Title: State v. Leonard J. Quintana
Citation: 2008 WI 33
Docket Number: 2006AP000499-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 2008

2008 WI 33 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP499-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Leonard J. Quintana, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2007 WI App 29 
Reported at: 299 Wis. 2d 234, 729 N.W.2d 776 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 1, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 31, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon   
 
JUDGE: 
Vincent K. Howard   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by James B. Connell, Robyn J. DeVos, and Crooks, Low & Connell, 
S.C., Wausau, and oral argument by William R. Kerner, William 
Robert Kerner Law Office, Milwaukee. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was oral argument by 
Christopher G. Wren, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 33
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2006AP499-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2004CF733) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN: 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Leonard J. Quintana, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 1, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals,1 which reversed and 
remanded the decision of the Marathon County Circuit Court, 
Vincent K. Howard, Judge.  The circuit court concluded that the 
forehead does not qualify as an "other bodily member" under 
Wisconsin's mayhem statute, Wis. Stat. § 940.21 (2003-04),2 and 
it concluded that the violent crime in a school zone penalty 
                                                 
1 State v. Quintana, 2007 WI App 29, 299 Wis. 2d 234, 729 
N.W.2d 776. 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted, which frequently occurs 
throughout this opinion. 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
2 
 
enhancer, Wis. Stat. § 939.632, was unconstitutional as applied 
to Quintana.  The court of appeals reversed and remanded, and 
Quintana petitioned this court for review.  We affirm the court 
of appeals' decision. 
¶2 
This appeal presents the following two issues: First, 
we must decide whether the forehead qualifies as an "other 
bodily member" under Wisconsin's mayhem statute.  We conclude 
that the forehead qualifies as an "other bodily member" under 
Wis. Stat. § 940.21, Mayhem.  Wisconsin's mayhem statute seeks 
to punish those who intentionally disable or disfigure another 
person's bodily member.  The manner in which the legislature 
used the phrase, "other bodily member," requires that we give 
that phrase a broad construction.  If "other bodily member" were 
to be narrowly construed, the construction would produce absurd 
results, and the purpose of the statute would easily be 
defeated.  Because the legislature intended the phrase "other 
bodily member" to be construed broadly rather than narrowly, the 
phrase "other bodily member" in the mayhem statute encompasses 
all 
bodily 
parts, 
including 
a 
person's 
forehead. 
 
The 
application of the mayhem statute is limited by the need to 
prove that a person specifically intended to disable or 
disfigure. 
¶3 
Second, we must decide whether the violent crime in a 
school zone penalty enhancer3 is unconstitutional as applied to 
Quintana.  We conclude that the violent crime in a school zone 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.632. 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
3 
 
penalty enhancer is not unconstitutional as applied to Quintana.  
The legislature seeks to deter violent crime near schools in an 
effort to create a safety zone around schools.  The 1,000-foot 
perimeter is a reasonable distance to try to accomplish this 
legislative goal.  Quintana has failed to show that the penalty 
enhancer is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  
I. FACTS 
¶4 
At approximately four o'clock in the morning on 
September 4, 2004, Leonard Quintana allegedly entered the 
bedroom of his sleeping ex-wife, Shannon Quintana, and struck 
her on the head with a hammer.  Police officers who responded to 
the scene described Shannon's head and hair as covered in blood, 
and they described a large amount of blood located at the head 
of the bed.  Additionally, police officers stated that the 
walls, window shades, and dresser were spattered with blood.   
¶5 
The neurosurgeon who treated Shannon, Dr. Dennis 
Mollman, testified at Quintana's preliminary hearing on March 
28, 
2005. 
 
Dr. 
Mollman 
stated 
that 
Shannon 
suffered 
"approximately three blows to the head."  One blow was done with 
a sharp instrument and resulted in a scalp laceration that 
started just above the eyebrow and continued to behind the ear.  
The impact caused a skull fracture, which resulted in fragments 
of the skull tearing the lining of the brain otherwise known as 
the dura.  This blow also caused spinal fluid to leak into the 
wound.  Dr. Mollman testified that it takes significant force to 
fracture the forehead part of the skull.  He stated that the CT 
scan revealed a "significant intracranial injury with air inside 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
4 
 
the brain [and] blood inside the brain."  He concluded that this 
"type of injury carries [the] potential [of] dying from it."   
¶6 
Shannon suffered two other blows to the head: one 
located on the left side of her head near the temple region, and 
the second located on the right side of her head just in front 
of the ear.  Dr. Mollman further stated that Shannon suffers 
from post-traumatic headaches, which will likely be life-long, 
and she suffers from memory deficits, which will probably end 
within a year of the injury. 
¶7 
A criminal complaint was filed on September 7, 2004.4  
The mayhem charge at issue was added in the amended information, 
which was filed November 23, 2005.  It charged Quintana with 
four counts: (1) mayhem, with violent crime in a school zone, 
domestic abuse, and use of a dangerous weapon enhancers; (2) 
first-degree reckless injury, with domestic abuse and dangerous 
weapon enhancers; (3) aggravated battery, with violent crime in 
a school zone, domestic abuse, and use of a dangerous weapon 
enhancers; and (4) solicitation of first-degree intentional 
homicide. 
                                                 
4 The initial criminal complaint, filed on September 7, 
2004, charged Quintana with one count of attempted first-degree 
intentional homicide with domestic abuse and dangerous weapon 
enhancers, and a second count of theft with a domestic abuse 
enhancer.  The State amended the criminal complaint twice: first 
to correct the last name of the victim, and a second time to add 
a 
third 
count, 
solicitation 
of 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide.  The first information filed reflected the counts in 
the second amended criminal complaint. 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
5 
 
¶8 
Quintana objected to the amended information.  He 
argued that, as a matter of law, the allegations did not support 
the offense of mayhem, and the violent crime in a school zone 
penalty enhancer was unconstitutional as applied to him.  The 
circuit court agreed and concluded that the mayhem charge was 
improper because "other bodily member" was limited to those 
parts of the body listed or associated with the parts listed in 
the mayhem statute.  The circuit court reasoned that skin or 
bone, like that found in the forehead, can be found throughout 
the human body, and therefore, interpreting the statute to 
include the forehead would eliminate any limitations in the 
mayhem statute as to what parts of the body are included.  The 
circuit court also concluded that the violent crime in a school 
zone penalty enhancer was unconstitutional as applied to 
Quintana because it is extremely unlikely that "domestic 
violence" would ever endanger students in school, and the 
proximity of the school bears no logical relationship to a 
legitimate government interest.   
¶9 
In a published decision, the court of appeals reversed 
the circuit court's order.  State v. Quintana, 2007 WI App 29, 
299 Wis. 2d 234, 729 N.W.2d 776.  It concluded that "the mayhem 
statute covers cutting or mutilation to the forehead."  Id., 
¶17.  It reasoned that because the forehead is skin and bone 
protecting parts of the brain, an attack on the forehead 
threatens injury to the brain.  Therefore, the forehead is an 
"other bodily member."  The court, however, declined to conclude 
that the entire head was an "other bodily member."    
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
6 
 
¶10 The court of appeals also concluded that the violent 
crime in a school zone penalty enhancer, Wis. Stat. § 939.632, 
is not unconstitutional as applied to Quintana because there are 
"rational, reasonable bases" for the penalty enhancer.  The 
court reasoned that it is clear the legislature sought to create 
a protective zone around schools regardless of time of day, 
calendar date, or whether children are actually present.  The 
court of appeals was persuaded by the State's list of plausible 
reasons for the statute's creation, such as children congregate 
around 
schools, 
increased 
concentration 
of 
children 
near 
schools, and the likelihood that violent crime in the home could 
"spill over into public areas." 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶11 "Statutory interpretation is an issue of law which we 
review de novo.  While the review is de novo, this court 
benefits from the analyses of the circuit court and the court of 
appeals."  Megal Dev. Corp. v. Shadof, 2005 WI 151, ¶8, 286 
Wis. 2d 105, 705 N.W.2d 645. 
¶12 The constitutionality of a statute is a question of 
law, which this court determines independently of both the 
circuit court and court of appeals but still benefiting from 
their analyses.  State v. Radke, 2003 WI 7, ¶11, 259 Wis. 2d 13, 
657 
N.W.2d 
66. 
 
"All 
statutes 
enjoy 
a 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality and the heavy burden of overcoming this 
presumption lies with the person attacking the statute."  Id.  
"This court will sustain a statute against a constitutional 
challenge if there is 'any reasonable basis' for the statute" 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
7 
 
even if that reasonable basis is not expressly stated by the 
legislature.  Id.  "[I]f the court can conceive of facts on 
which the legislation could reasonably be based, it must uphold 
the legislation as constitutional."  Id. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶13 At issue in this case is the meaning of the phrase 
"other bodily member" in Wis. Stat. § 940.21, Mayhem.  The 
mayhem statute provides, "[w]hoever, with intent to disable or 
disfigure another, cuts or mutilates the tongue, eye, ear, nose, 
lip, limb or other bodily member of another is guilty of a Class 
C felony."  "[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Ct. for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  This court begins statutory interpretation with 
the language of a statute.  Id., ¶45.  If the meaning of the 
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry and give the 
language its "common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except 
that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given 
their technical or special definitional meaning."  Id.   
¶14 Context and structure of a statute are important to 
the meaning of the statute.  Id., ¶46.  "Therefore, statutory 
language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not 
in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language 
of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id.  Moreover, the 
"statutory language is read where possible to give reasonable 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
8 
 
effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  Id.  "A 
statute's purpose or scope may be readily apparent from its 
plain language or its relationship to surrounding or closely-
related statutes——that is, from its context or the structure of 
the statute as a coherent whole."  Id., ¶49. 
¶15 At the outset, we acknowledge the difficulty of 
interpreting this statute.  The statutory language of mayhem is 
based upon and is very similar to the Coventry Act——a statute 
from seventeenth century England.  Some states that have 
retained the crime of mayhem have modernized their mayhem 
statutes seemingly in an effort to clarify its application.  See 
generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 16.5, 
599-600 nn.6, 7, and 8 (2d ed. 2003) (referencing current mayhem 
statutes).  Our state legislature may find it useful to re-
examine our mayhem statute.   
A.  History of mayhem 
¶16 The history of "mayhem" and Wisconsin's mayhem statute 
is quite extensive.  The English common-law crime of mayhem 
originated from the principle that "he that maimed any man 
whereby he lost any part of his body was sentenced to lose the 
like part."  William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *206 (Lewis ed. 
1897).  However, the crime was soon punished by fine and 
imprisonment because punishment could not be repeated if it 
remained "an eye for an eye."  Id.  Blackstone defines mayhem as 
"the violently depriving another of the use of such of his 
members as may render him the less able, in fighting, either to 
defend himself or to annoy his adversary."  Id. at *205.  Thus, 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
9 
 
at common law it was not mayhem if one merely disfigured another 
or even disabled parts of the body not critical to fighting, 
such as the nose or ear.  Id.  It appears that the first 
statutory expression of mayhem was in 1403, which punished a 
person for cutting out the tongue or putting out the eye of a 
person who could testify against him.  Id. at *206.  A 
subsequent 
statute 
punished 
persons 
for 
maliciously 
and 
unlawfully cutting off the ear of another.  Id. at *206-07. 
¶17 Following this statute was the Coventry Act, which was 
"by far the most severe and effectual" mayhem statute.  Id.  
This early English statute, which laid the foundation for even 
the modern day mayhem statute, was established in 1670.  Id.  It 
arose out of an incident whereby Sir John Coventry's nose was 
slit because of "obnoxious words uttered by him in Parliament."  
Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 239 (3d ed. 
1982).  At common law, such conduct did not constitute mayhem, 
emphasizing the weakness of the law of mayhem.  Id.  As stated 
in Blackstone, the Coventry Act provided: 
By this statute it is enacted that if any person shall 
of malice aforethought and by lying in wait unlawfully 
cut out or disable the tongue, put out an eye, slit 
the nose, cut off a nose or lip, or cut off or disable 
any limb or member, of any other person, with intent 
to 
maim 
or 
disfigure 
him, 
such 
person, 
his 
counsellors, aiders, and abettors, shall be guilty of 
felony without benefit of clergy. 
Blackstone, supra, at *207 (emphasis included in Blackstone).  
"This statute did not displace the English common law of mayhem 
[] but provided an increased penalty for intentional maiming and 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
10 
 
for the first time extended the crime to include [intentional] 
disfigurement []."  Perkins & Boyce, supra, at 240 (footnotes 
and emphasis omitted).  The Coventry Act represented an 
expansion 
of 
common-law 
mayhem, 
which 
punished 
only 
for 
disabling members of the body important for fighting.  The 
Coventry Act punished persons for disabling other members of the 
body not critical to fighting, and it further prohibited the 
intentional disfiguring of another person.   
¶18 American mayhem statutes in the nineteenth century 
were nearly identical to the Coventry Act.5  Even prior to 
statehood, the statutes of Wisconsin contained the crime of 
"maiming or disfiguring" in almost identical form to the 
Coventry Act.6  Until 1955, the mayhem statute remained nearly 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Moore v. State, 3 Pin. 373 (Wis. 1851) (citing 
to Rev. Stat. c. 133, § 31); Foster v. People, 1 Cow. Cr. 
Rep. 508, 6 (N.Y. 1872) (citing 2 Rev. Stat., c. 665, § 36); 
O'Brien v. State, 21 Ohio Cir. Dec. 33, 1 (1908) (citing to Sec. 
6819 Rev. Stat.).  
6 In the 1839 Statutes of the Territory of Wisconsin, 
Maiming or disfiguring, read: 
That if any person, with malicious intent, to 
maim or disfigure, shall cut out or maim the tongue, 
put out or destroy an eye, cut or tear off an ear, cut 
or slit or mutilate the nose or lip, or cut off or 
disable a limb or member of any other person, every 
such offender, and every person privy to such intent, 
who shall be present aiding in the commission of such 
offence, shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
state prison, not more than five years nor less than 
one year, or by fine, not exceeding one thousand 
dollars nor less than two hundred dollars. 
Statutes of the Territory of Wisconsin, An Act to Provide for 
the Punishment of Offences Against the Lives of Persons or 
Individuals, § 9, 348 (1839). 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
11 
 
unchanged except for an increase in the maximum penalty to 15 
years and minor word changes, which are insignificant to our 
question today.7 
¶19 The legislature revised the mayhem statute in 1955 
when it revised the entire Wisconsin criminal code.8  The 
Legislative Council——Criminal Code Advisory Committee——nearly 
removed mayhem from Wisconsin's criminal code.9  1953 A.B. 100, 
at 70 (§ 340.21 comment).  The council initially consolidated 
the 1953 statutes of "mayhem" and "assault, great bodily harm" 
into "aggravated battery," which it defined as "[w]hoever 
                                                 
7 Section 340.35, Mayhem, of the 1953 Wisconsin Statutes 
read: 
Any person with malicious intent to maim or 
disfigure, who shall cut out or maim the tongue, put 
out or destroy an eye, cut or tear off an ear, cut, 
slit or mutilate the nose or lip, or cut or disable a 
limb or member of another person, and any person privy 
to such intent who shall be present aiding in the 
commission of such offense shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison, not more than 
fifteen years nor less than one year, or by fine not 
exceeding five thousand dollars nor less than two 
hundred dollars.  
8 See generally William A. Platz, The Criminal Code, 1956 
Wis. L. Rev. 350 (1956) (discussing the overhaul of Wisconsin's 
criminal code); see also Wisconsin Legislative Council—Criminal 
Code Advisory Committee minutes re criminal code bill, 1953 A.B. 
100.  The revisions of the code were conducted by a 16-member 
committee 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
bar 
association 
under 
the 
chairmanship of the Hon. Edward J. Ruetz, technical staff, and 
the legislative council's judiciary committee.  Platz, supra, at 
351.  
9 See generally Wisconsin Legislative Council—Criminal Code 
Advisory Committee minutes re criminal code bill, April 29, 
1954.   
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
12 
 
intentionally causes great bodily harm to another may be 
imprisoned not more than 15 years."  Id., at 69-70.   
¶20 The proposed revisions of the criminal code included 
comments stating that mayhem would now fall under aggravated 
battery and describing this change as a "substantial restatement 
of the old law."10  Id. at 69.  However, the legislature 
ultimately retained mayhem largely to differentiate those who 
caused great bodily harm, which resulted in a disabled or 
disfigured victim, from those who possessed the specific intent 
                                                 
10 1953 A.B. 100, at 70 (§ 340.21 comment) provides: 
[Wisconsin Statute §] 340.35, Mayhem dealt with 
the common-law crime of injuring another so that he 
loses the use of one of his members and is less able 
to fight.  It also included certain disfigurement——
slitting or mutilating the nose or lip or cutting off 
an ear.  All of these would come within the definition 
of great bodily harm.  
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
13 
 
to 
disable 
or 
disfigure——the 
latter 
punishing 
much 
more 
severely.11  
¶21 The 1955 revised version read: "Whoever, with intent 
to disable or disfigure another, cuts or mutilates the tongue, 
eye, ear, nose, lip, limb or other bodily member of another, may 
be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than 15 
years or both."  Wis. Stat. § 940.21 (effective July 1, 1955) 
(emphasis added).   
¶22 The phrase "other bodily member" likely came from 
Wisconsin's "great bodily harm" statute.  Great bodily harm was 
                                                 
11 At least two meetings of the Criminal Code Advisory 
Committee reference the mayhem statute.  Of concern in the first 
meeting referencing mayhem, April 29, 1954, was incorporating 
mayhem into aggravated battery, and the penalty for aggravated 
battery, which would include the accidental cutting off of 
another's nose, would be 15 years whereas "a person who 
intentionally just about killed another" only faced a three-year 
penalty.  The committee agreed to continue mayhem in largely the 
same language with the exact wording to be worked out by the 
technical staff.  The second meeting on June 3, 1954, approved 
the revised mayhem statute.  Aggravated battery was reduced to a 
maximum 5-year penalty from 15 years when it no longer included 
mayhem.  It appears that mayhem was retained in order to 
severely punish those who intentionally maim or disfigure 
another and to distinguish those who accidentally cut off 
another's nose (aggravated battery) from those who have a 
specific intent to disable or disfigure.  Moreover, mayhem was 
removed from the aggravated battery statute to harmonize the 
penalties 
for 
aggravated battery——which would include the 
accidental cutting off of another's nose and give rise to 15 
years of exposure with mayhem included in the aggravated battery 
statute but only five years exposure with mayhem removed from 
the aggravated battery statute——with the penalty for "a person 
who intentionally just about killed another," faced a three year 
penalty. 
 
See Wisconsin Legislative Council—Criminal Code 
Advisory Committee minutes re criminal code bill, 1953 A.B. 100 
(specifically those meetings on April 29 and June 3 of 1954).   
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
14 
 
defined as: "[B]odily injury which creates a high probability of 
death, or which causes serious disfigurement, or which causes 
permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of 
any bodily member or organ."  1953 A.B. 100, at 14 (setting 
forth the proposed Wis. Stat. § 339.22(12)).   
¶23 Prior to the 1955 criminal code revision, no mayhem 
statute in Wisconsin's history used the term "other bodily 
member."  As previously stated, the original plan of the 1955 
criminal code revision was to incorporate mayhem into aggravated 
battery.  Aggravated battery required great bodily harm, which 
included "bodily member" as part of its definition.  Great 
bodily harm appeared in the criminal code for the first time in 
1955.12  See Chapter 623, Laws of 1953 (effective July 1, 1955 
and defined in section 339.22(12)).  The definition of "great 
bodily harm" was taken from the Restatement of Torts § 63 
                                                 
12 However, the great bodily harm statute was revised the 
very next year to add "or other serious bodily injury" to the 
end of the statute.  See Chapter 696, Laws of 1955 (effective 
July 1, 1956).  In 1976, this court concluded that the addition 
of "or other serious bodily injury" to the end of the great 
bodily harm statute in 1956 represented a "broadening of the 
scope of the statute to include bodily injuries which were 
serious, although not of the same type or category as those 
recited in the statute."  La Barge v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 327, 
331-32, 246 N.W.2d 794 (1976).  Today, great bodily harm reads: 
"'Great bodily harm' means bodily injury which creates a 
substantial risk of death, or which causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or 
other 
serious 
bodily 
injury." 
 
Wis. Stat. § 939.22(14).  
"'Bodily harm' means physical pain or injury, illness, or any 
impairment of physical condition."  Wis. Stat. § 939.22(4). 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
15 
 
cmt. b, which specifically mentions mayhem.13  While the phrase 
"other bodily member" likely came from the great bodily harm 
statute, this does not explain or provide insight as to what 
"other bodily member" means for purposes of our analysis.   
¶24 The only recent changes to the mayhem statute occurred 
in 1977 when the legislature classified mayhem as a Class B 
felony and 2001 when it was reclassified as a Class C felony, 
thus revising only the penalty portion of the statute.14  The 
current version of Wisconsin's mayhem statute reads:  
Whoever, with intent to disable or disfigure 
another, cuts or mutilates the tongue, eye, ear, nose, 
lip, limb or other bodily member of another is guilty 
of a Class C felony. 
                                                 
13 The 1955 definition of "great bodily harm" was taken from 
Restatement of Torts § 63 cmt. b, which read: 
Meaning of "serious bodily harm."  The phrase "serious 
bodily harm" is used to describe a bodily harm, the 
consequence of which is so grave or serious that it is 
regarded as differing in kind, and not merely in 
degree, from other bodily harm.  A harm which creates 
a substantial risk of fatal consequences is a "serious 
bodily harm" as is a harm, the infliction of which 
constitutes the crime of mayhem.  The permanent or 
protracted loss of the function of any important 
member or organ is also a "serious bodily harm." 
See 1953 A.B. 100, at 14 (§ 339.22(12) comment).   
14 Both the 1977 and 2001 classifications were based on the 
degree of actual or potential harm involved in the commission of 
the crime in question.  The 2001 classification automatically 
moved all 1977 Class B felonies to Class C felonies, and then 
each was reviewed to ensure proper and consistent placement with 
the code.  See Classifying Penalties to the Criminal Code: 
Report to the 1973 Legislature, pg. 11 (1973); Criminal 
Penalties Study Committee, Final Report, pgs. 1-14, 24 (August 
31, 1999).   
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
16 
 
Wis. Stat. § 940.21 (emphasis added).15 
B.  Interpretation of Wisconsin's mayhem statute 
¶25 The rationale underlying the modern mayhem statute is 
the "preservation of the natural completeness and normal 
appearance of the human face and body, and not, as originally, 
the preservation of the sovereign's right to the effective 
military assistance of his subjects."  2 LaFave, supra, § 16.5, 
at 600.  The Coventry Act changed the rationale to protecting 
more than just those parts of the body critical to fighting.  "A 
statute must be construed, [] in light of its manifest object, 
the evil sought to be remedied."  State v. Clausen, 105 
Wis. 2d 231, 239, 313 N.W.2d 819 (1982).  The purpose of 
Wisconsin's mayhem statute is to punish those who intentionally 
disable or disfigure another by cutting or mutilating the 
victim's member(s) including "other bodily member(s)," but the 
phrase "other bodily member" raises a question as to what parts 
of the body——if any——the mayhem statute is limited.   
¶26 However, the manner in which the legislature uses the 
phrase "other bodily member" indicates that it intended the 
phrase to be construed broadly and not in a restrictive manner.  
The specific terms listed in the statute have no common feature 
                                                 
15 Only a few modern day criminal codes retain the stand 
alone crime of mayhem.  2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal 
Law § 16.5(b) (2d ed. 2003) (citing to Cal. Penal Code § 205; 
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 14; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 750.397; Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-59; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-105; 
and Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.21). 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
17 
 
or class from which one could ascertain an intention to restrict 
the meaning of the general term. 
¶27 Ejusdem generis, a canon of construction, instructs 
that when general words follow specific words in the statutory 
text, the general words should be construed in light of the 
specific words listed.  Thus, the general word or phrase will 
encompass only things of the same type as those specific words 
listed.  Adams Outdoor Adver., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 
104, ¶62 n.15, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803.  Legislatures 
use this common drafting technique to save the legislature the 
time and effort of spelling out every possible situation in 
which the statute could apply.  2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. 
Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction 
§ 47.17, at 370-73 (7th ed. 2007).   
¶28  In the case at hand, we can discern no class that 
encompasses all of the specific terms listed.  When specific 
terms do not suggest a particular class, the rule of ejusdem 
generis does not apply.  Id., § 47.20.     
¶29 The relevant terms enumerated in the mayhem statute 
are: tongue, eye, ear, nose, lip, limb or other bodily member.  
We first look to determine whether there is a common class that 
can be derived from the specific enumerated terms.  One possible 
class may be parts of the body that protrude from the body, but 
the eyes and tongue do not naturally protrude from the body like 
the ears, nose and limbs.  If not for the inclusion of the word 
"limb," the class could be "crucial areas of the face," but the 
insertion of the word limb renders this unusable as a class.   
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
18 
 
¶30 The tongue, eyes, ears, and nose are all associated 
with one of the five senses, but the lips and limbs are not 
unless you consider sense of touch.  However, sense of touch 
could incorporate the entire body, so that does not assist us in 
trying 
to 
limit 
the 
definition 
of 
the 
general 
term.  
Furthermore, member includes internal organs, as we know from 
the dictionary and Moore v. State, 3 Pin. 373 (Wis. 1851), but 
we can discern no "class" from the specific terms in the 
enumerated list that would also include internal organs.   
¶31 When no class can be discerned, the canon of ejusdem 
generis cannot be used.  See 2A Singer et al., supra, § 47.20.  
More significant, when a class cannot be ascertained, it 
indicates that the legislature did not intend for the general 
term to be limited by the specific terms listed in the statute.  
See id. at n.3 (referencing a number of state and federal cases 
including 
United 
States 
v. 
Lawrence, 
26 
F. 
Cas. 
878 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875), which concluded that the listed items had 
no common features from which one could ascertain an intention 
to restrict the meaning of the general term). 
¶32 When 
the 
legislature 
does 
not 
use 
words 
in 
a 
restricted manner, the general terms should be interpreted 
broadly to give effect to the legislature's intent.  In 
Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, the United States Supreme 
Court stated: 
To ascertain the meaning of the words of a statute, 
they may be submitted to the test of all appropriate 
canons of statutory construction, of which the rule of 
ejusdem generis is only one.  If, upon a consideration 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
19 
 
of the context and the objects sought to be attained 
and of the act as a whole, it adequately appears that 
the general words were not used in the restricted 
sense suggested by the rule, we must give effect to 
the conclusion afforded by the wider view in order 
that the will of the Legislature shall not fail. 
Helvering, 293 U.S. 84, 89 (1934) (emphasis added). 
¶33 Because we can discern no class from the specific 
terms listed in the statute, we must conclude that the 
legislature did not use "other bodily member"——formerly known as 
"member"——in a restrictive sense.  Thus, the legislature 
intended it to be interpreted broadly.  As a result, using the 
phrase "other bodily member" along with the other parts of the 
body listed in the statute renders the rest of the human body 
included within the meaning of the mayhem statute.  In short, 
"other bodily member" encompasses all bodily parts. 
¶34 Quintana asserts that the covered "class" is limited 
to specific parts of the body that serve a function on their 
own, and if those parts are taken away, a person could still 
live.  However, this is unworkable as a "class" to determine the 
scope of "other bodily member" because it leads to absurd 
results.  For example, following Quintana's logic, since we have 
two kidneys, they are members, but because we have only one 
liver, it is not a member.  Both the kidney and liver are of the 
same class, internal organs, yet, if one is taken away a person 
dies but if the other is taken away the person may still live.  
This practical application of Quintana's argument shows why it 
is absurd.  As a result, because no class can be discerned, the 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
20 
 
