Title: Thomas J. Pinter v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co.
Citation: 2000 WI 75
Docket Number: 1999AP000869
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 2000

2000 WI 75 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0869 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Thomas J. Pinter  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Employers Ins. of Wausau a Mutual Co.,  
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
American Family Mutual Ins. Co., Stephen  
Jesmok, Heritage Mutual Ins. Co. and  
Herbert O. Otto,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 30, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
May 4, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick L. Snyder 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by 
Patricia A. Schober and Schober, Bostetter & Heiden, S.C., 
Brookfield, and oral argument by Patricia A. Schober. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief 
by Arthur P. Simpson and Simpson & Deardorff, S.C., Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Arthur P. Simpson. 
 
2 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Frank T. 
Crivello, II, and Warshafsky, Rotter, Tarnoff, Reinhardt & Bloch, 
S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial 
Lawyers. 
 
2000 WI 75 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-0869 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Thomas J. Pinter  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
Employers Ins. of Wausau a Mutual Co.,  
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
American Family Mutual Ins. Co., Stephen  
Jesmok, Heritage Mutual Ins. Co. and  
Herbert O. Otto,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, Patrick L. Snyder, Judge.  Affirmed.  
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   Thomas Pinter appeals from the 
grant of summary judgment against his negligence action.  Pinter 
is a firefighter and EMT who sustained injuries while providing 
emergency medical assistance to a passenger who was injured in 
an automobile accident.  Pinter sued the drivers of the cars 
that were involved in the accident, arguing that his injuries 
were the direct and proximate result of the drivers' negligence.  
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
2 
¶2 
The drivers moved for summary judgment.  The Circuit 
Court for Waukesha County, Patrick L. Snyder, Judge, granted the 
drivers' summary judgment motions because the court concluded 
that a public policy limitation on liability, commonly termed 
the "firefighter's rule," bars Pinter from pursuing a negligence 
action against the drivers. 
¶3 
Pinter appealed.  The court of appeals certified the 
appeal to this court to decide the following question: 
 
Does the firefighter's rule, as adopted in Hass v. 
Chicago & North Western Railway, 48 Wis. 2d 321, 179 
N.W.2d 885 (1970), bar an emergency medical technician 
(EMT) from pursuing a cause of action against a 
negligent 
driver 
for 
injuries 
sustained 
while 
rendering aid to the victim of an automobile accident? 
We answer this question in the affirmative.  We therefore affirm 
the judgment of the circuit court. 
FACTS 
¶4 
Because this case arises on a motion for summary 
judgment we accept the facts pleaded by the plaintiff as true.  
Sawyer v. Midelfort, 227 Wis. 2d 124, 136, 595 N.W.2d 423 
(1999).  The facts alleged by Pinter are as follows. 
¶5 
On February 27, 1997, Stephen Jesmok and Herbert Otto 
negligently caused 
an 
automobile 
collision 
in 
Brookfield, 
Waukesha County.  The collision resulted in injury to a woman 
who was a passenger in Jesmok's vehicle.   
¶6 
Pinter is a firefighter and EMT for the city of 
Brookfield whose job requires him to provide emergency care and 
treatment to victims of automobile accidents in the Brookfield 
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
3 
vicinity.  Pinter has special training and extensive experience 
in extricating injured individuals from automobiles.   
¶7 
Pinter was called to the scene of the collision caused 
by Jesmok and Otto on February 27, 1997.  He responded to the 
emergency in his capacity as an EMT, to provide emergency 
medical assistance to the injured passenger.   
¶8 
The passenger appeared to be suffering from a spinal 
cord injury.  To assist in safely extricating the passenger from 
the vehicle, Pinter was required to maintain traction on the 
passenger's head, neck, and back.  To do so, Pinter had to 
assume an awkward position for a period of time.  As a result of 
maintaining this awkward position, Pinter sustained an inguinal 
hernia, a serious and permanent injury that required surgical 
repair. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶9 
On July 29, 1998, Pinter filed a complaint against 
Jesmok, Otto, and their insurers claiming that his injuries were 
a direct and proximate result of Jesmok and Otto's negligence.  
In his action against the drivers, Pinter seeks compensatory 
damages for severe and permanent injuries; pain, suffering, and 
disability; medical bills; and loss of earning capacity.  The 
worker's compensation carrier who compensated Pinter for his 
injuries is a subrogated plaintiff in Pinter's complaint.   
¶10 The defendants filed motions for summary judgment 
arguing that Pinter's action against the negligent drivers was 
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
4 
barred by Hass and by public policy considerations.1  Hass holds 
that "one who negligently starts a fire is not liable for that 
negligence when it causes injury to a firefighter who comes to 
extinguish the blaze."  Hass, 48 Wis. 2d at 327.   
¶11 The circuit court concluded that the reasoning of Hass 
applied equally to Pinter's cause of action.  The court 
indicated that if Pinter's claims against the drivers were based 
at least in part on separate acts of negligence (that is, 
negligence besides the negligent driving that caused the 
collision) then the claims could proceed.  However, Pinter 
conceded that his claims were based solely on the negligent 
driving that caused the collision.  The court therefore 
dismissed Pinter's claims with prejudice. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶12 Pinter appeals from the circuit court's grant of 
summary judgment to the defendants-respondents.  We review a 
grant of summary judgment independently, using the same method 
as the circuit court.  Sawyer, 227 Wis. 2d at 135.  Summary 
judgment will be granted only when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Id. at 136 (quoting Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 
Wis. 2d 223, 424 N.W.2d 159 (1988)). 
                     
1 The defendants Stephen Jesmok and American Family Mutual 
Insurance Co. did not file a separate brief in support of their 
motion for summary judgment but joined in the arguments set 
forth in the brief submitted by defendants-respondents Herbert 
Otto and Heritage Mutual Insurance Co.  The defendants-
respondents have also aligned their positions in this appeal. 
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
5 
¶13 Summary judgment was granted in this case in reliance 
on Hass, which establishes a public policy limitation on 
liability.  Whether public policy considerations preclude a 
particular cause of action is a question of law, to be 
determined solely by the court.  Hass, 48 Wis. 2d at 326.  
Although it is often better to examine such public policy 
considerations after the facts have been resolved by trial, 
there are cases in which the public policy question is fully 
presented by the pleadings.  Id. at 326-27.  This is such a 
case. 
ANALYSIS 
¶14 Most 
jurisdictions 
in 
the 
United 
States 
limit 
liability in negligence cases under a theory of law commonly 
termed the "firefighter's rule."2  As applied to firefighters, 
the rule limits a firefighter's ability to recover damages for 
injuries sustained while performing his or her duties as a 
firefighter.  In many jurisdictions this rule was originally 
based on the reasoning that a firefighter who enters premises to 
fight a fire is a licensee to whom the owner or occupier of the 
premises owes no duty except to refrain from willful or wanton 
injury.3  As the categories of "invitee" and "licensee" gradually 
                     
2 See generally, Larry D. Scheafer, Annotation, Liability of 
Owner or Occupant of Premises to Firefighter Coming Thereon in 
Discharge of His Duty, 11 A.L.R.4th 597 (1982 and Supp. 1999).   
3 Hopkins v. Medeiros, 724 N.E.2d 336, 341 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2000); Larry D. Scheafer, Annotation, Liability of Owner or 
Occupant of Premises to Firefighter Coming Thereon in Discharge 
of His Duty, 11 A.L.R.4th 597 at § 2 (1982 and Supp. 1999). 
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
6 
have been abolished in tort law,4 some courts turned to the 
doctrine of assumption of risk to support the rule.5  These 
courts reasoned that "'one who has knowingly and voluntarily 
confronted a hazard cannot recover for injuries sustained 
thereby.'" 
 
Thomas 
v. 
Pang, 
811 
P.2d 
821, 
824 
(Haw. 
1991)(quoting Walters v. Sloan, 571 P.2d 609, 612 (Cal. 1977), 
abrogated in part by Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 
347 (Cal. 1994) and superseded in part by statute in Cal. Civil 
Code § 1714.9 (West 1999)).   
¶15 More recently, most courts adopting or adhering to the 
firefighter's rule have justified the rule on public policy 
grounds.  Thomas, 811 P.2d at 824.  Thirty years ago, public 
policy led this court to recognize a limitation on liability in 
a firefighter's negligence action in Hass.  Hass, 48 Wis. 2d at 
326-27.   
¶16 In Wisconsin, even when negligent conduct was a 
substantial 
factor 
in 
causing 
an 
injury, 
public 
policy 
considerations may preclude the injured party from pursuing a 
                     
4 See, e.g., Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 236 
N.W.2d 1 (1975)(abolishing the special immunities applied to 
licensees and invitees in negligence cases and discussing the 
general 
trend 
toward 
abolition 
of 
distinctions 
between 
licensees, invitees, and trespassers).  See also Larry D. 
Scheafer, Annotation, Liability of Owner or Occupant of Premises 
to Firefighter Coming Thereon in Discharge of His Duty, 11 
A.L.R.4th 597 at § 2 n.4 (1982 and Supp. 1999). 
5 See Thomas v. Pang, 811 P.2d 821, 824 (Haw. 1991)(citing 
cases that premised the rule on the assumption of risk 
principle); Wright v. Coleman, 148 Wis. 2d 897, 904, 436 N.W.2d 
864 (1989)(noting that in some jurisdictions the firefighter's 
rule is based on a theory of assumption of risk). 
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
7 
cause of action.  Hass, 48 Wis. 2d at 326.  Recovery may be 
denied when: 
 
"[T]he injury is too remote from the negligence or too 
'wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the 
negligent tort-feasor,' or in retrospect it appears 
too highly extraordinary that the negligence should 
have brought about the harm, or because allowance of 
recovery would place too unreasonable a burden upon 
users of the highway, or be too likely to open the way 
to fraudulent claims, or would 'enter a field that has 
no sensible or just stopping point.'" 
Id. (quoting Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 599, 85 N.W.2d 
345 
(1957)). 
 
Hass 
concluded 
that 
these 
public 
policy 
considerations precluded a firefighter's negligence action for 
injuries sustained while fighting a fire.  Hass, 48 Wis. 2d at 
322-23.   
¶17 The firefighter in Hass was injured in a fire that was 
caused by a railroad company's negligence.  Id. at 326.  The 
Hass court acknowledged that starting a fire under the alleged 
circumstances was negligent, and that such negligence was a 
"substantial factor" in causing the plaintiff's injuries.  Id. 
at 326.   
¶18 Nonetheless, the court barred recovery.  The court 
observed that nearly all fires are caused by negligence.  Id. at 
327.  The court therefore determined that requiring a person who 
negligently starts a fire to pay damages to a firefighter would 
place too great a burden on owners and occupiers of real estate. 
 Id.  In addition, liability would "'enter a field that has no 
sensible or just stopping point.'"  Id.  The court held that 
because 
of 
these 
public 
policy 
considerations, 
"one 
who 
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
8 
negligently starts a fire is not liable for that negligence when 
it causes injury to a firefighter who comes to extinguish the 
blaze."  Id. 
¶19 Pinter argues that the rule in Hass does not apply to 
his case because Hass only bars recovery for negligence in 
"starting a fire and failing to curtail its spread."  See id.  
Pinter emphasizes that all of this court's subsequent cases 
examining Hass have distinguished Hass and have permitted 
recovery.  Pinter urges this court to hold that Hass is limited 
to its literal terms.   
¶20 Pinter is correct in his assertion that thus far Hass 
has not been extended beyond its own facts.   
¶21 The first case that re-examined the rule in Hass was 
Clark v. Corby, 75 Wis. 2d 292, 249 N.W.2d 567 (1977).  Clark 
involved a fire that started in a residence when the owner's son 
drained cans of gasoline into a basement sewer.  Id. at 293.  
The homeowners had built a bedroom in the basement without 
obtaining a building permit, and the bedroom did not conform to 
applicable housing codes.  Id. at 294.  The basement contained 
various 
particularly 
flammable 
items, 
such 
as 
carpeting, 
pillows, paneling, tile, bedding, and paint thinner, the 
combination of which caused a particularly hot fire with thick 
black smoke.  Id.  A firefighter who was injured while 
attempting 
to 
fight 
the 
fire 
sued 
on 
three 
grounds: 
(1) negligence in starting a fire, (2) negligence in failing to 
warn about the special, hidden hazards in the basement, and 
(3) negligence in violating the housing code.  Id. at 295. 
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
9 
¶22 This court held that the firefighter's first cause of 
action, based on negligent starting of the fire, was barred by 
Hass.  Id. at 296.  However, the cause of action based on 
negligent failure to warn about hidden, special dangers could 
proceed to trial.  Id. at 298.  In addition, the cause of action 
based on violation of a housing ordinance could proceed, 
provided that the plaintiff was able to establish that the 
ordinance 
was 
enacted 
to 
protect 
a 
firefighter 
in 
the 
performance of his or her duties.  Id. at 299-300.   
¶23 Thus, although the court in Clark affirmed the basic 
public policy analysis in Hass, it determined that a firefighter 
may pursue a cause of action based on additional acts of 
negligence, other than the initial negligence that caused the 
fire. 
¶24 The next case in which this court considered the rule 
in Hass was Wright v. Coleman, 148 Wis. 2d 897, 904, 436 N.W.2d 
864 (1989).  In that case, a firefighter was injured when he 
slipped 
and 
fell 
on 
the 
defendant's 
icy 
driveway 
while 
attempting to bring a hose to the garage to fight a fire.  Id. 
at 900.  The trial court allowed the claim to proceed to trial. 
 Id.  The plaintiff produced evidence establishing that there 
was no ice anywhere else in the city on that evening and that 
the defendant's son had created the icy patch on the driveway by 
using a garden hose to wash his car.  Id.  Relying on Clark, the 
trial court instructed the jury that the firefighter's action 
could not succeed unless the homeowner had failed to warn the 
firefighter of a "hidden hazard."  Id. at 901. 
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
10
¶25 This 
court 
concluded 
that 
the 
trial 
court's 
instruction was erroneous.  Id. at 902.  The court stated that 
Clark was not "a special rule applicable only for hazards that 
were 'hidden' but a case of inapplicability of the policy 
immunity recognized in Hass . . . ."  Id. at 905.  The court 
described Hass as an exception to the general principles of 
negligence, id. at 907, and observed, "[i]t is only in the 
unusual or very clear case that a court can conclude, as we did 
in Hass, that, despite negligent conduct, as a matter of law, 
i.e., under appropriate policy, there shall be no recovery."  
Id. at 908.  The court then determined that liability might 
exist in the case if under the circumstances a reasonable person 
would have warned the firefighter about the ice.  Id. at 909.   
¶26 Wright, like Clark, clarified that Hass only precludes 
a negligence action when it is based on the initial act of 
negligence that caused the fire and necessitated rescue. 
¶27 The last case in which this court examined the public 
policy analysis in Hass was Hauboldt v. Union Carbide Corp., 160 
Wis. 2d 662, 467 N.W.2d 508 (1991).  The fire in that case was 
caused by a woodburning furnace in a garage.  Id. at 668.  The 
furnace started a fire that ignited spilled gasoline and 
eventually caused other containers of flammable substances in 
the garage to burn and explode.  Id. at 668.   
¶28 A firefighter who responded to the emergency and was 
attempting to extinguish the blaze was seriously injured when an 
acetylene tank exploded.  Id.  The firefighter sued the 
manufacturer of the acetylene tank, arguing that the tank was 
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
11
negligently manufactured and was inherently dangerous.  Id. at 
669.  The manufacturer claimed that liability was barred by the 
firefighter's rule.  Id. at 666-67.   
¶29 This court held that the rule in Hass did not extend 
to causes of action against "manufacturers whose defective 
product directly causes the injury to firefighters during the 
course of a fire, when the danger caused by the defective 
product is not reasonably 
apparent 
to them, 
or a 
risk 
anticipated by them."  Id. at 673.  The court reasoned that none 
of the public policy considerations served by the rule would be 
fulfilled by extending the rule to manufacturers under such 
circumstances.  Id. at 675.   
¶30 Hauboldt follows the same reasoning as Clark and 
Wright; the public policy considerations that barred the cause 
of action in Hass do not bar a cause of action that is based on 
an independent act of negligence.   
¶31 This series of cases shows that the public policy 
limitation in Hass is so limited that it applies in few cases.  
It bars a cause of action only when the sole negligent act is 
the same negligent act that necessitated rescue and therefore 
brought the firefighter to the scene of the emergency.  If the 
cause of action is based on any other negligent act (such as 
negligent failure to warn, negligent violation of an ordinance 
designed to protect the injured party, or negligent manufacture 
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
12
of a dangerous product), public policy does not bar recovery.6  
Based on this precedent, we agree with Pinter that the rule in 
Hass is a narrow limitation on liability.   
¶32 However, we do not agree with Pinter that Hass should 
be limited to its literal terms.  Hass is not an artificial, 
technical rule that applies only to firefighters.  It is an 
application of the standard public policy analysis that applies 
to all tort cases in Wisconsin.  The circuit court recognized 
this: 
 
I can't distinguish the facts of this case from the 
Hass case.  This is not an extension of the theory 
because a man is an EMT.  This is the same rule 
applying in the same circumstances as what has been 
commonly called the fireman's rule.  And I think it 
could be named other things, and I think it applies to 
anyone in a similar capacity. . . .  
 
Absent some act that can be considered negligence in 
itself, the mere fact there was negligence causing the 
accident cannot give rise to collection for or 
liability on the part of these defendants towards Mr. 
Pinter. . . .   
                     
6 In this respect the public policy limitation recognized in 
Hass is different from the "firefighter's rule" recognized in 
some jurisdictions, which precludes recovery even when secondary 
and aggravating acts of negligence are involved.  See, e.g., 
Young v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 569 A.2d 1173, 1178-79 (D.C. 
1990)(declining to recognize an exception to the firefighter's 
rule for willful, wanton acts); Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Elec. 
Supply Co., 415 N.W.2d 178, 189-90 (Mich. 1987)(stating that the 
firefighter's rule "insulates a defendant from liability for 
injuries arising out of the inherent dangers of the profession" 
of a safety officer and determining that "inherent dangers" 
include "alleged negligence relating to the condition of the 
premises").  See also Rennenger v. Pacesetter Co., 558 N.W.2d 
419, 422 (Iowa 1997)(commenting that Wisconsin follows a very 
limited firefighter's rule). 
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
13
¶33 The real issue in this case is whether the public 
policy analysis in Hass is still valid, and if so, whether it 
logically extends to Pinter's negligence action.   
¶34 We first consider whether the public policy analysis 
in Hass is still valid.  Pinter does not explicitly ask this 
court to overturn Hass.  However, Pinter and the amicus curiae 
point out that some jurisdictions have recently abolished the 
"firefighter's rule" by judicial decision or by statute.7  They 
also note that the rule has been the subject of criticism and 
dissent.8 
¶35 The concerns that have led other jurisdictions to 
abandon or reject the so-called "firefighter's rule" do not 
persuade us that the public policy analysis in Hass should be 
rejected.  Many jurisdictions that have criticized or rejected 
                     
7 See Wills v. Bath Excavating and Constr. Co., 829 P.2d 
405, 408-09 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991)(concluding that the Colorado 
Supreme Court has abandoned the firefighter's rule); Hopkins v. 
Medeiros, 724 N.E.2d 336, 343 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (concluding 
that the firefighter's rule has no continuing vitality in 
Massachusetts); Christensen v. Murphy, 678 P.2d 1210 (Or. 
1984)(rejecting the firefighter's rule).  See also Fla. Stat. 
ch. 112.182 (1999)(abolishing the firefighter's rule); Minn. 
Stat. § 604.06 (1999)(same).  
8 See, e.g., Edwards v. Honeywell, Inc., 50 F.3d 484, 491-92 
(7th Cir. 1995); Waggoner v. Troutman Oil Co., 894 S.W.2d 913, 
916-19 (Ark. 1995)(Roaf, J., dissenting); Walters v. Sloan, 571 
P.2d 609, 614-20 (Cal. 1977)(Tobriner, Acting C.J., dissenting), 
abrogated in part by Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 
347 (Cal. 1994) and superseded in part by statute in Cal. Civil 
Code § 1714.9 (West 1999); Thomas v. Pang, 811 P.2d 821, 826-28 
(Haw. 1991) (Padgett, J., dissenting); David L. Strauss, Where 
There's Smoke, There's the Firefighter's Rule:  Containing the 
Conflagration After One Hundred Years, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 2031, 
2059-2062. 
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
14
their version of the "firefighter's rule" have noted that the 
licensee/invitee distinction that was the original basis for the 
rule has fallen out of the law.  See David L. Strauss, Comment, 
Where There's Smoke There's the Firefighter's Rule: Containing 
the Conflagration After One Hundred Years, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 
2031, 2034-35; Wills v. Bath Excavating and Constr. Co., 829 
P.2d 405, 408-09 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Hopkins v. Medeiros, 724 
N.E.2d 336, 341 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); Christensen v. Murphy, 
678 P.2d 1210, 1214 (Or. 1984).  However, this distinction was 
never the basis of the public policy analysis in Hass.  See 
Hass, 48 Wis. 2d at 325.   
¶36 Similarly, jurisdictions that relied on the assumption 
of risk doctrine to justify the "firefighter's rule" have 
abandoned the rule under comparative negligence principles.  See 
Wills, 829 P.2d at 409 (concluding that the firefighter's rule 
has 
been 
abandoned); 
Christensen, 
678 
P.2d 
at 
1216-18 
(abandoning the firefighter's rule).  See also Thomas, 811 P.2d 
at 824-25 (noting that the widespread abolition of contributory 
negligence as a total bar to recovery has caused courts to 
question the firefighter's rule).  However, Hass was never 
premised on the idea that a firefighter's assumption of the 
risks inherent in his or her profession makes the firefighter's 
negligence greater than the alleged tortfeasor's as a matter of 
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
15
law. 
 
Instead, 
Hass 
was 
based 
squarely 
on 
Wisconsin's 
traditional public policy analysis in negligence cases.9 
¶37 The 
most 
recent 
jurisdiction 
to 
reject 
the 
"firefighter's rule" did so on the grounds that the rule was in 
conflict with a state statute that specifically granted a right 
to file suit.  Hopkins, 724 N.E.2d at 343.  No such statute 
exists in Wisconsin.  In the thirty years since Hass, the 
Wisconsin Legislature has done nothing to modify or abolish the 
public policy limitation established in Hass. 
¶38 We are convinced that the public policy analysis in 
Hass remains sound.  It is still true that nearly all fires are 
caused by negligence.  See Hass, 48 Wis. 2d at 327.  It is 
therefore still true that permitting firefighters to pursue 
negligence actions based on the negligent act of starting a fire 
would place an unreasonable burden on the owners and occupiers 
of premises and would enter a field with no sensible or just 
stopping point.  See id.   
¶39 Fundamentally, the rule recognized in Hass is an 
expression of public policy because it prohibits a firefighter 
                     
9 We reject Pinter's argument that the rescue doctrine 
stated in Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525, 546-47, 259 N.W.2d 
672 (1977) authorizes recovery in his case.  The rescue doctrine 
in Cords absolves a rescuer of responsibility for his or her own 
contributory negligence, under the theory that the sight of 
another person in danger prompts rescue, even if attempting the 
rescue is obviously dangerous.  Id. at 546.  The defendants-
respondents do not argue that Pinter's contributory negligence 
outweighs their negligence as a matter of law.  Instead, they 
argue that the public policy reasoning in Hass applies equally 
to Pinter's cause of action and bars liability.  Cords did not 
overrule the public policy reasoning in Hass.  
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
16
from "'complaining about the negligence that creates the very 
need for his or her employment.'"  Hauboldt, 160 Wis. 2d at 676 
(quoting Mignone v. Fieldcrest Mills, 556 A.2d 35, 39 (R.I. 
1989)).  As stated by the Supreme Court of Hawaii: 
 
The very purpose of the fire fighting profession is to 
confront danger.  Fire fighters are hired, trained, 
and compensated to deal with dangerous situations that 
are often caused by negligent conduct or acts.  "[I]t 
offends public policy to say that a citizen invites 
private liability merely because he happens to create 
a need for those public services."  
Thomas, 811 P.2d at 825.  Permitting firefighters to pursue 
actions like the one in Hass is therefore not consistent with 
the relationship of the fire fighting profession to the public. 
 See id.  It would contravene public policy to permit a 
firefighter to recover damages from an individual who has 
already 
been 
taxed 
to 
provide 
compensation 
to 
injured 
firefighters.  Hauboldt, 160 Wis. 2d at 677 (citing Mignone, 556 
A.2d at 39).   
¶40 In sum, we reaffirm the public policy reasoning set 
forth in Hass.  The limitation stated in Hass has been the law 
of Wisconsin for thirty years, and it is still good law.   
¶41 The remaining question is whether the public policy 
reasoning in Hass logically extends to Pinter's cause of action. 
 Pinter argues that Hass's reasoning does not logically extend 
to his case because of two differences between his case and 
Hass:  (1) Pinter is an EMT rather than a firefighter, and 
(2) Pinter's cause of action is based on negligent driving 
rather than the negligent starting of a fire. 
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
17
¶42 First, Pinter and the amicus curiae both contend that 
EMTs are readily distinguishable from firefighters, and that the 
public policy considerations that bar firefighters from recovery 
should not bar EMTs from recovery under analogous circumstances. 
 They point to other jurisdictions that have declined to extend 
the "firefighter's rule" to emergency medical personnel like 
EMTs.10  These courts have reasoned that unlike firefighters, who 
are specially employed and trained to confront danger, emergency 
medical personnel are not specially trained or employed to deal 
with dangerous situations.  See Kowalski v. Gratopp, 442 N.W.2d 
682, 684 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)(paramedic) ("The paramedic's 
occupation is one which may peripherally involve hazards, but 
they are not employed, trained, or paid specifically to confront 
those hazards."); Krause v. U.S. Truck Co., 787 S.W.2d 708, 713 
(Mo. 1990)(ambulance attendant) ("[S]ociety does not expect 
                     
10 See 
Heck 
v. 
Robey, 
659 
N.E.2d 
498, 
505 
(Ind. 
1995)(paramedic); Kowalski v. Gratopp, 442 N.W.2d 682 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1989)(paramedic); Krause v. U.S. Truck Co., 787 S.W.2d 708 
(Mo. 1990)(ambulance attendant); Lees v. Lobosco, 625 A.2d 573 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)(EMT). 
It is interesting to note that each of these cases would 
have been able to proceed in Wisconsin regardless of the 
firefighter's rule, because they all involved injuries that were 
caused by independent acts of negligence. Heck, 659 N.E.2d at 
500 (the driver being rescued "flailed and kicked in a combative 
manner during the rescue"); Kowalski, 442 N.W.2d at 683 (while 
on his way to pick up a patient, the paramedic slipped and fell 
on an icy walkway); Krause, 787 S.W.2d at 710 (after arriving at 
the scene of a multi-vehicle accident, the ambulance attendant 
was struck by another vehicle); Lees, 625 A.2d at 574 (same).  
Clark, Wright, and Hauboldt make clear that Wisconsin's version 
of the firefighter's rule does not extend to such claims.   
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
18
ambulance attendants to throw themselves in harm's way."); Lees 
v. Lobosco, 625 A.2d 573, 576 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1993)(EMT) (quoting Krause and citing Kowalski).   
¶43 This reasoning does not persuade us that the public 
policy limitation in Hass should not extend to Pinter's claim.  
Firefighting and emergency 
medical 
assistance 
are closely 
related professions; like Pinter, some EMTs also serve as 
firefighters.  Members of both professions have special training 
and experience that prepare them to provide assistance under 
dangerous 
emergency 
conditions. 
 
Persons 
entering 
either 
profession know that they will be expected to provide aid and 
protection to others in these hazardous circumstances.  In 
short, both EMTs and firefighters are professional rescuers who 
are specially trained and employed to conduct rescue operations 
in dangerous emergencies.   See Maltman v. Sauer, 530 P.2d 254, 
257 (Wash. 1975)(holding that a professional rescuer may not 
recover damages for an injury that is "the result of a hazard 
generally recognized as being within the scope of dangers 
identified with the particular rescue operation"). 
¶44 The facts of Pinter's case illustrate this point.  
Pinter 
had 
helped 
to 
extricate 
injured 
individuals 
from 
automobiles on over two hundred occasions.  Pinter's injury 
occurred because he was required to maintain an awkward position 
for an extended period of time to avoid aggravating the 
passenger's spinal injuries.  Thus, because of his position as a 
specially trained, experienced EMT, Pinter was asked to put 
himself in harm's way for the protection of another, more 
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
19
seriously endangered individual.  We conclude that EMTs, like 
firefighters, are specially employed and trained to confront 
danger. 
¶45 Pinter's second effort to distinguish his case from 
Hass focuses on the fact that Pinter's cause of action is based 
on negligent driving and not on the negligent starting of a 
fire.   
¶46 We are not persuaded.  Like fires, nearly all 
automobile accidents are the result of negligence.  Pinter 
suggests that the possibility that the negligent drivers 
violated the motor vehicle code provides a separate basis for 
recovery.  However, "the protection of a safety statute or 
ordinance is extended only to those whom the enactment was 
intended to protect."  Clark, 75 Wis. 2d at 299.  Unlike the 
municipal housing code provisions at issue in Clark, motor 
vehicle code provisions are not arguably designed to protect 
rescuers in the performance of their duties.  See Clark, 75 Wis. 
2d at 300.  We conclude that an automobile collision is 
equivalent to a fire under the public policy analysis in Hass. 
¶47 In sum, we can find no logical reason that the public 
policy analysis set forth in Hass should not extend to Pinter's 
cause of action.  Instead, we conclude that public policy bars 
Pinter's recovery.  In the same way that allowing a firefighter 
to recover in Hass would have placed an unreasonable burden on 
the 
railroad 
company 
that 
negligently 
caused 
the 
fire, 
permitting an EMT to recover under the circumstances alleged by 
Pinter would place an unreasonable burden on drivers who 
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
20
negligently cause collisions.  See Hass, 48 Wis. 2d at 327.  The 
injury that Pinter sustained is simply too remote from the 
initial 
acts 
of 
negligence 
that 
caused 
the 
collision.  
Permitting Pinter's action to proceed would enter a field with 
no sensible or just stopping point.   
¶48 Hass would not bar Pinter's cause of action if Pinter 
sought recovery on the basis of some act or omission other than 
the initial negligence that necessitated emergency medical 
assistance. 
 
However, 
Pinter 
concedes 
no 
secondary 
or 
aggravating 
negligence 
supports 
recovery.11 
 
We 
therefore 
conclude that public policy bars Pinter's cause of action.  
¶49 Pinter 
argues 
that 
extending 
the 
public 
policy 
limitation in Hass to an EMT claim will result in "a flood of 
challenges to traditional negligence claims whenever a public 
employee is injured."  (Appellant's Brief at 22.) 
¶50 Our holding should have no such effect.  We do not 
broaden the underlying public policy analysis in Hass, which has 
been the law in Wisconsin for thirty years.  We merely hold that 
when an EMT is called to the scene of an automobile collision in 
his professional capacity, and the EMT sustains an injury while 
performing his duty to provide emergency care, public policy 
prohibits the EMT from maintaining a cause of action based on 
the negligent driving that caused the collision.  We emphasize 
that our public policy analysis is based on the fact that the 
                     
11 We 
have 
already 
rejected 
Pinter's 
suggestion 
that 
violation of the motor vehicle code provides a basis for 
recovery under the circumstances of his case. 
No. 
99-0869 
 
 
21
only negligence Pinter complains of is the same negligence that 
caused the initial emergency and resulted in rescue personnel 
being called to the scene.  Under these limited circumstances, 
public policy bars Pinter's cause of action.  
¶51 In conclusion, we answer the certified question in the 
affirmative: the firefighter's rule, as adopted in Hass, 48 Wis. 
2d 321, bars an emergency medical technician (EMT) from pursuing 
a cause of action against a negligent driver for injuries 
sustained while rendering aid to the victim of an automobile 
accident.  However, we emphasize that in Wisconsin the so-called 
"firefighter's rule" in Hass is merely one application of the 
standard public policy analysis that applies to all negligence 
claims. 
¶52 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit 
court. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 99-0869.ssa 
 
1 
¶53 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  
The majority opinion attempts to fit this case within the public 
policy considerations for 
denying 
liability 
for 
negligent 
conduct, which are the grounds used to explain the firefighter 
rule in Wisconsin.12  The public policy applied in the 
firefighter case was that imposing liability would place "too 
great a burden on homeowners, and other occupiers of real 
estate . . . [and] would permit the law of negligence to enter a 
field that has no sensible or just stopping point" (citation 
omitted).  Hass v. Chicago N.W. Ry., 48 Wis. 2d 321, 327, 179 
N.W.2d 885 (1970).   
¶54 The 
majority 
opinion 
simply 
concludes, 
without 
explanation or justification, that permitting the EMT in this 
case to recover damages places an unreasonable burden on drivers 
who negligently cause collisions; that the EMT's injury is 
simply too remote from the initial acts of negligence that 
caused the collision; and that permitting the action to proceed 
would enter a field with no sensible or just stopping point.  
Majority op. at ¶ 47.   I am not persuaded.  Negligence law 
imposes liability on negligent drivers for greater burdens and 
more remote injuries than would be imposed for injury to the 
                     
12 The firefighter rule in other states developed from the 
doctrine of assumption of risk and the law of premises 
liability.  Some states have relied on different public policy 
considerations than those relied on in Wisconsin cases.  See 
Joseph B. Conder, Annotation, Application of "Fireman Rule" to 
Bar 
Recovery 
by 
Emergency 
Medical 
Personnel 
Injured 
in 
Responding to, or at Scene of, Emergency, 89 A.L.R.4th 1079, 
§ 2(a) (1991).  
No. 99-0869.ssa 
 
2 
EMT.  The usual rules applicable to negligence actions suffice 
to address the majority's concerns.  
¶55 The majority opinion applies the public policy doctrine 
underlying the firefighter rule to firefighters and EMTs because 
"[m]embers of both professions have special training and 
experience that prepare them to provide assistance under 
dangerous emergency conditions."  Majority op. at ¶ 43.  The 
rule the majority opinion adopts seems to apply to a host of 
paid employees and volunteers, both in public and private 
service.  Are doctors or nurses who work in emergency rooms or 
in ambulances barred from recovery for injuries caused by the 
negligence of a tortfeasor?  Are teachers who assist children 
under dangerous emergency conditions barred from recovery for 
injuries caused by a negligent pupil?  Are private-sector safety 
supervisors trained in emergency responses to toxic spills or 
petroleum fire-fighting barred from recovery for injuries caused 
by a negligent tortfeasor?13 
¶56 The 
number 
of 
factual 
scenarios 
to 
which 
the 
majority's reasoning can be applied is troubling.  The holding 
in this case is contrary to the general rule that cases in which 
a causally negligent tortfeasor is relieved of liability are 
                     
13 See Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347, 350 
(Cal. 1994) (distinguishing firefighters and police officers and 
holding that the firefighter rule did not apply to private 
safety employees). 
No. 99-0869.ssa 
 
3 
infrequent and present unusual and extreme considerations.14  I 
do not think that the law of negligence or that public policy 
considerations favor holding that a tortfeasor has complete 
immunity from liability based on the plaintiff's occupation. 
¶57 For the reasons stated, I dissent. 
¶58 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
                     
14 See Schlomer v. Perina, 169 Wis. 2d 247, 253, 485 N.W.2d 
399 (1992); Stewart v. Wulf, 85 Wis. 2d 461, 479, 271 N.W.2d 79 
(1978).