Title: In re: Sanford P. Krigel, Respondent.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95098
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: January 26, 2016

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
IN RE:  SANFORD P. KRIGEL,   
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC95098 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent.  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING 
 
Opinion issued January 26, 2016 
 
The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel (hereinafter, “OCDC”) seeks to 
discipline Sanford P. Krigel’s (hereinafter, “Krigel”) law license for alleged multiple 
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  This Court finds that Krigel committed 
violations of Rule 4-3.3(a)(3) (knowingly offering false evidence), Rule 4-4.1(a) (false 
statement of material fact), Rule 4-4.4(a) (using means to improperly burden or delay a 
third person), and Rule 4-8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).  
Krigel is suspended from the practice of law for six months, with execution of such 
suspension stayed, subject to Krigel’s completion of a two-year term of probation in 
accordance with conditions imposed by this Court. 
Factual and Procedural History 
Krigel was admitted to The Missouri Bar in September 1976.  He has no 
disciplinary history, and his license is in good standing.  He is an owner, founder, and 
managing partner of Krigel & Krigel.  Krigel has substantial experience in the practice of 
law and specializes in adoption law.   
This matter arises from Krigel’s representation of an unmarried, pregnant, 
eighteen year old woman (hereinafter, “Birth Mother”) in 2009.  Birth Mother became 
unexpectedly pregnant while in a monogamous relationship with her boyfriend 
(hereinafter, “Birth Father”).  Birth Mother and Birth Father discussed various options for 
dealing with this pregnancy.  Ultimately, they made no decision other than to hide the 
pregnancy from their parents until Birth Mother was approximately eight months 
pregnant. 
Birth Mother and Birth Father both resided with their respective families.  On 
March 5, 2010, Birth Mother, Birth Father, and both sets of their parents came together to 
discuss the pregnancy.  During this discussion, Birth Father declared he wanted to raise 
the child at his home with his parents and that he did not want to place the child up for 
adoption.  This discussion precipitated a sharp decline in the relationship between the 
birth parents.  Birth Mother and Birth Father ended their relationship, and Birth Mother’s 
parents initiated steps to prevent Birth Father from having further contact with Birth 
Mother.   
Birth Father retained Jeff Zimmerman (hereinafter, “Zimmerman”), an attorney, in 
connection with the pregnancy.  Meanwhile, Birth Mother contacted Hillary Merryfield1 
(hereinafter, “Merryfield”), seeking information regarding options available to her and 
requesting an attorney referral.  Merryfield referred Birth Mother to Krigel; Merryfield 
and Krigel had worked together on adoption matters for approximately twenty years. 
                                              
1 Merryfield is a licensed clinical social worker in both Missouri and Kansas.  Merryfield 
operates a licensed child placement agency, Adoption Option Inc., which counsels birth 
mothers and couples seeking adoption.  Additionally, Merryfield works for Missouri and 
Kansas courts to provide home studies for prospective adoptive parents. 
3 
 
Krigel met with Birth Mother and her parents on March 11, 2010.  Birth Mother 
and her parents advised Krigel of the background, pregnancy, and relationship with Birth 
Father and its deterioration earlier in the month.  Birth Mother indicated that originally 
she and Birth Father discussed raising the child together, but since the deterioration of 
their relationship, she believed that it would be best for the child to be adopted by a 
family.  Birth Mother provided Krigel with her April due date as well as Birth Father’s 
name and residence.  There was no doubt in Birth Mother’s mind as to the actual 
paternity of the child.  Krigel was told that Birth Mother and Birth Father were to 
communicate only through attorneys.  Further, Krigel was informed that Birth Father 
would not consent to an adoption. 
Krigel explained to Birth Mother her rights under Missouri law and the rights of a 
biological father to assert paternity.  Krigel described the relevant time frames in which a 
biological father had to assert his parental rights to have his consent required for an 
adoption.  Ultimately, the family retained Krigel to assist Birth Mother in terminating her 
parental rights in anticipation of a subsequent adoption proceeding.   
 
Krigel employed a “passive strategy” in his representation of Birth Mother.  
Accordingly, Krigel and Birth Mother would “actively do nothing” to communicate with 
Birth Father or his counsel; they would not advise Birth Father or his counsel of the 
adoption plans, the birth of the child, and the instigation of any legal proceedings.   
 
On March 19, 2010, Krigel received a telephone call from Zimmerman.  Krigel 
knew Zimmerman practiced law primarily in Kansas, and he did not believe Zimmerman 
typically handled adoption or paternity matters.  Krigel represented to Zimmerman that 
4 
 
the child would not be adopted without Birth Father’s consent.  Zimmerman stated that 
he believed Birth Mother and Birth Father needed to be counseled regarding their 
situation without the presence of their parents.  Krigel suggested Birth Mother and Birth 
Father meet with Merryfield, knowing Birth Mother was working with Merryfield 
already and pursuing an adoption for the child.  Subsequently, Zimmerman contacted 
Merryfield to obtain an appointment for Birth Mother and Birth Father to obtain 
counseling and attempt to reconcile a unified course of action for the child.   
 
On March 22, 2010, Birth Mother and Birth Father met with Merryfield.  At the 
meeting, Birth Father stated he would not consent to an adoption, and he wanted to raise 
the child, preferably with Birth Mother.  After the meeting, Merryfield contacted Krigel 
and informed him that Birth Father did not want to consent to an adoption.  However, 
Merryfield thought that Birth Father probably would not contest the adoption because she 
characterized him as quiet, sad, and passive.   
 
Birth Mother contacted Birth Father in late March.  Birth Mother informed him 
that her expected due date had changed from early April to early May.  This statement 
was intended to deceive Birth Father of the real due date. 
 
The child was born.  Neither Birth Father nor Zimmerman was informed of the 
child’s birth.  Birth Father’s name was not indicated on the birth certificate.   
 
On April 6, 2010, there was a “Consent to Terminate Parental Rights” hearing in 
Jackson County, Missouri, allowing Birth Mother to terminate her parental rights in 
preparation for adoption proceedings.  Neither Birth Father nor Zimmerman was aware of 
the hearing, and accordingly, they did not appear.  In response to a question by Krigel, 
5 
 
Birth Mother agreed that Birth Father “had been consulted at length about the matter.”  
Birth Mother also agreed when Krigel asked “even though you’ve talked to him and his 
family at some length, he has not stepped forward since the birth of the child claiming 
any rights to the child.”  Birth Mother’s parental rights were terminated.  Immediately 
thereafter, a “Motion to Transfer Custody and for Adoption” was heard.  The custody of 
the child was transferred to the prospective adoptive parents. 
 
At some point between May 3 and May 12, 2010, Birth Father learned of the 
child’s birth and the deception regarding Birth Mother’s expected due date.  Birth Father 
then placed his name on the Putative Father Registry.  Later in May, Birth Father learned 
of the adoption proceedings, and he moved to intervene.  On May 6, 2011, the trial court 
entered its judgment in the adoption proceedings, denying the petition of the adoptive 
parents and awarding legal and physical custody of the child to Birth Father.   
The OCDC filed an information against Krigel in February 2014.  Krigel did not 
admit to any violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that were alleged in the 
information.  In December 2014, the Disciplinary Hearing Panel (hereinafter, “DHP”) 
conducted an evidentiary hearing .   
The Disciplinary Hearing Panel 
Following its hearing, the DHP found Krigel violated four rules of professional 
conduct:  Rule 4-3.3(a)(3); Rule 4-4.1(a); Rule 4-4.4(a); and Rule 4-8.4(d).  The DHP did 
not make any findings regarding aggravating or mitigating factors.  The DHP 
recommended Krigel be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law with no leave to 
apply for reinstatement for six months. 
6 
 
 
The OCDC accepted the DHP’s recommendation.  However, Krigel rejected the 
DHP’s recommendation, believing that no sanction for his actions should be imposed.  
Krigel asks this Court to dismiss the information against him.  Because Krigel rejected 
the DHP’s recommendation, this Court must determine the appropriate discipline.  Rule 
5.19(d)(3). 
Standard of Review 
The DHP’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are advisory.  In re Belz, 258 
S.W.3d 38, 41 (Mo. banc 2008).  “This Court [in a disciplinary proceeding] reviews the 
evidence de novo, independently determining all issues pertaining to credibility of 
witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and draws its own conclusions of law.”  In re 
Snyder, 35 S.W.3d 380, 382 (Mo. banc 2000).  “Professional misconduct must be proven 
by a preponderance of the evidence before discipline will be imposed.”  In re Madison, 
282 S.W.3d 350, 352 (Mo. banc 2009) (quoting In re Crews, 159 S.W.3d 355, 358 (Mo. 
banc 2005)). 
Krigel’s Conduct 
 
Based on the record before this Court, Krigel committed multiple violations of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  This Court finds Krigel to have violated the following 
rules: 
Violation of Rule 4-3.3(a)(3) 
 
Rule 4-3.3(a)(3) requires a lawyer shall not knowing “offer evidence that the 
lawyer knows to be false ….”  Krigel’s questioning of Birth Mother at that hearing was 
7 
 
designed to mislead the trial court as to the actual circumstances between Birth Mother 
and Birth Father.   
Prior to the April 2010 hearing, Krigel and Birth Mother discussed his intended 
examination of her.  Krigel’s questioning of Birth Mother at that hearing, while 
technically truthful, omitted essential information.  While representing there was a belief 
Birth Father may not actively pursue opposition to the adoption, there was no indication 
that Birth Father stated his acquiescence to adoption.  Krigel knew Birth Father was 
uninformed about the child’s birth, his name was omitted from the child’s birth 
certificate, and his attorney had contacted Krigel to work cooperatively on the child’s 
future placement and prevent adoption.  Birth Mother’s testimony further indicated that 
Birth Father was able to be in continuous communication with her, which Krigel knew 
was untrue.  Birth Mother also stated that Birth Father had not visited the hospital after 
the birth, which was true, but Krigel failed to clarify that Birth Father was not informed 
of the time or place of the child’s birth.  Krigel’s representation to the trial court via his 
questioning, by permitting false and misleading testimony to be presented, was designed 
to portray the false impression that Birth Father was not interested in the child or in 
asserting his parental rights. 
Violation of Rule 4-4.1(a) 
Rule 4-4.1(a) specifies that when representing a client, a lawyer shall not 
knowingly “make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person ….”  Krigel 
violated this rule in his communication with Zimmerman, indicating the child would not 
be adopted without Birth Father’s consent.  Further, at the time Krigel spoke with 
8 
 
Zimmerman, Krigel knew that he advised Birth Mother not to communicate with Birth 
Father regarding any information about the child, including the child’s birth or 
subsequent adoption proceedings. 
Violation of Rule 4-4.4(a) 
 
Rule 4-4.4(a) requires that in representing a client, a lawyer “shall not use means 
that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person 
….”  By actively concealing factual information from Birth Father and his counsel so that 
his client’s position would prevail, Krigel violated this rule.  Comment one to this rule 
provides, in pertinent part:  “Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate 
the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a 
lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons.” 
 
Krigel advised Birth Mother and her family to have no contact with Birth Father 
and to not divulge any information to Birth Father regarding the birth of their child.  
Krigel communicated with Zimmerman, indicating that the child would not be adopted 
without Birth Father’s consent.  Further, Krigel advised Birth Mother and Birth Father to 
receive “counseling” from Merryfield, who was actively working with Birth Mother to 
place the child in an adoptive home.  Despite actual knowledge that Birth Father wanted 
to raise the child, Krigel pursued a course of action that disregarded the parental rights of 
Birth Father and the best interests of the child in remaining with a natural parent.  
Krigel’s actions served no substantial purpose other than to impair and delay Birth 
Father’s assertion of his parental rights. 
 
9 
 
Violation of Rule 4-8.4(d) 
Rule 4-8.4(d) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice ….”  Krigel signed and 
submitted two documents to the trial court, which hindered the administration of justice. 
Krigel signed and submitted a “Petition to Approve, Consent, and Transfer of 
Custody” to the trial court, stating that Birth Mother did not know of any “other person 
not a party to these proceedings who has physical custody of the child or claims to have 
custody or visitation rights with respect to the child.”  This was not a true statement in 
that Krigel knew the name, address, and attorney for Birth Father.  Birth Father was not a 
party to the proceedings, but one who had a claim of child custody or visitation. 
The opportunity for Birth Father to assert his parental rights actively was thwarted 
by Krigel’s violation of this rule. 
Discipline 
 
This Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Krigel committed the 
foregoing rule violations, amounting to multiple acts of professional misconduct.  
Accordingly, this Court must determine the appropriate discipline to impose.  “This Court 
relies on the ABA Standards when imposing sanctions to achieve the goals of attorney 
discipline.”  In re Coleman, 295 S.W.3d 857, 869 (Mo. banc 2009).2 
 
 
                                              
2 This Court recognizes that the ABA Standards are used for guidance in imposing 
attorney discipline, and the most recent ABA Standards were published in 2013.  See In 
re Ehler, 319 S.W.3d 442, 451 (Mo. banc 2010). 
10 
 
Factors Governing Discipline 
This Court has the inherent authority to regulate the practice of law and administer 
attorney discipline.  In re Zink, 278 S.W.3d 166, 169 (Mo. banc 2009).  The purpose of 
imposing discipline is not to punish the attorney but to protect the public and maintain the 
integrity of the legal profession.  In re Stewart, 342 S.W.3d 307, 308 (Mo. banc 2011).  
“Those twin purposes may be achieved both directly, by removing a person from the 
practice of law, and indirectly, by imposing a sanction which serves to deter other 
members of the Bar from engaging in similar conduct.”  In re Kazanas, 96 S.W.3d 803, 
807-08 (Mo. banc 2003).     
It is this Court’s duty to determine what discipline is appropriate to impose for 
these violations by reviewing similar past cases, the disciplinary rules, and the applicable 
ABA standards.  Stewart, 342 S.W.3d at 310.  This Court notes that generally when 
considering what sanction to impose, this Court considers four factors: 
(a) the duty violated; 
(b) the lawyer’s mental state; 
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and  
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
 
ABA Standard 3.0 (2013 Ed.)  When this Court finds an attorney has committed multiple 
acts of misconduct, “the ultimate sanction imposed should at least be consistent with the 
sanction for the most serious instance of misconduct among the violations.”  Coleman, 
295 S.W.3d at 870 (internal citations omitted).   
Appropriate Discipline 
 
This Court determined Krigel committed professional misconduct in violation of 
Rule 4-3.3(a)(3), Rule 4-4.1(a), Rule 4-4.4(a), and Rule 4-8.4(d).  Once misconduct is 
11 
 
established, this Court may consider aggravating and mitigating factors when deciding 
what sanction to impose. 3  ABA Standard 9.1.  The record contains evidence of both 
factors.  With respect to aggravating factors, Krigel committed multiple offenses and fails 
to grasp the severity of these charges.  However, in mitigation, Krigel has been a 
practicing attorney for more than thirty years with no disciplinary history prior to this 
incident. 
Krigel’s most egregious act of misconduct was lack of candor toward the tribunal.  
Generally, “when an attorney, with an intent to deceive the court, submits a false 
document, makes a false statement, or withholds material information, disbarment is the 
appropriate sanction.”  In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 919 (Mo. banc 1997); see also 
ABA Standard 6.11.   
 Disbarment is “reserved for clear cases of gross misconduct, those in which the 
attorney is demonstrably unfit to continue in the profession.”  In re Ver Dught, 825 
S.W.2d 847, 851 (Mo. banc 1992) (suspending the attorney for his belief that the law did 
not require him to disclose facts that he believed were not material and no material fact 
was falsified).  The dissent believes that Krigel should be disbarred from the practice of 
law, comparing Krigel’s conduct to that of the attorney in In re Oberhellmann, 873 
S.W.2d 851 (Mo. banc 1994).  In Oberhellmann, the attorney’s misrepresentations were 
made in two separate and unrelated cases.  Id. at 853.4  In one case, the attorney 
affirmatively instructed his client to perjure herself on the witness stand, and in the other 
                                              
3 The DHP did not address aggravating or mitigating factors in its decision. 
4 These misrepresentations were made in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Missouri and the United States District Court for the Central District of 
Illinois.  Id. at 853-54. 
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case, the attorney forged his former legal associate’s signature on a document submitted 
to the court.  Id. at 853 and 855.  The analogy of Krigel’s conduct to Oberhellmann is 
inapposite.   
A lesser sanction of suspension may be appropriate in cases when “the attorney 
merely knows of the misrepresentation ….”  Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d at 919.  
“Suspension is appropriate only if a lawyer knows that a false statement is being 
submitted to a court and takes no remedial action.”  Oberhellmann, 873 S.W.2d at 856.  
Turning to ABA Standards, this Court finds the appropriate recommended range of 
discipline to be reflected in ABA Standard 6.12.   
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false 
statements or documents are being submitted to the court or that material 
information is improperly withheld, and takes no remedial action, and 
causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes 
an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding. 
 
Id.   
There must be significant discipline to maintain the public’s trust and protect the 
integrity of the legal system; accordingly, Krigel’s request that no sanction be imposed is 
not appropriate.  Krigel’s conduct in this matter was not passive; he knew material 
information was withheld from the trial court, and he took no remedial action during any 
of the proceedings. 
However, this is Krigel’s first disciplinary matter before this Court.  “This Court 
adheres to a practice of applying progressive discipline when imposing sanctions on 
attorneys who commit misconduct.”  In re Forck, 418 S.W.3d 437, 444 (Mo. banc 2014).  
Considering Krigel has never been disciplined by this Court and has specialized in this 
13 
 
area of law for more than thirty years without complaint, disbarment is an inappropriate 
sanction.   
In accord with the ABA Standards, this Court suspends Krigel from the practice of 
law, with execution of such suspension stayed, subject to Krigel’s completion of a two-
year term of probation in accordance with conditions imposed by this Court.  This 
sanction is designed to maintain the public’s trust, protect the integrity of the legal 
system, and is supported by prior disciplinary proceedings.  See Ver Dught, 825 S.W.2d 
at 850-51.  Should Krigel not comply with this Court’s discipline by violating the terms 
of his probation, he may be subject to having his probation revoked or further discipline 
being imposed.  Rule 5.225(f)(2). 
Conclusion 
Krigel is suspended from the practice of law for six months, with execution of 
such suspension stayed, subject to Krigel’s completion of a two-year term of probation in 
accordance with conditions imposed by this Court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, JUDGE 
 
Stith and Russell, JJ., concur; Breckenridge, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part in 
separate opinion filed; Fischer, J., dissents in separate opinion filed; Wilson and 
Teitelman, JJ., concur in opinion of Fischer, J. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
In re:  SANFORD P. KRIGEL, 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
No.  SC95098 
 
 
 
Respondent.  
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART 
  
 
I agree with the discipline imposed by the majority opinion.  I respectfully differ 
from the majority opinion’s findings and analysis, however, as to the rules violated by 
Mr. Krigel.  While I find that Mr. Krigel violated Rule 4-3.3(a)(3), Rule 4-4.1(a), and 
Rule 4-8.4(d), I do not believe that Mr. Krigel’s failure to provide factual information to a 
potential opposing party constituted a violation of Rule 4-4.4(a).   
 
I agree with the following factual findings made by the disciplinary hearing panel: 
12.  [Mr. Krigel] first met with the expectant mother and her family on 
March 11, 2010.  At that meeting, [Mr. Krigel] was provided background 
on the relationship between the expectant parents and how it had 
deteriorated after the disclosure of the pregnancy to their families.  The 
expectant mother indicated that she and the expectant father had originally 
planned to raise the child together, but with the deterioration of the 
relationship it would be best for the child to be adopted by a family.   
 
13. During the first meeting between [Mr. Krigel] and the expectant 
mother, [Mr. Krigel] was advised of the name and whereabouts of the 
expectant father and the due date of April 8, 2010.  The expectant mother 
and her family told [Mr. Krigel] that the expectant parents were to 
communicate only through attorneys.  
 
2 
 
14.  At this meeting the expectant mother and her family advised           
[Mr. Krigel] that the expectant father would not consent to an adoption. 
 
15.  Also at this meeting, [Mr. Krigel] explained to the expectant mother 
her rights under Missouri law and the rights of a biological father to assert 
paternity.  [Mr. Krigel] testified that this explanation included a description 
of the timeframes within which an expectant father was to assert his 
parental rights in order to have his consent required for an adoption.  
 
16.  At the March 11, 2010 meeting [Mr. Krigel] was retained to assist the 
expectant mother with pursuing termination of her parental rights in 
anticipation of a subsequent adoption proceeding.  
 
17.  There was no reasonable doubt in the minds of the expectant parents or 
their counsel as to the actual paternity of the child.  
 
18.  In his representation of the expectant mother [Mr. Krigel] employed 
what he referred to as a “passive strategy.”  Under this strategy [Mr. Krigel] 
and his client would “actively do nothing” to communicate with the 
expectant father or his counsel, and would not advise the expectant father or 
his counsel of adoption plans, the actual birth of the child, and the 
institution of any legal proceedings.  
 
19.  On or about March 19, 2010, [Mr. Krigel] received a call from the 
expectant father’s attorney, Mr. Zimmerman, whom [Mr. Krigel] had 
known since junior high school.  [Mr. Krigel] knew that Mr. Zimmerman 
practiced law primarily in Kansas and did not believe that Mr. Zimmerman 
typically handled adoption or paternity matters.  
 
20.  In this call, Mr. Zimmerman told [Mr. Krigel] that he represented the 
expectant father, and that the father wanted to raise the child and would not 
consent to an adoption.  In response, [Mr. Krigel] indicated to                  
Mr. Zimmerman that, without father’s consent, there would not be an 
adoption.  Mr. Zimmerman took [Mr. Krigel’s] comment to be a statement 
of fact.  Following their call, Mr. Zimmerman heard nothing further from 
[Mr. Krigel] with respect to the pregnancy, the birth of the child, or the 
institution of any adoption proceedings.  
 
21.  In the March 19, 2010 call, Mr. Zimmerman told [Mr. Krigel] that he 
believed the expectant parents needed to have some counseling about their 
situation, without involvement of their respective families.  [Mr. Krigel] 
suggested to Mr. Zimmerman that they meet with Ms. Merryfield.  At the 
3 
 
time of [Mr. Krigel’s] discussion with Mr. Zimmerman, [Mr. Krigel] knew 
Ms. Merryfield had already begun working with the expectant mother.  
 
