Title: IN RE ADJUDICATION OF EXISTING WATE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 00-100
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: September 24, 2002

No. 00-1 00 iS THE SIJPXEME COCRT OF TiiE STATE OF ?vI.:OUTAXA IN THE MATTER OF THE ADJUDICXTLON OF THE EXISTIXG RIGHTS TO 'THE USE OF .ALL TfiE W'ATER, BOTH SURE:ACE AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE MISSOURI RIVER DRAINiZGE AREA, IUCLUDING ALL TRIRUTARlES OF TIIE lL1ISSOURl RIVER IK BROADWATER, CASCADE, JEFFERSON AUD LEWIS AND CLARK COU APPEAL FROM: The Montana Water Court, Honorable C. Bruce I,oble, Chief Judge COUUSEL OF RECORD: For rippellant: G. Steven Broun (argued), Attorney at Law, Helena, Montana Robert I ; . Lane, Montana Department of Fisli, Wildlife 2nd Parks, I~Ieiena, Montana For Respondent: Honorable C Bruce Loble (argued), ChlefWater Judge; Colleen Coyle. Water Master, Montana Water Court, Bozcman, Montan- For Alnici Curiae: David W. DePuy (argued), DcPuy Law Finn, P.C., Livingston. Montana; William L. Madden, Jr., Willianl L. Madden, Jr. P.C., Bozeman, hfontana (Estate of Eva S. DePuy) Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey Dobbins and Mark R. Maag (argued), Attorneys, United States Department of Justice; Alexandra I.. Davis, Office of the Solicitor, United States Dcpartrnent of Interior (United States of il~nerica) Laura Zlenier (itrgued), Borcman, Montana (Montana Srate Counc~l of Trout Utrln~lited) John E. Bloo~nquist (argued), Doney, Crowley, Bloomquist & Ccla, Flelena, Montana (hlontaiia Stockgrowers Association) Senator Lorents Gros!ield, Big T~rnbcr, Montdna (Pro Se) Argued and Subm~tted Mav 22,2001 Filed: Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion ofthe Courr. "1 The klontana Dcpal~ment of Fish liriidiife anti Parks (DFWP) appeals a I-uling by the Chief Water Judge 011 five pre-1973 water rights claims in the hlissouri River basin. The t h c claims are based on dners~ons of uater for purposes of fish. \\ildltfe or rccrcation 7 he Water Court rullng refers to Iit the ;Ifcztto- i$f)emrbonl ilrairtage ili-eii (1 98X), 234 Mont 331,766 P.2d 228 (Bean Lake) in remarking on the potential inlalidity of the claims. This C'ourt invited subntission of i~micus curiae briefs and received briefs from: E.state of Eva S. Depuy: Montana State Council of Trout Lnlimited; Montana Stoekgrovrcrs Assoelation: Senator L.orcnts Grosfield; and the United States. Only DFWP can represent citizen intcrcsts in the adjudication proccss and, in light of our decision in B ~ N M Lrrke, DFWP prcsenily asserts only those fish, wildlife and recreation claims that involve diversions. To provide gu~dance to the ii'ater Court. me must reso1t.c the Remrr Lake confus~on and address not onlv the question of whether fish, wildlife and recreation uses are recognized as beneficial uses for appropriation purposes, but also whether a diversion is required for appropriation purposes *a2 We restate the issues as follows: f Was Beiziz Lake correct in its holding that "under Montana la\'? before 1073, no appropriation right was recognixed for recreation, fish and wildlife, except through a Murphy right statute?" I I Does the Water Court's use of the "Beatz Lake remark" violate the Suprerne Coun's Water Right Claitn Eramination Rules 5.11 and S.IV(l)(a)'? Jurisdictional Issues 3 ,d- The i$7a'aler Court asscl-rs that the i>FTt'F's appeal is procedrrraliy dcfcctl\e. The Water- four% points out that a Master's Rc~ort was issued with regard to the five DFWP claims involved. The Master's Repon denied the DFWP's requests, and aftcr the ten-day objection period provided for in Rule 53(e), M.R.Civ.P., and Claim Examination Rule 1.1114) lapsed> witliout any objection from DFWP, the Chief Water J ~ ~ d g e adopted the Master's Repot*. The Chief Water Judge correctly points out that when objections are filed, the Water Court researches the issues raised and issues an extensive written opinion which, in turn, fdcilitates review by the appellate court. Accordingly, the Water Court urges this Court to dismiss this appeal or; in thc alternative, corrvcrt the appeal to a petition for declaratory relief or supervisory control. DFWP asserts that strict compliance with Rule 1.11(4) of the Claim Examination Rules is not necessary here since it has consistently and repeatedly objected to the Water Court's insertion of its Bean Lake remark and that the Water Court has adopted an unwavering policy of rejecting I>FWP's arguments concerning this policy cven Lvhen DFWP has filed objections to the master's reports. Nonetheless. DFlVP indicates that it has no objection to the Court's reclassifying this appeal as a petition for declaratory relief or supervisory control. 7 1 4 While we agree bvith the LVater Court that compliance with Rule 1.11(4) of the Clainr Examination Rules i s critical to effective appellate review, we determine, given that our decision i n Rcirti Lrrke is the genesis of the alleged confusion which tltc parties seek to resolve, it is appropriate that we trcat this matter as a continuation of the 1986 Bean Lake 3 controversy wbcrcin we excrciseci supervisory control. Zlccordingiy, as B-c did in iieclir Liliie, \rc acccptjurisdictioa and cxercise our power of general supcwisory control over. the Water Court, pursuant to Artrele 1'11, Sectton 2(2). of the Montana Constttution and Rule 17. M.R,App.P, Taking jitrisdiction no\&- on these purely legal issues will resolve confusion in oui casc lax. pronlote jtrdicial eeonomq, expedite dctcrminat!oil of existing water rrghts and assist in avoiding protracted litigation. McDonczld v. State (1986), 220 Mont. 5 19,524,722 Facts and Procedure T5 This case i~~volves five pre-.luly 1, 1973, water appropriation claims in the Missouri R~ber bas~n. DTWP filed the fivc claims based on dkersions for fish, mildlife andrecreatron purposes for adjudlcatron rn tile Water Court The Water Cour-t ~nscrted in the abstracts for the claims a remark (hereafter "Bcntz L I I X ~ remark") stat~ng: There is a question as to the validity of this claimed right. 1 1 1 the Matter of the Dearborn Drainage Area, 234 Mont. 343 (19888) (the Bean Lake case) the Montana Supreme Court stated: "it is clear therefore that under Montana law before 1973, no appropriation right was recognized for recreation, fish and wildlife, except through a Murphy right statute." 0 Without ruling on any issue, the Water Court's renlark highlights the conflict in our casc law regarding whether appropr~at~ons of water for fish. a rldlife and reereatton purposes are val~d under the prior appropriation doctrine before 1973 1 1 7 DFIVP objected to the ~nsertlon of the remark and requested that thc Water Court remove the remark from the abstracts ofrhc five claims. Follo~ving submission ofbrici's and 21 hearrng, the Water Court denred 11F7U'l''s 0bj~Ctton~ and rctdrncd the Rrnn Lrrkr remark 1 The \%~ter iblaster issued a ""Repol-tand .~vlcmorandum and Order" finding illat tile five claims fcil within the pararnciers ofthe Beiiil Lrike decision and that therefore thc inscrrion of the Berrir Lake remark was appropriate. DFCVP did not object to this Report, and the Chiefilrater Judge subsequently adopted the Master's Report 8 After repeatedly objecttng to the tnsert~on of Bean Lake remarks and rccel-Llng consistent denials in the \Vater Court, DFCVP appealed to this Court for resolution of the conflict in our case law as to whether appropriations for fish, wildlife and recreation uses arc valid water rights under prior approprixtion law. The Water Court objected to appearing as respondent in this case, and this Cour-t issued an order that the Water Court, as author ofthe Rciin Lake remark, was a proper respondent in these proceedings. Given thc on-going and state-wide significance of the issue, we invited all interested parties to submit nrriicrt.~ ctiriite briefs DISCUSSION I Was Kenr~ Lalie correct in its holding that "under Montana law before 1973, no appropriation right was recogniled for recreation, fish and \vildlrfe. except through a Murphy r~ght statute'?" Water Law in the American West: 'i'he Doctrine of Prior Appropriation '0 Miners in California developed a water use system as an altcmative to the riparian water system prevalent in England and the eastern United States. While riparian5 allowed owners of land abutting the water source to control it, the more arid climes of the American West required a different approach. Priot- appropriation, adapting flexibly to the needs ofa developing society, allowed diversion to a distant location and simply required use of the 5 water for a beneiiciai purpose. "Kestern states adopted ihc miners. customs through both court decisions and codification, and the doctrine of prior appropriation became the iaw of the western states. A. Stone; Selected As~~ecrs of'Mont(ztrila Mirter Liiw 7 (1978j; Christine A. Kiein, l%e Cor~.stituriotzal .Llt%tltoloL~,~ qq/'I.Vestertz IYr~ter L,ai,t-. 14 Va. Envtl. L..J. 343? 347-48 (1 995). 710 The common law elements of a valid appropriation are intent, notice, diversion and application to beneficial use. However, in Montana, as in many western states, the flexibility of the prior appropriation doctrine has allowed acquisition of the right to use a specific amount of water tlirough application of the water to a beneficial use. A, Stone, ;\,fontaria Water La!? (1 994). Judicial opinions and scholarly comnlcntators have repeatedly stated the rule that application to a beneficial use is the touchstone of the appropriation doctrine. See, e.g., PI. Stone. Selected Aspects of i\/lorrtczna Water Law 30 (1978): Thonra.r v. Grrir(zzirl (1883), 6 Colo. 530. 533 ("[t]he true test of appropriation of water is the successful application thereof to the beneficial use designed, and the method of diverting or carrying the same, or niaking such application. is immaterial"). Bean Lake 71 1 Bear1 Lrrke involved a claim for inlalte water rights for fish, wildlifc and recreation purposes in a natural pothole lake. In Ilecin Lmlce this Court stated, "[ijt is clear therefore that rinder Montana law before 1973, no appropriation right was recognized for recrcatiott, fish and wiidiife, cxccpt through a Murphy right stature."! ileltrr Luke, 234 hlciiont. at 343, 755 P.2d at 236. 312 The Beati Lukc decision appears to be inconsistent \vith earlicr case law in which the Court recognircd appropriations for fish. wildlife and recreation. See, e.g, Ostles Livesrock G. 1:. CVurrerl (1936). 103 Mont. 284, 62 P.2d 205, and Psi-adke Rainbou:~ v. Fish iirtd Ciutne Cotnrrrission (1966), 148 Mont. 412,421 P.Zd 717. In holding that no appropriation right was recognized for fish, wildlife and recreation, the Bear? Lalw Court ignored Osrzes and misread Paradise Rainhorvs. The Ost~cs Court ruled that an earlier diversion of water, even if used only to maintain a swimming pool or fish pond, had priority over a later appropriation and stated, "it is not clear that such a use [slrin~rning pool or fish pond] bvould not be a beneficial use and hence the basis of a valid appropriation." Oaze.s, 103 Mont. at 302, 62 P.2d at 214. The Bean Lake Court neglected to discuss or ackno\vledge the 0.snes precedent. 1/13 In Pnt-c~di~se Kuiriha~t~s, the Court again recognized the diversion of water for fish ponds as a valid appropriation of water. The Pcrrrtdise Ritirtboir:~ holding explicitly validated a diversionaly appropriation for fish. In Rerrri Lake. however, the Court concentrated solely on the P-'crrcidise Nrrlrzho1v.s Court's un>~illingness, tinder the peculiar facts of that case; to z . 3 I l-rc ! 960 klontana L,egislaturc created a procedure by which the Fish and Game Comit~issioii could appropriate instream flows for fish, wildlife and reereatio~i purposes on certain designated streams. Section 89-80!, RCM (1947). prorecx rrin instrea~n fish and rccrcaiion right and, conscyucntiy, ovcriooked the flv-t that in Poi-czdise Ruinhoit.~ the Court upheld a diversionary appropriarion o f water for fish. 714 The majority of briefs sub~iiitted in this case concur that the Beat! Lake decision is fraught with internal inconsistencies. In Recin Lake. the Court acknowledged that beneficial use is the touchstone of a valid appropriation right. Reart Lake, 234 Mont. at 340,766 P.2d at 234. The Court noted that Article IX, Section 3, of the 1972 Montana Constitution recognized recreation as a beneficial use and accepted "as given that the activities of the DFWP in stocking Bean Lake: maintaining the fishery resource. . . coupled with the general public use of Bean Lake thr the purpose of recreation, wildlife and fishing constituted a beneficial use of the \vaters within the meaning of the appropriation doctrine." /3ean Lake, 234 blont. at 339, 7hh P.2d at 233. 715 In seeming conflict with these findings that (1) beneficial use is the test of a valid right, and (2) fish, wildlife and recreation uses are beneficial uses, the Court concluded that "no Montana legal authority, deriving from common lax?: or statute, acknowledged that recreattonal, fish or wildlife uses, eten though benefic~al, gave rise to any water rights - bv Etpproprtatron under Vontana law" and therefore "under Montana lac\ before 1973. no appropr~at~on rlght \\as recogni/ed for recreation. fish and rn ~ldlife . . . ." Bean Luke, 234 .4. Did the Bean Lake Court correctly hold that prior to 1973 Montana did not recognize water rights for recreation, fish and wildlifc purposes under the appropriation doctrine? 1 in Becitz kizke, the Court citcd ai~ii discussed iJaii:r/idise il/iirzhoiz.;, in which this Court specificall> recogr~izcd as a vsilid appropriation a diversion of water for fish propagation. There is no hint in the Heiriz Lake decision of an intent tci ovcrrulc Pi;rildi.se Rairrhiiw.9. Beu!: Lake is no model of clarity, ignores 0stle.i altogether. fails to appreciate the ultimate holding in Pnrilili~se Rriir~bo~vs precedent and incorrectly states Montan;i law. Prior to 1973? Montana explicitly recognized water rights for fish, wildlife and recreation uses. Montana was not alone in recognizing as bcncficial the use of water for fish, wildlife and recreation purposes. See, e.g., Fcrden v. fIz~hht.ll(Colo. 1033), 28 P.2d 247,250-5 1 ("lilt is self-evident that water diverted and cmployed for the propagation of fish is devoted to a useful purpose, and all of the parties completed their appropriations of water by its application to the bencticial use designed"); State es rel. Sttrte C;nnie (ilmnzi.isiorr v. Neil River I.'uilej~ C b . ( N . M. !945), 182 P.2d 421, 428 ("we arc unable to find authority, or justification in reason, to support the claim that the 'beneficial LISC' to which public waters, as defined in this and other jurisdictions, may be put, does not include uses for recreation and fishing"). 1 1 1 7 To the extent Reun Lalre suggests that fish. wildlife and recreation are not beneficial uses, it simply misstates Montana precedent and is hereby overruled. We next address ~vhcther ileczi? Luke correctly held that non-diversionary water rights for fish, jvildlife and recreation purposes were not recognizeil in Montana under the doctrine of prior appropriation. F3. Does Aemrz Luke correctly hold that claims for the lion-diversionary use of water for fish. wildlife and recreation are not recognized in :vlonta~la law under the prior appropriatioli doctrine'! " ; 8 in arguing this matter to thc Court; I1f;WP has strenuously contendecl that, since the fi\-e nater right claiins .*\-hich arc the subject o f the Department's appcal ail involve diversions of water. the Court should correct the language in Bctrn Lakc as it applies to diversionary rights but should leave the llectn Lczlce holding in tact as it applies to non- diversionary claims. The dissent also argues that the Coui?, in addressing non-diversionary uses, is going outside the issues and shouid confine itself to diversionary rights. We determine illat such a restricted clarificatio~~ would bc inconsistent with the fact that the Necliz Lake remark R hich has given rise to this appeal is bang applied by the LVater Court to both diversionary and non-di~ers~onarj pre-July 1. 1973, cla~ms. and that the lica~i Lake decision itself arosc out of LIFWP's claim for an instreain, non-dii-ersionary claim to ihc water in a natural pothole lake. Finally. in the Renr~ Lake paragraph which is the primary source of the present confus~on. the Court spec~fieally escherned a n ; v reliance on a d~st~nction betmfeen diversionary and non-diversionary claims when it concluded "[w]hatever the merits of the lack of d~vers~on argument, the DFWP and the public could not habe ~tltended an appropriat~on %here none was recogni/ed by lam. and for the same reason, adverse appropriators could not hale had notice of such a claim."' lien// Lc~ke. 234 \font. at 343,766 T h e Court further exacerbated the confusioi~ when it issued a sccond decision on the Bean Lake matter, ilirrfter ofDenrborn Dr-rrinage Areu (1 980), 240 Mont. 39, 782 P.2d 8% (Beniz Lake II), in \vhich it rejected the Monlana Stockgro\\.ers Association's request for attorneys fees for its role in the original Recrn Lrrlze case. In dictum, the Court purports to sunlrnarize the Neiliz Laice holding, and, in doing so, seems to recognize a distinction between diverted and non-diverted rights. The LVater court ruled, and we affirmed, the Department had no appropri- ation right in Bean Lake predating 1973, because before that time no such P.2d at 236. Thus. given the facts of Uecrri i,nke9 the language ofthc ijeair Lake decision and the bi-oad application of tile resulting iiecur Lake remark, it is necessary that we address the question of l%licthcr thc Kciirz Lirke dec!ston conectls liolds that claims for the non- diversionary use ofwatcr for fish, wildlife and recreation are not recognized in Montana law under the prior appropriation doctrine. I After the Reun Luke Court concluded that prior to 1973, Xlontana dtd not allo\% appropr~atlon of Liatcr for fish, vvildlrfc and recreatron purposes, the Court essentially skipped the traditional appropriation analysis. Rathcr than evaluating whether DFWP had intended to appropriate water and whether IIFWP provided notice of its intent, the Court simply stated that because Montana did not recognij-c water rights for ikh; \tildlifc and recreatron purposes, DFWP could not hahe intended to approprrate w ater for those purposes, and thus adverse nater users could not hate had notice of any such intent. It 1s unclear from thc opinion itself, whether the Court denled the appropriation for Bean Lake because there Tvas no drverslon or because it found there was no notice of~ntent to apptoprlate. To resolxc the confus~on engendered by Bcnn L,nke, we now determine uhethcr a baltd appropriation of water may be established without a diversion where no diversion i s physically necessary for the ~ntcnded usc. right was recognized for recreation, fish and wildlife. Before 1973, some form of diversion was necessary for an approprialictn. Because the right asserted by the Department lacked rhc elements of"divcrsion, intent and notice," we held that the Department, for itself or for the public, had no valid water right which predated the 1973 Water Use Act. Hean Lake 1 1 , 240 Mont. at 41, 782 P.2d at 899. ":O Vv~hile most traditional uses necessitated a diversion of water for application to beneficial use. thc appropriation doctrine's histoi-y of flcvibiiiiy and practicality support a holding tl~at a diversion is not reauired where thc application to beneficial use does not physically require a diversion. Common sense rebels against a rigid diversion requirement that would refuse to recognize a11 acknowledged bc~zcficial use simply because application to the use does not require removal from and depletion of the water source. 1 1 1 accordance with the doctrine's flexibility, we find that a diversion is not a requisite elernent of an appropriation when it is not a physical necessity for application to a beneficial use. 2 1 More than one commentator has warned against the strict adherence to traditional elements, such as diversion? when the clement no longer serves its original purpose. These scholars also note that beneficial use is the only essential element of a valid appropriation. See, e g.. Tarlock, :3pproprlatio/z For Iil.\trennl Floit. Muintennnce: -4 Progress Report o r 1 ",$'ei.~. " P~lhlic C ~ J tern Water Riglztr, 1 978 Gtah L. Re\ . 2 1 1, 22 1 ("Most \\cstern water experts agree that the actual diversion requirement serves no function that cannot be served by other water law doctrines and statutory procedures. Thus the real issue is whether these uses are beneficial"); Christine A. Klein, Tlze Coa~fitz~tio~zal Mythology of lVesterrl Water Lrrlt~, 13 Va. Envtl. L.J. 333,35 1 (1995) ("Rigid adherence to the diversion requirement has increasingly restricted the traditional flexibility of the ideas of beneficial use and waste. Although appropriation to beneficial use is the true measure of a water right, diversion has frequently bee11 substiuuted as the constitutional require1nent"j. 712 i,:ildcr prior appropriation. a divcrsio:~ traditionally servcd ifrial purposes-providing notice o i a USCT'S intent to approprirrlc tl-alcrl and defining rhc c?ctc:ll of the use. 111 bv\jeui r Caitleroi? i 1922j.04 Mont. d04.2 I 0 P. 761. this Court cxyiaincd that inleiit to ilppropr~ate is to be determined from the specific facts and circurnstanccs pertaining It is argued by defendants' learned counsel that no intent to make an appropriation from Mill Creek on the part of [plaintiffs' predecessors] is shorn-n, and therefore the adjudication is not warranted. . . . Intent to appropt-iate will be presumed fiom tiiese facts, showing, as they do, diversion and use of Mill Creek waters for irrigating purposes. A cluiiiliitrt S itztent at tlie time o f nppropriatiotz must he deter-mined by his act and by sr*rrourzdi~~g circ~~nrstances, its actt~al and contemplated use, and the purpose thercof. (Toofley 1,. C(rrrzpphel1, 24 Mont. 13, 60 Pac. 396.) Actual diversion and beneficial use existing or in contemplation constitute an appropriation [citations omitted], and,fronz this evidence it is plain that water from Mill Crcek was in fact appropriated in the spring of 1867 by [plaintiffs' predecessors], as found by the court. And the change in the point of diversion or place of use did not affect the appropriation. CVileat, 64 Pviont. at 501,210 P. at 763 (emphasis added). 723 In accordance with the historical flexibility of the doctrine ofprior appropriation. the I V h e z e c l t Court held that although rntent could bepreslln~ed from actual d~vcrston, ~ntent could be proven through other facts and surrounding circumstances. Sim~larly. In Bean Luke, the Court noted that d~version could proklde notice or proof of an intent to appropnate. Bea~r Lake, 234 Mont. at 339. 766 P.2d at 233. 'These decisions do not require a diversion for proof of intent. To the contrary. the opinions suggest that although a diversion may provide proof, intent is the essential element and may bc proLen through means other than a diversion. In other words, a diversion, although sufficient to prove intent, is not necessary. qj24 Decisions from this Court have not consisieniiy reqiiircd di~ersions for ivatcr appropi-iatior~s, indeedl dcspiie die fact rhai most traditional bcncficinl uses of ~lvat,ir, such as mining and irrigation, could not occur l,',ithout a diversion, Montana has spccificaliy recognized appropriations of u-ater without diversions where no diversion was required for the intended hencficial use. See, e.g., Iloniclz v. .Joltt~soi~ (l02Gj, 77 Mont. 220,250 P. 963 (appropriation recognized for instream resewoir); Axfell v. M.S. Cotist~l1irrg, 1998 IZIT 64; 288 Mont. 1 50? 955 P.2d 1362 (dorncstic i:se recognizcd without a diversion). Those cases that do suggest that a diversion is an essential element of an appropriation i~rvolvc uses that, of practical necessity, require a diversion for the application to beneficial use. See, e.g., FV(~t*i-erl v. Setiecizl(1924), 71 Moi~t. 210, 220,221 P. 71, 75 (diversion by ditch for use in mining and irrigation); Sherlock v. Cirz.rives (1938), 106 Mont. 206, 216, 76 P.2d 87, 89 (diversion by pipes and flumes from ditch for irrigation and domestic use). 725 .Instice Rice in his dissent states that, in recognizing instream uses prior to 1973, we are rewriting hlontana history. Justice Rice's protestations to the contrary. Montana has a legendary history of cattle and sheep ranching. No doubt Montana's stockgrowers would be surprised to learn, as the dissent suggests, that Montana law would not have rccognizcd a right to Xvater stock directly from a stream. lake, pond or slough w~thout a man-made di~ers~on. Just~ce Rice's assertion that Montana law 1s "monoltth~c" and absolute tn requiring a diversion as a prerequisite element for all pre-1073 water appropriation claims is belied by the fact the Montana Legislature recognized that pre- 1973 claims for stock use and individual use bcrsed l q ~ o r z itistrccinl /low were valid. Such non-diversionar-y, instreanr 14 clainls were exempted from themanciatory filingrcquirement ofTiilc 85, Chapter 2. ('"~vcrq . . person . . . asserting a aciini to an existing righr to the lrsc ol'\xiatcr ansing prior t o i ~ i i y I. i97;3_ is ordered to file a statement of claim to that right with thc departmertl no later than June 30, 1083. Claims for stock and individual as opposed to municipal doniestic uses b(xscd 1lpo11 irrstt-ecmz,flo,v or ground lvater sources are exempt kom this requirement; however, claims for such uses niay be voluntarily filed." Section 85-2-21 2, MCA (emphasis added)). 726 Thc fact tlrat there arc no Montana decisions establishing such an instrean1 right merely reflects the fact that that issue was not litigated, not that such a right was beyond the pale of Montana prior appropriation doctrine. See T.l'ilhlire v. Billitzgs etc. F'oiver C'o. ( 1 909), 38 blont. 1, 101 P. i68, in \vIrich Wilhite brought a nuisance action against thc rnainteiiancc of a dam on the Yello~vstone River which caused the river to overflow somc of LVilhite's land making it '.almost impossible for plaintiff to reach the river and water his livestock or to obtain water for 11ousehold purposcs . . . ." CViIlrite, 39 Mont. at 4, 101 P. at 168. This Court affimied the injunctive relief but renianded for a narrowing of the terms of the injunction. In Bear1 Lake; cve acknowledged, "[ijt cannot be disputed . . . that there were beneficial uses for which appropriation rights could be obtained which would not require diversion of the waters." 234 Motit. at 340, 766 P.2d at 233. Given our history, there is every reason to believe that had tlie issue arisen, Montana would have followed the lcad of Nevada and ltcld that no ditclt, dam reservoir or other artificial means was necessary for watering cattle. If there must be a diversion with intent to apply water to a beneficial use: ihen "'the drinking by cattle consrltutcs a diversion, [and] the ncccssary intent must be that d27 The non-recognltton of lnsheain rises prror to l 973 nould Iikcwtse have been a stlock to Montana's early loggers and railroaders mho used Montana stream Ron s to float logs and railroad ties. .See ,\loi~ta~lii Coalition fbrSfr.eirin Access v. Cur-run (1984), 210 Mont. 38,44, 682 P.2d i03; 166, where we recognized that the Dearbom River was used in 1887, two years before Montana statehood, to float approximately lO0,000 railroad tics. Then in 1888 axid 1889, there \%ere one or two log drives per year donn the Dearbom thus satlsfylng the federal test for navigability for title purposes. The Court then proceeded to analy/e wltether public recreational usc and tishing make a stream na\ igable for "use" as opposcd to titli. I h ' j ~ c quoted extensively from an 1893 decision ti-om Minnesota which rcasoned that navigability for use should not be llmited to commerc~al usage. Rather, the concept must lnclude noncominere~al uses such as "boating and sailing for pleasure." Many, if not the most, of the meandered lakes of this state, arc not adapted to, and probably will never be used to any great extent for, com~nercial navigation; but they are used--and as population increases, and towns and cities are built up in their vicinity, will be still more used-by the people for sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing, skating, taking water for domestic, agricultural, and even city purposes, cutting ice, and other public purposes which cannot now be enumerated or even anticipated. To hand over all these lakes to pril-ate ownership, under any old or narrow test of navigability, would be a great wrong upon the public for all time, the extent of which cannot, perhaps. be now even anticipated. . . . 728 We also quoted from a Wqoming dectston as to the pubhe's use of state waters ir~especti\re of the ow~~ership of the bed or chanilei of waters. and irrespective of their navigability, the public has the right to use public waters of this State for floating usable craii and that use ma:; nut be inicrfei-ed wit11 or curtailed by any landowner. it is also the riglrt of the public \vhilc so lawfully floating in the State's wliters to lawfully hunt or fish or do any and all other things which are not otherwise made unlawf~~!. Drq' v. Ariilsft,o-ong (Wyo, 1961 j, 362 P.2d 137, 137, quoted in ;Clo/zt[lniz Coillitio/r, 2 i O Mont. at 5 1-52. 682 P.2d at 170. e29 I-laving noted n ~ t h approla1 the M~nnesota and Wyom~ng precedent, me quotcd Article IX, Section 3(3), of the Montana Constitutiotl, which statos that all waters within the boundaries ofthe state are the property of the state for the use of its people and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law. Relying on this constitutional provision and on the public trust doctrine dating back to statehood, the Court concluded that navigability for purposes of detemtining public "use" rights is determined by the capability of me of the \ % ater for recr2at1onal pulTnses In sum, we hold that, under the public trust doctrine and the 1972 Montana Constitution, any surface waters that are capable of recreational use may be so used by the public without regard to streambed ownership or navigability for nonrecreational purposes. iblontancl Coalition, 210 Mont. at 53, 682 P.2d at 171. 7'30 Tl?c dissent queries "how this I984 decision, interpreting the 1972 Constitution could have established in-stream water rights for prior years." She dissent conveniently ignores the fact that thc Court, in ;Gloittana Coiilltzon, ~nterpreted not only the 1972 Const~tutton, but also the publ~c trust doctr~ne n h ~ h dates back to Montana's statehood Lnder the Constitution the public trust doctrine, thc public has an instream: non-diversionary right 17 to the recreational use irfthe Stare's navigable siirfacc waters. This holding: ofcciurse, allays the ciinccnir that ?"n Court cxprcssed in Pai-iidise i?:riiiiioiis \;-iicrc tiic Fish arid Ciamc Comtnission contended that the public had a prior right to the use of the strean? since the publrc had used tlic creek as a fisltlng stream and natural fish hatchcp The Court statcd that it could not yield to this coi~tentioit since "[s/ucl~ a public riglit itas never been dcclared in the case law of this state." Prrrcrdise Kuir~hoirs. 148 'Llont. at 419, 421 P.2d at 721. The Court in itloiitnrrii C:oalition fillcd that void and declared that the public docs l-iave a right to recreational use of the State's navigable waters. 73 1 The dissent quotes ,'lfontnrlci Coalitiort as recognizing that landowiier C:urran had no right to control thc use of thc surface ivatcrs of thc Dcslrborn Rivcr to the cxclusiorr of the public. "except to the extent of his prior appropriation of part of the water for irrigation purposes. . . ." Montcrrza Chalitiorz, 210 Mont. at 52,682 P.2d at 170. Justice Rice accuses the Court of ignoring the qualifying clause (quoted above). The referenced clause from illorztailn C'oc~litiorz merely recognizes the principle of prior appropriation: that first in time is first in right. ~Zfiiirte v. Ferris (19521, 126 Mont. 210,216,237 P.2d 105, 108: 5 85-2-401. MCA. In adjudicating individual claims forpre- 1973 recreation, fish and \vildlifc, the Water Court will have to determine the validity of each claini, and as to those claims it finds valid, it will have to assign a priority datc. Section 85-2-234(O)(c). MC.4. 732 Ample case law depicting the evolution of thc prior appropriation doctrine, and emerging from throughout the west. supports a concius~on that the doctrlnc sl~ould not rlg~dly demand a diversion where unnecessary to achieve the itltended beneficial use. See, e,g., 18 f5fipii.e i.'!irter & /"ewer Ch. v. C>r.sccicle Trii,t:n Co. (8th Cir. 1913). 205 F. 123; 12")"[i]f nature acciirnpiislies a result \vhich is recogniicd and utilized, a changc of proccss by rrian :vould seem unncccssary"): 1 1 1 re IVcitei. Kigl~is in 3il::ier River (Or. 1925). 237 P. 322.336 "[wjhen no 'ditch, canal, or other structure' is necessary to divert the water from its natural channel. the law does not vainly require such works: prior to an appropriation"); Town of iienou v. U.i.stfull (Colo. i%GO), 349 P.2d 370,378 ("It is not necessary in every case for an appropriator of water to construct ditches or artificial ways through xvl-iich the water might be taken from the stream in order that a valid appropriation be made. The only indispensable requirements are that the appropriator intends to use the waters for a beneficial purpose and actually applies them to that usc"); State, D q t . ofPczrk.s 1.. [(((tho Depi. o f Wafer Acli?~ln. (idaho 1974), 530 P.2d 924; 933 (Bakes, J., concurring) ("[wlhere an appropriativc water right docs not require a diversion to make it effective and beneficial, in the absence of a statute requiring a diversion there appcars to be no practical reason why a diversion should be required"). *33 The issue of whether Montana recognizes instream water rights prior to 1973 was again addressed by this Court in Stutc e . u re/. C;r,ccly v. Cot~edernted Sulislz arzri Kootenili ( 1 985), 2 19 hlont. 70.7 12 P.2d '754. In Greeb.. the issue was whether Montana's bVatcr Use Act R~as adequate to adjudicate federal and Indian reserved water rights which pre-dated 1973. Addressing Indian water rights: we noted that Montana's Water Use Act permits the Watcr Court to treat Indian reserved rights differently from state appropriatcd rights in terms of thc filing of c!ai!ns and contents of prciiminary and final dccrces.' We then noted that the Act recugniic.s and ~ o n f i m 2 ~ "existing rights l o the usc of any svatcrs fiir an): iwscfiil or beneficial purpose." Section 85-2- 101 (3j, 1IC'A. "Existing right'' means : . . right to the use of ~vater which would be protected under the law as it existed prior to July 1. 1973. Section 85-2-102(8). MC.4. Since the Court in C;~-eely recognized that state appropriative water rights and Indian reserved water rights differ in origin and definition and that Indian rights are governed by federal law (Greely, 219 illont. at 89, 712 P.2d at 762; ciccord, /fpplicotiiiiz fir Henqficiizi Ilr&ter Use Pel-]nit (l996), 278 Mont. 50; 55-57,921 P.2d 1073, 10771, the Court could have coi~cluded that the State of Montana uas bound to reeogni/e Indian resc~wed rights as "existing rights" whicl? would be protected under the law (federal law) as it existed prior to J L I I ~ 1. 1973. Section 85-2-102(8), MCA. Ho\vcver, rather than rely on a federal definition of Indian reserl ed rights, the Greebl Court then set out the Water I'se Act definition of "beneficial use," that is. "t~se of water for the benefit of the appropriator, other persons, or the public, including but not limited to agricultural (including stock water), domestic. fish and wildlife. industrial, irrigation, mining, municipal. polver and recreational uses." Section 85-2- 102(2), 'CICA. Flav~ng thus set out the \ arlous state statutory premtses. 'See, e.g., $ 85-2-224, MC.4 (statement of claim for federal reserved water rights); 5 85-2-234(2), MCA (terms of negotiated Indian water rights compact must be included in final decree without alteration); $ 85-2-234(3), MCA (final decree must establish existing rights and priorities of Indian tribe possessing water rights arising under federal law); and $5 85-2-701 through -705, MCA (establishing reserved water rights compact commission to negotiate with Indian tribes to quantify Indian reserved water rightsj. the (:our; then concluded: "!'his definition recogniyes nonconsumptivc anti insircam nscs for fish and wildlife. it is sufficientiy hrc3nci to a!iaw aiij~tdica~ion of water rcccrved lo protect tribal hunting and fishing rights, including protcction Goin the depletion of streams below a protected protection level." C;r-eely, 21 WMont. at 91,712 P.2d at 763. This holding is significant in that in relies, not on fcderal law, but on the Montana Water I.!se Act's very broad definition of"beneficia1 usc" as the basis for recogni~ing pre- 1973 tribal rights to non- cot~sumptive and instream uses as "existing rights" which n3~1st be corifirmed u~lder the Act. The Court thus concluded that the \\iater Use Act, on its face, is adequate to adjudicate Indian resewed water rights, including claims for instream uses prior to 1973. In effect, the Court, in detcnnining what constitutes an "existing ~isc," incorporated the Water LTse Act's broad definition of "beneficial use," thereby making that definition applicable to both post and prc-1973 water rights claims. Using the same statutory defi~iition for "beneficial use" as cited in Greely (a definition applicable to all water users, not just tribes), thcre is no reason bvhy the Water Court cannot adjudicate both tribal and non-tribal claims for instream uses prior to 1973. '134 Three years after Gt-cell:, we decided Benlz Lclh-e. We note that in Reirn Lake, the DFWP; although it did not prevail, argued in its brief against making an artificial distinction between diverted and non-diverted rights for fish, wildlife and recreation purposes. First, such : a requirement urould be an anachronisn~. While the diversion requirement is appropriate whcrc dibcrsion is the only means by which water can he rrsed, it makes no sense to blindly require a diversion whcri: a beneficial use can and must be made in the stream or lake. As an iiiustrarion of the inapplicabiiiry o f a diversion rcquirernent to ihc rccrcaiional and fish and wildlife use of Bean Lake, imagine a natural or ~nanmadt. depression located close to the lake and of the same size and shape as Bean I.akc, Further assume that all of the watcr of Bean Lake is dikefled by pumping into this depression and the new "lake" is stocked and managed as a fishery and a recreational resource. The artificial lake is unlikely ro be either as productive or as aesthetically pleasing as the natural lake. Ho\vever, if a diversion is an absolute requirement for an appropriation, then the less desirable and much more expensive artificial lake would be given preference in law over the use of the natural lake. Such a conclusion \vould he, at the very least, a disservice to logic. 735 Only two slloi? months alier our Bean Lake decision, the Nevada Supreme Court decided a nearly identical controversy. In Sfcrtc I : . i\lorro.s. the Nevada Coun considered whether "Ncvada law absolutely rcquires a physical diversion of water to obtain a ivaier right" in a controversy involving an inlake appropriation claim for recreation purposes. State v ~Morrooj (Nev. 1988), 766 P.2d 263,265. After noting that the common law had ecolkcd to allow appropriations for stock watering without a diversion when there was no practical need for a physical diversion, the Nevada Court validated a11 inlake appropriation for recreation purposes ,\firroc 766 P 2d at 267. In protecting the tnlake ~ a t e r right, the co~trt held thatjust as the contmoll law "conformed to the practical demands ofstockwatering," so should it reflect the fact that "[dliversions are not needed for and are incon~patible with man3 recreational uses." .Worms, 706 P.2d at 267. U e find the P.re\ada Court's reasoning 3 0 Any perception that Montana law required a diversion as a sitze yiiu nevi to an appropriation arises fi-on1 the fact that most traditio~lal rises, such as agriculture and mining, had a practical nccd for a physical diversion. That necessity coml9incd lviih thc practice of using diversions as ci idence of ii uscr7s intcnt t o appropriate has iindeniahly led to con fusioin in our precedent, ~vhich likewise recognizes instrearn uscs of watcr where no diversion is necessary for the beneficial use. See. e.g.; Axtell 1 ; . MS. (Joils~~lting; 1998 MT 64,288 Wont. 150, 955 P.2d 1352; I>orliciz v. ,Johnsur~ (1926). 77 Mont. 229, 250 P. 063: hloritioln Cbnlition, 2 1 O Mont. at 44,062 P.2d at 160; and Cit.eel7, 219 Mont. at 91, 71 2 P.2d at 763. Given Montana's long history ofbeneficially usingwater for purposes ofagriculture, inining, cattle and sheep ranching, logging, rcrilroading, fishing and recreation, we resolve the confi~sion in favor of the Axtell, 1)oney; .\fotzfurln Co~zlitioil and Cireely line of authority and hold that the doctrine of prior appropriation docs not require a physical diversion of water ulhere no diversion is necessary to put the water to a beneficial use. Thus, instrearniinlake appropriations of water for beneficial uses may be valid when the purpose (c.g., stock- watering, fish, wildlife and recreation) does not require a diversion. 737 Because beneficial use rather than diversion is the touchstone of the prior appropriation doctrine: because Montana has long recognized as beneficial the use of water for fish, wildlife and recreation; and because Montana has validated non-diversionary appropriations, we no%. hold that Montana law prior to 1973 did not absolutely require a diversion for a valid appropriation of lvater. 1138 Finally, we note that the Benil Lake Court's conclusion that the framers of the Montana Cocistitution did not accept fish, wildlife and recreation uscs as a valid basis for appropriative miter rights does not accurately reflect the substance of the debates reflected 23 in the transcripts of the i'oi~stitutio~zal Conucnticin. i h c Court seems to haw based its conciusion on the fict that, afier debiiic, Subsection 4 to Anicie 1X: Section 3; was dcierccl. Propcjscd Subsect~on 4 read as fol!oi%s: Subsection 4, Beneficial uses iriclude but are not lilnited to domestic, municipal, agriculture. stocl<~vatering, industry, recreation, sceslic waterways, and habitat for wildlife, and all other uses presently recognized by the law together with future beneficial uses as deteiniincd by the 1,egislature or courts of Montana. A diversion or development is not required for future acqrlisition of a water right for the foregoing uses. The L,egislature shall determine a method of establishiiig those futurc water rights which do not require a diversion and may designate priorities for those future rights if necessary. 139 A thorough review of the transcripts reveals the rationale for the deletion. After Delegate Wilson proposed at1 amendment that mould make non-diberssonary rights permanently junior to diversionary rights regardless of tile date of appropriation, the delegates voted to delete the entlre section. Sebe~al delegates urged the deletion of the section to avoid the eternal subordinatioa of instream rights to diversionary agric~lltural and industrial rights. Delegate i\rbanas explained, "I sense that the time may collie in Montana when recreation may be our big industry. . . . To say foreber that agriculture or industry will come ahead of-seelns to me somethrng I don't want rn the Constrtutron." Verbatsm Transcript Vol. I.., at 1332. Delegate Re~chert sirn~farly expressed hereoncerns: "Ifwe pass this . . . is there a danger of ha~ing these other amendments tacked on to it? Perhaps I'd be better off, since I'm for recreat~on as a beiieficral use-perhaps \LC are all bctter offto delcte the entire section." Verbatim Transcript at 1341. I'hc transcripts inciicatc that it was thc fear offuture limitations on fish, wildlife and recreation rights that led to the deletion of the entire section. rather than a hciiefthai such rights had not already been recogni~ed. Thus the Beizn LilRe Court misiakcni): relied an riic dcletinn of Subsection 4 in concluding that the friimcrs ofthe Constitution did not intend to rccognize appropriations rights existed for fish, 1 % iidlifk and recreation uses 540 For the foregoing reasons, we overrule the Beat? Lake concli~sion that Montana: prior to 1973, did not recognize fish, wildlife and recreation appropriations of water, whether diversionary or non-diversionary. We hold that Montana recognized fish, wildlife and recreation uses as beneficial and that valid instream and inlake appropriations of water existed in Montana prior to 1073 where the intended beneficial use did not require diversion. and witcn the facts and cjrcumstar~~es indicate that notice of the appropriator's intent had been given. 741 In its brief to this Court, the Water Court requested that, ifthis Court revisits the Berm Lalie decision, we give the Water Court "clear instn~ctions" on how to proceed with regard to recreation, Gsh and vvildlife claims. Accordingly, the Water Court is instructed to identify, review and hold hearings in a manner sin~ilar to Adiudicatio~z of U'nter. RigJzfr. ofYelloiilvtone River. (1992)> 253 Mont. 167, 832 P.2d 1210; on all pre-1973 recreation, fish and wildlife claims, both diversionary and non-diversionary, and determine the validity of such claims under the holding ljerein. 142 final note about Justice Rice's dissentient incantations that the Court has, in addressing non-diversionary rights, gone outside the pleadings anct outside the issues. Far from being outside the issues: non-diversionary rigilts are at the 11ca1T of tile dispute. They arc the very source of the confitsioa that \be arc asked to resolve. v 1 3 The Bear2 Lnkc decision which hits engendered all the coizfusion arose out of claim for inlake, non-diversionarywater rights for fish, wildlife and recreation purposes in a natural pothole. That decision then gave rise to the Water Court's Beilri Lnke remark which, in turn, has been applied to both diversionary and non-diversionary rights. Since the Bear1 take decisions in 1988 and 1989, the Water Court has (as of May 9, 2000) issued Bean Lake remarks in 1666 claims in 38 basins. It makes little sense to prolong the confusion by stopping the legal analysis midstream? as the dissent would have us do. 7 1 4 4 If Hecrrr Luke needs clarification: as all agree it does, then we must, of necessity. address both diversionary and non-diversionary uses. If we were to embrace Justice Rice's simplified rendition of Montana's \\later usage history (ignoring non-diversionary uses for logging, stockwatering, railroading and recreation), we would be writing fiction rather than engaging in legal analysis I1 Does the Water Court's use of the "Heiltl Lizkc remark" \lolate the Supreme Court's Water Rlght Claim Examlnatron Rules 5.11 and 5.IV(l)(a)? lj45 DFWP argues that the remark highlighting the an~bigtlity ill Montana prceedent is a "policy' instituted by the Water Court that violates the Claims Examination R~tlcs promulgated by this Court. We tind that the Montana Water Court has the authority ro include relevant potential issue remarks in its rulings, and that the Heri/l Lnke remark is such an issue remark. ! l 4 G While not challenging the Water Court's authority ro insert issuc remarks, DFWP suggests ihat the consistent insertion of thc h'ccii? Like remark in ali fish, wiidir'c: ar~c! recreation claims indicates that tlse Water Court has adopted a position on thc suhstanti7;e issue. The Water Court on the other hand states that the rcmark mercly identifies potential issues as autliorized by various Claims Examination Rules. Sec. e.g., Rules 2.1(5)(b), 3.11(5)(b), and 4.III(3)(b). 747 We agree with the Water Court that tile Beuit Luke remark simply notes a potential legal issue. The remark does not take a position and does not rule on any issue but merely highlights the conflict engendered by Werol I-nke. Rather than instituting any "policy." the remark simply points out the possibility that Betm Luke could provide a basis for a challeiige to any pre-1 a173 iish, wildlife and recreation water claim. The I-eniark was therefore an appropriate exercise of the Water Court's discretion and did not violate our Claims Examination Rules. We concur: Justice Jim Rice concurring in part aaci dissenting in pal-!. 7 . 1 8 . r ' i he public right urged by the Ccmmissin:i would bc based on the i'dct that the public had used the creek as a f?sl~ing strem~ and natural fish hatchery before DuPuy built his dam. . . . Such a public right has never been dcciared it1 the case law of this state. t'u~zirlise Rr~ifrhow:r v. Fish and G n ~ ~ t e Comn~ission (1966), 148 Mont. 412, 419. 421 P.2d "'49 11 In this appeal, the DFWP is asserting a prc-1973 water tight claim for fish, ivildlife and recreation purposes for appropriations inbolvtng a diversion or capture of water. Although the Court's rationale in Rt'(21z Luke properly recognized that recreational uses may coilsiitutc a beneficial use for purposcs of applying the prior appropriation doctrine, thc op1111on urtfortunatcly concluded that no approprration r~ght for reereat~onal uses of any kind u as recogni~ed pnor to 1973, except for those contemplated under the Murphy r~ghts statute. That conclusion appeared to in\ alidate pre- 1973 rcereat~onal clatms u h ~ c h satisfied all of the elements of the appropriation doctrine, including the element of diversion. '150 1 concur with the Court's holding herein that recreational use is a beneficial use of water, and that the language in Reczn Lnke which purports to invalidate all pre-1973 recreational claiins is erroneous. 'Po the extent that it is necessary to clarify that pre-1973 recreational claims which meet all of the elements of the appropriation doctrine, including diversion, are valid, I concur with the Court's decision herein. I-lowever, I must dissent from the remaining, substantla1 portlon of the Court's optnion llenrz Luke properly held that pie- 1973 claims involving %on-captive," i.e., lnst~earn or iniakc, reercationai uses have never been rccogi~i~ed, as also acknuirledgcd by this C:ouri i ~ r iscirili!i'se R~tinhou,~, 751 The Court offers a lengthy discussion in an effort to market its conclusions that t!lc doctrine ofprior appropriation is aLLhistorieally flexible" concept. and that the strict necessity of establishing diversion is mere "perception." 'The Court further holds that the doctrine recognizes appropriations of water without a diversion whenever a diversion is not necessary for the use. Finally, the Court holds that pre- 1973 instream appropriations have already been recognized and approved in our law. Tliese conclusions, which blatantly ignore controlling statutes and case law, are all erroneous. .A proper review of the applicable law establishes that diversion, or a fonn thereof, such as impoundnient or capture, is a longstanding, foundational and requisite element for all pre-1973 water appropriation claims, including recreational uses. That the law clearly required it is an inescapable conclusion. '52 A brief look at our early history and precedent is necessary to accurately determine the applicable law on these issues. 553 This Court provided a detailed recounting of the early law of water appropriation in Bnilej,~. li'ntinger (,I!) 12), 45 Mont. 154, 122 P. 575. The Court noted the law had its origins in the customs of miners and others in California, and that those customs ripened into well- recognized I-ules long before the development of local government and legislation. "These customs formed a part of our unwritten law, or, as it might more aptly be termed: the common lalv ofthis country as distinguished from the common la\v of Engla~~d.'' Rniiiij:, 45 FMonr, at i 66, 122 P. at 5 7 9 . ;[54 This pre-statutory common law of appropriatioii, often referred to in our case law as the "settlers' customs," was sumniarired by the Court in ii:f;~rrny v. Titigley (1 897)> 20 Mout. 260, 50 P. 723, as follows: "A person acquired a right to use the water by digging a ditch, rapping a stream, and turning water into it, and applying the water so diverted to a beneficial use. This constituted a valid appropriation ofwater." ibf~n'c~r;, 20 illont. at 268,50 P. at 725, Consequently, the Court reaffirmed therein that "[tlhe essence of an appropriation [is] a completed ditch, actually diverting water, and putting it to a beneficial use . . . ." 12.ltlrrizy~ 20 hlont. at 26") 5 5 0 P. at 725. These common law requircmcnts were repeatedly c~mphasircd in our early case law and throughout our histot-y. 755 Even at this early juncture in the discussion, the flaws in the Court's analysis begin to appear. The Court holds that "benefic~al use is the tcst of a t alid right" and "beneficial use rather than diversion is the touchstone of the prior appropriation doctrine," but fails to acknowledge that diversion has always been an inherent requircn-ient in our law's assessment of whether water was beneficially used. As noted in the above quotations from Bailey and z V ~ ~ r q ~ beneficial use has always been a separate, and additional, consideration which followed capture of the water itself. See irlso IZ'11etll v. Crzmeron (1922), 64 'Llont. 494,501, 21 0 P. 761,763 ("[a]ctual diversion and beneficial use existing or in conternplation constitute an appropriation"), 'The Uoctrt further explaii~ed the a i f f c 1 . e ~ ~ ~ belt!-ecn tl~csc two considerations in iboi~cj, 1.. Lhirrpheii (i(JOii:, 24 Monr. 13; 60 P. 396, holding: that right to the use of xvater is a possessory one, that may be obtained by actual appropriation and diversion, perfected by application of the water so appropriated to a beneficial use then present and contemplated. Tool~ey~ 24 'Llont. at 17, 60 P. at 397. After explaining that the requirement ofbeneficial use "perfected" a dibersion-based appropriation, the Court further explained the process of determining beneficial usc, which underscores another error in the Court's opinion herein: But, as every appropriation must be made for a beneficial or useful purpose . . . it becomes the duty of the courts to try the question ofthe claimant's intent by his acts and the circumstances surrounding his possession of the water, its actual or contenlplated use and the purposes thereof. Toohel. 24 Mont. at 18, 60 P. at 397. Contrary to the Court's holding heretn at " 23, proof of intent is not, and has nmcr been, a substitute for diversion. Rather, as the Court has previously explained, a claimant's intent was analyzed to detemiine whether a beneficial use mas contemplated, the amount of water appropriated, or IF the right had been lost b q abandonment of its beneficial use. In erroneously holding othenvise, the Court misappre- hends bt'71eflf v. Cunieron, and cites it for the wrong proposition at yi 22. The FV/zc?ur Coul-i, In hold~ng that a cli~tmant's Intent could be establ~shed "by h ~ s act atid by surrounding circumstances. its actual axid contemplated use. and the purpose thereof," ncwr navered from also requiring "actual diversion," in addition to intent. FVl~ut; 64 %font. at 501: 201 P. at 762. Further, as we have clearly held, "[alctual use was not a prereyr~isitc to the creation of the right. . . actual diversion was enough, ifwith f~oncr.fiife irltenr." Kuiley, 45 Mont. at 173, 122 P. at 582 (emphasis added), qr~oticg \Vie! on Water Rights. The inicnt. of course, \>;as not an intent to divert, hut an intent to use the water beneticially. q5h This Courl has explained that the concept of beneficial use develoijcd in the law aficr tlrc diversion rcquircment was already established. See 1 1 1 re ~4(ijz~clicuriot~ of Water I<iglzts oflilcrr-k Fol-I< River (1 992). 254 Mont. 11: 15,833 P.2d 1 120,1123. The concepts \yere then used together to define the extent of the right: "Water rights have therefore been limited to the amount of water actitally put to a beneficial use, despite the amount ofwater diverted or claimed under a notice of appropriation." 79 Rnncl~ 1,. Pitsch (1983), 204 Mont. 426,432, 666 P.2d 215, 218. 7/57 Even berore statehood, the demands on water protnptcd the Montana Territoriai Legislature to enact statutes governing the appropriation process. LLegislatioli was first enacted in 1870 and revised in 1877. These provisions recognized water rights "acquired or to be acquired under the rules and customs of the early settlers," and did not attempt to prescribe any other method of securing water rights. Builey. 45 hilont. at I GO, 122 P. at 579. However, such an effort was undertaken by the enactlnent of "An Act relating to Water Rights" in 1885, legislation which this Court declared had ushered in a new era in lvater appropriation law. Commenting thereon. this Court stated: [Tlhcre are, then, two distinct periods in the history of our water right law. The first comprises the time from the earliest settlement to 1885, during b~hich period the rights were determined exclusively by the rules and customs of the setrlers; and the second extends from 1 8 8 to the present time. liniiej, 45 Mont. at 167, 122 P. ar 579. llie Rnili;!. C:oun cxtcnsively analyzed the legislation, fir~ding that the LcgisIa~urc's '"puq7osc was to prescribe tiic jfive j steps Ilecessary to bc taken to effect a complete appropriation of ~vater," including: ( I posting notice, ( 2 ) filing notice with the county- clerli and recorder, (3) commencing xo1.k within forty days of posting notice, (4) prosecuting the work with reasonable diligence, and (5) actual completion of the diversionary works. Bailey, 45 Mont. at 170, 173, 122 P. at 580, 581. The Court emphasized the requirement of diversion under the statute, and, consistent with its explanation of beneficial use in Toofzej., held that beneficial use could be established as a future intent, rather than eoncunentlq established at the time of diversion: [T]hc claimant who proceeds under the statute, and performs the acts required as set forth above, has a completed appropriation ofwater upon the completion of the kvork on his ditch, canal, or other means of diversion, even before the water is actually applied to beneficial use. Bailey; 45 Mont, at 174, 122 P. at 582. The Court canc!uded that, fo!low-ing passage of the landmark legislation, water could be appropriated in two ways, either by way of the .4ct, or b q the elements of the common law as exrsted prtor to the 1885 enactment, but that both methods required a diversion or possession of water. Rmiley, 45 blont. at 174, 122 P, at 582. 758 That remamed the law in hlontana over the next century. Since 1885, Montana has had virtually the same statutory provisions governing water appropriation, and has continued to recognize diversion-based common law claims. The two methods, common law and statute, both requiring diversion, remained the only alternatives for securing an appropriation of water. As we explained in L5'!t(zr~zti~el v. fig1 (1954), 144 Mont. 354, 396 P.2d 103: On March 12, 1885, the stamtory appropriation act was passcd in Montana. Since 1885, tbvo distinct methods of appropriating water exist. One is by coinplying ivith the rulcs and customs of the early settlers; eonsisiiag of actual appropriation and application to a beneficial use. The other is by cornpi;iing with the terms of the statutes passed pursuant to thc ! 885 Act. Slzn~rir~tei, 144 Mont. at 367,306 P.2d at 1 10 This Court further held that thc requ~rements of the appropriation statute will be "stnctly construed," and that a notlee of appropriation thereunder is "fatally defectike" to the cla~med uater right tf it does not conforni to statutory requirements. Holrnstroriz Lnizil Co~ttpatiy v WengIrer Coutlil (lO70j, 185 Mont. 400.427, 605 P.2d 1060, 1070; LS'lininmei, 144 Mont. at 369, 396 P.2d at I 1 1 759 The statutory scheme required that a nonce of approprrat~on contam the follou~~ng information. nith the focus on dilersion: The quantity of water claimed designated in cubic feet or miner's inches: the purpose for which the water is claimed and the place of intended use; the rnearls of di~>e,lc.ior~, including size of ditch, etc., by which diversion will be made; the date of appropriation; the name of the appropriator; the name or description of the stream from which diversion is made; an accurate description of thepoinr o f diversion, with reference to some natural object or permanent monument; and, finally, the notice is to be verified by the affidavit of the appropriator or someone in his behalf, which affidavit must state that the matters and facts contained in the notice are true. Sectlon 89-810, R.C.M. (1947) (emphasis added) #I60 1nDIVKCv Irzfake U'ater Coiripurrj (19761, 171 Mont. 31 6,558 P.2d 1 1 10, the Court analyzed the requirements for establishing a valid appropriation under the statutes. After setting forth the five statutory rcqulrcments enumerated abo~e, the Court eonimented as follows: Completion ofail tlicse steps is ncccssary to a compld~ appropriation [citation omitted]. declc~mtion ofnppl-oprintion, unncconrpattied by cortstruction of a cfive!-.sion %vor/<.s and ncrua/ diver.siot~ ~g"dic ,~t'~,!er* i . 7 it~.~uflicieri~ [citation omittedj. I-hus the posting and filing oC tile notice of appropriation is ti condition precedent to a valid appropriation. and n vir!id clp~pr-opriictiori &e.r rzot exi:~r ~t'it!~ol(i cor~zpierio~i of the work 1 1 / 2 d iictuai clivcrsioti i,lihe wirrer. iiztcihe, 171 Mont. at 430. 558 P.2d at 11 18 (emphasis added). The lrit'zke Court could nor hake been more clea~, holding that (I j declaration of one's intent to appropriate, uithout a diversion, does not establish a valid water right; and (2) a statutory appropriation is not valid '61 in reaching its conelustons todaj, the Court in large part ignores our century-old statutory sclicnie requiring diversion', prefemng instead to focus on our common lavr history. After ignortng the enduring history of these legislatibe enactments, and the repeated interpretation and application of the law by generations of Montana judges, the Court seizes upon the 1979 enactment of 8 85-2-21 2, MCA, as evidence of the Legislature's recognition of pre-1973 nondiversionary rights. f h e Court apparently concludes therefrom that these nondiversionary rights were superior to other water claims in that filing a claim was not even mandatory. At any rate, the Court has sorely misinterpreted this statute. First, although this claim statute allowed voluntary filing of certain non-recreational instrcam claims, all claims were tionethelcss required to prove "the place and means of dikersion" in order to suecessfuiiy establish the water right, 5 85-2-234(6j, MCA, and there was nothing inconsistent abottt this requirement. The statute, by its definition of "appro- priation" (quoted herein), limited "instream" claims to those which were based upon "diversion, impoundment or withdrawal." Section 85-2-102(1), MCA. Instream stock claims were deemed to be based upon withdrawal. Secorrd, clairns allowed under this staulte were restricted to those with "existing rights," which were defined by the statute as a water right "protected under the law as it existed prior to 1973." Section 85-2-1 02(10), ;MCA. As demonstrated herein, no pre-1973 law protected instreani recreational claims. Third, while the statute's definition of "beneficial use" included recreational uses, the definition of "appropriation" nonetheiess required those claims to be based upon diversion: "'Appro- priate' means . . . (a) to divert, inzj)ozlrrcl, or withn'vc~rv (including by stock for stock waterj a quantity of water." Section 85-2-101(1)(a), MCA (en~pliasis added). In the case of the Court finds that "the appropriation doctrine's history of flexibility and practicality support a holding that a diversion is not rcquircd," and that '-beneficial use is lhc oi~ly esscntiai element of a valid appropriation." Finally. the Court concludes that "'iintcnt is thc essential element andmay be proven through means other than diversion." In so holding, thc Cour~ refuses to lionor our common law. $62 In S\zumniel v. Vogl, sapric, after the Court concluded that the claimant's right could not bc established under the appropriation statiltes, it analyzed her claim under the common law: If the [claimant's] water right exists, it will have to be shown as a water right acquired prior to the 1885 Act and without benefit of that Act. The essential features of an appropriation of water made prior to the 1885 Act are a completed ditch and actual appropriation and application of an amount of water to a beneficial use. Slranrtrzel, 144 Vont. at 369, 306 P.2d at 11 1. The Co~trt then found that the ela~mailt's failure to provide evidence of diversion was fatal, and affirmed thc district court's refusal to recognize the claim. This has been the unwavering position of the Court in regard to common law (non-statutory) water appropriations for a century. See ~Lfidkiff v. Kitrclzeloe (1953), 127 Mont. 324. 328, 263 P.2d 976, 978 ("[tlhe rille is that hc %ho first diverts the Depat-tnient of Fish. Wildlife and Parks, the Petitioner here, appropriation was limited to leasing water under legislation adopted in 1989. Section 85-2- 101 (1)(c)> R.IC.4. Clearly, this 1979 claim statute did not alter the state of pre- 1973 law, and the Court cannot point to any autlior~ty for such a conclusion. The Court also falls to explarn lio\v tlirs statute's provision for voluntary filing of diversion or withdrawal-based stock and individual claims recognizes non-diversionary recreational claims. kvater to a beneficial use has the prior righi thereto where the right is based upon : h i : custom and practice of the cariy settlers as hcre, and where ihcrc was no cnnpiiani.~ with the s:atute"j: C'iaziseii v. ilrrni/zgfoii ( I %9), 123 Mont. 1 2 12 P.2d 340 (""a person may niake a valid appropriation of water by actual diversion and use thcreof without filing a notice of appropriation as detit~ed in sections 7100 to 7102, R. C. M. 1035"): Kikrl v. Ke~lsler (19351, 100 Mont. 592, 51 P.2d 235 ("a valid appropriation of water mey he acquired even where there has heen no co~npliance with the statute regulating appropriations by record, where the water is actually diverted from the stl-cam and applicd to a beneficial use: compliance is important only with regard to the doctrine of 'relation hack'"): !Vlrzytznrd v. I?.irlkins ( I ? 18), 55 Mont. 54, 173 P. 551 ("[tjhe essential elements of an appropriation were a completed ditch and the application of water through it to a beneficial use"). 7'63 Despite the heavy weight of o~rr precedent, the rnajority finds that diversion was not a part of this Court's "traditional appropriation analysis," and that "[djecisions from this Court have not consistently required diversions for water appropriations." The cases cited for this supposed "inconsistency" are llonich 11. .Jolrr~so~? (1926), 77 Mont. 229> 250 P. 963, and A.uteli v. hl.3. Coi~sulting, 1998 MT 64, 288 Mont. 150; 955 P.2d 1362. tiowever, neither stand for the proposition for which they are offercd. 7164 The issue in Donich was whether junior appropriators were infringing upon the m:ater rights of senior appropriators, who claimed that the damming and storing of water by the junior rightholders was infringing upon their senior rights established under a previous adjudication. i)onich dciilt with thc priorit;; of rights between appropriators, not~.vbether the junior appropriators' actions f~ifiiled app~npriationrequireinenis. The cxisrenci: ofdiversion was nor an Issue in the case. becausc di\ersioii \\as zccknotbfcdged thcreln. The lI<iiiicii Court stated that the actions of the junior appropriators constituted "diverting watcr," and approved the junior appropriators' capture and storage of tlre water for irrigation purposes: The construction and maintenance of secure rese~~oirs for the conservation of these waters, therefore, is of very high public importance. . . . The right to condemn land for a reservoir for the storing of water was declared in ilele/za t'oiver Trar~srr?ission Co. [citation omitted]. T 1 1 e right to impound and store water has been recognized repeatedly in other [Montana] opinions [citations omitted]. Indeed, the practice of impounding water in reservoirs has obtained in this state from the earliest days. l)oniclz, 77 Mont. at 239-40, 250 P. at 865. ln suppotting this kind of di~ersion, tlre Court stated that the use was permissible because "water appropriated may be turned into the channel of another stream, or from a reservoir into a stream and mingled with its waters and then reclaimed." Donich, 77 Mont. at 240, 250 P. at 966. Although diversion was not an issue therein, 1J)onicJz clearly appro\ ed of the physical capture of water as the equivalent of 7'65 The Court then offers our 1998 dee~s~on in Artell as an example of a cominon law non-diversion appropriation we have previously approved. As in llolziclz. iZ,xtell did not address the necessity for diversion, but instead decided \vhether ownership of an existing rtght had passed to a successor in interest. The Court spec~fically stated that it was not addressing the "method of appropriation," .4sfei17 7 3 1. However, to the extent the issue can bc a~~alogized, it supports the dik-crsion requirement. i h c Court first summi~rizcd prc-1973 water !am. in Montana, scaling that: As previous!y stated, under the common la-;*. doctrine of prior appropriation. a person could acquire an exclusive right to use a specific amount ofwater by applying it to the land for a beneficial use. "Appropriate " inenns to "divert, iiiil~ound or rviihdruw . . . n quantity ofwurer. , . dstell, 25 (emphasis added). In retracing the history of the water right in question, rile A.xtell Court found that the original rightholder would "pack water from the spring to her home for her dornestic needs." Axtell, 5 3 1. This "packing" of water, while not a diversion of the manner we normally think; is yet an equivalent physicrtl capture which properly established the water right. Axtell thus rebels at the proposition for which it is offered. 766 Despite the capture of water involved in Oonicli and Axtell, and the recognition of diversion therein, the Court concludes from these two cases that "hlontana ltas specifically recognized appropriations of water lvithout diversions," 157 Clearly, the Court is remalting the law, but more than that, it is rewriting history. Its hold~ng does not simply pronounce a rule of lamr for future applrcat~on. Rather, the holding declares the state of the law prior to 1973-that instream, non-diversion rrghts were then recognized. If that assessment of the law is correct; the Court should be able to cite to a Montana case which approved of such a prc- 1973 right, but, of course; it is unable to do so. The only two cascs which recognized prc-1973 recreational cli~ims, (Is1ie.7 Livestock 60. v. I ( 9 3 103 Mont. 28J1 62 P.2d 206, and I'ar-c~~li~se Rui,lhorvs v, Fi.yir and (intne -. C,'omn~ '11 (lOOO), 148 hlont. 412, 421 P.2d 717, were based upon diuersion. Illere are no other cases in our history to xhich the Court can cite in support ofrccretltional claims- and ccnainly~ none u-hich cstabiished a recrearionai right wirboui diversion, 111 fiici, cbery Montana case cited in the opinion stands precisely for the opposite concliision than the one reael~ed by the Court here. 768 The Court attempts to divert attention from thc obvious lack of suppot? in our precedent for its analysis by denouncing this dissent as a "simplified rendition of Montana's water usage history." If the Court deems this discussion of our law sinlplified, the objection lies not with the dissent, but with the law. Indeed, this Court has previously acknowledged the truth of the dissent's central premise: "Such a public right has never been declared in the case law of this state." Put-clilise Rciitzboii.~, 148 illont. at 419, 421 P.2d at 721. \Vhilc the Court claims to disdain fiction m~ithin legal analysisi its inability to point to a single Montana case supporting its position belies its asserted literary preference. 160 Thc Court also responds to this criticism by stating that stockgrowers, loggers, and railroaders would be surprised to learn that the diversion requirement would have affected their water use. and that thc Court "would have" approved of such uses? had it been given the opportunity. While I have not suggested, as the opinion states, that Montana law would not have recognized the withdrawal ofwater by stock as a water right, I respectfully suggest that it is our duty to apply the law as it exists, not the law that "might have been," in seeking to explain the correct status of the law prior to 1973. 770 in an attempt to sllorc up its holding, thc Court assens that prc-10173 instrcam rights were recognircd uadcr tile Public Trust Docirine expiaincd ii-i ,l,foiiiltizi!cl C1:ii~jiiii):i,fi)i-.!~fii'::iii .