Title: Lamkin v. Hill
Citation: 120 N.H. 547
Docket Number: 79-382
State: new-hampshire
Issuer: new-hampshire Supreme Court
Date: September 3, 1980

120 N.H. 547 (1980) EVERETT W. LAMKIN &amp; a. v. BENJAMIN CUTTER HILL &amp; a. No. 79-382. Supreme Court of New Hampshire. September 3, 1980. G. Page Brown, Jr., of Exeter, by brief for the plaintiffs. *548 Dane, Howe &amp; Brown, of Boston, Massachusetts, by brief for the defendants. PER CURIAM. This is a bill in equity brought by Everett W. Lamkin and David and Dori Rifkin, as trustees of the Everett W. Lamkin Trust, against Benjamin Cutter Hill and Lee H. Clair. The plaintiffs seek to set aside a deed by Clair that created a joint tenancy in Lamkin and Hill in certain real estate owned by Lamkin in Deerfield. The bill alleged in part that Lamkin did not intend to transfer his interest in his real estate. It further alleged that Lamkin received no consideration therefor and that the transaction resulted from fraud and misrepresentation on the part of Hill. The Trial Court (Mullavey, J.) ruled, however, that plaintiffs' claim that the conveyance was procured through fraud was not supported by the evidence. Rather, the trial court found that the conveyance in question was made through mistake and that it was not intended as a gift. The court therefore imposed a constructive trust upon Hill's interest in the property received under the conveyance. Defendant Hill maintains that in the absence of fraud, deception, or undue influence on his part, the trial court erred in imposing a constructive trust on the basis of a mere unilateral mistake on the part of Lamkin. There was evidence that Hill and Lamkin first became acquainted in 1963 when Hill was referred to Lamkin's office in Lynn, Massachusetts, for orthodontry work. At the time, Lamkin was 78 years old and had no immediate family. A friendship developed between the two, and Hill and his wife visited Lamkin occasionally. At some point in 1963 or 1964, Lamkin invited Hill to visit him at his residence in Deerfield, New Hampshire. Hill gradually became a frequent visitor there, during which times he assisted Lamkin in various ways including running errands and performing "carpentry of one kind or another." Although Lamkin suffered from deteriorating vision due to cataracts, he continued to practice orthodontry and to build and repair clocks as a hobby from 1962 until the commencement of this action in April 1978. The court properly found that Hill was a "Christian Science Practitioner" and for some time attempted to treat Lamkin's eye condition without success. Thereafter, Lamkin underwent two operations which resulted in substantial improvement to his eyesight. The trial court also made the following findings. In 1967, Lamkin and Hill went to the office of an attorney and at that time *549 Lamkin signed a deed of Lamkin's Deerfield property to defendant Lee H. Clair, who was the attorney's secretary, and Clair then executed a deed of that property to Lamkin and Hill as joint tenants. About this time, several bank accounts were also placed in the joint names of Hill and Lamkin; however, Hill did not exercise control over these accounts. The deposition of Lamkin was taken on May 18, 1978, when he was 94 years of age (Lamkin died on December 28, 1978). Lamkin denied knowingly executing the deed to Clair and indicated that he did not intend to grant Hill any present interest in his real estate. He further testified that he did not learn of these deeds until early 1978. This action was instituted soon thereafter. At some time after 1967 Hill and Lamkin did construct a log cabin upon the premises, which Hill used for his personal and business use. Although Hill paid a portion of the taxes for a number of years, he did not exercise control over the property during the life of Lamkin. On March 5, 1976, Lamkin conveyed a portion of his Deerfield property by warranty deed to Deene D. Clark and his wife. In September 1976, Lamkin conveyed the remainder of his property to plaintiffs, David and Dori Rifkin, as trustees of the Everett W. Lamkin Trust, which was an irrevocable trust created by Lamkin for his benefit and for others named as beneficiaries upon his death. The trial court also found the following: The trial court further found that: It is alleged in the bill in equity, and not specifically denied by *550 the defendants, that in September 1976, Lamkin conveyed all of his Deerfield property to the Rifkins as trustees of the Everett W. Lamkin Trust. Under its terms, after the death of Lamkin, the Deerfield property, except for a small parcel, was to be held for the use and benefit of defendant Hill for his lifetime. Furthermore, certain investment and savings certificates in the trust were to be divided at Lamkin's death as follows: one-half to defendant Hill and one-half to the trustees, or the whole to the survivors. A copy of this irrevocable trust was introduced in evidence as an exhibit. The following language appears in the trial court's findings of fact: Relying on the facts found, the court ordered Hill to convey his interest in the real estate to the plaintiffs. *551 The transcript of the testimony, the depositions and exhibits introduced in evidence support the findings made by the trial court. Defendant Hill maintains, however, that the trial court misapplied the rule of Patey v. Peaslee, 101 N.H. 26, 131 A.2d 433 (1957). That case held that the defendant who concealed his sole purpose in marrying, which was to become beneficiary of his wife's estate, thereby committed a fraud upon his wife and her heirs-at-law that constitutes a cause for equitable relief by the imposition of a constructive trust. Because the trial court in the present case specifically found that the plaintiffs' claim that the conveyance in question was procured through fraud was not supported by the evidence, defendant Hill argues it erred in imposing a constructive trust on the basis of a unilateral mistake. [1, 2] The Patey case recognized, however, that the equitable principle of imposing a constructive trust rests upon the doctrine that restitution will be compelled to prevent unjust enrichment. Patey v. Peaslee, 101 N.H. 26, 29, 131 A.2d 433, 436 (1957); see Cornwell v. Cornwell, 116 N.H. 205, 208-09, 356 A.2d 683, 686 (1976). "There are no rigid requirements for a constructive trust.. . . A court may impose a constructive trust on property to prevent the unjust enrichment of the person holding title at the expense of another." Clooney v. Clooney, 118 N.H. 754, 757, 394 A.2d 313, 316 (1978); Hartsock v. Strong, 21 Md. App. 110, 116-17, 318 A.2d 237, 241 (1974). D. DOBBS, REMEDIES §§ 4.1 at 224, 11.7 at 756 (1973). "Thus a constructive trust arises where the title to property is acquired through a mistake . . . ." 5 SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 462.2 (3d ed. 1967), see Hertz v. Klavan, 374 A.2d 871, 873 (D.C.C.A. 1977); 5 SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 464 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 163, comment b (1937); G. C. and G. T. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 77 (5th ed. 1973). [3] The record warrants the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs have proved by clear and convincing evidence that under the circumstances of the case the retention by Hill of the title to *552 Lamkin's Deerfield property in question would result in unjust enrichment to Hill. The trial court therefore correctly imposed a constructive trust upon Hill's interest created by the deed and properly ordered Hill to convey his interest in that real estate to the plaintiffs. Decree affirmed.