Title: Stabiler v. Webb
Citation: 375 So. 2d 980
Docket Number: 51386
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: September 12, 1979

375 So. 2d 980 (1979) Dennis Ray STABILER et ux. v. F.E. WEBB. No. 51386. Supreme Court of Mississippi. September 12, 1979. Rehearing Denied October 31, 1979. *981 Hopkins &amp; Logan, Floyd J. Logan, Gulfport, for appellant. Estes &amp; Estes, G.E. Estes, Jr., Gulfport, for appellee. Before PATTERSON, C.J., and SUGG and WALKER, JJ. WALKER, Justice, for the Court: This suit was instituted in the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Harrison County, Mississippi, by F.E. Webb, appellee herein, for cancellation of a contract for the purchase and sale of certain real estate, possession of the real property involved, for unpaid installments and for damages for the wrongful detention of the property. The cause came on for hearing in due course and was submitted to a special master for hearing. The master subsequently filed his findings of fact which contained, inter alia, the following: There was no objection interposed to any part of the special master's finding of facts; consequently, under well-settled law, those findings are not now reviewable except as to conclusions of law. Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice section 605 (2d ed. 1950). Pursuant to the special master's report of his findings, the chancellor entered a final decree which provided, in material parts, as follows: The defendants, in their answer to the bill of complaint, during the hearing of the cause and prior thereto steadfastly denied that they were in arrears in any sum whatsoever on the contract prior to October 16, 1977, when Webb declared it in default and demanded possession. At no time did they testify that Webb indulged them in late payments and by so doing allowed the payments to accumulate to their disadvantage. The Webbs testified that repeated demands were made when payments were in arrears and that the Stabilers were advised that if the payments were not made that the Stabilers would have to give up possession of the property. The Stabilers first assign as error that the trial court erred in decreeing that the contract between the parties was cancelled and terminated in that the seller waived his right to declare forfeiture. They argue that a seller must exercise his option to declare forfeiture under a sales contract promptly after default is made otherwise his failure to do so is taken to evidence his purpose of continuing the contract, which amounts to a waiver of his right to declare forfeiture. Relying on Ratliff v. Jackson, 151 Miss. 486, 118 So. 418 (1928); Gannaway v. Toler, 122 Miss. 111, 84 So. 129 (1920); Denkmann Lumber Company v. Morgan, 219 Miss. 692, 69 So. 2d 802 (1954). They also argue that where a vendor has granted indulgence to the vendee for an indefinite time, the vendee can be placed in default only by a demand upon him for payment of the balance of the purchase price and an offer on the part of the vendor to perform his part of the contract. Citing Denkmann Lumber Co., supra. They contend that at no time did the Webbs demand full payment from Stabiler and offer to deed him the property. We are of the opinion that this case is readily distinguishable from the cases cited by the Stabilers. As stated earlier, the Stabilers' contention was that they were not in arrears in any sum whatsoever. Under those circumstances, a demand from the Stabilers for full payment, accelerating the payments under the contract, would have been useless. Moreover, after the master determined that the Stabilers were in arrears in the monthly installments as well as insurance premiums and taxes, they failed to take advantage of Mississippi Code Annotated section 89-1-59, as amended March 25, 1975. This section reads as follows: A contract for the purchase and sale of real property which provided for monthly installments comes within this section. In 77 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and Purchaser § 415 (1975), it is stated: Also, see 77 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and Purchaser §§ 316 and 317 (1975). We are therefore of the opinion that since the Stabilers did not take advantage of Section 89-1-59 after the court determined, contrary to their contention, that they were substantially in arrears under the contract they may not now complain, and the chancery court properly cancelled the contract. It is next argued that the trial court erred in decreeing that appellants pay to appellee past due installments, taxes and insurance premiums in the total sum of $4,823.36. The terms of the installment sales contract provided: In United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Parsons, 154 Miss. 587, 122 So. 544 (Miss. 1929), this Court said: Interpreted fairly, and in light of the entire agreement, this contract simply provides that in case the Stabilers failed to make the payments in accordance with the terms of the contract, they would forfeit what they had paid up to that time, and the vendor, Webb, would retain this sum as compensation therefor. Therefore, the court erred in entering judgment in favor of Webb for $4,823.36 for installments, taxes and insurance past due. We have considered appellants' remaining assignment of error and are of the opinion that it is without merit. The appellee in this case also prosecutes a cross-assignment of error, that is, the trial court erred in failing to award damages for the wrongful detention of the property from October 16, 1977 until possession was awarded. Having found in the instant case that the contract was lawfully terminated as per the master's findings on October 16, 1977, and in view of the fact that the appellants refused to give up possession until they were ordered to by the chancery court on September *985 23, 1978, it is the Court's opinion that the appellee should be awarded fair rental for the wrongful detention of the property by the Stabilers. Therefore, the cause should be remanded to the lower court to determine the amount to be paid Webb for the fair rental value beginning October 16, 1977 to the date that the Stabilers relinquished possession pursuant to the court's decree. The case is affirmed as to the cancellation of the contract, reversed and rendered as to judgment for past due installments, taxes and insurance but remanded for determination of rental value. AFFIRMED AS TO CANCELLATION OF THE CONTRACT; REVERSED AND RENDERED AS TO JUDGMENT FOR PAST DUE INSTALLMENTS, TAXES AND INSURANCE; BUT REMANDED FOR DETERMINATION OF RENTAL VALUE. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, BROOM, LEE, BOWLING and COFER, JJ., concur.