Title: STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. MADDOX
Citation: 152 P.3d 204, 2006 OK 95
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 2006

STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. MADDOX Annotate this Case STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. MADDOX 2006 OK 95 152 P.3d 204 Case Number: SCBD-4639 Decided: 12/19/2006 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association, Complainant, v. JOHN GLEN MADDOX, Respondent. BAR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING ¶0 The complainant, Oklahoma Bar Association, charged the respondent, John Glen Maddox, with one count of professional misconduct associated with a guilty plea and deferred sentence to a charge of embezzlement by a public official. The Professional Responsibility Tribunal recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years and one day and that costs be imposed. Upon de novo review we hold that the respondent's license to practice law is suspended for two years beginning retroactively on March 22, 2005, the date in which the respondent began a self-imposed suspension from the practice of law. The respondent is assessed the costs of this proceeding in the sum of $431.07 for payment not later than ninety days after this opinion becomes final. RESPONDENT SUSPENDED; COSTS IMPOSED. Dan Murdock, General Counsel, Oklahoma Bar Association, For Complainant. Irven R. Box, Stephen Box, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, For Respondent. KAUGER, J.: ¶1 The complainant, Oklahoma Bar Association (Bar Association), charged the respondent, John G. Maddox, (respondent/Maddox) with one count of professional misconduct resulting from a guilty plea on a charge of embezzlement by a public official. The Bar Association alleged that the attorney violated Rule 8.4, 5 O.S. 2001 Ch. 1, App. 3-A, FACTS ¶2 In 1994, the respondent, a licensed lawyer since 1974, was elected as District Attorney for District 8. On September 10, 1999, Maddox resigned from office amidst an ongoing investigation regarding his use of a state owned automobile and his submission of travel claims. The respondent was indicted by the Multicounty Grand Jury on March 2, 2000. He acknowledged that: ". . .while driving a vehicle owned by the State of Oklahoma, I filed claims for mileage and received monies from the State for milage on the vehicle. The law does not allow receiving funds when driving a State owned car, but only for a privately owned vehicle and the funds I received were improper and unlawful." Maddox entered into a plea agreement and plead guilty to one count of embezzlement by a public official in violation of ¶3 On September 8, 2000, six months after the indictment was returned, the General Counsel for the Oklahoma Bar Association wrote to the respondent to tell him that an investigation was being opened based on the circumstances surrounding his indictment. The letter noted that the respondent "may" have committed actions which would constitute a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Maddox was given twenty days to respond to the letter and he did so on October 2, 2000, admitting the facts which supported his plea agreement. ¶4 Nearly one year later, on August 27, 2001, a complaint was filed with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The respondent promptly answered the complaint on September 14, 2001, and both pleadings were filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court on September 17, 2001. By May 15, 2002, the two year deferred sentence had expired, Maddox had fully complied with all the imposed conditions and the record was expunged by order of the court. ¶5 On March 22, 2005, the respondent began a self-imposed suspension from the practice of law in anticipation of a hearing on disciplinary proceedings before the trial panel ¶6 THE RESPONDENT'S CONDUCT WARRANTS A TWO YEAR SUSPENSION AND THE IMPOSITION OF COSTS BEGINNING RETROACTIVELY FROM MARCH 22, 2005, THE DATE IN WHICH THE RESPONDENT BEGAN A SELF-IMPOSED SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW. ¶7 The trial panel recommended two years and a day suspension. The Bar Association concedes that it failed to prosecute this action in a prompt and timely manner and, as a result, it recommends the imposition of a one year suspension. Maddox argues that considering the totality of the circumstances, this cause warrants a public censure,6 but he agrees to the imposition of costs. ¶8 Rule 7.1 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S. 2001 Ch. 1, App. 3-A, provides that a lawyer who has been convicted of a crime which demonstrates unfitness to practice law regardless of whether the conviction resulted from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or from a verdict after trial shall be subject to discipline regardless of pendency of an appeal.7 ¶9 Rule 7.2 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S. 2001 Ch. 1, App. 3-A requires the clerk of any court to send certified copies of the indictment or the judgment and sentence to the Chief Justice and to the General Counsel of the Oklahoma Bar Association within 5 days. Upon receipt of this documentation, the Supreme Court is mandated to suspend immediately the lawyer from the practice of law. ¶10 The integrity of and confidence in the profession -- therein lies the problem. This Court is faced with a dilemma. The system has not worked. Rule 7 needs to be amended. Because the respondent pled guilty and received a deferred sentence on a plea agreement, he apparently escaped Rule 7 because he was not "technically" convicted for the same acts of which had he been convicted would have resulted in an immediate suspension. This Court was not advised within 5 days of the guilty plea nor within 5 weeks or 5 months apparently because he wasn't "convicted" of the crime, even though he admitted his guilt. ¶11 The first news we received of the deferred sentence was September 17, 2001, when a copy of the Bar complaint was filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The initial hearing before the trial panel was set for October 18, 2001, but it was continued to November 1, 2001. No hearing was held in November of 2001. Instead, on March 1, 2002, the November hearing was re-set for April 9, 2002. On April 9, 2002, the hearing was continued indefinitely. Nearly three years later, on February 3, 2005, the April 9, 2002, hearing was re-set for March 22, 2005. On March 23, 2005, an order was filed striking the March 22 hearing. The hearing was finally held on January 17, 2006, with the General Counsel advising the respondent that he would recommend a one-year suspension. ¶12 Rule 6.6 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A, provides in pertinent part: "Within ten (10) days after receiving notice of the filing of a complaint, the Chief Master . . .of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal shall select three members thereof to serve as a trial panel of Masters. . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Rule 6.7 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings,5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A, provides: "The Chief Master or Vice-Chief Master of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal shall notify the respondent and the General Counsel of the appointment and membership of the Trial Panel and of the time and place for hearing, which shall not be less than thirty (30) nor more than sixty (60) days from the date of appointment of the Trial Panel. Extension of this period may be granted by the Chief Master (or the Vice-Chief Master, in case of the unavailability of the Chief Master) for good cause shown." (Emphasis supplied.). ¶13 In a letter of support dated January 12, 2006, Thomas J. Morris, III, Maddox's employer, wrote to the Oklahoma Bar Association. He said that he was enclosing a copy of a letter he wrote on October 11, 2001, "since the original may have been misplaced during the ages." Indeed. Mr. Morris also observed that he had seen the respondent "grieve over" this matter, waiting, without knowing what the Oklahoma Bar Association was going to do because his day in court never came. C.D. Northcutt, a Ponca City attorney, wrote that the matter had not been handled expeditiously and that the respondent had suffered from being left in limbo. Fred Boettcher, another Ponca City attorney, noted in his letter that the Oklahoma Bar Association had moved for continuances which had unduly delayed the matter, that further proceedings were unfair and unnecessary, and that the respondent had suffered personal agony not knowing what tomorrow would bring. ¶14 This attorney did something really wrong. He betrayed his trust as a public official. He put gas in his pickup and charged the gas on a state credit card and then he charged for mileage. He has completed his deferred sentence. Had the matter been held in a timely manner and had we disbarred him, he would likely be eligible to apply for reinstatement. Instead, through a tragedy of errors, we now seek to impose the discipline which should have been imposed much earlier. ¶15 There is equal blame to share: Our failure to monitor, the Bar Association's failure to prosecute, and the respondent's lawyer's lack of reasonable diligence in representation. These are the facts. They cannot be varnished, spun, or obliterated. There has been a breakdown in the system. This does not meet the constitutional requirements of due process, ¶16 When it took nearly two years from the time a formal complaint was filed until a trial panel hearing was held in State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Benefield, 1) In 1999, respondent's daughter was in a plane crash; 2) Respondent's lawyer had surgery followed by a severe infection; 3) Respondent's lawyer was on television in the Nichols and McVeigh cases and ministered to the needs of victims; 4) General Counsel's sister died and the funeral was held on the date of the hearing scheduled March 22, 2005, but the hearing was postponed until January 17, 2006. These reasons fail to show good cause for such delay. Co-counsel for the respondent appeared at the hearing on January 17, 2006. The General Counsel's office of the Oklahoma Bar Association has almost a million dollar budget and employs four other lawyers who routinely handle disciplinary proceedings. ¶17 We would have agreed to the discipline imposed by the professional tribunal panel had this cause been presented in a timely and orderly manner. However, this Court is the ultimate arbiter of appropriate sanctions in bar discipline cases. ¶18 Discipline is fashioned to coincide with the discipline imposed upon other lawyers for similar acts of professional misconduct. ¶19 Here, the respondent has been totally cooperative with the Bar Association. Maddox has admitted his conduct and violation of the Rules and taken it upon himself to begin self imposed discipline. Furthermore, the respondent has not been previously disciplined. Given the totality of the circumstances, the respondent's license to practice law is suspended for two years beginning on March 22, 2005, the date in which the respondent began a self-imposed suspension from practicing law. The respondent is assessed the costs of this proceeding in the sum of $431.07 for payment not later than ninety days after this opinion becomes final. CONCLUSION ¶20 The nondelegable, constitutional responsibility to regulate both the practice and the ethics, licensure, and discipline of the practitioners of the law is solely vested in this Court. RESPONDENT SUSPENDED; COSTS IMPOSED. Watt, C.J., Winchester, V.C.J., Lavender, Hargrave, Kauger, Edmondson, Colbert, JJ., concur. Taylor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part. While I agree with some of the concerns expressed in the majority opinion, I must dissent to the discipline imposed. I find no indication that the Respondent or his counsel ever vigorously objected to any of the delay or the process in this case. The delay was not an issue raised by either party to these proceedings at any time. The delay is not a mitigating factor. This lawyer has committed extremely grievous acts of dishonesty and has violated the public trust. The Professional Responsibility Tribunal recommended that the Respondent be suspended for two years and a day. That discipline is clearly and certainly warranted in this case and should be imposed. Opala, J., disqualified. FOOT