Title: Commonwealth v. Evelyn
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11643
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 2, 2015

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SJC-11643 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SEAN EVELYN. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 3, 2014. - March 2, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, 
JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Argument by counsel, Admissions 
and confessions, Waiver.  Constitutional Law, Waiver of 
constitutional rights, Admissions and confessions.  Due 
Process of Law, Fair trial.  Supreme Judicial Court, 
Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 23, 2007. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Frank M. Gaziano, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Jeanne M. Kempthorne for the defendant. 
 
Donna Jalbert Patalano, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Donald A. Harwood & David A.F. Lewis, for Committee for 
Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  After an altercation with Cushings Fortuna 
(victim), the defendant returned to his vehicle, removed a gun 
from a hidden compartment, chased the victim, and shot him dead.  
At trial, the defendant's attorney in opening statement conceded 
that the defendant committed the killing, and told the Superior 
Court jury that the issue they had to decide was whether the 
defendant was guilty of manslaughter or murder.  The jury 
convicted the defendant of murder in the second degree and of 
possession of a firearm without a license.1  The defendant 
appealed his convictions, and we granted direct appellate 
review. 
 
The defendant claims that his attorney's concession at 
trial that the defendant was guilty of manslaughter was 
tantamount to a guilty plea, and that a colloquy between the 
judge and the defendant was therefore constitutionally required 
to ascertain that the defendant made the concession knowingly 
and voluntarily.  The defendant contends that, because such a 
colloquy did not take place, he was deprived of due process and 
the right against self-incrimination, and he asks that we vacate 
his convictions and remand for a new trial.  We conclude that, 
in these circumstances, no colloquy between the judge and the 
defendant is required.  We note that the defendant in this case 
                                                 
 
1 The defendant was found not guilty on indictments charging 
the possession of cocaine and of marijuana. 
3 
 
expressly did not claim ineffective assistance of counsel and 
there is nothing in the record to suggest that the defendant did 
not consent to his attorney's strategic concession.2 
 
Background.  We summarize the evidence at trial.  On 
December 31, 2006, the defendant (who was then twenty years old) 
and his former girl friend, Shantel Baxter, drove his cousin 
into Boston to drop him off at the South Station bus terminal.  
At around 3:30 P.M., the defendant double-parked his vehicle on 
Atlantic Avenue, and Baxter stayed with the vehicle while the 
defendant walked with his cousin into the bus terminal.  At 
approximately 4:04 P.M., as the defendant was about to leave the 
bus terminal, the victim entered the terminal with his brother, 
Patrick Fortuna,3 and his girl friend's cousin, Robertho 
Francois, and confronted the defendant, getting "[r]ight in his 
face."  The defendant "tr[ied] to walk away" in the direction of 
his vehicle, but the victim and Patrick followed him.  As they 
approached the defendant's vehicle, the victim pulled the 
defendant up against an adjacent vehicle, grabbed the defendant 
by the neck, said that the defendant owed him money, and was 
                                                 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services and the Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
3 Because the victim and his brother have the same last 
name, we shall refer to the brother by his first name. 
4 
 
"kneeing" the defendant and "calling [him] a pussy" and "a 
bitch-ass nigger." 
 
Baxter came out of the defendant's car, physically "trying 
to get between them" and "begging [the victim] to stop," but the 
victim swung his elbow at her and "told [her] to get the fuck 
off of him."  The victim "just kept squeezing [the defendant's] 
neck," "kicking him," "spitting on him," and "yelling in his 
face."  After the victim yelled that he needed the defendant's 
telephone number, Baxter provided the number to Patrick in an 
effort to get the victim to stop.  Then, Patrick said to the 
victim, "All right.  Let's go."  Shortly afterwards, the victim 
and Patrick, along with Francois (who had been watching from a 
short distance), walked away from the defendant towards the bus 
terminal. 
 
The defendant and Baxter got back into the defendant's 
vehicle.  As they sat there, the defendant told Baxter (who was 
in the passenger's seat) to "move the car," and a short time 
later,4 he left the vehicle and headed back towards the bus 
terminal.  When Baxter got into the driver's seat, she noticed 
                                                 
 
4 Baxter testified that she and the defendant sat in the car 
for "a couple seconds" or "a couple minutes." 
 
5 
 
that the "secret compartment" installed in the vehicle's 
dashboard (which moments earlier had been shut) was now open.5 
 
The victim, Patrick, and Francois "were walking back toward 
the bus station" when the victim "turn[ed] his head back," and 
suddenly started to run, as did Patrick and Francois.  Gunshots 
were fired.  Patrick ran in a different direction from that of 
the victim and Francois, and the victim later turned right on 
South Street while Francois turned left.  At that point, 
Francois "turn[ed] around" and saw the "same man" that the 
victim had assaulted follow the victim down South Street.  The 
defendant caught up with the victim, and shot him three times:  
once in the arm, once in the back, and once in the head.  The 
victim fell to the ground, and the defendant fled.6  At 
approximately 4:24 P.M., a Boston police officer arrived at the 
scene, and determined that the victim did not have a pulse. The 
victim was pronounced dead at 4:45 P.M., and the cause of death 
was identified as gunshot wounds to the head and chest. 
 
At trial, defense counsel in his opening statement conceded 
that the defendant had committed the killing but stated that the 
                                                 
 
5 Baxter testified that she did not see anything inside the 
compartment.  When police searched the defendant's vehicle after 
seizing it in the aftermath of the shooting, they found a small 
plastic bag containing cocaine in the compartment.  A small bag 
of marijuana was also found in one of the vehicle's "rear map 
pockets." 
 
 
6 A week after the shooting, Francois participated in a 
police lineup and identified the defendant as the shooter. 
6 
 
evidence would show that the defendant was guilty of 
manslaughter, not murder in the first or second degree.7  He 
declared: 
"[The defendant] no doubt did a terrible thing and no doubt 
he's guilty of very serious crimes.  But the issue here is 
going to be did he act in a heat of passion, did he have 
the ability to reason, to think about what he was going to 
do, to premeditate, which is what's required for first 
degree murder . . . or did he act out of a rage that he and 
any reasonable person would have felt treated the way he 
was treated, assaulted and humiliated . . . ." 
 
Defense counsel continued to pursue this strategy in his closing 
argument, noting that "our law recognizes that there are times 
when a person can be so provoked by what . . . somebody else 
does to them, that even if they commit a terrible act of killing 
that person, . . . they don't have the malice required for 
murder."  He argued that "[t]he evidence in this case . . . 
shows very clearly that [the defendant] acted out of heat of 
passion," and therefore should be found guilty of manslaughter, 
not murder.  The jury did not find the defendant guilty of 
                                                 
 
7 Before trial, the defendant had agreed to plead guilty to 
manslaughter and the other three indictments, and a change of 
plea hearing was conducted where a judge in the Superior Court 
was presented with a joint sentencing recommendation by the 
Commonwealth and the defendant.  However, during the plea 
colloquy, when the judge (who was not the trial judge) inquired 
of the defendant whether he "[has] been fully, fairly, and 
adequately represented by [his attorney] in this case," the 
defendant replied, "Not really."  The defendant explained that 
he had not been aware of the two drug charges and had not known 
he was going to be pleading guilty until he walked into the 
court room.  At that point, the judge declined to accept the 
guilty plea and set the matter for trial. 
7 
 
murder in the first degree, as argued by the prosecutor, but did 
find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree. 
 
Discussion.  The defendant asserts that, where defense 
counsel concedes the defendant's guilt in opening statement, due 
process "requires an intelligent and voluntary waiver by the 
defendant in a non-capital case," "[n]o less than in the case of 
a guilty plea, or an admission to sufficient facts, or a 
stipulation of facts in a trial, or a waiver of jury trial." 
 
Before we address this claim, it is important to be clear 
as to what the defendant is not claiming on appeal.  
Specifically, the defendant is not claiming that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  He does not claim that his 
trial counsel did not discuss this strategic concession with him 
before opening statement, or that he did not consent to this 
course of action; the record is silent regarding his discussions 
with trial counsel on this issue.8  Nor does he claim that it was 
"manifestly unreasonable" for trial counsel to have made this 
strategic choice.  See Commonwealth v. Glover, 459 Mass. 836, 
843 (2011).  He admits that his trial counsel "perhaps even 
correctly believed" that it served the defendant's interest to 
concede guilt to the lesser included offense of manslaughter to 
attempt to avert conviction on the murder indictment.  Rather, 
                                                 
 
8 His trial counsel was not his counsel for the aborted 
guilty plea hearing. 
8 
 
he claims that the absence of a colloquy by the judge, standing 
alone, constitutes a violation of due process that requires that 
the defendant's convictions be vacated.  We disagree. 
 
Where a defendant tenders a guilty plea, the judge must 
engage the defendant in a colloquy before accepting the plea 
because "[d]ue process requires that 'a guilty plea should not 
be accepted, and if accepted must be later set aside,' unless 
the contemporaneous record contains an affirmative showing that 
the defendant's plea was intelligently and voluntarily made."  
Commonwealth v. Furr, 454 Mass. 101, 106 (2009), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Foster, 368 Mass. 100, 102 (1975).  See Boykin 
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-243 (1969).  See also Commonwealth 
v. Duquette, 386 Mass. 834, 842-843 (1982) (if admission to 
facts sufficient to support finding of guilt "is to be given the 
effect of a guilty plea, it must be supported by the same 
demonstrations of voluntariness and intelligence that are 
required of any other guilty plea").  The reason for requiring a 
plea colloquy is that, by pleading guilty, the defendant waives 
three constitutional rights -- the right to a jury trial, the 
right to confront witnesses, and the privilege against self-
incrimination -- and "[w]e cannot presume a waiver of these 
three important . . . rights from a silent record."  Boykin, 
supra at 243.  See Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 390 Mass. 714, 
715-716 (1984) ("Because a plea of guilty involves these 
9 
 
constitutional rights, the plea is valid only when the defendant 
offers it voluntarily, with sufficient awareness of the relevant 
circumstances, . . . and with the advice of competent counsel").  
See also Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c), as appearing in 442 Mass. 
1511 (2004).9 
 
Where a defendant, instead of pleading guilty, agrees to 
try a case to a judge on stipulated evidence in an effort to 
preserve his or her right to appeal the judge's pretrial 
rulings, we have also required a colloquy to ensure that the 
defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to a 
jury trial, the right to confront witnesses, and the privilege 
against self-incrimination.  See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 399 
Mass. 761, 763-764 (1987) (reversing conviction for absence of 
colloquy where "parties stipulated to what the Commonwealth's 
evidence would be" and defendant offered no evidence); 
Commonwealth v. Castillo, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 34, 36-38 (2006) 
(where defendant stipulated to material facts conclusive of 
                                                 
 
9 "After being informed that the defendant intends to plead 
guilty or nolo contendere:  . . . The judge shall inform the 
defendant on the record, in open court:  . . . that by a plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere, or an admission to sufficient facts, 
the defendant waives the right to trial with or without a jury, 
the right to confrontation of witnesses, the right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and the privilege against self-incrimination."  Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 12 (c) (3) (A), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1511 (2004).  "The 
judge shall conduct a hearing to determine the voluntariness of 
the plea or admission and the factual basis of the charge."  
Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (5). 
10 
 
guilt in case tried to judge, stipulation was tantamount to 
guilty plea, and failure of judge to engage defendant in plea 
colloquy required reversal of convictions).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 440, 448-449 (2002); 
Commonwealth v. Hill, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 130, 132-133 (1985). 
 
Where we have found a constitutional entitlement to a plea 
colloquy, a defendant has waived at least one of the three 
constitutional rights that are waived by a guilty plea.  "It is 
axiomatic that, if the defendant does not plead guilty and does 
not waive these rights, the judge need not conduct a plea 
colloquy."  Commonwealth v. Lopez, 447 Mass. 625, 629 (2006), 
citing Commonwealth v. Stevens, 379 Mass. 772, 774-776 (1980). 
 
Here, the defendant did not waive any constitutional right.  
He exercised his right to a trial by jury, confronted witnesses 
against him through cross-examination, exercised his privilege 
against self-incrimination by not testifying, and stipulated to 
no facts.  "Unlike the case of a guilty plea, the Commonwealth 
was put to its proof beyond a reasonable doubt and met it."  
Stevens, 379 Mass. at 774-776 (no colloquy was required where 
defense counsel offered to stipulate to prosecution's evidence 
in effort to preserve defendant's right to appeal pretrial 
rulings but trial judge refused to accept offer, and defense 
counsel instead offered no defense when prosecution's evidence 
was presented at jury-waived trial).  See Commonwealth v. 
11 
 
Ramsey, 466 Mass. 489, 491, 496 n.8 (2013) (case law requiring 
colloquy where defendant submits to jury-waived trial on 
stipulated facts did not apply where case was tried to jury and 
where defendant admitted in his testimony that he possessed 
drugs and firearm "as part of a litigation strategy to boost his 
credibility" regarding his defense of necessity to firearms 
charge); Commonwealth v. Charles, 456 Mass. 378, 383 (2010), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Shea, 398 Mass. 264, 269 (1986) (where 
defendant was indicted for possession with intent to distribute 
but defense counsel encouraged jury to convict on simple 
possession, defense counsel's concession that substances in 
defendant's possession were "drugs" did not amount to tacit 
stipulation as to nature of substances, because "defendant's 
theory of his case cannot relieve the Commonwealth of its burden 
of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt").  
Because defense counsel's concession did not constitute a waiver 
of the defendant's constitutional rights, the trial judge was 
not constitutionally required to conduct a plea colloquy 
confirming that the defendant had waived his rights knowingly 
and voluntarily. 
 
We recognize that, after a defendant's attorney concedes in 
opening statement that the defendant is guilty of manslaughter, 
there is virtually no chance that a jury would return a verdict 
of anything less than manslaughter.  But that may also be true 
12 
 
where a defendant testifies in his or her own defense and admits 
to the killing, or where a defendant calls a witness to testify 
to the victim's conduct that provoked the killing and the 
witness testifies that the defendant subsequently killed the 
victim.  The purpose of a plea colloquy is to ensure that the 
waiver of certain fundamental constitutional rights is knowing 
and voluntary; it is not to ensure that the defense strategy is 
sound or that the defendant has consented to that strategy.  
Where a defense attorney's concession is manifestly unreasonable 
or where a defendant has not consented to that strategy, we have 
relied on posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
as the remedy for a miscarriage of justice.10 
                                                 
 
10 A defense counsel's decision to concede voluntary 
manslaughter to strengthen the possibility of sparing the 
defendant a conviction of murder constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel only where it was "'manifestly 
unreasonable' when made," and where it prejudiced the defendant 
by depriving him of a "substantial ground of defense."  
Commonwealth v. Glover, 459 Mass. 836, 842-843 (2011), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 442, 446 (2006).  "When 
the evidence implicating the defendant is strong, and a 
concession does not undercut viable defenses, a tactical 
concession of guilt by counsel in a murder prosecution is 
securely within the realm of effective representation."  
Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 581-582 (2003).  We do 
not consider here whether it is manifestly unreasonable to 
pursue such a strategy (regardless of its merits) without the 
defendant's consent, or whether prejudice should be presumed in 
such circumstances.  Compare Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 192 
(2004) (in capital case, "[w]hen counsel informs the defendant 
of the strategy counsel believes to be in the defendant's best 
interest and the defendant is unresponsive, counsel's strategic 
choice [to concede defendant's guilt at guilt phase of trial in 
order to focus jury on reasons to spare defendant's life during 
13 
 
