Title: Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Werner Industries
Citation: 209 S.E.2d 734, 286 N.C. 89
Docket Number: 6
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: November 26, 1974

209 S.E.2d 734 (1974)
286 N.C. 89
NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY
v.
WERNER INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED.
No. 6.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
November 26, 1974.
*736 Craige &amp; Brawley by C. Thomas Ross, Winston-Salem, for plaintiff appellant.
Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge &amp; Rice by William F. Womble, Jr., and Allan R. Gitter, Winston-Salem, for defendant appellee.
HUSKINS, Justice:
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant.
Principles applicable to summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure are discussed in Kessing v. Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d 823 (1971), and have been applied in various cases by this Court, including Harrison Associates v. State Ports Authority, 280 N.C. 251, 185 S.E.2d 793 (1972); Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 186 S.E.2d 400 (1972); Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 186 S.E.2d 897 (1972); Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35 (1972); Schoolfield v. Collins, 281 N.C. 604, 189 S.E.2d 208 (1972); Page v. Sloan, 281 N.C. 697, 190 S.E.2d 189 (1972); McNair v. Boyette, 282 N.C. 230, 192 S.E.2d 457 (1972).
Rendition of summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c). The record in this appeal consists of pleadings and exhibits, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and counteraffidavits.
In granting summary judgment for Werner the trial court found that there were no genuine issues of material fact. Before the propriety of that finding can be considered, we must construe the relevant portion of the indemnity provision upon which plaintiff bases its claim. It reads as follows:
The language is unambiguous and should be given its ordinary meaning. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Light Co., 257 N.C. 717, 127 S.E.2d 539 (1962). Under the terms of this indemnity provision, Werner agreed to indemnify Norfolk for any liability which Norfolk incurred for property damage or personal injury caused by or resulting from any acts or omissions of Werner or Werner's employees, whether the acts or omissions were negligent or not. Such an indemnity provision is not against public policy when the contract is private and not connected with the public service of a public service corporation. Gibbs v. Light Co., 265 N.C. 459, 144 S.E.2d 393 (1965).
In order for Norfolk to recover under the indemnity agreement at trial it must prove that the injury of Jerry Boyles was caused *737 by or resulted from an act or omission of Werner. Boyles was an employee of Werner and acting within the scope of his employment at the time of his injury. Thus, in the context of Werner's agreement to indemnify Norfolk, any act or omission of Boyles, negligent or otherwise, which was a proximate cause of his injury was the act or omission of Werner.
The first determination to be made in considering the propriety of summary judgment is whether Werner, as the party moving for summary judgment, has met the burden placed upon it under Rule 56(c). The movant's burden was stated in Page v. Sloan, supra, as follows:
The movant must meet this burden even when he does not have the burden of proof at trial. First Fed. Savings &amp; Loan Assoc. v. Trust Co., 282 N.C. 44, 191 S.E.2d 683 (1972).
The phrase "no genuine issue as to any material fact" is the heart of the summary judgment procedure and the test applied in reviewing the propriety of a trial court's ruling on a summary judgment motion. 10 Wright &amp; Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil §§ 2716 and 2725 (1973). In McNair v. Boyette, supra, this Court articulated the test in these words:
Application of the foregoing rules to the evidentiary material demonstrates that this is not an appropriate case for summary judgment.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Werner offered the affidavit of Jerry Boyles reading as follows:
Werner then offered Norfolk's answers under oath to certain interrogatories wherein Norfolk stated that it was the owner and responsible for the repair and maintenance of the unloading ramp under which Boyles' foot was caught and broken. Norfolk's answers further disclose that the ramp was installed by it in February 1970 and that no repairs were made thereafter to said ramp, either before or after the accident in which Boyles was injured. Norfolk further states that prior to Boyles' injury no problem or defect in the electric control mechanism of this particular ramp was ever reported to any employee of Norfolk.
The affidavit of Jerry Boyles, taken as true, establishes that the injury was due to a malfunction in the switch, the repair and maintenance of which was the responsibility of Norfolk. In that event, the accident was not caused by an act or omission of either Boyles or Werner. This showing negates Norfolk's claim that the accident resulted from an act or omission of Werner and initially carries the burden placed upon movant under Rule 56(c). The burden consequently shifts to plaintiff, who opposed the motion for summary judgment, to show "that there is a genuine issue for trial" as required under Rule 56(e), or to provide an excuse for not doing so under Rule 56(f). G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(e); 6 Moore's Federal Practice § 56.15[3] (1974).
To meet the burden thrust upon it by Rule 56(e), Norfolk offered the affidavits of W. D. Mason, Jr. and Byron D. Williams (the affidavit of L. L. Callahan, Jr. is not pertinent to this case) which read as follows:
Facts asserted by the party answering a summary judgment motion must be accepted as true. Schoolfield v. Collins, supra. When so considered, Norfolk's affidavits contradict Boyles' assertion that the accident resulted from a faulty switch and permit the inference that Boyles has falsified the cause of his injury. This raises an issue of credibility sufficient to defeat defendant's motion for summary judgment and advance the case to trial. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 64 S. Ct. 724, 88 L. Ed. 967 (1944); Eisbach v. Jo-Carroll Electric Cooperative, Inc., 440 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1971); 6 Moore's Federal Practice § 56.15[3] and § 56.15[4] (1974); 10 Wright &amp; Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2726 (1973); see Louis, A Survey of Decisions Under the New North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 N.C.L. Rev. 729, 735-46 (1972).
In our opinion various inferences arise from the evidentiary materials now in the record. Boyles was the only witness to his accident and is the only person knowledgeable of its cause. Furthermore, he is an employee of defendant and an interested witness. We hold on these facts that Norfolk should have the opportunity to impeach Boyles at trial. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., supra; Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949); Lee v. Shor, 10 N.C.App. 231, 178 S.E.2d 101 (1970).
For the reasons stated the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant is
Reversed.
BOBBITT, C. J., not sitting.
LAKE, J., did not participate in the hearing or decision of this case.