Title: State v. Leinweber
Citation: 121 Ariz. 435, 590 P.2d 1381
Docket Number: 4369
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: February 8, 1979

121 Ariz. 435 (1979) 590 P.2d 1381 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Robert B. LEINWEBER, Appellant. No. 4369. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. February 8, 1979. *436 John A. LaSota, Jr., Former Atty. Gen., Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer III, Barbara A. Jarrett, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Gordon J. O'Brien, Lake Havasu City, for appellant. STRUCKMEYER, Vice Chief Justice. Appellant Robert Leinweber pled guilty and was sentenced to five to eight years on the charge of possession of dangerous drugs, and to nine to twelve years on the possession of dangerous drugs for sale. He appeals. On August 28, 1976, appellant and his codefendant, Scott Buse, had a party in their room at the Ramada Inn in Kingman, Arizona. They offered their guests a drug, supposedly tetrahydrocannabinol, a marijuana derivative ("THC"). Actually, the drug was phencyclidine, an animal tranquilizer ("PCP" or "angel dust"). After taking the drug, one of the guests died and another was hospitalized in a coma for three days. Both defendant and his companion were arrested. While defendant was in jail, three Mohave County police officers sought to question him. After being advised of his Miranda rights,[1] appellant told the officers that he wanted to consult with his attorney. While one of the officers unsuccessfully sought to contact appellant's attorney, the two other officers had a discussion with appellant at which he made numerous incriminating statements. It is appellant's position that because of the claimed violation of his rights, he was forced into a disadvantageous plea bargaining agreement. The question of whether an otherwise valid guilty plea may be impeached by assertions that the plea was motivated by a prior coerced confession was discussed by the United States Supreme Court in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970). The Court said: Here, appellant does not claim that his attorney was incompetent or that he received poor advice. Our review of the record indicates that defense counsel vigorously represented appellant, and in view of the facts of this case, a guilty plea appears to have been to appellant's advantage. Since a guilty plea "simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt," Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 n. 2, 96 S. Ct. 241, 242, 46 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1975), we hold that appellant, by entering an otherwise valid guilty plea,[2] may not raise the issue of an involuntary confession on appeal. We therefore do not reach the question whether appellant's statements were made involuntarily. Judgment affirmed. CAMERON, C.J., and HAYS, HOLOHAN and GORDON, JJ., concur. [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). [2] A guilty plea is valid if it is entered knowingly and voluntarily, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), and there is strong evidence of guilt. State v. DeCoe, 118 Ariz. 502, 578 P.2d 181 (1978).