Title: In re Jackson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S056461
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 24, 2009

FILED: December 24, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re: Complaint as to the Conduct of
JAY R. JACKSON,
Accused.
(OSB Case No. 07-54;
SC S056461)
En Banc
Argued and submitted September 15, 2009.
On review of the decision of a trial panel of
the Disciplinary Board.
Jay R. Jackson, Lebanon, filed the brief
and argued the cause in propria persona.
Stacy J. Hankin, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel,
Tigard, filed the brief and argued the cause for the Oregon State Bar.
PER CURIAM
The accused is suspended from the practice of
law for 120 days, effective 60 days from the date of the filing of this
decision.
PER CURIAM
In this lawyer
discipline case, the Bar charged the accused with neglect of a legal matter,
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, knowingly making a false
statement of fact to a tribunal, and conduct involving dishonesty that reflects
adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.  The accused's primary
defense is factual; he contends that the Bar failed to prove that he neglected
his client and made misrepresentations to the court.  On de novo review,
we find that the Bar proved the charged violations by clear and convincing
evidence, and we suspend the accused for 120 days.
The accused has been
a lawyer since 1976.  In 2005, he began working as the administrator of a
charter school operated by People Involved in Education (PIE).  The accused still
continued to handle a few cases and used space in a trailer that PIE owned for
his law office.  In the fall of 2005, the accused agreed to represent a
coworker, who was in the process of divorcing her husband.  The accused's
client (the wife) and her husband had already reached an agreement on parenting
time and property division, and the accused filed a petition for the
dissolution of the marriage on December 19, 2005, in Linn County Circuit Court.
On December 26,
2005, someone broke into and vandalized the trailer that the accused used for
his law office.(1) 
The accused's files were "trashed," including the wife's dissolution
file.  At that point, the dissolution file consisted of the petition and
information that the wife had given the accused.  The accused reconstructed most,
if not all, of the wife's file(2)
and, after December 26, 2005, stopped using the trailer as his law office.
The husband retained
Edward Daniels to represent him in the dissolution proceeding, and Daniels
filed a response to the dissolution petition on January 6, 2006.  Linn County
has an established procedure for resolving dissolution proceedings.  Once the
petition and response have been filed, the court seeks to resolve the
proceeding within eight to 12 months.  Towards that end, the court sets an
early resolution conference.  If the case involves child custody matters, the
court refers the case to mediation, which usually will occur before the early
resolution conference.  At the early resolution conference, the court will try
to determine which matters are contested.  If disputed property issues remain,
the court refers the case to arbitration and sets a date for a final resolution
conference after the arbitration.  The purpose of the final resolution
conference is to determine whether any disputed issues remain for trial.
After the husband
filed his response to the petition in January, the court scheduled the early
resolution conference for February 23, 2006.  At that conference, Daniels
represented that both parties were in mediation where they were formulating a
parenting plan, that the parties did not think that there would be any property
issues, but that spousal support might be an issue.  He explained that
"what we would like to do is set a settlement conference out about six to
eight weeks maximum, which would give us time to get through a mediation,"
and that he anticipated that all the issues could be resolved at the settlement
conference.  The accused agreed with Daniels' representation and added that he
thought "that [it] would be appropriate to set it out for a settlement
conference."  Consistent with the parties' representations, the court
scheduled a settlement conference for April 20, 2006.  Daniels also noted that
the parties had not exchanged discovery but that there might not be a need to
do so.
On April 20, the accused
appeared at the settlement conference and told the court that "he hadn't
spent the time he needed or had been too busy to look at the file or something
to that effect and he wasn't prepared to do a settlement conference."(3)  The court ordered
arbitration to attempt to settle the remaining property issues and scheduled a
final resolution conference for July 20, 2006.  The court appointed an arbitrator
and directed that the arbitration be completed by June 13, 2006.  The court
sent a notice to the parties identifying the arbitrator and directing the
parties to provide a calendar response to the arbitrator within ten days,
showing the dates on which they would be available for arbitration.
