Title: STATE v BALLEW
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12821
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: February 25, 1975

No. 12821 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE OF M O N T A N A T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - DEAN WILLIAM B A L L E W , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant: John L. Adams, Jr. argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas A. Budewitz, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, B i l l i n g s , Montana Charles A. Bradley, Deputy County Attorney, argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: January 17, 1975 Decided : 2 5 1975 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This is an appeal from a conviction of deviate sexual conduct, entered i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Yellowstone County. Defendant r a i s e s f i v e i s s u e s on appeal: (1) Is s e c t i o n 94-5-505, R.C.M. 1947, unconstitutionally vague, i n d e f i n i t e and uncertain? ( 2 ) Did t h e d i s t r i c t court e r r by giving an i n c o r r e c t i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e s t a t u t o r y elements of t h e offense? ( 3 ) Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r i n refusing an i n s t r u c - t i o n on t h e necessity of viewing t h e complaining witness' t e s t i - mony with caution? ( 4 ) Did t h e d i s t r i c t court err i n refusing defendant's proposed i n s t r u c t i o n on impeachment of witnesses? (5) Does t h e evidence support t h e v e r d i c t ? The deviate sexual conduct allegedly occurred on t h e evening of February 15, 1974, i n B i l l i n g s , Montana. The prose- cution and t h e defense each presented a d i f f e r e n t version of t h e events of t h a t evening. The complaining witness ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e "victim"), a sixteen-year-old boy, t e s t i f i e d he was walking home from a f r i e n d ' s house s h o r t l y a f t e r 10:OO p.m. on t h e day i n question. H e crossed t h e parking l o t of a s t o r e and continued across a nearby f i e l d . He was then accosted by defendant, who drove up t o him i n a p r i v a t e automobile, accompanied by two young l a d i e s . The conversation which ensued, o u t s i d e t h e hearing of t h e women, was t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t defendant suspected t h e v i c t i m ' s involvement i n burglaries of t h e s t o r e which t h e victim had j u s t passed. Although t h e victim had never seen t h e defendant before, he entered t h e c a r with him, thinking he was a s e c u r i t y guard f o r t h e s t o r e . One of the women drove t h e c a r back t o the s t o r e parking 1ot.where t h e two women g o t o u t and l e f t i n another vehicle. Defendant then drove t o a remote p a r t of t h e c i t y and, a f t e r threatening t o g e t mean i f t h e victim d i d not cooperate, he performed a c t s of o r a l and a n a l intercourse on t h e victim. H e then returETthe victim t o a point near where he had picked him up and l e t him o u t of t h e c a r . The victim went t o t h e nearest public phone amd c a l l e d t h e police. Defendant w a s a r r e s t e d t h e following afternoon, a f t e r t h e victim had i d e n t i f i e d him and t h e vehicle which he was d r i v i n g t h e previous night. Defendant t e s t i f i e d he worked a s a stock boy i n a s t o r e i n B i l l i n g s , and t h a t he had been approached by t h e victim, who requested a r i d e home a f t e r t h e s t o r e closed. Defendant agreed and when he l a t e r saw t h e victim i n t h e parking l o t , he assumed t h a t he s t i l l needed a r i d e . After some d i f f i c u l t y i n l o c a t i n g him, he approached t h e victim and offered t o d r i v e him home. After dropping t h e women off a t t h e i r c a r , he then took t h e victim d i r e c t l y t o t h e location indicated by t h e victim, and l e t him o u t of t h e c a r . H e denied t h a t he ever made sexual advances toward t h e victim. The only other evidence presented was c e r t a i n physical evidence tending t o s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e v i c t i m ' s version of t h e events, and c e r t a i n character evidence favoring defendant. The physical evidence included laboratory a n a l y s i s of semen s t a i n s and h a i r s found on t h e victims clothing and c l o t h i n g taken from defendant when he was a r r e s t e d . The c h a r a c t e r evidence showed t h a t t h e defendant had not molested other youngsters although he had opportunity t o do s o while baby-sitting young boys. D e - fendant d i d admit t o having engaged i n homosexual a c t i v i t i e s f o r over f i v e years, but indicated he had discontinued t h i s p r a c t i c e more than s i x months before t h i s incident. Defendant was charged with v i o l a t i o n of section 94-5-505, R.C.M. 1947, which provides, i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : l1 (1) A person who knowingly engages i n d e v i a t e sexual r e l a t i o n s , o r who causes another t o engage i n d e v i a t e sexual r e l a t i o n s commits t h e offense of d e v i a t e sexual conduct. " ( 3 ) A person convicted of d e v i a t e sexual conduct without consent s h a l l be imprisoned * *- *'I* Relying primarily on Harris v. S t a t e , (Alas. 1969), 457 P-2d 6381 defendant urges t h e quoted s t a t u t e i s unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. I n Harris, t h e Alaska c o u r t was considering a s t a t u t e which employed t h e term "crime a g a i n s t nature". That c o u r t held, c i t i n g Lanzetta v. N e w Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 8 3 L.Ed. 888, t h a t t h e t e r m was so vague it f a i l e d t o give f a i r warning of t h e a c t s prohibited and therefore it worked a deprivation of due process i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e Fourteenth Amend- ment t o t h e United S t a t e s Constitution. Defendant a l l e g e s t h e Montana s t a t u t e does not s u f f i c i e n t l y enunciate t h e prohibited conduct and, l i k e t h e Alaska s t a t u t e , it must therefore be held unconstitutional. W e disagree. The a t t a c k on the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e s t a t u t e was r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t time i n defendant's supplemental a p p e l l a t e b r i e f . However, s i n c e t h i s i s a criminal case, w e w i l l not con- t e n t ourselves with disposing of t h e challenge on t h a t b a s i s alone. See e.g. S t a t e v. Braden, 163 Mont. 1 2 4 , 515 P.2d 692, 30 St.Rep. 961. The a l l e g a t i o n of vagueness is not supported by t h e s t a t u t e i t s e l f when viewed i n t h e context of Montana's criminal code. Section 94-2-101, R.C.M. 1947, defines t h e terms used i n t h e s t a t u t e proscribing d e v i a t e sexual conduct. The s p e c i f i c i t y of those d e f i n i t i o n s avoids a r e s u l t s i m i l a r t o t h a t reached i n Harris, urged by defendant. I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , those d e f i n i t i o n s provide : " ( 1 4 ) 'Deviate sexual r e l a t i o n s ' means sexual contact o r sexual intercourse between two (2) persons of t h e same sex, o r any form of sexual intercourse with an animal. "(55) 'Sexual c o n t a c t 1 means any touching of t h e sexual o r o t h e r intimate p a r t s of t h e person of another f o r t h e purpose of arousing o r g r a t i f y i n g t h e sexual d e s i r e of e i t h e r party. "(56) 'Sexual i n t e r c o u r s e ' means penetration of t h e vulva, anus o r mouth of one person by t h e penis of another person, o r penetration of t h e vulva o r anus of one person by any body member of another person o r penetration of t h e vulva, o r anus of one person by any foreign instrument o r o b j e c t manipulated by another person f o r t h e purpose of arousing o r g r a t i f y i n g t h e sexual d e s i r e of e i t h e r party. Any penetration, however s l i g h t , i s s u f f i c i e n t . " ( 6 8 ) 'Without consent' means: " ( a ) t h e victim is compelled t o submit by f o r c e o r by t h r e a t of imminent death, bodily i n j u r y , o r kidnaping, t o be i n f l i c t e d on anyone * * *." The t e x t of t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s i s set f o r t h completely t o show t h e s p e c i f i c i t y and absolute lack of vagueness i n t h e s t a t u t o r y formulation of t h e offense of d e v i a t e sexual conduct. Defendant's second i s s u e i s a l s o r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on appeal. He o b j e c t s t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n informing t h e jury of t h e elements of t h e offense. The challenged portion of I n s t r u c t i o n No. 15 reads: "SECOND: That t h e Defendant d i d so [performed t h e a c t ] without t h e consent of [ t h e v i c t i m ] , s a i d consent having