Title: Deras v. Myers
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S45581
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: August 27, 1998

Filed:  August 27, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

WARREN C. DERAS,

	Petitioner,

	v.

HARDY MYERS, Attorney General,
PHIL KEISLING, Secretary of State,
and HELEN HILL, SHEA GRIMM, CATHERINE
DEXTER, JIM WHEELER, and MICHAEL SCHRUNK,
Members, Citizens Explanatory Statement
Committee for Measure 58,

	Respondents.

(SC 45581)

	On petition to review ballot measure explanatory statement.

	Argued and submitted August 18, 1998.

	Warren C. Deras, petitioner pro se, argued the cause and
filed the petition.

	Helen Hill and Shea Grimm, respondents pro se, argued the
cause and filed answering memoranda.

	Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General, waived appearance
for respondents Myers and Keisling.

	No appearance for respondents Dexter, Wheeler and Schrunk.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Kulongoski, and Leeson, Justices.

	GILLETTE, J.

	Ballot measure explanatory statement certified as modified. 
Pursuant to ORAP 1.20(4) and notwithstanding ORAP 11.30(10), this
opinion will become effective when the appellate judgment issues. 
The State Court Administrator shall issue the appellate judgment
at 12:00 p.m. on August 31, 1998, unless a petition for
reconsideration is both filed with and physically received by the
Office of the State Court Administrator by that time.  Any timely
petition for reconsideration will stay issuance of the appellate
judgment until the court acts on such petition.

	Durham, J., dissented and filed an opinion.

		GILLETTE, J.

		In this original proceeding, petitioner challenges the
explanatory statement for 1998 Ballot Measure 58, a measure
concerning the circumstances under which an adult adopted person
can obtain a copy of his or her original birth certificate.  See
ORS 251.205 (requiring selection of committee of five citizens to
prepare explanatory statement for measures proposed by initiative
or referendum); ORS 251.215 (setting out procedures for preparing
and filing explanatory statement).

		This court conducts judicial review of ballot title
explanatory statements pursuant to ORS 251.235, which provides:

		"Any person dissatisfied with an explanatory
statement for which suggestions were offered at the
Secretary of State's hearing under ORS 251.215, may
petition the Supreme Court seeking a different
statement and stating the reasons the statement filed
with the court is insufficient or unclear.  If the
petition is filed not later than the fifth day after
the deadline for filing a revised statement with the
Secretary of State, the court shall review the
statement, hear arguments and certify an explanatory
statement to the Secretary of State.  The review by the
Supreme Court shall be conducted expeditiously to
insure the orderly and timely conduct of the election
at which the measure is to be submitted to the
electors.  The statement certified by the court shall
be the explanatory statement printed in the voters'
pamphlet."

See also Lewis v. Keisling, 320 Or 13, 16, 879 P2d 857 (1994)
(further explaining this court's standard of review).  For the
reasons that follow, we conclude that two of petitioner's
arguments are well taken.  Accordingly, we modify the statement
in the manner set out below.

		Ballot Measure 58 as submitted provides:

	"Upon receipt of a written application to the state
registrar, any adopted person 21 years of age and older
born in the state of Oregon shall be issued a certified
copy of his/her unaltered, original and unamended
certificate of birth in the custody of the state
registrar, with procedures, filing fees, and waiting
periods identical to those imposed upon non-adopted
citizens of the State of Oregon pursuant to OS [sic]
432.120 and 432.146.  Contains no exceptions."

		The revised explanatory statement filed by the
committee of five citizens under ORS 251.215(3) states:

		"This measure changes existing law to allow an
adopted person 21 years of age or older to obtain a
copy of the person's original birth certificate. 
Current Oregon law prohibits the release of an original
birth certificate which may provide birth information
to an adopted person without a court order.  The law
currently requires that upon receipt of a decree of
adoption or a report of adoption from a court, the
state registrar shall issue a new birth certificate
unless the court, the adoptive parents or the adopted
person requests otherwise.  The new birth certificate
may not provide accurate birth information and the
original birth certificate shall not be subject to
inspection except by court order.

		"This measure requires that upon receipt of a
written application the state registrar shall provide a
copy of the original birth certificate which may
provide accurate birth information to an Oregon born
adopted person 21 years of age or older.  This measure
requires that the procedures, filing fees and waiting
periods for certified copies of original birth
certificates be the same for requests by adopted
persons as for non-adopted persons.

		"This measure applies to persons adopted in the
past or in the future.  There are no exceptions to this
measure."

		Petitioner first argues as a blanket criticism that the
explanatory statement "does not correctly explain the difference
between an original birth certificate of an adoptee and the
amended birth certificate."  The short answer to that contention
is that, given the limited nature of the measure and the precise
and limited right that it creates for a defined class of persons,
the five-person committee was under no obligation to offer any
explanation of the difference between those two kinds of birth
certificates.

		Petitioner argues more specifically that the
explanatory statement is inaccurate, and therefore insufficient,
in stating variously that the original birth certificate "may
provide accurate birth information" and the amended birth
certificate "may not provide accurate birth information."  We
agree with that argument.  Information provided by the parties in
their submissions and at oral argument establishes that neither
birth certificate necessarily will be more accurate than the
other and that, in any event, the purpose of the measure is to
make the original birth certificate available to adult adopted
persons, regardless of its accuracy.  Under those circumstances,
the explanatory statement should not be couched in terms of the
accuracy or inaccuracy of the original or amended birth
certificates.

		The foregoing defect appears in two places in the
explanatory statement.  The last sentence of the first paragraph
of the explanatory statement provides:  "The new birth
certificate may not provide accurate birth information and the
original birth certificate shall not be subject to inspection
except by court order."  As noted, the first part of that
sentence is inappropriate and should be deleted.  In addition,
the second part of the sentence is redundant of material
appearing elsewhere in the explanation, so deleting the balance
of the sentence will cause no change to the substantive content
of the statement.  Accordingly, we delete that sentence.

		The second reference to the accuracy of birth
certificates appears in the first sentence of the second
paragraph of the explanatory statement, which states:  "This
measure requires that upon receipt of a written application the
state registrar shall provide a copy of the original birth
certificate which may provide accurate birth information to an
Oregon born adopted person 21 years of age or older."  In this
instance, the explanatory statement's insufficiency may be cured
by deleting the words, "which may provide accurate birth
information."  That change will be made.

		Petitioner separately argues, and respondents at oral
argument conceded, that the second sentence of the first
paragraph of the explanatory statement is insufficient.  That
sentence states:  "Current Oregon law prohibits the release of an
original birth certificate which may provide birth information to
an adopted person without a court order."  The parties, however,
agree that ORS 432.420 provides for access to such records by
agencies operating voluntary adoption registries.  The
insufficiency of the sentence can be cured by striking the words
"which may provide birth information" from the sentence and
inserting the word "such" after the word "to," so that the
sentence reads:  "Current Oregon law prohibits the release of an
original birth certificate to such an adopted person without a
court order."  That change, too, will be made.

		We have considered petitioner's other contentions, but
do not find them to be well taken.

		Based on the foregoing, we certify the following
explanatory statement for Ballot Measure 58:

		This measure changes existing law to allow an
adopted person 21 years of age or older to obtain a
copy of the person's original birth certificate. 
Current Oregon law prohibits the release of an original
birth certificate to such an adopted person without a
court order.  The law currently requires that upon
receipt of a decree of adoption or a report of adoption
from a court, the state registrar shall issue a new
birth certificate unless the court, the adoptive
parents or the adopted person requests otherwise.

		This measure requires that upon receipt of a
written application the state registrar shall provide a
copy of the original birth certificate to an Oregon
born adopted person 21 years of age or older.  This
measure requires that the procedures, filing fees and
waiting periods for certified copies of original birth
certificates be the same for requests by adopted
persons as for non-adopted persons.

		This measure applies to persons adopted in the
past or in the future.  There are no exceptions to this
measure.

		Ballot measure explanatory statement certified as
modified.  Pursuant to ORAP 1.20(4) and notwithstanding ORAP
11.30(10), this opinion will become effective when the appellate
judgment issues.  The State Court Administrator shall issue the
appellate judgment at 12:00 p.m. on August 31, 1998, unless a
petition for reconsideration is both filed with and physically
received by the Office of the State Court Administrator by that
time.  Any timely petition for reconsideration will stay issuance
of the appellate judgment until the court acts on such petition.

		Deras v. Myers

	DURHAM, J., dissenting.

	I respectfully dissent.  The majority concludes that,
pursuant to ORS 251.235, it must alter the explanatory statement
prepared in accordance with ORS 251.215(1) by the five-person
committee.  That conclusion rests on the majority's implicit
determination that the committee's statement is "insufficient or
unclear," ORS 251.235, as "an impartial, simple and
understandable statement explaining the measure," ORS 251.215(1). 
The majority construes ORS 251.235 to require this court to
certify a different explanatory statement that complies with ORS
251.215(1) if the court concludes that the committee's
explanatory statement is insufficient or unclear.  I agree with
that interpretation of ORS 251.235.  The question that remains is
whether the judges on this court are authorized by the Oregon
Constitution to comply with that requirement.  I conclude that
they are not.

	Article III, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides:

		"The powers of the Government shall be divided
into three seperate (sic) departments, the Legislative,
the Executive, including the administrative, and the
Judicial; and no person charged with official duties
under one of these departments, shall exercise any of
the functions of another, except as in this
Constitution expressly provided."

	The legislative power of the state government is vested
in the Legislative Assembly and, with respect to certain
initiative and referendum powers, in the people.  Article IV,
section 1(1), of the Oregon Constitution, provides:

		"The legislative power of the state, except for
the initiative and referendum powers reserved to the
people, is vested in a Legislative Assembly, consisting
of a Senate and a House of Representatives."

	This court exercises only "judicial power."  Article
VII (Amended), section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, provides in
part:

		"The judicial power of the state shall be vested
in one supreme court and in such other courts as may
from time to time be created by law."

	Those constitutional provisions enact two protections 
against encroachments in the exercise of power by the separate
branches of government.  First, the constitution assigns a
particular type of governmental power -- and only that power --
to each branch.  For example, the authorization to the judicial
branch to exercise "judicial power" means that the courts may not
carry out legislative or executive functions.  Second, Article
III, section 1, forbids any person charged with official duties
in one branch of government from performing the functions
constitutionally assigned to another branch unless the
constitution expressly so provides.  That provision prohibits a
judge from carrying out any legislative or executive function. 
The exception set forth at the end of Article III, section 1
("except as in this Constitution expressly provided"), is
inapplicable here.

	Petitioner's argument, viewed in light of the
constitutional provisions just reviewed, raises the following
question:  Do the judges in the majority exercise a nonjudicial
function, in violation of Article III, section 1, when they
revise the committee's explanatory statement and certify the
revised explanatory statement to the Secretary of State?  In my
view, the answer is yes.(1)

	The explanatory statement for a state measure has one
function:  To explain the measure to the voters in not more than
500 words.  ORS 251.215(1).  The Secretary of State must print
the explanatory statement in the voters' pamphlet, ORS 251.185,
and distribute the voters' pamphlet to voters throughout Oregon,
ORS 251.175.  For many voters who choose not to study the text of
a measure before voting, the explanatory statement and ballot
title in the voters' pamphlet are the only sources of information
about the consequences of adopting a measure.

	The political character of the five-person committee is
undeniable.  Under ORS 251.205(2) to (4), the proponents of the
measure are entitled to appoint two members of the committee. 
The Secretary of State also must appoint two members from among
the measure's opponents.  If the four appointed members cannot
agree on a fifth member, then the Secretary of State appoints a
fifth member.  The committee must consider the public's
suggestions, submitted pursuant to ORS 251.215(2), for
modification of the committee's explanatory statement, and file
any revised statement with the Secretary of State.  ORS
251.215(3).  At least three out of the five committee members
must vote to approve an explanatory statement.  ORS 251.215(4).

	The statutes just described demonstrate what is obvious
to any knowledgeable observer:  The explanatory statement is the
end product of a political process that is involved directly with
the creation of law by initiative and referendum.  The
legislature has designed that political process and the resulting
explanatory statement to provide influence and guidance to the
lawmaker (here, the electorate).  That influence can dictate the
success or failure of a measure at the polls and control the
legal interpretation of a measure should the voters adopt it.

	The latter point is made clear by this court's cases
that treat the explanatory statement of a measure as legislative
history.  For example, in State v. Wagner, 305 Or 115, 136-39,
752 P2d 1136 (1988), this court quoted both the ballot title and
the explanatory statement for a measure and interpreted the
measure in question in accordance with the description of the
measure set forth in those statements.

		In Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm.,
318 Or 551, 560 n 8, 871 P2d 106 (1994), this court said:

		"In considering the history of a constitutional
provision adopted through the initiative process, this
court examines, as legislative facts, other sources of
information that were available to the voters at the
time the measure was adopted and that disclose the
public's understanding of the measure.  Such
information includes the ballot title and arguments for
and against the measure included in the voters'
pamphlet, and contemporaneous news reports and
editorial comment on the measure.  See State v. Wagner,
305 Or 115, 131-34, 752 P2d 1136 (1988) (examining
those items in determining the meaning of a
constitutional amendment adopted through the initiative
process)."(2)

	Finally, in MacAfee v. Paulus, 289 Or 651, 655, 616 P2d
493 (1980), this court stated:

	"Voters' Pamphlet statements in turn become
'legislative' history when that meaning later is
disputed by persons affected by the measure in a
concrete case."

	The foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion that
the preparation of the explanatory statement is a significant
preliminary step in the enactment of law by initiative or
referendum.  The requirement in ORS 251.235 that the court revise
any explanatory statement that is insufficient or unclear
enmeshes the court in the creation and approval of a statement
that serves to influence voter approval or rejection of the
measure.  Moreover, if the voters approve a measure for which the
court revised the explanatory statement, the court's own words
about the meaning of the measure may play a significant, if not
controlling, role in any subsequent judicial construction of the
measure.  The process of drafting an alternative explanatory
statement, pursuant to ORS 251.235, bears no resemblance to the
resolution and remediation of a genuine case or controversy,
i.e., the exercise of "judicial power."  In my view, insofar as
ORS 251.235 compels the court to revise an explanatory statement
for the voters' pamphlet, it requires the court to carry out a
function that properly belongs to the legislative or executive
branch, not the judicial branch.  Accordingly, Article III,
section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, prevents the members of
this court from complying with that statutory requirement.

	Ideally, the parties to a proceeding under ORS 251.235 
will raise questions regarding the court's authority to revise an
explanatory statement in their briefs.  However, even in the
absence of argument and briefing regarding those questions, it is
appropriate -- indeed, necessary -- for the court to consider
such questions on its own motion.  To ask whether a statute would
compel the court to carry out a function that falls outside of
the judicial power is to ask whether the court has jurisdiction. 
Because the issue here implicates the court's jurisdiction, the
court must address that question whether or not the parties raise
it in their briefs.

	ORS 251.235 does not authorize the court to remand to
the committee any explanatory statement that the court determines
is insufficient or unclear.  I do not express a view about
whether judicial review coupled with a remand procedure would
pass muster under Article III, section 1, of the Oregon
Constitution.  It is sufficient to say that the revision
requirement in ORS 251.235 does not.  I would dismiss the
petition.

	Accordingly, I dissent.

1. 	Justice Unis addressed a similar issue regarding
the court's duty to revise a ballot title pursuant to ORS
250.085(5) in his dissenting opinion in Rooney v. Kulongoski
(Elections Division #13), 322 Or 15, 55, 902 P2d 1143 (1995)
(Unis, J., dissenting).  I joined that dissenting opinion.  I
rely here on the rationale and supporting authorities cited in
Justice Unis' opinion in Rooney because, for purposes of analysis
under Article III, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, there
is no material difference in the function of a ballot title and
an explanatory statement, or in the court's statutory duty on
review to revise those statements if they do not meet statutory
requirements.  

	In two judicial review cases, I joined in the conclusion
that an explanatory statement should be modified.  See Deras v.
Keisling, 320 Or 1, 879 P2d 850 (1994) (explanatory statement
certified as modified); Lewis v. Keisling, 320 Or 13, 18, 879 P2d
857 (1994) (Unis, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion advocating
modification of explanatory statement).  However, those cases
predated Rooney, in which Justice Unis pointed out the separation
of powers problem concerning modification of a ballot title. 
This case is the first case after Rooney to raise the question
whether modification of an explanatory statement violates the
separation of powers.  See Brummell v. Kulongoski, 324 Or 131,
922 P2d 666 (1996) (explanatory statement certified without
modification).  As explained here, I now conclude that Justice
Unis' rationale in Rooney is applicable in the explanatory
statement context.

2. 	By citing Ecumenical Ministries, I do not necessarily
endorse all of the court's discussion about what legislative
facts form the legislative history of a constitutional provision. 
For example, paid written arguments for and against a measure in
the voters' pamphlet and pre-election news and editorial
treatment of a measure in the media may reflect only partisan
viewpoints and, if so, will shed little or no light on the
voters' intention in approving a measure.  Similarly, the court
cannot assume that all ballot titles and explanatory statements
are free of partisan manipulation.  Those sources properly may
serve as legislative history that clarifies the meaning of
ambiguous text in a measure only if they disclose the voters'
intention in voting to approve the measure.  Whether they meet
that standard requires analysis on a case-by-case basis.