Title: Mills v. State
Citation: 304 So. 2d 651
Docket Number: 48089
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 1974

304 So. 2d 651 (1974) Veto MILLS v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 48089. Supreme Court of Mississippi. December 16, 1974. *652 James B. Floyd, III, Tupelo, for appellant. A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Pete J. Cajoleas, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. SUGG, Justice: Veto Mills was convicted in the Circuit Court of Lee County for the delivery of 2.6 grams of marijuana. He was sentenced to serve 4 years in the State Penitentiary with one year suspended. From that conviction and sentence, he now appeals. The State offered only one witness to prove the delivery of marijuana charged in the indictment. This witness was an agent for the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics. He testified that the defendant delivered a small quantity of marijuana to an informer who immediately handed it to him. Although the agent stated that the informer was present at the time of delivery, he was not identified by the State, nor was he called to testify on behalf of the State. The defendant and his brother denied that defendant delivered marijuana either to the informer or the agent. Defendant first contends that the trial court erred by allowing the agent to testify about an attempt to purchase phenobarbital and seconal from defendant and his brother. On direct examination of the agent by the district attorney, he was asked if appellant had made any statement to him about drugs in Lee County. When defense counsel objected, the district attorney replied that: The objection was overruled, and on direct examination of the agent, the following transpired: Defendant argues that the above testimony tended to prejudice the jury against him and prevented him from receiving a fair trial. In Sumrall v. State, 257 So. 2d 853 (1972), the Court, speaking through Justice Inzer stated: The testimony quoted above tended to show that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity other than the crime for which he was indicted by showing his willingness to secure other controlled substances to sell to the agent. It was specifically directed toward defendant's involvement in the crime of conspiracy. Such testimony had no probative value on the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant as to the crime charged but only served to prejudice the jury. The introduction of this evidence requires a reversal of the case. Defendant next contends that the court erred when it permitted the district attorney to cross-examine him about his work record for the five years previous to the trial. When the district attorney sought to question defendant about this matter, defense counsel objected, and stated, "... he is going back to when the boy was fourteen years of age and questioning him about his work record." The district attorney, in the presence of the jury, responded to the objection by stating that the testimony showed defendant was trying to "get up some deals" and he was attempting to show that he had a reason to do so. The objection was overruled, and the district attorney was allowed to continue this line of questioning. Once again, there was injected into the record the inference that appellant was guilty of other offenses. The statement that defendant was "trying to get up some deals," together with the questions propounded to the defendant about his work record, acted to compound the prejudice of the original improper suggestion that appellant was involved in criminal activity other than the specific act for which he was indicted. The defendant was a 19 year old minor and the impression was thus created that he was dealing in controlled substances because of his irregular employment. This may well be true, but under the facts in this case, the interrogation of the defendant about his work record was not relevant and served no purpose other than to prejudice the jury. Appellant also contends that the court erred in refusing to allow him the opportunity to make a record out of the presence of the jury regarding the identity *654 of the informer. The trial judge sustained the State's objection to this attempt and noted that to allow a record to be made on this particular point would defeat the purpose of the rule whereby the witness is not required to reveal the name of his informant. The proper rule regarding the circumstances under which the identity of the informer should be disclosed was stated in Young v. State, 245 So. 2d 26 (Miss. 1971): The narcotics agent testified that appellant handed the marijuana to the informer who was seated in an automobile next to him and that the informer immediately handed the marijuana to the agent. Under these circumstances, the identity of the informer should be revealed. However, this assignment of error has no merit because the defendant and his attorney were aware of the identity of the informer and of his participation before the trial. See Laughter v. State, 235 So. 2d 468 (Miss. 1970). We have carefully considered all other errors assigned on this appeal and find they are without merit. For the reasons stated, this case is reversed and remanded for a new trial. Reversed and remanded. RODGERS, P.J., and PATTERSON, SMITH and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur.