Title: DELONG v DOWNES
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13629
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 22, 1977

No. 13629 IN THE SUPREME: COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 JOE A. DeLONG et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, -vs- ALEX L. DOWTJES et al., Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Honorable Robert Sykes, Judg& presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Maore, Lympus and Dor,an, Kalispell, Montana James Moore argued, Kalispell, Montana For Respondents: Patrick M. Springer Kalispell, Montana Norbert F. Donahue Submitted.: December 1, 1977 DEC 2 2 lgn, Decided: , - . --- - M r . Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court : This is an action for a declaratory judgment i n i t i a t e d i n the District Court, Flathead County, by the Board of County Commissioners of that county. Defendants are ten individuals whose signatures appear on a Petition for I n i t i a t i v e requesting that the Board place before the general electorate for vote a resolution limiting gambling within Flathead County t o bingo, raffles and g i f t enterprises t o be conducted by religious and charitable organizations. The Board, i n i t s complaint and petition for declaratory judgment f i l e d September 16, 1976, sought judgment that the subject matter of the Petition for I n i t i a t i v e was outside the powers and jurisdiction of any board of county commissioners and that it be enjoined and restrained from placing a resolution pursuant t o the petition on the ballot for submission t o the general electorate. The City of Kalispell received a similar petition and moved the District Court t o intervene as a p l a i n t i f f . Supported by stipulation of the parties, an order authorizing intervention was issued by the court on September 22, 1976. The cause was submitted upon the pleadings of the respective parties. The'District Court, the Hon. Robert C. Sykes presiding, i n i t s order containing findings of fact and conclusions of l a w , dated September 30, 1976, concluded the Board and City were without jurisdiction t o prohibit certain gambling a c t i v i t i e s , and without power t o l i m i t issuance of gambling licenses t o non- p r o f i t religious and charitable organizations. The court there- fore restrained the Board and City from placing the proposed resolutions on the ballot. Defendants, individual signators of the petition, appeal the order of the District Court. O n September 3 , 1976, the,-described petitions for i n i t i a t i v e s on gambling, prepared i n accordance with sections 37-301 and 11-1104, R.C.M. 1947, were presented t o the Board and the City Council. The petitions requested that those bodies submit t o the qualified electorate measures t o enact a resolution and an ordinance, respectively, that such bodies: "Section 1. * * * may authorize Bingo, (not Keno) , Raffles o r Gift Enterprises by non-profit religious or charitable organizations within [the City and County]; provided however, that a l l other forms of gambling, l o t t e r i e s o r g i f t enterprises, for whatever purposes, are hereby prohibited * * *. "Section 2. A l l acts, ordinances, resolutions, regulations o r rules of [the City and County] i n con- f l i c t with t h i s a c t are hereby repealed." (Bracketed material paraphrased). There i s no question as t o the validity of the petitions o r the manner i n which they were prepared o r certified. The City and County refused t o honor the petitions, on the ground the requested measures were outside the powers and jurisdiction of the respective bodies t o enact and were, there- fore, improper subjects for i n i t i a t i v e . The instant action ensued. The issue to be resolved on t h i s appeal is: Does a resolution which specifies the types of gambling to be licensed and l i m i t s the nature of organizations or individuals t o be li+bensea for gambling constitute a proper subject for public i n i t i a t i v e within the legislative jurisdiction and powers of the City of Kalispell and County of Flathead? The thrust of appellants' argument is that local units of government have the power and jurisdiction, pursuant t o the Montana gambling statutes, section 62-701 et.seq., R.C.M. 1947, to limit and control, as well as authorize, gambling and the various forms thereof. Such limitation, it is argued, may be accomplished by way of initiative or referendum, submitted to the qualified voters in such jurisdictions. We cannot sustain this position. A county possesses and can exercise only such powers as are conferred on it by the Constitution and statutes of the state, or such powers as arise by necessary implication from those expressly granted, or such as are required for performance of duties imposed on it by law. Hersey v. Neilson, 47 Mont. 132, 131 P. 30 (1913); Roosevelt County v . State Board of Equalization, 118 Mont. 31, 162 P.2d 887 (1945); Helena Gun Club v. Lewis and Clark County, 141 Mont. 490, 379 P.2d 436 (1963). Therefore, beyond the express powers delegated counties by virtue of section 16-801 et.seq., R . C . M . 1947, and those necessarily implied therefrom, counties are without powers. Any reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a power should be resolved against a county's exercise of that power. Sullivan v . Big Horn County, 66 Mont. 45, 212 P. 1105 (1923); Bignell v. Cumins, 69 Mont. 294, 222 P. 797 ( 1 9 2 3 ) . Cites and towns are similarly limited in their exercise of legislative powers. Sharkey v. City of Butte, 52 Mont. 16, 155 P. 266 ( 1 9 1 6 ) ; Penland v. City of Missoula, 132 Mont. 591, 318 P.2d 1089 (1957); Leischner v. City of Billings, 135 Mont. 109, 337 P.2d 359 ( 1 9 5 9 ) . The Montana Card Games Act and the Bingo and Raffles Law, section 62-701 et.seq., R.C.M. 1947, by their express terms authorize various forms of gambling. Sections 62-703, 62-717. The gambling acts contain a delegation of authority t o c i t i e s , towns and counties, by t h i s language i n sections 62-708 and "The governing body authorized t o issue gambling licenses pursuant t o t h i s a c t may establish by ordinance or resolution regulations governing the qualifications for and the issuing, suppression, and revocation of such gambling licenses. * * *" Theabsve statutes make plain, the sole power delegated t o the local governing bodies is a discretionary power t o regu- l a t e the licensing of gambling. The statutes reveal no language empowering the local units t o prohibit "authorized" forms of gambling i n t h e i r entireties. Neither is such prohibition properly implied from an exercise of licensing power. Thus, neither the City of Kalispell nor Flathead County has the power o r jurisdiction to l i m i t or altogether prohibit certain forms of gambling within i t s jurisdiction by way of ordinance o r resolution. Nor can local gambling restrictions be properly considered an implied exercise of police powers by the local governing bodies. It is entirely conceivable that a group of citizens i n a given locality may desire t o l i m i t o r prohibit a c t i v i t i e s such as gambling on the basis of a perceived adverse moral and economic impact upon their community. However, the Montana Legislature expressly chose t o regard the question of gambling a s a matter of statewide, as contrasted with local, concern. I n effect, the legislature has preempted the field with regard t o the authoriza- tion of certain forms of gambling and card games. In State ex rel. City of Libby v. Haswell, 147 Mont. 492, 414 P.2d 652 (1966), a case concerning a conflict, such as the instant one,in the area of liquor control, t h i s Court recognized the applicable principle: "* 9; * when the s t a t e has exercised a power through i t s s t a t u t e s which c l e a r l y show t h a t the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e deems the subject matter of the l e g i s l a t i o n t o be a matter of general statewide concern rather than a purely l o c a l municipal pro- blem, the c i t y is then without the e s s e n t i a l authority o r power t o pass o r adopt any ordinance dealing with the subject matter." 147 Mont. 495. See also: City of Billings v. Herold, 130 Mont. 138, 296 P.2d 263 (1956); State ex r e l . Wiley v. D i s t r i c t Court, 118 Mont. City of Bozeman v. Ramsey, 139 Mont. 148, 362 P.2d 206 (1961) and Town of White Sulphur Springs v. Voise, 136 Mont. 1, 343 P.2d 855 (1959), while factually analogous t o the i n s t a n t case, a r e c l e a r l y distinguishable. I n those cases challenges were made t o the j u r i s d i c t i o n of l o c a l governmental bodies re- garding c e r t a i n l o c a l t r a f f i c regulations alleged t o be preempted by s t a t e s t a t u t e s . However, the s t a t e s t a t u t o r y scheme there i n question, the 1957 amendment t o the Uniform Act Regulating T r a f f i c , granted express authority t o l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s t o so regulate t r a f f i c , a s an exercise of the police power. Such cases have no application where, a s here, the l e g i s l a t i v e grant of power t o l o c a l u n i t s of government is patently absent. Appellants would have us hold the gambling a c t s confer upon l o c a l governments a "local option" i n permitting o r pro- h i b i t i n g gambling i n t h e i r respective jurisdictions. It i s argued the l e g i s l a t i v e provision t h a t l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s "may" issue licenses implies a l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o create a l o c a l option concerning gambling. Sections 62-707, 62-719. Such a position is untenable. It i s axiomatic t h a t l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t i s f i r s t t o be ascertained from the language of the lawmakers. Green v. C i t y of Roundup, 117 Mont. 249, 157 P.2d 1010 (1945). W e conclude, from the plain language of the gambling acts, that the legislature intended t o grant minimal power t o the local governments regarding regulation of gambling, such power being confined t o a discretionary licensing power. W e therefore hold that local governmental bodies a r e without the power, under the Montana Card Games Act and the Bingo and Raffles Law t o l i m i t or prohibit gambling and the approved forms thereof, except a s expressly provided by such a c t s , within t h e i r respective jurisdictions. Accordingly, the order of the District Court restraining respondents from placing the proposed resolutions on the ballot for submission t o the general electorate i s affirmed. W e Concur: -