Title: The Country Vintner, Inc. v. Louis Latour, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 052224
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 15, 2006

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
THE COUNTRY VINTNER, INC. 
 
v.  Record No. 052224 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
SEPTEMBER 15, 2006 
LOUIS LATOUR, INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Theodore J. Markow, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in dismissing with prejudice a civil action1 for common law 
conspiracy and statutory conspiracy filed by a wine wholesaler 
against a winery.  At issue is the application of the doctrine 
of primary jurisdiction. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
The conditions for the creation and continuation of all 
wholesale wine distributorships, including franchise 
agreements, are established in the Wine Franchise Act, Code 
§§ 4.1-400 through -418 (“the Act”).  Under the Act, The 
Country Vintner, Inc., (“TCV”) is licensed as a “wine 
wholesaler” as defined in Code § 4.1-401.2  Louis Latour, Inc., 
(“Louis Latour”) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Maison Louis 
                     
1 Herein, we will occasionally refer to the matter filed 
in the circuit court as the "civil action" to distinguish it 
from the administrative proceeding before the ABC Board. 
2 "Wine wholesaler" means any wholesale wine licensee 
offering wine for sale or resale to retailers or other wine 
wholesalers without regard to whether the business of the 
person is conducted under the terms of an agreement with a 
licensed winery. 
 
2
Latour, a French winery, that imports wine into the United 
States.  As a licensed wine importer, Louis Latour is a 
"winery" as defined in Code § 4.1-401.3 
 
In 1990, TCV entered into an "agreement" with Maison 
Louis Latour to sell wine in Virginia pursuant to Code § 4.1-
401.4  Two years later, Maison Louis Latour certified to the 
Virginia Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (“ABC 
Board”) in a “Designation of Authorized Distributor Form” that 
TCV was an authorized wine distributor in “Northern, Central 
and Eastern Virginia.”  For approximately 13 years, TCV sold 
                     
3 "Winery" means every person, including any authorized 
representative of such person pursuant to § 4.1-218, which 
enters into an agreement with any Virginia wholesale wine 
licensee and (i) is licensed as a winery or is licensed as a 
Virginia farm winery, (ii) is licensed as a wine importer and 
is not simultaneously licensed as a wine wholesaler, (iii) 
manufactures or sells any wine products, whether licensed in 
the Commonwealth or not, or (iv) without regard to whether 
such person is licensed in the Commonwealth, has title to any 
wine products, excluding Virginia wholesale licensees and 
retail licensees, and has the manufacturer's authorization to 
market such products under its own brand or the manufacturer's 
brand. 
4 "Agreement" means a commercial relationship, not 
required to be evidenced in writing, of definite or indefinite 
duration, between a winery and wine wholesaler pursuant to 
which the wholesaler has been authorized to distribute one or 
more of the winery's brands of wine. The doing or 
accomplishment of any of the following acts shall constitute 
prima facie evidence of an agreement within the meaning of 
this definition:  
1. The shipment, preparation for shipment or acceptance 
of any order by a winery for any wine to a wine wholesaler 
within the Commonwealth.  
2. The payment by a wine wholesaler and the acceptance of 
payment by any winery for the shipment of an order of wine 
intended for sale in the Commonwealth. 
 
3
Maison Louis Latour wine throughout Virginia, and for the 
final four years of that period TCV was the winery’s sole 
distributor in Virginia.  Throughout that period, Louis Latour 
facilitated the importation of the wine. 
 
In 2003, TCV’s status as the exclusive distributor of 
Maison Louis Latour wine changed.  According to TCV’s motion 
for judgment, Louis Latour’s regional sales manager met with 
another wine wholesaler, Virginia Distributing Company 
(“Virginia Distributing”).  Virginia Distributing agreed that 
it would “take the brand if it was ‘unencumbered’” for sales 
in central, south, and eastern Virginia.  Louis Latour's 
regional sales manager assured Virginia Distributing that TCV 
"would not be able to compete” because Louis Latour would 
restrict TCV’s supply of wine by utilizing TCV’s depletion 
reports that tracked wine sales and inventory. 
 
Similarly, Louis Latour’s sales manager met with another 
wine wholesaler, Select Wines, Inc., (“Select Wines”), that 
indicated it would “love” to be a Maison Louis Latour 
distributor, but “suggested that Louis Latour should ‘police’ 
its [other] distributors to insure they were not selling 
outside their designated territory.”  Louis Latour made the 
same assurances regarding depletion reports that were made to 
Virginia Distributing and explained that the reduced supply 
would prevent TCV from continuing to sell in northern 
 
4
Virginia.  Thereafter, Louis Latour designated Virginia 
Distributing and Select Wines as Maison Louis Latour's wine 
wholesalers in their respective sales territories in Virginia, 
and provided them with TCV’s depletion reports. 
 
Louis Latour then submitted a new, written “Distribution 
Agreement” to TCV with modified terms seeking to restrict 
TCV’s sales of Maison Louis Latour wine to Surry and 
Gloucester Counties.5  TCV rejected the proposed agreement and 
Louis Latour issued a “Requirements Announcement” to TCV that 
achieved essentially the same restrictions by prohibiting 
sales outside Surry and Gloucester Counties and restricting 
the supply of wine.  These changes significantly curtailed 
TCV’s sales of Maison Louis Latour wine throughout the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Pursuant to the administrative procedures set forth in 
the Act, see Code §§ 4.1-409 and 4.1-410, TCV filed a 
complaint with the ABC Board asserting that Louis Latour 
violated multiple provisions of the Act, and that the 
agreements with Virginia Distributing and Select Wines were 
illegal and void.  A hearing panel concluded that Louis Latour 
did violate the Act when it:  (1) established a dual 
distributorship; (2) attempted a unilateral amendment to the 
franchise agreement without good cause; (3) discriminated 
                     
5 The initial agreement was not evidenced in writing. 
 
5
among its wine wholesalers; and (4) acted in bad faith in its 
dealings with TCV. 
 
Significantly, the hearing panel concluded that Count II, 
alleging that Louis Latour’s contracts with Virginia 
Distributing and Select Wines were illegal and void, was 
“inappropriate for determination” because the other 
distributors “were not parties against which relief may be 
granted under the Act.”  Louis Latour appealed the hearing 
panel’s decision to the ABC Board. 
 
Prior to the Board’s ruling on appeal, TCV filed a motion 
for judgment against Louis Latour, Virginia Distributing, and 
Select Wines in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond.  
Counts I and II of the motion for judgment alleged common law 
conspiracy and statutory conspiracy against all three 
defendants.  Counts III and IV alleged tortious interference 
with TCV’s contract and business expectations against Virginia 
Distributing and Select Wines.  As a result, Louis Latour’s 
appeal to the ABC Board was pending at the same time that 
TCV’s motion for judgment was pending before the trial court. 
 
In response to TCV’s motion for judgment, Louis Latour 
filed a “Motion to Dismiss or Stay on Grounds of Primary 
Jurisdiction.”  Louis Latour argued that “[t]he claims alleged 
in the Motion for Judgment . . . would not exist but for the 
provisions of [the Act]” and that “the very same issues” were 
 
6
pending before the ABC Board.  Consequently, Louis Latour 
asserted that the trial court was compelled to dismiss the 
action because primary jurisdiction over the matter was vested 
by the General Assembly in the ABC Board.  The trial court 
granted the motion and dismissed with prejudice the claims 
against Louis Latour; however, the trial court denied the 
motion with respect to Virginia Distributing and Select Wines. 
 
In its order, the trial court stated that it “agree[d] 
with Plaintiff’s argument that if the Act did not exist, it 
would still have a claim for conspiracy and tortious 
interference based on the alleged facts" against Louis Latour.  
Nevertheless, the trial court held that “action[s] for 
conspiracy and tortious interference involve[] the same legal 
issues as those contemplated in [the] ABC Board complaint, and 
the legislature has empowered the Board to adjudicate issues 
of this type under [the Act].”  On this basis, the trial court 
held that the Board has “primary jurisdiction” and granted the 
motion to dismiss with regard to Louis Latour.  With regard to 
Virginia Distributing and Select Wines, however, the trial 
court held that the Board’s decision would be “irrelevant” and 
denied the motion to dismiss.  TCV elected to nonsuit the 
claims against Virginia Distributing and Select Wines, and 
timely filed an appeal from the dismissal of its claims 
against Louis Latour. 
 
