Title: Brown v. Maryland Cas. Co.
Citation: 521 So. 2d 854
Docket Number: 56733
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: July 22, 1987

521 So. 2d 854 (1987) Jerry BROWN v. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY. No. 56733. Supreme Court of Mississippi. July 22, 1987. Rehearing Denied March 16, 1988. Taylor D. Buntin, Yvonne K. Chapman, Bridgforth, Woods, Buntin &amp; Snyder, Southaven, for appellant. Lester F. Sumners, Sumners, Carter, Trout &amp; McMillin, New Albany, for appellee. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN and GRIFFIN, JJ. ROY NOBLE LEE, Presiding Justice, for the Court: Jerry Brown and Toni Brown, husband and minor child of Tracy Dee Brown, deceased, appeal from a summary judgment entered by the Circuit Court of DeSoto County, Mississippi, holding that they were unable to stack uninsured motorist coverages on an insurance policy issued by Maryland Casualty Company. The sole question presented is whether or not the lower court erred in denying appellant's stacking claim on uninsured motorist coverage. On May 3, 1984, Tracy Dee Brown, while driving a 1978 Ford Fairlane automobile, with the consent of Roy Brown, her father-in-law and owner of the vehicle, was involved in an automobile accident, which resulted in her death. It was admitted that the accident was due to the negligence of one David Perry, whose liability insurance carrier tendered its maximum-per-person coverage in the amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) to appellants. *855 In addition to the insurance policy issued by Maryland Casualty Company on the Roy Brown 1978 Fairlane automobile, the policy covered another automobile with uninsured motorist protection in the amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per person and twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) per accident. Thus, the aggregate uninsured/underinsured coverage on one person in the Brown policy amounted to twenty thousand dollars ($20,000). Separate premiums were paid to cover the two vehicles. Appellants contend that under appellee's policy, Tracy Dee Brown was a covered person and is entitled to the uninsured motorist protection afforded both automobiles. Appellee argues that Tracy Dee Brown was a covered person for only the uninsured motorist coverage pertaining to the Ford Fairlane automobile, which she was driving, and appellee denied liability for any amount exceeding that $10,000 coverage. The parties admitted that the damages incurred by reason of Tracy Dee Brown's death exceeded thirty thousand dollars ($30,000), the amount of the David Perry liability insurance and the aggregate of uninsured motorist coverage on the two Roy Brown vehicles for one person. In sustaining the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the lower court held that the uninsured motorist coverage could not be stacked to afford appellants $20,000 in such benefits, since Tracy Dee Brown was an occupant, or Class 2 insured, covered only while using the vehicle to which the uninsured motorist policy applied. Stated differently, the issue on this appeal is whether or not a Class 2 occupancy insured is entitled to stack the coverages held by the named insured under his uninsured motorist policy. The answer must be found in an interpretation of the Mississippi Uninsured Motorist Act and the construction of the parties' contract, under Mississippi decisions. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Kuehling, 475 So. 2d 1159 (Miss. 1985). Pertinent part of the applicable statute, Mississippi Code Annotated § 83-11-101(1) (Supp. 1986), provides: In construing this statute, the Court stated in Harthcock v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 456, 461-62 (Miss. 1971): This Court has further held that an insurer may contract with its insured to provide broader coverage than required by the uninsured motorist statute. Pearthree v. Hartford Accident &amp; Indemnity Co., 373 So. 2d 267, 271 (Miss. 1979). Mississippi's Uninsured Motorist Act defines its terms in § 83-11-103(b) (Supp. 1986): The first class, i.e., Class I, named insureds, is afforded liberal coverage extending to all circumstances when a member of the first class is injured by an uninsured motorist. Stevens v. U.S.F. &amp; G., 345 So. 2d 1041, 1043 (Miss. 1977). The inclusion of an exclusionary clause in the policy will not abrogate that liberal interpretation. Lowery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 767, 777 (Miss. 1974). Again, we repeat the definition of the Class 2, i.e., occupancy insured, viz, "any person who uses, with the consent, express or implied, of the named insured, the motor vehicle to which the policy applies." See Stevens, 345 So. 2d at 1043, quoting MCA § 83-11-103(b). The policy issued by appellee substitutes "covered person" for "insured" and defines a "covered person" as (1) you or any family member, (2) any other person occupying your covered auto. We make no material distinction between the act's definition of "insured" and appellee's meaning of "covered person." In Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Brown, 446 So. 2d 1002, 1006 (Miss. 1984), this Court held that there are two distinct theories by which an insured may aggregate/stack his uninsured motorist coverages: See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nester, 459 So. 2d 787, 793 (Miss. 1984). In United States Fidelity &amp; Guaranty Co. v. Pearthree, 389 So. 2d 109 (Miss. 1980), the second decision after remand of Pearthree I, [Pearthree v. Hartford Accident &amp; Indemnity Co., 373 So. 2d 267 (Miss. 1979)], the Court reiterated its holding as to the stacking of coverages: 389 So. 2d at 112. See also Pearthree v. Hartford Accident &amp; Indemnity Co., 373 So. 2d 267 (Miss. 1979). The Montana Court has adopted a view similar to that of Mississippi in deciding this question: *857 Sayers v. Safeco Ins. Co., 628 P.2d 659, 662 (Mont. 1981). In considering the Pearthree and Harthcock cases, supra, and reviewing the statute on the question now before us, we are of the opinion that stacking is proper and should be mandated in the case sub judice. We note appellants have conceded that, under State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kuehling, supra, appellee is permitted to set off the amount of $10,000 acquired from the underinsured motorist David Perry's liability carrier. Therefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed, the set-off is applied, and judgment is rendered here for appellants in the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000). JUDGMENT REVERSED AND RENDERED. WALKER, C.J., HAWKINS, P.J., and DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.