Title: Baumruk v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC91564
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 2012

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
KENNETH BAUMRUK,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
No. SC91564 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent.  
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. CHARLES COUNTY 
The Honorable Lucy D. Rauch, Judge 
 
Opinion issued April 17, 2012 
 
This is an appeal from the St. Charles County circuit court's judgment overruling 
Kenneth Baumruk's Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief.  This Court previously 
affirmed Baumruk's guilty verdict on one count of first degree murder and his sentence of 
death.  See State v. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 600 (Mo. banc 2009) (Baumruk III).   
 
After that appeal, Baumruk filed a Rule 29.15 pro se motion for post-conviction 
relief, and appointed counsel later filed an amended motion.  An evidentiary hearing was 
held on most, but not all, of the claims set forth by the motion.  After the evidentiary 
hearing, the motion court entered findings and a judgment overruling Baumruk's motion.  
Because a death sentence was imposed, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over this 
appeal.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10; order of June 16, 1988.    
FACTS1 
 
On May 5, 1992, Baumruk and his wife appeared in St. Louis County circuit court 
for a hearing regarding the dissolution of their marriage.  On that day, Baumruk secretly 
carried two .38 caliber handguns in his briefcase.  During the hearing, Baumruk drew 
both the guns out of his briefcase and opened fire, first on his wife, then her attorney, 
then his own attorney.   Baumruk then shot at Judge Hais, the judge presiding over the 
case, but Judge Hais escaped through a door behind the bench.   
 
  Baumruk, with his weapons still drawn, exited the courtroom into the hallway in 
search of Judge Hais.  In the hallway, he shot a bailiff in the shoulder.   As his search of 
the courthouse continued, he fired shots at two police officers; Jim Hartwick, a St. Louis 
County prosecutor's office investigator; and a security guard.  He hit only the security 
guard.   After this, Baumruk was confronted by additional police officers.  Baumruk shot 
at one of these officers and missed; the officers returned fire, hitting Baumruk nine times.  
Two of these shots hit Baumruk in the head.  In total, before Baumruk was subdued by 
the police, he had shot at nine different individuals, hitting four of them, killing one of 
those four.  The one he killed was his wife.  
 
Baumruk initially was charged with one count of first degree murder and multiple 
counts of first degree assault and armed criminal action in St. Louis County.  However, 
his motion for change of venue was sustained, and his case was transferred to Macon 
County.  Because of the brain injuries that resulted from Baumruk being shot in the head 
                                                 
1 Portions of this section are taken or paraphrased from this Court's opinion in Baumruk III and 
are used without further attribution.  
twice, the circuit court held what would be the first of three hearings regarding 
Baumruk's competency.  Afterwards, the circuit court determined that Baumruk was not 
competent to stand trial.  For this reason, the Macon County circuit court ultimately 
dismissed the charges against Baumruk after being ordered to do so by this Court in State 
ex rel. Baumruk v. Belt, 964 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. banc 1998) (Baumruk I).  
 
The St. Louis County prosecutor subsequently obtained an 18-count indictment 
against Baumruk, which included one count of first degree murder for the killing of 
Baumruk's wife.  The St. Louis County circuit court held a second hearing regarding 
Baumruk's competency in 2000.  "The trial court determined that despite the injuries 
caused by gunshot wounds to his head, Baumruk was now competent to understand and 
appreciate the proceedings and assist in his own defense."  State v. Baumruk, 85 S.W.3d 
644, 648 (Mo. banc 2002) (Baumruk II).  Baumruk again filed a motion to change venue, 
but this time it was overruled.   
In 2001, Baumruk was tried in front of a jury, found guilty, and, in accordance 
with the jury's recommendation, sentenced to death.  He appealed the conviction to this 
Court, which reversed the judgment and remanded with directions to the St. Louis 
County circuit court to sustain Baumruk's motion for change of venue.  Baumruk II, 85 
S.W.3d at 651.  
The St. Louis County circuit court transferred the case to St. Charles County.  In 
2005, the St. Charles County circuit court held a third hearing regarding Baumruk's 
competency.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the St. Charles County circuit court 
determined that Baumruk was competent to stand trial.   
 
3
In 2007, Baumruk was retried for the murder of his wife.  The State presented 
numerous witnesses who testified about Baumruk's plan to shoot his wife and the 
execution of that plan.  Baumruk presented evidence that he was not guilty because he 
lacked responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect.  He presented the testimony 
of Dr. Elizabeth Nettles, a psychologist, and Dr. Moisy Shopper, a psychiatrist.  Both 
testified that Baumruk suffered from a delusional disorder.  They opined that this mental 
disease or defect caused Baumruk to have persecutory delusions that the system was 
against him, that he was singled out, and that the system was corrupt.  They also testified 
that Baumruk's anger and violent behavior were products of this disease.  In their 
opinion, Baumruk did not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and was incapable 
of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law.   
At the conclusion of Baumruk's defense, the State presented rebuttal evidence 
through the testimony of two psychiatrists, Dr. Jerome Peters and Dr. John Rabun.  
Dr. Rabun testified that he found no evidence that Baumruk suffered from delusions or 
from a mental disease or defect.  Instead, Dr. Rabun found that Baumruk's acts were 
driven by hatred and anger toward his wife and the courts.  
At the completion of the guilt phase of the trial, the jury found Baumruk guilty of 
first degree murder.  The jury then was presented evidence during the penalty phase, after 
which it found several statutory aggravating factors.  These factors were that the murder 
of Baumruk's wife "involved depravity of mind" and "was outrageously and wantonly 
vile, horrible, and inhuman;" that Baumruk, by his act of murdering his wife, "knowingly 
created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon that would 
 
4
normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person;" and that the murder of his 
wife was committed while Baumruk was engaged in the attempted commission of eight 
other unlawful homicides.  The circuit court entered judgment imposing the death penalty 
on Baumruk.   
This Court affirmed Baumruk's conviction and sentence in Baumruk III. 280 
S.W.3d 600. 
Baumruk timely filed a pro se Rule 29.15 motion, and his appointed counsel filed 
an amended motion that raised numerous claims and incorporated claims from Baumruk's 
pro se motion.  The motion court denied some of the claims without an evidentiary 
hearing and held an evidentiary hearing on the remaining claims.  The court issued a 
judgment overruling all claims put forth by the motion.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court in "reviewing the overruling of a motion for post-conviction relief" 
presumes that the motion court's findings are correct.  Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 175 
(Mo. banc 2009).  For this reason, "[a] motion court's judgment will be overturned only 
when either its findings of facts or its conclusions of law are clearly erroneous."  Id.; Rule 
29.15(k).  Therefore, to overturn the ruling of the motion court on a Rule 29.15 motion, 
this Court must be left "with a definite and firm impression" that the motion court made a 
mistake.  Zink, 278 S.W.3d at 175 (internal quotation omitted). 
A motion court clearly erred in overruling a Rule 29.15 motion's request for an 
evidentiary hearing only if movant can show 1) that his motion alleged facts, not 
conclusions, warranting relief; 2) the facts alleged were "not conclusively refuted by the 
 
5
files and records in the case;" and 3) "the matters complained of . . . resulted in prejudice 
to the movant."  State v. Driver, 912 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo. banc 1995).  
Baumruk alleges that his competency hearing counsel, trial counsel, and appellate 
counsel were ineffective for numerous reasons.  To succeed on an allegation of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, Baumruk must show 1) "that his counsel's 
representation 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;'" and 2) "that this 
deficiency prejudiced him, meaning that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'"  
Edwards v. State, 200 S.W.3d 500, 518 (Mo. banc 2006) (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)).  "A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  Id.  In making this determination, 
Baumruk's counsel's performance is presumed reasonable.  Id.  
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COMPETENCY HEARING COUNSEL 
First Competency Hearing Counsel Ineffective for Seeking Dismissal of Charges 
 
Baumruk argues that the motion court clearly erred in overruling, without an 
evidentiary hearing, his claim that his first competency hearing counsel was ineffective 
for ignoring his wishes to remain under the state mental health department's custody and 
pursuing a writ in Baumruk I that sought to have the charges against him dismissed. 
Baumruk alleges that the dismissal of these charges prejudiced him because it allowed 
the charges to be refiled in St. Louis County, which resulted in his conviction and, 
ultimately, his death sentence.   
 
6
 
The motion court overruled this claim without an evidentiary hearing because it 
found that Baumruk's charges had to "be dismissed under the clear mandate of 
§ 552.020.10, RSMo" 1994, as explained in Baumruk I.  964 S.W.2d at 447.  It also noted 
that this Court determined in Baumruk II that an initial finding that Baumruk was 
incompetent did not bar a subsequent determination that he was competent to stand trial 
nor did it bar the State from refiling charges against him.  85 S.W.3d at 648.  The motion 
court, therefore, determined that, regardless of Baumruk's counsel's actions, the State was 
free to prosecute Baumruk if and when his mental condition improved.  
 
Baumruk's argument fails because he cannot demonstrate prejudice.  In addressing 
post-conviction motions, this Court should presume that a motion court acted according 
to the law.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  As previously determined by this Court in 
Baumruk I, the trial court was required to dismiss the charges against Baumruk once it 
determined that he was incompetent. 964 S.W.2d at 447.  Furthermore, even without 
Baumruk's counsel actively pursuing dismissal of the charges, the court in which those 
charges originally were filed would have been able to proceed on them as soon as it 
determined that Baumruk was competent to stand trial.  Baumruk II, 85 S.W.3d at 648.  
The State also was permitted to reraise the issue of Baumruk's competency at any time 
pursuant to § 552.020.10, RSMo 2000.2  For these reasons, Baumruk was not deprived of 
any substantive or procedural right; therefore, he cannot demonstrate that he was 
prejudiced.  Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993).   
                                                 
2  In 1995, the State would have been permitted to reraise the issue of Baumruk's competency 
pursuant to § 552.020.9, RSMo 1994. 
 
7
Failure to Move to Suppress Baumruk's Statements Made to Social Worker Buck 
 
Baumruk asserts that the motion court clearly erred in overruling his claim that his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the statements made by Baumruk 
to social worker Larry Buck because these statements were obtained in violation of his 
rights under the Fifth Amendment as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966) and the Sixth Amendment as described in State v. Dixon, 916 S.W.2d 834 (Mo. 
App. 1995).  
 
During Baumruk's second competency hearing, Buck testified that he was a social 
worker in the St. Louis County jail who would meet weekly with Baumruk and other 
inmates to assess their mental health.  These meetings began with general inquiries about 
how Baumruk was doing in jail and included discussions of how he ended up in jail.   
During the course of these meetings, Baumruk told Buck that he shot his wife and several 
other people because he was angry that his wife was going to end up with his house.  He 
also told Buck that he bought the handguns for the shooting when things began to not go 
his way in the divorce.  Baumruk's counsel did not object to some of Buck's notes being 
entered into evidence, but did object when Buck began to testify regarding Baumruk's 
motives for shooting his wife on the basis of the therapist/client privilege.   This objection 
was overruled.   The transcript from the second competency hearing was subsequently 
incorporated into the record in Baumruk's third competency hearing.  
During Baumruk's trial, Dr. Shopper, one of Baumruk's experts, discussed an 
incident in which Baumruk accused Buck of extortion for telling Baumruk that if he 
needed new glasses to have his son purchase them for him.  This incident escalated into 
 
8
Baumruk assaulting Buck.  Dr. Shopper opined that this incident supported her 
conclusion that Baumruk suffered from a delusional disorder.   
 During the State's cross-examination of Dr. Shopper, the State inquired as to 
whether Dr. Shopper had reviewed the sworn testimony of Buck in forming her opinion 
and if she recalled that Baumruk told Buck about shooting his wife, two lawyers, and the 
bailiff, to which Dr. Shopper answered "yes" that was in the transcript she had reviewed.  
The State used this evidence to demonstrate that Baumruk was feigning his memory loss 
and delusional disorder.  
On redirect, Dr. Shopper testified that Baumruk had no understanding of the 
consequences of his criminal behavior and, instead, thought that after shooting his wife, 
he was going to be able to return to Seattle.  Dr. Shopper explained that statements like 
the ones Baumruk made to Buck were consistent with a delusional disorder.  
The motion court, in overruling this claim, found that the statements made by 
Baumruk to Buck were not the product of a custodial interrogation.  It further found that 
any reference to Buck's conversations with Baumruk were made after Baumruk raised the 
issue of his mental competency by claiming that he was not guilty because he lacked 
responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect.  The court concluded that any 
objection or motion to suppress the statements would have been overruled.   
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of what constitutes 
a custodial interrogation of a prisoner and when a prisoner is entitled to a Miranda 
warning in Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. ___, No. 10-680, slip op. at 1 (Feb. 21, 2012).   It 
found that "[w]hen a prisoner is questioned, the determination of custody should focus on 
 
9
all of the features of the interrogation" including "the language that is used in summoning 
the prisoner to the interview and the manner in which the interrogation is conducted."  Id. 
at 13.  "Taking into account all of the circumstances of [Howes'] questioning," the United 
States Supreme Court determined that Howes "was not in custody within the meaning of 
Miranda."  Id. at 16.  This determination was based on the undisputed fact that Howes 
was free to end the questioning at any time and request to be returned to his cell.  Id.   
Missouri courts have made the same determination that "[a] defendant's status as a 
prison inmate does not necessarily make an interview by prison officials 'custodial 
interrogation' requiring the protections set out in Miranda."  State v. Brown, 18 S.W.3d 
482, 485 (Mo. App. 2000).   Instead, when a prisoner is questioned, "the language used to 
summon the individual, the physical surroundings of the interrogation, the extent to 
which he is confronted with evidence of his guilt, and the additional pressure exerted to 
detain him must be considered to determine whether a reasonable person would believe 
there had been a restriction of his freedom over and above that in his normal prisoner 
setting."  Id.  Nothing in the record indicates that Buck's interviews took place in a 
coercive atmosphere or that any coercive questioning techniques were used.  Like in 
Howes, the record is clear that Baumruk was in no way forced to meet with Buck and 
could choose not to attend or to leave the meeting at any time.  At the Rule 29.15 
evidentiary hearing, Buck testified that it was completely up to Baumruk whether he 
decided to talk about a subject or answer a question.  The record also shows that 
Baumruk, on at least one occasion, completely ignored his regularly scheduled meeting 
 
10
with Buck.  The motion court did not clearly err in determining that these statements 
were not obtained in violation of Miranda.  
Baumruk also asserts a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  In 
Dixon, the court of appeals held that, prior to an interview, a social worker was 
"obligated to heed the same procedural safeguards as those imposed on the prosecutor 
and the police."  916 S.W.2d at 837.  It found that a social worker failed to heed these 
procedural safeguards by directly questioning Dixon regarding the allegations against 
him without notifying his attorney; therefore, the social worker acted in violation of 
Dixon's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Id.  "Once an accused invokes his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, the state cannot subsequently initiate an interrogation of the 
accused unless his or her attorney is present or has been notified."  Id. 
The current case is distinguishable from Dixon in at least two ways.  In Dixon, the 
statements made by Dixon were used during trial as evidence that Dixon committed the 
crime for which he was charged.  Id. at 835.  In the current case, Buck only testified 
during the second competency hearing, the transcript of which was incorporated into the 
third competency hearing.  His statements were not introduced by the State during its 
case in chief.  While Baumruk argues that the expert testimony at trial brought in some of 
the statements he made, these statements were not introduced with regard to whether 
Baumruk shot his wife.  It was undisputed that Baumruk shot his wife.  Instead, the 
transcript of Buck's testimony was injected by Baumruk through the testimony of defense 
expert, Dr. Shopper, when she discussed the incident in which Baumruk accused Buck of 
extortion and Baumruk's subsequent assault of Buck.   
 
11
Baumruk's case is also distinguishable from Dixon in that the record in Baumruk's 
case refutes any claim that his counsel had not been notified of the meetings between 
Baumruk and Buck.  To the contrary, the record reflects that Baumruk's counsel was well 
aware of Buck's interviews with Baumruk and hoped that Buck would testify on 
Baumruk's behalf in the penalty phase.3  Therefore, this Court finds that the motion court 
did not clearly err by overruling Baumruk's claim that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to assert a Sixth Amendment violation of his right to counsel.  
Failure to Move to Suppress Baumruk's Statements to Officer Glenn 
 
Baumruk alleges that the motion court clearly erred by overruling his claim that 
his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress Baumruk's statements to 
Officer Stewart Glenn.  These statements were made to Glenn during the course of an 
investigation that was initiated after Baumruk filed a complaint that someone was 
stealing his newspapers.  Glenn testified during Baumruk's second competency hearing 
that he did not go to the jail with the intent of obtaining any information other than that 
related to the newspaper complaint; however, during the course of this conversation, 
Baumruk volunteered that he had been shot nine times.  Glenn responded by asking what 
happened.  Baumruk told Glenn that he shot his wife in the courtroom, but did not 
remember doing so.  Baumruk later told Glenn that he shot her "when she crunched her 
lips."  This testimony was used by Dr. Rabun, the State's expert, to support his conclusion 
that Baumruk had some memory of the shootings and was competent to stand trial.  
                                                 
3 This hope was not realized after Baumruk assaulted Buck.  
 
12
 
Baumruk claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
suppress the statements he made to Glenn.  He claims that the admission of such 
statements violated his Miranda rights because they were made during a custodial 
interrogation.  Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.  He argues reasonable counsel would have moved 
to suppress these statements and prohibit Dr. Rabun from analyzing them in his expert 
testimony.  He asserts not doing so was not a reasonable strategic decision by counsel 
even though counsel wished to rely on Baumruk's missing newspaper preoccupation as 
evidence of his delusional disorder.  
 
After an evidentiary hearing, the motion court overruled this claim because it 
found that Baumruk did not suffer any prejudice from his counsel's failure to file a 
motion to suppress Glenn's testimony.  It based this determination on the fact that 
Baumruk previously had filed a motion to suppress the same testimony.4  Counsel is not 
ineffective for failing to file a meritless motion.  State v. Hunter, 840 S.W.2d 850, 870 
(Mo. banc 1992).  
Current CT and PET Scans 
Baumruk argues that the motion court clearly erred in overruling, without an 
evidentiary hearing, his claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain more 
recent computed tomography (CT) and positron emission tomography (PET) scans 
because such scans would have shown that Baumruk was incompetent to proceed.  He 
                                                 
4 During the first trial, the circuit court determined that Baumruk's Miranda rights were not 
violated by his interview with Glenn.  In 2006, Baumruk filed a second pro se motion to 
suppress the statements he made to Glenn.  In 2007, the State agreed not to present Glenn's 
testimony but still presented Dr. Rabun's analysis of the statements made by Baumruk to Glenn.   
 
 
13
argues that more recent CT and PET scans would show that the areas of his brain 
damaged were responsible for executive decision making and controlling impulsivity.  He 
argues that without these areas functioning properly, he was incompetent to proceed.  
In overruling Baumruk's request for an evidentiary hearing on this matter, the 
motion court found that the record contained ample evidence of the brain injuries he 
suffered.  It also found that Baumruk's claim that the scans would explain the actual 
effect of his brain injuries was refuted by the record.  In conclusion, it found that "[t]he 
scans would not have any probative value in any phase of this case, would be speculative, 
and would be cumulative to evidence already presented."  
The motion court did not clearly err in determining that this claim was refuted by 
the record.  The record shows that the scans would not demonstrate that Baumruk was 
incompetent.  Dr. Bruce Harry, a psychiatrist, testified that to understand the effects of 
Baumruk's brain injury would require an actual examination of him, the continued 
collection of information about him, and the linking together of this information and the 
examination, not merely new CT and PET scans of his brain. 
Baumruk also does not allege sufficient facts in his motion to show that 
performing new CT and PET scans on him would have led the circuit court to find him 
incompetent to proceed.  The circuit court in the competency hearing heard evidence 
from multiple experts regarding Baumruk's competency including testimony regarding 
the effects of Baumruk's brain injuries.  The record shows that CT or PET scans would be 
cumulative evidence and, therefore, not a sufficient basis for a finding of ineffective 
counsel.  Forrest v. State, 290 S.W.3d 704, 709 (Mo. banc 2009).   
 
14
Baumruk also claims that the motion court clearly erred by overruling his motion 
requesting that the court order new CT and PET scans because such scans would have 
supported the allegations underlying Baumruk's Rule 29.15 motion.  Because Baumruk's 
motion does not contain sufficient allegations to establish the need for these scans and the 
allegations it does make regarding the scans are refuted by the record, the motion court 
did not clearly err in overruling this motion. 
Failing to Call Dr. Fisher and Dr. Perkowski at Competency Hearing 
 
Baumruk claims that the motion court clearly erred in overruling his claim that his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to call Dr. Linda Fisher and Dr. Les Perkowski as 
witnesses during his third competency hearing.  Dr. Fisher was the chief physician for the 
St. Louis police department, who specialized in internal medicine.  After examining 
Baumruk in 1993, she believed that Baumruk's memory deficits were permanent and that 
he had no real memories of the shooting.  Dr. Perkowski was the staff psychiatrist at 
Fulton State Hospital in 1994; he diagnosed Baumruk with dementia caused by head 
trauma.  Baumruk claims that his counsel's choice not to call these witnesses was not a 
reasonable trial strategy because, as disinterested witnesses,5 their testimony would have 
been more credible than the expert witnesses that his counsel chose to have testify.  
 
The motion court found that the testimony of Dr. Fisher and Dr. Perkowski would 
not have provided Baumruk with a viable defense.  It also found that their testimony 
would have been cumulative, not probative of Baumruk's incompetence, and would have 
                                                 
5 Baumruk's assertion that of these witnesses would be disinterested is questionable but irrelevant 
to the resolution of his argument.  
 
15
impeached the testimony of Baumruk's other experts regarding his condition.  The motion 
court also recognized that Baumruk's condition had changes since 1994, which made both 
doctors' testimony less probative.  "The choice of witnesses is ordinarily a matter of trial 
strategy and will not support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim."  Strong v. State, 
263 S.W.3d 636, 652 (Mo. banc 2008) (Strong II).  During the evidentiary hearing on 
Baumruk's motion, his counsel testified that they chose not to call Dr. Fisher because her 
specialty was in internal medicine, not psychiatry, psychology, or neurology like the 
other experts they chose to call.  As for Dr. Perkowski, Baumruk's counsel chose not to 
call him because his testimony was contrary to the other experts whom they intended to 
call in that Dr. Perkowski had diagnosed Baumruk with dementia in 1994 while more 
recent examinations of Baumruk by other experts had determined that he did not have 
dementia but, instead, had a delusion disorder.  Strategic decisions, such as the ones made 
by Baumruk's counsel here, made after thorough investigation are virtually 
unchallengeable.  Id.  The motion court did not clearly err in determining that Baumruk's 
counsel's strategic decisions not to call Dr. Fisher and Dr. Perkowski were reasonable.      
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL DURING GUILT PHASE 
Failure to Object to Dr. Kane's Testimony 
Baumruk alleges that the motion court clearly erred by overruling his claim that 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Dr. Alex Kane's testimony of a 
statement Baumruk made to him.  He argues that his counsel had no strategic reason for 
failing to object to this statement as being privileged under § 491.060.5.   
 
16
The State called Dr. Kane during the guilt phase of Baumruk's trial to testify about 
the statement made by Baumruk in the emergency room after he was admitted for 
treatment of the nine gunshot wounds he received during his apprehension.  Dr. Kane 
testified that, as part of his assessment of Baumruk, he attempted to determine if 
Baumruk could talk by asking him an open-ended question.  While Dr. Kane could not 
remember the exact question, he testified that it was something to the nature of "what 
happened?"  Baumruk responded with the statement that he "wanted to shoot that bitch" 
due to "divorce."  Dr. Kane testified that he remembered these quoted remarks because "it 
was very memorable and remarkable to me that despite being under the obvious stresses 
of multiple wounds this man was expressing great vehemence and coldness about having 
reached a conclusion to something."  Baumruk's counsel did not object to this testimony.   
Dr. Kane also testified as to his treatment of Baumruk.  
After an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the motion court overruled this claim 
because it found that Baumruk's statement was not confidential information necessary for 
treatment.  It also found that Baumruk had waived his right to assert the privilege by 
putting his mental health at issue by claiming he was not guilty by reason of mental 
disease or defect.  The court concluded that counsel had a strategic reason for allowing 
the admission of the statement and that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to 
Dr. Kane's testimony on the ground of privilege.   
Section 491.060.5, RSMo 2000, prohibits a physician from testifying to any 
information obtained from a patient that was necessary to enable the physician to 
prescribe and provide treatment for the patient.   It states that a physician is incompetent 
 
