Title: Joseph Finnegan v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund
Citation: 2003 WI 98
Docket Number: 2001AP002911
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 2003

2003 WI 98 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2911 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Joseph Finnegan, Tanice Finnegan, Calvin Joseph 
Finnegan, Zachary Trevor Finnegan and Mikayla 
Fae Finnegan, by their Guardian ad Litem, David 
M. Skoglind,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
Manitowoc Public Schools Self-Insured, c/o Plan 
Administrators Humana Employers Health,  
 
Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund,  
 
Defendant-Co-Appellant, 
Manitowoc Clinic Incorporated and ABC Insurance 
Company,  
 
Defendants, 
Aurora Medical Group, Inc. d/b/a Manitowoc 
Clinic and Aurora Health Care, Inc.,  
 
Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 4, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Manitowoc   
 
JUDGE: 
Fred H. Hazlewood   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX, BRADLEY, PROSSER and SYKES, JJ., join 
Part II of the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
BABLITCH, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
CROOKS, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants there were briefs by Randal 
N. Arnold, David J. Hanus and Hinshaw & Culbertson, Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Randal N. Arnold. 
 
 
 
2
For the defendant-co-appellant there were briefs by R. 
George Burnett and Liebmann, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, S.C., 
Green Bay, and oral argument by R. George Burnett. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief by Timothy 
J. Aiken, James C. Gallanis, and Aiken & Scoptur, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Timothy J. Aiken. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Martha H. Heidt and 
Doar, Drill & Skow, S.C., Baldwin, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
2003 WI 98 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-2911  
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 359) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Joseph Finnegan, Tanice Finnegan, Calvin  
Joseph Finnegan, Zachary Trevor Finnegan  
and Mikayla Fae Finnegan, by their  
Guardian ad Litem, David M. Skoglind,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
Manitowoc Public Schools Self-Insured,  
c/o Plan Administrators Humana Employers  
Health,  
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund,  
 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant, 
 
Manitowoc Clinic Incorporated and ABC  
Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendants, 
 
Aurora Medical Group, Inc. d/b/a  
Manitowoc Clinic and Aurora Health Care,  
Inc.,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Manitowoc 
County, Fred H. Hazlewood, Judge.  Reversed.     
No. 
01-2911   
 
2 
 
 
¶1 
DIANE 
S. 
SYKES, 
J.   We 
have 
this 
case 
on 
certification from the court of appeals for resolution of two 
issues: 1) does Chapter 655 of the Wisconsin Statutes (1999-
2000),1 which exclusively governs medical malpractice claims in 
this state, permit a bystander claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress in a medical malpractice lawsuit; and 2) if 
such a claim is statutorily permitted, does a misdiagnosis 
leading to the patient's eventual death give rise to a claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress under Bowen v. 
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 517 N.W.2d 432 
(1994), where the claimant witnessed the patient's physical 
deterioration but did not witness an injury-producing event or 
its immediate aftermath? 
¶2  Three members of the court——Justice Wilcox, Justice 
Prosser and the author of this lead opinion——conclude that 
Chapter 655 does not permit bystander claims for negligent 
infliction 
of 
emotional 
distress 
in 
medical 
malpractice 
lawsuits.  Two members of the court——Justice Bablitch and 
Justice Crooks——conclude that bystander claims for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress are derivative claims that fall 
within and are actionable under Chapter 655.  One member of the 
court——Chief Justice Abrahamson——concludes that if a Bowen 
bystander claim is an independent cause of action, it can be 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version. 
No. 
01-2911   
 
3 
 
brought outside Chapter 655.  Justice Bradley takes no position 
on the statutory question, concluding instead that the second 
certified question is dispositive. 
¶3 
The second issue on certification is a common-law 
question regarding whether a bystander claim can be maintained 
under Bowen where the injury-producing event is somewhat 
attenuated from the physical manifestation of injury and death 
that was witnessed by the claimant.  Three members of the court 
(Justice Wilcox, Justice Prosser, and I) have concluded that 
this claim is statutorily impermissible, and therefore we need 
not necessarily address the separate common-law attenuation 
question presented in the certification.  However, because of 
the split vote on the threshold statutory question, Justice 
Wilcox, Justice Prosser, and I join Part II of Chief Justice 
Abrahamson's opinion, in which she addresses Bowen and concludes 
that its factors have not been met.  Justice Bradley also joins 
Part II of the chief justice's opinion on this second issue, 
which constitutes the opinion of the court.  Justice Bablitch 
and Justice Crooks conclude that the Bowen factors have been 
met.  
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY   
¶4 
Jared Finnegan was born on March 3, 1997.  During the 
first week of August, 1997, Jared stayed with his grandparents 
while his parents, Tanice and Joseph Finnegan, spent their five-
year anniversary in Florida.  During that time, Jared developed 
a low-grade fever.  When the Finnegans returned on August 4th, 
Jared was still running a slightly elevated temperature of about 
No. 
01-2911   
 
4 
 
99.5 degrees.  Tanice gave him Tylenol to bring his temperature 
down. 
¶5 
The next day, Jared became increasingly fussy. By 
10:00 p.m., his temperature was up to 103.1 and he continued to 
run high temperatures through the morning of August 6th.  
Alarmed by Jared's persistent, unexplained fever, Tanice took 
Jared to the Manitowoc Clinic, where he was seen by the 
Finnegans' pediatrician, Dr. Kevin Molteni.  Dr. Molteni ordered 
a complete blood count ("CBC") and blood culture.  When the CBC 
indicated that Jared's white blood cell count fell within the 
normal range, Dr. Molteni advised Tanice to take Jared home, and 
to alternate doses of Tylenol and Motrin to combat the fever. 
¶6 
After the Finnegans returned home from the Manitowoc 
clinic, Jared's temperature spiked to 104 degrees, but came down 
somewhat 
after 
Tanice 
gave 
him 
the 
Tylenol 
and 
Motrin.  
Throughout the day, Jared continued to be very irritable.  That 
evening he had episodes of vomiting, and Tanice called Dr. 
Molteni at home to report on his condition.  Dr. Molteni advised 
Tanice to discontinue the Tylenol and to either phone the on-
call physician or go to the emergency department if Jared got 
worse.  Jared eventually fell asleep. 
¶7 
When Jared awoke at approximately 7:00 a.m. on August 
7, 1997, he was moaning and appeared lethargic.  The Finnegans 
took Jared back to the Manitowoc Clinic at 8:30 a.m.  Dr. 
Molteni noted that the results of Jared's blood culture showed 
bacteria in Jared's blood, and he told the Finnegans to 
immediately take Jared to the hospital for a lumbar puncture.  
No. 
01-2911   
 
