Title: William J. Vincent and Judy S. Vincent v. Jack C. Voight
Citation: 2000 WI 93
Docket Number: 1997AP003174
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2000

2000 WI 93 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-3174 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
William J. Vincent and Judy S. Vincent,  
individually and as parents of Tonya M.  
Vincent, Carol Bartlein, individually and  
as parent of Kurt Bartlein, Sara Bartlein  
and Kimberly Bartlein, Pam Britten,  
individually and as parent of Travis  
Britten, Cortney Britten and Taylor  
Britten, Karen Drazkowski, individually  
and as parent of Steve Drazkowski and Ann  
Drazkowski, Michael Endress and Susan  
Endress, individually and as parents of  
Jill Endress and Megan Endress, Michael  
J. Fairchild and Juliana Schmidt,  
individually and as parents of Kara B.  
Fairchild and Alexander R. Fairchild,  
Charles Hetfield, individually and as  
parent of Angela Hetfield, Rebecca  
Hetfield and Brock Hetfield, John Keller  
and Kathleen Keller, individually and as  
parents of Courtney K. Keller, Lynn  
Klatt, individually and as parent of  
Leslie Klatt and Ross Klatt and as foster  
parent of Blade Corrente, William  
Loasching, individually and as parent of  
Kelly Loasching, Kari Loasching, Kirt  
Loasching and Katie Loasching, Margaret  
McGinnity and Thomas McGinnity,  
individually and as parents of Ann  
McGinnity, Kate McGinnity, Megan  
McGinnity, and Betsy McGinnity, Joyce A.  
Olson, individually and as parent of  
Casey Brouhard and Robert Brouhard,  
Denise Callaway Reistad and Gary Reistad,  
Individually and as parents of George  
Reistad, Kelsey Reistad and Sonja  
Reistad, Mary Rochon-Jewert, individually  
and as parent of Keith Jewert and Candyl  
Jewert, Pao Vang, individually and as  
parent of Phong Vang, Lee Vang, Mary  
Vang, See Vang, Toua Vang, Sheng Vang, Lue  
Vang, Xay Vang and Jenny Vang, Gloria  
Wahl, individually and as parent of  
 
Jordan Woods-Wahl, Ronald J. Walsh,  
individually and as parent of Ryan J.  
Walsh and Laura M. Walsh; and, Jacqueline  
Ward, individually and as parent of  
Jessica Justiniano and Tatiana  
Justiniano, Tonya M. Vincent, Kurt  
Bartlein, Sara Bartlein, Kimberly  
Bartlein, Travis Britten, Cortney  
Britten, Taylor Britten, Steve  
Drazkowski, Ann Drazkowski, Jill Endress,  
Megan Endress, Kara B. Fairchild,  
Alexander R. Fairchild, Angela Hetfield,  
Rebecca Hetfield, Brock Hetfield,  
Courtney K. Keller, Leslie Klatt, Ross  
Klatt, Blade Corrente, Kelly Loasching,  
Kari Loasching, Kirt Loasching, Katie  
Loasching, Ann McGinnity, Kate McGinnity,  
Megan McGinnity, Betsy McGinnity, Casey  
Brouhard, Robert Brouhard, George  
Reistad, Kelsey Reistad, Sonja Reistad,  
Keith Jewert, Candyl Jewert, Phong Vang,  
Lee Vang, Mary Vang, See Vang, Toua Vang,  
Sheng Vang, Lue Vang, Xay Vang, Jenny  
Vang, Jordan Woods-Wahl, Ryan Walsh,  
Laura M. Walsh, Jessica Justiniano and  
Tatiana Justiniano, minors, on behalf of  
themselves and all other public school  
students and prospective students in the  
State of Wisconsin similarly situated;  
and, Mary Bills, Douglas Haselow, Ray  
Heinzen, Mary Lohmeier, David Smette and  
Jerome A. Sommer, on behalf of themselves  
and all other property taxpayers in the  
State of Wisconsin similarly situated;  
and Ray Heinzen, Mary Lohmeier and Roland  
Rockwell, on behalf of themselves and all  
Other citizens of the State of Wisconsin  
Similarly situated; and, School District  
of Abbotsford and its School Board,  
School District of Algoma and its School  
Board, School District of Alma and its  
School Board, School District of Alma  
Center-Humbird Merrillan and its School  
Board, School District of Ashland and its  
School Board, School District of Augusta  
and its School Board, Baldwin-Woodville  
Area School District and its School  
Board, Barron Area School District and  
its School Board, School District of  
Bayfield and its School Board, School  
District of Beecher-Dunbar-Pembine and  
its School Board, School District of  
 
Beloit and its School Board, School  
District of Benton and its School Board,  
Berlin Area School District and its  
School Board, School District of Black  
Hawk and its School Board, School  
District of Black River Falls and its  
School Board, School District of Bloomer  
and its School Board, Boyceville  
Community School District and its School  
Board, School District of Cadott  
Community and its School Board, School  
District of Cameron and its School Board,  
School District of Cashton and its School  
Board, School District of Chetek and its  
School Board, Clayton School District and  
its School Board, School District of  
Clear Lake and its School Board,  
Clintonville Public School District and  
its School Board, Cochrane-Fountain City  
Community School District and its School  
Board, School District of Colfax and its  
School Board, School District of Cornell  
and its School Board, School District of  
Cuba City and its School Board, School  
District of Denmark and its School Board,  
Desoto Area School District and its  
School Board, Dodgeland School District  
and its School Board, Dodgeville School  
District and its School Board, School  
District of Durand and its School Board,  
Elk Mound Area School District and its  
School Board, School District of Elmwood  
and its School Board, School District of  
Fall Creek and its School Board, Frederic  
School District and its School Board,  
School District of the City of  
Galesville, Villages of Ettrick and  
Trempealeau, Towns of Caledonia, Dodge,  
Ettrick, Gale and Trempealeau in  
Trempealeau County and the Town of North  
Bend in Jackson County and its School  
Board, School District of Gilmanton and  
its School Board, School District of  
Grantsburg and its School Board, School  
District of Greenwood and its School  
Board, School District of Holmen and its  
School Board, School District of Horicon  
and its School Board, School District of  
Howard-Suamico and its School Board,  
Kewaunee School District and its School  
Board, Kickapoo Area School District and  
its School Board, School District of La  
 
Crosse and its School Board, School  
District of Lake Holcombe and its School  
Board, School District of Laona and its  
School Board, Lena Public School District  
and its School Board, School District of  
Luck and its School Board, Manitowoc  
Public School District and its School  
Board, School District of Marion and its  
School Board, School District of Mayville  
and its School Board, Medford Area Public  
School District and its School Board,  
School District of the Menomonie Area and  
its School Board, Milwaukee Public  
Schools and the Board of School Directors  
of the City of Milwaukee, Mineral Point  
Unified School District and its School  
Board, School District of Mondovi and its  
School Board, School District of Mosinee  
and its School Board, Necedah Area School  
District and its School Board, School  
District of New Richmond and its School  
Board, North Crawford School District and  
its School Board, Oconto Falls School  
District and its School Board, Oconto  
Unified School District and its School  
Board, Osseo-Fairchild School District  
and its School Board, School District of  
Owen-Withee and its School Board, Pepin  
Area School District and its School  
Board, School District of Phillips and  
its School Board, School District of  
Poynette and its School Board, Prairie  
Farm Public School District and its  
School Board, Pulaski Community School  
District and its School Board, Racine  
Unified School District and its School  
Board, Reedsville School District and its  
School Board, School District of Rib Lake  
and its School Board, Rice Lake Area  
School District and its School Board,  
Riverdale School District and its School  
Board, River Ridge School District and  
its School Board, Saint Croix Central  
School District and its School Board,  
School District of Seneca and its School  
Board, Seymour Community School District  
and its School Board, School District of  
Shell Lake and its School Board, School  
District of Siren and its School Board,  
School District of Somerset and its  
School Board, Southwestern Wisconsin  
Community School District and its School  
 
Board, School District of Spring Valley  
and its School Board, School District of  
Stratford and its School Board, School  
District of Superior and its School  
Board, School District of Thorp and its  
School Board, School District of Tigerton  
and its School Board, Tomah Area School  
District and its School Board, Valders  
Area School District and its School  
Board, Viroqua Area School District and  
its School Board, School District of  
Wabeno Area and its School Board, School  
District of Washburn and its School  
Board, School District of Waupun and its  
School Board, Joint School District,  
Villages of Wauzeka and Steuben, Towns of  
Wauzeka, Bridgeport, Eastman, Haney,  
Marietta and Prairie du Chien and its  
School Board, School District of West  
Salem and its School Board, School  
District of Weston and its School Board,  
Weyerhauser Area School District and its  
School Board, School District of Winter  
and its School Board, School District of  
Wonewoc and Union Center and its School  
Board, and Mary Bills, Pam Britten, and  
Lynn Klatt, on behalf of themselves and  
all other school board members in the  
State of Wisconsin similarly situated,  
 
Plaintiffs-Co-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Terrance Craney, Guy Costello, Regina  
Washinawatok, Jeffrey Erhardt, Kathleen  
Hildebrandt, Randy Kuivinen, William  
Nelson, Douglass Thomas, and Wisconsin  
Education Association Council,  
 
Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
 
Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Jack C. Voight, in his official capacity  
as State of Wisconsin Treasurer, John T.  
Benson, in his official capacity as State  
of Wisconsin Superintendent of Public  
Instruction, Wisconsin Department of  
Public Instruction, Cate Zeuske, in her  
official capacity as Secretary of the  
Wisconsin Department of Revenue, and  
Wisconsin Department of Revenue,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  223 Wis.2d 799, 589 N.W.2d 455 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999 Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 11, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
February 8, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Callaway 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
Concur & Dissent: ABRAHAMSON, C.J. concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
 
 
BABLITCH and BRADLEY, J.J., join concur/dissent. 
 
 
BABLITCH, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
 
 
PROSSER, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
 
 
SYKES, J., joins concur/dissent. 
 
 
SYKES, J., concurs in part/dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
 
 
PROSSER, J., joins concur/dissent. 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the intervening plaintiffs-appellants-
petitioners there were briefs by Bruce Meredith, Chris Galinat 
and Wisconsin Education Association Council, Madison, and Robert 
H. Friebert and Friebert, Finerty & St. John, SC, Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Bruce Meredith. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-co-appellants-petitioners 
there were briefs by David J. Hase, Heidi L. Vogt and Cook & 
Franke, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by David J. Hase. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents the cause was 
argued by Peter C. Anderson, assistant attorney general, with 
 
whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general, and Bruce 
A. Olsen, assistant attorney general. 
 
 
Amicus Curiae brief by Patricia A. Brannan, 
Alethia Nancoo and Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., on 
behalf of The Council of the Great City Schools. 
 
 
Amicus Curiae brief by Gary E. Sherman on behalf 
of State Representatives Gary E. Sherman, Dan Schooff, John H. 
Ainsworth, Tom Sykora, Shirley I. Krug, Marlin D. Schneider, 
Peter E. Bock, Robert L. Turner, Julie M. Lassa, Mary Hubler, G. 
Spencer Coggs, Pedro A. Colon, Barbara Gronemus, Donald W. 
Hasenohrl, John W. Lehman, Mark Miller, Joe Plouff, Jon Richards, 
Marty Reynolds, Christine Sinicki and State Senators Brian D. 
Rude, Brian B. Burke, Gwendolynne S. Moore, Kimberly M. Plache. 
 
 
Amicus Curiae brief by Raymond P. Taffora, Jordan 
J. Hemaidan, Karla M. Davis and Michael, Best & Friedrich LLP, 
Madison, on behalf of Fair Aid Coalition. 
 
 
Amicus Curiae brief by Lawrence A. Wiley on 
behalf of Governor Tommy G. Thompson. 
 
 
Amicus Curiae brief by James D. Peterson, Brady 
C. Williamson and LaFollette Sinykin, LLP, Madison, on behalf of 
Institute for Wisconsin’s Future, Inc., Wisconsin Coalition for 
Advocacy, Inc., and Wisconsin Parent Teachers Association. 
 
 
Amicus Curiae brief by Peter M. Koneazny on 
behalf of American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin, Inc. 
 
 
Amicus Curiae brief by James D. Peterson, Brady 
C. Williamson and LaFollette Sinykin, LLP, Madison, on behalf of 
City of Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist. 
 
 
 
2000 WI 93 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
No. 97-3174 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
William J. Vincent and Judy S. Vincent,  
individually and as parents of Tonya M.  
Vincent, Carol Bartlein, individually and  
as parent of Kurt Bartlein, Sara Bartlein  
and Kimberly Bartlein, Pam Britten,  
individually and as parent of Travis  
Britten, Cortney Britten and Taylor  
Britten, Karen Drazkowski, individually  
and as parent of Steve Drazkowski and Ann  
Drazkowski, Michael Endress and Susan  
Endress, individually and as parents of  
Jill Endress and Megan Endress, Michael  
J. Fairchild and Juliana Schmidt,  
individually and as parents of Kara B.  
Fairchild and Alexander R. Fairchild,  
Charles Hetfield, individually and as  
parent of Angela Hetfield, Rebecca  
Hetfield and Brock Hetfield, John Keller  
and Kathleen Keller, individually and as  
parents of Courtney K. Keller, Lynn  
Klatt, individually and as parent of  
Leslie Klatt and Ross Klatt and as foster  
parent of Blade Corrente, William  
Loasching, individually and as parent of  
Kelly Loasching, Kari Loasching, Kirt  
Loasching and Katie Loasching, Margaret  
McGinnity and Thomas McGinnity,  
individually and as parents of Ann  
McGinnity, Kate McGinnity, Megan  
McGinnity, and Betsy McGinnity, Joyce A.  
Olson, individually and as parent of  
Casey Brouhard and Robert Brouhard,  
Denise Callaway Reistad and Gary Reistad,  
individually and as parents of George  
Reistad, Kelsey Reistad and Sonja  
Reistad, Mary Rochon-Jewert, individually  
and as parent of Keith Jewert and Candyl  
Jewert, Pao Vang, individually and as  
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
 Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
97-3174 
 
 
2 
parent of Phong Vang, Lee Vang, Mary  
Vang, See Vang, Toua Vang, Sheng Vang, Lue  
Vang, Xay Vang and Jenny Vang, Gloria  
Wahl, individually and as parent of  
Jordan Woods-Wahl, Ronald J. Walsh,  
individually and as parent of Ryan J.  
Walsh and Laura M. Walsh; and, Jacqueline  
Ward, individually and as parent of  
Jessica Justiniano and Tatiana  
Justiniano, Tonya M. Vincent, Kurt  
Bartlein, Sara Bartlein, Kimberly  
Bartlein, Travis Britten, Cortney  
Britten, Taylor Britten, Steve  
Drazkowski, Ann Drazkowski, Jill Endress,  
Megan Endress, Kara B. Fairchild,  
Alexander R. Fairchild, Angela Hetfield,  
Rebecca Hetfield, Brock Hetfield,  
Courtney K. Keller, Leslie Klatt, Ross  
Klatt, Blade Corrente, Kelly Loasching,  
Kari Loasching, Kirt Loasching, Katie  
Loasching, Ann McGinnity, Kate McGinnity,  
Megan McGinnity, Betsy McGinnity, Casey  
Brouhard, Robert Brouhard, George  
Reistad, Kelsey Reistad, Sonja Reistad,  
Keith Jewert, Candyl Jewert, Phong Vang,  
Lee Vang, Mary Vang, See Vang, Toua Vang,  
Sheng Vang, Lue Vang, Xay Vang, Jenny  
Vang, Jordan Woods-Wahl, Ryan J. Walsh,  
Laura M. Walsh, Jessica Justiniano and  
Tatiana Justiniano, minors, on behalf of  
themselves and all other public school  
students and prospective students in the  
State of Wisconsin similarly situated;  
and, Mary Bills, Douglas Haselow, Ray  
Heinzen, Mary Lohmeier, David Smette and  
Jerome A. Sommer, on behalf of themselves  
and all other property taxpayers in the  
State of Wisconsin similarly situated;  
 
and  
 
Ray Heinzen, Mary Lohmeier and Roland  
Rockwell, on behalf of themselves and all  
other citizens of the State of Wisconsin  
similarly situated; and, School District  
of Abbotsford and its School Board,  
School District of Algoma and its School  
Board, School District of Alma and its  
No. 
97-3174 
 
 
3 
School Board, School District of Alma  
Center-Humbird Merrillan and its School  
Board, School District of Ashland and its  
School Board, School District of Augusta  
and its School Board, Baldwin-Woodville  
Area School District and its School  
Board, Barron Area School District and  
its School Board, School District of  
Bayfield and its School Board, School  
District of Beecher-Dunbar-Pembine and  
its School Board, School District of  
Beloit and its School Board, School  
District of Benton and its School Board,  
Berlin Area School District and its  
School Board, School District of Black  
Hawk and its School Board, School  
District of Black River Falls and its  
School Board, School District of Bloomer  
and its School Board, Boyceville  
Community School District and its School  
Board, School District of Cadott  
Community and its School Board, School  
District of Cameron and its School Board,  
School District of Cashton and its School  
Board, School District of Chetek and its  
School Board, Clayton School District and  
its School Board, School District of  
Clear Lake and its School Board,  
Clintonville Public School District and  
its School Board, Cochrane-Fountain City  
Community School District and its School  
Board, School District of Colfax and its  
School Board, School District of Cornell  
and its School Board, School District of  
Cuba City and its School Board, School  
District of Denmark and its School Board,  
Desoto Area School District and its  
School Board, Dodgeland School District  
and its School Board, Dodgeville School  
District and its School Board, School  
District of Durand and its School Board,  
Elk Mound Area School District and its  
School Board, School District of Elmwood  
and its School Board, School District of  
Fall Creek and its School Board, Frederic  
School District and its School Board,  
School District of the City of  
Galesville, Villages of Ettrick and  
No. 
97-3174 
 
 
4 
Trempealeau, Towns of Caledonia, Dodge,  
Ettrick, Gale and Trempealeau in  
Trempealeau County and the Town of North  
Bend in Jackson County and its School  
Board, School District of Gilmanton and  
its School Board, School District of  
Grantsburg and its School Board, School  
District of Greenwood and its School  
Board, School District of Holmen and its  
School Board, School District of Horicon  
and its School Board, School District of  
Howard-Suamico and its School Board,  
Kewaunee School District and its School  
Board, Kickapoo Area School District and  
its School Board, School District of La  
Crosse and its School Board, School  
District of Lake Holcombe and its School  
Board, School District of Laona and its  
School Board, Lena Public School District  
and its School Board, School District of  
Luck and its School Board, Manitowoc  
Public School District and its School  
Board, School District of Marion and its  
School Board, School District of Mayville  
and its School Board, Medford Area Public  
School District and its School Board,  
School District of the Menomonie Area and  
its School Board, Milwaukee Public  
Schools and the Board of School Directors  
of the City of Milwaukee, Mineral Point  
Unified School District and its School  
Board, School District of Mondovi and its  
School Board, School District of Mosinee  
and its School Board, Necedah Area School  
District and its School Board, School  
District of New Richmond and its School  
Board, North Crawford School District and  
its School Board, Oconto Falls School  
District and its School Board, Oconto  
Unified School District and its School  
Board, Osseo-Fairchild School District  
and its School Board, School District of  
Owen-Withee and its School Board, Pepin  
Area School District and its School  
Board, School District of Phillips and  
its School Board, School District of  
Poynette and its School Board, Prairie  
Farm Public School District and its  
No. 
97-3174 
 
 
5 
School Board, Pulaski Community School  
District and its School Board, Racine  
Unified School District and its School  
Board, Reedsville School District and its  
School Board, School District of Rib Lake  
and its School Board, Rice Lake Area  
School District and its School Board,  
Riverdale School District and its School  
Board, River Ridge School District and  
its School Board, Saint Croix Central  
School District and its School Board,  
School District of Seneca and its School  
Board, Seymour Community School District  
and its School Board, School District of  
Shell Lake and its School Board, School  
District of Siren and its School Board,  
School District of Somerset and its  
School Board, Southwestern Wisconsin  
Community School District and its School  
Board, School District of Spring Valley  
and its School Board, School District of  
Stratford and its School Board, School  
District of Superior and its School  
Board, School District of Thorp and its  
School Board, School District of Tigerton  
and its School Board, Tomah Area School  
District and its School Board, Valders  
Area School District and its School  
Board, Viroqua Area School District and  
its School Board, School District of  
Wabeno Area and its School Board, School  
District of Washburn and its School  
Board, School District of Waupun and its  
School Board, Joint School District,  
Villages of Wauzeka and Steuben, Towns of  
Wauzeka, Bridgeport, Eastman, Haney,  
Marietta and Prairie du Chien and its  
School Board, School District of West  
Salem and its School Board, School  
District of Weston and its School Board,  
Weyerhauser Area School District and its  
School Board, School District of Winter  
and its School Board, School District of  
Wonewoc and Union Center and its School  
Board, and Mary Bills, Pam Britten, and  
Lynn Klatt, on behalf of themselves and  
all other school board members in the  
State of Wisconsin similarly situated,  
No. 
97-3174 
 
 
6 
 
Plaintiffs-Co-Appellants- 
Petitioners, 
 
Terrance Craney, Guy Costello, Regina  
Washinawatok, Jeffrey Erhardt, Kathleen  
Hildebrandt, Randy Kuivinen, William  
Nelson, Douglass Thomas, and Wisconsin  
Education Association Council,  
 
Intervening Plaintiffs- 
Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
 
Jack C. Voight, in his official capacity  
as State of Wisconsin Treasurer, John T.  
Benson, in his official capacity as State  
of Wisconsin Superintendent of Public  
Instruction, Wisconsin Department of  
Public Instruction, Cate Zeuske, in her  
official capacity as Secretary of the  
Wisconsin Department of Revenue, and  
Wisconsin Department of Revenue,  
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   The Petitioners in this case 
are various Wisconsin 
students, parents, teachers, 
school 
districts, school board members, citizens, and the president of 
the Wisconsin Education Association Council (WEAC).1  The 
                     
1 We remember Ralph Waldo Emerson's words to the Harvard 
graduating class of 1837: 
[T]here is a portion of reading quite indispensible to 
a wise man [or woman].  History and exact science he 
[or she] must learn by laborious reading.  Colleges 
[and public schools], in like manner, have their 
No. 97-3174 
 
7 
Petitioners collectively challenge the constitutionality of the 
state school finance system under Wis. Stat. ch. 121 and Wis. 
Stat. §§ 79.10 and 79.14.  Two main issues are presented for our 
review:  1) whether the state school finance system is 
unconstitutional under Wis. Const. art. X, § 3the uniformity 
clause of the education article; and 2) whether the state school 
finance system is unconstitutional under Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 1the Equal Protection Clause.  The Petitioners contend that 
the school finance system violates both art. X, § 3 and art. I, 
§ 1 because it fails to equalize access to financial resources 
among school districts. 
¶2 
In an unpublished decision, the court of appeals 
upheld the constitutionality of the school finance system.  
Vincent v. Voight, No. 97-3174, unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. 
Dec. 23, 1998).  The court determined that the current school 
finance system is not materially different from the system that 
                                                                  
indispensable officeto teach elements.  But they can 
only highly serve us when they aim not to drill, but 
to create; when they gather from far every ray of 
various genius to their hospitable halls, and by the 
concentrated fires, set the hearts of their youth on 
flame.  Thought and knowledge are natures in which 
apparatus and pretension avail nothing.  Gowns and 
pecuniary foundations, though of towns of gold, can 
never countervail the least sentence or syllable of 
wit.  Forget this, and our American colleges [and 
public 
schools] 
will 
recede 
in 
their 
public 
importance, whilst they grow richer every year. 
 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, "The American Scholar" in Ralph Waldo 
Emerson:  Essays and Journals, 1837, at 37 (Lewis Mumford ed., 
1968) (words added in brackets).  
No. 97-3174 
 
8 
this court upheld as constitutional in Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 
2d 469, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989).2  Slip op. at 6.  We agree that 
the Petitioners have not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the current state school finance system violates either art. X, 
                     
2 We hold that this case presents a justiciable issue.  In 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962), the United States 
Supreme Court stated that a court must decide on a case-by-case 
inquiry whether a so-called political issue is justiciable, and 
"[d]eciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed 
by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether 
the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been 
committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional 
interpretation . . . ."  This court on numerous occasions has 
interpreted the state constitution to find that assessing the 
constitutionality of the state school finance system is within 
its province.  See, e.g., Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 436 
N.W.2d 568 (1989); Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 
(1976); State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 221 N.W. 
860 (1928). 
In Kukor the court of appeals specifically certified the 
issue of whether the judiciary has the power to declare the 
system of financing unconstitutional, after the circuit court 
found that "'[w]hether a higher degree of uniformity is now 
'practicable' is for the Legislature to decide . . . . The 
battle over scarce tax dollars for education is a political one 
. . . . The Legislature is where the framers of the constitution 
intended these decisions to be made.'"  Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 
483 n.8.  This court clearly concluded that it does have that 
power by proceeding to examine the constitutionality of the 
school finance system.  Moreover, in Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 581, we 
held a portion of the school finance system unconstitutional.  
There we specifically stated, "to hold that the legislature is 
constitutionally mandated to provide an equal opportunity for 
education . . . is not necessarily to validate as constitutional 
any means chosen by the legislature to achieve that end."  Id. 
at 567.  We are satisfied that the issues presented to us in 
this case are appropriate for decision by this court in the 
exercise of our constitutional role.  This is an area where all 
three of the co-equal branches of state government share power 
and authority consistent with the Wisconsin Constitution.  It is 
indeed "a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation." 
No. 97-3174 
 
9 
§ 3 or art. I, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The present 
school finance system more effectively equalizes the tax base 
among districts than the system in place at the time Kukor was 
decided. 
¶3 
We further hold that Wisconsin students have a 
fundamental right to an equal opportunity for a sound basic 
education.  An equal opportunity for a sound basic education is 
one that will equip students for their roles as citizens and 
enable them to succeed economically and personally.  The 
legislature has articulated a standard for equal opportunity for 
a sound basic education in Wis. Stat. §§ 118.30(lg)(a) and 
121.02(L) (1997-98) as the opportunity for students to be 
proficient 
in 
mathematics, 
science, 
reading 
and 
writing, 
geography, and history, and for them to receive instruction in 
the arts and music, vocational training, social sciences, 
health, physical education and foreign language, in accordance 
with their age and aptitude.3  An equal opportunity for a sound 
basic education acknowledges that students and districts are not 
fungible and takes into account districts with disproportionate 
numbers 
of 
disabled 
students, 
economically 
disadvantaged 
students, and students with limited English language skills.  So 
long as the legislature is providing sufficient resources so 
that school districts offer students the equal opportunity for a 
sound basic education as required by the constitution, the state 
school finance system will pass constitutional muster. 
                     
3 See Wis. Stat. §§ 118.30(1g)(a) and 121.02(L) (1997-98).  
No. 97-3174 
 
10
I 
A. 
The Wisconsin School Finance System 
 
¶4 
We begin by outlining the constitutional provisions 
applicable to school finance.  Article X of the Wisconsin 
Constitution establishes the state public school system4 and 
provides that the school districts "shall be as nearly uniform 
as practicable . . . ."  Wis. Const. art. X, § 3.  The 
constitution also creates a school fund for the "support and 
maintenance" of schools and libraries.  Wis. Const. art. X, § 2. 
Article X, § 4 allows for the imposition of a local tax on the 
school districts.  It states that the sum to be raised locally 
must be "not less than one-half the amount received by such town 
or city respectively for school purposes from the income of the 
school fund."  Wis. Const. art. X, § 4.  Section 5 provides for 
the distribution of the income from the school fund "in some 
just proportion to the number of children and youth resident 
therein between the ages of four and twenty years."  Wis. Const. 
art. X, § 5. 
 
¶5 
From these constitutional provisions, the legislature 
has developed an elaborate state school finance formula.5  One 
                     
4 The constitution refers to "common schools," "normal 
schools," and "district schools," instead of "public schools," 
which is the general terminology used today.  Wis. Const. art. 
X, §§ 2(1), 2(2), and 3.  Common schools, district schools, and 
normal schools were all forms of publicly funded schools.  See 
generally, Conrad E. Patzer, Public Education in Wisconsin 
(1924).  
5 The state appropriated approximately $7.72 billion in 
school aid for 1997-99 biennium budget.  Wisconsin Legislative 
Fiscal Bureau, Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids 1 (Jan. 1999).  
No. 97-3174 
 
11
source of school funding is the property tax, which applies 
directly to each local district.  The other significant source 
of funding is state aid.6  State aid includes equalization aid, 
categorical aid, and the school levy tax credit.7  We describe 
each type of aid in turn. 
EQUALIZATION AID 
 
¶6 
According 
to 
the 
Legislative 
Fiscal 
Bureau, 
equalization aid "is intended to ensure that differences in tax 
rate primarily reflect differences in school district spending 
                     
6 The federal government also contributes a limited amount 
of aid to school districts, which is generally used for special 
education and remedial education.  Elementary and Secondary Sch. 
Aids at 3.  The amount of this aid is not significant for the 
purposes of this case, so we do not address it further in this 
opinion.  
7 The legislature, as part of Wis. Stat. ch. 121the 
chapter on school financefurther includes a provision on school 
district standards, which directs school boards to maintain 
certain 
licensure 
requirements, 
facility 
and 
curriculum 
standards, and standardized testing procedures.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 121.02 (1997-98).  This statute is incorporated into the 
subchapter on general aid.  Section 121.02(L) directs local 
school boards to provide regular instruction in particular 
courses in the elementary grades, grades 5-8, and grades 9-12.  
No. 97-3174 
 
12
levels."8  Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Elementary and 
Secondary Sch. Aids at 10 (Jan. 1999).  Equalization aid is 
distributed on the basis of a school district's relative fiscal 
capacity.  Id. at 1.  The majority of school funds are derived 
from property taxes.  However, since the property tax base 
differs between districts, the state distributes equalization 
aid according to the formula set forth in Wis. Stat. § 121.07 
(1997-98).9  Equalization aid provides each qualifying school 
district 
with 
a 
guaranteed 
tax 
base, 
thereby 
minimizing 
differences in the ability of school districts to raise revenue 
through 
property 
tax. 
 
Equalization 
aid 
compensates 
any 
deficiencies in a school district's tax base up to the 
guaranteed amount provided by the state.  In other words, the 
equalization 
aid 
"make[s] 
up 
the 
difference 
between 
the 
district's actual tax base and the state['s] guaranteed tax 
base."  Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 7. 
                     
8 We note that equalization aid is a component of general 
school aids.  Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 1.  Other 
general 
school 
aids 
include 
integration 
aid 
and 
special 
adjustment aid.  Id. at 11.  We only discuss equalization aid in 
detail because many school districts do not receive either 
integration aid or special adjustment aid.  Id. at 12.  A school 
district receives integration aid when it transfers students to 
change the racial balance of the district.  Id.  Special 
adjustment aid is given to a district that is experiencing a 
reduction in general school aid, or when a school district is 
consolidating.  Id. at 13.  We also note that a portion of the 
School District of Milwaukee's equalization aid goes toward 
paying for the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program and charter 
schools.  Id. at 13-14.     
9 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 text unless otherwise noted. 
No. 97-3174 
 
13
 
¶7 
Computation of state equalization aid depends on five 
factors:  a)  membership, b) shared cost, c) equalized property 
valuation, d) guaranteed valuation, and e) the amount of 
available funding.  Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 7.  
The number of students enrolled in a district determines the 
district's membership.  Wis. Stat. § 121.07(1)(a).  Shared cost 
is the "sum of the net cost of the general fund and the net cost 
of the debt service fund."  § 121.07(6)(a).  Shared cost 
represents those school district expenditures for which the 
equalization formula provides aid.  Elementary and Secondary 
Sch. Aids at 8.  Equalized property valuation is "the full 
market value of taxable property in the school district as 
determined by the Department of Revenue (DOR) . . . each year." 
 Id.  District equalized value (DEV) is the equalized valuation 
on a per pupil basis.  See Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 
33.  Guaranteed valuation represents a guaranteed tax base.  Id. 
at 10.  The state guaranteed valuation (SGV) is "the amount of 
property tax base support which the state guarantees behind each 
pupil."  Id. at 8.  See also § 121.07(7)-(8).   
¶8 
Equalization aid applies at three different district 
spending levels.  District spending levels are defined in terms 
of shared cost.  The first level consists of a primary 
guaranteed tax base of $2,000,000 per pupil for the first $1,000 
No. 97-3174 
 
14
of shared costs.10  Wis. Stat. § 121.07(6)(b), (c), and (7)(a).  
The $1,000 is also referred to as the primary cost ceiling.  The 
Legislative Fiscal Bureau further explains: 
 
The first level is for shared costs up to the "primary 
cost ceiling" of $1,000 per member.  The state's 
sharing of costs at the primary cost ceiling, referred 
to as "primary shared costs," is calculated using a 
statutory 
guaranteed 
valuation 
of 
$2,000,000 
per 
member.  State aid at the primary level is based on a 
comparison 
between 
a 
school 
district's 
equalized 
valuation 
per 
member 
and 
the primary 
guaranteed 
valuation; state aid will equal the amount of costs 
that would be funded by the missing portion of the 
guaranteed tax base.  Elementary and Secondary Sch. 
Aids at 8. 
Currently, all school districts in the state receive some 
primary equalization aid.  The primary guarantee is protected by 
a hold harmless provision, which means that negative aids cannot 
reduce any district's primary aid amount.  See id. 
¶9 
The state gives secondary equalization aid to a school 
district when the district spends at a level between the primary 
shared cost ceiling and the secondary cost ceiling.  Elementary 
and 
Secondary 
Sch. 
Aids 
at 
8. 
 
See 
also 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 121.07(6)(d)(1)-(2) and (dg).  The 1998-99 secondary cost 
ceiling was $6,285.  Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 8.  
The amount of aid is determined by the ratio of a district's 
                     
10 A different primary guarantee applies to various types of 
school districts.  The primary guarantee for a K-12 school 
district is $2,000,000.  A union high school's primary guarantee 
is $6,000,000, and the primary guarantee for a K-8 school is 
$3,000,000.  This opinion focuses on the primary guarantee for 
K-12 school districts because most districts are in that 
category.  Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 9.   
No. 97-3174 
 
15
actual per-pupil equalized valuation to the secondary guaranteed 
valuation.  The secondary guaranteed valuation is a variable 
amount.  Id.  In 1998-99 it was $676,977.  Id. 
¶10 The third level, or "tertiary shared cost" level, "is 
that portion of a school district's shared cost which is greater 
than the secondary ceiling cost per member multiplied by its 
membership." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 121.07(6)(dr). 
 
Before 
the 
legislature acted in 1995, the state employed a two-tiered 
system, which was replaced by the current three-tiered system 
under 1995 Wis. Act. 27.  The amount of tertiary aid is deducted 
from the secondary aid amount if the amount of tertiary aid is a 
negative number.  Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 9.  This 
is referred to as "negative aid."  However, when the secondary 
and tertiary aid equal a negative number, the resulting amount 
is not deducted from the primary aid.  Id.  The tertiary 
guarantee is designed to discourage districts from spending at a 
level above the ceiling, and to narrow per pupil spending 
disparities.  Id.   
¶11 Applying these concepts, the amount of aid a district 
receives at any level may be determined by the following 
formula: 
State aid = 1-DEV/SGV x shared cost11 
The general equalization formula to determine the amount of aid 
a school district receives is: 
                     
11 As defined in ¶7, "DEV" represents the district equalized 
value 
figure, 
and 
"SGV" 
represents 
the 
state 
guaranteed 
valuation figure.  
No. 97-3174 
 
16
 
Equalization aid = (1-(DEV/primary SGV) x primary shared cost) + 
(1-(DEV/secondary SGV) x secondary shared cost) +  
(1-(DEV/tertiary SGV) x tertiary shared cost) 
 
CATEGORICAL AID 
¶12 There are approximately 25 categorical aid programs.12 
 The programs are either formula-driven, or they are grant 
programs. 
 
Formula-driven 
programs 
give 
funds 
to 
school 
districts on the basis of the number of students who meet the 
criteria for the program.  Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 
14.  Grant programs require districts to submit a proposal to 
receive funds.  Id.  Categorical aids differ from equalization 
aid in that they do not depend on the relative wealth of a 
school district.  Id.  Categorical aids are not calculated into 
statutory revenue limits. 
 
                     
12 The following is a list of the state categorical aid 
programs:  1)  handicapped education, 2) county children with 
disabilities education boards (CCDEBs), 3) pupil transportation, 
4) school library, 5) TEACH technology block grants, 6) TEACH 
training and technical assistance grants, 7) telecommunications 
access 
program, 
8) 
technology 
infrastructure 
loans, 
9) 
pioneering partners grants, 10) bilingual-bicultural education, 
11) aid to Milwaukee Public Schools (desegregation settlement 
aid), 12) preschool to grade 5 grants, 13) state tuition 
payments; open enrollment transfer payments, 14) full-time open 
enrollment aid for transportation, 15) alcohol and other drug 
abuse (AODA) grants, 16) head start supplement, 17) nutritional 
programs, 18) student achievement guarantee in education (SAGE), 
19) driver education, 20) children-at-risk programs, 21) peer 
review and mentoring, 22) CESA administration, 23) environmental 
education, 24) alternative schools for American Indians, 25) 
youth options and open enrollment transportation.  Elementary 
and Secondary Sch. Aids at 14-25.   
No. 97-3174 
 
17
THE SCHOOL LEVY TAX CREDIT 
 
¶13 The school levy tax credit is paid to municipalities, 
in contrast to equalization aid and categorical aid, which are 
paid to school districts.  Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 
1.  See also Wis. Stat. §§ 20.835(3)(b), 79.10, 79.14.  The tax 
credit is designed to reduce property taxes.  Id.  In 1998-99, 
on a statewide level, the school levy credit reduced the school 
portion of tax bills by 16.8% on average.  Elementary and 
Secondary Sch. Aids at 29. 
 
¶14 In addition to the school levy tax credit, district 
increases funded by local taxes are limited by a fixed amount, 
termed a "revenue limit."  Wis. Stat. § 121.91.  Revenue limits 
may only be exceeded if residents in a district pass a voter 
referendum.  § 121.91(3).  A school district may be penalized if 
the school district exceeds the maximum allowed revenue under 
§ 121.91.  § 121.92. 
B. 
Procedural History 
 
¶15 We now turn to an examination of the procedural 
history of this case.  The Plaintiffs initiated this action in 
October 1995.  Thereafter, the president of the Wisconsin 
Education Association Council (WEAC) and other teachers ("the 
Intervening 
Plaintiffs") 
intervened. 
 
The 
Plaintiffs, 
Intervening Plaintiffs, and Defendants filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment on February 24, 1997.   
No. 97-3174 
 
18
¶16 The Petitioners13 contend that the needs of Wisconsin 
students are changing and that the school finance system has not 
kept up with those needs.  They contend that the perceived 
inequities in the system violate the uniformity clause and the 
Equal Protection Clause, contrary to the Wisconsin Constitution. 
 The inequality stems from a failure "to adequately adjust for 
the disparity in tax base."  (Pl.-Pet'r's Br. at 4.)  As a 
result, property wealth dictates educational opportunity in this 
state, the Petitioners argue. 
¶17 According to the Petitioners, categorical aids have 
been reduced, which "effectively restricts district spending by 
preventing the school board from compensating for the reduced 
state aid with additional property tax revenue."  (Intervening 
Pl.-Pet'r's Br. at 12.)  This results in school districts 
shifting funds away from regular programs and into categorical 
programs.  As a result, some districts are unable to retain 
teaching positions or maintain school facilities.  Other 
districts have cut their offerings in advanced placement or 
multiple foreign languages.   
¶18 The Petitioners further contend that revenue limits 
prevent school districts from raising necessary funding.  For 
                     
13 We refer to the Plaintiffs and Intervening Plaintiffs 
collectively as "Petitioners," except when referring to the 
procedural history of this case.  Throughout this opinion, we 
also identify specific arguments made by either the Plaintiffs 
or the Intervening Plaintiffs in their briefs as "Plaintiffs-
Petitioners," or "Intervening Plaintiffs-Petitioners."  
No. 97-3174 
 
19
instance, 
revenue 
limits 
prohibit 
school 
districts 
from 
purchasing and implementing new technology.   
¶19 Moreover, the Petitioners argue that there has been a 
significant increase in "high need" students in Wisconsin.  High 
need students include impoverished children, disabled children, 
and children with limited English skills.  Additional programs 
have been mandated by either the state or the federal government 
for these high need students, but without necessarily increasing 
funding for the programs. 
¶20 Finally, 
the 
Intervening 
Plaintiffs-Petitioners 
contend that charter schools and the Milwaukee Parental School 
Choice Program pull students out of the public schools.  This in 
turn decreases the number of pupils, or members, in a school 
district, reducing the amount of funding the district receives. 
 
