Title: McClinton v. McClinton
Citation: 63 So. 2d 594
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 20, 1952

63 So. 2d 594 (1952)
McCLINTON
v.
McCLINTON.
1 Div. 424.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 20, 1952.
Rehearing Denied March 19, 1953.
Lyons, Thomas &amp; Pipes, Mobile, and Adams &amp; Gillmore, Grove Hill, for appellant.
Scott &amp; Porter, Chatom, and Paul S. Jones, Grove Hill, for appellee.
LIVINGSTON, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment for plaintiff below for the sum of $6,750.
The defendant below, appellant here, offered no evidence on the trial of the cause and the issues were presented to the jury on the plaintiff's evidence alone.
The appellant challenged the sufficiency of the various counts of the complaint; requested the general affirmative charge, and other charges, and excepted to certain portions of the court's oral charge.
*595 We deem it unnecessary to pass upon all the assignment of errors, as we are of the opinion that the court erred in submitting the case to the jury. That is, the defendant was due the general affirmative charge as to all counts of the complaint. The rule is, of course, that before giving the general charge for defendant, the court must view the evidence in its most favorable light towards plaintiff's cause of action. We, therefore, summarize the evidence pertinent to the question for decision.
The undisputed evidence discloses that appellant and appellee, mother and son respectively, occupied adjoining houses in Jackson, Alabama. Appellant purchased a secondhand Ford automobile sometime in February, 1948. On March 17, 1948, appellant requested another one of her sons, Benny Ray McClinton, to drive her and her husband to the moving picture theater. The son did so, using his mother's car, but kept the car for his own use during the time his parents were in the theater. He returned to pick them up and drive them home. Upon arriving at his mother's home, Benny Ray was given permission by his mother to use the car for a short while to carry a friend home, but was told by her to park the car in appellee's garage when he returned. Benny Ray did park the car in appellee's garage upon his return about 10:00 or 10:30 o'clock. Appellee's house was a two-story garage apartment, the bottom story of which was a garage and storeroom, with living quarters on the second floor. Approximately two hours after the car was left in the garage, fire was discovered in the car, which fire spread to the building, completely destroying it, together with all its furnishings. The electrical system in the automobile had given some trouble, but the car had been repaired about a week prior to the night it burned. There was no evidence of a defective condition in the carelectrical or otherwiseafter the repairs were made and prior to Benny Ray's discovery when he carried his friend home on the night the car burned. Appellee denied granting his mother permission to use his garage, but testified that the car had been parked there on at least two occasions previously and he had not complained to his mother about it. The evidence is clear to the effect that the fire originated in the automobile, but the only proof relied upon by appellee to establish the original cause of the fire is the testimony of his brother, Benny Ray McClinton, and an electrician by the name of Jim Lawlis. Benny Ray testified, in substance, as follows:
*596 On cross-examination, this witness, Benny Ray McClinton, testified substantially as follows:
Lawlis testified, in substance, as follows:
The following is quoted from the case of Southern Ry. Co. v. Dickson, 211 Ala. 481, 100 So. 665, 669:
See also Mobile Light and Railroad Company v. Roberts, 192 Ala. 486, 68 So. 815; Central Bank &amp; Trust Co., v. Alabama Broom &amp; Mattress Co., 204 Ala. 410, 85 So. 738.
We assume for argument that Benny Ray was his mother's agent when he "parked" the car in his brother's garage, nevertheless, the evidence is without "selective application" as to a plausible explanation as to the origin of the fire. See Georgia Power Company v. Edmunds, 233 Ala. 273, 171 So. 256. The most that can be said of the testimony of the electrical expert, Lawlis, is that it was possible for a defective dimmer switch to start a fire. As we view the record, all other defects in the lighting system had been corrected a few days before the fire. Lawlis also testified that no electric current passes through the dimmer switch when the lights were turned off, and Benny Ray testified that he cut off the lights when he parked the car in the garage. We are not unmindful of the testimony of Lawlis to the effect the electric wires may become crossed and cause a short circuit and thereby start a fire. We cannot bring ourselves to the conclusion that the proof points to appellee's theory of causation, indicating a logical sequence of cause and effect. The proof here rests in speculation only. Authorities, supra.
The foregoing conclusion renders inapplicable the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, for the reason that "while the doctrine permits an inference that the known act which produced the injury was a negligent act, it does not permit an inference as to what act did produce the injury, and there can be no foundation for the application of the doctrine where the physical act or thing which caused the injury is unknown or not disclosed." 45 C.J. 1212; See, also, 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 220; Georgia Power Co. v. Edmunds, supra; Alabama Power Co. v. Bryant, 226 Ala. 251, 146 So. 602.
Reversed and remanded.
FOSTER, LAWSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.