Title: Berroteran v. Superior Court
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S259522
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: March 7, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
RAUL BERROTERAN II, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 
Respondent; 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,  
Real Party in Interest. 
 
S259522 
 
Second Appellate District, Division One 
B296639 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BC542525 
 
 
March 7, 2022 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the 
Court, in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Manella* concurred. 
 
 
* 
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Four, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
S259522 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
We granted review to address a conflict in the Courts of 
Appeal regarding an exception to the hearsay rule, articulated 
in Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a)(2) (hereinafter 
section 1291(a)(2)), concerning testimony taken in an earlier 
proceeding and offered against a party to that former 
proceeding.1  Petitioner and plaintiff below, Raul Berroteran II, 
had been a putative member of a federal multidistrict 
consolidated class action suit against real party in interest and 
defendant below, Ford Motor Company (hereinafter Ford), 
arising from the diesel engine used in some of Ford’s vehicles in 
the early and mid-2000s.  The federal matter settled, and 
Berroteran, like many others, opted out in order to pursue his 
own suit.   
In the meantime, nine out-of-state Ford employees or 
former employees had given videotaped deposition testimony in 
the federal action or in subsequent related California opt-out 
litigation.  In connection with Berroteran’s ensuing suit in the 
Los Angeles County Superior Court, he filed 10 designations of 
deposition testimony (one witness having testified twice) listing 
depositions of these nine unavailable out-of-state witnesses and 
identifying the testimony that he proposed to introduce and 
present at trial.  As a general matter, each deposition concerned 
 
1  
Future undesignated statutory citations are to the 
Evidence Code unless otherwise indicated.   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
Ford’s knowledge of and ability to address defects in the engines, 
and its asserted concealment of those defects.   
 
Shortly before trial in Berroteran’s lawsuit was set to 
begin, Ford, relying on the interpretation of section 1291(a)(2) 
articulated in Wahlgren v. Coleco Industries, Inc. (1984) 
151 Cal.App.3d 543 (Wahlgren), moved to exclude all of 
Berroteran’s proffered deposition testimony.  This aspect of the 
statute’s hearsay exception applies when the party against 
whom testimony is offered “had the right and opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar 
to that which” the objecting party would have in the present 
trial.  (§ 1291(a)(2), italics added.)  The official comment 
accompanying that provision explains that in determining 
similarity of interest and motive under the statute, inquiry 
should focus on practical factors, and not simply on any 
similarity regarding the position of the party in the two settings.  
Interpreting the statute in light of this commentary, Wahlgren 
concluded, in essence, that the provision’s hearsay exception is 
generally inapplicable to testimony arising from a discovery 
deposition.   
 
After the trial court granted Ford’s motion, Berroteran 
sought, and the Court of Appeal granted, a writ of mandate, 
directing the trial court to issue a new order denying Ford’s 
motion.  The appellate court viewed section 1291(a)(2) as 
reflecting no general rule against introduction of prior discovery 
deposition testimony, but rather the opposite:  According to the 
court, a litigant in Ford’s position has an interest and motive to 
examine its own witnesses during their depositions, similar to 
that which it would have during trial in a later related case.  
Indeed, the appellate court added, at each of the prior 
depositions, Ford had an interest and motive “to disprove” the 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
allegations of misconduct and knowledge concerning the diesel 
engine.  (Berroteran v. Superior Court (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 
518, 534, italics added (Berroteran).)  The Court of Appeal 
suggested that Ford bore the burden to show that it lacked a 
similar interest and motive — and on this record, failed to do so.  
(Ibid.)   
Following full briefing by the parties and amici curiae, and 
a few days after oral argument in this court, the parties filed a 
document advising that they had “reached an agreement to 
settle the case on terms independent of the outcome of the 
opinion from this court,” and that “the settlement will obviate 
the need for trial proceedings on the merits that would 
otherwise take place on remand.”  In light of the important 
issues presented, we exercise our discretion to proceed to decide 
the matter.  (E.g., Marin County Bd. of Realtors v. Palsson 
(1976) 16 Cal.3d 920, 929 [“an appeal will not be rendered moot 
if the parties raise substantial questions of public interest that 
are likely to recur”]; Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of 
Redondo Beach (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852, 867.)  We will 
conclude that the appellate court’s analysis is incompatible with 
(1) the established principle that the party proposing to 
introduce evidence under section 1291(a)(2)’s former testimony 
exception to the hearsay rule bears the burden of establishing 
the requirements for admission, and (2) the Legislature’s official 
comment, reflecting its understanding when it enacted the 
provision at issue as part of the Evidence Code in 1965.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment, and provide guidance 
for future resolution of similar issues.   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURE  
A.  The Underlying Complaint  
Berroteran’s first amended complaint, filed in mid-2014, 
asserted that in early 2006, after relying on Ford’s 
representations that its vehicle was reliable and provided 
superior power, he purchased a new Ford truck equipped with a 
defective 
6.0-liter 
diesel 
engine 
supplied 
by 
Navistar 
(hereinafter Navistar engine).  The complaint alleged that 
notwithstanding Ford’s representations, when driving the 
vehicle, Berroteran experienced breakdowns and lack of power 
while towing.  Moreover, the complaint alleged, Ford’s attempts 
to address these problems were unsuccessful, even though Ford 
had represented that it had fixed the engine.  Consequently, 
Berroteran alleged, he was unable to use the truck for its 
intended and advertised purposes.   
 
The complaint further alleged that Ford:  “(a) rather than 
identifying and eliminating the root cause of these defects, 
produced and sold the vehicle to [Berroteran] and other 
consumers, knowing it contained a defective engine; (b) adopted 
through its dealers a ‘Band-Aid’ strategy of offering minor, 
limited repair measures to customers who sought to have the 
defects remedied, a strategy that reduced Ford’s warranty 
expenditures but did not resolve the underlying defects and, in 
fact, helped to conceal the defects until the applicable 
warranties expired; and (c) intentionally and fraudulently 
concealed from [Berroteran] . . . these inherent defects prior to 
the sale or any time thereafter.”  The complaint claimed that 
“Ford was aware of its inability to repair the defects” in the 
Navistar engine, and asserted causes of action for fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation, violation of the Consumers Legal 
Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq., hereinafter CLRA), and 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (id., 
§ 1790 et seq.).   
In order to put this complaint and the corresponding 
evidentiary issues arising under section 1291(a)(2) into 
perspective, we find it useful to briefly describe the relevant 
underlying prior federal litigation, and the ensuing California 
opt-out litigation that, in turn, spawned the deposition 
testimony at issue here.   
B.  Earlier Litigation Against Ford Concerning the 
Navistar Engine, and the Resulting 10 
Videotaped Depositions  
1.  The federal consolidated class action complaint 
and the six depositions related to that and 
predecessor federal suits 
 
The 2011 operative federal consolidated class action 
complaint2 alleged defects in the diesel engine supplied by 
Navistar that Ford installed in various vehicles between 2003 
and 2007.  That complaint, foreshadowing those subsequently 
filed by others in California (including Berroteran) who opted out 
of the federal consolidated class action, alleged that “Ford knew 
from the outset that there were severe and pervasive design, 
manufacturing, and quality issues plaguing” the Navistar 
 
2   
Berroteran was a putative class member of a federal 
lawsuit filed in the Southern District of California (Burns v. 
Navistar, Inc. (U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D.Cal., Feb. 23, 2011, Civ. 
No. 10-cv-2295-LAB-BGS) 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18147).  That 
case, along with others, was subsequently consolidated into a 
federal multidistrict class action filed in the Northern District 
of Illinois, Eastern Division (In re Navistar 6.0 L Diesel Engine 
Products Liability Litigation (U.S. Dist. Ct., N.D.Ill., Aug. 12, 
2013, Civ. Case No. 1:11-cv-02496, MDL No. 2223) 2013 WL 
4052673 (In re Navistar)).  
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
engine; yet Ford “never disclosed any of these issues to 
consumers” and failed to authorize necessary major engine 
repairs for its customers during the warranty period of their 
vehicles.  In other words, the complaint asserted, Ford “simply 
kicked the can down the road” until each warranty expired, so 
that “ ‘the customer — not Ford — would pay for repairs.’ ”   
 
The federal consolidated class action ultimately settled — 
preliminarily in late 2012, and finally in mid-2013.  As noted, 
Berroteran, like many others, opted out and pursued separate 
suits.   
 
In connection with the federal In re Navistar (see ante, 
fn. 2) and related predecessor federal suits in Illinois3 and 
Texas,4 various Ford employees and former employees were 
deposed.  Six of those videotaped depositions, taken in Michigan 
and Florida, are among the ten depositions at issue in the 
present case.  Ford’s counsel consulted with each witness prior 
to, and represented that witness at, each deposition.  Ford’s 
counsel raised objections at each deposition, but asked no 
questions of these witnesses.  None of these deposition 
 
3  
Custom Underground, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company 
(N.D.Ill., No. 1:10-cv-00127), concerned the performance of more 
than 20 Ford vehicles with Navistar 6.0-liter diesel engines 
purchased by that plaintiff.  The case was subsequently 
consolidated into the federal multidistrict class action, In re 
Navistar, supra, 2013 WL 4052673. 
4  
Years prior to the federal consolidated class action 
litigation, In re Navistar, supra, 2013 WL 4052673, a Texas 
ambulance service that had purchased Ford vehicles filed 
Williams A. Ambulance, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company (E.D.Tex., 
No. 1:06-CV-00776).  It is uncontested that the complaint in that 
case alleged that Ford equipped ambulances with the defective 
Navistar 6.0-liter diesel engine.   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
transcripts contains any discussion about the intended future 
use of the deposition.   
 
We will briefly describe, as representative, the deposition 
of John Koszewnik, conducted in February 2011 in connection 
with the Illinois federal litigation (see ante, fn. 3).  Koszewnik 
had been Ford’s director of North American diesel products, 
responsible for investigating “failures in the field” of the 
Navistar engine and identifying related “root cause[s] and 
corrective actions.”  He testified that four troublesome 
components had been “injectors, turbochargers, EGR [exhaust 
gas recirculation] valves, [and] EGR coolers.”  He addressed 
related warranty problems with the engine and recounted that, 
as of February 2006, Ford had incurred “about 36 million 
[dollars] a year,” and “as high as 5 million a month,” in warranty 
expenses relating to the engine’s suspect EGR valve.  And yet, 
he testified, Ford refused to approve a replacement EGR valve 
or to notify owners that they should seek such an upgrade.   
2.  Four depositions of three other Ford employees 
arising under three California “opt-out” suits5   
 
The subsequent videotaped depositions were conducted in 
California in 2015–2017 — many years after, and indeed, in light 
of, the above-described depositions in the federal matters.  Each 
deponent was designated by Ford as a “person most qualified” 
(PMQ).  Again Ford’s counsel consulted with each witness prior 
 
5   
In each of these California actions, the complaint tracked 
the claims asserted in the prior federal consolidated class action 
litigation and presaged those set out in Berroteran’s operative 
complaint:  (1) Preston v. Ford Motor Company (Super. Ct. El 
Dorado County, No. SC20130071); (2) Dokken v. Ford Motor Co. 
(Super. Ct. Sutter County, No. CVCS131994); and (3) Brown v. 
Ford Motor Company (Super. Ct. Butte County, No. 160060).   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
to, and represented that witness at, each deposition.  Ford’s 
counsel once more raised objections at each deposition — and at 
the conclusion of the first two depositions, briefly asked focused 
questions of the witness to clarify certain testimony.   
 
The final deposition, conducted in June 2017 in connection 
with Brown v. Ford Motor Company (see ante, fn. 5), reflects 
substantial discussion about its intended future use.  Because 
these parts of that transcript particularly implicate the 
evidentiary issues in the present case, we review this portion of 
the Brown deposition in some detail.   
 
Eric Kalis appeared as Ford’s PMQ concerning various 
matters, including the internal review and approval process 
conducted by Ford personnel of marketing materials provided by 
Ford to its dealers and customers to facilitate vehicle sales.  He 
further testified as Ford’s custodian of records.  When examples 
of marketing publications (Ford’s “Frontline Magazine,” “Source 
Book,” “Trailer Tow Guide,” and sales brochures) were shown to 
him, Kalis confirmed that each appeared to be a Ford business 
record.  He also presented a USB drive, referred to as “the 
compilation,” reflecting search results concerning “12 million 
pages” of Ford documents that had been produced in connection 
with various prior Navistar engine opt-out lawsuits, and that 
had been introduced as trial exhibits in yet another related 
California opt-out case, Margeson v. Ford Motor Company.6  The 
USB drive included emails by and to Ford employees whose 
 
6  
Los Angeles County Superior Court, No. BC549430.  At 
the time of the deposition in Brown, the Margeson suit had 
yielded a substantial jury verdict against Ford.  Subsequently, 
that verdict was, in most part, recently affirmed on appeal.  
(Margeson v. Ford Motor Company (Sept. 22, 2020, B287445) 
[nonpub. opn.].)   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
depositions are at issue in the present case.  In his testimony 
Kalis 
addressed 
those 
same 
documents 
and 
email 
communications, along with substantive issues such as effects of 
an improperly functioning turbocharger on horsepower and 
towing.  At the close of Kalis’ deposition, following an extended 
off-the-record discussion, counsel for both parties discussed (1) a 
stipulation regarding the documents referred to earlier in the 
deposition and (2) agreement about future use of Kalis’ 
deposition testimony.   
 
Regarding the documents, Ford’s counsel stipulated that 
all of the marketing materials and, with certain exceptions, most 
other files contained within the USB drive — including the 
emails by and to Ford employees — were indeed Ford “business 
records for California hearsay purposes, and are true and correct 
copies of Ford documents.”  Next, after conferring with Ford’s 
counsel, Kalis certified that these documents were “created in 
the normal course of business,” are “true and correct,” and 
constitute Ford “business records.”  Those exhibits were in turn 
made an exhibit to Kalis’ deposition.   
 
The parties then addressed the scope of the stipulation 
regarding the Ford documents, and in connection with that 
discussion they also addressed the future use of the transcript 
and video of the Kalis deposition.  Counsel for the plaintiff 
sought to clarify that the stipulation would apply generally to 
all cases, not only “this case.”  Counsel for Ford replied:  “I . . . 
can’t do the blanket stipulation as to all [Navistar engine] 
matters.  That doesn’t mean that, . . . if you folks bring it up to 
the judge, that you’re going to not get it through easily.  It’s just 
the onus needs to be on your side of the table in those cases.”  
Counsel for the plaintiff responded:  “Mr. Kalis is frequently 
identified and designated as either an expert or a [person most 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
knowledgeable/qualified] — perhaps both — by Ford” and that 
use of “these transcripts” should not be limited “to just this 
Brown versus Ford case.”  At that point, Mr. Scott Erskine, a 
principal counsel for Ford, who had been listening to and 
participating in the deposition by phone, interjected to reiterate 
that he, like defense counsel who was present at the deposition, 
had no authority to “bind other counsel.”   
 
After further discussion the parties agreed to “use a copy 
of the [deposition] transcript and a copy of the video for all 
purposes, for all [Navistar] 6.0[-liter diesel engine] cases in 
which [the Erskine] firm” is “currently counsel of record” — 
listing, in addition to Brown, a few other then-pending 
California opt-out cases (not including or mentioning the 
present matter).  Defense counsel also reiterated that the 
stipulation concerning use of the documents was similarly 
circumscribed.7  In response to renewed questioning by the 
plaintiff’s counsel, Kalis clarified that, so far as he was aware, 
the Ford business records to which he had confirmed 
authenticity were relevant to “all [Navistar] 6.0 diesel” engines 
“in general,” and his conclusion about authenticity of those 
documents would be the same in any case in which the same 
issue arose.  Finally, all counsel agreed to meet and confer 
within two weeks about “expanding this stipulation on the use 
of these transcripts and the video for use in all [Navistar] 6.0 
 
7  
Defense 
counsel 
stated:  “[F]or 
the 
reasons 
that 
Mr. Erskine stated on the phone, . . . I just don’t have the 
authority on that for the other outside counsel.  That doesn’t 
mean you don’t have a good argument to take to a judge in one 
of those cases involving other counsel, it just means that 
I personally don’t have the authority to speak on behalf of [other 
outside counsel] at all, about their cases.”   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
litigation matters, irrespective of” who is counsel of record.  And 
yet the record reflects, and we are advised of, no such further 
agreement.   
C.  Berroteran’s Designation of Passages from the 
10 Video Depositions and Ford’s Motion in 
Limine to Exclude  
 
Berroteran designated various passages of the earlier-
described video depositions, stating that he planned to play 
them at trial.  Relatedly, he also sought to present the Ford 
documents and emails that had been produced in the federal 
consolidated class action litigation, and more recently 
introduced in the California opt-out trial, Margeson v. Ford 
Motor Company (see ante, fn. 6).  As observed immediately 
above, Eric Kalis, Ford’s PMQ and custodian of records, had 
certified, in deposition testimony in Brown, that all of these 
documents were indeed Ford business records.  Ford filed 
motions in limine to exclude both categories of materials.  The 
first, motion No. 29, which is not directly at issue here, sought 
to exclude Berroteran’s trial exhibits.  The second, motion in 
limine No. 30, which is at issue here, sought to exclude each of 
the 10 videotaped depositions described earlier as constituting 
inadmissible hearsay.   
 
As observed earlier, section 1291(a)(2) recognizes an 
exception to the hearsay rule and allows introduction of “former 
testimony” if the declarant is unavailable8 and the proponent 
 
8  
As alluded to earlier, there is no dispute that all 
prospective witnesses at issue in this case are “unavailable” 
because, as out-of-state residents, they are beyond the reach of 
subpoena power.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1989 [a witness is not 
obliged to appear in a California court unless the witness is a 
 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
shows that the objecting party had a “right and opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar 
to that which” it would have at trial in the present case.  (Italics 
added.)  Ford relied on language in Wahlgren, supra, 
151 Cal.App.3d 543, asserting that the inquiry concerning 
motive 
and 
interest 
“ ‘should 
be 
based 
on 
practical 
considerations and not merely on the similarity of the party’s 
position in the two cases’ ” (id., at 546, italics omitted) — and 
argued that Berroteran had failed to carry his burden of 
showing that Ford had a similar interest or motive to cross-
examine the deponents as it would at trial in the present case.   
 
In opposition, Berroteran asserted, “[t]he deposition 
testimony . . . has been admitted in four jury trials in the past 
year and has been submitted to countless courts in connection 
with summary judgment motions, pretrial motions, discovery 
motions. . . .  It is highly relevant, as it directly concerns the 
subject matter of this case.  Ford and its army of lawyers had 
unlimited opportunities to prepare those ‘Ford company 
witnesses’ in advance of their testimony, had every opportunity 
to examine those witnesses during the depositions, and had the 
same or similar motive as Ford has in this case.”   
D.  The Trial Court’s Ruling Excluding the 
Depositions, and the Court of Appeal’s Contrary 
Determination 
 
In arguing that Ford lacked similarity of interest and 
motive to examine the witnesses at the depositions as it would 
 
resident of the state at the time of service]; Evid. Code, § 240, 
subd. (a)(4) [“ ‘unavailable as a witness’ means that the 
declarant is any of the following: . . . [¶] . . .  [¶]  Absent from the 
hearing and the court is unable to compel his or her attendance 
by its process”].)   
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
have at trial, counsel for Ford focused on an asserted 
dissimilarity between Ford’s position in the depositions and in 
the present litigation.  In this regard counsel stated repeatedly 
that at least some of the depositions at issue arose in the context 
of Ford’s own separate lawsuit against “Navistar . . . for breach 
of contract.”  Based on that, counsel stressed, “it doesn’t make 
sense that we would have a motive to cross-examine our own 
witnesses in a suit by Ford against Navistar for breach of 
contract.”  (Italics added.)  In fact, however, as our own review of 
the 10 depositions sought to be introduced reveals, none arose in 
that breach of contract suit setting — and instead all arose in the 
context of consumer actions against Ford.   
 
In a similar vein, Ford’s counsel repeatedly argued that 
Ford had no motive to cross-examine its own witnesses with 
regard to the multidistrict consolidated class action suit because 
those depositions were “limited to class issues” over a span of 
model years and, counsel asserted, discovery in that litigation 
was confined to those “class issues only” and “not merits issues.”  
And yet, as we have confirmed by our own review of each 
deposition, in none was the testimony limited to class 
certification issues such as commonality and typicality — and 
instead each repeatedly, and in considerable detail, addressed 
“merits issues.”  Indeed, as counsel for plaintiff Berroteran 
stressed, the operative complaint in the present suit (and also in 
all other opt-out suits) was modeled on the federal complaint — 
and hence, counsel asserted, the depositions in the prior federal 
action covered “the same subject matter.”  Relatedly, counsel also 
asserted, without opposition, that in each of the four other recent 
California opt-out trials at which the depositions had been 
admitted, “Ford has [simply] counter-designated from the same 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
transcripts,” instead of calling the deponents as live trial 
witnesses.   
 
In response, the trial court stated:  “My ruling would be to 
grant the motion in limine and exclude those deposition 
transcripts for the reasons argued.  In terms of . . . the broadness 
of the other cases and lawsuits and specifics of our particular 
case and whether or not those cases address the specifics of our 
particular case — I just don’t think they [do]. . . .  [T]hey involve 
multiple issues that are not really at issue here.”  Yet, after 
counsel for Berroteran indicated that “this is going to be an issue 
on appeal,” the trial court asked counsel to resume argument.  
Following that further discussion,9 the trial court reaffirmed its 
 
9  
The court asked for clarification regarding similarity with 
respect to the federal consolidated class action suit, In re 
Navistar.  In response, counsel for Ford reprised the earlier 
assertion that those depositions were “limited to class issues . . . 
bearing on whether the class should be certified” and “didn’t even 
deal with merits issues.”  Later, after again repeating that the 
class action depositions were “limited to class discovery,” Ford’s 
counsel ultimately conceded, “obviously there’s some cross over 
with the merits” — yet counsel maintained that the depositions 
addressed “class issues, not merits issues.”  Moreover, Ford’s 
counsel asserted:  “Generally speaking, litigants don’t have 
motive to cross-examine their own witness” unless, as counsel 
acknowledged, there are case-specific reasons for doing so — for 
example, if “our corporate witness is dying of terminal cancer and 
we need his testimony and he might not last until trial.”   
 
Counsel for plaintiff Berroteran asserted that all prior 
counsel understood that the depositions, each of which 
concerned witnesses who were “clearly going to be out of the 
subpoena power of many of the courts” where the cases were 
being litigated, “were preservation depositions.  Why else would 
you videotape the deposition?”  In this respect, counsel for 
Berroteran asserted, contemporaneous comments by the 
 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
original ruling.10   
 
The Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ requiring 
the trial court either to vacate its ruling granting the motion to 
exclude or show cause why a peremptory writ of mandate 
ordering the trial court to vacate its ruling should not issue.  The 
trial court indicated that it would not vacate its ruling.  After 
briefing and argument, the appellate court determined that the 
10 prior depositions were admissible under section 1291(a)(2).  In 
doing so it disagreed with Wahlgren, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d 543, 
which it characterized as establishing a “categorical bar to 
admitting 
deposition 
testimony 
under 
section 
1291.”  
(Berroteran, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 529, italics added.)  
Instead, the appellate court (1) determined that a litigant in 
Ford’s position has a similar interest and motive to examine its 
own witnesses during their depositions as that party would have 
in a later related trial based on similar subject matter, without 
considering any differences between the two contexts, and 
(2) appeared to place the burden on Ford to disprove any 
similarity of interest and motive — and to conclude that Ford 
had failed to satisfy this burden.  (Id., at p. 534.)11   
 
plaintiffs’ counsel at six of the 10 depositions reflected an 
expectation or assumption by that counsel that those videotaped 
sessions would be used as evidence at any trial related to that 
suit.   
10   
The trial court likewise reaffirmed its earlier ruling 
granting motion in limine No. 29, excluding the numerous 
exhibits proffered by Berroteran and referenced in the Kalis 
deposition testimony.   
11  
The appellate court also directed the trial court to “vacate 
its order granting Ford’s motion in limine No. 29 [see ante, 
fn. 10] concerning documentary evidence and to reconsider that 
 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
II.  THE LEGISLATURE’S COMMENT 
CONCERNING SECTION 1291, WAHLGREN, AND 
THE COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION  
A.  The Comment Concerning Section 1291 
 
The Legislature has provided unusually specific guidance 
concerning section 1291, in the form of official commentary that 
originated with the California Law Revision Commission 
(Commission) and then became an integral aspect of the 1965 
legislation enacting the Evidence Code (Stats. 1965, ch. 299).12  
 
order in light of our ruling vacating the trial court’s order 
regarding motion in limine No. 30.”  (Berroteran, supra, 
41 Cal.App.5th at p. 536.)   
12  
In 1956 the Legislature enlisted the Commission to work 
with other interested entities to review existing statutory 
provisions, many of which were then in the Code of Civil 
Procedure, to draft and recommend a dedicated Evidence Code.  
(See Cal. Law Revision Com., Recommendation Proposing an 
Evid. Code (Jan. 1965) at p. 29 [describing the history].)  Nine 
years later, the Commission proposed to the Legislature such a 
code.  (Ibid.)  As recounted in a contemporaneous article by John 
R. McDonough, Chairman of the Commission, the Commission 
“provided a comment for each code section,” explicating “the 
section’s purpose . . . and discuss[ing] some potential problems 
of its meaning or application. . . .”  (McDonough, The California 
Evidence Code: A Précis (1966) 18 Hastings L.J. 89, fn. 4.)  As 
McDonough 
explained, 
and 
as 
the 
Commission’s 
and 
Legislature’s reports reflect, the resulting “comments are of 
special significance in the legislative history of the Evidence 
Code as a result of the special attention given them by the 
legislative committees that considered the code.  Both the 
Assembly and the Senate Committees on Judiciary issued 
special reports on Assembly bill 333 (1965), which became the 
California Evidence Code.”  (McDonough, supra, 18 Hastings 
L.J. at pp. 89–90, fn. 4.)  These special committee reports 
declared that the Law Revision Commission’s comments 
 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
(See generally Cal. Law Revision Com., Evid. Code with Official 
Comments (Aug. 1965) at p. 1007 [“These Comments are 
especially significant in the legislative history of the Evidence 
Code because of the consideration given them by the legislative 
committees that considered the code”].)   
The resulting official comment concerning section 1291 is 
set out verbatim in the published codes (at 29B pt. 5 West’s Ann. 
Evid. Code (2015 ed.) foll. § 1291, pp. 86–87, and Deering’s Ann. 
Evid. Code, vol. 2 (2021 ed.) foll. § 1291, pp. 810–811).13  The 
comment reflects a distinction between two major types of 
former testimony — that given at a prior trial, and that given in 
 
expressed each “committee’s intent in approving the bill, except 
to the extent that new or revised comments were set out by the 
committees themselves.”  (Id. at p. 90, and legislative sources 
cited.)  Accordingly, “for each section of the Evidence Code . . . 
that was revised or enacted by Assembly bill 333 there is a 
comment which is either a legislative committee comment that 
was set forth in one of the two legislative committee reports, or 
a Law Revision Commission comment, that was approved by the 
legislative committees.”  (Ibid.)  In all respects relevant here, 
section 1291’s official comment is taken verbatim from the 
January 1965 Commission Recommendation, supra, at pages 
251–253.  (See Cal. Law Revision Com., Evid. Code with Official 
Comments (Aug. 1965) at pp. 1247–1249 [memorializing the 
approved final version of the  comment concerning section 1291]; 
see also id., at pp. 1007–1008 [recounting the special 
consideration given in April 1965 by the Assembly and Senate 
judiciary committees to the Commission’s proposed comments].)   
13  
West’s designates the matter as “Comment — Assembly 
Committee on Judiciary.”  Deering’s designates the same as 
“Law Revision Commission Comments” and notes at the end, 
“As amended in the Legislature.”  As observed ante, footnote 12, 
in each publication the relevant text of the comment reflects, as 
pertinent here, the Law Revision Commission’s January 1965 
recommendation, as approved in April 1965 by the Legislature’s 
judiciary committees.   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
the context of a deposition.  The comment first explains, in 
general terms:  “[I]f a series of cases arises involving several 
plaintiffs and but one defendant, Section 1291 permits testimony 
given in the first trial to be used against the defendant in a later 
trial if the conditions of admissibility stated in the section are 
met.”  (Com., ¶ 1, italics added.)   
 
In its specific discussion of the statute’s subdivision 
(a)(2) — the provision applicable in this case14 — the comment 
is considerably more detailed.  It states in full:  “Paragraph (2) 
of subdivision (a) of Section 1291 provides for the admissibility 
of former testimony where the party against whom it is now 
offered had the right and opportunity in the former proceeding 
to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive 
similar to that which he now has.  Since the party has had his 
opportunity to cross-examine, the primary objection to hearsay 
evidence — 
lack 
of 
opportunity 
to 
cross-examine 
the 
declarant — is not applicable.  On the other hand, paragraph (2) 
does not make the former testimony admissible where the party 
against whom it is offered did not have a similar interest and 
motive to cross-examine the declarant.  The determination of 
similarity of interest and motive in cross-examination should be 
based on practical considerations and not merely on the 
similarity of the party’s position in the two cases.  For example, 
testimony contained in a deposition that was taken, but not 
offered in evidence at the trial, in a different action should be 
excluded if the judge determines that the deposition was taken 
for discovery purposes and that the party did not subject the 
 
14  
Section 1291 also addresses, in subdivision (a)(1), 
admission of former testimony submitted against a party “who 
offered it in evidence in his own behalf” in a prior proceeding.   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
witness to a thorough cross-examination because he sought to 
avoid a premature revelation of the weakness in the testimony of 
the witness or in the adverse party’s case.  In such a situation, 
the party’s interest and motive for cross-examination on the 
previous occasion would have been substantially different from 
his present interest and motive.”  (Com., ¶ 4, italics added.)   
B.  Wahlgren   
 
Nearly 20 years after the adoption of section 1291, the 
Court of Appeal in Wahlgren, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d 543, cited 
and applied the Legislature’s official comment.  In that case the 
plaintiff, who had been injured when he dove from a slide into 
an above ground swimming pool, sued the pool manufacturer, 
among others, and then sought to introduce “two depositions 
taken in a prior unrelated action” in which the same defendant 
pool manufacturer had been a party.  (Id., at p. 545, fn. omitted.)  
Relying alternatively on section 1291(a)(2), the trial court 
excluded the depositions.  (See post, fn. 15.)  After a jury found 
for the defendants, the plaintiff challenged exclusion of the 
deposition evidence on appeal.   
Without addressing or describing the nature of the prior 
unrelated action in which the depositions had been taken, the 
Court of Appeal explained that the deponents were officers of 
the pool manufacturer, and “their testimony concerned [the 
manufacturer defendant’s] policy of placing labels on pools 
which alerted users to the dangers of diving.”  (Wahlgren, supra, 
151 Cal.App.3d at p. 545.)  The appellate court affirmed the trial 
court’s order of exclusion, determining that the deposition 
testimony was inadmissible under section 1291(a)(2), as 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
informed by the section’s comment quoted earlier.15  In the 
process, the court asserted that as a general matter, a party’s 
interest and motive to cross-examine its own witnesses at a 
deposition is different from the party’s interest and motive to do 
so at trial.   
 
The key passage from the brief opinion in Wahlgren reads 
in full:  “ ‘[A] determination of similarity of interest and motive 
. . . should be based on practical considerations and not merely 
on the similarity of the party’s position in the two cases.’  [Citing 
the official comment concerning § 1291, supra.]  Bearing this in 
mind, it should be noted that a deposition hearing normally 
functions as a discovery device.  All respected authorities, in 
fact, agree that given the hearing’s limited purpose and utility, 
examination of one’s own client is to be avoided.  At best, such 
examination may clarify issues which could later be clarified 
without prejudice.  At worst, it may unnecessarily reveal a 
weakness in a case or prematurely disclose a defense.  [¶]  In 
contrast, a trial serves to resolve any issues of liability.  
Accordingly, the interest and motive in cross-examination 
increases dramatically.  Properly exercised, this right serves to 
clarify a litigant’s position and may result in his or her complete 
exoneration.  Given the practical differences between each of the 
proceedings involved, it is therefore clear, at least with respect 
to [the pool manufacturer defendant, who was aligned with the 
 
15  
The trial court had initially denied admission of the 
depositions because they were merely notarized photocopies, not 
certified copies.  The Court of Appeal affirmed on that same 
ground, before addressing, in what appears to be dicta, the 
“alternative[]” ground that the depositions were properly 
excluded as not meeting the requirements of section 1291(a)(2).  
(Wahlgren, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 546; see id., at pp. 546–
547.)   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
deposed witnesses], that the trial court acted properly in 
excluding the deposition testimony.”  (Wahlgren, supra, 151 
Cal.App.3d at pp. 546–547.) 
 
In other words, the decision in Wahlgren effectively 
construed section 1291(a)(2) as articulating a general rule 
against the use of discovery depositions such as were at issue in 
that case (of witnesses aligned with the defendant) in a 
subsequent proceeding — unless the proponent can show that 
the requirements of the statute, as illuminated by the 
Legislature’s official comment, are met.16   
C.  The Court of Appeal Decision Below  
 
In determining that the trial court abused its discretion by 
excluding the 10 former depositions, the Court of Appeal 
acknowledged that Wahlgren “arguably supported Ford’s 
argument and the trial court’s conclusion.”  (Berroteran, supra, 
41 Cal.App.5th at p. 529.)  Yet, the appellate court explained, it 
disagreed with what it characterized as “Wahlgren’s categorical 
bar to admitting deposition testimony under section 1291 based 
on the unexamined premise that a party’s motive to examine its 
witnesses at deposition always differs from its motive to do so at 
trial.”  (Ibid., italics added.)   
In articulating its disagreement with Wahlgren and 
reaching its conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion 
in granting Ford’s motion to exclude the proffered depositions, 
the Court of Appeal was heavily influenced by the subsequently-
enacted and similarly-worded federal counterpart to section 
 
16  
The parties in Wahlgren did not seek review in this court, 
and the propriety of its reasoning does not appear to have been 
raised here since.   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
1291(a)(2) — Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 804(b)(1).17  
Indeed, the appellate court reasoned, federal decisions 
construing the federal rule should inform interpretation of the 
previously-enacted state statute.  The court determined, after 
surveying some of those cases, that under the federal rule, 
“former deposition testimony is not categorically excluded based 
on an assumption that a motive to examine a witness differs 
during 
deposition 
and 
at 
trial” 
(Berroteran, 
supra, 
41 Cal.App.5th at p. 531) — and that “ ‘[a]s a general rule, a 
party’s decision to limit cross-examination in a discovery 
deposition is a strategic choice and does not preclude his 
adversary’s use of the deposition at a subsequent proceeding.’ ”  
(Id., quoting Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. (11th Cir. 
1985) 776 F.2d 1492, 1506 [observing that pretrial depositions 
can serve not only as discovery, but also to preserve testimony 
that might be unavailable at trial].)   
The Court of Appeal focused on Wahlgren’s assertion that 
“[a]ll respected authorities . . . agree that given the [deposition] 
hearing’s limited purpose and utility, examination of one’s own 
client is to be avoided” (Wahlgren, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 546) — and it criticized that decision for failing to cite any 
support for that proposition.  (Berroteran, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th 
 
17  
That rule, adopted in 1975, states:  “The following are not 
excluded by the rule against hearsay if the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness:  [¶]  (1)  Former Testimony.  Testimony 
that:  [¶]  (A) was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful 
deposition, whether given during the current proceeding or a 
different one; and  [¶]  (B) is now offered against a party who 
had — or, in a civil case, whose predecessor in interest had — 
an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, 
or redirect examination.”  (Fed. Rules Evid., rule 804(b)(1), 
28 U.S.C., italics added.)   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
at p. 533.)  The Court of Appeal characterized Wahlgren as 
asserting that “a deposition functions only as a discovery device” 
(ibid., italics added) and responded:  “That blanket assumption 
appears inconsistent with the reality of often overlapping 
lawsuits in different jurisdictions and the prospect that an 
important 
witness 
could 
retire 
or 
otherwise 
become 
unavailable.”  (Ibid.)  In other words, the appellate court 
concluded, Wahlgren is simply out of date, “given the prevalence 
of videotaped deposition testimony in modern trial practice.”  
(Ibid.)    
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal relegated to a footnote the 
Legislature’s official comment concerning section 1291.  The 
court asserted that because Ford did not “proffer any evidence 
that there was any strategic reason for not cross-examining its 
witnesses at their depositions here,” the court saw no reason to 
“address whether this partial legislative history would dictate a 
different outcome upon a proper and different record.”  
(Berroteran, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 534, fn. 10, italics 
added.)18   
 
18  
In this respect, the appellate court wrote, in full:  “Ford 
relies on a comment regarding section 1291 from the Assembly 
Committee on the Judiciary in the publisher’s editor’s note that 
where ‘the deposition was taken for discovery purposes’ and the 
party did not cross-examine its own witness to ‘avoid a 
premature revelation of the weakness in the testimony of the 
witness or in the adverse party’s case . . . the party’s interest 
and motive for cross-examination on the previous occasion 
would have been substantially different from his present 
interest and motive.’  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary com., 29B pt. 5 
West’s Ann. Evid. Code (2015 ed.) foll. § 1291, p. 86.)  Ford, 
however, did not proffer any evidence that there was any 
strategic reason for not cross-examining its witnesses at their 
 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
Having reached this conclusion, the appellate court found 
it unnecessary to address other contentions raised by 
Berroteran.19   
 
depositions here.  Absent such a record, we do not address 
whether this partial legislative history would dictate a different 
outcome upon a proper and different record.”  (Berroteran, 
supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 534, fn. 10.)   
19  
Berroteran’s primary argument in the trial court was that 
the depositions taken in the federal class action litigation are 
admissible under Code of Civil Procedure, section 2025.620, 
subdivision (g).  That provision states in pertinent part:  “When 
an action has been brought in any court of the United States or 
of any state, and another action involving the same subject 
matter is subsequently brought between the same parties . . . all 
depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the initial action 
may be used in the subsequent action as if originally taken in 
that subsequent action.  A deposition previously taken may also 
be used as permitted by the Evidence Code.”  (See also, e.g., id., 
§ 2025.620, subd. (b) [“An adverse party may use for any 
purpose, a deposition of a party to the action, or of anyone who 
at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, 
managing agent, employee, agent, or designee under Section 
2025.230 of a party.  It is not ground for objection to the use of a 
deposition of a party under this subdivision by an adverse party 
that the deponent is available to testify, has testified, or will 
testify at the trial or other hearing,” italics added].)  In his trial 
briefs, Berroteran quoted the Law Revision Commission’s 1965 
comment to the Evidence Code’s definitional section, 1290 (Law 
Revision Com., Evid. Code with Official Comments, supra, foll. 
§ 1290, p. 1247, now set out in 29B pt. 5 West’s Ann. Evid. Code 
(2015 ed.) foll. § 1290, p. 84, and Deering’s Ann. Evid. Code, vol. 
2 (2021 ed.) foll. § 1290, p. 807 [listing provisions that, as of then, 
“will continue to govern the use of depositions in the action in 
which they are taken”]), and he characterized Code of Civil 
Procedure, section 2025.620, subdivision (g) as a “standalone 
authorization for using depositions as evidence at trial . . . 
separate and independent from any Evidence Code provisions.”  
 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
III.  DISCUSSION 
We first consider section 1291(a)(2)’s language in light of 
the Legislature’s comment and corresponding observations in 
leading practice guides — and conclude that the statute 
articulates a general rule (not a categorical bar) against 
admission at trial of prior testimony from a typical discovery 
deposition.  Thereafter, we address the contrary conclusion 
reached by the appellate court below — and explain why we find 
its reasoning unpersuasive. 
A.  As Wahlgren Implied, Section 1291(a)(2) Creates 
a General Rule Against Admission of Testimony 
from a Prior Civil Discovery Deposition 
As noted, section 1291(a)(2) permits the use of prior 
testimony in a proceeding only if the party seeking to exclude 
 
