Title: Commonwealth v. Roman
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11311
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 2014

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SJC-11311 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MIGUEL ROMAN. 
 
 
 
Hampshire.     September 5, 2014. - November 4, 2014. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Agreement between prosecutor and 
witness, Capital case, Conduct of prosecutor, Disclosure of 
evidence, Discovery, Examination of jurors, Instructions to 
jury, Interrogation of jurors, Jury and jurors, Mistrial, 
Required finding, Speedy trial, Voir dire, Witness. 
Constitutional Law, Jury.  Evidence, Bias of government 
witness, Credibility of witness, Immunized witness.  
Witness, Bias, Credibility, Immunity.  Jury and Jurors. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 18, 2010. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Richard J. Carey, J.; a 
renewed motion to dismiss was considered by Cornelius J. 
Moriarity, II, J.; and the cases were tried before Constance M. 
Sweeney, J. 
 
 
 
Donald A. Harwood for the defendant. 
 
Jane Davidson Montori, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  The defendant was convicted of deliberately 
premeditated murder and possession of a class B substance.  On 
2 
 
appeal he asserts error in (1) the denial of his motion for a 
required finding of not guilty; (2) the denial of his motion to 
dismiss based on Mass. R. Crim. P. 36, as amended, 422 Mass. 
1503 (1996) (rule 36); (3) the denial of his motion to dismiss 
for delayed disclosure; (4) the judge's failure to declare, sua 
sponte, a mistrial based on alleged jury tampering; and (5) the 
judge's instruction pursuant to Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 
Mass. 257 (1989).  The defendant also seeks relief under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  We affirm the convictions and decline to 
exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the 
conviction of murder to a lesser degree of guilt or order a new 
trial. 
 
1.  Background.  The jury could have found the following 
facts.  Shortly before midnight on January 28, 2010, Angel 
Gonzalez (Angel) called the defendant on his cellular telephone 
to arrange a purchase of cocaine.  Angel and Luis Soto then 
drove to a night club in Holyoke where the defendant sold them 
cocaine.  They traveled in a grey four-door 2006 Nissan Altima 
owned by Soto's girl friend.  They then drove to a bar in 
Holyoke, ingesting the cocaine en route. 
 
At about 12:56 A.M. on January 29, Angel's mother called 
Angel on his cellular telephone and told him that the victim was 
at the Holyoke Medical Center and needed a ride.  Soto, Angel, 
and Angel's brother Felipe left the bar in the Altima.  They 
3 
 
drove to the hospital and went inside to get the victim.  The 
four men then returned to the bar.  After about one hour they 
all left together.  Angel called the defendant on his cellular 
telephone to arrange another purchase of cocaine.  Angel's 
cellular telephone records showed three calls that connected 
with the defendant's cellular telephone between 1:30 A.M. and 
1:52 A.M.  They drove to the night club to meet the defendant.  
Angel and the victim got out of the car and went inside the 
club.  When they returned, the defendant was with them and the 
three men entered the Altima. 
 
Soto was driving; Angel was in the front passenger seat; 
the defendant sat behind Soto; Felipe was behind Angel; and the 
victim sat between the defendant and Felipe.  The defendant told 
Soto to drive.  They proceeded down High Street.  The defendant 
directed Soto to turn right onto Essex Street.  The defendant 
pulled out a handgun and shot the victim twice in the left rear 
side of his head.  Soto stopped the car and shifted into the 
"park" position.  Felipe got out of the car and ran toward High 
Street.  Angel got out of the car and stood nearby for a short 
time before running toward High Street.  Soto was the third to 
get out of the car.  He hesitated because he was concerned about 
abandoning his girl friend's car, but then he left and ran 
toward High Street. 
4 
 
 
The defendant was the last person to get out of the Altima.  
He walked around the rear of the car, opened the rear 
passenger's side door and fired a third shot into the victim's 
right temple.  He then got into the driver's seat of the Altima 
and sped off.  The defendant turned onto Newton Street where he 
stopped and dumped the victim's body in the road.  In the 
meantime, Felipe, Angel, and Soto made their way to Sam's Food, 
a nearby store on High Street.  The defendant called Angel's 
cellular telephone at 2:04:07 A.M.  The call connected for 
forty-four seconds.  The Altima, driven by the defendant, 
arrived at Sam's Food store shortly thereafter.  The defendant 
left the car there, and left the scene himself.  The others then 
drove away in the Altima.  Soto turned himself in to police the 
next day. 
 
2.  Motion for required finding of not guilty.  The 
defendant argues that the evidence was not sufficient to convict 
him and that the judge erred in denying his motion for a 
required finding of not guilty.  He contends that Felipe and 
Soto, who testified pursuant to cooperation agreements1 and whose 
                     
 
1 Angel Gonzales invoked his privilege against self-
incrimination in the presence of the jury, at the request of the 
defendant, and did not testify.  Without question, the 
prosecutor could not have called Angel to invoke his privilege 
against self-incrimination in the presence of the jury.  The 
defendant had no right to proceed in this manner.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rosario, 444 Mass. 550, 557-560 (2005); 
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 Mass. 340, 350 (2001); Commonwealth 
v. Hesketh, 386 Mass. 153, 157 (1982).  There was no perceptible 
5 
 
murder indictments had been nolle prossed before the defendant's 
trial, gave "perjurious" and "uncorroborated" testimony that was 
legally insufficient to support a conviction. 
 
He further contends that the evidence "conclusively 
demonstrate[d]" that Felipe was the only person in the car 
positioned to fire a bullet into the right temple of the victim, 
who was sitting immediately to his left.  In this regard he 
cites the testimony of Soto, who heard only one shot fired in 
the car, then turned and saw the victim falling forward.  The 
defendant reasons that this single shot, the only shot Soto 
heard in the car, must have been the one fired into the victim's 
right temple.  He further cites the testimony of Barbara St. 
Amand, a witness who looked out of her apartment window on 
Newton Street after hearing a car come to a screeching stop.  
She saw one man wearing a black hooded jacket, the same type of 
clothing worn by Felipe, go to the rear passenger's side of the 
car and pull something out.  The man then entered the car 
through the door behind the driver, and the car sped away.  The 
defendant contends that St. Amand's testimony establishes that 
two people were involved in the killing -- the driver of the 
car, Soto, and his rear driver's side passenger, Felipe. 
                                                                  
prejudice to the defendant.  Indeed this evidence allowed the 
defendant to buttress his theory that Luis Soto and Felipe 
Gonzales killed the victim. 
6 
 
 
The defendant asserts that there was no evidence that he 
had a motive to kill the victim and, by contrast, that Angel and 
Felipe went to see the victim about one week before the killing 
to settle a dispute over a large sum of money that the victim 
owed Felipe and Angel.  The victim was not at his apartment but 
a brother of Angel and Felipe took a valuable necklace from the 
victim's girl friend as payment.  When the victim learned what 
had happened he telephoned Angel and told him he was "going to 
kill him and fuck him up." 
 
When reviewing the denial of a motion for a required 
finding of not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth's case, 
"the critical inquiry . . . must be . . . to determine whether 
the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .  [The] question is whether, 
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" 
(emphasis in original).  Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 
671, 677 (1979), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-
319 (1979).  In developing his argument, the defendant largely 
has marshaled the evidence in the light most favorable to 
himself.  We reject the defendant's approach.  The jury were not 
required to accept all the testimony of a witness, for example, 
St. Amand; nor are we.  When deciding the denial of a motion for 
7 
 
a required finding of not guilty, we consider the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  In addition, the 
absence of evidence of motive is not material to our inquiry.  
The Commonwealth is not required to prove motive.  See 
Commonwealth v. Brooks, 422 Mass. 574, 581 (1996). 
 
Soto testified that as they were driving he heard a 
"detonation" and stopped the car.  He turned around and saw the 
victim falling forward, and he saw the defendant holding a small 
black gun pointed at the victim's head.  There was evidence from 
which the jury could infer that Soto heard only one shot because 
he experienced ringing in his ears after the detonation. 
 
Video recordings from security cameras located at Essex and 
High Streets, Newton and Cabot Streets, Sam's Food store, and 
Holyoke Medical Center were admitted in evidence and shown to 
the jury.  The video recording from the Holyoke Medical Center 
showed Soto, Felipe, and Angel inside the hospital between 
12:56:47 A.M. and 12:57:42 A.M. on January 29, where they 
earlier had picked up the victim.  It also showed the Altima in 
the parking lot. 
 
The video recording from the security camera at Essex and 
High Streets showed the Altima stopped in the road.  A person in 
the rear passenger's side seat could be seen getting out of the 
car and running toward High Street.  That person was followed by 
a person in the front passenger's side seat, and then the 
8 
 
driver.  Those three people could be seen running toward High 
Street.  The next person to step out of the car was a person in 
the rear driver's side seat.  He walked around the rear of the 
car to the rear passenger's side door, opened it, and leaned 
inside for about thirteen seconds.  That person then backed away 
from the car and walked around the rear of the car toward the 
driver's side.  The person entered the car through the driver's 
door and drove away.  The video tape indicated this took place 
between about 2:02:22 A.M. and 2:02:56 A.M. on January 29, 2010. 
 
Soto's testimony that he, Felipe, and Angel met outside 
Sam's Food store shortly after they fled from the Altima was 
corroborated by the video recording from the security cameras 
outside and inside Sam's Food store.  The video recording from 
the front door area showed the three men as they arrived at the 
store, variously between 2:04:02 A.M. and 2:04:17 A.M. on 
January 29.  The video recording from inside the store showed 
Angel and Soto inside the store, and it later showed Angel and 
Felipe talking at the front door.  These video recordings 
corroborated Soto's testimony that he, Felipe, and Angel had 
made their way on foot to Sam's Food store. 
 
The video recordings from the security cameras outside the 
front and at the rear parking lot at Sam's Food store showed the 
Altima turning right onto High Street from Cabot Street and then 
approach the front door area of the store at 2:04:18 A.M.  The 
9 
 
front door video recording showed Angel talking on his cellular 
telephone.  Cellular telephone records of Angel and the 
defendant indicate that at this same time the defendant called 
Angel's cellular telephone, and their cellular telephones were 
connected for forty-four seconds, beginning at 2:04:07 A.M. on 
January 29.  The jury could have inferred from this evidence 
that Angel was talking to the defendant on his cellular 
telephone and told him that Soto, Felipe, and Angel were at 
Sam's Food store and that the defendant should return the Altima 
to them at that location. 
 
The period that elapsed from the time the Altima stopped on 
Essex Street, 2:02:22 A.M., until the Altima arrived at Sam's 
Food store where Soto, Angel, and Felipe were waiting, at 
2:04:18 A.M., was one minute and fifty-six seconds.  The 
inference that Soto, Angel, and Felipe were the three figures 
who fled from the Altima on Essex Street, and the corresponding 
inference that the defendant drove the Altima from Essex Street 
to Sam's Food store, given the brief time span involved, was 
extremely powerful.  There would only have been enough time for 
the convergence of Soto, Angel, Felipe, and the Altima at Sam's 
Food store by 2:04:18 A.M. if events had occurred as Soto and 
Felipe had testified.  The defendant drove the Altima down two 
streets of a single city block (Newton and Cabot) to Sam's Food 
10 
 
store, while Soto, Angel, and Felipe ran along the other two 
streets of the same city block (Essex and High) to the store. 
 
Although the identity of the various occupants of the car 
could not be ascertained from the Essex and High Streets video 
camera images, the video recording (in tandem with the Sam's 
Food video recording) corroborated Soto's testimony concerning 
their movement based on where they sat in the Altima.  Based on 
this evidence the jury could have found that Soto was the 
driver, that Angel was the front passenger, and that Felipe was 
the right rear passenger, all of whom fled, and that the 
defendant was the left rear passenger who walked over to the 
rear passenger's side door, opened it and leaned inside, and 
then drove the car away. 
 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence indicated that the 
victim's DNA matched the single-source DNA profile obtained from 
a blood stain on the defendant's right boot,2 and the major-
source DNA profile obtained from the edge of the defendant's 
right jacket pocket.3  The victim's DNA also matched the major 
                     
 
2 The probability of a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile 
match here from a randomly selected unrelated individual is 
about one in 136.8 trillion in the Caucasian population, one in 
10.27 quadrillion in the African-American population, one in 
1.036 quadrillion in the Hispanic population, and one in 1.647 
quadrillion in the Asian population. 
 
 
3 The probability of a DNA profile match here from a 
randomly selected unrelated individual is about one in 9.881 
billion in the Caucasian population, one in 238.5 billion in the 
African-American population, one in 48.26 billion in the 
11 
 
profile of a blood stain on the Altima's headliner (roof 
interior).4 
 
In addition, transfer stains of human blood were found on 
the driver's door, the gear shift, the steering wheel, the rear 
view mirror, and the emergency brake of the Altima.  From this 
evidence the jury could infer that the defendant transferred the 
victim's blood from his hands when he closed the driver's door, 
held the steering wheel, adjusted the rear view mirror, and 
moved the gear shift into drive.  The jury also could infer that 
the defendant stepped in the victim's blood when he removed his 
body from the Altima.  Human blood stains were found on the back 
side of the fourth and fifth fingers of the right-hand glove 
recovered from the defendant.  None of these blood stains was 
tested for DNA.  The jury could have inferred that the blood was 
the victim's, which sprayed back onto only two fingers of the 
glove exposed at the time the defendant fired two shots into the 
back of the victim's head at close range. 
 
The defendant made a statement to police in which he denied 
knowing the victim and denied being in the Altima in the early 
                                                                  
Hispanic population, and one in 115.7 billion in the Asian 
population. 
 
 
4 The probability of a DNA match here from a randomly 
selected unrelated individual is about one in 136.8 trillion in 
the Caucasian population, one in 10.27 quadrillion in the 
African-American population, one in 1.026 quadrillion in the 
Hispanic population, and one in 1.647 quadrillion in the Asian 
population. 
12 
 
morning hours of January 29.  He also denied owning a gun.  
However, police recovered a gun cleaning kit from the 
defendant's apartment. 
 
A medical examiner testified that the victim had sustained 
three gunshot wounds to the head.  Two were on the left rear 
side, almost on top of each other; a third was on the right 
temple.  She opined that at least one of the left rear wounds 
and the right temple wound were fatal. 
 
Soto and Felipe heard one gunshot while inside the Altima, 
and they heard a second gunshot as they were making their way to 
Sam's Food store.  St. Amand also thought that she heard two 
shots.  A shell casing was found in the vicinity where the 
Altima stopped on Essex Street.  Although the murder weapon was 
not found, a ballistics expert opined that the gun used to kill 
the victim was a Jennings Bryco model J22 semiautomatic pistol.  
This is a .22 caliber firearm similar to the gun Soto testified 
that he saw the defendant holding after he heard the first shot.  
This type of gun is very loud and is capable of firing shots in 
rapid succession, thus explaining how two projectiles could be 
nearly on top of one another, and why Soto and Felipe 
experienced ringing in their ears, and were unable to discern 
that two shots had been fired when they were inside the car.  It 
also is consistent with a shell casing being ejected from the 
gun where it was recovered on Essex Street after the defendant 
13 
 
opened the right rear door of the Altima and fired one shot into 
the victim's right temple. 
 
The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, was sufficient to support a conviction of 
deliberately premeditated murder.  The defendant fired two shots 
at close range into the back of the head of the victim, which 
alone, is sufficient to support a conviction of deliberately 
premeditated murder.  See Commonwealth v. Coleman, 434 Mass. 
165, 168-169 (2001).  He then went around the other side of the 
car, opened the rear passenger's side door, and fired a third 
shot into the right temple of the victim.  There was no error in 
the denial of the defendant's motion for a required finding of 
not guilty. 
 
3.  Speedy trial.  On September 20, 2011, the defendant 
filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b), 
alleging the denial of his right to a speedy trial.  The motion 
was denied on October 31, 2011, by a judge who was not the trial 
judge.  "Under rule 36, if a defendant is not 'tried within 
twelve months after the return day,' he . . . is entitled upon 
motion to a dismissal of the charges."  Commonwealth v. Denehy, 
466 Mass. 723, 729 (2014), quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (1) 
(C), (D).  Because the return day in this case was March 2, 
14 
 
2010, the day of arraignment,5 and more than one year had passed 
before he filed his motion to dismiss under rule 36, on 
September 20, 2011, the defendant established a prima facie 
violation of the rule.  See Denehy, supra.  The burden shifts to 
the Commonwealth to justify the delay, which it may do by 
showing that a certain portion of the delay falls within one of 
the excluded periods provided by rule 36 (b) (2), or by a 
showing that the defendant acquiesced in the delay, or that he 
benefited from the delay.  Id.  A failure to object to a 
continuance or other delay constitutes acquiescence.  
Commonwealth v. Tanner, 417 Mass. 1, 3 (1994).  The filing of a 
rule 36 motion tolls the running of the time within which a 
defendant must be brought to trial.  Barry v. Commonwealth, 390 
Mass. 285, 294 (1983).  For purposes of a rule 36 calculation of 
excludable periods, the docket and the clerk's log are prima 
facie evidence of the facts recorded therein.  Id. at 289.  The 
period from March 2, 2010, to September 20, 2011, is 567 days.  
The Commonwealth was required to account for at least 202 days. 
 
The original pretrial hearing date, August 24, 2010, was 
continued to November 16, 2010, by agreement of the parties, as 
reflected in the clerk's log.  This period, eighty-four days, is 
excludable by reason of the defendant's acquiescence in the 
                     
 
5 See Mass. R. Crim. P. 2 (b) (15), as amended, 397 Mass. 
1226 (1986). 
15 
 
delay.  See Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 411 Mass. 503, 504 
(1992). 
 
The pretrial hearing was continued again from November 16, 
2010, to December 13, 2010; then to January 11, 2011; and then 
to February 16, 2011.  The defendant voiced no objection or 
opposition to these continuances and thus is deemed to have 
acquiesced in them, regardless whether the continuances were 
ordered by the court or the subject of an agreement of the 
parties.  See Denehy, supra at 731.  The periods involved 
comprise ninety-two days that are excludable. 
 
On February 16, 2011, the defendant expressly agreed to a 
trial date of September 12, 2011, thus acquiescing in a period 
of 208 days.  This amount is excludable. 
 
The Commonwealth filed a motion on July 20, 2011, to 
continue the trial date.  The motion was allowed, and the trial 
was continued to October 14, over the defendant's objection.  
The defendant's original acquiescence in the setting of the 
original trial date of September 12, 2011, is unaffected by the 
continuance over his objection.  However, the time between 
September 12 and September 20, 2011, is chargeable to the 
Commonwealth.  The total amount of excludable time between 
March 2, 2010, and September 20, 2011, was 384 days, leaving 183 
days chargeable to the Commonwealth.  This was well within the 
16 
 
one-year requirement of rule 36.  The motion properly was 
denied. 
 
4.  Renewed motion to dismiss.  The defendant filed a 
renewed motion to dismiss on December 2, 2011, alleging both a 
violation of rule 36 and a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in 
the delayed production of discovery.  Circumstances that 
occurred between September 20, 2011, the date the defendant 
filed his first motion to dismiss and December 2, 2011, the date 
he filed his renewed motion are relevant to our discussion. 
 
The defendant's first motion to dismiss was heard on 
September 28, 2011, by a judge who was not the trial judge.  It 
was taken under advisement and denied on October 31, 2011.  In 
the meantime, the defendant filed a motion to continue the 
October 14 trial date because his rule 36 motion was under 
advisement.  The trial was continued to November 17, 2011.  On 
November 15, after the rule 36 motion was denied, the 
Commonwealth served on the defendant about 300 pages of 
additional discovery, plus four "CDs" containing the videos from 
the various security cameras.  On November 16, the defendant 
orally moved to continue the trial because time was needed to 
review the additional discovery.  A second judge, not the trial 
judge, continued the trial to December 15, 2011, and charged the 
time from November 16 to December 15 to the Commonwealth.  The 
defendant filed his renewed motion to dismiss on December 2.  
17 
 
The motion was denied by the second judge on December 13.  The 
defendant asserts error in the denial of his renewed motion to 
dismiss. 
 
We first address the rule 36 claim.  The period from 
September 20, 2011, to September 28, 2011, is a reasonable time 
in which to schedule a hearing on the rule 36 motion, and is 
excludable for that reason.  Moreover, the rule 36 clock was 
tolled by reason of the filing of the motion.  See Barry, 390 
Mass. at 294; Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) (A) (v) (period 
between request for hearing and conclusion of hearing is 
excludable).  In addition, a period of not more than thirty days 
during which the motion was taken under advisement by the first 
judge is excludable.  See rule 36 (b) (2) (A) (vii).  Thus, the 
period from September 20 to October 28, or thirty-eight days, is 
excludable.  The three additional days taken by the first judge 
in deciding the first rule 36 motion are not excludable. 
 
The period from November 1 to November 16, 2011, is 
excludable because the defendant had moved to continue the trial 
from October 14 to November 17.  On November 16 the second judge 
continued the trial to December 15, 2011, and charged the time 
to the Commonwealth.  Thus, sixteen days are excludable from the 
period between November 1 and December 15. 
 
The period of time from September 20 to December 2, 2011, 
the date the renewed motion to dismiss was filed, was seventy-
18 
 
three days, of which fifty-four days are excludable.  The total 
time from arraignment to December 2, 2011, was 640 days, of 
which the Commonwealth had to account for 275 days.  A total of 
438 days are excludable.  There was no violation of rule 36. 
 
We turn to the claim of prosecutorial misconduct.  Rule 36 
(c) provides that 
"[n]otwithstanding the fact that a defendant is not 
entitled to a dismissal under subdivision (b) of this rule, 
a defendant shall upon motion be entitled to a dismissal 
where the judge after an examination and consideration of 
all attendant circumstances determines that:  (1) the 
conduct of the prosecuting attorney in bringing the 
defendant to trial has been unreasonably lacking in 
diligence and (2) this conduct on the part of the 
prosecuting attorney has resulted in prejudice to the 
defendant." 
 
Rule 36 (c) is consistent with constitutional principles.  See 
generally Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
 
There was evidence that the delays were caused in part by 
the laboratory assigned to perform the DNA tests, by failure of 
the police to deliver reports and witness statements to the 
district attorney in a timely manner, and by the failure of the 
district attorney's office to provide timely disclosure of 
certain cellular telephone records.  Some of this came to light 
at the July 20, 2011, hearing on the Commonwealth's motion to 
continue the September 12 trial date.  Counsel for all 
defendants were present, and at one point counsel for Soto 
stated, without objection or opposition or expression of 
disassociation from other counsel, including trial counsel for 
19 
 
the defendant (who is not appellate counsel), "[W]e should have 
acted sooner. . . .  But having said that, the Government also 
bears some of the brunt of the responsibility here.  And the 
laboratory as well.  So I think all of us are culpable in equal 
degrees."  The second judge rejected the claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  He found that the belated discovery disclosure was 
"not intentional but rather the result of oversight," and that 
the defendant had not shown prejudice.  Accordingly, the 
defendant has not shown that the second judge erred.  The 
renewed motion to dismiss properly was denied. 
 
5.  Mistrial.  The defendant urges us to invoke our powers 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and conclude that the trial judge 
should have declared a mistrial sua sponte with respect to 
alleged jury tampering by members of the victim's family. 
 
Juror no. 14 approached a court officer on the seventh day 
of trial and informed him of troublesome conduct by certain 
individuals who had been in the court room.  As a result, the 
judge conducted an individual voir dire of the jury at the 
beginning of the seventh day of the trial.  The judge asked each 
juror if he or she had heard any comments from members of the 
audience, whether the juror had had any contact with members of 
the audience, and whether the juror had heard other jurors 
express any concerns about members of the audience.  Her final 
question to each juror asked whether the juror could remain fair 
20 
 
and impartial.  All jurors indicated that they could remain fair 
and impartial.  Three jurors heard comments or observed conduct 
from members of the audience, as summarized below. 
 
While waiting for an elevator juror no. 3 heard a young, 
brown-haired woman (later identified as the defendant's aunt) 
who had been in the audience say to a group of people with whom 
she was talking, "If they send him upstate, he'll be dead."  
Juror no. 3 indicated that this did not affect his ability to 
remain fair and impartial. 
 
While walking down a corridor in the court house, juror no. 
14 heard a woman who had been a member of the audience say to a 
group of nonjurors, "Every one of those fucking jurors . . . ," 
and then abruptly stop speaking when she saw juror no. 14 
approaching.  Juror no. 14 saw this same woman (later identified 
as the same aunt) look at a group of jurors in the parking lot, 
and then spit on the ground.  Juror no. 14 found this person's 
conduct "atrocious" and "vulgar," but the juror assured the 
judge that she could remain "fair and impartial."  Juror no. 14 
spoke to other jurors.  She and other jurors speculated whether 
their license plates could be used to locate them, but this 
speculation was not based on anything that a member of the 
audience said or did.  She expressed concerns that at the end of 
each day jurors and spectators left the court house at the same 
time. 
21 
 
 
Juror no. 16 was in an elevator with a group of people when 
one woman who had not been in the audience asked, "What's going 
on with the trial?"  A blonde-haired woman who had been in the 
audience (later identified as the defendant's mother) said, 
"None of her fucking business what's going on with the trial."  
Juror no. 16 was not affected by the incident. 
 
The judge asked the prosecutor to identify the women 
described by jurors nos. 3, 14, and 16.  The blonde-haired woman 
was identified as the victim's mother; the woman referenced by 
jurors nos. 3 and 14 was identified as an aunt of the victim.  
The judge excluded them from the court room for the balance of 
the trial.  The judge characterized the conduct of the victim's 
aunt as "potential juror tampering" and said she would refer the 
matter to the Attorney General. 
 
The prosecutor requested that juror no. 14 be excused.  The 
defendant objected, and the judge denied the prosecutor's 
request.  The judge determined that based on the voir dire, 
juror no. 14 remained "fair and impartial." 
 
"If, during trial or jury deliberations, the judge is 
advised of a claim of an extraneous influence on the jury, he or 
she is to first 'determine whether the material . . . raises a 
serious question of possible prejudice.'  Commonwealth v. 
Jackson, 376 Mass. 790, 800 (1978).  If 'a juror indicates 
exposure to the extraneous material in question, an individual 
22 
 
voir dire is required to determine the extent of that exposure 
and its prejudicial effect.'  Commonwealth v. Tennison, 440 
Mass. 553, 557 (2003).  Because the judge 'is in the best 
position to observe and assess the demeanor of the juror[s] on 
voir dire . . . [t]he determination that [a] juror was 
unaffected by extraneous information is within the sound 
discretion of the trial judge.'  (Citation omitted.)  Id. at 
560."  Commonwealth v. Meas, 467 Mass. 434, 451 (2014), cert. 
denied, U.S. Supreme Ct., No. 13-10630 (Oct. 6, 2014).  Here, 
the judge followed the correct procedure and was entitled to 
rely on the jurors' assertions of impartiality, and on her 
observations of them during voir dire in assessing whether they 
could remain fair and impartial.  We also are mindful that 
experienced trial counsel voiced no objection.  The defendant 
has failed to demonstrate any "solid evidence of a distinct 
bias," Commonwealth v. Bryant, 447 Mass. 494, 500 (2006), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Leahy, 445 Mass. 481, 499 (2005), or 
that the judge otherwise abused her discretion.  There was no 
error. 
 
6.  The Ciampa instruction.  The defendant contends that 
the judge's instruction concerning the manner in which the jury 
should consider the testimony of a cooperating witness was 
error.  In particular, he argues that the judge did not 
"adequately focus the jury's attention on the incentives that 
23 
 
could have influenced [Soto's and Felipe's] testimony."  Ciampa, 
406 Mass. at 263-264.  In addition, he argues, the judge failed 
to instruct the jury that "the government did not know whether 
[Soto and Felipe] were telling the truth]."  Id. at 264.  See 
Commonwealth v. Meuse, 423 Mass. 831, 832 (1996).  There was no 
objection to the jury instruction.  We review to determine if 
there was error, and, if so, whether it created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Wright, 
411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). 
 
Trial counsel began his cross-examination of both Soto and 
Felipe with a discussion of the unredacted terms of their 
cooperation agreements and the nolle prosse filed in the murder 
case against each witness.  Both Soto and Felipe still had 
outstanding indictments for accessory after the fact of murder.  
He elicited from both witnesses that they had spent twenty-one 
months in custody in lieu of bail, that conditions of their 
incarceration were stressful, and that the Commonwealth was 
"totally in charge" of whether their testimony was in breach of 
their cooperation agreements.  The decision to cooperate with 
the Commonwealth was not difficult for either man, even though 
for Felipe it meant he might have to testify against his brother 
Angel.  Trial counsel also stressed the fact that prior to their 
being held, police interrogators repeatedly told them they did 
not believe their early statements, implying that the 
24 
 
Commonwealth was looking for specific testimony and until it was 
forthcoming they would remain in jail. 
 
Toward the end of his closing argument trial counsel 
forcefully argued that Soto and Felipe had made what were 
essentially the deals of a lifetime.  He argued that the case 
came down to whether the jury believed Soto and Felipe.  He 
mocked the cooperation agreements, claiming, 
"the Commonwealth controls what [I] would argue to you is a 
puppet.  [The Commonwealth] control[s] the strings . . . .  
The agreement that they signed to get out of jail . . . 
says, all the rights are with the government to determine 
what we really think about your testimony. . . .  Read it 
in detail.  Did [they] have any choice?  Did either one of 
them have any choice?  They were walking away from murder 
in the first degree, they were walking out of jail after 21 
months. . . .  I think I recorded that [they] said I'm just 
here to tell the truth.  I think I recorded that [they] 
said I'm just here to tell the truth 32 times.  I guess 
that's for you ladies and gentlemen of the jury to decide 
whether or not [they were] there to tell the truth, or to 
fulfill the obligations of [their] cooperation agreement. . 
. .  Well, the cooperating individuals are cooperating for 
only one reason.  They're cooperating because they're 
afraid that they'll go back to being charged with murder in 
the first degree."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
 
The prosecutor never mentioned the cooperation agreements 
in his closing argument.  His argument carefully and 
methodically focused upon the importance of the security camera 
video recordings and the forensic evidence, and how they 
corroborated the testimony of Soto and Felipe.  His argument 
rested on painstaking attention to detail.  He never suggested 
that the Commonwealth had superior knowledge that the witnesses 
25 
 
were telling the truth; rather, he stated that it was the jury's 
function to determine the truth. 
 
