Title: Frugis v. Bracigliano
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-156-01
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: July 29, 2003

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). The Court determines whether the trial court properly directed a liability verdict in favor of plaintiffs on their negligence and negligent supervision claims against the defendant Elmwood Park Board of Education (Board or School Board) and whether it properly declined to submit to the jury the issue of apportionment of liability between the Board and defendant Bracigliano. The Court also considers whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in not submitting the issue of diminished earning capacity to the jury. Bracigliano was the principal of the Gilbert Avenue Elementary School in Elmwood Park, New Jersey, from 1982 until his arrest on November 29, 1990, when investigators discovered an assortment of pornographic photographs and videotapes in his home. The investigators also found 176 photographs of past and present male students that had been taken in Bracigliano's elementary school office. Bracigliano was charged with and convicted of official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2a. The parents of B.F. and R.H, two of the victimized students, individually and on behalf of their children, sued Bracigliano and the Board. Plaintiffs asserted against the Board claims of common-law negligence and negligent supervision, among others. The Board denied the allegations, but Bracigliano failed to respond to the claims asserted against him and a default judgment was entered. The testimony before the jury revealed that Bracigliano blocked the view into his office by covering the window in his office door with paper as soon as he assumed his post as principal. Obscuring the window violated N.J.A.C. 6:22-5.4(c). During Bracigliano's tenure, state monitors ordered the removal of the paper, but Bracigliano replaced it shortly thereafter. According to the testimony of one witness, a Board member commented during a break at a Board meeting about the state monitors' order, demonstrating that the Board was aware of the actions of the state monitors. Thereafter, the Board took no action to assure that the door window complied with administrative regulations. Testimony also was offered about the numerous boys who came to Bracigliano's office each day, one at a time, and his habit of calling the students to his office from their classrooms. Bracigliano's secretary testified that the door to his office was always locked during these visits and that she would often hear the click of a camera and the pop of flashbulbs from behind the door. A teacher testified to witnessing Bracigliano rocking back and forth against a first-grader who was standing against a wall. A substitute school nurse also witnessed an incident during which Bracigliano walked into the nurse's office, put his arms around a boy and began pushing against him. Another teacher testified to witnessing Bracigliano rocking back and forth against a student and hitting him with his stomach. Witnesses testified to other incidents as well. However, not one school staff member who witnessed Bracigliano's questionable behavior reported his conduct directly to DYFS or to his superiors at the Board. Each was unaware of any procedure for disclosing such information to the Board. Testimony revealed also that the Board was aware of Bracigliano's attendance at the weigh-ins of naked athletes on the high school's varsity wrestling team. Moreover, the school superintendent knew of Bracigliano's attendance at the weigh-ins and considered it inappropriate, but took no action. Finally, a complaint was registered with the Board by a student's mother about Bracigliano's insistence that her son attend private counseling sessions with him during the summer, even though Bracigliano was not a counselor and the school building was officially closed. The president of the Board reported the incident to the superintendent, who instructed Bracigliano to cease and desist. In respect of harm to B.F. and R.H., witnesses and plaintiffs' expert testified to the emotional harm that resulted from their experiences with Bracigliano, including psychological harm requiring therapy. The parents also determined to transfer the children to private school. At trial, before closing arguments, the judge directed a liability verdict in favor of plaintiffs on their negligence and negligent supervision claims against the Board, and on their negligence, intentional tort, and 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 claims against Bracigliano. The trial court declined to submit to the jury the issue of apportionment of liability between the Board and Bracigliano and the issue of lost future income in calculating any award for B.F. and R.H. The jury returned a damages verdict on plaintiffs' negligence claims in the amounts of $275,000 to B.F. and $117,000 to his parents, and $275,000 to R.H. and $109,250 to his parents. The trial court entered judgment on all claims against Bracigliano. The Appellate Division reversed. 351 N.J. Super. 