Title: John M. Buzia v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC04-582
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 31, 2006

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-582 
____________ 
 
 
JOHN M. BUZIA,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[March 23, 2006] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We review appellant John M. Buzia’s appeal of a circuit court judgment 
sentencing him to death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  
As we explain below, we affirm. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Buzia was indicted on charges of the first-degree murder of Charles Kersch, 
attempted first-degree murder of Thea Kersch, armed burglary of a dwelling with 
an assault or battery, and robbery with a deadly weapon.  Trial was held in March 
2003.  
 
 
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A.  The Guilt Phase 
The Kersches, both 71 years old and retired, lived in a gated community.  In 
the past, Buzia had performed odd jobs around their residence and rental 
properties.  On the morning of March 14, 2000, Charles Kersch and his wife Thea 
expected Buzia at their residence for work, but he did not appear.  In a videotaped 
interview with the police, Buzia stated that he had a “money issue” with the 
Kersches and, on that day, decided to steal money from them.   
 Buzia arrived at the residence at about 2:30 p.m.  He waited twenty minutes 
for someone to arrive.  Mrs. Kersch arrived home between 4 and 4:30 p.m.  Buzia 
told her that his brother had been beaten up and that he needed to talk to her 
husband.  She allowed him to wait in the enclosed patio area until Mr. Kersch 
returned.   
On the patio, Buzia retrieved a serving tray he found and approached the 
sliding glass door that led into the kitchen.  Mrs. Kersch opened the door, and he 
handed it to her.  Once she placed the tray on a table inside, Buzia entered.  They 
briefly conversed.  Mrs. Kersch said nothing to upset him.  Yet, without warning, 
Buzia struck her several times with his fist.  Blood sprayed from her nose.  Buzia 
admitted that he was trying to make her unconscious so that he could take her 
money.  He knocked her down and kicked her.  She lost consciousness.  He took 
her keys and removed about $80 from her purse.  He dragged her into the back 
 
 
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bedroom and covered her with a blanket.  Then he searched the house and removed 
a Mastercard from her purse. 
Buzia then heard the garage door open and assumed that Mr. Kersch had 
arrived home.  He considered at this point whether he should tell Mr. Kersch that 
he had attacked his wife, or whether he should assault him, too, and leave.  As 
soon as Mr. Kersch entered the house through the garage entrance, Buzia hit him 
with his fist, causing him to fall on the floor and hit his head on the tile.  Mr. 
Kersch was breathing, but bleeding severely.  Buzia told the police, “I was . . . 
thinking . . . you know . . . he’s gonna die, if [I] leave right now.”  Mr. Kersch 
attempted to rise to his feet, getting up on his hands and knees.  Buzia stated that 
his “intention was . . . obviously to keep him down longer, so maybe [he] could 
drive away and get more time.”  He was “committed” at this point.  He struck him 
again with his fist, and Mr. Kersch again fell to the floor.  He removed about $100 
from Mr. Kersch’s wallet.   
Buzia obtained one of the two axes from the garage.  He thought about 
“using it to make ’em unconscious” but then “threw it on the . . . puddle of mess.”  
He claims he never hit Mr. Kersch with that ax.  However, after hearing moaning 
and groaning from Mrs. Kersch in the back bedroom, he went to the garage a 
second time and returned with another ax.  It is unclear which ax he used on the 
Kersches—the first one or the second one.  It seems that he used the second one 
 
 
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and hit Mr. Kersch once in the head with the flat side of it.  He stated that his 
intention in hitting Mr. Kersch with the ax was to “slow him” and “put him out.”  
In the back bedroom, Mrs. Kersch was awake and attempting to get up, but he also 
hit her once with the same flat side of the ax.  She lost consciousness again.   
He covered Mr. Kersch with a blanket, and he duct-taped the door handle in 
the back bedroom where Mrs. Kersch lay unconscious.  After looking in closets 
and other things, he tried to clean up the residence a little bit, but he admitted that 
it was “overwhelming.”  Buzia then took Mr. Kersch’s car keys and one of his T-
shirts.  He changed his shirt because it was “nasty” and “dirty.”  The Kersches 
were both moving, moaning, and groaning when he left.  He drove away in Mr. 
Kersch’s car.  Shortly thereafter, the paramedics arrived.  Mrs. Kersch survived, 
but Mr. Kersch died of blunt force injuries to the head. 
The following morning, the police arrested Buzia at a bank after he 
attempted to cash a check for $830 drawn from Mr. Kersch’s account.  Buzia 
appeared to understand the officers’ commands, did not have any trouble walking, 
and did not resist the officers’ efforts to search him. 
Investigators found Mr. Kersch’s body lying near the garage door and 
covered with a blanket.  They also found a single-headed ax on the chair at the 
dinette table inside the house and a double-headed ax behind the couch.  The 
 
 
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medical examiner also testified regarding the various injuries Mr. Kersch suffered 
and the causes of those injuries. 
 
The jury found Buzia guilty of the first-degree premeditated murder of Mr. 
Kersch, the attempted first-degree murder of Mrs. Kersch, armed burglary of a 
dwelling with an assault or battery, and robbery with a deadly weapon. 
B.  The Penalty Phase 
At the penalty phase, Buzia presented several lay witnesses, as well as a 
psychologist, who testified about his problems with drugs and alcohol, including 
his cocaine dependence.  The State rebutted this evidence with its own expert, who 
stated that Buzia’s actions suggested goal-directed and purposeful behavior.  The 
jury, by a vote of eight to four, recommended the death penalty.     
After the Spencer1 hearing, the trial court issued its sentencing order, in 
which it found that the evidence supported the following six aggravating 
circumstances: (1) that Buzia was previously convicted of another capital offense 
or of a felony involving the use of violence to some person; (2) that the murder 
was committed while he was engaged in the commission of or flight after 
committing or attempting to commit the crime of kidnapping; (3) that the murder 
was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or 
effecting an escape from custody; (4) that the murder was committed for financial 
                                          
 
 
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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gain; (5) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (“HAC”); and 
(6) that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, 
and without any pretense of moral or legal justification (“CCP”).  However, the 
court assigned great weight to only four aggravators—prior violent felony, avoid-
arrest, HAC, and CCP.  The court did not consider the other two—during the 
course of a robbery/burglary/kidnapping and pecuniary gain. 
After reviewing the record for mitigation, the court assigned little weight to 
two factors under the statutory catchall provision, section 921.141(6)(h), Florida 
Statutes (2003), specifically Buzia’s interaction with the community and his work 
record.  The court also found seven nonstatutory mitigating factors and ascribed 
weight as follows: (1) influence of a mental or emotional disturbance, not extreme 
in nature (substantial weight); (2) Buzia’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired, but 
not substantially (substantial weight); (3) gainful employment (little weight); (4) 
appropriate courtroom behavior during the guilt and penalty phases of the trial and 
during the Spencer hearing (little weight); (5) cooperation with law enforcement 
(little weight); (6) difficult childhood (little weight); and (7) remorse (little 
weight).  The trial court concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed 
the mitigation and sentenced Buzia to death.  In addition, the court sentenced Buzia 
 
 
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to three concurrent life sentences for the attempted first-degree murder, armed 
burglary, and armed robbery convictions. 
II.  THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
Buzia raises six issues on appeal, which we address in turn below: (A) the 
trial court erred in finding the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance; (B) 
the trial court erred in finding the avoid-arrest aggravating circumstance; (C) the 
trial court erred in finding the HAC aggravating circumstance; (D) the trial court 
erred in finding the CCP aggravating circumstance; (E) the death penalty is not 
warranted in this case; and (F) Florida’s capital sentencing procedures violate Ring 
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  We also independently determine that the 
evidence was sufficient to convict Buzia of first-degree murder.2 
A.  Prior Violent Felony Aggravating Circumstance 
 
In his first claim, Buzia challenges the trial court’s finding of the prior 
violent felony aggravator.  He argues that his contemporaneous guilty verdict for 
the attempted murder of Mrs. Kersch was not a “conviction” under section 
921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2003).  However, Buzia failed to preserve this 
issue for appeal.  See Harrell v. State, 894 So. 2d 935, 940 (Fla. 2005) (“[A] 
litigant must make a timely, contemporaneous objection.”).  Although he filed 
pretrial motions contesting the application of this aggravator, those objections were 
                                          
 
2.  The State cross-appealed and raised two issues.  However, because we 
affirm all of the trial court’s findings, the State’s cross-appeal is rendered moot. 
 
 
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not contemporaneous with the penalty phase.  In his sentence memorandum, Buzia 
objected to the other aggravators, but he did not raise any arguments regarding the 
prior violent felony aggravator.  Accordingly, this issue was not preserved.   
This claim lacks merit anyway.  Section 921.0011(2), Florida Statutes 
(2001), defines “conviction” as a “determination of guilt that is the result of a plea 
or a trial, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld.”  (Emphasis added.)  
“The word ‘convicted’ as used in section 921.141(5)(b) means a valid guilty plea 
or jury verdict of guilty for a violent felony; an adjudication of guilt is not 
necessary . . . .”  McCrae v. State, 395 So. 2d 1145, 1154 (Fla. 1980) (emphases 
added).  Furthermore, we have long recognized that a contemporaneous conviction 
for a violent felony can serve as a basis for the prior violent felony aggravator.  
Lecroy v. State, 533 So. 2d 750, 755 (Fla. 1988); Correll v. State, 523 So. 2d 562, 
568 (Fla. 1988). 
Buzia’s argument rests on the incorrect assumption that, for purposes of this 
aggravator, a conviction requires adjudication.  Under section 921.0011(2) and 
McCrae, the jury determined Buzia’s guilt as to the attempted murder of Mrs. 
Kersch at the end of the guilt phase and, thus, “convicted” him of that crime.  
Adjudication was unnecessary.  The jury’s guilty verdict for the attempted murder 
of Mrs. Kersch was a “conviction” for purposes of the prior violent felony 
aggravator.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s finding. 
 
 
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B.  Avoid-Arrest Aggravating Circumstance 
In his second claim, Buzia challenges the trial court’s finding of the avoid-
arrest aggravator.  He argues that (1) he did not intentionally kill Mr. Kersch; and 
(2) the evidence in support of this aggravator was circumstantial and inconclusive.  
Buzia’s contention and accompanying arguments that he did not intend to kill Mr. 
Kersch attempt to reargue the merits of his first-degree murder conviction.3  At 
trial, the jury found Buzia guilty of first-degree murder and based its finding on 
both felony murder and premeditated murder.  This latter finding establishes intent.  
The correct question is whether competent, substantial evidence supports the 
trial court’s finding that Buzia murdered Mr. Kersch to avoid arrest.  “[O]ur task 
on appeal is to review the record to determine whether the trial court applied the 
right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if so, whether competent 
substantial evidence supports its finding.”  Owen v. State, 862 So. 2d 687, 698 
(Fla. 2003) (quoting Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 918 (Fla. 2000)).  We have 
outlined the appropriate circumstances for finding the avoid-arrest aggravator: 
                                          
 
3.  First, Buzia asserts that he never hit Mr. Kersch with a full swing of the 
ax and simply intended to “knock him silly.”  Those words, however, arose in 
response to police questioning, where Buzia hypothetically distinguished between 
swinging as hard as he could, which he admitted would kill a victim, and hitting 
someone “enough to . . . you know . . . to maybe knock silly.”  Second, he argues 
that he used the flat side of the ax, not the sharp side, so that he could slow down 
Mr. Kersch and get out of the house.  This statement undermines Buzia’s position 
against the avoid-arrest aggravator.     
 
 
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Where the victim is not a police officer, “the evidence 
[supporting the avoid arrest aggravator] must prove that the sole or 
dominant motive for the killing was to eliminate a witness,” and 
“[m]ere speculation on the part of the state that witness elimination 
was the dominant motive behind a murder cannot support the avoid 
arrest aggravator.”  However, this factor may be proved by 
circumstantial evidence from which the motive for the murder may be 
inferred, without direct evidence of the offender’s thought processes. 
In other cases, this Court has found it significant that the 
victims knew and could identify their killer.  While this fact alone is 
insufficient to prove the avoid arrest aggravator, we have looked at 
any further evidence presented, such as whether the defendant used 
gloves, wore a mask, or made any incriminating statements about 
witness elimination; whether the victims offered resistance; and 
whether the victims were confined or were in a position to pose a 
threat to the defendant. 
   
Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270, 289 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Farina v. State, 801 So. 
2d 44, 54 (Fla. 2001)).  Buzia argues that the circumstantial evidence is too 
inconclusive to support this aggravator, while the State asserts that direct evidence 
of Buzia’s thought processes exists to support it.4  We address each of these 
arguments in turn.   
                                          
 
4.  Buzia makes various other arguments that do not support his position.  
First, his argument that he left Mrs. Kersch alive as a witness against him has no 
bearing on whether he killed Mr. Kersch to avoid arrest.  Second, the fact that 
Buzia attempted to duct-tape the door of the bedroom to keep Mrs. Kersch inside 
suggests that he was trying to keep her from getting out—and, presumably, alerting 
someone.  If anything, this evidence indicates that he had an intent to do what he 
could to avoid detection.  Third, Buzia argues that his search for valuables proves 
that he did not immediately flee the house after assaulting Mrs. Kersch.  This fact 
is irrelevant.  The question, again, is whether he killed Mr. Kersch to eliminate him 
as a witness.     
 
 
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First, Buzia relies heavily on Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2000), arguing 
that similar circumstances in that case did not warrant application of this 
aggravator.  In Zack, the defendant and the victim returned to the victim’s home 
after meeting at a bar.  The defendant hit the victim with a beer bottle, sexually 
assaulted her, and beat her head against the bedroom’s wooden floor.  He retrieved 
a knife from the kitchen and stabbed her in the chest four times.  The defendant 
went back to the kitchen, cleaned the knife, put it away, and washed the blood 
from his hands.  He then returned to the master bedroom, placed the victim’s 
bloody shirt and shorts in her dresser drawer, stole a television, a VCR, and the 
victim’s purse, and placed the stolen items in her car and drove away.  Id. at 14.  
We concluded that the evidence was inconclusive to support the avoid-arrest 
aggravator because the defendant had a larger “premeditated plan” in mind.  Id. at 
20.  The defendant’s acts were part of a “crime-riddled journey” in which he had 
committed a variety of assaults and robberies against other victims.  Id. at 13-14.  
Although he did not have to murder the victim “to accomplish his monetary goals, 
this alone does not make the defendant’s dominant motive the desire to avoid 
arrest.”  Id. at 20. 
This case is distinguishable from Zack.  Unlike the defendant in Zack, Buzia 
was not on a “crime-riddled journey.”  His actions involved one robbery at one 
location.  Furthermore, aside from not having to murder Mr. Kersch “to 
 
 
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accomplish his monetary goals,” additional circumstances (which were absent in 
Zack) prove that Buzia killed him to avoid arrest.   
We agree with the State that Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1997), is 
more similar to this case.  In Willacy, the defendant bludgeoned the victim and tied 
her hands and feet together.  Id. at 696.  Because the victim no longer posed an 
immediate threat to him, and because she was his next-door neighbor and could 
identify him easily, we concluded that he had little reason to kill her except to 
eliminate her as a witness.  Id.  Buzia, too, easily subdued his victim.  Mr. Kersch, 
an elderly man who was injured and bleeding badly, no longer posed an immediate 
threat to Buzia.  He “was incapable of thwarting [Buzia’s] purpose or of escaping 
and could not summon help.”  Id.  Buzia went to the garage not once, but possibly 
twice, to obtain an ax, which indicates that he had enough time to escape 
undetected with the Kersches’ money and valuables.  There was little reason for 
Buzia to hit Mr. Kersch with an ax, except to kill him so Buzia could avoid arrest. 
In addition to these circumstances, Buzia’s incriminating statements to the 
police evidence his thought processes.  We have found that a defendant’s 
statements to the police, in part, support a finding of the avoid-arrest aggravator.  
Derrick v. State, 641 So. 2d 378, 380 (Fla. 1994) (“In a statement to the [police], 
[the defendant] indicated that the victim recognized him and that he killed the 
victim to ‘shut him up.’”).  Buzia told the police that his “intention [in hitting Mr. 
 
 
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Kersch the second time with his fist] was . . . obviously to keep him down longer, 
so maybe [he] could drive away and get more time.”  He admitted that, after doing 
so, he thought Mr. Kersch was going to die: “I was . . . thinking . . . you know . . . 
he’s gonna die, if [I] leave right now.”  Even more relevant is his statement to the 
police regarding why he used the ax—the instrument that ultimately killed Mr. 
Kersch.  Buzia stated that his intention in hitting him with it was to “slow him” and 
“put him out.”                    
In addition, Buzia admitted that, when he heard Mr. Kersch arrive, he 
considered whether or not he should tell him that he had hurt his wife, or instead 
attack him as well.  He obviously decided on the latter course, most likely because 
it would help him escape undetected.  These admissions prove that Buzia’s intent 
to avoid arrest extends beyond mere speculation.  His “sole or dominant” motive 
for murdering Mr. Kersch was to eliminate him as a witness.  We find no error in 
the trial court’s finding of the avoid-arrest aggravator.      
C.  HAC Aggravating Circumstance 
In his third claim, Buzia challenges the trial court’s finding that the murder 
of Mr. Kersch was heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  To qualify for this aggravator, “the 
crime must be both conscienceless or pitiless and unnecessarily torturous to the 
victim.”  Hertz v. State, 803 So. 2d 629, 651 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Richardson v. 
State, 604 So. 2d 1107, 1109 (Fla. 1992)).  Buzia raises two grounds for the trial 
 
 
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court’s error: he never intended to kill or torture Mr. Kersch; and Mr. Kersch was 
not acutely aware of impending death. 5  The State responds that because the 
murder of Mr. Kersch was a beating, the HAC aggravator applies. 
Buzia’s reliance on intent is misplaced.  “The intention of the killer to inflict 
pain . . . is not a necessary element of the aggravator.”  Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 
110, 135 (Fla. 2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Guzman v. State, 721 So. 2d 1155, 
1160 (Fla. 1998)).  We have upheld a finding of the HAC aggravator where “the 
killer was utterly indifferent to the suffering of another.”  Id. (quoting Guzman, 
721 So. 2d at 1160)  “[The HAC aggravator] focuses on the means and manner in 
which death is inflicted and the immediate circumstances surrounding the 
death . . . .”  Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 849-50 (Fla. 2002) (emphasis 
added); see also Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998).  “[T]he focus 
should be upon the victim’s perceptions of the circumstances.”  Lynch v. State, 
841 So. 2d 362, 369 (Fla. 2003) (emphasis added) (citing Farina, 801 So. 2d at 53); 
see also Hitckcock v. State, 578 So. 2d 685, 692 (Fla. 1990) (“That [the defendant] 
might not have meant the killing to be unnecessarily torturous does not mean that it 
. . . was not unnecessarily torturous and, therefore, not [HAC].”).  None of Buzia’s 
                                          
 
5.  In addition, Buzia argues that the court improperly weighed the HAC 
aggravator.  This Court’s function is not to reweigh the evidence but, rather, to 
determine whether competent, substantial evidence supports the lower court’s 
finding.  Owen, 862 So. 2d at 698.  Our discussion of this argument properly 
belongs in our proportionality analysis.   
 
 
- 15 -
arguments regarding intent have any merit.6  Our analysis focuses on “the means 
and manner” in which Buzia killed Mr. Kersch and Mr. Kersch’s perceptions of the 
circumstances.  Therefore, we address the following two issues: (1) whether the 
murder of Mr. Kersch was a beating; and (2) whether Mr. Kersch was acutely 
aware of impending death.   
We have upheld the HAC aggravator in numerous cases involving beatings.  
Lawrence v. State, 698 So. 2d 1219, 1221-22 (Fla. 1997) (“We have consistently 
upheld HAC in beating deaths.”); see also, e.g., Colina v. State, 634 So. 2d 1077, 
1081 (Fla. 1994) (holding that the HAC aggravator applied where one of the 
defendants hit the victim, who fell to the ground, and when that victim attempted 
to get to his feet, the other defendant hit him several times in the back of the head 
with a tire iron); Owen v. State, 596 So. 2d 985, 990 (Fla. 1992) (upholding the 
HAC aggravator where the sleeping victim was struck on the head and face with 
five hammer blows); Lamb v. State, 532 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1988) (upholding 
the HAC aggravator where the defendant struck the victim six times in the head 
with a claw hammer, pulled his feet out from under him, and kicked him in the 
                                          
 
6.  Buzia repeats his argument that, instead of intending to kill Mr. Kersch, 
he only struck him hard enough to “knock him silly.”  However, that statement 
again misrepresents the facts.  See supra note 3.  Second, he argues that his intent 
was to render the Kersches incapacitated so that he could rob them, escape, and 
“get high.”  That admission essentially concedes the State’s position regarding the 
avoid-arrest aggravator but does not address the manner of the killing. 
 
 
- 16 -
face); Heiney v. State, 447 So. 2d 210, 216 (Fla. 1984) (upholding the HAC 
aggravator where seven severe hammer blows were inflicted on the victim’s head).   
A crime scene analyst concluded that the blood spatter on the wall near Mr. 
Kersch’s body was the “result of a beating.”  Based on those blood stains and 
patterns, she also concluded that there were at least two separate swings of the ax 
and two separate impacts to Mr. Kersch’s head.  In addition, Buzia stated to the 
police that he twice knocked Mr. Kersch to the floor. 
Although the beatings in Heiney, Owen, and Lamb were probably more 
severe than this one, these facts parallel the circumstances in Colina.  In that case, 
one of the defendants hit the victim, who fell to the ground.  At that point, the co-
defendant administered several blows with a tire iron to the back of the head.  634 
So. 2d at 1081.  We conclude the attack on Mr. Kersch amounts to a “beating” for 
purposes of the HAC aggravator.              
Nevertheless, nothing done to the victim after the victim is dead or 
unconscious can support this aggravator.  Zakrzewski v. State, 717 So. 2d 488, 493 
(Fla. 1998); see also Jones v. State, 569 So. 2d 1234, 1238 (Fla. 1990); Jackson v. 
State, 451 So. 2d 458, 463 (Fla. 1984).  Therefore, awareness of impending death 
is critical in determining whether a beating unnecessarily tortured the victim.  See 
Cox v. State, 819 So. 2d 705, 720 (Fla. 2002) (noting that “a victim’s suffering and 
awareness of his or her impending death . . . supports the . . . [HAC] aggravating 
 
 
- 17 -
circumstance where there is a merciless attack and beating”); see also Colina, 634 
So. 2d at 1081 (upholding the HAC aggravator where one of the victims moaned, 
and the defendant dealt her several more blows); Owen, 596 So. 2d at 990 
(upholding the HAC aggravator where, after being struck on the head with a 
hammer, the sleeping victim awoke screaming and struggling and endured several 
more blows); Lamb, 532 So. 2d at 1053 (upholding the HAC aggravator where, 
after being struck six times in the head with a claw hammer, the victim did not die 
instantaneously but fell to his knees and to the floor and moaned, and the defendant 
kicked him in the face).   
Buzia argues that the murder happened quickly, and therefore Mr. Kersch 
was not conscious during the attack or aware of his fate.  At oral argument, Buzia’s 
counsel insisted that the medical examiner’s testimony about the circumstances 
surrounding Mr. Kersch’s death contradicted Buzia’s statement to the police that 
Mr. Kersch attempted to get up on his hands and knees.  We discern no such 
conflict.  The medical examiner found, in addition to bruising on Mr. Kersch’s 
right hand, significant injuries in three areas: (1) lacerations in three places on the 
right side of his head—above the right ear, to the right of his eyebrow, and on the 
side of his nose—with abundant hemorrhaging underneath the injury just above his 
eye; (2) a laceration of the scalp on the back of his head with marked 
hemorrhaging and, underneath that, a large amount of accumulated blood and a 
 
 
- 18 -
small skull fracture; and (3) on the left side of his head, a large complex laceration 
(including fractured skull bones underneath) with superficial abrasion and some 
soft tissue hemorrhage.   
The medical examiner concluded that the laceration on Mr. Kersch’s eye 
was consistent with the blunt force of being hit with a fist and inconsistent with a 
blow from an ax.  The laceration above his right ear was less consistent with a 
blow from a fist, but he would not rule it out.  Regarding the second injury—the 
laceration, hemorrhage, and skull fracture on the back of Mr. Kersch’s head—he 
stated that it was consistent with an ax or “a really rapid fall to the floor could 
cause this kind of injury.”  It was “possible, but not necessarily likely” that this 
injury caused death.  It “would very possibly have caused unconsciousness,” but it 
“may not have.”  The examiner testified that, if Mr. Kersch had lost consciousness 
as a result of this injury, he might have regained it.  In addition, he speculated that 
the third injury could have resulted from either one blow or separate blows.  The 
contusion in that area was consistent with either being struck by an ax or falling 
and hitting one’s head on the floor.  The skull bone fractures underlying the “gash” 
or laceration were consistent with a blow from the flat side of an ax but not 
consistent with hitting one’s head on the floor.   This larger wound would have 
caused unconsciousness instantly and likely death within a couple of minutes.  On 
 
 
- 19 -
cross-examination, the medical examiner stated that Mr. Kersch would not have 
regained consciousness from this injury.   
Although the medical examiner did not testify that, after falling to the 
ground, Mr. Kersch attempted to get up on his hands and knees—in fact, neither 
side asked him about it—his testimony is consistent with Buzia’s confession to that 
effect.7  He ruled out that hitting his head on the floor caused the injury to the left 
side of Mr. Kersch’s head, and he concluded that that injury would have instantly 
caused unconsciousness and likely death within minutes.  Logic dictates that this 
injury was the final one Mr. Kersch suffered.  On the other hand, the laceration and 
skull fracture on the back of Mr. Kersch’s head was consistent with an ax or “a . . . 
rapid fall to the floor.”  Furthermore, it was “not necessarily likely” that this injury 
caused death.  Unconsciousness could have resulted from this injury, but it was 
possible that Mr. Kersch regained it.  This possibility reinforces Buzia’s admission 
that Mr. Kersch attempted to get up on his hands and knees. 
Counsel insisted during oral argument that there is no evidence to suggest 
that Mr. Kersch pled for his life or screamed for help.  The evidence shows that 
Mr. Kersch was awake and aware during at least part of this ordeal.  Whether this 
                                          
 
7.  The only conflict in the testimony concerns whether Mr. Kersch was 
moaning and groaning when Buzia left the residence.  Buzia told the police that he 
heard such noises, but the medical examiner stated that Mr. Kersch would not have 
regained consciousness from the injury caused by the ax on the left side of his 
head.   
 
 
- 20 -
state of consciousness lasted minutes or seconds, he was “acutely aware” of his 
“impending death[].”  We have upheld the HAC aggravator where the victim was 
conscious for merely seconds.  See Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278, 296 (Fla. 
1997).  Competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding. 
D.  CCP Aggravating Circumstance 
In his fourth claim, Buzia challenges the trial court’s finding of the CCP 
aggravator.  To support the CCP aggravator, a jury must find  
that the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection and not an 
act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage (cold), and 
that the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to commit 
murder before the fatal incident (calculated), and that the defendant 
exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated), and that the 
defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification.  
  
Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla. 1994) (citations omitted).  Buzia argues 
that the evidence does not support a finding of heightened premeditation.  
“Premeditated” refers to “heightened premeditation,” which is more than what is 
required to prove first-degree, premeditated murder.  Id. at 88.  “[D]eliberate 
ruthlessness” is “necessary to raise . . . premeditation above that generally required 
for premeditated first-degree murder.”  Fennie v. State, 648 So. 2d 95, 99 (Fla. 
1994) (finding heightened premeditation where the defendant kept the victim 
waiting for her ultimate fate while he contemplated various methods of execution); 
see also Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381, 388 (Fla. 1994) (where the defendant 
“toyed with [the victim] prior to her death” and “told [the victim] that he was going 
 
 
- 21 -
to ‘hurt’ her,” and where the defendant “saw that the killing was a drawn-out 
affair”).  We conclude that Buzia’s actions rise to this level of deliberate 
ruthlessness because (1) he had the opportunity to leave the scene, and (2) he 
procured a weapon.  We address these issues in turn.  
First, Buzia had the opportunity to leave the residence with the Kersches’ 
money and valuables without committing further harm.  We have “found . . . 
heightened premeditation . . . where a defendant had the opportunity to leave the 
crime scene and not commit the murder but, instead, commit[ted] the murder.”  
Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 148, 162 (Fla. 1998) (where the defendant could have 
stopped at kidnapping and robbery, but instead confined the victim and forced him 
to contemplate his death while the defendant decided what to do with him) (citing 
Jackson v. State, 704 So. 2d 500, 505 (Fla. 1997)); see also Lynch, 841 So. 2d at 
372-73 (where the defendant waited “thirty to forty minutes” for the victim to 
arrive home and, after initially shooting the victim and then dragging her into the 
apartment, had five to seven minutes in which he could have left the scene and not 
inflicted the final harm).  We conclude in part that, by remaining there and 
murdering Mr. Kersch, Buzia developed “heightened premeditation.”     
In its sentencing order the trial court states the following:  
The time lapse that occurred between the beating of Thea Kersch and 
the murder of Charles Kersch allowed [Buzia] to reflect upon his 
criminal activity and to renounce any further violence.  Instead 
 
 
- 22 -
[Buzia] used that extended period of time to . . . perfect his plan of 
attack toward Charles Kersch. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  As in Lynch, where the defendant waited “thirty to forty 
minutes” for the victim to arrive home, 841 So. 2d at 373, Buzia had a short period 
of time during which he could have left the scene and not inflicted further harm.  
He could have “renounce[d] any further violence” by either leaving or, upon Mr. 
Kersch’s arrival, passively explaining to him what occurred.  Yet, when he heard 
the garage door open, he considered his options and decided to attack Mr. Kersch 
as well.  He calmly chose the criminal option and “perfect[ed] his plan of attack.”         
Despite this course, Buzia had one final instance where he could have left 
the scene without committing further harms—the lapse of time during which he 
obtained the ax.  This interlude was similar to the five to seven minutes in Lynch.  
Moreover, Buzia could have stopped his criminal activity at the level of assault and 
robbery.  Instead, he remained there, obtained the first ax, and thought about 
“using it to make ’em unconscious.”  Although he dropped it on the floor, he 
obtained the other ax and carried out his plan.  Buzia could have left the scene 
without committing further harm, but he remained and committed murder.  See 
Alston, 723 So. 2d at 161-62 (emphasizing the defendant’s choice between 
stopping at the level of kidnapping and robbery and murdering the victim). 
Most importantly, during this final lapse of time, Buzia procured his own 
weapon.  “[T]he facts supporting [the CCP aggravator] must focus on the manner 
 
 
- 23 -
in which the crime was executed, e.g., advance procurement of weapon, lack of 
provocation, killing carried out as a matter of course . . . .”  Looney v. State, 803 
So. 2d 656, 678 (Fla. 2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 
2d 29, 48 (Fla. 2000)).  We have found the CCP aggravator where the defendant 
procured a weapon beforehand.  See, e.g., Rodriguez, 753 So. 2d at 46 (where the 
defendant armed himself with a loaded handgun before proceeding to commit the 
crime); Sireci v. Moore, 825 So. 2d 882, 886 (Fla. 2002) (acquisition of a tire 
iron); Zakrzewski, 717 So. 2d at 492 (the defendant purchased the murder weapon 
the morning before the murders).  However, such procurement need not be that far 
in advance.  In Jackson, 704 So. 2d at 505, the defendant went upstairs, obtained a 
gun, and made a deliberate and conscious choice to shoot a law enforcement 
officer.  We found heightened premeditation because the defendant could have left 
the scene, but instead purposely returned with the gun to confront the officer.  Id. 
at 505.  We have found the CCP aggravator in other cases where the defendant did 
not procure his own murder weapon before arriving at the scene.  See Mason v. 
State, 438 So. 2d 374, 379 (Fla. 1983) (where the defendant broke into the victim’s 
home, armed himself with a knife from her kitchen, and attacked the victim as she 
lay sleeping in bed).     
Although Buzia did not bring his own weapon to the residence, he 
nevertheless procured one.  Because he was performing various jobs for the 
 
 
- 24 -
Kersches at their residence, he knew exactly where to obtain the axes.  Like the 
defendant in Jackson, 704 So. 2d at 505, he left the immediate vicinity of the 
victim, obtained a weapon from a location nearby, and returned to use it on that 
victim.  These actions reflect “a deliberate and conscious choice” to commit 
murder.  Therefore, competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 
finding of the CCP aggravator. 
Buzia nevertheless relies on Geralds v. State, 601 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 1992).  
In Geralds, the defendant interrogated the victim’s children regarding when family 
members would be present in the house; brought gloves, a change of clothes, and 
plastic ties to the house; left his car at a location away from the house; and bound 
and stabbed the victim.  Id. at 1163-64.  We held that the trial court erred in finding 
the CCP aggravator.  Id. at 1164.  Buzia asserts that this case is “indistinguishable” 
from Geralds.  Although this case and Geralds bear one significant similarity—the 
weapon used in each crime was a “weapon of opportunity” found in the house 
rather than one “brought to the scene,” id.—Geralds is nonetheless distinguishable.  
First, the defendant in Geralds obtained information about who would be home 
probably to avoid contact with anyone during the burglary.  Id. at 1163.  Here, 
Buzia traveled to the Kersches’ residence for the explicit purpose of confronting 
the Kersches.  Second, the defendant in Geralds bound the victim first instead of 
immediately killing her, which suggests that he might not have planned to kill her.  
 
 
- 25 -
Id. at 1163-64.  There was also evidence of a struggle prior to the killing.  Id.  
Here, Buzia never bound Mr. Kersch, and no frenzy or struggle occurred.  He 
immediately attacked him with his fists and, shortly thereafter, struck him with an 
ax.  Therefore, we find Geralds distinguishable. 
E.  Proportionality 
 
In his fifth claim, Buzia challenges the weight assigned to the aggravating 
circumstances and argues that the death penalty is not appropriate.  The weight to 
be given aggravating factors is within the discretion of the trial court, and it is 
subject to the abuse of discretion standard.  Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d 923, 934 
(Fla. 2000).  “[D]iscretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take the 
view adopted by the trial court.”  Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 1990) 
(quoting Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980)).  We affirm 
the weight accorded an aggravator if based on competent, substantial evidence.  
Sexton, 775 So. 2d at 934.  Here, the trial court assigned great weight the prior 
violent felony, avoid-arrest, HAC, and CCP aggravators.  As discussed above, 
competent, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding of these aggravators.  
We find no abuse of discretion. 
 
We are nevertheless obligated to review each death sentence for 
proportionality.  Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 407 (Fla.), cert. denied, 540 
U.S. 956 (2003).  In this case, the jury recommended death by a vote of eight to 
 
 
- 26 -
four, and the trial court so sentenced Buzia.  The court found and assigned great 
weight to four aggravating circumstances—prior violent felony, avoid-arrest, 
HAC, and CCP.  We have held that both the HAC and CCP aggravators are “two 
of the most serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme.”  
Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999).  Furthermore, we have upheld 
death sentences where the prior violent felony aggravator was the only one present.  
See, e.g., LaMarca v. State, 785 So. 2d 1209, 1217 (Fla. 2001); Ferrell v. State, 
680 So. 2d 390, 391 (Fla. 1996).   
The court assigned little weight to two factors under the statutory catchall 
provision, section 921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes (2003), specifically Buzia’s 
interaction with the community and his work record.  The court also found several 
nonstatutory mitigators and afforded the weight indicated: influence of a mental or 
emotional disturbance, not extreme in nature (substantial weight); capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of one’s conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was impaired, but not substantially (substantial weight); 
gainful employment (little weight); appropriate courtroom behavior (little weight); 
cooperation with law enforcement (little weight); difficult childhood (little weight); 
and remorse (little weight).  The court determined that the aggravating 
circumstances outweighed the mitigation and sentenced Buzia to death. 
 
 
- 27 -
We find that the sentence is proportional in relation to other death sentences 
we have upheld.8  See, e.g., Lynch, 841 So. 2d at 377 (finding death sentence 
proportionate where three aggravators were found applicable to each murder—
including prior violent felony, CCP, and HAC—and little weight was given one 
statutory mitigator and eight nonstatutory mitigators were accorded moderate or 
little weight); Way, 760 So. 2d at 920-21 (finding the death penalty proportional 
where four aggravators were found—prior violent felony, murder committed 
during the commission of a felony, HAC, and CCP—and two statutory mitigators 
and seven nonstatutory mitigators were found); Cave v. State, 727 So. 2d 227, 229 
(Fla. 1998) (affirming death sentence where four aggravators were found—murder 
in the course of a felony (robbery-kidnapping), CCP, HAC, and avoid-arrest—and 
one statutory and eight nonstatutory mitigators were found). 
F.  The Ring Claim 
 
In his final claim, Buzia argues that Florida’s capital sentencing procedures 
violate Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  We have previously rejected this 
contention.  See Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 2003) (citing Bottoson v. 
Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 
2002)).  Additionally, we have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of Florida’s 
                                          
 
8.  Buzia cites various cases based on the assumption that only one 
aggravator in this case has merit.  Because competent substantial evidence supports 
the trial court’s finding of four aggravating circumstances, and because it properly 
assigned great weight to those aggravators, these cases do not apply. 
 
 
- 28 -
capital sentencing procedures in cases, such as this one, that include the prior 
violent felony aggravator.  See Robinson v. State, 865 So. 2d 1259, 1265 (Fla. 
2004) (“[A] prior violent felony involve[s] facts that were already submitted to a 
jury during trial and, hence, [is] in compliance with Ring.”) (citing Owen v. 
Crosby, 854 So. 2d 182, 193 (Fla. 2003)).  Accordingly, Buzia is not entitled to 
relief.  
G.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
Although Buzia has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, we have 
the independent duty to review the record in each death penalty case to determine 
whether competent, substantial evidence supports the murder conviction.  See Fla. 
R. App. P. 9.140(i); Davis v. State, 859 So. 2d 465, 480 (Fla. 2003).  After 
reviewing the record, we conclude that competent, substantial evidence supports 
Buzia’s first-degree murder conviction.  At trial, the State presented Buzia’s 
videotaped confession, as well as other strong evidence to establish Buzia’s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  A lab analyst matched the bloody shoe impressions 
found on the tiles in the foyer, family room, garage hallway, kitchen, and dinette 
area in the Kersches’ residence to Buzia’s shoes.  Investigators found a blood 
smear on the door of the cabinet (which contained the axes) in the garage, and a 
print examiner concluded that Buzia’s palm print was on that cabinet.  
Furthermore, Buzia’s shorts had blood stains on the left front leg from the middle 
 
 
- 29 -
extending to the side seam, and he had bloodstains on his socks and shoes.  The 
blood on his shorts and on one of the axes matched Mr. Kersch.  This evidence, 
combined with Buzia’s own confession to the murder, provides sufficient proof to 
uphold the adjudication of guilt.  Accordingly, competent, substantial evidence 
supports the verdict.    
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
Having heard oral argument and considered each of the issues raised in this 
direct appeal, we affirm Buzia’s judgment and sentence of death. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Seminole County,  
Kenneth R. Lester, Jr., Judge - Case No. 00-923-CFA 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender and George D.E. Burden, Assistant Public 
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Barbara C. Davis, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee