Title: County of Jefferson v. Christopher D. Renz
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP003512
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 22, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-3512 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
County of Jefferson,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Christopher D. Renz,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  222 Wis. 2d 424, 588 N.W.2d 267 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
December 22, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 9, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson 
 
JUDGE: 
John Ullsvik 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs. (opin. filed) 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins. 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs and oral argument by David J. Wambach, District 
Attorney. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
Stephen E. Mays and Thomas, Kelly, Habermehl & Mays, S.C., 
Madison and oral argument by Stephen E. Mays. 
 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
1 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 97-3512 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
County of Jefferson,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Christopher D. Renz,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The petitioner, Jefferson County, 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals, 
County of Jefferson v. Renz, 222 Wis. 2d 424, 588 N.W.2d 267 
(Ct. App. 1998), which held that a law enforcement officer must 
have probable cause for an arrest before asking a driver 
suspected 
of 
driving 
while 
intoxicated 
to 
submit 
to 
a 
preliminary breath test (PBT) under Wis. Stat. § 343.303 (1993-
94).1  The court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction 
against the defendant, Christopher Renz, for driving while 
intoxicated (OWI) and with a prohibited alcohol concentration 
                     
1 Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes refer to the 1993-94 version. 
FILED 
 
DEC 22, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
2 
(PAC), which was entered in the circuit court for Jefferson 
County, Judge John M. Ullsvik. 
¶2 
The sole issue on appeal is whether a law enforcement 
officer is required to have probable cause for arrest before 
asking a suspect to submit to a PBT.  We conclude that the 
legislature did not intend to require an officer to have 
probable cause to arrest before requesting a PBT.  We therefore 
reverse the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit 
court for reinstatement of the judgment of conviction. 
I. 
¶3 
The parties agree that the facts in this case are as 
follows.  At about 2:00 a.m. on February 12, 1996, Deputy 
Sheriff 
David 
Drayna 
of 
the 
Jefferson 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Department was on duty as a patrol officer.  As he traveled west 
on Highway 106, a Chevy Camaro with a loud exhaust passed by 
heading east.  Concluding that the exhaust system was in 
violation of the law, the officer pulled the Camaro over. 
¶4 
When the officer approached the car, the defendant 
rolled down his window, presented a Wisconsin driver’s license 
and identified himself as Christopher Renz.  The officer 
informed him that he had been stopped for a defective exhaust, 
and the defendant acknowledged that the exhaust leaked and was 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
3 
loud.  During this initial conversation, the officer smelled a 
strong odor of intoxicants coming from inside the Camaro.2 
¶5 
The officer returned to his squad car and ran a 
standard computer check on the defendant and the Camaro.  The 
check yielded nothing of interest, and the officer returned to 
the driver’s side window.  The officer again smelled the strong 
odor of intoxicants.  He asked the defendant to step out of the 
car and inquired whether he had been drinking.  The defendant 
replied that he was a bartender at a tavern and had drunk three 
beers earlier in the evening.  The officer asked the defendant 
to submit to field sobriety tests, and he agreed. 
¶6 
Officer Drayna had received training on OWI detection, 
and during his six years with the Jefferson County Sheriff’s 
Department he had made over 200 OWI arrests.  His training was 
based in part on a field sobriety test manual developed by the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT). 
¶7 
The first test he administered was the alphabet test. 
 The defendant was able to recite the alphabet correctly.  At no 
time during the test or throughout their conversations did the 
officer observe the defendant’s speech to be slurred.   
¶8 
The next test was the one-legged stand.  The officer 
instructed the defendant to stand with his feet together and his 
                     
2 In addition, the officer noted in his offense report that 
the defendant’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy.  Although the 
defendant annexed this report to his motion to dismiss, the 
parties did not address this fact at the motion hearing, before 
the court of appeals, or before this court.  
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
4 
arms directly down at his sides.  The defendant was then asked 
to raise one leg directly out in front of him about six inches 
off the ground and count from 1001 to 1030 while watching his 
foot.  At 1018, he put his foot down, raised it again, and 
restarted his count from 1010.  He was able to complete the 
count from 1010 to 1030 without putting his foot down again.  
The DOT manual lists four standard clues of intoxication to 
watch for on this test; the defendant only exhibited one clue, 
putting the foot down. 
¶9 
The third test was the heel-to-toe walking test.  The 
officer instructed the defendant to walk nine steps on an 
imaginary line, heel to toe, with his arms directly down at his 
sides, then to turn back and walk another nine steps.  The 
defendant left a half inch to an inch of space between his heel 
and toe on all of the steps.  On his way back, the defendant 
stepped off the imaginary line on step seven.  He then restarted 
and completed the test.  The manual lists eight possible clues 
of intoxication for this test; the defendant exhibited two of 
these, stepping off of the line, and leaving more than a half 
inch between steps.  The officer also observed that the 
defendant swayed from left to right while performing the test, 
but because swaying is not one of the clues in the manual, the 
officer did not account for this in calculating the standardized 
test.  He did, however, consider it to be an indicator of 
intoxication. 
¶10 The fourth test was the finger-to-nose test.  This 
test was not from the manual, but the officer had learned it in 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
5 
his recruit class and through training at the sheriff’s 
department.  He instructed the defendant to stand with his feet 
together, arms out to his sides, with fingers extended.  He was 
then supposed to tilt his head back, close his eyes, and touch 
the tip of his nose, first with his right index finger, then 
with his left.  The defendant touched the tip of his nose with 
his right index finger, but touched the upper bridge of his nose 
with his left. 
¶11 The fifth test was another standardized test, the 
horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, which the officer was 
certified to perform after twenty-four hours of training.  The 
test requires a subject to stand with his or her feet together 
and arms down and follow the tip of a pen with his or her eyes 
as the officer moves the pen from one side to the other.  The 
specially 
trained 
officer 
watches 
for 
six 
“clues” 
of 
intoxication, relating to a particular kind of jerkiness in the 
eyes.  The defendant exhibited all six clues.  Based on his 
training, the officer believed that this indicated a blood 
alcohol level of at least .10. 
¶12 After administering these tests, the officer asked the 
defendant if he would submit to a PBT.  The defendant agreed.  
The PBT indicated his blood alcohol level was .18.3  The officer 
then placed the defendant under arrest for OWI in violation of 
Jefferson 
County 
ordinance 
83.16,4 
adopting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                     
3 An alcohol level of .1 or more is a “prohibited alcohol 
concentration.”  Wis. Stat. § 340.01(46m).  
4 The relevant Jefferson County ordinance provides: 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
6 
§ 346.63(1)(a).  In addition, after blood tests had been 
performed, the defendant was cited with violation of the 
county’s 
ordinance 
adopting 
the 
PAC 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(b).5 
¶13 Through his attorney, the defendant filed various 
motions objecting to the arrest and to the evidence against him, 
including a motion to suppress evidence because of an unlawful 
detention and arrest.  In that motion, he argued that the 
officer lacked the requisite probable cause to request a PBT 
under Wis. Stat. § 343.3036 and that the PBT result therefore 
                                                                  
[T]he 
statutory 
provisions 
in 
Chapters 
340 
to 
348 . . . of the Wisconsin Statutes describing and 
defining regulations with respect to vehicles and 
traffic, . . . , 
are 
hereby 
adopted . . . . 
 
Any 
future amendments, revisions or modifications of the 
statutes incorporated herein are intended to be made 
part of this code . . . . 
 
Jefferson County, Wis., Ordinance No. 83-16, § 1 (January 
17, 1984). 
5 § 346.63(1) provides: 
No person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while: 
 
(a) Under the influence of an intoxicant  . . . ; or 
 
(b) The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration.  
 
6  Wis. Stat. § 343.303 provides in relevant part: 
If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to 
believe 
that 
the 
person 
 . . . has 
violated 
s. 
346.63(1) . . . the officer, prior to an arrest, may 
request the person to provide a sample of his or her 
breath for a preliminary breath screening test using a 
device approved by the department for this purpose.  
The result of this preliminary breath screening test 
may be used by the law enforcement officer for the 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
7 
could not be considered in the determination of whether there 
was probable cause for the arrest.  At the motion hearing Judge 
Ullsvik sustained an objection to the officer’s testimony 
regarding the HGN test on the grounds that the testimony was not 
admissible without independent expert testimony establishing the 
validity of the test.  Nonetheless, the judge held that the 
officer had the requisite amount of probable cause to request 
the PBT.  He explained that the definition of “probable cause” 
varies in relation to the liberty interests involved at the 
various stages of governmental interaction with the accused.  
The judge concluded that the officer had sufficient probable 
cause for the purpose of continuing the investigation by 
requesting the PBT. 
¶14 The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the 
legislature intended that an officer must have probable cause to 
arrest a person for violation of the relevant laws before 
requesting a PBT, and that before administering the PBT, the 
officer lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant. 
II. 
¶15 We now consider the petitioner Jefferson County’s 
argument that the level of probable cause required before an 
                                                                  
purpose of deciding whether or not the person shall be 
arrested . . . and whether 
or 
not 
to 
require or 
request 
chemical 
tests 
as 
authorized 
under 
s. 
343.305(3).  The result of the preliminary breath 
screening 
test 
shall 
not 
be 
admissible 
in 
any . . . proceeding except to show probable cause for 
an arrest, if the arrest is challenged, or to prove 
that 
a 
chemical 
test 
was 
properly 
required 
or 
requested  . . . under s. 343.305(3). 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
8 
officer may request a PBT under Wis. Stat. § 343.303 is a lesser 
amount of proof than probable cause for arrest.  The case turns 
on interpretation of the first sentence of § 343.303, which 
states that “[i]f a law enforcement officer has probable cause 
to believe that the person is violating or has violated s. 
346.63(1) . . . ,” the officer, prior to an arrest, may request 
the person to provide a PBT.7   
¶16 The court of appeals held that the legislature 
intended by this language to require an officer to have probable 
cause to arrest before requesting a PBT.  Renz, 222 Wis. 2d at 
443.  The court based this holding in part on its conclusion 
that case law so clearly defines “probable cause” in this 
context to mean “probable cause to arrest,” that the legislature 
would have indicated if it intended some other standard to 
apply.  Id.  The court also concluded that legislative history 
supports this interpretation.  Id. 
¶17 The petitioner argues that this interpretation is 
contrary to the intent of the legislature and cannot be 
reconciled with the rest of Wis. Stat. § 343.303.  In support of 
this 
argument, 
the 
petitioner 
insists 
that 
under 
this 
interpretation other provisions of the statute do not make sense 
and points to case law establishing that “probable cause” refers 
                     
7 While this case only involves violations of Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1), 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.303 
applies 
to 
suspected 
violations of Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(1), 346.63(2m), 346.63(2), 
346.63(6), 940.25, or 940.09. 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
9 
to different degrees of proof at different stages of the 
proceedings. 
¶18 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  State v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 405-06, 565 
N.W.2d 506 (1997); Lake City Corp. v. City of Mequon, 207 Wis. 
2d 155, 162, 558 N.W.2d 100 (1997).  The objective of statutory 
interpretation is to discern and give effect to the intent of 
the legislature.  Lake City, 207 Wis. 2d at 162.  To do so, we 
look first to the plain language of the statute.  Id.  When the 
statutory language clearly and unambiguously sets forth the 
legislative intent, we may not look beyond the language to 
determine its meaning.  Id. at 163.  However, if the statutory 
language is ambiguous or unclear, we may examine the statute’s 
history, scope, context, subject matter, and objective in our 
efforts to ascertain the legislative intent.  Id.  
¶19 With these principles in mind, we examine the language 
of Wis. Stat. § 343.303.  A statute is ambiguous when it is 
capable of being understood in two or more different senses by 
reasonably well-informed persons.  Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d at 406; 
State ex rel. Neelen v. Lucas, 24 Wis. 2d 262, 267, 128 N.W.2d 
425 (1964).  The provision at issue in this case is the language 
in the first sentence of the statute requiring a law enforcement 
officer to have “probable cause to believe” that a person has 
violated the law before requesting a PBT.  As the court of 
appeals noted, this sentence could reasonably be understood in 
different senses.  Renz, 222 Wis. 2d at 439. 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
10
¶20 First, upon reading the first sentence of Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.303, a reasonable person could conclude that “probable 
cause to believe” means “probable cause for arrest,” because 
case law commonly defines probable cause for an arrest as proof 
that would lead a reasonable police officer to believe that a 
person probably committed a crime.  See id. 
¶21 At the same time, the petitioner’s interpretation, 
that “probable cause to believe” means something less than 
probable cause for arrest, is also reasonable, especially when 
the first sentence is read together with the next two sentences. 
 Ambiguity may arise from the words of the statutory provision 
itself, or from their interaction with and relation to other 
provisions of the statute and other statutes.  State v. Sweat, 
208 Wis. 2d 409, 416, 561 N.W.2d 695 (1997).  The first sentence 
of Wis. Stat. § 343.303 provides that an officer may request a 
PBT when the officer has “probable cause to believe” that the 
driver has violated the laws against OWI.8  The second sentence 
                     
8 The first sentence of § 343.303 reads in full: 
If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to 
believe that the person is violating or has violated 
s. 
346.63(1) 
or 
(2m) 
or 
a 
local 
ordinance 
in 
conformity therewith, or s. 346.63(2) or (6) or 940.25 
or s. 940.09 where the offense involved the use of a 
vehicle, or if the officer detects any presence of 
alcohol, a controlled substance or other drug, or a 
combination thereof, on a person driving or operating 
or on duty time with respect to a commercial motor 
vehicle or has reason to believe that the person is 
violating or has violated s. 346.63(7) or a local 
ordinance in conformity therewith, the officer, prior 
to an arrest, may request the person to provide a 
sample of his or her breath for a preliminary breath 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
11
provides that an officer may use the PBT result to help 
determine whether to arrest a driver.9  The third sentence then 
provides that the PBT result is only admissible in proceedings 
to establish probable cause for an arrest or proper grounds for 
requiring a subsequent chemical test.10   
¶22 Thus, the overall scheme of these provisions is to 
allow officers to use the PBT as a tool to determine whether to 
arrest a suspect and to establish that probable cause for an 
arrest existed, if the arrest is challenged.  This scheme makes 
the most sense if the officer may request a PBT before 
establishing probable cause for an arrest, to help determine 
whether there are grounds for arrest.  A reader therefore could 
easily conclude that “probable cause to believe” must mean 
something less than probable cause for arrest. 
                                                                  
screening 
test 
using 
a 
device 
approved 
by 
the 
department for this purpose. 
 
9 The second sentence of § 343.303 reads: 
The result of this preliminary breath screening test 
may be used by the law enforcement officer for the 
purpose of deciding whether or not the person shall be 
arrested for a violation of s. 346.63(1), (2m), (5) or 
(7) or a local ordinance in conformity therewith, or 
s. 346.63(2) or (6), 940.09(1) or 940.25 and whether 
or not to require or request chemical tests as 
authorized under s. 343.305(3).   
 
10 The third sentence of § 343.303 reads: 
The result of the preliminary breath screening test 
shall not be admissible in any action or proceeding 
except to show probable cause for an arrest, if the 
arrest is challenged, or to prove that a chemical test 
was properly required or requested of a person under 
s. 343.305(3).   
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
12
¶23 This interpretation is also reasonable because it is 
well established in our case law that “probable cause” does not 
refer to a uniform degree of proof, but instead varies in degree 
at different stages of the proceedings.  For example, the 
probable cause required for issuance of a warrant is less than 
the probable cause needed to bind a defendant over for trial 
after a preliminary hearing.  State v. Knoblock, 44 Wis. 2d 130, 
134, 170 N.W.2d 781 (1969); State v. Berby, 81 Wis. 2d 677, 683, 
260 N.W.2d 798 (1977); State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 396, 359 
N.W.2d 151 (1984).  See also Taylor v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 168, 
173, 197 N.W.2d 805 (1972)(noting that a preliminary hearing 
requires more evidence than other preliminary probable cause 
determinations) and State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d 673, 682, 518 
N.W.2d 325 (Ct. App. 1994)(holding that the level of proof 
needed to establish probable cause at a hearing on the 
revocation of a driver’s license is less than that needed to 
establish probable cause at a suppression hearing).  It is 
therefore reasonable to interpret “probable cause to believe” in 
the first sentence of Wis. Stat. § 343.303 to mean a lesser 
degree of probable cause than that required to justify an 
arrest. 
¶24 Because the statute is subject to these conflicting, 
reasonable interpretations, it is ambiguous.  We therefore must 
examine the context, history, and purpose of the statute in 
order to determine the legislative intent. 
III. 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
13
¶25 We first make a closer examination of the statutory 
language in its context.  In construing the statute, we must 
avoid interpretations that yield absurd or unreasonable results. 
 Lake City, 207 Wis. 2d at 162.  Courts must also attempt to 
give effect to every word of a statute, so as not to render any 
portion of the statute superfluous.  State ex rel. Reimann v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 214 Wis. 2d 605, 619, 571 N.W.2d 
385 (1997); Lake City, 207 Wis. 2d at 162.  The petitioner 
argues that, reading the first sentence in context with the rest 
of the statute, the court of appeals’ interpretation creates 
unreasonable results and renders the third sentence of Wis. 
Stat. § 343.303 superfluous.   
¶26 The 
petitioner 
persuasively 
argues 
that 
the 
interpretation the defendant urges us to adopt would severely 
restrict the application of the second sentence of Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.303.  As noted above, the second sentence provides that an 
officer may use the PBT result to help decide whether to arrest 
a suspect for OWI.  § 343.303.  This provision seems to presume 
that an officer will be able to request the PBT during the 
process of determining whether probable cause for arrest exists, 
rather than only after probable cause for arrest has been 
established.  After probable cause for arrest exists, the PBT is 
not really needed “for the purpose of deciding whether or not 
the 
person 
shall 
be 
arrested.” 
 
Thus, 
the 
defendant’s 
interpretation of the first sentence seems to unreasonably 
restrict the commonsense meaning of the second sentence. 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
14
¶27 The defendant argues that under this interpretation 
the second sentence still makes sense because an officer who 
already has probable cause for an arrest may decide to request a 
PBT before actually arresting the suspect.  Although this may 
occasionally be true, as a practical matter, it seems unlikely. 
 If the officer must have already established probable cause for 
an arrest without the PBT, the officer will save time and 
resources by arresting the suspect and administering the implied 
consent 
test 
authorized 
upon 
arrest 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(2)-(3).  In reality, the effect of this interpretation 
would be to restrict the usefulness of the PBT in a manner that 
conflicts with the commonsense meaning of the second sentence. 
¶28 Even worse, this interpretation of the first sentence 
in effect writes part of the third sentence out of the statute. 
 The third sentence provides in part that the PBT result will be 
admissible in proceedings to establish that probable cause 
existed for an arrest.  Wis. Stat. § 343.303.  Yet, under the 
defendant’s interpretation, the PBT result cannot be admitted 
until 
after 
probable 
cause 
for 
arrest 
has 
already 
been 
established.  At that point, the PBT evidence would be 
cumulative and unnecessary to establish probable cause for the 
arrest.  Thus, the PBT result would, in fact, not be admissible 
to show that there was probable cause for the arrest.  This 
result renders part of the third sentence meaningless. 
¶29 Thus, under the defendant’s interpretation, an officer 
could only request a PBT after already having established 
probable cause for an arrest, even though the statute explicitly 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
15
provides that the officer may use the PBT result in determining 
whether to make an arrest.  Furthermore, before presenting 
evidence of the PBT result to rebut a challenge to probable 
cause for an OWI arrest, the petitioner would have to prove that 
probable 
cause 
to 
arrest 
existed 
before 
the 
PBT 
was 
administered, even though the statute clearly states that the 
PBT result will be admissible “to show probable cause for an 
arrest, if the arrest is challenged.”  Wis. Stat. § 343.303.   
¶30 Basic principles of statutory construction disfavor an 
interpretation 
of 
the 
first 
sentence 
that 
yields 
such 
unreasonable results.  The court of appeals acknowledged that 
its construction “limits the conditions under which a PBT may be 
requested and undercuts the use of a PBT to establish probable 
cause to arrest,” Renz, 222 Wis. 2d at 442, but determined that 
“[t]his circularity is a necessary but perhaps unsatisfactory 
result” that the legislature may wish to consider.  Id. at 447 
n.22.  The court concluded that its construction was nonetheless 
the only reasonable one, id. at 447, because it believed that 
“probable cause” in this context was clearly defined in case law 
to mean “probable cause to arrest” and that the legislative 
history supported this interpretation, id. at 443. 
¶31 We do not agree that case law and legislative history 
compel this construction of Wis. Stat. § 343.303.  Instead, we 
conclude that our case law establishes that “probable cause to 
believe” has different meanings at different stages of criminal 
proceedings.  Furthermore, the legislative history shows that 
the legislature intended to allow an officer to request a PBT as 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
16
a screening test before establishing probable cause for an OWI 
arrest. 
¶32 Probable cause is not an unvarying standard because 
“each decision at the various stages of the proceedings is an 
independent determination with the varying burdens of proof.”  
Knoblock, 44 Wis. 2d at 134.  Thus, the level of proof needed to 
establish probable cause for an arrest is less than that needed 
to bind a defendant over for trial after a preliminary 
examination.  Knoblock, 44 Wis. 2d at 134; Taylor, 55 Wis. 2d at 
173.  See also In the Interest of T.R.B., 109 Wis. 2d 179, 188-
89, 325 N.W.2d 329 (1982)(explaining that the requisite degree 
of probable cause varies with the different function of the 
probable cause determination at different stages of proceedings) 
and State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d at 396-98 (discussing the 
function of the probable cause determination at a preliminary 
hearing as compared to the other stages of proceedings).  
Similarly, the level of proof needed to establish probable cause 
at a hearing on the revocation of a driver’s license is less 
than that needed to establish probable cause at a suppression 
hearing.  State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d at 682. 
¶33 This is true despite the fact that nearly identical 
language, “probable cause to believe” that a person has violated 
the law, describes the probable cause inquiry at different 
stages 
of 
proceedings. 
 
Cf. 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a) 
(providing that at a refusal hearing, the issue is “whether the 
officer had probable cause to believe the person” was violating 
the OWI laws) with Wis. Stat. § 968.04 (providing that an arrest 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
17
warrant may issue when there is “probable cause to believe that 
an offense has been committed and that the accused has committed 
it”) and Wis. Stat. § 970.03(1) (providing that the purpose of a 
preliminary examination is to determine whether there is 
“probable cause to believe a felony has been committed by the 
defendant”).  Thus, the same language, “probable cause to 
believe,” indicates different levels of proof at different 
stages of proceedings.  It is therefore reasonable to conclude 
that the legislature intended the language “probable cause to 
believe” in the first sentence of Wis. Stat. § 343.303 to mean a 
level of proof appropriate to that stage in the proceedings and 
less than that required to establish probable cause for arrest. 
  
¶34 For these reasons, we are not persuaded by the 
defendant’s argument that because the legislature created a 
lower proof requirement for PBT tests of commercial drivers 
under Wis. Stat. § 343.303, “probable cause to believe” must 
mean “probable cause for arrest.”  With regard to commercial 
drivers, an officer may request a PBT upon the detection of “any 
presence” of an intoxicant or if the officer has “reason to 
believe” 
that 
the 
driver 
is 
operating 
a 
vehicle 
while 
intoxicated. § 343.303.  Thus, the legislature authorizes police 
officers to request a commercial driver to submit to a PBT with 
a minimum of suspicion.   
¶35 It does not follow from this that “probable cause to 
believe” must mean “probable cause for arrest.”  There is a 
great degree of difference between the minimum of suspicion 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
18
indicated by the language “reason to believe” and “any presence” 
of alcohol and the degree of proof required to establish 
probable cause for arrest.  As we have just explained, “probable 
cause to believe” is not a uniform standard, but varies in 
degree at different stages of criminal proceedings.  In light of 
this, we are not persuaded that because Wis. Stat. § 343.303 
describes a lower standard of proof for PBTs of commercial 
drivers, “probable cause to believe” must mean “probable cause 
for arrest.”  Instead, it appears that the legislature intended 
“probable cause to believe” to mean something between these two 
levels of proof, more proof than “any presence” of an intoxicant 
but less than probable cause for arrest. 
¶36 This interpretation of “probable cause to believe” is 
also consistent with the PBT’s place in the process of an OWI 
investigation.  First, an officer may make an investigative stop 
if the officer “reasonably suspects” that a person has committed 
or is about to commit a crime, Wis. Stat. 968.24,11 or reasonably 
suspects that a person is violating the non-criminal traffic 
laws, State v. Griffin, 183 Wis. 2d 327, 333-34, 515 N.W.2d 535 
(Ct. App. 1994).  After stopping the car and contacting the 
                     
11 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 968.24 
codifies 
the 
“reasonable 
suspicion” standard articulated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) and adopted by 
this court in State v. Chambers, 55 Wis. 2d 289, 294, 198 N.W.2d 
377 (1972).  See State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 55, 556 
N.W.2d 681 (1996).  Terry and Chambers hold that “a police 
officer may in appropriate circumstances temporarily stop an 
individual when, at the time of the stop, he or she possesses 
specific and articulable facts which would warrant a reasonable 
belief that criminal activity was afoot.”  Id. 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
19
driver, the officer’s observations of the driver may cause the 
officer to suspect the driver of operating the vehicle while 
intoxicated.  If his observations of the driver are not 
sufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for an OWI 
violation, the officer may request the driver to perform various 
field sobriety tests.  The driver’s performance on these tests 
may not produce enough evidence to establish probable cause for 
arrest.  The legislature has authorized the use of the PBT to 
assist an officer in such circumstances.  If the person stopped 
is a commercial driver, the officer may request a PBT upon the 
detection of “any presence” of an intoxicant or if the officer 
has “reason to believe” the driver has been operating the 
vehicle while intoxicated.  Wis. Stat. § 343.303.  For non-
commercial drivers, the officer may request a PBT if there is 
“probable cause to believe” that the person has been violating 
the OWI laws.  § 343.303.  If the driver consents to the PBT, 
the result can assist the officer in determining whether there 
is probable cause for the arrest.  § 343.303.  If under the 
facts there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person 
has violated the OWI laws, the officer may arrest the driver 
under Wis. Stat. § 345.2212 or Wis. Stat. § 968.07(1)(d).13  
                     
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 345.22 provides that “[a] person may be 
arrested without a warrant for the violation of a traffic 
regulation if the traffic officer has reasonable grounds to 
believe that the person is violating or has violated a traffic 
regulation.”  
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.07(1)(d) provides that an officer 
may arrest a person when “[t]here are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the person is committing or has committed a crime.”  
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
20
Finally, to bind the defendant over after a hearing, the 
authorities will need to show probable cause that is greater 
than that required for the arrest, but less than the guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt that must be proven before conviction. 
 Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d at 396 (citing Berby, 81 Wis. 2d at 683). 
¶37 In sum, we find that case law does not compel the 
conclusion that the legislature must have intended “probable 
cause to believe” to mean probable cause for an arrest.14 
¶38 We likewise find nothing in the legislative history 
that compels the interpretation of the statute that the 
defendant urges us to adopt.  The Wisconsin legislature first 
authorized a preliminary breath test in 1977 as part of Assembly 
Bill 1 of the November 1977 Special Session.  1977 A.B. 1; § 7, 
ch. 193, Laws of 1977.  That original PBT statute provided “[i]f 
a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a 
person has violated s. 346.63(1) . . . , the officer may request 
the person, prior to arrest and issuance of a citation, to take 
a 
preliminary 
breath 
test . . . .” 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(2)(a)(1977-78)(repealed 1981).   
                     
14 The defendant also raises a constitutional challenge, 
arguing that under Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) 
and County of Milwaukee v. Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 291 N.W.2d 
608 (Ct. App. 1980), the PBT is a warrantless search and seizure 
and may only be conducted incident to a lawful arrest or with 
probable cause for arrest.  However, consent is an established 
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements.  State 
v. Douglas, 123 Wis. 2d 13, 18, 365 N.W.2d 580 (1985).  Since 
the defendant in this case consented to submit to the PBT, we 
need not reach this issue. 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
21
¶39 Refusal to take this test subjected the driver to 
license revocation, unless the driver consented to a post-arrest 
chemical 
test. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(2)(a), 
(9)(c)(1977-
78)(repealed 1981).  The Legislative Reference Bureau’s (LRB) 
analysis of the bill indicated that it authorized officers “to 
request persons suspected of driving under the influence of an 
intoxicant to submit to a preliminary breath test.”  1977 A.B. 
1.   
¶40 In 1981, as part of the budget bill, the legislature 
enacted amendments to the OWI laws that, among other changes, 
removed the PBT from Wis. Stat. § 343.305 and created Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.303.  §§  1568b and d, ch. 20, Laws of 1981.  Senator 
Adelman first introduced substantially similar changes in Senate 
Bill 310, which was never enacted.  1981 S.B. 310.  The LRB 
analysis of Senate Bill 310 stated, in relevant part: 
 
PRELIMINARY BREATH TEST 
This proposal retains the present option for law 
enforcement officers to use a preliminary breath test 
to screen out potential violators.  The results will 
still be inadmissible in any O.W.I. or related case, 
but the officer need not give a written notice to the 
person regarding the test.  There will be no penalty 
for refusing to take a preliminary breath test. 
1981 S.B. 310 (emphasis in original).   
¶41 Thus, both the 1977 and the 1981 LRB analyses indicate 
that the legislature intended the PBT to function as a 
preliminary screening tool, to be used by an officer during 
investigation of a person suspected of an OWI violation.   
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
22
¶42 Likewise, the language that the legislature chose to 
describe the test confirms that it intended the PBT to function 
as a screening tool to be used prior to arrest.  The legislature 
entitled Wis. Stat. § 343.303 “Preliminary breath screening 
test,” and the text of the statute also describes the test as a 
“preliminary breath screening test.”  The word “preliminary” 
means “[p]rior to or preparing for the main matter, action, or 
business; introductory or prefatory.”  The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 1429 (3d ed. 1992).  Thus, 
when it described the test as “preliminary,” the legislature 
clearly indicated that it intended the test to be a preparation 
for something else.  It seems obvious that that something else—
the main matter—is the arrest itself. 
¶43 The PBT will not function as a preliminary screening 
tool if an officer cannot request a PBT until after probable 
cause for the arrest has already been established.  The LRB 
analyses and the language the legislature chose to describe the 
test therefore strongly suggest that the legislature intended to 
authorize an officer to request a PBT before establishing 
probable cause for arrest. 
¶44 It is true that during the drafting process in 1981, 
“reason to believe,” LRB Drafting Record to 1981 S.B. 310, Draft 
of Senate Substitute Amendment 1 to 1981 S.B. 310 (LRBs0150/1), 
and “reasonably suspects,” LRB Drafting Record to S.A. 125 to 
1981 A.B. 66, (LRBb1636/1), were proposed as substitutes for 
“probable cause to believe.”  However, this fact does not 
persuade us that the legislature must have intended “probable 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
23
cause to believe” to mean “probable cause for arrest.”  As we 
have explained, “probable cause to believe” refers to different 
degrees of proof at different stages of proceedings.  It is 
therefore reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended 
“probable cause to believe” to mean a level of proof greater 
than 
the 
reasonable 
suspicion 
necessary 
to 
justify 
an 
investigative stop but less than that required to establish 
probable cause for arrest. 
¶45 We also note that the 1981 amendments to the laws 
against driving while intoxicated separated the PBT provision, 
Wis. Stat. § 343.303, from the implied consent test provision, 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305, and removed any penalty for refusing the 
PBT.  Cf. Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2)(a), (9)(c)(1979-80)(repealed 
1981) with Wis. Stat. § 343.303 (1981).  The fact that the 
legislature removed the penalty for refusing to take a PBT is 
further evidence that the legislature intended the PBT to be a 
preliminary, investigative test.  Moreover, since § 343.305 
authorizes chemical tests of drivers upon arrest for OWI 
violations, § 343.305(2)-(3), the PBT is of little use to law 
enforcement officers after they have established probable cause 
for arrest.   
¶46 Furthermore, the legislature’s explicit statement of 
the 
purpose 
of 
the 
1981 
act 
supports 
the 
petitioner’s 
interpretation of the statute.  The provision states: 
 
