Title: PILATI v PILATI
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14374
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 4, 1979

No. 14374 I N THE SUPREME COUKC O F THE STATE O F m m 1979 l%vAlxx PILATI, Petitioner and Appellant, -vs- P A U L A. PILATI, Respondent and Respondent. Appeal frm: D i s t r i c t Court of the Thirteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable Mbert H. Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of m r d : For Appellant: Terry Seifert and Gary Wilcox, Billings, Wntana For Respondent: Berger, Anderson, Sinclair and Mxphy, Billings, Pllontana m< - 7 TCT? Filed : Suhnitted on briefs: February 9, 1979 Decided: -- AFT: - 5 1979 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P e t i t i o n e r a p p e a l s from a determination of t h e Thir- t e e n t h J u d i c i a l District, t h e Honorable Robert H. Wilson g r a n t i n g , on January 19, 1978, r e s p o n d e n t ' s motion t o quash a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n praying f o r : (1) an o r d e r d i r e c t e d t o t h e respondent, commanding him t o appear b e f o r e t h e c o u r t t o show cause, i f any, why t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreement and t h e p a r t i e s ' decree of d i s s o l u t i o n , i n t o which t h e former w a s incorporated, should n o t be set a s i d e ; ( 2 ) a r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r a g a i n s t t h e respondent, precluding him from s e l l i n g any p r o p e r t y acquired by him o r by t h e p a r t i e s j o i n t l y during t h e course of t h e i r marriage; ( 3 ) a r e s t r a i n - i n g o r d e r a g a i n s t t h e respondent precluding him from i n t e r - f e r i n g w i t h o r bothering t h e p e t i t i o n e r and h e r c h i l d r e n ; and ( 4 ) a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s i n t h e e v e n t t h e p r o 2 e r t y s e t t l e m e n t i s set a s i d e . The p e t i t i o n was accompanied by an a f f i d a v i t signed by t h e p e t i t i o n e r - a p p e l l a n t , i n which she a l l e g e s m a t t e r s which, i f found t o be t r u e , would form t h e founda- t i o n f o r s e t t i n g a s i d e o r amending t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreement. Some of t h e s a l i e n t f a c t s follow. The p a r t i e s were married f o r over 1 3 y e a r s b e f o r e d i v o r c i n g on December 9, 1976. They had two c h i l d r e n , who a t t h e t i m e of t h e d i v o r c e w e r e ages n i n e and s i x . When married, p e t i t i o n e r was 16 y e a r s o l d , t h e respondent 35 y e a r s o l d . She had a n i n t h grade education and was n o t employed then o r a t any t i m e d u r i n g t h e course of t h e marriage. I n c o n t r a s t , respondent i s w e l l educated; he holds both a b a c h e l o r ' s and m a s t e r ' s degree and has worked toward a Ph.D. and, according t o t h e b r i e f s , a J . D . H e i s both a rancher and high school t e a c h e r and does r e a l e s t a t e a p p r a i s a l s . During t h e course of t h e marriage, he handled a l l t h e f i n a n c e s of t h e family--even t o t h e e x t e n t of purchasing t h e g r o c e r i e s and c l o t h i n g . P e t i t i o n e r a p p a r e n t l y knew nothing of t h e i r f i n a n c i a l s t a t u s , a l l e g e d l y having been d e l i b e r a t e l y k e p t i n t h e dark by respondent. E a r l y i n November 1976 p e t i t i o n e r r e t a i n e d an a t t o r n e y t o f i l e f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage. H e s o f i l e d on Novem- b e r 18, 1976, i n t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Carbon County. Subsequently, t h a t p e t i t i o n w a s dismissed and i n i t s p l a c e one was j o i n t l y f i l e d by t h e p a r t i e s , through respondent's counsel, on December 9, 1976. P e t i t i o n e r a l l e g e s i n h e r a f f i d a v i t t h a t she was misled by respondent and h i s a t t o r n e y and induced t o f i l e t h a t latter p e t i t i o n . On t h