Title: Ex parte James Henry Borden, Jr. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: James Henry Borden, Jr. v. State of Alabama)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1050042
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 17, 2007

08/17/07jameshenryborden
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2007
_________________________
1050042
_________________________
Ex parte James Henry Borden, Jr.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  James Henry Borden, Jr.
v.
State of Alabama)
(Lawrence Circuit Court, CC-93-228.60;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-02-1314)
BOLIN, Justice.
James Henry Borden, Jr., was convicted of capital murder
for intentionally causing the death of Nellie Ledbetter after
1050042
2
he had been convicted of another murder within the 20 years
before that offense. See § 13A-5-40(a)(13), Ala. Code 1975.
The jury, by a vote of 10 to 2, recommended a sentence of
death, and the trial court accepted the jury's recommendation
and sentenced Borden to death by electrocution.  The Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence.  Borden
v. State, 769 So. 2d 935 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997).  This Court
affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision, Ex parte
Borden, 769 So. 2d 950 (Ala. 2000), and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari review.  Borden v. Alabama,
531 U.S. 961 (2000).
On October 18, 2001, Borden timely filed a Rule 32, Ala.
R. Crim. P., petition for postconviction relief, challenging
his conviction and sentence of death.  Among other things,
Borden argued that he should not be executed because, he
alleged, he is mentally retarded, death by electrocution
violates the prohibition in the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution against cruel and unusual punishment, his
trial counsel did not render reasonably effective legal
representation, and the jury engaged in misconduct.  The State
filed its initial response and supporting affidavits. On July
1050042
3
17, 2002, the State filed a motion for leave to amend its
answer, included additional affidavits, and also filed a
motion to dismiss.  On June 20, 2002, the United States
Supreme Court released its decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002), holding that the execution of mentally
retarded capital offenders violates the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. On July 1, 2002, the Alabama
Legislature modified Alabama law to provide for execution of
capital offenders by lethal injection unless a death-row
inmate elects electrocution as a means of execution.
Subsequently, the trial court allowed the State to amend its
response to reflect those two developments in the law.  On
August 21, 2002, Borden filed a response to the State's motion
to dismiss and a motion to vacate his death sentence, in which
he set out specific facts supporting his claim that he is
mentally retarded and thereby ineligible for the death
sentence.  He also filed a motion to amend his Rule 32
petition setting out, among other things, in more detail his
argument regarding his claims of juror misconduct.  The trial
1050042
4
court summarily dismissed Borden's petition, without ruling on
Borden's motion to amend.  
Borden appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals
remanded the case for the trial court to make specific
findings of fact as to Borden's claim that he is mentally
retarded and therefore could not be sentenced to death as a
matter of law.  Borden v. State, [Ms. CR-02-1314, February 27,
2004]     So. 2d      (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).  The trial court
then found that Borden was mentally retarded.  On return to
remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals again remanded the case
to the trial court for Borden to be sentenced to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  Borden v.
State, [Ms. CR-02-1314, January 7, 2005]     So. 2d     (Ala.
Crim. App. 2004) (opinion on return to remand).  The trial
court sentenced Borden to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.
On the return to the second remand, the Court of Criminal
Appeals in an unpublished memorandum issued on August 19,
2005, dismissed the remainder of Borden's Rule 32 claims.  We
granted certiorari review to address the following two issues:
(1) Whether, in its unpublished memorandum, the Court of
1050042
5
Criminal Appeals correctly held that Borden failed to comply
with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., and thereby waived his
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, and (2) whether the
Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that Borden failed to
preserve for appellate review his juror-misconduct claims.
Were Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claims Waived?
The trial court summarily dismissed Borden's Rule 32,
Ala. R. Crim. P., petition, which included his claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The Court of Criminal
Appeals concluded that Borden waived the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel on appeal by failing to comply with Rule
28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.  The Court of Criminal Appeals'
unpublished memorandum of August 19, 2005, states, in
pertinent part:
"In Part II(A) of his brief, Borden contends
that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing
his claim that trial counsel were ineffective at the
guilt and penalty phases of trial.  Because Borden
2
has been resentenced to life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole, his claims of ineffective
penalty-phase representation are moot.  His claims
of 
ineffective 
guilt-phase 
representation 
are waived
on appeal  because his argument does not comply with
the requirements of the Alabama Rules of Appellate
Procedure.   
"Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., requires the
argument section of an appellant's brief to set out
1050042
6
'the contentions of the appellant with respect to
the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with
citations to the cases, statutes, other authorities,
and parts of the record relied on.'  Borden's
argument consists of a single paragraph of general
propositions of law; a lengthy recitation of the
facts of his life and the facts of the offense; and
an eleven-page list of ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel allegations.  The list of claims is
unsupported by legal authority, and it is almost
entirely devoid of citations to the record.  
"'This 
type 
of 
"scattergun" 
approach 
to
appellate argument is forbidden by Rule 28(a)[(10)],
Ala. R. App. P.'  Hamm v. State, 913 So. 2d 460,
490-91 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002).  'Recitation of
allegations without citation to any legal authority
and without adequate recitation of the facts relied
upon has been deemed a waiver of the arguments
listed.'  Hamm, 913 So. 2d at 491, citing Gay v.
State, 562 So. 2d 283, 289 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).
'By failing to include any citation to the record on
this issue, [the appellant] has failed to comply
with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., and has waived
this claim for purposes of appellate review.'  Hart
v. State,  852 So. 2d 839, 848 (Ala. Crim. App.
2002).   
"In Part II(B) of his petition, Borden contends
that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing
his ineffective-counsel claim for the following
reasons: (1) His petition clearly exceeded the
specificity requirements of Rule 32.2(b), Ala. R.
Crim. P.; (2) the affidavits submitted by his
counsel created an issue of fact, and the court's
reliance on them to summarily dismiss his petition
was improper; (3) the court was wrong to refuse to
consider parts of his claim; (4) the court
improperly dismissed his claim without permitting
him to obtain discovery to prove the merits of his
claim; and (5) the trial court improperly adopted
1050042
7
the State's proposed order 'without scrutiny or
modification.'   
"The first four arguments fail to state a claim
for 
relief 
because 
they 
address 
the 
same
ineffective-counsel claims that are not properly
before this court for review.  This court is not
required to review arguments which fail to meet the
requirements of Rule 28(a).  Hallford v. State, 629
So. 2d 6 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).  Borden's fifth
argument must fail because this court does not find
error simply because the trial court has adopted an
order proposed by the State. 
"'While the practice of adopting a State's
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is
subject to criticism, the general rule is that even
when the court adopts findings and conclusions
verbatim, the findings are those of the court and
may be reversed only if clearly erroneous.'  Wood v.
State, 891 So. 2d 398, 420 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).
Here, the order of dismissal specifically stated
that '[t]he Court further has reviewed the record
and the supporting affidavits and finds that the
State's proposed order submitted herein accurately
reflects the findings and conclusions of the Court.'
The 
record 
fully 
supports 
the 
findings 
and
conclusions of the court.3
______________
" Issues I and II in Borden's Rule 32 petition.
2
" The court erred in finding one of Borden's
3
claims 
[ineffective 
counsel 
resulting 
from
inadequate compensation] procedurally barred under
Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (5), Ala. R. Crim. P. However,
the court properly found that this claim also was
barred under Rules 32.6(b) and 32.7(d). When the
circuit court's denial of a Rule 32 petition is
correct for any reason, it will be affirmed by this
1050042
8
court on appeal. Long v. State, 675 So. 2d 532 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1996)."
The purpose of Rule 28, Ala. R. App. P., outlining the
requirements for appellate briefs, is to conserve the time and
energy of the appellate court and to advise the opposing party
of the points he or she is obligated to make. United States v.
Levy, 391 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2004)(discussing the rule that
issues not briefed are waived and Rule 28, Fed. R. App. P.,
which sets out the requirements for appellate briefs in the
federal courts).  Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., provides
that the argument section of the appellant's brief shall set
out "the contentions of the appellant/petitioner with respect
to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with
citations to the cases, statutes, other authorities, and parts
of the record relied on."  Additionally, "'[i]t is not the
function of this Court to do a party's legal research or to
make and address legal arguments for a party based on
undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient
authority or argument.'" Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1,
20 (Ala. 2003)(quoting Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.
