Title: Kliment v. National Farms, Inc.
Citation: 245 Neb. 596, 514 N.W.2d 315
Docket Number: 804
State: Nebraska
Issuer: Nebraska Supreme Court
Date: April 8, 1994

514 N.W.2d 315 (1994) 245 Neb. 596 Ivan KLIMENT and Ethel Kliment, Husband and Wife, Appellees and Cross-Appellants, v. NATIONAL FARMS, INC., a Delaware Corporation, doing business as NATIONAL FARM PRODUCTS, and O.N. Corporation, a Nebraska Corporation, Appellants and Cross-Appellees. No. S-92-804. Supreme Court of Nebraska. April 8, 1994. *316 David A. Domina, Cletus W. Blakeman, and James G. Kube, of Domina &amp; Copple, P.C., Norfolk, for appellants. Steven D. Burns and Jeffrey S. Schmidt, of Burns &amp; Associates, Lincoln, for appellees. HASTINGS, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, WHITE, CAPORALE, FAHRNBRUCH, LANPHIER, and WRIGHT, JJ. HASTINGS, Chief Justice. Ivan Kliment and Ethel Kliment, husband and wife, brought this action against defendants, National Farms, Inc., and O.N. Corporation, seeking damages for a private nuisance because of the swine-raising activities of defendants. Following a jury trial which resulted in a verdict for plaintiffs in the amount of $13,000, defendants appealed. Because of the action of this court in affirming a case involving the same issues and these same defendants, Kopecky v. National Farms, Inc., 244 Neb. 846, 510 N.W.2d 41 (1994), defendants have dismissed their appeal. However, remaining is plaintiffs' cross-appeal, in which it is claimed the trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings and in failing to award plaintiffs reimbursement for several items they claim to be legitimate costs. We affirm as to the cross-appeal. The facts of this case are substantially the same as those in Kopecky. Here, plaintiffs attempted to introduce exhibits 14, 14A, 15, and 15A, which were reports made for defendants by L.M. Safely, Jr., as to waste-handling matters at the subject swine-raising facility. The reports were transmitted by Safely to defendants, which reports described the waste disposal system at this swine-raising facility as being significantly overloaded. Safely was not called as a witness by either defendants or plaintiffs. The offer of the exhibits by plaintiffs was rejected by the trial court upon defendants' objection as hearsay. Plaintiffs contend that the exhibits should have been received under the provisions of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-801 (Reissue 1989), which provides: Because Greg Gilsdorf, executive vice president of National Farms, testified that he had the authority to request Safely to make this report, plaintiffs argue that Safely was a person authorized by National Farms to make a statement concerning the subject or that his report was a statement by National Farms' agent or servant within the scope of his agency or employment. See § 27-801. However, plaintiffs overlook two problems. Firstly, Gilsdorf was authorized to request the report, and Safely was requested to make the report. That is far different from making a statement on behalf of the principal or agent. Secondly, the report discusses the overloading of the waste disposal system which explains the objectionable odors, thus making out a case for liability of National Farms for maintaining a nuisance; an issue which the jury by its verdict determined favorably to plaintiffs. The report does not address the issue of damages. Plaintiffs direct us to Bump v. Firemens Ins. Co., 221 Neb. 678, 380 N.W.2d 268 (1986), as a case, very similar to the present case, in which this court held that the statements of an insurance company's claims adjuster in advising the insured that his loss was covered were binding on the principal. In Bump, we said: Id. at 686-87, 380 N.W.2d at 275. This court went on to state: 221 Neb. at 688, 380 N.W.2d at 275-76. Here, unlike the situation in Bump, there is nothing to suggest that Safely was employed for any purpose other than to give technical advice to National Farms. Safely's employment or agency did not include making statements on behalf of National Farms. Plaintiffs could have called Safely to testify at trial, but his report under these circumstances is hearsay and not subject to any of the exceptions. *318 We adopt the rule laid down in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 89 F. Supp. 349, 352 (D.Mass.1950): (Emphasis omitted.) Furthermore, the information imparted by Safely went to the issue of liability for a nuisance, not the damages incurred. Plaintiffs were successful on the issue of liability, and therefore, any error that might have been committed because of the rejection by the trial court of Safely's report is at best harmless error. Plaintiffs attempted to recover for their costs incurred, which included costs of expert witnesses and expenses of their attorneys in attending on the depositions of various witnesses. Plaintiffs point to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1708 (Reissue 1989), which provides: "Where it is not otherwise provided by this and other statutes, costs shall be allowed of course to the plaintiff, upon a judgment in his favor, in actions for the recovery of money only, or for the recovery of specific real or personal property." This court has held that "`nothing can be taxed as costs in an action except such items as are prescribed by those statutes or are expressly authorized by the consent or agreement of the parties.'" State v. Jungclaus, 176 Neb. 641, 650, 126 N.W.2d 858, 864 (1964). We have been directed to no statutes or case law, nor have we been able to find any, which define costs to include travel, meals, lodging, fees to attorneys or witnesses, or the expenses of making extra copies of depositions or of enlarging exhibits. An obvious exception, of course, is Neb.Rev. Stat. § 76-720 (Reissue 1990), which provides in part: Plaintiffs direct us to Lockwood v. Lockwood, 205 Neb. 818, 290 N.W.2d 636 (1980), as authority for their proposition that the fees paid to an expert witness may be taxed as costs. However, in that case, we stated: "It has long been the rule that a witness who testifies as an expert on a subject requiring special knowledge and skill is, in the absence of a contract for those services, entitled only to the statutory witness fee." Id. at 821, 290 N.W.2d at 639. The court went on to say: 205 Neb. at 821-22, 290 N.W.2d at 639. In the case at hand, the only evidence of a contract of hire is the following testimony of the expert witness, Leon Chesnin: There was no testimony by the witness as to the value of his services. The only other reference to witness fees is found in the supplemental transcript, in a portion of the bill of costs submitted by plaintiffs, which simply reads, "8. Expert Witness Fees $14,545.59." The most recent citation of Lockwood may be found in Vredeveld v. Clark, 244 Neb. 46, 57, 504 N.W.2d 292, 300 (1993), a tort action for damages resulting from an automobile accident, in which we said: As is apparent, we have further limited the rule announced in Lockwood to be applicable only to similar cases in which the special statutory provisions exist. Applying the reasoning of the foregoing authorities to the record before us, we find that the trial court did not err in refusing to award expert witness costs to plaintiffs or in failing to award costs for attorney fees, expenses of litigation, and expenses for making additional copies of depositions or enlargements of exhibits. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. FAHRNBRUCH, J., concurs in the result.