Title: In the Matter of Establishment of Congressional Districts by the New Jersey Redistricting Commission
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: February 3, 2022

In the Matter of Establishment of Congressional Districts by the New Jersey Redistricting Commission Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary This matter involved a legal challenge to the congressional redistricting map selected by the New Jersey Congressional Redistricting Commission (Commission). On December 22, 2021, a majority of the Commission’s members that included the Chair, voted in favor of the map the Democratic delegation presented. Plaintiffs, the Republican delegation to the Commission, filed an amended complaint on January 5, 2022 to challenge that map. Plaintiffs filed their complaint directly with the New Jersey Supreme Court, pursuant to Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. The Supreme Court observed it had no role in the outcome of the redistricting process unless the map is "unlawful." The Supreme Court found none of plaintiffs' arguments asserted the plan was unlawful or the result of "invidious discrimination." Because plaintiffs’ allegations were insufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be granted, defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice was granted. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY R- 3 September Term 2021 086587In the Matter of Establishment of Congressional Districts by the New Jersey Redistricting Commission,Douglas Steinhardt, in his official capacity as Delegation Chair and Member of the New Jersey Redistricting Commission, Michele Albano, in her official capacity as Member of the New Jersey Redistricting Commission, Jeanne Ashmore, in her official capacity as Member of the New Jersey Redistricting Commission, Mark Duffy, in his official capacity as Member of the New Jersey Redistricting Commission, Mark LoGrippo, in his official capacity as Member of the New Jersey Redistricting Commission, and Lynda Pagliughi, in her official capacity as Member of the New Jersey Redistricting Commission, Plaintiffs, v. New Jersey Redistricting Commission, John E. Wallace, Jr., in his official capacity as Chair and Member of the New Jersey Redistricting Commission, Janice Fuller, in her official capacity as Delegation Chairwoman and Member of the New Jersey Redistricting Commission, Iris Delgado, in her official capacity as Member of the New Jersey Redistricting Commission, Vin Gopal, in his official capacity as Member of the New Jersey Redistricting Commission, Stephanie Lagos, in her official capacity as Member of the New Jersey Redistricting Commission, Jeff Nash, in his official capacity as Member of the New Jersey Redistricting Commission, Dana Redd, in her official capacity as Member of the New Jersey Redistricting Commission, and Tahesha Way, in her official capacity as New Jersey Secretary of State, Defendants. 1. This matter involves a legal challenge to the congressionalredistricting map selected by the New Jersey Congressional RedistrictingCommission (Commission).Selection of Commission members and redistricting process 2. The State’s political leaders appoint the members of the Commission.Under the State Constitution, the following individuals each appoint twomembers: the President of the Senate and Speaker of the Assembly; theminority leaders of the Senate and Assembly; and the chairs of the Statecommittees of the political parties whose candidates received the largest ornext largest number of votes in the most recent election for Governor. N.J.Const. art. II, § 2, ¶ 1(b). As a result, the Commission is initially comprised ofsix individuals affiliated with the Democratic Party and six who are affiliatedwith the Republican Party. 3. The Constitution also provides for an independent thirteenth member.Id. ¶ 1(c). Because the original twelve members were unable to agree on a 2 proposed tiebreaker by a majority vote, each delegation submitted one name tothe Court. From those names, the Court had to select the thirteenth member, inaccordance with the Constitution. Ibid. 4. The Constitution sets forth two qualifications for the independentmember: the individual must have been a New Jersey resident for the past fiveyears and, during that period, “shall not . . . have held public or party office inthis State.” Ibid. The Constitution also provides a standard for the selectionof the independent member. It calls upon the Court to select, by a majorityvote, the person “more qualified by education and occupational experience, byprior public service in government or otherwise, and by demonstrated ability torepresent the best interest of the people of this State.” Ibid. From the twonames presented, the Court selected the Honorable John E. Wallace, Jr. (ret.),to serve as the independent member. Neither party objected to his selection.The independent member serves as Chair of the Commission. Id. ¶ 2. 