Title: Richard Blumberg v. USAA Casualty
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95-740
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2001

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC95740
____________
RICHARD BLUMBERG,
Petitioner,
vs.
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondent.
[July 12, 2001]
HARDING, J.
We have for review Blumberg v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co.,  729 So. 2d
460 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), which expressly and directly conflicts with this Court’s
previous opinion in Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So. 2d 1323 (Fla.
1990).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida
Constitution.  For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we approve the result
below.
Blumberg and Peat, Marwick are in conflict regarding when a cause of action
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for negligence/malpractice accrues.  The facts of Blumberg are as follows:
Blumberg's residence was insured for a number of
years through St. Paul Insurance Company ("St. Paul"). 
In December 1989, he bought a new home and contacted
Bruner, his insurance agent, to request that St. Paul insure
the new property.  St. Paul, however, would not insure
beach front property.  Nevertheless, St. Paul continued to
insure the old residence, which Blumberg rented out. 
Bruner reduced the insurance coverage at the old
property to reflect the transfer of Blumberg's possessions
to the new home and the premiums were accordingly
reduced.
Blumberg had an interest in a sports card store,
which proved to be unsuccessful.  The store was closed
in November 1991, and the inventory of cards, allegedly
worth over $100,000, was turned over to Blumberg.  He
stored the cards in his old residence, which was still
insured by St. Paul.  As soon as the cards were brought
to the old home, Blumberg called Bruner to verify that he
had insurance coverage for the cards at that home.  He
also contacted the insurer of his new home who advised
him that he could obtain coverage under his new policy
for the cards if not covered under his existing policy. 
However, Bruner contacted Blumberg on November 9,
1991, and informed him that he had spoken to St. Paul
and confirmed that the policy provided the necessary
coverage.
On the same day that Bruner called Blumberg to
confirm coverage, the old home was broken into and all
of the cards were stolen.  Blumberg made a claim with St.
Paul, but coverage was denied.  In the end of 1992,
Blumberg filed suit for breach of contract and for
promissory estoppel.  In the complaint, Blumberg alleged
that Bruner was the agent of St. Paul and, as an agent had
represented to him that coverage was available under the
policy.  In the alternative, Blumberg alleged that, acting in
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reliance on St. Paul's representation of coverage, Bruner
failed to secure for him other insurance on the cards. 
The case went to trial in August of 1996 and resulted in a
directed verdict in favor of St. Paul on the breach of
contract count because the trial court found that the
policy did not cover the loss of the cards.  The
promissory estoppel count went to the jury who found in
favor of Blumberg but awarded only $25,000 in damages. 
Before judgment was entered, Blumberg dismissed his
claim with prejudice.
Blumberg then filed suit against Bruner, now
alleging that Bruner was his agent for the procurement of
insurance coverage, and Bruner negligently failed to
procure insurance to cover the loss of the sports cards. 
Blumberg alleged that he believed that there was coverage
until the trial court ruled adversely to him in the prior suit
despite his alternative position in the previous complaint
that Bruner did not obtain the requisite additional
insurance on the cards.  Therefore, he alleged that he was
not damaged by Bruner's negligence until August of 1996.
Bruner answered the complaint and raised the
statute of limitations, contending that the statute began to
run when St. Paul denied coverage, or at least when it
denied coverage in its answer to Blumberg's suit.  On
Bruner's motion for summary judgment, the trial court
agreed and granted the motion.   
Blumberg, 729 So. 2d at 460-61.  On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
affirmed, reasoning that the statute of limitations began to run when Blumberg filed
his action against St. Paul.  See id. at 462.
The Blumberg decision is in conflict with Peat, Marwick.  In that case, the
Lanes in 1976-77 retained Peat, Marwick as their accountants.  In 1976, Peat,
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Marwick recommended that the Lanes invest in a limited partnership.  The Lanes
invested in that partnership, and in filing their federal income tax returns for 1976
and 1977, they claimed deductions, on the advice of Peat, Marwick, based upon
losses of the partnership.  In 1981, the IRS sent the Lanes a ninety-day letter,
informing them that it had determined that there were deficiencies in their 1976 and
1977 tax returns because of the claimed deductions for the partnership losses.  The
letter informed them of the amount of the deficiencies and of the procedures
available to them for challenging the IRS's deficiency determination.  One of the
alternatives available to the Lanes was to challenge the IRS's deficiency
determination in the United States Tax Court.  The Lanes pursued this option and
filed their challenge in tax court later that year (1981).  In 1983, the Lanes agreed to
the entry of a stipulated order which required them to pay a tax deficiency amount
agreed to by them and the IRS.  In 1985, less than two years after the entry of the
tax court order based on the stipulation, the Lanes filed a complaint against Peat,
Marwick for accounting malpractice.  As one of its affirmative defenses, Peat,
Marwick asserted that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.  The trial
court agreed with Peat, Marwick that the Lanes’ claim was barred and granted
summary judgment in Peat, Marwick’s favor.
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the
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limitations period commenced when the judgment was entered in tax court.  See
Lane v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).  After
granting the petition for review, this Court agreed with the district court:
In this case, the Lanes chose to appeal the IRS's
determination to the United States Tax Court, in
accordance with the advice given them by Peat Marwick. 
We find, consistent with the holdings of numerous
attorney malpractice cases, that until their tax court action
was final, the Lanes did not have an action for
malpractice.  We reject Peat Marwick's contention that an
IRS deficiency determination conclusively establishes an
injury upon which to base a professional malpractice
action.  If we were to accept that argument, the Lanes
would have had to have filed their accounting malpractice
action during the same time that they were challenging the
IRS's deficiency notice in their tax court appeal.  Such a
course would have placed them in the wholly untenable
position of having to take directly contrary positions in
these two actions.  In the tax court, the Lanes would be
asserting that the deduction Peat Marwick advised them
to take was proper, while they would simultaneously
argue in a circuit court malpractice action that the
deduction was unlawful and that Peat Marwick's advice
was malpractice.  To require a party to assert these two
legally inconsistent positions in order to maintain a cause
of action for professional malpractice is illogical and
unjustified.  Until the tax court determination, both the
Lanes and Peat Marwick believed that the accounting
advice was correct;  consequently, there was no injury. 
To hold otherwise would mean that an accountant's client
would have an action for malpractice as soon as the client
received a "Ninety-Day Letter" from the IRS.  That result
is contrary to common sense and reason.  Further, to
construe the legislative enactment of the statute of
-6-
limitations for accounting malpractice in the manner
suggested by Peat Marwick would, in our view, be
contrary to the legislature's intent in enacting this
limitations period.
Peat, Marwick, 565 So. 2d at 1326.
In the case below, the district court attempted to distinguish its holding from
our holding in Peat, Marwick:
First, appellant in this case had reason to know that
the agent had acted negligently long before the final
disposition of the case by this court in 1988.  Unlike in
Peat, Marwick, the court’s ruling here did not make the
injury apparent to the appellants for the first time, but
rather confirmed what the appellants had reason to know
previously – that there was a gap in the coverage.
Second, in Peat, Marwick the plaintiffs were the
defendant's clients, and were being advised by defendant
on how to challenge an IRS determination.  The clients
took the defendant's advice and challenged the IRS
determination in the tax court, unsuccessfully.  It was not
until that determination by the tax court that it became
apparent that the accountants were negligent.  Here, the
appellee insurance agent was not representing the insureds
and advising them regarding this very dispute.  To us, this
is a distinction with a substantial difference.  
Blumberg, 729 So. 2d at 462 (quoting Russell v. Frank H. Furman, Inc., 629 So.