2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1994)).
1050042
9
Borden argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in
holding that his brief failed to comply with Rule 28(a)(10),
Ala. R. App. P.  Borden's brief to the Court of Criminal
Appeals 
regarding 
his 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claims
included 22 pages of facts addressing why the trial court
erred in summarily dismissing the ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims in his Rule 32 petition.   Borden's brief
included 11 pages of argument regarding ineffective assistance
of counsel, including some 25 citations to caselaw, along with
explanations and quotations from the cited cases. Although
another attorney may have treated the ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel argument differently, Borden's brief is sufficient
to apprise the Court of Criminal Appeals of Borden's
contentions with regard to his ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims.   Accordingly, Borden did not fail to comply
with the Rule 28(a)(10) and therefore did not waive his claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
We note that waiver of an argument for failure to comply
with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., has been limited to
those cases where there is no argument presented in the brief
and there are few, if any, citations to relevant legal
1050042
10
authority, resulting in an argument consisting of undelineated
general propositions.  See Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc.
v. Smith, [Ms. 1051115, March 9, 2007]     So. 2d     (Ala.
2007)(appellant's argument was insufficient to invoke review
of the allegedly excessive compensatory-damages award to
plaintiff/appellee in a personal-injury action where the
appellant's three-sentence argument cited only a single case
in support of a general proposition of law and offered no
discussion of the nature and extent of the plaintiff's
injuries); Davis v. Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc., [Ms. 1050478,
January 12, 2007]     So. 2d     (Ala. 2007)(appellant's lone
citation to a general principle of law without specific
relevance to her action against financial services company was
insufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 28(a)(10) to
cite relevant authority in support of arguments); Hall v.
Hall, 903 So. 2d  78 (Ala. 2004)(the appellant cited no
authority for the proposition that the checking account should
have been included as an asset of the estate and presented no
argument and cited no authority to support his conclusion that
the ore tenus rule did not require an affirmance on this
issue); and Ex parte Gonzalez, 686 So. 2d 204 (Ala.
1050042
At least three members of the Court of Criminal Appeals
1
have questioned the scope and application of Rule 28, Ala. R.
App. P.  L.J.K. v. State, 942 So. 2d 854, 869 and 871 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2005)(Shaw, J., concurring specially, and Baschab,
J., concurring in the result, with Cobb, J., joining). 
11
1996)(petitioner did not show a clear legal right to having
capital-murder indictment quashed on the ground that the
district attorney testified as a witness in front of the grand
jury when the petitioner cited only a federal district court
case 
that 
was 
not 
binding 
authority 
and 
that 
was
distinguishable).1
Were Borden's Juror-Misconduct Claims
Preserved for Appellate Review?
Borden alleged juror misconduct in his Rule 32 petition
filed on October 18, 2001. On August 21, 2002, Borden filed a
motion for leave to amend his Rule 32 petition, specifically
to add more details in support of his juror-misconduct claims.
The trial court did not rule on Borden's motion for leave to
amend his Rule 32 petition.  
On March 14, 2003, the trial court entered its final
order dismissing Borden's Rule 32 petition.  With regard to
Borden's juror-misconduct claims, the trial court stated:
"In his claim, Borden asserts error because, he
alleges, his 'right to a fair and impartial jury was
violated due to several jurors' failure to respond
1050042
12
truthfully to multiple questions on voir dire.'
(Borden's Rule 32 pet. pp. 76-77.)  The members of
the jury were dismissed from serving on the jury on
December 1, 1994, after recommending that Borden be
sentenced to death. (C.R. 4, R. 1175-1177.)  The
hearing on Borden's motion for a new trial was
conducted on, or about, June 22, 1995.  (SR. 2.)