328 (2002). In reversing the trial court's directed verdict against the Board, the panel held that although the evidence of Bracigliano's misconduct was overwhelming, a reasonable fact-finder could have found that under all the circumstances the Board was not negligent. The panel concluded also that N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1 mandated apportionment of liability between the Board and Bracigliano and that the trial court erred by not submitting the issue to the jury. The panel affirmed, however, the trial court's decision to withhold plaintiffs' lost-future-income claims from the jury for lack of sufficient expert testimony as to their future-earnings capacities. HELD : Because the uncontested proofs, when viewed in their totality, are so overpowering that a reasonable trier-of-fact could not find an absence of negligence on the School Board's part, the trial court properly entered a directed liability verdict in favor of plaintiffs on their claims against the Board. N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1 mandates apportionment of fault between the Board and defendant Bracigliano. 1. The law imposes a duty on children to attend school and on parents to relinquish their supervisory role over their children to teachers and administrators during school hours. A board of education must take reasonable measures to assure that the teachers and administrators who stand as surrogate parents during the day are educating, not endangering, and protecting, not exploiting, vulnerable children. (Pp. 19-20). 2. The ultimate issue in this matter is whether the Board failed to use the degree of care, precaution and vigilance that a reasonably prudent school board would use under the same or similar circumstances. Here, the Board did not fulfill its most basic obligation to protect the children in its care because it failed to implement rudimentary reporting procedures that would have informed it of Bracigliano's misconduct and because it grossly disregarded critical information, either in its hands or easily accessible, that called for scrutiny of Bracigliano's activities. The Court concludes, on this record, that the uncontested proofs, viewed in their totality, are so overpowering that a reasonable trier-of-fact could not find an absence of negligence on the Board's part. (Pp. 21 to 28). 3. The Court notes plaintiffs' argument that apportioning fault between the Board and Bracigliano may lead to the lion's share of fault falling on Bracigliano as the intentional tortfeasor, thus diminishing the Board's duty of care to prevent acts of wrongdoing. The Court agrees with the Appellate Division, however, that N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1 requires apportionment of fault between the Board and Bracigliano. The Tort Claims Act (TCA) eliminated the doctrine of contributory negligence, which barred a negligent plaintiff from receiving any recovery for his injuries from the party that wronged him. In its place, the TCA put a system of comparative fault that allowed the apportioning of liability among the parties, including joint tortfeasors. In cases involving joint tortfeasors, the TCA limits a public entity's liability to an injured party to the entity's percentage of fault. By its express language, N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1 stands alone in determining a public entity's liability relative to joint tortfeasors. The Court is enjoined, therefore, from considering common law and non-TCA statutory constructs on joint tortfeasors that are inconsistent with the dictates of N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1. (Pp. 28 to 31). 4. N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1 states that a public entity is liable only for its percentage of negligence, requiring a comparison of the negligent public entity to the other tortfeasors. The provision does not limit apportioning fault to only "negligent" tortfeasors, but rather embraces "other tortfeasors." The history of the provision reveals that its objective was to eliminate joint and several liability for public entities and to limit an injured party's recovery to the percentage of the amount of the judgment that is directly attributable to the negligence of the public entity. (Pp. 31 to 33). 5. The Court acknowledges that N.J.S.A. 59:9-4b might suggest an exclusion of intentional acts from the comparative fault analysis. Based on this Court's interpretation of an identical provision of the Comparative Negligence Act, however, the Court determines that the TCA requires apportionment of liability between a negligent public entity and an intentional tortfeasor. The language and legislative history of N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1, the entire legislative scheme of the TCA and the Court's decision in Blazovic v. Andrich, 124 N.J. 90 (1991), lead the Court to conclude that N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1 mandates apportionment here. (Pp. 33 to 39). 6. On remand, the jury should be instructed on the heightened duty of school boards to ensure students' safety from foreseeable harms. The Court sets forth eight specific points on which the jury should be instructed including, in part, that the Board stands in a parens patriae role, that the jury's apportionment should reflect the extent to which the Board's failure to discharge its duties exposed the student to intentional misconduct by one of its employees, and that the jury may consider whether the Board promulgated effective policy guidelines for reporting student abuse and then trained school personnel in their use. Because these instructions carry the potential of creating prejudice to school boards in the liability and damages portion of a trial, the jury should determine first who, if anyone, is at fault among the parties and then determine the total damages award. Last, the jury should be charged on apportionment of damages and determine the allocation of fault. The jury should be instructed in advance of the two-phase procedure that will be followed by the court. The Court refers to the Supreme Court Committee on Model Jury Charges (Civil) the preparation of a model charge on apportionment consistent with this opinion. (Pp. 39 to 43). 7. The trial court properly withheld from the jury the issue of lost future earnings of B.F. and R.H. An injured party has the right to recover damages for diminished-earning capacity if there is a basis in the evidence to warrant submission of the issue to the jury. A plaintiff must present evidence that there is 1) a reasonable probability that the injuries will impair future earning capacity, and 2) sufficient factual matter on which the quantum of diminishment can reasonably be determined. The second prong of this standard need not be proven in the case of a severely injured child, i.e., one who demonstrates a permanent or lasting injury of the kind that renders it reasonably probable, rather than merely possible, that the capacity to earn a living will be affected. Here, plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the psychological injuries of B.F. and R.H. made it reasonably probable their ability to earn a livelihood would be impaired. (Pp. 43 to 48). 8. The Court reinstates the trial court's directed verdict against the Board and remands the matter to the Law Division for a trial on apportionment consistent with this opinion, with the caveat that the damages verdict need not be disturbed. After the apportionment trial, the court shall mold the verdict accordingly. (P. 49). The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part, and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division. JUSTICE COLEMAN filed a separate concurring opinion to state that he would refer the matter to the Civil Jury Charge Committee to write a charge that would eliminate the necessity of bifurcating the liability trial to determine fault and then determine the percentage of fault of the respective parties. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE ALBIN's opinion. JUSTICE COLEMAN filed a separate concurring opinion. Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SAMUEL BRACIGLIANO, THE BOROUGH OF ELMWOOD PARK and JOHN DOE I &amp; II (individuals whose identities are as yet unknown), Defendants, and THE ELMWOOD PARK BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Respondent. ROBERT and JEANNE HUTZEL, Individually, and as guardians for their minor child, R.H., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SAMUEL BRACIGLIANO, THE BOROUGH OF ELMWOOD PARK and JOHN DOE I &amp; II (individuals whose identities are as yet unknown), Defendants, and THE ELMWOOD PARK BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Respondent. Argued December 3, 2002 Decided July 28, 2003 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 351 N.J. Super. 328 (2002). Herbert C. Klein argued the cause for appellants (Nowell Amoroso Klein Bierman, attorneys; Mr. Klein and Sean M. Lipsky, on the briefs). Christopher R. Carroll argued the cause for respondent (Carroll, McNulty &amp; Kull, attorneys; Mr. Carroll and James W. Gunson, on the brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by ALBIN, J. Defendant Samuel Bracigliano, the former principal of the Gilbert Avenue Elementary School in Elmwood Park, photographed scores of young male students in provocative poses and retained those photographs for his sexual gratification. As a result, he was charged with and convicted of official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2a. Frugis v. Bracigliano, 351 N.J. Super. 328, 339 n.2 (App. Div. 2002). The parents of two of the victimized students, individually and on behalf of their children, sued Bracigliano and the Elmwood Park Board of Education (Board). Although various theories of liability were asserted in the complaints, the focus of the appeal before us is plaintiffs allegation that the Board negligently supervised Bracigliano, causing emotional and economic injuries to the two families. We must determine whether the evidence presented against the Board at trial was so overwhelming as to justify a directed verdict in favor of plaintiffs. We must also determine whether, if the Board is liable, apportionment of damages between the negligent Board and the intentional tortfeasor principal is required pursuant to the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, or whether such apportionment is contrary to public policy because it would dilute the responsibility of the Board to protect the children from the very harm it should have anticipated the principal s wrongful acts. Last, we must decide whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in not submitting the issue of diminished earning capacity to the jury. The duty may be violated by not only the commission of acts but also in the neglect or failure to act. The theory behind the duty is that the relationship between the child and school authorities is not a voluntary one but is compelled by law. The child must attend school and is subject to school rules and discipline. In turn, the school authorities are obligated to take reasonable precautions for his/her safety and well-being. [Model Jury Charge (Civil), 5.32, Duty of Teacher and School Personnel to Student, (Sept. 1980).] We agree with the trial court that a conclusion of negligence on the part of the [Board] was irresistible from the proofs. Dolson, supra, 55 N.J. at 8. The undisputed