Title: State v. Nhia Lee
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP000221-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 24, 2022

2022 WI 32 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP221-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Nhia Lee, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 396 Wis. 2d 136,955 N.W.2d 424 
PDC No:2021 WI App 12 - Published  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 24, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 10, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon   
 
JUDGE: 
Lamont K. Jacobson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J. and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. DALLET, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
filed by Julianne M. Lennon and the Law Offices of Attorney 
Julianne M. Lennon. There was an oral argument by Julianne M. 
Lennon.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief filed by 
Timothy M. Barber, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Timothy M. Barber. 
 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Ellen Henak and Henak 
Law Office, S.C. for the Wisconsin Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers. There was an oral argument by Ellen Henak and 
Bonnie Hoffman.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jerome F. Buting and 
Buting, Williams & Stilling, S.C. for the National Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Andrew T. Phillips, 
Natalie D. Fluker, and Matthew J. Thome and von Briesen & Roper, 
S.C. for the Wisconsin Counties Association.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Katie R. York, state 
public defender, for the Office of the Wisconsin State Public 
Defender.  
 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 32 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP221-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2018CF1025) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Nhia Lee, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
MAY 24, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Dismissed as 
improvidently granted.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Nhia Lee petitioned for review of a 
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Lee, 2021 WI App 12, 
396 Wis. 2d 136, 955 N.W.2d 424, reversing the circuit court's 
orders denying his motion to dismiss the criminal complaint and 
remanding with directions to grant the motion and dismiss the 
criminal complaint without prejudice.  After reviewing the 
record and the briefs, and after hearing oral arguments, we 
conclude that this matter should be dismissed as improvidently 
granted. 
By the Court.—The review of the decision of the court of 
appeals is dismissed as improvidently granted.    
No.  2019AP221-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
¶2 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).   In 
her 
dissent, Justice Rebecca Dallet identifies a number of "systemic 
issues" with the "process for appointing counsel for indigent 
defendants."  Although acknowledging a lack of merit with two of 
the three issues Lee raises, she nevertheless accuses the court 
of "fail[ing] him" by dismissing his petition as improvidently 
granted.  Justice Dallet doesn't explain how the court "fail[s]" 
Lee, considering he would remain incarcerated regardless of this 
court's disposition of his case.1  Even if one or more of Lee's 
issues have merit, Justice Dallet "agree[s] with the court of 
appeals that, consistent with our precedent, the correct remedy 
for failing to hold a timely preliminary examination is 
dismissal without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction."2  
Resolving Lee's case therefore would require nothing more than 
an opinion from this court agreeing with the court of appeals.  
There are much better uses of this court's time than repeating 
work already done correctly by a lower court. 
¶3 
Justice Dallet seems to suggest Lee's case somehow 
offers an avenue for taking "transformative steps" to implement 
policy changes.3  As she sees it, "Lee's appeal provided the 
court with the chance to highlight the problems with our 
appointed-counsel system, so all three branches of government 
                                                 
1 Dissent, ¶6 n.2. 
2 Id., ¶9. 
3 Id., ¶16. 
No.  2019AP221-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
can begin working toward solutions."4  That's not part of our 
case-deciding function.  When we grant a petition for review, we 
resolve issues of law. 
¶4 
The court's superintending authority, which Justice 
Dallet would apparently use to effect policy changes she 
acknowledges would inflict a financial burden on counties, "is 
ordinarily exercised when a party asserts error by the circuit 
court causing 'great and irreparable' 'hardship.'"  Koschkee v. 
Evers, 2018 WI 82, ¶42, 382 Wis. 2d 666, 913 N.W.2d 878 (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., concurring/dissenting) (citing Application 
of Sherper's, Inc., 253 Wis. 224, 226, 33 N.W.2d 178 (1948); 
State ex rel. Wis. State Dep't of Agric. v. Aarons, 248 
Wis. 419, 423, 22 N.W.2d 160 (1946)).  There was no error in 
this case, and we should not transform it (or any other case) 
into a vehicle for "highlight[ing]" issues that are more 
properly considered through a rule petition or legislative 
proposal.5  The principal policy changes for which Justice Dallet 
advocates are properly considered by the legislature, which 
possesses the power of the purse.  We don't have this power, 
which is why we should decide cases and leave policymaking to 
the legislature.   
¶5 
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER 
and 
Justice 
BRIAN 
HAGEDORN 
join 
this 
concurrence. 
                                                 
4 Id., ¶17. 
5 Id., ¶16 n.6. 
No.  2019AP221-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
 
¶6 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  The criminal 
justice system has already failed Nhia Lee twice, and by 
dismissing his appeal, we fail him as well.  First, he was not 
promptly appointed counsel after being charged with felony drug 
and identity theft offenses.  Second, the circuit court and 
court commissioners, often over Lee's pro se objections, 
erroneously exercised their discretion by repeatedly extending 
the 10-day statutory time limit for holding a preliminary 
examination solely because the State Public Defender's Office 
(SPD) had not yet appointed counsel for Lee.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.03(2) (requiring a preliminary examination within 10 days 
of the initial appearance unless the parties stipulate or "on 
motion and for cause.");1 State v. Lee, 2021 WI App 12, ¶¶51–52, 
                                                 
1 A preliminary examination "is a hearing before a court for 
the purpose of determining if there is probable cause to believe 
a felony has been committed by the defendant."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.03(1).  It serves a different purpose than a Riverside 
hearing, which is a constitutionally required preliminary 
probable cause determination that must be made within 48 hours 
of arrest "as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty," 
and which does not entail any adversary rights.  See Gerstein v. 
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975); see also County of Riverside v. 
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991); State v. Koch, 175 
Wis. 2d 684, 697-98, 499 N.W.2d 152 (1993).  This requirement 
was satisfied when the circuit court made an initial finding of 
probable cause the day after Lee was arrested.   
No.  2019AP221-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
396 Wis. 2d 136, 955 N.W.2d 424.  Those extensions resulted in 
Lee being in custody for 113 days before a preliminary 
examination was held, 101 of which were prior to the appointment 
of counsel.2   
¶7 
Now, with no explanation, the court dismisses his 
appeal as improvidently granted.  By doing so, we minimize the 
important questions Lee's case raises about the efficacy of 
Wisconsin's 
process 
for 
appointing 
counsel 
for 
indigent 
defendants, which protects one of a defendant's most important 
constitutional rights.  See Wis. Const. art. 1, § 7 (providing 
that a criminal defendant "enjoy[s] the right to be heard by 
                                                                                                                                                             
Unlike a Riverside hearing, a preliminary examination 
"'protect[s] the accused from hasty, improvident, or malicious 
prosecution'" by providing defendants the right to cross-examine 
the State's witnesses and to call witnesses of their own.  State 
v. Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 527, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996) (quoted 
source omitted); see also Wis. Stat. § 970.03(5).  At the 
conclusion of the preliminary examination, the court must find 
probable cause to believe a felony was committed in order to 
bind over the defendant for trial.  See id., at (7).  Despite 
the 10-day statutory time limit for holding a preliminary 
examination, Lee's preliminary examination did not take place 
until 113 days after his initial appearance.   
2 Lee was initially charged with the drug offenses in a 
different case.  After Lee made an initial appearance in that 
case, authorities discovered he had given a fake name.  As a 
result, that case was dismissed and this case was filed, adding 
the identity theft charge.  In this case, Lee made his initial 
appearance on September 10, 2018, but the hearing was continued 
until the next day.  The time Lee spent in custody before 
counsel was appointed is calculated from the conclusion of the 
initial appearance on September 11, 2018.   
While Lee was in custody, he was also being held on an 
extended-supervision hold in another case.  See State v. Lee, 
No. 2015CF1190 (Brown Cnty. Cir. Ct.).    
No.  2019AP221-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
himself and counsel."); see also State v. Forbush, 2011 WI 25, 
¶43, 332 Wis. 2d 620, 796 N.W.2d 741 (recognizing that "to be 
effective, [the Article I, Section 7 right to counsel] must 
include the right to have the expense of counsel for indigent 
defendants covered by the State.").  I write separately to 
discuss the systemic issues highlighted by Lee's case.   
¶8 
Before addressing those broader issues, however, I 
briefly discuss the legal issues Lee raised in this appeal.  
Section 970.03(2) gives the circuit court discretion to extend 
the time limit for holding a preliminary examination "on motion 
and for cause."  In State v. Selders, 163 Wis. 2d 607, 472 
N.W.2d 526 (Ct. App. 1991), the court of appeals held that a 
circuit court's discretionary decision to extend the time limit 
for "cause" must be based on the justification for the 
extension, the possible prejudice to the opposing party, and, 
where appropriate, the public interest.  See id. at 613-16.  
Here, the parties agree with the court of appeals that the 
circuit court and court commissioners erroneously exercised 
their discretion in finding "cause" to extend the time limit for 
holding Lee's preliminary examination, because those extensions 
were based solely on the fact that counsel had not yet been 
appointed for Lee.  See Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 136, ¶¶51–52.   
¶9 
The parties disagree, though, about what remedy is 
appropriate.  The court of appeals concluded that the circuit 
court should dismiss the criminal complaint without prejudice.  
See id., ¶61.  Lee argues that the appropriate remedy is 
dismissal with prejudice.  We have repeatedly held, however, 
No.  2019AP221-CR.rfd 
 
7 
 
that the remedy for failing to hold a timely preliminary 
examination is dismissal without prejudice for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Armstrong v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 282, 
285, 198 N.W.2d 357 (1972); Crummel v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 348, 
356, 174 N.W.2d 517 (1970); State ex rel. Klinkiewicz v. Duffy, 
35 Wis. 2d 369, 375, 151 N.W.2d 63 (1967).  Departing from that 
precedent would require a "special justification," which Lee 
does not offer.  See Hennessy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2022 WI 
2, ¶27, 400 Wis. 2d 50, 968 N.W.2d 684.  Instead, he argues that 
the circuit court's failure to hold a timely preliminary 
examination means the circuit court lost competency.  See 
generally Green Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. H.N., 162 
Wis. 2d 635, 656, 469 N.W.2d 845 (1991) (failing to comply with 
statutory time limits may result in the circuit court losing 
competency to proceed).  But even if the circuit court lost 
competency, that doesn't explain why the charges against Lee 
must be dismissed with prejudice——and we have never held as 
much.  See City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, ¶21, 370 
Wis. 2d 595, 
882 
N.W.2d 738 
(explaining 
that 
a 
lack 
of 
competency means that the circuit court may not adjudicate "the 
particular case before the court" (quoted source omitted)).  I 
therefore agree with the court of appeals that, consistent with 
our precedent, the correct remedy for failing to hold a timely 
preliminary examination is dismissal without prejudice for lack 
of personal jurisdiction.  See Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 136, ¶¶61–62.   
¶10 Lee's alternative arguments are also unavailing.  I 
agree with the court of appeals that Lee's constitutional 
No.  2019AP221-CR.rfd 
 
8 
 
speedy-trial claim is premature.  See id., ¶62 n.24.  And as for 
Lee's remaining constitutional claims——that the unjustified 
delay 
in 
holding 
a 
preliminary 
examination 
resulted 
in 
violations of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel or Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process——it is not clear from the 
briefing that these claims, even if successful, would give Lee 
the remedy he seeks.  Finally, I agree with the court of appeals 
that our order in In re Petition to Amend SCR 81.02, S. Ct. 
Order 17-06, 2018 WI 83 (issued Jun. 27, 2018, eff. Jan. 1, 
2020) mandated only an increase in the hourly rate for court-
appointed counsel.  See Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 136, ¶¶35–36. 
¶11 That 
said, 
Lee's 
final 
argument 
merits 
further 
attention:  that we should use our superintending authority to 
require circuit courts to appoint counsel at county expense when 
there are delays in securing SPD-appointed counsel.  See Wis. 
Const. 
art. 
VII, 
§ 3 
("The 
supreme 
court 
shall 
have 
superintending . . . authority over all courts.").  There are 
several reasons why this court has not already done so.  For 
starters, appointing counsel at county expense only responds to 
one reason SPD might have trouble finding an attorney willing to 
accept an appointment: the low hourly rate for SPD appointments, 
No.  2019AP221-CR.rfd 
 