¶21 The circuit court, the Honorable Richard J. Callaway 
presiding, found that under Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d 469, the school 
finance system is constitutional and granted the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment.  The court first noted that all 
children in this state have an equal right to education.  
However, the Plaintiffs "mistakenly framed the issue as whether 
the State distributes its school money in a manner which 
equalizes local budgets rather than whether the children of 
Wisconsin . . . are receiving the education to which they are 
entitled."  The court then concluded that the Plaintiffs and 
Intervening Plaintiffs had not overcome the strong presumption 
of constitutionality that statutes enjoy.  See, e.g., United 
States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963).   
No. 97-3174 
 
20
 
¶22 The school finance system does not violate the 
uniformity clause of the constitution, the circuit court found, 
because 
according 
to 
this 
court's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
uniformity clause in Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 492 (Ceci, J. 
plurality); 148 Wis. 2d at 514 (Steinmetz, J., concurring), the 
constitution does not require that the educational opportunities 
provided by school districts be absolutely equal.   
 
¶23 The circuit court also determined that the school 
finance system does not violate equal protection.  The court 
repeatedly noted that the Plaintiffs and Intervening Plaintiffs 
failed to give virtually any evidence relating to the quality of 
education students receive in Wisconsin, and therefore, the 
court could not ascertain whether students are being deprived of 
their right to an education.  The state has significantly 
increased its total state aid to the public schools, and the 
increase 
in 
state 
aid 
outweighs 
any 
disproportionate 
distribution of tax credit to wealthy property owners.  The 
court further recognized that the current system provides 
schools across the board with more state aid than the system at 
issue in Kukor.  The schools face the same problems that they 
did when the Kukor court reviewed the system, and the Kukor 
court was unpersuaded by those facts.   
¶24 In 
sum, 
the 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
the 
Plaintiffs and Intervening Plaintiffs did not demonstrate the 
school finance system's negative impact on education.  Without 
such evidence, the court had no way to ascertain "the magnitude 
No. 97-3174 
 
21
of any deficiencies in the State's effort to fulfill its duty to 
provide students with a basic education." 
¶25 The court of appeals agreed that the plaintiffs did 
not demonstrate any material difference between the current 
system and the system at issue in Kukor.  Vincent, slip op. at 
6.  In other words, no significant disparities exist between the 
aid given under either system.  Slip op. at 28-29.  Moreover, 
the court found no evidence of children who do not receive at 
least a basic education.  Slip op. at 32-33.  In fact, the court 
concluded, "the evidence suggests that the state is providing 
greater aid to school districts than it did at the time Kukor 
was decided."  Slip op. at 33. 
¶26 Judge Dykman concurred in the court of appeals' 
decision, but noted the record demonstrated "that lower spending 
school districts are laboring under very difficult conditions." 
 Vincent, slip op. at 35 (Dykman, J., concurring).  The 
concurrence also lamented that Kukor contained no test for the 
court of appeals to use in assessing the current finance system 
and that "substantially improved programs are needed in our less 
affluent school districts."  Slip op. at 36.  
¶27 In part II of this opinion we analyze art. X, § 3 in 
light of its constitutional history and this court's past 
precedent.  We affirm Kukor, but explain further the Kukor 
definition of equal opportunity for an education.  In parts III 
and IV we address whether the current school finance system 
violates art. X, § 3 and art. I, § 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  
No. 97-3174 
 
22
II 
 
¶28 We begin by interpreting the uniformity clause in art. 
X, § 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which states that the 
district schools "shall be as nearly uniform as practicable."14  
We interpret constitutional provisions de novo.  Thompson v. 
Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 N.W.2d 123 (1996).  We 
benefit, however, from the analyses of the circuit court and the 
court of appeals. 
 
¶29 We recognize that "the clear purpose of art. X, § 3, 
was to compel the exercise of the power to the extent 
designated."  Zweifel v. Joint Dist. No. 1, Belleville, 76 Wis. 
2d 648, 658, 251 N.W.2d 822 (1977).  It is a "fundamental 
principle" that the Wisconsin Constitution limits legislative 
power.  Manitowoc v. Manitowoc Rapids, 231 Wis. 94, 97, 285 N.W. 
403 (1939).  See also State ex rel. Dudgeon v. Levitan, 181 Wis. 
326, 339, 193 N.W. 499 (1923); Pauly v. Keebler, 175 Wis. 428, 
439, 185 N.W. 554 (1921); Outagamie County v. Zuehlke, 165 Wis. 
32, 35, 161 N.W. 6 (1917).  In Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 
564, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976), we specifically stated that "the 
                     
14 Wisconsin Const. art. X, § 3District schools; tuition; 
sectarian instruction; released timestates: 
The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment 
of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as 
practicable; and such schools shall be free and without charge 
for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years; 
and no sectarian instruction shall be allowed therein; but the 
legislature by law may, for the purpose of religious instruction 
outside the district schools, authorize the release of students 
during regular school hours.  
No. 97-3174 
 
23
search is not for a grant of power to the legislature but for a 
restriction thereon."  Moreover, it is  "a limitation upon the 
broad power of the state to educate its citizens through the 
establishment and operation of schools.  The limitations are 
precisely stated:  District schools, uniformity, and free 
tuition for certain ages."  Zweifel, 76 Wis. 2d at 658.  See 
also Manitowoc, 231 Wis. at 97-98; Zuehlke, 165 Wis. at 35. 
¶30 Three 
sources 
guide 
our 
interpretation 
of 
a 
constitutional provision:  "the plain meaning of the words in 
the context used; the constitutional debates and the practices 
in existence at the time of the writing of the constitution; and 
the earliest interpretation of the provision by the legislature 
as manifested in the first law passed following adoption."  Id. 
¶31 The word "uniform" in the context of art. X, § 3 
plainly refers to the "character of instruction" provided in the 
public schools.  In T.B. Scott Lumber Co. v. Oneida County and 
another, 72 Wis. 158, 161, 39 N.W. 343 (1888), this court found 
that the organization of a township school system15 did not 
violate the uniformity clause under art. X, § 3.  By finding the 
township school system "uniform," this court implied that it did 
not equate equal acreage with "uniformity."  Suzanne M. Steinke, 
The Exception to the Rule:  Wisconsin's Fundamental Right to 
Education and Public School Financing, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 1387, 
                     
15 A township school system was organized and taxed through 
a town.  Patzer, Public Education in Wisconsin at 63.  Under 
this system, independent school districts became sub-districts 
of the greater township school unit.  Id.   
No. 97-3174 
 
24
1399 [hereinafter, The Exception to the Rule].  Later, in State 
ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 290, 221 N.W. 860 (1928), 
we determined that the uniformity clause in art. X, § 3 related 
to the "character of instruction" at the public schools after 
they were established, not the "method of forming school 
districts," or fixing district boundaries.  "Character of 
instruction" was described as "the training that these schools 
should give to the future citizens of Wisconsin."  Id.  These 
representative 
cases 
demonstrate 
that 
from 
our 
earliest 
jurisprudence on, we have construed the uniformity clause to 
relate to the "character of instruction" offered in the public 
schools, and not the size, boundaries, or composition of the 
school districts.  See also The Exception to the Rule, 1995 Wis. 
L. Rev. at 1400. 
¶32 The practices in existence around the time of the 
constitutional conventions further guide our interpretation of 
Wis. Const. art. X, § 3.  Before the mid-1800's, elementary and 
secondary schools were generally privately funded.  Erik LeRoy, 
The Egalitarian Roots of the Education Article of the Wisconsin 
Constitution:  Old History, New Interpretation, Busé v. Smith 
Criticized, 
1981 
Wis. 
L. 
Rev. 
1325, 
1344 
[hereinafter, 
Egalitarian Roots].  See also The Exception to the Rule, 1995 
Wis. L. Rev. at 1391.  The territorial government in 1836 
created a "district school" system that was financed partially 
by taxes, but still in large part by private subscription.  
Egalitarian Roots, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. at 1344-45. 
No. 97-3174 
 
25
 
¶33 Several factors produced an "impetus" for free public 
school education in Wisconsin.  Egalitarian Roots, 1981 Wis. L. 
Rev. at 1347.  First, some viewed public schools as an 
opportunity to eliminate distinctions between the wealthy and 
the poor.16  Id. at 1346.  Others viewed public schools as a way 
to integrate the swell of new immigrants with East Coast 
"transplants."  Id. at 1347.  Finally, others simply wanted to 
use state funds to "to pay for education."  Id. at 1348. 
 
¶34 It appears that by the time of the 1846 constitutional 
convention, there was general support for a constitutional 
provision on education.  Egalitarian Roots, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. at 
1348 and n.101.  The 1846 constitutional convention manifested 
its support for education by devoting 500,000 acres of land, 
which the federal government was to give to Wisconsin upon 
attaining statehood.  Id. at 1349.  Unfortunately, however, no 
debates ensued relating to the draft of art. X, § 3 at either 
the 
1846 
or 
1848 
constitutional 
conventions 
because 
the 
provision was wholly uncontroversial.  Id. at 1350.    
 
¶35 Finally, we examine the early state statutes on school 
finance.  The state laws of 1848 contained a number of statutory 
provisions 
relating 
to 
the 
public 
schools. 
 
The 
most 
comprehensive statute on public schools included a detailed 
section on local taxes17 and a section on the distribution of 
                     
16 The suffrage movement has also been credited with 
promoting public education.  Egalitarian Roots, 1981 Wis. L. 
Rev. at 1346 n.93.    
17 Laws of 1848Of Taxes for School Purposes: 
No. 97-3174 
 
26
                                                                  
Sec. 90.  It shall be the duty of the supervisors 
of the towns in this state to assess the taxes voted 
by every school district in their town, and also all 
other 
taxes provided 
in 
this chapter 
chargeable 
against such district or town upon the taxable 
property of the district or town respectively, and to 
place the same on the town assessment roll, in the 
column of school taxes and the same shall be collected 
and returned by the town treasurer in the same manner 
and for the same compensation as town taxes. 
Sec. 91.  The supervisors of each town shall 
assess upon the taxable property of said town a sum 
not less than one half of the amount received by said 
town from the school fund of this state, and the same 
shall be collected and returned in the same manner as 
is provided in the preceding section and shall be 
apportioned to the several school districts in the 
town in proportion to the number of children in each 
district between the ages of four and twenty years for 
the support of schools therein. 
Sec. 92.  The supervisors shall also assess upon 
the taxable property of their township two and a half 
mills on each dollar of the valuation thereof in each 
year which shall be apportioned to the several school 
districts in the townships for the support of schools 
therein, and the same shall be levied, callected [sic] 
and returned in the same manner as is provided in the 
preceding section. 
Sec. 93.  Each school district at any regularly 
called meeting of the legal voters of said district 
may raise an additional tax to defray the expenses of 
teachers wages and contingent expenses: and said tax 
shall be levied collected and returned as the town 
taxes provided for in this act:  Provided, that when a 
tax shall be voted in any school district meeting, the 
notice for such meeting shall specify the object of 
raising such tax. 
Sec. 94.  The supervisors on delivery of the 
warrant for the collection of taxes to the town 
treasurer, shall also deliver to said treasurer a 
written statement of the amount of school taxes, the 
amount 
raised 
for 
district 
purposes 
on 
taxable 
property of each district in the town, the amount 
belonging to any new district on the division of the 
former district and the names of all persons having 
judgments 
assessed under 
the 
provisions of 
this 
No. 97-3174 
 
27
income of the school fund.  "An Act in Relation to Public 
Schools," Laws of 1848, p. 240-41, 243.  Significantly, Section 
91 of the statute required each town receiving state funds to 
match at least half of the amount donated by the state.  Section 
92 set the property tax at "two and a half mills on each 
dollar."  Section 93 provided for an additional tax that could 
be raised after a vote was taken to fund teachers' wages and 
expenses.  The school fund provision stated that towns would 
receive interest from the school fund "in proportion to the 
number of children in such town . . . ."  Section 104, 
Distribution of Income of the School Fund, Laws of 1848, p. 243. 
 
¶36 The plain meaning, the practices around the time of 
the constitutional convention, and the early statutes all 
indicate that art. X, § 3 was intended to refer to the character 
of the instruction given at the public schools. 
¶37 We now turn to this court's more recent precedent 
regarding school finance.  This court has directly examined the 
                                                                  
chapter, upon the taxable property of any district 
with the amount payable to such person on account 
thereof. 
Sec. 95.  The town treasurer of each town shall 
retain in his hands out of the moneys collected by him 
the full amount of the school tax collected on the 
assessment roll, and hold the same subject to the 
order of the district treasurer. 
Sec. 96.  Said treasurer shall from time to time 
apply to the county treasurer for all school moneys 
belonging to his town or the districts thereof, and on 
the receipt of the moneys to be apportioned to the 
districts, he shall notify the town clerk of the 
amount to be apportioned. 
  
No. 97-3174 
 
28
constitutionality of the state school finance system twice in 
the last 25 years.  At issue in Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 556, were 
two statutes that created negative aid for certain school 
districts, or reduced the positive aid those districts could 
have received.  The plaintiffs, the negative aid school 
districts and property taxpayers residing in the negative aid 
school districts, argued that the negative aid statutes were 
unconstitutional.  Their main argument was that the statutory 
negative aid provisions violated the rule of uniform taxation, 
articulated in art. VIII, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 554.  Additionally, the court addressed 
whether negative aid was unconstitutional under art. X, §§ 3 and 
4 and art. I, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Id. at 562.    
¶38 The court first examined whether the statutes violated 
the uniformity clause of Wis. Const. art. X, § 3.  The court 
specifically considered whether art. X, § 3 requires the 
legislature "to provide an equal opportunity for education for 
all school children in the state."  Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 562.  
The court recognized that while the United States Constitution 
does not require the establishment of schools, San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the 
Wisconsin Constitution does contain that requirement.  Busé, 74 
Wis. 2d at 564 (quoting Wis. Const. art. X, § 3).  Besides 
establishing the public schools, art. X, § 3 also states that 
the public schools must be "as nearly uniform as practicable" 
and that children in the state may attend the public schools 
without charge.  Id. at 565.   
No. 97-3174 
 
29
¶39 Having 
set 
forth 
the 
pertinent 
constitutional 
provisions, the court held the framers of the constitution 
intended the phrase "as nearly uniform as practicable" to refer 
to the "character of instruction" at the district schools.  Id. 
at 566 (quoting State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 
289-90, 221 N.W. 860, 223 N.W. 123 (1928)).  The court further 
stated that "[e]quality of opportunity for education is equated 
with the right of all school children to attend a public school 
free of charge . . . ," id. at 565, and equal opportunity for 
education is a fundamental right.  Id. at 567.  However, the 
court concluded that according to the plain meaning of art. X, 
§ 3 and constitutional history, art. X, § 3 does not require 
educational opportunity to be absolutely uniform.  Id. at 568. 
¶40 With 
regard 
to 
art. 
X, 
§ 4 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, the court examined whether local district control 
of funding was, in some measure, required by the constitution.  
Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 570.  The court again carefully examined the 
language of the constitution, the constitutional debates, and 
the early legislative enactments to determine that "[l]ocal 
districts 
retain 
the 
control 
to 
provide 
educational 
opportunities over and above those required by the state and 
they retain the power to raise and spend revenue ' . . . for the 
support of common schools therein . . . . '"  Id. at 570-72. 
¶41 The court then found the negative aid provisions 
unconstitutional in light of the uniform tax rule in art. VIII, 
§ 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The court set forth the 
limitations on the power to tax, noting that "the purpose of [a] 
No. 97-3174 
 
30
tax must be one which pertains to the public purpose of the 
district within which the tax is to be levied and raised."  Id. 
at 577.  The state does not have the power to tax a local entity 
"'for a purely local purpose.'"  Id. at 576 (quoting Thomas M. 
Cooley, Law of Taxation, § 86, pp. 211, 212 (1924)).  As such, 
the court concluded, "the state cannot compel one school 
district to levy and collect a tax for the direct benefit of 
other school districts, or for the sole benefit of the state."  
Id. at 579. 
¶42 Finally, the court examined whether the negative aid 
provisions violated equal protection and due process.  Because 
the 
court 
held 
that 
equal 
educational 
opportunity 
is 
a 
fundamental right, the court applied the strict scrutiny test to 
its equal protection analysis.  Id. at 580.  The court then 
concluded that the negative aid provisions survived strict 
scrutiny.  Id. 
¶43 The concurrence viewed negative aid as a state tax.  
Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 581 (Robert W. Hansen, J., concurring).  
However, the concurrence agreed with the majority that a 
municipality cannot be forced to assume obligations that it does 
not ordinarily have.  Id. (quoting Lund v. Chippewa County, 93 
Wis. 640, 648-49, 67 N.W. 927 (1896)). 
¶44 The dissent disagreed that negative aid violated the 
uniform taxation rule.  Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 583 (Abrahamson, J., 
dissenting).  The dissent first noted that it felt the majority 
had not "accorded this statute the proper presumption of 
constitutionality."  Id. at 584.  Moreover, the dissent argued 
No. 97-3174 
 
31
it was "not clear beyond reasonable question that the statute 
conflicts with the constitution," and when in doubt, a court 
must  "'favor . . . the validity of the act.'"  Id. (quoting 
State ex rel. New Richmond v. Davidson, 114 Wis. 563, 579-80, 88 
N.W. 596, 90 N.W. 1067 (1902)). 
¶45 The dissent articulated the issue before the court as 
"whether the 'negative aid' statute violates the public purpose 
doctrine . . . ."  Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 589.  The dissent  found 
that negative aid "applies across the state to all school 
districts," and "[n]o one school district is singled out to 
support another school district or state education."  Id. at 
594.  Moreover, the dissent felt that negative aid should not be 
invalidated just because some, but not all, districts have to 
pay it.  Id.  The dissent concluded that the negative aid 
provisions were consistent with precedent.  Id. at 594-95.  
¶46 More recently, in Kukor v. Grover, the plurality and 
concurrence agreed that under art. X, § 3 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution each student is guaranteed a basic education.18 148 
Wis. 2d at 503 (Ceci, J., plurality); id. at 514 (Steinmetz, J., 
                     
18 We have adopted the United States Supreme Court's 
treatment of plurality opinions in applying the holdings of that 
Court.  Lounge Management v. Town of Trenton, 219 Wis. 2d 13, 
21-22, 580 N.W.2d 156 (1998); Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 
245, 284, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998) (Crooks, J., concurring).  In a 
plurality "'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments 
on the narrowest grounds.'"  Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 [] (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and 
Stevens, JJ.)).  See also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 
193 (1977).   
No. 97-3174 
 
32
concurring).  The plurality and concurrence further agreed that 
education does not have to be absolutely uniform to satisfy art. 
X, § 3.19  Id. at 487 (Ceci, J., plurality); id. at 514 
(Steinmetz, 
J., 
concurring). 
 
Second, 
the 
plurality 
and 
concurrence 
held 
that 
the 
legislature's 
fiscal 
decisions 
regarding education are entitled to great deference.  Id. at 
502-03 (Ceci, J., plurality); id. at 512 (Steinmetz, J., 
concurring).  Third, the plurality and concurrence held that it 
is not necessary to analyze the school funding system under 
strict scrutiny, because equal allocation of state resources is 
not a fundamental right.20  Id. at 498 (Ceci, J., plurality); id. 
at 513 (Steinmetz, J., concurring). 
 
¶47 The dissent characterized the state school finance 
system as "fundamentally flawed" because the state, according to 
the dissent, did not take educational need into account when 
distributing funds.  Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 516 (Bablitch, J., 
dissenting).  The dissent noted that "character of instruction" 
had been defined by this court as "'services, procedures, 
opportunities or rules' provided in district schools."  Id. at 
520 (quoting Zweifel v. Joint Dist. No. 1, Belleville, 76 Wis. 
                     
19 We also note that the plurality viewed the "character of 
instruction" that must be uniform as the standards set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 121.02, such as "minimum standards for teacher 
certification, minimal number of school days, and standard 
school curriculum."  Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 492-93, 
436 N.W.2d 568 (1989).  
20 However, the court recognized that equal access to 
education is a fundamental right.  Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 496.  
No. 97-3174 
 
33
2d 648, 653, 251 N.W.2d 822 (1977)).  The dissent then pointed 
to the circuit court's findings, which indicated the failure of 
the school finance system.  Id. at 522-24.  In particular, the 
dissent criticized the finance system's method of funding 
"special needs" programs, leaving school districts with little 
choice but to draw funds from "regular" programs to be used for 
"special needs."  Id. at 525.  The dissent felt that the 
evidence demonstrated the finance system's failure to provide 
children with "a uniform opportunity to become an educated 
person."  Id. at 526. 
¶48 Our decision in Kukor laid the foundation for the 
right that we explain today.  Recently, a number of states 
considering the constitutionality of school finance systems have 
turned toward the notion of educational adequacy as a better 
approach than previous educational equality analyses.  See, 
e.g., McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ. and 
others, 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993) (quoting Rose v. 
Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989)); 
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979).  The 
adequacy approach to school finance refers to an examination of 
"the quality of the educational services delivered to children 
in disadvantaged districts . . . ."  Peter Enrich, Leaving 
Equality Behind:  New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 
Vand. L. Rev. 101, 109 (1995) [hereinafter, Leaving Equality 
Behind].   
¶49 Courts have turned toward adequacy as an alternative 
way to analyze school finance systems because previous decisions 
No. 97-3174 
 
34
centered on equality have not lessened the disparity between 
school districts.  Leaving Equality Behind, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 
102-03.  Focusing on adequacy, it is claimed, has a number of 
benefits.  Among other benefits, the adequacy approach is 
"grounded in broadly shared societal values concerning the 
importance of education and the obligation to provide for the 
basic needs of society's least advantaged."  Id. at 170.  The 
adequacy approach also may be appealing because it does not 
threaten to lower the level of achievement in some districts in 
an effort to create equality.  Id. 
¶50 Under the adequacy approach, a state generally lists 
the types of knowledge that a child should possess to guide a 
legislature in fulfilling its constitutional obligations.  For 
example, Massachusetts articulated the following guidelines: 
 
An educated child must possess "at least the seven 
following capabilities:  (i) sufficient oral and 
written communication skills to enable students to 
function 
in 
a 
complex 
and 
rapidly 
changing 
civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, 
social, and political systems to enable students to 
make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding 
of governmental processes to enable the student to 
understand 
the 
issues 
that 
affect 
his 
or 
her 
community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-
knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and 
physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the 
arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her 
cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient 
training or preparation for advanced training in 
either academic or vocational fields so as to enable 
each 
child 
to 
choose 
and 
pursue 
life 
work 
intelligently; and (vii) sufficient level of academic 
or vocational skills to enable public school students 
to compete favorably 
with their 
counterparts in 
No. 97-3174 
 
35
surrounding states, in academics or in the job 
market." 
McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554 (quoting Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212).  
This type of standard articulates the content of an adequate 
education.  Leaving Equality Behind, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 176.  
Courts that have used this approach do not attempt to "displace 
the legislative function of identifying realistic parameters for 
the state's ambitions, but rather [attempt] to serve as a goad 
or as a backstop to the legislature's accomplishment of that 
task."  Id.  In Massachusetts, it was expected that limited 
judicial intervention would likely be "quite productive."  Id. 
¶51 An equal opportunity for a sound basic education is 
one that will equip students for their roles as citizens and 
enable them to succeed economically and personally.  The 
legislature has articulated a standard for equal opportunity for 
a sound basic education in Wis. Stat. §§  118.30(1g)(a) and 
121.02(L).  Section 118.30(lg)(a) states that "each school board 
shall adopt pupil academic standards in mathematics, science, 
reading and writing, geography and history." Section 121.02(L) 
requires 
that 
"each 
school 
board 
shall . . . provide 
instruction" in several subjects, according to school grades. 
¶52 By grounding the standard in statutes, we reiterate 
our position in Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 503, 505 n.14, wherein we 
stated that we defer to the legislature because it "is uniquely 
equipped to evaluate and respond to such questions of public 
policy . . . ."  As such, we defer here to the legislature's 
No. 97-3174 
 
36
wisdom in choosing which core subjects21 should be involved in 
providing an equal opportunity for a sound basic education.22  
¶53 Further, we note that the reason for articulating the 
standard in terms of equality and adequacy is to guarantee "that 
each district can provide its students with an acceptable basic 
level of educational services."  Leaving Equality Behind, 48 
Vand. L. Rev. at 112.  The objective is to adopt a standard that 
will "equaliz[e] outcomes, not merely inputs."  Id. at 151. 
III 
 
¶54 We now consider the Petitioners' argument that the 
statutory school finance system set forth in Wis. Stat. ch. 121, 
and Wis. Stat. §§ 79.10 and 79.14, lacks uniformity under art. 
X, § 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  A party challenging a 
statute must prove that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Norquist v. Zeuske, 211 Wis. 2d 241, 250, 564 
                     
21 The opportunity to be proficient in these core subjects 
must be as equal as practicable; the performance on proficiency 
tests is not expected to be equal.  This means that poor student 
performance on proficiency tests in school districts is not, 
without much more, an indicia of the unconstitutionality of the 
state school finance system.  
22 Wisconsin Stat. § 118.30 (1997-98) was the result of a 
coordinated effort on the part of both the executive and 
legislative branches of Wisconsin state government.  For 
instance, the state superintendent is responsible for general 
pupil assessments given in the 4th, 8th, and 10th grade, 
§ 118.30(1)(a), and the department must develop a high school 
graduation examination based on pupil academic standards if 
academic standards are issued by the governor.  § 118.30(1)(b). 
 In accepting and applying the standard set forth today, this 
court is cognizant of its role, and the respective roles of the 
other co-equal branches of government in Wisconsin.   
No. 97-3174 
 
37
N.W.2d 748 (1997).  "Constitutional challenges to a statute must 
overcome a strong presumption of constitutionality," and the 
presumption of constitutionality is greatest for tax statutes.  
Id.  We make every effort to construe a statute consistent with 
the constitution.  Id.  We conclude the Petitioners have not 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory school 
finance system violates art. X, § 3.  The state adequately funds 
each school district to provide for a basic education, and any 
disparity between districts is a result of district revenue-
raising capacity above the state's guaranteed tax base.  The 
right to an equal opportunity for a sound basic education has 
not been shown to be violated by the present school finance 
system. 
 
¶55 We begin by briefly summarizing the Petitioners' 
arguments relating to their challenge under art. X, § 3 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Both the Plaintiffs-Petitioners and the 
Intervening Plaintiffs-Petitioners argue that the school finance 
system fails because, they contend, the state does not equalize 
financial resources between school districts.  (Pl.-Pet'r's Br. 
at 41; Intervening Pl.-Pet'r's Br. at 33.)  The Plaintiffs-
Petitioners specifically argue that the Legislature should 
"eliminate the tax base disparities from the system so districts 
that tax the same (at whatever level they choose), spend the 
same."  (Pl.-Pet'r's Br. at 71.)   
¶56 The Intervening Plaintiffs-Petitioners argue that the 
state should create a school finance system that "recognizes, 
rather than ignores, differing needs of both property-poor 
No. 97-3174 
 
38
districts and high needs students."  (Intervening Pl.-Pet'r's 
Br. at 34.)  Essentially, the Intervening Plaintiffs-Petitioners 
would like the state school financing system to adjust the 
financial resources distributed to school districts to take into 
account the cost of educating high need students.  (Intervening 
Pl.-Pet'r's Br. at 35.)  The Intervening Plaintiffs-Petitioners 
also would like the state to formulate objective standards to 
measure whether students are receiving at least a basic 
education.  (Intervening Pl.-Pet'r's Br. at 34.) 
¶57 Historically, this court has held that disparity in 
the revenue-raising capacity of a school district does not 
constitute a violation of the uniformity clause.  As we stated 
earlier, in Zilisch, 197 Wis. at 289, we considered whether the 
phrase, "as nearly uniform as practicable," referred to the 
method of establishing school districts, or to maintaining 
schools after the districts were established.  The court looked 
to the language of art. X, § 3, which refers to "the 
establishment of district schools," for guidance.  Id.  This 
language revealed that the framers applied the uniformity clause 
to the schools themselves, not to the creation of the school 
districts.  Id. at 290.  The court explained that the provision 
spoke to "the character of instruction that should be given in 
those schools after the districts were formed,with the training 
that these schools should give to the future citizens of 
Wisconsin."  Id. 
¶58 Similarly, in Larson v. State Appeal Board, 56 Wis. 2d 
823, 827-28, 202 N.W.2d 920 (1973), this court again held that 
No. 97-3174 
 
39
art. X, § 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution applies to the 
"character of instruction" in schools, not the nature of the 
boundaries between school districts.  The appellant in Larson 
set forth evidence relating to the equalized valuations, the 
number of students, and the size of the Watertown and Johnson 
Creek school districts.  Id. at 826-27.  The court refused to 
apply an analysis under Wis. Const. art. X, § 3 because the 
court found that those facts did not pertain to the character of 
instruction in the districts.  Id. at 828.  Larson reaffirmed 
that this court does not review the composition of school 
districts under the guise of an art. X, § 3 analysis.   
¶59 We find this conclusion to be very significant.  The 
Petitioners argue that some school districts have low property 
values and therefore cannot raise as much local revenue as other 
districts.  However, according to a careful reading of Zilisch, 
the constitution does not require districts to have uniform 
revenue-raising capacity.  The Zilisch court stated that 
districts are not required to have uniform boundaries, or to be 
established in a uniform manner.  Zilisch, 197 Wis. at 290.  See 
also Joint Sch. Dist. v. Sosalla, 3 Wis. 2d 410, 420, 88 N.W.2d 
357 (1958).  If the framers of the state constitution did not 
intend the districts' boundaries or method of establishment to 
be uniform, then surely the framers could not have envisioned 
the districts' taxing capacity to be uniform, since taxing 
ability and boundaries are interrelated. 
 
¶60 Moreover, the constitution only requires that each 
child receive an equal opportunity for a sound basic education. 
No. 97-3174 
 
40
 Busé recognized that children have a fundamental right to an 
"equal opportunity for education."  See Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 567. 
 We have repeatedly stated this proposition, both before and 
after our pronouncement in Busé.   
¶61 First, in State ex rel. Comstock v. Joint School 
District, 65 Wis. 631, 636-37, 27 N.W. 829 (1886), we stated 
that "when the legislature has provided for each such child the 
privileges of a district school, which he or she may freely 
enjoy, the constitutional requirement in that behalf is complied 
with."  Later, in Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 539, 480 
N.W.2d 460 (1992), we held:  "[t]he uniformity clause clearly 
was intended to assure certain minimal educational opportunities 
for the children of Wisconsin . . . . [T]he uniformity clause 
requires the legislature to provide the opportunity for all 
children 
in 
Wisconsin 
to 
receive 
a 
free 
uniform 
basic 
education."  In Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 894-95, 578 
N.W.2d 602 (1998), this court most recently recognized that 
"art. X, § 3 provides not a ceiling but a floor upon which the 
legislature can build additional opportunities . . . ." 
¶62 A review of other provisions in art. X of the 
Wisconsin Constitution is further helpful in ascertaining the 
framers' intent in drafting art. X, § 3.  Article X, § 5 is the 
one constitutional provision that allocates state funds for the 
public school districts.  It states that income from the school 
fund is to be distributed "in some just proportion to the number 
of children and youth resident therein between the ages of four 
and twenty years . . . ."  This provision articulates the extent 
No. 97-3174 
 
41
of the state's funding obligation to the school districts: to 
provide funding on a per-pupil basis.  The plain meaning of the 
provision 
supports 
this 
viewthe 
framers 
phrased 
their 
directions in purely mathematical terms such as "proportion" and 
"number."  The provision does not include language from which we 
could infer that certain children were to be allocated more 
funding than others based on subjective need alone. 
¶63 An analysis of Wis. Const. art. X, § 4 further 
supports our conclusion.  Article X, § 4 requires towns and 
cities to raise a tax to support the schools located within that 
area.  Wis. Const. art. X, § 4.  In Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 571, we 
recognized the importance of local control under art. X, § 4.  
We 
quoted 
Experience 
Estabrook, 
the 
Chairman 
of 
the 
Constitutional Committee on Education and School Funds during 
the second Wisconsin Constitutional Convention, who argued that 
local funds should support local schools so that all citizens, 
wealthy or poor, would have an "adequate interest" in their 
public schools.  We find his language worth repeating: 
 
If a sufficient sum was not contributed by the school 
fund, the towns should have power to raise more.  This 
provision was directly for the advantage of the poor . 
. . . [A] poor man with a family of children, and no 
fancy lots to dispose of, could understand the 
advantage.  Experience had shown that if nothing was 
contributed 
by 
the 
town, 
the 
common 
schools 
languished, and select schools rose on their ruins.  
The school fund of Connecticut was so large as to be 
sufficient to defray the expenses of the education of 
every child within the limits of the state.  Yet 
there, until a year or two, the district school-system 
had declined.  No adequate interest was felt by the 
people, in common schools, unless they contributed to 
No. 97-3174 
 
42
their support.  To obviate this danger, the committee 
had inserted the section. 
Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 570-71 (quoting Experience Estabrook, 
Journal and Debates Constitutional Convention 1847-48, p. 335). 
 Estabrook's comments on art. X, § 4 demonstrate that above the 
constitutionally mandated state per-pupil expenditures, the 
framers intended local government to contribute a significant 
amount to school districts.  More importantly, Estabrook's 
comments suggest that local school districts may vary in the 
amount they tax and spend on their districts.   
¶64 Other jurisdictions have also upheld their school 
finance systems on the basis that the state provided for a basic 
level of education.  The Minnesota Supreme Court recently 
interpreted the phrase, "general and uniform system of public 
schools," contained in the education clause of the Minnesota 
Constitution, and found that it did not mean "'identical'" or 
"'nearly identical.'"  Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 302, 311 
(Minn. 
1993). 
 
The 
Minnesota 
school 
finance 
system 
was 
constitutional, the court determined, because the evidence did 
not establish "that the basic system is inadequate or that the 
'general 
and 
uniform' 
requirement 
somehow 
implies 
full 
equalization of local referendum levies."  Id. at 312.  The 
court further stated that the inequities in the system did not 
"rise to the level of a constitutional violation."  Id.  Most 
significantly, 
the 
court 
recognized 
that 
the 
system 
was 
constitutional 
because 
it 
continued 
to 
"meet 
the 
basic 
educational needs of all districts."  Id. 
No. 97-3174 
 
43
¶65 The Virginia Supreme Court, in examining the education 
article of the Virginia Constitution, held that it does not 
require "'substantial equality' in spending or programs among or 
within the school divisions in the Commonwealth."  Scott v. 
Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994). 
¶66 Other courts have examined whether the state funds 
each district enough to fulfill state minimum requirements.  The 
Oregon Supreme Court found compliance under the language of the 
Oregon Constitution "if the state requires and provides for a 
minimum of educational opportunities in the district and permits 
the districts to exercise local control over what they desire, 
and can furnish, over the minimum."  Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 
139, 148 (Or. 1976).  Noting that it did not necessarily find 
the school finance system "desirable," the court nevertheless 
held that the system was constitutional. 
¶67 Further, the Colorado Supreme Court cautioned that the 
uniformity provision in the Education Clause of the Colorado 
Constitution did "not prevent a local school district from 
providing 
additional 
educational 
opportunities 
beyond" 
the 
constitutional standard.  Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 
649 P.2d 1005, 1025 (Colo. 1982).  Moreover, the court held that 
the uniformity provision did not require identical per-pupil 
expenditures among school districts.  Id. 
¶68 The 
cases 
from 
other 
jurisdictions 
support 
our 
conclusion that the uniformity clause under Wis. Const. art. X, 
§ 3 does not require absolute uniformity in either educational 
offerings or per-pupil expenditures among school districts.  The 
No. 97-3174 
 
44
cases cited above also demonstrate that a school finance system 
that uniformly funds school districts to provide a basic level 
of education is constitutional.      
¶69 We now turn to the evidence presented in this case.  
The legislature is entitled to deference in its "legislative 
policy involving fiscal-educational decisions."  Kukor, 148 Wis. 
2d at 503 (quoting Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 566).  In Busé, 74 Wis. 
2d at 566, we explained that the legislature "determine[s] what 
uniformity [is] 'practicable.'"  We uphold a circuit court's 
findings of evidentiary or historical fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  Treiber v. Knoll, 135 Wis. 2d 58, 64, 398 
N.W.2d 756 (1987).  The Petitioners made a voluminous record, 
submitting 
numerous 
affidavits, 
depositions, 
and 
other 
materials.  We have carefully perused the record made by the 
Petitioners, and yet we cannot conclude that they have proved 
the 
school 
finance 
system 
is 
unconstitutional 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt. 
¶70 The Plaintiffs-Petitioners attempt to demonstrate that 
some districts "are able to provide more opportunities" in their 
course offerings and technology than other districts.  (Pl.-
Pet'r's Br. at 50, quoting Deputy State Superintendent Steven 
Dold's deposition).  They also attempt to demonstrate that some 
districts maintain better facilities, textbooks, and a larger 
teaching staff.  Finally, they attempt to provide statistical 
and 
financial 
evidence 
showing 
differences 
in 
equalized 
valuations between districts.  They then cite to case law from 
Arizona, Ohio, and Vermont, invalidating school finance systems 
No. 97-3174 
 
45
based on financial differences among the school districts in 
those states. Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. Number 66 v. 
Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); DeRolph v. State of Ohio, 677 
N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) (plurality opinion); Brigham v. State of 
Vermont, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997).  
¶71 The 
Petitioners' 
evidence, 
however 
meticulously 
gathered, fails to demonstrate that any children lack a basic 
education in any school district.  Merely showing disparity of 
the financial resources among school districts is not enough in 
this state to prove a lack of equal opportunity for a sound 
basic education.  As we have discussed above, Wisconsin requires 
districts 
to 
fulfil 
a 
constitutional 
minimum 
educational 
offering, not a maximum.   
¶72 While we recognize that the Petitioners have gathered 
qualitative evidence pertaining to the deteriorating school 
facilities, limited curricula, and lack of computer technology 
of some "property poor" school districts, we agree with the 
Respondents that evidence of the elimination or reduction of 
certain advanced or elective courses from some districts does 
not mean that those school districts fail to offer a basic 
education.  (Resp't's Br. at 71-72.)  We also strongly agree 
with the circuit court that the evidence fails to show that the 
actual basic education being received by the students attending 
these school districts is inferior to that of the students in 
the "property rich" school districts.  There is no evidence, as 
the circuit court noted, of poor standardized test scores, 
No. 97-3174 
 
46
college entrance rates, or the like.  As we have stated, what is 
required is an equal opportunity for a sound basic education. 
 