On May 1, 2006,
Daniels sent his calendar response to the arbitrator and the accused.  The
accused testified before the trial panel that he had written "OK" on a
copy of Daniels's calendar response, signed it, and sent the marked copy of
Daniels' calendar response to the arbitrator and, he presumed, Daniels.(4)  Neither Daniels nor the
arbitrator received the accused's response.  On May 18, 2006, the arbitrator's
assistant called the accused and left a message on his voicemail for him to
mail his calendar response.(5) 
The accused did not respond to the message.  On May 30, 2006, the arbitrator's office
left another message for the accused telling him that they could not proceed
until they heard from him and again asking for a response.  The accused did not
respond.
On June 28, 2006,
after learning that Daniels also had not received any communication from the
accused, the arbitrator's assistant sent a letter to the court arbitration
coordinator, copying both attorneys.  The letter stated that arbitration had
not been scheduled because the arbitrator had never heard from the accused
despite having left messages for him.  The accused received the June 28 letter
but did not respond to it.  He later testified that he assumed that the issue
would be discussed at the final resolution conference, which was scheduled in
approximately three weeks.  
On July 20, 2006,
both parties appeared before the circuit court for the final resolution
conference.  After the court called the case, the following exchange took
place:
"[THE ACCUSED]:  Your Honor, if I may --
"THE COURT:  Yeah.
"[THE ACCUSED]: -- I think it's incumbent
on me to explain what's going on here.
"THE COURT:  Well, I notice there's a
letter in the file from [the arbitrator] and I remember reading this and noting
that we would address this today.
"And, I guess, the problem, [counsel], is
nobody could find you.
"[THE ACCUSED]:  That's correct, Your
Honor.
"The condensed version is that my office --
all my files, materials have been burglarized and vandalized actually a series
of times.  Everything was either taken or destroyed for all my calendaring,
billing.  All my record keeping electronically.
"However, whoever did this was fairly
methodical in vandalizing all of the paperwork, dumping all of the file
cabinets.  What I have been attempting to do is organize and straighten this
stuff out.
"However, in the meantime, I developed some
form of an eye ailment that I'm being treated for which, unfortunately, one of
the side effects of that is it made it very difficult for me to read anything
to sort through the paperwork.
"I realize this creates a huge
inconvenience for the Court, opposing party and counsel, and my client.
"* * * I don't know that there's much of
anything that I could have done to head this off."
The court and the
parties discussed the best way to proceed in light of those events.  The court
noted that the accused had to get "all the discovery.  If some of it's
been stolen, we got to get it again" and stated that the accused needed to
ask Daniels for the discovery that was missing.  Daniels, for his part, noted
that the accused had never called and said, "you know, I lost everything,
update it, or anything like that."  The accused acknowledged that he had
not contacted Daniels to ask for replacement documents.  He explained that,
"however poor judgment that may have been, I was still hoping that I could
resurrect and reorganize enough of my file to be able to proceed with this
thing."
At the end of the
final resolution conference, Daniels noted that he had "real serious
questions about all of what's been said" and asked the court if he could ask
the accused two things:  "the physical address of the office that was
burglarized and when it was burglarized."  The accused gave the address for
the trailer but was not sure when the burglaries had occurred.  When Daniels
asked, "Can you give a month?  Like was it May or June?," the accused
said, "Well, it's been a couple of times.  Two times since our last court
appearance," which the accused has acknowledged referred to the settlement
conference in April.
The court referred
the matter once again to the arbitrator, directed the parties to proceed with
arbitration, and set the next court date for October 19, 2006.  During the next
two months, the accused took no steps to proceed with the arbitration.  Rather,
on September 13, 2006, the husband asked Daniels to withdraw as his attorney,
and Daniels did so.  The husband and wife then entered into a settlement
agreement, and the accused filed a final stipulated judgment on October 17,
2006.
The Bar filed a
formal complaint against the accused.  For the first cause of complaint, the
Bar asserted that the accused's lack of preparation for the April 20, 2006,
settlement conference and his failure to communicate with the arbitrator
constituted violations of Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.3 ("A
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.") and RPC
8.4(a)(4) (making it professional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice").(6) 
In its second cause of complaint, the Bar alleged that, when the accused told
the court on July 20, 2006, that multiple burglaries had affected his handling
of the dissolution proceeding, that statement was false.  The Bar alleged that the
accused's conduct violated RPC 3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly "mak[ing]
a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal") and RPC 8.4(a)(3) (making
it professional misconduct for an attorney to "engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's fitness to practice law").  The accused filed an answer denying
the Bar's allegations.
