Title: State v. DeLuna
Citation: 110 Ariz. 497, 520 P.2d 1121
Docket Number: 2679
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 1974

110 Ariz. 497 (1974) 520 P.2d 1121 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Eric DeLUNA, Appellant. No. 2679. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. April 15, 1974. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Thomas A. Jacobs, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender, by Paul J. Prato, Former Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a conviction and judgment of guilt to the crime of theft from the person, §§ 13-661, 13-662, and 13-663, as amended 1968, A.R.S., with a sentence thereon of not less than ten nor more than fifteen years in the Arizona State Prison. *498 We must consider two questions on appeal: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. The defendant was arrested for stealing a wallet from the person of another. Preliminary hearing was held at which time he was represented by a deputy public defender and he was held to answer. At the arraignment in the Superior Court, the defendant refused the assistance of the public defender and demanded the appointment of private counsel. The demand for private counsel was refused and defendant then notified the court that he would act as his own counsel and entered a plea of not guilty. On the morning of the trial, the defendant was again advised of his right to have the public defender represent him, but he again refused the services of the public defender and renewed his request for the appointment of counsel other than the public defender. This request was denied and the case proceeded to trial. After the lunch recess, the defendant advised the judge that he had made a mistake, and requested that the court appoint the public defender to handle the case. A deputy public defender was present and he advised the court that he would represent the defendant, but that he would need an overnight continuance in order to prepare for trial. The trial judge denied the request for the continuance and allowed the public defender to remain and advise the defendant for the remainder of the trial. The jury returned a verdict of guilty from which defendant appeals. WAS THERE AN EFFECTIVE WAIVER OF DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL? Defendant on appeal contends that the trial court failed to "determine on the record whether appellant's waiver of counsel was competent and intelligent." At the arraignment before Judge Harold D. Martin the following transpired: And on the day of the trial before Judge Hardy: And: We have stated concerning the duty of the trial judge when a defendant desires to waive counsel in a criminal trial: A reading of the record indicates that the defendant knew full well of his right to have counsel represent him and that he clearly waived counsel. We find no error in the court's failure to appoint counsel other than the public defender. A defendant is entitled to the appointment of competent counsel, but not of a particular counsel: We find no error in the acceptance by the trial court of defendant's waiver of counsel. DENIAL OF THE CONTINUANCE After the noon recess the following transpired: Although the defendant does not raise the issue on appeal, a minority of this court is of the opinion that the trial court committed fundamental error in denying defense counsel's request for an overnight continuance so that he might actively conduct the defense rather than act in an advisory capacity only. Once a defendant has waived the right to counsel, that waiver continues throughout the trial unless he clearly indicates a change of mind: A defendant also has a right to change his decision concerning the assistance of counsel and he may ask that counsel be appointed to represent him midway in the trial. Steed, supra. This does not mean, however, that the trial judge must stop the trial for the convenience of the defendant each time he changes his mind. While we believe in the instant case that the better practice would have been to grant the request for an overnight continuance, it was within the discretion of the trial court, considering the facts of the case, to grant or deny the request as he deemed proper. We agree with the Wisconsin Supreme Court which has stated: And, the California Supreme Court has stated: Judgment affirmed. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, J., concur. HOLOHAN, Justice (dissenting). A defendant has the right to change his decision concerning the appointment of counsel, and he may then have counsel appointed to defend him. State v. Steed, 109 Ariz. 137, 506 P.2d 1031 (1973). In the case at issue the defendant recognized his inability to represent himself in the trial, and, although he had previously refused the public defender as appointed counsel, he changed his decision and advised the court that he was willing to have the public defender represent him in the trial. The public defender asked for a recess overnight to prepare for the trial. The trial judge denied this request. The record also indicates that the trial judge did not appoint the public defender to represent the defendant but merely placed him in the capacity of an advisor with the defendant left to conduct the trial. The majority finds no abuse of discretion by the trial court in these actions. I disagree. Certainly an accused may not request the appointment of counsel late in the proceedings as a device to delay and obstruct the trial of the case. I find no abuse of discretion in the refusal of the trial court to grant a mistrial so that the defendant might have the trial start anew. The crucial factor is whether the public defender should have been granted an overnight recess to prepare himself to represent the defendant during the remainder of the trial. The request for the appointment of counsel and for a continuance was made after the noon recess. The delay sought was a matter of hours, that is, until the next morning. The request does not appear to me to be unreasonable. On the contrary, the denial of the continuance is an abuse of discretion. The action by the trial court in effect denied the defendant an opportunity to have effective counsel represent him for the balance of the case, and the actions of the trial court in having the public defender act as advisor denied the defendant the right to counsel. I would reverse the conviction and grant the defendant a new trial at which he could be represented by counsel. LOCKWOOD, Justice. I concur in the foregoing dissent of Justice HOLOHAN.