Title: Wilkins v. West
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 021003
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 1, 2002

P
 
resent:  All the Justices 
S. VANCE WILKINS, SPEAKER OF THE 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 021003     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
November 1, 2002 
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR WEST, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SALEM 
Richard C. Pattisall, Judge 
 
Article II, § 6 of the Constitution of Virginia provides: 
 
Members of the House of Representatives of the 
United States and members of the Senate and of the 
House of Delegates of the General Assembly shall be 
elected from electoral districts established by the 
General Assembly.  Every electoral district shall 
be composed of contiguous and compact territory and 
shall be so constituted as to give, as nearly as is 
practicable, representation in proportion to the 
population of the district.  The General Assembly 
shall reapportion the Commonwealth into electoral 
districts in accordance with this section in the 
year 1971 and every ten years thereafter. 
 
The official 2000 United States census data showed that 
Virginia's population had grown 14.4% over the previous decade, 
from 6,187,350 residents in 1990, to 7,078,515 in 2000.  The 
data also showed that the population growth in Northern 
Virginia and suburban areas of the state was greater than in 
other areas of the state.  Some of the central cities and rural 
areas of the Commonwealth had experienced a decrease in 
population.  To comply with Article II, § 6 the Virginia 
General Assembly was required to enact new electoral districts 
in 2001. 
After receiving the 2000 census data, the General Assembly 
enacted Senate Bill 1 (SB 1) and House Bill 1 (HB 1) creating 
new electoral districts for the Virginia General Assembly.  The 
bills were signed by the Governor on April 21, 2001 and 
subsequently submitted to the Attorney General of the United 
States for pre-clearance as required by the Voting Rights Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 through 1974(e) (2000), (VRA).  On June 15, 
2001 and July 9, 2001, respectively, HB 1 and SB 1 received 
pre-clearance from the Attorney General. 
This litigation was initiated by a Bill of Complaint filed 
on June 26, 2001 by 46 complainants against the Governor, 
Lieutenant Governor, Acting Attorney General, Secretary of the 
State Board of Elections, and six members of the General 
Assembly.1  An amended bill of complaint was filed on August 
10, 2001.  Count I alleged that House of Delegates Districts 
49, 63, 69, 70, 71, 74, 75, 77, 80, 89, 90, 92, and 95, and 
Senate Districts 2, 5, 9, 16, and 18, were "designed with the 
avowed, race-based goal of maximizing the number of minority 
voters" in violation of Article I, §§ 1 and 11 of the 
Constitution of Virginia.  Count II asserted that the pairing 
of incumbent female legislators in SB 1 and HB 1 intentionally 
                     
1 The Lt. Governor was never served with process and the 
trial court granted the defendant legislators' motion to quash 
service of process on them.  The Acting Attorney General was 
dismissed as a defendant. 
 
2
"disproportionately increase[d] the odds against re-election of 
certain Democratic female legislators" in violation of Article 
I, §§ 1 and 11 of the Constitution of Virginia.  Count III 
asserted that the legislative redistricting plans 
unconstitutionally discriminated against Virginia voters on the 
basis of political viewpoint by disproportionately pairing 
incumbent Democratic legislators.  In Count IV, the 
complainants asserted that 17 House Districts and 9 Senate 
Districts were not comprised of "contiguous and compact 
territory" as mandated by Article II, § 6 of the Constitution 
of Virginia.  Finally, in Count V, the complainants charged 
that the districts were unequal on the basis of population 
because the Commonwealth did not use statistically adjusted 
census figures in violation of Article I, §§ 1 and 11 of the 
Constitution of Virginia. 
Prior to trial, the defendants filed various motions to 
dismiss and a motion for change of venue.  The trial court 
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Count V but denied 
the motions requesting dismissal on the basis of standing and 
for a change of venue.  A three-day, ore tenus hearing was held 
in September 2001.  Following presentation of the complainants' 
evidence, the trial court granted the defendants' motion to 
strike Counts II and III.  The claims of racial gerrymandering 
and non-compact and non-contiguous election districts contained 
 
3
in Counts I and IV were submitted to the trial court for 
determination. 
The trial court filed its amended written opinion on March 
13, 2002.  Applying a definition of contiguous that required 
reasonable internal access, the trial court concluded that 
Senate Districts 1, 2, and 6, along with House Districts 74, 
91, and 100, did not satisfy the contiguous and compactness 
requirements of Article II, § 6 of the Constitution of 
Virginia.  The trial court made no finding regarding challenged 
Senate Districts 3 and 4 because no evidence was introduced 
relating to those districts.  The court found that the 
remaining districts challenged in Count IV reasonably complied 
with the requirements of Article II, § 6 as interpreted by this 
Court in Jamerson v. Womack, 244 Va. 506, 423 S.E.2d 180 
(1992).2
The trial court struck as unconstitutional House Districts 
62, 69, 70, 71, 74, 77, 80, 89, 90, 91, 92, and 95, and Senate 
                     
2 A number of discrepancies exist regarding the challenged 
districts and the holdings of the trial court.  In its amended 
opinion the trial court listed House District 75 as a district 
challenged by complainants as not compact and contiguous, 
although District 75 was not listed in Count IV of the amended 
Bill of Complaint.  The trial court found that District 75 did 
not violate Article II, § 6.  Similarly the complainants 
challenged House District 79, but the trial court did not 
identify that district as a challenged district in Count IV 
and made no ruling on the district.  Finally, the trial court 
held Senate District 6 in violation of Article II, § 6 
 
4
Districts 2, 5, 9, 13, 16, and 18.3  The trial court held that 
those districts violated Article I, §§ 1 and 11 because 
the General Assembly of Virginia has subordinated 
traditional redistricting principles to race in 
drawing district lines.  The Court having found that 
race was the predominate factor in drawing district 
lines has applied strict scrutiny to determine if 
race was necessary to further some compelling state 
interest and in all of the challenged districts, 
with the exception of those previously mentioned, 
the Commonwealth has failed to show that the 
electoral districts for the House of Delegates or 
Senate achieve any compelling state interest or 
action that it is narrowly tailored to fit such 
interest. 
 
Based on these findings, the trial court enjoined the 
defendants from conducting any elections under HB 1 or SB 1 
until the General Assembly enacted, and the Governor signed, 
legislation establishing "new redistricting statutes for the 
House of Delegates and the Senate Districts that abide by all 
of the requirements of the Constitution of the United States 
and Constitution of Virginia, specifically adhering to Article 
I, § 1, Article I, § 11, and Article II, § 6, and the other 
laws of the Commonwealth . . . ."  The trial court also ordered 
that "an election to elect representatives from each new 
                                                                
although the amended Bill of Complaint did not claim such a 
violation.  
3 The trial court stated in its amended opinion that 
Senate District 13 and House Districts 62, 64, 83, and 91 were 
challenged as racially gerrymandered.  These districts were 
not listed in the amended Bill of Complaint as violating 
Article I, § 11.  The trial court struck District 91, upheld 
District 64, and made no ruling on District 83 on this issue. 
 
5
electoral district enacted for the House of Delegates be 
conducted in 2002, as provided by law, to take office as 
members of the House of Delegates upon convening of the 2003 
session of the General Assembly of Virginia."  The trial court 
denied the defendants' motion for a stay pending appeal. 
 
The defendants filed a notice of appeal, a petition for 
appeal, a motion for expedited appeal, a motion for a stay of 
the trial court's order pending appeal, and a petition for a 
writ of prohibition.  We granted the defendants' petition for 
appeal and motion for stay pending appeal.4  
 
On appeal, the defendants raise eight assignments of 
error.  The first three assignments address the substantive 
findings of the trial court in this matter:  (1) whether the 
complainants lacked standing to pursue the litigation; (2) 
whether certain districts met the constitutional requirement of 
compactness and contiguity; and (3) whether certain districts 
were racially gerrymandered.  These issues, in our view, are 
dispositive of this appeal. 
I.  STANDING 
 
The defendants argue that the trial court should have 
dismissed the bill of complaint because the complainants failed 
                     
4 Governor Mark R. Warner was substituted for former 
Governor James Gilmore, III, by order entered April 12, 2002 
pursuant to Rule 2:16.  Governor Warner withdrew as an 
 
6
to establish that they had standing to pursue the claims 
asserted.  Relying on this Court's precedent, the defendants 
maintain that standing to challenge an electoral district 
should not be inferred solely from residency in that district.  
Rather, the defendants argue, standing requires "a personal 
stake in the outcome" of the litigation.  Cupp v. Board of 
Supervisors, 227 Va. 580, 589, 318 S.E.2d 407, 411 (1984) 
(emphasis deleted).  Merely advancing a public right or 
redressing a public injury cannot confer standing on a 
complainant.  Virginia Beach Beautification Comm'n v. Board of 
Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 415, 419, 344 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1986).  
Thus, the defendants assert that to establish standing, the 
complainants were required to show that they suffered racial, 
gender, or political discrimination, and, if the injury was 
racial in nature, the complainant had the burden of 
establishing his or her race. 
 
Because proof of residency was the only evidence produced 
by the complainants relative to standing, the defendants argue 
that the trial court erred in not granting their motion to 
dismiss the amended bill of complaint for lack of standing.  
The defendants further assert that the trial court erred in 
failing to dismiss the complainants' challenges to four House 
                                                                
appellant and participated in the appeal of this case as an 
amicus curiae on behalf of the complainant-appellees. 
 
7
districts and three Senate districts because none of the 
complainants resided in those districts. 
The complainants contend that proof of residency in a 
particular district is sufficient to establish standing to 
challenge actions in other districts as well as the district of 
residence. 
Standing to maintain a challenge to redistricting 
legislation is an issue of first impression in this 
Commonwealth.  In our previous redistricting cases, we recited 
the status of the various complainants, but we did not address 
the elements required to establish standing to maintain such an 
action.  Wilkins v. Davis, 205 Va. 803, 139 S.E.2d 849 (1965); 
Davis v. Dusch, 205 Va. 676, 139 S.E.2d 25 (1964); Brown v. 
Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932).  The complainants 
here, while acknowledging that the issue of standing in this 
case is one of state jurisprudence, suggest that we adopt the 
standing principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995), for cases involving 
challenges to redistricting legislation. 
 
The plaintiffs in Hays challenged Louisiana's 
congressional redistricting statute, asserting it was racially 
gerrymandered in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  The challenge was directed at 
District 4 of the plan but the plaintiffs were residents of 
 
8
District 5.  The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs 
did not have standing to maintain the challenge because 
standing requires the plaintiff to show that he or she has 
suffered an " 'injury in fact' – an invasion of a legally 
protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and 
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."  
Hays, 515 U.S. at 743 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).  And, in an equal protection claim, 
only "'those persons who are personally denied equal treatment' 
by the challenged discriminatory conduct," suffer such injury.  
Hays, 515 at 743-44 (citations omitted).  Thus, the Supreme 
Court rejected the proposition that any citizen of a state 
would have standing to challenge a redistricting statute on an 
equal protection claim regardless of whether such citizen was 
personally denied equal treatment. 
 
Recognizing that demonstration of a particularized injury 
in the racial gerrymandering context may be difficult, the 
Supreme Court concluded that an inference of particularized 
injury was created for a plaintiff who resides in a racially 
gerrymandered district because such resident "has been denied 
equal treatment because of the legislature's reliance on racial 
criteria . . . ."  Id. at 745.  This inference vests the 
resident of the district with standing in federal court to 
challenge the use of racial classification in creating that 
 
9
district.  A person who does not live in such a district does 
not suffer such harm and is not entitled to the inference of 
harm, but may establish standing nevertheless, if he or she 
produces specific evidence to show individualized injury 
resulting from racial classifications.  "Unless such evidence 
is present, that plaintiff would be asserting only a 
generalized grievance against governmental conduct of which he 
or she does not approve."  Id.
 
Like federal standing jurisprudence, our requirement that 
a complainant show a particularized injury applies to claims of 
racial gerrymandering under Article I, §§ 1 and 11 of the 
Constitution of Virginia.  While specific evidence of personal 
harm in the redistricting context may be difficult to show, we 
agree that residents of a racially gerrymandered electoral 
district "suffer the special representational harms racial 
classifications can cause in the voting context."  Id.  
Accordingly, we, like the federal courts, will consider proof 
of residency in an alleged racially gerrymandered district as 
sufficient to establish standing to challenge that district 
without further proof of personalized injury.  Standing can 
also be shown by a non-resident of the district who produces 
specific evidence of a particularized injury arising from the 
alleged racial gerrymandering. 
 
10
 
While this standard was developed in the context of racial 
gerrymandering claims, we believe the same standard is 
appropriate to establish standing for allegations that 
electoral districts violate the compactness and contiguous 
requirements of Article II, § 6 of the Constitution of 
Virginia.  If a district fails to meet the compactness and 
contiguous requirements, residents of that district are 
directly affected by the legislature's failure to comply with 
the Constitution of Virginia.  In the absence of residency in a 
challenged district, a complainant can establish standing only 
by showing a particularized injury. 
 
The complainants claim that any citizen of the 
Commonwealth has standing to challenge any district based on 
violations of Article I, §§ 1 and 11 or Article II, § 6 because 
an unconstitutional configuration of one district may have an 
impact on the drawing of all other districts.  We reject this 
rationale as a basis for establishing standing.  It is true 
that if a district must be reconfigured, another district or 
districts will be affected; however, this fact does not give 
rise to any inference that every district will be affected, or 
that such effect will have a constitutional impact on every 
citizen.  Furthermore, any attempt to identify in this forum 
which district or districts will be affected by legislative 
action in reconfiguring the districts is entirely speculative.  
 
11
The fact that a putative complainant's district may be affected 
is insufficient to establish the particularized injury required 
for standing in a redistricting case. 
Applying these principles to the record in this case, we 
conclude that the trial court erred in denying the defendants' 
motion to dismiss those claims challenging electoral districts 
in which no complainant resides and no evidence of injury to 
non-resident complainants was produced.  Specifically, the 
trial court had no jurisdiction to consider claims against 
Senate Districts 1, 6, and 13, and House Districts 62, 83, 91, 
and 100.  Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of the trial 
court with regard to those districts and will not consider them 
further.5  
II.  COMPACT AND CONTIGUOUS DISTRICTS 
 
Article II, § 6 of the Constitution of Virginia requires 
that electoral districts adopted by the General Assembly be 
"composed of contiguous and compact territory."  The trial 
court held that the contiguity requirement included a 
reasonable opportunity for travel within the district.  The 
trial court also determined that it was not bound by the 
expert's testimony regarding compactness, and it concluded that 
it was the court's responsibility to "examine each district in 
 
12
context of its geographical form and structure in relation to 
other portions of the district . . . ."  Of the districts which 
complainants had standing to challenge, Senate District 2 and 
House District 74 were found by the trial court to violate the 
requirements of Article II, § 6 with regard to compactness and 
contiguity. 
A.  Standard of Review 
The defendants argue that the trial court erred because it 
did not review the legislative action using the "fairly 
debatable standard" utilized in Jamerson v. Womack, 244 Va. 
506, 423 S.E.2d 180 (1992), and because it construed contiguity 
by water to include convenience of travel within the district.  
The complainants respond that the trial court correctly found 
that contiguity required a reasonable opportunity for access 
within the district, and under the standards developed in 
Jamerson, the trial court correctly held that the districts in 
question were plainly repugnant to the Constitution. 
 