5. The Commission must hold at least three public hearings. Id. ¶ 4. Inthis case, it held ten hearings, virtually and in-person, at which it heardtestimony from the public. The Commission also received written submissionsand draft maps from the public. 6. The process that follows is intensely political, not legal, whichreflects the makeup of the Commission and the nature of its work. The 3 Commission is essentially a political body, comprised mostly of partisanappointees, that fixes boundaries for election districts. See Gaffney v.Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 , 753 (1973) (“Politics and political considerationsare inseparable from districting and apportionment.”). 7. Historically, after meeting in private with the respective partisandelegations to discuss their proposals, the independent member serves as thetiebreaker and selects one party’s preferred map. The outcome commonlygarners praise from one party and criticism from the other. This redistrictingcycle was no different. 8. On December 22, 2021, a majority of the Commission’s membersthat included the Chair voted in favor of the map the Democratic delegationpresented. Plaintiffs, the Republican delegation to the Commission, filed anamended complaint on January 5, 2022 to challenge that map. Plaintiffs filedtheir complaint directly with this Court, pursuant to Article II, Section 2,Paragraph 7 of the Constitution.Plaintiffs’ challenge 9. Plaintiffs ask the Court to vacate the Commission’s decision andremand the matter to the Commission for further proceedings, with the Chair,Justice Wallace, recused. Defendants, the Democratic delegation to theCommission, filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Among other 4 arguments, defendants assert that the amended complaint fails to state a claimupon which relief can be granted. 10. Plaintiffs’ arguments rest to a large extent on the rationale offeredby the Chair to explain his vote in support of the Democratic delegation’s map.The Chair provided reasons for his vote at the Commission’s final meeting onDecember 22, 2021. He also amplified his reasoning in writing, on January11, 2022, in response to a request from the Court. 11. This Court has no role in the outcome of the redistricting processunless the map is “unlawful.” N.J. Const. art. II, § 2, ¶¶ 7, 9. If it is, theCommission must reassemble and adopt another redistricting plan. Id. ¶ 9.Legal standard 12. In 1974, before the current constitutional process was adopted, theCourt noted that reapportionment plans “must be accorded a presumption oflegality with judicial intervention warranted only if some positive showing ofinvidious discrimination or other constitutional deficiency is made. Thejudiciary is not justified in striking down a plan, otherwise valid, because a'better’ one, in its opinion, could be drawn.” Davenport v. ApportionmentComm’n, 65 N.J. 125, 135 (1974) (citing Gaffney). 5 13. That stringent standard still applies. It is not the Court’s task todecide whether one map is fairer or better than another.1 We reviewredistricting plans only to determine if the map selected is “unlawful.” N.J.Const. art. II, § 2, ¶ 9. So long as the final map is constitutional, the Courtcannot grant any relief. 14. Plaintiffs claim the actions of the Chair were “arbitrary, capricious,and unreasonable,” presented violations of “federal and state constitutionalequal protection and due process protections,” and posed a “common lawconflict of interest.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 8, 101. The complaint also assertsthere were “significant differences between the maps” and sets forth ways inwhich the Republican delegation’s map better met the standards the Chair hadapplied. Id. ¶¶ 49-56. Plaintiffs’ complaint, however, does not assert that themap the Commission adopted -- which the Democratic delegation and theChair voted for -- was itself “unlawful.”1 Only if neither map receives seven votes from the members of the Commission does the Supreme Court choose between two competing maps. N.J. Const. art. II, § 2, ¶ 3. In that case, the Court must select the map that “conforms most closely to the requirements of the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Ibid. 6 Threshold arguments 15. Defendants contend that plaintiffs -- the Republican members of theCommission who brought suit in their official capacity -- lack standingbecause they have no “personal stake” and have not alleged a “personalinjury.” Instead, defendants contend plaintiffs have only an institutionalinterest that does not afford them standing any more than it would the minorityside of a legislative body that lost a vote on an ordinance or bill. 16. Our jurisprudence takes a more liberal approach to standing thanfederal law. See In re Camden County, 170 N.J. 439, 448 (2002); see also JenElec., Inc. v. County of Essex, 197 N.J. 627, 645 (2009). The StateConstitution does not limit “our judicial power to actual cases andcontroversies.” Camden County, 170 N.J. at 448 (quoting Crescent ParkTenants Ass’n v. Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y., 58 N.J. 98, 107-08 (1971)).At the same time, courts do not render advisory opinions or “entertain . . .plaintiffs who are 'mere intermeddlers,’ or are merely interlopers or strangersto the dispute.” Id. at 449 (omission in original) (quoting Crescent Park, 58 N.J. at 107). 17. To possess standing in state court, a party must have “a sufficientstake in the outcome of the litigation” and “real adverseness,” and there mustbe “a substantial likelihood that the party will suffer harm in the event of an 7 unfavorable decision.” Camden County, 170 N.J. at 449; Jen Elec., Inc., 197 N.J. at 645. We also give weight to the public’s interest in the resolution of amatter and favor a just ruling on the merits over “procedural frustrations.” 2Crescent Park, 58 N.J. at 107-08; see also Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J.Court Rules, cmt. 2.1 on R. 4:26-1 (2022). 18. Plaintiffs have a strong stake in the outcome of the redistrictingprocess and are plainly adverse to the map adopted. Their assertion ofpersonal harm as members of the delegation is less strong, but the overridingpublic interest in this case is compelling. Resolving the map for congressionaldistricts for the next decade is of the utmost importance. Doing soexpeditiously, in time for candidates and election officials to plan for theupcoming primary and general elections, is also significant to the public. Wetherefore consider the merits.2 Here, for example, the complaint could be amended, or possibly refiled, with plaintiffs or others listed as residents of New Jersey and not just in an official capacity. See R. 4:9-1 (noting that pleadings may be amended as a matter of right and “by leave of court which shall be freely given in the interest of justice”); cf. Brady v. N.J. Redistricting Comm’n, 131 N.J. 594, 605 (1992) (addressing congressional redistricting challenges brought by residents and taxpayers). If the complaint were amended in that way, there would be no prejudice to defendants. See Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490, 501 (2006). 8 19. Defendants raise an additional threshold argument that thecomplaint must be dismissed because it presents a nonjusticiable politicalquestion. That issue “is primarily a function of the separation of powers.”Gilbert v. Gladden, 87 N.J. 275, 281 (1981) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 , 210 (1962)). To determine whether an issue poses a nonjusticiablepolitical question, courts consider, among other factors, if there is “a textuallydemonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate politicaldepartment.” Id. at 282 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). Here, theConstitution grants the Supreme Court “jurisdiction over any judicialproceeding challenging . . . any action, including the establishment ofCongressional districts, by the commission.” N.J. Const. art. II, § 2, ¶ 7. TheCourt’s narrow role in that regard -- limited to challenges over whether a mapis unlawful -- avoids political questions that could be raised by a review of theCommission’s decisions. 20. Plaintiffs raise a threshold argument as well and contend that theChair’s amplified statement of reasons cannot be considered because it violatesthe State Constitution’s public meeting requirement and analogous principlesin the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA), N.J.S.A. 10:4-6 to -21. To repeat,on January 4, 2022, the Court requested an amplified statement of reasons toassist in its review of this matter. By analogy to Rule 2:5-1(b), which allows a 9 trial judge or agency head to submit “an amplification of a prior statement ,opinion or memorandum” when an appeal is taken, the Court asked the Chairto amplify the grounds for his oral decision on December 22, 2021. The Chairpresented a written statement to the Court and the parties on January 11, 2022,and it was posted on the Judiciary’s website the same day. Response to Orderof Jan. 4, 2022, https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/supreme/ResponseCongressional1-21.pdf?c=avq. 21. In light of the challenges plaintiffs assert and the limited nature ofour review of the Commission’s work, we do not rely on the Chair’s amplifiedstatement. Plaintiffs’ argument is therefore moot. 33 We note that the Constitution’s meeting requirement does not apply to the Chair’s supplemental statement. The Constitution directs that the Commission “certify the establishment of [congressional] districts pursuant to a majority vote of the full authorized membership of the commission convened in open public meeting, of which meeting