7
 
On appeal, TCV argues that the trial court erred in 
finding that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to 
this case.  Alternatively, if the doctrine applies, TCV argues 
it was misapplied when the trial court dismissed TCV’s common 
law and statutory conspiracy claims “on the basis of 
preemption.”  Acknowledging that the trial court did not state 
explicitly that it based its holding on the doctrine of 
preemption, TCV maintains that the trial court’s analysis 
demonstrates that preemption is the implicit basis for its 
holding. 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Standard of review 
 
The resolution of this appeal is determined by two 
distinct inquiries.  The first inquiry is whether the trial 
court had jurisdiction to resolve claims of common law 
conspiracy and statutory conspiracy based upon alleged 
wrongful conduct arising from violations of the Act.  The 
second inquiry is whether the trial court’s application of the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction was proper.  Both inquiries 
present questions of law which we review de novo.  Dowling v. 
Rowan, 270 Va. 510, 519, 621 S.E.2d 397, 401 (2005). 
B.  The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction 
 
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a judicially 
created doctrine used by courts to allocate decision-making 
 
8
responsibility between courts and agencies when jurisdiction 
may overlap and potential for conflicts or inconsistent 
decision exists.  The doctrine is recognized in the federal 
courts and in many states.  E.g., Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 
258, 268 (1993); Birmingham Hockey Club, Inc. v. Nat'l Council 
on Comp. Ins., Inc., 827 So. 2d 73, 82 (Ala. 2002); Capital 
Tel. Co. v. Pattersonville Tel. Co., 436 N.E.2d 461, 466 (N.Y. 
1982); Foree v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 431 S.W.2d 312, 
316 (Tex. 1968).  The doctrine has been used to preclude court 
consideration of an entire claim and has also been used to 
separate for agency consideration issues within a claim:6 
If a court concludes that a dispute brought 
before the court is within the primary 
jurisdiction of an agency, it will dismiss the 
action on the basis that it should be brought 
before the agency instead.  Similarly, if a 
court concludes that an issue raised in an 
action before the court is within the primary 
jurisdiction of an agency, the court will defer 
any decision in the action before it until the 
agency has addressed the issue that is within 
its primary jurisdiction.  The court retains 
jurisdiction over the dispute itself and all 
other issues raised by the dispute, but it 
cannot resolve that dispute until the agency 
has resolved the issue that is in its primary 
jurisdiction. 
 
                     
6 An example of precluding judicial consideration of an 
entire dispute is illustrated by Texas & Pac. R.R. Co. v. 
Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).  However, the 
court may retain its power over a dispute and refer an issue 
in the dispute to an agency for determination.  See Reiter, 
507 U.S. at 268-69 (1993). 
 
9
2 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise 917 (4th 
ed. 2002) (emphasis added). 
 
In the matter before us, Louis Latour maintains that when 
the General Assembly enacted the Wine Franchise Act, it 
intended that the remedies contained therein would be exclusive 
for any actions based upon conduct defined as wrongful by the 
Act.  By contrast, TCV acknowledges that violations of the Act 
must be heard by the ABC Board, but it maintains that a cause 
of action for common law or statutory conspiracy may be 
maintained in the courts because the Act does not confer 
jurisdiction upon the ABC Board to hear such claims and the Act 
does not abrogate the common law cause of action nor preempt 
the statutory cause of action. 
 
The trial court held that the causes of action for common 
law and statutory conspiracy involve "the same legal issues as 
those contemplated in [the] ABC Board complaint" and held that 
the legislature "has empowered the Board to adjudicate issues 
of this type."  As a consequence, the trial court dismissed the 
conspiracy claims with prejudice.  Herein lies the origin of 
TCV's claim that, without expressly stating, the trial court 
decided that the Act precluded the conspiracy claims. 
C.  Preemption and Jurisdiction of the Trial Court 
 
The first question we address is whether, after the 
Act, TCV can bring common law and statutory claims for 
 