17
to testify "concerning any information which he or she may have acquired from any 
patient while attending the patient in a professional character, and which information was 
necessary to enable him or her to prescribe and provide treatment for such patient as a 
physician . . . ."  
In order for Baumruk to demonstrate that the motion court clearly erred by not 
finding his counsel ineffective for failing to object, he must be able to show that if the 
objection was made, it would have been meritorious.  Zink, 278 S.W.3d at 188.  Baumruk 
cannot show that an objection based on physician-patient privilege would have been 
successful because he waived any such claim of privilege by placing his mental condition 
at issue by arguing at trial that he was not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.  
State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 57 (Mo. banc 1982).  Therefore, the motion court did not 
clearly err in overruling this claim.   
Failure to Move to Suppress Baumruk's Statements to Officer Salamon 
Baumruk alleges that the motion court clearly erred in overruling his claim that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress statements made by Baumruk to 
Officer Steven Salamon, one of the police officers who arrested Baumruk.  During the 
guilt phase of Baumruk's trial, Salamon testified that while he was handcuffing Baumruk, 
Baumruk asked him, "Officer, did I get her, did I kill her?" Salamon responded to 
Baumruk's question that he did not know.  Baumruk then stated, "God, I hope so."  
Baumruk claims that Salamon obtained this statement by interrogating him prior to 
reading him his Miranda rights. 
 
18
After an evidentiary hearing, the motion court overruled this claim because it 
found that the record made it clear that Baumruk's statement was unsolicited and not the 
product of a custodial interrogation.  It concluded that a motion would have been 
overruled if filed.  
To trigger the requirements of the Miranda warnings, a suspect must not only be 
in custody, but the "questioning must be initiated by law enforcement officers."  State v. 
Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496, 510 (Mo. banc 2004).  Voluntary statements are not the product 
of interrogation and, therefore, are not barred by the Fifth Amendment or Miranda.  
Gregg v. State, 446 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Mo. 1969).  
Baumruk argues that his statements to Salamon were not voluntary.  He claims 
that Salamon asked him about the shootings with the hopes of getting a dying declaration 
from him.  He attempts to support this assertion with the testimony of Officer Robert 
Perry, who stated in his police report written on the day of the shooting that this is what 
Salamon hoped to do.  During the Rule 29.15 evidentiary hearing, Perry stated that he 
could not recall whether he even took a statement from Salamon.  Instead, he could only 
confirm that his report indicated that he had.  Salamon denied making the statement in 
Perry's report.   
The motion court was presented with both the testimony of Salamon and Perry.  
Compared with this Court, the lower court had "a superior opportunity to judge the 
credibility" of both Salamon and Perry.  Clayton v. State, 63 S.W.3d 201, 209 (Mo. banc 
2001).  This Court, therefore, will defer to the motion court's determination that 
 
19
Baumruk's statement to Salamon was voluntary.  Id.  Accordingly, Baumruk's counsel 
cannot be ineffective for failing to file a meritless motion.   Hunter, 840 S.W.2d at 870.      
Failure to Impeach Dr. Rabun 
 
Baumruk claims that the motion court clearly erred in overruling his claim that his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Dr. Rabun with the fact that when he first 
gave his opinion on Baumruk's mental state, Dr. Rabun's divorce was pending before 
Judge Hais.   He claims that if his counsel would have cross-examined Dr. Rabun on this, 
it would have shown Dr. Rabun's bias towards holding unfavorable opinions regarding 
Baumruk.  
Dr. Rabun was called by the State as a rebuttal witness to Baumruk's not guilty by 
reason of mental disease or defect defense.  Dr. Rabun had examined Baumruk three 
times prior to being called.  He examined Baumruk in 1994 and concluded that Baumruk 
"was not suffering from any psychiatric diagnosis."  In 1999, he examined him again and 
diagnosed him with "an amnestic disorder due to his head trauma."  In 2000, Dr. Rabun 
was ordered to evaluate Baumruk's mental responsibility at the time of the offense.  After 
an investigation, which included the review of numerous documents and interviews, 
Dr. Rabun vacated his amnestic disorder diagnosis and again found that Baumruk was not 
suffering from any mental disorder.  Dr. Rabun concluded that Baumruk's shooting of his 
wife in the courtroom demonstrated planning for the most opportune time to carry out his 
acts against her and the others involved in the divorce case.     
 
After an evidentiary hearing, the motion court overruled Baumruk's claim because 
it found that, even though Dr. Rabun's dissolution was in front of Judge Hais, the 
 
20
dissolution was uncontested and, therefore, would have no impeachment value.  It also 
concluded that there was not "even a slight possibility of a different result" had counsel 
cross-examined Dr. Rabun about his uncontested dissolution that occurred 11 years prior 
to Baumruk's most recent trial.   
 
The failure to impeach a witness does not "constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel unless such action would have provided a viable defense or changed the outcome 
of trial."  State v. Ferguson, 20 S.W.3d 485, 506 (Mo. banc 2000).  Baumruk does not 
allege that the impeachment would have provided a viable defense.  That being so, this 
Court must only determine if the motion court clearly erred in determining that 
impeachment of Dr. Rabun regarding his uncontested dissolution would have changed the 
outcome of the trial.  This Court does not believe that the motion court clearly erred in 
determining that it would not. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL  
DURING PENALTY PHASE 
Failure of Counsel to Seek Disqualification of Prosecutor 
 
Baumruk alleges that the motion court clearly erred in overruling, without an 
evidentiary hearing, his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to 
disqualify the St. Louis County prosecutor's office (STLCPO).  He claims that he was 
prejudiced by this failure because Hartwick, one of the nine persons at whom Baumruk 
shot, was an investigator for STLCPO and Hartwick's wife was a STLCPO attorney.  He 
claims that this prevented the STLCPO from acting objectively and without personal bias 
in pursuing the death penalty against Baumruk.  
 
21
 
The motion court overruled this claim without an evidentiary hearing because, 
relying on the evidence presented to it during the hearing on Baumruk's motion to 
disqualify the STLCPO from the Rule 29.15 proceedings, it determined that Baumruk's 
trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a similar motion prior to his trial 
because he could not demonstrate conflict or prejudice.  The evidence presented showed 
that Hartwick left the STLCPO prior to Baumruk's first trial and that neither Hartwick 
nor his former wife had any meaningful participation in the investigation or prosecution 
of Baumruk.  While Hartwick did obtain copies of recordings from the courthouse 
security cameras from the day of the shooting, this was nothing more than a clerical act.  
The motion court concluded that any objection or claim of conflict on the part of the 
STLCPO would have been overruled; therefore, counsel cannot be effective for failing to 
make a meritless motion or objection.  
 
"Failure to seek unwarranted relief does not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel."  State v. Redman, 916 S.W.2d 787, 793 (Mo. banc 1996).   The record refutes 
Baumruk's claim that the disqualification of the prosecutor was warranted; therefore, 
Baumruk has failed to meet his burden of affirmatively proving prejudice.  Adkins v. 
State, 169 S.W.3d 916, 920-21 (Mo. App. 2005) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).  
Even if Baumruk is correct that the STLCPO should be disqualified, "prejudice likely 
does not lie."  Id. at 921.  Speculation that a different prosecutor may not have requested 
the death penalty does not meet the requirement of demonstrating "that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different."  Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  
 
22
Failure to Move to Suppress Baumruk's Statements to Officer Venable 
Baumruk argues that the motion court clearly erred by overruling his Rule 29.15 
claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the statements that 
Baumruk made to Corrections Officer Robert Venable after Baumruk struck Trina Bland, 
a medical assistant.   
Baumruk claims that Venable questioned him regarding an incident in which he 
assaulted Bland without first giving him a Miranda warning.  Venable testified during the 
penalty phase of Baumruk's trial that he had been called to the clinic in the immediate 
aftermath of Baumruk's assault on Bland.  Venable questioned Baumruk regarding the 
incident, asking him why he had assaulted Bland.  Baumruk responded that she had lied 
to him about changing the dressings of a wound on a daily basis.  Venable inquired 
further, "So, that's why you assaulted a woman?"  To which Baumruk responded, "Yes, 
that's right.  I killed once and I would do it again."   
After an evidentiary hearing, the motion court overruled this claim because it 
found that Venable's question was not an interrogation and the trial court's admission of 
the statement did not violate Miranda.  It also determined that trial counsel had a strategic 
reason for allowing this testimony.   
Baumruk's trial counsel made the strategic decision to defend their client on the 
basis that he was not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.  As part of this defense, 
trial counsel sought to present evidence of Baumruk's diagnosis of a delusional disorder.  
This evidence included Dr. Shopper's testimony regarding Baumruk's delusional thinking.  
One example that Dr. Shopper presented was that Baumruk had attempted to discharge 
 
23
his counsel because they declined to call the doctor responsible for overseeing Baumruk's 
care to testify that Bland was not following that doctor's directions regarding changing 
the dressing of his wound.   
The strategic decision to defend Baumruk on the basis that he had a mental disease 
or defect was "made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible 
options" by Baumruk's counsel and is, therefore, virtually unchallengeable.  Strong II, 
263 S.W.3d at 652 (internal quotations omitted).  His counsel testified during the post-
conviction relief hearing that they considered a motion to suppress Baumruk's statement 
to Venable but decided against it because Venable's testimony was going to be mentioned 
by Baumruk's experts anyway.  Because trial strategy is not a ground for ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the motion court did not clearly err in overruling this claim.  Id.  
Cross-Examination of Officer Venable 
Baumruk claims that the motion court clearly erred in overruling, without an 
evidentiary hearing, his claim that his counsel was ineffective for cross-examining 
Venable during the penalty phase as to whether Baumruk's jail file showed violent 
behavior prior to his assault of Bland.  Baumruk claims that this question allowed 
Venable to testify about an incident where Baumruk stabbed a social worker6 with a 
pencil. 
After Venable testified regarding Baumruk's assault on Bland, Baumruk's counsel 
attempted to impeach this evidence by asking Venable if there was anything in 
                                                 
6   This incident was when Baumruk stabbed Buck.   
 
24
Baumruk's file indicating that he had previously been violent within the jail.  Venable 
answered:  
I don't think there was anything current.  In the past he had been violent in 
the facility.  I'm aware of at least one incident where he stabbed a social 
worker with a pencil, a lead pencil.  At the time that this incident occurred 
it was not in his file.    
 
Though a portion of this answer was non-responsive to the question asked, no objection 
was made. 
 
The motion court overruled the request for an evidentiary hearing on this claim 
because it found that it was refuted by the trial transcript.  The court noted that counsel's 
question only inquired as to whether Baumruk's file reflected any violent behavior prior 
to the assault on Bland, not whether Venable had any recollection of any other violent 
behavior.  Further, it noted that an objection by counsel to the answer as non-responsive 
would have risked highlighting the answer to the jury.   
 
"Defense counsel cannot be ineffective for attempting to impeach the state's 
witness and receiving a nonresponsive statement."  State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d 447, 469-
70 (Mo. banc 1993).  As the motion court recognized, it was reasonable strategy for 
Baumruk's counsel to not object to this response in order to avoid highlighting this 
incident to the jury.  See State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753, 768 (Mo. banc 1996).  
Failure to Call Worchester 
Baumruk alleges that the motion court clearly erred by overruling, without an 
evidentiary hearing, his claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present 
evidence that Baumruk told Austin Worchester, an emergency medical technician, that he 
 
25
was sorry.  Baumruk made this statement as he was drifting in and out of consciousness 
in the ambulance on the way to the hospital after he sustained his nine gunshot wounds.  
Baumruk argues that his counsel should have presented this evidence during the penalty 
phase of trial to rebut the State's evidence that cast Baumruk as an unremorseful "jerk." 
The motion court overruled this claim without a hearing because it found that 
Worchester could not offer any testimony that would withstand a hearsay objection.  
Baumruk is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this ground because, even if 
the facts he alleges in the motion regarding Worchester's testimony were true and were 
not inadmissible hearsay as determined by the motion court, he still cannot demonstrate 
that the failure of his counsel to present this evidence caused him prejudice.  Even if this 
Court were to presume that the vague statement that Baumruk made to Worchester meant 
that he was sorry for killing his wife, the overwhelming evidence still shows that he was 
unremorseful.  Dr. Kane, Dr. Rabun, Salamon, Dr. Shopper,  and Venable all testified that 
Baumruk was not remorseful about killing his wife.  Worchester's testimony would have 
contradicted the testimony of Dr. Shopper, who was Baumruk's own witness.  The 
aggravating factors as found by the jury are such that no reasonable probability exists that 
the outcome of the penalty phase would have been different.  Zink, 278 S.W.3d at 176.   
Failure to Present Expert Testimony Utilizing Available CT Scans 
Baumruk claims the motion court clearly erred in overruling his claim that his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert to testify as to the precise areas of 
Baumruk's brain damage and how these injuries affected Baumruk's executive decision 
making and ability to control impulsivity by analyzing Baumruk's pre- and post-surgery 
 
26
1992 CT scans.  Baumruk claims that this evidence could have explained his post-
shooting negative behaviors and been utilized as a mitigating factor. 
After evidentiary hearing, the motion court overruled this claim after finding that a 
number of medical experts testified during trial about the brain injuries that Baumruk 
suffered in his shoot-out with the police and that "[t]he introduction of the CT scans 
would not have altered the outcome of the penalty phase."  The court found that counsel 
had discussed presenting the evidence but decided that it would not mitigate punishment 
because Baumruk was shot in the head only after firing on a uniformed officer.   
The motion court did not clearly err in making these findings.  As previously 
described, Dr. Harry testified that the CT and PET scans were insufficient to help the jury 
understand how Baumruk would be affected by his brain injuries.  The record also 
supports the motion court's finding that it was a strategic decision by Baumruk's counsel 
not to present this evidence because it would open the door to more evidence of the 
shoot-out with police that caused the injuries.  Baumruk's counsel testified that they 
thought the mitigating value of such evidence would be limited and that the evidence 
might, instead, be aggravating.  The motion court also noted that this evidence had been 
presented in Baumruk's first trial to no avail and, therefore, it was a reasonable strategic 
decision for Baumruk's counsel to present different mitigating evidence during 
Baumruk's second trial.  
Baumruk's argument relies on Hutchison v. State for the proposition that "evidence 
of impaired intellectual functions is inherently mitigating. . . ."  150 S.W.3d 292, 308 
(Mo. banc 2004).  However, Hutchison is distinguishable in that Hutchison had had 
 
27
mental problems his entire life, including bipolar disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder, and alcoholism.  Id. at 302.  Such circumstances were mitigating because they 
showed that Hutchison was a "follower" and less culpable than the other participants in 
the killing in question.  Id. at 303.  In the current case, the CT scans that Baumruk claims 
his counsel should have presented would only demonstrate his mental problems after the 
shooting.   Also, unlike Hutchison, Baumruk planned and executed the murder of his wife 
on his own.   
Failure to Present Evidence of the Impact of "Life Stressors" 
Baumruk claims that the motion court clearly erred in overruling, without an 
evidentiary hearing, his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to present expert 
testimony during the penalty phase regarding the numerous life stressors Baumruk was 
facing at the time of the shooting including the dissolution action itself, the death of his 
mother, and the relocation to a new job in Seattle.  Baumruk claims that an expert could 
have testified that these stressors left him with an overwhelming sense of rejection and 
betrayal, which would have served as mitigating evidence. 
In overruling Baumruk's request for an evidentiary hearing, the motion court noted 
that both Dr. Nettles and Dr. Shopper testified in the guilt phase to their opinions 
regarding how the divorce proceeding and the other stressors in Baumruk's life related to 
his mental state at the time of the killing of his wife.  The court also noted that Baumruk's 
counsel cross-examined both Dr. Peters and Dr. Rabun about Baumruk's anger and other 
emotions resulting from the dissolution.  The motion court found that to permit another 
 
28
expert during the penalty phase to reiterate evidence already heard by the jury would 
have been unnecessary.   
The motion court did not clearly err in making this ruling because Baumruk failed 
to plead facts showing that he was entitled to relief.   The failure to produce cumulative 
evidence is not a sufficient basis for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Forrest, 290 S.W.3d at 709.  In order to demonstrate that Baumruk was not guilty by 
reason of mental disease or defect, his counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Shopper 
and Dr. Nettles that Baumruk suffered from delusional disorder that created beliefs that 
the system was rigged against him, that he would therefore lose his house in the divorce, 
and that he was justified in taking action to prevent that from happening.  The fact that 
counsel did not call another witness during the penalty phase to provide more testimony 
about these life stressors was a trade-off trial counsel was in the best position to assess.  
See Strong II, 263 S.W.3d at 652 ("The choice of witnesses is ordinarily a matter of trial 
strategy and will not support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.")  
Failure to Call Treating Nurses Gast and Johns 
 
Baumruk claims that the motion court clearly erred in overruling his claim that his 
counsel was not ineffective for failing to call two Barnes Hospital treating nurses, 
Catherine Gast and Cathy Johns.  He claims that these nurses would have testified that 
patients with head injuries such as Baumruk can be belligerent as a result of their injuries.  
Baumruk claims that this testimony would have neutralized the State's aggravating 
evidence about Baumruk's belligerent behavior toward Regional Hospital nurse Lisa 
Williams.  
 
29
 
The motion court overruled this claim because it found that Baumruk's counsel 
had investigated the use of both Gast and Johns as witnesses but had made the reasonable 
strategic decision that they would not provide useful testimony. 
 
During the guilt phase, Dr. Rabun testified that Baumruk grabbed Williams' arm 
because he felt she was not doing her job properly.  Baumruk then told her that she 
deserved the same thing as his wife.  Williams, however, was not called to testify.  
Baumruk's counsel testified that, while they had interviewed both Gast and Johns and 
investigated whether to call them as witnesses, they decided not to when they learned the 
State was not going to call Williams.  
 
"The choice of witnesses is ordinarily a matter of trial strategy and will not 
support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim."  Id.  Strategic decisions such as the 
one made by Baumruk's counsel here after thorough investigation are virtually 
unchallengeable.  Id.  Baumruk's counsel had unfettered discretion in making the 
determination of what witnesses to call.  Id. at 653.  Therefore, the motion court did not 
clearly err in determining that Baumruk's counsel's strategic decision not to call Gast and 
Johns was reasonable; therefore, his counsel was not ineffective.  
Repeated Slide Show During Closing Argument of Penalty Phase 
 
Baumruk alleges that the motion court clearly erred by overruling his claim that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a complete record of their objection to 
the repeated slide show shown to the jury during the State's closing argument.  
 
The repeated slide show, which Baumruk claims was prejudicial to him, consisted 
of 11 photographs.  Each of the 11 photographs was admitted into evidence prior to the 
 
30
showing of the slide show.  Four of the photographs were of Baumruk's wife, by herself 
or with one of her two daughters.  Juxtaposed with these photographs were three pictures 
of Baumruk's wife slumped over in a courtroom chair with blood on her face and neck.  
There were three photographs of Baumruk's wife's grandchildren. Baumruk's counsel 
objected to these photographs prior to their admission on the grounds that they were 
improper victim impact evidence because the grandchildren in them were born after 
Baumruk's wife's death.  The trial court overruled this objection.  The final photograph 
was of Baumruk himself. 
 
During the State's closing argument, Baumruk's counsel objected to the slide show 
stating that he was sorry but: 
At this point, your Honor, I'm going to object. I want the record to reflect 
that while [the prosecuting attorney] is going through his closing argument 
there is a nice little slide show that's going on behind him that's showing 
various pictures of the victim's family, showing [Baumruk's wife], various 
State's exhibits that have been admitted into evidence, pictures of the 
courtroom.  And I anticipate that they will keep on flashing up as he goes 
through closing argument.  I would object to that, and I would at the very 
least want the record to reflect that this was going on.  
 
The court stated that the record would so reflect and asked the State if it had a response.  
The State responded:  "I didn't know if there was a legal objection, Your Honor.  All I 
can say is these, every one of these exhibits is in evidence and has been available for the 
jury and they've all viewed them."  The court overruled the objection and let the State 
proceed with its argument.  Baumruk's counsel also included a claim in his motion for 
new trial that the trial court erred in overruling this objection. 
 
31
Baumruk claimed in his Rule 29.15 motion that reasonable counsel, who objected 
like his counsel did to the slide show, would have made the slide show part of the record.  
In overruling the claim, the motion court concluded that raising the issue on appeal would 
not have entitled Baumruk to relief.  The motion court noted in its findings of facts that  
[it had] reviewed the photographs as they played during the closing portion 
of the State's case and finds no errors. [It also noted that it] reviewed the 
transcript of the State's closing argument and [found] the photographs 
corresponded with the victim impact portions of the presentation.  While 
choreographing of words and photographs may not have been to 
[Baumruk's] satisfaction, from a review of the entire record, it is clear that 
the statements and photographs were supported by the evidence adduced at 
trial, were relevant and probative to the issues presented and did not 
prejudice [Baumruk].  Any further objection or preservation of the issue for 
appeal would not have resulted in [Baumruk] receiving relief.  
 
As the motion court correctly found, Baumruk's counsel could not be ineffective for 
failing to preserve a non-meritorious argument.  Hunter, 840 S.W.2d at 870.    
Baumruk also claims the motion court clearly erred in overruling his claim that his 
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the slide show on direct 
appeal.  While "[a] defendant is entitled to effective assistance of appellate counsel," 
appellate counsel has "no duty to raise every possible issue asserted in the motion for new 
trial on appeal, and no duty to present non-frivolous issues where appellate counsel 
strategically decides to winnow out arguments in favor of other arguments."  Storey v. 
State, 175 S.W.3d 116, 148 (Mo. banc 2005).  In the current case, Baumruk's appellate 
counsel testified that she decided not to present this issue on appeal because she could not 
effectively argue that the trial court erred in allowing the slide show to be presented by 
the State.   Because, "[t]he trial court has discretion during the punishment phase of trial 
 
32
to admit whatever evidence it deems helpful to the jury in assessing punishment,"  State 
v. Strong, 142 S.W.3d 702, 720 (Mo. banc 2004) (Strong I), it is likely that Baumruk's 
counsel was correct in her assessment that such an argument would have been 
unsuccessful.  In Strong I, this Court held that a similar slide show, consisting of 
photographs, nearly all of which were previously admitted, was not more prejudicial than 
probative and, therefore, "[t]he trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the 
state to display a slide show to the jurors during the penalty phase."  Id. at 721.  In cases 
such as the current one, "[g]ruesome crimes produce gruesome, yet probative, 
photographs, and a defendant may not escape the brutality of his own actions."  Id. 
(internal quotations omitted).   
Baumruk's final claim regarding the slide show is that that the motion court clearly 
erred in overruling his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel without 
making findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues.  However, the motion 
court's finding of fact on this claim is sufficient to permit appellate review and, therefore, 
does not violate Rule 29.15(j).  Rule 29.15(j) requires a motion court to enter "findings of 
fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented" pursuant to Rule 29.15(j).  The rule, 
however, does not require the motion court "to individually address every claim brought 
by the movant."  Edwards, 200 S.W.3d at 513 (internal quotations omitted).  Instead, 
"[g]eneralized findings are sufficient so long as they permit the appellate court an 
adequate record for appellate review of movant's claims."  Id.   In this case, the motion 
court found that the trial court did not err by allowing the slide show to be played and 
also that any further objection or preservation of the issue for appeal would not have 
 
33
 
34
resulted in Baumruk obtaining relief.   This is sufficient to preserve the error of whether 
appellate counsel was ineffective.     
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
 
Teitelman, C.J., Russell, Breckenridge,  
Stith and Price, JJ., and Mesle, Sp.J., concur.   
Draper, J., not participating.