Title: Southern Environmental Law Center v. N.C. Railroad Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 453A20
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: August 13, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-84 
No. 453A20 
Filed 13 August 2021 
SOUTHERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTER 
 
 
v. 
THE NORTH CAROLINA RAILROAD COMPANY, and MICHAEL WALTERS, 
JACOB F. ALEXANDER III, WILLIAM V. BELL, MARTIN BRACKETT, LIZ 
CRABILL, WILLIAM H. KINCHELOE, JAMES E. NANCE, JOHN M. PIKE, 
GEORGE ROUNTREE III, FRANKLIN ROUSE, NINA SZLOSBERG-LANDIS, 
AND MICHAEL L. WEISEL, in their official capacities as members of the Board of 
Directors of the North Carolina Railroad Company 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a)(2) from an order and opinion entered 
on 20 August 2020 by Judge Michael L. Robinson, Special Superior Court Judge for 
Complex Business Cases, in Superior Court, Wake County, after the case was 
designated a mandatory complex business case by the Chief Justice pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(b).  Heard in the Supreme Court on 19 May 2021. 
 
Kimberly Hunter, Ramona H. McGee, and Maia Hutt for plaintiff-appellant.  
 
James P. Cooney III and Rebecca C. Fleishman for defendant-appellees. 
 
 
ERVIN, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
In this case, we are called upon to decide whether defendant North Carolina 
Railroad Company is an “agency” or “subdivision” of “North Carolina government” for 
purposes of the Public Records Act, N.C.G.S. § 132-1.  In order to resolve this issue, 
we are required to interpret the pertinent provisions of the Public Records Act, in 
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light of the totality of the circumstances, in order to determine whether the state 
government exercises such substantial control over the Railroad that it is necessarily 
an agency or subdivision of state government.  After carefully weighing all of the 
relevant facts and circumstances, we determine that the Railroad has been an 
independent, private corporation since it was chartered in 1849 and that, while the 
State does exert a considerable degree of control over the Railroad, it primarily 
exercises this authority in its capacity as the Railroad’s sole shareholder rather than 
in its capacity as a sovereign.  As a result, we affirm the trial court’s order. 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
A. History and Current Operations of the Railroad 
¶ 2 
 
The Railroad, which was chartered by an act of the General Assembly in 1849, 
An Act to incorporate the North Carolina Rail Road Company, ch. LXXXII, § 1, 1848–
1849 N.C. Laws, 138, 139, is the oldest existing North Carolina corporation.  Although 
interest in building a railroad in North Carolina surfaced as early as the 1820’s and 
even though the construction of such a facility was delayed for over twenty years by 
high construction costs and the fact that “[p]rivate capital was inadequate,” “the 
legislature long refused to tax the public for state aid.”  Trelease, Allen W., The North 
Carolina Railroad, 1849-1871, and the Modernization of North Carolina, 14 (1991).  
Throughout this period, the proponents of a railroad argued that the availability of 
such a facility was critical to the improvement of North Carolina’s notoriously poor 
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internal transportation system and expressed concern that, without a railroad, 
“North Carolina’s ports would continue to languish while her neighbors waxed rich 
and powerful at her expense” and that the State “would remain what many of her 
citizens ruefully admitted her to be, a backwater, the Rip Van Winkle State.”  Id. 
¶ 3 
 
Although many people opposed the idea of State ownership of a business 
enterprise, the State’s involvement in the development, construction, and operation 
of a railroad was “the product of state pride and economic necessity.”  Trelease, Allen 
W., The Passive Voice:  The State and the North Carolina Railroad, 1849-1871, 61 
The North Carolina Historical Review 174, 175 (1984).  In view of the fact that the 
proposed railroad had an estimated construction cost of three million dollars and the 
fact that “[n]o one believed that private investors in the state would or could subscribe 
that much money,” railroad advocates believed that “[c]hief reliance would have to be 
placed on the public sector, primarily the state.”  Id. at 177. On the other hand, 
railroad critics “demanded most commonly that the state turn over control of the road 
to its private stockholders, whose enlightened self-interest would quickly maximize 
earnings and dividends.”  Id. at 175.  According to the Railroad, “[t]he working model 
devised was a public-private entity structured as a private business corporation.” 
¶ 4 
 
As an initial matter, the State pledged to contribute two million dollars to the 
cost of building the proposed railroad, with this amount to be paid once private 
investors had pledged the remaining one million dollars.  Id. at 177.  After 
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construction of the railroad began, however, it became apparent that the completion 
of the project would require another one million dollars, with the State ultimately 
agreeing to provide the needed additional funds for the project.  Id. at 178. 
¶ 5 
 
The Railroad’s original charter allowed the Governor to appoint eight of the 
twelve members of the Railroad’s board.  Id.  According to an amended charter that 
was approved by the board in 1855, the State held three-quarters of the Railroad’s 
stock and an equivalent number of voting shares in corporate elections.  Id. at 179.  
However, “[t]he state’s power was exercised very lightly.”  Id. at 180.  More 
specifically, “[a]lthough politics played a large role in directorship appointments, it 
almost never intruded on operational or financial matters,” so that, as a general 
proposition, “[s]tate control was unobtrusive.”  Trelease, Allen W., A Southern 
Railroad at War: The North Carolina Railroad and the Confederacy, 164 Railroad 
History 5, 5 (1991). 
¶ 6 
 
In 1997, the General Assembly authorized the State to buy out the remaining 
privately held shares of Railroad stock.   An Act to Make Appropriations for Current 
Operations and for Capital Improvements for State Departments, Institutions, and 
Agencies, and for Other Purposes [hereinafter 1997 Budget Appropriation], ch. 443 
§ 32.30, 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 1344, 1842–44.  In 1998, the State loaned the Railroad 
sixty-one million dollars to complete this stock purchase transaction.  The Railroad 
repaid the principal amount of this loan to the State over a period of five years, during 
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the first two of which it paid interest on the loan, after which the General Assembly 
enacted legislation which provided that interest would no longer accrue on the 
principal balance.  As a result of the buyout, the State became the only holder of 
voting shares in the Railroad by 1998 and became the Railroad’s sole shareholder in 
2006. 
¶ 7 
 
After the approval of the purchase of the remaining privately held shares by 
the State in 1997, all of the Railroad’s directors have been appointed by the State.  
Id. at 1843–44.  At present, the Railroad’s board consists of thirteen directors, seven 
of whom are appointed by the Governor, three of whom are appointed by the General 
Assembly upon the recommendation of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
and three of whom are appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation 
of the President Pro Tempore of the Senate.  N.C.G.S. § 124-15(a) (2019).  Of the 
seven gubernatorial appointees, one must be a member of the Board of 
Transportation and one must be either the Secretary of Commerce or the Secretary’s 
designee.  Id.  The Railroad cannot sell, lease, mortgage, or otherwise encumber its 
property without board approval.  Id. § 124-15(b). 
¶ 8 
 
Consistently with the requirements of Chapter 55 of the North Carolina 
General Statutes, the Railroad operates pursuant to a set of corporate bylaws.  
Although the Governor does appoint a majority of the members of the board, the 
board does not have to obtain approval from the Governor or any other state official 
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before taking actions such as establishing a budget or selling property.  In 2019, the 
Governor sent a letter to the Railroad asking to be provided with the information 
required by N.C.G.S. § 124-17, additional information relating to the actions that had 
been taken at board meetings, and the contents of trackage rights agreements and 
requesting that, “as the shareholders’ representative,” “the Board refrain from 
engaging in any real estate transactions until further notice.”  Although the board 
complied with the Governor’s request for information, it “continued to do business in 
[its] real estate transactions” while “ke[eping the Governor’s office] abreast of the 
negotiations” relating to a specific real estate transaction in which the Governor had 
expressed interest.  All of the members of the Railroad’s board testified that they cast 
independent votes during board meetings and act independently of the will of the 
Governor or the General Assembly.1 
¶ 9 
 
At present, the Railroad owns approximately 317 miles of railroad trackage 
that runs from Charlotte to Morehead City.  The Railroad holds this property in its 
own corporate name and pays property taxes to the sixteen counties through which 
its tracks run.  The Railroad’s revenue is derived from a trackage rights agreement 
 
1 At least one board member testified that he had “never–in [his] entire time on the 
Board . . . gotten directions from” or “been directed to do something by anybody, either 
legislatively or executive branch,” while another testified that no elected official, member or 
agent of the General Assembly, or representative of the Department of Transportation or the 
Department of Commerce had ever directed him to vote a certain way during a board 
meeting. 
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that it has with Norfolk Southern, a private railroading entity that operates using 
the Railroad’s property.  In addition, the Railroad generates revenue through utility 
encroachment fees, the proceeds from leasing real property, and investment earnings.  
The Railroad’s stated mission is to “develop the railroad’s unique assets for the good 
of the people of North Carolina” “by enabling freight to grow business, expanding rail 
to move people and investing in North Carolina.” 
¶ 10 
 
The General Assembly directed the Railroad to pay a one-time dividend of 
$15,500,000 to the State, in its capacity as the Railroad’s sole shareholder, in 2013.  
An Act to Make Base Budget Appropriations for Current Operations of State 
Departments, Institutions, and Agencies, and for Other Purposes [hereinafter 2013 
Budget Appropriation], S.L. 2013-360, § 34.14(f), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 995, 1340.  In 
addition, the 2013 legislation required the Railroad to submit annual reports to the 
General Assembly that included information concerning its strategic and capital 
investment plans; its anticipated dividends for the next three fiscal years; and a 
description of its business and subsidiaries, the markets in which it operates, and the 
properties that it owns.  Id. § 34.14(d) at 1339–40. 
¶ 11 
 