9 
 
which is set by statute.3  Appointing counsel at county expense 
does not, however, address the other potential obstacles SPD 
might encounter, including heavy workloads or conflicts of 
interest among local lawyers, or a relative lack of qualified 
attorneys in a particular part of the state.  Moreover, even if 
the issue is the meager compensation for SPD appointments, it is 
difficult to create a bright-line rule for when circuit courts 
would be required to appoint counsel at the more generous county 
rate, because any such line would necessarily be arbitrary and 
could have significant budgetary consequences for counties.   
¶12 Nevertheless, there are strong reasons to change the 
status quo, namely that the costs of maintaining it are too 
high.  Counties bear not just the cost of paying court-appointed 
counsel but also the costs "of continuing to incarcerate the 
                                                 
3 In Petition to Amend SCR 81.02, 2018 WI 83, we observed 
that the then-applicable $40-per-hour statutory rate under Wis. 
Stat. § 977.08 (2018-19) for private attorneys appointed to 
represent indigent criminal defendants was "the lowest in the 
entire nation."  Id. at 2.  Because of that "abysmally low" 
rate, "SPD struggles to find counsel who will represent indigent 
criminal 
defendants" 
at 
the 
statutory 
rate 
because 
many 
attorneys "literally lose money if they take these cases."  Id. 
at 2–3.  In Marathon County, where Lee was charged, it took the 
SPD "an average of 80 contacts and 17 days to appoint a private 
attorney to a case."  See id. at 7.   
Effective January 1, 2020, the legislature increased the 
statutory rate for SPD appointments to $70 per hour.  2019 Wis. 
Act 9, §§ 2244, 2245.  Although that change was not in place 
when the SPD sought appointed counsel for Lee, I hope it will 
increase the number attorneys willing to accept SPD appointments 
in the future.   
No.  2019AP221-CR.rfd 
 
10 
 
defendant while awaiting the preliminary hearing."4  See Lee, 396 
Wis. 2d 136, ¶55.  In addition to the monetary costs, delays in 
appointing counsel also impose significant and unquantifiable 
harms on both defendants and the public.  Uncounseled defendants 
may be hindered in their ability to prepare a defense, engage in 
plea negotiations, or seek pretrial release.  See Blackledge v. 
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (explaining that plea bargains 
can help defendants "avoid[] extended pretrial incarceration and 
the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial" and lead to speedy 
disposition of the case).  And failing to timely appoint counsel 
to represent an indigent defendant may tarnish the public's 
perception of the fairness of our criminal justice system by 
suggesting that speedy justice is available only to those who 
can afford a private attorney.  Not to mention that delays in 
appointing counsel may lead to the same negative consequences as 
any other pre-trial delay, such as postponing closure for 
victims or increasing the chance that witnesses may become 
unavailable.   
¶13 The court of appeals' decision helps to alleviate some 
of these concerns by mandating that circuit courts carefully 
consider and analyze, on the record, all relevant factors before 
                                                 
4 Information about the costs at the county-jail level is 
hard to come by, but according to a 2018 report, it costs an 
average of $38,644 per year (or $105.87 per day) to house an 
inmate in a state correctional facility.  See https://www.wisbar
.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=
91&Issue=6&ArticleID=26397#a; see also https://www.prisonpolicy.
org/blog/2017/02/07/pretrial_cost/ (nationally, pre-trial 
incarceration costs local governments $13.6 billion per year).  
No.  2019AP221-CR.rfd 
 
11 
 
extending 
the 
statutory 
time 
limit 
for 
a 
preliminary 
examination.  See Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 136, ¶50 (citing Selders, 163 
Wis. 2d at 614-15); 
see 
also 
id., 
¶¶54–55, 
59 
("The 
justification for extending the time limit must be set forth 
with reasonable specificity, and the court must consider 
countervailing 
factors 
and 
what 
weight 
to 
give 
them.").  
Importantly, the court of appeals also emphasized that "simply 
observing that the defendant has not yet had counsel appointed 
by SPD is insufficient" to justify extending that time limit.  
Id., ¶51.   
¶14 Indeed, Lee's case perfectly illustrates that point, 
as well as broader systemic issues.  At each of Lee's 12 review 
hearings, the circuit court or court commissioner extended the 
time for holding a preliminary examination on their own motion 
and often over Lee's objections.  Such extensions require a 
finding of cause; yet the record indicates that neither the 
circuit court nor the court commissioners knew the cause for the 
delay.  For example, at the fifth review hearing, a court 
commissioner told Lee, "I wish I could tell you what the hold up 
is . . . .  I'm not sure what the hold up is on your particular 
case."  After Lee wrote the circuit court in mid-October asking 
for the case to be dismissed due to the failure to hold a 
preliminary examination, more than three weeks passed before the 
circuit court held a hearing on Lee's request.  At that hearing, 
a SPD attorney appeared and explained that SPD had contacted 
over 100 attorneys and none were willing to represent Lee, but 
she was not asked why that was the case.  After the review 
No.  2019AP221-CR.rfd 
 
12 
 
hearing, the circuit court observed that the delay was "getting 
very, very close to the point where the Court could find a 
constitutional violation," but it refused to dismiss the case.  
Lee waited 44 more days for counsel to finally be appointed.   
¶15 The facts of this case are concerning, and reflect a 
breakdown in our system of appointing attorneys for indigent 
defendants.  Even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, SPD staffing 
shortages and a low hourly rate for appointed counsel resulted 
in delays in finding counsel for indigent defendants, especially 
to more rural parts of the state.  Delays will likely increase 
as the criminal-justice system responds to a statewide backlog 
of more than 17,000 felony cases.5     
¶16 Although circuit courts cannot solve all of the 
state's appointed-counsel problems on their own, they can help 
to prevent unjust delays by ensuring that extensions of time for 
holding a preliminary examination are granted only upon a 
finding of cause.  Circuit courts should also seriously consider 
using their power to appoint counsel at county expense, 
especially when they find, as the circuit court put it in this 
case, 
that 
the 
delay 
is 
"very, 
very 
close 
to . . . a 
constitutional violation."  See Douglas County v. Edwards, 137 
Wis. 2d 65, 76, 403 N.W.2d 438 (1987) ("The trial court has the 
authority to appoint counsel whenever in the exercise of its 
discretion it deems such action necessary.").  Additionally, 
                                                 
5 https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/local/milwaukee/2022/0
4/07/how-milwaukee-county-courts-plan-clear-case-backlog-fix-
staff-shortages/7247260001/. 
No.  2019AP221-CR.rfd 
 
13 
 
more transformative steps are needed from all three branches of 
government, including allocating additional funding for indigent 
criminal defense, encouraging increased pro bono participation, 
and providing incentives for attorneys to live and practice in 
the rural parts of the state where these problems are 
particularly pressing.6   
¶17 Lee's appeal provided the court with the chance to 
highlight the problems with our appointed-counsel system, so all 
three branches of government can begin working toward solutions.  
Because the court instead summarily dismisses the case, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶18 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
                                                 
6 The court has the power to adopt rules of "pleading, 
practice, and procedure in all courts, for the purposes of 
simplifying the same and of promoting the speedy determination 
of litigation upon the merits."  Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1).  We 
have recently used that power to take steps in the right 
direction, including by adopting a rule petition that allows 
lawyers to elect emeritus status at age 70, relieving them of 
State Bar dues and continuing-legal-education requirements, 
while allowing them to continue performing pro bono work.  See 
In re Modification of Emeritus Status, S. Ct. Order 20-06, 2021 
WI 19 (issued Mar. 2, 2021, eff. July 1, 2021).  We have 
likewise expanded opportunities for law students to practice 
under supervision prior to graduation.  See In re Petition to 
Repeal and Recreate SCR Ch. 50, S. Ct. Order 20-04, 2021 WI 20 
(issued Mar. 2, 2021, eff. July 1, 2021).  The State Bar is also 
doing important work to highlight opportunities for new lawyers 
and 
law 
students 
to practice in rural areas.  See https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPubl
ications/InsideTrack/pages/article.aspx?Volume=10&Issue=14&Artic
leID=26523.