Title: Highway Commission v. Anderegg
Citation: 241 Or. 31, 403 P.2d 717
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 1965

Reversed with instructions June 30, 1965.
*32 Robert A. Holland, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General, and G.E. Rohde, Assistant Attorney General, Salem.
A.W. Gustafson, Gresham, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were McAllister, Burns, Gustafson &amp; Lock, Gresham.
Before PERRY, Presiding Justice, and O'CONNELL, DENECKE, HOLMAN and LUSK, Justices.
REVERSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
HOLMAN, J.
Plaintiff, State of Oregon through its Highway Commission, condemned defendants' land for highway purposes. Plaintiff, in its complaint, alleged the value of the property to be $10,844. The jury returned a verdict of $13,650. The defendant moved to set aside the verdict and for a new trial which motion the court granted, and plaintiff appealed.
1. One ground for the motion is that the trial judge instructed the jury that the verdict could not be less than $10,844, the sum the State alleged as being its value, when the State's sole value witness testified the property's value was $13,000. The trial judge did not grant the new trial on this basis. With this we agree. The instruction, if in error  which is not decided here  was not prejudicial. The jury returned a verdict for a value greater than that to which the State's value witness testified.
The sole remaining basis for the motion for a new *33 trial, and the one on which it was granted, was that the court erred in not allowing the property owners to admit into evidence as part of their case the assessed value of the property as shown by the records of the county assessor. The appraiser who valued the property was not called as a witness. The contended basis for its admissibility was that it was an admission against interest by the state.
2. The property owners admit the great weight of authority holds that assessed value is not competent direct evidence of value for purposes other than taxation. See cases collected in an annotation at 39 ALR2d 214. In the case of Oldenburg v. Oregon Sugar Co., 39 Or 564, 569, 65 P 869 (1901), it was held the assessed value was not admissible to show the value of property in a case in which damages were sought for injuries to it.
3. Where the property owner has participated in the valuation for tax purposes or has requested reappraisal because he claims the property is valued too highly, the assessed value is admissible in proceedings other than those related to taxes to prove an admission against interest by the taxpayer. State Highway Commission v. Jones, 237 Or 372, 375, 391 P2d 625 (1964). See cases collected in 39 ALR2d 230.
The State Tax Commission has been given supervisory control over the actions of the county assessors, ORS 305.090. In conformance with its duty to see that all property is assessed according to law, it may give any order to the county assessor as to the valuation to be placed on any property for tax purposes, ORS 306.111. The property is to be assessed in accordance with its true cash value which is synonymous with market value. ORS 308.232 and 308.205. As the tax *34 commission has allowed the county assessors' valuation to stand when it was its duty to change it, if not in conformance with market value, the property owners contend the assessed value is admissible as an admission against the State. They claim the rule, as laid down in State Highway Commission v. Jones, supra, should, in fairness, be a two-way street.
There is a split of authority as to whether the assessed valuation of property in which one of the state's agencies has participated is admissible against the state when acting through another of its agencies. However, the great weight of authority appears to be that it is not. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 261 F2d 287 (4th Cir., 1958); In re Northlake Avenue v. City of Seattle, 96 Wash. 344, 165 P 113 (1917); City of Dallas v. Malloy, (Tex. Civ. App.) 214 SW2d 154 (1948); Bergen County Sewer Authority v. Burrough of Little Ferry, 15 NJ Super 43, 83 A2d 4 (1951).
Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd ed., Vol. 5, § 22.1, page 504, states as follows:
*35 In United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, supra, it was stated as follows:
In In re Northlake Avenue v. City of Seattle, supra, the court remarked upon the matter as follows:
4. That the government, while acting through one agency, is not bound by the actions of another agency which performs a different function was recognized by this court in the case of Tax Commission v. Consumers' Heating Co., 207 Or 93, 123, 294 P2d 887 (1956), where the court said as follows:
That one agency of government was not necessarily bound by the actions of another was also recognized in the case of Belton v. Buesing, 80 Or Adv Sh 619, 629, 402 P2d 98 (May 1965).
We believe that the trial court was not in error in refusing to admit evidence of the assessed value of the property which was being condemned, and therefore that it was mistaken in entering an order setting aside the judgment and allowing a new trial for this reason. The order of the trial court setting aside the judgment and allowing a new trial is reversed and the court is instructed to reinstate the judgment upon the jury's verdict.