Title: State v. Stidham
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 20S-PC-00634
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: November 17, 2020

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 20S-PC-634 
State of Indiana, 
Appellant (Respondent), 
–v– 
Matthew Stidham, 
Appellee (Petitioner). 
Argued: February 27, 2020 | Decided: November 17, 2020 
Appeal from the Delaware Circuit Court,  
No. 18C02-1602-PC-3 
The Honorable Kimberly S. Dowling, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, 
No. 18A02-1701-PC-68 
Opinion by Justice Goff 
Chief Justice Rush and Justice Massa concur. 
Justice David concurs in result. 
Justice Slaughter dissents with separate opinion. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Nov 17 2020, 10:43 am
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634  | November 17, 2020 
Page 2 of 19 
Goff, Justice. 
Seventeen-year-old Matthew Stidham and two others committed a 
brutal murder and several other crimes in 1991. For these crimes 
committed as a juvenile, Stidham received a total sentence of 138 years—
the maximum possible term-of-years sentence. In 1994, a narrow majority 
of this Court affirmed the appropriateness of the sentence on appeal and 
declined to exercise the Court’s constitutional authority to review and 
revise sentences.  
In this post-conviction proceeding, we find the extraordinary 
circumstances required to revisit our prior decision on the 
appropriateness of Stidham’s sentence. Two major shifts in the law—one 
easing the standard by which we exercise our power to review and revise 
sentences and another limiting the applicability of the most severe 
sentences to children—render suspect Stidham’s maximum sentence for 
crimes he committed as a juvenile. So, we reconsider the appropriateness 
of Stidham’s sentence in light of the nature of the offenses and Stidham’s 
character. In doing so, we note the brutal nature of these crimes. However, 
we also recognize Stidham’s steps toward rehabilitation and the impact of 
the abuse and neglect he suffered earlier in his childhood. Most 
importantly, we reinforce the basic notion that juveniles are different from 
adults when it comes to sentencing and are generally less deserving of the 
harshest punishments. We ultimately conclude that the maximum 138-
year sentence imposed on Stidham for crimes he committed as a juvenile 
is inappropriate, and we revise it to an aggregate sentence of 88 years. 
Factual and Procedural History 
Stidham had a difficult childhood. As the probation officer put it in his 
pre-sentence investigation report, Stidham “was raised in a dysfunctional 
family” and “was shuffled from pillar to post like a hot potato.” Direct 
Appeal Tr. Vol. 1, p. 243. 
Stidham’s first twelve years of life consisted of relatively frequent 
movement between family members, neglect, and abuse. From about age 
five to age nine, Stidham lived with his father and first stepmother, and 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634  | November 17, 2020 
Page 3 of 19 
during that time welfare authorities were involved with the family on 
neglect referrals. Later, from about age eleven through age twelve, he 
lived with his father and second stepmother and suffered severe abuse at 
the hands of his second stepmother. She would regularly punish Stidham 
and his brothers by locking them in and out of the house, hitting them 
with pans and paddles, punching them, kicking them, and choking them. 
On one occasion she punished Stidham for having scissors in his room by 
stabbing him in the chest with the scissors.1 And on multiple occasions, 
she punished pre-teen Stidham for failing to clean up after the family dogs 
by alternatively smearing the dogs’ feces in his face or making him eat the 
dogs’ feces. This abuse eventually resulted in the boys’ removal from the 
home. A later child-in-need-of-services report would conclude that 
Stidham “suffered no permanent physical damage from the injuries he 
received, however, he carries deep emotional scars which come out as 
anger, hatred, and defiance toward authority figures.” Id. at 241 (citation 
omitted). 
After experiencing this neglect and abuse, Stidham ping-ponged 
between placements with family members and stints in juvenile facilities 
from age thirteen through age seventeen. In these five years, his 
placements changed at least nine times, and he attended several different 
schools. During this time, he also began collecting juvenile adjudications, 
most of which involved running away or escaping from his residential 
placement. The State ultimately terminated wardship of Stidham when he 
was seventeen. All this culminated in the horrific events underlying this 
case. 
One night in February of 1991, seventeen-year-old Stidham and several 
friends went to Daniel Barker’s apartment to drink whiskey and play 
guitar. At some point, Stidham and Barker got into a fight, and the others 
at the apartment joined Stidham in beating Barker. They then gagged 
Barker and forced him toward his van, which they had loaded with some 
 
1 Lest “stabbing” be characterized as a child’s exaggeration, testimony at the March 15, 2018 
resentencing hearing indicated that Stidham retains the physical scars from this incident. 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634  | November 17, 2020 
Page 4 of 19 
of his possessions. Barker tried to flee, but Stidham hit him with a wooden 
club and put him in the van. The group then drove the loaded van to a 
remote bank of the Mississinewa River. There, they stabbed Barker forty-
seven times and threw his body in the river. The group left the scene in 
Barker’s van, told friends of their brutal murder, and drove to Illinois 
where police arrested them. 
