Title: STATE v MANGELS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12863
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: February 14, 1975

Uo. t28b3 ilq LBE ~ U P K E P ~ L COURT 3~ STATE OF MONIIANA 1975 S'fATE O F XONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - H. K. MANGELS, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge presiding. Courisel of Record: For Appellant : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas A. Budewitz, Assistant Attorney General, argued, H e lena , Montana William Solem, County Attorney, Chinook, Montana S t u a r t C. MacKenzie, Deputy County Attorney, argued, Chinook, Montana For Respondent: Robert D. Morrison argued, Havre, Montana Morrison, E t t i e n and Barron, Havre, Montana - - - Submitted: January 21, 1975 -C - 4 F i l e d : 4 Decided :Jpd :,,, 4 5 P 7 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Herbert R. Mangels was convicted i n t h e j u s t i c e c o u r t of Blaine County f o r driving while under t h e influence of in- toxicating liquor. He appealed from t h a t conviction t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . P r i o r t o t r i a l t h e r e , he f i l e d a motion t o suppress evidence of h i s blood alcohol l e v e l , derived from a blood sample taken s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e alleged offense. The motion was granted, and t h e S t a t e here appeals from t h a t order. The d i s t r i c t court considered t h e motion t o suppress s o l e l y on t h e b a s i s of an agreed statement of f a c t s and support- ing memoranda by t h e p a r t i e s . N o f u r t h e r evidence o r o r a l argu- ment was received. O n t h e evening of August 2 6 , 1973, defendant was involved i n a two-vehicle c o l l i s i o n on U.S. Highway No. 2 , near Lohman, Montana. Only defendant was injured and, while he was awaiting t r a n s p o r t a t i o n t o a nearby h o s p i t a l , t h e odor of alcohol was detected on h i s breath by t h e i n v e s t i g a t i n g highway patrolman. Defendant a r r i v e d a t the h o s p i t a l by ambulance approxi- mately forty-five minutes a f t e r t h e accident occurred. The nurse on duty noted " t h a t t h e defendant appeared t o be confused and was s u f f e r i n g from abrasions and contusions". A t t h e request of t h e highway patrolman, t h e nurse prepared t o take a blood sample f o r determining defendant's blood alcohol l e v e l . The nurse t o l d defendant t h a t she was going t o draw h i s blood, but d i d not t e l l him her purpose i n doing so. Defendant n e i t h e r objected nor expressly consented t o t h e taking of t h e sample. Analysis of t h a t sample l a t e r revealed a . 1 9 blood alcohol l e v e l . The highway patrolman did not t a l k t o defendant a t any time p r i o r t o the taking of t h e blood sample. A t no t i m e had de- fendant been t o l d t h a t he was under a r r e s t o r t h a t he was charged w l t h d r i v i n y w h i l e under t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r . In t h e patrolman's opinion, he d i d n o t a r r e s t defendant, a l t h o u g h he d i d g i v e him a c i t a t i o n on t h e morning following t h e a c c i d e n t and t h e blood t e s t . S e v e r a l weeks l a t e r , a complaint was f i l e d i n j u s t i c e c o u r t and a warrant f o r d e f e n d a n t ' s a r r e s t was i s s u e d . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t h e l d , i n g r a n t i n g t h e motion t o sup- p r e s s , t h a t s i n c e defendant had n o t been a r r e s t e d and s i n c e he had n o t given h i s a c t u a l consent t o t h e t e s t , t h e t a k i n g o f t h e sample was i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 32-2142.1, R.C.M. 1947. T h i s a p p e a l p r e s e n t s t h a t i s s u e only. The c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e , a s c i t e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o r d e r , is s e c t i o n 32-2142.1, R.C.M. 1947. I t provides: " ( a ) Any person who o p e r a t e s a motor v e h i c l e upon t h e p u b l i c highways of t h i s s t a t e s h a l l be deemed t o have given consent, s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 32-2142, R.C.M. 1947, t o a chemical test of h i s blood, b r e a t h , o r u r i n e f o r t h e purpose of determining t h e a l c o h o l i c c o n t e n t of h i s blood i f a r r e s t e d by a peace o f f i c e r f o r d r i v i n g o r i n a c t u a l p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l of a motor v e h i c l e while under t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t o x i - c a t i n g l i q u o r . * * * The a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r may d e s i g n a t e which of t h e a f o r e s a i d tests s h a l l be administered. " ( b ) Any person who i s unconscious o r who is otherwise i n a c o n d i t i o n r e n d e r i n g him i n c a p a b l e of r e f u s a l , s h a l l be deemed n o t t o have withdrawn t h e consent provided by paragraph ( a ) of t h i s s e c t i o n . " (c) I f a person under a r r e s t r e f u s e s upon t h e r e q u e s t of a peace o f f i c e r t o submit t o a chemical test d e s i g n a t e d by t h e a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r a s pro- vided i n paragraph (a) of t h i s s e c t i o n , none s h a l l be given. * * *." [Emphasis added.] T h e absence of an a r r e s t is n o t d i s p u t e d , b u t t h e S t a t e a s s e r t s t h a t an a r r e s t i s n o t r e q u i r e d under paragraph ( b ) . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t he was n e i t h e r unconscious nor "otherwise i n a con- d i t i o n rendering him i n c a p a b l e of r e f u s a l " and t h e r e f o r e para- graph ( a ) c o n t r o l s . Paragraph ( a ) c l e a r l y r e q u i r e s an a r r e s t before t h e implied c o n s e n t p r o v i s i o n becomes o p e r a t i v e . The requirement i s c l e a r , both on t h e f a c e of t h e s t a t u t e and i n t h e title of the original act. Sec. 1, Ch. 131, Laws of 1971. It is equally apparent that there is no similar requirement in paragraph (b) . Unless the facts before us establish the applicability of paragraph (b), we must affirm the district court's order suppressing the blood test for lack of a preceding arrest. Since there is no question as to defendant's consciousness, paragraph (b) can only apply if the defendant was "in a condition render- ing him incapable of refusal". The agreed facts are insufficient to bring this case within the provisions of paragraph (b). They do not establish that defendant was in a condition rendering him incapable of refusal. The nurse did not indicate in the hospital record that defendant was intoxicated. The State attempts to meet that argument by asserting that the defendant's physical condition was so unstable that any questions by the patrolman would have been injurious. The agreed statement of facts does not support that argument. Finally, the State urges our adoption of the rationale employed by the Florida court in State v. Mitchell (Fla. 1971), 245 So.2d 618. While the facts and statutes presented there are somewhat parallel to the instant case, we are not persuaded. Al- though here the State argues that the arresting officer must have discretion in making his determination of capacity, the result of the rationale employed by the Florida court is a vesting of too much discretion. The potential for abuse is manifest. The arresting officer, under the broad discretion there granted, need only find some fact on which to base a conclusion of incapacity, and then he need not arrest or request the test, before ordering its administration. We do not mean to suggest that such abuse is likely in Xontana, but the potential for abuse outweighs any inconvenience which might result from a narrower construction. Section 32- 2142.1, R.C.M. 1947, limits the.,officerls discretion to those cases where the subject is incapable of refusing the test. Here, we only require that the incapacity be determined on the basis of the best evidence which is reasonably available to the officer. The agreed statement of facts does not so indicate here. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order sup- pressing the results of the blood test. Justice i q e cbncur : .. I dissent. I would hold t h a t evidence of che blood sample caken 1:rorn defendant i s admissible against him. The opinion of the majority stands f o r the proposition t h a t the highway patrolman o r police o f f i c e r on the scene does have the discretion t o make the determination of whether the suspect i s "in a condition rendering him incapable of refusal" but t h a t , i n t h i s case, the agreed statement of f a c t s was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o support a finding t h a t t h i s defendant was "in a condition rendering him incapable of refusal". I would hold t h a t the agreed statement of f a c t s does support such a finding. The defendant was i n the emergency room of the hospital. H e was i n a supine position a t a l l times. The nurse on duty noted t h a t defendant "appeared t o be con- fused and was suffering abrasions and contusions." To have actually placed defendant under a r r e s t a t t h i s time q u i t e possibly could have worsened h i s physical and emotional condition. Public policy demands the l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of laws concerning driving on public highways while under the influence of alcohol. The drunk driver i s responsible f o r a great percentage of t r a f f i c deaths on the n a t i o n ' s highways. The "implied consent" law was enacted as a deterrent force t o keep drunk drivers off the road. In order t o give e f f e c t t o the law, law enforcement o f f i c e r s must be able t o use discretion i n enforcing it. This i s not an unbridled dis- c r e ~ i o n , a s the majority opinion would suggest, but i s discretion reviewable a t a l l times by the courts.