Title: Barrett v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 032252
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2004

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
AMY JEAN BARRETT, A/K/A 
AMY JEAN CLARK 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 032252 
SENIOR JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 
 
 
 
 
June 10, 2004 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In a jury trial held in the Circuit Court of York County, 
Amy Jean Barrett (Barrett)1 was convicted pursuant to Code 
§ 18.2-371.1(A) of a Class 4 felony for the criminal neglect 
of her ten-month-old son, Joshua, resulting in his death.  She 
was sentenced to serve two years in the penitentiary and 
ordered to pay a fine of $1,000.00.  Barrett was also 
convicted pursuant to former Code § 18.2-371.1(B)2 of a Class 6 
felony for the criminal neglect of her daughter, Patricia, 
aged two years and ten months.  Barrett was assessed a fine of 
$2,500.00 for this conviction.3 
                     
 
1 Apparently, Barrett married and became Amy Jean Clark at 
some time during these proceedings, but she was indicted under 
the name of Barrett and we will refer to her by that name. 
 
2 Code § 18.2-371.1(B) was amended in 2003. Paragraph B of 
the former statute, under which Barrett was indicted, is now 
set forth in identical language as paragraph (B)(1) in the 
amended statute.  We will use the current numbering in this 
opinion. 
 
3 Barrett was also charged with involuntary manslaughter 
in the death of Joshua, but the jury found her not guilty of 
that charge. 
 
2
 
In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
both convictions.  Barrett (Clark) v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. 
App. 377, 585 S.E.2d 355 (2003).  We awarded Barrett this 
appeal to consider the two questions presented by her 
assignments of error, (1) whether the trial court erred in 
refusing to quash the indictment for Barrett’s neglect of 
Patricia on the ground the indictment was the result of 
prosecutorial vindictiveness, and (2) whether the trial court 
erred in finding the evidence sufficient to support Barrett’s 
convictions. 
MOTION TO QUASH 
Background 
 
With respect to the death of Joshua, Barrett was indicted 
on September 15, 1998, for felony child neglect under Code 
§ 18.2-371.1(A) and for felony murder under Code § 18.2-33.  
In a jury trial held in February 1999, Barrett was convicted 
of both offenses.  However, on June 27, 2000, the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia reversed the convictions.  Barrett v. 
Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 693, 530 S.E.2d 437 (2000).  The 
court held that, although the evidence was sufficient to 
support the conviction for felony child neglect under Code 
§ 18.2-371.1(A), the trial court erred in refusing to instruct 
the jury on the meaning of the term “willful,” as used in that 
Code section.  32 Va. App. at 699, 530 S.E.2d at 440.  The 
court also held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain 
 
3
the felony murder conviction.  The case was remanded for 
further proceedings, “if the Commonwealth be so advised.”  Id. 
at 701, 530 S.E.2d at 441. 
 
When the case returned to the trial court, the 
Commonwealth moved to amend the charge for the felony murder 
of Joshua to a charge of involuntary manslaughter.  On April 
3, 2001, without objection from Barrett, the trial court 
entered an order directing the amendment. 
 
During plea negotiations that followed, the Commonwealth 
informed Barrett that it intended to proceed with a trial on 
both charges involving Joshua, i.e., manslaughter and felony 
child neglect under Code § 18.2-371.1(A).  The Commonwealth 
also told Barrett that, if she refused to plead guilty to 
those charges, it would seek an indictment for felony child 
neglect of Patricia under Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1).  The plea 
negotiations failed, Barrett did not plead guilty, and, on May 
22, 2001, the Commonwealth sought and received an indictment 
charging Barrett with felony child neglect of Patricia. 
 
Barrett then filed a motion to quash the new indictment.  
In a hearing on the motion, Barrett asserted that the 
Commonwealth was pursuing the new charge as “punishment to 
[her] for having . . . successfully appealed her initial 
charges.”  She argued that the Commonwealth had the 
opportunity to bring the charge involving Patricia prior to 
trial on the initial charges yet waited for almost eleven 
 
4
months after the Court of Appeals had remanded the case, that 
the new indictment was based upon the same “facts and 
incidents” presented at the first trial, and that the new 
charge “carries a potential additional sentence to which 
[Barrett was] being subjected.”  All this, Barrett maintained, 
raised a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness or 
created “the appearance of vindictiveness,” resulting in a 
violation of her Fifth Amendment right of due process.  Thus, 
Barrett concluded, the trial court should quash the new 
indictment “based on prosecutorial vindictiveness or the 
appearance of vindictiveness.”  Finding “no presumption of 
vindictiveness, nor . . . any actual vindictiveness,” the 
trial court denied Barrett’s motion to quash. 
Discussion 
 
On appeal, Barrett repeats her argument that her due 
process rights “were violated because the Commonwealth was 
permitted to bring a new indictment based on the same facts, 
transaction, or occurrence” and, hence, that she “is being 
punished for exercising her right to appeal the first set of 
convictions.”4  She states that the issue in this case “seems 
to be a matter of first impression for this Court as no 
appellate decision has opined whether the Commonwealth can 
                     
 
4 Barrett does not claim that her prosecution for the 
neglect of Patricia constituted double jeopardy but relies 
solely on her assertion that the prosecution was vindictive 
and thus violative of her right of due process. 
 
5
indict a defendant on a wholly new charge following a 
successful appeal.” 
 
Barrett cites three decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States on the subject at hand:  North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 
(1974); and United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982). 
 
In Pearce, a defendant was originally convicted of 
assault with intent to commit rape and sentenced to serve 
eight to ten years.  His conviction was reversed on appeal, 
and, upon retrial of the rape charge, the defendant was 
convicted and sentenced to a term of twelve to fifteen years, 
which, when added to the time he had already spent in prison, 
amounted to a longer sentence than originally imposed. 
 
In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the district court 
held that the longer sentence imposed upon retrial was 
unconstitutional and void.  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding.  
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit, stating that 
the “imposition of a penalty upon the defendant for having 
successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal or collateral 
remedy would be . . . a violation of due process of law.”  395 
U.S. at 724. 
 
In Perry, the defendant was charged in a state district 
court with the misdemeanor of assault with a deadly weapon.  
Upon conviction, for which he received a six-month sentence, 
 
6
he appealed to the superior court, where he had the right to a 
trial de novo.  While the appeal was pending, the prosecutor 
obtained an indictment charging a felony for the same conduct, 
to which the defendant plead guilty and for which he was 
sentenced to a term of five to seven years. 
 
In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the district court 
granted the defendant a writ, and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.  In affirming the 
Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court stated that “[a] person 
convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his statutory 
right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the State 
will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the 
original one, thus subjecting him to a significantly increased 
potential period of incarceration.”  417 U.S. at 28.     
 
 
In Goodwin, the defendant was originally charged in 
federal district court with several misdemeanors, including 
assault of a police officer.  He expressed an interest in plea 
bargaining but decided not to plead guilty and requested a 
trial by jury.  Then, while those charges were still pending, 
he was indicted and thereafter convicted by the district court 
on a felony charge of forcibly assaulting a police officer 
arising out of the same incident.  The court denied the 
defendant’s motion to set the verdict aside on the ground of 
prosecutorial vindictiveness.  The United States Court of 
 
7
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding a legal 
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness. 
 
Although Barrett cites Goodwin as though it supports her 
argument, she does not tell us that the Supreme Court, while 
saluting the rule that “[t]o punish a person because he has 
done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process 
violation,” 457 U.S. at 372, actually reversed the Fourth 
Circuit.  The Supreme Court held that a presumption of 
prosecutorial vindictiveness was not warranted, id. at 382, 
and that “[a]bsent a presumption of vindictiveness, no due 
process violation has been established,” id. at 384.  The 
Supreme Court also stated that 
the mere fact that a defendant refuses to plead guilty 
and forces the government to prove its case is 
insufficient to warrant a presumption that subsequent 
changes in the charging decision are unjustified. 
 
457 U.S. at 382-83.  Goodwin, therefore, actually supports the 
Commonwealth’s position; it certainly does not require the 
finding of a presumption of vindictiveness in Barrett’s favor. 
 
Barrett also cites three decisions by Circuit Courts of 
Appeals:  United States v. Fiel, 35 F.3d 997 (4th Cir. 1994) 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1177 (1995); United States v. Williams, 
47 F.3d 658 (4th Cir. 1995); and United States v. Whaley, 830 
F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 (1988).  
Again, Barrett cites these cases as though they support her 
argument and, again, she does not tell us the outcome of the 
 
8
cases.  However, while all three of the cases involved 
prosecutions for offenses more serious than originally 
charged, in not one did the court apply a presumption of 
vindictiveness.5  So the cases do not support the finding of a 
presumption of vindictiveness in Barrett’s favor.  To the 
contrary, the cases support the Commonwealth’s position. 
 
Hence, in only two of the cases cited above, Pearce and 
Perry, was a presumption of vindictiveness applied, and they 
are clearly distinguishable from the present case.  In Pearce 
and Perry, the enhanced charge or punishment was directly 
related to the reversal on appeal of the initial charge.  
Here, there is no such relationship.  The harsher punishment 
imposed in this case resulted not from the reversal on appeal 
of the offense involving Joshua, but from a trial for a 
separate offense, separate because it involved a different 
victim in the person of Patricia.  It is merely coincidental, 
therefore, that the facts other than the identity of the 
victim might provide proof of Barrett’s neglect of both Joshua 
and Patricia.  And it is immaterial that the offense against 
Patricia could have been initiated at an earlier time.  As the 
Court of Appeals stated in its written opinion in this case: 
We note at the outset that “[i]t is well established that 
the choice of offenses for which a criminal defendant 
will be charged is within the discretion of the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney.”  Kauffmann v. Commonwealth, 8 
                     
 
5 Nor did any of the courts make a finding of actual 
vindictiveness. 
 
9
Va. App. 400, 410, 382 S.E.2d 279, 284 (1989).  Indeed, 
“the institution of criminal charges, as well as their 
order and timing, are matters of prosecutorial 
discretion.”  Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 484, 492, 
323 S.E.2d 567, 572 (1984). 
 
41 Va. App. at 391, 585 S.E.2d at 362. 
 
Here, Barrett, as did the defendant in Goodwin, declined 
to plead guilty to the original charges after plea 
negotiations failed and put the Commonwealth to proof of its 
case.  What was said in Goodwin bears repeating here: 
[T]he mere fact that a defendant refuses to plead guilty 
and forces the government to prove its case is 
insufficient to warrant a presumption that subsequent 
changes in the charging decision are unjustified. 
 
457 U.S. at 382-83. 
 
Under the circumstances of this case, we are of opinion 
that a presumption of vindictiveness is not warranted.  And, 
as in Goodwin, “[a]bsent a presumption of vindictiveness, no 
due process violation has been established.”  457 U.S. at 384. 
 
In such absence, the burden was upon Barrett to establish 
actual vindictiveness, and we conclude that she failed to 
carry her burden.  All Barrett offered in her attempt to show 
actual vindictiveness were allegedly contradictory statements 
made by the Commonwealth during argument on Barrett’s motion 
to dismiss. 
 
In responding to Barrett’s argument that the charge 
involving the neglect of Patricia should have been pursued 
during the first trial, Leslie A. Siman-Tov, an Assistant 
 
10
Commonwealth’s Attorney, said the prosecution was “focusing so 
much on the felony homicide and neglect of Joshua” that it 
failed to consider “there should have been another charge for 
neglect of Patricia.”  Ms. Siman-Tov also said it was not 
until the prosecution reviewed the Court of Appeals’ opinion 
reversing Barrett’s initial convictions that it was realized 
Barrett should also have been charged with the neglect of 
Patricia. 
 
Then, when the Commonwealth’s Attorney, Eileen M. 
Addison, joined the argument, she stated that two or three 
weeks prior to the initial trial “there was some discussion 
with defense counsel at that time about the possibility of 
this other charge of neglect of Patricia” but that Ms. Siman-
Tov was not “involved in that conversation.”  Ms. Addison also 
said that the neglect of Patricia “was not charged at that 
time because there was no time to add an additional charge 
between the time that we thought of it and the time that [the 
initial charge] was set for trial.” 
 