facts reveal that the Board did not fulfill its most basic obligation to protect the children in its care because it failed to implement effective rudimentary reporting procedures that would have informed it of Bracigliano s misconduct and because it grossly disregarded critical information, either in its hands or easily accessible, that called for scrutiny of Bracigliano s activities. From the inception of Bracigliano s eight-year tenure as principal, he covered the office-door window in violation of N.J.A.C. 6:22-5.4(c). The covering permitted Bracigliano to take 176 photographs of children in sexually provocative poses ( that is, to commit 176 acts of abuse behind a closed, locked door. After state monitors inspected the elementary school and had the paper removed from the window, Bracigliano boldly replaced it when the coast was clear, having no fear of enforcement by the school administration. The Board knew of the state monitors actions, but did not follow up to ensure that Bracigliano was in compliance. The continuing violation of N.J.A.C. 6:22-5.4(c), which required the principal s door window to be transparent, although not negligence per se, was evidence of the Board s failure to supervise Bracigliano and to enforce a regulation designed to ensure student safety. J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 348 (1998). Although Bracigliano was an avid photographer, as noted by the trial court, no one questioned why many of the pictures being taken did not appear for school-sanctioned purposes. Ms. Gerard and Nurse Klink witnessed Bracigliano rocking his body back and forth into children in a sexually-suggestive, inappropriate way, but knew of no procedure for reporting those incidents to Bracigliano s superiors. Nurse Klink disclosed her concerns to the full-time nurse, Ms. Glouster, but apparently Ms. Glouster did not report to administration officials. Ms. Rockefeller observed similar conduct, but thought that Bracigliano was intimidating or bullying a student. She too knew of no reporting procedure. Those witnesses, particularly Ms. Gerard and Nurse Klink, had an independent obligation to report directly to DYFS. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10 ( Any person having reasonable cause to believe that a child has been subjected to child abuse or acts of child abuse shall report the same immediately to [DYFS] . . . . ); J.S., supra, 155 N.J. at 343 (noting that [t]he duty to report is not limited to professionals, . . . but is required of every citizen ). The failure to do so, standing alone, was evidence of negligence, vicariously imputable to the Board. See J.S., supra, 155 N.J. at 349. That two teachers and a nurse did not disclose observed instances of misconduct to school administration officials in Elmwood Park reflected either a lack of reporting protocols or a failure to instruct school staff in their use. The grievance procedure pursuant to the teacher s collective-bargaining agreement, the affirmative-action grievance procedure, and the general policy that permitted Board members to speak with faculty clearly were not intended to be communication conduits for reporting a principal s aberrant behavior with students. Bracigliano s routine appearances at the high-school wrestlers nude weigh-ins were considered suspect by a Board member and the wrestling coach, and inappropriate by Superintendent Santini, yet the Board was not spurred into action. Bracigliano became a fixture at the weigh-ins, and the Board ignored telltale signs that should have prompted at least a cursory inquiry. The Board also knew of a parent s complaint of Bracigliano s attempts to counsel a student at the school during the summer months while the building was closed. That incident prompted a [c]ease and desist order from the Board to Bracigliano. Because the school district administration did not have adequate reporting procedures or training in the use of such procedures, Superintendent Santini and the Board failed to put together the varied strands of Bracigliano s strange and aberrant behavior that were known by teachers, staff, and administrators. Any school administrator visiting Bracigliano s office should have known of his violation of the clear-window policy. But, apparently, no one bothered to pay him a call at his office. The plaintiff children were subjected to humiliating indignities in the principal s office in the last two years of Bracigliano s reign at the elementary school. Those young students, as well as others, could have been spared the psychological harm inflicted had the Board exercised an appropriate degree of care. Bracigliano s well-respected status as an effective school administrator should not have insulated him from oversight, particularly in light of the observed acts of his questionable and deviant behavior. The Board claims that it acted reasonably, that its reporting procedures met acceptable educational standards, and that it did not have sufficient information to put it on notice of the years of wrongdoing behind Bracigliano s closed door. We disagree. We conclude, on this record, that the uncontested proofs, when viewed in their totality, are so overpowering that a reasonable trier-of-fact could not find an absence of negligence on the Board s part. We encourage school districts to promulgate policies that will guide school staff in reporting the abuse of students by anyone, at any level in the educational hierarchy and to implement training programs to ensure the effectiveness of a zero-tolerance-of-abuse policy. See footnote 3 Such steps are consistent with a school s parens patriae role and will promote the safety and welfare of New Jersey s children, while lessening the likelihood that school districts will have to defend against abuse-based suits. See Lehmann v. Toys R Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 624 (1993) (holding that employers can be liable for supervisory sexual harassment, regardless of actual or constructive notice, if they negligently or recklessly fail[] to have an explicit policy that bans sexual harassment and . . . provides an effective procedure for the prompt investigation and remediation of such claims ). [N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1 (emphasis added).] N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1, by its express language, stands alone in determining a public entity s liability relative to joint tortfeasors. We are therefore enjoined from considering common-law and non-TCA statutory constructs on joint tortfeasors that are inconsistent with the dictates of N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1. See N.J.S.A. 59:1-3 ( Law includes enactments and also the decisional law applicable within this State as determined and declared . . . by the courts . . . . ). Although N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1 states that a public entity is liable only for its percentage of negligence, that provision requires a comparison of the negligent public entity to one or more other tortfeasors. N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1. N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1 does not limit apportioning fault to only negligent tortfeasors, but rather embraces other tortfeasors, which includes both negligent acts and intentional wrongdoing. The legislative history of N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1 also reveals that its objective was to eliminate[] joint and several liability for public entities, and to limit an injured party s recovery to the percentage of the amount of the judgment which is directly attributable to the negligence of the public entity. Assemb. Ins. Comm. Stmt. to Senate, No. 375 L. 1987, c. 324, reprinted in N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1. The very purpose of N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1 was to increase protection for public entities by limiting liability for them. Furey v. County of Ocean, 273 N.J. Super. 300, 318 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 138 N.J. 272 (1994). N.J.S.A. 59:9-3 provides that a public entity s obligation to contribute to a joint tortfeasor is confined to its percentage of liability. That provision supports the conclusion that the TCA mandates apportionment of liability between joint tortfeasors: Notwithstanding any other law, in any case where a public entity or public employee acting within the scope of his employment is determined to be a joint tortfeasor[,] the public entity or public employee shall be required to contribute to a joint tortfeasor only to the extent of the recovery provided for under this act. [N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.] The language, to the extent of the recovery provided for under this act, refers to the limitations contained in 59:9-2[,] . . . 59:9-3.1[,] . . . and 59:9-4. Margolis, supra, comment on N.J.S.A. 59:9-3 at 223 (quoting N.J.S.A. 59:9-3). Moreover, to the extent that N.J.S.A. 59:9-3 is inconsistent with the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law, the TCA is controlling. Ibid. Last, N.J.S.A. 59:9-4 provides the mechanics for determining the relative degrees of fault between joint tortfeasors. The statutory language is framed in terms of comparative negligence: In all negligence actions in which the question of liability is in dispute, the trier of fact shall make the following as findings of fact: a. The amount of damages which would be recoverable by the injured party regardless of any consideration of negligence, that is, the full value of the injured party s damages to the extent permitted under this act. b. The extent, in the form of a percentage, of each party s negligence. The percentage of negligence of each party shall be based on 100% of [sic] the total of all percentages of negligence of all the parties to a suit shall be 100%. [N.J.S.A. 59:9-4a, -4b.] Although N.J.S.A. 59:9-4b refers to the term negligence instead of fault, which might, when viewed in isolation from other provisions of the TCA, suggest an exclusion of intentional acts from the comparative fault analysis, this Court has interpreted an identical provision of the Comparative Negligence Act, former N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2b, to require the apportionment of fault for both negligent and intentional acts. See Blazovic v. Andrich, 124 N.J. 90, 97-98, 106-08 (1991). See footnote 5 Determining whether the TCA requires apportionment of liability between a negligent public entity and an intentional tortfeasor is a matter of first impression for this Court. However, Blazovic v. Andrich, supra, 124 N.J. 90, provides a framework for analyzing the present case. In Blazovic, we examined whether apportionment of liability between private negligent and intentional joint tortfeasors was compelled by former N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2b, the then-identical Comparative Negligence Act analogue to N.J.S.A. 59:9-4b. In Blazovic, several persons who patronized the barroom of a restaurant assaulted another patron, plaintiff, in the restaurant s parking lot. 124 N.J. at 93. The plaintiff alleged that the restaurant s service of alcohol to the assailants and its negligence in failing to provide adequate lighting and security in the parking lot made possible the assault by the intentional tortfeasor patrons. Id. at 94. After surveying a number of cases that addressed the arguments for and against apportionment between negligent and intentional tortfeasors, id. at 100-02, we held that the responsibility for a plaintiff s claimed injury is to be apportioned according to each party s relative degree of fault, including the fault attributable to an intentional tortfeasor. Id. at 107. We arrived at that conclusion despite former N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2b s explicit reference only to negligent private joint tortfeasors. See supra note 5. As noted, that provision is identical to N.J.S.A. 59:9-4b, which we now construe. In light of the express aim of the TCA to limit public entity liability, we see no justification for interpreting N.J.S.A. 59:9-4b to achieve a result that would expose public entities to greater liability awards than similarly-situated private parties under the Comparative Negligence Act. Given the dictates of the TCA, it would be anomalous indeed to prohibit apportionment between a negligent public entity and an intentional tortfeasor, but to permit such apportionment among private parties when the statutory provision we construed in Blazovic is the same rule we construe here. In Blazovic, we rejected the approach called for by the dissent in the Appellate Division the suspension of a comparative fault analysis in cases where a defendant s negligence consists only of failing to secure adequately against the independent intentional wrongdoing of third parties that results in injury to a plaintiff. 124 N.J. at 97. We also recognized, in dictum, a line of cases decided by this Court in which we have precluded defendants from relying on a plaintiff s negligence to offset the defendant s duty, under circumstances in which the defendant s duty encompassed the obligation to prevent the plaintiff s allegedly-inappropriate conduct. Cf. Cowan v. Doering, 111 N.J. 451, 458-67, 545 A.2d 159 (1988) (hospital could not assert contributory negligence as defense when its duty included exercise of reasonable care to prevent plaintiff from engaging in self-damaging conduct); Suter [v. San Angelo Foundry &amp; Mach. Co.], 81 N.J. [150,] 165-68, 406 A.2d 140 [(1979)] (comparative negligence not available as defense in products-liability case when factory worker sustains injury while using unsafe machine for its intended purpose); Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 589-92, 218 A.2d 630 (1966) (contributory negligence not available as defense to tavern keeper who negligently sells alcoholic beverages to visibly-intoxicated customer, proximately contributing to resulting injury). [Id. at 111 (emphasis added).] Those cases all involved whether comparative fault should have applied between a negligent defendant and a plaintiff who was alleged to have contributed to his own injuries. In those cases, we recognized that the inappropriate imposition of a comparative-negligence defense could lead to the dilution or diminution of a duty of care. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). We understood that the reasoning underlying those decisions could appropriately be applied to preclude apportionment of fault between [defendant] tortfeasors when the duty of one encompassed the obligation to prevent the specific misconduct of the other. Ibid. (citing Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 89 N.J. 270 (1982)). Nevertheless, in Blazovic, we adhere[d] to the general principle that liability should be imposed in proportion to [the] fault of each of the parties, including the plaintiff, because the events which took place in the parking lot were not sufficiently foreseeable and causally connected to the restaurant s negligence to justify imposing the entire responsibility for the plaintiff s injuries on the restaurant alone. Id. at 112. Neither the language nor legislative intent of the TCA support the use of Blazovic s dictum to eliminate a comparative-fault analysis in the present case. To import Blazovic s dictum into the TCA to abrogate apportionment between a negligent public entity and an intentional tortfeasor under N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1 and 4 would extend a public entity s liability beyond that intended by the Legislature. N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1 plainly states that the language of that provision controls even in the face of decisional law to the contrary, which necessarily includes the dictum in Blazovic. We have emphasized repeatedly that when interpreting a statute, our overriding goal must be to determine the Legislature s intent. Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 231 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute s language is ordinarily the surest indicator of that intent. Ibid. If the language is plain and clearly reveals the statute s meaning, the Court s sole function is to enforce the statute according to its terms. Ibid. If the statute suggests more than one interpretation, the broader legislative scheme, its history, and relevant sponsor statements may also inform the Court s interpretation in light of the statute s overall policy and purpose. See id. at 234-36. Here, the language and legislative history of N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1, and indeed the entire legislative scheme of the TCA, as well as our decision in Blazovic, lead us to conclude that N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1 mandates apportionment. Although there are persuasive public policy arguments that the Board alone should be held responsible for plaintiffs injuries caused by Bracigliano s intentional wrongs to give a strong incentive to all boards to fulfill their duty to safeguard their students, we must enforce the language and purpose of the TCA. We do, however, have a paradigm for the use of jury instructions to provide guidance in identifying and assessing important factors in determining apportionment between negligent and intentional tortfeasors. In Steele v. Kerrigan, 148 N.J. 1 (1997), this Court suggested guidelines for instructing a jury on how fairly to apportion liability in a case where a negligent tavern had a duty of care to protect a patron from violent acts of another patron. We revisited and affirmed Blazovic within the context of the Licensed Alcoholic Beverage Server Fair Liability Act (Beverage Server Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:22A-1 to 7. We examined the issue of proper apportionment of fault among a tavern that negligently served alcohol to a minor patron, the minor who assaulted another patron, and the patron whose negligence may have contributed to the assault. Steele, supra, 148 N.J. at 10-15. We reviewed analogous provisions of the Beverage Server Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:22A-6b, and the social host provision of the Comparative Negligence Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.8, which eliminate joint and several liability for alcohol servers and echo the language of N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1. See Steele, supra, 148 N.J. at 21. We found it clear that the Legislature intended that comparative negligence principles be used to apportion fault between multiple defendants . . . and that recovery from the tavern be limited to the percentage apportioned, notwithstanding the fact that a blameless plaintiff may be unable to recover fully in cases where one or more tortfeasors are insolvent. Id. at 22. However, because of the unique circumstances of Steele in comparison to typical dram-shop actions the negligent service of alcohol to a minor who committed an assault we enunciated a set of practical guidelines for the trial court to follow on the remand when instructing the jury on apportionment of liability. Id. at 27. Those guidelines included that jury instructions be given on the purpose of imposing tavern liability under the Beverage Server Act, the heightened duty of taverns to underage patrons, and the foreseeability of risk that a tavern s negligent service might induce assaultive conduct. Id. at 33-34. In light of the strong public policy considerations that must inform the decision-making process in assessing comparative fault in a case of a board of education that fails to exercise due care in protecting its students from the very persons in charge of protecting those students, we conclude that similar guidelines are equally appropriate here. Therefore, with respect to apportionment of liability between Bracigliano and the Board, the jury on remand should be instructed on the heightened duty of school boards to ensure students safety from foreseeable harms, particularly those presented by the intentional acts of school personnel. Specifically, the jury should be instructed that: in considering how to apportion liability, it must consider the peculiar concerns that surround the education of children, including their safety and security; a school board stands in parens patriae, in the role of a parent, to students while they are entrusted to its care; children do not voluntarily elect to attend school they are required to do so by law, and are subject to school rules and discipline; children are a vulnerable class by virtue of their age and immaturity, and, therefore, it is expected not only by their parents and guardians, but by society as a whole, that school personnel will take all reasonable measures to protect students health, safety, and well-being; a school board has a duty to protect students entrusted to its care from foreseeable risks of harm, including intentional harms caused by school personnel the very people who are charged with their care; the jury s apportionment of liability should reflect the extent to which the school board s failure to discharge its duties exposed the students in its care to intentional misconduct by one of its employees; the jury s apportionment of liability should not diminish the school board s overriding duty to protect students from foreseeable intentional torts by school personnel; the jury may consider whether the school board promulgated effective policy guidelines for the reporting of student abuse and whether school personnel were trained in their use. The use of such powerful instructions carries the potential of creating prejudice to school boards in the liability and damages portion of a trial. Accordingly, the better practice would be to have the jury first determine who, if anyone, is at fault among the parties, and then to determine the total damages award. Last, the jury should be charged on apportionment of damages and determine the allocation of fault. The jury should be instructed in advance of that two-phase procedure to be followed by the court. We refer to the Supreme Court Committee on Model Jury Charges (Civil) the preparation of a model charge on apportionment consistent with this opinion. In light of these instructions, we do not find persuasive plaintiffs argument that the Appellate Division s construction of N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1 violates the Thorough and Efficient Education Clause of our State Constitution, N.J. Const. art. VIII, 4, 1. See In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 126 (2002) (noting that [i]n construing a challenged statute, courts will assum[e] that the Legislature intended to act in a constitutional manner, and will seek to avoid a statutory interpretation that might give rise to serious constitutional questions ) (internal quotation marks omitted). [Id. at 33 (emphasis added).] This Court recognized an exception to the Coll standard because there is always going to be limited evidence, if any at all, permitting a concrete calculation of future earnings in cases involving injured infants. Id. at 26. Plaintiffs argue that no expert testimony on the quantum of lost future income was required in light of Lesniak. They contend that neither B.F. nor R.H. had yet entered the adult workforce, making any calculation of their lost future earnings impossible, despite their academic successes and ages at the time of trial. The Board counters that plaintiffs did not present adequate expert testimony to satisfy either prong of the Coll standard, and that even under Lesniak, plaintiffs did not adduce the requisite threshold evidence demonstrating a permanent or lasting injury of the kind that renders it reasonably probable, rather than merely possible, that the capacity to earn a living will be affected. (quoting id. at 32). We need not decide whether plaintiffs were required to present expert testimony on the quantum of lost future income because, in the circumstances of this case, we conclude that plaintiffs failed to meet the threshold test for invoking the Lesniak rule. Plaintiffs simply did not present sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that their psychological injuries made it reasonably probable that their ability to earn a livelihood would be impaired. Id. at 22. Dr. Feldman s bare expectations that B.F. would have significant problems presenting himself in new situations . . . such as at a job interview. . . . [or in] being assertive or ambitious in terms of his career, and that R.H. would be likely to have difficulties with . . . employment or with interviewing if he perceived that the authority figures were people who might be either critical . . . or suspicious of him, were too speculative for a jury to find impairment of career opportunities and award damages on that basis. We do add, however, that had plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of diminution of future-earning capacity as a result of their injuries, the better course would have been to offer expert testimony on the quantum of their loss, in light of their ages at the time of trial. Their lost future-earning capacity would have been susceptible to measurement by methods of projection more definite than can reasonably be applied in the case of an infant whose aptitudes, skills, capacity and inclinations have yet to meet worldly tests. Id. at 14 (quoting Lesniak v. County of Bergen, 219 N.J. Super. 468, 478 (App. Div. 1987) (Landau, J., dissenting)). See generally Douglas M. Foley, Infants, Lost Earning Capacity, and Statistics: Sound Methodology or Smoke and Mirrors?, 13 Geo. Mason U.L. Rev. 827 (1991). Although expert testimony is not required, as a general rule, to establish the quantum of earning-capacity loss in cases involving minor plaintiffs, this case is different. The Appellate Division concluded, and we agree, that [h]ere, unlike Lesniak, there was a basis for an expert to provide an opinion as to the future earning capacity of B.F. and R.H. in light of their age. Frugis, supra, 351 N.J. Super. at 361. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in not submitting the issue of lost or impaired future earnings to the jury. BRIAN FRUGIS and SUSAN FRUGIS, Individually and as guardians for their minor child, B.F., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SAMUEL BRACIGLIANO, THE BOROUGH OF ELMWOOD PARK and JOHN DOE I &amp; II (individuals whose identities are as yet unknown), Defendants, and THE ELMWOOD PARK BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Respondent. ROBERT and JEANNE HUTZEL, Individually, and as guardians for their minor child, R.H., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SAMUEL BRACIGLIANO, THE BOROUGH OF ELMWOOD PARK and JOHN DOE I &amp; II (individuals whose identities are as yet unknown), Defendants, and THE ELMWOOD PARK BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Respondent. COLEMAN, J., concurring in the judgment. I concur in the judgment of the Court. I would not undertake to write the jury charge, but would instead refer the matter to the Civil Jury Charge Committee. An appropriate jury charge will eliminate the necessity of bifurcating the liability trial to determine fault and then determine the percentage of fault of the respective parties. BRIAN FRUGIS and SUSAN FRUGIS, etc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SAMUEL BRACIGLIANO, THE BOROUGH OF ELMWOOD PARK, etc., et al., Defendants, And THE ELMWOOD PARK BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED July 28, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Albin CONCURRING OPINION BY Justice Coleman DISSENTING OPINION BY