Title: State v. Tonnie D. Armstrong
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP000926-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 21, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Tonnie D. Armstrong,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
January 21, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 17, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Emmanuel Vuvunas 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by 
Steven A. Koch and Seymour, Kremer, Nommensen, Morrissy & Koch, 
Elkhorn, and oral argument by Steven A. Koch. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by David J. Becker, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, assistant attorney general. 
 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
1
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in the 
bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
Nos. 
97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :          
      
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Tonnie D. Armstrong,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JAN 21, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Racine County, 
Emmanuel J. Vuvunas, Circuit Court Judge.  Affirmed.  
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  These cases are before the court 
on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.61 (1995-96).1  Police officers investigating a 
homicide interviewed Tonnie D. Armstrong ("Armstrong") at the 
county jail, where Armstrong was serving time for an unrelated 
offense.  Armstrong made oral statements incriminating himself in 
the homicide.  At the end of the interview, the officers 
administered the Miranda warnings2 to Armstrong for the first time. 
 About two hours later, they presented Armstrong with a written 
statement memorializing the earlier unwarned statements.  Armstrong 
reviewed and altered the written statement, and after the officers 
                     
1 Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 1995-96 version.   
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
2
read the Miranda warnings a second time, Armstrong initialed and 
signed it. 
¶2 
Based on Armstrong's oral and written statements, the 
State charged Armstrong with first-degree intentional homicide, 
theft from a person, and bail jumping.  Before trial, Armstrong 
filed a motion challenging the admissibility of his statements.  
Following Circuit Court Judge Emmanuel J. Vuvunas' ruling that the 
oral and written statements were admissible, Armstrong entered into 
a plea agreement in which he pled guilty to second-degree reckless 
homicide, theft from a person, and bail jumping as a habitual 
offender.3  Armstrong was convicted of all charges and was sentenced 
to a total of twenty-six years in prison.  Armstrong appealed the 
portion of the final order which denied his motion challenging the 
admissibility of the statements, and the court of appeals certified 
the matter to this court. 
¶3 
This court is confronted with two primary issues on this 
appeal.  First, we must determine the admissibility of the oral 
statements which Armstrong made before receiving his Miranda 
warnings.  Second, we must decide the admissibility of the written 
statement which reiterated Armstrong's earlier unwarned oral 
statements and which Armstrong signed after receiving his Miranda 
                     
3 Armstrong also agreed to probation revocation and re-
sentencing for his conviction in case number 97-0925-CR of theft 
from a person.  Case number 97-0925-CR is now the companion case to 
the main case before us, case number 97-0926-CR. 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
3
warnings and after signing a form stating that he understood and 
waived his rights.4  
¶4 
Upon review, we conclude that Armstrong's oral statements 
were inadmissible because Armstrong made the statements during 
custodial interrogation and before the administration of Miranda 
warnings. 
 
However, 
the 
circuit 
court 
properly 
ruled 
that 
Armstrong's written statement was admissible pursuant to Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).  In light of our ruling that 
                     
4 The court of appeals set forth the following issues when it 
certified Armstrong's appeal to this court:  
 
1.  Who has the burden of proof on a Miranda custody 
question? 
 
2.  On the issue of custody, is the language of Mathis v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), to be read literally or 
limited as indicated by other federal and state cases?  
More specifically, is Schimmel v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 287, 
294, 267 N.W.2d 271, 274 (1978), overruled on other 
grounds by Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 294 N.W.2d 2 
(1980) (where it appears the court accepted the State's 
concession that a defendant was in custody for purposes 
of Miranda by being an inmate in the Wisconsin prison 
system) still the law in Wisconsin? 
 
3.  On the issue of interrogation, should the language of 
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), be read as 
broadly as it appears, or should Wisconsin follow the 
lead of some of the federal cases and other states which 
look to the totality of the circumstances to see if a 
Miranda-type interrogation occurred? 
 
4.  In light of the above, is the holding of State v. 
Ambrosia, 208 Wis. 2d 269, 560 N.W.2d 555 (Ct. App. 
1997), a proper application of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 
298 (1985)? 
 
Certification by Court of Appeals at 1-2(footnote omitted).  We 
will answer these issues in the course of this opinion.   
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
4
Armstrong's written statement was admissible, we conclude that the 
circuit court's decision to admit the oral statements constituted 
harmless error.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit 
court. 
I. 
¶5 
This case involves the admissibility of statements 
made by Tonnie Armstrong during two meetings with police 
officers on July 31, 1995.  On that day, Armstrong was serving 
time at the Racine County Jail as a result of his conviction in 
an earlier case, case number 97-0925-CR.  The conviction arose 
out of an incident on May 9, 1995, in which Armstrong snatched a 
woman's purse.  Armstrong pled guilty to theft from a person and 
was convicted on June 1, 1995.5      
¶6 
From June 1, 1995, until his sentencing hearing on 
July 13, 1995, Armstrong was free on bond.  The circuit court, 
Judge Emmanuel J. 
Vuvunas 
presiding, 
withheld 
Armstrong's 
sentence and placed him on probation for three years.  As a 
condition of the probation, Armstrong was required to serve four 
months in the Racine County Jail.  
¶7 
On the morning of June 29, 1995, Detective Steve Mich 
of the City of Racine Police Department discovered the body of 
Donald Thomas.  Thomas’ body was lying on the floor of the 
bookstore he owned, and his wallet and keys were missing.  An 
                     
5 Armstrong was originally charged with strong armed robbery. 
 The charge was later amended to theft from a person in violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(a),(3)(d)2.  
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
5
autopsy suggested that Thomas had died of asphyxiation and had 
probably been choked.  
¶8 
Police investigators soon learned that Armstrong had 
been in Thomas' bookstore the night before Thomas’ body was 
found.  Detective Mich and another officer went to the Racine 
County Jail on July 31, 1995, to speak with Armstrong about the 
homicide.  The officers met with Armstrong at about 2:15 p.m. in 
an interview room in the jail’s main level intake area. 
¶9 
Detective Mich began by telling Armstrong that the 
officers were there to talk to him about the death of Donald 
Thomas.  Neither officer read Armstrong his Miranda warnings at 
the start of the interview.  According to the officers, 
information they had received from an employee of Thomas' 
bookstore had caused them to believe that Armstrong may have 
witnessed 
something 
which 
would 
assist 
them 
in 
their 
investigation.6  Detective Mich later testified that the officers 
did not suspect Armstrong of involvement in the crime when they 
went to talk with him.  
¶10 Armstrong proceeded to tell the officers that he was 
present when Thomas died and that he and Thomas had argued that 
                     
6 The bookstore employee told police that Armstrong was in 
Thomas' bookstore on June 29, 1995, the night before Thomas' body 
was found there.  According to the employee, Armstrong left the 
store about a half hour before the employee left at 1:30 a.m., at 
which time Thomas was still alive.   
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
6
night.7  Armstrong admitted that he had choked Thomas with both 
hands for about ten seconds, stopped, and then grabbed him by 
the front of his shirt and shook him until Thomas went limp and 
fell to the floor.  Armstrong also recounted his actions after 
Thomas died, including his removal of Thomas' wallet and keys 
and exit from the bookstore.  At some point, Armstrong drew the 
officers a map showing where he disposed of the wallet and keys.8  
¶11 During the interview, the officers asked Armstrong 
questions.  Detective Mich told Armstrong that he did not 
believe some of Armstrong's statements, including his story 
about which route he took home from the store and his version of 
the events which transpired inside the store.  According to 
Detective Mich, the first moment at which he began to suspect 
that Armstrong might have been involved in Thomas' death was 
when Armstrong told him that he and Thomas had argued and that 
he had placed his hands on Thomas.9  
                     
7 Detective Mich testified at the preliminary hearing that 
Armstrong told him that the argument ensued over a debt allegedly 
owed by Armstrong to Thomas.  Detective Mich stated that he and 
Armstrong together estimated the amount of the debt to be around 
$100.  See Prelim. Hearing Tr., Sept. 8, 1995 at 13-14 (No. 97-
0926-CR).    
8 The motion hearing testimony is somewhat unclear as to 
precisely when the map was drawn.  The circuit court concluded that 
the map was drawn partly before and partly after Armstrong was read 
the Miranda warnings at the first interview.  See Motion Hearing 
Tr., Feb. 2, 1996 at 19 (No. 97-0926-CR).  
9 See Motion Hearing Tr., Jan. 19, 1996 at 41-42 (No. 97-0926-
CR).    
  
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
7
¶12 At about 3:00 p.m., the officers administered Miranda 
warnings to Armstrong for the first time.10  Detective Mich read 
the warnings directly from a “Notification and Waiver of Rights” 
form.  Armstrong signed the top portion of the form, which set 
forth the text of the warnings.11  However, he refused to sign 
the waiver of rights printed on the bottom part of the form.12 
¶13 Nevertheless, Armstrong told the officers that he 
understood the Miranda warnings and would speak with them.  The 
only conversation after the warnings, however, consisted of a 
brief discussion of whether Armstrong would accompany the 
officers on their attempt to locate Thomas' wallet and keys.  It 
was decided that Armstrong would remain at the jail.  Armstrong 
finished constructing the map and the officers left, taking the 
map with them.    
                     
10 Detective Mich testified at the motion hearing that he read 
Armstrong his rights at this point in the interview "[b]ecause I 
believed him now."  See Motion Hearing Tr., Jan. 19, 1996 at 24 
(No. 97-0926-CR).    
11 Armstrong does not challenge the substance of the warnings.  
12 The bottom portion of the form read, 
I have read this statement of my rights and I understand 
what my rights are.  I am willing to make a statement and 
answer questions.  I do not want a lawyer at this time.  
I understand and know what I am doing.  No promises or 
threats have been made against me and no pressure or 
coercion of any kind has been used against me.  
According to Detective Mich, the officers did not press 
Armstrong to sign this bottom portion of the form, in part because 
they felt that they had finished the interview.  See Motion Hearing 
Tr., Jan. 19, 1996 at 24-25 (No. 97-0926-CR). 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
8
¶14 In its entirety, the first interview lasted about an 
hour.  Afterward, the officers left the jail and drove to the 
place depicted on the map, where they located Thomas' wallet and 
keys.  Detective Mich returned to the police department and 
reduced Armstrong's oral statements to writing in a document he 
labeled, "Sworn Affidavit."  It is undisputed that this written 
statement was based completely on Armstrong's previous oral 
statements. 
¶15 The officers returned to the jail at about 5:10 p.m. 
the same day, July 31, 1995, with the written statement, which 
they presented to Armstrong.  Armstrong reviewed the statement 
and made some changes in it.13  When he was finished, Detective 
Mich administered the Miranda warnings for the second time, 
reading them from another copy of the “Notification and Waiver 
of Rights” form.  This time, Armstrong signed both the top 
"notification" and bottom "waiver" portions of the form.  
Armstrong then returned to the written statement prepared by 
Detective Mich, initialed each change he had made, and signed 
                     
13 Armstrong made the following changes in the statement:  (1) 
replaced “three or four” with “one” in the phrase, “I had watched 
three or four peep shows”; (2) replaced "and" in the phrase "and I 
told him that I would start paying" with an illegible word ("him" 
refers to Donald Thomas); (3) replaced “I knew he was dead” with 
“He was unconscious” (“he” refers to Thomas); and (4) crossed out 
the sentence, “I knew he had a bad heart” (again, “he” refers to 
Thomas).  Armstrong later testified that the written statement was 
accurate and was the same as the statements he had made earlier.  
See Motion Hearing Tr., Jan. 19, 1996 at 70-72 (No. 97-0926-CR).   
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
9
the statement.  Nothing further occurred in this second meeting 
between the officers and Armstrong.14      
¶16 In an information filed October 5, 1995, the State 
charged Armstrong with first-degree intentional homicide, theft 
from a person, and bail jumping, all as a habitual offender.15  
Armstrong filed a pre-trial motion on November 15, 1995, 
challenging the admissibility of his oral statements and the 
written statement.  
¶17 Hearings on the motion were held on January 19, 1996, 
and February 2, 1996.  The circuit court, Judge Emmanuel J. 
Vuvunas presiding, ruled that the statements Armstrong made at 
the first and second interviews were admissible.  Judge Vuvunas 
began by stating that he found the police officers to be 
"credible" and that he believed them when they said that they 
did not think Armstrong was a suspect at the start of the first 
                     
14 Police officers met with Armstrong for a third time on 
August 2, 1995.  At that meeting, Armstrong was asked whether he 
wanted a lawyer, and he gave a general reply along the lines of 
"maybe I should."  The circuit court ruled that this statement was 
inadmissible because the officer had not either clarified it or 
attempted to obtain a waiver of Armstrong's right to an attorney.  
The State does not challenge that ruling, and the third meeting is 
not otherwise relevant to this appeal.   
15 More specifically, Armstrong was charged with homicide under 
Wis. Stat. § 940.01, theft from a person in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.20(1)(a),(3)(d)2, 
and 
bail 
jumping 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 946.49(1)(b).  Armstrong was charged with all three offenses as a 
habitual offender pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.62 because he 
committed the three offenses within five years of his conviction of 
theft from a person in case number 97-0925-CR. The habitual 
offender statute increases the maximum term of imprisonment for 
crimes committed by persons who have been convicted of certain 
other crimes within the previous five years.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.62. 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
10
interview.  Motion Hearing Tr., Feb. 2, 1996 at 18 (No. 97-0926-
CR).  In regard to the oral statements, Judge Vuvunas ruled, 
 
I'm satisfied that when the officer realized that 
[Armstrong] was, in fact, making statements that might 
be incriminating, they gave him his rights.  He did 
not – he did acknowledge . . . the fact that his 
rights were given.  He did not sign the waiver.  I 
don't find that to be telling here.  I believe the 
officers that even though he said he didn't want to 
sign the waiver, but he did want to continue talking, 
and did it's clear that he was talking and drawing and 
doing things both before this, these rights were 
given[,] and after, . . . so I find that they did 
comply with Miranda . . . once they were appraised and 
knew that he, in fact, was a suspect in this matter, 
and that the statements made on that occasion were 
voluntary by Mr. Armstrong. 
 
Motion Hearing Tr., Feb. 2, 1996 at 19 (No. 97-0926-CR).  
Consequently, the circuit court held that Armstrong's oral 
statements were admissible.    
¶18 The court also ruled that Armstrong's written statement 
was admissible.  The court reasoned that Armstrong had made the 
statement after receiving his Miranda warnings at the first meeting 
about two hours earlier.  The court found that Armstrong 
"understood what he was doing, that he understood the warnings of 
Miranda and was making a statement voluntarily."  Motion Hearing 
Tr., Feb. 2, 1996 at 19 (No. 97-0926-CR).  
¶19 After the circuit court's ruling that Armstrong’s 
statements were admissible, Armstrong entered into a plea 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
11
agreement.16  Pursuant to the agreement, Armstrong pled guilty to 
second-degree reckless homicide, theft from a person, and bail 
jumping as a habitual offender.17  In addition, Armstrong agreed 
to refuse the probation which was imposed upon him and to be re-
sentenced for his conviction of theft from a person in case 
number 97-0925-CR.  Armstrong was convicted of all three 
charges, and on April 11, 1996, was sentenced to a total of 
twenty-six years in prison.18  Armstrong appealed the portion of 
the final 
order in which 
the court 
denied 
his motions 
challenging the admissibility of the statements.  The court of 
appeals certified the matter to this court. 
                     
16 The parties entered the agreement during the hearing.  
Apparently, the parties had made alternative plea agreements and 
the choice of agreement was dependent on the circuit court's ruling 
on the motion.  
17 The record contains no amended information, but the State 
clearly amended the information orally at the motion hearing.  See 
Motion Hearing Tr., Feb. 2, 1996 at 21 (No. 97-0926-CR).  
Essentially, the count of first-degree intentional homicide was 
amended to a count of second-degree reckless homicide, which is 
defined by Wis. Stat. § 940.06.  Also, the increased penalty for 
habitual offenders was applied only to the bail jumping count.   
18 At the sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Armstrong for 
the three counts in case number 97-0926-CR and the one count in 
case number 97-0925-CR.  The court imposed sentences of ten years 
on the homicide charge, five years on each theft charge, and eleven 
years as a habitual offender on the bail jumping charge.  Except 
for one of the five-year theft sentences, the sentences are to be 
served consecutively.  
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
12
II.    
¶20 As a threshold matter, we determine which party bears 
the burden of proof19 on the issue of whether a "custodial 
interrogation" 
occurred. 
 
Determining 
whether 
a 
custodial 
interrogation occurred is the first step in an inquiry of 
whether statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), because Miranda warnings need only 
be administered to individuals who are subjected to a custodial 
interrogation.  See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 
(1980); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977); Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 444, 477; State v. Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d 672, 686, 
482 N.W.2d 364 (1992).  The allocation of the burden of proof is 
important in this case because the record provides only sketchy 
information about the circumstances of the interview between 
Armstrong and the police.     
¶21 We conclude that the State must establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence whether a custodial interrogation 
took place.  Although Wisconsin courts have not yet ruled 
directly on the precise issue, our holding is consistent with 
Wisconsin precedent which places the burden of proving other 
aspects of Miranda on the State.  Moreover, our holding is 
consistent with federal law, including the Miranda decision 
itself.  
                     
19 In this opinion, the term "burden of proof" includes both 
the burden of production of evidence and the burden of persuasion. 
 We used "burden of proof" in the same way in State v. Santiago, 
206 Wis. 2d 3, 19, 556 N.W.2d 687 (1996).  
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
13
¶22 Wisconsin courts have not directly decided which party 
possesses 
the 
burden 
of 
establishing 
whether 
a 
custodial 
interrogation occurred, although language in State v. Mitchell, 167 
Wis. 2d 672, 696, 482 N.W.2d 364 (1992), suggests that the burden 
is on the State.  In Mitchell, we stated, "Once the state has 
established a prima facie case of waiver of Miranda rights and 
voluntariness of a statement of an in-custody police interrogation 
in the absence of countervailing evidence, the statement should be 
admitted into evidence."  Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d at 696 (citing 
State 
v. 
Hernandez, 
61 
Wis. 2d 
253, 
259, 
212 
N.W.2d 
118 
(1973))(emphasis added).  Wisconsin courts have placed the burden 
of proving other aspects of Miranda squarely on the State.  It is 
well established that the State must show that the defendant 
received and understood his or her Miranda warnings.  See Mitchell, 
167 Wis. 2d at 696-97; Hernandez, 61 Wis. 2d at 258.  The State 
must show that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the 
constitutional rights protected by the Miranda warnings.  See State 
v. Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d 3, 12, 556 N.W.2d 687 (1996); Mitchell, 
167 Wis. 2d at 696-97; Hernandez, 61 Wis. 2d at 258.   The State 
also bears the burden on the issue of whether the warnings were 
sufficient in substance.  Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d at 12.   
¶23 Further, in State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 
244, 262, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965), this court held that a separate 
hearing before the trial judge is required in order to determine 
whether a defendant's admission was voluntary.  Goodchild, 27 
Wis. 2d at 262. 
 The State bears the burden on the issue of 
voluntariness in Goodchild hearings.  See Goodchild, 27 Wis. 2d at 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
14
264-65.  In Roney v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 522, 534, 171 N.W.2d 400 
(1969), we ruled that Miranda objections also require a hearing.  
We went on to "adopt the procedure of the Goodchild hearing in 
determining Miranda questions," and to hold that the Miranda and 
Goodchild hearings may be held together.  Roney, 44 Wis. 2d at 534. 
 We stated: 
 
[I]n each case, whether the challenge is under Goodchild 
or under Miranda, substantially the same type of inquiry 
must be made by the court.  In Miranda the question is, 
was the confession or other statement obtained under such 
circumstances of custodial interrogation as to require 
the exclusion of the statement from evidence.  In 
Goodchild the question is, was the statement involuntary 
and therefore should be excluded from evidence. . . .  
 
We therefore conclude that Miranda, like Goodchild, 
should require a hearing by the trial judge out of the 
presence of the jury. 
 
The Goodchild procedure has been outlined in the case 
bearing that same name.  A similar procedure should be 
followed in the event of a Miranda objection.  The court 
should determine the merits of that objection sitting 
alone, out of the presence of the jury and preferably, as 
in Goodchild, in a pretrial proceeding.  Following such a 
hearing in which the facts are heard, the court's finding 
would have to be made beyond a reasonable doubt and the 
[S]tate would have the burden of proving compliance with 
Miranda or a waiver of those requirements. . . . 
 
Id. at 533-34 (Emphasis added).  Because the State bears the burden 
of proof in Goodchild hearings as to whether a defendant's 
admission or confession was voluntary, it follows that the State 
should bear the burden of proof in Miranda hearings on the issue of 
whether a custodial interrogation occurred.  See Goodchild, 27 
Wis. 2d at 264-65.  A holding to the contrary would seem to be 
inconsistent with this court's holding in Roney.   
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
15
¶24 Requiring the State to establish whether a custodial 
interrogation took place also comports with the reasoning of the 
United States Supreme Court in Miranda.  In Miranda, the Court 
placed the burden of showing that the defendant waived the 
constitutional privilege protected by the Miranda warnings on the 
government.  See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.  Although the burden on 
the issue of waiver is distinct from the burden of establishing 
that a custodial interrogation took place, the Court's reasoning 
applies with equal force to the question we face in this case.  The 
Court stated: 
 
This Court has always set high standards of proof for the 
waiver of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 
U.S. 458 (1938), and we re-assert these standards as 
applied to in-custody interrogation.  Since the State is 
responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances 
under which the interrogation takes place and has the 
only means of making available corroborated evidence of 
warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, the 
burden is rightly on its shoulders. 
 
Id.; see also Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 470-71 
(1980)(citing this language from Miranda with approval).20  
                     
20 The State relies on Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) 
as support for the proposition that the United States Supreme Court 
has placed the burden of establishing custodial interrogation on 
the defendant.  In particular, the State points to the following 
language from Berkemer:  "[R]espondent has failed to demonstrate 
that, at any time between the stop and the arrest, he was subjected 
to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest." 
 Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 441.  When coupled with the Court's holding 
that the Berkemer respondent was not in custody, the State argues, 
the quoted language shows that the Supreme Court placed the burden 
of establishing a custodial interrogation on the defendant.  See 
id. 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
16
¶25 Applying this reasoning to the current situation, we 
conclude that the State should be required to establish whether 
a custodial interrogation took place.  The State is responsible 
for creating the custodial situation, and the State conducts and 
controls the interrogation.  Further, as a result of its record-
keeping practices, the State is more likely to reduce an 
interview to writing or have other "corroborated evidence" of 
the interrogation session.  Indeed, the Court in Miranda noted 
that the atmosphere of custodial interrogation was a "police-
dominated" one.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.  A defendant in such 
an environment is less likely to be familiar with his or her 
surroundings or to otherwise be able to provide evidence of the 
circumstances of the custody or interrogation.   Therefore, 
under the reasoning of Miranda, the State is the party better 
                                                                  
We are not persuaded that the quoted language from Berkemer 
reflects a desire by the United States Supreme Court to place the 
burden on the issue of custodial interrogation upon the defendant 
rather than the State.  The language cited by the State is the only 
reference made in the decision to the allocation of burdens of 
proof.  Further, the language appears near the end of a discussion 
of "whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained 
pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered 'custodial 
interrogation.'"  Id. at 435.  The issue of which party bore the 
burden of proving that a custodial interrogation took place was not 
squarely before the Court. 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
17
suited to bear the burden of establishing whether a custodial 
interrogation took place.21   
¶26 Federal and Wisconsin law are clear that the standard of 
proof which the State must meet in proving compliance with Miranda 
is preponderance of the evidence.  See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 
U.S. 157, 168 (1986)(stating that preponderance of the evidence is 
the appropriate standard of proof whenever the State bears the 
burden of proving waiver of the rights protected by Miranda);  
Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d at 12 (holding that the State must prove the 
sufficiency of the Miranda warnings and waiver of Miranda rights by 
a preponderance of the evidence); State v. Jones, 192 Wis. 2d 78, 
114a, 
532 
N.W.2d 
79 
(1995)(per 
curiam 
on 
motion 
for 
reconsideration)(striking from the court's original opinion the 
statement that the State must prove waiver of Miranda rights beyond 
a reasonable doubt and instead imposing the preponderance of the 
evidence standard).  As the United States Supreme Court stated in 
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178, n.14 (1974), "the 
                     
21 Both sides refer to the analysis for allocating burdens of 
proof which this court employed in State v. McFarren, 62 Wis. 2d 
492, 215 N.W.2d 459 (1974).  In McFarren, we stated that a court 
should take five factors from McCormick, Handbook of the Law of 
Evidence, § 337 at 787-89 (2d ed. 1972), into account when 
determining which party bears the burden of proof.  See McFarren, 
62 Wis. 2d at 499-503.  Stated concisely, the factors are: "(1) the 
natural tendency to place the burden on the party desiring change; 
(2) special policy considerations such as those disfavoring certain 
defenses; (3) convenience; (4) fairness; and (5) the judicial 
estimate of probabilities."  State v. Big John, 146 Wis. 2d 741, 
755, 432 N.W.2d 576 (1988).  In this case, an analysis based on the 
McFarren factors appears unnecessary given the Wisconsin and 
federal precedent supporting our decision to place the burden on 
the State.   
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
18
controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose 
no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence . . 
. ."  See also Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168 (citing this language from 
Matlock with approval); State v. Rewolinski, 159 Wis. 2d 1, 16 n.7, 
464 N.W.2d 401 (1990)(quoting this language from Matlock); State v. 
Lee, 175 Wis. 2d 348, 364, 499 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1993)(holding, 
based on Connelly and Rewolinski, that the State must prove waiver 
of 
Miranda 
rights 
by 
a 
preponderance 
of 
the 
evidence).  
Accordingly, we hold that the State must meet its burden of 
establishing whether a custodial interrogation occurred by a 
preponderance of the evidence.22 
 ¶27 For the reasons stated, we hold that the State 
possesses the burden of establishing whether a custodial 
interrogation occurred such that Miranda warnings were required. 
 The State must meet this burden by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
                     
22 In Wisconsin, "preponderance of the evidence" is equivalent 
to the civil "greater weight of the credible evidence" standard of 
proof.  Wis. JICivil 200 and Comment; Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d at 12, 
n.5.           
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
19
III. 
¶28 Next, 
we 
consider 
the 
admissibility 
of 
the 
incriminating oral statements Armstrong made before he received 
his Miranda warnings.  In short, we hold that Armstrong's oral 
statements are inadmissible because they were obtained in 
violation of Miranda. 
¶29 In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that law 
enforcement officers conducting a “custodial interrogation” must 
employ “procedural safeguards” sufficient to protect a defendant’s 
Fifth 
Amendment 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
privilege 
against 
compelled self-incrimination.23  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; see also 
Innis, 446 U.S. at 297.  The Court spelled out a list of 
“procedural safeguards” which it considered sufficient; these 
safeguards are commonly called “Miranda warnings.”24 Law enforcement 
officers must administer Miranda warnings at the first moment an 
individual is subjected to "custodial interrogation."  Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 444, 477; see also Innis, 446 U.S. at 300; Mathiason, 429 
U.S. at 495; Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d at 686.  In other words, police 
                     
23 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that no "person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself."  The Fourteenth Amendment of 
the federal constitution requires state courts to observe this 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination.  Malloy v. Hogan, 
378 U.S. 1, 3 (1978).   
24 The administration of Miranda warnings involves informing a 
person that he or she has the right to remain silent, that any 
statement he or she makes can be used as evidence against the 
person, that he or she has the right to have an attorney present 
during the interrogation, and that if the person wants an attorney 
but cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed for the 
person.  See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 467-73. 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
20
must read the Miranda warnings to any person who is both “in 
custody” and under “interrogation.”  Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d at 686. 
¶30 As we have already decided, the State had the burden of 
showing 
whether 
Armstrong 
was 
the 
subject 
of 
a 
custodial 
interrogation.  During oral argument, the State admitted that if it 
bore the burden on the issue of custodial interrogation, then the 
State had failed to meet it.25  We consider those issues in the 
interest of judicial economy where, as here, the issues were fully 
briefed and are likely to recur.  See State ex rel. Jackson v. 
Coffey, 18 Wis. 2d 529, 532, 118 N.W.2d 939 (1963); Gross v. 
Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663 (1938).26   
¶31 We note at the outset of our discussion that this court 
will not set aside the circuit court's findings of fact unless they 
are "clearly erroneous."  State v. Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d 272, 282 
(1988); Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2).  We must give "due regard" to the 
circuit court's opportunity to observe the witnesses and determine 
their credibility.  Wis. Stat. § 807.15(2).  The determination of 
whether the facts in this case meet the appropriate legal standards 
presents a question of law which we may decide independently of the 
circuit court.  Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 282.   
                     
25 Counsel's exact statement was, "If the burden of proof is on 
the State, then I don't think we have established . . . 
affirmatively that there wasn't custody, and . . . I think that we 
probably have not affirmatively established that there wasn't 
interrogation."  
26 The parties in this case briefed and argued the issues of 
custody and interrogation and that the court of appeals raised both 
issues when it certified Armstrong's appeal to this court.  
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
21
¶32 In general, a person is "in custody" for purposes of 
Miranda when he or she is "deprived of his [or her] freedom of 
action in any significant way."  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 477.  A 
person may be deemed to be “in custody” in a broad variety of 
settings.  For example, a person in his or her own bedroom is "in 
custody" if the person has been placed under arrest and is not free 
to go wherever he or she wants.  See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 
327 (1969).  Of relevance to this case, the United States Supreme 
Court has ruled that a prison inmate was "in custody" for purposes 
of Miranda even though he was questioned about a situation distinct 
from the one for which he was incarcerated.  See Mathis v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968).  
¶33 The State argues that Armstrong was not "in custody" 
when he made his oral statements, and therefore, his statements 
are admissible even in the absence of Miranda warnings.  Since 
there was no change in Armstrong's custodial status concurrent 
with the time at which officers arguably began interrogating 
Armstrong, the State reasons, Armstrong was not "in custody" 
because he was free to get up out of the jailhouse interview 
room and walk back to his cell.   
¶34 We reject this argument as directly contrary to Mathis 
and its Wisconsin counterpart, Schimmel v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 
287, 267 N.W.2d 271 (1978).27  The defendant in Schimmel was an 
inmate at the Wisconsin State Reformatory at Green Bay (now the 
                     
27 Schimmel v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 287, 267 N.W.2d 271 (1978), 
was overruled on other grounds by Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 
294 N.W.2d 2 (1980).  
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
22
Green Bay Correctional Institution).  See Schimmel, 84 Wis. 2d 
at 288.  While attending a Division of Corrections alcohol 
treatment program at the Winnebago Mental Health Institute, the 
defendant went to the office of the Division of Corrections 
employee who was in charge of the program and told him that he 
had killed a waitress and had tried to rape her.  Id. at 288-89. 
 The employee called the police.  Id. at 289.  After the 
officers arrived and read the defendant his Miranda warnings, 
the defendant told them the same story.  Id. at 289-90.   
¶35 This court upheld the circuit court’s ruling in 
Schimmel that the defendant’s statements to the employee were 
admissible in the absence of Miranda warnings because the 
statements did not stem from interrogation and were made 
voluntarily.  See id. at 297-98.  This court stated, “There can 
be no question that the defendant was in custody at the time he 
made the statement to [the employee].”  Id. at 294.  As support 
for our holding, we quoted directly from Mathis: 
 
“The Government also seeks to narrow the scope of the 
Miranda holding by making it applicable only to 
questioning one who is ‘in custody’ in connection with 
the very case under investigation.  There is no 
substance to such a distinction, and in effect it goes 
against the whole purpose of the Miranda decision 
which was designed to give meaningful protection to 
Fifth Amendment rights.  We find nothing in the 
Miranda opinion which calls for a curtailment of the 
warnings to be given persons under interrogation by 
officers based on the reason why the person is in 
custody.” 
  
Id. at 294-95 (quoting Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4-5). 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
23
¶36 Today, we reaffirm our decision in Schimmel and hold that 
a person who is incarcerated is per se in custody for purposes of 
Miranda.28  See also State v. Hockings, 86 Wis. 2d 709, 720 & n.5, 
273 N.W.2d 339 (1979).  Under Mathis and Schimmel, the reason that 
                     
28 The State argues that this court’s holding in Schimmel that 
the defendant was in custody is of no precedential value because 
the Schimmel court noted that the State “apparently concede[d] that 
the defendant was in custody.”  Schimmel, 84 Wis. 2d at 295.  As 
support for this argument, the State relies primarily upon Wilson 
v. State, 82 Wis. 2d 657, 264 N.W.2d 234 (1978).  Quoting from 
Wilson, the State contends, “A holding that is based on a 
concession by the [S]tate ‘has no precedential value’ in this 
state.”  State’s Br. at 24 (quoting Wilson, 82 Wis. 2d at 663). 
This court does not read Wilson as establishing such a broad 
rule.  An examination of the pertinent discussion in Wilson is 
illuminating.  The discussion concerned Harris v. State, 78 Wis. 2d 
357, 254 N.W.2d 291 (1971), which the defendant cited in support of 
the argument that he should be given credit for time served against 
all of his sentences.  Wilson, 82 Wis. 2d at 663.  In Harris, the 
State conceded that the defendant was entitled to a credit against 
all sentences.  Id.  This court stated,  
We are satisfied that the [S]tate’s concession in Harris 
was inappropriate, and that the mandate of the court in 
respect to the consecutive sentence has no precedential 
value, because the issue was not before it and because 
the court stated no rationale which would justify a 
credit against the consecutive sentence . . . .” 
 
Id. at 663-64 (emphasis added).   
Under our reading of Wilson, the only situation in which a 
holding based on a concession by the State may not have 
precedential value arises when the court provides no rationale or 
analysis of the subject of the concession and the subject of the 
concession is not disputed by the parties and is therefore not an 
issue before the court.  In Schimmel, custody was an issue which 
was directly presented to the court and the court provided over a 
half-page of rationale for its decision that custody existed.  See 
Schimmel, 84 Wis. 2d at 294-95.  Therefore, this court does not 
believe that Schimmel’s precedential value is impaired in any way 
by virtue of the State’s concession that custody existed.        
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
24
a person was incarcerated is irrelevant to a determination of 
whether he or she was in custody.  The State’s assertion that 
custody only occurs if there is an increase in custodial status 
commensurate with the interrogation simply misses the point.  
Indeed, we can think of no situation in which a defendant is more 
clearly in custody, as envisioned by the Miranda Court, than when 
the defendant is confined in a prison or jail.  Accordingly, we 
hold that Armstrong was in custody when he made all of the 
statements at issue in this case, because he was an inmate of the 
Racine County Jail at the time.  
¶37 Next, we consider whether, at the time he made his 
statements, Armstrong was subjected to interrogation by the police 
officers.29 
 
Both 
parties 
agree 
that 
the 
seminal 
case 
on 
interrogation is Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).  Under 
Innis, an “interrogation” occurs when a person is “subjected to 
either express questioning or its functional equivalent.”  Innis, 
446 U.S. at 300-301.  More specifically, the Court stated: 
 
We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play 
whenever a person in custody is subjected to either 
express questioning or its functional equivalent.  That 
is to say, the term “interrogation” under Miranda refers 
not only to express questioning, but also to any words or 
actions on the part of the police (other than those 
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police 
should 
know 
are 
reasonably 
likely 
to 
elicit 
an 
incriminating response from the suspect. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
                     
29 In the discussion which follows, we address the third issue 
raised by the court of appeals in its certification of this case.  
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
25
¶38 This court adopted the Innis test in State v. Cunningham, 
144 Wis. 2d 272, 276-82, 423 N.W.2d 862 (1988).  We pointed out in 
Cunningham that the Innis test focuses on the perspective of the 
suspect, not the subjective intent of the police officers.  See 
Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 279-80.  This court stated: 
 
Even where the officer testifies that his or her actions 
had some purpose other than interrogation, the action 
must be 
viewed 
from 
the 
suspect’s perspective to 
determine whether such conduct was reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response.  If an impartial 
observer perceives the officer’s purpose to be something 
other than eliciting a response, the suspect is also 
likely to view the officer’s purpose that way. 
 
