Title: People v. Bingham
Citation: 2018 IL 122008
Docket Number: 122008
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: September 20, 2018

2018 IL 122008 
IN THE  
SUPREME COURT  
OF  
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS  
(Docket No. 122008) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
JEROME BINGHAM, Appellant. 
Opinion filed September 20, 2018. 
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Kilbride, Garman, Burke, Theis, and 
Neville concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
OPINION 
¶ 1 
Following a September 2014 bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, 
defendant Jerome Bingham was convicted of felony theft (720 ILCS 
5/16-1(a)(2)(A), (b)(2) (West 2012)) and sentenced to three years in prison. 
Defendant had a prior conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault that 
occurred in 1983, but he was not required to register as a sex offender at that time 
because the conviction occurred prior to the 1986 enactment of the Sex Offender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Registration Act (Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2012)). Under section 
3(c)(2.1) of the Act as amended in 2011 (id. § 3(c)(2.1)), however, defendant’s 
2014 felony theft conviction triggered a requirement that he register as a sex 
offender on account of his 1983 conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault. 
Sex offender registration is a matter controlled by statute and was not a requirement 
imposed by the trial court in this case, and it is thus not reflected in the trial court’s 
judgment. 
¶ 2 
On appeal to the appellate court, defendant argued that the Act’s registration 
requirement was unconstitutional as applied to him on due process grounds and that 
it violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. 
The appellate court addressed the merits of defendant’s claims and rejected them, 
thereby upholding the constitutionality of the Act. The appellate court also 
modified or vacated various fines and fees imposed by the trial court. 
¶ 3 
Defendant petitioned for leave to appeal to this court, which we allowed. Ill. S. 
Ct. R. 315 (eff. Mar. 15, 2016). For the reasons that follow, we vacate the portion of 
the appellate court’s judgment that addressed, on the merits, the constitutionality of 
the Act’s registration requirement, and we dismiss defendant’s appeal before this 
court. 
¶ 4 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 5 
Defendant was charged with felony theft after a surveillance camera recorded 
him taking several pallets from the unfenced yard of a Kmart at 4201 Harlem 
Avenue in Norridge, Illinois, at approximately 6:30 p.m. on May 3, 2014. The 
indictment alleged that defendant committed theft 
“in that he knowingly obtained or exerted unauthorized control over property, 
to wit: pallets, of a value less than five hundred dollars, the property of Kmart, 
intending to deprive Kmart, permanently of the use or benefit of said property, 
and the defendant has been previously convicted of the offense [of] retail theft 
[(720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1) (West 1992))].” 
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Although theft is generally a Class A misdemeanor, the offense in this case was 
elevated to a Class 4 felony because defendant had previously been convicted of 
another theft offense. See 720 ILCS 5/16-1(b)(2) (West 2012). 
¶ 6 
At trial, the State presented testimony from various witnesses establishing that 
on May 3, 2014, defendant took from the Norridge Kmart a total of six pallets, 
valued at $72, and drove away in his truck without paying or receiving permission 
to take them. The parties stipulated that defendant had a previous conviction for 
retail theft in case No. 00125524901. The State entered various exhibits into 
evidence, and the trial court viewed a video depicting defendant taking the pallets 
from the Kmart receiving area. 
¶ 7 
Defendant testified that, about six months before the incident at issue, he had a 
conversation with a person who was driving a forklift in the back of the Kmart at 
4201 North Harlem Avenue. The forklift driver told defendant that it would be 
okay for him to take broken pallets from behind the Kmart for scrapping purposes. 
¶ 8 
The trial court found defendant guilty of theft, and the cause proceeded to 
sentencing. The presentence investigation report showed that defendant had an 
extensive criminal history, which included convictions for the following offenses: 
attempted criminal sexual assault in 1983, possession of a controlled substance in 
1993 and 1996, violation of an order of protection in 1999, retail theft of less than 
$150 in 1999, possession of a stolen vehicle in 2000, two retail thefts in 2000, theft 
in 2004, and possession of a controlled substance in 2005 and 2007. The State also 
presented evidence at sentencing that on May 2, 2014, the day before the theft that 
defendant was found guilty of in this case, defendant also stole pallets from the 
Kmart located at 4201 North Harlem Avenue. 