+Iccc.s.s v. C~crrnt~. l'he Court faiis to explain hoxv iifoiit(:iii~ Coitlitioiz could havc retroacrively altered pre-1973 water law, noting simply that it magically '"fills the void." While it is undisputed that the public tnlst doctrine has long existed in our precedent,' the point ii~issed is that the doctrine had lie\-er bee11 interpreted or understood in our history as establishing an instream, non-diversionary right, because such an interpretation ivas inherently inconsistent with the known law ofappropriation ia Montana. Itlorztcrr~a (ktclitio17, \I-hilc not directly addressi~ig appropriative rights, did help to change the understanding of the public trust doctrine in 1984. ,\-lor~fiiiin C;?nlitiori did not, however, change water law as it had existed prior to 1973. That is probably wliy rroiie of the many parties who haye 'The Court reviewed these principles long before the 1972 Constitution was adopted. In PI-entice v. iWcKay (1909), 38 Mont. 1 14, 98 P. 1081. we held that "the use of water is declared by tile Constitiltion of this state . . . to be a pubiic use;" 38 &font. at i i7, " 1 8. at 1083, citing Artieie 111, Section 15, of the 1889 Colistitution. and we again acknowledged this pri~iciple in Bailey, 45 Mont. at 175, 122 P. at 582. However, citing both federal and state statutes, the Pve~itice Court explained that, nonetheless, both "[tlhe United States and the state of Montana have recognized the right of an individual to acquire the use of water by appropriation," and have established procedures for doing so. Prelzticc, 38 blont. at 1 17, 08 P. at 1083. These principlesl adopted under the 1889 Constitution, were then incorporated into the 1972 Constitution, as specifically held by this Court in (;eizeriz/.~lgriczilt~~~~e 1 : hiloore (1975), 166 hlont. 510.534 P.2d 859 ("[wle construe Article IX, Section 3(1) of the 1972 Constitution as not only reaffirming the public policy of the 1889 Constitution but also as recognizing and confirming all [water] rights acquired under that Constitution and the implementing statutes thereunder"). appcarcd before the Court evcu cited ,blorzirrnii Giiiliition in its brick. ,l.fon?anci C?ja!irio;~ simply did not do what the Coull: reads into it. T71 Complicating its cnor, the Court ignores a critical part ofhfontlzrrtr C,,om/itioir. After the Court in _llorltczna C'on!itiorz pronounced the general principle that "[tlhe Constitution and the public trust doctrine do not perniit a private party to interfere with the public's right to recreational use of the surface of the State's waters," it clarified that principle in regard to tlic party at issue: "Curran has no right to control the use of the surface waters of the Dearbom to the exclusion of the public e.wcept to the e.wtewt ofhis prior npj~roj?rinrion of'j~art ofthe wizterfOr it-i,igatiotzpurpo.ses. . ." h4orztana Ciialifioi?, 2 10 Mont. at 52, 682 P.2d at 170 (emphasis added). '172 The Court somehow overlooks thatlWorittrnrr Ci)crlitiotz lieid that, although Curran had no right to ownersliip of the riverbed or surface waters, his prior diversion-based irrigation right was superior to the public's right? and he could properly restrict the public's use to that extent. In its expansive re-write of pre-1973 water law, and its order for the \Vater Court to review all pre- 1973 recreational, fish and wildlife claims. the Court apparently does not deem this part of the ~bforlmnn Coalition holding significant enough to mention or to include in its instruction to the Water Court. '73 The Court then turns to St~zfe ex re/. Greely 1 : . (Iol~fiderczted ,\ii~li.~I~ m~ld Kooterzni to justify its recognition of pre-1973 instreatn rights, but misapplies that case. Although the GI-eely Court held that reserved federal and tribal rights could be adjudicated by the Water C'ourt pursuant io tile Montana Water ilse Act, rhc substance of tiic opinion addrcsscs il-te & flicu!tics of so doing, given the consider ah?^ di i'Pcrcilces between reserxcd and starc waiter rights 1 1 7 4 The (ireely Cour~acknowledged that "u'lhe doctrine of rescrvcd water rights conflicts with prior appropriation principles in several respects." Grcelr., 2 10 Monl. at 00. 712 P.2d at 702. The Court explained that state water rights were apportioned on the basis of use, prioritized by time, defined by a specified quantity of water, required an actuall beneficial use of the water, and required that "an appropriator of a state-created right must dikert, impound or w~thdrau mater to appropriate." (;reel), 219 Mont. at 89. 712 P.2d '762 !:7 , - The Couri further explained that rcscrvcd rights were substantially different, in large part because, unl~ke state water rtghts, they were not based on use of the water. Rather, they were based up011 the purposes of the resen ation: Appropriative rights are based on actual use. ,4p1~1+opri~1rio1z for berzeficiul use is governed by stare lrzw. Reserved water rights izre esmbli.slzed 11y rcf J erelzcc to the purposes qf the re.serv(rtiotz rcrther tliari ro uctzral, preserzt Z ~ S C oftl~e water. The basis for an Indian reserved water right is the treaty, federal statute , . or executive order setting aside the reservation. lreaty iiiterprctation and statutory co~istruction are governed by federal Indian law. Cireeh; 219 blont. at 00,712 P.2d at 762 (emphasis added). In assessing whether the Water Use Act was capable of adjudrcattng reserveci malcr rrghts, the Court first noted that the Legislature had enacted provisions governing rese~ved rights differently than state water rights. tilh~le the Act required a wdtel rrght dccret to state rlic place and rncans of dir,cislon, 4 85-2-234(5)(g), .MCA, the Act had been ~ewsed to read that a decree "shall state . . . the 43 - * * ,, place and rneztns of divcrsiorr, tf'iiill.. . ." for reserved rights. Section 85-2-i~.r(,t)(g), bli'A. i-ikcwisc, pro\.isior;s rquiring a decree to describe rile property tc; ~vl~ich the right Mas appurtenant, and the use to which watcr was being applied, ~ - were not required for reserved rights, contrasting the fundamental nature ofthese rcquiremcnts for statc a aterrights. Gi\ en these changes. the Court fourtd thc Act broad enough to adjud~cate reserx ed nghts, ex en though it noted that some provisions of the ixet were irreconcilable with resewed rights, ., cautioning the Water Court "to not apply these code sections in an improper manner, or otherwise inconsistently with federal law. (?recIv, 219 Mont. at 94, 712 P.2d at 765 776 The Court begins its misapplication of GI-eel) at l ; [ 33: In effect, the [Gree(i.] Couit, in dctennining what constitutes ari "existing use," incorporated the Water Use Act's broad definition of "beneficial use" thereby making that definition applicable to both post andpre-1973 water right claims. Using the same statutory definition for "beneficial use" as cited in Greely (a definition applicable to all water uses, not just tribes), there is no reason why the Water Court cannot adjudicate both tribal and non-tribal claims for instream uses prior to 1973. From here, the Court then concludes that (;reell can be c~ted as supporting Montana's teeognition of pre-1973 instream water rights. It is doubtful that anyone honestly reading Greely would give it such an interpretation. None of the niany parties and urtzici before this Court c~tcd it for such-and for good reasons. F~rst. (;reell, addressed reserved rights old! --state water rights were not before the Court. Secondly, the Fact that the Act authorized the Water Court to adjudicate pre-1073 instrearn tribal water rights did not magically create and recognwc prc-1971 lnstream rtate water r~ghts To the contrary. the Gr-eely Coun took geat pains to differentiate these fundarnentaiiy dirfcrent rights. 'The rrrajority's irrlerpre?arion or 77'7 Yet, from Greely and thc three other cited cases, the Court finds at 7 34 that there is "confusion in our precedent" over the diversion requirement, and that it must "resol\'e the confusion in favor of the Axtell, Donich? /\~fontirizci Conlition and Gi-eelj line of authority,"' 'Thts means, according ro the Court. that "because Montana has \ alrdared non-di~ersionai> approprrations, we now liold that Montana law, prior to 1973 did not absolutely require a diwrsion for a valid appropriation of water." The absoluteness of the Court's error on the substance of the law cannot be overstated. There 1s as much "confuslo~t" In our pre- 1073 la\\ on diversion as there i s in a brick. Our law is simply monolithic. 8 This is acknowledged and explained in the brief of the I)I-'L\'P, who is the Petitioner here: [Tlhe general appropriation requirements of pre-July I, 1973 Montana law. . .[required] an actual diversion (capture) and beneficial use of water to establish intent and to give other water users notice of the specifics of the appropriation. Diverting or capturing water for fish, wildlife or recreation is a beneficial use of water and establishes a valid right under pre-July 1, 1973 Montana law. Instream or inlake fish. wildlife and recreation claims that do 'This "line of authority" is most interesting. The four refercnccd cases address very different issues, and none of them cite to any of tlte others. If the focus is diversion, then Dorlich and ,?.u/ell spoke approvingly of capture as a form of diversion, ~Wo~ztcrnir Cbalitiotz acknowledged the superiority of diversion-based irrigation rights over the public's right to use water pursuant to the Public Trust Doctrine, and Greeiy spoke of diversion approvingly in distinguishing state water rights from reserved rights. To the extent these cases provide any authority on the question here, it xveighs against the Court's position. not involve a diversion (capture) of water, exccpi iiir Murphy Rights; as invalid under pre-July 1, 1973 Vtontana law. 7 7 9 The i'our~ has now re-created pre-1973 Lvatcr law in Mclonraiia, its opinion is a smootb!y written; seamless essay which attracts an unsuspecting reader to ilreconclusion that the holding is completely correct and justified under the law. Indeed, 1 cannot disagree with the proposition that "[c]ommon sense rebels against a rigid diversion requirement which would refuse to recognize an acknowledged beneficial use simply because application to tlte use does not require removal from the ~vater source." If this issue had becn presented to the Court as a prospectne re\ iston to the cornmon lam properly arising out of litiration. I lbould most seriously consider it. However, thc issue of instream rights is nor even before the Court; only diversion-based claims are before us. The Court chooses to go outside the issues actually raised here, outside the arguments presented, outside the rclicfrequested, and outside 100 p!us years of precedent to retroactively redefine pre-I073 law, I submit that the Court is also going outside its judicial obligation to apply the law that is, electing instead to remake pre-1973 law in accordance with what it wished the law had been. Chief Justice Karla M. Gray: I concur in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion of j~~stic Rice. C