¶73 Moreover, the present school finance system more 
effectively equalizes the tax base among districts than the 
system did at the time Kukor was decided.  At the time of the 
Kukor decision, the system had only two levels of shared cost.  
Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 476-77.  The present system now includes a 
tertiary level of shared cost.  The effect of the tertiary level 
of shared cost has been to redistribute funds to districts 
spending less, which are those with lower property values.  As 
such, the present system does more to equalize values between 
districts than the system found constitutional in Kukor did. 
¶74 State 
funding has 
also 
significantly 
increased.23  
Kukor was based on figures compiled for the 1985-86 school year. 
 Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 475 nn.1-2.  In 1985-86, the state 
distributed approximately $1.142 billion in state aid.  Kukor, 
148 Wis. 2d at n.2 (citing Basic Facts (1986-87), Wisconsin 
Department of Public Instruction at A-6, A-7).  By 1997-98, in 
comparison, the state appropriated approximately $3.804 billion. 
                     
23 We also note that the state appears to fund "poor" school 
districts much more than it funds "wealthy" districts.  The 
circuit court cited some excellent comparisons of the amount of 
state aid per pupil given to "wealthy" and "poor" school 
districts.  For instance, according to the equalization aid 
estimate for 1996-97, Mequon-Thiensville (a "wealthy" district) 
received $724.61 in equalization aid, which was 10.6% of its 
$6,840.53 costs per pupil.  In comparison, Antigo (a "poor" 
district) received $4,642.05 in equalization aid, which was 
77.2% of its $6,014.20 costs per pupil.  This is but one example 
of the more substantial state aid given to "poor" districts than 
to "wealthy" districts.  
No. 97-3174 
 
47
 Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 4, Table 3.  Between 1987 
and 1998, state aid increased by at least 4.9% every fiscal 
year, and often much more.  Id.  For instance, from the 1995-96 
fiscal year to the 1996-97 fiscal year, state aid increased by 
31.8%.24  Id.  In contrast, the Consumer Price Index only 
reflected increases between 2.3% and 5.4% per year.  Id. 
 
¶75 The 
Petitioners 
also 
contend that 
the 
statutory 
revenue limits are unconstitutional under art. X, § 3.  In 
particular, the Intervening Plaintiffs-Petitioners argue that 
revenue limits most severely affect school districts with 
decreasing student populations, or those with many high needs 
students.  (Intervening Pl.-Pet'r's Br. at 47.)   
¶76 We do not agree that revenue limits adversely affect 
the constitutionality of the school finance system.  Revenue 
limits were included in the 1848 statutes, as we noted earlier. 
 Revenue limits do not absolutely bar school districts from 
increased spendingthey merely require a voter referendum to do 
so.  Moreover, Wis. Stat. § 121.91(4)(f) and (6), as created by 
1997 Wis. Act 27, §§ 2902v and 2903g, minimize the impact of 
revenue limits on school districts with declining enrollments by 
adjusting the method for counting pupils.  Finally, revenue 
limits were intended to provide property tax relief, and 
actually have an equalizing effect, because districts that spend 
                     
24 The state is now committed to funding two-thirds of the 
school districts' cost of education.  1997 Wis. Act 27.  
No. 97-3174 
 
48
less can increase their spending by a greater percentage without 
first seeking a referendum. 
¶77 Finally, 
we 
note 
that 
the 
cases 
cited 
by 
the 
Plaintiffs-Petitioners 
are 
distinguishable 
on 
the 
facts.  
Brigham is distinguishable because the Vermont Constitution does 
not contain a provision requiring local funding of school 
districts.  Brigham, 692 A.2d at 392.  In DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 
742-745, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that many districts in 
the Ohio public school system were wholly unable to provide the 
basic 
resources 
necessary 
to 
educate 
the 
students, 
and 
therefore, the finance system was in violation of the Ohio 
Constitution.  This is not the case in Wisconsin where the basic 
resources are being provided.  The school finance system at 
issue in Roosevelt relied heavily on local property taxation and 
"only partial attempts at equalization."  Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 
815.  Again, the state funds two-thirds of the school districts' 
expenditures 
in 
Wisconsin 
and 
employs 
three 
levels 
of 
equalization aid.  Certainly, this is not heavy reliance on 
local 
property 
taxation 
or 
a 
half-hearted 
attempt 
at 
equalization. 
¶78 In sum, we conclude the Petitioners have not proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory school finance 
system violates art. X, § 3.  The state adequately funds each 
school district to provide for a basic education, and any 
disparity between districts is a result of district revenue-
raising capacity above the state's guaranteed tax base.  The 
right to an equal opportunity for a sound basic education has 
No. 97-3174 
 
49
not been shown to be violated by the current school finance 
system.         
IV 
 
¶79 We now address whether the current school finance 
system violates equal protection under art. I, § 1 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.25  First, we must determine whether to 
apply a strict scrutiny review or a rational basis review.  The 
Petitioners urge us to apply a strict scrutiny standard of 
review.   
¶80 Equal protection guarantees the "right to be free from 
invidious discrimination in statutory classifications and other 
governmental activity."26  Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d at 901 (quoting 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980)).  We apply a strict 
scrutiny review of a statute when the legislative classification 
interferes with a fundamental right or is created on the basis 
of a suspect criterion.  State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 468, 
484 N.W.2d 138 (1992).  If a fundamental right or a suspect 
                     
25 Article I, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution states: 
All people are born equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent rights; among these are life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these 
rights, governments are instituted, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed. 
 
 
26 We treat the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin 
Constitution as equivalent.  Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 
900-01 n.28, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998).  As such, we refer to cases 
analyzing either the Fourteenth Amendment or art. I, § 1 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  
No. 97-3174 
 
50
class is not involved, then a court reviews whether the 
statute's 
classification 
"rationally 
furthers 
a 
purpose 
identified by the legislature."  Id.  Fundamental rights are 
based on the Constitution either explicitly or implicitly.  
State v. Martin, 191 Wis. 2d 646, 652, 530 N.W.2d 420 (Ct. App. 
1995) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 33 (1973)).           
¶81 We 
acknowledge 
that 
Wisconsin 
children 
have 
a 
fundamental right to an equal opportunity for a sound basic 
education, and that right is based on art. X, § 3 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.27  Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 496 (quoting 
Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 567).  However, in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973), reh'g 
denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973), the United States Supreme Court 
held that the Equal Protection Clause does not require "absolute 
equality or precisely equal advantages" on the basis of wealth. 
 We also have stated that while the right to an equal 
opportunity for education is fundamental in Wisconsin, absolute 
equality in per-pupil expenditures is not mandated.  Kukor, 148 
Wis. 2d at 496. 
¶82 The Petitioners argue that we should review their 
equal protection claim relating to financial disparities between 
districts under strict scrutiny.  They argue that since this 
                     
27 We note that children do not have a fundamental right to 
an education under the United States Constitution.  San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
No. 97-3174 
 
51
court has recognized the equal opportunity for education as a 
fundamental right, strict scrutiny applies.   
¶83 We carefully distinguish between the fundamental right 
to an equal opportunity for a sound basic education under art. 
X, § 3 and the wealth-based arguments the Petitioners make.  In 
other words, the fundamental right to an equal opportunity for a 
sound basic education does not rest on any classification based 
on wealth.  In Kukor we addressed a similar argument.  Citing 
Rodriguez, we concluded that a rational basis standard should be 
applied "because the rights at issue in the case before the 
court are premised upon spending disparities and not upon a 
complete denial of educational opportunity within the scope of 
art. X."28  Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 498.  See also Skeen, 505 
N.W.2d at 316-17 (citing our approach in Kukor with approval).  
Since 
the 
Petitioners' 
argument 
rests 
on 
wealth-based 
classifications and not classifications based on art. X, § 3, we 
apply the rational basis test. 
                     
28 In Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), the 
United States Supreme Court again analyzed whether a school 
funding 
scheme 
violated 
equal 
protection. 
 
The 
Court 
differentiated allegations that "petitioners have been denied a 
minimally adequate education," and the allegations of disparity 
in distributing funds.  Id.  The court found that the 
petitioners had not alleged the denial of a minimally adequate 
education because "they [did] not allege that they receive[d] no 
instruction on even the educational basics."  Id.  Similarly in 
this case, the Petitioners have not alleged a violation of equal 
protection under art. I, § 1, since they do not allege that 
students lack even a basic education.  Their arguments, while 
couched 
in 
terms 
of 
adequacy, 
actually 
allege 
financial 
disparities.     
No. 97-3174 
 
52
¶84 Under the rational basis test, we give great deference 
to legislative classifications.  Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 
245, 264, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998).  We must "'locate or . . . 
construct, if possible, a rationale that might have influenced 
the legislature and that reasonably upholds the legislative 
determination.'"  Id. (quoting Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 
Wis. 2d 356, 371, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980)). 
¶85 The legislative classifications set forth in Wis. 
Stat. ch. 121 are rationally related to the purpose of educating 
Wisconsin's children.  The school financing system provides all 
school districts with a guaranteed tax base.  Moreover, the 
three-tiered shared cost system, which was implemented after 
Kukor was decided, is specifically designed to narrow per pupil 
spending disparities between districts.  The school financing 
system seeks to equalize the tax base, not rate, of the school 
districts.  Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 10.  Arguably, 
the system of taxation may actually penalize wealthier school 
districts because it is designed to tax districts that spend at 
a higher level.  See id. (stating that "[a] school district that 
spends at a higher per pupil level than another will continue to 
face a higher tax rate unless the district is not subject to the 
formula 
because 
its 
local 
tax 
base 
exceeds 
the 
state's 
guaranteed tax base.")  As such, the three-tiered classification 
system is rationally related to the legitimate governmental end 
of providing an equal opportunity for a sound basic education. 
No. 97-3174 
 
53
¶86 Finally, the legislative classifications set forth in 
Wis. Stat. §§ 121.91 and 121.92 relating to revenue limitations 
pass the rational basis test.  We agree with the Respondents 
that revenue limitations "serve the legitimate state purpose of 
reducing the risk that local school boards would use the 
additional state aid to increase local spending by keeping tax 
rates as high as they had been before the infusion of additional 
state 
aid," 
instead 
of 
replacing 
local 
property 
taxes.  
(Resp't's Br. at 85. 
V 
¶87 A majority of this court holds that Wisconsin students 
have a fundamental right to an equal opportunity for a sound 
basic education.  An equal opportunity for a sound basic 
education is one that will equip students for their roles as 
citizens and enable them to succeed economically and personally. 
 The 
legislature 
has 
articulated 
a 
standard 
for 
equal 
opportunity for a sound basic education in Wis. Stat. §§ 
118.30(lg)(a) and 121.02(L) (1997-98) as the opportunity for 
students to be proficient in mathematics, science, reading and 
writing, geography, and history, and to receive instruction in 
the arts and music, vocational training, social sciences, 
health, physical education and foreign language, in accordance 
with their age and aptitude. An equal opportunity for a sound 
basic education acknowledges that students and districts are not 
fungible and takes into account districts with disproportionate 
numbers 
of 
disabled 
students, 
economically 
disadvantaged 
students, and students with limited English language skills.  So 
No. 97-3174 
 
54
long as the legislature is providing sufficient resources so 
that school districts offer students the equal opportunity for a 
sound basic education as required by the constitution, the state 
school finance system will pass constitutional muster.  
¶88 We conclude that the school finance system articulated 
in Wis. Stat. ch. 121 is constitutional under both art. X, § 3 
and art. I, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The Petitioners 
have not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the current school 
financing system violates either art. X, § 3, or art. I, § 1, 
and therefore, they have not made out a prima facie case in 
support of their motion for summary judgment. 
¶89 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON, Justice WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, and Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY join in the standard we have set forth in ¶3, ¶51, and 
¶87.  I am further authorized to state that Justice JON P. 
WILCOX, Justice DAVID T. PROSSER, and Justice DIANE S. SYKES 
join in our decision as to the constitutionality of the present 
school finance system.  
 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 97-3174 
 
55
 
 
 
 
No. 97-3174.jpw 
 
1 
¶90 JON P. WILCOX, J. (concurring).  I agree that the 
Petitioners' constitutional challenge presents a justiciable 
issue for this court.  I also agree that the current system of 
school financing is constitutional and that there is no reason 
to remand the case for further proceedings.   
¶91 However, I do not agree with the test that the 
majority opinion sets forth for examining whether the state 
school financing system violates art. X, § 3 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Therefore, I do not join ¶¶ 3, 48-53, or 87 of 
the majority opinion.   
¶92 Article X, § 3 does not mandate absolute uniformity of 
equal opportunity for education in all school districts in this 
state.  Majority  op. at ¶ 46 (citing Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 
2d 469, 487, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989)(Ceci, J., plurality) and id. 
at 514 (Steinmetz, J., concurring)).  Legislative determinations 
in the area of school finance schemes are entitled to great 
deference by this court.  Majority op. at ¶ 46 (citing Kukor, 
148 Wis. 2d at 502-03 (Ceci, J., plurality) and id. at 512 
(Steinmetz, J., concurring)).   
¶93 Like the majority of this court, I conclude that the 
Petitioners have not demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the present system of school financing is not "as nearly uniform 
as practicable" as guaranteed by art. X, § 3 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
No. 97-3174.sa 
 
1 
 
¶94 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).  The majority opinion written by 
Justice Crooks establishes in paragraphs 3, 51 and 87 a standard 
for interpreting the uniformity provision of article X, § 3 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  I join only paragraphs 3, 51, 87 
and footnote 2 of Justice Crooks' opinion.29  In contrast to the 
                     
29 The defendants at oral argument, unlike the plaintiffs, 
the plaintiff-intervenors, the circuit court and the court of 
appeals, did not request the court to set a standard.  The 
defendants' position at oral argument, like that of the 
concurring justices, Justices David T. Prosser and Diane S. 
Sykes, was that the courts have no role in interpreting article 
X, § 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution; article X, § 3 speaks only 
to the legislature. 
The suggestion that the court should not interpret the 
uniformity provision of article X, § 3 is contrary to the 
language of the constitution and this court's long-standing 
precedent.  "The specific constitutional guarantee of education 
flows from the provision that the legislature provide for the 
establishment of district schools.  Since the [legislature's] 
power to establish schools existed without a specific grant as 
an inherent function of state government . . . the clear purpose 
of article X, § 3, was to compel the exercise of the power to 
the extent designated."  Zweifel v. Joint Dist. No. 1, 76 
Wis. 2d 648, 658, 251 N.W.2d 822 (1977). 
No. 97-3174.sa 
 
2 
majority, however, I would remand the cause to the circuit 
court. 
¶95 Neither the parties nor the courts have had the 
opportunity to consider the state school finance system under 
the constitutional standard set forth in the majority opinion. 
Both the circuit court and court of appeals suggested other 
evidence that might be presented in this case.  The majority 
opinion also points to evidence that is lacking in the record.  
See majority op. at ¶¶ 71, 72.  After establishing a standard of 
                                                                  
A "fundamental principle" of state constitutional law is 
that the Wisconsin Constitution, in contrast with the U.S. 
Constitution, is not a grant of, but a limitation upon, 
legislative power.  "The purpose [of article X, § 3] was not to 
grant a power to the legislature to establish schools, for this 
power would exist without grant, but to compel the exercise of 
the power to the extent designated."  Manitowoc v. Manitowoc 
Rapids, 231 Wis. 94, 97-98, 285 N.W. 403 (1939).  See also Busé 
v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 564, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976) ("the 
search is not for a grant of power to the legislature, but for a 
restriction thereon"); State ex rel. Dudgeon v. Levitan, 181 
Wis. 326, 339, 193 N.W. 499 (1923); Pauly v. Keebler, 175 
Wis. 428, 439, 185 N.W. 554 (1921); Outagamie County v. Zuehlke, 
165 Wis. 32, 36, 161 N.W. 6 (1917).  
Article X, § 3 is "a limitation upon the broad power of the 
state to educate its citizens through the establishment and 
operation of schools.  The limitations are precisely stated: 
District schools, uniformity, and free tuition for certain 
ages."  Zweifel, 76 Wis. 2d at 658. 
I agree with the majority opinion that the task of 
interpreting the uniformity provision of article X, § 3, falls 
on the courts.  If the function of interpreting the Wisconsin 
Constitution were left to the legislature, there would not only 
be a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, but also 
the legislature would be empowered to amend the constitution 
without 
abiding 
by 
the 
constitutional 
requirements 
for 
amendments. 
No. 97-3174.sa 
 
3 
constitutional 
interpretation 
the court 
should 
afford the 
parties an opportunity to develop additional facts, if needed, 
in the circuit court.  Accordingly, I would remand the cause to 
the circuit court for further proceedings.   
¶96 In remanding, however, I note my concerns and those of 
the circuit court, that the state school finance system is 
failing in certain respects.  The state school finance system 
may be failing to provide each of the property-poor districts 
with the necessary resources to provide all students with the 
opportunity for a sound basic education.  The state school 
finance system may be providing inadequate resources to those 
districts with disproportionately large numbers of high needs 
students.  The parties should have a chance to present evidence 
and argument relating to the standard set forth today. 
I 
¶97 The framers of the Wisconsin Constitution recognized 
the importance of education when they created article X 
governing the establishment and funding of public schools.  
Creating a system of free and uniform public schools was 
considered to be among the most essential of the framers' 
tasks.30  Throughout the 1846 and 1848 conventions, the framers 
expressed the desire that all of Wisconsin's students, rich and 
poor, would be educated together in the public schools.31  For 
                     
30 Conrad E. Patzer, Public Education in Wisconsin at 18 
(1924). 
31 See The Convention of 1846 at 574-75 (Milo M. Quaife, 
ed., 1919). 
No. 97-3174.sa 
 
4 
example, the requirement in article X, § 4 that localities 
contribute to school funding was included "directly for the 
advantage of the poor," because it increased the commitment to 
local schools.  Without local support "the common schools 
languished, and select schools rose on their ruins."32 
¶98 The sweeping and revolutionary goals of article X were 
explained by Eleazor Root, the state's first superintendent of 
public instruction and a member of the education committee at 
the second constitutional convention.  Root explained that the 
purpose of article X was to secure permanently to all the 
benefits of a free and comprehensive public school system.  
"None are excluded,  none are condemned by the accidents of 
birth or fortune to grow up in ignorance.  The state acts the 
part of a wise and affectionate parent, and dispenses its bounty 
with an impartial hand to all its children . . . [and] seeks to 
train them up so as to render them useful and honorable 
citizens."33  In State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 
289-290, 221 N.W. 860 (1928), the court summarized the intent of 
the framers as follows: 
 
It is significant that [article X, § 3] applies to the 
"establishment of district schools,"  not to the 
establishment 
of 
school 
districts . . . . 
 
