Title: In Re Anderson
Citation: 247 Kan. 208, 795 P.2d 64
Docket Number: 64,564
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 1990

247 Kan. 208 (1990)
795 P.2d 64
In the Matter of WAYNE R. ANDERSON, Respondent.
No. 64,564

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 13, 1990.
Stanton A. Hazlett, deputy disciplinary administrator, argued the cause and was on the brief for the petitioner.
Wayne R. Anderson, pro se, argued the cause and was on the brief for the respondent.
Per Curiam:
This original proceeding in discipline was filed by the office of the disciplinary administrator against Wayne R. Anderson, of Goodland, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in the State of Kansas. The formal complaint filed against respondent alleges violations of Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3 (1989 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 238); 8.1 (1989 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 266); 8.2 (1989 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 267); and 8.4 (1989 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 268). Respondent did not file an answer.
A hearing before the panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys was held on July 12, 1989, in the Harold R. Fatzer hearing room at the Kansas Judicial Center, Topeka, Kansas. Respondent appeared pro se. The panel found that, apart from the accuracy of respondent's public statements, there is no material dispute as to the facts. The panel noted, however, that respondent "fervently disagrees" as to the motives and purpose for his conduct or that his conduct was a violation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
The panel noted that the complaint against respondent involved his refusal to obey child custody and support orders of the district court in Colorado (Case No. 78-DR-0576); the truthfulness and adequacy of disclosures made relative to respondent's admission to practice law in Kansas; respondent's actions relative to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) proceedings; his statements to the press following his resignation as county counselor; and his incarceration for failing to comply with the child support order in the URESA proceedings filed in Sherman *209 County District Court. The panel then made the following findings:
"`A. That's right.
"`A. That's true.
"`Q. Could you state your reasons why you resigned?
"`Q. Garnished by whom?
"`A. By you I would assume.
"`A. That's right, that's right.
"`A. That's the only reason, that's right.
"`A. No, I don't believe so.
The panel then recommended suspension, stating:
The respondent filed exceptions to the report of the hearing panel. He takes exception to several factual findings which are not relevant or material. He primarily contends that he did not violate any court order nor was he ever found guilty of violating any order for support or custody. He denies that he ever refused to obey any valid court order. He specifically denies that he has shown indifference to the legal obligations or defiance to any lawful order. He further denies that Judge Delaney's findings are anything more than dicta and nebulous charges.
Respondent contends that he was unjustifiably found in contempt of court by Judge Worden and that there was no evidence presented to find he was in contempt of court. However, he did not appeal Judge Worden's finding of contempt. He further contends that the agreement he signed to purge himself of contempt and gain his release from jail was invalid and unenforceable because it was an adhesion contract. Even if the agreement was valid, respondent contends he only agreed to pay support ordered by the court and to seek employment to pay the support. He further contends that, since there has been no subsequent order by the court to pay support or a specific time in which to pay it, he did not breach the agreement. It would serve no useful purpose to reiterate the nonsensical arguments by the respondent. His oral argument before this court was a rehashing and a reargument of his divorce action in Colorado and the URESA proceeding in Sherman County.
Respondent admitted that he has not made one single voluntary payment of child support since he was divorced in 1978. He testified before Judge Worden that he quit his position as county counselor to avoid paying child support as ordered by the Colorado district court. He continues to argue that the orders of the Colorado district court and Judge Worden were not valid. That argument should have been made on appeal of those orders and not in this proceeding. There was ample evidence to support the panel's findings that respondent's conduct and behavior evidenced *212 a contempt for judicial process and an indifference to his legal obligations.
The respondent also contends that MRPC 8.4(d) is a "vague and loose standard." We do not agree. Rule 8.4(d) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." In State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. 637, 504 P.2d 211 (1972), Mr. Nelson made the same contention as to the identical language in DR 1-102(A)(5) (1989 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 147). This court said: "It cannot be seriously contended that `prejudicial' does not sufficiently define the degree of conduct which is expected of an attorney." 210 Kan. at 640. As to such rule having a chilling effect on the First Amendment, this court said:
Finally, respondent takes issue with the panel's reliance upon § 6.22 of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. Section 6.22 provides: "Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows that he is violating a court order or rule, and there is injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding." The panel found that the language found in the commentary following § 6.22 resolved the issue concerning whether the respondent should be disciplined for his actions in willfully violating court orders.
The ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions are designed to promote uniform discipline for attorneys. Respondent, in his brief, asserts that the Standards have "no weight in the law." However, in In re Price, 241 Kan. 836, 739 P.2d 938 (1987), this court specifically relied on the Standards in its decision to disbar Mr. Price. We cited the Standards in supporting the proposition that a lawyer should receive more severe discipline for repeated neglect of clients' cases than he would for a single, isolated instance of neglect.
*213 We cannot help but note respondent's failure to cite any legal authority in support of his arguments in his exceptions, brief, or oral argument to this court.
This court, having considered the record herein, concurs in the findings and recommendation of the panel that the respondent should be suspended.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Wayne R. Anderson be and he is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Kansas.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall comply with the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 218 (1989 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 138), that he shall pay the costs of this proceeding, and that this order be published in the official Kansas Reports.