Title: Short v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 59, 2015
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2015

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LAKISHA SHORT, 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 59, 2015 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0107017038 
§   
§ 
 
Submitted: May 26, 2015 
Decided: 
July 9, 2015 
 
Before HOLLAND, and VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 9th day of July 2015, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court 
that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Lakisha Short, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of Short’s second motion for postconviction relief under Superior 
Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  The State of Delaware has filed a motion to 
affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Short’s 
opening brief that this appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm.  
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a).   
 
2 
(2) 
In January 2002, Short pled guilty to Burglary in the Second Degree 
(“Burglary Case”).  Short was sentenced to eight years of Level V incarceration, 
suspended after time served for decreasing levels of supervision.  Short did not 
appeal the Superior Court’s judgment.   
(3) 
While on probation in the Burglary Case, Short was arrested for 
Robbery in the First Degree and other related offenses (“Robbery Case”).  In 2004, 
Short was convicted and sentenced as a habitual offender to fifty-five years of 
Level V incarceration in the Robbery Case and discharged as unimproved from 
probation in the Burglary Case.  The Burglary Case was closed in 2011.   
(4) 
In March 2013, Short filed a motion for postconviction relief under 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”) in the Burglary Case.  Short claimed 
the guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary.  The Superior Court concluded 
that Short’s claims were procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(1), (i)(3), and (i)(4) and 
summarily dismissed the motion.  Short filed a notice of appeal and then withdrew 
the appeal. 
(5) 
In January 2015, Short filed a second motion for postconviction relief 
under Rule 61 in the Burglary Case.  In this motion, Short argued that: (i) the 
conviction for Burglary in the Second Degree was one of the predicate offenses for 
the habitual offender sentence in the Robbery Case; (ii) Short was innocent of 
Burglary in the Second Degree; (iii) the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because 
 
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the burglary conviction arose from a domestic dispute between Short and a 
girlfriend; and (iv) Short’s counsel was ineffective.  The Superior Court summarily 
dismissed the motion because Short was no longer in custody or serving the 
sentence in the Burglary Case.  This appeal followed.      
(6) 
On appeal, Short claims to have standing to file a postconviction 
motion in the Burglary Case because that conviction was used to enhance the 
sentence in the Robbery Case.  The State has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s 
judgment on the ground that Short lacked standing to move for postconviction 
relief.  We agree.  
(7) 
A person loses standing to move for postconviction relief under Rule 
61 when they are not in custody for the underlying offense or challenged sentence.2  
Short was discharged as unimproved from probation in the Burglary Case in 2004 
and the case was closed in 2011.  Short is not in custody for the Burglary Case.  
The Superior Court did not err in concluding that Short lacked standing to file a 
motion for postconviction relief in the Burglary Case and dismissing Short’s 
motion for postconviction relief. 
                                                 
2 Super. Ct. R. 61(a) (“This rule governs the procedure on an application by a person in custody 
under a sentence of this court seeking to set aside the judgment of conviction or a sentence of 
death on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction or on any other ground that is a sufficient 
factual and legal basis for a collateral attack upon a criminal conviction or a capital sentence.”) 
(emphasis added); Summers v. State, 2003 WL 1524104, at *1 (Del. March 20, 2003) (holding 
movant was not entitled to seek postconviction relief for 1993 conviction because he had been 
discharged from probation for 1993 conviction and was no longer in custody for 1993 
conviction). 
 
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(8) 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that motion to affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice