Title: State v. Harms
Citation: 263 Neb. 814, 643 N.W.2d 359
Docket Number: 1157
State: Nebraska
Issuer: Nebraska Supreme Court
Date: May 3, 2002

643 N.W.2d 359 (2002) 263 Neb. 814 STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Russell W. HARMS, Appellant. No. S-00-1157. Supreme Court of Nebraska. May 3, 2002. *365 James R. Mowbray and Robert W. Kortus, of the Nebraska Commission on Public Advocacy, for appellant. Don Stenberg, Attorney General, and Marilyn B. Hutchinson, for appellee. HENDRY, C.J., WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, GERRARD, STEPHAN, McCORMACK, and MILLER-LERMAN, JJ. HENDRY, C.J. At approximately 12:10 p.m. on December 10, 1999, Harms shot 84-year-old Kelsay 15 times with a .22-caliber semiautomatic rifle in the parking lot of a shopping center in Auburn, Nebraska. Harms was alone in his white pickup truck when he saw Kelsay, a stranger to him, in the parking lot. Harms picked up his rifle, pointed it out the window of his truck, and fired one shot at Kelsay, who was standing 5 to 8 feet away. There was a brief pause in the shooting as Kelsay "recoiled" and then started to fall backward to the ground. As Kelsay was falling, Harms resumed firing his rifle in a rapid succession of shots that continued after Kelsay was on the ground. Kelsay died as a result of the multiple gunshot wounds. After the shooting, Harms slowly drove a half block to his trailer home, which was located in a trailer park across the highway from the shopping center and visible from the scene of the shooting. At approximately 12:14 p.m. Holly Plager, a dispatcher for the Nemaha County Sheriff's Department, received a 911 emergency dispatch service (911) call from a cellular telephone. The caller identified himself as Russell Harms. Harms asked Plager for *366 his lawyer's telephone number. Plager attempted to keep Harms on the telephone line, but for an unknown reason, the call was soon lost. Plager called Harms back and resumed speaking with him. Auburn police officers Daniel White and Eric Adams had been called to the shopping center parking lot within minutes of the shooting. Witnesses at the scene described a white pickup truck and provided a license plate number. After Adams radioed in the license plate number, Harms' ownership of the truck was confirmed. The officers could see Harms' trailer from where they stood in the parking lot, so they immediately went to the trailer. While the officers were in front of Harms' trailer, Plager called White on the radio and notified him that Harms had called 911 and was on the telephone requesting his attorney. White then advised Plager to tell Harms that "Officer Adams and [White] were out front, that we wouldn't hurt him and we would take him up to [the police station] and have contact with his attorney." Plager did so, and Harms again requested to speak with his attorney. White then spoke to Harms utilizing his cruiser's "public address system" in an attempt to get Harms to come out from the trailer. White repeated the assurances to Harms that he would not be hurt and would be taken to see his attorney. At that point, Harms told Plager he would step outside. Harms stepped outside of the trailer without any weapons, closed the door, and stood on the stairs. White spoke to Harms, reassuring him as he had previously. Adams then told Harms to step away from the trailer and lie down on the asphalt. When Harms did so, White handcuffed him and verbally informed him of his Miranda rights. Harms again requested an attorney. Harms was transferred to the police station. He sat in a chair next to White while the police attempted to contact his attorney. During this time, White advised Harms again of his Miranda rights through a written Miranda advisement form, which Harms signed. After approximately 1 hour had elapsed, Harms' attorney arrived and spoke to Harms. Harms was then placed in jail. On February 2, 2000, Harms was charged with first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. On May 11, Harms gave notice pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2203 (Reissue 1995) of his intention to rely upon the insanity defense and to plead not responsible by reason of insanity at the time of the offense. A bench trial was held on August 15 and 16, 2000. At trial, Harms presented the expert testimony of Dr. William Logan, together with Dr. Logan's written psychiatric evaluation of Harms. Dr. Logan discussed Harms' lengthy history of mental illness and, specifically, Harms' condition as a paranoid schizophrenic. Dr. Logan testified that Harms often went to his attorney to discuss his delusional thoughts about "people bothering him" and had previously felt urges to "kill somebody at random." Dr. Logan stated that in the weeks prior to the shooting, Harms had experienced "command voices" telling him to shoot someone. Dr. Logan defined a "command voice" as a "voice that is experienced and instructs you to do something or [is] harassing you to do something." Dr. Logan also described Harms' numerous hospitalizations and difficulties with antipsychotic medication since 1987. Dr. Logan further testified that Harms was having a psychotic episode at the time of the shooting. According to Dr. Logan, Harms told him during their meeting after Harms was arrested that he "remembered *367 hearing the words `not a baby' going on in his head" prior to shooting Kelsay. Specifically, Dr. Logan testified: Dr. Logan stated that he did not know whether Harms was also experiencing command voices on the morning of the shooting in addition to hearing these other voices. Finally, Dr. Logan testified that Harms had not previously had a specific delusion about Kelsay, but he was "sure that Mr. Kelsay intersected Mr. Harms' delusional system at some point either by the fact that he was at the shopping center and there was some delusion about the shopping center or something about Mr. Kelsay himself intersected his delusion." In Dr. Logan's opinion, Harms' delusional thinking at the time of the shooting prevented Harms from rationally considering whether the act of shooting Kelsay was right or wrong. On this basis, Dr. Logan concluded that Harms was insane at the time of the shooting. The State responded by offering the expert testimony of Dr. Sanat Roy, together with Dr. Roy's written evaluation of Harms. Dr. Roy testified that Harms was legally sane at the time of the shooting because he understood the nature of the act he had committed and was able to distinguish right from wrong with respect to the shooting. Dr. Roy stated, "Based on my evaluation with him, certainty [sic] he was responsible for his behavior at the time of his alleged act." Dr. Roy disputed any contention that Harms' thought of "`this old guy looks like he had a lot of good years' "was a command voice or command hallucination. Dr. Roy stated, "Command hallucination tells you, Roy, go out, kill that man. Kill that man. Kill that man. Roy, this person is holding your soul. If you don't kill him, you'll be dead. Kill him, kill him. That is command hallucination." Dr. Roy testified that individuals experiencing a command hallucination are "so disturbed they cannot function." He concluded that based on his personal meetings with Harms, as well as others' accounts of Harms' actions before, during, and after the shooting, Harms did not behave like a person who was hallucinating or experiencing command voices at the time of the shooting. The State also presented the testimony of two eyewitnesses who described the shooting and Harms' actions afterward. One witness, Shawn Clark, testified that Harms left the parking lot in his truck at a normal rate of speed and was "[n]ot [in] a real big hurry." The other witness, Kenneth Hatten, testified that Harms did not appear to be in a hurry to leave the area, since he drove away "[s]low, deliberate, like watching." Plager, the dispatcher, also testified at trial. She described the details of her conversation with Harms after the shooting, including Harms' requests for his attorney. Plager testified that Harms was not excited or agitated when she spoke with him on the telephone and that he was "just kind of okay." She noted that Harms did talk "kind of choppy" and that he sounded as if he were "confused," "distracted," "disoriented," and not focused. Harms never told Plager during their conversation that he was experiencing command voices or hallucinating. White and Adams testified at trial. Both officers described their involvement in arresting Harms on the day of the shooting. They discussed Harms' behavior *368 at the time of arrest, including Harms' request for his attorney and the fact that during and after the arrest, Harms did not tell the officers that he was hallucinating or experiencing command voices. The district court found Harms guilty on both counts and sentenced Harms to life in prison for the murder charge and not less than nor more than 20 years' imprisonment for use of a weapon. Both sentences were to be served consecutively. Harms filed a notice of appeal and a poverty affidavit and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Harms assigns, rephrased, that the district court erred in (1) admitting and considering evidence of Harms' silence and requests for counsel in violation of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 106 S. Ct. 634, 88 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986); (2) finding that Harms was not insane at the time of the shooting; and (3) improperly interpreting and applying the elements of first degree murder. Determination of a jurisdictional issue which does not involve a factual dispute is a matter of law which requires an appellate court to reach an independent conclusion. State v. VanAckeren, ante p. 222, 263 Neb. 222, 639 N.W.2d 112 (2002). A conviction in a bench trial of a criminal case is sustained if the properly admitted evidence, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support that conviction. State v. Campbell, 260 Neb. 1021, 620 N.W.2d 750 (2001); State v. Beyer, 260 Neb. 670, 619 N.W.2d 213 (2000). In making this determination, an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in evidence, pass on credibility of witnesses, evaluate explanations, or reweigh evidence presented, which are within a fact finder's province for disposition. Campbell, supra; Beyer, supra. In a bench trial of a law action, including a criminal case tried without a jury, erroneous admission of evidence is not reversible error if other relevant evidence, admitted without objection or properly admitted over objection, sustains the trial court's factual findings necessary for the judgment or decision reviewed; therefore, an appellant must show that the trial court actually made a factual determination, or otherwise resolved a factual issue or question, through the use of erroneously admitted evidence in a case tried without a jury. State v. Lara, 258 Neb. 996, 607 N.W.2d 487 (2000). The appellant must show that the trial court made a finding of guilt based exclusively on the erroneously admitted evidence. Id. If there is other sufficient evidence to support the finding of guilt, the conviction will not be reversed. Id. The verdict of the finder of fact on the issue of insanity will not be disturbed unless there is insufficient evidence to support such a finding. State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610 (1989). Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it. State v. McLemore, 261 Neb. 452, 623 N.W.2d 315 (2001). The State contends that this court lacks jurisdiction because the district court's order granting Harms' request to proceed in forma pauperis does not comply with Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2306 (Cum.Supp.2000). Section 29-2306 states: The State argues that jurisdiction is lacking because the district court judge did not sign the order granting Harms' application to proceed in forma pauperis within 30 days after the entry of Harms' sentence. This argument is without merit. The relevant date under § 29-2306 is the date the defendant files the application to proceed in forma pauperis, not the date on which the court grants the application. The record shows, and the State acknowledges, that Harms timely filed his notice of appeal, application to proceed in forma pauperis, and poverty affidavit within 30 days after the entry of his sentence. Since the district court granted Harms' application to proceed in forma pauperis, the "Supreme Court shall acquire jurisdiction of the case when the notice of appeal is filed with the clerk of the district court." See § 29-2306. We determine that the requirements of § 29-2306 have been satisfied. Accordingly, we determine that we have jurisdiction over Harms' appeal. In his first assignment of error, Harms argues that the district court erred in allowing and considering evidence of Harms' silence and his requests for counsel as substantive evidence of his guilt and sanity. He asserts that the State violated the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976), and Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 106 S. Ct. 634, 88 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986), by introducing evidence of Harms' silence and requests for counsel as a means to contest his insanity defense. We note that while this court has addressed alleged violations of Doyle on several occasions, this case presents the first opportunity for us to consider the Wainwright decision, which applied the Doyle rule in a case involving an insanity defense. In Doyle, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the State may not "seek to impeach a defendant's exculpatory story, told for the first time at trial, by cross examining the defendant about his failure to have told the story after receiving Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest." 426 U.S. at 611, 96 S. Ct. 2240. The Supreme Court found that a defendant's postarrest, post-Miranda silence is "insolubly ambiguous" as to whether the defendant is guilty or merely exercising his rights in accordance with the implicit assurance in the Miranda warnings that "silence will carry no penalty." 426 U.S. at 617-18, 96 S. Ct. 2240. The Supreme Court thus determined that the State's use of a defendant's postarrest, post-Miranda silence to impeach the defendant would be "fundamentally unfair" and a violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. 426 U.S. at 618, 96 S. Ct. 2240. The Supreme Court extended the due process rationale of Doyle in Wainwright, supra, a case in which the State introduced a defendant's postarrest, post-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of his sanity. At the defendant's jury trial in Wainwright, the defendant did not testify; however, *370 police officers involved with the defendant's arrest did testify, at the State's request, about how the defendant "had exercised his right to remain silent and had expressed a desire to consult counsel before answering any questions." 474 U.S. at 287, 106 S. Ct. 634. The State referred to the officers' testimony again in closing arguments to the jury, arguing that the defendant's refusal to answer and his requests for an attorney showed that the defendant was sane. In analyzing Wainwright, the Supreme Court declined to distinguish the case from Doyle: Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292, 106 S. Ct. 634, 88 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986). The Court found in Wainwright, as it did in Doyle, "the problem of fundamental unfairness that flows from the State's breach of its implied assurances." 