Title: Baca v. Chaffin
Citation: 253 P.2d 309, 57 N.M. 17
Docket Number: 5484
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: January 28, 1953

253 P.2d 309 (1953) 57 N.M. 17 BACA v. CHAFFIN. No. 5484. Supreme Court of New Mexico. January 28, 1953. Chester A. Hunker, Santa Fe, for appellant. Robert E. Fox, Santa Fe, for appellee. LUJAN, Justice. The sole question is whether the district court erred in setting aside an order issued by the Chief of the Division of Liquor Control revoking the appellee's retail liquor license for the sale of intoxicating liquor in the City of Tucumcari. He will be hereafter referred to as the Chief and the defendant as the appellee. The appellee was granted, by the Chief's predecessor in office, a retail liquor license for the sale of intoxicating liquor in the City of Tucumcari, but before he had established his business the Chief filed a charge against him under Section 61-601 of the 1941 Compilation, seeking to revoke his license on the ground that the license was issued illegally in that there was no proper posting of the premises as required by Section 1, Chapter 134, N.M.L. 1947, which is as follows: The parties herein appeared in person and by counsel and after taking of testimony the Chief entered an order revoking the appellee's retail liquor license on the ground that the premises were not posted as required by the provisions of the above statute. The appellee prosecuted, in strict compliance with the statute, an appeal from the order of revocation of his license to the District Court of Santa Fe County as is provided for by applicable statute, wherein the record as made at the trial before the Chief was filed, including the transcript of evidence heard before him. The trial of the appeal in the district court is not deemed a trial de novo, but is to be tried only on the record made at the hearing before the Chief, from which the appeal is taken to the Santa Fe County District *310 Court. In the case at bar the trial court reviewed the testimony adduced at the hearing before the Chief and directed that the order of revocation issued by him be vacated and set aside. The testimony given at the hearing before the Chief to establish that the license was issued illegally on the ground that appellee's premises were not posted as required by statute, is as follows: On cross-examination he testified: Mr. Kenneth Ayers called by the State testified: On cross-examination he testified. On re-direct examination he testified: There was also testimony that the premises in question were posted from November 30, 1950 to January 3, 1951, and this testimony was not contradicted. Based upon the foregoing testimony the Chief made the following finding: The question to be determined is whether the above finding is supported by some evidence of probative value. If so, it is conclusive, Yarborough v. Montoya, 54 N.M. 91, 214 P.2d 769, and we must affirm the order. The record leaves no doubt as to the proper answer. There must be some substantial evidence of probative character to sustain the finding of the liquor authority, or else its decision will be set aside, but its presence is absolutely necessary. A finding without some evidence of probative value would be arbitrary and baseless. A fair trial is the antithesis of an arbitrary trial. A trial which proceeds to a conclusion resulting in a quasi-judicial determination depriving appellee of legal rights, can well be said to be unfair if the determination is necessarily based on a finding of fact which is not supported by proof of a probative character. Based solely upon the testimony adduced at the hearing before the Chief, the district court made the following finding, which is supported by the record. It follows that the action of the Chief in revoking the license upon the ground that it was issued illegally in that there was no proper posting of the premises lacks the necessary factual support. We conclude that the trial court did not err in vacating *312 and setting aside the order of the Chief revoking appellee's license. We have not considered other questions raised in appellee's brief, and intimate no opinion on them, since the point already discussed is determinative. The judgment is affirmed. It is so ordered SADLER, C.J., and McGHEE, COMPTON and COORS, JJ., concur.