Title: Sedam v. 2JR Pizza Enterprises, LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 39S05-1703-CT-171
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: October 31, 2017

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS 
Scott A. Faultless 
Craig Kelley & Faultless LLC 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
Merritt K. Alcorn 
Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP 
Madison, Indiana 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE INDIANA TRIAL 
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION 
George C. Gray 
Nicole B. Burks 
Gray, Robinson, Ryan & Fox, P.C. 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES 
Rodney L. Scott 
Tricia Kirkby Hofmann 
Rebecca L. Didat 
Waters, Tyler, Hofmann & Scott, LLC 
New Albany, Indiana 
 
Karl L. Mulvaney 
Jessica Whelan 
Bingham Greenebaum Doll LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE DEFENSE TRIAL 
COUNSEL OF INDIANA 
Lucy R. Dollens 
Quarles & Brady, LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
Crystal G. Rowe 
Kightlinger & Gray, LLP 
New Albany, Indiana 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE INDIANA LEGAL 
FOUNDATION INC. 
Julia Blackwell Gelinas 
Maggie L. Smith 
Frost Brown Todd LLC 
Indianapolis, Indiana
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
No. 39S05-1703-CT-171 
DALE SEDAM, KIM SEDAM, AND BRYAN 
NORRIS, AS CO-PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 
OF THE ESTATE OF DAVID C. HAMBLIN, 
DECEASED, 
Appellants (Plaintiffs below), 
v. 
2JR PIZZA ENTERPRISES, LLC DOING 
BUSINESS AS PIZZA HUT #013413, AMANDA 
PARKER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Oct 31 2017, 1:54 pm
2 
EMPLOYEE OF 2JR PIZZA ENTERPRISES, LLC, 
AND RALPH BLITON, 
Appellees (Defendants below). 
Appeal from the Jefferson Circuit Court, No. 39C01-1209-CT-890 
The Honorable Darrell M. Auxier, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 39A05-1602-CT-296 
October 31, 2017 
Massa, Justice. 
More than forty years ago, our Court of Appeals decided Tindall v. Enderle, 162 Ind. App. 
524, 320 N.E.2d 764 (1974), and today we reaffirm its holding.  When an employer admits that an 
employee was acting within the course and scope of his or her employment, the employer may 
only be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and thus the plaintiff is precluded 
from also bringing a negligent hiring claim in most circumstances.  We therefore affirm the trial 
court’s partial grant of summary judgment for Pizza Hut, allowing only the negligence claim under 
the doctrine of respondeat superior to proceed.   
Facts and Procedural History 
On August 24, 2012, Amanda Parker was delivering pizzas as a driver for 2JR Pizza 
Enterprises, LLC (“Pizza Hut”).  While she was driving, her Dodge Stratus collided with the back 
of a scooter operated by David Hamblin.  As a result, Hamblin was tossed onto the road and was 
run over and killed by another motorist, Ralph Bliton. 
3 
Hamblin’s Estate1 then filed a wrongful death suit against Parker, Bliton, and Pizza Hut.  
The Estate alleged Hamblin’s death was directly and proximately caused by Pizza Hut’s negligent 
hiring, training, and/or supervision of Parker; Parker’s negligent operation of her car; and that 
Pizza Hut was liable for Parker’s negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior.  Pizza Hut 
moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that since it admitted Parker was acting within the 
course and scope of her employment, it could only be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior.  The trial court agreed and granted partial summary judgment dismissing the Estate’s 
negligent hiring, training, and/or supervision claim.  Pursuant to Trial Rule 54(B), the trial court 
entered final judgment, and the Estate appealed. 
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.  After comparing Broadstreet v. Hall, 168 
Ind. 192, 80 N.E. 145 (1907), and Tindall v. Enderle, 162 Ind. App. 524, 320 N.E.2d 764 (1974), 
the panel found Tindall had improperly distinguished Broadstreet, and thus Broadstreet was 
controlling.  Sedam v. 2JR Pizza Enterprises, LLC, 61 N.E.3d 1191, 1195-98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).  
Therefore, the court concluded that the Estate could pursue both theories of recovery because the 
claims are “separate torts that are not derivative of the employee’s negligence[.]”  Id. at 1196.  
Moreover, the panel reasoned this outcome was more consistent with Indiana’s Comparative Fault 
Act, enacted after Broadstreet and Tindall, and the Restatement (Third) of Agency.  Id. at 1197-
98. 
Pizza Hut petitioned for transfer, which we granted, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals 
opinion.  Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).2   
                                                 
1 The Estate includes Dale Sedam, Kim Sedam, and Bryan Norris, co-personal representatives. 
2 We thank the Defense Trial Counsel of Indiana, the Indiana Legal Foundation, Inc., and Indiana Trial 
Lawyers Association for their appearances as amici in this case.  
4 
Standard of Review 
When reviewing the grant or denial of summary judgment, we apply the same test as the 
trial court:  Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact, 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 
1003 (Ind. 2014); Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).  Where a challenge to summary judgment raises a question 
of law, we review it de novo.  Megenity v. Dunn, 68 N.E.3d 1080, 1083 (Ind. 2017).  
Respondeat Superior and Negligent Hiring, Training, and/or Supervision Claims May Not 
Be Simultaneously Brought When an Employer Admits That an Employee Was Acting 
Within the Course and Scope of His or Her Employment. 
Resolution of this case hinges on our interpretation of the precedential effect of two 
opinions:  Tindall and Broadstreet.   
In Broadstreet, a businessman employed his nine-year-old son to deliver a message on 
horseback.  While doing so, the horse collided with a buggy, resulting in injuries to its occupant.  
The occupant sued, alleging negligent hiring because the businessman knew of his son’s careless 
and dangerous riding, and liability for the son’s negligence under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior.  Broadstreet, 168 Ind. at 195-96, 80 N.E. at 145-46.  After a trial, the jury returned a 
general verdict for the occupant.  Id. at 202, 80 N.E. at 148.  The businessman appealed, arguing, 
in part, that the trial court improperly instructed the jury to consider evidence of the son’s careless 
and reckless reputation for riding horses when determining whether the son was acting within the 
course and scope of his employment.  Id. at 203-04, 80 N.E. at 148-49.  This Court found no error, 
indicating that the instruction to consider all the evidence was limited to the “purpose for which it 
was introduced.”  Id. at 205, 80 N.E. at 149.   
In Tindall, a tavern employee shot and killed a patron.  The patron’s estate brought a 
negligence action against the employee, and a negligent hiring and retention claim against the 
tavern.  Tindall, 162 Ind. App. at 525, 320 N.E.2d at 765.  Before trial, the tavern stipulated that 
5 
at the time of the shooting the employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment.  
Id., 320 N.E.2d at 765.  The tavern also filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of the 
employee’s prior assaults on patrons, which the estate intended to use to support its claim that the 
tavern was negligent in hiring and retaining the employee.  Id. at 525-26, 320 N.E.2d at 765.  The 
trial court granted the tavern’s motion.  Id. at 525, 320 N.E.2d at 765.  The estate appealed, arguing 
that by granting the motion in limine the trial court effectively eliminated its negligent hiring and 
retention claim, which it contended was “separate and distinct from their action in respondeat 
superior.”  Id. at 527, 320 N.E.2d at 766.  The Court of Appeals disagreed.  In its analysis, the 
court distinguished Broadstreet, and concurred with a federal district court that the holding in 
Broadstreet was limited to “special situations.”  Id. at 528-29, 320 N.E.2d at 767 (discussing Lange 
v. B & P Motor Exp., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 319, 323 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (special situations likely found 
when “ordinary respondeat superior principles would fail [and] sound policy would support a 
cause of action”3)).  The Lange court recognized Indiana courts had not spoken on this issue but 
nevertheless determined that, when the employer had stipulated to course and scope, it would be 
“an undue extension of Broadstreet” to allow both claims to proceed because each claim is derived 
from the negligence of the employee, making the negligent hiring claim, “as a matter of law, 
wholly unnecessary to plaintiffs’ right to recover.”  Lange, 257 F. Supp. at 324.   
Pizza Hut argues that Tindall is settled law and, absent a special circumstance, an 
employer’s admission to course and scope renders negligent hiring-based claims duplicative and 
unnecessary.  Moreover, Pizza Hut contends that Broadstreet is not controlling because the 
Plaintiff in that case contested, rather than conceded, respondeat superior liability.  The Estate, on 
                                                 
3 In Lange, the court indicated some special circumstances include when an employee commits an 
intentional tort, an employee is incapable of being negligent, and when an employer is a charitable 
institution.  257 F. Supp. at 323.  In Tindall, the court noted negligent hiring claims are advantageous in 
cases involving punitive damages.  162 Ind. App. at 530, 320 N.E.2d at 768. 
6 
the other hand, argues Broadstreet controls, which expressly permits both claims against an 
employer and is more consistent with Indiana’s Comparative Fault Act. 
We agree with Pizza Hut and find Tindall controlling.   
First, the current issue—whether both claims may be pursued when an employer admits to 
course and scope—was not before the Court in Broadstreet.  In that case, the businessman did not 
admit that his son was acting within an employment capacity at the time of the accident; rather, he 
argued he was not liable for the boy’s actions at all.  168 Ind. at 199, 80 N.E. at 147.  Further, the 
businessman never challenged whether both claims could be brought; instead his appeal focused 
on the jury instructions and evidence of his son’s reputation.  See id. at 203-205, 80 N.E. at 148-
49.  Based on these distinctions, we decline to find Broadstreet expressly permits both claims when 
an employer admits liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
Second, starting with Tindall, there is a line of Indiana precedent spanning nearly five 
decades holding that an employer’s admission that an employee was acting within the course and 
scope of his employment precludes negligent hiring claims.4  This outcome recognizes that a 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Davis v. Macey, 901 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1111-13 (N.D. Ind. 2012); Kapitan v. DT Chicagoland 
Exp. Inc., No. 2:12-CV-321, 2013 WL 5655704, at *4-5 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 15, 2013); Amcast Indus. Corp. v. 
Detrex Corp., 779 F. Supp. 1519, 1543 (N.D. Ind. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds, 2 F.3d 746 (7th 
Cir. 1993); Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs of City of Indianapolis v. Pettigrew, 851 N.E.2d 326, 332-33 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2006), trans. denied; Shipley v. City of South Bend, 175 Ind. App. 464, 468-69, 372 N.E.2d 490, 493 
(1978); Gordon v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp., No. 4:12-CV-18, 2017 WL 662856, at *7-8 (N.D. Ind. 
Feb. 17, 2017); Perron v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No 1:12-CV-01853-TWP-TAB, 2014 WL 931897, 
at *5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2014); Cottle v. Falcon Holdings Mgmt., LLC, No. 2:11-CV-95-PRC, 2012 WL 
4361552, *21-22 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 24, 2012); Kpotufe v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-0539-RLY-
MJD, 2011 WL 6092159, *6 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 6, 2011); Estate of Mayer v. Lax, Inc., 998 N.E.2d 238, 249 
n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied; Marshall v. Town of Merrillville, 228 F. Supp. 3d 853, 868 (N.D. 
Ind. 2017); see also, e.g., Levinson v. Citizens Nat. Bank of Evansville, 644 N.E.2d 1264, 1269-70 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied (finding Tindall-Lange rule inapplicable because special circumstances 
permitted both claims); Issa v. Priority Transp., LLC, No. 1:05-CV-394-TS, 2006 WL 1886225, *7 (N.D. 
Ind. July 7, 2006) (same). 
7 
respondeat superior claim necessarily involves an act within the scope of employment, whereas 
negligent hiring claims require an act outside the scope of employment.  Under each claim, the 
plaintiff seeks the same result—employer liability—and recovery is based on the same negligent 
act—the employee’s.  Tindall, 162 Ind. App. at 530, 320 N.E.2d at 768 (“Proof of negligence by 
the employee on the particular occasion at issue is a common element to the theories of respondeat 
superior and negligent hiring.”).  To allow both claims would serve only to prejudice the employer, 
confuse the jury, and waste judicial resources when ultimately the result—that the employer is 
liable—is the same and the employer has stipulated as much.  Such an admission exposes an 
employer to liability for any and all fault assessed to the employee’s negligence, and thus a 
negligent hiring claim becomes duplicative since a plaintiff may not recover twice for the same 
damage.  See INS Investigations Bureau, Inc. v. Lee, 784 N.E.2d 566, 577 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) 
(“The law disfavors . . . double recovery for a single wrong.”), trans. denied.   
The Estate argues that precluding both claims contravenes Indiana’s Comparative Fault 
Act.  We disagree.  The Comparative Fault Act provides that the jury must apportion fault to those 
“who caused or contributed to cause the alleged injury[.]”  Ind. Code § 34-51-2-8(b)(1) (2014).  
The rule expressed here and in Tindall is consistent with this mandate because, as already stated, 
the negligent hiring and respondeat superior claims are derived from the same negligent act of the 
employee.  Thus, at the point an employer stipulates to course and scope it assumes indirect 
liability for the person “who caused or contributed to cause the alleged injury.”  If a jury were 
allowed to allocate fault under both theories, the employer could be assessed fault in excess of the 
employee’s negligence it already assumed in full.  Conversely, a plaintiff’s fault remains 
unchanged whether an employee, employer, or a combination of the two is responsible for the 
injury.   
Third, this outcome is bolstered by Indiana’s adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
section 317.  See Parr v. McDade, 161 Ind. App. 106, 117-118, 314 N.E.2d 768, 774-775 (1974).  
Section 317 provides that “[a] master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his 
servant while acting outside the scope of his employment[.]”  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 
(Am. Law Inst. 1965).  This rule is “applicable only when the servant is acting outside the scope 
8 
of his employment.  If the servant is acting within the scope of his employment, the master may 
be vicariously liable under the principles of the law of Agency.”  Id. § 317 cmt. a.  Although the 
Restatement (Third) of Agency may find otherwise,5 Indiana has developed a line of precedent 
according to Tindall and section 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and we find no reason 
to upset reliance on this point. 
In sum, based on Tindall, substantial precedent has established that when an employer 
admits that an employee was acting within the course and scope of his or her employment, absent 
special circumstances, negligent hiring claims are precluded.  Neither Broadstreet nor the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts nor the Comparative Fault Act compel a different result. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons above, we affirm the trial court’s partial grant of summary judgment for 
Pizza Hut. 
Rush, C.J., and David, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.   
                                                 
5 See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.05(1) (Am. Law Inst. 2006) (“A principal who conducts an activity 
through an agent is subject to liability for harm to a third party caused by the agent’s conduct if the harm 
was caused by the principal’s negligence in selecting, training, retaining, supervising, or otherwise 
controlling the agent.”); Id. § 7.03 cmt. b (“A principal’s own fault may subject the principal to liability to 
a third party harmed by an agent’s conduct.”).