e very day t h e j o i n t p e t i t i o n w a s f i l e d , t h e d i s s o l u - t i o n was granted; t h e decree was signed and e n t e r e d and a p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t , prepared by r e s p o n d e n t ' s a t t o r n e y a l o n e and executed by t h e p a r t i e s some t e n days e a r l i e r on Novem- b e r 30, 1976, was incorporated t h e r e i n . P e t i t i o n e r even- t u a l l y received as h e r s h a r e of t h e p a r t i e s ' p r o p e r t y a one bedroom house, one a c r e of t h e 46 which was t h e "ranch" on which they had l i v e d , and a 1976 Toyota automobile. She w a s awarded custody of t h e two minor c h i l d r e n , and was t o re- c e i v e $250 p e r month f o r t h e i r support and $50 per month f o r h e r maintenance. Within s i x months of t h e d i s s o l u t i o n , p e t i t i o n e r , unable t o s u p p o r t h e r s e l f and her c h i l d r e n , was f o r c e d t o a c c e p t p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e form of food stamps. A t t h e t i m e of t h e d i v o r c e , p e t i t i o n e r d i d n o t know t h e e x t e n t of t h e p a r t i e s ' holdings o r t h e i r t r u e worth. She l a t e r l e a r n e d t h a t t h e 45 a c r e s which respondent r e c e i v e d was worth about $70,000 and t h a t t h e remainder of t h e prop- e r t y owned by t h e p a r t i e s was worth over a h a l f m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . Once s h e discovered t h e e x i s t e n c e and worth of t h e p r o p e r t y , she contacted an a t t o r n e y who, on June 24, 1977, f i l e d a p e t i t i o n on h e r b e h a l f . The D i s t r i c t Court, i n response, i s s u e d an o r d e r , f i l e d June 30, 1977, s e t t i n g a hearing t o show cause. Subsequently, on J u l y 21, 1977, t h e d a t e set f o r hearing, respondent f i l e d a motion t o quash. During a September 1, 1977, hearing, counsel presented o r a l arguments, b u t t h e p a r t i e s o f f e r e d no testimony of which t h e r e i s record. On January 19, 1978, a f t e r b r i e f s had been f i l e d , Judge Wilson granted r e s p o n d e n t ' s motion t o quash, from which appeal has been timely taken. The c a s e was deemed submitted on b r i e f s , s o t h e r e has been no o r a l argument. A p p e l l a n t - p e t i t i o n e r advances t h r e e i s s u e s f o r o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n : 1. Is p e t i t i o n e r e n t i t l e d t o a hearing t o determine whether o r n o t t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t should be set a s i d e ? 2 . Did t h e c o u r t err i n g r a n t i n g r e s p o n d e n t ' s motion t o quash and thereby e f f e c t i v e l y d i s m i s s t h e p e t i t i o n t o set a s i d e t h e d i v o r c e decree? 3 . I f a j o i n t p e t i t i o n i s f i l e d , must t h e District Court w a i t 20 days before s i g n i n g a f i n a l decree? W e s h a l l consider t h e f i r s t two i s s u e s t o g e t h e r , inasmuch as t h e response t o one w i l l be t h e response t o t h e o t h e r . Because w e f i n d p e t i t i o n e r i s e n t i t l e d t o a hearing, t h e D i s t r i c t Court having e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g r e s p o n d e n t ' s motion t o quash, w e need n o t reach t h e f i n a l i s s u e . The reasons a r t i c u l a t e d i n r e s p o n d e n t ' s motion t o quash, on which t h e lower c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e motion, are: "1. That t h e s a i d o r d e r i n p a r t modifies a d e c r e e of d i v o r c e dated December 9, 1976. "2. That t h e t i m e f o r appeal has elapsed pursuant t o Rule 5, Nontana Rules of Appellate Procedure. "3. That t h e t i m e f o r modification o r amendment o f t h e judgment of December 9, 1976, has elapsed pursuant t o Rule 6 0 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P." I n b r i e f response, w e note f i r s t t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n i s n o t a n appeal from t h e g r a n t i n g of t h e d e c r e e of d i s s o l u - - t i o n ; hence, t h e t i m e l i m i t a t i o n s of Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P., a r e i n a p p l i c a b l e . The t i m e l i m i t a t i o n upon a n independent a c t i o n seeking r e l i e f from a judgment t a i n t e d by f r a u d "normally i s laches." 