Title: State v. James E. Brown
Citation: 2006 WI 100
Docket Number: 2003AP002662-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2006

2006 WI 100 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
James E. Brown, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 6, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Martin J. Donald   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Richard D. Martin, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
William C. Wolford, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2006 WI 100
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2662-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2001CF4764) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
James E. Brown, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished court of appeals decision1 affirming the circuit 
court's denial of James Brown's (Brown) postconviction motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas to three felony charges.  Brown 
contends that he did not enter his guilty pleas knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.  To support this claim, he 
points to the transcript of the plea hearing and alleges that 
                                                 
1 State v. Brown, No. 2003AP2662-CR, unpublished order (Wis. 
Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2005). 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
2 
 
the circuit court judge failed to follow some of the duties 
imposed by Wis. Stat. § 971.08 (2001-02)2 and State v. Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). 
¶2 
This review presents the question whether the circuit 
court erred by denying Brown's postconviction motion without an 
evidentiary hearing.  A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea when (1) the 
defendant makes a prima facie showing that the circuit court's 
plea colloquy did not conform with § 971.08 or other procedures 
mandated at a plea hearing; and (2) the defendant alleges he did 
not know or understand the information that should have been 
provided at the plea hearing.  State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, 
¶46, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 N.W.2d 14; Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 
274.  In this case, the parties dispute whether Brown has met 
these two requirements. 
¶3 
First, Brown contends his guilty plea was not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary because the circuit court (1) failed 
to enumerate the elements of the charges to which he pleaded 
guilty; (2) failed to inform him of the constitutional rights he 
waived by pleading guilty; and (3) failed to adequately explain 
the potential punishment he faced. 
¶4 
Second, Brown alleges, somewhat indirectly, that he 
did not understand information that should have been presented 
at the plea hearing. 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
3 
 
¶5 
Based on the transcript of the plea hearing, we 
conclude Brown has made a prima facie showing that the circuit 
court did not fully comply with Wis. Stat. § 971.08 and Bangert.  
The circuit court did not satisfactorily enumerate, explain, or 
discuss the facts or elements of the three felonies in a manner 
that would establish for a reviewing court that Brown understood 
the nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty.  We 
further conclude that Brown adequately alleged that he did not 
understand the nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty.  
Finally, we conclude that there were shortcomings with respect 
to Brown's apparent waiver of constitutional rights. 
¶6 
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing at which 
the State will have an opportunity to present evidence that 
Brown understood the nature of the charges to which he pleaded 
guilty and understood the rights he gave up.  See Hampton, 274 
Wis. 2d 379, ¶46.  If the State cannot prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that Brown understood the nature of the 
charges and the constitutional rights he gave up, the circuit 
court shall grant Brown's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶7 
The criminal complaint alleges that on July 19, 2001, 
Brown and two other males approached Steven Booth at a Milwaukee 
hotel where Booth worked.  Brown and the other men robbed Booth 
at gunpoint and forced him into the hotel room where Booth lived 
with his girlfriend.  Booth's girlfriend was sleeping in the 
room when the men entered.  Once in the room, Brown and his 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
4 
 
friends rummaged through the victims' belongings, forced Booth 
into 
the 
bathroom, 
and 
each 
sexually 
assaulted 
Booth's 
girlfriend.  Some of these allegations are in dispute. 
¶8 
The criminal complaint charged Brown with first-degree 
sexual assault by use or threat of use of a dangerous weapon,3 
armed burglary,4 and armed robbery.5  Subsequently, the State 
filed an information that added a charge of kidnapping.6  On all 
four counts, Brown was named as party to the crime pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 939.05.  All four counts were Class B felonies that 
carried 
maximum 
penalties 
of 
60 
years.  
Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(b). 
¶9 
At the time of these crimes, Brown was a 17-year-old 
high-school dropout.  He had completed ninth grade but was 
illiterate and had been diagnosed with reading and mathematics 
disorders.  At the sentencing hearing, Brown's attorney told the 
court: "Mr. Brown is not a slow reader.  He's not a poor reader.  
He is a nonreader.  He's as deficient in this regard as anybody 
I've ever represented in 20-some years." 
¶10 At Brown's initial appearance, the court stated the 
three offenses with which Brown was originally charged and told 
Brown that each charge carried a maximum penalty of 60 years.  
In his next court appearance, Brown waived his right to a 
                                                 
3 Wis. Stat. § 940.225(1)(b). 
4 Wis. Stat. § 943.10(2)(a). 
5 Wis. Stat. § 943.32(1)(a) and (2). 
6 Wis. Stat. § 940.31(1)(b). 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
5 
 
preliminary hearing.  Neither the criminal complaint nor the 
information was ever read to Brown in court before the plea 
hearing. 
¶11 After plea negotiations, Brown pleaded guilty, as a 
party to the crime, to first-degree sexual assault with a 
weapon, armed robbery with use of force, and kidnapping, at a 
hearing before Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Jeffrey Wagner.7  
Because of Brown's illiteracy, no plea questionnaire and waiver 
of rights form was completed.  Instead, Brown's attorney, 
Patrick Earle, advised the circuit court that the requirements 
for a valid guilty plea, including "the factual basis," would 
have to be done orally. 
¶12 Despite this notice, the circuit court never addressed 
any of the elements of the crimes to which Brown pleaded guilty.  
The entire exchange between the circuit court and Brown 
concerning the nature of the charges was as follows: 
THE COURT: 
But we 
need a 
signed Guilty 
Plea 
Questionnaire 
and 
Waiver 
of 
Rights 
form. 
MR. EARLE: 
Okay.8 
THE COURT: 
If I have one, then you can——I mean do 
you feel comfortable with what you've 
said 
to 
him 
and 
gone 
over 
the 
provisions that are contained in that 
form, right? 
                                                 
7 In exchange for his guilty pleas, the State agreed to 
dismiss the charge of armed burglary and have it read in at 
sentencing. 
8 Completed documents were never supplied for the record. 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
6 
 
MR. EARLE: 
I've gone over every word. 
THE COURT: 
All right.  Then he can sign the one 
that he's got. 
MR. EARLE: 
I wasn't able to put all the elements 
of all three offenses on each one.  I 
started to fill out one and decided I 
could do it orally with him.  So I 
don't have three for him to sign, just 
this one.  I would have to do three 
more. 
THE COURT: 
But he understands those elements of 
the offenses? 
MR. EARLE: 
Yes. 
THE COURT: 
You've gone over those elements with 
him? 
MR. EARLE: 
Yes. 
THE COURT: 
Okay.  Sir, do you understand what 
you're 
charged 
with, 
the 
charges 
against you?  The first degree sexual 
assault while armed; is that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: 
And the armed robbery, party to a 
crime? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: 
And the kidnapping, party to a crime? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: 
You have read the Complaint or had it 
read to you? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: 
So you understand it? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
. . . .  
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
7 
 
THE COURT: 
You understand the charges to which 
you're pleading to? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
. . . .  
THE COURT: 
And you've gone over the elements with 
your lawyer, right? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: 
And, Counsel, you've gone over those 
elements specific with him as to each 
one of those counts? 
MR. EARLE: 
Yes. 
THE COURT: 
And he appeared to understand those 
elements the State would have to prove? 
MR. EARLE: 
Yes. 
¶13 After accepting Brown's guilty pleas, the circuit 
court added: 
THE COURT: 
Now, you've gone over the concept of 
party to a crime with your lawyer, 
also, right? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: 
You understand that also? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
¶14 Next, the circuit court reviewed the constitutional 
rights Brown waived by pleading guilty, including the right to a 
trial; the right to a jury and a unanimous verdict; the right 
not to incriminate himself; the right to testify and present 
evidence; the right to subpoena witnesses; the right to confront 
witnesses; and the right to make the State prove the elements of 
each count beyond a reasonable doubt.  Additionally, the circuit 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
8 
 
court explained that each charge carried a maximum sentence of 
60 years. 
¶15 Based on the colloquy, the circuit court accepted 
Brown's guilty pleas.  At the subsequent sentencing hearing, 
Brown was sentenced to 25 years initial confinement and 25 years 
extended supervision by Circuit Judge M. Joseph Donald.9 
¶16 After sentencing, Brown timely filed a postconviction 
motion under Wis. Stat. § 809.30, seeking to withdraw his guilty 
pleas on the basis that the pleas were not knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary.  The motion alleged that the elements of the 
offenses were not recited or discussed, that the record failed 
to demonstrate Brown understood the elements of the charges or 
the constitutional rights he was waiving, and that the record 
lacked an accurate and complete recitation of the potential 
penalties or the possibility of consecutive sentences.  The 
motion also alleged indirectly that Brown did not understand the 
information that should have been presented at the plea hearing. 
¶17 Judge 
Wagner 
denied 
Brown's 
motion 
without 
an 
evidentiary hearing, finding that the plea colloquy met the 
requirements of both Wis. Stat. § 971.08 and Bangert.  The court 
                                                 
9 The circuit court sentenced Brown to 10 years for the 
sexual assault, and 40 years each for the armed robbery and 
kidnapping.  The 40-year sentences are concurrent to each other, 
and consecutive to the 10-year sentence.  The sentences are 
bifurcated as follows: for the sexual assault, 5 years initial 
confinement and 5 years extended supervision; for the armed 
robbery, 20 years initial confinement and 20 years extended 
supervision; for the kidnapping, 20 years initial confinement 
and 20 years extended supervision. 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
9 
 
of appeals summarily affirmed, and we granted Brown's petition 
for review. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 When a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea after 
sentencing, he must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that a refusal to allow withdrawal of the plea would result in 
"manifest injustice."  State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶16, 232 
Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836.  One way for a defendant to meet 
this burden is to show that he did not knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily enter the plea.  State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 
56, ¶15, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891; State ex rel. Warren v. 
Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 636, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998); State v. 
Krawczyk, 2003 WI App 6, ¶9, 259 Wis. 2d 843, 657 N.W.2d 77. 
¶19 When a guilty plea is not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary, a defendant is entitled to withdraw the plea as a 
matter of right because such a plea "violates fundamental due 
process."  State v. Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 139, 569 
N.W.2d 577 (1997).  Whether a plea is knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary is a question of constitutional fact.  Trochinski, 253 
Wis. 2d 38, ¶16.  We accept the circuit court's findings of 
historical and evidentiary facts unless they are clearly 
erroneous but we determine independently whether those facts 
demonstrate that the defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary.  Id. 
¶20 The issue presented in this case does not require us 
to 
determine 
whether 
Brown's 
guilty 
pleas 
were 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.  Our task is to determine whether 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
10 
 
Brown has raised sufficient concerns about whether his pleas 
were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary to entitle him to an 
evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw the pleas.   
¶21 Brown's 
postconviction 
motion 
concerns 
alleged 
deficiencies in the plea colloquy.  Whether Brown has pointed to 
deficiencies in the plea colloquy that establish a violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or other mandatory duties at a plea hearing 
is a question of law we review de novo.  See State v. Brandt, 
226 Wis. 2d 610, 618, 594 N.W.2d 759 (1999).  Likewise, whether 
Brown has sufficiently alleged that he did not know or 
understand information that should have been provided at the 
plea hearing is a question of law.  See State v. Bentley, 201 
Wis. 2d 303, 310, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996). 
III. THE BANGERT REQUIREMENTS FOR A PLEA COLLOQUY 
¶22 Given 
the 
frequency 
with 
which 
violations 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.0810 and Bangert are alleged, and in light of 
the inadequate plea colloquy in this case, we take this 
opportunity to reexamine the legal tenets fundamental to guilty 
pleas. 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(1) provides in part: 
(1) Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or 
no contest, it shall do all of the following: 
(a) Address 
the 
defendant 
personally 
and 
determine that the plea is made voluntarily with 
understanding of the nature of the charge and the 
potential punishment if convicted. 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
11 
 
