Title: Kormanik v. Brash
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2022AP001736-W
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: October 26, 2022

2022 WI 67
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This order is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound volume of the official 
reports.   
 
 
 
No.  2022AP1736-W 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Nancy Kormanik, 
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
William Brash, in his official capacity as 
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, 
 
          Respondent,  
 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Democratic 
National Committee, and Rise, Inc., 
 
          Interested Parties.   
FILED 
 
OCT 26, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Court entered the following order on this date: 
 
¶1 
Nancy Kormanik has filed a petition for a supervisory 
writ, claiming that petitions for leave to appeal filed by the 
Democratic National Committee ("DNC") and Rise, Inc. ("Rise") in 
Kormanik v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, Case Nos. 2022AP1720-
LV and 2022AP1727-LV, are pending in the wrong appellate district.  
Because we agree with Kormanik, we grant her petition for a 
No.  2022AP1736-W 
2 
 
supervisory writ and vacate the appellate order transferring venue 
from District II to District IV. 
¶2 
This case arose out of a lawsuit filed by Kormanik in 
Waukesha County circuit court against the Wisconsin Elections 
Commission ("WEC").  Generally speaking, the complaint alleged 
that two documents provided by the WEC to municipal clerks 
erroneously interpreted certain election statutes as permitting a 
clerk to "spoil" an absentee ballot at an elector's request.  The 
complaint asked the circuit court to:  (1) declare that municipal 
clerks are prohibited from "spoiling" a previously completed and 
submitted absentee ballot; (2) declare that any WEC publication 
that states otherwise shall be rescinded or otherwise removed from 
availability to the public; (3) declare that the WEC failed to 
promulgate the documents at issue as administrative rules; and (4) 
temporarily and permanently require the WEC to cease offering 
incorrect guidance and to promptly issue corrected guidance. 
¶3 
Rise and the DNC moved to intervene in the matter.  The 
circuit court granted their motions. 
¶4 
Kormanik moved the circuit court to issue a temporary 
injunction directing the WEC to withdraw the challenged documents 
and to cease providing further guidance on the subject.  On Friday, 
October 7, 2022, after a hearing, the circuit court granted 
Kormanik's motion and thereby required the WEC to withdraw the 
challenged documents and all similar publications, as well as to 
No.  2022AP1736-W 
3 
 
notify all municipal clerks and local elections officials of their 
withdrawal, by 7:00 p.m. on October 10, 2022.  The WEC moved the 
court to stay the temporary injunction, which the circuit court 
denied. 
¶5 
Later on October 7, 2022, the DNC and Rise filed separate 
petitions for leave to appeal and requests for a stay of the 
circuit court's temporary injunction pending appeal.  The DNC and 
Rise directed their petitions and stay requests to appellate 
District IV. 
¶6 
The court of appeals, by Chief Judge William Brash, 
ordered the parties to file letter memoranda by Monday, October 
10, 2022, regarding the proper appellate district to consider the 
petitions and stay requests.   
¶7 
The letter memoranda subsequently filed by the parties 
addressed the following statutes (2019-20): 
Wis. Stat. § 752.21 
(1) Except as provided in sub. (2), a judgment or order 
appealed to the court of appeals shall be heard in the 
court of appeals district which contains the court from 
which the judgment or order is appealed. 
(2) A judgment or order appealed from an action venued 
in a county designated by the plaintiff to the action as 
provided under s. 801.50(3)(a) shall be heard in a court 
of appeals district selected by the appellant but the 
court of appeals district may not be the court of appeals 
district that contains the court from which the judgment 
or order is appealed. 
 
No.  2022AP1736-W 
4 
 
Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(a) and (b) 
(a) Except as provided in pars. (b) and (c), all actions 
in which the sole defendant is the state, any state board 
or commission, or any state officer, employee, or agent 
in an official capacity shall be venued in the county 
designated by the plaintiff unless another venue is 
specifically authorized by law. 
(b) All actions relating to the validity or [invalidity] 
of a rule or guidance document shall be venued as 
provided in s. 227.40(1). 
 
Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1)  
(1) Except as provided in sub. (2), the exclusive means 
of judicial review of the validity of a rule or guidance 
document shall be an action for declaratory judgment as 
to the validity of the rule or guidance document brought 
in the circuit court for the county where the party 
asserting the invalidity of the rule or guidance 
document resides or has its principal place of business 
or, if that party is a nonresident or does not have its 
principal place of business in this state, in the circuit 
court for the county where the dispute arose. The officer 
or other agency whose rule or guidance document is 
involved shall be the party defendant. . . .  The court 
shall render a declaratory judgment in the action only 
when it appears . . . that the rule or guidance document 
or its threatened application interferes with or 
impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the 
legal rights and privileges of the plaintiff.  A 
declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the 
plaintiff has first requested the agency to pass upon 
the validity of the rule or guidance document in 
question. 
 
¶8 
In its legal memorandum to Chief Judge Brash, the DNC 
argued that according to precedent——primarily, State ex rel. DNR 
v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District IV, 2018 WI 25, 380 
Wis. 2d 354, 909 N.W.2d 114——Kormanik's complaint fell within the 
No.  2022AP1736-W 
5 
 
scope of § 801.50(3)(a), and therefore triggered the appellate 
venue-shifting provision of § 752.21(2).  The DNC argued that 
because, under DNR, a plaintiff still "designates" a circuit court 
venue under § 801.50(3)(a) even though the plaintiff is required 
by another statute to lay venue in that particular county, Kormanik 
should 
also 
be 
deemed 
to 
have 
designated 
venue 
under 
§ 801.50(3)(a)——thereby triggering the venue-shifting provision of 
§ 752.21(2)——even though her complaint cited § 801.50(3)(b).  
Finally, the DNC argued that Kormanik's complaint fell within the 
scope of § 801.50(3)(a) because her claim goes beyond that 
contemplated by § 801.50(3)(b) in that it is not restricted to a 
§ 227.40(1) action relating to the validity or invalidity of a 
guidance document, but additionally seeks injunctive relief. 
¶9 
Like the DNC, Rise argued in its letter memorandum to 
Chief Judge Brash that Kormanik's complaint is governed by Wis. 
Stat. § 801.50(3)(a) because her complaint was not truly a 
challenge to the validity of a guidance document, but instead was 
one seeking a declaratory judgment regarding various election 
statutes. 
¶10 In her letter response to Chief Judge Brash's order, 
Kormanik argued that her case was venued as a matter of law under 
Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(b) because it is a declaratory judgment 
action under § 227.40(1) relating to the validity of a guidance 
document by the WEC.  Because the case was venued under 
No.  2022AP1736-W 
6 
 
§ 801.50(3)(b), Kormanik argued, any appeal from that action had 
to be venued in the district encompassing the Waukesha County 
circuit court pursuant to § 752.21(1). 
¶11 On the same day that the parties filed their letter 
memoranda on appellate venue, Chief Judge Brash entered an order 
that largely agreed with the DNC's position.  Chief Judge Brash 
held that, under the reasoning of DNR, even though Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.50(3)(b) required Kormanik to designate venue in the circuit 
court in accordance with § 227.40(1), she was also designating 
venue within the meaning of § 801.50(3)(a).  Thus, the venue-
shifting provision of § 752.21(2) applied, such that venue was 
appropriate in the appellate district selected by the DNC and Rise—
—District IV.1 
¶12 Later in the day on October 10, 2022, District IV issued 
an order in both leave matters.  Because the circuit court's 
injunction order required that the WEC comply with it by 7:00 p.m. 
that evening, the court of appeals granted a temporary stay of the 
circuit court's injunction pending the court of appeals' decision 
on whether to grant leave to appeal. 
                                                 
1 We note that Chief Judge Brash's order was captioned as 
applying only to the appeal number associated with the DNC's 
petition for leave to appeal, Case No. 2022AP1720-LV.  The order 
self-evidently also applies to the appeal number associated with 
Rise's petition for leave to appeal, Case No. 2022AP1727-LV. 
 
No.  2022AP1736-W 
7 
 
¶13 The following day, October 11, 2022, Kormanik filed a 
petition for a supervisory writ in this court.2  As she did below, 
Kormanik argued that Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(b) controlled venue in 
the circuit court because she filed a declaratory judgment action 
under § 227.40(1) that related to the validity or invalidity of a 
rule or guidance document.  Because venue was proper under 
§ 801.50(3)(b), Kormanik argued, this case cannot also fall within 
§ 801.50(3)(a).  This is so because § 801.50 itself describes 
subsection (3)(b) as an exception to subsection (3)(a), and the 
court must give that exception meaning.  She asked this court to 
stay the proceedings in the court of appeals during the pendency 
of her writ petition, and to order the leave petitions filed by 
the DNC and Rise to be returned to District II.3  
¶14 On October 12, 2022, this court ordered responses to 
Kormanik's writ petition.  It also directed the court of appeals 
                                                 
2 The caption in this case designates the Court of Appeals, 
Districts II and IV as respondents. It also designates the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission as defendant-respondent and the 
Democratic National Committee and Rise, Inc. as intervenor-
defendant-respondents.  These designations are in error.  The clerk 
of this court is directed to amend the caption to remove the Court 
of Appeals, Districts II and IV as respondents; to designate Judge 
William Brash, in his official capacity as Chief Judge of the Court 
of Appeals, as the respondent; and to designate the Wisconsin 
Elections Commission, the Democratic National Committee, and Rise, 
Inc. as other interested parties.  We use this corrected caption 
in this order. 
 
3 Kormanik did not ask this court to vacate the stay of the 
circuit court injunction order issued by District IV.  Because we 
have not been requested to address the stay, we do not address it.   
No.  2022AP1736-W 
8 
 
to take no further action in Case Nos. 2022AP1720-LV and 
2022AP1727-LV until further order of this court. 
¶15 In his response, Chief Judge Brash sets forth two primary 
reasons why Kormanik's writ petition should be denied.  First, he 
argues that he did not violate any plain legal duty because his 
venue order was correct under the applicable statutes and the 
reasoning of DNR.  He asserts that in DNR, this court concluded 
that both Wis. Stat. §§ 801.50(3)(a) and 227.53(1)(a)3. could 
apply, such that even when § 227.53(1)(a)3. required the plaintiff 
to venue the circuit court action in the plaintiff's county of 
residence, the plaintiff was still designating venue within the 
meaning of § 801.50(3)(a).  Here, Chief Judge Brash maintains that 
§ 801.50(3)(b) required Kormanik to venue her complaint in 
Waukesha County under § 227.40(1), but as in DNR, that requirement 
does not mean that Kormanik did not also designate venue under 
subsection (3)(a).  Second, Chief Judge Brash argues that Kormanik 
forfeited any arguments based on DNR because she did not raise 
those arguments in her letter memorandum to him regarding appellate 
venue. 
¶16 DNC and Rise filed responses that largely repeat their 
arguments made in their letter memoranda to Chief Judge Brash. 
¶17 Kormanik's writ petition and the responses thereto are 
now before us to decide whether to grant the requested writ.  "A 
supervisory writ is 'an extraordinary and drastic remedy that is 
No.  2022AP1736-W 
9 
 
to be issued only upon some grievous exigency.'"  DNR, 380 
Wis. 2d 354, ¶8 (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶17, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110).  "As the 
court of original jurisdiction, we have discretion to issue a 
supervisory writ."  State v. Buchanan, 2013 WI 31, ¶11, 346 
Wis. 2d 735, 828 N.W.2d 847.  In DNR, this court addressed whether 
the requirements for a supervisory writ were satisfied in the 
context of an appellate venue challenge under Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.21(2).  DNR, 380 Wis. 2d 354, ¶2.  There, we stated that:  
To justify the writ, a petitioner must demonstrate that: 
"(1) an appeal is an inadequate remedy; (2) grave 
hardship or irreparable harm will result; (3) the duty 
of the trial court is plain and it . . . acted or intends 
to act in violation of that duty; and (4) the request 
for relief is made promptly and speedily." 
 
Id., ¶9 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶17).     
¶18 We will consider only the first three factors identified 
above, as there is no dispute that Kormanik "promptly and speedily" 
filed her writ petition by doing so the day after the court of 
appeals issued its venue order.  We address the remaining three 
factors in turn. 
¶19 The obligation to venue an appeal in the correct district 
is a "plain duty" for purposes of the supervisory writ 
requirements.  We reasoned in DNR that because the general 
appellate venue provision in § 752.21 utilizes the mandatory word 
No.  2022AP1736-W 
10 
 
"shall," "the court of appeals has no discretion with respect to 
where it must hear the appeal. . . . [T]he obligation to venue the 
appeal in the correct district is clear, unequivocal, and 
mandatory.   It is, therefore, a 'plain duty' within the meaning 
of our supervisory writ jurisprudence."  380 Wis. 2d 354, ¶13.   
¶20 Having determined that a plain duty existed, the 
question becomes whether Chief Judge Brash violated this duty when 
he ordered the transfer of appellate venue from District II to 
District IV.  We conclude that he did.     
¶21 To begin, we note that Kormanik's lawsuit clearly 
"relat[ed] to the validity or [invalidity] of a rule or guidance 
document" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(b).  It is 
likewise clear that Kormanik's lawsuit remained within the 
confines of § 801.50(3)(b) even though she sought injunctive 
relief in addition to declaratory relief.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.50(3)(b) (requiring actions brought thereunder to "be venued 
as provided in s. 227.40 (1)"); see also Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1) 
(providing that "the exclusive means of judicial review of the 
validity of a rule or guidance document shall be an action for 
declaratory judgment as to the validity of the rule or guidance 
document").  Because Kormanik's claim for injunctive relief was 
completely dependent upon a favorable decision on her claim for 
declaratory relief, her action is quintessentially one for 
declaratory relief.  See Wis. Stat. § 806.04(1) ("Courts of record 
No.  2022AP1736-W 
11 
 
within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare 
rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further 
relief is or could be claimed.").  
¶22 Having determined that Kormanik's action "relat[ed] to 
the validity or [invalidity] of a rule or guidance document" within 
the meaning of § 801.50(3)(b), the question becomes whether, as 
Chief 
Judge 
Brash 
reasoned, 
venue 
is 
also 
proper 
under 
§ 801.50(3)(a).  The answer is no.  The legislature chose to begin 
subsection (3)(a) with the phrase "Except as provided in pars. (b) 
and (c), . . . ."  Although the DNC argues that this phrase means 
that subsection (3)(b) "is incorporated by reference in subsection 
(3)(a)," agreeing with this argument would require us to ignore 
the plain meaning of that phrase.  We will not do so; a statute 
cannot incorporate that which it specifically excepts. 
¶23 The legislature "expresses its purpose by words.  It is 
for us to ascertain——neither to add nor to subtract, neither to 
delete nor to distort."  62 Cases, More or Less, Each Containing 
Six Jars of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 596 (1951).  The 
language of Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(a) and (3)(b) is plain, whether 
considered alone or in conjunction with the appellate venue 
statute, § 752.21.  The challenged interpretation of these 
statutes is not true to their language.   
¶24 We are unpersuaded by alternative arguments raised in 
opposition.  Although Chief Judge Brash claims that Kormanik has 
No.  2022AP1736-W 
12 
 
forfeited any precedent-based arguments by failing to raise them 
in her letter memorandum on appellate venue, this argument is 
unpersuasive given that Kormanik's arguments depend not on 
precedent but on the plain text of the applicable statutes.  
Moreover, the case cited most frequently in the parties' briefing, 
DNR, is not as on point as the DNC, Rise, and Chief Judge Brash 
suggest.  DNR did not involve the interplay between § 801.50(3)(a) 
and (3)(b), and indeed made clear that § 801.50(3)(b) was "not 
relevant to this case."  DNR, 380 Wis. 2d 354, ¶16 n.8.  The other 
case cited in the parties' briefing, Teigen v. Wisconsin Elections 
Commission, 2022 WI 64, 403 Wis. 2d 607, 976 N.W.2d 519, is 
similarly unenlightening.  Our decision in Teigen arose from a 
Waukesha County case against the Wisconsin Elections Commission 
that was venued on appeal in District IV after the appellants 
selected that district——without objection——pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.21(2).  However, Teigen came to us on a petition for bypass, 
so the issue of proper appellate venue was not presented and was 
not litigated.  Teigen is not helpful authority on an issue left 
unexamined.  
¶25 Next, we determine whether an appeal would be an adequate 
remedy to address the question of appropriate appellate venue.  
Based on our holding in DNR, the answer is no.  We explained in 
DNR that there is no "appellate pathway" to seek review of 
appellate venue questions, and that obtaining review of such 
No.  2022AP1736-W 
13 
 
questions via a petition for review "would depend on a 
serendipitous confluence between (1) the venue error, and (2) a 
'plus' factor, such as we describe in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.62(1r) (criteria for granting review)."  380 Wis. 2d 354, ¶43. 
Thus, we concluded "that a petition to review the court of appeals' 
eventual decision on the merits is an inadequate remedy to address 
the question of appropriate appellate venue."  Id., ¶45.  This 
rationale clearly applies to Kormanik's writ petition in this case. 
¶26 Finally, we determine whether Kormanik would suffer 
irreparable harm if this court denies the supervisory writ.  Again, 
we are guided by our decision in DNR.  There, we reasoned that the 
right to choice of venue under § 752.21(2) is a "statutorily 
granted right" and that it is "nearly tautological to observe that 
losing a statutorily-granted right is a harm.  Losing the right 
with no means to recover it makes the harm irreparable."  Id., 
¶47.  We further held in DNR that because a petition for review is 
not a suitable remedy for correcting an error in appellate venue, 
without a supervisory writ, an appellate litigant "would be left 
with no sure means by which to remedy the deprivation of its 
statutory right.  That makes the loss, by definition, irreparable." 
Id., ¶47.  Thus, for purposes of the irreparable harm requirement 
for obtaining a supervisory writ, DNR held that losing the right 
to a statutorily mandated appellate venue is itself an irreparable 
No.  2022AP1736-W 
14 
 
harm.  Under the rationale of DNR, Kormanik would suffer an 
irreparable harm if she were denied a change of appellate venue. 
¶27 Whether to issue a supervisory writ is, as we have 
repeatedly affirmed, a discretionary decision.  Buchanan, 346 
Wis. 2d 735, ¶11.  While not every appellate venue question is 
proper fodder for a supervisory writ, we determine it is 
appropriate here in light of our decision in DNR and to facilitate 
the efficient administration of justice in the decision on appeal.  
We therefore grant the petition for a supervisory writ and vacate 
the October 10, 2022 appellate order transferring appellate venue 
from District II to District IV.  The court of appeals shall hear 
these matters in District II. 
¶28 IT IS ORDERED that the petition for supervisory writ is 
granted, and the October 10, 2022 order of the Chief Judge 
transferring appellate venue from District II to District IV of 
the court of appeals is vacated; and 
¶29 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petitions for leave to 
appeal filed by the Democratic National Committee and Rise, Inc., 
respectively, in Kormanik v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, Case 
Nos. 2022AP1720-LV and 2022AP1727-LV, shall be heard in District 
II of the court of appeals. 
No.  2022AP1736-W.rfd 
 
15 
 
¶30 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the court's order granting Kormanik's petition for a supervisory 
writ.  A straightforward application of the venue statutes, Wis. 
Stat. §§ 801.50(3)(b), 752.21(2) and the related statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 227.40(1), requires that the petitions for leave to appeal 
and motions for temporary stay pending appeal be decided by 
District II of the court of appeals, not District IV.  And given 
the court of appeals' decision on venue in this case, exercising 
our equitable discretion to grant the writ is the only way to 
ensure that this case is heard in a timely manner and in the proper 
venue.   
¶31 I write separately, however, because I am concerned that 
our decision in State ex rel. DNR v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 
District IV, 2018 WI 25, 380 Wis. 2d 354, 909 N.W.2d 114 (DNR) may 
be written too broadly, and in a way that appears inconsistent 
with other decisions regarding the availability of supervisory 
writs.  A supervisory writ is supposed to be an "extraordinary and 
drastic remedy that is to be issued only upon some grievous 
exigency."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 
WI 58, ¶17, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Yet DNR appears to 
suggest that whenever the court of appeals misapplies the venue 
statutes, a per se irreparable harm has occurred which an appeal 
cannot adequately remedy, and a supervisory writ must issue as a 
result.  See DNR, 380 Wis. 2d 354, ¶¶43-48.  These conclusions are 
hard to square, however, with the equitable discretion we have in 
deciding whether to grant such a writ, see, e.g., Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶17, and with the idea that applying the law correctly 
No.  2022AP1736-W.rfd 
 
