Title: Mizer v. Kansas Bostwick Irrigation District
Citation: 172 Kan. 157, 239 P.2d 370
Docket Number: 38,549
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: December 8, 1951

172 Kan. 157 (1951)
239 P.2d 370
CHARLES MIZER, R.J. SWEARINGEN, ELMER E. ANDERSON and HOWARD BARBER, Appellees,
v.
KANSAS BOSTWICK IRRIGATION DISTRICT No. 2, F.H. GARMAN, WARD DOUGLAS, ALBERT BILLINGS and FRED SWOYER, for Himself and Other Landowners similarly situated as Intervenors, Appellants.
No. 38,549

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 8, 1951.
Fred Swoyer, of Belleville, argued the cause and N.J. Ward, of Belleville, was with him on the briefs for the appellants.
David Prager, of Topeka, argued the cause and Edward Rooney and Jacob A. Dickinson, both of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellees.
Paul W. Applegate, of Wakeeney, and Arno Windscheffel, of Smith Center, as amici curiae.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SMITH, J.:
This is an action by taxpayers to enjoin the officers of an irrigation district and the district itself from proceeding pursuant to a contract with the federal government. Judgment was for the plaintiffs. Defendants have appealed.
The petition alleged first the action was brought by four named plaintiffs and certain other persons similarly situated; that one defendant was an incorporated irrigation district and the three named defendants were the elected members of the board of directors of the district.
The petition then alleged that each of the plaintiffs were owners of irrigable land within the district and some of them were signers on the petition for the organization of the district, in accordance with G.S. 1947 Supp., 42-701, et seq; that they and many others were induced to sign the petition on representation that under the provisions of G.S. 1947 Supp., 42-701, before any assessment for improvement should be made against the lands of any person in the district the contract for such improvement should first be submitted to the electors of the district.
The petition then set out G.S. 1949, 42-721. This section provided, amongst other things, for the district entering into a contract with the United States for the construction of irrigation works and that such contract might provide for the payment of the cost of the levy and collection of assessments against the lands benefited. The section contained a proviso as follows:
The petition then alleged that plaintiffs and the others in the district in reliance on the statute quoted above contracted with each other and with the state of Kansas in the organization of the district; that the statute was a part of the contract between the parties and the rights of the property owners in the district to vote on any proposal or contract providing for an assessment upon the lands in the district was a valuable vested property right, which was a part of the contract between the property owners and the state at the time the district was organized.
The petition then set out chapter 304 of the Session Laws of 1951. This section amended G.S. 1949, 42-721. This new section is exactly like the old 42-721 except for the proviso. That portion of the new section provides as follows:
The petition then alleged that defendant had entered into a contract with the United States and were about to carry it into effect and levy assessments on plaintiffs' land without affording plaintiffs and other landowners in the district a chance to vote on the contract providing for such an assessment; that they had filed an action in the district court of Republic county for the approval of this contract; that plaintiffs had been informed, and believed and therefore alleged the fact to be that a majority of the electors and landowners in the district were opposed to the contract and as a result of the enactment of the new act of 1951 and the acts of the defendants the rights of the landowners in the irrigation district to vote on the assessments had been transgressed, in violation of article 1, section 10, of the constitution of the United States, which prohibited any state from passing any law impairing the obligation of a contract and the defendants were threatening to carry out the provisions of the void statute, in violation of the vested rights of plaintiffs, and in violation of the due process clause of the constitution.
The petition then alleged that in order to legally organize the district it was necessary that a majority of the qualified owners of irrigable land within the district sign the petition; that at the time the district was organized there were 604 persons listed as owners of property in the district and only 265 persons signed the petition, which was not a majority; that the organization of the district was ineffective since a condition precedent to the organization of the district was not complied with.
The petition then alleged that chapter 304, Laws of 1951, was unconstitutional because it vested uncontrollable discretion in the court to approve or disapprove any contract entered into by the board of directors in behalf of the district; that this was an improper *162 delegation of legislative power to a judicial body, in violation of the constitution.
The petition further stated that plaintiffs had no adequate remedy at law and the acts of defendants might result in the creation of a public burden or the levy of an illegal tax; that all the plaintiffs' owned property might be effected by such assessment and their tax burden would be thereby increased.
The petition then alleged that an injunction should be granted enjoining the defendants from proceeding further with the action in the district court of Republic county and from carrying out the provisions of the contract and from levying any assessment on the lands of plaintiffs until they and the other landowners in the district have an opportunity to vote on the proposal.
The petition further stated there was an actual controversy between plaintiffs and defendants and the court should make a declaratory judgment as to the validity of chapter 304 of the Laws of 1951.
The prayer was for an injunction and that chapter 304, Laws of 1951, be held to violate the constitution.
Defendants' demurrer to this petition was overruled. Then they answered. In this answer they admitted the organization of the district; that plaintiffs owned land in the district classified as irrigable and that the legislature of 1951 enacted chapter 304, which amended G.S. 1949, 42-721. The answer then admitted the district had entered into a contract with the United States and shortly thereafter had filed an action in the district court for confirmation of that contract, pursuant to that chapter; that the action was pending on a motion to dismiss because of the filing of the present suit; that the petition was sufficient for the confirmation of the contract and the proceeding should not be dismissed; that on a day stated a demurrer to the petition in this and in the action to confirm were both heard by the court and at the same time the motion to dismiss was heard; the court took both demurrers under advisement and the court directed all parties to have their answers on file; that on June 21, 1951, a hearing was had and the district offered its evidence on the action to confirm, which evidence supported the petition, and the contract should be confirmed. The answer then contained two paragraphs as follows:
The answer then contained eleven additional paragraphs setting out legal questions and contentions the parties desired to have adjudicated. We do not find it expedient or necessary to set these out at this point.
At this point Fred Swoyer on behalf of himself and as the representative of some 237 landowners in the district moved for an order permitting him to intervene in the action. He stated that all the persons whom he represented were the owners of real estate in the district and interested in the action. This motion was allowed and the intervenor adopted the allegations of the defendant.
The reply was a general denial.
A motion was filed to strike several of the allegations of the answers. This was overruled. The cause was finally submitted on a motion of defendants for judgment on the pleadings.
The trial court made some eighteen conclusions of law, not all of which will we find necessary to discuss. Two of them are as follows:
The final judgment was as follows:
It will be noted the trial court adopted the contention of the plaintiff (1) that the provision in the statute at the time the district was organized providing for submission of the contract with the United States, together with the provision for the securing of the signatures at the time the district was organized constituted a contract between the landowners in the district on one hand and the state on the other and the repeal of the provision of the statute providing for submission of the proposal to the electors of the district constituted impairment of a contract in violation of article 1, section 10, of the constitution of the United States; and (2) that the statute amending G.S. 1949, 42-721, conferred legislative powers on the district court. Once we have answered these two contentions, some of the others will not require consideration.
We shall first consider the argument of plaintiffs on Question No. 2. It is based on the clear allegation in their petition that the transaction between the landowners, who signed the petition to organize the district, and the state, which enacted the statute through its legislature, was a contract, which article I, section 10, of the constitution of the United States, prohibits the state from impairing. Stated in other words, they argue that the right which the statute provided at the time they signed the original petition to vote on proposed assessments was a vested right which the state could not impair by subsequent legislation. We find but little to distinguish the organization proceedings provided in this statute from those providing for the organization of other districts in the state. Our statute books are full of organization proceedings for school districts, drainage districts and other municipal corporations. This statute provides as to irrigation districts organized pursuant to it 
A distinction between this and most other districts is that apparently *165 because this corporation was entering a rather new field in Kansas there were additional safeguards thrown around its organization.
In the first place, a majority of the qualified owners of irrigable land within a proposed district must sign a petition directed to the chief engineer of the division of water resources of the state board of agriculture for the organization of the district. "Chief engineer" is a new designation for an old office, the powers of which have been broadened somewhat as the state became irrigation conscious. (See G.S. 1949, 42-701[a].)
This first section contains a sentence as follows:
The act provides the requisite number of owners shall be filed for the approval of the creation of the proposed district; that such application shall be accompanied by adequate maps, a general description of the land proposed to be in the district and a statement of the source of water supply of the district, the proposed name, a description of the territory proposed to be organized, the name of the owners of irrigable lands in the district, the source from which the lands in the proposed district are expected to be irrigated, the character of the works, water rights, canals, ditches and other property proposed to be constructed, a statement of the need and purpose of the district. (G.S. 1949, 42-701.)
The act then provides that the engineer shall have the power to grant or reject or withhold approval of the application or incorporate in and make a part of his approval such conditions, regulations and restrictions as may be deemed by him advisable or require the submission of additional data and information before he does approve it. (G.S. 1949, 42-702.)
The act then provides for publication of notice of hearing upon the application by the chief engineer.
The act then provides any person interested may file a protest against the approval of the application stating his reasons and that a signer of the petition shall not be permitted to withdraw his name as a signer except for fraud, undue influence or mutual mistake of fact and then only after the chief engineer shall have determined that there was such fraud, undue influence or mutual *166 mistake. It provides that these applications for permission to withdraw must be filed with the chief engineer within thirty days after the first application and that he may hear and determine that application for withdrawal of signatures in advance of hearing for approval upon petition for establishment and organization of the proposed irrigation district.
The act then provides that applicants and objectors shall have the right to appeal to the district court in the county in which the proposed place of diversion of water is situated for a review as to the reasonableness of the division of the chief engineer in granting, withholding, or rejecting approval of the application submitted. These appeals must be taken within thirty days from the date of the order of the chief engineer. (G.S. 1949, 42-703.)
The act then provides that upon determination of the chief engineer that the proposed project is "practical, feasible and economically sound" and applicant is entitled to a permit for the use of water he shall issue applicant a permit providing for the incorporation of the proposed district. Then and not until then may the application be presented to the secretary of state for the granting of articles of incorporation, and the district shall be eligible to incorporate as a quasi municipal corporation." (G.S. 1949, 42-704.)
The act then provides that upon incorporation the district shall have all the rights, powers and responsibilities belonging to other public corporations created in and by virtue of the statutes of the State of Kansas. (G.S. 1949, 42-705.)
The act then provides detailed regulations as to the manner in which the election of three members of the board of directors of the district shall be held. It provides that these directors shall be owners of land within the district and residents of the county in which the district or portion thereof is located and that they shall serve for three years. This election is under the direction of the chief engineer. (G.S. 1949, 42-706.)
The board is directed first to elect a president, secretary and treasurer and that they shall appoint an assessor of the district and other employees. (G.S. 1949, 42-707, 708.)
The act then provides for selling negotiable evidences of debt for the purpose of defraying the temporary and necessary financial or preliminary expenses. (G.S. 1949, 42-709.)
The act provides that as soon as practicable after the organization the board shall formulate a general plan for its proposed operation *167 powers, as approved by the chief engineer, and it shall state what construction work it is proposed to do and the estimated cost of such construction and shall state whether funds to defray such purchase price of cost of construction shall be raised by issuing bonds or by levying assessments. It provides for carrying on surveys and examinations and that the board shall submit a copy of its maps, plans and estimates to the chief engineer for his approval and upon receiving the approval thereof the board shall determine the amount of money required to be raised. (G.S. 1949, 42-710.)
This section provides as follows:
The act then confers certain powers upon the board of directors, amongst them are
And further:
The act then provides the district, after it has obtained the approval of the chief engineer of its plans, maps, applications, surveys and examinations and his approval of application for beneficial use of the water, shall have the power to issue bonds of the district for the purpose of purchasing or constructing irrigation works. (G.S. 1949, 42-712.)
The act then provides in a detailed manner for the conduct of the bond election. (G.S. 1949, 42-712.)
The act then contains sections 42-715 and 42-717 of G.S. 1949, which provides as follows:
We have already set out section 42-721, G.S. 1949, so it will not again be set out here.
There is then a provision for the dissolution of the district upon petition of the majority of the members of the board of directors and the approval of the chief engineer, a provision that the sections and provisions of the act are severable and not matters of mutual, essential inducement and that if any part of the act is held unconstitutional for any reason it was the intention that the remaining sections and provisions be in full force and effect.
There are provisions for changing the boundaries of the district and some other provisions with which we are not now concerned.
*169 The trial court here found that all steps leading to the incorporation of the district had been duly performed and could not be questioned in this action. No cross appeal was taken from this order and it has become final. Besides the point was settled by what we held and said in State, ex rel., v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 207 P.2d 440.
The proceedings are referred to here in detail for the purpose of demonstrating that in the early phases of the organization of the district the rights of landowners are meticulously safeguarded by the provisions of the statute and that the purpose of the act was that when a district was organized pursuant to it it should enter into contracts with the United States. Once we have reached this conclusion it is inescapable that the situation is governed in a large measure by applicable federal statutes. In State ex rel., v. Knapp, supra, in dealing with the same irrigation district we said:
Again 
This district, like the other districts and municipalities in the state, is a creature of the legislature. It has all the power that the statutes gives it plus those generally conferred on quasi municipal and other corporations by operation of law. Once the corporation has gone through the organization stage the property owners who signed the original petition for its organization have no other or additional rights than those of the other property owners, residents and electors in the district. In The State, ex rel., v. French, 111 Kan. 820, 208 Pac. 664, in dealing with a school district problem, we said:
*170 School District v. Board of Education, 110 Kan. 613, 204 Pac. 758, is a school-district consolidation case. This court upheld a statute which provided for consolidation and for the organization of certain districts. We stated the question to be:
Then we said:
Board of County Comm'rs v. Robb, 166 Kan. 122, 199 P.2d 530, was a case in which we considered the constitutionality of a statute providing for drainage districts. One question was whether the statute was unconstitutional because it enabled the district to interfere with the functions of certain other districts. We said:
The rule as to irrigation districts is laid down in 30 Am. Jur. 653, sec. 77, as follows:
See, also, Roby v. Drainage District, 77 Kan. 754, 95 Pac. 399.
The plaintiffs recognize the force of the foregoing rule as to the district itself. They contend, however, that the rule is different as *171 respects the rights of the individuals in the district. Plaintiffs argue that these individuals have acquired vested rights in the election which cannot be taken away. We cannot see this distinction. In the opinions we have examined the trouble arose on account of contentions on the part of people generally, electors or taxpayers in the district, or who were affected by what happened in the district. We find no case where members of the group which initiated the organization of the district have rights different from those of the other taxpayers, electors or residents therein. The rule is stated in 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, p. 664 as follows:
State, ex rel., v. North Wichita Drainage District, 127 Kan. 207, 272 Pac. 177, is informative partly because of the legislative history of the statute involved. Article 7 of chapter 24 of the Revised Statutes of 1923 had provided for the organization of a drainage district under certain circumstances by application to the district court of the county in which the land sought to be drained was situated, and that the district court could if upon the hearing of such petition it deemed the petition to be sufficient appoint two commissioners to project, control and conduct the drainage. The statute then set out detailed provisions as to the conduct of the business to the district.
Chapter 163 of the Laws of 1925 provided that after the proceedings had reached the point under the above statute where the court had provided the boundaries of the district and authorized the commissioners to proceed with the final plans, the commissioner should apply to the board of county commissioners for the incorporation of a drainage district to be composed of the lands approved by the court to be benefited by the proposed drainage. The law then provided for a hearing and for the issuing of bonds and for the levying of assessments to pay for these bonds. The act was attacked in State, ex rel., v. North Wichita Drainage District, supra, on one ground  that it impaired vested rights of property owners because a new method of financing drainage projects started *172 under the old statute was adopted. We dealt with this argument in a summary manner and said:
This matter has been dealt with by many courts on the theory that the relationship between the state on the one hand and the signers of a petition creating a district on the other one was not a contract. One court said it is not "a matter of contract but a proceeding in invitum in the exercise of the state police power." (See Northern Road Improv. Dist. v. Meyerman, 169 Ark. 383, 275 S.W. 762.)
This court used similar language in an analogous case. (See State, ex rel., v. Bone, 120 Kan. 620, 244 Pac. 852.) There banks of the state had voluntarily joined a bank guaranty fund. At the time the fund was organized the statute provided member banks could quit the fund by taking certain steps and insuring certain liabilities. A subsequent statute amended the original one in regard to the liabilities. One bank argued that if the statute as amended be interpreted to increase its liabilities it would be in violation of article 1, section 10 of the constitution of the United States in that it would impair a contract. In dealing with this argument we said: "The statute is hardly contractual in its nature anyway. It was originally enacted and the successive changes from time to time have been made in it, under and by virtue of the police power of the state." This court then pointed out that those who entered on enterprises such as the bank guaranty fund did so with the knowledge that the entity they are creating was a creature of the state acting through its legislature and subject to change as the legislature might deem to the best interests of all concerned.
On sober reflection this must be the law. To hold otherwise would be to open the door to all sorts of confusion when some enterprise did not turn out as anticipated. No one would care to deal with a municipal corporation such as the many districts in the state. To safeguard against any bad results from such a situation, the legislature threw the many safeguards around the organization of the districts that have been heretofore noted in this opinion.
The business of irrigation is a new one in this state. It would not do to hold that the statute in force when the district was organized *173 constituted such a contract between the state on one hand and the incorporators of the district and other landowners therein on the other that it could not be changed by subsequent legislation. The entire affair is a matter of the police power of the state and subject to the legislative will. This is the effect of the holding in LaMesa L.G. &amp; S. Valley Irrig. Dist. v. Halley (1925), 197 Cal. 50, 239 Pac. 719, where the court held that a statute under which an irrigation district was organized did not constitute the basis of a contract between the state and individual property owners in the state, incapable of impairment by the provisions of a subsequent statute. (See Everglades Drainage Dist. v. Florida Ranch &amp; Dairy Corp. (1935); C.C.A. 5th), 74 F. (2d) 914, also Northern Road Improv. Dist. v. Meyerman (1925), 169 Ark. 383, 275 S.W. 762; also Collins v. Jaicks Co. (1919), 279 Mo. 404, 214 S.W. 391; also Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist. (1912), 248 Mo. 373, 154 S.W. 739 (affirmed in [1915], 239 U.S. 254, 60 L. Ed. 266, 36 S. Ct. 58.)
We conclude that the enactment of chapter 304 of the Session Laws of 1951 did not impair a contract in violation of article 1, section 10 of the constitution of the United States.
We go now to a consideration of Holding No. 1 of the trial court that chapter 304 of the Laws of 1951 constituted an unlawful delegation of nonjudicial functions and powers to the court and as such was in violation of the constitution of the state of Kansas. At the outset, we shall again refer to the provisions of chapter 304 of the Session Laws of 1951.
In the first place, the proviso of chapter 304 enacted in lieu of the provisions of G.S. 1949, 42-721, provides for the filing by the board of directors of an action in the district court for the approval of any contract between the district and the United States and of the proposed assessments thereunder. It provides that a copy of the proposed schedule of assessments shall be attached to the petition or embodied therein.
The act then sets out how notice by publication shall be had. There is no dispute about that. It provides that within thirty days after the date of the first publication and not later than forty days thereafter any qualified owner of land within the district shall file his answer or other pleading challenging the assessment against his property. This in plain language means that the court shall take no action against any of the assessments unless some particular owner challenges the assessment by a pleading filed in the action.
*174 A vigorous argument is made as to the next three provisions, that is, the assessments may be challenged if they are too high, erroneously computed or not uniformly assessed in proportion to other tracts in the district. This provision, however, must be construed in connection with the following language, which provides that the court shall hear evidence concerning the correctness and uniformity of the assessments and may modify the schedule of assessments in accordance with such evidence. The entire power of the court, however, is limited by the provision as follows:
Regardless of the language in the early part of the act, where it speaks of assessments being too high, erroneously computed or not uniformly assessed in proportion to other tracts, and the court being given power to modify the schedule of assessments, the court's power is limited by the quoted language. It can only modify the schedule of assessments where some particular assessment is found to be "manifestly disproportionate" and that manifest disproportionment must be challenged by a pleading filed in the action within the time provided.
The provisions of the state's statute providing for the organization of drainage districts have been already set out in this opinion. The matter of the organization of the drainage district was before this court in State, ex rel., v. Knapp, supra. In that opinion we pointed out that this project is all a part of a general plan of congress authorized by the acts of congress.
As already quoted in this opinion, we said there:
We further said:
G.S. 1949, 42-711, provides amongst other things, as already quoted herein, that the board of directors shall have full power to do any and all things required by federal statutes and rules and regulations thereunder for the construction, operation and maintenance of any necessary irrigation works. Chapter 304 of the Laws of 1951 in a provision, the validity of which is not questioned, provides that "any irrigation district may enter into an agreement with the United States or any department, bureau or agency thereof in pursuance of the federal laws governing such department, bureau or agency." All the pertinent federal statutes, the compact between Kansas, Nebraska and Colorado, the contract between the district and the United States, G.S. 1949, 42-701 to 42-730, and chapter 304 of the Laws of 1951, must be construed together. It is our duty to uphold legislation, rather than to defeat it, and if there is any reasonable way to construe legislation as constitutionally valid it should be so construed. Chapter 304 of the Laws of Kansas of 1951 when so construed limits the power of the district court. This power must also be construed in connection with the provisions of the pertinent federal statutes. One of these provisions is
The power is judicial, not legislative. Chapter 304 of the Session Laws of 1951 does not confer legislative power upon the district court of Republic county.
(See City of Salina v. Thompson, Trustee of Mo. Pac. Rly Co., 169 Kan. 579, 220 P.2d 147; also 44 C.J. 590.)
We pass now to a consideration of Conclusions of Law No. 4 of the trial court, that chapter 304 of the Session Laws of 1951 is invalid insofar as it purports to confer jurisdiction on the court to pass upon assessments as against the owners of irrigable land in the district because no standard or set of rules is provided by which *176 the court may determine such assessments and it takes from the board of directors of the district a vested right to determine such assessments and the needs of the district in respect thereto. We have already determined in this opinion the only power the court has with respect to assessments is to determine whether any particular assessment against some particular tract of land is manifestly disproportionate. The court has no jurisdiction nor power to modify the schedule of assessments generally or otherwise than above. The contract between the district on one hand and the United States on the other provides that the land shall be divided into three classes by the secretary of the interior and that the assessments shall be made by taking into account the number of acres of land and their productivity, taking into account soils, topography and other relevant conditions. This is all a matter of expert testimony and is no more difficult of ascertainment than many other matters with which the courts are confronted. The federal statutes provide for this classification and for a reclassification under certain circumstances. At any rate, it is of no concern to the trial court in this action other than for the light it throws on the question whether some particular assessment against some particular tract is manifestly disproportionate.
We conclude the act was not unconstitutional for the reason given in Conclusion No. 4.
We shall next consider Conclusion No. 7 of the trial court that chapter 304 of the Statutes of 1951 is invalid because as construed by the trial court the court must make binding assessments at the time the contract is approved and there is no standard of rules to be observed in passing thereon. The court is in error in holding that the statute requires that it must make a final finding upon the schedule of assessments. As already held, the court's sole power is to set aside any assessment that is manifestly disproportionate. G.S. 1949, 42-715, provides for a uniform assessment of all the lands in the district in March of each year. G.S. 1949, 42-717, provides for an equalization of these assessments in May of each year. The provision as to the finality of the court's order upon approving the contract as to the assessment must give way to these two provisions. Furthermore, the federal statutes and the provisions of the contract provide that the question of assessments must be re-examined every year.
*177 The entire science of irrigation is such that the federal statutes require a reclassification of lands within a district upon request. (See 43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 485g [c].) This provision is embodied in the contract in Section 16, Part B. Section A of the same part provides for the cost of the construction of the district estimated assessed at $3,500,000, being apportioned amongst the land in the district and one-fortieth of that cost being paid annually for forty years. There is a reason for this reclassification and reassessment. Over the period of forty years the science of agriculture will change. What would be approved practice tending to greater productivity today might not be the case forty years from today. Land that was most productive under the present art of husbandry might fall into one of the lower classes in the progress of the years. It would not do to place the stamp of finality upon any schedule of assessments made under present day conditions. (See 43 Stat. 702, subsection D, et seq.)
The only question is how this will be apportioned amongst the various tracts in the district. The entire matter is left to reassessment every year. It is a matter of the internal affairs of the district and cannot be settled with finality at the trial upon the petition to confirm or approve the contract.
We now shall consider Conclusion No. 9 of the trial court. This is that the contract is so uncertain and indefinite in its terms and conditions as to not present any issue that could be passed upon or approved by the court. As we have heretofore held, the only matter with which the court need concern itself is whether there is any tract of land, the assessment of which is manifestly disproportionate. We find no such uncertainty as to permit a striking down of this statute.
We next consider Finding No. 10 of the trial court. This is that there is direct conflict between the provisions of the federal statutes and the state statutes. We have demonstrated that the federal statutes, the state statutes, the contract between the district court and the United States and the Republican river compact must all be construed together.
It is the duty of all courts to so interpret, apply and construe a statute as to result in it being held valid, when such an end can be reasonably attained. All these acts provide a pattern for the organization of irrigation districts. The contract naturally had to *178 meet the requirements of the statutes, both state and federal. The only matters with which the trial court was concerned are (1) whether the proceedings on the part of the district for the authorization of the execution of the contract had been carried out in a valid manner. These proceedings are not attacked here and anyway were approved by our decision in State, ex rel., v. Knapp, supra, and (2) whether the assessment as to any particular tract of land was manifestly disproportionate, as we have held this is a judicial question and the only one about which the trial court in this action is concerned. We find no such conflict as will require the striking down of the statute.
We find it unnecessary to examine the other conclusions of the trial court. They are all settled by what we have already said.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and it is directed to dissolve the injunction heretofore issued against the board of directors of the district restraining them from proceeding further with the action in the court entitled "In Re Kansas Bostwick Irrigation District No. 2, A Corporation, No. 10,556" and the court is directed to proceed with the determination of that action and to determine whether any assessment as to any particular tract of land, which assessment was challenged in a pleading filed by the owner of that particular tract in due time, was manifestly disproportionate, and if he finds no such assessment to be manifestly disproportionate, to approve and to confirm the contract.