Title: Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11562
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 5, 2014

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11562 
 
JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 68549  vs.  SEX 
OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 3, 2014. - November 5, 2014. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Administrative Law, Substantial 
evidence, Regulations.  Evidence, Sex offender, Expert 
opinion.  Practice, Civil, Sex offender.  Witness, Expert. 
Regulation.  Minor. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
June 15, 2010.  
 
 
The case was heard by Robert C. Cosgrove, J., on a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Francis J. DiMento (Dana Alan Curhan with him) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Jennifer K. Zalnasky for the defendant. 
 
Eric Tennen, for Youth Advocacy Division of the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
2 
 
 
Robert E. McDonnell, Jeff Goldman, Nathaniel P. Bruhn, & 
Saia M. Smith, for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of 
Massachusetts & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
LENK, J.  Over a three-year period ending in 1988, when he 
was sixteen years old, John Doe No. 68549 repeatedly subjected 
two of his cousins to sexual assaults, including rape.  His 
victims came forward many years after the fact and, in October, 
2003, when Doe was thirty-one years old, he pleaded guilty to a 
number of sex offenses committed when he was a juvenile.  
 
In March, 2006, a hearing examiner of the Sex Offender 
Registry Board (SORB) determined that Doe posed a moderate risk 
of reoffense and a moderate degree of dangerousness, and 
classified Doe as a level two sex offender.  A Superior Court 
judge, determining that this classification was not supported by 
substantial evidence, remanded for further proceedings.  In May, 
2010, a successor hearing examiner (successor examiner) 
concluded that Doe poses a low risk of reoffense and a low 
degree of dangerousness.  Doe was therefore classified as a 
level one sex offender, a classification that was upheld by a 
different judge of the Superior Court.  Doe appealed, and we 
granted his application for direct appellate review. 
 
Doe contends that he should not be required to register as 
a sex offender.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (a)-(d).  He argues 
that, in light of scientific research showing that adolescent 
3 
 
brains are different from adult brains, and in light of the long 
period of time that has elapsed since his last offense, the 
successor examiner's decision was not supported by substantial 
evidence.  Doe contends also that the regulations enacted and 
applied by SORB are outmoded, in that they predate recent 
studies concerning adolescent brains and adolescent behavior.  
 
We conclude that, although Doe presented considerable 
information suggesting that he is no longer dangerous, the 
successor examiner took this information into account and 
reached a decision that was supported by substantial evidence in 
determining that Doe should be classified as a level one sex 
offender.  We therefore conclude that there was no error in the 
successor examiner's classification of Doe as a level one sex 
offender, and affirm the Superior Court judge's decision 
upholding the successor examiner's classification determination.  
We emphasize, however, as we have done previously, that it is 
incumbent upon SORB to update its guidelines at reasonable 
intervals in order to take proper account of current scientific 
knowledge.1 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Youth 
Advocacy Division of Committee for Public Counsel Services, the 
Children's Law Center of Massachusetts, and Citizens for 
Juvenile Justice; and by the American Civil Liberties Union 
Foundation of Massachusetts and Citizens for Juvenile Justice in 
support of John Doe. 
 
4 
 
 
1.  Statutory framework.  In prior cases, we described in 
detail the tapestry of statutes and regulations that governs the 
registration requirement imposed on sex offenders.  See, e.g., 
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 594, 595-597 (2013) (Doe No. 205614); 
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 614-615 (2010) (Doe No. 151564); 
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3844 v. Sex Offender Registry 
Bd., 447 Mass. 768, 768-772 (2006) (Doe No. 3844).  Here we 
reprise the essential elements of that scheme. 
 
An individual is a "sex offender" if he or she has been 
convicted of one or more statutorily enumerated offenses.  G. L. 
c. 6, § 178C.  Sex offenders are classified into levels of 
dangerousness, increasing in severity from level one to level 
three.  Each level is attended by different implications.  
Although SORB transmits information about all sex offenders to 
specific authorities, information about level one offenders is 
not available to the general public.  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (2) (a).  Information about level two and level three 
offenders is entered into a publicly accessible Internet 
database.  G. L. c. 6, § 178D.  See Moe v. Sex Offender Registry 
Bd., 467 Mass. 598, 600-606, 616 (2014) (declaring 
unconstitutional the retroactive application of this provision 
to individuals classified as level two sex offenders on or 
5 
 
before July 12, 2013).  In addition, SORB and local police 
departments "actively disseminate" information about level three 
offenders to individuals and organizations who are likely to 
encounter those offenders.  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (c). 
 
SORB is required to consider a list of statutory factors in 
making its classification determinations.  See G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (1) (a)-(l).  This list is not exhaustive, however, and 
SORB also must take into account any other information that is 
"useful in assessing the risk of reoffense and the degree of 
dangerousness posed to the public by the sex offender," 
including information of this kind introduced by the offender.  
G. L. c. 6, § 178L (1).  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 
10216 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 779, 787 (2006) 
(Doe No. 10216), citing Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 1211 
v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 750, 762 n.9 (2006) (Doe 
No. 1211); 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.38(2) (2013). 
 
As mandated by statute, SORB has promulgated "guidelines 
for determining the level of risk of reoffense and the degree of 
dangerousness posed to the public or for relief from the 
obligation to register."  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1).  These 
guidelines describe the manner in which SORB is to apply twenty-
four factors increasing or decreasing risk, which are derived 
from the factors enumerated in the statute.  See 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.40 (2013) (guidelines).  The guidelines require SORB 
6 
 
to be guided by the "definitions, explanations, principles, and 
authorities" contained in the guidelines.  See id.  We have read 
the term "authorities" to encompass studies conducted by 
researchers whose work is cited in the guidelines.  See Doe No. 
205614, 466 Mass. at 604; Doe No. 151564, 456 Mass. at 622. 
 
"The registration and classification process is, 
essentially, a two stage process."  803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.38(3) (2013).  First, SORB makes an initial "recommendation" 
concerning an offender's classification level.  Id.  See G. L. 
c. 6, § 178L (1) (a).  The offender may then object to SORB's 
recommendation, in which case he or she "is provided an 
individualized hearing . . . at which all relevant evidence is 
evaluated anew by a disinterested Hearing Examiner."  803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.38(4) (2013).  See Doe No. 3844, 447 Mass. at 
772; G. L. c. 6, § 178L (1), (2).  At this hearing, SORB bears 
the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the offender has a duty to register, and what the 
offender's classification should be.  803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.10(1) (2013). 
 
SORB "may . . . relieve [a] sex offender of any further 
obligation to register" if the offender establishes that "the 
circumstances of the offense in conjunction with the offender's 
criminal history do not indicate a risk of reoffense or a danger 
to the public."  G. L. c. § 178K (2) (d).  The decision as to 
7 
 
whether this provision should be applied must take into account 
"factors, including but not limited to, the presence or absence 
of any physical harm caused by the offense and whether the 
offense involved consensual conduct between adults."  Id. 
 
We have emphasized that the sex offender registration 
requirement "implicates constitutionally protected liberty and 
privacy interests."  See Doe No. 205614, 466 Mass. at 596, 
citing Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. 136, 144 (1997).  
Accordingly, "careful and individualized due process is 
necessary to sort sexual predators likely to repeat their crimes 
from large numbers of offenders who pose no danger to the 
public."  Doe No. 205614, supra, citing Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 972 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 428 Mass. 90, 
105 (1998) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 
2.  Facts.  We recite the facts found by the successor 
examiner.  These facts were relied upon by the Superior Court 
judge, and Doe does not dispute them.  
 
Doe's cousins, a boy and a girl, emigrated from Ireland to 
the United States with their family.  The cousins' family was, 
at first, dependent on Doe's family.  During the years from 1986 
through 1988, Doe, then a teenager, engaged in repeated sexual 
assaults against his male cousin and in one sexual assault 
against his female cousin.  At the end of this period, Doe and 
8 
 
the female cousin were sixteen years old.  The male cousin was 
two years younger.  
 
Doe's assaults against the male cousin, which began when 
the cousin was eleven years old, escalated in violence over 
time, from masturbation to digital and then penile rape.  Doe's 
assault against his female cousin occurred when they were both 
sixteen years old.  On that occasion, the female cousin was 
swimming in Doe's family's swimming pool, when Doe swam over and 
raped her digitally.2   
 
Doe's cousins first disclosed the sexual assaults in 2000, 
twelve years after the assaults had ceased.  The cousins 
explained that they had been afraid to complain earlier because 
of their parents' dependency on Doe's family, and because Doe 
had threatened that he would cause their family to be deported 
if they complained.  Doe initially told police that he had 
engaged only in consensual acts with his male cousin.  In 
October, 2003, however, he pleaded guilty to five counts of rape 
of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 22A; five counts of rape and abuse 
of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 23; and two counts of rape, G. L. 
c. 265, § 22 (b).   
                     
 
2 As discussed infra, evidence of a sexual assault by Doe on 
another female victim was excluded by the successor hearing 
examiner in the more recent Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) 
proceedings.  In addition, the successor examiner made no 
findings concerning other sexual assaults reported to police by 
Doe's female cousin. 
 
9 
 
 
3.  Classification proceedings.  On March 1, 2005, SORB 
notified Doe that it was recommending that he be classified as a 
level two sex offender.  Doe objected to this classification, 
and his matter was considered de novo by a SORB hearing examiner 
(original examiner).  The original examiner held a hearing and 
heard testimony from two experts proffered by Doe, Dr. Bernard 
Katz and Dr. Barbara K. Schwartz.  He also received from Doe an 
expert report of Dr. Joseph J. Plaud.  On March 17, 2006, the 
original examiner ordered, as SORB had recommended, that Doe 
register as a level two offender.   
 
Doe sought judicial review in the Superior Court.  A 
Superior Court judge determined that the original examiner's 
classification decision was not supported by substantial 
evidence.  He therefore entered judgment on the pleadings in 
Doe's favor, and remanded the matter to SORB.   
 
On remand, two additional hearings were conducted by the 
successor examiner.  The successor examiner took additional 
evidence, including an updated report and oral testimony from 
Schwartz, one of Doe's expert witnesses.  The successor examiner 
made new, independent rulings and factual findings.  Among other 
things, he excluded from the record a police report, which the 
original examiner had considered, describing a complaint against 
Doe by another woman, unrelated to Doe.   
10 
 
 
The successor examiner noted that Doe had been "a juvenile" 
and "an adolescent" when he committed his offenses.  The 
examiner accepted the opinion of another of Doe's experts, Katz, 
that at the time of the offenses, Doe was "an unhappy, 
overweight and maladjusted teenager."  In his decision, the 
successor examiner also considered as risk reducing the facts 
that Doe had not committed his offenses against strangers; had 
not reoffended since 1988; had enjoyed success in high school, 
in college, and in his work at a car dealership; was in a 
romantic relationship with an age-appropriate woman; had not 
abused alcohol in recent years; and had participated 
successfully in sex offender treatment.  The successor examiner 
noted also that the experts proffered by Doe opined that the 
risk he presented was "extremely low" or none.  In view of these 
facts, the successor examiner determined that Doe "has made 
substantial progress towards 'no risk' status."   
 
On the other hand, the successor examiner found that Doe's 
sex offenses, which included "high contact" acts that had 
escalated "over a three-year period," had been "repetitive and 
compulsive."  The successor examiner determined that there had 
been "a disparity between [Doe] and his [v]ictims as regards 
age, size, strength, economic status, and citizenship"; that Doe 
had been "controlling" and "hostile"; and that Doe had 
"victimized his male cousin in an escalating, repetitive and 
11 
 
predatory pattern."  In addition, the successor examiner noted 
that when, as a twenty-eight year old, Doe was confronted by his 
aunt about his actions, he "wondered . . . how many times he 
needed to apologize" and then "told his aunt, 'I never liked you 
or your family.  You're weak and you're stupid.  As a matter of 
fact, that made it all the more enjoyable.'"  The successor 
examiner concluded that Doe presents "cognizable low risk of 
reoffense and a low degree of dangerousness," and ordered Doe to 
register as a level one sex offender.   
 
Doe again sought judicial review.  This time, a different 
Superior Court judge affirmed the classification determination, 
stating that "[a]lthough . . . if considering the matter de 
novo, [the judge] might place more weight on the factors 
emphasized by Doe," the successor examiner's decision 
nevertheless was supported by substantial evidence.  
 