16 
 
"is not the type of plain legal duty contemplated by the 
supervisory writ procedure."  State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners 
v. Peterson, 2015 WI 85, ¶81, 363 Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 165.  
Additionally, DNR broadly asserts that "losing a statutorily-
granted right is a harm," and that "[l]osing the right with no 
means to recover it makes the harm irreparable."  DNR, 380 
Wis. 2d 354, ¶47.  But not all denials of a statutory right without 
a remedy, no matter how trivial within the context of a case, are 
the kind of "grave or irreparable harm" our supervisory writ cases 
are concerned with.  See Alt v. Cline, 224 Wis. 2d 72, ¶52, 589 
N.W.2d 21 (1999).  Finally, DNR relies on the fact that venue 
determinations by the court of appeals are not appealable to this 
court as of right in concluding that such appeals are not an 
adequate remedy.  DNR, 380 Wis. 2d 354, ¶¶43-44.  But as DNR 
acknowledges, no issue is appealable to us as of right.  See id., 
¶43 & n.18 ("Strictly speaking, there is no right of appeal to 
this court at all.").  We only grant review when one or more of 
our criteria for review in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r) are met.  
If this language from DNR is read too broadly, it would mean that 
an appeal is never an adequate remedy, which would "transform the 
writ into an all-purpose alternative to the appellate review 
process."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶24.     
¶32 Despite these potential problems with DNR, no party 
asked us to revisit it in this case.  Nevertheless, in a future 
case, we should seriously consider doing so, or possibly clarifying 
DNR to bring it more into line with our other cases regarding the 
availability of supervisory writs.   
No.  2022AP1736-W.rfd 
 
17 
 
¶33 Additionally, I note that the way in which the venue 
issue was litigated in this case and in others may not be the best 
practice in all cases.  Here, as our order explains, both of the 
appellants directed their petitions for leave to appeal and stay 
motions to District IV.  Nevertheless, Chief Judge Brash sua sponte 
ordered the parties to submit letters regarding the proper 
appellate venue, and ultimately decided that District IV should 
hear this case.  Chief Judge Brash explained that he did so because 
he views venue as an "administrative matter, not a substantive 
matter in the appeal," and therefore that it fell within his 
purview as Chief Judge.  See Wis. Ct. App. IOP I (Nov. 30, 2009).  
But it's not clear to me why that would be the case.   
¶34 In any event, that's not how venue issues have come up 
in the court of appeals before.  In DNR, one judge on District IV 
sua sponte rejected the DNR's designation of appellate venue in 
District II, and a three-judge panel from District IV subsequently 
denied a motion for reconsideration of that decision.  DNR, 380 
Wis. 2d 354, ¶5; see also Clean Wis., Inc. v. DNR, No. 2016AP1688, 
unpublished order, at 2 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2016); Clean Wis., 
Inc. v. DNR, No. 2016AP1688, unpublished order, at 4-5 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Sept. 29, 2016).  Yet in another case, the parties themselves 
raised venue objections, see League of Women Voters v. Evers, No. 
2019AP559, unpublished order, at 1 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2019) 
(Stark, P.J.), which were ruled on by the presiding judge.  Id. at 
1 (rejecting a motion for reconsideration of an order "rejecting 
[the respondents'] objection to the decision of [the court of 
appeals'] clerk to docket this appeal in District III).  And in 
No.  2022AP1736-W.rfd 
 
18 
 
others, neither the court of appeals nor the parties seem to have 
noticed or raised a potential venue defect.  See, e.g., Teigen v. 
Wis. Elecs. Comm'n, 2022 WI 64, 403 Wis. 2d 607, 976 N.W.2d 519. 
¶35 Courts should strive for consistency in process.  Yet 
there doesn't appear to be any reason why the venue issues in these 
cases were treated differently.  Although there may be some 
situations in which the court of appeals may appropriately raise 
a venue issue, I question whether that should be the default 
approach.  After all, venue is not jurisdictional.  See Kett v. 
Community Credit Plan, Inc., 228 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 596 N.W.2d 786 
(1999).  We generally leave it to the parties to raise venue 
objections in circuit court, see Wis. Stat. § 801.51, and I see no 
reason why the general appellate motions statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.14(1), would not allow parties to an appeal to do the 
same thing.  Whatever the process is, however, it should be clearly 
defined so the court of appeals and the parties know how to raise 
and decide venue issues.   
¶36 I am authorized to state that Justices BRIAN HAGEDORN 
and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this concurrence.   
  
No.  2022AP1736-W.rfd 
 
1