Title: Guzman v. County of Monterey
Citation: 46 Cal. 4th 887
Docket Number: S157793
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: June 22, 2009

1 
Filed 6/22/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
JAVIER R. GUZMAN et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S157793 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H030647 
COUNTY OF MONTEREY et al., 
) 
 
) 
Monterey County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. M71543 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
This case involves the state‟s Safe Drinking Water Act (Health & Saf. 
Code, § 116270 et seq.) and its implementing regulations.  Plaintiffs are 
approximately 80 men, women, and children who resided at the Jensen Camp 
Mobile Home Park (Jensen Camp) in Monterey County (County) between 1995 
and 2003.  Plaintiffs claim that since at least 1995, the drinking water at Jensen 
Camp was contaminated with high levels of naturally occurring fluoride, but that 
residents were not told of the contamination until 2003.  They brought an action 
against Rick Pinch, Jensen Camp‟s owner and the operator of its water system, 
and against the County and the County‟s Department of Health, which were 
responsible for overseeing the public water systems in their jurisdiction.1 
                                            
1  
The County and its Department of Health were not treated as separate 
entities below.  Like the Court of Appeal below, we refer to the entities 
collectively as the County.   
2 
 
Plaintiffs alleged that the County negligently failed to perform certain 
duties under the Safe Drinking Water Act and regulations, the performance of 
which they claim would have prevented them from drinking the contaminated 
water.  Among other things, plaintiffs maintained that the County had the duty to 
review and to respond to the water system‟s monitoring reports, which necessarily 
implied that the County would direct Pinch to notify the residents of any reported 
water contamination.  The Court of Appeal here held that the County had an  
implied mandatory duty to direct Pinch to give such notification to residents, 
which mandatory duty subjected the public entity to liability under Government 
Code section 815.6. 
 
For reasons that follow, we disagree.  Although the County oversees the 
water systems within its jurisdiction, it does not have the primary responsibility to 
notify consumers of any contaminated water.  This duty rests squarely with the 
operator of the water system (hereafter, water system or water system operator).  
As discussed in greater detail below, in order to impose a mandatory duty on a 
public entity (see Gov. Code, § 815.6), “ „the mandatory nature of the duty must 
be phrased in explicit and forceful language‟ ” (In re Groundwater Cases (2007) 
154 Cal.App.4th 659, 689 (Groundwater Cases), and the statute “must impose a 
duty on the specific public entity sought to be held liable” (Forbes v. County of 
San Bernardino (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 48, 54 (Forbes)). 
 
We reverse the Court of Appeal‟s judgment, which reversed the trial court‟s 
order sustaining the County‟s demurrer without leave to amend and the resulting 
judgment of dismissal.  However, as we shall further explain, the Court of Appeal 
on remand should determine whether plaintiffs have alleged any express 
mandatory duties that would, in and of themselves, give rise to an action against 
the County under Government Code section 815.6. 
3 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
We rely largely on the Court of Appeal‟s statement of facts.  (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 8.500(c)(2).)  As that court explained, “ „On appeal from dismissal 
following a sustained demurrer, we take as true all well-pleaded factual allegations 
of the complaint.‟  (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 495 
(Haggis).)”  Plaintiffs‟ third amended complaint alleged the following facts.  
 
From November 1995 through August 2003, defendant Pinch owned Jensen 
Camp, which contained approximately 25 spaces for mobile homes.  He also 
operated the public water system that provided drinking water to Jensen Camp‟s 
residents.  As discussed in greater detail below, plaintiffs allege that the County 
was responsible for ensuring that public water systems in its jurisdiction, like the 
one at Jensen Camp, were operated in compliance with the law.  Plaintiffs 
maintain that Pinch, who was not knowledgeable as a water system operator, 
relied on the County for information and direction in managing the Jensen Camp 
water system.   
 
Under the Safe Drinking Water Act and its implementing regulations, Pinch 
was required to monitor the water quality at Jensen Camp and to notify the County 
and the water consumers whenever certain inorganic chemicals in the water, like 
fluoride, exceeded a specified maximum contaminant level (MCL).  (Health & 
Saf. Code, § 116275, subd. (f) [defining MCL].)  The MCL for fluoride is 2.0 
milligrams per liter (mg/L).  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, ch. 15, § 64431.)  Water 
containing fluoride in excess of the MCL poses a risk of injury to persons drinking 
it. 
 
Pinch periodically monitored the water quality at Jensen Camp.  The 
monitoring reports indicated that in 1995, the level of fluoride in the water was 7.6 
mg/L; in 1999, it was 8.5 mg/L; and in 2002, it was 5.8 mg/L.  Therefore, each of 
the water monitoring reports showed that the water at Jensen Camp greatly 
4 
exceeded the allowable MCL for fluoride.  The County received copies of these 
monitoring reports.  However, prior to 2003, it did not review the reports and did 
not direct Pinch to notify plaintiffs that their drinking water was unsafe.  In April 
2003, the County imposed a compliance order under which Pinch acknowledged 
the fluoride contamination and agreed to make necessary repairs to the water 
system.   
 
In or about August 2003, plaintiffs Javier R. Guzman and Tosha F. 
Djirbandee-Ramos, who were residents of Jensen Camp at the time, purchased the 
camp from Pinch.  They did not become aware of the fluoride contamination until 
after the sale.  Once the new owners learned of the contamination, they notified 
the other residents and provided bottled water while they investigated repairs to 
the water system.   
 
Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit against Pinch and the County.  In their 
third amended complaint (the relevant pleading here), plaintiffs alleged two 
negligence causes of action against the County.2  Claiming that the County had 
breached a mandatory duty under Government Code section 815.6, plaintiffs cited 
the following statutes in support of this negligence claim:  Health and Safety Code 
section 116325, and sections 64256, 64257, 64432, 64480, and former section 
64464.3 of title 22 of the California Code of Regulations.3 
                                            
2  
One of plaintiffs‟ negligence claims against the County, which alleges a 
“special relationship” between plaintiffs and the County, is not at issue in this 
appeal.  Plaintiffs‟ claims against Pinch are pending in the superior court, and are 
also not at issue here. 
 
3 
Unless otherwise noted, all further section references are to title 22 of the 
California Code of Regulations. 
 
5 
 
As discussed in greater detail below, plaintiffs‟ third cause of action against 
the County alleged that under these “enactments” (Gov. Code, § 815.6), the 
County had a mandatory duty to:  (1) review Pinch‟s water quality monitoring 
reports and establish a system to assure that data submitted by water suppliers be 
reviewed for compliance (§ 64256, subd. (e)); (2) notify Pinch of his monitoring 
requirements under section 64432 (§ 64256, subd. (a)); (3) report water quality 
violations to the state Department of Health Services4 (§ 64257); (4) review 
“consumer confidence reports” and ensure that Pinch delivered such reports to the 
Jensen Camp residents (§ 64480); and (5) ensure that Pinch complied with the 
Safe Drinking Water Act and that he notified Jensen Camp residents of the 
contaminated water (Health & Saf. Code, § 116325; former § 64464.3).  The trial 
court sustained, without leave to amend, the County‟s demurrer to the third cause 
of action, and subsequently dismissed the County from the action.  Plaintiffs 
appealed.   
 
Agreeing with plaintiffs in part,5 the Court of Appeal held that the County, 
as the local primacy agency, had the implied mandatory duty to instruct the water 
                                            
4 
As of July 1, 2007, the “duties, powers, functions, jurisdiction, and 
responsibilities” of the former state Department of Health Services were 
transferred to the state Department of Public Health.  (Health & Saf. Code, § 
131051, subd. (a)(5); see id., § 116270, subd. (g).)  We shall refer to the 
responsible state entity as the “Department.” 
 
5  
Plaintiffs do not challenge the Court of Appeal‟s holding that Health and 
Safety Code section 116325, and sections 64480, 64432, and former section 
64464.3 (at least not explicitly) do not impose any particular mandatory duty on 
the County because “[n]one of these enactments is directed to the primacy 
agency . . . .”  Nor do plaintiffs challenge the Court of Appeal‟s conclusion that 
section 64256, subdivision (e) in part does not impose a mandatory duty because it 
does not specify the type of system a local primacy agency must establish.  As 
such, we do not discuss them here. 
 
6 
system operator to notify consumers of any water contamination.  To reach this 
holding, the Court of Appeal concluded the County had mandatory duties to notify 
the water system of its monitoring and reporting requirements, to review 
monitoring reports monthly, and to report compliance violations to the 
Department.  (§ 64256, subds. (a) & (e); § 64257, subd. (a).)  While recognizing 
that Pinch, as the water system operator, had the direct duty to notify consumers of 
any water contamination (see former § 64464.3, subd. (a)(1)), the Court of Appeal 
concluded that “[t]he system described in former section[s] 64464.1 and 64464.3[6] 
unquestionably presumed that the local primacy agency would respond to reports 
of contamination and direct the water system to notify the persons served and to 
specify the manner in which notification was to be given.”  It stopped short of 
holding that the County “had a mandatory duty to ensure that the notice was given 
or that it was given in any particular manner.”  In addition, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that these mandatory duties were intended to protect against the 
physical and emotional injuries plaintiffs claimed to have suffered, and that 
plaintiffs sufficiently pled a causal link between the mandatory duty and the injury 
alleged to withstand the demurrer.  Finally, the Court of Appeal rejected the 
County‟s claim that it was immune from liability under Government Code sections 
818.2, 818.4, 820.4, 820.8, 821, and 821.2. 
 
We granted review.  
                                            
6  
Former sections 64464.1 and 64464.3, which were adopted in 1992 but 
repealed in 2006, were operative at all times relevant here.  (See Register 92, No. 
22 (May 29, 1992).)  The current notification regulations are set out in article 18, 
title 22 of the California Code of Regulations, titled “Notification of Water 
Consumers and the Department.”  (See, e.g., §§ 64463 [“General Public 
Notification Requirements”], 64463.1 [“Tier 1 Public Notice”], 64463.4 [“Tier 2 
Public Notice”], 64463.7 [“Tier 3 Public Notice”], 64465 [“Public Notice Content 
and Format”].)   
7 
DISCUSSION 
A. Government Code section 815.6 
 
Under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.), there is no 
common law tort liability for public entities in California; instead, such liability 
must be based on statute.  (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a) [“Except as otherwise 
provided by statute:  [¶] A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such 
injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity . . . .”]; Miklosy v. 
Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899; see Williams v. 
Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 838 [“intent of the act is not to expand the rights of 
plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential 
governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances”].)  One such statute is 
Government Code section 815.6, which provides:  “Where a public entity is under 
a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the 
risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that 
kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public 
entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.”  
(See Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 498 (Haggis).)  A 
private cause of action lies against a public entity only if the underlying enactment 
sets forth the elements of liability set out in section 815.6.  (Haggis, supra, 22 
Cal.4th at pp. 499-500; see Gov. Code, § 810.6 [“ „[e]nactment‟ ” defined as 
“constitutional provision, statute, charter provision, ordinance or regulation”].) 
 
The elements of liability under Government Code section 815.6 are as 
follows:  “First and foremost, application of section 815.6 requires that the 
enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in 
its directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or 
permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken.  [Citation.]  It is not enough, 
8 
moreover, that the public entity or officer have been under an obligation to 
perform a function if the function itself involves the exercise of discretion.  
[Citation.]”  (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 498.)  Courts have construed this first 
prong rather strictly, finding a mandatory duty only if the enactment “affirmatively 
imposes the duty and provides implementing guidelines.”  (O’Toole v. Superior 
Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 488, 510 (O’Toole); Clausing v. San Francisco 
Unified School Dist. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1224, 1240 (Clausing) [“If rules and 
guidelines for the implementation of an alleged mandatory duty are not set forth in 
an otherwise prohibitory statute, it cannot create a mandatory duty”].) 
 
“Second, but equally important, section 815.6 requires that the mandatory 
duty be „designed‟ to protect against the particular kind of injury the plaintiff 
suffered.  The plaintiff must show the injury is „ “one of the consequences which 
the [enacting body] sought to prevent through imposing the alleged mandatory 
duty.” ‟  [Citation.]  Our inquiry in this regard goes to the legislative purpose of 
imposing the duty.  That the enactment „confers some benefit‟ on the class to 
which plaintiff belongs is not enough; if the benefit is „incidental‟ to the 
enactment‟s protective purpose, the enactment cannot serve as a predicate for 
liability under section 815.6.  [Citation.]”  (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 499; 
see also Evid. Code, § 669, subd. (a)(1) [rebuttable presumption of negligence 
based on violation of statute, ordinance or regulation of public entity].)  If these 
two prongs are met, the next question is whether the breach of the duty was a 
proximate cause of the plaintiff‟s injury.  (See Groundwater Cases, supra, 154 
Cal.App.4th at p. 689; Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 
1450, 1458.) 
 
“Whether a particular statute is intended to impose a mandatory duty, rather 
than a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of 
statutory interpretation for the courts.”  (Creason v. Department of Health Services 
9 
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 623, 631 (Creason); see Manriquez v. Gourley (2003) 105 
Cal.App.4th 1227, 1234-1235 [same rules of statutory construction govern 
interpretation of regulations by administrative agencies].)  We examine the 
“language, function and apparent purpose” of each cited enactment “to determine 
if any or each creates a mandatory duty designed to protect against” the injury 
allegedly suffered by plaintiff.  (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 500.)  At the 
outset, we recognize that the term “shall” is defined as “mandatory” for purposes 
of the Health and Safety Code.  (Health & Saf. Code, § 16; see also Gov. Code, § 
14.)  However, as we have emphasized, this term‟s inclusion in an enactment does 
not necessarily create a mandatory duty; there may be “other factors [that] indicate 
that apparent obligatory language was not intended to foreclose a governmental 
entity‟s or officer‟s exercise of discretion.”  (Morris v. County of Marin (1977) 18 
Cal.3d 901, 910, fn. 6 (Morris); Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 499, citing 
Morris.) 
 
While a public entity‟s exercise of discretion may often mark the dividing 
line between a duty that is mandatory and one that is not (Haggis, supra, 22 
Cal.4th at p. 498), that line is sometimes difficult to draw.  (See Johnson v. State 
of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 788-789 (Johnson) [rejecting semantic and 
literal definitions of “discretion” and adopting rule based on policy 
considerations];7 see also Creason, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 631-633 [holding 
                                            
7 
Although our decision in Johnson, supra, 69 Cal.2d 782, concerned the 
statutory immunity for a public employee‟s “discretionary” acts (Gov. Code, § 
820.2), we recognized that such cases as Johnson “obviously are instructive in 
determining whether „mandatory acts‟ liability should be imposed.”  (Creason, 
supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 633 [applying Johnson‟s distinction between “planning” 
and “operational” levels of decisionmaking to determine if duty is mandatory 
under Gov. Code, § 815.6]; cf. Barner v. Leeds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 676, 685, fn. 2 
[rejecting criticism of Johnson based on stare decisis].)  
10 
Dept. of Health Services had substantial discretion to formulate and report 
appropriate testing standards for hypothyroidism].)  In Creason, we had little 
difficulty concluding that “[t]he drafting of rules, regulations and standards by the 
governmental agency charged with that responsibility would unquestionably fall in 
the category of discretionary „basic policy decisions‟ for which governmental 
agencies usually are insulated from civil liability.”  (Creason, supra, 18 Cal.4th at 
p. 633, citing Johnson, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 793-794.)  However, in cases not 
involving a public entity‟s “ „quasi-legislative policy-making‟ ” (Creason, supra, 
18 Cal.4th at p. 633), the inquiry should focus on whether the entity must “render 
a considered decision” (Johnson, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 795, fn. 8), one requiring 
its expertise and judgment.  (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 506-507; but see 
Morris, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 905 [“the county enjoyed no discretion to ignore the 
dictates of Labor Code section 3800”].) 
 
For instance, in Haggis, which involved local ordinances on property 
development in landslide zones, one ordinance at issue required the City of Los 
Angeles “first, to determine the location and boundaries of the areas requiring 
affidavits, and, second, to decide whether the instability of a given property is of 
such magnitude as to cause an immediate hazard to the occupancy of the proposed 
development.”  (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 506.)  Recognizing the 
“pervasively discretionary nature” of the city‟s authority, we held that the 
ordinance, as a whole, “provides the City with such significant discretion in 
whether to issue or withhold permits as to make Government Code section 815.6 
inapplicable.”  (Ibid.)  We similarly concluded that another ordinance, which 
called on “the judgment, expertise and discretion of the City‟s staff to evaluate” 
whether the slope stabilization was “ „satisfactorily demonstrated‟ ” under the 
ordinance, also did not create a mandatory duty.  (Id. at p. 507; see also Braman v. 
State of California (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 344, 351 (Braman) [“very essence of 
11 
discretion is the power to make „comparisons, choices, judgments, and 
evaluations‟ ”]; de Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 
261 [no mandatory duty where “the predicate enactment confers on government 
officials the discretion to evaluate and decide how best to implement the required 
security”]; cf. Ortega v. Sacramento County Dept. of Health & Human Serv. 
(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 713, 733 [Gov. Code § 820.2, “the collection and 
evaluation of information is an integral part of „the exercise of the discretion‟ ”].) 
 
 Before we address the specific provisions of the Safe Drinking Water Act 
and regulations at issue here, it is helpful to have a basic framework of the 
statutory scheme as it relates to this case. 
B. The Safe Drinking Water Act 
 
The Legislature enacted the Safe Drinking Water Act (Act) in part to 
“ensure that the water delivered by public water systems of this state shall at all 
times be pure, wholesome, and potable.”  (Health & Saf. Code, § 116270, subd. 
(e) [legislative findings and declaration].)8  To achieve the goals of the Act, the 
Legislature established a drinking water regulatory program within the 
Department.  (Health & Saf. Code, § 116270, subd. (g); see ante, at p. 5, fn. 4.)   
 
Among other things, the Department has the responsibility to “adopt 
primary drinking water standards for contaminants in drinking water” (Health & 
Saf. Code, § 116365, subd. (a)), which standards include MCL‟s, specific 
treatment techniques, and monitoring and reporting requirements specified by the 
Department.  (Id., § 116275, subd. (c)(1)-(3) [defining “ „[p]rimary drinking water 
                                            
8  
This legislative objective itself, however, does not create a mandatory duty 
within the meaning of Government Code section 815.6.  (Groundwater Cases, 
supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 691-692 [collecting cases].) 
 
12 
standards‟ ”]; see Groundwater Cases, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 678.)  The 
Department must also “adopt regulations it determines to be necessary to carry out 
the purposes of the chapter.”  (Health & Saf. Code, § 116375; id., § 116375, 
subds. (a)-(j) [inclusive list of types of regulations].)  The Act and its 
implementing regulations are comprehensive and detailed.  (See Hartwell Corp. v. 
Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 256, 268-269 [describing general statutory 
scheme under the Act]; see also Coshow v. City of Escondido (2005) 132 
Cal.App.4th 687, 704 [same]; City of Watsonville v. State Dept. of Health Services 
(2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 875, 887 [“Pursuant to its legislative mandate, 
[Department] has developed comprehensive drinking water standards, which 
include standards for fluoride”].) 
 
As relevant here, the County is a local primacy agency (see Health & Saf. 
Code, § 116275, subd. (r)), that assumed the Department‟s role in administering 
and enforcing the Act for designated public water systems in its jurisdiction.9   
                                            
9  
Under a local primacy delegation agreement, the Department “may delegate 
primary responsibility for the administration and enforcement of this chapter 
within a county to a local health officer” designated as a local primacy agency.  
(Health & Saf. Code, § 116330, subd. (a); id., § 116330, subd. (f) [“local primacy 
agency . . . empowered with all of the authority granted to the department by this 
chapter over those water systems”].)  The Department, however, does not 
“relinquish its authority, but rather shall retain jurisdiction to administer and 
enforce this chapter for the designated water systems to the extent determined 
necessary by the department.”  (Id., § 116330, subd. (a).) 
 
The Department has delegated primacy to local primacy agencies in 35 of 
the 58 counties to regulate public water systems serving fewer than 200 
connections.  (Dept., Small Water Systems:  Technical Support Unit (Apr. 2008 
update) available online at http://www.cdph.ca.gov/certlic/drinkingwater/pages/ 
smallwatersystems.aspx [as of June 22, 2009].)  The Department‟s Web site 
indicates that these local primacy agencies regulate approximately “1,600 
community water systems and 3,900 non-community water systems.”  (Ibid.)  
There are approximately “7,500 public water systems” in the state.  (Dept., 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
13 
Pinch was the operator of one such system at Jensen Camp.10  For purposes of this 
appeal, any duties imposed under the Act and implementing regulations (along 
with any liability resulting from any breach thereof), are identical for the 
Department and for the County.  Only the County‟s duties are at issue here, and 
we focus on them.11 
C. Does the County Have an Implied Duty to Direct a Water System 
Operator to Notify Consumers of Water Contamination? 
 
As the Court of Appeal noted and the parties agree, the express duty to 
notify consumers of any water contamination rests on the operator of the water 
system, not the local primacy agency.  (Former § 64464.3, subd. (a)(1) [“water 
supplier shall notify the [local primacy agency] and the persons served by the 
water system”].)  There is no mandatory duty imposed on a public entity if the 
specified enactment is inapplicable to that entity.  (Hoff v. Vacaville Unified Sch. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
Drinking Water Program (June 2009 update) available online at 
http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/pages/dwp.aspx [as of June 22, 2009].) 
 
10 
The Act and applicable regulations contain varying references to the public 
water system.  (See Health & Saf. Code, § 116275, subd. (h) [defining “public 
water system”]; id., subd. (i) [defining “community water system” as a type of 
public water system]; id., subd. (aa) [defining “small community water system”]; § 
64402.20 [“water supplier,” “person operating a public water system,” and 
“supplier of water” used interchangeably to mean “any person who owns or 
operates a public water system”]; id., § 64400.10 [defining “community water 
system”].)  Neither party asserts that the distinction among the terms, if any, 
makes any difference to the issue here.   
 
11  
As relevant here, the references to the “Department,” “local primacy 
agency,” or “local health officer” in the applicable statutes and regulations are all 
to the County unless otherwise noted.  (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 116275, subd. 
(r), 116330; see also §§ 64251, subd. (a)(2), 64252.)   
14 
Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 939 [“By its terms, Education Code section 44807 
requires only „teacher[s]‟ to hold pupils to strict account for their conduct; it does 
not purport to impose a mandatory duty more broadly on any public entity”]; 
Forbes, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 54.) 
 
However, the Court of Appeal held that the County had an implied 
mandatory duty to direct a water system operator to notify consumers of any 
contamination.  This implied duty is at the heart of plaintiffs‟ action.  To reach this 
holding, the court made several conclusions about the County‟s various mandatory 
duties as a local primacy agency.  (See §§ 64256, 64257; former §§ 64464.1, 
64464.3; see ante, at p. 6.)  It held that the County had an express duty to notify 
Pinch of his water monitoring and reporting requirements (§ 64256, subd. (a)), 
which assertedly included his duty to notify his customers that the water was 
contaminated.  It also concluded that the County had the express duty to review a 
system‟s water quality reports (§ 64256, subd. (e)), and to report compliance 
violations to the Department (§ 64257, subd. (a)), and that this duty “presumes that 
the primacy agency will evaluate the reports to identify violations.”  Finally, the 
court held that the notification regulations (former §§ 64464.1, 64464.3) 
“unquestionably presumed that the local primacy agency would respond to reports 
of contamination and direct the water system to notify the persons served and to 
specify the manner in which the notification was to be given.”   
 
Urging us to adopt the Court of Appeal‟s reasoning, plaintiffs maintain that 
case law and public policy considerations support their claim that an implied 
mandatory duty exists here.  (See Alejo v. City of Alhambra (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 
1180 (Alejo); Walt Rankin & Associates, Inc. v. City of Murrieta (2000) 84 
Cal.App.4th 605 (Rankin); Braman, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 344.)  As we explain 
further below, the Court of Appeal‟s holding rests largely on its erroneous 
interpretation of several regulations, which assertedly imposed certain duties.  We 
15 
conclude that the cited regulations do not individually or collectively impose an 
implied mandatory duty on the County to direct Pinch to notify consumers when 
water contamination occurs. 
 
We discuss each underlying duty in turn, beginning with the language of 
each enactment.  (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 499.) 
1. Duty to Notify Water System of Monitoring and Reporting 
Requirements (§ 64256, subd. (a)) 
 
Section 64256 is directed to the local primacy agency:  “The local primacy 
agency shall notify each small water system under its jurisdiction in writing of the 
monitoring requirements for that system pursuant to Title 22, Division 4, Chapters 
15, 17, and 17.5 of the California Code of Regulations.[12]  The notice shall identify 
the specific contaminants to be monitored, the type of laboratory analyses required 
for each contaminant, the frequency of sampling and any other sampling and 
reporting requirements applicable to that system.”  (§ 64256, subd. (a).)   
 
The regulation‟s language clearly provides that the County shall give the 
water system written notice of the system‟s monitoring, sampling, and reporting 
requirements; it makes no reference to any notification requirements, such as those 
contained in former sections 64464.1 and 64464.3.  While plaintiffs use the terms 
“report” and “notify” interchangeably, those terms are used distinctively under the 
Act and the regulations.  (See Health & Saf. Code, § 116375, subds. (a), (f) [Dept. 
shall adopt regulations for “[t]he monitoring of contaminants, including the type of 
contaminant, frequency and method of sampling and testing, and the reporting of 
                                            
12 
Chapter 15, titled “Domestic Water Quality and Monitoring Regulations,” 
currently covers sections 64400 through 64483, which include the regulatory 
provisions at issue here.  Chapter 17 (§§ 64650-64666), which is titled “Surface 
Water Treatment,” and Chapter 17.5 (§§ 64670-64692), which is titled “Lead and 
Copper,” are not relevant here.  
16 
results,” and “[r]equirements for notifying the public of the quality of the water 
delivered to consumers” (italics added)]; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, ch. 15, art. 18 
[Notification of Water Consumers and the Department (italics added)]; id., art. 19 
[Records, Reporting and Recordkeeping (italics added)]; id., art. 4.1, § 64433.7 
[Recordkeeping, Reporting, and Notification for Water Systems Fluoridating 
(italics added)].)  Thus, contrary to plaintiffs‟ assertion, section 64256, subdivision 
(a), does not impose any duty on the County to inform Pinch of his notification 
duties under former section 64464.3. 
 
Moreover, even assuming that section 64256, subdivision (a), does refer to 
a water system operator‟s notification requirements, the issue here is not whether 
the County failed to inform Pinch of such requirements generally, that is, that he 
had an ongoing obligation to notify the Department (or the local primacy agency 
here) and the water consumers “whenever . . . [t]he water supplied to the 
consumers . . . exceeds the maximum contaminant levels for inorganic chemicals.”  
(Former § 64464.3, subd. (a)(1); see also Health & Saf. Code, § 116450, subd. (a) 
[Act‟s corresponding notification provision].)  Rather, plaintiffs claim that the 
County failed to direct Pinch to notify the Jensen Camp residents of specific 
instances of water contamination in 1995 and 1999.  To address this claim, we 
focus on sections 64256, subdivision (e), and 64257, subdivision (a), which, in 
part, the Court of Appeal found implied such a duty. 
2. Duty to Review Water System’s Monitoring Reports and to Report 
Compliance Violations (§§ 64256, subd. (e), 64257, subd. (a)) 
 
Section 64256, subdivision (e), provides in pertinent part:  “The monitoring 
reports shall be reviewed [by the local primacy agency] each month for each small 
water system and the data entered into the data management system at least 
monthly.”  Section 64257, as relevant here, provides that the local primacy agency 
17 
“shall . . . submit[]” to the Department monthly reports summarizing a water 
system‟s compliance violations.  (§ 64257, subd. (a).) 
 
Based on these regulations, the Court of Appeal found that the County had 
mandatory duties to review a water system‟s monitoring reports and to report 
compliance violations to the Department.  These duties, the court went on, 
necessarily presumed that the County would evaluate the reports to identify any 
violations.  Relying on the reasoning in Alejo, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th 1180, the 
court held that the County had an implied duty to direct Pinch to notify consumers 
of any contamination.  It added that a contrary interpretation “would defeat the 
purpose of the law, which is „to ensure that the water delivered by public water 
systems of this state shall at all times be pure, wholesome, and potable,‟ (Health & 
Saf. Code, § 116270, subd. (e)).” 
 
We disagree with the Court of Appeal‟s reasoning, which plaintiffs urge us 
to adopt.  Even assuming that any duty to review these reports (§ 64256, subd. (e)) 
and to report compliance violations to the Department (§ 64257, subd. (a)) would 
indicate that the County will respond to accounts of water contamination, it does 
not inevitably follow that the County‟s response would be to instruct the water 
system to notify affected consumers, particularly when the system is already under 
an express duty to do so (see ante, at p. 13).  (See Brenneman v. State of 
California (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 812, 818 [a mandatory duty to investigate is not 
a mandatory duty to take action].)  Alejo does not compel a contrary conclusion.   
 
In Alejo, the enactment at issue (Pen. Code, former § 11166, subd. (a)) 
provided that an employee of a child protective agency (such as the police 
department) “shall report” any known or reasonably suspected instances of child 
abuse.  (Alejo, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1185-1186.)  Relying on the statutory 
language, prior cases, and public policy considerations, the Alejo Court of Appeal 
found this enactment imposed two mandatory duties on a police officer who 
18 
receives an account of child abuse — the duty to investigate and the duty to file a 
report of child abuse when an objectively reasonable person in the same situation 
would suspect abuse.  (Alejo, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1186-1188.)  Although 
Penal Code former section 11166, subdivision (a), did not include the term 
“investigate,” the Court of Appeal found such an implied duty because it 
concluded the enactment “clearly envisions some investigation in order for an 
officer to determine whether there is reasonable suspicion to support the child 
abuse allegation and to trigger a report to the county welfare department and the 
district attorney under section 11166, subdivision (i), and to the Department of 
Justice under section 11169, subdivision (a).”  (Alejo, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 
1186.)  This latter section required the child protective agency to forward to the 
Department of Justice a written report of “every case it investigates of known or 
suspected child abuse which is determined not to be unfounded,” and proscribed 
the agency from forwarding a report “unless it has conducted an active 
investigation and determined that the report is not unfounded.”  (Pen. Code, 
former § 11169, subd. (a), quoted in Alejo, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 1186.)  As 
the statutory scheme clearly contemplated, the officer‟s express duty to report was 
necessarily predicated on the officer first investigating the accounts of child abuse.  
(See Nunn v. California (1984) 35 Cal.3d 616, 625 [harmonizing parts of 
enactment “by considering the particular clause in the context of the whole 
statute”].) 
 