Barrett says she “pointed out [in her argument below] 
that the prosecutors contradicted themselves by first claiming 
they did not think about the charge [involving Patricia] and 
then claiming that they ran out of time to get the 
indictment.”  However, if this indeed constitutes a 
contradiction, it is of such trifling importance that it does 
not deserve further comment beyond stating that it does not 
 
11
support a finding of actual vindictiveness or an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the prosecutor. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err 
in denying Barrett’s motion to quash the indictment charging 
the neglect of Patricia. 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Background 
In accordance with familiar principles, we will state the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 
prevailing party at trial.  Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 
178, 204, 590 S.E.2d 520, 535 (2004).  And we will affirm the 
judgment of the trial court unless plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it.  Id. 
 
The evidence shows that on April 17, 1998, Barrett and 
her two children were living with her boyfriend, Craig 
Griffith, in his apartment in York County.  After Barrett put 
the children to bed that evening, she “went out,” leaving the 
children in Griffith’s care, which she did three or four times 
each month.  She arrived at a local bar at 8:00 or 8:30 p.m. 
and had three beers during the course of the evening.  She 
stayed at the bar until about 3:30 a.m. and then went to the 
home of the bartender, where she had one or two more beers. 
 
The next morning, Griffith woke up about 5:00 a.m. and 
found that Barrett had not yet returned home.  Griffith took a 
 
12
shower preparatory to going to work.  He turned off the water 
when he finished his shower, but, because of an ongoing 
problem with the plumbing, approximately two to three inches 
of water remained in the tub.  Usually, the water drained out 
in five to ten minutes but “[s]ometimes it could be worse than 
others.” 
 
Barrett returned home about 6:00 a.m.  Griffith “wasn’t 
happy” with her, and he left immediately for work.  He 
returned home about noon and, upon entering the apartment, 
found “[i]t was a wreck . . . [it] was just tore up.”  
Patricia was “standing there with make-up on and no clothes.”  
The TV was on but “playing static.”  Barrett was asleep on the 
couch and did not wake up when Griffith came in. 
 
Griffith asked Patricia where Joshua was.  She said 
“[h]e’s in there,” pointing to the entryway leading to the 
bedrooms and the bathroom.  Joshua was not in either bedroom, 
so Griffith went into the bathroom and saw “a blanket over the 
top of the bathtub.”  When he removed the blanket, he saw in 
the tub a “lot of junk, toys, food, [and] a laundry basket 
upside down.”  He picked up the laundry basket and found 
Joshua underneath it.  He picked Joshua up and saw that he was 
blue and cold.  He found that cold water was running into the 
bathtub, and “potato chips were clogging the drain.”  Griffith 
tried to turn the water off but was unsuccessful, the faucet 
“just kept on spinning around.” 
 
13
 
Griffith picked Joshua up and “screamed for [Barrett],” 
saying  “she had killed her kid.”  She awoke and called "911."  
An ambulance arrived and transported Joshua to a hospital, 
where he was pronounced dead.  An autopsy disclosed that 
drowning was the cause of death.  The autopsy also revealed 
there were thirteen fresh bruises on Joshua’s forehead and the 
“top sides of his head.” 
 
The blanket Griffith found in the bathtub came from his 
bed and the laundry basket came from the bedroom occupied by 
Barrett and Griffith.  The toys that were found in the bathtub 
were usually kept in Patricia’s room. 
 
Griffith testified that, approximately three months 
before the tragic events of April 17-18, 1998, Joshua’s crib 
was moved into the bedroom occupied by Griffith and Barrett 
because Patricia had put “toys and stuff” on top of Joshua.  
Griffith testified further that Patricia was jealous of Joshua 
and that he, Griffith, had observed her covering Joshua with a 
blanket on one occasion and pushing him down in several other 
instances, that Barrett was present when this occurred, and 
that he had warned her more than once she “needed to keep her 
eye on them.” 
 
