Title: Stoner v. Delaware
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 422, 2018
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ARTHUR STONER, 
 
Respondent Below,  
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Petitioner Below,  
Appellee. 
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No.  422, 2018 
 
Court Below:  Family Court  
of the State of Delaware 
 
ID. No. 1711009911 (N)  
 
Submitted:  May 8, 2019 
Decided:  July 11, 2019 
 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Family Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED. 
 
Kevin P. Tray, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware for Appellant, Arthur Stoner. 
 
Sean P. Lugg, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware for 
Appellee, State of Delaware. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
VAUGHN, Justice: 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The appellant, Arthur Stoner,1 appeals from a Family Court order finding him 
delinquent of Robbery in the Second Degree and Conspiracy in the Second Degree.  
He makes three claims on appeal.  First, he contends that the finding that he 
committed Conspiracy in the Second Degree violated his right to due process 
because it was based on a finding that he violated an uncharged subsection of the 
conspiracy statute.  Second, he contends that there was insufficient evidence to find 
him delinquent of Robbery in the Second Degree.  In particular, he contends that 
the Family Court misconstrued a part of the robbery statute, 11 Del. C. § 831(b), 
which provides that “the phrase ‘in the course of committing theft’ includes any act 
which occurs . . . in immediate flight after the attempt or commission of the theft.”  
Third, he contends that 11 Del. C. § 512(1), the subsection of the conspiracy statute 
under which he was found delinquent, is unconstitutionally vague because it does 
not expressly include the requirement of an overt act. 
The State agrees that the Family Court erred when it found Stoner delinquent 
for violating an uncharged subsection of the conspiracy statute.  According to the 
State, “The trial court effectively convicted Stoner of an offense for which the State 
had not charged him.  His adjudication of second degree conspiracy should be 
                                                 
1 A pseudonym was assigned on appeal pursuant to Supr. Ct. R. 7(d). 
 
 
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vacated.”2  Because the State concedes error and agrees that Stoner’s adjudication 
of delinquency as to Conspiracy in the Second Degree should be vacated, we accept 
its concession and have no further need to discuss Stoner’s first contention.  For this 
same reason, Stoner’s third contention, that 11 Del. C. § 512(1) is unconstitutionally 
vague, need not be addressed.  We need address only Stoner’s contentions relating 
to the Family Court’s finding of delinquency for Robbery in the Second Degree. 
II.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On November 16, 2017, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Jessica Halloran exited 
a restaurant in Trolley Square in Wilmington.  She saw “two guys” across the street 
“hanging by the Fed Ex box.” 3  Although one of the them, later identified as 
Tayshaun Gibbs, was facing her, the other, later identified as Arthur Stoner, was 
facing away from her.  As she crossed the street toward them, Gibbs kept looking 
up and down from his phone, which illuminated his face “pretty clearly.”4  Thinking 
this was odd, Halloran intentionally made direct eye contact with him.  As soon as 
she did that, he looked down again.  Gibbs was wearing a black hooded sweatshirt 
and blue jeans.  Although Halloran never saw Stoner’s face, she saw that he was 
wearing a black hooded sweatshirt and khaki pants. 
                                                 
2 Appellee’s Answering Br. at 8-9. 
3 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A9. 
4 Id. at A12. 
 
 
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Within a few seconds of Halloran walking past them, Gibbs grabbed a wristlet 
bag Halloran was carrying, ripping it off the hook strap.  Both Gibbs and Stoner 
immediately ran off, with Stoner slightly ahead, in the direction from which Halloran 
had come, eventually leaving her sight.  Although there was never any 
communication from either Gibbs or Stoner to Halloran or between Gibbs and Stoner 
themselves before or during the robbery, Halloran later testified that they appeared 
to be together. 
The police were notified, and shortly thereafter, Gibbs and Stoner were 
stopped approximately ten blocks away by Corporal David Simmons of the 
Wilmington Police Department.  Approximately twenty minutes after the robbery, 
Halloran was transported to the area, and she identified Gibbs and Stoner as the two 
individuals who had robbed her.  Recognizing his face, she specifically identified 
Gibbs as the one who took her wristlet.  She identified Stoner based on his clothing.  
She also identified her wristlet, which had been found near where Gibbs and Stoner 
were stopped. 
At trial, following the conclusion of the State’s case, Stoner moved for 
judgment of acquittal on the robbery charge.  Citing the lack of any 
communications between the two accused and the only evidence pertaining to Stoner 
being his “mere presence at the scene” and his flight, Stoner argued that there was 
“simply no evidence that the presence or the actions of [Stoner] indicate[d] that he 
 
 
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was aiding, soliciting, requesting, [or] facilitating the crime of robbery.”5  The court 
denied the motion, explaining that there was “sufficient evidence to substantiate the 
State’s claim.”6 
Following closing arguments, the court rendered its verdict.  After noting the 
requirements for Robbery in the Second Degree, the court stated: 
Now, the question here is what did the Defendant 
do, since—since the Defendant was not the grabber, what 
did he do to facilitate that?  Because, the evidence here 
is, well—that’s been suggested by Defense, that all he did 
was run. 
831B [11 Del. C. § 831(b)], in addition to the Order, 
meaning the phrase, “In the course of committing theft 
includes any act which occurs in an attempt to [commit] 
theft or an immediate flight from the attempt or 
commission of the theft.” 
So, the—so the act does not end with the snatch, it 
continues thereafter, as part of the immediate flight. 
The Court’s satisfied that beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the Defendant was aware of what was going to 
happen.  That he had, by his conduct, demonstrated that 
he was in agreement with that.  And engaged in the 
immediate flight thereafter from the—from the physical 
act of the force of the robbery committed by [Gibbs] . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . The evidence is that they literally took off 
together, a step behind.  There wasn’t any evidence here 
that the Defendant was surprised by what had occurred.  
                                                 
5 Id. at A86-87. 
6 Id. at A91. 
 
 
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He was part of the act itself.  One grabbed, they both ran, 
virtually simultaneously. 
. . . The evidence is beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the Defendant was intending to facilitate the act, although 
the physical act, itself, the grab, was done by the other 
accused. 
So, I am finding the Defendant delinquent on both 
Counts, the Conspiracy 2nd and the Robbery 2nd.7 
Following the verdict, Stoner was sentenced to indefinite commitment at the 
Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services, suspended for twelve months of 
community supervision. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
Stoner contends that he was merely present at the scene of the robbery 
committed by Gibbs and that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he acted 
as Gibbs’s accomplice.  He contends that the Family Court seems to have 
misconstrued 11 Del. C. § 831(b) to mean that immediate flight is “part of” the 
commission of Robbery in the Second Degree in every case, even if no force is used 
or threatened during the flight.  That misconception, he argues, led the court to find 
that the robbery was not concluded when Gibbs took the wristlet bag by force, an 
act in which Stoner did not participate, but continued through the immediate flight 
after the theft.  In other words, Stoner contends that the Family Court erred by 
                                                 
7 Id. at A104-06. 
 
 
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finding that his act of fleeing with Gibbs, in and of itself, made him guilty of Robbery 
in the Second Degree.  The State does not address Stoner’s argument regarding the 
court’s interpretation of the second-degree robbery statute, but instead argues that 
there was sufficient evidence that Stoner acted as an accomplice as defined by 11 
Del. C. § 271(2)(b). 
We start with the petition’s charging language.  Tracking the language of 11 
Del. C. § 831(a), the petition charged that Stoner “did when in the course of 
committing theft, use force upon JESSICA HALLORAN with the intent to 
overcome the resistance to the taking of her property.”8  As mentioned, § 831(b) 
provides that “the phrase ‘in the course of committing theft’ includes any act which 
occurs . . . in immediate flight after the attempt or commission of the theft.”  
Therefore, under § 831(b), an act that occurs during immediate flight after the 
attempt or commission of theft may be found to be an act that occurs in the course 
of committing the theft. 
In its ruling, the Family Court first explained that the “act [of robbery] does 
not end with the snatch, it continues thereafter, as part of the immediate flight” and 
then twice referenced Stoner’s immediate flight while finding that he was part of the 
                                                 
8 Id. at A143; see also 11 Del. C. § 831(a) (“A person is guilty of robbery in the second degree 
when, in the course of committing theft, the person uses or threatens the immediate use of force 
upon another person with intent to: (1) Prevent or overcome resistance to the taking of the property 
or to the retention thereof immediately after the taking . . . .”). 
 
 
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robbery itself.9  Specifically, the court found that Stoner “engaged in the immediate 
flight thereafter from the—from the physical act of the force of the robbery 
committed by [Gibbs]” and that Stoner “was part of the act itself.”10 
We think the Family Court’s ruling is ambiguous.  It appears from the facts 
before us that the robbery was a completed act when Gibbs ripped Halloran’s wristlet 
off her wrist.  The flight was not “part of” Gibbs’s act of robbery.  The purpose of 
§ 831(b) is to help define the phrase “in the course of committing theft.”  If a theft 
begins as one not accompanied by the use or threat of force, but force or the threat 
of force is used to overcome resistance to flight after the theft, then the threat or use 
of force during flight can be found, as a matter of fact, to have occurred during the 
course of committing the theft.11  Under the facts of this case, Stoner’s flight, 
standing alone, was not part of Gibbs’s act of robbery.  What the Family Court 
meant by the statement that “the act [of robbery] does not end with the snatch, it 
continues thereafter, as part of the immediate flight” is unclear. 
There also seems to be ambiguity with regard to the Family Court’s findings 
regarding accomplice liability.  When a trial judge, following a bench trial, makes 
                                                 
9 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A104, A104-05. 
10 Id. at A105. 
11 See 11 Del. C. § 831 (“A person is guilty of robbery in the second degree when, in the course 
of committing theft, [including any act which occurs in immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission of the theft,] the person uses or threatens the immediate use of force upon another 
person with intent to: (1) Prevent or overcome resistance to the taking of the property or to the 
retention thereof immediately after the taking . . . .”). 
 
 
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specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, instead of rendering a general 
verdict, the findings must cover every essential element of the offense.12  Here, the 
court’s specific findings and conclusions as to whether Stoner was delinquent as an 
accomplice to robbery are that Stoner: (1) “was aware of what was going to happen,” 
(2) “was in agreement with that,” (3) “engaged in the immediate flight thereafter,” 
(4) “was part of the act itself,” and (5) “was intending to facilitate the act.”13 
In order to find Stoner delinquent as an accomplice, it must be found that he 
(1) intended to promote or facilitate the commission of the robbery and (2) aided, 
counseled, or agreed or attempted to aid Gibbs in planning or committing it.14  The 
Family Court clearly found that Stoner intended to facilitate the robbery.  However, 
being “aware” that someone is about to commit a crime and being “in agreement 
with that” is not necessarily the same as aiding, counseling, or agreeing or attempting 
to aid the other person in planning or committing the crime.  One can know that 
another is about to commit a crime and agree with that without aiding, counseling, 
or agreeing or attempting to aid the other person.  Moreover, the court’s conclusions 
that Stoner was “engaged in the immediate flight thereafter” and “was part of the act 
                                                 
12 Scott v. State, 117 A.2d 831, 833 (Del. 1955); see also Dolan v. State, 925 A.2d 495, 496, 501-
02 (Del. 2007) (en banc). 
13 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A104-05. 
14 See 11 Del. C. § 271(2)(b) (providing that a person acts as an accomplice when, “[i]ntending to 
promote or facilitate the commission of the offense,” the person “[a]ids, counsels or agrees or 
attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it”). 
 
 
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itself” are ambiguous for the reasons discussed above regarding the court’s 
statements about when the robbery ended.  There is no clear finding by the Family 
Court that Stoner aided, counseled, or agreed or attempted to aid Gibbs in planning 
or committing the robbery. 
When a trial judge’s findings are ambiguous, the case may be remanded for 
the making of more specific findings.15  We think the best course of action is to 
remand this matter to the Family Court for the making of more specific findings on 
the charge of Robbery in the Second Degree. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Family Court is reversed, and 
the case is remanded to Family Court.  The Family Court shall vacate Stoner’s 
adjudication of delinquency for Conspiracy in the Second Degree.  In addition, it 
shall make more specific or such additional findings of fact as may be appropriate 
with regard to the charge of Robbery in the Second Degree, and it shall “reinstate or 
vacate the judgment of [delinquency], according to the results indicated by such 
findings and in accordance with the principles of law laid down in this opinion.”16  
Jurisdiction is not retained. 
                                                 
15 Scott, 117 A.2d at 833; see also Dolan, 925 A.2d at 496, 501-02. 
16 Scott, 117 A.2d at 836.