Title: Soaper v. Hope Industries, Inc.
Citation: 309 S.C. 438, 424 S.E.2d 493
Docket Number: 23747
State: south-carolina
Issuer: south-carolina Supreme Court
Date: November 30, 1992

309 S.C. 438 (1992) 424 S.E.2d 493 Whit SOAPER, Respondent v. HOPE INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner. 23747 Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard October 26, 1992. Decided November 30, 1992. Craig S. Kelly, Columbia, for petitioner. James B. Richardson and Gerald F. Smith, both of Svalina, Richardson &amp; Smith, Columbia and Melody L. James of Setzler, Chewning and Scott, West Columbia, for respondent. Heard Oct. 26, 1992. Decided Nov. 30, 1992. CHANDLER, Justice: We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' opinion reported at ___ S.C. ___, 413 S.E. (2d) 38 (Ct. App. 1992). We affirm as modified. Respondent, Whit Soaper (Soaper), purchased a color film processing machine from Petitioner Hope Industries, Inc. (Hope), for use in his fast photo business. The machine repeatedly malfunctioned over a three-year period, as a result of which Soaper closed his business.[1] Thereafter, Soaper sued Hope, alleging (1) breach of express warrant,[2] (2) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability,[3] and (3) breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.[4] Although evidence was presented at trial, and Hope's counsel conceded at oral argument, that the machine was unfit for ordinary use, plaintiff proceeded solely on the cause of action for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The jury returned a verdict for Soaper in the amount of $84,783.40, the full value of the machine and its component parts. Court of Appeals affirmed, finding ample evidence that "the goods were defective so as to be unfit for their intended use in Soaper's fast photo business." ___ S.C. at ___, 413 S.E. (2d) at 40 (emphasis supplied). Hope sought rehearing, alleging Court of Appeals erroneously equated Soaper's intended purpose with a particular purpose, whereas the only evidence was that Soaper had purchased the machine for its ordinary use. Court of Appeals denied rehearing, declining to address the issue; we do so today. Does a purchaser establish a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose when goods, purchased solely for their ordinary purpose, are found to be unfit for any and all purposes? The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises under the Uniform Commercial Code, S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-315 (1976): Hope contends that this warranty applies only when the buyer has some particular use for a product other than the product's ordinary/contemplated use. Although there is authority supporting this view,[5] we decline to follow it. Comment 2 to § 2-315 specifically states that "a contract may of course include both a warranty of merchantability[6] and one of fitness for a particular purpose." Moreover, § 2-317 requires that warranties arising under the UCC "be construed as consistent with each other and as cumulative." We hold that, where the particular purpose for which a product is purchased is also the ordinary or intended purpose of the product, the warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose, merge and are cumulative, such that a plaintiff may proceed upon either theory. As Dean William Hawkland noted in his guide to the Uniform Commercial Code: Hawkland, A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code, § 1.19020702 at p. 68 (1964) (Emphasis supplied). Under the facts here, Soaper, upon purchasing the film processor, impliedly made known to Hope that his particular purpose for the machine was fast film developing. When the machine failed in that purpose, it was both unmerchantable and unfit for its particular purpose. Our holding today accords with other jurisdictions. See, e.g., County of Westchester v. General Motors Corp., 555 F. Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Colorado-Ute Electric Ass'n, Inc. v. Envirotech Corp., 524 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Colo. 1981); Anderson v. Chrysler Corp., 184 W.Va. 641, 403 S.E. (2d) 189 (1991); Mennonite Deaconess Home v. Gates Engineering Co., Inc., 219 Neb. 303, 363 N.W. (2d) 155 (1985); Van Wyk v. Norden Laboratories, Inc., 345 N.W. (2d) 81 (Iowa 1984); Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 99 N.M. 645, 662 P. (2d) 646, cert. denied 99 N.M. 644, 662 P. (2d) 645 (1983); Ontai v. Straub Clinic and Hospital, 66 Haw. 237, 659 P. (2d) 734 (1983); Thomas v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 48 Md. App. 617, 429 A. (2d) 277 (1981); Tennessee Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Strick Corp., 283 N.C. 423, 196 S.E. (2d) 711 (1973); and cases collected at Annot. 83 A.L.R. (3d) 656 (1978). We hold that where a product is not fit for any purpose, it is not fit for its particular purpose. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals opinion is affirmed as modified. Affirmed as modified. HARWELL, C.J., and FINNEY, TOAL and MOORE, JJ., concur. [1] A more detailed account of the facts is set forth in the Court of Appeals' opinion. [2] S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-313 (1976). [3] S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-314 (1976). [4] S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-315 (1976). [5] See Crysco Oilfield Serv., Inc. v. Hutchison-Hayes International, Inc., 913 F. (2d) 850 (10th Cir.1990); Balog v. Center Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc. 745 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Hawaii 1990); Fiat Auto U.S.A., Inc. v. Hollums, 185 Ga. App. 113, 363 S.E. (2d) 312 (1987); Smith v. Stewart, 233 Kan. 904, 667 P. (2d) 358 (1983); Royal Lincoln-Mercury Sales, Inc. v. Wallace, 415 So. (2d) 1024, (Miss. 1982); Schenck v. Pelkey, 176 Conn. 245, 405 A. (2d) 665 (1978). [6] Under § 2-314(2)(c), to be merchantable, goods must be at least such as "are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."