At a hearing before
the trial panel, the accused testified that he had in fact returned a calendar
response to the arbitrator,(7)
and he identified exhibit 16 as a copy of the marked response that he returned.(8)  The accused also
testified that he may not have been as clear as he could have been in
identifying when the break-ins occurred.  The trial panel issued an opinion
finding that the Bar had proved all of its allegations.  Among other things, it
did not credit the accused's testimony at the disciplinary hearing.  After
considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including prior
disciplinary sanctions against the accused, the trial panel suspended the
accused for 180 days.
On review, the accused
raises six arguments.  He argues initially that the trial panel erred "in
failing to hold the Bar to its burden of proving any alleged misconduct by
clear and convincing evidence."  The accused's second, third, fourth, and
fifth arguments assert that the Bar did not prove the four charged violations
by clear and convincing evidence.  The accused's final argument concerns the
sanction; on that issue, he argues only that no sanction should be levied
because he did not violate any ethical rules. 
The accused's first
argument is brief.  Essentially, he argues that, because the trial panel did
not state specifically that the Bar had proved its case by "clear and
convincing evidence," the trial panel failed to apply the correct standard
of proof.  It is true that the trial panel's opinion does not state the
standard of proof that it applied.  As the Bar points out, however, the pleadings
that the Bar filed with the trial panel stated the correct standard of proof. 
For example, in its written closing argument, the Bar began by asserting that
the evidence established violations by "clear and convincing
evidence" and concluded that "[t]he credible evidence is clear and
convincing."  Nothing in this record suggests that the trial panel used
any other standard of proof.  Beyond that, this court reviews the facts in disciplinary
proceedings de novo.  ORS 9.536(2); In re Koch, 345 Or 444, 447,
198 P3d 910 (2008).  Even if the trial panel used the wrong standard, this
court's application of the correct standard of proof on de novo review
cures any possible error.
The first cause of
complaint alleges that the accused's failure to prepare for the April 20
settlement conference, to provide a calendar response to the arbitrator, to respond
to the arbitrator's calls, and to schedule arbitration constitute neglect and
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.  The accused has not
disputed that, at the April 20 settlement conference, he told the trial court,
that "he hadn't spent the time he needed or had been too busy to look at
the file or something to that effect and he wasn't prepared to do a settlement
conference."  Rather, his factual dispute focuses on the events
surrounding arbitration.
On that issue, the
accused testified before the trial panel that he had mailed the arbitrator and presumably
Daniels his calendar response and that he did not receive the voicemail messages
that the arbitrator's assistant left for him.  As noted, however, neither the
arbitrator nor Daniels received the accused's calendar response.  Similarly,
the accused never responded to the voicemail messages that the arbitrator's
assistant left for him, and the only explanation that the accused offered at
the July 20, 2006, final resolution conference and later at the disciplinary
hearing was that his voicemail must not have been working.  The accused,
however, never identified any other voicemail messages that he did not receive,
although he speculated that some messages might have been missed.
To credit the
accused's testimony, we would have to conclude that his letters to both the
arbitrator and Daniels were lost in the mail and that he never received the two
voicemail messages that the arbitrator's assistant left for him.  Objectively,
the coincidence that all four messages would have been lost is difficult to
credit.  See State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 552-53, 725 P2d 312 (1986) (discussing
similar issue).  The accused's testimony that he in fact returned the calendar
response also is inconsistent with his actions at the July 20 hearing.  The
accused received the June 28 letter from the arbitrator's assistant, which told
the court that arbitration had not been scheduled because the assistant had
never received a calendar response from the accused "in spite of the fact
that I have left telephone messages requesting that he send the
response."  The accused, however, never called the arbitrator's assistant
or Daniels after he received the June 28 letter to let them know that he in
fact had sent the arbitrator a calendar response.  Nor did he tell the court at
the final resolution conference that he in fact had sent in the calendar
response, even though the court inquired about it.  The accused's silence
before the court is inconsistent with his later testimony before the trial
panel.
