Title: Van Poyck v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC11-724
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 16, 2012

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-724 
____________ 
 
WILLIAM VAN POYCK, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[February 16, 2012] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
William Van Poyck, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the circuit 
court‟s summary denial of his second successive motion for postconviction relief 
filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  Because Van Poyck‟s claim originates from 
information that existed as early as this Court‟s issuance of its direct-appeal 
decision in 1990, and because the juror affidavits at issue in this case relate to 
matters that inhere in the verdict, we affirm the circuit court‟s denial of this claim 
as it is both untimely and based upon inadmissible evidence. 
 
Van Poyck was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for 
 
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his role in the June 1987 killing of correctional officer Fred Griffis.  On direct 
appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.  See Van Poyck v. State 
(Van Poyck I), 564 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1990).  Although the Court held that “the 
record [did] not establish that Van Poyck was the triggerman,” we recognized that 
it did “establish that he was the instigator and the primary participant in this 
crime.”  Id. at 1070.  We further concluded that because “there [was] no question 
that Van Poyck played the major role in this felony murder and that he knew lethal 
force could be used,” his death sentence was proportionate.  Id. at 1070-71.   
Since this Court‟s affirmance of his conviction and sentence, Van Poyck has 
continuously raised his alleged non-triggerman status as a basis for seeking 
postconviction relief in both state and federal courts.  The denial of each of these 
claims has been consistently affirmed on appeal.  See Van Poyck v. State (Van 
Poyck II), 694 So. 2d 686, 696-97 (Fla. 1997); Van Poyck v. Fla. Dep‟t of Corr. 
(Van Poyck III), 290 F.3d 1318, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 2002); Van Poyck v. State 
(Van Poyck IV), 908 So. 2d 326, 329-30 (Fla. 2005); Van Poyck v. State (Van 
Poyck V), 961 So. 2d 220, 224-26 (Fla. 2007); see also Van Poyck v. McCollum 
(Van Poyck VI), 646 F.3d 865, 866-67 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming the dismissal of 
a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in which Van Poyck sought access to DNA evidence in 
an attempt to show that he was not the triggerman for the purpose of seeking 
executive clemency). 
 
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Most recently, this Court in Van Poyck V affirmed the circuit court‟s 
summary denial of Van Poyck‟s first successive motion for postconviction relief in 
which he asserted a newly discovered evidence claim predicated upon an affidavit 
by Enrique Diaz, a prison acquaintance of Van Poyck‟s codefendant Frank Valdes, 
stating that “between 1990 and 1997, Valdes „repeatedly and consistently‟ said he 
had shot and killed Griffis.”  961 So. 2d at 223.  Relying on our prior precedent, 
we rejected Van Poyck‟s argument that newly discovered evidence that Valdes was 
the triggerman to Griffis‟s murder would probably yield a lesser sentence for Van 
Poyck.  See id. at 227-28.  We find our decision in Van Poyck V to be dispositive 
here. 
The argument Van Poyck raises on appeal relates to his original penalty 
phase and is based on alleged newly discovered evidence consisting of four 
affidavits Van Poyck obtained on his own initiative, and absent the assistance of 
counsel, through the retention of a private investigator.  These affidavits were 
sworn to by four of Van Poyck‟s original jurors in 2010 and essentially state that 
had it been determined that Van Poyck was not the person who shot Griffis, two 
jurors would have recommended a life sentence and it was at least a reasonable 
probability that two other jurors would have done the same.1  Van Poyck alleges 
                                         
 
1.  Specifically, one juror declared that “[i]f [he] had known for a fact that 
William Van Poyck was not the triggerman, [he] would have recommended to the 
trial judge that Van Poyck be sentenced to life imprisonment, without the 
 
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that these affidavits are proof that he would probably receive a lesser sentence on 
resentencing.  The circuit court summarily denied relief on this claim, finding it to 
be both untimely and based on inadmissible evidence.  We agree. 
To obtain a new capital penalty-phase proceeding based on newly 
discovered evidence, a defendant must meet two requirements.  First, the evidence 
must not have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of 
trial, and it must also appear that neither the defendant nor defense counsel could 
have known of such evidence by the use of diligence.  Second, the newly 
discovered evidence must be of such a nature that it would probably yield a less 
severe sentence.  See Davis v. State, 26 So. 3d 519, 526 (citing Jones v. State 
(Jones II), 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998); Jones v. State (Jones I), 591 So. 2d 
911, 915 (Fla. 1991)).  Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of 
the Jones II test if it “weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to 
a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.”  Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 526 (quoting 
Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)).  “In considering the second prong, 
                                                                                                                                   
possibility of parole, instead of the death penalty.”  Another juror stated that had 
she “known that Van Poyck did not kill Fred Griffis, there [was] a reasonable 
probability that [she] would have recommended to the trial judge that Van Poyck 
be sentenced to life imprisonment rather than a recommendation for death.”  A 
third juror explained that had she “known for certain that Van Poyck was not the 
individual who killed Fred Griffis, there [was] at least a reasonable probability that 
[she] would not have recommended a death sentence for Van Poyck.”  The final 
juror confirmed that she was “not an advocate of the death penalty and would 
recommend life [without] parole if given the option.”   
 
