Title: Ex parte State of Alabama Board of Education et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1150366
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 9, 2016

Rel: 09/09/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2016
____________________
1150366
____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama Board of Education et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Sharper D. Adams  et al.
v.
State of Alabama Board of Education et al.)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-13-900242)
PARKER, Justice.
The State of Alabama Board of Education ("SBOE"); Dr.
Thomas  B. Bice, individually and in his official capacity as
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the State Superintendent of Education;  and Dr. Edward R.
1
Richardson, individually and in his official capacity as the
State Intervention Chief Financial Officer (hereinafter
referred to collectively as "the petitioners"), petition this
Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit
Court ("the circuit court") to vacate its order denying the
petitioners' motion to dismiss the claims filed against them
by Sharper D. Adams and numerous other former employees of the
Birmingham Board of Education ("the BBOE") (hereinafter
referred to collectively as "the respondents")  and to enter
2
an order dismissing with prejudice all claims against the
petitioners on the basis of immunity.  We grant the petition
in part, deny it in part, and issue the writ.   
I. Facts and Procedural History
The School Fiscal Accountability Act, § 16-13A-1 et seq.,
Ala. Code 1975  ("the Accountability Act"), which became
Thomas B. Bice is no longer superintendent of education. 
1
See Rule 43(b), Ala. R. App. P., providing that, when a public
officer is a party to an appellate proceeding and ceases to
hold office, "the public officer's successor is automatically
substituted as a party."
The respondents refer to themselves as "nonprobationary
2
employees" and assert that they have a property interest in
their former employment positions with the BBOE.  The
petitioners dispute this fact.  
2
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effective on June 1, 2006, Act No. 2006-196, Ala. Acts 2006,
requires the State superintendent of education to oversee the
financial integrity of the local school boards in Alabama.  §
16-13A-2, Ala. Code 1975.  The Accountability Act also
requires local school boards to submit certain financial
reports, including an annual projected budget, to the State
chief education financial officer ("the CEFO").  § 16-13A-6
and -7, Ala. Code 1975.  In addition, local school boards must
establish and maintain a minimum-reserve fund equal to one
month of the local school board's operating expenses.  § 16-
13A-9, Ala. Code 1975. 
At the end of fiscal year 2011, the CEFO determined that
31 of Alabama's 134 local school boards, including the BBOE,
did not have a fully funded minimum-reserve fund.  In fiscal
year 2012, although the BBOE's monthly operating expenses 
were
approximately $17 million, the balance of the BBOE's minimum-
reserve fund was approximately $2 million.  Thus, pursuant to
§ 16-13A-9, the BBOE's minimum-reserve 
fund was 
underfunded 
by
approximately $15 million. 
In February 2012, because of the BBOE's failure to fully
fund 
its 
minimum-reserve 
fund, 
the 
CEFO 
met 
with
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representatives of the BBOE and other noncompliant local
school boards to help them prepare a plan to build and
maintain the required minimum-reserve fund.  Pursuant to the
authority granted to the CEFO under the Accountability Act,
the CEFO required the BBOE and other noncompliant local school
boards to submit to the SBOE for its approval, by April 2,
2012, a financial-recovery plan detailing how the boards
planned to fully fund their required minimum-reserve funds. 
Once approved by the SBOE, the local school boards' financial-
recovery plans were to be adopted as a resolution by the local
school 
board. 
 
The 
resolutions 
adopting 
the 
financial-recovery
plans were to be submitted to the SBOE by May 31, 2012.
The BBOE failed to submit a financial-recovery plan to
the SBOE for its approval by the April 2, 2012, deadline, and
its minimum-reserve fund remained underfunded.  As a result,
on April 12, 2012, the SBOE adopted a "Resolution for an
Investigative Review of the Governance of the [BBOE]."  This
resolution authorized and directed Dr. Bice to "investigate,
review, and resolve by appropriate order(s) all controversies
and matters" concerning the BBOE. 
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Throughout April and May 2012, the SBOE and the BBOE
worked to create a financial-recovery plan for the BBOE.  The
CEFO met with the BBOE to discuss the specifics of a potential
financial-recovery plan on April 18, April 24, and May 24,
2012. 
On May 31, 2012, the CEFO and the superintendent of the
BBOE presented a financial-recovery plan ("the financial-
recovery plan") to the BBOE for the BBOE's adoption.  The
financial-recovery plan included, among other things, a
reduction in force ("RIF"), which required that the jobs  of
the respondents, among others, be eliminated.  The financial-
recovery plan projected that the BBOE's required minimum-
reserve fund would be fully funded at $17 million within two
years of implementation of the plan. 
On June 5, 2012, a motion was presented to the BBOE to
approve the financial-recovery plan; the motion failed for
lack of a majority.  At the BBOE's next regular meeting, held
on June 12, 2012, all the BBOE members present voted to
approve the financial-recovery plan, but the financial-
recovery plan as approved did not include details as to how
the financial-recovery plan would be implemented. 
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On June 14, 2012, as a result of the BBOE's continued
failure to approve the required financial-recovery plan
(including a plan for implementation), the SBOE adopted a
resolution, 
pursuant 
to 
§ 
16-6B-4, 
Ala. 
Code 
1975,3
Section 16-6B-4 states: 
3
"[I]f a local board of education is determined to
have submitted fiscally unsound financial reports,
the State Department of Education shall provide
assistance and advice. If during the assistance the
State Superintendent of Education determines that
the local board of education is in an unsound fiscal
position, a person or persons shall be appointed by
the State Superintendent of Education to advise the
day-to-day financial operations of the local board
of education. If after a reasonable period of time
the State Superintendent of Education determines
that the local board of education is still in an
unsound fiscal condition, a request shall be made to
the [SBOE] for the direct control of the fiscal
operation of the local board of education. If the
request is granted, the State Superintendent of
Education shall present to the [SBOE] a proposal for
the implementation of management controls necessary
to restore the local school system to a sound
financial condition. Upon approval by the [SBOE],
the State Superintendent of Education shall appoint
an individual to be chief financial officer to
manage the fiscal operation of the local board of
education, until such time as the fiscal condition
of the system is restored. The chief financial
officer shall perform his or her duties in
accordance with rules and regulations established by
the [SBOE] in concert with applicable Alabama law.
Any person appointed by the State Superintendent of
Education to serve as chief financial officer to
manage the fiscal operation of a local board of
education shall be required to give bond with a
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authorizing Dr. Bice to appoint a person to provide oversight
of the BBOE's day-to-day operations and to advise and assist
the BBOE with the implementation of the financial-recovery
plan.  This resolution further authorized Dr. Bice, in the
event 
a 
financial-recovery 
plan, 
including 
implementation, 
was
not approved by the BBOE at its June 26, 2012, meeting, to
intervene and to assume direct control of the fiscal operation
of the BBOE and to appoint a chief financial officer to manage
the financial operations of the BBOE in order to restore the
BBOE to a sound financial condition. 
On June 26, 2012, the CEFO and the superintendent of the
BBOE presented the implementation phase of the financial-
recovery plan to the BBOE for its approval.  However, the BBOE
surety company authorized to do business in Alabama
and shall not be required to receive approval of the
local superintendent to expend monies. The chief
financial officer shall serve at the pleasure and
under the direction of the State Superintendent of
Education. The State Superintendent of Education,
directly or indirectly through the chief financial
officer, may direct or approve such actions as may
in his or her judgment be necessary to: (1) Prevent
further deterioration in the financial condition of
the local board; (2) restore the local board of
education to financial stability; and (3) enforce
compliance with statutory, regulatory, or other
binding legal standards or requirements relating to
the fiscal operation of the local board of
education."
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did not approve the financial-recovery plan.  Dr. Bice then
intervened and appointed Dr. Richardson as the 
chief 
financial
officer for purposes of intervention, i.e., the State
Intervention Chief Financial Officer. 
The BBOE continued to resist the SBOE's efforts to
implement the financial-recovery plan.  As a result, the SBOE,
Dr. Bice, and Attorney General Luther Strange ("the State
plaintiffs") sued the BBOE and its members, in their official
capacities, in the Jefferson Circuit Court on July 20, 2012,
seeking 
declaratory 
and 
injunctive 
relief 
("the 
SBOE 
action"). 
The State plaintiffs sought to determine the authority of the
SBOE and Dr. Bice to control the BBOE's financial operations. 
The court entered a temporary restraining order 
preventing 
the
BBOE from interfering with the implementation of the
financial-recovery plan; from interfering with any other
decision or action deemed necessary by the SBOE to ensure that
schools included in the Birmingham School System opened for
the academic year in a timely and orderly manner; or from
interfering with Dr. Bice's and his staff's access to offices
of the BBOE and its computers and files. 
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Meanwhile, on July 24, 2012, Dr. Bice presided over a
BBOE meeting.  At this meeting, the superintendent of the BBOE
requested that the members of the BBOE vote to approve the
implementation of the financial-recovery plan, which included
the RIF.  The vote of the members of the BBOE on the adoption
of the financial-recovery plan was evenly split; Dr. Bice
overrode the tie vote of the members of the BBOE and approved
the implementation of the financial-recovery plan.
On August 13, 2012, the court in the SBOE action granted
the SBOE's request for an injunction.  The court held that the
SBOE and Dr. Bice were authorized by Alabama law to take all
the actions they had taken with respect to the BBOE.  On
October 11, 2012, after the final judgment had been entered,
the respondents filed a motion to intervene in the SBOE
action, which the Jefferson Circuit Court denied. 
On January 22, 2013, the respondents filed the underlying
action against the petitioners, the BBOE, and certain BBOE
officials (the BBOE and the BBOE officials are hereinafter 
referred to collectively as "the BBOE defendants").   In their
4
complaint, the respondents sought a judgment declaring that
The BBOE defendants are not parties to this mandamus
4
petition.
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the petitioners did not have the authority under state law to
adopt 
and 
to 
implement 
the 
financial-recovery 
plan. 
