Title: Wade v. GLENCOE LUMBER COMPANY
Citation: 103 So. 2d 730
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 1958

103 So. 2d 730 (1958)
B. B. WADE et al.
v.
GLENCOE LUMBER COMPANY.
7 Div. 337.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 12, 1958.
*731 Hood, Inzer, Martin &amp; Suttle and Walter I. Barnes, Gadsden, for appellants.
Lusk, Swann &amp; Burns, Gadsden, for appellee.
COLEMAN, Justice.
Appellee filed its bill of complaint in the Circuit Court, In Equity, to enforce an alleged materialman's lien against "Lots Numbered 28 to 38, both inclusive, in Block Number 6 in Glenwood Addition," according to the record map thereof, said lots being located in the town of Glencoe, in Etowah County, Alabama. The bill alleges that respondents, B. B. Wade and Mary Pauline Wade, are the owners of said lots and that respondent, East Gadsden Bank, a corporation, holds two mortgages on said property. The bill also avers that said mortgages are inferior to the lien claimed by complainant, and prays that the court will so declare in its final decree. To review a decree overruling demurrer to the bill of complaint as last amended, the respondents bring this appeal.
Of the 25 grounds of demurrer assigned, appellants argue Grounds 1, 10, 25, 3, 5, and 9. We will consider those grounds adequately argued.
Ground 1.
Section 41, Title 33, Code 1940, requires every person entitled to a lien to file the prescribed statement in the office of the judge of probate, and provides that: "* * * Unless such statement is so filed the lien shall be lost. * * *" This Court said:
"The materialman's lien is of statutory origin, and its attachment and enforcement depend upon a compliance, in all matters of substance, with the provisions of the statute to which it owes its existence. * * *" Gilbert v. Talladega Hardware Co., 195 Ala. 474, 476, 70 So. 660, 661.
Appellants argue that the statement filed "* * * is ineffective because it fails to state that the materials set out in the claim went into and became a part of an improvement on the premises."
We are thus brought to decide whether or not the statement filed was sufficient to establish the lien claimed, or, to state the question another way, does the statement filed show that the materials furnished were in fact used.
A copy of the statement filed by appellee is attached to the amended bill as an Exhibit. In pertinent part the statement recites:
The recital is, in substance, that the lien is claimed to secure an indebtedness "* * * for materials and supplies furnished * * * for the erection of a residential dwelling on the * * * property under * * * a contract with the owners * * *."
*732 The statement filed does not assert that the materials furnished were ever actually used for the erection of a building or for any other purpose, or indeed that any building was erected at all. If the materials furnished by appellee were in fact used for the erection of a building on the land involved in the suit, the appellee ought not to encounter any substantial difficulty in alleging and proving that fact. The statement filed in the office of the judge of probate is insufficient in that it fails to allege that the materials furnished were used in the erection of an improvement.
We have held, however that the failure of the statement to show that the materials were used may be cured by sufficient averments to that effect in the bill. This court has said:
We hereinafter discuss the averments of the bill relating to the use of the materials furnished, and state our reasons for holding that the averments of the bill are also insufficient in this respect. It follows, therefore, that the defect in the statement in the instant case was not cured by the bill.
Grounds 10 and 25.
These grounds recite as follows:
The substance of the averments of the bill as to the use of materials is as follows:
"7. * * *.
Construing these averments most strongly against the pleader, here again, there is no averment that the materials were used. The averment is merely that they were furnished.
Paragraph 7 of the amended bill does aver that "work had been started on the residential *733 dwelling erected upon the above property." This statement might be sufficient to support an inference that a building had been erected, but is not sufficient to say that the building was erected out of material furnished by appellee or that the material furnished by appellee was used in constructing the building on which a lien is claimed.
The bill says that materials were furnished for the purpose of erecting an improvement, but fails to say the materials were used for that purpose. In deciding the question here involved, this court has held as follows:
Following the last cited case, we conclude that the court below erred in overruling Grounds 10 and 25 of the demurrer in the instant case.
Appellee argues that because the demurrer is joint, it must be good as to each demurrant, or it will be bad as to each, and that the demurrer as to the East Gadsden Bank is not well taken and was properly overruled.
We do not agree. If the materials furnished by appellee were merely furnished, but were not used in the construction of the building, certainly appellee is not entitled to a lien against either the Wades or the Bank. For the lien to attach, the materials must become a part of or be used in the construction of an improvement. We have said:
The averments of the bill fail to show that the materials furnished were used. In that situation, appellee would not have a right to a lien against either the owners or the mortgagee. Grounds 10 and 25 were well taken by the Bank as well as by the owners.
Ground 3.
[6] Ground 3 is as follows:
In pertinent part, § 37, Title 33, Code 1940, recites:
The amended bill avers that the land here in question is "located in the Town of Glencoe." The lots are described by number, and block, according to the recorded map, and on its face the description is sufficient.
Appellants argue "* * * that for Complainant to be entitled to a lien on either of the eleven lots he must allege which one the improvement is located on and for the Complainant to be entitled to a lien on all of the eleven lots there must be an allegation that the improvement is situated on each of them."
At this time we are concerned only with the averments in the bill. The bill describes the lots and asserts that they constitute "one parcel of land." Paragraph 4 of the amended bill asserts that the owners entered into a contract whereby the complainant-appellee agreed to furnish appellants with materials for the purpose of erecting a dwelling "on the above described property * * *."
Part of the relief prayed for is that the court will decree that complainant is entitled to a lien "upon the property herein described * * *."
We think the bill does sufficiently show "what specified lot, or lots," the pleader intended. With what the proof may show as to the location of the building on one or all of the lots embraced in the description, and the rights of appellee resulting from such proof, we are not here concerned. The description of the property is sufficient and Ground 3 of the demurrer is not well taken.
In Grimsley v. First Ave. Coal &amp; Lumber Co., 217 Ala. 159, 161, 115 So. 90, 91, in considering the sufficiency of a description against demurrer, this court said:
Tanner v. Foley Bldg. &amp; Mfg. Co., 254 Ala. 476, 48 So. 2d 785, 786, cited by appellants, holds nothing contrary to our conclusion in the case at bar. In the Tanner case, supra, the lien was claimed on 3.44 acres of land "* * * not within a city, town or village * * *." In the instant case, the land is alleged to be within the Town of Glencoe.
Grounds 5 and 9.
[7] These grounds are as follows:
*735 "9. The bill does not sufficiently allege when the work commenced."
In support of Grounds 5 and 9, appellants argue that "* * * the bill appears to be defective in not alleging that at the time the Respondent Bank's mortgage was executed that work of a substantial and conspicuous nature had been done, i. e., it fails to allege that the mortgage was executed subsequent to the `commencement of work on the building or improvement.'"
We have examined the original record in Grimsley v. First Ave. Coal &amp; Lumber Co., supra. In that case, appellant Grimsley held certain second mortgages on property involved in the suit. Grimsley contended that under the allegations of the bill, his mortgages were not inferior to the materialman's lien because the bill did not show that he had notice of the furnishing of materials by the materialman. Ground 41 of Grimsley's demurrer to the bill in that case recites as follows:
The trial court overruled Grimsley's demurrer and on appeal this ruling was affirmed. The report of that case sets out paragraph 3 of the bill of complaint, which states the date when the materialman began to furnish materials. We find in the record that paragraph 6 of the bill in that case, stated, inter alia: "* * * that subsequent to the commencement of the work on each of said dwelling houses the said Rimer and Vickrey executed a second mortgage to the respondent A. M. Grimsley on each of said lots * * *."
From the opinion it appears that this was held to be sufficient allegation of notice to Grimsley. In pertinent part, we said:
In the instant case, the bill alleges in pertinent part as follows:
With respect to the argument of appellants as to the allegation of notice to the mortgagee, East Gadsden Bank, we are of opinion that the averment of the bill which states that the mortgages "* * * were *736 given subsequent to the commencement of work * * *" is a sufficient averment of notice and that Grounds 5 and 9 of demurrer were correctly overruled.
Whether the work done was actually of a conspicuous character sufficient to put the mortgagee on notice is a matter of proof not now before us.
The decree of the trial court overruling the demurrer is reversed and one here rendered sustaining the demurrer. The cause is remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed, rendered, and remanded with leave to appellee to amend within thirty days from the date on which the decree of this court reaches the Register of the Circuit Court of Etowah County.
Reversed, rendered, and remanded.
All the Justices concur except LIVINGSTON, C. J., who dissents.