Title: Commonwealth v. Didas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11712
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 13, 2015

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SJC-11712 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DAMIEN DIDAS. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 4, 2014. - March 13, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Practice, Criminal, Sentence.  Statute, 
Construction, Retroactive application, Amendment. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 20, 2011. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to apply to the defendant's case 
amendments made to G. L. c. 94C was heard by Garry V. Inge, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Bethany Stevens, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Arnold A. Blank, Jr., Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for the defendant. 
 
Barbara J. Dougan, for Families Against Mandatory Minimums, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  In this case we return to St. 2012, c. 192, 
"An Act relative to sentencing and improving law enforcement 
tools" (Crime Bill).  More specifically, we revisit the question 
2 
 
whether certain provisions of the Crime Bill apply to drug 
crimes with which the defendant was charged before the statute's 
effective date, but for which the defendant was not convicted 
until after the effective date.  See Commonwealth v. Galvin, 466 
Mass. 286 (2013).  See also Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 
551 (2013). 
 
The Crime Bill had an emergency preamble and was effective 
on passage, which occurred on August 2, 2012.  Among other 
things, it made a number of changes to provisions of the 
Commonwealth's controlled substances law, G. L. c. 94C.1  The 
Crime Bill also included a section specifying that certain 
provisions of the legislation were to apply retroactively to 
individuals who previously had been convicted of certain drug 
crimes with mandatory minimum sentences and were still serving 
those sentences.  See St. 2012, c. 192, § 48 (§ 48).  In Galvin, 
466 Mass. at 286-287, 290-291, based on our review of the Crime 
Bill's language and purpose, we interpreted § 48's retroactivity 
provisions to mean that certain of its mandatory minimum 
sentence reductions should be applied retroactively to a 
defendant who had been charged with committing a drug offense 
                     
 
1 These changes to G. L. c. 94C include increases to the 
weights required to establish certain drug offenses; reductions 
to the mandatory minimum sentences associated with certain drug 
crimes; and a reduction in the radius of school zones, which 
influences whether those convicted of certain drug violations in 
specified areas must be subject to mandatory sentence 
enhancements.  See, e.g., St. 2012, c. 192, §§ 21, 25, 30. 
3 
 
before the Crime Bill's effective date, but who was not tried, 
convicted, or sentenced until after that date.  Thereafter, in 
Bradley, 466 Mass. at 561, we held that the school zone radius 
reduction included in § 30 of the Crime Bill should be applied 
retroactively to an individual who committed a drug offense 
prior to the Crime Bill's effective date, where the adjudication 
of the case did not occur until later. 
The defendant here has been indicted on a charge of 
trafficking in cocaine in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b) 
(2), the second tier of this trafficking crime.2  The indictment 
was pending on August 2, 2012, the Crime Bill's effective date, 
and remains pending.  The Crime Bill amends § 32E (b) (2), along 
with § 32E (b) (1), in two ways:  by striking out the previous 
versions of these two clauses and replacing them with new 
clauses that reconfigure or redefine the trafficking weights 
defining each, and by reducing the mandatory minimum sentence 
applicable to each.  See St. 2012, c. 192, § 21.  A judge of the 
Superior Court has agreed with the defendant that, following 
this court's decisions in Galvin and Bradley, both the 
                     
 
2 General Laws c. 94C, § 32E (b), prohibits trafficking in 
"a controlled substance defined in clause (4) of paragraph (a) 
. . . of Class B of [§ 31]" (emphasis added).  Cocaine is one of 
the controlled substances included in class B.  See G. L. 
c. 94C, § 31.  For ease of reference, we refer to § 32E (b) in 
this opinion as prohibiting trafficking in cocaine.  Section 32E 
(b) defines four tiers of trafficking in cocaine, differentiated 
by the weight of the cocaine in question, and prescribes an 
increased sentence for each successive tier. 
4 
 
amendments to § 32E (b) (2) effected by § 21 of the Crime Bill 
apply to this defendant.  We conclude that, in accordance with 
Galvin, 466 Mass. at 290-291, § 21's reduction of the mandatory 
minimum sentence required for a violation of § 32E (b) (2) 
applies retroactively to the defendant, but that § 21's 
redefinition of the minimum and maximum trafficking weights does 
not.3 
 
Background.4  On May 3, 2011, Somerville police officers 
observed the defendant engaging in what they believed to be 
street level drug transactions.  The police later searched the 
defendant and discovered him to be in possession of eight bags 
of cocaine with a total weight of 28.14 grams.  On October 20, 
2011, the defendant was indicted on a charge of violating G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32E (b) (2), which at the time prohibited trafficking 
in cocaine with a net weight of "[t]wenty-eight grams or more, 
but less than one hundred grams," and imposed a mandatory 
minimum prison sentence of five years and a maximum sentence of 
not more than twenty years.  See G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b) (2), as 
amended through St. 2010, c. 256, § 70.  See also G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 31. 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Families 
Against Mandatory Minimums in support of the defendant. 
 
 
4 Because the defendant's case remains pending and untried, 
we summarize allegations taken from the Commonwealth's statement 
of the case that was filed in the Superior Court.  The 
summarized allegations are provided only to provide context; 
they have not been proved. 
5 
 
 
On August 2, 2012, the Crime Bill was enacted and went into 
effect.  As noted, § 21 amended § 32E (b) (1), the first tier 
of trafficking in cocaine, by increasing the net weights 
defining the tier to the range of from eighteen grams to thirty-
six grams -- the first tier previously had been defined as from 
fourteen grams to twenty-eight grams -- and to establish a 
mandatory minimum sentence of two years, rather than the 
previous mandatory minimum of three years.  See G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32E (b) (1), as amended by St. 2012, c. 192, § 21.  Section 
32E (b) (2), the second trafficking tier, was amended to 
redefine the weight range for the tier as from thirty-six grams 
to one hundred grams -- previously, the range had been from 
twenty-eight to one hundred grams -- and to set the mandatory 
minimum sentence as three and one-half years instead of the 
previous five years.5  See G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b) (2), as 
amended by St. 2012, c. 192, § 21.  Thus, if the defendant were 
to be charged and convicted under the version of § 32E (b) that 
incorporates the Crime Bill amendments, the defendant could only 
be found guilty under § 32E (b) (1), the lowest tier of 
trafficking in cocaine, rather than § 32E (b) (2), the second 
tier. 
                     
 
5 The Crime Bill also amended the third and fourth tiers of 
trafficking in cocaine, G. L. c. 94C § 32E (b) (3) and (4), by 
lowering the mandatory minimum sentence for each tier, but did 
not make any change to the trafficking weights in either tier.  
See St. 2012, c. 192, §§ 22, 23. 
6 
 
 
Prior to trial, on September 28, 2012, the defendant filed 
a motion to apply all the Crime Bill's amendments to § 32E (b) 
(1) and (2) to his case.  He later filed a supplemental motion 
renewing his request in light of this court's decisions in 
Galvin and Bradley.  On February 6, 2014, the judge allowed the 
defendant's motion in a written memorandum of decision.  On 
March 3, the Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal from the 
judge's order pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (1), as 
appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996), arguing that the order in 
substance constituted an allowance of a motion to dismiss so 
much of the indictment as charged trafficking in cocaine in 
violation of § 32E (b) (2), leaving in place the lesser-included 
offense of trafficking in cocaine in violation of § 32E (b) (1).6 
We granted the Commonwealth's application for direct appellate 
review. 
 
Discussion.  "As a general rule of statutory construction, 
a newly enacted statute is presumptively prospective, and '[t]he 
repeal of a statute shall not affect any punishment, penalty or 
forfeiture incurred before the repeal takes effect.'"  Galvin, 
466 Mass. at 290, quoting G. L. c. 4, § 6, Second.  See Bradley, 
466 Mass. at 553; Commonwealth v. Dotson, 462 Mass. 96, 99-100 
                     
 
6 The defendant does not contest the Commonwealth's 
characterization of the judge's order as a partial motion to 
dismiss, or argue that the Commonwealth was not entitled to 
appeal the order pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (1).  We 
accept the Commonwealth's characterization, and we do not 
discuss the issue further in this opinion. 
7 
 
(2012).  "The consequence of this presumption is to 'preserve, 
even after legislative change of a statute, the liability of an 
offender to punishment for an earlier act or omission made 
criminal by [a] statute repealed in whole or in part.'"  
Bradley, supra, quoting Dotson, supra at 99-100.  The 
presumption of prospective application governs "unless [its] 
observance would involve a construction inconsistent with the 
manifest intent of the law-making body or repugnant to the 
context of the same statute."  Galvin, supra at 290, quoting 
G. L. c. 4, § 6.  See Bradley, supra. 
 