Specifically, 
the 
respondents 
sought 
a 
judgment 
declaring 
that
the petitioners did not have the authority to implement the
RIF.  Rather, the respondents alleged that the BBOE was the
entity with the authority to adopt and to implement the
financial-recovery plan, including the RIF, which, the
respondents argued, it did not do, because its vote ended in
a tie vote overridden by Dr. Bice's action.  The respondents
requested that they be reinstated to their now eliminated
positions with the BBOE and that they be awarded money damages
in the form of backpay from the time their positions with the
BBOE were eliminated as a result of the implementation of the
RIF.  In a separate count, the respondents alleged that their
due-process rights had been violated by the elimination of
their positions.  The respondents cited 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
alleged: 
"[The 
petitioners'] 
aforementioned 
conduct
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1, and the guaranty of due
process contained in the Alabama Constitution, Ala.
Const. 1901, art. I, §§ 1, 6, 13, and 22, denying
[the respondents'] property rights without providing
due process of law as evidenced by the failure of
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[the petitioners] to provide [the respondents] with
proper notice of the adverse employment actions
taken against them in the illegal RIF of July 24,
2012, in express violation of the Students First
Act, § 16-24C-6(b)[, Ala. Code 1975]."
Under this count, the respondents requested the following
relief:
"An order declaring that [the respondents],
having been denied proper notice of the adverse
employment actions taken against them in the illegal
July 24, 2012 RIF implemented in 2012 and 2013, in
violation of § 16-24C-6(b), Code of Alabama (1975),
have been denied due process of law under the
Constitution of Alabama ... and the Constitution of
the United States, Amendment XIV.
"That 
[the 
respondents] 
be 
immediately
reinstated to their pre-RIF positions, 
compensation,
duties, work stations, reporting and supervisory
channels, and all terms and conditions of their pre-
RIF employment.
"That [the respondents] be awarded general
compensatory damages, to include all back pay, where
appropriate, and to restore any and all benefits, as
required; and such other and further relief as
necessary to make [the respondents] fully whole." 
On March 1, 2013, the BBOE defendants filed an answer to
the complaint.  On March 15, 2013, the petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint.  On March 25, 2013, the
respondents amended their complaint to add a claim alleging
that the petitioners and the BBOE defendants had failed to
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follow certain administrative procedures in implementing the
RIF.
On April 19, 2013, the petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss the respondents' amended complaint.  The petitioners
argued that all of the  respondents' claims were due to be
dismissed as an impermissible collateral attack on the final
judgment entered in the SBOE action, which declared that the
SBOE had the authority to implement the RIF.  The petitioners
did not argue in the motion that they were entitled to
immunity.  The respondents filed a memorandum of law in
opposition to the petitioners' motion to dismiss their first
amended complaint. 
On August 24, 2014, after extensive briefing and oral
argument, the circuit court treated the petitioners' 
motion 
to
dismiss and the respondents' response as cross-motions for a
summary judgment.  The circuit court entered a partial summary
judgment in favor of the petitioners on the respondents'
declaratory-judgment 
claim, 
entered 
a 
partial 
summary 
judgment
in favor of the respondents on their due-process claim, and
dismissed 
the 
respondents' 
administrative-procedure 
claim. 
 
In
analyzing the respondents' due-process claim, the circuit
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court determined that the respondents had a property interest
under state law in their employment with the BBOE and that
they were entitled to certain due-process protections under
federal law.  The circuit court determined that the
petitioners had violated the respondents' federal due-process
rights by depriving them of their property interest without
due process of law because, the circuit court concluded, the
petitioners failed to comply with the procedural requirements
of the Students First Act, § 16-24C-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975
("the SFA").  Specifically, the circuit court concluded that
the SFA, a state law, required that the respondents receive
notice of the fact that the implementation of the RIF would
result in the termination of their employment positions with
the BBOE and that the petitioners failed to give the
respondents such notice.  Accordingly, the circuit court
concluded 
that 
the 
respondents' 
federal 
due-process 
rights 
had
been violated.
On September 8, 2014, the petitioners filed a motion
requesting that the circuit court "reconsider" its partial
summary judgment in the respondents' favor as to the
respondents' due-process claim.  It was in this motion that
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the petitioners first argued that they were entitled to
immunity from the respondents' claims.  The petitioners
alleged, among other things, that "[the respondents] are not
permitted to assert a § 1983 claim for money damages against
[the petitioners] in their official capacities."  The
petitioners additionally alleged that the § 1983 claim 
against
Dr. Bice and Dr. Richardson in their individual capacities is
barred by qualified immunity.  Moreover, the petitioners
argued that the respondents' state-law claims are barred by
State immunity and State-agent immunity.  The circuit court
denied the petitioners' motion on May 13, 2015, without
specifically addressing the petitioners' immunity-based
arguments.
On July 12, 2015, the respondents amended their complaint
a second time to add as plaintiffs additional former employees
of the BBOE.   In response, on July 13, 2015, the petitioners
5
The respondents consist of two groups of former
5
employees.  The two groups filed separate responses to this
petition for a writ of mandamus.  The first group consists of
the original plaintiffs and the second group consists of the
additional former employees of the BBOE.  Because we treat
both groups of plaintiffs as respondents, we do not
differentiate those responses in our discussion, except in
note 6, infra.
Roderick Jackson, a former employee of the BBOE whose
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filed a motion to dismiss the respondents' second amended
complaint.  In their motion, the petitioners raised the same
immunity arguments they had raised in their "motion to
reconsider," which the circuit court had denied on May 13,
2015.  
