Title: People v. Agnew
Citation: 454 N.E.2d 641, 97 Ill. 2d 354
Docket Number: 57206
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: September 23, 1983

97 Ill. 2d 354 (1983)
454 N.E.2d 641
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee,
v.
MICKEY D. AGNEW, Appellant.
No. 57206.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
Opinion filed September 23, 1983.
*355 Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Gary R. Peterson, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.
Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Michael B. Weinstein and Kevin Patrick Connor, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Mickey D. Agnew, and three other persons were arrested and charged with armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 18-2). Defendant's case was severed from the others. At a preliminary hearing in the circuit court of Coles County before Judge Paul C. Komada, defendant's counsel objected to Judge Komada's hearing the matter, stating that when he was State's Attorney the judge had prosecuted the defendant on a similar but unrelated charge. After discussion, the motion was denied. At the hearing, probable cause was found, defendant was bound over for trial, and at a jury trial, with Judge Komada presiding, defendant was *356 found guilty and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed (108 Ill. App.3d 79), and we allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal (87 Ill.2d R. 315).
It is defendant's contention that his oral motion for mandatory substitution of judges was made at the earliest practicable moment, before the judge had ruled adversely to defendant on any substantive issue in the case, that the court waived the statutory requirement that the motion be written and, having elected to entertain the motion, erred in denying it.
Section 114-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 114-5(a)) provided:
The following colloquy ensued at the preliminary hearing, after Mr. Geisler (defense counsel) entered his appearance for the defendant in substitution of the public defender:
Following the finding of probable cause, while the court *358 and counsel were attempting to agree on a trial date, the judge stated that he was assigned to another county during a two-week period and then made the following comment:
In affirming the judgment the appellate court held that a motion for substitution of judge under section 114-5(a) may be made early, but that such motion may be made only one time. (108 Ill. App.3d 79, 81.) After reviewing and analyzing the appellate court decisions on the question it held that a motion under section 114-5(a) must be in writing. We agree. The statutory requirement is explicit and requires no interpretation. A defendant who, on the day the case is set for trial, is informed as to the identity of the judge on whose call the case is set must be given a reasonable opportunity to file a written motion.
We need not and do not reach the question whether the appellate court correctly held that such motion may be filed prior to the time that a cause "has been placed on the trial call of a judge." Nor need we, and therefore do not, reach the question whether under certain circumstances the requirement that the motion be in writing may be waived, for the reason that we are unable to read into the colloquy the statutory requirement that the motion state that the judge "is so prejudiced against him [the defendant] that he cannot receive a fair trial." Counsel suggests that the court might be "privy to some information * * * which would put the Defendant at a disadvantage" and that "it would be a conflict in your hearing." In our opinion, these statements, individually or collectively, fail to meet the statutory requirement.
For the reasons stated the judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.