Title: POULSON v WALSH-GROVES
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12718
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: February 6, 1975

No. 12718 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1975 FRANCIS 0. POULSON, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -VS - W A L S H - G R O V E S e t a 1 . , Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert C. Sykes, .Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Measure, Cumming and Salansky, Columbia F a l l s , Montana James A, Cumming argued, Columbia F a l l s , Montana For Respondents: Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana Gary L. Graham argued, Missoula, Montana -- Submitted: January 10, 1975 - T G - 2 -375 Decided: - w Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This is an appeal from a summary judgment i n favor of a prime c o n t r a c t o r . P l a i n t i f f , a workman employed by a sub- c o n t r a c t o r , was i n j u r e d i n a work t r a i n c o l l i s i o n near Trego, Montana. The t r a i n was operated by an employee of t h e prime c o n t r a c t o r . The subcontract agreement required t h e subcon- t r a c t o r t o maintain workmen's compensation coverage. Subse- quent t o t h e accident p l a i n t i f f made claim f o r workmen's com- pensation b e n e f i t s , which he received. Two i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d on appeal: (1) Does t h e " s t a t u t o r y employer" concept of s e c t i o n 92-438, R.C.M. 1947, v i o l a t e t h e equal p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e s of t h e United S t a t e s and t h e 1889 Montana Constitutions? ( 2 ) Does t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n operate r e t r o - s p e c t i v e l y t o i n v a l i d a t e t h e immunity t o s t a t u t o r y employers? This Court has repeatedly r u l e d on i s s u e one. See: S t a t e ex rel. Hamrnond v. Hager, 160 Mont. 391, 503 P.2d 52, where t h i s Court upheld t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l exemption of t h e Act a g a i n s t an equal p r o t e c t i o n argument. O n appeal t o t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court, 4 1 1 U.S. 912, 93 S.Ct. 1548, 36 L ed 2d 303, t h a t Court dismissed t h e appeal f o r want of a s u b s t a n t i a l f e d e r a l question. Also, i n Larson v. Watters Const. Co., 161 Mont. 48, 503 P.2d 996, t h i s Court upheld t h e very provision involved i n t h e i n s t a n t case when presented with an argument t h a t such a provision w a s v i o l a t i v e of t h e equal p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e of t h e Fourteenth Amendment t o t h e Constitution of t h e United S t a t e s and A r t . V, Sec. 26 of t h e 1889 Montana Constitution. Larson c i t e s Ashcraft v. Montana Power, 156 Mont. 368, 480 P.2d 812 and Buerkle v . Montana Power Co., 157 Mont. 57, 482 P.2d 564. E l e c t r i c See a l s o : Fiscus v. BeartootM Mont . , 522 P.2d 87, Plaintiff-appellant acknowledges these holdings, but argues at length in a studious brief that the United States Supreme Court has enunciated a more strict standard of con- stitutional interpretation of the equal protection clause than it has used in the past. Appellant uses analysis of recent United States Supreme Court cases by Gunther, 86 Harvard Law Review 1, and Kwasnick, 26 Stanford Law Review 155, to attempt to show a new or different concept of the equal protection clause as it affects appellate court examination of legislation. The brief writer concludes the Court has now seemingly adopted a view that a close scrutiny of a statute will be made to ascer- tain whether the manner of accomplishing a permissible goal is in itself an acceptable manner. As applied to this case, appel- lant claims discrimination against himself out of proportion to possible benefits of the "statutory employer" legislation. Appellant in his reply brief complains that respondents' brief is disappointing--"a failure to enter into a dialogue on the relevance of a remarkable, and well marked upon, application of the Equal Protection Clause.'' This Court has carefully ex- amined the rationale previously expressed in the cases heretofore cited and findsno reason to change its holdings. The second issue on appeal is whether Art 11, Sec. 16, 1972 Montana Constitution should be given retroactive effect so as to bar immunity granted to statutory employees. That section provides in part: " * * * No person shall be deprived of this full legal redress for injury incurred in employment for which another person may be liable except as to fellow employees and his immediate employer who hired him if such immediate employer provides coverage under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of this state. * * *." The instant case involved an accident. on April 14, 1969. Suit was filed on April 11, 1972, just three days before the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s would have expired. The r i g h t s of a workman under A r t . 11, Sec. 16, d i d not a r i s e u n t i l t h e effec- t i v e d a t e of t h e new Constitution, J u l y 1, 1973. A s appellant expresses it, t h e question f o r decision i s whether t h e r e is a savings clause under which l i t i g a t i o n pending a t t h e t i m e t h e 1972 Constitution went i n t o e f f e c t , reaped t h e benefit. Appellant urges t h a t by implication Sections 3 and 6 of t h e Transition Schedule applied t h e r i g h t s granted under A r t . 11, Sec. 16 retrospectively. Section 3 of t h e Transition Schedule with the Convention notes reads: "Section 3. Prospective Operation O f Declaration Of Rights "Any r i g h t s , procedural o r substantive, created f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e by A r t i c l e I1 s h a l l be pros- pective and not r e t r o a c t i v e . " The Convention note reads: "Any new r i g h t s created i n A r t i c l e I1 take e f f e c t only a f t e r J u l y 1, 1973. It does not c r e a t e any r i g h t s f o r past events." That language seems c l e a r enough, but appellant argues t h a t s i n c e "any r i g h t s * * * created f o r t h e f i r s t time" a r e prospective only, t h a t other r i g h t s mentioned might be r e t r o - spective. The "other r i g h t s " a r e not explained. Here, c l e a r l y , t h e r i g h t t o seek r e d r e s s a g a i n s t a s t a t u t o r y employer i s a r i g h t created f o r t h e f i r s t time. Appellant would use t h e gen- e r a l provisions of Section 6 of t h e Transition Schedule t o over- r i d e t h e c l e a r meaning of Section 3. But even here, Section 6 s t a t e s : " ( 2 ) The v a l i d i t y of * * * a l l s u i t s , a c t i o n s and r i g h t s of a c t i o n , s h a l l continue as i f no change had taken place." Thus, w e hold t h a t a l l of t h e operative events having a r i s e n long before the e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e 1972 Constitution, t h e a c t i o n w a s not governed by its provisions. Compare Fiscus v. Beartooth Electric, Mont . - , 522 P.2d 87, 31 St. Rep. 395; State Highway Commission v. Olsen, Mont . - - P.2d I - - St.Rep. - , decided February 5, 1975. Having found no error we affirm the judgment. We concur: - ? - A * - - - . -. . . - 4--+----------r------------------- Chief Justice --. Justices