Title: Errol Austin Rollman v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC03-1871
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 18, 2004

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida 
____________ 
No. SC03-1871 
____________ 
ERROL AUSTIN ROLLMAN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
[October 21, 2004] 
PER CURIAM. 
We have for review a decision of a district court of appeal on the following 
questions, which the court certified to be of great public importance: 
WHERE A TRIAL COURT ANNOUNCES THE MOST SEVERE 
SENTENCE THAT WILL BE IMPOSED IN THE EVENT OF A 
PLEA, MAY THE TRIAL COURT THEREAFTER, ONCE THE 
PLEA HAS BEEN ACCEPTED, PRONOUNCE A MORE SEVERE 
SENTENCE WITHOUT ANY STATED REASON OR ANY 
REASON APPARENT FROM THE RECORD?  IF SO, MUST THE 
TRIAL COURT AFFIRMATIVELY OFFER THE DEFENDANT 
AN OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA? 
 
 
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Rollman v. State, 855 So. 2d 239, 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  We answer both questions in the affirmative. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Errol Austin Rollman was charged with committing robbery with a firearm.  
See Rollman v. State, 855 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).  At a June 12, 2002, 
hearing, the trial judge announced to Rollman that if a plea of nolo contendere 
were entered, he would be sentenced to no greater than ten years in prison.  See id.  
Some two months later, on August 14, 2002, the same sentencing judge 
pronounced Rollman's sentence, which imposed ten years in prison, ten years of 
probation, and the payment of restitution and court costs.  See id. at 240.  At that 
time, Rollman's attorney moved to vacate the imposition of probation and to reduce 
the restitution to a civil judgment.  See id. at 240 n.4.  Rollman's attorney argued 
that the imposition of probation, restitution and court costs exceeded the sentence 
originally promised by the trial court; however, Rollman did not seek to withdraw 
his plea.  The trial court denied Rollman's motion.  See id. 
Rollman appealed his sentence to the First District Court of Appeal.  The 
district court affirmed Rollman's sentence in light of this Court's decision in Davis 
v. State, 308 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1975), and certified the questions presently before this 
Court. 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
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Rollman urges this Court to conclude that the terms of the sentence he 
actually received, in particular, the ten-year probationary sentence, were improper 
because the trial court's earlier statements appeared to cap his sentence at ten years 
of incarceration.1  As noted above, the First District concluded that pursuant to this 
Court's decision in Davis v. State, the defendant was not entitled to specific 
performance of the alleged June agreement, but was limited to withdrawing his 
plea. 
In Davis, defendant Vikki Davis was charged with two drug-related felonies.  
See Davis, 308 So. 2d at 28.  Davis entered into plea discussions with the trial 
court.  See id.  Davis and the court reached an agreement that she would be placed 
on probation and serve a maximum of one year in jail; the agreement also specified 
that Davis's adjudication would be withheld.  See id.  However, while the 
presentence investigation was pending, Davis was arrested for possession of 
marijuana.  See id.  Taking all factors into consideration, the trial judge adjudicated 
her guilty of the sale of narcotics, placed her on probation for seven years, and 
sentenced her to one year in jail.  See id. 
On appeal, Davis challenged her sentence on the grounds that the 
adjudication violated the terms of the plea bargain, and she sought specific 
performance of the terms of the plea bargain.  See id.  Her argument was rejected 
                                        
1.  Rollman actually does not want to withdraw his plea; the sole remedy he 
seeks is specific performance of the terms of the original plea agreement.  
 
 
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by the district court, and subsequently by this Court.  In approving the district 
court's decision, this Court explained:
 
[W]hen a judge who has participated in or tentatively approved a plea 
bargain decides not to include the concessions contemplated therein in 
his final disposition of the case and affirmatively offers the defendant 
the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, may the defendant refuse 
to withdraw his plea on the ground that the plea bargain is a 
specifically enforceable contract?  We think not.  It is our view that, 
even if the trial judge's indication of leniency is the only inducement a 
defendant has in pleading guilty, the court is not bound by it. 
Davis, 308 So. 2d at 29.  We continue to agree that a trial court retains the 
authority to alter a prior plea arrangement up until the time sentence is imposed, so 
long as the trial court provides the defendant an opportunity to withdraw any plea 
that was entered in reliance on the promised sentence.  It does not matter whether 
the judge simply changed his mind, or whether there was a misunderstanding. 
Although we conclude that specific performance is not available, we do 
conclude that as in Davis, the trial court was required to affirmatively offer 
Rollman an opportunity to withdraw his plea.  Because Rollman was not afforded 
this opportunity, it will still be available to him when this case returns to the trial 
court.  By providing Rollman this opportunity, he will be placed in the same 
position he was in before he entered his plea.  Hence, Rollman has not 
demonstrated that he has suffered any prejudice that cannot be undone by simply 
allowing him to withdraw his plea.  This conclusion is also consistent with Davis, 
where we said:
 
 
 
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If for any reason the plea bargain is not carried out, the defendant has 
two alternatives: (1) he may withdraw his plea and proceed to a 
disposition of the matter without any of his admissions, statements, or 
other evidence given in the plea negotiations being used against him; 
or (2) he may agree to proceed with the guilty plea without being 
bound by any conditions or agreements.  The result is that, if the trial 
judge decides not to fulfill the tentative plea agreement, the case is 
returned to the position it was in prior to the plea negotiations, thereby 
imposing no unfair disadvantage on a defendant. 
Davis, 308 So. 2d at 29.  Rollman faces the same options we provided to Davis. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the facts of this case, we hold that, absent a demonstration of 
prejudice, Rollman is not entitled to specific performance of the terms of the plea 
arrangement discussed with the trial court.  Therefore, we approve the result of the 
district court and remand with instructions for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D-02-3544 
 
 
(Okaloosa County) 
 
 
 
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Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender and P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public 
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Robert R. Wheeler, Bureau Chief, Criminal 
Appeals and Karen Armstrong, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent