Title: Long v. DFS & Office of Child Advocate
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 546, 2011
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 3, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JUSTINE LONG,1     
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Respondent Below, 
 
§  No. 546, 2011 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Court Below – Family Court 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for Sussex County 
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES §  File No.: 10-10-04TS 
and OFFICE OF THE CHILD  
§  Petition No.:  10-34503 
ADVOCATE, 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Petitioners Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellees.  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  March 28, 2012 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  April 3, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Family Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Mark H. Hudson, Esquire, Haller & Hudson, Georgetown, Delaware, 
for appellant. 
 
John A. Eberly, Esquire, Department of Justice, Georgetown, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
Jennifer S. Donahue, Esquire, Office of the Child Advocate, 
Georgetown, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
                                          
 
1 The Court sua sponte assigned a pseudonym to the appellant by Order dated October 
13, 2011 pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
2 
 
The respondent-appellant, Justine Long (the “Mother”), appeals from 
a final judgment of the Family Court that terminated her parental rights in 
her now three-year-old son (the “Child”).  The Mother raises two arguments 
on appeal.  First, she contends that the Family Court erred, by shifting the 
burden of proof from the Division of Family Services (“DFS”) to her, at the 
termination of parental rights hearing.  Second, the Mother contends the 
Family Court’s factual determination that the Mother failed to plan for the 
Child was clearly erroneous and not sufficiently supported by the record. 
We have concluded that both of the Mother’s arguments are without 
merit.  Therefore, the judgment of the Family Court is affirmed. 
Facts and Procedural History 
In September 2009, the Family Court entered an ex parte order 
awarding temporary care and custody of the Child to DFS.  The Family 
Court “found probable cause that sufficient emergency conditions existed to 
believe that the child continues to be in actual physical, mental or emotional 
danger, or there is a substantial imminent risk thereof, due to [M]other’s 
failure to protect the child and [F]ather’s pending criminal charges with 
[M]other and [C]hild as victims.”   
At the scheduled preliminary protective hearing, the Mother waived 
her right to a hearing based on her lack of housing and domestic violence.  
3 
 
The Father waived his right to a hearing based on criminal charges against 
him for Assault in the Third Degree, with the Child as victim, Offensive 
Touching, and Unlawful Imprisonment, with the Mother as victim.  The 
Father had a no-contact order in place against him with respect to the Mother 
and the Child.  The Family Court ordered that custody of the Child continue 
with DFS, who had placed the Child in the care of Jamie Hammond, the 
Child’s godmother.  At the time, the Child was six months old.    
At a dispositional hearing on October 27, 2009, the Family Court 
approved a case plan for the Mother which required that she:  follow 
supervised visitation for four hours a week; obtain employment or other 
income to provide for the family’s basic needs; provide a living environment 
for the Child free of domestic violence and engage in a parenting class; 
undergo a substance abuse evaluation and follow any treatment 
recommendations; undergo a mental health evaluation and follow any 
treatment recommendations; obtain secure and safe housing, and inform 
DFS of anyone moving into her home to allow for a background check.  The 
Father failed to appear at the hearing. 
On November 24, 2009, the Family Court held a hearing to review the 
dispositional hearing order.  The Father again failed to appear.  The Mother 
testified that she was living with the Father, and had been for two weeks.  
4 
 
She testified that her living arrangement was temporary, and that she did not 
want the Child living with her there because the housing was not up to 
standard.  She said that she left the Safe House where she had been residing 
because she had no transportation.  The Safe House had provided the Mother 
with a car, but then took it away after she was accused of transporting 
others.  She testified that she understood the Father needed to leave her 
home for her to regain custody of her son.  The Mother had secured 
employment.   
The Family Court held another hearing on February 23, 2010.  Neither 
the Father nor the Mother appeared.  Dr. Joseph Zingaro, who had 
performed a psychological evaluation of the Mother, testified and explained 
a report he had prepared.  He testified that he based his report on the Family 
Court’s October order, and had not received the Family Court’s November 
order from the Mother.  He felt that the Mother sought to deceive him by 
purposively withholding that information.   A DFS worker testified that 
Hammond told her the Mother had not visited with the Child in almost two 
months.  She also testified that the Mother had quit her employment one 
week after the November hearing. 
On June 1, 2010, the Family Court held proceedings to review the 
Child’s placement and the case plans of the parents.  Only the Mother 
5 
 
appeared at the hearing.  A DFS worker testified that the Mother had visited 
the Child only two times since the February 23 hearing.  The Mother 
testified that she had moved to Ocean City, where she had resided with the 
Father.  She then left the Father and moved in with her mother, who had 
custody of the Mother’s other child.  The Mother had not begun her 
parenting or domestic violence counseling, but stated that she intended to 
pursue both. 
At the next hearing on August 24, 2010, DFS requested that the 
Family Court change the permanency goal to termination of parental rights.  
A staff member from Brandywine Counsel and Community Services 
testified that the Mother had failed to follow through with her treatment 
recommendations, and that the center had lost contact with her.  The DFS 
worker testified that the Mother had two visits with the Child in the last two 
months.  The Mother testified that she was pregnant with the Father’s child.  
She testified that she needed to miss her visitations and counseling 
appointments because of her employment.  The Family Court entered an 
order that the permanency goal be changed from reunification to termination 
of parental rights.  DFS then filed this action for termination of parental 
rights. 
6 
 
On March 29, 2011, the Family Court held the first day of trial on the 
termination of parental rights.  Hammond testified that the Child regarded 
her as his mother.  A DFS worker testified that the Mother and the Child had 
“really no bond at all,” and that the Mother recognized that the Child viewed 
Hammond as his mother.  Another DFS worker testified that DFS had 
ongoing concerns about the Mother, including the history of domestic 
violence with the Father, the presence of the Mother’s other child during 
domestic violence incidents, and the Mother’s failure to complete her case 
plan in a reasonable time frame. 
At the second day of trial on May 10, 2011, the Mother testified that 
she was employed, had received domestic violence treatment, and had not 
been in contact with the Father for almost one year.  She also testified that 
her monthly visits with the Child had been going well, and that she wanted 
the Child to develop a relationship with her other children.  The Mother’s 
mother also testified.  She stated that the Child should be returned to the 
Mother’s custody at some point, but that the Mother first needed to 
reestablish a bond with the Child.   She also testified that this was the 
longest period of time that the Mother and the Father had been out of 
contact.  
7 
 
The Family Court took the matter under advisement and subsequently 
issued its written decision.  The Family Court found that DFS had 
established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Mother failed to plan 
adequately for the Child for over one year; that DFS had used reasonable 
efforts to reunite the Child with the Mother; and that it was in the Child’s 
best interests to terminate the Mother’s parental rights.  Therefore, the 
Family Court terminated the Mother’s parental rights in the Child.  This 
appeal followed.  
Standard of Review 
When reviewing a Family Court’s order, our standard and scope of 
review involves a review of the facts and law, as well as the inferences and 
deductions that the Family Court has made.2  To the extent that the issues on 
appeal implicate rulings of law, we conduct a de novo review.3  To the extent 
that the issues on appeal implicate rulings of fact, we review the factual 
findings of the Family Court to assure that they are sufficiently supported by 
the record and are not clearly erroneous.4  We will not disturb inferences and 
deductions that are supported by the record and that are the product of an 
                                          
 
2 Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families, 963 A.2d 724, 730 
(Del. 2008); Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983). 
3 Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families, 963 A.2d at 730–31; In 
re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995). 
4 Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families, 963 A.2d at 731; In re 
Stevens, 652 A.2d 18, 23 (Del. 1995). 
8 
 
orderly and logical deductive process.5  If the Family Court has correctly 
applied the law, our review is limited to abuse of discretion.6 
Burden of Proof Proper 
The statutory standard for terminating parental rights provides for two 
separate inquiries.7  In the first inquiry, the Family Court must find a 
statutory ground for termination under title 13, section 1103 of the Delaware 
Code.8  In the second inquiry, the Family Court must determine whether 
termination is in the best interests of the child.9  DFS must satisfy both 
inquiries by clear and convincing evidence.10  Before filing the petition to 
terminate parental rights, DFS must also prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that it made bona fide reasonable efforts to reunite parent and 
child.11  
The Mother contends that the Family Court erred by shifting the 
burden of proof at the termination of parental rights hearing from DFS to the 
                                          
 
5 Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families, 963 A.2d at 731; Solis 
v. Tea, 468 A.2d at 1279. 
6 Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families, 963 A.2d at 731; Solis 
v. Tea, 468 A.2d at 1279. 
7 Green v. Div. of Family Servs., 2010 WL 1114928, at *3 (Del. 2010) (quoting Shepherd 
v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536–37 (Del. 2000)). 
8 Id. (quoting Shepherd v. Clements, 752 A.2d at 537). 
9 Id; Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 722(a) (2009). 
10 In re Stevens, 652 A.2d at 23. 
11 Rhineway v. Dept. of Services for Children, Youth, and Their Families, 2005 WL 
2179240, at *2 (Del. Sept. 8, 2005) (citing In re Hanks, 553 A.2d 1171, 1179 (Del.1989); 
In re Burns, 519 A.2d 638, 649 (Del.1986)). 
9 
 
Mother.  The Mother points to an excerpt from the hearing transcript where 
the Family Court stated:  
[F]or purposes of this case I believe once this Court orders that 
services not be provided, then the clock and obligation of the 
Division ends as to whether or not it has to continue to try to 
show the mother or the father is working up to the case plan. 
 
Unfortunately, the Mother’s burden shifting argument cites to that 
isolated excerpt out of context.  A review of the complete hearing transcript 
demonstrates that the Family Court did not shift the burden to DFS.  The 
Family Court first discussed the goals set forth in the case plan.  The Family 
Court then stated: 
I’m satisfied that at this point the Division has established a 
ground for termination and that mother has not successfully 
completed the case plan.  Now there’s been talk about where is 
the cut-off as to what the State has to prove. . . . 
 
Again, obviously the parents are entitled to provide whatever 
evidence they want to show circumstances have since changed 
from the time the Court ordered a change of goal to where we 
are now and there’s obviously been cases where that has been 
done.  But we have to depend on what the evidence is as shown.  
That does not shift the burden from the Division to the parents 
to show that there has been a termination.  Otherwise, in the 
Burns case, the Supreme Court would not have said that the 
Division no longer has to provide services and that the clock 
would stop.  So I think that’s when . . . the Division’s case is 
either made or lost as far as it’s concerned.  Obviously parents 
can provide more evidence.  
 
Thus, a reading of the complete record reflects the Family Court was 
stating that DFS had satisfied its duties with respect to reunification 
10 
 
efforts—not that the burden of proof had shifted from DFS to the Mother.  In 
Burns, we held that if termination of parental rights is sought based on the 
parent’s failure to plan, “the trial court is required to make appropriate 
findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the State’s bona fide efforts to 
meet its own obligations.” 12  We also explained: “[w]e see no fundamental 
error in permitting the agency to discontinue reunification efforts if the State 
has acted properly to terminate parental rights. In such circumstances the 
State assumes an adversarial role vis a vis the parents. To require continued 
reunification efforts, while contending for termination, is illogical.”13   The 
Family Court’s statements at oral argument were entirely consistent with this 
Court’s holding in Burns. 
Moreover, the Family Court’s final opinion demonstrates that it was 
holding DFS to the standard of proving failure to plan by clear and 
convincing evidence.  The Family Court stated that:  “[i]n addition to 
establishing a ground for the termination of parental rights, the Division 
must also establish that it has used reasonable efforts to reunite a parent with 
a child.”  It then held: “[a]fter considering all of the evidence in this case, I 
am satisfied the Division has by clear and convincing evidence established 
that mother has failed to adequately plan for [Child] for over a period of one 
                                          
 
12 Matter of Burns, 519 A.2d 638, 649 (Del. 1986). 
13 Id. 
11 
 
year . . . .”  The record reflects that the Family Court properly placed the 
burden of proof on DFS throughout the termination proceedings.   
Failure to Plan 
 
The Mother also contends that the Family Court’s determination that 
the Mother had failed to plan for the Child was clearly erroneous and not 
sufficiently supported by the record.  Failure to plan is a statutory ground for 
termination under section 1103.   Section 1103(a)(5) provides that this 
ground exists where the parent(s) “are not able, or have failed, to plan 
adequately for the child's physical needs or mental and emotional health and 
development” and one or more additional conditions is met, including that 
“[t]he child has been in the care of the Department or licensed agency for a 
period of 1 year, or for a period of 6 months in the case of a child who 
comes into care as an infant . . . .”14 
The Family Court concluded that the Mother had failed to plan based 
on the uncompleted portions of her case plan and, most significantly, her 
failure to create a parent/child bond with the Child.  Specifically, the Family 
Court explained that the Mother’s visits with the Child were “sporadic,” the 
Child had bonded with Hammond, and the Child viewed Hammond—and 
only Hammond—as his mother.    The Family Court also emphasized the 
                                          
 
14 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(5) (2009). 
12 
 
importance of the failure to bond given the Child’s young age and the two 
years over which the Family Court had attempted reunification.  These 
findings were supported by the hearing testimony from DFS workers, 
Hammond, the Mother, and the two-year proceedings.   The Mother has not 
shown that the Family Court’s “failure to plan” determination was clearly 
erroneous.   
Conclusion 
The judgment of the Family Court is affirmed.