Title: McAfee v. McAfee
Citation: 255 S.W.2d 185
Docket Number: A-3819
State: Texas
Issuer: Texas Supreme Court
Date: February 4, 1953

255 S.W.2d 185 (1953) McAFEE v. McAFEE. No. A-3819. Supreme Court of Texas. February 4, 1953. Rehearing Denied March 4, 1953. J. Manuel Hoppenstein, Dallas, for petitioner. Burt Barr, Dallas, for respondent. SMITH, Justice. On July 28th, 1949, a judgment was rendered and entered in a cause numbered and styled 33947 Millicent Ann McAfee v. John M. McAfee, District Court, Dallas County, Texas, dissolving the bonds of matrimony between petitioner and respondent, and awarding the care and custody of their minor child, Dionne Hope McAfee, to petitioner. The judgment further ordered, adjudged and decreed that respondent pay to petitioner the sum of $160 per month for the support of said child, "or until further ordered by the court and subject to the further orders of this court." On August 24, 1951, respondent filed a motion in the same case alleging that conditions had materially changed, in that, his income had been substantially reduced, and that the sum of $40 per week was more than sufficient to support the minor child. The petitioner filed her answer, and on the 5th day of December, 1951, the court, without the aid of a jury, after hearing the pleadings, evidence and argument of counsel, entered its judgment reducing the sum for the support of the child to $100 per month. Petitioner perfected her appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fifth Supreme Judicial District of Texas. That court sustained the motion of respondent to dismiss the appeal, holding that the judgment entered on December 5, 1951, was interlocutory, *186 "and necessarily so, under Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 4639a, * * * is not appealable." 250 S.W.2d 310, 311. This Court had granted a writ of error. Article 4639a reads as follows: Respondent contends that the provisions in the statute giving the Court the power and authority to "alter or change such judgments" renders the judgment entered not final, and, therefore, not appealable. With this contention we cannot agree. The order involved here is a complete and final judgment in a civil case rendered and entered after a full hearing on the merits, and cannot be classed as interlocutory. The District Court of Dallas County had jurisdiction, and the Court of Civil Appeals had appellate jurisdiction under such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law. Constitution, Art. 5, § 6, Vernon's Ann.St.; Lawler v. Wray, Tex.Civ.App., 8 S.W.2d 524. This was a divorce suit originally between petitioner as plaintiff and respondent as defendant. The pleadings in the case presented the issue of divorce, custody of the minor child, and the issue of support for said child. The issues thus raised are severable, and the fact that the petitioner was granted a divorce which became final does not preclude the parties from the right of further litigation of the issues of child custody and child support. Article 4639a does not say and it was not intended by the Legislature to say that a formal party to a suit wherein these issues were involved would be compelled to accept the judgment of the trial court as final and, thereby be deprived of his right of appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals. The pleadings and the evidence presented a new cause of action and either party to this litigation had the *187 absolute right to have the case reviewed by the Court of Civil Appeals just as in any other civil case. McLemore v. McLemore, Tex.Civ.App., 285 S.W. 693; Burckhalter v. Conyer, Tex.Com.App., 285 S.W. 606. The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court.