Title: Family Security Credit Union v. Gene McClure
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1151005
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 19, 2017

Rel: 05/19/2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
1151000
____________________
Family Security Credit Union
v.
Richard W. Etheredge
____________________
1151001
____________________
Family Security Credit Union
v.
Kendrick M. Nettles
____________________
1151002
____________________
Family Security Credit Union
v.
Wanda J. Pezent
____________________
1151003
____________________
Family Security Credit Union
v.
David Moore
____________________
1151004
____________________
Family Security Credit Union
v.
Martha H. Dunagan
____________________
1151005
____________________
Family Security Credit Union
v.
Gene McClure
__________________
1151006
____________________
Family Security Credit Union
v.
Kayla N. Williams
____________________
1151007
____________________
Family Security Credit Union
v.
Dana Dunn and Timothy Dunn
Appeals from Clarke Circuit Court
(CV-15-16; CV-15-20; CV-15-21; CV-15-22; CV-15-24; CV-15-28;
CV-15-30, and CV-15-38)
MAIN, Justice.
Family Security Credit Union ("FSCU") appeals the trial
court's denial of its motions to compel arbitration in eight
separate but closely related cases.  We reverse and remand.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Action Auto Sales ("Action Auto") is a car-financing
group that financed the vehicle inventory of Pine City Auto
("Pine City"), a used-car dealership.  Action Auto held the
titles to the vehicles in the inventory it financed and 
released a title only when a vehicle was sold and Pine City
paid off a proportional amount of the inventory financing. 
Pine City eventually went out of business without paying off
3
1151000; 
1151001; 
1151002; 
1151003; 
1151004; 
1151005; 
1151006;
1151007
the inventory financing on some of the vehicles it had sold. 
Action Auto sued Pine City and the purchasers of eight
vehicles who had purchased vehicles from Pine City and
financed those purchases through FSCU.1  Action Auto sought
possession of the vehicles and money damages.  The purchasers
each filed counterclaims and cross-claims against Action Auto
and Pine City and third-party claims against FSCU, alleging
negligence, 
wantonness, 
and 
conspiracy. 
The 
purchasers' 
third-
party claims against FSCU are based on FSCU's alleged failure
to perfect its security interest in the vehicles before
financing the purchasers of the vehicles.  FSCU moved for each
of those third-party claims to be submitted to arbitration,
and, to support its motions, FSCU attached a copy of a "Retail
Installment Sale Contract" and a "Dealer's Assignment and
Buyer's Consent to Assignment" that each purchaser had
executed when he or she purchased the vehicle.  The purchasers
opposed the motions to compel arbitration, but they did not
submit any evidence.  After hearing oral arguments, the trial
1Those purchasers are Richard W. Etheredge, Kendrick M.
Nettles, Wanda J. Pezent, David Moore, Martha H. Dunagan, Gene
McClure, Kayla N. Williams, and Dana Dunn and Timothy Dunn,
the appellees in these appeals.  Action Auto sued each 
purchaser, along with Pine City, in a separate case.
4
1151000; 
1151001; 
1151002; 
1151003; 
1151004; 
1151005; 
1151006;
1151007
court denied all eight motions to compel arbitration.  FSCU
filed these eight appeals, which this Court consolidated for
the purpose of issuing one opinion.
As part of the purchase of the vehicle, each purchaser
executed a "Retail Installment Sale Contract" with Pine City
and a "Dealer's Assignment and Buyer's Consent to Assignment,"
which assigned the sale contract to FSCU.  The "Dealer's
Assignment and Buyer's Consent to Assignment" contained the
following 
arbitration 
provision 
immediately 
above 
the
signature lines:  
"Any controversy or claim arising out of or
relating to this Agreement shall be settled by
binding arbitration. Dealer and Buyer further agree
that any such arbitration shall take place in Morgan
County, Alabama. Judgment upon any award rendered by
the arbitrator may be entered by any court having
jurisdiction thereof. The arbitrator shall determine
the prevailing party, and the costs and expenses of
the 
arbitration 
proceeding, 
including 
the
arbitrator's fees, shall be borne by the non-
prevailing party, unless otherwise required by law.
