Title: Kartsonis v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC20-1500
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2021

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
 
 
No. SC20-1500 
____________ 
 
PAUL THOMAS KARTSONIS, 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
June 10, 2021 
 
LAWSON, J. 
 
 
Petitioner Paul Kartsonis seeks review of the decision of the 
First District Court of Appeal in Kartsonis v. State, 302 So. 3d 508 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2020), arguing that we have jurisdiction because of 
the decision’s “apparent conflict” with the Second District Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Gay v. State, 898 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2005), and because the decision expressly affects a class of 
constitutional or state officers, namely judges.  We deny review on 
the latter basis without comment, see art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const., 
 
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but briefly write to address Petitioner’s arguments regarding conflict 
with Gay and explain why we lack jurisdiction. 
ANALYSIS 
The Florida Constitution provides that this Court “[m]ay review 
any decision of a district court of appeal . . . that expressly and 
directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal 
or of the supreme court on the same question of law.”  Art. V, § 
3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  “Express and direct conflict” is a strict standard 
that requires either the announcement of a conflicting rule of law or 
the application of a rule of law in a manner that results in a 
conflicting outcome despite “substantially the same controlling 
facts.”  Nielson v. City of Sarasota, 117 So. 2d 731, 734 (Fla. 1960).  
Because the facts in the second situation “are of the upmost 
importance,” there can be no conflict on this basis when the cases 
are easily distinguishable.  Mancini v. State, 312 So. 2d 732, 733 
(Fla. 1975). 
In the decision under review, the First District held that it was 
not error for a successor judge to deny Petitioner’s Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) motion when the original sentencing 
judge is unavailable, rejecting the Petitioner’s suggestion below that 
 
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Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.700(c)(1), which governs the 
pronouncement of a new sentence by a successor judge in 
noncapital cases, should apply to all sentencing related matters.  
Kartsonis, 302 So. 3d at 508.  In rejecting this suggestion, the First 
District distinguished Gay—the primary decision relied on by 
Petitioner below—on the grounds that “the defendant in Gay was 
resentenced by a different judge.”  Id. (emphasis added).   
Petitioner does not disagree with the First District’s conclusion 
that Gay is distinguishable but nonetheless argues that we should 
exercise our discretion to grant jurisdiction because of “apparent 
conflict” with Gay.  Nevertheless, where the district court decisions 
alleged to be in conflict are materially distinguishable, as they are 
here, we have no discretion to review because we lack jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons explained above, we deny the petition for 
review. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
 
 
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NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 
– Class of Constitutional Officers/Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
First District - Case No. 1D19-1172 
 
(Duval County) 
 
Michael Ufferman of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, 
and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent