Title: State v. Gornick
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S52252
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: March 9, 2006

FILED: March 9, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
THOMAS J. GORNICK,
Respondent on Review.
(CC No. 02C53376; CA A121042; SC S52252)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 9, 2005.
Jonathan H. Fussner, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the brief
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
Jamesa J. Drake, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent on review.  On the briefs were Peter A.
Ozanne, Executive Director, Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, and
Monica L. Finch, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense
Services, Salem.
Before Carson,** Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz,*** Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.
CARSON, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Susan Tripp, Judge. 196 Or App 397, 102 P3d 734 (2004).
**Chief Justice at the time of argument.
***Chief Justice at the time the decision was issued.
CARSON, J.
The issue in this criminal case is whether the Court of
Appeals improperly considered, as plain error, an unpreserved
claim of sentencing error under the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US 466, 120 S
Ct 2348, 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000).  Defendant was charged with
assault in the third degree and pleaded guilty to that charge. 
During sentencing, which occurred after the United States Supreme
Court had issued its decision in Apprendi, the trial court found
certain aggravating facts and, based upon those facts, imposed an
upward departure sentence.  Defendant failed to object to the
upward departure or assert that, in accordance with Apprendi, he
was entitled to have a jury find the aggravating departure facts
beyond a reasonable doubt.  On appeal, defendant, for the first
time, argued that the trial court had erred in imposing the
departure sentence because a jury had not found the departure
facts beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Blakely v. Washington, 542
US 296, 124 S Ct 2531, 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004) (clarifying Sixth
Amendment principles).  Defendant acknowledged that he had made
no objection at sentencing but asserted that the Court of Appeals
should consider his unpreserved claim because the trial court had
committed plain error in imposing the departure sentence.  The
Court of Appeals concluded that defendant's claim constituted
plain error, exercised its discretion to address the claim, and
vacated defendant's sentence.  State v. Gornick, 196 Or App 397,
102 P3d 734 (2004).  We allowed the state's petition for review
and now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The following facts are undisputed.  In 2002, defendant
was indicted for assault in the third degree, ORS 163.165(1)(f)
and (i).  After consulting with his lawyer, defendant executed a
written plea agreement and pleaded guilty to the assault charge. 
Under the Oregon Felony Sentencing Guidelines
(sentencing guidelines), defendant's presumptive sentence was 13
to 14 months.  At sentencing, the trial court reviewed the
presentence investigation report and found three aggravating
facts.  Based upon those findings, the trial court imposed a
departure sentence of 26 months. (1)  
Defendant did not admit to any of the facts that the
trial court relied upon in imposing the departure sentence and,
as noted, no jury found those facts beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Although he was represented by counsel at sentencing, defendant
did not object to the trial court's finding of the aggravating
facts; neither did he request that a jury find the facts beyond a
reasonable doubt.
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court had
exceeded its authority by imposing a departure sentence based
upon facts that he had not admitted or that a jury had not found
beyond a reasonable doubt.  To support that argument, defendant
cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in Blakely, 542
US 296, which that Court had decided after defendant had been
sentenced, but while his appeal to the Court of Appeals was still
pending.  Defendant asserted that the Court of Appeals should
consider his Sixth Amendment claim, even though he had failed to
preserve it by objecting at sentencing, because the trial court's
failure to recognize and apply the Blakely rule constituted plain
error. 
To place defendant's plain error claim in context, we
first review the state of the law as it existed when defendant
was sentenced and as it exists today.  At the time of defendant's
sentencing in March 2003, Apprendi was the primary United States
Supreme Court case applicable to departure sentences.  In
Apprendi, which was decided in June 2000, the Supreme Court held
that under the Sixth Amendment, any fact, "[o]ther than the fact
of a prior conviction, * * * that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  Apprendi, 530
US at 490.  
In January 2002, in State v. Dilts, 179 Or App 238, 39
P3d 276 (2002) (Dilts I), the Court of Appeals analyzed Apprendi
and applied it to the sentencing guidelines.  Dilts I held that
the "prescribed statutory maximum" sentence that constitutionally
could be applied under Apprendi was the statutory maximum
sentence for the particular class of offense, not the maximum
presumptive sentence set by the sentencing guidelines.  Id. at
251-52.  Thus, according to Dilts I, a trial court did not
violate the constitutional principles announced in Apprendi by
imposing a departure sentence based upon facts not admitted by
the defendant or proved to a jury, so long as that sentence did
not exceed the maximum sentence set by statute for the particular
class of offense.  Id. at 251-52.  Essentially, according to the
reasoning set out in Dilts I, any sentence imposed in accordance
with the sentencing guidelines satisfied the Sixth Amendment, in
as much as no such sentence -- even one involving a departure --could result in a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum.  
At the time of defendant's sentencing in March 2003,
Dilts I was still controlling authority. (2)  As noted,
defendant had been charged with assault in the third degree, a
Class C felony.  ORS 163.165(2).  The statutory maximum sentence
for a Class C felony was five years, or 60 months.  ORS 161.605. 
Defendant was sentenced to 26 months' incarceration.  Therefore,
his sentence was within the statutory maximum for Class C
felonies, and the trial court imposed a proper sentence under
Dilts I.  
In June 2004, after the trial court sentenced
defendant, the Supreme Court decided Blakely.  Among other
holdings, Blakely expressly rejected reasoning similar to that
set out in Dilts I.  In Blakely, the Court clarified the meaning
of the phrase "prescribed statutory maximum" from Apprendi:
"[T]he 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis
of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
by the defendant.  In other words, the relevant
'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge
may impose after finding additional facts, but the
maximum he may impose without any additional findings."
542 US at 303-04 (internal citations omitted; emphasis in
original).  Thus, in accordance with Blakely, the presumptive
sentence under the sentencing guidelines is the "statutory
maximum" that constitutionally may be imposed, absent the
defendant's admission of aggravating facts or a jury finding of
such facts beyond a reasonable doubt. (3)       
With that background in mind, the Court of Appeals
considered defendant's argument that the trial court had
committed plain error in this case.  After explaining the
framework for analyzing a claim of plain error, the Court of
Appeals analyzed defendant's contention that his sentence was
"invalid because the aggravating facts were determined by the
court rather than by a jury."  Gornick, 196 Or App at 406.  The
Court of Appeals concluded that, under Blakely, the trial court
had committed an error of law by finding the aggravating facts
that had increased defendant's sentence beyond the statutory
maximum prescribed by the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at 409.  The
Court of Appeals further held that the error was "apparent on the
face of the record" because the record could support only one
possible reason for defendant's lack of objection at sentencing,
that is, that he did not know that Apprendi soon would require a
jury to find the aggravating facts that supported a sentence in
excess of 13 to 14 months.  Id. at 406-09.  Finally, the Court of
Appeals chose to exercise its discretion to correct the
sentencing error, and it therefore vacated defendant's sentence. 
Id. at 410.  As noted, the state petitioned for review, and we
allowed the petition.          
ORAP 5.45(1) provides, in part: 
"No matter claimed as error will be considered on
appeal unless the claimed error was preserved in the
lower court and is assigned as error in the opening
brief * * *, provided that the appellate court may
consider an error of law apparent on the face of the
record."
As mentioned previously, defendant's claim of error indisputably
was not preserved and can be considered only if it qualifies as
"an error of law apparent on the face of the record."  That
exception to the preservation requirement also is known as "plain
error."  See State v. Terry, 333 Or 163, 180, 37 P3d 157 (2001)
(so stating). 
Determining whether a trial court committed plain error
involves a two-step analysis.  Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc.,
312 Or 376, 381-82, 823 P2d 956 (1991).  The first step
incorporates the following three requirements:  "(1) [the claimed
error] is an error of law, (2) the [claimed] error is obvious,
not reasonably in dispute, and (3) it appears on the face of the
record, i.e., the reviewing court * * * need [not] go outside the
record to identify the error or choose between competing
inferences, and the facts constituting the error are
irrefutable."  State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or 431, 435, 7 P3d
522 (2000) (citing Ailes, 312 Or at 381-82) (internal quotation
marks omitted).  If all the requirements of the first step are
satisfied, then the court proceeds to the second step, where it
must decide whether to "exercise its discretion to consider or
not to consider the error[.]" (4)  Ailes, 312 Or at 382. 
However, as this court has warned in the past, "[a] court's
decision to recognize unpreserved or unraised error in this
manner should be made with utmost caution.  Such an action is
contrary to the strong policies requiring preservation and
raising of error."  Id. at 382.  "It is only in rare and
exceptional cases that this court will notice an alleged error
where no ruling has been sought from the trial judge."  Hotelling
v. Walther, 174 Or 381, 385-86, 148 P2d 933 (1944) (citing
Kuhnhausen v. Stadelman, 174 Or 290, 148 P2d 239 (1944)). 
This court employs two different standards of review to
ascertain whether the Court of Appeals properly concluded that a
trial court committed plain error.  See Ailes, 312 Or at 381-82
(generally framing analysis in that manner).  First, this court
considers whether the Court of Appeals committed an error of law
in determining that the three elements under the first step of
the plain error analysis had been satisfied.  See id. at 382
(implying that this court will decide anew whether elements of
plain error have been satisfied).  Next, this court inquires
whether the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in deciding to
consider the error under the second step in the plain error
analysis.  See id. (stating this court normally "will not second-guess" Court of Appeals' express exercise of discretion).       
We turn, then, to whether the Court of Appeals
committed an error of law in applying the first step of the plain
error framework.  As we described previously, for the claimed
error to constitute plain error (1) it must be "an error of law";
(2) it must be "obvious"; and (3) "it [must] appear[] on the face
of the record."  Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or at 435.  Here, defendant
claims that the trial court committed legal error by finding the
facts that it relied upon in imposing a departure sentence. 
Under Blakely, such an event may have been legal error.  See
Blakely, 542 US at 303-04 (holding that "judge exceeds his proper
authority" by inflicting additional punishment based upon facts
that jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt and that
defendant did not admit).  However, in responding to the
suggestion that prohibiting judicial factfinding worked to the
detriment of defendants, the Supreme Court, in Blakely, stated:  
"[N]othing prevents a defendant from waiving his
Apprendi rights.  When a defendant pleads guilty, the
State is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements so
long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant
facts or consents to judicial factfinding.  If
appropriate waivers are procured, States may continue
to offer judicial factfinding as a matter of course to
all defendants who plead guilty.  Even a defendant who
stands trial may consent to judicial factfinding as to
sentence enhancements, which may well be in his
interest if relevant evidence would prejudice him at
trial.  We do not understand how Apprendi can possibly
work to the detriment of those who are free, if they
think its costs outweigh its benefits, to render it
inapplicable."
Id. at 310 (internal citations omitted).  Thus, a trial court
does not commit legal error by finding aggravating facts if the
defendant chooses not to exercise his rights under Blakely.  See 
id. at 310 (so implying).  It follows that the mere fact that a
judge, rather than a jury, decides the facts relevant to
sentencing does not demonstrate that any error occurred.  Both
courses of proceeding are constitutionally permissible. 
In this case, defendant chose to plead guilty and
signed a form entitled "petition to enter 'guilty' or 'no
contest' plea[.]"  That form contained the following provisions:
"My lawyer has explained to me, and I understand,
that I have the following rights:
"* * * * *
"3) I have a right to a public trial by jury
without delay, in which the jury, not the Judge, will
decide whether or not the evidence proves beyond a
reasonable doubt that I am guilty of this crime. 
"* * * * *
"My lawyer has explained to me, and I understand,
that by voluntarily pleading 'guilty' or 'no contest'
to this crime, I will be giving up each of these
rights, and I will immediately be convicted of this
crime without a trial." 
"* * * * *
"My lawyer has explained to me, and I understand,
that * * * the Court can impose a * * * sentence which
the court finds is appropriate, up to the maximum
sentence previously stated [five years of
imprisonment][.]"