Upon returning to Indiana, the State charged Stidham with murder, 
Class A felony robbery, Class B felony criminal confinement, Class C 
felony battery, and Class D felony auto theft. A jury found him guilty as 
charged, and the trial court sentenced him to the maximum aggregate 
term of 141 years, resulting from consecutive sentences of 60 years for 
murder, 50 years for robbery, 20 years for criminal confinement, 8 years 
for battery, and 3 years for auto theft. On direct appeal, this Court ruled 
that certain evidence had been improperly admitted at trial, reversed the 
convictions, and remanded for a new trial. Stidham v. State (Stidham I), 608 
N.E.2d 699, 700–01 (Ind. 1993). 
On retrial, a jury again found Stidham guilty of the five charges, and 
the trial court again sentenced him to the maximum 141-year term. 
Stidham appealed, and this Court affirmed each conviction except auto 
theft, finding that it should have merged with the robbery charge. Stidham 
v. State (Stidham II), 637 N.E.2d 140, 144 (Ind. 1994). In largely affirming 
the trial court, a majority of this Court rejected Stidham’s argument that 
his sentence was “unreasonable” and “disproportionate to the crime 
committed.” Id. However, Justices Sullivan and DeBruler dissented on this 
point. Relying on the fact that Stidham was a juvenile at the time of the 
crimes as well as the extensive child abuse he suffered, these two Justices 
would have revised the trial court’s 141-year sentence down to 60 years by 
running the sentences for each crime concurrently. Id. (Sullivan, J., 
concurring and dissenting). But in the end, Stidham was left with a 138-
year sentence for the crimes he committed as a juvenile. 
In February of 2016, Stidham filed a verified petition for post-
conviction relief. He challenged the propriety of imposing the maximum 
term-of-years sentence on him for crimes committed as a juvenile, relying 
on provisions of the United States and Indiana Constitutions, cases from 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634  | November 17, 2020 
Page 5 of 19 
the Supreme Court of the United States discussing constitutional 
limitations on juvenile sentences, and cases from this Court revising 
maximum sentences imposed on juveniles. He submitted evidence of his 
activities between his first trial and his retrial as well as evidence of his 
activities since his retrial, which he argued showed his potential for 
rehabilitation at sentencing and his actual rehabilitation since then.  
The post-conviction court granted Stidham’s petition. Although it 
described Stidham’s crimes as “heinous,” it relied on precedent from both 
the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court that applied relatively recent 
scientific research on juvenile development to find that Stidham’s 
“sentence was excessive in light of his age at the time of the offense.” 
Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 51–52. After an intervening appeal and a 
subsequent hearing, the post-conviction court resentenced Stidham to the 
same maximum terms for each offense as before—60 years for murder, 50 
years for robbery, 20 years for criminal confinement, and 8 years for 
battery—but it did not order each term to be served consecutively.  
Instead, it provided that Stidham would serve the terms for robbery and 
criminal confinement concurrent to the term for murder and the term for 
battery consecutive to the other terms. Thus, the post-conviction court 
imposed an aggregate 68-year sentence. 
The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. State v. Stidham 
(Stidham III), 110 N.E.3d 410, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). A majority of the 
Court of Appeals panel concluded that the doctrine of res judicata barred 
Stidham’s challenge to his sentence because this Court had considered 
and resolved the same issue in Stidham II. Id. at 420. The majority went on 
to find that, to the extent Stidham’s challenge relied on his improvements 
since his retrial, he sought an improper sentence modification because he 
had not obtained the consent of the prosecuting attorney. Id. at 420–21 
(citing Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17(k) (2015)). Judge May concurred in the 
result. She noted that, despite res judicata, a court can revisit a prior 
decision under certain circumstances. Id. at 421 (May, J., concurring in 
result). And, as Stidham did in his petition for post-conviction relief, she 
quoted at length from this Court’s precedent discussing the unique factors 
involved when considering the propriety of a maximum sentence for a 
juvenile. Id. at 421–23 (quoting Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 6–8 (Ind. 2014)). 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634  | November 17, 2020 
Page 6 of 19 
See also Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Appellant’s App. Vol. 
II, p. 8 (same). However, because the Court of Appeals cannot revisit 
decisions of this Court, she admittedly could not reach the merits to 
consider the appropriateness of Stidham’s sentence, so she concurred in 
the result of the majority’s ruling. 110 N.E.3d at 423. 
