Title: In re Christopher K.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 98597
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 15, 2005

Docket No. 98597-Agenda 5-September 2005.
In re CHRISTOPHER K., a Minor (The People of the State of 							

Illinois, Appellant, v. Christopher K., Appellee.)
Opinion filed December 15, 2005.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	After a jury trial, respondent, Christopher K., was adjudicated
delinquent for the offense of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1
(West 1998)). The trial court imposed both a juvenile sentence and an
adult sentence pursuant to the extended juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ)
statute of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West
1998)). The appellate court affirmed respondent's conviction, but
reversed his adult sentence. 348 Ill. App. 3d 130, 154. The main issue
before this court is whether the law-of-the-case doctrine prohibits the
designation of a case as an EJJ prosecution after the appellate court
affirms the denial of a motion to prosecute a juvenile as an adult under
section 5-805(3) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-805(3) (West 1998)).
We hold it does not and reverse the appellate court's modification of
respondent's sentence. We also affirm respondent's conviction. In
doing so, we hold the trial court did not err in determining respondent
did not unambiguously invoke his right to counsel.
BACKGROUND
	On January 23, 1999, 16-year-old Willie Lomax was shot and
killed. Soon thereafter, respondent, who at the time was 14 years old,
was arrested and taken into custody for the shooting. With his mother
present, he was questioned by two Chicago Police Department
detectives. Ultimately, respondent provided oral and court-reported
statements admitting his involvement in the shooting.(1)
	On February 1, 1999, the State filed a petition for adjudication of
wardship charging respondent with first-degree murder. The State
also filed a motion to prosecute respondent as an adult pursuant to
section 5-805(3) of the Juvenile Court Act, which gives a juvenile
court discretion to permit the prosecution of a minor under the state's
criminal laws (705 ILCS 405/5-805(3) (West 1998)). This procedure
is known as a discretionary transfer of jurisdiction (705 ILCS
405/5-805(3) (West 1998)). After a hearing, the trial court denied the
State's discretionary transfer motion, and the State appealed.
	The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the State's
motion. In re Christopher K., No. 1-99-3175 (2001) (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Initially, it rejected the State's
contention that respondent was engaged in "adult activities" to such
an extent that his behavior warranted transfer. The appellate court
then reasoned that the trial court considered all the appropriate
statutory factors in ruling on the State's motion. According to the
appellate court, the trial court correctly gave the seriousness of the
alleged crime and respondent's history of delinquency the most
weight. The former factor weighed against respondent, because first
degree murder is a serious crime, but the latter factor weighed in his
favor, because he had only one prior station adjustment. The
remaining six factors enumerated in the discretionary transfer statute
were "equally split." Respondent's culpability, premeditated actions,
and use of a deadly weapon all weighed against him, but his age, his
willingness to participate meaningfully in available services, and the
adequacy of the punishment or services available in the juvenile system
all weighed in respondent's favor. The appellate court concluded that
the record supported the trial court's findings with respect to each
statutory factor. Therefore, the appellate court held the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the State's motion. In re
Christopher K., No. 1-99-3175.
	After the appellate court issued its mandate, respondent moved
to quash his arrest for lack of probable cause, and to suppress any
evidence obtained as a result of his arrest. Respondent also moved
separately to suppress the statements he made to the police while in
custody. The trial court denied both motions.
	On June 20, 2001, the State filed a motion to designate
respondent's case as an EJJ prosecution under section 5-810 of the
Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 1998)). When a
juvenile court designates a case as an EJJ prosecution, the minor
subject to the EJJ prosecution is entitled to a jury trial. 705 ILCS
504/5-810(3) (West 1998). If the trial results in a guilty verdict, the
trial court must impose a juvenile sentence and an adult sentence,
staying the adult sentence on the condition that the minor not violate
the provisions of the juvenile sentence. 705 ILCS 504/5-810(4) (West
1998). The trial court granted the State's EJJ motion, and the case
proceeded to a jury trial.
	At trial, the jury found respondent guilty of first-degree murder.
Therefore, in accordance with section 5-810, the trial court
committed respondent to the Illinois Department of Corrections,
Juvenile Division, until the age of 21 (705 ILCS 405/5-750(2) (West
1998)) and imposed an adult sentence of 40 years' imprisonment (730
ILCS 5/5-8-1 (West 1998)), staying the latter on the condition
respondent successfully complete his juvenile sentence.
	Respondent appealed both his conviction and sentence. 348 Ill.
App. 3d at 154. With respect to the sentence, the appellate court
found the trial court erred in designating respondent's case as an EJJ
prosecution and, accordingly, in imposing a stayed adult sentence. 348
Ill. App. 3d at 154. Specifically, the appellate court held that the law-of-the-case doctrine barred the application of section 5-810 to
respondent's case. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 140. The court reasoned that
the State's EJJ motion was directed toward the same "ultimate issue"
as the State's discretionary transfer motion, which the trial court
denied, and which was affirmed on appeal. See 348 Ill. App. 3d at
140. Therefore, the appellate court reversed respondent's adult
sentence. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 154. In addition, based on its
interpretation of section 5-805 and section 5-810, the appellate court
held the legislature intended discretionary transfer motions and EJJ
motions to be filed simultaneously. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 142. The
appellate court rejected respondent's claims that section 5-810
violates the principles of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000) (348 Ill. App. 3d at 142-43),
and is unconstitutionally vague (348 Ill. App. 3d at 143-47).
	With respect to respondent's conviction, the appellate court held
the trial court did not err in denying respondent's motion to suppress
his statements to the police. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 151-53. The appellate
court also upheld the trial court's denial of respondent's motion to
quash his arrest and suppress related evidence. 348 Ill. App. 3d at
153. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed respondent's conviction.
348 Ill. App. 3d at 154.
	The State filed a petition for leave to appeal with this court. We
allowed the State's petition (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) to address whether
the law-of-the-case doctrine bars the designation of a case as an EJJ
prosecution after the appellate court affirms the denial of a
discretionary transfer motion. We also permitted The Juvenile Law
Center and a number of other organizations concerned with the
welfare of minors to file an amicus curiae brief in support of
respondent (155 Ill. 2d R. 345).
ANALYSIS
I. Mootness
	Prior to oral argument, the State filed a motion to dismiss certain
issues respondent raised on cross-appeal as moot. We ordered the
State's motion to be taken with the case. As a preliminary matter, we
address this motion.
	The issues on cross-appeal fall into three categories. First,
respondent claims section 5-810 is unconstitutionally vague. He
argues the statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face because it
fails to provide adequate notice to a minor as to what acts violate the
"conditions" (705 ILCS 405/5-810(6) (West 1998)) of the minor's
juvenile sentence for purposes of lifting the stay on the minor's adult
sentence. He also argues section 5-810 is unconstitutionally vague on
its face because it encourages arbitrary and capricious enforcement of
a minor's adult sentence by failing to specify what acts violate the
"conditions" of the minor's juvenile sentence. In addition, respondent
argues section 5-810 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him
because the trial court did not specifically identify the "conditions"
attached to his juvenile sentence, thereby failing to provide him with
adequate notice as to what acts could trigger his stayed adult
sentence. Respondent also argues the statute is unconstitutionally
vague as applied to him because the trial court did not specifically
identify the "conditions" attached to his juvenile sentence, thereby
encouraging the arbitrary and capricious imposition of his adult
sentence.
	Second, respondent claims two Apprendi violations. He argues
the initial designation of his case as an EJJ prosecution violated
Apprendi because it increased his penalty for the alleged offense
beyond the statutory maximum absent proof to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt of the factors necessary to designate a case as an EJJ
prosecution. Respondent reasons that the trial court's denial of the
State's motion to prosecute him as an adult effectively set his
maximum sentence at commitment to juvenile detention until the age
of 21. The designation of his case as an EJJ prosecution, he concludes,
exceeded this maximum. Additionally, respondent argues the
procedure in section 5-810 for lifting the stay on a minor's adult
sentence violates Apprendi. Respondent reasons that section 5-810
impermissibly allows a trial judge to extend a minor's sentence beyond
the statutory maximum after finding by a preponderance of the
evidence that the minor committed a new offense or violated the
conditions of the juvenile sentence. He reiterates that the applicable
maximum sentence is commitment to juvenile detention until the
minor's 21st birthday.
	Finally, respondent raises a fifth amendment claim. He argues that
while he was in police custody, he invoked his right to counsel, and
this right was not honored. Accordingly, he concludes the trial court
should have suppressed the statements he made to the police.
	In its motion to dismiss, the State points out that respondent
turned 21 while this appeal was pending, successfully completing his
juvenile sentence. The State concedes respondent's fifth amendment
claim may not be moot because it relates to the validity of his
conviction, not to his sentence. It argues, however, that this court
cannot grant respondent any effectual relief on the other issues raised
in his cross-appeal. The State further asserts that the issue of whether
the law-of-the-case doctrine bars the designation of respondent's case
as an EJJ prosecution falls within the public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine.
	In objection, respondent requests that this court dismiss as moot
all of the issues related to the designation of his case as an EJJ
prosecution, including the law-of-the-case issue. He also asserts his
fifth amendment claim is not moot and should not be dismissed. In
addition, respondent argues that if this court considers the State's law-of-the-case issue under the public interest exception to the mootness
doctrine, it should also consider respondent's vagueness and Apprendi
claims.
	The threshold question before us is whether the issues raised in
this appeal are moot. An issue on appeal becomes moot where events
occurring after the filing of the appeal render it "impossible for the
reviewing court to grant effectual relief to the complaining party."
People v. Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d 430, 435 (2004). The mootness
doctrine stems from the fear that parties to a resolved dispute lack a
stake in its outcome sufficient to ensure "that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult *** questions." Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 678, 82 S. Ct. 691, 703
(1962), quoted in Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d  at 435. In general, this court
will not consider moot issues. In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 45
(2004).
	Respondent's fifth amendment claim is not moot. This court has
previously acknowledged that the completion of a defendant's
sentence renders a challenge to the sentence moot, but not a challenge
to the conviction. People v. Lynn, 102 Ill. 2d 267, 272-73 (1984).
Nullification of a conviction may hold important consequences for a
defendant. Lynn, 102 Ill. 2d  at 273. Respondent's fifth amendment
claim calls into question the validity of his conviction and therefore is
not moot.
	On the contrary, the issues raised by the State and by respondent
regarding the designation of respondent's case as an EJJ prosecution
are moot. Under section 5-810, the successful completion of the
juvenile sentence imposed on a minor in an EJJ prosecution terminates
the minor's adult sentence. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(7) (West 1998).
Respondent successfully completed his juvenile sentence upon turning
21. Therefore, he is no longer subject to the adult sentence imposed
by the trial court pursuant to section 5-810. As a result, this court
cannot grant any meaningful relief to the State or to respondent by
ruling on the validity of the trial court's EJJ designation.
	While this court generally will not consider moot issues, it may
choose to review such issues under the public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine. Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d  at 45. Therefore, we must
inquire whether the moot issues raised by the State and by respondent
fall within the public interest exception. The exception applies when
(1) an issue is public in nature, (2) it is likely to recur, and (3) an
authoritative determination of the issue is desirable for the future
guidance of public officers. In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 402
(2002). The exception is construed narrowly, and requires a clear
showing of each criterion. In re Adoption of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 365 (1999).
	The law-of-the-case issue raised by the State is public in nature,
because it pertains to the administration of the juvenile justice system.
The issue is also likely to recur. It has the potential to arise anytime a
minor eligible for discretionary transfer is prosecuted. At oral
argument, respondent argued the issue implicates only the facts of this
case. We disagree. The appellate court's law-of-the-case holding
effectively precludes the State from ever filing an EJJ motion after the
denial of a discretionary transfer motion is affirmed on appeal,
regardless of the underlying facts of the case. Finally, an authoritative
determination of the law-of-the-case issue is desirable for the future
guidance of public officers. In assessing the desirability of an
authoritative determination, this court has consistently looked to
whether there is conflicting case law on the issue in question. See,
e.g., In re Marriage of Peters-Farrell, 216 Ill. 2d 287, 292 (2005) (no
authoritative determination needed because no conflicting case law);
In re J.B., 204 Ill. 2d 382, 387-88 (2003) (same); Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d  at 365-66 (same); Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d  at 46 (authoritative
determination needed because of conflicting case law); People v.
Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d 430, 436 (2004) (same); Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d  at 402; Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27, 33 (2001); In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2000) (same); Lucas
v. Lakin, 175 Ill. 2d 166, 170 (1997) (same). While the appellate
court's decision in this case does not directly conflict with prior case
law regarding law-of-the-case doctrine, none of the cases cited by the
appellate court apply the law-of-the-case doctrine to bar consideration
of an issue defined by a different statutory section than the issue
determined in the first appeal. Compare 348 Ill. App. 3d at 140, with
People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381 (2002); People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414 (1992); People v. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d 24 (1988); People v.
Rodriguez, 313 Ill. App. 3d 877 (2000); Lake Bluff Heating &amp; Air
Conditioning Supply, Inc. v. Harris Trust &amp; Savings Bank, 117 Ill.
App. 3d 284 (1983); Miscevich v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 110 Ill.
App. 3d 400 (1982). Moreover, the appellate court did not clearly
explain whether its conclusion that the State must simultaneously file
a motion for discretionary transfer and an EJJ motion is dicta, or a
necessary implication of its holding that the law-of-the-case doctrine
bars the consideration of an EJJ motion after the denial of a
discretionary transfer motion is affirmed on appeal. See 348 Ill. App.
3d at 141-42. For these reasons, we find that an authoritative
determination of the law-of-the-case issue is desirable to guide
juvenile judges in the disposition of motions for discretionary transfer
and EJJ motions. Because the law-of-the-case issue meets the three
criteria of the public interest exception, we choose to consider it on
the merits.
	We next turn to respondent's vagueness claims. We acknowledge
at the outset that facial and as applied vagueness challenges to section
5-810 have the potential to recur anytime a case is designated as an
EJJ prosecution. Moreover, whether section 5-810 is
unconstitutionally vague on its face is an issue that is public in nature,
because if the statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face, it has no
valid application. See People v. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 394, 399 (2005)
(noting that where a statute does not affect first amendment rights, it
will not be declared unconstitutionally vague unless it is not capable
of any valid application). Whether section 5-810 is unconstitutionally
vague as applied to defendant, however, is an issue specific to the
facts of defendant's case. Therefore, it is not public in nature.
Furthermore, we do not believe an authoritative determination of
either of the vagueness claims raised by respondent is necessary at this
time. Our research discloses that only one appellate court decision
besides the case before us has addressed a vagueness challenge to
section 5-810. See In re J.W., 346 Ill. App. 3d 1 (2004). The
appellate court's resolution of the vagueness challenge in J.W. is not
inconsistent with the appellate court's discussion of respondent's
vagueness claims in this case. Compare J.W., 346 Ill. App. 3d at 13-15
(holding respondent had no standing to raise vagueness challenge to
section 5-810), with 348 Ill. App. 3d at 146-47 (holding the term
"offense," as used in section 5-810, is not unconstitutionally vague).
We are aware that neither the instant appellate court decision nor J.W.
addresses the specific arguments respondent raises before this court
in support of his claims. This, however, merely further confirms that,
as yet, there is no need for an authoritative pronouncement on
vagueness challenges to section 5-810. For these reasons,
respondent's as-applied and facial-vagueness claims do not fall within
the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
	Finally, we address whether respondent's Apprendi claims fall
within the public interest exception. These claims are public in nature
because, like the law-of-the-case issue, they pertain to the
administration of the juvenile justice system. Specifically, they
implicate the legislature's decision to allow judges to make EJJ
designations and determine whether to impose stayed adult sentences
on minors convicted in EJJ prosecutions. They also are likely to recur,
as they may potentially be raised whenever a judge rules on an EJJ
motion after the denial of a discretionary transfer motion is affirmed
on appeal. However, we conclude that no authoritative determination
of these issues is necessary at this time. Our research discloses that the
appellate court has thus far uniformly rejected respondent's claim that
the initial designation of a case as an EJJ prosecution violates
Apprendi. See 348 Ill. App. 3d at 143; J.W., 346 Ill. App. 3d at 10-12;
In re Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d 276, 289 (2002). The appellate
court has yet to address respondent's claim that the procedure for
lifting a stay on the minor's adult sentence in an EJJ case violates
Apprendi. However, as we noted with respect to respondent's
vagueness claims, this merely confirms that, at this time, there is no
need for an authoritative determination of this issue. Thus,
respondent's Apprendi claims do not fall within the public interest
exception to the mootness doctrine.
	In sum, the law-of-the-case issue raised by the State and the
vagueness and Apprendi claims raised by respondent are moot.
However, we shall consider the law-of-the-case issue on the merits
because it falls within the public interest exception to the mootness
doctrine. We shall also consider the fifth amendment issue raised by
respondent on the merits, because it pertains to the validity of his
conviction and is therefore not moot.
II. Law-of-the-case Doctrine
	The law-of-the-case doctrine prohibits the reconsideration of
issues that have been decided by a reviewing court in a prior appeal.
See generally 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review §§605 through 613
(1995). We now consider whether the doctrine prohibits the
designation of a case as an EJJ prosecution after the appellate court
affirms the denial of a discretionary transfer motion. This issue
presents a question of law. Therefore, we review it de novo. P.R.S.
International, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 184 Ill. 2d 224, 234 (1998).
Resolving the issue will necessarily require us to examine the statutory
language of section 5-805 and section 5-810. An issue of statutory
interpretation likewise presents a question of law, which we review de
novo. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001).
	The plain language of a statute is the best indication of the
legislature's intent (In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364, 372 (2005)),
and the primary objective of statutory interpretation is to determine
and give effect to that intent (In re Ryan B., 212 Ill. 2d 226, 232
(2004)). In doing so, this court will examine a statute as a whole,
considering all relevant parts. In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184, 197 (1997).
Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we will give
effect to it without resorting to other aids of construction. In re D.F.,
208 Ill. 2d 223, 229 (2003).
	At the outset, we note that nothing in the plain language of either
statute prohibits the filing of an EJJ motion after the denial of a
discretionary transfer motion is affirmed on appeal. To the contrary,
section 5-810 permits the State to file an EJJ motion "at any time
prior to commencement of the minor's trial" (705 ILCS 405/5-810(1)
(West 1998)). Moreover, section 5-810 specifically provides that
"[n]othing in this [s]ection precludes the State from filing a motion for
transfer under [s]ection 5-805" (705 ILCS 405/5-810(8) (West
1998)). We will not read exceptions, conditions, or limitations into a
statute that the legislature did not express if the statutory language is
clear and unambiguous, which it is here. In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 62
(2003).
	This conclusion, however, does not end our inquiry. These
statutory provisions alone do not resolve whether, as a matter of
judicial discretion, the law-of-the-case doctrine precludes a trial court
from considering an EJJ motion after the appellate court affirms the
denial of a discretionary transfer motion. In general, the law-of-the-case doctrine "prohibits reconsideration of issues which have been
decided in a prior appeal." 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review §605, at
300 (1995). If "there have been no material changes in the facts since
the prior appeal, such issues may not be relitigated in the trial court or
re-examined in a second appeal." 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review
§605, at 300 (1995); see also Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d  at 395 (law-of-the-case doctrine bars relitigation of issue already decided in same case);
Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 468 (under law-of-the-case doctrine, rule
established as controlling in particular case will continue to be law of
the case as long as facts remain the same). The underlying purposes
of the doctrine are to avoid indefinite relitigation of the same issues,
to obtain consistent results in the same litigation, and to ensure that
lower courts follow the decisions of appellate courts. 5 Am. Jur. 2d
Appellate Review §605, at 301 (1995). While the doctrine is not a
jurisdictional limitation on a court's power to address an issue, it does
express the practice of courts generally to decline to reopen what has
been decided. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review §605, at 300-01
(1995); see also Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 468-69, citing Christianson
v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 100 L. Ed. 2d 811, 831, 108 S. Ct. 2166, 2178 (1988).
	The State argues the law-of-the-case doctrine does not bar a trial
court from designating a case as an EJJ prosecution after the court's
denial of discretionary transfer has been affirmed on appeal. It reasons
that the question of whether to prosecute a minor as an adult under
section 5-805(3) is different from the question of whether to
designate the minor's case as an EJJ prosecution under section 5-810.
It also points out that the statutory factors considered in disposing of
each motion are different. Accordingly, the State asserts the appellate
court erred in concluding a discretionary transfer motion and an EJJ
motion both decide the same "ultimate issue."
	Respondent argues the law-of-the-case doctrine prohibits an EJJ
designation after a denial of discretionary transfer is affirmed on
appeal. He asserts that a discretionary transfer motion and an EJJ
motion both decide the issue of whether to subject a minor to an adult
sentence, and emphasizes that the statutory factors considered in
disposing of each motion are essentially identical.
	To address whether the law-of-the-case doctrine prohibits the
designation of a case as an EJJ prosecution after the denial of a
discretionary transfer is affirmed on appeal, we must determine
whether a discretionary transfer motion and an EJJ motion decide the
same issue. To do so, we return to the statutory language of section
5-805 and section 5-810.
	Section 5-805 of the Juvenile Court Act provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
			"§ 5-805. Transfer of jurisdiction.
* * *
			(3) Discretionary transfer.
				(a) If a petition alleges commission by a minor 13 years
of age or over of an act that constitutes a crime under the
laws of this State and, on motion of the State's Attorney
to permit prosecution of the minor under the criminal
laws, a Juvenile Judge assigned by the Chief Judge of the
Circuit to hear and determine those motions, after hearing
but before commencement of the trial, finds that there is
probable cause to believe that the allegations in the motion
are true and that it is not in the best interests of the public
to proceed under this Act, the court may enter an order
permitting prosecution under the criminal laws.
				(b) In making its determination on the motion to permit
prosecution under the criminal laws the court shall
consider among other matters:
				(i) The seriousness of the alleged offense;
				(ii) The minor's history of delinquency;
				(iii) The age of the minor;
				(iv) The culpability of the minor in committing the
alleged offense;
				(v) Whether the offense was committed in an
aggressive or premeditated manner;
				(vi) Whether the minor used or possessed a deadly
weapon when committing the alleged offense;
				(vii) The minor's history of services, including the
minor's willingness to participate meaningfully in available
services;
				(viii) The adequacy of the punishment or services
available in the juvenile justice system.
			In considering these factors, the court shall give greater
weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and the
minor's prior record of delinquency than to the other factors
listed in this subsection.
			***
			(5) If criminal proceedings are instituted, the petition for
adjudication of wardship shall be dismissed insofar as the act
or acts involved in the criminal proceedings." 705 ILCS
405/5-805 (West 1998).
To summarize, section 5-805(3) gives a juvenile court authority to
permit the prosecution of a minor under the state's criminal laws. For
a court to allow a minor to be prosecuted as an adult under the
discretionary transfer provision, the minor must be at least 13 years
old, the act the minor is alleged to have committed must be a crime,
and there must be probable cause to believe the allegations against the
minor are true. In addition, the court must determine it is not in the
best interests of the public to prosecute the minor in juvenile court.
See 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)(a) (West 1998). In making this
determination, the court must consider the eight factors enumerated
in the statute, "among other matters" within its discretion. See 705
ILCS 405/5-805(3)(b) (West 1998). If the court determines transfer
is appropriate, criminal proceedings are instituted against the minor
and the juvenile petition is dismissed. See 705 ILCS 405/5-805(5)
(West 1998).
	Section 5-810 of the Juvenile Court Act provides, in relevant
part, as follows:
			"§ 5-810. Extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecutions.
			(1) If the State's Attorney files a petition, at any time prior
to commencement of the minor's trial, to designate the
proceeding as an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution
and the petition alleges the commission by a minor 13 years
of age or older of any offense which would be a felony if
committed by an adult, and, if the juvenile judge assigned to
hear and determine petitions to designate the proceeding as
an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution determines that
there is probable cause to believe that the allegations in the
petition and motion are true, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the proceeding shall be designated as an
extended jurisdiction juvenile proceeding.
				(b) The judge shall enter an order designating the
proceeding as an extended jurisdiction juvenile proceeding
unless the judge makes a finding based on clear and
convincing evidence that sentencing under the Chapter V
of the Unified Code of Corrections would not be
appropriate for the minor based on an evaluation of the
following factors:
				(i) The seriousness of the alleged offense;
				(ii) The minor's history of delinquency;
				(iii) The age of the minor;
				(iv) The culpability of the minor in committing the
alleged offense;
				(v) Whether the offense was committed in an
aggressive or premeditated manner;
				(vi) Whether the minor used or possessed a deadly
weapon when committing the alleged offense.
			In considering these factors, the court shall give greater
weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and the
minor's prior record of delinquency than to other factors
listed in this subsection.
* * *
			(4) Sentencing. If an extended jurisdiction juvenile
prosecution under subsection[ ] (1) results in a guilty plea, a
verdict of guilty, or a finding of guilt, the court shall impose
the following:
				(i) one or more juvenile sentences under Section 5-710;
and
				(ii) an adult criminal sentence in accordance with the
provisions of Chapter V of the Unified Code of
Corrections, the execution of which shall be stayed on the
condition that the offender not violate the provisions of
the juvenile sentence." 705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 1998).
Section 5-810 thus gives a juvenile court authority to impose an adult
sentence on a minor in conjunction with a juvenile sentence, staying
the adult sentence pending successful completion of the juvenile
sentence. For a court to designate a case as an EJJ prosecution, the
minor must be at least 13 years old, the act the minor is alleged to
have committed must be a felony if committed by an adult, and there
must be probable cause to believe the allegations against the minor are
true. See 705 ILCS 405/5-810(1) (West 1998). If these criteria are
met, the court must then designate the proceeding as an EJJ
prosecution unless clear and convincing evidence demonstrates an
adult sentence would be inappropriate. In making this finding, the
court must consider the six factors enumerated in the statute. See 705
ILCS 405/5-810(1)(b) (West 1998). If a case designated as an EJJ
prosecution results in a finding of guilt, both a juvenile sentence and
an adult sentence are imposed, and the latter is stayed. See 705 ILCS
405/5-810(4) (West 1998).
	Based on the language of section 5-805(3) and section 5-810, it
is apparent that a discretionary transfer motion and an EJJ motion
decide distinct issues. Section 5-805(3) allows the State to prosecute
a minor "under the criminal laws" (705 ILCS 405/5-805(3) (West
1998)), meaning that the minor is prosecuted in the same manner as
an adult offender. Adult prosecution subjects the minor to adult
sentencing. For instance, a minor who, like respondent, is convicted
of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1998)) faces a
minimum sentence of 20 years' imprisonment (730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) (West 1998)). The minor convicted and sentenced
as an adult has no possibility of avoiding the adult sentence. By
contrast, section 5-810 subjects a minor to a potential adult sentence
that the minor may or may not be required to serve, depending on the
minor's successful completion of a juvenile sentence. By way of
example, a minor who, like respondent, is convicted of first degree
murder in an EJJ prosecution faces commitment to juvenile detention
until the age of 21 (705 ILCS 405/5-750(2) (West 1998)) and the
prospect of a minimum adult sentence of 20 years' imprisonment (730
ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) (West 1998)). The minor convicted in an EJJ
prosecution remains within the juvenile justice system as long as he
does not violate the conditions of his juvenile sentence or commit a
new offense (705 ILCS 405/5-810(4), (6) (West 1998)). Thus,
section 5-810 reflects the legislature's intent to show minors who
qualify for the application of the statute greater leniency than minor's
who qualify for discretionary transfer, while still providing them with
a tangible incentive to avoid flouting their juvenile sentences or
reoffending. In this respect, section 5-810 differs significantly from
section 5-805(3). It follows that the issue of whether to designate a
case as an EJJ prosecution is not the same as the issue of whether to
prosecute a minor as an adult under section 5-805(3).
	Our conclusion is further supported by the fact that the inquiry
underlying a discretionary transfer motion is distinct from the inquiry
underlying an EJJ motion. The initial factors that qualify a minor's
case for discretionary transfer and an EJJ designation are essentially
the same. The minor must be at least 13 years old, there must be
probable cause to support the allegations against the minor, and the
minor must be alleged to have committed a crime (705 ILCS
405/5-805 (West 1998)) or an act that is a felony if committed by an
adult (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 1998)). After these initial factors
are met, however, the inquiries underlying a discretionary transfer
motion and an EJJ motion diverge. In the case of a discretionary
transfer motion, the trial court must consider whether it is in the best
interests of the public to prosecute the minor as an adult. 705 ILCS
405/5-805(3)(a) (West 1998). In the case of an EJJ motion, once the
initial qualifying factors are met, a rebuttable presumption arises that
the case will be designated as an EJJ prosecution (705 ILCS
405/5-810(1) (West 1998)), and the designation will remain unless the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that an adult sentence
would be inappropriate for the minor (705 ILCS 405/5-810(1)(b)
(West 1998)). It is true that some of the statutory factors a trial court
must consider in determining whether discretionary transfer is in the
best interests of the public overlap with the statutory factors a trial
court must consider in determining whether an adult sentence would
be appropriate for the minor under the EJJ statute. However, these
factors are not identical. Under section 5-805(3), the trial court must
consider "[t]he minor's history of services, including the minor's
willingness to participate meaningfully in available services," and
"[t]he adequacy of the punishment or services available in the juvenile
justice system," as well as "other matters" within the court's
discretion. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)(b), (3)(b)(vii), (3)(b)(viii) (West
1998). These factors are not considered in deciding whether to
designate a case as an EJJ prosecution. See 705 ILCS
405/5-810(1)(b) (West 1998). It is entirely conceivable that a trial
court could determine on the basis of the eight factors listed in section
5-805(3), as well as other matters within its discretion, that it would
be inappropriate to try a minor as an adult, but that, on the basis of the
six factors listed in section 5-810(3), it would be appropriate to
designate a minor's case as an EJJ prosecution.
	Previous decisions of this court cited by respondent in support of
affirming the judgment of the appellate court are distinguishable. In
People v. Tenner, this court concluded the law-of-the-case doctrine
was inapplicable because the case at issue, which involved the
defendant's second postconviction petition, was not the same case as
either that involving his first postconviction petition or his federal
habeas corpus petition. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d  at 395-96. People v.
Williams, 138 Ill. 2d 377 (1990), and People v. Taylor, 50 Ill. 2d 136
(1971), relied on by Williams, both involved the State's attempt to
relitigate fourth amendment suppression issues after the suppression
order had become final. In Williams, this court stated the rule in
Taylor as follows:
		"Taylor's procedural rule is simple: A suppression order may
be an appealable order ***, and, if it is, the State must either
appeal or not. Except for seeking timely reconsideration by
the same or a successor judge of the court in which the order
was entered [citation], the State 'cannot now have [the]
order reviewed by another trial judge' and 'cannot [before
such a judge] retry the issues therein decided' [citation]."
Williams, 138 Ill. 2d  at 389-90.
The court went on to state that the Taylor rule was not strictly driven
by the law-of-the-case doctrine, but was "a discrete rule of Illinois
procedure, independent of such related doctrines as collateral
estoppel, law of the case, or even res judicata." Williams, 138 Ill. 2d 
at 392.
	In light of the foregoing, we hold the law-of-the-case doctrine
does not prohibit the designation of a case as an EJJ prosecution after
the appellate court affirms the denial of a motion for discretionary
transfer. Therefore, where a trial court denies a motion for
discretionary transfer, the denial is affirmed on appeal, and the State
subsequently files an EJJ motion, the trial court must consider the EJJ
motion, as the trial court did in this case.
III. Invocation of Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel
	Finally, we address whether the statements respondent made
while in custody were obtained in violation of his fifth amendment
right to counsel. This issue requires us to review the trial court's
ruling on respondent's motion to suppress. Review of a motion to
suppress presents both questions of law and fact. People v. Smith, 214 Ill. 2d 338, 347 (2005). A trial court's credibility determinations and
findings of historical fact will be upheld on review unless they are
against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Watson, 214 Ill. 2d 271, 279 (2005). However, the ultimate legal question of whether
the evidence should be suppressed is reviewed de novo. Watson, 214 Ill. 2d  at 279. 
	The testimony at the hearing on respondent's motion to suppress
revealed the following facts. On the afternoon of January 31, 1999,
respondent turned himself in to the police and was placed under arrest
in connection with the shooting of Willie Lomax. One of the arresting
officers read respondent his Miranda rights, and respondent stated he
understood them. Respondent's mother, who was present, stated the
same. Respondent was then taken to the district police station,
accompanied by his mother. The arresting officers did not question
respondent about the shooting. 
