Title: RUSSELL REALTY CO v KENNEALLY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-071
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: January 16, 1980

No. 80-71 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF RAYMOND C. MILLER, Petitioner and Respondent, ARLENE MILLER I Respondent and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Valley. Honorable M. James Sorte, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Oleson Law Firm, Kalispell, Montana For Respondent: Langen and Nielsen, Glasgow, Montana Filed: Submitted on briefs: July 11, 1980 Decided : ? Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This is an appeal from a d e n i a l t o reopen and vacate a judgment i n a divorce a c t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Seventeenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County of Valley. A separation agreement was signed and f i l e d with t h e D i s t r i c t Court by t h e p a r t i e s October 22, 1976. O n March 28, 1978, respondent, M r . Miller, f i n a l i z e d t h e divorce by obtaining a decree f o r d i s s o l u t i o n . Appellant, M r s . Miller, argues t h a t t h i s was done without n o t i c e t o her of e n t r y of judgment and t h a t she only received a copy of t h e f i n a l decree a f t e r it had been obtained. I n August 1978, M r s . Miller moved t o reopen o r vacate t h e judgment. The motion was denied on t h e grounds t h a t it offended Rule 60, M.R.Civ.P. O n September 26, 1978, M r . M i l l e r f i l e d a motion f o r p a r t i t i o n of r e a l e s t a t e . After hearing, t h e Honorable M. James S o r t e issued an order on December 21, 1978, i n d i c a t i n g t h a t he would only consider property acquired by t h e p a r t i e s between October 2 2 , 1976 and March 28, 1978. A motion f o r reconsideration was f i l e d by a p p e l l a n t on June 8, 1979, but was never r u l e d upon. A hearing t o determine t h e r i g h t s of t h e p a r t i e s i n r e a l estate acquired between the time of t h e separation agreement and t h e f i n a l decree was conducted on August 2 4 , 1979. A n order including findings of f a c t , conclusions of law and judgment and decree was entered on December 13, 1979. M r . Miller f i l e d a n o t i c e of e n t r y of judgment one week l a t e r . The M i l l e r s were married on November 13, 1974, and moved t o Richland, Montana, where M r . M i l l e r had resided p r i o r t o the marriage. Two years l a t e r , on October 2 2 , 1976, a f t e r s e r i o u s m a r i t a l problems had developed between them, t h e Millers executed and f i l e d a separation agreement. Thereafter M r s . M i l l e r moved t o K a l i s p e l l , Montana. M r . M i l l e r followed h e r , and f o r s i x t e e n months t h e r e w e r e attempts t o reconcile, r e s u l t i n g i n a t l e a s t a periodic m a r i t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . During t h i s r e c o n c i l i a t i o n period, t h e M i l l e r s purchased two a c r e s of land near K a l i s p e l l a s t h e site of M r s . M i l l e r ' s t r a i l e r . The resumption of t h e m a r i t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p involved s h o r t periods wherein the p a r t i e s l i v e d together a s husband and wife. Further, f o r t h e years of 1976 and 1977, t h e M i l l e r s f i l e d j o i n t income t a x r e t u r n s . O n March 28, 1978, M r . Miller obtained a divorce and a d e f a u l t judgment a g a i n s t M r s . Miller. O n August 1 0 , M r s . M i l l e r f i l e d a motion t o reopen o r vacate t h e judgment. M r . M i l l e r then moved t o p a r t i t i o n the r e a l property. A f t e r hearing on t h e motions on October 6, 1978, and a f i n a l hearing on August 24, 1979, t h e c o u r t entered t h e December 13, 1979, decree which i s now appealed. The following i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d f o r our consideration: 1. What e f f e c t d i d t h e p a r t i e s ' attempt t o r e c o n c i l e have on t h e separation agreement? 2. Can m a r i t a l property be d i s t r i b u t e d i n s e p a r a t e hearings without e i t h e r hearing involving t h e t o t a l i t y of t h e property? 3. Is t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of the marriage d i v i s i b l e from t h e o t h e r aspects of t h e decree? 4. W a s t h e r e e x t r i n s i c fraud on t h e p a r t of respondent s o a s t o deny a p p e l l a n t her "day i n court"? 5. Was the c o u r t ' s f i n a l a c t i o n an " a c t i o n i n r e a l property," and i f so, was t h e t r i a l properly conducted under s e c t i o n 25-2-103, M C A ? The record d i s c l o s e s t h a t i n t h e s i x t e e n months between t h e f i l i n g of t h e separation agreement and t h e d a t e of t h e f i n a l decree of d i s s o l u t i o n , the M i l l e r s attempted a recon- c i l i a t i o n . The f i r s t i s s u e presented, t h e r e f o r e , i s r e a l l y twofold: Was t h e r e a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , and d i d it revoke t h e separation agreement? Reconciliation is t h e voluntary resumption of a m a r i t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t h e f u l l e s t sense, and i s a s t a t e of mind t o be determined by t h e evidence. Keller v. Keller (1932), 122 Cal.App. 712, 10 P.2d 541. The i n c i d e n t s of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , and t h e evidence of it, generally include cohabitation where possible, sexual r e l a t i o n s , and the maintenance of j o i n t a f f a i r s a s husband and wife. I n 1927, i n t h e case of Ward v. Ward (1927), 81 Mont. 587, 264 P. 667, t h i s Court acknow- ledged t h a t the revocation of such an agreement i s d e t e r - mined by the i n t e n t of t h e p a r t i e s . However, t h e i n t e n t i o n must be t o resume married l i f e completely and e n t i r e l y , and n o t t o merely enjoy each o t h e r ' s s o c i e t y temporarily, f o r l i m i t e d purposes, o r a s a t r i a l t o s e e i f t h e p a r t i e s want t o continue a s a married couple. Temporary cohabitation i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t evidence of a mutual i n t e n t t o revoke t h e separation agreement. Ward v. Ward, 81 Mont. a t 602, 264 P. a t 672. I n t h e case before us t h e f a c t s a r e n o t conclusive a s t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o r nonexistence of a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . M r s . M i l l e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t she and M r . M i l l e r spent a t most t h r e e months together between December 1976 and ~ p r i l 1978. However, they f i l e d j o i n t income t a x r e t u r n s and purchased t h e Flathead County property together. W e take note of t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s p e r i o d i c s t a t e of matrimony may have been s u f f i c i e n t under t h e circumstances i n l i g h t of the t i m e demands placed on M r . M i l l e r t o conduct h i s Richland business. The D i s t r i c t Court found t h e r e was a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . I t i s t h e e f f e c t of t h e r e c o n c i l i a t i o n which i s a t t h e h e a r t of the i s s u e a t bar. W e a r e confronted with t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of both a separation agreement and a prop- e r t y settlement agreement inseparably mixed i n one i n s t r u - ment. A r e c o n c i l i a t i o n may have a c e r t a i n e f f e c t upon a separation agreement and q u i t e another on a settlement agreement. Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 707, 711 (1954). The p r i n c i p a l functions of a separation agreement are t o s t i p u - l a t e t h a t t h e p a r t i e s may lawfully l i v e s e p a r a t e and a p a r t and t o provide f o r t h e support of t h e wife and t h e custody and support of children. Acre v. Koenig (1965), 89 Idaho 342, 404 P.2d 621, 623. O n the o t h e r hand, t h e function of a property settlement i s t o make a f u l l and f i n a l disposi- --- t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s ' r i g h t s with r e s p e c t t o j o i n t and s e p a r a t e property. Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d a t 711. W e a r e persuaded by t h e reasoning i n P o t t s v. P o t t s (1975), 24 N.C.App. 673, 2 1 1 S.E.2d 815, wherein t h e c o u r t held t h a t r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and resumption of t h e m a r i t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , and a l l t h e i n c i d e n t s t h e r e o f , w i l l have no e f f e c t upon those provisions of t h e agreement which have already been executed. I n t h e case before us, t h e M i l l e r s had executed a l l t h e terms of the agreement r e l a t i n g t o t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of property owned by them a s of October 22, 1976. I n such a case it would r e q u i r e an express i n t e n t t o revoke, manifested by c l e a r and unmistakable a c t i o n , t o void t h e o r i g i n a l agreement. W e conclude t h a t when t h e terms of an agreement have been executed, and t h e agreement does n o t d i s c l o s e overreaching by e i t h e r p a r t y , the instrument i s binding a s t o both i n t h e absence of a new agreement. I f t h e p a r t i e s d i d reconcile, t h a t r e c o n c i l i a t i o n had no e f f e c t on t h e provisions which had been completely f u l - f i l l e d . For t h i s Court t o hold otherwise would be an a f f r o n t t o t h e p o l i c i e s of t h e Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act which encourage t h e amicable settlement of d i s p u t e s and an improper infringement on t h e individual r i g h t s of persons t o determine t h e i r own a f f a i r s . Appellant's r e l i a n c e on our decision i n Metcalf v. Metcalf (1979), Mont. , 598 P.2d 1140, 36 St.Rep. 1559, i s n o t well founded i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o her appeal. I n Metcalf we upheld t h e w e l l - s e t t l e d r u l e t h a t a t r i a l c o u r t i s obligated t o determine t h e n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s a t t h e t i m e of t h e i r divorce. See a l s o Grenfell v. Grenfell (1979) - Mont. - , 596 P.2d 205, 207, 36 St.Rep. 1100, 1103. However, t h e presence of a v a l i d separation agreement i s f a t a l t o the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h e Metcalf r u l e . The t r i a l judge must a l s o honor the s t a t u t e s of t h e S t a t e of Montana and i s d i r e c t e d i n s e c t i o n 40-4-201, MCA, a s f o l - lows : I' (1) To promote amicable settlement of d i s p u t e s between p a r t i e s t o a marriage a t t e n d a n t upon t h e i r separation o r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e i r marriage, t h e p a r t i e s may e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n separation agreement containing provisions f o r d i s p o s i t i o n of any property owned by e i t h e r of them, maintenance of e i t h e r of them, and sup- p o r t , custody, and v i s i t a t i o n of t h e i r children. " ( 2 ) I n a proceeding f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage o r f o r l e g a l separation, the terms -- of t h e separa- t i o n agreement, except those providing f o r t h e support, custody, and v i s i t a t i o n of c h i l d r e n , a r e binding upon t h e c o u r t unless it f i n d s , a£- ter considering t h e economic circumstances of t h e p a r t i e s and any o t h e r r e l e v a n t evidence pro- duced by the p a r t i e s , on t h e i r own motion o r on r e q u e s t of t h e c o u r t , t h a t t h e separation agree- ment i s unconscionable." (Emphasis added.) Unconscionability w a s never a t i s s u e a t any t i m e during t h e proceedings. When t h e D i s t r i c t Court complies with such a d i r e c t s t a t u t o r y mandate, t h e r e can be no e r r o r . This Court takes note of t h e age of t h e