Title: Ayr-Way Stores, Inc. v. Chitwood
Citation: 300 N.E.2d 335
Docket Number: 873S162
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: August 23, 1973

300 N.E.2d 335 (1973)
AYR-WAY STORES, INC., and the E.T. Rugg Company, Appellants (Respondents Herein),
v.
Randall Scott CHITWOOD, a Minor, by Michael T. Chitwood, His Next Friend, Appellee (Petitioner Herein).
No. 873S162.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
August 23, 1973.
Rehearing Denied October 3, 1973.
*336 Keith C. Reese, William T. White, Jr., Rocap, Rocap, Reese &amp; Young, Indianapolis, for Ayr-Way Stores, Inc.
Emerson Boyd, Robert F. Zoccola, Locke, Reynolds, Boyd &amp; Weisell, Indianapolis, for E.T. Rugg Co.
Forrest Bowman, Jr., George E. Martz, Martz, Bowman &amp; Kammen, Indianapolis, Parr, Richey, Obremsky, Pedersen &amp; Morton, Lebanon, for appellee.
HUNTER, Justice.
This is an action for personal injuries brought by Michael Chitwood on behalf of his four-year-old son against the manufacturer and seller of a power lawnmower. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $80,000. Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals for the First District. Ayr-Way Stores, Inc. v. Chitwood (1973), Ind. App., 292 N.E.2d 298.
The primary issue raised on appeal was whether the trial court erred in granting Chitwood's motion to amend his complaint to conform to the evidence during trial. The defendants maintain that if to allow the amendment was not error, then they were entitled to a continuance to meet the new issues raised by the amendments. The Court of Appeals agreed with the defendants and reversed the trial court. The cause was remanded for a new trial in order to avoid "trial by ambush." 292 N.E.2d 302.
The facts disclose that on May 30, 1966, Michael Chitwood purchased a riding lawnmower from Ayr-Way. The mower was in a sealed carton which was placed in Chitwood's car by the employees of Ayr-Way. Instructions were inside the carton. This particular model had a single pedal which operated as both a clutch and a brake. After attaching the steering wheel and adding gas and oil to the engine, Michael Chitwood, assisted by his brother, Wayne, began to mow his lawn. The mower appeared to operate satisfactorily in forward gear. Releasing the foot pedal caused the machine to stop. Wayne Chitwood began mowing in the back yard. Coming to the junction of two sidewalks, he stopped the mower, put it in reverse gear, and started to back up. When he looked over his shoulder he saw the plaintiff, *337 Randall Chitwood, standing behind him. He released the pedal, but the mower continued to move, running over the plaintiff. This resulted in permanent and severe injuries to the four-year-old child, including amputation of the great toe and distal head of the metatarsal bone on his left foot and severe lacerations to his lower lumbar region and buttocks.
Chitwood's complaint was in two paragraphs, alleging breach of express warranty and negligence as to both defendants. Trial commenced on June 2, 1971. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, Chitwood moved to amend his complaint pursuant to Trial Rule 15(B), IC 1971, 34-5-1-1. The amendment consisted of two additional paragraphs alleging strict liability and breach of implied warranty. The trial court granted Chitwood's motion and denied the defendant's motion for a continuance.
The Court of Appeals held that the defendants had not impliedly litigated the added issues of strict liability and implied warranty. Therefore, the failure to grant a continuance was prejudicial to the defense because they were forced to defend two entirely new issues without sufficient time for preparation. We do not agree.
Trial Rule 15(B) reads as follows:
Prior to the adoption of our present Rules of Trial Procedure, the Indiana Appellate Court was faced with a procedural issue analogous to the one in the instant case. The case was General Outdoor Advertising Co., Inc. v. LaSalle Realty Corp. (1967), 141 Ind. App. 247, 218 N.E.2d 141. Plaintiff's complaint was grounded on a contract theory, but the proof introduced at trial, without objection, was in negligence. On appeal, the issue before the court was whether the pleadings could be amended to conform to the evidence presented. The defendant-appellant contended that the variance was fatal to the plaintiff's claim. The court answered:
Similarly, in Morrison's Southern Plaza Corp., et al. v. Southern Plaza, Inc. (1969), 252 Ind. 109, 120-121, 246 N.E.2d 191, this Court reiterated:
It cannot be denied that the policy behind Trial Rule 15(B) is to promote relief for a party based upon the evidence actually forthcoming at trial, notwithstanding the initial direction set by the pleadings. Moreover, in the instant case, Chitwood sufficiently pleaded facts in his original complaint which should have put the defendants on notice as to the evidence to be presented at trial. The amendments did not alter the factual theory of plaintiff's claim for relief. In his original complaint, Chitwood alleged that Rugg manufactured a defective lawnmower, that his father purchased the lawnmower from Ayr-Way, and that the defect caused the lawnmower to malfunction resulting in his injuries. It is cogently clear that more than one legal theory supports recovery under these facts.
Even without amendment to the pleadings, the trial of the issues of strict liability and implied warranty would have proceeded absent any objection from the defendants on the grounds that the offered evidence was outside the pleadings. No such objection to evidence was made here. It is when a party objects to evidence because it is outside the issues raised by the pleadings that the question of the utility of a continuance arises.
In their motion for a continuance, defendants merely raise a general allegation of prejudice. They do not carry their burden of pointing out to the trial court in what way they have been denied substantial rights. Certainly there are times when an amendment of the pleadings would require the granting of a continuance. But in such a case, the party moving for a continuance must show that allowing the amendment would prejudice his rights in maintaining his action or defense. Defendants Ayr-Way and Rugg have not carried *339 that affirmative burden in this case. The Court of Appeals stated:
We agree with this statement but would carry it to its logical conclusion, i.e., that, therefore, the amendment was properly granted since the proof at trial sustained a theory of strict liability and/or breach of implied warranty. Further, that no prejudice issue can be raised by the defendants who have consented to the proof offered. No objection was made by either defendant to the evidence presented during plaintiff's case in chief.
Whether or not to grant a continuance where pleadings are amended is a matter of discretion for the trial court. Absent a showing of clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion, the trial court's ruling will not be disturbed by an appellate court. Defendants urge that they were greatly prejudiced by denial of their motion for a continuance. However, they fail to show in what way they were deprived of any substantial rights. We shall treat each of their arguments individually.
Defendants contend that by allowing the amended allegations they were deprived of the right to voir dire the jury on the issues of strict liability and implied warranty. This contention is absolutely without merit. Would the defendants have us believe that in every civil case where a party is allowed to amend pleadings to conform to the evidence that the trial of the cause must start anew? The purpose of TR 15(B) is to afford relief based on the evidence presented at trial. The underlying policy is to promote speedy justice, not to create multiplicity in litigation. To agree with the defendants herein would completely destroy the efficacy of TR 15(B). We reject this contention.
Defendants contend that by allowing the amendment they were prejudiced on their defense of the merits of the action. Here again, the defendants fail to show in what way they were prejudiced. They offer no credible showing of any defense of which they were deprived. They in no way show that the defense against the claims of strict liability and implied warranty would be so different so as to prejudice their defense against negligence and express warranty. In all candor, it appears that the defendants are alleging prejudice because the plaintiff has made a good case for recovery.
In their motion to correct errors, defendants allege clear abuse of trial court discretion without showing such abuse. A general allegation unsupported by clear and convincing arguments should not be the basis for reversing the trial court's action in denying a motion for continuance.
The rule of strict liability in tort is set out in § 402A, Restatement 2d of Torts:
Indiana subscribes to this theory of liability. Perfection Paint &amp; Color Co. v. Konduris (1970), Ind. App., 258 N.E.2d 681; Cornette v. Searjeant Metal Products, Inc. (1970), Ind. App., 258 N.E.2d 652. An examination of the record in the case at bar discloses that the evidence supports a theory of strict liability. Plaintiff showed (1) a purchase of (2) a defective product from (3) a seller engaged in the business of selling such a product (4) and the product reached him without substantial change in its condition and (5) that the product caused physical harm because of the defect. Through these facts the plaintiff has laid his basis for recovery. The evidence was not objected to at trial. We quote with approval Indianapolis Transit System, Inc. v. Williams (1971), Ind. App., 269 N.E.2d 543, where the court held:
We turn now to the issue of whether defendants can claim prejudice on the basis that breach of implied warranty was added in the amended allegations. Recovery for breach of implied warranty is a statutory remedy governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. The relevant provisions at issue are IC (1971), XX-X-X-XXX and IC (1971), XX-X-X-XXX; Ind. Stat. Ann. §§ 19-2-314 to 19-2-315 (1964 Repl.):
Once again, we turn to the Court of Appeals opinion:
Contrary to the position taken by the Court of Appeals, the record shows that (1) Ayr-Way was a merchant (2) dealing in lawnmowers (3) and that the lawnmower was not fit, neither when purchased nor when demonstrated to the court at trial.
From an examination of the record, we offer the following observations:
1. Plaintiff's evidence on the issues of strict liability and breach of implied warranty was admitted at trial over no objection by defendants.
2. The trial court correctly applied TR 15(B) to allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint.
3. The defendants failed to show how they were prejudiced by the trial court's action in denying their motion for a continuance.
For all of the foregoing reasons, transfer is hereby granted and the judgment of the trial court in this cause should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and DeBRULER, GIVAN and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.