Title: BEAMER v RICE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14406
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 26, 1979

No. 1 4 4 0 6 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 7 9 DOROTHY BEAMER, ELSOM ELDRIDGE, J R . , ART FORAN, CYNTHIA KLIMAS, LARRY KNUTSON and MARY ROHN, P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t s , GEORGIA RUTH R I C E , SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, D e f e n d a n t and R e s p o n d e n t . A p p e a l f r o m : D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , H o n o r a b l e G o r d o n R. B e n n e t t , Judge presiding. C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For A p p e l l a n t s : J a m e s W. Z i o n argued, H e l e n a , M o n t a n a For R e s p o n d e n t : C a n n o n and G i l l e s p i e , H e l e n a , M o n t a n a R i c h a r d G i l l e s p i e argued, H e l e n a , M o n t a n a S u b m i t t e d : February 8, 1 9 7 9 D e c i d e d : ; R P R 2 7 1979 Filed: @k 2 i 1979 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from t h e order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , granting i n p a r t defendant superin- t e n d e n t ' s motion f o r summary judgment. P l a i n t i f f s / a p p e l l a n t s a r e s i x former employees of t h e Office of t h e Superintendent of Public I n s t r u c t i o n (OSPI). After e l e c t i o n t o t h e o f f i c e of superintendent, defendant requested a letter of resignation from a l l members of t h e OSPI professional s t a f f . She indicated t h a t , upon r e c e i p t of these l e t t e r s , she would meet with each of t h e members individually t o "evaluate" t h e i r p o s i t i o n on t h e s t a f f . I n t h e i r complaint, p l a i n t i f f s alleged t h a t they w e r e each dismissed without cause following t h e presentation of t h e i r requested resignations. They f u r t h e r alleged t h a t they requested from defendant reasons f o r t h e i r dismissal, b u t t h a t t h e i r request was refused. Defendant's predecessor i n o f f i c e adopted an Affirma- t i v e Action program f o r t h e OSPI on March 26, 1976. That program included a plan f o r termination of employment proce- dures i n s e c t i o n 904: "Section 904 Termination "Goal : Terminations w i l l be made f o r job r e l a t e d rea- sons only. "Action I t e m s 1. Termination f o r cause w i l l be made only a f t e r a t l e a s t one evaluation session has been held t o discuss t h e problem, remedial a c t i o n has been requested, and reasonable t i m e has been allowed f o r improvement unless t h e person's presence i s a d i r e c t t h r e a t t o t h e s a f e t y and continuation of t h e agency's function. "2. The EEO coordinator o r a designee w i l l con- d u c t e x i t interviews and w i l l provide documen- t a t i o n t o t h e Personnel Services Manager who w i l l keep a running log of t h e employees' rea- sons f o r termination. I f t h e r e i s any sugges- t i o n t h a t discrimination i s involved, t h e EEO coordinator o r a designee w i l l be asked t o par- t i c i p a t e i n t h e interviews. Apparent discrim- a t o r y a c t i o n s w i l l be investigated and corrected." P l a i n t i f f s a l l e g e d i n t h e i r f i r s t claim f o r r e l i e f t h a t s e c t i o n 904 c o n s t i t u t e d a c o n t r a c t u a l term of t h e i r employ- ment and t h a t defendant f a i l e d t o l i v e up t o t h a t c o n t r a c t i n s e v e r a l p a r t i c u l a r s . Second, they a l l e g e d a t o r t , i n t h a t defendant acted maliciously toward them by disregarding t h e termination f o r cause plan. Third, p l a i n t i f f s a l l e g e d t h e t o r t of "outrage," i n t h a t defendant's w i l l f u l d i s r e g a r d of s e c t i o n 904 caused them emotional d i s t r e s s . A f o u r t h claim, a claim f o r l o s t wages, w a s dismissed by t h e D i s t r i c t Court a s being redundant. P l a i n t i f f s ' f i f t h claim a l l e g e d a v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 64-317(1), R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 49-3-201 MCA, i n t h a t defendant f a i l e d t o make a merit-based evaluation of t h e OSPI personnel before dismissing them. The s i x t h claim a l l e g e s t h a t t h e d i s m i s s a l s were motivated by p o l i t i c a l f a v o r i t i s m , and w e r e t h e r e f o r e a r b i t r a r y and capricious, and v i o l a t e d p l a i n t i f f s ' s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . P l a i n t i f f s ' seventh claim alleged a v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 41- 1311, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 39-2-801 MCA, i n t h a t defen- dant f a i l e d t o provide a " f u l l , s u c c i n c t , and complete statement of t h e reason of [ t h e i r ] discharge" when requested t o do so. I n t h e i r prayer f o r judgment, p l a i n t i f f s sought, i n t e r a l i a , a t t o r n e y f e e s under provisions of 4 2 U.S.C. §I988 (1976). Defendant superintendent moved f o r summary judgment on p l a i n t i f f s ' f i r s t , second, t h i r d and f i f t h claims. The D i s t r i c t Court, i n an o r d e r dated A p r i l 27, 1978, granted summary judgment t o defendant on t h e f i r s t , second and t h i r d claims, set t h e f i f t h , s i x t h , and seventh claims f o r t r i a l and denied p l a i n t i f f s ' claim f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s under 4 2 U.S.C. S1988. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s reason f o r g r a n t i n g summary judgment a s t o t h e f i r s t t h r e e claims was t h a t t h o s e claims w e r e a l l based upon s e c t i o n 904 o f t h e OSPI Affirma- t i v e Action p l a n and t h a t t h e s u p e r i n t e n d e n t lacked s t a t u - t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o adopt such a plan. I t denied p l a i n t i f f s ' claim f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s under 42 U.S.C. 81988 on t h e r a t i o - n a l e t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y f e e s p r o v i s i o n of t h a t s e c t i o n i s intended t o apply only t o f e d e r a l c o u r t s and t h a t a b s e n t a s t a t u t e , s t i p u l a t i o n by p a r t i e s , o r r u l e of c o u r t , a t t o r n e y f e e s a r e n o t recoverable by t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y . P l a i n t i f f s r a i s e s e v e r a l s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of e r r o r on t h e merits of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g b u t because w e have determined t h a t t h e o r d e r g r a n t i n g summary judgment a s t o some, b u t n o t a l l of t h e i r claims, i s i n t e r l o c u t o r y and n o t appealable, w e w i l l n o t d i s c u s s t h o s e i s s u e s . P l a i n t i f f s presented seven s e p a r a t e claims f o r r e l i e f , t h r e e of which remain t o be a d j u d i c a t e d a t t r i a l . This s i t u a t i o n i s n o t e x p r e s s l y contemplated i n Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., b u t r e q u i r e s r e f e r e n c e t o Rule 5 4 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P. Rule 54(b) provides t h a t a District Court may g r a n t a f i n a l , appealable judgment as t o some b u t n o t a l l of t h e claims involved i n a n a c t i o n only i f it makes a n express determination t h a t t h e r e i s no j u s t reason t o d e l a y an appeal on t h o s e claims and e x p r e s s l y d i r e c t s e n t r y of judgment: "When m u l t i p l e claims f o r r e l i e f o r m u l t i p l e p a r t i e s a r e involved i n an a c t i o n , t h e c o u r t may d i r e c t t h e e n t r y of a f i n a l judgment a s t o one o r more b u t fewer than a l l of t h e claims o r p a r t i e s o n l y -- upon an express determination t h a t t h e r e i s no j u s t reason for d e l a y and --- upon a n express d i r e c t i o n f o r t h e e n t r y of -- -- - judgment. . ." (Emphasis added.) Rule 54 (b) goes on t o provide t h a t i f t h e D i s t r i c t Court f a i l s t o make t h e r e q u i r e d "determination" and " d i r e c - t i o n , " any o r d e r which a d j u d i c a t e s less than a l l of t h e c l a i m s does " n o t t e r m i n a t e t h e a c t i o n a s t o - any of t h e claims" and t h e o r d e r remains " s u b j e c t t o r e v i s i o n " u n t i l t h e f i n a l e n t r y of judgment a d j u d i c a t i n g a l l t h e claims. (Emphasis added.) Thus, when Rule 54 (b) i s construed to- g e t h e r with Rule 5 6 ( c ) , t h e r e s u l t i s t h a t a District Court may e n t e r a f i n a l appealable summary judgment i f it r u l e s on one o r more b u t n o t a l l of a p a r t y ' s claims and makes t h e r e q u i s i t e "determination" and " d i r e c t i o n " i n its o r d e r . A s P r o f e s s o r Moore comments on t h e i d e n t i c a l Federal Rules: ". . . Neither Rule 56 nor any o t h e r Rule a u t h o r i z e s t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o t r a n s l a t e an i n t e r l o c u t o r y a d j u d i c a t i o n of a p a r t of a s i n g l e c l a i m i n t o a f i n a l judgment. I f , how- e v e r , i n a n a c t i o n involving m u l t i p l e claims o r p a r t i e s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t f u l l y a d j u d i c a t e s one o r more b u t fewer than a l l t h e claims, it can make t h a t a d j u d i c a t i o n f i n a l by making t h e 'express determination' and t h e 'express d i r e c t i o n ' c a l l e d f o r by Rule 5 4 ( b ) . F a i l i n g t o do t h a t t h e a d j u d i c a t i o n remains i n t e r - locutory." 6 Moore' s Federal Practice 1156.20 [ l ] a t 56-1204. See a l s o , I n re Marriage of Adams (1979), Mont. I P.2d , 36 St.Rep. 565, 566; S t a t e ex rel. Marlenee v . D i s t r i c t Court (1979), Mont . I P.2d , 36 St.Rep. 457, 459-60; 6 Moore's Federal P r a c t i c e 1156.21[1.-21 a t 56-1271 t o 1 2 7 2 ; c f . Krusemark v. Hanson (1979) r - Mont. - I - P.2d , 36 St.Rep. 159 (involving m u l t i p l e p a r t i e s ) . The "determination" and " d i r e c t i o n " requirements of Rule 54(b) a r e intended t o permit t h e D i s t r i c t Court, i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e , t o consider whether t h e judgment upon some, b u t n o t a l l , of a l i t i g a n t ' s claims can properly be appealed. A s described by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court, t h e d i s - t r i c t c o u r t , i n e f f e c t , " i s used as a ' d i s p a t c h e r ' . " " I t i s permitted t o determine, i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e , t h e appropri- a t e t i m e when each ' f i n a l d e c i s i o n ' upon 'one o r more but less than a l l ' of t h e claims i n a m u l t i p l e claims a c t i o n i s ready f o r appeal." S e a r s , Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey (1956), 351 U.S. 427, 435, 76 S.Ct. 895, 899, 100 L.ed 1297. I n t h i s way t h e D i s t r i c t Court n o t o n l y a s s i s t s t h i s Court by preventing "piecemeal a p p e l l a t e d i s p o s i t i o n " of what i s more properly considered a s i n g l e controversy, see, Eisen v . C a r l i s l e & J a c q u e l i n (1974), 417 U.S. 156, 170, 40 L Ed 2d 732, 744, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2149, quoted i n Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum ( 5 t h C i r . 1978), 577 F.2d 298, 301, b u t a l s o permits t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o determine whether s p e c i a l circumstances r e q u i r e an immediate appeal: "'The i n q u i r y r e q u i r e s some e v a l u a t i o n of t h e competing c o n s i d e r a t i o n s underlying a l l ques- t i o n s of f i n a l i t y - - " t h e inconvenience and c o s t s of piecemeal review on t h e one hand and t h e dan- g e r of denying j u s t i c e by d e l a y on t h e o t h e r . " Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950). ' " Occidental ~ e t r o l e u m , 577 P.2d a t 301, quoting Eisen v. C a r l i s l e & J a c q u e l i n , 417 U.S. a t 171, 40 L Ed 2d a t 745, 94 S.Ct. a t 2149. I n l i g h t of t h e "competing c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , " t h e review- i n g c o u r t may, under l i m i t e d circumstances, consider t h e appeal d e s p i t e t h e l a c k of t h e express "determination" and " d i r e c t i o n " required by Rule 5 4 ( b ) . Riggle v . S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a ( 9 t h C i r . 1978), 577 F.2d 579, 581 n. A; Huckeby v . Frozen Food Express ( 5 t h C i r . 1977), 555 F.2d 542, 546- 47. I n Huckeby, t h e Court of Appeals l i s t e d t h r e e circum- s t a n c e s which would permit an a p p e l l a n t t o proceed i n t h e absence of a Rule 45(b) determination and d i r e c t i o n , none of which a r e a p p l i c a b l e t o o u r c a s e here. P l a i n t i f f s argue t h a t an a l t e r n a t i v e d i s p o s i t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e , t h a t t h i s Court may i s s u e a w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court r e i n s t a t i n g t h e i r f i r s t t h r e e claims. However, such a w r i t would n o t s u r e l y terminate "needless l i t i g a t i o n " as was t h e c a s e i n S t a t e ex rel. Buttrey Foods v . D i s t r i c t Court (1966), 148 14ont. 350, 354, 420 P.2d 845, 847, and w e d e c l i n e t o i s s u e a w r i t . The summary judgments appealed from a r e interlocutory and not appealable. The appeal i s dismissed without preju- dice. J u s t i c e W e concur: % 4 s , g , Chief J u s t i c e