Title: STATE v ARBGAST
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 82-228
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: January 20, 1983

No. 82-228 I N T H E SUPREME COURT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1983 T H E STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -VS- JULIE ARBGAST I Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of t h e Nineteenth J u d i c i a l District, I n and f o r t h e County of Lincoln, The Honorable Robert M. H o l t e r , Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: German & McClain, Missoula, Montana Keller & G i l m e r , K a l i s p e l l , Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana W i l l i a m A. Douglas, County Attorney, Libby, Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : December 1 6 , 1982 Decided: January 2 0 , 1983 F i l e d : J A N 2 0 1983 Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . Defendant was charged w i t h t w o c o u n t s of c r i m i n a l sale of dangerous d r u g s i n t h e District C o u r t , Lincoln County. Defendant p l e d n o t g u i l t y a t h e r a r r a i g n m e n t on October 5 , 1981. On F e b r u a r y 5 , 1982, d e f e n d a n t changed h e r p l e a to g u i l t y to t h e c h a r g e i n count two of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n and c o u n t one was d i s m i s s e d p u r s u a n t to a p l e a b a r g a i n w i t h t h e L i n c o l n County A t t o r n e y ' s O f f i c e . On March 1 5 , 1982, t h e District Court sen- t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t to f i v e y e a r s i n p r i s o n w i t h t h r e e y e a r s suspended. On A p r i l 7 , 1982, d e f e n d a n t moved to withdraw h e r p l e a of g u i l t y . A f t e r a h e a r i n g t h e District Court denied t h e motion on May 11, 1982. Defendant a p p e a l s . Defendant was charged w i t h two c o u n t s of c r i m i n a l sale of d a n g e r o u s d r u g s which p r e c i p i t a t e d from d e f e n d a n t ' s admitted sale o f m a r i j u a n a t o Richard Morrow, an undercover i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f f i c e r working i n L i n c o l n County. Defendant claims s h e f i r s t met Morrow a t a b a r i n Eureka, Montana, when she was i n t r o d u c e d t o him by a mutual f r i e n d , Gary T o r r e s . She t e s t i f i e d Morrow asked h e r i f she or anyone s h e knew of would s e l l him c o c a i n e . Defendant s t a t e d s h e was n o t involved w i t h d r u g s nor a s s o c i a t e d w i t h people who were. Morrow s t a t e d by sworn a f f i d a v i t d e f e n d a n t s o l d him % ounce of m a r i j u a n a f o r $25 on t h e i r f i r s t meeting a t t h e Eureka Tavern. Defendant tes t i £ i e d s h e s o l d m a r i j u a n a to Morrow on t h e i r t h i r d meeting a t t h e L i n c o l n County F a i r . She c l a i m s a f r i e n d of h e r s from K a l i s p e l l approached h e r and s t a t e d she had some m a r i - juana t o s e l l . Defendant claims she w a s t h e n approached by Gary T o r r e s who t o l d h e r Morrow was l o o k i n g t o buy some d r u g s . Defendant then o b t a i n e d some m a r i j u a n a from h e r K a l i s p e l l f r i e n d , exchanged it w i t h Morrow i n a car, and gave a l l of t h e exchange money to t h e f r i e n d from K a l i s p e l l . Defendant t e s t i f i e d s h e s o l d m a r i j u a n a to Morrow a second t i m e when Gary T o r r e s approached h e r and t o l d h e r Morrow was l e a v i n g f o r Washington and wanted to buy more d r u g s f o r t h e road. Defendant a g a i n approached h e r K a l i s p e l l f r i e n d and o b t a i n e d some m a r i j u a n a which s h e exchanged w i t h Morrow. Defendant re t u r n e d t h e exchange money to h e r f r i e n d . Morrow s t a t e d d e f e n d a n t approached him a t t h e L i n c o l n County F a i r seeking to sell mari- juana f o r $25 p e r a ounce. H e claims he t h e n purchased one f u l l ounce of m a r i j u a n a f o r $45 from h e r t h e n e x t n i g h t a t t h e same l o c a t i o n . Defendant was a r r e s t e d on September 1, 1981, and charged by i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h t w o c o u n t s of c r i m i n a l sale of dangerous d r u g s . On October 5, 1981, d e f e n d a n t appeared and pled n o t g u i l t y to b o t h c o u n t s . On February 8 , 1982, d e f e n d a n t signed a p l e a b a r g a i n agreement w i t h t h e Lincoln County A t t o r n e y ' s O f f i c e a g r e e i n g to e n t e r a p l e a of g u i l t y to count two of t h e i n f o r - m a t i o n i n exchange f o r d i s m i s s a l of c o u n t one. On March 1 5 , 1982, t h e D i s t r i c t Court sentenced d e f e n d a n t t o be i n c a r c e r a t e d a t Montana S t a t e P r i s o n f o r a term of f i v e y e a r s w i t h a l l b u t t w o y e a r s suspended. On A p r i l 1, 1982, d e f e n d a n t moved t o withdraw h e r p l e a of g u i l t y and t o set a s i d e t h e p l e a b a r g a i n agreement. The District Court heard t h e motion on A p r i l 1 9 , 1982. On May 1 1 , 1982 t h e District Court denied d e f e n d a n t ' s motion. Defendant a p p e a l s . The i s s u e s r a i s e d on a p p e a l a r e : 1. Whether t h e District Court abused its d i s c r e t i o n i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s motion to withdraw h e r g u i l t y p l e a and r e f u s i n g to set a s i d e t h e p l e a b a r g a i n agreement. 2 . Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court committed r e v e r s i b l e error i n its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of s e c t i o n 45-9-101, MCA. Defendant f i r s t c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n denying h e r motion t o withdraw h e r g u i l t y p l e a . The g r a n t i n g or r e f u s a l o f p e r m i s s i o n t o withdraw a p l e a of g u i l t y and s u b s t i t u t e a p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y rests i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e District Court and is s u b j e c t to review o n l y upon a showing of abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . S t a t e v. H u t t i n g e r (1980 ) , -- -- Mont . - - - 1 595 P.2d 363, 376, 36 I n H u t t i n q e r , s u p r a , t h i s Court s t a t e d t h r e e f a c t o r s must be balanced when examining a d e f e n d a n t ' s a t t e m p t t o withdraw a p l e a o f g u i l t y : " (1) t h e adequacy of the i n t e r r o g a t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e d e f e n d a n t a t t h e e n t r y o f t h e g u i l t y p l e a as to d e f e n d a n t ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e consequences of h i s p l e a , ( 2 ) t h e promptness with which t h e d e f e n d a n t a t t e m p t s to withdraw t h e p r i o r p l e a , and ( 3 ) t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a was a p p a r e n t l y t h e r e s u l t of a p l e a b a r g a i n i n which t h e g u i l t y p l e a was g i v e n i n exchange f o r d i s m i s s a l of a n o t h e r c h a r g e . . ." Here, d e f e n d a n t a d m i t s t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was a d e q u a t e b u t claims she d i d n o t a c t u a l l y understand t h e consequences of h e r response and t h a t she was o n l y answering a s i n s t r u c t e d by h e r a t t o r n e y . H e r argument is unfounded. The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s d e f e n d a n t and d e f e n d a n t ' s sister had s e v e r a l m e e t i n g s w i t h d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l . The consequences of t h e c h a r g e s were t h o r o u g h l y d i s c u s s e d . T h a t d e f e n d a n t v o l u n t a r i l y e n t e r e d a g u i l t y p l e a is w i t h o u t q u e s t i o n . Her a t t e m p t to withdraw h e r g u i l t y p l e a was prompted by t h e District C o u r t ' s s e n t e n c e . W e do n o t f i n d t h i s to be s u f f i c i e n t grounds to r e v e r s e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g as a d e f e n d a n t h a s o t h e r remedies to pursue i n such an i n s t a n c e . The S t a t e a g r e e s t h e second f a c t o r i n H u t t i n g e r , . - t h e prompt- n e s s of t h e motion to withdraw, is n o t an i s s u e h e r e . The t h i r d f a c t o r , t h a t t h e g u i l t y p l e a was a p p a r e n t l y t h e r e s u l t of a p l e a b a r g a i n i n which t h e g u i l t y p l e a was g i v e n i n exchange f o r d i s m i s s a l of a n o t h e r c h a r g e , is the e x a c t s i t u a t i o n t h a t f a c e s u s h e r e . On February 8 , 1982, d e f e n d a n t signed a p l e a b a r g a i n agreement whereby she agreed to p l e a d g u i l t y to c o u n t two of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n and i n exchange t h e S t a t e agreed to d i s m i s s t h e c h a r g e c o n t a i n e d i n c o u n t one of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . T h i s Court h a s s t a t e d many times t h a t it w i l l n o t lend its a s s i s t a n c e to a n accused c r i m i n a l i n e s c a p i n g t h e o b l i g a t i o n s of h i s agreement a f ter a c c e p t i n g t h e b e n e f i t s t h e r e o f . S t a t e v. H u t t i n g e r , s u p r a ; S t a t e v. S a t t l e r ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. 35, 549 P.2d 1080. I n H u t t i n g e r w e s t a t e d : . . - " T h i s is undoubtedly t h e most t r o u b l i n g a s p e c t of t h i s a p p e a l and is t h e f a c t o r weighing most s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t a l l o w i n g H u t t i n g e r t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a . " Although i n H u t t i n g e r we found t h i s f a c t o r d i d n o t outweigh t h o s e f a c t o r s which favored a l l o w i n g t h e w i t h d r a w a l , i n t h e p r e s e n t case t h e S t a t e rests upon t h e heavy arm of t h e scale. I n H u t t i n g e r t h e r e were s e r i o u s d e f e c t s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e g i v i n g and a c c e p t a n c e of t h e g u i l t y p l e a , n o t p r e s e n t h e r e . On a p p e a l d e f e n d a n t h a s q u e s t i o n e d t h e competency of d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l p r i o r to, and a t t h e t i m e of t h e g u i l t y p l e a . However, t h i s Court f i n d s t h e claim is u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d i n t h e r e c o r d . A s s t a t e d above, d e f e n d a n t was d i s t r a u g h t w i t h t h e sen- t e n c e pronounced by t h e District Court and h e r i l l - f e e l i n g s toward c o u n s e l sprang therefrom. Such is n o t s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n t o f i n d i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l . See S t a t e v. Bigsmoke (198211 ---- Mont . , 642 P.2d 1068, 39 St.Rep. 481. The second i s s u e i n v o l v e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 45-9-101 MCA. S e v e r a l times d u r i n g t h e p r o c e e d i n g s t h e District Court s t a t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t was n o t a c a n d i d a t e f o r a suspended or d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e r e l y i n g upon a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t s e c t i o n 45-9-101( 4 ) , MCA, r e q u i r e s a mini- mum imprisonment of one y e a r . An example is from t h e A p r i l 1 9 h e a r i n g : ". . . i f you can t e l l m e , w i t h a s t r a i g h t f a c e , t h a t t h e people of t h e S t a t e of Montana h a v e n ' t s a i d t o t h e judges, 'You b e t t e r send p e o p l e who d e a l i n d r u g s t o p r i s o n , ' I g u e s s I b e t t e r go back t o l a w s c h o o l , too. I ' v e -- i f you wish to go through t h e r e c o r d s , M r . Keller, i n s t e a d of making some w i l d comment of somebody who sits on t h e s i d e l i n e , t h a t ' s one t h i n g , b u t you g o t e v e r y r i g h t to do it. But t h e r e are a l l k i n d s of c a s e s , M r . K e l l e r : There a r e p o s s e s s i o n cases, t h e r e ' s sale c a s e s , w e even had a manufacturing c a s e t h a t d i d n ' t g e t to t r i a l . And s o , anyway, i f t h a t ' s a c h a l l e n g e , I see it and acknowledge i t , But t h e good people of t h e S t a t e of Montana have s a i d to t h e judges t h a t , 'You b e t t e r p u t t h e d r u g - s a l e s people i n p r i s o n , ' and p l a i n and simply, t h a t ' s t h i s case." However, s e c t i o n 45-9-101 ( 4 ) , MCA, d o e s not r e q u i r e imprison- ment. A p r i s o n s e n t e n c e may be d e f e r r e d under s e c t i o n 46-18-201(3), MCA: "Except as provided i n 46-18-222, t h e imposi- t i o n o r e x e c u t i o n of t h e f i r s t 2 y e a r s of a s e n t e n c e of imprison- ment imposed under t h e f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s may not be d e f e r r e d or suspended : . . . 45-9-101(2) and ( 3 ) . . ." A s d e f e n d a n t w a s s e n t e n c e d under s e c t i o n 45-9-101(4), MCA, s h e was not b a r r e d from a suspended o r d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e by s e c t i o n 46-18-201(3), MCA. The S t a t e concedes s e c t i o n 45-9-101(4), MCA, d o e s n o t r e q u i r e mandatory imprisonment as t h e D i s t r i c t Court b e l i e v e d , b u t claims t h e s e n t e n c e of f i v e y e a r s i n Montana S t a t e P r i s o n w i t h a l l b u t two y e a r s suspended was w i t h i n t h e con£ i n e s o f t h e s t a t u t e and t h a t t h e District C o u r t ' s m i s r e l i a n c e was not p r e j u d i c i a l to d e f e n d a n t . W e d i s a g r e e . I n l i g h t of t h e f a c t s it a p p e a r s t h e District C o u r t ' s b e l i e f t h a t t h e c h a r g e r e q u i r e d imprisonment was p r e j u d i c i a l to d e f e n d a n t . W e o r d e r t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e be vacated and remand for resen- t e n c i n g . w C h i e f J u s t x c e