Title: Commonwealth v. Odgren
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11573
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 4, 2019

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SJC-11573 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOHN ODGREN. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     April 1, 2019. - September 4, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Motion to 
suppress, Capital case.  Insanity.  Mental Impairment.  
Mental Health.  Evidence, Insanity, Sound recording, 
Telephone conversation, Intent, Relevancy and materiality.  
Malice.  Search and Seizure, Expectation of privacy.  
Constitutional Law, Privacy, Freedom of association. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 1, 2007. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 455 Mass. 171 (2009), a 
pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by S. Jane 
Haggerty, J., and the case was tried before her. 
 
 
 
Patricia L. Garin (Jonathan Shapiro also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Marguerite T. Grant, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Merritt Schnipper & Robert F. Hennessy, for youth advocacy 
division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, John Odgren, of 
2 
 
 
murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty in the stabbing 
death of a schoolmate.  At trial, the defendant conceded that he 
had killed the victim and asserted that he lacked criminal 
responsibility because at the time of the stabbing he was in a 
transient psychotic state brought on by a confluence of mental 
illnesses and, as a result, lacked the substantial capacity both 
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions and to act in 
conformity with the law.  In his direct appeal, he asserts that 
the judge erred in instructing the jury, as well as in admitting 
several conversations recorded while the defendant was in 
pretrial detention.  For the reasons stated below, we affirm.  
After a thorough review of the record, we also decline to 
exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant a new 
trial or to reduce or set aside the verdict. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts that the jury could 
have found, reserving certain details for our discussion of the 
legal issues.  On January 19, 2007, the defendant, then sixteen 
years old and attending Lincoln-Sudbury Regional High School, 
stabbed to death a schoolmate in a school bathroom using a 
kitchen knife that he had brought with him that morning.  On the 
morning of the killing, the defendant entered a bathroom located 
in the vicinity of his classroom, stayed for several minutes and 
then went to another bathroom on a different floor, where he 
3 
 
 
encountered the victim. 
 
The defendant admitted to stabbing the victim, and the 
details of the encounter were provided primarily through the 
testimony of another student who was using one of the bathroom 
stalls at the time of the murder.  The witness heard a brief 
struggle between the defendant and the victim, during which he 
heard the victim exclaim, "What are you doing?  Stop that.  Ow, 
ow.  You're hurting me."  He then heard the victim leave the 
bathroom and noticed three or four drops of blood at the foot of 
his stall.  The defendant, who was still inside the bathroom, 
repeated, "Oh, my God.  Oh, my God.  What did I just do?" 
several times and, after a pause, say, "Whoever is in that 
stall, I need you to go get help." 
 
When the witness opened the stall door, the defendant was 
sitting on the floor with his arms wrapped around his knees, 
"kind of clutched up in a fetal-type position," and a large, 
knife was on the bathroom floor.  The defendant again asked the 
witness to find help and stated that he would not hurt him.  
When the witness left the bathroom, the victim was lying in the 
hallway just outside the bathroom door. 
 
When the witness returned to the area with help, he saw the 
defendant kneeling next to the victim.  The defendant stated, 
"Don't let him die.  It was all me.  I did this.  I just went 
crazy."  He also asked if the victim was "okay" several times 
4 
 
 
and continued, "I think I did it.  I don't know why.  I blank 
sometimes, but I'm not psychotic."1  At that time, the victim was 
breathing slowly and had a weak pulse, but when a school nurse 
arrived moments later, the victim did not have a pulse.  Shortly 
thereafter, he was pronounced dead at a local hospital.  An 
autopsy established that the victim had lacerations on his neck 
and chin and defensive wounds on his fingers and that he died 
from stab wounds to his heart, left lung, and liver. 
 
At trial, the defendant did not contest that he had killed 
the victim; rather, he argued that he lacked criminal 
responsibility because, due to a mental disease or defect, he 
lacked the substantial capacity at the time of the killing both 
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law. 
 
A history of the defendant's mental health issues was 
provided by the testimony of his father.  As a young child, the 
defendant engaged in atypical social behavior, was the object of 
bullying, was unable to socialize with other children, became 
increasingly fascinated with weapons and the macabre, and often 
expressed suicidal and homicidal ideations. 
The defendant began receiving treatment for major 
                     
 
1 The defendant made similar statements to police officers 
shortly after the stabbing:  "Is he still alive?  He should be 
alive," and "I can't believe I did it.  Is he okay?" 
5 
 
 
depressive disorder beginning in the third grade.  He was 
subsequently diagnosed with Asperger's syndrome, an autism-
spectrum disorder, as well as attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder, general anxiety with symptoms similar to that of 
obsessive compulsive disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, 
affective dysregulation, cerebral dysfunction, and mood 
dysregulation not otherwise specified.  The defendant attended 
several schools with programs aimed at addressing his special 
needs before entering a program at the public high school in 
Lincoln-Sudbury in 2006. 
 
To support his defense of lack of criminal responsibility, 
defense counsel called three mental health experts -- Dr. 
Richard Barnum, a child and adolescence psychiatrist; Dr. Ross 
Greene, a clinical child psychologist; and Dr. Montgomery 
Brower, a forensic psychiatrist with a specialty in 
neuropsychiatry -- who opined in essence that the defendant 
suffered from one or more related mental illnesses, namely, 
Asperger's disorder and mood disorder, and that those illnesses, 
coupled with his increasing feelings of anxiety and paranoia, 
led to his experiencing a brief psychotic episode during which 
he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions or 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. 
 
Brower testified that at the time of the incident, 
"symptoms of paranoid psychosis, mood disorder, and also 
6 
 
 
cognitive deficits related to Asperger's disorder substantially 
impaired [the defendant's] ability to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law."  He was of the opinion that the 
defendant had developed "a very fearful and anxious take on the 
world because of his difficulties with social interactions and 
his difficulty reading situations and the repeated conflicts and 
problems that he had had as a result," and, accordingly, "he was 
very much increasingly on his guard and afraid of things that 
might happen to him."  Brower concluded that at the time of the 
murder the defendant was in "a paranoid state" without "the 
ability to really distinguish between fantasy and reality," and 
that he "lash[ed] out in a way that reflected a complete loss of 
control. 
 
Similarly, Barnum opined that at the time of the stabbing 
the defendant was essentially experiencing an "autistic 
meltdown," and was so overwhelmed that he could not "undertake 
any kind of sort of clear action or thought."2  Greene testified 
                     
 
2 Specifically, Barnum testified the defendant "had two 
different psychiatric diagnoses," "Asperger's disorder" and 
"what's referred to as mood disorder not otherwise specified, 
which basically refers to significant symptoms of depression and 
emotional instability that don't fit exactly with the other 
defined criteria for depression or bipolar disorder."  It was 
Barnum's opinion that the defendant's "agitation and anxiety and 
disorganization of emotional functioning and thinking were so 
severe that [at the time of the stabbing] he was essentially 
7 
 
 
that the defendant was experiencing delusional thinking and that 
something, although he could not say what, happened in the 
bathroom to cause the defendant to believe that he was in 
serious danger, prompting him to react in an "extremely 
emotional, explosive fashion," and in a way that was "removed 
from reality" and consistent with transient psychosis.3 
 
The Commonwealth called its own expert witness on rebuttal, 
Dr. Alison Fife, a psychiatrist, who testified that, although 
the defendant had "Asperger's syndrome, depression, and 
attention deficit disorder" at the time of the killing, "he did 
not lack the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his actions and he did not lack the substantial capacity to 
conform his behavior to the requirements of the law."  Fife 
                     
psychotic."  The defendant could not "recognize what was real," 
he was not thinking coherently, and "his emotions were 
completely overwhelming him," resulting in an inability to 
control his actions. 
 
 
3 Greene testified that the defendant had a "long-standing 
diagnosis of Asperger's disorder," and opined that at the time 
of the stabbing, the defendant "was experiencing a brief 
psychotic episode."  Greene also opined that "in the time 
leading up to the crime," the defendant "also had a psychotic 
process going on that included delusional beliefs."  He was 
becoming "increasingly anxious about social situations, 
sometimes depressed about them, and increasingly worried about 
the intentions of others, what peoples' intentions were, even 
fear of being attacked."  Greene explained that, as a result of 
the mounting anxiety that the defendant was experiencing, he 
withdrew into a "world of his own making" and his preoccupation 
with Stephen King novels and the number nineteen fueled his 
delusion that something "cataclysmic" would happen on the day of 
the stabbing. 
8 
 
 
opined that there was no indication that the defendant was 
experiencing hallucinations or delusional thinking on the day of 
the stabbing.  She considered it significant that after the 
murder the defendant said nothing about being in fear for his 
life; in fact, he did not say anything that would indicate that 
"he was operating under a paranoid, delusional thought process."  
To the contrary, he was "clear, coherent, and asking for help in 
a calm way." 
 
The jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first 
degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Jury instructions.  When the judge reached 
the substantive crimes at issue in the course of her final 
charge, she instructed the jury on the elements of murder in the 
first degree based on the theories of deliberate premeditation 
and extreme atrocity or cruelty, and murder in the second 
degree, mental impairment, and criminal responsibility.  In 
doing so, the judge followed the Model Jury Instructions on 
Homicide (1999) (model instructions), which were operable at the 
time of the defendant's trial. 
The defendant argues that the judge erred in instructing 
the jury on malice and the inference of sanity, where the 
defendant is a juvenile relying on the lack of criminal 
responsibility defense; the order in which she instructed the 
9 
 
 
jury on the elements of murder, the defense of lack of criminal 
responsibility, and mental impairment; and failing to give the 
defense's requested instruction concerning the consequences of a 
verdict of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal 
responsibility. 
 
"When reviewing jury instructions, we 'evaluate the 
instruction as a whole, looking for the interpretation a 
reasonable juror would place on the judge's words'" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 349 (2016).  
"We do not consider words from the instructions in bits and 
pieces or in isolation from one another."  Id.  With one 
exception, the defendant objected to the challenged instructions 
at trial.  Therefore, we review for prejudicial error.  
Commonwealth v. Waweru, 480 Mass. 173, 187 (2018).  "This means 
that we inquire whether there is a reasonable possibility that 
the error might have contributed to the jury's verdict" 
(quotation, citation and alteration omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Wolfe, 478 Mass. 142, 150 (2017).  "An error is not prejudicial 
if it did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Id.  See Commonwealth v. 
Oliveira, 445 Mass. 837, 845 (2006). 
 
a.  Instructions on malice and intent.  As to malice, the 
judge instructed the jury:  "As a general rule, you are 
permitted to infer that a person who intentionally uses a 
10 
 
 
dangerous weapon on another person is acting with malice.  A 
dangerous weapon is an item which is capable of causing serious 
injury or death.  I instruct you as a matter of law, the knife 
is a dangerous weapon."  As to intent, she instructed the jury:  
"[You] may but need not necessarily infer from the conduct of a 
person that he intended the natural and probable consequences of 
his own acts."  The defendant argues essentially that the 
inclusion of these instructions was prejudicial error because 
the jury cannot infer malice and intent from the actions of a 
juvenile with multiple mental health diagnoses. 
 
As a general rule, "[t]he jury are permitted to infer 
malice from the use of a dangerous weapon, even in connection 
with first prong (intent to kill) malice"4 (quotations and 
citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 250 
(2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1038 (2018).  See Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 105 (2018) (providing instruction that 
jury may infer intent to kill from use of dangerous weapon).  
"It is a principle frequently cited with approval in our cases, 
including those where there is evidence of intoxication or 
mental impairment on the part of the defendant."  Commonwealth 
v. Miller, 457 Mass. 69, 74 (2010), and cases cited.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Szlachta, 463 Mass. 37, 45-46 (2012).  The 
                     
 
4 The defendant does not dispute that the knife is a 
dangerous weapon. 
11 
 
 
inference must be presented as permissive.  See Commonwealth v. 
Albert, 391 Mass. 853, 860–861 (1984) ("Certainly, the jury were 
entitled to infer malice from the intentional use of a deadly 
weapon, so long as the judge's instructions did not compel them 
to do so").  See also Commonwealth v. Dyous, 436 Mass. 719, 734-
735 (2002).  The same applies to the inference of intent.  See 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 815–816 (2017), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018) ("no constitutional infirmity where 
a jury instruction creates only a permissive inference" of 
intent).  Here, the judge's instruction was in accordance with 
the model instructions and appropriately permissive and properly 
instructed the jury on the use of dangerous weapons.  There was 
no error. 
 
The defendant does not challenge as a general matter the 
principle that where a defendant purposefully uses a dangerous 
weapon to inflict fatal wounds, a jury may infer that the 
defendant acted with malice.  He argues rather that the jury 
cannot infer either malice or intent from his actions because it 
presupposes that he is sane and "it ascribes [to him] an adult's 
ability to reason" in contravention of our holding in Diatchenko 
v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 
(2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015).  We have discussed supra that 
such instructions are appropriate in cases where evidence of 
mental impairment has been introduced so long as they clearly 
12 
 
 
are permissive.  See, e.g., Miller, 457 Mass. at 74-75.  
Therefore, we focus our attention on the import of the 
defendant's juvenile status. 
"There is no question that our scientific and legal 
understanding of adolescent brain development has advanced since 
the defendant's trial."  Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 480 Mass. 
334, 341-342 (2018) (collecting cases).  "It is now well 
established, based on 'science, social science, and common 
sense,' that adolescents are significantly different from adults 
for purposes of analysis under the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution."  Id. at 342, quoting Diatchenko, 
466 Mass. at 660.  See Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 59-
60 (2015) ("Scientific and social science research on adolescent 
brain development and related issues continues"). 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, "our acknowledgement that 
adolescents are constitutionally different from adults has been 
precisely limited to our consideration of juvenile sentencing, 
not whether a juvenile defendant is capable of committing 
murder."  Fernandez, 480 Mass. at 342.  Indeed, cases decided 
after Diatchenko, have established that juveniles are capable of 
formulating the intent to commit murder.  See Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 474 Mass. 576, 590 & n.7 (2016) (rejecting argument that 
jury should be instructed that all juveniles incapable of 
forming intent for murder); Okoro, 471 Mass. at 65 ("Legislature 
13 
 
 
has clearly indicated that youth in the defendant's age group 
are considered capable of committing murder, and the trial judge 
was correct to preclude the defendant from putting forward 
evidence that would have suggested it was impossible for anyone 
the defendant's age to formulate the necessary intent to commit 
this crime").  See generally Commonwealth v. Ogden O., 448 Mass. 
798, 804 (2007) ("While a delinquent child may not have the 
maturity to appreciate fully the consequences of his wrongful 
actions . . . , that does not mean that a delinquent child lacks 
the ability to formulate the specific intent to commit 
particular wrongful acts").  At this juncture, we see no reason 
to alter the position articulated in Brown and Okoro, to grant 
the defendant's request that we except juveniles generally from 
application of our usual jury instructions.  Moreover, we are 
satisfied that in the defendant's specific case the jury were 
made sufficiently aware of the impact that the defendant's age 
and various diagnoses might have had on his ability to form the 
requisite intent to kill.  Indeed, his state of mind was the 
central issue at trial.  In short, we discern no error.5 
 
b.  Instruction on sanity.  Concerning the inference of 
sanity, the judge instructed that "[i]n considering whether or 
                     
5 Because we find that the judge's inclusion of each 
instruction was not error, we need not address the defendant's 
argument that he preserved his objection to the instruction on 
intent. 
14 
 
 
not the defendant was sane, that is, criminally responsible, if 
you feel it appropriate you may take into account that the great 
majority of people are sane and that there is a resulting 
likelihood that any particular person is sane."  The defendant 
maintains that including this instruction where the defendant is 
a juvenile relying on the lack of criminal responsibility 
defense and failing to instruct that the jury could reject this 
inference was prejudicial error because it unfairly bolstered 
the Commonwealth's case and critically undermined the 
defendant's only defense.  We do not agree. 
 
At the time of the defendant's trial, we required an 
instruction concerning the inference of sanity "in every case in 
which the question of the defendant's criminal responsibility 
[was] raised."  Commonwealth v. Keita, 429 Mass. 843, 846 
(1999).  In this case, although the judge's instruction was 
consistent with the model instructions, see Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 51 (1999), since the defendant's trial, 
we have advised that "judges should not instruct juries 
regarding this inference."  Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 
806, 815 n.8 (2016).  In that case we explained, "The inference 
that a defendant is probably sane because most people are sane 
is not strong enough alone to permit a rational finder of fact 
to conclude that a defendant is criminally responsible beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Although it is probable that an individual 
15 
 
 
selected randomly would be criminally responsible for his or her 
acts, that same probability would not attach to the tiny subset 
of the population who are criminal defendants with a long 
history of mental illness who proffer a defense of lack of 
criminal responsibility."  Id. at 814.  Thus, we subsequently 
held that such an instruction is erroneous, see, e.g., Waweru, 
480 Mass. at 187; Commonwealth v. Muller, 477 Mass. 415, 431 
(2017), and omitted the instruction from subsequent versions of 
the model instructions.  See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 
(2018); Model Jury Instructions on Homicide (2013).  "Here, the 
defendant is entitled to the benefit of Lawson, as that case was 
released while the defendant's appeal was pending on direct 
review."  Waweru, supra, quoting Muller, supra.  As defense 
counsel objected at trial, we review for prejudicial error.  See 
Waweru, supra. 
 
We are satisfied that in this case the judge's instruction 
did not oblige or even encourage the jury to rely on the 
inference of sanity rather than the evidence presented to them 
in determining whether the defendant was criminally responsible, 
and read as a whole, her instructions sufficiently mitigated any 
risk of juror confusion concerning the burden of proof. 
 
First, the judge prefaced the inference with explicitly 
permissive language that made clear to the jury that they were 
free to consider it, or not, as they saw fit.  We conclude that 
16 
 
 
it was unnecessary for her to instruct the jury that they also 
were free to reject the inference -- we are confident that a 
reasonable juror would have understood as much.6  See 
Commonwealth v. Silva, 482 Mass. 275, 288 (2019) (central to 
assessment of possible impact of alleged error is whether 
reasonable juror could have used instruction incorrectly).  
Second, she instructed that the jury "must decide the facts, 
solely and entirely," including "whether the defendant had a 
mental disease or defect."  Third, and most importantly, she 
instructed the jury repeatedly and thoroughly that the 
Commonwealth had the burden to prove that the defendant was 
criminally responsible and that the defendant did not have the 
burden to prove that he was not criminally responsible.  See 
Waweru, 480 Mass. at 187 (no prejudicial error where evidence 
overwhelming and judge "strongly and specifically instructed 
that the burden is on the Commonwealth to prove criminal 
responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt" [citation omitted]).  
For example, she concluded her criminal responsibility 
instruction with, "Once again, I remind you, it is not up to the 
defendant to prove that he was not criminally responsible at the 
                     
 
6 We do not agree with the defendant that the judge 
presented the inference as a judicially noticed fact.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 806, 814 (2016) (so-called 
"presumption of sanity" is "accurately characterized as an 
inference"). 
17 
 
 
time of the crime.  Remember that the burden of proof is on the 
Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was criminally responsible." 
 
We are satisfied that where the instruction was couched in 
permissive language and coupled with repeated, clear 
instructions concerning the Commonwealth's burden of proof, 
inclusion of the inference of sanity did not diminish the 
Commonwealth's standard of proof, undermine the defendant's lack 
of criminal responsibility defense, or otherwise prejudice the 
defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 475 Mass. 848, 863 
(2016) (inference of sanity instruction did not create 
substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice where judge 
"strongly and specifically" instructed that proof of criminal 
responsibility is Commonwealth's burden and where substantial 
evidence of guilt).  See also Waweru, 480 Mass. at 187-188 
(same); Muller, 477 Mass. at 431 (same).7 
 
c.  Order of instructions and instructions on mental 
                     
 
7 The defendant urges us also to conclude that the inference 
of sanity is particularly problematic as applied to juveniles 
because the "great majority of people" is even less reflective 
of the subset of the population who are juvenile criminal 
defendants asserting a lack of criminal responsibility defense.  
Although it is entirely possible that the inference of sanity is 
even weaker as applied to juveniles than it is as applied to 
adults, it does not alter our conclusion that in this case 
inclusion of the inference did not substantially sway the 
judgment of the jury.  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 
591 (2005). 
18 
 
 
impairment.  The judge instructed on murder in the first degree 
by deliberate premeditation and with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, on murder in the second degree, on mental impairment, 
and on lack of criminal responsibility, in that order.  
Immediately before the instruction on criminal responsibility, 
she stated:  "If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
. . . that the defendant committed a crime, you must decide 
whether the Commonwealth . . . prove[d] that the defendant was 
criminally responsible beyond a reasonable doubt," and she 
reiterated within her criminal responsibility instruction that 
"the issue of criminal responsibility arises only if the 
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant has committed a crime." 
 
The defendant argues in essence that, as a whole, the 
instructions regarding criminal responsibility and mental 
impairment were erroneous, were confusing, and undermined the 
defendant's only defense because the jury were instructed on 
those defenses only after she completed her instructions on the 
elements of murder, and instructed that the jury must consider 
whether the defendant committed a crime before they considered 
the defenses.  We are not persuaded. 
 
Although we do not require a specific order in jury 
instructions, we reiterate that "[i]t is generally preferable to 
instruct on the elements of a defense to a crime after 
19 
 
 
describing the elements of the crime."  Commonwealth v. 
Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 506 (1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 298 and 428 
Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998).  We also note that 
the sequence of the instructions in this case was consistent 
with the sequence of the model instructions.  Although the model 
instructions have been revised to afford the trial judge 
discretion to instruct the jury on criminal responsibility 
either before instructing on murder or within the murder 
instruction in cases where the defendant has conceded commission 
of the crime and where criminal responsibility is the only live 
issue for the jury to decide, we discern no error in this case 
where the instructions flowed logically and the discussion of 
criminal responsibility immediately followed the instructions 
concerning murder and mental impairment.8 
 
In addition, we are not persuaded that instructing the 
jury, "If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that 
the defendant committed a crime, you must decide whether the 
                     
 
8 Our current Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 1 (2018) 
include the following note to the judge:  "Where there is 
evidence of lack of criminal responsibility, [the criminal 
responsibility] instruction, at the discretion of the judge, may 
be given as a stand-alone instruction prior to the murder 
instruction or inserted within the murder instruction.  In 
deciding when to give this instruction, a judge may wish to 
consider whether the defendant has conceded that he committed 
the crime and whether the only live issue for the jury to decide 
is the defendant's criminal responsibility."  See Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 1 (2013) (same). 
20 
 
 
Commonwealth . . . prove[d] that the defendant was criminally 
responsible beyond a reasonable doubt," had the effect of 
"plac[ing] the jurors in an irreconcilable predicament, because 
a person who is not criminally responsible cannot be convicted 
of a crime."  We do not read the judge's instruction as 
requiring that the jurors reach a conclusion concerning whether 
the defendant was guilty of murder before considering whether 
the defendant was criminally responsible.  Rather, it obligated 
the jury to determine whether the Commonwealth proved that the 
defendant was criminally responsible beyond a reasonable doubt 
if the jury were satisfied that the defendant had committed a 
crime.  Lack of criminal responsibility is not an element of any 
crime, see Lawson, 475 Mass. at 812; rather, it is a defense 
that operates to foreclose the possibility of a finding of 
guilty where the defendant's conduct would have constituted a 
crime but for the defendant's lack of criminal responsibility.  
It would not be incongruous then for a reasonable juror to 
conclude that a defendant had committed the act but nevertheless 
was entitled to a verdict of not guilty because he or she lacked 
the requisite criminal responsibility.  Considered as a whole, 
and against the backdrop of a trial that focused almost 
exclusively on the defendant's criminal responsibility, we are 
confident that the jurors understood that they were obligated to 
determine whether the Commonwealth proved that the defendant was 
21 
 
 
criminally responsible beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
The defendant also argues that, to avoid juror confusion, 
the judge should have instructed the jury to consider evidence 
of the defendant's mental impairment each time that she 
instructed the jury on deliberate premeditation, on a prong of 
malice, and on a factor that the jury must consider in 
determining whether the defendant acted with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.9  We disagree. 
 
