Title: Old Dominion Boat Club v. Alexandria City Council
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 130062
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: October 31, 2013

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
OLD DOMINION BOAT CLUB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. 
 
Record No. 130062 
 
  JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  October 31, 2013 
ALEXANDRIA CITY COUNCIL, 
ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
John J. McGrath, Jr., Judge Designate 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the acquisition of a 
fee simple interest in a public way by a city, pursuant to a 
local ordinance, extinguishes a pre-existing easement over that 
way when there has been no implied or express dedication of 
that easement by its holder. 
Background 
Old Dominion Boat Club (ODBC) filed an amended complaint 
against the City of Alexandria and Alexandria City Council 
(collectively, the City), as well as 106 Union Dublin, LLC and 
106 Union Ireland, LLC (collectively, the Union parties), 
seeking to enforce a purported private easement over a public 
street, Wales Alley, after the City granted a special use 
permit and license to the Union parties, allowing the Union 
parties to construct an outdoor dining deck on Wales Alley.  
ODBC alleged that the outdoor dining deck, authorized by the 
City, would encroach upon an easement ODBC had been deeded over 
Wales Alley prior to its becoming a public street.  ODBC sought 
a declaration of the existence of its vested easement and a 
 
2 
permanent injunction against the City and the Union parties 
prohibiting them from obstructing its easement. 
In its final order, the Circuit Court of the City of 
Alexandria found that the fee simple interest in Wales Alley 
was dedicated to the City and the City accepted Wales Alley as 
a public way and therefore held authority over it, pursuant to 
City of Alexandria Charter Section 2.03(a), to “lay out, open, 
extend, widen, narrow or close” the alley that had become a 
public way.  Although it had previously found that ODBC had 
never expressly or implicitly dedicated its easement to the 
City, the circuit court ruled that the City’s acceptance of the 
fee simple interest extinguished ODBC’s easement.  The circuit 
court entered judgment for the City and the Union parties.  
ODBC appeals. 
Facts 
The unchallenged factual background of this matter was 
thoroughly discussed by the circuit court in its Opinion and 
Order dated April 22, 2011 (the Opinion and Order), and is 
recounted here as relevant.  The alleged “vested” easement 
relied upon by ODBC arises out of a deed of partition executed 
July 10, 1789 between John Fitzgerald of Alexandria, Virginia, 
and Valentine Peers of Port Tobacco, Maryland.  The July 10, 
1789 deed divided the land commonly or jointly owned by 
Fitzgerald and Peers according to a plat or drawing that was 
 
3 
apparently made part of the deed.1  In the July 10, 1789 deed, 
after laying off the specific parcels that were being released 
or conveyed to each of them as sole owners, the grantors 
provided in the last paragraph of the deed as follows: 
and moreover the said parties do covenant assure and 
Confirm by these presents each to other the free use 
and passage of the several Streets and Alleys in 
common now left by them from their grounds for the 
more easy communication with the public main Streets 
and the river, Viz; One alley of twenty feet wide 
running from Water to Union Street, and one Street or 
Alley of thirty feet wide running from Union Street to 
the river . . . . 
 
 
The property referred to as the “Street or Alley of thirty 
feet wide” has been known as Wales Alley since at least the 
nineteenth century.  Presently Wales Alley runs between Union 
Street and the Strand.2  The easement was and purportedly 
remains appurtenant to the parcels now owned by ODBC, a 
successor in interest to John Fitzgerald, and 106 Union 
Ireland, LLC, a successor in interest to Valentine Peers. 
 
In the Opinion and Order, the circuit court found that 
from the time of the original 1789 deed until approximately 
                     
1 The copper plate version of the deed prepared by the 
scrivener contains the plat directly before the writing.  The 
deed allots various parcels of land by metes, bounds and 
monuments, and refers to such descriptions as “per plat above.” 
 
2 Although the alley or street in question originally ended 
at the river, through accretion and fill there is now solid 
land at the eastern end of Wales Alley, which is called the 
Strand. 
 
4 
1970, there was relatively little known of the exact uses of 
Wales Alley.  It was originally part of a bustling seafront 
that gradually declined as a port.  The area became more of a 
heavy industrial center along the waterfront, featuring a 
torpedo factory, a cement plant and a Ford plant at various 
points in time.  In 1935, ODBC bought its property.  From 1935 
until at least 1970, there were incidental references to Wales 
Alley as a private alley.  Such notations were made in 
documents and maps maintained by the City of Alexandria. 
 
