Title: Bartz v. Board of Adjustment
Citation: 492 P.2d 1374, 80 Wash. 2d 209
Docket Number: 42129
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: January 27, 1972

80 Wn.2d 209 (1972) 492 P.2d 1374 LUCILE BARTZ, Respondent, v. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT et al., Petitioners. No. 42129. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. January 27, 1972. HUNTER, J. In this case Lucile Bartz, plaintiff (respondent), appealed to the Court of Appeals, Division 3, from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, affirming an order of the board of adjustment of that county, *211 granting a permit to the defendant (petitioner), Dolph Spalding, to construct a building to house a disassembling operation of automobiles in his wrecking yard. The Court of Appeals, Division 3, in Bartz v. Board of Adjustment, 5 Wn. App. 497, 487 P.2d 782 (1971), reversed the judgment of the trial court. The defendant, Dolph Spalding, petitioned this court for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, which we granted. The same issues raised in the Court of Appeals are raised in this court. The defendant, Dolph Spalding, is the owner of Spalding's Wrecking Yard located in Spokane Valley. The defendant started his wrecking yard business in 1935, in the city of Spokane. In 1940, he acquired property in the Spokane Valley where he commenced storing automobiles. He eventually built his home on the property and moved his entire operation to this location. In 1942, the defendant's property and the surrounding area was zoned "agricultural" under the zoning ordinance of Spokane County. The defendant's wrecking yard thereupon became a nonconforming use. The wrecking yard of the defendant presently covers an area of approximately 29 acres. In addition to his home, there is also on the premises a private garage 43 by 30 feet, a shop and office building 60 by 120 feet, and a warehouse building 50 by 128 feet. The building which Mr. Spalding proposes to construct for his car disassembling operations, under his permit, in the furtherance of his wrecking business, will be a 70 by 120 foot steel building which will be located in the vicinity of the other buildings on the wrecking yard premises. Application for the permit was made to the zoning adjuster of Spokane County in 1969. Lucile Bartz, whose residence is located on property adjoining the wrecking yard, learning that the permit had been granted, timely petitioned for a writ of certiorari for review before the superior court. Since the zoning adjuster kept no record of the proceedings, *212 upon stipulation of the parties, the matter was referred to the Board of Adjustment to be heard as an appeal to that board from the zoning adjuster's order granting the building permit. The hearing was held on March 30, 1970. Testimony was introduced by the defendant, and in behalf of the plaintiff, Mrs. Bartz (a widow), by her attorney. It was the contention of Mrs. Bartz that the zoning adjuster was without jurisdiction to grant the permit. The Board of Adjustment entered its findings and affirmed the order of the zoning adjuster, the pertinent part of which is as follows: Upon appeal to the superior court, that court approved the findings of the Board of Adjustment and affirmed its order granting the building permit to the defendant, Dolph Spalding. The plaintiff's appeal to the Court of Appeals followed and the case is before us pursuant to our granting the defendant's petition for review of the Court of Appeal's decision reversing the trial court and revoking the building permit. The plaintiff's primary contention on appeal from the *214 order of the superior court is that the decision of the Board of Adjustment was in excess of the board's authority. [1] The plaintiff argues that the Board of Adjustment, under the Planning Enabling Act, RCW 36.70, et seq., has no authority to consider applications for other than conditional uses or variances. RCW 36.70.810 provides: We agree that no authority for the Board of Adjustment to consider nonconforming uses is lodged in this section of the act. However, it is clear that an area of regulation essential to the use of property not covered by the Planning Enabling Act, must be implemented by ordinance. This is what the Spokane County commissioners have done by the enactment of the zoning ordinance of Spokane County in the area of nonconforming uses, deriving their authority to zone under prior enactments, RCW 36.32.120 and RCW 35.63, et seq. In instances where a nonconforming use came into existence by reason of a reclassification of property under the zoning ordinance, no permit is required for a continuation of that use. Zoning ordinance of Spokane County, 4.18.010, so provides: No permit was required for the restoration of a building under a nonconforming use in certain instances. Zoning ordinance of Spokane County, 4.18.020, provides: However, in the instance when it was deemed necessary for a permit to be required for a nonconforming use, authority for the consideration of such an application was delegated to the board of adjustment and the zoning adjuster.[1] Zoning ordinance of Spokane County, 4.18.030, provides: The pertinent provision in chapter 4.25.030, referred to in *216 zoning ordinance 4.18.030 of Spokane County, is as follows: It is to be noted that one section of the ordinance uses the term "extension of a nonconforming use," and the other "expansion of a nonconforming use." We find no distinction in the meaning of the terms. [2] The plaintiff argues that this extension of a nonconforming use is a legislative function, and that the ordinances are in derogation of the seventh amendment to the state constitution since there are insufficient legislative standards or criteria for the exercise of this authority. We disagree. The ordinances must be considered in pari materia. The issuance of the permit must be "subject to such conditions as will assure that the public health, safety, convenience, and general welfare are protected." This, considered in light of the purposes and objectives of the zoning ordinance of Spokane County, 4.20.010, clearly constitutes adequate standards. See Fox v. Adams, 134 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Holy Sepulchre Cemetery v. Greece, 191 Misc. 241, 79 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1947), aff'd, 273 App. Div. 942, 79 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1948); McCord v. Ed Bond &amp; Condon Co., 175 Ga. 667, 165 S.E. 590, 86 A.L.R. 703 (1932). The ordinances meet the test of constitutional validity. We hold the board of adjustment had the jurisdiction to consider the application of the defendant, Dolph Spalding, for an extension of his nonconforming use. The plaintiff further argues that the board of adjustment exceeded its authority in granting the defendant's application for an extension of a nonconforming use that to permit the construction of this permanent steel building in the *217 operation of his wrecking yard is contrary to the established policy of phasing out a nonconforming use under the zoning regulations. [3, 4] We agree that phasing out a nonconforming use, insofar as this can be done without violating constitutional rights of due process, is the desirable policy of zoning legislation. However, it must be remembered that the enactment of comprehensive zoning ordinances in their inception, as desirable as they may be in promoting the health and general welfare of the public, being permissive and not mandatory, are within the discretion of the legislative body of the city or county. By the same token, the severity of limitations within constitutional due process standards, in the phasing out of a nonconforming use, are within the discretion of the legislative body. In the recent case of State ex rel. Smilanich v. McCollum, 62 Wn.2d 602, 607, 384 P.2d 358 (1963), we stated: In the instant case we find no prohibition in the Spokane zoning ordinance against the extension or expansion of a nonconforming use. This is clearly within the board's exercise of discretion, subject to the guidelines contained in zoning ordinance of Spokane County 4.25.030(g), supra. It is argued that the board of adjustment cannot deviate from the definition of an auto wrecking yard, as it contains no provision for buildings. Zoning ordinance of Spokane County 4.03.020(9), provides: (Italics ours.) [5] We do not so construe this definition of a wrecking yard. The ordinance must be read in its entirety. The last sentence of the ordinance contemplates the existence of a building in a wrecking yard. A contrary construction would be unrealistic. Under such a construction, even a structure for an office or garage, or for storage facilities, would not be permissible. The defendant argues that the board is bound by standards for a wrecking yard as set forth in zoning ordinance of Spokane County 4.24.060, which makes no provision for a building: (b) Conditional standards: These are standards that are required as a condition precedent to the issuance of a conditional use permit for the operation of a wrecking yard in an agricultural area under *219 chapter 4.24, conditional uses, and are unrelated to a lawfully established nonconforming use in an agricultural area for which no permit is required. It is apparent from the language of the ordinance that the primary object of zoning ordinance of Spokane County 4.24.060, is to obscure unsightliness of the wrecking yard. The board of adjustment in the instant case found the unsightliness would be improved by granting the permit. The board of adjustment, after a consideration of the testimony, found, as heretofore recited: (Italics ours.) The trial court found the record supported these findings and approved the granting of the permit. Our examination of the record shows substantial testimony to support the determinations of the board of adjustment. Mr. Spalding's son, Max, in business with his father, testified they would have a cleaner and more efficient operation: The record further shows: Mr. William Wagstaff, a mechanical engineer for 12 years, who designed the proposed building, testified as follows, under examination of Mr. Cooney: This record amply supports the findings of the board of adjustment to the effect that the use of the proposed building would constitute an improvement in the operation of the wrecking yard to the public interest. The plaintiff contends she was denied a fair hearing. We disagree. This was an administrative hearing conducted by laymen who are not charged with the strict rules of procedure required in a judicial proceeding. The plaintiff failed to testify; however her attorney, who represented her at the hearing, testified and engaged in lengthy colloquy. The record shows that all persons for and against the granting of the permit were invited to be heard. The following appears in the record: [6] The plaintiff further contends that the action of the board was arbitrary and capricious in its failure to consider her contention that the defendant had previously violated his nonconforming use by increasing the acreage of his wrecking yard. The board held, in finding No. 9, supra, that if this be true, there are appropriate remedies available to the objectors, and that this was not appropriate or sufficient grounds for denial of the application for the permit. We believe this was a correct ruling by the board. This was not a proper forum for the hearing and determination of charges of past violations. *222 We have considered the other contentions of irregularities by the board and find them to be without merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the trial court is affirmed. HAMILTON, C.J., FINLEY, ROSELLINI, HALE, NEILL, STAFFORD, and WRIGHT, JJ., concur. Petition for rehearing denied March 27, 1972. [1] The zoning adjuster has the same power and duties as the board of adjustment, except the board of adjustment has the additional authority to hear appeals from the order of the zoning adjuster. See S.Z.O. 4.25.010 and 4.25.060-.070-.080.