Title: Thompson v. Skate America Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 000461
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2001

Present: Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, 
JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
JONATHAN THOMPSON, AN INFANT WHO SUES BY 
 HIS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, CYNTHIA THOMPSON 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 000461 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
January 12, 2001 
SKATE AMERICA, INC., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Theodore J. Markow, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court 
properly sustained demurrers to a motion for judgment.  In his 
motion for judgment, the plaintiff, a business invitee, alleged 
that a minor, also a business invitee, intentionally injured him 
while on the premises of the business owner.  The plaintiff 
further alleged that his injuries proximately resulted from the 
negligence of the business owner and the minor’s parent. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Our review is governed by the well-settled principle that 
when we consider the trial court’s sustaining of a demurrer “we 
look solely at [the plaintiff’s] allegations in his motion for 
judgment to determine whether he stated a cause of action.”  
Perk v. Vector Resources Group, Ltd., 253 Va. 310, 312, 485 
S.E.2d 140, 142 (1997).  In accord with this standard of review, 
we will recite as true the well-pleaded facts in the motion for 
judgment. 
 
On October 18, 1999, Jonathan Thompson, by his mother and 
next friend, Cynthia Thompson, filed a motion for judgment 
against Skate America, Inc., Travis Bateman, and Bonnie Mundie, 
Bateman’s mother.1  That pleading contains the following 
allegations of fact.  On March 12, 1999, Thompson and Bateman 
were both patrons and invitees of Skate America, a commercial 
skating rink in Hanover County.  “[O]n several prior occasions, 
Bateman had caused disturbances, arguments and fights” at Skate 
America and “was a known trouble maker, consistently disobeyed 
the rules of [Skate America] and generally was a menace to . . . 
patrons of the skating rink.”  On several prior occasions, 
“Bateman had been ejected from Skate America by its employees,” 
and he “had been banned from reentry to Skate America on 
multiple occasions and was under such a ban” on March 12, 1999. 
 
At closing time, Thompson and Bateman were waiting on Skate 
America’s premises for their parents to pick them up.  
“[W]ithout . . . provocation, Bateman struck [Thompson] in the 
back of [his] head with a roller skate, fracturing [his] skull, 
causing severe and permanent damage, extensive hospitalization 
and medical expense and grave emotional damage.” 
                     
1The motion for judgment does not state the ages of Thompson 
or Bateman, referring to them only by the legal designation of 
“infant.”  On brief, the parties refer to Thompson and Bateman 
as “teenagers.” 
 
2
 
In separate counts of the motion for judgment, Thompson 
asserts that Skate America, Bateman, and Mundie are separately 
and jointly liable for the injuries caused by Bateman.  
Bateman’s alleged liability is premised on the assault and 
battery being a deliberate, intentional act.  Skate America’s 
and Mundie’s alleged liability is premised on their negligent 
failure to conduct themselves in accord with duties of care each 
owed, as business owner and parent respectively, to Thompson 
regarding the danger of injury from the unlawful act of Bateman.  
It is further asserted in the motion for judgment that 
Thompson’s injuries were proximately caused by the actions of 
the defendants. 
 
Thompson specifically asserts in the motion for judgment 
that Skate America owed its business invitees a duty to protect 
them by “exclud[ing] persons it knew or, in the exercise of 
reasonable care, should have known, demonstrated violent and 
aggressive behavior, so that business invitees, including 
[Thompson], would not be in danger of physical harm from” such 
persons.  He further asserts that having banned Bateman from the 
premises, Skate America “failed and neglected to properly 
 
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supervise Bateman once he had entered, and failed and neglected 
to keep the premises safe for those lawfully on the premises.”2
 
Thompson also specifically asserts in the motion for 
judgment that Mundie “knew or in the exercise of reasonable 
care, should have known of Bateman’s aggressive and violent 
behavior, . . . that Batemen had been [banned] from Skate 
America and . . . that Bateman was a risk to those . . . around 
him.”  Thompson further asserts that, in light of this 
knowledge, “Mundie had the duty, as Bateman’s mother and legal 
custodian, . . . to properly supervise and control him so that 
he would not endanger those around him.” 
 
Skate America filed a demurrer to the motion for judgment.  
Citing Wright v. Webb, 234 Va. 527, 530, 362 S.E.2d 919, 920 
(1987), Skate America contended that a business owner is 
generally under no duty to protect an invitee from a third 
person’s criminal act committed while the invitee is upon the 
owner’s premises.  Skate America conceded that Wright recognized 
a “narrow, limited exception to this general rule,” Burns v. 
Johnson, 250 Va. 41, 44, 458 S.E.2d 448, 450 (1995), where the 
owner “knows that criminal assaults against persons are 
occurring, or are about to occur, on the premises which indicate 
                     
2Thompson does not assert in his motion for judgment that 
Skate America had a duty to warn him concerning the danger of 
harm from an assault by Bateman. 
 
 
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an imminent probability of harm to an invitee,” and that in such 
cases this exception requires “notice of a specific danger just 
prior to the assault.”  Wright, 234 Va. at 533, 362 S.E.2d at 
922.  Skate America contended, however, that the allegations of 
its knowledge of Bateman’s prior propensity for disruptive, 
violent behavior were insufficient to establish that it had 
notice of the specific danger that Bateman would assault 
Thompson. 
 
Mundie also filed a demurrer to the motion for judgment.  
Relying upon Bell v. Hudgins, 232 Va. 491, 494, 352 S.E.2d 332, 
334 (1987), Mundie contended that, in the absence of a 
principal-agent relationship, a parent cannot be held separately 
liable for the malicious, intentional acts of a minor child 
premised upon the independent negligence of the parent in 
failing to control or supervise the child. 
 
On December 3, 1999, the trial court held a hearing to 
consider both demurrers.  Skate America and Mundie adhered to 
the positions stated in their pleadings.  Thompson, who had not 
filed a response to either demurrer, argued that Skate America’s 
decision to ban Bateman from its premises showed that it had 
sufficient notice that Bateman was a present danger to other 
patrons.  Thompson also argued that a parent could be liable for 
negligently failing to prevent a child from acting on a known or 
knowable predilection to commit criminal acts. 
 
5
 
The trial court sustained both demurrers.  In the order 
dismissing Skate America and Mundie from the suit, the trial 
court expressly relied upon the Wright and Bell cases as the 
basis for its judgment.  We awarded Thompson this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Initially, the finality of the judgments at issue here 
requires explanation.  Bateman has not yet filed a response to 
the motion for judgment or otherwise entered an appearance in 
the trial court, or in this Court although he was made a party 
to this appeal.  Thus, the case against Bateman remains active 
in the trial court, and the judgment order that is the subject 
of this appeal is interlocutory in nature. 
 
An interlocutory order which is final as to some but not 
all parties may in some circumstances be appealed before the 
case is concluded as to all defendants under the severable 
interests rule set forth in Wells v. Whitaker, 207 Va. 616, 628-
29, 151 S.E.2d 422, 432-33 (1966).  See also Leggett v. Caudill, 
247 Va. 130, 134, 439 S.E.2d 350, 352 (1994).  Under this rule, 
a final adjudication of a collateral matter that addresses 
separate and severable interests can be appealed only when the 
appeal cannot affect the determination of the remaining issues 
in the case, even if the adjudication is reversed.  Id.  In such 
instances, the order may be appealed either at the time of its 
entry or when the trial court enters a final order disposing of 
 
6
the remainder of the case.  Code § 8.01-670(A)(3); see also, 
e.g., Hinchey v. Ogden, 226 Va. 234, 236-37 and n.1, 307 S.E.2d 
891, 892 and n.1 (1983). 
 
Bateman’s liability, as alleged in the motion for judgment, 
is for the intentional assault and battery of Thompson.  The 
cause of action for this intentional act by Bateman is separate 
and distinct from the causes of action for negligence asserted 
against Skate America and Mundie.  Accordingly, the order that 
sustained the demurrers and dismissed Skate America and Mundie 
from the case was final as to them and severable from the 
interests of the remaining defendant. 
 
The trial court’s orders sustaining the two demurrers, each 
to a distinct cause of action, are addressed by Thompson in two 
assignments of error, one addressed to each demurrer.  
Accordingly, we will consider the legal sufficiency of the 
motion for judgment to state those two causes of action 
seriatim. 
Cause of Action Against Skate America
 
The procedural posture of this case is significant.  A 
demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the claims stated 
in the pleading challenged.  Dray v. New Market Poultry 
Products, Inc., 258 Va. 187, 189, 518 S.E.2d 312, 312 (1999).  
While a demurrer does not admit the correctness of the 
pleading’s conclusions of law, Ward’s Equip., Inc. v. New 
 
7
Holland North America, Inc., 254 Va. 379, 382, 493 S.E.2d 516, 
518 (1997), it “admits the truth of all material facts that are 
properly pleaded, facts which are impliedly alleged, and facts 
which may be fairly and justly inferred,” Cox Cable Hampton 
Roads, Inc. v. City of Norfolk, 242 Va. 394, 397, 410 S.E.2d 
652, 653 (1991).  Thus, the sole question to be decided by the 
trial court is whether the facts thus pleaded, implied, and 
fairly and justly inferred are legally sufficient to state a 
cause of action against the defendant.  In this context, a 
plaintiff challenging on appeal the sustaining of a defendant’s 
demurrer by the trial court need show only that the trial court 
erred in finding that the pleading failed to state a cause of 
action, and not that the plaintiff would have prevailed on the 
merits of that cause. 
 
Guided by these principles, the issue we must decide is 
whether the factual allegations in Thompson’s motion for 
judgment are sufficient, as a matter of law, to establish that 
Skate America had a duty of care to protect Thompson from the 
injuries caused by Bateman such that a jury could find it liable 
for those injuries.  See Burns v. Johnson, 250 Va. 41, 44, 458 
S.E.2d 448, 450 (1995).  Whether such duty exists is “a pure 
question of law.”  Id. at 45, 458 S.E.2d at 451; Acme Markets, 
Inc. v. Remschel, 181 Va. 171, 178, 24 S.E.2d 430, 434 (1943) 
 
8
(“[t]he law determines the duty, and the jury, upon the 
evidence, determines whether the duty has been performed”). 
 
Familiar principles control our determination of whether 
Skate America potentially had a duty of care in this case.  “In 
Virginia, we adhere to the rule that the owner or occupier of 
land ordinarily is under no duty to protect an invitee from a 
third person’s criminal act committed while the invitee is upon 
the premises.”  Gupton v. Quicke, 247 Va. 362, 363, 442 S.E.2d 
658, 658 (1994).  However, we have recognized that certain 
“special relationships” may exist between particular plaintiffs 
and defendants, either as a matter of law or because of the 
particular factual circumstances in a given case, which may give 
rise to a duty of care on the part of the defendant to warn 
and/or protect the plaintiff against the danger of harm from the 
reasonably foreseeable criminal acts committed by a third 
person.  We also have stressed that “[b]efore any duty can arise 
with regard to the conduct of third persons, there must be a 
special relationship between the defendant and either the 
plaintiff or the third person.”  A.H. v. Rockingham Publishing 
Co., 255 Va. 216, 220, 495 S.E.2d 482, 485 (1998)(employer has a 
de jure special relationship with its employees); see also Delk 
v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 259 Va. 125, 132, 523 S.E.2d 
826, 830-31 (2000)(medical facility created de facto special 
relationship with its patient when it determined that she was in 
 
9
need of constant supervision and surveillance); Burdette v. 
Marks, 244 Va. 309, 312-13, 421 S.E.2d 419, 420-21 
(1992)(special relationship existed between deputy and passerby 
which imposed legal duty upon deputy to render assistance to 
passerby and protect him from attack).  We have recognized 
examples of such necessary special relationships that arise as a 
matter of law to include a common carrier and its passengers, an 
employer and its employees, an innkeeper and its guests, and a 
business owner and its invitees.  See A.H., 255 Va. at 220, 495 
S.E.2d at 485; Klingbeil Management Group Co. v. Vito, 233 Va. 
445, 448, 357 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1987).  Undoubtedly, a special 
relationship existed here between Skate America, a business 
owner, and Thompson, its invitee.  Accordingly, the dispositive 
question in this case is whether that special relationship also 
gave rise to a duty of care on the part of Skate America to 
protect Thompson from the danger of harm from the criminal act 
of Bateman. 
 
In Wright, the first instance in which we addressed 
directly the special relationship between a business owner and 
an invitee, we held that despite the existence of that special 
relationship, the business owner does not owe a duty of care to 
protect its invitee unless it “knows that criminal assaults 
against persons are occurring, or are about to occur, on the 
premises which indicate an imminent probability of harm to [its] 
 
10
invitee.”  Wright, 234 Va. at 533, 362 S.E.2d at 922.  We 
further held that for the duty to be imposed there must be 
“notice of a specific danger just prior to the assault.”  Id.
 
As it did in the trial court, Skate America contends on 
appeal that the principles stated in Wright are controlling in 
this case.  It argues that the motion for judgment fails to 
allege facts that state, imply, or raise the fair and just 
inference that it had notice of the specific danger of the 
assault on Thompson by Bateman or that it knew that the assault 
on Thompson was occurring, or about to occur, on its property.  
Accordingly, Skate America asserts that, even if it had a 
special relationship with Thompson, the trial court properly 
concluded that the facts were insufficient to support the legal 
conclusion that Skate America owed a duty of care to protect 
Thompson.  While we agree that the general principles stated in 
Wright are implicated in this case, we disagree with Skate 
America’s conclusion regarding the legal sufficiency of the 
factual allegations in Thompson’s motion for judgment. 
 
The significant factor which distinguishes this case from 
Wright, and from other similar cases, with respect to the 
question whether Skate America owed Thompson, its invitee, a 
duty of care to protect him from criminal assaults on its 
premises is that here it is alleged that a specific individual 
was known to Skate America to be violent and to have committed 
 
11
assaults on other invitees on its property in the recent past.  
While in Wright, and other cases, we have declined to “impose 
liability for negligence based solely upon . . . a background” 
of prior criminal activity on the defendant’s premises or in its 
vicinity by unknown persons, 234 Va. at 533, 362 S.E.2d at 922, 
here the circumstances are quite different.  Indeed, the 
allegations in Thompson’s motion for judgment plainly state that 
Skate America had specific knowledge of Bateman’s propensity to 
assault its other invitees, had intervened to inhibit that 
behavior in the past, and had taken steps to avoid a 
reoccurrence of that behavior in the future.  Thus, taking these 
allegations as true on demurrer, we are of opinion that the 
allegations as to Bateman’s presence on Skate America’s premises 
were sufficient to state a claim that Skate America was on 
notice specifically that Thompson was in danger of being injured 
by Bateman in a criminal assault.  The “imminent probability” of 
that harm, as characterized in Wright, is merely a heightened 
degree of the “foreseeability” of that harm and here we are of 
opinion that the specific allegations concerning the knowledge 
Skate America had of Bateman’s prior violent conduct satisfied 
the necessary degree of foreseeability. 
 
Similarly, these allegations raise the fair and just 
inference that the magnitude of the burden on Skate America to 
guard against Bateman’s act was negligible, in as much as Skate 
 
12
America need only to have enforced the ban it was alleged to 
have imposed on Bateman.  The consequences of placing that 
burden on Skate America are equally negligible, for it is 
obviously in the best interest of any business owner to exclude 
from its premises a person it knows has disrupted its business 
in the past and who is likely to do so in the future. 
 
We emphasize that our consideration is limited to the 
question whether the allegations in this motion for judgment are 
sufficient to state a cause of action against this particular 
business owner.  Whether the evidence produced at trial would 
confirm those allegations, and whether a jury would assign 
sufficient weight to that evidence to impose liability on Skate 
America for a breach of the duty of care owed must be resolved 
at trial on remand.  We hold, however, that the allegations of 
the motion for judgment were sufficient to state a cause of 
action against Skate America and, thus, we further hold that the 
trial court erred in sustaining Skate America’s demurrer to the 
motion for judgment. 
Cause of Action Against Mundie
 
Thompson recognizes on brief that we have declined to 
impose liability on parents for the criminal acts of their minor 
children under a theory of negligent parental supervision.  
Bell, 232 Va. at 494, 352 S.E.2d at 334.  Thompson contends, 
however, that we have recognized potential parental 
 
13
responsibility for tortious acts committed by minor children in 
other contexts such as the negligent entrustment of an 
automobile.  See, e.g., Turner v. Lotts, 244 Va. 554, 558, 422 
S.E.2d 765, 767 (1992).  Thompson asserts that “it is impossible 
to distinguish between liability for permitting a youth to 
operate a vehicle when injury is likely and permitting a child 
to be at a public place where he has been banned for aggressive 
conduct.”  Accordingly, he invites us to reconsider the rule in 
Bell, asserting that it “is not just and it should not be the 
law of the Commonwealth of Virginia.” 
 
Thompson’s reliance on Turner is misplaced.  While it is 
true that the defendant in Turner was the parent of the 
tortfeasor, this fact was not relevant to our consideration of 
whether the allegations in that case were sufficient, as a 
matter of law, to support a claim of negligent entrustment.  
Rather, our inquiry was limited to whether the defendant “‘knew, 
or had reasonable cause to know, that he was entrusting his car 
to an unfit driver likely to cause injury to others.’”  Turner, 
244 Va. at 557, 422 S.E.2d at 767 (quoting Denby v. Davis, 212 
Va. 836, 838, 188 S.E.2d 226, 229 (1972)).  Accordingly, the 
holding in Turner has no bearing on the reconsideration of Bell 
urged upon us by Thompson. 
 
In Bell, we said: 
 
14
 
We are unwilling to establish in Virginia by 
judicial decree a blanket rule which would impose 
civil liability upon parents who fail to control their 
minor child’s criminal behavior.  The General Assembly 
already has legislated in this area, but stopped short 
of imposing the broad parental liability urged by the 
plaintiff. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
We believe that a decision whether to adopt a 
doctrine of parental neglect is more properly left to 
the legislature because of the many societal and 
policy considerations which necessarily bear upon such 
a decision. 
 
Bell, 232 Va. at 494-95, 352 S.E.2d at 334 (citations 
omitted). 
In the fourteen years since we rejected the plaintiff’s 
invitation in Bell to impose by judicial fiat direct liability 
upon parents for the alleged negligent supervision of their 
minor children, the General Assembly has left that holding 
undisturbed.  We remain of opinion that the answers to the 
“policy questions generated by the rule advocated by the 
plaintiff should come from the General Assembly and not the 
courts.”  232 Va. at 495, 352 S.E.2d at 334.  Accordingly, we 
decline Thompson’s invitation to revisit the issue, and we hold 
that the trial court did not err in sustaining Mundie’s demurrer 
to the motion for judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the trial court’s 
judgment sustaining Skate America’s demurrer to the motion for 
 
15
judgment, affirm that portion of the judgment sustaining 
Mundie’s demurrer to the motion for judgment, and remand the 
case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with 
the views expressed in this opinion. 
Affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
 
 
 
 
   and remanded. 
 
16