Title: Ehle v. Prosser
Citation: 197 N.W.2d 458
Docket Number: 43138
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: May 5, 1972

197 N.W.2d 458 (1972) Fayette EHLE, et al., Appellants, v. Margaret K. PROSSER, et al., Respondents. No. 43138. Supreme Court of Minnesota. May 5, 1972. Rehearing Denied May 31, 1972. *459 William A. Lindquist, Winona, for appellants. Peterson, Challeen, Delano &amp; Thompson, Winona, for respondents. Heard before KNUTSON, C. J., and OTIS, ROGOSHESKE, and TODD, JJ. TODD, Justice. Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Winona County denying their claims to certain disputed property by reason of adverse possession or establishment of boundary lines as provided by our statutes. Plaintiffs challenge the trial court's holding that payment of real estate taxes for 5 years is an absolute prerequisite in all cases for establishing title by adverse possession. The evidence supports the claim of plaintiffs to title to the disputed property, and the decision of the trial court is reversed. Plaintiffs Kay Ehle Kobus and James Ehle are the fee owners, subject to a life estate in plaintiff Fayette Ehle, of the following described property situated in Winona County, Minnesota: Defendants, brother and sister, are the record owners of the following described property adjacent to the above-described property: Plaintiffs acquired title to their property under a probate decree in the estate of Mayda O. Roesner on September 25, 1968. Mrs. Roesner acquired title on May 31, 1957, from the estate of her husband, Louis G. Roesner, who acquired title to the property by deed dated June 30, 1920. Defendants acquired title to their property by probate deed from the estate of Theodore Heck dated September 3, 1948. Theodore Heck, Alfred Meier, and Otto Weibel owned both properties prior to the conveyance in 1920 to Louis Roesner. Theodore Heck subsequently acquired the interest of Meier and Weibel on December 17, 1942. Louis Roesner built a year-round home on his property in 1928. In 1936 Mr. Roesner married Mayda Ehle, the mother of plaintiff Fayette Ehle. At this time Mr. Roesner made substantial improvements to his property and to a portion of Lot 4 of the above-described property of the defendants lying easterly of the property of which Roesner was record owner. The disputed property consists of the westerly 37 feet of the defendants' property, the parties having stipulated to the location of the common boundary line between Lots 4 and 5 following a survey of plaintiffs' property. In 1936 when Mr. Roesner made improvements to his home, he also landscaped his yard, including the disputed area. He established a parking area on the easterly edge of the disputed area; constructed a stone walkway from that parking area to his home; placed two stone monuments at the beginning of the stone walkway; placed, and planted flowers in, a 3-foot urn just south of the above monuments; erected clothes poles near the easterly edge of the disputed area, constructing a walkway from the clothes poles area to his home; planted three sets of hedges, two parallel with the clothes pole area and one near the parking area; planted grass in the disputed area; and maintained the area. Sometime thereafter, Mayda Roesner had a tree removed in the disputed area, and *461 there appeared on one of the trees in the disputed area a sign placed there by Mr. Roesner, saying "PrivateKeep Out." There is no evidence that the defendants or their predecessors in interest in any way objected or asserted any claim to the disputed property prior to 1966, at which time defendants asserted ownership. The dispute arising therefrom led to this litigation. Defendants claim that they were aware of the true location of the property line at the time of their acquisition of title in 1948, but admit that they never communicated this alleged knowledge to the plaintiffs or any of their predecessors in title. There is some evidence that the defendants on occasions used the clothes poles and the parking area, but there is no evidence that this use was under a claim of ownership. Further, it appears that defendant Margaret Prosser in 1965 removed one of the hedges planted on the easterly side of the clothes pole area and adjacent to the disputed boundary line because the hedge had suffered damage in the 1965 flood, but she admitted that she caused this removal to be made for esthetic reasons and not by reason of any claim of ownership. The parcels of real estate of the plaintiffs and the defendants were separately assessed and taxed. There was no separate assessment or taxation of the 37-foot strip of disputed property. There is no evidence that either the plaintiffs or the defendants intended that the roadway easement reserved in the deed of the plaintiffs' predecessors in title across Lots 3 and 4 of Block 22, Village of Homer, would be affected in any way by this litigation. The matter was tried before the court without a jury on October 10 and 11, 1968, the Honorable Arnold Hatfield presiding. The court entered its findings in favor of the defendants on November 26, 1968, and the plaintiffs moved for amended findings or a new trial before Judge Hatfield on December 9, 1968. On September 1, 1969, without ruling on plaintiffs' motion, Judge Hatfield retired for reasons of ill health. Subsequently, by appointment of the chief judge of the judicial district, Judge Hatfield served as a retired judge from January 26, 1970, to June 30, 1970. On July 8, 1970, he entered his order correcting some typographical errors as to direction in the original order, but otherwise denying plaintiffs' motion. Thereafter, plaintiffs moved the court, the Honorable Glenn E. Kelley presiding, for an order adjudging the amended findings of Judge Hatfield dated July 8, 1970, null and void, and asking for a rehearing of plaintiffs' original motion for amended findings or a new trial. At the same time, a supplemental motion was filed asking for amended findings or a new trial. Both motions were denied, and judgment was entered in favor of defendants on April 5, 1971, adjudging defendants the owners of the disputed land and holding that plaintiffs had no interest whatever in the property of the defendants, a determination which necessarily terminated the easement reserved in the original deed. From this judgment and the orders denying their motions for a new trial, the plaintiffs appeal. Plaintiffs question the validity of Judge Hatfield's order of July 8, 1970, upon which the judgment is based, since his appointment as a retired judge had expired before that date. We do not reach the issue, since this case will be disposed of on other grounds. 1. The trial court in a memorandum accompanying its order of November 26, 1968, stated that the plaintiffs, in order to acquire title to land by adverse possession, must pay the taxes for 5 consecutive years on the land being acquired by adverse possession. This statement is contrary to our statutes and decisions on this subject and is in error. Minn.St. 541.02 provides: Claims relating to boundary lines of lands and claims to lands not assessed for taxation as separate tractsboth of which are presented in this caseare clearly exempt from the statutory provisions requiring the payment of taxes. Mellenthin v. Brantman, 211 Minn. 336, 1 N.W.2d 141 (1941); Skala v. Lindbeck, 171 Minn. 410, 214 N.W. 271 (1927); Riley v. Kump, 170 Minn. 58, 212 N.W. 13 (1927); Fredericksen v. Henke, 167 Minn. 356, 209 N.W. 257, 46 A.L.R. 785 (1926); Kelley v. Green, 142 Minn. 82, 170 N.W. 922 (1919). 2. In order to establish title by adverse possession, the disseizor must show, by clear and convincing evidence, an actual, open, hostile, continuous, and exclusive possession for the requisite period of time which, under our statute, is 15 years. Subjective intent to take land adversely is not essential in this state and title by adverse possession may be obtained even though the disseizor does not intend to take land not belonging to him so long as he does intend to exclude all others. Engquist v. Wirtjes, 243 Minn. 502, 504, 68 N.W.2d 412, 415 (1955). It is sufficient that the land is occupied by mistake. Mellenthin v. Brantman, 211 Minn. 336, 341, 1 N.W.2d 141, 143; Skala v. Lindbeck, supra. In Kelley v. Green, 142 Minn. 82, 86, 170 N.W. 922, 923, we quoted with approval the language of Seymour, Sabin &amp; Co. v. Carli, 31 Minn. 81, 16 N.W. 495 (1883): In Cool v. Kelly, 78 Minn. 102, 104, 80 N.W. 861 (1899), this court said: Similarly, the requirement of "hostile" possession does not refer to personal animosity or physical overt acts against the record owner of the property but to the intention of the disseizor to claim exclusive ownership as against the world and to treat the property in dispute in a manner generally associated with the ownership of similar type property in the particular area involved. Norgong v. Whitehead, 225 Minn. 379, 31 N.W.2d 267 (1948); Thomas v. Mrkonich, 247 Minn. 481, 78 N.W.2d 386 (1956); Skala v. Lindbeck, supra. The evidence is undisputed that the possession of plaintiffs and their predecessors in title was open and actual and continuous from at least 1936 to 1966, when defendants made their first claim of ownership. The occasional use of the clothes line *463 and the parking area by defendants and their predecessors in title was minimal in nature, and there is no evidence that it was ever made under a claim of ownership so as to defeat plaintiffs' claim that their possession of the disputed property was exclusive. Plaintiffs and their predecessors in title improved the property, maintained the property, and at all times treated it as property owned by them. 3-4. Defendants claim that the use was permissive and not adverse. The trial court found that the original use was permissive. The evidence does not sustain this finding. This court has distinguished between permissive use and acquiescence. In Dozier v. Krmpotich, 227 Minn. 503, 507, 35 N.W.2d 696, 699 (1949), our court held: It is clear from the evidence in this case that irrespective of whatever relationship existed between predecessor owners of the property, defendants, who owned the property from 1948 to 1966, silently permitted and thus acquiesced in the acts of ownership of plaintiffs and their predecessors in title for 18 years, a period sufficient to establish title by adverse possession in the plaintiffs under our statute. In Minnesota adverse possession of land for the period of time prescribed by the statute of limitations not only bars the remedy but practically extinguishes the right of the party having the paper title and vests a perfect title in the adverse holder. Dean v. Goddard, 55 Minn. 290, 56 N.W. 1060 (1893); McArthur v. Clark, 86 Minn. 165, 90 N.W. 369 (1902); Ross v. Cale, 94 Minn. 513, 103 N.W. 561 (1905); Fredericksen v. Henke, 167 Minn. 356, 209 N.W. 257, 46 A.L.R. 785 (1926); Mellenthin v. Brantman, 211 Minn. 336, 1 N.W.2d 141 (1941). Having concluded that plaintiffs have established title to the disputed property by adverse possession, it is not necessary to consider the evidence or cases involving *464 establishment of a practical boundary line under Minn.St. 559.23. There is no evidence in this case which would support the conclusion of the trial court eliminating the roadway easement reserved in the original deed to the plaintiffs' property. That conclusion is without merit. Reversed and the judgment appealed from is vacated and the matter remanded to the trial court for issuance of amended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment consistent with this opinion. MacLAUGHLIN, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. It is ordered that the taxation of costs and disbursements entered on May 15, 1972 in favor of appellants in the amount of $598.40 be and hereby is vacated. It is ordered that the petition for rehearing be and hereby is denied.