2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)).  We, however, are not persuaded by this
reasoning.  The logic behind the Peat, Marwick decision was that a client should
not be forced to bring a claim against an accountant prior to the time that the client
1 In Blumberg, this would have been when the underlying litigation against St.
Paul was final or, if Blumberg had declined to file a suit against St. Paul, when his right
to sue St. Paul expired.  In Peat, Marwick, this would have been when the underlying
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has incurred damages.  A rule that would mandate simultaneous suits would hinder
the defense of the underlying claim and prematurely disrupt an otherwise
harmonious business relationship.  Surely, this same logic should hold true for the
client that has an established relationship with a particular insurance agent,
especially if the agent maintains that coverage exists even after coverage has been
denied by the insurance company.  The record in this case demonstrates that
Bruner maintained that coverage existed throughout the St. Paul suit.  Moreover, the
insurer's denial of coverage in this case merely represented the insurer's position on
the matter and did not resolve whether damages were incurred either for the benefit
or detriment of the insurer, the insured or the agent.
Because we fail to see a distinction in the case below and Peat, Marwick, we
are compelled to resolve the conflict that exists between the two cases.  Consistent
with Peat, Marwick, we hold that, in the circumstances presented here, a
negligence/malpractice cause of action accrues when the client incurs damages at
the conclusion of the related or underlying judicial proceedings or, if there are no
related or underlying judicial proceedings, when the client’s right to sue in the
related or underlying proceeding expires.1  If a negligence/malpractice action is filed
tax court litigation was final or, if the Lanes had declined to appeal the IRS’ “Ninety-
Day Letter” in tax court, when their right to appeal the IRS’ “Ninety-Day Letter”
expired. 
2“The proper remedy for premature litigation ‘is an abatement or stay of the
claim for the period necessary for its maturation under the law.’”  Bierman v. Miller,
639 So. 2d 627, 628 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (quoting Angrand v. Fox, 552 So. 2d 1113,
1115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)).    
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prior to the time that a client’s right to sue in the related or underlying judicial
proceeding has expired, or if a negligence/malpractice action is filed during the time
that a related or underlying judicial proceeding is ongoing, then the defense can
move for an abatement or stay of the claim on the ground that the
negligence/malpractice action has not yet accrued.2  The moving party will have the
burden of demonstrating that the related or underlying judicial proceeding will
determine whether damages were incurred which are causally related to the alleged
negligence/malpractice.  The determination of this will be for the trial court. 
Similarly, if a party raises an affirmative defense that a negligence/malpractice action
has expired, the party bringing the action may file a reply asserting the avoidance of
the statute of limitations due to a related or underlying judicial proceeding.
Applying this reasoning to the present case, we find that the limitations
period for the negligence action against the agent did not accrue until the St. Paul
3 As pointed out by the district court, Blumberg asserted in the negligence action
against Bruner that Bruner was acting as his agent for the procurement of insurance
coverage.  In this context, the negligence action against Bruner is analogous to the
malpractice action brought against the accountants in Peat, Marwick.
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proceeding was final. 3  We disapprove of the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s
reasoning to the extent that it is inconsistent with this holding.
Nevertheless, we conclude that Blumberg’s action against Bruner is still
barred in this case due to the principles of judicial estoppel.  “Judicial estoppel is
an equitable doctrine that is used to prevent litigants from taking totally inconsistent
positions in separate judicial, including quasi-judicial, proceedings.”  Smith v.
Avatar Properties, Inc., 714 So. 2d 1103, 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).  The doctrine
prevents parties from “making a mockery of justice by inconsistent pleadings,"
American Nat’l Bank v. Federal Deposit  Ins. Corp., 710 F.2d 1528, 1536 (11th
Cir. 1983),  and "playing fast and loose with the courts."  Russell v. Rolfs, 893
F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990).    
In Chase & Co. v. Little, 156 So. 609, 610 (Fla. 1934), this Court stated the
following regarding the judicial estoppel doctrine:
The rule applicable to judicial estoppel is stated in 21 C.J.
1228 et seq., as follows:
A claim made or position taken in a former action
or judicial proceeding will, in general, estop the party to
make an inconsistent claim or to take a conflicting
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position in a subsequent action or judicial proceeding to
the prejudice of the adverse party.  
In order to work an estoppel, the position assumed
in the former trial must have been successfully
maintained.  In proceedings terminating in a judgment, the
positions must be clearly inconsistent, the parties must be
the same and the same questions must be involved.  So,
the party claiming the estoppel must have been misled and
have changed his position;  and an estoppel is not raised
by conduct of one party to a suit, unless by reason
thereof the other party has been so placed as to make it
to act in reliance upon it unjust to him to allow that first
party to subsequently change his position.  There can be
no estoppel where both parties are equally in possession
of all the facts pertaining to the matter relied on as an
estoppel;  where the conduct relied on to create the
estoppel was caused by the act of the party claiming the
estoppel, or where the positions taken involved solely a
question of law.  
Based on the facts of the present case, we conclude that this is a proper case for
the application of the judicial estoppel doctrine.  Prior to the time that Blumberg
filed the action against St. Paul, St. Paul made a of number of settlement offers in
order to resolve the sports card claim, all of which were rejected by Blumberg. 
Blumberg’s claim against St. Paul consisted of two counts:  breach of contract and
promissory estoppel.  The trial court granted a directed verdict against Blumberg
on the breach of contract claim.  However, the promissory estoppel claim went to
the jury, with the jury ultimately rendering a verdict in favor of Blumberg in the
amount of $25,000.  Apparently, this award was not sufficient to beat St. Paul’s
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offer of judgment and, therefore, after St. Paul moved to tax attorneys’ fees,
Blumberg entered into a voluntary stipulation dismissing his promissory estoppel
claim against St. Paul with prejudice in exchange for St. Paul’s agreement to forego
its attorneys’ fees.  
This case is exactly the type of scenario for which the judicial estoppel
doctrine was intended.  Blumberg is attempting “to make a mockery out of justice”
by asserting inconsistent positions in the St. Paul suit (where he claimed that
coverage existed and prevailed) and the Bruner suit (where he claimed that coverage
did not exist).  
Blumberg argues that judicial estoppel is inappropriate in this case for two
reasons.  First, he claims that he did not “successfully maintain” his promissory
estoppel claim in the St. Paul suit.  Second, he claims that the doctrine cannot be
applied because there was not mutuality of parties in both suits.  We disagree.
The favorable jury verdict satisfies the requirement that the party successfully
maintain the action in the first suit.  See Palm Beach Co. v. Palm Beach Estates,
148 So. 544, 549 (Fla. 1933) (stating that a suit can be successfully maintained by
verdict, findings of fact, or admissions in an adversary’s pleadings operating as a
confession of facts he or she has alleged).  The mere fact that Blumberg voluntarily
dismissed his claim after the jury rendered its verdict does not negate the fact that a
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factfinder determined that St. Paul was liable under a promissory estoppel theory. 
In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Geodata Services, Inc., 547 So. 2d 919, 924 (Fla. 1989)
(quoting Restatement (second) of Contracts § 90 (1979)), this Court set forth the
basic elements of promissory estoppel:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance on the part of the
promisee or a third person and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.  The
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice
requires. 
Two years earlier, in Crown Life Insurance Co. v. McBride, 517 So. 2d 660, 662
(Fla. 1987), we held that promissory estoppel may be utilized to create insurance
coverage in situations where refusing to do so would sanction fraud or other
injustice.  In the present case, the jury returned a favorable verdict on Blumberg’s
promissory estoppel claim, which, in essence, means that coverage existed for the
cards.  After this determination was made, Blumberg could not turn around in the
Bruner suit and claim that coverage did not exist.
Additionally, although Blumberg is correct in pointing out that judicial
estoppel normally requires mutuality of parties, there are exceptions to this
requirement.  In West v. Kawasaki Motors Mfg. Corp., 595 So. 2d 92, 94 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1992), the district court stated the following regarding the mutuality of parties
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requirement in the context of res judicata and collateral estoppel:  “Florida courts
have on occasion recognized exceptions to the identity of parties requirement under
the res judicata or collateral estoppel doctrines where special fairness or policy
considerations appear to compel it.”  See also Zeidwig v. Ward, 548 So. 2d 209
(Fla. 1989) (allowing defendant lawyer in malpractice suit to assert defense of
collateral estoppel based on prior criminal judgment even though he was not a party
to the post-judgment criminal proceeding).  We see no reason why this exception
should not be extended to the doctrine of judicial estoppel.  Further, we find that
special fairness and policy considerations compel the exception in this case.  The
mere fact that Bruner was not a named party in the St. Paul suit does not prevent
the application of the judicial estoppel doctrine in this case.   
In sum, we hold that the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Blumberg’s claim
against Bruner.  The courthouse should not be viewed as an all-you-can-sue buffet,
in which litigants can pick and choose which verdicts they want and which they do
not.  Blumberg certainly had the option to voluntarily dismiss the promissory
estoppel claim after he received a successful jury verdict.  But after receiving that
successful verdict, he did not have the option of pursuing an entirely inconsistent
position in a subsequent suit.
Accordingly, for the reasons expressed in this opinion, we approve the result
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below, albeit on different grounds than the ones relied on by the district court. 
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which SHAW and ANSTEAD, JJ.,
concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., dissenting.
 I respectfully dissent because in my opinion a cause of action against an
insurance agent for negligent failure to obtain coverage accrues when the insurer
denies coverage and the insured has reason to know that coverage does not exist--
rather than when there is a final judicial determination against the insurer as to the
coverage issue.  I would point out that the original complaint against the insurer in
this case alternatively alleged both breach of contract and promissory estoppel.  In
fact, Blumberg alleged in his original complaint against the insurer that Bruner, the
insurance agent, had "advised him of coverage when there was none and that
Bruner had failed to obtain other coverage."  Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.,
729 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).  Thus, by the time Blumberg filed his
complaint against the insurer, Blumberg had both knowledge of the harm and a
redressable injury.     
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Furthermore, I find difficulty with the majority's reliance on Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1990), because one of the key
rationales for that decision--the opportunity for the professional to correct the
error--does not exist in the context of insurance disputes.  Implicit in the Peat,
Marwick line of decisions is the concern that plaintiffs should allow their
accountants and attorneys the opportunity to correct their mistakes before the
plaintiff initiates a malpractice claim--and that no redressable harm exists until that
time.  Because there is no redressable harm if the accountant or the attorney
resolves the underlying litigation favorably, any harm is speculative until the
resolution of the separate and unrelated litigation.  This is an important concern that
serves the interest of judicial economy as well as fairness to both sides in the
professional malpractice context. 
In contrast, in the insurance coverage context, the harm is the denial of
coverage--this is not speculative; it is an immediate and real harm.  The insurance
agent cannot "correct" the failure to provide coverage.  Therefore, the opportunity
for remediation, which strongly supports a delay in the accrual of the statute of
limitations in malpractice actions against attorneys and accountants to determine if
redressable harm exists, simply does not apply in this circumstance.   
I further find the policy reasons behind the Peat, Marwick reasoning to be
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inapplicable under these circumstances.  In cases involving accountant or attorney
malpractice, to require the plaintiff to sue the professional before the resolution of
the underlying litigation would place the client in 
the wholly untenable position of having to take directly contrary
positions in these two actions.  In the tax court, the Lanes would be
asserting that the deduction Peat Marwick advised them to take was
proper, while they would simultaneously argue in a circuit court
malpractice action that the deduction was unlawful and that Peat
Marwick's advice was malpractice.  To require a party to assert these
two legally inconsistent positions in order to maintain a cause of action
for professional malpractice is illogical and unjustified.  Until the tax
court determination, both the Lanes and Peat Marwick believed that
the accounting advice was correct;  consequently, there was no injury. 
To hold otherwise would mean that an accountant's client would have
an action for malpractice as soon as the client received a "Ninety-Day
Letter" from the IRS.  That result is contrary to common sense and
reason.
Id. at 1326 (emphasis added).
 In contrast, in most cases involving insurance agents, the insurance agent is
neither representing nor advising the insured regarding the insurance coverage
dispute--even if there is an allegation that the agent acted as the insured's agent at
the time that coverage was procured.  I agree with the Fourth District that this fact
constitutes a "substantial difference."  Blumberg, 729 So. 2d at 462 (citing Russell
v. Frank H. Furman, Inc., 629 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)).
Another reason why the rationale behind Peat, Marwick is justified in the
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context of attorney and accountant malpractice claims is that to require a client in
an accountant or attorney malpractice case to simultaneously sue his or her attorney
or accountant in a separate and unrelated proceeding would in fact place the client
in the position of having to assert inconsistent positions in separate and completely
unrelated litigation with separate and unrelated issues.  However, unlike the case of
attorney or accountant malpractice, in the context of suits against insurance agents,
there are cases where the plaintiff would not risk asserting inconsistent positions in
separate and unrelated lawsuits, but would in fact be asserting interrelated claims in
the same lawsuit stemming from the denial of coverage.
Today's majority opinion also constitutes a departure from actual practice
and prior case law.  Florida courts have long permitted plaintiffs to simultaneously
bring causes of action against both an insurer and an agent when a coverage dispute
arises.  See, e.g., McLeod v. Barber, 764 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Daniel
v. Florida Residential Prop. & Cas. Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 718 So. 2d 936 (Fla.
3d DCA 1998); Warren v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 662 So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 4th DCA
1995); Time Ins. Co. v. Neuman, 634 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994);    Russell v.
Frank H. Furman, Inc., 629 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Hardy Equip.
Co. v. Travis Cosby & Assocs., 530 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Wolfe v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 436 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).  Further, often times the
4  Unlike the statute of limitations for a negligence claim, which is four years, see
§ 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000); Hardy Equip. Co., 530 So. 2d at 522, the statute of
limitations for a breach of contract claim is five years.  See  § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat.
(2000); Passman, 779 So. 2d at 325. 
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cause of action against the insurance agent is for both breach of contract and
negligence.  See, e.g., Schuck v. Habicht, 672 So. 2d 559, 562 (Fla. 4th DCA
1996); Oliver v. Severance, 542 So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Robinson v.
John E. Hunt & Assocs., 490 So. 2d 1291, 1293 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).  The statute
of limitations for a breach of contract action begins to run when the cause of action
accrues--i.e., when the insurer breaches the obligation to pay.  See Passman v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 779 So. 2d 323, 325 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 678 So. 2d 818, 821 (Fla. 1996); Levy v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 580 So. 2d 190, 191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).  Moreover, if the insurer puts the
insured on notice that it will no longer pay benefits, this constitutes an anticipatory
repudiation, giving rise to a cause of action for breach of contract and commencing
the running of the statute of limitations.  See Peachtree Cas. Ins. Co. v. Walden,
759 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).4  
Additionally, it is unclear under the majority's decision how the statute of
limitations would operate when the insured sues the insurer and the agent and
alleges both tort and breach of contract claims against the agent.  Will the majority
5  In Mid-Florida Growers, 570 So. 2d at 901, we noted that 
The rule against splitting causes of action is predicated on the following
basic policy considerations:  (1) finality in court cases promotes stability
in the law; (2) multiple lawsuits arising out of a single incident are costly
to litigants and an inefficient use of judicial resources; and (3) multiple
lawsuits cause substantial delay in the final resolution of disputes.  