Although the Railroad pays property taxes to the counties in which it owns 
property, it does not pay property taxes to the State.  The Railroad does, however, 
pay franchise taxes to the State.  In spite of the fact that it files a federal income tax 
return, it does not pay federal taxes because its revenues qualify as “income derived 
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from . . . the exercise of any essential governmental function and accruing to a State.”  
26 U.S.C. § 115.  The State University Railroad Company, which is a for-profit 
subsidiary of the Railroad, pays both federal and state income taxes. 
¶ 12 
 
The Railroad works closely with the Department of Transportation and 
communicates frequently with Department employees concerning transportation-
related matters.  In the past, the Department of Transportation has made 
investments using federal and state funds to improve the Railroad’s corridor.  
According to the Railroad, these monies constitute a “capital contribution to the 
company by the shareholder.” 
B. Procedural History 
¶ 13 
 
In 2018, plaintiff Southern Environmental Law Center was one of several 
organizations advocating for the construction of the Durham-Orange light rail transit 
project, a 17.7-mile system that would have provided an additional mass transit 
connection between Durham and Chapel Hill.  The proposed light rail project would 
have utilized facilities adjacent to certain existing railroad trackage and other real 
property that the Railroad owned in downtown Durham.  In 2019, the Railroad and 
certain other entities declined to sign a cooperative agreement that would have 
allowed the light rail project to move forward.  After the collapse of the proposed 
cooperative agreement, the project’s board voted to cease further efforts toward the 
completion of the light rail project.  On 23 May 2019, SELC, acting in reliance upon 
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the Public Records Act, submitted a request to defendant Scott M. Saylor, president 
of the Railroad, seeking to inspect all of the records in the Railroad’s possession 
relating to the light rail project that had been generated on or after 1 January 2018.  
The Railroad declined to provide the requested records on the grounds that it was not 
subject to the Public Records Act. 
¶ 14 
 
On 1 July 2019, the SELC filed a complaint in the Superior Court, Wake 
County, against, Mr. Saylor; the Railroad; and Michael Walters, Jacob F. Alexander, 
III, William V. Bell, Martin Brackett, Liz Crabill, William H. Kincheloe, James E. 
Nance, John M. Pike, George Rountree, III, Franklin Rouse, Nina Szlosberg-Landis, 
and Michael L. Weisel, in their official capacities as members of the Railroad’s board 
of directors, in which it requested the entry of an order declaring that the Railroad 
was an agency of the State of North Carolina for purposes of the Public Records Act, 
declaring that the records that SELC had requested from the Railroad constituted 
public records, and ordering the Railroad to make those records available for 
inspection by SELC.  On 2 August 2019, defendants filed a motion seeking the entry 
of judgment on the pleadings in their favor, which the trial court denied on 11 
September 2019. 
¶ 15 
 
After the discovery process had been completed, the parties filed cross-motions 
seeking the entry of summary judgment in their favor, with both parties having 
acknowledged that an examination of the record did not reveal the issue of any 
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genuine issue of material fact and that the sole issue before the trial court was 
“whether, as a matter of law, the [Railroad] is an agency of the State for purposes of 
the Public Records Act.”  On 20 August 2020, the trial court entered an order granting 
summary judgment in favor of defendants. 
¶ 16 
 
In reaching this result, the trial court began by describing the establishment 
and subsequent operations of the Railroad before discussing the decisions of the Court 
of Appeals in News & Observer Publ’g. Co. v. Wake Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., 55 N.C. App. 
1, 7 (1981), and Chatfield v. Wilmington Hous. Fin. and Dev. Inc., 166 N.C. App. 703 
(2004), both of which addressed the issue of whether certain entities were subject to 
the Public Records Act.  According to the trial court, “the facts of neither case [we]re 
substantially similar to the unique situation before the court [in this case]—a private 
corporation whose sole shareholder is the State of North Carolina; therefore, a 
comparison of these two cases to the facts of this case [was] insufficient” to permit a 
determination of whether the Railroad was a government agency or subdivision. 
¶ 17 
 
After concluding that the ultimate issue that it faced in this case hinged “on 
whether the [Railroad was] subject to provisions of the Public Records Act, a statute 
duly enacted by the General Assembly of North Carolina,” the trial court reasoned 
that it “ha[d] a responsibility to consider whether the General Assembly intended for 
the [Railroad] to be considered a government agency for purposes of the Act.”  In 
conducting the required inquiry, the trial court identified “several instances in which 
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the General Assembly ha[d] seemingly expressed its intent that the [Railroad] should 
not be considered an agency of the State,” such as the fact that N.C.G.S. § 124-12 
authorized the Railroad to exercise the power of eminent domain under the statutory 
provisions related to private condemnors rather than public condemnors.  In addition, 
the trial court pointed out that “the fact that the [Railroad] has to qualify for an 
exemption in order for its taxable gross income to be excluded from the Internal 
Revenue Code is further indication that the [Railroad] is not an agency of the State” 
on the theory that state government agencies “are not subject to federal taxation to 
begin with.”  In the same vein, the trial court determined that the fact that the 
Secretary of Commerce was statutorily required to serve as a member of the 
Railroad’s board provided further evidence that the Railroad was not a government 
agency in light of the constitutional and statutory provisions that are intended to 
limit double office-holding. 
¶ 18 
 
The trial court further noted that legislation enacted in 2013, which required 
the Railroad to make an annual report to the General Assembly, provided additional 
grounds for believing that the General Assembly did not intend for the Railroad to be 
subject to the Public Records Act.  2013 Budget Appropriation, S.L. 2013-360, § 34.14, 
2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1138–42.  The 2013 legislation rested upon a study completed 
by the General Assembly’s Program Evaluation Division,2 an independent entity that 
 
2 N.C.G.S. § 120-36.11 provides that the Program Evaluation Division 
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conducts research for the General Assembly, which found that the Railroad was “not 
subject to the State’s public records law.”  After highlighting the Railroad’s corporate 
status, the trial court expressed concern that “equating majority, or sole, ownership 
with degree of supervisory control would, in effect, collapse the [Railroad]’s corporate 
personhood” on the theory that a corporation, even one with a single owner, is an 
entity that is distinct from its shareholders.  For that reason, the trial court concluded 
that the SELC was essentially asking it to ignore the Railroad’s corporate structure, 
an action that the trial court did not believe itself authorized to take.  In light of its 
determinations that the Railroad “operates as an independent corporate entity” and 
that the General Assembly had failed on multiple occasions to declare the Railroad a 
public agency, the trial court concluded that, since the Railroad was not an agency of 
the State, it was not subject to the Public Records Act.  The SELC noted an appeal 
from the trial court’s order to this Court. 
C. Parties’ Arguments 
 
 
is established as a staff agency of the General Assembly.  The 
purpose of the [Program Evaluation Division] is to assist the 
General Assembly in fulfilling its responsibility to oversee 
government functions by providing an independent, objective 
source of information to be used in evaluating whether programs 
or activities of a State agency, or programs or activities of a non-
State entity conducted or provided using State funds, are 
operated and delivered in the most effective and efficient 
manner and in accordance with law. 
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¶ 19 
 
In seeking relief from the trial court’s order before this Court, the SELC begins 
by arguing that the Railroad should be deemed to be subject to the Public Records 
Act on the grounds that it performs important public and government functions, that 
the State owns one hundred percent of the Railroad’s stock, and that the Railroad 
“was formed to enhance the economic well-being of the State and its citizens as a 
whole.”  In discussing the nine factors enumerated by the Court of Appeals in News 
& Observer, 55 N.C. App. at 11, the SELC asserts that, when each of these factors is 
properly evaluated in light of the record that was developed before the trial court in 
this case, the resulting analysis “establish[es] the State’s substantial degree of 
supervision and control” over the Railroad.  More specifically, the SELC argues that: 
(1) the State selects all of the Railroad’s directors; (2) the State must approve all 
substantive amendments to the Railroad’s articles of incorporation; (3) the State 
provided the primary source of funding for the initial construction of the Railroad, 
loaned sixty-one million dollars to the Railroad at the time that the remaining shares 
of that entity came into State ownership in 1998, and has continued to invest in the 
Railroad; (4) the Railroad is required to transfer its assets to the State upon 
dissolution; (5) revenue collected by the Railroad is to be used “for the public good”; 
(6) the Railroad’s records are subject to government audit pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 124-
17; (7) the Railroad must make a report concerning its receipts, expenditures, debts, 
leases, sales, property acquisitions, sales of stock, and more to the State pursuant to 
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N.C.G.S. § 124-17; (8) the State reviews the Railroad’s investment plan and has 
influence upon the Railroad’s annual budget by virtue of the fact that two appointees 
to positions in the Governor’s administration are required to serve on the Railroad’s 
board; and (9) the State has other means to control the Railroad’s activities, including 
the fact that the Governor has the ability to appoint members of the board and the 
fact that the Railroad’s “stated purpose is to serve North Carolina rather than 
generate profit.” 
¶ 20 
 
In light of the substantial degree of control that the State exercises over the 
Railroad, the SELC argues that the trial court’s decision that the Railroad was not 
subject to the Public Records Act conflicts with News & Observer and Chatfield.  In 
the SELC’s view, the fact that the Railroad has a separate corporate existence does 
not make the Railroad a distinct entity from the State, which is “different from a 
traditional private shareholder,” rendering the Railroad “a unique entity, with 
unique powers and responsibilities owed to its citizens as a sovereign.”  According to 
the SELC, the issue of “why the State exerts control [over the Railroad] is less 
important than the substance of the control,” with the extensive degree of control that 
the State exercises over the Railroad being sufficient to make the Railroad the 
functional equivalent of an agency of the State. 
¶ 21 
 
The SELC disputes the validity of the trial court’s analysis of the relevant 
legislative intent by arguing that the trial court erroneously examined legislative 
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materials other than the Public Records Act in the course of determining that the 
Railroad was not subject to the Public Records Act.  According to the SELC, the trial 
court’s determination that the Railroad is not an agency of the State “as a general 
matter” and “for all purposes” is irrelevant to the issue that is before us in this case 
on the theory that the trial court should have focused upon the issue of whether the 
Railroad was an agency of the State for purposes of the Public Records Act rather 
than whether it was an agency of the State for all purposes.  The SELC argues that 
the Program Evaluation Division’s conclusion that the Railroad was “not subject to 
the State’s public records law” was nothing more than an “unconsidered statement 
by staff in a report prepared decades after the Public Records Act” that “warrants no 
deference and does not come close to constituting legislative intent,” with “[f]ootnotes 
in legislative research reports [not being] how law is made in North Carolina.”  
Finally, the SELC contends that the people’s power to inspect government records 
under the Public Records Act is derived from the constitutional principle that all 
governmental power originates “from the people,” N.C. Const. art. I § 2, and that the 
people of North Carolina “shall not be taxed or made subject to the payment of any 
impost or duty without the consent of themselves or their representatives in the 
General Assembly, freely given.” N.C. Const. art. I § 8.  As a result, the SELC argues 
that the citizens of North Carolina “must have access to records of the railroad 
company they own.” 
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¶ 22 
 
In seeking to persuade us to uphold the trial court’s order, defendants argue 
that the State does not exercise sufficient control over the Railroad to warrant a 
finding that the Railroad is a public agency under the factors discussed in News & 
Observer and Chatfield.  Defendants note that Chatfield held that “an entity’s stated 
purpose of performing a function that is of use to the general public, without more, is 
insufficient to make the Public Records Law applicable,” 166 N.C. App. at 709, and 
that many private organizations, such as non-profit corporations, have been formed 
for the purpose of benefiting the general public.  In defendants’ view, the Railroad is 
not a government agency for purposes of Chatfield given that it acts independently of 
the State and has, on occasion, declined to comply with requests that the board had 
received from the Governor. 
¶ 23 
 
After discussing the nine factors delineated in News & Observer for the purpose 
of determining the degree of control that the government exercises over the Railroad, 
defendants conclude that a proper analysis of the relevant factors weighs in favor of 
a determination that the Railroad is a private entity.  For example, defendants argue 
that the only reason that the Railroad’s assets would be transferred to the State upon 
dissolution is that the State is the Railroad’s sole shareholder and that any one 
hundred percent shareholder would be able to name all of the members of the 
corporation’s board.  In addition, defendants note that the Railroad owns its real 
property independently of the State and that the State is required to pay the Railroad 
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for the right to lease property from it.  Similarly, defendants assert that the Railroad 
is a for-profit corporation that earns its own revenue and distributes dividends to the 
State at the sole discretion of the board. 
¶ 24 
 
According to defendants, the ultimate issue that must be decided in this case 
is one of statutory interpretation, which means that the General Assembly’s intent 
with respect to whether the Railroad is subject to the Public Records Act should be 
deemed to be controlling.  Defendants contend that the trial court correctly evaluated 
the impact of the 2013 legislation, which “imposed reporting requirements [on the 
Railroad] similar to those required of companies whose stock is publicly traded” and 
evinced the General Assembly’s belief that the Railroad was not a government 
agency.  In defendants’ view, the Program Evaluation Division’s report regarding the 
Railroad did not constitute an “unconsidered statement” or a “footnote”; instead, 
defendants contend that this determination was critical to an understanding of the 
manner in which the 2013 legislation was structured.  Defendants express concern 
that a decision to disregard the Railroad’s corporate existence in this case would have 
broader implications for other for-profit and non-profit corporations in which the 
State holds interests.  In view of the fact that the State “invests as a shareholder in 
hundreds, if not thousands, of entities, both publicly traded and privately held,” 
defendants caution that a holding that the State’s ownership of corporate stock has 
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the effect of making the entity in question a public agency would render many private 
and nonprofit institutions entities subject to the Public Records Act. 
II. Legal Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
¶ 25 
 
This Court reviews appeals from trial court summary judgment orders using a 
de novo standard of review.  JVC Enterprises, LLC v. City of Concord, 376 N.C. 782, 
2021-NCSC-14, ¶ 8 (citing In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573 (2008)).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and 
a “party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) 
(2019).  As both parties have acknowledged in their briefs, the record in this case does 
not reveal the existence of a disputed issue of material fact.  For that reason, the 
ultimate issue that has been presented for our consideration in this case is the purely 
legal question of whether, given the undisputed facts set out in the record, the 
Railroad is an “agency of North Carolina government or [a] subdivision” of such an 
agency as defined by the Public Records Act.  See Chatfield, 166 N.C. App. at 706–07 
(holding that summary judgment was appropriate when the facts were not disputed 
“and the only issues are whether as a matter of law [the entity] is subject to the Public 
Records Law of North Carolina”). 
¶ 26 
 
The North Carolina Public Records Act provides that: 
(a) 
“Public record” or “public records” shall mean all 
documents, papers, letters, maps, books, photographs, 
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films, sound recordings, magnetic or other tapes, electronic 
data-processing records, artifacts, or other documentary 
material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, 
made or received pursuant to law or ordinance in 
connection with the transaction of public business by any 
agency of North Carolina government or its subdivisions.  
Agency of North Carolina government or its subdivisions 
shall mean and include every public office, public officer or 
official (State or local, elected or appointed), institution, 
board, 
commission, 
bureau, 
council, 
department, 
authority, or other unit of government of the State or of any 
county, unit, special district or other political subdivision 
of government. 
 
(b)  
The public records and public information compiled 
by the agencies of North Carolina government or its 
subdivisions are the property of the people.  Therefore, it is 
the policy of this State that the people may obtain copies of 
their public records and public information free or at 
minimal cost unless otherwise specifically provided by 
law. . . . 
 
N.C.G.S. § 132-1 (2019).  “When interpreting statutes, our principal goal is to 
effectuate the purpose of the legislature.”  State v. Jones, 358 N.C. 473, 477 (2004) 
(quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 356 N.C. 571, 574 (2002)) (cleaned up).  
“Legislative intent controls the meaning of a statute.”  In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 380 
(2019) (quoting Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 522 (1998)).  “The intent of the General 
Assembly may be found first from the plain language of the statute, then from the 
legislative history, the spirit of the act and what the act seeks to accomplish.”  Lenox, 
Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 664 (2001) (quoting Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 349 N.C. 
290, 297 (1998)) (cleaned up). 
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¶ 27 
 
Although the issue of whether a particular entity is “an agency” or 
“subdivision” of state government for purposes of the Public Records Act is a question 
of first impression for this Court, the Court of Appeals has previously addressed this 
issue on two prior occasions.  In News & Observer, 55 N.C. App. at 7, the Court of 
Appeals considered the extent to which the Wake County Public Health System was 
an “agency of North Carolina government” for purposes of the Public Records Act.  
According to the Court of Appeals, “[t]he critical determination” that had to be made 
in deciding whether the Public Health System was a government agency was whether 
its “ ‘independent authority’ so overshadows the county’s supervisory responsibilities 
that it forecloses a conclusion that the System is an ‘agency of North Carolina 
government or its subdivisions.’ ”  Id. at 9.  In holding that the Public Health System 
was subject to the Public Records Act, the Court of Appeals “look[ed] at the nature of 
the relationship between the System and the county” government and found that the 
county’s “supervisory responsibilities and control over the System [were] manifest.”  
Id. at 11.  In the course of its analysis, the Court of Appeals identified the following 
facts as indicative of the substantial degree of control that the county government 
exercised over the Public Health System: 
(1) that upon its dissolution, the System would transfer its 
assets to the county; and (2) that all vacancies on the board 
of directors would be subject to the Commissioners' 
approval[;] (3) that the System occup[ies] premises owned 
by the county under a lease for $ 1.00 a year; (4) that the 
Commissioners review and approve the System's annual 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
budget; (5) that the county conduct[s] a supervisory audit 
of the System's books; and (6) that the System report[s] its 
charges and rates to the county[;] (7) that the System be 
financed by county bond orders; (8) that revenue collected 
pursuant to the bond orders be revenue of the county; and 
(9) that the System would not change its corporate 
existence nor amend its articles of incorporation without 
the county's written consent. 
 
Id.  In the Court of Appeals’ view, the county continued to exercise substantial control 
over the Public Health System, the Public Health System performed important public 
functions, and, before the Public Health System had assumed corporate status, it had 
conceded that it was an agency of the state and had “undergone little more than a 
change of name through incorporation.”  Id. at 12.  As a result, the Court of Appeals 
found that the Public Health System was a governmental agency subject to the Public 
Records Act. 
¶ 28 
 
In Chatfield, 166 N.C. App. at 704, the Court of Appeals was called upon to 
decide whether an entity which had been formed by the Wilmington Housing 
Authority and the City of Wilmington as a nonprofit corporation and the charter of 
which had been modified to make it more independent of the Housing Authority and 
the City, was subject to the Public Records Act.  At the beginning of its analysis, the 
Court of Appeals noted that “each new arrangement must be examined anew and in 
its own context” and that the “nature of the relationship between a corporate entity 
and the government is the dispositive factor in determining whether the corporate 
entity is governed by the Public Records Law.”  Id. at 707–08 (quoting News & 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
Observer, 55 N.C. App. at 11).  After holding that, “[p]ursuant to this Court's decision 
in News & Observer, the government must exercise ‘supervisory responsibilities and 
control’ over a corporate entity for such an entity to qualify as a government agency 
and fall within the ambit of the Public Records Law,” the Court of Appeals found that 
none of the nine factors indicating substantial government control upon which it had 
relied in News & Observer were present in Chatfield, with “an entity’s stated purpose 
of performing a function that is of use to the general public, without more, [being] 
insufficient to make the Public Records Law applicable.”  Id. at 709. 
¶ 29 
 
Although we believe that both News & Observer and Chatfield were correctly 
decided and that the analytical approach that was utilized in those decisions is 
certainly relevant to the proper resolution of this case, we are not prepared to 
conclude that the nine factors delineated in News & Observer should be treated as 
outcome-determinative.  Instead, we recognize that the Court of Appeals utilized a 
totality of the circumstances approach in both News & Observer and Chatfield, 
pursuant to which it weighed all of the relevant facts and circumstances in order to 
determine whether the record, when viewed in its entirety, showed that the 
government exercised such substantial control over the operations of the relevant 
entity as to render it a governmental agency or subdivision, with “each new 
arrangement [to] be examined anew and in its own context.”  Id. at 707–08.  At the 
end of the day, however, we must recognize that we are necessarily attempting to 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
determine whether the relevant facts do or do not satisfy a statutory standard, a fact 
that, ultimately, makes the inquiry in which we are required to engage in this case, 
in large part, one of statutory construction.  After conducting the required totality of 
the circumstances evaluation, we hold that the Railroad is not an agency or 
subdivision of government that is subject to the requirements of the Public Records 
Act. 
B. Legislation involving the North Carolina Railroad Company 
¶ 30 
 
In examining past laws, decisions, and governmental opinions relating to the 
Railroad, we conclude that, in addition to the fact that the General Assembly has had 
multiple opportunities to define the Railroad as a governmental agency without 
having done so, various components of state government have acted on numerous 
occasions in such a manner as to suggest their belief that the Railroad is a private 
corporate entity rather than a governmental agency or subdivision.  While these 
determinations do not, of course, control the outcome in this case, they are, when 
taken in conjunction with our evaluation of the relevant facts and circumstances 
outlined in News & Observer and Chatfield, sufficient to persuade us that the 
Railroad is not a governmental agency or subdivision for purposes of the Public 
Records Act. 
¶ 31 
 
As we have already noted, the General Assembly enacted new reporting 
requirements applicable to the Railroad in the 2013 Budget Appropriation, S.L. 2013-
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
360, § 34.14(d), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1139–40 (codified at N.C.G.S. § 124-17), 
pursuant to which the Railroad was required to “submit an annual report” to the 
General Assembly that included the Railroad’s strategic and capital investment 
plans, the dividends that the Railroad anticipated paying during the next three fiscal 
years, a list of the properties owned by the Railroad, and a list of the Railroad’s 
officers and directors, among other things.  N.C.G.S. § 124-17(a).  The enactment of 
the 2013 legislation followed a comprehensive study of the Railroad conducted by the 
Program Evaluation Division.  In the legislation commissioning the Program 
Evaluation Division’s study of the Railroad, An Act to Make Technical, Clarifying, 
and Other Modifications to the Current Operations and Capital Improvements 
Appropriations Act [hereinafter 2011 Technical Corrections Act], S.L. 2011-391, § 52, 
2011 N.C. Sess. Law 1557, 1584–85, the General Assembly noted that, for the 
purposes of the study, “the terms ‘State agency’ or ‘agency’ as used under Article 7C 
of Chapter 120 of the General Statutes shall include the North Carolina Railroad 
Company.”  The inclusion of this language tends to suggest a recognition on the part 
of the General Assembly that the Railroad was not a state agency, given that the 
Program Evaluation Division is tasked with “evaluating whether programs or 
activities of a State agency, or programs or activities of a non-State entity conducted 
or provided using State funds” are being operated efficiently and in accordance with 
law.  N.C.G.S. § 120-36.11 (2019).  Since the Railroad is not a “State agency” and is 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
not operated “using State funds,” it was necessary for the General Assembly to define 
the Railroad as a state agency in the 2011 Technical Correction Act, S.L. 2011-391, 
§ 52, 2011 N.C. Sess. Law at 1585, to give it the authority to conduct the required 
evaluation.  This language would have been unnecessary in the event that the 
Railroad was already considered a state agency. 
¶ 32 
 
On the first page of the study that it performed pursuant to the requirements 
of the 2011 legislation, the Program Evaluation Division noted that the “State ha[d] 
limited mechanisms for oversight” of the Railroad given the Railroad’s status as “a 
private corporation” and that the Railroad was subject to “less stringent reporting 
requirements than publicly-traded corporations.”  For that reason, the Program 
Evaluation Division suggested that the General Assembly “amend Chapter 124 of the 
General Statutes to strengthen reporting” requirements applicable to the Railroad.  
In support of its recommendations, the Program Evaluation Division stated that the 
State of North Carolina is the sole shareholder of the 
[Railroad], but it remains a private corporation. . . .  As a 
private corporation, [the Railroad] files with the U.S. 
Internal Revenue Service as a C corporation and is subject 
to Chapter 55 of the General Statutes.  Because [the 
Railroad] is not part of state government, several state 
laws do not apply to the corporation. 
 
• [Railroad] employees are not state employees under 
the State Personnel Act. 
• [The Railroad’s] Board of Directors is not a covered 
board under the State Government Ethics Act. 
• [The Railroad] is not subject to the State's public 
records law. 
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• [The Railroad] is not reviewed as a part of the state 
budget process because it does not receive state 
appropriations. 
 
Although the Program Evaluation Division acknowledged that the General Assembly 
had the authority to transform the Railroad into an entity of state government by 
repealing the Railroad’s corporate charter and dissolving the corporation, it cautioned 
that acting in such a manner “would be a lengthy and complicated process” that had 
“several legal and financial implications,” including the risk that the State would 
become responsible for the Railroad’s financial obligations and the fact that the State 
would lose the income that was currently being derived from the Railroad’s franchise 
tax payments.  As a result, the Program Evaluation Division did not advise the 
General Assembly to convert the Railroad into a state agency and, instead, 
recommended that the General Assembly enact legislation strengthening the 
reporting requirements to which the Railroad was subject and requiring the Railroad 
to pay a dividend to the State. 
¶ 33 
 
According to the SELC, the trial court placed “undue reliance on a footnote in 
a report written by the [Program Evaluation Division]—unelected staff tasked with 
completing research, not drafting law,” in reaching the conclusion that the Railroad 
was not subject to the Public Records Act.  Although the SELC is certainly correct in 
pointing out the non-binding nature of the Program Evaluation Division’s comment, 
the record also reflects that the General Assembly enacted legislation during the 2013 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
session that imposed additional reporting requirements upon the Railroad and 
required the Railroad to make a specific dividend payment.  Although the General 
Assembly did not, to be sure, include any sort of explicit endorsement of the Program 
Evaluation Division’s position with respect to the issue of whether the Railroad was 
subject to the Public Records Act in the 2013 legislation, the General Assembly’s 
decision to adopt the Division’s ultimate recommendations does tend to suggest that 
it agreed with the logic that undergirded those recommendations. 
¶ 34 
 
In addition, the General Assembly stated in the 2013 legislation that: 
(b)  
Upon the request of the Governor or any committee 
of the General Assembly, [the Railroad] shall provide all 
additional information and data within its possession or 
ascertainable from its records. . . .  At the time [the 
Railroad] provides information under this section, it shall 
indicate 
whether 
the 
information 
is 
confidential. 
Confidential information shall be subject to subsection (c) 
of this section. 
 
(c)   
Confidential information includes (i) information 
related to a proposed specific business transaction where 
inspection, examination, or copying of the records would 
frustrate the purpose for which the records were created, 
or (ii) information that is subject to confidentiality 
obligations of [the Railroad].  Confidential information is 
exempt from Chapter 132 of the General Statutes and shall 
not be subject to a request under G.S. 132-6(a).  
 
N.C.G.S. at § 124-17(b), (c).  A careful reading of N.C.G.S. § 124-17 suggests that, 
consistently with the approach adopted by the Program Evaluation Division, the 
General Assembly did not consider the Railroad to be a governmental agency or 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
subdivision that was subject to the Public Records Act.  Simply put, there would have 
been no need for the enactment of subsection (b), which requires the Railroad to 
provide the information that had to be submitted to the Governor or the General 
Assembly without in any way limiting such requests to confidential information, in 
the event that the Railroad was already subject to the provisions of the Public Records 
Act.  A similar deduction can be made from the fact that, in subsection (c), the General 
Assembly adopted a confidentiality provision applicable to information that it 
received from the Railroad that would have been unnecessary in the event that the 
Public Records Act directly applied to the Railroad.  As a result, we find it difficult to 
reach any conclusion other than that the General Assembly agreed with the Program 
Evaluation Division that the Railroad was not, under existing North Carolina law, 
an agency or subdivision of State government that is obligated to comply with the 
Public Records Act. 
¶ 35 
 
Although the history surrounding the language contained in the 2013 
legislation provides the strongest indication of the General Assembly’s belief that the 
Railroad is not a governmental agency or subdivision subject to the Public Records 
Act, the language of other statutory provisions points in a similar direction.  For 
example, in 1997, the General Assembly enacted legislation permitting the members 
of the Railroad’s board to request coverage under the State’s officers, directors, and 
employees’ liability policy while specifying that “[c]overage of the officers, directors, 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
and employees of the [Railroad] under this subsection shall not be construed as 
defining the [Railroad] as a public body or defining its officers, directors, or employees 
as public officials.”  1997 Budget Appropriation, ch. 443, § 32.30, 1997 N.C. Sess. 
Laws at 1844.  In 2000, the General Assembly passed An Act to Implement the 
Recommendations of the Future of the North Carolina Railroad Study Commission, 
S.L. 2000-146, 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 869, 872, which gave the Railroad “the power of 
eminent domain to acquire property in fee simple for the purposes specified in G.S. 
40A-3(a)(4),” which affords eminent domain authority to private, rather than public, 
condemnors.  N.C.G.S. § 124-12.  As a result, other relevant statutory provisions 
enacted by the General Assembly consistently suggest that the Railroad is not a 
governmental agency or subdivision subject to the Public Records Act. 
¶ 36 
 