Stidham petitioned for transfer, which we now grant, thereby vacating 
the Court of Appeals opinion. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 
Standard of Review 
When the State appeals from a grant of post-conviction relief, we apply 
the clearly-erroneous standard of review. State v. Oney, 993 N.E.2d 157, 
161 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). Under this standard, we 
reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment “only upon a showing of 
‘clear error’—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that 
[a] mistake has been made.” State v. Green, 16 N.E.3d 416, 418 (Ind. 2014) 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). However, we review the post-
conviction court’s legal conclusions de novo. State v. Hollin, 970 N.E.2d 
147, 151 (Ind. 2012). 
Discussion and Decision 
In seeking post-conviction relief, Stidham presents multiple arguments 
challenging the 138-year sentence imposed on him in the early 1990s for 
crimes he committed as a juvenile. Stidham focuses most of his effort on 
arguing that his sentence constitutes a discretionary, de facto life-without-
parole sentence and that the United States and Indiana Constitutions 
prohibit such sentences for crimes committed by juveniles. But, in 
consistently invoking this Court’s precedent in which we have exercised 
our authority under the Indiana Constitution and Indiana Appellate Rule 
7(B) to review and revise inappropriate sentences, he also raises a 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634  | November 17, 2020 
Page 7 of 19 
challenge to the appropriateness of his sentence.2 See, e.g., Verified Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief, Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 7–9 (quoting 
Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 6–8; Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 657–58 (Ind. 2014)); 
Br. of Appellee, pp. 28–29 (relying on Brown and Fuller). We begin our 
analysis with this appropriateness argument, and, because we find that 
argument dispositive, we do not reach Stidham’s other argument that his 
sentence constitutes an impermissible discretionary, de facto life-without-
parole sentence. See Gammons v. State, 148 N.E.3d 301, 304 n.2 (Ind. 2020). 
Our analysis of Stidham’s argument that his sentence is inappropriate 
involves two steps. First, we consider the preliminary issue of whether res 
judicata prevents us from considering the argument and conclude that it 
does not. Second, we proceed to the merits and find that Stidham’s 138-
year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his 
character. 
I. The doctrine of res judicata does not bar 
consideration of Stidham’s appropriateness 
argument thanks to two major shifts in the law. 
Preliminarily, we must determine whether this Court has previously 
decided the issue of the appropriateness of Stidham’s sentence in 
connection with our constitutional authority to review and revise 
 
2 Toward the beginning of oral argument, Stidham’s counsel stated, “7(B) is not available to 
my client.” Oral Argument at 3:33–3:35. But he went on to say, “[A]s to the 7(B) . . . as it relates 
back to Brown and Fuller, . . . this exactly applies here . . . .” Id. at 7:01–7:11. Considering 
Stidham’s consistent prior reliance on our precedent, and his counsel’s later reference to that 
precedent at oral argument in arguing for Appellate Rule 7(B)’s applicability, we decline to 
find that Stidham abandoned this argument. 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634  | November 17, 2020 
Page 8 of 19 
sentences. See Ind. Const. art. 7, § 4; Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B).3 If we have 
already decided the issue, a procedural bar could preclude our 
consideration of the issue now. 
A. Despite the doctrine of res judicata, a court can revisit a 
prior decision in extraordinary circumstances. 
“As a general rule, when a reviewing court decides an issue on direct 
appeal, the doctrine of res judicata applies, thereby precluding its review in 
post-conviction proceedings.” Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1194 (Ind. 
2006). On direct appeal from Stidham’s retrial, this Court considered 
Stidham’s argument that his sentence was “unreasonable” and 
“disproportionate to the crime committed.” Stidham II, 637 N.E.2d at 144. 
Stidham admits that this was a decision on an earlier appropriateness 
argument. Pet. to Transfer, p. 8 (noting that Stidham II “determined 
whether or not the sentence was manifestly unreasonable” under 
Appellate Rule 7(B)). Thus, res judicata would normally apply and bar our 
consideration of the issue now. 
Notwithstanding res judicata, “[a] court has the power to revisit prior 
decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance.” State v. 
Huffman, 643 N.E.2d 899, 901 (Ind. 1994) (quoting State v. Lewis, 543 N.E.2d 
1116, 1118 (Ind. 1989)). This power, though, should be exercised only in 
“extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was 
clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice.” Id. (quoting Lewis, 
543 N.E.2d at 1118). Two cases—Huffman and Saylor v. State, 808 N.E.2d 
646 (Ind. 2004)—illustrate instances in which we have found such 
extraordinary circumstances. 
 
3 Appellate Rule 7(B) provides the standard by which we implement our constitutional 
authority to review and revise sentences. McCullough v. State, 900 N.E.2d 745, 747 (Ind. 2009). 
However, the standard’s location in our rules has changed from time to time. See Fointno v. 