In contrast to Alejo, plaintiffs here have identified no enactment in which  
an express duty is necessarily predicated or dependent on a county directing a 
water system to notify consumers of contaminated water.13  Contrary to plaintiffs‟ 
                                            
13  
Moreover, Rankin, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 605, and Braman, supra, 28 
Cal.App.4th 344, are distinguishable and do not support imposing an implied 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
19 
contention, section 64256, subdivision (a), is not such an enactment because as we 
have explained (see ante, at pp. 15-16), it does not require the County to inform a 
water system of its notification requirements.  Plaintiffs question then, what is the 
purpose of the County reviewing a water system‟s monitoring reports if not to 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
mandatory duty in this case.  In Rankin, the Court of Appeal held that even though 
Code of Civil Procedure section 995.310‟s “plain language . . . [did] not per se 
impose a duty on” the city to ensure that a surety providing a bond on one of its 
public works projects is one of three categories of insurers, the court imposed such 
a duty.  (Rankin, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 621.)  Reading this statute in 
conjunction with statutes requiring a payment bond as a condition of being 
awarded a contract by a public entity (Civ. Code, §§ 3247, 3248), the Court of 
Appeal found that these statutes together imposed a duty on the city to make sure 
that the payment bond surety is an admitted surety insurer.  “As the public entity is 
the one required to approve the subject bond, it stands to reason that the public 
entity must be the one to require compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 
995.310.  Any other interpretation would render the provision meaningless.”  
(Rankin, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 621.)  In Rankin, the city alone had the duty 
to ensure that its public works projects were properly bonded; thus, it was 
reasonable to impose the specific duty under Code of Civil Procedure section 
995.310.  In contrast here, the water system operator, Pinch, and not the local 
primacy agency, the County, is expressly charged with notifying affected 
consumers.  The effectiveness of the notification procedure is not wholly 
dependent on the local primacy agency‟s instruction to a water system operator to 
notify consumers.   
 
In Braman, the Court of Appeal found that the Department of Justice had a 
mandatory duty under Penal Code section 12076 to investigate a person‟s 
eligibility to purchase a concealable firearm and to notify a gun dealer if a 
prospective purchaser is ineligible.  (Braman, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 351.) 
Contrary to plaintiffs‟ suggestion, the department‟s duty to act on its examination 
of records was expressly set out in the statute.  (Id. at p. 350, quoting Pen. Code, § 
12076, former subd. (c) [“The department shall examine” records to determine if a 
person is disqualified from purchasing a concealable firearm.  “If the department 
determines that the purchaser or transferee is” disqualified, “it shall immediately 
notify the dealer of that fact.”  (Stats. 1990, ch. 1090, § 2, p. 4550)].)  Thus, 
Braman does not lend support to plaintiffs‟ argument.  
20 
receive notice of water contamination and to act accordingly.  Even if the main 
purpose of reviewing the reports is to receive notice of any contamination, it does 
not necessarily follow that a local primacy agency‟s response must be to direct a 
water system to notify consumers.  Instead, a local primacy agency‟s response can 
be varied.     
 
In responding to noncomplying water systems, local primacy agencies 
“have the same administrative authority as [the Department] to cite and fine 
noncomplying water systems.  [Local primacy agencies] may conduct office 
hearings where they hear the testimony of an alleged noncomplying company. . . .  
As a last resort, the [local primacy agencies] may utilize the County District 
Attorney to initiate court actions against recalcitrant water systems.”  (Final 
Opinion Resolving Substantive Water Quality Issues (Cal.P.U.C. Nov. 2, 2000) 
No. D. 00-11-014 [2000 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 722, *22-23]; see Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 116330, subd. (f) [local primacy agency “shall be empowered with all of the 
authority granted to the department” over specified water systems]; § 64258, subd. 
(a) [“local primacy agency shall take enforcement actions as necessary to assure” 
that water systems “are in compliance” with regulations].)  These various options 
underscore that a local primacy agency has discretionary authority in this context.  
(See Braman, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 351.) 
 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that sections 64256, subdivision (e), 
and 64257, subdivision (a), do not support imposing an implied mandatory duty on 
the County. 
3. Notification Regulations (former §§ 64464.1 and 64464.3) 
 
Contrary to the Court of Appeal‟s conclusion and plaintiffs‟ contention, the 
notification regulations (former §§ 64464.1, 64464.3) also do not support 
imposing an implied duty here.  By their terms, former sections 64464.1 and 
21 
64464.3 focused on the notification obligations of Pinch as the operator of the 
water system.  Former section 64464.3, subdivision (a), provided:  “Unless 
otherwise directed by the [local primacy agency], the water supplier shall notify 
the [local primacy agency] and the persons served by the water system whenever” 
the supplied drinking water exceeds bacteriological quality limits or MCL‟s, or the 
water supplier fails to comply with a prescribed treatment technique or violates 
any schedule.  (Former § 64464.3, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)  This section also set out how 
community water systems were to give notice to the public.  (Id., subd. (b)(1)(A)-
(D).)14  Subdivision (b)(1) provided that if there is water contamination, the water 
supplier “shall” give notice to affected consumers by way of a daily newspaper 
and by mail or hand delivery.  (Former § 64464.3, subd. (b)(1)(A); see former § 
64464.1, subd. (a)(2), (4), (5).)  While this subdivision was specific and, by its 
terms, self-executing, former section 64464.3 went on to describe several 
contingencies where a local primacy agency may intervene:  “If the [local primacy 
                                            
14  
Former section 64464.3, subdivision (b)(1) specifically provided:  “The 
notice to the public pursuant to paragraph (a) shall be given in accordance with the 
following methods which are described in [section] 64464.1:   
 
(1) For community water systems:  
 
(A) By Method 2, and by Method 4 or 5; or  
 
(B) If the [local primacy agency] finds that there is no daily newspaper of 
general circulation serving the area served by the system, by Method 3 and by 
Method 4 or 5; or 
 
(C) If the [local primacy agency] finds that there is no daily or weekly 
newspaper of general circulation serving the area served by the system, then by 
Method 6 or 7 as directed by the [local primacy agency] based on the degree of 
health risk and the nature of the population served by the system; 
 
(D) If the [local primacy agency] finds that, based on the degree of health 
risk and the nature of the population served, additional notification is necessary, 
then it may direct the community water system to carry out such notification 
required to adequately alert the public to the risk.”  
 
22 
agency] finds that” (1) there is no daily newspaper, the method of notification is 
by weekly newspaper and by mail or hand delivery (former § 64464.3(b)(1)(B)); 
(2) there is no daily or weekly newspaper, the notification method is by expedited 
hand delivery or by posting in conspicuous places “as directed by the [local 
primacy agency] based on the degree of health risk and the nature of the 
population served by the system” (id., subd. (b)(1)(C)); or (3) “additional 
notification is necessary, then it may direct the community water system to carry 
out such notification required to adequately alert the public to the risk” (id., subd. 
(b)(1)(D)). 
 
Also relevant here, former section 64464.1, which described the 12 
different notification methods, stated:  “When a water supplier is required to 
provide notice pursuant to section 64464.3, or 64464.6, or 64465, then the notice 
shall be provided using one or more of the following methods as directed by the 
[local primacy agency] pursuant to sections 64464.3, 64464.6, or 64465 . . . .”  
(Former § 64464.1, subd. (a); id., subd. (a)(1)-(12) [explaining notification 
methods 1 through 12].)15  
 
We conclude that in specifying how notice should be given to the public, 
these former sections permitted, but did not obligate, a local primacy agency to 
intervene in the notification process.  (See Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 498; 
Fox v. County of Fresno (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 1238, 1244 [“These portions of 
the statute clearly give the enforcement authority a choice, therefore discretion, to 
choose which course of action would be appropriate when a violation is found”].)  
                                            
15  
As relevant here, Method 4 (“Mail Delivery of Notice of Water Quality 
Failure”) and Method 5 (“Hand Delivery of Notice of Water Quality Failure”) 
provided that the local primacy agency “may waive the requirement” for mail or 
hand delivery “if it determines that” the violation or failure has been corrected 
within the specified 45-day period.  (Former § 64464.1, subd. (a)(4), (5).) 
23 
The regulatory language (“If the [local primacy agency] finds”) underscores that 
the decision to intervene was based on the agency‟s judgment and discretion.  
(Former § 64464.3, subd. (b)(1)(B)-(D).)  For instance, under former section 
64464.3, subdivision (b)(1)(D), the local primacy agency must not only “find” 
whether “based on the degree of health risk and the nature of the population 
served, additional notification is necessary,” it must also determine what notice 
will “adequately alert” the public of the risk.  These actions clearly call for the 
exercise of the County‟s discretion, and compel the conclusion that the County 
was not under a mandatory duty to act.  (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 498; see 
Braman, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 351 [“very essence of discretion is the power 
to make „comparisons, choices, judgments, and evaluations‟ ”].)  Indeed, the 
introductory phrase of this former section (“[u]nless otherwise directed by the 
[local primacy agency]”), which does not specify, much less require, that any 
particular action be taken or not taken, only underscores that the County has 
discretionary authority to intervene in this notification process.  (Former § 
64464.3, subd. (a); see ante, at p. 8; O’Toole, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 510; 
Clausing, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1240.) 
 
Likewise, former section 64464.1 did not impose any particular mandatory 
duty on the County.  As noted above, former section 64464.1 provided that when a 
water supplier must give notice of any water contamination under former section 
64464.3, “the notice shall be provided using one or more of the following methods 
as directed by the [local primacy agency] pursuant to section[] 64464.3.”  (Former 
§ 64464.1, subd. (a), italics added.)  This italicized portion, which precedes 
descriptions of the various notification methods, merely cross-references the 
notification procedure outlined in former section 64464.3, which we have 
concluded does not obligate the local primacy agency to act.  It does not otherwise 
independently impose any duty on the agency.  Moreover, contrary to the Court of 
24 
Appeal‟s suggestion, the local primacy agency‟s decision to waive the requirement 
for mail or hand delivery of a notice of water contamination “if it determines that” 
the violation or failure has been corrected (former § 64464.1, subd. (a)(4), (5), 
italics added), does not mandate that the local primacy agency intervene, but again 
emphasizes that a local primacy agency has the discretion to act under the 
regulation.  (See Braman, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 351.) 
 
In addition, the Act‟s corresponding provision governing the notice 
requirement for a water system (Health & Saf. Code, § 116450), also supports our 
conclusion that the County was under no mandatory duty to instruct Pinch to 
notify plaintiffs of any water contamination.  Health and Safety Code section 
116450, subdivision (a), provides that the operator of a public water system “shall 
notify the department and shall give notice to the users” of any noncompliance 
with drinking water standards, failure to perform a monitoring requirement, or 
failure to comply with any variance or exemption, “in the manner prescribed by 
the department.”  (Italics added.)  This italicized portion does not presuppose that 
the Department (or the local primacy agency here) will tell a water system 
operator to notify consumers of any noncompliance or failure; rather, as 
reasonably construed, it refers to the Department‟s authority to adopt regulations 
outlining the “[r]equirements for notifying the public of the quality of the water 
delivered to consumers” (Health & Saf. Code, § 116375, subd. (f)), such as former 
section 64464.3.  Indeed, this interpretation is bolstered by subdivision (e) of 
Health and Safety Code section 116450, which provides:  “In addition, the same 
notification requirement shall be required in any instance in which the department 
or the local health department recommends to the operator that it notify its 
customers to avoid internal consumption of the water supply and to use bottled 
water due to a chemical contamination that may pose a health risk.”  (Italics 
added.)  Thus, this section makes clear that any specific direction to the water 
25 
system to notify consumers is made at the recommendation, and not based on the 
compulsory duty, of the Department or the local primacy agency.  (Cf. Health & 
Saf. Code, § 116450, subd. (c) [when Department “determines” there is “an 
immediate danger to health” based on significant rise in bacterial count of water, it 
“shall immediately notify” operator to implement “emergency notification plan”].) 
4. Other Considerations 
 
Contrary to the Court of Appeal‟s suggestion, one of the Act‟s purposes — 
“to ensure that the water delivered by public water systems of this state shall at all 
times be pure, wholesome, and potable” (Health & Saf. Code, § 116270, subd. (e)) 
— is not a proper consideration in determining whether to find a mandatory duty 
here.  (See Groundwater Cases, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 683, 692 [Act‟s 
legislative objectives are “not „standards‟ by which the actions of the defendants 
may be judged” under Gov. Code, § 815.6].)  We are mindful that an enactment‟s 
purpose may be relevant in this analysis (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 500); 
however, the purpose expressed in Health and Safety Code section 116270, 
subdivision (e), does not directly shed light on the core duty plaintiffs seek to 
impose, namely, the duty to direct a water system to notify consumers of specific 
instances of contaminated water.  (See Paredes v. County of Fresno (1988) 203 
Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [“specific standards must be and are being set” to reach general, 
undefined objective of “ „pure, wholesome, healthful, and potable‟ ” water]; see 
also Groundwater Cases, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 683 [“to impose liability on 
water suppliers for failing to provide „pure‟ water would impose on them a 
standard impossible to achieve”].)  Indeed, the Court of Appeal‟s conclusion — 
that the failure to infer such a mandatory duty would defeat this particular purpose 
of the Act — only begs the question whether the Legislature or the Department 
26 
(responsible for adopting the regulations) intended to impose such a duty on a 
local primacy agency, a question we have answered in the negative. 
 
