
the prosecutor's comment did not constitute a fundamental failure in Harris' trial, we need 
not engage in the prejudice analysis. 
 
Analyzing whether a fundamental failure occurred varies with the alleged 
deficiency's nature, such as whether the allegation is based on a witness' actions, a 
bystander's actions, prosecutorial misconduct, or an evidentiary error. 292 Kan. at 551. 
This case involves a motion for mistrial based upon a prosecutorial misconduct claim. 
Appellate review of an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct requires a two-step 
analysis. First, an appellate court decides whether the comments were outside the wide 
latitude a prosecutor is allowed, e.g., in discussing the evidence. If so, there was 
misconduct. Second, if misconduct is found, an appellate court must determine whether 
the improper comments prejudiced the jury and denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. 
Mireles, 297 Kan. 339, Syl. ¶ 11, 301 P.3d 677 (2013). 
 
Discussion 
 
The first question we must answer is whether the district court abused its 
discretion in determining the prosecutor's response to defense counsel's objection was not 
a fundamental failure in the proceeding. On appeal, the State concedes the prosecutor's 
comment in front of the jury was "probably improper." Moreover, in the district court the 
prosecutor explicitly conceded her statement was improper but noted she apologized to 
 
17 
 
 
 
the jury, the court, and defense counsel and told the court she was not intentionally trying 
to cause a mistrial. 
 
The district court determined the prosecutor's comment did not rise to prejudicial 
intentional misconduct. We agree the comment did not amount to a fundamental failure 
in Harris' trial. 
 
Prosecutors are generally afforded wide latitude in presenting evidence and 
arguing their cases. See State v. Albright, 283 Kan. 418, 430, 153 P.3d 497 (2007) ("We 
conclude that [the prosecutor's analogies for the defendant's theory of the case] were 
within the wide latitude given a prosecutor in discussing the evidence."); see also State v. 
Richmond, 289 Kan. 419, 442, 212 P.3d 165 (2009) (prosecutor was within wide 
discretion when telling defense witness "[y]ou can go back to jail"). 
 
But prosecutors may exceed this latitude and commit misconduct by, for example, 
commenting to the jury on facts not in evidence; asking witnesses questions not founded 
in law or fact; violating orders in limine; commenting on defendants' postarrest silence; 
and commenting on witnesses' credibility—specifically, calling defendants or defense 
counsel liars during arguments to the jury. See State v. Inkelaar, 293 Kan. 414, 429, 264 
P.3d 81 (2011) (questions predicated on misstatement of law); State v. White, 284 Kan. 
333, 340, 161 P.3d 208 (2007) (failure to notify defense of material change in expert 
testimony); State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624, 640-41, 88 P.3d 218 (2004) (introducing 
evidence excluded by order in limine); State v. Pabst, 268 Kan. 501, 506, 996 P.2d 321 
(2000) (comment on credibility of defendant and defense counsel); State v. Ruff, 252 
Kan. 625, 634-35, 847 P.2d 1258 (1993) (telling jury it had a duty to send a message). 
The State concedes the comment here was probably improper; but that does not 
necessarily mean it amounted to prejudicial misconduct. See Richmond, 289 Kan. at 445; 
White, 284 Kan. at 340 (prosecutor did not commit misconduct when he suggested 
 
18 
 
 
 
witness "practices a lot in testifying"); see also State v. Wells, 297 Kan. ___, ___ P.3d 
___ (2013) (No. 104,092, 2013 WL 3242300, at *7-8) (no misconduct when prosecutor 
told jury in closing arguments there were "at least $3,500 worth of reasons" defendant's 
paid expert gave favorable testimony).   
 
Harris argues misconduct has been found when prosecutors called defendants or 
defense counsel liars multiple times, or in conjunction with other objectionable conduct 
while making arguments and commenting upon evidence to the jury. See Pabst, 268 Kan. 
at 505-12 (prosecutor referred to defendant and his attorney as liars 11 times in closing 
argument); State v. Magdaleno, 28 Kan. App. 2d 429, 437-38, 17 P.3d 974 (prosecutor 
suggested in closing arguments that defense counsel lied), rev. denied 271 Kan. 1040 
(2001); State v. Pham, 27 Kan. App. 2d 996, 1005-06, 10 P.3d 780 (2000) (prosecutor 
stated in closing arguments that defense counsel did not care about the truth, did not want 
the truth, and was not credible); State v. Lockhart, 24 Kan. App. 2d 488, 491-93, 947 
P.2d 461 (prosecutor called both defendant and counsel liars in closing arguments), rev. 
denied 263 Kan. 889 (1997). But these cases are easily distinguishable. 
 
The comment in this case did not occur during argument about the evidence to the 
jury. Rather, the prosecutor made the comment to the judge in response to an evidentiary 
objection. And it happened only once and did not include a more derogatory label such as 
"lie," "liar," or similar words. Moreover, the comment did not directly reflect on Harris or 
his attorney. It was simply the prosecutor's emphatic evaluation of the grounds upon 
which Harris' attorney raised an objection. 
 
Under these facts, this isolated comment did not constitute misconduct. It was 
within the wide latitude afforded to prosecutors. The district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it concluded the comment did not constitute prejudicial misconduct. The 
comment did not cause a fundamental failure in Harris' trial. The district court considered 
 
19 
 
 
 
that the prosecutor did not utter the comment to attack defense counsel's character, but 
rather in response to defense counsel's objection. But see Ward, 292 Kan. at 576 (district 
court abused its discretion in denying motion for mistrial when it did not consider legal 
principles governing decision). 
 
We hold the district court did not err when it denied Harris' motion for mistrial. 
Accordingly, we need not address the injustice prong. 
 
ALTERNATIVE MEANS 
 
Harris next argues the district court instructed the jury on four alternative means of 
committing felony murder: that Martin was killed while Harris was (1) committing an 
aggravated robbery; (2) attempting to commit an aggravated robbery; (3) in flight from 
committing an aggravated robbery; or (4) in flight from attempting to commit an 
aggravated robbery. The felony-murder jury instruction in this case, which was based on 
K.S.A. 21-3401(b), read:  
  
 
"To establish [the crime of murder in the first degree,] . . . . the following claims 
must be proved: 
 
. . . .  
 
"2. That such killing was done while in the commission of, 
attempting to commit, or in flight from committing or attempting to 
commit an inherently dangerous felony, to-wit: aggravated robbery. . . ." 
(Emphasis added.)  
 
Harris argues the State only presented evidence the killing was done while 
committing a robbery and presented no evidence on the other three means the State 
charged (attempting to commit, in flight from committing, and in flight from attempting 
to commit). 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
We recently rejected this same argument in State v. Cheffen, 297 Kan. ___, 
___P.3d ___ (2013) (No. 105,384, 2013 WL 3120189), which involved the underlying 
felony of child abuse. We held: 
 
 
"The felony-murder statute has two primary elements—killing and 
simultaneously engaging in an inherently dangerous felony. The second element can be 
established through proof that the killing occurred while the defendant was committing, 
attempting to commit, or fleeing from an inherently dangerous felony. These are simply 
factual circumstances in which a material element may be proven. Therefore, this 
language in the felony-murder statute does not create alternative means, and the State was 
not obligated to prove the killing was done during an attempt to commit child abuse." 
Cheffen, 297 Kan. at ___. 
 
In Cheffen, the State omitted the "flight from" language in K.S.A. 21-3401(b), but 
we noted as a practical matter the alternative means analysis is the same for all phrases in 
the felony-murder statute. 297 Kan. at ___. For the same reasons, Harris' alternative 
means argument is without merit. 
 
Affirmed.   
 
* * * 
 
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:  I respectfully dissent from the majority's determination 
that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for the charged version of 
aggravated robbery. As the majority notes:  "Robbery is the taking of property from the 
person or presence of another by force or by threat of bodily harm to any person." K.S.A. 
21-3426. In other words, a robber can obtain control over the victim's property by 
forcibly taking it or a robber can acquire possession of the stolen property by coercing the 
 
21 
 
 
 
victim to relinquish it out of the fear created by a threat to inflict bodily harm on the 
victim if he or she resists the taking.  
 
I appreciate that public sentiment might lean toward punishing a person who has 
been proved guilty of accomplishing aggravated robbery by one method, notwithstanding 
that the State charged the defendant with committing the crime by another method. But 
the people's documents, our federal and state constitutions, have imbued a criminal 
defendant with the due process right to know the allegations against which he or she must 
defend. See, e.g., Wisner v. State, 216 Kan. 523, 532 P.2d 1051 (1975) ("Procedural due 
process requires that a defendant have notice of a specific charge so that he has an 
opportunity to defend himself and be heard on trial of the issues raised by that charge."). 
And it is our duty, notwithstanding the inevitable scorn that will be visited upon us by the 
legally uninformed and regardless of our personal disdain for the ultimate result in a 
particular case, to guard and protect those constitutional rights for future generations. If 
not here, then where?  
 
Here, the State chose to exclusively pursue a taking-by-threat theory of 
prosecution. Accordingly, the jury was instructed that one of the material elements that 
the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt was "[t]hat the taking was by threat of 
bodily harm to Phillip A. Martin." Yet, the only evidence presented by the State 
established that the robbers searched for and took Martin's box of money only after all 
three robbers had shot him, inflicting a total of 16 bullet wounds that left Martin lying on 
his kitchen floor incapacitated, if not lifeless, and way past the point at which he could 
respond to a threat. As the majority points out, citing State v. Deiterman, 271 Kan. 975, 
992-93, 29 P.3d 411 (2001), and State v. Myers, 230 Kan. 697, 703, 640 P.2d 1245 
(1982), we have previously clarified that shooting a robbery victim as a prelude to taking 
his or her property is a taking by force, not a taking by threat of bodily harm. Indeed, if a 
robber shoots the victim, i.e., actually inflicts bodily harm, one would intuit that the 
 
22 
 
 
 
scenario has moved past the threat of bodily harm stage. Even if the robber verbalizes a 
threat to inflict additional bodily harm, it would be the actual infliction of the initial 
bodily harm that precipitated the relinquishment of property. 
 
I parted ways with the majority early in its analysis, fundamentally disagreeing 
with its declaration that the "taking can occur after . . . the victim's death." I construe the 
"taking by threat" language of both the statute and the jury instruction as addressing 
causation, i.e., the taking was accomplished through the use of the threat. The only way 
to apply that language to a post-death taking is to construe the words to mean "taking 
after a threat," even though the taking was actually effected by the forceful killing of the 
victim rather than by the threat. Putting aside the rule that we should assign common 
meaning to common words, I can divine no possible reason for having such a temporal 
rule. To the contrary, logic rejects the fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc (after this, 
therefore because of this). Plainly then, I would simply say that, as a matter of law, a 
robber cannot take property from a dead person by threat of bodily harm. 
 
My disagreement with the concept of post-death taking by threat leads me to also 
reject the majority's definition of the question presented as being "whether direct 
evidence supports one or more inferences that Martin was threatened with bodily harm." 
The issue is not whether a threat was made or implied; it is whether property was taken 
through the use of a threat. For instance, the majority points to the testimony that the two 
initial shooters, Gibson and Blakeney, were in the house for approximately 5 minutes 
before the gunfire erupted, which was plenty of time for the robbers to communicate a 
threat or for Martin to realize he was being threatened. My response is, "So what?" Five 
minutes was enough time for Gibson to commit sexual battery, criminal damage to 
property, or any number of other crimes, but there is no evidence that he did so. We do 
not permit juries to speculate about what might have happened, and we should not engage 
in such guess work either. See State v. Spear, 297 Kan. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 104,206, 
 
23 
 
 
 
2013 WL 3378395, at *9 (Kan. 2013) (citing indicating a "guess" cannot prove a fact 
beyond a reasonable doubt). Moreover, common sense would suggest that the robbers 
would be loathe to compromise the element of surprise by warning an armed man of their 
intention to rob him.  
 
Nevertheless, even if a threat did occur in that 5-minute time frame, it was not 
effective to transfer possession of Martin's property to the robbers, and the most that 
could be said is that there was an attempted aggravated robbery by threat of bodily harm. 
That attempt charge was not on the table. Neither was aggravated assault, rendering 
Martin's realization of imminent danger irrelevant. Accordingly, it matters not a whit 
whether Martin was facing his attackers when the first shot was fired, so long as his 
property did not transfer to the robbers before they forcibly took it by rendering him 
incapable of resisting with 16 rounds of handgun ammunition. The real question is 
whether any conjured-up, speculative threat "ma[d]e it possible for the defendant to take 
property from the victim's [presence] without resistance." Myers, 230 Kan. at 703. The 
resounding answer in this case is "no." With that answer comes reversal. 
 
MORITZ, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.