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the trial court should initially consider whether the evidence would have been 
admissible at trial or whether there would have been any evidentiary bars to its 
admissibility.”  Id. at 521. 
 Van Poyck‟s claim is procedurally time-barred under the first prong of the 
Jones II test.  The fact underlying this claim—that insufficient evidence existed to 
support a finding that Van Poyck was the triggerman—is not new at all.  The issue 
of Van Poyck‟s non-triggerman status was contested at his trial in 1988.  This 
Court on direct appeal acknowledged that the record did “not establish that Van 
Poyck was the triggerman,” but nevertheless affirmed his conviction for first-
degree murder and his sentence of death.  Van Poyck I, 564 So. 2d at 1070.     
As recounted above, in every state postconviction motion filed since his 
sentence became final, Van Poyck, through counsel, has raised a variant of a claim 
regarding his non-triggerman status.  While these affidavits are technically “new,” 
in that they were drafted and sworn to in 2010, the information upon which they 
are based existed as early as September 1990, when this Court‟s direct-appeal 
decision became final, or at least as early as March 2005, when inmate Enrique 
Diaz executed the affidavit that spurred the Van Poyck V litigation.  Van Poyck 
himself concedes that the very reason counsel never secured such affidavits is 
because counsel was prohibited from doing so under Rule Regulating the Florida 
Bar 4-3.5(d)(4).  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court‟s finding that this claim 
 
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was procedurally barred. 
This claim also fails under Jones II‟s second prong.  It is well established 
that a verdict cannot be subsequently impeached by matters that inhere in the 
verdict and relate to the jury‟s deliberations.  See Duckett v. State, 918 So. 2d 224, 
231 n.7 (Fla. 2005); Marshall v. State, 854 So. 2d 1235, 1240 (Fla. 2003); Johnson 
v. State, 593 So. 2d 206, 210 (Fla. 1992).  Codifying this principle, section 
90.607(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that “[u]pon an inquiry into the 
validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror is not competent to testify as to any 
matter which essentially inheres in the verdict or indictment.”  As interpreted by 
this Court, section 90.607(2)(b) “absolutely forbids any judicial inquiry into 
emotions, mental process, or mistaken beliefs of jurors.”  Baptist Hosp. of Miami, 
Inc. v. Maler, 579 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1991) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 574 So. 2d 
124, 128 (Fla. 1991)).  In Maler, this Court further explained that “the reasons why 
jurors reach[ ] a particular verdict clearly are subjective impressions or opinions 
that are not subject to judicial inquiry.”  Id. at 100. 
Reduced to their essence, the four juror affidavits in this case can be likened 
to instances where a juror renounces his or her decision after a verdict has been 
entered.  Cf. Simpson v. State, 3 So. 3d 1135, 1143-44 (Fla. 2009) (holding that 
juror‟s guilty verdicts were not impeachable by her subsequent repudiation of those 
verdicts because the basis for her repudiation related to matters that inhered in the 
 
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verdicts).  Each affidavit essentially contains a subjective impression relating 
directly to the reason why that juror reached his or her recommendation for a 
sentence of death.  We agree with the circuit court‟s conclusion that 
jurors cannot testify or provide affidavits about the nature and kind of 
evidence that was presented and the effect this evidence had upon 
their decision to convict or which sentence they chose to impose.  If 
such affidavits are submitted, they cannot be considered as evidence.  
There is nothing more sacrosanct in the criminal justice system than 
the private thoughts of jurors.  Members of a jury should not be 
tracked down or subject to an interrogation process when there is not 
even a scintilla of evidence suggesting misconduct or malfeasance 
during deliberations. 
Because the thoughts expressed by these jurors are not matters external to the 
verdict and relate to topics about which they are ultimately incompetent to testify, 
section 90.607(2)(b) renders these juror affidavits inadmissible, and they cannot be 
classified as newly discovered evidence. 
In addition, the affidavits do not support Van Poyck‟s assertion that the jury 
vote in the penalty phase would have changed because the statements contained 
therein are predicated upon facts that have never been conclusively determined to 
be true.  Before each juror interview, Van Poyck‟s investigator informed the jurors 
that she was there to obtain their “opinion about the suitability of [Van Poyck‟s] 
death sentence in light of evidence that has surfaced since his trial including the 
fact that the Florida Supreme Court has found that Van Poyck was not the 
triggerman as well as the State‟s concession that Van Poyck was not the 
 
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triggerman.”  (Emphasis added.) 
Contrary to the investigator‟s instruction, this Court has never found that 
Van Poyck was not the triggerman; we have only recognized that the evidence 
introduced at his trial was insufficient to establish that he was.  See Van Poyck I, 
564 So. 2d at 1070-71.2  Further, the State asserts that it has never conceded that 
Van Poyck was not the shooter, but has simply acknowledged this Court‟s 
conclusion regarding insufficient evidence.  Because the juror affidavits in this 
case are predicated upon misleading facts, the information they provide reveals 
nothing more than the subjective impressions of what four of the jurors might have 
done had they been presented with facts never determined to be true.  Moreover, 
their so-called “changed” opinions would not affect the jury‟s ultimate sentencing 
recommendation; even considering these four affidavits in a light most favorable to 
Van Poyck, the jury vote would remain seven to five in favor of death.3  
As a final concern, we echo the circuit court‟s express disapproval of the 
manner in which Van Poyck first secured, and defense counsel later utilized, the 
subject juror affidavits to set forth a factual basis for this claim.  Rule 4-3.5(d)(4) 
                                         
 
2.  We note that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
recently observed that the “identity of the triggerman was not established at [Van 
Poyck‟s] trial or in later proceedings.”  Van Poyck VI, 646 F.3d at 867 n.2. 
 
3.  Following Van Poyck‟s penalty phase, the jury recommended a sentence 
of death by a vote of eleven to one.  The four juror affidavits at issue here are in 
addition to the one juror who originally voted for a sentence of life imprisonment. 
 
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of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.575 govern the method by which a lawyer or party may initiate contact with 
jurors after the jury enters a verdict to determine whether the verdict may be 
subject to legal challenge.  See Israel v. State, 985 So. 2d 510, 522 (Fla. 2008); see 
also R. Regulating the Fla. Bar 4-3.5(d)(4) (requiring a lawyer to file with the trial 
court a notice of intent to interview a juror before doing so where “the lawyer has 
reason to believe that grounds for [a] challenge [to the verdict] may exist”); Fla. R. 
Crim. P. 3.575 (requiring a party to file with the trial court a motion to interview a 
juror before doing so where the party “has reason to believe that the verdict may be 
subject to legal challenge”).  Neither defense counsel nor Van Poyck notified the 
circuit court of Van Poyck‟s retention of a private investigator who interviewed the 
original jurors in this case. 
We agree with the circuit court that although defense counsel was not 
representing Van Poyck at the time these affidavits were obtained and thus may not 
have violated rule 4-3.5(d)(4), counsel‟s decision to later use these affidavits to 
support this claim constitutes a disregard for the spirit of the rule.  As the circuit 
court cogently explained: 
In this case, though defense counsel states [Van Poyck] was not 
represented at the time these affidavits were collected, counsel, as a 
member of The Florida Bar, still utilized affidavits in crafting the 
present motion.  Though it might not be a technical violation, the 
actions of [Van Poyck‟s] attorney nonetheless constitute a disregard 
for the spirit of the rule.  A lawyer may not simply stick his head in 
 
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the sand when his client presents juror affidavits collected after a 
guilty verdict was rendered and simply present them to the Court.  
Though a lawyer has a duty to zealously advocate for a client, this 
duty must be tempered by the lawyer‟s other professional obligations.  
A lawyer must always keep in mind the broader duty to the criminal 
justice system which can never be forsaken in the interest of zealous 
advocacy. 
(Footnote omitted.) 
In sum, we conclude that Van Poyck‟s motion was untimely and that his 
reliance on these affidavits represents an improper attempt to use inadmissible 
evidence to reargue the merits of this Court‟s legal determination in Van Poyck V 
that his non-triggerman status probably would not yield a lesser sentence at a 
resentencing.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court‟s order summarily denying 
relief. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and 
PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Palm Beach County,  
John S. Kastrenakes, Judge - Case No. 87-CF006736 A02 and  
88-CF-11116 A02 
 
Gerald S. Bettman, Jacksonville, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
 
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Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Celia Terenzio, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee