Title: Forshee v. Neuschwander
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP001608
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 2018

2018 WI 62 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP1608 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Richard Forshee, Judith Timmerman, Verlan E. 
Edwards, Robert R. Olson, Mary L. Edwards on 
behalf of Verlan & Mary Edwards LLP and Jean 
Forshee, Janet A. Olson, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Lee Neuschwander and Mary Jo Neuschwander, 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 377 Wis. 2d 162, 900 N.W.2d 100  
PDC No:  2017 WI App 43 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 5, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 23, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Sawyer 
 
JUDGE: 
John M. Yackel 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
KELLY, J. concurs (joining majority except to 
the extent it is inconsistent with this 
concurrence), joined by BRADLEY, R. G., J. 
(Opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, A. W., J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Linda I. Coleman, John R. Carlson, and Spears, 
Carlson, & Coleman, S.C., Washburn.  There was an oral argument 
by Linda I. Coleman. 
 
For the defendants-appellants, there was a brief filed by 
Anne 
Berleman 
Kearney, 
Joseph 
D. 
Kearney, 
and 
Appellate 
 
 
2 
Consulting Group, Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument by Anne 
Berleman Kearney. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the Wisconsin 
REALTORS Association by Cori Moore Lamont and Wisconsin REALTORS 
Association, Madison. 
 
 
2018 WI 62
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP1608 
(L.C. No. 
2016CV4) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Richard Forshee, Judith Timmerman, Verlan E. 
Edwards, Robert R. Olson, Mary L. Edwards on 
behalf of Verlan & Mary Edwards LLP and  
Jean Forshee, Janet A. Olson, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Lee Neuschwander and Mary Jo Neuschwander, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 5, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   Lee and Mary Jo 
Neuschwander purchased property on Hayward Lake in Hayward, 
Wisconsin.  They renovated the large house and began renting it 
to vacationers on both short-term and long-term bases.  Several 
neighboring property owners (the "Neighbors") objected to the 
use of the property as a vacation rental.  They brought suit in 
Sawyer County Circuit Court, claiming that a restrictive 
covenant that encumbers all lots in the subdivision of which 
No. 
2016AP1608   
 
2 
 
Neuschwanders' property is a part, precludes short-term rentals 
of property.1   
¶2 
The Sawyer County Circuit Court held in favor of the 
Neighbors and enjoined Neuschwanders from further short-term 
rentals, except for the Birkebeiner weekend.2  The court of 
appeals reversed.  Forshee v. Neuschwander, 2017 WI App 43, 377 
Wis. 2d 162, 900 N.W.2d 100.  The Neighbors petitioned for 
review, which we granted. 
¶3 
We review a single issue:  Whether the short-term 
rental of the Neuschwanders' property constitutes "commercial 
activity" under the restrictive covenant that encumbers their 
property.  We conclude that the term, "commercial activity," 
which is undefined in the covenant, is ambiguous.  Therefore, we 
narrowly interpret it and conclude that it does not preclude 
either 
short-term 
or 
long-term 
rentals 
of 
Neuschwanders' 
property.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
The Neuschwanders' property was purchased by the 
Louisiana Pacific Corporation in 1984 and 1985.  It consists of 
two lots of a 15-lot subdivision that was originally owned by 
                                                 
1 No objection was made to long-term rentals of the 
Neuschwanders' property.  Although what would be characterized 
as long-term rentals is not apparent from the record before us. 
2 The Honorable John M. Yackel of Sawyer County presided.   
No. 
2016AP1608   
 
3 
 
four individuals.  All lots in the subdivision have been 
encumbered by a restrictive covenant that provides: 
1. No dwelling can be erected on said property 
with a living space of less than 1,000 square 
feet. 
2. There shall be no subdivision of existing 
lots. 
3. There shall be no commercial activity allowed 
on any of said lots. 
¶5 
Louisiana Pacific built the first house in the 
subdivision.  It is a large building that Louisiana Pacific used 
to provide short stays to clients, vendors, politicians and 
employees.  The house was used for everything from single-night 
events to month-long stays, as well as serving as a corporate 
social center. 
¶6 
In 2014, the Neuschwanders bought the property and 
expended a substantial amount of money renovating the large 
house.  While the Neuschwanders used the property themselves on 
occasion, the primary use has been the rental of the property to 
vacationers on both short-term and long-term bases through the 
website VRBO (Vacation Rental By Owner).3   
¶7 
Neuschwanders' property consists of two lots equaling 
2.2 acres and a large house.  It is located on a peninsula in 
Lake Hayward in the City of Hayward, Wisconsin.  It is 
accessible via a narrow, private road that Louisiana Pacific 
built.  There are a number of other residents in the 
                                                 
3 Vacation Rental By Owner, https://www.vrbo.com. 
No. 
2016AP1608   
 
4 
 
subdivision, several of whom filed this action.  Each of their 
homes was built after Louisiana Pacific's construction of the 
now-Neuschwander house.   
¶8 
The Neuschwanders' house is large, about 4,000 square 
feet, and able to sleep up to 15 people.  When renting the 
property, the occupants treat the house in the same way that an 
owner would:  They sleep, cook, eat, and recreate in their 
preferred manner.  During the course of renters' stays the 
Neuschwanders do not provide any services to renters.  For 
example, there is no maid or room service of any type. 
¶9 
The Neighbors' complaint alleged that the restrictive 
covenant that proscribes "commercial activity" was violated by 
short-term rentals of the property.  They sought injunctive 
relief to prevent the Neuschwanders from "further violating the 
restrictions placed upon [their property]."  Upon the parties' 
competing motions for summary judgment, the circuit court agreed 
with the Neighbors and concluded that short-term rentals of the 
Neuschwanders' property violated the restrictive covenant.   
¶10 The circuit court explained that the unstated "purpose 
of the restrictive covenant was to ensure and maintain a quiet 
neighborhood where people would know their neighbors," and that 
the Neuschwanders' short-term rentals violated that purpose.  
The circuit court enjoined the Neuschwanders from using their 
No. 
2016AP1608   
 
5 
 
property for short-term rentals except for the Birkebeiner 
weekend. 4  The Neuschwanders appealed. 
¶11 On 
appeal, 
the 
Neuschwanders 
alleged 
that 
the 
restrictive covenant is ambiguous and that the circuit court 
improperly considered extrinsic evidence in coming to its 
conclusion.  In a published opinion,5 the court of appeals agreed 
with the Neuschwanders, concluding that the restrictive covenant 
is ambiguous and that it did not bar short-term rentals.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
summary judgment and lifted the injunction on the Neuschwanders' 
use of their property. 
¶12 The Neighbors sought review of the court of appeals' 
decision, 
which 
we 
granted. 
 
For 
the 
reasons 
explained 
hereafter, we affirm the court of appeals. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶13 We independently review a grant or denial of summary 
judgment by applying the same standards used in the circuit 
court and the court of appeals, while benefitting from the 
discussions of both courts.  Sands v. Menard, 2017 WI 110, ¶28, 
379 Wis. 2d 1, 904 N.W.2d 789; Dufour v. Progressive Classic 
Ins. Co., 2016 WI 59, ¶12, 370 Wis. 2d 313, 881 N.W.2d 678.  
                                                 
4 The circuit court did not explain why the Birkebeiner 
weekend was excluded from what it held was proscribed by the 
restrictive covenant.   
5 Forshee v. Neuschwander, 2017 WI App 43, 377 Wis. 2d 162, 
900 N.W.2d 100. 
No. 
2016AP1608   
 
6 
 
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the movant has established the right to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2015–16);6 
Sands, 379 Wis. 2d 1, ¶28.   
¶14 Interpretation of a restrictive covenant is a question 
of law that we review independently of prior court decisions.  
Zinda v. Krause, 191 Wis. 2d 154, 165, 528 N.W.2d 55 (Ct. App. 
1995).  Whether the language employed in a restrictive covenant 
is ambiguous is also a question of law that we independently 
decide.  Id.   
B.  Restrictive Covenants 
1.  General principles 
¶15 Covenants come in various forms, and are characterized 
by the nature of the burden or benefit imposed.  Restatement 
(Third) of Property: Servitudes § 1.3(3) cmt. e. (Am. Law Inst. 
2000).  A covenant becomes a servitude on the land if either its 
burden or its benefit runs with the land.  Id. cmt. a.  "A 
restrictive 
covenant 
is 
a 
negative 
covenant 
that 
limits 
permissible uses of land."  Id. § 1.3(3).  
¶16 Public policy of the State of Wisconsin "favors the 
free and unrestricted use of property."  Crowley v. Knapp, 94 
Wis. 2d 421, 434, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980).  "Accordingly, 
restrictions contained in deeds and in zoning ordinances must be 
strictly construed to favor unencumbered and free use of 
                                                 
6 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP1608   
 
7 
 
property."  Id. (citing McKinnon v. Benedict, 38 Wis. 2d 607, 
619, 157 N.W.2d 665 (1968) (further citations omitted)).  
Consequently, in order to be enforceable, deed restrictions that 
limit the free use of property "must be expressed in clear, 
unambiguous, and peremptory terms."  Id. at 435.   
¶17 In 
resolving 
contests 
about 
the 
meaning 
of 
a 
restrictive covenant in a deed, we do not look for amorphous 
general intent, but rather, we determine the meaning of the 
restriction 
by 
the 
words 
actually 
used. 
 
Id. 
at 
438.  
Construction of a covenant is necessary when the covenant is 
ambiguous.  Id. at 434 (citing Bollenbeck v. Vill. of Shorewood 
Hills, 237 Wis. 501, 297 N.W.568 (1941)); see also Peterson v. 
Gales, 191 Wis. 137, 139-40, 210 N.W. 407 (1926) (construing 
"house" as an ambiguous term such that the restrictive covenant 
did not prohibit the use of the property as a machine shop).  If 
the words employed in the restrictive covenant are ambiguous, we 
resolve disputes about the meaning of the restriction in favor 
of the free use of the property.  Crowley, 94 Wis. 2d at 438 n.3 
(citing Schneider v. Eckhoff, 188 Wis. 550, 556, 206 N.W. 838 
(1926) (providing that because "the language used in the 
restriction is doubtful in meaning . . . all doubt, under the 
general rule, should be resolved in favor of the free use [of 
land]")). 
¶18 On the other hand, if the meaning of a restrictive 
covenant clearly can be ascertained from the words of the 
covenant itself, its restrictions will be enforced.  See Zinda, 
191 Wis. 2d at 166; see also Voyager Vill. Prop. Owners Ass'n v. 
No. 
2016AP1608   
 
8 
 
Johnson, 97 Wis. 2d 747, 749, 295 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1980) 
(concluding that "camping equipment" clearly included camping 
trailers).   
2.  The restrictive covenant 
¶19 Currently, 
individuals 
who 
rent 
and 
occupy 
the 
Neuschwanders' residence on both short-term and long-term bases 
use the property in a manner similar to how an owner uses his or 
her own house.  They buy their own food, cook their own meals, 
make their own beds and recreate as the house's location 
provides, just as a property owner would.   
¶20 As we consider those uses, we review a restrictive 
covenant that declares that "[t]here shall be no commercial 
activity allowed on any of said lots."  The key term in the 
covenant, as focused on by the parties in their briefs and at 
oral argument, is "commercial activity."  Therefore, we examine 
whether this term precludes short-term rentals of Neuschwanders' 
property.  
¶21 We consider the term, "commercial activity," not in 
isolation, but in the context of the deed's restrictions as a 
whole.  Zinda, 191 Wis. 2d at 166.  However, reviewing 
"commercial activity" in the context of the two other provisions 
of the restrictive covenant at issue here does not add clarity 
to the term we must interpret.  We can see that the covenanters 
clearly required dwellings to have a minimum size and that lots 
could not be subdivided.  However, those two provisions provide 
no guidance as to what was meant by the "commercial activity" 
that the covenant precludes.  "Commercial activity" is simply an 
No. 
2016AP1608   
 
9 
 
undefined term, whether read separately or in the context of the 
complete covenant.   
¶22 It could be that the drafters were attempting to 
prevent a lot from being used as a lakefront restaurant or a 
filling station for boats.  On the other hand, perhaps a 
homeowner could maintain a daycare for preschool children in his 
or her home without running afoul of the commercial activity 
proscription.  Because we are unable to clearly discern the 
restrictive covenant's meaning through the text of covenant 
itself, we conclude that it is ambiguous.  Id. at 165-66 ("The 
language in a restrictive covenant is ambiguous if it is 
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.").   
¶23 When we determine the ordinary meaning of undefined 
words, a dictionary often is helpful to our construction.  Xcel 
Energy Servs. v. LIRC, 2013 WI 64, ¶30, 349 Wis. 2d 234, 833 
N.W.2d 665 (quoting Cty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶23, 315 
Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571).  We do so here as we construe 
"commercial activity" with the aid of its dictionary definition.   
¶24 Webster's Dictionary defines "commercial" as "engaged 
in work designed for the market," "of or relating to commerce," 
or "characteristic of commerce."  Commercial, Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary 226 (1974 ed.).  "Commerce," then, refers 
to "the exchange or buying and selling of commodities on a large 
scale involving transportation from place to place."  Commerce, 
id.   
¶25 These dictionary definitions posit that "commercial 
activity" includes some form of buying and selling.  However, 
No. 
2016AP1608   
 
10 
 
the dictionary definition is very nonspecific.  One could read 
these definitions to mean that "commercial activity" is limited 
to products bought or sold and subsequently moved to another 
location, thereby excluding purchases and sales that result in 
consumption or use of the purchased item or service in a single 
place.  However, what we take away from our review of dictionary 
definitions is that in the context of the entirety of the 
restrictive covenant on the Neuschwanders' property, we cannot 
clearly decipher the meaning of "commercial activity."  
¶26 Case law requires that in order to be enforceable, 
deed restrictions "must be expressed in clear, unambiguous, and 
peremptory terms."  Crowley, 94 Wis. 2d at 435.  However, we are 
unable to determine precisely what the words in this covenant 
preclude.  Stated otherwise, the covenant presents no "clear, 
unambiguous, and peremptory terms" to follow.  Id.  Accordingly, 
because this restrictive covenant is ambiguous, we must resolve 
the contest before us in favor of the property owners' ability 
to use their property freely.  Id. at 438 n.3.   
¶27 Furthermore, 
support 
for 
interpreting 
"commercial 
activity" narrowly as not precluding use of the property for 
short-term rentals is provided by the way in which the first 
homeowner in the subdivision, Louisiana Pacific, interpreted 
"commercial activity" as it used the same property.  The record 
establishes that since Louisiana Pacific's construction of the 
house in the mid-1980s and throughout its ownership, the house 
No. 
2016AP1608   
 
11 
 
was used by individuals who were not the owners,7 for both short-
term and long-term stays.  Under Louisiana Pacific's ownership, 
guests would arrive at the house and leave anywhere from hours 
later to a full month later.  Therefore, because of Louisiana 
Pacific's corporate status and because of its use of the house, 
Louisiana Pacific's ownership did not further the purpose of 
"ensuring a quiet neighborhood where people would know their 
neighbors," which the circuit court concluded the restrictive 
covenant was enacted to provide.  And finally, if the 
encumbrance actually were placed on the property to proscribe 
short-term stays, as the original owner of the property who 
would 
have 
been 
well-aware 
of 
the 
restrictive 
covenant, 
Louisiana Pacific would not have built and maintained the house 
as it did.    
¶28 Because we cannot specify the precise activities 
included 
in 
the 
definition 
of 
"commercial 
activity," 
we 
interpret the covenant narrowly and conclude that short-term 
rentals are not prohibited.  Therefore, the Neuschwanders are 
not precluded from renting their property for short or long 
periods of time.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals 
decision voiding the injunction issued by the circuit court.  
                                                 
7 It is worth reiterating that Louisiana Pacific is a 
corporation whose business operations includes buying products 
from suppliers and selling products to vendors and consumers, 
and that both suppliers and vendors were entertained at the 
property during Louisiana Pacific's ownership. 
No. 
2016AP1608   
 
12 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶29 Upon our review, we consider a single issue:  Whether 
the short-term rental of the Neuschwanders' property constitutes 
"commercial activity" under the restrictive covenant that 
encumbers 
their 
property. 
 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
term, 
"commercial activity," which is undefined in the covenant, is 
ambiguous.  Therefore, we narrowly interpret it and conclude 
that it does not preclude either short-term or long-term rentals 
of Neuschwanders' property.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2016AP1608.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶30 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  The lead 
opinion1 reaches the right conclusion for the wrong reasons.  The 
decision of the court of appeals should be affirmed, but not 
because "commercial activity" is an ambiguous term that is 
construed in favor of the free and unencumbered use of the 
property.   
¶31 Instead, the decision of the court of appeals should 
be affirmed because the Neuschwanders did not violate the 
unambiguous language of the deed restriction.  
¶32 Because the lead opinion incorrectly concludes that 
the term "commercial activity" is ambiguous, it fails to address 
many of the parties' substantive arguments regarding the 
application of the restrictive covenant to the activity in 
question, namely, the short-term renting of the Neuschwanders' 
property. 
¶33 Accordingly, I write separately to set forth the 
correct legal analysis that should have been relied upon by the 
lead opinion in deciding the instant case. 
I 
¶34 The lead opinion erroneously concludes that the term 
"commercial activity" is ambiguous.  It is not. 
¶35 A restrictive covenant is ambiguous if its language is 
reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation.  Zinda 
v. Krause, 191 Wis. 2d 154, 165-66, 528 N.W.2d 55 (Ct. App. 
1995).  "[I]f the intent of a restrictive covenant can be 
                                                 
1 See ¶76 n.1, infra (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting). 
No.  2016AP1608.ssa 
 
2 
 
clearly ascertained from the covenant itself, the restrictions 
will be enforced."  Zinda, 191 Wis. 2d at 166.  "Intent" does 
not mean "the subjective intent of the drafter," but rather, it 
refers to "the scope and purpose of the covenant as manifest by 
the language used."  Zinda, 191 Wis. 2d at 166.  "'[W]here the 
language used is clear and unambiguous[,] it will be given its 
obvious meaning.'"  Bubolz v. Dane Cty., 159 Wis. 2d 284, 294, 
464 
N.W.2d 67 
(Ct. 
App. 
1990) 
(quoted 
source 
omitted).  
Importantly, language is not rendered ambiguous simply because 
it may be difficult to apply to the facts of a particular case.  
Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 2008 WI 86, ¶20, 
311 Wis. 2d 492, 753 N.W.2d 448. 
¶36 The restrictive covenant in the instant case reads as 
follows:  "There shall be no commercial activity allowed on any 
of said lots."   
¶37 The 
term 
"commercial 
activity" 
is 
reasonably 
susceptible 
to 
only 
one 
interpretation, 
namely, 
the 
interpretation attributed to it by both the circuit court and 
court of appeals.  The term "commercial activity" refers to an 
activity undertaken with the intent to profit.  See Forshee v. 
Neuschwander, 
2017 
WI 
App 
43, 
¶6, 
377 
Wis. 2d 162, 
900 
N.W.2d 100 (stating that the circuit court defined "commercial" 
as "viewed with regard to profit"); Forshee, 377 Wis. 2d 162, 
¶11 (using a dictionary to define "commercial activity" to mean 
"activity of buying and selling, or activity by which [the 
Neuschwanders] make or intend to make a profit"); see also 
Black's Law Dictionary 41 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "commercial 
No.  2016AP1608.ssa 
 
3 
 
activity" as "[a]n activity, such as operating a business, 
conducted to make a profit").   
¶38 The term "commercial activity," although breathtaking 
in scope,2 does not appear to be reasonably susceptible to more 
                                                 
2 Indeed, the restrictive covenant may be so broad that it 
is unenforceable.   
Although the drafters of the restrictive covenant may have 
intended only to prohibit brick-and-mortar businesses and the 
nuisances that come with them (e.g., incessant noise and 
traffic), the language they used in the covenant is not limited 
to a prohibition on brick-and-mortar businesses. 
It is easy to imagine many unobtrusive activities that 
could have been conducted on the property in 1982 with the 
intent to make a profit that would have been prohibited under a 
literal application of the restrictive covenant.  For example, 
could an attorney work on a case from home and bill for the 
time?  Could an architect work on a design at home?  Could an 
artist produce a work of art at home and mail it to the buyer?  
These and many other "commercial activities" might be prohibited 
under the expansive language of the restrictive covenant, even 
though these activities would have had no effect on neighboring 
property owners.  
Has a restrictive covenant that was broad when it was 
written in 1982 become practically boundless with the passage of 
time and the development of technology?  The advent of the 
internet has vastly expanded the universe of activities that can 
be conducted in one's home for profit.  Can online entertainers 
create content from home and upload that content to sites like 
YouTube?  Can an author write an article and upload it to an 
online publication from home?  Can an investor trade stock 
online from home?  Can a person sell belongings on sites like 
Craigslist from home?   
One might reasonably question whether putting the property 
up for sale and showing it to potential buyers would be 
prohibited under a literal application of the restrictive 
covenant's plain language.  However, if the language of the 
restriction is unambiguous, the language controls.  Tufail v. 
Midwest Hospitality, LLC, 2013 WI 62, ¶¶25-26, 348 Wis. 2d 631, 
833 N.W.2d 586.   
No.  2016AP1608.ssa 
 
4 
 
than one interpretation.  Notably, the lead opinion does not 
posit a second reasonable interpretation.  Instead, the lead 
opinion confuses ambiguous language with unambiguous language 
that is difficult to apply to the facts of the instant case.3   
¶39 Because the language of the restrictive covenant is 
reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, I now apply that 
unambiguous language to the facts of the instant case. 
II 
A 
¶40 First, 
it 
must 
be 
determined 
whether 
the 
Neuschwanders' 
short-term 
rentals 
qualify 
as 
"commercial 
activity."  The short-term rentals constitute "commercial 
activity" if the Neuschwanders engaged in the short-term rentals 
for the purpose of making a profit.   
¶41 The conclusion that the short-term rentals qualify as 
"commercial activity" is unavoidable.  As the court of appeals 
observed, "it is undisputed that the Neuschwanders make money, 
and intend to make money, and by inference a profit, by renting 
their property to others on a short-term basis." 
¶42 Second, in order for the "commercial activity" to be 
prohibited by the restrictive covenant, it must be determined 
                                                 
3 See Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 2008 WI 
86, 
¶20, 
311 
Wis. 2d 492, 
753 
N.W.2d 448 
("An 
otherwise 
unambiguous provision is not rendered ambiguous solely because 
it is difficult to apply the provision to the facts of a 
particular case."). 
No.  2016AP1608.ssa 
 
5 
 
that the "commercial activity" is taking place "on" the 
property.4 
¶43 In the instant case, there is no "commercial activity" 
taking place on the Neuschwanders' property.  The Neuschwanders 
are correct that, as a factual matter, the only activity that 
occurs on the property is residential, not commercial, in 
nature. 
¶44 The Neighbors' reliance on the federal district court 
decision Gibbs v. Williams is misplaced.5  The court in Gibbs was 
tasked with interpreting language that is materially different 
than the language at issue in the instant case. 
¶45 In Gibbs, the court interpreted a restrictive covenant 
that stated that the subject property "shall not at any time be 
used 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
any . . . business 
of 
any 
description . . . ."  Gibbs v. Williams, No. 14-cv-420-jdp, 2015 
WL 5440628, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 14, 2015) (emphasis added). 
¶46 If the property at issue in the instant case were 
subject to the language of the restrictive covenant discussed in 
Gibbs, the Neuschwanders' short-term rentals would likely 
violate the restrictive covenant.  The Neuschwanders' property 
is being used for commercial activity in that the temporary use 
                                                 
4 There is no reasonable basis for concluding that "on," in 
the context of the restrictive covenant, means anything other 
than physically on the property. 
5 Gibbs v. Williams, No. 14-cv-420-jdp, 2015 WL 5440628, at 
*1 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 14, 2015). 
No.  2016AP1608.ssa 
 
6 
 
and enjoyment of the property is the "thing" being bought and 
sold. 
¶47 However, the restrictive covenant in the instant case 
is interested in the nature of the specific activities that 
occur on the property.  In the instant case, the Neuschwanders' 
activity involves the property, but it is not conducted on the 
property.  To conclude otherwise would be to impermissibly 
rewrite the language of the restrictive covenant.6 
B 
¶48 The Neighbors cannot rewrite the unambiguous language 
of the restrictive covenant so that it focuses on the use of the 
property as opposed to focusing on the nature of the activities 
that occur on the property. 
¶49 However, to the extent the restrictive covenant 
directs the court to focus on the use of the property, Wisconsin 
courts focus on how the property is used by the occupants rather 
than how the property is used by the owners. 
¶50 The court of appeals' decisions in State ex rel. 
Harding v. Door County Board of Adjustment7 and Heef Realty & 
Investments, LLP v. City of Cedarburg Board of Appeals8 are 
                                                 
6 Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wis. Gas Co., 2003 WI 38, ¶12, 
261 Wis. 2d 70, 661 N.W.2d 776 (courts cannot insert into a 
contract what has been omitted, nor can they rewrite a contract 
made by the parties). 
7 State ex rel. Harding v. Door Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 125 
Wis. 2d 269, 371 N.W.2d 403 (Ct. App. 1985). 
8 Heef Realty & Invs., LLP v. City of Cedarburg Bd. of 
Appeals, 2015 WI App 23, 361 Wis. 2d 185, 861 N.W.2d 797. 
No.  2016AP1608.ssa 
 
7 
 
instructive, even though they involve zoning ordinances rather 
than restrictive covenants. 
¶51 In Harding, a property owner sought a building permit 
that would allow him to build a time-share property owned by 13 
families, each of which would have rights to occupy the property 
for four weeks per year.  Harding, 125 Wis. 2d at 270.  The 
Board claimed that this proposed use would violate a zoning code 
ordinance that restricts the use of the property to single-
family dwellings.  Harding, 125 Wis. 2d at 270. 
¶52 The court of appeals held that the ordinance did not 
unambiguously prohibit the property's use as a time-share.  In 
so holding, the court focused on how the time-share would be 
used by its occupants (i.e., residential use) rather than how 
the property was being used by the owners (i.e., commercial 
use): 
The building's purpose is to provide living quarters 
for a family.  The proposed building's floor plan has 
a kitchen, dining room, and living room in addition to 
four bedrooms.  The building would be occupied 
exclusively by one family.  Although a different 
family would occupy the building each week, that one 
family would occupy the building to the exclusion of 
the other twelve families. 
Harding, 125 Wis. 2d at 271. 
¶53 In Heef Realty, the owners of two homes initiated a 
lawsuit when the Board told them that they could not use their 
homes for short-term rentals.  Heef Realty, 361 Wis. 2d 185, ¶2.  
The Board claimed that because the homes were located in a 
"single-family residential zone" that permits only "single-
No.  2016AP1608.ssa 
 
8 
 
family dwellings," short-term rentals were not allowed.  Heef 
Realty, 361 Wis. 2d 185, ¶5. 
¶54 The court of appeals held that the zoning ordinance 
did not prohibit short-term rentals of the homes at issue.  In 
so holding, the court of appeals relied heavily on Harding, 
noting that "the cases are essentially the same."  Heef Realty, 
361 Wis. 2d 185, ¶10.  Like in Harding, the court of appeals 
focused on how the property would be used by its occupants 
rather than focusing on the commercial nature of the owners' 
short-term rentals: 
The properties here are designed for use by one 
family, just like the property in Harding.  The 
Ordinance here permits single-family dwellings in a 
single-family residential zone, just like in Harding.  
And, just like in Harding, only one family will use 
each home at a time. 
Heef Realty, 361 Wis. 2d 185, ¶10.9 
¶55 The court of appeals in both Harding and Heef Realty 
could not have reached the same conclusions if it had focused on 
how the property was being used by its owners instead of how the 
property was being used by its occupants.  The property owners 
in both cases were using the properties for commercial purposes 
(i.e., 
renting 
for 
profit), 
not 
residential 
purposes.  
                                                 
9 The court of appeals also noted "that the home [in 
Harding] was designed with a kitchen, dining room, living room, 
and four bedrooms.  This focus on the daily living connotation 
of 
'residential' 
gibes 
[sic] 
with 
the 
circuit 
court's 
explanation that what makes a home a residence is its use 'to 
sleep, eat, shower, relax, things of that nature.'"  Heef Realty 
& Invs., LLP v. City of Cedarburg Bd. of Appeals, 2015 WI App 
23, ¶12, 361 Wis. 2d 185, 861 N.W.2d 797. 
No.  2016AP1608.ssa 
 
9 
 
Nonetheless, because the occupants were using the properties for 
residential purposes, the court of appeals in Harding and Heef 
Realty both concluded that the ordinances at issue were not 
violated by the property owners' commercial use of the property 
for short-term rentals. 
¶56 The court of appeals decision in Bubolz v. Dane County 
is also instructive, even though it does not involve short-term 
rentals.10   
¶57 In 
Bubolz, 
the 
property-owning 
defendants 
were 
operating an electrical contracting business out of their home.  
Bubolz, 159 Wis. 2d at 291.  The property on which their home 
was located was subject to a deed restriction that specified 
that "[n]ot more than one (1) single family residence shall be 
constructed on said premises at a cost of not less than 
$20,000.00."  Bubolz, 159 Wis. 2d at 290.  The property-owning 
defendants argued that the restrictive covenant pertained to and 
limited only what could be constructed on the property.  Bubolz, 
159 Wis. 2d at 293.  They contended that the restrictive 
covenant did not pertain to or limit their use of the property 
for a commercial purpose.  Bubolz, 159 Wis. 2d at 293. 
¶58 The court of appeals rejected the property-owning 
defendants' argument.  First, the court of appeals held that the 
restrictive covenant at issue extended to the use of the 
property.  Bubolz, 159 Wis. 2d at 294.  Then, as it did in 
Harding, the court of appeals focused on how the property was 
                                                 
10 Bubolz v. Dane Cty., 159 Wis. 2d 284, 464 N.W.2d 67 (Ct. 
App. 1990). 
No.  2016AP1608.ssa 
 
10 
 
being used by the occupants.  In Bubolz, the occupants happened 
to also be the property owners who were conducting the 
electrical contracting business out of their home.  Thus, in 
Bubolz, the occupants/owners were using the property for both 
residential and commercial purposes.  Bubolz, 159 Wis. 2d at 
294.  This is in contrast to the occupants of the properties in 
Harding and Heef Realty, who used the properties at issue for 
residential purposes only. 
¶59 Accordingly, to the extent the restrictive covenant 
directs the court to focus on the use of the property rather 
than on the nature of the activities occurring on the property, 
Wisconsin courts focus on how the property is used by the 
occupants, not how the property is used by the owners. 
III 
¶60 In sum, because the lead opinion errs at the outset by 
concluding that the term "commercial activity" is ambiguous, it 
embarks down the wrong analytical path, leaving many questions 
unanswered.   
¶61 I concur with the mandate of the court, but I write 
separately to set forth the correct legal analysis that the 
court would have otherwise had to engage in but for its mistaken 
conclusion that the term "commercial activity" is ambiguous. 
 
No.  2016AP1608.dk 
 
1 
 
¶62 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  "There shall be no 
commercial activity allowed on any of said lots."  Sentences 
become unnecessarily convoluted when they speak in the passive 
voice 
through 
split 
verb 
phrases, 
as 
this 
one 
does.  
Fortunately, neither of these foibles is, strictly speaking, 
ungrammatical.1  And that means the quoted sentence will show us 
its plain meaning if we just apply a little grammatical elbow-
grease. 
¶63 We start, as would all good grade-school students, 
with identifying the sentence's subject.  Unfortunately, authors 
make this first step more difficult when they use the passive 
voice.  Such a formulation allows them to hide the actor (the 
sentence's grammatical subject) by replacing it with what would 
have been the sentence's grammatical object if they had written 
the sentence in the active voice.  To identify the subject of 
this sentence, we first must rearrange it into its active-voice 
form so we can find the grammatical object.  Thus rearranged, 
the restrictive covenant would read:  "Lot owners[2] shall allow 
no commercial activity on any of said lots."  The verb phrase in 
this formulation is "shall allow," which makes "commercial 
                                                 
1 We do, however, generally frown on them for their 
obscurantism. 
2 "Lot owners" were the hidden actors of the restrictive 
covenant.  Because they were hidden, identifying them requires a 
little speculation.  But only a little.  Lot owners, of course, 
are the only ones realistically capable of allowing commercial 
activity on the lots, so it's a pretty safe guess that they are 
the ones to whom the covenant applies. 
No.  2016AP1608.dk 
 
2 
 
activity" the verb's direct object.3  The passive voice 
transformation, therefore, moved "commercial activity" to the 
subject slot. 
¶64 The passive voice not only swaps the sentence's 
subject and object, it also transforms the verb phrase ("shall 
allow") by adding the verb "to be" while simultaneously putting 
the existing verb into the past tense.  Here, the author placed 
the sentence's subject (commercial activity) in the middle of 
the verb phrase, which made it read as follows:  "shall be no 
commercial activity allowed."  But after setting aside the 
sentence's subject (commercial activity) for a moment, the verb 
phrase easily resolves to "shall be allowed." 
¶65 Now that we have accounted for the subject and verb 
phrase, we may readily identify the remainder of the sentence as 
a simple, but critical, prepositional phrase:  "on any of said 
lots."  Prepositional phrases come in two varieties——adjectival 
and adverbial.  As the names imply, they provide additional 
information about either a noun or a verb.  Here, the 
prepositional phrase is adjectival because the preposition 
provides 
identifying 
information 
about 
the 
noun 
phrase 
"commercial activity."  That is to say, the prepositional phrase 
tells us the sentence does not apply to all "commercial 
activity," 
but 
only 
to 
"commercial 
activity" 
as 
further 
                                                 
3 "[N]o," as it appears immediately before the direct 
object, is simply a word of negation.  Grammatically, an author 
may accomplish the negation either by using "no" in conjunction 
with the object to be negated, or "not" in conjunction with the 
verb.  The meanings are equivalent. 
No.  2016AP1608.dk 
 
3 
 
described by the prepositional phrase.  The preposition——"on"——
is locational, which tells us the sentence's subject is not 
allowed 
only 
when 
it 
occurs 
where 
identified 
by 
the 
prepositional phrase. 
¶66 When we stitch all of this together, the restrictive 
covenant says that no "commercial activity" (the subject) "shall 
be allowed" (the verb) "on any of said lots" (the adjectival 
prepositional phrase).  The covenant does not prohibit all 
commercial activity, but only so much of it that takes place "on 
any of said lots."  It says nothing about what may be done 
"with" the property, or "to" the property, but only what may be 
done "on" the property.  That is to say, the covenant's 
restriction is locational. 
* 
¶67 This 
grammatical 
exercise 
makes 
the 
restrictive 
covenant really quite easy to understand.  It also unequivocally 
prevents the covenant from saying what the Forshees want it to 
say.  The Forshees assert that the Neuschwanders engage in 
commercial 
activity 
when 
they 
rent 
their 
property 
(the 
"Property"), something they believe the restrictive covenant 
expressly forbids.  But they can make the covenant say this only 
if they ignore either the nature of the activity taking place on 
the Property, or the prepositional phrase. 
¶68 Because the restrictive covenant is a location-
specific prohibition of commercial activity, our application of 
its language must begin with surveying what is happening on the 
Property.  As the court's opinion aptly describes, renters 
No.  2016AP1608.dk 
 
4 
 
"sleep, cook, eat, and recreate in their preferred manner" on 
the Property.  Majority op., ¶8.  If this is the "renting" about 
which the Forshees complain, then substituting that activity 
into the covenant should produce a meaning that is satisfactory 
to them.  Here is how it would read:  "There shall be no 
sleeping, cooking, eating, or recreating commercial activity 
allowed on any of said lots."  If the Forshees stopped a renter 
in the middle of his meal to ask him what he was doing, he would 
not say he was renting.  He would say he was eating.  And if the 
renter had the temerity to stop the Forshees in the middle of 
their meal to ask what they were doing, they would not say they 
were owning.  The renters obtained the right to sleep, cook, 
eat, 
and 
recreate 
on 
the 
Property 
through 
the 
rental 
transaction, but "renting" does not describe what they do on the 
Property.  We could not read the restrictive covenant this way 
without disastrous, unintended consequences.  If we were to 
conclude that what the renters do on the Property comprises 
"commercial activity," then the Neuschwanders' neighbors had 
best pack their bags because the owners and renters are doing 
the same thing. 
¶69 Even though the covenant's restrictions only apply to 
what occurs "on any of said lots," the Forshees are not actually 
interested in what happens there.  They are quite adamant, in 
fact, that "[w]hat the customers do while on the property is 
irrelevant."  Instead, they say, it is the Neuschwanders' act of 
renting the Property that violates the covenant.  If that is 
what the covenant prohibits, plugging that activity into the 
No.  2016AP1608.dk 
 
5 
 
restrictive covenant should produce the meaning favored by the 
Forshees.  That substitution would have the covenant read, 
"There shall be no renting of the Property commercial activity 
allowed on any of said lots."  "Renting of the Property," of 
course, simply refers to the transaction by which one obtains 
the right to use the Property for a defined period of time, just 
as purchasing the Property refers to the transaction by which 
one obtains ownership of the Property. 
¶70 So if the Forshees are right——that "renting" is a 
commercial activity to which the covenant refers——then the 
covenant would merely prohibit the rental transaction from 
taking place on the Property.  That, of course, is not what they 
want the covenant to say.  But it could say that if we ignored 
the prepositional phrase.  The Forshees' desired effect would 
obtain if we further modified the covenant to say, "There shall 
be no renting of the Property allowed on any of said lots."  But 
that would make surplusage of the prepositional phrase, which we 
avoid whenever possible.  See Maryland Arms Ltd. P'ship v. 
Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶45, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 ("When 
possible, contract language should be construed to give meaning 
to every word, 'avoiding constructions which render portions of 
a contract meaningless, inexplicable or mere surplusage.'" 
(quoted source omitted)). 
¶71 The restrictive covenant's plain meaning simply does 
not say what the Forshees want it to say.  No grammatical 
reading of the covenant could prevent the Neuschwanders from 
renting their property——so long as the renters do not engage in 
No.  2016AP1608.dk 
 
6 
 
"commercial activity" while residing there.  The Forshees do not 
appear to be claiming that activities like sleeping, cooking, 
eating, and recreating are commercial in nature.  Nor could 
they——if such activity is commercial, the Forshees could no more 
engage in it than the renters.  
¶72 After 
applying 
a 
few 
rules 
of 
grammar 
to 
the 
restrictive covenant, the sentence disclosed more than enough of 
its plain meaning to resolve this case.  Instead of employing 
this grammatical analysis, the court sought a comprehensive 
definition of "commercial activity."  When it was unable to 
discover one, it declared the phrase ambiguous, and used a rule 
of construction to resolve the covenant's language against the 
Forshees.  If we should find our covenant construction efforts 
in extremis, we certainly may have resort to this lifeline.  We 
shouldn't grab for it, however, unless we really are in 
extremis.  We weren't, and we could have (and should have) 
stated the covenant's meaning without it.  Therefore, I 
respectfully concur and join the majority except to the extent 
it is inconsistent with this concurrence. 
¶73 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2016AP1608.awb 
 
1 
 
¶74 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The restrictive 
covenant at issue provides, "There shall be no commercial 
activity allowed on any of said lots."  Although the application 
of the phrase "commercial activity" in some contexts may render 
the statute ambiguous, it is not ambiguous here. 
¶75 The Neuschwanders purchased the property in 2014, 
renovated it, and have primarily rented it out to vacationers.  
Lead op., ¶6.  In 2015, the Neuschwanders received $55,784.93 in 
rent including taxes and paid $4,973.81 in room tax to the City 
of Hayward. 
¶76 To run such a lucrative enterprise is, in my view, 
plainly "commercial activity."  It relates to commerce and has 
profit as its chief aim.  Accordingly, I reach a conclusion 
contrary to the lead opinion1 and respectfully dissent. 
                                                 
1 I use the term "lead" opinion for two reasons.  First, I 
am concerned that without this cue, the reader may mistakenly 
believe that the lead opinion has any precedential value.  
Although six justices join in the mandate of the opinion to 
affirm the court of appeals (Roggensack, C.J., joined by 
Abrahamson, J., Ziegler, J., Gableman, J., Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., and Kelly, J.), it represents the reasoning of only 
three justices (Roggensack, C.J., joined by Ziegler, J., and 
Gableman, J.).  Justices Abrahamson, Rebecca Grassl Bradley and 
Kelly joined in the mandate, but they would rely on contrary 
reasoning. 
Although set forth in three separate opinions, four 
justices disagree with the reasoning of the lead opinion.  
Contrary to the lead opinion, four justices determine that the 
restrictive covenant is unambiguous (Abrahamson, J., Ann Walsh 
Bradley, J., Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., and Kelly, J.). 
(continued) 
No.  2016AP1608.awb 
 
2 
 
I 
¶77 The lead opinion concludes that the term "commercial 
activity" as used in the restrictive covenant is ambiguous.  
Lead op., ¶¶21-22.  It therefore construes the words in favor of 
the property owners' ability to use their property freely.  Id., 
¶26.  Accordingly, in the lead opinion's view, the restrictive 
covenant does not prohibit any short-term or long-term rentals 
of the Neuschwanders' property.  Id., ¶28. 
¶78 A restrictive covenant will be enforced if the 
intention of the parties is clearly shown in the covenant.  
Voyager Vill. Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Johnson, 97 Wis. 2d 747, 
749, 295 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1980).  Intent does not refer to 
the subjective intent of the drafter, but to the scope and 
purpose of the covenant as manifest by the language used.  Zinda 
v. Krause, 191 Wis. 2d 154, 166, 528 N.W.2d 55 (Ct. App. 1995). 
¶79 Further construction of a covenant is only necessary 
when it is ambiguous.  Voyager Village, 97 Wis. 2d at 749.  In 
interpreting the language of a restrictive covenant, we apply 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words.  See Tufail v. 
Midwest Hosp., LLC, 2013 WI 62, ¶28, 348 Wis. 2d 631, 833 
                                                                                                                                                             
Second, I use the term "lead" opinion because although it 
is undefined in our Internal Operating Procedures, its use here 
is consistent with past description.  We have said "that a lead 
opinion is one that states (and agrees with) the mandate of a 
majority of the justices, but represents the reasoning of less 
than a majority of the participating justices."  State v. Lynch, 
2016 WI 66, ¶143, 371 Wis.2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 (Abrahamson & Ann 
Walsh Bradley, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(citing Hoffer Props., LLC v. State, Dep't of Transp., 2016 WI 
5, 366 Wis.2d 372, 874 N.W.2d 533). 
No.  2016AP1608.awb 
 
3 
 
N.W.2d 586; Solowicz v. Forward Geneva Nat'l., LLC, 2010 WI 20, 
¶34, 323 Wis. 2d 556, 780 N.W.2d 111 (explaining that ordinary 
contract rules apply to interpreting the terms of a restrictive 
covenant). 
¶80 "Commercial activity" is susceptible to a clear 
definition.  As the lead opinion does, I turn to the dictionary 
for assistance.  The dictionary includes as definitions of 
"commercial" the rather obvious "[o]f or relating to commerce" 
and the more incisive "[h]aving profit as a chief aim."  
American Heritage Dictionary 380 (3d ed. 1992).  I accept the 
plain meaning of these words, and therefore determine that the 
covenant is unambiguous. 
¶81 Applying 
the 
restrictive 
covenant's 
unambiguous 
language to the specific activity in this case, I conclude that 
the short-term vacation rental activity here is prohibited.  The 
record in this case indicates that the Neuschwanders profited 
handsomely from the rental of their house.  They further paid 
substantial room tax to the City of Hayward and have held the 
property out as a lodge available for rent in advertisements. 
¶82 A 
profit 
motive 
was 
the 
entire 
basis 
of 
the 
relationship.  The Neuschwanders did not operate the property as 
a single or two family dwelling.  It was advertised to sleep up 
to 15 people with a maximum of eight cars, regardless of the 
family relationship.  Instead, they conducted a short term 
transient lodging business and used the property as part of that 
business enterprise.  Both the Neuschwanders and their renters 
engaged in this enterprise.  The very presence of the renters on 
No.  2016AP1608.awb 
 
4 
 
the property is the result of a commercial exchange.  Absent 
payment, renters would not be able to engage in any activities 
on the property, such as eating, sleeping, and recreating. 
¶83 Additionally, the Neuschwanders acquired the property 
in the first instance through a 1031 tax exchange.  See 26 
U.S.C. § 1031.  A 1031 tax exchange is a process by which 
certain 
properties 
may 
be 
exchanged 
without 
the 
I.R.S. 
recognizing a gain or loss.  See id.  The catch is that the 
property exchanged must be "held for productive use in a trade 
or business or for investment."  Id.  By seeking the tax 
advantage that accompanies a 1031 exchange, the Neuschwanders 
tacitly acknowledge that the property is used for "business," or 
in other words, "commercial activity." 
II 
¶84 Although I conclude that the Neuschwanders' rental of 
their property is circumscribed by this restrictive covenant 
because their activity relates to commerce and has profit as its 
chief aim, I do not reach my conclusion without pause. 
¶85 As the lead opinion observes, the breadth of the 
restrictive covenant at issue raises concern.  See lead op., 
¶22.  It could be read to proscribe selling homemade crafts, 
writing a blog post for compensation, or keeping any kind of 
home office.  On the other hand, it also could be that these 
activities would be considered de minimus or "incidental to 
No.  2016AP1608.awb 
 
5 
 
their occupation of the premises as their single family 
residence."2  But these facts are not before us. 
¶86 Although some activities may be close calls as to 
whether 
they 
constitute 
"commercial 
activity," 
the 
Neuschwanders' vacation rental is not a close call.  The 
language of the covenant is unambiguous and its application to 
the Neuschwanders does not render an absurd result. 
¶87 The breadth of the restrictive covenant, however, is 
not the only concern.  So, too, is the apparent breadth of the 
lead opinion's holding.  Its interpretation of "commercial 
activity" has ramifications well beyond the facts of this case.  
Likely there are a myriad of restrictive covenants that use the 
same or a similar phrase.  Are all of those now void?  The lead 
opinion seems to provide a blanket statement favoring the 
property owner's rights over the rights of others.  Yet, it 
supports its conclusion with only a truncated analysis that does 
not consider the larger context in which it fits. 
¶88 The breadth of the lead opinion's holding stands in 
contrast to the dearth of its analysis.  Without sufficient 
explanation, the lead opinion extols the property rights of the 
                                                 
2 See Bubolz v. Dane Cty., 159 Wis. 2d 284, 295-96, 464 
N.W.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1990) (injunction against violation of 
restrictive covenant did not prohibit a residents from engaging 
in business activities that are "incidental to their occupation 
of the premises as their single family residence."); see also 
Joyce v. Conway, 7 Wis. 2d 247, 251, 96 N.W.2d 530 (1959) 
(explaining that acquiescence to past violations does not 
deprive affected property owners of the right to enforce later 
violations of a restrictive covenant). 
No.  2016AP1608.awb 
 
6 
 
Neuschwanders at the expense of other rights and other property 
owners. 
¶89 Pivotal to the lead opinion's analysis is its premise 
that "[p]ublic policy of the state of Wisconsin 'favors the free 
and unrestricted use of property.'"  Lead op., ¶16 (quoting 
Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 434, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980)).  
But what about the public policy of this state that favors 
freedom to contract?  Because of the import of freedom to 
contract, courts in the past have supported the right of 
property owners to create and enforce covenants affecting their 
own property.  See Solowicz, 323 Wis. 2d 556, ¶¶34-35.  Which 
right should prevail under these circumstances and why?  The 
lead opinion does not explain. 
¶90 Likewise, the lead opinion fails to explain why the 
property right of the Neuschwanders should prevail over the 
property rights of their neighbors.  Concerns have arisen 
regarding traffic, noise, and other disturbances.  Here the 
property is comprised of a house located on 2.2 acres.  What 
about the rights of those where the rental is not so distant, 
but rather the front doors are separated by only a few feet?  
The lead opinion is silent. 
¶91 Although espousing to be written narrowly,3 the lead 
opinion instead appears to write large, without consideration or 
analysis of the competing rights and implications of its 
decision.  This is particularly problematic because the rapid 
                                                 
3 See lead op., ¶3. 
No.  2016AP1608.awb 
 
7 
 
development of the short-term rental industry appears to have 
outpaced the development of the law.4  State and local 
legislative bodies5 as well as courts6 have only recently been 
grappling 
with 
the 
weighty 
issues 
that 
attend 
to 
this 
enterprise. 
¶92 Some courts addressing issues akin to that which we 
address today employ an analysis and reach a conclusion similar 
to that set forth in this dissent.  See Eager v. Peasley, __ 
N.W.2d __, 322 Mich. App. 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2017); Vonderhaar 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Fruchter v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of 
Hurley, 133 A.D.3d 1174, 1175 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) ("The Town 
Code does not appear to have been updated to consider the 
ramifications from the emergence of the so-called 'sharing 
economy,' which includes the type of house sharing or short-term 
rentals recently made popular by various platforms on the 
Internet . . . ."). 
5 See 2017 Wis. Act 59, §§ 985L, 985r (creating Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0615(1)(bs) and (5)); Wis. Stat. § 66.0615(5) (requiring 
"lodging marketplaces" to register with the department of 
revenue, and to collect sales and use tax, as well as room tax, 
if applicable); see also Wis. Stat. § 66.0615(1)(bs) (defining 
"lodging marketplace" as "an entity that provides a platform 
through which an unaffiliated 3rd party offers to rent a short-
term rental to an occupant and collects the consideration for 
the rental from the occupant."); see also Vanessa Katz, 
Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1067 
(2015). 
6 As an example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently 
accepted review of Slice of Life, LLC v. Hamilton Twp. Zoning 
Bd., 164 A.3d 633 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017), review granted 180 A.3d 
367 (Pa. 2018).  There, the question to be addressed is set 
forth as:  "Whether the Commonwealth Court disregarded the 
binding precedent of this Court, set forth in the case Albert v. 
Zoning Hearing Bd. of North Abington Twp., 578 Pa. 439, 854 A.2d 
401 (2004), by finding that the purely transient use of a 
property as part of a commercial short-term vacation rental 
business was a permitted use in a residential zoning district?" 
No.  2016AP1608.awb 
 
8 
 
v. Lakeside Place Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., No. 1021-CA-002193-MR, 
unpublished slip op. (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2014).  Others 
embrace a contrary path and conclusion.  See Santa Monica Beach 
Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v, Acord, 219 So.3d 111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2017); Wilkinson v. Chiwawa Cmtys. Ass'n, 327 P.3d 614 
(Wash. 2014). 
¶93 As new arguments are developed, new fact situations 
presented, and new legislation passed, the law will continue to 
evolve in this area.  Restrictive covenants will be only one 
part of this evolution, as they intersect and overlap with the 
enforcement of local zoning ordinances that attempt to regulate 
this rapidly growing enterprise.  There will inevitably be more 
litigation surrounding short-term rentals. 
¶94 This court paints with a broad brush where a more 
nuanced analysis is required.  Lest by the apparent breadth of 
its 
decision, 
the 
lead 
opinion 
unintentionally 
provides 
inflexible answers to questions not yet presented.  A more 
nuanced analysis, at least recognizing the important rights it 
is subjugating, together with an explanation of why, may provide 
guidance to future courts and litigants as they grapple with the 
developing issues that attend this burgeoning industry. 
¶95 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2016AP1608.awb 
 
1