Title: STATE v RYAN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12845
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 9, 1975

No. 12845 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE OF M O N T A N A 1975 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - D O N A L D E. RYAN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Michael Whalen argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas A. Budewitz argued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: March 7, 1975 Decided : ARR - 9 1 9 E Filed: - 9 !$n M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. O n July 27, 1973, Donald E. Ryan pleaded g u i l t y t o three counts of grand larceny i n the d i s t r i c t court, Yellowstone County. The court deferred imposition of sentence f o r one year, placing defendant on probation under the supervision of the S t a t e Board of Pardons. One of the terms of the probation, accepted by de- fendant a s a condition of the sentence d e f e r r a l , was a requirement t h a t : "3. The defendant s h a l l conduct himself i n a law abiding manner and s h a l l not v i o l a t e any law of t h e United States o r of the State of Montana o r the ordinance of any c i t y o r town during s a i d term * * *. 'I O n July 8, 1974, p e t i t i o n was f i l e d f o r revocation of t h e d e f e r r a l order; the grounds f o r revocation were t h a t defendant allegedly s t o l e a typewriter from a bus terminal i n Billings. On the same day, an Information was f i l e d which charged defendant with t h e f t (a felony), alleging t h e same a c t contained i n the p e t i t i o n f o r revocation. Following arraignment and defendant's plea of not g u i l t y , t r i a l was s e t f o r September 16, 1974. A hearing on the p e t i t i o n f o r revocation was s e t f o r July 12, 1974. On t h a t date, defendant moved f o r a continuance u n t i l a f t e r the t r i a l on the criminal charge o r , i n the a l t e r n a t i v e , f o r dis- missal of the criminal charge with prejudice. The grounds f o r the motion were s t a t e d a s : "* * * That t h e i d e n t i c a l f a c t s with which he is charged i n t h e P e t i t i o n f o r Revocation a r e alleged i n t h e Information charging him with the crime f o r which he is y e t t o stand t r i a l and h i s g u i l t o r inno- cence has not yet been determined and t o require him t o go t o hearing a t t h i s time upon the Petition f o r Revocation would effectively deprive him of h i s constitutional r i g h t s t o remain s i l e n t a s t o the f a c t s i n the felony case pending against him i n Cause No. 9335, and i n e f f e c t would amount t o subjecting him t o double jeopardy i f he were required t o t e s t i f y a s t o the f a c t s a t t h i s time and then subsequently appear i n a t r i a l before a jury i n Cause No. 9335. In addi- t i o n t o t h a t it would put the Court i n a position whereby he could be convicted on the present factual s i t u a t i o n with- out the benefit of a jury t r i a l , and a t a time when a criminal charge has i n f a c t been f i l e d upon the same s e t of facts." The motion was denied and the hearing proceeded with the s t a r e ' s presentation of witnesses t o t h e alleged crime. These witnesses were cross-examined by defense counsel, but defendant did not take the stand i n h i s own defense nor present any evidence. Defendant was found i n violation of the conditions of h i s probation and was subsequently sentenced t o terms of ten years on each of the three p r i o r counts. The sentences were t o be served concurrently. Following revocation and sentencing, the new criminal charge was dismissed on t h e county attorney's motion. ~ e f e n d a n t ' s appeal from the judgment r a i s e s a s i n g l e issue: Should the revocation hearing have been continued u n t i l a f t e r t r i a l of the criminal charge o r , i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , should the criminal charge have been dismissed with prejudice? Defendant contends he was denied due process by being forced t o e l e c t between e i t h e r exercising h i s r i g h t t o remain s i l e n t (risking possible revocation of h i s deferred sentence) o r waiving t h a t r i g h t (risking possible self-incrimination on the criminal charge, yet t o be t r i e d ) . H e argues the s t a t e ' s only motive f o r compelling t h i s election by holding the revocation hearing f i r s t , was t o coerce him i n t o taking the stand. I f he had done so, he would have been available f o r cross-examination which could be used by the s t a t e a s a discovery technique, Although t h i s argument i s raised f o r the f i r s t time before t h i s Court, other jurisdictions have been presented with similar issues. For recent examples see: People v. Carr, (Colo.1974), 524 P.2d 301; Gonsalves v. Howard, (R.I.1974), 324 A.2d 338; People v. Cruz, 14 Ill.App.3d 513, 302 N.E.2d 702. The most complete dis- cussion on these issues can be found i n these three r e l a t e d opinions: F l i n t v. Howard, 110 R.I.223, 291 A.2d 625, cert,den. 409 U.S. 1078, 93 S e c t . 694, 34 L ed 2d 667; F l i n t v. Mullen, 372 F.Supp. 213 (D.R.I. 1974), reversed i n F l i n t v, Mullen, 499 F.2d 100 (1st C i r . 1974). These cases hold t h a t due process i s not violated by holding a revocation hearing prior t o t r i a l of a criminal charged based on t h e same f a c t s alleged a s grounds f o r the revocation. In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L ed 2d 711, 729, the United States Supreme Court decided a question similar t o the constitutional challenge raised i n t h e i n s t a n t case. There defendant was t r i e d before a jury which decided both the ques- t i o n of g u i l t or innocence, a s well a s the question of sentence, i f guilty. Defendant alleged violation of due process a r i s i n g from the necessity of choosingwhether t o remain s i l e n t (risking a harsher sentence) o r waiving t h a t r i g h t (risking possible s e l f - incrimination). Recognizing defendant's predicament, the Court said: "The criminal process, l i k e t h e rest of the l e g a l system, i s r e p l e t e with s i t u a t i o n s requiring ' t h e making of d i f f i c u l t judgments' a s t o which course t o follow. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S., a t 769, 25 L Ed 2d a t 772. Although a defendant may have a r i g h t , even of constitutional dimensions, t o follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by t h a t token always forbid requiring him t o choose." Under the f a c t s of McGautha no constitutional violation was found. Here, a s i n McGautha, defendant was presented with a s t r a t e g i c choice--silence, which he claims contributed t o the revocation of h i s deferred sentence, o r speaking out a t the r i s k of possible self-incrimination on the substantive criminal charge. The choice of whether o r not t o waive h i s r i g h t t o remain s i l e n t was one which defendant necessarily would have t o make, sooner o r l a t e r . H i s position a t the revocation hearing and a t t h e t r i a l would be sub- s t a n t i a l l y similar, maintaining h i s innocence of t h e alleged t h e f t of the typewriter. The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a l i d i t y of requiring e a r l i e r disclosure of c e r t a i n defenses was upheld by the United States Supreme Court i n Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L ed 2d 446. It has a l s o been upheld by t h i s Court. S t a t e ex r e l . Sikora v. D i s t r i c t Court, 154 Mont. 241, 462 P.2d 897. W e hold t h a t the e a r l i e r choice a s t o exercise of the r i g h t t o remain s i l e n t , under the f a c t s of t h i s case, is not repugnant t o e i t h e r United States or Montana constitutional provisions. The t h r u s t of the a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d i s plain. A defendant, i n the course of defense, must necessarily make a number of hard decisions many of which bear on the exercise o r waiver of consti- t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . Often, as here, the choice is a d i f f i c u l t one. However, it does not follow t h a t such choices cannot be constitu- t i o n a l l y required. In finding no violation of due process requirements we have not discussed the jury t r i a l and double jeopardy issues raised by defendant i n h i s motion f o r continuance i n the d i s t r i c t court. O n appeal defend an^ c i t e d no authority i n support of these challenges, and treatment of these issues i n the b r i e f s and o r a l argument was cursory. W e note t h a t a revocation hearing is j u s t that--- a hearing, n o t a t r i a l . Its function i s t o determine whether o r not the terms of probation have been violated. T r i a l by jury on the criminal charge is s t i l l assured. W e find no m e n t i n defendant's constitutional challenges. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s affirmed. i ! I . . .................................. J u s t i c e // Chief J u s t i c e /' justices. / /{