agreement a t t h e t i m e of i t s incorporation i n t o t h e f i n a l decree. But we w i l l n o t s u b s t i t u t e our conclusions f o r those of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n t h e absence of c l e a r and r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . I n r e Mar- r i a g e of Kramer (1978), 177 Mont. 6 1 , 580 P.2d 439, 442, 35 St.Rep. 700, 704. W e conclude t h a t m a r i t a l property can be d i s t r i b u t e d i n s e p a r a t e hearings without e i t h e r hearing discussing the t o t a l i t y of the m a r i t a l e s t a t e where t h e r e i s mutual agreement a s t o i t s d i s p o s i t i o n . The r u l e i s w e l l reasoned t h a t persons must be a b l e t o s e p a r a t e amicably and d i v i d e t h e i r property without i n t e r f e r e n c e where such d i v i - s i o n i s f e a s i b l e . I t i s n o t the province of t h i s Court t o a l t e r d e c i s i o n s and agreements made between husband and wife i n t h e absence of compelling i n j u s t i c e . Appellant i s c o r r e c t i n contending t h a t the n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s i s a necessary consideration; however, i f t h e r e i s a signed and executed separation agreement, we must conclude t h a t t h e p a r t i e s themselves have already made a determination of t h e i r n e t worth a s a b a s i s f o r t h e i r de- c i s i o n . Appellant contends t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n separating t h e d i s s o l u t i o n a s p e c t of t h e decree from t h e property d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e Flathead County property. Argued conversely, the claim i s t h a t property d i s t r i b u t i o n must take place within t h e same o r d e r , t h e decree being an unseverable instrument. The i s s u e has no merit. Disposition of such a question can be accomplished by r e f e r r i n g t o the s t a t u t e s of Montana, t h e Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. Section 40-4-104, MCA, r e c i t e s i n appli- c a b l e p a r t : " ( 1 ) The d i s t r i c t c o u r t s h a l l e n t e r a decree of d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage i f : " (d) t o t h e e x t e n t it has j u r i s d i c t i o n t o do so, t h e c o u r t has considered, approved, o r made pro- v i s i o n f o r c h i l d custody, t h e support of any c h i l d e n t i t l e d t o support, t h e maintenance of e i t h e r spouse, and t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of property o r - provide - - f o r a s e p a r a t e , - l a t e r hearing t o - complete t h e s e matters." (Emphasis added.) Clearly, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e intended t o g r a n t t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h e power t o sever t h e decree t o whatever e x t e n t necessary t o resolve d i s p u t e s e f f i c i e n t l y . The D i s t r i c t Court must be f r e e t o dispose of those portions of the decree t h a t a r e i n a condition t o be de- cided. W e a r e persuaded by the comments t o t h e Uniform Mar- r i a g e and Divorce Act: "The phrase, 'considered, approved, o r provided f o r , ' i n subsection ( a ) ( 4 ) i s intended t o con- f e r upon t h e c o u r t t h e a u t h o r i t y t o r e f u s e t o make any award, i f t h e evidence j u s t i f i e s an o u t r i g h t d e n i a l , a s w e l l a s t h e a u t h o r i t y t o make such allotment a s the f a c t s r e q u i r e . To avoid any doubt, t h e c o u r t i s authorized ex- p r e s s l y t o provide - - - f o r a l a t e r hearing t o corn- -- p l e t e a c t i o n on t h e s e matters, i f necessary." Uniform Laws Annot., S302, Commissioner's Com- ment (1973), Vol. 9 A a t 123. (Emphasis added.) W e conclude, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t s of j u s t i c e and j u d i c i a l economy a r e b e s t served by giving D i s t r i c t Courts broad d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e conduct of t h e i r proceedings and t h e severance of t h e various elements of d i s s o l u t i o n decrees. M r s . M i l l e r a s s i g n s two claims of e x t r i n s i c fraud a g a i n s t M r . M i l l e r . E x t r i n s i c fraud i s t h a t which denies an adversary the opportunity t o have a t r i a l o r f u l l y p r e s e n t her s i d e of the case. Selway v. Burns (1967), 150 Mont. 1, 429 P.2d 640. Cases decided by t h i s Court r e v e a l t h a t t h e prohibited r e s u l t of denying t h e o t h e r p a r t y access t o a f a i r t r i a l may be achieved by a f f i r m a t i v e l y misrepresenting f a c t s ( S t a t e ex rel. Sparrenberger v. D i s t r i c t Court (1923), 66 Mont. 496, 214 P. 85) o r by concealment of f a c t s by a person who had a l e g a l duty t o d i s c l o s e those f a c t s (Hoppin v. Long (1925), 74 Mont. 558, 580, 241 P. 636). F u r t h e r , it has been t h i s C o u r t ' s longstanding r u l e t h a t w e have t h e i n h e r e n t power i n e q u i t y t o g r a n t r e l i e f from judgments obtained by e x t r i n s i c fraud. Bullard v. Zimmerman (1930), 88 Mont. 271, 292 P. 730. However, f o r t h i s Court t o set a s i d e a D i s t r i c t Court judgment, t h e f r a u d complained of must be e x t r i n s i c o r c o l l a t e r a l and i n no way i n t r i n s i c t o t h e m e r i t s of t h e case. Khan v. Khan (1940), 110 Mont. 591, 105 P.2d 665. The f i r s t a l l e g e d l y f r a u d u l e n t e x e r c i s e upon a p p e l l a n t was M r . Miller's statement t o t h e c o u r t d u r i n g d i s s o l u t i o n proceedings on March 28, 1978. During those proceedings Judge S o r t e asked M r . M i l l e r i f t h e s e p a r a t i o n agreement included and disposed of a l l of t h e Millers' m a r i t a l prop- e r t y . M r . Miller r e p l i e d t h a t it d i d n o t i n c l u d e t h e F l a t - head County property acquired by t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e s i x t e e n - month period between October 1976 and March 1978. Appellant c h a l l e n g e s t h a t statement a s being e x t r i n s i c f r a u d upon t h e c o u r t because her husband f a i l e d t o acknowledge t h e r e c e i p t s from t h e course of h i s farm and ranch business i n t h e Rich- land a r e a and contends t h a t he had a l e g a l d u t y t o do so. W e a r e d i r e c t e d by t h e language set down i n Caldwell v. Taylor (1933), 218 Cal. 471, 23 P.2d 758, 760, which t h i s Court adopted i n Minter v. Minter (1936), 103 Mont. 219, 62 P.2d 233. I n Minter w e found t h a t " a showing of f r a u d p r a c t i c e d i n t h e t r i a l of t h e o r i g i n a l a c t i o n w i l l n o t s u f f i c e . " 103 Mont. a t 230, 62 P.2d a t 236. Such f r a u d i s i n t r i n s i c and does n o t warrant r e l i e f . Moreover, w e a r e n o t convinced t h a t M r . Miller's statements o r concealments, whether by mistake o r design, i n any m a t e r i a l way thwarted a p p e l l a n t ' s a b i l i t y t o p r e s e n t h e r case. On t h e r e c o r d w e see no connection between t h e concealment and any i n j u r y t o t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of M r s . M i l l e r ' s case. H i s a l l e g e d f r a u d u l e n t concealment i s t h e "very warp and woof of t h e c a s e i t s e l f " and, a s such, could a t b e s t only c o n s t i t u t e i n t r i n s i c f r a u d which does n o t a f f o r d t h i s Court t h e grounds t o d i s t u r b t h e District Court decree. Minter, 103 Mont. a t The o t h e r claim of f r a u d charges M r . M i l l e r w i t h fraudu- l e n t l y inducing t h e Valley County Clerk of Court t o e n t e r a d e f a u l t judgment'against M r s . M i l l e r which s t a t e d on t h e p r i n t e d form, "having f a i l e d t o appear." Appellant contends t h a t she d i d make a g e n e r a l appearance when she f i l e d an admission of s e r v i c e d a t e d October 22, 1976. I n t h a t docu- ment a p p e l l a n t s t a t e d t h a t she d i d "hereby v o l u n t a r i l y e n t e r h e r g e n e r a l appearance." The conclusion she a s k s t h i s Court t o draw is t h a t by o b t a i n i n g a d e f a u l t , ' o n a p r e p r i n t e d form w i t h t h e phrase "having f a i l e d t o appear" on it, she was deprived of her "day i n c o u r t " by means of e x t r i n s i c f r a u d . W e do n o t draw t h a t conclusion. I f a p p e l l a n t relies on t h a t p o r t i o n of her admission of s e r v i c e , she i s c o n s t r a i n e d by t h e whole of it. I n t h a t document t h e r e i s language which r e a d s : "Respondent h a s been f u l l y and f a i r l y ad- v i s e d i n t h e premises, and w i t h f u l l know- ledge, d e c l i n e s t o answer o r otherwise plead i n such a c t i o n and consents t h a t h e r d e f a u l t may be e n t e r e d t h e r e i n , and t h a t s a i d cause may be set down f o r t r i a l a t t h e convenience of t h e c o u r t , and waives n o t i c e of such s e t - t i n g and any and a l l o t h e r n o t i c e s o r process r e q u i r e d by law i n t h e premises." By s i g n i n g t h e above instrument, M r s . Miller d i d more t o d e p r i v e h e r s e l f of h e r "day i n c o u r t " than d i d any a c t i o n of M r . M i l l e r . W e a r e n o t persuaded t h a t t h e inaccuracy on t h e d e f a u l t form c o n s t i t u t e d fraud. Moreover, even assuming f o r t h e sake of argument t h a t t h i s were fraud, t h e r e i s nothing i n t h e record o r i n a p p e l l a n t ' s argument which d i s c l o s e s t h a t t h i s i n c o r r e c t phrase had any impact whatsoever on M r s . Miller's c a s e o r her opportunity t o p r e s e n t it. W e must conclude, a s w e d i d i n Dudley v. S t i l e s (1963), 142 Mont. 566, 386 P.2d 342, t h a t such a small e r r o r cannot amount t o f r a u d on t h e c o u r t , and w e a r e r e s t r a i n e d from e x e r c i s i n g our e q u i t a b l e p r e r o g a t i v e s . M r s . M i l l e r a s s e r t s t h a t t h e o r d e r determining t h e r i g h t s of t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e Flathead County property was a " p a r t i t i o n " of r e a l p r o p e r t y and t h a t those r i g h t s must be determined by a Flathead County D i s t r i c t Court pursuant t o s e c t i o n 25-2-103, MCA. She concludes t h a t t h e Valley County D i s t r i c t Court i s " t o t a l l y without j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear and decide such a p a r t i t i o n a c t i o n . " W e d i s a g r e e . F i r s t of a l l , t h e s t a t u t e t o which a p p e l l a n t r e f e r s i s a venue s t a t u t e , n o t a s t a t u t e e s t a b l i s h i n g o r r e s t r i c t i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n . See s e c t i o n s 3-5-301 e t seq., MCA. C l e a r l y , any D i s t r i c t Court i n t h i s s t a t e has j u r i s d i c t i o n over a c i v i l cause of a c t i o n such a s t h i s . Although s e c t i o n 25-2- 103, MCA, s t a t e s t h a t a c t i o n s involving r e a l p r o p e r t y must be t r i e d i n t h e county where t h e p r o p e r t y i s s i t u a t e d , t h a t s t a t u t e i s i n p a r i m a t e r i a with s e c t i o n 25-2-201, MCA, and t h e two s t a t u t e s must be r e a d t o g e t h e r t o determine t h e t r u e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . S t a t e ex rel. F o s t e r v. Mountjoy (1928), 83 Mont. 162, 271 P. 446. See a l s o s e c t i o n 1-2-102, MCA. S e c t i o n 25-2-201, MCA, recites i n a p p l i c a b l e p a r t : "The c o u r t o r judge must, - on motion, change t h e p l a c e of t r i a l i n t h e following c a s e s : " (1) when t h e county designated i s n o t t h e proper county; . . . " (Emphasis added. ) Montana has long followed t h e r u l e t h a t although a D i s - t r i c Court may n o t be t h e proper c o u r t because of venue considerations, the c o u r t can nevertheless t r y t h e case i f t h e r e i s no objection from t h e p a r t i e s . This Court i s guided by our decision i n Bullard v. Zimmerman (1928), 82 Mont. 434, 443, 268 P. 512, 516, wherein w e held: "Thus, we see, with c e r t a i n exceptions, of which t h i s s u i t i s n o t one, an a c t i o n i n a matter over which t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t has j u r i s d i c t i o n may be brought i n any county of t h e s t a t e and may be t r i e d where brought, unless s e n t elsewhere upon demand of defen- dant o r by agreement . . ." (Emphasis sup- p l i e d . ) The record i n t h i s case does n o t d i s c l o s e any motion f o r a change of venue which would have required the Valley County c o u r t t o t r a n s f e r t h e case t o Flathead County. W e conclude t h a t t h e judge i n Valley County had j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear t h i s matter, and w e r e f u s e t o decide whether t h a t c o u r t was t h e proper forum f o r t h e t r i a l . The i s s u e on appeal i s moot and w i l l n o t be considered. W e c a l l t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s and t h e c o u r t t o t h e instrument t r a n s f e r r i n g t h e Flathead County property. The instrument i s a commonly used j o i n t tenancy deed which g r a n t s t o the p a r t i e s equal shares i n t h e property and a r i g h t of survivorship. I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d i n Montana t h a t a r i g h t of survivorship accompanies a l l j o i n t tenancy i n t e r - e s t s i n r e a l property. Hennigh v. Hennigh (1957), 131 Mont. 372, 377, 309 P.2d 1022. I f t h e i n t e n t of the c o u r t i s t o g r a n t t o each p a r t y an undivided one-half i n t e r e s t , some a d d i t i o n a l order o r instrument w i l l have t o be executed. The Millers a r e n o t tenants i n common, and t h e r e e x i s t cer- t a i n r e s t r a i n t s on t h e f r e e a l i e n a t i o n of the property by e i t h e r . Neither p a r t y has complete c o n t r o l over t h e i r i n t e r e s t even though they have equal i n t e r e s t . The j o i n t tenancy deed, beyond g i v i n g t h e p a r t i e s equal i n t e r e s t s , has l i m i t e d t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s i n t h e property. S e c t i o n 70-1-307, MCA. See F i r s t Westside National Bank of Great F a l l s v. L l e r a (1978), 176 Mont. 481, 580 P.2d 100, 35 St.Rep. 717. I n conclusion, w e must a f f i r m t h e D i s t r i c t Court deci- s i o n i n a l l r e s p e c t s . W e a r e of t h e view t h a t t h e recon- c i l i a t i o n could n o t a f f e c t an agreement t h a t had a l r e a d y been executed. F u r t h e r , w e can f i n d no s e r i o u s i n e q u i t y i n t h e agreement t h a t would j u s t i f y our i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e mutual agreement of t h e Millers. The D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t err i n making two s e p a r a t e d i s p o s i t i o n s . Although w e do n o t favor such a piecemeal d i s t r i b u t i o n , i n c a s e s of v a l i d s e p a r a t i o n agreements which do n o t d i s p o s e of a l l m a r i t a l property, w e must r e s p e c t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n and t h e i n t e g r i t y of mutual agreements. W e f i n d t h e same reasoning persuasive with r e s p e c t t o s e p a r a t i n g t h e d i s s o l u - t i o n from o t h e r a s p e c t s of t h e decree. A s t o t h e i s s u e of e x t r i n s i c fraud, w e f i n d no f r a u d which would j u s t i f y d i s t u r b i n g t h e D i s t r i c t Court judgment. F i n a l l y , t h e Valley County D i s t r i c t Court c l e a r l y had j u r i s d i c t i o n , and i f venue was improper, t h e c o u r t was n o t r e q u i r e d t o t r a n s f e r t h e c a s e without a demand from a p p e l l a n t . N o motion was made, and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e o b j e c t i o n i s n o t reviewable by t h i s Court. Af firmed. We concur: 7 Chief Justice L Justices !ddL @ .2y