Title: Pub. Employee Ret. Admin. Comm’n v. Bettencourt
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11906
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 2016

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11906 
 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION  vs.  
EDWARD A. BETTENCOURT. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 6, 2015. - April 6, 2016. 
 
Present (Sitting at New Bedford):  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, 
Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission.  
Retirement.  Public Employment, Retirement benefits, 
Forfeiture of retirement benefits.  Constitutional Law, 
Excessive fines clause. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 19, 2012. 
 
 
The case was heard by Garry V. Inge, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Paul T. Hynes (Michael R. Keefe with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
Peter Sacks, State Solicitor (Judith A. Corrigan, Special 
Assistant Attorney General, with him) for the plaintiff. 
 
Ian O. Russell & Patrick N. Bryant for Massachusetts 
Coalition of Police, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  The Commonwealth's law governing public 
employee retirement systems and pensions requires that a public 
employee forfeit the retirement and health insurance benefits 
(retirement allowance or pension) to which the employee would be 
entitled upon conviction of a crime "involving violation of the 
laws applicable to [the employee's] office or position."  G. L. 
c. 32, § 15 (4) (§ 15 [4]).1  We consider here whether this 
mandatory forfeiture of a public employee's retirement allowance 
qualifies as a "fine" under the excessive fines clause of the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  We conclude 
that it does and that, in the circumstances of this case, the 
mandatory forfeiture of the public employee's retirement 
allowance is "excessive."2 
 
Background.3  Edward A. Bettencourt was first appointed as a 
police officer in the city of Peabody in October, 1980, and 
became a member of the Peabody retirement system on November 7, 
                     
 
1 The statutory forfeiture provision at issue in this case, 
G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4) (§ 15 [4]), by its terms applies solely to 
"member[s]" of a public employee retirement system.  In this 
opinion, we generally use the term "public employee" rather than 
"member;" every member is or was a public employee. 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Coalition of Police. 
 
 
3 The facts are taken from the record on appeal, and are 
generally not in dispute, except that the parties disagree about 
the value of the defendant Edward A. Bettencourt's retirement 
allowance. 
3 
 
1982.4  Bettencourt was promoted to the rank of sergeant around 
1990, and promoted again to serve as a lieutenant in 2003.  In 
the early morning hours of December 25, 2004, Bettencourt was on 
duty as a watch commander, and he knowingly accessed, through 
the Internet and without permission, the Massachusetts human 
resources division (HRD) computer system, and specifically the 
HRD Internet site containing individual applicant record 
information.  Gaining the unauthorized access, he viewed the 
civil service promotional examination scores of twenty-one other 
police officers, including four officers who were his direct 
competitors for a promotion to the position of captain in the 
police department.  In order to view the examination scores of 
these other officers, Bettencourt created a distinct user 
account for each officer, using the Social Security numbers and 
birth dates of the officers. 
 
On October 26, 2006, Bettencourt was indicted for 
unauthorized access to a computer system, in violation of G. L. 
c. 266, § 120F; the indictment contained twenty-one separate 
counts.  On April 4, 2008, at the conclusion of a jury-waived 
trial before a judge in the Superior Court (trial judge), 
                     
 
4 The Peabody retirement system is a public pension system 
that operates pursuant to G. L. c. 32. 
 
4 
 
Bettencourt was found guilty on all counts.5  Bettencourt filed 
an application for voluntary superannuation retirement with the 
Peabody retirement board (board) on the same day he was found 
guilty.  As of that date, he had served as a Peabody police 
officer for over twenty-seven years and had been a member of the 
Peabody retirement system for over twenty-five years.  On 
May 23, 2008, after learning of Bettencourt's convictions, the 
board held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether, because 
of these convictions, Bettencourt remained eligible for his 
retirement allowance.  A majority of the board concluded that 
none of the convictions was a "violation of the laws applicable 
to his office or position" under § 15 (4), and, thus, his 
application for superannuation retirement was to be processed, 
subject to the approval of the public employee retirement 
administration commission (PERAC).  On September 10, 2008, PERAC 
denied Bettencourt's retirement application because it concluded 
that Bettencourt's criminal convictions did relate to his office 
or position, and therefore, under § 15 (4), he was not entitled 
to receive any retirement allowance. 
                     
5 On April 18, 2008, Bettencourt was sentenced to a fine of 
$500 on each of the twenty-one counts of the indictment, for a 
total of $10,500.  In imposing her sentence, the trial judge 
rejected the Commonwealth's sentencing recommendation of a 
probationary sentence of eighteen months and one hundred hours 
of community service, in addition to a fine of $500 per count; 
she also rejected Bettencourt's recommendation of a period of 
unsupervised probation and no fine. 
5 
 
 
Bettencourt sought certiorari review of PERAC's decision in 
the Peabody Division of the District Court Department, arguing 
that his convictions did not trigger the forfeiture mandated by 
§ 15 (4) because they were not related to his office or 
position, and, alternatively, that the forfeiture of his pension 
would constitute an "excessive fine" in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.  A judge in the District Court concluded that 
Bettencourt's convictions were not sufficiently related to his 
office or position as to trigger forfeiture under § 15 (4), and, 
therefore, the judge did not reach the "excessive fine" 
argument.  PERAC sought certiorari review of the judge's 
decision in the Superior Court.  A Superior Court judge affirmed 
the District Court decision, and PERAC appealed to the Appeals 
Court.  In a memorandum and order pursuant to its rule 1:28, the 
Appeals Court, concluding that Bettencourt's convictions were 
linked directly to his office or position, vacated the judgment 
and remanded the case to the District Court for consideration of 
Bettencourt's alternative argument that forfeiture of his 
pension constituted an excessive fine.  Public Employee 
Retirement Admin. Comm'n v. Bettencourt, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 1113 
(2012). 
 
On remand, the District Court judge concluded that 
forfeiture of a retirement allowance pursuant to § 15 (4) was a 
fine under the Eighth Amendment and that the fine in this case, 
6 
 
forfeiture of Bettencourt's lifetime retirement allowance, as 
compared to the harm suffered by the other officers and the 
public, was excessive and violated the Eighth Amendment.  PERAC 
again sought certiorari review in the Superior Court.  In an 
amended decision dated February 6, 2014, a Superior Court judge 
reversed, ruling that forfeiture of an employee's pension rights 
under § 15 (4) does not constitute a fine for purposes of the 
Eighth Amendment because "the right to a pension is conditioned 
on not incurring criminal convictions related to public 
service."  Bettencourt filed a timely appeal in the Appeals 
Court, and we transferred the case to this court on our own 
motion. 
 
Discussion.  General Laws c. 32, § 15 (4), provides: 
 
"Forfeiture of pension upon misconduct.  -- In no 
event shall any member [of a retirement system] after final 
conviction of a criminal offense involving violation of the 
laws applicable to his office or position, be entitled to 
receive a retirement allowance under the provisions of 
[G. L. c. 32, §§ 1 through 28], inclusive, nor shall any 
beneficiary be entitled to receive any benefits under such 
provisions on account of such member.  The said member or 
his beneficiary shall receive, unless otherwise prohibited 
by law, a return of his accumulated total deductions; 
provided, however, that the rate of regular interest for 
the purpose of calculating accumulated total deductions 
shall be zero." 
 
At this juncture, Bettencourt does not challenge the Appeals 
Court's conclusion that his convictions under G. L. c. 266, 
§ 120F, involved violations of a law "applicable to his office 
or position" within the meaning of § 15 (4), and, thus, 
7 
 
triggered imposition of the section's forfeiture provisions.6  
Rather, he focuses solely on his Eighth Amendment claim.7  That 
claim has two parts:  (1) the forfeiture of his pension under 
§ 15 (4) by its terms qualifies as a fine; and (2) the fine is 
excessive.  This court has considered the claim's second part, 
excessiveness, in two previous cases, MacLean v. State Bd. of 
Retirement, 432 Mass. 339, 347-350 (2000), and Maher v. 
Retirement Bd. of Quincy, 452 Mass. 517, 523-525 (2008), cert. 
denied, 556 U.S. 1166 (2009).8  We have never addressed the 
                     
6 Bettencourt has appealed his underlying convictions, and 
that appeal is pending in the Appeals Court. 
 
7 The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides:  "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted" 
(emphasis added).  The due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution "makes the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and 
unusual punishments applicable to the States," Cooper Indus., 
Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433-434 
(2001), and imposes "substantive limits" on the broad discretion 
that States exercise in the criminal penalty arena, id. at 433. 
 
 
Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
contains an excessive fines clause:  "No magistrate or court of 
law, shall demand excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive 
fines, or inflict cruel or unusual punishments."  However, the 
parties have not raised a claim under art. 26 and therefore we 
consider solely the Eighth Amendment in this case. 
 
 
8 In both MacLean v. State Bd. of Retirement, 432 Mass. 339 
(2000), and Maher v. Retirement Bd. of Quincy, 452 Mass. 517 
(2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1166 (2009), this court assumed, 
without deciding, that forfeiture of pension benefits pursuant 
to § 15 (4) constitutes a fine for purposes of the Eighth 
Amendment, and then concluded in each case that the fine was not 
excessive and therefore no violation of the excessive fines 
8 
 
threshold question whether the forfeiture of a public employee's 
pension under § 15 (4) is a "fine" under the Eighth Amendment.  
We consider that question first. 
 
1.  Is the forfeiture required by § 15 (4) a fine?  a.  
Property requirement.  As it noted in United States v. 
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327 (1998), the United States Supreme 
Court has had "little occasion" to interpret the Eighth 
Amendment's excessive fines clause.  In that case, following the 
lead of two earlier decisions, the Court explained that "at the 
time the Constitution was adopted, 'the word "fine" was 
understood to mean a payment to a sovereign as punishment for 
some offense.'"  Id. at 327, quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of 
Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989).9  A 
fine may involve the payment of money to the government, but as 
Bajakajian makes clear, the forfeiture of property also may 
                                                                  
clause had occurred.  See MacLean, supra at 346, 347-350; Maher, 
supra at 523-525.  See also Flaherty v. Justices of the 
Haverhill Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't of the Trial Court, 83 
Mass. App. Ct. 120, 123-125, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 325 (2013) 
(adopting same assumption and concluding forfeiture not 
excessive). 
 
 
9 In Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265, 275-276 (1989), the United States 
Supreme Court concluded that an award of punitive damages in a 
civil case between two private parties does not implicate the 
excessive fines clause, because the clause applies only when the 
required payment is to the government, i.e., the sovereign. 
9 
 
qualify as a fine.10  Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that 
the excessive fines clause does not apply solely to criminal 
cases, such as Bajakajian; a civil forfeiture proceeding in 
which the government seeks the forfeiture of particular property 
on account of its owner's conviction of a crime also implicates 
the clause.  See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 608-610, 
618, 621-622 (1993) (civil proceeding initiated by government 
seeking to forfeit auto body shop and mobile home as 
instrumentalities of drug offense to which property owner 
pleaded guilty; forfeiture sought by government qualified as 
fine under Eighth Amendment).  "The Excessive Fines Clause thus 
'limits the government's power to extract payments, whether in 
cash or in kind, "as punishment for some offense."'. . .  
Forfeitures -- payments in kind -- are thus 'fines' if they 
constitute punishment for an offense."  Bajakajian, supra at 
328, quoting Austin, supra at 609-610. 
                     
 
10 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998), 
involved a defendant who had pleaded guilty to failing to report 
exported currency in excess of $10,000 in violation of 31 U.S.C. 
§ 5316(a)(1)(A).  A separate Federal statute required that "a 
person convicted of willfully violating this reporting 
requirement shall forfeit to the Government 'any property . . . 
involved in such offense.'"  Bajakajian, supra at 324.  Under 
this forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), the United 
States sought forfeiture of the entire $357,144 that Bajakajian 
had failed to report.  The Supreme Court concluded that 
forfeiture of the entire amount constituted an excessive fine in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Bajakajian, supra at 339-
340. 
10 
 
 
To decide whether the forfeiture of Bettencourt's pension 
qualifies as a fine under the Supreme Court's definition, the 
first question to be answered is whether the forfeiture operates 
to "extract payments" from him -- that is, requires the transfer 
of money or some other form of property of Bettencourt's to the 
government.  See Hopkins v. Oklahoma Pub. Employees Retirement 
Sys., 150 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 1998) (considering 
forfeiture of retired State employee's pension as result of 
criminal bribery conviction:  "Implicit in [the Supreme Court's] 
interpretation of the Excessive Fines Clause is the notion that 
it applies only when the payment to the government involves 
turning over 'property' of some kind that once belonged to [the 
employee]").11 
 
In response to this first question, Bettencourt contends 
that the mandatory forfeiture under § 15 (4) has required him to 
transfer or turn over property -- his right to receive his 
retirement allowance -- to the Commonwealth.  PERAC, on the 
other hand, argues that Bettencourt had no property interest in 
the retirement allowance being forfeited.  Rather, in PERAC's 
view, Bettencourt, as a member of the Peabody retirement system, 
had only a future interest in receiving retirement allowance 
                     
 
11 If the forfeiture does require transfer of a property 
interest, the second question is whether the forfeiture operates 
as a form of punishment related to Bettencourt's convictions.  
We address the punishment issue in part 1.b, infra. 
11 
 
payments, one that was wholly contingent on his not being 
convicted of a crime involving misconduct in office, and 
"contingent, future interests are not property." 
 
We do not share PERAC's view.  Under the Commonwealth's 
contributory retirement system, the relationship between a 
member and the system is contractual.  See G. L. c. 32, § 25 
(5).12  However, we previously have noted that in this context, 
the term 
 
"'[c]ontract' (and related terms such as rights, 
benefits, protection) should be understood . . . in a 
special, somewhat relaxed sense. . . .  It is not really 
feasible -- nor would it be desirable -- to fit so complex 
and dynamic a set of arrangements as a statutory retirement 
scheme into ordinary contract law which posits as its model 
a joining of the wills of mutually assenting individuals to 
form a specific bargain. . . .  When, therefore, the 
characterization 'contract' is used, it is best understood 
as meaning that the retirement scheme has generated 
material expectations on the part of employees and those 
expectations should in substance be respected.  Such is the 
content of 'contract.' 
 
 
". . . 
 
                     
 
12 General Laws c. 32, § 25 (5), provides: 
 
"The provisions of [G. L. c. 32, §§ 1 through 28,] 
inclusive, and of corresponding provisions of earlier laws 
shall be deemed to establish and to have established 
membership in the retirement system as a contractual 
relationship under which members who are or may be retired 
for superannuation are entitled to contractual rights and 
benefits, and no amendments or alterations shall be made 
that will deprive any such member or any group of such 
members of their pension rights or benefits provided for 
thereunder, if such member or members have paid the 
stipulated contributions specified in said sections or 
corresponding provisions of earlier laws." 
12 
 
 
"The contract so 'envisaged [by G. L. c. 32, § 25 
(5),] is under the shelter of the impairment-of-contract 
clause, or, what amounts to much the same thing, the due 
process clause of the Federal Constitution and State 
constitutional provisions cognate to the latter. . . .  [A] 
retirement plan establishing a contractual relationship[,] 
. . . whether viewed strictly as contract or as property[,] 
may be constitutionally guarded against impairment" 
(emphasis supplied; footnote omitted). 
 
Opinion of the Justices, 364 Mass. 847, 861, 863 (1973).13  See 
Madden v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 431 Mass. 697, 701 
(2000) (under contractual relationship between State retirement 
system members and State, "[t]here can be no change to the 
system that deprives members of benefits as long as they have 
paid the required contributions"). 
 
As Opinion of the Justices and Madden reflect, this court 
has long held the view that a public employee who is a member of 
a retirement system holds an interest in retirement benefits 
that originates in a "contract" and in substance amounts to a 
                     
 
13 In Opinion of the Justices, 364 Mass. 847, 862 (1973), we 
quoted with approval the following passage from a decision of a 
California appellate court, Wisley v. San Diego, 188 Cal. App. 
2d 482, 485-486 (1961), and characterized the passage as 
describing a contractual relationship similar to that envisaged 
by G. L. c. 32, § 25 (5): 
 
 
"Where a city charter provides for pensions, it is 
well settled that the pension rights of the employees are 
an integral part of the contract of employment and that 
these rights are vested at the time the employment is 
accepted.  An amendment to the charter which attempts to 
take away or diminish these vested rights is an 
unconstitutional impairment of contract.  However, this 
does not preclude reasonable modifications of the pension 
plan prior to the employees' retirement [to maintain the 
financial viability of the plan]. . . ." 
13 
 
property right.  See Garney v. Massachusetts Teachers' 
Retirement Sys., 469 Mass. 384, 389 (2014) (G. L. c. 32, § 15, 
"involves the forfeiture of property").  See also Collatos v. 
Boston Retirement Bd., 396 Mass. 684, 686 (1986).14,15  Cf. G. L. 
c. 208, § 34 (property constituting marital estate subject to 
division in divorce includes vested and unvested retirement 
                     
 
14 The public employee retirement administration commission 
(PERAC) argues that to the extent Collatos v. Boston Retirement 
Bd., 396 Mass. 684, 686 (1986), implies that forfeiture of a 
pension involves property, the case was concerned with G. L. 
c. 32, § 15 (3A), which requires forfeiture not only of pension 
benefits, but also of the employee's accumulated salary 
deductions (i.e., the employee's contributions to the retirement 
system), whereas § 15 (4) directs that the employee's 
accumulated deductions be returned to him.  We read Collatos as 
more broadly suggesting that the employee's right to pension 
benefits themselves represented a property interest, but in any 
event, § 15 (4) itself requires an employee to forfeit the 
interest that would otherwise be due to him on his accumulated 
salary deductions, see G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), and such interest 
clearly represents property belonging to the employee. 
 
 
15 While the view that retirement benefits provided by a 
public employee retirement system constitute a contractually 
created property right is not universally shared by all, a 
number of courts have so held.  See, e.g., Betts v. Board of 
Admin. of the Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 21 Cal. 3d 859, 
863 (1978); Birnbaum v. New York State Teachers Retirement Sys., 
5 N.Y.2d 1, 8-9 (1958); Mazzo v. Board of Pensions & Retirement 
of the City of Philadelphia, 531 Pa. 78, 84 (1992); Leonard v. 
Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 479, 487-488 (1972) (pension rights 
constitute property as deferred compensation); Booth v. Sims, 
193 W. Va. 323, 337-341 (1994).  See also Pineman v. Oechslin, 
195 Conn. 405, 416-417 (1985) (even in absence of express 
contractual rights to pension benefits, State employees have 
property interest in them).  Contrast, e.g., Hopkins v. Oklahoma 
Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 150 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 
1998) (Oklahoma law); Hames v. Miami, 479 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1288 
(S.D. Fla. 2007) (Florida law); Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 
516 (Me. 1993); Scarantino v. Public Sch. Employees' Retirement 
Bd., 68 A.3d 375, 385 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013). 
14 
 
benefits); Krapf v. Krapf, 439 Mass. 97, 104 (2003) (pension 
rights "often constitute valuable marital assets"). 
 
In arguing that Bettencourt had no property interest in his 
retirement allowance, as stated previously, PERAC posits that an 
employee's interest is always contingent on not being convicted 
of an offense "applicable to his office" under § 15 (4); in 
contractual terms, this contingency, in PERAC's view, is a 
condition precedent that must be satisfied before the employee's 
right to retirement benefits "matures" into a contractual right, 
see Haverhill v. George Brox, Inc., 47 Mass. App. Ct. 717, 719 
(1999), and without so maturing, no property right is or could 
be created.  In support of this argument, PERAC relies on three 
decisions of courts applying the laws of other States:  Hopkins, 
150 F.3d at 1162 (holding that, under Oklahoma law, public 
employee convicted of accepting bribe while in office had no 
property right in pension benefits because pension was always 
contingent on maintaining "honorable service" while in office; 
employee's acceptance of bribe constituted breach of duty of 
honorable service, and as result, employee had no "vested right" 
in pension); Hames v. Miami, 479 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1288 (S.D. 
Fla. 2007) (11th Cir. 2008) (under Florida law, public employee 
has no property interest in pension because pension vests 
"subject to the conditions in the forfeiture statute"); and 
Scarantino v. Public Sch. Employees Retirement Bd., 68 A.3d 375, 
15 
 
385 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013) (under Pennsylvania law, public 
employee's right to pension depends upon certain conditions 
precedent, including that "an employee cannot have been 
convicted of . . . [certain] crimes"). 
 
We are not persuaded by the reasoning in these cases.  If 
an employee has a protected contract right and, derivatively, a 
property interest in retirement benefits, the fact that the 
benefits may be subject to forfeiture on account of misconduct 
does not change the fundamental character of the contract right 
or property interest.  Rather, it simply means that the employee 
will lose his or her right and interest as a result of the 
misconduct.16 
 
PERAC also argues that no forfeiture occurred here because, 
through the operation of § 15 (4), Bettencourt simply was 
foreclosed from receiving retirement benefits in the future, and 
nothing was actually "extracted" from him and paid to the 
government as required to trigger review under the Eighth 
                     
 
16 Furthermore, in contrast to at least the Scarantino case 
-- and directly contrary to PERAC's argument here -- when we 
have described a public employee's conviction of an offense 
described in § 15 (4) in contract terms, we have not 
characterized the conviction as a "condition precedent" but 
rather a "condition subsequent" that operates to discharge the 
duty of the retirement system to pay benefits.  See State Bd. of 
Retirement v. Woodward, 446 Mass. 698, 705 n.7 (2006).  This 
characterization supports our conclusion that, under the 
statutory scheme, a public employee participating in the 
retirement system possesses a contractual entitlement or right 
to the benefits before his or her commission of an offense 
results in the forfeiture of that right. 
16 
 
Amendment.  We disagree with PERAC that the phrase "extract 
payments . . . in cash or in kind," as used by the Supreme Court 
in Austin¸ 509 U.S. at 609-610, and Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 328, 
means that there literally must be a physical transfer of 
tangible property from the individual to the State; "property" 
exists in tangible and intangible form.  Under the 
Commonwealth's public employee retirement system, the employee 
makes contributions to the system during the period of his or 
her active employment through salary deductions.  When the 
employee retires for superannuation (assuming no beneficiaries), 
he or she retires with an allowance that is comprised of an 
"annuity share" actuarially determined on the basis of his or 
her accumulated deductions, and a "pension share" that the 
governmental unit is required to pay and that represents "the 
usually considerable difference needed to make good the normal 
yearly allowance paid to the [employee] until his death."  
Opinion of the Justices, 364 Mass. at 854.  The pension share 
that the employee is entitled to receive from the government 
during retirement is money, i.e., property.  If the employee is 
obligated to forfeit his or her retirement allowance pursuant to 
§ 15 (4), the pension share reverts to the government; put 
another way, by operation of § 15 (4), the pension share is 
effectively transferred from the employee to the government.  We 
consider this effective transfer of property to qualify as an 
17 
 
extraction of payment from the employee to the sovereign within 
the meaning of Austin and Bajakajian. 
 
To summarize, at the point that Bettencourt, as a Peabody 
police officer, became a contributing member of the Peabody 
retirement system with deductions taken from his salary in 
accordance with governing statutes and rules, he acquired a 
protected interest in the retirement allowance provided by the 
retirement system that amounted to a property interest.  See 
Opinion of the Justices, 364 Mass. at 863.17  This is not to say 
that Bettencourt, or any public employee, may not lose his right 
to receive his retirement allowance as a result of committing a 
crime connected to his employment.  Section 15 (4) expressly 
requires this result, and Bettencourt raises no challenge to the 
authority of the Legislature to enact such a statute.  But the 
fact that § 15 (4) mandates forfeiture of an employee's 
retirement allowance when the employee is convicted of 
misconduct in office does not mean that the employee lacked a 
property interest in that allowance prior to the employee's 
conviction.  Rather, it is precisely this property interest that 
the employee is required to forfeit, and the forfeiture effects 
what is in substance an extraction of payments from the employee 
to the Commonwealth. 
                     
 
17 For cases in other jurisdictions to the same effect, see, 
e.g., Betts, 21 Cal. 3d at 863; Birnbaum, 5 N.Y.2d at 8-9; 
Leonard, 81 Wash. 2d at 487. 
18 
 
 
b.  Punishment requirement.  A forfeiture of property only 
qualifies as a fine under the Eighth Amendment if it constitutes 
punishment.  See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 328.  Bettencourt 
argues that the required statutory forfeiture here did operate 
to punish him for his criminal offense; PERAC, pointing to 
MacLean, 432 Mass. at 351, characterizes the mandatory 
forfeiture as serving remedial, nonpunitive purposes. 
 
In MacLean, 432 Mass. at 351, in the context of considering 
a retired public employee's argument that the forfeiture of his 
retirement allowance violated double jeopardy principles, we 
stated that "[a]lthough § 15 (4) certainly contains an element 
of deterrence, it also serves other, nonpunitive purposes, such 
as protection of the public fisc and preserving respect for 
government service."  But there is no double jeopardy issue 
raised in this case, and for purposes of the excessive fines 
clause, the Supreme Court has made clear that unless the 
sanction at issue -- here, forfeiture -- can be said to serve 
"solely" a remedial purpose, it qualifies as punishment.  
Austin, 509 U.S. at 610, quoting United States v. Halper, 490 
U.S. 435, 448 (1989).  Accord Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 329 n.4, 
331 n.6. 
 
In Bajakajian, the Court described the characteristics of 
the currency forfeiture at issue there that indicated it 
qualified as punishment:  "The forfeiture is . . . imposed at 
19 
 
the culmination of a criminal proceeding and requires conviction 
of an underlying felony, and it cannot be imposed upon an 
innocent owner."  Id. at 328.  Forfeiture pursuant to § 15 (4) 
meets all of these criteria.  It operates as "an automatic legal 
consequence of conviction of certain offenses," MacLean, supra 
at 343; it only comes into play after the employee's final 
conviction of one of those offenses; and it cannot be imposed on 
an employee who is not convicted of committing such an offense.  
We conclude, therefore, that the forfeiture required by § 15 (4) 
qualifies as "punishment."  Accordingly, because the forfeiture 
does involve an "extraction of payments" and is punitive, it is 
a fine within the meaning of the excessive fines clause of the 
Eighth Amendment.  We turn to the question whether the 
forfeiture is excessive. 
 
2.  Was the fine excessive?  Bettencourt argues that the 
mandated forfeiture of his retirement benefits is excessive 
because the amount of the forfeiture is grossly disproportional 
to the gravity of his offenses.  The District Court judge 
agreed.18 
                     
 
18 The Superior Court judge, having concluded that 
forfeiture pursuant to § 15 (4) did not constitute a fine, did 
not analyze excessiveness. 
 
20 
 
 
We review the District Court judge's determination of 
excessiveness de novo.  Maher, 452 Mass. at 523.19  "The 
touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive 
Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality:  The amount of 
the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the 
offense that it is designed to punish."  Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 
334.  In conducting the review, we are to compare the forfeiture 
amount to that offense, and "[i]f the amount of the forfeiture 
is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant's 
offense, it is unconstitutional."  Id. at 337.  See Maher, supra 
at 522.  As the party challenging the constitutionality of the 
forfeiture, Bettencourt bears the burden of demonstrating that 
the forfeiture is excessive.  Id. at 523. 
 
The amount of the forfeiture is the first issue to 
consider.  Bettencourt estimated the value of his pension 
benefits to be approximately $1,487,940 and the value of his 
health care benefits to be approximately $482,500, or 
approximately $1.9 million in total.  In contrast, PERAC 
introduced an actuarial estimate stating that the value of 
Bettencourt's pension benefits, independent of the health 
                     
 
19 Factual findings, when made by a judge, are to be 
accepted unless clearly erroneous.  See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 
336 n.10.  The District Court judge made no findings here.  As 
this court has noted, "[i]n any forfeiture case it would be 
helpful for the judge to make a finding of the total value of 
the forfeiture involved."  MacLean, 432 Mass. at 348 n.11. 
21 
 
benefits, was $659,000.  Although PERAC disputes Bettencourt's 
calculation of health benefits, PERAC agrees that they confer 
some value.  Accepting for purposes of discussion that PERAC's 
estimate is correct, Bettencourt would face forfeiture of 
$659,000 at a minimum, plus the value of health insurance 
benefits.20  Bettencourt accrued his interest in the forfeited 
benefits over more than twenty-five years of public service. 
 
Turning to the gravity of the underlying offenses that 
triggered the forfeiture, we are called upon to gauge the degree 
of Bettencourt's culpability and, in that regard, to consider 
the nature and circumstances of his offenses, whether they were 
related to any other illegal activities, the aggregate maximum 
sentence that could have been imposed, and the harm resulting 
from them.  See Maher, 452 Mass. at 523, citing Bajakajian, 524 
U.S. at 337-339; MacLean, 432 Mass. at 346.  We consider these 
factors in order. 
 
First, with respect to the nature and circumstances of the 
offenses, Bettencourt was convicted of twenty-one counts of 
unauthorized access to a computer system in violation of G. L. 
c. 266, § 120F,21 during a single shift of duty; in the period of 
                     
 
20 The differing values and estimates provided by the 
parties underscore the need for factual findings to be made by 
the District Court judge reviewing a forfeiture case such as 
this. 
 
21 General Laws c. 266, § 120F, provides in relevant part: 
22 
 
access, he viewed private information, including civil service 
examination scores relating to several police officers within 
his department.  In sentencing Bettencourt, the trial judge 
observed that there was no evidence that Bettencourt made any 
use at all of this private information -- i.e., no evidence of 
any gain to Bettencourt other than the satisfaction of his 
curiosity; the essence of his crime, in substance, was one of 
"snooping." 
 
Second, Bettencourt's offenses were wholly unrelated to 
other illegal activities.  Bettencourt had no prior criminal 
record, and there is nothing before us suggesting that he had 
engaged in any criminal or illegal misconduct besides this one 
episode of accessing the computer files without authority. 
 
The third factor focuses on the maximum potential penalties 
for Bettencourt's offenses.  See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 338-
339.  In this regard, "the maximum punishment authorized by the 
Legislature is the determinative factor."  Maher, 452 Mass. at 
524 n.12.  See MacLean, 432 Mass. at 348.22  The maximum 
                                                                  
 
"Whoever, without authorization, knowingly accesses a 
computer system by any means, or after gaining access to a 
computer system by any means knows that such access is not 
authorized and fails to terminate such access, shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the house of correction for not 
more than thirty days or by a fine of not more than one 
thousand dollars, or both." 
 
22 Bettencourt argues that our analysis of the maximum 
penalty should be controlled by the maximum punishment 
authorized by the Massachusetts sentencing guidelines, citing 
23 
 
punishment authorized by the Legislature for a single offense 
under G. L. c. 266, § 120F, a misdemeanor, is imprisonment in a 
house of correction for thirty days and a fine of not more than 
$1,000, which suggests to us that the Legislature did not view 
this crime as a grave, serious offense.  See Bajakajian, 524 
U.S. at 338-339 (maximum possible punishment of six months' 
imprisonment and $5,000 fine confirms "minimal level of 
culpability").  Compare Maher, supra at 524 (discussing maximum 
penalties of felonies of which retired public employee had been 
convicted).  The aggregate maximum penalty that could have been 
imposed on Bettencourt -- imprisonment in the house of 
correction for 630 days and a fine of $21,00023 -- does not 
indicate a substantial level of culpability for purposes of this 
analysis, particularly where the potential period of 
imprisonment is relatively low as compared to that of other 
crimes.24 
                                                                  
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 338-339.  The argument fails.  The 
Massachusetts sentencing guidelines are simply guidelines, not a 
set of rules that judges must follow -- in contrast to the 
Federal sentencing guidelines that were in effect at the time 
that Bajakajian was decided and until the Supreme Court's 
decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 
 
23 Bettencourt received a sentence of $10,500, or $500 for 
each offense, but was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment or 
probation.  We decline to consider the relative leniency of the 
sentence received by Bettencourt as opposed to other potential 
violators.  See Maher, 452 Mass. at 524 n.12. 
 
24 In MacLean, 432 Mass. at 348, this court opined that the 
maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed for a single 
24 
 
 
Harm caused by the offense is the fourth factor.  PERAC 
contends that Bettencourt's offenses were a breach of the public 
trust that was "especially serious because it involve[d] a 
police officer, in command of a police department, breaking the 
law in the police station, by willfully impersonating fellow 
police officers while using their personal information to do 
so."  We recognize that Bettencourt's offenses certainly 
violated the privacy rights of his fellow officers, and -- as 
will always be the case when a public employee commits a crime 
by violating a law connected to his or her office or position -- 
that there was a breach of the public trust.  However, no harm 
to the public fisc was accomplished or threatened here, compare 
Maher, supra at 524-525, there was no improper or illegal gain 
involved, compare MacLean, supra at 349-350, and, as the trial 
judge recognized, the offenses did not warrant concern about 
protection of the public.  PERAC also argues that Bettencourt's 
offenses undermined the integrity of the civil service promotion 
                                                                  
violation of the conflict of interest law, G. L. c. 268A, § 7 -- 
two years (at the time of that case) -- in combination with the 
possible aggregate fine for the two offenses to which MacLean 
had pleaded guilty -- $6,000 -- indicated that the Legislature 
"considered violations of this [statute] a serious offense."  
The opinion does not explain why the court combined the maximum 
statutory period of incarceration for a single violation of 
G. L. c. 268A, § 7, with the maximum fine for MacLean's two 
offenses.  The maximum term of imprisonment for two violations 
of this statute would have been four years.  This is 
significantly longer than the maximum possible term of 
imprisonment in this case, 630 days. 
25 
 
process because the knowledge of the identities of his main 
competitors for promotion to captain and their examination 
scores provided an advantage to him.  But, as the District Court 
judge stated, despite PERAC's attempts to speculate about how 
Bettencourt could have gained from knowledge of the scores, 
nothing in the record demonstrates that Bettencourt received any 
personal benefit, profit, or gain from his actions.  Over-all, 
although there certainly was harm caused by Bettencourt, it was 
relatively small as compared to our other cases.25 
                     
 
25 PERAC also argues that the forfeiture of $659,000, plus 
an undetermined value of health insurance benefits, is not 
excessive because it is comparable to other forfeiture amounts 
upheld by this court and the Appeals Court under § 15 (4).  See 
Maher, 452 Mass. at 525 ($576,000 not excessive); MacLean, 432 
Mass. at 348-350 ($625,000 not excessive); Flaherty, 83 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 124-125 ($940,000 not excessive).  We disagree.  The 
facts of each of these cases are very different, and each case 
must be decided on its own facts.  See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 
336 n.10.  Cf. Gaffney v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 
423 Mass. 1, 5 (1996) (court must look to facts of each case to 
determine whether "direct link" between criminal offense and 
public employee's position exists).  Unlike Bettencourt's 
offenses, MacLean's offenses resulted in substantial pecuniary 
benefits to himself and his wife; the forfeiture was triggered 
by multiple illegal activities that concerned the financial 
interest of the State; and the offenses occurred over a lengthy 
period of time.  The crimes to which Maher pleaded guilty -- 
breaking and entering in the daytime with intent to commit a 
felony, stealing in a building, and wanton destruction of 
property -- were far more serious in nature, including felonies; 
Maher faced a potential maximum penalty of seventeen and one-
half years of imprisonment; there was evidence that he stood to 
gain a substantial salary from his misconduct; and Maher's 
crimes "could have undermined public confidence in the selection 
and appointment of officials to supervisory positions," Maher, 
452 Mass. at 525.  Flaherty was the superintendent of the 
Haverhill highway department and was convicted of larceny over 
26 
 
 
Considering the factors discussed above, we conclude that 
the complete forfeiture of Bettencourt's retirement benefits in 
excess of $659,000, accrued over a lengthy career as a full-time 
municipal police officer, was not proportional to the gravity of 
the underlying offenses of which he was convicted.  In sum, the 
forfeiture violates the excessive fines clause of the Eighth 
Amendment. 
 
3.  If the mandatory forfeiture of a public employee's 
retirement allowance qualifies as an excessive fine, what is the 
appropriate remedy?26  Although the United States Supreme Court 
in Bajakajian declined to consider the issue,27 we recognize that 
like the trial judge in Bajakajian (see note 27, supra), as 
                                                                  
$250, a felony, for stealing paving supplies from the highway 
department in concert with his son, who also worked for the 
highway department and was under Flaherty's supervision, in 
order to make use of the supplies in a side business Flaherty 
operated; the acts of larceny occurred several times over the 
course of three years.  The fact that Flaherty stole from the 
government for years with the help of his government-employed 
son and used the stolen materials for personal gain added to his 
level of culpability, justifying the forfeiture of his pension 
benefits.  No such facts are present in this case. 
 
 
26 Following oral argument in this case, we invited the 
parties to address this and related subsidiary questions in 
supplemental memoranda.  The parties and the Massachusetts 
Coalition of Police, as amicus, all did so. 
 
 
27 In Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 326, the trial judge, after 
determining that the statutory forfeiture amount was excessive 
and therefore constitutionally invalid, proceeded to establish 
an alternative forfeiture amount that the judge deemed 
appropriate.  The Supreme Court, however, declined to consider 
the propriety of that determination, as the defendant had not 
cross-appealed that issue.  See id. at 337 n.11. 
27 
 
PERAC points out, a number of courts, after concluding that a 
statutory forfeiture operated as an excessive fine in the 
particular circumstances of the case, have proceeded to 
determine a forfeiture amount that would not be excessive, and 
have imposed it.  See, e.g., United States v. Castello, 611 F.3d 
116, 121 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1251 (2011) 
(where forfeiture amount is constitutionally excessive, court 
must impose alternative fine in exact amount over which fine 
would become excessive); United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 
716, 724 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding in context of case involving 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act violations 
that lower court is required to impose maximum fine amount that 
would not be excessive under Eighth Amendment).28  Cf. United 
States ex rel. Bunk v. Gosselin World Wide Moving, N.V., 741 
F.3d 390, 405-410 (4th Cir. 2013) (civil qui tam actions under 
Federal False Claims Act; relator's acceptance of less than 
statutory False Claims Act penalty was permissible solution to 
Eighth Amendment excessive fines concern and amount agreed upon 
did not qualify as constitutionally excessive).  But see, e.g., 
United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop. Located at 461 Shelby 
Rd. 361, Pelham, Ala., 857 F. Supp. 935, 939-940 (N.D. Ala. 
1994) (declining to adopt holding in Sarbello and impose 
                     
 
28 See also United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 543, 552, 558 
(6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 819, 824 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 878 (1994). 
28 
 
alternative fine, noting difficulty judges would face in 
determining exact amount defendant could be fined without 
violating excessive fines clause). 
 
We agree with PERAC that, as a general proposition, where a 
court determines that imposition of a statutorily mandated 
forfeiture would violate the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines  
clause, it is likely within the court's authority to determine a 
level or amount of forfeiture or fine that would be 
constitutionally permissible –- whether the statutory forfeiture 
is criminal (as in the Castello and Sarbello cases) or, as here, 
civil in nature.  However, we decline to attempt such a 
determination in this case.  We do so because even if we put to 
one side the inherent difficulty in determining the maximum 
amount of retirement allowance forfeiture that is 
constitutionally permissible,29 implementation of this judicially 
                     
 
29 In those cases where a court has ordered that a statutory 
forfeiture amount would be an excessive fine and has imposed a 
lesser fine, the property subject to forfeiture has been readily 
divisible, the total value of the property was established, and 
the forfeiture was to be imposed on a one-time basis by payment 
to the government.  See United States v. Castello, 611 F.3d 116, 
118 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1251 (2011) 
(forfeiture amount determined as percentage of value of checks 
exceeding $10,000 for which no currency transaction reports were 
filed, funds connected to crime committed, and defendant's 
equity interest in his home); Bieri, 21 F.3d at 824 (real 
property potentially subject to forfeiture was divisible by 
plots of land); United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 724 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (specific percentage of defendant's interest in 
business required to be forfeited).  None of those factors is 
known with adequate certainty in this case. 
29 
 
established forfeiture determination would involve the creation 
of procedures to be carried out by administrative bodies such as 
the local retirement board and perhaps PERAC, for which there is 
currently no legislative authorization or direction.30  Stated in 
more general terms, the decision that a public employee's 
retirement allowance should be forfeited completely upon 
conviction of certain types of crimes constitutes a policy 
choice for the Legislature to make -- as it has by enacting § 15 
(4). 
 
This is the first case in which this court has held (rather 
than assumed) that the forfeiture required by § 15 (4) is 
subject to the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment, 
and the first case in which the court has determined that a 
total forfeiture of a public employee's pension pursuant to § 15 
                     
 
30 In a hypothetical case in which a court determines that 
total pension forfeiture is constitutionally excessive, PERAC 
has proposed an implementation plan that appears to require the 
following.  First, the local retirement board would determine 
the total value of the employee's (here, Bettencourt's) 
retirement allowance and health insurance benefits; using the 
total value, the local board would then determine what the 
employee's monthly retirement allowance and health insurance 
benefits would be; and the local board would then calculate how 
many months need to pass until the sum of the monthly payments 
withheld equaled the constitutionally permissible forfeiture 
amount imposed by the judge.  Then, at the end of that 
calculated period of time, the employee would be entitled to 
begin receiving monthly payments (if the employee were still 
alive).  Presumably, there would need to be some additional 
adjustments to this implementation plan if the employee had 
elected, as Bettencourt did, a retirement plan option that 
included payments to a beneficiary in the event of the 
employee's death. 
30 
 
(4) would violate that clause.  Accordingly, the Legislature has 
not had the opportunity to consider what should occur if and 
when such a judicial determination of excessiveness is made, and 
questions of policy abound.  For example, assuming that where a 
court finds that total forfeiture of a public employee's pension 
would be constitutionally excessive, the Legislature would seek 
to require forfeiture of the maximum amount a court found 
constitutionally permissible -- an assumption that itself 
obviously incorporates a policy judgment -- what method for 
implementation of such a decision would the Legislature choose?  
The method suggested by PERAC?31  A method that distributed to 
the employee a reduced benefit payment on a periodic basis 
immediately following the court's judgment, calculated to 
account for the constitutionally permissible forfeiture amount?  
A different method altogether?  Or, in light of our 
determination that the excessive fines clause applies to the 
statutory pension forfeiture program prescribed by § 15 (4), 
might the Legislature choose to establish a wholly different 
forfeiture system -- for example, one that provided for 
different percentages of pension forfeiture depending on the 
nature and circumstances of the crime? 
 
These types of determinations are ones that fit squarely 
within the legislative, not the judicial, domain, and we believe 
                     
 
31 See note 30, supra. 
31 
 
that the more prudent approach is to defer to the Legislature 
for its resolution of such issues in the first instance.  See 
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 
329 (2006) (where Court determines statute is unconstitutional 
as applied, its "ability to devise a judicial remedy that does 
not entail quintessentially legislative work often depends on 
how clearly [it has] already articulated the background 
constitutional rules at issue and how easily [it] can articulate 
the remedy"). 
 
Conclusion.  There is no question that the mandatory 
forfeiture provisions of § 15 (4) serve an important public 
interest in protecting the honesty and integrity of those who 
are paid with public funds to carry out the responsibilities of 
government.  We emphasize that the Legislature properly may 
provide for such forfeitures.  We hold today, however, that 
under the pension forfeiture scheme established by G. L. c. 32, 
§ 15 (4), the complete forfeiture of a public employee's 
retirement allowance upon conviction of a crime "involving 
violation of the laws applicable to his office or position" is a 
fine that is subject to the Eighth Amendment's proscription 
against excessive fines.  In the present case, because § 15 (4), 
as applied to Bettencourt, results in the imposition of an 
excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment, the statute cannot be 
enforced, and his retirement allowance cannot be forfeited 
32 
 
pursuant to the statute's terms.32  Any changes to the system of 
retirement allowance forfeiture established by § 15 (4) 
implicate policy determinations that the Legislature should have 
an opportunity to make in the first instance. 
 
The judgment of the Superior Court is vacated, and the case 
remanded to that court for entry of judgment affirming the 
judgment of the District Court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
32 Our conclusion that Bettencourt is entitled to his 
retirement allowance in full is based solely on the application 
of the mandatory total forfeiture provision in G. L. c. 32, § 15 
(4), to the particular facts presented in this case -- as 
discussed, commission of a misdemeanor with a relatively light 
maximum sentence, no attempt by Bettencourt to divert or misuse 
public funds, no evidence that the private information he 
improperly gained was misused (or used at all), and no injury 
beyond the invasion of the other officers' privacy interest in 
their respective test scores.  If history is any guide, cases 
involving such a relatively minimal degree of culpability and 
harm to the public are highly unusual.  It is significant that 
in the cases previously before this court and the Appeals Court 
in which the courts assumed without deciding that the Eighth 
Amendment's excessive fines clause applied to forfeitures 
imposed under § 15 (4), the total forfeitures of the employees' 
retirement allowances were not deemed to be excessive.  See 
Maher, 452 Mass. at 518, 523-525; MacLean, 432 Mass. at 348-350; 
Flaherty, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 124-125.