	From the district police station, respondent was transferred to the
area police headquarters. Detectives Steven Buglio and Edward
Winstead met him there in an administrative room. Detective
Winstead again advised respondent of his Miranda rights. When asked
if he understood those rights, respondent answered "yes."
Respondent's mother also acknowledged that she understood the
Miranda rights.
	It is undisputed that, at this time, respondent mentioned a lawyer.
However, the testimony presented at the suppression hearing varies
regarding what respondent actually said. Respondent's mother
recalled respondent saying, "I think I should have a lawyer."
Respondent testified, "I asked them [the detectives] if I would need
a lawyer." Detective Winstead testified that respondent asked him
"[D]o I need a lawyer?" and that he answered respondent by saying
"[T]hat's not my call."
	After the exchange between Detective Winstead and respondent,
respondent's mother asked if she could speak with respondent alone.
Both detectives left the room and began preparations for a lineup.
There is no indication in the record that respondent talked to his
mother about a lawyer after the detectives left, or that respondent's
mother took any action to secure a lawyer for respondent.
	Detective Winstead returned once to the room before the lineup
to see if respondent and his mother needed anything. He did not ask
respondent about the shooting at this time. Shortly thereafter,
respondent participated in the lineup.
	When the lineup was over, a youth investigator was summoned
to the police station. After the youth investigator arrived, Detective
Winstead again read respondent his Miranda rights. Respondent and
his mother both indicated they understood those rights, and
respondent proceeded to speak to the detectives about Lomax's
shooting.
	The detectives left the room once they finished speaking with
respondent and called an assistant State's Attorney to the police
station. When the assistant State's Attorney arrived, respondent was
given further Miranda warnings. He continued to cooperate with the
police and ultimately provided a court-reported statement.
	Based on these facts, the trial court found that:
			"[A]s a matter of fact *** the Minor Respondent asking
the question 'Do I need a lawyer' does not suggest his
implication *** of a right to remain silent. He was looking
for advice. The police were wise *** not to give him advice.
They left him alone with his mother and he made his
decision."
Accordingly, the trial court denied respondent's motion to suppress
the statements respondent made while he was in custody.
	Respondent argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress. He reasons that when he said either "Do I need a lawyer?"
or "I think I should have a lawyer," his statement was sufficiently clear
to invoke his fifth amendment right to counsel. Respondent and amici
urge this court to focus on respondent's youth in determining whether
his statement constituted an invocation of his right to counsel. In
support of doing so, they claim the United States Supreme Court has
historically viewed minors' constitutional rights differently than those
of adults. They also cite numerous psychological and developmental
differences between minors and adults, arguing minors are more likely
than adults to couch their invocation of the right to counsel in an
inquiry about possible counsel, to use indirect language, and to refrain
from repeatedly requesting counsel. Respondent's invocation was,
they argue, sufficiently clear for a 14-year-old. Therefore, they
conclude, all questioning should have ceased after respondent
mentioned a lawyer.
	In response, the State argues respondent's statements were
properly admitted into evidence. The State asserts that the arguments
of respondent and amici ignore the specific facts at issue, which
demonstrably prove that, under the circumstances, respondent's
question "Do I need a lawyer?" could not have reasonably been
understood as an invocation of counsel. Respondent, the State
suggests, was an intelligent and capable minor, who turned himself in
to the police on his own volition, understood his Miranda rights, and
had his mother present with him throughout the fairly short police
detention and interrogation. According to the State, the facts show the
detectives responsible for interviewing respondent reasonably
understood his question to be a request for their advice, not a request
for counsel. The State argues that the relevant inquiry must focus on
the facts at hand, not a hypothetical situation involving a hypothetical
14 year old. Thus, the State concludes respondent's question was not
sufficiently clear to invoke his fifth amendment right to counsel.
	Prior to any interrogation by law enforcement officials, a person
in custody must be advised of the right to remain silent and the right
to counsel. People v. Villalobos, 193 Ill. 2d 229, 233 (2000), citing
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706-07, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966). A suspect who expresses the desire to deal
with police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation
until counsel has been made available, unless the suspect initiates
further communication with the police. People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382, 389-90 (1995), citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386, 101 S. Ct. 1800, 1884-85 (1981). To
determine whether statements obtained during custodial interrogation
may be used against an accused, a court must decide whether the
accused actually invoked his right to counsel, and if so, whether he
then initiated further conversation with the police so as to knowingly
and intelligently waive his previously asserted right. People v. Evans,
125 Ill. 2d 50, 74-75 (1988), citing Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95,
83 L. Ed. 2d 488, 493-94, 105 S. Ct. 490, 492-93 (1984). This case
involves the former inquiry. Accordingly, it requires us to clarify the
standard we apply to determine whether a suspect has invoked the
right to counsel.
	This court's leading discussion of the invocation issue is People
v. Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d 305 (1980). In Krueger, testimony at the
defendant's suppression hearing revealed that, after the written waiver
of his Miranda rights, the defendant answered questions about several
burglaries. Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d  at 308. However, when the questioning
turned to the alleged homicide for which the defendant was arrested,
the defendant made a remark variously described by the investigators
who conducted his questioning as "Maybe I ought to have an
attorney," "Maybe I need a lawyer," and "Maybe I ought to talk to an
attorney." Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d  at 308. When the defendant made the
remark, the investigators continued to question him, and shortly
thereafter, the defendant gave a written statement admitting his
responsibility for the homicide. Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d  at 308.
	In Krueger, this court refused to interpret the Miranda decision
as requiring "that every reference to an attorney, no matter how
vague, indecisive or ambiguous, should constitute an invocation of the
right to counsel." Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d  at 311. The court observed that
the record established the defendant was a person of normal
intelligence, the defendant fully understood his Miranda rights, the
defendant waived those rights, his interrogation lasted only a short
while, and there was no indication he was under any coercion or
duress other than that inherent in every custodial setting. Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d  at 311. While the court also acknowledged that, according to
the evidence, none of the investigators considered the defendant's
comment to be a request for counsel, it declined to place "undue
emphasis or weight" on the investigators' subjective beliefs. Krueger,
82 Ill. 2d  at 311. Instead, the court concluded "[u]nder the present
facts, we find such belief [the investigators' belief the defendant did
not invoke his right to counsel] to have been reasonable." Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d  at 312. Accordingly, the court held that because, in the instant
case, a more positive indication of a desire for an attorney was
required, the investigators did not violate the defendant's fifth
amendment right to counsel. Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d  at 312.
	After Krueger was decided, the United States Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994). In Davis, the United States
Supreme Court considered how police should respond when a suspect
makes a reference to an attorney that is insufficiently clear to invoke
the right to counsel. Davis, 512 U.S.  at 454, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 368,
114 S. Ct.  at 2352. The petitioner in Davis waived his right to remain
silent and his right to counsel both orally and in writing, but stated
"Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" an hour and a half into his interview
with investigators. Davis, 512 U.S.  at 455, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 368, 114 S. Ct.  at 2353. At that point, the investigators attempted to clarify
whether the petitioner wanted an attorney, to which the petitioner
responded "No, I'm not asking for a lawyer" and "No, I don't want
a lawyer." Davis, 512 U.S.  at 455, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 368, 114 S. Ct. 
at 2353. After a short break, the investigators reminded the petitioner
once again of his rights to remain silent and to counsel, and continued
on with the interview. Davis, 512 U.S.  at 455, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 369,
114 S. Ct.  at 2353.
	In finding against the petitioner, the Court emphasized that
determining whether a suspect actually invoked his right to counsel is
an "objective inquiry." Davis, 512 U.S.  at 458-59, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at
371, 114 S. Ct.  at 2355. According to the Court, "if a suspect makes
a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a
reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood
only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel," the
officer is not required to cease questioning the suspect. (Emphasis in
original.) Davis, 512 U.S.  at 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 371, 114 S. Ct.  at
2355. The Court went on to state that a suspect "must articulate his
desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable
police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to
be a request for an attorney." Davis, 512 U.S.  at 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d 
at 371, 114 S. Ct.  at 2355. It then rejected the petitioner's argument
that law enforcement officers should be required to stop questioning
a suspect immediately upon the suspect's ambiguous or equivocal
reference to an attorney. Davis, 512 U.S.  at 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at
372, 114 S. Ct.  at 2355. Specifically, the Court held that "after a
knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement
officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly
requests an attorney." Davis, 512 U.S.  at 461, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 373,
114 S. Ct.  at 2356. In so holding, the Court also noted that, when a
suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney, it
often will be good police practice to clarify whether the suspect
actually wants counsel, as the investigators did in Davis, 512 U.S.  at
461, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 373, 114 S. Ct.  at 2356. Such clarification,
however, is not required. Davis, 512 U.S.  at 461-62, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at
373, 114 S. Ct.  at 2356.
	This court applied the Davis holding in People v. Oaks. People
v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409 (1996), rev'd on other grounds, In re G.O.,
191 Ill. 2d 37, 45-50 (2000). In Oaks, the defendant inquired "Should
I see a lawyer?" in response to an investigator's question about
whether the defendant had any problem with memorializing the oral
statement he had just given. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d  at 452. The investigator
initially responded "[T]hat's up to you," but also made further
comments urging the defendant to give a written statement. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d  at 452-53. After summarily concluding that the defendant's
remark "Should I see a lawyer?" was ambiguous (Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d at
451), this court applied Davis and held that, absent an unambiguous
or unequivocal request for counsel, the investigators had no obligation
to stop questioning the defendant (Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d at 453). As in
Davis, this court noted that it would have been good police practice
for the investigators to clarify whether the defendant actually wanted
an attorney. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d  at 453. However, they were not
required to do so. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d  at 453.
	While this court's adherence to the holding in Davis has been
clear since Oaks, this court has yet to express any opinion on the
Davis objective test. At this time, we note that the objective test is
consistent with the approach we set forth in Krueger. There, we
emphasized that while "an assertion of the right to counsel need not
be explicit, unequivocal, or made with unmistakable clarity," not
"every reference to an attorney, no matter how vague, indecisive or
ambiguous, should constitute an invocation of the right to counsel."
Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d  at 311. After setting forth this threshold standard,
we proceeded to examine the circumstances surrounding the
defendant's purported invocation of the right to counsel. Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d  at 311. Ultimately, we concluded that, in light of the
circumstances, the investigators reasonably believed the defendant's
comment was not a request for counsel. Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d  at 312; see
also People v. Smith, 102 Ill. 2d 365, 376 (1984) (Simon, J.,
dissenting, joined by Goldenhersh and Moran, JJ.) ("The focus of a
reviewing court should be on whether the defendant's alleged
assertion of his right to counsel, standing alone or in conjunction with
his earlier statements or actions insofar as they shed light on his
desires, were sufficient to be understood as such an invocation by a
reasonable man in the interrogating officer's position" (emphasis
omitted)), rev'd on other grounds, Smith, 469 U.S.  at 99-100, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 496-97, 105 S. Ct.  at 495. This approach is essentially the
same as that endorsed by Davis. Thus, for the sake of clarity, we now
formally recognize our adherence to the Davis objective test.
	Respondent correctly points out that the holding in Davis is
limited to the situation where the alleged invocation of the right to
counsel comes after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the suspect's
Miranda rights. Davis, 512 U.S.  at 461, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 373, 114 S. Ct.  at 2356. By implication, this suggests the United States Supreme
Court has left open the issue of whether the objective test applies in
a prewaiver setting. We believe the objective test set forth in Davis
can be applied to situations where, as here, the suspect makes a
reference to counsel immediately after he has been advised of his
Miranda rights. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 287 F.3d 965, 971-73 (10th Cir. 2002) (applying Davis in pre-waiver situation); United
States v. Muhammad, 120 F.3d 688, 697-98 (7th Cir. 1997) (same);
Ex parte Cothren, 705 So. 2d 861, 862-67 (Ala. 1997) (same); Moore
v. State, 321 Ark. 249, 257, 903 S.W.2d 154, 157-58 (1995) (same).
In such a case, the relevant inquiry should remain whether a
reasonable officer in the circumstances would have understood only
that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel (Davis, 512 U.S.  at 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 371, 114 S. Ct. at 2355), or stated
alternatively, whether the suspect's articulation of the desire to have
counsel present was sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer in the
circumstances would have understood the statement to be a request
for an attorney (Davis, 512 U.S.  at 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 371, 114 S.
Ct. at 2355). The fact waiver has not yet occurred can simply be
subsumed into the objective test. That is, a trial court may consider
the proximity between the Miranda warnings and the purported
invocation of the right to counsel in determining how a reasonable
officer in the circumstances would have understood the suspect's
statement. The primary focus of the inquiry, however, should remain
on the nature of the actual statement at issue. See, e.g., Evans, 125 Ill. 2d  at 75 (holding that defendant never invoked right to counsel
"equivocally, ambiguously or otherwise" where questions of "You
mean, I can have a PD here, or do you mean I have to wait?" and "We
can take time for you to get a PD, right?" asked during Miranda
warnings merely constituted inquiries into the availability of a public
defender); People v. Smith, 102 Ill. 2d 365, 376 (1984) (Simon, J.,
dissenting, joined by Goldenersh and Moran, JJ.) ("[T]his court has
required *** that a statement invoking the right [to counsel] be at
least sufficiently free of indecision or double meaning to reasonably
inform the authorities that [the defendant] wishes to speak to
counsel"), rev'd on other grounds, Smith, 469 U.S.  at 99-100, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 496-97, 105 S. Ct.  at 495.