State, 487 N.E.2d 140, 144 (Ind. 1986) (providing the standard located at Rule 2 of the Indiana 
Rules for the Appellate Review of Sentences at that time). For ease of discussion, we will refer 
to the standard as the Appellate Rule 7(B) standard, based on its current location, throughout 
this opinion, rather than referring to it by its various former locations. 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634  | November 17, 2020 
Page 9 of 19 
In Huffman, this Court affirmed the post-conviction court’s grant of 
relief and, in doing so, declined to apply res judicata. During trial, 
Huffman raised a voluntary intoxication defense, and the trial court 
instructed the jury that the “burden of proving this defense” rests on the 
defendant. Huffman, 643 N.E.2d at 901 n.2 (citation and alteration omitted). 
Huffman was convicted, and this Court affirmed on direct appeal. Id. at 
900. After Huffman sought post-conviction relief, the post-conviction 
court reversed Huffman’s convictions, finding that the trial court 
committed fundamental error by giving the intoxication instruction. Id. at 
899. The State appealed that decision, arguing that the post-conviction 
court erred in granting relief based on the instruction because this Court 
had already found “that the intoxication instruction was adequate.” Id. at 
901. In affirming the grant of post-conviction relief, this Court recognized 
res judicata but declined to apply it, noting the Court’s power to revisit 
prior decisions in certain circumstances. Id. We acknowledged that 
“[f]inality and fairness are both important goals,” but we went on to 
conclude that, “[w]hen faced with an apparent conflict between them, this 
Court unhesitatingly chooses the latter.” Id. Thus, although we had 
already addressed a challenge to the jury instruction on direct appeal, we 
declined to apply res judicata in the post-conviction proceeding and 
affirmed the grant of post-conviction relief. 
In Saylor, this Court did not apply res judicata, found Saylor’s sentence 
inappropriate, and revised the sentence despite acknowledging that the 
Court had previously found the sentence appropriate. A jury found Saylor 
guilty of murder and other crimes, and the trial court sentenced him to 
death over the jury’s unanimous recommendation against that penalty. 
Saylor, 808 N.E.2d at 647. On direct appeal, Saylor petitioned for 7(B) 
relief, but we found the death sentence appropriate and refused to revise 
it. Id. at 650. Saylor sought post-conviction relief but was denied, which 
we affirmed. Id. at 648. But we eventually granted rehearing and revised 
Saylor’s death sentence to a term of years. Id. We supported our 
conclusion to revisit our prior decision on the appropriateness of Saylor’s 
sentence, notwithstanding res judicata, by pointing to two important 
changes in the law since the initial decision. First, we noted that a trial 
court could no longer impose the death penalty without an affirmative 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634  | November 17, 2020 
Page 10 of 19 
recommendation from the jury for death. Id. at 648, 650, 651 (relying on 
legislative developments and intervening caselaw). Second, we described 
how the Appellate Rule 7(B) standard had changed from prohibiting 
revision unless a sentence was “manifestly unreasonable” to permitting 
revision if a sentence was “inappropriate.” Id. at 650. Based on these 
changes in the law, we revisited our prior decision and found Saylor’s 
death sentence inappropriate. 
Huffman and Saylor provide important guideposts for determining 
when a court should revisit a prior decision despite res judicata concerns. 
Huffman states that courts should revisit a prior decision only in 
extraordinary circumstances. But we also explained that, if the question of 
whether to revisit a prior decision reveals a conflict between finality and 
fairness, we should choose fairness. Saylor shows that changes in the law 
can sometimes provide the extraordinary circumstances required to revisit 
a prior decision. This case falls well within those guideposts: it presents 
the extraordinary circumstances required to revisit our prior decision 
thanks to the combination of two major shifts in the law since Stidham’s 
direct appeal. 
B. We will revisit our prior decision regarding the 
appropriateness of Stidham’s sentence because of two 
major shifts in the law. 
The first major shift occurred when we changed the standard by which 
we exercise our authority under Article 7, Section 4 of the Indiana 
Constitution “to review and revise” sentences. At the time of Stidham’s 
direct appeal, the standard was as follows: 
(1) The reviewing court will not revise a sentence authorized by 
statute except where such sentence is manifestly unreasonable 
in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 
offender. 
(2) A sentence is not manifestly unreasonable unless no 
reasonable person could find such sentence appropriate . . . . 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634  | November 17, 2020 
Page 11 of 19 
Fointno v. State, 487 N.E.2d 140, 144 (Ind. 1986) (bold emphasis added) 
(citation and italics omitted). Under this standard—phrased as a 
prohibition on revision and turning on the narrow meaning of manifestly 
unreasonable—revision of term-of-years sentences was “extraordinarily 
rare” and, in fact, nearly impossible. Hon. Randall T. Shepard, Robust 
Appellate Review of Sentences: Just How British is Indiana?, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 
671, 676–77 (2009) (hereinafter Shepard). We later expressed concern that 
employing such an oppressive standard risked impinging criminal 
defendants’ constitutional right to an appeal. Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 
852, 856 (Ind. 2003).  