No provision of this Agreement, nor the exercise of
any right under this Agreement, shall limit the
right of the Credit Union to (1) obtain provisional
or ancillary remedies, such as injunctive relief,
writ of attachment, or protective order from a court
having jurisdiction before, during, or after the
pendency of any arbitration; (2) exercise self-help
remedies, such as set-off; (3) foreclose against or
sell any real or personal property collateral by the
exercise of a power of sale under a mortgage or
5
1151000; 
1151001; 
1151002; 
1151003; 
1151004; 
1151005; 
1151006;
1151007
other security agreement or instrument, a deed of
trust, or applicable law; (4) exercise any other
rights under this Agreement upon the breach of any
term or condition herein; or, (5) ... proceed with
collection of the account through all other legal
methods, including, but not limited to, proceeding
in court to obtain judgment. Any and all arbitration
under this contract will take place on an individual
basis; class arbitrations and class actions are not
permitted. DEALER AND BUYER FURTHER AGREE THAT YOU
ARE WAIVING THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY AND TO
PARTICIPATE IN A CLASS ACTION."
(Capitalization in original.)
In denying FSCU's motions to compel arbitration, the
trial court held that "FSCU's promise to arbitrate is merely
illusory and does not serve as valid consideration to support
the arbitration agreement" because "the arbitration clause
does not preclude FSCU from pursuing several alternative
avenues of relief against the borrower, including the filing
of a judicial lawsuit," but "requires that borrowers ...
settle '[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating
to this Agreement' through binding arbitration."  
Further, the trial court held that the arbitration
provision was 
unconscionable.  
Specifically, 
the 
court 
stated:
"In the present case, the terms of the
arbitration clause contained in the Assignment are
grossly favorable to FSCU. Although consumer debtors
such as [the purchasers] are required to arbitrate
6
1151000; 
1151001; 
1151002; 
1151003; 
1151004; 
1151005; 
1151006;
1151007
all disputes they may have against FSCU, FSCU has
the option of pursuing several alternative remedies
to arbitration, including the filing of a judicial
lawsuit. The huge disparity in the rights of the
contracting parties is one-sided and unreasonably
favors FSCU.
"In addition, FSCU, a large and sophisticated
business entity, has overwhelming bargaining power.
To obtain the financing needed to purchase a used
car from Pine City, [the purchaser] had no choice
but 
to 
execute 
FSCU's 
boilerplate 
Assignment
containing the arbitration clause, along with FSCU's
form applications for membership to the credit union
and for credit financing.
"Under the circumstances, the used car sales
transaction evinces the necessary elements to
support a finding of unconscionability. Hence, the
arbitration requirement contained in the Assignment
should be declared invalid and unenforceable, and
FSCU's motion to compel arbitration should be
denied."
(Citations omitted.)
II. Standard of Review
"'This Court reviews de novo the
denial of a motion to compel arbitration.
Parkway Dodge, Inc. v. Yarbrough, 779 So.
2d 1205 (Ala. 2000). A motion to compel
arbitration is analogous to a motion for a
summary judgment. TranSouth Fin. Corp. v.
Bell, 739 So. 2d 1110, 1114 (Ala. 1999).
The party seeking to compel arbitration has
the burden of proving the existence of a
contract 
calling 
for 
arbitration 
and
proving that the contract evidences a
transaction affecting interstate commerce.
Id. "[A]fter a motion to compel arbitration
7
1151000; 
1151001; 
1151002; 
1151003; 
1151004; 
1151005; 
1151006;
1151007
has been made and supported, the burden is
on the non-movant to present evidence that
the supposed arbitration agreement is not
valid or does not apply to the dispute in
question." Jim Burke Automotive, Inc. v.
Beavers, 674 So. 2d 1260, 1265 n.1 (Ala.
1995) 
(opinion 
on 
application 
for
rehearing).'"
Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Gantt, 882 So. 2d 313, 315 (Ala.
2003) (quoting Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Bruno, 784 So. 2d
277, 280 (Ala. 2000)).
III. Discussion
It is undisputed that FSCU moved to compel arbitration
and supported its motions with contracts that were executed by
the purchasers and that each contract contained the above-
quoted arbitration provision.  It was also undisputed that the
contracts evidenced a transaction affecting interstate
commerce.  Thus, the burden shifted to the purchasers to
present evidence that the arbitration agreements were not
valid or that they did not apply to the disputes in question. 
The purchasers did not present any additional evidence.  They
presented only argument.  Therefore, unless on its face the
arbitration provision is not valid or does not apply to the
8
1151000; 
1151001; 
1151002; 
1151003; 
1151004; 
1151005; 
1151006;
1151007
dispute in question, the trial court's decision to deny the
motions to compel arbitration was erroneous.
A. Unconscionability
The trial court held that the arbitration provision in
each contract  is unconscionable on its face.  Concerning
unconscionability, this Court has stated:
"'Unconscionability is an affirmative defense, Green
Tree Fin. Corp. v. Wampler, 749 So. 2d 409, 415
(Ala. 1999), and the party asserting the defense
bears the burden of proof. Ex parte Napier, 723 So.
2d 49, 52–53 (Ala. 1998).' Fleetwood Enters., [Inc.
V. Bruno,] 784 So. 2d [277] at 281 [(Ala. 2000)]. In
order to meet that burden, the party seeking to
invalidate an arbitration provision on the basis of
unconscionability must establish both procedural and
substantive unconscionability. Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Alabama v. Rigas, 923 So. 2d 1077, 1087
(Ala. 2005). As this Court explained in Rigas:
"'Substantive unconscionability
"'"'relates to the substantive
contract terms themselves and
whether 
those 
terms 
are
unreasonably favorable to the
more powerful party, such as
terms that impair the integrity
of the bargaining process or
otherwise contravene the public
interest or public policy; terms
(usually 
of 
an 
adhesion 
or
boilerplate nature) that attempt
to alter in an impermissible
manner 
fundamental 
duties
otherwise imposed by the law,
9
1151000; 
1151001; 
1151002; 
1151003; 
1151004; 
1151005; 
1151006;
1151007
fine-print terms or provisions
that 
seek 
to 
negate 
the
reasonable expectations of the
n o n d r a f t i n g  
p a r t y ,  
o r
unreasonably 
and 
unexpectedly
harsh terms having to do with
price or other central aspects of
the transaction.'"
"'Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 731
(Ala. 2002) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex
parte Foster, 758 So. 2d 516, 520 n.4 (Ala.
1999), quoting in turn 8 Richard A. Lord,
Williston on Contracts § 18:10 (4th ed.
1998)). See also Leeman v. Cook's Pest
Control, Inc., 902 So. 2d 641 (Ala. 2004).
"'Procedural 
unconscionability, 
on 
the
other 
hand, 
"deals 
with 
'procedural
deficiencies in the contract formation
process, such as deception or a refusal to
bargain over contract terms, today often
analyzed 
in 
terms 
of 
whether 
the
imposed-upon party had meaningful choice
about whether and how to enter into the
transaction.'" Thicklin, 824 So. 2d at 731
(quoting Foster, 758 So. 2d at 520 n.4,
quoting in turn 8 Williston on Contracts §
18:10).'
"923 So. 2d at 1086–87."
Newell v. SCI Alabama Funeral Servs., LLC, [Ms. 1151078, March
17, 2017] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2017) (emphasis added).
