Title: State v. Barry M. Jenkins
Citation: 2007 WI 96
Docket Number: 2005AP000302-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2007

2007 WI 96 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP302-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Barry M. Jenkins, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 28 
Reported at: 289 Wis. 2d 523, 710 N.W.2d 502 
(Ct. App. 2006—Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 1, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Elsa C. Lamelas 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BUTLER, Jr., J., joins the concurrence. 
 
BUTLER, Jr., J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J., join the 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Maura F.J. Whelan, with whom on the briefs was Peggy 
A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Melinda A. Swartz, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
2007 WI 96
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP302-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2002CF5203) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Barry M. Jenkins, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals1 reversing the circuit court's 
denial of Barry Jenkins' (Jenkins) presentence motion for plea 
withdrawal.   
¶2 
The case presents the recurrent question of how to 
review a circuit court's denial of a defendant's motion to 
withdraw his plea before sentencing, given the longstanding 
legal principle that a circuit court should "freely allow a 
                                                 
1 State v. Jenkins, 2006 WI App 28, 289 Wis. 2d 523, 710 
N.W.2d 502. 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
2 
 
defendant to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing for any fair 
and just reason, unless the prosecution [would] be substantially 
prejudiced."2  State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶28, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 
578, 605 N.W.2d 199.  In this case, the State does not argue 
that it would be substantially prejudiced by Jenkins' plea 
withdrawal.  Therefore, the issues are whether Jenkins had a 
fair and just reason to withdraw his plea and how a reviewing 
court should review the circuit court's denial of Jenkins' 
motion.   
¶3 
Jenkins contends that he offered a fair and just 
reason, namely a misunderstanding of the consequences of his 
plea, to support his presentence motion for plea withdrawal.  He 
contends that he misunderstood the consequences of his plea 
because he thought that he would be guaranteed the opportunity 
to work with law enforcement to potentially affect his sentence.  
Jenkins asserts that the circuit court erred when it denied his 
motion because it considered only whether a breach of the plea 
agreement had occurred, rather than whether he misunderstood the 
consequences of his plea. 
¶4 
The State contends that the circuit court did not err 
when it denied Jenkins' motion because the circuit court did not 
                                                 
2 This rule for withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to 
sentencing should not be confused "with the rule for post-
sentence withdrawal where the defendant must show the withdrawal 
is necessary to correct a manifest injustice."  Dudrey v. State, 
74 Wis. 2d 480, 483, 247 N.W.2d 105 (1976) (citing State v. 
Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967)); see State v. 
Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶18, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906. 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
3 
 
believe that Jenkins misunderstood the consequences of his plea.  
It posits that Jenkins may have hoped to work with law 
enforcement but that the evidence does not show that Jenkins 
actually believed or was led to believe that he would be 
guaranteed the opportunity to work with law enforcement.  The 
State contends that the court of appeals erred when it reversed 
the circuit court’s decision because it did not apply the 
appropriate standard of review and did not defer to the circuit 
court's credibility and factual determinations.  Instead, it 
argues, the court of appeals substituted its own determinations 
for those of the circuit court. 
¶5 
We conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion when it denied Jenkins' motion to 
withdraw his plea.  From the beginning, Jenkins was represented 
by counsel.  He had a lengthy criminal history, including two 
prior felony convictions, parole revocations, and incidents of 
violence.  He was charged with selling heroin.  He had several 
months to consider a plea agreement offered by the State.  This 
agreement did not include a promise that Jenkins would be 
guaranteed the opportunity to work with law enforcement.  At the 
plea hearing, Jenkins participated in a thorough plea colloquy 
with the court, with the active participation of his attorney, 
and the record supports the circuit court's determination that 
Jenkins understood the consequences of his plea.  Jenkins did 
not attempt to withdraw his plea until the sentencing hearing, 
more than two months after he had entered the plea.  By that 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
4 
 
time, he had read the recommendations for sentence in his 
presentence investigation.  
¶6 
Because the circuit court's decision to grant or deny 
a motion for plea withdrawal is within its discretion, we must 
affirm the circuit 
court's decision as long as it was 
demonstrably "'made and based upon the facts appearing in the 
record and in reliance on the appropriate and applicable law.'"  
State v. Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d 565, 579, 469 N.W.2d 163 (1991) 
(quoting Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 
(1981)).  After applying the appropriate standard of review and 
finding support for the circuit court's decision in the record, 
we conclude that the circuit court did not err.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals.   
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶7 
On September 12, 2002, Jenkins was charged with 
delivery of a controlled substance-heroin (3 grams or less), 
contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 961.14(3)(k) and 961.41(d)(1).3  The 
charge arose out of a September 6, 2002, incident in which two 
undercover police officers purchased heroin from a person they 
later identified as Jenkins.  On October 2, 2002, a preliminary 
hearing was conducted and Jenkins was bound over for trial.  The 
State filed an information, and Jenkins pled not guilty. 
¶8 
In mid-November Jenkins' first defense counsel moved 
to withdraw.  He was succeeded by Attorney Paul Barrett.  At a 
                                                 
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
2004 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
5 
 
December 18 scheduling conference, Attorney Barrett learned that 
Jenkins had written a December 1 letter to Milwaukee County 
Circuit Judge Elsa Lamelas without consulting an attorney. 
¶9 
In that letter, Jenkins complained about alleged flaws 
in police procedure,4 the purported inadequacy of his first 
attorney, and excessive bail.  He added: 
I've now become even more convinced that I'll not be 
able [to] fully prove my innocence——which only leaves 
me with one other option.  That is to except [sic] 
this plea offering, which seems to be the best thing 
to do, before deciding to go into a full trial, and 
find myself over-powered by the judicial system and 
found guilty for a crime I truly was never a part of. 
(Emphasis added).  Nonetheless, Jenkins insisted that his 
identification was faulty and should be suppressed. 
 
¶10 On December 19, Attorney Barrett wrote to Jenkins, 
advising him that ex parte letters to the court were "totally 
inappropriate."  He then addressed a separate letter that 
Jenkins had written to the District Attorney's office about the 
possibility of receiving some benefit at sentencing in exchange 
for 
divulging 
relevant 
information 
about 
other 
drug 
perpetrators.  Attorney Barrett wrote: 
I 
was 
also 
informed 
by 
Assistant 
District 
Attorney Steven Glamm that you wrote to him concerning 
                                                 
4 In the December 1, 2002, letter to Judge Elsa Lamelas, 
Jenkins complained about the photo array procedure that led to 
his identification and asked the judge to suppress the evidence.  
On February 11, 2003, Attorney Barrett filed a motion to 
suppress identification on the grounds that the identification 
procedures were impermissibly suggestive.  After Jenkins pled 
guilty to the charge against him, Attorney Barrett withdrew this 
motion. 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
6 
 
the possibility of getting some benefit for some 
information that you know.  It is often possible to 
work out an arrangement where a defendant gets credit 
for what aid he gives to the police departments.  He 
might even get enough credit that the police would 
testify at a sentencing hearing so the defendant would 
not be sent to prison.  Assistant District Attorney 
Glamm is willing to work out some arrangement, but he 
insists that you take responsibility for your acts 
beforehand.  That is, acknowledge that it was you 
making the hand to hand buy from the police officers.  
If you then wish to work with officers from narcotics 
or vice, that can be arranged.  You would be debriefed 
and given use immunity for anything that you told to 
them.  They would then make arrests or get warrants 
leading to arrests.  If there were productive arrests 
from your information, you would be given credit.  You 
might be given a lot of credit if you further 
testified against perpetrators.  Bear in mind that all 
of this is predicated on acceptance of responsibility 
for the crime for which you were charged.   
¶11 Two months later, on February 24, 2003, Jenkins 
entered a guilty plea to the charge.  The plea agreement, which 
was the same as one offered to Jenkins through his first 
attorney, was that, in exchange for Jenkins' plea, the State 
would recommend 24 months initial confinement, 24 months 
extended supervision, and a $1000 fine, plus costs.  In the plea 
colloquy, the court specifically asked Jenkins if the State's 
recitation of this agreement was correct, and Jenkins answered 
that it was.5  The court then asked Jenkins if he understood the 
charges and penalties against him, and Jenkins replied that he 
                                                 
5 The court stated: 
THE COURT: 
Mr. Jenkins, has Miss Carrick correctly 
set forth what the State is required to 
recommend at the time of sentencing? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
7 
 
did.  He also said he understood that the court was not required 
to follow the State's recommendation on sentencing.  Jenkins 
then pled guilty to the charge of Delivery of a Controlled 
Substance-Heroin. 
¶12 Before accepting the plea, the court went through the 
rights that Jenkins was waiving and the elements of the crime.  
The court asked Jenkins if anybody had promised anything to get 
him 
to 
plead 
guilty, 
other 
than 
the 
State's 
promised 
recommendation on sentencing.  Jenkins replied, "No, they 
haven't."  Jenkins said that no one had threatened him.  Asked 
whether he was pleading guilty because he was guilty, Jenkins 
replied, "Totally." 
¶13 In discussing the basis for the charge, Jenkins told 
the court that he did not completely agree with the allegations 
in the criminal complaint.  He asserted that, unlike allegations 
in the complaint, he did not speak to the undercover officers 
during the drug buy.  When asked how delivery took place without 
any speaking, Jenkins replied that "there wasn't no need for 
talking.  It was already [understood] what they are there for." 
¶14 Near the end of the plea hearing, the court asked 
counsel whether Jenkins was "possible FDOATP material," meaning 
whether he was a candidate for the Felony Drug Offender 
Alternatives to Prison Program.  Attorney Barrett replied that 
he was asking for a 45-day adjournment because "[the defendant] 
has some people that he needs to talk to that may influence your 
judgment on sentencing."  He added, "I think that a presentence 
investigation may be of help to you as well."  The court then 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
8 
 
granted a two-month adjournment.  After a bailiff pointed out 
that Jenkins was already in the Dodge Correctional Institution 
on another offense, however, the court said: "He's already in 
Dodge. . . . So he won't be going to FDOATP, or, at least, I 
don't think they would ever take him." 
¶15 On April 19, 2003, shortly before the scheduled 
sentencing, Jenkins sent a new letter to Judge Lamelas.  He 
complained about a conspiracy against him.  He stated that it 
was his understanding that he would have to plead guilty to the 
charge in order to receive any type of benefit or relief in 
terms of an agreement.6  He also told the court that the plea he 
entered was not genuine or of his own free will, that he entered 
the guilty plea "for the purpose of mentally gaining [the 
court's] approval."  He told the court that he was "not guilty 
of these accusations."  Jenkins also complained about Attorney 
Barrett's representation and asked the circuit court to dismiss 
the case. 
¶16 When a sentencing hearing finally occurred on April 
28, defense counsel renewed a motion to adjourn it for 30 to 60 
days.  He offered the following two reasons: (1) an adjournment 
would not prejudice the State because Jenkins was currently 
                                                 
6 Jenkins wrote, "My understanding . . . [is that] I would 
half [sic] to plead guilty to the charge that was being held 
against me in order of receiving any type of benefit or relief 
in terms of an agreement, in this matter." 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
9 
 
incarcerated on another charge; and (2) Jenkins was hoping to 
cooperate with the State to help himself at sentencing.7 
¶17 Defense counsel then explained his efforts.  He said 
that he had approached Assistant District Attorney Glamm about 
the possibility of Jenkins' cooperation with law enforcement and 
was told that Jenkins would first have to accept responsibility 
for the charge.  Defense counsel told the court that Jenkins had 
accepted responsibility.  He said that after the plea hearing, 
the State made arrangements for two detectives to meet with 
Jenkins and that after this meeting, one of the detectives told 
defense counsel that Jenkins had "volumes of information; good 
information."  He said the detective advised counsel, however, 
that because Jenkins was incarcerated and would be unable to 
arrange a narcotics transaction, he would not be able to get any 
credit.  The detective told defense counsel that he would try to 
influence the liaison officer from the federal government to 
interview Jenkins.  With permission, defense counsel contacted a 
different assistant district attorney, a special prosecutor 
working with the federal government, who indicated that he would 
refer Jenkins' offer to three federal agencies.  He said the 
special prosecutor later told defense counsel that he was having 
trouble interesting the federal government because of its 
increased focus on terrorism.  The special prosecutor then told 
                                                 
7 The 
court indicated that it had an off-the-record 
conversation the week before with the parties, and during that 
conversation, the court indicated that it was disinclined to 
adjourn the sentencing hearing. 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
10 
 
defense counsel that he would refer the matter to a fourth 
federal agency.  As of the sentencing hearing, however, no 
federal agents had contacted Jenkins. 
¶18 Defense counsel asked for an adjournment of the 
sentencing hearing because it was unclear whether federal agents 
were not interested in talking to Jenkins or whether they simply 
did not have the time or resources to do so.  He made an offer 
of proof indicating that Jenkins had knowledge of a drug-dealing 
network that imported thousands of pounds of heroin from 
Nigeria.  He urged an adjournment, suggesting that the use of 
Jenkins' information would be an effective way to attack the 
heroin trade in Milwaukee. 
¶19 In response, the court asked defense counsel if he was 
"suggesting that the defendant entered a guilty plea because he 
had some sort of sense that he would definitely be working with 
authorities."  Barrett responded: 
I was suggesting that I told him that he would 
have to accept responsibility as the entry card to 
doing this work.  Mr. Glamm insisted on that. 
He said, ["]that's okay if I can get to talk to 
these people, I have a lot to tell them,["] and then I 
[Barrett] proceeded to do the debriefing so I could 
make an offer of proof.   I think in his mind 
. . . . [court interjects] 
he was not thinking that he would get out of 
everything, that maybe you would go along with Mr. 
Glamm on the recommendations or something like that, 
but it was more to get out of the business and that he 
would have some . . . good come of it, that you could 
consider it in making your sentencing.  Yes, Your 
Honor, I do believe that. 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
11 
 
 
¶20 The court did not grant an adjournment.  It reasoned 
that Jenkins had already been transported from prison to 
Milwaukee and had been incarcerated for about eight months since 
the offense, and that the authorities were apparently not 
interested in Jenkins' cooperation.  The court stated that, 
absent a showing that Jenkins' guilty plea was premised on the 
notion that there would be cooperation and that the failure of 
additional agents to meet with Jenkins constituted a breach of 
the plea agreement, it was not prepared to adjourn sentencing 
again.  Defense counsel Barrett replied that nothing was said at 
the plea hearing about Jenkins working with law enforcement 
officials as part of the plea agreement.  He stated that he did 
not have a good faith ability to move for a change in plea 
because he did not allude to any condition of cooperation on the 
record during the plea taking, but he suggested that Jenkins 
might want to make a motion. 
¶21 The court then reiterated the terms of the plea 
agreement 
and 
asked 
Jenkins 
if 
these 
terms 
were 
his 
understanding of the agreement.  Jenkins replied that they were, 
but then said he wanted to withdraw his plea.  The court asked 
Jenkins the basis of his request.  Jenkins replied: 
Stipulations that I'm not able to fulfill, what I 
had my projections on. I'm sure the federal agents 
were meaning to speak to me.   
 
Mr. Barrett has done a lot, you know, in regards 
to this, and it's on the basis, the sole basis is it 
was initially my part, my purpose of entering the plea 
that I entered which was a guilty plea, and I would 
just like to withdraw my plea. 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
12 
 
The court then asked Jenkins his understanding of what was going 
to happen when he entered a plea.  He replied: 
At least I would benefit, at least, you know, 
something, at least to, you know, be able to get out 
of the life I'm already in or I was involved in at the 
time.  And sort of, you know, they bring in at least 
to assist the state here, you know, from much of the 
troubles I've caused and the stress we place on 
Milwaukee, the police department here in this state, 
and sort of abolish this heroin that's flowing into 
the states and guns and everything else, so sort of 
just kind of get myself cleared up and get back on 
track. 
 
It's not too much about the time, you know.  It's 
not much time.  I've done, as you can read, I've done 
time before.  My point is just to get some changes, 
you know, with myself and help. 
¶22 The court denied Jenkins' motion to withdraw his plea.  
It stated: 
Mr. Jenkins, no one has a right to any kind of 
special treatment.  Sometimes a plea agreement is 
reached that has certain specific parts to it that 
require one party to do something or the other party 
to do something else.  And from what [defense counsel] 
has told me and what [the prosecutor] has told me, 
that was not part of the plea agreement that was 
reached here.  So you had a hope that did not come to 
fruition.  Nothing happened.  No one came to see you.  
But I don't see that that was a violation of a plea 
agreement; therefore, I will not permit you to vacate 
your plea and we will proceed to sentencing. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶23 The court then conducted a sentencing hearing and 
imposed a total sentence of eight years, with five years initial 
confinement and three years of extended supervision, plus a 
$500.00 fine. 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
13 
 
¶24 Jenkins filed a motion for post-conviction relief on 
two grounds: (1) the court erred when it denied Jenkins' request 
to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing; and (2) Jenkins 
was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel when trial counsel failed to move for plea withdrawal 
before sentencing.  Jenkins later filed a supplemental motion on 
a third ground: manifest injustice, because Jenkins' guilty plea 
was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  As part of his 
claim of manifest injustice, Jenkins argued that (1) he did not 
understand the terms of the plea agreement; (2) he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel 
failed to adequately explain the terms of the plea agreement; 
and (3) his plea was not knowing and voluntary because the court 
failed to inform him during the plea colloquy that Wisconsin's 
Truth in Sentencing legislation mandates that he serve each day 
of confinement imposed by the court. 
¶25 The circuit court denied the parts of Jenkins' motion 
based on grounds that there was a fair and just reason for plea 
withdrawal, that he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel, and that a manifest injustice occurred because he 
misunderstood the terms of the plea agreement.8 
                                                 
