Title: Sizemore v. Myers
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S45582
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: August 27, 1998

Filed:  August 27, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

BILL SIZEMORE,

										Petitioner,

	v.

HARDY MYERS, Attorney General,
State of Oregon, ROGER GRAY, 
GREG HARTMAN, STEVE HARPER, 
and KATHLEEN BEAUFAIT,

										Respondents,

	and

DANIEL W. MEEK,

										Intervenor.

(SC S45582)

	On petition to review ballot measure explanatory statement.

	Argued and submitted August 18, 1998.

	Gregory W. Byrne, of Byrne &amp; Associates, P.C., Portland,
filed the petition and argued the cause for petitioner.

	Gregory A. Hartman, of Bennett, Hartman, and Reynolds,
Portland, argued the cause for respondents Gray, Hartman, and
Beaufait.  With him on the answering memorandum was Aruna A.
Masih, Portland.

	Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General, Salem, waived
appearance for respondent Myers.

	No appearance for respondent Harper.

	Daniel W. Meek, Portland, filed the memorandum and argued
the cause for intervenor pro se.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Kulongoski, and Leeson, Justices.

	CARSON, C.J.

	Ballot measure explanatory statement certified as modified. 
Pursuant to ORAP 1.20(4) and notwithstanding ORAP 11.30(10), this
opinion will become effective when the appellate judgment issues. 
The State Court Administrator shall issue the appellate judgment
at 12:00 p.m. on August 31, 1998, unless a petition for
reconsideration is both filed with and physically received by the
Office of the State Court Administrator by that time.  Any timely
petition for reconsideration will stay issuance of the appellate
judgment until the court acts on such petition.

	Durham, J., dissented and filed an opinion.

		CARSON, C.J.

		This is an original proceeding in which petitioner
challenges the explanatory statement for 1998 Ballot Measure 59. 
If adopted, Measure 59 would amend the Oregon Constitution to
prohibit public funds from being spent to collect or assist in
the collection of "political funds."  The measure defines
"political funds" as funds contributed to a candidate or
political action committee, or funds spent to support or oppose a
candidate for public office or a ballot measure.

		An explanatory statement committee, comprised of five
citizens including petitioner, prepared an explanatory statement
for Measure 59 and filed that statement with the Secretary of
State.  ORS 251.205; ORS 251.215(1).  Petitioner dissented from
that statement.  The Secretary of State held a hearing to receive
comments on the prepared explanatory statement, and petitioner
offered suggestions at that hearing.  ORS 251.215(2). 
Consequently, petitioner is entitled to seek a different
explanatory statement in this court.  ORS 251.235; see also
Homuth v. Keisling (S39531), 314 Or 214, 218, 837 P2d 532 (1992)
(ORS 251.235 allows Supreme Court review of only those
explanatory statements for which suggestions were offered by any
person at the Secretary of State's hearing).

		Our task is to determine whether the explanatory
statement contains a sufficient and clear statement explaining
the measure.  See June v. Roberts, 310 Or 244, 247, 797 P2d 357
(1990) (court reviews explanatory statement to determine whether
it is "insufficient or unclear"); ORS 251.235 (a petition to
review an explanatory statement must state the reasons why the
statement is "insufficient or unclear").  As we shall explain, we
conclude that two of petitioner's challenges to the explanatory
statement are well taken, and, accordingly, we modify the
explanatory statement and certify the modified statement to the
Secretary of State.  See ORS 251.235 (describing review process).

		The explanatory statement for Measure 59 provides as
follows:

	"This measure adds a new section to the Oregon
Constitution that prohibits any person or organization
from using public resources to collect or help collect
political funds.  Public resources that cannot be used
to collect political funds include public moneys,
public employee time, public property and public
equipment and supplies.  Political funds include any
money contributed to candidates or political committees
and any money spent supporting or opposing a candidate,
ballot measure or initiative petition.  A public body
is prohibited from using its resources to collect
political funds even if it is reimbursed for the cost.

	"An organization violating this measure by using
non-political funds (collected for it by a public body)
for a political purpose will lose the right to payroll
deductions by any public body for all purposes.

	"This measure prohibits several activities
currently allowed under Oregon law.  For example, under
this measure it would be illegal:

"1)	To use public property, including public
buildings, to collect or help collect political
campaign funds.

"2)	To recognize a public employee's request to
payroll deduct part of the employee's wages and
transfer that deducted money to an organization that
uses all or part of that money to support or oppose
candidates, initiatives or ballot measures.

"3)	To include in the voters' pamphlet any paid
statement supporting or opposing candidates,
initiatives or ballot measures."  

(Boldface in original.)

		Petitioner raises four challenges to the explanatory
statement.  First, he objects to the use of the word "illegal" in
the third paragraph, contending that it is a "charged" term that
will inflame the voters.  Second, he objects to the use of
boldface type in the third paragraph, contending that it
inappropriately highlights the purported effects if Measure 59 is
adopted, drawing attention away from the description of the
measure contained in the first two paragraphs.  Third, petitioner
objects to the final paragraph of the explanatory statement,
because he disagrees that the measure, if adopted, will affect
the voters' pamphlet.  Finally, he challenges the notion that an
explanatory statement, such as the one prepared here, may include
any description of the purported effects of the measure.

		Respondents Gray, Hartman, and Beaufait (respondents)(1)
and intervenor contend that the explanatory statement properly
and accurately describes the effects if Measure 59 is adopted by
the voters.  Intervenor also offers some minor grammatical
modifications to the statement, concerning the discussion of the
voters' pamphlet.

		We first consider whether ORS 251.215(1) permits the
explanatory statement committee to include a description of the
effects of a measure in the explanatory statement.  Because the
answer is a matter of statutory construction, we follow the
template set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or
606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  We first examine the text and
context of the statute.  Id. at 610-11.  Context includes other
related statutes and earlier versions of the statute under
consideration.  See Owens v. Maass, 323 Or 430, 435, 918 P2d 808
(1996) (so stating).  If the meaning of the statute cannot be
determined from an examination of its text and context, then we
examine the legislative history of the statute.  PGE, 317 Or at
611-12.  Our goal at both levels of analysis is to determine
legislative intent.  Id. at 610-12.

		ORS 251.215(1) requires an explanatory statement
committee to prepare "an impartial, simple and understandable
statement explaining the measure," not to exceed 500 words.
(Emphasis added.)  As a textual matter, the parties' dispute
centers upon the meaning of the word "explaining."  The statute
does not define that term, so we turn to its plain, natural, and
ordinary meaning.  See PGE, 317 Or at 611 (words of common usage
typically should be given their plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning).

		The dictionary definition of the word "explain"
provides, in part:

"ex-plain * * * 1 a : to make manifest : present in
detail : EXPOUND, DISCLOSE * * * b : to make plain or
understandable : clear of complexities or obscurity :
INTERPRET, CLARIFY * * * c : to give the meaning or
significance of : provide an understanding of * * * d :
to give the reason for or cause of * * * 3 a : to show
the logical development of : EXPLICATE."

Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 801 (unabridged ed 1993)
(boldface in original).  Respondents emphasize that one meaning
of the word "explain" is "to show the logical development of." 
In their view, that broader definition demonstrates that, in
directing the explanatory statement committee to "explain[]" a
measure, ORS 251.215(1) permits the committee to show the logical
developments, i.e., the effects, of the measure in the
explanatory statement.  Stated differently, respondents contend
that the words "explaining the measure," as used in           
ORS 251.215(1), encompass explaining the effect or effects of the
measure.

		That is one logical interpretation of the text of   
ORS 251.215(1).  However, the wording of that statute also
suggests that the purpose of an explanatory statement is to
describe the measure itself, in a manner that is sufficient and
clear.  That is, an explanatory statement must "make plain or
understandable," or "provide an understanding of," the measure,
but not its effect.  In that vein, it is significant that      
ORS 251.215(1) does not provide that an explanatory statement
also must, or may, identify the effect of a measure.  Compare 
ORS 250.035(2)(d) (the summary of a ballot title for a state
measure must summarize the measure "and its major effect").

 		Turning to the context of ORS 251.215(1), we observe
that an earlier version of that statute required the explanatory
statement committee to prepare "an impartial, simple and
understandable statement explaining the measure and its effect." 
ORS 251.215(1) (1991) (emphasis added).  See also Homuth, 314 Or
at 220 (stating, in relation to the 1991 version of the statute,
that the court must determine whether a challenged explanatory
statement is "a sufficient and clear statement of the measure and
its effect" (internal quotation marks omitted)).  However, the
1993 Legislature removed the phrase "and its effect" from     
ORS 251.215(1).  Or Laws 1993, ch 493, § 20; Or Laws 1993,     
ch 811, § 14.  

		We can draw one of two conclusions from the
legislature's decision to remove the phrase "and its effect" from
ORS 251.215(1).  On one hand, that statutory change suggests that
the legislature intended to prevent explanatory statements from
explaining the effect or effects of a measure, thereby limiting
an explanatory statement to explaining the measure itself.  That
is petitioner's position here.  However, the 1993 change also
could have been intended to remove the requirement that an
explanatory statement explain the effect of a measure, while
still permitting the statement to explain such an effect, if the
committee chooses to do so.  That reading of the statute is
consistent with respondents' proffered definition of the word
"explain," because it incorporates the notion that, in order to
"explain" a measure, a committee may "show the logical
development of" the measure, i.e., set out its effect or 
effects.

		Because the legislature's intent is not clear from an
examination of the text and context of ORS 251.215(1), we turn to
the available legislative history.  The 1993 amendment to     
ORS 251.215(1), which removed the phrase "and its effect," was
made through two different bills, one introduced in the House and
one introduced in the Senate.  In the House, the 1993 amendment
was part of House Bill (HB) 2275, which was an omnibus elections
bill drafted by the Secretary of State and the Oregon Association
of County Clerks.  From the outset, that bill contained a
provision that deleted the phrase "and its effect" from       
ORS 251.215(1).  In the Senate, the 1993 amendment was part of
Senate Bill (SB) 1072, which made several changes to the voters'
pamphlet statutes and also was drafted by the Secretary of State. 
Although SB 1072 originally did not contain a provision deleting
the phrase "and its effect," a Senate committee amended that bill
to include such a provision, at the request of the Secretary of
State.  Minutes, Senate Committee on Ethics, Elections, and
Campaign Finance, SB 1072, May 18, 1993, p 7.  The 1993
Legislature passed both HB 2275 and SB 1072 with those identical
provisions intact, and the governor signed them into law.      
Or Laws 1993, ch 493, § 20; Or Laws 1993, ch 811, § 14. 

		Testimony supporting both bills is helpful, to some
extent, to our inquiry here.  For example, written testimony
presented by the Secretary of State's Office in support of     
HB 2275 stated that the "requirement" that an explanatory
statement explain the effect of a measure should be deleted from
ORS 251.215(1) "because of ambiguity of the term and its meaning,
and the difficulty in addressing this term in drafting the
explanatory statements."  Testimony, House Committee on General
Government, Subcommittee on Government, HB 2275, January 26,
1993, Exhibit D, p 2 (statement of Phil Keisling, Secretary of
State).  That testimony suggests the following sources of concern
surrounding the "effect" requirement of ORS 251.215(1).  First,
it was difficult to determine exactly what was meant by the
"effect" of a measure.  Second, the explanatory statement
committees had difficulty determining the particular "effects" of
the measures at issue.  Further, both those difficulties
apparently stemmed from the fact that the statute required the
committees to agree upon the effects of the measures at issue.

		Additional testimony also demonstrates that the purpose
of the amendment to ORS 251.215(1) was to avoid inevitable
disputes on explanatory statement committees, which are comprised
of two opponents of the measure, two proponents, and one neutral
person, ORS 251.205(2) to (4), concerning the true effect or
effects of the measure.  For example, Nina Johnson of the
Secretary of State's Office testified as follows before a House
subcommittee concerning HB 2275:

	"The discussions and disputes over what the word
'effect' of the measure means are significant in the
committee proceedings. * * * [T]here's not a common-sense understanding of this, and, quite frankly, I
would bet that probably 99 percent of the time, * * *
the fifth voting member of the committee has to make
that call, because there's not agreement over what that
means."  

Tape Recording, House Committee on General Government,
Subcommittee on Government, HB 2275, January 26, 1993, Tape 3,
Side B (statement of Nina Johnson).  Johnson added that, as an
alternative to deleting the requirement entirely, the Secretary
of State's Office could work to define the word "effect," as it
was used in ORS 251.215(1).  Ibid.

		At a subsequent hearing on HB 2275, at the request of
subcommittee members, Todd Jones of the Secretary of State's
Office gave a more detailed explanation of the problems in
drafting the "effect" part of an explanatory statement:

	"This language is borne [sic] out of the
experience of the nine explanatory statement committees
from the 1992 general election. * * * More than half of
our explanatory statement committees during the 1992
general [election] elected not to try to comment on [a
measure's] effect in their statement.  Their reasoning
* * * was that, by definition, we're opponents and
proponents of this measure, and * * * the whole purpose
of arguing this measure is to try to figure out what
its effect will and will not be.  We are never going to
agree on its effect at this table, [and] the best we
can do is to simply try to come to some understanding
of what this language means -- * * * the simple,
impartial explanation of the measure.  And what they
decided in * * * more than half of those nine
[committees] is that [they would] leave it to arguments
that could be submitted to the voters' pamphlet to
argue the effects of the measure."  

Tape Recording, House Committee on General Government,
Subcommittee on Government, HB 2275, February 9, 1993, Tape 11,
Side B (statement of Todd Jones).  Jones added that, for the
committees that did try to include an explanation of the effects
of the measures, "the language they were able to agree on was at
best amorphous" and difficult for a lay person to understand. 
Ibid.

		Jones also testified before a Senate committee,
advocating that the committee amend SB 1072 to eliminate the
phrase "and its effect" from ORS 251.215(1).  There, Jones
reiterated his earlier testimony that explanatory statement
committees often are fraught with division, with the opponent and
proponent members each trying to "win over" the fifth, neutral
committee member.  Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Ethics,
Elections, and Campaign Finance, SB 1072, May 18, 1993, Tape 67,
Side A (statement of Todd Jones).  Jones concluded:

	"[W]e're scratching the words 'and its effect'
because obviously that's where supporters and opponents
differ.  That's where they diverge and break is in
their interpretation of * * * what will the effect of
[the] measure be, and so clearly a lot of the
committees chose to not mess with the effect and to
just focus on the explanation." 

Ibid.  Immediately following Jones's testimony, one legislator
recalled similar problems on a particular explanatory statement
committee, which he characterized as involving a "gruesome"
discussion.  The members of the Senate committee then unanimously
voted to remove the phrase "and its effect" from ORS 251.215(1). 
Ibid.

		As can be seen, the legislative history demonstrates
that the earlier requirement that an explanatory statement
committee explain the effect of a measure was problematic,
because often there was disagreement about what was encompassed
by the word "effect," and because deciding the particular
"effect" of a measure often caused division among the committee
members.  Indeed, despite that statutory requirement, many
committees apparently did not include explanations of the effect
of the measures before them.  Nonetheless, the legislative
history does not reflect an antipathy toward the notion that an
explanatory statement contain an explanation of the effect of a
measure.  Rather, the history demonstrates that the requirement
that the explanatory statement committees explain such effects
left divided committees with a choice of two evils -- either have
an acrimonious debate concerning the potential effect of a
measure, or disobey the law and omit the effect from the
explanatory statement altogether.

		Our review of the legislative history of ORS 251.215(1)
leads us to conclude that the legislature intended to eliminate
the requirement that an explanatory statement committee explain
the effect or effects of a measure, but that the legislature did
not intend to prevent a committee from explaining effects
altogether.  Our conclusion is consistent with the purpose of an
explanatory statement, which serves to inform the electorate, in
a more detailed manner than the ballot title, about the nature of
the measure being proposed.  The purpose of any ballot measure is
to effect a certain change in the law, either by changing the law
as it currently exists or by adding a new provision or
provisions.  In either circumstance, an explanation of the effect
of a measure can be a critical part of an explanation of the
measure itself, because the voters will be able to make a more
informed decision after understanding the effect if the measure
is approved by the voters.

		In sum, we conclude that, in directing an explanatory
statement committee to prepare a statement "explaining" the
measure in ORS 251.215(1), the legislature intended only to
remove a statutory requirement that, if obeyed, could lead to
prolonged and fruitless committee debate and that, if disobeyed,
could lead to a challenge that the resulting explanatory
statement, without a statement of "effect," was insufficient as a
matter of law.  The statutory wording that the legislature chose
to retain still permits an explanatory statement committee to
explain the effect or effects of a measure, when the committee
finds that to do so will further its statutory duty to
"explain[]" the measure.

		The next question to be addressed concerns the standard
of review to be applied to those effects that the explanatory
statement committee has seen fit to include in the explanatory
statement.  We find no indication, either from the text and
context of ORS 251.215(1), or the legislative history of the 1993
change to its wording, that the legislature intended that this
court depart from its longstanding approach to judicial review of
explanatory statements under ORS 251.235. 

		That approach has been one of deference.  We long have
held that this court "should not invalidate [an explanatory
statement] or modify it unless its insufficiency is beyond
reasonable argument."  June, 310 Or at 248 (quoting Teledyne Wah
Chang Albany v. Powell, 301 Or 590, 593, 724 P2d 319 (1986)).  As
this court explained, under the earlier version of ORS 251.215(1):

	"[W]e do not believe that ORS 251.235 meant to
call on this court to settle disputes over the meaning
of a measure in reviewing and certifying explanatory
statements, especially since Voters' Pamphlet
statements in turn become 'legislative' history when
that meaning later is disputed by persons affected by
the measure in a concrete case.  At this stage, the
court's scrutiny goes only so far as necessary to
determine, not whether a more detailed or comprehensive
explanatory statement might have been written, but
whether the committee's statement falls short to the
point of being 'insufficient.'"

MacAfee v. Paulus, 289 Or 651, 655, 616 P2d 493 (1980).  The
court then described in some detail two diametrically opposing
interpretations of the measure at issue in that case, one of
which had been adopted and the other rejected by the committee
preparing the explanatory statement.  The court declined to
resolve the controversy, stating in effect that the committee's
choice was not itself legally insufficient under the governing
statute, even though another, opposing choice also would have
been defensible.  Id. at 657.

	We adhere to the foregoing rule of deference in
assessing the challenges to the statements of effect adopted by
the explanatory statement committee in this case.  It is not our
function to resolve disputes, whether among committee members or
with other members of the public, concerning whether a better or
different statement of a result or results could have been
included in the explanatory statement.  Rather, petitioner has
the burden under ORS 251.235 of showing that the choices that the
committee did make were legally "insufficient."

	The explanatory statement in this case identifies three
purported effects if Measure 59 is adopted.  The first listed
effect is the prohibition of the use of "public property,
including public buildings, to collect or help collect political
campaign funds."  For the most part, that wording is taken
directly from the text of the measure itself.  The committee did
not create an insufficient explanatory statement by including it.

