Title: Black v. Employment Div.
Citation: 301 Or. 221, 721 P.2d 451
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 24, 1986

721 P.2d 451 (1986)
301 Or. 221
Galen W. BLACK, Respondent on review,
v.
EMPLOYMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, Ray Thorne, Administrator, Petitioners on review. and
ADAPT, Respondent (below).
EAB 84-AB-161; CA A31186; SC S32482.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted April 1, 1986.
Decided June 24, 1986.
Reconsideration Denied September 3, 1986.
James E. Mountain, Jr., Sol. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With him on the petition for review were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and Michael D. Reynolds and Jeff Bennett, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salem.
David Morrison, of Heiling &amp; Morrison, P.C., Roseburg, argued the cause for respondent on review.
David M. Gordon, of Thorp, Dennett, Purdy, Golden &amp; Jewett, P.C., Springfield, filed a brief amicus curiae on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union.
Before PETERSON, C.J., and LENT, LINDE, CAMPBELL, CARSON and JONES, JJ.
JONES, Justice.
This is a companion case to Smith v. Employment Division, 301 Or. 209, 721 *452 P.2d 445 (1986) (decided this date). Claimant appealed an Employment Appeals Board (EAB) order denying unemployment compensation benefits. Claimant's employer discharged him for ingesting peyote during a Native American Church ceremony.
The employer, Douglas County Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment (ADAPT), hired claimant as a resident assistant September 12, 1982. ADAPT's policy is to suspend or discharge employees who abuse alcohol or other drugs because it considers its employees role models for persons they treat. Claimant had a history of substance abuse but had not used drugs since early 1982. After two promotions, claimant became a drug rehabilitation counselor in June 1983.
Claimant, like Smith in the companion case, belongs to the Native American Church and attends services weekly. During a Church ceremony on September 10, 1983, claimant ingested a small amount of peyote "for spiritual reasons, as a communion." When claimant's supervisor discovered that claimant had ingested peyote, he told claimant to choose between resignation, discharge or entry into an inpatient treatment program. Contending that his ingestion of peyote was not a relapse into drug abuse, claimant rejected the treatment offer, and on October 3, 1983, ADAPT discharged him. John Gardin, ADAPT's executive director, stated that "we would have taken the same action had the claimant consumed wine at a Catholic ceremony or any drug anywhere. It would be the same result."
When the Employment Division denied benefits, claimant requested a hearing. At the hearing, claimant argued that he had a right to practice his religion any way he chose, including the ingestion of peyote, and further asserted that the only reason he took the drug was as part of the spiritual ceremony at the Native American Church. After the hearing, the referee concluded that claimant's ingestion of peyote was "an isolated instance of poor judgment," and therefore not misconduct justifying denial of benefits. OAR 471-30-038(3).
After the referee's decision for claimant, the employer requested review by EAB, which denied benefits. The EAB order referred to claimant's religious use of peyote as follows:
and concluded:
"We find in the instant case that the claimant's actions constitute misconduct as defined above. He knew the employer's rules prohibited use of drugs and alcohol and also recognized that he could be terminated if he violated those policies. Although the use of an illegal drug was optional during the religious ceremony, the claimant wilfully made the choice to ingest those drugs.[1] He did so even *453 after he was advised by others that such a choice would perhaps be incorrect or improper. Considering the seriousness of the claimant's conduct in violating the employer's rules we find the exculpatory provisions of the Rule cannot come into play."
The question in this case, as in Smith v. Employment Division, supra, is whether the denial of unemployment compensation benefits because claimant used peyote in a Native American Church ceremony unconstitutionally infringes upon his right to the free exercise of his religion. As in Smith, we hold that denial of unemployment compensation benefits did not violate Article I, sections 2 and 3, of the Oregon Constitution, but did violate the free exercise clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.[2]
Although the referee failed to make precise factual findings, we infer from the EAB's somewhat anemic conclusions that the Native American Church is a recognized religion, that peyote is the sacrament of the Church, and that claimant was a member of the Church and an active participant in the religious ceremonies of the Church.
Other courts have noted the role of peyote in the ceremonies and practices of the Native American Church. For instance, in People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 720-21, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964), the California Supreme Court wrote:
"The `meeting,' a ceremony marked by the sacramental use of peyote, composes the cornerstone of the peyote religion. The meeting convenes in an enclosure and continues from sundown Saturday to sunrise Sunday. To give thanks for the past good fortune or find guidance for future conduct, a member will `sponsor' a meeting and supply to those who attend both the peyote and the next morning's breakfast. The `sponsor,' usually but not always the `leader,' takes charge of the meeting; he decides the order of events and the amount of peyote to be consumed. Although the individual leader exercises an absolute control of the *454 meeting, anthropologists report a striking uniformity of its ritual.
Of course, we quote Woody for illustration only and not as a substitute for administrative findings and conclusions.
The Court of Appeals, apparently troubled by the lack of administrative findings, remanded this case to EAB for findings of fact concerning the following questions:
We agree that the agency findings are meager, but we see no reason to remand because there is no genuine dispute that the ingestion of peyote is a sacrament of the Native American Church, that the claimant was a member of that Church and that his religious beliefs were sincerely held.
The Court of Appeals is affirmed as modified; the case is remanded to the Board for issuance of an order not inconsistent with this opinion.
[1]  As we noted in Smith v. Employment Division, 301 Or. 209, 721 P.2d 445 (1986), whether a particular religious practice or belief is optional or universally accepted by members of a particular religion is irrelevant to the federal analysis. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16, 101 S. Ct. 1425, 1430-31, 67 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1981) ("the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all the member of a religious sect").
[2]  Article I, sections 2 and 3, of the Oregon Constitution provide:

"Section 2. Freedom of worship. All men shall be secure in the Natural right, to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences.
"Section 3. Freedom of religious opinion. No law shall in any case whatever control the free exercise, and enjoyment of religious (sic) opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience."
The federal First Amendment provides in relevant part:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibit the free exercise thereof * * *."