Title: Commonwealth v. Fragata
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12330
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 18, 2018

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SJC-12330 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSEPH FRAGATA. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     December 4, 2017. - July 18, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Intimidation of Witness.  Witness, Intimidation. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Fall River Division 
of the District Court Department on December 28, 2015. 
 
 
The case was tried before Gilbert J. Nadeau, Jr., J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Christopher DeMayo for the defendant. 
 
Roger L. Michel, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  A District Court jury convicted the defendant, 
Joseph Fragata, of intimidating a witness in violation of 
2 
 
G. L. c. 268, § 13B, in connection with an incident of alleged 
domestic violence.1  The statute, as relevant here, provides: 
 
"Whoever, directly or indirectly, willfully . . .  
attempts or causes physical injury . . . [or] 
intimidates . . . another person who is . . . a 
witness or potential witness at any stage of a 
criminal investigation, . . . or other criminal 
proceeding of any type . . . with the intent to 
impede, obstruct, delay, harm, punish or otherwise 
interfere thereby, or do so with reckless disregard, 
with such a proceeding shall be punished . . . ." 
 
G. L. c. 268, § 13B (1) (a), (c) (i), (v), as amended through 
St. 2010, c. 256, § 120.2  The Commonwealth's theory at trial was 
that the defendant violated § 13B (1) (c) (i) by taking away the 
alleged victim's cellular telephone to prevent her from calling 
911 for help after he had verbally assaulted her.  On direct 
appellate review, the defendant contends primarily that the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of witness 
intimidation under § 13B (1) (c) (i), because no view of the 
                     
 
1 The jury acquitted the defendant of four related offenses 
arising from the same incident.  See part 1, infra. 
 
 
2 Here and throughout this opinion we cite G. L. c. 268, 
§ 13B, as it was in effect at the time of the alleged crime and 
the defendant's conviction and sentencing.  We note that the 
statute was substantially reorganized and rewritten by the 
criminal justice reform bill enacted in April, 2018, see St. 
2018, c. 69, § 155, but the 2018 amendment has no bearing on 
this case.  See Commonwealth v. Galvin, 466 Mass. 286, 290 
(2013) ("As a general rule of statutory construction, a newly 
enacted statute is presumptively prospective . . ."); G. L. 
c. 4, § 6, Second ("The repeal of a statute shall not affect any 
punishment, penalty or forfeiture incurred before the repeal 
takes effect . . ."). 
3 
 
evidence would have allowed the jury to conclude that he had 
committed any crime before he took the victim's cellular 
telephone. 
 
We hold that, to convict a defendant of witness 
intimidation under the central provision at issue here, 
G. L. c. 268, § 13B (1) (c) (i), the Commonwealth must prove 
that (1) a possible criminal violation occurred that would 
trigger a criminal investigation or proceeding; (2) the victim 
would likely be a witness or potential witness in that 
investigation or proceeding; (3) the defendant engaged in 
intimidating behavior, as defined in the statute, toward the 
victim; and (4) the defendant did so with the intent to impede 
or interfere with the investigation or proceeding, or in 
reckless disregard of the impact his conduct would have in 
impeding or interfering with that investigation or proceeding.  
Applied here, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the defendant's conviction on the particular theory 
argued by the Commonwealth at trial.  There was sufficient 
evidence to convict the defendant of witness intimidation based 
on his conduct after he took the victim's cellular telephone.  
But this alternative ground was not argued by the Commonwealth, 
and we have no way of knowing whether the jury based their 
verdict on this alternative ground, for which the evidence was 
sufficient to convict, or on the theory argued by the 
4 
 
Commonwealth, for which the evidence was insufficient to 
convict.  Accordingly, we reverse. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details 
for later discussion.  Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 
676-677 (1979). 
 
The victim and the defendant met in May, 2014, and 
developed a romantic relationship.  On Christmas Day, 2015, the 
victim and the defendant hosted a small gathering in the 
apartment where the two were living.  After their guests left, 
the defendant screamed at the victim and called her "nasty 
names."  The victim began to cry and told the defendant that she 
was going to telephone 911.  The defendant immediately took the 
victim's cellular telephone from her and begged her not to call 
the police. 
 
The victim told the defendant that she wanted to leave and 
that she was still going to call 911.  As soon as she ran to the 
door to get out and call 911, the defendant stood in front of 
the door; grabbed the victim by the arms, causing them to 
bruise; and pushed the victim aside, again begging her not to 
call 911.  Then, while the victim was sitting on a couch, the 
defendant approached her, grabbed her throat, and started 
choking her, hitting her head against the wall.  After that 
attack, the victim sat on the couch and cried; the defendant had 
5 
 
told her that he would not let her leave and she did not feel 
free to do so.  Finally, after about thirty to forty-five 
minutes, the victim was able to grab her cellular telephone, 
leave the apartment, and call 911 from across the street. 
 
The defendant was tried before a jury in the District 
Court on charges of intimidating a witness, strangulation 
or suffocation, assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon, kidnapping, and assault on a family or household 
member.  At the close of the Commonwealth's case, and again 
at the close of the evidence, the defendant moved for a 
required finding of not guilty on all charges, which the 
judge denied.  In his final jury charge, the judge 
instructed the jury on the elements of the crime of witness 
intimidation as follows: 
"In order to prove the [d]efendant guilty of 
[intimidation of a witness], the Commonwealth must 
prove three things beyond a reasonable doubt:  First, 
that the [d]efendant directly or indirectly attempted 
to cause physical injury to [the victim], cause[d] 
physical injury to her, or intimidated her; second, 
that [the victim] was a witness or potential witness 
in any stage of a criminal investigation or criminal 
proceeding of any type; and third, that the 
[d]efendant did so willfully with the specific intent 
to impede, obstruct, delay, or otherwise interfere 
with a criminal investigation." 
 
The jury convicted the defendant of intimidating a witness, but 
acquitted him of all other charges.  The judge imposed a 
sentence of two years in a house of correction.  The defendant 
6 
 
appealed, and we granted his application for direct appellate 
review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  General Laws c. 268, § 13B, offers far-
reaching protection to five categories of protected persons 
delineated therein.  See Commonwealth v. Morse, 468 Mass. 360, 
367 (2014) (noting that § 13B is "[o]ne of the broader statutes 
in the category of 'crimes against public justice'"); 
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 434 n.16 (2011) 
(acknowledging legislative intent to proscribe broad range of 
conduct by "expanding the types of 'proceeding' covered by the 
statute").  The subsection at issue here specifically prohibits, 
in relevant part, intimidation of "a witness or potential 
witness at any stage of a criminal investigation, . . . or other 
criminal proceeding of any type."  G. L. c. 268, 
§ 13B (1) (c) (i). 
 
The defendant argues that § 13B (1) (c) (i) prohibits 
intimidation only of witnesses who have knowledge of actual 
crimes that have already occurred.  The defendant thus contends 
that his motion for a required finding of not guilty should have 
been allowed because there was no basis for a reasonable jury to 
find that he had already committed a crime when he took the 
victim's cellular telephone to prevent her from calling 911.  
See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 368 Mass. 580, 589 (1975) 
("abusive speech is not, without more, subject to criminal 
7 
 
sanction").  Although we reject the defendant's construction of 
the statute as too narrow, we agree that the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain his conviction under § 13B (1) (c) (i) 
on the theory argued by the Commonwealth at trial. 
 
The language of § 13B (1) (c) (i) does not require proof 
that an actual crime was committed before the act of 
intimidation, but rather, as stated, that the victim of the 
intimidation was "a witness or potential witness at any stage of 
a criminal investigation, . . . or other criminal proceeding."3  
We have previously observed that a "'criminal proceeding' within 
the meaning of § 13B commences on the investigation of a 
possible criminal violation" -- not an actual crime (emphasis 
added).  Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 464 Mass. 365, 371 (2013).  
To require proof that a predicate crime was committed before the 
act of intimidation would be contrary to the statute's plain 
language and the intent of the 2006 amendment that added this 
provision.  See St. 2006, c. 48, § 3; Figueroa, supra at 368-369 
(noting 2006 amendments were intended to broaden scope of 
                     
 
3 In arguing that G. L. c. 268, § 13B (1) (c) (i), requires 
proof that a predicate crime was committed before the act of 
intimidation, the defendant relies on G. L. c. 268, 
§ 13B (1) (c) (ii), which protects "a person who is or was aware 
of information, records, documents or objects that relate to a 
violation of a criminal statute, or a violation of conditions of 
probation, parole or bail."  That is not, however, the part of 
the statute under which the Commonwealth prosecuted the 
defendant and the trial judge charged the jury. 
8 
 
protections and prohibited conduct); Hrycenko v. Commonwealth, 
459 Mass. 503, 508 (2011) (amendments "expressly expanded" scope 
of § 13B). 
 
Further, the statute's reference to a "potential witness at 
any stage of a criminal investigation" indicates that the 
investigation need not have already begun when the intimidation 
occurred.  "Potential" means "[c]apable of being but not yet in 
existence; latent."  American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 1025 (New College ed. 1980).  See Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 1775 (1963) (defining "potential" as 
"existing in possibility:  having the capacity or a strong 
possibility for development into a state of actuality"); Black's 
Law Dictionary 1357 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "potential" as 
"[c]apable of coming into being; possible if the necessary 
conditions exist").  See, e.g., Boelter v. Selectmen of Wayland, 
479 Mass. 233, 239 (2018), quoting Boylston v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, 434 Mass. 398, 405 (2001) ("We usually determine the 
plain and ordinary meaning of a term by its dictionary 
definition").  Consistent with these definitions, we have 
described a potential witness as, inter alia, a person who might 
observe further criminal activity or testify at a future 
proceeding.  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 479 Mass. 163, 167-168 
(2018) (describing "potential witness" as witness to "further 
criminal activity").  See also Commonwealth v. Squires, 476 
9 
 
Mass. 703, 711 (2017) (Gaziano, J., dissenting) (describing 
"potential witnesses" as persons who might see crime occurring); 
Commonwealth v. McCreary, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 797, 800 (1998), 
citing Commonwealth v. Belle Isle, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 230 
(1998) (describing victim of intimidation as "potential witness" 
where there was no ongoing investigation, but defendant 
prevented victim from contacting police by destroying 
telephone).  Thus, a "potential witness at any stage of a 
criminal investigation" includes persons who are likely to 
participate in a future investigation that has not yet begun. 
 
This interpretation is consistent with previous Appeals 
Court decisions, which have concluded that the purpose of 
G. L. c. 268, § 13B, includes "deterring interference with 
future communication of information," and that, consequently, 
"[a] criminal investigation need not have commenced" for the 
statute to apply.  Commonwealth v. King, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 113, 
121 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Burt, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 275, 
278 (1996).  "It is enough that the jury reasonably conclude 
from the surrounding circumstances that it was likely that the 
victim would furnish to an official investigating authority 
information pertaining to the crime and that the defendant 
intended to discourage such communication."  King, supra.  In 
Belle Isle, 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 227, 229, the Appeals Court 
rejected the defendant's argument that the statute did not apply 
10 
 
to him because there was no ongoing criminal investigation when 
he severed a telephone cord from the wall to prevent his sister 
from contacting the police to report the defendant's assault on 
her husband.4 
 
We therefore conclude that to convict the defendant of 
witness intimidation under G. L. c. 268, § 13B (1) (c) (i), the 
Commonwealth had to prove that (1) a possible criminal violation 
occurred that would trigger a criminal investigation or 
proceeding; (2) the victim would likely be a witness or 
potential witness in that investigation or proceeding; (3) the 
defendant engaged in intimidating behavior, as defined in the 
statute, toward the victim; and (4) the defendant did so with 
the intent to impede or interfere with the investigation or 
proceeding, or in reckless disregard5 of the impact his conduct 
                     
 
4 We recognize that these Appeals Court decisions concerned 
an earlier version of G. L. c. 268, § 13B, that lacked the 
statutory clause at issue here -- "potential witness at any 
stage of a criminal investigation" -- which was added by 
amendment in 2006.  But we think it unlikely that the 
Legislature intended thereby to narrow the statute's scope by 
newly requiring that a criminal investigation or other 
proceeding be pending at the time of the alleged intimidation, 
given that the purpose of the 2006 amendments was to broaden the 
statute's coverage.  See Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 464 Mass. 
365, 368-369 (2013). 
 
 
5 "A defendant's reckless disregard of the possibility that 
his or her conduct might interfere with the proceeding at issue 
also is sufficient to establish this element of the statute."  
Commonwealth v. Paquette, 475 Mass. 793, 797 n.5 (2016), citing 
G. L. c. 268, § 13B (1) (c) (v).  In this case, however, the 
 
11 
 
would have in impeding or interfering with that investigation or 
proceeding.  The Commonwealth was not required to prove that an 
actual crime had occurred or that a criminal investigation was 
in progress when the alleged intimidation occurred. 
 
With this legal framework in mind, we now turn to the 
particulars of the present case.  In closing argument, the 
prosecutor argued to the jury that the victim "wanted to call 
911 because [the defendant] was using . . . abusive language, 
was getting louder, and was getting louder every time that he 
was using that abusive language," but when "[s]he took her phone 
out and attempted to call 911," the defendant "grabbed her phone 
from her, prevented her from calling 911."  "That's intimidation 
of a witness," the prosecutor asserted.6  After careful review of 
the record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we 
conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support a 
conviction on this basis.  The evidence did not permit a 
rational trier of fact to find that, at the point in time when 
the defendant took the victim's cellular telephone, a possible 
                                                                  
trial judge did not include the reckless disregard standard in 
his jury instruction, and consequently we do not consider it 
further in deciding whether to affirm the defendant's 
conviction. 
 
6 Although the prosecutor subsequently stated more 
generally, in discussing the witness intimidation charge, that 
the victim "attempted to call the police for help" and that the 
defendant "prevented her from doing that," he did not identify 
any other alleged actions by the defendant as the basis for that 
charge. 
12 
 
criminal violation had occurred that would trigger a criminal 
investigation or proceeding in which the victim was likely to be 
a potential witness, and that the defendant intended to 
interfere with such an investigation or proceeding. 
 
The victim testified that the defendant loudly called her 
"nasty names," which hurt her feelings and made her cry, and 
that as soon as she said she was going to call 911, the 
defendant took her cellular telephone from her and begged her 
not to call.  The prosecutor did not elicit any details from the 
victim, however, about how exactly the defendant took her 
cellular telephone, or whether he had made any kind of verbal 
threats or physical movements toward her, either before taking 
her cellular telephone or when he did so.  Thus, although the 
Commonwealth characterizes the defendant's conduct as 
"assaultive behavior," it presented no evidence at trial to 
support that characterization by showing that the defendant 
attempted a battery or sought to put the victim in fear of an 
immediately threatened battery at that point in time.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gorassi, 432 Mass. 244, 247-248 (2000) ("Under 
the common law, an assault may be accomplished . . . either by 
an attempted battery, or by putting another in fear of an 
immediately threatened battery. . . .  In the case of a 
threatened battery type of assault, the Commonwealth must prove 
that the defendant engaged in 'objectively menacing' conduct 
13 
 
with the intent to put the victim in fear of immediate bodily 
harm").  See also Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42, 56 
(2015) ("The victim's apprehension of imminent physical harm 
must be reasonable.  In determining whether an apprehension of 
anticipated physical force is reasonable, a court will look to 
the actions and words of the defendant in light of the attendant 
circumstances" [citations omitted]). 
 
In sum, the Commonwealth failed to present a case that the 
defendant engaged in anything more than abusive speech before he 
took the victim's cellular telephone.  Consequently, we are 
constrained to conclude that there was insufficient evidence for 
the jury to find that, at the moment when the defendant took the 
victim's cellular telephone, a possible criminal violation had 
occurred; that a criminal investigation would ensue in which the 
victim would likely become a potential witness; and that the 
defendant intended to interfere with that anticipated 
investigation.7 
                     
 
7 We disagree, however, with the defendant's contention that 
taking the victim's cellular telephone was not sufficient to 
constitute "intimidat[ion]" under G. L. c. 268, 
§ 13B (1) (c) (i).  The statute "does not require that a 
defendant specifically articulate a threat not to speak to the 
police or other criminal investigator."  Commonwealth v. King, 
69 Mass. App. Ct. 113, 120 (2007).  And an "action does not need 
to be overtly threatening to fall within the meaning of 
'intimidation.'"  Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 
124 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Casiano, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 
705, 708 (2007).  Especially given the central place of cellular 
 
14 
 
 
The prosecutor could have made a different argument to the 
jury, for which the evidence was sufficient to convict the 
defendant of witness intimidation.  The prosecutor could have 
argued that, once the defendant grabbed the victim's arms and 
pushed her away as she attempted to leave the apartment, the 
victim had knowledge of a possible criminal violation, such as 
assault or assault and battery, and therefore became a 
"potential witness at any stage of a criminal investigation."  
See G. L. c. 268, § 13B (1) (c).  The prosecutor could also have 
argued that, by choking the victim, banging her head against the 
wall, and preventing her from leaving the apartment, the 
defendant "attempt[ed] or cause[d] physical injury" to the 
victim or "intimidate[d]" her within the meaning of the statute.  
See G. L. c. 268, § 13B (1) (a), (c).  And finally, given the 
victim's testimony that she had told the defendant she wanted to 
leave to call 911, that he begged her not to do so, and that he 
said he was not going to let her leave, the prosecutor could 
have argued that the defendant attempted or caused physical 
injury to the victim or intimidated her to prevent her from 
                                                                  
telephones as a means of communication in contemporary life, 
depriving a victim of access to one can certainly qualify as an 
act of intimidation when a potential witness seeks to report a 
possible criminal violation.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Belle Isle, 44 
Mass. App. Ct. 226, 230 (1998). 
15 
 
contacting the police, i.e., with the intent to interfere with a 
criminal investigation.  See G. L. c. 268, § 13B (1) (c) (v). 
 
But we cannot affirm the defendant's conviction on this 
alternative ground, even though it was open to the jury to 
consider under the trial judge's instructions,8 because we have 
no way of knowing whether the jury's verdict was based on this 
ground or on the defendant's isolated act of taking the victim's 
cellular telephone, as the prosecutor argued.  "[I]f the 
evidence presented to the jury would warrant a conviction on one 
ground, but not on another, and it is impossible to tell on 
which ground the jury relied, the verdict must be set aside on 
appeal."  Commonwealth v. Rollins, 470 Mass. 66, 78 (2014), 
quoting Chambers v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 49, 51-52 (1995).9  
Indeed, given the prosecutor's singular focus on the defendant's 
act of taking the victim's cellular telephone as the ground for 
the witness intimidation charge, the jury may well have 
                     
 
8 In response to a question from the jury about the criteria 
for witness intimidation, the judge instructed them that the 
charge of intimidation "relates to the Commonwealth's allegation 
of what happened inside the apartment and [the defendant] 
allegedly preventing [the victim] from leaving and/or taking her 
cell phone." 
 
 
9 For example, in Commonwealth v. Rollins, 470 Mass. 66, 78-
79 (2014), we reversed a defendant's conviction on one count of 
possession of child pornography where the Commonwealth submitted 
two photographs to the jury, only one of which was pornographic 
under the relevant statute, and there was no way of discerning 
which photograph was the premise for the jury's guilty verdict. 
16 
 
convicted the defendant based on that isolated act, even though 
the evidence was insufficient to show that a possible criminal 
violation had occurred at that point in time.  In light of these 
circumstances, we must reverse the defendant's conviction.  "It 
is well established in this Commonwealth that a verdict cannot 
stand unless it appears that the jury reached their verdict on a 
theory for which there was factual support."  Commonwealth v. 
Plunkett, 422 Mass. 634, 635 (1996).  The Commonwealth may retry 
the defendant on the charge of witness intimidation based on the 
alternative ground set forth above, since sufficient evidence 
was introduced to support a conviction on that basis.10  See 
Gorassi, 432 Mass. at 249-250. 
                     
 
10 The defendant also argues that the trial judge abused his 
discretion by admitting in evidence a letter and drawings that 
the defendant later sent to the victim.  The defendant contends 
that these documents constituted uncharged bad acts evidence the 
prejudicial effect of which outweighed their probative value, 
and that the jury may have based their verdict on these 
documents rather than on the events on December 25, 2015.  While 
this argument is moot in light of our ruling above, we address 
the issue in case it resurfaces at a new trial.  The trial judge 
specifically and repeatedly instructed the jury that the letter 
and drawings were admitted for the limited purposes of showing 
the defendant's consciousness of guilt, that the defendant was 
not charged with any crime based on those documents, and that 
they were not the basis for the witness intimidation charge.  
"We generally 'presume that a jury understand and follow 
limiting instructions, . . . and that the application of such 
instructions ordinarily renders any potentially prejudicial 
evidence harmless.'"  Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 
251 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 718 
(2000). 
17 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment is reversed, and the verdict 
is set aside. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.