After instructing the jury on the elements of murder in the 
first and second degrees, the judge instructed on "knowledge" 
and "intent" and stated that "[w]henever the Commonwealth must 
prove the defendant's intention to do something, you should 
consider any credible evidence of mental impairment in 
determining whether the Commonwealth has met its burden of 
proof."  She continued, "Likewise, whenever the Commonwealth 
must prove the defendant's knowledge of any facts or 
circumstances, you should consider any credible evidence of 
mental impairment in determining whether the Commonwealth has 
met its burden of proof."  She stated, "More particularly, you 
may consider any credible evidence of the defendant's mental 
impairment in determining whether the defendant deliberately 
premeditated the killing," and added for good measure:  "I 
                     
9 This factor is "whether the defendant was indifferent or 
took pleasure in the suffering of [the victim]." 
22 
 
 
reiterate, whenever the Commonwealth must prove that the 
defendant intended to do something or had knowledge of certain 
facts and circumstances, in order to prove the crime, you may 
consider any credible evidence of mental impairment in 
determining whether the Commonwealth has met its burden . . . ." 
The judge's instructions flowed in a logical order and 
tracked the model instructions, which noted that when an 
instruction on mental impairment was required it need be given 
only once.  Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 61 (1999).  See 
Commonwealth v. Grey, 399 Mass. 469, 474 (1987) (defendant is 
entitled to instruction that jury could consider defendant's 
mental condition whenever Commonwealth has burden of proving 
defendant's specific intent to cause particular result).  This 
is not a case like Commonwealth v. Berry, 466 Mass. 763, 773 
n.17 (2014), where we determined that the judge's timing of the 
mental impairment instruction had the potential to be confusing 
because the instruction "was so separated from its intended 
context that it is somewhat questionable whether the jury 
actually made the link."  We do not have that concern here.  
There was no error. 
 
d.  Instruction concerning consequences of verdict of not 
guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility.  The 
defendant maintains that it was error for the judge to reject 
his proposed instruction concerning the consequences of a not 
23 
 
 
guilty verdict by reason of lack of criminal responsibility and 
instruct from the model instructions instead.10,11  This claim is 
without merit. 
 
Since the defendant's trial, we have determined that the 
model instruction concerning the consequences of a verdict of 
not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility, which 
was derived from Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 823 & 
n.12 (1975) (Mutina instruction), should be modified to inform 
the jury:  "There is no limit to the number of such renewed 
orders of commitments as long as the defendant continues to be 
                     
 
10 The judge instructed:  "In the event that the defendant 
is found not guilty by reason of lack of criminal 
responsibility, the district attorney or other appropriate 
authority may petition this court under our statutes for his 
commitment to a facility for the care and treatment of mentally 
ill persons or commitment to Bridgewater State Hospital for care 
and treatment.  If upon such a petition, [t]he [c]ourt finds 
that the defendant is mentally ill at the present time and that 
his discharge would create a likelihood of serious harm to 
himself or others, then the defendant would be committed to a 
facility or to the strict security in Bridgewater State Hospital 
in appropriate cases.  The order of commitment is thereafter 
periodically reviewed by the courts of the Commonwealth." 
 
11 The defendant requested that the judge modify the usual 
model instruction in several respects; most substantively, he 
sought the addition of language that would inform the jury (1) 
of the time period that the defendant would be held for 
observation prior to a petition for commitment to the court, (2) 
that there is no limit as to how long he could be committed, and 
(3) that he would not be discharged unless a finding was made by 
a judge that he was sane and able to resume a normal life.  The 
defendant requested also that the instruction be given at the 
start of the trial in addition to the close. 
24 
 
 
mentally ill and dangerous; if these conditions do continue, the 
defendant may remain committed for the duration of his [or her] 
life."  Commonwealth v. Chappell, 473 Mass. 191, 209 (2015) 
(Appendix).  See Commonwealth v. Dunn, 478 Mass. 125, 139 
(2017).  Our holding in Chappell, supra at 205-206, was 
prospective only, and we have concluded that it is not error for 
a judge to give this instruction in accordance with the operable 
model jury instructions.  See Waweru, 480 Mass. at 188-189; 
Dunn, supra.  We discern no error in this case.12 
 
2.  Recorded conversations.  From January 19, 2007, to 
September 1, 2007, the defendant was held without bail in a 
Department of Youth Services facility (facility).  Pursuant to 
the telephone use policy of the facility, all telephone calls 
made by a juvenile to outside telephone numbers and 
conversations between the juvenile and visitors in the 
facility's visitor's room, which take place by telephone, are 
monitored and recorded, with the exception of conversations 
between the juvenile and his attorneys or clergy. 
 
In advance of trial, the Commonwealth subpoenaed recordings 
of the defendant's telephone calls for the period from January 
                     
12 We note that in this case the judge questioned 
prospective jurors on their attitudes toward the "insanity 
defense," substantially limiting the risk that jurors with a 
bias against the defense would be seated, and gave the jury a 
preliminary instruction on criminal responsibility at the outset 
of the trial. 
25 
 
 
19 to July 31, 2007.  The defendant moved to suppress these 
recordings, which he represented included over 2,000 minutes 
(33.3 hours) of conversations between the defendant and his 
family and his friends, arguing that the procedures by which the 
district attorney's office obtained the recordings constituted 
an abuse of the district attorney's subpoena power and that the 
sheriff's disclosure of the jail recordings violated the 
defendant's Federal and State constitutional rights.  The judge 
granted the defendant's motion.  We need not belabor the 
extensive procedure that followed, which was detailed in 
Commonwealth v. Odgren, 455 Mass. 171, 172-176 (2009).  It 
suffices to say that we reversed and remanded the matter for 
consideration of the defendant's contention that the disclosure 
of the recordings without a finding of probable cause violated 
his State and Federal constitutional rights.  Id. at 189. 
 
On remand, the motion judge, who was also the trial judge 
in this case, denied the defendant's motion to suppress, 
reasoning that (1) he did not retain a privacy interest in the 
use of the recordings, even when considering his age and mental 
health diagnoses; (2) the recordings did not impinge on his 
right to communicate with his family and friends; and (3) he was 
not unconstitutionally deprived of due process.  At the 
suppression hearing, the Commonwealth introduced fifty-three 
excerpts of recorded conversations, totaling 138 minutes, that 
26 
 
 
took place on and between January 23 and April 5, 2007.  The 
defendant supplemented the evidence with excerpts of 
conversations, totaling seventeen minutes, that took place on 
and between January 23 and March 29, 2007. 
 