We are aware that this holding appears to work some injustice against 
plaintiffs.  As plaintiffs allege, the County was remiss in failing to fulfill a basic 
task, i.e., reviewing the periodic monitoring reports Pinch provided, which would 
have disclosed to the County the elevated MCL‟s in 1995 and 1999.  As a result of 
Pinch‟s failure to notify the Jensen Camp residents, they drank the contaminated 
water for a number of years.  The natural inclination is to place the County at fault 
because it is charged with the general oversight of public water systems in its 
jurisdiction, “responsible for ensuring that all public water systems are operated in 
compliance with this chapter and any regulations adopted hereunder.”  (Health & 
Saf. Code, § 116325.)  However, as the Court of Appeal recognized, this statute 
itself does not require the County to perform any particular act and, as such, 
imposes no mandatory duty.  “The controlling question is whether the enactment 
at issue was intended to impose an obligatory duty to take specified official action 
to prevent particular foreseeable injuries, thereby providing an appropriate basis 
for civil liability.”  (Keech v. Berkeley Unified School Dist. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 
464, 470.)  Indeed, as we have explained above, there is no statute or regulation 
that expressly or impliedly mandates that the County instruct the water system to 
notify its customers of water contamination.  There is no clear, explicit intent to 
make the County a “fail-safe” to ensure that notification takes place.  “To construe 
a statute as imposing a mandatory duty on a public entity, „the mandatory nature 
of the duty must be phrased in explicit and forceful language.‟  [Citation.]  „It is 
not enough that some statute contains mandatory language.  In order to recover 
plaintiffs have to show that there is some specific statutory mandate that was 
violated by the [public entity] . . . .‟ ”  (Groundwater Cases, supra, 154 
Cal.App.4th at p. 689; cf. Braman, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 352 [mandatory 
27 
duty where “Legislature inserted language of unavoidable obligation and specified 
the nature of that obligation with some precision”].) 
 
Indeed, the County‟s amici curiae — the California State Association of 
Counties and the League of California Cities and numerous state regulators of 
public health and safety services represented by the Attorney General — point out 
that imposing an implied mandatory duty in this circumstance would frustrate the 
Legislature‟s intent to secure support from counties to help administer and enforce 
the Act.  Under the Act, the Department has delegated primacy to 35 of the state‟s 
58 counties to oversee over half of the public water systems.  (See ante, fn. 9.)  As 
amici curiae note, “This delegation reflects a legislative preference for county 
regulation of local matters, at least when these localities demonstrate commitment 
and ability to take on regulatory responsibility.”  By exposing these public entities 
to unanticipated liability and unforeseen fiscal burden, counties will be 
discouraged from undertaking responsibility of the regulatory programs, thus 
frustrating the effective administration and enforcement of the Act.  
CONCLUSION 
  
 
Our holding that the County was not subject to any mandatory duty for 
purposes of Government Code section 815.6 liability is limited to the implied duty 
to instruct a water system to notify consumers of water contamination.   
Notwithstanding the Court of Appeal‟s conclusions on various express duties of 
the County, the lower court made such conclusions in the context of finding an 
implied duty.  It did not, however, determine whether there are any express 
mandatory duties that would, in and of themselves, give rise to an action under 
Government Code section 815.6.16  
                                            
16  
Given our holding, it is unnecessary to discuss whether any duties were 
intended to protect against the alleged injuries suffered or to address the proximate 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
28 
 
Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeal‟s judgment with directions to 
determine whether the County has any express mandatory duties that are 
actionable under Government Code section 815.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
cause element.  (Gov. Code, § 815.6; see ante, at p. 8.)  It is also unnecessary to 
address whether any of the identified immunity statutes (Gov. Code, §§ 818.2, 
818.4, 818.6, 820.4, 820.8, 821, 821.2, 821.4), would apply here.  (Creason, 
supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 630 [question of liability precedes that of statutory 
immunity].)  However, in remanding the matter to the Court of Appeal, we do not 
perceive the Court of Appeal‟s previous conclusions on these matters to foreclose 
the County‟s ability to raise these issues with respect to any express mandatory 
duty. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Guzman v. County of Monterey 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 155 Cal.App.4th 645 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S157793 
Date Filed: June 22, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Monterey 
Judge: Kay T. Kingsley 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Sullivan Hill Lewin Rez & Engel, Brian L. Burchett; Law Offices of Richard H. Rosenthal, Richard H. 
Rosenthal; Selden Law Firm and Lynde Selden II for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Charles J. McKee, County Counsel, and Patrick McGreal, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney (San Francisco), Joanne Hoeper, Chief Trial Deputy, John S. Roddy and 
Donald P. Margolis, Deputy City Attorneys, for California State Association of Counties and League of 
California Cities as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, David S. Chaney, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gordon B. 
Burns, Deputy State Solicitor General, James M. Schiavenza, Assistant Attorney General, and Kristin G. 
Hogue, Deputy Attorney General, for California Health and Human Services Agency, California 
Department of Public Health, California Department of Aging, California Department of Alcohol and Drug 
Programs, California Department of Child Support Services, California Department of Community 
Services and Development, California Department of Developmental Services, California Emergency 
Medical Services Authority, California Department of Health Care Services, California Managed Risk 
Medical Insurance Board, California Department of Mental Health, California Department of 
Rehabilitation, California Department of Social Services and California Office of Statewide Health 
Planning and Development as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Brian L. Burchett 
Sullivan Hill Lewin Rez & Engle 
550 West C Street, Suite 500 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 233-4100 
 
Patrick McGreal 
Deputy County Counsel 
168 W. Alisal Street, 3rd Floor 
Salinas, CA  93901-2439 
(831) 755-5045