Title: Pritchett v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 99, 2012
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MICHAEL D. PRITCHETT, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
                     Plaintiff Below- 
          Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 99, 2012 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, in and 
§  for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 1009007341 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                   
Submitted:  April 12, 2012 
 
Decided:  
April 20, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 20th day of April 2012, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) The defendant-appellant, Michael D. Pritchett, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s February 2, 2012 order denying his motion for 
sentence modification pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
 
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Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) The record before us reflects that, in May 2011, Pritchett entered 
a plea of guilty to one count of Drug Trafficking.  He was sentenced to 7 
years at Level V, with credit for 12 days previously served, to be suspended 
after 3 years for 18 months at Level III probation.  Pritchett’s sentence 
should have begun immediately, but the Department of Correction (“DOC”) 
mistakenly released him.  Pritchett remained free from May 31, 2011 until 
August 4, 2011, when he was apprehended by police.  He began serving his 
sentence on August 4, 2011. 
 
(3) In September 2011, Pritchett filed a “Motion to Compel My 
Sentence” requesting the Superior Court to credit him with the time he 
remained at large.  Pritchett cited no legal authority in support of his motion.  
The Superior Court denied the motion, ruling that the DOC’s error merely 
acted to stay Pritchett’s sentence, not shorten it.  Pritchett did not file an 
appeal.  Instead, in November 2011, he filed a “Rule 35 Motion for 
Correction or Reduction of Sentencing.”  This time, Pritchett cited legal 
authority to support his position.  Again, Pritchett asked the Superior Court 
to credit him with the time he remained at large.  The Superior Court, 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
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treating the motion as a motion for reargument, denied it as untimely.  The 
Superior Court also ruled that the lack of supporting legal authority in 
Pritchett’s original motion constituted a waiver of his claim.    
 
(4) In his appeal, Pritchett claims that the Superior Court erred and 
abused its discretion by a) denying his request that his sentence be credited 
with the time he remained at large; b) violating his right to due process; and 
c) treating his second Rule 35 motion as a motion for reargument. 
 
(5) We conclude that none of Pritchett’s claims has any merit.  It is 
axiomatic that a defendant should receive Level V credit only for time 
actually spent at Level V.2  As such, the Superior Court correctly concluded 
that Pritchett was not entitled to Level V credit for the time he spent at large.  
The Superior Court acted within its discretion when it treated Pritchett’s 
second filing as a motion for reargument.3  The motion clearly was out of 
time and the Superior Court properly denied it on that ground.4  Moreover, 
the Superior Court acted within its discretion when it declined to consider 
the legal authority advanced by Pritchett in his second motion and ruled that 
his failure to advance it initially constituted a waiver of his claim.5  Finally, 
                                                 
2 Gamble v. State, 728 A.2d 1171, 1172 (Del. 1999). 
3 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(e); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 57(d). 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 45(a); Brooks v. State, Del. Supr., Nos. 106 and 236, 2008, Holland, 
J. (Dec. 18, 2008). 
5 Flamer v. State, 953 A.2d 130, 134 (Del. 2008). 
 
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we find no legal or factual basis for a finding of a due process violation in 
this case.6 
 
(6) It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
           Justice 
 
 
                                                 
6 The case cited by Pritchett in his second motion, Harley v. State, Del. Supr., Nos. 93 
and 230, 1986, Horsey, J. (May 27, 1987), is inapposite to the situation presented here in 
any case.  In that case, the Court’s ruling was limited to whether the prisoner was 
properly re-incarcerated after a period spent at large and does not support Pritchett’s 
claim for Level V credit for time spent at large.