4.  Standard of review.  SORB's final classification of a 
sex offender is subject to judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 14.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178M.3  This review is "confined to the 
record, except that in cases of alleged irregularities in 
                     
 
3 Our inquiry on appeal is similar to the inquiry conducted 
by a Superior Court judge in an action for judicial review of 
SORB's decision.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 
v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 594, 601-602 (2013); 
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 614-615 (2010). 
 
12 
 
procedure before the agency, not shown in the record, testimony 
thereon may be taken in the court."  G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (5). 
 
A reviewing court will not disturb SORB's decision unless 
that decision was (a) in violation of constitutional provisions; 
(b) in excess of SORB's authority; (c) based upon an error of 
law; (d) made upon unlawful procedure; (e) unsupported by 
substantial evidence; (f) unwarranted by facts found by the 
court, where the court is constitutionally required to make 
independent findings of fact; or (g) arbitrary or capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.  
G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).  See Doe No. 151564, 456 Mass. at 614-
615.  The court must "give due weight to [SORB's] experience, 
technical competence, and specialized knowledge . . . as well as 
to the discretionary authority conferred upon it."  G. L. 
c. 30A, § 14 (7).  In addition, SORB's guidelines "must be 
accorded all the deference due to a statute."  Doe No. 205614, 
466 Mass. at 602, quoting Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers, AFT, 
AFL-CIO v. Board of Educ., 436 Mass. 763, 771 (2002). 
 
5.  Analysis.  a.  Substantial evidence of Doe's 
dangerousness.  Doe's primary argument is that the successor 
examiner's decision to classify him as a level one sex offender 
was not supported by substantial evidence, particularly since 
"the offenses he committed occurred while he was a juvenile more 
13 
 
than twenty years ago."  In the circumstances, this argument is 
unavailing. 
 
A decision of a SORB hearing examiner will not be upheld if 
it is "[u]nsupported by substantial evidence."  G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 14 (7) (e).  See Doe No. 10216, 447 Mass. at 787, citing Flint 
v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 412 Mass. 416, 420 (1992).  
"Substantial evidence" is "such evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."  G. L. 
c. 30A, § 1 (6).  A decision does not satisfy the "substantial 
evidence" requirement if "the evidence points to no felt or 
appreciable probability of the conclusion or points to an 
overwhelming probability of the contrary."  Cobble v. 
Commissioner of Dep't of Social Servs., 430 Mass. 385, 390-391, 
(1999), quoting New Boston Garden Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, 
383 Mass. 456, 466 (1981).  Any evidence may be considered and 
relied upon by the examiner "if it is the kind of evidence on 
which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct 
of serious affairs."  G. L. c. 30A, § 11 (2). 
 
A classification decision should not be based solely on the 
fact that an offender's underlying crime was sexual in nature.  
See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 24341 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 74 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 387 (2009), citing Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 
Mass. 780, 787, 790 (2008) (Doe No. 8725).  A hearing examiner 
14 
 
has discretion, however, to consider which statutory and 
regulatory factors are applicable and how much weight to ascribe 
to each factor, and, as stated, a reviewing court is required to 
"give due weight to [the examiner's] experience, technical 
competence, and specialized knowledge."  G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).  
See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 633 (2011) (Doe No. 10800), citing 
Smith v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 65 Mass. App. Ct. 803, 812-
813 (2006).  Accordingly, "[o]ur review does not turn on 
whether, faced with the same set of facts, we would have drawn 
the same conclusion as an agency or local board, but only 
'whether a contrary conclusion is not merely a possible but a 
necessary inference.'"  Goldberg v. Board of Health of Granby, 
444 Mass. 627, 638 (2005), quoting Commissioner of Revenue v. 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 423 Mass. 42, 43 (1996). 
 
As noted, the successor examiner took account of various 
factors that tended to alleviate the concern that Doe will 
reoffend.  He considered, among other things, Doe's age at the 
time of the offenses; the fact that Doe knew his victims; Doe's 
subsequent educational, professional, and personal successes; 
and his completion of sex offender treatment.  The successor 
examiner also considered, as required by the guidelines, "the 
length of time [that Doe] has had access to the community 
without committing any new offenses," see 803 Code Mass. 
15 
 
Regs. § 1.40(9)(a), finding that, "since 1988, [Doe] has not 
reoffended."  Cf. Doe No. 8725, 450 Mass. at 790. 
 
