Title: State of Florida v. Henry Alexander Davis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-803
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 19, 2004

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
Nos. SC02-803 & SC03-186
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
vs.
HENRY ALEXANDER DAVIS,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
____________
HENRY ALEXANDER DAVIS,
Petitioner,
vs.
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., ETC.,
Respondent.
[February 19, 2004]
PER CURIAM.
This case comes to us as a State appeal of a trial court order granting a new
penalty phase on Davis's motion for postconviction relief, a cross-appeal by Davis
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.
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of the denial by the trial court of a new guilt phase, and a petition by Davis for a
writ of habeas corpus.1  The trial court ordered a new penalty phase after
concluding that Davis's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately
investigate and present evidence of Davis's brain damage and background, and in
failing to assert the statutory "age" mitigator.  We do not reach this issue, and
instead conclude that a new guilt phase is warranted because the blatant
expressions of racial prejudice by trial counsel in this case constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel that affected the fairness and reliability of the proceedings to
such an extent that our confidence in the outcome is undermined.
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts pertinent to the issue we decide today are as follows.  Davis, an
African-American male who was 22 at the time, was accused of stabbing to death
Joyce Ezell, a 73-year-old white woman, in the foyer of Ezell's house in Lake Wales
on March 18, 1987.  Davis was arrested two days after the murder.  Two other
attorneys preceded trial counsel in representing Davis on these charges.  In
preparing his defense, Davis's first lawyer visited the home of Davis's family, where
a relative asked him about Davis's seizures, a condition of which the attorney had
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been unaware.  This discovery led that attorney to gather additional information and
then successfully move to have Davis declared incompetent to stand trial in
September 1988.  The first attorney withdrew, and a second attorney represented
Davis from September 1988 to June 1989, until he also withdrew.  Davis was
declared competent, and a third attorney, who is the subject of the ineffective
assistance claim herein, then assumed representation of Davis.  The third attorney,
whom we refer to herein as trial counsel, represented Davis in his January 1990
murder trial.
Trial counsel testified in the postconviction proceedings that in presenting his
defense in this case, he favored a "minimalist," "less is more" approach. 
Accordingly, trial counsel declined to present the testimony of two African-
American witnesses whose testimony might have implicated others in the murder,
consistent with Davis's defense that he was present during or just after a murder
that was committed by someone else.  Trial counsel also elected not to call friends
and family members who would have contradicted testimony by an acquaintance of
Davis that on the day after the murder, Davis had bloody scratches around his
eyes.  Additionally, as found by the trial court in its order granting Davis a new
penalty phase, trial counsel "did not obtain Davis's school records, never visited
Davis's family or neighborhood, [and] did not talk to his family members, coaches
2.  The records on appeal in this case and in Davis's direct appeal do not
reflect any challenge to the composition of the venire or Davis's jury.  During the
hearing on Davis's motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850, trial counsel acknowledged that no African Americans served on
the twelve-person jury that found Davis guilty of murder and recommended the
death penalty.
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or friends."
These considerations serve as a backdrop for trial counsel's comments while
questioning an apparently all-white panel of potential jurors during voir dire.2  Using
what he described during the rule 3.850 hearing as a hand-drawn chart with a
thermometer to discuss how the jurors' "feelings might grow in intensity possibly
towards black people," trial counsel stated:
Now, Henry Davis is my client and he's a black man, and he's
charged with killing Joyce Ezell who was a white lady, lived in Lake
Wales.  Now, all of us that are talking now, myself and all of y'all, are
all white.
There is something about myself that I'd like to tell you, and
then I'd like to ask you a question.  Sometimes I just don’t like black
people.  Sometimes black people make me mad just because they’re
black.  And, you know, I don’t like that about myself.  It makes me
feel ashamed.  But, you know, sometimes if this was a thermometer of
my feelings, and if you took it all the way up to the top, and this was
one, this was five, all the way up here was ten, you know, my feelings
would sometimes start to boil and I get so mad towards black people
because they're black that it might go all the way up to the top of that
scale. And, you know, I'm not proud of that and it embarrasses me to
tell y'all that, to say it in public.
(Emphasis supplied.)  In followup questioning of individual jurors—none of whom
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stated that they shared counsel's sentiments—trial counsel stated, "Well, I'm a
white southerner, and I've got those feelings in me that I—maybe I grew up with
them."  During his penalty-phase closing argument, trial counsel reminded the jurors
of his comments during jury selection:
Henry is a black man, Mrs. Ezell was a white woman.  We are all of us
white.  I’m a white southerner.  You have told me and the court that
you would disregard and not base your verdict on the question of
race.  I will believe you, I will trust you on that.  It is hard for me to
talk to you, my friends and neighbors, about something like this.  I will
not believe that race will be a factor in your decision, but I will ask you
to be especially vigilant, because being a white southerner, I know
where I come from.  And I told you a little bit when we were
questioning you as to potential jurors about some feelings that I have,
and maybe very deep down y’all have them too.
During the rule 3.850 hearing, trial counsel testified that he decided on the
comments excerpted above as a way of getting jurors to "drop the mask" and
acknowledge hidden feelings about race.  He testified that his comments constituted
"new ground" for him, but he felt the approach was warranted because this was an
"extreme case, a very bad case on the facts."  Trial counsel testified that he
discussed the strategy with Davis, who told him that blacks sometimes feel the
same way about whites.
The jury found Davis guilty as charged of first-degree murder, robbery with a
deadly weapon, and burglary with a battery, and recommended death for the
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murder by a vote of twelve to zero.  The trial court imposed the death penalty for
the murder, finding four aggravating circumstances and insufficient mitigation to
justify a sentence other than death.  On direct appeal, this Court struck two
aggravators and remanded for resentencing.  See Davis v. State, 604 So. 2d 794,
797-99 (Fla. 1992).  The trial court again imposed death on remand, and this Court
affirmed.  See Davis v. State, 648 So. 2d 107, 110 (Fla. 1995).
In his motion for postconviction relief, Davis asserted multiple grounds for a
new trial, including trial counsel's comments during voir dire, the failure to call
witnesses whose testimony would have tended to implicate others in the murder,
and the failure to impeach a witness who testified to scratches on Davis's face.  The
trial court denied relief on all these grounds.  The trial court determined that the
remarks on racial animus made by counsel during voir dire were a legitimate tactical
approach by experienced counsel, and that Davis approved the tactic.  The court
concluded that "[n]othing in the record supports Davis' claim that his attorney is a
racist and as a result failed to properly represent him."
II.  ANALYSIS
Claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel require a showing of deficient
performance and prejudice.  See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984).  First, a defendant must establish conduct on the part of counsel that is
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outside the broad range of competent performance under prevailing professional
standards.  See Gore v. State, 846 So. 2d 461, 467 (Fla. 2003). Second, the
deficiency must be shown to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the
proceedings that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  See id.  The two
prongs are related, in that "the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness
must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result."  Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 219 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 686).  In reviewing a trial court's ruling on an ineffective assistance
claim, this Court defers to findings of fact based on competent, substantial
evidence and independently reviews deficiency and prejudice as mixed questions of
law and fact.  See Gore, 846 So. 2d at 468; Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028,
1033-34 (Fla. 1999). 
Applying these standards and principles, we conclude that the expressions of
racial animus voiced by trial counsel during voir dire so seriously affected the
fairness and reliability of the proceedings that our confidence in the jury's verdicts 
of guilt is undermined.  We cannot agree with the trial court's conclusion that an
explicit expression of racial prejudice can be considered a legitimate tactical
approach.  Whether or not counsel is in fact a racist, his expressions of prejudice
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against African Americans cannot be tolerated.
Initially, we strongly reaffirm the principle that racial prejudice has no
acceptable place in our justice system.  As we stated in Powell v. Allstate Insurance
Co., 652 So. 2d 354, 358 (Fla. 1995),
[t]he founding principle upon which this nation was established is that
all persons were initially created equal and are entitled to have their
individual human dignity respected. This guarantee of equal treatment
has been carried forward in explicit provisions of our federal and state
constitutions. It is not by chance that the words "Equal Justice Under
Law" have been placed for all to see above the entrance to this
nation's highest court. If we are to expect our citizens to treat one
another with equal dignity and respect, the justice system must serve
as the great example of maintaining that standard. And while we have
been far from perfect in implementing this founding principle, our
initial declaration and our imperfect struggle and efforts have served as
a beacon for people around the world.