The defendant in Galvin had been charged with committing a 
drug crime -- distribution of cocaine as a second or subsequent 
offense in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (d) -- before August 
2, 2012, the effective date of the Crime Bill, but his case was 
not adjudicated until after that date.  Galvin, 466 Mass. at 
287.  Section 14 of the Crime Bill amended § 32A (d) to reduce 
the section's mandatory minimum sentence of five years to three 
and one-half years and, in sentencing the defendant, the judge 
imposed the amended three and one-half year mandatory minimum.  
Id. at 288.  The question raised on appeal was whether, given 
the date of his offense and indictment, the defendant was 
entitled to the benefit of this reduced mandatory minimum 
sentence effected by § 14 of the Crime Bill.  Id. at 286-287. 
8 
 
 
In answering this question, we observed that "one of [the 
Crime Bill's] primary purposes was to significantly reduce the 
sentences to be served by individuals under the mandatory 
minimum provisions of a wide range of drug-related offenses."  
See Galvin, 466 Mass. at 291.  Given this statutory goal of 
reducing sentences served for certain drug offenses (including 
violations of § 32A [d]) going forward, and considering the fact 
that in the retroactivity provisions of § 48 of the Crime Bill 
the Legislature had expressly provided for application of the 
legislation's reduced mandatory minimums to individuals 
previously convicted of these crimes and currently serving 
prison sentences, we concluded that to deny the defendant in 
that case the benefit of the Crime Bill's reduced mandatory 
minimum sentence for violating § 32A (d) would be "anomalous, if 
not absurd," id. at 291, and accordingly "inconsistent with the 
manifest intent of the [Legislature] as well as repugnant to the 
context of the [Crime Bill]."  Id., quoting G. L. c. 4, § 6. 
 
In contrast to the change to § 32A (d) at issue in Galvin, 
the defendant here seeks to benefit from changes to § 32E (b) 
(2) that do not merely reduce the applicable mandatory minimum 
sentence but also effectively redefine the elements of the 
underlying crime for which he has been indicted.  This change is 
unquestionably substantive in nature:  by increasing the minimum 
drug weight required for a violation of § 32E (b) (2), the 
9 
 
Legislature has altered what the Commonwealth must prove in 
order to convict the defendant under this statute.  See Dotson, 
462 Mass. at 100 (legislative amendment to G. L. c. 272, § 53, 
differentiating between first and second offenses for disorderly 
conduct has substantive impact on how Commonwealth must 
prosecute offenses).  The result of applying the increased drug 
weights to the defendant's case would be that the defendant can 
be charged only with violating § 32E (b) (1), which, as the 
Commonwealth correctly contends, is essentially a lesser 
included offense of § 32E (b) (2). 
 
The defendant does not contest this characterization of the 
redefined weights as a change to the elements of the crime of 
which he is accused, or the observation that this is a more 
substantive change than the one applied retroactively in Galvin. 
Rather, he argues that regardless of the nature of the change, 
retroactive application of the reconfigured drug weights to him 
is consistent with the manifest intent of the Crime Bill and of 
§ 48 in particular.  Section 48 provides: 
"Notwithstanding any general or special law to the 
contrary, any person incarcerated on the effective date of 
this act for an offense which, at the time such person was 
sentenced on such offense, requires serving a minimum term 
of incarceration before such person is eligible for 
probation, parole, work release or release shall be 
eligible for probation, parole, work release and deductions 
in sentence for good conduct under [§§] 12 to 29, 
inclusive" (emphasis added). 
 
10 
 
St. 2012, c. 192, § 48.  The defendant argues that because the 
reconfigured trafficking weights are included in § 21 of the 
Crime Bill and § 21 itself is included within §§ 12 to 29, the 
reconfigured trafficking weights therefore come within the 
portion of the Crime Bill to which the retroactivity provision 
in § 48 specifically applies.  He concludes from this that the 
retroactivity provision in § 48 demonstrates a clear legislative 
intent to apply all the provisions of § 21 retroactively to him, 
not merely those provisions that affect his eligibility for a 
reduced mandatory minimum sentence under § 32E (b) (2). 
 
The difficulty with the defendant's argument is that it 
substantially ignores key language of § 48 the Crime Bill.  By 
its express terms, § 48 focuses on offenders with mandatory 
minimum terms of incarceration, and specifically on these 
offenders' eligibility "for probation, parole, work release and 
deductions in sentence for good conduct."  The reductions in the 
mandatory minimum sentences included within §§ 12 to 29 of the 
Crime Bill directly affect a drug offender's eligibility for 
virtually all of these programs, because the programs otherwise 
would not be available until the mandatory minimum portion of a 
sentence has been served.  See G. L. c. 94C, § 32H.  For the 
same reasons that we discussed in Galvin, see 466 Mass. at 291, 
it would be "inconsistent with the manifest intent" and 
"repugnant to the context" of the Crime Bill not to apply the 
11 
 
new mandatory minimum sentence for a violation of § 32E (b) (2) 
expressly set out in § 21 of the Crime Bill to the defendant in 
this case.  If we did not apply this new mandatory minimum 
sentence retroactively, a person convicted and sentenced before 
the enactment of the Crime Bill would be eligible to be released 
on parole upon completion of the new, shorter mandatory minimum 
term, but a person who committed the crime on the same day but 
was convicted and sentenced after its enactment would not be 
eligible for release until completion of the old, longer 
mandatory minimum. 
 
But the provisions of § 21 that amend § 32E (b) (1) and (2) 
by reconfiguring the trafficking weights are a different matter.  
These provisions in and of themselves have no direct 
relationship to eligibility for probation, parole, work release, 
or good conduct sentence deductions.  Rather, the net weights 
determine only which tier of trafficking will apply; it is the 
separate sentencing provisions within each trafficking tier that 
then define the mandatory minimum sentence for that tier.7 
                     
 
7 The defendant's case illustrates the point.  If the 
reconfigured trafficking weights in § 21 of the Crime Bill were 
applied retroactively to him, the direct effect would be that 
the crime with which he is charged would change from trafficking 
in violation of § 32E (b) (2) to trafficking in violation of 
§ 32E (b) (1).  As a consequence of that change -- not directly 
-- the mandatory minimum sentence upon conviction would then 
shift from three and one-half years (§ 32E [b] [2]) to two years 
(§ 32E [b] [1]). 
12 
 
 
As Galvin, 466 Mass. at 290-291, suggests, the starting 
point for any consideration of applying the Crime Bill 
retroactively to the defendant is § 48.  Section 48 specifically 
refers to mandatory minimum sentences (required "minimum term of 
incarceration"), and provides that the Crime Bill's amended 
minimums are to apply to those currently incarcerated.  It makes 
no mention of the redefined trafficking weights that the Crime 
Bill enacts, and at best, it would be administratively 
challenging to apply those redefined weights to currently 
incarcerated individuals.8  More importantly, it would appear to 
be beyond the authority of the Department of Correction 
(department) to treat a person convicted and sentenced for 
violation of § 32E (b) (2) as effectively convicted and 
sentenced for violation of § 32E (b) (1) -- the result the 
defendant seeks in this case.9 
                     
 
8 Not everyone previously convicted of trafficking in 
cocaine in violation of § 32E (b)(2) who was still serving a 
sentence when the Crime Bill went into effect would be affected 
by the bill's reconfiguration of the trafficking weight ranges 
of § 32E (b)(1) and (2).  Rather, whether such an inmate would 
be affected would depend on the actual weight of the cocaine 
involved in his or her underlying criminal case, and the 
Department of Correction (department) would have to investigate 
and determine the actual weight of the drugs at issue in each 
such person's case.  Such an investigation into the underlying 
facts of each case is certainly outside the scope of the 
department's responsibilities, if not of its authority, and is, 
in many cases, difficult if not impossible to accomplish as a 
practical matter. 
 
 
9 We note that although the department began as early as 
2012 to apply the Crime Bill's reduced mandatory minimum 
13 
 
 
If the redefined trafficking weights in § 21 of the Crime 
Bill do not apply to those who are the direct and explicit 
beneficiaries of the retroactivity provisions of § 48 -- 
individuals convicted of drug crimes with mandatory minimum 
penalties who were previously sentenced and remained 
incarcerated when the Crime Bill went into effect -- there is no 
reason or justification for them to apply retroactively to the 
defendant.  In light of this, and of the indirect manner in 
which the trafficking weight amendments affect mandatory minimum 
sentences, we conclude that it is not inconsistent with § 48 or 
with the manifest intent of the Crime Bill generally to confine 
the retroactive application of the Bill's provisions solely to 
the revised and reduced mandatory minimum sentences contained 
within §§ 12 to 29.10 
                                                                  
sentences to those convicted before the Crime Bill's effective 
date who are still incarcerated, the department did not 
similarly apply the Crime Bill's amendments to the trafficking 
weights for cocaine (see St. 2012, c. 192, § 21) and heroin (see 
St. 2012, c. 192, § 25) to this group.  See Memorandum from 
Charles W. Anderson, Jr., Counsel to Department of Correction, 
to Hon. Robert A. Mulligan, Chief Justice of Massachusetts Trial 
Court, et al., at 2-3 (Sept. 18, 2012) (regarding department's 
implementation of St. 2012, c. 192). 
 
 
10 We disagree with the defendant's contention that the 
reference in § 48 to §§ 12-29 "inclusive" of the Crime Bill as a 
unit reflects a manifest intent by the Legislature to give every 
provision of each of these sections retroactive effect, rather 
than an intent to ensure only that the changes in mandatory 
minimum sentences would be retroactive.  As discussed, this more 
limited scope of retroactivity is consistent with the actual 
language of § 48. 
14 
 
 
In arguing against this result, the defendant asserts that 
applying the amended drug trafficking weights in § 21 to him 
furthers a primary purpose of the Crime Bill, namely, to 
"significantly reduce the sentences to be served by individuals 
under the mandatory minimum provisions of a wide range of drug-
related offenses."  Galvin, 466 Mass. at 291.  As previously 
described, see note 7, supra, retroactive application to the 
defendant of the Crime Bill's reconfigured drug weights for the 
trafficking offenses defined in G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b) (1) and 
(2), would result in his receiving, if convicted, two reductions 
in the mandatory minimum term he must serve when compared to the 
sentence he would have received under the version of § 32E (b) 
(2) in effect at the time he was indicted, thereby furthering 
the Crime Bill's goal of reducing the mandatory minimum 
sentences served for drug-related offenses.  This, he argues, is 
additional evidence that retroactive application of the amended 
drug weights to him is consistent with the manifest intent 
behind the new statute. 
 
However, in light of the presumption of prospectivity in 
G. L. c. 4, § 6, Second, the mere fact that retroactive 
application of the amended trafficking weights to the defendant 
might appear to advance an important purpose of the Crime Bill, 
by itself, does not necessarily mean that failing to do so is 
inconsistent with the statute's purpose.  If it were otherwise, 
15 
 
every amendment or partial repeal and amendment of a criminal 
statute would need to be given retroactive effect, in direct 
conflict with the presumption of prospectivity. 
 
In sum, although retroactive application of the increased 
drug weights to cases pending at the time that the Crime Bill 
became effective might further advance an important goal of the 
Crime Bill, in contrast to the Galvin and Bradley cases, here, 
we conclude that prospective application is not contrary to its 
"manifest intent" or "repugnant" to the statute's context.11  
G. L. c. 4, § 6. 
 
Finally, the defendant invokes the "rule of lenity," 
arguing that in interpreting the Crime Bill, any ambiguity as to 
whether the increased drug weights should apply retroactively to 
him must be resolved in his favor.  See Commonwealth v. 
Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 679 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Roucoulet, 413 Mass. 647, 652 (1992) ("when a criminal statute 
can 'plausibly be found to be ambiguous,' the rule of lenity 
                     
 
11 Although in Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551 
(2013), and Watts v. Commonwealth, 468 Mass. 49 (2014), we 
treated these two exceptions to the rule of prospective 
application as distinct analyses, at other times, we have 
determined that a single line of inquiry is sufficient to 
address both exceptions.  Compare, e.g., Bradley, supra at 553; 
Watts, supra at 55, 60, with Commonwealth v. Galvin, 466 Mass. 
286, 290-291 (2113); Commonwealth v. Dotson, 462 Mass. 96, 100-
101 (2012).  Addressing both exceptions together is appropriate 
here, where the defendant advances essentially the same argument 
under the repugnancy exception as he does under the manifest 
intent exception, namely, that applying the amended drug weights 
retroactively results in lower mandatory minimum sentences for 
more individuals, in keeping with the Crime Bill's purpose. 
16 
 
applies, and we 'give the defendant the benefit of the 
ambiguity'").  However, the rule of lenity does not come into 
play when the question to be answered is whether a particular 
criminal statute should be applied retroactively to a defendant 
who is charged with committing an offense before that statute 
went into effect.  This inquiry is governed instead by G. L. 
c. 4, § 6, Second.  Even if this were not the case, "[t]he rule 
of lenity does not require . . . that absent an ambiguity we 
construe a penal statute most favorably to a defendant."  
Commonwealth v. Carrion, 431 Mass. 44, 46 (2000).  See Watts v. 
Commonwealth, 468 Mass. 49, 52 n.8 (2014).  Here, given the 
presumption that new statutes will be applied prospectively, the 
absence of any explicit indication that the Legislature intended 
the increased drug weights to apply retroactively, and our 
observation that applying the increased drug weights 
retroactively would appear to create substantial practical 
difficulties, we conclude that no ambiguity exists concerning 
the retroactive application of the redefined drug trafficking 
weights in § 21 of the Crime Bill. 
 
Conclusion.  The reduced mandatory minimum sentence under 
G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b) (2), as amended by St. 2012, c. 192, 
§ 21, will apply to the defendant if he is convicted of that 
offense.  The reconfigured drug trafficking weights provided in 
G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b) (1) and (2), as amended by St. 2012, 
17 
 
c. 192, § 21, are not applicable to the defendant.  The order of 
the Superior Court dated February 6, 2014, is vacated, and the 
case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.