there shall be at least 24 hours’ public notice.” N.J. Const. art. II, § 2, ¶ 3 (emphasis added). As noted earlier, the Constitution also requires the Commission to “hold at least three public hearings in different parts of the State.” Id. ¶ 4. Except for those two types of proceedings -- the requisite public hearings and the meeting to certify the establishment of districts -- meetings of the Commission “may be closed to the public.” Id. ¶ 5. The meeting to certify congressional districts took place on December 22, 2021, when the full Commission voted on and adopted a map, at an open public meeting. The Chair’s supplemental statement did not certify a congressional map, which no single member could have accomplished. Furthermore, OPMA does not apply to the work of the Commission. Nor does the statute apply to the State’s legislative redistricting process. 10 Statements and findings by the Chair 22. Here, the Chair concluded that both maps were constitutional. OnDecember 22, 2021, he first orally outlined certain factors that guided hisdetermination: that “congressional districts . . . shall be geographicallycontiguous” and account for each district’s total population; that “[m]apmakersshall comply with the Voting Rights Act” and other relevant authority, and“should include sufficient numbers of minority/majority districts”; that maps“shall not split political subdivision boundaries and communities of interestunless necessary” to comply with the above standards; that “[c]ompetitivedistricts are favored”; that “[n]o district may be formed solely to favor ordisfavor any political party or the election of any person” (which the Chairdescribed as “partisan fairness”); that “districts may include the cores ofexisting districts” “[to] assist voters in assessing incumbents and minimizingvoter confusion”; and that “[a]ll districts shall be as compact and regularlyshaped as possible unless deviation is required to comply with any of the N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(a). The public meeting requirements for the Commission are spelled out in the Constitution. Under the Commission’s by-laws, notice for required public meetings shall be given in accordance with the Constitution and OPMA, “notwithstanding the OPMA’s inapplicability to the Commission.” See Redistricting Commission By-Laws art. IV, ¶ 6. The Chair’s submission of a supplemental statement was not a required public hearing or a meeting to certify the establishment of districts under the Constitution. 11 above standards.” Plaintiffs’ complaint does not challenge the map for any ofthose reasons. 23. The Chair then found that both maps satisfied the above standardswith one exception: “The only area where one map pulled ahead of the otheris in partisan fairness.” As the Chair explained, Both maps were evaluated by my team using various statewide tests for partisan fairness. Without getting into the details of the tests, I simply state that the results showed that the partisan fairness would favor the Democratic[] map. However, because neither delegation used these tests, I have decided not to give any weight to them in making my decision.The Chair next added, In summary, both delegations aptly applied our standards to their map. In the end, I decided to vote for the Democratic map, simply because in the last redistricting map it was drawn by the Republicans. Thus, I conclude that fairness dictates that the Democrats have the opportunity to have their map used for this next redistricting cycle. Thank you. That concludes my comments.We do not rely on the above statement to resolve plaintiff’s claims, which donot challenge the constitutionality of the map. 24. In an amplified statement of reasons on January 11, 2022, the Chairreiterated his belief that both maps were constitutional and met the standardshe had previously outlined. Although we do not rely on the amplified 12 statement, we include a part of it for completeness. The Chair stated “that theDemocrats’ map better satisfied the standard for Partisan Fairness.” In hiswords, Many tests for Partisan Fairness are accepted by the social science community. They fall into two broad categories, a category based on partisan symmetry and a category based on geography. Tests of partisan symmetry have their roots in a simple and intuitive concept of fairness: what would happen if the tables were turned? Social scientists have overwhelmingly endorsed such a concept. For example, in the ideal case, given the same statewide electoral totals, each side should win the same number of seats. Using such mathematical tests, my team determined that the Democratic plan shows superior partisan symmetry to the Republican plan. The second category of test is to use the natural geography of the state. Modern technology allows hundreds of thousands of alternative plans to be drawn automatically, providing a way to determine what a “natural” outcome would be if plans were drawn in a party-blind manner generally following the required redistricting standards. Such an approach is called the ensemble comparison method, and is used by state courts to evaluate partisan gerrymandering claims. My team found that the Democratic plan is closer to the average of the ensemble than the Republican plan, and therefore is more “party-blind.” 25. In addition, the Chair explained that had his team informed thedelegations that it would use the above tests to evaluate their maps, “I wouldhave stated that Standard 5 for Partisan Fairness tipped the scales in favor of 13 the Democrats’ map.” The Chair added that, “[u]pon reflection, I realize Imistakenly failed to consider . . . Partisan Fairness of the maps” and “shouldhave stated that the Democrats’ map better satisfied the standard. . . . I do thatat this time.”Substantive challenges 26. Reasonable people may differ with a tiebreaker’s evaluation of, andsupport for, a particular plan, but that decision is not subject to review by theCourt unless the plan is unlawful or reflects invidious discrimination. N.J.Const. art. II, § 2, ¶ 9; Davenport, 65 N.J. at 135. No count in the complaint,however, asserts that the final map itself is unlawful or that it is the result ofinvidious discrimination. 27. Plaintiffs’ arguments instead center on the tiebreaker’s reasons insupport of his vote. In their complaint, plaintiffs assert the Commission’s“adoption of the Democratic map . . . must be set aside . . . because itsadoption was based upon an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable vote andreasoning by Chair Wallace.” Am. Compl. ¶ 77. Plaintiffs’ brief similarly“challenges Chair Wallace’s arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable decisionto select the Democratic map out of 'fairness’ because the Republicans 'won’in the last redistricting cycle.” According to plaintiffs, the adoption of a mapbased on the Chair’s manner of decision and his vote violated their federal and 14 state procedural due process rights and constitutional due process protections.We briefly address each claim in turn, starting with procedural due process. 28. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no“State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without dueprocess of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1. Although the New JerseyConstitution does not articulate a “right to due process,” Article I, Paragraph 1has been interpreted to “protect[] 'values like those encompassed by theprinciple[] of due process.’” Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 99 (1995) (secondalteration in original) (quoting Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 568(1985)). “To examine a procedural due process claim, courts 'first assesswhether a liberty or property interest has been interfered with by the State, andsecond, whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation areconstitutionally sufficient.’” State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 75 (2017)(quoting Doe, 142 N.J. at 99). 29. Plaintiffs’ argument appears to rest on the use of the amplifiedstatement. They claim they lacked notice and an opportunity to be heard, andthat they were deprived of an opportunity to respond to the Chair’s “ultimatereasons.” Because we do not rely on either statement, that argument is moot.To the extent plaintiffs assert a broader claim, it does not allege how the planis unlawful. See N.J. Const. art. II, § 2, ¶ 9; Davenport, 65 N.J. at 135. For 15 that reason alone, their argument fails. We note as well that, althoughplaintiffs cite generally to the fundamental right to vote, they do not offerpersuasive authority that the State interfered with a liberty or property interestthrough the manner in which the Chair explained his decision. 30. Plaintiffs advance a related due process argument based on thedoctrine of fundamental fairness. The doctrine protects against “unjust andarbitrary governmental action,” in particular, government procedures thatoperate arbitrarily. State v. Njango, 247 N.J. 533, 548 (2021) (quoting Doe, 142 N.J. at 108). Courts apply the doctrine sparingly -- “in those rare caseswhere not to do so will subject the defendant to oppression, harassment, oregregious deprivation.” Doe, 142 N.J. at 108 (quoting State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679, 712 (1989) (Garibaldi, J., concurring and dissenting)). 31. That argument, as well, does not purport to establish that the map isunlawful. Plaintiffs’ claim therefore cannot prevail. See N.J. Const. art. II,§ 2, ¶ 9; Davenport, 65 N.J. at 135. In addition, the Constitution does notafford either partisan delegation a right to dispute or counter the independentmember’s decision. The vote marks the end of a political process. It followsdays of private meetings and discussions in a hotel, with one side and then theother meeting with the Chair. Those discussions and their resolution are not 16 subject to procedural rules or judicial review in precisely the manner that anagency decision or a trial judge’s ruling would be. 32. Plaintiffs also assert that the Court should apply the standard foragency review to redistricting decisions, and that the Chair’s conclusion wasarbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. (a) The traditional standard of review for actions of a publicagency is whether the action was “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.”Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 234 N.J. 150, 157(2018). Under that standard, reviewing courts consider (1) whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. [Ibid. (quoting In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)); see also In re Request to Modify Prison Sentences, 242 N.J. 357, 390 (2020).]Courts also assess whether the agency’s action offends the Federal or StateConstitutions. In re Eastwick Coll. LPN-to-RN Bridge Program, 225 N.J. 533,541 (2016). 17 (b) This challenge likewise fails because it, too, does not allegehow the redistricting plan is unlawful. See N.J. Const. art. II, § 2, ¶ 9;Davenport, 65 N.J. at 135. The argument is therefore beyond the limited scopeof our review. We also note that the standard of review for an agency’s actionis not an ideal fit. There are no express or implied constitutional or legislativepolicies to guide the Commission’s work. There is also no traditional recordto measure any findings against because the key work of the Commission takesplace behind closed doors with no record of its discussions. 33. In addition, plaintiffs submit the adoption of a map based upon theChair’s reasons violated their substantive due process protections. Relying onWinters v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 197 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Ill.2001), plaintiffs argue that the Chair’s vote and the adoption of the map didnot satisfy rational basis review. 4 Under that standard, a statute, typically,must bear a “rational relationship to a legitimate government goal.” State inInterest of C.K., 233 N.J. 44, 73 (2018). The claim thus falls outside the4 In Winters, the district court assessed Illinois’ practice of having the Secretary of State select the tiebreaker for congressional redistricting by randomly drawing one of two names, of people from different political parties, submitted by the State Supreme Court. 197 F. Supp. 2d at 1112. The district court upheld the practice because it was rationally related to a legitimate government interest -- giving the parties an incentive to compromise to avoid losing a random drawing. Id. at 1114-16. 18 limited nature of our review of redistricting decisions. Plaintiffs’ argumentfocuses on the Chair’s thought process but does not allege how the map suffersfrom invidious discrimination or is otherwise unlawful. See N.J. Const. art. II,§ 2, ¶ 9; Davenport, 65 N.J. at 135.5 34. Plaintiffs submitted a second amended complaint on February 2,2022. The newly amended complaint adds the Princeton GerrymanderingProject (PGP) as a defendant. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 27. According toplaintiffs, the group advised and provided independent analysis of the parties’proposed redistricting maps to the Chair during the redistricting process andbreached an alleged promise of confidentiality by providing valuable feedbackto the Democratic delegation. Id. ¶¶ 119-21. At the same time, however,plaintiffs acknowledge that during four days of discussions at a hotel in CherryHill, “Chair Wallace provided feedback to the Republican delegation (andpresumably to the Democratic delegation as well), and the Republicandelegation made changes to its proposed map based upon the comments fromChair Wallace.” Id. ¶ 39. Plaintiffs also allege that PGP is supported byprivate donors who have contributed to Democratic officials and causes. Id. ¶¶5 Plaintiffs have not submitted argument in support of strict scrutiny review or their equal protection claim, so we do not consider either issue further. 19 115-18. Without citing a particular legal theory, plaintiffs assert judicialintervention is required to respond to a “tainted” process. 