Title: People v. Baldwin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 90433
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: February 7, 2002

Docket No. 90433–Agenda 9–November 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 
Appellee, v. WILLIE BALDWIN, Appellant.
Opinion filed February 7, 2002.
       JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
       In March 1999, the State charged defendant with four counts 
of home invasion. 720 ILCS 5/12–11(a) (West 1998). Following 
a bench trial, the trial court rendered a general finding acquitting 
defendant on all four counts but found him guilty of aggravated 
unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10–3.1 (West 1998)) and 
aggravated assault (720 ILCS 5/12–2(a)(1) (West 1998)). 
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the trial court 
erroneously convicted him of the uncharged crimes. The trial court 
denied defendant’s motion and sentenced defendant to five years’ 
imprisonment on the aggravated unlawful restraint finding. The 
trial court imposed no sentence for the aggravated assault finding.
       Defendant appealed and the appellate court affirmed. No. 
1–99–2312 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We 
granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. On appeal to this 
court, defendant argues that his conviction must be vacated 
because the charging instrument did not sufficiently identify 
aggravated unlawful restraint as a lesser-included offense of home 
invasion. We agree and reverse.
 
BACKGROUND
       The alleged victim, Donna Roberts, testified that she and 
defendant lived together intermittently from 1991 through 1999. In 
January 1999, defendant and Roberts became involved in an 
altercation that led to defendant’s arrest and imprisonment. An 
order of protection was also issued against defendant.
       Roberts claimed sole ownership of the home she formerly 
shared with defendant. According to Roberts, in March 1999, she 
and a friend, Willie Jackson, returned to her home after shopping. 
Upon arriving, Roberts noticed that her burglar alarm had been 
triggered. She and Jackson entered the house and searched for 
intruders. Jackson remained in the living room while Roberts 
checked the basement.
       Roberts claimed that she discovered defendant in the 
basement. According to Roberts, defendant grabbed her while 
wielding a butcher knife and dragged her up the stairs. He ordered 
Jackson out of the house and away from “his woman.” Jackson left 
immediately and went to call the police.
       Roberts claimed that defendant spent several minutes talking 
to her and dragging her through the house. During this 
conversation, defendant repeatedly threatened Roberts and asked 
her why she called the police on him during the January 1999 
altercation that led to defendant’s incarceration until that day.
       Chicago police officers arrived and rang the doorbell. 
Defendant answered the door and, standing beside Roberts, told 
the officers that she was all right and that he had not done anything 
to her.
       Officer Victoria Barber testified that defendant tried to close 
the door while holding Roberts by the arm. Barber put her foot in 
the way. Barber then separated them by insisting on speaking to 
defendant outside. After speaking with defendant outside, Barber 
walked back into the house to interview Roberts. According to 
Barber, Roberts look scared. Roberts hunched over, kept her head 
down, and barely spoke. Mindful that the police dispatch indicated 
that defendant was armed with a knife, Barber searched the vicinity 
of the front door. She discovered a butcher knife beneath the seat 
cushion of a chair placed approximately two feet from the front 
door. She placed defendant in custody.
       Defendant also testified. He claimed that he went to the house 
after his release from jail for the sole purpose of retrieving some 
clothes to wear. Defendant testified, and Roberts admitted, that 
Roberts served time in jail for a felony drug conviction. According 
to defendant, Roberts had quitclaimed the house to him and he 
resided there while Roberts was incarcerated. He testified that he 
entered the home with his own key.
       He denied pulling a knife on Roberts or threatening her. He 
indicated he was arrested while seated on the couch. He admitted 
knowing of the order of protection, but stated that he simply went 
to the house to get his clothes.
       Following a review of the evidence, the trial court acquitted 
defendant on all four home invasion counts but found him guilty of 
aggravated unlawful restraint and aggravated assault. Defendant 
filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the trial court 
erroneously convicted him of the uncharged crimes. The trial court 
denied defendant’s motion and sentenced defendant to five years’ 
imprisonment on the aggravated unlawful restraint finding. The 
trial court imposed no sentence for the aggravated assault finding.
       Defendant appealed, arguing that neither aggravated unlawful 
restraint nor aggravated assault are lesser-included offenses to 
home invasion. In a two-page summary order, the appellate court 
held that it could not review defendant’s conviction for aggravated 
assault because the trial court did not impose sentence. Absent a 
sentence, a conviction is not a final and appealable judgment. 
People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 95 (1989). On that basis, the 
appellate court partially dismissed defendant’s appeal. With respect 
to the aggravated unlawful restraint finding, the appellate court 
found that the charging instrument sufficiently alleged the elements 
of aggravated unlawful restraint to make that charge a lesser-included offense of home invasion.
 
ANALYSIS
        
On appeal to this court, defendant argues that his conviction 
for aggravated unlawful restraint must be vacated because the 
charging instrument did not sufficiently identify aggravated 
unlawful restraint as a lesser-included offense of home invasion. He 
does not challenge the propriety of the trial court’s aggravated 
assault finding. For the reasons that follow, we agree that 
defendant’s conviction for aggravated unlawful restraint must be 
reversed.
       Generally, a defendant cannot be convicted of an offense that 
was never alleged. People v. Jones, 149 Ill. 2d 288, 292 (1992). 
This court, however, has recognized a two-tiered exception to this 
general rule. First, a defendant can be properly convicted of an 
uncharged offense when the uncharged offense is identified by the 
charging instrument as a lesser offense of the one charged. Second, 
if the charging instrument identifies a lesser-included offense, 
evidence adduced at trial must rationally support the conviction on 
the lesser-included offense. See People v. Landwer, 166 Ill. 2d 475, 486 (1995); Jones, 149 Ill. 2d  at 292, 298-99. The exception 
has essentially the same application regardless of whether the 
reviewing court is considering the propriety of a defendant’s 
request for a lesser-included offense jury instruction (e.g., 
Landwer, 166 Ill. 2d 475) or the propriety of a trial court’s bench 
trial finding (e.g., Jones, 149 Ill. 2d 288).
       With regard to the first tier, section 2–9(a) of the Criminal 
Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/2–9(a) (West 1998)) defines an 
included offense in pertinent part as an offense that “[i]s established 
by proof of the same or less than all of the facts or a less culpable 
mental state (or both), than that which is required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged.” The statutory definitions do 
not, however, provide the determinative factors in deciding if a 
particular offense is an included offense of another. People v. 
Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 106 (1994).
       Initially, defendant cites People v. Kuykendall, 108 Ill. App. 
3d 708 (1982), to support his argument that unlawful restraint 
cannot be a lesser-included offense of home invasion. In 
Kuykendall, defendant was charged with home invasion but was 
convicted of unlawful restraint. The appellate court reversed, 
finding that the only restraint that occurred was incidental to a 
battery that the defendant inflicted upon the victim. The court held 
that this incidental restraint necessary to commit the battery was 
insufficient to support an independent conviction of unlawful 
restraint. The court further held that unlawful restraint and home 
invasion have different scienter requirements and therefore 
unlawful restraint cannot be a lesser-included offense of home 
invasion. Kuykendall, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 710-11.
       Kuykendall is not instructive. There, the court made its 
determination ostensibly by examining defendant’s conduct as 
portrayed by the evidence adduced at trial. That case preceded our 
decision in Novak and our express adoption of the charging 
instrument approach. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 112-13. Under this 
approach, courts must examine allegations contained in the 
charging instrument; an offense is considered a lesser-included 
offense if it is described by the charging instrument. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 107. In making this first-tier determination, courts do not 
consider facts adduced at trial. See Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 106-08 
(adopting approach requiring examination of facts alleged in 
charging instrument and rejecting approach requiring examination 
of facts adduced in evidence).
       The charging instrument approach does not generally require 
that the lesser offense be a theoretically or practically “necessary” 
part of the greater offense. Instead, the lesser offense need only 
relate to the greater offense to the extent that the charging 
instrument describes the lesser. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 107. “The 
'lesser offense must have a broad foundation in the instrument 
charging the greater,’ or at least 'set out the main outline of the 
lesser offense.’ ” Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 107, quoting People v. 
Bryant, 113 Ill. 2d 497, 505 (1986). A charging instrument need 
not expressly allege all of the elements of the crime if those 
elements can be inferred from the language of the charging 
instrument. People v. Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d 319, 325 (1997).
       With these principles in mind, we must first review the offense 
of aggravated unlawful restraint. “A person commits the offense of 
aggravated unlawful restraint when he knowingly [and] without 
legal authority detains another while using a deadly weapon.” 720 
ILCS 5/10–3.1 (West 1998).
       Next, we must examine the allegations contained in the 
charging instrument and determine whether they set out a broad 
foundation or main outline of aggravated unlawful restraint. The 
appellate court based its findings on counts I and II of the 
information. However, the State specifically notes in its brief that 
it did not contend in the appellate court that counts I and II set 
forth a broad foundation or main outline of an aggravated unlawful 
restraint. Instead, the State contended that counts III and IV 
supported the trial court’s findings.
       On appeal to this court, the State essentially concedes that 
counts I and II do not support a guilty finding of aggravated 
unlawful restraint. The State does, however, maintain that counts 
III and IV do support such a finding. Therefore, we need only 
focus on allegations contained in counts III and IV.
       Count III of the information alleged that defendant:
“Without authority knowingly entered the dwelling place
of Donna Roberts *** and he remained in such dwelling
place until he knew that one or more persons were
present, and while armed with a dangerous weapon, to
wit: a butcher knife, used of force [sic] upon Donna
Roberts, within said dwelling place whether or not injury
occurred in violation of Chapter 720 Act 5 Section
12–11–A(1) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes ***.”
       Count IV alleged that defendant:
“Without authority knowingly entered the dwelling place
of Donna Roberts *** and he knew or had reason to know
that one or more persons were present, and while armed
with a dangerous weapon, to wit: a butcher knife used
force upon Donna Roberts, within said dwelling place
whether or not injury occurred in violation of Chapter 720
Act 5 Section 12–11–A(1) of the Illinois Compiled
Statutes ***.”
       We conclude that neither of these counts set forth a broad 
foundation or main outline of aggravated unlawful restraint. The 
general allegation in both of these counts is that defendant, while 
armed with a butcher knife, used force on Roberts. Neither count 
specifically alleges that defendant used the knife to detain Roberts. 
The question, then, is whether we can infer the existence of this 
element from the language contained in the charging instrument. 
See Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d  at 325.
       We have previously inferred the existence of missing elements 
to identify a lesser-included offense. For example, in Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d  at 324-25, we examined an indictment that alleged defendant 
“ 'committed the offense of Residential Burglary in that he 
knowingly without authority entered the dwelling place of [the 
victims] with the intent to commit therein a theft, in violation of 
[section 19–3(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961].’ ” In considering 
whether the charging instrument in Hamilton identified theft as a 
lesser-included offense, we stated that:
“The offense of theft by unauthorized control is
committed when a person knowingly '[o]btains or exerts
unauthorized control over property of the owner’ and
'[i]ntends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or
benefit of the property.’ 720 ILCS 5/16–1(a) (West Supp.
1995); see also People v. Jones, 149 Ill. 2d 288, 296
(1992). By alleging in the indictment that defendant
entered the [victims’] dwelling place with the intent to
commit a theft, the charging instrument necessarily infers
that defendant intended to obtain unauthorized control
over and deprive another of property. This intent can
typically be inferred, as it was in this case, only through
showing an actual taking of property. Moreover, the
indictment expressly charged the specific intent to commit
theft, which has been deemed sufficient to satisfy the first
step of the charging instrument approach. See People v.
Dace, 104 Ill. 2d 96, 102-03 (1984). Thus, the charging
instrument in the instant case sufficiently identifies theft as
a lesser included offense of the charged offense of
residential burglary.” Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d  at 325.
       The inference we made in Hamilton was a fairly short reach. 
That is not the case here. In fact, the allegation that defendant 
“used force” could imply a myriad of acts that do not necessarily 
include unlawful restraint. It could mean a single blow. It could 
mean a single blow delivered while the victim was fleeing. It could 
mean a series of blows delivered while the victim was fleeing. It 
could mean that, as Roberts fled, defendant pushed her in the same 
direction that she was running and essentially aided her forward 
progress and escape. Thus, one can use force on a victim without 
detaining her.
       If we were to infer that “used force while armed with a 
butcher knife” necessarily identified “aggravated unlawful 
restraint” as a lesser-included offense of home invasion, we would 
be obliged to find that a charging instrument containing such 
language could identify countless other crimes as lesser-included 
offenses, including aggravated kidnapping, armed robbery, 
aggravated criminal sexual assault, or aggravated criminal sexual 
abuse. We cannot make such a long reach without offending the 
well-settled general rule that a defendant must be charged with an 
instrument that sets forth allegations with sufficient precision to 
allow defendant to prepare a defense. See People v. Smith, 99 Ill. 2d 467, 471 (1984); People v. Alvarado, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 
1023 (1998);  J. Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in Criminal 
Cases 44 (15th ed. 1862).
       That is not to say that these crimes could never constitute 
lesser-included offenses of home invasion. To the contrary, they 
could, depending on the context of the allegations contained in the 
charging instrument. For example, we might have reached a 
different conclusion had the information alleged that “defendant 
used force upon Roberts, to wit: dragged Roberts through the 
house at knifepoint.” That, however, was not alleged in the 
information. Each charging instrument is different and raises 
different allegations. In this case, the connection between the 
charging instrument’s allegations and the elements of aggravated 
unlawful restraint is simply too remote to identify sufficiently 
aggravated unlawful restraint as a lesser-included offense to home 
invasion.
       Of course, the act of using force on someone while armed with 
a butcher knife could include an unlawful restraint. The evidence 
adduced at trial, if taken as true, certainly indicated that defendant 
in fact did more than inflict a single blow or a series of blows while 
Roberts was fleeing and that his conduct was more akin to an 
unlawful restraint. Indeed, Roberts testified that defendant dragged 
her around the house. Nonetheless, the information does not 
contain these allegations.
       Based on our finding as to the first tier, we need not address 
the second tier. The State’s comments at oral argument implied 
that we should collapse these two tiers and consider both facts 
alleged in the charging instrument and facts adduced at trial to 
determine whether aggravated unlawful restraint constituted a 
lesser offense of home invasion. We decline.
       Whether the facts alleged in the charging instrument set forth 
a broad foundation or main outline of the lesser included offense is 
a separate inquiry from whether the facts adduced at trial 
supported a conviction on the lesser included charge. We made 
that clear in Novak, where we first identified three proposed 
approaches used to determine whether a particular offense is a 
lesser included offense of another: (1) the abstract statutory 
definition of the greater crime; (2) the greater crime as it is alleged 
in the charging document; (3) or the greater crime as its necessary 
elements are proven at trial. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 106; People v. 
Bryant, 113 Ill. 2d 497, 503 (1986); People v. Mays, 91 Ill. 2d 251, 255 (1982). In holding that the charging instrument approach 
was best suited for the lesser included offense doctrine, we 
specifically rejected the approach that examined evidence adduced 
at trial. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 110. We deemed that approach, called 
the “inherent relationship approach,” too broad. We further noted 
that “parties would have to prepare to litigate all possible lesser 
offenses, or risk preparing less than all possible lesser offenses, or 
only the charged offense.” Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 110, citing C. 
Blair, Constitutional Limitations on the Lesser Included Offense 
Doctrine, 21 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 445, 449-50 (1984).
       A rule allowing courts to identify a lesser included offense 
based on evidence presented at trial raises serious and obvious due 
process concerns. It is well-settled that due process requires that 
a charging instrument adequately notify a defendant of the offense 
charged with sufficient specificity to enable a proper defense. 
People v. Alexander, 93 Ill. 2d 73, 79 (1982); People v. Gilmore, 
63 Ill. 2d 23, 28-29 (1976). A person’s right to reasonable notice 
of a charge and an opportunity to mount a defense in court is basic 
in our system of jurisprudence. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 92 L. Ed. 682, 694, 68 S. Ct. 499, 507 (1948). One of the oldest and 
most fundamental components of due process is the general rule 
that criminal proceedings be initiated by an information or 
indictment containing:
“all the facts and circumstances which constitute the
offence, ... stated with such certainty and precision, that
the defendant ... may be enabled to determine the species
of offence they constitute, in order that he may prepare his
defence accordingly ... and that there may be no doubt as
to the judgment which should be given, if the defendant be
convicted.” J. Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in
Criminal Cases 44 (15th ed. 1862).
       Novak does not contemplate the rule advocated by the State. 
In Novak, we held that a determination of whether the evidence 
supports a conviction on a lesser offense is a completely separate 
inquiry. We specifically stated that:
“Once a lesser included offense is identified, the
question remains whether the jury should be instructed on
the lesser offense. The identification of a lesser included
offense does not automatically give rise to a correlative
right to have the jury instructed on the lesser offense.
[Citation.] Rather, an 'independent prerequisite’ must be
met for the giving of a lesser included offense instruction
[citation], regardless of the approach used in identifying
the lesser included offense. This independent prerequisite
involves an examination of the evidence presented at
trial.” (Emphases added.) Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 107-08,
citing Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 n.8,
103 L. Ed. 2d 734, 746 n.8, 109 S. Ct. 1443, 1451 n.8
(1989).
       Admittedly, in Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d  at 324, we noted that, in 
determining whether a particular offense is correctly included in a 
charged offense, “the proper approach is to examine both the 
charging instrument and the evidence adduced at trial.” This 
statement was, however, made in general terms and was 
immediately followed by a recitation of our rule in Novak that the 
court nevertheless perform this inquiry in two separate and distinct 
tiers. We held that courts must first examine whether the charging 
instrument identifies a lesser-included offense. We then stated that 
“[o]nce a lesser included offense is identified,” (emphasis added) 
the court must then examine the evidence to determine whether the 
evidence supported a conviction on the lesser included offense. 
Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d  at 324.
       In making that general statement in Hamilton, we relied on a 
similar general statement in People v. Landwer, 166 Ill. 2d 475, 
486 (1995). In Landwer, we reasoned that, in determining whether 
a particular offense is appropriately included in a charged offense, 
“the proper approach is to examine the charging instrument and the 
evidence presented at trial.” Landwer, 166 Ill. 2d  at 486, citing 
Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93. Nevertheless, we immediately elaborated 
that the proper analysis is actually twofold. We noted that:
“First, a court must determine whether the charging 
instrument contains a ' “broad foundation” ’ or ' “main 
outline” ’ of the lesser offense. [Citation.] Second, a court 
must examine the evidence presented at trial to determine 
whether a jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of 
the lesser offense, but acquit on the greater offense.” 
(Emphases added.) Landwer, 166 Ill. 2d  at 486.
In the next paragraph of our opinion, we reiterated these
sentiments. We noted that “we must first determine whether the
charging instrument provides a main outline of the included offense
***.” (Emphasis added.) Landwer, 166 Ill. 2d  at 486. After
performing this inquiry, we explained that “[t]he second step in
analyzing the propriety of an included offense instruction is to
examine the evidence presented at trial to determine whether a jury
could rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense ***.”
(Emphasis added.) Landwer, 166 Ill. 2d  at 487.
       Our general statements in Landwer and Novak related to 
whether a particular offense is appropriately included in a charged 
offense. This inherently necessitates a two-tiered inquiry. First, is 
the convicted offense indeed a lesser-included offense at all? To 
answer that question, we must examine the charging instrument 
and determine whether it sets forth a broad foundation or main 
outline of the lesser-included offense. Second, was it proper to find 
defendant guilty of this lesser-included offense? To answer that 
question, we must examine the evidence adduced at trial and 
determine whether it rationally supports a guilty finding. We 
cannot reach the second question without an affirmative answer to 
the first question.
       This conclusion is obvious when one notes that, in setting 
forth the initial general statement in Landwer, we cited Novak. 
Novak contains no language suggesting that these two inquiries 
should be combined or, in other words, that courts can identify a 
lesser-included offense by examining the charging instrument and 
the facts adduced at trial. To the contrary, as previously noted, 
Novak clearly establishes a two-part inquiry. See Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  
at 107-08 (stating that, “[o]nce a lesser included offense is 
identified, the question remains whether the jury should be 
instructed on the lesser offense” (emphases added)).
       A combined inquiry would essentially create a hybrid between 
the charging instrument approach and the inherent relationship 
approach that we rejected in Novak. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 110. As 
the State admitted at oral argument, we must cautiously avoid 
converting the charging instrument approach into the inherent 
relationship approach. This hybrid approach not only contradicts 
our holding in Novak but it also raises grave constitutional 
concerns. It would require the defendant to wait until all of the 
evidence is presented at trial before he or she ascertains the 
criminal charge. That, of course, directly contradicts the due 
process right to notice of a charged offense to afford an adequate 
defense. See Alexander, 93 Ill. 2d  at 79. A defendant cannot 
prepare an adequate defense to a charge that is identified after 
hearing the evidence presented at trial.
 
CONCLUSION
We find that the circuit court erred in finding defendant guilty 
of the uncharged crime of aggravated unlawful restraint. The 
charging instrument did not sufficiently set forth a broad 
foundation or main outline of unlawful restraint to identify that 
crime as a lesser-included offense of home invasion. In light of our 
finding, we need not consider whether the evidence adduced at trial 
would have supported a guilty finding of aggravated unlawful 
restraint.
       We vacate defendant’s conviction for aggravated unlawful 
restraint. We also remand for sentencing on defendant’s conviction 
for aggravated assault. See People v. Dixon, 91 Ill. 2d 346, 353-54 
(1982).
 
Reversed and remanded.