Title: Sargent v. Cole
Citation: 598 S.W.2d 749
Docket Number: CR 80-82
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: May 27, 1980

598 S.W.2d 749 (1980) Donald Odell SARGENT, Petitioner, v. Honorable John W. COLE, Circuit Judge, Respondent. No. CR 80-82. Supreme Court of Arkansas. May 27, 1980. *750 Dan E. Moudy, Robert F. Alsobrook, Benton, for petitioner. Steve Clark, Atty. Gen. by Catherine Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for respondent. HICKMAN, Justice. Donald Odell Sargent, a seventeen-year old, was charged by information in the Saline County Circuit Court with first degree murder. He has petitioned this court to prohibit his trial in the circuit court. We granted temporary stay of the proceedings until the parties could brief the issue. We find no merit to the petition and deny the writ. The only question before us is whether the Arkansas Juvenile Code of 1975 requires that all juveniles, persons under eighteen years of age, be charged and tried for criminal acts in juvenile court. We find that it does not. The Juvenile Code was adopted at the same regular session of the Arkansas General Assembly as the Criminal Code, the 1975 session. See Act 451, the Arkansas Juvenile Code and Act 280, the Arkansas Criminal Code, Acts of Arkansas 1975. The Criminal Code was passed before the Juvenile Code at the 1975 session.[1] One provision of the Criminal Code, as it is found in Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-617 (Repl. 1977) provides that persons 15, 16 and 17 years old can be tried for offenses in either municipal, juvenile or circuit court. All other persons, those under 15, must be tried in juvenile court. The petitioner argues that this section of the Criminal Code was repealed by the language in the Juvenile Code which granted "original and exclusive" jurisdiction to juvenile court over all juveniles charged with any acts that would be considered criminal misconduct. If we simply read the provisions of the juvenile code relied upon by the petitioner and stop there we might agree, for the language "original and exclusive" does seem to be all encompassing. That portion of the Juvenile Code in its entirety reads: A delinquent juvenile is defined as: However, the statutory rules of construction do not limit us to examining any single part of a law. We are required to reconcile statutes of the same general subject matter, construing them together if possible, in order to implement legislative intent. Cook v. Bevill, 246 Ark. 805, 440 S.W.2d 570 (1969); Louisiana Oil Refining Co. v. Rainwater, 183 Ark. 482, 37 S.W.2d 96 (1931). This is especially so if two acts on the same subject were enacted during the same general session as the Juvenile Code and the Criminal Code were. Cordell v. Kent, 174 Ark. 503, 295 S.W. 404 (1927). More importantly, we must construe a statute, if possible, so that all of its parts will be effective. Town of Wrightsville v. Walton, 255 Ark. 523, 501 S.W.2d 241 (1973). In at least four specific instances, provisions of the Juvenile Code refer to jurisdiction of courts other than a juvenile court regarding criminal acts by juveniles. Ark. Stat.Ann. § 45-417 (Repl.1977) provides: The language of this statute clearly indicates that a court other than the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a juvenile. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 45-418 reads: Clearly this language grants a prosecuting attorney discretion as to which court will be utilized in charging certain juveniles. This authority given to a prosecuting attorney would seem to coincide with the provision of the Arkansas Criminal Code, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-617 (Repl.1977) that permits certain juveniles to be tried in circuit court or municipal court. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 45-420 reads: This provision could only refer to the fact that a court other than a juvenile court could exercise jurisdiction over a juvenile. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 45-421 (Repl.1977) is of a similar import. It says: When these provisions of the Juvenile Code are read with the rest of the Act, it is clear to us that the General Assembly did not intend that all juveniles must be tried in juvenile court. We find that the law clearly grants a prosecuting attorney discretion to charge juveniles over 15 years of age in any of three courts, juvenile, municipal or circuit. Prohibition is granted only when a court has no jurisdiction. Brown v. Kimbrough, 263 Ark. 913, 568 S.W.2d 226 (1978); Skinner v. May field, 246 Ark. 741, 439 S.W.2d 651 (1969). Sargent was over 15 years of age at the time he was alleged to have committed the offense and, therefore, the prosecuting attorney had discretion to file charges against him in the circuit court. Since the court did have jurisdiction, the petition for writ of prohibition is denied. Writ denied. [1] Certain sections of the Criminal Code and the Juvenile Code were amended by the Arkansas General Assembly at its 1979 session. However, those amendments do not substantially change the provisions that were enacted in 1975. In this opinion we quote the language of those statutes as they read in 1975. Those sections that were changed in 1979 to some extent are: Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-617, § 45-403, § 45-406, § 45-417 and § 45-418.