Title: In Re: Asbestos Litigation Colgain v. OY Pratek AB
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 359, 2001
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 22, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN RE:  ASBESTOS LITIGATION
)
)  No. 359, 2001
RALPH F. COLGAIN, JR.,
)
)  Court Below:  Superior Court
Plaintiff Below,
)  of the State of Delaware
Appellant,
)  in and for New Castle County
)
v.
)  C.A. No. 98C-04-122
)
OY PARTEK AB,
)
)
Defendant Below,
)
Appellee.
)
Submitted:  May 6, 2002
Decided:  May 22, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justices.
Upon  appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.
Thomas C. Crumplar (argued) of Jacobs & Crumplar, Wilmington,
Delaware, and David Alexander Arndt of Doroshow, Pasquale, Krawitz, Siegel &
Bhaya, Dover, Delaware, for appellant.
Felice Glennon Kerr of The Bayard Firm, Wilmington, Delaware and
Michael Evan Jaffe (argued) admitted Pro Hac Vice, for appellee.
Per curiam:
2
In July 2001, a Superior Court judge granted Summary Judgment to
Appellee, defendant-below, Oy-Partek Ab, on the products liability claims of
Appellant, plaintiff-below, Ralph Colgain.  The Superior Court judge found that
Colgain presented insufficient evidence to establish that Partek’s predecessor in
interest, Finska Mineral, had the requisite actual or constructive knowledge of the
hazards associated with asbestos between 1938 and 1941.  In the absence of at least
a prima facie case establishing that knowledge, Finska Mineral had no duty to
warn of the potential dangers arising from asbestos use.  This is Colgain’s direct
appeal from that Summary Judgment.  We agree with the trial judge’s conclusion
that Colgain presented insufficient evidence to establish, even at the Summary
Judgment stage, that Finska Mineral had sufficient knowledge of asbestos danger
to impose a duty to warn.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Superior
Court.
Colgain filed suit in April 1998 claiming that he developed asbestos-related
pleural disease and pulmonary asbestosis as a result of varying exposures to
asbestos.  The only claim relevant to this appeal is his alleged exposure to
anthophyllite asbestos mined in Finland by Finska Mineral.  A predecessor
corporation of Partek acquired Finska Mineral in 1959.
When confronted with a Motion for Summary Judgment, the party bearing
the burden of proof at trial must submit sufficient evidence to establish a prima
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facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.1  Among the
essential elements that a plaintiff must prove in a negligence-based products
liability case is that the defendant had a duty to warn of dangers associated with its
product.2  At issue in this appeal is whether, after giving Colgain the benefit of all
facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom, he presented sufficient evidence
to establish that Partek indeed had a duty to warn the employees of the Continental
Diamond Fibre Company’s Haveg plant in Marshalltown, Delaware of the
potential dangers of exposure to its asbestos product.  The manufacturer’s duty to
warn is dependant on whether it had knowledge of the hazards associated with its
product.  Colgain, however, does not need to present evidence that Finska Mineral
had actual knowledge of those dangers.  It is enough that he merely establish that
the manufacturer should have known of them.3  In turn, what knowledge a
defendant should have had is a function of what a reasonably prudent individual
would have known under the pertinent circumstances at the time in question.4
Before the Superior Court, Colgain relied principally on the testimony of Dr.
Barry I. Castleman, a well-recognized expert in the field of asbestos research, to
                                                
1 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
2 See, e.g., In re Asbestos Litigation (Mergenthaler), 542 A.2d 1205, 1208 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986)
(acknowledging a duty to warn of a dangerous product in discussion of “knowledgeable
purchaser” defense); Threadgill v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Comp. Fund, D. Del., No.
88-161-SRR, 1990 WL 294271 at *1 (July 27, 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 928 F.2d 1366 (3d
Cir. 1991) (“Under Delaware law, a plaintiff seeking to recover for asbestos related injuries must
show as part of his prima facia [sic] case a duty to warn on the part of the defendant…”).
3 Graham v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 593 A.2d 567, 568 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990).
4
show that Finska Mineral had the requisite knowledge of the health risks
associated with asbestos products.  Dr. Castleman opined that the Finnish scientific
and manufacturing community did indeed have, at the very least, constructive
knowledge of those dangers from 1938 to 1941.  The evidence he cites as the basis
for that opinion, however, can only give rise to speculation that Finska Mineral
should have had this knowledge.  Our courts have held that an expert opinion
based on speculation alone can not defeat a motion for summary judgment.5
Although the literature that served as the foundation for Castleman’s opinion
indicates that some countries were aware of the dangers of asbestos in the 1930’s,
none of Colgain’s evidence indicates that this information was actually available in
either the Finnish manufacturing or scientific community.  As stated by the trial
judge:
Plaintiff’s evidence that Finska Mineral should have known of the risk is
insufficient.  It consists mainly [of] scientific or other technical articles
regarding emerging knowledge of the hazards of asbestos none of which
were published in Finland and the record is devoid of information showing
that such information was actually available to Finska Mineral.6
The record before us fully supports the trial judge’s finding and his reasoning.
Colgain also has advanced the theory that Partek must be held to the same
standard of knowledge that was available to asbestos manufacturers in the United
                                                                                                                                                            
4 Id. at 571.
5 Lynch v. Athey Prods. Corp., 505 A.2d 42, 45 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985).
5
States.  This argument rests on the premise that the standard of knowledge for
manufacturers in the United States is imputed to foreign manufacturers who market
their products in this country.7  In this instance Colgain maintains that the presence
of asbestos mined by Finska Mineral at the Haveg plant in Delaware sufficiently
establishes the business link that would impute the information on the risks of
asbestos available in the United States to the Finnish company.
This Court asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing referencing
any evidence in the record that specifically establishes that Finska Mineral had
direct ties to Haveg or the United States from 1938 to 1941.  Colgain cited several
instances including testimony that one Haveg employee regularly calculated
conversions to Finnish currency and testimony relating second-hand accounts that
the asbestos at the Haveg plant was from the Finska Mineral mines.  Partek
disputes whether certain of this evidence, including transcripts of testimony taken
in related cases, is actually a part of the record in this appeal.  We need not
determine that issue.  Similarly, we are not required to determine whether the
Navarro standard urged on us by Colgain is consistent with or properly applied to
Delaware’s reasonable person standard for knowledge.  Even if we were to accept
not only Colgain’s facts, but the Navarro standard as well, Colgain’s proffered
                                                                                                                                                            
6 Colgain v. A.C. and S, Inc., Del. Super., C.A. No. 98C-04-122, Babiarz, J., let. order (July 2,
2001).
7 Navarro v. Fuji Heavy Indus., Ltd., 117 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 1997).
6
evidence in response to our request is insufficient to establish that Finska Mineral
had direct business ties to the United States.  To decide otherwise would require us
to engage in the same rampant speculation that impermissibly formed the basis of
Dr. Castleman’s opinion, supra.
Conclusion
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.