Title: Finebaum v. Coulter
Citation: 854 So. 2d 1120
Docket Number: 1000676
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 7, 2003

854 So. 2d 1120 (2003)
Paul FINEBAUM and Capstar Operating Corporation d/b/a WERC AM/FM Radio
v.
Richard Matthew COULTER.
1000676.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 7, 2003.
*1121 Warren B. Lightfoot and Ivan B. Cooper of Lightfoot, Franklin &amp; White, L.L.C., Birmingham; L. Graves Stiff III, Jeannie Bugg Walston, and Elise May Frohsin of Starnes &amp; Atchison, L.L.P., Birmingham; *1122 and Lee Levine and Jay Ward Brown of Levine, Sullivan &amp; Koch, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for appellants.
Robert Hayes and Jackie Swinford of Hayes &amp; Swinford, Birmingham; and Sterling L. DeRamus, Birmingham, for appellee.
E. Cutter Hughes of Bradley Arant Rose &amp; White, LLP, Huntsville, for amici curiae The Huntsville Times Co., Inc.; The Birmingham News Company; The Mobile Press Register, Inc.; Florence Times Daily; Gadsden Times; Tuscaloosa News; WHNT 19; Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press; Birmingham Post Herald; WCFT-TV; WJSU-TV; WBMA-LP; and The Montgomery Advertiser.
JOHNSTONE, Justice.
Paul Finebaum and Capstar Operating Corporation d/b/a WERC AM/FM Radio ("WERC") petitioned this Court for permission to appeal a trial court order denying in part their motion for a summary judgment. We granted their petition. We now reverse the partial denial of the motion for a summary judgment filed by Finebaum and WERC, and we remand the cause for entry of an appropriate judgment.
Plaintiff Richard Matthew Coulter sued Finebaum and WERC for defamation, conspiracy, the tort of outrage, and invasion of privacy. The gravamen of each theory was a comment by Finebaum about Coulter, a sportscaster, during Finebaum's December 15, 1998 radio talk show. Specifically, Coulter complained that, by comparing a conversation on Coulter's own radio program between Coulter and another male participant with "oral sex," Finebaum had, on his program, implied that Coulter "is a homosexual."
Finebaum and WERC moved for a summary judgment on several grounds. The first was that, because Finebaum's statement was an expression of opinion, it was not defamatory. The second ground was that, because Finebaum's statement was "rhetorical hyperbole" protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the statement was not actionable. The third ground was that Coulter's status as a public figure required him to prove that Finebaum made his statement with actual malice, which Coulter could not prove. The last ground was that Finebaum's statement did not cause Coulter any physical or mental injury or any economic loss. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Finebaum and WERC on Coulter's conspiracy claim, but denied summary judgment on Coulter's other claims.
Finebaum was a sports journalist who hosted a daily sports talk radio program. Coulter was likewise a sports journalist who hosted his own radio talk program. Coulter had been a sports journalist, either on television or on radio, for over 20 years.
On December 15, 1998, on his radio program, Finebaum was discussing the motivation of college football recruiters and the deferential treatment that recruiters receive from sportscasters and coaches. Finebaum took a telephone call from a caller identified as "Reg from Altadena." The following colloquy occurred between Finebaum and "Reg":
Finebaum made no other reference to Coulter.
In Coulter's deposition, he admitted that he had "been a public sports figure and analyst and sportscaster for ... seventeen to eighteen years...." In Finebaum's deposition, he testified that his December 15, 1998 statement about Coulter's radio program was "an attempt to satire, an attempt to humor, trying to characterize a little bit about our business, the business of sports and sports entertainment." Coulter's attorney asked Finebaum, "Did you make the statement with any animosity toward Mr. Coulter?" Finebaum replied, "Absolutely not." Coulter's attorney asked Finebaum, "So you were not saying that [Coulter] was gay?" Finebaum replied, "Absolutely not."
"`[T]he freedom to speak one's mind is not only an aspect of individual libertyand thus a good unto itselfbut also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a *1124 whole.'" Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-51, 108 S. Ct. 876, 99 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1988) (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-04, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 80 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1984)).
Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 12, 90 S. Ct. 1537, 26 L. Ed. 2d 6 (1970) (footnote omitted).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974). A public figure
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510, 111 S. Ct. 2419, 115 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1991), and Sanders v. Smitherman, 776 So. 2d 68, 71 (Ala.2000) (emphasis added).
Falwell, 485 U.S.  at 56, 108 S. Ct. 876. When a public official or public figure alleges a defamatory meaning, a defamatory implication, or a defamatory innuendo, "[n]ot only must the plaintiff establish that *1125 the statement is susceptible of a defamatory meaning which the defendants knew to be false or which the defendants published with reckless disregard for its potential falsity, but also that the defendants intended to imply or were reckless toward the implications." Saenz v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 841 F.2d 1309, 1318-19 (7th Cir.1988) (footnote omitted). See Dodds v. American Broad. Co., 145 F.3d 1053, 1063-64 (9th Cir.1998); Newton v. National Broad. Co., 930 F.2d 662, 681 (9th Cir.1990); Tilton v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 905 F. Supp. 1514, 1523 (N.D.Okla.1995); Worrell-Payne v. Gannett Co., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1176-77 (D.Idaho). See also Loveless v. Graddick, 295 Ala. 142, 148, 325 So. 2d 137, 142 (1975). "`[T]he most repulsive speech enjoys immunity provided it falls short of a deliberate or reckless untruth.' " Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284, 94 S. Ct. 2770, 41 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1974) (quoting Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63, 86 S. Ct. 657, 15 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1966)).
The First Amendment also protects mere rhetorical hyperbole or statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as representing actual facts. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 111 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990); Letter Carriers, 418 U.S.  at 284-86, 94 S. Ct. 2770; Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n, 398 U.S.  at 14, 90 S. Ct. 1537. See also Harris v. School Annual Publ'g Co., 466 So. 2d 963, 965 (Ala.1985).
Milkovich, 497 U.S.  at 16-20, 110 S. Ct. 2695 (emphasis added).
Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n, 398 U.S. 10-11, 90 S. Ct. 1537.
Addressing whether the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964), actual-malice standard applies to a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress allegedly inflicted by an allegedly "outrageous" "ad parody" published in a magazine, the United States Supreme Court stated:
Falwell, 485 U.S. 50-57, 108 S. Ct. 876 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
"Whether a communication is reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning is, in the first instance, a question of law." Camp v. Yeager, 601 So. 2d 924, 926 (Ala.1992). "[I]f the communication is not reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning, there is no issue of fact, and summary judgment is proper." Harris, 466 So. 2d  at 964-65. "However, if the trial court finds that the statement is reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning, `it is then for the jury to say whether [the statement was] in fact so understood.'" Yeager, 601 So. 2d  at 927 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 111, at 781 (5th ed.1984)). "[T]he test to be applied [by the court] in determining the defamatory nature of an imputation is that meaning which `would be ascribed to the language by a reader or listener of ordinary or average intelligence, or by a "common mind."`" Loveless, 295 Ala. at 148, 325 So. 2d  at 142. Similarly, "`[t]he question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question of law.'" Milkovich, 497 U.S.  at 17, 110 S. Ct. 2695 (quoting Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 105 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1989)).
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., and Dobbs v. Shelby County Econ. &amp; Indus. Dev. Auth., 749 So. 2d 425 (Ala.1999). The court must accept the tendencies of the evidence most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. System Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Boykin, 683 So. 2d 419 (Ala.1996). "In a ruling on a *1129 summary-judgment motion in a defamation action involving a public figure, the trial judge must determine whether the plaintiff has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice." Sanders, 776 So. 2d  at 71. "`[I]n cases raising First Amendment issues ... an appellate court has an obligation to "make an independent examination of the whole record" in order to make sure that "the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.'"" Milkovich, 497 U.S.  at 17, 110 S. Ct. 2695 (quoting Bose Corp., 466 U.S.  at 499, 104 S. Ct. 1949, quoting in turn New Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.  at 284-86, 84 S.Ct. 710).
In the context of Finebaum's December 15, 1998 sports talk radio program, Finebaum's statement"It was Matt Coulter, and I can't remember the other clown, it, I mean, these two guys really slobbered over each other, I mean, I really thought they were going to start performing oral sex on one another, it was so sickening"was not a statement that can "`reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts' about [Coulter]." Milkovich, 497 U.S.  at 20, 110 S. Ct. 2695. Finebaum's statement is only rhetorical hyperbole, which the United States Supreme Court has held protected by the First Amendment. Moreover, Coulter did not present clear and convincing evidence that Finebaum intended to imply that Coulter is a homosexual. Saenz, supra. Finally, Coulter did not present clear and convincing evidence that Finebaum made the statement with actual malice. Accordingly, Finebaum and WERC are entitled to summary judgment on Coulter's defamation, tort of outrage, and invasion of privacy claims.
Therefore, the trial court erred in denying the summary judgment motion filed by Finebaum and WERC as it applied to these claims. We reverse the denial and remand this cause to the trial court for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, HARWOOD, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.