Title: Marcisz v. Marcisz
Citation: 357 N.E.2d 477, 65 Ill. 2d 206
Docket Number: 48029
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: November 15, 1976

65 Ill. 2d 206 (1976)
357 N.E.2d 477
PATRICIA A. MARCISZ,
v.
MATTHEW J. MARCISZ, Appellee.  (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant.)
No. 48029.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
Opinion filed November 15, 1976.
*207 William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Martin Rudman, State's Attorney, of Ottawa (James B. Zagel, Jayne A. Carr, and Anne Taylor, Assistant Attorneys General, and Rodney B. Lechwar, Assistant State's Attorney, of counsel), for the People.
Rogert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Mark W. Burkhalter, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Matthew J. Marcisz, was found guilty of contempt in the circuit court of Will County and sentenced to six months imprisonment to be served at the Illinois State Penal Farm. The appellate court reversed and remanded (32 Ill. App.3d 467), and we allowed the People's petition for leave to appeal.
The facts are stated in the appellate court's opinion and need not be repeated here. Defendant was held in contempt for repeated violation of that portion of a divorce decree which enjoined him from interfering with his former wife's occupancy of the marital residence and from otherwise molesting her. The appellate court held that the contempt was criminal rather than civil, that "defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel and his right not to incriminate himself," reversed the judgment, and remanded for a new hearing. (32 Ill. App.3d 467, 473, 474.) The People *208 contend that because the contempt stems from defendant's violation of the injunction contained in the divorce decree, "The entire contempt action is in effect a continuation of the divorce proceedings and is therefore civil in nature."
The appellate court, on its own motion, ordered that the People be "substituted as appellee" and appointed the State Appellate Defender to represent defendant. The State's Attorney of Will County moved that an order be entered "allowing The People * * * to withdraw from the * * * cause * * * inasmuch as this matter is a civil action over which the state's attorney * * * and the People * * * have no jurisdiction to appeal." The appellate court held that "this is an appropriate case for the appointment of the People as substitute appellee * * *" and denied the motion. The People contend that "The State was erroneously substituted as appellee in this civil contempt action" and that "such an appointment does not come within the statutory duties of the State's Attorney. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 14, sec. 5 (1973)."
In People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Barasch, 21 Ill. 2d 407, in considering the respondent's contention that the contempt there involved was criminal rather than civil, the court said:
In addition to the charges of repeated violation of the injunction, the petition for an order to show cause alleged that defendant had willfully failed to pay child support.
In its order the circuit court said:
The transcript of the proceedings and the circuit court's findings leave no doubt that the order was intended not to "compel obedience" to the provisions of the decree but to preserve the "dignity and authority of the court" and to punish defendant for past transgressions. We agree with *210 the appellate court that the contempt was criminal and that defendant was entitled "to notice, a reasonable opportunity to defend, the assistance of counsel [citations], and the right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and not be compelled to testify against himself. [Citations.] " 32 Ill. App.3d 467, 473.
We consider next whether the appellate court erred in substituting the People as appellee in the contempt proceedings and in denying the State's Attorney's motion to withdraw. Contempts are not crimes defined by statute and in the circuit court may be prosecuted, as in this case, by counsel for a litigant, by the State's Attorney or by an amicus curiae appointed by the court. (People v. Goss, 10 Ill. 2d 533.) It would appear that the same rule should apply to the prosecution or defense of the appeal from the order of the circuit court entered in the contempt proceeding. Section 5 of "An Act in regard to attorneys general and state's attorneys" provides that it is the duty of the State's Attorney "To commence and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments and prosecutions, civil and criminal, in the circuit court for his county, in which the people of the State or county may be concerned." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 14, par. 5.) We are of the opinion that this contempt proceeding, designed to preserve the dignity and authority of the court, and in which the sentence imposed was clearly intended to punish defendant rather than compel obedience for the benefit of his children and former wife, was an action "in which the people of the State or county may be concerned." The State's Attorney, however, is not merely a ministerial officer but is vested with a large measure of discretion. (People ex rel. Hoyne v. Newcomer, 284 Ill. 315.) In the exercise of that discretion he has the responsibility of determining what offense should be charged (People v. Rhodes, 38 Ill. 2d 389) and may exercise discretion concerning the prosecution and defense of appeals. Here, in the exercise of his discretion, the State's Attorney sought to be relieved of the appointment *211 to defend the appeal and the appellate court erred in denying the motion.
Concerning the question whether the appellate court erred in substituting the People as appellee, the People were appropriately substituted whether the appeal was to be defended by the State's Attorney or by an amicus curiae appointed by the court.
For the reasons stated the judgment of the appellate court insofar as it denied the motion of the State's Attorney for leave to withdraw is reversed and in all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.