Title: Carver v. Commissioner of Correction
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13247
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 3, 2023

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13247 
 
JAMES CARVER  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & another.1 
 
 
 
Essex.     September 9, 2022. - April 3, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Parole.  Imprisonment, Parole.  Commissioner of Correction.  
Practice, Civil, Action in nature of certiorari. 
 
 
 
Civil actions commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
January 29 and March 11, 2021. 
 
After consolidation, the cases were heard by Jeffrey T. 
Karp, J., on motions for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Sharon L. Sullivan-Puccini for the plaintiff. 
Scott McLean for the defendants. 
Mara Voukydis, Committee for Public Counsel Services, Tatum 
A. Pritchard, Jacob Addelson, David Milton, Lauren Petit, & Ada 
Lin, for Prisoners' Legal Services of Massachusetts & others, 
amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
1 Superintendent, Old Colony Correctional Center. 
2 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  James Carver, the plaintiff, currently is 
serving fifteen life sentences for murder in the second degree.  
Commonwealth v. Carver, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 378, 379, 389 (1992).  
In 2020, the plaintiff submitted a petition requesting medical 
parole pursuant to G. L. c. 127, § 119A (§ 119A or statute).  
The Commissioner of Correction (commissioner) denied the 
petition, after receiving a recommendation in support of denial 
from the superintendent of the Old Colony Correctional Center 
(superintendent).  The commissioner subsequently denied two 
additional requests for release. 
In this opinion, we consider whether the commissioner's 
decision to deny the plaintiff medical parole was arbitrary or 
capricious.  In McCauley v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional 
Inst., Norfolk, 491 Mass.    ,     (2023), we determined that 
501 Code Mass. Regs. § 17.02 (2019) does not impermissibly 
narrow the scope of the statute.  With that in mind, and after 
consideration of the facts of the present case, we conclude that 
the commissioner's determination that the plaintiff would pose a 
public safety risk on release is supported by the record.2 
Background.  1.  Petition for medical parole.  On September 
30, 2020, the plaintiff filed a petition for medical parole, 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Prisoners' 
Legal Services of Massachusetts, the Disability Law Center, and 
the Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
3 
 
pursuant to § 119A.  The plaintiff indicated that the reasons 
for the request were that he has many comorbidities, he is 
confined to a wheelchair, and he has family willing to care for 
him.  His petition included a medical parole plan. 
On October 21, 2020, the superintendent recommended against 
medical parole for the plaintiff.  He recognized the plaintiff's 
proposed plan for medical parole, and the completed medical 
assessment of the plaintiff.  The superintendent submitted a 
risk assessment and a classification report, as required by the 
statute, but did not include a medical parole plan aside from 
discussing the plaintiff's plan.  The superintendent opined that 
the plaintiff did not meet the criteria for medical parole, 
citing his ability to transfer independently to and from his 
wheelchair, his relatively young age, his mobility, a 
physician's opinion that the plaintiff was not permanently 
incapacitated or terminally ill, improvement in his prostate 
cancer diagnosis, the seriousness of his offenses, his minimal 
recent programming, and a 2019 disciplinary report as indicators 
that he "would pose a major risk to public safety if released." 
The plaintiff's risk assessment, conducted in 2009, 
indicated that he had been arrested or charged three or more 
times with a new crime while on pretrial release.  It noted that 
he has received serious or administrative disciplinary 
infractions for fighting or threatening other inmates or staff.  
4 
 
The plaintiff's drug screen resulted in a score of zero, 
indicating a low risk of substance use disorder.  The assessment 
categorized his needs as low for criminal involvement and 
noncompliance history, and high for violence history and current 
violence.  Despite finding the plaintiff's needs high for 
violence-related concerns, the assessment characterized his 
violence and recidivism risks as low. 
The plaintiff received a score of two on his classification 
report, suggesting that he should be placed in minimum custody 
or below.  He received a score of six for the severity of his 
current offense; scores of zero for severity of convictions 
within the last four years, history of escape or attempts to 
escape, prior institutional violence within the last three 
years, and number of disciplinary reports within the last year; 
and scores of negative two for his age, which was fifty-six at 
the time, and his program participation or work assignment, 
indicating that he satisfied all of his program requirements.  
Due to his conviction of a crime resulting in loss of life, 
Department of Correction (department) policy did not permit 
minimum security, and because of the need for alternate 
placement "following conflicts" at the Massachusetts 
Correctional Institution at Shirley (MCI-Shirley), medium 
custody level was recommended in July 2020. 
5 
 
On November 3, 2020, the district attorney's office wrote a 
letter to the commissioner opposing the plaintiff's petition.  
The district attorney's office pointed to the medical assessment 
stating that he was at "high risk" to become "permanent[ly] 
incapacitat[ed]," but that he currently was not permanently 
incapacitated such that he does not pose a public safety risk. 
On December 4, 2020, the commissioner denied the 
plaintiff's petition for medical parole.  The commissioner 
recognized his numerous medical conditions but stated that the 
medical assessment did not opine that the plaintiff currently 
was "terminally ill" or "permanently incapacitated" within the 
meaning of the statute, and she concluded that his medical 
condition was not "so debilitating that [he did] not pose a 
public safety risk." 
Shortly after the commissioner released her decision, the 
plaintiff's attorney requested preservation of video footage 
(video) from an incident (use of force incident) relied on in 
the commissioner's decision, which was not part of the 
administrative record.  The attorney sent a letter requesting 
reconsideration of the petition for medical parole, along with 
another letter requesting that the commissioner watch the video 
of the incident.3  On January 29, 2021, before receiving a 
 
3 The plaintiff's attorney dated the letters January 15, 
2020.  It appears, however, that the accurate date would have 
6 
 
response from the commissioner, the plaintiff filed a complaint 
in the nature of certiorari in the Superior Court challenging 
the commissioner's denial. 
Awaiting a response from the commissioner, the plaintiff's 
attorney sent her another letter on February 2, 2021, 
reiterating the attorney's request that the video be preserved.  
On February 9, the plaintiff sent the commissioner additional 
medical and mental health records.  In response, counsel for the 
commissioner told the plaintiff's attorney "that the 
administrative record on reconsideration is limited to those 
materials that [the commissioner] deems relevant to her decision 
making."  The district attorney's office sent an updated 
opposition, and an updated medical parole assessment was 
provided to the commissioner. 
On March 1, 2021, the commissioner denied the plaintiff's 
request for reconsideration.  She indicated that she considered 
the updated medical information, the incident reports relating 
to the use of force incident, supplemental letters, and a 
renewed opposition from the district attorney's office, but made 
no mention of the video.  She noted that there was no 
"significant and material change" to the plaintiff's medical 
 
been January 15, 2021, as she refers in the letters to an 
incident occurring in June 2020 and the commissioner's December 
2020 decision. 
7 
 
condition and that she did not believe that he would live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law.4  She opined that 
his release would be incompatible with the welfare of society.  
The commissioner claimed that, although the updated medical 
assessment stated that the plaintiff has "multiple risk factors 
for mortality and morbidity" and "debilitating medical 
conditions with permanent mobility and other functional 
incapacitation," it did not assert that he was either 
"terminally ill" or "permanently incapacitated" within the 
meaning of the statute. 
The plaintiff then filed another complaint in the nature of 
certiorari in the Superior Court seeking review of this 
subsequent denial, and the cases were consolidated.  Both 
parties filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the 
plaintiff filed a motion to strike the administrative record 
submitted by the department and replace it with a record to 
include the video of the use of force incident.  After a 
hearing, a Superior Court judge ordered the commissioner to 
 
4 In Harmon v. Commissioner of Correction, 487 Mass. 470, 
477 (2021), we held that the mandatory language of G. L. c. 127, 
§ 119A (c) (1), prohibited the department from requiring "a 
significant and material decline in medical condition" for a 
petitioner to submit a new petition.  Consequently, we do not 
consider this reason in the commissioner's decision when 
analyzing whether she abused her discretion. 
8 
 
review the video and issue a "revised decision" on the 
plaintiff's medical parole petition. 
On August 17, 2021, the commissioner issued a new decision 
denying the plaintiff's petition for medical parole.  She 
explicitly reviewed the video, as well an updated medical 
assessment, and a written statement from the district attorney's 
office.  After describing the district attorney's position on 
the video in detail, the commissioner indicated that she agreed 
with it and opined that the plaintiff did not meet the criteria 
for medical parole.  She found that he did not meet the criteria 
for "permanent incapacitation, as he [did] not have a physical 
or cognitive incapacitation that [was] so debilitating that he 
[did] not pose a public safety risk."  The commissioner stated 
that his medical conditions were all stable, and that he 
required a wheelchair for mobility, "but only due to an unsteady 
gait and tremors, as opposed to physical weakness."  She noted 
that independently he was able to "perform a number of 
activities of daily living," cited the severity of his offense, 
and observed that "[i]n his current physical condition, [he was] 
certainly still capable of committing a similar crime."  She 
further stated that nothing in the video demonstrated that the 
plaintiff was either terminally ill or permanently 
incapacitated. 
9 
 
On December 17, 2021, after submission of new filings 
incorporating the commissioner's latest decision, a Superior 
Court judge held a hearing on the motions for judgment on the 
pleadings.  At the hearing, the judge asked the plaintiff 
whether the statute required the commissioner to consider the 
medical parole plan in determining whether a petitioner was 
permanently incapacitated.  Initially, the plaintiff's counsel 
responded, "I don't think so. . . .  [S]he has to find those 
three things, and then he should be released in the process, and 
then they could look at the plan."  Subsequently, counsel said 
that the commissioner would consider the medical parole plan in 
determining whether the plaintiff was a safety risk.  In a 
written decision, the judge denied the plaintiff's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, and a judgment was entered affirming 
the commissioner's decision.  The plaintiff filed a timely 
notice of appeal, and we granted his application for direct 
appellate review. 
2.  Criminal case.  A jury convicted the plaintiff of 
fifteen counts of murder in the second degree and one count of 
burning a dwelling house stemming from an early morning fire set 
on July 4, 1984, at a rooming house in Beverly.  Carver, 33 
Mass. App. Ct. at 379.  On December 1, 1989, he was sentenced to 
10 
 
several consecutive life sentences in prison with the 
possibility of parole.5 
An investigator determined that the fire started in an 
alcove adjacent to the front entrance to the building and was 
set with a stack of newspapers found next to the door and 
hydrocarbon accelerant.  Carver, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 379-380.  
During the night before the fire, the plaintiff confronted a man 
who lived in the rooming house and was dating the plaintiff's 
former girlfriend.  Id. at 380.  The plaintiff warned the man 
that if he continued to date her, the plaintiff would kill him 
and burn down his house.  Id.  On the morning of the fire at 
around 1:15 A.M., the plaintiff told a friend that he was upset 
because of his breakup and that he wanted his girlfriend back.  
Id.  Between 3 A.M. and 4 A.M., a taxicab driver observed the 
plaintiff standing in front of the rooming house, and a 
newspaper delivery woman saw a man standing in the entryway to 
the rooming house leaning over a stack of newspapers.6  Id.  The 
fire started at 4:18 A.M.  Id.  Although the plaintiff's parents 
testified that he was home and asleep at that time, the 
 
5 Including the above charges, the plaintiff has had twenty-
four adult arraignments.  These resulted in seventeen 
convictions, including sixteen convictions of offenses against 
the "person" and one of a "property" offense. 
 
6 Another man in the area at the time saw a man smoking a 
cigarette in the doorway of the rooming house and stated that it 
was not the defendant.  Carver, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 380. 
11 
 
plaintiff made numerous incriminating statements, and admitted 
to two friends that he had started the fire.  Id.  Fifteen 
people died.  Most of the victims died from smoke inhalation 
combined with severe burns, but one victim died jumping from an 
upper window trying to escape the burning building. 
Based on the "official version" of the offenses retained by 
the department, a week after the fire the plaintiff began to 
make "harassing" telephone calls to his former girlfriend and 
appeared at her work in an emotional state.  As he was leaving, 
he yelled out the window, "[T]his is the next place I will 
burn."  Later, he emotionally confessed to his friend that he 
had lit the fire, but that he had not meant to kill people.  The 
plaintiff disagrees with this version of events. 
The plaintiff has filed numerous motions for a new trial, 
and he has appealed from the denial of his motions.  He became 
parole eligible in 2018, but he chose to postpone his parole 
hearing. 
3.  Plaintiff's medical condition.  On October 9, 2020, 
Dr. John Straus and Despina Kiely, a nurse practitioner, of the 
department's medical provider, performed a medical parole 
assessment of the plaintiff.  He has been diagnosed with right-
sided acoustic neuroma or vestibular schwannoma,7 causing chronic 
 
7 "Neuroma" is a "[g]eneral term for any neoplasm derived 
from cells of the nervous system."  Stedman's Medical Dictionary 
12 
 
dizziness and vertigo.  He has moderate to severe hearing loss 
in his left ear.  He was diagnosed with prostate cancer in 2015, 
and he declined an offer for a radical prostatectomy.  He has a 
history of stable angina,8 coronary artery disease,9 atrial 
fibrillation10 with stable rate control, hypertension, 
dyslipidemia, gastroesophageal reflux disease, skin cancer, 
neurogenic bladder,11 and epilepsy.  He suffers from essential 
tremors.  He is dependent on a wheelchair (and has been provided 
one since 2006), but he is able to transfer independently.  
Straus and Kiely opined that the plaintiff has "multiple risk 
factors for mortality and morbidity" and has "debilitating 
conditions with high risk for permanent incapacitation." 
 
1311 (28th ed. 2006).  "Schwannoma" is a "benign, encapsulated 
neoplasm in which the fundamental component is structurally 
identical to the syncytium of Schwann cells."  Stedman's Medical 
Dictionary 1730. 
 
8 "A severe, often constricting pain or sensation of 
pressure, usually referring to a. pectoris."  Stedman's Medical 
Dictionary 85. 
 
9 "[N]arrowing of the lumen of one or more of the coronary 
arteries, usually due to atherosclerosis."  Stedman's Medical 
Dictionary 554. 
 
10 Atrial fibrillation is a condition "in which the normal 
rhythmic contractions of the cardiac atria are replaced by rapid 
irregular twitchings of the muscular wall."  Stedman's Medical 
Dictionary 722-723. 
 
11 "Neurogenic" is defined as "[o]riginating in, starting 
from, or caused by, the nervous system or nerve impulses."  
Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1310. 
13 
 
On January 25, 2021, Straus completed an updated medical 
parole assessment for the plaintiff, which provided additional 
information with respect to his medical conditions.  The 
plaintiff had an occipital craniotomy in November 2005 to 
address his vestibular schwannoma.  He suffers from tinnitus12 
and leg neuropathy and is incontinent for urine and stool.  He 
requires catheterization for his coronary artery disease.  He 
has experienced hypertension since he was the age of eight, and 
epilepsy since the age of sixteen.  He has had numerous 
surgeries, ranging from upper back surgery to surgery to address 
skin cancer.  He is overweight and experiences microcytic 
anemia.13  The plaintiff, at the time of the report, was being 
evaluated for congestive heart failure.  Straus opined that the 
plaintiff has "debilitating medical conditions with permanent 
mobility and other functional incapacitation."  He stated that 
the plaintiff was expected to survive the next eighteen months, 
"but at significant risk." 
On July 29, 2021, Straus and Michelle Mulvey-Sylvia, a 
nurse practitioner, performed another medical parole assessment 
on the plaintiff.  This assessment conveyed much of the same 
 
12 "Perception of a sound in the absence of an environmental 
acoustic stimulus."  Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1992. 
 
13 "[I]n which the average size of circulating erythrocytes 
is smaller than normal."  Stedman's Medical Dictionary 79. 
14 
 
information as the first two assessments.  It further indicated 
that he suffers from presbyopia14 and seborrhea.15  The assessment 
confirmed that the plaintiff must use a wheelchair "for 
movement" and that he has "multiple chronic medical 
condition[s]."  Although the plaintiff has to use a wheelchair, 
he "is able to utilize the bathroom independently . . . , feed 
himself independently, shower independently, dress himself 
independently, and voice his needs without issue."  Although 
Straus and Mulvey-Sylvia opined that his conditions "may 
contribute to a shortened lifespan," the plaintiff's chronic 
conditions were "stable" and he was expected to live for longer 
than eighteen months. 
The July 2021 assessment specified various reasons that the 
plaintiff is provided his accommodations:  he uses a wheelchair 
for "unsteady gait and tremors"; since 2013 he has been provided 
a bottom bunk for "seizures"; he is housed in a twenty-four hour 
health staff facility because it is "handicap accessible"; he is 
prescribed briefs and condom catheters for his "urinary 
incontinence"; and he is provided compression stockings for his 
"neuropathy."  When he leaves the prison, he is transported by a 
 
14 "The physiologic loss of accommodation in the eyes in 
advancing age, said to begin when the near point has receded 
beyond 22 cm (9 inches)."  Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1556. 
 
15 "Overactivity of the sebaceous glands, resulting in an 
excessive amount of sebum."  Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1738. 
15 
 
wheelchair van, and he has a peer assistant who pushes his 
wheelchair.  The plaintiff is able to stand only with support.  
He has been provided with extra pillows since 2006 and hearing 
aids since 2011.  He is able to administer the catheter supplies 
himself.  He is prescribed an extensive list of medications. 
On at least one occasion in December 2020, the plaintiff 
was evaluated after he reported that he fell while transferring 
from his wheelchair to his bed, resulting in an injury to his 
ribs.  Despite blood being found in the plaintiff's urine in 
January 2021, he refused to see a urologist.  He stated to 
Kiely, who was performing his evaluation, that he would "not go 
no[] matter how hard [Kiely] tr[ied] to convince [him], [he 
felt] fine, [he had] no major issues, just the swelling."  
During that same evaluation, Kiely noted that, with his 
wheelchair, he was able to "self-propel[] up and down the ramp."  
The plaintiff reported that he felt "pretty good, no breathing 
issues, no heart issues," but he reported difficulty getting his 
medical supplies and swelling in his ankles and feet. 
The plaintiff also has a documented mental health history, 
dating back to before he was incarcerated.  Since his teenage 
years, the plaintiff has suffered from depression.  In the 
1980s, when he found out that he was being charged with the 
murders and arson, he attempted suicide, for which he was 
hospitalized for psychiatric treatment.  At that same time, he 
16 
 
was diagnosed with major depressive disorder with melancholic 
symptoms.  In 1989, he was sent to Bridgewater State Hospital 
(hospital) due to threats to "hang himself if he was convicted 
of the crimes [with which] he was charged." 
He was diagnosed with adjustment disorder in 2020, and 
depressive disorder due to another medical condition, with 
depressive features.  He has had several suicide attempts in the 
recent past.  On May 20, 2020, the defendant was injured due to 
such an attempt and again was sent to the hospital.  He had 
similar attempts in June and July 2020, when he attempted to use 
a bed sheet and a towel, respectively, for hanging.  Also in 
2020, the plaintiff experienced two hospitalizations for further 
psychiatric care due to "ongoing delusional thought patterns," 
as "[h]e believed that his family was in danger and he was being 
targeted by gang members because of the crimes [for which] he 
was convicted."  The plaintiff believed that the only way to 
protect his family was to end his life, and he was "unable or 
unwilling to engage in reality testing."  As of an evaluation 
completed on September 9, 2020, there are no further documented 
attempts to take his own life. 
During an evaluation in January 2021, the plaintiff 
indicated that he was afraid to be admitted to a hospital, and 
that his primary methods of coping with his stressors were 
"becoming difficult due to lack of tablet and differing 
17 
 
recreation times."  Although he reported that he was feeling 
hopeless, he denied any intent to harm himself or others. 
4.  Plaintiff's disciplinary history.  The plaintiff has 
accumulated an extensive disciplinary record, but also has held 
jobs and completed programming.  While he was incarcerated at 
the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk (MCI-
Norfolk), during his early years of incarceration he received 
four disciplinary reports for fighting, threatening staff, not 
standing for a count, and lying.  During his ten years at MCI-
Norfolk, he held several jobs as a janitor and attended stress 
management classes, health awareness, and church services. 
On June 25, 2001, the plaintiff was transferred to the 
Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center (SBCC) because he lied to 
staff about another inmate.  While he was there, he received 
three disciplinary reports for fighting with another inmate and 
possession of contraband (both in November 2006) and threatening 
another inmate (March 2007).  At SBCC, he worked as a "runner" 
and a property worker. 
On May 29, 2007, the plaintiff was transferred to MCI-
Shirley, where he remained for thirteen years.  During his time 
there, he received three disciplinary reports for removing a 
blade from a razor (June 2007), missing a scheduled appointment 
(November 2011), and, most recently, being out of place and 
refusing a direct order (April 2019).  He completed a computer 
18 
 
skills program and intermittently worked as a housing unit 
runner. 
In May 2020, he was transferred for psychiatric treatment 
to the hospital units at Old Colony Correctional Center 
following his suicide attempt at MCI-Shirley.  On June 18, he 
returned to MCI-Shirley; after twelve days, he again was 
committed to the hospital due to "paranoid beliefs and suicidal 
ideation."  He is not permitted to return to MCI-Shirley because 
of a "newly identified conflict" with another inmate.16 
On the morning of June 21, 2020, during his brief return to 
MCI-Shirley, the plaintiff attempted "to use his bed sheet as a 
ligature," which led to a use of force by correction officers.17  
Several correction officers wrote reports regarding this 
incident.  The lieutenant who used force against the plaintiff 
stated that he was taking property from the plaintiff's cell 
because of the plaintiff's being placed on a fifteen-minute 
mental health watch.  According to the lieutenant, the plaintiff 
threw his watch toward the lieutenant, "narrowly missing," and 
"followed that with an awkward open hand punch to the chest."  
At that point, the lieutenant grabbed the plaintiff in his upper 
 
16 The plaintiff's classification report indicates that he 
has an "active" enemy due to false allegations made by the 
plaintiff. 
 
17 As part of our review, we watched the prison footage 
depicting this incident, which is discussed infra. 
19 
 
body area "to subdue him," during which the plaintiff wrapped 
his legs around a leg of the lieutenant and tried to twist the 
lieutenant's left wrist.  The lieutenant gave the plaintiff 
several orders to release the lieutenant's leg and hand; when 
the plaintiff did not respond, the lieutenant struck him with a 
closed fist in the back, causing him to release the lieutenant's 
hand.  The lieutenant twisted the plaintiff's arm behind his 
back to get him to release the lieutenant's leg, and he was put 
in restraints by two other correction officers.  The officers 
removed the plaintiff's boxer shorts, and a security smock was 
given to him.  When a sergeant attempted to remove the leg 
restraints from the plaintiff, the plaintiff tried to kick him.  
At that point, staff left the cell and returned approximately 
one minute later to move the plaintiff onto his back. 
The accounts of the other officers present during the 
incident support the lieutenant's account.  Another lieutenant 
indicated that while holding the plaintiff on his side, he 
"continu[ed] his verbal beratement of staff and would not cease 
this behavior."  An officer stated that they were removing the 
plaintiff's belongings because he was on mental health watch for 
his safety.  As they were doing so, the plaintiff "refused [to 
surrender his clothing and belongings], became combative, and 
assaulted" the lieutenant.  Another officer indicated that she 
assisted the plaintiff onto his side to prevent positional 
20 
 
asphyxia while waiting for medical help to arrive, but the 
plaintiff refused medical assistance and became combative, so 
she was directed to leave the cell.  A third officer reported 
that he saw the plaintiff assault the lieutenant and that, prior 
to the lieutenant's use of force, he noticed and reported to his 
supervisor that the plaintiff was fashioning a noose with his 
bed sheet by "tying the sheet into the vent on two separate 
occasions."  A sergeant wrote that the plaintiff tried to kick 
him during the incident, which was supported by another officer.  
A responding nurse noted swelling to the plaintiff's left elbow.  
A captain, in a letter to the interim superintendent, stated 
that her review of this incident determined that it was in 
compliance with the use of force policies set out in 103 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 505.  She wrote that the plaintiff became 
noncompliant by refusing to have property removed from his cell, 
and that he escalated the situation by becoming aggressive and 
assaultive toward security staff. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  As discussed in 
McCauley, 491 Mass. at    , where the decision of the 
commissioner to grant or deny medical parole is one of 
administrative discretion, we apply "the 'arbitrary or 
capricious' standard."  Mederi, Inc. v. Salem, 488 Mass. 60, 67 
(2021), quoting Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming Comm'n, 476 Mass. 
591, 605 (2017).  "A decision is not arbitrary and capricious 
21 
 
unless there is no ground which 'reasonable [persons] might deem 
proper' to support it."  Garrity v. Conservation Comm'n of 
Hingham, 462 Mass. 779, 792 (2012), quoting T.D.J. Dev. Corp. v. 
Conservation Comm'n of N. Andover, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 124, 128 
(1994).  Keeping in mind our determination in McCauley that 501 
Code Mass. Regs. § 17.02 does not impermissibly narrow the 
statute, we analyze the commissioner's decision in the present 
case. 
2.  Medical parole plan.  The plaintiff argues that the 
statute places a burden on the superintendent to prepare a 
comprehensive medical parole plan for the prisoner.  He asserts 
that the medical parole plan is a factor for the commissioner to 
consider in making the determination whether a prisoner 
qualifies for medical parole, and the fact that the 
superintendent failed to propose a plan in his case, along with 
the absence of an application for interstate transfer of parole, 
created a substantial error of law affecting his rights.  The 
defendants argue that, because the plaintiff proposed a detailed 
medical plan, there was no need for the superintendent to 
develop one and that, even assuming there was such a 
requirement, the provision of a department-authored medical 
parole plan would not have influenced the commissioner's 
decision here where she determined that he was not permanently 
incapacitated. 
22 
 
General Laws c. 127, § 119A (a), defines "[m]edical parole 
plan" as 
"a comprehensive written medical and psychosocial care plan 
specific to a prisoner and including, but not limited to:  
(i) the proposed course of treatment; (ii) the proposed 
site for treatment and post-treatment care; (iii) 
documentation that medical providers qualified to provide 
the medical services identified in the medical parole plan 
are prepared to provide such services; and (iv) the 
financial program in place to cover the cost of the plan 
for the duration of the medical parole, which shall include 
eligibility for enrollment in commercial insurance, 
Medicare or Medicaid or access to other adequate financial 
resources for the duration of the medical parole." 
 
The statute indicates that "[t]he superintendent shall transmit 
with the recommendation:  . . . a medical parole plan," in 
addition to a written diagnosis by a physician and the risk for 
violence assessment.  G. L. c. 127, § 119A (c) (1).18 
 
Originally, before the regulations were amended, 501 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 17.03(3)-(4) (2019) required a petitioner to 
develop a medical parole plan that detailed the information 
mentioned in the statute.19  In Buckman v. Commissioner of 
 
18 The statute has equivalent requirements for a sheriff.  
G. L. c. 127, § 119A (d) (1).  Throughout this opinion, we 
discuss the statute and the regulations as applied to a 
superintendent, but our discussion is applicable equally to a 
sheriff. 
 
19 The medical parole plan was required to discuss the 
proposed course of treatment; level of care required and the 
site for treatment; availability of medical care and 
documentation indicating that qualified medical providers were 
prepared to provide treatment; and the financial program in 
place to cover the cost of the plan.  501 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 17.03(4) (2019). 
23 
 
Correction, 484 Mass. 14, 29-30 (2020), we voided the above 
regulations in addition to several other regulations "to the 
extent that they declare[d] that the medical parole plan or 
written diagnosis by a licensed physician must be provided by 
the petitioner."  The court reasoned that "the Legislature did 
not intend to place this burden on those so poorly able to bear 
it" and held that "the superintendent bears the burden" of 
preparing a medical parole plan and a written diagnosis.  Id. at 
29.  This determination was made based on the Legislature's 
intent "to trigger a collaborative process whereby the health 
care provider for the institution, reentry staff, and the 
prisoner . . . work together" to prepare the required documents.  
Id. 
 
The current version of 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 17.03(4), as 
amended in 2022, indicates that "[a] proposed medical parole 
plan may be submitted along with the petition, but, where not 
submitted by the petitioner, said proposed plan shall be 
developed by the superintendent prior to transmitting the 
petition to the [c]ommissioner."  Similarly, the current version 
of 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 17.04(4) states that the 
superintendent shall transmit a recommendation to the 
commissioner, along with several other documents, including "a 
proposed medical parole plan" and "an updated clinical review of 
the prisoner by a licensed physician." 
24 
 
 
In Malloy v. Department of Correction, 487 Mass. 482, 494 
(2021), this court discussed the obligation of the department in 
identifying appropriate placements in a medical parole plan 
"[a]t least for inmates without family home-care options."  
"[W]ithin twenty-one days of a petition for medical parole, a 
prison superintendent must submit a recommendation to the 
commissioner accompanied by a medical parole plan."  Id. at 493.  
Recognizing the "contingencies at the conclusion of this process 
when medical parole is granted," the court stated that the 
department's proposed medical parole plan must be comprehensive.  
Id. at 495. 
 
Neither Buckman nor Malloy discussed whether a 
superintendent must submit an additional medical parole plan 
where a prisoner has drafted his or her own.  Here, the 
plaintiff included a medical parole plan in his petition, which 
indicated that he would live with his daughter, her husband, 
their children, and the plaintiff's father if he were to be 
released.  The plan described the floor plan of the home, which 
is wheelchair accessible and has a chair lift; indicated where 
the plaintiff would receive medical care and who his primary 
care doctor would be; and specified that his care would be 
funded by public health insurance.  The superintendent's 
recommendation incorporated and detailed the medical parole plan 
submitted by the petitioner. 
25 
 
The inclusion of the plaintiff's medical parole plan, where 
the superintendent did not indicate that he found the plan 
inadequate, was sufficient to satisfy the requirement that 
"[t]he superintendent shall transmit with the recommendation:  
. . . a medical parole plan."  G. L. c. 127, § 119A (c) (1).  
The plaintiff's medical parole plan satisfied most of the 
statutory requirements.  Although it did not detail explicitly 
the proposed course of treatment or provide documentation 
regarding his proposed physician, it specified the location of 
the medical facility where he would receive "medical care 
services," including for "emergencies," and identified his 
expected primary care doctor.  See G. L. c. 127, § 119A (a) (i)-
(iii).  It further indicated where and with whom he would live, 
stated that his family would help him to ensure his services 
were obtained, and described the home he would live in, 
indicating that it is wheelchair accessible.  Taking into 
consideration the many "contingencies" in the medical parole 
process, "including changes in the medical condition of the 
prisoners, availability of beds in care facilities, and 
conditions imposed by the parole board," along with COVID-19, it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, for a proposed medical 
parole plan to be precise regarding the particular course of 
treatment that the petitioner will undergo on release from 
prison, especially where many prisoners, including the 
26 
 
plaintiff, suffer from numerous ailments requiring various forms 
of treatment.  Malloy, 487 Mass. at 495.  Additionally, the 
plaintiff's medical parole plan, referred to by the 
superintendent, provided that his treatment would be funded by 
public health insurance.  See G. L. c. 127, § 119A (a) (iv).  It 
would make little sense to require the superintendent to create 
an additional medical parole plan where the plaintiff has 
provided a comprehensive plan, and where the superintendent does 
not voice his or her disagreement with the plan.  Because the 
superintendent included this plan in his recommendation, he 
fulfilled his requirement to submit a medical parole plan to the 
commissioner. 
 
The Superior Court judge found that this reference did not 
fulfill the superintendent's obligation because the information 
in the petition failed to satisfy fully the statutory 
requirements.  The judge cited Malloy in support, where this 
court referenced a superintendent's medical parole plan that 
only included information provided by the petitioner, and stated 
"this paragraph appears to be the entirety of the medical parole 
plan submitted to the commissioner."  Malloy, 487 Mass. at 488.  
Malloy is not determinative in this case.  First, the plan in 
Malloy was significantly less detailed than the plaintiff's 
27 
 
medical parole plan.20  It failed to mention the proposed course 
of treatment, the proposed site for treatment and posttreatment 
care, and documentation that medical providers were willing to 
provide him medical services.  Indeed, his plan only satisfied 
the statute in that it indicated the financial program in place 
to cover the costs of his health care.  G. L. c. 127, 
§ 119A (a) (iv).  Second, Malloy did not discuss whether the 
superintendent's submission describing the petitioner's plan was 
inadequate, as the petitioner already had been released on 
medical parole, so his appeal was moot.  Malloy, supra at 500. 
 
We do not condone the statutory insufficiency of the 
medical parole plan submitted to the commissioner by the 
superintendent here, and of course, we do not fault the 
plaintiff for that insufficiency.  Where a petitioner submits 
his or her own medical parole plan, and there are gaps in the 
information required by the statute, the superintendent should 
work with the petitioner in a "highly collaborative process" to 
 
20 The medical parole plan in Malloy stated in its entirety: 
 
"[The petitioner's attorney] states that if released on 
medical parole, [Malloy] would be willing to live any place 
that is agreeable to the Department of Correction[].  
[Malloy] has been accepted to handicapped accessible 
section 8 housing in Worcester and has documentation for 
it.  His financial source of payment would be through 
Mass[H]ealth Medicare." 
 
Malloy, 487 Mass. at 488. 
28 
 
ensure it is complete.  Malloy, 487 Mass. at 500.  But where, as 
here, the petitioner submits a comprehensive, yet statutorily 
insufficient plan, detailing where and with whom he will live, 
describes the home and its accessibility for his wheelchair, 
indicates who his caregivers will be, who will "work to ensure 
all medical and mental health services are obtained," discusses 
the insurance that would fund his medical care, indicates where 
he will receive medical services, for both everyday care and 
emergencies, and indicates who his primary care doctor will be, 
it would be senseless for a superintendent to start from scratch 
to create an alternative medical parole plan.  Because the 
superintendent fully detailed this thorough plan in his 
submission to the commissioner, he complied with the statute 
with the exception of the provision of documentation regarding 
the proposed physician and a description of the proposed course 
of treatment.  As discussed infra, we do not think these minute 
deficiencies had an impact on the commissioner's decision. 
Our decision in McCauley, 491 Mass. at    , remanding the 
petition to the commissioner for the completion and 
consideration of a standardized risk assessment, does not compel 
a different result.  First, in McCauley, there was no attempt to 
provide a standardized risk assessment required by the 
regulation.  Id. at    .  Here, the plaintiff submitted a 
comprehensive medical parole plan largely complying with 
29 
 
statutory requirements, which the superintendent then forwarded 
to the commissioner.  Second, in McCauley, the standardized risk 
for violence assessment would have been important for the 
commissioner to consider in the first instance with respect to 
whether the prisoner would pose a risk to the safety of the 
public on release; it could not have been changed or 
supplemented were the commissioner to determine that the 
prisoner should be released.  In contrast, the medical parole 
plan here, as the plaintiff admits, "accounted for his medical 
and mental health needs and supervision."  The plan addressed 
where he would stay, who would supervise him, and who would 
ensure that his medical needs were addressed.  Indeed, the 
commissioner described the medical parole plan in her decision 
without indicating that she considered it to be inadequate.  Any 
of its inadequacies could have been accounted for through the 
imposition of conditions by the parole board were the 
commissioner to decide that the plaintiff was permanently 
incapacitated or terminally ill as defined by the statute.  See 
G. L. c. 127, § 119A (e) ("parole board shall impose terms and 
conditions for medical parole that shall apply through the date 
upon which the prisoner's sentence would have expired"); Malloy, 
487 Mass. at 494-495 (stressing importance of plan setting out 
proposed site for placement, but acknowledging parole board may 
change proposed plan, including potential addition of 
30 
 
"electronic monitoring, supervision for drugs and alcohol, 
visitation by parole officers, and no-contact orders" among 
other conditions to protect public safety). 
 
3.  Denial of petition for medical parole.  The plaintiff 
argues that his medical conditions are so debilitating that he 
does not pose a public safety risk, as his current medical 
conditions demonstrate irreversible permanent incapacitation.  
He asserts that the medical assessment from January 2021 opined 
that he was permanently incapacitated, and that the statute does 
not require complete absence of independent functioning.  He 
points to the 2009 risk assessment, which he asserts 
demonstrated that he is of low risk for violence and substance 
use disorder, and argues that the majority of his disciplinary 
reports are dated and precede his incapacity, highlighting that 
he has participated in programs.  He also argues that the 
commissioner's review of the video of the use of force incident 
is inaccurate.  Finally, he argues that maintaining his 
innocence should not be considered as a factor in denying him 
medical parole.21 
 
The defendants argue that the commissioner's decision was 
supported properly by the plaintiff's ability to perform 
 
21 In his reply brief only, the plaintiff "joins [Martin 
McCauley's] argument that the regulation is void."  As discussed 
in McCauley, 491 Mass. at    , we have concluded that it is not. 
31 
 
activities of daily living independently, as discussed by 501 
Code Mass. Regs. § 17.02, the seriousness of the crimes that 
resulted in his incarceration and his ability to carry out a 
similar act, and his involvement in the recent use of force 
incident, as both depicted in the video and discussed in the 
reports. 
 
We cannot say that the commissioner's decisions denying the 
plaintiff medical parole are arbitrary and capricious such that 
there is "no ground which 'reasonable [persons] might deem 
proper' to support [them]."  Garrity, 462 Mass. at 792, quoting 
T.D.J. Dev. Corp., 36 Mass. App. Ct. at 128.  The commissioner 
relied on appropriate factors in making her determination that 
the plaintiff does not qualify for medical parole. 
 
"Permanent incapacitation" is defined as "a physical or 
cognitive incapacitation that appears irreversible, as 
determined by a licensed physician, and that is so debilitating 
that the prisoner does not pose a public safety risk."  G. L. 
c. 127, § 119A (a).22  The commissioner shall order release on 
medical parole where she determines that a prisoner is 
"permanently incapacitated such that if the prisoner is released 
the prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating 
 
22 We discuss permanent incapacitation, as the plaintiff 
does not allege that he is terminally ill within the meaning of 
the statute. 
32 
 
the law and that the release will not be incompatible with the 
welfare of society."  G. L. c. 127, § 119A (e).  As discussed in 
McCauley, 491 Mass. at    , the definition of "debilitating 
condition" in the regulation does not impermissibly narrow the 
class of persons who qualify for medical parole.  Title 501 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 17.02, as in effect at the time of the plaintiff's 
petition, stated: 
"A physical or cognitive condition that appears 
irreversible, resulting from illness, trauma, and/or age, 
which causes a prisoner significant and serious impairment 
of strength or ability to perform daily life functions such 
as eating, breathing, toileting, walking or bathing so as 
to minimize the prisoner's ability to commit a crime if 
released on medical parole, and requires the prisoner's 
placement in a facility or a home with access to 
specialized medical care." 
 
In the initial medical parole assessment submitted to the 
commissioner, Straus and Kiely opined that the plaintiff had 
debilitating conditions and was at "high risk for permanent 
incapacitation," but currently was not physically incapacitated.  
In the January 2021 updated assessment by Straus, he opined that 
the plaintiff had "debilitating medical conditions with 
permanent mobility and other functional incapacitation."  
Therefore, at that point, Straus had determined that the 
plaintiff suffered from "a physical . . . incapacitation that 
appears irreversible."  G. L. c. 127, § 119A (a).  The 
commissioner appeared to conflate the two prongs of § 119A (a):  
(1) a finding by the physician indicating "irreversible" 
33 
 
incapacitation and (2) evidence that the condition is so 
debilitating that the prisoner does not pose a public safety 
risk.23  Nonetheless, it is clear, in light of the factors that 
she considered, that the commissioner ultimately determined that 
his medical conditions did not so debilitate him such that he no 
longer posed a public safety risk.  The commissioner's 
determination that the plaintiff's release would pose a public 
safety risk was within her discretion based on the factors that 
she properly considered. 
The commissioner properly considered the plaintiff's 
ability to perform independently a significant number of 
activities of daily living as a factor in her determination that 
he does not qualify for medical parole in each of her decisions.  
As Straus opined, and as indicated supra, the plaintiff has 
numerous debilitating conditions that cause permanent mobility 
concerns and result in other forms of functional incapacitation.  
The plaintiff is dependent on a wheelchair.24  Despite his 
 
23 For example, in the March 2021 decision, the commissioner 
wrote:  "Dr. Straus does not opine that [the plaintiff] is 
currently 'terminally ill' or 'permanently incapacitated' within 
the meaning of the medical parole statute . . . .  Accordingly, 
I do not find that [the plaintiff's] current medical condition 
is 'so debilitating that [he does] not pose a public safety 
risk.'" 
 
24 The plaintiff takes issue with the commissioner's finding 
that his requirement for a wheelchair was only due to "unsteady 
gait and tremors" as opposed to "physical weakness."  The July 
2021 medical parole assessment opined that the plaintiff uses a 
34 
 
dependence, however, he is able to transfer independently.  He 
requires catheterization, but he is able catheterize himself.  
He is able to "utilize the bathroom independently . . . , feed 
himself independently, shower independently, dress himself 
independently, and voice his needs without issue."  The 
superintendent's recommendation indicated that the plaintiff has 
a peer assistant to push his wheelchair, but his medical records 
indicate that in January 2021 during an evaluation he was able 
to "self-propel[] up and down the ramp."  The plaintiff is 
correct that complete absence of independent functioning is not 
required by either the statute or the regulation.  As discussed 
in McCauley, 491 Mass. at    , although it is just one factor to 
be considered in the comprehensive evaluation of a petitioner, 
consideration of ability to perform independently the vast 
majority of activities of daily living is a relevant factor, as 
set out by 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 17.02, that is pertinent to 
the definition of permanent incapacitation in the statute. 
The commissioner's decision properly discussed additional 
factors in determining that the plaintiff, if released, would 
 
wheelchair for "unsteady gait and tremors"; thus, the 
commissioner's finding that the plaintiff's gait and tremors 
require him to use a wheelchair is grounded in the record.  It 
is difficult to understand how that in itself does not 
constitute "physical weakness."  Nonetheless, this distinction 
did not have an impact on the commissioner's decision where she 
recognized that "[h]e requires a wheelchair." 
35 
 
not "live and remain at liberty without violating the law" and 
that his release "would be incompatible with public safety and 
the welfare of society."  Another factor that she considered was 
the plaintiff's 2009 risk assessment.25  See 501 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 17.04 (2022).  The risk assessment noted that the plaintiff 
had been arrested or charged three or more times with a new 
crime while on pretrial release.  It noted that the plaintiff 
has received serious or administrative disciplinary infractions 
for fighting or threatening other inmates or staff.  In the 
section entitled "Criminogenic Need Scales," the assessment 
indicated that both his violence history and current violence 
were "high."  Despite this indication, the assessment concluded, 
without explanation, that his violence and recidivism risk were 
"low." 
Further, the plaintiff's crimes for which he was 
incarcerated were a proper factor to consider, and the 
commissioner did not give them undue weight.  The facts of the 
plaintiff's crimes were highly violent and resulted in fifteen 
convictions of murder in the second degree for his setting fire 
to a rooming house in the early hours of the morning and killing 
 
25 The plaintiff protests that the commissioner "states 
nothing" about the risk assessment in her latest decision.  
Nonetheless, her first decision mentions the assessment, 
including its conclusion that he is a "low risk for violence and 
recidivism."  Thus, the commissioner was aware of its contents 
and considered it in making a decision. 
36 
 
fifteen people.  Carver, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 379-380.  The 
facts of the plaintiff's convictions were indicated in the 
superintendent's recommendation to the commissioner, which is 
contemplated by both the statute and the regulation.  See G. L. 
c. 127, § 119A (c) (1); 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 17.04 (2022).  As 
discussed in McCauley, 491 Mass. at    , the statute does not 
require that the commissioner limit consideration to whether a 
petitioner is capable of committing the same or a similar 
offense to that resulting in his or her incarceration; the 
inquiry is more general and centers around concern for public 
safety as set out in the statute.  Nonetheless, that the 
plaintiff physically is capable of setting fire to a building is 
relevant to the danger he may pose to the public on release.26 
The plaintiff's disciplinary reports also were an 
appropriate factor to consider in determining whether he 
qualified for medical parole, as mentioned in his classification 
report and the superintendent's recommendation.27  See G. L. 
c. 127, § 119A (c) (1); 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 17.04 (2022).  
 
26 As discussed in McCauley, 491 Mass. at    , the 
plaintiff's refusal to admit guilt should not have been counted 
against him.  In the context of all the other factors the 
commissioner considered in making a determination here, her 
reference to his assertion of innocence does not invalidate the 
commissioner's decision. 
 
27 The commissioner also recognized the plaintiff's 
"moderate programming history," noting that most of it "occurred 
two decades ago." 
37 
 
The commissioner recognized that "most of [the plaintiff's] 
disciplinary reports of a serious nature are remote in time," 
but their age does not render them wholly irrelevant to the 
safety of the public on his release where he has a history of 
fighting, threatening staff and other inmates, lying, possessing 
contraband, and removing a blade from a razor.  The plaintiff is 
not permitted to return to MCI-Shirley because of a "newly 
identified conflict" with another inmate. 
The commissioner most heavily relied on the use of force 
incident in her discussion of the plaintiff's disciplinary 
history.  The plaintiff disputes the commissioner's 
characterization of the incident.  The reports and the video 
were appropriate for the commissioner to consider in determining 
whether the plaintiff qualified for medical parole as they bear 
on the plaintiff's physical ability to engage in a struggle.  
See G. L. c. 127, § 119A (a) (defining permanent incapacitation 
as physical or cognitive condition that is "so debilitating that 
the prisoner does not pose a public safety risk" [emphasis 
added]).  Further, in the plaintiff's counsel's affidavit to the 
Superior Court judge, she indicated that the incident was 
referenced by the superintendent in his materials sent to the 
commissioner as a part of his recommendation. 
At the outset, given that the commissioner deemed the 
reports surrounding the use of force incident relevant, review 
38 
 
