Title: Commonwealth v. Lepage
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12571
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 17, 2024

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SJC-12571 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  BRANDYN LEPAGE. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     January 8, 2024. - May 17, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Robbery.  Firearms.  Cellular 
Telephone.  Practice, Criminal, Disclosure of evidence, 
Assistance of counsel, Motion to suppress, New trial, 
Capital case.  Search and Seizure, Expectation of privacy.  
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Privacy, Right to 
obtain evidence, Assistance of counsel.  Due Process of 
Law, Disclosure of evidence.  Evidence, Exculpatory, 
Disclosure of evidence.  Privacy. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 20, 2012. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Renee 
P. Dupuis, J.; the cases were tried before Robert J. Kane, J.; 
and a motion for a new trial, filed on February 10, 2020, was 
heard by Dupuis, J. 
 
 
 
Chauncey Wood (Rachel Chunnha also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Julianne Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  On September 29, 2012, the defendant, Brandyn 
Lepage, shot and killed Aja Pascual in her car.  After a jury 
trial, the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree 
on the theory of felony-murder.1  Before us is the defendant's 
consolidated appeal from his conviction and from the denial of 
his motion for a new trial, in which the defendant principally 
challenges the denials of his two pretrial motions to suppress 
certain cell phone records and other evidence related thereto.  
The defendant raises several arguments centered around the 
theory the police illegally obtained call detail records2 from 
his cell phone, as well as historical cell site location 
 
1 The jury also convicted the defendant of unlawful 
possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and armed 
robbery, G. L. c. 265, § 17; the trial judge dismissed the armed 
robbery conviction under the merger doctrine. 
 
2 "Call detail records" consist of time-stamped logs of "[1] 
the telephone numbers from which the cellular telephone received 
incoming calls [and text messages] and [2] the telephone numbers 
to which outgoing calls were made [and text messages sent] from 
the cellular telephone."  Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 
255, 269 (2014).  Any reference to "call detail records" within 
this opinion is not to be construed as including any cell site 
location information (CSLI) that may appear in such records. 
 
3 
 
information (CSLI)3 and ping data,4 and then used this 
information to develop the case against him.   
We conclude the police did not illegally obtain the 
defendant's call detail records, and we adopt the motion judge's 
findings that the police did not use the CSLI or ping data in 
the manner the defendant alleges.  Additionally, after plenary 
review of the record, we find no basis to exercise our 
extraordinary powers under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the 
verdict or grant a new trial.  Therefore, we affirm the 
defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree and 
likewise affirm the denial of his motion for a new trial.5 
 
3 CSLI "refers to a cellular telephone service record or 
records that contain information identifying the base station 
towers and sectors that receive transmissions from a [cellular] 
telephone.  Historical CSLI refers to CSLI relating to and 
generated by cellular telephone use that has already occurred at 
the time of the order authorizing the disclosure of such data" 
(quotations and citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Augustine, 
467 Mass. 230, 231 n.1 (2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 
448 (2015). 
 
4 "On request, a cellular service provider (service 
provider) can cause a cell phone to transmit its global 
positioning system (GPS) coordinates to the provider, in a 
process known as 'pinging.'"  Commonwealth v. Almonor, 482 Mass. 
35, 36 n.1 (2019). 
 
5 The defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a 
firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), without the benefit of 
requiring the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt he 
lacked a firearm license.  See Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 
Mass. 666, 690, S.C., 493 Mass. 1 (2023).  Accordingly, we 
vacate that conviction and remand for a new trial as to that 
indictment.  See Guardado, 493 Mass. at 12. 
 
4 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We summarize the facts the 
jury could have found, reserving certain facts for later 
discussion.  On September 29, 2012, at around 1:23 P.M., Fall 
River police officers were dispatched to Cherry Street, a 
residential road in Fall River, where they found the victim, who 
had been shot and killed in her parked car.  The victim's pants 
pockets had been turned inside out and a package containing 
cocaine was discovered beneath her body.  Another package of 
cocaine was later found inside the victim's bra. 
Although the victim had been in possession of her cell 
phone shortly before her death, the cell phone was not found at 
the scene.  The police obtained call logs listing incoming calls 
to and outgoing calls from the victim's cell phone around the 
time of the shooting.  One of the phone numbers listed in the 
call logs belonged to the defendant.  The call logs indicated 
that, on the day of the shooting, the defendant called the 
victim's cell phone at 12:50 P.M. and the victim returned the 
call shortly after 1 P.M. -- less than half an hour before the 
police were dispatched to the scene of the shooting. 
In September 2012, the defendant was living in Fall River 
with his friend, Thomas Brabant, one street over from where the 
victim was murdered.  At that time, the defendant was in a 
dating relationship with Jared Skomiro, who lived in an 
apartment -- also in Fall River -- belonging to Skomiro's 
5 
 
friend, Ashley Richard.  The defendant often stayed at Richard's 
apartment with Skomiro. 
On the evening of September 28, 2012, the defendant spent 
the night at Richard's apartment.  The next morning -- the day 
of the shooting -- the defendant left the apartment after making 
a phone call.  Later that day, at approximately 1:28 P.M., 
Skomiro received a phone call from the defendant.  The defendant 
told Skomiro he wanted to be picked up, and he did not want to 
talk about what had occurred.  According to Skomiro, the 
defendant sounded "weird" during the call. 
Skomiro and another individual subsequently drove to the 
defendant's location, which was near the scene of the shooting.  
Once in the car, the defendant told the group that "he got into 
a fight with a guy," and that he "ran his pockets," which 
Skomiro understood to mean the defendant had robbed someone.  
The defendant also showed Skomiro a pill bottle containing what 
appeared to be "crack" cocaine.  At the defendant's request, the 
group drove by the scene of the shooting, where they saw police 
tape and investigators.  Leaving the crime scene, the group went 
to Richard's residence.  Later that evening, after watching a 
television news broadcast about the murder, the defendant told 
Skomiro he knew the person who had been killed and was supposed 
to meet up with her that day.   
6 
 
During their investigative efforts, the police secured a 
warrant to search Richard's apartment, where they seized a 
handgun, a bloodstained T-shirt, bloodstained shorts, and a pill 
bottle on which the defendant's fingerprints were found.  
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profiles were recovered from the 
handgun, the T-shirt, and the shorts.  The DNA profile from the 
handgun matched the defendant's DNA profile, while the DNA 
profiles from the T-shirt and shorts matched the victim's and 
the defendant's DNA profiles. 
b.  Procedural history.  On December 20, 2012, the 
defendant was indicted by a Bristol County grand jury on one 
count of murder in the first degree, in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 1; one count of armed robbery, in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 17; and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm, 
in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). 
Prior to trial, the defendant filed several motions to 
suppress.  Relevant to this appeal, the defendant filed two 
motions to suppress cell phone records -- obtained by the police 
without a warrant from the defendant's cellular service 
provider, T-Mobile -- and evidence derived from these records.6  
First, in December 2014, the defendant filed a motion to 
suppress "evidence of call logs, phone calls, [text messages], 
 
6 How these records were obtained by the police is further 
discussed infra.  
7 
 
[multimedia messages], data sent and receive[d], and all 
historical records of [CSLI] obtained from the defendant's 
cellular telephone and/or cellular provider without a warrant."  
Second, in June of 2015, the defendant filed a motion to 
suppress "all evidence and information derived directly or 
indirectly from the T-Mobile records" under the "fruits of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine.  After holding a three-day evidentiary 
hearing on the defendant's motions to suppress, a Superior Court 
judge (motion judge) denied both motions in April of 2016. 
The defendant's jury trial commenced on June 13, 2016, 
before a different Superior Court judge (trial judge).  The 
Commonwealth proceeded on all three theories of murder in the 
first degree.  On the ninth day of trial, the jury found the 
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree based on the 
theory of felony-murder, with armed robbery as the predicate 
felony.  The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 
On February 10, 2020, the defendant moved for a new trial, 
which we remitted to the Superior Court.  After a four-day 
evidentiary hearing, on July 6, 2022, the same motion judge who 
had previously denied the defendant's motions to suppress 
likewise denied the defendant's motion for a new trial.  We 
subsequently consolidated the defendant's direct appeal with his 
appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial. 
8 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant argues the motion judge 
erred in denying his motions to suppress and his motion for a 
new trial because the police illegally obtained his call detail 
records, CSLI, and ping data in violation of his rights under 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  Moreover, the defendant alleges the police used this 
information during their investigation to identify witnesses, 
obtain search warrants, and surveil the defendant prior to his 
arrest.  The defendant further contends the police and 
prosecutors purposefully concealed from the defendant the fact 
they obtained and used this information during their 
investigation. 
"When considering a defendant's direct appeal from a 
conviction of murder in the first degree along with an appeal 
from the denial of a motion for a new trial, we review the 
entire case pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E."  Commonwealth v. 
Wilson, 486 Mass. 328, 333 (2020).  There is substantial overlap 
in the issues raised by the defendant in his motions to suppress 
and his motion for a new trial.  For the sake of clarity, we 
analyze them separately -- starting with the defendant's motions 
to suppress. 
 
a.  Motions to suppress.  In his motions to suppress, and 
on appeal, the defendant argues the police violated his 
9 
 
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures 
when they obtained his call detail records without a warrant.7  
Moreover, the defendant asserts the fruits of this unlawful 
search should have been suppressed -- including statements made 
by several witnesses the police contacted using the defendant's 
call detail records, as well as physical evidence seized 
pursuant to search warrants predicated on the statements of 
these witnesses. 
In support of his argument that a warrant is required for 
call detail records, the defendant contends the Federal Stored 
Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq., creates a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in call detail records because 
it limits the circumstances when these records can be disclosed 
by cellular service providers.  The defendant further contends 
that even if he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his call detail records, suppression is still the proper 
remedy because the police violated the SCA when they allegedly 
fabricated exigent circumstances in order to obtain the call 
detail records.   
 
7 The defendant also argues the search of his call detail 
records was neither justified by exigent circumstances nor 
supported by probable cause.  We need not reach this argument 
because, as explained infra, the defendant lacked a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his call detail records and therefore 
a warrant was not required to obtain this information.  See 
Almonor, 482 Mass. at 40.   
 
10 
 
i.  Motion judge's factual findings.  When reviewing the 
denial of a motion to suppress, "[w]e accept the motion judge's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Henley, 488 Mass. 95, 100 (2021).  We 
also "defer to the judge's determination of the weight and 
credibility to be given oral testimony presented at the motion 
hearing" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Miranda, 484 Mass. 799, 835, cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 683 
(2020).  Here, the motion judge made the following relevant 
findings of fact based on the evidence presented during the 
evidentiary hearing, which are not clearly erroneous, and which 
we supplement based only on the undisputed evidence in the 
record.  See Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 
(2015). 
 
Detective Lawrence Ferreira of the Fall River police 
department oversaw the investigation of the victim's death, 
which spanned several days.  Other Fall River police officers 
assisted with the investigation, including Detective Steven 
Washington, Detective John McDonald, and Detective Raul Camara.  
Additionally, members of the State police aided in the 
investigation, including Trooper Jeremiah Donovan and Trooper 
Eric Benson.   
At Ferreira's direction, Washington obtained the victim's 
call logs and began contacting phone numbers listed as incoming 
11 
 
and outgoing calls near the time of the shooting.  One of the 
listed numbers, which was associated with the defendant's cell 
phone, appeared as an incoming call to the victim's cell phone 
at 12:50 P.M. on September 29, the day of the shooting.  A 
return call was then made from the victim's cell phone to the 
defendant's associated cell phone at approximately 1:02 P.M., 
just over twenty minutes before the police were dispatched to 
the scene at 1:23 P.M. 
Washington called the defendant's phone number on September 
29, and identified himself as a Fall River police officer 
investigating the victim's murder.  The individual who answered 
had a male voice and identified himself as "Brandyn Jackson."  
Washington asked "Jackson" to come into the station for 
questioning, but the male replied he could not do so because he 
was in New Bedford with his mother. 
 
Washington called the defendant's number two more times on 
October 1, 2012.  Once again, the individual who answered the 
call identified himself as Brandyn Jackson.  "Jackson" further 
declined Washington's request to come into the station for 
questioning.  That same day, the police received a tip from a 
first-time confidential informant, whose identity and contact 
information were known to the police.  The informant indicated 
an individual known as "gay-boy Brandyn" was responsible for the 
victim's death.  According to the informant, the victim's phone 
12 
 
records would show Brandyn had called the victim on September 
29, at around 1 P.M., to arrange a drug transaction up the 
street from Brandyn's house.  The informant further explained, 
when Brandyn and the victim met for the planned drug transaction 
and began to argue over drugs and money, Brandyn shot the 
victim.  This account was consistent with drug evidence found at 
the scene of the robbery.  It was further corroborated when 
Ferreira, the lead investigator, independently learned the 
victim was a street-level drug dealer and the victim's wife 
claimed the victim had issues or a conflict with "gay-boy 
Brandyn." 
 
Unable to convince "Brandyn Jackson" to come to the station 
for questioning, Washington contacted the defendant's cellular 
service provider, T-Mobile, seeking the call detail records, 
CSLI, and ping data associated with the defendant's cell phone 
number.  A senior member of T-Mobile's law enforcement relations 
group testified about T-Mobile's protocols regarding law 
enforcement requests for cell phone records under the voluntary 
disclosure provision of the SCA, 18 U.S.C. § 2702.  The T-Mobile 
employee testified that a law enforcement agent seeking such 
records, who is facing an ostensible emergency, may call the 
company and explain the emergency circumstances warranting 
voluntary disclosure.  After the law enforcement agent has done 
13 
 
so, the agent is sent a preprinted "[e]xigent [c]ircumstances 
[r]equest [f]orm" drafted by T-Mobile.   
Among other information, this form asks for a description 
of the emergency and the phone number for which records are 
sought.  Additionally, the requesting party can choose several 
records to be disclosed, including "[c]all [d]etail [r]ecords 
with [c]ell [s]ite [i]information (within the past 48 hours)" 
and "[r]eal-[t]ime location of [m]obile [d]evice [ping data]."  
After filling out this form and signing it under the pains and 
penalties of perjury, the requesting party must send it back to 
T-Mobile.  The completed form is then reviewed by a member of T-
Mobile's law enforcement group, and if it determines based on 
the content of the form that exigent circumstances exist, the 
company will comply with the request. 
In this case, after calling T-Mobile, Washington filled out 
an exigent circumstances request form and sent it by facsimile 
to T-Mobile.  On the form, he described the emergency as:  
"Homicide investigation and number (phone) was last contacted 
during murder.  Unknown where owner is or if owner is alive or 
deceased."  From the list of records that could be requested, 
Washington selected call detail records with CSLI and ping data.8   
 
8 Washington also selected "[c]urrent [s]ubscriber 
[i]nformation" and "[o]ther," but he did not list what other 
information he was seeking in the space provided. 
 
14 
 
T-Mobile determined an exigency existed and sent Washington 
the call detail records for the defendant's cell phone number, 
which consisted of a time-stamped log of all incoming and 
outgoing calls and text messages associated with his number from 
September 9, 2012, through October 1, 2012.9,10  After receiving 
the call detail records, Washington began contacting the phone 
 
9 Though the call detail records included the times when 
text messages were sent or received, the records did not contain 
the content of any text messages. 
 
10 Because Washington requested CSLI, the call detail 
records also contained cell site identification numbers and 
location area codes.  The T-Mobile employee at the evidentiary 
hearing explained a cell site identification number "is the 
number assigned to [a] particular cell site in [a] sector, 
[while] the location area code may encompass a larger area . . . 
or it could encompass different equipment that's on the [cell] 
tower."  As we have previously explained, "[a] cellular service 
provider has a network of base stations, also referred to as 
cell sites or cell towers, that essentially divides the 
provider's service area into 'sectors.' . . .  Cell site 
antennae send and receive signals from subscribers' cellular 
telephones that are operating within a particular sector."  
Augustine, 467 Mass. at 237.   
 
Notably, as the T-Mobile employee acknowledged during the 
evidentiary hearing, this CSLI "isn't really helpful to anybody" 
unless further information -- such as the corresponding 
addresses of the cell sites or their latitude and longitude -- 
are produced as well.  Although the employee confirmed such 
information can be provided by T-Mobile to law enforcement, the 
call detail records in this case do not include it, unlike in 
Augustine, 467 Mass. at 239, where the CSLI included "the 
latitude and longitude of the cell sites."  Nor is there any 
evidence in this case that the police otherwise accessed such 
information.  In other words, in the absence of further 
information, the police in this case would be unable to decipher 
the provided CSLI. 
 
15 
 
numbers listed therein, including numbers belonging to Jordan 
Ferreira,11 Brabant, and Skomiro, who were each interviewed by 
the police.12   
 
On the morning of October 2, the police interviewed Jordan.  
Jordan told the police he met with the defendant on September 
28, the day before the victim's death, to buy marijuana at a 
location approximately one block away from where the victim's 
body was found.  During this meeting, the defendant told Jordan:  
"I've got the heat, I ain't droppin' no shells."  Jordan took 
this statement to mean the defendant had a gun, most likely a 
revolver.  Jordan also told the police he was with the defendant 
near the scene of the shooting on the day of the murder. 
 
Later that day, the police also interviewed Brabant.  
Brabant told the police the defendant had been living at his 
residence, which was approximately two hundred feet from the 
murder scene.  According to Brabant, the defendant came to his 
residence on the morning of the shooting but then left between 
11 A.M. and 11:30 A.M. to "make some plays," which Brabant 
understood to mean the defendant intended to sell drugs.  The 
 
11 Because this witness shares the same last name as one of 
the police officers in this case, we refer to this witness by 
his first name for clarity. 
 
12 The police also contacted and interviewed Richard and the 
defendant's friend Jessica Rogers, who identified the 
defendant's phone number on his call detail records during an 
interview. 
16 
 
defendant returned to the residence later that morning to 
replenish his supply of marijuana.  Brabant further told the 
police that, on his return, the defendant asked if Brabant could 
acquire any .38 caliber bullets; Brabant responded he could not.  
Also on October 2, the police interviewed Skomiro, who informed 
them he and the defendant were staying with Richard.  Skomiro 
further informed the police that on the day of the murder, he 
picked up the defendant near the scene of the shooting and 
traveled with him to Richard's apartment. 
 
Based on this information, Ferreira applied for a warrant 
to search Richard's apartment and sent officers to secure the 
scene, where the defendant was later arrested and taken into 
custody. 
 
ii.  Motion judge's rulings of law.  "In reviewing the 
denial of a motion to suppress, we . . . assess the correctness 
of the judge's legal conclusions de novo" (citation omitted).  
Henley, 488 Mass. at 100.  See Commonwealth v. Gumkowski, 487 
Mass. 314, 317 (2021) ("we undertake an independent 
determination as to the correctness of the judge's application 
of constitutional principles to the facts as found" [quotation 
and citation omitted]). 
A.  Call detail records.  In denying the defendant's 
motions to suppress, the motion judge correctly concluded that, 
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 251 
17 
 
(2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 448 (2015), the 
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his call detail records, and therefore the police did not need a 
warrant to obtain this information.13   
 
"The Fourth Amendment and art. 14 protect individuals from 
unreasonable searches and seizures."  Commonwealth v. Almonor, 
482 Mass. 35, 40 (2019).  "For these constitutional protections 
to apply, however, the Commonwealth's conduct must constitute a 
search in the constitutional sense[,] . . . [which] occurs when 
the government[] . . . intrudes on a person's reasonable 
expectation of privacy" (quotation and citation omitted).  Id.  
"An individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy if 
(i) the individual has manifested a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the object of the search, and (ii) if society is 
willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable" (quotations 
 
13 The motion judge also correctly concluded the defendant 
was not entitled to suppression of the records pursuant to the 
SCA.  The SCA permits an aggrieved party to file a civil suit 
against the cellular provider, but expressly states the remedies 
described therein "are the only judicial remedies . . . for 
nonconstitutional violations of [the SCA]."  18 U.S.C. § 2708.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (civil suits).  Because we conclude the 
search of these records was constitutionally permissible, 
suppression would not be appropriate, regardless of whether the 
search violated the SCA.  See United States v. Guerrero, 768 
F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 575 U.S. 916 (2015) 
("suppression is not a remedy for a [nonconstitutional] 
violation of the [SCA]").  
 
18 
 
and citation omitted).  Id.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 
Pursuant to the third-party doctrine, individuals have 
historically lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information that they voluntarily convey to third parties and is 
collected for legitimate business purposes.  See Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-744 (1979); Commonwealth v. Cote, 
407 Mass. 827, 834 (1990).  However, with the rise of the 
"digital age, [in which] the technology of real-time monitoring 
has become commonplace," we have narrowed the application of 
this doctrine.  Henley, 488 Mass. at 107-108.  In Augustine, 467 
Mass. at 249-252, we concluded CSLI is not covered by the third-
party doctrine because individuals do not voluntarily convey 
their location information to cellular service providers in the 
same manner they convey the phone numbers they dial.  Rather, 
"CSLI is purely a function and product of [cell phone] 
technology, created by the provider's system network at the time 
that a [cell phone] call connects to a cell site[,] . . . a 
serendipitous (but welcome) gift to law enforcement 
investigations."  Id. at 250-251.  See Henley, supra (declining 
to extend third-party doctrine to location information obtained 
by Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority from transactions 
using stored-value transit fare card).   
19 
 
 
Despite the narrowing of the third-party doctrine in other 
contexts, it remains applicable to call detail records.  
Notwithstanding recent technological changes, the phone numbers 
an individual dials are still conveyed voluntarily to a phone 
service provider, and providers still maintain those records for 
legitimate business purposes.  See Augustine, 467 Mass. at 251 
("we see no reason to change our view that the third-party 
doctrine applies to traditional telephone records").  See also 
Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
telephone numbers dialed); Cote, 407 Mass. at 834 (no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in telephone answering service because it 
"necessarily involved a voluntary conveyance of information to 
[a] third party").   
The defendant asks us to revisit our art. 14 jurisprudence 
and hold that, because the SCA limits the circumstances in which 
a third-party provider of electronic communication services can 
disclose call detail records, the SCA creates a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in this information.  He does not cite to 
any Massachusetts authorities for this proposition.14  In the 
 
14 The defendant asks us to adopt the reasoning of the 
Supreme Court of Iowa in State v. Wright, 961 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 
2021), in which the court held citizens have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in closed garbage bags left out for 
collection, due in part to a local ordinance restricting the 
parties authorized to collect such bags.  Id. at 419.  However, 
this court already held in Commonwealth v. Pratt, 407 Mass. 647, 
660 (1990), that a defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of 
20 
 
absence of any compelling reason to depart from our 
jurisprudence in this area, we conclude the SCA does not create 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in call detail records for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment or art. 14.  Though the SCA 
limits the circumstances in which providers of electronic 
communication services may disclose call detail records, a 
person still assumes the risk "that the information will be 
conveyed by [the service provider] to the Government" when he or 
she volunteers this information to the provider.  Cote, 407 
Mass. at 834, quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 
(1976). 
B.  CSLI.  While the motion judge focused on the 
defendant's call detail records in her decision, the motion 
judge noted the defendant's CSLI was not used in any warrant 
applications and the Commonwealth did not intend to introduce it 
as evidence at trial; therefore, the motion judge explicitly 
limited her decision to the call detail records.  Assuming, 
without deciding, that the motion judge erred in failing to 
order the suppression of the CSLI, we review such error to 
 
privacy in trash bags he had placed at the curb for collection.  
Although the ordinance in that case similarly "allowed only 
licensed trash collectors to transport garbage," we concluded 
this fact "[did] not make the defendant's subjective expectation 
of privacy any more reasonable" as "[t]he licensed collectors 
may have rummaged through the defendant's garbage themselves."  
Id. 
21 
 
determine whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
See Gumkowski, 487 Mass. at 321-322 (applying harmless error 
standard to erroneous admission of CSLI at trial).  When 
evaluating if an error is harmless, we must decide whether "on 
the totality of the record before us, weighing the properly 
admitted and the improperly admitted evidence together, . . . we 
are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the tainted 
evidence did not have an effect on the jury and did not 
contribute to the jury's verdicts" (citation omitted).  Id. at 
322.   
Here, even assuming the police unlawfully obtained the 
CSLI, the police did not use this information to secure evidence 
against the defendant, as we explain infra.15  Given that no 
fruits -- tainted or otherwise -- were derived from the CSLI, 
let alone admitted in evidence, the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 482 Mass. 694, 
 
15 Additionally, although the call detail records containing 
the CSLI were introduced at trial, no evidence was admitted at 
trial that would allow the jury to decipher the CSLI -- 
comprised of a series of numbers and codes -- in any meaningful 
sense.  See note 10, supra.  Therefore, this CSLI could not have 
had any effect on the jury's verdicts. 
 
22 
 
715 (2019) (defendant failed to identify any specific evidence 
admitted at trial derived from suppressed recordings).16,17 
b.  Motion for a new trial.  On appeal from the denial of 
his motion for a new trial, the defendant similarly argues the 
police violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and art. 
14 by obtaining his historical CSLI and ping data without a 
warrant.18   
Unique to his motion for a new trial, the defendant further 
argues the Commonwealth violated his due process rights under 
 
16 Where no decipherable CSLI was admitted at trial, and 
where the defendant's CSLI was not used by the police to further 
their investigation or develop evidence against the defendant, 
"[w]e do not need to analyze whether there was probable cause 
and exigency" to obtain this information.  Commonwealth v. Lugo, 
482 Mass. 94, 109 (2019).  See Commonwealth v. Chesko, 486 Mass. 
314, 322 n.9 (2020) ("we need not determine whether, as the 
defendant argues, the Commonwealth's application for the CSLI 
failed to meet . . . the probable cause standard set forth in 
[Augustine, 467 Mass. at 255]"). 
 
17 In his motions to suppress, the defendant did not seek to 
suppress the ping data.  Regardless, any error would have 
likewise been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The ping data 
was not introduced at trial and, as discussed infra, also not 
utilized by the police during their investigation.  See 
Gumkowski, 487 Mass. at 320, 322. 
 
18 Moreover, the defendant also reiterates his argument from 
his motions to suppress that his call detail records were 
unlawfully obtained because Washington lied in the exigent 
circumstances request form he submitted to T-Mobile.  The motion 
judge found Washington did not lie on the form or "act in bad 
faith" when he sent the form to T-Mobile.  Although our 
discussion supra obviates any need to further discuss this 
issue, it suffices to say the judge's finding that Washington 
did not lie is supported by substantial evidence. 
23 
 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights by allegedly concealing from the defendant the fact the 
police used his cell phone's location data during their 
investigation.  Specifically, the defendant asserts the police 
used information they acquired from his CSLI and ping data to 
elicit statements from witnesses that incriminated the 
defendant, which in turn were used to secure the search warrants 
leading to the seizure of incriminating physical evidence 
against him, including the murder weapon, bloodstained clothing, 
and contraband.  The defendant also alleges the police used ping 
data to track him during their investigation, which led to his 
arrest and the seizure of his cell phone.  The defendant further 
claims that, after using his CSLI and ping data in this manner, 
the police and the prosecutor then engaged in a conspiracy to 
hide their actions from the defendant and the court.  Lastly, 
the defendant argues his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to discover the police used his CSLI and ping data 
during the investigation.   
i.  Motion judge's factual findings.  "In reviewing a 
motion judge's findings of fact made after an evidentiary 
hearing [on a motion for a new trial], we accept the findings 
where they are supported by substantial evidence in the 
record. . . .  When, as here, the motion judge did not preside 
24 
 
at trial, we defer to that judge's assessment of the credibility 
of witnesses at the hearing on the new trial motion, but regard 
ourselves in as good a position as the motion judge to assess 
the trial record" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Velez, 487 Mass. 533, 540-541 (2021).  Since the 
defendant raised similar arguments in his motion for a new trial 
to those pressed in his motions to suppress, many of the motion 
judge's factual findings in her order on the motion for a new 
trial overlap with those in her order on the motions to 
suppress.  To avoid duplication, we limit this summary to any 
factual findings discrete to the discussion infra.  
In the absence of any notable evidence suggesting 
otherwise, the motion judge found the CSLI and ping data that T-
Mobile sent to Washington was not used by the police during 
their investigation to develop witness testimony or to track the 
defendant prior to his arrest.19  At most, the motion judge found 
the CSLI and ping data were received, but not used by, the 
 
19 The motion judge also found the police did not 
intentionally conceal from the defendant that they requested and 
received the CSLI or ping data, because the exigent 
circumstances request form, among other records, was produced to 
defense counsel by the Commonwealth.  Further, the motion judge 
also found the police lacked a motive to hide their request for 
and receipt of this information, noting Augustine, 467 Mass. at 
251, had not been decided at the time the officers obtained the 
defendant's records.  These findings are supported by 
substantial evidence.   
 
25 
 
police.  Specifically, T-Mobile sent Washington sixty-two hours 
of CSLI for the defendant's cell phone, which Washington 
forwarded to Donovan.  Washington also received ping data from 
T-Mobile, though this information "was never located or produced 
in court."20  Although Washington believed he sent the ping data 
to Donovan as well, Donovan confirmed "he never received the 
ping data and did not know how it was used."21   
Regarding the defendant's arrest and his assertion that the 
police used ping data to locate him, the motion judge found the 
defendant was apprehended in the parking lot of Richard's 
apartment complex on October 2.  Instead of using ping data to 
locate the defendant, the motion judge found the police learned 
the defendant was staying at Richard's apartment from witness 
interviews.  The judge further credited testimony from Camara 
that he and another officer were conducting surveillance at 
Richard's apartment building that evening, while awaiting the 
 
20 The motion judge noted:  "The record is unclear as to 
when the ping data was sent by T-Mobile, the form in which it 
was sent (either by e[-]mail or phone) or what was done with the 
ping data after it was received."  However, because an e-mail 
message Washington forwarded to Donovan only contained call 
detail records and CSLI, the motion judge inferred T-Mobile must 
have "shared the ping [data] by phone or fax, but not by e[-
]mail."   
 
21 The motion judge found the police officers' inability at 
times to "recall the minutia of their investigation conducted 
nine years earlier" during the evidentiary hearing was "a result 
of the passage of time and not an attempt to mislead the court."   
 
26 
 
issuance of a search warrant, when they observed the defendant 
approach in a vehicle and took him into custody.  Bearing in 
mind these findings depended on the motion judge's credibility 
determinations, we conclude they are supported by substantial 
evidence.   
Camara testified he did not request or use ping data to 
locate the defendant while surveilling Richard's apartment, had 
no knowledge of anyone possessing such data, and did not recall 
ever learning of any CSLI.  Further, Camara testified that, 
while surveilling Richard's apartment building, he became 
suspicious of a car, in which he eventually discovered the 
defendant, because it sat idle in the apartment parking lot with 
its running lights on for about ten minutes.  Eventually, the 
car left its parking spot and headed in Camara's direction, at 
which point he noticed the car was the same make and model as 
the car in which the defendant had last been seen.  The officers 
then proceeded to stop the car and discovered the defendant in 
the passenger seat.  In short, Camara's testimony clearly lays 
out how he and other officers located the defendant without the 
use of the defendant's cell phone information. 
The defendant nonetheless maintains the motion judge erred 
in finding the police did not use the CSLI or ping data.  In 
support of this assertion, he focuses on three specific parts of 
the record before the motion judge. 
27 
 
First, the defendant points to the interview of Brabant, 
during which the questioning officer, Benson, inquired about a 
series of phone calls between Brabant and the defendant on the 
day of the murder.  After Brabant claimed he was unable to 
remember what was discussed, Benson told Brabant:  "It might 
blow you down if I laid this out to you, but I can tell you that 
basically during all of those calls, he is outside your house.  
We know he is right outside your house. . . .  He is right 
there.  And he is there for hours."  The motion judge rejected 
the defendant's theory that Benson must have used the CSLI to 
determine the defendant's location from the defendant's calls 
with Brabant.  Instead, the motion judge credited Benson's 
testimony that he was merely embellishing the police's knowledge 
of the defendant's whereabouts.   
As the motion judge explained:  "CSLI data would have 
provided the police only with the tower to which the cell phone 
connected, not the exact location of the phone, leaving an area 
of one-half to three miles of ground as to where the phone might 
have been located, not a location as specific as right outside 
[Brabant's] house."  Additionally, the motion judge credited 
Benson's testimony that the police learned the defendant was in 
the general area of Brabant's residence prior to Brabant's calls 
28 
 
with the defendant through previous witness interviews."22  This 
testimony supports the judge's finding that Benson was not 
relying on the CSLI, but rather "embellish[ing]" the police's 
knowledge derived from other sources.  
Next, the defendant points to another statement in the same 
interview with Brabant where Benson claimed to know the 
defendant turned off his phone the evening of October 1.  The 
defendant maintains the police must have used the ping data for 
his cell phone around that time; otherwise, he claims, they 
would not have known his phone was off.  However, the motion 
judge again "credit[ed] Benson's testimony that he did not rely 
upon ping data . . . but must have learned that the defendant's 
phone was off [through] other means, such as by calling the 
defendant's phone and it going directly to voicemail." 
 
22 Specifically, Benson testified:  "I know that at the time 
that I made this statement, we had spoken to Jordan Ferrier, a 
witness from the previous day.  He had indicated that he had 
made a call or that he had purchased marijuana from Mr. Lepage 
at the intersection [where] Mr. Brabant's house . . . sits."  
Benson later testified that, based on Jordan's interview, the 
police knew the defendant was "outside selling marijuana 
sometime after 11:40 [A.M.]," and the defendant had "a history 
of selling [marijuana] in that area."  Additionally, Benson 
testified that he believed another witness, Jessica Rogers, had 
also indicated the defendant was living at Brabant's residence, 
which further supported the notion the defendant was in the 
area. 
29 
 
During the evidentiary hearing on the motion for a new 
trial, the following exchange occurred between Benson and 
defense counsel: 
Q.:  "[Washington] got prospective cell site location 
information; what's sometimes referred to as ping 
information, correct?" 
 
A.:  "Yes.  I have come to find that out, yes." 
 
. . .  
 
Q.:  "[D]id you ever learn of the use of this ping 
information during the investigation?" 
 
A.:  "No." 
 
Q.:  "Okay.  So as you're sitting here today, you have no 
knowledge of how that ping information was used?" 
 
A.:  "No."   
 
The defendant's theory, that Benson knew the defendant's phone 
was turned off because of the ping data, is squarely 
contradicted by Benson's own credited testimony that he had no 
knowledge of how the ping data was used during the 
investigation. 
Third, the defendant points to the statement of another 
officer, McDonald, who interviewed the defendant's romantic 
partner, Skomiro.  During this interview on October 2, McDonald 
conveyed to Skomiro that the defendant had been driving around 
with another romantic interest, Alex Vieira, over the previous 
twenty-four hours in New Bedford.  The defendant argues this 
shows the police used his CSLI or ping data to determine the 
30 
 
defendant's location at that time.  However, the motion judge 
"credit[ed] McDonald's testimony that he did not receive any 
CSLI or ping [data] during the investigation" and instead 
acquired knowledge of the defendant's whereabouts "based upon 
witness interviews and . . . physical surveillance of the 
defendant."   
Evidence was presented that the caller who had identified 
himself as "Brandyn Jackson" -- who the police suspected was the 
defendant -- had already told Washington he was in New Bedford.  
Further, two witnesses -- the defendant's "best friend," Jessica 
Rogers, and Brabant -- told the police they had seen the 
defendant and Vieira together on September 29 and October 1, 
respectively.  Finally, as explained by the motion judge, 
"pinging the defendant's phone would only have provided the 
police with the defendant's whereabouts, not whether he was with 
someone else, or the identity of this individual." 
In sum, there is substantial evidence in the record to 
support the motion judge's finding that law enforcement 
personnel did not use the CSLI or ping data as part of their 
investigation of the defendant and his eventual apprehension.   
 
ii.  Motion judge's rulings of law.  As noted supra, 
"[w]here an appeal from the denial of a motion for a new trial 
has been consolidated with a defendant's direct appeal from a 
conviction of murder in the first degree, we review the denial 
31 
 
of the motion for a new trial under G. L. c. 278, § 33E."  
Commonwealth v. Duke, 489 Mass. 649, 662 (2022).  "Thus, we 
examine the motion judge's decision to determine whether there 
was error and, if so, whether the error created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  Id. 
 
A.  Due process.  The defendant continues to maintain on 
appeal that the Commonwealth violated his constitutional rights 
to due process by intentionally concealing from him the fact the 
police obtained and used his cell phone's historical CSLI and 
real-time ping data both to develop witness testimony against 
him, and to track and arrest him.  "Under the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, a 
prosecutor must disclose exculpatory information to a defendant 
that is material to either guilt or punishment" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Pope, 489 Mass. 790, 797 (2022).  See 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  A defendant may be 
entitled to a new trial where the government fails to comply 
with the obligation to turn over exculpatory evidence.  Pope, 
supra at 798.  "To obtain a new trial on the basis of 
nondisclosed exculpatory evidence, a defendant must establish 
(1) that the evidence was in the possession, custody, or control 
of the prosecutor or a person subject to the prosecutor's 
control; (2) that the evidence is exculpatory; and (3) 
32 
 
prejudice" (quotations, citation, and alteration omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369, 380 (2017).   
Here, the motion judge concluded the defendant failed to 
establish any exculpatory evidence existed.23  See Commonwealth 
v. Schand, 420 Mass. 783, 787 (1995) (to prevail, defendant was 
obligated to "establish that the [exculpatory] evidence 
existed").  As outlined supra, after crediting the testimony of 
the interviewing and arresting officers, the motion judge found, 
based on their testimony, that the police did not use the CSLI 
or ping data during their investigation to obtain information 
from the witnesses they interviewed, to track and arrest the 
defendant, or to otherwise develop the evidence against the 
defendant.  Accordingly, the motion judge reasoned, because the 
Commonwealth did not use this data, "the Commonwealth had 
nothing to disclose."  On these facts, we agree with the motion 
judge that the Commonwealth did not violate the defendant's due 
process rights by failing to disclose the alleged misuse of the 
location data.  Accordingly, the motion judge did not err in 
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial based on his 
claim the Commonwealth withheld exculpatory evidence.  
 
23 As a threshold matter, the defendant cannot reasonably 
claim any records obtained from T-Mobile were withheld from him 
considering he received the exigent circumstances request form 
in discovery, which should have alerted him to the fact the 
police had, at minimum, requested the information. 
33 
 
B.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant next 
claims he was entitled to a new trial because his trial counsel 
was ineffective in failing to investigate how the police misused 
the defendant's historical CSLI and ping data.   
"Because the defendant was convicted of murder in the first 
degree, we do not evaluate his ineffective assistance claim 
under the traditional standard set forth in Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96, (1974).  Instead, we apply the 
more favorable standard of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and review 
his claim to determine whether there was a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Under this review, 
we first ask whether defense counsel committed an error in 
the course of the trial."  (Citations and footnote 
omitted.)   
 
Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 62 (2018).  "If there was 
an error, we ask whether it was likely to have influenced the 
jury's conclusion."  Id.   
Here, the defendant did not demonstrate his trial counsel 
committed any error.  As the motion judge concluded, the 
defendant has not "show[n] that further investigation of the 
police's alleged use of CSLI and ping data would have 
accomplished something material for the defense" given that "the 
police did not use the defendant's CSLI or ping data to secure 
evidence in the investigation."  Indeed, the notion trial 
counsel would have discovered the police did in fact use this 
data is entirely speculative.  See Commonwealth v. Watson, 455 
Mass. 246, 256 (2009) ("mere speculation, without more, is 
insufficient to establish ineffective representation").  
34 
 
Therefore, the motion judge did not err in denying the 
defendant's motion for a new trial based on his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  
c.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having reviewed the 
entire record, we discern no reason to exercise our 
extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.   
3.  Conclusion.  The defendant's conviction of murder in 
the first degree and the order denying his motion for a new 
trial are affirmed.  We vacate the defendant's conviction of 
unlawful possession of a firearm and remand for a new trial on 
that indictment.24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
24 See note 5, supra.