Title: State v. Campbell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 123190
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 14, 2023

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 123,190 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JERRY W. CAMPBELL, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
The harmless error standard of K.S.A. 60-2105 and K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-261 
applies to determine if erroneous admission of prior drug crime evidence under K.S.A. 
2022 Supp. 60-455 prejudicially affected a party's substantial rights, considering the 
entire record. Where an error implicates a statutory but not a federal constitutional right, 
the harmless error test is whether there is a reasonable probability that the erroneous 
admission of prior drug crime evidence affected the outcome of the trial, considering the 
entire record. The party benefiting from the improper admission of evidence bears the 
burden to show harmlessness.  
 
2. 
At least three types of prejudice can result from the admission of prior bad acts 
evidence:  (1) a jury might exaggerate the value of other crimes as evidence showing that, 
because a defendant previously committed a crime, it might be properly inferred that he 
or she committed the currently charged offense; (2) a jury might conclude that a 
defendant deserves punishment because he or she is a general wrongdoer, even if the 
prosecution has not otherwise met its burden to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; 
2 
 
 
 
and (3) a jury might conclude that because the defendant is a criminal, the evidence he or 
she presents on his or her own behalf should not be believed.  
 
3. 
Although PIK Crim. 4th 57.040 states that a defendant's use of a controlled 
substance is a factor the jury can consider in a nonexclusive possession case, the pattern 
instruction fails to adequately summarize the nuances of this court's caselaw relating to 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-455 evidence. While a defendant's use of a controlled substance 
may be admitted—subject to the requirements of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-455—when such 
evidence is relevant to prove a disputed material fact, the defendant's use of a controlled 
substance is not a factor that is automatically admissible as an exception to the specific 
mandates of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-455. To the extent PIK Crim. 4th 57.040 suggests 
otherwise, the instruction is disapproved. To the extent past appellate cases in this state 
suggest otherwise, they also are disapproved. 
 
4. 
Appellate courts generally treat motions to reconsider as motions to alter or 
amend. When reviewing the district court's ruling on a motion to alter or amend, we 
apply an abuse of discretion standard. A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion 
if it is (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) based on an error of law; or (3) based 
on an error of fact.  
 
5. 
A magistrate may issue a search warrant authorizing the installation and use of a 
tracking device to collect data for a specified period of time. Upon a showing of good 
cause by the State, the magistrate may grant extensions of the search warrant.  
 
 
3 
 
 
 
6. 
Absent a showing of illegality, search warrants and their supporting affidavits are 
presumed valid. The party challenging the validity of the search warrant bears the burden 
of establishing its illegality. 
 
7. 
No search warrant shall be quashed or evidence suppressed because of technical 
irregularities not affecting the substantial rights of the accused. In Kansas, the test used to 
evaluate search warrant technical irregularities is one of practical accuracy rather than 
one of hyper technicality. The label of "technical irregularity" is generally reserved for 
clerical mistakes or omissions that do not otherwise affect the substance of the warrant. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed July 1, 2022. 
Appeal from Douglas District Court; AMY J. HANLEY, judge. Oral argument held March 28, 2023. 
Opinion filed July 14, 2023. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is affirmed. 
Judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions.  
 
Kasper Schirer, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for 
appellant.  
 
Brian Deiter, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Suzanne Valdez, district attorney, 
and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
STANDRIDGE, J.:  After law enforcement discovered drugs and items associated 
with the sale of drugs in a car Jerry W. Campbell was driving on two separate occasions, 
a jury convicted him of two counts of possessing methamphetamine and four counts of 
possessing drug paraphernalia with intent to use to distribute. At trial, the district court 
allowed the State to introduce detailed evidence relating to Campbell's prior convictions 
4 
 
 
 
for similar crimes under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-455. Campbell appealed. The Court of 
Appeals reversed Campbell's convictions, finding the district court erred by allowing the 
State to introduce the prior crimes evidence. The panel remanded the case for a new trial. 
Judge Henry Green, concurring in part and dissenting in part, also would have found the 
prosecutor committed reversible error during voir dire by using an inflammatory 
hypothetical to explain the presumption of innocence to the prospective jurors.  
 
In its petition for review, the State does not challenge the panel's finding that the 
district court erroneously allowed introduction of the prior crimes evidence. Instead, the 
State claims the panel erred in failing to analyze whether this error required reversal. 
Applying that analysis, the State maintains the error was harmless. We agree that the 
panel erred in failing to conduct a harmless error analysis but disagree that application of 
a reversibility analysis results in a finding of harmless error.   
 
Campbell filed a cross-petition for review raising three issues:  (1) the panel erred 
in affirming the district court's reversal of its order suppressing evidence found in 
Campbell's car, (2) this court should adopt Judge Green's dissent and find the prosecutor 
committed reversible error during voir dire, and (3) the cumulative effect of the alleged 
errors violated his constitutional right to a fair trial. Given our holding that introduction 
of the prior crimes evidence constitutes reversible error, we only reach the merits of 
Campbell's claim of error relating to his motion to suppress because resolution of this 
claim will assist the district court on remand. We conclude Campbell has no right to relief 
on this basis because the district court did not abuse its discretion in reversing its 
suppression order. 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On September 23, 2017, Lawrence Police Officer Matt Roberts saw Campbell 
driving a blue Lincoln Town Car with a seven-year-old child as a passenger. After 
learning Campbell had an active warrant for his arrest and a suspended driver's license, 
Officer Roberts stopped Campbell and arrested him. The officer located several $100 
bills in Campbell's pants pockets, along with some $20 bills and other smaller 
denominations. During a later search of the car, Officer Roberts discovered several items 
he associated with the sale of drugs, including a zippered case containing an unknown 
white powdery substance, a digital scale with white residue, a measuring spoon, Ziploc 
bags containing white residue and what appeared to be marijuana seeds, and 64 unused 
Ziploc bags. The residue later tested positive for methamphetamine.  
 
In November 2017, law enforcement applied for and received a search warrant to 
place a GPS tracking device on the Lincoln Town Car. Although Campbell was not the 
registered owner of the car, law enforcement regularly saw him driving it. In the affidavit 
supporting the search warrant, law enforcement alleged Campbell was a 
methamphetamine distributor and listed previous encounters law enforcement had with 
Campbell. These encounters included three occasions when law enforcement found what 
appeared to be methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in cars driven by Campbell in 
May 2017 (May stop), July 2017 (July stop), and September 2017, which is the incident 
referenced above (September stop).  
 
Law enforcement attached the GPS tracking device to the Lincoln Town Car and 
began monitoring its movements. On the evening of December 28, 2017, and into the 
early morning hours of December 29, 2017, law enforcement used the GPS tracker to 
physically follow Campbell as he drove to various locations in Kansas City, Missouri, 
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and back toward Lawrence. Officers saw a female passenger in the car who they later 
identified as Kayla Stroda.  
 
Around 3:15 a.m., law enforcement stopped Campbell just outside Lawrence and 
arrested him for driving without a valid license. A drug-sniffing dog alerted law 
enforcement to the possibility of drugs inside the car. A search revealed a red bag on the 
passenger floor containing two bags of methamphetamine, a digital scale with white 
residue, and a large Ziploc bag containing a roll of smaller Ziploc bags. Inside the center 
console, law enforcement located a small coin purse containing a small bag of 
methamphetamine, a paper tablet folded up in foil, and a bag of broken pill pieces. 
Campbell agreed to speak with law enforcement. Campbell admitted he typically drove 
the car but denied any knowledge of the methamphetamine and said it did not belong to 
Stroda either. Campbell advised he often gave rides to people and claimed the 
methamphetamine could belong to one of these passengers.  
 
The State combined the charges relating to the September and December stops 
into a single complaint. For the September stop, the State charged Campbell with one 
count of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, two counts of possessing 
drug paraphernalia with intent to use to distribute, and one count of child endangerment. 
For the December stop, the State charged Campbell with one count of possessing 
methamphetamine with intent to distribute, two counts of possessing drug paraphernalia 
with intent to use to distribute, one count of possessing diazepam with intent to distribute 
(the bag of pill pieces), and one count of possessing buprenorphine (the paper tablet).  
 
Before trial, Campbell moved to suppress the evidence seized during the 
December stop, arguing law enforcement lacked probable cause to search the car. At first, 
the district court granted the motion based on its finding that law enforcement's use of the 
GPS tracker to search Campbell's car occurred after the GPS search warrant expired. But 
7 
 
 
 
after hearing testimony and arguments on the State's motion for reconsideration, the court 
reversed its ruling and found the evidence seized from Campbell's car during the 
December stop was admissible because the warrant expired due to a clerical error that did 
not otherwise affect the substance of the warrant.  
 
In another pretrial ruling, the district court granted the State's motion to introduce 
detailed evidence of Campbell's prior crimes from the May and July stops under K.S.A. 
2017 Supp. 60-455. During the May stop, law enforcement discovered 41.6 grams of 
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia associated with the sale of methamphetamine, 
including a pipe, new and used Ziploc bags, a digital scale with residue, two measuring 
spoons, and a notepad listing names of people known to possess or distribute 
methamphetamine next to numbers and dollar amounts, which law enforcement called a 
"drug ledger." During the July stop, law enforcement located more than 8 grams of 
methamphetamine separately packaged by common distribution weights. They also found 
drug paraphernalia associated with the sale of methamphetamine, including a pipe, a 
plastic Ziploc bag containing smaller unused bags, plastic bags with distinct imprints 
commonly used for distributing drugs, a black scale with white residue, and $90.  
 
The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the State presented evidence relating to 
the May, July, September, and December stops. The district court instructed the jury it 
could consider the May and July stop evidence "solely as evidence of the defendant's 
intent, and to prove the truth or falsity of the defendant's innocent explanation." In a 
different instruction, the court told the jury it could consider Campbell's prior 
participation in the sale or use of controlled substances to determine whether Campbell 
possessed the controlled substances in the current case.  
 
The jury returned a relatively favorable verdict for Campbell. It declined to find 
him guilty of possession with intent to distribute. And it acquitted him of the child 
8 
 
 
 
endangerment charge and the charges for possessing diazepam and buprenorphine. In 
total, the jury found Campbell guilty of two counts of the lesser included offense of 
possession of methamphetamine and four counts of possessing drug paraphernalia with 
intent to use to distribute. The district court sentenced Campbell to 31 months' 
imprisonment followed by 12 months' postrelease supervision. The court ordered this 
sentence to run consecutive to Campbell's sentences for the convictions resulting from 
the May and July stops.  
  
On appeal, Campbell raised four issues. He argued the district court committed 
reversible error by allowing the State to introduce the prior crimes evidence and by 
reversing its order suppressing the December stop evidence. Campbell also alleged the 
State committed prosecutorial error during voir dire by using an inflammatory 
hypothetical to explain a defendant's presumption of innocence and the cumulative effect 
of the alleged errors violated his right to a fair trial.  
 
A Court of Appeals panel reversed Campbell's convictions and remanded the case 
for a new trial. State v. Campbell, No. 123,190, 2022 WL 2392519, at *24 (Kan. App. 
2022) (unpublished opinion). The panel agreed the district court erred in allowing the 
State to introduce evidence of the prior crimes at trial. In reaching this conclusion, the 
panel stated: 
 
"Because Campbell has established that the trial court erred by granting the 
State's motion to admit evidence of his May stop and July stop law enforcement 
encounters for purposes of establishing his intent and for evaluating the veracity of his 
innocent explanation, we consider the prejudicial effect of this error in our cumulative 
error analysis further below." (Emphasis added.) 2022 WL 2392519, at *19. 
 
 
But the panel never analyzed the prejudicial effect of the district court's error in admitting 
the prior crimes evidence. Campbell, 2022 WL 2392519, at *19-24. Instead, it summarily 
9 
 
 
 
concluded the district court's erroneous admission of prior crimes evidence denied 
Campbell his right to a fair trial. After rejecting Campbell's remaining claims of error, the 
panel reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. 2022 WL 2392519, at *24. 
 
The State moved for rehearing or modification based on the panel's failure to 
address the prejudicial effect resulting from admission of K.S.A. 60-455 evidence or 
otherwise address whether the error was harmless. Without explanation, the Court of 
Appeals summarily denied the State's motion. We granted the State's petition for review 
and Campbell's cross-petition for review. Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 20-3018(b) 
(providing for petitions for review of Court of Appeals decisions); K.S.A. 60-2101(b) 
(Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review Court of Appeals decisions upon petition for 
review).   
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The State raises a single issue on review, arguing the Court of Appeals erred in 
failing to review the district court's erroneous admission of K.S.A. 60-455 evidence for 
harmlessness. The State maintains any error in the admission of this evidence was 
harmless. Campbell raises three points of error in a cross-petition for review, alleging:  
(1) the district court erred in reversing its order suppressing the December stop evidence, 
(2) the Court of Appeals majority erred in finding improper comments during voir dire 
did not deny him a fair trial via prosecutorial error, and (3) cumulative error denied him a 
fair trial.  
 
A. The State's Petition for Review:  Harmlessness 
 
The State's issue is narrow. The parties agree the panel correctly determined the 
district court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of Campbell's prior crimes 
10 
 
 
 
under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-455. And Campbell does not dispute the State's claim that 
the panel erred in failing to conduct a harmless error analysis to determine whether the 
error required reversal. All that remains is whether the erroneous introduction of K.S.A. 
60-455 evidence was harmless. The State contends it was.  
 
Given the panel's analytical misstep, we could remand the case to the Court of 
Appeals to perform the appropriate harmlessness analysis. See Littlejohn v. State, 310 
Kan. 439, 446, 447 P.3d 375 (2019) (remanding case to Court of Appeals with direction 
to perform analysis under correct legal standard). Or, in the interest of judicial economy, 
we may complete the harmless error analysis ourselves. See State v. Taylor, 314 Kan. 
166, 174, 496 P.3d 526 (2021) ("[W]e believe judicial economy weighs in favor of 
completing the cumulative error analysis to move the case along for district court 
disposition."). We choose the latter option.  
 
To decide whether an error in admitting K.S.A. 60-455 evidence is reversible, we 
apply the harmless error standard of K.S.A. 60-2105 and K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-261 to 
determine if admission of the evidence prejudicially affected a party's substantial rights, 
considering the entire record. K.S.A. 60-2105 ("[A]ppellate court shall disregard all mere 
technical errors and irregularities which do not affirmatively appear to have prejudicially 
affected the substantial rights of the party complaining, where it appears upon the whole 
record that substantial justice has been done by the judgment."); K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-
261 ("Unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence . . . is 
ground for . . . disturbing a judgment or order. At every stage of the proceeding, the court 
must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights."). 
Where, as here, an error implicates a statutory but not a federal constitutional right, we 
must determine if there is a "'reasonable probability that error will or did affect the 
outcome of the trial in light of the entire record.'" State v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, 
981-82, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012) (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 569, 256 P.3d 801 
11 
 
 
 
[2011]). As the party who benefits from the improper admission of evidence under the 
statute, the State bears the burden of proof. McCullough, 293 Kan. at 983. 
 
The State claims there is no reasonable probability introduction of K.S.A. 60-455 
prior crimes evidence affected the trial's outcome. The State argues that even without the 
prior crimes evidence, it presented the jury with overwhelming evidence of Campbell's 
intent to both possess and distribute methamphetamine. In support, the State cites 
evidence establishing (1) law enforcement discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia 
typically used for distribution inside the Lincoln Town Car during the September and 
December stops and (2) Campbell drove the Lincoln Town Car on both occasions and 
told law enforcement he typically drove the car. Because the jury did not convict 
Campbell of possession with intent to distribute, the State argues the jury did not 
improperly rely on the prior crimes evidence.  
 
Campbell disagrees, arguing the State's harmless error argument focuses solely on 
the admissible evidence introduced and disregards in its analysis the inadmissible 
evidence presented to the jury. Campbell points out the State devoted a significant 
portion of its opening statement to the May and July stops, introduced detailed evidence 
from these stops and stressed the importance of this evidence during closing argument. 
Because the jury acquitted him of possessing diazepam and buprenorphine, Campbell 
suggests the jury relied on his prior methamphetamine convictions to convict him only of 
the charges involving methamphetamine.  
 
 
To decide whether the State has met its burden to show there is no reasonable 
probability the impermissible evidence from the May and July stops affected the outcome 
of the trial, we must look at the entire record. Given the arguments submitted by the 
parties, we review the record to assess (1) the prejudicial impact on the outcome of the 
trial resulting from the impermissible evidence introduced at trial and (2) the prejudicial 
12 
 
 
 
impact on the outcome of the trial resulting from the district court's instructions to the 
jury that it could consider the impermissible evidence.  
 
1. Prejudicial impact on the outcome of the trial resulting from the introduction of 
impermissible evidence 
 
In State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 48, 144 P.3d 647 (2006), we reiterated there were 
at least three types of prejudice resulting from the admission of prior bad acts evidence: 
 
"'First a jury might well exaggerate the value of other crimes as evidence proving that, 
because the defendant has committed a similar crime before, it might properly be inferred 
that he committed this one. Secondly, the jury might conclude that the defendant deserves 
punishment because he is a general wrongdoer even if the prosecution has not established 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in the prosecution at hand. Thirdly, the jury might 
conclude that because the defendant is a criminal, the evidence put in on his behalf 
should not be believed.' [Citation omitted.]" Gunby, 282 Kan. at 48-49 (quoting State v. 
Davis, 213 Kan. 54, 58, 515 P.2d 802 [1973]).  
 
Gunby differs from this case in that it measured prejudicial impact against 
probative value to determine admissibility of the evidence under K.S.A. 60-455. But we 
recently used Gunby's "types of prejudice" rationale as a useful perspective when 
determining reversibility in a harmless error analysis as well. See Taylor, 314 Kan. at 
174-77 (discussing three types of possible prejudice that could result from wrongfully 
admitting evidence in context of constitutional harmless error standard to determine 
whether State established beyond a reasonable doubt that cumulative errors did not affect 
trial's outcome).  
 
Although this case presents a nonconstitutional harmless error analysis, the Taylor 
rationale is persuasive. Applying it here, we find the wrongful admission of evidence 
13 
 
 
 
from the May and July stops prejudiced Campbell and created a reasonable probability 
the outcome of the trial would have been different had the State not presented the 
inadmissible evidence to the jury. Our finding is based on the emphasis placed on 
evidence from the May and July stops by the State in its opening statement, case-in-chief, 
and closing argument.  
 
 
Early in the State's opening statement, the prosecutor referenced law enforcement's 
familiarity with Campbell from the May stop and then described in detail the 
methamphetamine and other items associated with methamphetamine distribution found 
in his car during the May stop. The prosecutor then discussed the July stop, again 
describing in detail the drug evidence found in Campbell's car during that stop. All told, 
the prosecutor devoted about half of the opening statement to discussing inadmissible 
prior crimes evidence from the May and July stops.  
 
Then, during the State's case-in-chief, it presented in detail the inadmissible prior 
crimes evidence from the May and July stops through witness testimony. Based on the 
transcript, it appears the prosecutor brought out as much detail about inadmissible prior 
crimes evidence as it did about admissible evidence from the September and December 
stops.  
 
 
And during closing argument, the prosecutor linked the prior crimes to the present 
charges, repeatedly telling the jury to consider Campbell's prior crimes as evidence of his 
intent and again detailing the specific amounts of methamphetamine and the items of 
drug paraphernalia recovered during the May and July stops. The prosecutor also told the 
jury it could consider the prior crimes evidence to determine whether Campbell possessed 
the alleged drug paraphernalia for use or sale and to determine whether an object 
constitutes drug paraphernalia.  
 
14 
 
 
 
Finally, during rebuttal, the prosecutor emphasized the similarities between 
Campbell's prior crimes and the present charges:    
 
 
"Go back. Look at the photos. Look how things are packaged. Look how they're 
contained. Look if they're similar. And you will see that there's white residue on the 
scales. 8-ball seems to be a very consistent amount that the defendant liked to sell. 
 
 
"There were two 8-balls in his hat. July 18th, I think there were seven 8-balls. 
Yep. On May 21st and on December 29th, there were two 8-balls. And, remember, that's 
a presumption distribution amount. You heard all the witnesses that testified about 
distribution amounts say that that is a common distribution amount.  
 
 
"How do we know his intent? We can't crawl in his head. But [defense counsel] 
says, 'Well, if an 8-ball is a common distribution amount, then how do we know he wasn't 
just possessing it for his own personal use? How do we know, on December 29th, that he 
intended to sell it? How can we be sure?['] 
 
 
"Well, first of all, there were unused baggies and digital scales in the same bag. 
That's consistent with May 21st, July 18th, and September 23rd. If you are just intending 
to use it, why do you need unused baggies? You don't. Why do you need scales? You 
don't.  
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"Go back and look at the photographs, look at the similarities between the items, 
and I'm sure that you will be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant 
possessed the methamphetamine . . . and the drug paraphernalia intending to distribute 
methamphetamine.  
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
"Did the defendant possess the paraphernalia to distribute? Again, go back and 
look at the pictures. Look at [the] May 21st pictures, July 28th, December 29th. What do 
you have? The scales with residue, measuring spoons, unused baggies. It's all consistent, 
ladies and gentlemen."  
 
The emphasis placed on the inadmissible evidence throughout the trial as 
described above increases the likelihood that the jury relied on the inadmissible evidence 
to conclude that, because Campbell committed a similar crime before, (1) he committed 
the crimes charged here and (2) he deserves to be punished because he is a general 
wrongdoer even if the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
Gunby, 282 Kan. at 48-49. 
 
2. Prejudicial impact on the outcome of the trial resulting from the district court's 
instructions to the jury that it could consider the impermissible evidence 
 
The district court provided two instructions to the jury regarding its ability to 
consider prior crimes evidence. The first instruction told the jury it could consider prior 
crimes as non-propensity evidence for the limited purpose of evaluating the veracity of 
Campbell's innocent explanation to decide whether the State proved Campbell's intent to 
commit the crimes charged. The second instruction told the jury it could consider the 
prior crimes as propensity evidence to prove that, because Campbell committed similar 
crimes before, he committed the current crimes.  
 
Non-propensity 
 
In non-sex offense cases, evidence of prior crimes is inadmissible to prove a 
criminal defendant's propensity to commit the charged crime, but it can be "admissible 
when relevant to prove some other material fact." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-455(b). Here, 
16 
 
 
 
the court instructed the jury it could consider prior crimes only to decide "the defendant's 
intent, and to prove the truth or falsity of the defendant's innocent explanation." 
 
Although the panel did not analyze whether the district court erred in giving this 
jury instruction, it did hold evidence of a prior drug crime was inadmissible to prove 
intent or the veracity of an innocent explanation when, as here, the defendant denied 
having possessed the drugs. Campbell, 2022 WL 2392519, at *16 (citing State v. Boggs, 
287 Kan. 298, 314, 197 P.3d 441 (2008). The panel noted Campbell's theory of defense at 
trial "'was to present no evidence, to take advantage of his right not to testify, and to hold 
the State to its burden of proof.'" 2022 WL 2392519, at *12. Given this theory of defense, 
the panel determined the State's unilateral introduction of evidence about intent and 
innocent explanation failed to create a dispute of material fact on those issues. Absent a 
legitimate dispute about intent or an innocent explanation, the panel concluded the K.S.A. 
60-455 exception allowing prior crimes to prove some other material fact did not apply 
and evidence from the May and July stops was inadmissible. 2022 WL 2392519, at *14-
16. 
 
As noted above, the State does not challenge the panel's finding that evidence from 
the May and July stops was inadmissible to prove intent or innocent explanation, so that 
issue is not before us. But given the panel's holding that the prior crimes evidence was 
inadmissible, we find the district court erred by instructing the jury it could consider the 
inadmissible prior crimes evidence. And given the emphasis placed on the inadmissible 
evidence in the State's opening statement, case-in-chief, and closing argument, this 
erroneous instruction increases the likelihood that the jury relied on the inadmissible 
evidence to conclude that, because Campbell committed a similar crime before, (1) he 
committed the crimes charged here and (2) he deserves to be punished because he is a 
general wrongdoer even if the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  
17 
 
 
 
 
Propensity 
 
After the "limited purpose" non-propensity instruction, the court instructed the 
jury that, when a defendant is in nonexclusive possession of drugs, it could consider prior 
crimes as propensity evidence to prove the defendant knowingly possessed 
methamphetamine under the current charges: 
 
"'Possession' means having joint or exclusive control over an item with 
knowledge of and the intent to have such control or knowingly keeping some item in a 
place where the person has some measure of access and right of control.  
 
"When a defendant is in nonexclusive possession of an automobile in which a 
controlled substance is found, it cannot be inferred that the defendant knowingly 
possessed the controlled substance unless there are other circumstances linking the 
defendant to the controlled substance. 
 
"You may consider all factors supported by the evidence in determining whether 
the defendant knowingly possessed a controlled substance, including the following: 
 
1. whether the defendant previously participated in the sale of a controlled 
substance; 
2. whether the defendant used controlled substances; 
3. whether the defendant was near the area where the controlled substance was 
found; 
4. whether the controlled substance was found in plain view; 
5. whether the defendant made any incriminating statements; 
6. whether the defendant's behavior was suspicious; 
7. whether the defendant's personal belongings were near the controlled 
substance."  
 
18 
 
 
 
Although this instruction mirrors PIK Crim. 4th 57.040, we find it troubling 
because the first and second factors in the third paragraph conflict with K.S.A. 2022 
Supp. 60-455(a), which prohibits introduction of prior crimes evidence if its only purpose 
is to establish a propensity to commit the current crime. The Notes on Use explain the 
factors in the third paragraph originally were based on historical caselaw. PIK Crim. 4th 
57.040, Notes on Use. But a review of that caselaw reflects we have disapproved of the 
unqualified use of these factors because doing so fails to adhere to the prior crime 
limitations in K.S.A. 60-455. See Boggs, 287 Kan. at 318.  
 
 
In State v. Faulkner, 220 Kan. 153, 551 P.2d 1247 (1976), law enforcement 
discovered illicit drugs and paraphernalia on the passenger floorboard and in the glove 
box of a car where Faulkner was a passenger. At trial, the State introduced evidence that 
Faulkner had a prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, 
Faulkner argued the prior conviction was inadmissible under K.S.A. 60-455 and, without 
that evidence, his mere presence in the vehicle could not prove he possessed the drugs 
and paraphernalia. We agreed with Faulkner that "when illicit drugs are found in an 
automobile containing more than one person, the defendant's mere presence in the 
vehicle, without more, would not sustain his conviction for possession." 220 Kan. at 160. 
But we discussed other circumstances that could be introduced to show a person 
possessed drugs in a nonexclusive possession case:  
 
"Other circumstances which have been held sufficiently incriminating to link a defendant 
with illicit drugs in a vehicle are his previous participation in the sale of drugs, his use of 
narcotics, his proximity to the area where drugs are found and the fact the drugs were 
found in plain view." Faulkner, 220 Kan. at 160. 
 
Significantly, however, we held introduction of prior drug crimes in this context 
was subject to the rule from K.S.A. 60-455 prohibiting consideration of prior crime 
19 
 
 
 
evidence as propensity evidence and allowing it only when relevant to prove some other 
material fact in dispute. We ultimately held the prior crime evidence admissible because 
the State did not introduce it for propensity reasons but to prove a fact substantially in 
dispute—Faulkner's intent to possess the drugs and paraphernalia. Faulkner, 220 Kan. at 
157.  
 
In State v. Bullocks, 2 Kan. App. 2d 48, 574 P.2d 243 (1978), the Court of Appeals 
expanded the Faulkner discussion to conclude that evidence of prior drug use is a factor 
that always can be considered in nonexclusive possession cases. The Bullocks court 
explained: 
 
"'Possession' of marijuana is having control over the marijuana with knowledge 
of, and intent to have, such control. Possession and intent, like any element of a crime, 
may be proved by circumstantial evidence. [Citation omitted.] Possession may be 
immediate and exclusive, jointly held with another, or constructive as where the drug is 
kept by the accused in a place to which he has some measure of access and right of 
control. [Citation omitted.] 
 
"When a defendant is in nonexclusive possession of premises on which drugs are 
found, the better view is that it cannot be inferred that the defendant knowingly possessed 
the drugs unless there are other incriminating circumstances linking the defendant to the 
drugs. [Citation omitted.] Such parallels the rule in Kansas as to a defendant charged with 
possession of drugs in an automobile of which he was not the sole occupant. [Citation 
omitted.] Incriminating factors noted in Faulkner are a defendant's previous participation 
in the sale of drugs, his use of narcotics, his proximity to the area where the drugs are 
found, and the fact that the drugs are found in plain view. Other factors noted in cases 
involving nonexclusive possession include incriminating statements of the defendant, 
suspicious behavior, and proximity of defendant's possessions to the drugs." Bullocks, 2 
Kan. App. 2d at 49-50. 
 
The Bullocks court did not cite to or consider K.S.A. 60-455 in its analysis. 
20 
 
 
 
 
Over the years, our appellate courts consistently relied on the Bullocks 
incriminating factors and circumstances to support an inference that a defendant is in 
possession of drugs. See, e.g., State v. Cruz, 15 Kan. App. 2d 476, 489, 809 P.2d 1233 
(1991) (applying factors in Faulkner and Bullocks).  
 
In 2001, citing Cruz and Faulkner, the PIK committee recommended courts give a 
new instruction in nonexclusive possession cases. See PIK Crim. 3d 67.13-D. This 
instruction provided the jury with the Bullocks factors to consider in deciding whether a 
defendant was the individual who possessed illicit drugs in a nonexclusive possession 
case. The PIK instruction failed, however, to provide language explaining—as we did in 
Faulkner—that introducing prior drug crimes as an incriminating factor for the jury to 
consider is subject to the limitations in K.S.A. 60-455.  
 
In 2008, we addressed the tension between K.S.A. 60-455 and PIK Crim. 3d 
67.13-D in Boggs. There, we reaffirmed Faulkner's holding that introduction of prior 
drug crimes as a factor for the jury to consider in nonexclusive possession cases was 
subject to the rule in K.S.A. 60-455. We held prior crime evidence in nonexclusive 
possession cases is prohibited unless relevant to prove a disputed material fact. In so 
holding, we disapproved Bullocks and any other case holding prior drug use is always a 
factor juries can consider in nonexclusive possession cases. Boggs, 287 Kan. at 317-18.  
 
In 2009, the Legislature codified the common law definition of possession. The 
Legislature did not include the Faulkner/Bullocks/Cruz factors in the definition. And the 
PIK committee did not include the PIK Crim. 3d 67.13-D Faulkner/Bullocks/Cruz factors 
in the fourth edition of its pattern instructions, published in 2012. See Notes on Use, PIK 
Crim. 4th 57.040 (2018 Supp.) (concluding "that [the new statutory definition] was meant 
21 
 
 
 
to supplant the much expanded definition of possession previously found in PIK Crim. 3d 
67.13-D"). 
 
But in 2019, the PIK committee chose to reinsert the Faulkner/Bullocks/Cruz list 
of nonexclusive possession factors into PIK Crim. 4th 57.040, when appropriate. See PIK 
Crim. 4th 57.040 [2018 Supp.]. The committee did not explain what it meant by 
appropriate, but it did cite to "[r]ecent opinions of the Kansas appellate courts 
[indicating] . . . that the previous list of nonexclusive possession factors survives the 
legislative change." Notes on Use, PIK Crim. 4th 57.040 (citing State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 
560, Syl. ¶ 2, 357 P.3d 251 [2015], and State v. Rosa, 304 Kan. 429, 434, 371 P.3d 915 
[2016]). 
 
In Keel, the defendant appealed his convictions for possession of 
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, arguing the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence to show he had constructive possession of the drugs and paraphernalia found in 
the residence he shared with his girlfriend. Consistent with our precedent, we held that 
when "a defendant does not have exclusive control of the premises upon which drugs are 
found, 'more than mere presence or access to the drugs [is] required to sustain a 
conviction.'" 302 Kan. at 567. In such cases, we held the State may prove possession by 
presenting other evidence of incriminating circumstances linking the defendant to the 
drugs, including "(1) the defendant's previous sale or use of narcotics; (2) the defendant's 
proximity to the area in which the drugs were found; (3) the fact that the drugs were 
found in plain view; and (4) the defendant's incriminating statements or suspicious 
behavior. [Citation omitted.]" 302 Kan. at 567-68. We found Keel's proximity to the 
drugs, the plain view of the drugs, and Keel's suspicious behavior sufficiently linked him 
to the contraband and concluded he possessed the contraband. 302 Kan. at 568. 
Presumably because there was no evidence Keel previously sold or used narcotics, we did 
22 
 
 
 
not discuss Boggs' holding that introduction of prior drug crimes as a factor in 
nonexclusive possession cases was subject to the rule in K.S.A. 60-455.  
 
In Rosa, the State charged Rosa with possession of methamphetamine after 
discovering a meth lab in the bedroom of a long-term resident living in Rosa's house. 
Rosa conceded he owned the house and the drugs were found in the house but denied any 
knowledge the drugs were there. To prove he knew about the drugs, the State introduced 
witness testimony to show Rosa was in close proximity to the room where the meth lab 
was discovered, had actual knowledge of its existence, and knew about 
methamphetamine in general because he used it in the past.  
 
Rosa claimed on appeal that the district court erroneously permitted the jury to 
consider evidence of his past drug use. Citing Boggs and State v. Preston, 294 Kan. 27, 
34, 272 P.3d 1275 (2012), we reiterated K.S.A. 60-455 prohibits consideration of prior 
crimes evidence for propensity purposes but allows it when relevant to prove some other 
material fact in dispute. Rosa claimed he did not know the people living in his house 
were keeping or making methamphetamine in the house. Thus, we held the district court 
properly allowed the roommates to testify about Rosa's prior acquaintance with 
methamphetamine under K.S.A. 60-455(b) because it was relevant to prove some other 
material fact—Rosa's knowledge. Rosa, 304 Kan. at 436-37. 
 
 
Keel and Rosa adhere to Boggs, and we reaffirm that holding here:  evidence of 
prior drug crimes as a factor to consider in nonexclusive drug possession cases is 
admissible only when the evidence is relevant to prove some other disputed material fact 
as authorized under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-455(b). See Boggs, 287 Kan. at 318. To the 
extent PIK Crim. 4th 57.040 conflicts with the legislative mandate in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 
60-455 limiting admissibility, we disapprove of its use.  
 
23 
 
 
 
Contrary to Boggs, the PIK Crim. 4th 57.040 instruction given here erroneously 
informed the jury it could consider Campbell's prior drug crimes for any reason, 
including propensity. Given the emphasis placed on the inadmissible evidence in the 
State's opening statement, case-in-chief, and closing argument, this erroneous instruction 
substantially increases the likelihood that the jury relied on the inadmissible evidence to 
conclude that, because Campbell committed a similar crime before, (1) he committed the 
crimes charged here and (2) he deserves to be punished because he is a general 
wrongdoer even if the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, we find a reasonable probability the erroneous admission of prior 
drug crime evidence affected the outcome of the trial, considering the entire record. For 
this reason, we hold the district court's error in admitting the prior crimes evidence was 
not harmless. Our holding is based on the sheer amount of evidence and argument 
focused on the inadmissible evidence throughout trial, as well as the court's erroneous 
instructions to the jury that it could consider Campbell's prior drug crimes as propensity 
evidence. Accordingly, we reverse Campbell's convictions and remand the case to the 
district court for a new trial. Because we reverse Campbell's convictions on this basis, we 
need not address all the claims raised in his cross-petition for review. Because it will 
provide guidance for the district court on remand, however, we will address Campbell's 
claim of error relating to his motion to suppress the December stop evidence.  
 
B. Campbell's Cross-Petition for Review:  Motion to Suppress  
 
Campbell objects to the district court's reversal of its order suppressing the 
evidence from the December stop. He alleges the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the 
district court's decision to grant the State's motion for reconsideration.  
24 
 
 
 
 
Appellate courts generally treat motions to reconsider as motions to alter or 
amend. When reviewing the district court's ruling on a motion to alter or amend, we 
apply an abuse of discretion standard. See Exploration Place, Inc. v. Midwest Drywall 
Co., 277 Kan. 898, 900, 89 P.3d 536 (2004). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of 
discretion if it is (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) based on an error of law; or 
(3) based on an error of fact. State v. Levy, 313 Kan. 232, 237, 485 P.3d 605 (2021).  
 
Before trial, Campbell moved to suppress all evidence seized during the December 
stop, arguing law enforcement lacked probable cause to search the Lincoln Town Car. At 
a hearing on Campbell's motion, the district court held law enforcement had probable 
cause to search the car. But the court questioned whether the search warrant was valid at 
the time of the December 29, 2017, stop.  
 
The search warrant provided law enforcement with authorization to monitor the 
tracking device installed on the Lincoln Town Car "for a period of 30 days from the date 
the tracking device is installed." Law enforcement installed the tracking device on 
November 28, 2017, but removed the device two days later because it was not working 
properly. Then, the Lincoln Town Car was not operational and remained parked in front 
of Campbell's residence, so law enforcement did not reinstall the tracking device until 
December 19, 2017. On December 27, 2017, Lawrence Police Officer Kristen Kennedy 
filed an affidavit requesting a 30-day extension of the warrant. Noting the GPS tracking 
device had been usable for only 8 out of the 30 days allowed for in the original warrant, 
law enforcement requested "a 30 day extension of the current search warrant, which is set 
to expire on Thursday, November 28, 2017." The designation of November 28 instead of 
December 28 as the date the search warrant expired appears to be a typographical error. 
The district court granted the request on December 27, 2017, but apparently did not catch 
the typographical error because it authorized extension of the search warrant "for an 
25 
 
 
 
extended period of 30 days from the expiration date on the previous search warrant, 
November 28, 2017."  
 
After reviewing the relevant exhibits and hearing argument from the parties, the 
district court suppressed the December stop and the evidence seized from Campbell's car 
on December 29, 2017. Although the court agreed Officer Kennedy and the district court 
judge who signed the warrant extension mistakenly listed November 28—rather than 
December 28—as the date the original search warrant was set to expire, the court still 
granted Campbell's motion to suppress because "[t]hat's a mistake they made."  
 
The State moved for reconsideration, arguing the search warrant extension should 
be read to expire 30 days after December 28, 2017. The State claimed the district court's 
interpretation of the search warrant extension conflicted with its plain language and 
produced an absurd result, which authorized extension of the search warrant for a single 
day. In support of its motion, the State presented testimony from Officer Kennedy. She 
testified the affidavit requested a 30-day extension from the December 28, 2017, 
expiration date of the original warrant. As a result, she believed the new expiration date 
would be sometime around January 28, 2018. Officer Kennedy pointed out interpreting 
the search warrant to extend for 30 days from November 28, 2017, would not actually 
result in an extension because it would cover the same timeframe as the original search 
warrant.  
 
After hearing Officer Kennedy's testimony, the district court reversed its prior 
ruling granting Campbell's motion to suppress:  
 
"And I think when you read everything together to avoid unreasonable results, but mainly when 
reading everything all together that the November 28th modifies the date of the previous search 
warrant when the tracking device was installed and she wanted—what she wanted was 30 days 
26 
 
 
 
extension, and it's clear when you look at her reference to Thursday that she did not mean 
November 28th. She meant December 28th. So I do reconsider and reverse my prior ruling."  
 
On appeal, Campbell argued the district court erred in granting the State's motion 
for reconsideration because the court's original interpretation of the 30-day extension to 
the search warrant aligned with the plain language of the warrant extension. The Court of 
Appeals rejected Campbell's argument, holding it created an unreasonable result and was 
contrary to K.S.A. 22-2511, which states "[n]o search warrant shall be quashed or 
evidence suppressed because of technical irregularities not affecting the substantial rights 
of the accused." Campbell, 2022 WL 2392519, at *23-24. The panel concluded: 
 
 
"Because no evidence should be set aside based on technical irregularities under 
K.S.A. 22-2511, it necessarily follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
granting the State's reconsideration motion. This was something that the trial court 
needed to do to correct its previous mistaken decision to grant Campbell's suppression 
motion based on an unreasonable interpretation of the trial court's order extending the 
GPS search warrant for 30 days." 2022 WL 2392519, at *24.  
 
Campbell argues the panel erred in affirming the district court's reconsideration 
ruling based on a mistake of law. First, he asserts the incorrect expiration date listed on 
the search warrant extension constituted a substantive error rather than a technical 
irregularity under K.S.A. 22-2511. Second, Campbell claims the panel erred in failing to 
reach his alternative argument that the original suppression order was proper because law 
enforcement placed the GPS tracking device on his car outside the statutory timeframe 
set forth in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-2506(b)(2).  
 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
1. K.S.A. 22-2511 
 
A magistrate may issue a search warrant authorizing the installation and use of a 
tracking device. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-2502(a)(2). The tracking device may be used to 
track and collect certain data "for a specified period of time, not to exceed 30 days from 
the date of the installation of the device." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-2502(b)(1). Upon a 
showing of good cause by the State, the magistrate may grant one or more 30-day 
extensions of the search warrant. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-2502(b)(3). A plain reading of 
the search warrant at issue establishes the 30-day extension expired on December 28, 
2017, the day before law enforcement stopped Campbell's car. 
 
As discussed, K.S.A. 22-2511 states "[n]o search warrant shall be quashed or 
evidence suppressed because of technical irregularities not affecting the substantial rights 
of the accused." In Kansas, the test used to evaluate search warrant technical irregularities 
is one of practical accuracy rather than one of hyper technicality: 
 
"[C]ourts prefer searches conducted under the authority of warrants to those conducted 
without benefit thereof. Therefore, warrants and their supporting affidavits are interpreted 
in a common sense, rather than a hypertechnical, fashion. To do otherwise would tend to 
discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before 
acting." State v. LeFort, 248 Kan. 332, 335-36, 806 P.2d 986 (1991). 
 
Absent a showing of illegality, search warrants and their supporting affidavits are 
presumed valid. Campbell, as the party challenging the validity of the search warrant, 
bears the burden of establishing its illegality. See 248 Kan. at 336. 
 
The label of "technical irregularity" is reserved for clerical mistakes or omissions 
that do not otherwise affect the substance of the warrant. See, e.g., State v. Francis, 282 
Kan. 120, 127-29, 145 P.3d 48 (2006) (mere technical irregularity where affidavit 
28 
 
 
 
identifies one affiant in its text but is signed by different affiant); LeFort, 248 Kan. at 337 
(failure of warrant to specify exact address of residence to be searched mere technical 
irregularity where affidavit contained correct description and executing officer familiar 
with location); State v. Holloman, 240 Kan. 589, 595-96, 731 P.2d 294 (1987) (mere 
technical irregularity when duplicate of warrant and inventory of items to be seized given 
to defendant's mother rather than defendant); State v. Spaulding, 239 Kan. 439, 441-42, 
720 P.2d 1047 (1986) (judge's failure to sign warrant mere technicality where probable 
cause finding made); State v. Jackson, 226 Kan. 302, 304, 597 P.2d 255 (1979) (mere 
technical irregularities found where affidavit failed to specifically allege similarity 
between circumstances of prior conviction and present crime and also provided 
inaccurate description of plea to prior conviction); State v. Ames, 222 Kan. 88, 92-95, 563 
P.2d 1034 (1977) (mere technical irregularities found where warrant return was unsigned, 
listed incorrect date, failed to list a seized item, and was not served on defendant); State 
v. Tryon, 36 Kan. App. 2d 349, 352, 138 P.3d 1259 (2006) (finding improper date on 
warrant return a mere technicality insufficient to overturn search); State v. Forsyth, 2 
Kan. App. 2d 44, 47, 574 P.2d 241 (1978) (absence of return receipt on search warrant 
mere technical irregularity). Compare State v. Journey, 1 Kan. App. 2d 150, 151-52, 562 
P.2d 138 (1977) (lack of jurat signature on search warrant mere technical irregularity), 
with State v. Belt, 285 Kan. 949, 950-54, 960-62, 179 P.3d 443 (2008) (no mere 
technicality where John Doe search warrants contained insufficient identifying 
information by failing to particularly describe perpetrator's unique DNA profile).  
 
Campbell argues the incorrect date listed in the search warrant extension is a 
substantive error, distinct from the technical irregularities contemplated by K.S.A. 22-
2511. He reasons law enforcement got exactly what it asked for—a warrant expiring on 
December 28, 2017—even if it meant to ask for something else. But Campbell's attempt 
to distinguish the present circumstances from those cases in which our courts have found 
technical irregularities under K.S.A. 22-2511 is unpersuasive. Campbell does not allege 
29 
 
 
 
any of the allegations within the body of the affidavit are false or otherwise challenge the 
sufficiency of the probable cause to support issuance of the search warrant. A review of 
the evidence presented at the reconsideration hearing confirms the discrepancy in the 
dates was simply a clerical error. This error did not affect the substance of the warrant 
and thus constitutes a mere technical irregularity under K.S.A. 22-2511. See Blackburn v. 
State, No. 105,697, 2012 WL 603284, at *1, 3 (Kan. App. 2012) (unpublished opinion) 
(upholding validity of search warrant signed and executed in February 2006 where law 
enforcement's probable cause affidavit mistakenly said events occurred in February 2005; 
had counsel moved to suppress, discrepancy in dates likely would have been found a 
mere technical irregularity under K.S.A. 22-2511).  
 
2. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-2506(b)(2) 
 
Under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-2506(b)(2), law enforcement must install a tracking 
device within 15 days from the date the search warrant is issued. Here, the search warrant 
issued on November 20, 2017. Law enforcement placed a tracking device on Campbell's 
car on November 28, 2017, but removed the device two days later because it was 
defective. Law enforcement then placed a new tracking device on Campbell's car on 
December 19, 2017, once the car appeared drivable.  
 
Campbell argues the search warrant was invalid because the second tracking 
device was not placed on his car within the 15-day window allowed by statute. This 
argument is as unpersuasive as Campbell's first argument and fails for the same reason. 
Law enforcement initially installed the tracking device in compliance with K.S.A. 2022 
Supp. 22-2506(b)(2). Because of circumstances outside their control, law enforcement 
had to remove the tracking device but later reinstalled it as soon as practicable. Law 
enforcement's failure to strictly comply with the statutory timeframe when installing the 
second tracking device constitutes a technical irregularity under K.S.A. 22-2511 that does 
30 
 
 
 
not affect the validity of the search warrant. See LeFort, 248 Kan. at 335-36 ("[W]arrants 
and their supporting affidavits are interpreted in a common sense, rather than a 
hypertechnical, fashion."). 
 
We find any discrepancy in the dates of the search warrant or the timing in placing 
the tracking device are technical irregularities that did not affect the validity of the search 
warrant. See K.S.A. 22-2511 ("No search warrant shall be quashed or evidence 
suppressed because of technical irregularities not affecting the substantial rights of the 
accused.") As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's 
motion to reconsider its erroneous suppression ruling.  
 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is affirmed. 
Judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.