474 U.S. at 294, 106 S. Ct. 634. In so finding, the Court confirmed and reiterated its prior holdings in Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 65 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1980), and Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 102 S. Ct. 1309, 71 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1982), which determined that the State's impeachment use of a defendant's pre-Miranda silence, whether prearrest or postarrest, does not violate the 14th Amendment. See Wainwright, supra. We also note that requests for counsel, as well as actual silence, constitute "silence" for purposes of analyzing potential Wainwright violations. In Wainwright, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "[w]ith respect to post-Miranda warnings `silence,' we point out that silence does not mean only muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted." 474 U.S. at 295 n. 13, 106 S. Ct. 634. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly stated that "we must treat a defendant's invocation of his Miranda rights not as a statement, but as post-Miranda warnings silence." Fields v. Leapley, 30 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir.1994). Additionally, this court has found that refusal to give a statement constitutes silence. State v. Woods, 249 Neb. 138, 542 N.W.2d 410 (1996). Accordingly, we will consider Harms' requests for counsel, as well as his actual silence, as "silence" for purposes of determining whether a Wainwright violation has occurred. As an initial matter, Harms invites this court to expand the Doyle and Wainwright protections to bar any use by the State of a defendant's prearrest, preMiranda silence. We decline to do so. In State v. Lofquest, 223 Neb. 87, 388 N.W.2d 115 (1986), this court adopted Doyle's prohibition against use of a defendant's silence during the postarrest, post-Miranda time period. Since that time, this court has had additional occasions to consider Doyle, and it has not precluded the admissibility of pre-Miranda silence. See, e.g., *371 Woods, supra; State v. Myers, 244 Neb. 905, 510 N.W.2d 58 (1994), overruled on other grounds, State v. Burlison, 255 Neb. 190, 583 N.W.2d 31 (1998); State v. Wells, 229 Neb. 89, 425 N.W.2d 338 (1988); State v. Lofquest, 227 Neb. 567, 418 N.W.2d 595 (1988). See, also, State v. Duis, 207 Neb. 851, 301 N.W.2d 587 (1981). We agree with the U.S. Supreme Court that it is not a violation of fundamental fairness for the State to use a defendant's pre Miranda silence as impeachment or as substantive evidence of sanity. See, Wainwright, supra; Fletcher, supra; Jenkins, supra; Thomas v. State of Ind., 910 F.2d 1413, 1414 (7th Cir.1990) (admission of pre-Miranda silence and request for counsel as evidence of sanity "raises no problems"). Prior to a defendant's receipt of Miranda warnings, there is "no governmental action induc[ing] [the defendant] to remain silent before arrest." Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240, 100 S. Ct. 2124. We therefore limit our analysis to evidence elicited by the State at trial referring to Harms' post-Miranda silence. Harms challenges portions of the testimony given by five witnesses at trial: Plager, Dr. Logan, Dr. Roy, White, and Adams. Harms contends that the district court, in admitting this testimony, considered Harms' silence as evidence of both his guilt and sanity. The district court's responses to Harms' objections based on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976), however, do not support Harms' contention that such evidence was considered by the court as evidence of his guilt. In response to Harms' first Doyle objection, the district court stated: Later, in response to another objection by Harms, the district court stated, "[A]s the Court indicated, I'm receiving it for a limited purpose and that's to determine insanity and not to prove his guilt or innocence as regarding that particular right that he has." The record clearly demonstrates that the district court's sole purpose in receiving testimony regarding Harms' silence and requests for counsel was to aid the court in determining whether Harms was sane at the time of the shooting. It was not used as substantive evidence of Harms' guilt. Therefore, the allegation that the district court used Harms' silence as evidence of his guilt is without merit. We thus analyze the testimony of each witness solely to determine whether the district court improperly considered Harms' silence as substantive evidence of his sanity. Plager's telephone conversation with Harms took place before Harms was arrested and had received Miranda warnings. Therefore, pursuant to Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 106 S. Ct. 634, 88 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986), Plager's testimony regarding her conversation with Harms, including Plager's references to Harms' requests for his attorney, was admissible. During recross-examination, defense counsel objected on the basis of Doyle to the State's attempt to elicit Dr. Logan's opinion regarding Harms' mental state at the time Harms called the dispatcher and requested his attorney. The district court overruled the objection and allowed Dr. Logan to testify as follows: The record shows that the subject matter of the State's questions and Dr. Logan's comments did not extend beyond Dr. Logan's interpretation of Harms' telephone call to the dispatcher and Harms' requests for his attorney during the telephone call. Since Harms' requests for his attorney while speaking with the dispatcher clearly occurred in the prearrest, pre-Miranda time period, Dr. Logan's statements were admissible. See Wainwright, supra. As the State was preparing to call Dr. Roy to testify at trial, defense counsel objected to any questioning of Dr. Roy that would violate Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976). The court overruled the objection and permitted Dr. Roy's testimony. Dr. Roy testified regarding Harms' prearrest, preMiranda call to the dispatcher and his requests for counsel at that time. As previously noted, such testimony was properly admitted under Wainwright. However, Dr. Roy also testified regarding Harms' refusal to speak with police officers after receiving Miranda warnings. Dr. Roy stated, "[W]hen he was explained his Miranda rights, he said, 'I'm not going to talk without my lawyer."' This statement by Dr. Roy commented on Harms' post-Miranda silence and was thus inadmissible as evidence of Harms' sanity pursuant to Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 106 S. Ct. 634, 88 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986). In addition, Dr. Roy's written psychiatric evaluation was admitted as an exhibit *373 at trial. The written evaluation stated in part: Mr. Harms refused to talk to the police officer without the present [sic] of his lawyer. This also was suggestive that he knew the role of his lawyer and the consequences of the alleged offense. Mr. Harms did understand the nature of what he was doing and he did know the difference between right and wrong with respect to what he was doing. While these portions of Dr. Roy's evaluation utilized Harms' post-Miranda silence as evidence of sanity, counsel did not object to their admission. When the State offered the evaluation as an exhibit, defense counsel stated, "No objection, Judge." As a result, Harms has waived his "right on appeal to assert prejudicial error concerning the evidence received without objection." State v. Harris, ante p. 331, 339, 263 Neb. 331, 640 N.W.2d 24, 33 (2002). White testified at trial regarding his communications with the dispatcher as he was stationed in front of Harms' trailer. White testified that the dispatcher had advised him that Harms was on the telephone requesting an attorney. As discussed supra, these conversations and events occurred pre-Miranda and were properly admitted under Wainwright. The State, however, also asked White how Harms had reacted after being arrested and receiving the Miranda warnings. The following dialog occurred at trial: .... .... A No, sir. The State's questions to White elicited testimony about Harms' post-Miranda requests for his attorney and his failure to speak with police officers regarding his mental state. When the police officers gave Harms his Miranda warnings, they gave him an "implicit promise" that his decision to remain silent or request his attorney would not be used to penalize *374 him. See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292, 106 S. Ct. 634, 88 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986). However, by commenting on this silence at trial, the State "breach[ed] that promise by using silence to overcome [Harm's] plea of insanity." See 474 U.S. at 292, 106 S. Ct. 634. We determine, therefore, that the above portions of White's testimony which discussed Harms' post-Miranda silence were inadmissible and error pursuant to Wainwright. Adams' testimony at trial was very similar to White's description of Harms' post-Miranda behavior. In its examination of Adams, the State elicited from Adams the fact that Harms, after receiving Miranda warnings, requested his attorney and did not mention anything about hearing voices or having hallucinations. However, Harms did not object to Adams' testimony. Although all Wainwright errors were properly preserved by Harms in similar testimony by White, such objection made during White's testimony does not preserve the objection as to Adams' testimony. Where an objection has once been made to the admission of testimony and overruled by the court, it is unnecessary to repeat the same objection to further testimony of the same nature by the same witness in order to preserve alleged error in the admission of the testimony to which the objection was made. State v. Kirksey, 254 Neb. 162, 575 N.W.2d 377 (1998). Adams' testimony at trial was of the "same nature" as White's testimony, but Adams was not the "same witness." Thus, it was necessary for Harms to object to any alleged error in Adams' testimony in order to properly preserve it for appeal. See id. "A party who fails to make a timely objection to evidence waives the right on appeal to assert prejudicial error concerning the evidence received without objection." State v. Harris, ante p. 331, 339, 263 Neb. 331, 640 N.W.2d 24, 33 (2002). Since Harms did not object to Adams' testimony, we determine that Harms has waived the right to assert prejudicial error regarding Adams' testimony on appeal. Harms also argues that it was a violation of Wainwright for the court to admit evidence at trial of Harms' silence following a prior arrest by Adams in 1994. The challenged testimony, which was initiated by Harms' counsel, is as follows: Q All right, thank you. No further questions. Harms' allegation is without merit because defense counsel elicited the response from Adams. While the State, in its direct examination of Adams, initiated the questioning regarding the 1994 arrest of Harms, the State did not inquire into Harms' post-Miranda silence at the time of that arrest. The State asked Adams whether Harms' "behavior was different at that time than other times that you have seen him." Adams responded that Harms was "somewhat upset" and "angry" during the 1994 arrest. Such questioning is permissible under Wainwright because it "avoided any mention of the defendant's *375 exercise of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to consult counsel." Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 295, 106 S. Ct. 634, 88 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986). A defendant in a criminal case may not take advantage of an alleged error which the defendant invited the trial court to commit. State v. Dunster, 262 Neb. 329, 631 N.W.2d 879 (2001). Also, one may not waive an error, gamble on a favorable result, and, upon obtaining an unfavorable result, assert the previously waived error. State v. Trotter, 262 Neb. 443, 632 N.W.2d 325 (2001). For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Adams' testimony describing Harms' silence during a 1994 arrest was properly admitted. Having determined that portions of the testimony of Dr. Roy and White were improperly admitted pursuant to Wainwright, the issue becomes whether the erroneously admitted evidence is harmless. In this court's prior cases analyzing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976), we have stated that "'[b]ecause the nature of a Doyle error is so egregious and so inherently prejudicial, reversal is the norm rather than the exception.'" State v. Lofquest, 227 Neb. 567, 571, 418 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1988), quoting Williams v. Zahradnick, 632 F.2d 353 (4th Cir.1980). However, Doyle and Wainwright violations constitute "trial error" and are subject to a harmless error analysis. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993). See, also, Lofquest, 227 Neb. at 570-71, 418 N.W.2d at 597 (applying "` "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to Doyle violations' "). Generally, "'erroneous admission of evidence is harmless error and does not require reversal if the evidence is cumulative and other relevant evidence, properly admitted, supports the finding by the trier of fact.'" State v. Ildefonso, 262 Neb. 672, 686, 634 N.W.2d 252, 265 (2001). At Harms' trial, the trier of fact was the district court. In such a context, this court has stated: In a bench trial of a law action, including a criminal case tried without a jury, erroneous admission of evidence is not reversible error if other relevant evidence, admitted without objection or properly admitted over objection, sustains the trial court's factual findings necessary for the judgment or decision reviewed; therefore, an appellant must show that the trial court actually made a factual determination, or otherwise resolved a factual issue or question, through the use of erroneously admitted evidence in a case tried without a jury.... The appellant must show that the trial court made a finding of guilt based exclusively on the erroneously admitted evidence.... If there is other sufficient evidence to support the finding of guilt, the conviction will not be reversed. State v. Lara, 258 Neb. 996, 1002, 607 N.W.2d 487, 491-92 (2000). We examine the evidence and the district court's findings in accordance with these standards. Therefore, the issue is whether the district court resolved the question of Harms' sanity exclusively through the use of the impermissible testimony of Dr. Roy and White. If the record contains other sufficient evidence to support the district court's finding that Harms was sane beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction will not be reversed. In Nebraska, the test of responsibility for crime is a defendant's capacity to understand the nature of the act alleged to be criminal and the ability to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to the act. State v. *376 Smith, 256 Neb. 705, 592 N.W.2d 143 (1999). For an insanity defense, the insanity must be in existence at the time of the alleged criminal act. Id. We begin our analysis by examining those portions of the testimony of Dr. Roy and White that were inadmissible pursuant to Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 106 S. Ct. 634, 88 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986). Erroneous admission of evidence is harmless error and does not require reversal if the evidence is cumulative and other relevant evidence, properly admitted, supports the finding by the trier of fact. Ildefonso, supra. Dr. Roy's testimony that "when [Harms] was explained his Miranda rights, he said, `I'm not going to talk without my lawyer,'" is essentially identical to the statement in Dr. Roy's written evaluation, admitted without objection, that "Mr. Harms refused to talk to the police officer without the present [sic] of his lawyer." Accordingly, we find Dr. Roy's testimony cumulative. Similarly, White's testimony regarding Harms' post-Miranda requests for counsel and failure to mention anything about hearing voices or having hallucinations is repeated without objection in Adams' testimony, which provides virtually the same answers to the same questions posed by the State. Because of this repetition, we also find White's testimony cumulative. Since the inadmissible portions of the testimony of Dr. Roy and White are cumulative, we must determine next whether "`other relevant evidence, properly admitted, supports the finding by the trier of fact.'" See State v. Ildefonso, 262 Neb. 672, 686, 634 N.W.2d 252, 265 (2001). At trial, the State offered a substantial amount of evidence regarding Harms' sanity. Several individuals testified to Harms' calm demeanor immediately after the shooting. Clark, an eyewitness to the shooting, stated that Harms drove away after the shooting at a normal rate of speed and was "[n]ot [in] a real big hurry." Hatten, another eyewitness, also testified that Harms did not hurry to leave the area after shooting Kelsay, but, rather, drove away "[s]low, deliberate, like watching." Both White and Adams, the police officers, described how Harms behaved calmly, normally, and without agitation at the time of his arrest. Adams specifically noted that Harms' "normal" demeanor on the day of the shooting differed significantly from an angry encounter Adams had with Harms in 1994. Plager, the dispatcher, discussed how Harms was not excited or agitated when she spoke with him after the shooting, and how he had asked for his attorney without any mention of hallucinations or command voices. Dr. Roy's statements at trial and in his written evaluation of Harms, excluding inadmissible portions in violation of Wainwright, also provided the court with evidence of Harms' sanity at the time of the shooting. Dr. Roy found that Harms' thoughts prior to the shooting, such as "`this old guy looks like he had a lot of good years,'" were distinguishable from command voices ordering Harms to kill someone. He testified that when he interviewed Harms, Harms denied "any auditory hallucination, delusional thinking, or any paranoia related to" Kelsay because "he has no connection with that man." Dr. Roy also compared the behavior of someone who was actively hallucinating with Harms' behavior on the day of the shooting. Dr. Roy testified that an individual in Harms' circumstance who was actively hallucinating or experiencing delusions would have exhibited "bizarre" behavior, such as engaging in a random shooting spree with multiple victims or driving at an extremely high rate of speed, and would have been incapable of acting rationally. Dr. Roy contrasted this scenario *377 with Harms' actions, specifically, Harms' ability to slowly drive to his trailer, pick up the telephone, dial 911, speak with the dispatcher, and ask the dispatcher for his attorney. In sum, Dr. Roy testified that a person who was actively hallucinating could not have behaved the way Harms did after the shooting. Dr. Roy further testified that Harms' call to the dispatcher with a request for his attorney demonstrated that Harms knew that shooting Kelsay was wrong and would subject him to legal proceedings. In addition, portions of the testimony offered by Dr. Logan, Harms' expert witness, support a finding of sanity. Dr. Logan stated that Harms, in shooting Kelsay, "knew he was firing a gun," "knew he was shooting an elderly gentleman," and was acting with deliberation and premeditation "[t]o the extent that he had to take out a rifle and shoot him numerous times." Dr. Logan also concluded that Harms "knew what he was doing" and "certainly knew the number he was dialing" when he called 911 with a request for his attorney. The district court in its findings does not refer to Harms' post-Miranda silence, either as a basis for its finding of sanity or for any other purpose. The court stated: Again, I know that Dr. Logan emphasized strongly the historical pattern up to the shooting which would leave a basis for his opinion as to the actual, you know, state of mind of the defendant at the time of the shooting. Now, we know the actions of the defendant at the time based on the evidence that's been submitted. And we don't know what was going on in his mind and that's the problem the Court has. Okay, we've got somebody's got to make a decision as to what was going on in his mind at the time. We know his actions thereafter and, of course we know the cliches are brought about because they're generally *378 there for all of us to hear, like the cliche actions speak louder than words. What he did do at the time, what he did do thereafter and, of course, [defense counsel] is saying what have we also got in the beginning of this, also to look from the standpoint of his actions, Judge, also to consider it. Given the court's findings and the admissible evidence as evaluated in this opinion, we determine that the district court did not resolve the issue of Harms' sanity "based exclusively on the erroneously admitted evidence." See State v. Lara, 258 Neb. 996, 1002, 607 N.W.2d 487, 492 (2000). We find that the erroneously admitted testimony of Dr. Roy and White in violation of Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 106 S. Ct. 634, 88 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986), is cumulative to other relevant and properly admitted evidence regarding Harms' sanity. Furthermore, we find that the properly admitted evidence contained in the record is sufficient to support the district court's finding that Harms was not insane at the time of the shooting. For these reasons, we determine that the Wainwright errors which occurred at trial were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In his second assignment of error, Harms argues that the district court erroneously concluded that he was not insane at the time of the shooting. (Citation omitted.) State v. Smith, 256 Neb. 705, 710, 592 N.W.2d 143, 147 (1999). A defendant who pleads that he or she is not responsible by reason of insanity has the burden to prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See § 29-2203. It is undisputed that Harms is a paranoid schizophrenic with a long history of mental illness, failed medications, and hospitalizations. However, the fact that a defendant has some form of mental illness or defect does not by itself establish insanity. See, State v. Lesiak, 234 Neb. 163, 449 N.W.2d 550 (1989); State v. Lamb, 213 Neb. 498, 330 N.W.2d 462 (1983). As discussed previously, two eyewitnesses, two police officers, and a dispatcher testified at trial regarding their encounters with Harms' calm and normal demeanor after the shooting. Dr. Logan, Harms' expert, and Dr. Roy, the State's expert, presented opposing opinions as to Harms' sanity. Both experts submitted detailed written evaluations of Harms based on their examination of his medical records and their individual meetings with him. The verdict of the finder of fact on the issue of insanity will not be disturbed unless there is insufficient evidence to support such a finding. State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610 (1989). Also, an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in evidence, pass on credibility of witnesses, evaluate explanations, or reweigh evidence presented, which are within a fact finder's province for disposition. State v. Campbell, 260 Neb. 1021, 620 N.W.2d 750 (2001). This court will not reevaluate the testimony of Dr. Roy or Dr. Logan, or reweigh such testimony against the testimony of others at trial. We conclude that the issue of sanity was fairly presented to the district court and that the record contains sufficient admissible evidence for the finder of fact to conclude that Harms was not insane at the time of the shooting. See Ryan, supra. Harms' second assignment of error is without merit. In his final assignment of error, Harms argues that the district court erred in interpreting and applying the elements of first degree murder. In enumerating its findings of fact, the district court stated: The elements of first degree murder are listed in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-303 (Reissue *380 1995), which states, "A person commits murder in the first degree if he kills another person (1) purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice...." Accord State v. McLemore, 261 Neb. 452, 623 N.W.2d 315 (2001). Relying on State v. Reynolds, 235 Neb. 662, 457 N.W.2d 405 (1990), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Messersmith, 238 Neb. 924, 473 N.W.2d 83 (1991), Harms argues that Nebraska law requires the trier of fact to find that a defendant's deliberation and premeditation were rational. He asserts: Brief for appellant at 48. Based on this argument that "rational" intent is a required element of first degree murder, Harms argues that the district court erred in impermissibly placing the burden of proving "rational" premeditation and deliberation on him as part of his insanity defense. He further maintains that since the State did not prove that his premeditation and deliberation were rational, there was insufficient evidence to convict him of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. This court has determined that "deliberate" means not suddenly, not rashly, and requires that the defendant considered the probable consequences of his or her act before doing the act. See State v. McBride, 250 Neb. 636, 550 N.W.2d 659 (1996). We have also determined that one kills with "premeditated malice" if, before the act causing the death occurs, one has formed the intent or determined to kill the victim without legal justification. Id. The time required to establish premeditation may be of the shortest possible duration and may be so short that it is instantaneous, and the design or purpose to kill may be formed upon premeditation and deliberation at any moment before the homicide is committed. Id. A fundamental principle of statutory construction requires that penal statutes be strictly construed. State v. Hamik, 262 Neb. 761, 635 N.W.2d 123 (2001). We find nothing in § 28-303 or in this court's interpretation of § 28-303 which requires that a defendant must rationally consider the probable consequences of his or her actions or rationally determine to kill the victim without legal justification. See, e.g., McLemore, supra; McBride, supra; Reynolds, supra. Therefore, in stating its findings, the district court did not err in determining that "rational" was not a required element of "premeditation" or "deliberation." As a result, we also find that the district court did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to Harms or err in finding that there was sufficient evidence to convict Harms of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. We determine that this assignment of error is without merit. For the foregoing reasons, Harms' convictions are affirmed. AFFIRMED.