Title: STATE v PETKO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13887
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: July 3, 1978

No. 13887 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- TERRANCE ALAN PETKO, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Third Judicial District, Honorable Edward Dussault, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Edward Yelsa argued, Anaconda, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greeley, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Charles R. Anderson, argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana John Radonich, County Attorney, Anaconda, Montana Submitted: June 5, 1978 Filed: 3 u i 3 1373 Clerk M r . Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court: O n January 6, 1977 defendant Terrance Alan Petko was arrested and subsequently charged in the District Court, Deer Lodge County, with two counts: Felony possession of marijuana and possession with intent t o s e l l . The second count was sub- sequently dropped during t r i a l . The case was t r i e d t o a jury, defendant was found guilty and given a deferred imposition of sentence under the condition that he pay $500 within s i x months. From t h i s sentence defendant appeals and alleges s i x specifica- tions of error: 1. Whether the warrantless a r r e s t of defendant was lawful? 2. Whether the conviction should be reversed because evidence which was viewed by the jury and commented on by witnesses was subsequently suppressed by the t r i a l judge? 3. Whether the fact that defendant never entered a formal plea of not guilty is a jurisdictional defect warranting a new t r i a l ? 4 . Whether the s t a t e ' s expert could properly t e s t i f y that the evidence seized was marijuana? 5. Whether it was error for the District Court t o refuse t o give defendant's proposed instructions 7 and 19? 6. Whether a fine of $500 payable within s i x months is a proper condition pursuant t o a deferred imposition of sentence? The events leading t o the warrantless a r r e s t of defendant Petko, were: Officers Bernard M a y and Kichard Ivankovich were driving south on Maple Street i n Anaconda a t approximately 11:30 p.m., Jaunuary 6, 1977. Maple Street was well lit by s t r e e t lights. The officers were traveling a t approximately 10 t o 15 miles per hour. I n front of 508 Maple the officers observed two persons approaching a blue Rambler automobile. One person was t a l l , slender, had shoulder length hair and was wearing a dark blue coat. The other person was shorter and wore a lighter colored coat. The shorter of the individuals was carrying a large grocery sack and acted nervous and peculiar a t the officers drove by. The officers con- tinued t o observe the two and saw the shorter man place the grocery sack i n the s t r e e t behind the sheel of a truck parked on Maple Street. Then both individuals hurriedly got into a Rambler auto- mobile and l e f t in a northerly direction a t a high r a t e of speed. The officers retrieved the abandoned sack. Inside the sack they found 21 cellophane bags containing a substance which appeared t o be marijuana and a metric scale. The officers then attempted to find the Rambler automobile but were unsuccessful. After radioing the c i t y police and the highway patrol for assistance the officers returned t o the vicinity of 508 Maple and parked near the alley between Maple and Elm. Approximately fifteen or twenty minutes a f t e r the i n i t i a l encounter with the two individuals, the officers observed defendant coming down the alley behind 508 Maple carrying a large grocery sack. Defendant was t a l l , had a slender build and was wearing the same color coat as the person seen i n front of 508 Maple. The officers believed him t o be the same person they had seen when the. f i r s t sack of marijuana was abandoned on Maple Street. When the officers entered the alley defendant started t o run, jumped a fence and ran across E l m Street. A s the officers pursued they identified themselves and Officer Ivankovich fired a warning shot in the a i r . Defendant slipped, f e l l t o the ground and was apprehended by Officer May. The sack found i n the possession of defendant a t the time of h i s a r r e s t revealed 24 cellophane bags and one large plastic sack which contained a substance that appeared t o be marijuana. Chemical analysis subsequently disclosed the f i r s t grocery sack contained 530 grams of marijuana and the second grocery sack found i n possession of defendant contained 858 grans of marijuana. A search was conducted of defendant's car and h i s house a t 508 Maple but the evidence seized therein was suppressed on motion of defendant. Defendant was charged with two counts: 1. Felony possession of dangerous drugs under section 54-133, R.C.M. 1947. 2. Criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent t o s e l l pursuant t o section 54-133.1, R.C.M. 1947. Following the District Court's suppression of the marijuana contained i n the f i r s t grocery sack found i n the s t r e e t the proseuction dismissed the second count since section 54-133.1 requires one kilogram or more. Thereafter the jury was admonished t o disregard the f i r s t grocery sack of marijuana and t o consider only the f i r s t count of felony possession, based upon the second grocery sack of marijuana found i n the possession of defendant. Defendant's conviction for possession of the second grocery sack containing 858 grams of marijuana which was taken from de- fendant's possession a t the time of h i s a r r e s t is the subject of t h i s appeal. I n Issue No. 1 defendant contends the a r r e s t was i l l e g a l and therefore the search and seizure incident t o the a r r e s t was also i l l e g a l and the admission of the f r u i t s of the search a t t r i a l constituted reversible error. The c r i t e r i a for testing the sufficiency of a warrantless a r r e s t , a s i n t h i s case, was recently stated by t h i s Court i n State v. Lenon, (1977), Mont . , 570 P.2d 901, 34 St.Rep. 1153, 1156, quoting from State v. H i l l , (1976), Mont . - 9 550 P.2d 390, 33 St. Rep. 496: "'Probable cause to a r r e s t without a warrant exists where the facts and circumstances within the o f f i c e r ' s knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient i n themselves t o warrant a man of reasonable caution i n the belief that an offense has been or is being committed."' The facts and circumstances within the officers' personal knowledge a t the time of defendant's a r r e s t were: a) Two individuals were seen emerging from 508 Maple Street a t 11:30 p.m.; b) Maple Street was illuminated by s t r e e t lights; c) The two individuals were one t a l l man, with a slender build, shoulder length hair and a dark blue coat, and a shorter man with a l i g h t colored coat; d) The two men acted nervous and suspicious when the officers drove by, and the shorter man hurriedly placed a grocery bag which he was carrying behind the wheel of a Datsun pickup, and both men jumped into a Rambler automobile and l e f t a t a high r a t e of speed; e) The officers retrieved the abandoned grocery bag and found 21 cellophane bags containing a substance believed t o be marijuana and a metric scale; f ) Both officers were experienced and trained i n the detection of marijuana; g) After an unsuccessful search for the Rambler automobile the officers returned t o the vicinity of 508 Maple and fifteen or twenty minutes a f t e r their f i r s t encounter, they saw defendant walking down the alley behind 508 Maple, carrying a grocery bag similar t o the one previously abandoned on Maple Street; h) Defendant met the description of the t a l l e r of the two individuals who abandoned the marijuana found on Maple Street. H e appeared t o the officers t o be the same individual; and i ) Upon seeing the officers defendant attempted t o escape, and continued t o do so even though the officers' identified them- selves t o him. These facts and circumstances would justify a man of reasonable caution t o believe that an offense has been or was being committed and there was sufficient probable cause t o a r r e s t defendant. Defendant's a r r e s t was based upon probable cause and therefore a lawful arrest. The seizure of the grocery sack i n h i s possession and i n plain view was made pursuant t o a valid lawful arrest. The District Court properly denied the motion t o suppress t h i s evidence. Regarding Issue No. 2, the t r i a l court reversed its ruling on the s t a t e ' s exhibits which consisted of the contents of the f i r s t grocery bag abandoned on Maple Street and t h i s evidence was shown t o the jury and commented upon by witnesses prior t o its exclusion. During the time the court delayed ruling upon the admissibility of the exhibits, the bags of marijuana and the metric scale were displayed before the jury and commented upon by Officer May, Officer Ivankovich and the forensic chemist, Arnold Melnikoff . Officer Ivankovich t e s t i f i e d a t length on the finding of the evidence, the contents of the bag, and how the scale was used t o weigh fine weights. The scale was attributed as having come out of the house of Terrance Petko a t 508 Maple Street. The question was asked Officer Ivankovich - " ~ o u l d t h i s be something that would be used by somebody who would be packaging i n the form of lids?" Officer Ivankovich answered "Yes". 530 grams of marijuana and a weight scale, similar t o ones typically used for weighing marijuana for sale was displayed t o the jury and commented on by s t a t e witnesses. When the t r i a l judge decided t o suppress the above evidence he admonished the jury t o disregard the f i r s t grocery sack of marijuana and t o consider only the f i r s t count, felony possession of marijuana based upon the second grocery sack of marijuana found i n defendant's possession. It is apparent the t r i a l court committed error by allowing the jury t o view the evidence and permit the witnesses t o comment upon it. However, w e must examine a l l of the circumstances surrounding the error and determine i f the defendant's right t o a f a i r t r i a l was substantially prejudiced and therefore e n t i t l e him t o a new t r i a l . The District Court did reserve i t s ruling on the s t a t e ' s exhibits which consisted of the contents of the f i r s t grocery bag abandoned on Maple Street. This evidence was shown t o the jury and commented upon by witnesses prior t o i t s exclusion. Defendant was originally charged with two counts : felony possession and possession with intent t o s e l l . When the District Court suppressed the marijuana contained in the f i r s t grocery bag found by the officers on Maple Street, the possession with intent t o s e l l was dismissed. The conviction on appeal is felony posses- sion, which results from the possession of marijuana i n excess of 60 grams. The second grocery bag, which was i n the defendant's pos- session a t the time of h i s a r r e s t , contained 858 grams of marijuana! Certainly the jury could not ignore t h i s evidence regardless of viewing the original grocery bag and i t s contents. I f t h i s was a borderline case as t o the amount possessed or a s t o possession, then defendant may have a legitimate argument. But i n l i g h t of the abundance of evidence presented against him on the felony possession charge, there i s l i t t l e persuasion i n the argument that defendant is entitled t o a new t r i a l . State v. Bradford, (1978), Mont . 35 St. Rep. Issue 3. It appears that the formal entry of a plea by the defendant was never completed. Defendant contends t h i s oversight on the part of the District Court requires a reversal of h i s con- viction even though defendant was represented by counset a t a l l times, was informed of the charges against him and tried by a jury of h i s peers. This contention is answered by section 95-1608, R.C.M. 1947, which provides: ''No irregularity i n the arraignment which does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant s h a l l affect the validity of any proceeding i n the cause i f the defendant pleads t o the charge or proceeds t o t r i a l without objecting t o such irregularity." (Emphasis supplied. ) The Revised Commission Comment t o section 95-1608 states: "The real question i n a l l criminal cases on appeal is whether the substantial rights of the defendant have been adversely affected. The purpose of t h i s section is t o prevent reversal where the court has strayed from the procedure s e t forth, but the failure has not hindered the defense. "The burden is upon the defendant t o object, i f any irregularity i n connection with the arraignment is going t o affect h i s defense. This does not override any of the defendant's substantial consti- tutional rights even though not objected to." The defendant did not object t o any irregularity before proceeding t o t r i a l and w e find no prejudice arising from t h i s - irregularity. Issue 4 . Defendant argues the court erred i n allowing expert testimony as t o the substance found i n the grocery bags being marijuana. H e argues t h i s testimony embraced an ultimate issue t o be decided by the jury. There i s no dispute that M r . Melnikoff was qualified a s an expert i n h i s f i e l d of forensic chemistry and was testifying as an expert witness when he stated that i n h i s mind he had no doubt the evidence seized was