Id. at 280.  
¶39 Applying the Innis test to the facts of this case, we 
conclude that at the beginning of the interview, the officers had 
no reason to know that their questions would likely elicit an 
incriminating response from Armstrong.  The information provided to 
them by the bookstore employee gave them cause to believe that 
Armstrong was not even present at the time of the crime under 
investigation.  However, the situation changed the moment Armstrong 
contradicted the statement of the bookstore employee and said he 
was in the bookstore when Thomas died.30  At that point, the 
officers should have known that their questioning was reasonably 
likely to result in an incriminating response.  When Armstrong said 
                     
30 Although the focus of our analysis is not the subjective 
perspective of the officers, we point out that Detective Mich 
agreed that Armstrong became a suspect only when he indicated that 
he had been in the bookstore when Thomas died.  See Motion Hearing 
Tr., Jan. 19, 1996 at 41-42 (No. 97-0926-CR).   
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
26
he was there at the time of the crime, a reasonable person would 
have realized that Armstrong was a potential suspect and that 
questioning could therefore result in a confession.  
¶40 Nevertheless, even after Armstrong admitted that he was 
in the bookstore when Thomas died, the officers continued to 
question him about the events of that night.  They indicated that 
they did not believe Armstrong's story about the route he took home 
and they challenged his version of the events which transpired 
inside the bookstore.  Although Detective Mich testified that the 
officers in fact did not believe that Armstrong was a suspect and 
that they thought Armstrong was lying in order to cover for someone 
else, an objective observer could certainly have concluded from the 
officers’ questions and confrontational conversation that their 
purpose was to elicit an incriminating response from Armstrong.  
From Armstrong’s perspective, the officers' conduct placed him in 
the position of having to elaborate upon his story in order to 
defend himself and preserve his credibility.  Id.  Therefore, under 
Innis and Cunningham, the officers' words and conduct following 
Armstrong’s statement that he was present at the bookstore when 
Thomas died constituted interrogation. 
¶41 We have concluded so far that Armstrong was in custody 
for the entire duration of the interview and that Armstrong was 
interrogated from the moment he became a potential suspect until 
the end of the interview.  Consequently, Armstrong was first 
subjected to custodial interrogation when he told the police he was 
at the crime scene when the crime occurred, because that is when 
interrogation first existed.  At that point, the police officers 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
27
should have administered Miranda warnings to Armstrong to ensure 
that his constitutional privilege to be free from compelled self-
incrimination was protected.  
¶42 It is undisputed, however, that Armstrong was not given 
his Miranda warnings until the end of the first interview, after he 
had made all of his incriminating oral statements.  Because the 
police officers did not read Armstrong his Miranda warnings when 
the custodial interrogation began, Armstrong’s oral statements are 
inadmissible and should have been suppressed by the circuit court. 
 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478; Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d at 686.  
IV. 
¶43 Having concluded that the failure of police to 
administer required Miranda warnings renders Armstrong’s oral 
statements 
inadmissible, 
we 
move 
on 
to 
consider 
the 
admissibility of Armstrong’s written statement.  Armstrong 
argues that his written statement is inadmissible because it was 
tainted by his earlier, unwarned oral statements.  In support of 
his position, Armstrong cites State v. Ambrosia, 208 Wis. 2d 
269, 560 N.W.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1997), in which the court applied 
the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine of Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), in holding that portions of the 
defendant’s post-Miranda statement were inadmissible because 
they were tainted by his earlier, unwarned statement.  Ambrosia, 
208 Wis. 2d at 276-78.  We reject Armstrong’s argument and 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
28
overrule the part of Ambrosia upon which Armstrong relies.31  We 
hold instead that Armstrong’s written statement is admissible 
pursuant to Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).     
¶44 In Elstad, police officers obtained a warrant to 
arrest the defendant, Elstad, for the burglary of a neighbor’s 
home.  See Elstad, 470 U.S. 300-301.  The officers spoke with 
Elstad in the living room of his home.  Id. at 301.  After 
asking Elstad a few questions, one of the officers told Elstad 
that he suspected Elstad of involvement in the burglary.  Id.  
Elstad responded, “Yes, I was there.”  Id.  The officers then 
drove Elstad to the police station, where they administered 
Miranda warnings for the first time.  Id.  Elstad indicated that 
he understood his rights and wanted to talk to the officers.  
Id.  He proceeded to give a complete oral account of his 
involvement in the crime.  Id.  The statement was typed into a 
written statement, which Elstad reviewed, initialed, and signed. 
 Id.     
¶45 At 
trial, 
the 
court 
admitted 
Elstad’s 
written 
statement into evidence, finding that it was given knowingly and 
voluntarily after a waiver of the rights protected by Miranda.32 
 Id.  at 302.  Elstad was convicted of first-degree burglary.  
                     
31 This court may overrule, modify or withdraw language from 
published decisions of the court of appeals.  Cook v. Cook, 208 
Wis. 2d 166, 189-90, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997).   
32 The trial court suppressed Elstad’s initial statement, “Yes, 
I was there,” because of the officers’ failure to administer 
Miranda warnings.  Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 302 (1985).  The 
State did not challenge the suppression of that statement.  Id.  
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
29
Id.   The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that 
there was not a sufficient lapse in time between Elstad's 
inadmissible statement and his later written statement to 
"insulate the latter statement from the effect of what went 
before."  Id. at 303 (quoting State v. Elstad, 658 P.2d 552, 554 
(Or. Ct. App. 1983)).  The Oregon Supreme Court denied review. 
¶46 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
framing the issue in Elstad as “whether the Self-Incrimination 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the suppression of a 
confession, made after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver 
of rights, solely because the police had obtained an earlier 
voluntary but unwarned admission from the defendant.”  Elstad, 470 
U.S. at 303.  In a 6-3 decision, the Court answered this question 
in the negative and reversed the decision of the Oregon Court of 
Appeals.  Id. at 300.  The Court held that Elstad's written 
statement was not tainted by his earlier statement, and therefore, 
need not be suppressed.  Id. at 318.   
¶47 The Court in Elstad started by rejecting Elstad's 
argument that a statement occurring after an unwarned statement 
must be suppressed under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine 
of Wong Sun.  See id. at 304-05.  In Wong Sun, the Court held that 
witnesses and evidence must be excluded if they are "fruits" of a 
search 
which 
violated 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
of 
the 
federal 
constitution.  See Wong Sun, 471 U.S. at 485, 488; id. at 305-06.  
As the Court in Elstad noted, the Wong Sun rule applies equally to 
require the suppression of a confession obtained as a consequence 
of a Fourth Amendment violation such as an illegal arrest. See 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
30
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306; Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 
(1982). 
¶48 In Elstad, however, the Court made a clear distinction 
between violations of the procedures set forth in Miranda and 
violations of the United States Constitution.  See Elstad, 470 U.S. 
at 306.  The key difference between violations of Miranda and the 
Fourth Amendment violations involved in Wong Sun, according to the 
Elstad Court, is that "a simple failure to administer Miranda 
warnings is not in itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment."  Id. 
at 307 n.1.  The Court explained:  
 
The Miranda exclusionary rule . . . serves the Fifth 
Amendment 
and 
sweeps 
more broadly 
than the Fifth 
Amendment itself.  It may be triggered even in the 
absence of a Fifth Amendment violation.  The Fifth 
Amendment prohibits use by the prosecution in its case in 
chief only of compelled testimony.  Failure to administer 
Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion.  
Consequently, unwarned statements that are otherwise 
voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must 
nevertheless be excluded from evidence under Miranda.  
Thus, in the individual case, Miranda's preventive 
medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant who has 
suffered no identifiable constitutional harm. 
 
Id. at 306-07. (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 
(1983) and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974))(footnote 
omitted).  Therefore, the Elstad Court continued:  
 
If errors are made by law enforcement officers in 
administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures, they 
should not breed the same irremediable consequences as 
police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself.  It is 
an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple 
failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any 
actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to 
undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free 
will, 
so taints 
the investigatory 
process 
that 
a 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
31
subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective 
for some indeterminate period.   
 
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309.   
¶49 Having concluded that the Wong Sun "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine did not apply, the Elstad Court set forth 
the following rule: 
 
[A]bsent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in 
obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a 
suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a 
presumption of compulsion.  A subsequent administration 
of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a 
voluntary 
but 
unwarned 
statement 
ordinarily 
should 
suffice to remove the condition that precluded admission 
of the earlier statement.  
 
Id. at 314.33  The Court reiterated this rule later in the opinion: 
  
[T]here is no warrant for presuming coercive effect where 
the suspect's initial inculpatory statement, though 
technically in violation of Miranda, was voluntary.  The 
relevant inquiry 
is 
whether, in fact, the second 
statement was also voluntarily made. 
 
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318.  When determining whether the second 
statement was made voluntarily, a finder of fact must look at the 
totality of the circumstances.  Id.  The Elstad Court noted that 
                     
33 In Elstad, the Court was careful to mention that its 
decision did not alter the rule of Miranda, stating,  
When police ask questions of a suspect in custody without 
administering the required warnings, Miranda dictates 
that the answers received be presumed compelled and that 
they be excluded from evidence at trial in the State's 
case in chief. . . . The Court today in no way retreats 
from the bright-line rule of Miranda. . . .    
 
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 317-18. 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
32
"[t]he fact that a suspect chooses to speak after being informed of 
his rights is, of course, highly probative" in determining the 
voluntariness of the suspect's post-Miranda statements.  Id.        
¶50 In this case, we are faced with a question nearly 
identical to the one addressed by the Court in Elstad.  Although 
the officers technically violated Miranda when they failed to 
administer Miranda warnings prior to Armstrong's oral confession, 
there is no claim that Armstrong made his oral or written 
statements involuntarily.34  Since Armstrong's written statement was 
given after Armstrong knowingly waived his Miranda rights, the 
written statement is admissible under Elstad.  
¶51 We hold first that the officers' failure to administer 
the Miranda warnings prior to Armstrong's oral statements was in 
the nature of a technical violation as conceptualized by the Elstad 
Court.  The Court in Elstad drew a distinction between violations 
of Miranda and violations of constitutional rights.  According to 
the Court, a failure to administer the Miranda warnings which was 
"unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances 
calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free 
will" was insufficient to result in an imputation of taint to 
subsequent statements.  Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309.  
¶52 As noted previously, the circuit court found that 
Armstrong’s oral statements were voluntary.  See Motion Hearing 
Tr., Feb. 2, 1996 at 19 (No. 97-0926-CR).  There is no evidence of 
                     
34 As we have already indicated, the circuit court specifically 
found that Armstrong's oral and written statements were voluntarily 
made.  See Motion Hearing Tr., Feb. 2, 1996 at 19 (No. 97-0926-CR).  
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
33
any coercion or circumstances designed to undermine Armstrong's 
ability to exercise his free will.  Detective Mich testified that 
there was no initial intent to interrogate Armstrong and that until 
they administered the Miranda warnings, the officers thought 
Armstrong was a mere witness to the events leading up to the crime. 
 Moreover, less than forty-five minutes elapsed between the time at 
which the officers should have administered the Miranda warnings, 
when Armstrong told them that he was present when Thomas died, and 
the point at which they did read the Miranda warnings, at about 
3:00 p.m.  The officers did read the Miranda rights before the 
interview ended and Armstrong cooperated fully thereafter.  Since 
under the totality of the circumstances, Armstrong gave his oral 
statements voluntarily, we uphold the circuit court’s finding that 
the oral statements were voluntary.  We conclude that the officers' 
violation of Miranda during the taking of the oral statements was 
merely a technical one that did not amount to a constitutional 
violation.          
¶53 Given our conclusion that the officers only technically 
violated Miranda as to Armstrong's oral statements, Armstrong's 
subsequent written statement is admissible pursuant to Elstad as 
long as it was a voluntary statement made after a valid 
administration of the Miranda warnings as well as a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of the constitutional privilege which Miranda 
protects.  As we have already indicated, the circuit court found 
that Armstrong provided the written statement voluntarily after he 
had been read the Miranda warnings and had knowingly waived his 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
34
rights.  See Motion Hearing Tr., Feb. 2, 1996 at 19 (No. 97-0926-
CR).  Looking at the totality of the circumstances, we agree.  
¶54 After Armstrong received his Miranda rights the first 
time, he signed the notification portion of the "Notification and 
Waiver Form."  He also indicated to the officers that he understood 
his rights and would speak with them.  Armstrong continued to 
cooperate with the officers by finishing up the map he was drawing 
and reviewed and corrected the written statement the officers gave 
him about two hours later.  When Armstrong was read his Miranda 
warnings again after he edited the statement, he signed both parts 
of the "Notification and Waiver Form" and signed and initialed the 
statement.  From this chain of events, we conclude that Armstrong 
knew his rights when he signed the written statement.  Further, we 
agree with the Elstad Court that Armstrong's choice to continue 
cooperating and speaking after he received his Miranda rights each 
time is "highly probative" to our inquiry.  Consequently, under the 
totality of the circumstances, Armstrong voluntarily provided his 
written statement, and he did so after receiving his Miranda 
warnings and knowingly and voluntarily waiving the constitutional 
rights safeguarded by Miranda.    
¶55 Armstrong argues that the court of appeals' decision in 
State v. Ambrosia, 208 Wis. 2d 269, 560 N.W.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1997), 
governs this case.  We disagree.  In Ambrosia, the court of appeals 
concluded, based on Wong Sun, that "those portions of the post-
Miranda statement tainted by the earlier statement must be 
suppressed."  Ambrosia, 208 Wis. 2d at 277.  As we have already 
indicated, Elstad makes clear that the application of the "fruit of 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
35
the poisonous tree" doctrine to violations of Miranda which are not 
also violations of the Fifth and/or Fourteenth Amendment is 
improper.  Accordingly, we overrule the parts of Ambrosia in which 
the court of appeals made the above-quoted statements, relied upon 
Wong Sun, or applied the Wong Sun "fruit of the poisonous tree" 
rationale to a statement made after a Miranda violation.35     
¶56 In 
summary, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Armstrong's 
written 
statement is admissible under Elstad.  Armstrong made the statement 
voluntarily, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda 
rights, and the officers' failure to administer Miranda warnings 
prior to Armstrong's first statement was only a technical violation 
of Miranda, not a violation of the Fifth Amendment to the federal 
constitution as applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  In addition, we overrule the parts of Ambrosia which 
refer to Wong Sun or apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree" 
doctrine.            
V. 
¶57 We have held that Armstrong’s oral statements are 
inadmissible and that his subsequent written statement is 
admissible.  We have yet to determine the effect of our holdings 
on the outcome of this case.  Because we have held that 
Armstrong's written statement is admissible, the circuit court 
committed harmless error when it failed to suppress Armstrong's 
                     
35 The language to which we refer occurs on pages 276 through 
278 of the opinion.  See State v. Ambrosia, 208 Wis. 2d 269, 560 
N.W.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1997).  
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
36
oral statements.  Therefore, we affirm Armstrong's convictions. 
      
¶58 The harmless error test appears in Wis. Stat. § 805.18,36 
which requires that this court "disregard any error or defect in 
the . . . proceedings which shall not affect the substantial rights 
of the adverse party."  § 805.18(1).  When a court has improperly 
admitted evidence, § 805.18 prohibits the court from reversing 
unless an examination of the entire proceeding reveals that the 
admission of the evidence has "affected the substantial rights" of 
the party seeking the reversal.  § 805.18(2).37  
¶59 The United States Supreme Court set forth the harmless 
error test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  In 
Strickland, the Court ruled that a conviction must be reversed if: 
 
                     
36 Although § 805.18 is part of the Wisconsin Rules of Civil 
Procedure, this court has ruled that Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1) renders 
§ 805.18 applicable to criminal proceedings as well.  See State v. 
Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 547, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985); see also State 
v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 39 & n.6, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997)(Crooks, 
J., dissenting).  Section 972.11(1) provides, in pertinent part, 
that "the rules of evidence and practice in civil actions shall be 
applicable in all criminal proceedings unless the context of a 
section or rule manifestly requires a different construction."   
37 Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) provides:  
No judgment shall be reversed or set aside . . . in any 
action or proceeding on the ground of . . . improper 
admission of evidence . . . unless in the opinion of the 
court to which the application is made, after an 
examination of the entire action or proceeding, it shall 
appear that the error complained of has affected the 
substantial rights of the party seeking to reverse or set 
aside the judgment, or to secure a new trial. 
  
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
37
there is a reasonable probability that, but for . . . 
[the] errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been 
different. 
 
A 
reasonable 
probability 
is 
a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome. . . . [T]he question is whether there is a 
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the 
factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting 
guilt.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95.  This court adopted Strickland's 
harmless error test in State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 544-45, 370 
N.W.2d 222 (1985).  In Dyess, the court held, 
 
[I]n respect to harmless versus prejudicial error . . . 
the test should be whether there is a reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. 
 If it did, reversal and a new trial must result. 
Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 543.  Although, in Dyess, this court used the 
phrase "reasonable possibility" in place of the Strickland Court's 
"reasonable probability" language, we explained that the phrases 
were "substantively the same."  See id. at 544.38        
                     
38 We have already concluded that the failure to administer 
Miranda warnings did not amount to a constitutional violation in 
this case.  Nevertheless, we note that in State v. Dyess, 124 
Wis. 2d 525, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985), we held that the harmless error 
test we established in that case applies to "a wide range of trial 
errors," Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 545, "whether of constitutional 
proportions or not."  Id. at 543.   
In footnote 10 of Dyess, we pointed out that an exception to 
the general rule occurs for violations of constitutional rights "so 
basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as 
harmless error."  Id. at 543 n.10 (quoting Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)).  This court then listed all of the case 
law examples which the Chapman Court provided to illustrate this 
exception.  See id. (citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 
(1958)(right to remain free from coerced confessions); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)(right to counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 
273 U.S. 510 (1927)(right to impartial judge)); see also Chapman, 
386 U.S. at 23 n.8.  We note that the instant case does not involve 
circumstances similar to any of the listed cases.   
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
38
¶60 In this case, we conclude that the circuit court 
committed harmless error when it ruled that Armstrong's oral 
statements were admissible.  As a result of the circuit court's 
ruling admitting the statements, Armstrong entered a plea 
agreement and was convicted on all counts.  An examination of 
the entire proceeding leads us to conclude that there is no 
reasonable possibility that a different result would have been 
reached had the circuit court suppressed the oral statements.   
¶61 At the same time the circuit court erroneously allowed 
the oral statements, the court properly admitted Armstrong's 
written statement.  It is undisputed, and Armstrong himself 
testified, that the written statement simply reiterated the 
earlier oral statements.  Since the oral statements were 
identical to other admissible evidence, the circuit court's 
failure to suppress them constitutes only an allowance of 
cumulative evidence of guilt.  In other words, the same evidence 
would have come in to the proceeding through the written 
statement had the circuit court properly suppressed the oral 
statements.  We can discern no basis for believing that 
Armstrong would not have entered his plea agreement or would not 
have been convicted had only the written statement been admitted 
                                                                  
We recognize that this area of law has been a source of some 
confusion in the past.  See Comment, Confusion in the Court  
Wisconsin's Harmless Error Rule in Criminal Appeals, 63 Marq. L. 
Rev. 643 (1980).  This court has continued to apply the Dyess 
harmless error test, although it has been the subject of some 
debate.  See State v. Grant, 139 Wis. 2d 45, 406 N.W.2d 744 
(1987)(applying the Dyess test and containing concurring opinions 
which question the aptness of the Dyess test). 
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
39
by the circuit court.  Therefore, we conclude that the admission 
of the oral statements constituted harmless error.  Accordingly, 
we affirm Armstrong's convictions.  
VI. 
¶62 Finally, we summarize the conclusions we reach today.39 
 First, 
we 
hold 
that 
Armstrong's 
oral 
statements 
are 
inadmissible under Miranda.  The State bore the burden of proof 
on the issue of custodial interrogation and it failed to 
establish that the interview in which Armstrong made his oral 
statements did not constitute a custodial interrogation.  Under 
Mathis and Schimmel, Armstrong was in custody because he was 
incarcerated when the officers conducted their first interview 
with him.  Also, under Innis and Cunningham, Armstrong was 
interrogated from the moment a reasonable person would have 
realized that he was a potential suspect through the end of the 
interview.  Because the officers did not read the Miranda 
warnings 
at 
the 
start 
of 
the 
custodial 
interrogation, 
Armstrong's oral statements are inadmissible. 
¶63 Further, we hold that Armstrong's written statement is 
admissible pursuant to Elstad.  We reject Armstrong's contention 
that the Wong Sun "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine applies 
to preclude the admission of the written statement on the basis 
of taint from the earlier, inadmissible oral statements, and we 
overrule the part of Ambrosia which applies the Wong Sun "fruit 
                     
39 In summarizing our conclusions, we will answer the questions 
certified by the court of appeals in the order in which they were 
presented.  
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
40
of the poisonous tree" rationale.  Since the officers' violation 
of Miranda was of a technical nature and Armstrong made the 
written statement after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the 
rights protected by Miranda, Armstrong's written statement is 
admissible under Elstad.   
¶64 Because Armstrong's written statement is admissible, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
ruling 
admitting 
Armstrong's oral statements constituted harmless error.  There 
is no reasonable possibility40 that the admission of the oral 
statements contributed to Armstrong's conviction because the 
written statement in which the oral statements were duplicated 
was admitted by the circuit court as well.  Therefore, we affirm 
Armstrong's conviction.  
By the Court.— The judgments of the circuit court in 97-0925-
CR and 97-0926-CR are affirmed. 
                     
40 As we have explained, the phrase, "reasonable possibility" 
in Wisconsin's harmless error test, Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 543, is 
identical in substance to the phrase, "reasonable probability" in 
the harmless error test used by the United States Supreme Court, 
Strickland, 466 U.S. 694-95.  Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 544.      
Nos.  97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR  
 
1