In Jamerson, the complainants asserted that two electoral 
districts in the 1991 Senate redistricting plan did not comply 
with the compactness requirement of Article II, § 6.  In 
resolving the issue, we recited the principles applicable to 
our review of legislative determinations.  First, legislation 
                                                                
5 In light of this holding we do not address whether the 
trial court properly considered Senate District 6 in the 
 
13
is entitled to a "strong presumption of validity" and will be 
invalidated by the courts only if it clearly violates a 
constitutional provision.  Id. at 510, 423 S.E.2d at 182.  
"[O]nly where the statute in issue is 'plainly repugnant' to a 
constitutional provision will we declare it null and void."  
Id.(citations omitted). 
 
When the constitutionality of a statute depends on facts, 
the determination of those facts by the legislature can be set 
aside if it is clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or wholly 
unwarranted.  If the evidence offered in support of the facts 
in issue would lead objective and reasonable persons to reach 
different conclusions, the legislative determination is 
considered fairly debatable and such a determination must be 
upheld by the courts.  Id. at 509-10, 423 S.E.2d at 182.  
Although Jamerson involved a challenge to the constitutional 
requirement of compactness only, these principles are equally 
applicable to the current challenge to the requirement of 
contiguity. 
 
We also note, as we did in Jamerson, that Article II, § 6 
speaks in mandatory terms, stating that electoral districts 
"shall be" compact and contiguous.  This directive, however, 
does not override all other elements pertinent to designing 
electoral districts.  In making reapportionment decisions, the 
                                                                
absence of a challenge to that district by the complainants. 
 
14
General Assembly is required to satisfy a number of state and 
federal constitutional and statutory provisions in addition to 
designing districts that are compact and contiguous.  To do 
this requires the General Assembly to exercise its discretion 
in reconciling these often competing criteria.  Id. at 511, 423 
S.E.2d at 182-83. 
 
Finally, any purpose that may underlie the design of an 
electoral district, while relevant to challenges under other 
portions of the Constitution of Virginia as discussed below, is 
not determinative in a challenge based on Article II, § 6.  
Determinations of contiguity and compactness, as we said in 
Jamerson, are limited to consideration of the district from a 
spatial perspective, id. at 514, 423 S.E.2d at 184, taking into 
consideration the other factors which a legislative body must 
balance in designing a district. 
 
In summary, if the validity of the legislature's 
reconciliation of various criteria is fairly debatable and not 
clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or wholly unwarranted, neither 
the court below nor this Court can conclude that the resulting 
electoral district fails to comply with the compactness and 
contiguous requirements of Article II, § 6.  We now apply these 
principles to Senate District 2 and House District 74. 
B.  Senate District 2 
 
15
 
Senate District 2 is comprised of part of the City of 
Hampton, part of the City of Newport News, one precinct of the 
City of Suffolk, and one precinct of the City of Portsmouth.  
The Portsmouth-Suffolk portion of the district is separated 
from the Hampton-Newport News portion by the Hampton Roads body 
of water.  Travel by motor vehicle between the two portions of 
the district is possible by driving four to five miles on the 
Hampton Roads Beltway, Interstate Highway I-664. 
The trial court first determined that, to meet the 
constitutional requirement of contiguity, land masses within a 
district that are separated by water must provide for every 
part of the district to be accessible "to all other parts of 
the district without having to travel into a second district."  
We have not previously considered the elements which may 
be required to meet the state constitutional mandate of 
contiguity.  Clearly, a district that contained two sections 
completely severed by another land mass would not meet this 
constitutional requirement.  Moreover, no one disputes that the 
geography and population of this Commonwealth necessitate that 
some electoral districts include water, and that land masses 
separated by water may nevertheless satisfy the contiguity 
requirement in certain circumstances. 
The trial court's requirement that there be a bridge, 
road, or ferry allowing full internal access to all parts of 
 
16
the district is a requirement grounded in the theory that 
residents of the district need to have physical access to other 
parts of the district.  However, such physical access is not 
necessary for exercising the right to vote, does not impact 
otherwise intact communities of interest, and, in today's world 
of mass media and technology, is not necessary for 
communication among the residents of the district or between 
such residents and their elected representative.  
As indicated above, the General Assembly must balance a 
number of competing constitutional and statutory factors when 
designing electoral districts.  In addition, traditional 
redistricting elements not contained in the statute, such as 
preservation of existing districts, incumbency, voting 
behavior, and communities of interest, are also legitimate 
legislative considerations.  Id. at 512-14, 423 S.E.2d at 183-
84.  While ease of travel within a district is a factor to 
consider when resolving issues of compactness and contiguity, 
resting the constitutional test of contiguity solely on 
physical access within the district imposes an artificial 
requirement which reflects neither the actual need of the 
residents of the district nor the panoply of factors which must 
be considered by the General Assembly in the design of a 
district.  Short of an intervening land mass totally severing 
two sections of an electoral district, there is no per se test 
 
17
for the constitutional requirement of contiguity.  Each 
district must be examined separately. 
In this case, the trial court found that Senate District 2 
failed the constitutional requirement of contiguity, not 
because there was no access between the two portions of the 
district, but because the access was unreasonable.  The trial 
court cites no record evidence supporting its position that the 
travel required was unreasonable and our review of the record 
shows none. 
Similarly, the trial court held that the four or five 
mile separation across water rendered the district non-compact 
without any further explanation or discussion of evidence 
supporting this conclusion.  The trial court did note, 
however, that "there was no testimony that any particular 
district was unacceptably non-compact according to either of 
the measures applied by the experts."6
In our view, the evidence in this record does not rise to 
a level of proof implicating application of the fairly 
debatable standard.  And it is wholly insufficient to support 
                     
6 Complainants' expert Dr. Lublin, and defendants' expert 
Dr. Webster, both utilized the Reoch/Geographic Dispersion 
Method and the Polsby-Popper/Perimeter Compactness Method as 
objective measures of compactness.  The former measures the 
level of compactness by determining the ratio of the area of 
the district to the smallest circle that can be superimposed 
over the district.  The latter computes a ratio based on the 
 
18
a conclusion that Senate District 2 clearly violates or is 
plainly repugnant to the compactness and contiguity 
requirements of Article II, § 6.  Accordingly, we will reverse 
the trial court's judgment in that regard. 
C.  House District 74 
 
The trial court also concluded that House District 74 
violated the compactness requirement of Article II, § 6 of the 
Constitution of Virginia because a 20-mile long stretch of 
land connected the northern portion of the district in Henrico 
County to the City of Hopewell, the southern portion of the 
district.  Using its definition of constitutional contiguity, 
the trial court also found that District 74 violated Article 
II, § 6 because the City of Hopewell precincts were separated 
from the remainder of the district by the James River.  No 
tunnel, road, or bridge connects this portion of the district 
with the remainder of the district and travel through other 
districts is required to access the remainder of District 74 
from the Hopewell precincts. 
In Jamerson, we considered two electoral districts each 
covering significantly greater area than House District 74.  
We held that the manner in which the General Assembly 
reconciled the compactness requirement with the other factors 
                                                                
area of the district compared to a circle that equals the 
length of the perimeter of the district. 
 
19
which had to be addressed in creating new electoral districts 
was not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or wholly unwarranted.  
Even though reasonable persons may have configured the 
district differently in reconciling the various redistricting 
factors, applying the fairly debatable standard, we concluded 
that the choice of the General Assembly in reconciling these 
factors could not be set aside.  Id. at 517, 423 S.E.2d at 
186. 
 
The evidence in this case showed that House District 74 
has the lowest rankings for compactness, but the expert 
testimony was that this district did not fall below an 
objective standard for compactness.  The new District 74 
contained 98.3% of the 1991 district.  The change from the 
1991 district was the reunification of a previously split 
precinct in Charles City County, the City of Hopewell 
precincts, and two precincts in Henrico County. 
 
The record also shows that the incumbent member of the 
House of Delegates from House District 62 was a Republican.  
Removing the "highly Democratic" Hopewell precincts from 
District 62 made that district a "safer" Republican district. 
The changes to House District 74 did not improve the 
district's rating with regard to compactness, but they did 
bring the district closer to the target population.  The black 
voting age population (BVAP) fell from 65% to 60%, but the 
 
20
district continues to have more African Americans than any 
other district in HB 1. 
 
Although the record shows that travel between the 
Hopewell precincts and the remainder of the district requires 
travel through another district, there is nothing in this 
record showing that such access is unreasonable, unduly 
burdensome, or adversely impacts the ability of residents to 
secure meaningful representation of their interests or 
effective communication with their elected representative.  
Furthermore, we think it is significant that this district's 
configuration has remained substantially the same for over a 
decade, allowing development of relationships and communities 
of interest relative to election of delegates.  Maintaining an 
existing district in this case and removing the Hopewell 
precincts from the adjoining district in which the incumbent 
is Republican reflects the traditional redistricting 
considerations of incumbency. 
 This record reflects a balancing by the General Assembly 
of population equality, incumbency, maintaining communities of 
interest, and avoiding retrogression in designing District 74.  
While far from the most compact district, and containing a 
small portion that is contiguous only by water, nothing in 
this record indicates that the District is repugnant to the 
constitutional principles of compact and contiguous electoral 
 
21
districts.  The expert testimony shows that the district is 
within acceptable objective measures of compactness.  No one 
has testified that communication between the residents of the 
district and their elected representative has been adversely 
impacted in the past in a substantially similar district, or 
will be adversely impacted in the future because of the design 
of the district.  No intervening land mass separates one 
portion of the district from another. 
 
Given the strong presumption of constitutionality 
afforded legislative acts, and the fairly debatable standard 
we apply when considering the validity of such acts, we 
conclude that the trial court erred in holding that District 
74 violated the compactness and contiguity requirements of 
Article II, § 6 of the Constitution of Virginia. 
III.  RACIAL GERRYMANDERING 
 
The defendants also assign error to the trial court's 
holding that certain house and senate districts violated 
Article I, §§ 1 and 11 of the Constitution of Virginia because 
they were the product of racial gerrymandering. 
A.  Standard of Review 
 
We have not previously considered a challenge of this 
nature solely under Article I, § 11 of the Constitution of 
Virginia.  Accordingly, we first address the standards for 
evaluating such a claim. 
 
22
Article I, § 11 of the Constitution of Virginia provides 
in pertinent part that "the right to be free from any 
governmental discrimination upon the basis of . . . race . . . 
shall not be abridged."  In Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 638, 
194 S.E.2d 707, 711 (1973), we held that this provision was 
"no broader" than the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
applied the federal rational basis standard of 
constitutionality in considering the challenge under the 
Virginia provision, even though the Virginia provision, unlike 
the federal equal protection clause, identified gender as a 
protected class.  In subsequent cases involving allegations 
that statutes violated both Article I, § 11 of the 
Constitution of Virginia and the equal protection clause of 
the federal constitution, we applied standards of 
constitutionality developed under federal law.  We neither 
stated nor applied a separate standard for resolution of the 
challenge under state law.  Hess v. Snyder Hunt Corp., 240 Va. 
49, 53, 392 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1990) (statute not 
unconstitutional if meets rational basis test, or, if it 
affects fundamental right or suspect classification, meets 
strict scrutiny test); Mahan v. National Conservative 
Political Action Comm., 227 Va. 330, 336, 315 S.E.2d 829, 832 
(1984). 
 
23
The defendants argue that our jurisprudence requires that 
review of a legislative act requires application of the fairly 
debatable standard discussed above, and that this standard is 
simply another way of expressing the federal rational basis 
test.  We need not resolve this semantics issue.  Because the 
discrimination clause of Article I, § 11 is congruent with the 
federal equal protection clause, we will continue to apply the 
standards and nomenclature developed under the equal 
protection clause of the United States Constitution to claims 
involving claims of discrimination under Article I, § 11 of 
the state constitution, including the claims in this case. 
 
In Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001), the most 
recent redistricting case involving a challenge of racial 
gerrymandering under the equal protection clause, the Supreme 
Court recited the burden borne by the challenger.  A party 
asserting that a legislative redistricting plan has improperly 
used race as a criterion must show that the legislature 
subordinated traditional redistricting principles to racial 
considerations and that race was not merely a factor in the 
design of the district, but was the predominant factor.  The 
challenger must show that a facially neutral law is 
explainable on no other grounds but race.  Id. at 241-42.  The 
Court in Cromartie went on to state 
 
24
where majority-minority districts . . . are at issue 
and where racial identification correlates highly 
with political affiliation, the party attacking the 
legislatively drawn boundaries must show at the 
least that the legislature could have achieved its 
legitimate political objectives in alternative ways 
that are comparably consistent with traditional 
districting principles.  That party must also show 
that those districting alternatives would have 
brought about significantly greater racial balance. 
 
Id. at 258. 
 
If the challenger meets its evidentiary burden, the 
electoral district in issue is subjected to strict scrutiny 
review, rather than a rational basis test, because the 
legislative action was taken on the basis of race, a suspect 
category.  Under the strict scrutiny standard, the defendant 
must show that the district's design was the result of a 
compelling governmental purpose and was narrowly tailored to 
achieve that purpose.  Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 
(1995). 
 
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has 
repeatedly noted the discretion vested in a legislative body 
"to exercise the political judgment necessary to balance 
competing interests" in creating redistricting plans, and that 
"courts must 'exercise extraordinary caution' " in determining 
that an electoral district was motivated by racial, not 
political, interests when there is a high correlation in the 
voting age population between race and political affiliation.  
 
25
Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 242 (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-
16). 
 
In this case, the defendants readily acknowledged that 
race was a consideration in drawing the district lines.  The 
General Assembly was required to comply with the provisions of 
the VRA which mandate that a redistricting plan not dilute the 
African-American voter strength, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000), and 
that there be no retrogression in the plan; that is, the plan 
must contain no fewer majority minority districts than the 
prior plan.  42 U.S.C. § 1973(c)(2000).  The criteria adopted 
by the General Assembly specifically recognized these 
requirements as guiding factors in drawing the new 
redistricting legislation.7
 
Accordingly, to prevail in this case, the complainants 
were required to show that race was the predominant factor 
used by the General Assembly in drawing the districts at 
issue.  Additionally, if the evidence showed a high 
correlation in the voting age population between race and 
political affiliation, the complainants were also required to 
                     
7 The House and Senate committees charged with drafting 
the redistricting plans adopted identical criteria:  
population equality with a deviation within plus or minus two 
percent, compliance with the Voting Rights Act, contiguous and 
compact districts, single-member districts, and respect for 
communities of interest.  In the event of a conflict, priority 
was to be given to population equality and compliance with the 
 
26
produce districting alternatives which were comparably 
consistent with traditional redistricting principles and which 
could have brought significantly greater balance while still 
achieving legitimate political objectives. 
 
The trial court concluded that the complainants met this 
burden and, with regard to the districts in which the 
complainants had standing, declared that in creating Senate 
Districts 2, 5, 9, 16, and 18, and House Districts 69, 70, 71, 
74, 77, 80, 89, 90, 92, and 95, the General Assembly 
"subordinated traditional redistricting principles to race," 
and that the defendants failed to show that these districts 
"achieve any compelling state interest or action that . . . is 
narrowly tailored to fit such interest." 
 
In determining whether this conclusion was correct, we 
look to the underlying findings which formed the basis of such 
conclusion as to each of the districts.  In doing so we note 
that, as in Cromartie, the trial was not long, the evidence 
consisted primarily of documents and expert testimony, and 
there were no issues involving the credibility of the 
witnesses.  Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 243.  Thus, the record 
before us for resolving this evidentiary question is in 
virtually the same posture as it was before the trial court.  
                                                                
state and federal constitutional requirements and the Voting 
Rights Act. 
 
