Title: Heidi M. Christie and Michael L. Rosenberg v. Regions Bank d/b/a Regions Mortgage, etal.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1091077, 1091105
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 24, 2010

REL: 11/24/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
_________________________
1091077
_________________________
Lighting Fair, Inc., et al.
v.
Michael L. Rosenberg et al.
_________________________
1091105
_________________________
Heidi M. Christie and Michael L. Rosenberg
v.
Regions Bank d/b/a Regions Mortgage, et al.
Appeals from Montgomery Circuit Court
2
(CV-09-900314)
LYONS, Justice.
The dispute in the action in the Montgomery Circuit Court
underlying 
this 
appeal 
and 
cross-appeal 
involves 
the
construction of a residence.  In appeal no. 1091077, Lighting
Fair, Inc. ("Lighting Fair"), Cherry Marble Group, LLC
("Cherry Marble"), and Texture Crete, Inc. ("Texture Crete"),
the plaintiffs below, appeal from the summary judgment against
them and in favor of Michael L. Rosenberg, Heidi M. Christie,
and Regions Bank d/b/a Regions Mortgage ("Regions").  In
appeal no. 1091105, Rosenberg and Christie cross-appeal from
the trial court's order compelling arbitration of their cross-
claims asserted against Terry H. Taylor and T.H. Taylor, Inc.,
d/b/a T.H. Taylor Homes ("Taylor Homes").  Rosenberg and
Christie also appeal from the summary judgment against them
and in favor of Regions on their cross-claims against Regions.
Factual Background
In December 2007, Rosenberg and Christie, who are married
(hereinafter referred to as "the Rosenbergs"), executed an
agreement with Taylor Homes ("the construction contract").
The construction contract provided that Taylor Homes would
construct a house for the Rosenbergs for approximately
1091077, 1091105
The disbursement schedule was not made a part of the
1
record on appeal.
3
$756,000.  Under the construction contract, Taylor Homes was
to be paid "based on the value of work in place as defined by
the percentage of completion of each work item on the
disbursement schedule."   Specifically, Taylor Homes was to
1
"present [the Rosenbergs] with a pay request every Monday for
payment on Thursday of the same week."  The construction
contract also included an arbitration provision, which stated:
"[Taylor 
Homes] 
and 
[the 
Rosenbergs] 
acknowledge
and 
agree 
that 
this transaction substantially
affects interstate commerce by virtue of the
materials and components contained in the dwelling.
Any controversy, claim, or dispute arising out of or
relating to this agreement, or the breach thereof,
or the transaction contemplated hereby, shall be
settled by binding arbitration pursuant to the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC 1, et seq., and shall
be administered in accordance with the applicable
rules of the Federal Arbitration Act.  Judgment on
the award rendered by the arbitrators may be entered
in any court having jurisdiction thereof."
The Rosenbergs obtained a loan from Regions to finance
the construction.  On January 2, 2008, they executed an
agreement with Regions ("the loan contract") whereby they
borrowed approximately $800,000 from Regions.  Taylor Homes,
by its president and sole shareholder, Terry H. Taylor, also
executed the loan contract which, as discussed below,
1091077, 1091105
4
contained certain duties and guaranties with respect to Taylor
Homes.
The loan contract provided that "construction advances"
to Taylor Homes, which it also referred to as "disbursements,"
would be "made in installments as the work on the construction
progress[ed]."  Rosenberg stated in an affidavit that Regions
represented to him and Christie at the closing on the loan
contract "that Regions would make all the construction
advancements/disbursements pursuant to Regions' standard
disbursement schedule and procedures."  The loan contract in
fact granted Regions authority to make advances: "(a) to [the
Rosenbergs], (b) as authorized by [the Rosenbergs] in writing,
or (c) as otherwise provided in the agreement."  The loan
contract further stated that advancements would be made "in
accordance with this agreement and [Regions'] standard
disbursement schedule and procedures."  
Dottie Moore, the Regions employee who worked on the loan
contract, stated in an affidavit that the Rosenbergs' "entire
transaction" with Regions "was handled on an arm's-length
basis."  Additionally, the loan contract stated that Regions
was not acting as the Rosenbergs' agent and that its
1091077, 1091105
5
relationship with the Rosenbergs was "solely that of borrower
and lender."  In the loan contract, Regions also disclaimed
responsibility for inspecting the Rosenbergs' property or
informing the Rosenbergs of the quality of Taylor Homes'
construction or of "the progress or course of construction and
its conformance with the plans and specifications."
At the time the loan contract was executed, Regions'
Consumer Loan Policy Manual stated: "Physical inspections are
required to verify and document construction progress."  The
loan contract provided:
"All inspection services, if any, rendered by
[Regions] 
or 
[Regions'] 
officers, 
agents 
or
employees, are or shall be rendered solely for the
benefit of [Regions], and said inspections are not
made for the benefit of, and shall not be construed
to have been made for the benefit of, [the
Rosenbergs], any subsequent purchasers, laborers,
materialmen, 
contracting 
parties, 
the 
general
public, or any other person, firm or corporation,
whether known or unknown. ..."
The loan contract also expressly limited Regions' liability to
materialmen and subcontractors and further stated that the
loan contract "shall not be construed to be[] a third-party
beneficiary contract in any respect or to any extent."
Finally, the loan contract contained the following guaranty by
Taylor Homes:  "[Taylor Homes] hereby guarantees completion of
1091077, 1091105
6
all improvements in full accordance with the plans and
specifications ... and further agrees that all bills,
invoices, and other charges incurred by [Taylor Homes] for
labor and materials used in the construction of the
improvements will be paid in full."
Taylor Homes began work on the Rosenbergs' house in
January 2008 and promptly began requesting disbursements under
the loan contract.  Moore stated in her affidavit that Regions
"received from [the Rosenbergs] requests for disbursement of
loan proceeds which they had received from their contractor
and which contained statements regarding the percentages of
completion."  In response to discovery in this action, Regions
stated that disbursements "were paid per the instructions of
[the Rosenbergs]" and that "[e]ach request for advance on the
construction loan was accompanied by a signed warranty that
all subcontractors and other persons furnishing labor,
material and equipment on the construction ... had been paid
in full."
In 
his 
affidavit, 
Rosenberg 
stated 
that 
Taylor
periodically presented him with requests for disbursement that
Taylor "was going to present to Regions" and that he "signed
1091077, 1091105
7
the request acknowledging [that he] had seen the request."
Rosenberg explained: "I was under the impression that Regions
was following [its] standard disbursement schedule and
procedures when advancing funds to [Taylor Homes;] otherwise,
I would not have signed the document.  It was my understanding
that Regions controlled when and how the disbursement of funds
would be made to [Taylor Homes]."
By October 15, 2008, approximately $728,000, or 90% of
the principal of the loan, had been disbursed to Taylor Homes.
However, according to Regions' inspection reports, the
Rosenbergs' house was only 78.5% complete.  No further
disbursements were requested or made after October 15, 2008.
Construction on the Rosenbergs' house, however, continued,
and, in November and December 2008, Lighting Fair, Cherry
Marble, 
and 
Texture 
Crete 
(hereinafter 
referred 
to
collectively as "the materialmen") provided materials used in
the construction.  Taylor Homes did not pay the materialmen
for the materials they provided.
In January and February 2009, the materialmen separately
notified Taylor Homes, Regions, and the Rosenbergs of their
intent to file liens on the Rosenbergs' property.  On January
1091077, 1091105
8
20, 2009, Lighting Fair filed a lien with the Montgomery
Probate Court against the Rosenbergs' property in the amount
of $8,565.  On February 9, 2009, Texture Crete filed a lien
against the Rosenbergs' property in the amount of $19,850.
And on March 6, 2009, Cherry Marble filed a lien against the
Rosenbergs' property in the amount of $3,113.
Procedural History
On March 13, 2009, Lighting Fair sued Taylor, Taylor
Homes, the Rosenbergs, and Regions seeking a judgment on its
lien and possession of the Rosenbergs' property.  Lighting
Fair also asserted claims of breach of contract and account
stated against Taylor and Taylor Homes; a civil-conspiracy
claim against Taylor, Taylor Homes, and Regions; and, against
all the defendants, claims alleging unjust enrichment and
violations of § 8-29-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, ("the Prompt
Pay Act").  Lighting Fair also stated claims seeking recovery
of amounts it alleged it was owed for materials it had
supplied to Taylor Homes on construction projects unrelated to
the Rosenbergs' residence.  Lighting Fair named as defendants
to those claims: Taylor; Taylor Homes; a homeowner, George
Vogt; and two lenders, Compass Bank and Whitney National Bank.
1091077, 1091105
9
The Rosenbergs answered Lighting Fair's complaint and
stated cross-claims against Taylor, Taylor Homes, and Regions.
Specifically, the Rosenbergs stated claims of fraud and civil
conspiracy against Taylor and Taylor Homes.  They alleged
that, in requesting disbursements, Taylor and Taylor Homes had
misrepresented the amount of work done on the house and had
conspired with Regions to obtain disbursements to which Taylor
and Taylor Homes were not entitled.  Against Regions, the
Rosenbergs stated claims of suppression, civil conspiracy, and
negligent, 
willful, 
or 
wanton 
failure 
to 
follow 
its
procedures.  The Rosenbergs alleged that Regions had
suppressed information from them regarding its inspections,
had conspired with Taylor and Taylor Homes to wrongfully
disburse funds to Taylor Homes, and had wrongfully failed to
follow internal procedures that would have protected the
Rosenbergs.
Regions likewise answered Lighting Fair's complaint and
stated cross-claims against Taylor Homes and against the
Rosenbergs.  Regions stated a claim of breach of contract
against Taylor Homes, alleging that Taylor Homes had breached
that provision of the loan contract guaranteeing completion of
1091077, 1091105
The record on appeal does not include a copy of Whitney
2
Bank's complaint against Taylor and Taylor Homes. Accordingly,
10
the Rosenberg's house in accordance with the plans and
specifications and guaranteeing payment of materialmen and
subcontractors.  Regions stated a claim of breach of contract
against the Rosenbergs, alleging that the Rosenbergs had
breached several provisions of the loan contract.  Regions
also sought a judgment against the Rosenbergs based on a
promissory note the Rosenbergs executed simultaneously with
the loan contract, alleging that the Rosenbergs had defaulted
on the note.
Lighting Fair subsequently amended its complaint to add
Cherry Marble as a plaintiff; Cherry Marble joined all of
Lighting Fair's claims against Taylor, Taylor Homes, Regions
and the Rosenbergs.  Subsequently, Lighting Fair and Cherry
Marble amended their complaint again to add negligence claims
against Regions and the Rosenbergs based on alleged duty on
the part of those defendants to ascertain whether Taylor Homes
was paying its materialmen.  
Ultimately, the action was consolidated 1) with a
separate action by Whitney National Bank against Taylor and
Taylor Homes unrelated to the Rosenbergs' property  and 2)
2
1091077, 1091105
we cannot determine precisely what claims were asserted in
that action.
11
with an action by Texture Crete against Taylor Homes and the
Rosenbergs.  In the Texture Crete action, Texture Crete sought
enforcement of its lien related to the Rosenbergs' property
and stated claims against Taylor Homes seeking recovery on an
open account and for "work and labor done" and against both
Taylor Homes and the Rosenbergs, alleging breach of contract
and account stated.  After the actions were consolidated,
Texture Crete amended its complaint to add Regions as a
defendant 
and 
to 
state 
claims 
of 
negligence, 
unjust
enrichment, and violations of the Prompt Pay Act against
Regions.
Based on the arbitration provision in the construction
contract, Taylor and Taylor Homes moved to compel arbitration
of the fraud and civil-conspiracy cross-claims asserted
against them by the Rosenbergs.  The Rosenbergs opposed the
motion, but on June 16, 2009, the trial court ordered the
Rosenbergs' cross-claims against Taylor and Taylor Homes to
arbitration.
The parties thereafter engaged in extensive discovery.
Ultimately, Regions moved for a summary judgment as to all the
1091077, 1091105
Vogt and Whitney National Bank also moved for a summary
3
judgment on the claims asserted against them by the
materialmen in the action unrelated to the construction of the
residence in this proceeding.  The trial court granted their
summary-judgment motions.
12
claims asserted against it by the materialmen and as to the
cross-claims asserted against it by the Rosenbergs.  The
Rosenbergs moved for a summary judgment, arguing only that the
materialmen were not entitled to enforce liens against them.
Additionally, the materialmen filed an offensive motion for a
summary judgment asking that the trial court enter a judgment
in their favor against Regions and the Rosenbergs on the
materialmen's liens.3
On March 22, 2010, the trial court entered an order
stating:
"Defendants Rosenberg[s] ... Motion[] for Summary
Judgment against [the materialmen] is GRANTED.
Defendant[] Regions ... Motion for Summary Judgment
is GRANTED. The jury trial on remaining issues is
set for the week of May 3, 2010."
The Rosenbergs' claims against Taylor and Taylor Homes
remained pending in arbitration, and the following claims
remained pending before the trial court: all of the
materialmen's claims against Taylor and Taylor Homes; and the
materialmen's claims against the Rosenbergs unrelated to their
1091077, 1091105
The supplemental record on appeal shows that, after the
4
notices of appeal were filed, the materialmen settled their
claims against Taylor and Taylor Homes.  The trial court
entered consent judgments against Taylor and Taylor Homes and
in favor of the materialmen in the total amount of $53,000 in
May 2010.
13
liens; Regions' cross-claims against Taylor Homes and the
Rosenbergs.  On the materialmen's motion, the trial court, on
April 9, 2010, certified its March 22, 2010, order as final
under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  
On April 29, 2010, the materialmen filed a notice of
appeal from the trial court's March 22, 2010, order (appeal
no. 1091077).  On May 4, 2010, the Rosenbergs filed a notice
of appeal from the trial court's June 16, 2009, order granting
Taylor and Taylor Homes' motion to compel arbitration and from
the trial court's March 22, 2010, summary judgment on their
cross-claims against Regions (appeal no. 1091105).4
Analysis
I.
Arbitration of the Rosenbergs' Cross-Claims Against
Taylor and Taylor Homes
We will first consider that portion of the Rosenbergs'
cross-appeal challenging the trial court's June 16, 2009,
order granting Taylor and Taylor Homes' motion to compel
arbitration (appeal no. 1091105).  The Rosenbergs argue that
1091077, 1091105
14
the trial court erred in granting Taylor and Taylor Homes'
motion to compel arbitration of the Rosenbergs' fraud and
civil-conspiracy cross-claims.  As to this issue, however, the
appeal is untimely and must be dismissed.  
Rule 4(d), Ala. R. App. P., provides:
"An order granting or denying a motion to compel
arbitration is appealable as a matter of right, and
any appeal from such an order must be taken within
42 days (6 weeks) of the date of the entry of the
order, or within the time allowed by an extension
pursuant to Rule 77(d), Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure."
(Emphasis added.)  Additionally, Rule 2(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P.
provides:  "An appeal shall be dismissed if the notice of
appeal was not timely filed to invoke the jurisdiction of the
appellate court."  Cf. Jenks v. Harris, 990 So. 2d 878, 883-84
("'A direct appeal is the proper procedure by which to seek
review of a trial court's order granting or denying a motion
to compel arbitration.' Conseco Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Salter,
846 So. 2d 1077, 1080 (Ala. 2002). ... '[Rule 4(d), Ala. R.
App. P.,] now evenhandedly states that both an order granting
and an order denying a motion to compel arbitration are
"appealable as a matter of right" within 42 days from date of
the entry of the order. The "finality" of the order is thus
1091077, 1091105
15
assured, because failure to take an appeal from it within the
42-day time period forecloses later appellate review.'
Bowater Inc. v. Zager, 901 So. 2d 658, 664 (Ala. 2004)
(emphasis added). ... Harris's failure to appeal the trial
court's decision within 42 days bars his attempt to challenge
it once arbitration has been completed.").  
The trial court's order granting Taylor and Taylor Homes'
motion to compel arbitration was entered on June 16, 2009.
The Rosenbergs did not file a notice of appeal from the order
until May 4, 2010, nearly 11 months after the order was
entered and well outside the 42 days prescribed by Rule 4(d).
Because the Rosenbergs' appeal of the trial court's order
granting Taylor and Taylor Homes' motion to compel arbitration
is untimely, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider
it.  Accordingly, we must dismiss that portion of the
Rosenbergs' appeal.  See Rule 2(a)(1); see also, e.g., Graves
v. Golthy, 21 So. 3d 720, 723 (Ala. 2009)("Graves's appeal is
untimely; therefore, this Court is without jurisdiction and
must dismiss the appeal. See Buchanan v. Young, 534 So. 2d
263, 264 (Ala. 1988) ('The failure to file a notice of appeal
within the time provided in Rule 4, [Ala. R. App. P.], is a
1091077, 1091105
16
jurisdictional defect and will result in a dismissal of the
appeal.').").  
II.
Certification Under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.