The Attorney General has suggested that the Railroad is not subject to the 
Public Records Act as well.  In a 2000 opinion, the Attorney General stated that the 
“North Carolina Constitution [ ] sanctions the appropriation of public money to a 
private corporation for the accomplishment of a public purpose,” citing N.C. Const. 
art. V, § 2(7).  After noting that “the 1997 General Assembly authorized the 
investment of Sixty-One Million Dollars ($61,000,000) in order to acquire the 
outstanding private shares, and thereby total control, of the [Railroad],” the Attorney 
General opined that the State also had the authority to acquire control over a 
healthcare corporation without rendering that corporation an agency of the State, 
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described the Railroad as an example of a private corporation in which the State is 
nothing more than a shareholder, and stated that “it is clear that the System’s 
acquisition of corporate control over a nonprofit corporation does not alter the legal 
status of the corporation or vest within it attributes of the State of North Carolina.”  
Letter from Grayson G. Kelley, Senior Deputy Attorney General, to Representative 
Daniel T. Blue, Proposed Acquisition of Rex Healthcare by the University of North 
Carolina 
Health 
Care 
System 
(Mar. 
8, 
2000) 
(available 
at 
https://ncdoj.gov/opinions/proposed-acquisition-of-rex-healthcare-by-the-university-
of-north-carolina-health-care-system/). 
¶ 37 
 
Similarly, according to materials provided to the trial court in this case, the 
State Ethics Commission voted in 2010 that the Railroad’s directors were not subject 
to the provisions of the State Government Ethics Act, Chapter 138A of the General 
Statutes.3  In seeking a determination that the Railroad was not a state agency 
subject to the provisions of the State Ethics Act, the Railroad contended, by means of 
a letter drafted by private counsel,4 that the “fact that the State is the sole-
shareholder . . . does not change the private corporate status” of the Railroad, with 
 
3 The State Government Ethics Act is intended to “ensure that elected and appointed 
State agency officials exercise their authority honestly and fairly, free from impropriety, 
threats, favoritism, and undue influence,” with the Act serving to establish a code of ethical 
conduct “for elected and appointed state agency officials.”  N.C.G.S. § 138A-2 (2019). 
4 We further note that the Railroad is not represented by the Department of Justice 
in this case and has, instead, conducted its defense using privately retained counsel, a fact 
that further tends to show that the Railroad is not a governmental agency or subdivision. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
there being multiple grounds for concluding that the Railroad was not an agency of 
state government, including the fact that the Railroad did not have the eminent 
domain authority available to public condemnors, that the Railroad paid property 
taxes to the sixteen counties in which it owned property, that the Railroad did not 
have the benefit of sovereign immunity, and that the Railroad’s employees were not 
state employees.  In light of these and similar factors, the Commission concluded that 
the Railroad was a “unique agency,” that it “presented special issues not previously 
considered by the Commission,” and that it should not be deemed to be a state agency 
subject to the State Ethics Act.  As a result, certain relevant statutory provisions and 
the decisions of the Attorney General and the State Ethics Commission, which clearly 
constitute persuasive authority that sheds light on the question that is before us in 
this case, suggest, if they do not explicitly state, that the Railroad is not a 
governmental agency or subdivision subject to the Public Records Act. 
C.  Presence of “Substantial Government Control” 
 
¶ 38 
 
The legislative enactments and other official determinations outlined above 
are consistent with our understanding of the information contained in the record 
concerning the extent to which the State, acting in a governmental capacity, exercises 
sufficient supervision and control over the Railroad to make it a state agency or 
subdivision.  Admittedly, the Railroad has enjoyed and continues to enjoy a number 
of benefits from its relationship with the State.  For example, the State provided 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
three-quarters of the Railroad’s initial capital and loaned the Railroad the funds that 
it used to complete the purchase of its remaining shares.  In addition, the General 
Assembly allowed the Railroad to forego the payment of interest on the principal 
balance of this loan during the final three years of the repayment period.  Finally, the 
Railroad benefits from the use of state and federal funds in making safety and service-
related improvements to the corridor that the Railroad owns and the fact that it is 
not required to pay state and federal income taxes.  As a result, a number of factors 
would tend to support a determination that the Railroad is a governmental agency or 
subdivision. 
¶ 39 
 
However, we believe that a number of countervailing factors arising from the 
Railroad’s status as a separate corporate entity outweigh the factors that favor 
classifying the Railroad as a governmental agency or subdivision.  Among other 
things, the undisputed record evidence reflects that the Railroad has consistently 
maintained its separate corporate identity and structure and makes decisions 
independently of any directives that it might receive from governmental officials, 
including the Governor.  For example, the Railroad adopts and funds its own budget 
without the necessity for prior approval from any governmental entity.  In addition, 
the Railroad, rather than the State, owns title to its own property and exercises 
eminent domain authority as a private, rather than a public, condemnor.  The 
revenues that the Railroad uses to support its operations are titled to the Railroad 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
rather than the State; are derived from the Railroad’s trackage right agreements, 
utility encroachment agreements, real estate leases, and investment earnings rather 
than from the appropriation of state funds; and are spent, as a general proposition, 
in a manner controlled by the board rather than the Governor, the General Assembly, 
or any other agency of State government.  Although the Railroad does, and has even 
been ordered, on one occasion, to pay dividends to the State, those dividend payments 
are, for the most part, made at the behest of and in an amount determined by the 
board.  The revenues earned by the Railroad are reinvested into the company, 
whether through dividends that are received by the State and reinvested in the 
company’s infrastructure, or as directed by the board.  Similarly, the Railroad pays 
local property taxes to the counties in which it owns property and a franchise tax to 
the State and claims an exemption from federal income taxation on the basis of a 
statutory provision that would be irrelevant in the event that the Railroad was a 
governmental agency.  Although the Railroad does, on occasion, engage in planning-
related activities with governmental agencies, the same can be said of other private 
entities as well.  As a result, the manner in which the Railroad operates much more 
closely resembles the activities of a private corporation rather than those of a 
governmental agency or subdivision. 
¶ 40 
 
In seeking to persuade us to reach a different result, the SELC emphasizes the 
fact that the State is the Railroad’s sole shareholder, that the members of the board 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
are chosen by the Governor and the General Assembly, that certain members of the 
board must be members of the Governor’s administration, that the Railroad’s 
property must be transferred to the State upon dissolution, that the State must 
approve fundamental changes to the Railroad’s corporate documents, that the 
Railroad is entitled to favorable tax treatment in some instances, and that the 
General Assembly has exercised authority over the Railroad for the purpose of 
requiring the provision of certain information and the making of certain dividend 
payments.5  Although the State, in its capacity as the Railroad’s sole shareholder, 
does have a certain degree of indirect control of the entity’s day-to-day operations and 
has the right to approve or disapprove certain fundamental corporate decisions, those 
facts, standing alone, do not serve to make the Railroad a state agency or subdivision 
and exist in all situations in which the corporation is owned by a single stockholder.  
The same is true of the fact that the Railroad was organized and continues to operate 
for the benefit of the public rather than for purely profit-seeking purposes, with a 
similar statement being applicable to many nonprofit corporations in which the State 
has no interest.  Simply put, most of the information upon which the SELC relies in 
 
5 In view of the fact that many of the indicia of control upon which the SELC relies 
stem from the fact that the State is the Railroad’s sole shareholder, any effort to cumulate 
both the fact that the State is the Railroad’s sole shareholder and the fact that the State’s 
status as the Railroad’s sole shareholder gives it the right to make certain decisions relating 
to the Railroad, such as the election of the members of the Railroad’s board, seems to us to 
result in the placing of impermissible weight upon those more specific factors in the required 
totality of the circumstances analysis. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
seeking to persuade us that the Railroad should be deemed subject to the Public 
Records Act is the direct result of the State’s status as the Railroad’s sole shareholder 
rather than the exercise of the State’s sovereign authority. 
¶ 41 
 
Although the SELC argues that the nature of the State’s authority over the 
Railroad, rather than the source of that authority, should be deemed controlling, we 
do not find this argument persuasive.  The SELC’s argument to the contrary 
notwithstanding, the basis of the State’s influence over the Railroad is critical to the 
proper resolution of the issue of whether the Railroad is a governmental agency or 
subdivision for purposes of the Public Records Act.  The fundamental difference 
between a governmental entity and a private one is the extent, if any, to which the 
entity in question exercises the sovereign authority of the State.  As a result, it stands 
to reason that the extent to which the State exercises sovereign authority, rather 
than authority derived from some other source, should be an important feature of any 
determination concerning the applicability of the Public Records Act. 
¶ 42 
 