(Emphasis in original.)  During defendant's plea colloquy before
the trial court, the following exchange took place:
THE COURT: "On the charge of Assault in the Third
Degree, as we discussed, you have the right to that
trial that we talked about, to call witnesses.  If you
enter a plea today, you're giving up that right to a
trial.  All that will be left is for me to impose a
sentence.  We're going to get a [presentence
investigation report].  It'll tell me about your
background and history and then we'll make a decision. 
Do you understand that?"
DEFENDANT: "That's what I'd rather do."
At defendant's sentencing, the trial court found three
aggravating facts and stated that it was imposing a departure
sentence of 26 months based upon those facts.  The record does
not disclose whether the trial court found the facts beyond a
reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of evidence.  After the
trial court made those findings, defendant's lawyer and the trial
court engaged in the following exchange:
DEFENDANT'S LAWYER: "Your Honor, are you using the
aggravating factors that are in the [presentence
investigation report]?"
THE COURT: "I'm using the aggravating factors that
I just stated on the record."
DEFENDANT'S LAWYER: "For the record, we'd indicate
that we don't think that those are sufficient."
THE COURT: "I'll note your objection." 
Defendant's guilty plea clearly stated that he was
giving up his jury trial rights, and he explicitly consented to
having the trial court impose a "sentence which the Court [found]
appropriate, up to the [five year] maximum sentence." 
Defendant's only objection challenged the sufficiency of the
facts upon which the departure was based, essentially implying
that they were not "substantial and compelling reasons" as
required by OAR 213-008-0001.  The record shows that defendant
took no issue with the trial court's factfinding.  Defendant sat
by quietly and made no other objections while the trial court
proceeded to find the aggravating facts and to impose a departure
sentence based upon those facts.  Given those circumstances,
defendant could have chosen to have the trial court, rather than
a jury, find the aggravating facts.  
Thus, we are left with a single event, the trial court
finding the aggravating facts, but multiple competing inferences
that can be drawn from that event.  One possible inference is
that the trial court erred by finding the aggravating facts in
violation of the Sixth Amendment.  Another possible inference is
that defendant chose, for one of many possible reasons, not to
have a jury find the aggravating facts.  If that were the case,
the trial court did not err.  A third possible inference is that
defendant did not want the trial court to find the facts but
chose not to object for strategic purposes.  In sum, the record
does not clearly show that the trial court erred, only that it
may have erred.  We would be speculating were we to state
otherwise.
In conclusion, because we would be forced to choose
between competing inferences respecting the trial court's finding
of the aggravating facts, the claimed error is not one appearing
"on the face of the record" under ORAP 5.45(1).  Hence, the first
requirement of the plain error analysis is not satisfied. 
Therefore, the claimed error, if indeed it were error, did not
qualify as plain error, and the Court of Appeals should not have
considered defendant's unpreserved claim. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
1. See OAR 213-008-0001 (providing that "the sentencing judge
shall impose the presumptive sentence provided by the guidelines
unless the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons to
impose a departure").
2. This court later affirmed the Court of Appeals decision in State v. Dilts, 336 Or 158, 82 P3d
593 (2003) (Dilts II).  However, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded this
court's decision in Dilts II, Dilts v. Oregon, 542 US 934, 124 S Ct 2906, 159 L Ed 2d 809 (2004),
for further consideration in light of its holding in Blakely.
3. The one exception to the rule set out in Blakely is that the trial court may take notice of prior
convictions and increase a sentence based upon that finding.  Blakely v. Washington,
542 US 296, 301, 124 S Ct 2531, 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004).  Such notice is
taken under the sentencing guidelines, as prior convictions make up part of one axis on the
sentencing guidelines grid.  See State v. Davis, 315 Or 484, 487, 847 P2d 834 (1993) (explaining
operation of sentencing guidelines grid). 
4. This court previously has articulated a nonexclusive list of factors that a court may consider
in choosing to exercise its discretion.  Those factors are:  "the competing interests of the parties;
the nature of the case; the gravity of the error; the ends of justice in the particular case; how the
error came to the court's attention; and whether the policies behind the general rule requiring
preservation of error have been served in the case in another way, i.e., whether the trial court
was, in some manner, presented with both sides of the issue and given an opportunity to correct
any error."  Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 382 n 6, 823 P2d 956 (1991).