Title: State v. Donavan W. Malone
Citation: 2004 WI 108
Docket Number: 2002AP002216-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 2004

2004 WI 108 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2216-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Donavan W. Malone,  
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 6, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Manitowoc   
 
JUDGE: 
Darryl W. Deets   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by John A. 
Cabranes and Servantez & Cabranes, Racine, and oral argument by 
John A. Cabranes. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Gregory M. Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
2004 WI 108 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-2216-CR   
(L.C. No. 
01 CF 338) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Donavan W. Malone,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a Judgment of the Circuit Court for Manitowoc 
County, Darryl W. Deets, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification by the court of appeals.  The court of appeals 
asks us to address whether, during a routine traffic stop, a law 
enforcement officer may request the passengers, as well as the 
driver, to exit the vehicle and individually ask them questions 
reasonably related to the nature of the stop.   
¶2 
This certified issue arises in the case of Donavan W. 
Malone, who was a passenger in a vehicle stopped for speeding.  
After a series of events, including the questioning of all three 
occupants of the vehicle, Malone was arrested and the vehicle 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
2 
 
was searched incident to his arrest.  He appeals the April 29, 
2002, decision of the Manitowoc County Circuit Court, Darryl W. 
Deets, Judge, denying his motion to suppress physical evidence 
of drug trafficking.  Malone ultimately pleaded no contest to 
conspiracy to deliver tetrahydrocannabinols (THC).  
¶3 
Malone sought to suppress the physical evidence on 
grounds that it was obtained in contravention of his Fourth 
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.  
Malone does not dispute the validity of the traffic stop, nor 
does he directly challenge a pat-down search of his person and 
subsequent vehicle search that produced physical evidence of 
drug courier activity.  Malone instead focuses on the questions 
an officer directed to him outside of the stopped vehicle, which 
he argues bore no reasonable relationship to the purpose of the 
traffic stop.  Without this reasonable relationship, Malone 
argues, the officer unreasonably extended his detention of the 
occupants without a basis to initiate a narcotics investigation, 
which might justify the intrusion occasioned by the questioning. 
¶4 
We hold that the law enforcement officer in this case 
acted reasonably.  Assuming that the officer asked Malone 
questions outside the scope of the initial traffic stop, the 
officer nonetheless had become aware of specific and articulable 
facts giving rise to the reasonable suspicion that a crime had 
been, was being, or was about to be committed.  Therefore, the 
officer was justified in briefly detaining and questioning 
Malone regarding that suspicion.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
3 
 
circuit court's decision to deny Malone's motion to suppress the 
physical evidence obtained against Malone. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶5 
The 
underlying 
facts 
are 
not 
in 
dispute. 
 
On 
Wednesday, November 7, 2001, Wisconsin State Patrol Trooper 
Andrew Hyer was patrolling Interstate Highway 43 in Manitowoc 
County when he clocked a southbound vehicle moving 77 miles per 
hour in contravention of the posted 65 miles per hour speed 
limit.  Hyer stopped the vehicle and spoke to the driver, who 
produced a driver license that identified him as Joshua Moede.  
In response to initial inquiries by Hyer, Moede indicated that 
he believed he had been traveling 78 miles per hour, and 
admitted that he was not wearing his seat belt.  Hyer procured 
driver licenses from the other two occupants in the vehicle 
because he observed that they were not wearing seat belts 
either.  Hyer returned to his squad car to run record checks on 
the three occupants.  Cory Marohl sat in the front passenger 
seat; Donavan Malone sat in the back seat on the passenger side.  
During his initial contact, Hyer determined that the car 
belonged to Marohl, but Moede was driving because Marohl did not 
have a valid license.   
¶6 
Upon approaching the vehicle, Hyer had observed an 
unusual number of air fresheners hanging from the vehicle’s 
rearview mirror.  He estimated that there were seven or eight 
air fresheners.  In cross-examination, Hyer stated that based on 
his drug indicator training, he was aware that air fresheners 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
4 
 
are used to mask drug odors.  Hyer also stated that I-43 was a 
primary area for drug interdiction activities.  
¶7 
Hyer asked the driver, Moede, to step out of the 
vehicle and move behind it.  When asked where the occupants were 
heading, Moede responded that they were going to a family 
member’s house in Milwaukee.  Hyer stated that Moede was 
continually putting his hands in his pockets during their 
conversation and Moede consented to a pat-down for Hyer’s 
safety.  The officer found nothing.  This interaction lasted 
approximately 30 to 45 seconds after which Hyer asked Moede to 
get back into the car.   
¶8 
Hyer then requested that Marohl exit the car and stand 
between his car and the squad car, and Hyer asked him where they 
were going.  Marohl responded that they were going to a rave 
party 
in 
Milwaukee 
and, 
without 
further 
questioning, 
he 
volunteered that he was on probation for drug-related offenses.  
When Hyer asked him whether his probation officer would approve 
of his attending a party in Milwaukee, Marohl indicated that 
only Moede and Malone were actually going to the party.  Hyer 
stated that Marohl was also "fidgety" and putting his hands in 
his pockets.  Because of this, Hyer asked for consent to pat 
Marohl down and Marohl consented.  The pat-down produced no 
weapons.  After this interaction of about 30 to 45 seconds, Hyer 
asked Marohl to get back into the car and provide his vehicle 
registration. 
¶9 
At this time Hyer asked Malone, 20, to step out and 
stand between the two cars.  Hyer asked about their destination, 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
5 
 
and Malone stated that they were going to visit some family 
members, but he was only along for the ride and didn’t know the 
family.  Hyer asked Malone whether he had gotten any tickets in 
his life.  Malone stated that he had received some traffic 
tickets and some drug-related tickets.  When asked whether he 
was still using drugs, Malone stated that he was still using 
marijuana.  Hyer asked if Malone had any marijuana on him and 
Malone said no.  
¶10 Malone, like Moede and Marohl, was putting his hands 
in his pockets contrary to Hyer’s instructions.  Hyer asked if 
Malone would consent to a pat-down, and Malone agreed.  Hyer 
found two objects that felt like boxes in Malone’s front right 
pants pocket and a third object about the size of a half dollar 
that felt "squishy" to the touch.  Hyer asked what the objects 
were, and Malone stated that he just had cigarettes.  However, 
Hyer testified that based on his training and experience, the 
object felt like a packet rolled up to hold marijuana.  Because 
Malone would not identify the packet, and because of his 
suspicion, Hyer removed the packet.  The object was a "baggie 
that was rolled up in a manner common among drug users" 
containing a few specks of a green leafy material and smelling 
strongly of marijuana.  Malone stated that he did not know what 
the baggie was or why it was in his pocket.  Hyer placed Malone 
under arrest for possession of marijuana, handcuffed him, and 
detained him in the back of his squad car.  
¶11 Hyer contacted his dispatcher and requested backup.  
After backup arrived in the person of Manitowoc County Deputy 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
6 
 
Sheriff Raube, Hyer performed two field tests on the suspected 
marijuana with inconclusive (not positive) results.  Hyer 
contacted his supervisor who stated that arrest was probably not 
justified, but a search was.  Hyer asked Moede and Marohl to 
exit the vehicle and a full search of the two was performed, 
yielding nothing.  Moede and Marohl were then placed in Raube’s 
squad car.  Hyer and Raube began a search of the car, but 
stopped when Raube informed Hyer that a K-9 unit was on its way.  
When the K-9 unit arrived, the dog indicated the center armrest 
and driver side back seat.  Hyer and Raube continued their 
search concentrating on the areas indicated by the dog.  The 
search yielded a marijuana pipe containing a black residue and 
smelling of marijuana, Zig-Zag rolling papers, and $4,400 in 
cash bundled in a rubber band.  Also discovered was a duffle bag 
containing a dry brown leafy substance along with a second 
duffle bag.  This second bag smelled of marijuana and contained 
some green leafy material in the bottom of the bag.  At this 
point, Moede and Marohl were also placed under arrest.  While he 
was in custody, Malone gave a statement in which he admitted 
that he was en route to Milwaukee to purchase marijuana for 
resale. 
¶12 On November 26, 2001, Malone was charged with being 
party to the crime of conspiring to deliver THC based on the 
evidence found in the car.  On January 23, 2002, Malone filed a 
motion to suppress all physical evidence taken from him or from 
the car on grounds that the search was in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
7 
 
I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  On April 29, the circuit 
court denied the suppression motion in a written decision.  The 
court determined that Hyer had probable cause to seize the 
packet from Malone’s pocket based on the unusual number of air 
fresheners, Marohl’s statement that they were attending a rave 
party, the nervousness of all three individuals, the fact that 
Malone had been ticketed for drug-related offenses, and Malone’s 
admission that he was still using marijuana.  Once Hyer seized 
the packet, there were proper grounds to continue the search.  
Malone later entered a guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to 
deliver THC. 
¶13 Malone appealed the circuit court’s denial of his 
suppression motion.  This court granted certification on the 
issue of whether, during a routine traffic stop, the police may 
request the passengers, as well as the driver, to exit the 
vehicle and individually ask them questions reasonably related 
to the nature of the stop.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 The issue in this case is whether Hyer's actions 
violated Donavan Malone's constitutional guarantees against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  The inquiry is thus one of 
constitutional fact.  State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, ¶23, 236 
Wis. 2d 48, 
613 
N.W.2d 72 
(citing 
State 
v. 
Kieffer, 
217 
Wis. 2d 531, 541, 577 N.W.2d 352 (1998)).  We analyze issues of 
constitutional fact within a bifurcated framework, on one hand 
giving deference to the circuit court's findings of evidentiary 
fact, and on the other reviewing independently the circuit 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
8 
 
court's application of those facts to constitutional standards.  
State v. Pallone, 2000 WI 77, ¶27, 236 Wis. 2d 162, 613 
N.W.2d 568 (citing State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶¶16-18, 231 
Wis. 2d 801, 
604 
N.W.2d 552; 
State 
v. 
Richardson, 
156 
Wis. 2d 128, 137-38, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990)).  Malone does not 
argue 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
came 
to 
erroneous 
factual 
conclusions; thus our review of the circuit court's application 
of the facts to constitutional standards is de novo.  
III. ANALYSIS 
¶15 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
protects "[t]he right of the People to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures." 
 
U.S. 
Const. 
amend. 
IV.1 
 
The 
interpretation of our state constitution's analogous provision2 
                                                 
1 The Fourth Amendment reads in its entirety:  
The right of the People to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.   
U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
2 Wis. Const., art. 1, §  11:   
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized.   
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
9 
 
has evolved in virtual lockstep with the United States Supreme 
Court's 
jurisprudence 
construing 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment.  
Griffith, 236 Wis. 2d 48, ¶24 n.10 (citing State v. Kiper, 193 
Wis. 2d 69, 80, 532 N.W.2d 698 (1995)).   
¶16 Malone asserts that Trooper Hyer intruded upon his 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  He 
argues that Hyer extended the stop to question Malone beyond 
what was necessary to investigate the traffic violation and with 
an insufficient factual basis to initiate a separate narcotics 
investigation.  If the pat-down search of Malone's person 
occurred 
during 
a 
seizure 
that 
violated 
Malone's 
Fourth 
Amendment protections, then the fruits of that search should 
have been suppressed.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) 
("Ever since its inception, the rule excluding evidence seized 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment has been recognized as a 
principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct.").   
A. 
Bright-Line Rule 
¶17 In this case, the court of appeals asks whether, 
during a routine traffic stop, a law enforcement officer may 
request the passengers, as well as the driver, to exit the 
vehicle and individually ask them questions reasonably related 
to the nature of the stop.  This certified question is difficult 
to answer because it calls upon this court to formulate a 
bright-line rule that law enforcement action in this regard is 
either always permitted or always prohibited.  The Supreme Court 
has "eschewed bright-line rules [in Fourth Amendment inquiries], 
instead 
emphasizing 
the 
fact-specific 
nature 
of 
the 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
10 
 
reasonableness inquiry."  Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 
(1996); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) 
(rejecting a per se rule in favor of an inquiry into "all the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
the 
encounter."); 
Michigan 
v. 
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988) (rejecting the parties' 
proposals for bright-line rules in favor of a fact specific 
analysis); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968) ("The 
constitutional validity of a warrantless search is pre-eminently 
the sort of question which can only be decided in the concrete 
factual context of the individual case."); Go-Bart Importing Co. 
v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) ("There is no formula 
for the determination of reasonableness.  Each case is to be 
decided on its own facts and circumstances.").   
¶18 It would be unwise for us to attempt to fashion a 
single rule purporting to encompass the innumerable variations 
of a routine traffic stop.  In this case, for instance, there 
were three people in the car——one driver and two passengers.  
None of these persons was wearing a seat belt.  The driver was 
not the owner of the car; the front seat passenger was.  The 
three occupants were young men between 20 and 22 years of age, 
from 
Shawano 
County, 
driving 
on 
a 
Wednesday 
evening 
to 
Milwaukee, roughly three hours away.  The driver failed to give 
a clear plausible explanation of the group's destination.  In 
addition, the officer had access to some of the records of the 
occupants before any of the occupants were asked to get out of 
the car.  The facts here are different from many others that 
might be conceived.   
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
11 
 
