Title: Ex parte Addison Fabricators, Inc. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Addison Fabricators, Inc. v. Ernest Davis)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1041505
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 16, 2007

Rel: 11/16/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1041505
_________________________
Ex parte Addison Fabricators, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:  Addison Fabricators, Inc.
v.
Ernest Davis)
(Winston Circuit Court, CV-01-64;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2030897)
PARKER, Justice.
Ernest Davis filed a worker's compensation claim against
Addison Fabricators, Inc. ("Addison"), based on a work-related
injury to his index finger.  The trial court found that Davis
1041505
2
was totally and permanently disabled and awarded compensation
outside the schedule established by the Legislature in § 25-5-
57, Ala. Code 1975, a part of the Workers' Compensation Act,
§ 25-5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.  Addison appealed, and the
Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and
remanded the case, Addison Fabricators, Inc. v. Davis, 892 So.
2d 440 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) ("Addison I").  On remand, the
trial court again ruled that Davis was totally and permanently
disabled and awarded compensation outside the schedule.
Addison again appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed the trial court's order without an opinion.  Addison
Fabricators, Inc. v. Davis, 945 So. 2d 496 (Ala. Civ. App.
2005) (table) ("Addison II").  Addison petitioned this Court
for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted.  We now
reverse and remand. 
I. Background
On April 19, 1999, Davis injured his right index finger
while operating a shear machine in the course of his work for
Addison. He was treated by Dr. Dan Hirschbruner, an
orthopaedic surgeon.  Dr. Hirschbruner returned Davis to work
on light duty on April 20, 1999, and he worked until April 26,
1041505
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1999, when there was no light-duty work available.  
After receiving temporary-total-disability benefits for
just under five weeks, Davis returned to work on June 1, 1999,
with the restriction of wearing a splint on his injured
finger.  Dr. Hirschbruner had seen Davis on May 2 and May 26,
1999, and he saw him again on June 18, 1999, when he released
Davis to return to work with no restrictions.  Davis did not
request pain medication after the injury, and Dr. Hirschbruner
prescribed none.  Davis worked for Addison for four weeks
after Dr. Hirschbruner released him, until July 16, 1999, and
there is no record of his reporting to his supervisor that his
finger was giving him difficulties in his work and no record
that Davis requested any accommodations from his supervisor
for his injury.  Davis resigned his position with Addison on
July 16, 1999, and three days later went to work for his
nephew in the timber business.  Davis was unable to grip a saw
handle and therefore was unable to perform the manual-labor
portions of the new job, but he continued to work for his
nephew in the timber business in a created position overseeing
the other workers, until the business closed in November 1999.
On April 11, 2000, Addison rehired Davis, who worked at
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4
his previous job as a fitter.  Davis again performed his job
but 
experienced 
considerable 
pain 
and 
had 
difficulty
completing the work.  He quit his job with Addison on May 25,
2000, and has not held a job since.
On May 8, 2000, Dr. Hirschbruner examined Davis and
assessed him as having a 54% physical-impairment rating to the
right index finger in accordance with American Medical
Association guidelines.  Dr. Hirschbruner testified that Davis
voiced no complaints of arm pain or of any problems at work
during the visit. 
Davis suffered a heart attack on August 9, 2000.  At that
time, in providing his medical history, Davis made no mention
of having had any problems with his finger.  Later that month,
Davis applied for Social Security disability benefits. On
September 6, 2000, Davis underwent heart-bypass surgery. He
was diagnosed as having coronary atherosclerosis, severe
microcytic anemia, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
On April 12, 2001, Davis filed his worker's compensation
action against Addison.
Addison, by and through its workers' compensation
carrier, referred Davis to Dr. John Walker for an independent
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5
medical evaluation, which was completed on January 30, 2002.
Dr. Walker testified that when he examined Davis, Davis's
finger was not swollen or grossly enlarged, and Dr. Walker did
not recommend any further treatment or restrictions other than
to recommend that Davis not use the finger for gripping or
pinching. 