These policies support the notion that an insured should not be precluded from
simultaneously suing the insurer and the agent when the insured alleges both tort and
breach of contract claims against the agent.
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require that the contract claims be separated from the tort claims, allowing the
contract claim to be brought at the time the insurance dispute is litigated and the
negligence claim brought only after the insurance dispute is resolved?  Surely
notions of judicial efficiency dictate against such a result, particularly where the
same evidence will be presented for both causes of action.  Moreover, such a
requirement could violate the rule against splitting causes of action, which requires
that a plaintiff "raise all available claims involving the same circumstances in one
action."  Department of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-Florida Growers, Inc.,
570 So. 2d 892, 901 (Fla. 1990).5  
Further, in many cases, the insured sues both the insurer and the agent for
separate causes of action based upon the same underlying factual situation.  See,
e.g., McLeod, 764 So. 2d at 791 (insured sued agent in tort and sued insurer in
6  In those cases where the facts are not intertwined, the trial court could sever
the claims, adjudicating the underlying coverage dispute first.  See generally Fla. R.
Civ. P. 1.270(b).
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both tort and contract); Time Ins. Co., 634 So. 2d at 728 (insured sued insurer for
breach of contract and negligence and sued agent for failure to obtain coverage and
negligence); Durbin Paper Stock Co. v. Watson-David Ins. Co., 167 So. 2d 34,
35 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (insured sued agent for negligence in failing to place
insurance policies and insurer for breach of contract).  In these circumstances, the
interests of judicial economy in fact would best be served by the trier of fact
considering both the coverage claim and the insurance agent's potential negligence
in failing to procure coverage in the same action.  In some cases, the answer to the
first and second issue may depend on resolution by the trier of fact of whether the
agent was acting as either the agent for the insurer or the insured--or acting in both
capacities.  See, e.g., Glynn v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 578 So. 2d 36, 36 (Fla.
4th DCA 1991).  Thus, the operative facts in the two causes of action may be
intertwined.  In fact, the case before us is one where the insured could have elected
to plead in the alternative regarding whether Bruner was his agent or the insured's
agent in the original lawsuit--in either case the underlying facts of both causes of
action were intertwined.6 
For example, in Durbin Paper Stock, the insured sued both the insurer and
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the insurance agent, who was a general lines agent for the insurance company.  167
So. 2d at 35.  The cause of action against the insurer was for breach of an oral
insurance contract and the cause of action against the agent was for negligence in
failing to place the policies--clearly a pleading in the alternative.  See id.  Given the
practice of joining both the insurer and the agent in the same action, I am uncertain
how the majority's bright-line rule affects the reasoning of cases such as Durbin
Paper Stock.
The majority attempts to address the issue of when a lawsuit against an agent
is prematurely brought by stating  
if a negligence/malpractice action is filed prior to the time that a client's
right to sue in the related or underlying judicial proceeding has expired,
or if a negligence/malpractice action is filed during the time that a
related or underlying judicial proceeding is ongoing, then the defense
can move for an abatement or stay of a claim on the ground that the
negligence/malpractice action has not yet accrued.  The moving party
will have the burden of demonstrating that the related or underlying
judicial proceeding will determine whether damages were incurred
which are causally related to the alleged negligence/malpractice.  The
determination of this will be for the trial court.
Majority op. at 7-8.  I take this to mean that if the issue of insurance coverage
remains pending, the trial court would be obligated to either stay or abate the action
against the agent as premature.  Thus, the option of the insured to sue both the
insurer and the agent in one lawsuit is eliminated.
 For all these reasons, I would approve the Fourth District's decision below. 
-22-
SHAW and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Fourth District - Case No. 4D98-1549 
(Broward County)
Eric Lee of Atlas Pearlman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Petitioner
Hinda Klein of Conroy, Simberg & Ganon, P.A., Hollywood, Florida,
for Respondent