In Powell, we considered whether to authorize an inquiry to ascertain whether racist
jokes and statements were made by jurors in a trial involving a suit by the plaintiffs,
who were black citizens of Jamaica, against an insurance company for claims
arising from an automobile accident.   See id. at 355.  We authorized the inquiry,
and ruled that if the trial court determined that the statements were in fact made, the
comments warranted a new trial.  See id. at 358.  Rejecting any notion that this was
not a proper concern within the purview of the justice system, we stated:
The issue of racial, ethnic, and religious bias in the courts is not
simply a matter of "political correctness" to be brushed aside by a
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thick-skinned judiciary. . . .
Despite longstanding and continual efforts, both by
legislative enactments and by judicial decisions to purge
our society of the scourge of racial and religious
prejudice, both racism and anti-Semitism remain ugly
malignancies sapping the strength of our body politic.
The judiciary, as an institution given a constitutional
mandate to ensure equality and fairness in the affairs of
our country when called on to act in litigated cases, must
remain ever vigilant in its responsibility. The obvious
difficulty with prejudice in a judicial context is that it
prevents the impartial decision-making that both the Sixth
Amendment and fundamental fair play require. A racially
or religiously biased individual harbors certain negative
stereotypes which, despite his protestations to the
contrary, may well prevent him or her from making
decisions based solely on the facts and law that our jury
system requires.
Id. (quoting United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524, 1527 (11th Cir. 1986)).  The
United States Supreme Court has observed that it has been compelled to "engage[]
in 'unceasing efforts' to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal justice system." 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 (1987) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 85 (1986)).
The necessity of vigilance against the influence of racial prejudice is
particularly acute when the justice system serves as the mechanism by which a
litigant is required to forfeit his or her very life.  As the United States Supreme
Court first stated more than twenty-five years ago, "death is different in kind from
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any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice."  Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); see also State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla.
1973) (stating that because "[d]eath is a unique punishment in its finality and in its
total rejection of the possibility of rehabilitation . . . , the Legislature has chosen to
reserve its application to only the most aggravated and unmitigated of most serious
crimes").  We have acknowledged that "death is different" in recognizing the need
for effective counsel in capital proceedings "from the perspective of both the
sovereign state and the defending citizen."  Sheppard & White, P.A. v. City of
Jacksonville, 827 So. 2d 925, 932 (Fla. 2002).
In Robinson v. State, 520 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1988), this Court emphasized that
the "risk of racial prejudice infecting a criminal trial takes on greater significance in
the context of a capital sentencing proceeding."  Accordingly, we vacated a death
sentence because of the prosecutor's suggestion during cross-examination of a
defense expert that the black defendant preyed on white women. 
In a noncapital case, the First District overturned a second-degree murder
conviction because of an improper appeal to racial prejudice.  See Wallace v. State,
768 So. 2d 1247, 1250-51 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).  In Wallace, the prosecutor
disregarded the trial court's admonition against emphasizing that before a fatal
confrontation with another man, the black defendant was making vulgar remarks to
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a white woman.  See id. at 1249. The First District stated:
In the present case, the jurors were required to determine
whether the homicide was justifiable. The race of the woman with
whom the defendant had been conversing in the café earlier in the
evening had nothing to do with the issue of his guilt or innocence. All
the prosecutor needed to do to put the events in the proper context
was to elicit a brief statement that the defendant was asked to leave
because he was arguing with another patron. Nevertheless, he
repeatedly emphasized that the woman in the café was a white woman
and he repeatedly stressed the fact that the defendant had been making
vulgar comments to her.
These actions effectively invited the jury to make a decision
based on a characterization of the defendant and not on the evidence
of his guilt or innocence. Without even a pretense of relevancy the
prosecutor managed to conjure up the image of a black man making
rude and sexually offensive comments to a white woman. Some
members of the defendant's all-white jury may have reacted negatively
to this portrayal of the defendant, regardless of their views of the
evidence.
We are not suggesting that the jurors were affected by the
prosecutor's appeal to racial prejudice merely because all of them are
white. The point is that no jury should be exposed to an argument like
the one made in this case.
Id. at 1250 (emphasis supplied).  
In light of the repeated admonitions by the United States Supreme Court, this
Court, and others against allowing racial prejudice to play any part in the
determination of guilt or imposition of sentence in a criminal case, we are greatly
disturbed by trial counsel's blatant acknowledgment to the jury, in defending an
African-American defendant accused of an interracial crime, of his negative feelings
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toward "black people just because they're black."  We condemn these statements
not because counsel chose to discuss the topic of race in voir dire, which is
permissible, but because he did so in a manner that fatally compromised his ability
to effectively represent Davis in his capital trial and created a reasonable probability
of unreliable convictions.
"[A] capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have
prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of
racial bias."  Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986).  The decision whether
to question jurors on feelings about race is within trial counsel's discretion.  See id.
at 37 n.10 ("Should defendant's counsel decline to request voir dire on the subject
of racial prejudice, we in no way require or suggest that the judge broach the topic
sua sponte.")  Recently, this Court held that trial counsel was not ineffective in
choosing not to explore the issue of racial prejudice during jury selection in a
capital case.  See Fennie v. State, 855 So. 2d 597, 603 (Fla. 2003). 
In this case, as in Fennie, see id., the defendant was black and the victim
white, and there was no apparent racial motivation for the crime.  Instead, the
evidence pointed to a theft as the motive for the murder.  The victim's silver serving
pieces, her purse and wallet, a pearl-handled pistol, some rare coins, jewelry, a ring
belonging to her late husband, and her car were taken from her home. 
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The issue is not that Davis's trial counsel chose to question jurors on their
feelings about race but rather what counsel stated about his own racial prejudices. 
The manner in which counsel approached the subject unnecessarily tended either to
alienate jurors who did not share his animus against African Americans "just
because they're black," or to legitimize racial prejudice without accomplishing
counsel's stated objective of bringing latent bias out into the open.  We conclude
that counsel's admission of his own racial prejudice constituted deficient
performance satisfying the first prong of an ineffective assistance claim.  
With respect to both the first and second prongs of the ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, there is also evidence in this record to suggest that counsel's
expressions of racial bias during voir dire affected his performance in both the guilt
and penalty phases of Davis's trial, creating an unacceptable risk that prejudice
clouded counsel's judgment and diminished the force of his advocacy.  
In the guilt phase, trial counsel rested without presenting a case.  While not
presenting a defense case in a first-degree murder prosecution is not inherently
deficient performance, in making this decision counsel opted not to present two
African-American witnesses whose testimony would have implicated others in the
murder.  Counsel testified that he declined to present the testimony of one of the
witnesses, who would have placed two other men at the murder scene with Davis,
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because he considered a neighbor of the victim who saw Davis approach the
victim's house alone to be more credible.  The neighbor was white.  Asked whether
it would have been beneficial nonetheless to place others who may have actually
committed the murder at the victim's house with Davis, trial counsel testified during
the rule 3.850 hearing that "for some reason it was my decision then that this was
not testimony that was going to help me."  A second African-American witness
would have testified that he participated in helping one of the other men identified
by the first witness as being at the victim's house in disposing of bloody clothing at
around the time of the murder.  Trial counsel testified during the rule 3.850 hearing
that he declined to present this witness because he "couldn't get any corroboration
or anything that I thought I could use at trial."
Both witnesses would have supported the defense theory that, although
Davis may have been present during or immediately after the killing, he did not
commit the murder.  We view these decisions by trial counsel as additional
indications that his judgment may have been affected by improper considerations,
consistent with the views he expressed during voir dire.
The grounds on which the trial court found counsel ineffective as to the new
penalty phase also support our conclusion that improper racial considerations
compromised counsel's representation.  We note that in its order granting Davis a
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new penalty phase, the trial court found that counsel admitted
that he did not obtain Davis' school records, never visited Davis'
family or neighborhood, did not talk to his family members, coaches
or friends.
[Trial counsel] could, through reasonable diligence, have
discovered those mitigation witnesses Davis presented at the
evidentiary hearing.  Counsel failed to present this additional mitigation
evidence at trial. . . .
. . . Every single bit of mitigation offered may have had a
substantial effect on the jury's recommendation of the trial judge's
sentence.  [Trial counsel] failed to properly investigate and present this
available mitigation evidence.
There is simply no explanation why trial counsel would not have explored this type
of standard mitigation testimony by visiting Davis's nearby family or neighborhood. 
We also note that trial counsel reprised his acknowledgments of racial
prejudice in his closing argument during the penalty phase.  As asserted by Davis in
the postconviction proceedings, these remarks may either have been perceived as
an insult by the jurors, none of whom had acknowledged during voir dire that they
shared counsel's bias, or implicitly validated any latent racial bias on the part of the
jurors. 
For all these reasons, counsel's overt admissions of racial prejudice
compromised his representation to such an extent that it has undermined our
confidence in the guilty verdicts. Thus, we conclude that Davis has also met the
standard for prejudice, in that because of counsel's deficient performance, "the trial
3.  We do not address the additional issues raised in the State appeal and
Davis's cross-appeal and habeas petition because these issues are rendered moot
by our decision herein. 
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cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order denying Davis's motion to vacate his
convictions and remand for a new trial. 3
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ.,
concur.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs with an opinion.
QUINCE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurring.
I fully concur in the majority's opinion that trial counsel's conduct in this case
constituted a patent deficient performance which prejudiced Davis to the extent that
we can have no confidence in the outcome of his trial.  I write separately to praise
the prospective jurors in this case for their enlightened responses to trial counsel's
blatantly improper questions and statements.  
Despite trial counsel's persistent attempts and invitations to elicit admissions
of racial prejudice from the panel during voir dire, the panel members were
steadfast in their rejection of counsel's assumptions and in their refusal to allow
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Davis's race to become a factor in the case they might soon hear.  The following
exchanges demonstrate the panel's integrity and refusal to take the "bait" offered by
counsel:
Prospective Juror Read: I get angry with people but never because
of the color of their skin.
Counsel: OK, Mr. Davis, do you?
Prospective Juror Davis: Hart.
Counsel: Mr. Hart, I'm sorry.  Mr. Hart?
Prospective Juror Hart: I don't agree with you at all.  I was born
and raised in Brooklyn, New York.  I was born and raised with black
people.  They were my best of friends when I was growing up.  I
judge everybody as they are.  I don't care what color their skin is. 
That's very unfair.
Counsel: You know what I'm saying, Mr. Hart?
Prospective Juror Hart: Yeah, but I don't agree with you on it.  I'm
sorry, I just don't agree.  You judge people for who they are, not what
color skin they have.  There's bad white people, too, and Spanish and
Mexican, Asian.  We all have our faults.
. . . .
Counsel: This is a young black man that's asking you for justice.
Prospective Juror Vasquez: Uh-huh.
Counsel: You think you can give it to him?
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Prospective Juror Vasquez: Same as a white person, yes.  It's
whether they're guilty or not.
Counsel: OK.  Ms. Strong, how do you feel?
Prospective Juror Strong: I feel I could give him justice, too.  I used
to teach kindergarten kids, they're black and white and Mexican.  We
all got along, no problems.  
Counsel: OK. Mr. O'Leary?
Prospective Juror O'Leary: I went in the service in the early fifties
when it was probably one of the only truly integrated organizations in
the United States, and I spent 20 years there.  I've been a teacher at the
college ever since with both black and white students.  I have no
problem whatsoever with that, I really don't.
It is of the utmost importance that racial prejudice not enter into Florida's
courtrooms.  Attorneys, judges and all citizens must be the bearers of this standard. 
Today though, I acknowledge with great pride, the example set for us all by the
citizen jurors who stood in for us in this case.  We, as Americans and Floridians,
have much to be thankful for.  But we should be especially thankful for the courage
and conviction of these citizens to reject counsel's improper suggestion that they
must surely suffer from the same affliction that he had.  They were on the front line
with no warning of what was to come, yet they rose to the occasion.
Two Cases:
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Notice and Cross-Notice of Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Polk County,
Charles Lee Brown, Judge - Case No. CF87-1347A1-XX  and
An Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Scott A. Brown, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Petitioner
Leslie Anne Scalley, Assistant CCRC and Marie-Louise Samuels Parmer, Assistant
CCRC , Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Middle Region, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Respondents