Title: State v. Wills
Citation: 244 Kan. 62, 765 P.2d 1114
Docket Number: 61,335, 61,336, 61,337
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: December 9, 1988

244 Kan. 62 (1988)
765 P.2d 1114
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
JIMMY D. WILLS, Appellant.
Nos. 61,335, 61,336, 61,337

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 9, 1988.
Lucille Marino, assistant appellate defender, argued the cause, and Benjamin C. Wood, chief appellate defender, was with her on the brief for appellant.
Mona Furst, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Clark V. Owens, district attorney, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, was with her on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ALLEGRUCCI, J.:
The defendant, Jimmy D. Wills, appeals from a judgment denying his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to three counts of theft and two counts of burglary. The plea was entered pursuant to a plea bargain agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court in an unpublished opinion dated May 27, 1988. On July 8, 1988, we granted the defendant's petition for review.
The defendant was charged in Sedgwick County District Court with two counts of burglary and three counts of theft. The five counts arose from three separate complaints: 86-CR-1743 (charging one count of theft and one count of burglary); 86-CR-1763 (charging theft); and 86-CR-1814 (charging burglary and *63 theft). Under a plea agreement with the State, the defendant agreed to plead guilty to each count in exchange for the State's promise not to invoke the provisions of the Habitual Criminal Act, and to recommend that the sentences upon each count run concurrently, yielding a three- to ten-year controlling sentence on all counts.
The district court accepted the defendant's guilty plea on February 9, 1987, and on March 6, 1987, imposed a sentence of one to five years' imprisonment on each theft count, and three to ten years on each burglary count. The district court, however, chose not to follow the State's recommendation, and the sentences imposed in Case No. 86-CR-1814 were designated to run consecutively with the sentences imposed in the other three counts. The defendant thus received a controlling term of imprisonment of six to twenty years.
On March 9, 1987, the defendant filed a motion to modify the sentence imposed. At a hearing on the defendant's motion, counsel for the defendant requested that the court grant probation or reduce the controlling term of imprisonment to three to ten years. When the court asked the State for its views on the defendant's motion, the State's attorney referred to a State Reception and Diagnostic Center report, which it characterized as "not what you would call a good report." The State then concluded: "It does not appear that a modification is in order." The defendant's motion to modify the sentence was denied.
The defendant then moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that the State had violated his due process rights by failing to comply with the terms of the plea arrangement. The defendant's motion was overruled on June 18, 1987. The defendant then appealed the denial of his motion to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the district court.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea after the State failed to support the previously recommended sentence during a post-sentence hearing. More specifically, is the State bound by the plea agreement at the hearing on defendant's motion to modify the sentence?
While the opinion of the Court of Appeals cites to several Kansas cases applying general rules of law regarding plea bargains, none of the cited cases deals with the obligation of the *64 State to comply with the terms of the plea arrangement in post-sentence proceedings. Nor does the Court of Appeals opinion cite any persuasive authority for its conclusion that the State is absolved from any further obligations under the plea arrangement once it makes its initial recommendations at the original sentencing hearing.
The Court of Appeals, in finding that the district court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, stated:
While the Court of Appeals correctly noted that, in State v. Jennings, 240 Kan. 377, 729 P.2d 454 (1986), we held that a motion for modification is not part of the "imposition of sentence," the issue, however, was the right of the defendant to appear in person. We said:
The obligation of the State pursuant to a plea agreement was not at issue in Jennings. Nor did the State in the present case limit its promise to the "imposition of sentence."
In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 92 S. Ct. 495 (1971), the United States Supreme Court stated:
The basis for the Court's decision is somewhat unclear because the Court did not specifically cite a constitutional provision as the basis for its decision. However, one obviously existed in order for the Court to reverse the decision of the New York State court. The Court seems to apply a combination of contract and constitutional law in arriving at its decision. However, in Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437, 104 S. Ct. 2543 (1984), the Court made it clear that the decision in Santobello was based upon constitutional due process considerations. In Mabry, the Court said:
....
Neither Santobello nor Mabry speaks to whether the State is bound by its promise in post-sentence modification hearings. We did note the Santobello decision in Burden v. State, 225 Kan. 549, 553, 592 P.2d 451 (1979), stating, "[A]s a matter of constitutional law if the prosecution agrees to make concessions in exchange for a guilty plea, then it must carry out those concessions or the plea will be invalid." The issue of whether the prosecution may deviate from the terms of the plea agreement during post-sentence proceedings was not before this court in Burden, nor has it been considered by this court.
This issue was addressed in United States v. Ewing, 480 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir.1973), where the defendant agreed to plead guilty under a plea bargain in which the prosecution agreed not to oppose a sentence of probation. The trial court, however, denied the defendant's request for probation, and imposed a sentence of seven years' imprisonment. The defendant subsequently filed a motion for a reduction of sentence, pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. At a hearing on this motion, the prosecution "argued strongly in opposition" to the defendant's request for probation. 480 F.2d  at 1142. The defendant's motion for a reduction of sentence was denied, and he appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The circuit court concluded that the prosecution had violated the terms of the plea arrangement by opposing the defendant's request for probation in the hearing on his motion for a reduction of sentence:
In 1978, the Fifth Circuit held that the prosecution could *67 respond to false statements in a defendant's motion to modify a sentence without violating its obligations under the original plea agreement. In United States v. Johnson, 582 F.2d 335 (5th Cir.1978), the defendant's motion for modification incorrectly stated that the prison to which he had been assigned did not contain psychiatric facilities. In responding to the motion for modification, the Government noted simply that the institution did possess facilities for the treatment of psychiatric problems. The court held that, in sentence modification proceedings, the Government could counter misinformation by the defendant in his motion, but may not violate "the essence of the plea bargain." 582 F.2d  at 337.
Whether a "no recommendation" agreement, in which the prosecution agrees to make no recommendation at the original sentencing hearing, bars the prosecution from opposing a subsequent sentence modification motion is a disputed issue among the federal circuits. Several circuits have held that a "no recommendation" agreement does not bar the Government from opposing a motion for modification of sentence. See United States v. White, 724 F.2d 714 (8th Cir.1984); Brooks v. United States, 708 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir.1983); United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir.1979). The Eleventh Circuit, however, has indicated that such an agreement does prevent the Government from opposing a motion by the defendant to modify his sentence. See United States v. Campbell, 711 F.2d 159 (11th Cir.1983).
All of the above cases, with the exception of Brooks, distinguish rather than reject Ewing. Brooks unequivocally rejects Ewing, stating: "A plea bargain is, in law, just another contract." 708 F.2d  at 1281. The court went on to find that all the Government promised was not to make a sentence recommendation. It did not make a further promise to stand mute at the post-sentence hearing. The court concluded that the plea bargain agreement was silent on whether the Government was bound in a post-sentence hearing. Therefore, unless the agreement specifically states otherwise, the promise of the Government is not binding after the original sentencing. The court in Brooks found that, since the agreement was silent as to post-sentence hearings, the defendant bore the loss. In other words, the plea agreement is construed in favor of the Government and against the accused. The problem with such an approach is twofold. First, the defendant's *68 due process rights recognized by the decisions in Santobello and Mabry are ignored. We recognize that, before a plea of guilty is entered, the parties are free to contract subject to basically the same legal principles as apply in a commercial contract setting. Once the defendant enters a plea of guilty, due process mandates the State perform as it promised. As pointed out by Daniel Frome Kaplan in his comment on the subject:
....
Second, a plea agreement which is silent as to post-sentence hearings is ambiguous. The ambiguity of such a plea agreement is also discussed by Kaplan:
....
In the present case, the State's agreement to recommend a controlling term of imprisonment of three to ten years is silent as to the State's obligations under the arrangement during post-sentence proceedings. The agreement contains neither an express provision that the State's obligations to make such recommendations includes post-sentence proceedings nor an express provision that the State's obligations are limited solely to the original sentencing hearing. The State obviously controls the promise it makes to the defendant. The State for all practical purposes controls the plea agreement process from negotiations to drafting the final agreement that is signed by the defendant. If the State wants to limit its promises, it can do so by clearly setting out these limitations in the plea agreement. There can then be no question as to what the parties agree to and that the defendant's waiver of his constitutional right to jury trial is voluntary and knowing. Absent such a limitation, the defendant would reasonably expect the State to be bound by its promise at all hearings which affect the determination of his sentence.
A plea agreement reasonably susceptible to different interpretations is ambiguous. The plea agreement in the instant case is reasonably susceptible to different interpretation and is therefore ambiguous. Where a statute is ambiguous, we require that it be strictly construed in favor of the accused. State v. Magness, 240 Kan. 719, 721, 732 P.2d 747 (1987). We find no compelling reason to adopt a different rule in interpreting ambiguous plea agreements.
We conclude that in the present case the State's promise to make favorable sentence recommendations binds the State at the subsequent hearing on the defendant's motion to modify sentence, *70 absent language in the plea agreement limiting the State's promise to the original sentencing hearing. However, it does not follow that the defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea of guilty. Since the State honored the plea agreement at the time the defendant pled guilty and was sentenced, the district court was correct in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. The defendant is entitled to have his motion to modify his sentence reheard by a different district judge and, at such hearing, the State will be bound by the plea agreement.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SIX, J., not participating.