Title: State v. Coble
Citation: 351 N.C. 448
Docket Number: 446PA99
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: April 7, 2000

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 446PA99
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JERRY ALFRED COBLE
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a
unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___,
518 S.E.2d 251 (1999), finding no error in a judgment entered by
Allen (J.B., Jr.), J., on 26 March 1998 in Superior Court,
Alamance County.  Heard in the Supreme Court 17 February 2000.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by William P. Hart,
Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
Cheshire, Parker, Schneider, Wells & Bryan, by Joseph B.
Cheshire, V, and John Keating Wiles, for defendant-
appellant.
MARTIN, Justice.
On 12 May 1997 defendant was indicted for one count of
attempted murder.  Defendant was tried before a jury at the
23 March 1998 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Alamance
County.  At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial court,
over defendant’s objection, instructed the jury on two degrees of
attempted murder -- “attempted first-degree murder” and
“attempted second-degree murder.”  The jury found defendant
guilty of a crime denominated as “attempted second degree
murder.”
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found no error.  State v.
Coble, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 518 S.E.2d 251, 255 (1999).  On
4 November 1999 we allowed defendant’s petition for discretionary
review to determine whether the crime of “attempted second-degree
murder” exists under North Carolina law.
The elements of an attempt to commit a crime are:  “(1) the
intent to commit the substantive offense, and (2) an overt act
done for that purpose which goes beyond mere preparation, but
(3) falls short of the completed offense.”  State v. Miller, 344
N.C. 658, 667, 477 S.E.2d 915, 921 (1996); see State v. Ball, 344
N.C. 290, 305, 474 S.E.2d 345, 354 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1180, 137 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1997).  The crime of attempt requires an
act done with the specific intent to commit the underlying
offense.  See State v. Hageman, 307 N.C. 1, 13, 296 S.E.2d 433,
441 (1982); State v. Brayboy, 105 N.C. App. 370, 374, 413 S.E.2d
590, 593, disc. rev. denied, 332 N.C. 149, 419 S.E.2d 578 (1992);
2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.2,
at 25 (1986 & Supp. 2000) [hereinafter LAFAVE & SCOTT].  Therefore,
to commit the crime of attempted murder, one must specifically
intend to commit murder.  See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S.
344, 351, 114 L. Ed. 2d 385, 393 (1991); 4 CHARLES E. TORCIA,
WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 695, at 591-97 (15th ed. 1996 & Supp. 1999)
[hereinafter WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW.]
It is well settled that three forms of homicide exist under
North Carolina law.  See State v. Watson, 338 N.C. 168, 176, 449
S.E.2d 694, 699 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1071, 131 L. Ed.
2d 569 (1995).  Only first-degree murder and second-degree murder
are relevant to our analysis in this case.  The elements of
first-degree murder are:  (1) the unlawful killing, (2) of
another human being, (3) with malice, and (4) with premeditation
and deliberation.  See N.C.G.S. § 14-17 (1999); Watson, 338 N.C.
at 176, 449 S.E.2d at 699; State v. Bonney, 329 N.C. 61, 77, 405
S.E.2d 145, 154 (1991).  The elements of second-degree murder, on
the other hand, are:  (1) the unlawful killing, (2) of another
human being, (3) with malice, but (4) without premeditation and
deliberation.  See N.C.G.S. § 14-17; Watson, 338 N.C. at 176, 449
S.E.2d at 699; State v. Griffin, 308 N.C. 303, 306, 302 S.E.2d
447, 451 (1983).
This Court has articulated the important distinction between
first-degree murder and second-degree murder:
First degree murder, which has as an essential element
the intention to kill, has been called a specific
intent crime.  Second degree murder, which does not
have this element, has been called a general intent
crime.
State v. Jones, 339 N.C. 114, 148, 451 S.E.2d 826, 844 (1994),
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1169, 132 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1995).  “In
connection with [second-degree murder and voluntary
manslaughter], the phrase ‘intentional killing’ refers not to the
presence of a specific intent to kill, but rather to the fact
that the act which resulted in death is intentionally committed
. . . .”  State v. Ray, 299 N.C. 151, 158, 261 S.E.2d 789, 794
(1980), quoted in State v. Keel, 333 N.C. 52, 58, 423 S.E.2d 458,
462 (1992).  Moreover, we have explained that specific intent to
kill is “‘a necessary constituent of the elements of
premeditation and deliberation in first degree murder [] [and] is
not an element of second degree murder or manslaughter.’”  State
v. Barber, 270 N.C. 222, 227, 154 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1967) (quoting
State v. Gordon, 241 N.C. 356, 358, 85 S.E.2d 322, 323 (1955));
see State v. Phillips, 264 N.C. 508, 515, 142 S.E.2d 337, 342
(1965).  Therefore, it logically follows that the crime of
attempted murder, as recognized in this state, can be committed
only when a person acts with the specific intent to commit first-
degree murder.
In the present case, the Court of Appeals interpreted State
v. Reynolds, 307 N.C. 184, 297 S.E.2d 532 (1982), as recognizing
a form of malice in second-degree murder that encompasses
specific intent to kill.  Based on that interpretation, the Court
of Appeals reasoned “there are second-degree murders in which the
defendant intended to kill, and second-degree murders in which
there was no specific intent to kill, but the defendant
nevertheless acted with malice.”  Coble, ___ N.C. App. at ___,
518 S.E.2d at 253 (emphasis added).  Distinguishing first-degree
murder and second-degree murder, the Court of Appeals stated, “If
the actor intends to kill the victim, but acts without
premeditation and deliberation, the actor is guilty of attempted
second-degree murder.”  Id.  The Court of Appeals then concluded,
“Because intent to commit the underlying offense is a necessary
element of attempt, it follows that there can be an attempt to
commit those forms of second-degree murder in which the malice
element contains the intent to kill.”  Id.
Although the Court of Appeals’ reading of Reynolds was 
reasonable, a meaningful distinction nonetheless exists between
specific intent as an element of a crime and evidence of intent 
proffered to establish the element of malice for second-degree
murder.  In Reynolds we stated that the element of malice may be
established by at least three different types of proof: 
(1) “express hatred, ill-will or spite”; (2) commission of
inherently dangerous acts in such a reckless and wanton manner as
to “manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and
social duty and deliberately bent on mischief”; or (3) a
“condition of mind which prompts a person to take the life of
another intentionally without just cause, excuse, or
justification.”  Reynolds, 307 N.C. at 191, 297 S.E.2d at 536. 
We then explained that the third type of malice is established by
“intentional infliction of a wound with a deadly weapon which
results in death.”  Id.
The element of malice for second-degree murder, therefore,
may be established by evidence that a person intentionally
inflicted a wound that results in death.  Id.  The element of
specific intent to kill for first-degree murder, however, is not
satisfied by proof of “an intentional act by the defendant
resulting in the death of the victim; the State also must show
that the defendant intended for his action to result in the
victim’s death.”  Keel, 333 N.C. at 58, 423 S.E.2d at 462; see
Jones, 339 N.C. at 148, 451 S.E.2d at 844.  Moreover, as stated
above, specific intent to kill is “‘a necessary constituent of
the elements of premeditation and deliberation in first-degree
murder [] [and] is not an element of second-degree murder or
manslaughter.’”  Barber, 270 N.C. at 227, 154 S.E.2d at 108
(quoting Gordon, 241 N.C. at 358, 85 S.E.2d at 323).  Therefore,
evidence of intent as a component of malice is not equivalent to
the element of specific intent to kill.
Because specific intent to kill is not an element of second-
degree murder, the crime of attempted second-degree murder is a
logical impossibility under North Carolina law.  The crime of
attempt requires that the actor specifically intend to commit the
underlying offense.  See Hageman, 307 N.C. at 13, 296 S.E.2d at
441.  It is logically impossible, therefore, for a person to
specifically intend to commit a form of murder which does not
have, as an element, specific intent to kill.  As the United
States Supreme Court stated, “Although a murder may be committed
without an intent to kill, attempt to commit murder requires a
specific intent to kill.”  Braxton, 500 U.S. at 351, 114 L. Ed.
2d at 393.  Accordingly, the crime of attempted murder is
logically possible only where specific intent to kill is a
necessary element of the underlying offense.  See, e.g., State v.
Collins, 334 N.C. 54, 58-59, 431 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1993) (first-
degree murder conviction set aside for failure to instruct jury
on lesser-included offense of “attempted murder”); State v.
Gilley, 306 N.C. 125, 130, 291 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1982) (“attempted
murder” recognized where completed offense would have constituted
first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Barnes, 324 N.C. 539, 380 S.E.2d 118 (1989).
We note that our Court of Appeals faced a similar logical
impossibility in State v. Lea, 126 N.C. App. 440, 485 S.E.2d 874
(1997).  In Lea, a case involving two defendants, one defendant
was convicted of attempted first-degree felony murder.  On
appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that “the offense of
‘attempted felony murder’ does not exist in North Carolina.”  Id.
at 450, 485 S.E.2d at 880.  The Court of Appeals first explained
that felony murder “does not require that the defendant intend
the killing, only that he or she intend to commit the underlying
felony.”  Id. at 449, 485 S.E.2d at 880.  The Court of Appeals
next explained that an attempt crime “requires proof that the
defendant specifically intended to commit the crime he is charged
with attempting.”  Id.  Quoting the United States Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals recognized that “‘attempt to commit murder
requires a specific intent to kill.’”  Id. at 450, 485 S.E.2d at
880 (quoting Braxton, 500 U.S. at 351, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 393). 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded, “a charge of
‘attempted felony murder’ is a logical impossibility in that it
would require the defendant to intend what is by definition an
unintentional result.”  Id. at 450, 485 S.E.2d at 880.
Likewise, a charge of attempted second-degree murder is a
logical impossibility.  Second-degree murder, like felony murder,
does not have, as an element, specific intent to kill.  Rather,
where the element of malice in second-degree murder is proved by
intentional conduct, a defendant need only intend to commit the
underlying act that results in death.  See Reynolds, 307 N.C. at
191, 297 S.E.2d at 536.  Therefore, as in Lea, a charge of
attempted second-degree murder would require a defendant to
specifically intend what is by definition not a specifically
intended result.  See Lea, 126 N.C. App. at 450, 485 S.E.2d at
880.
Our conclusion is buttressed by a multitude of cases from
other jurisdictions.  This persuasive authority rejects the
offense of attempted second-degree murder where the substantive
offense of second-degree murder does not include, as an element,
specific intent to kill.  See, e.g., Huitt v. State, 678 P.2d
415, 419-20 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting offense of
attempted second-degree murder where statute did not require
specific intent to kill); Fenstermaker v. State, 128 Idaho 285,
291, 912 P.2d 653, 659 (Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing crime of
attempted second-degree murder where requisite intent for second-
degree murder is defined in part as “intent to take life”); State
v. Shannon, 258 Kan. 425, 429-30, 905 P.2d 649, 652-53 (1995)
(rejecting attempted second-degree murder where second-degree
murder statute did not require specific intent to kill); State v.
Earp, 319 Md. 156, 162-67, 571 A.2d 1227, 1230-33 (1990)
(rejecting crime of attempted second-degree murder where specific
intent to kill is not a necessary element of second-degree
murder).
Legal scholars have likewise recognized that the offense of
attempted murder requires the element of specific intent to kill. 
See, e.g., WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 695, at 591-97 (“[A]n attempt to
commit murder requires a specific intent to kill.”); LAFAVE &
SCOTT, at 25 (“attempted murder requires an intent to bring about
the result described by the crime of murder (i.e., the death of
another)”).
In the present case, defendant could have been separately
indicted for the crime of assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to kill.  See N.C.G.S. § 14-32 (1999).  Like first-degree
murder, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill has, as
an element, specific intent to kill.  See id.; N.C.P.I.--Crim.
208.10 (1989).  Because assault with a deadly weapon with intent
to kill requires proof of an element not required for attempted
murder -- use of a deadly weapon -- it is not a lesser-included
offense of attempted murder, see State v. Westbrooks, 345 N.C.
43, 55, 478 S.E.2d 483, 491 (1996), and  must be charged in a
separate indictment.
We note this case presents an issue of first impression
since this Court has not directly addressed the question of
whether the crime of attempted second-degree murder exists under
North Carolina law.  Nevertheless, because our appellate courts
have indirectly referenced this purported crime on several
occasions, see State v. Smith, 347 N.C. 453, 463, 496 S.E.2d 357,
363, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 845, 142 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1998), State
v. Cozart, 131 N.C. App. 199, 203, 505 S.E.2d 906, 909-10 (1998),
disc. rev. denied, 350 N.C. 311, __ S.E.2d __ (1999), State v.
Lea, 126 N.C. App. 440, 445, 485 S.E.2d 874, 877, the
prosecutor’s decision here to seek a verdict of attempted second-
degree murder, and the trial court’s decision to instruct the
jury accordingly, were both reasonable.
Nonetheless, a crime denominated as “attempted second-degree
murder” does not exist under North Carolina law.  Accordingly,
the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
REVERSED.