Title: State v. John Widmaier
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-169-97
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: March 3, 1999

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). STEIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. On this appeal, the Court considers whether a person arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) may be acquitted of refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test without unequivocally consenting to the test, and whether a person arrested for DWI has the right to consult with an attorney prior to providing breath samples. In addition, the Court addresses whether the double jeopardy clause of the federal and state constitutions bars the State from appealing Widmaier's acquittal of the refusal charge. John Widmaier was arrested for driving while intoxicated. The arresting officer asked Widmaier to take a breathalyzer test and informed Widmaier that his right to consult with an attorney did not apply to the taking of breath samples. Widmaier responded to the officer's request by saying that he wanted to call his lawyer. The police officer again instructed Widmaier that his right to consult with a lawyer did not apply to the taking of breath samples. Widmaier agreed to submit to the test but asked that his attorney be present "for calibration purposes." The officer determined that Widmaier's response constituted a refusal to take the breathalyzer test. Widmaier was issued summonses for driving while intoxicated, failing to maintain a lane, and refusing to take a breathalyzer test. Widmaier was convicted in municipal court of driving while intoxicated but acquitted of the charge of refusing to take the breathalyzer test. Both Widmaier and the State appealed to the Law Division. That court, conducting a trial de novo on the record, held preliminarily that the State was not barred by double jeopardy principles from appealing Widmaier's acquittal on the refusal charge because that charge is civil and not criminal in nature. The court upheld the DWI conviction, finding that charge had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. On the refusal charge, the court found that Widmaier did not refuse to take the breathalyzer test and that he did not knowingly subject himself to the statutory penalties for refusal. Both parties appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed Widmaier's DWI conviction and upheld the dismissal of the refusal charge. The Supreme Court granted certification. HELD: A person arrested for driving while intoxicated may not be acquitted of a refusal to take a breathalyzer test unless he or she unequivocally and unambiguously consented to the test. In addition, the double jeopardy clause of the federal and state constitutions bars the State from appealing Widmaier's acquittal of the refusal charge. 1. To facilitate the effective enforcement of the State's DWI statutes, the Legislature passed the Implied Consent Law, which provides that anyone operating a vehicle on the State's roads is deemed to have given consent to the taking of breath samples to determine the alcohol content in the blood of a driver arrested for DWI. Breath samples are nontestimonial evidence; therefore, a defendant is not entitled to the Fifth Amendment right to have an attorney present when the test is performed. Anything substantially short of an unequivocal assent to an officer's request to submit to the test constitutes a refusal to do so. (pp. 11-14) 2. The prohibition in the double jeopardy clause against repeated attempts to obtain a conviction against the accused after the accused has been acquitted applies to acquittals of criminal and quasi-criminal charges. There is no such prohibition in civil actions. In deciding whether a particular statute is civil or criminal, courts must determine whether the sanctions imposed for a violation are tantamount to a criminal penalty. (pp. 14- 21) 3. Violations of motor vehicle laws are quasi-criminal in nature. New Jersey courts have generally classified a refusal to take a breathalyzer test as a civil matter. Moreover, the refusal statute provides for a civil standard of proof. Nonetheless, the penalties for refusal convictions are as severe as, or more severe than, penalties for typical motor vehicle violations that have been categorized as quasi-criminal. (pp. 21-26) 4. The Court adopts the principle that anything substantially short of an unconditional, unequivocal assent to an officer's request that the arrested motorist take a breathalyzer test constitutes a refusal to do so. The arresting officer followed the proper procedures informing Widmaier of his obligation to submit to the test. Widmaier's ambiguous and conditional response appropriately was understood by the officer as a refusal to submit to the breathalyzer test. (pp. 26-27) 5. The arrested motorist's subjective intent is irrelevant in determining whether his or her responses to the officer constitute a refusal to take the test. It may be in the interest of both law enforcement officials and the driving public to amend the standard statement in order to eliminate any ambiguity concerning a driver's intent to submit to the test. The Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles is urged to consider revising the standard statement to further ensure that drivers will understand what will be deemed a refusal to take the test. (pp. 27-29) 6. Despite the use of a civil standard of proof, the consequences of a violation of the refusal statute are sufficiently severe as to be tantamount to a criminal penalty. Therefore, at least for double jeopardy purposes, a prosecution under the refusal statute must be regarded a quasi-criminal in nature. Here, the municipal court's determination that Widmaier did not refuse to take the breathalyzer test was based at least in part on factual findings. Therefore, the State's's subsequent appeals to the Law Division, Appellate Division and Supreme Court are barred by double jeopardy principles. (pp. 29-32) As MODIFIED, the judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE STEIN'S opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 169 September Term 1997 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN WIDMAIER, Defendant-Respondent. Argued October 14, 1998 -- Decided March 3, 1999 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Thomas M. Cannavo, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (E. David Millard, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney). Lisa Sarnoff Gochman, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (Peter Verniero, Attorney General, attorney). Matthew W. Reisig and David J. Foley, III, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew W. Reisig, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by STEIN, J. This appeal primarily requires us to determine what constitutes a refusal to take a breathalyzer test. When defendant John Widmaier was arrested for driving while intoxicated, the arresting police officer asked him to take a breathalyzer test and informed him that his right to consult with an attorney did not apply to the taking of breath samples. Defendant responded to the officer's request by saying only that he wanted to place a telephone call to his attorney. After the police officer again instructed defendant that his right to consult with an attorney did not apply to the taking of breath samples, defendant agreed to submit to a breathalyzer test but requested that his attorney be present for calibration purposes. The officer determined that defendant's response constituted a refusal to take the test. Defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated but acquitted of the charge of refusing to take a breathalyzer test. The primary issue before us is whether, in so responding, defendant refused to submit to the breathalyzer test within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a and in contravention of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2. We also address whether the double jeopardy clause of the federal and state constitutions bars the State from appealing defendant's acquittal of the refusal charge. At 3:04 a.m. on July 14, 1996, police officer Wayne Walker of the Little Egg Harbor Township Police Department was on duty in a marked patrol car, waiting to make a right-hand turn from Parkertown Drive onto the southbound lane of Route 9. After defendant, who was driving south on Route 9, passed Parkertown Drive, Walker made a right-hand turn onto Route 9 and proceeded on that road a few hundred yards behind defendant's vehicle. Walker observed defendant negotiate a tight curve, at which time defendant's left front and rear tires crossed the center line of Route 9 into the northbound lane. Walker testified that the area was well illuminated and that he did not observe any traffic or obstacles that might have interfered with defendant's ability to maintain his lane. Walker continued to follow defendant's vehicle on Route 9 and observed defendant again cross the center line. Defendant continued south on Route 9 until, without using his turn indicator lights, he abruptly made a sharp left turn onto Great Bay Boulevard in Tuckerton Borough. Defendant then traveled eastbound on Great Bay Boulevard and made a right turn onto Radio Road. In maneuvering that turn, defendant cut the wheel hard, and his vehicle began to skid toward the guardrail. After defendant appeared to have regained control of the car, his tires lost traction. Again, defendant was able to straighten the vehicle out of the skid. At that point, Walker activated his overhead lights. Defendant pulled over to the side of the road, turned off his engine, and through the open sunroof placed his keys on top of his car. As Walker approached defendant's vehicle, he smelled alcohol. Walker requested that defendant produce his driver's license, registration, and insurance card. The officer observed defendant fumble as he searched through his wallet for the requested documents; he was able to produce only his driver's license and registration. Asked whether he had had anything to drink that evening, defendant responded in the negative. Defendant spoke in a slow, slurred whisper, his face was flushed, and his eyes were red and watery. Defendant staggered as he complied with the officer's request to step out of his car and walk to the rear of his vehicle. Although the ground surface was flat macadam, defendant stood with his feet wide apart in order to maintain his balance. Defendant assumed a rigid posture but periodically swayed from side to side. Asked by the officer if he had any injuries, defendant replied that he had diabetes. The officer requested that defendant perform two field sobriety tests. Defendant was unable to perform the first test, which required him to stand for thirty seconds with his feet together, his hands down by his side, his head tilted back, and his eyes closed. Defendant did not perform the second test because he said he did not understand Walker's instructions; Walker had asked defendant to stand on one leg and count up to thirty. Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, and was informed of his Miranda rights as he was placed in the back of Walker's patrol car. Although the rear passenger compartment of the patrol car was separated from the driver's area by plexiglass, Walker noticed that an odor of alcohol was emanating from the passenger compartment. Defendant was taken to the Little Egg Harbor Township police headquarters. At headquarters, defendant's handcuffs were removed, and defendant was placed in a holding area. Walker then turned on the breathalyzer to warm it up, inserted a video tape into the video camera, and had defendant sit within the camera's view. When the breathalyzer was ready and the camera was filming, Walker read aloud paragraphs one through ten of the standard statement prepared by the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e): 1. You have been arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs or with blood alcohol concentration of 0.10" or more. 2. You are required by law to submit to the taking of samples of your breath for the purpose of making chemical tests to determine the content of alcohol in your blood. 3. A record of the taking of the samples, including the date, time, and results, will be made. Upon your request, a copy of that record will be made available to you. 4. Any warnings previously given to you concerning your right to remain silent and your right to consult with an attorney do not apply to the taking of breath samples and do not give you the right to refuse to give, or to delay giving, samples of your breath for the purposes of making chemical tests to determine the content of alcohol in your blood. You have no legal right to have an attorney, physician, or anyone else present, for the purpose of taking breath samples. 5. After you have provided samples of your breath for chemical testing, you have the right to have a person or physician of your own selection, and at your own expense, take independent samples and conduct independent chemical tests of your breath, urine, or blood. 6. If you refuse to provide samples of your breath you will be issued a separate summons for this refusal. 7. According to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a, if a court of law finds you guilty of refusing to submit to chemical tests of your breath, then your license to operate a motor vehicle will be revoked for a period of six months. If your refusal conviction is in connection with a second offense under this statute, your license to operate a motor vehicle will be revoked for a period of two years. If your refusal conviction is in connection with a third or subsequent offense under this statute, your license to operate a motor vehicle will be revoked for a period of ten years. The Court will also fine you a sum of between [sic] $250 and $500 for your refusal conviction. 8. Any license suspension or revocation for refusal conviction will be independent of any license suspension or revocation imposed for any related offense. 9. If you are convicted of refusing to submit to chemical tests of your breath, you will be referred by the Court to an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center and you will be required to satisfy the requirements of that center in the same manner as if you had been convicted of a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, or you will be subject to penalties for your failure to do so. 10. I repeat, you are required by law to submit to the taking of samples of your breath for the purpose of making chemical tests to determine the content of alcohol in your blood. Now, will you submit to the samples of your breath? Defendant's reply to the above-quoted statement was, Sir, I would like you to call Francis Xavier Moore, my attorney. The instructions accompanying the standard statement indicate that if the person remains silent, states that he has the right to remain silent, or says he wishes to consult an attorney, physician, or other person, the police officer shall read the following additional statement: I have previously informed you that the warnings given to you concerning your right to remain silent and your right to consult with an attorney do not apply to the taking of breath samples and do not give you a right to refuse to give, or delay giving, samples of your breath for the purpose of making chemical tests to determine the content of alcohol in your blood. If you (1) do not respond to my question about submitting breath samples; or (2) tell me that you refuse to answer this question because you have a right to remain silent or first wish to consult with an attorney, physician or any other person; or (3) tell me that you will not submit breath samples because you have a right to remain silent or first wish to consult with an attorney, physician, or any other person, then you will be issued a separate summons charging you with refusing to submit to the taking of samples of your breath for the purpose of making chemical tests to determine the content of alcohol in your blood. Once again, I ask you, will you submit to giving samples of your breath? Walker read the above statement to defendant, who responded by saying, I agree to the samples of my breath, but I would like my attorney present for calibration purposes. Walker again informed defendant that he did not have the right to have his attorney present for the breathalyzer test. Defendant remained silent, and Walker did not offer the breathalyzer mouthpiece to defendant. Walker again informed defendant of his Miranda rights, and defendant responded simply by saying that he understood. Walker asked defendant to perform physical coordination tests, and defendant refused to do so. Walker then issued defendant summonses for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWI), failure to maintain a lane, and refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test, in contravention of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b), and N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2, respectively. At trial, the Municipal Court merged the charge of failure to maintain a lane into the DWI charge and found defendant guilty of DWI. For that offense, defendant was assessed fines, penalties, and court costs in addition to mandatory attendance for twelve hours at the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center (IDRC) and revocation of his driving privileges for six months. With regard to the refusal charge, however, the court was not satisfied that defendant had refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. The court determined that defendant's statement, I agree to the samples of my breath, but I would like my attorney present for calibration purposes, was not a refusal. Both defendant and the State appealed to the Law Division, which, pursuant to Rule 3:23-8(a), held a trial de novo on the record below. The court held, as a preliminary matter, that the State was not barred by double jeopardy principles from appealing defendant's acquittal on the refusal charge because such a charge is civil and not criminal. The court found that the State proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was guilty of the DWI offense and upheld the penalties imposed by the trial court. On the refusal charge, however, the court found that defendant did not refuse to take the breathalyzer test and that defendant did not knowingly subject himself to the penalties for refusal mandated by N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. The court suggested that Officer Walker could have done more to make defendant understand that his unequivocal consent was needed in order for the officer to proceed with the breathalyzer test and that the test was mandatory. Both parties appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed defendant's DWI conviction and upheld the dismissal of the refusal charge. In an unpublished opinion, that court held that whether defendant's responses amounted to a consent or not was an issue for the trier of fact, and concluded that the trial court's findings were adequately supported by the evidence. The court found it unnecessary to consider defendant's argument that the State's appeal placed defendant in double jeopardy because the penalties for a conviction for refusal to consent are substantially the same as the penalties for a conviction of driving while under the influence of alcohol. Citing State v. Todaro, 242 N.J. Super. 177, 180 (App. Div. 1990), the Appellate Division panel noted that the Legislature intended a refusal trial to be a civil proceeding, and therefore not subject to double jeopardy limitations. The State filed a petition for certification, raising two issues for our review: (1) whether a person arrested for DWI may be acquitted of refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test without unequivocally consenting to the test; and (2) whether a person arrested for DWI has the right to consult with an attorney prior to providing breath samples. We granted certification. 153 N.J. 213 (1997). Although defendant did not file a cross-petition for certification, defendant argued before us that principles of double jeopardy bar the State from appealing his acquittal of the refusal charge. The Attorney General, as amicus curiae, urges us to hold that double jeopardy principles do not preclude the State from appealing refusal acquittals because the refusal statute is civil, not criminal, in nature. As modified, the judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE STEIN's opinion. NO. A-169 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN WIDMAIER, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED