Title: MATTER OF L F G
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14688
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 20, 1979

No. 14688 IN THE SUPlU3ME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 IN THE MATTER OF L . F . G . , Youth in Need of Care. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Robert L. Stephens, Jr. and David Kinnard, Billings, Montana David Kinnard argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Harold Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana Robert Waller argued, Deputy County kttorney, Billings, Montana Damon L . Gannett argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: June 15, 1979 ~ecided :AUG 2 0 lgtg Filed: i\u C '. i,*g$$ M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. c his appeal arises from a c u s t o d i a l hearing held on September 29, 1978, i n t h e District Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l ~ i s t r i c t , S t a t e of Montana, i n and f o r t h e County of Yellowstone, t h e Honorable Robert H. Wilson presiding. The c a s e was t r i e d on t h e p e t i t i o n of t h e Department of S o c i a l and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n Services of t h e S t a t e of Montana (SRS) t o have L.F.G. declared t o be a youth i n need of care and t o have h i s permanent c a r e , custody and c o n t r o l awarded t o t h e S t a t e of Montana, with a u t h o r i t y t o consent t o adop- t i o n . The Yellowstone County a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e appeared and p a r t i c i p a t e d a s counsel f o r SRS. The n a t u r a l p a r e n t s w e r e p r e s e n t a t t h e hearing and w e r e represented by counsel, and a previously appointed guardian ad l i t e m f o r t h e youth appeared and p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e hearing a s t h e representa- t i v e of t h e c h i l d . Upon completion of t h e hearing, t h e m a t t e r was taken under advisement by t h e t r i a l c o u r t . I t e n t e r e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t , conclusions of law and o r d e r on October 16, 1978, g r a n t i n g t h e r e l i e f requested by SRS. Judgment was subse- q u e n t l y e n t e r e d i n accordance therewith on October 17, 1978. The p a r e n t s of t h e youth appeal. L.F.G. was born on September 29, 1977, i n ~ i l l i n g s , Montana. The n a t u r a l p a r e n t s of t h e c h i l d a r e J.C.G. and R.G. A t t h e t i m e of t h e hearing, t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t s and t h e c h i l d r e s i d e d i n Yellowstone County, Montana. The s o c i a l worker i n t h e case, Martha E v e r e t t , had h e r f i r s t c o n t a c t with t h e mother on September 19, 1977, when s h e and h e r mother contacted t h e l o c a l SRS o f f i c e t o l e a r n t h e procedures r e l a t i v e t o t h e relinquishment of t h e mother's then unborn c h i l d . The mother i n d i c a t e d t o E v e r e t t during t h e i r i n i t i a l c o n t a c t t h a t she d i d n o t f e e l t h a t "she w a s strong enough t o take c a r e of a baby." The c h i l d was born t e n days a f t e r t h e mother's i n i t i a l Contact with t h e s o c i a l worker. A t b i r t h , t h e baby weighed f o u r pounds and eleven ounces. He was normal i n a l l re- s p e c t s , except t h a t h i s b i r t h weight w a s l i g h t f o r a f u l l - t e r m i n f a n t . O n October 3, 1977, t h e mother informed E v e r e t t t h a t she had changed her mind about r e l i n q u i s h i n g t h e c h i l d , and t h a t she no longer was i n t e r e s t e d i n having t h e c h i l d placed adoptively. The baby was placed i n a f o s t e r home on October 5, 1977, with t h e knowledge, understanding, and consent of t h e c h i l d ' s n a t u r a l parents. A t t h e time of placement i n f o s t e r c a r e , t h e mother i n d i c a t e d t h a t "she d i d n ' t f e e l t h a t she was physically ready f o r taking c a r e of t h e c h i l d . " M r s . Delores Smith was t h e f o s t e r p a r e n t who provided t h e primary c a r e f o r t h e baby during h i s residence i n her f o s t e r home. The baby remained i n t h e Smith f o s t e r home from October 5, 1977, u n t i l A p r i l 1 0 , 1978. During t h a t six-month period, t h e mother made 38 v i s i t s t o t h e f o s t e r home t o v i s i t her c h i l d . The purpose of t h e mother's v i s i t s with her c h i l d i n t h e f o s t e r home was t o allow her v i s i t a t i o n , t o observe her with t h e c h i l d , and t o attempt t o teach her t h e s k i l l s she would need t o c a r e f o r t h e c h i l d on h i s r e t u r n t o her phy- s i c a l custody. M r s . Smith was p r e s e n t during each of t h e v i s i t s t h a t t h e mother had with her c h i l d . During t h i s s i x - month period of f o s t e r c a r e , t h e f a t h e r made one v i s i t t o s e e t h e c h i l d i n t h e Smith home. The mother showed some improvement i n her apparent a b i l i t y t o c a r e f o r t h e c h i l d during t h e period of January t o March 1978. M r s . Smith i n d i c a t e d , however, t h a t she never r e a l l y held t h e baby properly, and t h a t she f a i l e d t o demonstrate any a f f e c t i o n o r emotion towards t h e c h i l d . The baby seemed t o c r y more than usual when he was around h i s mother, and t h e mother appeared t o be confused and uncertain about what t o do with t h e c h i l d i n general. M r s . Smith never observed any physical c o n t a c t o r i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e c h i l d and h i s f a t h e r during t h e i n i t i a l period of f o s t e r c a r e i n her home. The baby was returned t o h i s n a t u r a l p a r e n t s on A p r i l 1 0 , 1978. P r i o r t o t h a t r e t u r n , Martha E v e r e t t had made arrangements f o r t h e provision of many support s e r v i c e s t o a s s i s t t h e mother i n her c a r e of t h e c h i l d . Homemakers from SRS and a public h e a l t h nurse made r e g u l a r and frequent v i s i t s t o t h e c h i l d and his parents. Despite these e f f o r t s made t o upgrade t h e mother's child-caring s k i l l s , she f a i l e d t o l e a r n t h e t h i n g s t h a t she was taught concerning her care of t h e c h i l d . There was a l s o an absence of physical con- t a c t and play between t h e c h i l d and h i s mother. The p u b l i c h e a l t h nurse a l s o observed t h e mother leave t h e baby unat- tended on two occasions. The mother a l s o described t h e f a t h e r as having thrown t h e c h i l d i n t o t h e baby c r i b . The c h i l d ' s s i t u a t i o n with h i s n a t u r a l p a r e n t s began t o d e t e r i o r a t e . According t o t h e homemakers and public h e a l t h nurses who were i n t h e home, t h e mother became more d i s t a n t and less cooperative. F i n a l l y , on May 18, 1978, based upon t h e observations of t h e s e r v i c e providers and t h e recommenda- t i o n of a p s y c h i a t r i s t , D r . Van Dyke, t h e c h i l d was removed from t h e home of h i s n a t u r a l p a r e n t s and returned t o t h e Smith f o s t e r home. A t t h e t i m e of t h e c h i l d ' s r e t u r n t o t h e f o s t e r home, h i s head w a s d i r t y , h i s body was d i r t y , and h i s " l i t t l e p e n i s w a s f i l t h y . " H e was subsequently observed a p p a r e n t l y having nightmares and waking up c r y i n g and shaking. Evidence concerning t h e mother's psychological c o n d i t i o n was presented a t t h e hearing. The mother had been evaluated i n November 1977 by D r . Ned Tranel and a g a i n on March 21, 1978. D r . Tranel diagnosed t h e mother a s having two major psychological d i s o r d e r s . The f i r s t i s t e c h n i c a l l y classi- f i e d as schizophrenic r e a c t i o n , c h r o n i c u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d type. The second d i s o r d e r was described by D r . Tranel a s being an o r g a n i c b r a i n syndrome o r c h r o n i c b r a i n syndrome. D r . Tranel o f f e r e d t h e opinion t h a t t h e c h i l d should n o t be r e t u r n e d t o a s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e mother was t h e primary c a r e t a k e r f o r t h e c h i l d . The i s s u e s presented on appeal a r e : 1. Was t h e evidence presented a t t h e custody hearing s u f f i c i e n t t o support t h e f i n d i n g of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t L.F.G. was a youth i n need of c a r e w i t h i n t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 41-3-102, M C A ? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n terminating t h e p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of R.G., t h e f a t h e r , based upon t h e evidence presented? 3. Was L.F.G. a youth i n need of c a r e ? The f u n c t i o n of a reviewing c o u r t i n a case such as t h i s one has been w e l l defined i n p r i o r d e c i s i o n s of t h i s Court. I n R e Gore (1977), Mont. , 570 P.2d 1110, 34 - St.Rep. 1179, involved an appeal from a ~ i s t r i c t Court determination s i m i l a r t o one i n t h e i n s t a n t case. I n de- c i d i n g t h a t t h e District Court had n o t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n when it granted SRS's p e t i t i o n f o r permanent custody, t h i s Court s t a t e d : ". . . This Court i s mindful t h a t t h e primary d u t y of deciding t h e proper custody of c h i l - d r e n i s t h e t a s k of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . A s a r e s u l t , a l l reasonable presumptions a s t o t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of t h e determination by t h e d i s - t r i c t c o u r t w i l l be made. Foss v. Leafer, Mont. 550 P.2d 1309, 33 St.Rep. 528 (1976). Due t o t h i s presumption of c o r r e c t n e s s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s w i l l n o t be d i s - turbed u n l e s s t h e r e i s a mistake of l a w o r a f i n d i n g of f a c t n o t supported by c r e d i b l e e v i - dence t h a t would amount t o a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . . ." 570 P.2d a t 1112, 34 St.Rep. a t 1181-1182. The r u l e i n Montana i s t h a t b e f o r e t h e r u l i n g of t h e D i s t r i c t Court can be overturned, it must be shown t h a t t h e District Court c l e a r l y abused its d i s c r e t i o n . For t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o f i n d t h a t L.F.G. was a youth i n need of c a r e , it had t o f i n d t h a t he was dependent o r s u f f e r i n g from abuse o r n e g l e c t . S e c t i o n 41-3-102(4), MCA. S e c t i o n 41-3-102(2)(a) and ( b ) , MCA, d e f i n e abuse o r n e g l e c t : " ( 2 ) 'Abuse' o r ' n e g l e c t ' means: " ( a ) t h e commission o r omission of any a c t o r a c t s which m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t t h e normal phy- s i c a l o r emotional development of a youth. Any excessive p h y s i c a l i n j u r y ; sexual a s s a u l t , o r f a i l u r e t o t h r i v e , t a k i n g i n t o account t h e age and medical h i s t o r y of t h e youth, s h a l l be presumed t o be nonaccidental and t o mater- i a l l y a f f e c t t h e normal development of t h e youth. " ( b ) t h e commission o r omission of any a c t o r a c t s by any person i n t h e s t a t u s of p a r e n t , guardian, o r custodian who thereby and by reason of p h y s i c a l o r mental i n c a p a c i t y o r o t h e r cause r e f u s e s o r , with s t a t e and p r i v a t e a i d and a s s i s t a n c e , i s unable t o d i s c h a r g e t h e d u t i e s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r proper and necessary s u b s i s t e n c e , education, medical, o r any o t h e r c a r e necessary f o r t h e y o u t h ' s phy- s i c a l , moral, and emotional well-being." Appellants contend t h a t under t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e , t h e r e w a s a clear abuse of d i s c r e t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n t h e e n t r y of i t s f i n d i n g s . Appellants argue t h a t t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e has d e c l a r e d t h e p o l i c y of t h i s s t a t e f o r abused and neglected c h i l d r e n i n s e c t i o n 41-3-101(1), MCA, which provides: " ( 1 ) It i s hereby declared t o be t h e p o l i c y of t h e S t a t e of Montana t o : " ( a ) i n s u r e t h a t a l l youth a r e afforded an ade- q u a t e p h y s i c a l and emotional environment t o promote normal development; " ( b ) compel i n proper c a s e s t h e p a r e n t o r guardian of a youth t o perform t h e moral and l e g a l duty owed t o t h e youth; " ( c ) achieve t h e s e purposes i n a family environ- ment whenever p o s s i b l e ; and " ( d ) preserve t h e u n i t y and welfare of t h e family whenever possible." Where a c h i l d has a l l e g e d l y been abused o r neglected by h i s n a t u r a l p a r e n t s , t h e S t a t e has a c l e a r d u t y t o p r o t e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d by means of a j u d i c i a l hearing t o determine whether t h e youth i s i n f a c t abused o r neglected. The importance of t h e n a t u r e and scope of t h i s j u d i c i a l proceeding has previously been addressed by t h i s Court i n a r e c e n t case, I n t h e Matter of Guardianship of Doney (1977), Mont. "There a r e , however, few invasions by t h e s t a t e i n t o t h e privacy of t h e i n d i v i d u a l t h a t a r e more extreme than t h a t of depriving a n a t u r a l p a r e n t of t h e custody of h i s c h i l d r e n . For t h i s rea- son, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e c a r e f u l l y enunciated t h e procedures t h e state must follow and t h e find- i n g s which t h e c o u r t must make before custody of a c h i l d may l e g a l l y be taken from h i s n a t u r a l parent. "This c a r e f u l p r o t e c t i o n of p a r e n t a l r i g h t s i s n o t merely a m a t t e r of l e g i s l a t i v e grace, b u t i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y required. Stanley v. Illi- n o i s , 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) ." The p r o v i s i o n s mandated by t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e r e l a t i v e t o required procedure and f i n d i n g s by t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n c a s e s of a l l e g e d abuse o r n e g l e c t are set f o r t h i n s e v e r a l p e r t i n e n t s t a t u t e s . Section 41-3-404, MCA, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " ( 1 ) I n a hearing on a p e t i t i o n under 41-3-401, t h e c o u r t s h a l l determine whether s a i d youth i s --- an abused, neglected, o r dependent c h i l d , and - a s c e r t a i n , a s f a r a s p o s s i b l e , t h e cause t h e r e o f . " (Emphasis supplied.) S e c t i o n 41-3-406, MCA, then c l e a r l y s t a t e s i n p a r t : " ( 1 ) I f a youth i s found t o be abused, neglected, o r dependent, t h e c o u r t may e n t e r i t s judgment making any of t h e following d i s p o s i t i o n s t o p r o t e c t t h e welfare of t h e youth: " ( b ) Transfer l e g a l custody t o any of t h e follow- ing: " (i) Department of S o c i a l and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n Services. " Appellants argue t h a t t h e s e s t a t u t e s make it clear t h a t a f i n d i n g of abuse, n e g l e c t , o r dependency i s t h e j u r i s d i c - t i o n a l p r e r e q u i s i t e t o any c o u r t ordered t r a n s f e r of cus- tody, c i t i n g In t h e Matter of F i s h (1977), Mont . I 569 P.2d 924, 927, 34 St-Rep. 1080; Gore, 570 P.2d a t 1113, 34 St.Rep. a t 1183; Doney, 570 P.2d 577, 34 St.Rep. a t 1109- 10. Appellants argue it i s then, and only then, t h a t t h e " b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d " standard s o w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d by t h i s Court has i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i n t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h e q u e s t i o n of custody. Gore, 570 P.2d a t 1 1 1 4 , 34 St.Rep. a t 1184; Doney, 570 P.2d a t 578, 34 St.Rep. a t 1110. Thus, b e f o r e t h e District Court may consider what t h e " b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d " may i n f a c t be, t h e c o u r t must have found t h a t t h e c h i l d i n question was i n f a c t abused o r neglected pursuant t o s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n i n s e c t i o n 41-3- 1 0 2 ( 2 ) , MCA. T h i s element cannot be s a t i s f i e d by a m e r e r e c i t a t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t it f i n d s t h e c h i l d i n q u e s t i o n t o be abused o r neglected; t h e evidence submitted t o t h e c o u r t must c l e a r l y support such a finding. With this standard in mind, we have reviewed the evi- dence presented to the District Court as it fits into the general guidelines established by this Court in recent decisions regarding abused and neglected youths. The child here was placed in the family home for a period of only five weeks. During this time, the family was subject to the daily supervision of welfare department personnel. The public health nurse, the personnel of the welfare depart- ment, and a neighbor, all had the opportunity to observe the child in the parents' home, and all agreed that during their observations he appeared to be well-fed, well-clothed, and clean. In addition, during this period there were no signs of physical abuse, and the child appeared to have no learn- ing disabilities or behavior problems in the home, nor was he left alone for extensive periods of time without super- vision. On the basis of the above facts, appellants endeavor to distinguish the facts in this case from the facts in several cases involving physical abuse and neglect of a child jus- tifying the termination of parental custody. In addition, appellants endeavor to distinguish the facts in this case from the facts in several cases in which the mental condition of one or both parents was a factor considered by the court together with other environmental factors justifying the termination of parental custody. In the Matter of T.E.R. (1979), Mont . , 590 P. 2d 1117, 36 St.Rep. 276; In the Matter of J.J.S. (1978), Mont. , 577 P.2d 378, 35 St.Rep. 394; In re Moyer (1977), Mont. , 567 P.2d 47, 34 St.Rep. 682; In re Matter of Bessette (1976), 170 Mont. 122, 551 P.2d 653; In re Henderson (1975), 168 Mont. 329, 542 P.2d 1204. Appellants contend that a review of the evidence pre- sented at the hearing presents the contrary view, i.e., that the child suffered no adverse effects from his mother's mental condition, and that he was in fact well cared for. his, they claim, is the distinguishing factor from the other Montana cases previously cited. The mental condition of the mother standing alone, according to appellants, was apparently found by the District Court to be the sole basis for termination of parental rights, without a finding of the relationship between the mental condition and any alleged detriment to the child. A review of Montana case law reveals no decisions in which the mental condition of one or both parents was the sole factor considered by the court. Other jurisdictions, however, have considered this factor and some have arrived at a different conclusion than that reached by the District Court herein. Appellants cite a minority view of Mr. Justice Murphy in a 1972 termination of parental rights case from New York. While we do not wish to disagree with our Irish brother in New York, we find that relying on a minority view in making our decision as to what the law is to be in this State, while enlightening, is not persuasive. The majority found that under the New York Family Court Act, Section 1012(f), that the record amply supported a finding of neglect in that the child is "in eminent danger of becoming impaired." The court noted that a child living with a chronic paranoid and severely psychotic schizophrenic mother is in eminent danger of becoming physically and emotionally impaired. That is the situation the trial judge faced here, and we do not find fault with his judgment. Appellants go on to discuss several cases from other jurisdictions to substantiate their position on mental conditions as the sole factor in a case involving parental rights. See, In Interest of E. v. J.T. (1978), Utah2d , 578 P. 2d 831; In the Matter of Anderson (1978), 35 3 2 0r.App. 561, 582 P.2d ; In the Matter of Wyatt (1978), 34 0r.App. 793, 579 P.2d 889; In the Matter of Fisher (1976), 169 Mont. 254, 545 P.2d 654; In the Matter of J.J.S., supra. As these cases discuss, one of the controlling criteria to be considered is, what are the possibilities of damage to the child? What we have before us here is a case not of possibilities, but of high probabilities, and in such a case, the child's future must be paramount. As we noted in In the Matter of J.J.S., 577 P.2d at 381, 35 St.Rep. at 397: ". . . What is, or what is not, the best interests of the child depends upon the facts and circum- stances of each case. The responsibility of de- ciding custody is a delicate one that is lodged in the District Court. The judge hearing oral testimony in such a controversy has a superior advantage in determining the same, and his deci- sion ought not to be disturbed except under a clear abuse of discretion. [Citations omitted.]" Dr. Tranel testified that because of the mother's combination of a schizophrenic mental illness and organic brain damage, there existed a condition of material depri- vation known as "mask deprivation." This condition exists where there is no emotional responsiveness to the child, but this failure to "mother" the child is masked by the fact that the parent is physically present. He further testified that the mother would not be able to respond to the most basic emotional needs of the child because of her mental condition. Dr. Tranel stated that while it was possible that the mother's condition could be stabilized at its present level, it was unrealistic to expect any improvement. D r . Tranel concluded t h a t i f the c h i l d was returned t o t h e mother, he would n o t receive even minimally s a t i s f a c t o r y maternal c a r e and would be exposed t o "extremely high" chances of developing a mental condition s i m i l a r t o t h a t of t h e mother. W e f i n d t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t c r e d i b l e evidence t o sup- p o r t the decision of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t the c h i l d was a youth i n need of care. Therefore, t h e r e has been no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . I n removing the c h i l d permanently from t h e n a t u r a l parents, t h e D i s t r i c t Court w a s a c t i n g i n the b e s t i n t e r e s t s of the c h i l d as it was bound t o do. The D i s t r i c t Court i n t h i s case had the opportunity t o view the testimony of J . C . G . , and was j u s t i f i e d i n finding t h a t t h e c h i l d w a s a youth i n need of care. I t i s i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d t h a t he n o t be returned t o t h e n a t u r a l parents but placed f o r adoption. The attorney f o r t h e youth supports t h e position of t h e D i s t r i c t Court and t h e S t a t e on t h i s issue. Appellants next contend t h a t i n t h e t r i a l of t h i s matter R.G., t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r , played an i n s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n t h e evidence presented t o t h e c o u r t regarding t h e capacity and c a p a b i l i t i e s of R.G. and J.C.G. a s parents. This proceeding focused primarily on a l l e g a t i o n s of mental i n c a p a b i l i t i e s on t h e p a r t of the mother. ~ u r i n g t h e pro- ceedings, t h e f a t h e r w a s mentioned only i n passing on several occasions, and a t no t i m e during t h e proceedings was t h e r e any s u b s t a n t i a l e f f o r t made t o i n q u i r e i n t o h i s capa- b i l i t i e s as a parent. Appellants contend t h a t t h i s lack of discussion requires a c l o s e examination of t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e termination proceedings i n l i g h t of a r e c e n t decision made a f t e r the e n t r y of judgment i n t h e case here. I n the Matter of T.E.R. (1979), supra. I n t h a t case, the Court d i r e c t e d i t s e l f t o e x a c t l y t h i s i s s u e f o r what was appar- e n t l y t h e f i r s t time, and found an inadequate consideration of t h e r i g h t s of t h e o t h e r parent: "However, a c a r e f u l review of t h e record does n o t r e v e a l t h a t t h e youth c o u r t adequately con- sidered t h e r i g h t s of T . E . R . ' s motion i n award- i n g permanent custody of T.E.R. t o SRS with a u t h o r i t y t o consent t o her adoption. I n addi- t i o n t o t h e r i g h t s a s a couple, p a r e n t s may have i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s with r e s p e c t t o t h e i r children. The record i n the i n s t a n t c a s e re- v e a l s t h a t t h e mother's r i g h t s w e r e afforded no more than s u p e r f i c i a l consideration. There- f o r e , t h e order of t h e youth c o u r t i s vacated t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t it a p p l i e s t o T.E.R. 's mother, and t h e case i s remanded t o t h e youth c o u r t f o r f u r t h e r proceedings t o determine t h e f u t u r e s t a t u s of t h e mother's p a r e n t a l r i g h t s . " I n t h e Matter of T.E.R., 590 P.2d a t 1 1 2 1 , 36 St.Rep. a t 281. Appellants argue t h a t i n l i g h t of t h i s decision and t h e inadequate consideration of t h e f a t h e r ' s r i g h t s a s a p a r e n t herein, t h i s matter should be reversed and remanded, i f f o r no o t h e r reason than t h i s inadequate consideration p r i o r t o p a r e n t a l termination. The S t a t e and t h e a t t o r n e y f o r t h e youth contend t h a t t h e r i g h t s of t h e f a t h e r were considered. They argue t h a t t h e f a t h e r was served with n o t i c e of t h e hearing, was p r e s e n t a t t h e hearing, and had a c o u r t appointed a t t o r n e y t o repre- s e n t h i s i n t e r e s t s . D r . Tranel t e s t i f i e d t h a t , i n h i s opinion, t h e f a t h e r would n o t be a b l e t o provide enough influence t o o f f s e t t h e marked deprivation described above, nor i n f a c t , would anyone be a b l e t o do so. I n a d d i t i o n , testimony showed t h a t t h e f a t h e r made no e f f o r t t o a s s i s t t h e mother i n learning t o become a good parent. H e v i s i t e d t h e f o s t e r home only once while t h e mother made 38 v i s i t s . The homemaker who t e s t i f i e d reported t h a t t h e f a t h e r never a s s i s t e d t h e mother i n learning parenting s k i l l s and was, i n f a c t , a d i s t r a c t i o n . The f a t h e r d i d n o t t e s t i f y a t t h e hearing. The mother r e p o r t e d t o t h e homemaker t h a t t h e f a t h e r had abused t h e baby by throwing him i n t o t h e c r i b . W e b e l i e v e t h e record shows t h a t t h e f a t h e r ' s r i g h t s w e r e adequately considered p r i o r t o termination and t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t o terminate them i s supported by c r e d i b l e evidence. The f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of l a w of t h e t r i a l c o u r t and t h e judgment of t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s affirmed. W e concur: %44?w* Chief J u s t i c e