Title: CHOUTEAU COUNTY v GROSSMAN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13575
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: May 3, 1977

No. 13575 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1977 CHOUTEAU COUNTY, MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, HENRY I. GROSSMAN, BRUCE G. BRAMLETTE, RICHARD M. KURTH, JOSEPH C. TADEVICK, e t a l . , and a l l p e t i t i o n e r s whose names appear on t h e P e t i t i o n f o r a County Resolution f i l e d on t h e 25th day of May, i n t h e year 1976. Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Truman G. Bradford, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Donald A. LaBar argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Robert K. Strong argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Church, H a r r i s , Johnson & W i l l i a m s , Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent : A. Evon Anderson argued, F o r t Benton, Montana Submitted: March 30, 1977 Decided- MAY 3 1977 Mr. Justice Frank I . Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. The Board of Commissioners of Chouteau County (Board) brought this action pursuant to section 37-301(2), R . C . M . 1947, to determine whether a resolution proposed for voter referendum is valid and constitutional. The referendum proposes that no funds of any nature be used for paving 3 1/2 miles of county road for which the county had called for bids, and that no bids be accepted. The district court, Hon. Truman Bradford, district judge presiding, ruled the proposed resolution invalid. Defendant petitioners appeal. The issue is whether a decision of the Board of County Commissioners to call for bids and expend funds to pave or oil an existing segment of county road is a legislative function and thus subject to the powers of initiative and referendum reserved to the people, or whether it is an administrative function not subject to referendum. In late April 1976, the Chouteau County Board of Commissioners published in the Fort Benton, Montana, "River Press" a call for bids for a new paving project. The Board planned to use county funds to pave 3.5 miles of road south of Fort Benton in Chouteau County. A number of citizens of Chouteau County filed suit to prevent this paving project from being undertaken. On May 13, 1976, dis- trict judge Hon. R. J. Nelson, signed a temporary restraining order restraining the county from beginning the paving project by accepting bids, and ordered the county to appear and show cause why the order should not be made permanent. Before the date s e t for hearing, more than fifteen percent of the citizens and qualified electors of the county had properly signed petitions that the Board pass t h i s resolution which i s i n controversy here: "BE I T R E S O L V E D by the Board of County Commissioners of Chouteau County, Montana that: N o funds of any nature available t o Chouteau County from any source whatsoever be used for paving or oiling that segment of road which i s the subject of that certain c a l l for bids dated April 26, 1976, and signed by James F. White, Jr., Chairman and which c a l l for bids generally describes the road as approximately 3 112 miles of road a t a starting point 5 miles southwest of Fort Benton on the Highwood Road; that no bids from any person shall be accepted by the Board for any such paving or oiling; and, that a l l Resolutions of the Board of Commissioners of Chouteau County i f any t o the contrary are hereby repealed." Further proceedings i n the action for injunction were declared moot when the petitions were received. The clerk of Chouteau County certified t o the Board that the requisite number of signers had signed the petition. The Board then f i l e d t h i s s u i t for declaratory judgment alleging the resolution, i f adopted "* * * would be invalid i n that it i s unconstitutionally vague and The powers of i n i t i a t i v e and referendum are reserved to the people i n the 1972 Montana Constitution. A r t . V , Section 1, provides : "The legislative power i s vested i n a legislature consisting of a senate and a house of representatives. The people reserve t o themselves the powers of i n i t i a t i v e and referendum." (Emphasis added.) A r t . 1 1 1 , Section 4, provides for the enactment of law by i n i t i a t i v e by the people. As appellants s t a t e , what was sought here was a referendum t o either approve o r overrule the prior decision of the Board. State ex r e l . Hay v. Alderson, 49 Mont. 387,406, 142 P. 210. - 3 - A r t . 111, Section 5, provides i n pertinent p a r t : "(1) The people may approve o r r e j e c t by referendum any a c t of the l e g i s l a t u r e except an appropriation of money. A referendum s h a l l be held e i t h e r upon order by the l e g i s l a t u r e o r upon p e t i t i o n signed by a t l e a s t f i v e percent * * *." A r t . X I , Section 8, s t a t e s : "The l e g i s l a t u r e s h a l l extend the i n i t i a t i v e and referendum powers reserved t o the people by the constitution t o the qualified e l e c t o r s of each l o c a l government unit." The l e g i s l a t u r e enacted Chapter 3 , T i t l e 37, R.C.M. 1947, t o carry out t h a t constitutional mandate. Section 37-301(1)(2),, K.C.M. 1947, i n pertinent p a r t provides: "(1) Resolutions may be proposed by the l e g a l voters of any county i n t h i s s t a t e , i n the manner provided i n t h i s a c t . Fifteen per cent (15%) of the l e g a l voters of any county may propose t o the board of county commis- sioners a resolution on a subject within the l e g i s l a t i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n and powers of such county commissioners, o r a resolution amending o r repealing any p r i o r resolution o r resolutions .* * 7kf' (Emphasis added. ) The board then may enact the resolution o r submit it t o the people. Before submitting it, the board may challenge it i n court, a s was done here: "(2) fc * * t o determine whether the p e t i t i o n and ordinance a r e regular i n form, and whether the ordinance so proposed would be valid and constitutional.* * *I1 There i s no objection a s t o the form of the p e t i t i o n f o r a referendum o r the number of signers. The challenge here i s t o its v a l i d i t y . C i t i e s and towns of Montana have f o r many years been subject t o i n i t i a t i v e and referendum. Section 11-1104, et.seq., R.C.M. Both p a r t i e s agree t h a t i n i t i a t i v e and referendum extend only t o l e g i s l a t i v e action and not t o administrative a c t s , c i t i n g City of Billings v. Nore, 148 Mont. 96, 417 P.2d 458, and cases c i t e d therein. The issue then i s whether the proposed resolution addresses itself to a legislative or administrative function. The district court in its Opinion and Order resolved the issue in this manner: "The Montana Supreme Court, in 1966, reaffirmed the rule that 'initiative does not lie concerning matters administrative in nature. ' (City of Billings v. More, 1 4 8 Mont. 96, 104; citing Carlson v. City of Helena, 39 Mont. 82 and Allen v. City of Butte, 55 Mont. 205) The Court, in that same case, acknow- ledged that differentiating between legislative and administrative actions is difficult but accepted as a reasonable test a determination of whether the act was one creating a new law (legislative) or executing an already existing law (administrative). "The Montana legislative assembly has placed the 1 responsibility to Lay out, maintain, control, and manage county roads, ferries, and bridges within the county' with the board of county commissioners. (R.C.M., 1947, Section 1 6 - 1 0 0 4 ( 1 ) ) . The petition for county resolution that is the subject of this suit seeks to make use of the initiative procedure to govern the activities of the commissioners concerning the paving of an existing segment of road. "The Board of County Commissioners of Chouteau County, in publishing its call for bids for paving a section of county road, was attempting to fulfill its' duty and responsibility to maintain and manage county roads; it was performing an administrative act by the execution of an already existing law." We agree with the conclusion of the district court that the resolution seeks to govern administrative acts of the Board which are therefore not subject to referendum. The resolution in question here is in express terms of whether funds should be expended and bids accepted for the project. It would provide if enacted: "No funds of any nature * * * be used for paving or oiling that segment of road * * * that no bids from any person shall be accepted * * * and, that all Resolu- tions of the Board of Commissioners of Chouteau County if any to the contrary are hereby repealed." It expressly addresses itself to the expenditure of funds for the carrying out of the project. The acceptance of bids and use of funds for paving are administrative functions. The resolution does not concern the more fundamental decision of whether the county should pave the road. For this reason appellants' argument that the decision to pave or not to pave the segment of county road is a legislative function and therefore subject to initiative and referendum is not in point. We accept the principle that initiative and referendum provisions of the Constitution should be broadly construed to maintain the maximum power in the people, and that statutes in aid of these reserved powers "'should be liberally construed, and should not be interfered with by the courts, except upon a clear showing that the law is being violated."' State ex rel. Freeze v. Taylor, 90 Mont. 439, 447, 4 P.2d 479. 54 Cal.L.Rev. 1717, 1724. We are not persuaded by the so-called counter-principle that "'if essential governmental functions would be seriously impaired by the [initiative or] referendum process, the courts, in construing the applicable constitutional and statutory pro- visions, will assume that no such result was intended [by the d r a f t e r s ] ! ' ' 5 4 Cal. L . Rev. 1717, 1724. In City of Billings v. Nore, 148 Mont. 96, 417 P.2d 458, cited by the district court, the electors approved a bond issue for storm sewer system. At issue was the method of assessment to fund payment of the bonds. This Court held that since the ordinance for assessment substantially complied with the issue voted upon, it was administrative in nature and not subject to initiative. Two cases cited in City of Billings are not in point. Here, a special improvement district is not in question nor a special assessment. It is contemplated that(genera1 funds of the county are to be used. Allen v, City of Butte, 55 Mont. 205, 208, 175 P. 595, was an action to prevent the sale of property for delinquent assessments on a special improvement district. In Allen the Court stated: "The initiative and referendum apply only to matters of general legislation, in which all the quali- fied electors of the city are interested, and not to matters of purely local concern, such as the creation of a special improvement district, in which only the inhabitants or property owners are interested." Carlson v. City of Helena, 39 Mont. 82, 113, 102 P, 39, was a challenge to a proposed issuance of bonds for procuring a city water system and extending the sewer. An election on the bond issue had been held. On a relatively minor issue in the case, this Court found the initiative and referendum provisions of the code were not applicable and stated: "* * * They in terms apply, and were evidently intknded to apply only, to matters of general legislation in which all electors without distinc- tion may take an active interest. The question whether the council should have authority to issue bonds could be submitted to the taxpayers only." In summary, we hold that this proposed resolution to prevent the use of funds and acceptance of bids concerns an administrative function. Administrative acts are not subject to referendum. Therefore, the proposed referendum is invalid. Judgment of the district court is affirmed. W e concur: - - -3 5 :7JJ-& \ d , i Chief Justy,ce 4