Title: John W. Burch v. V. Gordon Moulton et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1050910
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 31, 2007

Rel 08/31/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 SPECIAL TERM, 2007
_________________________
1050910
_________________________
John W. Burch
v.
V. Gordon Moulton et al.
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-04-2400)
COBB, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment denying the
equitable relief requested by the plaintiff, John W. Burch
("Burch"), on the basis that V. Gordon Moulton and the other
defendants, all affiliated in some way with the University of
1050910
All the defendants listed in the complaint as amended are
1
as follows: Dr. V. Gordon Moulton, president of the University
of South Alabama; the Board of Trustees of the University of
South Alabama; Jack R. Brunson, J.L. Chestnut, Jr., E. Crum
Foshee, J. Cecil Gardner, Samuel L. Jones, Larry P. Langford,
Donald L. Langham, W.H. "Pat" Lindsey, Bettye R. Maye,
Christie D. Miree, Mayer Mitchell, Bryant Mixon, James P. Nix,
Dr. Joseph B. Morton, Dr. Steven H. Stokes, Larry D. Striplin,
Jr., and Governor Bob Riley, in their capacities as trustees
of the University of South Alabama; Dr. Robert A. Kreisberg,
dean of the college of medicine of the University of South
Alabama; Dr. M. Margaret O'Brien, associate dean of student
affairs of the college of medicine; and fictitiously named
defendants 1 through 100, members of the medical student
promotions and evaluation committee of the college of medicine
of the University of South Alabama; the University of South
Alabama; the College of Medicine of the University of South
Alabama; and Dr. J. Allan Tucker, professor at the college of
medicine.  
2
South Alabama ("USA"),  are protected by the doctrine of State
1
immunity. In April 2003, just before his scheduled graduation
from USA's college of medicine but while on nonacademic
probation at that institution, Burch was arrested for the
unlawful possession of prescription drugs and pleaded guilty
to a misdemeanor charge of possession of drug paraphernalia;
he was placed on "administrative leave" from the college of
medicine. In May 2004, after Burch completed a drug-treatment
program, the student promotions and evaluation committee
("SPEC") of the college of medicine met to evaluate Burch's
eligibility for graduation and to make a recommendation to Dr.
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3
Robert A. Kreisberg, then dean of the college of medicine.
Dean 
Kreisberg 
subsequently 
approved 
the 
SPEC's 
recommendation
that Burch be dismissed from the college of medicine.  After
he was dismissed, Burch sued USA; the college of medicine
itself; Dr. J. Allan Tucker, a professor of the college of
medicine; V. Gordon Moulton, the president of USA; the Board
of Trustees of USA and the individual trustees; Dean
Kreisberg; Dr. M. Margaret O'Brien, associate dean of the
college of medicine; and the individual members of the SPEC.
Burch sought an order requiring the defendants to issue to him
the degree of doctor of medicine. The defendants filed a
motion for a summary judgment, asserting as a defense the
doctrine of State immunity.  The trial court entered a summary
judgment for the defendants on the ground of State immunity.
Our standard of review for a summary judgment is settled:
    "In reviewing the disposition of a motion for
summary judgment, 'we utilize the same standard as
the trial court in determining whether the evidence
before [it] made out a genuine issue of material
fact,' Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860, 862
(Ala. 1988), and whether the movant was 'entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.' Wright v. Wright,
654 So. 2d 542 (Ala. 1995); Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ.
P. When the movant makes a prima facie showing that
there is no genuine issue of material fact, the
burden 
shifts 
to 
the 
nonmovant 
to 
present
substantial evidence creating such an issue. Bass v.
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4
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797-98 (Ala. 1989). Evidence is 'substantial' if it
is of 'such weight and quality that fair-minded
persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can
reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to
be proved.' Wright, 654 So. 2d at 543 (quoting West
v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.
2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)). Our review is further
subject to the caveat that this Court must review
the record in a light most favorable to the
nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts
against the movant. Wilma Corp. v. Fleming Foods of
Alabama, Inc., 613 So. 2d 359 (Ala. 1993)[overruled
on other grounds, Bruce v. Cole, 854 So.2d 47 (Ala.
2003)]; Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So. 2d
412, 413 (Ala. 1990)." 
Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 690 So.2d 341, 344
(Ala. 1997).
The college of medicine, a division USA, is supported by
the State of Alabama and is therefore considered a State
institution. Students must meet both "scholastic-cognitive"
requirements and "scholastic-noncognitive" standards in order
to 
graduate. 
Cognitive 
requirements 
concern 
academic
performance, 
e.g., 
standardized 
grades, 
courses, 
and
examinations.  Noncognitive standards  address behaviors
deemed necessary by the college of medicine for a career in
medicine, e.g., attentiveness, cooperation, responsibility,
and maturity.         
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5
Burch began his first semester of medical school in the
fall of 1998.  Burch was required to repeat two of his courses
and was placed on academic probation until May 2000, when his
grades improved significantly.  He was scheduled to graduate
with the class of 2003. During his medical-school career,
Burch 
received 
numerous 
complaints 
relating 
to 
the
noncognitive standards, including reports of difficulty with
authority, a lack of attentiveness, an unwillingness to
cooperate, and poor attendance. Burch was eventually placed on
noncognitive probation in August 2001 based on his delay in
taking the United States Medical Licensing Examination
("USMLE"), Step 1, a required exam, the complaints concerning
his failure  to meet noncognitive standards, and his
significantly late arrival to his first day of a scheduled
psychiatry rotation. Burch was still on noncognitive probation
when he was arrested in April 2003. Before his arrest, Burch
had received a letter dated February 28, 2003, from Dr. Betsy
Bennett, then vice dean for student affairs and medical
education, outlining the many obstacles Burch had to overcome
in order to graduate.  That letter stated, in pertinent part:
"As I made clear to you, I cannot include your
name on the list of students to be approved for
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6
graduation unless it is clear that you will meet all
graduation requirements by May 9. The Executive
Council must approve this list at its April 1
meeting.  Based on your failure to send in your
application 
[for 
the 
USMLE 
Step 
2 
test] 
as
instructed, it will be impossible for you to have
scheduled 
the 
examination 
by 
that 
time. 
...
Therefore, I am forced to omit your name from the
graduation list.
"An additional complicating factor is the fact
that you remain on non-cognitive probation and must
be removed from probation by the [SPEC] before you
can be approved to graduate. [The SPEC] will not
remove you from probation until it is clear that you
will meet all graduation requirements.... 
"At this point it is impossible for you to
receive a diploma on May 10. Even if you are able to
schedule USMLE during the last two weeks of April,
we will not receive your scores before graduation.
Should you somehow manage to get credit for the two
week rotation that you are missing, take and pass
ACLS [advanced cardiac life support exam], take
USMLE 
Step 
2, 
be 
removed 
from 
non-cognitive
probation by SPEC, get dispensation from the
Executive Council to be approved for graduation, and
choose to participate in graduation activities, you
would receive an empty diploma cover. Your diploma
would be mailed to you after we receive a passing
score on USMLE Step 2.
"You have spent five years of your time and a
great deal of borrowed money to reach this point.
Having done that, it seems unfortunate to put
yourself in a position not to graduate.  However, if
you do not intend to comply with the graduation
requirements, I would suggest that you consider
actively, rather than passively, withdrawing from
school.  There is no need to force us to dismiss you
for not fulfilling these criteria." 
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7
Dr. Bennett drafted another letter dated April 25, 2003,
informing Burch that because he had not yet scheduled his
USMLE Step 2 test, a meeting of the SPEC had been scheduled
for May 8, 2003, to discuss his failure to meet the
requirements for graduation. Dr. Bennett was not aware when
she drafted the letter that Burch had been arrested in the
early morning hours of April 25, 2003. 
