Title: BRYANT DEV ASSO v DAGEL v RECTO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12825
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: February 21, 1975

110. 12825 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE OF M O N T A N A 19 75 B R Y A N T DEVbLOPMENT ASSOCIATION, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - TED D A G E L e t a l . , Defendants and Respondents, -vs - RECTOR ' S GARAGE INC. , Defendant and Third Party P l a i n t i f f , -vs - B R Y A N T DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION e t a l . , Third Party Defendant-Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l District, Honorable P e t e r G. Meloy, ~ u d g e presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Smith and Harper, Helena, Montana Charles Smith, I11 argued, Helena, Montana For Respondents: Towe, Neely and B a l l , B i l l i n g s , Montana William L. Madden, Jr. argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana submitted: January 16, 1975 Decided : FEB 2 1 1975 M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This case i s before the Court on the appeal of Bryant Develop- ment Association and the crossappeal of ~ e c t o r ' s Garage, Inc., from an order of t h e d i s t r i c t court, Lewis and Clark County, which sus- tained a decision of the Lewis and Clark County Board of Adjust- ment granting ~ e c t o r ' s Garage, Inc., a variance from an emergency r e s i d e n t i a l zoning resolution. Since 1969 ~ e c t o r ' s Garage, Inc., hereinafter referred t o a s respondent, has owned and operated an antique auto storage and r e p a i r shop a t 1055 M i l l Road, Lewis and Clark County. Because of t h e inadequate s i z e of t h e company's buildings and a reluctance t o s c a t t e r unrestored automobiles and parts outside where they would be unsightly and susceptible t o the elements, o f f i c e r s of respondent had f o r some time been interested i n constructing a new building. In July 1973, the property adjoining t h e e x i s t i n g f a c i l i t i e s , 1035 M i l l Road, was offered f o r sale. In r e l i a n c e upon representations of appropriate county o f f i c i a l s t h a t no zoning o r building r e s t r i c - tions existed nor were contemplated f o r the neighborhood before January 1974, the property was purchased f o r approximately $35,000. O n September 10, 1973, negotiations were entered i n t o with a building contractor f o r construction of a prefabricated, commercial s t e e l building t o be cut and manufactured i n California and assembled a t the job s i t e by t h e contractor. Although t h e formal contract was not signed u n t i l September 17, 1973, the manufacturer was n o t i f i e d of the negotiations. O n September 14, 1973, a purchase order i n the amount of $55,500 was confirmed by the manufacturer, earnest money paid and work begun. However, on September 13, 1973, unbeknown t o o f f i c e r s of respondent, and without p r i o r notice whatsoever, the Lewis and Clark County Commissioners met i n an evening emergency session and purported t o adopt Temporary Interim Zoning Resolution No. 1973-33 r e s t r i c t i n g further development of the area i n question t o "CR-Z", r e s i d e n t i a l single family dwelling u n i t s . This meeting was convened upon the ex parte p e t i t i o n of some of t h e members of appellant association who r e s i d e i n t h e neighborhood i n which respondent i s located with the very purpose of stopping respondent from completing t h e building project it had commenced. Officers of respondent were not made aware of these summary proceedings u n t i l the following week when an o f f i c e r of the contractor was informed the building project had been prohibited. I I O n October 4, 1973, counsel f o r respondent f i l e d an Applica- tion f o r Variance or, i n the a l t e r n a t i v e , Appeal from the Administra- t i v e Decision of t h e Lewis & Clark County ~omrnissioners" with the Lewis and Clark County Board of Adjustment t o permit construction of an automobile restoration and storage f a c i l i t y a t 1035 M i l l Road. A recorded, evidentiary hearing was held on t h i s application before t h e Board of Adjustment on December 10, 1973. Counsel f o r respondent presented testimony and a memorandum supporting the firm's conten- t i o n t h a t t h i s zoning resolution was unconstitutional; t h a t it had established and was e n t i t l e d t o a nonconforming use exception t o t h e zoning; and, t h a t i n the event the zoning was found t o apply t o it, a variance should be granted. The Bryant Development Association, herein a f t e r referred t o a s appellant, a l s o appeared, presented testimony i n opposition t o respondent's requests and l a t e r f i l e d i t s l e g a l memorandum. O n February 2, 1974, the Board of Adjustment issued an order granting respondent t h e requested variance. By p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i , appellant asked the d i s t r i c t court t o review t h a t decision, contending it was unwarranted by t h e f a c t s . The d i s t r i c t court granted appellant's p e t i t i o n and issued a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i t o the Lewis and Clark County Board of Adjustment. On March 25, 1974, the d i s t r i c t court ordered t h a t the ~ o a r d ' s order granting the variance be stayed. Respondent thereupon moved, and was permitted t o intervene i n the review proceedings. Counsel f o r respondent f u r t h e r moved on April 8, 1974, t h a t t h e s t a y order be dissolved or, a l t e r n a t i v e l y , t h a t appellant be required t o post a $15,000 bond t o cover damages which might accrue t o Rector's Garage because of the s t a y order. By an order, dated July 1, 1974, the district court denied this latter moti on. In answer to appellant's petition for a writ of certiorari, respondent denied that the decision of the Lewis and Clark County Board of Adjustment was not based upon substantial evidence. It further alleged as a first counterclaim and crossclaim that the that the ~oard's order was defective in its failure to grant Rector's Garage, Inc. a nonconforming use exception to the zoning resolution, ins~eaci of a variance. k second counterclaim and crossclaim was also interposed claiming, alternatively, that the ~oard's order should be reversed because of its failure to quash the zoning reso- lution as unconstitutional. A third counterclaim requested damages stemming from appellant's unlawful and improper actions in instigating the emergency zoning resolution. By a final order, dated July 17, 1974, the district court afkirmed the decision of the Lewis and Clark County Board of Adjust- ment granting respondent the requested variance. Although the court further denied appellant's motion to strike or dismiss respondent's first counterclzim requesting a nonconforming use exception to the zoning, its order did not determine whether or not Rector's Garage, Inc. was entitled to such relief. Appellant's motions to strike or dismiss the second and third counterclaims were granted. The case now comes to this Court upon timely notices of appeal by Bryand Development Association and crossappeal by ~ector's Garage, Inc. Although appellant argues the only issue is the variance granted and urges that the writ of certiorari does not permit inquiry beyond that, the controlling issue on this appeal is the validity of L'emporary Interim Zoning Resolution No. 1973-33. We recognize that ordinarily the scope of review on a writ of certiorari is limited to whether an inferior tribunal, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded its jurisdiction. Section 93-9002, R.C.M. 1947; State ex rel. Mercer v. Woods, 116 Mont. 533, 538, L35 P. 2d 197. We also recognize: "The a u t h o r i t i e s a r e generally t o the e f f e c t t h a t , upon review of a decision of a zoning board, the p e t i t i o n e r w i l l not be heard upon the question of the v a l i d i t y of the zoning ordinance, o r of the a c t of the l e g i s l a t u r e under which the ordinance was enacted." 58 Am Jur,Zoning 5 232. See e . g . , Austin v. Older, 278 Mich. 518, 270 N.W. 771. However, Montana's s t a t u t e , section 16-4706, R.C.M. 1947, which provides f o r the powers and procedures of the board of adjustment, s t a t e s i n subsection (8) : 11 Any person * * * aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjustment 9 : 9 : * may present t o a court of record a p e t i t i o n , duly v e r i f i e d , s e t t i n g f o r t h t h a t such decision i s i l l e g a l , i n whole o r i n p a r t , specifying the grounds of the i l l e g a l i t y . k 9~ 9:" (Emphasis supplied) Further, subsection (11) of section 16-4706, s t a t e s : " ; k 9~ The court may reverse o r affirm, wholly o r p a r t l y , o r may modify the decision brought up f o r review. I I W e hold t h a t these words i n section 16-4706, R.C.M. 1947, give the d i s t r i c t courts a much broader scope of review than the general Montana s t a t u t e s pertaining t o c e r t i o r a r i . A similar position has been enunciated i n Arizona. See e.g., Lewis v. Board of A d j u s t m e n ~ o f City of Phoenix, 6 Ariz.App. 494, 433 P.2d 811. To hold otherwise, a s appellant would have us do, and deny respondent the use of t h i s affirmative defense, would be a triumph o i form over substance. Appellant f u r t h e r contends t h a t respondent i s precluded from 11 r a i s i n g the issue because of respondent's s t a t u s a s an intervenor" i n the main action. It argues t h a t an 'intervenor cannot r a i s e issues which the o r i g i n a l p a r t i e s , i n t h i s case the appellant and The Board of Adjustment, did not or could not, r a i s e . However, it was a p p e l l a n t ' s own e r r o r which i n i t i a l l y c a s t respondent i n the r o l e of "intervenor" when it named t h e Board of Adjustment a s the defendant i n i t s p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i . While under section 93-9004, R.C.M. 1947, the w r i t was properly directed t o the Board of Adjustment, section 93-8801, R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s t h a t the adverse party may be known as the defendant. In t h i s case, c e r t a i n conceptual and procedural d i f f i c u l i t i e s would have been avoided I 1 i f respondent ~ e c t o r ' s Garage Znc., the adverse party" had been properly designated a s "defendant1'. In Freeman v. Board of Adjustment, 97 Mont. 342, 34 P.2d 534, t h i s Court reviewed a constitutional challenge t o the v a l i d i t y of a zoning s t a t u t e and ordinance brought t o i t by way of an appeal from c e r t i o r a r i proceedings conducted by the d i s t r i c t court i n reviewing a variance granted by the board of adjustment of Great Falls. This Court passed upon the constitutional issue without even h e s i t a t i n g t o question whether the appellant was precluded from r a i s i n g such a challenge o r whether the issue could be determined by i t i n a c e r t i o r a r i proceeding. Proceeding t o the merits, respondent argues t h a t section 16-4711, R.C.M. 1947, i s unconstitutional on i t s face because it provides t h a t an emergency zoning resolution may be enacted without giving owners whose property may be affected prior notice of the proceedings. W e do not here consider the constitutional 5ssue since, i n any event, the s t a t u t e s were not followed. In viewing Chapter 47, T i t l e 16, R.C.M. 1947, a s a whole, it i s c l e a r t h a t section 16-4711, providing f o r the enactment of emergency zoning regulations, is governed by the provisions of section 16-4705, providing f o r notice and hearing "in the adoption o r amendment of zoning regulations". Nothing i n Chapter 47, nor i n section 16-4711 i n p a r t i c u l a r , d e t r a c t s from t h i s view. In f a c t , when section 16-4711 was enacted the immediately preceding section of t h a t b i l l was an amendment of section 16-4705. The close proximity of those two sections i n Chapter 273, Laws of 1971, would indicate a l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t h a t the two sections should be construed together. It i s apparent the L e w i s and Clark County Commissioners did not follow the procedure provided by section 16-4705. It thus follows t h a t Temporary Interim Zoning Resolution No. 1973-33 i s void f o r f a i l u r e t o follow t h e notice and hearing provisions s e t f o r t h i n section 16-4705, R.C.M. 1947. Thus, respondent Rector's Garage, Inc., i s e n t i t l e d t o a judgment. Since the record before us does not indicate whether the area has been properly zoned since t h i s action, we a r e unable t o say t h a t a judgment of nonconforming use i s proper. Accordingly, we return the matter t o t h e d i s t r i c t court f o r entry of an order o r judgment not inconsistent with what has been said i n t h i s Opinion. Costs a r e awarded respondent Rector's Garage, Inc. W e Concur: Chief J u s t i c e