Title: Fain v. O'CONNELL
Citation: 909 S.W.2d 790
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: November 20, 1995

909 S.W.2d 790 (1995) Virginia K. FAIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Anthony O'CONNELL, Bishop of Roman Catholic Diocese of Knoxville, Defendant-Appellee. Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Knoxville. November 20, 1995. *791 Russell W. Adkins, Wilson, Worley, Gamble &amp; Ward, P.C., Kingsport, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Janet L. Hogan, Hogan &amp; Hogan, Knoxville, for Defendant-Appellee. REID, Justice. This is an action in negligence for personal injuries against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Knoxville, an unincorporated association, brought by a member of the association. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, but granted a Rule 9[1] appeal on the issue of whether the plaintiff's cause of action is barred because she is a member of the diocese. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, ruling that a member of an unincorporated association has "no standing" to sue the association for negligence in the maintenance of a parking lot owned by the association. For the reasons hereinafter stated, the action of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the suit is allowed to proceed. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff sustained personal injuries as the result of a fall in the parking lot owned by the diocese and located at St. Mary's Catholic Church in Johnson City; the plaintiff was injured while attending a church-related function;[2] the plaintiff's fall was caused by an unsafe and dangerous condition existing in the parking lot; and the unsafe and dangerous condition was the result of the defendant's failure to properly maintain the parking lot. The complaint named as the defendant the Bishop of the diocese, as the legal owner of all diocesan property, which property is held in trust for the use and benefit of the members of the diocese. The plaintiff is a member of St. Dominic's Church in Kingsport. Both St. Mary's Church and St. Dominic's Church are parishes within the diocese of Knoxville. In granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Court of Appeals stated: The issue, then, is whether the complaint states a cause of action against the defendant upon which relief can be granted. The issue presented is a question of law raised by the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The scope of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. Union Carbide Corporation v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). The traditional rationale for denying recovery against an unincorporated association by a member is the doctrine of imputed or transferred negligence. Calvary Baptist Church v. Joseph, 522 N.E.2d 371, 374 (Ind. 1988); Cf. John T. Hennis, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 26 Tenn.L.Rev. 531, 547-48 (1959). This Court, historically, has applied the rule that the negligence of those engaged in a joint enterprise or joint venture may be imputed to the other members, thereby barring a suit by a non-negligent member against the other members of the venture. See Cole v. Woods, 548 S.W.2d 640 (Tenn. 1977). The principle is explained by Prosser as follows: W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 72, at p. 516-17 (5th ed. 1984). Most Tennessee decisions defining joint enterprise have been in suits involving automobile accidents. For example, in Schwartz v. Johnson, 152 Tenn. 586, 280 S.W. 32 (1926), the plaintiff's son was killed in a car accident while riding in a car driven by the defendant's son. In response to the defense that the boys were engaged in a joint enterprise and therefore there could be no recovery because of the doctrine of imputed negligence, the Court stated, *793 Id., 280 S.W. at 33 (citations omitted). In Cole v. Woods, 548 S.W.2d 640 (Tenn. 1977), the Court severely limited the application of imputed contributory negligence to the passenger in automobile accident cases: Id. at 650. The Court also stated: Id. at 651. And subsequently, in Cecil v. Hardin, 575 S.W.2d 268 (Tenn. 1978), the Court further limited joint enterprises in which recovery by a member would be barred. The Court said, Id. at 271-72. The Court articulated the same essential elements in Spencer Kellogg &amp; Sons, Inc. v. Lobban, 204 Tenn. 79, 315 S.W.2d 514 (1958). In that case, the plaintiff sold soybean oil to a Louisiana partnership. The defendant was the broker in the transaction and also a partner in the Louisiana partnership. The complaint alleged that recovery of the purchase price from the defendant should be allowed because the partnership should be considered a joint venture. The Court, in determining that the facts did not set forth a joint venture, stated as follows: Id., 315 S.W.2d at 520. Based on these definitions of a joint venture, common interest and purpose and equal right of control are essential components of a joint venture in which the negligence of one member is imputed to all of the other members. The defendant in this case, the diocese, asserts that it is immune from suit because *794 the plaintiff and all of the other members of the diocese are engaged in a joint enterprise to promote religious activities. The plaintiff responds that her suit is not precluded by the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence because she did not have an equal right to control the instrumentality that caused her injury. The Court has not heretofore considered the application of this rule in an action for negligence by a member of an unincorporated association against the association. However, principles implicit in the Court's prior decisions militate against extension of the doctrine of imputed negligence among joint enterprisers as a blanket defense to suits by members against unincorporated associations. Application of those principles to the facts and circumstances of this case compel the conclusion that the defendant is not a joint enterprise for the purposes of this suit. The total administrative structure of the diocese of Knoxville is not stated in the record. However, the record does show that each separate church of the diocese has a parish pastoral council. The immediate control of the church facilities, including the parking lot, was vested in St. Mary's parish council, a body elected by the membership of the parish, and its administrative staff. Apparently, each parish throughout the diocese, including St. Dominic's of which the plaintiff was a member, functioned in the same manner. There is no assertion that the plaintiff, as a member of St. Dominic's, had any responsibility for or any right of control over the maintenance of St. Mary's parish facilities. These facts do not establish a joint venture among the members of the diocese. The diocese, thus organized, though an unincorporated association, is a separate legal entity apart from its individual members for the purposes of this suit. Unincorporated associations are consistently treated as legal entities which are subject to suit in the statutory law. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-3-103(8) (1991); Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-405 (1991) (Associations are not exempt from health and civil rights regulations.). For example, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-2-202(a) (1994) provides: Sections 66-2-201 and 202 (1993) of the Code authorize unincorporated churches to acquire land with title to be vested in those persons designated by the members. And although the directors of non-profit associations are statutorily protected from suit, no legislation providing immunity to non-profit associations has been enacted: Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-58-601(c) (Supp. 1994). Immunity from liability for negligence is disfavored in the law of this state and will not be granted without a compelling justification or statutory authority. See, e.g., Broadwell v. Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471, 476 (Tenn. 1994) (allowing parental immunity only to the extent that the constitutional rights of the parent are implemented). The Court's dramatic repudiation of imputed contributory negligence in Cole v. Woods, 548 S.W.2d at 650, anticipated the decision in McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992), wherein this Court adopted the Tennessee doctrine of comparative fault, a system of allocating damages among the parties in a tort suit in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to the respective parties. In that case, the Court held that as between a plaintiff and a defendant, the "outmoded and unjust common law doctrine of contributory *795 negligence" should be abandoned. Id. at 56. It follows that the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence among members of an unincorporated association, which is based on the legal form of the organization rather than the actual degree of fault of the member, should not be adopted by this Court. The judgment of the Court of Appeals granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment is reversed, and the order of the trial court denying summary judgment is reinstated. The case is remanded to the trial court. Costs of appeal are taxed against the defendant. ANDERSON, C.J., and DROWOTA, BIRCH, and WHITE, JJ., concur. [1] Tenn.R.App.P. 9. [2] The plaintiff was employed as the Religious Education Director and Youth Minister for St. Dominic's Catholic Church, but the accident was not related to her employment.