Title: Ward v. Foster
Citation: 517 So. 2d 513
Docket Number: 57020
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 1987

517 So. 2d 513 (1987) Virginia WARD v. Juanita W. FOSTER. No. 57020. Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 4, 1987. Rehearing Denied January 13, 1988. C.R. McRae, Margaret P. Ellis, Pascagoula, for appellant. Ernest R. Schroeder, Carolyn Dohn, Bryan, Nelson, Allen, Schroeder &amp; Backstrom, Pascagoula, for appellee. Before HAWKINS, P.J., and ROBERTSON and SULLIVAN, JJ. HAWKINS, Presiding Justice, for the Court: Virginia M. Ward appeals from a final judgment in her favor against Juanita W. Foster for $3,500, later reduced by court order on a Miss.R.Civ.P. Rule 60(b)(5) motion to $1,808.50. We find her assignments of error unpersuasive and affirm. On January 15, 1982, Ward was driving south and Foster was driving north on Highway 513 in Jackson County. Foster made a left turn in front of Ward at the Interstate 10 intersection, resulting in a collision and personal injuries to Ward. Foster had liability insurance coverage with Allstate Insurance Company. On April 27, 1984, Ward filed a complaint against Foster and Allstate. The circuit court dismissed the suit against Allstate. The jury returned a verdict of $3,500 and final judgment was rendered in favor of Ward for this amount on May 28, 1985. Thereafter, on June 28, Foster moved pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure (MRCP) 60(b)(5) for relief from the judgment because of monies previously paid Ward by Allstate. At the hearing on this motion, it developed that Allstate had previously paid Ward $1,691.50 on her claim against Foster. In an order dated October 31, 1985, the circuit court reduced the verdict of the jury and the judgment thereon to $1,808.50. Ward appealed from the original and amended judgment. As necessary, we will cite and review the pertinent portions of the record in discussion of the assignments. Ward's claim that this was error is without merit. Westmoreland v. Raper and Commercial Union Insurance Companies, 511 So. 2d 884 (Miss. 1987). Following trial, by Instruction D-14-A, the court instructed the jury that the failure of Ward to call certain doctors, who had treated her for her injuries, as trial witnesses authorized the jury to infer that the doctors' testimony would have been unfavorable to the plaintiff. Ward does not contend that the instruction misstated the law, but argues that Foster was not entitled to any such instruction, because the medical privilege was waived as to these doctors. The record does not support Ward's argument. On July 27, 1984, Foster propounded interrogatories to Ward, which were answered on November 15. Interrogatories 9, 13 and 19, and their answers, as well as her answer to 23, follow: On January 22, 1985, defense counsel wrote plaintiff's counsel about her medical bills, treatment and waiver of the medical privilege. Plaintiff's counsel responded by letter of January 23, 1985, the second paragraph of which follows: Defense counsel's response to this letter was acknowledged confusion. Plaintiff's counsel was asked: "has the medical privilege been waived or has it not? We're enclosing a copy of a medical waiver which we request your client sign and return." Neither the waiver nor any substitute was forwarded. On March 15, 1985, Ward was deposed. A copy of a portion of this deposition follows: It is thus clear that Ward through her counsel failed to waive the medical privilege. A medical privilege is either waived or it is not. We do not need to address the question of whether, in granting a waiver, a party may not validly condition it upon a reasonable exercise, as for instance requiring that an inspection of books and records be made during office hours, or that a reasonable advance notice be given before an inspection. In this case, if plaintiff's counsel had desired to be present when defense counsel interviewed the doctors, he should have notified defense counsel the *516 privilege was being waived, but requested a reasonable advance notice of any interview so that he could counsel the privilege was being waived, but requested a reasonable advance notice of any interview so that he could be present. A waiver embodying that understanding should then have been executed. We might then have the question of whether Ward had effectively waived the medical privilege under the circumstances she now argues. As noted, however, we do not address this question, because the response of plaintiff's counsel was more ambiguous and uncertain than what she argues was the case. At the rate plaintiff's counsel was moving, the attorneys might still be writing one another as to whether and under what circumstances defense counsel would be permitted to interview the physicians. Moreover, defense counsel's statements at Ward's deposition show nothing approaching an effective waiver was seriously contemplated. It is true that Ward did in fact execute a medical waiver on February 16, 1982, about a month following the accident, and at a time when she probably was not represented by legal counsel. After suit was filed on April 27, 1984, it was proper for defense counsel to inquire if the medical privilege was waived. If plaintiff's counsel considered the February 16, 1982, waiver still in effect, he had an opportunity for Ward to so state in her answers to the interrogatories. It is clear he took the position no waiver was in effect. Ward argues the circuit judge erred following final judgment in amending the judgment so as to allow credit for sums already paid her by Foster. Several months prior to trial Foster moved the court to amend her pleadings to plead credit for payments Allstate had paid on her claim. The motion to allow such amendment, together with a post-trial hearing to determine the amount, was sustained at the beginning of trial. A jury verdict for $3,500 was rendered May 28, 1985, and judgment entered thereon. On June 7 Ward moved for a new trial on damages only, denied by court order dated June 21. On that same date a notice of appeal was filed. On June 27 following Foster filed a motion for relief from judgment on the amount paid. Following a hearing on the motion, at which time Ward argued the circuit court had lost jurisdiction because a notice of appeal and appeal bond had been filed, the court sustained the motion, after first ascertaining the appeal record had not been transmitted to this Court. The court granted relief from the judgment by order dated October 31, 1985, crediting the former judgment of $3,500 with $1,691.50, thus rendering final judgment in the amount of $1,808.50. The circuit court's order was based upon MRCP 60(b)(5), which reads in pertinent part: The circuit judge clearly had authority to correct his judgment under Rule 60(b)(5), and committed no error in doing so. Prior to the enactment of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, the perfection of an appeal deprived the trial court of authority to correct judgments. Gatlin v. Cook, 380 So. 2d 236 (Miss. 1980); Crocker v. Farmers &amp; Merchants Bank, et al., 293 So. 2d 444 (Miss. 1974). The adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, however, gave trial courts the authority in certain specified circumstances to correct judgments even though an appeal has been perfected. *517 Brinnon v. Wilson, 485 So. 2d 301 (Miss. 1986), held otherwise, and we now recognize our holding in that case to be a misapprehension of the Rule. Therefore, Brinnon v. Wilson is expressly overruled. We have carefully examined all remaining assignments of error, and find them to be without merit. There being no reversible error, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON, GRIFFIN and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur. DAN M. LEE, P.J., dissents without written opinion. [1] References are to page number of the deposition, made a part of the record through this Court sustaining a suggestion of diminution of record on July 30, 1986.