	This brings us to the contention of respondent and amici that
respondent's age should be the determinative factor in our analysis of
whether respondent invoked his right to counsel. We decline to adopt
this approach. Doing so would shift the focus of the invocation
analysis away from what is actually said to a single characteristic of
the person saying it. In this case, regardless of what a hypothetical 14-year-old would possibly have meant when making the statement
respondent made, the relevant inquiry must focus on what the police
reasonably believed the statement to mean, under the particular
circumstances, with regard to this respondent. Respondent's age is not
wholly irrelevant to this inquiry, but it is merely one of multiple factors
the trial court could permissibly have considered in reaching its
conclusion. Cf. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at 55 (holding with respect to
voluntariness inquiry that a juvenile's confession should not be
considered involuntary simply because the juvenile is denied the
opportunity to confer with a parent or other concerned adult before
or during interrogation, but noting that this factor may be relevant in
determining whether a juvenile's confession was voluntary). We note
that respondent and amici have not cited any authority in which this
court or the United States Supreme Court has held that, when
assessing an alleged invocation of the right to counsel by a minor, a
court must factor the minor's youth into the analysis.
	Applying the foregoing principles to this case, we find the trial
court did not err in denying respondent's motion to suppress. At the
outset, we note the trial court determined as a matter of fact that, after
being advised of his Miranda rights, respondent asked, "Do I need a
lawyer?" This characterization of respondent's statement is consistent
with respondent's own testimony and with Detective Winstead's
testimony. Therefore, the trial court's finding that respondent asked
the question "Do I need a lawyer?" is not against the manifest weight
of the evidence. It is this statement we must examine.(2)
	In light of the circumstances, respondent's query "Do I need a
lawyer?" was not sufficiently clear that a reasonable police officer
would have understood it to be a request for an attorney. While
respondent's inquiry came immediately after Detective Winstead
finished reading the Miranda warnings, it was phrased as a request for
advice, not as an assertion of a desire to obtain counsel. We note that
the actual content of the statement is virtually identical to that of the
statement we found to be ambiguous in Oaks, "Should I see a
lawyer?" Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d  at 451 (defendant's fifth amendment right
to counsel not violated by the continuation of questioning after his
ambiguous remark "Should I see a lawyer?"). In addition, despite the
fact respondent was only 14 years old at the time of his exchange with
Detective Winstead, the evidence in the record establishes he was
articulate and above average in intelligence. There is no indication
respondent was incapable of simply saying "I want a lawyer." When
respondent made his ambiguous reference to a lawyer, Detectives
Winstead and Buglio acted appropriately by allowing respondent's
mother, who intervened on respondent's behalf, to confer with her son
in private. Although they were not obligated to cease questioning at
that point, the detectives' decision to do so gave respondent the
opportunity to ask his mother for advice regarding counsel. The trial
court did not err in concluding respondent's statement was not
sufficiently clear to invoke his right to counsel.
CONCLUSION
	We hold that the law-of-the-case doctrine does not bar the
designation of a case as an EJJ prosecution after a motion for
discretionary transfer has been affirmed on appeal. Therefore, we
reverse that part of the appellate court's judgment which modified
respondent's sentence. We also hold the trial court did not err in
determining respondent did not unambiguously invoke his right to
counsel. Accordingly, we affirm that part of the appellate court's
judgment which affirmed respondent's conviction.
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
	I agree with the majority's disposition of those issues it chooses
to reach. There was no fifth amendment violation in allowing
defendant's confession into evidence, and defendant's extended
juvenile justice (EJJ) prosecution does not run afoul of the "law of the
case" doctrine. However, unlike the majority, I believe it would be
proper to address defendant's Apprendi challenge, and I would do so.
Accordingly, I write separately to explain why I do not join the
majority's mootness analysis.
	Because defendant has turned 21, all issues save his fifth
amendment challenge are moot. Accordingly, we normally would not
consider them. Slip op. at 5. However, we can transcend mootness
considerations when we conclude that it would be in the public
interest to do so. As the majority notes, there are three factors we
consider when determining whether to apply the public interest
exception: the issue must be public in nature, it must be likely to recur,
and an authoritative determination of the issue must be desirable for
the future guidance of public officers. Slip op. at 6-7. I agree with the
majority that the first two factors are satisfied with respect to both the
"law of the case" issue and defendant's Apprendi challenge. The
majority chooses to reach the former, but not the latter based solely
on the third factor of the public interest test: that an "authoritative
determination of the issue is desirable for the future guidance of public
officers." Slip op at 6-7. The majority concludes that this factor is
satisfied for the "law of the case" issue (slip op. at 8), but not for
Apprendi (slip op. at 9).
	The majority seems to intimate that this distinction is warranted
because there is conflicting authority on"law of the case," but not on
Apprendi.(3) Compare slip op. at 7 with slip op. at 9. This is not
accurate, however. The appellate court's "law of the case" holding is
not in conflict with any other authority. All the majority actually says
on this point is that there is no prior authority applying the "law of the
case" issue in this context. That means nothing more than that the
appellate court's opinion is a case of first impression. This is not
"conflicting" case law. Accordingly, the "law of the case" issue and
the Apprendi issue are not differentiable on this basis.
	In addition, the majority's decision to reach one issue but not the
other seems to me to run counter to the spirit of the public interest
exception. Other than the fifth amendment issue, none of our analysis
can have any effect on the parties to this appeal. Any issue we reach
and resolve other than the fifth amendment issue, we are reaching and
resolving for the sole purpose of giving guidance to lower courts. As
the majority notes, our decision answers the question whether the law
of the case doctrine prevents the State from "ever filing an EJJ motion
after the denial of a discretionary transfer motion is affirmed on
appeal." Slip op. at 7. But what sort of "guidance" is this? By looking
only at the "law of the case" issue, we leave unresolved whether the
EJJ system is itself wholly unconstitutional-an issue which the
majority admits to be public in nature and likely to recur, and the
importance of which can hardly be denied. If we are going to decide
the first issue because we desire to provide guidance to lower courts,
why deny them any guidance on the arguably more important second
issue?
	Because the majority and I part ways on the threshold question
of whether defendant's Apprendi argument should be addressed, it
would serve no purpose for me to engage in a solitary discourse on its
merits. Accordingly, I express no opinion on the issue other than my
belief that this court ought to address it.
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