The trial panel, as
noted, did not find the accused's testimony credible.  In discussing the
subjective reasons for its credibility determination, the trial panel
explained:  "First of all, the manner in which the Accused testified was
not credible.  His mannerisms and speech levels when discussing this issue were
not indicative of a person who was being candid.  He was clearly uncomfortable
while responding to direct questions on this issue."  We defer to the
trial panel's subjective credibility findings, In re Fitzhenry, 343 Or
86, 103 &amp; n 13, 162 P3d 260 (2007), and the panel's subjective credibility
finding is consistent with our objective credibility finding.  We find by clear
and convincing evidence that the accused did not submit his calendar response
to the arbitrator and that he received but did not respond to the voicemails
regarding that failure.
Having resolved
those factual disputes, we turn to whether the accused's conduct violated RPC
1.3 or RPC 8.4(a)(4).  RPC 1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer."  Although one act of negligence
is not sufficient to violate RPC 1.3, either a course of neglectful conduct or
an extended period of neglect is sufficient.  In re Koch, 345 Or at
452.  In this case, the accused engaged in a course of neglectful conduct.  The
accused was not prepared for the settlement conference on April 20 that he had
requested, he failed to send in his calendar of available dates after receiving
the notice of the appointment of an arbitrator, he failed to respond to two
voice messages reminding him to send in the response, and he took no steps to pursue
arbitration after the court referred the matter, once again, to the arbitrator
at the July 20 hearing and told the parties "we need to get that going as
soon as possible."  Any of those enumerated events can -- and will --
occur on occasion, but having all of them occur in the same case and in the
serial manner in which they occurred is sufficient to constitute neglect.  See
id. at 452-53 (accused's repeated failure to contact client and respond to
client's inquiries over a six-month period constituted neglect);  In re Knappenberger,
337 Or 15, 23-24, 90 P3d 614 (2004) (accused's repeated failure to contact
client or respond to events related to an unsuccessful appeal constituted
neglect under a previous, but identically worded, rule of professional conduct). 
 The accused knowingly neglected his client's legal matter under RPC
1.3.
The accused's
conduct also violated RPC 8.4(a)(4).  RPC 8.4(a)(4) prohibits an attorney from
"engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice."  To establish a violation under RPC 8.4(a)(4), the Bar must show
that "(1) the accused lawyer's action or inaction was improper; (2) the
accused lawyer's conduct occurred during the course of a judicial proceeding or
a proceeding with the trappings of a judicial proceeding; and (3) the accused
lawyer's conduct had or could have had a prejudicial effect upon the
administration of justice."  In re Kluge, 335 Or 326, 345, 66 P3d
492 (2003) (setting forth this standard for violations of a previous, but
identically worded, rule of professional conduct); see In re Paulson,
346 Or 676, 683, 216 P3d 859 (2009) (adopting that standard for RPC
8.4(a)(4)).  We find that the accused's failure to be prepared at the April 20
settlement conference and his repeated failure to respond to the arbitrator was
improper, occurred during a dissolution proceeding, and prejudiced the administration
of justice. 
On the last point,
Linn County has established a procedure for resolving dissolution proceedings
quickly and efficiently.  One part of that procedure is to arbitrate property
disputes before the final resolution conference so that the court can narrow
the remaining issues, if any, for trial.  Here, the accused failed to respond
to the court's order to schedule arbitration and the arbitrator's attempts to
secure his compliance.  Not only did the accused's failure to respond unnecessarily
expend the time of the arbitrator and his staff, it undercut the essential purpose
of the final resolution conference.  Instead of narrowing the issues for trial,
the court spent its time at the final resolution conference trying to
understand what had happened to derail the dissolution proceeding and how it
could get the case back on track.  
Additionally, the
accused's failure to be prepared for the April 20 settlement conference that he
requested (and that he continued to hold out as the best way of resolving the
dissolution proceeding) unnecessarily expended judicial resources.   We
conclude that the accused's actions, taken together, prejudiced the
administration of justice.  See In re Gresham, 318 Or 162, 166, 864 P2d
360 (1993) ("The accused's repeated failures to do anything to administer
the estate -- notwithstanding his repeated assurances to the court -- were
prejudicial to the administration of justice, requiring the court repeatedly to
request information from the accused.").