8 The court held in abeyance Jenkins' claim that a manifest 
injustice occurred when the court failed to inform him of the 
Truth in Sentencing requirement.  The circuit court held this 
claim in abeyance, pending our decision in State v. Uhde, whose 
certification from the court of appeals we later vacated.  State 
v. Uhde, 2004 WI 138, 276 Wis. 2d 31, 689 N.W.2d 59.  The 
circuit court later denied this claim, and Jenkins appealed.  
The defendant did not raise the issue on appeal of whether his 
plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered when the court failed 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
14 
 
¶26 Jenkins appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, 
holding that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion when it denied Jenkins' presentence motion to 
withdraw his plea.  State v. Jenkins, 2006 WI App 28, ¶19, 289 
Wis. 2d 523, 710 N.W.2d 502.  The court of appeals determined 
that Jenkins "had a genuine misunderstanding about whether he 
would be guaranteed an opportunity to work with law enforcement 
to potentially receive a benefit at sentencing." Id., ¶24.  The 
court of appeals said that Jenkins’ misunderstanding was 
corroborated with 
undisputed, substantial evidence in the 
record.  Id.  The court declared that the circuit court erred 
when it considered Jenkins’ reason for plea withdrawal in terms 
of a breach of plea agreement and not in terms of a 
misunderstanding of the plea.  See id., ¶25.  Because the court 
of appeals held that Jenkins had a fair and just reason to 
withdraw his plea before sentencing, it did not address the 
other two issues of ineffective assistance of counsel and 
manifest injustice.  Id., ¶1. 
¶27 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on June 14, 2006. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. 
General Principles and Standard of Review 
 
¶28 In 1991 this court stated that "[t]he appropriate and 
applicable law" when a defendant seeks to withdraw his plea 
before sentencing is that the "defendant should be allowed to 
                                                                                                                                                             
to inform him that he must serve every day of his initial 
confinement. 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
15 
 
withdraw a guilty plea for any fair and just reason, unless the 
prosecution would be substantially prejudiced."  Canedy, 161 
Wis. 2d at 582.  In 1995 the court said a circuit court should 
"freely allow a defendant to withdraw his plea prior to 
sentencing if it finds any fair and just reason for withdrawal, 
unless the prosecution has been substantially prejudiced by 
reliance on the defendant's plea."  State v. Garcia, 192 
Wis. 2d 845, 861, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995).  In 1999 the court said 
that where a defendant moves to withdraw his plea before 
sentencing, "the circuit court is to look only for a fair and 
just reason and freely allow the withdrawal."  State v. Kivioja, 
225 Wis. 2d 271, 287, 592 N.W.2d 220 (1999).  In 2000 the court, 
citing Garcia, said that the circuit court "should freely allow 
a defendant to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing for any 
fair 
and 
just 
reason, 
unless 
the 
prosecution 
will 
be 
substantially prejudiced."  Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶28 (citing 
Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 861). 
 
¶29 Although in recent years the court has consistently 
articulated 
a 
liberal 
rule 
for 
plea 
withdrawal 
before 
sentencing, it has not consistently allowed plea withdrawal in 
its cases.  The overriding reason is that the decision to grant 
or deny "the motion to withdraw the plea rests within the sound 
discretion of the circuit court."  Kivioja, 225 Wis. 2d at 302 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); see Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 
¶28.  This discretion gives the circuit court latitude in 
assessing the defendant's reason and determining whether it is 
fair and just under the circumstances. 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
16 
 
 
¶30 A circuit court's discretionary decision to grant or 
deny a motion to withdraw a plea before sentencing is subject to 
review under the erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  
Kivioja, 225 Wis. 2d at 284.  All that "this court need find to 
sustain a discretionary act is that the circuit court examined 
the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using 
a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable 
judge 
could 
reach." 
 
Loy 
v. 
Bunderson, 
107 
Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982); see Kivioja, 225 
Wis. 2d at 284 (citing State v. Salentine, 206 Wis. 2d 419, 429-
30, 557 N.W.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1996)).  In Canedy, the court said 
it would affirm the circuit court's decision as long as it was 
demonstrably "'made and based upon the facts appearing in the 
record and in reliance on the appropriate or applicable law.'"  
Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 579 (quoting Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d at 66).  
 
¶31 A "fair and just reason" has never been precisely 
defined.  State v. Shimek, 230 Wis. 2d 730, 739, 601 N.W.2d 865 
(Ct. App. 1999).  Indeed, the fair and just reason standard 
"lack[s] any pretense of scientific exactness."  United States 
v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 220 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 1013 (1975).  This court has said that the term 
contemplates "the mere showing of some adequate reason for the 
defendant's change of heart," Libke v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 121, 
128, 208 N.W.2d 331 (1973), and that "the exercise of discretion 
requires the [circuit] court to take a liberal, rather than a 
rigid, view of the reasons given for plea withdrawal."  Bollig, 
232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶29.  Nonetheless, "[w]hether a defendant's 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
17 
 
reason adequately explains his or her change of heart is up to 
the discretion of the circuit court."  Kivioja, 225 Wis. 2d at 
284 (citing Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 584). 
¶32 Withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing is not 
an absolute right.9  Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 583.  The defendant 
has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he has a fair and just reason.  Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 862; 
Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 583-84.  The reason must be something 
other than the desire to have a trial, Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 
583, or belated misgivings about the plea.  See Tucker v. United 
States, 470 F.2d 220, 221 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 
U.S. 929 (1973). 
¶33 On review of the circuit court's decision, we apply a 
deferential, clearly erroneous standard to the court's findings 
of evidentiary or historical fact.  State v. Turner, 136 
Wis. 2d 333, 343, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987).  The standard also 
applies 
to 
credibility 
determinations. 
 
Cf. 
Canedy, 
161 
Wis. 2d at 579; Dudrey v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 480, 483, 247 
N.W.2d 105 (1976).  In reviewing factual determinations as part 
of a review of discretion, we look to whether the court has 
examined the relevant facts and whether the court's examination 
is supported by the record.  State v. Shanks, 152 Wis. 2d 284, 
289, 448 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1989). 
                                                 
9 When the defendant establishes the denial of a relevant 
constitutional right, withdrawal of the plea is a matter of 
right and the court has no discretion in the matter.  State v. 
Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 139, 569 N.W.2d 577 (1997).   
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
18 
 
¶34 When there are no issues of fact or credibility in 
play, the question whether the defendant has offered a fair and 
just reason becomes a question of law that we review de novo.  
To illustrate, a defendant's genuine misunderstanding of the 
consequences of a plea is a fair and just reason to withdraw his 
plea.  See Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 862; Dudrey, 74 Wis. 2d at 
405.  But whether such a misunderstanding actually exists is a 
question of fact, and the circuit court's determination depends 
heavily on whether the court finds the defendant's testimony or 
other evidence credible and persuasive.  If "the circuit court 
does not believe the defendant's asserted reasons for withdrawal 
of the plea, there is no fair and just reason to allow 
withdrawal of the plea."  Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 863. 
¶35 Where the circuit court provides an inadequate account 
to show an application of the facts to the proper legal 
standard, we "independently review the record to determine 
whether the trial court's decision can be sustained when the 
facts are applied to the applicable law."  Libke, 60 Wis. 2d at 
129; Shanks, 152 Wis. 2d at 289.  This review is evidence of an 
appellate 
court's 
desire 
to 
uphold 
a 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary decision if there is good justification for the 
decision present in the record. 
¶36 In her dissent in Kivioja, Chief Justice Abrahamson 
wrote: "The court of appeals certified the present case to this 
court because it perceived inconsistencies in certain Wisconsin 
appellate decisions interpreting and applying the 'any fair and 
just 
reason' 
standard." 
 
Kivioja, 
225 
Wis. 2d at 
302 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
19 
 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  This inconsistency appears to 
exist not only among opinions but also within opinions, making 
the law governing plea withdrawal before sentencing difficult to 
apply. 
B. 
History of the Fair and Just Reason Standard 
¶37 This court first adopted the fair and just reason 
standard, proposed by the American Bar Association (ABA) Project 
on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, in 1967.  See State 
v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967).  At that time, 
the ABA's tentative draft provided that "[b]efore sentence, the 
court in its discretion may allow the defendant to withdraw his 
plea for any fair and just reason unless the prosecution has 
been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's 
plea."  Id. at 385 n.2 (quoting American Bar Association Project 
on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice——Pleas of Guilty § 2.1 
(Tentative Draft, Feb., 1967)) (emphasis added). 
¶38 This language becomes clearer when it is placed in the 
context of the broader rule: 
2.1 Plea Withdrawal 
 
(a) The court should allow the defendant to 
withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere 
whenever the defendant, upon a timely motion for 
withdrawal, proves that withdrawal is necessary to 
correct a manifest injustice. . . .  
(b) In the absence of a showing that withdrawal 
is necessary to correct a manifest injustice, a 
defendant may not withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere as a matter of right once the plea has been 
accepted by the court.  Before sentence, the court in 
its discretion may allow the defendant to withdraw his 
plea 
for 
any 
fair 
and 
just 
reason 
unless 
the 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
20 
 
prosecution 
has 
been 
substantially 
prejudiced 
by 
reliance upon the defendant's plea. 
American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for 
Criminal Justice——Pleas of Guilty § 2.1 (Tentative Draft, Feb. 
1967) (emphasis added); see Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d at 385 n.2. 
¶39 In Libke (1973) and Dudrey (1976), we applied the 
ABA's 1968 approved draft (which was in pertinent part the same 
as the tentative draft), but instead of providing that the court 
may allow the plea withdrawal, we used the word "should" in our 
analysis: (1) "[W]e are convinced that the trial court applied 
the wrong standard [manifest injustice] and since the defendant 
did present a 'fair and just reason' to permit a plea 
withdrawal, the defendant should have been permitted to withdraw 
his guilty plea."  Libke, 60 Wis. 2d at 129.  (2) "Under this 
[ABA 2.1(b)] standard, leave to withdraw a guilty plea should be 
freely granted prior to sentencing where there is a fair and 
just reason for doing so presented by the defendant."  Dudrey, 
74 Wis. 2d at 482. 
¶40 In 1979 the ABA standard was revised to read as 
follows: "After entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and 
before sentence, the court should allow the defendant to 
withdraw the plea for any fair and just reason unless the 
prosecution has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon 
the defendant's plea."  See Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 581 (quoting 
American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for 
Criminal Justice——Pleas of Guilty § 14-2.1 (1979)).   
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
21 
 
¶41 The commentary on the new ABA standard noted that 
"[t]his change from [may to should] reflects the belief that 
prior to sentencing, when there is a basis for the defendant’s 
motion and the absence of compelling prosecutorial reason for 
its denial, withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere 
normally should be allowed."  Id. at 582 (citing Note, American 
Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal 
Justice——Pleas of Guilty § 14-2.1 (1979)).  This commentary 
appears to reject the commentary to the 1968 rule, which reads 
in part: 
There does not appear to be any good reason for 
allowing withdrawal as a matter of right, absent a 
showing of manifest injustice, once the court has 
accepted the plea. 
 
The 
standard 
does 
recognize 
the 
generally 
acknowledged 
discretion 
of 
the 
judge 
to 
permit 
withdrawal before sentence even in the absence of a 
manifest injustice.  This is a matter solely within 
the discretion of the judge; he may but need not grant 
the motion. 
American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for 
Criminal Justice——Pleas of Guilty § 2.1(b) (Approved Draft, 
1968). 
¶42 There is no dispute that the shift from "may" to 
"should" constituted movement toward a more lenient standard of 
presentence plea withdrawal.  At the same time, however, this 
court never abandoned the "discretion" that was so prominent in 
the 1967-68 rule.  We emphasized the trial court's discretion in 
Libke, 60 Wis. 2d at 126-27 (quoting United States v. Fernandez, 
428 F.2d 578, 580 (2d Cir., 1970)); see also Libke, 60 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
22 
 
Wis. 2d at 129 (Hansen, Robert W., J., concurring); Dudrey, 74 
Wis. 2d at 482-83 (withdrawal is a determination "addressed to 
the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed 
only for an abuse of that discretion"); and Canedy, 161 
Wis. 2d at 579, 584, 586.  "Discretion" appears to temper "fair 
and just reason" in all our cases. 
C. 
Application of the Fair and Just Reason Standard 
¶43 On the surface, the language and history of the fair 
and just reason standard suggest that a defendant is required to 
meet a relatively low burden to justify plea withdrawal before 
sentence.  In actual application, however, the burden has been 
more difficult.  Upon a motion to withdraw a plea before 
sentencing, the defendant faces three obstacles.  First, the 
defendant must proffer a fair and just reason for withdrawing 
his plea.  Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 583-84.  Not every reason will 
qualify as a fair and just reason.  Second, the defendant must 
proffer a fair and just reason that the circuit court finds 
credible.  Id. at 585.  In other words, the circuit court must 
believe that the defendant's proffered reason actually exists.  
Id.  Third, the defendant must rebut evidence of substantial 
prejudice to the State.  Id. at 582. 
¶44 If the defendant does not overcome these obstacles in 
the view of the circuit court, and is therefore not permitted to 
withdraw his plea, the defendant's burden to reverse the circuit 
court on appeal becomes relatively high.  This is so because, on 
appeal, the defendant has two additional and substantial 
obstacles.  The first obstacle is the applicable standard of 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
23 
 
review, which requires the reviewing court to affirm the circuit 
court’s decision unless it is clearly erroneous.  The second 
obstacle is the extensive plea colloquy required of circuit 
courts.  The plea colloquy is designed to secure a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary plea from the defendant and a 
developed record from which reviewing courts may evaluate the 
circuit court's decision. 
¶45 We discuss each of these latter two obstacles in turn.   
1. 
Standard of Review 
¶46 As we previously noted, under the erroneous exercise 
of discretion standard of review, the reviewing court upholds 
the circuit court's factual and credibility determinations if 
there is support for them in the record.  Moreover, even if the 
circuit court misapplies the law or inadequately explains the 
reasons for its decision, the reviewing court must independently 
review the record to find support for the circuit court's 
decision if the justification is there.  Shanks, 152 Wis. 2d at 
289.   
¶47 A review of the applicable plea withdrawal cases 
reveals that, under this standard of review, reviewing courts 
are likely to affirm the circuit court's decision either to 
grant or deny a motion to withdraw a plea.  For example, in 
State v. Manke, 230 Wis. 2d 421, 602 N.W.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1999), 
the court affirmed the circuit court's decision to grant the 
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.  In that case, the 
State argued that the circuit court failed to identify the 
specific fair and just reason it relied on when granting Manke's 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
24 
 
motion.  Id. at 428.  The court of appeals responded that it was 
"obliged to search the record for facts supporting the court's 
discretionary act."  Id.  After searching the record for 
evidence of misleading advice from the defendant's attorney and 
the defendant's misunderstanding of the plea, the court was 
"convinced that the record support[ed] the trial court's 
conclusion that Manke presented a fair and just reason."  Id. at 
430.   
¶48 Reviewing courts have been equally supportive of a 
circuit court's decision to deny a defendant's motion for plea 
withdrawal.  See, e.g., Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561; Kivioja, 225 
Wis. 2d 271; Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845; Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d 565; 
Dudrey, 74 Wis. 2d 480; State v. McKnight, 65 Wis. 2d 582, 223 
N.W.2d 550 (1974); State v. Leitner, 2001 WI App 172, 247 
Wis. 2d 195, 633 N.W.2d 207. 
¶49 Reviewing courts have reversed a circuit court's 
decision where the circuit court applied the wrong legal 
standard or where there was a defect with the plea questionnaire 
and plea colloquy.  See, e.g., Libke, 60 Wis. 2d 121; Shanks, 
152 Wis. 2d 284.  For example, in Libke, the circuit court 
denied the defendant's presentence motion to withdraw his plea 
while incorrectly applying the manifest injustice standard 
instead of the fair and just reason standard.  Libke, 60 
Wis. 2d at 128.  We reversed the circuit court's decision after 
finding in the record that the defendant had presented a fair 
and just reason for plea withdrawal.  Id. at 129.  Notably, we 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
25 
 
never assessed whether the circuit court found that reason 
incredible.   
¶50 In Shanks, the court of appeals reversed the circuit 
court's denial of a plea withdrawal motion where the defendant 
proffered the following reasons: "[d]enial of intent during the 
plea colloquy, coercive action by defense counsel, haste and 
confusion in the plea taking, and a prompt motion to withdraw."  
Shanks, 152 Wis. 2d at 291.  In that case, the record indicated 
several defects with the plea questionnaire and the plea 
colloquy: One, the plea questionnaire indicated that the 
defendant intended to plead guilty to a different charge than 
the one before the court.  Id.  Two, during the plea colloquy, 
the defendant pled guilty to a charge not before the court.  Id.  
Three, during a discussion with the circuit court concerning the 
elements of the charge, the defendant denied the element of 
intent.  Id.  These defects, made apparent by the record, 
warranted a reversal of the circuit court's denial of the 
defendant's plea withdrawal motion.  Id. at 292.   
¶51 The Shanks case is a prime illustration of the 
importance of the plea colloquy and its developed record, which 
gives courts a good opportunity to review the circuit court's 
decision to grant or deny a motion for plea withdrawal.   
2. 
History and Development of the Plea Colloquy 
¶52 We now turn to the plea colloquy and its history to 
show how the increasing duties imposed on the circuit court to 
ensure the defendant's understanding of the plea, have prompted 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
26 
 
an evolution in the meaning of a fair and just reason for 
presentence plea withdrawal.   
¶53 More than 40 years ago, in State v. Strickland, 27 
Wis. 2d 623, 135 N.W.2d 295 (1965), this court held that the 
circuit court had no duty to inquire into the defendant's 
understanding of his pleas during a plea colloquy.  In that 
case, the defendant argued that his guilty pleas were not 
intelligently and understandingly made because the circuit court 
did not inquire of the defendant personally whether he had 
intelligently and understandingly entered his pleas.  Id. at 
631.  Defendant's counsel asserted that federal courts, in 
accordance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, interrogate the accused at the arraignment even 
though the accused is represented by counsel.  Id. at 631 n.2. 
¶54 This 
court 
replied 
that 
such 
inquiries 
were 
unnecessary where the defendant is represented by counsel.  Id.  
The court stated: 
Courts have the right to assume in such a situation 
that 
counsel 
has 
fulfilled 
his 
duty 
of 
proper 
representation by fully explaining to the accused the 
nature of the offense charged, the range of penalties, 
and possible defenses thereto, and satisfying himself 
that the accused understands such explanations, before 
permitting the accused to authorize the entry of a 
plea of guilty.  There is no allegation in defendant's 
motion that this was not done. 
 
We deem it inadvisable to lay down a rule that 
trial courts must, in every case, where an accused is 
represented by counsel at time of entering a plea, 
before accepting the plea interrogate defendant to 
make sure that the defendant has understandingly and 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
27 
 
intelligently entered the plea.  However, we recommend 
that such practice be adopted.   
Id. at 631-32 (emphasis added). 
¶55 Four years later in 1969, this court did mandate such 
a practice.  Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 661, 170 N.W.2d 713 
(1969), abrogated by State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986).  In Ernst, this court overruled the Strickland 
"assumption" and mandated that the circuit courts follow the 
practice suggested in State ex rel. Burnett v. Burke, 22 
Wis. 2d 486, 494, 126 N.W.2d 91 (1964).  Ernst, 43 Wis. 2d at 
674.  The court mandated that circuit courts have a duty to do 
the following and make a record thereof: 
1. 
To determine the extent of the defendant's 
education and general comprehension. 
2. 
To establish the accused's understanding of 
the nature of the crime with which he is charged and 
the range of punishments which it carries. 
3. 
To ascertain whether any promises or threats 
have 
been 
made 
to 
him 
in 
connection 
with 
his 
appearance, his refusal of counsel, and his proposed 
plea of guilty. 
4. 
To alert the accused to the possibility that 
a 
lawyer 
may 
discover 
defenses 
or 
mitigating 
circumstances which would not be apparent to a layman 
such as the accused. 
5. 
To make sure that the defendant understands 
that if a pauper, counsel will be provided at no 
expense to him.   
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
28 
 
Id.  The Ernst court also added a sixth requirement that the 
trial judge personally determine whether a factual basis exists 
to support the plea.10  Id. 
¶56 In Bangert, we overruled language from prior cases 
that indicated that plea colloquy procedures are mandated by the 
United States Constitution.11  However, the Bangert court did 
                                                 
10 The second and sixth duties have been codified.  § 63, 
ch. 255, Laws of 1969.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) and (b) 
read as follows: 
971.08 
 
Pleas 
of 
guilty 
and 
no 
contest; 
withdrawal thereof.  (1) Before the court accepts a 
plea of guilty or no contest, it shall do all of the 
following: 
(a) Address 
the 
defendant 
personally 
and 
determine that the plea is made voluntarily with 
understanding 
of 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
charge 
and 
potential punishment if convicted. 
(b) Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged. 
11 In State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 257, 389 N.W.2d 12 
(1986), we explained that Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 
(1969), "merely sets forth the constitutional standard that 
there must be an affirmative showing . . . that the plea was 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made."  Therefore, in 
Bangert, we held that defendants do not have a constitutional 
right to withdraw a plea merely because the circuit court failed 
to ascertain his understanding of the nature of the charge on 
the record during the plea colloquy.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 
273.  Rather, under a new two-step process, the reviewing court 
may review evidence outside the plea colloquy record that 
substantiates that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made.  
Id. at 274-75.  One of the effects of this ruling is that it 
prevents "a defendant [who] does understand the charge and the 
effects of his plea . . . [from] gam[ing] the system by taking 
advantage of judicial mistakes."  State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, 
¶37, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906. 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
29 
 
"not discard the mandatory requirement that trial judges 
undertake a personal colloquy with the defendant to ascertain 
his understanding of the nature of the charge."  Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 260.  The court viewed that duty as a statutory 
requirement under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1).  Id. 
¶57 The Bangert court also expanded the judicial duties 
under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a), which requires the court to 
determine that the plea is voluntary.  The circuit court must 
"do more than merely record the defendant's affirmation of 
understanding pursuant to sec. 971.08(1)(a)."  Id. at 267.  The 
circuit court must determine a defendant's understanding of the 
nature of the charge.  Id. at 268.  
¶58 The Bangert court also added a seventh duty for the 
circuit court, to "inform the defendant of the constitutional 
rights which he will be waiving, or to ascertain that the 
defendant possesses such knowledge."  Id. at 272.   
¶59 Since 
Bangert, 
the 
court 
has 
articulated 
three 
additional duties in the plea colloquy for circuit courts.  See 
State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶35, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 
N.W.2d 906.  Thus, the duties imposed upon circuit courts during 
the plea colloquy have expanded significantly.  Understanding 
that a plea of guilty is a conviction, not a mere confession, 
see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969), we require 
elaborate 
plea 
colloquies 
to 
"demonstrate 
the 
critical 
importance of pleas in our system of justice."  Brown, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, ¶23.   
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
30 
 
¶60 The effect of more elaborate and comprehensive plea 
colloquies is to ensure that pleas are knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.  Id., ¶23.  The corresponding impact, however, is to 
make it more difficult for defendants to withdraw their pleas.  
Unlike circuit courts at the time of Strickland, circuit courts 
today are expected to develop an extensive record related to the 
defendant's 
personal 
understanding 
of 
the 
plea. 
 
This 
undertaking has changed the notion that guilty pleas are merely 
tentative until after sentence.12  As long as circuit courts 
follow the court mandated and statutory requirements during plea 
colloquies, defendants will ordinarily have difficulty showing a 
fair and just reason for plea withdrawal if the reason is based 
on grounds that were adequately addressed in the plea colloquy.13 
                                                 
12 See 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure 
§ 21.5(a), at 196 (2d ed. 1999), which states: 
Given the great care with which guilty pleas are now 
taken——including placing the plea agreement on the 
record, making full inquiry into the voluntariness of 
the plea, advising the defendant in detail concerning 
his 
rights 
and 
the 
consequences 
of 
his 
plea, 
determining 
that 
the 
defendant 
understands 
these 
matters, and determining that the plea is accurate——
there is no reason to view pleas so taken as merely 
"tentative," subject to withdrawal before sentence 
whenever the government cannot establish prejudice. 
Id. 
13 For illustrations of reliance on the record of the 
plea colloquy, see State v. Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d 565, 578-
79, 585, 469 N.W.2d 163 (1991), and Dudrey, 74 Wis. 2d at 
484-85. 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
31 
 
 
¶61 The evolution in the meaning of a fair and just reason 
for plea withdrawal tracks the policy basis for allowing the 
withdrawal of pleas before sentencing.  This policy basis was 
carefully set out in Libke: 
 
The liberal rule for withdrawal of a guilty plea 
before sentence is consistent with the efficient 
administration of criminal justice.  It reduces the 
number 
of 
appeals 
contesting 
the 
"knowing 
and 
voluntariness" of a guilty plea, and avoids the 
difficulties of disentangling such claims.  It also 
ensures that a defendant is not denied a right to 
trial by jury unless he clearly waives it. 
Libke, 60 Wis. 2d at 127-28 (quoting United States v. Young, 424 
F.2d 1276, 1279 (3d Cir. 1970)).  This rationale was repeated in 
Shanks, 152 Wis. 2d at 288, and Shimek, 230 Wis. 2d at 739. 
 
¶62 A fair and just reason for plea withdrawal before 
sentence will always be subject to case-by-case analysis.  As a 
general rule, a fair and just reason for plea withdrawal before 
sentence will likely exist if the defendant shows that the 
circuit court failed to conform to its statutory or other 
mandatory duties in the plea colloquy, and the defendant asserts 
misunderstanding because of it.  In such a circumstance, the 
State may show that it has been prejudiced, in which case the 
court will have to decide whether the deficiency in the plea 
colloquy compromised the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
nature of the defendant's plea.  Cf. State v. Van Camp, 213 
Wis. 2d 131, 139, 569 N.W.2d 577 (1997).  A defendant may 
proffer a fair and just reason, including misunderstanding and 
changed circumstances, based on matters outside the plea 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
32 
 
colloquy record.  When the plea colloquy is sufficient, however, 
the defendant's fair and just reason should rely on matters 
outside the plea colloquy record or be able to show why it is 
fair and just to disregard the solemn answers the defendant gave 
in the colloquy.  A failure to recognize the implications of a 
valid plea colloquy would "debase[ ] the judicial proceeding at 
which a defendant pleads and the court accepts its plea."  
United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 676 (1997). 
¶63 A fair and just reason to withdraw a plea before 
sentence does not depend upon either a deficient plea colloquy 
or 
the 
existence 
of 
a 
constitutionally 
invalid 
plea.  
Nevertheless, because a fair and just reason will nullify both a 
sufficient plea colloquy and a constitutionally valid plea, the 
court may consider whether the proffered fair and just reason 
outweighs the efficient administration of justice. 
D. 
Application of the Fair and Just Reason Standard to this 
Case 
¶64 We now review the circuit court's decision in this 
case, bearing in mind the standard of review and use of the 
record to support the circuit court's decision. 
¶65 Jenkins had a lengthy criminal history when he 
appeared before the court at his sentencing hearing and 
attempted to withdraw his plea.  He had been convicted of two 
prior felonies, had his parole revoked, and had established a 
record of violence against both family and strangers.  From the 
beginning of this case, Jenkins had been represented by counsel.  
He had several months to consider a plea agreement offered by 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
33 
 
the State.  On February 24, 2003, he accepted that agreement——
pleading guilty to selling heroin, a third felony——after 
participating in a thorough plea colloquy with the court.  After 
the plea, he was returned to the Dodge Correctional Institution 
on a prior offense.   
¶66 Before the sentencing hearing and two months after 
entering his plea, Jenkins received and examined a presentence 
investigation (PSI) that described the offense, the defendant's 
admission 
of 
that 
offense, 
the 
defendant's 
admission 
of 
extensive 
drug 
dealing, 
and 
the 
defendant's 
nickname 
of 
"Streetwise," as well as the PSI writer's recommendation of five 
to seven years in prison, plus one to two years of extended 
supervision.  Hence, before the sentencing hearing, Jenkins knew 
that the PSI recommended a prison sentence at least two-and-a-
half times what the prosecutor was pledged to recommend. 
¶67 At the sentencing hearing, Jenkins' counsel asked for 
another 30 to 60 days of postponement to see whether federal 
authorities would decide to meet with Jenkins.  Jenkins' counsel 
had already debriefed Jenkins and supplied the Milwaukee County 
District Attorney's office with a summary of information that 
Jenkins was prepared to discuss.  At the request of one 
prosecutor, two Milwaukee police detectives met with Jenkins.  
Another prosecutor encouraged federal authorities to talk with 
Jenkins, but they never accepted the invitation.  Consequently, 
the court decided not to postpone sentencing again. 
¶68 Jenkins then moved to withdraw his plea.  When the 
court asked him the basis for his request, he proffered the 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
34 
 
following reason: "Stipulations that I'm not able to fulfill, 
what I had my projections on.  I'm sure the federal agents were 
meaning to speak to me."  In response to the court's question of 
his understanding of what was going to happen when he entered a 
plea, Jenkins replied: 
At least I would benefit, at least, you know, 
something, at least to, you know, be able to get out 
of the life I'm already in or I was involved in at the 
time.  And sort of, you know, they bring in at least 
to assist the state here, you know, from much of the 
troubles I've caused and the stress we place on 
Milwaukee, the police department here in this state, 
and sort of abolish this heroin that's flowing into 
the states and guns and everything else, so sort of 
just kind of get myself cleared up and get back on 
track. 
 
It's not too much about the time, you know.  It's 
not much time.  I've done, as you can read, I've done 
time before.  My point is just to get some changes, 
you know, with myself and help. 
¶69 To that response, the court told Jenkins that it was 
not going to permit Jenkins to withdraw his plea.  The court 
reasoned that Jenkins "had a hope that did not come to 
fruition."  Because there was no breach of the plea agreement, 
the court did not allow Jenkins to withdraw his plea.   
¶70 On appeal, Jenkins argues that the circuit court's 
decision should be reversed because it applied the wrong legal 
standard by considering Jenkins' request for plea withdrawal in 
the context of a breach of a plea agreement, rather than in the 
context of his misunderstanding the consequences of the plea.  
Jenkins argues that the circuit court focused on whether the 
opportunity to work with law enforcement was part of the plea 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
35 
 
agreement 
instead 
of 
whether 
Jenkins 
believed 
that 
the 
opportunity to work with law enforcement was part of the plea 
agreement.  We see this argument as without merit. 
¶71 First, Jenkins did not proffer a fair and just reason 
at the time of his motion for plea withdrawal.  "[T]he burden is 
on the defendant to offer a fair and just reason for withdrawal 
of the plea."  Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 583-84.  Jenkins did not 
plainly assert that he misunderstood the consequences of the 
plea.  Jenkins asserted that he wanted to withdraw his plea 
because of stipulations that he could not fulfill and because of 
his "projections."  Disappointment and unfulfilled hopes are not 
the same as a misunderstanding of the consequences of the plea.  
See Leitner, 247 Wis. 2d 195, ¶33; Dudrey, 74 Wis. 2d at 486.   
¶72 Even after the court explicitly asked Jenkins at 
sentencing about his understanding of what was going to happen 
when he entered a plea, he did not assert that he thought his 
cooperation 
with 
law 
enforcement 
would 
lead 
to 
definite 
sentencing benefits.  Nor did he assert that anyone had told him 
that his plea would guarantee an opportunity to work with law 
enforcement.  Instead, Jenkins discussed how he wanted to help 
the community through his cooperation and help himself by 
getting out of the life he was living.  Had Jenkins and his 
attorney actually had an agreement with authorities, they would 
have found some way to memorialize the agreement off the record.  
Jenkins' imprisonment for eight months before the plea made his 
active cooperation with authorities virtually impossible.   
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
36 
 
¶73 Second, even if we assume that Jenkins alleged a 
misunderstanding of the plea, the circuit court still had to 
find that this misunderstanding actually existed.  See Dudrey, 
74 Wis. 2d at 485.  The circuit court did not explicitly state 
during the motion for plea withdrawal that it did not believe 
that Jenkins misunderstood the consequences of his plea, but the 
court rejected the proffered misunderstanding when it stated 
that Jenkins simply had a "hope that did not come to fruition."  
The circuit court made this statement right after it heard 
Jenkins explain what he thought was going to happen. 
¶74 The circuit court's statement supports the inference 
that the circuit court found that Jenkins understood the 
consequences of the plea and simply took his chances on whether 
he would be able to meet with law enforcement and benefit from 
that encounter.  See Dudrey, 74 Wis. 2d at 486.  Like the 
defendant in Dudrey, when Jenkins realized that his chances had 
passed, he decided to withdraw his plea.  See id.  As we have 
stated, "[t]he defendant must show some reason more than a mere 
desire to have a trial."  Id.  There must be some fair and just 
reason for a "change of heart."  In its post-conviction 
decision, the circuit court explicitly found that Jenkins did 
not misunderstand the consequences of his plea. 
¶75 Third, even if we were to accept Jenkins' argument 
that the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard by not 
considering 
his 
plea 
withdrawal 
in 
the 
context 
of 
a 
misunderstanding of the plea, we must still "independently 
review the record to determine whether the [circuit] court's 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
37 
 
decision can be sustained when the facts are applied to the 
applicable law."  Shanks, 152 Wis. 2d at 289.   
¶76 When we review the record, especially the plea 
colloquy, we find evidence to support a finding that Jenkins did 
not misunderstand the consequences of his plea. 
¶77 In the plea colloquy, the State recited the terms of 
the plea agreement: "The State is recommending 24 months initial 
confinement, 24 months extended supervision, a thousand dollars 
fine, plus costs."  The court asked Jenkins: "[H]as [the State] 
correctly set forth what the State is required to recommend at 
the time of sentencing?"  Jenkins replied, "Yes."   
¶78 Jenkins' 
affirmative 
response 
indicates 
that 
he 
understood what the State would recommend in exchange for his 
plea.  The State's recommendation did not include any benefit 
conditioned on 
Jenkins' cooperation with law enforcement.  
Significantly, Attorney Barrett made a revealing statement about 
the plea agreement at the beginning of the plea hearing, when he 
said: "It wasn't much of a negotiation."  Attorney Barrett's 
statement reinforces the fact that Jenkins' cooperation with law 
enforcement was not part of the plea agreement. 
¶79 The circuit court also warned Jenkins that it was not 
required to follow the State's recommendation: 
THE COURT: 
Mr. Jenkins, the State is required at 
the time of sentencing to make the 
recommendation 
that 
you 
heard 
[the 
State] describe in court.  I want you 
to understand that I am not required to 
follow that recommendation.  I could 
impose any penalty up to the maximum 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
38 
 
allowed by law.  Do you understand what 
I am saying? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
Jenkins' affirmative response indicated that he understood that 
regardless of any plea agreement, the court was not required to 
follow the State's recommendation at sentencing.  Thus, Jenkins 
understood that even if he had been able to fully cooperate with 
law enforcement and earn more favorable comment, the court did 
not have to follow the State's recommendation.   
 
¶80 The court also inquired whether anyone had promised 
Jenkins something to get Jenkins to plead guilty: 
THE COURT: 
Other than what the State has agreed to 
recommend, has anybody promised you 
anything to get you to plead guilty 
here today? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, they haven't. 
THE COURT: 
Has anybody threatened you to get you 
to plead guilty? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am. 
THE COURT: 
Are you pleading guilty because you are 
guilty? 
THE DEFENDANT: Totally. 
Jenkins' responses demonstrate that Jenkins did not believe that 
the State, his lawyer, or any law enforcement official promised 
him anything beyond the plea bargain to induce him to plead 
guilty.   
¶81 The record of the plea colloquy also indicates that 
the court followed its other statutory and court-mandated 
duties.  First, the court established Jenkins' understanding of 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
39 
 
the charge against him by referring to the guilty plea 
questionnaire and the jury instructions for the crime of 
Delivery 
of 
a 
Controlled 
Substance. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a); Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶35.  The 
court informed Jenkins of the range of punishment he was facing.  
See id. 
 
¶82 The court also established the factual basis for 
Jenkins' 
plea. 
 See Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b); Brown, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, ¶35.  When the court asked Jenkins if he agreed 
with the allegations in the complaint, Jenkins explained that he 
did not agree that he spoke to the undercover officers during 
the delivery.  After hearing Jenkins' objection to one piece of 
information, the court found that, based on the criminal 
complaint and its colloquy with Jenkins, there was a factual 
basis for Jenkins' plea. 
¶83 Implicit in the court's acceptance of Jenkins' plea 
was a determination that the circuit court believed that Jenkins 
understood the nature of the charge and the effects of his plea.  
See Id., ¶37 (stating, "If a defendant does not understand the 
nature of the charge and the implications of the plea, he should 
not be entering the plea, and the court should not be accepting 
the plea.").   
¶84 Based on the extensive plea colloquy, there is 
sufficient evidence to support a finding that Jenkins understood 
the consequences of his plea.  We may, however, also look to 
other evidence in the record to support this conclusion.  For 
instance, we look to the letter that Jenkins' attorney wrote to 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
40 
 
Jenkins 
concerning 
the 
opportunity 
to 
work 
with 
law 
enforcement.14   
 
¶85 We must accept the circuit court's finding that 
"th[is] letter refers to a multitude of possibilities, none of 
which a reasonable person would construe as a 'guaranteed 
opportunity[,]'" unless the finding is clearly erroneous.  It is 
not.   
¶86 We also refer to the letters that Jenkins wrote to 
Judge Lamelas before the plea hearing and before the sentencing 
hearing.  In the first letter, dated December 1, 2002, Jenkins 
foreshadowed accepting the State's plea offer without any 
reference to future cooperation with law enforcement.15  In the 
second letter, Jenkins complained about a conspiracy against 
him.  He stated that it was his understanding that he would have 
to plead guilty to the charge in order to receive any type of 
benefit or relief in terms of an agreement.  He also told the 
court that the plea he entered was not genuine or of his own 
free will, and that he entered the guilty plea "for the purpose 
                                                 
14 For a transcript of the letter, see ¶10 above. 
 
15 Jenkins wrote: 
I've now become even more convinced that I'll not be 
able [to] fully prove my innocence——which only leaves 
me with one other option.  That is to except [sic] 
this plea offering, which seems the best thing to do, 
before deciding to go into a full trial, and find 
myself over-powered by the judicial system and found 
guilty for a crime I truly was never a part of. 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
41 
 
of mentally gaining [the court's] approval."  He told the court 
that he was "not guilty of these accusations."16  Jenkins also 
complained about his counsel's representation and asked the 
circuit court to dismiss the case against him. 
¶87 Jenkins' second letter contradicts prior statements 
and known facts.  When the circuit court referenced the letter, 
after denying Jenkins' motion for plea withdrawal, it addressed 
only Jenkins' alleged dissatisfaction with his attorney.  The 
court discounted this dissatisfaction by noting that Jenkins' 
attorney did not get to control the offer from the State.  The 
court's silence as to other allegations supports a finding that 
the circuit court did not find Jenkins' letter credible. 
¶88 Even if Jenkins entertained hopes of giving extensive 
cooperation to law enforcement in order to potentially affect 
his sentence, his hopes were too unrealistic in view of the 
serious charge against him, his lengthy incarceration before his 
plea, and his extensive criminal history, to constitute a fair 
and just reason to withdraw his plea when his hopes were not 
                                                 
16 Jenkins wrote: 
I must notify you, your honor, that my statement 
was fales [sic], and the way it was presented in it's 
[sic] formulated terms and fashion, for the purpose of 
mentally gaining your approval.   
 
. . . . 
. . . However, I must also notify you that 
truthfully, I am not guilty of these accusations.  The 
plea I've entered on my last court appearance was not 
genuine or of my own free willing [sic]. 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
42 
 
realized.  Jenkins knew he could not count on that cooperation 
to materially affect his sentence.17 
E. 
Assertion of Innocence 
 
¶89 Finally, we address the question of whether an 
assertion of innocence is necessary under the fair and just 
reason standard.  We note that like the manifest injustice 
standard, the fair and just reason standard does not require 
that the defendant assert his innocence.  See Reppin, 35 
Wis. 2d at 385 n.2 (stating that under the manifest injustice 
standard, "[t]he defendant may move for withdrawal of his plea 
without alleging that he is innocent of the charge to which the 
plea has been entered.").  However, an assertion of innocence is 
a factor "that bear[s] on whether the defendant's proffered 
reason 
of 
misunderstanding, 
confusion 
or 
coercion 
[is] 
credible."  Shimek, 230 Wis. 2d at 740 n.2.  In other words, an 
assertion of innocence is not necessary, but it helps the 
circuit court evaluate the defendant's "fair and just reason." 
 
¶90 In this case, the circuit court did not explicitly 
address Jenkins' innocence.  However, the record supports a 
conclusion that Jenkins' assertions of innocence were not 
                                                 
17 The court was told at the sentencing hearing of Jenkins' 
cooperation and his willingness to cooperate more.  Because the 
court did not impose anything close to the maximum sentence or 
even the high end of the range recommended in the presentence 
investigation, we cannot exclude the possibility that the court 
considered 
Jenkins' 
desire 
to 
cooperate 
when 
it 
imposed 
sentence. 
No.  2005AP302-CR 
 
43 
 
credible and would therefore not support the credibility of his 
proffered misunderstanding.   
¶91 Jenkins contradicted any assertions of his innocence 
at the plea colloquy.  In response to whether he was pleading 
guilty because he was guilty, Jenkins replied, "Totally."  Later 
during the plea colloquy, in response to a question on the 
accuracy of the criminal complaint, Jenkins agreed to the 
substantial accuracy of the complaint but then elaborated on his 
version of the events, thus revealing and admitting his legal 
culpability. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶92 We hold that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion when it denied Jenkins' motion to 
withdraw his plea.  From the beginning of the case, Jenkins was 
represented by counsel.  He had several months to consider the 
plea agreement offered by the State.  The plea agreement did not 
include 
a 
promise 
that 
Jenkins 
would 
be 
guaranteed 
the 
opportunity to work with the police.  Jenkins participated in a 
thorough plea colloquy with the court.  The record supports the 
circuit court's determination that Jenkins understood the 
consequences of his plea.  We conclude that the circuit court 
did not err in denying Jenkins' motion to withdraw his plea.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  2005AP302-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶93 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I join 
Justice Butler's concurrence.  I, too, am concerned that the 
majority opinion might be misinterpreted as merging our law for 
withdrawing a plea of guilty or no contest before sentencing 
with our law for withdrawing such a plea after sentencing.  The 
State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), and 
State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996), lines 
of cases are postsentencing cases.  Reliance on them in the 
instant case, which involves a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
before sentencing, is misplaced.  The standards governing plea 
withdrawal 
before 
sentencing 
and 
after 
sentencing 
remain 
distinct. 
¶94 It is well established that a circuit court exercises 
discretion in freely allowing the withdrawal of a guilty plea 
before sentencing for any fair and just reason, unless the 
prosecution would be substantially prejudiced.  I concur with 
the majority opinion because I believe that the circuit court's 
order denying the plea withdrawal was within its discretion.   
¶95 I write separately, however, to raise an issue that is 
buried 
in 
the 
discussion 
of 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion: the wheeling-and-dealing 
that may occur during plea negotiations and the "loose" plea 
"deals" that sometimes result. 
¶96 The circuit court concluded that the defendant did not 
have 
a 
plea 
agreement 
premised 
on 
cooperation 
with 
law 
No.  2005AP302-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
enforcement, but rather had only a hope for a deal on 
cooperation and leniency in sentencing.   
¶97 There was more going on between the lines than appears 
in the plea colloquy.  Apparently the unwritten understanding 
was as follows:  The defendant had to plead guilty to the 
charges.  If he did so, then state or federal law enforcement 
officials might try to use the defendant to make controlled drug 
buys or use the information the defendant provided to set up 
drug dealers to be caught and prosecuted.  If the defendant 
performed as contemplated, the State's sentencing recommendation 
might be considerably more lenient.  The key was that the 
defendant had to plead guilty before he would be allowed to go 
to the next step, that is, to meet with the law enforcement 
officials to arrange cooperation.  The defendant pled guilty 
after being advised of this scenario.   
¶98 Unfortunately for the defendant, he was not able to 
cooperate as he had planned.  No arrangements with law 
enforcement panned out.  The defendant subsequently moved to 
withdraw his guilty plea.   
¶99 My sense is that the court of appeals took the 
realities of the criminal justice system, not legal fictions, 
into account.  The court of appeals reasoned that "the trial 
court believed that the State and defense counsel may not have 
considered working with law enforcement a specific component of 
the plea agreement [but that the defendant asserts] that he 
believed it was part of the agreement. . . . Jenkins's belief 
that 
he 
would be 
working with law enforcement was not 
No.  2005AP302-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
unreasonable under the circumstances, and provided a fair and 
just reason for plea withdrawal."  State v. Jenkins, 2006 WI App 
28, ¶¶25, 30, 289 Wis. 2d 523, 710 N.W.2d 502 (emphasis in 
original). 
¶100 Had the court of appeals sat as the circuit court and 
allowed the withdrawal of the plea that order would have been 
affirmed on appeal as an appropriate exercise of discretion.  
But the test is not what an appellate court would have done had 
it been the circuit court.  The test is whether the circuit 
court's order denying the plea withdrawal is within the circuit 
court's range of discretion.  The circuit court's refusal to 
allow withdrawal of the plea was not an erroneous exercise of 
discretion. 
¶101 My problem with this case, and the reason I write, is 
that the instant case highlights a situation that is troublesome 
for a circuit court both in accepting a guilty plea or plea of 
no contest and in ruling on a motion for plea withdrawal before 
sentencing.  My understanding is that the kind of "deal" the 
State and defense counsel arranged for the defendant is not 
unusual.  It appears to be a common arrangement that the plea 
agreement struck between the parties is not expressly premised 
on the defendant's cooperation with law enforcement officials, 
but that there is nonetheless the "strong suggestion" that the 
sentence recommendation will be more favorable if the defendant 
pleads guilty and then cooperates. 
¶102 Cooperation with law enforcement is vital and these 
"deals" 
help 
make 
such 
cooperation 
with 
law 
enforcement 
No.  2005AP302-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
possible.  These "deals" are left largely unwritten and "loose" 
in a number of respects because the needs of law enforcement 
officials 
and 
circumstances 
may 
change. 
 
There 
is 
also 
reluctance to announce in open court that the defendant will be 
"of service" to law enforcement officials.  The "deal" is not 
placed on the record because any public record would render the 
defendant useless to law enforcement, might endanger the 
defendant's life on the street, and might compromise the 
defendant as a witness in any drug prosecution that he might 
help bring about.   
¶103 As a result, a defendant may not fully understand "all 
the ifs, ands, and buts" of the "deal" that may be explained to 
him.  The defendant does understand, however, that before 
anything can be done for him, he must plead guilty.    
¶104 All hope, however, may not be lost for the defendant 
in this situation.  The State asserted before this court that 
the court of appeals had wrongly assumed that postsentencing 
cooperation by a defendant sentenced under Truth-in-Sentencing 
principles cannot yield benefits in the form of sentence 
modification.  The State's brief points out that the circuit 
court, despite denying plea withdrawal, concluded that the 
"defendant is not precluded from providing information after 
sentencing and applying for a sentence modification in the 
future based on his actions."  The State argues that the 
defendant may still get the benefit he had hoped for——sentence 
modification based on postconviction cooperation.  The State 
asserts that such cooperation may be a new factor warranting 
No.  2005AP302-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
modification under the right circumstances, citing State v. Doe, 
2005 WI App 68, ¶¶5, 7, 10, 280 Wis. 2d 731, 697 N.W.2d 101. 
¶105 I remain concerned, however, about the secretive 
nature of the "deals" and worry that because of them, circuit 
courts may not be able to ensure that pleas are constitutionally 
sound.  Circuit courts must be on their guard to ensure that a 
defendant fully understands the circumstances under which a 
guilty plea "for the possibility of cooperation with law 
enforcement" is taken.   
¶106 I nonetheless conclude that in the instant case the 
denial of the plea withdrawal was within the circuit court's 
discretion.   
¶107 For the reasons set forth, I concur. 
¶108 I am authorized to state that Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, 
JR. joins this opinion. 
No.  2005AP302-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
¶109 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  I concur in 
the mandate.  Barry Jenkins' plea agreement at the time he 
entered his guilty plea did not include a provision that called 
for him to receive some benefit at sentencing in exchange for 
divulging relevant information about other drug perpetrators.  
While he may have had a "hope" for some sort of leniency should 
he provide assistance to law enforcement in apprehending other 
drug dealers, that was not a part of the negotiation he entered 
into.  He cannot now assert that he misunderstood an agreement 
that he acknowledges he never had.  Consequently, I conclude 
that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion when it denied Jenkins' motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  State v. Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d 565, 579-80, 469 N.W.2d 163 
(1991).  
¶110 I write separately because a guilty plea withdrawal 
prior to sentencing is controlled by well-settled precedent.  
See State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶28, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 
N.W.2d 199; 
State 
v. 
Kivioja, 
225 
Wis. 2d 271, 
287, 
592 
N.W.2d 220 (1999); State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 861, 532 
N.W.2d 111 (1995); and State v. Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 582.  A 
defendant's assertion of a misunderstanding of a plea or plea 
agreement must be genuine to satisfy the fair and just reason 
standard for plea withdrawal.  Kivioja, 225 Wis. 2d at 291; 
Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 585-86.  The circuit court must determine 
No.  2005AP302-CR.lbb 
 
2 
 
whether the defendant's reason for withdrawal is credible or 
plausible or believable.  Kivioja, 225 Wis. 2d at 291-92.  We 
apply a clearly erroneous standard of review to the circuit 
court's findings of historical or evidentiary fact.  State v. 
Turner, 136 Wis. 2d 333, 343-44, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987).  
¶111 In a letter prior to sentencing, Jenkins' attorney 
advised Jenkins about the possibility of working with the police 
as an informer in exchange for the possibility of some sort of 
sentence credit should the information prove useful and should 
he testify against other perpetrators.  The plea agreement, 
however, was not predicated on Jenkins actually working for the 
police.  The agreement Jenkins entered into was that, in 
exchange for a plea of guilty, the State would recommend 24 
months' initial confinement, 24 months' extended supervision, 
and a $1000 fine, plus costs.  The circuit court failed to see 
any misunderstanding about the plea or the plea negotiation on 
Jenkins' part.  Jenkins was aware of the possibility that he 
might be able to earn a better sentencing recommendation from 
the State if everything worked out and he was able to assist the 
State 
in 
other 
prosecutions. 
 
Due 
to 
his 
continued 
incarceration, things did not work out, and he therefore was 
unable to secure a better recommendation.  He received the 
recommendation he bargained for, no more, no less.  That should 
be the end of the case. 
¶112 Unfortunately, the majority has written an unnecessary 
and expansive opinion that might be misinterpreted to merge the 
manifest injustice standard for withdrawal of a guilty plea 
No.  2005AP302-CR.lbb 
 
3 
 
after sentencing with the fair and just reason standard for 
withdrawal prior to sentencing.  Our standard for reviewing 
motions to withdraw guilty pleas prior to sentencing under the 
fair and just reason standard is a good one.  Because the 
majority opinion might be misinterpreted as changing the law 
with respect to plea withdrawals prior to sentencing, I decline 
to join it. 
¶113 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶114 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this concurring 
opinion.  
 
 
No.  2005AP302-CR.lbb 
 
 
 
1