Jane M. Steele, an emergency room nurse who was present 
when a doctor told Barrett Joshua had died, testified that 
Barrett was “upset and crying [and] blamed a sibling, another 
child,” meaning Patricia, for Joshua’s death but then “turned 
 
14
and just blamed herself.”  Nurse Steele said that Patricia was 
present at the time, that Barrett was “very harsh toward the 
child,” and that Barrett told Patricia, “you killed him.” 
Sergeant William Fordham of the Poquoson Police 
Department testified that he arrived at the hospital after 
Joshua was pronounced dead and asked Barrett for a statement.  
Barrett told him she was taking a nap on the couch about ll:00 
or 11:30 on the morning in question and had placed Joshua on 
the floor next to the couch and given him a bottle.  Patricia 
was asleep in her room.  Barrett said there was something 
wrong with Patricia, that she constantly abused Joshua, tying 
scarves around his neck, pulling him around the apartment, and 
slamming her bedroom door in his face when he tried to crawl 
into the room.  Barrett stated that Patricia had “tried in the 
past” to kill Joshua “but today she had been successful.”  
Barrett told Fordham “she didn’t want to even look at or be in 
the same room with Patricia.” 
Fordham was also present when Barrett was interviewed by 
two social service workers on the day Joshua died.  Barrett 
said her son was “f----- dead and [Patricia] killed him.”  
Then Barrett said: “It’s my fault.  I shouldn’t have taken a 
nap.” 
The Commonwealth also introduced into evidence a 
videotape that was made of an interview of Barrett by a social 
service worker about five days after Joshua’s death.  Barrett 
 
15
said Patricia was jealous of Joshua from the beginning; on the 
day she brought Joshua home from the hospital after his birth, 
Patricia, out of jealousy, threw toys on top of him in his 
crib.  Barrett attributed much of the bruising found on 
Joshua’s head in the autopsy to Patricia, including an 
occasion when she hit him in the head with a broom for no 
reason. 
Barrett said the bathtub was Patricia’s favorite place to 
play and she allowed her to sit in the tub with her toys as 
long as 45 minutes at a time; Patricia knew how to turn on the 
water and would turn it on to indicate she wanted to take a 
bath.  Barrett agreed she could hear water running from the 
other parts of the apartment. 
Barrett admitted that, shortly before Joshua’s death, she 
had left Patricia unattended in the bathtub and that Patricia 
had pulled Joshua into the tub head first.  This terrified 
Barrett.  When asked whether Patricia could lift Joshua, 
Barrett said she definitely could, she had seen Patricia lift 
Joshua. 
Barrett acknowledged to the social service worker that 
she had gone out the night before Joshua’s death and had drunk 
about a six-pack of beer.  She said she was not completely 
intoxicated but conceded that she could have been arrested for 
driving under the influence had she been stopped by the police 
on the way home.  She said that she was extremely tired when 
 
16
she got home, that she still had alcohol in her system that 
morning, and that she had taken some sinus medication, 
although it was the non-drowsy kind. 
After Barrett returned home, she gave Joshua a bottle and 
sat him on the floor next to the couch.  She sent Patricia to 
her room, although it was well before Patricia’s nap time.  
Barrett then went to sleep on the couch.  She did not hear 
water running in the bathroom and did not wake up until she 
heard Griffith’s screams. She conceded that she had failed to 
supervise the children that morning.  She said that she had to 
be sleeping quite soundly and that, had she not fallen asleep, 
Joshua would still be alive. 
 
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case in chief, 
Barrett made a motion to strike the evidence.  In argument on 
the motion, Barrett stated that foreseeability was “really the 
crux of this case” and that the Commonwealth had “not put on 
evidence that is sufficient to indicate that Mrs. Barrett 
could have or should have anticipated the probable result of 
Joshua drowning in a tub.”  Barrett also argued that the level 
of negligence the Commonwealth must prove was “not simple 
negligence” or “even what’s called gross negligence,” but, 
rather, “a merciless or inhumane disregard or an arrogant 
recklessness toward the rights or feelings of others.” 
 
The trial court denied the motion to strike.  Barrett 
then rested her case and renewed the motion.  The trial court 
 
17
denied the renewed motion, stating that “[i]t’s a question of 
fact for the jury.” 
Discussion 
Code § 18.2-371.1(A),6 under which Barrett was indicted 
for the neglect of Joshua, proscribes a “willful act or 
omission or refusal to provide any necessary care for [a] 
child’s health.”  Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1),7 under which Barrett 
was prosecuted for the neglect of Patricia, proscribes a 
“willful act or omission in the care” of a child that is “so 
gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for 
human life.” 
The word [willful] often denotes an act which is 
intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished 
from accidental. But when used in a criminal statute it 
generally means an act done with a bad purpose; without 
justifiable excuse; stubbornly, obstinately, 
perversely[.]  The word is also employed to characterize 
a thing done without ground for believing it is lawful. 
 
United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933) (citations 
omitted).  The term “willful act” imports knowledge and 
                     
6 Code § 18.2-371.1(A) provides in pertinent part as follows: 
A. Any parent, guardian, or other person responsible for 
the care of a child under the age of 18 who by willful 
act or omission or refusal to provide any necessary care 
for the child’s health causes or permits serious injury 
to the life or health of such child shall be guilty of a 
Class 4 felony. 
 
7 Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1) provides as follows: 
B. Any parent, guardian, or other person responsible for 
the care of a child under the age of 18 whose willful act 
or omission in the care of such child was so gross, 
wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for 
human life shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. 
 
18
consciousness that injury will result from the act done.  The 
act done must be intended or it must involve a reckless 
disregard for the rights of another and will probably result 
in an injury. 
[T]he term “gross, wanton, and culpable” describes 
conduct.  The word “gross” means “aggravated or increased 
negligence” while the word “culpable” means “deserving of 
blame or censure.”  Bell [v. Commonwealth, 170 Va. 597, 
611, 195 S.E. 675, 681 (1938)].  “ ‘Gross negligence’ is 
culpable or criminal when accompanied by acts of 
commission or omission of a wanton or wilful nature, 
showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights 
of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to 
produce injury, or which make it not improbable that 
injury will be occasioned, and the offender knows, or is 
charged with the knowledge of, the probable result of his 
acts.”  Id. at 611-12, 195 S.E. at 681. 
 
Cable v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 236, 240, 415 S.E.2d 218, 220 
(1992). 
Barrett argues that the evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, “only shows ordinary 
negligence, at best, and does not show a reckless disregard 
for Patricia’s life.”  Barrett says that when she fell asleep, 
“the atmosphere was peaceful and serene, Patricia was in her 
room playing, and Joshua was drinking a bottle while sitting 
on the floor next to [Barrett].”  Under these circumstances, 
Barrett asserts, her “act of falling asleep cannot support, as 
a matter of law, a conviction for felony neglect because there 
was no evidence of intent with a bad purpose.” 
Barrett also argues that “[t]he evidence failed to prove, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Barrett] could reasonably 
 
19
foresee that her daughter would somehow cause the death of her 
son in a tub which was holding about two inches of water.”  
Barrett concludes that “[w]hile [her] falling asleep was not 
without remorse and blame, it does not rise to the level of a 
willful act or omission committed with a bad intent, a bad 
purpose, or a conscious disregard for human life.” 
We disagree with Barrett.  She would have us focus on her 
“act of falling asleep” in a vacuum when it must be viewed in 
light of all the circumstances preceding and surrounding the 
tragic events of April 17-18, 1998.  When so viewed, the 
circumstances show beyond all reasonable doubt that Barrett 
was guilty of more than the “ordinary negligence” she concedes 
she was guilty of.  She was fully aware of Patricia’s 
propensity for attempting to injure Joshua but recklessly 
disregarded those warning symptoms in neglect of her duty to 
protect both children.  Coupling this with the evidence of her 
conduct on her “night out” and her resulting condition the 
next morning, she created a situation “reasonably calculated 
to produce injury, or which [made] it not improbable that 
injury [would] be occasioned, and [she knew], or [was] charged 
with the knowledge of, the probable results of [her] acts.”  
Cable, 243 Va. at 240, 415 S.E.2d at 220. 
Barrett knew from “the beginning” that Patricia was 
jealous of Joshua and that Patricia constantly abused him, 
covering him with a blanket, pushing him down, throwing toys 
 
20
on top of him in his crib, tying scarves around his neck, 
pulling him around the apartment, slamming Barrett’s bedroom 
door in his face when he tried to crawl into the room, and 
hitting him in the head with a broom.  Barrett said that 
Patricia had tried in the past to kill Joshua, and, upon 
learning Joshua was dead, Barrett immediately said Patricia 
intentionally killed him. 
Barrett also knew that the bathtub was Patricia’s 
favorite place to play, and she allowed Patricia to sit in the 
tub with her toys for extended periods of time.  Barrett knew 
that Patricia could turn on the water, and Barrett 
acknowledged that she could hear water running in the bathroom 
from other parts of the home. 
Furthermore, and of the utmost significance, Barrett 
admitted that, shortly before Joshua’s death, she had left 
Patricia unattended in the bathtub and Patricia had pulled 
Joshua into the tub head first.  Barrett had seen Patricia 
lift Joshua before, and this should have forewarned Barrett 
that Patricia could get into the tub by herself and pull 
Joshua in after her. 
Yet, Barrett “went out” drinking beer the evening before 
the tragic incident and spent the entire night away from home, 
even remaining away and drinking beer after the beer parlor 
had closed.  She drank enough by her own admission to justify 
 
21
her arrest for driving under the influence had she been 
stopped by the police on her way home the next morning. 
Barrett sent Patricia to her room even though it was well 
before nap time, gave Joshua a bottle and placed him on the 
floor beside the couch, and then, still intoxicated as well as 
tired, proceeded to go to sleep on the couch, knowing she was 
the only one left in the apartment to supervise the children.  
From this, the jury could have concluded that Barrett’s 
conduct was willful and accompanied by acts of omission of a 
wanton nature showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of 
the life and health of both children. 
Barrett argues, however, that “Patricia was never in 
danger; there was no foreseeable risk of harm to Patricia [and 
no] evidence demonstrated any known or suspected danger based 
on any previous events or any other evidence which would even 
suggest that injury to Patricia was a likely result of 
[Barrett’s] action or inaction.  In fact, Patricia was not 
injured, nor was she in jeopardy of being injured.”  Barrett 
also argues that “the evidence failed to prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that [she] could reasonably foresee that her 
daughter would somehow cause the death of Joshua in a tub 
which was holding about two inches of water.” 
This represents a very narrow view of the evidence.  What 
we have here is the story of a disaster just waiting to 
happen, a disaster any reasonable person would consider likely 
 
22
to result in injury to Patricia herself or to Joshua, or both.  
Barrett owed a duty to Joshua to protect him from injury by 
Patricia and a duty to Patricia to prevent her from injuring 
Joshua or being injured herself.  Yet, Barrett failed 
miserably in her duty.  Indeed, Barrett admitted “a lack of 
supervision” over the children on the occasion in question. 
 
Barrett is correct in saying Patricia was not injured but 
incorrect in saying she was not in jeopardy of being injured.  
Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1) does not require a showing of actual 
injury or death.  “[S]ubsection (B)(1) does not limit the 
prohibited conduct to acts and omissions that subject a child 
to an actual risk of death, but proscribes conduct that is so 
‘gross, wanton and culpable’ as to demonstrate a ‘reckless 
disregard’ for the child’s life.”  Commonwealth v. Duncan, 267 
Va. 377, 385, 593 S.E.2d 210, 215 (2004).  And “such ‘reckless 
disregard’ can be shown by conduct that subjects a child to a 
substantial risk of serious injury, as well as to a risk of 
death, because exposure to either type of risk can endanger 
the child’s life.”  Id. 
The evidence clearly showed conduct by Barrett that 
subjected Patricia to a substantial risk of serious injury or 
death.  It might well have been Patricia’s rather than 
Joshua’s cold and blue body Griffith found under the laundry 
basket on that fateful morning. 
 
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Accordingly, we find the evidence sufficient to support 
Barrett’s conviction for the criminal neglect of both Patricia 
and Joshua, and we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals.8 
Affirmed. 
                     
 
8 Barrett maintains that the present case is “strikingly 
similar” to Ellis v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 548, 513 S.E.2d 
453 (1999), where the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction 
of a mother who failed to turn off the gas burner in her 
apartment and then left her two children alone to walk some 30 
to 75 yards away to visit a friend.  A fire ensued, and the 
two children were injured.  However, Ellis is distinguishable.  
Ms. Ellis’s neglect was inadvertent, id. at 557, 513 S.E.2d at 
458, Barrett’s was willful.