Title: State v. Tyrone L. Dubose
Citation: 2005 WI 126
Docket Number: 2003AP001690-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 14, 2005

2005 WI 126 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1690-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Tyrone L. Dubose,  
         Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  272 Wis. 2d 856, 679 N.W.2d 927 
(Ct. App. 2004-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 14, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 2, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
Sue E. Bischel   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs (opinion filed). 
CROOKS, J., joins the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Jefren E. Olsen, assistant public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by David 
H. Perlman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Keith A. Findley, John 
A. Pray and Byron C. Lichstein, Madison, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Innocence Project of the Frank J. Remington Center, 
University of Wisconsin Law School. 
 
 
2005 WI 126 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1690-CR 
(L.C. No. 
02 CF 0028) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Tyrone L. Dubose,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 14, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
Remanded.   
 
¶1 
N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J.   Petitioner 
Tyrone 
Dubose 
(Dubose) seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals that affirmed the circuit court's judgment of conviction 
for armed robbery.  The main issue presented to us is whether 
the circuit court erred in denying Dubose's motion to suppress 
the 
victim's 
out-of-court 
identifications 
of 
him, 
after 
determining that the eyewitness identification procedures used, 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
2 
 
including two showups,1 were not impermissibly suggestive, nor 
the result of an illegal arrest.   
¶2 
We agree with Dubose that the circuit court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress the out-of-court identification 
evidence.  However, we decline to adopt his proposed per se 
exclusionary rule regarding such evidence.  Instead, we adopt 
standards for the admissibility of out-of-court identification 
evidence similar to those set forth in the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).  We 
hold that evidence obtained from such a showup will not be 
admissible unless, based on the totality of the circumstances, 
the showup was necessary.  A showup will not be necessary, 
however, unless the police lacked probable cause to make an 
arrest or, as a result of other exigent circumstances, could not 
have conducted a lineup or photo array.  Since the motion to 
suppress the out-of-court identifications of Dubose should have 
been 
granted 
here, 
because 
such 
identifications 
were 
unnecessarily suggestive, we reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals and remand the case to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with the standards adopted herein.     
 
 
                                                 
1 "A 'showup' is an out-of-court pretrial identification 
procedure in which a suspect is presented singly to a witness 
for 
identification 
purposes." 
 
State 
v. 
Wolverton, 
193 
Wis. 2d 234, 263 n.21, 533 N.W.2d 167 (1995) (citing Stovall v. 
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967)). 
 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
3 
 
I 
¶3 
Timothy Hiltsley (Hiltsley) and Ryan Boyd (Boyd) left 
the Camelot Bar in Green Bay, Wisconsin, at approximately 1:00 
a.m. on January 9, 2002.  Hiltsley had been drinking at the bar 
and admitted to being "buzzed" when he left.  In the parking 
lot, Hiltsley and Boyd encountered a group of men, some of whom 
Hiltsley recognized as regular customers of a liquor store where 
he worked.  Dubose, an African-American, was one of the men he 
allegedly recognized.  After a brief conversation, Hiltsley 
invited two of the men, along with Boyd, to his residence to 
smoke marijuana.   
¶4 
When they arrived at Hiltsley's apartment, Hiltsley 
sat down on the couch to pack a bowl of marijuana.  At that 
time, Dubose allegedly held a gun to Hiltsley's right temple and 
demanded money.  After Hiltsley emptied his wallet and gave the 
men his money, the two men, both African-Americans, left his 
apartment.   
¶5 
Within minutes after the incident, at approximately 
1:21 a.m., one of Hiltsley's neighbors called the police to 
report a possible burglary.  She described two African-American 
men fleeing from the area, one of whom was wearing a large 
hooded flannel shirt.  At the same time, Hiltsley and Boyd 
attempted to chase the men.  They searched for the men in Boyd's 
car and hoped to cut them off.  After driving nearly two blocks, 
Hiltsley got out of the car and searched for the men on foot.  
During his search, Hiltsley flagged down a police officer that 
was responding to the burglary call.  Hiltsley told the officer 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
4 
 
that he had just been robbed at gunpoint.  He described the 
suspects as African-American, one standing about 5-feet 6-
inches, and the other man standing a little taller.   
¶6 
Another police officer also responded to the burglary 
call.  As he neared the scene, he observed two men walking about 
one-half block from Hiltsley's apartment.  This officer, Jeffrey 
Engelbrecht, 
was 
unable 
to 
determine 
the 
race 
of 
the 
individuals, but noted that one of the men was wearing a large 
hooded flannel shirt.  When the officer turned his squad car 
around to face the men, they ran east between two houses.  The 
police quickly set up a one-block perimeter in order to contain 
the suspects.     
¶7 The officer subsequently requested headquarters to 
dispatch a canine unit to help search for the men.  While he 
waited at the perimeter for the canine unit, police headquarters 
reported another call in regard to an armed robbery at 
Hiltsley's apartment.  The report indicated that the two 
suspects were African-American males, that one was possibly 
armed, and that the two calls were probably related.  Upon their 
arrival, the canine unit officer and his dog began tracking the 
suspects within the perimeter.  The dog began barking near a 
wooden backyard fence, and the officer demanded that the person 
behind the fence come out and show his hands.  A male voice 
responded that he was going to surrender and asked why the 
police were chasing him.  The male who came out from behind the 
fence was Dubose, who was subsequently arrested.    
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
5 
 
¶8  Dubose, who was not wearing a flannel shirt, told the 
police that he had been in an argument with his girlfriend and 
that he had just left her house.  He thought she might have 
called the police on him, which is why he ran when he saw the 
squad car.  After his arrest, he was searched.  The search did 
not uncover any weapons, money, or contraband.2  Dubose was then 
placed in the back of a squad car and driven to an area near 
Hiltsley's residence.   
¶9 
At this location, the officers conducted a showup 
procedure, giving Hiltsley the opportunity to identify one of 
the alleged suspects.  The officers placed Hiltsley in the 
backseat of a second squad car, which was parked so that its 
rear window was three feet apart from the rear window of the 
squad car containing Dubose.  The dome light was turned on in 
the car containing Dubose.  The officers told Hiltsley that 
Dubose was possibly one of the men who had robbed him at 
gunpoint, and asked Hiltsley if he could identify the man in the 
other squad car.  Hiltsley told the police that he was 98 
percent certain that Dubose, who sat alone in the back seat of 
the other squad car, was the man who held him at gunpoint.  
Hiltsley also told the police that he recognized him due to his 
small, slender build and hairstyle.    
                                                 
2 At approximately 3:57 a.m., two police officers attempted 
to retrace Dubose's movements to see if they could locate the 
weapon used in the alleged robbery.  They located a semi-
automatic pistol near the two houses where Dubose allegedly ran 
with the unidentified man.   
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
6 
 
¶10 The squad cars separated and took both Hiltsley and 
Dubose to the police station.  Approximately 10 to 15 minutes 
after the first showup, the police conducted a second showup.  
There, Hiltsley identified Dubose, alone in a room, through a 
two-way mirror.  Hiltsley told police that Dubose was the same 
man he observed at the previous showup, and that he believed 
Dubose was the man who robbed him.  A short time after the 
second showup, the police showed Hiltsley a mug shot of Dubose, 
and he identified him for a third time.   
¶11 The State of Wisconsin (State) charged Dubose with 
armed robbery. 
 Dubose 
filed 
a motion to 
suppress all 
identifications of him in connection with the case, specifically 
asserting that the first showup was "unnecessarily suggestive 
and conducive to an irreparable mistaken identification. . . ."  
He also claimed that the identifications were the fruits of an 
unlawful arrest, which denied him due process of law.  The Brown 
County Circuit Court, Sue E. Bischel, Judge, denied Dubose's 
motion and scheduled a jury trial.  At trial, Hiltsley testified 
about the events and subsequent showups that occurred on January 
9, 2002.  He also identified Dubose in the courtroom as the man 
who held him at gunpoint on the night in question.  The jury 
convicted Dubose of armed robbery on September 5, 2002. 
¶12 Dubose appealed his conviction to the court of 
appeals.  In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals 
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.  The court held that 
the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that Dubose's 
arrest was lawful, and that Dubose had not met his burden to 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
7 
 
prove the impermissible suggestiveness of the out-of-court 
identifications.  In concluding that there was probable cause 
for arrest, the appellate court relied on several factors, 
including the time of the arrest, the proximity of Dubose's 
location to Hiltsley's apartment, Dubose's similarity to the 
description provided by dispatch, and Dubose's flight after 
seeing the police car.   
¶13 The court of appeals also determined that the first 
showup was not impermissibly suggestive.  Dubose's argument 
concerning suggestiveness relied on the fact that he sat alone 
in the police vehicle, the witness had been drinking and was 
"buzzed," the identification occurred shortly after the robbery 
occurred while Hiltsley was upset, and the officers suggested to 
Hiltsley before the showup they had possibly caught "one of the 
guys."  The court of appeals held that the showup was not 
impermissibly suggestive based on the totality of the factors 
involved.   
¶14 Likewise, the court rejected Dubose's challenge to the 
second showup at the police station.  The court was not 
persuaded by Dubose's argument that he was the only suspect 
shown to Hiltsley, and that the second showup occurred too soon 
after the first one.  The court held that showing only one 
suspect to Hiltsley does not, by itself, render a showup 
impermissibly suggestive.  In responding to Dubose's other 
argument, that the timing of the showups was too closely 
related, the court of appeals held:  
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
8 
 
First, to the extent that Dubose claims this 
second identification was premised on an earlier 
mistaken identification, we note that our inquiry 
rests solely on the suggestiveness of the police 
procedures 
used 
in 
garnering 
an 
individual's 
identification and whether those procedures create 
impermissible 
suggestiveness. 
 
Therefore 
Dubose's 
contention that the second identification allowed 
Hiltsley to confirm an earlier mistake misses the 
point.  
Second, Dubose has not provided any authority to 
support 
his 
assumption 
that 
a 
subsequent 
identification must occur after a period of time has 
lapsed to ensure the identification is separate and 
independent, 
thereby 
preventing 
impermissible 
suggestiveness.  In reality, Dubose's argument relates 
only 
to 
the 
reliability 
of 
the 
identification.  
Without there being any impermissible suggestiveness 
in 
the 
second 
showup, 
the 
reliability 
of 
the 
identification is immaterial for our purposes of 
considering whether a defendant's due process rights 
have been violated.   
State v. Dubose, 2003AP1690-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶36-37 
(Wis. Ct. App. March 2, 2004). 
¶15 Dubose petitioned this court for review.  We granted 
his petition on October 19, 2004, and now, for the reasons set 
forth herein, reverse the decision of the court of appeals.  
Accordingly, we remand this case to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.     
II 
¶16 On review of a motion to suppress, this court employs 
a two-step analysis.  State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶9, 245 
Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.  First, we review the circuit 
court's findings of fact.  We will uphold these findings unless 
they are against the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence.  State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶18, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
9 
 
604 N.W.2d 552.  "In reviewing an order suppressing evidence, 
appellate 
courts 
will 
uphold 
findings 
of 
evidentiary 
or 
historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous."  State v. 
Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, 541, 577 N.W.2d 352 (1998); see also 
State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 249-50, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996).  
Next, we must review independently the application of relevant 
constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. Vorburger, 
2002 WI 105, ¶32, 255 Wis. 2d 537, 648 N.W.2d 829.  Such a 
review presents a question of law, which we review de novo, but 
with the benefit of analyses of the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  See Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d at 541.         
III 
 
¶17 Our analysis begins with a summary of the law relating 
to the right to due process in out-of-court identification 
procedures.  In Stovall, the United States Supreme Court 
considered 
for 
the 
first 
time 
whether, 
and 
under 
what 
circumstances, 
out-of-court 
identification 
procedures 
could 
implicate a defendant's right to due process.3  The defendant in 
that case, an African-American male, was arrested for murder.  
Without time to consult with or retain counsel, the defendant 
                                                 
3 Prior to Stovall, the United States Supreme Court had 
never applied the due process analysis to the admissibility of 
eyewitness testimony.  See Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the 
Right to Due Process in Connection With Pretrial Identification 
Procedures: An Analysis and a Proposal, 79 Ky. L.J. 259, 264 
(1991).  
In 
discussing 
identification 
procedures, Justice 
William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for the Court, stated: "The 
overwhelming majority of American courts have always treated the 
evidence question not as one of admissibility but as one of 
credibility for the jury."  Stovall, 388 U.S. at 299-300.    
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
10 
 
was taken to the hospital room of the only surviving witness to 
the alleged crime.  The witness had been stabbed multiple times 
and was awaiting surgery.  The defendant was handcuffed to one 
of five police officers who, along with two prosecutors, brought 
him into the hospital room.  He was the only African-American in 
the room.  The witness subsequently identified the defendant 
from her hospital bed after a police officer asked her if he 
"was the man," and the defendant uttered a few words for the 
purpose of voice identification.  The witness later recovered, 
and testified at the defendant's trial as to the events that 
occurred in her hospital room.  At that time, she also made an 
in-court identification of the defendant.  Stovall, 388 U.S. at 
295.     
 
¶18 The United States Supreme Court considered whether the 
confrontation in the hospital room was "so unnecessarily 
suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification 
that he was denied due process of law."  Id. at 302.  The Court 
concluded that due process was a recognized ground of attack 
under such circumstances, as "[t]he practice of showing suspects 
singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as 
part of a lineup, has been widely condemned."  Id. (footnote 
omitted).  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the 
existence of a due process violation "depends on the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding it" and that this case did not 
present such a violation.  Id.  The Court determined that 
necessity is a key factor in reviewing whether a showup violates 
due process.  Although the identification was suggestive, the 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
11 
 
Court determined that it did not violate the defendant's right 
to due process because the procedure was necessary.  It held:  
"Here was the only person in the world who could 
possibly exonerate Stovall.  Her words, and only her 
words, 'He is not the man' could have resulted in 
freedom for Stovall.  The hospital was not far distant 
from the courthouse and jail.  No one knew how long 
Mrs. 
Behrendt 
might 
live. 
 
Faced 
with 
the 
responsibility of identifying the attacker, with the 
need for immediate action and with the knowledge that 
Mrs. Behrendt could not visit the jail, the police 
followed the only feasible procedure and took Stovall 
to the hospital room.  Under these circumstances, the 
usual police station line-up, which Stovall now argues 
he should have had, was out of the question." 
Id. 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
Thus, 
while 
the 
out-of-court 
identification 
was 
not 
suppressed 
in 
that 
case, 
Stovall 
"established a due process right of criminal suspects to be free 
from 
confrontations 
that, 
under 
all 
circumstances, 
are 
unnecessarily 
suggestive. 
 
The 
right 
was 
enforceable 
by 
exclusion at trial of evidence of the constitutionally invalid 
identification."  Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 120 (1977) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting).        
¶19 On the same day that the United States Supreme Court 
decided Stovall, it also decided United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218 (1967) and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).  
These decisions all reflected the Court's concern about the 
reliability of out-of-court eyewitness identification evidence.  
See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 120 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
Particularly, in Wade, the Court made strong statements about 
the dangers involved with eyewitness identifications:  
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
12 
 
[T]he confrontation compelled by the State between the 
accused and the victim or witnesses to a crime to 
elicit identification evidence is peculiarly riddled 
with innumerable dangers and variable factors which 
might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair 
trial.  The vagaries of eyewitness identification are 
well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with 
instances of mistaken identification. 
Wade, 388 U.S. at 228 (footnote omitted).  The foundation of 
this "trilogy" of cases was "the Court's recognition of the 
'high incidence of miscarriage of justice' resulting from the 
admission of mistaken eyewitness identification evidence at 
criminal trials."  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 119 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted).        
 
¶20  After Stovall, Wade, and Gilbert, the United States 
Supreme Court next considered the identification issue in 
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).  In that case, 
the defendant was convicted of armed robbery based on in-court 
identification.  However, the in-court identification witnesses 
had been shown photographs of the defendant prior to trial.  The 
defendant argued that the in-court identifications were tainted, 
because the out-of-court photo identification was suggestive.      
¶21 The Court, attempting to follow the "totality test" 
developed 
in 
Stovall, 
determined 
that 
the 
in-court 
identification was not tainted.  However, "the exclusionary 
effect of Stovall had already been accomplished, since the 
prosecution made no use of the suggestive confrontation.  
Simmons, therefore, did not deal with the constitutionality of 
the out-of-court identification procedure.  The only question 
was the impact of the Due Process Clause on an in-court 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
13 
 
identification that was not itself unnecessarily suggestive."  
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 121-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).     
 
¶22 The United States Supreme Court nevertheless held in 
Simmons "that each case must be considered on its own facts, and 
that convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial 
following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set 
aside on that ground only if the photographic identification 
procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a 
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."  
Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384.  In so holding, however, the Supreme 
Court "delineated a more expansive definition of totality than 
the one established in Stovall."  David E. Paseltiner, Twenty-
Years of Diminishing Protection: A Proposal to Return to the 
Wade Trilogy's Standards, 15 Hofstra L. Rev. 583, 589 (1987).  
"Substitution of the word 'permissible' for 'unnecessarily' 
creates the impression that what may be 'unnecessary' could 
still be 'permissible.'  Moreover, replacing 'conducive to 
irreparable mistaken identification' with 'a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification' requires a much 
higher level of proof on the part of the defendant."  Id. 
(footnote 
omitted). 
 
As 
a 
result, 
Stovall 
and 
Simmons 
established two different due process tests for two different 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
14 
 
factual scenarios.  See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 122 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting).4   
¶23 In Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), the United 
States Supreme Court shifted away from its reliance on the 
"necessity" of the out-of-court identification as set forth in 
Stovall and, instead, emphasized the standard of reliability 
established in Simmons.5  In Biggers, the police conducted a 
showup that consisted of two detectives walking the defendant 
past the victim at the police station.  At the victim's request, 
the police directed the respondent to say "shut up or I'll kill 
you."  The victim identified the defendant after the showup and 
then 
later 
at 
trial. 
 
The 
defendant 
objected 
to 
the 
admissibility of the out-of-court identification.   
¶24 The Supreme Court determined that an improper out-of-
court identification alone does not require the exclusion of the 
evidence.  The Court concluded that evidence from a suggestive 
identification would be admissible if a court can find it 
reliable under the totality of the circumstances.  In order to 
                                                 
4 The distinction established between the circumstances 
presented in Stovall and Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 
(1968), was preserved in two succeeding United States Supreme 
Court cases: Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) and Foster v. 
California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969). 
5 In Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), "the Court 
observed that the challenged procedure occurred pre-Stovall and 
that a strict rule would make little sense with regard to a 
confrontation that preceded the Court's first indication that a 
suggestive procedure might lead to the exclusion of evidence."  
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107 (1977) (citation 
omitted).   
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
15 
 
determine if an identification is reliable under the totality of 
the circumstances, the Court developed a five-part test: (1) the 
opportunity of the witness to view the defendant at the time of 
the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the 
accuracy of the witness' prior description of the defendant; (4) 
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the 
confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and 
the confrontation.  See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200.6 
¶25 The United States Supreme Court's next significant 
eyewitness identification case was Manson v. Brathwaite.  In 
that case, a police officer made a positive out-of-court photo 
identification of the defendant two days after he conducted an 
                                                 
6 In response to this decision, one commentator observed:  
[T]he Court moved from the relatively objective tests 
of Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) and 
Stovall to a subjective test.  The Biggers test first 
requires the determination of suggestiveness under an 
expansive reading of the totality test, and then, even 
if the lineup is found to be suggestive, it may still 
be 
used, 
if, 
after 
weighing 
all 
the 
factors 
surrounding the lineup, it is found to be reliable.  
Biggers, 
therefore, 
makes 
it 
difficult 
for 
the 
defendant to prove suggestiveness, while at the same 
time making it easier for the prosecution to use a 
suggestive identification.  The courts are thus able 
to dismiss flagrant violations on a finding of 
reliability, and the police have little to fear 
concerning 
the 
suppression 
of 
suggestive 
identifications. 
 
David E. Paseltiner, Twenty-Years of Diminishing Protection:  A 
Proposal to Return to the Wade Trilogy's Standards, 15 Hofstra 
L. Rev. 583, 592 (1987)(footnotes omitted).     
 
 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
16 
 
undercover purchase of drugs from the defendant.  Both parties 
agreed that the identification was improperly suggestive.  The 
Supreme 
Court 
held 
that, 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, the identification was reliable even though the 
confrontation procedure was suggestive.  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 
106.  The Court reaffirmed Biggers and held that "reliability is 
the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification 
testimony. . . .  The factors to be considered are set out in 
Biggers."  Id. at 114 (citation omitted). 
¶26 With guidance from the United States Supreme Court, 
this court has adopted the test set forth in Biggers and 
Brathwaite in an attempt to minimize the misidentification of 
defendants 
in 
Wisconsin. 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Wolverton, 
193 
Wis. 2d 234, 
533 
N.W.2d 167 
(1995); 
Fells 
v. 
State, 
65 
Wis. 2d 525, 223 N.W.2d 507 (1974) (in a case involving lineup 
and photo identifications, the proper procedure is to first 
determine if the identification was "unnecessarily suggestive," 
and, if so, decide whether, under the totality of circumstances, 
the identification was nevertheless reliable).  In Wolverton, 
this court decided a case that presented similar factual 
circumstances to the case presently before us.  There, the 
police conducted showups in driveways of different witnesses to 
different incidents.  The suspect was positively identified 
while sitting alone in the back of a squad car.  The 
identifications took place shortly after the alleged incidents, 
and the witnesses later identified the suspect at trial.   
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
17 
 
¶27 In relying on Biggers and Brathwaite, we held that if 
the 
criminal 
defendant 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
showup 
was 
impermissibly suggestive, the burden "shifts to the state to 
demonstrate that 'under the "totality of the circumstances"' the 
identification was reliable. . . ."  Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 
264.  Accordingly, we upheld the admissibility of the out-of-
court identifications, not under standards involving due process 
and necessity as set forth in Stovall, but because under the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, 
such 
identifications 
were 
determined to be reliable.     
IV 
¶28 This case presents us with an opportunity to revisit 
our position with regard to the United States Supreme Court 
decisions in Biggers and Brathwaite.  The State urges us to 
reaffirm our adherence to these holdings, and again conclude 
that evidence from an impermissibly suggestive out-of-court 
identification can still be used at trial if, based on the 
totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable.   
In contrast, Dubose asks us to abandon this approach and apply a 
per 
se 
exclusionary 
rule 
in 
cases 
where 
out-of-court 
identifications were impermissibly suggestive. 
¶29 We begin our assessment by recognizing that much new 
information has been assembled since we last reviewed the showup 
procedure in Wolverton.  Over the last decade, there have been 
extensive studies on the issue of identification evidence, 
research that is now impossible for us to ignore.  See Nancy 
Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Police Showup and 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
18 
 
Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 27 L. & Human 
Behav. 523 (2003); Winn S. Collins, Improving Eyewitness 
Evidence Collection Procedures in Wisconsin, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 
529; Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 
Ann. Rev. Psychol. 277 (2003); Tiffany Hinz & Kathy Pezdek, The 
Effect of Exposure to Multiple Lineups on Face Identification 
Accuracy, 25 L. & Human Behav. 185 (2001); U. S. Department of 
Justice, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement 
(1999), 
available 
at 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf; Gary L. Wells & 
Amy L. Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect": Feedback 
to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing 
Experience, 83 J. Appl. Psych. 360 (1998); Gary L. Wells et al., 
Eyewitness 
Identification 
Procedures: 
Recommendations 
for 
Lineups and Photospreads, 22 L. & Human Behav. 603 (1998); U.S. 
Department of Justice, Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by 
Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish 
Innocence 
After 
Trial, 
(1996), 
available 
at 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf.     
¶30 These studies confirm that eyewitness testimony is 
often "hopelessly unreliable."  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 
N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Mass. 1995).  The research strongly supports 
the conclusion that eyewitness misidentification is now the 
single greatest source of wrongful convictions in the United 
States, and responsible for more wrongful convictions than all 
other causes combined.  See Wells, Eyewitness Identification 
Procedures, 22 L. & Human Behav. at 6.  In a study conducted by 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
19 
 
the 
United 
States 
Department 
of 
Justice 
of 
28 
wrongful 
convictions, it determined that 24 (85 percent) of the erroneous 
convictions were based primarily on the misidentification of the 
defendant by a witness.  Collins, Improving Eyewitness Evidence 
Collection Procedures in Wisconsin, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. at 532-33. 
In a similar study conducted by the Innocence Project at the 
Benjamin Cardozo School of Law, mistaken identifications played 
a major part in the wrongful conviction of over two-thirds of 
the first 138 postconviction DNA exonerations.  Available at, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/mistakenid.php. 
 
These 
statistics certainly substantiate Justice William J. Brennan, 
Jr.'s concerns in Wade that "the annals of criminal law are rife 
with instances of mistaken identification."  Wade, 388 U.S. at 
228 (footnote omitted).  
¶31 In light of such evidence, we recognize that our 
current approach to eyewitness identification has significant 
flaws.7  After the Supreme Court's decisions in Biggers and 
Brathwaite, the test for showups evolved from an inquiry into 
unnecessary suggestiveness 
to 
an 
inquiry of 
impermissible 
suggestiveness, while forgiving impermissible suggestiveness if 
                                                 
7 As further evidence of a flawed procedure, we note that 
the Wisconsin Attorney General's Office has recently adopted a 
Model Policy and Procedure for Eyewitness Identification.  The 
policy was a result of "[r]esearch and nationwide experience 
(which) 
demonstrated 
that 
eyewitness 
evidence 
can 
be 
a 
particularly fragile type of evidence, and that eyewitnesses can 
be mistaken."  Wisconsin Department of Justice, Model Policy and 
Procedure for Eyewitness Identification at 2, available at, 
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/EyewitnessPublic.pdf. 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
20 
 
the identification could be said to be reliable.  Studies have 
now shown that approach is unsound, since it is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, for courts to distinguish between 
identifications that were reliable and identifications that were 
unreliable.  "Considering the complexity of the human mind and 
the 
subtle 
effects 
of 
suggestive 
procedures 
upon 
it, 
a 
determination that an identification was unaffected by such 
procedures must itself be open to serious question."  State v. 
Leclair, 385 A.2d 831, 833 (N.H. 1978).  Because a witness can 
be influenced by the suggestive procedure itself, a court cannot 
know exactly how reliable the identification would have been 
without the suggestiveness.        
¶32 It is now clear to us that the use of unnecessarily 
suggestive evidence resulting from a showup procedure presents 
serious problems in Wisconsin criminal law cases.8  Justice 
                                                 
8 One commentator stated:  
Unnecessarily 
suggestive 
pretrial 
identification 
procedures 
differ 
from 
most 
other 
improper 
law 
enforcement activities because they do not further any 
valid law enforcement interest.  Although a violation 
of a suspect's fourth or fifth amendment rights——for 
example, a warrantless search or an interrogation 
without a lawyer present——is plainly wrong, it might 
at least further the valid law enforcement objective 
of collecting relevant evidence.  By contrast, an 
unnecessarily 
suggestive 
identification 
procedure 
simply creates unreliable evidence where reliable 
evidence could have been gathered.  It is not a case 
where good ends justify bad means——the end result of 
an unnecessarily suggestive procedure is worthless 
precisely because of the means used. 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
21 
 
Thurgood Marshall, dissenting in Brathwaite, took note of such a 
problem and expressed his concern when he wrote:  
In my view, this conclusion totally ignores the 
lessons 
of 
Wade. 
 
The 
dangers 
of 
mistaken 
identification are, as Stovall held, simply too great 
to permit unnecessarily suggestive identifications.  
Neither Biggers nor the Court's opinion today points 
to any contrary empirical evidence.  Studies since 
Wade 
have 
only 
reinforced 
the 
validity 
of 
its 
assessment of the dangers of identification testimony.  
While the Court is 'content to rely on the good sense 
and judgment of American juries,' the impetus for 
Stovall and Wade was repeated miscarriages of justice 
resulting 
from 
juries' 
willingness 
to 
credit 
inaccurate eyewitness testimony.   
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 125-26 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(footnote omitted) (citation omitted).  We agree with him that 
many 
of 
the 
concerns 
regarding 
unnecessarily 
suggestive 
procedures were addressed in Stovall and Wade.  Stovall 
recognized that the risk of misidentification is too great to 
allow the jury to hear evidence from unnecessarily suggestive 
showup procedures.  As stated, the United States Supreme Court 
specifically held that the "practice of showing suspects singly 
to persons for the purpose of identification . . . has been 
widely condemned."  Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302 (footnote omitted).  
While the Court allowed the showup evidence to be admitted in 
that case, its holding was limited to situations where, based on 
the totality of the circumstances, the showup was necessary.  
Such a strict requirement helped ensure that the police would 
                                                                                                                                                             
Rosenburg, Rethinking the Right to Due Process, 79 Ky. L.J. 
at 291 (footnote omitted).   
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
22 
 
take precautions when considering the use of a showup and, if a 
showup was appropriate, conduct the procedure in a non-
suggestive manner.   
¶33 With Stovall as our guide, we now adopt a different 
test 
in 
Wisconsin 
regarding 
the 
admissibility 
of 
showup 
identifications.9  We conclude that evidence obtained from an 
out-of-court showup is inherently suggestive and will not be 
admissible unless, based on the totality of the circumstances, 
the procedure was necessary.  A showup will not be necessary, 
however, unless the police lacked probable cause to make an 
arrest or, as a result of other exigent circumstances, could not 
have conducted a lineup or photo array.  A lineup or photo array 
is generally fairer than a showup, because it distributes the 
                                                 
9 As a result of our return to the United States Supreme 
Court's Stovall approach, we now withdraw any language in 
Wolverton, 
193 
Wis. 2d at 
533, 
in 
State 
v. 
Streich, 
87 
Wis. 2d 209, 274 N.W.2d 635 (1979), as well as in the court of 
appeals' decision in State v. Kaelin, 196 Wis. 2d 1, 538 
N.W.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1995), and in cases cited therein, that 
might 
be 
interpreted 
as 
being 
based 
on 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Those cases were based on the United States 
Constitution and focused more on the reliability of the 
identification than on the necessity for a showup. 
 
In Wisconsin, there are several criteria that should be 
considered in regard to whether to adhere to precedent.  See 
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins., 2003 WI 108, 264 
Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257.  One such factor relates to the need 
to reach a decision that corresponds to newly ascertained facts.  
Id., ¶98.  Another factor is whether the prior decisions have 
become unsound, because they are based on principles that are no 
longer valid.  Id., ¶99.  We conclude, in light of the 
compelling research discussed herein, that these criteria have 
now been satisfied.        
 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
23 
 
probability of identification among the number of persons 
arrayed, thus reducing the risk of a misidentification.  See 
Richard Gonzalez et al., Response Biases in Lineups and Showups, 
64 J. of Personality & Soc. Psych. 525, 527 (1993).  In a 
showup, however, the only option for the witness is to decide 
whether to identify the suspect.10  See id. 
¶34 We emphasize that our approach, which is based to some 
extent on the recommendations of the Wisconsin Innocence 
Project, is not a per se exclusionary rule like Dubose requests.  
Showups have been a useful instrument in investigating and 
prosecuting criminal cases, and there will continue to be 
circumstances in which such a procedure is necessary and 
appropriate.11    
¶35 If and when the police determine that a showup is 
necessary, special care must be taken to minimize potential 
suggestiveness.  We recommend procedures similar to those 
proposed by the Wisconsin Innocence Project to help make showup 
identifications as non-suggestive as possible.  For example, it 
is important that showups are not conducted in locations, or in 
                                                 
10 "'There is a great potential for misidentification when a 
witness identifies a stranger based solely upon a single brief 
observation, and this risk is increased when the observation was 
made at a time of stress or excitement.'"  State v. Cromedy, 727 
A.2d 457, 463 (N.J. 1999) (citation omitted). 
11 An example of this would be when the police apprehend a 
suspect during a Terry stop.  If that person is suspected of 
committing a crime, but the police do not have the requisite 
probable cause to arrest and then to conduct a lineup or photo 
array, a showup could be considered necessary.     
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
24 
 
a manner, that implicitly conveys to the witness that the 
suspect is guilty.  Showups conducted in police stations, squad 
cars, or with the suspect in handcuffs that are visible to any 
witness, all carry with them inferences of guilt, and thus 
should be considered suggestive.12  Next, officers investigating 
the matter at issue should proceed with caution in instructing 
the witness.  The investigators must realize that "a witness's 
memory of an event can be fragile and that the amount and 
accuracy of the information obtained from a witness depends in 
part on the method of questioning." United States Department of 
Justice, Eyewitness Evidence, at 3-4.  Therefore, an eyewitness 
should be told that the real suspect may or may not be present, 
and that the investigation will continue regardless of the 
result of the impending identification procedure.  Finally, it 
is important that a suspect be shown to the witness only once. 
If a suspect is identified, the police have no reason to conduct 
further identification procedures.  Conversely, if the suspect 
is not identified by the witness, he or she should not be 
presented to that witness in any subsequent showups.  While this 
list is far from complete, a showup conducted in accord with 
these 
standards 
will 
do 
much 
to 
alleviate 
the 
inherent 
suggestiveness of the procedure.      
 
¶36 Applying this approach to the facts before us, it is 
clear that the showups conducted were unnecessarily suggestive, 
                                                 
12 If a suspect is detained within the police station, logic 
dictates that the identification procedure should be a lineup or 
photo array, rather than the inherently suggestive showup.     
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
25 
 
and that the admission of identification evidence denied Dubose 
a right to due process under Article I, Section 8 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  First, there existed sufficient facts 
at the time of Dubose's arrest to establish probable cause for 
his arrest.13  It was not necessary for the police to conduct the 
showups, since they had sufficient evidence against Dubose to 
arrest him without such showups.14  Next, the officers handcuffed 
                                                 
13 We have held that "'[p]robable cause to arrest refers to 
that quantum of evidence which would lead a reasonable police 
officer to believe that the defendant probably committed a 
crime.'"  State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 701, 499 N.W.2d 152 
(1993) (citation omitted).   
14 In State v. Dubose, 2003AP1690-CR, unpublished slip op., 
¶26 (Wis. Ct. App. March 2, 2004), the court of appeals held 
that, based on the totality of the circumstances, there was 
sufficient probable cause to arrest Dubose.  It relied on the 
following facts:  
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
26 
 
Dubose and placed him in the back seat of a squad car.  By 
placing a suspect in a squad car, the police implicitly suggest 
that they believe the suspect is the offender.  This is similar 
to the situation in Stovall, where the United States Supreme 
Court held that the showup procedure was suggestive when the 
defendant was brought into the hospital room in handcuffs and 
accompanied by police officers and prosecutors.  Third, the 
police officers told the witness, Hiltsley, that they may have 
caught "one of the guys" who had robbed him.  Such a comment is 
                                                                                                                                                             
First, the entirety of the events occurred in the early morning 
hours when there were few people out on the streets.  See State 
v. Flynn, 92 Wis. 2d 427, 447, 285 N.W.2d 710 (1979) (time of 
day is a relevant factor). Second, Engelbrecht noticed two 
people in the very near vicinity of the burglary call, about a 
block and a half away, shortly after the call was made. Third, 
because one of the individuals wore a flannel shirt with a hood, 
they matched the description given in connection with the 
burglary 
call. 
Fourth, 
the 
then 
suspects 
ran 
away 
from 
Engelbrecht after he turned his vehicle in their direction. See 
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000) (flight from 
the police, although not dispositive, can be a relevant factor). 
Fifth, within a minute and a half, Engelbrecht set up a one-
block perimeter to lock-down the area. Sixth, while waiting for 
the canine unit to arrive, Engelbrecht heard a dispatch 
regarding an armed robbery involving two African-American male 
suspects. Dispatch further advised this call may be related to 
the earlier burglary call. Seventh, Rocky, the canine partner, 
immediately picked up the scent of the suspects who ran away 
from Engelbrecht and ultimately tracked Dubose to a location 
that was within the officers' one-block perimeter. Eighth, 
Dubose was hiding in someone's backyard behind a fence. Ninth, 
after being told to come out, Dubose, an African-American male, 
appeared and fit the description from the armed robbery 
dispatch. The sum total of these events constitutes probable 
cause. 
Id.  We wholeheartedly agree with this analysis by the court of 
appeals.    
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
27 
 
suggestive and, as studies have shown, greatly increases the 
chance of misidentification.15  Although the court of appeals 
stated that it found "nothing wrong with a police procedure 
where officers indicate an individual is a possible suspect," 
Dubose, 2003AP1690-CR, unpublished slip op. at ¶33, we consider 
such a comment unnecessarily suggestive.  
¶37 Finally, after the first showup was conducted and 
Dubose was positively identified, the police still conducted two 
more identification procedures, another showup and a photo of 
Dubose, at the police station shortly after Dubose's arrival.  
These subsequent identification procedures were unnecessarily 
suggestive.  Dubose had already been arrested and positively 
identified by Hiltsley.  The record does not show that any 
exigent 
circumstances 
existed 
making 
the 
out-of-court 
identification procedures used here necessary.  Therefore, we 
conclude, based on the totality of the circumstances, that 
"[t]he suggestive elements in this identification procedure made 
it all but inevitable that [the witness] would identify [the 
defendant] whether or not he was in fact 'the man.'  In effect, 
the police repeatedly said to the witness 'This is the man.'"  
Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969) (citation 
omitted).  For similar reasons, as discussed above, we reverse 
the court of appeals and remand this case to the circuit court 
                                                 
15 Studies 
have 
demonstrated 
that 
giving 
a 
proper 
instruction can reduce mistaken identification rates by as much 
as 
41 
percent 
without 
affecting 
the 
rate 
of 
accurate 
identifications.  See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, 
Eyewitness Testimony, 54 Ann. Rev. Pscyh. 277, 286-87 (2003).    
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
28 
 
for further proceedings, consistent with the standards adopted 
herein.  While our focus is on the two showups that occurred 
here, the photo identification by showing Hiltsley a mug shot of 
Dubose, was also unnecessarily suggestive and that out-of-court 
identification should have been suppressed.        
¶38 On remand, we recognize that the exclusion of evidence 
of the out-of-court identifications "does not deprive the 
prosecutor of reliable evidence of guilt.  The witness would 
still be permitted to identify the defendant in court if that 
identification is based on an independent source.  And properly 
conducted pretrial viewings can still be proven at trial and, 
would be encouraged by the rule prohibiting use of suggestive 
ones."  People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 384 (N.Y. 1981).  In 
this case, we do not now vacate the circuit court's judgment of 
conviction, 
since 
the 
circuit 
court 
must 
review 
any 
identification of Dubose made by a witness during the trial.  If 
the court determines that any such identification was based on 
the 
unnecessarily 
suggestive 
showups 
and 
the 
photo 
identification, then the conviction must be set aside and a new 
trial 
ordered, 
unless 
any 
in-court 
identification 
was 
independent or untainted.  The court may uphold any in-court 
identification if the circuit court determines that it "had an 
origin 
independent 
of 
the 
lineup 
or 
was 
'sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'"  State v. 
McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 156, 175, 570 N.W.2d 384 (1997) (quoting 
Wade, 388 U.S. at 241).  In other words, if the circuit court 
determines that any in-court identification of Dubose was not 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
29 
 
tainted by out-of-court identifications, then the conviction 
should stand.  "[T]he in-court identification is admissible if 
the State carries the burden of showing 'by clear and convincing 
evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon 
observations of the suspect other than the [out-of-court] 
identification.'"  McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d at 167 (quoting Wade, 
388 U.S. at 240.     
V  
 
¶39 We find strong support for the adoption of these 
standards 
in 
the 
Due 
Process 
Clause 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, Article I, Section 8.16  It reads in relevant part: 
"No person may be held to answer for a criminal offense without 
due process of law. . . ."17  Based on our reading of that 
clause, and keeping in mind the principles discussed herein, the 
                                                 
16 While we recognize that Article I, Section 1 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution also refers to principles of due process, 
the relevant provision of the Wisconsin Constitution at issue in 
this case, as noted in the arguments in the briefs of counsel, 
is Article I, Section 8.  As a result, case law discussing 
Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution is not 
relevant to this present inquiry.     
17 The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution states:  
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and the State wherein they 
reside.  No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
30 
 
approach outlined in Biggers and Brathwaite does not satisfy 
this requirement. We conclude instead that Article I, Section 8 
necessitates the application of the approach we are now 
adopting,18 which is a return to the principles enunciated by the 
United States Supreme Court's decisions in Stovall, Wade, and 
Gilbert.     
 
¶40 The State concedes in its brief that this court has 
never interpreted Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution as equivalent to the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution in regard to pretrial identification.  
The State does argue, however, that on issues other than 
pretrial identification, we have stated that the provisions are 
essentially equivalent, and that we should interpret them 
identically here.  However, we are not required to interpret the 
Due Process Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution in lock-step with the Federal Constitution.  See 
State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶59, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517 
("[I]t would be a sad irony for this court to . . . act as mere 
rubber 
stamps 
ourselves 
when 
interpreting 
our 
Wisconsin 
Constitution."); 
State 
v. 
Knapp, 
2005 
WI 
127, 
¶60, 
___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 
___ 
N.W.2d ___ 
(Knapp 
II) 
("While 
textual 
                                                 
18 We note that "the Federal Constitution does not foreclose 
experimentation by the States in the development of such rules."  
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 118 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also 
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 94 (2004) (The Court recently 
decided this case exclusively under the Federal Constitution and 
noted "that states are free to adopt by statute, rule, or 
decision any guides . . . they deem useful.").       
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
31 
 
similarity or identity is important when determining when to 
depart from federal constitutional jurisprudence, it cannot be 
conclusive, lest this court forfeit its power to interpret its 
own constitution to the federal judiciary.  The people of this 
state 
shaped 
our 
constitution, 
and 
it 
is 
our 
solemn 
responsibility to interpret it.") (citation omitted).   
¶41 Even though the Due Process Clause of Article I, 
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution uses language that is 
somewhat similar, but not identical, to the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
we retain the right to interpret our constitution to provide 
greater protections than its federal counterpart.  See Knapp II, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶59; State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 242, 
580 N.W.2d 171 (1998); State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 171-72, 254 
N.W.2d 210 (1977); Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407 (1923); 
Carpenter v. County of Dane, 9 Wis. 249, [*274] (1859).  
"'[W]hile this results in a divergence of meaning between words 
which are the same in both federal and state constitutions, the 
system of federalism envisaged by the United States Constitution 
tolerates such divergence where the result is greater protection 
of individual rights under state law than under federal 
law. . . .'"  William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and 
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 500 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
32 
 
(1977) (quoting State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (Haw. 
1974)).19   
¶42 We gain support for our reliance on the Wisconsin 
Constitution by noting that the federal standard in out-of-court 
eyewitness identifications has also not been accepted, on state 
constitutional grounds, in two prominent states——New York and 
Massachusetts.  See Johnson, 650 N.E.2d at 1257; Adams, 423 
N.E.2d at 379.20  Although these states have adopted a per se 
                                                 
19 We recognize that experimentation in state courts serves 
to guide the United States Supreme Court in its determinations. 
See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. 
L.J. 951, 966 (1982).   Thus, "a state can be innovative within 
its own borders without involving the entire nation.  State 
courts have greater latitude in devising remedies that respond 
to local concerns.  Indeed, state judicial review may be said to 
foster the values of federalism by allowing the nation to profit 
by using what succeeds in a state and avoiding what fails."  
Shirley S. Abrahamson, State Constitutional Law, New Judicial 
Federalism, and the Rehnquist Court, 51 Clev. St. L. Rev. 339, 
347 (2004) (footnote omitted).   
Likewise, we fully expect that our experimentation with 
this test will be successful in Wisconsin and later adopted 
elsewhere. 
20 In People v. Adams, 423 N.E. 2d 379, 383 (N.Y. 1981), the 
New York Court of Appeals justified its reliance on its state 
constitution in the following passage:  
In the past Federal constitutional guarantees, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, generally satisfied 
and often exceeded the requirements of comparable 
provisions of the State Constitution.  But there would 
be no need for an independent State Bill of Rights if 
that 
were 
always 
the 
case. 
 
In 
recent 
years 
particularly the Supreme Court has emphasized and 
encouraged this and related aspects of Federalism by 
exercising 
special 
restraint 
in 
prescribing 
constitutional rules of procedure which would displace 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
33 
 
exclusionary rule under their respective state constitutions, 
and thus provide a different approach than this court, we 
recognize nevertheless that Wisconsin does not stand alone on 
out-of-court identification issues. 
¶43 We also recognize that this case is not the first to 
result in a change in principles based on extensive new studies 
completed 
after 
a 
court 
decision 
that 
was 
premised 
on 
constitutional interpretation and application.  For example, in 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the United 
States Supreme Court relied on comprehensive studies to support 
its legal conclusion that the doctrine of separate but equal was 
violative of the United States Constitution and, thus, that 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) should be overruled.  
For support of this much-needed shift in constitutional law, the 
United States Supreme Court based its decision on several modern 
studies and on the effects of segregation in public education.21  
The Court stated: "[W]e cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when 
                                                                                                                                                             
or foreclose development of State rules specifically 
tailored to local problems and experiences. . . .  
Id. (citations omitted). 
21 "The Court simply cited the studies seriatim in a 
footnote, much as it would list case citations supporting a 
proposition of law."  John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social 
Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating and Establishing Social Science 
in Law, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477, 483-84 (1986) (footnote 
omitted).  Thus, the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954) is a "prototypical example of an appellate 
court using modern social and behavioral sciences as legislative 
evidence to support its choice of a rule of law."  Cromedy, 727 
A.2d 457 at 463 (citation omitted). 
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
34 
 
the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. 
Ferguson was written.  We must consider public education in the 
light of its full development and its present place in American 
life throughout the Nation."  Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93.   
¶44 In agreeing with the position that "Negro children, as 
a 
class, 
receiv(e) 
educational 
opportunities 
which 
are 
substantially inferior to those available to white children 
otherwise similarly situated," id. at 494 n.10 (quoting Belton 
v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862, 865 (Del. Ch. 1952)), the United States 
Supreme Court based its holding on "modern authority."  Id. at 
494.  Because we also base our decision, in part, on "modern 
authority," we have no trouble following the lead of Brown and 
making a much-needed change to our jurisprudence based on the 
application of the Due Process Clause of Article I, Section 8 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.22   
VI 
¶45 In sum, we agree with Dubose that the circuit court 
erred in denying his motion to suppress the out-of-court 
identification evidence.  However, we decline to adopt his 
proposed per se exclusionary rule regarding such evidence.  
Instead, we adopt standards for the admissibility of out-of-
court identification evidence similar to those set forth in the 
                                                 
22 For a more recent example of current studies influencing 
a shift in constitutional principle, see Roper v. Simmons, 125 
S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (The United States Supreme Court held, based 
largely on current evidence, that the execution of minors is 
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution).   
No. 
2003AP1690-CR   
 
35 
 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Stovall.  We hold that 
evidence obtained from such a showup will not be admissible 
unless, based on the totality of the circumstances, the showup 
was necessary.  A showup will not be necessary, however, unless 
the police lacked probable cause to make an arrest or, as a 
result of other exigent circumstances, could not have conducted 
a lineup or photo array.  Since the motion to suppress the out-
of-court identifications of Dubose should have been granted 
here, 
because 
such 
identifications 
were 
unnecessarily 
suggestive, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals, and 
remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with the standards adopted herein.     
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.   
 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
¶46 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion in all respects.  I write separately to respond 
to the concerns raised by one of the dissenting opinions.  See 
Roggensack, J., dissenting. 
¶47 I agree with Justice Roggensack that with respect to 
identification testimony in criminal trials, reliability should 
be the key to admissibility.  Roggensack, J., dissenting, ¶79.  
I also agree that a criminal defendant is denied due process 
when identification testimony admitted at trial from a showup is 
"so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very 
substantial 
likelihood 
of 
irreparable 
misidentification."  
Roggensack, J., dissenting, ¶82 (citing State v. Wolverton, 193 
Wis. 2d 234, 264, 533 N.W.2d 167 (1995); Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)).  Finally, I agree that we 
should not impede "the presentation of reliable, relevant 
evidence at trial."  Roggensack, J., dissenting, ¶86.  However, 
I 
part 
ways 
with 
the 
dissent 
precisely 
because 
showup 
identifications have been shown to be unreliable, thereby 
undercutting the legal fiction that we have operated under with 
respect to eyewitness testimony. 
¶48 Some of the very research relied upon by the dissent 
to illustrate the "disagreements about the unreliability of 
showups" (Roggensack, J., dissenting, ¶90) sets forth an overall 
accuracy rate of 69 percent for showups, compared to 51 percent 
for lineups.  Id.  (citing Nancy Steblay, et al., Eyewitness 
Accuracy Rates in Police Showup and Lineup Presentations:  A 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.lbb 
 
2 
 
Meta-Analytic Comparison, 27 Law and Human Behavior 523, 535 
(2003)).  Although not mentioned by the dissent, that research 
further indicates that when the target is in the display, a 
correct identification occurs only 47 percent of the time in 
showups, compared to 45 percent of the time in lineups.  Steblay 
at 530.  Moreover, when the target is not in the display, a 
false identification of an innocent suspect (minus foil Ids) 
occurs 23 percent of the time in showups, as opposed to 17 
percent of the time in lineups.  Id.   
¶49 This 
is 
not 
"disputed 
social 
science 
theory."  
Roggensack, J., dissenting, ¶79.  This is data relied upon by 
the dissent.  Id., ¶90.  What we are dealing with is a serious 
failure 
rate 
with 
respect 
to 
eyewitness 
identifications.  
Whether we are looking at the dissent's failure rate for showups 
of 53 percent, 31 percent, 23 percent, or 16 percent, that rate 
is simply unacceptable.  Steblay, at 530, 532-33, 535.  See also 
Roggensack, J., dissenting, ¶90.  The dissent cannot seriously 
argue that any of these statistical misidentification rates lead 
to the conclusion that eyewitness identifications are inherently 
reliable.  What we have here is a legal fiction that is simply 
not borne out by the facts.  Unless, and until, we improve 
eyewitness identification procedures so that the likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification is significantly reduced, we can 
no longer proceed as though all is good in the Land of Oz. 
¶50 All of this does not mean that eyewitness testimony 
cannot be a valuable piece of evidence in a criminal trial.  
Showups 
will 
continue 
to 
be 
used 
where 
necessary 
and 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.lbb 
 
3 
 
appropriate.  Majority op., ¶34.  The goal of the majority's 
opinion, in my view, is to avoid a very substantial likelihood 
of irreparable misidentification.  Id., ¶35.   
¶51 The reasons supporting our approach should be readily 
apparent.  If the wrong person is incorrectly identified, an 
innocent person faces potential prosecution, incarceration, and 
conviction.23  More important, however, is the fact that the 
guilty perpetrator remains at large, able to wreak havoc upon an 
unsuspecting populace.  See Tom Kertscher, Wrongly Convicted Man 
Freed, 
Milwaukee 
Journal 
Sentinel 
Online, 
available 
at 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/state/sep03/169169.asp. 
 
No 
one 
wants that.  I therefore join the majority opinion in this 
matter. 
¶52 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
                                                 
23 A basic tenet of our criminal justice system is that it 
is better that ten guilty persons go free than that one innocent 
person is convicted. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England (1769) c. 27, p. 352; see also Furman v. 
Georgia, 
408 
U.S. 
238, 
367 
n.158 
(1972) 
(Marshall, 
J., 
concurring) ("It is better for ten guilty people to be set free 
than for one innocent man to be unjustly imprisoned.") (quoting 
William O. Douglas, Foreword to Jerome Frank & Barbara Frank, 
Not Guilty 11-12 (1957)); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("It is far worse to convict an 
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.")).  While the 
majority relies on Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), I fail to see how the majority "trades on Brown's 
prestigious position in American jurisprudence to support the 
majority opinion's reliance on a disputed social science 
theory."  See Roggensack, J., dissenting, ¶93.  Just as the High 
Court sought to root out the unjust doctrine of "separate but 
equal" in Brown, we seek to root out unjust convictions based on 
mistaken identifications.  The principle is the same:  if we see 
the error of our ways, we are duty-bound to correct that error.  
That, I discern, is the point of the majority's analogy.   
No.  2003AP1690-CR.lbb 
 
4 
 
¶53 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this concurrence.                          
 
 
 
 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.jpw 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶54 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
Justice Roggensack that if a constitution is to mean anything, 
its principles must not be subject to change based on the 
prevailing winds of the time.  See Justice Roggensack's dissent, 
¶80.   
¶55 The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution provides, in relevant part:  "[N]or shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws."  The Wisconsin equivalent of 
the Federal Due Process Clause, Article I, Section 8 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, provides, in relevant part:  "No person 
may be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process 
of law[.]"  Both clauses are virtually identical.24   
¶56 Seven years ago, the author of today's majority 
opinion recognized:  "This court has repeatedly stated that the 
due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions are 
essentially 
equivalent 
and 
are 
subject 
to 
identical 
                                                 
24 Wisconsin courts have also recognized a co-extensive due 
process right originating from Article I, Section 1 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, which provides:  "All people are born 
equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights; 
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to 
secure these rights, governments are instituted, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed."  See Reginald D. 
v. State, 193 Wis. 2d 299, 306-07, 533 N.W.2d 181 (1995); State 
v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 130, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989); State 
ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 49-50, 132 
N.W.2d 249 (1965).   
No.  2003AP1690-CR.jpw 
 
2 
 
interpretation."  State v. Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 891, 580 
N.W.2d 660 (1998)(emphasis added).  See also State v. Harris, 
2004 WI 64, ¶2 n.1, 272 Wis. 2d 80, 680 N.W.2d 737 (accord); 
County of Kenosha v. C & S Mgmt., Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 373, 393, 
588 N.W.2d 236 (1999) ("On more than a few occasions we have 
expressly held that the due process and equal protection clauses 
of our state constitution and the United States Constitution are 
essentially the same[.]"); State v. Greenwold, 189 Wis. 2d 59, 
71, 525 N.W.2d 294 (Ct. App. 1994) ("[I]t is well established 
that the due process clause of the Wisconsin Constitution is the 
substantial equivalent of its respective clause in the federal 
constitution.").   
¶57 Likewise, in Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 2000 WI 60, ¶35 
n.11, 235 Wis. 2d 610, 612 N.W.2d 59, this court ruled: 
We treat the Thorps' claims under the federal 
Constitution consistently with their claims under the 
state constitution because ordinarily there is no 
discernible difference in intent between the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses under the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
and 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution.  
Compare U.S. Const. amend. XIV with Wis. Const. art. 
I, §§ 1, 8.  State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 180-
81, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999) (stating that "[w]here . . . 
the 
language 
of 
the 
provision 
in 
the 
state 
constitution is 'virtually identical' to that of the 
federal provision or where no difference in intent is 
discernible, Wisconsin courts have normally construed 
the state constitution consistent with the United 
States Supreme Court's construction of the federal 
constitution") 
(citing 
State 
v. 
Tompkins, 
144 
Wis. 2d 116, 133, 423 N.W.2d 823 (1988)). 
¶58 In sum, our decisions have recognized that because the 
language of the two provisions is almost identical, there is 
simply no basis to conclude that the drafters of the Wisconsin 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.jpw 
 
3 
 
Constitution intended our Due Process Clause to mean anything 
different than its federal analogue.  Furthermore, this court 
has repeatedly recognized that the unwritten due process 
protection in Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
is the same as that accorded under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.      
¶59 As this court explained in Reginald D. v. State, 193 
Wis. 2d 299, 306-07, 533 N.W.2d 181 (1995): 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides "nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."  The 
functional equivalent of this clause is found in 
Article I, sec. 1, of the Wisconsin Constitution:  
"All people are born equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent rights; among these are life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these 
rights, governments are instituted, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed."  As 
noted in State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 
Wis. 2d 43, 49-50, 132 N.W.2d 249 (1965), even though 
Article I, sec. 1, is based on the Declaration of 
Independence, "there is no substantial difference" 
between 
its 
equal 
protection 
and 
due 
process 
protections and that of the Fourteenth Amendment."  
See also [State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 130, 447 
N.W.2d 654 (1989)] ("This court has held that the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the Wisconsin 
Constitution are substantial equivalents of their 
respective clauses in the federal constitution); Funk 
v. Wollin Silo & Equipment, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 59, 61 
n.2, 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989) ("We have given the equal-
protection provision of the Wisconsin Constitution and 
the parallel clause of the United States Constitution 
identical interpretation.").   
¶60 The legitimacy of this parallel interpretation of the 
due process clauses of the Wisconsin Constitution and the 
federal 
constitution 
has 
been 
recognized 
by 
this 
court 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.jpw 
 
4 
 
throughout Wisconsin's history.  As this court discussed in 
Sonneborn, 26 Wis. 2d at 49-50: 
Preliminarily, we point out that sec. 1, art. I 
of the Wisconsin constitution is framed in language of 
a Declaration of Rights and reminiscent of the 
Declaration of Independence, and many times has been 
held to be substantially equivalent of the due-process 
and the equal-protection clauses of the Fourteenth 
amendment to the United States constitution.  In Black 
v. State (1902), 113 Wis. 205, 89 N.W. 522, the court 
said that the section must mean "equality before the 
law, if it means anything," and, "The idea is 
expressed more happily in the Fourteenth amendment."  
Again, in Pauly v. Keebler (1921), 175 Wis. 428, 185 
N.W. 554, it was said in referring to the Fourteenth 
amendment that the first article of the Declaration of 
Rights 
in 
our 
constitution 
was 
a 
substantially 
equivalent limitation of legislative power and "our 
legislature is bound to accord all persons within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."  More 
recently we reaffirmed the concept that sec. 1, art. 
I, is to be equated with the Fourteenth amendment in 
Boden 
v. 
Milwaukee 
(1959), 
8 
Wis. 2d 318, 
99 
N.W.2d 156; Lathrop v. Donohue (1960), 10 Wis. 2d 230, 
102 N.W.2d 404; and Haase v. Sawicki (1963), 20 
Wis. 2d 308, 121 N.W.2d 876.  Since there is no 
substantial difference between the two constitutions, 
we will henceforth refer only to the Fourteenth 
amendment of the United States constitution. 
¶61 Today the majority alters course and abandons this 
long line of well-established precedent, contending that the Due 
Process Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution now affords greater 
protections than its federal counterpart.  In doing so, the 
majority provides no legal justification for its decision other 
than its raw power to do so.  See majority op., ¶40.  The 
majority even recognizes that as a result, the exact same words 
in the federal and state constitutions now mean different things 
according to this court.  Id., ¶41.  Yet, the majority fails to 
articulate a rationale for how identical language in the two 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.jpw 
 
5 
 
documents can mean the same thing for a number of years and now 
suddenly mean something different.  Simply stating that a 
majority of the court disagrees with a United States Supreme 
Court decision and has the power to construe our state 
constitution more broadly is not a principled basis for suddenly 
rejecting our long history of interpreting the due process 
clauses of the federal and state constitutions in concert.   
¶62 Given the nearly identical language in the two 
provisions and this court's historic practice of interpreting 
the two provisions in the same fashion, the majority simply has 
no support for its conclusion that the language in Article I, 
Section 8 "necessitates" a rejection of the United States 
Supreme Court's opinions in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 
(1972), and Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), and that 
the these opinions "do[ ] not satisfy" the requirements of 
Wisconsin's due process clause.  Majority op., ¶39.   
¶63 The 
majority 
thus 
has 
no 
legal 
basis 
for 
its 
conclusion 
that 
Article 
I, 
Section 
8 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution requires a radical change in our law governing 
showups.  Simply put, Article I, Section 8 "necessitates" the 
rule announced by the court only because a majority of justices 
on this court wills it to be so.  Thus, I agree with Justice 
Roggensack that "[t]he rule of law announced today is not based 
on constitutional principle."  Justice Roggensack's dissent, 
¶87.   
¶64 This is the second time this term this court has 
abandoned 
our 
practice 
of 
interpreting 
similarly 
worded 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.jpw 
 
6 
 
provisions of the state and federal constitutions in concert.  
In State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ___Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___, 
this court abandoned our previous jurisprudence holding that 
Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution does not 
create broader rights than those provided by the Fifth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.  Thus, a majority of this 
court has not only twice unjustifiably rejected the strictures 
of stare decisis, but it has needlessly called in question 
countless opinions of this court that have relied on a parallel 
interpretation of the Wisconsin and federal constitutions.   
¶65 Furthermore, I, too, am troubled by the majority's 
reliance on recent social science "studies," majority op., ¶¶29-
30, presented by advocacy groups, to justify its departure from 
stare decisis.  Not only is such data disputed, as recognized by 
Justice Roggensack, see Justice Roggensack's dissent, ¶¶89-91, 
but, more importantly, it is not a valid basis to determine the 
meaning of our constitution.  The majority fails to adequately 
explain how the meaning of the text of the constitution can 
change every time a new series of social science "studies" is 
presented to the court.25  If the text is so fluid, then our 
constitution is no constitution at all, merely a device to be 
invoked whenever four members of this court wish to change the 
law.   
                                                 
25 This is the second time this term that a majority of the 
court has utilized "studies" and "data" to alter the meaning of 
our constitution.  See generally Ferndon v. Wisconsin Patients 
Compensation Fund, 2005 WI 125, ___Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___.   
No.  2003AP1690-CR.jpw 
 
7 
 
¶66 It is not the function of this court to create what it 
considers to be good social policy based on data from social 
science "studies."  That is the province of the legislature.  
Our task is to render decisions based on legal principles and 
constitutional authority.  See Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, ¶39, 
271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666.   
¶67 There must be consistency in our jurisprudence if our 
decisions are to have any semblance as law and not simply the 
unfettered will of a majority of the members of this court.  
Because I agree that "constitutional principles are not to 
change depending on what social science theory is in fashion[,]" 
Justice Roggensack's dissent, ¶80, and because the mere ability 
of the court to construe the Due Process Clause of the state 
constitution more broadly than its federal counterpart does not 
justify the majority's decision to abandon our history of 
according 
both 
provisions 
an 
identical 
interpretation, 
I 
dissent.   
 
 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶68 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  Nothing in the 
facts of this case justifies the precipitous departure from 
state and federal precedent the majority undertakes.  
¶69 As in any case, the facts are critical.  After 
committing an armed robbery against Timothy Hiltsley, two men 
fled from Hiltsley's residence in Green Bay.  A few minutes 
later, at about 1:21 A.M., a neighbor called the police to 
report the two men fleeing the scene.  Police officers arrived 
immediately, and one of the responding officers observed two men 
walking near the apartment.  When the officer turned his vehicle 
around to investigate, the men fled between two houses, into the 
middle of a residential block. 
¶70 The police immediately set up a perimeter around the 
block.  By all accounts, this took less than 90 seconds.  Upon 
searching the area, the police quickly discovered Dubose.  The 
officers placed Dubose in the back of a squad car and drove him 
to Hiltsley's location, where they conducted a showup.  Hiltsley 
immediately identified Dubose as the man who robbed him at 
gunpoint, mentioning that he recognized Dubose due to his build 
and hairstyle.   
¶71 All of this occurred within minutes after the robbery. 
¶72 Shortly thereafter, other officers located a semi-
automatic pistol within the perimeter, near the houses where the 
two unidentified men ran after being pursued by the police. 
¶73 The majority opinion spends most of its energy 
discussing the studies it relies on to depart from state and 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
federal precedent.  It devotes only two paragraphs to the 
application of its theory to this case.26   
¶74 The facts in this case are not sufficient to justify 
the majority's conclusion that this defendant's due process 
rights were violated.  Nothing in these facts is so inherently 
unfair or suggestive that it justifies this court-ordered sea 
change in the law.   
¶75 Throughout this term, the court has repeatedly used 
its 
raw 
power 
to 
interpret 
provisions 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution differently from the way the United States Supreme 
Court interprets provisions in the U.S. Constitution.  While the 
court may exercise this power, the court should pay more 
attention to whether it should exercise this power. 
¶76 By sheer volume of cases, the Supreme Court has 
developed substantial experience interpreting constitutional 
provisions.  Matters reaching the Supreme Court are of such 
import that they are also likely to be better briefed and argued 
than issues in the state court system.  When state courts adopt 
myriad different interpretations of state constitutions, the 
level 
of 
uncertainty 
rises 
exponentially. 
 
A 
suspect's 
constitutional rights may change dramatically depending on which 
side of a state line he robs an acquaintance. 
¶77 It is apparent that the majority opinion is out of 
step not only with the United States Supreme Court, but also 
with most other state courts.  It proudly proclaims as much.  It 
is curious that a court so confident in the wisdom and 
                                                 
26 Majority op., ¶¶36-37. 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
superiority of its analysis should consistently attempt to 
insulate its decisions from review.   
¶78 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶79 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J. 
(dissenting).   The 
majority concludes that its reading of the due process clause of 
Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution27 now requires 
suppression of any identification obtained through a process 
known 
as 
a 
"showup"28 
unless 
it 
was 
necessary 
to 
make 
identification in that manner.  Majority op., ¶2.  By so 
concluding, 
the 
majority 
requires 
the 
suppression 
of 
identifications of defendants charged with crimes, no matter how 
reliable the identification.  This holding substitutes a search 
for the truth, which should form the foundation for every 
criminal prosecution, with one social science theory that showup 
identifications are "unnecessarily suggestive."  Id.  In so 
doing, the majority opinion abandons our previous jurisprudence 
and the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning 
showup identifications, both of which have used the reliability 
of 
the 
identification 
as 
the 
linchpin 
for 
determining 
admissibility.  I dissent because reliability, and not a 
disputed social science theory, must be the key to admissibility 
of all identification testimony in criminal trials and because I 
conclude that the totality of circumstances bearing on the 
identification 
in 
this 
case 
resulted 
in 
a 
reliable 
                                                 
27 Article I, Section 8 provides in relevant part: 
(1) No person may be held to answer for a criminal 
offense without due process of law . . . . 
28 A showup is the individual presentation of a suspect in 
the commission of a crime to a witness of that crime.  
No.  2003AP1690-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
identification of Dubose as the perpetrator of the armed robbery 
of which he was convicted.  Accordingly, I would affirm the 
court of appeals. 
¶80 The term "due process of law" comes from the Magna 
Charta's promise of a trial directed by the "law of the land" as 
established by the legislative body of government.  Stovall v. 
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 305 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).  One of 
the four paintings in the Wisconsin Supreme Court hearing room 
depicts the signing of the Magna Charta.  And though many of the 
Magna 
Charta's 
provisions 
were 
subsequently 
repealed, 
my 
understanding is that the subject of the painting was chosen 
because of the significance of the foundational principle of due 
process that the Magna Charta promised in 1215 and that 
Wisconsin courts were to preserve.  I note this because 
constitutional principles are not to change depending on what 
social science theory is in fashion. 
¶81 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
addressed 
constitutional due process in the context of a showup eyewitness 
identification in Stovall.  It held that a claim to suppress an 
out-of-court 
identification 
implicates 
a 
defendant's 
constitutional right to procedural due process.  Stovall, 388 
U.S. at 299.  However, the United States Supreme Court also 
explained that blanket suppressions of identifications are not 
in keeping with the promotion of justice.  
The per se rule, however, goes too far since its 
application 
automatically 
and 
peremptorily, 
and 
without consideration of alleviating factors, keeps 
evidence from the jury that is reliable and relevant. 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977).  And, as we have 
explained, "'the admission of evidence of a showup without more 
does not violate due process.'"  State v. Streich, 87 Wis. 2d 
209, 214, 274 N.W.2d 635 (1979) (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 
U.S. 188, 198 (1972)).  We have also held that a one-to-one 
identification is not per se suggestive, and because such an 
identification is often done while the witness's memory is 
fresh, it actually promotes fairness by assuring reliability and 
preventing the holding of an innocent suspect.  Streich, 87 
Wis. 2d at 215-16 (citing State v. Isham, 70 Wis. 2d 718, 724-
25, 235 N.W.2d 506 (1975); see also Johnson v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 
13, 18, 176 N.W.2d 332 (1970). 
¶82 Prior to today's ruling, Wisconsin courts have held 
that a criminal defendant was denied due process only when 
identification evidence admitted at trial stemmed from a showup 
that was "'so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very 
substantial 
likelihood 
of 
irreparable 
misidentification.'"  
State v. Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d 234, 264, 533 N.W.2d 167 (1995) 
(quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).  "A 
criminal defendant [bore] the initial burden of demonstrating 
that a showup was impermissibly suggestive."  Wolverton, 193 
Wis. 2d at 264.  If this burden was met, the State was required 
to prove that "under the 'totality of the circumstances' the 
identification 
was 
reliable 
even 
though the 
confrontation 
procedure was suggestive," using the following five factors: 
"(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the 
criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the witness' 
degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of his prior 
description 
of 
the 
criminal, 
(4) 
the 
level 
of 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and (5) 
the time between the crime and the confrontation." 
Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 264-65 (quoting Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 
at 114; see also Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200; Powell v. State, 
86 Wis. 2d 51, 65, 271 N.W.2d 610 (1978).  The court's 
examinations of all eyewitness identifications 
focused on 
reliability, because it is the absence of reliability that 
violates due process.  Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02. 
¶83 There are many factors that bear on whether an 
identification is reliable.  Showup identifications that are 
done soon after the commission of the crime, while the 
appearance of the perpetrator is fresh in a witness's mind, have 
more reliability than identifications done after the passage of 
considerable time.29  Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 267; State v. 
Russell, 60 Wis. 2d 712, 721, 211 N.W.2d 637 (1973); Johnson, 47 
Wis. 2d at 18.  As we explained in Johnson, a "fresh 
identification" promotes fairness "by assuring reliability."  
Id.  Additionally, showup identifications are done in-person, 
and corporeal identifications are generally held more reliable 
than photo identifications.  Simmons, 390 U.S. at 386 n.6 
(citing P. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases 83 
(1965); Williams, Identification Parades, [1955] Crim. L. Rev. 
525, 531).  
                                                 