27
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the 
complainants failed to carry their burden of proof that race 
was the predominant factor used by the General Assembly and 
that qualifying alternative plans were available. 
B.  Race as the Predominant Factor 
 
Initially, we note that the complainants' factual 
premises supporting their contention that race was the 
predominate factor in drawing the districts are, in part, 
based on patterns gleaned from considering the redistricting 
plan as a whole.  These factual premises are, first, the use 
of split precincts in majority minority districts was 
disproportional, placing minorities in the majority minority 
district rather than in the majority white district, and, 
because only racial data is available below the precinct 
level, these precincts were split based on race, not politics. 
Second, where majority African-American boundary 
precincts adjoined majority white precincts, the African-
American precinct was consistently placed in the majority 
minority district rather than in the majority white district.  
This pattern again showed the use of race in designing the 
districts, according to the complainants. 
And finally, the complainants cited instances where white 
Democratic precincts were placed in the white majority 
district while the adjoining African-American Democratic 
 
28
precincts were placed in the majority minority district, thus, 
repeating a pattern of race-based behavior. 
Patterns of behavior of the nature recited above may add 
support to the conclusion that race was a predominate factor 
in drawing district lines but are not themselves dispositive 
of the issue.  The challenges in this litigation are to 
specific districts, each of which must be considered on its 
own merits, and, to prevail with regard to any specific 
district the complainants must satisfy their burden of proof 
as to that district. 
We now turn to the trial court's determinations of racial 
gerrymandering assigned as error in this appeal. 
1.  Senate Districts 
a.  Senate District 2 
 
Senate District 2 is a majority minority district 
comprised of parts of the Cities of Hampton and Newport News, 
and one majority African-American precinct each in Portsmouth 
and in Suffolk.  The trial court found that to create this 
district the General Assembly crossed the Hampton Roads body 
of water, "grabbing" isolated minority precincts to make up 
for minority precincts it "shed" closer to the Newport 
News/Hampton core of the district.  Crossing geographic and 
political boundaries in this manner was "in utter disregard of 
traditional redistricting principles," according to the trial 
 
29
court. 
 
The complainants' evidence included maps and charts, 
along with expert testimony, showing the district's 
configuration, population by race, BVAP, and political voting 
patterns in the 1997 gubernatorial race.  The complainants' 
expert also addressed the Langely precinct in Hampton which 
was split between Senate Districts 1 and 2.  The portion of 
the precinct placed in Senate District 2 had a 36.2% BVAP, 
while the portion assigned to the white majority district, 
Senate District 1, had a 20.4% BVAP, thus showing that the 
division was based on race, according to the complainants.  
Finally, the complainants' expert also stated that there were 
"several bordering precincts with relatively high 
concentrations of Democrats and low concentration of African-
Americans that are excluded from the District."  He concluded 
that placing the African-American Democratic precincts in the 
majority minority District 2 rather than the white Democratic 
precincts, further showed that race, not politics, was the 
predominant factor in drawing the district boundaries. 
 
While much of this evidence is reflected in the trial 
court's conclusions, little, if any, of the defendants' 
evidence supporting other reasons for the design of Senate 
District 2 is noted.  The defendants' evidence showed that 
Senate District 2 was under-populated by approximately 15% and 
 
30
thus needed an additional 27,000 people to meet the district 
population requirement.  The addition of the Suffolk and 
Portsmouth precincts added approximately 23,000 people.  A net 
increase of approximately 1,000 more people resulted from the 
removal of 47,000 Newport News residents in the northern part 
of the district and the addition of approximately 48,000 
residents of Hampton located immediately adjacent to the 1991 
district. 
 
The portion of Newport News removed from District 2 was 
connected by water, not land, to the remainder of the old 
district.  The resulting change in the contours of District 2 
increased its compactness under both the perimeter and 
geographic dispersion measurements when compared to the 1991 
district.  Finally, the racial profiles of the exchanged areas 
were similar. 
 
The defendants' evidence also showed that the changes 
made the District more Democratic because the removed portion 
of Newport News had a higher percentage of Republican voters 
than the added portions of Hampton, Portsmouth, and Suffolk.  
Although the complainants asserted that adjacent white 
precincts with "high concentrations of Democrats" were 
intentionally left out of District 2, their exhibits showed 
that those precincts voted less than 50% Democratic in the 
1997 gubernatorial race. 
 
31
 
Finally, the complainants' expert, Dr. Allan J. Lichtman, 
testified that he did not independently look at compactness in 
analyzing the challenged districts, did not analyze the 
districts for contiguity or communities of interest, and did 
not consider incumbency interests as part of his analysis. 
 
Based on this record we conclude that the complainants 
did not meet their evidentiary burden of showing that race was 
the predominant factor in drawing Senate District 2.  Evidence 
of the enhanced compactness, contiguity, and population 
equality of the District, the increased size of the Democratic 
voter population of the District, and the failure of the 
complainants' expert to consider significant traditional 
redistricting principles adopted by the General Assembly as 
criteria for use in its redistricting process undermines the 
trial court's conclusion.  Furthermore, the record shows that 
the section of the Newport News area "shed," according to the 
trial court, was not contiguous to the old district except by 
water and was not similar in racial makeup to the added 
Suffolk and Portsmouth precincts.  The added portions of 
Hampton were, however, similar in BVAP to the Suffolk and 
Portsmouth precincts. 
Finally, complainants' evidence that majority minority 
precincts were included in District 2 while bordering majority 
white precincts were retained in majority white districts does 
 
32
not compel the conclusion that race was the predominant design 
factor when considered in conjunction with the evidence as a 
whole.  Creating a majority minority district mandates placing 
minorities in that district and there is no dispute that race 
was a factor in drawing the district.  Similarly, a single 
split precinct, one of only 15 split precincts in SB 1, with 
1,375 African Americans unevenly divided between a white 
majority district and this majority minority district is 
insufficient to show that race was the predominant factor in 
designing the split of this precinct or the district itself. 
Legislatures must balance competing redistricting 
criteria in creating electoral districts.  This record 
contains substantial evidence that the General Assembly 
implemented a number of traditional principles of 
redistricting in creating Senate District 2 and, accordingly, 
does not support the conclusion that race predominated in the 
design of the district.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
trial court's judgment that Senate District 2 violated Article 
I, §§ 1 and 11. 
b.  Senate Districts 5, 9, 16, and 18 
 
The trial court also held that the General Assembly 
subordinated traditional redistricting principles to race in 
creating Senate Districts 5, 9, 16, and 18.  The sole basis 
cited for this conclusion was the trial court's finding that 
 
33
the General Assembly placed more minority voters in a district 
than necessary to provide such voters with a reasonable 
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, and, 
therefore, that the districts were not narrowly tailored in a 
manner reasonably necessary to comply with the federal 
requirements.  However, the issue of narrow tailoring is part 
of the strict scrutiny test, a test not applicable until after 
a determination is first made that race was the predominant 
factor in drawing the district.  Here, the trial court made no 
specific factual findings and cited no evidence relative to 
any of these districts in support of its conclusion that race 
was the predominant factor in designing each district. 
 
The evidence produced by the complainants to meet their 
initial burden of proof regarding Senate District 5 involved 
Dr. Lichtman's testimony comparing border precincts and his 
conclusion the district was drawn based on race because 
African-American border precincts were placed within the 
majority minority district and white majority border precincts 
were not.  The complainants' expert described the design of 
the district as having a "boot," looping lines, a "tail," and 
artificial peninsulas, all for the purpose of "picking off" or 
capturing African-American precincts and avoiding white 
precincts.  
 
The defendants' evidence showed that Senate District 5 
 
34
was under-populated by 33,320 people.  In adding population, 
over 97% of the district's core was retained, the district 
improved its compactness by the geographic dispersion method 
but decreased in perimeter compactness, and the BVAP decreased 
by approximately 4%.  Finally, with two exceptions, the areas 
added to the District reflected Democratic voting patterns in 
excess of 50%. 
The evidence produced by the complainants on this issue 
for the remaining Senate districts, Senate Districts 9, 16, 
and 18, follows a similar pattern to that offered regarding 
Senate District 5.  As to each district, the complainants' 
expert described the design of these majority minority 
districts as dependent upon "grabbing" or "picking up" 
majority minority precincts while avoiding majority white 
precincts, resulting in such shapes as "sickles" and 
"peninsulas."  This expert also testified that in certain 
areas, white Democratic precincts were excluded from majority 
minority districts while adjacent majority minority precincts 
were included in such districts, leading to the conclusion 
that the districts were drawn on the basis of race, not 
politics.  However, the complainants' expert also testified 
that in his analysis he had not considered whether other 
traditional redistricting principles such as compactness and 
contiguity, communities of interest, or incumbency, were 
 
35
reflected in the design of these districts. 
The evidence produced by the defendants showed that these 
three Senate districts were all under-populated from a low of 
9.9% to a high of 17%, requiring addition of population, that 
the redrawn districts were more compact by one or both of the 
objective tests used, and that the BVAP percentage declined 
with one exception where the BVAP rose from 56.5% to 58.5%.  
Finally, the defendants introduced maps and testimony 
regarding the political voting behavior in the challenged 
districts which showed a high correlation between race and 
voting patterns. 
 
We conclude that this record does not support the trial 
court's holding that race was the predominant factor in 
designing Senate Districts 5, 9, 16, and 18 for many of the 
same reasons recited in our conclusion regarding Senate 
District 2.  Unquestionably, the complainants have shown that 
race was a factor in designing these majority minority 
districts.  Indeed, to comply with the non-retrogression 
requirements of Section 5 of the VRA, race had to be a factor 
in drawing these districts.  The defendants have never 
maintained otherwise.  The record shows however, that these 
districts also were drawn with attention to such factors as 
population equalization, compactness and contiguity, retention 
of core districts where possible, and enhancement of 
 
36
communities of political interest.  We conclude that the 
complainants did not meet their "heavy burden" to show that 
the General Assembly, in exercising its political judgment to 
balance competing interests, was motivated by racial 
considerations, and subordinated other traditional 
redistricting principles to that end in creating Senate 
Districts 5, 9, 16, and 18. 
2.  House Districts 
 
a.  House Districts 92 and 95 
The City of Hampton is divided into three electoral 
districts:  House Districts 91, 92, and 95.  In District 92 
and District 95, the Hampton precincts are joined with Newport 
News precincts.  Hampton precincts are combined with the City 
of Poquoson and York County in District 91.  Because Hampton's 
population of 146,437 could support two house electoral 
districts,8 the trial court concluded that Hampton was 
"needlessly divided" into three districts "against all 
traditional race-neutral principles . . . ."  
The trial court's conclusion was based on the following 
findings.  The boundary between House District 91 and House 
District 92 separated whites from African Americans, placing 
the African Americans in the majority minority District 92.  
This boundary included three split precincts which the court 
 
37
determined followed the pattern of placing African Americans 
in the majority minority district.9  The trial court also found 
that minority candidates were unopposed or won election in 
House District 92 with over 70% of the votes with a BVAP of 
59.3%. 
The remaining African-American precincts in Hampton were 
placed in House District 95 along with heavily African-
American precincts from Newport News.  The western border of 
House District 95 abuts a majority white district, House 
District 94, and the adjoining white precincts were placed in 
District 94 and the African-American precincts in District 95.  
As in District 92, the trial court found that the minority 
candidate was elected by landslide votes with a BVAP of 59%.10
 The defendants' evidence showed that Hampton had been 
split into more than two districts prior to the enactment of 
SB 1:  former House Districts 91, 92, and 95.  Both former 
Districts 92 and 95 were approximately 15% below the target 
population, and former District 91 was 8.5% below that target.  
The underpopulation was addressed by adding the rest of the 
City of Poquoson and part of York County to these districts.  
                                                                
8 The target population for a house district is 70,785. 
9 A fourth split precinct was shared between Districts 92 
and 95. 
10 The trial court stated that the BVAP was 59% at the 
time.  However, the 59% BVAP was based on the 2000 census and 
was not representative of the BVAP in 1991 or 1993. 
 
38
While the area encompassed by House District 91 only retained 
57% of the previous district, House Districts 95 and 92 
retained 93.5% and 95.2%, respectively, of their core.  The 
defendants' evidence also showed that the voting behavior of 
the districts correlated highly with race.  The majority of 
the Democratic voters were retained in House Districts 92 and 
95.  The Hampton precincts included in the white majority 
District 91 were less Democratic than the neighboring Hampton 
precincts retained in the majority minority District 92.  The 
evidence also showed that the split of the Magruder precinct 
between House District 91 and 92 placed more African Americans 
in the majority minority House District 92 than in the 
majority white House District 91. 
This record establishes that the division of Hampton into 
3 districts was not a new legislative decision, but followed a 
three-way division that existed for at least a decade.  The 
evidence shows that the redistricting principles of population 
equality, partisan voting behavior, and avoiding retrogression 
all played a part in designing these two districts.  As we 
have said before, the complainants bear a heavy burden in 
successfully challenging the constitutionality of these 
legislative acts.  We find that this record does not support 
the trial court's conclusion that race was the predominant 
factor in designing House Districts 92 and 95. 
 
39
b.  House District 74 
 
In holding that House District 74 was racially 
gerrymandered in violation of Article I, §§ 1 and 11, the 
trial court cited the shape of the district including a 20 
mile "land bridge," and the lack of community of interest 
between the African Americans in rural Charles City County and 
those in urban northern Henrico and the Hopewell portion of 
the district.  The trial court concluded that the "grabbing" 
of "small, isolated minority communities in Charles City 
County and the two precincts in the City of Hopewell in order 
to 'preserve' a majority-minority district with a population" 
having "no common traditional, economic, or community of 
interests with Henrico," amounted to the "suspect use of race 
as a proxy to further the neighboring incumbents interests."  
Finally, the trial court observed that if avoiding 
retrogression was the General Assembly's goal, it could have 
created "four compact, politically cohesive majority-minority 
districts" in the Richmond, Henrico, and Chesterfield area. 
 
The defendants produced evidence showing that the 1991 
district was basically replicated in HB 1.  Although District 
74 was below the target population for a house district, 98.3% 
of District 74 was retained while adding the requisite 
population.  The new district was more compact than the old, 
and its BVAP declined from 65.1% to 59.7%. 
 
40
The defendants' evidence also showed that the incumbent 
representative in the neighboring district, District 62, was a 
Republican.  Removing the strongly Democratic Hopewell 
precincts from District 62 made that district a "safer" 
district for the incumbent.  Finally, the maps presented by 
both the complainants and the defendants showed that the "land 
bridge" between the Henrico and Charles City County portion of 
the district consisted of the precincts with the fewest 
Republican voters. 
 
Based on this record, we conclude that the trial court 
erred in determining that race was the predominant factor in 
creating District 74.  The record shows that race was a factor 
in designing the district along with traditional redistricting 
principles of retaining core areas, population equality, 
compactness and contiguity, partisan voting behavior, and 
protection of incumbents.  The record does not support the 
conclusion that any of these factors were subordinated to 
race.  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in 
holding that House District 74 was racially gerrymandered. 
c.  House Districts 69, 70, 71, 77, 80, 89, and 90 
 
The trial court also concluded that the majority minority 
House Districts 69, 70, 71, 77, 80, 89, and 90 violated 
Article I, § 11.  The only evidence cited in support of this 
conclusion was election results for these districts showing 
 
41
that, with the exception of seven races, minority candidates 
received 74% or more of the votes in each election.  The BVAP 
in these districts ranged from 53% to 64%, and, therefore, the 
court concluded that the districts were "packed," meaning that 
they were not narrowly tailored to meet the requirements of 
federal law.  As stated above, whether districts were narrowly 
tailored to comply with federal requirements is a 
consideration not raised until the requisite finding of racial 
predominance is first made. 
The trial court did not reference any specific evidence 
or make any specific findings for any of these districts to 
support a conclusion that race was the predominant factor in 
creating each district.  It did, however, cite patterns it 
found in the creation of the districts that illustrated the 
"subordination of the traditional redistricting principles to 
race."  These patterns included excessive splitting of 
jurisdictional lines, general disregard for keeping regions 
intact, abandoning the constitutional requirements of 
compactness and contiguity, and an inordinate use of split 
precincts in majority minority districts.  The trial court, 
however, did not identify any particular district in which 
these patterns occurred.  
 
We have already made clear that, in the absence of 
specific evidence in a specific district, such pattern 
 
42
evidence alone cannot sustain the trial court's finding of 
racial discrimination.  We also note that the trial court's 
own holdings in this case belie its conclusion that matters of 
contiguity and compactness have been "generally disregarded" 
in creating the majority minority districts.  Of the 23 House 
and Senate districts challenged under Article II, § 6, the 
trial court found only six to be non-compact or non-
contiguous.  These numbers do not support a conclusion that 
these constitutional requirements were "generally 
disregarded."  
Finally, the trial court cited the high percentage of 
split precincts in majority minority districts as evidence of 
race-based district line drawing.  Specifically, the court 
found that the inclusion of 77% of the 61 precincts split 
statewide in the contested districts was not by "coincidence 
or happenstance."  However, other than those split precincts 
discussed above, the court fails to identify the location or 
specific impact of any other split precincts on the districts 
in question. 
The record contains little evidence other than maps or 
general charts with regard to House Districts 71, 89, and 90.  
Complainants' expert did not analyze these districts 
individually, and they are referenced in a single chart 
prepared by the complainants' expert to show that the 
 
43
Democratic party voting percentage is higher than the BVAP in 
those districts. 
The evidence adduced by the complainants to meet their 
initial burden of showing that race was the predominant factor 
in drawing these districts included testimony by their expert 
that in each district where African-American boundary 
precincts adjoined white precincts, the African-American 
precincts were placed in the majority minority district.  This 
expert also cited three instances of split precincts in these 
districts that again placed more African Americans in the 
majority minority district.  The complainants' witnesses also 
testified regarding the "barbell," "lobster," and "foot with 
toes" shapes of the districts which they contended resulted 
from the General Assembly's "stretching" districts to include 
African-American precincts.  The complainants also argued that 
the evidence showed that in creating District 69, the General 
Assembly drew boundaries that crossed the James River to 
include four precincts that were heavily African American but 
did not include adjoining white precincts that were also 
heavily Democratic, supporting the proposition that the 
district was drawn on the basis of race, not politics. 
The defendants' evidence included documents and testimony 
showing that the population in each of these districts was 
from 5% to 27% below the requisite level.  In creating the 
 
44
revised districts, the General Assembly retained the 
substantial amounts of the districts' cores:  63% in District 
69, 70% in District 70, 95% in District 77, and 90% in 
District 80.  Of the three split precincts in these districts, 
the defendants' expert testified that two of the splits 
enhanced the compactness rating of the districts involved, 
Districts 69 and 77.  The splitting of the third precinct, the 
Bellwood precinct, resulted in 18.7% African Americans placed 
in District 70, and 16.2% African Americans placed in the 
majority white precinct, a difference which complainants' 
expert agreed was statistically insignificant and would not 
support a strong inference of race-based line drawing. 
In response to the contention that white Democratic 
precincts were not included in majority minority District 69 
while African-American precincts were, maps presented by both 
the defendants and the complainants showed that the white 
precincts adjoining the four African-American precincts north 
of the James River in District 69, while voting Democratic, 
generally reflected a lower level of Democratic voting 
behavior than the four African-American precincts that were 
included in House District 69.  Finally, with one exception, 
the BVAP in each district diminished.  The BVAP in District 77 
grew by a single percentage point, from 55% to 56%. 
 
45
 We conclude that this record does not support the trial 
court's conclusion that "being black was the predominant 
factor in being chosen as part of a population making up the 
majority-minority districts."  As stated above, the use of 
race as a factor in designing these districts is conceded.  
This record shows that along with race, accommodations for 
population equality, incumbency, and political party voting 
patterns were made by the General Assembly. 
C.  Alternative Plans  
There is no dispute that in the districts involved in 
this case there is a high correlation between race and 
political affiliation.  Under these circumstances, the 
complainants have to show not only that race was the 
predominate factor in creating the districts at issue, but 
also that alternative designs were available that were 
consistent with traditional redistricting principles and that 
"would have brought about significantly greater racial 
balance."  Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 258.  However, the evidence 
of alternative acceptable plans is sparse. 
The trial court stated that other districts could have 
been drawn in certain instances.  The trial court indicated 
the City of Hampton could have been contained in two House 
districts and did not need to be split three ways.  Similarly, 
the trial court stated that "four compact, politically 
 
46
cohesive majority-minority districts can be created in the 
Richmond, Henrico, and Chesterfield area without stretching 
across vast geographical distances and prominent natural 
barriers and ignoring race-neutral criteria."  Other than 
these statements, the trial court did not discuss the shape or 
qualities of such districts or reference any alternative 
districts offered by the complainants. 
The only alternative districts in evidence were House 
Bill 2 (HB 2) and Senate Bill 4, generally referred to as the 
Robinson plan and the Miller plan, respectively.  The primary 
analysis of these bills is found in attachments to the Senate 
and House submissions to the Department of Justice required by 
the VRA. 
House Bill 2 did not limit Richmond, Henrico, and 
Chesterfield to 4 districts, nor did it divide Hampton into 
only two districts.  The record shows that House Bill 2 split 
fewer precincts and localities than HB 1, but HB 2 also had a 
BVAP of less than 50.5% in six of the majority minority 
districts and had a higher population deviation between 
districts (+2.96 to –3.33).  This record is devoid of any 
other alternative plans offered by the complainants.  Indeed, 
at trial, counsel for complainants objected to the 
introduction of Senate Bill 4, stating the bill is "not part 
 
47
of this case.  It's not part of our argument or part of the 
case that we are putting forward . . . ."  
Accordingly, we hold that the complainants failed to 
carry their burden of proof as enunciated by the Supreme Court 
in Cromartie, thereby eliminating any application of the 
strict scrutiny standard. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, for the reasons stated above, we will vacate 
the trial court's judgment with regard to House Districts 62, 
83, 91, and 100 and Senate Districts 1, 6, and 13 because the 
complainants did not have standing to pursue claims against 
those districts. 
We will reverse the judgment of the trial court holding 
that Senate District 2 and House District 4 violated Article 
II, § 6 of the Constitution of Virginia. 
We will reverse the judgment of the trial court holding 
that Senate Districts 2, 5, 9, 16, and 18, and House Districts 
69, 70, 71, 74, 77, 80, 89, 90, 92, and 95 violate Article I, 
§§ 1 and 11 of the Constitution of Virginia.  Final judgment 
will be entered in favor of the defendants.11
Reversed and final judgment.
JUSTICE HASSELL, concurring. 
                     
11 In light of this holding, we need not address 
defendants' remaining assignments of error. 
 
48
I. 
 
I agree with the opinion of the majority.  I write 
separately solely to emphasize certain principles that govern 
my decision in this case.  It is no surprise to anyone that 
this redistricting, like most, is highly political.  The 
judiciary's sole function, however, is to determine whether 
legislative districts created by redistricting comport with 
the Constitution of Virginia.  The judiciary, a separate, co-
equal, and apolitical branch of government, must not concern 
itself with the political implications of the challenged 
redistricting plan. 
 
Upon consideration of the Constitution of Virginia, 
relevant case law, and the decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court, I am compelled to conclude that the plaintiffs 
in this case failed to establish that race was the predominant 
factor that the General Assembly used in creating the 
legislative districts.  Additionally, upon comparison of the 
majority black Senate district that this Court approved in 
1992 in Jamerson v. Womack, 244 Va. 506, 423 S.E.2d 180 
(1992), with the challenged legislative districts in this 
case, I can only conclude that the challenged legislative 
districts in this case do not violate Virginia's 
constitutional requirements of compactness and contiguity. 
II. 
 
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A. 
HOUSE DISTRICT 74 
 
Article II, § 6 of the Constitution of Virginia states 
that "[e]very electoral district shall be composed of 
contiguous and compact territory."  The circuit court 
concluded that several Senate and House Districts violate 
these constitutional requirements.  However, the only district 
that I find troublesome is House District 74 and, therefore, I 
will focus my discussion solely upon that district. 
 
Without question, House District 74 has a bizarre shape.  
It has a configuration somewhat similar to a diagram of an 
"axe handle."  However, a comparison of the record in this 
case with the record in Jamerson compels me to the inescapable 
conclusion that House District 74 is constitutionally 
permissible. 
 
In Jamerson, we acknowledged several principles that we 
must apply here.  We pointed out that legislative 
determinations of fact upon which the constitutionality of a 
statute may depend are binding upon this Court unless those 
determinations are clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or wholly 
unwarranted.  Jamerson, 244 Va. at 509, 423 S.E.2d at 182.  We 
recognized, however, that legislative conclusions based upon 
findings of fact are subject to judicial review when they are 
arbitrary and unwarranted.  Id.  We stated that every statute, 
 
50
including a statute enacting a redistricting plan, has a 
"strong presumption of validity," and we held that 
"reapportionment 'is, in a sense, political, and necessarily 
wide discretion is given to the legislative body.' "  Id. at 
510, 423 S.E.2d at 182 (quoting Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 
36, 166 S.E. 105, 107 (1932)). 
 
Additionally, in this appeal, just as in Jamerson, the 
General Assembly must comply with two overarching conditions:  
Article I, § 2 of the United States Constitution that compels 
"equal representation for equal numbers of people," often 
referred to as "one person, one vote," and compliance with the 
mandates of the federal Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1971-
74e (2000).  Of course, the Voting Rights Act requires that 
the General Assembly refrain from diluting black group voting 
strength in a redistricting.  Jamerson, 244 Va. at 511, 423 
S.E.2d at 183 (citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 
(1964)). 
 
I also observe, with great conviction, that this Court 
must be consistent in the application of its precedent.  
Fairness dictates that the same principles that this Court 
applied in Jamerson, which resulted in the approval of a black 
majority Senate district, must be applied in this case. 
 
Applying these principles, I conclude that House District 
74 satisfies Virginia's constitutional requirements of 
 
51
contiguity and compactness.  The reasons that justify approval 
of House District 74 are, in my opinion, more compelling than 
the reasons that required approval of Senate District 18 in 
Jamerson.  In Jamerson, we rejected the plaintiffs' challenges 
to two districts; one of those districts was a Senate district 
with a majority black voting age population.  This district, 
Senate District 18, extended from rural Halifax County to the 
City of Portsmouth.  Senate District 18 also had a bizarre 
shape.  Just like House District 74 in the present case, the 
challenged majority black voting district in Jamerson had a 
configuration that extended into a city which allowed the 
district to acquire a significant number of black voters.  
Unlike Senate District 18 that we approved in Jamerson, most 
of House District 74 has been in existence since 1990, and 
there is a much stronger community of interest within that 
district than Senate District 18.  Furthermore, House District 
74, which was created as a majority black district in 1991, is 
substantially similar today to its 1991 configuration, and 
contains 98.3% of the 1991 district which was approved by many 
of the legislator-plaintiffs in this case. 
B. 
Validity of Plaintiffs' Racial Challenge 
 
The litigants agree that race must be a factor in the 
redistricting because of the mandate of the federal Voting 
 
52
Rights Act.  However, race must not be the predominant factor.  
As the Supreme Court stated in Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 
234, 241-42 (2001): 
"The Court has specified that those who claim that a 
legislature has improperly used race as a criterion, 
in order, for example, to create a majority-minority 
district, must show at a minimum that the 
'legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral 
districting principles . . . to racial 
considerations.'  [Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 
916 (1995)].  Race must not simply have been 'a 
motivation for the drawing of a majority minority 
district,' Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996) 
(O'CONNOR, J., principal opinion) (emphasis in 
original), but 'the "predominant factor" motivating 
the legislature's districting decision,' Cromartie, 
526 U.S. at 547 (quoting Miller, supra, at 916) 
(emphasis added).  Plaintiffs must show that a 
facially neutral law ' "is 'unexplainable on grounds 
other than race.' " '  [Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 
546]." 
 
 
The Supreme Court also made the following observation in 
Easley v. Cromartie, that is pertinent here: 
 
"The Court also has made clear that the 
underlying districting decision is one that 
ordinarily falls within a legislature's sphere of 
competence.  Miller, 515 U.S. at 915.  Hence, the 
legislature 'must have discretion to exercise the 
political judgment necessary to balance competing 
interests,' ibid., and courts must 'exercise 
extraordinary caution in adjudicating claims that a 
State has drawn district lines on the basis of 
race,' id., at 916 (emphasis added).  Caution is 
especially appropriate in this case, where the State 
has articulated a legitimate political explanation 
for its districting decision, and the voting 
population is one in which race and political 
affiliation are highly correlated.  See Cromartie, 
supra, 526 U.S. at 551-[52] (noting that 'evidence 
that blacks constitute even a supermajority in one 
congressional district while amounting to less than 
 
53
a plurality in a neighboring district will not, by 
itself, suffice to prove that a jurisdiction was 
motivated by race in drawing its district lines when 
the evidence also shows a high correlation between 
race and party preference')." 
 
Id. at 242. 
 
Upon application of these principles to this case, I am 
persuaded that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the 
General Assembly used race as the predominant factor in the 
redistricting plan.  Simply stated, the plaintiffs failed to 
prove their case as required by law.  The undisputed evidence 
in the record before this Court is that in Virginia there is a 
high correlation between race and politics.  The plaintiffs, 
therefore, were required to introduce, in evidence, an 
alternative plan that showed that the General Assembly could 
have achieved its political and traditional districting 
objectives without the specific racial configurations that the 
General Assembly actually used.  The plaintiffs, however, 
failed to present an alternative plan that complied with the 
criteria required by Easley v. Cromartie. 
 
Without question, this Court has a constitutional duty to 
invalidate a redistricting plan if the evidence demonstrates 
that race was the predominant factor in the creation of 
legislative districts.  However, plaintiffs who challenge the 
redistricting plan have an obligation to prove their case, and 
in this instance the plaintiffs failed to satisfy that 
 
54
obligation.  The failure to satisfy this obligation is amply 
demonstrated by the testimony of plaintiffs' own expert 
witness, who testified that he neglected to consider certain 
basic factors that are highly relevant in any redistricting 
plan, including the factor of political incumbency.  Dr. Allan 
J. Lichtman testified as follows: 
 
"Q:  If you pick a district to study because it 
is black and compare it only to bordering districts 
that are white, wouldn't you expect to find that 
blacks are more heavily represented inside? 
 
 
"A:  If you are drawing the district based on 
race, yes.  If you are not drawing the district 
based on race, not necessarily.  It could be that 
there are all kinds of borders even though the 
district is less heavily black that they share, that 
both have heavy concentrations of blacks or heavy 
concentrations of whites, and you wouldn't find that 
kind of consistent pattern.  So, no, it doesn't 
follow. 
 
 
"Q:  Well, let me ask you this:  Did you look 
at the borders that you used to determine whether on 
the other side there were Republican incumbents or 
Democratic incumbents? 
 
 
"A:  No. 
 
 
"Q:  And you don't think that would make any 
difference in your analysis? 
 
 
"A:  I tested the proposition that the lines 
were drawn on a political basis.  I looked at the 
competitiveness of those districts.  I did not look 
at the identity of the incumbents or what role they 
may or may not have played.  I didn't see anything 
about that in any of the material presented by the 
State." 
 
 
55
The plaintiffs' failure to establish that the General Assembly 
relied predominantly upon race rather than basic political 
considerations, such as incumbency, is fatal to the 
plaintiffs' case.  See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 241-
42. 
 
 
56