(13)  OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
INTOXICANT OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
 
(a)   . . .  
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
24
 
(b)  The legislature intends by passage of this act: 
 
1.  To provide maximum safety for all users of the 
highways of this state. 
 
2.  To provide penalties sufficient to deter the 
operation of motor vehicles by persons who are 
intoxicated. 
 
3.  To deny the privileges of operating motor 
vehicles to persons who have operated their motor 
vehicles while intoxicated. 
 
4.  To encourage the vigorous prosecution of persons 
who operate motor vehicles while intoxicated. 
 
5.  To 
promote 
driver 
improvement, 
through 
appropriate treatment or education or both, of persons 
who operate motor vehicles while intoxicated. 
 
§ 2051(13)(b), ch. 20, Laws of 1981.  These purposes appear to 
be best served if an officer can request a PBT while 
investigating whether a driver has violated the OWI laws, before 
probable cause for arrest has been established.  As stated 
above, the petitioner’s interpretation maximizes highway safety, 
because it makes the PBT an effective tool for law enforcement 
officers investigating possible OWI violations.  It also 
encourages vigorous prosecution of OWI violations, because it 
allows PBT results to be used to show the existence of probable 
cause for an arrest.   
¶47 We therefore determine that neither case law nor 
legislative history compels us to interpret the first sentence 
of Wis. Stat. § 343.303 in a manner that undermines the meaning 
of the second and third sentences of the statute.  Instead, we 
conclude that the context, history and purpose of the statute 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
25
all suggest that “probable cause to believe” refers to a quantum 
of proof greater than the reasonable suspicion necessary to 
justify an investigative stop, and greater than the “reason to 
believe” that is necessary to request a PBT from a commercial 
driver, but less than the level of proof required to establish 
probable cause for arrest.  Under this construction, the second 
and third sentences function sensibly.  An officer may request a 
PBT to help determine whether there is probable cause to arrest 
a driver suspected of OWI, and the PBT result will be admissible 
to show probable cause for an arrest, if the arrest is 
challenged.  The context, history, and purpose of the statute 
strongly support this reasonable construction. 
IV. 
¶48 We now turn to the application of this standard to the 
facts of the case.  We uphold the trial court’s findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. Richardson, 156 
Wis. 2d 128, 137, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990).  Whether those facts 
satisfy the statutory standard of probable cause is a question 
of law we review de novo.  Id. at 137-38. 
¶49 The 
defendant 
exhibited 
several 
indicators 
of 
intoxication.  His car smelled strongly of intoxicants.  He 
admitted to drinking three beers earlier in the evening.  During 
the one-legged stand test, he was not able to hold his foot up 
for thirty seconds, and he restarted his count at 10 although he 
stopped at 18.  He appeared unsteady during the heel-to-toe 
test, left a space between his steps, and stepped off of the 
imaginary line.  He was not able to touch the tip of his nose 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
26
with his left finger during the finger-to-nose test.  On the 
other hand, his speech was not slurred, and he was able to 
substantially complete all of the tests.   
¶50 The officer was faced with exactly the sort of 
situation in which a PBT proves extremely useful in determining 
whether there is probable cause for an OWI arrest.  We conclude 
that the officer had the required degree of probable cause to 
request the defendant to submit to a PBT.
15 
¶51 In summary, we conclude that the legislature intended 
“probable cause to believe” in the first sentence of Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.303 to refer to a quantum of proof that is greater than 
the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative 
stop, and greater than the “reason to believe” necessary to 
request a PBT from a commercial driver, but less than the level 
of proof required to establish probable cause for arrest.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause to the circuit court for reinstatement of the 
judgment of conviction.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
                     
15 Because we conclude that the officer had sufficient 
probable cause to request the PBT even without the HGN test 
results, we do not need to reach the issue of whether those test 
results were properly excluded. 
No. 
97-3512 
 