In light of these concerns, we took “modest steps to provide more 
realistic appeal of sentencing issues” and promulgated a new standard in 
2003. Id. at 856–57. This new standard, still in effect today, provides:  
The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after 
due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds 
that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 
offense and the character of the offender.  
App. R. 7(B) (emphasis added). Whereas the old standard represented “a 
prohibition on revising sentences unless certain narrow conditions were 
met,” the current standard provides “an authorization to revise sentences 
when certain broad conditions are satisfied.” Neale v. State, 826 N.E.2d 635, 
639 (Ind. 2005). And, along with changing the language of the standard 
from a prohibition to an authorization, we lowered the bar for relief from 
“manifestly unreasonable” to “inappropriate.” All in all, prisoners seeking 
sentence revision under the current standard “have experienced an 
environment decidedly more open than it had been” before, including at 
the time Stidham initially sought relief. Shepard at 680. 
The second major shift in the law occurred when the U.S. Supreme 
Court began limiting when juveniles could be sentenced to the harshest 
punishments. More than a decade after Stidham’s crimes, trials, and 
appeals, the Court declared the death penalty unconstitutional for 
juveniles. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). Several years later, 
the Court declared life-without-parole sentences unconstitutional for 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634  | November 17, 2020 
Page 12 of 19 
juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48, 82 (2010). Shortly after that, the Court again limited the applicability of 
life-without-parole sentences to juveniles when it held unconstitutional “a 
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of 
parole for juvenile offenders.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).  
The U.S. Supreme Court based these decisions on its recognition of 
fundamental differences between adults and juveniles. Relying on 
developments in the fields of psychology, brain science, and social science, 
along with common sense, the Court summarized three important 
differences between adults and juveniles: juveniles “have a lack of 
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” an increased 
vulnerability “to negative influences and outside pressures,” and a still-
evolving character. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–
70). See also Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 n.5 (noting that “the science and social 
science supporting Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions have become even 
stronger”). Based in part on these differences, the Court concluded that 
“juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform” 
and that “the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological 
justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, 
even when they commit terrible crimes.” Id. at 471, 472. Therefore, the 
Court acknowledged that “Roper and Graham establish[ed] that children 
are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes.” Id. at 
471.  
This Court has since incorporated the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in Roper, Graham, and Miller into our own sentencing cases. In 2014, we 
relied on the unique attributes of juveniles in reducing maximum term-of-
years sentences imposed for crimes committed when the defendants were 
juveniles in Brown and Fuller. Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 6–8; Fuller, 9 N.E.3d at 
657–59. In both cases, we noted, “Consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning this Court has not been hesitant to reduce maximum sentences 
for juveniles convicted of murder.” Fuller, 9 N.E.3d at 658 (quoting Brown, 
10 N.E.3d at 7). Similarly, in 2017, we recognized the importance of 
considering the inherent differences between adults and juveniles in 
determining the appropriateness of a sentence when we reduced a 
juvenile’s life-without-parole sentence to a term of years. Taylor v. State, 86 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634  | November 17, 2020 
Page 13 of 19 
N.E.3d 157, 164–67 (Ind. 2017). Thus, since Stidham’s direct appeal ran its 
course in the early 1990s, the U.S. Supreme Court has steadily lowered the 
ceiling for punishment of juveniles based on its recognition of unique 
attributes of juveniles, and this Court has relied on the rationales 
underlying those decisions to revise juveniles’ maximum sentences. 
The combination of these two major shifts in the law presents the 
extraordinary circumstances necessary to reconsider our prior decision 
rejecting Stidham’s appropriateness argument. Stidham initially brought 
his appropriateness argument under the crushing “manifestly 
unreasonable” standard, which we have since changed “to provide [a] 
more realistic appeal of sentencing issues.” Serino, 798 N.E.2d at 856. And 
he brought his earlier appropriateness argument before the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided a string of groundbreaking juvenile-sentencing cases and 
before this Court incorporated the reasoning of those cases into our 
sentence-revision jurisprudence. Both courts now recognize that juveniles 
“are less deserving of the most severe punishments.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 
471 (citation omitted); Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 7. Yet Stidham received the 
maximum term-of-years sentence—138 years in total—for crimes he 
committed as a juvenile. Thus, these major shifts render suspect our prior 
decision on the appropriateness of Stidham’s maximum sentence. 
Revisiting our prior decision on the appropriateness of Stidham’s sentence 
under these circumstances meets the requirements of Huffman and follows 
the path laid down by Saylor, which also relied on the change in the 
Appellate Rule 7(B) standard and a groundbreaking change in sentencing 
law. So, we proceed to consider the merits of Stidham’s appropriateness 
argument. 
II. Stidham’s maximum term-of-years sentence 
imposed for crimes he committed as a juvenile is 
inappropriate. 
Appellate Rule 7(B) provides the standard by which we exercise our 
constitutional authority to review and revise sentences. We “may revise a 
sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634  | November 17, 2020 
Page 14 of 19 
court’s decision, [this] Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in 
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” App. 
R. 7(B). Whether we find a sentence inappropriate “turns on myriad 
factors that come to light in a given case” and ultimately “boils down to 
our collective sense of what is appropriate.” Taylor, 86 N.E.3d at 165 
(cleaned up). Thus, the trial court’s findings of aggravators and mitigators 
does not limit our review under Appellate Rule 7(B). Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 
4. That said, “[t]he principal role of our review is to leaven outliers rather 
than achieving a perceived correct sentence.’” Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 
204, 215 (Ind. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
With this general guidance in mind, we consider whether Stidham’s 
sentence of 138 years, the maximum term of years he could have received 
at the time, is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his 
character. 
Stidham’s crimes were horrific. A night that started as friends playing 
guitars together escalated through a series of crimes until the victim was 
brutally murdered. Stidham and two others severely beat the victim in his 
own home and stole some of his possessions. They gagged the victim and 
forced him into his van, with Stidham chasing down the victim when he 
tried to escape. The group then drove the victim’s van, with the victim 
and his possessions inside, to a hidden riverbank where they violently 
stabbed the victim forty-seven times before callously throwing his body in 
the river. The brutal nature of the offenses does not weigh in favor of 
finding Stidham’s sentence inappropriate. 
Stidham’s character, on the other hand, paints a less damning image. 
His actions up to the time of his retrial sentencing show a series of 
negative activities followed by a glimmer of hope for rehabilitation. 
During Stidham’s teenage years, he acquired several juvenile delinquency 
adjudications, most of which involved running away or escaping from his 
residential placement. While awaiting sentencing after his first trial, he 
tried to escape from the Madison County Jail and refused to cooperate in 
the pre-sentence investigation. And during his time at the Indiana State 
Prison between his first and second trials, Stidham joined a gang. 
However, he took several positive steps toward rehabilitation while in 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634  | November 17, 2020 
Page 15 of 19 
prison between trials. He completed his G.E.D. and began the process to 
enroll in college courses, and he participated in religion classes and 
substance-abuse counseling. As a result, Stidham and those around him 
began to notice a change. Stidham testified about how his newfound sense 
of accomplishment after completing his G.E.D. and his success in 
counseling had changed his perspective and helped him mature. In line 
with his self-assessment, Stidham’s DOC Substance Abuse Supervisor 
noted that “Matt’s willingness to learn, his desire to find positive 
alternatives to replace negative behaviors was apparent.” Direct Appeal 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 228. And the probation officer who conducted the pre-
sentence investigations before Stidham’s first trial and his retrial noted the 
drastic improvement in Stidham’s behavior. While Stidham’s actions 
hinted at a potential for rehabilitation, his difficult childhood and his 
youth at the time of the crimes showed his diminished culpability and 
provided additional reason for hope. 
Stidham had a difficult childhood that continued up until he committed 
the offenses here at the age of seventeen. “[A] juvenile offender’s difficult 
upbringing . . . can serve to diminish the juvenile’s culpability and weigh 
in favor of a lesser sentence.” Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 6. Accord Mullins v. State, 
148 N.E.3d 986, 987 (Ind. 2020) (per curiam) (relying on Mullins’s difficult 
childhood in reducing her sentence). While we need not rehash our earlier 
discussion of Stidham’s troubled childhood, two examples of the abuse he 
suffered at the hands of his second stepmother illustrate the trauma 
Stidham experienced as a child. On one occasion she punished pre-teen 
Stidham by stabbing him in the chest with scissors. And on other 
occasions, she punished him by smearing dog feces in his face or making 
him eat dog feces. As a child-in-need-of-services report later concluded, 
Stidham’s childhood inflicted “deep emotional scars” on the boy. Direct 
Appeal Tr. Vol. 1, p. 241 (citation omitted). And at the sentencing hearing 
after his retrial, Stidham acknowledged the effect of this abuse: “In a way I 
see myself acting just like she acted towards us. You know, it’s like no 
matter how much I hated what she did, I still acted like her and . . . it just 
messed me up all the way around, you know.” Direct Appeal Tr. Vol. 5, p. 
185. This upbringing does not excuse Stidham’s horrible crimes. But, as in 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634  | November 17, 2020 
Page 16 of 19 
Brown and Mullins, Stidham’s difficult childhood lessens his culpability 
and weighs against a maximum sentence. 
Most significantly here, Stidham was just seventeen years old when he 
committed the crimes. See Taylor, 86 N.E.3d at 166. As noted above, both 
the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court have recognized that, “[b]ecause 
juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform,” 
they “are less deserving of the most severe punishments.” Miller, 567 U.S. 
at 471 (citation omitted). Accord Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 7. This conclusion 
flows from the recognition of three important differences between 
children and adults. First, juveniles’ “lack of maturity and . . . 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility” leads to “recklessness, 
impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (citation 
omitted). Second, their susceptibility “to negative influences and outside 
pressures,” along with their limited ability to control their environment, 
can leave them lacking “the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, 
crime-producing settings.” Id. (citation omitted). Third, “a child’s 
character is not as well formed as an adult’s; his traits are less fixed and 
his actions less likely to be evidence of irretrievable depravity.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks, alteration marks, and citation omitted). “These 
salient characteristics mean that ‘[i]t is difficult even for expert 
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile 
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’” Brown, 10 N.E.3d 
at 7 (alteration in original) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68). Therefore, 
“juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst 
offenders.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). Yet, 
although we have said that “the maximum possible sentences are 
generally most appropriate for the worst offenders,” Buchanan v. State, 767 
N.E.2d 967, 973 (Ind. 2002) (citations omitted), Stidham received the 
maximum possible term-of-years sentence for crimes he committed as a 
juvenile. As we and the U.S. Supreme Court have held before, Stidham’s 
juvenile status weighs against a maximum sentence. 
Stidham’s progress supports the three reasons provided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court for why we treat juveniles, especially those subjected to 
difficult childhoods like Stidham’s, differently than adults for sentencing. 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634  | November 17, 2020 
Page 17 of 19 
Stidham, his DOC Substance Abuse Supervisor, and the probation officer 
who conducted his pre-sentence investigations all noticed positive 
changes in Stidham in the time between his first trial and his retrial. And 
those positive changes have only grown since that time, even though 
Stidham was staring down a 138-year sentence that all but guaranteed he 
would die behind bars. After obtaining his G.E.D., Stidham completed the 
prison’s culinary arts program and received his associate’s degree (with 
academic distinction) and bachelor’s degree (magna cum laude) from Ball 
State University. He also became a certified firefighter and has worked in 
the prison fire department for approximately fifteen years, all the while 
training other members of the department, collecting distinguished 
certifications, and rising to the rank of captain. At the post-conviction 
sentencing hearing, Stidham testified that this progress came about as part 
of his process of “growing up.” Resentencing Hr. Tr., p. 16. We do not 
note these post-sentencing accomplishments as evidence directly 
concerning the appropriateness of Stidham’s sentence at the time it was 
imposed in the early 1990s. Rather, we reference them as further support 
for the proposition that a child’s lessened culpability and heightened 
potential for rehabilitation, as compared to an adult, must be considered 
in sentencing. 
Considering all these aspects of the nature of the offenses and 
Stidham’s character, we conclude that the maximum 138-year sentence 
imposed on Stidham for crimes he committed as a juvenile is 
inappropriate. While Stidham’s crimes were horrific, his character makes 
this case less suitable for a maximum term-of-years sentence. Stidham’s 
status as a juvenile, his difficult childhood, and his initial steps toward 
rehabilitation between his first trial and his retrial demonstrate that he 
was not one of the worst offenders subject to the harshest punishment. We 
find support for this conclusion in Stidham II. There, under the onerous 
“manifestly unreasonable” standard of Appellate Rule 7(B), and before the 
U.S. Supreme Court or this Court had thoroughly discussed the unique 
qualities of juveniles as they pertain to sentencing, Justices Sullivan and 
DeBruler would have reduced Stidham’s sentence based on his age and 
the abuse he suffered. Stidham II, 637 N.E.2d at 144 (Sullivan, J., concurring 
and dissenting). Considering the shifts in the law discussed in Part I.B., 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634  | November 17, 2020 
Page 18 of 19 
supra, this case, which resulted in a narrow denial of relief in 1994, merits 
the grant of relief today. See Saylor, 808 N.E.2d at 648, 650–51 (relying on 
changes in the law to find Saylor’s death sentence inappropriate). Our 
review of the nature of Stidham’s offenses and his character shows that 
Stidham’s 138-year sentence is inappropriate. 
We now turn to Stidham’s revised sentence. In revising a sentence, 
“there is no right answer in any given case.” Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 8 
(alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, 
“appellate review and revision ultimately boils down to the appellate 
court’s ‘collective sense of what is appropriate, not a product of a 
deductive reasoning process.’” Id. (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 
1219, 1224–25 (Ind. 2008)). However, we also consider any precedent “in 
line with our principal role of leavening outliers.” Taylor, 86 N.E.3d at 166. 
As we did in Taylor, Brown, and Fuller, and as we do again today in Wilson, 
we find that the nature of Stidham’s crimes and his character warrant a 
lengthy sentence short of the maximum. See Taylor, 86 N.E.3d at 167 
(reducing a life-without-parole sentence to an aggregate 80-year sentence); 
Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 8 (reducing a maximum 150-year sentence to an 
aggregate 80-year sentence); Fuller, 9 N.E.3d at 658–59 (reducing a 
maximum 150-year sentence to an aggregate 85-year sentence); Wilson v. 
State, No. 19S-PC-548, --- N.E.3d --- (Ind. 2020) (reducing a 181-year 
sentence to an aggregate 100-year sentence). We conclude that Stidham 
should receive the maximum terms at the time of his offenses for each 
individual crime—60 years for murder, 50 years for robbery, 20 years for 
criminal confinement, and 8 years for battery. However, the robbery term 
should be served concurrent to the murder term, and the murder, criminal 
confinement, and battery terms should be served consecutively. Thus, we 
revise Stidham’s overall sentence from 138 years to 88 years. 
Conclusion 
We affirm the result of the post-conviction court’s order granting 
Stidham relief, revisit our prior decision regarding the appropriateness of 
his sentence, and revise his sentence to an aggregate term of 88 years. We 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634  | November 17, 2020 
Page 19 of 19 
remand to the trial court to enter a sentencing order consistent with this 
opinion. 
Rush, C.J., and Massa, J., concur. 
David, J., concurs in result. 
Slaughter, J., dissents with separate opinion. 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T  
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Ellen H. Meilaender 
Supervising Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Eric Hoffman 
Chief Trial Deputy Prosecutor 
Muncie, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L E E 
John C. Reeder 
Anderson, Indiana 
David W. Stone, IV 
Stone Law Office & Legal Research 
Anderson, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AM IC I 
C U R IAE   
Bernice Corley 
Joel C. Wieneke 
Indiana Public Defender Council, 
Juvenile Defense Project 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
John R. Mills 
Genevie Gold 
Phillips Black, Inc. 
San Francisco, California 
 
 
Slaughter, J., dissenting. 
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Matthew Stidham alleged that 
his term-of-years sentence was a “de facto” life-without-parole sentence 
that violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution. And Stidham sought 
relief consisting of “vacating, setting aside or correcting” his illegal 
sentence. Yet rather than tackling Stidham’s constitutional claims, the 
Court holds that his sentence is “inappropriate” under Appellate Rule 
7(B). Because the Court resolves a claim that Stidham did not raise and 
awards relief he did not seek, I respectfully dissent. 
At no time during this matter did Stidham invoke Rule 7(B) as a 
ground for relief—not in his trial-court petition; not in his brief in the 
court of appeals; not in his transfer papers in our Court. Instead, Stidham 
argued that his sentence was unconstitutional and that he had raised 
sufficiently different arguments on direct appeal so that res judicata did 
not preclude reaching the merits of his constitutional claims. In other 
words, Stidham did not seek to overcome res judicata so courts could 
decide an unraised 7(B) claim, but so courts could—and would—decide 
the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. What is more, when 
asked about 7(B) during oral argument, Stidham specifically disavowed 
its availability. Indeed, as the following Q&A reflects, only the Court 
wanted to discuss 7(B). 
Q. 
Is that more of a constitutional issue or is that 
something that fits more appropriately under the 
Court’s 7(B) authority? 
A. 
It did not fall under 7(B) because of the nature of the 
crime. The nature of the crime and the sentence at the 
time back in 1993 is more of a cruel-and-unusual 
argument. The court had reviewed that under 7(B), and 
while 7(B) applied to Brown and Fuller at the time, it 
was more of a constitutional issue as to cruel and 
unusual.  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-PC-634 | November 17, 2020 
Page 2 of 2 
Q. 
Is 7(B) not available to your client?  
A. 
7(B) is not available to my client due to the fact that 
even though there’s been changes in the law, Matt 
Stidham had already gone to the Indiana Supreme 
Court previously under the 7(B) and under the current 
state would make the constitutional claim, which it was 
framed more from the Indiana Supreme Court at the 
time as to the 7(B), and that’s where it was reduced 
down to the 138— 
Q. 
Let’s change your argument a little. Let’s not concede 
that so fast—because one thing we have that all the 
cases that you cite in your brief we do have 7(B), but 
you’ve got to get over the res judicata hurdle … 
This exchange underscores the Court’s resolve to decide this case under 
Rule 7(B) although Stidham never raised it and expressly disclaimed it. 
Yet the Court “decline[s] to find that Stidham abandoned this argument.” 
Ante, at 7 n.2. Finding Rule 7(B) not “abandoned” is an odd way of 
describing an argument Stidham never raised in the first place. If Stidham 
did not “abandon” 7(B), neither did he raise and preserve it, and thus he 
necessarily waived it. Because the Court awards relief on an alternative 
ground that Stidham both waived and disclaimed, I respectfully dissent.