Title: City of Virginia Beach v. Carmichael Dev. Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 990919
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 3, 2000

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton,1 Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, 
and Kinser, JJ. 
 
CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 990919 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
March 3, 2000 
CARMICHAEL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
H. Thomas Padrick, Jr., Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in entering judgment against a locality for alleged tortious 
interference with a contract. 
BACKGROUND 
The Virginia Beach Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals (the SPCA) acquired land (the property) in the City of 
Virginia Beach near the corner of General Booth Boulevard and 
Oceana Boulevard from the City for the operation of an animal 
shelter.  The original agreement between the SPCA and the City 
provided that the property would revert to the City if the SPCA 
discontinued its use of the property.  Subsequently, the City 
agreed to waive the reversion right and deeded the property to 
the SPCA in fee simple so that the SPCA might benefit from a 
sale of the property. 
                     
1Justice Compton participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 
February 2, 2000. 
The SPCA thereafter relocated its shelter operation, but 
was unable to find a purchaser for the property.  To enhance the 
marketability of the property, the SPCA obtained a rezoning of 
the property from agricultural to commercial use in 1986.  As 
part of the rezoning, the City required the SPCA to dedicate “an 
appropriately sized controlled access and scenic easement along 
the frontage on General Booth Boulevard.” 
In April 1997, the SPCA entered into a contract for the 
sale of the property to Carmichael Development Company 
(Carmichael) for $610,000.  Carmichael intended to develop the 
property as a shopping center and employed an engineering firm 
to draft a site development plan.  Because the site development 
plan would require approval from the City director of planning 
or his assignee (the City planning office) for several 
modifications to the property, Carmichael and the SPCA 
subsequently amended their contract to include a condition that 
Carmichael obtain approval of a site plan for the proposed 
shopping center from the Virginia Beach City Council by April 3, 
1998.  Relevant to this appeal, Carmichael desired to obtain 
approval for a “curb cut” on General Booth Boulevard.  A “curb 
cut” is an opening from a highway into a parking lot cut through 
a curb and/or the sidewalk. 
Pursuant to Virginia Beach City Code, App. C, § 3.1, 
Carmichael requested a “preapplication conference” with the City 
 
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planning office.  Under this ordinance, a “preapplication 
conference” is an informal meeting between a developer and the 
City planning office to discuss a general proposal for 
development.  The request for a conference does not constitute a 
formal application for approval of a site development plan or 
otherwise satisfy the requirements for filing such a plan. 
After reviewing Carmichael’s “preliminary site plan,” the 
City planning office advised Carmichael that the proposed curb 
cut would not be approved because of public safety concerns over 
anticipated traffic problems the proposed curb cut would create 
on General Booth Boulevard.  Although Carmichael’s engineers 
wrote the planning officials several times indicating that 
Carmichael wished to receive a formal decision on the proposed 
curb cut so that the matter could be “appealed” to the City 
Council, a formal site plan application was never submitted to 
the City planning office for a recommendation, nor did 
Carmichael pay a filing fee as required by the City code.  
Accordingly, the City planning office took no action on 
Carmichael’s request and the matter was not forwarded to the 
Office of the City Manager to be placed on the City Council’s 
agenda. 
The SPCA informed the City that the failure to approve the 
curb cut would defeat the consummation of its contract with 
Carmichael, and that it would result in the organization losing 
 
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needed revenue.  The SPCA asked the City to reconsider the 
decision to disapprove the curb cut.  Thereafter, the City 
planning office began to explore the option of the City 
purchasing the property from the SPCA as part of a policy to 
acquire “troublesome parcels” to control development.  On March 
26, 1998, the City made a formal written offer to purchase the 
property from the SPCA for the same price Carmichael had 
offered. 
On April 3, 1998, Carmichael informed the SPCA that it 
intended to file suit against the City to obtain an injunction 
to prohibit the City from acquiring the property.  Carmichael 
requested an extension of its contract right to May 3, 1998 and 
offered to increase the purchase price by $5,000.  The SPCA 
declined Carmichael’s request for an extension and subsequently 
agreed to sell the property to the City. 
On April 3, 1998, Carmichael filed a bill of complaint 
contending that the City tortiously interfered with Carmichael’s 
contract to purchase the property from the SPCA by refusing to 
approve the requested curb cut and subsequently offering to buy 
the property from the SPCA.2  Carmichael sought monetary damages 
in addition to injunctive relief. 
                     
2Carmichael subsequently argued to the trial court that the 
City further interfered with the contract by denying Carmichael 
a hearing before City Council on its curb cut request.  Although 
 
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On July 31, 1998, the trial court denied Carmichael’s 
request for a temporary injunction to prohibit the sale of the 
property to the City, finding that Carmichael had an adequate 
remedy at law.  Thereafter, the parties agreed to transfer the 
case from the chancery docket to the law docket and to limit the 
issue of the suit to monetary damages for the City’s alleged 
tortious interference with Carmichael’s contract with the SPCA. 
On September 9, 1998, the City filed a motion for summary 
judgment asserting, inter alia, that it was protected by 
sovereign immunity because the actions of which Carmichael 
complained fell within the proper governmental function of 
controlling land development and regulating and controlling 
traffic for public safety and welfare.  The City was 
subsequently granted leave to file an amended answer asserting a 
defense of sovereign immunity. 
The trial court heard argument on the motion for summary 
judgment immediately prior to trial and granted the City partial 
summary judgment on the ground that the approval or denial of a 
curb cut was a governmental function protected by sovereign 
immunity and, therefore, that it could not form the basis for a 
                                                                  
this theory was not expressly pled in the bill of complaint, the 
trial court apparently accepted that it was subsumed within the 
allegations relating to the denial of the curb cut by the City’s 
planning officials. 
 
 
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tort claim against the City.  The trial court permitted 
Carmichael’s case to go forward on the theory that the City’s 
offer to purchase the property tortiously interfered with 
Carmichael’s contract with the SPCA.  The case was also 
permitted to go forward on the theory that the actions of the 
City planning office denied Carmichael the opportunity to 
present the request for a curb cut to City Council and, thus, 
interfered with its efforts to meet the condition of its 
contract with the SPCA.  See note 2, supra. 
After evidence in accord with the above-recited facts was 
presented, the trial court, consistent with a concession made by 
Carmichael, instructed the jury “that the mere fact that the 
City made an offer to purchase the SPCA parcel is not improper.”  
The jury was further instructed that “[i]f you find that the 
City’s refusal to allow the “curb cut” on General Booth 
Boulevard was the only reason that Carmichael did not purchase 
the property, then you shall find that the City’s inaction was 
the proximate cause of Carmichael’s inability to complete the 
contract to purchase” the property.  The jury was also 
instructed to find its verdict for Carmichael if it found “by 
the greater weight if the evidence . . . that the City used 
improper methods to cause the SPCA to terminate the contract.” 
 The jury returned its verdict for Carmichael and awarded 
damages of $74,000.  The trial court denied the City’s motion to 
 
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set aside the verdict, Carmichael’s motion for additur, and 
entered judgment on the jury’s verdict.  We awarded the city 
this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
Although the City challenges the judgment against it on 
several grounds, the dispositive issue in this appeal is whether 
the trial court erred in determining that the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity did not shield the City from Carmichael’s 
claim of tortious interference with a contract relationship 
under the specific facts of this case. 
“The doctrine of sovereign immunity is ‘alive and well’ in 
Virginia.”  Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 307, 321 S.E.2d 657, 
660 (1984).  Sovereign immunity is “‘a rule of social policy, 
which protects the state from burdensome interference with the 
performance of its governmental functions and preserves its 
control over state funds, property, and instrumentalities.’”  
Hinchey v. Ogden, 226 Va. 234, 240, 307 S.E.2d 891, 894 (1983) 
(quoting 72 Am.Jur.2d States, Territories, and Dependencies § 99 
(1974)).  Most importantly, the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
provides for “smooth operation of government” and prevents 
“citizens from improperly influencing the conduct of 
governmental affairs through the threat or use of vexatious 
litigation.”  Messina, 228 Va. at 308, 321 S.E.2d at 660; accord 
Lentz v. Morris, 236 Va. 78, 81, 372 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1988). 
 
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It is a frequently recited proposition that a municipality 
is authorized to perform both “governmental” and “proprietary” 
functions.  Governmental functions, as the term implies, are 
powers and duties to be performed exclusively for the public 
welfare.  When a municipality exercises, or fails to exercise, a 
governmental function, it is shielded from liability by 
sovereign immunity on the theory that the municipality is 
performing as an agency of the state.  In contrast, proprietary 
functions are privileges and powers performed primarily for the 
benefit of the municipality and, thus, do not enjoy the shield 
of sovereign immunity.  See Hoggard v. Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 
147-48, 200 S.E. 610, 611 (1939).  The regulation of traffic or 
a similar activity intended to protect the general public safety 
is a governmental function of a municipality.  See, e.g., 
Transportation Inc. v. Falls Church, 219 Va. 1004, 1006, 254 
S.E.2d 62, 64 (1979).  The routine maintenance of a 
municipality’s streets, however, is a proprietary function.  
See, e.g., Bialk v. City of Hampton, 242 Va. 56, 58, 405 S.E.2d 
619, 620 (1991).  As just these few examples illustrate, while 
the principle of law is clear and well-established, the 
application of it to various municipal activities is sometimes 
difficult.  This is particularly so in cases where the activity 
in question has aspects of both governmental and proprietary 
functions.  However, when governmental and proprietary functions 
 
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coincide, “the governmental function is the overriding factor” 
and the doctrine of sovereign immunity will shield the locality 
from liability.  Taylor v. Newport News, 214 Va. 9, 10, 197 
S.E.2d 209, 210 (1973). 
Carmichael has not assigned cross-error to the trial 
court’s finding that the denial of the curb cut requested by 
Carmichael in its preliminary site plan was a governmental 
function protected by sovereign immunity and, therefore, could 
not constitute tortious interference with the contract in 
question.  Accordingly, that aspect of the trial court’s ruling 
is not subject to review in this appeal.  The City contends, 
however, that the trial court’s judgment that sovereign immunity 
barred any claim premised on the denial of the curb cut should 
have been dispositive of Carmichael’s entire claim and that the 
trial court erred in not extending that judgment to its 
“necessary and logical conclusion.” 
Carmichael responds that the City “does not understand this 
case.”  Carmichael asserts that while the decision to deny the 
curb cut requested in the preliminary site plan was a 
governmental function shielded by sovereign immunity, “what the 
City [planning office] did to prevent . . .a hearing” of 
Carmichael’s appeal of that decision before the City Council 
constituted tortious interference.  In effect, Carmichael is 
asserting that while the governmental function of reviewing the 
 
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preliminary site plan would be subject to sovereign immunity, 
allegedly improper actions of the City’s employees relevant to 
that review would not be shielded from liability.  As previously 
noted, it was on this theory of liability that the trial court 
permitted Carmichael to proceed at trial. 
While the City’s contention is facially compelling, we need 
not address whether sovereign immunity applies to this theory of 
liability for the sufficient reason that Carmichael’s own 
evidence contradicts its allegation that it was denied a hearing 
before the City Council because of the actions, improper or 
otherwise, of the City’s officials.  See Massie v. Firmstone, 
134 Va. 450, 462, 114 S.E. 652, 656 (1922).  The record is clear 
that Carmichael never complied with the procedures for obtaining 
a formal decision concerning the curb cut designated in its site 
plan from the City planning office.  To the contrary, the record 
shows that Carmichael’s engineers sought only to have the 
informal opinion offered at the “preapplication conference” 
reviewed by the City Council.  There is no mechanism provided in 
the City’s ordinances for such a review.  Moreover, since 
Carmichael failed to file the appropriate site plan and pay the 
required fee, it is self-evident that there was no formal action 
by the planning office upon which the City Council could have 
ruled. 
 
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During oral argument, counsel for Carmichael contended that 
submission of the appropriate site plan for a formal decision 
would have been redundant since the planning officials had 
already indicated that the plan, as reviewed in the informal 
conference, would not be approved.  However, there is nothing 
redundant about following the procedures required by law.  
Carmichael was cognizant of the necessary procedures and cannot 
be heard to complain that it was denied a hearing before the 
City Council when it failed to follow the procedures required to 
obtain that hearing. 
Finally we address the City’s contention that its offer to 
purchase the property was a governmental act protected by 
sovereign immunity.  Although at trial Carmichael conceded, and 
the jury was instructed, that the City’s offer to purchase the 
property was not per se improper since the contingent provision 
for approval of the curb cut in Carmichael’s contract with the 
SPCA had not occurred, Carmichael contends that the City’s 
purpose in denying approval of that curb cut was to facilitate 
the City’s acquisition of the property and, thus, that the offer 
to purchase the property constituted tortious interference. 
Unquestionably, when a locality acquires real estate for a 
valid governmental purpose, whether by contract or condemnation, 
that act is governmental in nature.  Carmichael contends, 
however, that in this instance, the City acquired the property 
 
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for a strictly proprietary purpose.  Carmichael noted at trial, 
for example, that the property was assessed at almost twice the 
proposed purchase price and, thus, the City might have been 
motivated by a desire for profit. 
We agree that the City’s policy of acquiring by contract 
and then reselling or leasing “troublesome parcels” has a 
proprietary aspect.  However, that policy also has an aspect 
that is a governmental function.  The facts developed at trial 
showed that the principal purpose of that policy is to resolve, 
efficiently and without resort to litigation, disputes over the 
proposed use of vacant land within the City in order to control 
and direct development consistent with the City’s public safety 
concerns of vehicular traffic impacted by that development. 
In addition, the record further undercuts Carmichael’s 
contention that the City was motivated solely by a proprietary 
interest in acquiring the property.  First, it is undisputed 
that the City was willing to resell the property to Carmichael 
at the same price for which it was acquired, providing only that 
Carmichael should accept the limitation that there would be no 
curb cut on General Booth Boulevard.  Second, the City’s 
motivation in originally deeding the property to the SPCA and 
then subsequently reacquiring it was consistent with the City’s 
stated purpose to benefit the charitable purposes of the SPCA 
 
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that benefited the City and its citizens, which is an 
appropriate act for a local government.  See Code § 15.2-953(A). 
In short, while there was a proprietary aspect to the 
City’s act of acquiring the property, we are of opinion that on 
the facts of this case the overriding factor in the City’s 
action was a governmental function to benefit the welfare and 
safety of the public.  Thus, we hold that the City’s actions 
were shielded by sovereign immunity and could not constitute  
tortious interference with Carmichael’s contract with the SPCA. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
trial court and enter final judgment for the City. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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