An 
examination of the debates in the conventions that 
framed our present constitution and the constitution 
                     
32 Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 489, 436 N.W.2d 568 
(1989) (quoting Journal and Debates, Constitutional Convention 
at 335 (1847-48)). 
33 Report of the State Superintendent at 13 (Dec. 31, 1849) 
in Plaintiff-Intervenors Appendix at 321. 
No. 97-3174.sa 
 
5 
of 
1846 
(which 
contained 
a 
similar 
provision) 
discloses that the members of those conventions, when 
they were framing the article relating to schools, 
were concerned, not with the method of forming school 
districts, but with the character of instruction that 
should be given in those schools after the districts 
were formed,  with the training that these schools 
should give to the future citizens of Wisconsin. 
¶99 Article X read as a whole demonstrates that the 
framers intended to require the legislature to create and 
finance a school system that is equitable and uniform in 
character 
throughout 
the 
state 
and 
that 
provides 
equal 
educational opportunity for all students.  
¶100 The 
constitution 
"virtually 
declares 
that 
public 
education is a state power and function, based upon the well-
established principle that the whole state is interested in the 
education of the children of the state and that this function 
must be exercised by the people as a whole . . . ."34  The 
framers believed that the creation of free and uniform public 
schools was "the only system on which we could depend for the 
preservation of our liberties."35  The legislature has recognized 
that "education is a state function" and that "the state must 
guarantee that a basic educational opportunity be available to 
each pupil."36 
 
                     
34 Conrad E. Patzer, Public Education in Wisconsin at 37 
(1924). 
35 Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 488 (quoting Journal and Debates, 
Constitutional Convention at 238 (1847-48)). 
36 Wis. Stat. § 121.01 (1997-98). 
No. 97-3174.sa 
 
6 
II 
¶101 The plaintiffs focus their claim on the inequities in 
the per capita student funds caused by the failure to provide 
sufficient equalization aid.37  The plaintiffs focus on the 
"equity approach": they seek to eliminate the disparity among 
school districts by equalizing available resources, 
while 
recognizing that individual school districts should be able to 
spend more for their children's education.  They argue that 
inequalities in the system stem from a failure to adjust 
adequately for the disparity in the property tax base.  
¶102 The framers of the Wisconsin Constitution did not 
intend the school districts' boundaries to be uniform and 
therefore could not have envisioned the school districts' taxing 
and spending capacity to be uniform, since taxing and spending 
ability and school district boundaries are related.38  But the 
state school finance system must provide districts and schools 
                     
37 The 181 plaintiffs in this case include school districts, 
parents, students and taxpayers.  The following non-parties have 
filed briefs in this case: A coalition of state representatives 
and senators, the Mayor of Milwaukee, the ACLU of Wisconsin, the 
Council of Great City Schools, the Institute for Wisconsin's 
Future together with the Wisconsin Coalition for Advocacy, the 
Wisconsin Parent Teachers Association, Governor Tommy Thompson, 
and the Fair Air Coalition. 
38 The requirement of uniformity applies to the districts 
after they are formed, to the character of the instruction 
given, rather than to the means by which the districts are 
established and their boundaries are fixed.  See Larson v. State 
Appeal Bd., 56 Wis. 2d 823, 827, 202 N.W.2d 920 (1973); Joint 
Sch. Dist. v. Sosalla, 3 Wis. 2d 410, 420, 88 N.W.2d 357 (1958); 
State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 289-90, 221 N.W. 
860 (1928). 
No. 97-3174.sa 
 
7 
with the funding needed to meet the constitutional mandate.  The 
record, which is undisputed, shows that school districts vary 
widely in the amount spent per student (ranging from $13,534 to 
$5,301), in the ability to raise dollars for every mill levied, 
and in the actual levy rates. 
¶103 The plaintiff-intervenors, the Wisconsin Education 
Association Council and a number of teachers and school 
administrators from school districts across the state, assert 
that the state school finance system is unconstitutional because 
it does not allow districts with significant numbers of high 
needs students to offer these students an adequate educational 
opportunity.  High needs students include disabled children, 
economically disadvantaged children and children with limited 
skills in the English language.  The State's brief concedes, as 
it must, that it probably costs more per child to educate high 
needs students. 
¶104 A non-uniform education can result from treating 
similarly situated students and school districts differently, 
but it can also result from treating differently situated 
students and school districts in the same way.39  Consequently, 
                     
39 In his dissent in Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 516-17, 525, 
which I joined, Justice William A. Bablitch wrote: 
The fundamental flaw of the state formula is that it 
distributes dollars without regard to educational 
needs.  It assumes that every child in this state 
begins his or her educational journey from the same 
starting point.  If all children began that journey 
from the same starting point, then the formula would 
provide no constitutional objection: every child would 
start with the same opportunity.  That may well have 
No. 97-3174.sa 
 
8 
to ensure that all students have an opportunity for a sound 
basic education, school districts with a disproportionate number 
of high needs students must be provided with extra financial 
resources 
to 
meet 
the 
standard 
that 
is 
constitutionally 
required. 
¶105 The plaintiff-intervenors argue that the current state 
school finance system fails to account for the distinct needs of 
school districts that have a disproportionate number of high 
needs students, so that these school districts are unable to 
provide educational opportunities that are sufficiently uniform 
or basic.40  For example, the plaintiff-intervenors emphasize, 
and the State admits, that the State reimburses districts for 
only approximately 39% of the cost of educating disabled 
                                                                  
been the reality, with few exceptions, in 1848.  It is 
not even close to reality today.  The result is that a 
significant number of school children in this state 
are denied an equal opportunity to become educated 
people. 
 
 . . .  
 
However, a close inspection of the record reveals that 
while some special needs of "exceptional" students are 
being met in overburdened school districts, such 
special needs programs are draining resources and 
staff from regular programs of instruction. 
 
40 The plaintiff-intervenors state the issue in the Reply 
Brief at 16 as follows: 
[W]hether 
the 
combination 
of revenue 
limits and 
declining categorical aids have prevented some of 
Wisconsin's 
children 
from 
receiving 
the 
basic 
education and equal educational opportunity to which 
they are constitutionally entitled. 
 
No. 97-3174.sa 
 
9 
students and 25% of the cost of educating limited English-
speaking 
(LES) 
students. 
 
With 
regard 
to 
economically 
disadvantaged students, the state school finance system has 
provided no extra resources on a statewide basis.41   
¶106 Because the state school finance system fails to 
address the costs of educating high needs students, the 
plaintiff-intervenors argue that schools or school districts 
with a disproportionate number of such students are not able to 
provide anywhere near the educational opportunities of other 
schools or school districts.42  While the state school finance 
system especially fails property-poor school districts with 
                     
41 The 
plaintiff-intervenors 
note 
that 
the 
State 
has 
implicitly accepted that these children require more resources 
by recently instituting the "SAGE" program (Student Achievement 
Guarantee in Education) on a pilot basis, which is aimed at 
reducing class size in high-poverty schools.  Plaintiff-
Intervenors Brief at 14. 
42 One of the biggest problems with the current state school 
finance system, according to the plaintiff-intervenors, is the 
recently adopted revenue limits.  Revenue caps or limits 
restrict the amount of revenue a district can raise from state 
aid and local property taxes.  See Wis. Stat. § 121.90 et seq.  
The base spending limit is calculated from a school district's 
spending in the 1992-93 school year, and a statutorily defined 
flat rate spending increase is allowed each year.  The spending 
increase was $206 per student in 1996-97.  A local school 
district may exceed these revenue limits only by a voter 
referendum.  Plaintiff-Intervenors Brief at 10-11. 
The plaintiff-intervenors argue that these revenue limits 
contribute heavily to a state school finance system that is 
arbitrary and refuses to take into account high needs students. 
 These limits are based, according to the plaintiff-intervenors, 
on the misguided assumptions that all students cost the same to 
educate and that educational needs do not change over time. 
No. 97-3174.sa 
 
10
disproportionate numbers of high needs students, the plaintiff-
intervenors assert that even property-rich school districts that 
have disproportionate numbers of high needs students, such as 
Madison, are unable to offer educational opportunities that are 
uniform with the rest of the state.43  School districts with 
large numbers of high needs students may have to divert funds to 
pay for the higher costs associated with the high needs 
students, leaving the other students at a disadvantage.44 
¶107 Wausau, 
for 
example, 
as 
a 
result 
of 
Hmong 
resettlement, has a kindergarten enrollment of 34% LES students. 
 Because of the high costs associated with educating such 
students, only a small portion of which is reimbursed by the 
state, the Wausau education community faces severe funding 
shortages.  Wausau has been forced to cut staffing and is unable 
to implement certain state-mandated programs.45 
                     
43 For a discussion of the impact of high needs students on 
Madison's school district, see Gia Weier, Heading Toward A 
Crisis?, The Isthmus, May 19, 2000, at 5 (discussing Madison's 
growing problem in providing adequately for its disabled 
students while maintaining a strong curriculum for other 
students). 
44 For challenges to state school finance systems based on 
educational equality and educational adequacy, see, e.g., Rose 
v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); 
McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education, 615 
N.E. 2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. 
Va. 1979); Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions 
in School Finance Reform, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 101 (1995). 
45 See Plaintiff-Intervenors Brief at 38-40 and Appendix at 
271-78. 
No. 97-3174.sa 
 
11
¶108 In Milwaukee the school district suffers the combined 
effects of being a relatively property-poor district along with 
having a disproportionate number of high needs students.  
According to the briefs, which are not disputed, approximately 
70% of Milwaukee's students are economically disadvantaged to 
the extent that they qualify for a free or reduced-cost lunch.  
Over 12,000 of Milwaukee's students are reported as homeless, 
constituting 
more 
than 
10% 
of 
the 
student 
population.46  
Milwaukee educates more than 25% of the state's LES students and 
more than 36% of the state's students living in poverty.  In 
addition, 
Milwaukee 
asserts 
that 
it 
has 
the 
comparative 
disadvantage of being surrounded by a number of the state's 
richest school districts.  Twelve of the thirty-four school 
districts that the State concedes are "unequalized," in that 
they have a disproportionately large amount of resources with 
which to fund their schools, are within commuting distance of 
Milwaukee.  A non-party brief filed by Milwaukee Mayor John 
Norquist asserts that these "unequalized" rich school districts 
drain students, teachers, and resources from the comparatively 
underfunded Milwaukee schools.47 
¶109 The evidence submitted shows that some Milwaukee 
school facilities are old and decrepit, that staffing shortages 
exist, and that vocational education and other programs have 
                     
46 See American Civil Liberties Union Brief at 9-10; 
Plaintiff-Intervenors Appendix at 282-85. 
47 See Mayor Norquist Brief at 6-8.  
No. 97-3174.sa 
 
12
been reduced significantly because of financial limitations.  
Milwaukee students scored dramatically below the state averages 
in 
the 
1997-98 
Wisconsin 
Student 
Assessment 
System 
test 
administered by the Department of Public Instruction.  For 
example, 
only 
26% 
of 
Milwaukee 
tenth-graders 
achieved 
a 
proficient or advanced score on the reading examination, 
compared with the statewide average of 63%.48 
¶110 The plaintiff-intervenors argue that the statewide 
tests offered by the Department of Public Instruction in the 
fourth, eighth and tenth grades show that LES students, 
economically disadvantaged students and disabled students have 
drastically lower rates of achieving a level of "proficiency or 
above."49 
¶111 Although 
the 
defendants' 
brief 
de-emphasizes 
the 
differences in educational opportunities offered to students 
around the state and characterizes the plaintiffs' evidence as 
anecdotal, the defendants were not able to confirm or dispute 
school 
district–specific 
allegations 
concerning 
course 
offerings, physical plants, staffing and other items.  The 
circuit 
court 
suggests 
that 
at 
least 
some 
property-poor 
districts 
are 
having 
difficulty 
with 
providing 
adequate 
educational opportunities to their students.   
¶112 The evidence, according to the circuit court, suggests 
that the school districts' inability to raise funds has resulted 
                     
48 See American Civil Liberties Union Brief at 10. 
49 See Plaintiff-Intervenors Appendix at 324-325. 
No. 97-3174.sa 
 
13
in increased class size with classes sometimes taught in 
partially 
condemned 
buildings, 
basements, 
storage 
rooms, 
hallways, auditorium stages, unused shower facilities, elevator 
shafts and janitorial closets.  The circuit court found that 
maintenance of facilities is often delayed, resulting in leaking 
roofs, antiquated 
heating 
and cooling 
systems, 
inadequate 
lighting and water running through the walls.  Furthermore, the 
circuit court found that in some districts textbooks are 
outdated and a lack of options in advanced math, science, 
electives, computer technology and extracurricular activities 
exists. 
¶113 The circuit court also found that school districts 
that spend more per student are able to provide their students 
with more opportunities in a variety of areas while students in 
property-poor school districts do not have equal educational 
opportunities. 
¶114 Judge Charles P. Dykman, in his concurrence in the 
Court of Appeals, concluded from the record that "lower spending 
school districts are laboring under very difficult conditions." 
¶115 I recognize that the State provides funds to educate 
limited–English speaking students and disabled students in the 
form of categorical aids.  Although this aid reimburses the 
school districts for only a portion of the cost of educating 
these high needs students, the circuit court on remand would 
determine whether this additional aid is sufficient to enable 
all school districts with the resources to provide students with 
an equal opportunity for a sound basic education. 
No. 97-3174.sa 
 
14
¶116 Although 
I 
realize 
that 
equal 
dollars 
do 
not 
necessarily translate to equal educational opportunity, it is 
clear that substantial funding differences may significantly 
affect students' opportunities to learn.  Money is not the only 
variable affecting educational opportunity, but it is one that 
the legislature can equalize.  
¶117 Both 
the 
circuit 
court 
and 
court 
of 
appeals 
acknowledged that they were unable to adequately adjudicate this 
case because of the lack of a developed standard from this court 
regarding the requirements of article X, § 3.  I would remand 
the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings in light 
of the standard the majority opinion sets forth in the present 
case to determine whether the defendants have met their 
constitutional obligation. 
¶118 The 
circuit 
court 
would 
determine 
whether 
the 
disparities in funding among school districts result in an 
unacceptable level of inequality in educational opportunity.  
The circuit court would also decide whether those students in 
property-poor 
districts 
or 
in 
school 
districts 
with 
disproportionate numbers of high needs students are offered 
unacceptably diminished educational opportunities. 
¶119 If the plaintiffs' and plaintiff-intervenors' proof is 
sufficient, the circuit court would not be limited to choosing 
between declaring the entire state school finance system 
constitutional or unconstitutional.  It may be that the state 
school finance system is constitutionally acceptable for some 
school districts, but not for others.   
No. 97-3174.sa 
 
15
¶120 If the circuit court were to declare all or part of 
the present state school finance system unconstitutional, it 
would not be up to the circuit court to adopt a state school 
finance 
system 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
considers 
to 
be 
constitutional.  Courts interpret the constitutional mandate.  
As the representatives of the people, the legislature should 
craft the state school finance system.  There are doubtless 
numerous ways a legislature might design a constitutionally 
acceptable state school finance system. 
¶121 Any declaration of unconstitutionality would cast no 
aspersion 
on 
the 
legislative 
or 
executive 
branches 
of 
government, which assuredly have worked very hard to craft our 
current educational system.  The legislature has appropriated 
vast sums of money for education in this state.  The executive 
branch 
has 
worked 
diligently 
to 
improve 
the 
students' 
proficiency. 
¶122 The 
legislative 
and 
executive 
branches 
and 
the 
citizens of the state recognize the high cost of further 
improving the educational system, but they also realize that the 
cost of not improving the educational system to meet the 
constitutional mandate will be much higher.  As Derek Bok, 
former president of Harvard University, wisely stated, "If you 
think education is expensive, try ignorance." 
¶123 I would remand the cause to the circuit court for 
further proceedings.  For the reasons set forth, I write 
separately. 
No. 97-3174.sa 
 
16
¶124 I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this opinion. 
No. 97-3174.wab 
 
1 
 
¶125 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  This is a landmark case in the history of education 
for the state of Wisconsin.  For the first time, this court has 
articulated the standard behind the constitutional guarantee to 
our children of an equal opportunity for education.  With three 
justices, including this writer, joining that part of the 
majority 
opinion 
of 
Justice 
Crooks 
that 
articulates 
a 
constitutional standard for education, the guarantee of an equal 
opportunity for education finally has teeth.  
¶126 Unfortunately, a different majority concludes that the 
present system meets constitutional muster.  I disagree.  I agree 
with the concurrence/dissent of Chief Justice Abrahamson that 
this case should be remanded for further proceedings, in light of 
the standard we set in the majority opinion, to determine whether 
the defendants have met their constitutional obligation.  This 
record raises serious and troubling questions about our system of 
education that should be examined more thoroughly below.   
¶127 Accordingly, I join paragraphs 3, 87, footnote 2, and 
Section 
II 
of 
the 
majority 
opinion, 
and 
join 
the 
concurrence/dissent of the Chief Justice.50  I write to more fully 
                     
50 The standard we adopt today recalls the standard which I 
urged in my dissent 11 years ago in Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 
469, 520-21, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989), joined in by then-Justice 
Shirley S. Abrahamson and Chief Justice Nathan S. Heffernan:  
No. 97-3174.wab 
 
2 
document the condition of education in this state as shown in the 
circuit court.  This evidence is not in dispute. 
¶128 This record demonstrates that various school districts 
suffer from woeful conditions: inadequate course offerings, an 
inability to raise further funds for ever-increasing educational 
demands from the state and federal government, and special needs 
that are either going unmet or are being met at the expense of 
regular education programs.  This record further shows great 
financial disparities among school districts.  As a result of all 
of this, it cannot come as a surprise that tens of thousands of 
                                                                  
[The constitutional requirement] has generally been 
defined as embracing broad educational opportunities 
needed to equip children for their roles as citizens, 
participants in the political system, and competitors 
in both the labor market and the market-place of 
ideas.  [citations omitted]. 
 
 . . .  
 
I conclude that the mandate given by the uniformity 
clause in art. X, sec. 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
is that the state provide a character of instruction 
in the state schools such that all children are 
provided with a uniform opportunity to become equipped 
for their future roles as citizens, participants in 
the 
political 
system, 
and 
competitors 
both 
economically and intellectually.  In short, the state 
must provide a character of instruction that allows 
each child an opportunity to become an educated 
person. 
 
It was a standard based not on financial disparities but on 
the adequacy of the education provided.  I read adequacy of 
education as the focal point of our newly adopted standard.    
No. 97-3174.wab 
 
3 
children across the state fail to meet even basic competency in 
reading, writing, mathematics, language, science, social studies 
and the arts.  These children have major gaps in knowledge and 
skills basic to progress.  For these children, the constitutional 
guarantee of an education is an empty promise.   
¶129 Despite the historic and commendable efforts by the 
Governor and the legislature to support public education, after 
reading this record one is left with the overwhelming realization 
that, for too many of our children, those efforts have not 
satisfied even a minimal constitutional guarantee of an equal 
opportunity for an adequate education.   
¶130 This 
record 
should 
leave 
every 
citizen 
greatly 
concerned at the lack of fairness and opportunity for tens of 
thousands of children in our schools.  For a state founded by 
immigrants and built with a common commitment to education for 
all, rich and poor alike, regardless of the accident of place of 
birth, this record shows that we have drifted far from the dreams 
of our ancestors. 
¶131 Several distinct categories illustrate the systemic 
problems in education. 
¶132 Plants and equipment.  Undisputed affidavits in the 
record illustrate that conditions in many districts across the 
state are hardly conducive to education.  Maintenance is 
deferred, if done at all.  Leaks, cracks, obsolete lockers go 
No. 97-3174.wab 
 
4 
unrepaired.  Libraries are inadequately stocked.  Computers, 
where they exist, are largely out of date.  School buses are run-
down and accordingly more expensive to fix.  As buses dwindle, 
transportation of students takes more time: One district has 
children traveling 90 minutes, leaving home at 6:50 a.m. and 
arriving to school at 8:20 a.m.   
¶133 House trailers, storage rooms, hallways, elevator 
shafts, and the like are used for classrooms.  In one school 
science class is held in a trailer, but has no science equipment. 
 Social studies is being taught off a cart, room to room.  
Special education therapy space is provided in a janitor's area; 
and in one school it is held in a storage room closet off the 
stage.  Another school has school suspension served in a 
janitor's closet.   
¶134 Many schools are unable to provide facilities that are 
accessible to people with disabilities.  Playgrounds are unsafe, 
uninsured, and unequipped.   
¶135 Course offerings.  In many schools, course offerings 
are being curtailed due to needs in other educational areas.  
Textbooks are seriously outdated.  Languages have been cutback or 
completely eliminated.  Advanced courses in subjects such as 
science, math, and technology are taught on an alternate year 
schedule.  Electives, such as family and consumer economics 
classes and technical education classes, have been eliminated.  
No. 97-3174.wab 
 
5 
Career counseling in many schools is severely limited or 
nonexistent.  Funds for training staff in computer technology are 
unavailable, which together with inadequate equipment make it 
impossible to teach basic computer skills. 
¶136 Children with special needs.  It is undisputed in the 
record that public schools are facing a significant increase in 
the number of special needs students.  These students generally 
fall into three, sometimes overlapping, categories: Limited 
English Speaking (LES) students, children living in poverty, and 
children with disabilities.  The children come to school lacking 
the language, social, and cultural tools many of us take for 
granted.  These children must be taught how to learn before they 
can begin to learn. 
¶137 A commonly voiced concern by numerous districts in the 
state is that special education programs established to meet 
these needs are eating up the dollars from other already limited 
education programs.  The communities of Wausau and Milwaukee are 
striking examples of this problem.   
¶138 Wausau has experienced a significant increase in the 
number of Hmong students, approximately 22 percent in the last 
ten years, and increasing steadily.  The kindergarten enrollment 
is 34 percent LES students.  The language problems are 
significant.  Communications between teacher and student, and 
between teacher and parent, are severely limited.  Accordingly, 
No. 97-3174.wab 
 
6 
LES costs, including indirect costs, are high; but unfortunately, 
state reimbursement has been decreasing.  Currently, the state 
reimburses for 25 percent of the direct LES costs, none for the 
indirect costs.  Direct costs associated with these needs exceed 
$2.5 million.  Indirect costs exceed $1 million.  As a result, 
Wausau School District has had to curtail programs and staffing. 
 It is grossly understaffed in its health services program, 
despite the increasing number of high needs students who have 
greater health requirements.  Wausau has been unable to implement 
the state-mandated middle school foreign language program.  It 
has been forced to make cuts with respect to staff development 
and teacher mentor programs.  It has been unable to implement its 
five-year technology plan, estimating the district is spending 
approximately three times less on its technology budget compared 
with adequate technology programs in other districts.   
¶139 Wausau is trapped in a vicious cycle.  As it reduces 
its general program quality to make up for mandated special 
needs, students without special needs leave for private schools 
to seek the quality that public schools no longer provide.  With 
the resulting drop in enrollment, state dollars decrease and the 
schools must further reduce program quality.   
¶140 Milwaukee must address perhaps an even larger struggle. 
 It is faced with a large number of high needs students.  
Approximately 80 percent of its students qualify for free or 
No. 97-3174.wab 
 
7 
reduced lunch.  Over 12,000 of their students are reported as 
homeless.  Poverty undisputedly leads to distinct learning 
problems.  As with Wausau, the needs of these students inevitably 
impact on regular educational programs. 
¶141 Financial 
disparities. 
 