On December 3, 2015, the circuit court denied the
petitioners' 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
the 
respondents' 
second 
amended
complaint.  On January 13, 2016, the petitioners filed this
petition for a writ of mandamus requesting review of the
circuit court's denial of their motion to dismiss.  The
petitioners argue that they are immune from liability on the
respondents' due-process claim, which the circuit court
decided in favor of the respondents in its partial summary
judgment; neither the petitioners nor the respondents 
make any
argument concerning the circuit court's order as to the
employment position was eliminated by the RIF, had filed a
motion to intervene in this action, which the circuit court
granted.  Further, the respondents had filed a motion to add
as necessary parties all those former employees of the BBOE
whose employment positions were eliminated or otherwise
adversely affected by the RIF, which the circuit court
granted.  The respondents' second amended complaint sought to
add these parties as plaintiffs.  As used in the rest of this
opinion, the term "the respondents" will include 
these 
parties
as well. 
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respondents' 
declaratory-judgment 
claim 
or 
their
administrative-procedure claim.
II. Standard of Review
"'The 
writ 
of 
mandamus 
is 
an
extraordinary legal remedy.  Ex parte
Mobile Fixture & Equip. Co., 630 So. 2d
358, 360 (Ala. 1993).  Therefore, this
Court will not grant mandamus relief unless
the petitioner shows: (1) a clear legal
right 
to 
the 
order 
sought; 
(2) 
an
imperative duty upon the trial court to
perform, accompanied by its refusal to do
so; (3) the lack of another adequate
remedy; and (4) the properly invoked
jurisdiction of the Court. See Ex parte
Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002).'
"Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 2005). 
A 'petition for a writ of mandamus is an appropriate
means for seeking review of an order denying a claim
of immunity.'  Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 176
(Ala. 2000).
"'In reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss
by means of a mandamus petition, we do not change
our standard of review.' Ex parte Haralson, 853 So.
2d 928, 931 (Ala. 2003).
"'In Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297
(Ala. 1993), this Court stated the standard
of review applicable to a ruling on a
motion to dismiss:
"'"On appeal, a dismissal is
not entitled to a presumption of
correctness. 
The 
appropriate
standard of review under Rule
12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is
whether, when the allegations of
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the complaint are viewed most
strongly in the pleader's favor,
it appears that the pleader could
prove any set of circumstances
that 
would 
entitle 
[it] 
to
relief. 
In 
making 
this
determination, this Court does
not 
consider 
whether 
the
plaintiff 
will 
ultimately
prevail, but only whether [it]
may possibly prevail. We note
that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is
proper only 
when 
it 
appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in
support of the claim that would
entitle the plaintiff to relief."
"'622 So. 2d at 299 (citations omitted).'
"Knox v. Western World Ins. Co., 893 So. 2d 321, 322
(Ala. 2004)."
Ex parte Troy Univ., 961 So. 2d 105, 107-08 (Ala. 2006).
III. Discussion
The petitioners argue that they are entitled to the
protection of immunity as to the respondents' due-process
claim.  Initially, we note that there is some confusion and
disagreement between the 
parties 
as to whether the respondents
allege a violation of their federal or state due-process
rights.  In order to properly address the petitioners'
immunity arguments, we must first determine whether the
respondents' due-process claim is based on federal or state
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law so that we can determine whether the principles of federal
immunity or state immunity apply.
The petitioners argue that the respondents' due-process
claim "seeks to vindicate an alleged violation of state law,
the Students First Act."  In support of their argument, the
petitioners cite the respondents' complaint, in which the
respondents alleged that they have been damaged "by the
failure of [the petitioners] to provide [the 
respondents] 
with
proper notice of adverse employment actions taken 
against 
them
in the illegal RIF ... in violation of the Students First
Act."  The petitioners also cite the circuit court's order,
which, they allege, "reinforced the notion that [the
respondents'] § 1983 claim is based upon an alleged violation
of the Students First Act, writing that [the circuit court]
'most significantly ... relies on the SFA in declaring below
[the respondents] were unlawfully separated from their BBOE
jobs.'"  The petitioners argue that the respondents' due-
process claim is not a § 1983 claim because the respondents
seek only to vindicate a violation of state rights.  
The respondents argue that their due-process claim is a
§ 1983 claim that seeks to vindicate an alleged violation of
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their federal due-process rights.  The respondents state that
their due-process claim, "as stated both in the complaint and
in the partial summary judgment order, is a federal claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to vindicate the constitutional right
of due process," and that it "is squarely based in federal
law: it is a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."  The respondents
state that they relied on the SFA only to establish that they
have a property interest in their  employment with the BBOE,
"[b]ut [that] once there is a property interest, then the
question of what 'process' is 'due' under the United States
Constitution is a matter of federal law."  They state that
their "claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 properly established that
they had a property interest in their positions pursuant to
state law.  Once that property right attached, however,
federal due process law determines whether the employees
received the process they were due."  Concerning whether
federal or state principles of immunity apply, 
the 
respondents
state:  
"Only federal immunity law is relevant in this
review.  The circuit court issued a summary judgment
in favor of the employees on one claim, pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983: that [the petitioners] deprived
employees of property without due process (or any
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process at all) in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment."  
Looking solely at the respondents' complaint and the
partial-summary-judgment order, it appears to us that the
respondents alleged that both their federal and state due-
process rights were violated.  In their complaint, as set
forth above, the respondents alleged that the petitioners'
conduct violated "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1, and the guaranty of due process contained in
the Alabama Constitution, Ala. Const. 1901, art. I, §§ 1, 6,
13, and 22."  The respondents also alleged that the
petitioners violated the procedural requirements of the SFA. 
These are clearly allegations that the respondents' federal
and state due-process rights were violated.  However, in their
responses before this Court, the respondents unequivocally
abandon any allegation they may have made in their complaint
that the petitioners violated their state due-process rights.  
6
See the original plaintiffs' response, at pp. 15
6
(alleging the respondents' due-process claim "is squarely
based in federal law: it is a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983"),
18 (the respondents state that their due-process claim, "as
stated both in the complaint and in the partial-summary-
judgment order, is a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to
vindicate the constitutional right of due process"), and 19
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Accordingly, based on the respondents' abandonment of their
allegation that the petitioners violated their state due-
process rights, we conclude that the respondents' due-process
claim is a § 1983 claim.  Therefore, only the petitioners'
immunity arguments concerning the respondents' § 1983 claim
are before us, and we will consider only whether the
petitioners are immune under federal principles of immunity. 
See Ex parte Madison Cty. Bd. of Educ., 1 So. 3d 981, 987, 989
(Ala. 2008) (immunity against a federal constitutional claim
under § 1983 is not a matter of state immunity law but a
matter of federal immunity law).
We turn now to the petitioners' federal immunity
arguments.   First, the petitioners argue that they are
7
("the question of what 'process' is 'due' under the United
States Constitution is a matter of federal law"); and the
additional plaintiffs' response, at pp. 4-5 ("Only federal
immunity law is relevant in this review.") and 6 ("The
[respondents'] claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 properly
established that they had a property interest in their
positions pursuant to state law.  Once that property right
attached, however, federal due process law determines whether
the employees received the process they were due.").
We note that the respondents argue that the petitioners'
7
petition is untimely.  However, the respondents rely solely on
Ex parte Jones, 147 So. 3d 415 (Ala. 2013), to demonstrate the
alleged untimeliness of the petition.  In Jones, this Court
determined that a mandamus petition raising solely the issue
of State-agent immunity was untimely.  Jones did not consider
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entitled to immunity from the respondents' § 1983 claim under
the Eleventh Amendment: "To the extent this Court is inclined
to treat [the respondents'] claim as a claim under § 1983, the
[petitioners] are entitled to dismissal pursuant to the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution." 
We first consider whether the SBOE is entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity from the respondents' § 1983
claim.  In Alabama State University v. Danley, [Ms. 1140907,
April 8, 2016] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2016), this Court
stated: "'"It is clear ... that in the absence of consent a
suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments
is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment.  This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the
nature of the relief sought."'" (Quoting Ex parte Retirement
Sys. of Alabama, 182 So. 3d 527, 537-38 (Ala. 2015), quoting
in turn Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 101 (1984)(emphasis added).)  In State Board of Education
v. Mullins, 31 So. 3d 91, 96 (Ala. 2009), this Court stated
the timeliness 
of 
a 
mandamus petition raising federal immunity
arguments.  The respondents have not cited any authority to
support the conclusion that the petition is untimely as to the
federal immunity issues, which are the only immunity issues
before us  in this case.
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that "[t]he [SBOE] ... [is an] agenc[y] of the State.  Ex
parte Board of Educ., 810 So. 2d 773, 776 (Ala. 2001); Ex
parte Craft, 727 So. 2d 55, 58 (Ala. 1999)."  It is undisputed
that the SBOE did not consent to the respondents' suit against
it.  Accordingly, the SBOE, as an agency of the State, is
entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from the
respondents' § 1983 claim.   
Next, we will consider whether Dr. Bice and Dr.
Richardson, in their official capacities, are entitled to
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from the respondents' §
1983 claim.  As set forth above, the respondents have
requested money damages in the form of backpay and injunctive
relief in the form of reinstatement to their pre-RIF
positions.  Concerning the respondents' request for money
damages, this Court has unequivocally stated that "[c]laims
for monetary relief against State officials in their official
capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment."  Ex parte
Retirement Sys. of Alabama, 182 So. 3d at 538 (citing Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) ("'[W]hen the action is in
essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the
state is the real, substantial party in interest and is
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entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even
though 
individual 
officials 
are 
nominal 
defendants.'" 
(quoting
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464
(1945)))).  Accordingly, Dr. Bice and Dr. Richardson, in their
official capacities, are entitled to immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment from the respondents' § 1983 claim insofar
as the respondents seek money damages.   However, Dr. Bice and
8
Dr. Richardson, in their official capacities, are 
not 
entitled
to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from the 
respondents'
§ 1983 claim insofar as the respondents seek injunctive
relief.  In Lane v. Central Alabama Community College, 772
F.3d 1349, 1351 (11th Cir. 2014), the Eleventh Circuit stated:
"Generally 
speaking, 
the 
Eleventh 
Amendment 
bars
civil actions against state officials in their
official capacity 'when the state is the real,
substantial party in interest.'  Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S. Ct.
900, 908, 79 L.Ed. 2d 67 (1984). Pursuant to the
exception established in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), official-
capacity 
suits 
against 
state 
officials 
are
permissible, however, under the Eleventh Amendment
when the plaintiff seeks 'prospective equitable
relief to end continuing violations of federal
law.'"
The respondents concede that they cannot recover money
8
damages against Dr. Bice and Dr. Richardson in their official
capacities. 
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The Eleventh Circuit has specifically held that "requests for
reinstatement fall within the scope of the Ex parte Young
exception and, thus, are not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment."  Id.  Thus, Dr. Bice and Dr. Richardson, in their
official capacities, are not entitled to immunity to the
extent the respondents seek prospective injunctive relief in
the form of reinstatement.
Next, we must consider whether Dr. Bice and Dr.
Richardson are entitled to immunity in their individual
capacities.  "[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not protect state
employees sued in their individual capacity for employment-
related acts."  Jackson v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 16 F.3d
1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21
(1991)).  Thus, Dr. Bice and Dr. Richardson are not entitled
to 
Eleventh 
Amendment 
immunity 
in 
their 
individual 
capacities. 
However, the petitioners argue that Dr. Bice and Dr.
Richardson, in their individual capacities, are entitled to
qualified immunity from the respondents' § 1983 claim.  This
Court has summarized the law on qualified immunity as follows:
"'[G]overnment 
officials 
performing
discretionary 
functions 
generally 
are
shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate
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6
clearly 
established 
statutory 
or
constitutional 
rights 
of 
which 
a 
reasonable
person would have known.'
"Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct.
2727, 73 L.Ed. 2d 396 (1982). 'Qualified immunity is
designed to allow government officials to avoid the
expense and disruption of going to trial, and is not
merely a defense to liability.' Hardy v. Town of
Hayneville, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1189 (M.D. Ala.
1999). 'An official is entitled to qualified
immunity if he is performing discretionary functions
and his actions do "'not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.'"' Hardy, 50 F.
Supp. 2d at 1189 (quoting Lancaster v. Monroe
County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1424 (11th Cir. 1997))."  
Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Youth Servs., 880 So. 2d 393, 402
(Ala. 2003).  "To receive qualified immunity, the government
official must first prove that he was acting within his
discretionary authority. ... Once the defendants have
established that they were acting within their discretionary
authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiffs to show that
qualified immunity is not appropriate."  Gonzalez v. Reno, 325
F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003).  Here, the parties do not
dispute whether Dr. Bice and Dr. Richardson were acting within
their discretionary authority.  Thus, we must determine
whether the respondents have demonstrated that Dr. Bice's and
Dr. Richardson's actions violated the respondents' clearly
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established 
rights, 
rendering 
qualified 
immunity
inappropriate.  
In analyzing whether a right is clearly established, we
must consider whether preexisting law at the time of the
alleged acts provided fair warning to Dr. Bice and Dr.
Richardson that their actions were unconstitutional.  
See 
Hope
v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) ("[Q]ualified immunity
operates 'to ensure that before [officials] are subjected to
suit, [they] are on notice their conduct is unlawful.'"
(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001))).
"For 
a 
constitutional 
right 
to 
be 
clearly
established, its contours 'must be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right.  This is
not to say that an official action is protected by
qualified immunity unless the very action in
question has previously been held unlawful, see
Mitchell [v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,] 535, n. 12, 105
S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 [(1985)]; but it is to
say that in the light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent.'  Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L.
Ed. 2d 523 (1987)."
Hope, 536 U.S. at 739.  
The United States Supreme Court noted in Wilson v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999), that the law was not clearly
established where the "state of the law was ... at best
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undeveloped."  The issue in Wilson involved whether a
reasonable police officer could have believed that bringing
members of the media into a home during the execution of an
arrest warrant was lawful.  Id. at 615.  In concluding that
the law regarding such an action was not clearly established,
the Court reasoned:
"Petitioners have not brought to our attention any
cases of controlling authority in their jurisdiction
at 
the 
time 
of 
the 
incident 
which 
clearly
established the rule on which they seek to rely, nor
have they identified a consensus of cases of
persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer
could not have believed that his actions were
lawful."  
Id. at 617.  Because of the undeveloped state of the law, the
Court concluded: "If judges thus disagree on a constitutional
question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for
picking the losing side of the controversy."  Id. at 618.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit has stated that, within that circuit, "the law can be
'clearly established' for qualified immunity purposes only by
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, or the highest court of the state where the case
arose."  Festa v. Santa Rosa Cty. Florida, 413 Fed. App'x 182,
185 (11th Cir. 2011) (not selected for publication in the
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6
Federal Reporter) (quoting Jenkins by Hall v. Talladega City
Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 827 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997)). 
The respondents rely solely upon Collins v. Wolfson, 498
F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1974), to support their argument that the
principle that an employee with a property interest in his
employment is entitled to notice and a hearing, even in an RIF
situation, is clearly established.  In Collins, one employee,
with a "continuing contract" akin to tenure, alleged that his
"vested property interest was not summarily defeasible by the
Board's couching the termination as a 'reduction in force'
rather than as a discharge."  Id. at 1102.  However, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit narrowly
held only that the employee "should have been permitted by the
court to establish entitlement to such a hearing, the purpose
of which would be to assure that his position was in fact
'discontinued' within the meaning of the contract and, if he
was instead the victim of a 'reduction in force,' that the
trustees made their decision pursuant to their previously
announced criteria."  Id. at 1104 (emphasis added).  Because
Collins held merely that the employee had a right to establish
entitlement to a hearing to determine whether his position had
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been discontinued within the meaning of his contract or
pursuant to an RIF, Collins does not clearly establish a right
to a hearing before termination of employment pursuant to a
bona fide RIF.  This is the only case the respondents cite to
demonstrate that they had a clearly established right to a
hearing before having their positions terminated pursuant to
an RIF.  
The 
petitioners 
cite 
several 
cases 
from 
other
jurisdictions 
that 
they 
allege 
demonstrate 
that 
employees 
with
a property interest in their employment do not have a clearly
established right to notice and a hearing when their
employment is terminated pursuant to a bona fide RIF.  See
Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local 639 v. District of
Columbia Pub. Sch. (No. 02-7082, September 17, 2003) (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (not published in F. Supp.) ("[T]he Due Process
Clause does not require individualized pre-termination
hearings 
when 
discharges 
are 
occasioned 
by 
genuine
reductions-in-force ...."); Duffy v. Sarault, 892 F.2d 139,
147 (1st Cir. 1989) ("Where a reorganization or other cost-
cutting measure results in dismissal of an employee no hearing
is due."); Misek v. City of Chicago, 783 F.2d 98, 101 (7th
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6
Cir. 1986) ("Of course, if defendants on remand could show
that plaintiffs were discharged pursuant to a reorganization
in fact, plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief."); and
Franks v. Magnolia Hosp., 888 F. Supp. 1310, 1313 (N.D. Miss.
1995), aff'd, 77 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[A]ssuming
arguendo that the plaintiff had a property interest in
employment, a due process hearing is not required when the
termination is the result of a bona fide reduction in force.
It is clear to the court that the termination of 71 employees
is a bona fide reduction.").
In Duffy, one of the cases relied upon by the petitioners
to show that there is no clearly established right to notice
and a hearing when employment is terminated as a result of an
RIF, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
held that "[w]here a reorganization or other cost-cutting
measure results in dismissal of an employee no hearing is
due." 892 F.2d at 147 (citing Hartman v. City of Providence,
636 F. Supp. 1395, 1410 (D.R.I. 1986) ("Numerous federal and
state courts have recognized that an employee who loses his or
her job ... is not entitled to a hearing ... when the position
is abolished pursuant to a bona fide government 
reorganization
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or kindred cost-cutting measure.")).  In Duffy, the trial
court found that the plaintiffs had a property interest in
their jobs; however, the trial court also found that the
"reorganization exception" to due-process hearings applied
because the reorganization was not pretextual but was a valid
reorganization.  Id. The First Circuit agreed and held: "We
find that because the appellants' jobs were lost subject to a
valid reorganization they were not entitled to due process
prior to that reorganization taking effect."  Id.    
The petitioners also cite Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d
1119 (Ala. 2013), in which this Court cited Duffy favorably. 
Although not dispositive to this Court's holding in Moulton --
that the employee was not entitled to a due-process hearing
under the terms of the staff-employee handbook -- this Court
did cite Duffy in a footnote in the context of its due-process
discussion for the proposition that "where reorganization or
cost-saving measures result in the termination of a public
employee's employment as a result of the elimination of the
employee's position, no hearing is required to satisfy due
process."  Moulton, 116 So. 3d at 1135 n.6 (citing Duffy, 892
F.2d at 147).  
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In addition to the cases cited by the petitioners, other
courts have suggested that no due-process violation occurs
when an employee is eliminated pursuant to a legitimate
governmental reorganization.  See  Schulz v. Green Cty.,
Wisconsin, 645 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2011) ("When a
government eliminates an employee's position in connection
with a 'legitimate governmental reorganization' ... the
employee is not entitled to notice or a hearing.");  West v.
Grand Cty., 967 F.2d 362, 367 (10th Cir. 1992) ("The fact that
[the county] labeled [the employee's] discharge a 'reduction
in force' does not affect her entitlement to a pretermination
hearing when she is asserting that the reduction in force was
a sham aimed particularly at her." (emphasis added)); and
Edmiston v. Idaho State Liquor Div. (No. 1:11-CV-395-BLW, May
7, 2014) (D. Idaho 2014) (not selected for publication in F.
Supp.) ("If she was fired for reasons connected to her
performance 
rather 
than 
as 
part 
of 
a 
system-wide
reduction-in-force, there is no dispute that she was entitled
to certain due process rights that she did not receive."
(emphasis added)).  
In deciding to recognize 
a 
"reorganization
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exception," the United States District Court for the District
of Rhode Island in Hartman, 636 F. Supp. at 1415, reasoned:
"[T]he 'hearing' to which [the plaintiff] belatedly
claims an entitlement would be at best an utter
waste of time, at worst a complete fiasco. There
would be no bill of particulars or specification of
charges to be answered; rather, the dialogue would
center around what revenues were available to
government and how the City should best deploy them.
Unless the trumpet is sounded with far more clarity
than is here the case, courts ought not to march
gratuitously into such a political thicket. Refusing
to recognize a reorganization exception to § 904
would bring about, in the Trembley [v. City of
Central Falls] phrase, 'absurd or unreasonable
results.' 480 A.2d [1359] at 1363 [(R.I. 1984)].
This court will not buy such tawdry goods."
Thus, several courts confronting the question of 
requisite due
process in the context of an RIF have held that no due process
is required in that situation.  
9
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second,
9
Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have expressly declined to reach
the question. See Connolly v. City of Rutland, Vermont, 487
Fed. App'x 666, 666-67 (2d Cir. 2012)(not selected for
publication in the Federal Reporter)(noting that, because the
employee was afforded a pre-termination hearing, the court
need not decide whether also to adopt an exception to normal
due-process-hearing requirements where dismissal is based on
a reorganization or an RIF); Lehman v. Sturza, 28 F.3d 1210
n.2 (4th Cir. 1994) (table) (unpublished disposition)
("Because we find no property interest here, we need not reach
defendants' alternative arguments that the Ordinance was
merely a guide for management and that an RIF layoff does not
require 
due 
process 
protections."); 
and 
Upshaw 
v. 
Metropolitan
Nashville Airport Auth., 207 Fed. App'x 516, 519 (6th Cir.
2006) 
(not 
selected 
for 
publication 
in 
the 
Federal
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Neither the United States Supreme Court, nor the Eleventh
Circuit, nor this Court has expressly decided the issue
(though this Court has cited Duffy, which found no right to
due process in the context of an RIF, favorably).  Numerous
courts that have decided the issue have come out against a
right to procedural due process in the context of a bona fide
RIF.  Due process has been required only in the context of an
RIF where the employee with a property interest alleged that
the RIF was a sham or pretextual.  The respondents here have
not so alleged.  Thus, the right to such process is not
sufficiently established to relieve Dr. Bice and Dr.
Richardson, in their individual capacities, of immunity. 
Accordingly, Dr. Bice and Dr. Richardson, in their individual
capacities, are entitled to qualified immunity.
Reporter)("This 
case, 
however, does not require us to consider
whether a general reorganization exception permits [the
employee's] 
termination 
without due process: the nature of the
specific property right that [the employee] enjoyed in his
position did not extend to protection from elimination of his
position in the context of a reorganization."). No federal
circuit court has explicitly recognized a right to a hearing
in the context of a bona fide RIF, only when the RIF is
alleged to be a sham.  See West v. Grand Cty., 967 F.2d 362,
367 (10th Cir. 1992); Misek v. City of Chicago, 783 F.2d 98,
101 (7th Cir. 1986).
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IV. Conclusion
The SBOE is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment from the respondents' § 1983 claim.  Dr. Bice and
Dr. Richardson, in their official capacities, are entitled to
immunity from liability under the Eleventh Amendment insofar
as the respondents seek money damages.  Dr. Bice and Dr.
Richardson, in their official capacities, are not, however,
entitled to immunity from liability under the Eleventh
Amendment insofar as the respondents seek injunctive 
relief 
in
the form of reinstatement.  Dr. Bice and Dr. Richardson, in
their individual capacities, are entitled to qualified
immunity as to the respondents' § 1983 claim.  Therefore, we
grant the petition in part and issue a writ directing the
circuit court to vacate its December 3, 2014, order denying
the petitioners' motion to dismiss and to enter an order
dismissing the respondents' § 1983 claim against the SBOE,
dismissing the respondents' § 1983 claim against Dr. Bice and
Dr. Richardson, in their official capacities, insofar as the
respondents 
seek 
money 
damages, 
and 
dismissing 
the
respondents' § 1983 claim against Dr. Bice and Dr. Richardson,
in their individual capacities; we deny the petition in part
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as to the petitioners' argument that Dr. Bice and Dr.
Richardson, in their official capacities, are entitled to
immunity from liability under the Eleventh Amendment from the
respondents' request for injunctive relief in the form of
reinstatement.
PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Bolin, Murdock, Shaw, and Bryan, JJ., concur in the
result.
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MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
I agree in the main with the analysis set out in the main
opinion, and I concur in the result reached.  I write
separately to comment on two aspects of that opinion. 
First, as to footnote 7, ___ So. 3d at ___, I have no
objection to the respondents' reliance on Ex parte Jones, 147
So. 3d 415 (Ala. 2013), as authority regarding the timeliness
of 
a 
mandamus 
petition 
raising 
immunity 
concerns. 
Nonetheless, I have no objection to the timing of the petition
in light of the subject-matter-jurisdiction nature of the
issue presented.
Second, I see no need, in order to reach the result that
is reached, to adopt the statement quoted by the main opinion
from Festa v. Santa Rosa County, Florida, 413 Fed. App'x 182,
185 (11th Cir. 2011) (an opinion not selected for publication
in the Federal Reporter, ___ So. 3d at ___), nor the negative
implication  that, if any of the listed courts has decided an
issue, the law regarding that issue is necessarily "clearly
established" for purposes of determining qualified immunity. 
38