Title: Anderson v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 951086
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 19, 1996

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 
Keenan, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
ARNOLD DORSEY ANDERSON 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.   Record No. 951086         April 19, 1996 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal of a judgment entered in a probation 
revocation proceeding, we consider whether the exclusionary rule 
may be used to exclude evidence suppressed in a prior criminal 
proceeding.   
 
Arnold Dorsey Anderson was convicted on December 18, 1989, 
in the Circuit Court of Nottoway County on four counts of cocaine 
distribution, possession of cocaine with the intent to 
distribute, and distribution of not more than one-half ounce of 
marijuana.  Anderson's punishment was fixed at 20 years' 
imprisonment with 12 years of the sentence for each of the 
cocaine distribution offenses suspended, a suspended term of 40 
years for the possession of cocaine offense, and a term of 30 
days in jail for the marijuana offense. 
 
In 1993, while at liberty on probation, Anderson was charged 
with possession of cocaine.  The Circuit Court of Nottoway County 
suppressed most of the Commonwealth's evidence because it was 
obtained in violation of Anderson's Fourth Amendment rights and 
dismissed the prosecution.  Subsequently, the Commonwealth 
initiated this probation revocation proceeding in the Circuit 
Court of Nottoway County and the court issued a capias requiring 
Anderson to show cause why his suspended sentences should not be 
revoked.  During the probation revocation hearing, the 
Commonwealth introduced in evidence the same evidence which had 
been suppressed in the 1993 criminal proceeding.  The suppressed 
evidence included:  "two baggies" containing cocaine residue 
which had been found in Anderson's bathrobe; Anderson's 
statements to the police that he had flushed marijuana down a 
toilet; and statements that he had purchased and sold a rock of 
crack cocaine and that he had consumed a portion of the cocaine. 
  
 
Anderson objected to the admission of this evidence for two 
reasons.  First, Anderson asserted that the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel prohibits the Commonwealth from re-litigating 
the issue whether the search and seizure was constitutionally 
permissible because that issue had been decided adversely to the 
Commonwealth in the 1993 criminal proceeding.  Second, Anderson 
argued that the exclusionary rule prohibits the admission of that 
evidence.   
 
The circuit court overruled Anderson's objections, 
considered the challenged evidence, revoked 20 years of 
Anderson's suspended sentence, and sentenced him to confinement 
in the penitentiary.  Anderson appealed the circuit court's 
judgment to the Court of Appeals and advanced the same arguments 
there.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit 
court, Anderson v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 361, 457 S.E.2d 396 
(1995), and we awarded Anderson an appeal.   
 
Anderson asserts the same arguments on appeal that he 
advanced below.  Initially, we note that Anderson failed to make 
the record of the 1993 criminal proceedings part of this record, 
which is essential to our consideration of his claim of 
collateral estoppel.  Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 743, 749, 
292 S.E.2d 373, 376 (1982).  Thus, we are unable to consider the 
merits of his assignment of error that "[t]he Commonwealth was 
barred by collateral estoppel from presenting the evidence, which 
was previously suppressed in a criminal trial, in a revocation of 
suspended sentence hearing."    
 
Anderson contends that the circuit court erred in admitting 
the evidence that had been suppressed in the 1993 criminal 
proceeding.  We disagree.   
 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides that: 
 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
 
 
The Fourth Amendment does not contain any provision 
expressly prohibiting the use of evidence obtained in violation 
of the amendment.  Rather, the exclusionary rule is a judicially 
created remedy designed to deter future unlawful police conduct. 
 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).  And, as the 
United States Supreme Court observed in United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974): 
 
 
Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the 
exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to 
proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all 
proceedings or against all persons.  As with any 
remedial device, the application of the rule has been 
restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives 
are thought most efficaciously served.   
 
Further, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, confronted with the identical issue as that before this 
Court, observed that the exclusionary rule "has never been 
interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in 
all proceedings or against all persons . . . and any extension of 
the rule beyond its traditional applicability in criminal 
proceedings makes sense only if use of the remedy would deter or 
would likely deter police misconduct."  United States v. Winsett, 
518 F.2d 51, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1975) (citations omitted).   
 
We hold that the exclusionary rule is not applicable in a 
probation revocation proceeding absent a showing of bad faith on 
the part of the police.  There is a strong public interest in 
receiving all evidence relevant to the question whether a 
probationer has complied with the conditions of probation.  
Application of the exclusionary rule in a probation revocation 
proceeding would frustrate the remedial and protective purposes 
of the probation system, because a court would not be permitted 
to consider relevant evidence of the probationer's rehabilitation 
or regression.  And, we observe that the exclusionary rule 
already served its deterrent purpose when the illegally seized 
evidence was excluded in the 1993 criminal proceeding.     
 
We also note that most jurisdictions which have considered 
this issue have held that evidence seized in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is admissible in a probation revocation hearing 
even though that evidence is not admissible in a criminal 
prosecution to determine guilt.  See, e.g., State v. Alfaro, 623 
P.2d 8, 9-10 (Ariz. 1980);  
People v. Wilkerson, 541 P.2d 896, 898 (Colo. 1975); Bernhardt v. 
State, 288 So.2d 490, 500 (Fla. 1974); People v. Dowery, 312 
N.E.2d 682, 685-87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 340 N.E.2d 529, 
533 (Ill. 1975); Tiryung v. Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d 503, 504 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495, 499 (Me. 
1975); Stale v. Thorsness, 528 P.2d 692, 695-96 (Mont. 1974); 
State v. Field, 571 A.2d 1276, 1279-80 (N.H. 1990); Commonwealth 
v. Davis, 336 A.2d 616, 621-22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975); State v. 
Kuhn, 499 P.2d 49, 51-52 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972), aff'd, 503 P.2d 
1061 (Wash. 1972).  But see Grimsley v. Dodson, 696 F.2d 303, 
304-05 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 
1209-10 (4th Cir. 1978). 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals.   
 
Affirmed.