The 
record, 
which 
is 
undisputed, shows inter alia the following financial disparities: 
 
1.  School districts vary widely in the amount spent 
per pupil, ranging from $13,534 to $5301. 
 
2.  The levy rates vary widely, ranging from $4.71 to 
$20.63 per thousand.  
 
3.  The ability to raise dollars for every mill levied 
varies widely.  For example, in 1996-67 Gibraltar was able to 
raise $1,270,000 for every mill levied; Bowler was able to raise 
$55,000 for every mill levied.  
¶142 The effects of these disparities are many.  To name but 
two: 
1.  Property poor districts that tax at the same rate 
as property rich districts have significantly fewer dollars to 
spend on education.  For example, the two like-size districts of 
Neenah and Elmbrook tax at approximately the same rate of $11.55 
per thousand.  However, due to the disparity of tax base, 
Elmbrook is able to spend $1400 more per pupil than Neenah, 
which amounts to over $9,000,000 more available to Elmbrook than 
to Neenah for educational needs.   
No. 97-3174.wab 
 
8 
2.  In some like-size districts, which spend the same, 
the tax burden on the taxpayer is significantly disparate.  For 
example, Beloit and Wauwatosa spend approximately $8500 per 
pupil.  Yet Beloit must tax their taxpayers $2.17 per thousand 
more than Wauwatosa to raise the same amount of dollars.   
¶143 The 
circuit 
court 
found 
that 
this 
evidence 
was 
undisputed. Plaintiffs assert that the system's disparities deny 
students 
in 
property-poor 
districts 
equal 
educational 
opportunities.  Based on this record it is hard to disagree.  But 
without a standard, the circuit court was powerless.   
¶144 Statewide testing. One measure of student achievement 
is the Wisconsin Student Assessment System (WSAS) Knowledge and 
Concepts Examinations at grades four, eight, and ten.  Student 
scores were reported in four general proficiency categories: 
advanced, proficient, basic, and minimal performance.   
¶145 "Advanced" means achievement beyond mastery, in depth 
understanding.   
¶146 "Proficient" means competent, including mastery of the 
important knowledge and skills.   
¶147 "Basic" means somewhat competent, mastery of most of 
the important knowledge and skill, but evidence of at least one 
major flaw in understanding.   
No. 97-3174.wab 
 
9 
¶148 "Minimal 
Performance" 
means 
limited 
in 
content, 
evidence of major misconceptions or gaps in knowledge and skill 
basic to progress.  
¶149 The scores achieved leave serious questions as to the 
adequacy of education achieved by tens of thousands of children 
across the state.   
¶150 Based upon this testing, in the fall of 1996 the 
Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction estimated51 that in 
reading, 8 percent of the fourth graders, 15 percent of the 
eighth graders, and 14 percent of the tenth graders were in the 
"Minimal Performance Category."  Assuming approximately 60,000 
students in each grade tested, 4800 fourth graders, 9000 eighth 
graders, and 8400 tenth graders had an education achievement that 
was limited in content, with major misconceptions or gaps in 
knowledge and skills basic to progress.   
¶151 With respect to language and writing skills, 10 percent 
(that is, 6000 children) of the fourth graders, 19 percent 
(11,400 children) of the eighth graders, and 14 percent (8400 
children) of the tenth graders had an education achievement that 
was limited in content, with major misconceptions or gaps in 
knowledge and skills basic to progress.   
                     
51 These statewide estimates are based on samples developed 
by CTB/McGraw Hill under contract with DPI.   
No. 97-3174.wab 
 
10
¶152 The figures are even worse in mathematics and science. 
 For example, in mathematics 33 percent of the tenth graders 
(20,000 children) had an education achievement that was limited 
in content, with major misconceptions or gaps in knowledge and 
skills basic to progress.   
¶153 This lack of educational achievement is particularly 
evident in the scores of children with special needs, of which 
there are tens of thousands of the over 800,000 students in K-12. 
 In reading, although 74 percent of the English proficient 
students in fourth grade were either at the "Proficient" or 
"Advanced" levels, only 28 percent of the Limited English 
Proficient students were at those levels.  Seventy-nine percent 
of the students without disabilities were at those levels, while 
only 31 percent of the disabled students were at those levels.   
¶154 These wide disparities continue through the grades 
tested, and cut across mathematics, language, arts, science, and 
social studies.   
¶155 It is shaming to this great state. 
¶156 By a slim majority, this court today decides that the 
present system is constitutionally acceptable.  However, if the 
conditions outlined above remain unattended, the system will 
inevitably get worse.  If the legislature does nothing, the 
children will be back demanding their constitutional guarantee. 
No. 97-3174.wab 
 
11
¶157 Unquestionably, the cost to fix the system is high.  
The cost of not fixing it will be much higher: Uneducated 
citizens will extract extremely high social costs in the future. 
 As the mechanic on television says, "You can pay me now or pay 
me later." 
 
 
97-3174.dtp 
 
 
1 
 
¶158 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. (concurring in part; dissenting 
in part).   The principal issue in this case is stated by the 
petitioners:  "Does the Wisconsin school finance system violate 
the Uniformity Provision of the Education Article, article X, 
§ 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution?"  A majority of the court 
holds that it does not.  Three justices, however, would rule 
otherwise.  Moreover, these three justices and Justice Crooks 
interpret art. X, § 3 in a manner that encourages future 
litigation and will plunge the judiciary into the legislature's 
domain. 
¶159 I join the concurring opinion of Justice Sykes not 
because I am unwilling to apply standards embedded in the text 
of the constitution or in statutory lawwhatever the field, 
regardless of the consequencesbut because I am unwilling to 
impose legal standards that did not exist before this decision. 
I 
¶160 A majority of the court embraces the proposition that 
art. X, § 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution gives Wisconsin 
students "a fundamental right to an equal opportunity for a 
sound basic education.  An equal opportunity for a sound basic 
education is one that will equip students for their roles as 
citizens 
and 
enable 
them 
to 
succeed 
economically 
and 
personally."  Majority op. at ¶¶ 3, 51, 87.  Chief Justice 
Abrahamson's concurrence/dissent at ¶ 94. 
¶161 Constitutional 
principles 
must 
be 
rooted 
in 
constitutional text.  Four members of the court maintain that 
97-3174.dtp 
 
 
2 
the standard they embrace is rooted in art. X, § 3.  They are 
mistaken.  Article X, § 3 was part of the original constitution. 
 The relevant text now reads: 
 
The 
legislature 
shall 
provide 
by 
law 
for 
the 
establishment of district schools, which shall be as 
nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools shall 
be free and without charge for tuition to all children 
between the ages of 4 and 20 years; and no sectarian 
instruction 
shall 
be 
allowed 
therein; 
but 
the 
legislature by law may, for the purpose of religious 
instruction outside the district schools, authorize 
the release of students during regular school hours. 
Our analysis must begin with the language of the constitution.  
Two phrases in art. X § 3 stand out:  "district schools" and "as 
nearly uniform as practicable."   
¶162 First, the text emphasizes the term "district schools" 
not "school districts."  There is danger in assuming that these 
terms are synonymous.  They are not.  A 1972 amendment to art. 
X, § 3 authorizing the release of students for religious 
instruction repeated the term "district schools."  The 1972 
amendment altered the text of the original section, substituting 
"4" for "four" and "20" for "twenty," but it did not change the 
term "district schools."  
¶163 Section 3 uses the term "district schools" followed by 
the 
phrase 
"such 
schools" 
and 
the 
clause 
"no 
sectarian 
instruction shall 
be allowed 
therein," 
although 
religious 
instruction 
"outside 
the 
district 
schools" 
is 
permitted 
(emphasis added). 
¶164 By contrast, art. X, §§ 2 and 5 both employ the term 
"school district."  These sections also were part of the 
97-3174.dtp 
 
 
3 
original constitution.  Article X, § 2 refers to "support and 
maintenance of common schools, in each school district."  
Article X, § 5 provides that no appropriation shall be made from 
the school fund to "any school district for the year in which a 
school shall not be maintained at least three months."  The 
constitution is precise in avoiding state payments from the 
school fund to individual schools. 
¶165 A fair reading of these sections suggests that "school 
districts" are political entities, whereas "district schools" 
are literally schools.  The legislature distributes state aid to 
the political entitiesto the school districts.  Consequently, 
it is troublesome to base a cause of action that school 
districts must be made uniform on a section of the constitution, 
art. X, § 3, that does not apply to them. 
¶166 It is even more unsettling to give Wisconsin students 
"a fundamental right to an equal opportunity for a sound basic 
education" and to ground that right in a section that makes no 
reference to individual rights, only to "district schools."  The 
responsibility of this court in constitutional interpretation is 
to state the law, not make the law.   
¶167 Second, art. X, § 3 contains the phrase "as nearly 
uniform as practicable."  The uniformity in the text is 
indisputably diluted by the adjacent phrases "as nearly" and "as 
practicable."  "As nearly uniform as practicable" does not mean 
"equal."  "As nearly uniform as practicable" is not as strong or 
uncompromising as the storied phrase "equal protection of the 
97-3174.dtp 
 
 
4 
law."  The words in the text suggest a goal; they do not impose 
a rule. 
¶168 Article X, § 3 may be compared to art. IV, § 23 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, which addresses town government and 
provides in part:  "The legislature shall establish but one 
system of town government, which shall be as nearly uniform as 
practicable" (emphasis added).  Because this section closely 
parallels art. X, § 3, this court should look to the experience 
with town government for guidance in interpretation.52  This 
court has declared that the "uniformity  requirement [in art. 
IV, § 23] has been consistently interpreted not to require 
absolute uniformity in the system of government, but only 
practical uniformity. . . .  [T]he framers of the constitution 
recognized that some latitude had to be provided to enable the 
                     
52 Jack Stark summarizes the litigation under this section 
in his book, The Wisconsin State Constitution, A Reference Guide 
at 100 (1997): 
According 
to 
this 
section 
"the 
principal 
organizational features of town government must be the 
same," but, as the section specifies, only "practical" 
uniformity is required, so general enactments that 
make 
reasonable 
distinctions 
among 
towns 
are 
constitutional [State ex rel. Wolf v. Town of Lisbon, 
75 Wis. 2d 152, 161-62, 248 N.W.2d 450 (1977)].  As to 
reasonable distinctions, this section "provides for 
the exercise of different powers by the boards of 
different towns, when there is anything in a town 
which calls for the exercise of such different or 
additional powers" [Land, Log & Lumber Co. and others 
v. Brown and others, 73 Wis. 294, 40 N.W. 482 (1889)]. 
 That is, a law that applies throughout the state and 
makes reasonable distinctions based on differences 
among towns does not violate this section [Thompson v. 
Kenosha County, 64 Wis. 2d 673, 221 N.W. 845 (1974)].  
 
97-3174.dtp 
 
 
5 
legislature to authorize departures from absolute uniformity."  
State ex rel. Wolf v. Town of Lisbon, 75 Wis. 2d 152, 162, 248 
N.W.2d 450 (1977). 
II 
 
¶169 Over the years, both the legislature and Wisconsin 
courts have interpreted the Education Article, including art. X, 
§ 3.  They have not required uniformity among school districts. 
 The legislature has never required that school districts be 
equal or uniform in terms of population or enrollment or 
geographic area.  School districts have been created in 
different ways, T.B. Scott Lumber Co. v. Oneida County, 72 Wis. 
158, 161 (1888); Maxcy v. Oshkosh, 144 Wis. 238, 260, 128 N.W. 
899 (1910), and they have not been uniform in their organization 
or reorganization.  Joint Sch. Dist. v. State Appeal Board, 56 
Wis. 2d 790, 794, 203 N.W.2d 1 (1973).  The state authorizes 
common school districts, union high school districts, and 
unified school districts.  Wis. Stat. §§ 120.001-120.44.  These 
districts may serve different grades.  Not all school districts 
have kindergarten for four-year-olds.  Zweifel v. Joint Dist. 
No. 1., Belleville, 76 Wis. 2d 648, 251 N.W.2d 822 (1977).  
Compensation among the school districts is not uniform, and 
employee benefits are not uniform.  In Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 
550, 568, 570, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976), this court recognized the 
obvious fact that not all school districts have equal revenue 
raising power and held that art. X, § 3 did not require 
equalization of revenue raising power. 
97-3174.dtp 
 
 
6 
¶170 Given the text of art. X, § 3, the immense diversity 
of school districts and district schools and the precedent of 
prior decisions about what art. X, § 3 does not mean, the court 
should have dismissed claims that the legislature has a 
constitutional obligation to equalize educational opportunity 
among school districts in terms of dollars.53 
¶171 What the court has done instead is to embrace two 
conflicting theories of what the section requires:  Equality of 
resources for school districts and special attention to special 
needs, beyond equality.  In short, EQUALITY PLUS.  This may be 
desirable social and educational policy but it does not arise 
from the text of our constitution.  It is distinctly legislative 
in character. 
 
¶172 Until today, this court has had difficulty imposing 
uniformity on much of anything based upon the language of art. 
X, § 3.  The court attempted to explain this section in State ex 
rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 289-90, 221 N.W. 860, 
                     
53 In his brief, Governor Thompson argues that the equalized 
share of state support for public education has increased from 
72.3 percent of state aid in 1986-87 to 77.6 percent in 1998-99. 
 Non-Party Brief by Governor Tommy G. Thompson at 4.  The first 
tier of the three-part general school aid formula is for costs 
shared between the state and school district up to a primary 
cost ceiling of $1,000 per student.  The state's share at this 
level is calculated using a guaranteed property valuation of $2 
million per student.  1997-98 Wisconsin Blue Book, p. 291.  
Plaintiffs argue that the first tier creates disequalizing 
spending disparities by its hold harmless feature.  The Governor 
responds that this disequalization has fallen from 0.7 percent 
of total equalization payments in 1996-97 to 0.52 percent in 
1999-2000.  Id. at 5. 
97-3174.dtp 
 
 
7 
(1928).  In response to arguments about detachment from a school 
district, the court said: 
 
An examination of the debates in the conventions that 
framed our present constitution and the constitution 
of 
1846 
(which 
contained 
a 
similar 
provision) 
discloses that the members of those conventions, when 
they were framing the article relating to schools, 
were concerned, not with the method of forming school 
districts, but with the character of instruction that 
should be given in those schools after the districts 
were formed,with the training that these schools 
should give to the future citizens of Wisconsin. 
 
Viewing the terms of this constitutional provision in 
the light of its express terms as well as of the 
purpose which actuated those who drafted it, we 
conclude that the requirement as to uniformity applies 
to the districts after they are formed,to the 
character of the instruction given,rather than to the 
means 
by 
which 
they 
are 
established 
and 
their 
boundaries fixed.54 
 
¶173 The court cited no authority for these passages.  In 
fact, the language was inspired by the brief of respondent 
(Zilisch) who did not point to constitutional debates.  Rather, 
counsel relied on a Wisconsin case, State ex rel. Dick v. 
Kalaher, 145 Wis. 243, 129 N.W. 1060 (1911), which defines a 
school:  "School is a generic term, and denotes an institution 
for instruction or education" (citing American Asylum v. Phoenix 
Bank, 4 Conn. 172 (1822); 7 Words & Phrases, 6343).  Then 
counsel argued: 
 
It is this institution and not the district to which 
the constitutional provision applies.  This is shown 
                     
54 In reaching this conclusion, the court overruled State ex 
rel. Brown v. Haney, 190 Wis. 285, 209 N.W. 591 (1926).  
97-3174.dtp 
 
 
8 
by the plain wording of the constitution which limits 
the requirement of uniformity to "schools" and merely 
prefixes the word "district" to denote the type of 
schools. 
 
This plain and natural construction has been followed 
by 
the 
courts, 
under 
similar 
constitutional 
provisions.  The decisions hold that such uniformity 
relates only to the character of the institution, 
called the school. 
Respondent's Brief at 64.  Today, a new constitutional right is 
founded on the argument of counsel in a school detachment case 
almost three-quarters of a century ago. 
III 
 
¶174 In the early years of statehood, the hiring and 
licensing of teachers was entirely a local matter.  Wisconsin 
Blue Book, p. 432 (1999-2000).  For a number of years, state 
support 
of 
public 
education 
consisted 
of 
money 
derived 
principally from the sale of public lands that the federal 
government had granted to the state.  Id.  In Chapter 287, Laws 
of 1885, the legislature levied a one-mill state property tax to 
be collected by the state and distributed to counties for school 
support.  Id.  The state's first attempt to equalize tax support 
for schools in property-poor districts was the Wisconsin 
Elementary Equalization Law of 1927 (Chapter 536).55  Id. 
                     
55  According to the 1999-2000 Wisconsin Blue Book, Chapter 
536, Laws of 1927, was promoted by State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction John Callahan, who urged a 40 percent level 
of state support for local school costs.  This figure was not 
reached until after 1970.  There was no state support for high 
schools until 1875.  1999-2000 Wisconsin Blue Book, p. 432. 
97-3174.dtp 
 
 
9 
 
¶175 In 1995, the legislature appropriated more than $4 
billion to provide 66.7 percent of the revenue for public K-12 
schools in Wisconsin beginning in the 1996-97 school year.  The 
money included general aid, delivered through a three-tier 
formula, categorical aid, and school levy credits.  The increase 
over the 1995-96 school year was more than $950,000,000.  School 
funding was increased 5.9 percent for the 1997-98 school year 
and 5 percent for the 1998-99 school year.  Legislative Fiscal 
Bureau, 1997-98 Wisconsin State Budget, Comparative Summary of 
Budget Provisions, Public Instruction, at 862-63.  These are the 
school finance plans under challenge.56 
 
¶176 This court on many occasions has observed that all 
legislative acts are presumptively constitutional.  If doubts 
exist about a statute's constitutionality, we must resolve them 
in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.  "Our task is 
not to judge the merits of the statute or the wisdom of the 
legislature.  Our task is to determine whether the statute 
clearly contravenes some constitutional provision."  Busé, 74 
Wis. 2d at 583 (Abrahamson, J., Day, J., and Heffernan, J. 
dissenting). 
                     
56 The court obtained printouts of school referenda in the 
1990s from the Department of Public Instruction.  According to 
our calculations, there were 166 successful referenda to exceed 
revenue caps in the four years 1996-1999.  These referenda 
totaled 
approximately 
$85,000,000. 
 
There 
also 
were 
approximately 335 successful referenda on long term debt during 
these same four years.  The value of these referenda exceeded 
$2.5 billion.  Local school referenda are part of the state 
school finance system.  A number of the school district 
plaintiffs in this case participated in successful referenda. 
97-3174.dtp 
 
 
10
 
¶177 We do not hide from the deficiencies that exist in 
this state's system of public education.  We are not insensitive 
to the fact that fiscal resources are not equal.  We might even 
have salutary proposals for improvements.  But it is not the 
role of the supreme court to shape education policy or provide 
revenues.  This vital responsibility is reserved to the 
executive and the legislative branches.  The judiciary's task is 
to determine whether the acts or omissions of other branches 
clearly contravene some constitutional provision.  In my view, 
they do not. 
 
¶178 I join the majority opinion in affirming the court of 
appeals and in holding the present school finance system 
constitutional.  In other respects, I dissent. 
 
¶179 I am authorized to state that Justice DIANE S. SYKES 
joins this concurring/dissenting opinion. 
 
 
 
No. 97-3174.dss 
 
1 
 
¶180 DIANE S. SYKES, J. (concurring in part; dissenting in 
part).  I agree with the majority's conclusion that the state 
school finance system is not unconstitutional under Wis. Const. 
art. X, § 3, the uniformity clause of the education article, or 
Wis. 
Const. art. 
I, § 
1, 
the 
Equal 
Protection Clause.  
Therefore, I join sections I and III of the opinion, as well as 
the decision to affirm.  However, I cannot agree with sections 
II and V of the majority opinion, which announce an expansive 
new state constitutional right under art. X, § 3 to "an equal 
opportunity for a sound basic education," defined as an 
education "that will equip students for their roles as citizens 
and enable them to succeed economically and personally."  
Majority op. at ¶¶ 3, 51, 52, 87.   
¶181 The petitioners allege that the current school finance 
formula violates the uniformity clause of the education article 
as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
by 
creating 
or 
failing 
to 
redress 
alleged 
educational disparities in so-called "property-poor" districts, 
districts with many high-needs children, and districts where 
charter schools and the school choice program decrease the 
enrollment in the public schools.  Four members of this court  
are convinced that in order to decide the uniformity clause 
challenge, the court is required to articulate a constitutional 
standard or test for the right to education under art. X, § 3.  
And they have done so, by reference to an elaborate definition 
No. 97-3174.dss 
 
2 
of "educational adequacy" that has no support in the text of the 
constitution itself nor in any of our prior art. X, § 3 cases. 
¶182 Any 
definition 
of 
education 
or 
standard 
for 
educational adequacy is inherently a political and policy 
question, 
not 
a 
justiciable 
one. 
 
The 
people 
of 
this 
statethrough their elected representatives in the legislature, 
the governor's office and local school boardsdecide what their 
schools will teach and how much education is adequate or 
desirable for their children.  What constitutes an "adequate" or 
"sound" or even "basic" education is most emphatically not a 
question of constitutional law for this or any other court. 
¶183 As the majority opinion discusses at length, our cases 
 pertaining to the education article have held that the framers 
of the Wisconsin Constitution were concerned with the nature, 
character and purposes of educationnot the technicalities of 
school district size, boundaries or compositionand viewed 
education as necessary to the preservation of liberty and the 
perpetuation of a productive, honorable citizenry.  Majority op. 
at ¶¶ 31-47; Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 485-90, 436 
N.W.2d 568 (1989); Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 564-66, 247 
N.W.2d 822 (1977); State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 
289-90, 221 N.W. 860 (1928).   
¶184 But I do not read these cases to mean that art. X, § 3 
commits to the judiciary, in the exercise of its obligation of 
constitutional 
interpretation, 
questions 
of 
educational 
adequacy, content or scope. There is certainly nothing in the 
No. 97-3174.dss 
 
3 
text of art. X, § 3 to support such a conclusion.  Wisconsin 
Const. art. X, § 3 provides: 
 
The 
legislature 
shall 
provide 
by 
law 
for 
the 
establishment of district schools, which shall be as 
nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools shall 
be free and without charge for tuition to all children 
between the ages of 4 and 20 years . . . . 
¶185 The other sections of the education article pertain to 
the election of the state superintendent of public instruction 
(art. X, § 1), the school fund (art. X, §§  2, 5), local school 
taxes (art. X, § 4), the state university system (art. X, § 6) 
and the sale of school and university lands (art. X, §§  7, 8). 
 There is nothing in the education article that specifically or 
even generally addresses the content, character or scope of the 
education the legislature must provide in the state's district 
schools.57 
¶186 As the majority opinion notes, the power to establish 
schools is inherent in state government, and so the education 
article 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
has 
always 
been 
interpreted as a directive compelling the legislature to 
exercise its power for the establishment of a public school 
system rather than as an organic grant of legislative authority 
over education.  Majority op. at ¶ 29.  Zweifel v. Joint Dist. 
No. 1, 76 Wis. 2d 648, 658, 251 N.W.2d 822 (1977); Busé v. 
Smith, 74 Wis. 2d at 564; Manitowoc v. Manitowoc Rapids, 231 
Wis. 94, 97, 285 N.W. 403 (1939). 
                     
57 See Justice Prosser's concurrence in part, dissent in 
part, which I join.    
No. 97-3174.dss 
 
4 
 
The 
specific 
constitutional 
guarantee 
of 
education 
flows 
from 
the 
provision 
that 
the 
legislature provide for the establishment of district 
schools.  Since the power to establish schools existed 
without a specific grant as an inherent function of 
state government, the clear purpose of art. X, sec. 3, 
was to compel the exercise of the power to the extent 
designated.  Art. X, sec. 3, must then be viewed as a 
limitation upon the broad power of the state to 
educate its citizens through the establishment and 
operation of schools.  The limitations are precisely 
stated: District schools, uniformity, and free tuition 
for certain ages. 
Zweifel, 76 Wis. 2d at 658 (citation omitted).  See also 
Manitowoc, 231 Wis. at 98 ("the purpose [of art. X, § 3] was not 
to grant a power to the legislature to establish schools, for 
this power would exist without grant, but to compel the exercise 
of the power to the extent designated"); Outagamie County v. 
Zuehlke, 
165 
Wis. 
32, 35-36, 
161 
N.W. 6 
(1917)("It is 
established by the decisions of this court that our state 
constitution is not so much a grant as a limitation of power, 
therefore the state legislature has authority to exercise any 
and all legislative powers not delegated to the federal 
government nor expressly or by necessary implication prohibited 
by the national or state constitution"). 
¶187 However, art. X, § 3 says only that the legislature 
must establish uniform public schools, free and open to all.  It 
does 
nothing 
to 
either 
prescribe 
or 
limit 
instructional 
character or content, leaving it exclusively to the legislature, 
which had inherent authority over it to begin with. 
¶188 The lower courts, some members of the legislature and 
some amici complained about the lack of a constitutional 
No. 97-3174.dss 
 
5 
definition or standard for the right to education under art. X, 
§ 3.58  The court has responded to these complaints by adopting a 
broad new definition of the right to education that is as 
breathtaking in scope as it is disconnected to anything in the 
text of the constitution. 
¶189 The court’s new definition of the right to education 
is grounded in ideas about constitutional educational adequacy 
found in the law reviews and the decisions of other state 
supreme courts, measured by reference to the sufficiency of 
instruction and the equal opportunity to become proficient in 
specific curricular subjects.  Majority op. at ¶¶ 48-52.  The 
new approach emphasizes the objective of equalizing student 
outcomes, although the majority opinion notes that unequal 
student scores on proficiency tests would not be enough alone to 
make out a constitutional violation.  Majority op. at ¶¶ 51-53, 
n.21.  The court’s new standard is linked in part to statutes 
prescribing curricular requirements for the public schools.  
Majority op. at ¶ 51. 
¶190 The newly-minted constitutional right is as follows: 
"Wisconsin students have a fundamental right to an equal 
opportunity for a sound basic education.  An equal opportunity 
for a sound basic education is one that will equip students for 
their roles as citizens and enable them to succeed economically 
                     
58 The Wisconsin Constitution nowhere mentions the "right to 
education."  It is not contained in the Declaration of Rights, 
art. I, nor anywhere in the education article.  It is a judicial 
extrapolation from the uniformity clause of art. X, § 3.  Busé 
v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 567, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976). 
No. 97-3174.dss 
 
6 
and personally."  Majority op. at ¶ 3.  The new right to 
education 
includes 
"the 
opportunity 
for 
students 
to 
be 
proficient 
in 
mathematics, 
science, 
reading 
and 
writing, 
geography, and history, and for them to receive instruction in 
the arts and music, vocational training, social sciences, 
health, physical education and foreign language, in accordance 
with their age and aptitude."  Id.  There is more: "An equal 
opportunity for a sound basic education acknowledges that 
students and districts are not fungible and takes into account 
districts with disproportionate numbers of disabled students, 
economically disadvantaged students, and students with limited 
English language skills."  Id.  And the legislature must 
henceforward provide "sufficient resources" to meet the new 
standard; otherwise, it will be in violation of art. X, § 3.  
Id.     
¶191 The problem with all of this is that there is no 
support 
for 
it 
anywhere 
in 
the 
text 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  It is entirely the product of judicial invention, 
despite efforts to tie some parts of the standard to particular 
statutory enactments.  This may be fine education policy, and as 
a parent and a citizen I certainly support the educational 
aspirations and goals expressed by the new standard, as well as 
the 
requirement 
that 
schools 
include 
instruction 
in 
the 
specified curricular subject areas.  But as a judge, I am 
compelled to say as forcefully as I can that the court's 
exercise 
in education 
clause standard-writing 
has nothing 
whatsoever to do with constitutional law. 
No. 97-3174.dss 
 
7 
¶192 In my judgment, any attempt by this court to create a 
constitutional standard or definition of the right to education 
based upon ideas about educational adequacy, outcomes and 
curricular offerings is seriously misguided.  It encroaches upon 
the prerogatives of the legislative branch of government, 
implicating separation of powers principles and bringing into 
play the political question doctrine of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186 (1962).  The judiciary should not be drawn into deciding 
issues that are essentially political in nature, exclusively 
committed by the constitution to another branch of government 
and not susceptible to judicial management or resolution.  This 
is clearly such an issue. 
¶193 In Baker the United States Supreme Court established 
the 
basic 
framework 
for 
analyzing 
the 
justiciability 
of 
political questions: 
 
The nonjusticiability of a political question is 
primarily a function of the separation of powers.  
Much confusion results from the capacity of the 
'political question' label to obscure the need for 
case-by-case inquiry.  Deciding whether a matter has 
in any measure been committed by the Constitution to 
another branch of government, or whether the action of 
that 
branch exceeds 
whatever authority 
has 
been 
committed, 
is 
itself 
a 
delicate 
exercise 
in 
constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility 
of 
this 
Court 
as 
ultimate 
interpreter 
of 
the 
Constitution. 
 
. . . . 
 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a 
political question is found a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political 
department; 
or 
a 
lack 
of 
judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving 
No. 97-3174.dss 
 
8 
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an 
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a 
court's undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches 
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or the 
potentiality 
of 
embarrassment 
from 
multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question. 
Id. at 210-11, 217.  See also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 
224, 228-29 (1993); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-19 
(1969).  The Court in Baker ultimately found the reapportionment 
issue before it to be justiciable, a conclusion followed by this 
court in State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 
561-64, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964), overruling State ex rel. 
Broughton v. Zimmerman, 261 Wis. 398, 52 N.W.2d 903 (1952), and 
State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 101, 23 N.W.2d 610 
(1946). 
 
¶194 It is, of course, the duty and particular province of 
the judiciary to interpret the constitution and say what the law 
is.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); State ex 
rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 436, 424 
N.W.2d 385 (1988).59  I am fully aware that the doctrine of 
political question nonjusticiability is rarely invoked and in 
fact has not been directly applied by this court on a question 
of state constitutional law since Baker. 
                     
59 See also The Federalist, No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) 
("The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar 
province of the courts.  A constitution is, in fact, and must be 
regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law.  It therefore 
belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning 
of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body"). 
No. 97-3174.dss 
 
9 
¶195 I 
am 
convinced, 
however, 
of 
the 
doctrine's 
applicability to art. X, § 3, at least to the extent that this 
court has now ventured into creating a constitutional standard 
or test for "educational adequacy."  My conclusion is based upon 
the text of art. X, § 3, the obvious lack of judicially 
discoverable or manageable standards for educational adequacy, 
and the impossibility of deciding the issue without undertaking 
an initial, clearly nonjudicial policy determination. 
 
¶196 Under the Baker analysis, "the concept of a textual 
commitment 
to 
a 
coordinate 
political 
department 
is 
not 
completely separate from the concept of a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; the lack 
of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion 
that 
there 
is 
a 
textually 
demonstrable 
commitment 
to 
a 
coordinate branch."  Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228-29.  As I have 
already noted, while it is clear that art. X, § 3 is not a grant 
of legislative power but a direction that legislative power be 
exercised in a particular way, the text of the education article 
nonetheless supports the conclusion that this is an area that is 
committed entirely to the legislative branch.  Authority over 
public education is inherent in the legislature; art. X, § 3 
does nothing more than command its exercise for the creation and 
support of a system of generally uniform, tuition-free, district 
No. 97-3174.dss 
 
10
schools.60  The constitution is silent on the issue of the scope, 
content or character of the education provided by the public 
schools. 
¶197 In addition, the task of filling in the constitutional 
gaps is clearly a judicially unmanageable one, as the profound 
breadth and soaring rhetoric of the court's new standard  
demonstrate.  More fundamentally, just how much education is 
adequate to the requirements and expectations of students, 
parents and society at any given point in time manifestly 
involves policy determinations of a nonjudicial type. 
¶198 Finally, there is uncertainty and risk inherent in 
multiple and conflicting pronouncements about education policy 
emanating 
from 
different 
branches 
of 
government. 
 
By 
constitutionalizing 
the 
notion 
of 
"educational 
adequacy" 
(however we would choose to define it), we create the potential 
for never-ending school finance litigation. 
¶199 The majority opinion refers to the necessity of 
adopting an adequacy-based constitutional standard for education 
"as a goad or as a backstop to the legislature . . . ."  
Majority op. at ¶ 50.  But no legislature can ever satisfy 
everyone, particularly in a policy area so fraught with nuances 
and competing interests as this one.  The constitutional right 
to education announced by the court today guarantees not better 
                     
60 Of course, if the legislature suddenly started charging 
tuition or turning students away there would be a justiciable 
claim for violation of art. X, § 3.  The text is explicit as to 
these matters, which are clearly capable of judicial resolution 
and remedy. 
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schools but bi-annual school finance litigation, as dissatisfied 
combatants in the battle for state education budget dollars go 
to court with claims of educational "inadequacy." 
¶200 The majority dismisses the justiciability issue by 
reference 
to 
the 
unremarkable 
fact 
that 
this 
court 
has 
entertained art. X, § 3 challenges before, in Kukor, Busé and 
Zilisch.  Majority op. at ¶ 2, n.2.  In other words: "We’ve gone 
a little way down this road before, why not continue further?"  
This is poor constitutional justification for the exploration in 
educational policymaking the court engages in today.  The 
difference, of course, between this case and the earlier ones is 
that this court has never before arrogated to itself, under the 
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12
guise of constitutional interpretation, the power to dictate 
educational content, character or scope.61  Not until today.  
¶201 I recognize that courts in other states have attempted 
to define the parameters of their state constitution education 
clauses by reference to variations on the "educational adequacy" 
theme.  Majority op. at ¶¶ 48-50.  However, I am persuaded by 
the reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court, which invoked the 
political question nonjusticiability doctrine in declining to 
follow the trend: 
 
What constitutes a "high quality" education, and how 
it may best be provided, cannot be ascertained by any 
judicially discoverable or manageable standards.  The 
constitution provides 
no 
principled basis 
for 
a 
                     
61 There is unfortunate dicta in Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 
550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976), which suggests that this court has 
the authority to dictate the subjects to be taught in the public 
schools.  Referring to the distinction drawn in State ex rel. 
Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 221 N.W. 860 (1928), between the 
"character of instruction" and the mechanics of school district 
creation, 
the 
court 
in 
Busé 
stated: 
"If 
'character 
of 
instruction' was all that was required to be 'as nearly uniform 
as practicable' under the mandate of the constitution, then it 
was left up to this court to ultimately determine what subjects 
were to be included in 'character of instruction' and to the 
legislature to determine what uniformity was 'practicable.'"  
Buse, 74 Wis. 2d at 566.  This statement was completely 
unnecessary to the holding in Busé, which concerned the very 
technical issue of the constitutionality of the negative aids 
formula.  Zilisch itself was a challenge to school district 
boundaries.  Despite their expansive language, neither Busé nor 
Zilisch concerned the issue of whether art. X, § 3 mandates a 
certain content or character of education.  I would withdraw the 
foregoing language from Busé.  There is nothing in the text of 
art. X, § 3, nor in Zilisch or any of our cases, to support the 
proposition that this or any other court has a role in 
curriculum decisions. 
 
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13
judicial definition of high quality.  It would be a 
transparent conceit to suggest that whatever standards 
of quality courts might develop would actually be 
derived from the constitution in any meaningful sense. 
 Nor is education a subject within the judiciary's 
field of expertise, such that a judicial role in 
giving content to the education guarantee might be 
warranted. 
 Rather, 
the 
question 
of 
educational 
quality 
is 
inherently 
one 
of 
policy 
involving 
philosophical and practical considerations that call 
for the exercise of legislative and administrative 
discretion. 
 
To hold that the question of educational quality 
is subject to judicial determination would largely 
deprive the members of the general public of a voice 
in a matter which is close to the hearts of all 
individuals in Illinois.  Judicial determination of 
the type of education children should receive and how 
it can best be provided would depend on the opinions 
of whatever expert witnesses the litigants might call 
to testify and whatever other evidence they might 
choose to present.  Members of the general public, 
however, would be obliged to listen in respectful 
silence.  We certainly do not mean to trivialize the 
views of educators, school administrators and others 
who have studied the problems which public schools 
confront. 
 
But 
nonexpertsstudents, 
parents, 
employers, and others—also have important views and 
experiences 
to 
contribute 
which 
are 
not 
easily 
reckoned through formal judicial factfinding.  In 
contrast, an open and robust public debate is the 
lifeblood of the political process in our system of 
representative democracy.  Solutions to problems of 
educational quality should emerge from a spirited 
dialogue between the people of the State and their 
elected representatives. 
 
Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 
1996).  See also Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. 
Funding, 
Inc. 
v. 
Chiles, 
680 
So. 
2d 
400, 
408 
(Fla. 
1996)(challengers of school finance system failed to present "an 
appropriate standard for determining [educational] 'adequacy' 
No. 97-3174.dss 
 
14
that would not present a substantial risk of judicial intrusion 
into 
the 
powers 
and 
responsibilities 
assigned 
to 
the 
legislature"). 
 
¶202 So it is here.  The expansive constitutional right to 
education announced and explicated by the court today is not 
derived from the constitution in any meaningful sense, and it is 
entirely inappropriate in our representative system to resolve 
disputes over educational content, adequacy or finance through 
art. X, § 3 litigation.  To invoke the political question 
doctrine of nonjusticiability here is not to abdicate the 
responsibility 
of 
judicial 
review 
but 
to 
vindicate 
the 
democratic process by which these sorts of issues are best 
resolved.  This does not leave the legislature to exercise its 
authority over education issues unchecked.  The checks and 
balances of the ballot box are oftentimes far more effective 
than those of a coordinate branch of government. 
 
¶203 Accordingly, I cannot subscribe to parts II and V, or 
paragraph 3 of the majority opinion, in which the court 
articulates a new constitutional "right to education" under art. 
X, § 3.  Therefore, I respectfully concur in parts I and III of 
the majority opinion, but in other respects, I dissent.   
 
¶204 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. 
PROSSER, joins this opinion.   
 
 
 
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