Title: Commonwealth v. Alleyne
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11614
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 2016

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SJC-11614 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KYLE ALLEYNE. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     March 11, 2016. - July 15, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Jury and Jurors.  Evidence, Photograph, Inflammatory 
evidence, Relevancy and materiality.  Practice, Criminal, 
Capital case, Jury and jurors, Interrogation of jurors, 
Instructions to jury.  Search and Seizure, Consent.  
Intoxication. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 21, 2010. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Thomas P. Billings, J. 
 
 
 
Chauncey B. Wood for the defendant. 
 
Casey E. Silvia, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
William Trach & Laura Carey, for Massachusetts Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Paul R. Rudof, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & 
David Lewis, for Committee for Public Counsel Services & 
another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  The defendant, Kyle Alleyne, was convicted by a 
jury of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme 
2 
 
atrocity or cruelty1 for the stabbing death of his wife, Heather 
Alleyne, and of assault and battery of Josh Elinoff, the father 
of the victim's newborn baby.2  On appeal, the defendant 
challenges:  (1) the judge's failure to conduct a voir dire of 
an inattentive juror; (2) evidentiary rulings allowing the 
admission of numerous autopsy photographs, statements of the 
defendant, and the victim's purse; (3) the judge's modification 
of jury instructions pursuant to Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 
442 Mass. 423, 447-448 (2004); and (4) the judge's failure to 
alter the model instructions for extreme atrocity or cruelty.  
We affirm the defendant's convictions, and we discern no basis 
to exercise our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.3 
 
Background.  We summarize the evidence as the jury could 
have found it, reserving certain facts for later discussion.  
The victim met the defendant, who was six years older than she 
was, when she was thirteen or fourteen years of age.  Insofar as 
relevant here, the two had a dating relationship.  After the 
victim graduated from high school she and the defendant got 
                     
 
1 The defendant was also tried on the theory of deliberate 
premeditation, but the jury found him not guilty. 
 
 
2 The judge granted the defendant's motion for a required 
finding of not guilty on the charge of reckless endangerment of 
a child. 
 
 
3 We acknowledge amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
3 
 
married in March, 2009.  She gave birth to their daughter in 
June, 2009. 
 
The victim and her daughter moved back to her father's 
house for a period between October and December, 2009.  At that 
time, the victim's brother and one of his friends, Elinoff, also 
lived in the father's house.  The victim told Elinoff that her 
relationship with the defendant was "over and she was getting a 
divorce," and she and Elinoff engaged in a sexual relationship 
that ended when the victim moved back in with the defendant. 
 
Within one month after returning to live with the 
defendant, the victim learned that she was pregnant.  She gave 
birth to a baby girl on July 23, 2010.  She and the defendant 
did not name the baby. 
 
The defendant suspected that he might not be the father of 
the baby and on July 26, he and the victim submitted to a 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test to determine paternity.  The 
results, establishing that the defendant was not the father, 
became available on August 1.  On August 2, the victim called 
Elinoff to inform him that she had given birth to a baby and 
that he was the father.  Elinoff, who had not spoken to the 
victim since she left her father's house to resume living with 
the defendant, responded that he would help in any way that he 
could.  After this conversation, however, the victim sent him 
text messages stating that she and the defendant had decided to 
4 
 
give the baby up for adoption.  Elinoff responded that he would 
take the baby instead, and he arranged to meet the victim the 
following day. 
 
The victim met Elinoff outside her apartment complex during 
the evening hours of August 3, bringing with her the baby and 
baby supplies.  The two sat in Elinoff's vehicle for 
approximately two hours.  They agreed on a name for the baby.  
Elinoff asked for a letter authorizing custody of the baby until 
his name appeared on the birth certificate.  The victim went 
back to her apartment and came out with a document.  At one 
point, the defendant followed the victim out of the apartment 
and "tried to attack" Elinoff by "yelling," and chasing and 
hitting his vehicle.  Elinoff telephoned 911 as he drove away 
with the baby but hung up when the operator answered. 
 
In the late evening hours of August 3 and early morning 
hours of August 4, Elinoff corresponded with the victim and the 
defendant verbally and through text messages from the 
defendant's cellular telephone.4  The victim explained that her 
telephone had been "smashed."  On August 4, Elinoff learned that 
he needed to have a "denial of paternity" form signed by the 
                     
 
4 Josh Elinoff had communicated with the victim about a time 
to meet the following day.  During one of the calls, the victim 
"handed the [tele]phone" to the defendant.  The defendant told 
Elinoff that he was angry at him for "[r]uining his family and 
that he hated [him]."  The defendant "eventually calmed down."  
Elinoff and the victim agreed to meet on August 4 at 11:30 A.M. 
but the victim later canceled. 
5 
 
victim and the defendant in order to be able to file a birth 
certificate.  He spoke to the victim at approximately 5:30 P.M. 
and scheduled a meeting to take place the next day to obtain 
notarized signatures from the victim and defendant on the 
paternity form. 
 
The victim was last heard from on August 4, at 
approximately 10 P.M., when she telephoned her father's girl 
friend to try to arrange a meeting the following day to visit 
her father, who was hospitalized with a serious illness. 
 
On August 5, Elinoff drove to the victim's apartment 
complex at the arranged time.  He did not know which apartment 
unit was the victim's so he called the defendant's cellular 
telephone and waited outside for about thirty minutes before 
leaving.  That evening and the next day, the defendant 
telephoned two relatives to whom he had not spoken for at least 
one year.  One was an aunt who lived in Florida.  He told her 
that he was going to take a bus with his daughter to visit her. 
 
At around noon on August 6, Elinoff went back to the 
apartment complex, where a group of children pointed him to the 
correct apartment.  He "hammered on the [apartment] door" for 
five to ten minutes before the defendant answered and came out 
into the hallway, shutting the door behind him.  The defendant 
stated that he had not heard from the victim for a few days, but 
he would sign his portion of the paternity form if Elinoff came 
6 
 
back in a few hours.  The victim's mother also came by the 
apartment that afternoon, looking for the victim.  The defendant 
opened the door "a crack," just "enough for his face to get 
through to talk to [her]," and said that the victim "took off," 
probably to see Elinoff or her grandmother. 
 
Elinoff returned to the apartment at approximately 3 P.M.  
The defendant met him outside, and explained that he did not 
have a car seat for his daughter so he would leave her in the 
apartment.  The two drove to a nearby bank to secure the 
services of a notary public for the paternity form.  The 
defendant accused Elinoff of "ruining his family" and, in the 
bank's parking lot, read a letter written by the victim to the 
baby that contained derogatory statements about Elinoff.  The 
defendant punched Elinoff in the face, knocking out two of his 
teeth, and then he ran away.  Elinoff telephoned 911 at 
3:43 P.M.  When the police arrived, Elinoff reported what had 
happened and told them that the defendant had left his young 
daughter alone at the apartment.5 
 
After leaving the bank parking lot, the defendant went to a 
local restaurant.  A taxicab picked him up there at 
approximately 4 P.M. and drove him to three stores before 
                     
 
5 In response to Elinoff's report, a Framingham police 
officer went to the defendant's apartment and knocked on the 
door.  The officer left after three to five minutes when he was 
unable to gain entry. 
7 
 
dropping him off at his apartment.  During those stops, the 
defendant purchased bleach, trash bags, gloves, disinfectant 
wipes, packing tape, a clothesline, a mattress pad, a sleeping 
bag, a lighter, fuel, and a car seat.  He made a reservation 
with the taxicab for that evening, and at approximately 
7:30 P.M., the taxicab driver drove the defendant and his 
daughter to an area where there were two adjacent local hotels. 
 
At approximately 8:40 P.M. that evening, two Framingham 
police officers went to a local hotel for a well-being check on 
a child after being alerted by the hotel clerk that an 
intoxicated man checked into the hotel with a young child.  The 
officers went to the defendant's hotel room and spoke to the 
defendant, who was clumsy and had an alcohol odor but was able 
to converse with and understand the officers. 
 
While conducting a check on the child, the officers found a 
woman's purse inside of a grocery bag containing a half-empty 
bottle of liquor.  The purse contained two identification cards 
with the victim's photograph and name.  The defendant explained 
that the purse belonged to his daughter's mother, that she had 
recently given birth to another child that was not his, and that 
she no longer wanted anything to do with this daughter.  The 
defendant stated that the daughter's mother was not home because 
she was "out whoring around" and stated that he and the daughter 
had been homeless for approximately four weeks.  The officers 
8 
 
called the Department of Child and Family Services, and the 
defendant's mother and grandmother were called to the hotel to 
assist with the child.  The defendant's mother took the 
defendant's child home with her, and the defendant left with his 
grandmother. 
 
At the defendant's request, his grandmother dropped him off 
at a train station.  On August 8, he telephoned his aunt from 
Atlanta, Georgia, and requested money.  She asked him to contact 
her later that evening, but she did not hear from him again. 
 
On August 9, at approximately 4:30 P.M., the victim's 
mother went to the victim's apartment because of her concern 
that no one had heard from the victim since August 4.  When 
there was no answer at the door, she called the police and 
requested a well-being check.  The police gained entry to the 
apartment, where there was an odor consistent with a decomposing 
body.  In the corner of the second bedroom, under a blanket, was 
a sleeping bag with a trash bag closing off one end and sealed 
by tape.  Insects were flying above. 
 
State police transported the body to the medical examiner's 
office in its wrapped condition, where it was positively 
identified as the victim.  The sleeping bag and trash bags 
covering the victim matched the items purchased by the defendant 
on August 6.  A State medical examiner performed an autopsy on 
August 11, determining that there were thirteen stab wounds to 
9 
 
the victim's body, including cuts to the carotid artery and 
jugular vein.  The cause of death was loss of blood and oxygen. 
 
Also on August 11, Framingham police entered a warrant for 
the defendant's arrest into a national database maintained by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  On August 14, police 
officers in Laredo, Texas, informed State police that the 
defendant had been detained after he had walked across the 
border from Mexico.  Later that day, a State trooper and a 
Framingham detective flew to Texas and interviewed the 
defendant.  The defendant waived his Miranda rights as well as 
his rights pursuant to Commonwealth v. Rosario, 422 Mass. 48, 56 
(1996).6  He spoke to the officers during a recorded 
interrogation, telling them that he was unaware of the victim's 
death.  On August 15, the defendant waived extradition on the 
murder charge, and on August 16, the officers took custody of 
the defendant.   While awaiting the return trip to Massachusetts, 
the officers read and obtained a waiver from the defendant of 
his Miranda rights.  The defendant stated, "I've never been so 
happy to be arrested in my whole life."  The State trooper asked 
                     
 
6 The Rosario rule provides that "[a]n otherwise admissible 
statement is not to be excluded on the ground of unreasonable 
delay in arraignment, if the statement is made within six hours 
of the arrest (day or night), or if (at any time) the defendant 
made an informed and voluntary written or recorded waiver of his 
right to be arraigned without unreasonable delay."  Commonwealth 
v. Rosario, 422 Mass. 48, 56 (1996). 
10 
 
what he meant, and the defendant responded, "Mexico is a fucked 
up place.  It was fucking crazy over there." 
 
After arriving in Massachusetts, Framingham police officers 
transported the defendant to the police station for booking.  
The State trooper and the Framingham detective who had 
accompanied the defendant from Texas interviewed him, and the 
defendant stated "pretty emphatically that he did not want to be 
recorded."  The defendant signed new forms waiving his Miranda 
rights as well as his rights pursuant to the Rosario rule.  
During this interview, the defendant stated that he did not 
think that Elinoff was "capable of killing his wife"; he 
detailed the circumstances of their temporary separation, and he 
stated that he was not surprised by the DNA result. 
 
At trial, the defendant testified that a third-party 
culprit, probably Elinoff, killed the victim.7  According to the 
defendant, Elinoff was motivated by anger that the victim wanted 
to give the baby up for adoption instead of allowing him to keep 
her.  The defendant also suggested to the jury that shortcomings 
in the police investigation created reasonable doubt that he had 
committed the murder.  In his testimony, the defendant admitted 
that he and the victim got into a minor "argument" on the 
evening of August 4 regarding the victim's desire to take the 
                     
 
7 The police interviewed Elinoff for five hours on the night 
that the body was found.  The police also searched his vehicle. 
11 
 
baby back from Elinoff and give her up for adoption.  After the 
argument, the defendant left the apartment with a bottle of 
liquor to drink in an area under a bridge where people gathered.  
He woke up when it was light out and walked the mile back to the 
apartment.  He went into the bedroom and saw the victim's body.  
He decided to leave town instead of calling the police because 
he knew he would be the prime suspect.  He bought supplies so 
that he could plan a "goodbye ceremony" for the victim and 
wrapped her in those items and her "favorite blanket." 
 
Discussion.  1.  Juror attentiveness.  The defendant argues 
that the judge abused his discretion in failing to conduct a 
voir dire of an inattentive juror and, because this error is 
structural, he is entitled to a new trial.  On the tenth day of 
trial, the prosecutor alerted the judge that the juror in seat 
number three "appears to be struggling to remain awake through 
the entire testimony."8  The judge responded that he had not 
noticed, but he would "keep an eye" on the juror and he 
concluded that he was "not going to fiddle with the alternates 
without good cause, but I think maybe I'll take [the juror] off 
the list of potential forepeople."  The prosecutor and defense 
counsel accepted this suggestion. 
                     
 
8 The prosecutor made the same comment regarding the juror 
in seat number twelve.  Because juror number twelve was released 
from service prior to deliberations for a work emergency, we do 
not analyze any allegations regarding that juror's 
attentiveness. 
12 
 
 
A defendant's right to a constitutionally fair trial may be 
impaired by a juror sleeping through a significant portion of 
the trial.  Commonwealth v. McGhee, 470 Mass. 638, 645-646 
(2015), citing Commonwealth v. Dancy, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 175, 182 
(2009).  "A judicial observation that a juror is asleep, or a 
judge's receipt of reliable information to that effect, requires 
prompt judicial intervention to protect the rights of the 
defendant and the rights of the public, which for intrinsic and 
instrumental reasons also has a right to decisions made by alert 
and attentive jurors."  Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 Mass. 61, 
78 (2010), quoting Dancy, supra at 181.  "[N]ot every complaint 
regarding juror attentiveness requires a voir dire," however, 
and a judge has substantial discretion in this regard.  McGhee, 
supra at 644, quoting Beneche, supra.  The defendant bears the 
burden to demonstrate that a judge's response was "arbitrary or 
unreasonable."  McGhee, supra. 
 
Although the defendant now argues that the judge was 
required to hold a voir dire, the defendant has not met his 
burden to demonstrate that the judge acted unreasonably in 
deciding instead to remove the juror from the list of potential 
forepersons and "keep an eye" on the juror.  The defendant 
relies on McGhee, 470 Mass at. 642, 643, 645-646, where we 
vacated a defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial 
because the judge, based on his own "fail[ure] to observe any 
13 
 
sleepiness," denied requests by the prosecutor and defense 
counsel to hold a voir dire after receiving a reliable report 
that a juror had been snoring and "sound asleep" during the 
presentation of evidence. 
 
This case is distinguishable from McGhee for two reasons.  
First, in McGhee, the report was that the juror was asleep.  
Here, the report was simply that the juror was "struggling to 
stay awake."  Where a judge has only tentative information that 
a juror may be sleeping, it is sufficient to note the report and 
monitor the situation.  See Beneche, 458 Mass. at 78-79.  
Second, the prosecutor and defense counsel in this case agreed 
with the judge's plan, indicating that neither considered the 
suggestion of monitoring to be particularly prejudicial.9  See 
Commonwealth v. Lucien, 440 Mass. 658, 664 (2004) ("absence of 
an objection suggests the lack of any prejudice from the judge's 
practice"). 
 
2.  Evidentiary issues.  a.  Autopsy photographs.  The 
defendant challenges as unduly prejudicial the admission, over 
counsel's objection, of nineteen photographs and the judge's 
failure to give a contemporaneous limiting instruction.  In 
particular, the defendant contends that the autopsy photographs 
depicting close-up and medium distance views of the thirteen 
                     
 
9 Defense counsel indicated that he would watch the juror; 
he, the prosecutor, and the judge made no further mention of the 
attentiveness of this juror. 
14 
 
stab wounds to the victim's body and the effect of decomposition 
were unnecessarily gruesome and prejudicial.  "The question 
whether the inflammatory quality of a photograph outweighs its 
probative value and precludes its admission is determined in the 
sound discretion of the trial judge."  Commonwealth v. Amran, 
471 Mass. 354, 358 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Pena, 455 
Mass. 1, 12 (2009).  We defer to the judge's exercise of 
discretion unless the judge has made "'a clear error of judgment 
in weighing' the factors relevant to the decision, . . . such 
that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives" (citations omitted).  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 
Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
 
Recognizing the heightened risk of prejudice from autopsy 
photographs depicting a body in a state of decomposition, we 
have cautioned that such photographs should be admitted only if 
the judge determines that "they are important to the resolution 
of any contested fact in the case."  Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 
382 Mass. 86, 106 (1980).  Here the autopsy photographs 
depicting the thirteen stab wounds to the victim's body in a 
state of decomposition and the location of the body at the crime 
scene were indisputably probative of extreme atrocity or cruelty 
and premeditation, the theories of murder on which the defendant 
was tried.  It is settled law "that photographs indicating the 
force applied and portraying the injuries inflicted may properly 
15 
 
be admitted on the issue of whether the murder was committed 
with extreme atrocity or cruelty, as well as on the issue of 
premeditation and deliberation."  Commonwealth v. Meinholz, 420 
Mass. 633, 635 (1995), and cases cited.  In considering the 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, the jury would be 
required to consider the factors listed in Commonwealth v. 
Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983).  Of those factors, the 
autopsy photographs are probative of:  "consciousness and degree 
of suffering of the victim, extent of physical injuries, number 
of blows, manner and force with which delivered, instrument 
employed, and disproportion between the means needed to cause 
death and those employed."  Id.  The photograph depicting the 
victim's body surrounded by trash bags was relevant to 
concealment and, thus, to the defendant's consciousness of 
guilt.  The photographs depicting the advanced state of 
decomposition of the victim's body were relevant to the time of 
death which, based on reasonable inferences, could have occurred 
several days before the body was found and before the defendant 
fled to Mexico.  See Commonwealth v. Nadworny, 396 Mass. 342, 
366-367 (1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986). 
 
The judge properly weighed the probative value of the 
photographs against the prejudice to the defendant.  Because 
photographs that depict a decomposing body may be more 
inflammatory, "special caution" is warranted in the admission of 
16 
 
such photographs.  Commonwealth v. Cardarelli, 433 Mass. 427, 
431 (2001).  Having determined that the photographs were 
"important to the resolution of . . . contested fact[s] in the 
case," Bastarache, 382 Mass. at 106, the judge appropriately 
determined that the prejudice could be acceptably mitigated and 
did so. 
 
A judge may mitigate prejudice in several ways:  "alerting 
the venire during jury selection that graphic photographs might 
be admitted in evidence, and [asking] potential jurors if that 
might cause anyone particular difficulty"; limiting the number 
of photographs admitted; prohibiting the Commonwealth from 
displaying the photographs on a high-resolution video screen; 
and instructing the jury that they should not be swayed by 
emotion by the introduction of the photographs.  Amran, supra at 
358.  In the exercise of discretion in handling the admission of 
autopsy photographs, a judge is not required to take all of 
these steps.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo, 431 Mass. 
360, 362-363 & n.2 (2000), S.C., 447 Mass. 1017 (2006) (voir 
dire questioning and contemporaneous instructions "appropriate 
precautionary steps" for introduction of photographs showing 
victim's injuries); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 428 Mass. 455, 465 
(1998) (absence of limiting instruction not "sufficient to 
render the admission of the photographs error"); Nadworny, 396 
Mass. at 366-367 (no abuse of discretion where judge "diligently 
17 
 
reviewed the photographs, eliminating one as redundant," and 
gave limiting instruction regarding depictions of "badly 
decomposed body of the deceased in the fetal position in which 
it had been bound").  We need only determine that steps taken by 
the judge sufficiently mitigated the prejudice.  Jackson, 428 
Mass. at 465 (mitigating factors "considered in determining 
whether the photographs were more prejudicial than probative"). 
 
Here, the judge questioned the venire during voir dire to 
weed out those jurors who would have difficulty in remaining 
impartial after viewing the graphic autopsy photographs.  The 
judge also carefully reviewed the twenty autopsy photographs 
submitted by the prosecutor, out of the more than 300 
photographs that were available, and he winnowed the number to 
eighteen, each of which was probative of a point that the others 
were not.  During final instructions, the judge explained that 
the jury were not "to let [their] verdicts be influenced in any 
way by the fact that the photos were graphic."10  These steps 
sufficiently mitigated the prejudice inherent in use of such 
evidence. 
                     
 
10 The judge mistakenly stated that he had given a limiting 
instruction on this issue during the trial.  However, he had not 
done so.  The only prior time that the judge mentioned the 
photographs to the jury was during the voir dire when he alerted 
the venire that the written questionnaire would ask whether 
viewing "graphic and unpleasant" photographs would affect the 
juror's ability to be fair and impartial. 
18 
 
 
The defendant challenges the omission of a contemporaneous 
limiting instruction, which he failed to request when his 
objection to the admission of the photographs was overruled.  
Although it may have been better practice to give a limiting 
instruction before the photographs were introduced, the judge 
did not abuse his discretion in handling the autopsy 
photographs.  Jackson, 428 Mass. at 465 ("absence of [concurrent 
limiting] instruction is not, by itself, sufficient to render 
the admission of the photographs error"). 
 
b.  Prejudicial statements.  The defendant argues that 
certain of his statements were erroneously admitted at trial 
because they were irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.  As the 
defendant did not object, we review to determine whether any 
error caused a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681 (1992), 
S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). 
 
First, the defendant told the arresting officers, "I've 
never been so happy to be arrested in my whole life."  The 
defendant argues that reference to the prior arrest improperly 
suggests a propensity for criminal behavior.  This statement, 
together with the defendant's follow up that "Mexico is a 
fucked-up place," was relevant to why the defendant was crossing 
back into the United States from Mexico when he was arrested.  
Moreover, the jury were not likely to focus on any implication 
19 
 
of prior arrests where some of the defendant's prior convictions 
were introduced during his testimony. 
 
Second, the defendant challenges the admission of a 
statement in which he questioned the police officers 
accompanying him on the return trip to Massachusetts about 
whether the media were comparing him to a man who had shot his 
wife and infant and then fled the country.  He argued that the 
reference was highly prejudicial because the jurors may have 
been aware that the defendant in that case had been convicted of 
murder and viewed the two cases as similar.11  The defendant's 
comparison to another murder may not have been particularly 
relevant, but it did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice in light of the strong case against the 
defendant. 
 
Third, the defendant claims error in the admission of a 
statement to police that he and the victim had been "together" 
since she was fourteen years of age, arguing that reference to 
the victim's age indicated the prior bad act of a sexual 
relationship with a minor.  There was no error in admitting the 
statement referencing the victim's age when she and the 
defendant were first "together."  In the circumstances of this 
case, "the jury were entitled to evidence describing the whole 
                     
 
11 See Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 206 (2012), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 945 (2013). 
20 
 
relationship."  Commonwealth v. Robertson, 408 Mass. 747, 751 
(1990). 
 
c.  Victim's purse.  The defendant argues that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress 
the victim's purse, wallet, and identification that were found 
in the defendant's hotel room on August 6, when police performed 
a well-being check on the defendant's daughter.12  The officer 
who found the items testified that there "were several grocery 
bags" in the defendant's hotel room.  In one of the bags, he 
"noticed a large gallon of vodka" and a female's purse.  The 
purse "was in plain view in the bag as [he] looked in."  The 
defendant consented to the officer's request to "look" at the 
purse.  The officer found a wallet containing two items of 
identification with the victim's name on them, and he put them 
back in the purse after looking at them. 
                     
 
12 The evidence was not seized nor was it contained in the 
police report from that incident.  The evidence was, however, 
mentioned in the probable cause affidavit supporting the warrant 
application to search the defendant's apartment.  Three days 
before trial, the prosecutor notified defense counsel that the 
defendant had made a statement to police during the well-being 
check about the identification belonging to the victim and that 
the purse was just with the baby's things when he picked them 
up.  During trial, counsel filed a motion to exclude the 
evidence and statement, arguing that he had not been properly 
notified.  The judge denied the motion after concluding that the 
issue was waived because relevant information was contained in 
the probable cause affidavit.  Trial counsel moved for a 
mistrial after this ruling, arguing that he would have been 
ineffective for not raising the issue earlier.  The judge 
responded that "'ineffective' is not a word that comes to mind 
in my observations of you." 
21 
 
 
The defendant challenges the consent to search the purse, 
arguing that his intoxication and the coercive environment 
negated the voluntariness of any consent he may have given.  The 
defendant contends that this evidence created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice because the possession of 
the purse and its contents suggested a consciousness of guilt 
and the prior bad act of stealing from a deceased person. 
 
"The question whether consent was voluntary is a question 
of fact to be determined in the circumstances of each case, with 
the burden of proof on the government."  Commonwealth v. Carr, 
458 Mass. 295, 302 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Aguiar, 370 
Mass. 490, 496 (1976).  "An otherwise voluntary act is not 
necessarily rendered involuntary simply because an individual 
has been drinking or using drugs."  Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 
433 Mass. 678, 685 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. Shipps, 399 
Mass. 820, 826 (1987), S.C., 472 Mass. 1001 (2015). 
 
The defendant's claim is unavailing.  One of the responding 
officers described the defendant as "somewhat intoxicated, calm, 
cooperative."  Another testified that the defendant was able to 
understand and respond to his questions, and that he was able to 
properly change his daughter's diaper at the officer's request.  
An investigator with the Department of Children and Families 
testified that the defendant was "able to converse with [her] 
without any problem."  Because a motion to suppress on this 
22 
 
ground likely would not have succeeded, counsel was not 
ineffective.  Commonwealth v. Comita, 441 Mass. 86, 91 (2004).  
The evidence clearly demonstrates that the defendant was not too 
intoxicated to give consent and there was no evidence of 
coercion. 
 
3.  Jury instructions.  a.  Unrecorded interview.  The 
police interview on the evening of August 16, 2010, at the 
Framingham police station was unrecorded after the defendant 
stated "pretty emphatically that he did not want to be recorded" 
and signed a form acknowledging that he understood and waived 
his Miranda rights and that he "d[id] not want [their] 
discussion recorded."  The form was admitted at trial.  At the 
defendant's request, the judge gave instructions before the 
defendant's statements were introduced and during the final 
charge in accordance with DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. at 447-448,13 
                     
 
13 After Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 447-
448 (2004), we required, "when the prosecution introduces 
evidence of a defendant's confession or statement that is the 
product of a custodial interrogation or an interrogation 
conducted at a place of detention (e.g., a police station), and 
there is not at least an audiotape recording of the complete 
interrogation" and the defendant requests, that judges provide a 
jury instruction advising that: 
 
"the State's highest court has expressed a preference that 
such interrogations be recorded whenever practicable, and 
cautioning the jury that, because of the absence of any 
recording of the interrogation in the case before them, 
they should weigh evidence of the defendant's alleged 
statement with great caution and care.  Where voluntariness 
is a live issue and the humane practice instruction is 
23 
 
which alerted the jury that they should consider the credibility 
of the evidence with "great caution" and permitted the jury to 
conclude that the statements were not made voluntarily because 
the interview was unrecorded.  The judge added that the 
defendant has the "right" to refuse the recording.14  The 
defendant objected to the added language, asserting that there 
is "no right of a defendant to reject the recording."  The judge 
explained to counsel that his intention was to protect the 
defendant from his refusal "reflect[ing] badly on him" and that 
he thought the additional language was correct. 
 
The defendant argues that the judge erred in instructing 
the jury that the defendant had a "right to decline" recording 
of his custodial interrogation because DiGiambattista created no 
such right, only an obligation of the police to record the 
statement.  He further argues that we should require that all 
interrogations be recorded or subject to an exclusionary rule.  
We conclude that neither argument has merit. 
                                                                  
given, the jury should also be advised that the absence of 
a recording permits (but does not compel) them to conclude 
that the Commonwealth has failed to prove voluntariness 
beyond a reasonable doubt." 
 
 
14 The judge's contemporaneous instruction included the 
following elaboration:  "I should say at this point that it was 
[the defendant's] right to decline the recording.  That's why 
the form is there.  That's why he was asked the question.  So, 
that's just the way it is.  But the lack of a recording has 
those implications for you." 
24 
 
 
The DiGiambattista instruction "is required even when a 
defendant has refused a recording of his custodial 
interrogation."  Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 465 Mass. 372, 392 
(2013).  In Rousseau, supra at 391, as in this case, the 
defendant elected not to have his interview recorded orally by 
"initialing his refusal on his Miranda waiver form."15  We 
approved language instructing the jury that they could consider 
"whether the defendant was given an opportunity to have his 
interrogation recorded, and whether the defendant voluntarily 
elected not to have his interrogation recorded."  Id. at 393.  
Although in Rousseau, supra at 392, we cautioned against 
advising juries that defendants have "waived" the decision to 
have their interrogations recorded because waiver is a question 
of fact, the "gist of the judge's additional language" was not 
problematic in terms of the rule we adopted in Rousseau.  We now 
add that the better practice is not to instruct juries that 
defendants have a "right" to refuse recording.  Permission to 
record an interview is not required so long as the interviewee 
has actual knowledge of the recording.  See Commonwealth v. 
Boyarsky, 452 Mass. 700, 705 (2008), citing Commonwealth v. 
Jackson, 370 Mass. 502, 507 (1976) ("A recording that is made 
                     
 
15 In Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 465 Mass. 372, 392 (2013), 
the police recorded the defendant's decision not to have the 
interview recorded, and the audio recording was played for the 
jury.  We recommend following this practice where a suspect 
refuses to have his or her interview recorded. 
25 
 
with the actual knowledge of all parties is not an interception, 
even if they have not affirmatively authorized or consented to 
it").  Cf. G. L. c. 272, § 99 (B) (4), (C) (1) (prohibiting 
secret recordings). 
 
In any event, the defendant is not entitled to relief 
because the judge's instructions satisfied the intent of the 
DiGiambattista instruction as interpreted in Rousseau.  The 
judge gave the instruction before we proposed specific language 
in Rousseau, and we again recommend the language in Rousseau for 
similar circumstances.  In addition, as we have said before, a 
"judge need not use any particular words in instructing the jury 
as long as the legal concepts are properly described."  
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 449 Mass. 1, 8 (2007), citing 
Commonwealth v. Torres, 420 Mass. 479, 484 (1995). 
 
In connection with this argument, the defendant challenges 
the police practice of advising suspects that he or she has the 
"right" to decline recording.  In this case, the police used a 
form that advised the defendant that he had a choice whether or 
not to have his interview recorded and asked him to initial his 
name next to his choice and sign the form.16  As discussed, the 
police need only provide notification of a recording; permission 
to record is implied by any statements made after such 
                     
 
16 The amici advise that various versions of this form are 
used by police departments in the Commonwealth. 
 
26 
 
notification.  Accordingly, the better practice going forward is 
simply to advise suspects of the recording instead of requesting 
permission to record.17  A suspect's refusal to be recorded, 
however, does not cause unrecorded statements to be 
inadmissible.18 
 
Last, we have declined requests to adopt an exclusionary 
rule in DiGiambattista and in subsequent cases.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 472 n.9 (2010).  The 
defendant has offered no persuasive reason to change course, 
especially where his refusal to allow recording would likely be 
an exception to any such rule.  DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. at 
445. 
 
b.  Extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The defendant challenges 
the judge's instructions on murder in the first degree committed 
with extreme atrocity or cruelty, arguing that the Commonwealth 
should be required to prove that a defendant intended that the 
victim suffer greatly or was indifferent to such suffering and 
                     
 
17 Although there was no error in the police officer's use 
of the form, we recommend going forward that police, instead of 
requesting permission to record, advise that the interview is 
being recorded. 
 
 
18 Regardless, the defendant suffered no prejudice where the 
statements he made during this interview added little to the 
strong case against him.  Specifically, a State trooper who 
conducted the interview testified that the defendant denied 
killing his wife, described their marriage, and said that he was 
not surprised by the result of the deoxyribonucleic acid test. 
27 
 
the instructions should reflect that element of proof.19  As a 
threshold matter, the judge's instructions were consistent with 
the model instruction in effect at the time of trial.  Model 
Jury Instructions on Homicide 11-14 (1999).  We have declined a 
similar request to modify the current law in Massachusetts, and 
we decline to do so here.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Boucher, 
474 Mass. 1, 8 (2016) (reiterating that convictions of murder on 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty do not require intent 
"beyond the requirement of malice needed for all convictions of 
murder").  Even were we inclined to make such a change, this 
would not be an appropriate case to do so where the defendant's 
actions, including inflicting thirteen separate stab wounds, 
satisfies the very instruction he is requesting. 
 
4.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
examined the record pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, and we discern no basis on which to grant the defendant 
relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
                     
 
19 The defendant does not appear to have requested this jury 
instruction, but he objected to the applicable portion of the 
instructions before and after they were given.