Thus, Borden, or his counsel, had more than six
months to interview members of the jury to discover
whether anyone on the jury failed to respond
truthfully to any questions during voir dire.  As
such, Borden could have, but did not, raise this
claim at trial or on direct appeal.  This claim is,
therefore, summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule
32.7(d), A. R. Cr. P., because it is procedurally
barred.  Rule 32.2(a)(3), (5), A. R. Cr. P.
"....
"In his claim, Borden asserts error because, he
alleges, the jury considered extraneous evidence
during its deliberation.  (Borden's Rule 32 pet.,
pp. 77-78.)  The members of the jury were dismissed
from serving on the jury on December 1, 1994, after
recommending that Borden be sentenced to death.
(CR. 4, R. 1175-1177.)  The hearing on Borden's
motion for new trial was conducted on, or about,
June 22, 1995.  (SR. 2.)  Thus, Borden, or his
counsel, had more than six months to interview
members of the jury to discover whether anyone on
the jury considered extraneous evidence during
deliberations.  As such, Borden could have, but did
not, raise this claim at trial or on direct appeal.
This 
claim 
is, 
therefore, summarily dismissed
pursuant to Rule 32.7(d), A. R. Cr. P., because it
is procedurally barred.  Rule 32.2(a)(3), (5), A. R.
Cr. P."
The trial court did not address Borden's amended petition in
which he set out specific facts regarding the two claims of
1050042
13
juror misconduct.  On April 4, 2003, Borden filed a "motion
for reconsideration."  In that motion, Borden stated that the
trial court in its March 14, 2003, order failed to take into
account any of the facts alleged in his amended Rule 32
petition.  
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Borden had
failed to preserve the issue of juror misconduct for appellate
review.  That court's unpublished memorandum states:
"The appellant contends that he was denied his
right to a fair trial by virtue of several jurors'
failure to disclose information and the jury's
consideration of extraneous evidence.  He argues,
citing Ex parte Pierce, 851 So. 2d 606 (Ala. 2000),
and Ex parte Dobyne, 805 So. 2d 763 (Ala. 2001),
that the trial court erred in finding that these
claims were procedurally defaulted under Rule
32.2(a)(3) and (5), Ala. R. Crim. P.  
"In his original petition, Borden asserted that
'several' jurors failed to respond truthfully to
'multiple ... critical questions' during voir dire.4
He also asserted that unidentified 'extraneous
information' 
was 
introduced 
into 
the 
jury
deliberations.   In addition to pleading that these
5
claims were precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (5),
the State  specifically pleaded that the claims were
insufficient under Rule 32.6(b).  Rule 32.6(b), Ala.
R. Crim. P., provides:
   "'The petition must contain a clear and
specific statement of the grounds upon
which relief is sought, including full
disclosure of the factual basis of those
grounds.  A bare allegation that a
1050042
14
constitutional right has been violated and
mere conclusions of law shall not be
sufficient 
to 
warrant 
any 
further
proceedings.'  
"In his August 22, 2002, motion to amend his
petition, Borden attempted to add the necessary
factual basis for his juror-misconduct claims.
However, in its order dismissing Borden's petition,
the circuit court did not address the requested
amendments,  and Borden did not object to the court's
6
failure to rule.  Therefore, these matters are not
properly before this court on appeal.  Appellate
review is limited to rulings invoked on the trial
level.  Cross v. State,  536 So. 2d 155 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1988).  '[T]he trial court may not be put in
error in the absence of any attempt to invoke a
ruling of the court in the matters complained of.'
Bush v. State, 717 So. 2d 438, 441 (Ala. Crim. App.
1998)(citations omitted).
_______________
" Issue VII in the Rule 32 petition.
4
" Issue VIII in the Rule 32 petition.
5
" The State erroneously states in its appellate
6
brief that 'the trial court accepted Borden's
amendments to both of the other claims he sought to
amend.' The court's order of dismissal addresses the
two claims as they were set out in the original
petition, and it does not address Borden's requested
new claim."
It is well settled that an appellate court's review is
limited to matters seasonably raised in the trial court.  Ross
v. State, 581 So. 2d 495 (Ala. 1991).  "The trial court may
not be put in error for failure to rule on a matter which was
1050042
The Court of Criminal Appeals' unpublished memorandum
2
indicates that the trial court could have dismissed Borden's
15
not presented to it or decided by it."  City of Rainbow City
v. Ramsey, 417 So. 2d 172, 174 (Ala. 1982).  "[I]t is familiar
law that an adverse ruling below is a prerequisite to
appellate review.  We generally cannot consider arguments
raised for the first time on appeal."  CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Day, 613 So. 2d 883, 884 (Ala. 1993).  However, the Court of
Criminal Appeals' reliance on this well-settled principle is
misplaced in the present case; there is an adverse ruling from
the trial court regarding Borden's juror-misconduct claims. 
The trial court clearly ruled that both of Borden's
juror-misconduct claims were procedurally barred by Rule
32.2(a)(3) and (a)(5), Ala. R. Crim. P.  Rule 32(a)(3)
provides that a petitioner is precluded from postconviction
relief if the ground the petitioner asserts as a basis for
relief could have been, but was not, raised at trial, and Rule
32(a)(5) bars postconviction relief if the ground could have
been, but was not, raised on appeal.  Borden's brief to the
Court of Criminal Appeals addresses the trial court's
application of Rule 32(a)(3) and (a)(5) to his claims of juror
misconduct.   Accordingly, there is an adverse ruling
2
1050042
Rule 32 petition on the grounds of lack of specificity under
Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P.  However, the trial court did
not dismiss Borden's argument regarding juror misconduct for
lack of specificity.  Furthermore, there is a question as to
whether the State adequately asserted a lack of specificity.
16
regarding Borden's juror-misconduct claims for the Court of
Criminal Appeals to review.    
Further, the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding that
appellate review of Borden's juror-misconduct claims is barred
because Borden failed to obtain a ruling from the trial court
on his motion to amend his Rule 32 petition appears to
conflict with this Court's decision in Ex parte Rhone, 900 So.
2d 455 (Ala. 2004).  In Rhone, the defendant sought
postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P.,
from his capital-murder conviction and his sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  As grounds
for relief, the defendant alleged that he had been denied the
effective assistance of counsel in several respects at trial
and on appeal.  He subsequently filed a motion to amend his
Rule 32 petition.  The amended petition presented 10
additional grounds to support his ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims.  The trial court entered no ruling on the
defendant's motion to amend.  The State filed a response,
1050042
17
addressing only the allegations asserted in the original
petition.  The trial court entered a written order denying the
petition; that order did not address the claims asserted in
the proposed amendment.  The Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial
court had not exceeded its discretion  in failing to address
the claims in the defendant's amended petition because, it
reasoned, the defendant "failed to meet his initial burden of
showing diligence in filing the amendment or that the facts
underlying the amendment were unknown to him before filing his
original petition."  Rhone v. State, 900 So. 2d 443, 448 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2004). 
This Court in Ex parte Rhone held that the Court of
Criminal Appeals had erred in imposing upon a Rule 32
petitioner an initial burden to show that he had been diligent
in filing an amendment or that the facts underlying the
amendment were unknown when the original petition was filed.
The defendant is entitled to amend his petition for
postconviction 
relief 
to 
assert 
additional 
claims 
of
ineffective assistance of counsel when the amendment is
necessary for a full determination on the merits and there
1050042
18
would be no undue delay in the hearing because of the
amendment or undue prejudice to the State by the filing of the
amendment.  In the present case, the Court of Criminal
Appeals' unpublished memorandum places a burden on Borden to
secure a ruling on his proposed amendment to his Rule 32
petition when the amendment should be freely allowed if it is
necessary for a full determination on the merits and if the
amendment does not unduly prejudice the opposing party or
unduly delay the hearing.
Conclusion
       
We conclude that Borden did not fail to comply with Rule
28(a)(10) Ala. R. App. P., and, thus, that he did not waive
his 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claims. 
We 
also 
conclude
that Borden's juror-misconduct claims were preserved for
appellate review.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to that court
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, and Murdock, JJ.,
concur.
Parker, J., concurs in the result.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.