marijuana. This was h i s opinion based on the t e s t s he ran on the substance seized and such testimony was properly received. Rule 704, Montana Rules of Evidence, specifically states: "Testimony i n the form of an opinion o r inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue t o be decided by the t r i e r of fact .'I Though the Montana Rules of Evidence were not i n effect a t the time of t h i s t r i a l Rule 704 is merely a restatement of and is not intended t o change existing Montana law. A s Commission Comment t o Rule 704 states: "* * * Its affect is t o specifically abolish the rule against opinions on ultimate issues of fact, not currently followed i n Montana. Therefore, t h i s rule is consistent with existing Montana law. Kelly v. John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63,79, 181 P. 326 (1919); State v. Shannon, 95 Mont. 280, 286, 26 P.2d 360 (1933); State v. Campbell, 146 Mont. 251, 258, 405 P.2d 978 (1965); Rude v. Neal, 165 Mont. 520, 525, 530 P.2d 428 (1974); and McGuire v. Nelson, 167 Mont. 188, 536 P.2d 768, (1975) .'I A s t h i s Court stated i n McGuire v. Nelson, (1975), 167 Mont. 188, 200, 536 P.2d 768, in rejecting the t e s t of whether the opinion invades the province of the jury: "The true t e s t would seem to be whether the subject is sufficiently complex so as t o be susceptible t o opinion _evidence, and whether the witness i s properly qualified t o give h i s opinion." Here the proper identification of marijuana requires chemical testing conducted by a qualified person, and Arnold Melni- koff was properly qualified t o give such an opinion. Issue 5. Defendant contends the court erred i n not giving h i s proposed instructions, number 7 and number 19. Defendant's proposed instruction number 7 reads: "You may not find the defendant guilty as charged unless you have first found that, in addition to the other elements of the crime charged, that said marijuana admitted in evidence herein would produce a hallucin- ogenic effect on a person, and this must be concluded by you beyond a reasonable doubt ." ~efendant's proposed instruction number 19 reads: "The term Dangerous Drug means any depressant, stimulant, hallucinogenic, or narcotic drug. "A hallucinogenic drug is a drug which produces hallucinations, that is sensory perceptions not founded upon subjective reality." Defendant was convicted of felony possession of dangerous drugs pursuant to section 54-133, R.C.M. 1947. Section 54-133 prohibits the possession of any dangerous drug, as defined in action 54-301, R.C.M. 1947. Section 54-301(5) defines "Dangerous drug1' as any drug substance, or immediate precursor in Schedules I through V. Schedule I, found in section 54-305, lists marijuana as a dangerous drug. Marijuana is grouped with hallucinogenic drugs, but this does not call for the trier of fact to make a specific finding as to its hallucinogenic capabilities. The legislature has made that determination. The determination for the trier of fact is whether the substance introduced at trial is in fact marijuana, as defined by section 54-301(16), which states: "Marijuana (marihuana) means all plant material from the genus cannabis containing tetrahydrocannabinal (THC) or seeds of the genus capable of germination." The presence of THC is essential and this the reason for and the necessity of chemical analysis. The jury is not required to find that marijuana admitted into evidence is hallucinogenic but only that it meets the definition of section 54-301(16). The District Court's Instruction No. 8 fully explained the elements of this offense. Therefore, the District Court properly denied the defendant's proposed instructions requiring the jury t o find that the marijuana would produce an hallucinogenic effect and defining the term hallucinogenic. Issue 6 . Whether the District Court committed error in imposing a fine of $500, payable within s i x months a f t e r M a y 31, 1977, a f t e r defendant was found guilty of criminal possession of dangerous drugs and the court deferred the imposition of sentence. W e hold the imposition of a $500 fine or payment as a condition of probation a f t e r deferred imposition of sentence t o be a n u l l i t y and of no force o r effect and that the same be vacated and s e t aside t o conform with t h i s Court's Opinion i n State v. Merlin Babbit , (1978), Mont . - 9 574 P.2d 998, 35 St.Rep. 154. The judgment of the District Court i n a l l other respects is af firmed. Justice W e Concur: Chief Justice