The SELC’s suggestion that we should overlook the nature and source of the 
State’s authority over the Railroad is inconsistent with this Court’s jurisprudence for 
a second reason as well.  Although the Railroad’s separate corporate existence does 
not, of course, control the outcome of this case, we have consistently, throughout our 
history, been disinclined to disregard the distinction between a corporation and its 
shareholders.  For that reason, we have recently stated, in a different context, that, 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
“[o]nce a corporate form of ownership is properly established, the corporation is an 
entity distinct from the shareholder, even a shareholder owning one-hundred percent 
of the stock.”  Glob. Textile All., Inc. v. TDI Worldwide, LLC, 375 N.C. 72, 74 (2020).  
Nothing in the present record tends to suggest that the Railroad has failed to take 
the steps necessary to maintain its separate corporate identity or to operate in a 
fashion that exhibits a degree of independence from direct governmental control, a 
fact that further persuades us to refrain from holding that the mere fact that the 
State has certain authority over the Railroad by virtue of its status as the Railroad’s 
sole shareholder and the fact that the Railroad was organized and operates for the 
benefit of the public suffices to make the Railroad a governmental agency or 
subdivision subject to the provisions of the Public Records Act.6 
¶ 43 
 
Thus, given that both the General Assembly and other governmental entities 
have consistently treated the Railroad as a private corporation rather than a public 
agency or subdivision and given that the State, acting in its capacity as sovereign, 
 
6 The SELC’s suggestion that the trial court erred by examining whether the Railroad 
was a governmental agency or subdivision in general, rather than whether it was a 
governmental agency or subdivision for purposes of the Public Records Act, does not strike 
us as persuasive given that nothing in the relevant statutory language suggests that there is 
any difference between a governmental agency or subdivision, in general, and a 
governmental agency or subdivision for purposes of the Public Records Act.  Instead, the 
relevant statutory language simply speaks of an “agency” or “subdivision” of State 
government.  In the same vein, any argument that the Public Records Act requires an 
expansive interpretation of what is and is not a “public agency” or “subdivision” assumes the 
answer to the point at issue given that the relevant statutory language invariably refers to 
covered agencies or officers as “public” without further elaboration. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
does not have a sufficient degree of control over the day-to-day operations of the 
Railroad, we hold that the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in 
defendants’ favor in this case.  As a result, the trial court’s order is affirmed. 
AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice EARLS dissenting. 
 
¶ 44 
 
This case presents a single question: can a corporate entity, wholly owned by 
the State of North Carolina, directed by a board whose members are appointed by 
State elected officials, wielding the power of eminent domain, and comprised of assets 
that will escheat to the State in the event of dissolution, evade public scrutiny under 
the Public Records Act (the Act)? The majority says yes. Because this holding runs 
contrary to the purpose of the Act and privileges the form of the corporation over the 
public nature of its governance and activities, I respectfully dissent.  
I. 
Background 
¶ 45 
 
The North Carolina Railroad Company (NCRR) was created by statute in 1849. 
An Act to incorporate the North Carolina Rail Road Company, ch. LXXXII, § 1, 1848–
1849 N.C. Laws, 138. The State paid $2 million to be NCRR’s majority shareholder 
at that time, Id. § 36, came to own more of NCRR’s stock through transactions in the 
ensuing decades, and by 2006 owned all NCRR stock. Today, through its officials, the 
State chooses NCRR’s directors (N.C.G.S. § 124-15 (2019)), approves all substantive 
changes to NCRR’s articles of incorporation, facilitates financing for NCRR, receives 
reports of NCRR rates and rate changes (N.C.G.S. § 124-17), assumes control of 
revenue it collects, and stands to receive the assets of NCRR in the event of 
dissolution. 
¶ 46 
 
In 2019, the Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC) wrote to NCRR to 
request records related to NCRR’s involvement in a light rail project. SELC believed 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
NCRR would be compelled to provide the records under the Public Records Act. NCRR 
denied the request and sent no records, claiming it was not subject to the Act. SELC 
filed suit to compel production of the records. After a hearing, the North Carolina 
Business Court granted NCRR’s motion for summary judgment, concluding “that if it 
were the Legislature’s intent that [NCRR] be subject to the Public Records Act, [the 
Legislature] could have made that expressly clear . . . .” Today’s majority affirms the 
Business Court’s decision, holding that although the State has exercised a 
“considerable degree” of authority over NCRR in the past 170 years, it has done so as 
NCRR’s “sole shareholder rather than in its capacity as a sovereign.” But the 
majority’s decision ignores the legislative intent of the Public Records Act, the scope 
of the statutes governing NCRR’s activities, and the realities of NCRR’s relationship 
with the government of North Carolina. 
¶ 47 
 
Today’s decision runs contrary to precedent and threatens the vitality of the 
Public Records Act. It allows a corporate entity—fully owned by the State and 
operationally intertwined with numerous government officials and agencies—to 
shield from public scrutiny its records made in connection with the transaction of 
public business. It also risks allowing the State to sidestep the requirements of the 
Public Records Act by conducting its business through a nominally private entity. It 
is the substance of an entity’s actions or operations, not its particular form, which 
dictates whether the public has right to access its records. Accordingly, I would hold 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
that NCRR is a government agency subject to the Public Records Act. I respectfully 
dissent.  
II. 
Analysis 
¶ 48 
 
Enacted in 1975, the North Carolina Public Records Act provides that “[t]he 
public records and public information compiled by the agencies of North Carolina 
government or its subdivisions are the property of the people.” N.C.G.S. § 132-1(b) 
(2019). A “public record” is defined to include documents “made or received pursuant 
to law or ordinance in connection with the transaction of public business by any 
agency of North Carolina government or its subdivisions.” N.C.G.S. § 132-1(a). The 
Act further defines “agency of North Carolina government or its subdivisions” broadly 
to include “every public office, public officer or official (State or local, elected or 
appointed), institution, board, commission, bureau, council, department, authority or 
other unit of government of the State or of any county, unit, special district or other 
political subdivision of government.” Id. The question we must answer—and where I 
differ from the majority—is whether the phrase “agency of North Carolina 
government or its subdivisions” includes NCRR for the purposes of the Public Records 
Act. 
A. NCRR’s operations are sufficiently intertwined with those of North 
Carolina’s government to subject it to the Public Records Act  
¶ 49 
 
 Forty years ago, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Wake County 
Hospital System, organized as a nonprofit corporation, was a government agency 
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within the meaning of the Public Records Act because it “exercise[d] its ‘independent 
authority’ so intertwined with the [government] that it must be, and is, an ‘agency of 
North Carolina government or its subdivisions.’ ” News & Observer Pub. Co. v. Wake 
Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., 55 N.C. App. 1, 12 (1981), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 302 (1982). 
Since the Court of Appeals decided Wake County Hospital System, it has been the 
undisturbed law of our state that a formally corporate entity may be considered a 
government agency for the purposes of the Act depending upon “the nature of the 
relationship between the [entity] and the [government].” Id. at 11. Given the 
legislature’s intent in passing the Public Records Act, this rule makes good sense—
the purpose of the Act is to ensure that the people of North Carolina have the 
information they need to hold the government accountable to the citizens it serves.  
¶ 50 
 
A corporation’s public-serving actions do not, on their own, subject the 
corporation to the Act. See Chatfield v. Wilmington Hous. Fin. and Dev. Inc., 166 N.C. 
App. 703, 709 (2004) (“[A]n entity’s stated purpose of performing a function that is of 
use to the general public, without more, is insufficient to make the [Act] applicable.”). 
Rather, it is the “substance and not the form of the [corporation] that is the key” to 
our evaluation. Wake Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., 55 N.C. App. at 10. The substance of the 
corporation is often revealed by the extent to which the government exercises 
“supervisory responsibilities and control” over the entity. See Chatfield, 166 N.C. App. 
at 707. Put simply, a corporation can be “so intertwined” with the government that it 
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is “an agency of North Carolina” for the purposes of the Act. Wake Cty. Hosp. Sys., 
Inc., 55 N.C. App. at 12. But critically, it is possible that such a corporate entity, 
intertwined with the State, can be considered a public agency for the purposes of the 
Act without being treated as a state agency for all purposes. See id. at 7-8. The 
majority errs by collapsing this distinction.  
¶ 51 
 
In Wake County Hospital System, the Court of Appeals cited several specific 
aspects of the relationship between the hospital system and the county that 
demonstrated the government and the hospital system were substantially 
“intertwined.” They are of the categories that are essential to the operation of a 
corporate entity, including, but not limited to, financing, asset management, 
operations, and decision-making and control. Id. at 11. But as the court also noted, 
these aspects are not factors or elements that can be applied in each circumstance— 
“each new arrangement must be examined anew and in its own context.” Id.  
¶ 52 
 
Indeed, “examin[ing]” the relationship between NCRR and the State of North 
Carolina “anew and in its own context” reveals that the state’s “responsibilities and 
control” over NCRR are “manifest.” Wake Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., 55 N.C. App. at 11. A 
close examination of the relationship supports only the conclusion that NCRR must 
be a state agency for the purposes of the Act. The State selects every Director of 
NCRR, N.C.G.S. § 124-15, and those Directors perform State-mandated obligations. 
N.C. Exec. Order No. 2009-034 (Dec. 9, 2009). Two of the thirteen Directors must be 
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members of the Governor’s administration, N.C.G.S. § 124-15, serving both NCRR 
and the administration to ensure effective communication and coordination between 
the organizations. The State must approve all substantive amendments to NCRR’s 
articles of incorporation. Revenue earned today by NCRR belongs to the State and is 
treated as revenue for “the public good.” In turn, the General Assembly often directs 
how those revenues are spent once they accrue to the State. See An Act to Make Base 
Budget Appropriations for Current Operations of State Departments, Institutions, 
and Agencies, and for Other Purposes [hereinafter 2013 Budget Appropriation], S.L. 
2013-360, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 995. NCRR’s finances and records are subject to State 
review and records requests from State officials, and the results of external audits 
are provided to the General Assembly. N.C.G.S. § 124-17. Moreover, NCRR is 
statutorily mandated to annually submit to the General Assembly a detailed financial 
report concerning its strategy, operations, and personnel. Id. NCRR also enjoys 
powers of eminent domain. N.C.G.S. § 124-12. As the majority notes, that authority 
is given to NCRR as a private condemnor, not a public one, under N.C.G.S. § 40A-
3(a)(4). Yet N.C.G.S. § 40A-3(a) grants the power of eminent domain for “the public 
use or benefit,” another example of NCRR’s obligations to the people of North 
Carolina.  
¶ 53 
 