(Indeed, both of these subdivisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 
section 2025.620 — (b) and (g) — can be traced to at least Code 
Civil Proc., former § 2016, subd. (d)(2) & (4), par. 2, enacted by 
Stats. 1957, ch. 1904, § 2, p. 3323.  Those predecessor provisions 
were in turn reenacted, substantively unchanged, when former 
section 2016 was otherwise amended by the legislation that 
enacted the Evidence Code [see Stats. 1965, ch. 299, § 125, at 
p. 1365] — and they remain in place, as renumbered, today.)   
As the appellate court below observed, Berroteran 
advanced his argument grounded on Code of Civil Procedure, 
section 2025.620, subdivision (g), in his writ petition — and he 
further asserted that the testimony given by the three PMQs in 
the opt-out depositions constituted party-authorized admissions 
under Evidence Code section 1222.  The Court of Appeal 
explained that because, in its view, all of the designated 
testimony set out in the 10 depositions was admissible under 
section 1291(a)(2), it would not address these additional 
contentions.  (Berroteran, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 528, fn. 8.)  
Likewise, in this opinion, we express no view concerning the 
applicability of these other statutory provisions.   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
the testimony had “the right and opportunity to cross-examine 
the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which” 
the same party will have “at the [present] hearing.”  (§ 1291, 
subd. (a)(2).)  We are of course bound to construe and apply this 
statutory language.  (Smith v. LoanMe, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 
183, 190.)  Doing so here, we must bear in mind that the 
Legislature’s 
judiciary 
committees 
attributed 
special 
significance to the statute’s official comment.  (Ibid. [when, as 
the parties argue here, “ ‘ “ ‘ “statutory language permits more 
than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other 
aids, such as the statute’s . . . legislative history’ ” ’ ” ”].)20   
As observed earlier, the comment distinguishes trial 
testimony from deposition testimony and recognizes, in effect, a 
general rule in favor of introducing prior trial testimony that is 
otherwise within the rule:  “[I]f a series of cases arises involving 
several plaintiffs and but one defendant, Section 1291 permits 
testimony given in the first trial to be used against the 
defendant in a later trial if the conditions of admissibility stated 
 
20  
In Berroteran’s briefing in this court, advancing his view 
that section 1291(a)(2), as properly construed, supports the 
Court of Appeal’s construction of that provision, he briefly 
alludes to Code of Civil Procedure, section 2025.620, subdivision 
(g) (quoted ante, fn. 19).  Berroteran suggests we should 
construe section 1291(a)(2) “in conjunction with” the Code of 
Civil Procedure section, in order to avoid any asserted tension 
with it.  Because our grant of review was limited to Evidence 
Code section 1291(a)(2), the Code of Civil Procedure provision 
has not been briefed in this court and its application is not before 
us now.  If, as Berroteran suggests, there exists any significant 
tension between Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.620 (key 
parts of which, as observed ante, fn. 19, predated the Evidence 
Code and were reenacted along with it) and section 1291(a)(2) 
as we interpret it, the Legislature can be expected to address 
that issue.   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
in the section are met.”  (Com., ¶ 1.)  This is consistent with the 
language of the statute’s subdivision (a)(2); the defendant in a 
series of trials involving similar claims commonly has both the 
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and a similar interest 
and motive to do so in each trial.   
By contrast, the comment creates no such clear path 
regarding prior deposition testimony.  As noted, the comment 
explains that determination of similarity of interest and motive 
in 
cross-examination 
“should 
be 
based 
on 
practical 
considerations and not merely on the similarity of the party’s 
position in the two cases.”  (Com., ¶ 4.)  Moreover, it says, 
“testimony contained in a deposition that was taken, but not 
offered in evidence at the trial, in a different action should be 
excluded if the judge determines that the deposition was taken 
for discovery purposes and that the party did not subject the 
witness to a thorough cross-examination because he sought to 
avoid a premature revelation of the weakness in the testimony 
of the witness or in the adverse party’s case.  In such a situation, 
the party’s interest and motive for cross-examination on the 
previous occasion would have been substantially different from 
his present interest and motive.”  (Ibid., italics added.)   
In drawing a distinction between the treatment of prior 
trial and deposition testimony, the official comment relies on 
and highlights the different functions of trial and deposition 
testimony.  Trial testimony is presented for the related purposes 
of providing an evidentiary foundation for a favorable judgment 
and persuading the trier of fact to render such a judgment.  
Although depositions are sometimes conducted to preserve the 
testimony of a witness for trial, many are commonly conducted 
for the purpose of discovery.  (Haydock & Herr, Discovery 
Practice (2021-1 supp.) Deposition to Preserve Testimony, 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
§ 17.01[B] (hereinafter Discovery Practice).)  The goal of 
discovery depositions is ordinarily twofold:  to obtain 
information from the witness and to provide a foundation for the 
witness’s impeachment, if necessary, at trial.  Because a 
deposition transcript commits the witness to specific, sworn 
testimony on issues of significance to the litigation, it can be 
used to cast doubt on a deponent who departs from prior 
testimony on the stand.  A discovery deposition, in other words, 
is normally intended as a precursor to trial testimony — not as 
a substitute for such testimony.  (Dunne, Dunne on Depositions 
in California (2020–2021 ed.) Use of depositions generally, 
§ 13:1, p. 478 (hereinafter Depositions in California).)   
As these different purposes might suggest, the “interest 
and motive” of the party opponent in cross-examination at a 
discovery deposition is generally not, as required by section 
1291(a)(2), similar to that  prevailing at trial.  A party commonly 
does have an interest and motive to conduct full cross-
examination of an opponent’s witness at trial.  To the extent 
such a witness presents ostensibly favorable testimony, cross-
examination is the opponent’s primary tool for dispelling that 
appearance and, ideally, eliciting testimony favorable to the 
cross-examiner.  By contrast, there is no fact-finding audience 
at a deposition, and persuasion is ordinarily a secondary 
consideration.  Rather, the goal of an opposing party at a 
discovery deposition is typically to “get a ‘fix’ on” adverse 
witness testimony to be expected at trial (Weil & Brown, Cal. 
Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group, 
2021) Principal Reasons to Take Depositions, ¶ 8:419, p. 8E-3 
(hereinafter Civil Procedure Before Trial), without unduly 
aiding the deposing party’s discovery efforts (Imwinkelreid & 
Blumoff, Pretrial Discovery Strategy & Tactics (2021–2022 ed.) 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
Deposition tactics for opposing attorney, In general, § 7:1 
(hereinafter Pretrial Discovery Strategy)).  In this context, 
cross-examination 
of 
the 
witness 
risks 
unintentionally 
educating and aiding the deposing party because questioning 
necessarily reveals information and commits the witness to 
particular testimony.  The interest and motive of an opposing 
party at a discovery deposition is therefore often against cross-
examination of the witness, in order to avoid assisting the 
deposing party.  (E.g., id., Cross-examination of deponent, 
§ 7:26.)   
Even if there were an interest and motive for cross-
examination by the opposing party at a discovery deposition, the 
opportunity for full and searching cross-examination may, as a 
practical matter, be absent.  Cross-examination at trial is 
typically undertaken only after discovery is complete, when 
documents and testimony available to the parties have become 
known.  Such cross-examination is generally conducted using 
the documents produced in discovery, prior trial testimony, and 
deposition testimony of both the witness being examined and 
other deposed persons.  (E.g., Wegner, et al., Cal. Practice Guide: 
Civil Trials and Evidence (The Rutter Group 2021) Preparing 
for Cross-Examination — A Checklist,¶ 10:163 et seq., pp. 10-37 
et seq. (hereinafter Civil Trials and Evidence).)  As this 
suggests, effective cross-examination benefits from advance 
planning and a complete evidentiary record.  The deposition 
testimony of the witness being cross-examined is an important 
tool because, as noted, the deposition transcript reveals the 
witness’s 
likely 
testimony 
and 
provides 
material 
for 
impeachment if the witness departs from that testimony at trial.  
(E.g., Discovery Practice, supra, Rules Governing Use of 
Depositions at Trial, § 20.02.)  Effective cross-examination at a 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
30 
discovery deposition may be hindered by the absence of 
comparable circumstances.  Accordingly, although the opposing 
party at a discovery deposition has an opportunity to cross-
examine the deponent, that opportunity might often not be an 
ideal one.  This, too, creates less interest and motive for cross-
examination.   
For these reasons, as alluded to above, leading treatises 
are consistent in discouraging opposing parties from conducting 
cross-examination at a discovery deposition, at least when the 
witness being deposed is aligned in interest with the opposing 
party.  For example, Discovery Practice, supra, Questioning the 
Deponent, section 18.08, observes:  “In what situations should 
you question your client deponent?  The best question may be no 
question — the sooner the deposition is over, the better.  
Ordinarily, your preparation of the deponent does not include 
any preparation of questions.  If you ask questions, you run the 
risk of the deponent’s not understanding why you are asking a 
question, or responding to it in a fashion different from what you 
expected.  Further, the more questions you ask, the more 
information you provide the other side; the more questions you 
ask, the more time the other attorney has to think about what 
else to ask; the more questions you ask, the more chance the 
other attorney has to ask still more questions.”  (Accord, 
Depositions in California, supra, Cross-examining own client, 
§ 7:40, p. 277 [“Generally, it is not a good idea to cross-examine 
one’s own client even though counsel has the right to do so.  
[Citation.]  Through counsel’s cross-examination, counsel may 
give the examining attorney leads or ideas for further areas of 
inquiry, and damaging admissions may be made.”]; Civil 
Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶ 8:711, p. 8E-111 [“Attorneys 
often decide not to ask questions at depositions of their own 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
31 
clients or witnesses favorable to their side.  Since there is no 
judge or jury present, there is usually nothing to be gained by 
bringing out favorable testimony via ‘cross-examination.’  
Moreover, it may even do harm by ‘educating’ opposing counsel, 
or by allowing them to ask questions about matters they had 
forgotten to inquire about”]; Lisnek & Kaufman, Depositions: 
Procedure, 
Strategy 
& 
Technique 
(2021–2022 
ed.) 
Rehabilitation — Questioning the Deponent, § 11:10 [“When 
determining whether questions of one’s own client should be 
asked, an attorney must exercise restraint.  Any questions 
asked by the protecting attorney create a risk of additional 
disclosure.  Furthermore, the deponent cannot be expected to 
respond in a desirable manner.  The examiner therefore takes a 
risk as to what answers will be given.  In general, the protecting 
attorney who asks questions sends signals to the examiner that 
further information is out there to be gathered”].) 
As we have indicated, however, not all depositions are 
conducted for discovery purposes, or solely for discovery.  Among 
other purposes, depositions may preserve testimony when there 
is reason to believe the deponent will not later be called at 
trial — whether due to ill health or because of statutory 
provisions that allow for the use of deposition testimony at trial, 
given other considerations about witness availability.  (E.g., 
Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.620, subds. (b), (c) & (g).)  Practical 
guidance therefore acknowledges that cross-examination may 
be appropriate when a deposition serves “to preserve the 
testimony of a deponent who either will not or may not be 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
32 
available at trial” (Discovery Practice, supra, Questioning the 
Deponent, § 18.08) and under other circumstances.21   
In sum, and for the reasons discussed, the official 
comment concerning section 1291(a)(2) articulates what is, in 
effect, a general rule against admission at trial, by way of that 
statute’s hearsay exception, of prior testimony from a typical 
discovery deposition.  But it remains merely a general rule — 
that is, an approach to be adopted in the absence of persuasive 
evidence that the deposition testimony sought to be admitted 
satisfies the requirements of section 1291(a)(2).  The party 
seeking admission of prior deposition testimony under that 
provision is free to submit evidence to the court that the 
deposition sought to be introduced, unlike a typical discovery 
 
