Title: Grimes v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 449, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 20, 2004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
RUSSELL M. GRIMES,
§
§
No. 449, 2003   
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§
Court Below:  Superior Court of 
§
the State of Delaware in and for
              v.
§
New Castle County
§
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
Cr. I.D. No. 0301005026
§
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Submitted:
May 18, 2004
Decided:
August 20, 2004
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices.
O R D E R
This 20  day of August 2004, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties,
th
it appears to the Court that:
(1) Russell M. Grimes was charged with attempted burglary, attempted theft,
second degree conspiracy, receiving stolen property, resisting arrest, and various
motor vehicle offenses.  Following a jury trial in Superior Court, Grimes was found
not guilty of attempted burglary and attempted theft, and one of the motor vehicle
charges (failure to yield right of way) was dismissed by the Court.  Grimes was
convicted of the remaining charges and appeals from those convictions on the grounds
that the trial court, in response to two separate evidentiary objections, improperly gave
 A smash-and-grab burglary is one in which the perpetrator breaks a store-front window, quickly
1
removes property from inside the store, and flees within seconds.
- 2 -
limiting jury instructions and instead should have granted a mistrial.  We find no merit
in these claims.
(2) On January 9, 2003, Corporal Michael Butkus and Trooper Nicholas
Terranova, while on routine patrol on Kirkwood Highway near Price’s Corner
Shopping Center, decided to check the premises at that shopping center because of
numerous “smash-and-grab” burglaries in that area.   Upon driving into the shopping
1
center, the police observed a black Volkswagen Jetta parked outside a music store, and
two men standing on the sidewalk.  The police decided to investigate because there
had recently been two smash-and-grab burglaries in that shopping center, of which
one was at the music store.  
(3) Upon seeing the police approach, the two men quickly got into the Jetta
and sped away at a high rate of speed, with lights off, out of the shopping center
parking lot and onto Kirkwood Highway.  As the Jetta sped by the police car, Corporal
Butkus was able to see the driver, whom he identified in court as the defendant,
Russell Grimes.  
(4) The police gave chase, and the Jetta jumped the median strip, traveling
eastbound in the westbound lanes.  The chase extended through Elsmere and
 That Rule provides that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
2
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.”
- 3 -
eventually ended at a McDonald’s restaurant, where the two suspects abandoned their
car and fled on foot.  The police followed them, and eventually apprehended Grimes.
(5) A search of the Jetta revealed two cinder block pieces and a duffel bag.
In the car’s ignition was a key, to which was attached a tag identifying the Jetta’s VIN
(Vehicle Identification Number).  Further investigation revealed that the Jetta had
been stolen from a storage lot at the Port of Wilmington sometime after December 2,
2002.
(6) At trial, Grimes elected to represent himself, with his attorney serving as
stand-by counsel.  Grimes did not testify, nor did he call any witnesses to testify, in
his behalf. As noted, Grimes was acquitted of certain charges and convicted on others.
(7) During the trial, two evidentiary issues arose that, the trial judge ruled,
implicated D.R.E. 404 (b).   The trial judge’s dispositions of those evidentiary issues
2
constitute the grounds for Grimes’ appeal.
(8) The first issue concerned testimony about previous smash-and-grab
burglaries at the shopping center.  Consistent with the prosecutor’s opening statement,
Corporal Butkus testified that he and his partner decided to check the Price’s Corner
shopping center because previous smash-and-grab burglaries had occurred there, one
 538 A.2d 726, 734 (Del. 1988).
3
- 4 -
at the music store in front of which Grimes’ car was parked, and another at a Radio
Shack several doors away.  
(9) At this point the trial judge interrupted the testimony and, at sidebar,
expressed concern that the jury might infer that the defendant had committed the prior
burglaries, even though there was no evidence that that was the case.  After hearing
counsel the trial judge, sua sponte, delivered a limiting instruction to the jury, to the
effect that there was no evidence linking the prior smash-and-grab incidents to the
defendant and that the jury should not connect those incidents to the defendant.
(10) Grimes contends, on this appeal, that the trial court abused its discretion
by not granting a mistrial, even though the defendant did not request a mistrial.  The
argument lacks merit. 
(11) As the trial judge immediately recognized, to whatever extent the officer’s
testimony suggested that Grimes had committed the prior burglaries, that testimony
was inadmissible against Grimes under D.R.E. 404 (b), because it failed the prong of
the analysis in Getz v. State  requiring that there be plain, clear and conclusive
3
evidence of the defendant’s guilt of the other crime or crimes.  
(12) The evidence of the other smash-and grab burglaries in the general vicinity
(and in that same shopping center) was admissible, however, for the limited purpose
- 5 -
of explaining why the police were on special alert and were patrolling shopping
centers.  It was also admissible to explain the significance of the cinder block pieces
found in the stolen Jetta; that is, the evidence of the prior smash-and-grab burglaries
was relevant to the charged offenses themselves.  
(13) That being the case, the limiting instruction was an appropriate—indeed
perhaps the only appropriate—remedy to cure any possible unfair prejudice to the
defense while at the same time allowing the prosecution to prove its case.  The jury
is presumed to have followed that instruction, and Grimes has not articulated any
reason to conclude otherwise, as evidenced by the verdict acquitting him of attempted
burglary and attempted theft.  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not
granting (sua sponte) a mistrial.
(14) The second evidentiary objection resulted from the testimony of  Corporal
Butkus in response to defendant’s opening statement, where the jury was told that the
defendant was only a passenger in the Jetta and had no knowledge that it was stolen.
(15) During the prosecution’s case, Corporal Butkus testified that in searching
Grimes after his arrest, he (Butkus) found a key to another Volkswagen.  Like the key
to the stolen Jetta, this key also had a VIN tag attached to it.
(16) The defendant, through standby counsel, objected to this testimony on the
ground that it was inadmissible under D.R.E. 404 (b).  The prosecutor responded that
- 6 -
the testimony was admissible to rebut the defendant’s opening statement that he did
not know the Jetta was stolen.  
(17) The prosecutor represented that he intended to adduce testimony that the
VIN on the tag attached to the key found on Grimes’ person was different from the
VIN of the stolen Jetta, and that the jury could infer that this second key was to a
different Volkswagen had been stolen from the Port of Wilmington.  That inference,
in turn, would tend to prove that Grimes knew that the Jetta in question was stolen, a
proper purpose under D.R.E. 404 (b).  
(18) The trial judge found, however, that the evidence that the second key was
to a stolen car was too tenuous, and, hence, failed that prong of the Getz analysis
requiring that other crimes be proved by evidence that is plain, clear and conclusive.
(19) The trial judge then explained to the defendant carefully and at length, that
there were two remedies available, a mistrial or an instruction to the jury to disregard
the testimony.  The defendant stated that he did not want a mistrial but preferred an
instruction.  At that point the trial judge instructed the jury that the key found on
Grimes’ person should not be considered as evidence that he had committed any of
the crimes that he was charged with.
(20) On appeal, Grimes argues that the trial judge abused his discretion by not
declaring a mistrial.  The argument clearly has no basis, because given Grimes’
 Middlebrook v. State, 815 A.2d 739, 745-56 (Del. 2003).
4
- 7 -
tactical choice not to seek a mistrial, the argument has been waived.  Nor was the
giving of the instruction “plain error” in any meaningful sense, because the instruction
thoroughly and specifically directed the jury to disregard the testimony as evidence
of Grimes’ guilt of any of the offenses for which he was charged.  That instruction
was sufficient to cure any conceivable unfair prejudice.   
4
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that judgment of the Superior Court
is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs
                Justice