35. Like the allegations discussed above, plaintiffs’ additional claimdoes not assert that the redistricting plan is unlawful or is the result ofinvidious discrimination. See N.J. Const. art. II, § 2, ¶ 9; Davenport, 65 N.J. at 135. The new argument, as well, falls outside the Court’s limited scope ofreview in redistricting matters and therefore cannot prevail.Common law conflict of interest claim 36. For the first time, plaintiffs now contend the Chair had a conflict ofinterest under the common law and should have recused himself because hiswife made a political contribution to a member of Congress from New Jerseyin 2021. Am. Compl. ¶ 102. That information is readily available to thepublic; it appears on the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC’s) publicdatabase of contributions to candidates and committees in federal elections.Fed. Election Comm’n, Individual Contributions, https://www.fec.gov/data/receipts/individual-contributions/?two_year_transaction_period=2022&min_date=01%2F01%2F2021&max_date=12%2F31%2F2022. Becauseplaintiffs either knew or reasonably should have known of the contribution,they could have raised the argument earlier. Instead, they did not object to theChair’s participation until after he selected the other side’s map. On those 20 facts, a strong argument can be made that plaintiffs waived their conflictclaim. 37. As noted earlier, the Constitution sets forth specific qualificationsfor the independent member: the individual must have been a New Jerseyresident for the last five years and cannot “have held public or party office” inNew Jersey during that time. N.J. Const. art. II, § 2, ¶ 1(c). Because theConstitution specifies requirements for the tiebreaker, we do not look to thecommon law, as plaintiffs request, to insert additional qualifications. Cf.DCPP v. J.R.-R., 248 N.J. 353, 373 (2021) (noting the Court has no authorityto import a doctrine from the common law into the Legislature’s statutoryscheme); Coleman v. Martinez, 247 N.J. 319, 365 (2021) (Albin, J., dissenting)(“The common law persists in any field until occupied by the Legislature.”). 38. The Constitution does not bar the selection of a person who hascontributed to a political campaign or a partisan political group, or whosespouse has done so, as the independent member. See N.J. Const. art. II, § 2,¶ 2. We therefore find no disqualifying conflict. 39. Defendants also submitted FEC records about political contributionsthat members of both partisan delegations made in the past two years. Nothingabout the current system prevents that either. 21 40. The Commission fixes the boundaries for our State’s congressionaldistricts, which remain in place for a decade. It is vital that the public haveconfidence in the Commission’s important work. Questions of partisanship orthe appearance of partisanship can affect the public’s confidence, yet ourcurrent system is designed to be overseen by twelve partisan members and athirteenth member whom the party delegations propose. Two highly respectedindividuals were recommended for that role. But there are other ways toconduct the redistricting process. 41. A number of states, including California, Arizona, Michigan, andColorado, have created independent redistricting commissions that includecitizens with no party affiliation, in order to “increase the degree of separationbetween map-drawers and partisan politics.” League of Women Voters ofOhio, ___ N.E.3d ___, ___ (2022) (slip op. 2022-Ohio-65, ¶ 143) (O’Connor,J., concurring) (citing Emily Rong Zhang, Bolstering Faith with Facts:Supporting Independent Redistricting Commissions with RedistrictingAlgorithms, 109 Calif. L. Rev. 987, 990, 1000 (2021)). Chief JusticeO’Connor’s concurring opinion in League of Women Voters succinctlyoutlines those models. Id. at ___ (slip op. ¶¶ 144-46). In general, partisanactors and officials have a more limited role in selecting members ofindependent redistricting commissions. See Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting 22 Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 Yale L.J. 1808, 1818-19 (2012).Some models also require that individuals who are unaffiliated with a politicalparty be part of redistricting commissions. Cal. Const. art. XXI, § 2, ¶ (c)(2)(four out of fourteen members); Colo. Const. art. V, § 44.1, ¶¶ 8-10 (four outof twelve members); Mich. Const. art. IV, § 6, ¶ 2 (five out of thirteenmembers). 42. The current redistricting process in New Jersey stems from anamendment to the Constitution in 1995, N.J. Const. art. II, § 2, which followeda statute enacted in 1992, L. 1991, c. 510 (expired 2001). To change thesystem and distance it from partisan politics would require a proposedconstitutional amendment and voter approval. See N.J. Const. art. IX, ¶¶ 1, 4.Those decisions can begin with grassroots efforts, see Zhang, 109 Calif. L.Rev. at 1001, or the political branches of government. In the end, the choice isleft to the people of our State.Conclusion 43. Because plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to support a claimupon which relief can be granted, see R. 4:6-2(e), defendants’ motion to 23 dismiss the complaint with prejudice is granted. For the Court Stuart Rabner Chief JusticeFebruary 3, 2022CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, and SOLOMON; and JUDGE FUENTES (temporarily assigned), join in the Order. JUSTICES FERNANDEZ-VINA and PIERRE-LOUIS did not participate. 24