Title: Ex parte William Kenneth Sorsby. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: William Kenneth Sorsby vs. State of Alabama)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1050636
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 19, 2007

REL:10/19/07sorsby
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1050636
_________________________
Ex parte William Kenneth Sorsby
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  Ex parte State of Alabama
(In re: State of Alabama v. William Kenneth Sorsby))
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CC-05-1115;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-04-2166)
BOLIN, Justice.
On March 3, 2005, William Kenneth Sorsby pleaded guilty
in the District Court of Jefferson County to driving under the
1050636
At the same time, Sorsby pleaded guilty to the unlawful
1
possession of a controlled substance, in violation of § 13A-
12-212, and was admitted to a pretrial-diversion program.
Sorsby's certiorari petition does not address this plea. 
2
influence, in violation of § 32-5A-191(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975.1
At the time he entered his guilty plea, Sorsby did not waive
his right to appeal.  On March 11, 2005, Sorsby filed a notice
of appeal seeking a trial de novo in the Jefferson Circuit
Court.  On July 14, 2005, the State moved that the appeal be
dismissed, arguing that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction
to consider the appeal because, when Sorsby pleaded guilty, he
did not reserve any issue for appeal and he did not file a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  On July 25, 2005, the
circuit court denied the State's motion to dismiss. The State
then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus asking the Court
of Criminal Appeals to direct the circuit judge to grant the
State's motion to dismiss Sorsby's appeal.  The Court of
Criminal Appeals granted the State's petition and issued the
writ.  State v. Sorsby, [Ms. CR-04-2166, December 16, 2005]
____ So. 2d ____ (Ala. Crim. App. 2005).  Judge Shaw
dissented, with an opinion. Sorsby then petitioned this Court
for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court
of Criminal Appeals.
1050636
3
We granted certiorari review to address whether the
Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure limit the right to appeal
a district court's judgment to the circuit court for a trial
de novo following a guilty plea when the defendant did not
reserve any issue for appeal and did not file a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
State's petition for a writ of mandamus to the Court of
Criminal Appeals
The State argued before the Court of Criminal Appeals
that Rule 14.4(a)(1), Ala. R. Crim. P. (addressing the
reservation of issues when entering a guilty plea), and Rule
26.9(b)(4), Ala. R. Crim. P. (requiring the court to inform
the defendant that he must reserve an issue or file a motion
to withdraw the guilty plea if he wants to appeal), limit the
right to appeal a guilty plea and that Sorsby has no right to
appeal his guilty plea because he did not reserve an issue for
appeal nor did he file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Sorsby argued that Rule 14.4(a)(1) does not apply to an appeal
from a conviction in the district court for a trial de novo in
the circuit court.  He further argued that the only reason the
State may move to dismiss an appeal to the circuit court is
when the defendant fails to appear in court.  Last, he argued
1050636
4
that it was unnecessary for him to file a formal motion to
withdraw his guilty plea because his appeal to the circuit
court for a trial de novo amounted to a "de facto" withdrawal
of his guilty plea.  
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that when this Court
in 2002, pursuant to its rule-making authority under Amendment
No. 328, § 6.11, Ala. Const. 1901 (now § 150, Ala. Const. 1901
(Off. Recomp.)), amended Rule 2.2(e), Ala. R. Crim. P.
(setting out the procedure when a case is appealed from the
municipal or the district court to the circuit court), Rule
14.4(a)(1), Ala. R. Crim. P., and Rule 26.9(b)(4), Ala. R.
Crim. P., it did not include in these amended rules any
provision limiting the application of the amendments to a
guilty plea entered in the circuit court, where a defendant
has no right to an appeal for a trial de novo.  In other
words, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that, in amending
these rules, this Court evidenced an intent to apply the
limited right to appeal a guilty plea to all guilty pleas, no
matter how minor the charge to which the defendant is pleading
and no matter what trial court is accepting the plea.  The
Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that Rule 30.1, Ala. R.
1050636
5
Crim. P., addresses appeals to the circuit court for a trial
de novo after a conviction in either a municipal court or a
district court and that that rule applies to guilty pleas
entered in the lower court.  However, the Court of Criminal
Appeals noted that Rules 2.2, 14.4, and 26.9 were amended
after Rule 30.1 was adopted, and that when there is an
inconsistency in the rules, courts give precedence to the
later adopted rule.  Last, the Court of Criminal Appeals held
that Sorsby's motion to appeal his guilty plea was not a de
facto motion to withdraw his guilty plea because a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea seeks action in the court in which it
is filed and a notice of appeal requires no action by that
court other than to forward the notice of appeal to the
appropriate court.  The Court of Criminal Appeals recognized
that this issue should be decided by this Court, which adopted
the amendments to the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In his dissent, Judge Shaw wrote that the majority of the
Court of Criminal Appeals has effectively abrogated a criminal
defendant's statutory right to appeal a district court's
judgment to the circuit court for a de novo jury trial.  He
wrote that Rule 30.1, Ala. R. Crim. P., and the Committee
1050636
6
Comments to that rule indicate that Rule 30.1 is a general
statement of the statutory right of appeal granted a criminal
defendant convicted in the district court.  He contended that
the majority opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals assumes
that this Court simply overlooked Rule 30.1 when it amended
Rules 2.2(e), 14.4(a)(1), and 26.9(b)(4).  He wrote that
although this Court has the authority to promulgate rules
governing the administration of all courts, this Court is
prohibited from promulgating any rule that affects the
jurisdiction of the circuit courts.  Judge Shaw also wrote
that by definition a trial de novo means that the slate is
wiped clean and a trial in the circuit court is had without
any consideration given to prior proceedings in another court.
Sorsby's petition to this Court for a writ of certiorari
Sorsby argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in
concluding that this Court's amendments to Rule 2.2(e), Rule
14.4(a)(1), and Rule 26.9(b)(4) limit a defendant's right to
appeal from a guilty plea entered in the district court for a
trial de novo in the circuit court because, he argues, such a
limitation violates the United States Constitution and the
Alabama Constitution in that it places an undue burden on an
individual attempting to exercise his right to a jury trial.
1050636
7
Sorsby argues that the majority opinion of the Court of
Criminal Appeals also violates §§ 12-11-30, 12-12-70, 12-12-
71, and 12-14-70, Ala. Code 1975, all four of which grant a
criminal defendant tried before a district or a municipal
court the right to appeal the case to the circuit court for a
jury trial.  He argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals'
opinion effectively nullifies Rule 30.1, Ala. R. Crim. P., and
unduly limits the circuit court's jurisdiction in cases
seeking a de novo appeal to the circuit court from a
conviction in a district or a municipal court. Sorsby contends
that the plain reading of Rules 2.2(e), 14.4(a), and
26.9(b)(4), Ala. R. Crim. P., indicates that those rules were
never intended to apply to appeals seeking a trial de novo
under Rule 30.1.
The State argues that the 2002 amendments to Rules 14.4
and 26.9 place reasonable limits on a defendant's right to
appeal a conviction resulting from a knowing and voluntary
guilty plea.  Under the rules as amended, the State argues, a
criminal defendant waives his absolute right to appeal when he
enters a guilty plea and may only appeal when certain
statutory conditions have been met, i.e., when specific issues
1050636
8
are reserved for appeal or a motion is filed seeking a
withdrawal of the guilty plea.  
The State contends that because jurisdiction over
misdemeanors originates in either the municipal court or the
district court, one of those courts must find the defendant
guilty before the right to appeal for a trial de novo may be
invoked.  One way for this to occur is when a defendant is
found guilty following a bench trial.  Another way is
following a stipulation to the facts as alleged by the State,
which essentially allows a defendant to bypass a bench trial
and appeal immediately to the circuit court for a trial de
novo.  The State contends that a guilty plea is inherently
different from either of the above scenarios because it
requires an admission of guilt by the criminal defendant.
Also, the State contends that a guilty plea is often the
result of negotiations, which may include, for example,
recommendations for a specified sentence, promises not to
oppose probation, or an offer to reduce the charge to a lesser
offense. The State argues that a guilty plea based on a plea
agreement adds certainty and finality to a criminal case and
that if a defendant were allowed to plead guilty pursuant to
a plea agreement and then to have the right to an unlimited
1050636
9
appeal from that guilty plea the certainty and finality of
plea agreements negotiated at the municipal or the district
court level would mean nothing.     
Analysis      
Section 12-12-70(b) and (d), Ala. Code 1975, provide for
the right to appeal a final judgment of the district court in
a criminal case.  Section 12-12-71, Ala. Code 1975, provides
that all appeals from final judgments of the district court
shall be to the circuit court for trial de novo and allows a
jury trial if the appellant demands one in the notice of
appeal.  Section 12-11-30(3), Ala. Code 1975, sets out the
circuit court's appellate jurisdiction, providing that the
circuit court has appellate jurisdiction to try de novo a
criminal conviction appealed from the district court.  
In 1990, this Court, pursuant to its constitutional
authority to promulgate rules governing practice and procedure
in the lower courts, adopted the Alabama Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which were effective January 1, 1991.  Rule 30.1(a)
provides that a defendant convicted of an offense in the
municipal or the district court shall have the right to appeal
the judgment to the circuit court within 14 days of the
judgment or of the denial of a timely filed postjudgment
1050636
10
motion.  The Committee Comments to Rule 30.1 state, in
pertinent part:
"Under the Judicial Article Implementation Act,
the circuit court has jurisdiction of appeals from
municipal and district courts. Ala. Code 1975, § 12-
11-30.  
"The right to appeal from a judgment of a
municipal or district court to the circuit court is
purely statutory. The right is granted to those
parties in a municipal court case in the Judicial
Article Implementation Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 12-14-
70, and in district court cases under Ala. Code
1975, §§ 12-12-70 and 12-12-71. Ala. Code 1975, §
12-12-72, provides for appeals directly to the
appellate courts in certain cases. See, also, §§ 12-
12-70(b) and (d).
"Pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 12-14-70, a
defendant may appeal from the entry of a municipal
court judgment in 'any case.'  Ala. Code 1975, § 12-
12-70, provides that in a criminal or quasi-criminal
case tried in district court, the defendant may
appeal from a final judgment.  'For a judgment to be
final, it must ... reflect a complete resolution of
each and every matter in controversy.... In short,
[it] must be conclusive and certain.'  Potter v.
Owens, 535 So. 2d 173, 174 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988).
"The term 'convicted' in section (a) is used in
its usual sense to connote a final judgment on a
judicial finding of guilt or a plea of guilty;
therefore, pursuant to this rule, the defendant in
a criminal case shall be allowed to appeal to the
circuit court for a trial de novo even after
entering a plea of guilty in district or municipal
court. See ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice,
Criminal Appeals 21-1.3(a)(iii) (2d ed. 1986).  This
procedure follows present practice authorizing an
appeal from 'a final judgment' under § 12-12-70 and
an appeal 'in any case ... from entry of judgment'
1050636
11
pursuant to §  12-14-70 and specifically supersedes
Ala. Code 1975, § 15-15-26, prohibiting appeal
following a guilty plea." 
(Emphasis added.)
In 2002, this Court amended certain Rules of Criminal
Procedure limiting the right to appeal a judgment entered on
a guilty plea.  The 2002 amendment to Rule 14.4 limited
appellate review of a guilty-plea proceeding.  Before the 2002
amendment to Rule 2.2, Rule 2.2(e)(5) specifically provided
that "upon acceptance of defendant's plea of guilty and
pronouncement and entry of judgment and sentencing, the
defendant shall have a right of appeal from the action of the
court."  When Rule 14.4 was amended in 2002, Rule 2.2 was
amended to delete Rule 2.2(e)(1) through (6), including any
reference to a defendant's right to appeal a guilty plea. Rule
2.2(e) now reads: 
"(e)  Proceeding on Information. 
"At arraignment on an information following
receipt of a defendant's written notice of his or
her desire to plead guilty as charged or as a
youthful offender upon the granting of youthful-
offender status, the court shall proceed as provided
in Rule 14.4.  If the court does not accept the
defendant's guilty plea or denies the defendant's
application for youthful-offender status, the court
shall proceed as provided by law."
1050636
12
Rule 14.4, Ala. R. Crim. P., as amended effective August
1, 2002, provides:
"(a) Colloquy With Defendant. In all minor
misdemeanor cases, the execution of a form similar
to Form C-44B will be sufficient and no colloquy
shall be required. In all other cases, except where
the defendant is a corporation or an association,
the court shall not accept a plea of guilty without
first addressing the defendant personally in the
presence of counsel in open court for the purposes
of:
"(1) Ascertaining that the defendant has a full
understanding of what a plea of guilty means and its
consequences, by informing the defendant of and
determining that the defendant understands:
".... 
"(viii) The fact that there is no
right to appeal unless the defendant has,
before 
entering 
the 
plea 
of 
guilty,
expressly reserved the right to appeal with
respect to a particular issue or issues, in
which event appellate review shall be
limited to a determination of the issue or
issues so reserved ...."
(Emphasis added.)   
Rule 26.9, Ala. R. Crim. P., as amended in 2002, now
reads:
"(a) 
 
Pronouncement 
of 
Judgment. 
 
Judgment 
shall
be pronounced in open court.  A judgment of
conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict,
the findings, if any, and the adjudication.  If the
defendant is found not guilty or for any other
reason is entitled to be discharged, judgment shall
be entered accordingly.
1050636
13
"(b) 
 
Pronouncement 
of 
Sentence. 
 
In 
pronouncing
sentence, the court shall:
"....
"(4) Inform the defendant as to the
defendant's right to appeal; provided,
however, in cases in which the defendant
has entered a plea of guilty, the court
shall advise the defendant of his or her
right to appeal only in those cases in
which the defendant (i) has entered a plea
of guilty, but before entering the plea of
guilty has expressly reserved his or her
right 
to 
appeal 
with 
respect 
to 
a
particular issue or issues, or (ii) has
timely filed a motion to withdraw the plea
of guilty and the motion has been denied,
either by order of the court or by
operation of law. When informing the
defendant of his or her right to appeal,
the court shall also advise the defendant
that if he or she is indigent, counsel will
be appointed to represent him or her on
appeal if the defendant so desires, and
that a copy of the record and the
reporter's transcript will be provided at
no cost to the defendant for purposes of
appeal, if the appeal is from a judgment
and sentence of the circuit court." 
(Emphasis added.)
This Court's rule-making authority as set out in
Amendment No. 328, § 6.11, provides that this Court may
promulgate rules governing procedure in the courts of this
State.  "The mandate to this Court in § 6.11 to make and
promulgate ... rules governing practice and procedure in all
1050636
14
courts is an empowerment by and from the people; it does not
depend on legislative enactment for its existence or
implementation."  Schoenvogel v. Venator Group Retail, Inc.,
895 So. 2d 225, 234 (Ala. 2004).  However, "such rules shall
not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive right of any
party nor affect the jurisdiction of circuit and district
courts of venue of actions therein ...." Amendment No. 328, §
6.11.  The right to appeal to the circuit court a final
judgment in the district court for de novo review is based on
§ 12-12-70, and a defendant's right to a jury trial in the
circuit court is set out in § 12-12-71.   The circuit court's
appellate jurisdiction is set out in § 12-11-30, which
provides for a trial de novo of criminal misdemeanor
convictions.  
Rule 30.3(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., establishes the time for
filing a notice of appeal from the final judgment of a
municipal or a district court to the circuit court for a trial
de novo in accordance with § 12-14-70(c) and § 12-12-70(b),
respectively.  Rule 30.6 provides that in an appeal from the
district or the municipal court to the circuit court, the
parties may stipulate to the questions of law or fact involved
and the circuit court may in its discretion rule on the
1050636
15
stipulations, provided that any party entitled to a jury trial
has waived that right.  
In this case, Sorsby timely perfected his appeal to the
circuit court for a trial de novo in accordance with Rule
30.3, forgoing the option of stipulating to a question of law
or fact for the circuit court to decide.  Rules 2.2, 14.4, and
26.9 do not limit the right of a defendant in the district or
the municipal court to appeal because Rule 30.1, in accordance
with § 12-12-70, § 12-14-70, and § 12-11-30, provides for a
trial de novo, and Rule 30.6 sets out a procedure by which a
defendant convicted in the district or the municipal court can
limit his appeal to the circuit court to specific questions of
law or fact. Requiring a defendant in a municipal or a
district court to reserve a particular issue on appeal to the
circuit court limits the review by the circuit court in
derogation of §§ 12-12-70, 12-12–71, 12-14-70, and 12-11-30
and conflicts with Rule 30.6, which allows the defendant to
waive his right to a jury trial in order to have the circuit
court address a particular issue.  Additionally, requiring the
defendant to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea limits
the defendant's right to de novo review in the circuit court
because the circuit court's review will be limited to whether
1050636
16
the district or the municipal court exceeded its discretion in
ruling on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.  See Ex
parte Heaton, 542 So. 2d 931, 933 (Ala. 1989)("The law in
Alabama is clear that whether a defendant should be allowed to
withdraw a plea of guilty is a matter solely within the
discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.").
A trial de novo is "[a] new trial on the entire case --
that is, on both questions of fact and issues of law --
conducted as if there had been no trial in the first
instance."  Black's Law Dictionary 1544 (8th ed. 1990). In
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Lancaster, 121 Ala. 471, 473-
74, 25 So. 733, 735 (1899), this Court stated:
"[After appeal from a judgment of a justice of the
peace] the case is to be tried in the circuit court
de novo; or, in other words, as if no trial had ever
been had, and just as if it had originated in the
circuit court. The appeal when taken operates to
annul and vacate the entire judgment of the justice
of the peace, and not a part only of the judgment.
The judgment of the justice cannot upon the trial in
the circuit court be looked to as a matter of
evidence or of estoppel.  'The judgment of the
justice is not reversed or affirmed; but a new,
distinct, and independent judgment, as may be
required by the merits shown on the trial, is
rendered by the city or circuit court.'  Abraham v.
Alford, 64 Ala. 281 [(1879)]; Harsh et al. v.
Heflin, 76 Ala. 499 [(1884)]."
1050636
17
(Final emphasis added.)  At the district court level, whether
Sorsby is found guilty following a bench trial, stipulates to
the facts as alleged by the State in order to be found guilty,
or pleads guilty, review in the circuit court is by trial de
novo without any consideration being given to the prior
proceedings in the district court. 
We note that the State contends that the certainty and
finality of negotiated plea agreements would mean nothing at
the municipal or the district court level if a defendant is
allowed to appeal to the circuit court for de novo review
after pleading guilty.  The Court of Criminal Appeals has
held, and we agree, that a defendant can waive his right to
appeal as part of a negotiated plea agreement so long as he is
fully advised of the implications of doing so and he
voluntarily agrees to enter into the agreement.  Watkins v.
State, 659 So. 2d 688 (Ala. Crim. App.  1994).  We also agree
with the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding that a defendant
may also waive his right to appeal from the district court to
the circuit court for trial de novo as part of a negotiated
plea agreement so long as he is fully advised of the
implications of doing so and he voluntarily agrees to enter
into the agreement under which he expressly waives his right
1050636
18
to appeal.  Jones v. State, 675 So. 2d 69 (Ala. Crim. App.
1995).
We now specifically address several points raised in the
Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion.  The Court of Criminal
Appeals held that Rule 30.1 is inconsistent with Rules 2.2,
14.4, and 26.9 following this Court's amendments to those
rules in 2002. It cites Baldwin County v. Jenkins, 494 So. 2d
584 (Ala. 1986), for the proposition that when there is an
inconsistency in rules relating to the same subject matter,
the later adopted rule controls.  Baldwin County v. Jenkins
invokes the well-recognized rule of statutory construction
that in cases of conflicting statutes on the same subject, the
latest expression of the legislature must take precedence;
that rule, however, does not apply in this situation.
As the Court of Criminal Appeals also noted, Rule 1.2,
Ala. R. Crim. P., states that the Rules of Criminal Procedure
are intended to provide for the just and speedy determination
of every criminal proceeding and are to be construed to secure
simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the
elimination of unnecessary delay and expense, and to protect
the rights of the individual while preserving the public
welfare.  "[The rule] sets forth a principle of interpretation
1050636
19
to be used in construing ambiguous rules, not a principle of
law superseding clear rules that do not achieve the stated
objectives.  It does not, that is to say, provide that rules
shall be construed to mean something other than what they
plainly say ...."  Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416,
424 (1996)(discussing Rule 2, Fed. R. Crim. P., which
provides: "These rules are intended to provide for the just
determination of every criminal proceeding.  They shall be
construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in
administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense
and delay."). Any ambiguity in applying Rules 2.2, 14.4, and
26.9 in conjunction with Rule 30.1 is easily resolved when
viewed in light of the circuit court's statutory appellate
jurisdiction to conduct a trial de novo of cases charging a
criminal misdemeanor.  This Court cannot "abridge, enlarge, or
modify" the jurisdiction of the courts.      
The Court of Criminal Appeals states in its opinion that
the 2002 amendments to Rules 2.2, 14.4, and 26.9 "embrace §
15-15-26, Ala. Code 1975, which had previously been superseded
by Rule 2.2(e)(5), Ala. R. Crim. P. -- a rule that was
eliminated effective August 1, 2002. ...  Section 15-15-26,
Ala. Code 1975, has effectively been revived."      So. 2d at
1050636
20
  .  Section 15-15-26 provided: "After the court has heard and
considered a plea of guilty by a defendant and has permitted
the filing of such plea and sentenced the defendant, such
defendant shall not have the right to appeal from the action
of the court."  
We note that § 15-1-1, Ala. Code 1975, provides: "[a]ny
provisions of [Title 15] regulating procedure shall apply only
if the procedural subject matter is not governed by rules of
practice and procedure adopted by the Supreme Court of
Alabama." When this Court adopted the Alabama Rules of
Criminal Procedure effective January 1, 1991, the procedural
subject matter covered by § 15-15-26 was one of those areas
governed by those rules.  In Ex parte Oswalt, 686 So. 2d 368,
370-71 (Ala. 1996), this Court stated:
"Although a legislative act generally controls over
a court rule, Section 6.11 of Amendment 328 of the
Alabama Constitution of 1901 confers on this Court
the 
authority 
to 
'make 
and 
promulgate 
rules
governing the administration of all courts and rules
governing practice and procedure in all courts,'
subject 
to 
the 
rules 
being 
changed 
by 
the
legislature only 'by a general act of statewide
application.' See, also, Ex parte Foshee, 246 Ala.
604, 21 So. 2d 827 (1945); Holsemback v. State, 443
So. 2d 1371 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983); Committee
Comments to Rule 1.1, Ala. R. Crim. P.  The Alabama
legislature has recognized the supremacy of this
Court's Rules of Criminal Procedure over statutory
provisions on the same subject, stating in § 15-1-1,
1050636
21
Ala.Code 
1975: 
'Any 
provision 
of 
this 
title
["Criminal Procedure"] regulating procedure shall
apply only if the procedural subject matter is not
governed by rules of practice and procedure adopted
by the Supreme Court of Alabama.'"
Cf. Schoenvogel, 895 So. 2d 225 (addressing a rule of
procedure conflicting with Title 12 and holding that this
Court's constitutional authority to promulgate rules of
procedure for all the courts may supersede legislatively
enacted rules of practice and procedure so long as the rules
promulgated by this "Court did not abridge, enlarge, or modify
the substantive rights of any party and subject to the
legislature's right to change the Court-adopted rules by a
general act of statewide application). Accordingly, a rule
adopted by this Court could supersede § 15-15-26, and did so
when we adopted Rule 2.2(e)(5)(providing for a right to appeal
a guilty plea).  However, this Court's revision of Rule 2.2(e)
in 2002 did not revive the absolute bar of an appeal from a
guilty plea found in § 15-15-26. This is necessarily so
because Rules 14.4 and 26.9, also amended in 2002, provide for
a limited right to appeal from a guilty plea entered in the
circuit court; thus, there is no revival of the absolute bar
of an appeal from a guilty plea found in § 15-15-26.
Furthermore, Rules 14.4 and 26.9 were not intended to modify
1050636
22
the statutory right of appeal granted a defendant convicted in
the municipal or the district court as set in Rule 30.1.
Conclusion
The appellate authority of the circuit court provided by
statute allows for an appeal from the district or the
municipal court to the circuit court for a trial de novo.
Rule 14.4(a), however, requiring a defendant in the municipal
or the district court to reserve a particular issue on appeal
to the circuit court, limits the statutory authority of the
circuit court to conduct a de novo review.  Also, Rule
26.9(b)(4), requiring the defendant to file a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea before he can proceed to the circuit
court for a trial de novo limits his right to de novo review
in the circuit court because the circuit court's review will
be limited to whether the district or the municipal court
exceeded its discretion in ruling on the motion to withdraw
the guilty plea. Thus, those rules, if applied to appeals from
a district or a municipal court to the circuit court for a
trial de novo, would affect the jurisdiction of the circuit
court. Therefore, they are not to be applied to appeals from
a district or a municipal court's judgment to the circuit
court for a trial de novo.                 
1050636
23
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
See, Woodall, Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.
Lyons, Stuart, and Smith, JJ., concur specially.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.
1050636
24
LYONS, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur fully in the main opinion.  I write specially to
suggest that the Advisory Committee on the Alabama Rules of
Criminal Procedure consider proposing an amendment to Rule
26.9(b)(4), which now provides that, in instances where the
right to appeal has been properly reserved, "a copy of the
record and the reporter's transcript will be provided at no
cost to the defendant for purposes of appeal, if the appeal is
from a judgment and sentence of the circuit court."  (Emphasis
added.)  Our holding today would appear to make the emphasized
qualification unnecessary.
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STUART, Justice (concurring specially).
The amendments to Rules 2.2(e), 14.4(a)(1)(viii), and
26.9(b)(4), Ala. R. Crim. P., did not effectively abrogate a
criminal defendant's statutory right to appeal a district
court's judgment to the circuit court for a trial de novo, nor
did the amendments affect the jurisdiction of the circuit
court.  In light of the language limiting issues that may be
appealed and the type of review that may be conducted in the
circuit court, the amendments to the rules clearly address
pleas of guilty entered in the circuit court, not in the
district court or the municipal court.  
Rule 30.1, Ala. R. Crim. P., specifically provides that
"[a] defendant convicted of an offense in municipal court or
a district court shall have the right to appeal the judgment,
within fourteen (14) days of the date of judgment or the
denial of a timely filed post-judgement motion, to the circuit
court for a trial de novo."  Rule 30.1, Ala. R. Crim. P., does
not differentiate between a conviction from a bench trial or
a conviction from a voluntary plea of guilty.  Therefore, the
Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly provide that a defendant
who pleads guilty in a municipal or a district court has a
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26
right to appeal the judgment for a trial de novo in the
circuit court.
The right to appeal for a trial de novo in the circuit
court, however, is waivable:  
"It is well settled that a defendant may, as
part of a negotiated plea agreement, agree to waive
his right to appeal 'so long as he is fully advised
on its implications and he voluntarily agrees to
enter into the agreement.'  Watkins v. State, 659
So. 2d 688, 689 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). ...  '[A]
colloquy with the defendant that reflects that he or
she was informed of the right to appeal and that he
or she chose to waive this right is sufficient to
show a valid and enforceable waiver.'  Watson [v.
State,] 808 So. 2d [77,] 80 [(Ala. Crim. App.
2001)]. In addition, just like a challenge to the
voluntariness of a guilty plea, the issue of the
voluntariness of a waiver of the right to appeal
will be reviewed on direct appeal if it is first
presented to the trial court."
Boglin v. State, 840 So. 2d 926, 929 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002).
Moreover,  
"'The right to appeal is by the grace of
statute,' Pettway v. State, 519 So. 2d 548 (Ala.
Civ. 
App. 
1987), 
and 
this 
court 
will 
not
differentiate between a defendant's decision to
waive this right as part of plea negotiation in
district court or in circuit court.  ...
"....
"... [A] defendant may waive his right to appeal
to circuit court for a trial de novo as part of a
negotiated plea agreement in district court.  See
Gwin v. State, 546 So. 2d 845 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984)."
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27
Jones v. State, 675 So. 2d 69, 71 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).
Thus, the law in this State provides that a defendant
entering a guilty plea in the district or the municipal court
can voluntarily waive his right to appeal from a guilty-plea
conviction for a trial de novo in the circuit court as part of
a negotiated plea agreement.  A voluntary waiver of the right
for a trial de novo in the circuit court does not impugn or
modify the jurisdiction of the circuit court.  Moreover, the
2002 amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure did not
negate the enforcement of such a voluntary waiver.
My review of the materials before this Court does not
indicate whether Sorsby voluntarily waived his right to appeal
for a trial de novo in the circuit court as part of a
negotiated plea.  If he did waive the right to appeal as part
of a negotiated plea and the district court determined that
his waiver was voluntary, Sorsby has waived this right and the
circuit court should dismiss his appeal.  If Sorsby did not
voluntarily waive this right as part of a negotiated plea,
then Sorsby is entitled to a trial de novo in the circuit
court.
Smith, J., concurs.