Just like conventional state agencies, NCRR is frequently a partner to 
departments of state government in planning and decision-making. NCRR often 
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collaborates on projects with the Department of Transportation (DOT), and staff from 
both NCRR and DOT discuss those projects routinely. Leaders at the organizations 
aim to have a “regular exchange of information” between their respective governing 
boards. NCRR cooperates with DOT to serve as an intermediary between DOT and 
Norfolk Southern, another railroad company. Elsewhere, directors from the 
Department of Commerce are regularly updated on NCRR’s activities so that, in the 
words of one such director, “[c]ommerce [can] thrive in North Carolina.”  
¶ 54 
 
And, as mentioned previously, the State has owned all of NCRR’s stock since 
2006. NCRR contends that many of its entanglements with the State, like those 
detailed above, arise from the fact that the State is the sole shareholder of NCRR’s 
stock, and are thus irrelevant. But the State’s control of NCRR is essential context. 
To NCRR, the appointment of its Board members by elected state officials—the 
Governor and the General Assembly—is “the same . . . as any other private 
corporation.” Legislation mandating the frequency and content of reports is merely a 
“shareholder agreement.” As noted, under current arrangements, were the NCRR to 
be dissolved as a corporation, its assets would return to the State. NCRR claims that 
because this is simply one post-dissolution option among many, it should not bear on 
our analysis But I am unconvinced that what is presently true should be discounted 
simply because we can imagine other future alternatives. NCRR seeks to hide behind 
“the fundamental principle of corporate law that a corporation has a legal existence 
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that is distinct from its shareholders” and accuses SELC of attempting to “merge the 
identity” of the State with that of the corporation, but this case requires us to examine 
the substantive relationship between the corporation and the State. We cannot, as 
the majority does, rely upon the fact of NCRR’s “separate corporate identity” or 
“corporate form.” Our inquiry concerns when a corporation is obligated to be 
transparent about its operations, and we beg the question if we rest on corporate 
formalities.  
¶ 55 
 
The majority notes that we have “consistently . . . been disinclined to disregard 
the distinction between a corporation and its shareholders.” In the majority’s view, 
we may recognize that the State is NCRR’s “sole shareholder,” possesses “a certain 
degree of indirect control of the entity’s day-to-day operations,” and “has the right to 
approve or disapprove certain fundamental corporate decisions,” but “those facts, 
standing alone, do not serve to make [NCRR] a state agency or subdivision.” Yet this 
gives insufficient weight to the many facts relevant to our inquiry which all point in 
the direction of treating NCRR as a public entity for the purposes of the Act. When 
the State owns the corporation, appoints its board, mandates its reporting, spends its 
revenue, and stands to receive the assets in the event of dissolution, we should 
recognize the obvious truth that the identity of the corporation and its sole 
shareholder—the State—are meaningfully intertwined. NCRR’s argument—that the 
activities of this kind of corporation can be hidden from scrutiny by the people of 
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North Carolina—is a self-interested attempt to cleave its public business from its 
public responsibilities. Today’s decision gives that attempt the force of law. The 
“manner in which [NCRR] operates,” which the majority characterizes vaguely as 
“resembl[ing] the activities of a private corporation,” should not distract us from the 
manifest conclusion that NCRR and the State are substantially intertwined.  
B. Holding that NCRR is subject to the Public Records Act is consistent 
with the legislature’s intentions toward both NCRR and the Public 
Records Act 
¶ 56 
 
Contrary to the arguments promoted by NCRR and the majority, the 
conclusion that NCRR is subject to the Public Records Act is consistent with the 
intent of the General Assembly. This is true for two reasons.  
¶ 57 
 
First, the legislature created NCRR to benefit the State, and it has continued 
to exercise its authority over NCRR to serve the public. Troubled by the poor condition 
of the State’s transportation system and the limited connections between western 
North Carolina and the State’s eastern seaports, the General Assembly chartered 
NCRR “[t]o create a railroad company . . . to promote growth in the state.” Their 
efforts were motivated by a belief in “the importance of the railroad to the economic 
well-being of the State and its citizens as a whole.” While it is true, as NCRR 
repeatedly notes, that the large amount of money required to fund the initial 
investment in NCRR came from private sources, it is also apparent from the records 
of the time that the General Assembly intended to link the eastern and western parts 
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of the State by rail with a new public-private venture.1 Moreover, the State invested 
the lion’s share of the capital: two-thirds of the initial $3 million capitalization and 
an additional $1 million just four years later. NCRR’s charter gave it powers of 
eminent domain and the liberty to build widely, “across or along any public road or 
water source.” An Act to incorporate the North Carolina Rail Road Company, ch. 
LXXXII, §§ 26–28, 1848–1849 N.C. Laws, 138, 145–50.  
¶ 58 
 
The General Assembly’s actions in the years since corroborate its original 
intent to require NCRR to operate for the benefit of the state. In 1992, a State 
advisory study group issued a report in which it noted that “where the State grants 
a private corporation special governmental powers, such as eminent domain, those 
powers are to be used for the public benefit,” and public-private partnerships like 
NCRR are “obligated to carry out the public purpose for which they were chartered.” 
In service to this obligation, the State began buying more of NCRR’s shares “to help 
promote trade, industry, and transportation within the State of North Carolina and 
to advance the economic interest of the state.” An Act to Make Appropriations for 
 
1 NCRR contends that its view of history, that “[the Company] was formed as a private 
corporation to meet a pressing public need the government had been unable to meet and in 
which private participation was necessary,” is “[c]ontrary to” SELC’s “assertion that the 
Company was created ‘for the benefit of the State.’ ” This is an attempt to draw a distinction 
without a difference. It benefits the State when the government charters a company to build 
a railroad connecting the ends of the State to one another and provides the majority of the 
start-up capital. An action undertaken to “meet[ ] a pressing public need” is an action 
undertaken “for the benefit of the State.” Here, the private nature of the corporation does not 
alter the General Assembly’s intention, which was to create a railroad to serve North 
Carolina and its people.  
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Current Operations and for Capital Improvements for State Departments, 
Institutions, and Agencies, and for Other Purposes, ch. 443 § 32.30, 1997 N.C. Sess. 
Laws 1344, 1842–1844. This is not to say, of course, that any public-private venture 
necessarily becomes subject to the Public Records Act. However, where the venture 
is wholly owned and controlled by the State, it seems self-evident that the “public” 
part of the venture holds more import than that which is “private,” at least for the 
purposes of the Public Records Act. 
¶ 59 
 
Second, and separately, the legislature enacted the Public Records Act to 
enable public inspection of the workings of the state government and its agencies, not 
to create formalistic hideouts for public-private partnerships that wish to escape 
scrutiny. Sorely missing from the majority’s “totality of the circumstances analysis” 
is any meaningful evaluation of the scope and purpose of the Public Records Act. In 
my view, the General Assembly’s motivations for passing the Public Records Act 
suggest it intended entities like NCRR to fall within the Act’s purview. 
¶ 60 
 
The first North Carolina public records statute affirmed that public records are 
“the chief monuments of North Carolina’s past and are invaluable for the effective 
administration of government [and] for the conduct of public and private business.” 
An Act to Safeguard Public Records in North Carolina, ch. 265, § 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. 
L., 288. This statute and its 1975 successor are in keeping with American common 
law’s centuries-old recognition of the public’s right to inspect public records. See 
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Joseph D. Johnson, Administrative Law—Public Access to Government-Held Records: 
A Neglected Right in North Carolina, 55 N.C. L. Rev. 1187 (1977). Historically, our 
appellate courts have agreed. Given the legislature’s “mandate for open government,” 
News & Observer Pub. Co., Inc. v. Poole, 330 N.C. 465, 475 (1992), “it is clear that the 
legislature intended to provide [through the Public Records Act] that, as a general 
rule, the public would have liberal access to public records.” News & Observer Pub. 
Co. v. State ex rel. Starling, 312 N.C. 276, 281 (1984). This is because “[g]ood public 
policy is said to require liberality in the right to examine public records.” Advance 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Elizabeth City, 53 N.C. App. 504, 506 (1981). Just last year, this Court 
affirmed this principle:  
The Act is intended to be liberally construed to ensure that 
governmental records be open and made available to the 
public, subject only to a few limited exceptions. The Public 
Records Act thus allows access to all public records in an 
agency's possession “unless either the agency or the record 
is specifically exempted from the statute's mandate.” 
Times-News, 124 N.C. App. at 177, 476 S.E.2d at 452 
(emphasis added). “Exceptions and exemptions to the 
Public Records Act must be construed narrowly.” Carter-
Hubbard Publ'g Co., 178 N.C. App. at 624, 633 S.E.2d at 
684. 
DTH Media Corp. v. Folt, 374 N.C. 292, 300–01 (2020). 
¶ 61 
 
Liberal access to public records is, of course, not the same as liberal 
construction of what is a public record. But there, too, our lawmakers have recognized 
the importance of granting the people ready access to records concerning the 
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operations and transactions of their government: “It is an uncontestable pre-condition 
of democratic government that the people have information about the operation of 
their government . . . .” Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Controlling “Executive Privilege,”, 20 Loy. 
L. Rev. 11, 11 (1974). At bottom, “[w]hile some degree of confidentiality is necessary 
for government to operate effectively, the general rule in the American political 
system must be that the affairs of government be subject to public scrutiny.” Johnson, 
55 N.C. L. Rev. at 1188. Today’s decision undermines that principle.  
¶ 62 
 
 “In matters of statutory construction, our primary task is to ensure that the 
purpose of the legislature, the legislative intent, is accomplished.” Elec. Supply Co. of 
Durham, Inc. v. Swain Elec. Co., Inc., 328 N.C. 651, 656 (1991). That purpose is “first 
ascertained from the plain words of the statute.” Id. When the General Assembly 
passed the Public Records Act, it was so the public would have insight into how 
decisionmakers were going about their work, how public policy was being enacted, 
and how the agencies of North Carolina were being operated. Indeed, the Act applies 
to records produced by an “agency” which are “made . . . in connection with the 
transaction of public business.” N.C.G.S. § 132-1(a). Furthermore, the legislature 
provided an expansive definition of what might be considered an agency. As discussed 
above, if we were to apply the rule which has been the law in our state for the past 
forty years, NCRR falls firmly within the meaning of “agency.” While some 
government entities are enumerated, the language of the statute considers that not 
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all could be named specifically:  
Agency of North Carolina government or its subdivisions 
shall mean and include every public office, public officer or 
official (State or local, elected or appointed), institution, 
board, commission, bureau, council, department, authority 
or other unit of government of the State or of any county, 
unit, special district or other political subdivision of 
government. 
N.C.G.S. § 132-1 (emphasis added). If we were to place NCRR within the definition 
of “agency” within the statute, it would fit well within “institution” and certainly 
within the catchall of “other unit of government.” 
¶ 63 
 
In our consideration of the statues relevant to this case, we should “adopt an 
interpretation which will avoid absurd or bizarre consequences.” State ex rel. Com'r 
of Ins. v. N.C. Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 294 N.C. 60, 68, (1978). An interpretation 
that results in an entity created by the State for public benefit shielding its records 
from public scrutiny is an absurd one. Accordingly, I reject the necessary premise of 
the majority’s decision which says that the legislature, in enacting the 1975 Public 
Records Act, intended to permit the State or a related entity to hide from scrutiny 
merely by conducting its operations behind the corporate form.  
¶ 64 
 
The majority, as did the Business Court, makes much of a 2011 report from 
the General Assembly’s Program Evaluation Division (PED), which is “a staff agency 
of the General Assembly . . . [purposed to provide] an independent, objective source 
of information to be used in evaluating” the activities of state agencies or those of 
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non-state entities conducted using state funds. N.C.G.S. § 120-36.11(a) (2019). In that 
2011 report, as was well-documented by both parties, the PED found that “[NCRR] is 
not subject to the State’s [Public Records Act].” Both parties rightly recognize that 
whether NCRR is subject to the Public Records Act, a question of law, is a 
determination to be made by this court, not by a staff agency of the General 
Assembly.2 The PED report, then, adds little to our analysis.   
¶ 65 
 
As the majority notes, in advance of the PED study of NCRR, the General 
Assembly passed legislation stipulating that “[f]or the purposes of [the] evaluation, 
the terms ‘State agency’ or ‘agency’ ” would include NCRR. An Act to Make Technical, 
Clarifying, and Other Modifications to the Current Operations and Capital 
Improvements Appropriations Act, S.L. 2011-391, § 52, 2011 N.C. Sess. Law No. 
1557, 1584–85. The majority claims that that “this language tends to suggest a 
recognition on the part of the General Assembly that [NCRR] was not a state agency,” 
but this does not follow in light of the issue before us. It seems instead that the 
legislature thought it necessary to define the NCRR as a “State agency” for the 
limited purpose of the evaluation. I believe the Public Records Act contemplates the 
same—that a corporate entity can be considered a state agency for some purposes, 
 
2 Whether the NCRR is subject to the Public Records Act, a narrow question of law, is 
also not a determination to be made by the Attorney General or the State Ethics Commission 
in their realms of authority, though the majority points to decisions by both as “persuasive” 
in support of its ruling.  
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but not all.    
¶ 66 
 
The majority advances two further arguments by pointing to General 
Assembly activities in the wake of the PED report. Neither is availing. Both 
arguments focus on a 2013 statute imposing “additional reporting requirements,” 
N.C.G.S. § 124.17. In that legislative process, the General Assembly—equipped with 
the 2011 PED report which stated NCRR was not subject to the Public Records Act—
“deci[ded] to adopt” the recommendations in the report, a decision the majority reads 
to mean the General Assembly “agreed with” the PED’s assessment of NCRR. 
However, it is just as likely that the General Assembly disagreed with the PED report 
and saw no need to act in light of it. In other words, the General Assembly did not 
bring NCRR within the auspices of the Act in 2013 because they believed NCRR to 
already be there. The PED is, after all, a staff agency of the General Assembly. It is 
unlikely that, faced with a report containing an inaccuracy from one of its staff 
agencies, the General Assembly would see a need to respond with legislation to 
correct the error.  
¶ 67 
 
The majority also points to the provisions of the 2013 statute that imposed 
those additional reporting requirements, arguing that such legislation would be 
superfluous if NCRR were already a state agency. This position defies the plain 
reading of the 2013 statute. The statute is indeed meant to provide for an “[e]nhanced 
annual report.” N.C.G.S. § 124-17 (emphasis added). NCRR is mandated to “submit 
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an annual report to the Joint Legislative Commission of Governmental Operations 
and the Joint Legislative Transportation Oversight Committee.” N.C.G.S. § 124-
17(a). In other words, the Public Records Act imposes no affirmative obligation on 
NCRR to produce a report or records—the 2013 statute does. An entity subject to the 
Public Records Act is only required to make some of its records made available on 
request. The 2013 statute, on the other hand, establishes an affirmative reporting 
requirement for NCRR to regularly provide information to certain state government 
entities. As a result, the reporting requirements of the 2013 statute say nothing about 
whether NCRR was already subject to the requirements of the Public Records Act. 
¶ 68 
 
The majority’s argument regarding the 2013 statute is called into further 
question by a comparison of the text of that statute to the text of the Public Records 
Act. The 2013 statute requires that NCRR, “[u]pon the request of the Governor or any 
committee of the General Assembly . . . provide all additional information and data 
within its possession or ascertainable from its records.” N.C.G.S. § 124-17(b) 
(emphasis added). The Public Records Act, however, only applies to information 
“made or received pursuant to law or ordinance in connection with the transaction of 
public business.” N.C.G.S. § 132-1(a). These obligations are not the same. The 2013 
statute compels NCRR to provide all information by request of the Governor or 
legislature; the Public Records Act makes available only information related to public 
businesses. 
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¶ 69 
 
The majority attempts a similar line of reasoning with respect to the 2013 
statute’s provision allowing NCRR to “indicate whether the information [provided 
upon request of the Governor or General Assembly] is confidential.” N.C.G.S. § 124-
17(b). Were NCRR subject to the Public Records Act, it might possess information 
that is not covered by the Act, but which would otherwise become subject to the Act 
upon fulfilling a request for information from the Governor of the General Assembly 
pursuant to Section 124-17(b). This provision, then, does not prove extraneous to the 
Public Records Act or any of NCRR’s obligations under it. Instead, it provides 
additional safeguards for the enhanced reporting requirements the legislature has 
chosen to impose on NCRR.  
¶ 70 
 
Ultimately, I am unpersuaded by the evidence cited by the majority for the 
proposition that NCRR should not be subject to the Public Records Act. Rather, I 
believe a more just and accurate reading of the legislature’s intent in passing the 
Public Records Act and in creating NCRR is that NCRR is subject to the Act.3 
III. 
Conclusion 
 
3 Whether the specific records sought by SELC are covered by the Act’s requirements 
is a separate question not before us here. However, there is no denying that the public has 
been impacted by NCRR’s decision to abandon a light rail project in the Triangle.  
Public/private partnerships for the public good are not new.  It is equally still true that the 
public’s trust in government suffers when government decision-making is shielded from 
public view. “The generation that made the nation thought secrecy in government one of the 
instruments of Old World tyranny and committed itself to the principle that a democracy 
cannot function unless the people are permitted to know what their government is up to.”  
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (quoting Henry Steele 
Commager). 
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¶ 71 
 
Subjecting NCRR to the Public Records Act would not grant the people of North 
Carolina unfettered access to NCRR’s records. As discussed, the Public Records Act 
only applies to records “made or received pursuant to law or ordinance in connection 
with the transaction of public business.” N.C.G.S. § 132-1(a). NCRR maintains the 
right to indicate that other information is confidential when it is “related to a 
proposed specific business transaction where inspection, examination, or copying of 
the records would frustrate the purpose for which the records were created.” N.C.G.S. 
§ 124-17(b), (c). NCRR, then, would still be permitted to limit the public’s access to 
its records. But given the deeply intertwined relationship between NCRR and the 
State, those records which are sufficiently connected “with the transaction of public 
business” should be made available for public scrutiny.  
¶ 72 
 
I agree with the majority that our approach to interpreting statutes must 
always reckon with the “totality of the circumstances.” The circumstances to be 
considered here include both the scope and purpose of the Public Records Act and the 
legislation governing the NCRR’s activities. Because I believe the legislature’s intent 
was for the Public Records Act to make more, not less, of our government’s activities 
and operations available for public examination, and because I read our state’s prior 
appellate cases and the General Assembly’s actions as indicating that the North 
Carolina Railroad Company, owned fully by the State of North Carolina and obligated 
in several ways to its branches of government, should be subject to the Public Records 
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Act, I respectfully dissent. 
Justice HUDSON joins in this dissenting opinion.