Title: Ex parte The City of Selma.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1160469
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 1, 2017

REL: 09/01/2017 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2017
_________________________
1160469
_________________________
Ex parte City of Selma
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Gregory Pettaway
v.
Santander Consumer USA, Inc., et al.)
(Dallas Circuit Court, CV-11-900113)
WISE, Justice.
The City of Selma ("the City"), a defendant below, filed
a petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that this Court
1160469
direct the Dallas Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in
its favor, based on State-agent immunity, as to claims Gregory
Pettaway filed against it.  We grant the petition and issue
the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
Pettaway financed the purchase of a 2006 Nissan Armada
sport-utility vehicle.  Subsequently, Santander Consumer USA,
Inc. ("Santander"), took over the loan.  It appears that
Santander contracted with Par North America, Inc. ("Par"), to
handle repossessions for it and that Par used Central Alabama
Recovery 
Systems 
("CARS") 
to 
carry 
out 
the 
actual
repossessions.  
At around 4:30 a.m. on November 22, 2010, two men from
CARS came to Pettaway's residence and told him that they were
there to repossess the vehicle.  By the time Pettaway got
dressed and walked outside, the men had already hooked the
Armada up to the tow truck and lifted it.  Pettaway objected
and telephoned the Selma Police Department; Officer Jonathan
Fank responded to the call.  After Officer Fank told Pettaway
that the repossession was a civil matter and that he could not
do anything because the vehicle was already hooked up to the
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1160469
tow truck, Pettaway again called the Selma Police Department
to ask that Officer Fank's supervisor come to the scene.
Officer Willie Calhoun, a senior officer, arrived and
looked at the paper the men from CARS had, noted how far
behind in payments the paper indicated that Pettaway was, and
told the men to take the vehicle.  He also told Pettaway to
get any of his personal belongings out of the vehicle before
the men towed it away, and Pettaway did. 
On May 23, 2011, Pettaway filed a complaint in the Dallas
Circuit Court against Santander, Par, CARS, and the City.1  He
stated conversion, negligence, wantonness, and trespass
claims. 
 
Although 
he 
stated 
conversion, 
negligence,
wantonness, and trespass claims, Pettaway admitted that his
only complaint against the City was that the officers told the
repossession men to take the vehicle.2 
On June 2, 2011, the City filed an answer in which it
admitted that officers were called to the scene at Pettaway's
request to keep the peace but denied the remaining allegations
1The claims against Santander were resolved through
arbitration, and the claims against CARS and Par were
dismissed by a joint stipulation of the parties.
2In the complaint, Pettaway incorrectly identified the
responding officers as Officers Smyly and Benjamin.  
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as to the actions of its officers.  It also raised the
affirmative defense of immunity, including "immunity pursuant
to § 6-5-338(b), Ala. Code 1975."  
On June 28, 2011, the City filed a motion for a summary
judgment.  On August 24, 2011, Pettaway filed a response and
an objection to the City's motion, but he did not present any
evidence in support of his response.  On January 13, 2014, the
City filed a supplement to its motion for a summary judgment,
adding as a ground an assertion that the City was entitled to
State-agent immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338 and Ex parte
Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000).  The City supported the
supplement with a brief, an affidavit from Officer Fank, and
Pettaway's deposition testimony.  Pettaway did not respond to
the City's supplement.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion for a
summary judgment.3  On February 20, 2017, it denied the
motion.  This petition followed. 
Standard of Review
"'While the general rule is that the denial of
a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable, the
exception is that the denial of a motion for summary
3Neither party has provided a transcript of the hearing
for this Court's review.  
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judgment grounded on a claim of immunity is
reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus.'  Ex
parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000).  A writ
of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available
only when there is:  '(1) a clear legal right to the
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to
do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and
(4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.' 
Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272
(Ala. 2001)."
Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541, 543 (Ala. 2003).  Also,
"whether review of the denial of a summary-judgment
motion is by a petition for a writ of mandamus or by
permissive appeal, the appellate court's standard of
review remains the same.  If there is a genuine
issue as to any material fact on the question
whether the movant is entitled to immunity, then the
moving party is not entitled to a summary judgment. 
Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P.  In determining whether
there is a material fact on the question whether the
movant is entitled to immunity, courts, both trial
and appellate, must view the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, accord the
nonmoving party all reasonable favorable inferences
from the evidence, and resolve all reasonable doubts
against the moving party, considering only the
evidence before the trial court at the time it
denied the motion for a summary judgment.  Ex parte
Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000)."
Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002).
Discussion
The City argues that the trial court erroneously denied
its motion for a summary judgment.  Specifically, it contends
that, at the time of the incident that formed the basis for
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1160469
Pettaway's 
complaint, 
Officers 
Fank 
and 
Calhoun 
were
performing discretionary functions within the line and scope
of their law-enforcement duties and that, therefore, they
would be entitled to State-agent immunity.  The City also
asserts that none of the exceptions to State-agent immunity
apply to this case.  Therefore, it concludes that it is
entitled to immunity based on the discretionary-function
immunity that is afforded to police officers by § 6-5-338 and
on State-agent immunity pursuant to Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.
2d 392 (Ala. 2000).
Pettaway sued the City based on the actions of its
officers, but he did not sue Officers Fank and Calhoun
individually.  
"It is well established that, if a municipal peace
officer is immune pursuant to § 6–5–338(a), then,
pursuant to § 6–5–338(b), the city by which he is
employed is also immune.  Section 6–5–338(b)
provides:  'This section is intended to extend
immunity only to peace officers and governmental
units or agencies authorized to appoint peace
officers.'  (Emphasis added.)  See Ex parte City of
Gadsden, 781 So. 2d 936, 940 (Ala. 2000).  On the
other hand, if the statute does not shield the
officer, it does not shield the city.  Borders v.
City of Huntsville, 875 So. 2d 1168, 1183 (Ala.
2003)."
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1160469
Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 211 (Ala. 2003). 
Therefore, if Officers Fank and Calhoun would be entitled to
immunity under § 6-5-338, then the City is entitled to
immunity.
In Ex parte City of Midfield, 161 So. 3d 1158, 1163-64
(Ala. 2014), this Court recognized:
"'Section 
6–5–338(a)[, 
Ala. 
Code
1975,] provides: 
"'"Every peace officer, except
constables, who is employed or
appointed 
pursuant 
to 
the
Constitution or statutes of this
state 
... 
and 
whose 
duties
prescribed by law, or by the
lawful terms of their employment
or 
appointment, 
include 
the
enforcement 
of, 
or 
the
investigation and reporting of
violations of, the criminal laws
of 
this 
state, 
and 
who 
is
empowered by the laws of this
state to execute warrants, to
arrest and to take into custody
persons who violate, or who are
lawfully 
charged 
by 
warrant,
indictment, 
or 
other 
lawful
process, with violations of, the
criminal laws of this state,
shall at all times be deemed to
be officers of this state, and as
such shall have immunity from
tort liability arising out of his
or her conduct in performance of
any discretionary function within
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1160469
the line and scope of his or her
law enforcement duties."
"'The restatement of State-agent immunity
as set out by this Court in Ex parte
Cranman, [792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000)],
governs the determination of whether a
peace officer is entitled to immunity under
§ 6–5–338(a).  Ex parte City of Tuskegee,
932 So. 2d 895, 904 (Ala. 2005).  This
Court, in Cranman, stated the test for
State-agent immunity as follows:
  "'"A State agent shall be
immune from civil liability in
his or her personal capacity when
the conduct made the basis of the
claim against the agent is based
upon the agent's 
"'"....
"'"(4) 
exercising
judgment 
in 
the
enforcement 
of 
the
criminal laws of the
State, including, but
not 
limited 
to,
l a w - e n f o r c e m e n t
officers' arresting or
attempting 
to 
arrest
persons; ...
"'"....
"'"Notwithstanding anything
to the contrary in the foregoing
statement of the rule, a State
agent shall not be immune from
civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
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1160469
"'"(1) 
when 
the
Constitution or laws of
the United States, or
the 
Constitution 
of
this State, or laws,
rules, or regulations
of this State enacted
or promulgated for the
purpose of regulating
the 
activities 
of 
a
governmental 
agency
require otherwise; or
"'"(2) 
when 
the
State 
agent 
acts
willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, 
in 
bad
faith, beyond his or
her authority, or under
a  
m i s t a k e n
interpretation of the
law."
"'Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405.  Because the
scope of immunity for law-enforcement
officers set forth in § 6–5–338(a) was
broader 
than 
category 
(4) 
of 
the
restatement 
adopted 
in 
Cranman, 
this 
Court,
in Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d
300, 309 (Ala. 2006), expanded and modified
category (4) of the Cranman test to read as
follows:
"'"'A State agent shall be
immune from civil liability in
his or her personal capacity when
the conduct made the basis of the
claim against the agent is based
upon the agent's
"'"'....
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"'"'(4) exercising
judgment 
in 
the
enforcement 
of 
the
criminal laws of the
State, including, but
not 
limited 
to,
l a w - e n f o r c e m e n t
officers' arresting or
attempting 
to 
arrest
persons, or serving as
peace 
officers 
under
circumstances entitling
such 
officers 
to
immunity pursuant to §
6–5–338(a), Ala. Code
1975.'"
"'Hollis, 950 So. 2d at 309.  Additionally:
"'"'This 
Court 
has
established a "burden-shifting"
process when a party raises the
defense of State-agent immunity.' 
Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946
So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).  A
State agent asserting State-agent
immunity 'bears the burden of
demonstrating 
that 
the
plaintiff's claims arise from a
function that would entitle the
State agent to immunity.'  946
So. 2d at 452.  Should the State
agent make such a showing, the
burden 
then 
shifts 
to 
the
plaintiff to show that one of the
two categories of exceptions to
State-agent immunity recognized
in Cranman is applicable. ..."'
"Ex parte City of Montgomery, 99 So. 3d [282,]
291–94 [(Ala. 2012)] (quoting Ex parte Kennedy, 992
So. 2d 1276, 1282–83 (Ala. 2008))."
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In Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 3d 1276, 1282-83 (Ala. 2008),
this Court stated:
"The exception being argued here is that 'the State
agent acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in
bad faith, or beyond his or her authority.'  [Ex
parte Estate of Reynolds,] 946 So. 2d [450,] 452
[(Ala. 2006)].  One of the ways in which a plaintiff
can show that a State agent acted beyond his or her
authority is by proffering evidence that the State
agent failed '"to discharge duties pursuant to
detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated
on a checklist."'  Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d
1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775
So. 2d [173,] 178 [(Ala. 2000)])."
It is undisputed that Officers Fank and Calhoun are
"peace officers" for purposes of § 6–5–338(a) and that their
alleged misconduct occurred while they were performing a
discretionary law-enforcement function -- i.e., preventing a
breach of the peace.  Therefore, based on Ex parte Cranman, as
modified by Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300 (Ala.
2006), the City satisfied its burden of establishing that the
officers would be entitled to State-agent immunity.
Because the City established that the officers would be
entitled to State-agent immunity, the burden then shifted to
Pettaway to establish that "'one of the two categories of
exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in Cranman is
applicable.'"  Ex parte City of Montgomery, 99 So. 3d 282, 293
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(Ala. 2012)(quoting Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d at 1282).  In
his complaint, Pettaway alleged that
"Defendant City of Selma acted improperly through
its Officers ... in order[ing] Plaintiff's vehicle
to be taken.  All acts were done wantonly,
recklessly and maliciously."
   
However, after the City presented evidence showing that the
officers would be entitled to State-agent immunity, Pettaway
did not present any evidence, much less substantial evidence,
to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Officers Fank and Calhoun "'failed "'to discharge duties
pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such as those
stated on a checklist,'"'" Ex parte City of Montgomery, 99 So.
3d at 294 (quoting other cases), or acted willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their
authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law.  In
fact, Pettaway did not offer any argument or evidence in
response to the City's supplemental motion for a summary
judgment, which included its immunity arguments.  Because
Pettaway has not demonstrated that one of the exceptions to
State-agent immunity under Ex parte Cranman applies under the
facts of this case, Officers Fank and Calhoun would be
entitled to State-agent immunity.  Based on this Court's
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holding in Howard, supra, the City is likewise entitled to
immunity.  
Conclusion
 
For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that the City
has established that it has a clear legal right to a summary
judgment in its favor based on State-agent immunity pursuant
to § 6-5-338 and Ex parte Cranman.  Accordingly, we grant the
City's petition for a writ of mandamus and direct the trial
court to vacate its order denying the City's motion for a
summary judgment and to enter a summary judgment for the City.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, C.J., and Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, Bryan, and
Sellers, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
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