We 
must 
next 
consider 
whether 
the 
trial 
court's
certification of its March 22, 2010, order as final under Rule
54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., was proper.  Rule 54(b) provides, in
part:
"When more than one claim for relief is presented in
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry
of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than
all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment."
This Court recently explained the appropriate standard
for reviewing Rule 54(b) certifications, stating:
"'If a trial court certifies a judgment as final
pursuant to Rule 54(b), an appeal will generally lie
from that judgment.' Baugus v. City of Florence, 968
So. 2d 529, 531 (Ala. 2007).
"Although the order made the basis of the Rule
54(b) certification disposes of the entire claim
against 
[the 
defendant 
in 
this 
case], 
thus
satisfying the requirements of Rule 54(b) dealing
with eligibility for consideration as a final
judgment, there remains the additional requirement
that there be no just reason for delay. A trial
court's conclusion to that effect is subject to
review by this Court to determine whether the trial
1091077, 1091105
17
court exceeded its discretion in so concluding."
Centennial Assocs. v. Guthrie, 20 So. 3d 1277, 1279 (Ala.
2009).  Reviewing the trial court's finding in Schlarb v. Lee,
955 So. 2d 418, 419-20 (Ala. 2006), that there was no just
reason for delay, this Court explained that certifications
under Rule 54(b) are disfavored:
"This Court looks with some disfavor upon
certifications under Rule 54(b).
"'It 
bears 
repeating, 
here, 
that
"'[c]ertifications under Rule 54(b) should
be entered only in exceptional cases and
should not be entered routinely.'" State v.
Lawhorn, 830 So. 2d 720, 725 (Ala. 2002)
(quoting Baker v. Bennett, 644 So. 2d 901,
903 (Ala. 1994), citing in turn Branch v.
SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So. 2d
1373 (Ala. 1987)). "'"Appellate review in
a piecemeal fashion is not favored."'"
Goldome Credit Corp. [v. Player, 869 So. 2d
1146, 1148 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)] (quoting
Harper 
Sales 
Co. 
v. 
Brown, 
Stagner,
Richardson, Inc., 742 So. 2d 190, 192 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1999), quoting in turn Brown v.
Whitaker Contracting Corp., 681 So. 2d 226,
229 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)) (emphasis
added).'
"Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892 So. 2d
354, 363 (Ala. 2004)."
In considering whether a trial court has exceeded its
discretion in determining that there is no just reason for
delay in entering a judgment, this Court has considered
1091077, 1091105
18
whether "the issues in the claim being certified and a claim
that will remain pending in the trial court '"are so closely
intertwined 
that 
separate 
adjudication 
would 
pose 
an
unreasonable risk of inconsistent results."'"  Schlarb, 955
So. 2d at 419-20 (quoting Clarke-Mobile Counties Gas Dist. v.
Prior Energy Corp., 834 So. 2d 88, 95 (Ala. 2002), quoting in
turn Branch v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So. 2d
1373, 1374 (Ala. 1987), and concluding that conversion and
fraud claims were too intertwined with a pending breach-of-
contract claim for Rule 54(b) certification when the
propositions on which the appellant relied to support the
claims were identical).  See also Centennial Assocs., 20 So.
3d at 1281 (concluding that claims against an attorney
certified as final under Rule 54(b) were too closely
intertwined with pending claims against other defendants when
the pending claims required "resolution of the same issue" as
issue pending on appeal); and Howard v. Allstate Ins. Co., 9
So. 3d 1213, 1215 (Ala. 2008)(concluding that the judgments on
the claims against certain of the defendants had been
improperly certified as final under Rule 54(b) because the
pending claims against the remaining defendants depended upon
1091077, 1091105
"Federal cases are authoritative in construing the
5
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure because the Alabama rules
were patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Cutler v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 770 So. 2d 67, 70 n.2 (Ala.
2000)."  Borders v. City of Huntsville, 875 So. 2d 1168, 1176
n.2 (Ala. 2003).  Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., is nearly
identical to its federal counterpart, Rule 54(b), Fed. R. Civ.
P.
19
the resolution of common issues).
Additionally, in considering whether a trial court has
exceeded its discretion in determining that there is no just
reason for delay, several United States Courts of Appeals have
expressly considered whether the resolution of claims that
remain pending in the trial court may moot claims presented on
appeal.   In MCI Constructors, LLC v City of Greensboro, 610
5
F.3d 849 (4th Cir. 2010), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit explained:
"In determining whether there is no just reason for
delay in the entry of judgment, factors the district
court should consider, if applicable, include:
"'(1) 
the 
relationship 
between 
the
adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2)
the possibility that the need for review
might or might not be mooted by future
developments in the district court; (3) the
possibility that the reviewing court might
be obliged to consider the same issue a
second time; (4) the presence or absence of
a claim or counterclaim which could result
in a set-off against the judgment sought to
be made final;  (5) miscellaneous factors
3
1091077, 1091105
20
such as delay, economic and solvency
considerations, shortening the time of
trial, frivolity of competing claims,
expense, and the like.'
"Braswell [Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc.], 2
F.3d [1331,] 1335-36 [(4th Cir. 1993)] (footnote
call number added) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Phila. Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1975)
[overruled on other grounds by Curtiss-Wright Corp.
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1 (1980)]).
"____________
" On this factor, the [United States] Supreme
3
Court has explained 'that counterclaims, whether
compulsory 
or 
permissive, 
present 
no 
special
problems 
for 
Rule 
54(b) 
determinations;
counterclaims are not to be evaluated differently
from other claims.' Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S.
at 9, 100 S. Ct. 1460. Like other claims, the Court
has explained, 'their significance for Rule 54(b)
purposes turns on their interrelationship with the
claims on which certification is sought.' Id."
610 F.3d at 855 (emphasis added).  The United States Courts of
Appeals for the Third and Sixth Circuits have also used the
factors identified in MCI Constructors.  See, e.g., Berckeley
Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 203 (3d Cir. 2006);
and Corrosioneering, Inc. v. Thyssen Envtl. Sys., Inc., 807
F.2d 1279, 1283 (6th Cir. 1986).
Additionally, the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Seventh and First Circuits have specifically considered
mootness in determining whether there is no just reason for
1091077, 1091105
21
delay in the entry of a judgment under Rule 54(b), Fed. R.
Civ. P.  See, e.g., Lottie v. West American Ins. Co., 408 F.3d
935, 940 (7th Cir. 2005)("[W]e might never have to consider at
all the bad faith and race discrimination claims if the
contract claim is resolved in favor of West American. There
would be no reason to consider whether the insurer's breach
was so egregious that it amounted to bad faith if there was no
breach. Likewise, there would be no reason to consider whether
West American breached the contract on account of race if West
American did not in fact breach the contract."); Horn v.
Transcon Lines, Inc., 898 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 1990)("The
possibility that developments in the litigation may moot a
claim suggests that appellate resolution be deferred.");
Spiegel v. Trustees of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 44-45 (1st
Cir. 1988)("Should Spiegel prevail on Count IV--and we
intimate no view of the matter--she might well have her
tenure, her monetary balm, and payment for her litigation
expenses. The first three statements of claim would be largely
(if not entirely) mooted and the need for appellate review
would vanish. Appellate courts, understandably, have treated
such a possibility as a major negative in the Rule 54(b)
1091077, 1091105
22
equation."). 
In this case, the trial court's March 22, 2010, order
disposed of all the claims asserted by the materialmen against
Regions and the Rosenbergs and all the Rosenbergs' cross-
claims against Regions, thus satisfying the requirements of
Rule 54(b) dealing with eligibility for consideration as a
final judgment.  We must, however, determine whether the trial
court exceeded its discretion in determining that there was no
just reason for delay in the entry of the judgment.
Specifically, we must determine whether the claims certified
as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) and the claims that remain
pending in the trial court "are so closely intertwined that
separate adjudication would pose an unreasonable risk of
inconsistent results."  Branch v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan,
N.A., 514 So. 2d 1373, 1374 (Ala. 1987).  We must also
consider whether "the need for review might or might not be
mooted by future developments in the [trial] court."
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360,
364 
(3d 
Cir. 
1975), 
overruled 
on 
other 
grounds 
by
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1 (1980).
