Title: Hoard v. the Home State Bank
Citation: 176 Kan. 624, 272 P.2d 1054
Docket Number: 39,448
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 1954

176 Kan. 624 (1954)
272 P.2d 1054
NANCY JO HOARD, BARBARA ANN HOARD, and MARY JANE HOARD, minors, by RUTH J. HOARD, their mother, guardian, and next friend, Appellants,
v.
THE HOME STATE BANK OF RUSSELL, KANSAS; W.S. KNOX as Executor of the Wayne R. Hoard Estate; and the TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, Appellees.
No. 39,448

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 6, 1954.
Patrick H. Thiessen, of Salina, argued the cause, and Aaron A. Wilson, Jr., of Kansas City, Missouri, was with him on the briefs for the appellants.
Richard M. Driscoll, of Russell, argued the cause, and Jerry E. Driscoll and Chas. O. Boyle, both of Russell, were with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, J.:
Plaintiffs brought this action in the district court under the provisions of G.S. 1949, 60-3127 which provides that in cases of actual controversy courts of record within the scope of their respective jurisdictions shall have power to render judgments declaratory of the rights of interested parties. A demurrer to the petition by one defendant and a motion to dismiss by another, based on jurisdictional grounds, were sustained to the petition. The appeal is from those rulings.
The petition discloses the theory on which the plaintiffs base their right to the relief claimed and at the same time fully reveals the facts on which the rights of all parties depend on appellate review. Omitting formal averments, its prayer and allegations of no consequence to the jurisdictional issue, it reads:
In the interest of time and space, and because detailed reference to the grounds of the motion to dismiss, filed by the defendant bank, and the demurrer to the petition, filed by the defendant executor, would merely serve to further demonstrate the fact, it can be stated at the outset that the all decisive issue before this court on appellate review is whether the district court or, as such court held, the probate court, had jurisdiction of the cause of action set forth in the petition. In approaching that question two propositions, about which there can be no doubt under our statute, should be noted at this point. One, as we have heretofore indicated (See G.S. 1949, 60-3127), is that in cases of actual controversy courts of record within the scope of their respective jurisdictions shall have power to render declaratory judgments. The other is that under our probate code (G.S. 1949, 59-301) probate courts are courts of record. Thus, when the two sections of the statute above noted are read together and harmonized as our decisions require, it becomes obvious that where  as here  a proceeding to administer the estate of a deceased person is pending in probate court that tribunal has power and authority to render a judgment declaratory of the rights of the parties to participate in the assets of the involved estate.
Upon careful examination of the petition certain facts, existing prior to the commencement of the involved action on October 21, 1953, become crystal clear. Stated briefly they are:
1. That long prior to the death of Wayne R. Hoard and at a time when the appellants herein had no interest in the insurance policy in question, such decedent with the consent of the then beneficiary, Ruth J. Hoard, assigned and pledged benefits accruing under *628 the terms of such policy, along with certain assets receivable and other personal property, to the appellee bank to secure the payment of an indebtedness then existing and now unpaid, thus making money accruing from such policy, in event of his death, a part of the assets of his estate in the event such proceeds were required to pay that indebtedness.
2. That following the death of such decedent, who died leaving a last will and testament, administration proceedings were commenced in connection with his estate; that pursuant to such will, and in conformity with its terms, the appellee W.S. Knox was appointed as the executor of the estate; that thereafter Knox, in his fiduciary capacity, took over all the assets receivable which were pledged to the bank to pay the decedent's indebtedness and had them in his possession on the date of the filing of the involved petition.
3. That subsequent to the date of such action, and during the course of administration of the estate, a dispute arose between all parties to the involved action, except the insurance company which stands ready to pay the benefits of the policy to whomever is entitled thereto, as to whether the bank could collect the proceeds of such policy and apply them to the payment of its loan or was obliged to first exhaust the accounts receivable and other pledged personal property in payment of the amount due on its loan.
4. That, last but not least, the fundamental purpose of the action instituted by the appellants in district court was to marshal the assets of the decedent's estate and obtain a declaratory judgment determining the rights of the contending parties thereto which would have the effect of directing the probate court how to apply and distribute the assets of such estate.
In the face of the foregoing facts sound precedent can be found for holding that the involved action is one over which the probate court had exclusive original jurisdiction under the powers conferred upon probate courts by G.S. 1949, 59-301, but we need not labor or pass upon that question here. It is certain that the action is one over which such court had concurrent jurisdiction and the conceded facts, based upon the allegations of the petition itself, are that it had assumed and was exercising that jurisdiction prior to the commencement of appellants' action in district court. In such a situation our decisions are universal to the effect that the court which first acquires jurisdiction retains it to the exclusion of another court which is asked or seeks to assume it. See, e.g., Charvat v. Moore, *629 167 Kan. 336, 339, 205 P.2d 980; Vilm v. Hudson, 167 Kan. 372, 375, 205 P.2d 1021; Egnatic v. Wollard, 156 Kan. 843, 857, 137 P.2d 188, and authorities there cited. For further illustration of the same principle see Walker v. McNutt, 165 Kan. 533, 196 P.2d 163; Graves v. National Mutual Cas. Co., 164 Kan. 267, 188 P.2d 945; Correll v. Vance, 127 Kan. 840, 275 Pac. 174, and numerous other cases of like import listed in Hatcher's Kansas Digest, (Rev. Ed.), Courts, § 471; West's Kansas Digest, Courts, § 475 (1), (2).
Based upon the foregoing decisions and what has been heretofore stated we are constrained to hold the probate court had assumed and was exercising jurisdiction over the matters appellants sought to have determined in the instant action and that therefore the district court's action in sustaining the motion to dismiss and the demurrer to the petition, each of which challenged its right to hear and determine such action, was proper.
Allegations of the petition and arguments advanced by appellants' astute and industrious counsel on the hearing of the cause, to the effect disastrous results and litigation of an extensive nature will result to them, as well as to the appellees and other future litigants, as the result of the conclusion just announced, are more theoretical than real. It denies a litigant no right based upon any theory, either legal or equitable, for it permits them to assert their rights respecting the marshaling, application and distribution of the assets of the estate of deceased persons in a proper proceeding in probate court and if dissatisfied with its decision, respecting such matters, gives them the right (See G.S. 1949, 59-2408) of appeal and trial de novo in the district court on any adverse phase of the probate court's judgment.
What has been heretofore stated and held is limited strictly to the jurisdictional issue here involved and is in no sense to be construed as decisive of the merits of the cause or other questions raised by either party.
The judgment is affirmed.