5 
 
Dr. Molteni indicated that the lumbar puncture would tell them 
whether the bacteria had entered Jared's spinal fluid.  The 
Finnegans then drove Jared to Holy Family Hospital in Manitowoc, 
about five-to-ten minutes away. 
¶8 
The night before, on August 6, 1997, the laboratory 
had called Dr. Anne Schuette, who was on-call for Dr. Molteni.  
The lab advised Dr. Schuette that Jared's blood culture, ordered 
earlier that day by Dr. Molteni, had come back positive for 
bacteria.  Dr. Schuette, however, failed to relate this 
information to either Dr. Molteni or the Finnegans themselves.  
It was not until Tanice returned with Jared to the Manitowoc 
Clinic the next morning that Dr. Molteni reviewed the test 
results. 
¶9 
Upon arriving at the hospital, Joseph Finnegan dropped 
Tanice and Jared off at the front door and Tanice took Jared up 
the elevator to the pediatric ward.  Jared stopped breathing on 
the elevator.  When Tanice entered the pediatric ward, she 
immediately called for the nurse's attention and the nurse 
motioned for her to take Jared into a room.  Noting that Jared 
wasn't breathing, the nurse called a "code blue" and several 
hospital staff members rushed to help. 
¶10 Tanice remained with Jared throughout and was asked to 
leave the room only when Dr. Molteni arrived to do the lumbar 
puncture.  After performing the procedure, Dr. Molteni came out 
to Tanice and informed her that Jared's spinal fluid was cloudy 
and that a flight team was on its way from Children's Hospital 
in Milwaukee.  When the flight team arrived, Jared was 
No. 
01-2911   
 
6 
 
stabilized and prepared for the flight to Milwaukee.  The 
Finnegans followed the helicopter by car.  By the time Jared got 
to Children's Hospital, however, his infection had progressed 
too far and the doctors were unable to save his life.  Jared 
died at Children's Hospital on August 7, 1997. 
¶11 The Finnegans initially filed an action for wrongful 
death in Manitowoc County Circuit Court, alleging medical 
malpractice on the part of Dr. Schuette, Aurora Medical Group's 
on-call physician, based upon her failure to act upon the August 
6th laboratory results.  The Finnegans and Aurora Medical Group 
have settled the wrongful death claim for an undisclosed amount. 
¶12 The Finnegans amended their complaint to assert an 
additional claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
under Bowen, arising out of the malpractice.  This is the only 
remaining claim in the lawsuit. 
¶13 Aurora moved for summary judgment to dismiss the 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, asserting 
that: 1) Bowen-type claims for emotional distress are not 
cognizable in actions arising from medical malpractice, which 
are governed exclusively by Chapter 655; and 2) even if 
bystander 
claims 
for 
emotional 
distress 
are 
statutorily 
permitted, Bowen itself precludes the Finnegans' claim. 
¶14 The circuit court, the Honorable Fred H. Hazlewood, 
denied Aurora's motion for summary judgment, concluding that 
Chapter 655 recognizes Bowen claims for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and that the Finnegans' claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress was not precluded by Bowen 
No. 
01-2911   
 
7 
 
itself.  The court of appeals granted Aurora's petition for 
interlocutory appeal, and certified the case to this court.  We 
granted the certification to determine whether the Finnegans' 
bystander mental distress claim is permitted by Chapter 655, and 
if so, whether the claim is cognizable under Bowen itself.  We 
now reverse. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 The first certified issue is whether Chapter 655 
permits bystander claims for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress in medical malpractice actions.  This is a question of 
statutory interpretation, subject to de novo appellate review.  
Czapinski v. St. Francis Hosp., 2000 WI 80, ¶12, 236 Wis. 2d 
316, 613 N.W.2d 120 (citing Burks v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 227 
Wis. 2d 811, 824, 596 N.W.2d 391 (1999)). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
¶16 Wisconsin common law has "historically distrusted 
emotion" as the sole basis for a compensable tort claim.  Bowen, 
183 Wis. 2d at 638.  For many years, courts treated the tort of 
negligent infliction of emotional distress with skepticism, 
devising "various criteria to balance a plaintiff's compensatory 
interests for emotional distress with the interests of the 
judicial 
system 
in 
authenticating 
claims 
and 
preventing 
unlimited 
liability 
for 
the 
tortfeasor." 
 
Id. 
at 
640.  
Accordingly, 
our 
cases 
imposed 
rules 
limiting 
bystander 
emotional distress recovery to plaintiffs who 1) were in the 
"zone of danger" of the underlying accident or injury; 2) feared 
No. 
01-2911   
 
8 
 
for their own safety; and 3) suffered physical injury in tandem 
with the emotional distress.  Id. at 648. 
¶17  Bowen eliminated these "rigid doctrinal limitations" 
on tort liability for bystander claims for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress.  Id. at 651.  Bowen held that "the 
traditional elements of a tort action in negligence——negligent 
conduct, causation and injury (here severe emotional distress)——
should serve as the framework for evaluating a bystander's claim 
of negligent infliction of emotional distress."  Id. at 652-53. 
¶18  Bowen reiterated, however, the recurrent concerns 
about emotional distress claims: "Historically, the tort of 
negligent infliction of emotional distress has raised two 
concerns: (1) establishing authenticity of the claim and (2) 
ensuring fairness of the financial burden placed upon a 
defendant 
whose 
conduct 
was 
negligent." 
 
Id. 
at 
655.  
Accordingly, 
the 
court 
in 
Bowen 
adopted 
three 
elemental 
requirements and applied a public policy analysis in order to 
"help assure that the claim . . . is genuine, that allowing 
recovery is not likely to place an unreasonable burden upon the 
defendant, and that allowance of recovery will not contravene"  
public policy.  Id. at 656. 
¶19  The three prerequisites to a Bowen bystander claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress are: 1) the injury 
suffered by the victim must have been fatal or severe; 2) the 
claimant must be related to the victim as a spouse, parent, 
child, grandparent, grandchild, or sibling; and 3) the claimant 
must have witnessed the incident causing death or serious injury 
No. 
01-2911   
 
9 
 
or "the gruesome aftermath of such an event minutes after it 
occurs."  Id. at 656-58.  In addition to these basic 
limitations, the court in Bowen said that liability for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress (like liability in 
ordinary negligence cases) may be precluded as a matter of law 
by considerations of public policy: 
A court deals with . . . concerns [about claim 
authenticity 
and 
fairness 
to 
the 
defendant] 
by 
exploring 
in 
each 
case 
such 
public 
policy 
considerations as: (1) whether the injury is too 
remote from the negligence; (2) whether the injury is 
wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the 
negligent tortfeasor; (3) whether in retrospect it 
appears too extraordinary that the negligence should 
have brought about the harm; (4) whether allowance of 
recovery would place an unreasonable burden on the 
negligent 
tortfeasor; 
(5) 
whether 
allowance 
of 
recovery would be too likely to open the way to 
fraudulent 
claims; 
or 
(6) 
whether 
allowance 
of 
recovery would enter a filed that has no sensible or 
just stopping point.  
Id. at 655. 
¶20 The 
Finnegans' 
bystander 
claim 
for 
negligent 
infliction of emotional distress is premised upon having 
witnessed the physical deterioration and death of their son as a 
result of an act of medical malpractice.  Medical malpractice is 
governed by Chapter 655 of the Wisconsin Statutes, enacted in 
1975 to "control[] all claims for death or injury resulting from 
medical malpractice."  Czapinski, 236 Wis. 2d 316, ¶18.  Chapter 
655 "provides medical patients a recourse for health care 
No. 
01-2911   
 
10 
 
liability and establishes the Patients Compensation Fund."2  Id., 
¶14. 
¶21 We have previously recognized the legislative purposes 
that led to the enactment of Chapter 655:  
The legislature cited a sudden increase in the number 
of malpractice suits, in the size of awards, and in 
malpractice insurance premiums, and identified several 
impending dangers: increased health care costs, the 
prescription 
of 
elaborate 
"defensive" 
medical 
procedures, the unavailability of certain hazardous 
services and the possibility that physicians would 
curtail their practices. 
Id. (citing State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 
508, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978)).  Thus, Chapter 655 was intended to 
limit, not expand, medical malpractice liability. Northwest 
General Hosp. v. Yee, 115 Wis. 2d 59, 64, 339 N.W.2d 583 (1983). 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin 
Statute 
§ 655.27 
"create[s] 
a 
patients 
compensation fund for the purpose of paying that portion of a 
medical malpractice claim which is in excess of [the limits 
expressed in the chapter]" for "paying future medical expense 
payments 
under 
§ 655.015" 
and 
for 
"paying 
claims 
under" 
§ 655.27(1m).  The fund "provide[s] occurrence coverage for 
claims against health care providers that have complied with 
th[e] chapter, and against employees of those health care 
providers, and for reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in 
payment of claims and fund administrative expenses."  The 
chapter provides a detailed outline for the administration of 
the fund, including "Peer Review Activities," § 655.27(1m); 
"Fund 
Administration 
and 
Operation," 
§ 655.27(2); 
Fee 
Assessment, 
Establishment, 
Limitation, 
and 
Collection, 
§ 655.27(3); "Fund Accounting and Audit," § 655.27(4); "Claims 
Procedures," § 655.27(5); a legislatively designated "Integrity 
of [the] Fund" which ensures that it "shall be held in trust for 
the purposes of th[e] chapter and may not be used for purposes 
other than those of th[e] chapter,"  § 655.27(6); and, finally, 
for "Actions Against Insurers, Self-insurers, or Providers." 
§ 655.27(7). 
No. 
01-2911   
 
11 
 
¶22 It 
is 
now 
firmly 
established 
that 
Chapter 
655 
constitutes the exclusive procedure and remedy for medical 
malpractice in Wisconsin.  Czapinski, 236 Wis. 2d 316, ¶14; 
Rineck v. Johnson, 155 Wis. 2d 659, 665, 456 N.W.2d 336 (1990);3 
Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d at 499; Ziulkowski v. Nierengarten, 210 
Wis. 2d 98, 102, 565 N.W.2d 164 (Ct. App. 1997).  Accordingly, 
any claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising 
out of medical malpractice must find expression within the 
statutory framework of Chapter 655. 
¶23 Wisconsin Statutes § 655.005(1) provides: 
Any person listed in s. 655.007 having a claim or a 
derivative claim against a health care provider or an 
employee of the health care provider, for damages for 
bodily injury or death due to acts or omissions of the 
employee of the health care provider acting within the 
scope of his or her employment and providing health 
care services, is subject to this chapter. 
¶24 Wisconsin Statutes § 655.007 states:  
On and after July 24, 1975, any patient or the 
patient's representative having a claim or any spouse, 
parent, minor sibling or child of the patient having a 
derivative claim for injury or death on account of 
malpractice is subject to this chapter.     
¶25 As a primary matter, neither Wis. Stat. § 655.005 nor 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007 specifically describes a Bowen-type claim 
for emotional distress or confers standing on a bystander to 
bring such a claim in a medical malpractice lawsuit.  Section 
655.005(1) refers to all claims or derivative claims "for 
                                                 
3 Rineck v. Johnson, 155 Wis. 2d 659, 665, 456 N.W.2d 336 
(1990), was overruled on other grounds in Chang v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 549, 514 N.W.2d 399 (1994). 
No. 
01-2911   
 
12 
 
damages for bodily injury or death," and Wis. Stat. § 655.007 
refers to the claims of patients and the derivative claims of 
specified 
relatives 
"for 
injury 
or 
death 
on 
account 
of 
malpractice."  Emotional distress claims arising from witnessing 
an injury-causing event as a related bystander constitute an 
entirely different class of claim and are not mentioned. 
¶26  The statutes specify that a relative's claim must be 
derivative to fall within the scope of allowable medical 
malpractice recovery, and only certain relatives are included.  
See Wis. Stat. § 655.007 ("[A]ny spouse, parent, minor sibling 
or child of the patient having a derivative claim for injury or 
death on account of malpractice is subject to this chapter."); 
Wis. Stat. § 655.005(1)("Any person listed in s. 655.007 having 
a 
claim 
or 
a 
derivative 
claim 
against 
a 
health 
care 
provider . . . is subject to this chapter.").  Our jurisprudence 
outlines the types of claims that are considered derivative.  
Claims for the loss of society, companionship, and consortium 
are derivative even though they technically "belong" to the 
close relative making the claim.  Korth v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 
115 Wis. 2d 326, 331, 340 N.W.2d 494 (1983) (a parent's claim 
for loss 
of 
society and 
companionship with 
a 
child is 
derivative); Peeples v. Sargent, 77 Wis. 2d 612, 643, 253 N.W.2d 
459 (1977) (a claim for loss of consortium is derivative 
personal injury right which does not pass to bankruptcy 
trustee); Richie v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 2d 51, 
56, 409 N.W.2d 146 (Ct. App. 1987)([A] claim for loss of 
No. 
01-2911   
 
13 
 
consortium is derivative in that "it derives from physical or 
mental injuries suffered by a family member."). 
¶27 In contrast, a claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress is not considered derivative; although it 
arises from a shared set of underlying facts, as do loss of 
society, 
companionship, 
or 
consortium 
claims, 
negligent 
infliction of emotional distress is an independent tort injury 
suffered by the bystander himself or herself as a result of the 
shock of having witnessed an extraordinary and traumatic event.  
Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 657-58.  As we explained in Bowen: 
The emotional harm from the serious injury or loss of 
a spouse, parent, child, grandparent, grandchild or 
sibling is not the harm compensated in this tort.  The 
shock of seeing efforts to save the life of an injured 
spouse in an ambulance or hospital, for example, will 
not be compensated because it is a life experience 
that all may expect to endure.  The compensable 
serious emotional distress of a bystander under the 
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress is 
not measured by the acute emotional distress of the 
loss of the family member.  Rather the damages arise 
from the bystander's observance of the circumstances 
of the death or serious injury, either when the 
incident occurs or soon after."  
Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 659-60 (emphasis added).  A Bowen claim 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress does not depend 
on the primary tort victim's ability to make the claim. 
 
¶28  A plaintiff who sues for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress under Bowen is asserting that he or she has 
been the victim of an independent tort, not that he or she has a 
separate but dependent damages claim deriving from a tort injury 
to another, as in a derivative claim such as loss of consortium 
No. 
01-2911   
 
14 
 
or society and companionship.  We have held that a parent's 
derivative claim for loss of society and companionship must be 
joined with the child's personal injury claim.  See Shockley v. 
Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 404, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975).  Unlike a 
Bowen bystander claim, a derivative claim for loss of consortium 
or loss of society and companionship does not have its own 
elements distinct from the negligence claim to which it 
attaches; juries are instructed that loss of consortium or loss 
of society and companionship are categories of damages, not 
separate negligence inquiries.  See Wis JI——Civil 1815 (loss of 
consortium), 1837 (parent's loss of society and companionship), 
1838 (minor child's loss of society and companionship)(all 
appearing in the jury instruction manual under the subheading 
"Damages"). 
¶29  A Bowen bystander claim, as has been noted, has its 
own 
separate 
and 
distinct 
elements 
and 
rigorous 
proof 
prerequisites.  See, supra, ¶¶16-18.  A Bowen claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress is not merely a 
separate but dependent damages claim attaching to the primary 
negligence claim, but, rather, is a distinct and independent 
tort, on which the jury is separately instructed and must make 
separate, elemental findings in the special verdict.  See Wis 
JI——Civil 
1510 
(negligent 
infliction 
of 
emotional 
distress)(classified in the jury instruction manual among the 
negligence instructions, not the damages instructions).     
 
¶30  Thus, I conclude (joined by Justices Wilcox and 
Prosser) that a claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
No. 
01-2911   
 
15 
 
distress under Bowen is independent, not derivative; as such, a 
Bowen claim premised upon medical malpractice is not recognized 
in Chapter 655.  See Kosieradzki v. Matheys, 2002 WI App 191, 
¶10, 256 Wis. 2d 839, 649 N.W.2d 717 (concluding that under 
Bowen, 
"emotional 
distress 
claims 
are 
independent, 
not 
derivative").  Because Chapter 655 exclusively governs all 
claims arising out of medical malpractice, and because the 
legislature 
did 
not 
include 
Bowen-type 
claims 
in 
Wis. Stat. §§ 655.005(1) or 655.007, I conclude (joined by 
Justices Wilcox and Prosser) that negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claims arising out of medical malpractice are 
not actionable under Wisconsin law.4  
                                                 
 
4 Chief Justice Abrahamson's opinion contends that negligent 
infliction 
of 
emotional 
distress 
arising 
out 
of 
medical 
malpractice is actionable as "a valid tort claim outside chapter 
655," citing Johnson v. Rogers Memorial Hospital, Inc., 2001 WI 
68, 244 Wis. 2d 364, 627 N.W.2d 890; McEvoy v. Group Health 
Cooperative of Eau Claire, 213 Wis. 2d 507, 570 N.W.2d 397 
(1997); and Northwest General Hospital v. Yee, 115 Wis. 2d 59, 
339 N.W.2d 583 (1983).  Chief Justice Abrahamson's opinion, 
¶¶47-50.  Yee was a contract action on a medical debt.  Yee, 115 
Wis. 2d at 66.  McEvoy was a bad faith insurance claim against 
an HMO.  McEvoy, 213 Wis. 2d at 513.  Neither case involved a 
claim for personal injury arising out of or premised upon 
medical malpractice.  In Johnson, the plaintiff parents sued 
their adult daughter's therapists on negligence and contract 
theories for allegedly implanting false memories about childhood 
abuse.  We only very summarily addressed the applicability of 
Chapter 655 in Johnson, citing Sawyer v. Midelfort, 227 Wis. 2d 
124, 595 N.W.2d 423 (1999), and Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 
2d 223, 424 N.W.2d 159 (1988), for the proposition that "such 
claims . . . [may] move forward outside the realm of chapter 
655."  Johnson, 244 Wis. 2d 364, ¶20.  However, neither Sawyer 
nor 
Schuster 
specifically 
addressed 
the 
applicability 
or 
exclusivity of Chapter 655.  Accordingly, because Johnson's 
treatment of the issue was very cursory and was based entirely 
No. 
01-2911   
 
16 
 
¶31 Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 893.55 does not, as the 
Finnegans contend, operate to expand the categories of claims or 
claimants allowed by Chapter 655 to encompass Bowen bystander 
claims arising out of medical malpractice.  Entitled "Medical 
malpractice; limitation of actions; limitation of damages; 
itemization of damages," Wis. Stat. § 893.55 details certain 
procedural 
and 
substantive 
limits 
placed 
upon 
medical 
malpractice 
actions 
in 
this 
state. 
 
Specifically, 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1), 
(2), 
and 
(3) 
contain 
statutes 
of 
limitation for medical malpractice actions; subsection (4) 
specifies monetary limits on non-economic damages; subsection 
(5) requires an itemization of the categories of damages awarded 
in the special verdict; subsection (6) incorporates the rules of 
contributory negligence into medical malpractice actions; and 
subsection (7) alters the collateral source rule for purposes of 
medical 
malpractice 
actions. 
 
Thus, 
the 
provisions 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55 enumerate and limit the damages that may be 
collected in medical malpractice actions which, as a primary 
matter, remain governed by Chapter 655. 
¶32 More specifically, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(a) defines 
"noneconomic damages" as compensation for "pain and suffering; 
humiliation; embarrassment; worry; mental distress; noneconomic 
effects of disability including loss of enjoyment of the normal 
activities, benefits and pleasures of life and loss of mental or 
physical health, well-being or bodily functions; loss of 
                                                                                                                                                             
on two cases that did not even address the issue, I conclude 
that Johnson is neither helpful nor controlling here.       
No. 
01-2911   
 
17 
 
consortium, society and companionship; or loss of love and 
affection."  Wisconsin Statute § 893.55(5) provides that:  
Every award of damages under ch. 655 shall specify the 
sum of money, if any, awarded for each of the 
following for each claimant:  
(a) 
Pain, 
suffering 
and 
noneconomic 
effects 
of 
disability.  
(b) Loss of consortium, society and companionship or 
loss of love and affection.  
(c) Loss of earnings or earning capacity.  
(d) Each element of medical expenses.  
(e) Other economic injuries and damages.  
¶33 While 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 
893.55(4) enumerates "mental 
distress" as a noneconomic damage in a medical malpractice 
action, that section does not specifically address whose mental 
distress is included.  However, loss of consortium, society, and 
companionship and loss of love and affection——the categories of 
damages 
traditionally 
recoverable 
by 
close 
relatives 
in 
derivative 
claims——are 
listed 
separately 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4). 
 
Loss 
of 
consortium, 
society, 
companionship, love, and affection are also listed separately in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(5); the statute specifies that damages for 
the patient's "pain, suffering and noneconomic effects of 
disability" is to be itemized separately from the relative's 
damages for "loss of consortium, society and companionship or 
loss of love and affection."  Wis. Stat. § 893.55(5)(a) and (b).  
We note that Wis. Stat. § 893.55(5)(b) makes no mention of 
"mental distress" damages, instead listing only "loss of 
No. 
01-2911   
 
18 
 
consortium, society and companionship, or loss of love and 
affection."  Wis. Stat. § 893.55(5)(b).  Thus, the legislature 
has distinguished between damages that are recoverable by the 
patient and those that are recoverable by the patient's 
relatives.  Relatives' recovery is confined to damages for loss 
of consortium, society, companionship, love, and affection, and 
does not include mental distress damages associated with an 
independent Bowen tort claim. 
¶34 In 
Czapinski 
we 
rejected 
the 
argument 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55 operates to expand the class of claimants 
entitled to recover for medical malpractice under Chapter 655.  
Czapinski, 236 Wis. 2d 316, ¶¶13, 19.  Czapinski held that adult 
children do not have standing to sue for loss of society and 
companionship 
arising 
out 
of 
medical 
malpractice 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007, 
and 
also 
concluded 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55 does not operate to confer standing or 
expand the allowable scope of medical malpractice claims or 
claimants under Chapter 655.  Id. 
¶35  Similarly here, Wis. Stat. § 893.55 does not authorize 
bystander claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
arising out of medical malpractice where such claims are 
otherwise 
impermissible 
under 
Chapter 
655. 
 
Wisconsin 
Statute § 893.55 
limits 
recoverable 
damages 
in 
medical 
malpractice actions and requires separate itemization of each 
element of damage.  Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4) and (5).  The statute 
does not expand the scope or nature of medical malpractice 
liability beyond that which is permitted by Chapter 655. 
No. 
01-2911   
 
19 
 
¶36  This conclusion is consistent with the court of 
appeals' decision in Ziulkowski, 210 Wis. 2d at 102-06.  
Ziulkowski presented the narrower question of whether adult 
children of victims of medical malpractice can maintain a Bowen 
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  The court 
of appeals concluded that neither Bowen nor Chapter 655 permits 
such a claim.  Ziulkowski, 210 Wis. 2d at 102, 106.  The 
question in this case is broader, and my analysis differs 
somewhat 
from 
the 
analysis 
in 
Ziulkowski; 
nevertheless, 
Ziulkowski's conclusion is 
consistent 
with 
the 
conclusion 
reached here. 
¶37 In Chapter 655, the legislature has established an 
exclusive framework for medical malpractice litigation in this 
state, and has limited the classes of allowable claims and 
eligible 
claimants. 
 
I 
conclude 
that 
neither 
Wis. Stat. §§ 655.005 
nor 
655.007 
explicitly 
or 
implicitly 
allows a Bowen-type bystander claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.  Wisconsin Statute § 893.55 enumerates and 
limits the types of damages that are recoverable when authorized 
by Chapter 655 in the first instance; it does not operate to 
expand the classes of allowable claims or eligible claimants 
under Chapter 655.  I conclude that the independent bystander 
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress is not 
actionable in the medical malpractice context. 
¶38  As a result of our conclusion on the statutory 
question, Justices Wilcox, Prosser, and I need not necessarily 
resolve the second certified question, which presents a common-
No. 
01-2911   
 
20 
 
law issue regarding the scope of Bowen.  Specifically, the 
second certified question is whether a bystander claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress can be made where 
there is some attenuation between the injury-causing event and 
the physical deterioration and death from that injury, and where 
the claimant witnesses the deterioration and death of the 
victim, but not the injury-causing event or its immediate 
aftermath.  Because the court is split on the statutory 
question, Justices Wilcox, Prosser, and I join Part II of Chief 
Justice Abrahamson's opinion, in which she addresses the Bowen 
issue and concludes that the Bowen factors are not met.  Justice 
Bradley also joins Part II of the chief justice's opinion.  
Accordingly, the order of the circuit court is reversed.   
By the Court.—The order of the Manitowoc County Circuit 
Court is reversed.   
¶39 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and DAVID T. PROSSER, JR. join this opinion.   
 
 
 
No.  01-2911.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶40 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring).  
I conclude that if a parent's claim of negligent infliction of 
emotional 
distress 
resulting 
from 
medical 
malpractice 
in 
treating his or her child is an independent cause of action, the 
claim can be brought outside chapter 655.   
¶41 Nevertheless, I conclude that the "bystander claim"5 
urged by the parent in this case cannot proceed because it does 
not fall within the requirements of Bowen v. Lumbermen's Mutual 
Casualty Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994).6   
¶42 I would therefore reverse the order of the Circuit 
Court for Manitowoc County. 
I 
¶43 Justice Sykes's lead opinion concludes that chapter 
655 constitutes the exclusive procedure and remedy for medical 
malpractice in Wisconsin, and that a parent's claim against a 
health care provider for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress resulting from medical malpractice in treating his or 
her child must be dismissed because the claim does not fall 
within the list of claims covered by chapter 655, specified in 
Wis. Stat. §§ 655.005(1)7 and 655.007.8 
                                                 
5 "Bystander claim" refers to the claim of a plaintiff who 
alleges emotional distress arising from a tortfeasor's negligent 
infliction of physical harm on a third person.  Bowen v. 
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 632, 517 N.W.2d 431 
(1994).  
6 Justices Wilcox, Bradley, Prosser, and Sykes join this 
sentence and Part II of the opinion.  Part II is the majority 
opinion. 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 655.005(1) provides: 
No.  01-2911.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶44 The lead opinion reasons that a parent's claim of 
negligent 
infliction of 
emotional 
distress 
resulting 
from 
medical malpractice in the treatment of his or her child is not 
covered by chapter 655 as follows: (1) a parent's claim is not 
for medical malpractice and is independent of his or her child's 
claim, that is, it is not a derivative suit;9 (2) chapter 655 
                                                                                                                                                             
Any person listed in s. 655.007 having a claim or a 
derivative claim against a health care provider or an 
employee of the health care provider, for damages for 
bodily injury or death due to acts or omissions of the 
employee of the health care provider acting within the 
scope of his or her employment and providing health 
care services, is subject to this chapter.  
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 655.007 provides: 
On and after July 24, 1975, any patient or the 
patient's representative having a claim or any spouse, 
parent, minor sibling or child of the patient having a 
derivative claim for injury or death on account of 
malpractice is subject to this chapter. 
9 The lead opinion's conclusion that a parent's claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress is an independent, 
not derivative, claim is suspect.  The court of appeals has held 
that an adult child's suit against a health care provider for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from medical 
malpractice 
in 
the 
care 
of 
a 
parent 
was 
not 
within 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007.  See Ziulkowski v. Nierengarten, 210 
Wis. 2d 98, 104-06, 565 N.W.2d 164 (Ct. App. 1997).  The adult 
child plaintiff was barred from bringing suit in Ziulkowski 
because derivative claims were held to be limited to minor 
children under chapter 655.  Id.  The implication is that a suit 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress is a derivative 
suit. 
But see Kosieradzki v. Mathys, 2002 WI App 191, ¶10, 256 
Wis. 2d 839, 649 N.W.2d 717 
(concluding 
that 
under 
Bowen, 
"emotional distress claims are independent, not derivative").  
The lead opinion at ¶27 cites to and quotes from Bowen, but 
Bowen does not address or decide the question whether the claim 
for emotional distress is independent or derivative. 
No.  01-2911.ssa 
 
3 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
The lead opinion attempts to distinguish a claim for loss 
of society (which the lead opinion characterizes as derivative) 
from a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
(which the lead opinion characterizes as independent) to support 
its suspect conclusion.  The distinction between derivative and 
independent actions is, however, neither crystal clear nor 
absolute.  Indeed the distinction appears to depend on the 
purpose 
for 
which 
the 
distinction 
is 
being 
made; 
the 
characterization depends on whether the court is addressing, for 
example, contributory negligence, limits on amount of recovery, 
or statutes of limitations.  See, e.g., Korth v. Am. Family Ins. 
Co., 115 Wis. 2d 326, 340 N.W.2d 494 (1983): 
The minor's cause of action for physical injury and 
the parents' causes of action for the invasion of the 
parents' interests are separate in the sense that each 
is predicated upon the invasion of different interests 
of different persons.  The parents' claims are 
derivative, however, in the sense that they arise from 
the same tortious act that inflicted injury upon the 
child. . . . labels are not helpful in deciding the 
particular questions that come before the court.  The 
preferred approach is to examine the legal context in 
which the question . . . arises . . . . 
id. at 331; Peeples v. Sargent, 77 Wis. 2d 612, 253 N.W.2d 459 
(1977): 
The cause of action for consortium occasioned by an 
injury to one marriage partner is a separate cause of 
action belonging to the spouse of the injured marriage 
partner.  A wife's loss of consortium is derivative 
"in the sense it arose out of or was occasioned by an 
injury to her husband."  However, loss of consortium 
is a direct injury to the spouse who has lost the 
consortium. 
id. at 643 (citations omitted); White v. Lunder, 66 
Wis. 2d 563, 225 N.W.2d 442 (1975): 
[T]hat the question of whether a spouse's cause of 
action for loss of consortium arising in personal 
injury actions is derivative is not clearly settled 
and the cases are confusing.  
We deem it appropriate to declare, for the 
purpose 
of 
applying 
our 
comparative 
negligence 
statute, that both the causes of action for medical 
No.  01-2911.ssa 
 
4 
 
explicitly states that it applies only to patients or patients' 
representatives having a malpractice claim and to specified 
persons having a derivative claim for death on account of 
malpractice; and (3) in the present case, the parent suing for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress (rather than for 
injury to the child) is not a patient, is not a patient's 
representative, and is not suing on a derivative claim on 
account of malpractice.10   
¶45 Taking the lead opinion at its word, I fail to 
understand how it can then conclude that a parent's negligent 
                                                                                                                                                             
expenses and loss of consortium shall be deemed 
derivative.   
To declare both of these causes of action 
derivative might not be entirely logical . . . . 
id. at 574; Schwartz v. Milwaukee, 54 Wis. 2d 286, 195 
N.W.2d 480 (1972): 
[T]he wife's action [for loss of consortium] was 
derivative only in the sense it arose out of or was 
occasioned by an injury to her husband.  This is not 
the usual meaning of the word "derivative" and it 
might be more accurate to say a wife's damage was 
dependent upon the husband's injury and her cause of 
action must include the common factor of the accident 
and injury to her husband. 
id. at 293; Lord v. Hubbell, 210 Wis. 2d 150, 168, 563 
N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1997) ("we are mindful that we are to 
look beyond the labels of 'derivative' and 'separate' 
claims"). 
10 This claim is not a medical malpractice claim per se 
because a medical malpractice claim arises when there is a 
physician-patient relationship.  Ande v. Rock, 2002 WI App 136, 
¶10, 256 Wis. 2d 365, 647 N.W.2d 265.  In the present case, a 
physician-patient relationship 
does 
not exist 
between the 
complaining parent 
and 
the 
doctor. 
 
The 
child was the 
physician's patient. 
No.  01-2911.ssa 
 
5 
 
infliction of emotional distress claim is "impermissible" under 
chapter 655.  The only explanation I can come up with for its 
conclusion is that it assumes that the legislature intended to 
sweep 
away 
all 
claims 
having 
a 
connection 
with 
medical 
malpractice unless the claim is specifically included in the 
scope of chapter 655.   
¶46 To the contrary, however, several of our cases hold 
that chapter 655 does not govern every claim having a connection 
with medical malpractice.  Claims having a connection with 
medical malpractice can be brought outside chapter 655. 
¶47 For example, in Johnson v. Rogers Memorial Hospital, 
Inc., 2001 WI 68, 244 Wis. 2d 364, 627 N.W.2d 890, this court 
held that parents may sue their child's therapists for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress resulting from malpractice in 
treating the child.  The therapists argued that the claims were 
barred because they did not fall within the scope of chapter 
655, but this court allowed the claims "to move forward outside 
the realm of chapter 655" because "chapter 655 is not the 
exclusive remedy for such claims . . . ."11  
¶48 In another case, McEvoy v. Group Health Cooperative of 
Eau Claire, 213 Wis. 2d 507, 570 N.W.2d 397 (1997), the court 
allowed a suit for the tort of bad faith against a health 
                                                 
11 Johnson v. Rogers Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 2001 WI 68, ¶¶17, 
20, 244 Wis. 2d 364, 627 N.W.2d 890.  The Johnson court cited 
Sawyer v. Midelfort, 227 Wis. 2d 124, 595 N.W.2d 423 (1999), as 
another 
case 
allowing 
third 
party 
claims 
for 
negligent 
infliction of emotional distress in the medical malpractice 
arena.  In Sawyer the allegation was that the child's false 
accusations of the parent's sex abuse caused harm to the parent.   
No.  01-2911.ssa 
 
6 
 
maintenance organization, refusing to accept the organization's 
argument that it could not be sued because the suit was subject 
to chapter 655.  The court concluded, "[T]he legislature did not 
intend [in chapter 655] to go beyond regulating claims for 
medical 
malpractice," 
defining 
medical 
malpractice 
as 
"professional misconduct or unreasonable lack of skill."12   
¶49 In still another case, Northwest General Hospital v. 
Yee, 115 Wis. 2d 59, 339 N.W.2d 583 (1983), the court refused to 
read chapter 655 as governing all claims involving medical 
malpractice against a health care provider, allowing a patient 
to assert the defense of medical malpractice in a health care 
provider's suit for payment for services rendered.  The health 
care provider argued that the patient was asserting a claim for 
malpractice but not for bodily injury, and that the claim was 
not within the scope of chapter 655 and was thus prohibited.  
Examining the words of the statute and the legislative purpose, 
the court concluded that if the malpractice claim was not a 
claim for bodily injury, it did not fall within chapter 655 and 
therefore was not barred.  According to the court, contract law 
would apply regardless of chapter 655. 
¶50 That the parent's claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress falls outside of chapter 655 does not mean 
that the claim is barred.  Rather, it means that the claim may 
be a valid tort claim outside chapter 655.  Thus, the proper 
conclusion for the lead opinion to reach (assuming that the 
                                                 
12 McEvoy 
v. Group 
Health 
Coop. of Eau 
Claire, 213 
Wis. 2d 507, 527-30, 570 N.W.2d 397 (1997). 
No.  01-2911.ssa 
 
7 
 
claim is independent) is that chapter 655 does not govern a 
parent's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
from a health care provider's negligent infliction of physical 
harm on a third person. 
II 
¶51 Assuming arguendo that a parent's claim for negligent 
infliction 
of 
emotional 
distress 
resulting 
from 
medical 
malpractice is not barred by chapter 655, I conclude that 
summary judgment for the defendant was appropriate here.  This 
case is a bystander case, unlike the court's other cases 
described above concerning a third party's claims for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress involving medical malpractice.  
The leading case on a tortfeasor's liability to a bystander is 
Bowen v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., a case not involving 
medical malpractice.   
¶52 In Bowen, this court set forth three factors for 
determining whether a plaintiff could recover on his or her 
bystander claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress: 
(1) that "the injury suffered by the victim must have been fatal 
or severe"; (2) that "the victim and the plaintiff must be 
related as spouses, parent-child, grandparent-grandchild or 
siblings"; and (3) that "the plaintiff must have observed an 
extraordinary event, namely the incident and injury or the scene 
soon after the incident with the injured victim at the scene."13  
                                                 
13 Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 633. 
No.  01-2911.ssa 
 
8 
 
In bystander cases, a court rules on these factors on a case-by-
case basis.14 
¶53 The parties dispute whether the case at bar satisfies 
the third factor.  I conclude that the claim in the present case 
does not fit within the third factor. 
¶54 The parent's experiences were horrific.  The mother 
witnessed a prolonged and unsuccessful attempt to save their 
baby's life.  In the context of Bowen, however, the compensable 
serious emotional distress of a bystander is not measured by the 
acute emotional distress of the loss of a family member.  
Rather, the damages arise from the bystander's observation of an 
extraordinary event.  The hallmark of negligent infliction of 
emotional 
distress 
is 
a 
contemporaneous 
or 
nearly 
contemporaneous sensory perception of a sudden, traumatic, 
injury-producing event.  "Witnessing either an incident causing 
death or serious injury or the gruesome aftermath of such an 
event 
minutes 
after 
it 
occurs 
is 
an 
extraordinary 
experience . . . ."15   
¶55 In the present case, as in many cases, the failure to 
make the proper medical diagnosis is not an event that itself is 
perceived by a family member.  To extend Bowen to an injury 
caused by an improper diagnosis when the plaintiff observes the 
suffering of the victim and not the event that causes that 
suffering 
conflicts 
with 
the 
historical 
foundations 
for 
                                                 
14 Id. at 660. 
15 Id. at 658. 
No.  01-2911.ssa 
 
9 
 
negligent infliction of emotional distress and would be a 
significant broadening of the Bowen rule.  
¶56 For the reasons set forth, I would reverse the order 
of the Circuit Court for Manitowoc County.  
¶57 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX, 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DAVID T. PROSSER, JR., and DIANE S. SYKES 
join Part II of this opinion. 
 
 
No.  01-2911.wab 
 
1 
 
 
¶58 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
holding in this case, authored by Chief Justice Abrahamson, is 
that the Finnegans' claim does not fit within the third factor 
in Bowen.  I disagree and will address this issue first.  The 
lead opinion, authored by Justice Sykes, concludes that the 
Finnegans' claim is not permissible under chapter 655 because it 
is not derivative.  I disagree and will address this issue 
second.   
I 
¶59 The majority holding, which concludes that Bowen does 
not permit recovery in this case, is simply wrong.  The majority 
holding does not, because it cannot, articulate a principled 
distinction between the facts in this case and the facts in 
Bowen.     
¶60 Bowen set forth three factors for determining whether 
a bystander may recover for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress: (1) the injury suffered by the victim must have been 
fatal or severe; (2) the victim and the plaintiff must be 
related as spouses, parent-child, grandparent-grandchild or 
siblings; 
and 
(3) 
the 
plaintiff 
must 
have 
observed 
an 
extraordinary event, namely the incident and injury, or the 
scene soon after the incident with the injured victim at the 
scene.  Bowen v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 
633, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994).  In sum, the court in Bowen 
concluded that  
[T]o 
determine 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
public 
policy 
considerations 
whether 
to 
preclude 
liability 
for 
No.  01-2911.wab 
 
2 
 
severe emotional distress to a bystander a court must 
consider three factors: the severity of the injury to 
the victim, the relationship of the plaintiff to the 
victim, 
and 
the 
extraordinary 
circumstances 
surrounding the plaintiff's discovery of the injury.  
These factors relate to the underlying principles of 
the 
tort; 
they 
are 
relevant 
to 
measuring 
the 
authenticity of the claim and the limits of liability 
for 
emotional 
harm 
resulting from 
a 
defendant's 
negligence.  Courts must rule on these factors and the 
public policy considerations on a case-by-case basis. 
Id. at 660.   
 
¶61 It is undisputed that the Finnegans satisfy the first 
two prongs of Bowen: (1) Jared died due to egregious medical 
malpractice and (2) Jared was the Finnegans' son.  Only the 
third prong is at issue here: whether the Finnegans observed an 
extraordinary event——either witnessing an incident causing death 
or serious injury or the gruesome aftermath of such an event.  
Bowen reasoned that either witnessing an incident causing death 
or serious injury or witnessing its aftermath was different from 
"learning of a family member's death through indirect means;" 
therefore, this "is an appropriate place to draw the line 
between recoverable and non-recoverable claims."  Id. at 658.  
According to the majority holding, "the damages [for a Bowen 
claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress] arise from 
the bystander's observation of an extraordinary event."  Chief 
Justice Abrahamson's opinion, ¶54.  In other words, "the damages 
arise from the bystander's observance of the circumstances of 
the death or serious injury, either when the incident [of 
negligence] occurs or soon after."  Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 660.  
This is exactly what happened in this case. 
No.  01-2911.wab 
 
3 
 
 
¶62 Similar to the facts in Bowen, the Finnegans did not 
witness the negligent act that caused the death of their baby, 
but rather, they personally and directly experienced the 
traumatic aftermath.  See id. at 657-58.  Just as Sharon Bowen 
"saw her severely injured son trapped beneath the defendant's 
car . . . [and] watched the prolonged rescue attempt . . . ," 
the Finnegans directly experienced a prolonged attempt to save 
their dying baby's life.  Id. at 634-35.  The horrific 
experience of the Finnegans encompassed a series of events: 
receiving the news that the lab results of Jared's blood came 
back positive for bacteria and that this had been communicated 
to Dr. Schuette, who failed to notify them or act upon the 
results; observing Jared stop breathing when they were rushing 
him to the hospital for an emergency lumbar puncture; watching 
Jared stop breathing a second time while holding him in the 
hospital elevator; observing Jared change color and his head 
swelling; and finally witnessing Jared's death.      
 
¶63 How can we say that recovery is allowed for witnessing 
the aftermath of a negligent act resulting in death or serious 
injury in a single incident, but not if one witnesses the 
aftermath through a series of incidents?  If anything, it seems 
that witnessing multiple mind-numbing events due to a negligent 
act causing death or serious injury provides an even greater 
basis for recovery than witnessing just a single event.  
Regardless of whether the majority holding now believes that 
Bowen is too broad and should be limited, it is evident from 
comparing the facts in Bowen with those in the present case that 
No.  01-2911.wab 
 
4 
 
if Sharon Bowen was allowed to recover, then the Finnegans 
should as well.  There is no principled way to distinguish the 
two.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
II 
¶64 Second, I conclude that the Finnegans' claim is 
derivative and is therefore a permissible claim under chapter 
655.  The lead opinion concludes that a claim for emotional 
distress that is derived from the effects of medical malpractice 
on an immediate family member is not a "derivative" claim.  This 
is contrary to the common and well-accepted meaning of the word 
derivative.  It is also contrary to law and logic. 
¶65 The term "derivative" has a common and well-accepted 
definition: "something that derives from, grows out of, or 
results from an earlier or fundamental state or condition."  
Webster's International Dictionary 608 (3d ed. 1961).  A 
"derivative action" is defined as "[a] lawsuit arising from an 
injury to another person . . . ."  Black's Law Dictionary 455 
(7th ed. 1999).  Although it is not necessarily absolute that an 
accepted definition of an English word has the same legal 
definition, it should give one at least great pause when the two 
are so diametrically opposed.  To say that a claim derived from 
another is not derivative but is instead independent does strain 
credulity.      
¶66 The lead opinion is also contrary to law and logic.  
The lead opinion cannot deny and indeed admits that claims for 
loss of consortium and loss of society and companionship are 
derivative claims.  Further, the lead opinion acknowledges that 
No.  01-2911.wab 
 
5 
 
a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is 
similar to claims for loss of consortium and loss of society and 
companionship, in that they all arise from a shared set of 
underlying facts.  Lead op., ¶27.  Nevertheless, the lead 
opinion 
treats 
them 
entirely 
different 
by 
reaching 
the 
conclusion that claims for loss of consortium, society and 
companionship 
are 
"derivative," 
but 
claims 
for 
negligent 
infliction of emotional distress are "independent."  Simply put, 
that does not logically, nor does it legally, follow. 
¶67 The lead opinion attempts to make this distinction by 
asserting that "[a] Bowen claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress is not merely a separate but dependent 
damages claim attaching to the primary negligence claim . . . ."  
Lead op., ¶29.16  In support, the lead opinion claims that unlike 
a derivative claim for loss of consortium or society and 
companionship, 
"a 
Bowen 
bystander 
claim . . . has its own 
separate and distinct elements . . . ."  Id.  While a Bowen 
claim does have distinct elements that must be met, so do claims 
for loss of consortium, society and companionship.  In order to 
prevail on a claim for loss of consortium or society and 
companionship, a plaintiff must establish the existence of death 
                                                 
16 With respect to the lead opinion's reference to Shockley 
v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 404, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975), regarding 
the joinder of claims, we note that we have also held that while 
it is "preferable that the claims of both husband and wife for 
loss of consortium be joined . . . if this cannot be done 
because 
of 
procedural 
obstacles 
or 
the 
inability 
or 
unwillingness of the husband to assert his claim, the wife 
should not be prevented from pursuing her own independent cause 
of action."  
Fitzgerald 
v. 
Meissner 
& Hicks, 
Inc., 38 
Wis. 2d 571, 581, 157 N.W.2d 595 (1968).   
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or injury, and that the death or injury was caused by the 
defendant's negligent conduct.  Theodore V. Lyons, Jr., "Loss of 
Consortium, Society and Companionship," Law of Damages in 
Wisconsin, vol. 2, § 14.6 (2000).  In addition, such a claim 
"must be proved separately from the underlying claim in that 
distinct damages must be shown . . . ."  Giese v. Montgomery 
Ward, Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 392, 405, 331 N.W.2d 585 (1983).        
¶68 Furthermore, 
similar 
to 
the 
current 
disagreement 
regarding the nature of Bowen claims for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, early case law illustrates that there was 
also confusion regarding the "derivative" nature of claims for 
loss of consortium, society and companionship.  For example, 
this court stated in 1975 that "it is apparent . . . that the 
question of whether a spouse's cause of action for loss of 
consortium . . . is derivative is not clearly settled and the 
cases are confusing."  White v. Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d 563, 574, 225 
N.W.2d 442 
(1975). 
 
But 
ultimately, 
our 
case 
law 
has 
characterized claims for loss of consortium and loss of society 
and companionship as "derivative," based on reasoning that 
applies equally to Bowen claims for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.  See, e.g., Kottka v. PPG Indus., Inc., 130 
Wis. 2d 499, 521, 388 N.W.2d 160 (1986); Korth v. Am. Family 
Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d 326, 331, 340 N.W.2d 494 (1983); Gragg v. 
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI App 272, ¶12, 248 Wis. 2d 735, 
637 N.W.2d 477.       
¶69 Those cases, in contrast to the lead opinion's 
attempted 
distinction, 
described 
what 
makes 
a 
claim 
No.  01-2911.wab 
 
7 
 
"derivative." 
 "The claim 
for a 
loss of 
consortium is 
derivative, in the sense that it does not arise unless the other 
spouse has sustained a personal injury."  Kottka, 130 Wis. 2d at 
521 
(citing 
Fitzgerald 
v. 
Meissner 
& 
Hicks, 
Inc., 
38 
Wis. 2d 571, 579, 157 N.W.2d 595 (1968)).  In the context of a 
claim for loss of society and companionship, we have stated 
that:   
The minor's cause of action for physical injury 
and the parents' causes of action for the invasion of 
the parents' interests are separate in the sense that 
each is predicated upon the invasion of different 
interests of different persons.  The parents' claims 
are derivative, however, in the sense that they arise 
from the same tortious act that inflicted injury upon 
the child.   
Korth, 115 Wis. 2d at 331 (emphasis added).  In other words, 
"but for [a] primary tort victim's personal injury, a claim for 
loss of society and companionship or for loss of consortium 
would not exist."  Lyons, Law of Damages in Wisconsin, § 14.7 
(emphasis added).   
¶70 I see no difference in the derivative nature of claims 
for loss of consortium, society, and companionship and Bowen 
claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress——they all 
depend on and derive from the injury or death of someone else.  
Admittedly, the court of appeals has stated in dicta that "[i]n 
Bowen v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 517 
N.W.2d 432 (1994), our supreme court . . . held that emotional 
distress claims are independent, not derivative."  Kosieradzki 
v. Mathys, 2002 WI App 
191, ¶10, 
256 Wis. 2d 839, 649 
N.W.2d 717.  However, the court in Bowen did not address this 
No.  01-2911.wab 
 
8 
 
issue, much less hold that claims for emotional distress are 
independent 
instead 
of 
derivative. 
 
See 
Chief 
Justice 
Abrahamson's opinion, ¶44 n.5.   
¶71 In Kosieradzki, the court of appeals held that an 
insurance policy's "each person" limit applied instead of the 
"each accident" limit based on the terms of the insurance 
policy.  The court acknowledged that its statement about Bowen 
was pure dicta, stating that "[h]ow the law defines particular 
claims is immaterial.  At issue [in this case] is how the policy 
treats them, which is determined by the language of the policy."  
Kosieradzki, 256 Wis. 2d 839, ¶10.   
¶72 Further, just because a claim is "derivative" does not 
mean that it cannot involve a separate and independent loss.  As 
we reasoned in Kottka, even though a claim, such as for the loss 
of society and companionship of a spouse, is derivative, it "is 
not for the other spouse's personal injury but for the separate 
and independent loss which the noninjured spouse sustains."  
Kottka, 130 Wis. 2d at 521 (emphasis added) (citing Fitzgerald, 
38 Wis. 2d at 579).17  Therefore, despite Bowen's distinction 
between the emotional harm due to serious injury or death of a 
family member and the emotional distress from observing a family 
member's death or serious injury, the relevant point is that 
                                                 
17 "An action may be considered 'derivative' in the sense 
that it is dependent on the existence of a separate claim based 
on injury to a family member, but it may be considered 
'independent' in the sense that it must be based on a loss 
sustained personally by the parent."  Robert Michael Ey, "Cause 
of Action by Parent for Loss of Child's Consortium," 7 Causes of 
Action 2d 319 (2003) (citing Giese v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 111 
Wis. 2d 392, 331 N.W.2d 585 (1983)).    
No.  01-2911.wab 
 
9 
 
both of these depend on and derive from the injury or death of 
someone else——i.e., they are both derivative.  Thus, the 
statement in Kosieradzki that Bowen claims are independent is 
not only dicta, it is incorrect. 
¶73 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  Based on the 
above, I would hold that the Finnegans' claim is derivative and 
is therefore a permissible claim under chapter 655.   
 
¶74 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this dissenting opinion.   
 
 
 
 
 
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