 
We also consider whether, under our supervisory authority, 
we should require trial judges to conduct a colloquy with the 
defendant before a defendant's attorney makes a concession of 
guilt at trial.  We have exercised this supervisory authority to 
require that a colloquy be conducted where a defendant waives 
the right to a jury trial, even though it is not 
constitutionally required, because "a supervisory rule requiring 
a colloquy would aid in 'sound judicial administration' by 
foreclosing many disputes about whether a waiver of the right to 
a jury trial was knowingly and voluntarily made."  Commonwealth 
v. Pavao, 423 Mass. 798, 800 (1996), quoting Ciummei v. 
Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 504, 509 (1979).  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Davis, 376 Mass. 777, 784-785 (1978) (adopting "prophylactic 
measure" of requiring judge to conduct colloquy where defendant 
waives right to conflict-free counsel by agreeing to joint 
                                                                                                                                                             
penalty phase of trial] is not impeded by any blanket rule 
demanding the defendant's explicit consent"), with Commonwealth 
v. Velez, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 270, 277 & n.9 (2010) ("While 
Massachusetts has not had the opportunity to apply these 
principles . . . , courts in other jurisdictions have held that 
unauthorized concessions of guilt can constitute a lack of 
adversary testing within the meaning of United States v. Cronic, 
[466 U.S. 648 (1984)]," which triggers presumption of  
prejudice), and State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175, 180 (1985), 
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1123 (1986) ("ineffective assistance of 
counsel, per se in violation of the Sixth Amendment [to the 
United States Constitution], has been established in every 
criminal case in which the defendant's counsel admits the 
defendant's guilt to the jury without the defendant's consent"). 
14 
 
representation, even though colloquy is not constitutionally 
required). 
 
We think it more prudent to leave the decision whether to 
conduct a colloquy regarding a concession of guilt to the sound 
discretion of the trial judge than to exercise our supervisory 
authority to require it in all instances.  Strategic decisions 
to concede that a defendant is guilty of lesser included 
offenses are not uncommon, especially in drug cases, where a 
defendant may concede the possession of drugs to preserve the 
credibility of his claim that he or she did not intend to 
distribute.  Nor is it uncommon for a defendant to admit guilt 
to an offense, such as possession of drugs, to preserve the 
credibility of the defendant's claim that he or she did not 
commit a more serious crime, such as illegal possession of a 
firearm.  As noted earlier, such concessions are not limited to 
a defense attorney's opening statement or closing argument; they 
may be made in a defendant's trial testimony, or by a defense 
witness that the defendant calls to the stand knowing that the 
witness will testify to the defendant's participation in one of 
the offenses charged. 
 
Requiring a colloquy in all such cases would mean that the 
judge must be informed in advance of all such concessions, and 
conduct a colloquy that may invite discussion regarding the 
defendant's trial strategy.  Such an inquiry may be warranted to 
15 
 
determine "whether the defendant understands the significance of 
his apparent choice," Stevens, 379 Mass. at 776, where (unlike 
here) there is some indication that the defendant expressly 
opposes his or her attorney's trial strategy, or the concession 
appears to be a manifestly unreasonable trial strategy.  But 
because we can foresee instances where such a concession may not 
be known in advance (such as where a defendant admits to 
committing a lesser included offense during cross-examination) 
and other instances where a wise trial judge, when told of an 
anticipated concession, may decide that the more prudent course 
is to proceed without a colloquy, we decline to exercise our 
supervisory authority to impose a hard and fast rule that would 
require a colloquy whenever a concession of guilt is made.11 
 
Conclusion.  Because no colloquy was required regarding 
defense counsel's concession of guilt to the lesser included 
                                                 
 
11 Cf. Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 466 Mass. 475, 477 (2013) 
(rejecting "defendant's claim that under current rules of 
practice, a stipulation between the Commonwealth and the 
defendant as to an element of a crime, no matter when the 
stipulation is agreed to, must be in writing and signed by him 
or the subject of a colloquy between the defendant and the trial 
judge," but in light of Mass. R. Crim. P. 11 [a] [2] [A], as 
appearing in 442 Mass. 1509 [2004], which directs that any 
stipulation to the existence of a material fact contained in a 
pretrial conference report be signed by the defendant himself, 
asking "this court's standing committee on the rules of criminal 
procedure to consider whether it would be appropriate to adopt 
by rule a requirement similar to rule 11 [a] [2] [A] that would 
apply to stipulations first entered into at or immediately 
before trial"). 
16 
 
offense of manslaughter in opening statement and closing 
argument, the defendant's convictions are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.