Title: COLIN JARED MONTGOMERY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2022-SC-0353-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: October 26, 2023

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.” PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. RENDERED: OCTOBER 26, 2023 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Supreme Court of Kentucky 2022-SC-0353-MR COLIN JARED MONTGOMERY APPELLANT ON APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT V. HONORABLE JEFF L. DOTSON, JUDGE NO. 18-CR-00078 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING Colin Montgomery appeals as a matter of right1 from the Boyle Circuit Court judgment sentencing him to thirty-five years’ imprisonment for his conviction of murder. On appeal, he alleges two instances of error require reversal of his conviction: (1) the trial court’s failure to direct a verdict in his favor on the murder charge and (2) prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments. Finding no merit in Montgomery’s allegations of error, we affirm. I. Facts and Procedural Background On March 6, 2018, Montgomery fired a shotgun three times into the torso of his wife, Jennifer, killing her on their front lawn. Montgomery and Jennifer had been experiencing marital difficulties for some time and, the day 1 KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b). 2 before the shooting, had met with a divorce attorney to sign a settlement agreement. Montgomery suspected Jennifer was having an affair and just before the shooting, Jennifer disclosed that she had been having an affair with someone Montgomery knew from high school. At trial, this case centered on whether Montgomery presented sufficient proof of the defense of Extreme Emotional Disturbance (“EED”) to warrant a conviction of first-degree manslaughter, rather than murder. Shortly before shooting Jennifer, Montgomery called his mother, Pam Woods, and had a three-minute conversation with her. Montgomery told her that Jennifer had come to the house, and he had learned that she was having an affair. Woods testified that Montgomery was hysterical and said he was going to kill Jennifer. Woods told Montgomery not to do anything stupid because his kids needed him, and she needed him too. The line then went dead. Woods shared the conversation with her dinner companions, her husband and best friend, who said Montgomery was probably just angry. Minutes later, Woods received another call from Montgomery, who informed her that he had shot Jennifer. Wood testified that was when the hysteria set in for them both. Montgomery then phoned 911 and told the dispatcher that he had shot his wife with a shotgun because she was having an affair.2 Montgomery’s 2 The tape of the 911 dispatch call was played for the jury at trial. In his brief, Montgomery states that during the call, he threatened to kill himself, said he did not want to go to jail, and told the 911 dispatcher, “I am an Iraq Vet, I lost it, I have PTSD, my wife cheated on me, and she told me to shoot her, and I fucking did.” However, the recording of the dispatch call that has been provided to us on appeal is barely audible. We are unable to discern the specific words Montgomery says but hear him screaming for help during the phone call. 3 neighbor, Michael Tyler, testified that he heard three gunshots, went outside, and saw Montgomery on the ground. Tyler asked him if he was ok, and Montgomery told him to call 911. Tyler went inside to call 911, then went back outside to check on Montgomery. He heard Montgomery say, “see what you made me do” but was unsure to whom he was speaking. Tyler testified that Montgomery sounded anxious and stressed, but he was not screaming or crying. Boyle County Sheriff Derek Robbins was the first officer to arrive at the scene. He found Montgomery sitting on the front steps with a phone in one hand and a shotgun in the other. Sheriff Robbins told him to drop the gun and walk toward him. Boyle County Deputy Kody Cloud arrived to assist Sheriff Robbins and took Montgomery into custody. Montgomery told Deputy Cloud that he and his wife had an argument and she told him she was having an affair, so he shot her with a shotgun. Jennifer died at the scene. At the Sheriff’s station, now-retired Boyle County Detective Danny Moses interviewed Montgomery, who initially said that he did not know what happened. When asked if he remembered shooting his wife, he said he did. This interview was played for the jury at trial.3 After deliberating for a while, the jury informed the trial court that it was “stuck” and asked what would happen if there was a hung jury. The court read the jurors the Allen charge4 and directed them to resume deliberating. Soon 3 Again, the recorded interview provided to us is largely inaudible. 4 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). 4 after, the jury returned on a verdict of guilty on murder and recommended a sentence of thirty-five years, which the trial court imposed. This appeal followed. II. Analysis A. Denial of motion for directed verdict/Extreme Emotional Disturbance. Montgomery argues that the trial court’s denial of his motion to direct the jury that he was acting under EED when he killed his wife constitutes reversible error. We disagree. On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony. On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). On appeal, we review the trial court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. Lopez v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Ky. 2015). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision was “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007)). 5 KRS5 507.030(1)(b) provides that an act which might otherwise be classified as murder can become first-degree manslaughter if the perpetrator acted under EED. EED is defined as “a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.” KRS 507.020(1)(a). To prove EED, the defendant must present proof that he “suffered ‘a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one’s judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from [an] impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes.’” Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 81 (Ky. 2006) (quoting McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468–69 (Ky. 1986)). Pursuant to KRS 500.070, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving every element of the case beyond a reasonable doubt but is not required to disprove any element that is entitled a defense “unless the evidence tending to support the defense is of such probative force that in the absence of countervailing evidence the defendant would be entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.” KRS 500.070(1); Spears v. Commonwealth, 30 S.W.3d 152, 154 (Ky. 2000) (“Although the Commonwealth must prove every element of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, the Commonwealth need not affirmatively disprove 5 Kentucky Revised Statues. 6 EED unless the evidence of EED is so overwhelming that it necessitates acquittal on the charge of murder.”). “An instruction on murder need not require the jury to find that the defendant was not acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance unless there is something in the evidence to suggest that he was, thereby affording room for a reasonable doubt.” Greene, 197 S.W.3d at 81. “Thus, where proof is presented that would support the finding of EED, and the absence of EED is then a statutory element, then the burden switches to the Commonwealth to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. However, “that does not mean that [the Commonwealth] has to affirmatively introduce proof of the non-existence of EED, if such proof is already present.” Id. This Court’s EED jurisprudence requires proof of a provocation or “triggering event” that caused the state of EED. Holland v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 792, 807 (Ky. 2003). A jury may find sufficient provocation even if the “triggering event” did not immediately precede the defendant’s criminal act. [T]he triggering event need only be “sudden and uninterrupted.” No definite time frame between the triggering event and the killing is required, so long as the EED remains uninterrupted. In fact, the onset of EED “may be more gradual than the flash point normally associated with sudden heat of passion.” . . . “[T]he fact that the triggering event may have festered for a time in [the defendant's] mind before the explosive event occurred does not preclude a finding . . . of extreme emotional disturbance.” It is for a jury to decide whether a triggering event has occurred and whether a defendant acted under the influence of EED. Id. (citations omitted). 7 Our review of the record reveals that the evidence in this case did not compel a jury to find that Montgomery was acting under EED when he killed his wife, but it permitted a jury to; hence, an instruction on EED was warranted. Montgomery presented evidence in support of his EED defense: he discovered Jennifer had an affair with someone he knew, and he became hysterical, as described by his mom’s recollection of her phone call with him and as evidenced in his 911 call. However, the Commonwealth presented evidence that could have convinced the jury that he was not acting under EED: Montgomery and Jennifer had been experiencing marital discord for some time and had signed divorce papers; Montgomery suspected that Jennifer was having an affair; after learning of the affair, Montgomery had a three-minute phone conversation with his mom in which he stated his intent to kill Jennifer; Montgomery placed a four-minute phone call to his mom after the shooting and told her he had done it; and Montgomery’s neighbor described his demeanor after the shooting as “anxious or stressed” but “he wasn’t screaming or crying.” Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying Montgomery’s motion for a directed verdict on his EED claim. The determination of whether Montgomery was acting under EED was properly posed to the jury. B. Commonwealth’s closing argument statements. Montgomery asserts that this case was a close call, and that the prosecutor made several statements during closing argument that 8 misrepresented the law and the facts and misled the jury into convicting him of murder, rather than first-degree manslaughter. Montgomery did not object to the prosecutor’s statements at trial, so appellate review is limited to palpable error under RCr6 10.26, which provides: A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error. To uncover manifest injustice, “a reviewing court must plumb the depths of the proceeding . . . to determine whether the defect in the proceeding was shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2006). In other words, the defect must be “so egregious that it jumps off the page . . . and cries out for relief.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 620 S.W.3d 16, 30 (Ky. 2021) (citation omitted). The law is well established that counsel is afforded wide latitude when making closing arguments. Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.3d 310, 331 (Ky. 2016). During closing remarks, the prosecutor is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and announce a theory to explain the evidence and why it supports the guilt of the defendant, as well as respond to matters raised by the defense. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 165 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Ky. 2005). 6 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure. 9 “Prosecutorial misconduct is ‘a prosecutor’s improper or illegal act involving an attempt to persuade the jury to wrongly convict a defendant or assess an unjustified punishment.’” Dickerson, 485 S.W.3d at 329 (citations omitted). When a defendant fails to make a contemporaneous objection to alleged prosecutorial misconduct, reversal is required only if the misconduct is flagrant and renders the entire trial fundamentally unfair. Id. In deciding if the improper statements are flagrant enough to require reversal, we consider: “(1) whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury or to prejudice the accused; (2) whether they were isolated or extensive; (3) whether they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the strength of the evidence against the accused.” Id. “[W]e will not reverse a conviction even for prosecutorial misconduct if, in the whole context, the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, rendering the error harmless.” Robinson v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.3d 136, 144 (Ky. 2022). In support of his claim, Montgomery cites the following excerpts from the Commonwealth’s closing remarks which he finds objectionable: As you read about extreme emotional disturbance, the whole key in this case is do you want to apply it or not? And this is not a situation where based upon the evidence you have to apply that and you have to pick manslaughter in the first degree. Because, basically, based upon the evidence, that’s letting Colin Montgomery get away with murder. You have a choice. You can pick murder if the evidence supports that or you can pick manslaughter first. * * * * [Montgomery] keeps asking Jen to the point that she says, “yes, I’m seeing someone else.” I think it actually the way the wording was. I don’t think she said on the spot “I’m in love.” 10 * * * * This is not a situation where he came in and caught her in bed with somebody else. I would agree with you if the evidence showed that, then it would not be excusable, but it would probably be manslaughter in that situation. * * * * There’s nothing there that would constitute extreme emotional disturbance. There was a verbal argument. Hurt and anger, there is case law, there is law on this, hurt and anger does not equate to extreme emotional disturbance. * * * * He talked to his mom. Now, I think this is really important. What did his mom do? Did she care enough that she felt like she should call 911? Or that she should jump in the car and start heading that way? No. Her testimony was that she mentioned it to the folks with her, whoever that was, and they said “Oh, well. He is probably just angry.” Or something like that. I am paraphrasing. I don’t remember the exact words. But she didn’t hear enough at that point to call 911 or do any other action. Because I don’t think at that point we’ve got extreme emotional disturbance. * * * * Just because you’ve got a failing marriage, all of that is sad, but this is the United States and people are touched with that every day. And that’s a sad thing. But that’s not something that should equate or enrage you to the point that you feel like you have no choice but to shoot somebody. You know, he had every opportunity to stop that. It wasn’t immediate, there was some delay. * * * * I just want you to remember, anger by itself is not extreme emotional disturbance. Hurt is not extreme emotional disturbance. It takes more, and you’ve got the definition there. And it’s just not logical, it doesn’t make sense in this situation, with these facts, to give this man an excuse to get away with murder. 11 Montgomery argues that the following two statements misled the jury: (1) the statement that in deciding whether to apply EED, the jury did not have to pick first-degree manslaughter and, based upon the evidence, that would be letting Montgomery get away with murder; and (2) if the evidence showed that Montgomery had caught the victim in bed with someone else, that would be an example of first-degree manslaughter. Neither of these remarks are a misstatement of the facts or law and certainly did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. If the jury did convict Montgomery of first-degree manslaughter, it would not be convicting him of murder, which, technically speaking, would be allowing Montgomery to “get away with murder” because he would not be found guilty of that specific crime. “Under proper facts, EED reduces murder, a capital offense under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 507.020, to first degree manslaughter, a Class B felony under KRS 507.030(1)(b).” Hargroves v. Commonwealth, 615 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. 2021). Thus, the prosecutor’s statement was not untrue, nor outside the bounds of the wide leeway afforded to counsel during closing. Second, the prosecutor’s statement that based on the evidence, first- degree manslaughter was not justified since the evidence did not show that Montgomery caught his wife in bed with someone else – a common example of first-degree manslaughter under EED – was not a misstatement of law. The example cited by the prosecutor is an act that can constitute EED, though not a comprehensive list of acts that can constitute EED. See, e.g., Holland, 114 S.W.3d at 807-08 (EED instruction warranted where defendant suffered 12 borderline personality disorder and discovered lover in bed with ex-wife instead of caring for defendant during her recuperation from back surgery like promised); Fields v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 355 (Ky. 2001) (evidence of defendant’s discovery of her out-of-wedlock pregnancy triggered murder of child sufficient to permit EED instruction). The prosecutor’s comparison of an act which has been held to warrant a finding of EED was a permissible attempt to infer that the facts at bar did not rise to that level. Montgomery further challenges the prosecutor’s characterization of the evidence as to whether Jennifer said she was merely having an affair or was in love with someone else, and the prosecutor’s insinuation that the shotgun was in a bedroom, rather than by the front door. Montgomery argues these facts bear on the existence of a triggering event, and the length of the delay between the triggering event and the shooting. What Jennifer said before she was fatally shot will never be known for sure. Whether she said she was having an affair or was in love with someone else could have been a factor the jury considered in determining the presence of EED but certainly was not the only factor. Same goes for the location of the shotgun. The strength of the evidence that Montgomery was not suffering from EED was strong; this alone would render any error in this regard harmless. On balance, the Commonwealth’s closing remarks were permissible comments on, and inferences from, the evidence. Considering that Montgomery’s killing of Jennifer was never disputed, and trial counsel did not 13 object to the closing statements, we believe they come nowhere close to constituting palpable error. Accordingly, reversal is not warranted. C. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Boyle Circuit Court. All sitting. All concur. COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Jared Travis Bewley Department of Public Advocacy COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Daniel J. Cameron Attorney General of Kentucky Courtney J. Hightower Assistant Attorney General