Title: Roth v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 306, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 2, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RICHARD F. ROTH, JR., 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 306, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 9901000330 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: February 10, 2006 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: May 2, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
  
 
This 2nd day of May 2006, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Richard F. Roth, Jr., filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s June 13, 2005 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief and his motion for the appointment of counsel.  We 
find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
In June 2000, a Superior Court jury found Roth guilty of two 
counts of Murder in the First Degree, four counts of Robbery in the First 
Degree, three counts of Conspiracy in the Second Degree, and six counts of 
Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.  He was 
 
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sentenced to two life sentences, plus 188 years of Level V incarceration.  On 
direct appeal, this Court affirmed Roth’s convictions and sentences.1 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Roth claims that: a) the Superior Court erred by 
deciding his motion for postconviction relief before the filing of his reply 
brief; b) at trial, the Superior Court erred by failing to investigate the 
violation of its witness sequestration order, conduct voir dire regarding racial 
bias on the part of potential jurors, properly instruct the jury regarding the 
voluntariness of witness statements, and render consistent rulings regarding 
the admissibility of witness statements; c) at trial, the State intentionally 
violated the witness sequestration order and engaged in discovery violations; 
and d) his counsel provided ineffective assistance. 
 
(4) 
The record reflects that, on September 13, 2004, Roth filed a 
motion for postconviction relief in the Superior Court.  On February 7, 2005, 
the Superior Court ordered the Department of Justice to respond to the 
motion2 and ordered Roth’s two defense attorneys to respond by affidavit to 
Roth’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.3  Following receipt of 
                                                 
1 Roth v. State, 788 A.2d 101 (Del. 2001). 
2 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(f). 
3 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g) (2). 
 
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the State’s response to Roth’s motion on April 26, 2005, the Superior Court 
filed its order denying the motion.4   
 
(5) 
Roth’s first claim is that the Superior Court erred by deciding 
his motion for postconviction relief before the expiration of the 30-day 
period for filing his reply brief.5  Roth alleges that he signed his reply brief 
on May 27, 2005, but the Superior Court docket does not reflect that the 
brief was ever filed.  Thus, no prejudice was suffered by Roth as a result of 
the Superior Court’s failure to wait until the 30-day period had expired 
before issuing its decision.  Moreover, we have reviewed the arguments 
Roth contends would have been included in his reply brief and do not find 
that those arguments would have altered the decision of the Superior Court 
on Roth’s motion for postconviction relief.  Thus, no prejudice was suffered 
by Roth as a result of the Superior Court’s failure to review Roth’s reply 
brief.         
 
(6) 
Roth’s second claim is that the Superior Court committed error 
at trial in the questions posed during jury voir dire, in the instructions to the 
jury and in various evidentiary rulings.  None of these claims was raised in 
the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.  As such, these 
                                                 
4 The Superior Court docket sheet does not reflect the filing of defense counsels’ 
affidavits, although the Superior Court mentions them in its decision and Roth states in 
his opening brief that he has copies of them. 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(f) (3). 
 
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claims are procedurally barred in this proceeding unless Roth can show 
cause for relief from the procedural default and prejudice from a violation of 
his rights,6 or a miscarriage of justice.7  We have reviewed these claims 
carefully and do not find that Roth has succeeded in overcoming the 
procedural bar.8  Nor do we find any error or abuse of discretion on the part 
of the Superior Court in summarily denying Roth’s claims as procedurally 
barred. 
 
(7) 
As part of his claim of error on the part of the trial judge, Roth 
claims that certain statements to the Delaware State Police made by a 
prosecution witness were improperly found to be voluntary and, therefore, 
admissible at trial.  This claim previously was raised by Roth in his direct 
appeal.  There, we determined that there was no error or abuse of discretion 
on the part of the trial judge in ruling that the statements were voluntary and, 
therefore, admissible.9  Because this issue was formerly adjudicated, it is 
barred in this proceeding unless Roth can demonstrate that reconsideration 
of the issue is warranted in the interest of justice.10  We do not find that such 
reconsideration is warranted.  Nor do we find any error or abuse of 
                                                 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3)(A) and (B). 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5). 
8 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 555 (Del. 1990). 
9 Roth v. State, 788 A.2d at 106-08. 
10 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4). 
 
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discretion on the part of the Superior Court in summarily denying this claim 
as procedurally barred. 
 
(8) 
Roth next claims that, at trial, the State intentionally violated 
the witness sequestration order and engaged in discovery violations.  Neither 
of these claims was raised in the proceedings leading to the judgment of 
conviction.  As such, these claims are procedurally barred in this proceeding 
unless Roth can show cause for relief from the procedural default and 
prejudice from a violation of his rights,11 or a miscarriage of justice.12  We 
have reviewed these claims carefully and do not find that Roth has 
succeeded in overcoming the procedural bar.13  Nor do we find any error or 
abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior Court in summarily denying 
these claims as procedurally barred. 
 
(9) 
Roth next claims that his counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance.  Specifically, Roth argues that his counsel failed to: call the 
appropriate witnesses; review discovery materials; visit the crime scenes; 
and object to the State’s violation of the witnesses sequestration order and 
the prosecutor’s closing argument.  In order to prevail on this claim, Roth 
must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard 
                                                 
11 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3)(A) and (B). 
12 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5). 
13 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 555 (Del. 1990). 
 
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of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, there 
is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have 
been different.14  Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is 
highly demanding and leads to a “strong presumption that the representation 
was professionally reasonable.”15  This Court consistently has held that a 
defendant must set forth concrete allegations of actual prejudice and 
substantiate them, or risk summary dismissal.16  We find no merit to any of 
Roth’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because there is no 
evidence that any alleged error on the part of his counsel resulted in any 
prejudice to him.       
 
(10) Roth’s final claim is that the Superior Court improperly failed 
to appoint counsel to represent him in postconviction proceedings.  There is 
no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in postconviction 
proceedings.17  However, the Superior Court in its discretion may appoint 
counsel upon a showing of good cause.18  The Superior Court determined 
that Roth’s claims were not complex and were lacking in factual support.  
On those grounds, the Superior Court denied Roth’s request for counsel.  We 
                                                 
14 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
15 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
16 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 555-56. 
17 Floyd v. State, Del. Supr., No. 194, 1992, Veasey, C.J. (July 13, 1992)(citing Ross v. 
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)). 
18 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e) (1). 
 
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find no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior Court in so 
deciding. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice