Title: People v. Morgan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 92843
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: September 23, 2004

Docket No. 92843-Agenda 2-September 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 							
SAMUEL MORGAN, Appellant.
Opinion filed September 23, 2004. 
	JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	This matter is before the court on appeal from a judgment of the
circuit court of Cook County denying a successive petition for
postconviction relief filed by defendant, Samuel Morgan, based on
newly discovered evidence. Defendant argued that the new evidence,
particularly the recanted testimony of an eyewitness, established that
he was actually innocent of the crimes for which he had been
convicted. The circuit court denied defendant's claim after conducting
an evidentiary hearing. We now affirm.
	The legal proceedings underlying this case began in 1983, when
a jury convicted defendant of murdering William Motley and Kenneth
Merkson and of raping and the aggravated kidnapping of Phyllis
Gregson. Defendant received a death sentence for the murders and
prison terms for the remaining convictions. On direct appeal, we
affirmed all of defendant's convictions and his sentence of death, but
reduced his sentences for aggravated kidnapping and rape. People v.
Morgan, 112 Ill. 2d 111 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101, 94 L. Ed. 2d 180, 107 S. Ct. 1329 (1987).
	Defendant subsequently filed a petition under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1994)) challenging his
convictions and death sentence. The circuit court denied that petition
following an evidentiary hearing. On review of the circuit court's
judgment, we affirmed defendant's convictions, but held that errors by
defense counsel during the aggravation-mitigation phase of the
sentencing proceedings raised a serious doubt as to the propriety of
defendant's death sentence. We therefore vacated the death sentence
and remanded the cause to the circuit court for a new sentencing
hearing. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500 (1999).
	While the matter was pending on remand to the circuit court,
defendant brought an additional challenge to his convictions and
sentences. As grounds for that challenge, defendant asserted that
newly discovered evidence demonstrated that he was actually innocent
of the crimes for which he had been convicted in 1983. Defendant
sought relief under both the Post-Conviction Hearing Act and section
2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West
2000)). The gravamen of his new claim, which is the one before us
today, was that Elijah Prater, one of the two principal witnesses at the
1983 trial and the only eyewitness other than defendant still alive, had
recanted his testimony. According to an affidavit executed by Prater,
one of the two victims had actually been killed by the other, not by
defendant, and although defendant had killed the second victim, he
had done so out of self-defense.
	Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied
defendant's request for relief. Uncertain as to the proper forum in
which to obtain review of the circuit court's judgment, defendant filed
notices of appeal with both our court and the appellate court. On the
State's motion, and without objection by defendant, our court entered
an order pursuant to Rule 302(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(b)) specifying
that the appeal was to be taken directly to us.
	While the appeal was pending, the Governor commuted
defendant's death sentence. Under the terms of the commutation,
defendant's sentence was "Commuted to a Sentence Other Than
Death for the Crime of Murder, So that the Maximum Sentence that
may be imposed is Natural Life Imprisonment Without the Possibility
of Parole or Mandatory Supervised Relief." The State challenged the
validity of this and other commutations, but its challenge was
unsuccessful. People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d 457
(2004). On the court's own motion, and in the interest of judicial
economy, we elected to retain jurisdiction of the case. Briefing was
concluded and oral argument was held. The matter is now before us
for a decision on the merits.
	How we undertake our review is defined by the procedural
posture in which the case has come before us. As our summary of the
proceedings has indicated, this is not a direct appeal. It is an appeal
from a judgment denying relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act. To be entitled to relief under the Act, a defendant must
demonstrate a substantial deprivation of federal or state constitutional
rights in the proceedings that produced the conviction or sentence
being challenged. Not every constitutional violation can be challenged,
however. Res judicata and the waiver doctrine limit postconviction
relief to constitutional matters which have not been and could not
have been adjudicated earlier. People v. Jones, 211 Ill. 2d 140, 143-44
(2004), quoting People v. McNeal, 194 Ill. 2d 135, 140 (2000).
	Consistent with these principles, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition. People v.
Lee, 207 Ill. 2d 1, 5 (2003). Under the express terms of the statute,
"[a]ny claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in
the original or an amended petition is waived." 725 ILCS 5/122-3
(West 2000). This rule would normally be fatal to a successive
postconviction petition such as the one before us today. Our court has
held, however, that the statutory bar to a successive postconviction
petition will be relaxed when fundamental fairness so requires. People
v. Lee, 207 Ill. 2d  at 5. It is this exception on which the viability of
defendant's new petition depends.
	To establish that fundamental fairness requires that a successive
postconviction petition be considered on the merits, a defendant must
show both cause and prejudice with respect to each claim presented.
More precisely, the defendant must show good cause for failing to
raise the claimed error in a prior proceeding and that actual prejudice
resulted from the error. People v. Lee, 207 Ill. 2d  at 5. For purposes
of this test, "cause" has been defined as an objective factor external to
the defense that impeded counsel's efforts to raise the claim in an
earlier proceeding. People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 460
(2002). "Prejudice" exists where the defendant can show that the
claimed constitutional error so infected his trial that the resulting
conviction violated due process. People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381,
393 (2002).
	Acknowledging "the seriousness of an actual innocence claim in
a potentially capital case," the State did not dispute that defendant met
the cause and prejudice test and that fundamental fairness justified an
evidentiary hearing on defendant's successive postconviction petition.
The State's position in the circuit court and now on appeal is that
defendant simply failed to substantiate his claims. After careful review
of the record and the applicable law, we agree.
	The conviction of an innocent person violates the due process
clause of the Illinois Constitution. Our court has therefore recognized
the right of postconviction petitioners to assert a claim of actual
innocence based on newly discovered evidence. People v.
Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996). To win relief under that
theory, the evidence adduced by the defendant must first be "newly
discovered." That means it must be evidence that was not available at
defendant's original trial and that the defendant could not have
discovered sooner through diligence. The evidence must also be
material and noncumulative. In addition, it must be of such conclusive
character that it would probably change the result on retrial. People
v. Barrow, 195 Ill. 2d 506, 540-41 (2001).
	In the case before us, defendant's claim of actual innocence is
predicated on the decision by Elijah Prater, an eyewitness to the
murders for which defendant was convicted, to recant incriminating
testimony he had given at defendant's original trial. The recantation
occurred 18 years after the killings took place and 17 years after
defendant was tried and convicted. The State does not dispute that
Prater's recanted testimony was not available at defendant's original
trial and that the defendant could not have discovered it sooner
through diligence. Nor does the State question the material,
noncumulative nature of the evidence. In the State's view, the flaw in
defendant's claim is that the evidence was not of such conclusive
character that it would probably change the result on retrial. This
argument is well taken.
	The recantation of testimony is regarded as inherently unreliable.
As a result, the courts will not grant a new trial on that basis except
in extraordinary circumstances. People v. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d 239, 260
(1997). No such circumstances are present here.
	As it considered defendant's postconviction claim for a new trial,
the circuit court was duly mindful of the law's skepticism of recanted
testimony. The court held an evidentiary hearing at which Prater
testified. It observed Prater's demeanor and assessed his new
testimony against the facts and circumstances previously established
at trial. In the end, the court concluded that Prater's new testimony
was not credible.
	Where, as here, the circuit court has held an evidentiary hearing
on a postconviction petition at which the court was required to
consider new evidence and weigh the credibility of witnesses, we will
disturb the circuit court's judgment only if it is manifestly erroneous.
Manifest error is error which is " 'clearly evident, plain, and
indisputable.' " People v. Johnson, 206 Ill. 2d 348, 357-60 (2002),
quoting People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 384-85 (1997). We discern no
such error here.
	The facts adduced at defendant's original trial have been detailed
by this court previously. See People v. Morgan, 112 Ill. 2d 111
(1986); People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500 (1999). According to the
evidence presented to the jury, Elijah Prater was defendant's long-time friend. Defendant went to Prater's apartment on the afternoon of
January 27, 1982, accompanied by Motley and Merkson, who were
also his friends. The four men used various drugs and alcohol. They
were subsequently joined by Phyllis Gregson, who was a friend of
Prater.
	The group spent the night at Prater's apartment. Just before noon
the following day, Motley, Gregson and defendant were in the
apartment's front room. Motley was sitting on a couch, talking on the
telephone, and looking through a small, black telephone book. As he was making phone calls, Motley had a .357 Magnum handgun tucked
under his leg. Defendant was sitting on a chair with a shotgun across
his lap. Prater and Merkson were in the kitchen.
	Defendant instructed Gregson to remove her clothing and dance
for him. Gregson refused. Motley, who was still sitting on the couch,
made an unknown comment to defendant. Defendant, who was
between six and seven feet away from Motley, aimed the shotgun at
him and fired. Motley landed on the floor with a fatal shotgun wound
to the chest. Defendant then removed the handgun from Motley's
body and placed the gun in his own waistband.
	Defendant went into the kitchen and told Prater and Merkson to
come into the front room and clean up Motley's body. Merkson
removed money, marijuana, and the black telephone book from
Motley and gave them to defendant. Defendant looked at the names
in the book, asked if anyone knew the listed individuals, and then
placed the book in his pocket. Defendant said that he wanted to get Motley's body out of the apartment and told Prater and Merkson to
pull the drawer out of a bedroom dresser to determine if the body
would fit inside. Although Motley's body was bent and tied with a
rope, the dresser drawer would not accommodate the body. Prater
and Merkson then stuffed Motley's tied body into a laundry bag and
wrapped it inside a mattress. Defendant instructed Gregson to clean
Motley's blood from the floor, which she did.
	Shortly thereafter, defendant sent Prater to a liquor store to buy
something to drink, told Prater to put gas in Prater's car, and
instructed him to park the car at the rear of the apartment building.
Prater ran the errands and returned to the apartment approximately 15
minutes later. Upon Prater's return, Gregson was washing dishes in
the kitchen, and defendant was sitting in the dining room with the
shotgun in his lap and the handgun tucked into the waistband of his
pants. Merkson was walking around the apartment making jokes.
	Prater gave defendant the liquor he purchased and the men took
a few drinks. Merkson continued to make jokes until defendant told
him to stop joking and to remove Motley's body from the apartment.
Merkson and Prater then moved Motley's body, wrapped inside the
mattress, to the center of the room.
	When Merkson made another remark, defendant chased Merkson
into the front room, where they started to argue. After hitting
Merkson in the head with the butt of the handgun, defendant again
instructed Merkson and Prater to remove the body from the
apartment. Merkson made another remark to defendant and defendant
told Merkson to get down on his knees and face the floor. Prater
testified that he saw defendant point the handgun at Merkson's head
from a distance of four to five feet. Prater then turned to face the wall.
Prater testified that he heard a shot and turned back to see Merkson's
body on the floor with defendant, holding the handgun, standing
beside it. Gregson also testified that as she emerged from the kitchen
she saw the handgun in defendant's hand as he stood near Merkson's
body.
	Defendant ordered Gregson to clean up Merkson's blood, and
instructed Prater to get the body out of the apartment. As Prater
began to tie up Merkson's body with his belt, defendant came up
behind Prater and began shooting at him. Prater testified that he felt
a bullet pass by his head. Prater then ran through the kitchen and out
the back door of the apartment.
	Defendant, who was now alone with Gregson in the apartment,
ordered her into the bathroom. Gregson complied, and locked the
bathroom door behind her. After the passage of between 5 and 10
minutes, defendant ordered her out of the bathroom. When she
emerged, she saw defendant was still in possession of the handgun,
although she did not observe the shotgun. Defendant took Gregson by
the arm and they left the apartment together at approximately 1:30
p.m.
	While this was taking place, Prater's downstairs neighbor, Frank
Blume, called the police. Blume, who had heard several loud
shattering sounds coming from Prater's apartment during the morning,
testified that the last loud blast, which occurred at about 1:15 p.m.,
caused a hole in the ceiling in Blume's front hallway.
	The police arrived on the scene shortly after 1:30 p.m. Upon
entering Prater's apartment, they discovered the bodies of Motley and
Merkson. In the course of examining the scene, the police recovered
a loaded shotgun, a fingerprint from a dresser drawer later identified
as defendant's, and a bullet from the floor. The police also recovered
a bullet from Blume's apartment.
	Gregson testified that after leaving Prater's apartment, defendant,
who was still armed with the handgun, ordered her into his car and
drove her to the South Shore Motel, where he checked in under the
alias of Joseph Thurston. Defendant, who had Gregson by the arm,
then led her to a motel room, where he began to undress her.
Although Gregson told defendant that she did not want to have sex
with him, defendant completed removing her clothes, pushed her onto
the bed, and had sexual intercourse with her.
	Thereafter, defendant, still armed with the handgun, escorted
Gregson by the arm to his car. A motel employee testified that he
observed defendant pointing a gun to Gregson's head. Upon seeing
the employee, defendant aimed the gun at him and began chasing him.
As the employee ran towards the motel lobby, defendant ceased the
chase, again took Gregson by the arm, and pushed her headfirst into
his car. Soon thereafter, defendant stopped the car and told Gregson
to get out. After warning her not to tell anyone what had happened,
defendant drove off at a rapid rate of speed.
	Defendant was arrested the following day. Later that same day,
Prater contacted the police and informed them that defendant was
responsible for the deaths of Merkson and Motley. Prater's statements
to the police were subsequently confirmed by Gregson.
	Prater gave his account of the events leading to the deaths of
Merkson and Motley, under oath, on multiple occasions in the years
that followed. Approximately 18 years after the killings took place,
Prater's story suddenly changed. Under Prater's new version of the
crime, which he presented at the evidentiary hearing on defendant's
successive postconviction petition, Motley and Merkson got into an
argument while they were at his apartment. Motley struck Merkson
with the .357 Magnum handgun he had been carrying, then used the
weapon to shoot Merkson in the head. Gregson screamed. Motley
turned toward defendant and Prater, pointing the handgun at them.
Defendant then shot and killed Motley in self defense.
	It was at this point, after both Merkson and Motley were both
dead, that Prater now claimed that he left the apartment to get gas for
the car and to buy liquor. On his return, Prater helped tie up the
bodies of Motley and Merkson for disposal and to clean up the mess.
Defendant then shot at Prater and, as in Prater's original version,
Prater fled.
	According to Lemuel Bell, a friend of Prater who was called as
a witness at the hearing on the successive postconviction petition, but
not at the original trial, Prater telephoned him and told him that
Motley had shot Merkson in his apartment and that defendant had
"saved the day" by shooting Motley. Prater subsequently surrendered
to police. Prater now claims he attempted to tell the same version of
the story to police interrogators, but was coerced into changing his
story to implicate defendant.
	In urging the circuit court to adopt Prater's current story and to
reject the sworn testimony Prater has given in the past, defendant
argued that the new version was more consistent with a number of
pieces of physical evidence. These include the lack of blood or other
bodily fluid on or near the couch on which Motley had been sitting,
evidence that Merkson was shot from a distance of at least 18 inches,
the presence of defendant's fingerprint on a dresser drawer in Prater's
apartment, and the fact that defendant was found in possession of the
.357 Magnum handgun and ammunition and the book Motley had
been looking through while seated on the couch.
	The circuit court rejected these arguments. It noted that the
absence of blood and other bodily fluids on the couch could be
explained by testimony given at trial by Gregson that Motley's body
flew off the couch and landed on the floor nearby after he was shot by
defendant. Although pools of bodily fluids were later found farther
from the couch than that, evidence at trial indicated that Prater and
Merkson had moved Motley's body after Motley was shot and killed.
	The forensic evidence indicating that the shot which killed
Merkson was fired from a distance of at least 18 inches likewise did
not contradict evidence at the original trial. To the contrary, it was
consistent with Prater's original testimony that defendant was four or
five feet from Merkson when he shot him. The same is true of the
other elements of physical evidence cited by defendant: the fingerprint,
the gun and ammunition and the book. Those items did fit in with
Prater's new story, but they were also fully consistent the sworn
testimony that he had given in the past. As a result, they did not
demonstrate that Prater's new testimony was any more credible than
the previous testimony he now attempted to recant.
	In further support of Prater's new version of events, defendant
argued that it provides a more plausible explanation of Prater's
departure and return to the apartment. Plausibility, however, is not the
test. The question is whether the new evidence was sufficiently
compelling that a decision by the trial court to reject that evidence in
favor of the original testimony was manifestly erroneous. That is
clearly not the case here. Prater's original explanation for his decision
to leave the apartment and return made sense too, and nothing
brought to light since the trial suggests that the circuit court erred in
refusing to jettison Prater's original explanation in favor of the new
rationale he offered.
	We reach a similar conclusion with respect to testimony
presented at the postconviction hearing by Prater's girlfriend, Cynthia
Ruwe, and by defendant's former girlfriend, Rosemary Thomas. These
witnesses testified regarding matters that occurred at the police station
after Prater was in custody, and their testimony was intended to
buttress defendant's claim that his original testimony was the product
of police coercion. Without going into the specifics of their testimony,
we note that neither of these witnesses was independent. They both
had personal relationships with Prater or defendant. Moreover, their
testimony and the testimony of Prater regarding his interaction with
the police following the killings was contradicted by police officers
and an assistant State's Attorney who were directly involved in the
case. The trial court believed those witnesses. Indeed, it found their
testimony to be "compelling, credible, convincing and unimpeached on
any material point." It therefore concluded that "there is no credible
evidence that *** Prater was ever coerced by anyone to give false
testimony against [defendant] at any time." Credibility determinations
of this kind were for the trial court to make, and we have no basis in
the record before us for second-guessing its judgment.
	Defendant argues that before the trial court deferred to the
credibility of the police officers and rejected Prater's claim that he had
been coerced, it should have considered evidence that the officers had
coerced a different defendant in another, unrelated case several years
later. This argument must also fail. The circuit court has wide
discretion to limit the type of evidence it will admit at a postconviction
evidentiary hearing. People v. Coleman, 206 Ill. 2d 261, 278 (2002).
The incident in the other case was distinguishable from this one. It
involved a situation where the police denied a defendant access to his
attorney, continued to question the defendant after he requested
counsel, and subjected him to physical abuse. Unlike the defendant in
that case, Prater was not denied access to his attorney, was not
questioned after he asked for his attorney, and suffered no physical
abuse. The defendant in the other case was beaten. Prater's contention
was that he was kept handcuffed and had his clothes taken from him.
Given these differences, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its
discretion when it refused to admit the evidence from the other case.
	In People v. Burrows, 172 Ill. 2d 169, 188 (1996), this court
affirmed a circuit court's decision in a postconviction proceeding to
award a new trial based on, inter alia, the recantation of incriminating
testimony by one of the State's prime witnesses. One factor that
impressed this court was that the witness in Burrows did not merely
recant her testimony. She made self-incriminating admissions, under
oath, that placed the blame for the killing on her and exonerated the
defendant of any involvement in the murder. Nothing of that
magnitude is present here. Prater's new testimony does not implicate
him in the murders, nor does it subject him to any significant
additional threat of prosecution for any other offense. There was
apparently no realistic possibility of a perjury prosecution, and while
Prater may have opened himself to a charge of concealment of the
homicidal deaths of Motley and Merkson, that was also true of his
prior testimony in the case.
	We note, moreover, that Prater was not the only eyewitness to
the murders of Motley and Merkson. As we discussed earlier in this
opinion, the murders were also witnessed by Phyllis Gregson. Gregson
testified at defendant's original trial. In the ensuing years, up until the
time of her death, there was no indication that Gregson ever waivered
in her belief that defendant was responsible for murdering both of the
victims.
	Faced with Gregson's testimony and its incompatibility with the
version of events now offered by Prater, defendant attempted to
impeach Gregson's credibility by arguing that Gregson may have lied
at trial in order to obtain favorable treatment from the State on
various unrelated criminal charges filed against her shortly after the
crimes were committed. Defendant also attacked Gregson's credibility
by questioning the strength of the evidence supporting her claim that
she was sexually assaulted and by offering evidence that she was
convicted of several criminal offenses many years after the events
giving rise to this case.
	These attempts were properly rejected by the circuit court. In
assessing the strength of Gregson's testimony, the salient issue was
her credibility at the time of the original trial. Her subsequent legal
entanglements have no discernible relevance to that issue. If they
demonstrate anything, it is that the life she led after being raped and
kidnapped by defendant was an unfortunate one. They do not make it
any more or less likely that she was telling the truth when she took the
stand against defendant in 1983. As for the strength of the evidence
corroborating the sexual assault committed against her by defendant,
that was for defense counsel to argue and for the jury to consider
when the case was tried. It does not constitute newly discovered
evidence and there is no reason it could not have been fully explored
on direct review.
	More problematic is the disposition of the unrelated criminal
charges filed against Gregson shortly after the murders. There were
two arrests. The first, for possession of a controlled substance, was
nol-prossed by the State. The second, for possession of illegal drugs,
apparently resulted in a sentence of six months' supervision. Such
information should have been disclosed to defense counsel at the time
of trial, but was not. Once again, however, we note that there is no
apparent reason this problem could not have been explored and raised
earlier in the history of these proceedings. The records invoked by
defendant have been on file for two decades.
	In addition, the actual significance of the criminal charges is
questionable. Defendant looks to those charges and the way they were
disposed of by the State as providing a motive for Gregson's decision
to incriminate defendant. As the State points out, however, Gregson
had a much more compelling and entirely legitimate motive for
testifying against defendant. She did not do it to garner a favorable
disposition of her drug charges. She did it because defendant had
kidnapped and raped her, and she wanted insure that he was punished.
	While Prater's recanted testimony challenged defendant's role in
the murders, it did nothing to weaken the State's case against
defendant for the rape and aggravating kidnapping of Gregson. Her
testimony was corroborated at trial by other evidence, including the
testimony of a clerk at the hotel where defendant raped her. Any
notion that Gregson's testimony was actually the product of some
improper, ulterior motive is nothing more than unsubstantiated
speculation.
	In the end, defendant's postconviction petition turned on a single
factor: the credibility of Elijah Prater. Here, as in every case of this
kind, it was for the trial court to assess the credibility of the
recantation testimony after having observed the demeanor of the
witness. The trial judge studied the record, listened to Prater's
testimony, and watched how he reacted when he was questioned and
cross-examined. Based on our examination of the record, we cannot
say that the trial judge's decision to reject Prater's recanted testimony
was manifestly erroneous.
	In support of his claim for postconviction relief, defendant raises
the additional claim that the State violated his due process rights. He
also argues that the circuit court erred in not granting him relief under
section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Both of these
arguments are premised on the assumption that Prater's original trial
testimony was perjured and that his new testimony was honest. The
trial court rejected that assumption, holding that the new testimony
was not credible. In view of our conclusion that the trial court's
decision to reject Prater's recanted testimony was not manifestly
erroneous, defendant's additional arguments cannot be sustained.
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
denying defendant's successive postconviction petition is affirmed.
The State's motion to dismiss the appeal, which was taken with the
case, is hereby denied. Upon issuance of this court's mandate, the stay
of new sentencing proceedings previously ordered by our court shall
be lifted.
Affirmed.