10
conspiracy against Louis Latour.  To preclude these claims, 
the Act must abrogate common law conspiracy and repeal 
expressly or by implication a claim for statutory conspiracy. 
“A common law conspiracy consists of two or more persons 
combined to accomplish, by some concerted action, some 
criminal or unlawful purpose or some lawful purpose by a 
criminal or unlawful means.”  Commercial Business Sys. v. 
BellSouth Servs., 249 Va. 39, 48, 453 S.E.2d 261, 267 (1995) 
(citing Hechler Chevrolet v. General Motors Corp., 230 Va. 
396, 402, 337 S.E.2d 744, 748 (1985) and Werth v. Fire Adjust. 
Bureau, 160 Va. 845, 855, 171 S.E. 255, 259 (1933)).  When one 
party to a contract conspires with a third party to induce the 
breach of the contract, an action for conspiracy will lie.  
Worrie v. Boze, 198 Va. 533, 95 S.E.2d 192 (1956). 
The question whether a statute abrogates the common law 
is resolved by familiar principles: 
The common law will not be considered as 
altered or changed by statute unless the 
legislative intent is plainly manifested. A 
statutory change in the common law is limited 
to that which is expressly stated or 
necessarily implied because the presumption is 
that no change was intended.  When an enactment 
does not encompass the entire subject covered 
by the common law, it abrogates the common-law 
rule only to the extent that its terms are 
directly and irreconcilably opposed to the 
rule. 
 
 
11
Couplin v. Payne, 270 Va. 129, 136, 613 S.E.2d 592, 595 (2005) 
(citing Boyd v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 346, 349, 374 S.E.2d 
301, 302 (1988)).  See also Schlegel v. Bank of America, 271 
Va. 542, 553-55, 628 S.E.2d 362, 368 (2006) (only those common 
law claims "fall[ing] squarely within the confines" of an 
applicable statute are preempted thereby). 
Statutory conspiracy is defined in Code § 18.2-499(A), 
which states in pertinent part: "Any two or more persons who 
combine, associate, agree, mutually undertake or concert 
together for the purpose of (i) willfully and maliciously 
injuring another in his reputation, trade, business or 
profession by any means whatever . . . ."  Code § 18.2-500 
provides that a party aggrieved by a violation of Code § 18.2-
499 may obtain civil relief in the form of treble damages, 
costs, and attorney’s fees. 
“The implied repeal of an earlier statute by a later 
enactment is not favored.  There is a presumption against a 
legislative intent to repeal where the later statute does not 
amend the former or refer expressly to it."  Sexton v. 
Cornett, 271 Va. 251, 257, 623 S.E.2d 898, 901 (2006) (citing 
Albemarle County v. Marshall, 215 Va. 756, 761, 214 S.E.2d 
146, 150 (1975)).  More specifically, “a later act does not by 
implication repeal an earlier act unless there is such a 
clear, manifest, controlling, necessary, positive, 
 
12
unavoidable, and irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy, 
that the two acts cannot . . . be reconciled.”  Boulevard 
Bridge Corp. v. City of Richmond, 203 Va. 212, 218, 123 S.E.2d 
636, 640 (1962).  Therefore, even if the Act contained 
language that created an “apparent conflict” with the civil 
conspiracy statute, we would be bound, “if reasonably 
possible, to give them such a construction as [would] give 
force and effect to each.”  Sexton, 271 Va. at 257, 623 S.E.2d 
at 901 (citing Scott v. Lichford, 164 Va. 419, 422-23, 180 
S.E. 393, 394 (1935)). 
The provisions of the Act address specific conduct by 
which a winery or a wine wholesaler might unlawfully breach 
its franchise agreement; however, it does not expressly 
address the law of conspiracy.  The Act is applicable only to 
agreements between wineries and wine wholesalers.  Code § 4.1-
402.  It sets forth no rights or remedies concerning third 
parties, such as other wine wholesalers, that are not parties 
to a particular franchise agreement.  In accordance with this 
distinction, the hearing panel dismissed any complaints 
pertaining to conduct by Virginia Distributing and Select 
Wines because they “were not parties against which relief may 
be granted under the Act.” 
Louis Latour argues that TCV’s motion for judgment 
amounts to nothing more than “garden variety” violations of 
 
13
the Act that have been “dressed up” for a separate civil 
action.  In this case, TCV’s motion for judgment plainly 
alleges numerous violations of the Act which also are the 
basis for its conspiracy allegations.  Most significantly, TCV 
conceded to the trial court that “the illegality that is 
underlying this, Your Honor, is based upon specific provisions 
of the . . . Act.”  Louis Latour maintains that because the 
wrongful conduct supporting the conspiracy claims arose from 
the Act, there can be no remedies except those provided in the 
Act.  The Act prohibits certain conduct and provides remedies 
for such violations.  However, the Act does not address 
conspiracy to commit such violations.  We noted the 
distinction between the conspiracy to commit a wrongful act 
and the act itself in Worrie: 
The cause of action against Worrie for the 
breach of his contract involved the acts and 
conduct of Worrie alone.  No conspiracy with 
Baily, or anyone else, was necessary to 
maintain that action.  Mere proof of the breach 
by Worrie was sufficient.  On the other hand, 
the cause of action against Worrie in the 
present suit is based upon his alleged tort in 
conspiring with Baily to breach the Worrie 
contract.  Here the plaintiffs were required to 
prove something more than the mere breach by 
Worrie.  An essential element in the present 
case, absent in the first, is the alleged 
conspiracy between Worrie and Baily, as the 
result of which Worrie was induced to breach 
his contract. 
 
198 Va. at 539, 95 S.E.2d at 197. 
 
 
14
TCV’s administrative complaint against Louis Latour is 
limited to the question whether Louis Latour’s conduct 
violated the Act.  The civil action contains allegations that 
Louis Latour conspired with others to commit violations of the 
Act.  TCV maintains that the Act does not address actions for 
conspiracy nor does it have the power to grant relief against 
the other wine wholesalers. 
The discrete question we must address is whether a 
conspiracy action based upon a "wrong" arising from the 
provisions of the Act may be maintained outside of and in 
addition to the administrative proceedings before the ABC 
Board.  A legislative intent to supplant a common law action 
for conspiracy is not plainly manifested in the Act.  Nothing 
in the Act explicitly or implicitly prohibits a statutory 
conspiracy action based upon conduct declared wrongful by the 
Act.  As clearly exhibited in Worrie, the wrongful act and a 
conspiracy to commit the wrongful act are two separate causes 
of action.  The violation of the Act is covered by the Act, 
but a conspiracy to violate the Act is not.  We cannot say 
that there is "clear, manifest, controlling, necessary, 
positive, unavoidable, and irreconcilable inconsistency and 
repugnancy" between the Act and a civil action for statutory 
conspiracy such that the two cannot be reconciled.  Boulevard 
Bridge, 203 Va. at 218, 123 S.E.2d at 640.  The conclusion 
 
15
that the Act does not preempt a common law conspiracy claim or 
a statutory conspiracy claim is further supported by the 
language of the Act itself which “define[s] certain rights and 
remedies,” and establishes conditions for wine distribution 
“to the full extent consistent with the laws and Constitutions 
of the Commonwealth and the United States.”  Code §§ 4.1-
400(3) and (4) (emphasis added).  Therefore, we hold that the 
trial court erred in holding that, on these facts, the Act 
preempted or abrogated a civil action for statutory conspiracy 
and common law conspiracy against Louis Latour. 
D.  Application of Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine 
 
Having determined that TCV's conspiracy claims are not 
within the jurisdiction of the ABC Board and are not precluded 
by the Act, the question remains whether the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction should be employed nonetheless.  The 
doctrine is "specifically applicable to claims properly 
cognizable in court that contain some issue within the special 
competence of an administrative agency."  Reiter, 507 U.S. at 
268.  The doctrine “seeks to produce better informed and 
uniform legal rulings by allowing courts to take advantage of 
an agency's specialized knowledge, expertise, and central 
position within a regulatory regime.”  Pharmaceutical Res'ch & 
Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 672 (2003) (Breyer, 
Scalia, Thomas, and O'Connor, JJ., concurring). 
 
16
When utilized to address issues within a claim, the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is meant to merely postpone, 
not preclude, judicial action in a particular case.  “[I]t 
governs only the question whether a court or an agency will 
initially decide a particular issue, not the question whether 
a court or an agency will finally decide the issue.”  Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Co. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 
436 U.S. 180, 199 n.2 (1978).  A trial court stays the 
proceedings before it “so as to give the parties reasonable 
opportunity to seek an administrative ruling” on the matter 
within the agency’s expertise.  Reiter, 507 U.S. at 268 
(citations omitted).  See also Mitchell Coal Co. v. 
Pennsylvania R. Co., 230 U.S. 247, 267 (1913) (further action 
by district court should be “stayed” until the Commission 
rules on the issue of reasonableness). 
Primary jurisdiction should not be confused with 
exhaustion of administrative remedies.  As the Supreme Court 
of the United States explained: 
"Exhaustion" applies where a claim is 
cognizable in the first instance by an 
administrative agency alone; judicial 
interference is withheld until the 
administrative process has run its course. 
"Primary jurisdiction," on the other hand, 
applies where a claim is originally cognizable 
in the courts, and comes into play whenever 
enforcement of the claim requires the 
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory 
scheme, have been placed within the special 
 
17
competence of an administrative body; in such a 
case the judicial process is suspended pending 
referral of such issues to the administrative 
body for its views. 
 
United States v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 
(1956). 
 
In this case, the trial court held that the ABC Board had 
“exclusive” jurisdiction over the claims before it, and then 
applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to dismiss with 
prejudice TCV's claims against Louis Latour.  As previously 
discussed, the trial court erred in this holding.  
Consequently, we now consider whether the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction should apply in this case to permit the agency to 
initially decide issues within the dispute. 
"No fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction," but "[i]n every case the question is 
whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are 
present and whether the purposes it serves will be aided by 
its application in the particular litigation."  Western Pac. 
R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 64.  The framework set forth in National 
Communications Ass'n v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 46 F.3d 220, 
222-23 (2d Cir. 1995), provides the appropriate considerations 
for deciding whether a trial court should apply the doctrine 
of primary jurisdiction to stay its proceedings: 
(1) whether the question at issue is within the 
conventional experience of judges or whether it 
 
18
involves technical or policy considerations 
within the agency's particular field of 
expertise; 
(2) whether the question at issue is 
particularly within the agency's discretion; 
(3) whether there exists a substantial danger 
of inconsistent rulings; and 
(4) whether a prior application to the agency 
has been made. 
 
See also Environmental Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 
774, 789 (4th Cir. 1996). 
TCV had already filed an administrative complaint with 
the ABC Board claiming that Louis Latour’s conduct violated 
the Act.  TCV concedes that violations of the Act are within 
the particular, superior expertise of the ABC Board.  It is 
uncontested that the ABC Board is the body charged with 
interpretation and implementation of the Act, and, where 
appropriate, providing appropriate relief for violations of 
the Act.  Finally, the timing of the civil action and the ABC 
Board proceedings presented a risk of inconsistent rulings 
regarding violations of the Act.  Upon these considerations, 
we hold that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should apply 
in this case for the purpose of determining whether the 
wrongful acts underlying the conspiracy claims occurred. 
When applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a 
trial court may stay the proceedings or dismiss the action 
without prejudice.  Because the administrative proceeding will 
involve appeals to the circuit court, the Court of Appeals, 
 
19
and perhaps this Court, the better choice in this case is to 
stay the proceedings for common law conspiracy and statutory 
conspiracy.  Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech., 307 
F.3d 775, 782 (9th Cir. 2002).  Otherwise, TCV may be required 
to file the action anew to avoid the statute of limitations 
before appeals in the administrative proceeding have 
concluded. 
III.  Conclusion 
The trial court erred in concluding that it did not have 
jurisdiction to resolve claims of common law conspiracy and 
statutory conspiracy based upon alleged wrongful conduct 
arising from violations of the Act.  While the trial court did 
have jurisdiction over the conspiracy claims and the ABC Board 
did not, certain issues in the case are more appropriately 
resolved by the ABC Board.  Consequently, the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction applies and the trial court should stay 
the judicial proceedings until the agency has had the initial 
opportunity to resolve matters within its special competence 
and any applicable appeals have concluded. 
The judgment of the trial court will be reversed and the 
case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.