 
A. Appeal No. 1091077
1091077, 1091105
23
In appeal no. 1091077, the materialmen argue that the
trial court erred in entering a summary judgment against them
and in favor of Regions and the Rosenbergs on their lien
claims and that the trial court erred in not granting their
motion for a summary judgment.  First, the materialmen argue
that they presented sufficient evidence showing that they are
entitled to recover on alleged liens on the unpaid balance of
funds held by Regions that the Rosenbergs owe Taylor and
Taylor Homes; the materialmen contend that this evidence
precludes a summary judgment against them and warrants a
summary judgment in their favor.  The materialmen base their
lien claims on the premise that the Rosenbergs owe Taylor and
Taylor Homes additional funds.  The Rosenbergs, however, have
ceased making payments to Taylor Homes and have filed cross-
claims against Taylor and Taylor Homes, asserting claims of
fraud and civil conspiracy, alleging that Taylor and Taylor
Homes wrongfully obtained more of the proceeds of the loan
contract than they were entitled to receive.  The Rosenbergs
have been ordered to arbitrate their cross-claims against
Taylor and Taylor Homes.  For all that appears, the arbitrator
could determine that Taylor and Taylor Homes in fact engaged
1091077, 1091105
24
in wrongful conduct and that the Rosenbergs owe them nothing.
The materialmen's lien claim could, therefore, be rendered
moot because it is dependent on the liability of the
Rosenbergs to Taylor and Taylor Homes.  As a result, the trial
court exceeded its discretion in determining that there was no
just reason for delay and in certifying its judgment on the
materialmen's lien claims as final under Rule 54(b).  See,
e.g., MCI Constructors, 610 F.3d at 855; Horn,  898 F.2d at
592; and  Allis-Chalmers Corp., 521 F.2d at 364.
Second, the materialmen argue that they presented
sufficient evidence showing that they are entitled to an
equitable lien against the undisbursed loan proceeds held by
Regions; they contend that this evidence precludes a summary
judgment against them and indeed warrants a summary judgment
in their favor.  The materialmen base their argument that they
are entitled to an equitable lien against the undisbursed
proceeds on the premise that Regions has unclean hands in that
it wrongfully disbursed funds to Taylor and Taylor Homes for
work not yet done.  However, the question of Taylor and Taylor
Homes' wrongdoing--and consequently the question whether the
loan proceeds were wrongfully disbursed--is squarely at issue
1091077, 1091105
25
in 
the 
Rosenbergs' 
pending cross-claims against those
defendants.  As with the materialmen's lien claims, should the
arbitrator determine that Taylor and Taylor Homes did not
receive any funds to which they were not entitled, the
materialmen's equitable-lien claims against Regions on the
undisbursed loan proceeds would be moot.  Because the
materialmen's claims of an equitable lien involves the Court
in the adjudication of potentially moot claims, the trial
court exceeded its discretion in concluding that there was no
just reason for delay in entering the judgment and, therefore,
in certifying its judgment on that claim as final under Rule
54(b). See, e.g., MCI Constructors, 610 F.3d at 855; Horn,
898 F.2d at 592; and  Allis-Chalmers Corp., 521 F.2d at 364.
Next, the materialmen argue that the trial court erred in
entering a summary judgment against them on their claim of
unjust enrichment against Regions.  Regarding that claim, the
materialmen state the following argument in their principal
brief on appeal:
"In order to make the ruling it made, the only
conclusion the trial court could have made was that
there is no unpaid balance owed by [the Rosenbergs]
to [Taylor Homes].  Such a conclusion, however, is
not supported by the record. ... Additionally, none
of the claims brought by [the Rosenbergs] against
1091077, 1091105
26
[Taylor Homes] have even been adjudicated as the
trial court ordered arbitration of such. ... As
such, the trial court could not have and should not
have made the conclusion that there was no unpaid
balance."
(Materialmen's brief, at 30-31 (citations to the record
omitted).)  The materialmen, therefore, admit that the trial
court's determination on their unjust-enrichment claim is
intertwined with the Rosenbergs' claims against Taylor and
Taylor Homes.  Indeed, resolution of the claim requires
consideration of the same issue: whether the Rosenbergs owe
additional funds to Taylor and Taylor Homes.  The materialmen
argue that "the trial court could not have and should not
have" reached a decision regarding that question.  Likewise,
this Court should not consider the question because, as the
materialmen 
effectively 
concede, 
their 
unjust-enrichment 
claim
and the Rosenbergs' claims against Taylor and Taylor Homes
"are so closely intertwined that separate adjudication would
pose an unreasonable risk of inconsistent results."  Branch,
514 So. 2d at 1374; see also Centennial Assocs., 20 So. 3d at
1281.
Finally, the materialmen argue that the trial court erred
in entering a summary judgment for Regions on their negligence
1091077, 1091105
27
claim.  Like the materialmens' claim under an alleged
equitable lien, their negligence claim is based on the premise
that Regions wrongfully disbursed funds to Taylor and Taylor
Homes for work not yet done.  As discussed above, the
arbitrator's decision on the Rosenbergs' claims against Taylor
and 
Taylor 
Homes 
could 
render 
that 
question 
moot.
Accordingly, the trial court exceeded its discretion in
concluding that there was no just reason for delay in entering
the 
judgment 
and 
in 
certifying 
its 
judgment 
on 
the
materialmen's negligence claim as final under Rule 54(b). See,
e.g., MCI Constructors, 610 F.3d at 855; Horn,  898 F.2d at
592; and  Allis-Chalmers Corp., 521 F.2d at 364. 
We, therefore, conclude that, as to each of the
materialmen's claims against Regions and as to their lien
claims against the Rosenbergs, the trial court exceeded its
discretion in finding that there was no just reason for delay
in the entry of the judgment and in certifying its March 22,
2010, order as final under Rule 54(b).  Appeal no. 1091077,
therefore, must be dismissed as being from a nonfinal
judgment.
B.  Appeal No. 1091105
1091077, 1091105
28
We held in Part I of the Analysis section of this opinion
that that portion of the Rosenbergs' appeal challenging the
trial court's order compelling arbitration is due to be
dismissed as untimely filed. In appeal no. 1091105, the
Rosenbergs also argue that the trial court erred in entering
a summary judgment against them on their cross-claims against
Regions 
alleging 
suppression, 
civil 
conspiracy, 
and
negligence.  On close inspection, these claims  are closely
intertwined with the Rosenbergs' claims against Taylor and
Taylor Homes and may be rendered moot by the arbitrator's
resolution of those claims.
As discussed above, the Rosenbergs have stated claims of
fraud and civil conspiracy against Taylor and Taylor Homes,
and these claims have not yet been resolved in arbitration.
The Rosenbergs expressly allege in their civil-conspiracy
claim against Regions, Taylor, and Taylor Homes that 
"Taylor, [Taylor Homes], and Regions conspired
together, each with the other, to unlawfully scheme,
plan, design and intentionally commit all acts all
acts alleged, specifically, Regions disbursing funds
to [Taylor] and/or [Taylor Homes], with [the
Rosenbergs] receiving no value therefor[], in order
to wrongfully deprive [the Rosenbergs] of property
in order for [Taylor,] [Taylor Homes], and Regions
[to] financially gain from the same."
1091077, 1091105
29
This claim, asserted against Regions in the appeal before us
and against Taylor and Taylor Homes in arbitration, rests on
a single issue: whether those defendants conspired together to
wrongfully deprive the Rosenbergs of their property.  The
arbitrator and this Court could certainly reach different
conclusions regarding the sufficiency of the evidence as to
this question.  Accordingly, the Rosenbergs' civil-conspiracy
claim against Regions and their civil-conspiracy claim against
Taylor and Taylor Homes "are so closely intertwined that
separate adjudication would pose an unreasonable risk of
inconsistent results."  Branch, 514 So. 2d at 1374; see also
Centennial Assocs., 20 So. 3d at 1281.
Finally, the Rosenbergs' claims alleging that Regions
suppressed evidence from them and otherwise acted negligently
toward them are premised on the proposition that Regions knew
of or should have known of the allegedly wrongful conduct of
Taylor and Taylor Homes.  As stated above, however, the
question of Taylor and Taylor Homes' wrongdoing is squarely at
issue in the Rosenbergs' claims pending against those
defendants and, therefore, any issue related to their alleged
wrongdoing may be rendered moot by a resolution of those
1091077, 1091105
30
claims in arbitration.   See, e.g., MCI Constructors, 610 F.3d
at 855; Horn,  898 F.2d at 592; and  Allis-Chalmers Corp., 521
F.2d at 364. 
As a result, as to each of the Rosenbergs' cross-claims
against Regions, the trial court exceeded its discretion in
concluding that there was no just reason for delay in the
entry of its judgment and in certifying its March 22, 2010,
order as final under Rule 54(b).  We must, therefore, dismiss
appeal no. 1091105.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we dismiss appeal no. 1091077 and
appeal no. 1091105 in their entireties.
1091077 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
1091105 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, and Shaw, JJ., concur.