7 Moore's Federal P r a c t i c e Yi60.33 (2nd e d . ) . Respondent d i d n o t plead l a c h e s , and q u i t e r i g h t l y s o , f o r p e t i t i o n e r most a s s u r e d l y d i d n o t s l e e p on h e r r i g h t s s o a s t o be barred from r e l i e f i n a c o u r t of e q u i t y . Secondly, w e p o i n t o u t t h a t even i f t i m e has run o u t under Rule 6 0 ( b ) ( 3 ) , l4.R.Civ.P.--and w e do n o t decide t h a t q u e s t i o n - - p e t i t i o n e r has a l l e g e d m a t t e r s s u f f i c i e n t t o invoke t h e e q u i t a b l e powers of t h i s Court. S t i l l unchanged i s t h e long standing p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t y of a c o u r t of e q u i t y t o v a c a t e a decree obtained by f r a u d is i n h e r e n t . E.g., H a l l v. H a l l (1924), 70 Mont. 460, 467, 226 P. 469, 471. Montana's Uniform 24arriage and Divorce A c t , s e c t i o n 48- 330 (1) (b) (ii) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-4-208 (1) (b) (ii) MCA, s t a t e s t h a t " [ t ] he p r o v i s i o n s a s t o p r o p e r t y d i s p o s i t i o n may n o t be revoked o r modified by a c o u r t , except . . . i f t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h e e x i s t e n c e of c o n d i t i o n s t h a t j u s t i f y t h e reopening of a judgment under t h e l a w s of t h i s s t a t e . " Fraud upon t h e c o u r t and upon one of t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreement is c e r t a i n l y w i t h i n t h e scope of t h i s provision. The w i f e has a l l e g e d f a c t s ample t o j u s t i f y a reopening such a s t o r e d i s t r i b u t e t h e p r o p e r t y i n a n e q u i t a b l e manner. "[A] c o u r t o f g e n e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n has t h e r i g h t , e n t i r e l y independent of s t a t u t e , t o g r a n t r e l i e f a g a i n s t a judgment obtained by e x t r i n s i c f r a u d , and may g r a n t t h a t r e l i e f e i t h e r on motion i n t h e o r i g i n a l cause o r upon a s e p a r a t e e q u i t y s u i t , and a f t e r t h e period p r e s c r i b e d by t h e s t a t u t e [providing a s i x month l i m i t a t i o n ] r e l i e d on by [ t h e husband]." Cure v. Southwick (1960), 137 Mont. 1, 8, 349 P.2d 575, 579. ( C i t a t i o n s omitted. ) I n t h e motion t o quash, respondent makes a b s o l u t e l y no mention of t h e substance of t h e a f f i a n t ' s a l l e g a t i o n s which, i f a c c u r a t e , c l e a r l y show f r a u d on t h e p a r t of t h e husband i n f a i l i n g t o make a f u l l and a c c u r a t e d i s c l o s u r e of a l l t h e assets of t h e p a r t i e s , whether held s o l e l y , j o i n t l y o r through a business e n t i t y . I n Bates v. Bates (1965), 1 Ariz.App. 165, 400 P.2d 593, t h e c o u r t deemed t h a t , by v i r t u e of t h e husband's motion t o d i s m i s s made i n response t o t h e w i f e ' s complaint s t a t i n g a cause of a c t i o n based on f r a u d u l e n t procurement of a d i v o r c e d e c r e e and t h e a t t e n d a n t p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t , he had admitted f a c t s a l l e g e d by t h e wife. The c o u r t ' s language was " [ d l e f e n d a n t ' s admissions, v i r t u e -- of h i s Motion - t o D i s m i s s , i n c l u d e t h e following f a c t s -- t h a t a r e a l l e g e d - by p l a i n t i f f . . ." 