Title: Coleman v. Hogan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 961736
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 1997

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Present:  All the Justices 
 
MARGARET COLEMAN 
 
v.   Record No. 961736 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                       June 6, 1997 
THOMAS J. HOGAN 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
 
M. Langhorne Keith, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider the proper remedy for the 
unconstitutional exercise of a peremptory strike, specifically 
whether a juror, reseated on the panel after having been 
improperly stricken, may be stricken from the panel a second 
time by the same party. 
 
 The defendant in this personal injury action, Thomas J. 
Hogan, used two of his peremptory challenges to strike two 
females, one of whom, Nayamka Thomas, was the only black female 
on the jury panel.  The plaintiff, Margaret Coleman, challenged 
the strike, asserting that Hogan struck Thomas based on racial 
grounds in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution.  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 
89 (1986); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 
614, 628 (1991). 
 
 When asked by the trial court to provide his rationale 
for the strikes, Hogan's counsel explained that the women were 
students, and he wanted to strike all three students who were 
on the panel.  However, because he only had two strikes 
remaining, he struck the two women students, leaving the 
 
 
 
 
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remaining male student on the panel, "basically on the 
supposition that [the women] may be more sympathetic to the 
female plaintiff."  The trial court concluded that these two 
strikes were based on the gender of the panel members and, 
therefore, constituted purposeful gender-based discrimination 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 
145 (1994). 
 
The trial court then reseated the two women, stated that 
"student" was a valid basis for striking a potential juror, and 
told Hogan he could "strike one of them, but [not] both of 
them."  Hogan struck the male student and Thomas, the black 
female student.  When Coleman again challenged the strike of 
the black female, Hogan explained that he decided not to strike 
the other student, the white female, because "she was extremely 
soft-spoken and meek and . . . between the two women, we think 
she'll have less of an [e]ffect on the jury."  
 
The trial court allowed Hogan's second strike of Thomas, 
holding that Hogan gave a "racially-neutral reason" for his 
second strike of Thomas.  Following a jury verdict in favor of 
Hogan, Coleman filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for 
a new trial, again challenging Hogan's use of his peremptory 
strikes to remove Thomas from the jury panel a second time.  
After briefing and argument by counsel, the trial court denied 
Coleman's motion, reaffirming its holding that Hogan's second 
 
 
 
 
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strike of Thomas was based on a racially neutral reason.  We 
awarded Coleman an appeal to determine whether the trial court 
properly allowed Hogan to exercise a second peremptory strike 
against Thomas. 
 
Hogan does not challenge the trial court's ruling that his 
initial peremptory strikes on the basis of gender violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.  The issue before us is whether the 
remedy chosen by the trial court, allowing Hogan the 
opportunity to strike a reseated juror a second time, is 
consistent with the principles of Batson and its progeny, 
namely, whether this remedy provides sufficient assurance that 
an individual will not be prevented from serving as a juror for 
unconstitutional reasons. 
 
The positions of the parties on this issue are clear.   
Hogan asserts that, following the reseating of the jurors, the 
process begins anew.  The trial court's decision should be 
affirmed in this case, Hogan contends, because the reasons he 
advanced for striking Thomas a second time - she was a student 
and was not as "soft-spoken and meek" as the other woman juror 
- were facially neutral and, thus, subject only to the 
challenge that the reasons were pretextual.  Here, Hogan 
asserts, the trial court found that Hogan's reasons were not 
pretextual, and, Hogan argues, the trial court's determination 
on this factual issue should be given great deference and 
overturned only if the trial court abused its discretion or 
 
 
 
 
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committed manifest error.  Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 
364 (1991). 
 
Coleman argues that in cases such as this, where the 
reason for the initial strike was constitutionally infirm, any 
subsequent reason given for the strike, even if neutral on its 
face, cannot be separated from the original offensive basis for 
the strike.  "[C]ounsel cannot qualify or lessen the 
discriminatory effect of a peremptory strike based on gender by 
relying on the explanation of the juror's 'student' status."   
Once a gender-based reason was articulated for a peremptory 
strike, Coleman argues, "any additional neutral reasons are 
suspect" and "that strike must be disallowed in toto."   
 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in leaving the 
task of prescribing the appropriate remedy for the 
unconstitutional exercise of a peremptory strike to the states, 
identified two possible remedies:  reseating persons improperly 
struck from the jury panel and discharging the venire and 
selecting a new jury from a new panel.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 
n.24.  Some states have required that the venire be discharged 
and a new panel chosen.  See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 
748, 765 (Cal. 1978); State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144, 159 
(N.C. 1993); State v. Franklin, 456 S.E.2d 357, 360 (S.C. 
1995).  Other jurisdictions have required that an improperly 
stricken juror be reinstated on the panel.  See, e.g., State v. 
Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 416 (Mo. 1993)(en banc).  A third and 
 
 
 
 
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largest group has allowed the trial court to exercise its 
discretion in selecting the appropriate remedy.  See, e.g., 
Jefferson v. State, 595 So.2d 38, 41 (Fla. 1992); Jones v. 
State, 683 A.2d 520, 529 (Md. 1996); Commonwealth v. Fruchtman, 
633 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Mass. 1994); Ezell v. State, 909 P.2d 68, 
72 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); State ex rel. Curry v. Bowman, 885 
S.W.2d 421, 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). 
 
We agree with the majority of states that the choice of 
remedy should be within the discretion of the trial court.   A 
number of factors, such as the point at which the challenge to 
the strike is sustained and the knowledge of the jurors 
regarding the improper strike, affect the determination of 
which remedy to choose.  The trial court is uniquely positioned 
to evaluate the circumstances in each case and to exercise its 
discretion in selecting the appropriate remedy.  
 
The parties in this case do not suggest that the trial 
court's decision to reseat the juror was improper.  Rather, the 
dispute centers around the status of the juror, once reseated. 
Few cases address this issue because the majority of cases 
addressing challenges to peremptory strikes involve review of 
decisions holding that the use of a peremptory strike did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.  See, e.g., Buck v. 
Commonwealth, 247 Va. 449, 443 S.E.2d 414 (1994); James v. 
Commonwealth, 247 Va. 459, 442 S.E.2d 396 (1994); Faison v. 
Hudson, 243 Va. 397, 417 S.E.2d 305 (1992).  When an appellate 
 
 
 
 
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court reverses the trial court's decision, the remedy of 
"reseating" the improperly stricken juror is impossible; the 
only remedy available at that point is a new trial with an 
entirely new jury panel. 
 
In the few cases of which we are aware involving the issue 
in the instant case, the trial court refused to allow the 
striking party to challenge the reseated juror a second time.  
See United States v. Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d 1368, 1372 (5th Cir. 
1993); State v. Franklin, 456 S.E.2d 357, 360 (S.C. 1995).  
These cases do not provide extended discussion of the rationale 
supporting this restriction on the use of peremptory strikes.  
Nevertheless, we conclude that such a restriction is proper 
because a litigant should not be entitled to a new Batson 
analysis for every subsequent explanation he offers to justify 
striking a previously challenged juror.  Once the trial court 
determines that the basis for a peremptory strike is 
unconstitutional, any other reasons proffered at the same time, 
or subsequently, cannot erase the discriminatory motivation 
underlying the original challenge. 
 
 As the trial court recognized in this case, the initial 
rationale which included both "student" and "female" was 
tainted because one of the two proffered reasons was improper. 
  Hogan does not suggest that, at this point, the trial court 
should have held that the strikes were proper because one of 
the reasons was not constitutionally infirm.  Hogan's position, 
 
 
 
 
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however, would allow a constitutionally proper reason to 
override a constitutionally infirm reason if the acceptable 
reason is given at a later point in time.  To adopt the 
procedure suggested by Hogan invites a litigant to engage in 
creating successive rationales, hoping one will ultimately 
qualify as both facially neutral and not pretextual.  Such a 
manipulation of the jury selection process would erode the 
constitutional protections enunciated in Batson and its 
progeny.  Furthermore, it requires the trial court to ignore  
its prior determination and the prior explanations and conduct 
each successive evaluation of a newly proffered rationale as if 
on a "blank slate."  Such a process improperly restricts the 
ability of the trial court to make the required evaluation. 
 
 With the exception of one 1989 case from the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, peremptory 
strikes have not been upheld because one proffered reason was 
constitutionally acceptable even though another reason for the 
strike was constitutionally infirm.  Compare United States v. 
Iron Moccasin, 878 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1989)(where one 
explanation was race neutral, no need to consider other 
reasons) with Faison v. Hudson, 243 Va. at 402-03, 417 S.E.2d 
at 308 (strike disallowed although age, demeanor, and 
occupation also given as basis for strike); Riley v. 
Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 330, 335-36, 464 S.E.2d 508, 510 
(1995)(strikes exercised for age and gender reasons); Johnson 
 
 
 
 
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v. Love, 40 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1994)(evidence must show 
that invidious discrimination "played no role" in strike); 
United States v. Greene, 36 M.J. 274, 280-81 (C.M.A. 
1993)(explanation which includes "in part" a racially 
discriminatory reason is not neutral); Powers v. Palacios, 813 
S.W.2d 489, 490 n.1 (Tex. 1991)(race "not the sole reason" for 
improper strike). 
 
We conclude that once a juror has been unconstitutionally 
stricken, the jury selection process relative to that juror is 
tainted.  The remedy provided by the trial court must cure that 
taint.  Therefore, when the trial court chooses to reseat the 
improperly stricken juror, the striking party may not use a 
peremptory strike to remove that juror from the panel a second 
time. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be 
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
 
Reversed and remanded.