Title: People v. Szabo
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80891
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 3, 1998

People v. Szabo, No. 80891 (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 80891-Agenda 1-January 1998.
Opinion filed December 3, 1998.
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, John Szabo, brings this appeal from an order of the circuit 
court of Will County denying his post-conviction petition after an evidentiary 
hearing. Because the defendant received the death penalty for the underlying 
murder convictions, the present appeal lies directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d 
R. 651(a).
The defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in the circuit 
court of Will County in 1979. In the appeal from that judgment, this court 
vacated the defendant's convictions and remanded the cause for a determination 
whether a new trial was necessary because of an alleged discovery violation. At 
the same time, the court vacated the defendant's death sentence and directed the 
trial court to conduct a new sentencing hearing if the convictions were able to 
stand. People v. Szabo, 94 Ill. 2d 327, 447 N.E.2d 193 (1983). On 
remand, the trial court reinstated the defendant's convictions, and a new 
sentencing hearing, conducted before a jury in 1984, again resulted in a 
sentence of death. This court subsequently affirmed the defendant's convictions 
and death sentence (People v. Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d 83, 497 N.E.2d 995 
(1986)), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari 
(Szabo v. Illinois, 479 U.S. 1101, 94 L. Ed. 2d 181, 107 S. Ct. 1330 
(1987)).
The defendant initiated post-conviction proceedings in August 1987. In a 
pro se petition, the defendant challenged the competence of the lawyer 
who represented him at trial in 1979, David Landau. The defendant also 
challenged the competence of the two lawyers who represented him at the second 
sentencing hearing in 1984, Paul Bjekich and Daniel Doyle. The defendant 
contended that Landau, the 1979 trial lawyer, was ineffective because he was 
under investigation by the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission 
while he was representing the defendant. Separately, the defendant contended 
that Bjekich and Doyle, his 1984 resentencing lawyers, did not adequately 
prepare and present certain mitigating evidence, including evidence of the 
defendant's good conduct while incarcerated for the present offenses, and 
evidence that the defendant was acting under extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance at the time of the offenses. Counsel, Lawrence Morrissey, was 
appointed to represent the defendant in the post-conviction proceedings. The 
circuit court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing, and this court 
affirmed the judgment (People v. Szabo, 144 Ill. 2d 525, 582 N.E.2d 173 
(1991)). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Szabo 
v. Illinois, 506 U.S. 832, 121 L. Ed. 2d 59, 113 S. Ct. 99 (1992).
In February 1993, this court filed an opinion in an unrelated post-conviction 
matter, People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 609 N.E.2d 304 (1993), 
which addressed the duties of post-conviction counsel under Supreme Court Rule 
651(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c)). Regarding the record that must be prepared in 
the circuit court by appointed counsel in a post-conviction case, Rule 651(c) 
provides in pertinent part:
Johnson found that post-conviction counsel in that case had failed 
to comply with Rule 651(c) because he had not amended the defendant's pro 
se petition or submitted affidavits from possible mitigation witnesses 
identified in the petition. The court remanded the cause so that counsel could 
satisfy the requirements of the rule.
In May 1993, several months after the Johnson decision, the 
defendant, represented by new counsel, initiated the present action by filing a 
second post-conviction petition in the circuit court of Will County. By 
agreement of the parties a pending federal habeas corpus proceeding, 
which the defendant had filed in late April 1993, was dismissed without 
prejudice, so that the defendant could proceed on his state action. As the 
contents of the second post-conviction petition make clear, the impetus for the 
defendant's new petition was this court's decision in Johnson. Citing 
Johnson, the defendant alleged in his second petition that the lawyer 
representing him in the first post-conviction proceeding, Lawrence Morrissey, 
had failed to comply with Rule 651(c) by not submitting affidavits in support of 
the petition and by not amending the original pro se petition, as Rule 
651(c) requires. In addition, the second post-conviction realleged the claims 
raised in the first petition regarding the conduct of Bjekich and Doyle at the 
resentencing hearing.
The State initially moved to dismiss the defendant's second post-conviction 
petition, arguing that it was a repetitive action barred by this court's earlier 
decision on the defendant's first post-conviction petition. The circuit court 
denied the State's dismissal motion. An evidentiary hearing on the substantive 
allegations in the defendant's second post-conviction petition was later 
conducted before a different judge, who denied relief. The defendant now brings 
this appeal from the denial of his second post-conviction petition. 134 Ill. 2d 
R. 651(a).
I
As a preliminary matter, we believe it is appropriate to consider whether the 
defendant may prosecute a second post-conviction petition in this case. Although 
the State does not renew before this court its contention that the present 
matter must be dismissed as a repetitive action, we believe that this inquiry, 
undertaken on our own initiative, is proper here. Waiver is not a bar to our 
consideration of the issue, for we have an obligation to ensure the uniform and 
orderly development of the law (see Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 
224-25 (1967)), and therefore we will consider here the timeliness of the 
defendant's second post-conviction petition.
As we have stated, this court previously affirmed the circuit court's denial 
of relief on the defendant's first post-conviction petition. People v. 
Szabo, 144 Ill. 2d 525, 582 N.E.2d 173 (1991). At that time the court found 
that the lawyer who represented the defendant at the initial post-conviction 
hearing, Lawrence Morrissey, had substantially complied with Supreme Court Rule 
651(c). Szabo, 144 Ill. 2d  at 531-33. Notwithstanding that 
determination, the defendant subsequently initiated the present proceeding, 
which constitutes his second post-conviction challenge to the underlying 
convictions and death sentence. The question that arises is whether the 
defendant may now pursue a second post-conviction petition, following the 
rejection of his first.
This court has previously allowed a successive post-conviction petition to go 
forward only when the proceedings on the initial petition were "deficient in 
some fundamental way." People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 273-74, 606 N.E.2d 1078 (1992). This limitation on the circumstances in which successive 
petitions are allowed is designed to achieve a balance between society's 
interest in the finality of criminal convictions and the individual defendant's 
interest in vindicating constitutional rights. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 
274. In opposition to the State's dismissal motion in the circuit court below, 
the defendant contended that the proceedings on his initial post-conviction 
petition were fundamentally deficient. The defendant argued below, in opposition 
to the State's dismissal motion, that our earlier decision regarding the initial 
petition should not preclude the present action, because the earlier decision 
did not adequately resolve all the issues then pending. The defendant asserted 
that this court had misapprehended the basis for the argument on appeal that 
counsel had failed to comply with Rule 651(c). The defendant believed that this 
court had focused on the challenge to the performance of trial counsel, David 
Landau, and had failed to consider the separate challenges to the performance of 
counsel at the resentencing hearing, Bjekich and Doyle.
Our earlier decision affirming the denial of post-conviction relief, 
People v. Szabo, 144 Ill. 2d 525 (1991), would normally be sufficient 
to negate any suggestion that the defendant is now entitled to a second 
opportunity to establish a constitutional defect in the sentencing proceedings. 
The defendant's first post-conviction petition alleged incompetence by the 
defendant's trial lawyer and by the two lawyers who represented the defendant at 
the resentencing hearing. On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, 
the defendant argued before this court that post-conviction counsel had failed 
to properly substantiate those claims. Szabo, 144 Ill. 2d  at 532. At 
that time, this court rejected the defendant's challenge to post-conviction 
counsel's performance, concluding that adequate compliance with Rule 651(c) had 
been shown. Although the record did not contain an affidavit from 
post-conviction counsel, as required by Rule 651(c), the court nonetheless 
excused its absence, noting that the record as a whole evidenced sufficient 
compliance with the requirements of the rule. The court explained, "The record 
indicates that there was considerable communication between post-conviction 
counsel and defendant, and that defendant received reasonable assistance of 
counsel as contemplated by the rule." Szabo, 144 Ill. 2d  at 532.
Our subsequent decision in Johnson cited favorably to this court's 
disposition of defendant Szabo's first post-conviction petition. 
Johnson stated:
Thus, our earlier opinion in Szabo concluded that Rule 651(c) had 
been complied with, and our later opinion in Johnson reaffirmed that 
holding. Nonetheless, the defendant now wishes to challenge that earlier 
determination-in substance, the defendant now seeks a reexamination of the 
holding in the appeal from the first post-conviction petition (Szabo, 
144 Ill. 2d 525) that post-conviction counsel sufficiently complied with Rule 
651(c)'s requirements. We believe that a number of important considerations bar 
a reexamination of our earlier ruling.
We see no reason to excuse this repetitive filing, even on the ground that 
the holding in Johnson required post-conviction counsel to do more than 
what was done in that earlier proceeding. Johnson was decided after the 
present defendant's appeal from the denial of his first post-conviction 
petition. We do not believe that Johnson controls the outcome of the 
present case, any more than we believe that Johnson governs other 
post-conviction matters that were concluded long ago. The proceedings on 
defendant Szabo's first post-conviction petition had been entirely completed by 
the time Johnson was decided. Johnson remanded a 
post-conviction appeal to the circuit court so that post-conviction counsel 
could submit affidavits from potential witnesses in support of the petition. 
That we did not order the same remedy in defendant Szabo's earlier appeal, 
decided before Johnson, does not mean that we must now permit defendant 
Szabo to proceed with a second post-conviction petition, which is based, in 
substance, on a challenge to the performance of his initial post-conviction 
lawyer.
We have previously held that the post-conviction process does not provide a 
forum by which a defendant may challenge the conduct of counsel at an earlier 
post-conviction proceeding. People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 276-77, 
606 N.E.2d 1078 (1992). The reasons for this rule are clear. Post-conviction 
relief is limited to constitutional deprivations occurring at trial or 
sentencing. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 1996). The conduct of counsel in an 
earlier post-conviction proceeding, however, is by definition outside the ambit 
of post-conviction relief. Moreover, because there is no constitutional right to 
counsel in post-conviction proceedings (Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539, 546, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 1993 (1987)), the conduct 
of post-conviction counsel is not subject to a later constitutional challenge. 
Because the present defendant's second post-conviction petition is, in essence, 
a challenge to the performance of counsel at the initial post-conviction 
proceeding, this successive petition should be barred. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 280. Johnson itself does not endorse successive petitions; that 
case involved a first post-conviction petition.
II
Even if we were to consider the merits of the defendant's second 
post-conviction petition, we would not find that the defendant had established a 
violation of the right to the effective assistance of counsel occurring at his 
resentencing hearing.
Allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally measured 
against the two-part standard expressed by the United States Supreme Court in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance under 
Strickland, a defendant must establish both that counsel's performance 
was deficient and that the deficiency proved to be prejudicial. 
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064. 
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential under 
Strickland, and a court considering an ineffectiveness claim "must 
indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 694, 104 S. Ct.  at 2065. To establish prejudice resulting from an 
asserted deficiency in counsel's performance, "[t]he defendant must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2068.
A
The defendant first argues that counsel at the resentencing hearing should 
have presented favorable testimony from a number of jail and prison officers who 
would have described the defendant as a model prisoner following his 
incarceration on the charges here. The judge below concluded that the defendant 
sustained prejudice by his attorneys' failure to present this evidence. Still, 
the judge concluded that counsel was not deficient in failing to do so, and the 
judge accordingly rejected this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
At the evidentiary hearing on the defendant's second post-conviction 
petition, the judge heard the testimony of one of the lawyers, Paul Bjekich, who 
represented the defendant on resentencing. Bjekich stated that it was his 
understanding that the defendant would still testify, even after the denial of a 
defense motion in limine that sought to restrict any cross-examination 
of the defendant. Counsel proposed to present evidence of the defendant's 
favorable adjustment to prison life through the testimony of the defendant 
himself.
At the evidentiary hearing below, Bjekich was confronted with a portion of 
the transcript from the resentencing hearing, at which the defendant briefly 
took the stand in the wake of the denial of the defense motion in 
limine. At that time the defendant said that, because the motion had been 
denied, he would not testify in his own behalf. At the evidentiary hearing 
below, however, Bjekich stated that it had still been the defense plan for the 
defendant to testify, even after the denial of the motion in limine. 
The judge in the proceedings below credited Bjekich's testimony, and the judge 
found that counsel was not deficient for failing to have an alternative plan 
ready in case the defendant did not take the stand in his own behalf at the 
resentencing hearing. The credibility determination made by the judge is 
entitled to substantial weight, and we will not interfere with it.
The defendant further suggests, however, that counsel acted unreasonably, 
even if Bjekich's testimony at the evidentiary hearing below is accepted as 
true. The defendant apparently believes that counsel should have made the 
defendant's good conduct while incarcerated the centerpiece of the mitigation 
case at the second sentencing hearing. In fact, although counsel did not choose 
to make this the central feature of the defense, counsel did introduce some 
evidence on this point, and we will not attempt to second-guess this strategic 
decision. At the resentencing hearing, counsel chose instead to emphasize the 
disparity between a death sentence for the defendant and the relatively brief 
prison term received by a codefendant convicted of the same offenses. In 
addition, counsel presented testimony from the defendant's family members, who 
described, among other things, the defendant's favorable adjustment to prison 
life. To be sure, counsel could have introduced testimony from jail and prison 
officials, for evidence like that may not be barred at a capital sentencing 
hearing. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1, 106 S. Ct. 1669 (1986). Skipper did not also hold, however, that counsel must 
be deemed ineffective for failing to present available testimony of that 
nature.
In describing the proposed testimony of these omitted witnesses, the 
defendant mentions their opinions that the defendant should not have received 
the death sentence for these crimes. We note, however, that testimony of that 
nature is not allowed at a death penalty hearing. This court has consistently 
held that mitigation witnesses' views that the defendant should not be sentenced 
to death are inadmissible at a capital sentencing hearing. People v. 
Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d 22, 67 (1984); People v. Yates, 98 Ill. 2d 502, 535 (1983); People v. Williams, 97 Ill. 2d 252, 300-01 (1983). 
Thus, certain portions of the favorable testimony proposed by the defendant 
would not have been admissible at his capital sentencing hearing.
Before this court, the defendant briefly argues that resentencing counsel 
should have also introduced expert testimony about the defendant's future lack 
of dangerousness if sentenced to prison instead of death. The defendant did not 
raise this claim in his second post-conviction petition, however, and therefore 
we must consider it waived. People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 619 N.E.2d 750 (1993).
B
The defendant also presented a second ground in the proceedings below in 
support of his contention that his two lawyers at the resentencing hearing were 
ineffective. Specifically, the defendant presented testimony from a 
psychologist, Dr. William Hillman, regarding the defendant's mental condition at 
the time of the offenses. The defendant sought to show through Dr. Hillman's 
testimony that counsel acted unreasonably in failing to present evidence of the 
defendant's psychological state at the time of the offenses here. The defendant 
argued that evidence of this nature would have been mitigating and could have 
been used to establish that the defendant was acting under the influence of an 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he committed the charged 
offenses.
The judge below rejected this claim following the evidentiary hearing. The 
judge concluded that counsel did not act deficiently in failing to present 
testimony of the type proposed by the defendant and, further, that the defendant 
was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to do so. The judge did not believe that 
he should give much weight to Dr. Hillman's testimony in 1995, the time of the 
hearing on the second post-conviction petition, regarding the defendant's mental 
state some 16 years earlier, at the time of the commission of the offenses. The 
court noted that Bjekich was aware of similar testimony from the initial 
sentencing hearing, conducted in 1979, which resulted in a sentence of death. 
The judge explained further that evidence of psychological or mental impairment 
could be construed either favorably or unfavorably by a sentencing jury, and 
that use of evidence of that nature was essentially a question of strategy, 
subject to different opinions.
We conclude that the judge's determination is not against the manifest weight 
of the evidence. The judge found unpersuasive Dr. Hillman's testimony about the 
defendant's mental state in 1979, and we see no reason to disturb that 
determination. We cannot conclude that the counsel was required to add this 
additional theory to the mitigation strategy they pursued at the resentencing 
hearing. See People v. Erickson, 161 Ill. 2d 82, 89-92 (1994).
* * *
In sum, the defendant may not pursue a second post-conviction petition. 
Moreover, even if we consider the merits of the defendant's second 
post-conviction petition, we do not believe that the defendant is entitled to 
relief on the grounds raised in that petition.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is 
affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order setting Monday, 
March 22, 1999, as the date on which the sentence of death entered in the 
circuit court of Will County is to be carried out. The defendant shall be 
executed in the manner provided by law (725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996)). The clerk 
of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the 
Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and to the 
warden of the institution where the defendant is now confined.
Judgment affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
I agree that the doctrine of res judicata bars this, defendant's 
second successive, post-conviction petition. Accordingly, I join in Part I of 
the above opinion, and it is on this basis that I concur in the conclusion that 
the circuit court's judgment must be affirmed. That being the case, I see no 
legitimate reason to further hold, in Part II, that defendant has not 
established a violation of the right to the effective assistance of counsel, an 
analysis that I can only characterize as an "alternative" holding. Such an 
alternative holding, however, sends a mixed message to both bench and bar-that 
despite this court's professed disapproval of successive post-conviction 
petition filings and despite the fact that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act 
contemplates the filing of only one petition, we will nevertheless look to the 
merits of the claim even when res judicata bars relief. Accordingly, I 
do not join in Part II. In view of my belief that res judicata bars 
defendant's petition, I write separately in order to express my thoughts 
regarding (i) why our decision in Johnson does not support relaxing the 
res judicata effect of defendant's first post-conviction proceeding and 
(ii) the circumstances under which a second post-conviction petition may be 
proper.
I
A detailed factual recitation is warranted in light of the important 
procedural questions which have arisen in this case. Defendant's original 
convictions and sentence of death were vacated by this court on direct appeal. 
See People v. Szabo, 94 Ill. 2d 327 (1983) (Szabo I). On 
remand, the circuit court reinstated defendant's convictions, and following a 
second capital hearing, a jury voted to impose the death penalty. This court 
affirmed both the convictions and the sentence of death (see People v. 
Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d 83 (1986) (Szabo II), and the United States 
Supreme Court denied certiorari (Szabo, 479 U.S. 1101, 94 L. Ed. 2d 181, 107 S. Ct. 1330 (1987)).
In August 1987, defendant filed a pro se petition for 
post-conviction relief, alleging in part, that he had received ineffective 
assistance of counsel during his second capital sentencing hearing held in 1984. 
Specifically, defendant claimed that his attorneys, Paul Bjekich and Daniel 
Doyle, were ineffective for failing to call or conduct any investigation 
regarding (i) eight named jail and prison officials who were available and 
willing to testify to defendant's good behavior while he was incarcerated 
between 1979 and 1984 and (ii) various experts who would have testified about 
the effect of defendant's drug usage on his mental health at the time of the 
murders. Because these claims were de hors the record at the time of 
defendant's direct appeal in Szabo II and therefore could not have been 
asserted in that appeal, defendant's presentation of them in a post-conviction 
petition was proper. See, e.g., People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501 (1991); People v. Owens, 129 Ill. 2d 303 (1989). Accordingly, 
the circuit court appointed attorney Lawrence Morrissey to represent defendant 
during his post-conviction proceedings. Morrissey informed the circuit court 
that the defense would stand on the pro se petition, and the State 
moved to dismiss the action. The circuit court denied the State's motion and 
held an evidentiary hearing on the petition. The court ultimately denied 
post-conviction relief, finding, inter alia, that defendant had 
presented no evidence at the evidentiary hearing to substantiate his claim that 
Bjekich and Doyle provided ineffective assistance during the 1984 capital 
sentencing hearing.
Defendant again appealed to this court-this time represented by the office of 
the State Appellate Defender. In that appeal, defendant maintained, among other 
things, that Morrissey failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 651(c) in 
representing defendant during the post-conviction proceedings. People v. 
Szabo, 144 Ill. 2d 525, 531-32 (1991) (Szabo III). Rule 651(c) 
requires appointed counsel to certify that he or she has made the necessary 
amendments to a pro se petition so that a petitioner's contentions are 
adequately presented to the courts for their consideration of whether 
post-conviction relief must be granted. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c). This court 
rejected defendant's claim, specifically holding that Rule 651(c) had been 
satisfied and that the "record clearly support[ed] the trial court's finding of 
effective assistance of appointed counsel [Morrissey]." The United States 
Supreme Court denied certiorari. Szabo, 506 U.S. 832, 121 L. Ed. 2d 59, 113 S. Ct. 99 (1992).
Defendant, having thus exhausted his state appeals, next initiated federal 
habeas corpus proceedings. Meanwhile, this court stayed defendant's 
execution pending the filing and disposition of defendant's petition for 
habeas corpus which was to be filed on April 30, 1993. At that time, 
defendant was represented by attorneys from the Illinois Capital Resource Center 
for the office of State Appellate Defender, who began an investigation of the 
correctional guards named in defendant's first petition for post-conviction 
relief. These attorneys also hired a psychological expert to evaluate 
defendant's mental health. It was during this time that we announced our 
decision in People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227 (1993). A short while 
later, defendant's attorneys filed defendant's second petition for 
post-conviction relief on May 20, 1993, the denial of which is the subject of 
this appeal. The record reveals that in the petition, defendant maintained that 
our decision in Johnson "dictate[d] that [the circuit] court entertain 
the present post-conviction petition [because] [l]ike Johnson, [defendant] named 
in his post-conviction petition prison officials who were available to testify 
at this sentencing hearing." Defendant contended that his original 
post-conviction counsel, Morrissey, "had no strategic reason" for failing to 
present the evidence regarding the prison officials. He also noted that this 
second petition was "really nothing more [than] amended petition contemplated by 
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, *** being filed expeditiously by the first 
trial attorneys [defendant] has had since Morrissey left the case." Defendant 
asserted that the grounds for post-conviction relief were the failure of Bjekich 
and Doyle to investigate and present as witnesses (i) the various correctional 
officials who were willing to testify as to defendant's good behavior while 
defendant was incarcerated between 1979 and 1984 and (ii) several psychological 
experts who would have testified that defendant committed the crime while under 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Attached to the petition were the 
affidavits of five prison officials and a psychological report prepared by a 
mental health expert. Notably absent from the petition was any affidavit from 
Morrissey which explained the reason for his decision not to pursue the issue of 
the correctional officers' potential testimonials.
The State moved to dismiss defendant's petition, arguing that the asserted 
claims had been previously adjudicated in defendant's initial post-conviction 
proceeding. Although the State acknowledged that Illinois courts have, in 
limited cases, allowed the filing of a second petition, the State insisted that 
defendant's second petition was devoid of the necessary allegations that would 
permit a successive filing. The State also contended that concerns of finality 
prevented a successive petition in this case. In response, defendant admitted 
that his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing had been 
presented in his initial post-conviction petition. Nevertheless, he maintained 
that his attorney, Morrissey, had not presented any evidence to substantiate the 
claim at that proceeding, even though defendant's pro se petition had 
identified the potential witnesses by name. Defendant emphasized that although 
he had identified these witnesses as early as 1987, he "ha[d] never had 
a chance to present those arguments to any court." (Emphasis in 
original.) Thus, according to defendant, Morrissey provided him with "no 
representation whatsoever regarding the claims relating to the sentencing 
hearing." The circuit court denied the State's motion to dismiss and eventually 
held the evidentiary hearing described in the majority opinion. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court denied defendant's second petition, 
and this appeal followed.
II
The circuit court apparently agreed with defendant that our decision in 
Johnson "dictates" that the state courts must once again entertain his 
claims regarding the ineffectiveness of Bjekich and Doyle. Notwithstanding 
defendant's characterizations, this petition cannot, in any way, be deemed an 
"amended" petition. Once this court issued its opinion in Szabo III and 
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in the matter, there 
was simply nothing left of defendant's first petition to amend. Defendant's 
post-conviction petition and the claims raised in it were finally adjudicated at 
that point in time. See People v. Richeson, 50 Ill. 2d 46, 47 
(1971).
Defendant's motivation for portraying his second petition as nothing more 
than an "amended first petition" becomes obvious upon review of this court's 
previous holdings with respect to multiple petitions for post-conviction relief. 
Under Illinois law, successive post-conviction proceedings cannot be used to 
assail previous post-conviction counsel. In People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 276 (1992), we explained that the sixth amendment right to counsel has 
not been found to apply to attorneys representing petitioners in post-conviction 
proceedings. See also Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539, 546, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 1993 (1987). As the majority correctly notes, 
the reason a sixth amendment right to counsel does not attach in post-conviction 
proceedings is because a defendant's right to counsel in the proceedings derives 
not from the state or federal constitution, but from the Post Conviction Hearing 
Act (Act) itself. As a result, post-conviction petitioners are guaranteed only 
the level of assistance provided by the Act. This court has interpreted the Act 
to provide only for a "reasonable" level of assistance from their attorneys 
during these proceedings. See Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 276. Thus, 
post-conviction petitioners cannot present claims of ineffective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel based on the sixth amendment in subsequent 
post-conviction petitions. In addition,
Finally, petitioners cannot obtain relief under the Act simply by "rephrasing 
previously addressed issues in constitutional terms" in their petitions. 
People v. Gaines, 105 Ill. 2d 79, 90 (1984).
In his second post-conviction petition, defendant was careful not to assert a 
specific claim of ineffectiveness on the part of Morrissey as grounds for 
granting relief under the Act. His action was prudent-the above-noted caselaw 
teaches us that such a claim would fall outside the scope of the Act.(1) 
Only those claims which assert a deprivation of a constitutional right which 
occurred at trial fall within the ambit of the Act. Defendant's second 
petition, however, once again mentions Morrissey's failure, during the first 
proceeding, to comply with Rule 651(c) and his failure to substantiate 
defendant's pro se allegations, although defendant does not ground his 
request for post-conviction relief on these purported shortcomings. Rather, he 
identifies only Bjekich and Doyle's (the 1984 sentencing attorneys) purported 
ineffectiveness as the actual basis for the relief. This bootstrapping 
explains why defendant chose to characterize the second petition as an 
amendment-any subsequent petition which solely challenged Morrissey's 
performance would not meet the criteria for relief under the Act. Moreover, the 
operation of res judicata would bar any second petition which attempted 
solely to relitigate the Bjekich/Doyle claim, for that very issue had been 
adjudicated against defendant at the initial post-conviction proceeding. In the 
words of the trial judge who denied the petition, "no evidence [was] presented 
in connection with [the] substantiation of that []claim." We affirmed that 
finding on appeal, rejecting defendant's argument that Morrissey had failed to 
comply with Rule 651(c). This determination ordinarily will bar, under the 
doctrine of res judicata, any successive claim concerning Morrissey's 
failure to substantiate defendant's pro se allegations concerning the 
prison guards. In fact, this court very recently reaffirmed this basic tenet of 
post-conviction jurisprudence in People v. Erickson, 183 Ill. 2d 213 
(1998) (foreclosing relitigation of defendant's failure to investigate claim in 
a second post-conviction proceeding where defendant had raised same claim in a 
first petition).
Apparently mindful of these rather well-settled principles, defendant now 
attempts to use our decision in Johnson in order to skirt the res 
judicata effect of our decision in Szabo III and to avoid the 
conclusion that defendant's second petition is, in reality, nothing more than an 
improper challenge to Morrissey's performance at the first post-conviction 
proceedings. Although the majority rightly rejects this argument (see slip op. 
at 5-6), I would add the following observations to the analysis.
In my view, nothing in our opinion in Johnson allows Morrissey's 
performance in the first post-conviction proceedings to form the basis for 
relief in a second proceeding. As an initial matter, I strongly question the 
propriety of relying on a case decided after a defendant has completed 
post-conviction review in order to allow that same defendant to renew claims 
which had, up until that point in time, been finally adjudicated. 
Johnson did not announce a new rule of constitutional law to which one 
might argue necessitates retroactive application. Rather, the case concerned 
only an interpretation of one of this court's own rules. Moreover, unlike the 
present case, defendant Johnson's appeal came before this court upon the 
dismissal, without an evidentiary hearing, of his first post-conviction 
petition. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 234. Therefore, this court was not 
presented with the procedural concerns which arise whenever a 
subsequent petition is filed, and, as a result, those concerns were 
necessarily absent from our analysis. Notwithstanding this important 
distinction, the specific facts in Johnson serve to further 
differentiate it from the case at bar. While Johnson's petition had been pending 
before the circuit court, Johnson's appointed counsel failed to support the 
pro se allegations with affidavits or other supporting documents, 
despite the fact that Johnson had specifically identified both witnesses and 
documents which would have supported the allegations raised in the petition. 
Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 239. Appellate counsel then filed a 
supplemental record on appeal in this court which contained the affidavit of 
Johnson's post-conviction trial attorney. In this affidavit, counsel admitted 
that he did not attempt to contact or obtain affidavits from any of the prison 
employees named in the pro se petition. Nor did he attempt to review 
the documents to which Johnson had referred. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 
245-47. Based on the allegations contained in the affidavit, appellate counsel 
argued that post-conviction counsel could not be said to have complied with Rule 
651. We agreed, determining from the affidavit that post-conviction counsel made 
no effort at all to contact the witnesses specifically identified by name in 
Johnson's pro se petition even though he had an obligation to do so 
under Rule 651(c). In addition, the record in Johnson "suggest[ed] that 
counsel may have been under the misapprehension that the post-conviction 
petition would not [have been] dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. Counsel 
may have believed that there was no need to contact witnesses named in the 
post-conviction petition until after the matter was set for an evidentiary 
hearing." Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 248-49. For this reason, we concluded 
that a remand was necessary to give counsel the opportunity to contact the 
witnesses named in the post-conviction petition. In this way, the circuit court 
could then reconsider the State's motion to dismiss the petition on the basis of 
a properly developed record. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 249.
In contrast, I note that no affidavit from attorney Morrissey has ever been 
made a part of the record in this case. Defendant's present attorneys merely 
attached the affidavits of the prison guards themselves to the self-styled 
"amended" petition. As a result, we today do not know the reasons behind 
Morrissey's decision not to produce evidence of the guards' opinions regarding 
defendant's behavior while incarcerated. Consequently, we have no objective 
basis on which to conclude, as we did in Johnson, that Morrissey did 
not meet his obligation under Rule 651(c). More importantly, no such affidavit 
was supplemented to the record when the matter of Morrissey's failure to contact 
these witnesses was first presented to this court in Szabo III back in 
1991. Therefore, this court in 1991 did not know the reason behind Morrissey's 
decision not to seek out affidavits from the guards and, as a result, we could 
not grant defendant in 1991 the type of relief we ultimately granted to Johnson 
in 1993. In light of these facts, Johnson simply does not provide this 
court with the proper basis for relaxing the res judicata effect of our 
previous holding in Szabo III.
III
In order to maintain a consistent body of law in the area of post-conviction 
review, the threshold question that must be addressed in this case is whether 
the doctrine of res judicata can, in any way, be relaxed so that this 
court can legally and legitimately reach the merits of defendant's 
claim that Bjekich and Doyle failed to investigate and offer the testimony of 
the guards at the 1984 sentencing hearing. After reviewing the precedent of this 
court, I conclude that, absent a radical departure from our previous holdings, 
we cannot do so in this case.
This court has long recognized that the Act provides a statutory remedy to 
criminal defendants who claim that substantial violations of their 
constitutional rights occurred at trial. People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 510 (1991) (and cases cited therein). As such, a proceeding under the 
Act is not an appeal per se but, rather, a collateral attack on a final 
judgment. People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1989). Thus, where a 
petitioner has previously taken a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, 
the ensuing judgment of the reviewing court will bar, under the doctrine of 
res judicata, post-conviction review of all issues actually decided by 
the court, and any other claims that could have been presented to the reviewing 
court will be deemed waived. People v. Neal, 142 Ill. 2d 140, 146 
(1990). Moreover, section 122-3 of the Act specifically states that "[a]ny claim 
of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an 
amended petition is waived." 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1992). Accordingly, this 
court has held, consistent with its own precedent and the statutory language of 
the Act, that a ruling on an initial post-conviction petition has res 
judicata effect with respect to all claims that were raised or could have 
been raised in the initial petition. People v. Free, 122 Ill. 2d 367, 
376 (1988).
Nevertheless, this court has not deemed section 122-3 to be an ironclad bar 
on multiple post-conviction petitions and has, in the past, allowed successive 
filings when the proceedings on the original petitions were said to be deficient 
in some fundamental way. See, e.g., People v. Nichols, 51 Ill. 2d 244, 246 (1972); People v. Hollins, 51 Ill. 2d 68, 70 (1972); 
People v. Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d 278 (1968). I note that Justice 
Harrison's dissent posits that "[t]he criteria for establishing that the first 
proceeding was deficient is not set forth with any precision in our case law" 
(slip op. at 23 (Harrison, J., dissenting)); however, this is, in fact, not an 
entirely accurate statement. In Flores, this court undertook a thorough 
examination of the various situations in which a defendant will attempt to bring 
a successive petition. After reviewing our precedent and the language of the 
Act, we held without dissent that
In so holding, we necessarily overruled, sub silentio, People v. 
Hollins, 51 Ill. 2d 68, 70 (1972), and People v. Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d 278 (1968), at least to the extent that those cases suggest that 
inadequate representation at the prior proceeding-standing alone-constitutes a 
fundamental deficiency. Implicit in our holding in Flores is the 
recognition that the "fundamental deficiency" alleged to have occurred in the 
prior proceeding must flow from something other than the purported ineptitude or 
inadequacy of the prior post-conviction attorney. To hold otherwise would allow 
the fundamental-deficiency exception to res judicata to swallow the 
general proscription against the use of successive petitions to assail the 
conduct of post-conviction counsel. In addition, although we acknowledged in 
Flores that concerns of "fundamental fairness" colored the inquiry into 
whether a first post-conviction proceeding was fundamentally deficient, we also 
specifically spoke to a " `cause and prejudice' " evaluation to be 
applied in such circumstances. See Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 279; 
People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 407 (1996) (Miller, J., specially 
concurring). We further recognized that, even in the absence of cause and 
prejudice, a court may, "nonetheless, entertain successive claims if necessary 
to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  
at 279. I note that the United States Supreme Court has stated that this latter 
exception serves "as `an additional safeguard against compelling an innocent man 
to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty' [citation], guaranteeing that the 
ends of justice will be served in full." McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517, 546-47, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1471 (1991). In 
acknowledging these standards, we attempted in Flores to formulate 
objective guidelines to which the lower courts could turn in determining what 
constitutes a fundamental deficiency in prior post-conviction proceedings.
In light of the guidelines recognized in Flores, I do not believe 
defendant's allegations warrant a finding that his first post-conviction 
proceeding was deficient in some fundamental way. I must point out that this is 
not a case in which defendant's first post-conviction petition was cursorily 
dismissed by the circuit court without an evidentiary hearing. Rather, defendant 
was allowed to litigate his claims in an evidentiary hearing. Defendant thus 
received an unrestricted opportunity during his first post-conviction proceeding 
to develop his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant's second 
petition alleges that Morrissey "had no strategic reason" for failing to present 
the evidence of the correctional officers. Moreover, when the State countered 
that defendant's petition was devoid of the necessary allegations which would 
permit a successive filing, defendant responded-along the same lines contained 
in his petition-that Morrissey provided him with "no representation whatsoever 
regarding the claims relating to the sentencing hearing." In essence, these 
allegations amount to nothing more than a challenge to the performance of his 
first post-conviction attorney. In my opinion, they do not establish "cause" for 
a finding of a fundamental deficiency in the prior proceeding as contemplated in 
Flores.(2) 
See also Antone v. Dugger, 465 U.S. 200, 79 L. Ed. 2d 147, 104 S. Ct. 962 (1984) (holding second successive habeas corpus petition improper 
despite argument that previous habeas counsel had inadequately and 
hastily prepared prior petition). Defendant's allegations lead only to the 
inescapable conclusion that this case presents this court with the very type of 
prior post-conviction proceeding that we, in Flores, specifically 
refused to recognize as "fundamentally deficient." See Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 282 (holding such claims to be beyond the scope of the Act). As such, 
defendant's second request for post-conviction relief should have been denied by 
the circuit court on the grounds that it was barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata.
In my view, the fact that the circuit judge in this case failed to recognize 
defendant's second petition as an invalid successive filing does not mean that 
this court is required on appeal to follow suit. For this reason and the reasons 
set forth above, I concur in Part I of the majority's analysis.
JUSTICE HEIPLE joins in this special concurrence.
JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
In 1991, this court rejected defendant's appeal from the trial court's denial 
of post-conviction relief. People v. Szabo, 144 Ill. 2d 525 (1991). Two 
years later, in People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227 (1993), this court 
granted relief to a defendant asserting the exact same claim, i.e., 
that his post-conviction counsel had violated his duty under Supreme Court Rule 
651(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c)), by failing to substantiate the defendant's 
pro se petition alleging his capital sentencing counsel had been 
ineffective for failing to call certain named prison officials to testify in 
mitigation about his good prison conduct. Today, the majority, sua 
sponte, holds that defendant may not pursue a second post-conviction 
petition, stating: "That we did not order the same remedy in defendant Szabo's 
earlier appeal, decided before Johnson, does not mean that we must now 
permit defendant Szabo to proceed with a second post-conviction petition, which 
is based, in substance, on a challenge to the performance of his initial 
post-conviction lawyer." Slip op. at 6. I cannot agree with this holding, 
particularly when defendant's life is at stake.
It is true that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et 
seq. (West 1992)) contemplates the filing of only one petition, and a 
ruling on a post-conviction petition has res judicata effect with 
respect to all claims that were raised or could have been raised in the initial 
petition. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 211 (1997); People 
v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 273-74 (1992). The majority properly observes 
that successive post-conviction petitions raise two competing interests, "the 
State's interest in providing a forum for the vindication of the petitioner's 
constitutional rights *** [and its] interest in the finality of criminal 
litigation and judgments." Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 274. Generally, the 
operation of waiver and res judicata contribute to the finality of 
criminal litigation, but this court has acknowledged that, under certain 
circumstances, these procedural bars may be ineffectual in bringing about the 
finality which ordinarily follows direct appeal and the initial post-conviction 
proceeding. See Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 275, citing People v. 
Stewart, 141 Ill. 2d 107 (1990). This court has therefore allowed 
successive filings when the proceedings in the original petition were deficient 
in some fundamental way. See, e.g., People v. Hollins, 51 Ill. 2d 68, 70 (1972) (appointed counsel on prior petition failed, in either the 
trial court or the supreme court, to amend the pro se petition so that 
petitioner's contentions could adequately be addressed); People v. 
Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d 278 (1968) (inadequate representation on first 
petition where counsel merely repeated the conclusory allegations made in 
defendant's pro se petition).
Thus, the determination to be made in this case is whether defendant's 
initial post-conviction proceeding was deficient in some fundamental way. The 
criteria for establishing that the first proceeding was deficient is not set 
forth with any precision in our case law. See Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 
278-79 (noting that fundamental fairness concerns control the question); 
Hollins, 51 Ill. 2d  at 70 (recognizing that justice and fundamental 
fairness will dictate relaxation of the bar); Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d  at 
285 (holding that bar will be excused where defendant did not receive adequate 
representation during initial post-conviction proceeding). Indeed, the author of 
the majority opinion herein has stated that a successive petition is permissible 
when the initial proceeding is deficient and "defendant can demonstrate both 
cause for his failure to present his claims in a timely manner and prejudice 
from the procedural default." People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 407 
(1996) (Miller, J., specially concurring). As these cases make clear, the 
determination regarding the deficiency of the initial proceeding is not subject 
to bright line standards; rather, the court must undertake an individualized, 
fact-dependant analysis in order to decide the propriety of any successive 
petition.
In my opinion, the record in this case demonstrates that defendant's first 
post-conviction proceeding was deficient in that it did not provide an adequate 
hearing on defendant's pro se allegations concerning the existence of 
mitigating evidence from correctional officers. The record shows that defendant 
had, as early as 1987 in his post-conviction petition, identified by name the 
guards who allegedly would have been willing to testify as mitigation witnesses 
at his 1984 sentencing hearing, had counsel Bjekich and Doyle conducted an 
adequate investigation. Despite this fact, no action was ever taken by counsel 
Morrissey during the first post-conviction proceedings to present that evidence 
in any meaningful form to the circuit court. While defendant did all that could 
be expected of him to bring the alleged constitutional deprivation to the 
attention of the court in timely fashion, his claim went unheeded. To enforce 
the procedural bar under these circumstances would be to punish defendant for 
his failure to do something more to pursue this claim. However, I am at a loss 
to conceive of what more defendant himself could have done to have his claim 
addressed. As this court has stressed, the legislature provided for counsel to 
be appointed to represent post-conviction petitioners, "not to protect them from 
the prosecutorial forces of the State, but to shape their complaints into the 
proper legal form and to present those complaints to the court." People v. 
Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 365 (1990). Through no fault of defendant, his 
claim with respect to the guards' testimony was not adequately presented during 
the initial post-conviction proceeding. Thus, I believe that proceeding was 
fundamentally deficient and the time has now come for defendant's claim to be 
heard on the merits.
The majority suggests that this court's earlier decision affirming the denial 
of defendant's initial petition "would normally be sufficient to negate any 
suggestion that the defendant is now entitled to a second opportunity to 
establish a constitutional defect in the sentencing proceedings." Slip op. at 4. 
Again, I find it significant that this defendant, acting pro se, timely 
presented this claim in 1987, providing the names of specific witnesses he 
believed would have proven his claim regarding resentencing counsel's 
ineffectiveness. This is not a case where a defendant has waited until the 
eleventh hour to debut a claim which could have been raised and addressed in 
previous proceedings. In those circumstances, the interests of finality provide 
a far more compelling reason to enforce the procedural bars which normally exist 
to preclude further review. While I recognize the salutary principles behind the 
operation of procedural bars in collateral attacks on criminal convictions, as 
well as the notions of finality that are at play in such proceedings, I believe 
that those interests must yield, under the particular facts in this case, to 
defendant's interest in vindicating his constitutional rights. See 
Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d  at 285 (this court has repeatedly held that the 
objective of finality must yield when fundamental fairness so requires).
An additional reason supports relaxation of the bar in this case. As the 
majority notes, the State does not renew before this court its contention that 
res judicata preludes defendant's second petition. The State's decision 
to abandon the argument on appeal seems to be a concession that defendant's 
initial post-conviction proceeding was deficient at least with respect to this 
issue. Certainly the circuit court, by denying the State's motion to dismiss, 
found that a deficiency had existed in the initial proceedings so as to permit 
defendant's second petition to stand. Given the State's failure to press the 
point, there is even less reason for this court to enforce the procedural bar. 
Defendant's second post-conviction petition presented the circuit court with the 
opportunity to complete defendant's constitutional challenge, begun in 1987, to 
the effectiveness of his 1984 sentencing attorneys. Therefore, on a procedural 
level, I believe the circuit court correctly heard evidence regarding 
defendant's claim that Bjekich and Doyle provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel at sentencing by failing to investigate and call the correctional 
officials named in defendant's post-conviction petition.
I further dissent from the majority's conclusion that defendant did not 
establish that this failure on the part of Bjekich and Doyle amounted to 
ineffective assistance of counsel. "In the context of a death sentencing 
hearing, the defendant must prove that counsel's representation was deficient 
and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient 
conduct, the sentencer would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances did not warrant death." People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 109 (1992), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
695, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2069 (1984). It is clear that 
counsel has a duty to investigate potential sources of mitigation evidence, or 
to have reason not to make such an investigation. People v. Griffin, 
178 Ill. 2d 65, 86 (1997); People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1, 27 (1989). If 
mitigation exists, counsel has the duty to introduce it in support of the 
defendant. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 86. As this court recently stated in 
People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 385-86 (1997):
In the instant case, defendant had served more than five years in custody for 
these charges prior to the resentencing hearing, and because his behavior during 
this period was exemplary, defense counsel had a unique opportunity to present 
the jury with this mitigation evidence in an attempt to preclude the imposition 
of the death penalty. Nevertheless, counsel made no attempt to investigate or 
present evidence of defendant's good conduct from disinterested sources readily 
available to them. Therefore, applying the above-stated precedent to the record 
herein, I would find the determination of the circuit court, that defense 
counsel had no duty to present the mitigating testimony of the five correctional 
officials, to be manifestly erroneous. See People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168, 194 (1992) (defendant satisfied first prong of Strickland by 
showing counsel's failure to investigate and present to sentencer defendant's 
mental history and his failure to investigate defendant's background with the 
information he possessed).
In presenting its findings and announcing its ruling, the circuit court 
agreed with defendant that the correctional officials were readily available as 
mitigation witnesses, had counsel investigated to locate them. However, the 
court held that Bjekich had no duty to produce these witnesses because he had 
made a reasonable choice to rely on defendant's testimony instead. I believe 
that the record conclusively establishes that, contrary to Bjekich's testimony, 
the defense plan was to have defendant testify only if the motion 
in limine were granted. The majority refuses to disturb the circuit 
court's credibility determination on this matter. But regardless of whether the 
record refutes Bjekich's claim that he believed that defendant would testify at 
his resentencing hearing, Bjekich had no excuse for failing to investigate and 
present other independent evidence about defendant's good prison record.
Bjekich testified at the post-conviction hearing that one of the defense 
goals at resentencing was to show the jury that defendant had a good prison 
record, and Bjekich recognized the importance of this evidence, stating that at 
least one juror might be inclined to vote against the death penalty if it were 
shown that defendant could serve a prison sentence without hurting other people. 
While acknowledging that it would have been helpful to have correctional 
officials testify in defendant's behalf and despite possessing a copy of 
defendant's Department of Corrections records which could have led him to 
officials willing to corroborate the mitigating information the records 
contained, Bjekich admitted he did nothing.
Nor did Bjekich even attempt to introduce the Department of Corrections 
records to establish defendant's good behavior. Rather, Bjekich stated that his 
plan at resentencing was to rely on defendant's testimony about his conduct 
while in prison to "humanize" him and show he had not been a "troublemaker." 
However, Bjekich acknowledged that defendant's credibility would be severely 
impeached because he planned to contradict his previous testimony regarding his 
participation in the murders. Additionally, as noted by the United States 
Supreme Court in Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1, 9, 106 S. Ct. 1669, 1673 (1986), the testimony of a defendant or his family 
members about his good conduct in jail is "the sort of evidence that a jury 
naturally would tend to discount as self-serving." Conversely, "[t]he testimony 
of more disinterested witnesses-and, in particular, of jailers who would have 
had no particular reason to be favorably predisposed toward one of their 
charges-would quite naturally be given much greater weight by the jury." 
Skipper, 476 U.S.  at 8, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 9, 106 S. Ct.  at 1673.
In my opinion, defense counsel's decision to forgo an investigation and rely 
solely on defendant's testimony was objectively unreasonable, as it was "neither 
the product of an informed judgment nor a strategic decision reached after 
weighing all available options." People v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 136 
(1997). Therefore, I would find that defendant satisfied the first prong of the 
Strickland test. See Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d  at 386-87 (defense 
counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence, which a 
thorough investigation of defendant's background would have revealed, could not 
be deemed a strategic decision and was representation which fell below objective 
standards of reasonableness). Further, I believe the circuit court correctly 
found that the second prong of the Strickland test was met, 
i.e., that counsel's deficient performance so prejudiced the defense as 
to deny defendant a fair sentencing hearing.
"Mitigating evidence is extremely important under the Illinois capital 
sentencing scheme. Once an aggravating factor is found sufficient to impose the 
death penalty, there must be mitigating evidence sufficient to preclude the 
imposition of the death penalty." Perez, 148 Ill. 2d  at 194. Here, 
strong mitigating evidence existed which defense counsel failed to investigate 
and introduce. The resulting prejudice to defendant is clear.
As the majority notes, in Skipper, the United States Supreme Court 
reversed a state court's ruling that correctional officials' testimony as to a 
defendant's good conduct was irrelevant and inadmissible, holding that a 
defendant's disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life 
in prison is an aspect of his character that is by its nature relevant to the 
sentencing determination in a capital case. The Court found that the defendant 
was therefore deprived of his right to place before the sentencer relevant 
evidence in mitigation of punishment, stating:
"[T]he jury could have drawn favorable inferences from this testimony 
regarding [the defendant's] character and his probable future conduct if 
sentenced to life in prison. *** [T]here is no question but that such inferences 
would be `mitigating' in the sense that they might serve `as a basis for a 
sentence less than death.' [Citation.]" Skipper, 476 U.S.  at 4-5, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 6-7, 106 S. Ct.  at 1671.
The Court concluded that "under any standard, the exclusion of the evidence 
was sufficiently prejudicial to constitute reversible error." Skipper, 
476 U.S.  at 8, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 9, 106 S. Ct.  at 1673.
While we are dealing herein with counsel's ineffectiveness rather than a 
trial court's erroneous ruling as the reason for the absence of the mitigation 
evidence, I believe the Skipper court's holding that the error is 
prejudicial "under any standard" of review demonstrates that counsel's failure 
to present this evidence meets the prejudice prong of Strickland. See 
also Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 369 (7th Cir. 1989) (failure to 
introduce character witnesses constituted ineffective assistance at capital 
sentencing hearing, particularly where at least one of the 15 available 
character witnesses was a deputy sheriff). This failure raises a serious doubt 
as to the reliability of defendant's resentencing. See Ruiz, 177 Ill. 
2d at 387-88; Perez, 148 Ill. 2d  at 194-95. Here, as in Kubat, 
867 F.2d  at 369 "[t]he introduction of testimony by a law enforcement officer 
that the defendant had a salvageable character might not have gone totally 
unnoticed by the jury."
Thus, I concur with the following findings made by the circuit court at 
defendant's evidentiary hearing:
Stated another way, there is a reasonable probability that had the jury known 
of the evidence defense counsel failed to investigate and present, the jury 
"would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances did not warrant death." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069.
I therefore conclude that defendant was deprived of the effective assistance 
of counsel at his capital resentencing hearing and I would accordingly reverse 
the judgment of the circuit court denying post-conviction relief. Defendant's 
death sentence should be vacated and this cause remanded to the circuit court 
for resentencing. Because Illinois' death penalty law is unconstitutional 
(People v. Bull, No. 81578 (November 10, 1998) (Harrison, J., 
dissenting)), the circuit court should be directed to impose a sentence other 
than death.
JUSTICE McMORROW, also dissenting:
Except as herein noted, I join in the dissenting opinion filed by Justice 
Harrison. I dissent from Justice Harrison's proffered disposition of this case. 
In my view, this cause should be remanded to the circuit court for a new 
unrestricted sentencing hearing.
JUSTICE NICKELS, also dissenting:
I join in that portion of Justice Harrison's dissent which would hold that 
defendant's death sentence should be vacated. I do not join that part of the 
dissent which reads: "Because Illinois' death penalty law is unconstitutional 
[citation], the circuit court should be directed to impose a sentence other than 
death." I believe that this cause should be remanded to the circuit court for a 
new sentencing hearing. 
Footnotes:
1. Defendant's contention, however, that 
Morrissey "had no strategic reason" for not undertaking an investigation of the 
named guards does have the familiar ring of a Strickland claim, 
i.e., counsel's decision to forgo the investigation was objectively 
unreasonable, as it was neither the product of an informed judgment nor a 
strategic decision reached after weighing all available options. As noted above, 
such a sixth amendment based claim is not cognizable under the Act. 
2. Cause, I note, has been defined as 
" ` "some objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded 
counsel's efforts" to raise the claim' in an earlier proceeding." 
Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 279 quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517, 544, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1470 (1991), quoting 
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 9 L. Ed. 2d 397, 408, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has identified 
objective factors that constitute cause to include " ` "interference 
by officials" ' that makes compliance with the State's procedural rule 
impracticable, and `a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was 
not reasonably available to counsel.' [Citation.] In addition, constitutionally 
`[i]neffective assistance of counsel ... is cause.' [Citation.] Attorney error 
short of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, does not constitute cause 
***." McClesky, 499 U.S.  at 493-94, 113 L. Ed. 2d  at 544, 111 S. Ct.  at 
1470.