 
27
 
 
No. 97-3512.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶52 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  I 
agree with the majority opinion that if Wis. Stat. § 343.303 
(1993-94) is to have meaning in non-commercial motor vehicle 
cases, the phrase “probable cause to believe” used in that 
section must mean something different from the same phrase 
“probable cause to believe” used in § 968.04 to govern the 
issuance of an arrest warrant.  I conclude, in contrast to the 
standard set forth in the majority opinion, that an officer may 
request a preliminary breath screening test (PBT) of a driver of 
a non-commercial motor vehicle under Wis. Stat. § 343.303 when 
the driver exhibits several indicators of being under the 
impairment of intoxicants. 
¶53 I write for two reasons.  First, I do not think the 
majority opinion sets forth a workable standard to determine 
what information a police officer must have to request a driver 
of a non-commercial motor vehicle to submit to a PBT. The 
standard set forth in the majority opinion is that “probable 
cause to believe” refers “to a quantum of proof that is greater 
than 
the 
reasonable 
suspicion 
necessary 
to 
justify 
an 
investigative stop, and greater than the ‘reason to believe’ 
necessary to request a PBT from a driver of a commercial motor 
vehicle, but less than the level of proof required to establish 
probable cause for arrest.”  Majority op. at 25. See also maj. 
op. at 18, 26-27.  This standard does not sufficiently help law 
enforcement officers or the courts to determine whether a law 
enforcement officer has sufficient facts to satisfy § 343.303. 
Indeed the majority opinion does not even attempt to apply this 
No. 97-3512.ssa 
 
2 
 
standard to the evidence in the present case.  Rather, the 
majority opinion analyzes the record to determine whether the 
defendant 
exhibited 
several 
indicators 
of 
intoxication in 
resolving whether the officer had probable cause to request the 
defendant to submit to a PBT. Majority op. at 26. 
¶54 Second, I write to express my concern about this 
court’s evolving jurisprudence that “probable cause to believe” 
requires varying degrees of evidence depending on the stage of 
the proceedings.  Majority op. at 12, 16, 18.  The majority 
opinion declares that “there is a great degree of difference 
between the minimum of suspicion indicated by the language 
‘reason to believe’ and ‘any presence of alcohol’ and the degree 
of proof required to establish probable cause for arrest.” 
Majority op. at 18.  
¶55 As I see it, the degrees of proof required for various 
“probable 
cause” 
standards 
may, 
in 
real 
life, 
be 
indistinguishable. 
Although 
people 
on 
the 
planet 
may 
be 
connected by no more than six degrees of separation, as the 
popular play and motion picture demonstrate, I am not sure what 
degrees of separation exist in the various manifestations of 
probable cause.  I am sure, however, that the degrees of 
separation, if any, are crammed on a narrow spectrum.16  
¶56 Our case law supports the conclusion that the most 
demanding quantum of proof, the probable cause necessary to bind 
                     
16 A spectrum is defined as “a range of values of a quantity or 
set of related quantities.” The American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language 1731 (3rd ed. 1992).  
No. 97-3512.ssa 
 
3 
 
a defendant over for trial, is not very demanding at all. The 
magistrate must determine only whether under any plausible facts 
the accused probably committed a felony. State v. Dunn, 121 
Wis. 2d 389, 397-98, 357 N.W.2d 151 (1984).  
¶57 Furthermore our case law demonstrates that the varying 
degrees of proof are in fact very similar. In State v. Taylor, 
55 Wis.2d 168, 173, 197 N.W.2d 805 (1972), the court noted that 
“while a preliminary hearing may require more by the way of 
evidence than other preliminary determinations of probable cause 
[citations omitted], these pretrial proceedings are similar in 
that they are all concerned with the practical and nontechnical 
probabilities of everyday life in determining the existence of 
probable cause.”  
¶58 I have appended a diagram to this concurrence to 
demonstrate the spectrum of probable cause determinations.  The 
diagram is not, however, an exact representation of all the 
varying degrees of probable cause determinations. Some probable 
cause determinations may be missing. Furthermore, I am unsure of 
the placement on the spectrum of all the determinations that are 
shown.  For example, the majority opinion does not tell us where 
the quantum of proof required in this case fits in comparison 
with the quantum of proof needed to issue a search warrant (see 
note #5 in the diagram) and the quantum of proof needed to 
revoke an individual’s driver’s license (see note #6 in the 
diagram). 
¶59 Because the most stringent interpretation of probable 
cause (the bindover for trial) requires only a “plausible 
No. 97-3512.ssa 
 
4 
 
account of the defendant’s commission of a felony,” this case 
raises the question of the usefulness of our jurisprudence 
regarding degrees of proof of probable cause.  
¶60 For the reasons stated, I concur in the mandate. 
¶61 I am authorized to state that JUSTICE ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
No. 97-3512.ssa 
 
5 
 
DIAGRAM
Degrees of Probable Cause
Probable cause to bind over for trial (see Note #1 below)
Probable cause to issue search warrant (see Note #5 below)
Probable cause for warrantless arrest (see Note #4 below)
Probable cause to issue arrest warrant (see Note #3 below)
"Any reason to believe" required to request a PBT from a driver of a commercial motor
vehicle (see Note #8 below)
Probable cause at driver's license revocation hearing (see Note #6 below)
THIS CASE: Probable cause to request a PBT from a driver of a non-commercial motor
vehicle (see Note #7 below)
Reasonable suspicion for investigative stop (see Note #9 below)
Probable cause to approve issuance of criminal complaint (see Note #2 below)
No. 97-3512.ssa 
 
6