B. 
Standing 
¶19 This case presents a series of small incremental 
events leading to the search of Marohl's car and the seizure of 
marijuana and other drug-related evidence.  Part of Malone's 
strategy is to attack links in this chain that do not involve 
Malone, and this raises the question whether he has "standing" 
to do so. 
¶20 The court of appeals, in its certification, makes 
observations and queries that underscore Malone's approach: 
[I]n this case the passengers, Malone and Marohl, were 
not wearing seat belts when the car was stopped by 
Hyer; if the trooper can question them, are the 
reasonable questions he may ask limited to their seat 
belt violation or may they be asked questions related 
to the original reason for the traffic stop? If the 
passengers 
had 
not 
been 
guilty 
of 
any 
traffic 
regulation violation, may they be questioned to verify 
the information provided by the driver? If the 
passengers may be questioned, can the trooper require 
them to exit the vehicle and question them separately 
to test for consistency of information? If the trooper 
perceives 
the 
information 
he 
receives 
to 
be 
inconsistent, does that constitute an articulable 
suspicion justifying an expansion of the scope of the 
stop? 
State v. Malone, No. 02-2216-CR, 2003 WL 21659174 at *3 (Wis. 
Ct. App. July 16, 2003) (emphasis added).  If we answered all 
these questions, we would necessarily address issues relating 
not just to Donavan Malone's Fourth Amendment protections, but 
also the protections of defendants not party to this appeal.  We 
would also come close to fashioning the bright-line rule that we 
seek to avoid.   
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
12 
 
¶21 Law enforcement action is to be judged against the 
standard of reasonableness, which in turn "depends 'on a balance 
between the public interest and the individual's right to 
personal security free from arbitrary interference by law 
officers.'"  Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) 
(quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 
(1975)).  In crafting this balance, this court must carefully 
scrutinize the totality of the circumstances.  Robinette, 519 
U.S. at 39.   
¶22 There are broad principles of search and seizure, but 
each case must be evaluated on its own facts.  The facts may be 
different for members of the same group.  Consequently, each 
person's encounter with law enforcement should be evaluated 
individually.  Our constitutional guarantee against unreasonable 
searches and seizures is a personal right that may not be 
asserted vicariously.  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 
(1978).  A party attempting to exclude evidence obtained as a 
result of a search or seizure that violates the Fourth Amendment 
must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of his own privacy in 
the object of the search or must himself be the person seized.  
To understand why "standing" matters under these facts, it is 
important that we set forth Malone's position as we understand 
it.   
¶23 In his brief to this court, Malone focuses on whether 
Hyer 
had 
reasonable 
suspicion 
to 
initiate 
a 
narcotics 
investigation.  He contends that the case "presents two separate 
and 
distinct 
investigations." 
 
Trooper 
Hyer's 
subjective 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
13 
 
motivation 
may 
have 
been 
to 
pursue 
suspected 
narcotics 
trafficking, but his subjective motivations play no part in our 
analysis, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996), and 
the 
term 
"narcotics 
investigation" 
is 
an 
unsatisfactory 
description of Hyer's actual conduct because it does not capture 
the gravamen of Malone's legal argument.  At oral argument, 
Malone clarified that he objected to the questions posed to 
Malone outside the vehicle, as well as the technique of the 
officer asking each occupant of the vehicle questions and 
comparing the answers Hyer received. 
¶24 We note that the "[t]emporary detention of individuals 
during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for 
a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a 
'seizure' of 'persons' within the meaning of the [Fourth 
Amendment]."  State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 253, 557 
N.W.2d 245 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Whren, 517 
U.S. at 809-10).  The seizure here was a traffic stop, and we 
evaluate the reasonableness of Hyer's conduct under principles 
similar to those used to address a so-called Terry stop.  
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (citing Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)).  Under this approach, we 
must determine "whether the officer's action was justified at 
its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place."  Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.  However, if during a valid 
traffic stop, an officer becomes aware of suspicious factors or 
additional information that would give rise to an objective, 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
14 
 
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, that 
officer need not terminate the encounter simply because further 
investigation is beyond the scope of the initial stop.  State v. 
Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 94-95, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999).  
We might conceptualize this as a new, distinct investigation, 
but in reality there may not be a distinct line separating the 
two investigations——the first investigation may overlap the 
second without any outward indication of a shift. 
¶25 Malone does not challenge Hyer's decision to stop the 
car in which Malone was riding.  Because Hyer lawfully stopped 
the 
vehicle, 
Malone 
was 
also 
lawfully 
stopped. 
 