At trial, the Commonwealth introduced portions of eleven 
recordings over the defendant's objections on relevancy and 
undue prejudice grounds.  These recordings captured 
conversations covering various topics between the defendant and 
his family and friends.13  In addition, the Commonwealth's expert 
reviewed recordings for the period from January 19 to April 5, 
2007, and relied on those recordings in assessing the 
defendant's criminal responsibility. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge should have 
suppressed the recordings at the outset because disclosure of 
the recordings without a finding of probable cause violated his 
                     
 
13 The topics included the following:  a Viking battle that 
the defendant had learned about in class; execution of a search 
warrant related to a list of items for the end of the world that 
the defendant had written in a notebook as a "joke"; the 
significance to the defendant of the number nineteen; the 
defendant leaving a certain Internet community days before the 
stabbing; the defendant's Internet and computer usage; 
discussion of an archaic prisoner punishment; the defendant 
positing that he did not know why he did not use a different 
bathroom on the day of the murder; the defendant denying that he 
had stabbed the victim; the defendant demonstrating that he was 
aware that he was being recorded; the defendant suggesting that, 
at "worst," the stabbing was manslaughter because it was not an 
act of passion and it was not premeditated; and the defendant 
acknowledging that he did not know the victim. 
27 
 
 
constitutional right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights and his right to communicate with friends 
and family under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, as amended by art. 77 of the Amendments to the 
Constitution.  He renews also his relevancy and prejudice 
arguments.  We address each in turn. 
 
a.  Motion to suppress.  "In reviewing a decision on a 
motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings 
absent clear error but conduct an independent review of [the] 
ultimate findings and conclusions of law" (quotations omitted). 
Commonwealth v. Gallett, 481 Mass. 662, 667 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015).  The 
motion judge found the following. 
 
Inmates at the facility are permitted to place and receive 
telephone calls in accordance with facility procedures.  When an 
inmate enters the facility, staff gives him a form entitled, 
"Inmate List of Designated Telephone Numbers."  The inmate is 
permitted to list up to ten individuals to whom he wishes to 
make telephone calls.  The defendant listed the names, 
relationships, and telephone numbers of ten individuals:  he 
listed four individuals or groupings of individuals as parents 
and family and six individuals as friends. 
28 
 
 
 
The jail administrator then assigns an inmate personal 
identification number (IPIN) for the inmate's use when making 
telephone calls.  The form also provides in a separate box for 
the listing of the names and telephone numbers of attorneys and 
clergy whom the inmate wishes to call; these calls are neither 
monitored nor recorded.  Below this box is the following 
language both in English and Spanish:  "Your acceptance of the 
IPIN and use of the inmate telephones will be deemed as consent 
to the conditions and restrictions upon inmate telephone calls, 
including call monitoring, recording, and call detail."  
Immediately below the warning and acceptance is a line for the 
inmate's signature.  A message preceding every telephone call 
also warns the parties that the call is subject to monitoring 
and recording. 
 
In-person visits to inmates take place over a telephone, 
and a glass partition separates the inmate and the visitor.  At 
the start of the conversation, the parties hear the following:  
"This call is subject to monitoring and recording."  There are 
no contact visits (except with attorneys and clergy) at the 
facility.  There is no monitoring of outgoing mail; facility 
staff opens, but does not read, incoming mail to inspect for 
contraband. 
 
In addition, facility inmates are permitted, at a minimum, 
one call per week of at least ten minutes in duration that is 
29 
 
 
not recorded.  Facility staff visually monitor the inmates 
during these calls.  Between January 20, 2007, and March 4, 
2007, the defendant placed eight telephone calls that were not 
recorded. 
 
i.  Right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment and art. 
14.  The defendant argues that the recordings should have been 
suppressed because, although he was aware that his conversations 
were being recorded, he retained a reasonable expectation that 
they would not be disseminated absent a specific reason for 
disclosure related to some institutional security interest.  The 
judge determined that "the relevant question is not whether 
pretrial detainees or inmates generally retain a privacy 
interest in the uses to which their recordings are put (based on 
this court's interpretation of the current law, they do not), 
but rather whether the defendant's age and disability influenced 
his personal expectations regarding the recording and 
dissemination of his conversations such that his privacy 
interests are entitled to heightened protection." 
 
She determined that "the defendant had effective notice 
that his calls and visits were subject to monitoring and 
recording by correctional facility personnel;" "his age and 
disability did not prevent him from being able to appreciate the 
fact that others, including prosecutors, might have access to 
his conversations with friends and family;" he "is a very bright 
30 
 
 
individual whose conversations reflect a level of sophistication 
well beyond that of most sixteen year olds;" his "numerous 
references to the fact of recording and monitoring are 
persuasive evidence that he understood and appreciated that his 
privacy was curtailed;" and his "restraint in the content of his 
conversations concerning the crime further evidence[d] his 
awareness for the need to be circumspect."14  She concluded that 
"the defendant had no actual, objectively reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his recorded conversations that would prevent 
their dissemination."  We agree. 
 
We held in Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 454 Mass. 685 
(2009) (Grand Jury Subpoena), and reiterated in Commonwealth v. 
Hart, 455 Mass. 230 (2009), that "the constitutional rights of 
an adult pretrial detainee . . . are not violated when the 
sheriff provides copies of the detainee's recorded telephone 
calls in response to a subpoena, provided that all parties have 
notice that the calls are subject to monitoring and recording, 
and the monitoring and recording is justified by legitimate 
penological interests."  Hart, supra at 244, citing Grand Jury 
Subpoena, supra at 687–688, 692–693.  See Grand Jury Subpoena, 
                     
 
14 She noted that, "[i]n the two hour[s] and twenty-five 
minutes of conversation excerpts introduced for consideration, 
the total time of references to the crime is less than a few 
minutes." 
31 
 
 
supra (no privacy interest, under Fourth Amendment or art. 14, 
in contents of recorded telephone calls).15  See also 
Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. 581, 602 (2012) (same).  
This is because a privacy interest protected under the Fourth 
Amendment and art. 14 exists only where a person demonstrates a 
subjective expectation of privacy and that that expectation is 
one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.  Grand 
Jury Subpoena, supra at 688, citing Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 361 (1967).  If an inmate is on notice that his 
conversations are subject to monitoring and recording, then he 
does not have a subjective expectation of privacy in those 
conversations that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.  Grand Jury Subpoena, supra, citing United States v. 
Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290–291 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 
U.S. 912 (1996), and United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 379–
380 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Abbamonte v. United 
States, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988). 
 
In Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 206 (2011), we 
rejected the argument that such recordings could be used "to 
further the legitimate penological and security interests of the 
                     
 
15 In Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 454 Mass. 685, 686 
(2009) (Grand Jury Subpoena), a grand jury subpoena was at 
issue.  We clarified in Commonwealth v. Hart, 455 Mass. 230, 244 
n.13 (2009), that our reasoning in Grand Jury Subpoena applies 
equally to a trial subpoena. 
32 
 
 
sheriff" only, and "not for the prosecutorial purposes of the 
district attorney."  Id. at 206–207 (dissemination of detainee's 
recorded telephone conversation did not violate detainee's 
constitutional rights).  See United States v. Eggleston, 165 
F.3d 624, 626 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1031 (1999) 
("The defendant concedes that he agreed to the recording and 
monitoring of the calls, but argued that he did not consent to 
their use in evidence against him.  We do not think that the 
loaf can be sliced so thin.  If someone agrees that the police 
may listen to his conversations and may record them, all 
reasonable expectation of privacy is lost, and there is no 
legitimate reason to think that the recordings, like any other 
evidence lawfully discovered, would not be admissible"). 
 
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Rosa, 468 Mass. 231, 242–243 
(2014), we rejected the argument that, in accordance with the 
First and Fourth Amendments, "before evidence of a call may be 
used against a defendant at trial, the government must establish 
that the monitoring of that particular call was justified as 
advancing such a legitimate purpose. . . .  [T]his concept would 
be antithetical to the prophylactic purpose of the regulation, 
because it is at best difficult (and more likely impossible) to 
identify in advance specific telephone calls that may raise 
safety and security issues."  Id. at 243-244.  Both holdings 
were underpinned by our determination that adult detainees do 
33 
 
 
not maintain an objective privacy interest in recordings of 
their conversations, under either the Federal or State 
Constitution, when they are on notice that their conversations 
are subject to monitoring or recording. 
 
The defendant urges us to conclude that, by virtue of his 
juvenile status, he retained a reasonable expectation that 
recordings of his conversations would not be disseminated absent 
a specific reason for disclosure related to some institutional 
security interest.  We decline to do so.  The judge found that 
the defendant was effectively on notice, and in fact understood, 
that his telephone conversations were subject to monitoring and 
recording with some exceptions.  Critically, he had alternative, 
private means of communication available.  The judge also found 
that neither the defendant's youth nor his mental health 
diagnoses prevented him from understanding that his 
conversations were not private.  In these circumstances, even 
taking the defendant's age and mental health diagnoses into 
account, the defendant does not have a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the content of his recorded conversations that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.  In Cortez v. 
State, 240 S.W.3d 372, 383 (Tex. App. 2007), for example, police 
allowed a juvenile who was in custody to telephone his mother; 
during the conversation he told her about a shooting in which he 
had been involved.  The juvenile did take any precautions to 
34 
 
 
ensure his privacy but objected to the conversation being used 
at his trial.  The court stated, "Although appellant's juvenile 
status may have entitled him to rights and considerations not 
afforded adults under the same circumstances, we do not believe 
that society is prepared to accept as reasonable appellant's 
subjective belief that he could sit in a police interview room 
and discuss on the telephone his role in a murder for which he 
had been arrested without being overheard by the police, at 
least in the absence of any evidence of police conduct intended 
to give appellant the impression that his conversation would be 
private".  Id.  See Dickerson v. State, 292 Ga. App. 775, 779 
(2008) (juvenile arrested for armed robbery had no subjective 
expectation of privacy in conversation with his mother in 
interrogation room, and thus video recording of conversation was 
admissible at juvenile's subsequent trial, where officers made 
"no representations or inquiries . . . as to privacy or 
confidentiality" and juvenile and mother made no attempt to 
"make the[ir] conversation private").  Contrast People v. A.W., 
982 P.2d 842, 848 (Colo. 1999) (detective's assurances that 
"nothing or nobody" was behind two-way mirror in interview room, 
and "that he would not be listening in," gave rise to juvenile's 
subjectively and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy 
in statements he made to his father).  Accordingly, we discern 
35 
 
 
no Fourth Amendment or art. 14 violation.16  See Rosa, 468 Mass. 
at 242-243; Gomes, 459 Mass. at 206-207. 
 
ii.  Right to communicate under the First Amendment and 
art. 16.  The defendant also argues that dissemination of the 
recordings without probable cause impermissibly impinged on his 
First Amendment and art. 16 right to communicate with family and 
friends, which he maintains necessarily entails the right to 
communicate with them privately.  We disagree. 
 
We recognize that "persons incarcerated in penal 
institutions retain their First Amendment rights to communicate 
with family and friends."  Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 
1100 (6th Cir. 1994), citing Morgan v. LaVallee, 526 F.2d 221, 
225 (2d Cir. 1975).  "Criteria which have been established by 
                     
 
16 Although not apposite here, G. L. c. 233, § 20, 
concerning competency of witnesses, was amended recently to 
provide in pertinent part: 
 
"A parent shall not testify against the parent's minor 
child and a minor child shall not testify against the 
child's parent in a proceeding before an inquest, grand 
jury, trial of an indictment or complaint or any other 
criminal, delinquency or youthful offender proceeding in 
which the victim in the proceeding is not a family member 
and does not reside in the family household; provided, 
however, that for the purposes of this clause, 'parent' 
shall mean the biological or adoptive parent, stepparent, 
legal guardian or other person who has the right to act in 
loco parentis for the child . . . ." 
 
