Title: Richard L. Hermann v. Town of Delavan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP000171
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 23, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-0171 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Richard L. Hermann, Phillip Mattison, James M. 
Schoemperlen, Juan C. Beltran, Cary Berkowitz, 
Robert Berman, Clifford Blackwell, Joanne T. 
Bontkowski, Suzanne Brandner, George M. Briody, 
Barton F. Cameron, Dan U. Cameron, Douglas H. 
Cameron, Marion K. Cameron, Palmer W. Cameron, 
James G. Campbell, Edmund J. Cepulis, Mildred E. 
Chupich, George Cibon, Donald Clark, Ted 
Compall, Robert E. Cowhey, Dan Cox, Robert J. 
Darnall, Robert W. Davies, David J. Doerge, 
Stuart Ellison, Joseph Fehsenfeld, Theodore W. 
Filson, Ralph C. Glans, David Glickman, Gregory 
K. Goethal, Carlos A. Gonzalez, Howard C. Grant, 
Mike Grover, Steve R. Hall, Karen A. Hamm, John 
M. Hanson, Robert H. Harper, Erwin R. Herz, 
Donald C. Holst, Charles Ifergan, Allan 
Inbinder, Melvin F. Jager, Robert Kelman, Jim 
King, Raymond W. Kline, Jr., John T. Lauer, 
Terrence J. Lauer, Rhonda L. Levin, Mary Ellen 
Loofbourrow, Gerald R. Lynch, Richard L. 
Macgregor, Ethel A. Marett, Don W. Matheny, D. 
Chet Mckee, John J. Mckenna, John Mengel, Marion 
J. Mitchell, Vincent Micuch, William Mueller, 
William G. Myers, Larry Nendze, David A. Novak, 
Richard A. Nunemaker, Lucille M. Papendorf, Jon 
H. Rasmussen, Harold Rider,  M.B. Rude, Trudy 
Schwartz, David Semmel, Michael J. Sherman, 
William G. Shold, Myron Shure, James P. Soper, 
III, Barry M. Stagl, Donald Stephens, Allan J. 
Sternstein, Steven M. Stone, John F. Stoner, 
Donald J. Svachula, Steven Szczepanski, 
Magdalena O. Valle, William L. Weiss, Frances 
Whiteford, Helen M. Wydra, Susie Zeiser, Paul 
Balter and Reid S. Barker  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Town of Delavan, and Town of Delavan  
Board of Review,  
 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  208 Wis. 2d 216, 560 N.W.2d 280 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
January 23, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 5, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
John R. Race 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there 
briefs by Robert L. Gordon, Alan Marcuvitz and Weiss, Berzowski, 
Brady & Donahue, Milwaukee and oral argument by Robert L. Gordon. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief 
by Steven R. Wassel and Wassel Law Offices, Delavan and oral 
argument by Steven R. Wassel. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Richard J. 
Stadelman, Shawano and Claire Silverman, Madison for the 
Wisconsin Towns Association and the League of Wisconsin 
Municipalities. 
 
 
No. 96-0171 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-0171 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Richard L. Hermann, Phillip Mattison,  
James M. Schoemperlen, Juan C. Beltran,  
Cary Berkowitz, Robert Berman, Clifford  
Blackwell, Joanne T. Bontkowski, Suzanne  
Brandner, George M. Briody, Barton F.  
Cameron, Dan U. Cameron, Douglas H.  
Cameron, Marion K. Cameron, Palmer W.  
Cameron, James G. Campbell, Edmund J.  
Cepulis, Mildred E. Chupich, George  
Cibon, Donald Clark, Ted Compall, Robert  
E. Cowhey, Dan Cox, Robert J. Darnall,  
Robert W. Davies, David J. Doerge, Stuart  
Ellison, Joseph Fehsenfeld, Theodore W.  
Filson, Ralph C. Glans, David Glickman,  
Gregory K. Goethal, Carlos A. Gonzalez,  
Howard C. Grant, Mike Grover, Steve R.  
Hall, Karen A. Hamm, John M. Hanson,  
Robert H. Harper, Erwin R. Herz, Donald  
C. Holst, Charles Ifergan, Allan  
Inbinder, Melvin F. Jager, Robert Kelman,  
Jim King, Raymond W. Kline, Jr., John T.  
Lauer, Terrence J. Lauer, Rhonda L.  
Levin, Mary Ellen Loofbourrow, Gerald R.  
Lynch, Richard L. Macgregor, Ethel A.  
Marett, Don W. Matheny, D. Chet Mckee,  
John J. Mckenna, John Mengel, Marion J.  
Mitchell, Vincent Micuch, William  
Mueller, William G. Myers, Larry Nendze,  
David A. Novak, Richard A. Nunemaker,  
Lucille M. Papendorf, Jon H. Rasmussen,  
Harold Rider,  M.B. Rude, Trudy Schwartz,  
David Semmel, Michael J. Sherman, William  
G. Shold, Myron Shure, James P. Soper,  
III, Barry M. Stagl, Donald Stephens,  
Allan J. Sternstein, Steven M. Stone,  
John F. Stoner, Donald J. Svachula,  
Steven Szczepanski, Magdalena O. Valle,  
William L. Weiss, Frances Whiteford,  
Helen M. Wydra, Susie Zeiser, Paul Balter  
and Reid S. Barker  
FILED 
 
JAN 23, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
No. 96-0171 
 
2 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Town of Delavan, and Town of Delavan  
Board of Review,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents.  
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.    Affirmed. 
  
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.  There is one issue presented 
for review: must a complaint alleging a violation of the 
Uniformity Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, where 
the complaint challenges the tax assessment valuation of certain 
real property, but fails to allege plaintiffs' prior compliance 
with the property tax appeal procedures provided in Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47 (1995-96).1 
¶2 
This is a review of a decision of the court of 
appeals, Hermann v. Town of Delavan, 208 Wis. 2d 216, 560 N.W.2d 
280 (Ct. App. 1996), affirming a decision of the circuit court 
dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint for failing to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.  The court of appeals 
concluded that the plaintiffs' action could not be maintained 
without alleging prior compliance with the statutory scheme for 
challenging and reviewing a property tax assessment.  We agree 
with the court of appeals, and we affirm its decision.   
                     
1 All future references to Wis. Stats. will be to the 1995-
96 version of the statutes unless otherwise indicated  
No. 96-0171 
 
3 
¶3 
The relevant facts of the current dispute, as relayed 
by the court of appeals, are simple and undisputed.  Eighty-nine 
residential property owners (hereinafter the taxpayers) from the 
Town of Delavan (hereinafter the Town) filed a complaint under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80 alleging that the Town's method of property 
tax assessment for the year 1994 was unfair and non-uniform as 
between lakefront and inland properties in violation of the 
Uniformity Clause of Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 1.2  The complaint 
does not aver a prior objection before the Town of Delavan Board 
of Review (hereinafter the board), nor does it raise an appeal 
from the board's decision.3  The Walworth County Circuit Court 
Judge, John R. Race, dismissed the taxpayers' action under Wis. 
Stat. § 802.06(2)(a)6 for failing to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted.  The circuit court concluded that the 
taxpayers' action must be dismissed since they had failed to 
                     
2 Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 1 provides in pertinent part: 
"The rule of taxation shall be uniform, but the legislature may 
empower cities, villages or towns to collect and return taxes on 
real estate located therein by optional methods."   
3 Although the complaint does not allege prior objection 
before the board of review, the record indicates that 43 of the 
89 taxpayers had individually contested their property tax 
assessments before the board of review pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47 prior to joining this action and that at least one of 
the taxpayers who sought board review unsuccessfully appealed 
the board's decision to the circuit court.  The 43 taxpayers who 
appeared before the board have not in this action appealed the 
board's decision pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 70.47(13), 70.85, or 
74.37.  In the current analysis of whether the taxpayers' 
complaint properly pleads a cause of action upon which relief 
may be granted, we are limited to an examination of the 
allegations as stated in the complaint. See Weber v. Cedarburg, 
129 Wis. 2d 57, 64, 384 N.W.2d 333 (1986).   
No. 96-0171 
 
4 
exhaust 
the 
exclusive 
statutory 
remedies 
addressing 
the 
complaint's overassessment claims.  The court of appeals agreed 
with the circuit court and affirmed the dismissal of the 
taxpayers' complaint.  We accepted the taxpayers' petition for 
review. 
¶4 
Whether a complaint properly pleads a cause of action 
is a question of law which we decide without deference to the 
decisions of the lower courts.  See Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 
506, 512, 405 N.W.2d 305 (1987); Heinritz v. Lawrence Univ., 194 
Wis. 2d 606, 610, 535 N.W.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1995).  The purpose of 
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the 
legal sufficiency of the complaint.  See Evans v. Cameron, 121 
Wis. 2d 421, 426, 360 N.W.2d 25 (1985).  In determining whether 
a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted, the facts pled are taken as 
admitted.  See id.  Since pleadings are to be liberally 
construed, dismissal of a claim is improper if there are any 
conditions under which the plaintiffs could recover.  See Morgan 
v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 733, 275 N.W.2d 
660 (1979). 
¶5 
The taxpayers' current claim, although based on a 
uniformity clause challenge, is an action that inherently 
questions the valuation of certain property assessed for real 
property taxation.  In their complaint, the taxpayers do not 
challenge the Town's authority to assess the value of, and levy 
taxes upon, the real property in question.  The taxpayers do not 
contend that they did not own the property in question or that 
No. 96-0171 
 
5 
the taxes were levied upon the wrong taxpayers.  Nor do the 
taxpayers claim that the board of review failed to act in 
accordance with its procedural requirements.  The gravamen of 
the taxpayers' claim is that their lakefront properties were 
significantly overvalued and overassessed in relation to inland 
properties for the 1994 tax year.  This overassessment, the 
taxpayers argue, is a result of the town assessor's use of 
arbitrary and inconsistent formulas when assessing the value of 
their property.  A claim of overassessment, regardless of the 
basis upon which it is grounded, necessarily questions the 
valuation of real property assessed for taxation. 
¶6 
Chapter 70 of the Wisconsin Statutes establishes a 
comprehensive procedure by which property owners may challenge 
the valuation or the amount of property assessed for taxation.  
Persons objecting to either the valuation or the amount of 
property assessed by the taxing district must first file such 
objection with the clerk of the board of review prior to 
adjournment of public hearings by the board.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(7)(a).  Upon receiving such objection, the board must 
establish a time for hearing that objection and must give notice 
of the hearing to the objecting party.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(7)(bb).  At the hearing, the board must hear upon oath 
all persons who appear before it in relation to the assessment, 
and it may compel the attendance of, and examine, any witnesses 
it believes have knowledge of the property in question.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 70.47(8)(a), (c), (d).  If from the evidence 
gathered 
at 
the 
hearing, 
the 
board 
determines 
that 
the 
No. 96-0171 
 
6 
assessor's valuation is incorrect, the board is required to 
correct the assessment.  See Wis. Stat. § 70.47(9)(a).  If the 
board has reason to believe that property for which no objection 
has been raised is incorrectly assessed, the board must also 
review the assessment for such property and correct any error it 
discovers.  See Wis. Stat. § 70.47(10).  
¶7 
The statutory scheme of chs. 70 and 74 also provides a 
detailed method for taxpayers to appeal a decision of the board 
of review.  A property owner who files an objection with the 
board of review under Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7) and who disagrees 
with the board's determination has three options for appeal.  
The property owner may appeal the determination of the board by 
an action for certiorari.  See Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13).4  In 
addition, the property owner may file a written complaint with 
the department of revenue requesting that the department revalue 
the property and adjust the assessment thereof.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.85.5  In the alternative, the property owner may file a 
                     
4 Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13) provides in pertinent part: 
CERTIORARI.  Except as provided in s. 70.85, 
appeal from the determination of the board of review 
shall be by an action for certiorari commenced within 
90 days after  the taxpayer receives the notice . . . 
If the court on the appeal finds any error in the 
proceedings of the board which renders the assessment 
or 
the 
proceedings 
void, 
it 
shall 
remand 
the 
assessment to the board for further proceedings in 
accordance with the court's determination and retain 
jurisdiction of the matter until the board has 
determined 
an 
assessment 
in 
accordance 
with the 
court's order.  
 
5 Wis. Stat. § 70.85(1) provides: 
No. 96-0171 
 
7 
claim against the taxation district for an excessive assessment 
to recover any amount of property tax imposed as a result of the 
excessive assessment.  See Wis. Stat. § 74.37(2)(a).6 
¶8 
Each of the three methods of appealing a board of 
review's decision requires the objecting property owner to file 
his or her claim within a specific time limit.  If the property 
owner elects to pursue a certiorari action under Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(13), he or she must file that action within 90 days 
after final adjournment of the board's proceedings.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 70.47(13).  If the property owner chooses to appeal to 
the department of revenue under Wis. Stat. § 70.85, he or she 
must file a written complaint with the department within 20 days 
of receiving the board's decision or within 30 days of the date 
specified in the affidavit giving notice of the decision if 
there is no return receipt.  See Wis. Stat. § 70.85(2).  
Finally, the property owner who decides to file a claim for 
excessive assessment under Wis. Stat. § 74.37(2)(a) must do so 
                                                                  
 
(1) COMPLAINT.  A taxpayer may file a written 
complaint with the department of revenue alleging that 
the assessment of one or more items or parcels of 
property in the taxation district the value of which 
.  .  . is radically out of proportion to the general 
level of assessment of all other property in the 
district. 
 
6 Wis. Stat. § 74.37(2)(a) provides: "A claim for an 
excessive assessment may be filed against the taxation district, 
or the county that has a county assessor system, which collected 
the tax." 
No. 96-0171 
 
8 
by January 31 of the year in which the tax is payable.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 74.37(2)(b)5.7 
¶9 
Each method of appeal also requires that the objecting 
property owner satisfy certain conditions precedent.  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 70.47(13); 70.85(1)-(4); 74.37(4).  A prerequisite for 
all three forms of appeal, however, is filing an objection 
before the board of review pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7).  
See Wis. Stat. §§ 70.47(13);8 70.85(2);9 74.37(4)(a).10 
¶10 Upon review, we conclude that the detailed and 
comprehensive objection and appeals procedures provided in chs. 
70 and 74 were intended to be the exclusive means by which 
taxpayers may challenge the valuation of real property assessed 
for taxation.  First, the express language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(7) makes clear the legislature's intent to make an 
appeal before the board of review a condition precedent to any 
                     
7 Although not relevant to our analysis of the taxpayers' 
current complaint, we note that the taxpayers filed their 
§ 893.80 claim on 19 April 1995, nearly four months after the 
Delavan Board of Review adjourned its proceedings on 28 December 
1994 and outside each of the statutes of limitations provided in 
Wis. Stat. §§ 70.47(13); 70.85(2); and 74.37(2)(b)5.   
8 Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13): "Except as provided in s. 70.85, 
appeal from the determination of the board of review shall be by 
an action for certiorari . . . ."  
9 Wis. Stat. § 70.85(2): "A complaint under this section may 
be filed only if the taxpayer has contested the assessment of 
the property for that year under s. 70.47." 
10 Wis. Stat. § 74.37(4)(a): "No claim or action for an 
excessive assessment may be brought under this section unless 
the procedures for objecting to assessments under s. 70.47, 
except under s. 70.47(13), have been complied with."  
No. 96-0171 
 
9 
and all taxpayer challenges to the value at which property has 
been assessed: 
 
No 
person 
shall 
be 
allowed 
in 
any 
action 
or 
proceedings to question the amount or valuation of 
property unless [] written objection has been filed 
[with the board of review] and such person in good 
faith presented evidence to such board in support of 
such objections and made full disclosure before said 
board, under oath of all of that person's property 
liable to assessment in such district and the value 
thereof. . . . 
   
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.47(7)(emphasis 
added). 
 
The 
above-quoted 
language creates a condition precedent for "any action or 
proceedings," objecting to the valuation of property.  The 
language is without qualification or limitation as to the theory 
upon which such action or proceeding is based, the number of 
persons raising such objection, or the form of relief sought. 
¶11 Second, this court has adopted the general principle 
that, where a method of review is prescribed by statute, that 
prescribed method is exclusive.  See State ex rel. First Nat'l 
Bank of Wisconsin Rapids v. M & I Peoples Bank of Coloma, 82 
Wis. 2d 529, 537-38, 263 N.W.2d 196 (1978); Jackson County Iron 
Co. v. Musolf, 134 Wis. 2d 95, 101, 396 N.W.2d 323 (1986).  
Applying 
this 
"exclusivity" 
rule, 
Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
repeatedly found that where administrative action has taken 
place, and a statute sets forth a specific procedure for review 
of that action and court review of the administrative decision, 
the statutory remedy is exclusive and the parties cannot seek 
judicial review of the agency action through other means.  See 
No. 96-0171 
 
10
M & I Peoples Bank, 82 Wis. 2d at 538-39; Jackson County, 134 
Wis. 2d at 101; Association of Career Employees v. Klauser, 195 
Wis. 2d 602, 611-612, 536 N.W.2d 478 (Ct. App. 1995).  As 
explained above, chs. 70 and 74 of the Wisconsin Statutes 
provide a comprehensive scheme for reviewing actions by boards 
of review and for court review of a board's decision.  These 
procedures and remedies, being expressly provided by statute, 
are therefore considered exclusive and must be employed before 
other judicial remedies are pursued. 
¶12 Although as a general rule a court lacks jurisdiction 
where the plaintiff fails to follow the required statutory 
procedure, we recognize that this is a rule of "policy, 
convenience and discretion."  Association of Career Employees, 
195 Wis. 2d at 612.  There are some situations in which a court 
may entertain a petition seeking judicial relief by a method 
other than that prescribed by statute.  See Jackson County, 134 
Wis. 2d at 101.  Where an appeal to an administrative agency 
would not provide adequate resolution of the issues raised by a 
party, that party may properly challenge an administrative 
decision by commencing a separate action for relief.  See M & I 
Peoples Bank, 82 Wis. 2d at 541; Jackson County, 134 Wis. 2d at 
101; cf. Nodell Inv. Corp. v. Glendale, 78 Wis. 2d 416, 426, 254 
N.W.2d 310 (1977)(applying "exhaustion of remedies" doctrine); 
Town of Eagle v. Christensen, 191 Wis. 2d 301, 317-18, 529 
Wis. 2d 245 (Ct. App. 1994)(applying "exhaustion of remedies" 
doctrine).  In the current case, however, adequate remedies were 
available to the taxpayers. 
No. 96-0171 
 
11
¶13 The objection and review procedures of chs. 70 and 74 
could have provided an adequate resolution of the uniformity 
issues raised by the taxpayers.  Had the taxpayers raised a 
proper objection before the board of review, the board could 
have corrected each of the taxpayer's assessments, see Wis. 
Stat. § 70.47(9), thereby curing any non-uniform assessments.  
In addition, the board, upon reasonable belief, could have 
reviewed and corrected the non-uniform assessments of the inland 
Delavan properties, resolving the taxpayers' claims.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 70.47(10).  Assuming the board had rejected the 
taxpayers' claims, a court reviewing the board's decision in a 
certiorari action, upon finding the assessment violated the 
uniformity clause, could have remanded the assessment to the 
board for further proceedings consistent with that court's 
determination.  See Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13); see, e.g., State ex 
rel. Levine v. Board of Review, 191 Wis. 2d 363, 528 N.W.2d 424 
(1995);11 Flood v. Village of Lomira, 149 Wis. 2d 220, 440 N.W.2d 
                     
11 In State ex rel. Levine v. Board of Review, 191 Wis. 2d 
363, 528 N.W.2d 424 (1995), this court held that taxpayers are 
entitled to have their properties reassessed when they show that 
improper considerations have resulted in the underassessment of 
other properties in the district.  See id. at 367.  As the court 
of appeals noted in this case, Levine is inapposite here.  See 
Hermann v. Town of Delavan, 208 Wis. 2d 216, 226, 560 N.W.2d 280 
(Ct. App. 1996).  Since the plaintiffs in Levine both objected 
before the board of review and timely filed a certiorari action 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13), the court did not address 
the threshold, procedural issue here presented.  Since we have 
taken as admitted the facts alleged in the taxpayers' complaint, 
the substantive holding of Levine is not pertinent to our 
current analysis.  The Levine case, however, does illustrate 
that a person claiming a violation of the uniformity clause can 
No. 96-0171 
 
12
575 (Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 153 Wis. 2d 428, 451 N.W.2d 422 
(1990).  Any one of these statutory remedies could have provided 
an adequate resolution of the taxpayers' claims.  Where a party 
does not seek administrative redress of a grievance which might 
have been correctable by the administrative agency, the party 
may not seek judicial relief.  See Beres v. New Berlin, 34 
Wis. 2d 229, 235, 148 N.W.2d 653 (1967). 
¶14 Nonetheless, the taxpayers argue that an appeal of a 
decision by the board of review is not the exclusive remedy if 
taxpayers allege that a property tax assessment is fundamentally 
defective.  The taxpayers contend that the court of appeals 
erred by blurring the fundamental distinction between assessment 
valuation disputes and threshold challenges to an assessment 
which is alleged to be void ab initio.   
¶15 The 
taxpayers 
first 
contend 
that 
because 
their 
complaint 
"does 
not 
seek 
a 
reduction 
in 
any 
individual 
assessment, but rather an order voiding the Town's entire 1994 
assessment," it falls outside of the legislatively-mandated 
procedure for contesting a property tax assessment.  Citing 
Marsh v. Board of Supervisors, 42 Wis. 502 (1877), and Town of 
Eagle v. Christensen, 191 Wis. 2d 301, the taxpayers argue that 
Wisconsin courts have created a judicial bypass of the statutory 
board of review requirements in cases where a uniformity clause 
                                                                  
obtain relief through the objection and review procedures in 
chs. 70 and 74 of the statutes. 
No. 96-0171 
 
13
challenge is raised.  Having reviewed Marsh and Christensen, we 
find no such judicial bypass. 
¶16 In Marsh, this court permitted the plaintiffs to 
challenge under the uniformity clause a municipal assessment in 
an independent equitable action in the circuit court without 
first filing an objection with the board of review.  The Marsh 
decision, the taxpayers argue, must necessarily be read as "a 
deliberate decision by this court that board of review and 
certiorari procedures need not be followed by citizens who seek 
to challenge the threshold validity of a municipal assessment." 
¶17 The taxpayers' reliance on Marsh is misplaced.  The 
court in Marsh applied the real property assessment provisions 
of ch. 130, Laws of 1868.  See Marsh, 42 Wis. at 514.  Under the 
provisions of the 1868 statutes, a board of review was required 
to "hear and examine any person or persons upon oath, who shall 
appear before them, in relation to the assessment of any 
property . . . ."  See § 25, ch. 130, Laws of 1968.  The 
statutes, however, did not make filing an objection with the 
board of review either an exclusive remedy or a prerequisite for 
a 
uniformity 
clause 
challenge 
to 
a 
property 
assessment.  
Objection before the board of review did not become a condition 
precedent to Marsh-like challenges until 1887, ten years after 
Marsh was decided, when the statutes were amended to read: 
 
[N]o person or corporation shall be heard, in any 
action, suit or proceeding, to question the equality 
of any assessment, unless they shall have first made 
such objection before the said board of review, and 
made an offer to sustain the same by competent proof; 
No. 96-0171 
 
14
in which case it shall be the duty of the said board 
to inquire into the fact of such equality. 
 
§ 1, ch. 283, Laws of 1887.12  Applying the amended language, 
this court without exception dismissed Marsh-like complaints 
that failed to properly aver prior objection before the board of 
review.  See, e.g., Bratton v. Town of Johnson, 76 Wis. 430, 45 
N.W. 412 (1890); Boorman v. Juneau County, 76 Wis. 550, 45 N.W. 
675 (1890); Wisconsin Cent. R.R. Co. v. Ashland County, 81 Wis. 
1, 50 N.W. 937 (1891).  Unlike the decision in Marsh, this later 
string of cases is more directly on point with the issue now 
before the court:  when there is a statutory condition precedent 
to an action challenging a property assessment, a complaint 
failing to allege compliance with such condition precedent must 
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted.  Contrary to the taxpayers' contention, the holding 
of Marsh is limited to an application of the statutes in effect 
at that time, statutes that until 1887 were, in relevant part, 
significantly different from those we apply today. 
¶18 The taxpayers' reliance on Christensen is similarly 
misplaced.  In Christensen, taxpayers and the Town of Eagle, 
                     
12  The language added to the statutes by § 1, ch. 283, Laws 
of 1887 was repealed by § 1, ch. 138, Laws of 1889.  The 
repealed language of the 1887 act was then substantially re-
enacted as to personal property assessments in 1903.  See § 2, 
ch. 285, Laws of 1903; see also note to Wis. Stat. § 1061 
(1898)(Supp. 1905).  This language was again extended to real 
property assessments in 1949.  See § 6, ch. 101, Laws of 1949.  
The current language of Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7) remains, in 
relevant part, unaltered since being added in 1949.  Compare 
Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7) with § 6, ch. 101, Laws of 1949. 
No. 96-0171 
 
15
without first objecting before the Town of Eagle's board of 
review, brought an action for declaratory relief against the 
assessor of the neighboring Town of Palmyra, alleging the 
assessment practices utilized by that assessor were in violation 
of the uniformity clause.13  See Christensen, 191 Wis. 2d at 309. 
 The circuit court had dismissed the taxpayers' claim because 
they had failed to challenge their assessments before the Town 
of Eagle Board of Review.  See id. at 317.  The court of appeals 
reversed, concluding that no specific administrative action 
existed for the taxpayers' particular claim and that an appeal 
before the board of review would have been futile for those 
taxpayers: 
 
The Town of Eagle board of review cannot change the 
land classifications chosen by [the Palmyra assessor] 
nor 
can 
it 
resolve 
the 
use 
of 
differing 
classifications for similar land in the Towns of Eagle 
and Palmyra. . . . The Town of Eagle board of review 
has the power to raise and lower only a Town of Eagle 
property owner's assessment.   Thus, it would be 
futile for the Town of Eagle property owners to appeal 
their assessments before the Town of Eagle Board of 
Review. 
                     
13 In Christensen, the Town of Eagle property owners raised 
a uniformity clause challenge because the Towns of Eagle and 
Palmyra, although separate property assessment districts, shared 
a common school district funded by property tax revenue based on 
the equalized values of property.  See Town of Eagle v. 
Christensen, 191 Wis. 2d 301, 309, 529 N.W.2d 245 (Ct. App. 
1995). 
No. 96-0171 
 
16
See id. at 318 (internal citations omitted).14   
¶19 Contrary to taxpayers' arguments, the claims raised in 
Christensen are significantly distinguishable from those raised 
here by the taxpayers.  The property owners in Christensen did 
not claim that the Town of Eagle assessor improperly valued 
their lands, but rather that the Town of Palmyra assessor 
classified lands differently, resulting in a violation of the 
uniformity clause.  See Christensen 191 Wis. 2d at 318.  The 
taxpayers here are Delavan property owners who are challenging 
the assessment methods utilized by the Town of Delavan's, and 
not 
a 
neighboring 
municipality's, 
assessor. 
 
Unlike 
in 
Christensen, chs. 70 and 74 provide specific administrative 
procedures with which these taxpayers could have challenged the 
values at which their Delavan properties were assessed.  In 
addition, 
as 
explained 
above, 
the 
objection 
and 
review 
procedures of chs. 70 and 74 would not have been futile, but 
rather could have provided the Delavan taxpayers adequate 
relief. 
 
Considering 
these 
distinguishing 
factors, 
the 
taxpayers' argument that Christensen establishes a judicial 
bypass in this case is unavailing. 
¶20 The taxpayers also argue that an "unbroken line" of 
Wisconsin cases since Marsh uniformly holds that challenges to 
                     
14 The Christensen court also dismissed the argument that 
the Town of Eagle property owners should have raised an 
objection before the Town of Palmyra board of review.  The court 
concluded that the non-Palmyra property owners would not have 
had standing to raise such an objection before the Town of 
Palmyra board of review.  See Christensen, 191 Wis. 2d at 319.   
No. 96-0171 
 
17
the underlying legality of an assessment—claims that the 
assessment is void ab initio—are not subject to statutory 
provisions governing challenges to the valuation of a valid 
assessment.  To support this proposition, the taxpayers cite a 
string of tax exemption cases in which courts have held that 
litigation over whether property is exempt from taxation is not 
generally subject to limitations that may apply to other 
property tax disputes.15  The taxpayers urge this court to apply 
in this case the reasoning underlying the tax exemption 
decisions because the taxpayers similarly allege that the 
property assessment was void ab initio.  We find the taxpayers' 
argument unpersuasive. 
¶21 To apply by analogy the reasoning of the tax exemption 
cases to the case at bar would ignore a fundamental distinction 
between claims alleged in tax exemption cases and the claim now 
before us.  In cases concerning tax exempt properties, the 
plaintiffs generally allege that the taxing officers did not 
have, and never could acquire, jurisdiction to tax the lands 
there in question.  No such claim is here raised.  Unlike the 
taxpayers' claims, the tax in tax exemption cases is void not on 
account of any irregularity in the assessment proceedings, but 
because of an absolute want of power to tax in any manner at any 
                     
15 The taxpayers cite IBM Credit Corp. v. Village of 
Allouez, 188 Wis. 2d 143, 524 N.W.2d 132 (1994); Friendship 
Village of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee, 181 Wis. 2d 207, 511 N.W.2d 
345 (Ct. App. 1993); Hahn v. Walworth County, 14 Wis. 2d 147, 
109 N.W.2d 653 (1961); Trustees of Clinton Lodge v. Rock County, 
224 Wis. 168, 272 N.W. 5 (1937). 
No. 96-0171 
 
18
time.  See Family Hosp. Nursing Home, Inc. v. Milwaukee, 78 
Wis. 2d 312, 326, 254 N.W.2d 268 (1977); see also Ash Realty 
Corp. v. Milwaukee, 25 Wis. 2d 169, 174, 130 N.W.2d 260 
(1964)(distinguishing tax exemption cases from the situation 
where an action of taxing district is of "colorable legality"). 
 As we have previously explained: 
 
There is a wide distinction between a case where no 
tax can in any event be levied upon property because 
it is exempt or lies outside of the taxing district 
and a case where the property lies within the taxing 
district and is subject to taxation but the statutory 
or charter provisions have not been complied with in 
its levy.  The former is void ab initio and can never 
be rendered valid.  The latter is voidable, because of 
irregularities in the proceedings leading up to its 
levy. 
 
Family Hosp., 78 Wis. 2d at 326 (quoting Wisconsin Real Estate 
Co. v. Milwaukee, 151 Wis. 198, 205, 138 N.W. 642 (1912)).  The 
current dispute falls into the latter category of voidable 
claims identified in Family Hosp.  The properties here in 
question unarguably lie within the taxing district and are 
subject to assessment and taxation.  The taxpayers allege only a 
failure to perform the assessment of such properties according 
to the procedures prescribed by law. 
¶22 In addition, the 
legislature has 
recognized the 
distinction between claims of tax exemption and those of 
excessive assessment, and it has created a separate appeals 
No. 96-0171 
 
19
process for excessive assessment cases.16  Taxpayers claiming 
their property is exempt from taxation may file against the 
taxation district an action under Wis. Stat. § 74.35 to recover 
any "unlawful taxes" levied upon exempt property.  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 74.33(1);17 74.35(2)(a).18  Unlike actions for excessive 
assessment, actions to recover an "unlawful tax" under Wis. 
Stat. § 74.35(2)(a) may be filed without first objecting to the 
board of review.  See Wis. Stat. § 74.35(2)(b).  Specifically 
excepted from the category of "unlawful taxes," however, is "a 
tax in respect to which the alleged defect is solely that the 
                     
16 Prior to 1988, Wis. Stat. § 74.73 generally governed 
property tax refund claims.  In 1987, the legislature divided 
former § 74.73 into two distinct provisions:  Wis. Stat. § 74.35 
governing "unlawful taxes" (including taxes levied on tax exempt 
property), 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 74.37 
governing 
excessive 
assessments. See 1987 Wis. Act 378, § 75.  The latter requires 
as a condition precedent an objection before the board of 
review.  The former has no such requirement.   
17 Wis. Stat. § 74.33(1) provides in relevant part: 
After the tax roll has been delivered to the 
treasurer of the taxation district under s. 74.03, the 
governing body of the taxation district may refund or 
rescind in whole or in part any general property tax 
shown in the tax roll, including agreed-upon interest, 
if: 
 
 (c) The property is exempt by law from taxation, 
except as provided under sub. (2). 
 
18 Wis. Stat. § 74.35(2)(a) provides: 
 
A person aggrieved by the levy and collection of 
an unlawful tax assessed against his or her property 
may file a claim to recover the unlawful tax against 
the taxation district which collected the tax. 
  
No. 96-0171 
 
20
assessor placed a valuation on the property that is excessive." 
 Wis. Stat. § 74.35(1).  The distilled claim raised by the 
taxpayers, regardless of the theory on which it is based, 
alleges solely that the assessments of their properties were 
excessive in relation to other inland Delavan properties.  The 
legislature specifically excepted such claims from the more 
liberal appeals process of Wis. Stat. § 74.35.  We will not 
ignore the distinction previously recognized by this court and 
by the legislature. 
¶23 The taxpayers' arguments also fail under public policy 
considerations.  If owners of taxable property could neglect to 
assert their rights before the board of review and then be heard 
to litigate questions of value in court, the administration of 
the municipal tax laws would be seriously hampered.  A statutory 
plan of tax assessment, tax levying, and tax collection needs to 
have established procedures and time limits for effective 
governmental planning.  The administrative procedures, appellate 
process, and time limitations of chs. 70 and 74 serve as 
procedural safeguards against municipalities having to undertake 
comprehensive reassessments long after the books have been 
closed for a given tax year.  To allow the taxpayers to file 
their claims of excessive assessment nearly three months after 
the first installment of the taxes were due would significantly 
disrupt 
the 
Town's 
ability 
to 
carry 
out 
its 
statutory 
responsibilities.  In addition, the privilege of appearing 
before the board of review and having assessment errors 
corrected is coupled with a duty of the taxpayer to make full 
No. 96-0171 
 
21
disclosure of information.  See Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7);19 see also 
Herzfeld-Phillipson Co. v. Milwaukee, 177 Wis. 431, 439, 189 
N.W.2d 661 (1922).  To require property owners to put the 
taxation district on notice of alleged defects in the assessment 
procedures at a time of the board of review proceedings helps 
insure fair and equitable assessment in a timely manner for all 
property owners.  As we explained in Herzfeld-Phillipson:  "No 
economist would ever dream that there can be exact justice to 
all in administering any system of taxation.  The most that can 
be hoped for is that there may be wise and just statutes and 
that they may be ably and honestly administered."  Id. at 439. 
¶24 The tax appeal administrative procedures of chs. 70 
and 74 of the Wisconsin Statutes are a highly evolved and 
carefully interwoven set of statutes providing a comprehensive 
remedy 
for 
individuals 
seeking 
redress 
for 
excessive 
assessments. 
 
Under 
this 
exclusive 
statutory 
scheme, 
an 
objection before the board of review pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(7) was an express condition precedent to filing the 
taxpayers' action challenging the valuation at which their real 
property was assessed for taxation.  Being a statutory condition 
                     
19 Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7) provides in pertinent part: 
No person shall be allowed . . . to question the 
amount or valuation of property unless such written 
objection has been filed and such person in good faith 
presented evidence to such board in support of such 
objections and made full disclosure before said board, 
under oath of all that person's property liable to 
assessment in such district and the value thereof. 
(emphasis added). 
No. 96-0171 
 
22
precedent, it was necessary for the taxpayers to allege 
compliance therewith in their complaint.  No such objection was 
alleged.  As a result, there are no conditions under which the 
taxpayers can recover.  We must therefore find that the 
taxpayers' complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which 
relief can be granted, and we affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
   
 
 
 
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