This 
distinguishes the case from Harris.  Malone's position is that, 
at some point in time, Hyer's actions, specifically his 
questions, were no longer reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first 
place.   
¶26 We promulgated a framework to assess such claims in 
Griffith.  The reasonableness of a seizure that is alleged to 
impermissibly detain an individual for questioning can be 
measured by examining two variables.  First, the nature of an 
officer's actions may exceed the scope justified by the original 
stop, raising the question whether "the incremental intrusion" 
of additional questions is unreasonable when balanced against 
the public interest.  Id., ¶37-38.  Second, the duration of law 
enforcement questioning during a valid traffic stop "can 
transform a reasonable seizure into an unreasonable one if it 
extends the stop beyond the time necessary to fulfill the 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
15 
 
purpose of the stop."  Id., ¶54 (citing United States v. Sharpe, 
470 U.S. 675, 684-85 (1985) ("[I]f an investigative stop 
continues indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be 
justified as an investigative stop.")). 
¶27 Thus Malone can challenge the nature of the questions 
posed to him, as well as the duration of the stop, as these 
factors involve Malone directly.  Malone does not have standing 
under the Fourth Amendment, however, to challenge the nature of 
questions Hyer posed to Moede, the driver, or Marohl, the other 
passenger.  "It is one thing to allow a passenger to object to 
the fruits of an unduly prolonged stop, which would also affect 
his freedom directly; it is quite another to allow a passenger 
to object to, e.g., the asking of an improper question of the 
driver."  5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.3, n.230.1 
(Supp. 2004) (internal cross-references omitted) (citing United 
States v. Rodriguez-Arreola, 270 F.3d 611 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that one does not have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in other vehicle occupants' knowledge)).  Malone cannot 
circumvent the principle that Fourth Amendment protections are 
personal by challenging Hyer's conduct in asking each passenger 
to exit the vehicle and posing to them a short series of 
questions.  To adopt such a principle would abandon the holding 
in Rakas.  See ¶22, supra. 
¶28 In addition, both the court of appeals and Malone 
raise the issue of Hyer's tactics in comparing each occupant's 
story for consistency.  We must be careful to distinguish an 
officer's use of information once obtained from the tactics used 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
16 
 
to obtain it.  Unless Malone has standing to challenge the 
manner in which that information was obtained, the use of that 
information by the officer to compare stories is not a violation 
of Malone's Fourth Amendment rights.  Because Malone has no 
standing to challenge the questions asked of Moede and Marohl, 
there is no basis for him to challenge Hyer's actions unless 
Hyer violated Malone's own Fourth Amendment rights. 
C. 
Nature of Hyer's Questions to Malone 
¶29 In Griffith, we examined the extent to which a law 
enforcement officer may question an individual during an 
investigative detention, and concluded that we must determine 
whether the "incremental intrusion" resulting from the nature of 
the questioning is unreasonable.  236 Wis. 2d 48, ¶38.  We 
evaluate the incremental intrusion by weighing "the public 
interest served by the questioning against the incremental 
liberty intrusion that resulted from the questioning."  Id. 
(citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411-12 (1997); Brown 
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979); Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109; Terry, 
392 U.S. at 20-21).   
¶30 In 
this 
vein, 
Malone 
asserts 
that 
Hyer 
lacked 
reasonable 
suspicion 
to 
initiate 
any 
investigation 
into 
narcotics: "[T]he only basis for [Hyer's] extending the traffic 
stop is that he saw an unusual number of air fresheners."  By 
Malone's lights, "an unusual number of air fresheners in the 
vehicle (without the corresponding masking odor) does not, in 
[and] of itself, provide evidence of drug courier activity or 
drug use."  Accordingly, Malone asserts that the physical 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
17 
 
evidence obtained in the ensuing searches was a result of an 
illegal detention and must therefore be suppressed.    
¶31 However, this argument misstates the relevant inquiry 
because it assumes that the reasonableness of Hyer's actions 
vis-à-vis Malone should be measured by the information Hyer 
possessed at the outset of the encounter.  Malone does not 
challenge Hyer's actions at the outset, however.  Rather, Malone 
challenges questions that followed Hyer's interaction with the 
two other occupants of the vehicle, interactions that brought to 
Hyer's attention objective facts that we must take into account 
when determining whether Hyer's conduct was reasonable.    
¶32 Malone does not challenge Hyer's authority to ask 
Malone to exit the vehicle.  See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 415.  
Instead, Malone's position is that once Malone was out of the 
vehicle, Hyer was not permitted to question him, and even if he 
was allowed to question him, such questioning must be reasonably 
related to the speeding violation of the driver or the seat belt 
violation that Malone may have committed.3  Thus, the appropriate 
                                                 
3 Malone argues that the record is silent on whether the 
rear passenger compartment of the vehicle was equipped with a 
shoulder harness, and therefore Malone may not have been capable 
of violating the statute.  Wisconsin Stat. § 347.48(2m)(d) 
provides: 
If a motor vehicle is required to be equipped with 
safety belts in this state, no person who is at least 
4 years old and who is seated at a designated seating 
position in the front seat required under 49 CFR 571 
to have a safety belt installed or at a designated 
seating position in the seats, other than the front 
seats, for which a shoulder harness has been installed 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
18 
 
inquiry is to examine what information was available to Hyer 
when he asked Malone to step out of the vehicle. 
¶33 In Betow, the court of appeals, relying on an Eighth 
Circuit case, declared: 
There is no question that a police officer may stop a 
vehicle when he or she reasonably believes the driver 
is violating a traffic law; and, once stopped, the 
driver may be asked questions reasonably related to 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
stop——including 
his 
or 
her 
destination and purpose. 
226 Wis. 2d at 93 (citing United States v. Johnson, 58 F.3d 356, 
357 (8th Cir. 1995)).  The State takes the position that we 
should ratify this statement of law, and additionally import the 
principles of other Eighth Circuit cases addressing permissible 
questions for drivers as well as passengers within the scope of 
a valid traffic stop.  The cases the State asks that we rely 
                                                                                                                                                             
may be a passenger in that motor vehicle unless the 
person is properly restrained. 
Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(d) 
(2001-02). 
 
However, 
it 
is 
irrelevant whether Malone actually violated the seat belt law.  
The important inquiry is whether Trooper Hyer had cause to 
believe that a violation had occurred.  Given his observation 
that there was no seat belt being worn, Hyer would likely be 
justified in investigating the matter further. 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
19 
 
upon suggest that it is always permissible to ask a driver as 
well as the passenger about the group's travel plans.4   
¶34 We decline to formulate a bright-line rule.  As we 
previously stated, the reasonableness of searches and seizures 
is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, while the Eighth 
Circuit cases set forth bright-line rules.  We note the 
difficulty in demarcating at what point in time, if ever, Hyer's 
conduct became unsupportable based on the justification for 
stopping the vehicle for speeding, or the extent to which the 
seat belt violations might have permitted Hyer additional leeway 
to question Malone.  We will simply assume, without deciding, 
that Hyer's conduct toward Malone could not be supported based 
solely on the speeding and seat belt violations.  In this way, 
we can test whether Hyer's conduct is supported by articulable 
suspicion of criminal conduct wholly apart from the purpose of 
the stop.  If the conduct was justified, then we need go no 
further.  Thus, we focus today on whether Hyer had reasonable 
                                                 
4 See United States v. Gregory, 302 F.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 
2002) ("The Fourth Amendment grants an officer conducting a 
routine 
traffic 
stop 
latitude 
to 
check 
the 
driver's 
identification and vehicle registration, ask the driver to step 
out of his vehicle and over to the patrol car, inquire into the 
driver's destination and purpose for the trip, and 'undertake 
similar questioning of the vehicle's occupants to verify the 
information provided by the driver'"); see also United States v. 
Linkous, 285 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Edmisten, 208 F.3d 693, 694 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Foley, 206 F.3d 802, 805 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Perez, 200 F.3d 576, 579 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Lyton, 161 F.3d 1168, 1169-70 (8th Cir. 1998).   
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
20 
 
suspicion to question Malone based on the facts that were known 
to Hyer at the time he asked Malone to step out of the vehicle.   
¶35 A law enforcement officer is justified in detaining an 
individual 
if 
he 
has 
suspicion 
"grounded 
in 
specific, 
articulable facts and reasonable inferences from those facts, 
that the individual has committed a crime."  State v. Guzy, 139 
Wis. 2d 663, 675, 407 N.W.2d 548 (1987) (citing United States v. 
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226 (1985); Wendricks v. State, 72 
Wis. 2d 717, 723, 242 N.W.2d 187 (1976)).  At the point where 
Hyer asked Malone to exit the vehicle, he was able to point to a 
number of specific and articulable facts to support his 
suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle, including Malone, 
might be involved in illegal activity.  
¶36 Hyer observed an "unusual number" of air fresheners.  
Based upon his law enforcement training, Hyer knew that 
individuals involved in transporting narcotics may use air 
fresheners to mask odor.  Combined with other facts, this 
correlation becomes more significant.  Malone makes much of 
cases where the presence or scent of masking agents is held 
insufficient to satisfy the standards of probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion, either alone or in conjunction with other 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
21 
 
facts and circumstances.5  Yet, he cites no case that stands for 
the proposition that air fresheners or masking odors may never 
constitute part of the totality of the circumstances.6  In State 
v. Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201, 210, 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999), we 
noted that the "unmistakable odor of marijuana coming from an 
automobile provides probable cause for an officer to believe 
that the automobile contains evidence of a crime," thus 
justifying a search.  The presence of seven or eight air 
fresheners in a vehicle occupied by three young men with an 
average age of 21 does not provide probable cause for the search 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 569 S.E.2d 254, 256 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2002) (no reasonable suspicion where officer noted strong 
masking 
odor 
of 
laundry 
detergent 
and 
dryer 
sheets 
and 
defendant’s nervousness); Charity v. State, 753 A.2d 556, 573 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (presence of 72 air fresheners did not 
provide reasonable suspicion); State v. 1983 Toyota Corolla, 879 
P.2d 830, 832-34 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994) (smell of air freshener 
alone did not provide reasonable suspicion); State v. Juarez-
Godinez, 942 P.2d 772, 777 (Or. 1997) (no reasonable suspicion 
where Hispanic occupants were well dressed, on a long trip with 
no luggage, car was owned by drug offender on probation for 
delivery of a controlled substance, driver was nervous and 
unable to produce identification, and the car smelled of air 
fresheners); Commonwealth v. Phinn, 761 A.2d 176, 186 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2000) (no reasonable suspicion where officer noted a 
masking odor of fabric softener, saw furtive movements, and 
conflicting stories from vehicle occupants).   
6 The following cases permit the inclusion of the smell or 
presence of air fresheners in the totality of the circumstances 
in finding reasonable suspicion or probable cause.  See, e.g., 
United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1178-79 (10th Cir. 2000); 
United States v. McCoy, 200 F.3d 582, 584 (8th Cir. 2000); 
United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1066 (10th Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1302 (Kan. 2003); 
Nathan v. State, 805 A.2d 1086, 1096 (Md. 2002).  
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
22 
 
of a vehicle, but it certainly raises suspicion and justifies 
reasonable inquiry. 
¶37 After Hyer conducted a record check on the identities 
of the occupants in his squad car, he returned to the vehicle 
and asked the driver, Moede, to step out and to the rear of the 
vehicle.  Once outside the vehicle, Hyer asked Moede where the 
parties were going, and he responded that the three were heading 
to a family member's house in Milwaukee.  Following this brief 
encounter with the driver, Hyer asked Marohl, the owner of the 
car, to exit the vehicle.  Hyer asked Marohl where the group was 
going, and Marohl's response was inconsistent with Moede's 
response; indeed it constituted a radically different account of 
the occupants' travel plans.  When the owner of a vehicle and 
the driver of the vehicle are taking a three-hour trip on a 
Wednesday evening but cannot provide a consistent account of 
their 
destination, 
the 
inconsistency 
creates 
suspicion.  
Moreover, because Marohl indicated that the group was on its way 
to a rave party, it was reasonable for Hyer to infer that the 
driver, Moede, was lying about the destination, and that Marohl 
was telling the truth.  This increased the suspicion, given that 
Hyer knew there was a correlation between rave parties and 
narcotics and the inference that Moede may have been deceptive 
in not sharing that compromising information with Hyer. 
¶38 In addition, Marohl's explanation for the group's 
travel plans was internally inconsistent.  Unsolicited by any 
question from Hyer, Marohl followed up his answer to Hyer's 
first question by telling the officer that he was on probation 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
23 
 
for drug-related offenses.  Marohl's statements prompted Hyer to 
ask whether his probation agent would find it acceptable that 
Marohl 
was 
attending 
a 
rave 
party, 
and 
Marohl 
promptly 
backtracked, asserting that it was the other two occupants of 
the vehicle, and not himself, who were going to the party.  He 
offered no further explanation as to why he was traveling with 
the group if he was not going to the party with them.  It is 
reasonable for Hyer to have been suspicious given that Moede did 
not mention the rave party and that Marohl was evasive about his 
inclination to attend that party.   
¶39 Furthermore, when Marohl volunteered that he was on 
probation for drug-related offenses, this served to strengthen 
Hyer's suspicion that the group might be involved in conduct 
involving narcotics.  All three occupants appeared to be 
nervous.  In sum, Hyer became aware of several specific and 
articulable facts providing an objective basis to believe that 
illegal conduct involving narcotics might be afoot before he 
even asked Malone to step out of the vehicle.   
¶40 We first ask whether the nature of Hyer's questions 
was unreasonably intrusive.  The public interest served by the 
questioning in this case undoubtedly comes in detecting and 
preventing criminal activity.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22; see 
also State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 56, 556 N.W.2d 681 
(1996).  Hyer identified a number of objective reasons for 
suspecting criminal activity relating to narcotics.  The public 
interest in detecting and preventing crime is strong.   
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
24 
 
¶41 Against the public interest in the prevention and 
detection of crime, we assess the severity of Hyer's intrusion 
upon Malone's liberty.  Malone challenges the four questions 
Hyer asked Malone.  The subject matter of the first question was 
relatively benign.  Hyer asked Malone about the group's 
destination.  This question does not delve directly into matters 
of criminal conduct, and would help to confirm or rebut Hyer's 
suspicions 
about 
the 
group 
as 
created 
in 
part 
by 
the 
inconsistent answers of Malone's associates.   
¶42 The 
last 
three 
questions 
probed 
potentially 
incriminating areas.  Hyer asked about Malone's history of 
tickets, whether Malone was still using drugs, and whether 
Malone had any drugs on him.  These questions, especially the 
last two, are more intrusive than the first question regarding 
destination, and therefore constitute a more serious burden to 
Malone's liberty interest. 
¶43 It should be noted that Hyer had checked Malone's 
record before he asked Malone any questions.  The extent of 
Hyer's knowledge was not developed at the suppression hearing.  
Consequently, we do not know what Hyer knew about Malone's 
criminal history or traffic history.  Hyer may have asked Malone 
if he had received any tickets in his life to test whether 
Malone would give a truthful answer.  Malone himself did not 
know the extent of Hyer's knowledge.  Malone gave a truthful 
answer that acknowledged being charged in drug-related matters.  
That prompted the follow-up question whether he was still using 
marijuana and an admission from him that he was.  And that led 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
25 
 
to the question whether he had any drugs on him and the consent 
to conduct a pat-down search.  Before Hyer asked Malone the 
second question, Malone had told him he didn't know the family 
they were going to see; he was just along for the ride.  This 
again was an inconsistent, implausible answer, spurring an 
additional question. 
¶44 On 
balance, 
Hyer's 
conduct 
toward 
Malone 
was 
reasonable when viewed in light of the objective indications 
that criminal narcotics activity might be afoot: (1) the 
presence of an abnormal number of air fresheners, which may be 
used to mask the odor of narcotics; (2) the radically different 
accounts of the group's travel plans; (3) Marohl's statement 
that the group was headed to a rave party, which the driver may 
have attempted to conceal from the officer; (4) the nervousness 
of the driver and the passengers, e.g., putting their hands in 
and out of their pockets; and (5) the other passenger's 
unsolicited statement that he was on probation for a drug-
related offense.  The nature of the intrusion——that is, the 
subject matter of the questions——lined up with Hyer's suspicion 
and was supported by a number of specific and articulable facts, 
which, under the totality of the circumstances, suggested that 
the group might be involved in narcotics.  Though Hyer asked 
somewhat 
intrusive 
questions, 
Hyer's 
reasonable 
level 
of 
suspicion justified these questions.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that Hyer's conduct in posing these four questions to Malone was 
reasonable under the circumstances.    
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
26 
 
 
D. 
Duration of Seizure  
¶45 Duration is a second factor to consider in evaluating 
whether 
Trooper 
Hyer's 
conduct 
in 
"seizing" 
Malone 
and 
subsequently questioning him was unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.  As we noted in Griffith, "questioning can transform 
a reasonable seizure into an unreasonable one if it extends the 
stop beyond the time necessary to fulfill the purpose of the 
stop."  236 Wis. 2d 48, ¶54 (citing Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 684-85).  
The original purpose of the stop was to investigate the traffic 
violation.  The purpose of the stop was transformed as Hyer 
became aware of additional information that justified expanding 
his investigation to pursue his reasonable suspicion that the 
occupants of the vehicle might be committing or about to commit 
a crime involving narcotics.  Thus, Hyer had a new purpose——to 
investigate his suspicion regarding criminal activity.  However, 
Hyer's lawful authority to pursue his suspicion of criminal 
activity did not mean that the stop could last indefinitely.   
¶46 Malone does not claim that either the overall length 
of time or the length of time Hyer questioned Malone exceeded 
the outer limits of the Fourth Amendment.  Rather, we understand 
Malone to argue that any extension of the stop was unjustified.  
We disagree.  Malone fails to present an alternative argument 
regarding the permissible length of the detention if we were to 
find that Hyer was justified in pursuing his suspicion of 
criminal activity in a reasonable manner.  Because Malone does 
not address this issue, neither do we.   
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
27 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶47 We conclude that the law enforcement officer's conduct 
vis-à-vis Donavan Malone was reasonable both in its scope and 
length, and therefore affirm the circuit court's decision 
denying 
Malone's 
motion 
to 
suppress. 
 
Assuming 
the 
law 
enforcement officer's conduct with respect to the defendant in 
this case exceeded that justified by the initial stop, the brief 
detention of the defendant for questioning was permissible 
because the officer developed reasonable suspicion that criminal 
activity was afoot.  Thus, when the officer questioned the 
defendant, his actions were reasonable.  Accordingly, we affirm.  
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
 
All work on this opinion was completed on or before June 
30, 2004.  Justice Diane S. Sykes resigned on July 4, 2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 02-2216-CR  
 
 
 
1