Title: In re N.P.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 280A19
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: March 12, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-11 
No. 280A19 
Filed 12 March 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: N.P. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 30 
April 2019 by Judge J.H. Corpening, II in District Court, New Hanover County. 
Heard in the Supreme Court on 13 January 2021. 
 
Karen F. Richards for petitioner-appellee New Hanover County Department of 
Social Services. 
 
Michelle FormyDuval Lynch for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Peter Wood for respondent-appellant. 
 
 
MORGAN, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
In this appeal from a termination of parental rights order, this Court is asked 
to determine whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in the proceeding. 
Respondent-mother bases her argument contesting the trial court’s authority on her 
assertions that (1) neither she, her daughter “Nancy,” nor Nancy’s father were 
residents of North Carolina and (2) any temporary emergency jurisdiction which the 
trial court may have obtained in the matter had expired prior to the filing of the 
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termination of parental rights petition.1 After careful review of the unusual 
circumstances presented by this case, we conclude that the trial court here properly 
exercised subject matter jurisdiction concerning Nancy under the plain language of 
our state’s Juvenile Code. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating 
respondent-mother’s parental rights to Nancy. 
I. 
Factual Background and Procedural History 
¶ 2 
 
In July 2017, respondent-mother, then seventeen years of age, was pregnant 
and living with her boyfriend and his family in Norfolk, Virginia. During the early 
portion of the month, while visiting Onslow County, North Carolina, respondent-
mother went to see a doctor for prenatal care and was determined to be at risk for an 
immediate miscarriage. Respondent-mother was in labor as she was transported by 
helicopter to New Hanover Regional Medical Center in Wilmington, North Carolina. 
On 4 July 2017, Nancy was born twenty-three weeks prematurely, weighing one 
pound and four ounces, suffering from a hole in her heart, and needing a feeding tube 
to eat. As a result, Nancy required care from a variety of medical professionals, 
including a neurologist, an ophthalmologist, a cardiologist, and a pulmonologist. 
Respondent-mother remained at the hospital with Nancy after the child’s birth. 
                                            
 
1 We employ a pseudonym for the child for ease of reading and to protect the identity 
of the juvenile. 
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Respondent mother’s boyfriend, who was Nancy’s father, returned home to Virginia 
after Nancy’s birth, but joined respondent-mother and Nancy at the hospital for a 
temporary period beginning on 22 September 2017.2 When Nancy’s father and 
respondent-mother did not follow the proper feeding schedule for Nancy and had 
trouble providing proper care for the infant even with the help of hospital staff, the 
Onslow County Department of Social Services was contacted. Since the hospital 
where Nancy was receiving care was located in New Hanover County, the juvenile 
matter was transferred to the New Hanover County Department of Social Services 
(DSS) on 29 September 2017. As a result of the interrelated issues regarding Nancy’s 
health and care, DSS took Nancy into its custody on 3 October 2017. On 3 October 
2017, DSS filed a petition, which alleged that Nancy was neglected and dependent. 
Following an adjudication hearing in December 2017, the trial court adjudicated 
Nancy to be both neglected and dependent. 
¶ 3 
 
At a nonsecure custody hearing held on 11 October 2017, the trial court 
concluded that it “ha[d] emergency jurisdiction over the subject matter and the 
parties to this action and authority to enter this Order.” When Nancy was discharged 
                                            
 
2 Initially, Nancy’s father was not listed on her birth certificate, but he added his name 
to the birth certificate after the filing of the petition to terminate his and respondent-mother’s 
parental rights. The parental rights of Nancy’s father to the juvenile were also terminated, 
but he is not a party to this appeal.  
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from the hospital on 12 October 2017, DSS placed her in foster care in New Hanover 
County. On 9 November 2017, Nancy’s father and respondent-mother entered into a 
case plan with DSS, agreeing to complete parenting classes, to complete psychological 
evaluations and follow any recommendations, and to maintain stable housing and 
employment. After the agreement was reached, both parents moved back to Norfolk, 
Virginia, where they continued to reside at the time of the filing of the termination of 
parental rights petition with the family of Nancy’s father.  
¶ 4 
 
On 22 October 2018, DSS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights to 
Nancy of both respondent-mother and Nancy’s father. After a hearing on 1 April 2019, 
the trial court found that grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of both 
parents on the bases of neglect, failure to make “reasonable progress . . . in correcting 
those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile,” and willful abandonment. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(1), (2), (7) (2019). To support these grounds, among other findings 
of fact which are not challenged by respondent-mother on appeal, the trial court found 
that respondent-mother (1) did not engage in parenting classes, (2) delayed her 
psychological evaluation, (3) did not complete recommended therapy, (4) did not 
verify her housing or income during the course of the proceeding, (5) missed or 
rescheduled numerous visits with Nancy, and (6) did not provide emotional or 
financial support for Nancy. The trial court additionally determined that it was in 
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the best interests of Nancy to terminate the parental rights of both parents. The trial 
court entered the order of termination on 30 April 2019. Respondent-mother gave 
written notice of appeal to this Court on 2 May 2019.  
II. 
Analysis 
1. Standard of Review 
¶ 5 
 
“The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law and cannot be 
conferred upon a court by consent.” In re K.J.L., 363 N.C. 343, 345–46 (2009) 
(extraneity omitted). “[A] court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable 
and can be raised at any time,” id. at 346, including for the first time upon appeal, In 
re H.L.A.D., 184 N.C. App. 381, 385 (2007), aff’d per curiam, 362 N.C. 170 (2008). We 
review questions of law de novo. Willowmere Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 
370 N.C. 553, 556 (2018). 
2. Pertinent Law 
¶ 6 
 
Absent subject matter jurisdiction a court has no power to act and any 
resulting judgment is void. In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 590 (2006). “When the record 
shows a lack of [subject matter] jurisdiction in the lower court, the appropriate action 
on the part of the appellate court is to . . . vacate any order entered without authority.” 
State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 176 (1981). 
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¶ 7 
 
“In matters arising under the Juvenile Code, the court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction is established by statute.” In re K.J.L., 363 N.C. at 345. The Uniform 
Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) is an overarching 
jurisdictional scheme intended to “[a]void jurisdictional competition and conflict with 
courts of other States in matters of child custody.” N.C.G.S. § 50A-101 cmt. (2019); 
see also In re L.T., 374 N.C. 567, 569 (2020) (“The trial court must comply with the 
UCCJEA in order to have subject matter jurisdiction over juvenile abuse, neglect, 
and dependency cases and termination of parental rights cases.”).  
The UCCJEA applies to proceedings in which child custody 
is at issue, including those involving juvenile abuse, 
neglect, dependency and termination of parental rights; 
and a trial court must comply with its provisions to obtain 
jurisdiction in such cases. See N.C.G.S. §§ 50A-102(4), -
201(a)–(b) (2017). Generally, North Carolina courts have 
jurisdiction to make a child custody determination if North 
Carolina is the home state of the child. N.C.G.S. § 50A-
201(a)(1). “ ‘Home state’ means the state in which a child 
lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at 
least six consecutive months immediately before the 
commencement of a child-custody proceeding.” N.C.G.S. § 
50A-102(7) (2017). 
In re S.E., 373 N.C. 360, 364 (2020). 
¶ 8 
 
More specifically, in termination of parental rights matters, the North 
Carolina General Statutes provide: 
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The court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear 
and determine any petition or motion relating to 
termination of parental rights to any juvenile who resides 
in, is found in, or is in the legal or actual custody of a county 
department of social services or licensed child-placing 
agency in the district at the time of filing of the petition or 
motion. The court shall have jurisdiction to terminate the 
parental rights of any parent irrespective of the age of the 
parent. Provided, that before exercising jurisdiction under 
this Article, the court shall find that it has jurisdiction to 
make a child-custody determination under the provisions of 
G.S. 50A-201, 50A-203, or 50A-204. The court shall have 
jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of any parent 
irrespective of the state of residence of the parent. 
Provided, that before exercising jurisdiction under this 
Article regarding the parental rights of a nonresident 
parent, the court shall find that it has jurisdiction to make 
a child-custody determination under the provisions of G.S. 
50A-201 or G.S. 50A-203, without regard to G.S. 50A-204 
and that process was served on the nonresident parent 
pursuant to G.S. 7B-1106. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 (2019) (emphasis added). Section 50A-201 of the General Statutes 
of North Carolina sets forth in four subparagraphs when “a court of this State has 
jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination.” N.C.G.S. § 50A-201(a)(1) 
(2019). Section 50A-204 addresses when a court of this State has temporary 
emergency jurisdiction. N.C.G.S. § 50A-204 (2019). As pertinent to this appeal, 
subparagraph (a)(1) of N.C.G.S. § 50A-201 states:  
(1) This State is the home state of the child on the date of 
the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home 
state of the child within six months before the 
commencement of the proceeding, and the child is absent 
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from this State but a parent or person acting as a parent 
continues to live in this State[.] 
N.C.G.S. § 50A-201(a)(1). Once a court has made a child-custody determination under 
the provisions of section 50A-201, that court has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction 
over the determination until: 
(1) A court of this State determines that neither the child, 
the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do 
not have a significant connection with this State and that 
substantial evidence is no longer available in this State 
concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships; or 
(2) A court of this State or a court of another state 
determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any 
person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this 
State. 
N.C.G.S. § 50A-202 (2019).3  
3. Application 
¶ 9 
 
Respondent-mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction in this matter, although this position is premised on a 
series of related and overlapping contentions. First, while she acknowledges the 
appropriate exercise of the trial court’s temporary emergency jurisdiction in the days 
just after Nancy’s birth, respondent-mother asserts that “at some point after DSS 
                                            
 
3 Respondent-mother does not make a specific argument under section 50A-202. 
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took custody, that jurisdiction expired.” Respondent-mother also contends that she 
and Nancy’s father were residents of Norfolk, Virginia when Nancy was born and at 
least until some point after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate their 
parental rights to Nancy. Respondent-mother submits that the exercise of subject 
matter jurisdiction by the trial court here was improper under the terms of the 
UCCJEA. Respondent-mother also notes her own youth at the time of Nancy’s birth.  
¶ 10 
 
Further, respondent-mother represents that the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
trial court in New Hanover County created  
an uphill battle complying with the case plan. She had no 
transportation and could not easily make it back and forth 
between her home state and the state with custody of 
Nancy for visits. She had trouble lining up services in 
Virginia when that state did not administer the case plan. 
Keeping her child in a state where she did not reside 
presented logistical and legal barriers that would not have 
existed if the parents and Nancy lived in the same state. 
Respondent-mother goes on to contend that “[t]here are compelling public policy 
issues for not allowing a state that acquires temporary emergency jurisdiction to keep 
custody of a child indefinitely. At some point the child should be allowed to return to 
the state where the parents live.” Finally, respondent-mother maintains that Nancy’s 
case should have been transferred to Virginia, citing N.C.G.S. § 7B-903(a)(6) for the 
proposition that the trial court could have ordered DSS to “return the juvenile to the 
responsible authorities in the juvenile’s home state.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-903(a)(6) (2019).  
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¶ 11 
 
Assuming, arguendo, that the existence of a temporary emergency regarding 
Nancy’s welfare had expired at some point after the juvenile’s birth and before the 
filing of the petition to terminate parental rights to Nancy, such a circumstance is of 
no consequence in light of the facts and procedures in the present case. We are not 
required to determine with exactness the juncture at which the temporary emergency 
regarding the child’s well-being may have ended because the record reveals that, 
regardless of any temporary emergency jurisdiction exercised during the initial 
period of Nancy’s life or during the time leading up to her adjudication as a dependent 
and neglected juvenile, the trial court had exclusive, original jurisdiction over all 
petitions and motions concerning termination of parental rights to Nancy pursuant 
to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 and in conformance with the UCCJEA. Section 7B-1101 
properly focuses the question of subject matter jurisdiction on the custody, location, 
or residence of the subject child in a termination of parental rights proceeding rather 
than on the residential state of the parents. See, e.g., In re T.H.T., 362 N.C. 446, 450 
(2008) (affirming that the child’s best interests constitute “the ‘polar star’ of the North 
Carolina Juvenile Code”); see also In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 109 (1984). 
Respondent-mother incorrectly construes the applicable law regarding jurisdiction to 
be dictated by the residential location of the child’s parents, instead of the residential 
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location of the child along with other factors consistent with the child’s residential 
location which impact the child’s best interests.  
¶ 12 
 
Likewise, section 7B-1101 states, inter alia, that a trial 
court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and 
determine any petition or motion relating to termination of 
parental rights to any juvenile who resides in, is found in, 
or is in the legal or actual custody of a county department 
of social services . . . in the district at the time of filing of 
the petition or motion. . . . Provided, that before exercising 
jurisdiction . . . , the court shall find that it has jurisdiction 
to make a child-custody determination under the provisions 
of G.S. 50A-201 . . . . 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 (emphasis added). Similarly, section 50A-201 provides that “a 
court of this State has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination only 
if . . . [t]his State is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of 
the proceeding,” N.C.G.S. § 50A-201(a)(1) (emphasis added), and “ ‘[h]ome state’ 
means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent 
for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child-
custody proceeding,” N.C.G.S. § 50A-102(7) (2019) (emphasis added). 
¶ 13 
 
In the case at bar, the trial court made a finding of fact that Nancy “has lived 
in this state for her entire life. The Courts of the State of North Carolina have home 
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state jurisdiction over the child and at least one parent is a resident of this State.”4 
Nancy was born in North Carolina and lived with foster parents in the state for the 
six months immediately before the filing of the termination of parental rights petition 
on 22 October 2018. For the entirety of her life, which was nearly sixteen months at 
that time, Nancy lived in North Carolina. These facts indicate that the trial court’s 
determination that North Carolina was the home state for Nancy was supported by, 
and fully consistent with, both the UCCJEA and N.C.G.S. § 50A-201(a)(1). 
¶ 14 
 
With further regard to the operation of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101, as noted above, 
Nancy was born in New Hanover County, North Carolina, had resided for her entire 
life in New Hanover County at the time of the filing of the petition to terminate 
respondent-mother’s parental rights and was in the legal custody of DSS in New 
Hanover County at the time of the filing of the petition to terminate respondent-
mother’s parental rights.  Thus, every requirement for exclusive, original jurisdiction 
                                            
 
4 Although a trial court making specific findings of fact related to its jurisdiction under 
N.C.G.S. § 50A-201(a)(1) “would be the better practice,” this Court has affirmed that the 
statute “states only that certain circumstances must exist, not that the court specifically 
make findings to that effect.” In re T.J.D.W., 182 N.C. App. 394, 397, aff’d per curiam, 362 
N.C. 84 (2007). Although respondent-mother was a resident of Virginia when the termination 
of parental rights petition was filed on 22 October 2018, the record on appeal indicates that 
she relocated to North Carolina between that date and 3 December 2018 when the notice of 
hearing in the termination proceeding was filed, at which point her address was in Rocky 
Point, N.C. Likewise, both of the amended notices of hearing on the termination of parental 
rights petition, filed on 18 February 2019 and 25 March 2019, designate respondent-mother’s 
address as being located in Rocky Point, N.C.  
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under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 was satisfied: (1) Nancy “reside[d] in, [was] found in, or 
[was] in the legal or actual custody of a county department of social services . . . at 
the time of filing of the petition or motion;” (2) North Carolina was the home state for 
Nancy pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 50A-201(a)(1); and (3) “process was served on 
[respondent-mother] pursuant to G.S. 7B-1106.”5 N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101. This proper 
exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court is buttressed by the lack of any motion made 
by any party to the proceedings concerning Nancy to end the tribunal’s authority 
based upon the expiration or termination of the temporary emergency, or to transfer 
the tribunal’s authority to an appropriate legal forum in the parents’ residential state 
of Virginia. As a result, North Carolina’s ongoing jurisdiction was exclusive and 
appropriate. Accordingly, Nancy was a juvenile over whom our state’s courts could 
properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction in connection with a petition of 
termination of parental rights under our state’s Juvenile Code.  
¶ 15 
 
In response to respondent-mother’s representation that the transfer of her case 
plan to Virginia pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-903(a)(6) would have improved her 
opportunity to successfully complete it, we note that the statute is inapposite here 
                                            
 
5 Respondent-mother has never disputed the fact “that process was served on [her] 
pursuant to G.S. 7B-1106.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101.  
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and hence the transfer option was unavailable. The statute provides, in abuse, 
neglect, and dependency proceedings, that 
[t]he following alternatives for disposition shall be 
available to any court exercising jurisdiction, and the court 
may combine any of the applicable alternatives when the 
court finds the disposition to be in the best interests of the 
juvenile: 
. . . 
(6) Place the juvenile in the custody of the department of 
social services in the county of the juvenile’s residence. In 
the case of a juvenile who has legal residence outside the 
State, the court may place the juvenile in the physical 
custody of the department of social services in the county 
where the juvenile is found so that agency may return the 
juvenile to the responsible authorities in the juvenile’s home 
state. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-903(a)(6) (emphasis added). As already discussed, at all times during 
this matter, Nancy was found in New Hanover County, North Carolina and North 
Carolina was her home state. Therefore, N.C.G.S. § 7B-903(a)(6) was not available to 
be invoked in the instant case by the trial court. 
¶ 16 
 
As to respondent-mother’s reference to her own youth at the time of Nancy’s 
birth, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 specifically states that “[t]he court shall have jurisdiction 
to terminate the parental rights of any parent irrespective of the age of the parent.” 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 (emphasis added). Respondent-mother cites no legal authority to 
the contrary and makes no actual argument on this point. Also, we must decline 
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respondent-mother’s invitation to engage in public policy considerations here in light 
of the unambiguous and specific language chosen by the General Assembly in 
drafting and enacting the Juvenile Code of this state. Given the clarity of the statutes 
which pertain to subject matter jurisdiction as they apply to the present case, any 
such public policy concerns raised here should be directed to the state’s legislative 
branch for contemplation. See, e.g., State v. Whittle Commc’ns, 328 N.C. 456, 470 
(1991) (“[T]he general rule in North Carolina is that absent ‘constitutional restraint, 
questions as to public policy are for legislative determination.’ ” (quoting Gardner v. 
N.C. State Bar, 316 N.C. 285, 293 (1986))). 
III. 
Conclusion 
¶ 17 
 
In this juvenile matter, the trial court had exclusive, original jurisdiction over 
the termination of parental rights case regarding Nancy pursuant to the UCCJEA 
and N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating 
respondent-mother’s parental rights to Nancy. 
AFFIRMED.