¶ 9 
The trial court sentenced defendant to three years’ imprisonment on his theft 
conviction—which became a Class 4 felony due to his previous conviction for 
retail theft—and assessed $699 in various fines, fees, and costs. The trial court did 
not impose as part of its judgment a requirement that defendant register as a sex 
offender. 
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¶ 10 
Defendant’s theft conviction, however, did trigger the collateral consequence1 
of his having to register as a sex offender under the Act. The presentence 
investigation report indicated that defendant was convicted of attempted criminal 
sexual assault in 1983 and sentenced to serve four years in prison. At the time of his 
conviction in 1983, he was not required to register as a sex offender because the Act 
had not yet been enacted. It was enacted in 1986 and then amended in 2011 to 
provide that “[a] sex offender or sexual predator, who has never previously been 
required to register under this Act, has a duty to register if the person has been 
convicted of any felony offense after July 1, 2011.” 730 ILCS 150/3(c)(2.1) (West 
2012). Thus, defendant’s 2014 felony theft conviction now requires him to register 
with the appropriate law enforcement agency as a sex offender for his commission 
of attempted criminal sexual assault in 1983. 
¶ 11 
On appeal to the appellate court, defendant first argued that the registration 
requirement of the Act violated his substantive due process rights as applied 
because under the particular facts of this case, where such a long time had passed 
since defendant’s sex offense, there was no reasonable relationship between the 
Act’s requirement to register and its purpose of protecting the public from sex 
offenders. 2017 IL App (1st) 143150, ¶ 23. The appellate court rejected that 
argument. It found that the legislature could have reasonably determined that where 
a defendant commits a sex offense in the past for which he was not required to 
register and has shown a recent, general tendency to recidivate by committing a 
new felony offense since the amendment of the Act in 2011, he poses a potential 
threat of committing a new sex offense in the future. Id. ¶ 24 Moreover, the 
appellate court noted, “[s]uch a threat is magnified in the instant case, where 
defendant has committed no less than 11 crimes (6 felonies and 5 misdemeanors), 
in addition to the 2014 felony theft at issue here, since his attempted criminal sexual 
assault in 1983.” Id. The appellate court concluded that the Act’s requirement that 
defendant register as a sex offender for committing the 2014 felony theft after 
having committed the 1983 attempted criminal sexual assault is a reasonable 
method for accomplishing the desired legislative objective of protecting the public 
1A collateral consequence is an effect upon a defendant that the circuit court has no 
authority to impose, and it results from an action that may or may not be taken by an 
agency that the trial court does not control. People v. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507, 520 (2009). 
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from sex offenders, and therefore it found the Act as applied to defendant satisfies 
the rational basis test and is constitutional. Id. 
¶ 12 
Defendant next argued that the registration requirement of the Act is a new and 
ongoing punishment for the attempted criminal sexual assault offense he 
committed in 1983 and therefore violates the ex post facto clauses of the United 
States and Illinois Constitutions. Id. ¶ 25. The appellate court rejected this 
argument as well. Citing People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 207 
(2009), In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 75 (2003), People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 
424 (2000), People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 386-90 (1991), and People v. 
Fredericks, 2014 IL App (1st) 122122, ¶¶ 58-61, it concluded that the requirement 
of sex offender registration does not amount to punishment and there was therefore 
no violation of the ex post facto clauses. 2017 IL App (1st) 143150, ¶¶ 27, 30. 
¶ 13 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 14 
Before this court, defendant argues that the registration requirement of the Act 
is unconstitutional as applied to him on substantive due process grounds and 
violates ex post facto principles. 
¶ 15 
In response, the State first raises a threshold jurisdictional argument. It 
contends that a reviewing court has no power on direct appeal of a criminal 
conviction to order that a defendant be relieved of his obligation to register as a sex 
offender when that obligation was neither imposed by the trial court nor did it in 
any way relate to the reasons for his conviction and sentence in that court. We agree 
with the State. 
¶ 16 
In criminal cases, “[a] notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on an appellate court 
to consider only the judgments or parts of judgments specified in the notice.” 
(Emphasis added.) People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 37 (2009). Under Illinois 
Supreme Court Rule 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967), the scope of appellate review is 
defined by the trial court’s judgment and the proceedings and orders related to it: 
“On appeal the reviewing court may: 
(1) reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment or order from which the 
appeal is taken; 
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(2) set aside, affirm, or modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent 
to or dependent upon the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken; 
(3) reduce the degree of offense of which the appellant was convicted; 
(4) reduce the punishment imposed by the trial court; or 
(5) order a new trial.” 
¶ 17 
In the proceedings before the appellate court in this case, that court was not 
called upon to exercise any of the above delineated powers with respect to 
defendant’s argument that sex offender registration is unconstitutional as applied to 
him. The requirement that defendant register as a sex offender is not encompassed 
within the judgment or any order of the trial court. Thus, defendant’s argument did 
not ask a reviewing court to reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment or order from 
which the appeal is taken. Nor did it ask to set aside or modify any “proceedings 
subsequent to or dependent upon the judgment or order from which the appeal is 
taken.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). The requirement that defendant 
register as a sex offender cannot be fairly characterized as a “proceeding.” 
¶ 18 
Defendant argues that the requirement to register is “punishment,” but even if 
that were true, it would not be “punishment imposed by the trial court.” We find 
that none of the criteria of Rule 615(b) for invoking the powers of a reviewing court 
have been satisfied in this case. Accordingly, we conclude that a reviewing court 
has no power on direct appeal of a criminal conviction to order that defendant be 
relieved of the obligation to register as a sex offender when there is neither an 
obligation to register imposed by the trial court nor an order or conviction that the 
defendant is appealing that is directly related to the obligation or the failure to 
register. 
¶ 19 
A contrary rule would permit appeal of collateral issues on direct appeal from a 
criminal conviction not only to sex offender obligations but to a host of other 
collateral consequences of convictions that are not imposed by trial courts and are 
not embodied in their judgments. Such consequences would likely include “the loss 
of the right to vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess 
firearms, dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of business or 
professional licenses.” See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 376 (2010) (Alito, J., 
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concurring in the judgment, joined by Roberts, C.J.). Allowing defendants to 
challenge the collateral consequences of a conviction on direct appeal would place 
a reviewing court in the position of ruling on the validity (or resolving the details) 
of regulatory programs administered by state agencies and officials that are not 
parties to the action. See People v. Molnar, 222 Ill. 2d 495, 500 (2006) (the Illinois 
State Police is “the agency responsible for implementing [sex offender registration 
under the Act]”). 
¶ 20 
The only Illinois case that defendant has managed to cite with the same 
procedural posture as the present case—i.e., involving a defendant seeking to 
challenge a collateral consequence of a conviction on direct appeal from that 
conviction—is People v. Avila-Briones, 2015 IL App (1st) 132221. There, 
however, the State did not make the same argument about the limit on the powers of 
the reviewing court to address the collateral consequences of a conviction. Instead, 
the State in that case merely challenged the defendant’s ability to raise the sex 
offender registration requirement on the ground that the defendant lacked standing. 
The appellate court’s antennae were raised relative to the unusual nature of 
defendant bringing such a claim on direct appeal from the criminal conviction, but 
it ultimately concluded that the case did not pose a standing problem: 
“It is *** unusual for a defendant to raise the challenges to these 
nonsentencing laws on direct appeal from his criminal conviction, when a 
litigant typically does so in a civil action. The trial court, after all, did not 
impose these restrictions as part of its sentence. Instead, these laws 
automatically applied to defendant, no matter the trial court’s sentence. But that 
does not alter the fact that defendant checks all the boxes on the requirements 
for standing.” Id. ¶ 32. 
¶ 21 
We do not find Avila-Briones to be useful authority for resolving the precise 
issue before us here, which involves the power of a reviewing court to address the 
issue rather than simply the standing of the defendant. Also, Avila-Briones itself 
noted the difficulty it faced in reviewing such a case where the record lacked 
detailed factual findings because defendant “did not file a civil suit and seek an 
evidentiary hearing before the trial court” with respect to his claims. See id. ¶ 86. 
The two proper ways that the kinds of constitutional issues involved in this case 
typically make their way to a reviewing court are (1) through a direct appeal from a 
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case finding a defendant guilty of violating the regulation he attempts to challenge 
as unconstitutional, such as the sex offender registration law (see, e.g., People v. 
Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶¶ 13-17), 2 or (2) by filing a civil suit seeking a 
declaration of unconstitutionality and relief from the classification as well as the 
burdens of sex offender registration (see, e.g., Johnson v. Madigan, 880 F.3d 371, 
373-77 (7th Cir. 2018) (where the court in a civil suit rejected defendant’s 
ex post facto challenge to the same statute at issue here on basically the same facts, 
finding that the Act did not apply retroactively for ex post facto purposes as applied 
to defendant)). 
¶ 22 
Moreover, the improper tack that defendant chose in this case of raising his 
as-applied due process challenge to sex offender registration for the first time in the 
reviewing court in a collateral proceeding without the benefit of a factual record to 
support the claim makes it difficult if not impossible to adjudicate the claim on 
appeal. This court has repeatedly held that an as-applied challenge is not properly 
brought when there has been no evidentiary hearing and no findings of fact. People 
ex rel. Hartrich v. 2010 Harley-Davidson, 2018 IL 121636, ¶ 31; People v. Rizzo, 
2016 IL 118599, ¶ 26; People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872, ¶ 47; In re Parentage of 
John M., 212 Ill. 2d 253, 268 (2004). “ ‘ “Without an evidentiary record, any 
finding that a statute is unconstitutional ‘as applied’ is premature.” ’ ” Rizzo, 2016 
IL 118599, ¶ 26 (quoting Mosley, 2015 IL 115872, ¶ 47, quoting John M., 212 Ill. 
2d at 268). All as-applied challenges are, by definition, dependent on application of 
the law to the specific facts and circumstances alleged by the challenger; therefore, 
it is crucial that the record be sufficiently developed with respect to those facts and 
circumstances for purposes of appellate review. 2010 Harley-Davidson, 2018 IL 
121636, ¶ 31. 
¶ 23 
Defendant has the heavy burden of overcoming the strong judicial presumption 
in favor of the constitutionality of the statute he seeks to challenge. Neither the trial 
nor the sentencing hearings in this case allowed for the development of the record 
with a view to litigating a challenge to defendant’s sex offender registration 
2In Minnis, defendant was charged with failing to register as a sex offender. 2016 IL 
119563, ¶ 5. We noted that a court will not consider a constitutional challenge to a criminal 
statutory provision under which a defendant has not been charged unless his challenge is 
brought under the first amendment’s overbreadth doctrine. Id. ¶ 13-14. 
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obligation. Indeed, that obligation was not even mentioned in the trial court 
proceedings. 
¶ 24 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 25 
Because this is not the proper forum for defendant to raise his claims and 
because an as-applied constitutional challenge may not be raised where it is 
litigated for the first time on review, we vacate the portion of the appellate court’s 
judgment that addressed defendant’s constitutional claims on the merits, and we 
now dismiss defendant’s appeal. 
¶ 26 
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part; appeal 
dismissed. 
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