¶23 The duties established in Wis. Stat. § 971.08,11 in 
Bangert, and in subsequent cases are designed to ensure that a 
defendant's plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  The 
faithful discharge of these duties is the best way we know for 
courts to demonstrate the critical importance of pleas in our 
system of justice and to avoid constitutional problems.12 
¶24 The Bangert opinion is a timeless primer on the 
foundation principles of the plea colloquy.  It answers the oft-
expressed concern that pleas consume too much valuable court 
time. 
¶25 The United States Constitution sets forth the standard 
that a guilty or no contest plea must be affirmatively shown to 
be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 
260.  If this showing does not appear in the transcript of the 
plea hearing, there is a high probability that it will have to 
be shown in a postconviction hearing. 
¶26 Historical perspective on the required procedure is 
valuable.  In Bangert this court confronted the implications of 
a decision it had made a year earlier.  In State v. Cecchini, 
124 
Wis. 2d 200, 
368 
N.W.2d 830 
(1985), 
the 
court 
held 
                                                 
11 Wis——JI Criminal SM-32 (1995) summarizes the duties a 
circuit court should complete in accepting a guilty, no contest, 
or Alford plea and prescribes a recommended procedure to ensure 
no step is omitted.  See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 
(1970).  We strongly encourage courts to follow these plea-
acceptance procedures. 
12 "A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits 
that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction."  
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
12 
 
unanimously that prior to accepting a plea, a trial court "must 
ascertain that the defendant understands the nature of the 
charge, and that this must be done on the record at the plea 
hearing."  Id. at 201 (emphasis added).  The court added: 
"Because the trial court failed to do so . . . the plea was 
involuntary and unknowing and in violation of the defendant's 
right to due process."  Id.  In short, under Cecchini, a 
deficient plea colloquy was per se a violation of due process 
and required withdrawal of the defendant's plea. 
¶27 Then Bangert came along.  It involved a defendant who 
had murdered an Eau Claire police officer.  Although the 
defendant had been involved in extensive proceedings and 
discussions before his plea, his plea colloquy was plainly 
insufficient to show that he understood the nature of the 
charge.  If Cecchini were applied, Bangert could withdraw his 
plea as a matter of right. 
¶28 The Bangert court reconsidered the Cecchini rule and 
withdrew language from that opinion, but it did not compromise 
or 
"discard 
the 
mandatory 
requirement 
that 
trial 
judges 
undertake a personal colloquy with the defendant to ascertain 
his understanding of the nature of the charge[.]"  Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 260 (emphasis added). 
¶29 The court held that a plea will not be voluntary 
unless the defendant has a full understanding of the charges 
against him.  Id. at 257 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 748 n.6 (1970)).  In addition, for a plea to function 
as a valid waiver of constitutional rights, the plea must be an 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
13 
 
intentional relinquishment of known rights.  Id. at 265 (citing 
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969); Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).  Thus, a plea will not be 
voluntary unless the defendant understands the nature of the 
constitutional rights he is waiving.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 
265. 
¶30 To ensure a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea, 
Bangert also required that a trial judge explore the defendant's 
capacity to make informed decisions. 
¶31 In his concurring 
opinion, 
Chief 
Justice 
Nathan 
Heffernan stated: "Cecchini established that a complete record 
of a defendant's understanding of a plea be made at the plea 
hearing.  This procedure discourages postconviction attacks."  
Id. at 298 (Heffernan, C.J., concurring).  "[A] postconviction 
cure 
procedure simply 
means 
there 
will be 
one or 
more 
evidentiary hearings on the plea withdrawal issue."  Id. at 299. 
¶32 Smarting from this criticism, the majority condemned 
perfunctory colloquies, facially superficial colloquies, and 
ritualistic colloquies.  "This court cannot overemphasize the 
importance 
of 
the 
trial 
court's 
taking 
great 
care 
in 
ascertaining the defendant's understanding" of the nature of the 
charges and the constitutional rights being waived.  Id. at 266, 
270. 
¶33 To 
head 
off 
postconviction 
hearings 
on 
plea 
withdrawals, the court said: 
We reiterate that the duty to comply with the 
plea hearing procedures falls squarely on the trial 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
14 
 
judge.  We understand that most trial judges are under 
considerable calendar 
constraints, 
but 
it 
is of 
paramount importance that judges devote the time 
necessary 
to 
ensure 
that 
a 
plea 
meets 
the 
constitutional standard.  The plea hearing colloquy 
must not be reduced to a perfunctory exchange.  It 
demands the trial court's "utmost solicitude." 
Id. at 278-79 (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 
(1969)) (emphasis added).  "Such solicitude will serve to 
forestall postconviction motions, which have an even more 
detrimental effect on a trial court's time limitations than do 
properly conducted plea hearings."  Id. at 279. 
¶34 To 
assist 
circuit 
courts, 
the 
Bangert 
decision 
outlined a judge's duties at a plea hearing, drawing on 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08, familiar case law, and Wis JI——Criminal SM-
32 (1985), Part V, Waiver of Constitutional Rights.  Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d at 261-62, 270-71.  We take this opportunity to 
restate and supplement the Bangert outline. 
¶35 During the course of a plea hearing, the court must 
address the defendant personally and: 
(1) Determine the extent of the defendant’s 
education and general comprehension so as to assess 
the defendant's capacity to understand the issues at 
the hearing;13 
(2) Ascertain whether any promises, agreements, 
or 
threats 
were 
made 
in 
connection 
with 
the 
defendant's anticipated plea, his appearance at the 
hearing, or any decision to forgo an attorney;14 
                                                 
13 State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 261-62 389 N.W.2d 12 
(1986). 
14 Id. at 262. 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
15 
 
(3) Alert the defendant to the possibility that 
an attorney may discover 
defenses 
or 
mitigating 
circumstances that would not be apparent to a layman 
such as the defendant;15 
(4) Ensure the defendant understands that if he 
is indigent and cannot afford an attorney, an attorney 
will be provided at no expense to him;16 
(5) Establish the defendant's understanding of 
the nature of the crime with which he is charged and 
the range of punishments to which he is subjecting 
himself by entering a plea;17 
(6) Ascertain personally whether a factual basis 
exists to support the plea;18 
(7) Inform the defendant of the constitutional 
rights he waives by entering a plea and verify that 
the defendant understands he is giving up these 
rights;19 
(8) Establish 
personally 
that 
the 
defendant 
understands that the court is not bound by the terms 
of any plea agreement, including recommendations from 
the district attorney, in every case where there has 
been a plea agreement;20 
(9) Notify 
the 
defendant 
of 
the 
direct 
consequences of his plea;21 and 
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id.; Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a). 
18 Id.; Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b). 
19 State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, ¶24, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 
N.W.2d 14; Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 270-72. 
20 Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶¶20, 69; State ex rel. White 
v. Gray, 57 Wis. 2d 17, 24, 203 N.W.2d 638 (1973). 
21 State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 636, 
579 N.W.2d 698 (1998).  The most contemporary interpretation of 
this requirement is catalogued in Wis JI——Criminal SM-32. 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
16 
 
(10) Advise the defendant that "If you are not a 
citizen of the United States of America, you are 
advised that a plea of guilty or no contest for the 
offense [or offenses] with which you are charged may 
result in deportation, the exclusion from admission to 
this country or the denial of naturalization, under 
federal 
law," 
as 
provided 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c). 22 
¶36 A circuit court's failure to fulfill a duty at the 
plea hearing will necessitate an evidentiary hearing if a 
defendant's postconviction motion alleges he did not understand 
an aspect of the plea because of the omission.  As Bangert put 
it: "Whenever the sec. 971.08 procedure is not undertaken or 
whenever the court-mandated duties are not fulfilled at the plea 
hearing, the defendant may move to withdraw his plea."  Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d at 274.  Assuming the defendant's postconviction 
motion is adequate to require a hearing, he may withdraw his 
plea after sentencing as a matter of right unless the state can 
show 
the 
plea 
was 
entered 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily, despite the deficiencies in the plea hearing.  
Trochinski, 253 Wis. 2d 38, ¶17; Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d at 139. 
                                                 
22 See 
State 
v. 
Douangmala, 
2002 
WI 
62, 
¶19, 
253 
Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1. 
The court is also required by Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(d) to 
inquire of the district attorney whether he or she has complied 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 971.095(2) 
concerning 
consultation 
with 
victims. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08 is modeled on the 1970 version of 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 
260-61.  Since that time, Rule 11 has been significantly amended 
to impose a greater number of duties upon federal district court 
judges before accepting a guilty or no contest plea.  Many of 
the accretions to Rule 11 are tracked in Wisconsin case law and 
amendments to Wis JI——Criminal SM-32. 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
17 
 
¶37 If a defendant does not understand the nature of the 
charge and the implications of the plea, he should not be 
entering the plea, and the court should not be accepting the 
plea.  On the other hand, if a defendant does understand the 
charge and the effects of his plea, he should not be permitted 
to game the system by taking advantage of judicial mistakes. 
¶38 Under our rules, a defendant can wait until he knows 
his sentence before he moves to withdraw his plea, and he may 
not be disadvantaged by this delay as long as he is able to 
point to a deficiency in the plea colloquy.  Thus, only the 
court, with the assistance of the district attorney, can prevent 
potential sandbagging by a defendant by engaging the defendant 
at the plea colloquy and making a complete record.  See Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d at 275. 
¶39 After sentencing, in cases that involve an alleged 
deficiency in the plea colloquy, an attempt to withdraw a guilty 
plea 
proceeds 
as 
follows. 
 
The 
defendant 
must 
file 
a 
postconviction 
motion 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 809.30 
or 
other 
appropriate statute.  The motion must (1) make a prima facie 
showing of a violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) or other court-
mandated duties by pointing to passages or gaps in the plea 
hearing transcript; and (2) allege that the defendant did not 
know or understand the information that should have been 
provided at the plea hearing.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.   
¶40 When a Bangert motion is filed, it is reviewed by the 
court.  If the motion establishes a prima facie violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or other court-mandated duties and makes the 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
18 
 
requisite allegations, the court must hold a postconviction 
evidentiary hearing at which the state is given an opportunity 
to show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's 
plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary despite the 
identified inadequacy of the plea colloquy.23  Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 274.  When the defendant has met his two burdens, the 
burden of producing persuasive evidence at the evidentiary 
hearing shifts to the state.24  Id. at 275.  In meeting its 
burden, the state may rely "on the totality of the evidence, 
much of which will be found outside the plea hearing record."  
Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶47.  For example, the state may 
present the testimony of the defendant and defense counsel to 
establish 
the 
defendant's 
understanding. 
 
Bangert, 
131 
Wis. 2d at 
275. 
 
The 
state 
may 
also 
utilize 
the 
plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form, documentary evidence, 
recorded statements, and transcripts of prior hearings to 
satisfy its burden. 
¶41 If the state is able to meet its burden, the hearing 
should be over.  In a theoretical sense, the burden will have 
                                                 
23 There will be no need for an evidentiary hearing if the 
court grants the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.  Of 
course, the objective of a complete plea colloquy, beyond 
assuring that a defendant's plea is knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary, is to minimize the necessity of a postconviction 
evidentiary hearing on the plea. 
24 As we explained in Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 275, part of 
the reason the burden shifts from the defendant to the state is 
that this burden-shifting "will encourage the prosecution to 
assist the trial court in meeting its sec. 971.08 and other 
expressed obligations." 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
19 
 
shifted back to the defendant, but there is nothing for the 
defendant to prove because the defendant is not entitled to turn 
a Bangert hearing into a fishing expedition on other issues that 
were not pleaded in the defendant's original motion. 
¶42  When the defendant files a dual purpose motion——that 
is, a Bangert motion combined with a motion that alleges 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
or 
some 
other 
problem 
affecting the plea that is extrinsic to the plea hearing record—
—the court should make an initial ruling on whether an 
evidentiary hearing is required and, if it is, what the hearing 
will address.  It must be remembered that when the defendant 
makes the type of motion discussed in Bentley, which requires 
testimony or the examination of evidence outside the existing 
record, the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only 
if his postconviction motion alleges facts that, if true, would 
entitle him to relief.  Id. at 310.  "To ask the court to 
examine facts outside the record in an evidentiary hearing 
requires a particularized motion with sufficient supporting 
facts to warrant the undertaking."  Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 
¶61.  In addition, the defendant maintains the burden of proof 
in a Bentley-type hearing and the facts adduced must show 
manifest injustice by clear and convincing evidence before the 
defendant may withdraw his plea.  Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 311. 
IV. BROWN'S MOTION 
¶43 This case concerns whether Brown's postconviction 
motion was sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing because 
of alleged deficiencies in the plea colloquy.  Accordingly, we 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
20 
 
must determine (1) whether Brown has made a prima facie showing 
that Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) or other court-mandated duties were 
not followed, and (2) whether he adequately alleged that he did 
not understand information that should have been provided at the 
plea hearing. 
¶44 Brown contends the circuit court failed to conform to 
its plea-taking duties in three respects.  First, the circuit 
court did not establish that Brown understood the nature of the 
charges to which he pleaded guilty.  Second, the circuit court 
did not adequately inform Brown of the constitutional rights he 
waived by pleading guilty.  Third, the circuit court did not 
adequately explain the range of punishments associated with each 
charge.  We will address each of Brown's challenges to the plea 
colloquy. 
A. 
The Nature of the Charges 
¶45 Brown argues he made a prima facie showing that he did 
not understand the nature of the charges based on the fact that 
the plea hearing lacked any discussion of the elements of the 
offenses to which he pleaded guilty.  The State responds that 
the circuit court established Brown's understanding of the 
charges at the plea hearing in other ways.  Both parties rely 
upon Bangert. 
¶46 In Bangert we said a circuit court may establish the 
defendant's understanding of the charges to which he is pleading 
by any one of, or combination of, the following non-exhaustive 
methods.  "First, the trial court may summarize the elements of 
the 
crime 
charged 
by 
reading 
from 
the 
appropriate 
jury 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
21 
 
instructions, see Wis. JI——Criminal SM-32, Part IV [1995], or 
from the applicable statute."  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 268. 
¶47 "Second, the trial judge may ask defendant’s counsel 
whether he explained the nature of the charge to the defendant 
and request him to summarize the extent of the explanation, 
including a reiteration of the elements, at the plea hearing."  
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶48 "Third, the trial judge may expressly refer to the 
record or other evidence of defendant’s knowledge of the nature 
of the charge established prior to the plea hearing."  Id.  "For 
example, when a criminal complaint has been read to the 
defendant at a preliminary hearing, the trial judge may inquire 
whether the defendant understands the nature of the charge based 
on that reading."  Id.  "A trial judge may also specifically 
refer to and summarize any signed statement of the defendant 
which might demonstrate that the defendant has notice of the 
nature of the charge."  Id. 
¶49 The State emphasizes that the Bangert list is non-
exhaustive, and we agree.  There may be other ways to show a 
defendant's understanding of the charges. 
¶50 In this case, the State notes: (1) Brown's defense 
attorney stated he had reviewed the elements with Brown; (2) 
Brown confirmed that his attorney reviewed with him the elements 
of the charges; and (3) Brown said he understood the charges. 
¶51 These representations are not sufficient to establish 
that Brown's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  The 
State concedes that where an illiterate defendant is involved, 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
22 
 
the better practice is to use one of the three methods expressly 
stated in Bangert to establish that the defendant understood the 
nature of the charges.   
¶52 Complying 
with 
the 
requisite 
standards 
is 
not 
optional.  Bangert requires that the plea colloquy establish the 
defendant's understanding of the nature of the charges, the 
range of penalties, the constitutional rights being waived, and 
other essential information on the record.  We observed in 
Bangert that the method a circuit court employs to ascertain a 
defendant's understanding should depend upon "the circumstances 
of the particular case, including the level of education of the 
defendant and the complexity of the charge[s]."  Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 267-68.  The less a defendant's intellectual capacity 
and education, the more a court should do to ensure the 
defendant knows and understands the essential elements of the 
charges. 
¶53 In the present case, the circuit court did not follow 
any of the methods established in Bangert.  The circuit court 
never enumerated, explained, or discussed the elements of first-
degree sexual assault, armed robbery, or kidnapping, or the 
facts making up the elements.  Although Brown's attorney stated 
that he had explained the nature of the charges to Brown, the 
circuit court never asked either Brown or his attorney to 
summarize the extent of the explanation or the elements of the 
crimes on the record.  The circuit court never referred to the 
record from prior court proceedings to establish that Brown 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
23 
 
understood the nature of the charges.25  The circuit court never 
referred to or summarized the charges as found in a plea 
questionnaire or other writing signed by Brown, because there 
were no such documents. 
¶54 The fact that there was no plea questionnaire at hand 
should have warned the court that special steps were imperative 
to ensure, on the record, that the defendant was fully apprised 
and understood the charges, the potential penalties, and the 
panoply of valuable rights he was surrendering by entering his 
plea.  The absence of the plea questionnaire and waiver of 
rights form prevented the court from using these documents to 
instruct the defendant, to assess the defendant's understanding, 
or to construct an invulnerable record.  The absence of these 
documents will now hamper the State at the evidentiary hearing. 
¶55 An examination of the record illustrates why the 
court's failure to enumerate or discuss elements of the crimes 
may have shortchanged the defendant.  Brown pleaded guilty to 
all charges as a party to the crime without the circuit court 
ever explaining or ensuring that the defendant understood the 
concept of party to a crime.  This could be significant for four 
reasons.  First, at the plea hearing Brown's attorney said that 
Brown denied that he personally held or pointed a gun in Booth's 
hotel room.  Second, at the sentencing hearing, Brown's attorney 
repeated Brown's denial that he had intercourse with Booth's 
                                                 
25 Indeed, the circuit court could not have done so because 
the record is silent in that respect. 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
24 
 
girlfriend.  Third, the court never referenced "party to a 
crime" when it mentioned the sexual assault charge.  Fourth, 
Attorney Earle acknowledged, "perhaps I didn't prepare him as 
well for his plea as I should have . . . perhaps we should have 
tendered a no contest plea with regard to the sexual assault."  
These statements and omissions raise questions of whether Brown 
understood the concept of party to a crime, an essential element 
of the charges to which he pleaded guilty. 
¶56 The admission by Brown's original attorney that he may 
not have fully prepared Brown to plead guilty to the sexual 
assault charge also helps to explain why a court cannot rely 
very heavily upon mere statements from defense counsel that he 
or she has reviewed the nature of the charges with a defendant.  
Bangert requires verification, independent of defense counsel's 
assertion, that a defendant understands the nature of the 
charges.  See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 267 (requiring the circuit 
court to "ascertain that the defendant possesses accurate 
information about the nature of the charge").  Hence, Bangert 
requires a circuit court to summarize the elements of the 
offenses on the record, or ask defense counsel to summarize the 
elements of the offenses, or refer to a prior court proceeding 
at which the elements were reviewed, or refer to a document 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
25 
 
signed by the defendant that includes the elements.26  Id. at 
268.  Each method enables a court to ascertain the accuracy of 
the defendant's knowledge; each method gives substantive content 
to a defendant's understanding.  Cf. id. at 269 ("Understanding 
must 
have 
knowledge 
as 
its 
antecedent; 
knowledge, 
like 
understanding, cannot be inferred or assumed on a silent 
record.").  Moreover, we encourage circuit court judges to 
translate 
legal 
generalities 
into 
factual 
specifics 
when 
necessary to ensure the defendant's understanding of the 
charges.   
¶57 Unfortunately, the record in this case is bereft of 
what Brown knew and understood about the charges to which he 
pleaded guilty.  Although Brown's attorney stated he reviewed 
the charges with Brown, we do not know whether he accurately 
described and discussed all the elements because that is not on 
the record.  In view of Brown's illiteracy, his one-word 
responses, the complexity of the charges, and the absence of a 
plea questionnaire, Brown's one-word acknowledgment that he 
reviewed the elements with his attorney and understood them is 
conclusory, not persuasive.   
                                                 
26 We recognize that the United States Constitution is 
satisfied by defense counsel's representation that he or she has 
reviewed the elements of each charge with the defendant, and the 
defendant's acknowledgement 
that the 
elements 
were 
indeed 
reviewed by counsel.  Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 192 
(2005). 
 
Since 
Bangert, 
however, 
we 
have 
interpreted 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08 to require a court to obtain more direct 
confirmation of a defendant's understanding before accepting a 
plea. 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
26 
 
¶58 We conclude Brown's postconviction motion alleges a 
prima facie violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08. Although a circuit 
court must establish that a defendant understands every element 
of the charges to which he pleads, the circuit court is not 
expected to explain every element of every charge in every case.  
This opinion is intended to revitalize Bangert, which allows a 
court to tailor a plea colloquy to the individual defendant.27  
In customizing a plea colloquy, however, a circuit court must 
"do more than merely record the defendant's affirmation of 
understanding."  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 267.  As we stated in 
Bangert: 
[I]t is no longer sufficient for a trial judge merely 
to perfunctorily question the defendant about his 
understanding of the charge.  Likewise, a perfunctory 
affirmative 
response 
by 
the 
defendant 
that 
he 
understands the nature of the offense, without an 
affirmative showing that the nature of the crime has 
been communicated to him or that the defendant has at 
some point expressed his knowledge of the nature of 
the charge, will not satisfy the requirement of sec. 
971.08, Stats. 
                                                 
27 The need to expand the colloquy in certain cases is 
echoed by the American Bar Association, which states, "where a 
court is uncertain about the defendant's understanding, perhaps 
because 
of 
the 
defendant's 
lack 
of 
education 
or 
low 
intelligence, it may be advisable to ask the defendant to 
explain in his or her own words what several of the rights 
mean."  III American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal 
Justice, § 14-1.4 at 14.28 (2d ed. 1980).  Although this section 
pertains to establishing a defendant's understanding of what 
constitutional rights are waived by a guilty plea, the footnote 
to this sentence demonstrates it applies with equal force to 
establishing a defendant's understanding of the nature of the 
charges. 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
27 
 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 268-69 (emphasis added).  A statement 
from defense counsel that he has reviewed the elements of the 
charge, without some summary of the elements or detailed 
description 
of 
the 
conversation, 
cannot 
constitute 
an 
"affirmative showing that the nature of the crime has been 
communicated."  Id. at 268. 
¶59 To earn a Bangert evidentiary hearing, a defendant 
must satisfy a second obligation.  In addition to making a prima 
facie case that the circuit court erred in the plea colloquy, a 
defendant must allege he did not enter a knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary plea because he did not know or understand 
information that should have been provided at the plea hearing.  
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  Accordingly, we turn to the 
question whether Brown's postconviction motion sufficiently 
alleged that he did not understand the nature of the charges to 
which he pleaded guilty. 
¶60 The State contends Brown failed to adequately allege 
that he did not understand the nature of the charges.  The State 
argues 
Brown's 
motion 
to 
withdraw 
his 
guilty 
pleas 
was 
insufficient because it failed to specifically state what Brown 
did not understand. 
¶61 Brown's motion reads in part as follows: 
 
The guilty plea record fails to demonstrate that 
Mr. Brown actually understood the elements of any of 
the crimes to which he pled guilty.  The guilty plea 
record also fails to demonstrate that Mr. Brown 
actually understood the valuable constitutional rights 
he was waiving. 
. . . .  
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
28 
 
 
Illustration of the second part of defendant's 
burden, that Mr. Brown "did not know or understand the 
information which should have been provided at the 
plea hearing" is (only a bit) more problematic.  
Undersigned counsel considered, but rejected, having 
Mr. Brown execute an affidavit to this effect.  An 
affidavit would suffer from the same flaw as the 
(never executed) Plea Questionnaire——to wit, what use 
is an affidavit executed by an illiterate defendant? 
 
Counsel 
also 
considered 
submitting 
his 
own 
affidavit.  This suffers from a different flaw, 
placing counsel in the untenable dual role of advocate 
and witness.  Suffice it to say that counsel has 
discussed the issues raised herein and represents that 
Mr. Brown appears to understand very little of what 
transpired in connection with the entry of his guilty 
pleas.  His testimony will make this clear beyond 
dispute.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶62 We share the State's concern that this motion does not 
allege directly that the defendant did not know or understand 
certain information that should have been provided or addressed 
at the plea hearing.  A defendant is not required to submit a 
sworn affidavit to the court, but he is required to plead in his 
motion that he did not know or understand some aspect of his 
plea that is related to a deficiency in the plea colloquy. 
¶63 This requirement is necessary for at least three 
reasons.  First, if the defendant is unwilling or unable to 
assert a lack of understanding about some aspect of the plea 
process, there is no point in holding a hearing.  The ultimate 
issue to be decided at the hearing is whether the defendant's 
plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, not whether the 
circuit court erred.  The court's error has already been 
exposed.  In the absence of a claim by the defendant that he 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
29 
 
lacked understanding with regard to the plea, any shortcoming in 
the plea colloquy is harmless. 
¶64 Second, if the defendant alleges that he did not 
understand some aspect of the plea colloquy (such as the nature 
of the charges) but the transcript shows that the court's 
treatment of the subject was unassailable, the defendant's 
motion for a hearing cannot be granted on the basis of a 
deficiency in the transcript.  On that score, the defendant's 
motion will have failed to make a prima facie showing that the 
plea colloquy was deficient.  Strictly speaking, a Bangert 
motion relies on information in the record.  When a defendant 
moves to withdraw a plea based on information outside the 
record, the defendant has a higher burden and must meet the 
standards set out in Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 318. 
¶65 Third, when a Bangert-type motion is granted, the 
state should know from the pleading what it is required to prove 
at the evidentiary hearing.  A Bangert evidentiary hearing is 
not a search for error; it is designed to evaluate the effect of 
known error on the defendant's plea so that the court can 
determine 
whether 
it 
must 
accept 
the 
withdrawal 
of 
the 
defendant's plea.  The state must be given fair notice of what 
it must prove. 
¶66 In this case, defense counsel persuasively documented 
deficiencies in the plea hearing transcript, but the motion did 
not allege directly that the defendant did not understand the 
nature of the charges against him.  Counsel explained his 
decision not to submit an affidavit from the defendant or 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
30 
 
himself, but he did not explain why the defendant could not 
plead that he did not understand the nature of the charges.  We 
are required to infer such an allegation from the totality of 
the motion.  In this case, we accept counsel's representations 
that the defendant lacked understanding about the charges and 
that the defendant's "testimony will make this clear beyond 
dispute." 
¶67 In the ordinary case, defense counsel should plead 
with greater particularity a defendant's lack of understanding.  
A defendant must identify deficiencies in the plea colloquy, 
state what he did not understand, and connect his lack of 
understanding 
to 
the 
deficiencies. 
 
See 
Hampton, 
274 
Wis. 2d 379, ¶57; State v. Giebel, 198 Wis. 2d 207, 217, 541 
N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1995).  This procedure should prove fair to 
both parties. 
¶68 Because this case is being remanded to the circuit 
court for a hearing, we will respond to the defendant's two 
other attacks on the plea colloquy. 
B. 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
¶69 Brown alleges that the colloquy was insufficient with 
respect to the waiver of constitutional rights. 
¶70 The Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form lists 
seven statements of constitutional rights that a defendant 
agrees to give up by entering a plea.  The form reads as 
follows: 
1. 
I give up my right to a trial. 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
31 
 
2. 
I give up my right to remain silent and I 
understand that my silence could not be used 
against me at trial. 
3. 
I give up my right to testify and present 
evidence at trial. 
4. 
I give up my right to use subpoenas to require 
witnesses to come to court and testify for me at 
trial. 
5. 
I give up my right to a jury trial, where all 12 
jurors would have to agree that I am either 
guilty or not guilty.28 
6. 
I give up my right to confront in court the 
people who testify against me and cross-examine 
them. 
7. 
I give up my right to make the State prove me 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
¶71 The circuit court paraphrased these statements, asking 
the defendant if he was giving up each right.  Six times the 
defendant answered "yeah;" one time the defendant answered 
"yes." 
 
¶72 The circuit court was told earlier in the hearing that 
defense counsel had gone 
over the 
content 
of 
the 
plea 
questionnaire on two occasions.  "I've gone over every word," 
counsel declared. 
 
¶73 Brown contends the court "never engaged Brown in any 
discussion concerning the several constitutional rights waived 
by the plea."  On these facts, he has a point.  The transcript 
reveals no representation by Brown's attorney that he ever had a 
                                                 
28 This statement does not take into account the possibility 
of a hung jury.  We respectfully suggest that the Judicial 
Conference Forms Committee review the wording of this point. 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
32 
 
quality discussion with Brown about the meaning or value of the 
defendant's constitutional rights.  The court itself never 
probed the subject or elicited more than perfunctory one-word 
answers to its questions. 
 
¶74 This aspect of the colloquy contrasts dramatically 
with a court commissioner's colloquy with Brown when he waived a 
preliminary examination: 
The Court: 
You're 
waiving 
your 
right 
to 
a 
preliminary hearing.  Do you know what 
that is? 
The Defendant: Yeah. 
The Court: 
Tell me what it is, please. 
The Defendant: To get my next court date. 
The Court: 
Wrong. 
 
Try 
again. 
 
What 
is 
a 
preliminary hearing?  What are you 
waiving?  I've got to know that you 
know what you're waiving. 
The Defendant: Oh, well, what we discussed? 
Mr. Earle: 
Yes. 
The Court: 
What is a preliminary hearing? 
The Defendant: What we discussed, about what happened. 
The Court: 
Well, that doesn't help.  I know that 
you understand.  Let me define what I 
think a preliminary hearing is, and you 
tell me if you agree with it.  Okay? 
The Defendant: Yes. 
The Court: 
All right.  At a preliminary hearing 
the State must establish by evidence 
two things: Number 1, that a felony 
occurred in Milwaukee County, a serious 
crime. 
 
Number 
2, 
that 
you 
were 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
33 
 
probably responsible for it.  It's a 
preview of the State's case.  Is this 
what you want to waive?  Hello? 
The Defendant: Yes? 
The Court: 
Is that what you want to waive? 
The Defendant: Yes. 
 
¶75 The commissioner's colloquy is more in keeping with 
our expectation of what a court should do when it is dealing 
with a poorly educated defendant than the circuit court's 
colloquy.  The commissioner was not satisfied with one-word 
answers. 
 
¶76 On the facts of this case, where the defendant was 
illiterate, where there was no waiver of rights form, and where 
there was no rendition by Brown's attorney of a meaningful 
discussion of the defendant's rights, the court should have done 
more to show that the defendant understood the rights he was 
giving up by entering a plea. 
 
¶77 Probing questions may not always be necessary, but 
they help to ensure a defendant's understanding and they help to 
complete the hearing record.  Upon remand, the State, which 
remained silent in the face of an inadequate colloquy, will be 
required to show that the defendant made a knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights. 
C. 
Maximum Potential Sentence 
 
¶78 Brown also claims that the circuit court violated 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) by failing to state that the punishment 
for each charge could run consecutively.  The circuit court 
stated that each charge was a Class B felony and that it could 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
34 
 
impose a 60-year sentence for each charge.  We find it difficult 
to accept Brown's suggestion that failure to inform a defendant 
who is facing multiple charges that the sentence imposed on each 
charge could be consecutive (that is, the total sentence could 
add up to more than 60 years), would render a defendant's plea 
not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  The reasonable 
conclusion when a defendant is confronted with multiple charges 
is that the defendant could face multiple punishments.  That 
realization is a major explanation for plea bargains that reduce 
the number of charges.  Although the better practice is to 
advise a defendant of the cumulative maximum sentence he could 
receive from consecutive sentences, we do not believe the 
omission of such information should allow a defendant to 
withdraw a guilty plea in the absence of any allegation that the 
defendant did not understand the effect of multiple charges on 
his sentence.  Failure to understand this simple concept would 
signal more serious problems with the plea.  Even if we found 
error in the omission, it would be harmless on these facts 
because Brown's total sentence did not reach the maximum on even 
one of the Class B felonies. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶79 Brown's postconviction motion makes a prima facie 
showing 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
comply 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08 and Bangert in conducting the plea colloquy.  
The circuit court did not satisfactorily enumerate, explain, or 
discuss the facts or elements of the three felonies in a manner 
that would establish for a reviewing court that Brown understood 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
35 
 
the nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty.  We 
further conclude Brown adequately alleged that he did not 
understand the nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty.  
Finally, we conclude that there were shortcomings with respect 
to Brown's waiver of constitutional rights.  Accordingly, the 
court of appeals decision is reversed and the case is remanded 
for an evidentiary hearing at which the State will have an 
opportunity to present evidence that Brown understood the nature 
of the charges to which he pleaded guilty and the constitutional 
rights he gave up, despite the deficiencies in the plea hearing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
No. 
2003AP2662-CR 
 
 
 
1