Title: State Ex Rel. Klutey v. Daviess Circuit Court
Citation: 199 N.E.2d 335, 245 Ind. 400
Docket Number: 30,503
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 15, 1964

245 Ind. 400 (1964)
199 N.E.2d 335
STATE EX REL. KLUTEY
v.
DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT, DOBBYN, JUDGE.
No. 30,503.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed June 15, 1964.
*401 Richardson &amp; Rusk, of Washington, for relator.
Dean H. Neeriemer, of Washington, for respondents.
MYERS, J.
This is an original action filed by Edward L. Klutey as relator against the Daviess Circuit Court and the Honorable Fred Dobbyn as the Judge thereof.
*402 On May 29, 1963, relator brought an action in the Daviess Circuit Court against Robert and Delores Lynn for the recovery of the reasonable value for services performed and materials allegedly furnished them. Relator recovered a judgment by default against the Lynns in the amount of $675 and costs on June 29, 1963.
On September 30, 1963, having learned of the default judgment, the Lynns filed their complaint against relator to set aside the judgment on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence and excusable neglect, pursuant to statute, being § 2-1068, Burns' Ind. Stat., 1946 Replacement. Summons was duly issued and timely served upon relator. It was returnable on October 14, 1963. On that day, relator, by counsel, entered a special appearance in the cause and filed a motion to quash the summons on the ground that the Lynns' attorney had caused the Deputy Sheriff of Daviess County to amend the summons after its return and the filing thereof with the Clerk. Over objections by relator, the court, on October 18, 1963, authorized the Sheriff to amend the return of the summons.
On November 6, 1963, relator renewed his special appearance and filed a motion to quash the amended summons. Thereafter, on November 9, 1963, relator filed a motion for change of judge. This was granted. However, on November 13, 1963, the Lynns moved to set aside the order granting the change of judge. On November 15, 1963, the Judge sustained the motion to set aside the order granting the change of judge, and on November 18, 1963, he overruled the motion to quash. On November 18, 1963, relator appeared generally and filed his motion for change of judge. This was overruled on the ground that it had not been timely filed in accordance with Rule 1-12B of the Rules of the Supreme Court.
*403 Relator alleges that on November 18, 1963, there was no motion, rule or order of court against relator undisposed of or with which the relator had not complied.
On December 2, 1963, relator filed his verified petition for writ of mandate with this court, urging that an alternative writ be issued against the Daviess Circuit Court and Judge Dobbyn, as respondents, ordering a change of venue from the Judge, or, in the alternative, that respondents show cause why the writ should not be made permanent. Such a writ was issued and the respondent Judge timely filed his return to the petition.
The only real question in this case is whether relator is entitled to his change of venue from the judge. He relies upon the general rule in civil cases that when a proper application for change of judge is duly filed, it must be granted, and that the trial court has no discretion in the matter, being divested of jurisdiction to take any further action in the case except to grant the change. Flanagan, Wiltrout and Hamilton, Indiana Trial and Appellate Practice, Change of Judge, § 1251, Comments 2 and 3, page 100, and authorities cited therein. Relator asserts that if the trial judge refuses, mandate lies in the Supreme Court in this type of action, and cites State ex rel. Hobbs v. Claycombe, Judge, etc., et al. (1954), 233 Ind. 247, 118 N.E.2d 489, in support thereof. Relator further argues that prior to November 18, 1963, when the motion to quash was overruled, his general appearance was entered, his motion for change of judge was filed, the issues in law and in facts were not closed, and so he was well within the ten-day period established by Supreme Court Rule 1-12B.
Respondents' position is that the relator's motion for change of judge was not timely filed under the provisions *404 of the rule, for the reason that the motion was filed later than ten days after the issues in the case were closed by "operation of law." Argument is made that in a proceeding to set aside a default judgment, the complaint is the only necessary pleading, as no answer is required, citing Davis v. Steuben School Township (1898), 19 Ind. App. 694, 50 N.E. 1, and Graves v. Kelly (1916), 62 Ind. App. 164, 112 N.E. 899, as authority. Thus, the action is in the nature of a summary proceeding. 17 West's Ind. Law Ency., Judgment, § 199, page 314. This being the case, respondents contend that the issues were closed by operation of law on October 14, 1963, which was the return date on the summons issued and served on relator.
The statute which gives a definite relief from a default judgment is found in § 2-1068, Burns' Ind. Stat., 1946 Replacement, and reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Originally, the statutory grounds for such relief were by motion, and, if filed within term time, no notice need be given, but if filed beyond term time, notice was required. No further pleadings were necessary, and the court could summarily dispose of the matter upon affidavits and depositions. Brumbaugh et al. v. Stockman et al. (1882), 83 Ind. 583; State ex rel. Krodel v. Gilkinson, Judge (1935), 209 Ind. 213, 198 N.E. 323.
Since passage of the statute calling for a complaint to be filed within two years (§ 2-1068, Burns' Ind. *405 Stat., 1946 Replacement, supra), the courts have carried over some of the older conceptions pertaining to the motion. It has been stated that setting aside a default judgment is in the nature of a motion for new trial, State ex rel. Krodel v. Gilkinson, Judge, supra, at page 225 of 209 Ind.; that amending the old statute and requiring a complaint to be filed as an original action did not change the rule permitting application for relief to be determined in a summary manner and without pleadings other than a complaint. Woodard v. Killen (1925), 196 Ind. 570, 148 N.E. 195. Accordingly, it has been held that the statute cannot be construed to mean that a change of venue from the county may be granted. State ex rel. Krodel v. Gilkinson, Judge, supra, at page 225 of 209 Ind. Yet, it does permit a change from the judge, and mandate lies for such change if timely filed and wrongfully denied. State ex rel. Hobbs v. Claycombe, Judge, etc., et al., supra.
This court, in the case of State ex rel. Beckham, Sr. v. Vanderburgh Cir. Ct. (1954), 233 Ind. 368, 371, 119 N.E.2d 713, 714, 715, said as follows:
We come to the crucial point in this case as to whether the application for change of judge was filed within the time required by Rule 1-12B of the Supreme Court. That rule, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
It has been stated that a proceeding to set aside a default judgment raises "only a question of fact." State ex rel. Beckham, Sr. v. Vanderburgh Cir. Ct., supra, at page 371 of 233 Ind. In many cases, pursuant to § 2-1068, Burns' Ind. Stat., 1946 Replacement, supra, the defendant has filed an answer to the complaint. Walsh v. H.P. Wasson &amp; Co., Inc. (1938), 213 Ind. 556, 13 N.E.2d 696; Kuhn v. Indiana Ice &amp; Fuel Co. (1937), 104 Ind. App. 387, 11 N.E.2d 508; State ex rel. Hobbs v. Claycombe, Judge, etc., et al., supra; Vail v. Dept. of Financial Institutions (1938), 106 Ind. App. 39, 17 N.E.2d 854.
*407 In Walsh v. H.P. Wasson &amp; Co., Inc., supra, the court recites the filing of a complaint to set aside a default judgment (at page 557 of 213 Ind.), "to which complaint the defendant filed an answer in general denial. The issue thus joined was tried by the court and oral testimony was introduced both by appellant and by appellee." (Our emphasis.)
In § 2-1203, Burns' Ind. Stat., 1946 Replacement, it is stated, in part, as follows:
This court has said:
The general rule is:
To the same effect is 23 West's Ind. Law Ency., Pleading, § 211, page 423.
From the cases cited above, it is obvious that § 2-1068, Burns' Ind. Stat., 1946 Replacement, supra, was intended not only to include summary action where no adversary action was taken, but also a trial where the material allegations were controverted by answer. A judgment thereon refusing to vacate the default judgment is considered to be a final appealable judgment. Heck v. Wayman (1932), 94 Ind. App. 74, 179 N.E. 785.
*408 Here, the respondent Judge argues that the issues were closed by operation of law when the summons was returnable on October 14, 1963. Under this theory, the court could have entered judgment summarily, although relator had entered a special appearance and challenged the summons by motion to quash. We do not conceive this to be the law. The relator had the right to test the validity of the summons and the legal propriety of the complaint as in any other civil action before proceeding to put the matter at issue. Respondent recognized this and permitted several hearings on the matter presented. On November 18, 1963, relator changed his position and entered a general appearance, at the same time filing his application for a change of judge.
It has been stated:
In Wibright v. Wise (1835), 4 Blackf. 137, 138 (2d edition, pp. 153, 154, 155), it was said:
A general appearance indicates, therefore, that a defendant wants to become "an actor" in the case. See 3 Am. Jur., Appearances, § 10, page 788.
It is apparent that relator was preparing to defend himself at the time he entered his general appearance. *409 This could have resulted in filing an answer in denial, which would have put the facts in issue as stated in State ex rel. Hobbs v. Claycombe, Judge, etc., et al., supra. However, as respondent contends, if the matter was already at issue by operation of law on October 14, 1963, anything that relator had to plead thereafter would have been useless and could have been stricken from the record. This would have deprived him of due process of law.
The instant action under § 2-1068, Burns' Ind. Stat., 1946 Replacement, supra, is purely a statutory proceeding as was the will contest action involved in the recent case of State v. Whitley Circuit Court (1964), 245 Ind. 259, 198 N.E.2d 3. In that case, we stated (at pages 263 of 245 Ind., page 5 of 198 N.E.2d):
However, the facts here are entirely distinguishable from State v. Whitley Circuit Court, for in that case no pleadings were filed for a period of four months after the filing of the complaint. We further stated in that case (at page 264 of 245 Ind., page 6 of 198 N.E.2d):
Here the complaint was filed on September 30, 1963, and, after other pleadings, relator, on November 6, 1963, appeared specially and filed motion to quash the amended summons. The motion was overruled on November 18, 1963. Relator's motion for change of judge filed November 18, 1963, was timely filed, as it clearly appears the issues were not treated by the parties as being closed by operation of law, nor was the motion for change of venue filed more than ten days after relator had knowledge the cause was ready to be set for trial.
The alternative writ heretofore issued is made absolute.
Achor, C.J., and Arterburn and Landis, JJ., concur. Jackson, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 199 N.E.2d 335.