During his arrest, Burch consented to a search of his
automobile; the search produced not only tablets of Adderall
(an amphetamine) and acyclovir, but also a signed but
otherwise blank prescription form and a partially used
prescription pad.  Burch admitted to using the illegally
obtained Adderall to help stay awake and the acyclovir, also
illegally obtained, for another condition.  At a meeting of
the SPEC at which his arrest was discussed, Burch stated:
"[I]t was after my Family Practice rotation that I
illegally used a prescription pad. ... I basically,
you know, forged prescriptions, you know, you know,
and had it filled at a pharmacy with a friend. ..."
A letter written by Dr. Bennett, dated April 30, 2003,
and hand delivered to Burch, stated: 
"Given our discussion this morning and your
statement to me that you have an addiction to
prescription drugs, it is clear that no decision on
1050910
Ms. Esther Rogers is employed as the employee assistance
2
counselor for a drug-free workplace at USA hospitals and
campus. 
By the time of the May 13, 2004, meeting, Dr. Bennett had
3
been replaced by Dr. Margaret O'Brien and the title of the
position changed from vice dean to associate dean for student
8
your academic status is possible until you have
completed a course of rehabilitation therapy. ...
"I cannot make any promises about your academic
future after your therapy is completed. That
decision will rest with the [SPEC] and will depend
on input from Ms. Rogers
 and your therapists as
[2]
well as from you.  However, as I said this morning,
your first priority is treatment and we will deal
with other issues when that is completed."
Immediately following his arrest, the college of medicine
relieved Burch of all clinical responsibilities.  On May 28,
2003, the SPEC placed Burch on administrative leave from the
college of medicine pending resolution of his legal matters
and the completion of a drug-treatment program. A subsequent
meeting of the SPEC was held in December 2003 to discuss
Burch's status; Burch was present at the meeting and spoke on
his own behalf. Following the meeting, the SPEC recommended to
Dean Kreisberg that Burch be dismissed. Burch appealed the
decision, and another meeting of the SPEC was scheduled. 
The final SPEC meeting regarding Burch's dismissal was
conducted on May 13, 2004.   Burch's attorney was present but,
3
1050910
affairs. 
9
in accordance with school policy, was not allowed to
participate.  A faculty member, Dr. Kenneth Rettig, was  also
appointed to represent Burch. The specific charge against
Burch to be discussed at the SPEC meeting was that "he engaged
in criminal activity leading to his arrest and subsequent
guilty plea while he was on non-cognitive probation in the
College of Medicine." At the meeting, matters pertaining to
Burch's 
arrest, 
his 
cognitive 
medical-school 
record,
noncognitive 
medical-school 
record, 
and 
substance-abuse
treatment were all discussed.  The SPEC again recommended
Burch's dismissal to Dean Kreisberg, who was the final
authority in these matters. Burch met with Dean Kreisberg on
May 17, 2004, after learning of the recommendation of the
SPEC. Dean Kreisberg stated the following in deposition
regarding his meeting with Burch: 
"I suggested that he write me a personal letter
expressing and confirming his commitment to become
a 
physician 
in 
the 
face 
of 
these 
important
obstacles. He indicated he would get the letter to
me in several days since he would be leaving shortly
for California and had other important commitments.
I indicated that I would request a meeting with SPEC
after receipt of his letter. By June 2nd I had not
received a letter and I upheld the recommendation of
SPEC. ...
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10
"I'm saying that it wasn't important enough to
him in the face of the seriousness of all of this to
respond in a reasonable period of time and it was
consistent with all of his lack of cognitive-–or all
of the non-cognitive problems that he has had
throughout the entirety of his medical school
career." 
Burch eventually wrote a letter to Dean Kreisberg dated June
11, 2004. Burch did not appeal the decision reached at the
final meeting of the SPEC; instead, he filed this action in
the Mobile Circuit Court seeking an order requiring the
defendants to "confer unto (Burch) the degree of doctor of
medicine."
Controlling caselaw indicates that the defendants are to
be protected by State immunity unless a recognized exception
applies. In Alabama Agricultural & Mechanical University  v.
Jones, 895 So. 2d 867 (Ala. 2004), this Court construed § 14,
Ala. Const. 1901, as follows: 
"Section 14 provides: 'That the State of Alabama
shall never be made a defendant in any court of law
or equity.' Speaking of § 14, this Court has said:
"'The wall of immunity erected by § 14
is nearly impregnable. ...'
"... Thus, actions against officers, trustees,
and employees of state universities in their
official capacities are likewise barred by § 14."
 
1050910
11
895 So. 2d at 872-73. The following actions are not to be
considered actions against the State and therefore are not
subject to the defense of State immunity: 
"'(1) Actions brought to compel State officials to
perform their legal duties. (2) Actions brought to
enjoin 
State 
officials 
from 
enforcing 
an
unconstitutional law.  (3) Actions to compel State
officials to perform ministerial acts.  (4) Actions
brought under the Declaratory Judgments Act [Ala.
Code 1975, § 6-6-220 et seq.], seeking construction
of a statute and how it should be applied in a given
situation.'" 
Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ., 895 So. 2d at 873 (quoting
Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137, 142 (Ala. 2002)).
Burch does not debate that the defendants are State
entities or agents; he states:
 
"The University was created by the State of Alabama
as a public body corporate and the College of
Medicine is but a part [of] it. Ala. Code § 16-55-1
et seq.  The other defendants are University
Trustees, officers or employees and its Medical
College and, as such, are 'state agents.'"
However, Burch argues that the defendants should not enjoy the
protection of State immunity because, he argues, the
defendants violated Burch's right to due process, failed to
perform a ministerial act, i.e., awarding him a degree, and
acted willfully, maliciously, arbitrarily, and capriciously.
1050910
12
In essence, Burch alleges that the defendants are not
protected by State immunity because, he says, their acts in
denying him a medical degree were arbitrary or in bad faith.
Burch argues that the defendants have a legal duty to
grant him a medical degree because, he says, he has met, or if
allowed would have met, the necessary requirements for
graduation from the college of medicine. As referenced above
in the letter from Dr. Bennett to Burch dated February 28,
2003, the record shows that at the time of his arrest in April
2003 Burch lacked many of the requirements necessary to
graduate. This Court has recognized that parties like the
defendants have discretion in determining a student's academic
status and that if that discretion is not exceeded, their
immunity from suit is not compromised.  In Mustell v. Rose,
282 Ala. 358, 211 So. 2d  489 (1968), a former medical-school
student sought reinstatement as a medical student.  This Court
noted: 
"'It has been said that courts do not interfere with
the management of a school’s internal affairs unless
"there has been a manifest abuse of discretion or
where (the school officials’) action has been
arbitrary or unlawful," State ex rel. Sherman v.
Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822, cert. den. 319
U.S. 748, 63 S. Ct. 1158, 87 L. Ed. 1703 (1942), or
unless 
the 
school 
authorities 
have 
acted
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13
"arbitrarily or capriciously," Frank v. Marquette
University, 209 Wis. 372, 245 N.W. 125 (1932), or
unless they have abused their discretion, Coffelt v.
Nicholson, 224 Ark. 176, 272 S.W.2d 309 (1954),
People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees of
University of Illinois, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 134
N.E.2d 635, 58 A.L.R.2d W. 899 (1956), or acted in
"bad faith," Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne,
supra, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 [(1913)], and see
222 Mass. 76, 109 N.E. 818 [(1915)] (same case).
"'The effect of these decisions is to give the
school 
authorities 
absolute 
discretion 
in
determining whether a student has been delinquent in
his studies, and to place the burden on the student
of showing that his dismissal was motivated by
arbitrariness, capriciousness or bad faith. The
reason for this rule is that in matters of
scholarship, the school authorities are uniquely
qualified by training and experience to judge the
qualifications of a student, and efficiency of
instruction depends in no small degree upon the
school faculty’s freedom from interference from
other noneducational tribunals.  It is only when the
school authorities abuse this discretion that a
court may interfere with their decision to dismiss
a student.'" 
282 Ala. at 363, 211 So. 2d at 493. Even before Burch's
arrest, a meeting of the SPEC had been scheduled to discuss
Burch’s "obstacles" to graduation, indicating that Burch had
not yet met the requirements for graduation. Dr. M. Margaret
O'Brien, associate dean of student affairs of the college of
medicine and a defendant below, described in her deposition
1050910
14
the discretionary process of recommending students for
graduation:
"It's my understanding that if a student fulfills
the requirements for graduation and is recommended
to the President, the President ultimately confers
the degrees of graduation. ... On the College of
Medicine side, we have a committee called the
Student Promotions and Evaluation Committee which
basically throughout the course of each medical
student's tenure at the College of Medicine the
committee promotes them and evaluates them.  The
committee is also the mechanism for discipline.
"In order to graduate, the SPEC-–and that's spelling
S-P-E-C–-would 
recommend 
the 
candidates 
for
graduation."
Certainly the faculty of the college of medicine is well aware
of the requirements for graduation, as set out in the college
of medicine's guidelines and comprising both cognitive and
noncognitive criteria, that a student must meet to earn a
medical degree, and it is within their discretion to award or
decline to award such a degree. We conclude that Burch has
made no showing that the defendants' refusal to award him a
medical degree was arbitrary or in bad faith or that in
refusing to award him a medical degree they exceeded their
discretion over his academic career as recognized in Mustell,
supra.  
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15
Burch 
asserts 
that 
recommending 
a 
candidate 
for
graduation from medical school is merely a ministerial act.
"Actions to compel State officials to perform ministerial
acts" are not considered actions against the State, thereby
lifting the protection of State immunity. Alabama Agric. &
Mech. Univ., 895 So. 2d at 873. Burch asserts that his action
is one to compel the defendants to perform a ministerial act,
i.e., that the requirements for graduation are simply a
"checklist," that he had met all the requirements necessary
for graduation, and that recommending him for graduation was
simply a ministerial act. However, our review of the record
discloses ample evidence showing that the process of
recommending students for graduation requires the defendants
to exercise discretion in evaluating a candidate's compliance
with the prescribed guidelines and is not merely a ministerial
act. 
Among the evidence establishing that the defendants' were
exercising their discretion here are many instances in which
the faculty attempted to aid Burch through correspondence or
counsel regarding areas of deficiency during his years as a
student at the college of medicine. There was no other
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16
student-disciplinary 
proceeding 
with 
which 
to 
compare 
Burch's.
No other student had been arrested while he or she was on
noncognitive probation, and more specifically no student had
ever admitted to forging prescriptions from a stolen
prescription pad. Our review of the record of Burch's unique
case discloses no action by the defendants that could be
determined to be, as Burch argues, arbitrary, capricious, or
in bad faith.  In a similar action regarding a meeting of the
SPEC at which a student's dismissal from the college of
medicine was considered, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Alabama stated: 
"While the evidence reflects that different students
were treated differently and accorded individual
treatment, this is to be expected by a committee
considering the entire academic record of many
different students.  This Court would only be
persuaded by the plaintiff's arguments on this point
where there was evidence that a student with an
academic record and an individual history very
similar 
to 
the 
plaintiff's 
was 
afforded
substantially different treatment from that received
by the plaintiff." 
Watson v. University of South Alabama College of Medicine, 463
F. Supp 720, 727 (D.C. Ala. 1979). Our review of the record
reveals that Burch presented no evidence indicating that the
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Burch specifically asserts that Dr. O'Brien acted in bad
4
faith.  It is important to note that Dr. O'Brien did not
assume the role of associate dean of student affairs until
October 2003, several months following Burch's arrest. Dr.
O'Brien's role was limited, and no evidence was presented to
indicate 
that 
her 
conduct 
was 
anything 
other 
than
professional. 
17
conduct of any individual defendant was willful, malicious,
arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith.  
4
 Burch also argues that his due-process rights were
violated when he was denied a medical degree. We note that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
recognized that actions resulting in the denial of due process
could be sufficiently arbitrary to breach the protection
afforded by State immunity when it evaluated a due-process
claim 
brought 
by 
two 
students 
suspended 
from 
Auburn
University’s veterinary school. In Nash v. Auburn University,
812 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1987), the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that the students had received a fair
meeting, and it summarized procedural due-process claims in an
academic setting as follows:
"'The fundamental requirement of due process is
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner.' Mathews v. Elridge, 424
U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18
(1976) (citation omitted).  What process is due is
measured by a flexible standard that depends on the
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18
practical requirements of the circumstances.  Id. at
334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
577-78, 95 S.Ct. 729, 738, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975).
That flexible standard was translated by the Goss
court to mean that high school students facing the
deprivation of a property right by suspension from
school must, at a minimum, 'be given some kind of
notice and afforded some kind of meeting.' 419 U.S.
at 579, 95 S.Ct. at 738 (emphasis in original). In
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d
150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930, 82 S.Ct.
368, 7 L.Ed.2d 193 (1961), we broadly defined the
notice and hearing required in cases of student
expulsion from college: '[A]n opportunity to hear
both sides in considerable detail is best suited to
protect the rights of all involved.  This is not to
imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the
right to cross-examine witnesses, is required.' Id.
at 159."
812 F.2d at 660. 
We conclude that Burch was afforded far more than "the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner" due-process requirement mentioned above.
In fact, Burch had numerous meetings with the SPEC, was given
ample notice of the requirements he had to meet in order to
graduate, and was made aware of both his rights and the
complaints against him. Burch was allowed the opportunity at
the SPEC meeting to call witnesses, to testify on his own
behalf, and to have an attorney present. A member of the
faculty was appointed to represent Burch as an advocate who
1050910
19
cross-examined witnesses on Burch's behalf. Burch chose not to
appeal the SPEC’s recommendation of dismissal. The SPEC
reported its recommendation to Dean Kreisberg, with whom the
final decision for dismissal rested. 
Burch further argues that his due-process rights were
violated because he was not privileged to the communications
between the SPEC and Dean Kreisberg, through Dr. O'Brien. We
do not agree.  Burch had an extensive meeting with the SPEC
and was allowed to meet with Dean Kreisberg individually after
Dean Kreisberg received the SPEC's recommendation.  Following
that meeting, Dean Kreisberg gave Burch the opportunity to
submit a letter conveying the reasons Burch believed that he
should be allowed to graduate.  However, Burch was tardy with
his reply, and Dean Kreisberg approved the recommendation of
the SPEC before Burch replied.  After reviewing the record as
it pertains to the SPEC meeting and taking into consideration
the 
facts 
that 
Burch 
chose 
not 
to 
appeal 
the 
SPEC
recommendation and was tardy in his reply to Dean Kreisberg,
we conclude that Burch has suffered no violation to his due-
process rights.  
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20
Based on our careful review of the record, we believe
that no reasonable person could determine that a genuine issue
exists in regard to the trial court's determination that the
defendants acted within their discretion in refusing to award
Burch a medical degree and that Burch's due-process rights
were not violated in the process. The defendants therefore
were entitled to State immunity.  Because we conclude that the
trial court correctly found that there was no disputed issue
of material fact and that the defendants were entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law, we affirm the summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
See, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and Parker, JJ.,
concur. 
Lyons and Murdock, JJ., concur in the result.