Title: Bradshaw v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 345, 2001
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 13, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TERRENCE BRADSHAW, 
§ 
§ 
No. 345, 2001  
Defendant Below, 
§ 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of  
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
C. A. Nos.  IN00-06-0479 
§ 
 
 
IN00-06-0480 
§ 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0003013666 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted: May 14, 2002 
Decided:  June 13, 2002 
 
 Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED. 
 
 
Robert M. Goff, Jr., Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for Appellant. 
 
Thomas E. Brown, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
VEASEY, Chief Justice: 
 
In this appeal from the Superior Court we consider whether there was plain error 
when the defendant was absent from the courtroom both at the time his counsel, 
without authority, agreed to allow the trial court to give an Allen charge1 to a 
deadlocked jury and also when the charge was actually given.  We hold that the absence 
of the defendant was a violation of the right granted by Rule 43 of the Delaware 
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure to be present “at every stage of the trial . . . 
.”2  Furthermore, the defendant’s counsel was incapable of waiving this right for him, 
and the defendant’s absence for fifteen minutes at the end of a full day of jury 
deliberation does not constitute a personal waiver of this right. 
The defendant was prejudiced by this error.  First, he could well have had 
valuable input into the decision whether to give the Allen charge.  Second, the fact that 
the jury was able to view his empty chair at this critical moment in their deliberations 
was inherently prejudicial.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court 
and remand for a new trial. 
                                                 
1See Allen v. United States, 14 U.S. 492, 501 (1896) (authorizing a supplemental instruction encouraging a 
deadlocked jury to try to reach a verdict). 
2Super. Ct. Crim. R. 43(a). 
 
 
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Facts 
The State charged Terrence Bradshaw, defendant below and appellant, with two 
counts of third degree rape3 and one count of second degree unlawful sexual contact4 
for an incident involving Cassandra Winthrop,5 the 12-year-old victim in this case.  The 
State tried Bradshaw before a jury in Superior Court on May 1 and 2 of 2001. 
Winthrop testified that in January of 2000 she went to the Days Inn hotel in 
New Castle with a group of people, one of whom was Bradshaw.  They went to a room 
on the third floor.  When they entered the room, Winthrop testified that she lay on one 
of the beds and Bradshaw lay on top of her.  She testified that he took off her clothes 
and touched her vagina; that he removed his pants, put on a condom, and engaged in 
vaginal intercourse with her; and that he put his penis in her mouth.  A manager at the 
Days Inn hotel testified that business records showed that Bradshaw had registered for 
Room 308 on January 28, 2000. 
                                                 
311 Del. C. § 771(a)(1). 
411 Del. C. § 768. 
5This Court has sua sponte assigned a pseudonym to protect this underage victim’s true identity.  See Supr. Ct. 
R. 7(d) (“[T]he Court may order the use of pseudonyms sua sponte.”); Trump v. State, 753 A.2d 963, 965 n.1 (Del. 2000) 
(assigning a pseudonym to protect an underage victim’s true identity in an unlawful sexual intercourse case). 
 
 
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On cross-examination, Bradshaw’s counsel elicited the fact that Winthrop had 
told the police that they had not engaged in oral sex.  He also elicited the fact that she 
had initially told her mother about the incident because she had become symptomatic 
for genital herpes. 
Bradshaw testified in his defense.  He denied having registered at the Days Inn 
hotel on January 28, 2000.  He testified that the address listed on the Days Inn receipt 
was outdated and from an old identification card that he had lost.  He also denied 
knowing or having had sexual intercourse with Winthrop.  He testified that he had 
tested negative for genital herpes since the alleged encounter with Winthrop. 
The jury retired for deliberations at 4:05 P.M. on May 2 and went home at 5:24 
P.M.  Before they left for the evening, the jury asked the Superior Court three questions 
about whether there was any other evidence that Bradshaw was at the hotel that 
evening, including, “Is there a signature from January 28th, 2000, that could have been 
checked?”  The court responded, “The Court cannot comment on the evidence.”  The 
jury returned to the court to continue their deliberations at 9:30 A.M. the following 
morning.  At 3:10 P.M., the Superior Court received a note from the jury stating, “Dear 
Judge:  We are unable to make a decision.  Thanks.”  At 3:17 P.M., the court convened 
 
 
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the parties, with the exception of Bradshaw himself, who apparently was not 
immediately to be found at that moment in the vicinity of the courtroom. 
The State requested an Allen charge.  This is a request from a trial court to the 
jury to attempt to come to a decision in the case without abandoning any firmly held 
beliefs.6  The trial judge then observed that this was a two-day trial and “not a murder 
trial,” and that “it’s my experience that in such cases, an Allen Charge is probably not 
going to be fruitful.” 
The trial judge asked whether there was a “request for an Allen Charge.”  
Bradshaw’s counsel responded to this question, voicing his discomfort at proceeding 
without his client, who could not be immediately located.  His counsel claimed that 
Bradshaw had been at the courthouse all day, and that he had seen him an hour before. 
 Bradshaw’s counsel speculated that he could have gone out “to get a bite to eat . . . .” 
                                                 
6See Holland v. State, 744 A.2d 980, 981-82 (Del. 2000) (calling it “a supplemental instruction encouraging the 
jury to reach a verdict”) (citing Allen v. United States, 14 U.S. 492, 501 (1896)). 
Both Bradshaw’s counsel and the bailiff looked for Bradshaw unsuccessfully.  
After a very brief search for Bradshaw, his counsel made an “independent decision to 
join the prosecutor’s request for an Allen Charge . . . .”  He stated, “I can’t imagine that 
the case would, from the defense perspective, go any better than it did on the occasion 
 
 
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of this trial.”  The jury then entered the courtroom at 3:25 P.M., fifteen minutes after 
the jury’s note to the trial judge and eight minutes after the Superior Court reconvened. 
 The trial judge then polled the jury to see whether further deliberations might be 
fruitful.  A number of people indicated that it would not.  Some, however, did not 
respond.  The trial judge then gave an Allen charge to the jury.  Bradshaw was not 
present for the reading of the Allen charge to the jury.  At 1:50 P.M. on May 4, the jury 
reconvened and returned a verdict of not guilty on one of the rape counts and guilty on 
the other two charges. 
 
The Right to be Present Under Rule 43 
A defendant’s right to be present at his own trial has two dimensions: a 
constitutional one and one based on the Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.  The United States Supreme Court has ruled that due process guarantees a 
defendant’s right to be personally present “whenever [the defendant’s] presence has a 
relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the 
charge.”7  In applying this test, courts ask whether the defendant could personally “give 
advice or suggestion or even [decide] to supersede his lawyers altogether and conduct 
                                                 
7Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934). 
 
 
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the trial himself.”8  Thus, a defendant’s constitutional right to be present wanes when 
pure questions of law are discussed and waxes when his or her personal knowledge 
becomes germane.9 
This Court need not decide whether Bradshaw’s absence was a constitutional 
violation, however, because it was a violation of Superior Court rules.  Rule 43 of the 
Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a defendant to be 
present “at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including 
the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of 
sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule.”10  Rule 43 does not require a 
defendant’s presence “[a]t a conference or argument upon a question of law.”11  This 
                                                 
8Id. at 106. 
9See United States v. Graves, 669 F.2d 964, 972 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that defendants do not have the right to 
attend proceedings concerning a “purely legal matter” such as “jury instructions”). 
10Super. Ct. Crim. R. 43(a). 
11Super. Ct. Crim. R. 43(c)(3). 
 
 
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rule was modeled after Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43,12 so precedent regarding 
that rule is germane. 
                                                 
12Fed. R. Crim. P. 43. 
 
 
- 8 - 
The giving of an Allen charge to a jury is a “stage of the trial,” a stage wherein a 
trial court encourages the jury to continue deliberations.  An Allen charge takes place 
after “the impaneling of the jury” but before “the return of the verdict.”13  These are the 
two examples set forth in Rule 43 to delineate the bounds of a defendant’s right to be 
present.  Federal courts have held that giving an Allen charge to a jury implicates the 
federal version of Rule 43.14  Furthermore, this was not “a conference or argument 
upon a question of law.”15  As we discuss more fully below,16 the defendant's decision 
whether to agree to or resist the giving of an Allen charge implicates a choice whether a 
defendant likes his chances with this trial or with a new one.  That is not an “argument 
                                                 
13Super. Ct. Crim. R. 43(a). 
14United States v. Giacalone, 588 F.2d 1158, 1165 (6th Cir. 1978) (concluding that it was “technically in error” 
for the judge to give an Allen instruction when neither defendant nor defense counsel were present, but concluding that 
there was no prejudice); United States v. Wilburn, 549 F.2d 734, 737-38 (10th Cir. 1977) (concluding implicitly that Rule 
43 applied to the giving of an Allen instruction, but that the defendant had failed to show prejudice “[i]n the 
circumstances of the case”). 
15Super. Ct. Crim. R. 43(a)(3). 
16Infra notes 46-50 and text accompanying. 
 
 
- 9 - 
on a question of law,” but a basic question of trial objectives to which a defendant can 
reasonably be expected to contribute.  
 Moreover, Bradshaw was not in the courtroom when the trial judge actually gave 
the Allen charge to the jury.  This, quite apart from the decision to give the Allen charge, 
certainly did not implicate the Rule 43 exceptions pertaining to conferences in 
chambers about the proper application of legal principles.  Rather,  the defendant's 
absence, observable by the jury during the giving of the Allen charge, is an operative fact 
that raises the issue of prejudice. 
Waiver of the Right to be Present 
A defendant may normally waive a right either personally or through his or her 
counsel.  The common law exhibited a strong presumption against the waiver of the 
right to be present in criminal cases.17  “It was thought ‘contrary to the dictates of 
humanity to let a prisoner ‘waive that advantage to which a view of his sad plight might 
give him by inclining the hearts of the jurors to listen to his defence with 
                                                 
17See Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259 (1993) (“The right generally was considered unwaivable in 
felony cases.”). 
 
 
- 10 - 
indulgence.’’”18 Both the federal Rule 43 and its Delaware equivalent have, however, 
since modified this rule. 
                                                 
18Id. (quoting F. Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice 388 (9th ed. 1889) (quoting Prine v. Commonwealth, 
18 Pa. 103, 104 (Pa. 1851))). 
 
 
- 11 - 
We will first address whether Bradshaw waived his right to be present personally. 
 Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right19 and it can either be express 
or implied.  Rule 43(c)(2) addresses express waiver, and allows it if the consent is 
“written” and if the potential punishment does not exceed one year in prison.20  There 
is no evidence here that Bradshaw expressly waived his right to be present.  Rule 43(b) 
addresses implied waiver, providing, “The further progress of the trial to and including 
the return of the verdict shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be considered 
to have waived the right to be present whenever a defendant, initially present . . . [i]s 
voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced . . . .”21  Federal courts have interpreted 
the comparable federal rule to require both that a defendant’s absence be “voluntary” 
and that it be significant enough to impede “[t]he further progress of the trial . . . .”22 
                                                 
19Warner v. State, 2001 Del. LEXIS 489, at *3-4 (Del. Supr.) (requiring the “intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right”) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). 
20Super. Ct. Crim. R. 43(c)(2). 
21Super. Ct. Crim. R. 43(b). 
22United States v. Benavides, 596 F.2d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 
 
- 12 - 
We cannot say on this record that Bradshaw’s absence was voluntary in the sense 
that it constituted a knowing waiver of his right to be present at trial.  In the Rule 43 
scenario in which a defendant “flees from a courtroom in the midst of a trial —where 
judge, jury, witnesses and lawyers are present and ready to continue—” waiver is implied 
because a reasonable defendant would “know that as a consequence the trial could 
continue in his absence.”23  Here, the trial judge waited fifteen minutes before 
proceeding.  Furthermore, this was not the presentation stage of the trial—the jury had 
been deliberating uneventfully for almost the entire day.  Finally, the record is not 
inconsistent with the supposition that Bradshaw was taking a long restroom break, or 
that he was getting food.  There is no basis in this record to infer that Bradshaw would 
have known that his actions would constitute waiver of his right to be present. 
Furthermore, we cannot say that Bradshaw’s absence prevented “[t]he further 
progress of the trial . . . .”24  When a defendant is voluntarily absent, federal courts have 
considered a list of factors in determining whether the trial should proceed without a 
defendant, including “the likelihood that the trial could soon take place with the 
defendant present; the difficulty of rescheduling; . . . [and] the burden on the 
                                                 
23United States v. Taylor, 478 F.2d 689, 691 (1st Cir. 1973). 
24Super. Ct. Crim. R. 43(b). 
 
 
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Government.”25  There was no evidence that the trial judge or counsel on either side 
even touched upon these commonsense considerations. 
                                                 
25United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1210 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 
 
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Here, the jury had already been deliberating most of the day.  The court could 
have waited longer for Bradshaw that afternoon, or it could have continued proceedings 
until the next day.  Indeed, the jury deliberated into the following afternoon in any 
event.  Then the proceedings could have taken place with Bradshaw, and both the 
burden on the State and the difficulties of rescheduling would have been minimal.  
Cases finding implied waiver upon voluntary absence usually involve absences of a 
whole day or more,26 or where the defendant can be said to have “fled.”27  Even extreme 
cases finding waiver are distinguishable.28  We need not determine how long the trial 
judge should have waited.  It is sufficient to say that she did not wait long enough in 
this case. 
                                                 
26See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 604 F.2d 361, 365 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding waiver when the defendant was 
absent between a luncheon and afternoon recess, the trial court lectured him on the importance of his presence, and then 
he disappeared again from the following morning until the end of trial). 
27See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973) (finding waiver when a defendant fled his trial after the 
morning session). 
28See United States v. Warme, 572 F.2d 57, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding waiver when defendant was several 
hours late even when counsel explained that the defendant had rushed his wife, who was having medical problems, to the 
hospital); United States v. Davis, 486 F.2d 725, 726-27 (7th Cir. 1973) (finding waiver when a defendant was 25 minutes 
late for the presentation portion of his trial when he got “caught by a train”). 
 
 
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Bradshaw’s counsel affirmatively joined the State’s request for an Allen charge.  
But he had no authority to do so.  When counsel for a defendant expressly waives an 
objection, instead of merely not making one, this Court generally may not exercise 
review.29  Action by a defendant’s counsel, however, may not constitute waiver when a 
defendant must personally waive a right.30  The general rule is that the right to be 
present is a right that is personal to a defendant, and may not be waived by that 
defendant’s counsel.31 
Some courts hold that counsel may waive this right in misdemeanor cases,32 while 
others hold that such waivers are effective only in misdemeanor cases that do not 
                                                 
29Bullock v. State, 775 A.2d 1043, 1061 (Del. 2001) (Walsh, J., dissenting).  But see Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d  
465, 497 (Del. 1999) (deciding to “waive the waiver rule”). 
30See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (observing that whether a defendant must personally 
participate in the waiver depends on “the right at stake”). 
31See Garcia v. State, 492 So.2d 360, 363 (Fla. 1986) (“It is also true that counsel’s waiver of a defendant’s 
absence at a crucial stage of a trial, without acquiescence or ratification by the defendant, is error.”); Midgett v. State, 139 
A.2d 209, 214-15 (Md. Ct. App. 1958) (“[T]he right to be present is personal to the accused and cannot be waived by his 
counsel.”); Scott v. State, 204 N.W. 381, 381 (Neb. 1925) (“Defendant has a right to be present at all times when any 
proceeding is taken during the trial, from the impaneling of the jury to the rendition of the verdict, inclusive, unless he 
has waived such right; and, it being a personal right to the defendant, the waiver thereof, if permitted, must be by him 
personally, and not by his attorneys.”); 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 1136 (1998) (“According to some authorities, 
the right to be present at his trial . . . can be waived only by a defendant personally . . . . [while] [o]ther courts hold that 
although waiver by counsel is not absolutely precluded, it is not binding on the defendant unless made in his presence or 
by his express authority or unless subsequently acquiesced in by him.”) 
32See Harriet Cotton Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 111 S.E.2d 457, 463-64 (N.C. 1959) (“In this jurisdiction, 
the more important privilege of being present in person, so as to confront one’s accusers on trial for a criminal offense, 
may, in felonies other than capital, be waived by defendant himself, but not by his counsel, while in misdemeanors such 
waiver may be made through counsel with the consent of the court.”). 
 
 
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involve possible imprisonment.33  All three of Bradshaw’s charges were felonies.  The 
State has not pointed out, and this Court has not discovered, any case that would 
permit counsel to waive a defendant’s right to be present under the circumstances of 
this case. 
                                                 
33See Cole v. State, 248 P. 347, 348 (Okla. Crim. App. 1926) (“In a misdemeanor case, as here, where the 
punishment may be imprisonment as well as a fine, the accused may waive the right to be present, but the right to waive 
is personal and can be exercised only by accused.”). 
 
 
- 17 - 
In Crosby v. United States,34 the United States Supreme Court ruled that the 
federal version of Rule 43 contains an exclusive list of the ways in which the right to be 
present may be waived.35  Delaware Rule 43 provides that a defendant’s presence is 
“required . . . except as otherwise provided by this rule.”36  Although Rule 43 provides 
for a defendant’s written waiver under certain circumstances,37 it makes no provision 
for a waiver by counsel.  The implication, at least, is that counsel cannot waive this 
right. 
                                                 
34506 U.S. 255 (1993) 
35Id. at 258-59 (“The list of situations in which the trial may proceed without the defendant is marked as 
exclusive . . . by the express use of a limiting phrase.”)  (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 43  (“The defendant shall be present  . . . 
at every stage of the trial . . . except as otherwise provided by this rule . . . .”) (emphasis added)). 
36Super. Ct. Crim. R. 43(a). 
37Super. Ct. Crim. R. 43(c)(2). 
 
 
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The Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct also suggest that 
Bradshaw’s counsel did not have the authority to waive this right.  Rule 1.2(a) states, “A 
lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . 
and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”38  In 
a criminal case, Rule 1.2(a) states that a lawyer “shall abide by the client’s decision, after 
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and 
whether the client will testify.”39  In distinguishing between “objectives” and “means,” 
the Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct distinguish between certain 
fundamental rights in a criminal case and “decisions that involve tactics and trial 
strategy.”40  These fundamental rights may include the rights specified in Rule 1.2(a) as 
well as others, including the decision to forego other appeals and accept the death 
penalty,41 whether to waive counsel,42 and whether to appeal.43  Given the strong 
common law presumption against waiver of the right to be present, it would seem that 
this is such a right as well.  The decision to deny the jury “a view of the defendant’s sad 
                                                 
38Prof. Cond. R. 1.2(a). 
39Id. 
40Ann. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2 cmt. at 19-20 (3d ed. 1996). 
41Red Dog v. State, 625 A.2d 245, 247-48 (Del. 1993). 
42Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1975). 
 
 
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plight,”44 or to choose to encourage this jury to come to a decision rather than to prefer 
a new trial, seems as fundamental as the decision whether to waive a jury trial.  
Moreover, a lawyer has a duty to reasonably consult with his or her client even as to trial 
tactics and strategy.45  Here, the State conceded at oral argument in this Court that 
there was no valid reason why Bradshaw’s counsel could not have waited to consult with 
his client before proceeding. 
                                                                                                                                                             
43Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439-40 (1963). 
44Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259 (1993). 
45See Prof. Cond. R. 1.2(a) (providing that a lawyer “shall consult with the client as to the means by which [the 
objectives of representation] are to be pursued”); Ann. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2 cmt. at 20 (3d ed. 1996) 
(“[D]ecisions that involve tactics and trial strategy are reserved for the professional judgment of the lawyer after 
consultation with the client.”). 
 
 
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Prejudice and a Defendant’s Absence from an Allen Charge 
The next question is whether Bradshaw was prejudiced by the violation of his 
Rule 43 right to be present.  It is important to note that Bradshaw was absent for two 
conceptually distinct stages of his trial.  The first was the decision whether to give the 
jury the Allen instruction.  The second was the actual reading of the Allen instruction to 
the jury when the defendant was not present.  Each stage involves a separate prejudice 
analysis. 
Before a discussion of the former, it is instructive to consider the Allen charge 
itself.  This is a request from a trial court to the jury to attempt to come to a decision in 
the case without abandoning any firmly held beliefs.46  This charge is often helpful in 
persuading the jury to come to a unanimous verdict, and is sometimes controversial.47  
Delaware follows the majority rule in permitting trial courts to give Allen charges.48  It is 
hard to believe that Bradshaw’s presence, as distinct from that of his counsel, would 
have influenced the wording of Allen charges.  That is indeed a “question of law.”49  In 
                                                 
46Supra note 6. 
47See generally Ralls v. Manson, 375 F. Supp. 1271, 1294-96 (D. Conn. 1974) (noting that it is often called the 
“dynamite” charge because of its effectiveness in dislodging minority viewpoints among jurors, and noting criticism of 
the charge), rev’d, 503 F.2d 491, 498-99 (2d Cir. 1974). 
48Fensterer v. State, 493 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. 1985). 
49See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 43(c)(3) (failing to require a defendant’s presence for a “conference or argument upon 
a question of law”); cf. Krische v. Smith, 662 F.2d 177, 179-80 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the denial of the right to 
 
 
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the circumstances of this case, however, there was a significant possibility that the trial 
judge might have refused to give the instruction altogether in the face of a reasoned 
objection by the defendant.  The trial judge apparently doubted that an Allen charge 
would do any good.  Furthermore, even after the State had expressed a desire to give 
one, the trial judge asked Bradshaw’s counsel whether there was “any request” for one, 
and Bradshaw's counsel eventually made that request.   
Also, when the trial judge asked the jurors whether further deliberations would 
be helpful, none answered that they would.  If Bradshaw’s counsel had argued that this 
was an unambiguous indication that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked, it is also 
possible that the trial judge would have accepted that argument.  Had the jury 
continued to be deadlocked and a mistrial declared, a new trial could well have 
produced a different outcome.  It is at least possible, given the victim’s credibility issues 
and Bradshaw’s testimony, that a jury in any new trial would have concluded that there 
was reasonable doubt of Bradshaw’s guilt and acquitted him. 
                                                                                                                                                             
presence of the defendant and his counsel was prejudicial when the judge instructed a jury to continue deliberations as 
“It’s not soon enough” because “[t]he opportunity to participate in the drafting of a proper form of Allen charge was 
lost”). 
 
 
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This decision is one on which a defendant’s input would be helpful to his 
counsel.50  From a defendant’s perspective, whether to give an Allen charge is a basic, 
fundamental choice between a verdict on this trial or a new trial.  A defendant may well 
be in as good a position as his lawyer to know whether his case might go better at a 
second trial.  He would know how likely it is that he might discover additional evidence. 
 He might have input into how he and all the witnesses came across to the jury, in a 
common sense manner as distinct from a legal one.  Bradshaw was prejudiced in not 
having the chance to consult with his counsel on those considerations. 
                                                 
50See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934) (“Again, defense may be made easier if the accused 
is permitted to be present . . . for it will be in his power, if present, to give advice or suggestion . . . .”). 
 
 
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There is a second and independent reason why Bradshaw was prejudiced.  
Bradshaw was not present when the trial judge read the Allen charge to the jury.  After 
deliberating for more than a day on Bradshaw’s fate, the jury re-entered the courtroom 
only to see Bradshaw’s chair empty.  Instead of observing “a view of his sad plight” at 
this critical phase in their deliberations,51 the jurors might have concluded that 
Bradshaw did not care enough about the outcome of his case to be present, or that he 
thought the result to be a foregone conclusion because he was guilty, or both.  This also 
might have influenced their decision to find him guilty on two of the three charges.  
Accordingly, we conclude that his absence at this stage was inherently prejudicial. 
Conclusion 
We conclude that Bradshaw’s Rule 43 right to be present was violated and that 
neither Bradshaw nor his counsel waived that right.  Bradshaw was prejudiced by his 
counsel's unauthorized agreement to the Allen charge and by his absence when the 
charge was given.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and 
remand for a new trial on one charge of third degree rape and one charge of second 
degree unlawful sexual contact.52 
                                                 
51Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259 (1993). 
52Although Bradshaw has appealed requesting a new trial, the jury acquitted him of one charge, one of the 
counts of third degree rape.  A defendant convicted of one charge but acquitted on another who then procures a new trial 
 
 
- 24 - 
                                                                                                                                                             
may not be tried again on the count of which he was acquitted.  Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969).  
“[C]onditioning an appeal of one offense on a coerced surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another offense 
exacts a forfeiture in plain conflict with the constitutional bar against double jeopardy.”  Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 
184, 193-94 (1957).  Thus, Bradshaw may not be retried on the one count of third degree rape of which he was acquitted.