Title: State v. Kelsey
Citation: 201 N.W.2d 921
Docket Number: 54717
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: November 15, 1972

201 N.W.2d 921 (1972) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Ronald Allen KELSEY, Appellant. No. 54717. Supreme Court of Iowa. November 15, 1972. *922 Donald J. Bormann, of Prichard, Hanson, Doran &amp; Bormann, Emmetsburg, for appellant. Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Bennett Cullison, Jr., and Robert D. Jacobson, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Joseph J. Straub, County Atty., for appellee. Heard before MOORE, C. J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, LeGRAND and REES, JJ. RAWLINGS, Justice. Defendant, Ronald Kelsey, was charged with three crimes: murder in the perpetration of a robbery, premeditated murder, and robbery with aggravation. Trial jury found Kelsey guilty of the latter offense. From judgment accordingly entered, he appeals. We affirm. Appropriate here is this observation in State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa 1972): "The basic factual situation is as set forth in State v. Cunha, 193 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa). It need not be here repeated." See also State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1972). Issues here presented are, trial court erred in (1) permitting introduction of hearsay testimony, (2) overruling defendant's motion for a directed verdict based on claimed insufficiency of evidence to sustain a robbery with aggravation charge. These assignments will be considered in reverse order. I. This court has repeatedly held: II. As aforesaid, Kelsey contends the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the robbery with aggravation charge. Addressing ourselves to this same issue in State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d at 67, we said, to the extent here relevant: From this flows the conclusion there is no merit in Kelsey's instant contention. III. June 15, 1969, Kelsey, Cunha, Gilroy and Hinsey, accompanied by Kristine Henninger, Paula Campbell, and Mary Meighan went by automobile to The Grill, a restaurant in Waterloo. Ultimately two other girls emerged from that establishment and became involved in a dispute with the automobile occupants. Gilroy and Cunha left the vehicle in order to stop the affray. Kelsey remained behind the wheel. Kristine was seated next to him. Hinsey was in the rear seat, behind Kelsey, with Paula and Mary. Gilroy and Cunha went to the driver's side of the car and one of them there made the instantly controverted statement. In material part this is the record now before us as it relates to Kristine Henninger's testimony: It should be inceptionally noted the hearsay objection here interposed was not involved in Cunha, Gilroy or Hinsey, all cited above. Furthermore, Hinsey specifically admitted the damaging statement when made by Cunha or Gilroy. Resultantly we are now, for the first time in this series of cases, called upon to determine whether admission in evidence of the aforesaid inculpatory statement, over defendant's hearsay objection, constitutes reversible error. In substance, the hearsay rule does not prevent a witness from testifying only as to what has been heard, being rather a restriction on the proof of fact through extrajudicial statements. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86-89, 91 S. Ct. 210, 218-219, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1970). In that vein it is to us apparent the assertion by Cunha or Gilroy, testified to by Kristine Henninger, was for the purpose of proving the facts, i.e., commission of the robbery attendant murder of a man by Kelsey and his three accomplices. Surely it was not testimonially offered merely to prove the utterance was made in Kristine's presence. See 5 Wigmore on Evidence, § 1361 (3d ed.); cf. Lemke v. Mueller, 166 N.W.2d 860, 870-871 (Iowa 1969). This perforce means the out-of-court statement by Cunha or Gilroy, implicating Kelsey, was hearsay as to the latter. See Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 623-627, 91 *925 S. Ct. 1723, 1724-1726, 29 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1971); State v. Smith, quoted above. IV. Even so the State argues, in essence, the utterance must be held admissible as a "tacit admission", a so-called exception to the hearsay rule. By way of differentiation it is to be noted Kelsey is not here charged with conspiracy. See Dutton v. Evans, supra; State v. Theodore, 260 Iowa 1038, 1046, 150 N.W.2d 612 (1967); State v. Davis, 230 Iowa 309, 316, 297 N.W. 274 (1941); State v. Archibald, 204 Iowa 406, 409, 215 N.W. 258 (1927). In a civil case, Friedman v. City of Forest City, 239 Iowa 112, 30 N.W.2d 752 (1948) this court, though not so identifying it, dealt with the matter of tacit admission. There we said, 239 Iowa at 133-134, 30 N. W.2d at 763: More specifically, as stated in 29 Am. Jur.2d, Evidence, § 638: See also 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 610; 31A C.J.S. Evidence, § 294. It is also well settled: See also 31A C.J.S. Evidence, § 295. In such instances it is generally held the court shall preliminarily determine whether the circumstances were such as to reasonably require a reply by the party to an accusatory statement, but for the jury to decide whether that person actually heard and understood the assertion. See Friedman v. City of Forest City, supra; State v. Dexter, 115 Iowa 678, 681, 87 N.W. 417 (1901); Thurmond v. State, 212 Miss. 36, 53 So. 2d 44, 46 (1951); 4 Wigmore on Evidence, *926 § 1071 (3d ed.); McCormick on Evidence, § 247 at 528, et seq.; 31A C.J.S. Evidence, § 296. But see 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence, § 644. In relatively recent times, however, some courts have repudiated application of the foregoing doctrine in the field of criminal law. Demonstrably the court said in Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 424 Pa. 582, 227 A.2d 904, 905-906 (1967): And in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468, n. 37, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966) is this apt statement: See also Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421-423, 77 S. Ct. 963, 982-983, 1 L. Ed. 2d 931 (1957); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513-517, 82 S. Ct. 884, 888-890, 8 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1962); Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 16 S. Ct. 864, 868, 40 L. Ed. 1051 (1896); Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48, 50-51 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Brierly, 387 F.2d 597, 600-601 (3d Cir. 1967); State v. Peterson, 189 N.W.2d 891, dissent at 898 (Iowa 1971); State v. Osborne, 258 Iowa 390, 393, 139 N.W.2d 177, 179 (1965). In light of the foregoing we now hold, evidential use of "tacit admissions" by an accused offends the proscription included in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution against self-incrimination and is therefore no longer permissible in criminal trials within this jurisdiction. V. Consequently, the question posed is whether admission in evidence of the one item of hearsay instantly involved compels a reversal of this case. We are satisfied it does not. The record irrefutably discloses (1) Kelsey entered the Fareway Store in Algona armed with a deadly weapon, with which he killed Mr. Bay, the manager, (2) an attendant robbery was perpetrated, (3) Kelsey and his accomplices then fled. A review of the record fairly shrieks the guilt of this defendant. It is consequently inconceivable that admission of the hearsay here involved, mentioning neither names, dates nor places, could have possibly influenced the jury to reach an improper verdict. We therefore hold the admission of such hearsay was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 92 S. Ct. 1056, 1059-1060, 31 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S. Ct. 1726, 1728-1729, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1969); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 1627, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827-828, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619, 73 S. Ct. 481, 490, 97 L. Ed. 593 (1953). See also State v. Wallace, 259 Iowa 765, 771-772, 145 N.W.2d 615 (1966). As stated in Lutwak, supra, "A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one." Viewed in that perspective Kelsey has no cause for complaint. Affirmed.