G. L. c. 233, § 20, Fourth, inserted by St. 2018, c. 69, § 111.  
We note, without deciding, that this statutory disqualification 
may have implications for covered parent-child communications 
sought through court order. 
36 
 
 
the United States Supreme Court for judging claims arising under 
the First Amendment . . . are equally appropriate to claims 
brought under cognate provisions of the Massachusetts 
Constitution" (citation omitted).  See Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 
603, 623–624 (2011).  Certainly, the defendant's relationship 
and ability to communicate with his parents warrants some degree 
of protection.  See Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th 
Cir. 2010) ("The relationship between a father or mother and his 
or her child, even in prison, merits some degree of 
protection"); Wirsching v. Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191, 1201 (10th 
Cir. 2004) (same). 
 
Nonetheless, "freedom of association is among the rights 
least compatible with incarceration," and "[s]ome curtailment of 
that freedom must be expected in the prison context."  Overton 
v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003).  See Commonwealth v. 
Ecker, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 216, 220 (2017), quoting Cacicio v. 
Secretary of Pub. Safety, 422 Mass. 764, 770 n.10 (1996) 
("Although 'prison inmates retain certain constitutional 
rights,' those rights are necessarily limited by '[t]he fact of 
confinement as well as the legitimate goals and policies of the 
penal institution'"); Dunn, 621 F.3d 1202 (incarceration brings 
about necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and 
rights, including right to associate with individuals with whom 
37 
 
 
inmate would otherwise enjoy close personal and professional 
relations outside of prison context).  See also, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Jessup, 471 Mass. 121, 133 (2015) (policy 
precluding inmate-to-inmate correspondence did not violate First 
Amendment); Ecker, supra at 219-220 (policy authorizing 
censorship of inmate mail did not run afoul of First Amendment). 
 
In this case, we agree with the judge that the 
Commonwealth's ability to secure recordings of conversations 
between the defendant and his parents could constrain the 
defendant's ability to seek counsel from his parents concerning 
his defense, at least by means of the telephone.  The defendant 
presses the argument, without citation to authority, that his 
protected constitutional right to communicate with family and 
friends necessarily entails the right to communicate with them 
privately.  We are not persuaded, particularly to the extent 
that such a right extends to friends.  Nevertheless, we need not 
decide the question here because in this case, as noted by the 
judge, the defendant had available to him alternative means to 
communicate with his parents privately.  His outgoing and 
incoming mail was not read by facility staff; he had near 
unfettered access to his attorneys, who could act as liaisons 
between the defendant and his parents; and he had access to, at 
38 
 
 
minimum, one unrecorded telephone call per week.17  In short, the 
defendant was not, as he claims, "forc[ed] . . . to choose 
between his fundamental right to maintain and engage in intimate 
family relationships, or to be held incommunicado pending 
trial."  In these circumstances, we discern no violation of the 
First Amendment or art. 16. 
b.  Relevancy and undue prejudice.  The defendant argues 
that the recordings should not have been admitted because they 
were "largely irrelevant" and more prejudicial than probative, 
in that they captured the defendant's "inappropriately blithe 
tone" and peculiar "affect," which were likely to offend and 
alienate the jury.18  We disagree. 
"Whether evidence is relevant and whether its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect are 
matters entrusted to the trial judge's broad discretion and are 
                     
 
17 There was also evidence that on at least one occasion the 
facility allowed the defendant to speak with his parents out of 
earshot of facility staff. 
 
 
18 The defendant goes so far as to characterize the 
recordings as impermissible bad character evidence.  See Mass. 
G. Evid. § 404(a) (2019) ("Evidence of a person's character or a 
character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular 
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or 
trait").  We are not persuaded.  As the defendant notes in his 
brief, his inability to conform his conversations to accepted 
social norms was presented to the jury as a well-recognized 
symptom of his Asperger's disorder.  We conclude that an 
"inappropriately blithe tone" and peculiar "affect" are not 
indicative of a propensity to commit murder, and conclude that a 
reasonable juror would not have made such a connection. 
39 
 
 
not disturbed absent palpable error."  Keown, 478 Mass. at 242, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 456 Mass. 182, 192 (2010).  See 
Brown, 474 Mass. at 588.  "An abuse of discretion occurs only 
where the judge makes a clear error of judgment in weighing the 
factors relevant to the decision . . ., such that the decision 
falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives" (quotations 
and citation omitted).  Keown, supra. 
 
The judge did not abuse her discretion in determining that 
the recordings were relevant to show, among other things, state 
of mind, premeditation, consciousness of guilt, and knowledge of 
relevant evidence.  Nor did she abuse her discretion in 
determining that the recordings were not "unduly prejudicial."  
Rosa, 468 Mass. at 241.  Before trial, the judge reviewed the 
Commonwealth's proposed recordings and addressed each in turn, 
hearing arguments from both parties.  Although the judge allowed 
several calls, she also excluded or redacted others, and 
reserved her ruling on certain calls to determine their 
relevancy and probative value during trial.19  It is evident in 
the transcripts that the judge, in her calculus, weighed 
relevancy and probative value very carefully, and monitored 
closely the Commonwealth's use of the recordings during trial.  
We discern no error. 
                     
 
19 In total, the judge admitted eleven recordings amounting 
to less than fifteen minutes. 
40 
 
 
 
3.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, after a 
thorough review of the record, we find no reason to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant a new trial or 
either to reduce or set aside the verdict of murder in the first 
degree.20 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
defendant's conviction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
                     
 
20 Concerning our review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
the defendant argues that "serious errors in the instructions 
and evidentiary rulings, as well as other factors at play during 
the trial, undermined the jurors' ability to fairly judge the 
evidence presented."  The "other factors" include that (1) the 
judge and the Commonwealth shifted the jury's focus away from 
the defendant's youth by preventing defense counsel from 
referring to him as a "child" or "boy" despite the United States 
Supreme Court's determination that significant characteristics 
differentiate juveniles from adult offenders; and (2) the 
Commonwealth inflamed the jury and made appeals to juror 
sympathy with "unabashed efforts to compare the victim's 
lovability with [the defendant's] characteristics" and with an 
impassioned closing argument.  Neither requires prolonged 
discussion.  There is no danger that the jury were unaware that 
the defendant was a sixteen year old student at the time he 
stabbed the victim, and we presume that the jury heeded the 
judge's instruction that they must not be swayed by any 
sympathy, emotion, bias, or prejudice in reaching a verdict.  
See Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 243 (2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 1038 (2018) ("We presume that a jury 
understand and follow limiting instructions" [citation 
omitted]).