	The second and third effects of Measure 59 listed in
the explanatory statement, concerning certain payroll deductions
made in behalf of public employees and paid statements in the
voters' pamphlet, are not delineated in the wording of the
measure itself.  However, petitioner has not demonstrated that
either purported effect is one that cannot be justified by the
wording of the measure.  Neither, therefore, is clearly wrong,
and the explanatory statement is not rendered insufficient by
including both.

	We stress that, because of our deferential standard of
review, approval by this court of a particular explanatory
statement does not place any kind of judicial imprimatur upon
that statement.  The legal correctness of propositions set out in
the explanatory statement often will have to be determined in the
context of a case that raises issues concerning the meaning of
the measure, brought after the measure has been approved by the
voters.

	We turn to petitioner's remaining challenges, which
concern the third paragraph of the explanatory statement.  First,
petitioner objects to the use of the word "illegal" in that
paragraph, contending that the word is unnecessarily "charged." 
At oral argument, respondents conceded that the word "illegal"
was inappropriate and agreed that that word, together with the
clause accompanying it, could be deleted from the third paragraph
of the explanatory statement.  We shall modify the explanatory
statement in accordance with that suggested change.

	Petitioner also objects to the use of boldface type in
the third paragraph of the explanatory statement.  We agree with
petitioner that the use of boldface type here could be misleading
to the voters, because it highlights the stated effects of the
measure, rather than the earlier description of the text of the
measure.  See Homuth, 314 Or at 220 (a "potentially misleading"
statement is insufficient).  Consequently, we shall modify that
third paragraph to remove the boldface type.

	Finally, intervenor requests that we modify the final
paragraph of the explanatory statement, to capitalize the words
"voters' pamphlet" and to state the effect upon the voters'
pamphlet consistently in either a plural or singular voice. 
Although intervenor offers suggestions that perhaps would result
in a "better" explanatory statement, he does not demonstrate that
the statement as written is "insufficient or unclear."  See
Teledyne, 301 Or at 593 (court's task is not to write a "better"
statement).  We therefore reject those proposed modifications.

	Consistent with the foregoing discussion, we modify the
explanatory statement for Measure 59 and certify the following
explanatory statement to the Secretary of State:

	This measure adds a new section to the Oregon
Constitution that prohibits any person or organization
from using public resources to collect or help collect
political funds.  Public resources that cannot be used
to collect political funds include public moneys,
public employee time, public property and public
equipment and supplies.  Political funds include any
money contributed to candidates or political committees
and any money spent supporting or opposing a candidate,
ballot measure or initiative petition.  A public body
is prohibited from using its resources to collect
political funds even if it is reimbursed for the cost.

	An organization violating this measure by using
non-political funds (collected for it by a public body)
for a political purpose will lose the right to payroll
deductions by any public body for all purposes.

	This measure prohibits several activities
currently allowed under Oregon law.  For example:

1)	To use public property, including public
buildings, to collect or help collect political
campaign funds.

2)	To recognize a public employee's request to
payroll deduct part of the employee's wages and
transfer that deducted money to an organization that
uses all or part of that money to support or oppose
candidates, initiatives or ballot measures.

3)	To include in the voters' pamphlet any paid
statement supporting or opposing candidates,
initiatives or ballot measures.

		Ballot measure explanatory statement certified as
modified.  Pursuant to ORAP 1.20(4) and notwithstanding      
ORAP 11.30(10), this opinion will become effective when the
appellate judgment issues.  The State Court Administrator shall
issue the appellate judgment at 12:00 p.m. on August 31, 1998,
unless a petition for reconsideration is both filed with and
physically received by the Office of the State Court
Administrator by that time.  Any timely petition for
reconsideration will stay issuance of the appellate judgment
until the court acts on such petition.

Sizemore v. Myers

	DURHAM, J., dissenting.

	I would dismiss the petition for the reasons expressed
in my dissenting opinion in Deras v. Myers, ____ Or ____, ____
P2d ____ (August ____, 1998) (Durham, J., dissenting).

	Accordingly, I dissent.

1. 	Respondent Myers waived appearance on review;
respondent Harper did not appear on review.