Nonetheless, the successor examiner's ruling was supported 
by evidence concerning multiple factors that did tend to 
indicate Doe's dangerousness.  Much of this evidence is set 
forth above, including the repetitive, protracted, escalating, 
and "high contact" nature of Doe's offenses.  These are factors 
that, according to the guidelines, the successor examiner was 
required to consider.  The guidelines state that offenders who 
"manifest their compulsive behavior by engaging in a continuing 
course of sexual misconduct involving separate incidents . . . 
present[] a greater risk to reoffend and . . . pos[e] an 
increased degree of dangerousness."  803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.40(2).  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1) (a) (ii).  "[T]he level 
of physical contact between the offender and the victim during 
the sex offense is another important element to be considered in 
understanding the nature of the offense and in determining a 
level of dangerousness."  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40(9)(c)(7).  
Finally, "SORB also considers the length or duration of the sex 
offending behavior as important and useful information in 
determining dangerousness."  803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.40(9)(c)(8).  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1) (b) (iii) 
(mandating consideration of "the number, date and nature of 
prior offenses"). 
16 
 
 
The successor examiner also noted the following facts as 
indications, under the guidelines, of an increased risk of 
reoffense and degree of dangerousness:  that Doe offended 
against both a male victim and a female victim, see 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.40(9)(c)(2), (9)(c)(11); that his victims were 
children, see 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40(9)(c)(12); that he 
engaged in a variety of different offending behaviors, see 803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40(9)(c)(10); that he has, in the past, had 
difficulties with substance abuse, see 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.40(16) and G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1) (g); and that, as 
evidenced by his remarks to his aunt twelve years after the 
offenses, Doe's acceptance of responsibility has been less than 
complete.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40(9)(c)(13).   
 
In sum, in the context of the record as a whole, the 
successor examiner's ruling was based on evidence that "a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion" that Doe poses a low risk of reoffense and a low 
degree of dangerousness.  G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (6).  Cf. Doe No. 
10800, 459 Mass. at 637. 
 
b.  Other issues concerning Doe's classification.  We have 
noted previously that, in some cases, a SORB hearing examiner 
"might greatly benefit from testimony or a report by an 
appropriately trained and qualified mental health professional."  
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 89230 v. Sex Offender 
17 
 
Registry Bd., 452 Mass. 764, 776 (2008).  See Doe No. 151564, 
456 Mass. at 623-624.  Expert testimony is likely to be 
particularly valuable where a substantial period of time "has 
elapsed since the guidelines were last revised," and where 
significant, relevant research has been conducted in the 
intervening period.  See Doe No. 205614, 466 Mass. at 609. 
 
In this case, the hearing examiner heard evidence 
concerning Doe's degree of dangerousness from three experts.  
One of these experts, Schwartz, presented an updated report and 
updated testimony on remand.  The successor examiner considered 
this evidence and, in large part, found it cogent.  For 
instance, he was persuaded by Katz's opinion that "the sex 
offenses were causally related to the fact that during the 
offending era, [Doe] was an overweight, teased and maladjusted 
adolescent."4   
 
Ultimately, the successor examiner did not adopt the 
position advocated by Doe's experts, namely that Doe's risk of 
                     
 
4 The successor examiner concluded, however, that Doe's 
difficulties as an adolescent were not "the exclusive cause of 
the offending behavior."  In support of this conclusion, the 
successor examiner noted that Doe "not only sexually offended 
while a younger adolescent at [thirteen] but continued to do so 
when he was just four months shy of [seventeen]; did so in an 
escalating rather than diminishing fashion as regards level of 
contact; graduated from [a Catholic high school] as reflects 
some measure of positive adjustment, self control and social 
adaptation in that environment; and [had a] relationship with 
his parents [that] appears by the record to not have been 
unusual or extreme." 
 
18 
 
reoffense and his degree of dangerousness were less than "low."  
The successor examiner's decision on this score was not 
erroneous.  SORB is "not statutorily required to present expert 
testimony in support of its position before the examiner," Doe 
No. 10216, 447 Mass. at 786, and "[t]he opinion of a witness 
testifying on behalf of a sex offender need not be accepted by 
the hearing examiner even where the board does not present any 
contrary expert testimony."  Doe No. 10800, 459 Mass. at 637, 
citing Doe No. 1211, 447 Mass. at 764.  The successor examiner's 
reasons for reaching a conclusion not shared by Doe's experts 
were, as described above, supported by the evidence before him. 
 
We have held also that a SORB classification decision will 
be deemed "[a]rbitrary or capricious," G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 14 (7) (g), if it fails to take into account reliable evidence 
that a factor relevant to a given offender affects the 
likelihood that the offender will recidivate.  For instance, Doe 
No. 151564 involved an offender who was sixty-one years old at 
the time of the hearing and where "[t]here was substantial 
evidence presented at the hearing concerning the effect of age 
on recidivism."  456 Mass. at 622.  The SORB hearing examiner 
declined to take this evidence into account, reasoning that "age 
is not considered as a factor in [the guidelines]."  Id.  We 
concluded that the examiner's decision was arbitrary and 
capricious, noting that the studies submitted by the offender in 
19 
 
that case were "written by many of the same authorities on whom 
the board relies in its [guidelines]."  Id.  Similarly, in Doe 
No. 205614, the offender, a woman, presented "current, validated 
evidence demonstrating the relevance of gender in assessing the 
risk of reoffense."  466 Mass. at 607.  Two hearing examiners 
disregarded this evidence, and we held their decisions, too, to 
be arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 608. 
 
Doe argues that the successor examiner in his case also 
ignored, in essence, a scientifically relevant factor, namely, 
that Doe was an adolescent when he committed his offenses.  Doe 
cites recent scientific studies that, he asserts, establish that 
teenagers are more limited than adults in the soundness of their 
judgment in complex situations, in their capacity to control 
impulses, and in their ability to plan effectively.  These 
limitations are due, in part, to organic differences between 
adult brains and adolescent brains.   
 
Although the studies now cited by Doe were referred to 
briefly, and in general terms, in Schwartz's April, 2009, 
report, these studies were not relied upon or offered into 
evidence before SORB.  Because our review is "confined to the 
record," the successor examiner's failure to address evidence 
that was not presented to him would not be grounds for 
disturbing his decision.  G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (5).  See Doe No. 
20 
 
205614, 466 Mass. at 608 n.11, citing Commonwealth v. Vega, 449 
Mass. 227, 234 (2007). 
 
Nonetheless, it would not have been proper for the 
successor examiner to disregard the fact that Doe was a youth 
when he offended, because the applicable statute and the 
guidelines require that this fact be considered.  General Laws 
c. 6, § 178K (1) (e), provides that one of the "[f]actors 
relevant to the risk of reoffense" is "whether the sex offender 
was a juvenile when he committed the offense."  The guidelines, 
in turn, cite research pointing to "numerous differences between 
[juvenile offenders] and their adult counterparts."  803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.40(14).  Accordingly, the guidelines specify 
whether each of the factors enumerated in them applies in whole, 
in part, or not at all to a "[j]uvenile [o]ffender," namely "any 
sex offender who was younger than [seventeen] years old at the 
time he [or she] committed all of his or her sex offenses."  803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.39(4) (2013).  See, e.g., 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.40(1) ("[m]ental [a]bnormality" factor does not apply 
to juvenile offenders); 1.40(6) (same for maximum term of 
incarceration); 1.40(9)(c)(6) (same for convictions of nonsexual 
violent offenses); 1.40(3) ("[c]hild [v]ictim" factor applies 
differently to adults and to juveniles); 1.40(7) (same for 
relationship between offender and victim). 
21 
 
 
As noted, the successor examiner took into consideration 
Doe's young age at the time of his offenses.  Implicitly, he did 
so by applying only those factors that, according to the 
guidelines, appropriately are considered with regard to juvenile 
offenders.  The successor examiner also specifically applied the 
factor concerning an offender's relationship with his victim(s) 
in the manner that the guidelines deem appropriate for juvenile 
offenders.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40(7).  More 
explicitly, the successor examiner made repeated references to 
the fact that Doe was an "adolescent" and a "juvenile" at the 
time of his offenses, and rested one of his evidentiary rulings 
on his "appreciation of the fact that [Doe] was a juvenile at 
the time he committed the sex offenses."  We do not conclude, 
therefore, that the successor examiner failed to take into 
account the mandatory consideration that Doe committed his 
offenses at a young age.5 
 
c.  Validity of the guidelines.  Doe asserts that the 
factors and presumptions incorporated in the guidelines are "out 
of date," in that they were developed prior to recent studies 
concerning the differences between adolescents and adults.6  In 
                     
 
5 As explained, the successor examiner also did not ignore 
the fact that many years had passed since Doe last offended. 
 
 
6 The amici curiae present additional information concerning 
current research into the development of the adolescent brain.  
They also provide information about the deleterious effects that 
22 
 
none of the proceedings below did Doe argue that these 
scientific developments render the guidelines invalid.  Nor 
would such a request have been proper at the current juncture.  
A challenge to the validity of a general regulation "cannot be 
resolved by requesting declaratory relief in an appeal from an 
administrative agency decision because judicial review is 
confined to the administrative record."  Doe No. 10800, 459 
Mass. at 630, citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (5).  See Doe No. 
205614, 466 Mass. at 608 n.11.  We nevertheless make the 
following observations concerning the effect of the passage of 
time on the guidelines' validity. 
 
As noted, the guidelines "must be accorded all the 
deference due to a statute" (citation omitted).  Doe No. 205614, 
466 Mass. at 602.  "A party challenging the validity of a 
regulation must prove in a judicial proceeding 'that the 
regulation is illegal, arbitrary, or capricious.'"  Doe No. 
10800, 459 Mass. at 629, quoting Borden, Inc. v. Commissioner of 
Pub. Health, 388 Mass. 707, 722, cert. denied sub nom. 
Formaldehyde Inst., Inc. v. Frechette, 464 U.S. 936 (1983).  We 
have cautioned that "guidelines that fail to heed growing 
scientific consensus in an area may undercut the individualized 
nature of the hearing to which a sex offender is entitled, an 
                                                                  
the registration requirement can have on the lives of adolescent 
offenders. 
 
23 
 
important due process right."  Doe No. 205614, supra at 608, 
citing Doe No. 10800, supra at 626.  See Doe No. 151564, 456 
Mass. at 623 n.6. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has described "three 
significant gaps between juveniles and adults," namely: 
 
"First, children have a '"lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility,"' leading to 
recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. . . . 
Second, children 'are more vulnerable . . . to negative 
influences and outside pressures,' including from their 
family and peers; they have limited 'contro[l] over their 
own environment' and lack the ability to extricate 
themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. . . . 
And third, a child's character is not as 'well formed' as 
an adult's; his traits are 'less fixed' and his actions 
less likely to be 'evidence of irretrievabl[e] 
deprav[ity].'"  
 
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012), quoting Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569, 570 (2005).  The Court explained 
that its view of juvenile behavior rests 
 
"not only on common sense -- on what 'any parent 
knows' -- but on science and social science as well. . . .  
In Roper, we cited studies showing that '"[o]nly a 
relatively small proportion of adolescents"' who engage in 
illegal activity '"develop entrenched patterns of problem 
behavior."' . . .  And in Graham [v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 
68 (2010)], we noted that 'developments in psychology and 
brain science continue to show fundamental differences 
between juvenile and adult minds' -- for example, in 'parts 
of the brain involved in behavior control.'" 
 
Miller, supra, quoting Roper, supra at 569, 570. 
 
The guidelines do not ignore the importance of the 
distinctions, discussed in Miller, between adult and juvenile 
offenders.  Rather, as explained, the guidelines delineate in 
24 
 
some detail the different ways in which they are to be applied 
to adults and to juveniles.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (1) (e); 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40(1), (3), (6), (7), 
(9)(c)(6), (14).  
 
A question nevertheless remains, which cannot be answered 
on the record before us, whether the manner in which the 
guidelines differentiate between adults and juveniles is sound 
in view of current scientific research.  "SORB need not update 
its guidelines every time a new study is published," Doe No. 
205614, 466 Mass. at 605, but "[w]here, as here, scientific 
knowledge in a field is rapidly evolving, . . . the applicable 
standards may require more frequent modification in order to 
reflect accurately the current state of knowledge" (citation 
omitted).  Doe No. 151564, 456 Mass. at 623 n.6, citing 
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 27 (1994).  Given that 
the most recent studies cited in the guidelines were published 
in 2001, there is reason for some concern as to whether the 
guidelines continue to reflect accurately the current state of 
scientific knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.