Title: Rosendahl v. Tucson Medical Center
Citation: 380 P.2d 1020, 93 Ariz. 368
Docket Number: 7164
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: April 24, 1963

93 Ariz. 368 (1963) 380 P.2d 1020 John ROSENDAHL, Administrator of the Estate of Francis Rosendahl, deceased, Appellant, v. TUCSON MEDICAL CENTER, a corporation, Appellee. No. 7164. Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc. April 24, 1963. *369 Norman S. Herring, Sedona, for appellant. Darnell, Holesapple, McFall &amp; Spaid, by Richard C. Briney, Tucson, for appellee. UDALL, Vice Chief Justice. From a judgment for defendant in a wrongful death action plaintiff, father of the deceased and the administrator of the estate, appeals. Because the transcript of testimony was not included in the record on appeal our knowledge of the facts is limited. The record we do have indicates that deceased was admitted to defendant hospital on February 9, 1959, and died there on February 10, 1959. The death certificate shows the cause of death to be pulmonary hemorrhaging. Deceased had been a victim of pulmonary tuberculosis for fifteen years. His survivors alleged that the staff of defendant hospital failed to give him the "care and attention required by his serious physical condition" and consequently hastened his death. The jury found otherwise. The appeal is based on instructions given to the jury. Appellant contends the court erred: With regard to the first assignment we find that the trial judge did in fact include in his instructions on negligence a discussion of duty.[2] He said: This court has recognized the concept of duty as it relates to the doctrine of negligence in terms of "foreseeability" of harm to another. The foreseeability of the danger establishes the duty. See Tucker v. Collar, 79 Ariz. 141, 285 P.2d 178 (1955). The emphasized portion of the above instruction adequately sets out this concept. Furthermore the instructions spell out the very word "duty" when it was said: The court then said: The element of duty as related to the doctrine of negligence was adequately presented for the jury's consideration, and the first assignment is without merit. We likewise dismiss the second assignment of error as being without grounds. The instruction complained of said: We find nothing in this instruction that amounts to a comment on the evidence. In fact its prefacing remarks identify the instruction as a statement of "general principles." The error in assuming negligence on the strength of the pleadings, or in assuming negligence simply because of a death, or in determining negligence on guesswork is sound advice to a jury. Negligence must be proved and proximate cause established before liability can be found. Dungan v. Brandenberg, 72 Ariz. 47, 230 P.2d 518 (1951). Also, it seems to us to be a sound admonition to the jury that the "ordinary and due care" standard used in determining negligence does not always require that only one course of conduct *372 at the exclusion of all others to be followed by the actor. A reasonable and prudent person might have to decide between alternative courses of conduct either one of which would be proper under the circumstances. Salt River Valley W.U. Ass'n v. Compton, supra; Humphrey v. Atchison, T. &amp; S.F. Ry. Co., 50 Ariz. 167, 70 P.2d 319 (1937). We also find appellant's third assignment to be without merit. An examination of the instructions fails to indicate that the trial judge overemphasized the defense side of the case. As to the final assignment of error we find again that the record does not sustain appellant's contention. The instructions cited in this opinion show that the trial judge did in fact instruct the jury as to finding the existence of negligence and its proximate cause of decedent's death: Then again the court said: It does not appear that the jury would be misled by these instructions. Reah v. Jupin, 68 Ariz. 335, 206 P.2d 558 (1949). Judgment affirmed. BERNSTEIN, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, JENNINGS and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur. [1] Article VI. Section 12 reads: "Judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact nor comment thereon, but shall declare the law." [2] That duty is an element of negligence is established by our language in Scarborough v. Cent. Ariz. L. &amp; P. Co., 58 Ariz. 51, 117 P.2d 487, 138 A.L.R. 866 (1941); Salt River Valley W.U. Ass'n v. Compton, 40 Ariz. 282, 11 P.2d 839 (1932); City of Phoenix v. Lopez, 77 Ariz. 146, 268 P.2d 323 (1954); West v. Soto, 85 Ariz. 255, 336 P.2d 153 (1959). [3] It has been stated that hypercritical criticism to the charge will not be sustained. In keeping with this rule we have held that it is the charge as a whole which we will consider in passing upon objections made by the losing party. City of Phoenix v. Harlan, 75 Ariz. 290, 255 P.2d 609 (1953); Ruth v. Rhodes, 66 Ariz. 129, 185 P.2d 304 (1947); Humphrey v. Atchison, T. &amp; S.F. Ry. Co., supra.