22.  Following the call with [Mr. Krigel], Mr. Zimmerman contacted       
Ms. Merryfield to set up an appointment for the expectant parents to 
receive counseling about their situation and how they might come to 
agreement as to a course of action.  That meeting occurred on March 22, 
2010.  [Mr. Krigel] testified that he would not have mentioned his “passive 
strategy” to Ms. Merryfield because “she would have understood exactly 
what we were doing” and talking about it wouldn’t be necessary.   
 
23.  At the March 22 meeting, the expectant father said he would not 
consent to an adoption and that he wanted to raise the child, preferably with 
the expectant mother.  
 
24.  Following the March 22 meeting, Ms. Merryfield advised [Mr. Krigel] 
that the expectant father stated he did not want to consent to an adoption.  
Ms. Merryfield’s assessment of the expectant father was that he was quiet, 
sad and passive, and she advised [Mr. Krigel] that she thought the expectant 
father wasn’t likely to contest the adoption. 
 
25.  Late in March 2010, the expectant mother sent the expectant father a 
message falsely stating that her doctor had revised the due date from April 
8 until May 1.  The expectant father had been barred from attending the 
doctor appointments with the expectant mother and was deceived by her 
statements.  
 
26.  The baby was born on April 3, 2010.  Neither the father nor his 
attorney was notified of the birth.  The father’s name was not shown on the 
birth certificate.  . . . [T]he failure to notify the father or his attorney was 
purposeful and based on legal advice provided by [Mr. Krigel], and was 
designed to impair the father’s ability to assert his parental rights.  
 
27.  On April 6, 2010 a hearing was held in Jackson County, Missouri 
before Commissioner Merrigan, for the purpose of having the birth mother 
tender her consent to terminate her parental rights, preparatory to adoption 
proceedings being instituted.  [Mr. Krigel] appeared on behalf of the 
mother.  Neither the father nor his attorney received notice of the hearing 
and neither was aware of the birth of the child. 
 
28.  At the April 6, 2010 hearing, in response to [Mr. Krigel’s] questioning, 
the mother provided false testimony, stating that she had done nothing to 
defraud or mislead the father which was not true in light of the fact she had 
4 
 
given him false information regarding the expected due date.  [Mr. Krigel] 
testified . . . that he was not aware that the mother had provided the father 
with a false due date. 
 
29.  At the April 6 hearing, in response to [Mr. Krigel’s] question, the 
mother agreed that the father “had been consulted at length about the 
matter.”  [Mr. Krigel] knew that his “passive strategy” called for no 
communication 
following 
the 
initial 
counseling 
session 
with                    
Ms. Merryfield and that his questioning suggested to the Court that there 
had been more consultation than was the case.  
 
30.  [Mr. Krigel] testified . . . that he knew the father believed the mother’s 
due date to be April 8.  Having instructed his client not to communicate 
with the father, at the time of the April 6 hearing [Mr. Krigel] was aware 
that his strategy had prevented the father from knowing that the baby had 
been born, and from coming forward in advance of the April 6 hearing.  
[Mr. Krigel] was also aware that the father had consistently asserted his 
paternity, expressed his desire to raise the child, and stated his opposition to 
adoption.   
 
31.  Nevertheless, at the April 6 hearing, in response to a question from 
[Mr. Krigel], the mother agreed with [Mr. Krigel’s] statement that “even 
though you’ve talked to him and his family at some length, he has not 
stepped forward since the birth of the child claiming any rights to the 
child.”  [Mr. Krigel] elicited this misleading testimony knowing that his 
“passive strategy” had ensured that the father would not know of the birth.  
Further, [Mr. Krigel] posed his question fully aware that the father had 
consistently claimed rights to the child. 
 
32.  [Mr. Krigel’s] questioning of the mother at the April 6, 2010 hearing, 
while addressing certain statutory elements, was designed to present to the 
Court the incorrect impression that the father was not interested in the birth 
of the child or in asserting his parental rights, when [Mr. Krigel] knew that 
was not the case. 
 
33.  Also on April 6, 2010, immediately following the Consent to 
Terminate hearing in which [Mr. Krigel] participated, a Motion to Transfer 
Custody and for Adoption was heard by Commissioner Merrigan and 
custody of the child was transferred to prospective adoptive parents.1 
 
                                              
1 Although not found by the disciplinary hearing panel, I note that the adoptive parents 
paid for the legal services Mr. Krigel rendered to Birth Mother.  
5 
 
34.  The father learned of the child’s birth and the mother’s fraudulent 
statements at some point between May 3 and May 12, 2010.  He learned 
this information indirectly, and not from the mother or [Mr. Krigel].  He 
promptly placed his name on the Putative Father Registry.  Later in May he 
learned that adoption proceedings had already been instituted and he moved 
to intervene. 
 
35.  The father saw his child for the first time in a one hour supervised visit 
when the child was two months old.  He next saw the child in one and one-
half hour weekly supervised visits beginning when the child was five 
months old.  After litigating visitation issues he obtained unsupervised 
visitation rights for seven hours a week when the child was eight months 
old.  During all of this time the child was in the custody of the proposed 
adoptive parents. 
 
36.  On May 6, 2011, Judge Roldan of the Jackson County Circuit Court 
entered Judgment in the adoption proceeding, denying the petition of the 
adoptive parents and awarding legal and physical custody of the child to the 
father.  
 
37.  In establishing his parental rights and opposing the adoption, the father 
or his family incurred between $50,000 and $70,000 in attorney’s fees.  
 
38. To the extent the mother provided fraudulent information to the father 
concerning the supposed due date for the child, that behavior is not relevant 
to the Panel’s assessment of potential professional misconduct on the part 
of [Mr. Krigel]. 
 
Based on these factual findings, I agree with the majority opinion that Mr. Krigel violated 
Rule 4-3.3(a)(3) when he knowingly elicited and permitted false and misleading 
testimony at the April 6, 2010 hearing that effectively represented to and caused the trial 
court to believe that Birth Father had knowledge of the birth of the child and had not 
done anything to assert his parental rights.  These facts also support the majority 
opinion’s finding that Mr. Krigel violated Rule 4-4.1(a) in that he knowingly made a false 
statement of material fact to a third person when he told Mr. Zimmerman that there 
would not be an adoption without Birth Father’s consent.   
6 
 
I would not find that said facts support the majority opinion’s holding that          
Mr. Krigel violated Rule 4-4.4(a).  Rule 4-4.4(a) provides that “[i]n representing a client, 
a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, 
delay, or burden a third person[.]”  The majority opinion finds that Mr. Krigel violated 
Rule 4-4.4(a) by actively concealing factual information from Birth Father and Birth 
Father’s counsel so that his client, Birth Mother, would prevail. In doing so, the 
majority opinion reasons that Mr. Krigel’s actions served no substantial purpose other 
than to impair and delay Birth Father’s assertion of his parental rights.  I recognize 
that, because the purpose of adoption proceedings is to protect and determine the best 
interest of the child,2 the parties to such proceedings take on somewhat different roles 
than in a typical adversarial setting.  But even being mindful of the special nature of 
such proceedings, the majority opinion’s finding would require an attorney to divulge 
to a potential opposing party information that is not only detrimental to his or her 
client but also information that the majority opinion does not show the party had a 
legal duty to disclose at that time.  Therefore, to the extent Mr. Krigel concealed 
information from Birth Father and Birth Father’s counsel, he did so to avoid harm to 
his client.  Here, Mr. Krigel has been found to have violated Rule 4-4.1(a) for giving 
false information to Birth Father’s attorney.  I would find that such a rule violation 
                                              
2 Section 453.005.1, RSMo 2009, provides that statutes pertaining to adoption “shall be 
construed so as to promote the best interests and welfare of the child in recognition of the 
entitlement of the child to a permanent and stable home.” 
7 
 
sufficiently covers Mr. Krigel’s conduct and, under these circumstances, I would not 
find that Mr. Krigel violated Rule 4-4.4(a).   
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority opinion’s finding that Mr. Krigel 
violated Rule 4-4.4(a).  Nevertheless, I agree that the multiple acts of professional 
misconduct committed by Mr. Krigel justify the six-month suspension from the 
practice of law, with execution of the suspension stayed subject to Mr. Krigel’s 
completion of a two-year term of probation in accordance with conditions imposed by 
this Court.  I, therefore, concur in the majority opinion with respect to the discipline 
imposed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
In re: Sanford P. Krigel, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 Respondent.  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC95098 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
I respectfully dissent.  Every attorney licensed to practice law in this state must first 
take an oath.  The third paragraph of that oath provides, "That I will never seek to 
mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false statement of fact or law[.]"  Every 
attorney is reminded of this sacred promise, and is required to reaffirm it, each year when 
they sign their annual enrollment form.  Sanford Krigel knowingly violated that oath and 
multiple rules of professional conduct as explained in the principal opinion.  The 
principal opinion suspends Krigel but stays that suspension and places him on probation.  
In my view, Krigel's actions—in misleading both opposing counsel and the circuit 
court—warrant suspension without leave to reapply for six months, at a minimum, but I 
would disbar him.   
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Adoption Option, Inc., is a Kansas nonprofit corporation that is a licensed child 
placement agency in Missouri.  Its focus is to aid infertile couples with adopting children.  
The founder of Adoption Option was Hillary Merryfield.  She began working with the 
2 
 
prospective adoptive couple in this case in January 2010.  However, in March 2010, she 
first met with the biological mother.  At that time, Merryfield recommended the 
biological mother meet with Krigel, after the biological mother's parents requested an 
attorney referral.  Merryfield had worked with Krigel on numerous occasions involving 
adoption.  Krigel had been working in adoption law for more than two decades. 
 
Krigel met with, and agreed to represent, the biological mother on March 11, 
2010.  Krigel later admitted that he spent fewer than 10 hours on the case and was paid 
$22,0001 in fees by the prospective adoptive parents.  DHP Hearing Tr. 249, 328.  At this 
meeting, Krigel described that he would be using a passive strategy, as he described it, 
"to actively do nothing" to assist the father.  Shortly after his representation of the 
biological mother began, Krigel was contacted by the father's attorney, Jeffery 
Zimmerman, a business and real estate attorney.  During their discussion on the 
telephone, Zimmerman made Krigel aware of his client's concern about an adoption and 
was assured by Krigel that an adoption would not take place without the consent of the 
father.  Zimmerman also recommended that the biological mother and father receive 
some counseling, outside the presence of their parents.  Krigel recommended Merryfield, 
without disclosing that Merryfield had recommended the biological mother to Krigel, or 
that Merryfield was actively working with the biological mother in preparation of 
adoption. 
                                                          
 
1 The circuit court judgment states the prospective adoptive parents paid $20,000 in legal fees to 
Krigel for his representation of the biological mother.  This amount seems to be calculated solely 
on the prospective parents' testimony during proceedings before the circuit court; however, 
Krigel testified he received between $20,000-22,000 during his DHP testimony, resolving this 
discrepancy. 
3 
 
 
At the meeting with Merryfield, the father expressed that he would not consent to 
an adoption.  Despite this, Krigel was told by Merryfield that the father was very passive, 
and that Merryfield felt that, while he would not consent to adoption, he would not assert 
his rights and actively stop an adoption.  Krigel's next move was to terminate the 
biological mother's parental rights so custody could be transferred to the prospective 
adoptive parents.  This occurred in a hearing on April 6, 2010.  After this hearing, Krigel 
anticipated his representation of the biological mother would be complete.  Aside from 
this one hearing, Krigel had spent 10 hours or less on the entire case.   
 
Krigel's passive strategy worked so well that—had the biological mother not made 
comments to a thirdparty on Facebook—the father likely would not have found out about 
the birth of his child for months after it happened.  When the father did find out about the 
birth, he was referred to Mike Whitsitt.  Whitsitt immediately filed paperwork to have the 
father placed on the putative father registry and filed a paternity action.  Months and 
$50,000-$70,000 of attorney's fees later, the father was awarded custody of his child.    
DISCPLINE HEARING PANEL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The DHP made numerous factual findings and conclusions regarding Krigel's 
conduct.  The principal opinion acknowledges these findings and conclusions are 
supported by the record.  Some of the DHP's findings and conclusions that are significant 
include: 
25. Late in March 2010, the expectant mother sent the expectant father a 
message falsely stating that her doctor had revised the due date from April 
8 until May l. The expectant father had been barred from attending the 
doctor appointments with the expectant mother and was deceived by her 
statement. 
 
4 
 
26. The baby was born on April 3, 2010. Neither the father nor his attorney 
was notified of the birth. The father's name was not shown on the birth 
certificate.  The Panel finds the failure to notify the father or his attorney 
was purposeful and based on legal advice provided by Respondent, and was 
designed to impair the father's ability to assert his paternal rights. 
 
27. On April 6, 2010 a hearing was held in Jackson County, Missouri 
before Commissioner Merrigan, for the purpose of having the birth mother 
tender her consent to terminate her parental rights, preparatory to adoption 
proceedings being instituted.  Respondent appeared on behalf of the 
mother.  Neither the father nor his attorney received notice of the hearing 
and neither was aware of the birth of the child. 
 
28. At the April 6, 2010 hearing, in response to Respondent's questioning, 
the mother provided false testimony, stating that she had done nothing to 
defraud or mislead the father which was not true in light of the fact she had 
given him false information regarding the expected due date. Respondent 
testified to this Panel that he was not aware that the mother had provided 
the father with a false due date. 
 
29. At the April 6 hearing, in response to Respondent's question, the mother 
agreed that the father "had been consulted at length about the matter." 
Respondent knew that his "passive strategy" called for no communication 
following the initial counseling session with Ms. Merryfield and that his 
questioning suggested to the Court that there had been more consultation 
than was the case. 
 
30. Respondent testified to this Panel that he knew the father believed the 
mother's due date to be April 8. Having instructed his client not to 
communicate with the father, at the time of the April 6 hearing Respondent 
was aware that his strategy had prevented the father from knowing that the 
baby had been born, and from coming forward in advance of the April 6 
hearing. Respondent was also aware that the father had consistently 
asserted his paternity, expressed his desire to raise the child, and stated his 
opposition to adoption. 
 
31. Nevertheless, at the April 6 hearing, in response to a question from 
Respondent, the mother agreed with Respondent's statement that "even 
though you've talked to him and his family at some length, he has not 
stepped forward since the birth of the child claiming any rights to the 
child." Respondent elicited this misleading testimony knowing that his 
''passive strategy" had ensured that the father would not know of the birth. 
Further, Respondent posed his question fully aware of the fact that the 
father had consistently claimed rights to the child. 
5 
 
 
32. Respondent's questioning of the mother at the April 6, 2010 hearing, 
while addressing certain statutory elements, was designed to present to the 
Court the incorrect impression that the father was not interested in the birth 
of the child or in asserting his parental rights, when Respondent knew that 
was not the case. 
 
40. The Panel finds that Respondent employed his "passive strategy" for the 
express purpose of impairing the father's ability to establish his parental 
rights under the Putative Father Registry or otherwise. 
 
41. In conducting his examination of the birth mother at the April 6, 2010 
hearing, Respondent asked questions designed to elicit answers that 
misrepresented the facts of the situation, as known to Respondent, and that 
served to mislead the Court with respect to the true circumstances of the 
case, in violation of Supreme Court Rule 4-3.3(a)(3). 
 
42. 
In 
his 
telephone 
conversation 
with 
the 
father's 
attorney,                      
Mr. Zimmerman, Respondent made a false statement that there would be no 
adoption without the father's consent, in violation of Supreme Court Rule  
4-4.l(a), and made no subsequent effort to advise the attorney otherwise. 
 
43. Under the circumstances of this case, and given Respondent's clear 
understanding as to the identity of the father, that the father was not willing 
to consent to an adoption, and that the father wanted to raise his child, 
Respondent's conduct, including his conversation with Mr. Zimmerman, his 
instructions to the mother and her family to have no communication with 
the father, and his overall implementation of his "passive strategy" to 
"actively do nothing," had no substantial purpose other than to impair and 
delay the father's assertion of his parental rights in violation of Supreme 
Court Rule 4-4.4(a). 
 
44. Respondent's overall conduct in this matter, including his interaction, 
and failure to interact, with the father's counsel, the implementation of his 
"passive strategy," and his conduct at the April 6, 2010 hearing, constituted 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of Supreme 
Court Rule 4-8.4(d). 
 
46. As a result of Respondent's misconduct, the father was largely denied 
access to his child for the first year of its life, and the father and his family 
incurred substantial expense in establishing his parental rights and 
preventing the child's adoption. 
 
6 
 
DHP Decision at pp. 5-7, 8-9.  The DHP recommended Krigel be suspended without 
leave to reapply for a period of six months.  Neither the DHP nor OCDC recommended 
probation and staying the suspension of Krigel's license to practice law. 
DISCUSSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
The most serious of Krigel's violations is that of Rule 4-3.3(a)(1).  It provides: "A 
lawyer shall not knowingly: make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the 
lawyer."   
In addition to the factual findings and conclusions of the DHP, the circuit court's 
judgment—which eventually removed the child from the prospective adoptive parents 
and placed custody with the father—in this case is equally enlightening.  It begins with 
the following quotation: "The facts of this case shock the justice system that the people of 
Missouri enjoy.  The Court finds the actions of officers of this Court [referring to Krigel] 
to be at minimum disturbing to the administration of justice." Further, the circuit court 
made additional findings that even provide a more complete picture of Krigel's conduct.  
They include:  
[The biological mother], through her attorney, Mr. Krigel, assured 
[the father], through Jeff Zimmerman, that no adoption would take place 
without [the father's] consent, inducing him to forego protecting his 
parental rights under the statute, to file with the Putative Father Registry 
within fifteen (15) days after his child's birth, or to file a paternity action.  It 
was reasonable for [the father] to have believed that there was going to be 
no adoption. 
 
. . . 
 
In assessing the attorney's fees the Court takes into consideration the 
following factors: . . . (8) by the [proposed adoptive parents'] own 
7 
 
testimony, they have paid [Krigel's fees of] Twenty Thousand Dollars 
($20,000.00) for a minimal role in the litigation[.]  
 
 . . . 
 
Just because the fraud practiced upon the natural father and this Court by 
the [biological] mother and the [prospective adoptive parents] does not fit 
neatly into one of the statutory exceptions does not mean this Court cannot 
remedy that fraud. 
 
Judgment at 15-20.  The circuit court described exactly what this situation was: a fraud 
on the circuit court that resulted in a father not receiving custody of his child for in excess 
of a year, and Krigel receiving $22,000 "for a minimal role in the litigation." 
 
Here, the DHP found Krigel "asked questions designed to elicit answers that 
misrepresented the facts of the situation" and were used to mislead—and arguably 
intended to deceive—the circuit court.  This, coupled with the "passive strategy" 
designed to mislead opposing counsel and the father, created a web of fraud entangling 
these entire proceedings.2   
Accordingly, I agree with the portion of the principal opinion that states "Krigel's 
most egregious act of misconduct was lack of candor toward the tribunal.  Generally, 
'when an attorney, with an intent to deceived the court, submits a false document, makes 
a false statement, or withholds material information, disbarment is the appropriate 
sanction.'"  Principal. op. at 11 (quoting In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 919 (Mo. 
banc 1997)).  Violations of Rule 4-3.3(a) have traditionally resulted in disbarment or 
                                                          
 
2 As the principal opinion points out, the father asserted, from the outset, he wanted to raise his 
child, and the biological mother and her parents' initiated steps to prevent him from doing so.  
Principal Op. at 2.  Further, from the outset Krigel had the father's name and residence and knew 
the father would not consent to an adoption.  Id. at 3.  As soon as he became aware of the birth, 
the father retained new counsel with experience in adoption law, placed his name on the putative 
father registry, and intervened in the adoption proceedings. 
8 
 
indefinite suspension.  See In re Carey, 89 S.W.3d 477 (Mo. banc 2002) (attorneys that 
made misstatements of material fact to a court should be suspended indefinitely); In re 
Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910 (Mo. banc 1997) (attorney was disbarred for "falsely 
representing to the court that she lacked knowledge of a potential party's change of 
residence and . . . that she could connect the testimony of work environment witnesses to 
her client."  Id. at 918.); In re Storment, 873 S.W.3d 227 (Mo. banc 1994) (attorney's 
conduct warranted disbarment when he knowingly elicited false testimony from his client 
in order to deceive the circuit court).   
In In re Oberhellmann,  Elmer Oberhellmann was charged with violating Rules 
3.3(a)(1),(4); 5.5(a); 8.4(a), (c)-(d).  873 S.W.2d 851, 852 (Mo. banc 1994).  The charges 
stemmed from Oberhellmann's representation of two separate clients.  Id. at 853.  
Oberhellmann represented the first client in a medical malpractice suit, filed under 
diversity jurisdiction in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Missouri.  Id.  
When Oberhellmann filed his complaint, he stated that his client was a resident of Texas.  
Id.  Later, while answering interrogatories, Oberhellmann stated that his client lived at 
Oberhellmann's mother's address in Illinois.  Id.  Eventually, the case was dismissed after 
the fraud was discovered.  Id.  The misconduct involving the second client revolved 
around a soured law partnership.  Id. at 854.  Oberhellmann had been practicing with 
another attorney but later ended their association.  Id. at 855.  Afterward, Oberhellmann 
filed a motion to withdrawal his former partner from representation on a case that had 
already been settled.  Id.  In so doing, Oberhellmann forged his former partner's name, 
and that forgery was later reported to the court by Oberhellmann's former partner.  Id.   
9 
 
The Court in imposing its sanction held: 
In cases of false statements, fraud, or misrepresentation, this Court issues 
reprimands only if the lawyer is merely negligent in determining whether 
statements or documents are false.  Respondent was more than negligent; 
therefore, public reprimand is not appropriate.  Nor is suspension 
appropriate.  Suspension is appropriate only if a lawyer knows that a false 
statement is being submitted to a court and takes no remedial action.  
Disbarment is the appropriate sanction for respondent.  Disbarment is 
appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to deceive a court, makes a false 
statement or submits a false document to a court. 
 
Id. at 856 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).     
The principal opinion turns an "about face" from this precedent in merely 
suspending Krigel, staying the suspension, and permitting Krigel to continue to practice 
on probation.  That result does not protect the public nor the integrity of the legal 
profession.  At a minimum, this Court's case law, and the recommendation of the DHP, 
require Krigel be indefinitely suspended with no leave to apply for reinstatement for six 
months, but my view is his actions warrant disbarment.           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge