Title: State v. Rayos
Citation: 420 P.2d 314, 77 N.M. 204
Docket Number: 8170
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: January 16, 1967

420 P.2d 314 (1967) 77 N.M. 204 STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ireneo Felix RAYOS, Defendant-Appellant. No. 8170. Supreme Court of New Mexico. January 16, 1967. Boston E. Witt, Atty. Gen., Donald W. Miller, Paul J. Lacy, Asst. Attys. Gen., Santa Fe, for appellee. Albert J. Rivera, Alamogordo, for appellant. E.T. HENSLEY, Jr., Chief Judge, Court of Appeals. *315 By an information Ireneo Felix Rayos was charged with having committed sexual assault on a female minor under the age of sixteen years. The criminal offense charged is prohibited by § 40A-9-9, N.M.S.A. 1953 Compilation. A recital of the evidence adduced before the jury would serve no useful purpose. From a verdict of guilty and a sentence of one year in confinement the defendant now appeals. The appellant's contention in the district court was that by reason of extreme intoxication he was unable to form a specific intent. The instructions to the jury submitted by the trial court contained two paragraphs numbered ten and eleven as follows: The appellant tendered his requested instruction numbered two as follows: The requested instruction was refused and no instruction was given to the jury on this subject. The appellant assigns the refusal of the court as reversible error. In addition to instructions numbered ten and eleven the trial court in instruction number nine instructed the jury that before a verdict of guilty could be returned the jury must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and indecently handled the prosecutrix. Thus, the trial court fixed specific intent as an essential ingredient of the offense charged and this became the law of the case. We have held that where a defendant claims that he was so intoxicated as to be unable to form the necessary intent, that then the question of intent is a matter for the jury. See State v. Lucero, 70 N.M. 268, 372 P.2d 837. Further, see Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law, p. 91, where the following appears: See also Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense, p. 179, and the annotation in 8 A.L.R.3d 1236. Here, the appellant by making a timely tender of his requested instruction number two complied with the requirement of § 21-1-1 (51) (g), N.M.S.A. 1953, as the same existed prior to September 1, 1966. Other propositions were urged by the appellant as grounds for reversal, but we do not consider a treatment of them to be expedient. For failure to properly instruct the jury the conviction must be reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to set aside the sentence and verdict and to grant the defendant a new trial. It is so ordered. MOISE and CARMODY, JJ., concur.