Title: IN RE CHRISTIAN ALLEN WEBER MINOR
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 122790
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 23, 2003

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 23, 2003  
In re CAW,  
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,  
Petitioner-Appellant,  
v 
No. 122790  
LARRY HEIER,  
Appellee,  
and  
DEBORAH ANN WEBER AND ROBERT  
RIVARD,  
Respondents.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE COURT  
TAYLOR, J.  
This Court granted leave to appeal limited to the issue  
whether a putative father has standing to intervene in a child  
protective proceeding under the juvenile code1 in which the  
1MCL 712A.1 et seq.  
 
  
  
child involved has a legal father.  The Court of Appeals  
determined that the putative father had standing.  We reverse  
the decision of the Court of Appeals and hold that the  
putative father did not have standing to intervene.  We remand  
to the Court of Appeals to consider appellee’s remaining  
issues.  
I  
A child protective petition alleging abuse and neglect,  
brought pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b), was filed on July 31, 1998  
on behalf of three minor children, including “CAW.”  The  
petition stated that Robert Rivard was the legal father of the  
children, but might not have been the biological father of  
“any or all of the children.”  In particular, on the issue of  
paternity, the petition indicated that “CAW” was the child of  
Larry “Hier.”2  
Accepting the petition’s assertion that Heier’s address  
was unknown, the court, to give Heier notice of the child  
protective proceedings scheduled for August 19, 1998, issued  
an order for alternative service by publication.3  
At the August 19, 1998, hearing, at which Heier did not  
2This is apparently a misspelling of Larry Heier’s last  
name.  
3The notice was published with two errors: Heier’s name 
was misspelled in the same manner as in the petition, and the 
date of the hearing was incorrectly stated as August 9.  
2  
appear, the court decided that the children should remain in  
foster care.  Later, at a pretrial conference on September 3,  
1998, Rivard and Weber asserted that Rivard was the father of  
all three children. The court, after questioning Rivard and  
Weber, accepted this as fact and the petition was amended  
accordingly, including deleting any further reference to  
Heier. From this point on, the court and the parties in all  
proceedings referred to Rivard as the children’s father.  
In December 1999, well over a year later, progress toward  
reunification of the family was unsatisfactory.  A petition  
was filed by the Family Independence Agency to terminate  
Rivard and Weber’s parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b.4  
The 
proceedings 
that 
ensued culminated in an order terminating  
Rivard and Weber’s parental rights on November 13, 2000.  
On January 25, 2001, Weber appealed the termination  
adjudication to the Court of Appeals.5  At the same time,  
Heier filed a motion in the trial court seeking to intervene  
in the child protective proceeding concerning CAW.  Heier  
4Specifically, MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) (desertion, for 
Rivard only), (3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication 
continue to exist), (3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and 
custody), and (3)(j) (reasonable likelihood that the child 
will be harmed if returned to the parent’s home).  
5Rivard did not appeal the termination of his parental 
rights, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of 
Weber’s parental rights.  In re Weber, minors, unpublished 
memorandum opinion, issued October 26, 2001 (Docket No. 
232206).  
3  
alleged that he was the biological father of CAW and had  
standing on that basis.  He also argued, in essence, that the  
trial court had failed to provide him with adequate notice of  
the child protective proceedings and that he was entitled to  
notice pursuant to the United States Constitution regardless  
of whether the statutes or court rules gave him standing. In  
asserting that claim, he gave the court factual information  
regarding his relationship with the child both before and  
during the child protective proceedings in support of his  
constitutional claims.  
The trial court denied Heier’s motion to intervene on the  
ground that Heier lacked standing because CAW had a legal  
father. The court reasoned:  
It is clear that you cannot have a legal 
father and a punitive [sic] father.  In this case  
we did have a legal father. [CAW] was born– 
conceived and born during the marriage between Miss 
Weber and Mr. Rivard.  There has never been any 
dispute whether he was or was not the legal father. 
. . . [It had been determined that (Rivard) was the 
legal father, and once that determination was made 
all proceedings were geared toward (Rivard’s) 
rights to all three children.]  
On appeal, Heier argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed,  
that the termination of Rivard’s legal rights at the  
conclusion of the child protective proceeding was effectively  
a finding “by judicial notice or otherwise” that CAW was not  
the issue of the marriage.  A divided panel of the Court of  
Appeals, agreeing only that it was troubling that the law  
4  
  
 
should be interpreted to mean that Heier had no opportunity to  
establish his paternity, reversed the order of the trial  
court.  The majority held that there was standing under the  
juvenile code for putative fathers.  253 Mich App 629, 631;  
659 NW2d 657 (2002). It reasoned that even though “Rivard may  
still meet one or several of the definitions listed for  
‘father’ in MCR 5.903(A)(4),” because his rights were now  
terminated he no longer had any legal rights as father. 253  
Mich App 640. This, the majority concluded, opened the door  
for the putative father to have standing to establish his  
paternity. Id. at 644.  The Court, having resolved the matter  
favorably to Heier on the basis of the statute and court rules  
at issue, determined it unnecessary to deal with the  
constitutional issues Heier had raised. Id. at 633.  
We granted leave to appeal limited to the issue whether  
a putative father has standing to intervene in a child  
protective proceeding under the juvenile code in which the  
subject child has a legal father.  
II  
This is a question involving the construction of a  
statute, which we review de novo. Robertson v DaimlerChrysler  
Corp, 465 Mich 732, 739; 641 NW2d 567 (2002).  
III  
In this matter, Larry Heier, claiming paternity of CAW,  
5  
sought to intervene in child protective proceedings brought  
pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2).6  Intervention in such  
a proceeding is controlled by MCR 5.921(D). This court rule  
states that a putative father is entitled to participate only  
“[i]f, at any time during the pendency of a proceeding, the  
court determines that the minor has no father as defined in  
MCR 5.903(A)(4) . . . .”  
As relevant here, MCR 5.903(A) states:  
(A) ... When used in this subchapter, unless 
the context otherwise indicates:  
(1) “Child born out of wedlock” means a child 
conceived and born to a woman who is unmarried from  
the conception to the birth of the child, or a 
child determined by judicial notice or otherwise to 
have been conceived or born during a marriage but 
who is not the issue of that marriage.  
6In relevant part, MCL 712A.2(b) gives the court  
jurisdiction in proceedings concerning a juvenile:  
(1) Whose parent or other person legally 
responsible for the care and maintenance of the 
juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses 
to provide proper or necessary support, education, 
medical, surgical, or other care necessary for his 
or her health or morals, who is subject to a 
substantial risk of harm to his or her mental well­
being, who is abandoned by his or her parents, 
guardian, or other custodian, or who is without 
proper custody or guardianship. . . .  
* * *  
(2) Whose home or environment, by reason of 
neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or  
depravity on the part of a parent, guardian, 
nonparent adult, or other custodian, is an unfit 
place for the juvenile to live in.  
6  
 
* * *  
(4) “Father” means:  
(a) a man married to the mother at any time 
from a minor’s conception to the minor’s birth 
unless the minor is determined to be a child born  
out of wedlock[.]  
The essence of this rule is that a child has a father if  
his mother is married at any time during gestation unless the  
court determines ”by judicial notice or otherwise” that the  
child was not “the issue of the marriage.”  
In this case, CAW had a married mother and father,  
Deborah Ann Weber and Robert Rivard, during the gestation  
period.  Moreover, no finding was ever made by the court that  
CAW was not the issue of the marriage.  The termination of  
Rivard’s parental rights was not a determination that CAW was  
not the issue of the marriage and, thus, that Rivard was no  
longer his father; rather, it was only a determination that  
Rivard’s 
legal 
rights were terminated.  Thus, the requirements  
of the court rule to give Heier, a putative father, standing  
were not met.  
Finally, in the Court of Appeals opinion, as well as the  
dissent, there is much angst about the perceived unfairness of  
not allowing Heier the opportunity to establish paternity.  We  
are more comfortable with the law as currently written.  There  
is much that benefits society and, in particular, the children  
of our state, by a legal regime that presumes the legitimacy  
7  
of children born during a marriage.  See Serafin v Serafin,  
401 Mich 629, 636; 258 NW2d 461 (1977).  It is likely that  
these values, rather than failure to consider the plight of  
putative fathers who wish to invade marriages to assert  
paternity claims, motivated the drafters of the rules and  
statutes under consideration.  
IV  
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals because  
the 
circuit 
court 
properly denied Heier’s motion to intervene.  
We remand to the Court of Appeals to address Heier’s  
constitutional issues.  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
8  
 
 
____________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
In re CAW  
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,  
Petitioner-Appellant,  
v 
No. 122790  
LARRY HEIER,  
Appellee,  
and  
DEBORAH ANN WEBER AND ROBERT  
RIVARD, 
Respondents.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring).  
I concur in the majority’s reversal of the decision of  
the Court of Appeals.  Larry Heier, the putative father, does  
not have standing to intervene in this child protective  
proceeding because there is no previous determination by the  
circuit court that CAW was born out of wedlock.  I write  
separately because the majority’s statement that it is “more  
comfortable with the law as currently written,” ante at 8,  
lacks any force in the resolution of this case.  Consideration  
and rejection of the Court of Appeals reasoning provides a  
   
better approach to, and context for, understanding why a  
putative father does not have standing to intervene in a child  
protective proceeding unless the circuit court has previously  
determined that the child was born out of wedlock.  
The juvenile-code provisions addressing child protective  
proceedings 
do 
not 
list putative fathers among the individuals  
who must be served with notice.1  The Michigan Court Rules,  
however, do afford the court the discretion under defined  
circumstances to order that notice be served on a putative  
father.  MCR 5.921(D) provides, “[i]f, at any time during the  
pendency of a proceeding, the court determines that the minor  
has no father as defined in MCR 5.903(A)(4), the court may, in  
its discretion, take appropriate action as described in this  
subrule.”2  
A threshold requirement of MCR 5.291(D), before notice  
may be served on a putative father, is a determination by the  
1MCL 712A.19(5) and MCL 712A.19b(2).  
2If it is determined that the minor child has no “father”  
as that term is defined by the court rules, then MCR 
5.921(D)(1) provides:  
The court may take initial testimony on the 
tentative identity and address of the natural 
father.  If the court finds probable cause to 
believe that an identifiable person is the natural 
father of the minor, the court shall direct that 
notice be served on that person . . . .  
2  
 
court that the minor has no father as defined by MCR  
5.903(A)(4).  In pertinent part, MCR 5.903(A)(4) defines a  
“father” as “a man married to the mother at any time from a  
minor’s conception to birth unless the minor is determined to  
be a child born out of wedlock . . . .”  MCR 5.903(A)(1)  
defines a “child born out of wedlock” as  
a child conceived and born to a woman who is  
unmarried from the conception to the birth of the 
child, or a child determined by judicial notice or 
otherwise to have been conceived or born during a 
marriage but who is not the issue of that marriage.  
This Court has not addressed the standing of a putative father  
in light of this court rule.  
In Girard v Wagenmaker, 437 Mich 231, 242-243; 470 NW2d  
372 
(1991), 
however, 
this Court interpreted a similarly worded  
definition of “child born out of wedlock” to determine  
whether, and when, a putative father had standing to file a  
complaint 
pursuant 
to Michigan’s Paternity Act, MCL 722.711 et  
seq. The act defines in part “child born out of wedlock” as  
a child that “the court has determined to be a child born or  
conceived during a marriage but not an issue of that  
marriage.” MCL 722.711(a).  Girard, supra at 242 (citations  
omitted) reasoned:  
“[H]as determined” is the present perfect 
tense of the verb “determine.”  The present perfect 
tense generally “indicates action that was started 
in the past and has recently been completed or is 
continuing up to the present time” . . . .  
3  
 
 
Girard held that, under the plain terms of the Paternity Act,  
a putative father did not have standing “to establish  
paternity of a child born while the mother was legally married  
to another man without a prior determination that the mother’s  
husband is not the father.” Girard, supra at 235. 
Girard  
grounded its literal reading of the statute in the fact that  
it comported with “the traditional preference for respecting  
the presumed legitimacy of a child born during marriage.”  Id.  
at 246, citing Serafin v Serafin, 401 Mich 629, 636; 258 NW2d  
461 (1977).  
The majority of the Court of Appeals attempted to  
distinguish Girard, concluding that the definition of “child  
born out of wedlock” in MCR 5.903 is “less restrictive” than  
the Paternity Act definition.  253 Mich App 637.  However, the  
definition of “child born out of wedlock” in MCR 5.903(A)(1)  
varies from the definition of the same term in the Paternity  
Act only in its additional provision that a child may be  
determined to be born out of wedlock “by judicial notice or  
otherwise” and in its use of the past tense of the verb “to  
determine,” rather than the present perfect tense of that  
verb.  
The provision that the determination may be made by  
judicial notice does not affect when the determination must be  
made in order to permit standing.  Moreover, the use of the  
4  
 
 
 
past tense makes even clearer the fact that the determination  
must be made by the court before a putative father may be  
accorded standing in a child protective proceeding. Because  
Weber was married to Rivard from the time of conception to the  
birth of CAW, and because CAW was not “determined by judicial  
notice or otherwise to have been conceived or born during a  
marriage but . . . not the issue of that marriage” pursuant to  
MCR 5.903(A)(1),3 the provisions for notice to a putative  
father in MCR 5.921(D) were not applicable.4  
For these reasons, I concur in the result of the majority  
opinion.  I also concur in the remand to the Court of Appeals  
to address Heier’s argument that the standing requirements  
deny him due process of law by depriving him of an alleged  
established parental relationship with CAW.  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
3Recent amendments to MCR 5.903, issued February 4, 2003, 
were effective May 1, 2003 as MCR 3.903.  
4The Court of Appeals also premised its reversal of the 
family division of the circuit court’s denial of Heier’s 
motion to intervene in part on the termination of Rivard’s 
parental rights. 253 Mich App 640. While purporting to rely 
on the court rules, the Court of Appeals majority actually 
contradicts them.  The authority of the family division of the 
circuit court to determine the rights of a putative father 
derives from a determination that a child was born out of  
wedlock, not the termination of the legal father’s rights.  
5 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
In re CAW, minor,  
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,  
Petitioner-Appellant,  
No. 122790  
LARRY HEIER,  
Appellee,  
and  
DEBORAH ANN WEBER and ROBERT  
RIVARD,  
Respondents.  
KELLY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
I agree with the result reached by the majority in this  
case.  However, I disagree with the majority's reliance on MCR  
5.921(D). I also disagree with its glancing reliance on the  
policy underlying the Paternity Act1 to support its decision.  
1MCL 722.711 et seq.  
 
I. MCR 5.921(D) DOES NOT ADDRESS STANDING PER SE  
The majority spends little time analyzing MCR 5.921 and  
makes no effort to address the rule's relation to the  
requirements for intervention.  Nevertheless, it holds that  
MCR 5.921 controls whether Mr. Heier has standing in this  
case. This conclusion is erroneous.  
In interpreting and applying court rules, we apply the  
standard rules of statutory construction.  Accordingly, our  
primary purpose is to accurately interpret the meaning of the  
language of a rule.  Grievance Administrator v Underwood, 462  
Mich 188, 193-194; 612 NW2d 116 (2000).  
Notably, the text of MCR 5.921 does not explicitly  
address standing to intervene.  Rather, it designates the  
persons who must be given notice before child protective  
proceedings can go forward. In this respect, the rule is no  
different from others requiring notice be given to interested  
parties.  
In general, notice is not required for persons who merely  
have an interest that might be affected by the outcome of the  
case.  Rather, a person is allowed to intervene if (1) he  
timely claims an interest that is related to the subject of  
the proceedings, (2) the disposition of the action may impair  
his ability to protect his interest, and (3) his interest is  
inadequately represented by the existing parties. MCR 2.209.  
2  
 
However, 
in 
listing the categories of persons who require  
notice, MCR 5.921 does not state that all others are  
disallowed from inserting themselves into a termination  
dispute.  Accordingly, I believe that the majority is  
incorrect in holding that the rule precluded Mr. Heier's  
intervention in this matter.  
II. THE MAJORITY’S POLICY ARGUMENT IS ILL-CONCEIVED  
Although the majority rests its holding primarily on the  
notion that Mr. Heier’s claims are barred by MCR 5.921(D), it  
has attempted to fortify its reasoning by alluding to public  
policy.  It asserts that the public policy considerations  
underlying the enactment of the Paternity Act also underlie  
child protective proceedings. Again, I disagree.  
The public policy objective of the Paternity Act is to  
ensure that all children are provided with support and  
education. Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 269; 615 NW2d 218  
(2000), citing Whybra v Gustafson, 365 Mich 396, 400; 112 NW2d  
503 (1961).  The objective would be frustrated if a "legal"  
father were able to abandon his duty of support as the result  
of unfounded allegations of paternity.  Hence, before an  
action can be sustained under the Paternity Act, a  
determination must be made that the child in question was born  
out of wedlock, MCL 722.711(a); Girard v Wagenmaker, 437 Mich  
231; 470 NW2d 372 (1991).  
3  
  
By 
contrast, 
the 
purpose 
of 
termination 
proceedings 
under  
the juvenile code is to assure a child of care, guidance, and  
control conducive to his welfare and the interest of the  
state. MCL 712A.1(3). Accordingly, when a child is removed  
from his parents, the court must provide him with care that  
approximates the care his parents should have provided. Id.  
Thus, the two acts serve different masters.  A person must not  
blindly assume that a single public policy consideration  
fulfills their distinct purposes.  
Similarly, the majority's reliance on our opinion in  
Serafin v Serafin2 is unsuited to this case.  Serafin did not  
address the statutes or court rules at issue here. Instead,  
it held that Lord Mansfield's Rule, a common-law rule of  
evidence, was no longer viable in Michigan.  
It is true that Serafin observed that children remain  
"guarded by [a] still viable and strong . . . presumption of  
legitimacy" that can be rebutted only by clear and convincing  
evidence. Serafin, 401 Mich 636, citing Maxwell v Maxwell, 15  
Mich App 607, 617; 167 NW2d 114 (1969).  Yet, Serafin goes on  
to rebuke a too dogged pursuit of the presumption of  
legitimacy rule:  
"If the function of a court is to find the  
truth of a matter so that justice might be done, 
then a rule which absolutely excludes the best  
2401 Mich 629; 258 NW2d 461 (1977).  
4  
possible evidence of a matter in issue rather than 
allow it to be weighed by the trier of fact must 
necessarily lead to injustice.  Further, when a 
court voluntarily blindfolds itself to what every 
citizen can see, the public must justifiably 
question the administration of law to just that 
extent."  [Serafin, supra at 635-636, quoting Davis  
v Davis, 507 SW2d 841, 847 (Tex Civ App, 1974), 
rev'd on other grounds 521 SW2d 603 (1975).]  
In accordance with that rationale, I do not agree that  
the presumption of legitimacy rule has persuasive force in  
this case.  Certainly, the majority would not advance the  
argument that this rule protects the sanctity of CAW's family  
unit.
 That proposition is absurd in the context of  
termination proceedings, the object of which is to destroy any  
familial bond between a child and the parent whose rights are  
being terminated.  
Similarly, the policy cannot be advanced on the basis  
that it furthers the goals expressed in the juvenile code.  
Rigid application of the presumption of legitimacy would  
frustrate the code's preference for placing a child with his  
parent, if the parent is willing and able to care for him.  
For example, if Heier were a fit biological parent of CAW,  
rigid application of the presumption relied on by the majority  
would prevent the court from placing CAW with him.  
III. RESOLUTION  
Ultimately, the question here is whether the circuit  
court was correct in denying Mr. Heier’s petition to  
5  
 
intervene. The answer comes from a comprehensive reading of  
the relevant court rules.  
MCR 5.901 provides:  
(A) Scope. The rules in this subchapter, in 
subchapter 1.100 and in rule 5.113, govern practice 
and procedure in the family division of the circuit 
court in all cases filed under the Juvenile Code.  
Other Michigan Court Rules apply to such juvenile 
cases in the family division of the circuit court 
only when this subchapter specifically provides.  
(B) Application. Unless the context otherwise  
indicates:  
(1) MCR 5.901-5.927, 5.980 and 5.991-5.993 
apply 
to 
delinquency 
proceedings 
and 
child  
protective proceedings;  
* * *  
(4) MCR 5.961-5.974 apply only to child  
protective proceedings[.]  
None of these provisions permits intervention in child  
protective proceedings.  Nor does any of them reference  
another court rule that permits it.  But, in the end, Mr.  
Heier can identify no court rule under which he could  
intervene and, as a consequence, the trial court was required  
to deny his motion.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
While, applying the court rules, the trial court did not  
err in denying Mr. Heier's motion to intervene in the child  
protective proceedings, I am troubled by the result.  
I believe our court rules should be amended to allow a  
6  
putative father to intervene in a child protective proceeding  
if he is able to raise a legitimate question about paternity.3  
DNA testing now can determine paternity with relative ease,  
speed, and accuracy.  The juvenile code presumes that a  
child's interests are best served when he is in the care of a  
fit parent.  These considerations support a rule change and  
would give putative fathers the opportunity for a fair hearing  
in the future.  
Marilyn Kelly  
3I recognize that it may be necessary for the Legislature 
to amend the juvenile code to allow intervention in these 
proceedings.  Accordingly, to the extent necessary, I would 
also solicit the Legislature to amend the juvenile code to 
provide for such intervention.  
7  
 
 
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
In re CAW, 
_____________________________________/  
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,  
Petitioner-Appellant,  
No. 122790  
LARRY HEIER,  
Appellee,  
and  
DEBORAH ANN WEBER and ROBERT RIVARD,  
Respondents.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that  
our court rule deprives the putative father of standing to  
intervene, I must respectfully dissent.  I would hold, for the  
reasons stated in my dissent in Girard v Wagenmaker, 437 Mich  
231, 253-278; 470 NW2d 372 (1991), that the Legislature  
intended 
to 
allow 
putative fathers an opportunity to intervene  
1  
 
 
in child protective proceedings.  Hence, the majority errs by  
applying MCR 5.921(D) in a manner that prohibits standing.  
As stated in my Girard dissent, nothing in our statutes  
or court rules compels the conclusion that a putative father  
must 
first 
establish 
paternity in a separate legal proceeding.  
To so hold perpetuates the errors caused by the majority’s  
position in Girard, while denying parents the right to develop  
and maintain relationships with their children.  
Though my position in Girard adequately rebuffs the  
majority’s decision today, one need not focus exclusively on  
the rights of the putative father; the child’s rights also  
demand this result.1  Courts making paternity and custody  
determinations have the authority to inquire about a child’s  
putative father or parent in fact.  Without it, a court would  
be deprived of the means necessary to ensure that a child’s  
best interests and due-process rights are protected.  
1 See, e.g., In re Doe, 254 Ill App 3d 405, 410-411; 627  
NE2d 648 (1993):  
Fortunately, the time has long past when 
children in our society were considered the  
property of their parents.  Slowly, but finally, 
when it comes to children even the law has rid  
itself of the Dred Scott mentality that a human 
being can be considered a piece of property 
"belonging" to another human being. To hold that a  
child is the property of his parents is to deny the 
humanity of the child.  Thus, in the present case 
we start with the premise that . . . [the child] 
"belongs" to no one but himself.  
2  
 
Few would disagree that an extremely self-reflective and  
understanding 
legal 
father 
could 
process 
feelings of  
rejection, anger, or betrayal while continuing to lovingly  
nurture a child sired by another man. However, the majority  
assumes that all legal fathers have that extraordinary  
capacity and that the presence of putative fathers in their  
children’s lives would, in no way, prove beneficial if  
paternity had not been established at an earlier legal  
proceeding.  
For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent.  
Michael F. Cavanagh  
3