The trial judge focused upon the fact that trial counsel 
wanted to offer the cooperation agreements with nothing 
redacted.  Counsel made it clear that he wanted nothing 
redacted.  After Soto's cooperation agreement was admitted in 
evidence the judge instructed the jury, "[N]o matter what 
agreement[s] exist or do not exist between the Commonwealth and 
any witness in the case, you are the only ones who determine[] 
the truth in the case.  Period.  You are the only ones, no one 
else, who determine the truth and the facts in the case 
consistent with the burden of proof and presumption of innocence 
as discussed before."  After Felipe's cooperation agreement was 
admitted in evidence the judge instructed the jury, "I told you 
this yesterday when we had the same issue with another witness, 
Mr. Soto.  The instruction remains the same, but now with 
respect to this witness.  Any reference in any agreement to an 
agreement being based on a person telling the truth, I 
underscore to you the Commonwealth does not determine what the 
truth is.  The jury determines what the truth is, based on the 
evidence that they determine to be credible." 
 
In her final general instructions, the judge told the jury 
that when assessing a witness's credibility they could consider 
whether the witness has an interest in the outcome of the case, 
26 
 
any motive or reason they may have in testifying, and the 
witness's appearance and demeanor.  She later instructed the 
jury that with respect to the testimony of Soto and Felipe, who 
were alleged accomplices, they must bring "heightened scrutiny 
and care in evaluating and analyzing the testimony of those 
witnesses."  She further instructed, if a witness "has a 
cooperation agreement with the Commonwealth . . . you must 
scrutinize that witness's testimony with that high, high degree 
of scrutiny. . . .  [W]ith respect to those so-called 
cooperation agreements, I remind you that promises to tell the 
truth within cooperation agreements are irrelevant.  The jury 
determines what the truth of the matter is in the case, no one 
else." 
 
In Ciampa, we pointed to specific deficiencies in the 
judge's instructions.  We said that language in a cooperation 
agreement to the effect that the agreement was "contingent upon 
the truthfulness of [the cooperating witness]" should be 
redacted "on request" by a defendant (emphasis added).  Ciampa, 
406 Mass. at 262.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 1104(c) (2014).  Here, 
not only was there no request for such redaction, but also trial 
counsel specifically indicated he did not want anything 
redacted.  This language went to the heart of the defense.  
Trial counsel wanted the jury to understand that the 
Commonwealth brought tremendous pressure to bear on Soto and 
27 
 
Felipe until they came forward with a story that the 
Commonwealth wanted them to tell -- and that truth played no 
part in it. 
 
We also said in Ciampa that a judge should warn the jury 
that "the government did not know whether [the cooperating 
witness] was telling the truth."  406 Mass. at 264.  However, 
failure to so instruct, standing alone, is not reversible error.  
See Meuse, 423 Mass. at 832.  It is only where the prosecutor 
has vouched for the witness or suggested having special 
knowledge by which he or she can verify the witness's testimony 
that such an instruction must be given to avert reversible 
error.  See id.; Ciampa, 406 Mass. at 266.  Here, the prosecutor 
never vouched for Soto or Felipe.  Nor did he suggest that he 
had special knowledge by which to determine that they were 
telling the truth.  There was no error in the failure to give 
such an instruction. 
 
Finally, in Ciampa we said that a judge should "focus the 
jury's attention on the particular care they must give in 
evaluating testimony given pursuant to a plea agreement that is 
contingent on the witness's telling the truth."  406 Mass. at 
266.  We also said that "[w]e do not prescribe particular words 
that a judge should use" in this regard.  Id.  The judge did 
what minimally was required under Ciampa given the circumstances 
presented at the defendant's trial.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
28 
 
§ 1104(f) (2014).  She also reinforced the importance of such 
inquiry by instructing the jury that they should scrutinize the 
testimony of Soto and Felipe with great care by virtue of their 
being alleged accomplices, something we encourage but do not 
require.  See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 439 Mass. 362, 372 (2003).  
There was no error. 
 
7.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
transcripts, the briefs, and the entire record, and we discern 
no reason to exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
reduce the conviction of murder to a lesser degree of guilt or 
order a new trial.  The manner in which this case was 
prosecuted, defended, and judged was exemplary.  In the final 
analysis, this case is a testament to the power of 
circumstantial evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.