In the present case, to invalidate the arbitration
provision on the basis of unconscionability, the purchasers
were required to establish both procedural and substantive
10
1151000; 
1151001; 
1151002; 
1151003; 
1151004; 
1151005; 
1151006;
1151007
unconscionability.  The purchasers presented no evidence of
procedural unconscionability, i.e, they did not present any
evidence concerning the contract-formation process.  The
argument the trial court found persuasive -- that on its face
the arbitration provision is 
grossly favorable to FSCU because
FSCU reserved the right to avail itself of the courts while
forcing the purchasers to 
arbitrate every conceivable claim –-
concerns only substantive unconscionability.  Having no
evidence of procedural unconscionability before it, the trial
court erred in holding that the arbitration provision in each
contract is unconscionable.
B. Consideration
Like its holding concerning unconscionability, the trial
court held that the arbitration provision in each contract
failed for lack of consideration because, allegedly, "the
arbitration clause does not preclude FSCU from pursuing
several alternative avenues of relief against the borrower,
including the filing of a judicial lawsuit," but "requires
that borrowers ... settle '[a]ny controversy or claim arising
out of or relating to this Agreement' through binding
arbitration."  This holding was based on the allegation that
11
1151000; 
1151001; 
1151002; 
1151003; 
1151004; 
1151005; 
1151006;
1151007
the arbitration provision lacked mutuality of remedy. 
However, this Court has 
stated that, "properly understood, the
concept of mutuality of remedy has no application to
arbitration agreements." Ex parte McNaughton, 728 So. 2d 592,
598 (Ala. 1998).  Further,
"'[t]he doctrine of mutuality of
remedy is limited to the availability of
the ultimate redress for a wrong suffered
by a plaintiff, not the means by which that
ultimate redress is sought. A plaintiff
does not seek as his ultimate redress an
arbitration 
proceeding 
or 
a 
court
proceeding. Instead, he seeks legal relief
(e.g., damages) or equitable relief (e.g.,
specific performance) for his injury, and
he uses the proceeding as a means to obtain
that result.'"
Green Tree Fin. Corp. of Alabama v. Vintson, 753 So. 2d 497,
504 (Ala. 1999) (quoting Ex parte McNaughton, 728 So. 2d 592,
598 (Ala. 1998)).  Therefore, the trial court's holding was
erroneous.  
Also, to the extent that the trial court's holding might
have been based on the argument that consideration separate
and distinct from that which supports the contract as a whole
is required to enforce an arbitration provision, this Court
12
1151000; 
1151001; 
1151002; 
1151003; 
1151004; 
1151005; 
1151006;
1151007
has repeatedly rejected that argument. See Vintson, 753 So. 2d
at 502 n.3.
Although not addressed in the trial court's order, on
appeal the purchasers allege that the contract as a whole
lacked consideration.  This Court has stated:
"'"A test of good consideration for a
contract is whether the promisee at the
instance of the promisor has done, forborne
or undertaken to do anything real, or
whether he has suffered any detriment, or
whether in return for the promise he has
done something he was not bound to do, or
has promised to do some act or to abstain
from doing something."
"'Roberts v. Lindsey, 242 Ala. 522, 525, 7 So. 2d
82, 84 (1942); Russell v. Russell, 270 Ala. 662,
668, 120 So. 2d 733, 738 (1960). "[T]o constitute
consideration for a promise, there must have been an
act, a forbearance, a detriment, or a destruction of
a legal right, or a return promise, bargained for
and given in exchange for the promise." Smoyer v.
Birmingham Area Chamber of Commerce, 517 So. 2d 585,
587 (Ala. 1987).'"
Merchants Bank v. Head, 161 So. 3d 1151, 1155-56 (Ala. 2014)
(quoting Ex parte Grant, 711 So. 2d 464, 465 (Ala. 1997)).
In the present case, the first paragraph of each of the
contracts containing the arbitration provision states:
"The Buyer has purchased an automobile from
Dealer, both of whom have executed the attached
agreement setting forth the Buyer's obligation to
13
1151000; 
1151001; 
1151002; 
1151003; 
1151004; 
1151005; 
1151006;
1151007
pay (said obligation hereinafter 'Contract'). Buyer
has executed the Contract in order to purchase the
automobile described in the Contract (said vehicle
hereinafter 'Vehicle'). The Buyer is a Credit Union
member who requests the Credit Union purchase the
contract from Dealer so that Buyer may make payments
directly to the Credit Union. The Dealer hereby
assigns the Contract, to the Credit Union."
Each purchaser executed the contract in order to purchase
a vehicle through a loan from FSCU, and FSCU purchased the
contracts at the purchasers' request so that the  purchasers
could make payments directly to FSCU.  Those acts constitute
valid consideration for the contract as a whole.  Therefore,
the arbitration provision in the contract does not fail for
lack of consideration. 
C. Scope of the Arbitration Provision
The purchasers allege that their tort claims against FSCU
fall outside the scope of the arbitration provision.  "[T]he
burden of proving that the dispute falls outside the scope of
the arbitration agreement shifts to the nonmovant after the
movant proves the existence of a contract containing an
arbitration provision and that the transaction that is the
subject of the contract had an impact on interstate commerce."
Edwards Motors, Inc. v. Hudgins, 957 So. 2d 444, 447 (Ala.
14
1151000; 
1151001; 
1151002; 
1151003; 
1151004; 
1151005; 
1151006;
1151007
2006).  "Whether an arbitration provision encompasses a
party's claims 'is a matter of contract interpretation, which
interpretation is guided by the intent of the parties, and
which intent, absent ambiguity in the clause, is evidenced by
the plain language of the clause.'" Vintson, 753 So. 2d at 505
(quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 684 So. 2d 102,
110 (Ala. 1995)).  This Court has stated:
"'"[There is a] strong presumption in favor of
arbitration" created by the Federal Arbitration Act.
See, generally, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama v.
Rigas, 923 So. 2d 1077, 1083 (Ala. 2005). "In
interpreting an arbitration provision, 'any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the
problem at hand is the construction of the contract
language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay,
or a like defense to arbitrability.'" The Dunes of
GP, L.L.C. v. Bradford, 966 So. 2d 924, 927 (Ala.
2007) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)) (emphasis
omitted). Indeed, "'a motion to compel arbitration
should not be denied "unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is
not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute."'" Id. (quoting Ex parte Colquitt,
808 So. 2d 1018, 1024 (Ala. 2001), quoting in turn
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960))
(emphasis omitted). "While, 'as with any other
contract, the parties' intentions control, ... those
intentions are generously construed as to issues of
arbitrability.'" Carroll v. W.L. Petrey Wholesale
Co., 941 So. 2d 234, 237 (Ala. 2006) (quoting
15
1151000; 
1151001; 
1151002; 
1151003; 
1151004; 
1151005; 
1151006;
1151007
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)).'"
Green Tree-AL LLC v. White, 55 So. 3d 1186, 1192 (Ala. 2010)
(quoting Kenworth of Mobile, Inc. v. Dolphin Line, Inc., 988
So. 2d 534, 544–45 (Ala. 2008)).
In the present situation, the contract states: "Any
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
Agreement shall be settled by binding arbitration."  This
Court has stated that "the phrase 'any controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to' in arbitration agreements
covers a broad range of disputes." Vann v. First Cmty. Credit
Corp., 834 So. 2d 751, 754 (Ala. 2002).  In fact, "'[t]his
Court has held [that] where a contract signed by the parties
contains a valid arbitration clause that applies to claims
"arising out of or relating to" the contract, that clause has
a broader application than an arbitration clause that refers
only to claims "arising from" the agreement.'" Vintson, 753
So. 2d at 505 (quoting Reynolds & Reynolds Co. v. King Autos.,
Inc., 689 So. 2d 1, 2–3 (Ala. 1996)).
The purchasers claimed that FSCU negligently and wantonly
deprived them of clear title to their vehicles and that FSCU,
16
1151000; 
1151001; 
1151002; 
1151003; 
1151004; 
1151005; 
1151006;
1151007
Action Auto, and Pine City conspired to deprive them of clear
title to their vehicles.  The purchasers alleged that the
purchases of their vehicles were "financed by a purchase money
loan obtained from [FSCU], which loan was secured by an
alleged lien on the [vehicle] in favor of [FSCU]," and that
FSCU failed to perfect its security interest in the vehicles
by failing to ensure that title was properly applied for and
issued by the State of Alabama for the purchased vehicles. 
The purchasers further alleged that they were damaged by being
required to "pay[] loan on vehicle without clear title." 
Those claims against FSCU clearly "aris[e] out of or relat[e]
to" the contract containing the arbitration provision.  All
the claims relate to the title of the vehicles purchased
through contracts that were assigned to FSCU through the
agreements containing the arbitration provision.  Without the
agreement 
containing 
the 
arbitration 
provision, 
no
relationship as to the vehicles would exist between the
purchasers and FSCU.  Accordingly, the broad language of the
arbitration provision encompasses the purchasers' claims
against FSCU.
D. Jury Waiver
17
1151000; 
1151001; 
1151002; 
1151003; 
1151004; 
1151005; 
1151006;
1151007
Finally, although not mentioned in the trial court's
order, the purchasers make the argument on appeal that "the
lack of any valid jury trial waiver provides another viable
basis for the setting aside of the Assignment's arbitration
requirement." Purchasers' brief, at 54.  They further argue:
"Although a 
party 
may 
contractually waive 
his 
or
her fundamental right to a jury trial, such a waiver
must be narrowly and strictly construed. Ex parte
Cupps, 782 So. 2d 772, 775 (Ala. 2000). The court is
to 'indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver.' Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. to Use of
Boqash, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S. Ct. 809, 812, 81 L.
Ed. 1177 (1937)."
Purchasers' brief, at 54-55.
However, the purchasers' argument confuses jury-waiver
provisions, like the one at issue in Ex parte Cupps, 782 So.
2d 772 (Ala. 2000), and the other cases cited in the
purchasers' brief, and arbitration provisions, like the 
one at
issue in the present case.  This Court has previously
recognized the distinction between those two types of
provisions: 
"[A]nalogy 
[of 
jury-waiver 
provisions] 
to
arbitration 
cases 
is 
inappropriate 
because 
of 
the
inapplicability of the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution based on cases from the United States Supreme
18
1151000; 
1151001; 
1151002; 
1151003; 
1151004; 
1151005; 
1151006;
1151007
Court construing the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et
seq., and the resulting application of opposite presumptions
in interpreting arbitration and jury-waiver provisions." Ex
parte Carter, 66 So. 3d 231, 239 (Ala. 2010) (plurality
opinion); see also Ex parte Carter, 66 So. 3d at 241 (Murdock,
J., concurring in the result) ("I agree with the skepticism
expressed in the main opinion as to the appropriateness of
analogizing principles distilled from arbitration cases to
cases involving jury-waiver provisions. As the main opinion
notes, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
applied in relation to cases construing the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., on the one hand, and
the constitutional right to a trial by jury, on the other
hand, result in 'opposite presumptions in interpreting
arbitration and jury-waiver provisions.'").
The issue before us is whether the trial court erred in
denying FSCU's motions to compel arbitration under the
arbitration provision in the "Dealer's Assignment and Buyer's
Consent to Assignment."  No issue concerning a jury-waiver
provision is properly before this Court.  Therefore, this
19
1151000; 
1151001; 
1151002; 
1151003; 
1151004; 
1151005; 
1151006;
1151007
argument does not present a basis on which to affirm the trial
court's judgment.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court
erred in denying FSCU's motions to compel arbitration. 
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand
these cases for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1151000 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1151001 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1151002 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1151003 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1151004 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1151005 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1151006 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1151007 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stuart, C.J., and Parker and Bryan, JJ., concur.  
Bolin, Murdock, and Shaw, JJ., concur in the result.
20