been overcome by t h r e a t s o r p u t t i n g i n f e a r of h i s , [ t h e v i c t i m ' s ] safety." [Bracketed words supplied o r s u b s t i t u t e d . ] Defense r a i s e d no objection when t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n was offered. This, i n i t s e l f , i s s u f f i c i e n t t o d e f e a t defendant's arguments on appeal. See: S t a t e v. Braden, 163 Mont. 1 2 4 , 515 P.2d 692, 30 St.Rep. 961; Section 95-1910(d), R.C.M. 1947; Rule 2 , M.R.App. However, a p a r t from t h i s procedural deficiency we can f i n d no prejudice r e s u l t i n g from ;he i n s t r u c t i o n . It i s t r u e t h a t , i n a vacuum, t h e i n s t r u c t i o n might be construed t o in- clude f e a r f o r s a f e t y o t h e r than i n t h e sense of death, bodily i n j u r y o r kidnapping. An i n s t r u c t i o n using t h e s t a t u t o r y language of s e c t i o n 94-2-101 (68), R.C.M. 1947, would have been preferable. However, under the f a c t s of t h i s case, w e can f i n d no other p l a u s i b l e construction f o r t h e language of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n . The t h r e a t made a g a i n s t t h e victim here c l e a r l y involved h i s physical well-being. I f t h e jury had considered t h e meaning which defendant a t t a c h e s - t o t h e i.nstruction, it would have d i s - carded it as unsupported by t h e evidence. Finding no prejudice, we f i n d no r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . Defendant next argues t h a t t h e jury should have been i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e testimony of a complaining witness i n a sex offense case should be viewed with caution, since t h e charge i s e a s i l y made and d i f f i c u l t t o disprove. The i n s t r u c t i o n which defendant proposed i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s almost i d e n t i c a l t o t h e one quoted i n S t a t e v. Boe, 143 Mont. 1 4 1 , 148, 388 P.2d 372. Similar i n s t r u c t i o n s were presented i n S t a t e v. Stevens, 119 Mont. 169, 172 P.2d 299; S t a t e v. Peterson, 102 Mont. 495, 59 P.2d 61; S t a t e v. Mihalovich, 69 Mont. 579, 222 P. 695; S t a t e v. Gaimos, 53 Mont. 118, 1 6 2 P. 596; and S t a t e v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 156 P. 1080. These cases recognized t h a t such i n s t r u c t i o n s may be given but t h a t , a t l e a s t i n these cases, it w a s not r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r t o r e f u s e t o do so. Given t h i s a u t h o r i t y i n our own j u r i s d i c t i o n , we need not consider t h e California cases c i t e d by defendant i n support of h i s contention. Under t h e cases c i t e d above, it i s c l e a r t h a t r e f u s a l t o give such an i n s t r u c t i o n w i l l be e r r o r only when some s p e c i f i c cause is shown f o r d i s t r u s t i n g t h e testimony of t h e complaining witness. Such causes might include manifest malice, desire for revenge, or an absence of corroborating evidence tending to support the facts testified to by the complaining witness. Apart from the bald assertion that defendant was framed, we find no facts in the instant record which suggest the necessity of such an instruction. Defendant's unsubstantiated allegation is insufficient to make the refusal of the instruction reversible error. Defendant's assertion that the district court erred in refusing to give his proposed instruction on the weight which should be accorded to testimony of impeached witnesses is equally unimpressive. The omnibus instruction which was given to the jury covered all the material points raised by defendant's pro- posed instruction. The district court alluded to that fact at the time it refused the offered instruction. Under such circum- stances, we have previously recognized that the refusal of a similar instruction was not error, even though the language applied more directly to the factual situation presented by the case. State v. Black, 163 Mont. 302, 516 P.2d 1163, 30 St.Rep. 1106. That reasoning is equally applicable here, particularly when the scarcity of impeachment evidence is considered. Defendant's final argument is that the evidence does not support the verdict. Without further detailing the facts which were before the jury, we have reviewed the entire record and find ample, credible evidence upon which the verdict could be grounded. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction. Justice Justices ; I - 7 -