canon of ejusdem generis must not be used, and we must interpret 
the phrase broadly. 
¶35 Quintana also puts forth the rule of noscitur a sociis 
to support his argument.  This canon instructs that words are 
known from their associates.  Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for 
Cranes & Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶40, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 
N.W.2d 612.  "[A]n unclear statutory term should be understood 
in the same sense as the words immediately surrounding or 
coupled with it."  Id.  This canon is a variation of ejusdem 
generis.  2A Singer et al., supra, § 47.17.  However, this canon 
does not apply in this case because the specific words listed do 
not have similar meaning except that they are all members, which 
provides little guidance in defining "other bodily member."  
Rather, this would suggest that "other bodily member" is an 
expansive, not restrictive term added to the end of the statute 
in order to cover those other members not specifically listed.   
¶36 If the term "member"——or "other bodily member" as it 
is used in the current mayhem statute——were constrained to 
exclude the forehead, as Quintana urges, this would lead to 
absurd results that would frustrate the purpose of the statute.  
See generally State v. Morse, 126 Wis. 2d 1, 4, 374 N.W.2d 388 
(Ct. App. 1985) (concluding, "[t]o define vagina according to 
its medical definition would permit a defendant to touch almost 
the entire female external genitalia without legal consequence," 
which is contrary to the legislature's intent and would lead to 
absurd results if construed so narrowly).   
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
21 
 
¶37 For example, if a defendant poured acid over a 
victim's leg——a limb——causing permanent disfigurement, it could 
lead to a mayhem conviction so long as the other elements of the 
statute were met.16  See 2 LaFave, supra, § 16.5(c) (stating "[a] 
modern weapon of some potency is acid thrown at the victim's 
face or body"); see, e.g., Lawrence Van Gelder, Victor Riesel, 
81, Columnist Blinded by Acid Attack, Dies, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 
1995 (describing the horrific acid attack in 1956 that blinded 
the syndicated labor columnist).  However, under Quintana's 
interpretation of "other bodily member," if a defendant, who 
possessed the requisite intent, poured acid over a victim's head 
without permanently disfiguring or disabling the victim's eyes, 
nose, ear, or lip, it would not constitute mayhem even though 
the defendant had intentionally, permanently disfigured the 
victim's head and appearance——the very evil the mayhem statute 
seeks to punish.   
¶38 Consider also the nonconsensual, permanent tattooing 
or branding of another's forehead, which certainly is a 
prominent location for an unwanted mark.  See, e.g., People v. 
Page, 104 Cal. App. 3d 569, 576-77 (1980) (concluding that the 
nonconsensual tattooing of a woman's breast constitutes mayhem, 
but concluding the tattooing of the abdomen is questionable 
because the abdomen may not qualify as a member).  A defendant 
could tattoo the most obscene symbol imaginable on the forehead 
                                                 
16 See ¶¶70-73 of this opinion for a discussion regarding 
the elements of mayhem under Wis. Stat. § 940.21. 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
22 
 
of another and not be guilty of mayhem under Quintana's theory, 
but he or she would be guilty of mayhem if the tattoo or brand 
appeared on the victim's arm.  These scenarios produce absurd 
results when a heinous act constitutes mayhem if the victim's 
leg is involved, but it is not mayhem when the very same act 
involves the forehead, which is a much more prominent and 
difficult area of the body to hide from the view of others.  The 
same absurd results arise in a number of other scenarios, such 
as cutting and burning the leg, which could constitute mayhem, 
but the same act to the forehead would not be mayhem. 
¶39 The 
mayhem 
statute 
seeks 
to 
punish 
those 
who 
intentionally disable or disfigure another person's bodily 
member.  Absurd results would certainly arise if the forehead 
were excluded.  For example, disabling the nose is mayhem, but 
disabling the forehead, which protects one of the most important 
organs of the body, would not constitute mayhem.  A statute must 
be interpreted in light of its manifest object; therefore, we 
conclude that the forehead qualifies as an "other bodily 
member."   
¶40 The legislature reaffirmed its interest in severely 
punishing the intentional disabling or disfiguring of another 
when it retained mayhem in the 1955 criminal code revision after 
it was originally excluded from the statutes during the first 
round of revisions.  Moreover, it reaffirmed a broad definition 
of "member" when it did not use "other bodily member" in a 
restrictive manner. 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
23 
 
¶41 A nineteenth century Wisconsin mayhem case, which 
broadly defined the word "member" to include female reproductive 
organs, is consistent with our interpretation of member.  In 
Moore v. State, Margaret D. Moore's husband assaulted her with 
the intent to maim or disable her "private parts."  This court 
concluded that "member" under the mayhem statute at that time 
included female reproductive organs.  "Our legislature certainly 
gave the same protection to the internal organs of the female 
that it did to the external organs of the male, and there is no 
reason why it should not."  Moore, 3 Pin. 373.     
C.  Dictionaries and cases from other jurisdictions 
¶42 When interpreting a word or phrase in a statute, it 
often proves useful to look at dictionary definitions or 
sometimes even case law from other states.  However, in the case 
at hand, these tools lead to equivocal results rather than 
support a broad or narrow interpretation of "other bodily 
member."   
¶43 The 
dictionary 
definition 
of 
"member" 
is 
quite 
extensive.17  While "[m]any words have multiple dictionary 
definitions[, and] the applicable definition depends upon the 
context in which the word is used," Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49, 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., Swatek v. County of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 47, 61, 
531 N.W.2d 45 (1995) (stating that this court may consult a 
dictionary for the common meaning of a word); but see Kopke v. A 
Hartrodt 
S.R.L., 
2001 
WI 
99, 
¶16, 
245 
Wis. 2d 396, 
629 
N.W.2d 662 (stating that a dictionary may not be able to resolve 
the issue of whether a word should be broadly or narrowly 
defined). 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
24 
 
the dictionaries yield equivocal results in this case even when 
the context of "other bodily member" is known.   
¶44 The second edition of Webster's New International 
Dictionary defines "member" as "1.a Archaic. A bodily part or 
organ; esp., a limb. b Obs[olete],18 A private part. . . . 7. 
Anat[omy], A part or organ of the animal body; esp., a limb or 
other separable part."19  The second edition of The Random House 
Dictionary of the English Language defines "member" as "3. a 
part or organ of an animal body; a limb, as a leg, arm, or 
wing. . . . 5. the penis."20  The first edition of the same 
dictionary provides synonym explanations for the particular 
entry.  It reads, "Member, Limb refer to an integral part of a 
larger body.  Member is the general term applied to any integral 
part or vital organ of an organized animal body . . . The nose, 
tongue, and arms are members of the body.  Limb, which once, 
like Member, referred to any organ of the body, is now 
restricted to the legs and arms . . . ."21   
                                                 
18 A designation of "Obs" means obsolete.  "An Obsolete Word 
is one that has entirely disappeared from current usage.  In 
general, this Dictionary regards as obsolete all literary or 
colloquial words, and all meanings, that have not appeared in 
print since 1660."  Webster's New International Dictionary xcv, 
explanatory note 54 (2d ed. 1935). 
19 Webster's New International Dictionary 1533 (2d ed. 
1935). 
20 The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1198-
99 (2d ed. 1987). 
21 The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 894 
(1st ed. 1966) (emphasis omitted). 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
25 
 
¶45 The Oxford English Dictionary contains twelve entries, 
each with explanations, for the word "member."  "1.a. A part or 
organ of the body; chiefly, a limb or other separable portion" 
(as opposed to the trunk22).  "1.b. spec. (after L): = 'privy 
member.'"  This dictionary provides examples of the word's usage 
as it corresponds to different periods in time.  Usage of the 
word "member" under entry 1.a., which defined member as a "part 
or organ of the body," provides in part: 
1495 Act. II Hen. VII, c. 3 § 3 Any other offence 
wherfor 
any 
persone 
shall 
lose 
life 
or 
member. . . . 1611 Bible Deut. xxiii. I Hee that hath 
his priuie member cut off.  1660 F. Brooke tr. Le 
Blanc's Trav. 61 They tye a cloth only to hide their 
privie members. . . . 1823 J.F. Cooper Pioneers v. 
(1869) 24/2 There was something noble in the rounded 
outlines of his head and brow.  The very air and 
manner with which the member haughtily maintained 
itself [etc]. 
The Oxford English Dictionary Vol. IX, 590 (2d ed. 2000). 
¶46 Thus, 
the 
multiple 
dictionary 
definitions 
give 
conflicting answers as to whether the forehead is a member.  On 
the one hand, member seems to encompass organs.  The brain is an 
organ and impairment of its function can most certainly affect 
the functioning of the tongue, eyes, ears, lips, nose, and 
limbs.  In that sense, including the brain within the definition 
of "other bodily member" makes sense as the brain directly 
affects the functioning of the other parts of the body.   
                                                 
22 The Oxford English Dictionary defines "trunk" as "[t]he 
human body . . . without the head or esp[ecially] without the 
head and limbs . . . ."  The Oxford English Dictionary Vol. 
XVIII, 617 (2d ed. 2000).   
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
26 
 
¶47 Another definition of "member" could lead one to 
conclude that "other bodily member" refers only to male and 
female reproductive organs, deriving the term from the word 
"privie" or "private."  However, Webster's dictionary identifies 
this definition as obsolete.  In addition, restricting "member" 
to mean only private parts is doubtful because the legislature 
has had no problem delineating the "private parts" of humans in 
other areas of the statutes.  During the 1955 criminal code 
revision, the legislature did not use the word "member" in other 
statutes as a means to identify male or female reproductive 
organs.  See, e.g., Sexual perversion, Wis. Stat. § 944.17 
(1955) (utilizing the word "sex organ"); Lewd and lascivious 
behavior, Wis. Stat. § 944.20 (1955) (utilizing the word "sex 
organ").  Subsequently, the legislature has used "penis" or 
"vagina" in Wisconsin Statutes.  See, e.g., Words and phrases 
defined, Wis. Stat. § 939.22(19) (1979-80) ("'Intimate parts' 
means the breast, buttock, anus, groin, scrotum, penis, vagina 
or pubic mound of a human being.").  
¶48 Yet another dictionary definition indicates member 
could be anything besides the trunk and another includes all 
integral parts of the body.  Lastly, the dictionaries also 
define member as "any part of the body."  Thus, the dictionaries 
lead to equivocal results as to whether the forehead is a 
member.  Moreover, there are very few parts of the body not 
included in at least one of these many definitions.  Perhaps 
this indicates that "member," or "other bodily member," is meant 
to include every part of the entire body. 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
27 
 
¶49 One may also turn to other states to guide statutory 
interpretation, which can be especially useful when the relevant 
statute has been widely used and dates back to the 1400s.  
However, a review of the case law with regard to mayhem is also 
equivocal as to whether the forehead constitutes a member or 
"other bodily member."  In Foster v. People, the court concluded 
that the victim's skull fracture was not mayhem.  Foster v. 
People, 1 Cow. Cr. Rep. 508, 8 (N.Y. 1872).  The Court of 
Appeals of New York stated, "[a]n injury to the head or skull is 
not specified by Hawkins or Blackstone as mayhem . . . ."  Id. 
at 5 (emphasis omitted).  In contrast, however, the court 
stated, "the breaking of the skull" was considered mayhem under 
the definition by Lord Coke.  Id.  Lord Coke stated:    
"Mayhem," he says, "signifieth a corporal hurt, 
whereby a man looseth a member by reason whereof he is 
less able to fight, as by putting out his foretooth, 
breaking his skull, striking off his arm, hand or 
finger, cutting off his leg or foot, or whereby he 
looseth the use of any of his said members." (Coke 
Litt., 288 a.) 
Id. (emphasis added).23 
                                                 
23 Lord Coke referred to the authority of Glanville and 
Britton in support of his interpretation: 
"Mayhem," says Glanville, "signifies the breaking 
of any bone or injuring the head by wounding or 
abrasion.  In such case the accused is obliged to 
purge himself by the ordeal, that is, by the hot iron, 
if he be a freeman; by water, if he be a rustic." 
(Glanville, Blain's translation, book 14, chap. 1, 
350; see, also, Britton, Nichols' translation, liv. 1, 
chap. 26, fol. 48b, 49a, 123.) 
Foster, 1 Cow. Cr. Rep. 508, at 5. 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
28 
 
¶50 Thus, even historically, no consensus existed as to 
whether a skull fracture or injury to the forehead could 
constitute mayhem.  The New York court was persuaded by the 
conclusion that a blow to the head does not indicate intent to 
maim but rather intent to kill.  Id. at 8.  The court stated, 
"[a]nd while it was for the jury to determine with what intent 
the blow was inflicted, we cannot, without doing violence to 
common sense, say that the prisoner may have intended to break 
the skull of Putnam without producing death."  Id.   
¶51 However, a much earlier English case from A Complete 
Collection of State Trials is inconsistent with the New York 
court's decision.  In 1722, at the trial of John Woodburne and 
Arundel Coke, the defendants tried to escape a mayhem conviction 
by asserting that they did not intend to maim when they brutally 
cut up the face of the victim with a hedge-bill; rather, they 
intended to kill him.  "Trial of John Woodburne and Arundel 
Coke" 16 A Complete Collection of State Trials 54, 89 (1812).  
The court responded with disapproval: 
And that this was with an intent to disfigure, must be 
submitted upon the fact and the evidence.  A man uses 
a weapon fit to maim and to disfigure, he cuts another 
on 
the 
face 
and 
does 
disfigure 
him, 
shall 
he 
afterwards be at liberty to say, it was not his intent 
so to do?  How dangerous that would be, is obvious to 
every 
one; 
this 
act 
would 
then 
be 
easily 
eluded . . . . 
The Woodburne court's reasoning is persuasive in that it is 
possible one could intend to maim as opposed to kill when the 
action consists of attacking a victim's forehead. 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
29 
 
¶52 In 1908, an Ohio court concluded that striking a 
person on the head could constitute mayhem although the court 
did not explicitly conclude that the forehead was a member.  
O'Brien v. State, 21 Ohio Cir. Dec. 33, 4 (1908).  An 18-inch 
gas pipe wrapped with heavy paper was used to strike another 
over the head.  Id. at 1.  The victim fell to his knees and 
pulled out a revolver, shooting and killing one of the 
assailants.  Id.  The court concluded: 
So 
a 
blow 
upon 
the 
head 
made 
under 
the 
circumstances shown in this case may be presumed to 
have been made with intent to cause the loss of the 
use of some important member of the body.  Indeed, it 
is well settled by medical authority that a violent 
blow upon the head not fracturing the skull frequently 
does cause the paralysis of an arm or leg.  American 
Text Book of Surgery, Principles and Practice of 
Surgery by De Costa. 
Id. at 4.   
¶53 While it is not entirely clear whether the Ohio court 
would have considered a blow upon the head, which only disabled 
the brain or skull, as disabling a member, it is clear, however, 
that a blow to the head constituted intent to disable because it 
often causes the paralysis of the victim's limbs.  Thus, a blow 
to the head may constitute mayhem. 
¶54 Accordingly, a historical analysis of the case law is 
not particularly helpful.  Some authorities conclude that an 
injury to the forehead——a skull fracture——could constitute 
mayhem.  However, the courts' reasoning varies, such as an 
injury to the head could affect other members and thus 
constitute mayhem because a limb was disabled.  However, other 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
30 
 
authorities seem to conclude that the forehead is not a member 
and thus injuries to the forehead, like a skull fracture, cannot 
constitute mayhem. 
¶55 Even modern mayhem cases differ as to whether the head 
or forehead is a "member."  For example, California courts have 
concluded that the head qualifies as a member.24  In People v. 
Newble, the court concluded that in light of the rationale——the 
preservation of the natural completeness and normal appearance 
of the human face and body——there is "no tenable reason for 
distinguishing prominent facial wounds to a nose, ear or lip, 
from comparable wounds which happen to miss one of those areas 
of the head specifically mentioned in section 203."  Newble, 120 
Cal. App. 3d 444, 451 (1981).  Such a trivial distinction, the 
court 
concluded, 
would 
be 
undesirable 
and 
absurd. 
 
Id.  
Therefore, it concluded that a facial laceration from the ear to 
the chin could constitute mayhem.25 
¶56 On the other hand, a 1956 decision from a Pennsylvania 
court concluded that the face does not qualify as a limb or 
member.  Commonwealth v. Patterson, 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 227, 228 
                                                 
24 California mayhem statute reads: 
Every 
person 
who 
unlawfully 
and 
maliciously 
deprives a human being of a member of his body, or 
disables, disfigures, or renders it useless, or cuts 
or disables the tongue, or puts out an eye, or slits 
the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem. 
Cal. Penal Code § 203 (West 1999). 
25 See also People v. Page, 104 Cal. App. 3d 569, 577 (1980) 
(concluding that the female breast qualifies as a "member"). 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
31 
 
(1956).  The defendant bit the victim's lower left side of the 
face.  Id.  The court concluded that the face did not qualify as 
a member under Pennsylvania's mayhem statute, which reads: 
"Whoever . . . unlawfully . . . cuts off or disables any limb or 
member of another . . . ."  Id.  Other states, such as 
Massachusetts have upheld mayhem convictions for blows to the 
head, but those states had modified their mayhem statutes.  As a 
result, it was not necessary for those states to decide whether 
the head or forehead qualified as a member or "other bodily 
member."26 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lay, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 27, 29, 
36 (2005) (concluding that when the defendant struck the 
victim's head with a metal object sufficient to cause blood and 
brain matter to spray out, it was mayhem under Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann. ch. 265, § 14 (LexisNexis 2002).  Massachusetts Gen. Laws 
Ann. ch. 265, § 14, Mayhem; punishment (LexisNexis 2002), reads: 
Whoever, 
with 
malicious 
intent 
to 
maim 
or 
disfigure, cuts out or maims the tongue, puts out or 
destroys an eye, cuts or tears off an ear, cuts, slits 
or mutilates the nose or lip, or cuts off or disables 
a limb or member, of another person, and whoever is 
privy to such intent, or is present and aids in the 
commission of such crime, or whoever, with intent to 
maim or disfigure, assaults another person with a 
dangerous weapon, substance or chemical, and by such 
assault disfigures, cripples or inflicts serious or 
permanent 
physical injury upon such person, and 
whoever is privy to such intent, or is present and 
aids in the commission of such crime, shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not 
more than twenty years or by a fine of not more than 
one thousand dollars and imprisonment in jail for not 
more than two and one half years. 
(Emphasis added.)  
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
32 
 
¶57 While the dictionary definitions or the guidance from 
other states produces equivocal results, the manner in which the 
legislature uses the phrase "other bodily member" indicates that 
the legislature intended that phrase to be construed broadly, 
and thus we have given effect to that intent. 
D.  Defendant's arguments 
¶58 Quintana argues that a member is something that has 
function in and of itself, and if the member is lost, the victim 
can still survive.  His interpretation would lead us to conclude 
that mayhem occurs when a defendant repeatedly strikes a victim 
in the knee rendering the limb disabled.  However, a defendant 
who viciously and repeatedly clubs a person over the head does 
not commit mayhem, under Quintana's view, unless the brain——an 
organ——is permanently disabled because the forehead does not 
serve a function in and of itself.27   
¶59 The forehead, however, does serve a function in that 
it protects the brain.28  If the defendant's conduct resulted in 
                                                 
27 See 
also 
¶¶34-36 
of 
this 
opinion 
addressing 
this 
argument. 
28 See Keith L. Moore & Arthur F. Dalley, Clinically 
Oriented Anatomy 893 (5th ed. 2006) (describing fractures of the 
calvaria (skullcap, which would include the forehead)). 
The convexity of the calvaria distributes and thereby 
usually minimizes the effects of a blow to the head.  
However, hard blows in thin areas of the calvaria are 
likely to produce depressed fractures, in which a bone 
fragment 
is 
depressed 
inward, 
compressing 
and/or 
injuring the brain.  Linear calvarial fractures, the 
most frequent type, usually occur at the point of 
impact; but fracture lines often radiate away from it 
in two or more directions. . . .  
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
33 
 
the forehead no longer able to serve its function, the victim 
would be vulnerable to the most minor, subsequent injuries, and 
thus, the crime of mayhem likely has occurred so long as the 
other elements of the statute are satisfied.  While certainly 
not every injury to the forehead will constitute mayhem, a 
disabling injury to the forehead could certainly give rise to 
mayhem. 
¶60 Quintana also argues that if "other bodily member" 
includes the forehead, the other specifically delineated body 
parts are surplusage.  "It is an elementary rule of construction 
that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause, 
and sentence of a statute."  2A Singer et al., supra, § 46.6; 
State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 894, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991).   
¶61 However, our conclusion that the forehead qualifies as 
a member does not render the other enumerated facial features 
surplusage.  Everything in the enumerated list is a member.29  
The tongue, eyes, ears, nose, lips, and limbs are all members.  
Thus, the inclusion of "or other bodily member" must include 
members other than those specifically listed in the statute, or 
the phrase "other bodily member" is meaningless.   
                                                                                                                                                             
(Emphasis omitted.)   
29 See William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *205 (Lewis ed. 
1897) (stating that mayhem is defined as depriving another of 
the use of one of his members, and therefore, the cutting off or 
disabling a man's hand, striking out his eye or foretooth are 
all mayhems); see also William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries *121 
(Lewis ed. 1897) (listing members such as the arms, legs, 
fingers, eyes, foretooth); The Random House Dictionary of the 
English Language 894 (1st ed. 1966) (concluding that the "nose, 
tongue, arms are members of the body"). 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
34 
 
¶62 However, if we follow Quintana's argument, then all 
parts of the torso and head, except for those parts of the head 
listed in the statute, are excluded.  If true, then member could 
mean only sex organ under Quintana's argument because no other 
body parts are left except for the sex organs.  The limbs and 
the head, except those parts listed in the statute, are 
excluded.  In addition, the torso is excluded under Quintana's 
argument and some dictionary definitions.  Accordingly, only the 
sex organs are left.   
¶63 However, we know the legislature did not intend bodily 
member to mean only sex organ because it did not use that 
specific phrase, and it has not withheld from using that phrase 
elsewhere.  During the 1955 criminal code revision, the 
legislature did not use the word "member" in other statutes as a 
means to identify male or female reproductive organs.  See, 
e.g., Sexual perversion, Wis. Stat. § 944.17 (1955) (utilizing 
the word "sex organ"); Lewd and lascivious behavior, Wis. Stat. 
§ 944.20 (1955) (utilizing the word "sex organ").  If the 
legislature intended "other bodily member" to mean sex organ, it 
would have used that phrase as evident from other statutes in 
the 1955 criminal code revision that used the phrase "sex 
organ."  However, to accept Quintana's surplusage argument, 
"other bodily member" could mean only sex organ given he does 
not assert that the torso could be a member. 
¶64 The specific members listed should not be used to 
exclude other bodily members not listed, including other members 
located on the head.  For example, Blackstone's commentaries and 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
35 
 
state cases have concluded that a tooth is a member.30  However, 
the tooth could not be a member if Quintana's surplusage 
argument prevails. 
¶65 In this case, the enumerated list is a product of 
history.  The first statute listed only the eyes and tongue, but 
the list expanded into what we basically know it as today.  The 
full list of body parts was first enumerated in the Coventry Act 
of 1670 and represented parliament's response to the maiming of 
a member of parliament.  The phrase "other bodily member" is 
meant to address those things not specifically listed but that 
are also members of the body, such as the reproductive organs, 
the forehead, or other parts of the body.  Nothing indicates 
that the legislature used the phrase "other bodily member" in a 
restrictive 
manner. 
 
In 
fact, 
methods 
of 
statutory 
interpretation lead us to the opposite conclusion.  The list of 
body parts should not be used to eliminate other "members" from 
coming under the mayhem statute; to do so would render the 
phrase "other bodily member" meaningless. 
¶66 Quintana also invokes the rule of lenity asserting 
that the court should interpret "other bodily member" in favor 
of the defendant.  "[W]hen there is doubt as to the meaning of a 
                                                 
30 See footnote 29; see also Keith v. State, 232 S.W. 321 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1921) (concluding that a front tooth is a 
member of the body); Olson v. Union Pac. R. Co., 112 P.2d 1005 
(Idaho 1941) (describing that "[a]t common law, to unlawfully 
knock out one's 'front tooth' constituted the crime of mayhem" 
although it had not been determined whether knocking out a tooth 
fell within Idaho's mayhem statute). 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
36 
 
criminal statute, a court should apply the rule of lenity and 
interpret the statute in favor of the accused."  State v. Cole, 
2003 WI 59, ¶13, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700.  Additionally, 
Quintana argues that statutes should be strictly interpreted 
against the State and in favor of the defendant so as to avoid 
usurping the function of the legislature and provide the public 
with 
fair 
notice 
of prohibited conduct.  See State v. 
Kittilstad, 231 Wis. 2d 245, 266-68, 603 N.W.2d 732 (1999) 
(distinguishing between the rule of lenity and the rule that 
penal statutes are generally construed strictly to safeguard a 
defendant's rights).   
¶67 "'While it is true that criminal laws should be 
strictly construed, this rule . . . is not to be applied with 
such unreasonable technicality as to defeat the purpose of all 
rules of statutory construction, which purpose is to ascertain 
and enforce the true meaning and intent of the statute.'"  3 
Singer, supra, § 59.8 (quoting State v. Bonner, 190 So. 626, 627 
(La. 1939)).  The true meaning and intent of the mayhem statute 
is to punish those who intentionally disable or disfigure 
another person's bodily member.   
¶68 To argue that the statute does not provide fair notice 
highlights the absurdity of Quintana's interpretation.  To 
prohibit 
someone 
from 
mutilating 
the 
nose 
but 
allowing 
intentional mutilation of the forehead to a degree of severity 
that it no longer protects the brain is counter-intuitive.  A 
person of ordinary intelligence may ascertain from this statute 
that the intentional mutilation and disabling of the human body 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
37 
 
is prohibited under the law.  One could reasonably conclude that 
the forehead, one of the most prominent and critical parts of 
the body, is included if the nose, lip, and ear are included.  
The legislature did not use the phrase "other bodily member" in 
a restrictive sense.  Rather, the phrase is meant to cover those 
parts of the body not historically or specifically enumerated in 
the statute.   
¶69 Quintana argues that if "member" is defined to include 
skin and bone, the mayhem statute will be expanded and the only 
difference between mayhem and aggravated battery or reckless 
injury will be a greater penalty if the defendant happens to be 
charged with mayhem.31  However, mayhem can be distinguished from 
aggravated battery and other crimes because mayhem is a specific 
intent crime; namely, the specific intent to disable or 
disfigure.  The penalty for mayhem is more severe because mayhem 
                                                 
31 Mayhem is rarely charged because of the number of other 
statutes that can be charged in its place.  It will likely 
continue to be rarely charged due to the difficulty in proving a 
specific intent.   
[M]ayhem has become something of an anachronism in 
Wisconsin's criminal law, largely superseded by more 
"modern" crimes.  See, e.g., Wis. Stats. § 940.19 
(battery and aggravated battery); Wis. Stats. § 940.23 
(injury 
by 
conduct 
regardless 
of 
life); 
Wis. Stats. § 940.24 
(injury 
by 
negligent 
use 
of 
weapons); Wis. Stats. § 941.30 (endangering safety by 
conduct regardless of life).  Thus, prosecutors rarely 
charge offenders with mayhem anymore. . . . 
Cole v. Young, 817 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1987).  
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
38 
 
is a cruel and savage crime, and it requires the specific intent 
to disable or disfigure.32 
¶70 To constitute mayhem, the State must show that the 
defendant had (1) the specific intent to disable or disfigure; 
(2) by cutting or mutilating the tongue, eye, ear, nose, lip, 
limb, or other bodily member; and (3) the cutting or mutilating 
produced great bodily harm.  Wis JI——Criminal 1246.33    
¶71 A 
specific 
intent 
to 
disable 
or 
disfigure 
is 
distinguishable from a general intent.  A general intent to do 
the acts and the consciousness of the nature of the acts and 
possible results differs from the specific intent to do the 
intended 
harm, 
i.e., 
the 
specific 
intent 
to 
disable 
or 
disfigure.  Kirby v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 292, 301, 272 N.W.2d 113 
(Ct. App. 1978); State v. Weso, 60 Wis. 2d 404, 411-12, 210 
N.W.2d 442 (1973).  
¶72 Mayhem requires great bodily harm, although the Jury 
Instruction Committee has been skeptical of this assertion.34  
                                                 
32 By virtue of this specific intent, the penalty for mayhem 
is much more severe than other assault type crimes.  See 
generally 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mayhem and Related Offenses § 17 
(2006).  Mayhem is generally saved for "a cruel and savage 
crime."  Id.  In Wisconsin, it is a very serious charge; a 
person guilty of mayhem is guilty of a Class C felony, and thus 
faces 25 years of imprisonment unlike aggravated battery, which 
exposes a defendant to up to 10 years of imprisonment.      
33 Although the Jury Instruction Committee's determinations 
do not carry independent force of law, they are persuasive 
evidence of what the law is.  State v. Olson, 175 Wis. 2d 628, 
642, n.10, 498 N.W.2d 661 (1993).      
34 The Jury Instruction Committee writes: 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
39 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
The [] element of the instruction, requiring the 
causing of great bodily harm, was added in 1982 and 
reflects the holding in State v. Kirby [sic] [Kirby v. 
State], 86 Wis. 2d 292, 272 N.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 
1978). Kirby held that "causing great bodily harm" was 
an element of mayhem, even though[] it was not 
expressly stated in the statute. . . . The Committee 
revised the instruction in September 1982 to comply 
with the Kirby decision. 
In July 1982, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
(District I) decided State v. Cole (not published) and 
held that the 1969 version of Wis JI——Criminal 1230, 
without "great bodily harm," was a proper statement of 
the law.  Though written by the author of Kirby, the 
Cole decision did not mention that case or acknowledge 
the great bodily harm issue. 
On January 27, 1987, the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals (District IV) decided State v. Webie. . . . 
Webie also noted that "we need not consider whether 
mayhem continues to incorporate the unexpressed great 
bodily 
harm 
requirement." 
Though 
it 
reversed 
a 
previous decision and was recommended for publication, 
Webie was ordered not published on April 2, 1987. 
In the meantime, Cole (see State v. Cole, above) 
had gone to federal court, claiming that the failure 
to instruct on an element (great bodily harm) of the 
crime (mayhem) deprived him of due process.  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit granted habeas 
corpus relief in Cole v. Young, 817 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 
1987).  The court reviewed Kirby, Cole, and Webie and 
decided that state law made great bodily harm an 
element of mayhem.  That being the case, the court 
found a constitutional violation in the failure to 
instruct on that element. 
Since it is the only published opinion, Kirby 
remains the law of the state.  While at least one 
district of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals disagrees 
with it, that disagreement did not manifest itself in 
a published opinion.  Thus, Kirby must be followed 
until it is officially overruled. 
Wis JI——Criminal 1246 Comment (emphasis added). 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
40 
 
The court of appeals in Kirby concluded that the "cutting or 
mutilation, a statutory element of mayhem, requires an injury 
that 
constitutes 
'great 
bodily 
harm' 
as 
interpreted 
in 
La Barge . . . ."35  Kirby, 86 Wis. 2d at 301.  The court of 
appeals reasoned that in the 1957 decision of State v. Carli, 
the "Wisconsin Supreme Court held that mayhem necessarily 
includes the infliction of great bodily harm."36  Id. at 300; see 
also Cole v. Young, 817 F.2d 412, 416-22 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(discussing Wisconsin's mayhem statute, Kirby, and subsequent 
developments in Wisconsin mayhem law). 
                                                 
35 In La Barge, this court concluded that the addition of 
"or other serious bodily injury" to the end of the great bodily 
harm statute in 1956 represented a "broadening of the scope of 
the statute to include bodily injuries which were serious, 
although not of the same type or category as those recited in 
the statute."  La Barge, 74 Wis. 2d at 331-32.  Today, great 
bodily harm reads: 
"Great bodily harm" means bodily injury which 
creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a 
permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ or other 
serious bodily injury. 
Wis. Stat. § 939.22(14). 
36 State v. Carli, 2 Wis. 2d 429, 437, 86 N.W.2d 434 (1957) 
provides: 
In order to prove mayhem, as charged in the first 
count, the state must prove that [the] defendant acted 
with malicious intent to maim or disfigure and that he 
cut or tore off Garber's ear.  We are satisfied that 
the cutting or tearing off of an ear, or even the 
portion disclosed by the evidence here, constitutes 
great bodily harm. . . .  
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
41 
 
¶73 While the Jury Instruction Committee has expressed 
some concern over the great bodily harm requirement being read 
into the mayhem statute, the legislature has not acted to 
correct any possible misinterpretation that arose out of the 
1978 Kirby decision or its progeny.  The inclusion of great 
bodily harm as an element supports our conclusion that the 
legislature sought a broad definition of "other bodily member" 
as great bodily harm is not limited to specific parts of the 
body.  Of course, mayhem's specific intent element to disable or 
disfigure limits the applicability of the mayhem statute.   
¶74 We conclude that the forehead qualifies as an "other 
bodily member" under Wis. Stat. § 940.21, Mayhem, because "other 
bodily member" encompasses all bodily parts.  Because all 
methods of analysis lead to the conclusion that the legislature 
intended the phrase "other bodily member" to be construed 
broadly rather than narrowly, we conclude that the forehead 
qualifies as an "other bodily member."   
IV. SCHOOL ZONE PENALTY ENHANCER 
¶75 This court must now determine whether the violent 
crime in a school zone penalty enhancer37 is unconstitutional as 
                                                 
37 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.632, Penalties; violent crime in a 
school zone, provides: 
(1) In this section: 
(a) "School" means a public, parochial or private 
school that provides an educational program for one or 
more grades between grades 1 and 12 and that is 
commonly known as an elementary school, middle school, 
junior high school, senior high school or high school. 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
42 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) "School bus" has the meaning given in s. 
340.01(56). 
(c) "School premises" means any school building, 
grounds, recreation area or athletic field or any 
other property owned, used or operated for school 
administration. 
(d) "School zone" means any of the following: 
1. On the premises of a school. 
2. Within 1,000 feet from the premises of a 
school. 
3. On a school bus or public transportation 
transporting students to and from a public or private 
school. 
3m. At school bus stops where students are 
waiting for a school bus or are being dropped off by a 
school bus. 
(e) "Violent crime" means any of the following: 
1. Any felony under s. 940.01, 940.02, 940.03, 
940.05, 940.09(1c), 940.19(2), (4) or (5), 940.21, 
940.225(1), (2) or (3), 940.305, 940.31, 941.20, 
941.21, 
943.02, 
943.06, 
943.10(2), 
943.23(1g), 
943.32(2), 948.02(1) or (2), 948.025, 948.03(2)(a) or 
(c), 948.05, 948.055, 948.07, 948.08, or 948.30(2). 
2. The solicitation, conspiracy or attempt, under 
s. 939.30, 939.31 or 939.32, to commit a Class A 
felony. 
3. Any 
misdemeanor 
under 
s. 
940.19(1), 
940.225(3m), 940.32(2), 940.42, 940.44, 941.20(1), 
941.23, 941.235, 941.24 or 941.38(3). 
(2) If a person commits a violent crime in a 
school zone, the maximum term of imprisonment is 
increased as follows: 
(a) If the violent crime is a felony, the maximum 
term of imprisonment is increased by 5 years. 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
43 
 
applied 
to 
Quintana. 
 
Quintana 
argues, 
under 
the 
equal 
protection and due process clauses of the state and federal 
constitutions, that the statute creates an irrational and 
arbitrary classification, and he questions whether school zone 
laws ever have or ever will protect a single child.  The State, 
however, argues that Quintana fails to meet his burden and show 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the school zone penalty enhancer 
is unconstitutional as applied to him.  We conclude that 
Quintana has not met his burden of proof to show that the 
penalty enhancer is unconstitutional as applied to him.  The 
legislature has determined that safety zones around our schools 
serve the public interest.  An increased penalty for those who 
commit violent crimes within 1,000 feet of "school premises" is 
a reasonable approach by the legislature to accomplish this 
legislative goal.  Quintana has failed to show that the penalty 
enhancer is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  
¶76 This 
court presumes that Wisconsin statutes are 
constitutional.  Radke, 259 Wis. 2d 13, ¶11.  Moreover, "the 
heavy burden of overcoming this presumption lies with the person 
attacking the statute."  Id.  A "party bringing the challenge 
must show the statute to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 128-36, 447 
N.W.2d 654 (1989) (applying this standard to both facial and as-
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) If the violent crime is a misdemeanor, the 
maximum term of imprisonment is increased by 3 months 
and the place of imprisonment is the county jail. 
 . . . .  
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
44 
 
applied 
challenges 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b)); 
State 
v. 
Matthew A.B., 231 Wis. 2d 688, 710, 605 N.W.2d 598 (Ct. App. 
1999) (stating "the challenger, [] bears the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Chapter 980 is unconstitutional 
as applied to him").   
¶77 "'Every presumption must be indulged to sustain the 
law if at all possible and, wherever doubt exists as to a 
legislative enactment's constitutionality, it must be resolved 
in favor of constitutionality.'"  McManus, 152 Wis. 2d at 129 
(citation 
omitted). 
A 
statute 
must 
be 
sustained 
as 
constitutional if any reasonable basis for the statute exists.  
Radke, 259 Wis. 2d 13, ¶11.  "That reasonable basis need not be 
expressly stated by the legislature; if the court can conceive 
of facts on which the legislation could reasonably be based, it 
must uphold the legislation as constitutional."  Id.   
¶78 Quintana argues that the school zone penalty enhancer 
violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the 
state and federal constitutions.  "This court has held the due 
process 
and 
equal 
protection 
clauses 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution are the substantial equivalents of their respective 
clauses in the federal constitution."  McManus, 152 Wis. 2d at 
130.  The analysis under both the due process and equal 
protection clauses is largely the same.  State v. Jorgensen, 
2003 WI 105, ¶32, 264 Wis. 2d 157, 667 N.W.2d 318 (citing 
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991)).   
¶79  The 
equal 
protection 
clause 
requires 
that 
the 
legislature have reasonable and practical grounds for the 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
45 
 
classifications that it draws.  McManus, 152 Wis. 2d at 130.  
When neither a fundamental right has been interfered with nor a 
suspect 
class 
been 
disadvantaged 
as 
a 
result 
of 
the 
classification, "the legislative enactment 'must be sustained 
unless 
it 
is 
patently 
arbitrary 
and 
bears 
no 
rational 
relationship to a legitimate government interest.'"  Id. at 131 
(quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973)). 
Equal protection, however, does not preclude the state from 
treating persons within its jurisdiction differently so long as 
the classification it creates has a reasonable basis.  Id.  
¶80 Due 
process 
bars 
certain 
arbitrary, 
wrongful 
government actions.  Radke, 259 Wis. 2d 13, ¶12.  "Substantive 
due process forbids a government from exercising 'power without 
any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate 
governmental objective.'"  Id. (citation omitted). 
¶81 We conclude that the school zone penalty enhancer is 
not unconstitutional as applied to Quintana.  The legislature 
has sought to increase the penalty for those who commit violent 
crimes 
within 
1,000 
feet 
of 
"school 
premises." 
 
Under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.632, the crime of mayhem is specifically 
included in the definition of "Violent Crime."  Violent crime 
also includes a number of other crimes, such as homicide, 
battery, sexual assault, kidnapping, arson, intimidation of a 
witness, robbery by use of a dangerous weapon, child enticement, 
sexual exploitation of a child, and soliciting a child for 
prostitution.   
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
46 
 
¶82 Thus, the legislature seeks to deter a broad swath of 
violent or potentially violent crimes by increasing penalties 
for those crimes that occur within 1,000 feet of school 
premises.  One possible reason for such a law is to create a 
safe, or at least safer, zone around our schools where the 
population of children is likely higher.  Achieving safety zones 
around our schools is a legitimate governmental interest.  
Children should feel safe at school and, if possible, on their 
way to school.  The legislature seeks a safety zone in order to 
create a safe haven that children may not have further away from 
school.  Moreover, a safety zone around schools fosters a good 
learning environment. 
¶83 The 1,000-foot perimeter is rationally related to the 
government's interest.  One thousand feet is a reasonable 
distance around schools so as to further the legislature's goal 
of creating safety zones around our schools.  The legislature 
has clearly concluded that children congregate on or near school 
premises and are more likely to live near school premises.  
While one may argue that any number of feet is to some extent 
arbitrary in that the legislature chose a particular distance, 
the 1,000-foot perimeter is not patently arbitrary.  Moreover, 
it is rationally related to the government's interest.     
¶84 Quintana argues that no legitimate reason exists to 
punish more severely those who commit battery near a school from 
those who commit battery away from a school.  However, the 
legislature desires not only safe playgrounds, but also safe 
neighborhoods.  As a result, it has attempted to create a safety 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
47 
 
zone of 1,000 feet, approximately the length of three football 
fields, around schools.  The legislature certainly would not 
achieve its goal of a safety zone around schools if the 
increased penalties applied only to violent crimes on school 
grounds.  The benefits of safe school grounds dissipate 
substantially when the area surrounding the school is plagued 
with violent crime.  This is true regardless of whether that 
crime occurs inside or outside the home.   
¶85 Quintana argues that because the statute has no 
limitation as to the time of day or a requirement that children 
actually be present, the public safety goal of the legislation 
is not achieved.  However, the legislature has concluded that a 
safety zone around schools is desirable, and those advantages do 
not disappear when the school day is over.  It is unreasonable 
to believe that once the day is over, children cease to benefit 
from a safety zone around their school.   
¶86 Furthermore, requiring children to be present when the 
crime is committed is unworkable and would frustrate the purpose 
of the statute.38  Deterring violence can be difficult enough 
without placing requirements that only serve to confuse the 
legitimate goals of the statute.  The desire to deter violent 
crime around schools cannot be subjected to an unworkable 
                                                 
38 It is, however, interesting to note that according to 
police reports children were found in the house as police 
officers moved through the house searching for a potential 
victim.  One child, D.O.B. of 01-24-1991, was sleeping in a 
bedroom; one child, D.O.B. of 08-13-1992, was sleeping on the 
living room sofa. 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
48 
 
patchwork of criteria for determining whether the statute should 
or should not apply based on factors such as: did the violent 
crime take place within a structure, were weapons used, were 
children present, or would crime likely spill out into the 
streets?  Any deterrent effect would be eliminated if the law 
applied only during school hours or contained other such 
restrictions.  The switch to criminal activity is not so easily 
turned on and off.   
¶87 Whether the violence takes place on the streets or in 
a home within 1,000 feet of school premises is irrelevant to our 
analysis.  The penalty enhancers would certainly be worthless if 
violent crime in the home was not punished the same as outside 
the home.  There is simply no way to restrain the impact of 
violent crime to the four walls of the home.  The goals of the 
statute would be crippled if such a distinction were drawn.  A 
reasonable method to deter violent crime near schools is to 
clearly punish more severely, without variation, violent crime 
that occurs near schools.  We cannot expect to achieve safety 
zones around our schools if the homes around our schools are 
filled with violence.  The increased penalties further the 
state's legitimate objective.  
¶88 Quintana 
argues 
that 
State 
v. 
Hermann39 
can 
be 
distinguished from the case at hand.  He argues, as the circuit 
court concluded, that the rationale for an enhanced penalty 
                                                 
39 State v. Hermann, 164 Wis. 2d 269, 474 N.W.2d 906 (Ct. 
App. 1991). 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
49 
 
changes when a drug crime is not at issue.  We do not disagree, 
but this does not render another rationale unpersuasive or 
illogical.   
¶89 In Hermann, the court of appeals concluded that 
enhanced penalties for drug transactions near schools did not 
violate the equal protection or due process clause.  It 
concluded that drug transactions create a dangerous atmosphere, 
and thus, deterring those transactions near schools was not 
patently arbitrary or irrational, and enhanced penalties for 
drug transactions near schools did bear a reasonable and 
rational 
relationship 
to 
deterring 
such 
activity. 
 
The 
advantages of having fewer drug transactions near schools are 
similar to the advantages of having less violent crime near 
schools.  Violent crime creates a dangerous atmosphere, so 
deterring such violent crime near schools is neither patently 
arbitrary nor irrational.  Moreover, the 1,000-foot perimeter 
for 
increased 
penalties 
bears 
a 
reasonable 
and 
rational 
relationship to creating safety zones around schools. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶90 Accordingly, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
decision 
is 
affirmed.  We conclude that the forehead qualifies as an "other 
bodily member" under Wis. Stat. § 940.21, Mayhem.  Wisconsin's 
mayhem statute seeks to punish those who intentionally disable 
or disfigure another person's bodily member.  The manner in 
which the legislature used the phrase, "other bodily member," 
requires that we give that phrase a broad construction.  If 
"other bodily member" were to be narrowly construed, the 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
50 
 
construction would produce absurd results, and the purpose of 
the statute would easily be defeated.  Because the legislature 
intended the phrase "other bodily member" to be construed 
broadly rather than narrowly, the phrase "other bodily member" 
in the mayhem statute encompasses all bodily parts, including a 
person's forehead.  The application of the mayhem statute is 
limited by the need to prove that a person specifically intended 
to disable or disfigure. 
¶91 We further conclude that the violent crime in a school 
zone penalty enhancer is not unconstitutional as applied to 
Quintana.  The legislature seeks to deter violent crime near 
schools in an effort to create a safety zone around schools.  
The 1,000-foot perimeter is a reasonable distance to try to 
accomplish this legislative goal.  Quintana has failed to show 
that 
the 
penalty 
enhancer 
is 
unconstitutional 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
2006AP499-CR    
 
 
 
1