400 P.2d a t 596. (Emphasis added.) Among t h e f a c t s deemed admitted w e r e t h e following which bear a s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t y t o c e r t a i n of t h o s e i n t h i s case: t h e husband, d u r i n g t h e course of t h e marriage, s e c r e t l y purchased c e r t a i n r e a l e s t a t e , t h e owner- s h i p of which was concealed from t h e wife; t h e wife d i d n o t know of t h e e x i s t e n c e of c e r t a i n of t h e p r o p e r t y a t t h e t i m e of t h e d i v o r c e and d i d n o t discover t h e f a c t s of i t s owner- s h i p and concealment u n t i l w i t h i n t h i r t y days of t h e f i l i n g of h e r complaint; t h e property was n o t known t o t h e c o u r t and n o t made t h e s u b j e c t of a d j u d i c a t i o n by t h e c o u r t a t t h e t i m e of t h e d i s s o l u t i o n . I n t h i s c a s e , t h e wife d i d n o t know of c e r t a i n of t h e p a r t i e s ' a s s e t s , s p e c i f i c a l l y c e r t a i n r e a l property of considerable worth, u n t i l a f t e r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n . I t appears t h a t she became aware of t h e considerable v a l u e of some of t h a t property when t h e ex-husband attempted t o sell some of it. Almost immediately, she contacted a n a t t o r n e y who, w i t h i n a very few days, f i l e d t h e complaint s u b j e c t of t h i s a c t i o n . The D i s t r i c t Court, n o t f u l l y a p p r i s e d , does n o t appear t o have a d j u d i c a t e d , i n i t s e n t i r e t y , t h e d i v i s i o n of t h e property. Being uninformed of a l l of t h e f a c t s of t h e m a t t e r , t h e District Court was unable t o " f i n a l l y e q u i t a b l y apportion between t h e p a r t i e s t h e property and a s s e t s belong- i n g t o e i t h e r o r both, however and whenever acquired. . ." Section 48-321 (1) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-4-202 (1) MCA. Like t h e Arizona c o u r t , w e a r e s o r e tempted t o deem admitted, by v i r t u e of t h e husband's motion t o quash, t h e statements i n t h e w i f e ' s a f f i d a v i t ; however, a s t h e p e t i - t i o n e r has requested o n l y t h a t w e provide h e r with a hearing on t h e m a t t e r , w e a r e constrained t o provide t h a t r e l i e f . I n H a l l v. H a l l , 70 Xont. a t 467, 226 P. a t 471, w e noted t h a t t h e f r a u d from which r e l i e f w i l l be granted i s t h a t which i s " e x t r i n s i c o r c o l l a t e r a l t o t h e m a t t e r s t r i e d by t h e c o u r t , and n o t t o fraud i n t h e m a t t e r s on which t h e decree was rendered." Although t h e H a l l c o u r t declared t h a t n e i t h e r t h e f a l s i t y of a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e complaint nor t h e f a l s i t y of testimony given a t t r i a l c o n s t i t u t e d e x t r i n s i c f r a u d such as t o a f f o r d r e l i e f , it affirmed t h e District Court which granted r e l i e f t o t h e wife on whom f r a u d had been p r a c t i c e d t o procure a divorce. A s j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a d e c i s i o n which appears t o be, b u t which was n o t acknowledged a s being, i n contravention of i t s own a r t i c u l a t i o n of t h e r u l e t h a t r e l i e f w i l l n o t be granted f o r i n t r i n s i c f r a u d , t h e c o u r t s t a t e d : "A decree of a c o u r t of conscience ought n o t t o a f f o r d a sanctuary f o r fraud." 70 Mont. a t 473, 226 P. a t 473. I n B u l l a r d v . Zimmerman (1930), 88 Mont. 271, 277-78, 292 P. 730, 732, o f t e n c i t e d f o r t h e following, t h e Court declared: "The power of a c o u r t of e q u i t y t o g r a n t r e l i e f from a judgment obtained by f r a u d i s i n h e r e n t ; it does n o t depend upon s t a t u t e . [ C i t a t i o n omit- t e d . ] But . . . ' n o t every f r a u d committed i n t h e course of a j u d i c i a l determination w i l l furn- i s h ground f o r such r e l i e f . The a c t s f o r which a judgment o r decree may be set a s i d e o r annulled have r e f e r e n c e only t o f r a u d which i s e x t r i n s i c o r c o l l a t e r a l t o t h e m a t t e r t r i e d by t h e c o u r t , and n o t t o f r a u d i n t h e m a t t e r on which t h e judgment was rendered. * * * What, then, i s meant by t h e expression " f r a u d which i s e x t r i n s i c o r c o l l a t e r a l t o t h e m a t t e r t r i e d by t h e c o u r t ? " I t i s e x t r i n s i c o r c o l l a t e r a l w i t h i n t h e meaning of t h e r u l e , when t h e e f f e c t of it i s t o prevent t h e unsuccessful p a r t y from having a t r i a l o r from p r e s e n t i n g h i s case f u l l y . ' The r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s ample evidence t o b r i n g t h i s c a s e w i t h i n t h e r u l e announced. "'Fraud being t h e a r c h enemy of e q u i t y , a judgment obtained through f r a u d p r a c t i c e d i n t h e very a c t of g e t t i n g it w i l l be set a s i d e by a c o u r t of e q u i t y upon seasonable a p p l i c a t i o n . Indeed, t h e power of a c o u r t of e q u i t y t o g r a n t such r e l i e f i s i n h e r e n t . [ C i t a t i o n omitted.] The conscience of t h e c h a n c e l l o r moves q u i c k l y t o r i g h t t h e wrong when it i s shown t h a t through imposition p r a c t i c e d upon t h e c o u r t by a l i t i g a n t an u n f a i r advantage has been gained by him and t h u s it has been made a n instrument of i n j u s t i c e . [ C i t a t i o n omitted.] * * * I n t h e language of Lord Chief Baron Pollock i n Rogers v. Hadley: "Fraud -- c u t s down everything. The law sets i t s e l f a g a i n s t f r a u d t o t h e e x t e n t --- -- of breaking through almost every r u l e , s a c r i f i c i n g - - every maxim, g e t t i n g -- r i d of every ground of opposi- t i o n . --- The law s o abhors f r a u d a m i n n o t ----- allow t e c h n i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of ----- any kind t o i n t e r - f e r e t o p r e v e n t t h e success of j u s t i c e , r i g h t and -- t r u t h . " . . .' [ C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ] " ( ~ m p h a s i s added. ) The ilontana c o u r t i s n o t alone i n s t a t i n g t h a t t h e f r a u d from which a p a r t y w i l l be r e l i e v e d must be e x t r i n s i c o r c o l l a t e r a l . E.g., Bates v. Bates, 400 P.2d a t 597-98. The Supreme Court of Utah i n C l i s s o l d v. C l i s s o l d (1974), 30 Utah 2d 430, 519 P.2d 241, 242, s a i d : "A m a t e r i a l m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o r concealment of - a s s e t s o r f i n a n c i a l c o n d i t i o n as a r e s u l t of which - - a l i m o n y o r p r o p e r t y awarded i s less o r m o r e t h a n ----- o t h e r w i s ~ w o u l d -- h a v e m r o v i d e d f o r i s a proper -- ground f o r which t h e c o u r t may g r a n t r e l i e f t o t h e -- p a r t y who was offended & such m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n -- o r concealment, a b s e n t o t h e r e q u i t i e s such a s l a c h e s -- or negligence. [ C i t a t i o n s omitted and emphasis - added.] i-lowever, b e f o r e r e l i e f can be g r a n t e d , it must be determined t h a t t h e a l l e g e d misrepresenta- t i o n o r concealment c o n s t i t u t e s conduct, such a s fraud, a s would b a s i c a l l y a f f o r d t h e complaining p a r t y r e l i e f from t h e judgment. The proper d i s p o s i - t i o n of t h i s c a s e r e q u i r e s a n a n a l y s i s and discus- s i o n of t h e concepts of ' i n t r i n s i c ' and ' e x t r i n s i c ' fraud. The p u b l i c i n t e r e s t r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e r e be a n end t o l i t i g a t i o n . To accomplish t h i s o b j e c t i v e t h e c o u r t s have always d i s t i n g u i s h e d between t h e a c t i o n s of a p a r t y l i t i g a n t which b e a r upon t h e opposing p a r t y ' s o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a f a i r submission of h i s c a s e and a p a r t y ' s m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n during t r i a l . Those a c t i o n s a s s e r t e d t o be f r a u d u l e n t -7 which prevent a f a i r submission of t h e controversy such a s deceiving a p a r t y i n t o n o t f i l i n g an answer o r deceiving a p a r t y i n t o s t a y i n g away from c o u r t on t h e day of t h e t r i a l a r e c l a s s e d a s e x t r i n s i c f r a u d , and i f e x i s t e n t i n f a c t , e n t i t l e t h e opposing p a r t y t o r e l i e f from t h e judgment. Conduct a s s e r t e d t o be f r a u d u l e n t which occurs d u r i n g t h e course of -- t h e proceedings, such a s f a l s e testimony, whether o r n o t e x i s t e n t i n f a c t , does n o t e n t i t l e a p a r t y t o r e l i e f from t h e judgment. The p r i n c i p l e , of course, i s t h a t during a t r i a l v e r a c i t y i t s e l f i s on t r i a l , and i n t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t cannot be t r i e d again. Some exceptions t o t h i s r u l e e x i s t i n d i v o r c e c a s e s where t h e r e has been a g r o s s m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a s s e t s by a p a r t y . [Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . ] " Because t h e c o u r t found t h a t t h e m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w a s n o t g r o s s , f o r " [ a l t most t h e r e was a d i s p u t e as t o t h e v a l u e of some highly s p e c u l a t i v e p r o p e r t y , and an answer t o an i n t e r r o g a t o r y which might be i n t e r p r e t e d a s concealment," 519 P.2d a t 242, t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of a motion f o r a new t r i a l was affirmed. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , however, t h e m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s g r o s s and t h e p e t i t i o n e r w i l l n o t be denied r e l i e f . Fraud upon t h e c o u r t i s a s p e c i e s of e x t r i n s i c f r a u d which w i l l a f f o r d e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f . " [Flraud upon t h e c o u r t . . . a u t h o r i z e s s e t t i n a a a s i d e a p r i o r judgment. Such f r a u d may c o n s i s t of --- a f f i r m a t i v e l y misrepresenting f a c t s t o t h e c o u r t o r of concealment of m a t e r i a l f a c t s by a person who i s under a l e g a l d a y t o make a f u l l d i s c l o s u r e t o t h e c o u r t . [ C i t a t i o n omitted. 1 "The power o f t h e c o u r t t o set a s i d e a judgment -- -- on t h e b a s i s of f r a u d upon t h e c o u r t rs i n h e r e n t -- -- and independent of s t a t u t e , -- a n d t h e t i m e l i n e s s of proceedings t o s e t a s i d e p r i o r judgment s o obr -- -- t a i n e d i s n o t s u b j e c t t o t h e s i x months t i m e l i m i -- --- -- t a t i o n -- i n Rule 6 0 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., b u t must u l t i - -- mately depend upon e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s and t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e c o u r t . [ C i t a t i o n omitted -- I n re J u l i a Ann Bad Yellow Hair (1973) . 162 Xont. 107, 1 1 1 , 509 P.2d 9, 12. ( ~ m ~ h a s i s added.) Although w e determined t h a t f r a u d w a s n o t committed on t h e c o u r t i n t h a t c a s e , w e f i n d t h a t h e r e t h e husband committed f r a u d upon t h e c o u r t i n f a i l i n g t o d i s c l o s e f u l l y t h e e x t e n t and n a t u r e of property s u b j e c t of d i v i s i o n i n t h e proceeding f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage. " I n a number of c a s e s i n which t h e d i v o r c e judgment was based upon a s e t t l e m e n t agreement t o which t h e w i f e ' s consent had been obtained through t h e hus- band's concealment of p r o p e r t y and m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of f i n a n c i a l s t a t u s , t h e judgment h a s been h e l d n o t conclusive on t h e ground t h a t , by reason of t h e agreement, a c t u a l j u d i c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n o r d e t e r - mination of t h e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s of t h e p a r t i e s had been e f f e c t i v e l y prevented o r withdrawn." Annot., 152 A.L.R. 190, 213 (1944). Selway v. Burns (1967), 150 Mont. 1, 8-91 429 P.2d 640, 644, recites t h e s e b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s : " [ R l e l i e f may be g r a n t e d e i t h e r on motion i n t h e o r i g i n a l a c t i o n o r i n a s e p a r a t e e q u i t y s u i t . Rule 60(b) e x p r e s s l y preserved t h i s i n h e r e n t power i n i t s l a s t sentence which provides: ' T h i s r u l e does n o t l i m i t t h e power of a c o u r t t o e n t e r t a i n a n independent a c t i o n t o r e l i e v e a p a r t y from a judgment, o r d e r , o r proceeding, o r t o g r a n t r e l i e f t o a defendant n o t p e r s o n a l l y n o t i f i e d a s may be provided by law, o r t o set a s i d e a judgment f o r f r a u d upon t h e c o u r t . ' "Our f e d e r a l c o u r t s a l s o recognize and u s e t h e h i s t o r i c e q u i t y power t o set a s i d e judgments gained by fraud. Hazel-Atlas Class Co. v. Hart- f o r d Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed. 1250. The only l i m i t a t i o n t h a t has been placed upon t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h i s power is t h a t t h e i n v e s t i g a t i n g c o u r t must observe t h e usual safeguards of t h e ad- v e r s a r y process by g r a n t i n g n o t i c e t o a f f e c t e d persons and by conducting a f a i r hearing on t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e fraud. Universal O i l Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 66 S.Ct. 1176, 90 L.Ed. 1447. "The fraud t h a t w i l l move a c o u r t of e q u i t y t o ---- e x e r c i s e i t s i n h e r e n t power t o v a c a t e judgments has been described a s t h a t which p r e v e n t s t h e unsuc- c e s s f u l p a r t y from having a t r i a l - o r p r e s e n t i n g i t s case f u l l y . [ C i t a t i o n s omitted.] -- I t i s always t h e kind of f r a u d t h a t goes t o t h e very i n t e g r i t y of -- -- t h e j u d i c i a l system because t h e c o u r t i s m i s l e d a n d - made one of t h e v i c t i m s of t h e fraud. [ C i t a t i o n ---- -- omitted.] Cases decided by t h i s c o u r t show t h a t t h e p r o h i b i t e d r e s u l t may be achieved e i t h e r by a£- f i r m a t i v e l y misrepresenting f a c t s [ c i t a t i o n omitted] o r by concealment of f a c t s by a person who was under a l e g a l duty t o make a f u l l d i s c l o s u r e t o t h e c o u r t . [ C i t a t i o n s omitted. 1 " (Emphasis added. ) A c o u r t i s e n t i t l e d t o presume t h a t t h e s u b s t a n t i v e c o n t e n t of documents, presented f o r i t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n determining t h e l e g a l and e q u i t a b l e q u e s t i o n s of a c a s e , a r e t r u t h f u l and a c c u r a t e , "and a m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a s s e t s and income i s a s e r i o u s and i n t o l e r a b l e d e r e l i c t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e a f f i a n t which goes t o t h e very h e a r t of t h e j u d i c i a l proceeding." Casanova v. Casanova (1974), 166 Conn. 304, 348 A.2d 668, 668. Based on t h a t d e r e l i c t i o n , t h e Connecticut c o u r t determined t h a t t h e wife was e n t i t l e d t o " a new and f u l l hearing . . . u n t a i n t e d by t h e [husband's] misrepresentation." 348 A.2d a t 668-69. I n t h a t c a s e , c e r t a i n d e p o s i t i o n proceedings, subsequent t o a hearing on t h e w i f e ' s motion f o r a n o r d e r f o r temporary alimony and support f o r t h e p a r t i e s ' minor c h i l d r e n of whom s h e had custody, revealed t h a t t h e husband had m a t e r i a l l y misrepre- s e n t e d h i s f i n a n c i a l s t a t u s . I n t h e i n s t a n t case, t h e misrepresentation i s perhaps more s u b t l e , b u t no less m a t e r i a l and i n t o l e r a b l e . I n t h i s case, t h e property s e t t l e - ment agreement makes no mention whatsoever of t h e t o t a l a s s e t s of t h e p a r t i e s ; n e i t h e r does it r e c i t e what property t h e husband was t o g e t . The only mention of any property i s - t h e following: "That t h e husband s h a l l f u r n i s h t h e wife and c h i l d r e n [ t h e custody of whom had been awarded t o t h e wife] with adequate and comfortable l i v i n g q u a r t e r s by e i t h e r : a . Buying a house i n 3ed Lodge, Montana, b. Buying a mobile home and mak- i n g arrangements t o s e t same on acreage near Red Lodge, Montana, o r c . By moving t h e wife and c h i l d r e n i n t o a home p r e s e n t l y owned by husband on property owned by husband on property North of Red Lodge, Montana. I n any event, once t h e d e c i s i o n a s t o l i v i n g q u a r t e r s i s made, husband agrees t o cause t i t l e t o same t o be t r a n s f e r r e d t o wife within a reasonable t i m e . 5. That hus- band s h a l l f u r n i s h wife with an adequate v e h i c l e f o r t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n needs of h e r s e l f and t h e children." Thus, i n t e r m s of a "property s e t t l e m e n t , " t h e wife was t o g e t a house and a c a r , and t h e husband w a s t o g e t every- t h i n g e l s e , which it appears was worth over half a m i l l i o n d o l l a r s a t t h e t i m e of t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e marriage. The house and t h e one a c r e on which it i s located and t h e 1976 Toyota have not been shown t o be worth over h a l f a m i l l i o n d o l l a r s , such t h a t w e could say t h e property d i v i s i o n was e q u i t a b l e . I t i s indeed t h e r u l e t h a t a judgment must be regarded a s f i n a l and conclusive, u n l e s s it can be shown t h a t t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t has been imposed upon, o r t h a t a p a r t y , by some e x t r i n s i c o r c o l l a t e r a l f r a u d , has prevented a f a i r submission of t h e matter. E.g., Bates v. Bates, 400 P.2d a t 597. But, a s i n Bates, t h e w i f e ' s c a s e here comes w i t h i n t h e exception, f o r e x t r i n s i c fraud may a l s o c o n s i s t of deception p r a c t i c e d by a party--here, t h e husband--in purposely keeping another party--here, t h e wife--in ignorance. 400 P.2d a t 596. This s o r t of deception, j u s t i f y i n g e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f , f i t s w i t h i n t h e scope of t h a t denominated " e x t r i n s i c o r c o l l a t e r a l fraud", defined a s "some i n t e n t i o n a l a c t o r conduct by which t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y has prevented t h e unsuccessful p a r t y from having a f a i r submission of t h e controversy. [ C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ] " 400 P.2d a t 597. Although one might q u i b b l e t h a t i n a proceeding f o r d i s s o l u - t i o n of marriage under i.lontana's Uniform Marriage and D i - vorce A c t , t h e r e i s no " p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y " o r "unsuccessful p a r t y , " t h e s p i r i t of t h e p r i n c i p l e of e q u i t y w i l l n o t be s o e a s i l y downtrodden. There has n o t been a f a i r submission of t h e controversy here. Furthermore, " ' [ f l r a u d i n t h e s e n s e of a c o u r t of e q u i t y , p r o p e r l y i n c l u d e s a l l a c t s , omissions, and concealments which involve a breach of l e g a l o r e q u i t a b l e d u t y , t r u s t , o r confidence j u s t l y reposed, and a r e i n j u r i o u s t o another, o r by which a n undue and unconscientious advan- t a g e i s taken of a n o t h e r . ' 1 S t o r y Eq.Jur. 5 187. (Emphasis added.)" Bates, 400 P.2d a t 598. S u r e l y undue advantage was taken of Evalee P i l a t i , t o her i n j u r y , such t h a t she is e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f i n a c o u r t of e q u i t y . For t h e reasons a r t i c u l a t e d above, w e r e v e r s e t h e judgment and remand t h e cause with i n s t r u c t i o n s t o r e i n s t a t e it and t o proceed a s l a w and e q u i t y d i c t a t e s . / / W e concur: / \ % L d @ _ ~ i a / , w Chief J u s t i c e