21  
Such circumstances may include the following, not all of 
which apply concerning depositions of an aligned witness.  As 
explained in Pretrial Discovery Strategy, supra, Cross-
examination of deponent, section 7:26:  (1) “An explanation 
offered immediately on cross may be more credible than an 
excuse offered at the later trial.”  (2)  If “[t]he deponent made 
several statements favoring your theory of the case, but they are 
‘disjointed and spread over many pages’ ” it might be useful to 
“conduct a brief cross-examination to elicit a compact 
restatement of the favorable passages.”  (3)  If “[y]ou 
contemplate settling the case shortly after the deposition,” then 
“reflecting the testimony in the record will improve your 
settlement posture.”  (4) “If the examining attorney is an 
insurance defense attorney and the deponent is the plaintiff, 
[that party’s counsel] may want to cross-examine about injuries.  
The claims superintendent may review the deposition transcript 
and base the pretrial settlement offer in large part on the 
deposition.  Some credible cross-examination testimony about 
damages may lead to a higher settlement offer.”  Finally, (5) if 
the deponent is “an opposing witness,” cross-examination “is an 
opportunity for discovery you might otherwise not have.”  (Ibid., 
fns. omitted.) 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
33 
deposition, featured circumstances that provided the party 
opponent with an interest and motive for cross-examination 
similar to that at trial.  Properly understood, the official 
comment to section 1291 imposes no categorical bar to 
admission of deposition testimony from a prior proceeding.  It 
simply recognizes that the circumstances surrounding a civil 
discovery deposition typically do not create an interest and 
motive for cross-examination by the party opponent similar to 
that existing at trial.  The party urging admission of deposition 
testimony bears the burden of rebutting the general rule by 
submitting appropriate information justifying the admission of 
designated deposition testimony.   
B.  The Court of Appeal’s Contrary Reasoning is 
Unpersuasive 
As noted, the appellate court’s conclusion was heavily 
influenced by its understanding of the similarly-worded federal 
counterpart to section 1291(a)(2) — rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.  The language in the two provisions is indeed 
similar.  Yet the federal rule, which was enacted a decade after 
ours, does not come with any official comment similar to that 
accompanying California’s 1965 enactment.  And in any event, 
the interpretation of section 1291(a)(2) that we adopt is not 
contrary to what the Court of Appeal regarded as the prevailing 
interpretation of the federal rule — namely, that the former 
testimony inquiry requires a fact-specific analysis and that a 
similar but not identical motive is necessary to come within the 
former testimony hearsay exception.22  As has been explained, a 
 
22  
We note that federal courts have denied motions to 
introduce deposition testimony at trials in subsequent cases 
 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
34 
deposition may be admissible under section 1291(a)(2) in 
various situations in which the party against whom it would 
presently be introduced did in fact have the opportunity to cross-
examine the witness at the deposition with an interest and 
motive similar to those it has at the subsequent hearing.  (See 
Wahlgren, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 546.)   
But the Court of Appeal derived another rule from federal 
law — the proposition that “ ‘a party’s decision to limit cross-
examination in a discovery deposition is a strategic choice and 
does not preclude his adversary’s use of the deposition at a 
subsequent proceeding.’ ”  (Berroteran, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 531, quoting Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan Inc., supra, 776 
F.2d at p. 1506, and also citing Pearl v. Keystone Consolidated 
Industries, Inc. (7th Cir. 1989) 884 F.2d 1047, 1052.)  The Court 
of Appeal then cited California law purportedly consistent with 
the idea that a party’s motives and interest at trial are likely to 
be similar to the party’s motives and interest at an earlier 
deposition.23  Notably, however, the appellate court addressed 
 
even when the issues in the two cases were similar — suggesting 
that, consistent with our own understanding, similarity of the 
issues is not dispositive under the federal rule.  (See, e.g., S.E.C. 
v. Jasper (9th Cir. 2012) 678 F.3d 1116, 1128 [because the S.E.C. 
had a different motivation in examining the witness at an early 
“investigat[ive]” proceeding, the transcript of the earlier 
testimony could not be offered against the S.E.C. at trial]; see 
id., at pp. 1127–1129; Securities Investor v. Bernard L. Madoff 
Inv. (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 610 B.R. 197, 228 [finding no similar 
interest and motive in the absence of “an ‘interest of 
substantially similar intensity to prove . . . the same side of a 
substantially similar issue’ ”].)   
23  
Although, as noted, federal law is not our touchstone here, 
it may be questioned whether the two federal cases cited by the 
 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
35 
only decisions applying section 1291(a)(2) in the context of 
criminal trials — most affirming trial court decisions permitting 
testimony given at a preliminary hearing to be introduced at an 
ensuing criminal trial.  (41 Cal.App.5th at p. 532, citing People 
v. Ogen (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 611, 617 [affirming admission at 
trial of testimony from a preliminary hearing in a different 
proceeding, at which defense counsel had conducted extensive 
cross-examination]; and People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 
795, 850 [affirming admission at a capital penalty-phase trial of 
testimony elicited during a preliminary hearing at which 
defense counsel had conducted cross-examination designed to 
cast doubt on identification of the defendant].)  The Court of 
Appeal likewise cited criminal cases stressing that “[a] party’s 
‘interest and motive at a second proceeding is not dissimilar to 
his interest at a first proceeding within the meaning of . . . 
section 1291, subdivision (a)(2), simply because events occurring 
after the first proceeding might have led counsel to alter the 
nature and scope of cross-examination of the witness in certain 
particulars.  [Citation.]  The “ ‘motives need not be identical, 
only “similar.” ’ ” ’ ”  (Berroteran, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 532–533, quoting People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 
333.)   
These and analogous criminal cases concern testimony 
arising in earlier adjudicative hearings at which a defendant, 
 
Court of Appeal below for this proposition in fact support that 
view.  Indeed, it appears that Hendrix and Pearl simply recited 
and applied the unexceptional point that actual cross-
examination is not required for the former testimony exception 
to apply.  It is not clear that either meant to suggest that a 
party’s reasons for limiting cross-examination in a deposition 
are categorically irrelevant to the similarity of interest inquiry.   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
36 
who may be well-armed with discovery already received from 
the prosecution,24 often has an interest and motive to examine 
the witness in order to avoid being bound over for trial by the 
presiding magistrate.  In that setting, there frequently may be 
reason to find that similar interest and motive exist at the 
preliminary hearing and trial stages.  Yet, as the official 
comment concerning section 1291(a)(2) implies, and as the court 
in Wahlgren recognized, such a general rule does not naturally 
or normally apply with respect to civil depositions, which are 
never adjudicatory in nature, never subject a party to immediate 
jeopardy or loss of freedom, and which are, in practice, often 
undertaken purely (or at least primarily) for purposes of 
discovery.25    
 
24  
See, e.g., People v. Hull (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1034 
[independent of state criminal statutory directives, “ ‘a 
defendant has a due process right under the California 
Constitution and the United States Constitution to disclosure 
prior to the preliminary hearing of evidence that is both 
favorable and material, in that its disclosure creates a 
reasonable probability of a different outcome at the preliminary 
hearing’ ”].  By contrast, there is no comparable statutory or due 
process right to discovery at any stage of civil litigation.  
Although a party might find information in public records, and 
some witnesses may be available for informal interview, in civil 
cases most important document and witness information needed 
by a party, particularly a party plaintiff, frequently is under the 
control of the opposing party, and hence can be obtained only by 
discovery.   
25  
Although we discern no fault in our prior decisions 
applying section 1291 to preliminary testimony in a criminal 
case, our holding concerns civil depositions only; we express no 
view regarding admissibility under section 1291 of other types 
of former testimony.   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
37 
The Court of Appeal discounted Wahlgren’s assertion that 
“[a]ll respected authorities . . . agree that given the [deposition] 
hearing’s limited purpose and utility, examination of one’s own 
client is to be avoided” (Wahlgren, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 546) — and it criticized that decision for failing to cite any 
support for that proposition.  (Berroteran, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 533.)  As demonstrated above, however, Wahlgren’s 
observation about discovery depositions, even if not backed by 
citations in that opinion, is correct.  There was and remains 
overwhelming support for the proposition that defending 
counsel at a civil discovery deposition typically have strategic 
reasons to avoid questioning an aligned witness.  The Court of 
Appeal’s conclusion that Wahlgren is wrong or outdated in this 
respect is belied by prominent treatises and practice guides such 
as those discussed previously.   
Moreover, as Ford and its amici curiae correctly observe, 
videotaping, in itself, does not affect the decision whether to 
examine an aligned witness at deposition.  The determination to 
videotape is ordinarily made by the deposing party, which must 
specify videotaping in the deposition notice (Code Civ. Proc. 
§ 2025.220, subd. (a)(5)) and make practical arrangements for 
the recording.  Standing alone, the videotaping of a deposition 
may not trigger a motive and interest to cross-examine, 
although it may be a relevant factor in combination with other 
circumstances. 
Finally, as noted earlier, the Court of Appeal disregarded 
the Legislature’s official comment concerning section 1291, 
relegating discussion to a footnote.  The appellate court 
reasoned that because Ford did not “proffer any evidence that 
there was any strategic reason for not cross-examining its 
witnesses at their depositions,” the court saw no reason to 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
38 
“address whether this partial legislative history would dictate a 
different outcome upon a proper and different record.”  
(Berroteran, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 534, fn. 10, italics 
added.)   
There are multiple problems with this analysis.  First, as 
related ante, part II.A (and fn. 12), in adopting section 1291 the 
Legislature did so only after its judiciary committees endorsed 
the Law Revision Commission’s comment regarding that 
statute, distinguishing between trial and deposition testimony, 
and providing cautionary elaboration concerning the use of 
deposition testimony under the provision.  It is plain that the 
Legislature viewed the comment as integral to interpreting and 
applying the statute — and indeed, Berroteran does not contend 
otherwise.  In light of this background, a court may not dismiss 
the comment as mere “partial legislative history.”  (Berroteran, 
supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 534, fn. 10.)26   
Second, and fundamentally, the Court of Appeal’s stated 
reason for failing to honor the comment fails.  Absent an 
agreement among the parties concerning use of the deposition, 
the burden to establish the conditions of the exception to the 
hearsay rule articulated by section 1291(a)(2) rests with the 
proponent of admission — here, Berroteran — and not with 
Ford, the opponent of admission.  (See, e.g., People v. Livaditis 
 
26  
The same observation applies concerning the Court of 
Appeal’s assertion that “Wahlgren’s analysis . . . conflicts with 
the plain language of section 1291, subdivision (a)(2), which, on 
its face is unqualified:  The statute states that it applies to ‘the 
former testimony’ and is not limited to former ‘trial testimony.’ ”  
(Berroteran, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 533–534, fn. omitted.)  
Again, as noted, the Legislature’s official comment explicates 
the section’s purpose and addresses its meaning and 
application.   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
39 
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 778 [“The proponent of hearsay” must 
“alert the court to the exception relied upon and has the burden 
of laying the proper foundation”], and authorities cited; see also 
Civil Trials and Evidence, supra, ¶ 8:1405, p. 8D-114, [“the 
proponent must . . . establish that the adverse party’s cross-
examination motives and interests before and now are 
sufficiently similar,” first italics added, citing the official 
comment concerning section 1291].)  As noted, section 1291(a)(2) 
makes former testimony hearsay evidence admissible upon 
three conditions:  The declarant is unavailable; the opposing 
party was a party to prior litigation; and the opposing party had 
opportunity to cross-examine with a similar motive and interest.  
As the cited authorities suggest, it is natural to view the 
proponent of admission as bearing the burden of proof on each 
of these elements.  Yet the appellate court below appears to have 
shifted the burden of proof concerning this hearsay exception to 
the opponent of the evidence, Ford.27   
 
27  
Indeed, this aspect of the Court of Appeal’s reasoning 
pervaded and infected its analysis.  After setting forth its 
criticisms of Wahlgren, the appellate court proceeded to 
determine that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding 
the proffered video deposition testimony.  In the course of its 
discussion the appellate court reasoned that “Ford failed to 
demonstrate any such different motive or interest here” 
(Berroteran, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 520); “Ford offered no 
further explanation why its motive to examine any specific 
employee or former employee differed from its motive in the 
current case” (id., at p. 534, italics added); “Ford made no 
showing that it lacked a similar motive to examine its witnesses 
during their depositions” (ibid., italics added); and “Ford fails to 
demonstrate that it lacked a similar motive to examine its 
witnesses in the former litigation” (id., at p. 535, italics added).  
Given this, the appellate court concluded Ford did indeed have 
 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
40 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal reasoned, because “the 
gravamen of each lawsuit was the same or similar,” Ford must 
have had a “similar motive in questioning its witnesses on the 
substantial overlapping allegations.”  (Berroteran, supra, 
41 Cal.App.5th at p. 535.)28  In other words, the appellate court 
implicitly presumed that because of the similarity of the suits 
and Ford’s position in each, Ford had an interest and motive to 
cross-examine each aligned witness during each deposition.  In 
so reasoning, the court appears to have discounted, if not 
ignored, the comment’s admonition that “mere[] . . . similarity of 
the party’s position in the two cases” (Com., ¶ 4, italics added) is 
not dispositive, and instead must yield to other “practical 
considerations.”  (Ibid.)     
Indeed, the appellate court’s undue focus on Ford’s 
similarity of position in the various settings also led it to assert, 
repeatedly, that at each of the depositions “Ford had a similar 
motive to disprove the allegations of misconduct, and 
knowledge, all of which centered around the 6.0-liter diesel 
engine.”  (Berroteran, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 534, italics 
 
“a similar motive to examine each of the nine deponents.”  (Id., 
at p. 534, fn. omitted.)  And yet Ford — the opponent of 
introduction, which had appeared at the non-adjudicatory civil 
deposition representing an aligned witness — bore no burden to 
prove that it lacked a similar interest and motive to examine its 
witnesses at that deposition.  The burden to prove that Ford had 
a similar interest and motive rested with the proponent, 
Berroteran.   
28  
Likewise, the appellate court observed, “The videotaped 
deposition testimony from the former federal and state 
litigations was on the same issues Berroteran raises in his 
current lawsuit” — and hence, the court concluded, “Ford had a 
similar motive to examine each of the nine deponents.”  
(Berroteran, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 534, fn. omitted.)   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
41 
added.)29  And yet a party would be unlikely to have a motive or 
reason at a deposition of its own witness to disprove anything.  
As Ford and its supporting amici curiae observe, concluding 
otherwise 
would 
substantially 
expand 
and 
complicate 
deposition practice, forcing it to take on the character of a full-
blown liability trial.  For the reasons discussed above, the 
contrary views of Berroteran and amici curiae on his behalf are 
based on fundamental misconceptions concerning the practical 
considerations that must inform the requirements of section 
1291. 
Perhaps the Court of Appeal below was persuaded by 
Berroteran’s repeated assertions that Ford’s litigation position 
suggested “gamesmanship”:  Although Ford had not objected to 
introduction of the designated parts of these depositions in prior 
California opt-out cases, in this case, on the eve of trial, Ford 
asserted its purported rights under section 1291 to exclude the 
materials.  Berroteran argues that he would have to incur the 
expense of deposing each out-of-state witness in order to obtain 
and introduce that same testimony — much of which, 
assertedly, consists of uncontroverted historical facts.  Yet a 
litigant in Berroteran’s position has other means of avoiding 
repetitive depositions, and indeed, a trial court can and should 
facilitate use of measures to obviate need for repeated 
depositions covering the same ground.  Confirming uncontested 
matters is one purpose of interrogatories (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 2030.010 et seq.) and requests for admission (id., § 2033.010 
et seq.).  Both statutes are designed to accommodate enhanced 
 
29  
Later, the court reiterated, “Each deponent was 
represented by Ford’s counsel, and Ford had the same interest 
to disprove allegations related to the 6.0-liter diesel engine.”  
(Id., at p. 535, italics added.)   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
42 
use of each device (see id., §§ 2030.040, 2030.050 [propounding 
additional interrogatories]; 2033.040, 2033.050 [propounding 
additional requests for admission]), and we trust that a trial 
court would approve such requests as warranted.  Moreover, if 
a party fails to comply (see id., § 2023.010, subds. (d)–(h)), a 
court may, and we trust will, impose a broad range of 
appropriate sanctions (see id., § 2023.030).   
Finally, even if, as the Court of Appeal appears to have 
suggested, a presumption favoring admitting hearsay under 
section 1291 were supportable under the statutory scheme, that 
would be an unsuitably blunt tool by which to address the 
inefficiencies highlighted by Berroteran.  Instead, a proper 
application of the fact-sensitive approach that section 1291 
requires, and which we outline immediately below, can be 
expected to appropriately guide application of this hearsay rule.   
IV.  APPROACH THAT A TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD UNDERTAKE IN THIS SETTING  
We now address the process a trial court should undertake 
when determining whether, under the exception to the hearsay 
rule set out in section 1291(a)(2), a party seeking to exclude prior 
deposition testimony had “the right and opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to 
that which” the same party will have at the present trial.  
 
In light of the special significance of the Legislature’s 
official comment described ante, part II.A (and fn. 12), a trial 
court addressing a motion to exclude under 1291(a)(2) should, 
consistently with that comment and the consensus views 
expressed in the practice guides described ante, part III, conduct 
a factually intensive inquiry, separately as to each designated 
deposition, as follows:   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
43 
(A.)  Determining whether the parties intended, at the 
outset, that the deposition serve as trial testimony.  As an initial 
matter, the court should determine whether the parties 
manifested an intent to take the deposition for the purpose of 
preserving the witness’s testimony as a proxy for trial 
testimony.  If such intent is established, it may be inferred that 
all counsel had, at that deposition, a right and opportunity to 
examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to 
that which the party would have at trial in a future case — and 
hence this key requirement of section 1291(a)(2), would, as 
general matter, be satisfied.  In that situation, the burden would 
shift to the party opposing admission to demonstrate 
circumstances rebutting that conclusion.   
(B.)  Determining whether the parties subsequently reached 
agreement concerning use of the deposition at trial in that case, 
or in other cases.  In many circumstances there will be no 
express agreement reached at the beginning of the deposition 
concerning its future use, or evidence that it was intended to be 
anything other than an ordinary discovery deposition.  The court 
should nevertheless inquire whether the proponent of admission 
has shown that the parties subsequently reached agreement 
concerning use to which the deposition would be put, as reflected 
in, for example, the reporter’s transcript of the deposition, or any 
later memorializing document.  Moreover, if, as recounted ante, 
part I.B.2 (regarding the Kalis deposition taken in the Brown 
suit), the parties reach agreement at the close of a deposition 
concerning use in other specific related litigation, yet not 
regarding the litigation in which introduction is presently 
sought, the trial court should consider whether the now-
objecting party, by having agreed to use of the deposition 
testimony in some future related case, contemporaneously 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
44 
implied that, at the deposition at issue, it did indeed have a right 
and opportunity to examine the declarant with an interest and 
motive similar to that which it would have at trial in the present 
case.30 
(C.)  Key “practical considerations.”  In circumstances not 
falling within (A) or (B) above, and hence in which it is not 
evident that the parties understood that a deposition was 
intended for purposes other than discovery, the resulting 
testimony is, as Wahlgren, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d 543, implied, 
generally not made admissible by section 1291(a)(2).  As noted, 
this statute, in essence, mandates that the opposing party have 
had “interest and motive” to conduct an examination similar to 
the type that would be anticipated at the subsequent hearing in 
which the testimony is to be admitted.  Deposition testimony 
should not be admitted under this provision unless, in the 
manner described immediately below, the party proposing to 
introduce the testimony carries its burden of demonstrating that 
the opposing party had the required interest and motive.  In this 
respect the proponent, consistently with the Legislature’s 
official comment concerning section 1291(a)(2) and the 
consensus views expressed in the practice guides described ante, 
part III, should inform the court concerning — and the court 
should 
contemplate — 
various 
practical 
considerations, 
including the following:   
 
30  
In other words:  Presumably, counsel for a party would not 
agree to a deposition’s use in any future different albeit related 
case unless counsel was satisfied that there had been, at that 
deposition, a right and opportunity to examine the declarant 
with an interest and motive similar to that which the party 
would have at trial in a future related case.   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
45 
(1.)  The timing of the deposition within the context of 
the litigation, and special circumstances creating an incentive for 
cross-examination.  As observed earlier, parties may not be in a 
position to conduct cross-examination early in the discovery 
process.  The same is not necessarily true of depositions taken 
after the parties have been educated by discovery conducted in 
earlier, similar lawsuits, as is the situation in this case.  In 
addition, there may be special circumstances that create an 
incentive for cross-examination.  Anticipating a mediation or 
settlement conference, for example, a party may attempt during 
a deposition to demonstrate the weaknesses in an opponent’s 
case by conducting aggressive cross-examination.   
(2.)  The relationship of the deponent and the opposing 
party.  A party rarely has an interest and motive to cross-
examine deponents with whom the party has a close or aligned 
relationship, such as officers and employees of a corporation or 
family members of an individual — although that interest may 
be similarly low or minimal at trial.31  Correspondingly, the 
likelihood of a substantial interest in cross-examination may 
increase as the strength of the relationship between the 
deponent and the opposing party diminishes or if it is 
 
31  
Often a party may have reason to conduct limited 
examination of its own deposition witness in order to explain, 
circumscribe, or correct potentially misleading or damaging 
testimony.  Standing on its own, such limited examination does 
not demonstrate the existence of an interest and motive to 
conduct the type of cross-examination that the party would 
undertake at trial, as is required by the statute.  The proponent 
of admission, however, may be able to demonstrate that the 
opposing party would have no interest and motive to undertake 
a more extensive examination at trial compared with the interest 
and motive that existed at the deposition, thereby satisfying this 
element of admission.   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
46 
antagonistic, as is sometimes the case concerning former 
employees of a corporation or estranged friends and relatives of 
an individual.   
(3.)  The anticipated availability of the deponent at trial 
in the proceeding in which the deposition was taken, and the 
statutory context.  If the witness was expected to be available to 
testify at trial in the litigation for which the deposition was 
taken, this may have diminished the opposing party’s motive to 
cross-examine.  Conversely, if there was reason to believe that 
the witness would be unavailable, for example because the 
witness was not amenable to subpoena or was in ill health, the 
court should consider whether the now-objecting party would 
have had reason to anticipate that the deposition testimony 
might serve as a proxy for substantive testimony at trial — and 
have a corresponding motive and interest to treat it as such.  
Likewise, the motivation and interest in cross-examination may 
be enhanced when a statutory rule (such as those set out in Code 
of Civil Procedure section 2025.620, quoted ante, fn. 19) 
explicitly allows parties to use depositions as substantive 
evidence at the subsequent trial between the same parties, 
regardless of witness availability.   
(4.)  Conduct at, and surrounding, the deposition — and 
the degree of any examination conducted by the opposing party.  
Conduct such as compelling out-of-state witnesses to appear for 
a videotaped deposition, and references made at the ensuing 
deposition to “testimony for the jury,” particularly by the party 
opposing admission, may contribute to a showing that testimony 
preservation was among the purposes of a deposition.  Relatedly, 
if the party opposing admission actually undertook an 
apparently searching examination of the deponent, the court 
may determine that such conduct suggests an interest and 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
47 
motive with respect to cross-examination similar to that which 
the party would have at trial in the present case.  Conversely, 
the absence of any examination of the deponent, or the limited 
scope of any such examination, may suggest that the party 
lacked the same interest and motive for cross-examination that 
would exist at trial in the present case.32   
(5.)  The particular designated testimony.  In some 
circumstances, the proponent of admission may claim that the 
opposing party had an interest and motive to cross-examine a 
deponent concerning specific testimony sought to be admitted.  
As suggested above, there are tactical reasons why an opposing 
party may elect not to examine a deposition witness about 
particular testimony, regardless of its content.  Standing alone, 
therefore, the adverse or confusing nature of particular 
deposition testimony does not necessarily demonstrate an 
interest and motive to cross-examine at the deposition.  
Assuming, however, that the proponent is able to demonstrate 
with respect to particular testimony that the opposing party in 
fact had an interest and motive to examine at the deposition 
similar to that at trial, the trial court may conclude that this 
 
32  
As observed ante, footnote 31, however, the opposing 
party’s interest and motive at trial may be to conduct only a 
limited cross-examination, and this is particularly so when the 
witness is aligned with that party.  Under such circumstances, 
the proponent of admission may be able to demonstrate that the 
limited examination at the deposition was consistent with a 
correspondingly limited motive and interest to cross-examine at 
trial.  Regardless 
of 
the 
circumstances, 
however, 
any 
consideration of the cross-examination actually undertaken is 
merely evidence from which an interest and motive might be 
inferred and not an independent factor in the court’s analysis. 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
48 
element of admission is satisfied with respect to the designated 
testimony. 
(6.)  “Similarity of position.”  When, as appears in the 
present case, respective suits are shown to be substantially 
parallel, and the substance of the related deposition testimony 
correspondingly alike, nevertheless no affirmative presumption 
concerning similarity of interest and motive thereby arises.  
Instead, and although similarity of a party’s position is a 
relevant factor in assessing that party’s interest and motive in 
cross-examining at a deposition compared with at a subsequent 
trial, it is only a factor.  As the Legislature’s official comment 
stresses, “[t]he determination of similarity of interest and 
motive in cross-examination should be based on practical 
considerations” — such as those listed above — “and not merely 
on the similarity of the party’s position in the two cases.”  (Com., 
¶ 4, italics added.)  
Finally, with regard to the trial court’s review and 
determination, it should make a record — orally, or preferably 
in writing — reflecting its reasoning regarding the key issue of 
similarity of motive and interest.  (Cf. Facebook, Inc. v. Superior 
Court (Touchstone) (2020) 10 Cal.5th 329, 358 [a trial “should 
create a record that facilitates meaningful appellate review”].)   
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND DISPOSITION 
 
The Court of Appeal below construed Wahlgren, supra, 
151 Cal.App.3d 543, as establishing a “categorical bar to 
admitting 
deposition 
testimony 
under 
section 
1291.”  
(Berroteran, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 529, italics added; see 
also id., p. 533.)  We do not read Wahlgren as announcing any 
such definitive holding.  Instead, as explained previously, we 
view that case as appropriately construing section 1291(a)(2) to 
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
49 
articulate a general rule against the use of a discovery 
deposition in a subsequent proceeding, unless the proponent can 
show that the requirements of the statute, as illuminated by the 
Legislature’s official comment, are met.  If this understanding 
of section 1291(a)(2) is to be reconsidered or revised in the 
manner suggested by the Court of Appeal below, the 
Legislature, and not a court, should be the agent of any such 
change.33   
 
For the reasons set out above, we reverse the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment.   
 
 
 
33  
Likewise, if, as Berroteran suggests, there is any tension 
with the Code of Civil Procedure (see ante, fn. 19), that too is a 
matter for the Legislature’s attention and consideration.   
BERROTERAN v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
50 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur:  
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
MANELLA, J. * 
 
* 
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Four, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Berroteran v. Superior Court  
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 41 Cal.App.5th 518 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S259522 
Date Filed:  March 7, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County: Los Angeles  
Judge: Gregory Keosian 
 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Knight Law Group, Steve B. Mikhov, Lauren A. Ungs; The Altman 
Law Group, Bryan C. Altman, Christopher J. Urner; Greines, Martin, 
Stein & Richland, Edward L. Xanders, Cynthia E. Tobisman and 
Nadia A. Sarkis for Petitioner. 
 
The Sturdevant Law Firm and James C. Sturdevant for Consumers for 
Automobile Reliability and Safety, Consumer Action, Consumer 
Federation of California and California Public Interest Research Group 
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Alan Charles Dell’Ario for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
 
 
Horvitz & Levy, Frederic D. Cohen, Lisa Perrochet, Allison W. 
Meredith; Sanders Roberts, Justin H. Sanders, Darth K. Vaughn and 
Sabrina C. Narain for Real Party in Interest. 
 
Fred J. Hiestand for the Civil Justice Association of California as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath and Alan J. Lazarus for the Product 
Liability Advisory Council, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real 
Party in Interest. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Cynthia E. Tobisman 
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland LLP 
5900 Wilshire Boulevard, 12th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90036 
(310) 859-7811 
 
Frederic D. Cohen 
Horvitz & Levy LLP 
3601 West Olive Avenue, 8th Floor 
Burbank, CA 91505 
(818) 995-0800