Title: Templet v. Intracoastal Truck Line, Inc.
Citation: 230 So. 2d 74, 255 La. 193
Docket Number: N/A
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: December 15, 1969

230 So. 2d 74 (1969) 255 La. 193 Carroll P. TEMPLET v. INTRACOASTAL TRUCK LINE, INC., et al. No. 49734. Supreme Court of Louisiana. December 15, 1969. *75 James C. Murphy, Jr., of Sessions, Fishman, Rosenson, Snellings &amp; Boisfontaine, New Orleans, for appellant. Robert P. Charbonnet, of Charbonnet &amp; Charbonnet, New Orleans, for appellees. McCALEB, Justice. Plaintiff, a truck driver in the employ of Intracoastal Truck Line, Inc., seeks to recover Workmen's Compensation benefits from his employer and its insurer for injuries received when his automobile was struck from the rear, as he attempted a left turn into his employer's premises from Peters Road, Jefferson Parish, by a car driven by Renis Walters who was overtaking and about to pass plaintiff at the time he turned. On July 15, 1964, the date of the accident, plaintiff had been summoned by his employer to make a truck run to Houma, and for this purpose he was to leave his employer's premises about 5 o'clock a. m. It was while making a left turn into the premises to report for this assignment that he was struck from the rear by Walters and suffered the injuries for which he seeks compensation benefits in this suit.[1] Plaintiff contends, basically, that the accident arose in the course and out of his employment (1) because his car was partially on his employer's premises when struck, specifically the left front wheel being on the gravel portion of the parking lot of the premises adjacent to the public road, and (2) alternatively, the accident occurred on a portion of the highway leading to the employer's premises so as to make the "threshold" doctrine applicable. In this respect, plaintiff asserts that Peters Road, the route for ingress and egress to and from his employer's premises, subjected him to a greater travel risk than that of the general public; that this two-way two-lane roadway services a highly developed industrial area and is heavily traveled and that, therefore, since it is the only means of entry to and exit from the premises, the "threshold" doctrine is applicable. Defendants deny the pertinence of this doctrine, averring that one of its elements is lacking, i. e., a distinctive travel risk to the employee in going to and from his work. They maintain that to allow plaintiff recovery under the circumstances here presented would constitute an unwarranted extension of the coverage afforded to employees while traveling to and from work as plaintiff was subjected to no hazard which was peculiar to him rather than to every employee who travels to work in his own automobile and is allowed the privilege *76 of parking in an area adjacent to his employer's plant. After trial, plaintiff's suit was dismissed. The judge found that the location of defendant's plant presented no unusual traffic hazards; nor was there any special danger encountered by plaintiff as a result of his employment. Accordingly, he refused application of the threshold doctrine. Plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, 217 So. 2d 725, reversed and awarded plaintiff compensation. That court, after discussing many cases in the jurisprudence (consisting in the main of cases from the courts of appeal involving the threshold doctrine) concluded that the employee's subjection to a "peculiar hazard" deemed essential for recovery in some of these cases would not be "adopted." The holding of the court is stated in the following summation: Defendants applied for a writ of review, assigning as error the refusal of the Court of Appeal to follow the decisions requiring that, for the threshold doctrine to apply, the employee must have been subjected to a "distinctive" or "peculiar" risk, which is not present in this case. These decisions, they contend, are: Cudahy Packing Co. of Nebraska v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 44 S. Ct. 153, 68 L. Ed. 366, 30 A.L.R. 532 (1923); Walker v. Lykes Bros.-Ripley S. S. Co., 166 So. 624 (La.App.1936); Williams v. Sewerage &amp; Water Bd. of New Orleans, 90 So. 2d 582 (La.App. 1956); and Verret v. Travelers Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d 292 (La.App.1964). We granted certiorari. The salient facts of the case are not in dispute. The accident happened between 5 and 5:25 a. m. when plaintiff turned left from Peters Road to enter the premises of his employer. The location of defendant's plant, as found by the district judge, presented no unusual traffic hazards. Plaintiff testified that, when he was struck, the left front wheel of his car had reached the shell area of the parking lot of his employer and, because of this circumstance, he claims he was partially on the premises and, therefore, had actually entered his employment. Neither the district judge nor the Court of Appeal gave serious consideration to this contention, which plaintiff has raised again in his reply to the application for certiorari. We, like the lower courts, find no merit in this point. For the accident did not occur on the premises; plaintiff's car *77 was struck while it was in Peters Road and, hence, the fact that the left front wheel of the car had reached the shell area of the parking lot is immaterial. Accordingly, if plaintiff is to recover the threshold or proximity rule must be found applicable. The exception to the general rule in Louisiana which allows compensation to an employee for injuries sustained in an accident occurring before or after working hours, and off of, but within close proximity to, the premises of his employer, stems from the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Cudahy Packing Co. of Nebraska v. Parramore, supra, where it was found that this exception was not violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. This doctrine was reaffirmed in Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S. Ct. 221, 72 L. Ed. 507, 66 A.L.R. 1402 (1928). In our courts the doctrine of the Parramore and Giles cases, often referred to as the threshold rule, was applied in Walker v. Lykes Bros.-Ripley S. S. Co. (La.App. Orleans, 1936) 166 So. 624. This theory for extension of liability has been approved in later decisions of the courts of appeal and, inferentially, by this Court in Osborne v. McWilliams Dredging Co. (1938) 189 La. 670, 180 So. 481. It was not until the pronouncement of the Court of Appeal in the instant case that any question arose as to the use of the terms "peculiar" or "unusual" in relation to the risk or hazard to the employee discussed in the cases in which the doctrine has been applied. There are, however, a few Court of Appeal decisions allowing recovery without analyzing the true basis for the formulation of the exception to the general rule that off-premise accidents befalling employees on their way to or coming from work are not compensable viz. Ward v. Standard Lbr. Co., 4 La.App. 89 (1925); LeBlanc v. Ohio Oil Co., 7 La.App. 721 (1928); and Guient v. Mathieson Chem. Corp., 41 So. 2d 493 (La. App.1949). In determining whether there is justification for the requirement that off-premises liability accrues only in cases where the hazard to which the employee is exposed is "peculiar" or "greater" than that of the public generally, it is well to reexamine the decision in the Parramore case in the light of the pronouncement of the Court of Appeal, heretofore quoted, and its holding that the doctrine applies herein because the employee necessarily had to turn from the roadway into the employer's premises by reason of his employment and became "thus exposed to the risk as an employee rather than as a member of the general public", thereby making the accident one "arising out of the employment" and compensable under the act. We note this because it is obvious that, in the absence of a special or implied contractual understanding, the employer does not have the right of supervision and control over the employee before and after working hours and before he has arrived or after he leaves the premises. Therefore, any extension of coverage for workmen's compensation must necessarily be founded on the existence of conditions surrounding the locality of the employment which makes it more hazardous to the employee than it would have been had he not been employed. In the Parramore case the employee was killed when the automobile in which he was riding with another employee, while on his way to work, was struck by an engine of a railroad company. The plant of his employer could not be reached without crossing over three lines of railroad tracks, one of which was immediately adjacent to, and from which switches led directly into the plant. The automobile had crossed two of the railroad tracks and, when upon that of the Rio Grande Western, with switches leading into the plant, it was struck by the train and the employee, Parramore, was instantly killed. The question presented for consideration was whether the accident *78 arose out of and in the course of the employment. It was there contended that the accident was one which occurred off of the premises, on a public road, outside the hours of employment; while the employee was not engaged in any business of the employer; that it was not the result of any industrial risk, but arose from a common peril to which the public generally was exposed. The Court then referred to certain English decisions on the question of causal relationship which stated that: This same doctrine, so says the United States Supreme Court, has been declared in the state courts under the American statutes. The Court observed: Again in the case of Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, supra, the United States Supreme Court allowed recovery under the compensation act when the employee was struck and killed by a train as he crossed railroad tracks on his way to work in the brick company belonging to the employer under a state of facts similar *79 to those appearing in the Parramore case. The doctrine of the Parramore case, followed by Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, which has been denominated as the "threshold" or "proximity" doctrine, was discussed in detail in Walker v. Lykes Bros.-Ripley S. S. Co., supra. In that case, although recovery was denied because the employee had acquitted himself from the hazard existing on or near the employer's premises, the particular rules are stated. The hazard there was a roadway under the dock board shed which the court considered to be generally dangerous. It was stated: * * * * * * * * * * * * In spite of this language, the Court of Appeal stated herein: Professor Wex Malone in his work "Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law *80 and Practice" states correctly the extension of the rule of compensation coverage in Section 172, p. 201, thusly: * * * * * * In Verret v. Travelers Insurance Company, La.App 1st Cir. 1964, 166 So. 2d 292, the employee was found not to be subjected to any unusual risks so as to invoke the threshold or proximity doctrine. He was injured while crossing a street (Wilson Drive) after having descended the levee. It was there contended that the risk was the excessive amount of automobile traffic caused by the employees going to and from work, and the excessive amount of noise of the conveyor crossing Wilson Drive overhead which made it almost impossible for one to hear an approaching vehicle. This, the court held, was "no peculiar hazard" and, accordingly, the doctrine was not applicable. It is the Verret decision which the Court of Appeal has deduced herein as overstating the basic "arising out of the employment" requirement and, therefore, it rejected the rationale of that matter. In thus concluding, the court found comfort and support in our decision in Edwards v. Louisiana Forestry Comm., 221 La. 818, 60 So. 2d 449. But that case is wholly inapposite here. There, the accident occurred in the course of employment when the employee rescued an imperiled child from a vicious dog on the employer's premises and the only issue was whether the rescue was an act within the contemplation of the employment and, hence, arose out of the employment. We held in the affirmative, but there is certainly no basis for considering any language in the Edwards case as overriding other decisions on the threshold doctrine. The facts presented in this case do not show any special risk the defendant company's employees must assume in turning off the public road to enter the employer's premises which would not be encountered by the general public in turning off such road or other roads similarly situated. Accordingly, there was no "unusual", "peculiar" or "greater" hazard to the employees of the defendant company than that faced by any other motorist using the public streets. We hold that a claim for injuries occurring on a road or highway, as presented here, is not compensable. There must be a hazard such as railroad tracks, tunnels, covered wharves and the like to which the employee is regularly and peculiarly exposed by reason of his employment *81 to which the public generally, albeit also subjected to such hazard, is not usually exposed to the extent of the employee. For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and that of the trial court is reinstated and affirmed. [1] An action in tort was previously instituted by plaintiff against Walters and his insurer which resulted in the dismissal of the suit on a finding of contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff in attempting a left turn in front of the overtaking vehicle at a time when the maneuver could not be made with safety. See Templet v. Walters, La.App., 204 So. 2d 429.