Title: Ceravolo v. Brown
Citation: 364 So. 2d 1155
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 1, 1978

364 So. 2d 1155 (1978)
Norman A. CERAVOLO
v.
Norman K. BROWN.
77-375.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 1, 1978.
*1156 Norman A. Ceravolo, pro se.
Hudson John Myers, Birmingham, for appellant.
W. Gerald Stone, Bessemer, and Thomas B. Huie, Birmingham, for appellee.
FAULKNER, Justice.
Norman Ceravolo brought suit against Norman Brown for malicious prosecution and slander. Summary judgment was entered for Brown. Ceravolo appeals only as to the slander action. Because the complaint does not sufficiently allege a claim for relief for slander, even under our liberalized rules of procedure, we affirm.
Brown, an attorney in Bessemer, has been acting as counsel in a suit brought by MetroBank against Ceravolo and others. Ceravolo claims that during the pendency of that suit he has been the subject of several abusive outbursts by Brown. Ceravolo, acting pro se, brought a separate suit against Brown originally for malicious prosecution. Brown sought summary judgment on the grounds that the MetroBank suit was still pending. Subsequent to the filing of the motion for summary judgment, Ceravolo amended his complaint to base the action on slander. Brown, consequently, amended his motion to encompass the slander action. On summary judgment the trial court considered the affidavits of both parties as well as the entire record in the MetroBank suit, and entered judgment for defendant Brown. Ceravolo appeals, asserting that the complaint and affidavits entitled him to a jury trial on the slander count.
Brown's motion for summary judgment was based on two propositions: (1) that the amended complaint did not sufficiently state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and (2) that Brown is immune from suit as attorney in the MetroBank action. Since we find that the first contention is meritorious, we do not reach the question of any possible immunity for Brown.
The substance of the amended complaint is as follows:
Initially, we note that Ceravolo has not alleged any special damages. To state a claim Ceravolo's allegations must charge slander per se.
This Court outlined the requirements for slander per se in Marion v. Davis, 217 Ala. 16, 114 So. 357 (1927):
The rules enunciated in this case have been consistently followed within this state and were most recently reaffirmed in Brown v. W.R.M.A. Broadcasting Co., Inc., 286 Ala. 186, 238 So. 2d 540 (1970). See also Bryan v. Brown, 339 So. 2d 577 (Ala.1976). While it may be odious to berate someone in public with threats and ethnic slurs and to attack someone with epithets such as "dead beat" and "crook," such questionable behavior is, nevertheless, not actionable in Alabama absent allegations of special damages. Even under our liberalized rules of procedure, Rule 9(g) ARCP still requires special damages to be specifically stated, and without them Ceravolo's complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C. J., and BLOODWORTH, ALMON and EMBRY, JJ., concur.