Davis's attorney referred him to Dr. Keith Anderson for
an additional impairment rating and an opinion as to possible
work restrictions.  Dr. Anderson testified that at the time he
performed his examination, Davis's finger was not swollen and
he was not complaining of any arm or neck pain but that he did
have a problem with weakness in the injured finger.  Dr.
Anderson expressed the opinion that Davis should not perform
repetitive activities with his right hand and should not work
around dangerous equipment; specifically, he should not work
around a punch press.  At the time of Dr. Anderson's
examination, Davis was taking no medication for pain related
to his injured finger.
The first time the Court of Civil Appeals reviewed this
case, it stated:
"The case was tried in the Winston Circuit Court on
September 10, 2002, with the trial court receiving
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both oral and written evidence. On January 16, 2003,
the trial court entered its judgment, finding Davis
to 
be 
permanently 
and 
totally 
disabled.
Specifically, the trial court found that Davis's
injury was to his 'right index finger,' and that he
"'was permanently and totally disabled as
the result of the injury above-described,
arising out of and in the course of his
said employment with [Addison]; because of
said injury, and [Davis's] education and
training, he is unable to perform work of
his trade or obtain reasonably gainful
employment, resulting in his permanent and
total loss of ability to earn; said injury
permanently 
and 
totally 
incapacitates
plaintiff 
from 
working 
at 
and 
being
retrained for gainful employment.'
"Based on those findings, the trial court awarded
Davis $338.65 per week in accrued and future
benefits, minus an attorney fee awarded to his
counsel. Addison appeals."
Addison I, 892 So. 2d at 441.  The Court of Civil Appeals then
reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case,
stating:
"'The trial judge should make a finding of every
fact necessary to sustain the judgment of the
court.' United Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Culiver, 271 Ala.
568, 570, 126 So. 2d 119, 120-121 (1961). The trial
court in this case neglected to make findings
concerning whether Davis's injury entitled Davis to
compensation outside of the schedule. Therefore, as
we did in Wal-Mart [Stores, Inc. v. Gardner, 885 So.
2d 168 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)], we must reverse the
trial court's judgment and remand the cause for the
trial court to enter a judgment consistent with this
opinion and with the holding of our Supreme Court in
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7
Ex parte Drummond Co.[, 837 So. 2d 831 (Ala.
2002).]"
Addison I, 892 So. 2d at 443.
On remand, the trial court supplemented its findings as
follows: 
"Pursuant to the remand of the Alabama Court of
Civil Appeals, this trial court's order of January
16, 2003 is amended by adding to the findings of
fact, at the end of the paragraph number '1,' the
following: 'This court further finds that the
effects of said injury to plaintiff Ernest H. Davis
extend to his body as a whole and produce a greater
or more prolonged incapacity than that which
naturally results from the injury to his right index
finger, said effects interfering with the efficiency
of the plaintiff's body as a whole; Sections 25-5-
57(a)(3)a and d, Alabama Code 1975, are not
applicable."
The trial court cited no evidence to support this supplemented
finding.  The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this judgment of
the trial court without an opinion in Addison II.  Addison
then petitioned this Court to "issue a writ of certiorari,
directing the Court of Civil Appeals to reverse the trial
court's finding." 
II. Legal Analysis
We begin our analysis by observing that Davis's injury
was to one finger.  Because this was his right index finger
and because the injury involved open fractures to all three
1041505
8
bones of that finger, his gripping ability in his right hand
is markedly decreased as a result of the injury.   The injury
to his finger causes pain in his right hand and occasional
pain and/or numbness in his right arm, but the pain does not
extend beyond his hand to his entire body.
Also, on August 9, 2000, about 16 months after his injury
to his finger, Davis suffered a heart attack, and he underwent
bypass surgery on September 6, 2000.  He was diagnosed with
coronary atherosclerosis, severe microcytic anemia, and
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.  He does not claim that
the heart attack was job-related.  He testified that his heart
does not "bother" him now, and the discharge statement
following his heart surgery says he would have no permanent
heart-related limitations.  
Davis was 56 years old at the time of trial; he has only
a fifth-grade education; and he has never done any kind of
work except strenuous physical labor.  He testified at trial
that he cannot perform normal day-to-day activities because of
his hand, that he has no grip strength in his right hand, that
he cannot work with machinery, that he cannot perform acts of
personal hygiene or care for his yard, that he does not sleep
1041505
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well, that he frequently has to get up during the night
because of the pain, and that he consumes three or four
ibuprofen or acetaminophen tablets up to six times per day. 
Evidence exists from which the trial court could find
that the effects of Davis's injury extend beyond his right
index finger to his right hand.  There is also some testimony
concerning the effect of the injury upon his right arm.  But
the evidence is insufficient to establish that the effects of
the injury extend beyond his right arm to other parts of his
body.  A person who has lost his right hand or his right arm
is compensated according to the schedule, and Davis's
disability cannot be considered more severe than the injury of
such a person.  
Ex parte Dunlop Tire Corp., 772 So. 2d 1167 (Ala. 2000),
involved an employee who had suffered an injury to her arm,
which, she claimed, extended into her hand.  The trial court
awarded benefits according to the schedule in the Workers'
Compensation Act, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed its
judgment, saying that the extension of the injury into her
hand was sufficient to take the claim out of the schedule.
This Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment,
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stating:
"In reversing the trial court's judgment, the
Court of Civil Appeals held that '"if the effects
of an arm injury extend to the hand, then one is
not limited to the scheduled benefits provided for
the loss of an arm."' Morrow v. Dunlop Tire Corp.,
772 So. 2d [1161] at 1164 [(Ala. Civ. App. 1999)]
(quoting Cagle v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 681 So. 2d
611, 613 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996), in turn quoting
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. Elliott, 598 So. 2d
931, 933 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992)). This rule is
inconsistent with the plain meaning of Ala. Code
1975, § 25-5-57(a), and with logic. Clearly, the
loss of an arm includes the loss of a hand. See,
e.g., Flicker v. Mac Sign Co., 252 N.Y. 492, 170
N.E. 118 (1930). In Flicker, Chief Judge Cardozo
explained that '[w]ith the reservation for greater
prudence of exceptional conditions, the scheduled
compensation for loss of the larger member must be
accepted as compensation for the loss of its
component parts.' 252 N.Y. at 494, 170 N.E. at 118.
Accord Nabb v. Haveg Indus., Inc., 265 A.2d 320
(Del. Super. Ct. 1969) (holding that loss of an arm
includes loss of the hand); Armstrong Cork Co. v.
Sheppard, 222 Miss. 359, 370, 76 So. 2d 225, 229
(1954) ('[W]here multiple injuries are sustained by
the employee in a single accident, affecting
directly two members of the same extremity, if the
injuries result in some disability to the greater
member other than that occasioned by the disability
to the lesser member, the disability rating should
be for loss of use of the greater member.').
Therefore, to the extent that Cagle and Robbins
Tire  & Rubber Co. stand for the proposition that
'if the effects of an arm injury extend to the
hand, then one is not limited to the scheduled
benefits provided for the loss of an arm,' those
cases are overruled."
772 So. 2d at 1170.
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Similarly, in Alabama Workmen's Compensation Self-
Insurers Guaranty Ass'n v. Wilson, [Ms. 2040523, June 16,
2006] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2006), the Court of Civil
Appeals held that "[a]ny interference with the function of
both of the employee's arms is of no legal import given that
a loss of both arms is itself a scheduled injury." (Emphasis
omitted.)  In Stone & Webster Construction, Inc. v. Lanier,
914 So. 2d 869 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005), Stone claimed that an
injury to his right knee caused him to place more weight on
his left knee, thereby interfering with the function of both
knees.  The Court of Civil Appeals held that an injury to an
employee's right knee that interfered with the function of the
uninjured left knee must still be compensated under the
schedule, which provides for the loss of both legs.  The court
stated:
"Based on our review of the record in this case,
we agree with Stone & Webster that the evidence is
not sufficient to establish a permanent and total
disability on the part of Lanier and that the
standard required in order to remove Lanier's
injuries from the schedule imposed by § 25-5-
57(a)(3), as described in Ex parte Drummond Co.,
[837 So. 2d 831 (Ala. 2002),] has not been met."
914 So. 2d at 876.
1041505
1 Terry A. Moore, Alabama Workers' Compensation § 1:4-5
1
(1998).
12
Before the advent of workers' compensation laws, common-
law 
principles 
governed 
compensation 
for 
work-related
injuries.  An unfortunate consequence was expensive and time-
consuming litigation, and injured employees frequently were
unsuccessful in obtaining compensation because they could not
afford to pay an attorney or because their employers could
successfully raise common-law defenses such as the fellow-
servant rule, the doctrine of contributory negligence, or
assumption of risk.   A major purpose of the Legislature in
1
adopting the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act was to remove
these common-law defenses in most workers' compensation cases
and also to minimize the cost of litigation.  Various types of
injuries were compensated according to a fixed schedule
enacted by the Legislature as § 25-5-57.  Although the
individual worker lost the right to a jury trial in most
cases, he gained the right to a speedier and less expensive
determination without having to establish that the employer
was 
negligent 
and 
that 
he, 
the 
employee, 
was 
not
contributorily negligent.
1041505
13
The Legislature enacted the schedule in the Workers'
Compensation Act with a primary purpose of minimizing costly
and time-consuming litigation over work-related injuries.  The
Legislature did not totally eliminate litigation, but the
possibility of going outside the schedule to compensate
injuries was carefully limited.  
The Workers' Compensation Act, and particularly the
schedule at § 25-5-57(a)(3)a., does not provide for an
exception to the scheduled payments.  Instead, through Bell v.
Driskill, 282 Ala. 640, 213 So. 2d 806 (1968), as modified by
Ex parte Drummond Co., 837 So. 2d 831 (Ala. 2002), this Court
has created an exception, allowing an unscheduled award for an
injury of such severity that it impacts the claimant's entire
body.  Because this court-created exception is outside the
statutory schedule enacted by the Legislature, we must apply
it narrowly.  Ex parte Brookwood Med. Ctr., Inc., 895 So. 2d
1000, 1006 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) ("[I]t is not the role of the
judiciary to 'improve upon' legislation such as the [Workers'
Compensation] Act, even upon such grounds as necessity based
upon the passage of time."); Finch v. State, 271 Ala. 499,
503, 124 So. 2d 825, 829 (1960); Piggly Wiggly No. 208, Inc.
1041505
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v. Dutton, 601 So. 2d 907, 911 (Ala. 1992); and Birmingham
News Co. v. Muse, 669 So. 2d 138, 142 (Ala. 1995).
There is evidence from which the trial court could find
that Davis has suffered a work-related injury to his right
index finger and that this injury extends to his entire right
hand.  It is unclear from the evidence whether Davis's injury
extends further to his right arm.  However, it is clear that
the injury does not extend beyond his right arm to the rest of
his body.  He is therefore not entitled to compensation
outside the schedule.
III. Conclusion
The trial court's finding that Davis is totally and
permanently disabled and is entitled to compensation outside
the statutory schedule is clearly erroneous, and the Court of
Civil Appeals erred in affirming the judgment based on that
finding.  We reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil
Appeals and remand the case to that court.  The Court of Civil
Appeals is instructed to remand the case for the trial court
to determine the extent of injury to Davis's right index
finger, right hand, and right arm, and the extent of
disability benefits to which he is entitled.
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REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Stuart, Smith, and Bolin,
 JJ., concur.  
Woodall, J., concurs in the result.  
Murdock, J., recuses himself.