Title: Haggerty v. Thornton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S271483
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: February 8, 2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
BRIANNA MCKEE HAGGERTY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
NANCY F. THORNTON et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S271483 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division One 
D078049 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
37-2019-00028694-PR-TR-CTL 
 
 
February 8, 2024 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Acting 
Chief Justice Kruger and Justices Corrigan, Groban, Jenkins, 
Evans, and Poochigian* concurred. 
 
 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON 
S271483 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
This case concerns the methods for modifying a revocable 
trust.  Section 15402 of the Probate Code states that “[u]nless 
the trust instrument provides otherwise, . . . the settlor may 
modify the trust by the procedure for revocation.”  (Prob. Code, 
§ 15402; all undesignated statutory references are to this code.)  
Section 15401 sets out the procedures for revocation:  Trusts 
may be revoked by complying with any method provided in the 
trust instrument.  (§ 15401, subd. (a)(1).)  If the trust 
instrument explicitly makes that method exclusive, then the 
trust may be revoked only in that manner.  (§ 15401, 
subd. (a)(2).)  If not, then the trust may also be revoked by the 
statutory method — “a writing, other than a will, signed by the 
settlor or any other person holding the power of revocation and 
delivered to the trustee during the lifetime of the settlor or the 
person holding the power of revocation.”  (Ibid.)  
It is undisputed that if the trust instrument is silent on 
modification, the trust may be modified in the same manner in 
which it could be revoked, either via the statutory method or via 
any revocation method provided in the trust instrument.  In this 
case, we consider the circumstances under which the statutory 
method is available for modification if the trust instrument 
specifies a method for modification.  We hold that under section 
15402, a trust may be modified via the section 15401 procedures 
for revocation, including the statutory method, unless the trust 
instrument provides a method of modification and explicitly 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
 
makes it exclusive, or otherwise expressly precludes the use of 
revocation procedures for modification. 
I. 
Brianna McKee Haggerty appeals an order of the probate 
court finding a trust agreement was validly amended, thereby 
excluding her from distribution.  Haggerty’s aunt, Jeane M. 
Bertsch, created a trust in 2015.  The trust agreement included 
a provision reserving “[t]he right by an acknowledged 
instrument in writing to revoke or amend this Agreement or any 
trust hereunder.”  In 2016, Bertsch drafted an amendment 
providing for a distribution to Haggerty.  The amendment was 
signed by Bertsch and notarized. 
In 2018, Bertsch drafted an amendment providing that half 
of her assets would go to various beneficiaries upon her death, 
including the Union of Concerned Scientists, Patricia Galligan, 
and Racquel Kolsrud, who are respondents in this case.  
Haggerty was not listed as one of the beneficiaries.  The 2018 
amendment was signed by Bertsch but not notarized.  Thus, the 
2018 amendment was compliant with the statutory method but 
not with the method of modification specified in the trust 
instrument.   
After Bertsch’s death, Haggerty filed a petition to 
determine the validity of the 2018 amendment.  Haggerty 
argued that the amendment does not qualify as an 
“acknowledged instrument” because it was not notarized and 
therefore was not modified pursuant to the method of 
modification specified in the trust instrument.  In a minute 
order, the probate court held that the 2018 amendment was 
valid. 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
 
The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Bertsch’s 2018 
amendment was a valid modification pursuant to the statutory 
method.  (Haggerty v. Thornton (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1003, 
1012 (Haggerty); see §§ 15401, subd. (a)(2), 15402.)  The court 
concluded that the statutory method was available for 
modification because Bertsch’s trust agreement “does not 
distinguish between revocation and modification” and because 
“the method of revocation and modification described in the 
trust agreement is not explicitly exclusive.”  (Haggerty, at 
p. 1012.)  
We granted review to resolve a split of authority regarding 
the circumstances under which the statutory method is 
available for modification when a method of modification is 
specified in the trust instrument. 
II. 
Assembly Bill No. 2652 (1985–1986 Reg. Sess.) enacted 
sections 15401 and 15402 in 1986 as part of a general 
reorganization of trust laws recommended by the California 
Law Revision Commission (Commission).  (See Huscher v. Wells 
Fargo Bank (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 956, 960, fn. 2 (Huscher); 
Recommendation Proposing the Trust Law (Dec. 1985) 18 Cal. 
Law Revision Com. Rep. (1986) pp. 567–569 (Recommendation 
Proposing the Trust Law).)  Revocation was previously governed 
by Civil Code former section 2280.   (Huscher, at p. 961.)  No 
statute specifically addressed modification.  Rather, courts held 
that, in general, the power of revocation implied the power of 
modification, and they applied the rules governing trust 
revocation to trust modification.  (Id., at p. 962, fn. 5; see Estate 
of 
Lindstrom 
(1987) 
191 Cal.App.3d 
375, 
385, 
fn. 11 
[“[R]evocation and amendment are fungible.  ‘The unrestricted 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
 