In the spring of 1970, Dockside Sales, Inc. (Dockside 
Sales), 106 Union Ireland, LLC’s predecessor in title, erected 
two wooden fences that blocked the full length and width of 
Wales Alley from Union Street to the Strand.  ODBC took 
exception to the closing of Wales Alley, and on May 5, 1971, 
ODBC filed a bill of injunction against Dockside Sales in the 
Corporation Court of the City of Alexandria.3  In 1972, the 
corporation court ruled “that Wales Alley is an established 
public way and that the Complainant [ODBC], as an adjoining 
owner, has a vested easement of way in Wales Alley.”  It 
ordered that the obstructions in Wales Alley be removed. 
                     
3 This court was the predecessor of the Circuit Court of 
the City of Alexandria.  See Netzer v. Reynolds, 231 Va. 444, 
446, 345 S.E.2d 291, 292 (1986). 
 
5 
After 1972, there were various references to Wales Alley 
as a public alley.  In the 1980s and 1990s, the City approved 
various site plans submitted by developers that required 
installation of landscaping and erection of lighting fixtures 
in Wales Alley.  The City also approved a building expansion on 
the north side of Wales Alley. 
 
In approximately 1990, the City paved Wales Alley, erected 
no parking signs and began issuing traffic citations for 
violations of the no parking signs.  Also in 1990, the City 
permitted construction of a brick sidewalk of approximately 
four to five feet in width along a portion of the north side of 
Wales Alley.  The City also erected a public street sign 
indicating the intersection of Wales Alley and Union Street.  
Additionally, from time to time the City repaired potholes in 
Wales Alley and frequently performed maintenance and repairs of 
the brick sidewalk along the north side of Wales Alley. 
 
In May 2010, the Union parties applied for and were 
granted by the City a special use permit to operate a 
restaurant in a building adjacent to Wales Alley.  Also, the 
City subsequently granted the Union parties a license to build 
an elevated deck on Wales Alley, which would obstruct a large 
portion of the alley.  The City further declared that the alley 
would be open only to one-way vehicular traffic.  This 
litigation followed. 
 
6 
 
After hearing the parties’ evidence and arguments, the 
circuit court noted in its Opinion and Order that neither ODBC 
nor the Union parties claim a fee simple interest in Wales 
Alley.  It found that Wales Alley had been used by the public 
as a public alley for over a hundred years, and the alley must 
be considered as having been dedicated by “long public use.”  
The court also found that the City had exercised dominion and 
control over Wales Alley by paving it, repairing potholes, 
making numerous repairs to the brick sidewalk, posting public 
street signs and installing no parking signs, and that these 
activities were sufficient to prove an acceptance of the 
implied dedication of the fee simple interest in the property, 
pursuant to City of Alexandria Charter Section 2.03(a). 
 
However, concerning ODBC’s easement, the circuit court 
found that neither the City of Alexandria nor abutting 
landowners had interfered with ODBC’s use of its 30-foot 
easement over Wales Alley.  It went on to state that “[t]here 
is nothing in the evidence which would show clearly or 
otherwise, that ODBC and its predecessors in title had taken or 
permitted any action or entered into any contract which would 
indicate that they had ‘dedicated’ their right to a thirty foot 
right of way over Wales Alley.”  The circuit court noted that 
[t]he mere fact that ODBC has not protested the  
public use of Wales Alley for a pedestrian and 
vehicular passage between Union Street and The Strand 
 
7 
is not an abandonment of their vested easement or an 
indication that their “easement” was being “dedicated” 
to the public.  It, at most, was a “dedication” by 
long public use of whatever rights it may have had in 
the fee of the land which was used as an alley. 
 
 
In concluding its Opinion and Order, the circuit court 
acknowledged but declined to resolve the conflicts between the 
City’s ownership rights and ODBC’s easement rights in Wales 
Alley.  Instead, it resolved the case in ODBC’s favor by ruling 
that the Union parties were barred, by the doctrine of res 
judicata, from constructing the deck because the Union parties 
were successors in interest to Dockside Sales, the defendant in 
the 1972 case that had been enjoined from blocking the alley.  
The City and the Union parties appealed that decision to this 
Court. 
 
In an order dated May 25, 2012, this Court reversed the 
circuit court, holding that the 1972 “Dockside Sales” case did 
not provide a basis under the doctrine of res judicata for 
determining the City’s rights in the alley and, by extension, 
what rights they might license to the Union parties.  The case 
was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.  
 
On remand, with the agreement of the parties, the circuit 
court took no additional evidence but allowed additional 
argument and briefing.  Thereafter, in an Opinion and Order 
dated October 9, 2012, the circuit court stated: 
 
8 
 
For the reasons stated in this Court’s earlier 
Opinion and Order dated April 22, 2011 (pp. 9-17), the 
Court finds that ODBC’s interest in Wales Alley was 
dedicated to the City and that interest has been 
accepted by the City of Alexandria.  Therefore, the 
City has the authority to, inter alia, “lay out, open, 
extend, widen, narrow . . . or close . . .” the alleys 
of the City, including Wales Alley. 
 
The circuit court noted that what, if any, compensation to 
which ODBC might be entitled for the extinguishment or 
curtailment of its rights in Wales Alley was not before the 
court.  The circuit court dismissed ODBC’s complaint and 
entered judgment for the City and the Union parties.  ODBC 
filed a motion seeking reconsideration of this ruling, which 
was denied on October 30, 2012. 
Analysis 
 
ODBC claims that the circuit court erred in failing to 
recognize its continuing vested easement in Wales Alley.  It 
also claims that the circuit court erred in failing to enjoin 
the City from authorizing others to make obstructions in Wales 
Alley and in failing to enjoin the City or the Union parties 
from erecting any structures in Wales Alley. 
 
The City and the Union parties claim that any private 
rights held by ODBC did not survive dedication pursuant to City 
 
9 
of Alexandria Charter Section 2.03(a)4 and acceptance of the fee 
simple interest in the alley as a public way by the City.  They 
claim that once a jurisdiction accepts dedication of a right-
of-way, putative private access rights are extinguished and the 
holder of an easement is only entitled to reasonable and 
adequate access, like any other member of the public. 
 
It is undisputed that the fee simple interest in Wales 
Alley was dedicated to and accepted by the City of Alexandria.  
The fee simple interest in Wales Alley belongs to the City.  
                     
4 Section 2.03 of the City of Alexandria Charter states: 
 
 
In addition to the powers granted by other 
sections of this charter the city shall have the 
power: 
 
 
(a) To lay out, open, extend, widen, narrow, 
establish or change the grade, or close, vacate, 
abandon, construct, pave, curb, gutter, grade, 
regrade, adorn with shade trees, otherwise improve, 
maintain, repair, clean and light streets, including 
limited access or express highways, alleys, bridges, 
viaducts, subways and underpasses, and make and 
improve walkways upon streets and improve and pave 
alleys within the city; and the city shall have the 
same power and authority over any street, alley or 
other public place ceded or conveyed to the city or 
dedicated or devoted to public use as over other 
streets, alleys and other public places; provided, 
further, that whenever any ground shall have been 
opened to and used by the public as a street or alley 
for ten years it shall be considered as dedicated to 
the public and the city shall have the same authority 
and jurisdiction over and right and interest therein 
as it has over other streets. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
10 
Whether ODBC’s easement was extinguished upon dedication of the 
fee simple interest of the servient property is a question of 
law we review de novo.  Westgate at Williamsburg Condo. Ass’n 
v. Philip Richardson Co., 270 Va. 566, 574, 621 S.E.2d 114, 118 
(2005) (“We review questions of law de novo, including those 
situations where there is a mixed question of law and fact.”). 
An easement is “a property interest distinct from the fee 
and an encumbrance upon it.”  Ocean Island Inn, Inc. v. City of 
Va. Beach, 216 Va. 474, 476, 220 S.E.2d 247, 250 (1975).  A 
dedication is a gift to the public.  Lynchburg Traction & Light 
Co. v. City of Lynchburg, 142 Va. 255, 266, 128 S.E. 606, 609 
(1925).  “The donee cannot dictate the terms of the gift.”  Id.  
“Common law dedication involves the precise right offered, not 
a different right.”  Burns v. Board of Supervisors, 226 Va. 
506, 516, 312 S.E.2d 731, 736 (1984).  Thus, the dedication and 
acceptance of the fee simple interest in Wales Alley only 
transferred that fee simple interest to the City subject to the 
pre-existing easement. 
In City of Staunton v. Augusta Corp., 169 Va. 424, 438, 
193 S.E. 695, 700 (1937), this Court stated that a charter 
provision such as City of Alexandria Charter Section 2.03(a) 
“requires the same evidence of dedication, to put it in 
operation, as the law requires to raise an implication of a 
common-law dedication from mere user of a way.”  (Quoting 
 
11 
Keppler v. City of Richmond, 124 Va. 592, 604, 98 S.E. 747, 751 
(1919)).  For ODBC’s easement interest in Wales Alley to be 
transferred to the City pursuant to City of Alexandria Charter 
Section 2.03(a), it must be proven that there was an implied or 
express dedication of that easement to the City by ODBC.  The 
parties agree that there was no express dedication. 
Implication of a common law dedication may be found based 
upon “long use by the public of the land claimed to be 
dedicated.”  City of Staunton, 169 Va. at 433, 193 S.E. at 698.  
But, 
[t]o constitute a dedication, there must be an 
intention to appropriate the land for the use and 
benefit of the public.  The intention, the animus 
dedicandi, is the vital principle of the doctrine of 
dedication.  The acts and declarations of the 
landowner indicating such intention must be 
unmistakable in their purpose, and decisive in their 
character, to have that effect. 
 
Id. (quoting Harris v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 833, 
837 (1871)). 
User, in order to constitute proof of dedication, 
must have been by the public, and adverse to and 
exclusive of the use and enjoyment of the property by 
the proprietors, and not a mere use by the public 
under and in connection with its use by the owners in 
any manner desired by them; otherwise it is 
insufficient, no matter how far beyond the period of 
limitations it is extended. 
  
Id. (quoting 8 Ruling  
McKinney & Burdett A. Rich eds., 1915)); see 3232 Page Ave. 
Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n v. City of Va. Beach, 284 Va. 639, 
 
12 
649, 735 S.E.2d 672, 677 (2012) (“Where, in addition to long-
term public use, there has been an acquiescence in the exercise 
of dominion and control over the property,” dedication may also 
be implied.). 
ODBC enjoys not title to Wales Alley, but rather an 
easement for “the free use and passage” across it.  That was 
and is the full extent of ODBC’s property interest, and thus it 
only had authority to object to actions which prevented that 
limited use.  ODBC was not entitled to dominion and control 
over the easement.  Evidence of use hostile or adverse to, or 
which interfered with, ODBC’s “free use and passage” easement 
would be necessary to prove an implied dedication of the 
easement. 
After hearing evidence in this case, the circuit court 
found that neither the City of Alexandria nor abutting 
landowners had interfered with ODBC’s use of its 30-foot 
easement over Wales Alley, and that ODBC had not abandoned its 
easement by acquiescing in the public’s concurrent use of the 
alley for pedestrian and vehicular passage.  These findings are 
not disputed.  Thus, the evidence in this case is insufficient 
to support a finding that ODBC expressly or impliedly dedicated 
its easement to the City.  Therefore, pursuant to City of 
Staunton and Keppler, City of Alexandria Charter Section 
2.03(a) could not have operated to extinguish ODBC’s interest 
 
13 
in its easement over Wales Alley, or to transfer such easement 
rights to the City. 
 
Alternatively, the City and the Union parties claim that 
ODBC’s easement over Wales Alley was extinguished when its 
purpose was fulfilled and it was no longer necessary.  They 
cite American Oil Co. v. Leaman, 199 Va. 637, 101 S.E.2d 540 
(1958), as authority for that proposition.  They claim that 
“once the alley became public, the risk of private interference 
with access to the adjoining public streets ended, so the 
purpose of [ODBC’s] easement was no longer relevant,” and it 
was extinguished. 
We believe the City and Union parties misconstrue our 
precedent.  In American Oil Co., we said: 
Easements once created may be extinguished in the 
following ways:  (1) By a cessation of the purposes 
for which the easement was created; . . . . 
 
 
If the particular purpose for which the easement 
is granted is fulfilled or otherwise ceases to exist, 
the easement also falls to the ground. 
 
199 Va. at 652, 101 S.E.2d at 552 (quoting 1 Frederick D.G. 
Ribble, Minor on Real Property §§ 106-107, at 145-46 (2d ed. 
1928)). 
 
In American Oil Co., we further explained the principle as 
follows: 
 
It has been said that when an easement is created 
for a particular purpose, it comes to an end upon a 
cessation of that purpose, which means, apparently, 
 
14 
that an easement which is created to endure only so 
long as a particular purpose is subserved by its 
exercise, comes to an end when it can no longer 
subserve such purpose.  The question then is, in each 
case, what is the particular purpose to be subserved 
by the easement, and this, in the case of an easement 
created by grant is a question of intention. 
 
Id. at 652-53, 101 S.E.2d at 552 (quoting 3 Herbert T. Tiffany, 
The Law of Real Property § 817, at 368 (Basil Jones, ed., 3d 
ed. 1939)).  Additionally, realizing we were dealing with an 
issue of first impression, we specifically noted that “[t]he 
extinguishment of easements by cessation of the purpose for 
which they were granted” has been recognized by numerous texts 
and decisions, and we provided citations thereto.  Id. at 653, 
101 S.E.2d at 552. 
Cessation of purpose is essential.  Without cessation of 
the purpose for which the easement was created, an express 
easement does not end when its purpose is simply fulfilled or 
when it is no longer necessary unless its express terms so 
state. 
An easement’s purpose depends upon the intent that can be 
determined from the deed granting the easement.  See id. at 
652, 101 S.E.2d at 552.  When an easement is granted by a deed, 
unless it is ambiguous, “the rights of the parties must be 
ascertained from the words of the deed.”  Gordon v. Hoy, 211 
Va. 539, 541, 178 S.E.2d 495, 496 (1971). 
 
15 
 
In American Oil Co., the deed stated that an “easement of 
right of way” had been granted “to be used . . . as a means of 
ingress and egress . . . out to the public highway known as 
Goodwyn’s Neck Road.”  199 Va. at 643-44, 101 S.E.2d at 546.  
The public highway the easement was created to reach was later 
permanently closed by the county.  Another new highway was 
opened, but the new highway did not connect with the easement, 
turning the easement into a cul-de-sac.  Id. at 649, 652, 101 
S.E.2d at 550, 551-52.  This Court held that because the 
easement’s purpose was to provide access to a highway, the 
easement was extinguished when the highway was closed because 
the easement could no longer serve its purpose.  Id. at 652-53, 
101 S.E.2d at 551-52. 
 
In Pyramid Development v. D&J Associates, 262 Va. 750, 553 
S.E.2d 725 (2001), the relevant deed granted an easement “to 
use in common the said spur tracks and sidings, and so much of 
the property . . . abutting said spur tracks and sidings as may 
be necessary to afford the property hereby conveyed . . . free 
and convenient access to and use of the said spur tracks and 
sidings.”  Id. at 755, 553 S.E.2d at 728 (internal citations 
omitted).  We held that the language of the deed was not 
ambiguous and that “the purpose of the easement was expressly 
limited to allowing access to the spur tracks and sidings, and 
nothing more.”  Id.  Therefore, “[w]hen the rail service was 
 
16 
discontinued, the purpose of the easement, which was to allow 
access to [and use of] the spur tracks and sidings, ceased to 
exist,” and the easement was extinguished.  Id. at 756, 553 
S.E.2d at 728-29. 
 
In this instance, the relevant deed provided for a 30-foot 
easement across what is now known as Wales Alley.  The deed 
stated that its purpose was to provide “free use and passage of 
the several Streets and Alleys . . . for the more easy 
communication with the public main Streets and the river.”  The 
continuing purpose of the easement is to provide more easy 
communication with the public main streets.  Changing Wales 
Alley to a public street does not result in a cessation of the 
purpose of the easement; it merely facilitates the easement in 
continuing to fulfill its ongoing purpose.  Because the 
conversion of Wales Alley to a public street did not result in 
a cessation of the purpose for which the easement was granted, 
ODBC’s easement over Wales Alley was not extinguished when 
Wales Alley became a public street.  Therefore, we hold that 
the circuit court erred in failing to recognize ODBC’s 
continuing vested easement in Wales Alley. 
Conclusion 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the judgment of 
the circuit court will be reversed.  We hold that ODBC has a 
 
17 
vested easement over Wales Alley and remand the case to the 
circuit court for entry of appropriate injunctive relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reversed and remanded.