Title: STATE v WATKINS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12463
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: January 22, 1974

No. 12463 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1973 STATE O F M O N T A N A , Pla i n t i f f and Respondent, -VS - C H A R L E S R. C J A T K I N S , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : John L. Adams argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas Beers, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana Diane G. Barz, Deputy County Attorney, appeared, Billings, Montana Submitted: October 1, 1973 Honorable Paul G. Hatfield, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison, delivered the Opinion of the Court. O n October 31, 1972, defendant Charles R. Watkins was t r i e d , and on November 1, 1972, convicted of burglary i n the second degree i n t h e d i s t r i c t court, Yellowstone County. He was sentenced t o a term of f i v e years i n the s t a t e prison. From t h i s conviction and judgment he appeals. Either l a t e on May 5, 1972, or e a r l y i n the morning May 6, 1972, the r e a r door of the Gorham Park Drug, located a t Broadwater Avenue and 19th S t r e e t West i n Billings, Montana, was found open by a merchant policeman. The owner-manager t e s t i f i e d he had b r r e d the r e a r door from the inside of the s t o r e and l e f t the s t o r e through the front door, which he locked, a t approximately 8:15 p.m. on May 5, 1972. The testimony was uncontradicted t h a t defendant frequented the s t o r e q u i t e often; t h a t defendant was i n the drugstore on the evening of May 5 with a companion; t h a t he stayed q u i t e awhile; t h a t he bought e i t h e r Winston or Camel c i g a r e t t e s , a s the c l e r k recalled; and, t h a t no employee of the s t o r e saw defendant leave the premises. Testimony of t h e investigating o f f i c e r s revealed t h a t , i n t h e i r opinion, no forced entry of the premises was made. How- ever, they did conclude t h a t escape was made through the r e a r door. There was further testimony t h a t someone had been hiding i n the back storeroom. I n f a c t , several Camel c i g a r e t t e b u t t s were found i n a storage area between boxes. This was an area of the premises used f o r storage and not open t o the public. Investigation a l s o uncovered a p a i r of gloves which were d i r t y and greasy. The s a f e was peeled. Found a t the safe were a screwdriver and a c h i s e l , which did not belong t o the store. Also found was the d i a l from the safe and the shaft housing from the inside of t h e safe, which the police marked. Inventory of missing items given by the s t o r e manager t o the police a t the time of the investigation included a p i s t o l with its make, model and serial number; watches; cigarette lighters; and quite a bit of medicine from the pharmacy. There was also money and some narcotics missing from the safe. On the morning of May 7, 1972, authorities, armed with a search warrant, searched the premises of Room 6, in the Uptown Motel, Billings, Montana. In the room was defendant Charles Watkins. The authorities found a pistol which matched in make, model and serial number the pistol reported stolen from the Gorham Park Drug; and a narcotics label with the Gorham Park owner's initials, which labels were kept on the narcotics in the safe at the drugstore, in the room. They also found in the room an attache case containing numerous drugs, along with some watches and cigarette lighters. These items were all similar to the items reported missing from the Gorham Park Drug, but they had no identifying marks and, therefore, were not positively identified. Also found was a wallet in a shaving kit in a box next to or on the bed in the room. In the wallet were two ID'S belonging to defendant. Next to the box was found a paper sack containing brass, whiich together with pieces of the safe found at the scene of the crime were sent to the F.B.I. The F . B . I . reported this brass could have been from the same safe as the brass found at the scene of the crime. Placed in evidence were two registration cards for Room 6 of the Uptown Motel. One of these cards listed the address of the signer as 317 South 27th Street. This address is the address of one-half of a duplex. There was testimony that the other half of this duplex was rented to a Charles Watkins and a Betty Jones about a year prior to the date of the crime. Also on this registration card was listed a license number of a car owned by a person known to associate with defendant. Finally, there was found in Room 6 of the Uptown Motel a laundry tag with Watkins's name on it and the address 2612 South First. Testimony indicated this address is located between 26th Street South and 27th Street South in Billings. Too, there was evidence of the statement made by defendant at the sheriff's office, which will be discussed with more particularity later. Defendant contends t h a t no burglary was committed because of the lack of forced entry. The attorney on appeal i s not the same attorney who represented defendant a t t r i a l , and t h i s argu- ment was not presented a t t r i a l . A s a matter of f a c t , i n the closing argument t o the jury the defense counsel said: "* * * N o w we do not deny t h a t a burglary must have taken place. The police say it took place, it must have taken place. But, Ladies and Gentle- men, t h i s defendant d i d n ' t do it. I' Further, the case law c i t e d by defendant requiring a t r e s - pass, S t a t e v. Mish, 36 Mont. 168, 170, 92 P. 459, affirmed S t a t e v. Rodgers, 40 Mont. 248, 251, 106 P. 3, and carried out i n S t a t e v. Starkweather, 89 Mont. 381, 386, 297 P. 497, is: "* * * ' i n order t o c o n s t i t u t e a burglarious entry the nature of the entry must be i t s e l f a trespass.' A trespass i s the invasion of the possession of another. (Coburn C a t t l e Co. v. Hensen, 52 Mont. 252, 157 Pac. 177; Thrasher v. Hodge, 86 Mont. 218, 283 Pac. 219.)" The two cases c i t e d i n t h e above quotation a r e c i v i l cases. I n t h i s case, someone exceeded t h e i n v i t a t i o n given a s a business i n v i t e e and stayed i n the s t o r e a f t e r business was closed, becoming a trespasser. The principal contentions of defendant a r e (1) t h a t the evidence viewed i n i t s e n t i r e t y was i n s u f f i c i e n t i n law t o j u s t i f y conviction of the crime of burglary i n t h e second degree; (2) t h a t the p i s t o l introduced i n evidence was introduced without proper foundation l a i d f o r i t s admission; (3) t h a t evidence of other crimes including the f a c t defendant was under surveillance f o r another crime was prejudicial and improperly introduced; (4) t h a t the s t a t e - ment taken from defendant by the s h e r i f f was coerced and should have been suppressed; and (5) t h a t the closing argument of the prosecutor was prejudicial t o t h e r i g h t s of defendant t o a f a i r and impartial t r i a l . Concerning defendant's f i r s t contention, t h i s Court i n S t a t e v. Joseph Lee Allen, Mont . , 509 P.2d 849, 850, 30 St.Rep. 532, 533, 534, examined a similar conviction. I n Allen the Court said: "The record shows t h a t during t h e e a r l y morning hours of December 8, 1969, the Eagles Club Bar i n Bozeman, Montana was burglarized. There was no forced entry and t h e crime was accomplished by the burglar hiding himself i n the building u n t i l the club closea a t 1:00 a.m. He then wheeled t h e s a f e from the o f f i c e where it was kept i n t o the bar area. This was done so he was not v i s i b l e from the out- side of t h e building. The safe was turned on i t s back, the door pried o f f , and over $5,000 i n small b i l l s , f i v e s , tens and twenties, stolen. I I The same contention, lack of evidence, was made i n Allen and the Court said: h his Court has been faced with t h i s issue i n several previous cases. J u s t what weight and use should be given t o circumstantial evidence i n a criminal t r i a l ? W e answered t h a t question and established a t e s t i n S t a t e v. Cor, 144 Mont. 323, 326, 396 P.2d 86 (1964). I n t h a t case we held: 11 1 Circumstantial evidence i s not always i n f e r i o r i n q u a l i t y nor i s it necessarily r e l e - gated t o a "second c l a s s status" i n t h e consider- a t i o n t o be given it. The very f a c t it i s c i r - cumstantial i s not a s u f f i c i e n t allegation t o j u s t i f y a reversal of the judgment f o r such evi- dence may be and frequently i s , most convincing and satisfactory. I n any criminal case, evidence t h a t i s material, relevant and competent, w i l l be admitted, "nothing more and nothing less." The t e s t i s whether the f a c t s and circumstances a r e of such a quality and quantity a s t o legally j u s t i f y a jury i n determining g u i l t beyond a reasonable doubt. I f such be t h e case, then t h e court should not, indeed cannot, s e t aside the solemn findings of the t r i e r of the f a c t s . ' 1 I This t e s t was used recently i n a f i r s t degree murder case where t h e evidence of g u i l t was based on circumstantial evidence. S t a t e v. Gallagher, Mont . P.2d , 30 State Rep. r c ~ a y , m : " Again, i n S t a t e v. Fitzpatrick, Mont * - Y P. 2d , 30 St. Rep. 1052, 1060, t h i s Court r e i t e r a t e d t h e r u l e on circumstantial evidence. In the i n s t a n t case there was s u f f i - c i e n t evidence t o j u s t i f y the conviction. A s t o defendant's second contention--the introduction of the gun-- the objection i s t h a t t h e s t a t e f a i l e d t o introduce i n evidence the box i n which the gun was kept and which was l e f t a t the scene of the crime, o r a t l e a s t t h a t t h e s e r i a l number i n t r o - duced a t t r i a l had not been compared with the box the gun had o r i g i n a l l y come in. However, the o f f i c e r s did t e s t i f y they were given the s e r i a l number and t h a t the gun recovered i n motel Room 6 bore the same s e r i a l number a s the one given them a f t e r the burglary i n the inventory of missing a r t i c l e s . S t a t e v. Wilroy, 150 Mont. 255, 258, 259, 434 P.2d 138, s e t s out the rule: 11 Failure t o e i t h e r properly i d e n t i f y the a r t i c l e , or t o prove t h a t no substantial change has taken place i n the a r t i c l e , while i n custody, c o n s t i t u t e s ground f o r an objection t h a t the proper foundation has not been shown. I 1 X n t h i s case a s u f f i c i e n t foundation was shown and a s s t a t e d i n Wilroy and i n Fitzpatrick: "* * * we find the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t o have been s u f f i c i e n t . The lack of specific o r p o s i t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n marks i s not of great import f o r the items were not so uncommon t h a t a reasonable i d e n t i f i c a t i o n cannot be made. The lack of o s i t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n goes t o the weight of ! h e evidence r a t h e r than i t s admissibility. * * It i s s u f f i c i e n t i f they a r e shown t o be connect with the crime, and i d e n t i f i e d a s such." A s t o defendant's t h i r d contention--that evidence of other crimes including t h e f a c t defendant was under surveillance f o r an- other crime was prejudicial and improperly introduced i n the case-- we have made a careful inspection of the record and find no merit i n t h i s contention. A s t o the f i f t h contention--that t h e closing argument of the prosecutor was p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e r i g h t s of defendant t o a f a i r and impartial t r i a l when he r e l a t e d evidence not introduced. Again, we have examined the f i n a l argument of counsel s e t out i n the t r a n s c r i p t , and t h e case law i n S t a t e v. Watkins, 156 Mont. 456, 481 P.2d 689; S t a t e v. Quigg, 155 Mont. 119. 467 P.2d 692; S t a t e v. Lucero, 151 Mont. 531, 445 P.2d 731; and S t a t e v. Jensen, 153 Mont. 233, 455 P.2d 63). W e find the remarks made by the prosecutor were not s u f f i c i e n t l y prejudicial to require a m i s t r i a l . The remaining matter i s defendant's fourth contention-- t h a t the statement taken from defendant by the s h e r i f f was coerced and should have been suppressed. During the time a f t e r the execu- t i o n of the search warrant on May 7, 1972, and the time defendant was charged with the crime by d i r e c t Information on July 21, 1972, defendant on h i s own v o l i t i o n went t o the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e and inquired a s t o obtaining h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , which the s h e r i f f had from the execution of the search warrant. Defendant contends t h a t the statement taken a t t h a t time by the s h e r i f f from him was coerced and should have been suppressed. Basically, the statement the s h e r i f f took was merely a r e c e i p t f o r the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n which defendant wanted. The statement was required a s a r e c e i p t f o r l e t t i n g out of custody of the sheriff evidence t h a t the search warrant had obtained, and it merely s t a t e d t h a t the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w a s h i s , the defendant Watkins. The f i r s t question i s whether o r not the statement was voluntary. The t r i a l court properly held t h e hearing outside the presence of t h e jury and found the statement t o be voluntary before allowing i t s admission i n t o evidence. S t a t e v. White, 146 Mont. 226, 236, 405 P.2d 761; S t a t e v. Iacero, 151 Mont. 531, 445 P.2d 731. A t the time defendant signed the r e c e i p t he was represented by counsel. He was read the Miranda warning before he signed the statement. He was t o l d i n p a r t t h a t he had a r i g h t t o remain s i l e n t ; t h a t anything he said could and probably would be used against him; t h a t he had a r i g h t t o consult an attorney before making any s t a t e - ment; but t h a t he could waive these r i g h t s and make a statement without consulting an attorney i f he desired. The statement i t s e l f says it i s voluntary. Watkins t e s t i f i e d he understood the warning. There were no t h r e a t s nor promises made nor other coercion t o get him t o give the statement. Again, i t should be s t a t e d t h a t he went t o the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e on h i s own i n i t i a t i v e and t h e only admission was t h a t the identifcation was h i s , which i s merely a r e c e i p t which the s h e r i f f would require anyone t o sign i n order t o obtain any property the s h e r i f f might have. Further, it should be remembered t h a t Watkins himself was i n the room a t the time of the execution of the search warrant. The admission of the statement was not error. For the above reasons, the verdict was j u s t i f i e d by the evidence. The pistol was properly admitted into evidence, and the trial court did not err in allowing statements made by the prosecution in closing argument, especially where no objection was made at the time. The conviction of burglary in the second degree is a£ firmed. ...................................... Hon. Paul G. Hatfied, sitting for Justice John Conway Harrison. /i /chief Justice Justices.