Title: Brodie v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 463, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 17, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANDRE L. BRODIE, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 463, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0504012182 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: January 14, 2011 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
March 17, 2011 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 17th day of March 2011, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and 
the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Andre Brodie, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief.  We find no merit to the 
arguments Brodie raises on appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below. 
(2) 
The record reflects that Brodie was indicted on charges of first degree 
kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, two counts of first degree robbery, second 
degree burglary, second degree assault, using a disguise during the commission of 
a crime, second degree conspiracy, and six counts of possession of a firearm during 
the commission of a felony.  The charges stemmed from a home invasion robbery 
 
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by two masked and armed gunmen, who broke into the apartment of Rafael Perez, 
bound him with duct tape, and held him hostage for several hours demanding 
money and to know the whereabouts of Andre Higgins, a friend of Perez.  While 
the gunmen held Perez hostage, another friend of Perez, Rasheen Bowers, came to 
the apartment and also was held hostage.  The ordeal ended when Perez was able 
to break free and escaped by jumping out a window.  Police were able to link 
Brodie to the crime through information provided by a security guard who had 
taken down the license number of a suspicious vehicle in the area.  The police also 
were able to recover Brodie’s DNA evidence from a face mask left at the crime 
scene.  Four counts of the indictment related to crimes solely against Bowers as the 
victim.1  Bowers did not appear at trial to testify, although Perez did testify about 
statements he heard Bowers make to the gunmen.  The jury convicted Brodie of all 
counts.  The Superior Court sentenced Brodie to thirty-three years at Level V 
incarceration, to be suspended after serving twenty-seven years for decreasing 
levels of supervision. 
                                                 
1 The four counts of the indictment against Brodie involving Bowers as the victim included 
charges of first degree robbery, second degree kidnapping, and two counts of possession of a 
firearm during the commission of a felony  
 
3
(3) 
This Court affirmed Brodie’s convictions and sentence on direct 
appeal.2  In July 2009, Brodie filed his first motion for postconviction relief, which 
was referred to a Superior Court Commissioner for consideration.  In his motion, 
Brodie asserted that: (i) his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights were violated 
when the State failed to call Bowers as a witness at trial, and instead relied solely 
on the hearsay testimony of Perez in order to convict Brodie of the crimes 
involving Bowers; and (ii) his trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective 
for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him.  The 
Commissioner obtained both trial counsel’s and appellate counsel’s affidavits, as 
well as the State’s response thereto.  The Commissioner recommended denial of 
Brodie’s motion.  The Superior Court adopted the Commissioner’s report and 
recommendation.  This appeal followed. 
(4) 
In his opening brief on appeal, Brodie again contends that both trial 
and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise any issue challenging the 
violation of his confrontation rights or challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.  
To the extent that Brodie’s opening brief raises a new issue on appeal,3 we will not 
consider that claim because Brodie failed to raise it to the trial court in the first 
                                                 
2 Brodie v. State, 2009 WL 188855 (Del. Jan. 26, 2009).  On appeal, Brodie asserted that the 
Superior Court violated his right to a speedy trial when it granted a continuance of his trial date 
instead of granting his motion to preclude the State from introducing DNA results into evidence 
when that evidence had not been timely produced during discovery. 
3 Brodie now argues for the first time on appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
investigate and present an alibi defense. 
 
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instance.4    In reviewing the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief, this 
Court first must consider the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing 
any substantive issues.5  Rule 61(i)(3) bars litigation of any claim that was not 
asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction unless the 
defendant can establish cause for the procedural default and prejudice.  Claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, however, are excused from this requirement 
because these claims generally cannot be raised at trial or on direct appeal.6   
(5) 
To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Brodie 
was required to establish that (i) his counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness; and (ii) but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the outcome of his trial and his appeal in this case would have been 
different.7  Brodie was required to set forth and substantiate concrete allegations of 
actual prejudice8 in order to overcome the “strong presumption” that counsel’s 
representation was professionally reasonable.9 
(6) 
Brodie first argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the 
State’s violation of his confrontation clause rights as an issue at trial or on appeal.  
                                                 
4 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (2011). 
5Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
6Duross v. State, 494 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Del. 1985).  For this reason, we reject Brodie’s 
suggestion that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise his trial counsel’s 
ineffectiveness as an issue on direct appeal. 
7 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 692 (1984). 
8 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556. 
9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 
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The gist of Brodie’s argument is that the State could not convict him of crimes 
committed against Bowers without calling Bowers as a witness at trial.  Brodie 
contends that his trial counsel should have objected when the State elicited hearsay 
testimony from Perez about statements made by Bowers during the robbery, which 
was the only evidence to support Brodie’s convictions related to Bowers.10  In 
response to Brodie’s allegation, trial counsel stated in his affidavit that he did not 
object to Perez’s testimony about Bowers’ statements because the statements 
qualified as an “excited utterance” exception to the rule against hearsay.11 
(7) 
We agree with counsel’s assertion. The three foundational 
requirements that must be met before a statement can be admitted pursuant to the 
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule are that: (1) the excitement of the 
declarant must have been precipitated by an event; (2) the statement being offered 
as evidence must have been made during the time period while the excitement of 
the event was continuing; and (3) the statement must be related to the startling 
event.12  In this case, Bowers’ statements qualified as an excited utterance because 
the statements were made while Bowers was under the stress of a robbery, and the 
statements related to the robbery.  Because Bowers’ statements fell within a firmly 
rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the State was not required to produce Bowers 
                                                 
10 Perez testified that Bowers cried out to the gunmen, “Why are you all doing this to me? I don’t 
have anything to do with this…I gave you all the money.  What do you need me for?  You can 
let me go.” 
11 Del. Unif. R. Evid. 803(2) (2011). 
12 Gannon v. State, 704 A.2d 272, 274 (Del. 1998). 
 
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as a witness at trial in order to satisfy the confrontation clause of the Sixth 
Amendment.13  Accordingly, neither trial counsel nor appellate counsel erred in 
failing to challenge the admission of Bowers’ statements. 
(8) 
Brodie’s other contention is that trial counsel and appellate counsel 
were both ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
presented against him at trial.  Brodie asserts that the only evidence presented at 
trial was circumstantial and was insufficient to prove that he was one of the 
masked gunmen.  We disagree.  Contrary to Brodie’s assertions, DNA evidence 
was presented at trial, which linked Brodie to a face mask that was worn by one of 
the gunmen and was left behind at Perez’s apartment.  The police also found duct 
tape in Brodie’s car, as well as batting gloves and boots in his apartment, which 
Perez identified as being worn by one of the masked gunman during the robbery.  
The evidence, including Perez’s testimony, was more than sufficient evidence from 
which any rational juror could have found Brodie guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.14  Accordingly, we find no error in the Superior Court’s rejection of 
Brodie’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
                                                 
13 Id. at 275. 
14 Davis v. State, 453 A.2d 802, 803 (Del. 1982) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 
(1979)). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice