Title: CALAWAY v JONES
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13900
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 1978

No. 13900 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA TIMOTHY T. CALAWAY, Plaintiff, -vs- SID JONES, Defendant. ........................................ SID JONES, Third Party Plaintiff and Appellant, -vs- PARKER IRRIGATION & SUPPLY et al., Third Party Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Honorable doel G, R&h, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver, Great Falls, Montana George N. McCabe argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondents: Marra, Wenz, Iwen and Johnson, Great Falls, Montana Alexander, Kuenning & Miller, Great Falls, Montana Edward C. Alexander argued, Great Falls, Montana Dzivi, Conklin, Johnson & Nybo, Great Falls, Montana William Conklin argued, Great Falls, Montana Cure and Borer, Great Falls, Montana Edward W. Borer argued, Great Falls, Montana Smith, Emmons, Baillie and Walsh, Great Falls, Montana Dennis P. Clarke argued, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: May 1, 1978 Decided: JUN 2 ? 197.Q M r . Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court: This i s an appeal from an order of dismissal entered in the District Court, Cascade County. This action was commenced by a complaint f i l e d on December 5, 1972, by plaintiff Timothy T. Calaway, against defendant Sid Jones. The complaint alleged Calaway leased land from Jones in 1971, t o be seeded i n potatoes. Jones agreed t o provide irrigation for the land. The parties additionally agreed on a division of crop shares. Calaway alleged Jones failed t o provide the irrigation system required and, as a result, the entire crop was l o s t . On January 3, 1973, Jones f i l e d an answer, counterclaim and third party complaint, denying responsibility for the crop loss, alleging sums due and owing him from Calaway and asserting claims seeking both affirmative relief and idemnification against Parker Irrigation & Supply, a division of Bitterroot Cannery & Wholesale Supply Company, a Montana corporation; Simpson Timber Company, a corporation; Gheen Irrigation Works, a corporation; and B. F. Goodrich Company, a corporation, third party defendants and respondents. In sum, the third party complaint alleged the irrigation system installed and furnished by respondent Parker Irrigation & Supply, and materials manufactured by the other respondents, were defective and, therefore, responsible for the crop failure. Respondents f i l e d answers, the l a s t was filed by Parker Irrigation on November 27, 1973. B y reason of crossclaims between the respondents f o r indemnity, the pleadings between respondents were not completed u n t i l April 1975. Interrogatories were sent by Jones t o a l l respondents following the i n i t i a t i o n of the third party action. The interro- gatories were completed upon the June 26, 1974, receipt of the answers of Parker Irrigation. B. F. Goodrich Company submitted interrogatories t o Jones on September 10, 1973. Upon h i s failure t o answer, Goodrich, on June 27, 1974, moved to compel answers t o its interrogatories. Jones answered the interrogatories on July 2, 1974. Jones was t o be deposed by Goodrich on March 3, 1975. However, Jones failed t o appear, and was not deposed u n t i l March 24, 1975, upon the order t o appear entered by the District Court. Jones has taken no further action i n prosecution of h i s third party claims. Finally, on May 12, 1977, Simpson Timber Company moved t o dismiss the third party complaint for want of prosecution. The other respondents joined i n the motion. A hearing on the motions was held on June 1, 1977. On June 7, 1977, the District Court granted the motions t o dismiss, finding: It* * * that the third party plaintiff has not been diligent i n the prosecution of the third party com- plaint, or i n procuring determination of the principal action and that there is no adequate excuse for the delay * * *.It Jones appeals the June 7, 1977, order of the District Court dismissing h i s third party complaint. The sole issue presented for review i s whether the District Court abused i t s discretion in dismissing the third party com- plaint for want of prosecution. The rule of c i v i l procedure which governs the dismissal of an action for failure t o prosecute i s Rule 41(b), M.R.Civ.P. It provides i n part: " I N V O L U N T A R Y DISMISSAL -- EFFECT THEREOF. For failure of the plaintiff t o prosecute or t o comply with these rules o r any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action o r of any claim against him. * * *It It is generally held, i n the absence of a s t a t u t e pre- scribing time limitations for bringing an action t o t r i a l , that the matter of dismissal for want of prosecution is a matter addressed t o the sound discretion of the t r i a l court. This Court stated i n Cremer v. Braaten, (1968), 151 Mont. 18, 19, 20, 438 P.2d 553: "It is within the discretion of the t r i a l court t o dismiss an action i f it has not been prosecuted with reasonable diligence. It is presumed the t r i a l court acted correctly and its decision w i l l not be overturned without a showing of an abuse of discretion. M.R.Civ.P., Rule 41(b); State Savings Bank v. Albertson, 39 Mont. 414, 415, 102 P. 692; Silver v. Eakins, 55 Mont. 210, 175 P. 876." I n the instant case, Jones argues the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing the cross-complaint a s respondents have shown no actual prejudice occasioned by the delay, as a l l witnesses are presently available for t r i a l . Likewise, Jones con- tends the delay attributable t o him was not exceedingly lengthy, thus f a i l i n g t o give r i s e t o a presumption of prejudice. W e cannot agree with t h i s contention i n view of the conduct of Jones during the discovery phase of the the proceedings. It is well established i n Montana law that an action may be dismissed for failure of the p l a i n t i f f t o prosecute it with due diligence, absent a sufficient showing of excuse. State ex r e l . Johnstone v. District Court, (1957), 132 Mont. 377, 319 P.2d 957; Cremer v. Braaten, supra. The unanimous weight of authority demonstrates that the rule is equally applicable t o a defendant's failure t o diligently prosecute a cross-claim or counterclaim. Seaman v. Superior Court of Marin County, (1920), 183 Ca1.47, 190 P. 441; Harris v. Harris, (1948), 65 Nev. 342, 196 P.2d 402; Pettine v. Rogers, (1958), 63 N.M. 457, 321 P.2d 638; Hanson v. Lee, (1970), 3 Wash.App. 461, 476 P.2d 550; 27 CJS.Dismissa1 & Nonsuit 565. It was i n i t i a l l y held i n Montana that mere lapse of time is insufficient i n i t s e l f t o justify a dismissal. State Savings Bank v. Albertson, (1909), 39 Mont. 414, 102 P. 692. However, i n commenting upon the rule i n Cremer v. Braaten, supra, t h i s Court stated: "Plaintiff argues that the action could not be dismissed a s defendant has shown no injury by the delay. When a plaintiff has slept on h i s cause for over twelve years the law presumes injury and places the burden on the plaintiff t o show good cause for the delay. State ex r e l . Johnstone v. District Court, 132 Mont. 377, 319 P.2d 957." 151 Mont. 20. A n unreasonable delay therefore operates t o place upon the party seeking r e l i e f the burden of demonstrating a reasonable excuse for h i s inaction. Here, however, we find the delay occasioned by Jones' in- action t o be unreasonable. Jones failed t o take any significant action towards a f i n a l determination of the case for a t l e a s t three years prior t o the dismissal, and has offered no excuse for the delay. Jones' failure t o timely respond t o certain interroga- tories, and failure t o appear a t a scheduled deposition characterize h i s inaction regarding furtherance of an ultimate resolution of h i s claim. A s no abuse of discretion i n dismissing the cross-claim has been demonstrated, the order dismissing such claim i n favor of respondents and each of them is af % + ! , W e Concur: zd $.%YCPQ Chief Justice Justices .