The Bar's second
cause of complaint alleges that the accused's statements to the trial court on
July 20, 2006, violated RPC 3.3(a)(1) and RPC 8.4(a)(3).  As noted, at the earlier
April settlement hearing, the court had directed the parties to go to arbitration
so that it could determine at the final resolution conference in July what, if
any, issues remained for trial.  On June 28, the arbitrator's assistant wrote
the court that it had not been possible to schedule arbitration because the
accused had not notified the arbitrator when he would be available to arbitrate
despite her voicemail messages requesting a response.  The accused began the
July 20 hearing by attempting to "explain what's going on here."  He
told the trial court that "all my files, materials have been burglarized
and vandalized actually a series of times" and, more specifically, "[t]wo
times since our last court appearance."  He explained that all his
calendaring and billing had been destroyed and stated that, although he had not
asked Daniels for missing documents, "I was still hoping that I could
resurrect and reorganize enough of my file to be able to proceed with this
thing."
The Bar argues that
the accused's explanation was false or misleading in two respects.  First, it
argues that no burglaries occurred after December 26, 2005, and, at a minimum,
after April 20, 2006 -- the date that would have affected the accused's ability
to proceed with the arbitration.  Second, the Bar argues that, even if the
trailer was burglarized after April, the accused misled the trial court into
believing that those break-ins were the reason that he had failed to respond to
the arbitrator's request and proceed with the dissolution case.  The Bar notes
that, because the accused stopped working out of the trailer after December
2005, any subsequent break-ins would have had no material effect on his ability
to represent the wife's interests.
We begin with the
number and timing of any burglaries.  The evidence clearly establishes that, on
or about December 26, 2005, someone broke into the trailer that the accused
used for office space and completely vandalized its contents, including the
accused's legal files.  The testimony regarding the existence and timing of
other break-ins was mixed.  The owner of the property on which the trailer was
located works approximately 150 feet from the trailer and walks or drives by it
daily.  He testified that, within a month after the December break-in, the
trailer's windows and doors were boarded up and that he never saw evidence of a
later break-in.  Another witness, Cody Northern, is involved in PIE and helped
maintain the trailer.  He testified that two break-ins or attempted break-ins
occurred before the major break-in, but he could not identify the date when any
of the break-ins had occurred.  His mother, Mary Northern, testified that more
than one break-in occurred, and her testimony primarily is consistent with her
son's that the break-ins preceded the major break-in in December.  One part of
her testimony, however, may permit a weak inference that some break-ins
occurred after December 2005.(9) 
Finally, at the disciplinary hearing, the accused sought to clarify his
response to the trial court in July.  He testified that,
"in responding in court that day about the later burglaries,
what I should have made more clear was the fact that I don't know when any of
the burglaries occurred.  I personally don't have that knowledge.  The
reference that I should have made clearer is that I became aware of at least
two others after the last -- after the April court date."
There are no police reports or other documentation
of any burglaries after December 26, 2005, and we conclude that no break-ins
occurred after that date.  The accused's statement to the court on July 20,
2006, that two burglaries had occurred after April 20, 2006 was, at a minimum,
too broad, as he later acknowledged.(10)
The Bar also argues
that the accused represented to the trial court that he was unable to proceed
with the case because of the break-ins.  In responding to the court's inquiry
about the status of the case, the accused explained that his office had been
broken into and that his calendar had been destroyed.  Later in the colloquy,
he added that he was in the process of reconstructing the wife's file.  The accused
offered that explanation to the court to excuse his failure to submit the case
to arbitration or otherwise proceed with the case before the final resolution
conference.  The difficulty with that explanation, however, is that the accused
did not use the trailer for his legal work after December 26, 2005.  At that
point, his file was limited to the petition and information that the wife had
provided him.  The wife was able to provide duplicate copies of most, if not
all, the information, and we find that the December break-in did not prevent
the accused from proceeding with the arbitration in any material way.
More specifically,
the court did not send the notice to the parties directing them to proceed to
arbitration until April 2006.  The accused received that notice long after he
had moved his law office out of the trailer, and any break-ins that occurred at
the trailer either before or after the receipt of that notice did not affect
the accused's ability to pursue arbitration as the court had directed.  We find
that, when the accused represented that the break-ins had affected his ability
to proceed with the case, that representation was false.  We also find that the
accused acted intentionally in making that misrepresentation; he intended for
the court to conclude that he had been unable to proceed because of a series of
break-ins when that was not true.(11)
RPC 3.3(a)(1)
provides that a "lawyer shall not knowingly * * * make a false statement
of fact or law to a tribunal."  Given our factual findings, we conclude
that the accused violated that rule.  RPC 8.4(a)(3), by contrast, is not
limited to statements made to tribunals.  It provides that a lawyer shall not
"engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice
law."  Cf. In re Carpenter, 337 Or 226, 232, 95 P3d 203 (2004) (explaining
that Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3) applied to misconduct outside the practice
of law that showed that the "lawyer lacks those characteristics that are
essential to the practice of law").  We conclude that, in the
circumstances of this case, the accused's intentional misrepresentation to the trial
court "reflects adversely on [his] fitness to practice law."  We find
that the Bar proved both violations by clear and convincing evidence.
We now turn to the
appropriate sanction.  As this court has previously stated, the purpose of
attorney discipline is not retributive but is instead designed to protect the
public and the justice system from lawyers who have not, will not, or are
unlikely to properly discharge their professional duties.  In re Paulson,
346 Or at 712.  In determining a presumptive sanction we consider "(1) the
ethical duty violated; (2) the lawyer's mental state; and (3) the actual or
potential injury caused" by the conduct.  Id.  We then adjust the
presumptive sanction based on the presence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.  Id.  Finally, we consider whether the sanction is
consistent with Oregon case law.  Id.
The accused in this
case has violated his duties to his client and the legal system.  The accused's
failure to prepare for the settlement conference and his failure to schedule
arbitration breached his duty of diligence to his client.  See American
Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991)
(amended 1992) (ABA Standards) 4.4.  The accused's false statements and
misrepresentations to the court at the July 20 court appearance violated his
duty to the legal system.  ABA Standard 6.1 ("False Statements, Fraud, and
Misrepresentation").
Regarding the
accused's mental state, the trial panel found that the accused acted
intentionally in making false representations to the court at the July 20 court
appearance and acted knowingly when he appeared unprepared at the April 20
settlement conference and when he later failed to schedule arbitration. 
"'Intent' is the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result."  ABA Standards at 7.  "'Knowledge' is the conscious
awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without
the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result."  Id. 
We agree with the trial panel's findings.  As discussed above, given the
context and the questions from the trial court, the accused was aware that the
court wanted to know why arbitration was not scheduled.  The accused gave a
dishonest explanation to make the court believe that he should not be held
responsible.  In doing so, the accused acted intentionally. The accused
knowingly failed to be prepared for the conference and failed to schedule
arbitration.  The accused was aware of the settlement conference and the
required arbitration but failed to act.
Turning to the
question of injury, we find by clear and convincing evidence that the accused
caused both actual and potential injury.  The legal system suffered actual
injury when the accused made false statements to the court.  The court was
forced to make decisions based on inaccurate information provided by the
accused.  Any time a court is forced to make decisions with incomplete or
inaccurate information, the legal system is harmed.  The accused's client and
the judicial system suffered, at a minimum, potential injury when the accused
failed to prepare for the settlement conference and failed to schedule the
arbitration, because his actions potentially delayed the dissolution proceedings.(12)
With the above in
mind, we turn to the presumptive sanction.  The recommended sanctions generally
follow the specific duties violated -- in this case, the duty to the client and
the legal system.  Suspension is the appropriate presumptive sanction when an
attorney "knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes
injury or potential injury to a client."  ABA Standard 4.42(a).  When an
attorney "knowingly engages in * * * conduct that involves dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's
fitness to practice law," a reprimand generally is appropriate.  ABA
Standard 5.13.  Without serious or potentially serious injury, suspension is
generally appropriate when an attorney makes a false statement to a court.  See
ABA Standards 6.11-6.12.  On balance, we conclude tentatively that suspension
is appropriate in this case.
We next turn to
aggravating and mitigating factors.  The Bar identifies four aggravating
circumstances.  Three are relatively straightforward:  the accused had a
selfish motive in making false representations to cover his own failure to act,
ABA Standard 9.22(b), the accused committed multiple offenses, ABA Standard
9.22(d), and the accused has substantial experience in the practice of law,
having been admitted to practice in 1976, ABA Standard 9.22(i).  We agree that
those factors are present.  The other aggravating factor, prior disciplinary
history, ABA Standard 9.22(a), requires greater discussion.  
The accused has a
history of admonition and discipline for neglect.  The accused's first instance
of neglect occurred in 1987 when he accepted a letter of admonition for
neglecting a legal matter and failing to cooperate with the disciplinary
authority.  See In re Jackson (Jackson I), 10 DR Rptr 199, 202
(1996) (using the 1987 letter of admonition as an aggravating factor);  In
re Jackson (Jackson II), 13 DR Rptr 164, 168 (1999) (same).  The
accused was disciplined for similar conduct in 1996.  The accused stipulated to
a public reprimand in that proceeding for neglecting a legal matter when he
undertook representation of a probate case but failed to pursue the case and
failed to communicate with the client.  Jackson I, 10 DR Rptr at 201. 
In 1999, the accused received a 30-day suspension for failing to return a
client's property and failing to provide an accounting for a retainer despite
repeated requests from the client.  Jackson II, 13 DR Rptr at 164-66.
The accused's
history thus consists of a letter of admonition for neglect, a stipulated
reprimand for neglect in Jackson I, and an adjudicated determination in Jackson
II that the accused failed to return a client's property and failed to
provide an accounting -- specific types of neglect related to the accused's
clients.  The adjudication in Jackson II is similar to this case in another
respect.  In Jackson II,  the accused submitted billing statements to
the trial panel to establish that he had provided an accounting to this
clients; however, the trial panel found in that case that "the monthly
billing statements provided by the Accused were never sent to [his
clients]."  13 DB Rptr at 166.  In this case, the accused identified an
exhibit in the disciplinary proceeding -- a copy of a marked calendar response
-- as support for his testimony that he had returned that response to the
arbitrator.  As in Jackson II, we find that the accused never returned
the response.
With that background
in mind, we turn to the appropriate weight to give those prior disciplinary actions. 
A letter of admonition is not a sanction or part of a prior record of
discipline imposed on a lawyer; however, it "'can be relevant to the
determination of the appropriate sanction in a subsequent proceeding * * *
because it demonstrates that the accused lawyer has engaged in [similar]
misconduct in the past.'"  In re Bettis, 342 Or 232, 241, 149 P3d
1194 (2006) (quoting In re Cohen, 330 Or 489, 500, 8 P3d 953 (2000)). 
Similarly, the weight that we give stipulated reprimands has varied with the
context of each case.  See Koch, 345 Or at 457 (declining to give great
weight to a single stipulated reprimand because of the multiple reasons that
lawyers may agree to relatively light sanctions); In re Knappenberger,
340 Or 573, 585, 135 P3d 297 (2006) (even though the accused had committed
multiple previous violations, the stipulated reprimand involved dissimilar
conduct).  In this case, the accused has a history of neglectful conduct and a
history of gradually escalating responses (a letter of admonition, a stipulated
reprimand, and a 30-day suspension); as an integral part of that history, the
stipulated reprimand in 1996 takes on greater significance. 
The accused does not
identify any mitigating factors.  The Bar notes, however, that the prior
disciplinary offenses were remote in time, and the trial panel found that the
accused represented the wife pro bono when she could not otherwise
obtain legal counsel.(13) 
Although mitigating factors are present, we find that the aggravating factors,
including the numerous instances of prior discipline, outweigh the mitigating
factors.
We finally turn to
our own precedent.  This case involves both client neglect and
misrepresentations to the court.  As this court recently noted, in "disciplinary cases involving dishonesty and misrepresentation, this
court has ordered sanctions ranging from six-month suspensions to disbarment." 
In re Wilson, 342 Or 243, 251, 149 P3d 1200 (2006).  Similarly,
"the court has imposed sanctions ranging from a 60-day to a one-year
suspension when a lawyer's neglect and inattention has resulted in lost
opportunities for his or her client."(14) 
Koch, 345 Or at 458.
The Bar argues that
this case is similar to In re Worth, 337 Or 167, 92 P3d 721 (2004).  In Worth,
a lawyer neglected a legal matter and made misrepresentations to the court,
ultimately resulting in the dismissal of his client's case.  Id. at
169-73.  This court found four aggravating factors, including one instance of
prior discipline, and four mitigating factors.  Id. 179-80.  This court
concluded that the "aggravating factors outweigh[ed] slightly the
mitigating ones," and, after looking at this court's precedent, suspended
the accused for 120 days.  Id. at 180-81  
Worth has
some similarities to and differences from the present case.  In Worth,
the accused made two misrepresentations and the ultimate result, a dismissal of
the accused's case, was more severe than what occurred in this case.  In this
case, the accused made an intentional misrepresentation to the court in July,
which he compounded by trying to cover up that misrepresentation in the
subsequent disciplinary proceeding.  Moreover, the accused's history of prior
instances of neglect and similar conduct, accompanied by gradually increased responses
(admonition, reprimand, and a 30-day suspension), has not been sufficient to conform
his behavior to ethical standards and demonstrates that a greater sanction is
required here.  On balance, we conclude that the sanction that we imposed in Worth
-- a 120-day suspension -- is also appropriate here.
The accused is
suspended from the practice of law for 120 days, effective 60 days from the
date of the filing of this decision.
1. The
break-in was discovered on December 26.  It could have occurred before that
date.  There is also some evidence that there were a series of break-ins or
attempted break-ins at the trailer.  Although we discuss the evidence later in
greater detail, we find that, to the extent that more than one break-in
occurred, the final break-in occurred on December 26, 2005. 
2. The accused could not identify any specific documents that he did not
recover, although he suspected he might not have reconstructed the file
completely.
3. Daniels testified before the trial panel that the accused made the
statement quoted above (or one similar to it) at the settlement conference. 
The accused could not recall what he had said but "guess[ed] that would be
the best evidence of what I said."  Daniels made virtually the same
representation when he and the accused appeared before the circuit court on
July 20, 2006.  The accused did not dispute Daniels' representation then
either.
4. The accused could not remember specifically whether he had served a
copy of his response on Daniels but stated that that would be his custom.
5. Initially, the arbitrator's assistant called the wrong number.  She
found the correct number, got the accused's voicemail, and left two messages,
the first on May 18 and the second on May 30. 
6. The Bar's complaint cited RPC 8.4(a)(3) rather than RPC 8.4(a)(4). 
The Bar's subsequent filings cited 8.4(a)(4) for the first cause of complaint
and the Bar made the mistake known to the trial panel during the hearing.  The
accused stated that he had no objection to the Bar's amendment to its
complaint.
7. As noted, the accused testified that he had taken Daniels' calendar
response, written "OK" on it, signed it, and returned it to the
arbitrator and, he assumed, Daniels.
8. The
Bar offered exhibit 16 into evidence.
9. In response to the accused's question whether she remembered him
mentioning break-ins after the December 2005 break-in, Mary Northern said she
couldn't remember the time frame but did remember the accused mentioning things
like the door is just totally shot now.  The accused then asked "And that
would have been after the initial," to which Northern replied
"Okay."
10.  need not decide whether the accused knowingly made a false statement
to the trial court when he stated that two break-ins had occurred after April
20, 2006.  As explained below, we find that the accused's explanation for his
inability to proceed with the case was false and intentional. 
11. Our conclusion that the accused intentionally misrepresented his
reasons for failing to proceed with the case is consistent with the trial
panel's credibility finding.  On this issue, the trial panel found that,
"[w]hile the Accused denies making a false representation to the court,
again we find * * * the manner of testimony to not be credible."
12. It is possible that this was also actual injury, but we believe that,
in this case, it is too uncertain for us to say definitively that the
dissolution proceeding would have concluded earlier absent the accused's
conduct.  The parties eventually settled on their own terms, and it is unclear
on this record whether this would have occurred earlier.
13. The trial panel specifically found that the mitigation factor of
"cooperative attitude toward [disciplinary] proceedings," ABA
Standard 9.32(e), did not apply because "the Accused chose to excuse what
happened in this case with excuses and explanations that do not fit the facts[,
and] it appears that the Accused was attempting to 'cover up' for his
mistakes."  We agree with the trial panel.
14. We note that the lost opportunities in this case, the potential for an
earlier resolution for the wife's case, is speculative; in previous cases, the
injury has been actual and documented lost opportunities, such as dismissal of
a case.