power to revoke implies a power to amend without revoking; i.e., 
it is unnecessary for the trustor to take the circuitous steps of 
complete revocation and creation of a new trust with the desired 
changes.’ ”].) 
Since 1986, two separate statutory provisions have 
governed trust revocation and modification.  Section 15401 
governs the procedures for revocation.  Under this provision, a 
revocable trust “may be revoked in whole or in part by any of the 
following methods:  [¶] (1) By compliance with any method of 
revocation provided in the trust instrument.  [¶] (2) By a writing, 
other than a will, signed by the settlor or any other person 
holding the power of revocation and delivered to the trustee 
during the lifetime of the settlor or the person holding the power 
of revocation.”  (§ 15401, subd. (a)(1)–(2).)  We will refer to the 
second method as the statutory method.  Section 15401 further 
provides:  “If the trust instrument explicitly makes the method 
of revocation provided in the trust instrument the exclusive 
method of revocation, the trust may not be revoked pursuant to 
[the statutory method].”  (§ 15401, subd. (a)(2).)   
Section 15402 governs the procedures for modification.  It 
provides:  “Unless the trust instrument provides otherwise, if a 
trust is revocable by the settlor, the settlor may modify the trust 
by the procedure for revocation.”  (§ 15402.)  “Thus, if the trust 
instrument is silent on modification, the trust may be modified 
in the same manner in which it could be revoked,” either via the 
statutory method or via the revocation method provided in the 
trust instrument.  (King v. Lynch (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1186, 
1192 (King); accord, Diaz v. Zuniga (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 916, 
922 (Diaz); Balistreri v. Balistreri (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 511, 
516 (Balistreri); Pena v. Dey (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 546 (Pena).)  
But a revocable trust may not be modified “by the procedure for 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
 
revocation” where the trust instrument “provides otherwise.”  
(§ 15402.)  This case turns on the meaning of “provides 
otherwise.”   
The 
Courts 
of 
Appeal 
have 
put 
forward 
three 
interpretations.  One interpretation, advanced by King, is that 
“ ‘[u]nless the trust instrument provides otherwise’ indicates 
that if any modification method is specified in the trust, that 
method must be used to amend the trust.”  (King, supra, 204 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1193; accord, Diaz, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 924 [following King]; Balistreri, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 518 [same]; Pena, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 552 [same]; see 
also Conservatorship of Irvine (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1334 
(Irvine). )  A second interpretation, put forward by Huscher and 
adopted by the King dissent and by the Court of Appeal in this 
case, is that “unless the trust instrument provides otherwise” 
means “unless the trust provides a modification procedure and 
explicitly makes that method exclusive.”  (Huscher, supra, 
121 Cal.App.4th at p. 967; see Haggerty, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 1012; King, at p. 1197 (dis. opn. of Detjen, J.).)  The Court 
of Appeal here also advanced a third interpretation:  that 
“ ‘[u]nless the trust instrument provides otherwise’ ” also means 
“unless the trust instrument distinguishes between revocation 
and modification.”  (Haggerty, at p. 1011.)   
A. 
To resolve this issue, we begin with the text of section 
15402.  As noted, the phrase “[u]nless the trust instrument 
provides otherwise” qualifies the provision that follows it, i.e., 
that the settlor of a revocable trust “may modify the trust by the 
procedure for revocation.”  (§ 15402.)  The most natural reading 
of this sentence is that the settlor may modify the trust using 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
 
any procedure for revocation unless the trust instrument says 
that the settlor may not (i.e., “provides otherwise”).  This is 
supported by the plain meaning of the term “otherwise.”  (See, 
e.g., Marx v. General Revenue Corp. (2013) 568 U.S. 371, 377 [“A 
statute ‘provides otherwise’ than Rule 54(d)(1) if it is ‘contrary’ 
to the Rule.”].)  A trust term would be contrary to the 
authorization provided in section 15402 if it were to preclude the 
use of any of the section 15401 revocation procedures for 
modification.  It could do so by specifying an exclusive method 
of modification in the trust instrument (Haggerty, supra, 68 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1012; King, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1196 (dis. 
opn. of Detjen, J.); Huscher, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 967) or 
by otherwise precluding modification via the revocation 
procedures provided in section 15401.  But a trust instrument 
that merely specifies a method of modification without limiting 
settlors to the use of that method does not preclude the use of 
the revocation procedures and therefore does not “provide[] 
otherwise” from the general rule.  (§ 15402.) 
This interpretation is consistent with the Third 
Restatement of Trust Laws.  (See Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55 
Cal.4th 1058, 1072 [“California courts have considered the 
Restatement of Trusts in interpreting California trust law.”].)  
The Restatement provides:  “If the terms of the trust reserve to 
the settlor a power to . . . amend the trust exclusively by a 
particular procedure, the settlor can exercise the power only by 
substantial compliance with the method prescribed.”  (Rest.3d 
Trusts, § 63, com. i.)  However, if “the terms of the trust provide 
a method for . . . amendment” but “do not make that method 
exclusive, . . . the settlor’s [modification] power can be exercised 
either in the specified manner or by a method [that is available 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
 
when no modification method is specified in the trust 
instrument].”  (Id., § 63, com. i; id., § 63, com. h.) 
In this case, the Court of Appeal held that a trust 
instrument may preclude the use of revocation procedures for 
modification by “distinguish[ing] between revocation and 
modification.”  (Haggerty, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 1011.)  On 
this view, by treating revocation and modification differently — 
such as by specifying different procedures for revocation and 
modification or by specifying a method for modification but not 
for revocation — the settlor “provides otherwise” from the 
general rule that a settlor “may modify the trust by the 
procedure for revocation.”  (§ 15402.)  The court reasoned that 
distinguishing 
between 
revocation 
and 
modification 
is 
“ ‘ “contrary” ’ ” to the general rule that the method of 
modification is the same as the method of revocation.  (Haggerty, 
at p. 1011.)    
In King, the court held that a trust instrument “provides 
otherwise” from the general rule if any modification method is 
specified in the trust, regardless of whether that method is made 
exclusive.  (King, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193; accord, 
Diaz, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 924; Balistreri, supra, 75 
Cal.App.5th at p. 518; Pena, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 552.)  
“[W]hen the Legislature enacted sections 15401 and 15402, it 
differentiated between trust revocations and modifications.  
This indicates that the Legislature no longer intended the same 
rules to apply to both revocation and modification.  [¶] If we were 
to . . . hold that a trust may be modified by the revocation 
procedures set forth in section 15401 unless the trust explicitly 
provides that the stated modification method is exclusive, 
section 15402 would become surplusage.  Rather than enacting 
section 15402, the Legislature could have combined revocation 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
 
and modification into one statute.  Moreover, . . . the Legislature 
knew how to limit the exclusivity of a revocation method 
provided in a trust and chose not to impose such a limitation on 
modifications in section 15402.”  (King, at p. 1193.) 
B. 
Despite this natural reading of the word “otherwise,” 
several Courts of Appeal have interpreted section 15402 
differently.  Even if the text is susceptible to more than one 
reasonable construction, legislative history supports the 
interpretation above.  The Legislature intended section 15402 to 
codify the preexisting rule that the power of revocation implies 
the power of modification and to expand the availability of the 
statutory method for both revocation and modification. 
Assembly Bill No. 2652 (1985–1986 Reg. Sess.) was 
enacted “to effectuate recommendations of the California Law 
Revision Commission.”  (Exec. Sect. John H. DeMoully, letter to 
Chief Clerk James D. Driscoll (May 2, 1986) 4 Assem. J. (1985–
1986 Reg. Sess.) p. 7308.)  The Legislature thus relied on the 
intent and commentary of the Commission in passing the bill.  
(See e.g., Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 
2652 (1985–1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 10, 1986, p. 7 
[describing the “[n]eed for legislation” in terms of what “[t]he 
Commission believes” (underscoring omitted)]; ibid. [“This bill 
is a result of extensive study and recommendations by the 
California [L]aw Revision Commission.”].)   
In explaining its decision to recommend codifying section 
15402, the Commission said:  “Under general principles the 
settlor, or other person holding the power to revoke, may modify 
as well as terminate a revocable trust.  [Fn. omitted.]  The 
proposed law codifies this rule and also makes clear that the 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
 
method of modification is the same as the method of 
termination, barring a contrary provision in the trust.”  
(Recommendation Proposing the Trust Law, supra, at p. 568; 
see also id. at p. 636 [“Power to revoke includes power to modify” 
(boldface omitted)]; ibid. [“Section 15402 . . . codifies the general 
rule that a power of revocation implies the power of 
modification”].)  The Commission’s commentary makes clear 
that section 15402 was enacted to codify the preexisting rule 
that the power of revocation includes the power of modification, 
and thus an available method of revocation is also an available 
method of modification unless a trust term precludes the use of 
any method of revocation for modification.  (Recommendation 
Proposing the Trust Law, at p. 568.)  Section 15402 was not 
added, as King contends, to establish a different rule from 
section 15401.  (King, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193.)  
Nothing in the Commission’s statements proposed treating 
modification differently from revocation or changing the 
preexisting rule.  In fact, all of the Commission’s statements 
about modification indicate that modification should be 
governed by the procedures for revocation unless the settlor 
makes clear an intention to establish a different rule. 
King contends that if section 15402 merely incorporated 
the procedures of section 15401 for modifications, then section 
15402 would be surplusage.  (King, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1193.)  But the Legislature had reason to accept the 
Commission’s recommendation and codify the common law rule 
that revocation procedures can be used for modification.  An 
appellate court had expressed uncertainty about the legal 
underpinnings of the rule.  (See Heifetz v. Bank of America 
(1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 776, 781 [“ ‘Does power to revoke include 
power to amend?  It has been held that it does not where the 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
 
only power reserved is to revoke the trust in its entirety.  Where 
the terms of the trust are less explicit, the answer is more 
doubtful.  The Restatement [of Trusts] (§ 331[, com.] g) is 
favorable to the view that the power to amend is included in the 
power to revoke.  The authorities upon the point do not seem to 
be numerous.  As a practical proposition, the principle referred 
to, if it exists, is too uncertain, too dependent on language 
furnishing only disputable evidence of intent, to provide a safe 
working rule.’ ”].)  In the Commission’s reports recommending 
that the Legislature enact section 15402, it cited Heifetz, 
suggesting that the legal uncertainty Heifetz identified may 
have contributed to its decision to recommend formalizing the 
common law rule.  (See, e.g., Recommendation Proposing the 
Trust Law, supra, at pp. 568, fn. 253, 636.)   
A later amendment to section 15401 underscores that the 
Legislature 
intended 
revocation 
procedures 
to 
govern 
modification.  In 1988, in response to a proposal by the 
Commission, the Legislature enacted a change to what is now 
subdivision (c) of section 15401 relating to attorneys in fact.  The 
relevant statutory provision previously stated that “[a] trust 
may not be revoked by an attorney.”  (Stats. 1986, ch. 820, § 40, 
p. 2756, italics added.)  The Legislature amended the statute to 
state that “[a] trust may not be modified or revoked by an 
attorney.”  (Stats. 1988, ch. 113, § 19, p. 481, italics added.)  In 
proposing this change, the Commission explained that its goal 
was “to make clear that the rule applicable to revocation by an 
attorney in fact applies to modification,” which “is consistent 
with the rule provided in section 15402.”  (Recommendations 
Relating to Probate Law (Dec. 1987) 19 Cal. Law Revision Com. 
Rep. (1988) p. 1097.)  There is no evidence that the Legislature 
intended to depart from this goal in enacting the amendment. 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
 
It is also relevant that the Commission proposed to make 
the statutory method more readily available for modification 
and revocation.  The Commission repeatedly indicated that the 
power of revocation historically has implied the power of 
modification and that the Commission’s intention was to codify 
that rule.  (See, e.g., Recommendation Proposing the Trust Law, 
supra, at pp. 568, 636.)  Further, the Commission expressly 
stated its goal of expanding the availability of the statutory 
method for revocation.  (Id., at p. 568.)  These statements 
suggest that the Commission and, in turn, the Legislature 
intended to expand the availability of the statutory method not 
solely for revocation but also for modification, a process that the 
Commission viewed as implicit in the power of revocation.   
In explaining its proposal to expand the availability of the 
statutory method, the Commission said that under Civil Code 
former section 2280, “California courts generally . . . held that 
where the trust instrument prescribes a method of revocation, 
the prescribed procedure must be followed rather than the 
statutory method.  [Fn. omitted.]  This rule [was] defended on 
the grounds that the settlor may wish to establish a more 
complicated manner of revocation than that provided by statute 
where there is a concern about ‘future senility or future undue 
influence while in a weakened condition.’ ”  (Recommendation 
Proposing the Trust Law, supra, at pp. 567–568.)  However, the 
Commission pointed out, this prior “rule may be criticized as 
defeating the clear intention of the settlor who attempts to 
revoke a revocable trust by the statutory method, in 
circumstances that do not involve undue influence or a lack of 
capacity.  In fact, the settlor may have forgotten about the 
method provided in the trust, or may not be aware of the case-
law rule [that prescribing another procedure in the trust 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
 
instrument would displace the statutory method].”  (Id., at 
p. 568.)   
Taking these competing concerns into account, the 
Commission proposed section 15401, subdivision (a)(2), which 
was adopted by the Legislature to prioritize the availability of 
the statutory method while allowing settlors to bind themselves 
to more onerous procedures if they desire.  The Commission 
explained, “The proposed law adopts a compromise position that 
makes available the statutory method of revoking by delivery of 
a written instrument to the trustee during the settlor’s lifetime 
except where the trust instrument explicitly makes exclusive 
the method of revocation specified in the trust.  This allows a 
settlor to establish a more protective revocation scheme, but also 
honors the settlor’s intention where the intent to make the 
scheme exclusive is not expressed in the trust instrument.”  
(Recommendation Proposing the Trust Law, supra, at p. 568.)   
The Court of Appeal in this case said that a trust 
instrument precludes the use of revocation procedures for 
modification when it “distinguishes between revocation and 
modification.”  (Haggerty, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 1011.)  
However, the mere fact that a trust instrument distinguishes 
between modification and revocation by authorizing certain 
procedures for revocation and other procedures for modification 
does not suffice to preclude the use of revocation procedures for 
modification.  The legislative history supports the view that the 
settlor may modify the trust using any procedure for revocation 
unless the trust instrument says the settlor may not.  If a trust 
were to provide that it “may only be modified by an 
acknowledged instrument in writing,” then the trust would 
preclude modification via any different method of revocation, 
including the statutory method, regardless of whether the trust 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
 
distinguishes between revocation and modification.  But if a 
trust were to simply provide that it “may be modified by an 
acknowledged instrument in writing,” then the trust would not 
preclude modification via any method of revocation, again 
regardless of whether the trust treats modification and 
revocation differently. 
In sum, legislative history supports the view that the 
statutory method is available for modification unless the trust 
instrument “provides otherwise” by expressly precluding it or by 
explicitly making a different procedure exclusive. 
C. 
Haggerty and amicus curiae argue that policy reasons 
support making modification more difficult than revocation.  
According to Haggerty, “[t]he Legislature had reason to make 
modification presumptively more difficult than revocation.  An 
unscrupulous caretaker or counsel cannot usurp an elder’s 
assets by inducing her to revoke the trust, because intestacy 
laws would keep the estate within the family.  Only if the trustor 
modified the trust and selected a different beneficiary could the 
usurper take her assets.”  But, as respondents note, treating 
modification more restrictively than revocation is not 
necessarily more protective of settlors:  “The [undue] influencer 
could induce the settlor to simply revoke the trust and create a 
new one, which has the same effect as modifying the trust.  And 
even without either revocation or modification, an influencer 
can induce a settlor to transfer assets out of the trust and into 
the influencer’s control.”  Further, the influencer may well “be a 
family member who would inherit if the trust is revoked.”     
In any event, although there are reasons why the 
Legislature could have decided to treat modification more 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
 
restrictively, the question here is what policy choices the 
Legislature actually made, not what choices it reasonably could 
have made.  As noted (ante, at pp. 11–12), the Commission 
considered the policy concern that more restrictive procedures 
for revocation and modification might better protect settlors 
from undue influence.  After weighing the various policy 
considerations, it proposed a “compromise position” that 
preferences the availability of the statutory method unless the 
settlor explicitly binds himself or herself to a different rule.  
(Recommendation Proposing the Trust Law, supra, at p. 568.)  
We presume that when the Legislature adopted this proposal, it 
was mindful of existing protections against the dangers raised 
by Haggerty and amicus curiae, including the tort principles of 
undue influence and fraud.  (See, e.g., Tuolumne Jobs & Small 
Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029, 1039 
[“ ‘The Legislature is presumed to be aware of all laws in 
existence when it passes or amends a statute.’ ”].) 
Alternative 
policy 
arguments 
regarding 
whether 
modifications should be treated more restrictively than 
revocations are best directed to the Legislature, which may 
amend the trust laws if it chooses.  Our task is to give effect to 
the statute as we find it.  Under the statute, the procedures for 
revocation can be used for modification unless the trust 
instrument provides a method of modification and makes it 
exclusive, or otherwise expressly precludes the use of revocation 
procedures for modification.  We disapprove King v. Lynch, 
supra, 204 Cal.App.4th 1186; Balistreri v. Balistreri, supra, 75 
Cal.App.5th 511; Diaz v. Zuniga, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th 916; 
Pena v. Dey, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th 546; Conservatorship of 
Irvine, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th 1334; and Haggerty v. Thornton, 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
 
supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 1003, to the extent that they are 
inconsistent with this holding. 
Finally, Haggerty argues that our decision should apply 
only prospectively and that King should control this case 
because “it was the prevailing law when Ms. Bertsch devised her 
trust.”  But the court below was “ ‘not bound by an opinion of 
another District Court of Appeal.’ ”  (People v. Kim (2011) 193 
Cal.App.4th 836, 847.)  Moreover, “ ‘judicial construction of a 
statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant 
before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that 
construction.’ ”  (Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising Internat., Inc. 
(2021) 10 Cal.5th 944, 951, quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express, 
Inc. (1994) 511 U.S. 298, 312–313).  This rule generally applies 
absent narrow exceptions based on fairness and public policy.  
(Ferra v. Loews Hollywood Hotel, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 858, 
878.)  Haggerty does not argue that any of those exceptions 
apply here, and we see no reason to depart from the usual rule. 
 
 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
KRUGER, Acting C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
POOCHIGIAN, J.* 
 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Haggerty v. Thornton 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 68 Cal.App.5th 1003 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S271483 
Date Filed:  February 8, 2024 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  San Diego 
Judge:  Julia Craig Kelety 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Blut Law Group, Elliot S. Blut; Keiter Appellate Law and Mitchell 
Keiter for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Ragghianti Freitas and Paul B. Gruwell for Sal J. Balistreri as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Artiano Shinoff, Howard A. Kipnis, Steven J. Barnes; Spero Law Office 
and Leah Spero for Defendant and Respondent Patricia Galligan. 
 
Cross Law and Oleg Cross for Defendant and Respondent Racquel 
Kolsrud. 
 
Higgs Fletcher & Mack, John Morris, Roland H. Achtel, Scott J. Ingold 
and Rachel M. Garrard for Defendant and Respondent Union of 
Concerned Scientists. 
 
 
 
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents San Diego Humane 
Society, Nancy F. Thornton, Jill Bousman, George Bousman, Jack 
Hebert, Larry Guentherman, Gail Spielman and Dean Spielman. 
 
Hartog, Baer, Zabronsky & Verriere, David W. Baer and Kevin P. 
O’Brien for Mary A. Nivala Balistreri as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendants and Respondents.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion):  
 
Mitchell Keiter 
Keiter Appellate Law 
424 South Beverly Drive 
Beverly Hills, CA 90212 
(310) 553-8533, ext. 145 
 
Leah Spero 
Spero Law Office 
255 Kansas Street, Suite 340 
San Francisco, CA 94103 
(415) 565-9600 
 
Roland H. Achtel 
Higgs Fletcher & Mack LLP 
401 West A Street, Suite 2600 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 236-1551