Title: Raymond C. Bryan et al. v. Mike Hubbard and Gene Howard (Appeal
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1071590
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 10, 2008

REL: 10/10/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1071590
____________________
Raymond C. Bryan et al.
v.
Mike Hubbard and Gene Howard
____________________
1071662
____________________
Gene Howard
v.
Raymond C. Bryan et al.
Appeals from Jefferson Circuit Court 
(CV-08-902067)
1071590, 1071662
2
BOLIN, Justice.
This is an expedited appeal and cross-appeal.  Raymond C.
Bryan, Rodney James, and Jonathon Thompkins appeal from a
summary judgment in favor of Mike Hubbard and Gene Howard,
upholding the Alabama Republican Party's revocation of Bryan's
certificate of nomination as a candidate for judicial office.
Howard cross-appeals, arguing that the summary judgment is not
a final judgment.  We affirm in case no. 1071590 and dismiss
the cross-appeal in case no. 1071662. 
Facts and Procedural History
On April 4, 2008, Bryan, a licensed attorney in Alabama
residing in the Seventh Judicial Circuit, filed a candidate-
qualifying form with the Alabama Republican Party formally
declaring his intention to seek election to the office of
circuit judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, place 4.  The
Seventh Judicial Circuit comprises Calhoun and Cleburne
Counties.  James and Thompkins are registered voters who
reside in the Seventh Judicial Circuit.  Both James and
Thompkins voted for Bryan in the Republican Party primary
election.  Hubbard is the chairman of the Alabama Republican
Party executive committee.  Howard is a registered voter who
1071590, 1071662
3
resides in the Seventh Judicial Circuit and who voted for
Bryan's opponent and the incumbent judge, Mannon Bankson, Jr.,
in the Republican Party primary election.
Bryan and Bankson were certified to the secretary of
state's office as candidates for the office of circuit judge
of the Seventh Judicial Circuit by the Alabama Republican
Party for placement on the ballot for the primary election set
for June 3, 2008.  Both names appeared on the Republican Party
primary-election ballot.  No candidate qualified to run for
the judgeship in the Democratic Party primary election.
On May 29, 2008, five days before the primary election,
Bryan mailed to the secretary of state's office by certified
mail, return receipt requested, his pre-election report of
campaign contributions and expenditures required by the Fair
Campaign Practices Act, § 17-5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975
(hereinafter "the FCPA").  Bryan's report arrived at the
United States post office in Montgomery at 5:14 a.m. on
Monday, June 2, 2008.  June 2, 2008, was a state holiday, and
no one from the secretary of state's office retrieved the mail
from the post office that day.  Bryan's report was delivered
to the secretary of state's office at 7:42 a.m. on June 3,
1071590, 1071662
4
2008.  Bryan's report was posted on the secretary of state's
Web site later that same day.
On June 13, 2008, Hubbard, as chairman of the Alabama
Republican Party executive committee, certified the vote
totals from the June 3, 2008, Republican primary election:
Bryan received 3,051 votes and Bankson received 2,838 votes.
On that same day, Bankson wrote a letter to Hubbard, which
stated:
"Please accept this correspondence as a contest
of the June 3, 2008 Republican Primary Election held
in Calhoun and Cleburne Counties for the position of
Circuit Judge, Place 4.  I wish to contest the
election and the Republican nomination of candidate
Raymond C. Bryan, and his position on the ballot as
the candidate for November General Election.  I
contend and aver that due to Mr. Bryan's willful
failure to comply with the Fair Campaign Practices
Act 
in 
this 
election 
therefore 
renders 
him
ineligible to be a candidate for this position.
Furthermore, I contend that his failure to comply is
compounded by the fact that in Mr. Bryan's previous
election, he failed to also comply with the Fair
Campaign Practices Act."
Bryan received a telephone call from someone in Hubbard's
office, informing him of the receipt by the Alabama Republican
Party of Bankson's statement of election contest.  Bryan
responded to the telephone call by sending a letter to Hubbard
on June 16, 2008.  That letter stated:
1071590, 1071662
Section 17-5-8(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, requires a
1
candidate's campaign committee to file, between 10 and 5 days
before 
an 
election, 
a 
report 
of 
contributions 
and
expenditures.  The parties refer to this report as a "10/5 day
report" and a "10-5 day report."
5
"This letter is in response to the election
challenge filed by Mannon Bankson to my victory over
him in the June 3rd primary.  Mr. Bankson contends
the Party should not issue a certificate of election
to me due to my alleged '... willful failure to
comply with the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA)
in this election.'
"I strongly deny that I have willfully failed to
comply with any requirement of the FCPA and have
filed all reports required by the Act.  The
following is the time line of reports mailed to the
Secretary of State by certified mail/return receipt
requested 
with 
copies of supporting documents
attached:
"1). April 7, 2008 - Appointment Of Principal
Campaign Committee.
"2). April 19, 2008 -  45 day Candidate Pre-
Election Report.
"3). May 29, 2008 - 10/5 day Candidate Pre-
Election Report.[ ]  Attached are receipts showing
1
date/time stamp of this report being posted at the
Anniston Post Office on Thursday, May 29, 2008, at
02:07:40 PM.  When the report had not posted to the
Secretary of State's web site by Tuesday morning,
June 3rd, I contacted the Election's Division of the
Secretary of State.  I was informed they were not in
possession of this report. I then used the United
States Postal Service tracking service to trace the
report having arrived at the Montgomery Post Office
on Monday, June 2nd  at 05:14 AM (June 2nd was a
State holiday for Jefferson Davis' birthday.)  The
tracking service showed the report was delivered to
1071590, 1071662
6
the Secretary of State Tuesday, June 3rd at 07:42
AM.  After contacting the Secretary of State with
this information a search was conducted within the
Secretary of State's office and it was discovered
the report had been erroneously delivered to the
Corporation's division of that office.  I was
informed the report would be immediately scanned
into the system for posting to the web site.
"I learned at the time that I was trying to
trace the 10/5 day Report that the Secretary of
State had a deadline for certified mail of this
report to be May 27th.  I honestly did not know the
deadline for mailing this report was different than
the actual deadline when the report was due on May
29th. Had I known, I would most certainly have
mailed the report on the 27th or driven the report
to the Secretary of States' office that Thursday for
filing.  At the time I mailed the report I believed
mailing by certified mail was effective on the date
it was mailed just as it is done in the law by the
Rules of Civil Procedure and as is done when mailing
tax returns.  
"Mr. Bankson requests the Republican Party
disqualify me from being the Republican candidate
for election in the November General Election due to
the 10/5 day report having been tardy in mailing.
The Alabama Supreme Court has spoken to the issue of
a campaign report having been late in filing as
opposed to not having been filed at all pursuant to
the FCPA.  So long as the untimely report is filed
before the election to which it applies the law is
that an untimely filed FCPA-required report does not
impose the harsh penalty of disqualifying the
candidate pursuant to Ala. Code § 17-22A-21.
Instead, there may be criminal penalties for failing
to file the report timely pursuant to Ala. Code §
17-22A-22(b). See, Davis vs. Reynolds, 592 So. 2d
546 (Ala. 1991).
1071590, 1071662
7
"I contend that my election should stand as it
is undisputed that the 10/5 day 'Candidate Pre-
Election Report' was mailed by certified mail five
(5) days before the election and would have been
received by the Secretary of State no later than
Monday, June 2nd, had there not been a state holiday
for Jefferson Davis' birthday.  To deny the popular
vote of the people of Calhoun and Cleburne County of
my election over Mannon Bankson due to the state
having been on holiday would be a severe injustice
and unconstitutional.  I pray the leaders of our
Party will not grant Mr. Bankson what he could not
win by popular election and certify me as the
Republican party candidate for election in the
November general election for Circuit Judge in the
7th Circuit Place 4.
"Due to Mr. Bankson having raised a prior
election in which I was a candidate, although it
should have no bearing on the decision of the
Steering Committee in this matter, I feel I should
speak to the matter.  My opponent raises as
purported 
evidence 
of 
my 
willfulness 
in 
not
complying with the requirements of the FCPA in
missing the certified mail deadline that I did not
close out my campaign account in another election in
which I ran in 2006.  I lost that election and it
has no relation to the present election which I won
on June 3, 2008.  However, I would point out for my
opponent's sake that he also ran for election in
1998 and lost.  He also did not close out his
campaign account or file annual reports after the
1999 annual report reflecting a balance in his
campaign account of $1,720.25.  Having not filed an
annual report since January, 1999, on January 31,
2008, Mr. Bankson filed a waiver with the Secretary
of State that reflected a zero balance in the 1998
campaign account.  This was done without there being
any previous report having been filed explaining
what Mr. Bankson did with the campaign contributions
that had been present in his account in 1999 and
which no longer exist.  The disappearance of these
1071590, 1071662
8
campaign funds is a violation of the FCPA.  This
violation is compounded by the fact that all
receipts of funds to Mr. Bankson's campaign accounts
in the 1998 election were from contributors to his
campaign and there were no personal loans made by
Mr. Bankson to his campaign account.  Thank you for
considering my defense in this matter and [I] trust
the 
Republican 
Party 
will 
proudly 
uphold 
my
election."
On June 20, 2008, the steering/candidate committee of the
Alabama Republican Party met in Birmingham.  The minutes of
that meeting state, in pertinent part, as follows:
"The Chairman then 
called 
the 
Steering 
Committee
into session as the Candidate Committee of the
Alabama Republican Party.  The first discussion was
the matter of Mannon G. Bankson, Jr. and Raymond C.
Bryan.  Raymond C. Bryan won the primary election
for Circuit Judge, Place 4 in Cleburne and Calhoun
Counties.  Mr. Bankson contested the election
stating that Mr. Bryan failed to comply with the
Fair Campaign Practices Act, therefore making him
ineligible to be a candidate for the position.
Individuals [involved] in that dispute were asked to
leave the room until the Committee reviewed the
case.  After review of the documents provided by Mr.
Bankson and Mr. Bryan and reviewing the law
governing elections, Bettye Fine Collins made a
motion that the Committee directs the Chairman to
decertify the election of Raymond C. Bryan, but to
delay it until July [2], 2008.  After discussion and
a second, the motion carried.  Elbert Peters voted
no.  Del Marsh abstained."
On 
June 
27, 
2008, 
Bryan, 
James, 
and 
Thompkins
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the petitioners")
filed in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, where
1071590, 1071662
9
Hubbard's office is located, a petition for a writ of
prohibition, mandamus, certiorari, or other appropriate
extraordinary relief to preclude Hubbard, the probate judges
in Calhoun and Cleburne Counties, and the secretary of state
from preventing Bryan's name from appearing on the November 4,
2008, general-election ballot.  That same day, the petitioners
also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to
enjoin Hubbard from sending a letter to the secretary of state
stating that the Alabama Republican Party was revoking Bryan's
certificate of nomination.  On June 30, 3008, Howard filed a
motion to intervene in the action as a registered voter and a
resident of the Seventh Judicial District, which the trial
court granted.  Howard asserted that Bryan failed to comply
with the FCPA and that, therefore, the executive committee had
a duty to revoke Bryan's certificate of nomination.  He also
sought relief, in the alternative, from the secretary of state
and the respective probate judges in the form of not placing
Bryan's name on the November 4, 2008, general-election ballot.
On June 30, 2008, the trial court held a hearing on the
petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction.  At the
hearing, the parties stipulated to certain facts, including
1071590, 1071662
10
the fact that Hubbard did not conduct an election-contest
proceeding as requested by Bankson, even though § 17-13-70,
Ala. Code 1975, requires a hearing.  The parties also
stipulated that if Hubbard were to testify he would say that
the reason the Alabama Republican Party revoked Bryan's
certificate of nomination was that, based on the filings by
the parties, there was no dispute as to the facts, so there
was no need to conduct an election-contest proceeding.   At
the hearing, it was agreed that Hubbard would not send the
letter of revocation to the secretary of state's office until
July 7, 2008, in order to give the trial court time to review
the submissions and to prepare and enter an order.   
Also on June 30, 2008, Bankson filed additional materials
with the Alabama Republican Party, supplementing his original
letter of June 13, 2008, contesting the election, with an
affidavit attesting to the truth of the facts set out in his
original letter and offering to supply security for costs.
When the hearing concluded on June 30, 2008, Hubbard filed a
motion with the trial court, stating:
"Mike 
Hubbard, 
chairman 
of 
the 
Alabama
Republican Party Executive Committee, hereby gives
notice of the filing of an election contest by
Mannon G. Bankson, Jr. on June 13, 2008.  The
1071590, 1071662
11
statement challenges the nomination of Raymond C.
Bryan to the position of Circuit Judge, Place 4, by
the election results of the June 3, 2008 Republican
primary election.  A hearing on written materials
submitted by both Mannon G. Bankson and Raymond C.
Bryan was conducted on June 20.
"The matter is set for further hearing on July
2, 2008 and at such additional times as may be
needed for a proper resolution of the matter.  A
copy of the Bankson filing is attached. ..."
On July 1, 2008, Bryan filed an objection with the
Alabama Republican Party contesting the steering/candidate
committee's jurisdiction to hold a hearing on Bankson's
election contest because, he argued, under § 17-13-85, Ala.
Code 1975, an election contest must be heard not less than 5
nor more than 10 days after the filing of the statement of
election contest;  therefore, he stated, the hearing had to
have been held by June 23, 2008.  That same day, the
petitioners also filed a motion with the trial court, giving
the 
court 
notice 
of 
Bryan's 
filings 
contesting 
the
steering/candidate committee's election-contest hearing set
for July 2, 2008.        
On July 2, 2008, the steering/candidate committee of the
Alabama Republican Party met again.  The minutes from the
meeting provide, in pertinent part, as follows:
1071590, 1071662
12
"The duly called Candidate Committee meeting of
the Alabama Republican Party was convened by
Chairman Mike Hubbard at the headquarters of the
Party in Birmingham, Alabama on July 2, 2008 at 3:08
PM.  The roll was called by Secretary Sallie Bryant.
In attendance were Ed Allen, Bill Armistead (by
phone), Martha Stokes (proxy for Pierce Boyd),
Sallie Bryant, Bettye Fine Collins, Susan Filippeli
(by phone), Mike Fricker, Mike Hubbard (by phone),
Homer Jackson, Jerry Lathan (by phone), Bobbi Lou
Leigh (by phone), Del Marsh, Elbert Peters (by
phone), Greg Reed, Paul Reynolds (by phone), Harold
Sachs, Kevin Speed, George Williams (by phone), and
Bill Wood (by phone).
  
"The Chairman stated the purpose of the meeting
was to hear the facts on the matter of Mannon G.
Bankson, Jr. and Raymond C. Bryan. He turned control
of the meeting over to Senior Vice Chairman Greg
Reed.  Mr. Reed stated parties in the matter had
agreed Al Agricola would recite the stipulation of
facts. After his presentation of the stipulation of
facts, Mr. Agricola spoke on behalf of Raymond C.
Bryan, then Burt Jordan spoke on behalf of Mannon G.
Bankson, Jr. 
 
"After receipt of the documents related to the
case, statements from both attorneys and oral
statements from both candidates, Mr. Reed called the
Candidate Committee into closed session. Control was
returned to Chairman Hubbard.  After discussion,
Elbert Peters made a motion that the Candidate
Committee finds that Mr. Bryan filed his 10-5 day
report late.  The motion failed due to the lack of
a second.  After further discussion, Jerry Lathan
made a motion that the Committee affirms its
decision made on June 20, 2008 disqualifying Mr.
Bryan based on the facts of the case.  After a
second and discussion, the motion passed by a vote
of 12 to 5.  Those voting Aye were Bryant,
Filippeli, Fricker, Hubbard, Jackson, Lathan, Leigh,
Reed, Reynolds, Speed, Williams, and Wood.  Those
1071590, 1071662
13
voting No were Armistead, Stokes, Collins, Peters
and Sachs. Mr. Marsh abstained.
"During discussion of the above motions, the
supplemental Bankson filings were received over the
objection of Mr. Bryan; and the Bryan objections to
the Bankson contest and the Committee's jurisdiction
were overruled because the committee has not made it
a practice to require security for costs, also
because the original Bankson contest letter was
factually true and was undisputed by the Bryan
response and was substantiated by the Secretary of
State's website, and because Mr. Bankson had
qualified as a candidate and therefore was known to
be a qualified elector who participated in the
primary.  Susan Filippeli moved that we further
state that we believe the law requires that we
revoke Mr. Bryan's certification. After a second,
the motion passed.  Mr. Allen was instructed by the
Chairman to tell the candidates and the meeting was
adjourned at 5:55 PM."
On July 3, 2008, Hubbard filed the minutes of the July 2,
2008, hearing with the trial court.  
On July 3, 2008, the petitioners amended their petition,
arguing that Bankson could not amend his statement of election
contest to include an affidavit and offer to pay security for
costs 
after 
the 
expiration 
of 
the 
24-hour 
statutory
limitations period for filing an election contest in a
primary-election matter under §  17-13-70.  They also argued
that the Alabama Republican Party executive committee lost
jurisdiction over the election-contest proceedings because,
1071590, 1071662
14
they argued, the last day within which to timely hold the
election-contest hearing under § 17-13-85 was on or before
June 23, 2008, and the hearing was held on July 2, 2008.
On July 7, 2008, the trial court entered an order denying
the petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction because
the matter would be heard expeditiously and the petitioners
would suffer no harm by the denial of the motion for a
preliminary injunction.  In that same order, the trial court
dismissed without prejudice the probate judges of Calhoun and
Cleburne Counties, and the secretary of state, with the
understanding that those parties would carry out the trial
court's orders if necessary.  On July 11, 2008, the remaining
parties agreed to submit the case for a decision on the merits
on motions for a summary judgment. 
On July 21, 2008, the parties submitted their motions for
a summary judgment and on July 28, 2008, each side responded
to the other side's motion.  On August 18, 2008, the trial
court granted Hubbard and Howard's motion for a summary
judgment and declared all other pending motions moot.  The
petitioners appeal;  Howard cross-appeals.
Standard of Review
1071590, 1071662
15
"'"[B]ecause the underlying facts are not
disputed and this appeal focuses on the application
of the law to those facts, there can be no
presumption of correctness accorded to the trial
court's ruling." Beavers v. County of Walker, 645
So. 2d 1365, 1373 (Ala. 1994) (citing First Nat'l
Bank of Mobile v. Duckworth, 502 So. 2d 709 (Ala.
1987)).  Appellate review of a ruling on a question
of law is de novo. See Rogers Found. Repair, Inc. v.
Powell, 748 So. 2d 869 (Ala. 1999); Ex parte Graham,
702 So. 2d 1215 (Ala. 1997).'"
Woods v. Booth, [Ms. 1060953, Feb. 22, 2008]     So. 2d    ,
   (Ala. 2008)(quoting Ex parte Forrester, 914 So. 2d 855, 858
(Ala. 2005)). 
Discussion
Case no. 1071590
The petitioners argue that Hubbard, in his official
capacity as chairman of the executive committee of the Alabama
Republican Party, lacked the authority to hear Bankson's
election contest challenging Bryan's compliance with the FCPA
because Bankson failed to file his contest within 24 hours as
provided in § 17-13-70, failed to timely file an affidavit
averring that the statements in his letter were true as
provided in § 17-13-78(b), Ala. Code 1975, failed to timely
post security for costs as provided in § 17-13-78(b), and
failed to aver that he was a qualified elector who
1071590, 1071662
16
participated in the primary election as required by § 17-13-
78(a)(1). Hubbard argues that it was not necessary for Bankson
to have filed an election contest challenging Bryan's
candidacy under the unambiguous provisions of the FCPA and
that this Court should overrule recent caselaw holding that an
election contest is necessary to challenge a violation of the
FCPA and enforcement of the disqualification sanction set out
in § 17-5-18, Ala. Code 1975.
Section 17-5-18 provides:
"A certificate of election or nomination shall
not be issued to any person elected or nominated to
state or local office who shall fail to file any
statement or report required by this chapter.  A
certificate of election or nomination already issued
to any person elected or nominated to state or local
office who fails to file any statement or report
required by this chapter shall be revoked."
The legislature's primary purpose in enacting the FCPA
was to require candidates for public office in Alabama to
disclose campaign contributions and expenditures before an
election.   In accordance with this purpose, the legislature
provided for the harshest penalty of all in § 17-5-18 -- a
candidate who fails to file the reports required by the FCPA
before an election shall forfeit the election.
1071590, 1071662
17
In the present case, Bryan mailed his campaign-finance
report, by certified mail, on May 29, 2008.  The last day for
Bryan to have timely mailed the required campaign-finance
report and have it "deemed to be filed in a timely fashion"
pursuant to 17-5-10(b), Ala. Code 1975, was May 27, 2008,
because the report had to be postmarked two days before the
required filing date.  Although the report arrived at the post
office in Montgomery on June 2, 2008, that date was a state
holiday, and the secretary of state was under no duty to pick
up the report from the post office.  Bryan's report was
received at the secretary of state's office on June 3, 2008,
the day of the primary election.  This Court held in the
plurality opinion of Ex parte Krages, 689 So. 2d 799 (Ala.
1997), that a filing of a report required by the FCPA on the
day of the election is the equivalent of not filing the report
at all.  As noted above, the purpose of the FCPA campaign-
finance report is to allow the electorate to view a
candidate's list of contributors and expenditures.   Bryan's
filing on the day of the primary election was the equivalent
of not filing a report at all because information contained in
1071590, 1071662
18
the campaign-finance report was not available to the
electorate  before the time for voting.
The question we must answer is whether an election
contest was necessary to challenge a violation of the FCPA in
light of the action taken by the Alabama Republican Party.  If
an election contest was necessary, then we must also decide
whether Hubbard, in his official capacity as chairman of the
Alabama Republican Party executive committee, was without
authority to hear Bankson's election contest because he failed
to comply with the statutes governing an election contest.
This Court has recently addressed the need for filing an
election contest when a candidate's compliance with the FCPA
has been questioned.  See Roper v. Rhodes, [Ms. 1060331,
January 11, 2008]     So. 2d     (Ala. 2008).  William Roper
was a candidate in the Democratic Party primary election to
select the Party's nominee for a seat on the county board of
education.  Following the primary election, Roper and  Ronald
Rhodes participated in a runoff election for that office; the
runoff election resulted in a tie vote.  Roper lost to Rhodes
in a "domino draw" conducted by the county Democratic Party,
and Rhodes was certified as the nominee.  Roper sued the
1071590, 1071662
19
probate judge and the secretary of state, seeking to revoke
the certificate of nomination issued to Rhodes and to remove
Rhodes's name from the general-election ballot.  Also, Roper
alleged that Rhodes had violated the FCPA before the primary
and runoff elections.  Specifically, Roper claimed that Rhodes
had violated § 17-22A-8 (now § 17-5-8) of the FCPA, and he
asserted that the circuit court had jurisdiction to enforce §
17-22A-21 (now § 17-5-18) of the FCPA, which requires, under
certain circumstances, the revocation of the certificate of
election or nomination issued to a candidate who has not
complied with the FCPA.  
The Roper Court held that the circuit court did not have
jurisdiction to hear Roper's claims because the alleged
violations of the FCPA occurred before the primary and runoff
elections; it further noted that Roper was claiming that
Rhodes was ineligible to participate in those elections, and,
therefore, that Roper was attempting to contest those
elections.  This Court held that, because Roper had not
pursued an election contest of the primary election or the
runoff election as then provided for in § 17-16-70 to -89 (now
§§ 17-13-70 to -89), Ala. Code 1975, the circuit court did not
1071590, 1071662
20
have jurisdiction to hear any claims regarding an alleged
violation of the FCPA before the general election.
In Wood v. Booth, supra, a voter filed an action against
the county probate judge and the secretary of state seeking
declaratory, injunctive, and other relief and seeking a
revocation of certificates of nomination issued to certain
candidates for the state senate, as well as the removal of the
candidates' names from the general-election ballot.  The voter
alleged that the candidates had not filed pre-primary-election
campaign-finance reports as required under the FCPA.  Certain
others intervened.  This Court noted that although it was
unclear whether the voter could have filed a pre-primary-
election contest because the senate candidates at issue were
unopposed, the voter was required to file an election contest
following the general election, which he failed to do.    
Both Roper and Wood cite Harvey v. City of Oneonta, 715
So. 2d 779 (Ala. 1998), in which a candidate for city council
sought a judgment declaring that her opponent had not complied
with the FCPA and an injunction against certifying her
opponent as the winner of the election.  This Court held that
the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear the
1071590, 1071662
21
action, and it dismissed the candidate's appeal.  We held
that, instead of seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in
the courts, the candidate should have filed a contest to the
municipal election under § 11-46-69, Ala. Code 1975, which
sets out the grounds for filing a contest to a municipal
election and the period for filing such a contest.  On the
authority of Davis v. Reynolds, 592 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1991),
the Harvey Court stated that "a candidate who does not file a
statement or report required by the FCPA before the election
in question is ineligible to be elected to the office at that
election."  715 So. 2d at 780.  The candidate in Harvey should
have filed an election contest, and, because she failed to do
so, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the
action for declaratory and injunctive relief. 
 In Roper, Wood, and Harvey, the party was seeking to
disqualify a candidate who allegedly had not complied with the
FCPA, and, after the respective election was held, the party
did not file an election contest.  In each case, the party
sought relief in the courts to enforce the mandates of the
FCPA.   Roper, Wood, and Harvey held that the circuit courts
did not have jurisdiction to compel compliance with the
1071590, 1071662
22
mandates of the FCPA and, in particular, the disqualification
sanction, where the political parties or other officials
charged with the issuance of certificates of nomination or
election have not already acted.  This Court did not in Roper,
Wood, or Harvey address the issue whether a political party
lacked authority to implement the disqualification sanction
set out in § 17-5-18 (or its predecessor § 17-22A-21), Ala.
Code 1975, in the absence of an election contest.  That issue
was simply not before the Court in any of those cases. 
Although Roper, Wood, and Harvey recognize the existence
of an orderly mechanism for judicial enforcement of the
disqualification sanction in § 17-5-18 by way of  statutorily
created election contests, those cases cannot be cited as
authority for limiting the power of a political party to act
extrajudicially when there is no statutory basis for such a
limitation because that issue was not before the Court in
those cases.  We would thus limit Roper, Wood, and Harvey to
proceedings seeking judicial enforcement of § 17-5-18 by
persons who, unlike a political party, lack the authority on
their own to accomplish the revocation called for by § 17-5-18
without resort to an election contest.
1071590, 1071662
23
Applying Roper to limit the authority of a political
party to revoke a certificate of nomination it has previously
issued, which, as stated above, is an issue not presented in
Roper, without any indication of legislative intent to so
limit a political party's power, would unduly narrow the
protection conferred by the legislature on the public from a
candidate's failure to file a necessary financial report.
Section 17-5-18 states that "[a] certificate of election or
nomination .... shall be revoked"; it is silent as to whether
the political party has the power to effectuate the revocation
on its own initiative.
It should be noted that the Alabama Democratic and
Republican Parties, having received more than 20 percent of
the entire vote cast in that last general election, have the
right to hold a primary election if they so choose.  See § 17-
13-40 and § 17-13-42, Ala. Code 1975.  Here, the Alabama
Republican Party by resolution chose to have a primary
election for state-wide and county-wide offices.  After the
primary election, it was the duty of the Party to certify its
nominees for the respective offices based on the results of
the primary election.  However, the disqualification sanction
1071590, 1071662
24
of the FCPA set out in § 17-5-18 contains a penalty for
failure to comply with financial-reporting requirements that
overlap into the eligibility to be a nominee for the office in
question.  Political parties are not bound by the holdings in
Roper, Wood, and Harvey, because a political party, which is
clearly not a court, is not bound by § 17-16-44, Ala. Code
1975 (the jurisdiction-stripping statute).  
Whether the Alabama Republican Party learned of Bryan's
failure to file his campaign-finance report by Bankson's
letter 
or 
otherwise, 
it 
had 
the 
right, 
duty, 
and
responsibility to determine, under its rules and regulations,
whether Bryan failed to file a report required by the FCPA and
was thus ineligible to be issued a certificate of nomination,
and it did so on June 20, 2008, and again on July 2, 2008.  A
political party has the right to determine eligibility of its
nominees and to refuse to issue a certificate of nomination or
to revoke a certificate of nomination if one has been entered.
On 
June 
13, 
2008, 
Bankson's 
letter 
notified 
the
Republican Party that an issue existed as to whether Bryan had
complied 
with 
the 
requirements 
of 
the 
FCPA. 
 
The
steering/candidate committee gave notice, held a hearing based
1071590, 1071662
25
on stipulated facts, and determined that Bryan was not
qualified to be a candidate.  The committee's right, as an arm
of the political party, to do so was outside the grounds for
contesting an election or hearing a contest of an election.
As stated above, the parties stipulated that if Hubbard were
called to testify he would say that the reason the Alabama
Republican Party revoked Bryan's certificate of nomination was
that, based on the filings before the steering/candidate
committee, there was no dispute as to the facts, so there was
no need to conduct an election-contest proceeding; Hubbard
later filed a motion with the trial court stating that the
hearing held by the steering/candidate committee was "on
written materials submitted by both Mannon G. Bankson and
Raymond C. Bryan"; and finally, the minutes of the subsequent
hearing on July 2, 2008, state, in part, that "the Chairman
stated the purpose of the meeting was to hear the facts on the
matter" and that, after further discussion, "a motion [was
made] that the Committee affirms its decision made on June 20,
2008 disqualifying Mr. Bryan based on the facts of the case,"
and "Susan Filippeli moved that we further state that we
believe the law requires that we revoke Mr. Bryan's
1071590, 1071662
26
certification." (Emphasis added.)   Both of these motions were
seconded, discussed, and passed.  Therefore, it is apparent
that both hearings conducted by the Republican Party were
concerned with matters embraced in the attempted contest, but
the action of the Party was taken outside the contest.  Once
Bryan's certificate was revoked, a vacancy was created, and,
by virtue of § 17-13-23, Ala. Code 1975, the Republican Party
had the authority to certify another person as its nominee. 
Even if Bankson had complied with all the requirements of
§§ 17-13-70 through -89, Ala. Code 1975, in filing his
"election contest," the Alabama Republican Party could have
decided independently whether its nominees were qualified.
The Party, based on the undisputed facts before it -- that
Bryan mailed his report on May 29, 2008, and that the report
was received by the secretary of state on June 3, 2008 -- had
the duty to revoke the certificate of nomination under § 17-5-
18 of the candidate, Bryan, who failed to file a report
required by the FCPA.   The reason the parties in Roper, Wood,
and Harvey had to file an election contest is because, unlike
a political party, an individual with standing who wants to
challenge an election must file a timely and proper contest.
1071590, 1071662
27
An individual has the right to assert a candidate's
eligibility as a ground for contest and thereby bring the
issue before the political party involved, but separate and
apart from the individual's right to proceed, the political
party still has the duty, obligation, and responsibility,
consistent with its rules and bylaws and in accordance with
legislative enactments, to determine whether its nominees are
entitled to a certificate of nomination.
As we noted earlier, political parties are not bound by
the holdings in Roper, Wood, and Harvey, because a political
party, which is not a court, is not bound by § 17-16-44 (the
jurisdiction-stripping statute).  However, there remains a
question as to whether § 17-16-44 barred the trial court from
acting in the present case.    
Section 17-16-44 provides:
"No jurisdiction exists in or shall be exercised
by any judge or court to entertain any proceeding
for ascertaining the legality, conduct, or results
of any election, except so far as authority to do so
shall be specially and specifically enumerated and
set down by statute; and any injunction, process, or
order from any judge or court, whereby the results
of any election are sought to be inquired into,
questioned, or affected, or whereby any certificate
of election is sought to be inquired into or
questioned, 
save 
as 
may 
be 
specially 
and
specifically enumerated and set down by statute,
1071590, 1071662
28
shall be null and void and shall not be enforced by
any officer or obeyed by any person. If any judge or
other officer hereafter undertakes to fine or in any
wise deal with any person for disobeying any such
prohibited injunction, process, or order, such
attempt shall be null and void, and an appeal shall
lie forthwith therefrom to the Supreme Court then
sitting, or next to sit, without bond, and such
proceedings shall be suspended by force of such
appeal; and the notice to be given of such appeal
shall be 14 days."
Clearly, 
in 
enacting 
§ 
17-16-44 
the 
legislature
restricted the jurisdiction of the circuit courts in regard to
elections.  "Election challenges are strictly statutory, and
this Court has consistently recognized the Legislature's
intent in empowering the political parties to settle primary
election disputes."  McAdory v. Alabama Democratic Party, 729
So. 2d 310, 311 (Ala.  1999).  "The only caveat to a state
executive committee's otherwise plenary power to make such a
determination is that, in doing so, the committee cannot 'run
afoul of some statutory or constitutional provision.'" Alabama
Republican Party v. McGinley, 893 So. 2d 337, 346 (Ala.
2004)(quoting Ray v. Garner, 257 Ala. 1168, 171, 57 So. 2d
824, 826 (1952)).
In the present case, the petitioners filed a petition for
a writ of prohibition, mandamus, certiorari, or other
1071590, 1071662
29
appropriate extraordinary relief pursuant to § 6-6-640, Ala.
Code 1975, to prevent Hubbard, in his official capacity as
chairman of the Alabama Republican Party executive committee,
from revoking Bryan's certificate of nomination because, they
alleged, Bankson's election contest "was defective and failed
to quicken the jurisdiction of the committee for the reason
that it failed to provide security, it was not certified by
the affidavit of Mannon G. Bankson, Jr., and it did not
contain any averment that the said Mannon G. Bankson, Jr., was
a qualified elector when the primary was held and that he
participated in it as required by § 17-13-78."  The
petitioners also sought to prohibit Hubbard, the probate
judges, and the secretary of state from taking any action that
would prevent Bryan's name from appearing on the November 4,
2008, general-election ballot.  
The petitioners' challenge is in essence a challenge to
the Alabama Republican Party's actions in revoking Bryan's
certificate of nomination.  Hubbard specifically argues, and
we agree, that the Alabama Republican Party was not
determining an election contest but was acting to comply with
§ 17-5-18 to revoke a certificate of nomination of a candidate
1071590, 1071662
30
who had failed to comply with the reporting requirements of
the FCPA.  The petitioners sought relief in the trial court to
ascertain the validity of the actions taken by the Alabama
Republican Party, and the trial court had jurisdiction to
determine whether the Alabama Republican Party had "'run afoul
of some statutory or constitutional provision'" in revoking
the certificate of nomination of the candidate with the most
electoral votes in the June 3, 2008, primary.  Therefore, the
jurisdictional limits of § 17-16-44 are not applicable here.
The judgment of the trial court in case no. 1071590 is
affirmed.
Case no. 1071662
Howard 
intervened 
in 
the 
underlying 
action 
and
subsequently filed a cross-appeal from the trial court's
summary judgment, arguing that the summary judgment was not a
final judgment.  Howard intervened in the petitioners' action,
asserting that Bryan had not complied with the FCPA and that,
as a voter, Howard did not have the benefit of the financial
information regarding Bryan's campaign prior to the election
that he needed to make an informed decision.  However, unlike
a political party, Howard's only remedy was judicial in nature
1071590, 1071662
31
--  to file an election contest as discussed in Roper.  Howard
did not have standing to intervene in the actions taken by the
Alabama Republican Party to enforce the FCPA with regard to
the certification of its nominees.  "'"Standing represents a
jurisdictional requirement which remains open to review at all
stages of the litigation."'" Dunning v. New England Life Ins.
Co., 890 So. 2d 92, 97 (Ala. 2003)(quoting Ex parte Fort James
Operating Co., 871 So. 2d 51, 54 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn
National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255
(1994)).  Howard did not have standing to intervene in the
underlying action; therefore, we dismiss Howard's cross-
appeal.    
1071590 -- AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, and Parker, JJ.,
concur.
See, Smith, and Murdock, JJ., concur in the result.
1071662 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, and Parker, JJ.,
concur.
See and Smith, JJ., concur in the result.
Murdock, J., dissents.
1071590, 1071662
32
SMITH, Justice (concurring in the result).
I concur in the result in both cases.
In essence, the action filed by Raymond C. Bryan, Rodney
James, and Jonathan Thompkins (hereinafter "the petitioners")
is a collateral attack on the election-contest proceedings
conducted by the Republican Party in regard to the primary
election for the circuit judgeship for the Seventh Judicial
Circuit.  To the extent Bryan sought a judgment declaring
those election-contest proceedings invalid, the trial court
had jurisdiction to proceed.  Bryan's status as the contestee
adversely affected by the election-contest proceedings is
analogous to that of the appellant in Boyd v. Garrison, 246
Ala. 122, 125, 19 So. 2d 385, 387 (1944), in which this Court
stated:
"[I]nsofar 
as 
the 
petition 
seeks 
to 
have 
a
declaration as to the validity and legal effect of
the 
contest 
proceedings, 
thereby 
seeking 
no
restraining order or prohibition, we see no reason
why the Declaratory Judgment Act, section 156 et
seq., Title 7, Code of 1940, is not available.  See
Avery Freight Lines v. White, 245 Ala. 618, 18 So.
2d 394(8), 400 [(1944)].
"We there held that such proceeding was usable
to construe the judgment of a court as it affects
the rights of parties after that court had lost all
control over it and there was an actual controversy
as to its meaning or effect as it appears on record;
1071590, 1071662
33
that is 'whether it is void in toto or in part;
whether errors in that decree, if any, were errors
reviewable only on appeal, or were jurisdictional;
to what extent, if any, (the decree) was without
jurisdiction of the court and void.'"
As to the claims in Gene Howard's cross-appeal, I agree
that they should be dismissed.  Howard did not file an
election contest after the primary election; therefore, he was
precluded from seeking judicial enforcement of a provision of
the Fair Campaign Practices Act ("the FCPA") based on an
alleged violation of the FCPA.  See Roper v. Rhodes, 948 So.
2d 471 (Ala. 2008); Harvey v. City of Oneonta, 715 So. 2d 779
(Ala. 1998); and Davis v. Reynolds, 592 So. 2d 546 (Ala.
1991).  However, Howard's claims in intervention in the
underlying action seek judicial enforcement of the FCPA.
Consequently, the jurisdiction-stripping statute, § 17-16-44,
Ala. Code 1975, as construed in Davis, supra, and subsequent
cases, prevented the trial court from asserting jurisdiction
over Howard's claims.
Finally, the main opinion asserts that "[p]olitical
parties are not bound by the holdings in Roper, Wood, and
Harvey, because a political party, which is clearly not a
court, is not bound by § 17-16-44, Ala. Code 1975 (the
1071590, 1071662
34
jurisdiction-stripping statute)." ___ So. 2d at ___.  I agree
with both conclusions: (1) that Roper, Wood, and Harvey do not
speak to the issue of a political party's power to
independently enforce the FCPA, and (2) that a political party
is not a "court" as that term is used in § 17-16-44.  The
reason for the first conclusion is evident.  However, based on
language in Boyd, in which this Court suggested that the
legislature gave a limited judicial power to political parties
to hear election contests, see Boyd, 246 Ala. at 126, 19 So.
2d at 387-88, the petitioners challenge the second conclusion.
In suggesting that the legislature invested political
parties with limited judicial powers, the Boyd Court relied on
§ 139 of the then existing judicial article of the Alabama
Constitution of 1901.  When Boyd was decided, § 139 allowed
the legislature to give "powers of a judicial nature" to
persons through legislation.  See Boyd, 246 Ala. at 126, 19
So. 2d at 388.   However, the judicial article was amended in
1973 to create a unified judiciary.  Section 139, as amended,
now provides:  
"(a) Except as otherwise provided by this
Constitution, the judicial power of the state shall
be vested exclusively in a unified judicial system
which shall consist of a supreme court, a court of
1071590, 1071662
35
criminal appeals, a court of civil appeals, a trial
court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit
court, a trial court of limited jurisdiction known
as the district court, a probate court and such
municipal courts as may be provided by law.
"(b) 
The 
legislature 
may 
create 
judicial
officers with authority to issue warrants and may
vest in administrative agencies established by law
such judicial powers as may be reasonably necessary
as an incident to the accomplishment of the purposes
for which the agencies are created."
(Emphasis added.)  Because of the change in the Alabama
Constitution of 1901, political parties may not exercise
"judicial power."  Consequently, § 17-16-44, which by its
terms applies only to "any judge or court," does not apply to
political parties.
See, J., concurs.
1071590, 1071662
36
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result in case no. 1071590
and dissenting in case no. 1071662).
I concur in the result as to case no. 1071590; I
respectfully dissent from the dismissal, on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction, of the appeal in case no. 1071662.  See my
dissent in Roper v. Rhodes, [Ms. 1060331, January 11, 2008]
___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2008) (Murdock, J., dissenting).