Title: Blackmon v. Renasant Bank
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1150692
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 17, 2017

Rel: 03/17/2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
1150692
____________________
Deborah Michelle Blackmon and the Estate of Brian Alan
Blackmon
v.
Renasant Bank
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court
(CV-14-901198)
PARKER, Justice.
Deborah Michelle Blackmon ("Deborah") and the estate of
Brian Alan Blackmon ("the estate") appeal from a partial
summary judgment entered in favor of Renasant Bank and against
1150692
them by the Madison Circuit Court.  We dismiss the appeal as
being from a nonfinal judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
On November 8, 2004, Deborah and her husband Brian Alan
Blackmon (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the
Blackmons") executed an agreement establishing a home-equity
line of credit with Renasant Bank secured by a mortgage on the
Blackmons' house.1  The affidavit testimony of Jerry Harris,
first vice president of Renasant Bank, indicates that, also on
November 8, 2004, the Blackmons made an initial draw on their
home-equity line of credit in the amount of $110,000. 
Harris's affidavit states that, from July 21, 2006, to June 6,
2013, the Blackmons made a total of 125 withdrawals on the
home-equity 
line 
of 
credit 
totaling 
"approximately
$387,929.00."  In addition to making withdrawals on the home-
equity line of credit, the Blackmons also made payments on the
home-equity line of credit during that time.
On June 14, 2013, Brian Alan Blackmon died.  Harris's
affidavit states that, following Brian Alan Blackmon's death,
1We note that Deborah contests the fact that she executed
the documents establishing the home-equity line of credit and
the mortgage document.
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Deborah "made five separate payments" on the home-equity line
of credit.  However, the payments made by Deborah did not
satisfy the entirety of the money the Blackmons owed Renasant
Bank under the terms of the home-equity line of credit, and
Deborah failed to make any additional payments.  Deborah
denied that she had executed the home-equity line of credit or
the mortgage and, thus, denied liability for any outstanding
balance due under the home-equity line of credit.  Harris's
affidavit states that the home-equity line of credit "is
currently in default."  Harris's affidavit states: "The
balance on [the home-equity line of credit] as of June 23,
2015, is $129,545.86, inclusive of principal, interest and
late fees."  Harris's affidavit further states that "[t]he
total amount due to Renasant Bank at this time, inclusive of
principal, interest and attorney fees is $146,545.86."
On June 5, 2014, Renasant Bank sued Deborah and the
estate seeking a judgment declaring that the Blackmons had
executed the agreement establishing a home-equity line of
credit with Renasant Bank and a mortgage on the Blackmons'
house securing the home-equity line of credit and asserting a
claim of breach of contract seeking to recover the amount of
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money owed under the terms of the home-equity line of credit. 
On July 7, 2014, Deborah and the estate filed an answer to
Renasant Bank's complaint and asserted a counterclaim,
requesting a judgment declaring that the mortgage on the
Blackmons' house was not enforceable.
On May 4, 2015, by leave of the circuit court, Renasant
Bank filed an amended complaint against Deborah and the
estate. 
 
Renasant 
Bank 
reasserted 
its 
breach-of-contract claim
and 
asserted 
additional 
claims 
for 
"equitable 
mortgage," 
"open
account," and "account stated."  Through these various
theories of recovery, Renasant Bank's sole request for 
damages
was the outstanding balance owed on the home-equity line of
credit.  On August 21, 2015, Renasant Bank filed a second
amended complaint against Deborah and the estate.  In addition
to the claims detailed above, Renasant Bank asserted the
following claims: unjust enrichment, money had and received,
"quasi-contract," and "constructive trust."  Through these
various theories of recovery, Renasant Bank's sole request for
damages was the outstanding balance owed on the home-equity
line of credit.
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On November 12, 2015, Renasant Bank filed a motion for a
summary judgment.  On December 31, 2015, the circuit court
entered a partial summary judgment in favor of Renasant Bank
on its claims alleging unjust enrichment and money had and
received in the amount of $142,612.85.  The circuit court
specifically stated that "[a]ll other counts asserted by the
parties remain pending."
On January 28, 2016, Deborah and the estate filed a
motion to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court's partial
summary judgment in favor of Renasant Bank.  On February 23,
2016, the circuit court denied Deborah and the estate's
postjudgment motion.
On March 28, 2016, Deborah and the estate purported to
appeal the circuit court's December 31, 2015, partial summary
judgment in favor of Renasant Bank.  On November 28, 2016, the
clerk of the Supreme Court entered an order remanding the case
to the circuit court because all the claims pending before the
circuit court had not been adjudicated in the circuit court's
December 31, 2015, partial summary judgment.  On remand, upon
motion of Deborah and the estate, the circuit court certified
its December 31, 2015, partial summary judgment in favor of
5
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Renasant Bank as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ.
P.2
Standard of Review
"Whether the action involves separate claims and whether
there is a final decision as to at least one of the claims are
questions of law to which we will apply a de novo standard of
review."  Scrushy v. Tucker, 955 So. 2d 988, 996 (Ala.
2006)(emphasis added).
Discussion
Although neither party challenges the appropriateness of
the circuit court's Rule 54(b) certification of its December
31, 2015, partial-summary-judgment order in favor of Renasant
Bank, "it is well settled that this Court may consider, ex
mero motu, whether a judgment or order is sufficiently final
to support an appeal."  Natures Way Marine, LLC v. Dunhill
Entities, LP, 63 So. 3d 615, 618 (Ala. 2010).  In the present
2We note that Deborah and the estate filed a third-party
complaint against Brenda G. Day, the notary public who
notarized the home-equity line of credit agreement and the
mortgage, asserting various claims.  On March 24, 2016, the
circuit court entered a partial summary judgment in favor of
Day as to some of the third-party claims against her; the
circuit court did not certify that judgment as final pursuant
to Rule 54(b).  Day is not a party to the appeal before this
Court.
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case, as noted above, the circuit court certified as final
pursuant to Rule 54(b) its December 31, 2015, partial summary
judgment as to Renasant Bank's unjust-enrichment and money-
had-and-received claims against Deborah and the estate.  This
Court has stated that "'[n]ot every order has the requisite
element of finality that can trigger the operation of Rule
54(b).'"  Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892 So. 2d
354, 361 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Goldome Credit Corp. v. Player,
869 So. 2d 1146, 1147 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (emphasis
omitted)).  We will first consider whether the circuit court's
Rule 54(b) certification of its December 31, 2015, partial
summary judgment is appropriate.
Rule 54(b) states, in relevant part:
"When more than one claim for relief is presented in
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry
of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than
all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment."
Clearly, Renasant Bank's complaint involves multiple claims
against multiple parties.  "'[F]or a Rule 54(b) certification
of finality to be effective, it must fully adjudicate at least
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one claim or fully dispose of the claims as they relate to at
least one party.'  Haynes v. Alfa Fin. Corp., 730 So. 2d 178,
181 (Ala. 1999)."  Scrushy, 955 So. 2d at 996.
We must consider whether Renasant Bank's unjust-
enrichment 
and 
money-had-and-received 
claims 
were 
separate 
and
distinct claims that were fully adjudicated by the circuit
court's December 31, 2015, partial summary judgment.  This
Court considered a very similar issue in Scrushy.  In North
Alabama 
Electric 
Cooperative 
v. 
New 
Hope 
Telephone
Cooperative, 7 So. 3d 342, 345 (Ala. 2008), this Court
summarized the applicable law from Scrushy:
"The Scrushy Court quoted with approval the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for
'"certain rules of thumb to identify those types of
claims that can never be considered separate"' for
purposes of Rule 54(b). 955 So. 2d at 998 (quoting
Stearns v. Consolidated Mgmt., Inc., 747 F.2d 1105,
1108 (7th Cir. 1984)). One such rule is that
'"'claims 
cannot 
be 
separate 
unless 
separate
recovery is possible on each.... Hence, mere
variations of legal theory do not constitute
separate claims.'"' Id. (quoting Stearns, 747 F.2d
at 1108-09, quoting in turn Amalgamated Meat Cutters
v. Thompson Farms Co., 642 F.2d 1065, 1071 (7th Cir.
1981)). The Scrushy Court also noted the similar
rule of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, see Rieser v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,
224 F.2d 198, 199 (2d Cir. 1955), which was
summarized by the commentators of Federal Practice
and Procedure:
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"'"A single claimant 
presents 
multiple
claims 
for 
relief 
under 
the 
Second
Circuit's formulation when the possible
recoveries are more than one in number and
not mutually exclusive or, stated another
way, when the facts give rise to more than
one legal right or cause of action ....
However, when a claimant presents a number
of legal theories, but will be permitted to
recover only on one of them, the bases for
recovery are mutually exclusive, or simply
presented 
in 
the 
alternative, 
and 
plaintiff
has only a single claim for relief for
purposes of Rule 54(b)."'
"955 So. 2d at 998 (quoting 10 Charles Alan Wright
et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2657 (3d ed.
1998)(footnotes omitted))."
In Scrushy, this Court adopted the principles discussed
above and concluded that "the various claims in the complaint
[at issue in that case were] not all variations on a single
theme."  955 So. 2d at 998.  This Court so concluded because
some of the claims asserted by the plaintiff in that case
sought damages that other of the claims did not.  See id.
(stating that "[the plaintiff's] alleged breach of duty in
accepting bonuses that HealthSouth was not legally obligated
to pay is a sufficiently separate breach that is not alleged
elsewhere in the complaint").
In the present case, Renasant Bank alleges the following
claims against Deborah and the estate: a claim seeking a
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judgment declaring that Deborah executed the agreement
establishing a home-equity line of credit with Renasant Bank
and a mortgage on the Blackmons' house securing that line of
credit; breach of contract; "equitable mortgage"; "open
account"; "account stated"; unjust enrichment; money had and
received; "quasi-contract"; and "constructive trust."  Unlike
in Scrushy, the only damages requested by Renasant Bank for
each of the above-asserted claims is the outstanding balance
Renasant Bank alleges Deborah and the estate owe under the
home-equity line of credit.  Although Renasant Bank has
asserted several different legal theories, it has requested
the same damages as to each claim.  In fact, we note that
Renasant Bank states that all of its claims, including its
equitable claims, "originated" from "the written contract." 
Renasant Bank's brief, at p. 28.  According to Renasant Bank,
there is only one recovery possible for each claim: the
outstanding balance under the home-equity line of credit.3 
3In its partial summary judgment in favor of Renasant
Bank, the circuit court awarded Renasant Bank $142,612.85 of
the $146,545.86 it requested in damages.  Based on the fact
that the circuit court awarded the majority of the damages
requested by Renasant Bank, it would appear that the circuit
court adjudicated all the claims against Deborah and the
estate.  However, the circuit court specifically stated in its
partial summary judgment that "[a]ll other counts [besides
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Therefore, under the principles set forth in 
Scrushy, Renasant
Bank's several claims are actually just one claim, which the
circuit court's December 31, 2015, partial summary judgment
did not fully adjudicate.  Consequently, the adjudication of
Renasant Bank's unjust-enrichment and money-had-and-received
claims are not appropriate for Rule 54(b) certification; the
circuit court's partial summary judgment did not fully
adjudicate a single claim.4  See James v. Alabama Coalition
unjust enrichment and money had and received] asserted by the
parties remain pending."  Accordingly, we must conclude that
the circuit court did not fully adjudicate the claims asserted
by Renasant Bank against Deborah and the estate.
4We 
also 
note 
that 
Renasant 
Bank's 
unjust-enrichment 
claim
(which was adjudicated by the circuit court's partial summary
judgment) and its breach-of-contract claim (which remains
pending in the circuit court), which are based on the same
facts and contract, are mutually exclusive.  See, e.g., Lass
v. Bank of America, N.A., 695 F.3d 129, 140 (1st Cir. 2012)
("[D]amages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment are
mutually exclusive ...."); Univalor Trust, SA v. Columbia
Petroleum, LLC, 315 F.R.D. 374, 382 (S.D. Ala. 2016) ("[T]he
existence of an express contract extinguishes an unjust
enrichment claim altogether because unjust enrichment is an
equitable remedy which issues only where there is no adequate
remedy at law."); Shedd v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc.,
Civil Action No. 14-00275-CB-M (S.D. Ala. Nov. 17, 2014) (not
reported in F. Supp. 3d) ("[B]reach of contract and unjust
enrichment are mutually exclusive when both claims are based
on the same set of facts."); Clark v. Green Tree Servicing
LLC, 69 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1222 (D. Colo. 2014) (noting that
plaintiff may plead contract claim and estoppel claim in the
alternative but may not ultimately prevail on both); Superior
Edge, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 44 F. Supp. 3d 890, 900 (D. Minn.
11
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for Equity, Inc., 713 So. 2d 937, 942 (Ala. 1997) ("'Only a
fully adjudicated whole claim against a party may be certified
under Rule 54(b). See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424
U.S. 737, 742–44, 96 S. Ct. 1202, 1206, 47 L. Ed. 2d 435
2014) (noting that party cannot recover under both a
quasi-contract and express-contract theory); Naiser v.
Unilever U.S., Inc., 975 F. Supp. 2d 727, 748 (W.D. Ky. 2013)
("[U]njust enrichment 'has no application in a 
situation where
there is an explicit contract which has been performed.'");
Harrell v. Colonial Holdings, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d 813,
826–27 (E.D. Va. 2013) (noting that breach of contract and
unjust 
enrichment are 
alternative theories 
of 
recovery); 
Miami
Valley Mobile Health Servs., Inc. v. ExamOne Worldwide, Inc.,
852 F. Supp. 2d 925, 939 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (noting that breach
of express contract, breach of implied contract, and unjust
enrichment are alternative claims); Vives v. Rodriguez, 849 F.
Supp. 2d 507, 515 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (same); CoMentis, Inc.
v. Purdue Research Found., 765 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1098 (N.D.
Ind. 2011) (same); CLN Props., Inc. v. Republic Servs., Inc.,
688 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902 (D. Ariz. 2010) (same); Scowcroft
Grp., Inc. v. Toreador Res. Corp., 666 F. Supp. 2d 39, 44
(D.D.C. 2009) ("'[T]here can be no claim for unjust enrichment
when an express contract exists between the parties.'"
(quoting Schiff v. American Ass'n of Retired Persons, 697 A.2d
1193, 1194 (D.C. 1997))); Ryffel Family P'ship, Ltd. v. Alpine
Country Constr., Inc., 386 Mont. 165, 171, 386 P.3d 971, 977
(2016) ("[B]reach of contract and unjust enrichment are
mutually exclusive theories of recovery."); Lee v. Shim, 310
Ga. App. 725, 733, 713 S.E.2d 906, 913 (2011) (noting that
breach of contract and unjust enrichment are mutually
exclusive claims); and Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn. App. 619,
638, 882 A.2d 98, 111 (2005) ("[U]njust enrichment and breach
of contract are mutually exclusive theories of recovery."). 
It would not be prudent to try these mutually exclusive claims
in piecemeal fashion.
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(1976).'" (quoting Aktiengesellschaft v. Smoked Foods Prods.
Co., 813 F.2d 81, 84 (5th Cir. 1987))).
Conclusion
We dismiss the appeal as being from a nonfinal judgment.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Stuart, Bolin, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Shaw, J., concurs specially.
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SHAW, Justice (concurring specially).  
I agree that the partial summary judgment on two counts
of the complaint in this case cannot be made a final judgment
by virtue of a certification pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R.
Civ. P.  There are several reasons that lead me to this
conclusion.
Renasant Bank's second amended complaint contained nine
counts alleging (1) the need for a judgment declaring, 
essentially, whether the line of credit was valid and
enforceable and the amount due the bank under it; (2)
equitable mortgage; (3) breach of contract; (4) open account;
(5) account stated; (6) unjust enrichment; (7) money had and
received; (8) quasi-contract; and (9) constructive trust.  As
the main opinion notes, these all appear to be separate legal
theories advanced as part of one claim--different avenues to
recover payment of the balance outstanding on the home-equity
line of credit.5  The circuit court expressly disposed of two
of those counts in the bank's favor.  This would appear to
5The declaratory-judgment count, to the extent it seeks
a judgment as to the respective rights of the parties under
the line of credit, might be deemed to encompass some
additional claims different from the recovery of money under
the line of credit.