29 See also State v. DiMaggio, 49 Wis. 2d 565, 586, 182 
N.W.2d 466 (1971) ("An immediate confrontation is inherently 
more reliable than a delayed one, while failure to identify 
terminates any inconvenience to the suspect."); Turner v. United 
States, 622 A.2d 667, 672 (D.C. App. 1993) ("[I]dentifications 
conducted 
soon 
after 
the 
crime 
enhance 
the 
accuracy 
of 
witnesses' identifications and allow innocent suspects to be 
quickly freed.").   
No.  2003AP1690-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
¶84 The majority opinion asserts that it is relying on 
Stovall.  Majority op., ¶32. It contends that Stovall is 
"limited to situations where, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the showup was necessary."  Majority op., ¶32.  
This is a misreading of Stovall because there is nothing in 
Stovall that limits the use of showup identifications to those 
circumstances where that mode of identification was "necessary."  
Instead, Stovall defines its task as determining whether "the 
confrontation conducted in this case was so unnecessarily 
suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification 
that [the defendant] was denied due process of law."  Stovall, 
388 U.S. at 301-02.  The United States Supreme Court then 
further explained, "a claimed violation of due process of law in 
the conduct of a confrontation depends on the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding it."  Id. at 302.  Therefore, Stovall 
expressly focuses on the reliability of the identification, not 
on whether it was "necessary" to do a showup, as the majority 
opinion represents. 
¶85 The majority opinion also relies on United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 
263 (1967), which were decided the same day as Stovall.  
Majority op., ¶19.  However, Wade and Gilbert are not due 
process cases.  Instead, they are Sixth Amendment cases, where 
the United States Supreme Court concluded that post-indictment 
identifications could not be conducted without notice to and the 
presence of counsel.  Wade, 388 U.S. at 219-21; Gilbert, 388 
U.S. at 272.  The concern in Wade and in Gilbert was the right 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
to the assistance of counsel at all critical phases of a 
criminal 
prosecution, 
and 
the 
Court 
concluded 
that 
an 
identification conducted after indictment was a critical phase 
of a prosecution.  Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37; Gilbert, 388 U.S. 
at 272.  The showup identification of Dubose was not a post-
indictment 
identification, 
so 
Wade 
and 
Gilbert 
have 
no 
application.   
¶86 By banning all showups unless there is a "necessity," 
the majority completely overrides one of the major tenets in the 
administration of justice:  the presentation of reliable, 
relevant evidence at trial.  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112.  The 
United States Supreme Court has reasoned that inflexible rules 
of exclusion may frustrate justice, rather than promote it.  Id. 
at 113.  I agree completely. 
¶87 The rule of law announced today is not based on 
constitutional principle.  This is demonstrated in part by the 
majority opinion's decision that if officers lack probable cause 
to arrest, then a showup is permissible.  Majority op., ¶34 
n.11.  What follows from this is that at the trial of such a 
defendant later prosecuted for the crime, suppression of the 
showup identification will not occur unless the defendant is 
able to meet the current test showing the identification was 
unreliable.30  If the due process clause of Article I, Section 8 
                                                 
30 As set out in State v. Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d 234, 533 
N.W.2d 167 (1995), such a defendant must prove that the showup 
was impermissibly suggestive.  Id. at 264.  If he does so, then 
the State is required to prove that "under the 'totality of the 
circumstances' the identification was reliable."  Id. (citations 
ommitted). 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
of the Wisconsin Constitution truly requires the suppression of 
identifications made through the use of a showup, the majority 
opinion provides those suspects for whom law enforcement has 
less evidence of guilt with less constitutional protection when 
that person comes to trial.  The majority opinion may also place 
a defendant in the unusual position of arguing that law 
enforcement had probable cause to arrest, so the showup 
identification 
was 
unnecessary 
and 
accordingly 
should 
be 
suppressed.  This is an odd position in which to place a 
defendant whose defense is, "It wasn't me." 
¶88 In the case before us, Dubose's showup identification 
was done in person, within 30 minutes of his commission of the 
armed robbery, which occurred in a well-lighted apartment, when 
he wore no mask, the victim had a significant period of time to 
view him and Dubose had been seen by the victim prior to the 
date of the robbery.  There is no indication of unreliability in 
this identification.31  Nevertheless, in the event of a new 
trial, the majority opinion will deny a jury the right to hear 
this relevant, reliable evidence, and unless the circuit court 
                                                 
31 I disagree with the majority's discussion citing Foster 
v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969), as in that case, the witness 
initially could not positively identify the suspect and was 
"talked into" identifying the suspect after speaking with him 
one-on-one and viewing another lineup.  There, even though the 
witness could not initially identify the suspect, "[i]n effect, 
the police repeatedly said to the witness, 'This is the man.'"  
Id. at 443.  Here, while the second showup and photograph 
identification were needlessly redundant, they were used by 
police to ask the victim, "Are you sure?"  They were not used to 
talk the witness out of an initial failure to identify Dubose.  
Accordingly, 
the 
coercive 
nature 
of 
the 
identification 
procedures in Foster was not present here. 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
concludes 
that 
there 
is 
an 
independent 
basis 
for 
the 
identification of Dubose that the victim made at trial, that 
identification will be suppressed also.  Majority op., ¶38.  By 
so doing, the majority sets up a process where witnesses will be 
prevented from identifying the perpetrator of the crime for the 
jury.  How does due process require and how is justice served by 
refusing to permit the admission of this relevant, reliable 
evidence?  In my view, due process does not require it and 
justice is not served.  Instead, the perpetrator of a violent 
armed robbery may be set free to victimize others. 
¶89 The majority's main basis for holding that showups 
must be suppressed is "extensive studies on the issue of 
identification evidence" that assert that eyewitness testimony 
is "'hopelessly unreliable.'"  Majority op., ¶¶29-30 (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Mass. 1995)).32  
In my view, the majority opinion errs by adopting a disputed 
social science theory as a requirement for constitutionally 
sufficient due process instead of continuing to focus on the 
reliability of the evidence.  
¶90 The research cited by the majority does not represent 
the 
only 
social 
science 
theory 
on 
the 
subject 
of 
identifications.  Hard data that social scientists have analyzed 
have resulted in disagreements about the unreliability of 
                                                 
32 It should be noted that the broad statement quoted from 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Mass. 1995), is 
not limited to showup identifications.  It questions all 
eyewitness identifications.  Will the next step for this court 
be the suppression of all eyewitness identifications?   
No.  2003AP1690-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
showups.  One social science study reports that "[o]verall, the 
results present surprising 
commonality 
in 
outcome between 
[showups and lineups] and . . . an apparent contradiction of the 
ambient knowledge that showups are more dangerous for innocent 
suspects than are lineups."  Nancy Steblay, et al., Eyewitness 
Accuracy Rates in Police Showup and Lineup Presentations: A 
Meta-Analytic Comparison, 27 Law and Human Behavior 523, 535 
(2003).  Steblay reported that  
[w]hen overall identification decisions are tabulated, 
showups produce an accuracy advantage over lineups 
(69% vs. 51%).  This initial result is qualified by 
subsequent analyses.  As anticipated, a consideration 
of specific subject choices provides a more complete 
picture.  Correct identification (hit) rate within the 
context of a 
target-present 
condition 
is 
nearly 
identical 
for 
the 
two 
types 
of 
procedures:  
Approximately 46% of witnesses shown either a lineup 
or a showup correctly identified the perpetrator when 
he or she was present.  False suspect identification 
rates 
in 
a 
target-absent 
display 
are 
also 
approximately equal between showups and lineups, at 
about 16%. 
Id. 
¶91 Another study reports, "[O]ur results suggest that the 
formal task structure of a one-person showup does not create an 
unacceptable increase in the risk that an innocent suspect will 
be identified as the perpetrator."  Richard Gonzalez, et al., 
Response Biases in Lineups and Showups, 64 Journal of Pers. and 
Soc. Psychol. 525, 533 (1993).  One of the experiments that 
Gonzalez conducted showed "a striking tendency for subjects to 
respond no to the showup but yes to the lineup."  Id. at 528.   
¶92 The majority opinion attempts to gain support for its 
reliance on a disputed social science theory by paralleling its 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.pdr 
 
10 
 
use of social science data with the reference to social science 
reports in the landmark decision by the United States Supreme 
Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
Majority op., ¶¶43-44.  The majority opinion asserts, "we have 
no trouble following the lead of Brown."  Majority op., ¶44.  
¶93 However, the Brown holding was not made in reliance on 
a social science theory, nor was Brown the earliest or the 
latest case to refer to a social science report.  See, e.g., 
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005); Paris Adult Theatre I 
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 
(1908).  The reports in Brown were listed in one footnote and 
used without discussion to support one sentence in the entire 
opinion.  Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11.  Rather, Brown is 
preeminent because it judicially proclaimed that the enormity of 
suffering that generation after generation of African-Americans 
were forced to endure by the doctrine of "separate but equal" 
simply 
because 
they 
were 
a 
different 
color, 
was 
unconstitutional.  I object to the manner in which the majority 
opinion uses Brown because it trades on Brown's prestigious 
position in American jurisprudence to support the majority 
opinion's reliance on a disputed social science theory.  
¶94 No one wants the wrong person identified as the 
perpetrator of a crime.  However, where I part company with the 
majority opinion and the concurrence is that I am not willing to 
throw out identifications like the one now before us that are 
reliable, as the means of addressing those identifications that 
are 
not 
reliable. 
 
Suppressing 
the 
use 
of 
a 
reliable 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.pdr 
 
11 
 
identification is not necessary in order to guarantee due 
process of law because it is only an unreliable identification 
that violates due process.  Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02. 
¶95 All identification procedures, from showups to lineups 
to photo arrays, can be improved by crafting better techniques 
for 
these 
methods 
to 
reduce 
suggestiveness 
and 
increase 
reliability.33 
 
Proposed 
improvements 
include 
videotaping 
eyewitness identifications and making standard the need for 
officers to inform eyewitnesses that the suspect in the showup 
may not be the perpetrator or that the perpetrator may not be 
included in the lineup or array.  See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth 
A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 277, 286 
(2003).  Research and common sense agree with former United 
States Attorney General Janet Reno's statement that, "Even the 
most honest and objective people can make mistakes in recalling 
and interpreting a witnessed event; it is the nature of human 
memory."  United States Department of Justice, Eyewitness 
Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, at iii (1999), available 
at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf. Other proposed 
enhancements 
include 
allowing 
expert 
testimony 
on 
the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications or jury instructions 
on eyewitness identification.  None of these well-respected 
                                                 
33 I do not contend that "eyewitness identifications are 
inherently reliable," Justice Butler's concurrence, ¶49.  I 
recognize that no form of eyewitness identification is reliable 
100% of the time.  But I do contend that an eyewitness 
identification made by a witness very soon after the witness 
observed the commission of the crime and the witness had a good 
opportunity to view the perpetrator for a significant period of 
time is not inherently unreliable.   
No.  2003AP1690-CR.pdr 
 
12 
 
sources advocate the ban of showup identifications as the 
majority opinion has done.  Instead, they advocate for law 
enforcement education on how to better conduct eyewitness 
identifications and for a more complete presentation of the 
problems with eyewitness identification at trial. 
¶96 In sum, because reliability, and not a disputed social 
science theory, must be the key to admissibility of all 
identification testimony in criminal trials and because I 
conclude that the totality of circumstances bearing on the 
identification 
in 
this 
case 
resulted 
in 
a 
reliable 
identification of Dubose as the perpetrator of the armed robbery 
of which he was convicted, I would affirm the court of appeals. 
¶97 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion. 
 
 
No.  2003AP1690-CR.pdr 
 
 
 
1