of the video, which readily was available, was appropriate.  We 
agree with the Superior Court judge who heard the plaintiff's 
motion to strike the administrative record that "where the 
[c]ommissioner has . . . deemed reports describing the . . . 
incident relevant, it is difficult to understand how video 
evidence of the incident would not also be relevant."  The video 
was within the control of the department, as it was sent to the 
plaintiff's counsel and received in January 2021.  It should not 
have taken an order from a judge for the commissioner to review 
video of an incident that was accessible and heavily relied on 
in the decision to deny the plaintiff medical parole. 
Our review of the video reveals that it corroborates, or at 
the very least, does not refute, the statements in the reports.  
The video of this incident depicted the plaintiff's attempt to 
hang a sheet on the wall of his cell, until he was interrupted 
by correction officers.  The officers began to remove everything 
from the plaintiff's cell, and the plaintiff lunged on his bed 
to try to grab his wheelchair before they removed it.  There is 
no audio to the video, but it appears that the plaintiff argued 
with the officers as they removed things from his cell.  As 
officers attempted to pull the sheets off the bed, the plaintiff 
pulled them back in a struggle with the officers.  He took off 
his watch and threw it; the watch landed on the ground beside 
39 
 
one of the officers, and another officer picked it up.28  Next, 
the plaintiff made a motion toward an officer, and the officers 
pinned him to the bed.29  As the lieutenant held down the 
plaintiff on the bed, the plaintiff wrapped his legs around the 
lieutenant's leg.  The lieutenant punched the plaintiff during 
the struggle.  Eventually, six officers responded to this 
incident, and four tried to secure the plaintiff's hands and 
feet.  The officers removed the plaintiff's clothes and held him 
down on his side.  After a few minutes, it appeared that an 
officer tried to take off the plaintiff's foot restraints.  In 
response, the plaintiff kicked his feet and struggled with the 
officers again.  The officers then left the plaintiff 
restrained, placed him flat on his stomach, and closed the door 
to his cell.  A little over a minute later, officers went back 
into the plaintiff's cell, turned him over, and put over him 
what appeared to be a blanket.  The plaintiff's face suggested 
that he was in pain.  Throughout this video, the plaintiff did 
not rise from his bed, and continued to speak with officers.30 
 
28 The report states that the plaintiff threw his watch 
toward the officers and missed. 
 
29 Because of the angle of the video and where the officers 
were standing, it is not possible to see what the plaintiff did 
to the officer.  The report claims that the plaintiff threw "an 
awkward open hand punch to the [lieutenant's] chest." 
 
30 The reports indicate that the plaintiff berated staff and 
was aggressive throughout the incident. 
40 
 
The commissioner's discussion of the use of force incident 
is not contradicted by anything that appeared in the video.  The 
commissioner failed to note that the plaintiff never stood up 
throughout the incident.  Nonetheless, the plaintiff's legs were 
seen wrapping around the lieutenant's leg, and it took four 
officers to secure the plaintiff.  When an officer attempted to 
remove his foot restraints, the plaintiff kicked at the officer.  
This incident was recent, as it happened in June 2020.  This 
lends support to the commissioner's determination that the 
plaintiff is not so debilitated that he does not pose a risk to 
public safety. 
This incident happened as a result of the plaintiff's 
attempts to harm himself during a mental health crisis.  This 
was not the first time that the plaintiff tried to take his own 
life.  Leading up to this incident, in May, the plaintiff 
attempted suicide and was sent to the hospital, and soon after, 
in July, he made a similar attempt.  The plaintiff argues, in 
one paragraph and without citing case law for support, that "the 
[c]ommissioner could not have discriminated based on [his] 
mental state in denying medical parole without violating the 
Americans with Disabilities Act."  The plaintiff does not 
explain how the commissioner discriminated against him based on 
his mental state, nor does he assert conclusively that she did.  
As a result, his briefing on this issue does not rise to the 
41 
 
level of appellate argument.  See Commonwealth v. Beverly, 485 
Mass. 1, 16 (2020); Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing 
in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019). 
Nonetheless, the commissioner referenced the plaintiff's 
mental health history in her original decision without 
indicating that it had an impact on her determination, and in 
her March 2021 decision, she stated that the plaintiff's 
attorney "indicate[d] that [the plaintiff's] mental health is 
stable, and I have not received any information to the 
contrary."  Therefore, it does not appear that she treated his 
mental health history as a factor suggesting that he would pose 
a danger on release.  Contrast Crowell v. Massachusetts Parole 
Bd., 477 Mass. 106, 112-113 (2017) (where board "indicated its 
awareness both of the plaintiff's disability and of how symptoms 
stemming from that disability could affect his behavior . . . on 
parole," board should have considered risk reduction programs).  
Although the commissioner did not reference that the use of 
force incident was in response to a mental health crisis, she 
considered the incident for its depiction of the plaintiff's 
physical ability to be combative and violent, not for the 
motivations behind the plaintiff's physical actions.  This was 
not discriminatory. 
We do not think that the absence of two statutory 
requirements in an otherwise comprehensive medical parole plan 
42 
 
influenced the commissioner's decision, given her extensive 
discussion of other factors and her brief reference, only in the 
first decision, to the plaintiff's medical parole plan, in 
addition to the reasons discussed supra.31  This further is 
evidenced by the commissioner's decision in Malloy, 487 Mass. at 
489, where she granted the appellant's petition and allowed 
release "conditional on a suitable home care plan."  This 
suggests that the commissioner is willing to grant release, even 
where she believes that the initial home care plan is 
inadequate, and that the department will work with a prisoner to 
ensure an appropriate plan is established prior to release.32 
The plaintiff set fire to a building and killed fifteen 
people.  Carver, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 379.  Although he suffers 
from numerous serious medical conditions, and Straus's second 
medical evaluation opined that he has "permanent mobility and 
other functional incapacitation," he is able to perform 
activities of daily living including feeding, showering, 
dressing, and voicing his needs independently, and he is able to 
 
31 For the same reason, we do not think that the failure of 
the department to prepare an Interstate Compact for Adult 
Offender Supervision application was fatal in this case. 
 
32 In addition, in response to questioning at oral argument 
in McCauley, 491 Mass. at    , counsel for the commissioner 
provided several decisions where the commissioner determined 
that a petitioner was permanently incapacitated, despite an 
inadequate proposed plan. 
43 
 
administer his catheter supplies himself.  He is able to 
maneuver his wheelchair on his own, as indicated in a medical 
evaluation.  See McCauley, 491 Mass. at     (consideration of 
ability to perform majority of activities of daily living 
appropriate).  His chronic medical conditions are "stable."  He 
has received disciplinary reports for fighting, threatening 
people, lying, removing a razor from a blade, and possession of 
contraband.  During a mental health crisis, as correction 
officers tried to remove items from his cell to protect him, he 
struggled with the officers, wrapping his legs around a 
lieutenant's leg, requiring four officers to secure him.  
Considering the above factors, and additional factors discussed 
supra, the commissioner's determination that the plaintiff is 
not so debilitated that he does not pose a public safety risk 
was not arbitrary or capricious. 
Conclusion.  Because we see no reason to disturb the 
decisions of the commissioner, we affirm the judgment of the 
Superior Court denying the plaintiff's request for relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.