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implicitly dispose of the entire claim; Renasant Bank could
not later recover a second time on its other counts.  Thus, by
ruling in favor of the bank on the two equitable counts, the
circuit court also appeared to dispose of the remaining
counts.  See, e.g., Baldwin v. Panetta, 4 So. 3d 555, 557 n.1
(Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (concluding, when the trial court ruled
in favor of the appellees on two of their five counts, that
the judgment was nonetheless final because the remaining
counts "arose out of the same acts, were proved by the same
evidence, and constituted, in effect, the same claim for
relief, for which the [appellees] were entitled to recover
only once").  However, the circuit court, in its order,
explicitly stated that the other counts remained pending. 
This would tend to negate any inference that the circuit court
also disposed of the remaining counts.  If the remaining
counts, which appear to be part of the same claim, are still
pending, then the single claim is not fully adjudicated for
purposes of Rule 54(b). 
A Rule 54(b) certification "should not be entered if the
issues in the claim being certified and a claim that will
remain pending in the trial court '"are so closely intertwined
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that separate adjudication would pose an unreasonable risk of
inconsistent results."'"  Schlarb v. Lee, 955 So. 2d 418,
419–20 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Clarke–Mobile Counties Gas Dist.
v. Prior Energy Corp., 834 So. 2d 88, 95 (Ala. 2002), quoting
in turn Branch v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So. 2d
1373, 1374 (Ala. 1987)).  By the circuit court’s entry of a
judgment on two of the equitable counts, it would appear that
the bank would not also be entitled to a judgment on a theory
that an express contract existed.  Cf. note 4, supra.  The
partial summary judgment calls into question whether the
circuit court could later rule in favor of the bank on its
declaratory-judgment count or breach-of-contract count (or
against Deborah Blackmon and the estate of Brian Alan Blackmon
on 
their 
own 
declaratory-judgment 
counterclaim 
challenging 
the
existence of a valid contract).  Yet, according to the circuit 
court, those counts based on express contract remain pending,
thus raising the possibility of a later inconsistent
judgment.6
6It is possible that the circuit court merely intended to
express that the other claims in the case remained pending,
and not the remaining "counts."  However, the remaining
claims--Deborah Blackmon and the estate’s counterclaim and
what is left of Renasant Bank's declaratory-judgment claim--
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This illustrates why the judgment should not be certified
as final.  A nonfinal, interlocutory judgment "is subject to
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating
all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties."  Rule 54(b); see also Hallman v. Marion Corp., 411
So. 2d 130, 132 (Ala. 1982).  If in later proceedings on the
remaining counts the circuit court determines that a contract
did in fact exist and that the bank was entitled to a judgment
on its express-contract theories, it would be free to revise
its interlocutory judgment in favor of the bank on the two
equitable counts. 
Additionally, if this Court were to conclude in the
instant appeal that the judgment before us is final and go on
to consider the merits and affirm the partial summary
judgment, our decision might be read as determining the
similar issues remaining in the circuit court; further, this
Court in a subsequent appeal might be required to review the
very same facts again on the remaining issues.  However, 
"'[i]t is uneconomical for an appellate
court to review facts on an appeal
might still be subject to a later judgment inconsistent with
the judgment currently before this Court.  
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following a Rule 54(b) certification that
it is likely to be required to consider
again when another appeal is brought after
the [trial] court renders its decision on
the remaining claims or as to the remaining
parties.
"'An appellate court also should not
hear appeals that will require it to
determine questions that remain before the
trial court with regard to other claims.'"
Centennial Assocs., Ltd. v. Guthrie, 20 So. 3d 1277, 1281
(Ala. 2009) (quoting 10 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2659 (1998) (footnotes omitted in
Centennial)). 
This 
case 
illustrates 
why 
Rule 
54(b)
certifications should be entered only in exceptional cases and
why appellate review in a piecemeal fashion is disfavored. 
Id.
18