Title: Benoit v. City of Boston
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12204
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 16, 2017

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SJC-12204 
 
BRIAN BENOIT  vs.  CITY OF BOSTON 
(and a consolidated case1). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 9, 2017. - May 16, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Workers' Compensation Act, Compensation, Public employee, 
Decision of Industrial Accident Reviewing Board, Insurer.  
Public Employment, Suspension, Worker's compensation.  
Municipal Corporations, Officers and employees. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
November 24, 2014. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Linda E. Giles, J. 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
November 3, 2015. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Paul D. Wilson, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
John M. Becker for the plaintiff. 
 
E. David Susich (Thomas A. Pagliarulo also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
                     
 
1 The consolidated case involves the same parties. 
2 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  On September 5, 2011, after working almost twenty 
years as an emergency medical technician and paramedic for the 
defendant city's emergency medical services (EMS), the plaintiff 
suffered an incapacitating ankle injury while transporting a 
patient.  Unable to work, he received workers' compensation 
payments for almost one year pursuant to G. L. c. 152, the 
workers' compensation act. 
 
Learning that the plaintiff had been indicted on 
October 31, 2012, on charges relating to misuse of controlled 
substances intended for EMS patients, the defendant suspended 
him indefinitely without pay pursuant to G. L. c. 268A, § 25 
(suspension statute).  After the defendant, a self-insured 
municipal employer, discontinued the plaintiff's workers' 
compensation payments, he took the matter to the Department of 
Industrial Accidents (DIA); the defendant was ordered to restore 
those payments. 
 
When the defendant did not comply with the DIA order, the 
plaintiff sought enforcement in the Superior Court pursuant to 
G. L. c. 152, § 12 (1).  The defendant argued then, as now, that 
the provision of the suspension statute requiring that suspended 
public employees "shall not receive any compensation or salary 
during the period of suspension" prevails over the requirements 
of the worker's compensation act, and that the DIA order 
requiring proscribed payments should accordingly not be 
3 
 
 
enforced.  A Superior Court judge agreed and dismissed the 
enforcement actions.2  We conclude that workers' compensation 
benefits are not "compensation" as defined in the suspension 
statute, because they are not payments made "in return for 
services rendered."  G. L. c. 268A, § 1 (a).  The Superior Court 
actions brought by the plaintiff to enforce the orders of the 
DIA accordingly were dismissed in error.3 
 
1.  Background.4  The plaintiff began working for the city 
of Boston as an emergency medical technician in 1996, and was 
promoted to paramedic in 2004.  On September 5, 2011, he 
suffered a significant ankle injury while helping bring a 
patient to his ambulance.  As a result of the plaintiff's 
                     
 
2 The plaintiff brought two enforcement actions; one during 
his suspension and one after his resignation from the 
defendant's employment.  He argued in the latter action that 
G. L. c. 268A, § 25 (suspension statute), no longer precluded 
him from receiving workers' compensation payments because he was 
no longer suspended. 
 
 
3 Given our conclusion, we do not reach the plaintiff's 
contentions that attorney's fees, expenses, and court fees do 
not constitute compensation under G. L. c. 268A, § 25, nor his 
argument that he is entitled to workers' compensation for the 
periods before and after his suspension. 
 
 
4 We accept as true the facts alleged in the plaintiff's 
complaint.  See Burbank Apartments Tenant Ass'n v. Kargman, 474 
Mass. 107, 116 (2016). 
 
4 
 
 
incapacitation, the defendant paid workers' compensation 
benefits to him from September 5, 2011, until August 4, 2012.5 
 
In August, 2012, the defendant notified the plaintiff that 
his workers' compensation payments would be terminated.6  The 
plaintiff filed a claim contesting the termination of the 
payments with the DIA on October 23, 2012.  Just over a week 
later, the plaintiff was indicted on seventy-three counts of 
criminal misconduct involving controlled substances in his 
ambulance.  The defendant suspended the plaintiff's employment 
shortly thereafter pursuant to the suspension statute.7 
 
The DIA conducted a hearing regarding the plaintiff's 
workers' compensation claim on September 30, 2013.  On October 
                     
 
5 The defendant is obliged to make workers' compensation 
payments to its employees who suffer job-related injuries 
because it is a "self-insurer" under the workers' compensation 
act.  See G. L. c. 152, § 25A. 
 
6 The defendant apparently contested the plaintiff's claim 
that the injury was accidental.  Upon the defendant's suspension 
in connection with criminal charges, the defendant asserted that 
the payments were also proscribed by virtue of the suspension 
statute. 
 
 
7 General Laws c. 268A, § 25, provides in relevant part: 
 
 
"An officer or employee of a county, city, town or 
district, howsoever formed, including, but not limited to, 
regional school districts and regional planning districts, 
or of any department, board, commission or agency thereof 
may, during any period such officer or employee is under 
indictment for misconduct in such office or employment or 
for misconduct in any elective or appointive public office, 
trust or employment at any time held by him, be suspended 
by the appointing authority, whether or not such 
appointment was subject to approval in any manner." 
5 
 
 
6, 2014, the DIA ruled in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the 
defendant to resume making workers' compensation payments.  The 
defendant appealed from the DIA's decision and did not comply 
with the order.8  On November 24, 2014, the plaintiff brought an 
action in the Superior Court to enforce the DIA's order against 
the defendant pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 12 (1).9  A Superior 
Court judge granted the defendant's subsequent motion to dismiss 
on the ground that the suspension statute prohibited the 
plaintiff from receiving workers' compensation payments while he 
was suspended because it constituted "compensation" under the 
statute.  See G. L. c. 268A, § 25 ("Any person [suspended 
pursuant to the statute] shall not receive any compensation or 
salary during the period of suspension . . .").  The plaintiff 
appealed from the decision. 
 
On August 5, 2015, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to one 
felony count and seventeen misdemeanor counts and resigned from 
                     
 
8 The review board of the DIA eventually affirmed the order. 
 
 
9 The enforcement provision of the workers' compensation 
act, G. L. c. 152, § 12 (1), provides, in relevant part: 
 
 
"Whenever any party in interest presents a certified 
copy of an order or decision of a board member or of the 
reviewing board and any papers in connection therewith to 
the superior court department of the trial court for the 
county in which the injury occurred or for the county of 
Suffolk, the court shall enforce the order or decision, 
notwithstanding whether the matters at issue have been 
appealed and a decision on the merits of the appeal is 
pending." 
6 
 
 
his employment with the defendant.  He then brought another 
enforcement action in the Superior Court on the basis that the 
suspension statute no longer barred his compensation payments 
because he was no longer suspended.  A different Superior Court 
judge granted the defendant's subsequent motion to dismiss, 
concluding that the suspension statute still barred the 
plaintiff from receiving workers' compensation because his 
suspension had not been lifted prior to his resignation.  The 
plaintiff appealed from the ruling; his request that both cases 
be consolidated pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 3 (b), 365 Mass. 845 
(1974), was allowed in the Appeals Court.  We transferred the 
case from the Appeals Court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  Given that all of the plaintiff's 
objections to the two Superior Court judges' rulings concern 
questions of law, our review is de novo.  See Commonwealth v. 
Diggs, 475 Mass. 79, 81 (2016).  The plaintiff advances three 
claims in his appeal.  His main contention is that the judges 
erred in their determinations that workers' compensation 
payments are proscribed by the suspension statute, and in 
dismissing his enforcement actions on that basis.  He also 
contends both that G. L. c. 152, § 12 (1) ("the court shall 
enforce the order"), by its terms, requires the Superior Court 
to enforce his DIA order, and that the defendant waived its 
argument under the suspension statute by failing to raise it 
7 
 
 
before the DIA.  We first address only briefly the latter two 
issues and then turn to the matter of chief concern, viz., the 
apparent conflict between the workers' compensation act and the 
suspension statute. 
 
a.  Required enforcement of the DIA order pursuant to G. L. 
c. 152, § 12 (1).  The plaintiff maintains that the Superior 
Court judges were obliged to enforce the DIA's order pursuant to 
the unambiguous terms of G. L. c. 152, § 12 (1), and were 
required to do so irrespective of any potential conflict with 
the suspension statute.  This contention misses the mark.  The 
Superior Court, when asked to do so, must determine whether the 
statutory enforcement mechanism it is to employ conflicts with 
another potentially superseding statute.  See Keenan, 
petitioner, 310 Mass. 166, 179 (1941) (Superior Court "is a 
court of original and general jurisdiction and possesses the 
inherent powers of such a court under the common law, unless 
expressly limited, as well as those conferred by statute" 
[citation omitted]).  Language in the enforcement statute 
stating that a "court shall enforce" an order is not to the 
contrary -- it means only that, when asked to enforce the order, 
a Superior Court judge cannot second guess the merits of the 
DIA's decision.  That is not the situation here. 
 
b.  Waiver.  The plaintiff also contends, similarly without 
merit, that the defendant waived its argument concerning the 
8 
 
 
suspension statute by failing to raise it at the administrative 
level.  The DIA's jurisdiction, however, is limited to the 
interpretation and application of the workers' compensation act, 
and the defendant thus could not have raised the issue of G. L. 
c. 268A, § 25, before the DIA.  See Hayes's Case, 348 Mass. 447, 
452-453 (1965), quoting Levangie's Case, 228 Mass. 213, 216-217 
(1917) ("The [Industrial Accident Board, a predecessor to the 
DIA,] 'is not a court of general or limited common[-]law 
jurisdiction; . . . it is purely and solely an administrative 
tribunal, specifically created to administer the [workers'] 
compensation act in aid and with the assistance of the Superior 
Court . . . , and as such possesses only such authority and 
powers as have been conferred upon it by express grant or arise 
therefrom by implication as necessary and incidental to the full 
exercise of the granted powers'").  Accordingly, the defendant 
appropriately raised the issue in the Superior Court. 
 
c.  Whether the suspension statute prohibits suspended 
employees from receiving workers' compensation.  The plaintiff 
contends that workers' compensation does not constitute 
"compensation" within the meaning of the suspension statute.  
That statute states, in relevant part, that any employee 
suspended pursuant to it "shall not receive any compensation or 
salary during the period of suspension."  G. L. c. 268A, § 25.  
The term "compensation" is in turn defined as "any money, thing 
9 
 
 
of value or economic benefit conferred on or received by any 
person in return for services rendered or to be rendered by 
himself or another."  G. L. c. 268A, § 1 (a).  We first set 
forth an overview of the relevant statutes. 
 
i  Statutory overview.  1.  The suspension statute.  The 
suspension statute, "which applies to county, municipal, and 
district officers, is identical in its operative language to 
G. L. c. 30, § 59,  . . . which applies to officers and 
employees of the Commonwealth."  Springfield v. Director of Div. 
of Employment Sec., 398 Mass. 786, 788 (1986), quoting 
Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. 
Auth. Retirement Bd., 397 Mass. 734, 739 n.8 (1986).  The 
suspension statute was enacted in 1972, see St. 1972, c. 257, to 
"remedy the untenable situation which arises when a person who 
has been indicted for misconduct in office continues to perform 
his public duties while awaiting trial . . . by allowing for the 
temporary removal of such employees from office, and by 
precluding the payment of compensation . . . during the period 
of their suspension."  Springfield, supra at 788-789, quoting 
Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., supra at 739.  Because the 
statute does not include any exception, it "is dominant in its 
purpose and its terms" [quotation omitted].  Springfield, supra 
at 789. 
10 
 
 
We have interpreted the term "compensation," as it appears 
in the suspension statute, as encompassing "a broader meaning 
than the word 'salary.'"  Springfield, 398 Mass. at 790.  The 
term is to be "read in light of" the purpose of the suspension 
statute, i.e. to effect "a complete severance of the 
relationship between public employer and employee."  See id., 
quoting Brown v. Taunton, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 614, 620 (1983). 
2.  The worker's compensation act.  The workers' 
compensation act, originally enacted in 1911, guarantees workers 
certain benefits as the exclusive remedy for injuries they 
suffer in the course of employment, regardless of the employer's 
fault.  See Estate of Moulton v. Puopolo, 467 Mass. 478, 483 
(2014), citing St. 1911, c. 751, pt. 1, § 5, and pt. 5, § 1.  
The act "was intended to guarantee that workers would receive 
payment for any workplace injuries they suffered, regardless of 
fault; in exchange for accepting the statutory remedies, the 
worker waives any common-law right to compensation for 
injuries."  Estate of Moulton, supra.  The workers' compensation 
scheme "provides predictability for both employee and employer, 
balancing protection for workers with certainty for employers."  
Id. 
 
The worker's compensation act operates by requiring each 
employer in the Commonwealth to obtain workers' compensation 
coverage from an insurer that will make workers' compensation 
11 
 
 
payments to injured employees or, alternatively, to obtain a 
license "as a self-insurer" -- i.e., an employer that makes 
workers' compensation payments to its employees.  See G. L. 
c. 152, § 25A.  Failure to do so may result in, among other 
things, the imposition of civil penalties upon employers, who 
also may forfeit immunity from suits by employees.  See G. L. 
c. 152, § 25C (11).  An employee may opt out of the workers' 
compensation scheme and retain the right to sue the employer in 
tort by making such an intention clear in writing upon hire.  
See G. L. c. 152, § 24; Wentworth v. Henry C. Becker Custom 
Bldg. Ltd., 459 Mass. 768, 773 n.6 (2011). 
 
Under the worker's compensation act, an employee who 
suffers an injury arising out of employment is entitled to an 
array of benefits depending on the nature of the injury.  In 
general, an employee who suffers such an injury will recover 
medical expenses arising out of the injury, G. L. c. 152, § 30, 
and receive, for some period of time,10 weekly payments based 
                     
 
10 The period of time during which the injured employee will 
receive payments is dependent upon the extent and duration of 
the employee's incapacity for work.  See G. L. c. 152, § 35 
(compensation for partial incapacity extends to 260 weeks or to 
520 "if an insurer agrees or an administrative judge finds that 
the employee has, as a result of a personal injury under [the 
act], suffered a permanent loss of seventy-five percent or more 
of any bodily function or sense specified in" G. L. c. 152, 
§ 36); G. L. c. 152, § 34 (compensation for total incapacity 
extends to 156 weeks); G. L. c. 152, § 34A (compensation for 
total and permanent incapacity extends for entirety of 
employee's life). 
12 
 
 
upon the employee's salary prior to her injury.  In the event of 
certain specific and debilitating injuries, employees are also 
to receive an additional lump sum payment.  See G. L. c. 152, 
§ 36.  Should an employee succumb to a work related injury, 
certain survivors will receive weekly payments in the employee's 
stead.  See G. L. c. 152, § 31. 
ii.  Analysis.  The question before us is whether the 
meaning of the statutory term "compensation" in the suspension 
statute encompasses such workers' compensation benefits.  It is 
axiomatic that "a statute must be interpreted according to the 
intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words 
construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, 
considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may 
be effectuated."  Yeretsky v. Attleboro, 424 Mass. 315, 319 
(1997), quoting Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 
368 Mass. 511, 513 (1975).  "In interpreting the meaning of a 
statute, we look first to the plain statutory language."  
DiCarlo v. Suffolk Constr. Co., 473 Mass. 624, 629 (2016), 
quoting Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 
138 (2013).  Applying these principles to the present case, we 
conclude that workers' compensation benefits do not fall within 
the ambit of the suspension statute. 
13 
 
 
 
While the statutory term "compensation" is defined broadly, 
see Springfield, 398 Mass. at 790, its scope is not unbounded.  
The Legislature defined "compensation" as "any money, thing of 
value or economic benefit conferred on or received by any person 
in return for services rendered" (emphasis added).  G. L. 
c. 268A, § 1 (a).  The phrase "in return for services rendered," 
given its plain meaning, denotes a reciprocal relationship 
between the benefits received and the services provided.  See, 
e.g., Killoran v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 709 F.2d 31, 
31-32 (9th Cir. 1983) (taxicab driver's tips were paid "in 
return for services rendered" and were therefore income for 
Federal income tax purposes).  In order for a benefit to qualify 
as compensation that a suspended public employee may not 
receive, it must be provided as recompense for the employee's 
services, i.e., in return for services rendered. 
 
How strictly that requisite reciprocity is to be understood 
is central to the question before us:  whether workers' 
compensation benefits are received in return for services the 
injured employee rendered.  If reciprocity means only payments 
akin to wages, the broad meaning of "compensation" intended by 
the Legislature would be vitiated.  On the other hand, if 
reciprocity could mean, as the defendant seems to suggest, any 
benefit stemming from a "but for" nexus formed by the employee 
relationship itself -- i.e., any benefit arising from even a 
14 
 
 
tangential connection to employee services -- the phrase "in 
return for services rendered" effectively would be written out 
of the statutory definition.  See Chatham Corp. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 362 Mass. 216, 219 (1972) ("every word of a legislative 
enactment is to be given force and effect"). 
 
In determining that certain benefits constitute 
compensation under the suspension statute, our cases suggest a 
middle course, one which takes the phrase to mean a reciprocity 
where the benefits in question are interwoven with, and received 
primarily as a result of, services rendered.  Benefits in this 
category include sick pay, Brown, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 620 
(entitlement received as part of compensation package and 
provided in lump sum upon termination if not used); return on an 
investment received in exchange for technical advice given, 
Commonwealth v. Canon, 373 Mass. 494, 497 (1977), cert. denied, 
435 U.S. 933 (1978) (investment opportunity in exchange for 
engineering advice by city engineer constituted compensation); 
and unemployment benefits, Springfield, 398 Mass. at 790-791 
(employer obliged to pay such benefits as result of employee 
having rendered wage earning services to employer).  In each 
instance, the reason the employee received the benefit was 
primarily as the result of services he rendered as an employee. 
 
The receipt of workers' compensation benefits differs from 
these because, while such benefits are triggered by injuries 
15 
 
 
that arise in the course of employment, see Derinza's Case, 229 
Mass. 435, 441-442 (1918), they are not in exchange for services 
rendered during that employment.  The reciprocal exchange that 
occurs in the workers' compensation context is not between 
services and benefits, but between the waived right to sue the 
employer in tort for injuries and the guarantee of benefits when 
injured.  See Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of 
Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Dep't. of Labor, 
449 U.S. 268, 282 n.24 (1980) ("Employees . . . give up the 
right of suit for damages for personal injuries against 
employers in return for the certainty of compensation payments 
as recompense for those injuries" [citation omitted]); Estate of 
Moulton, 467 Mass. at 483 ("in exchange for accepting the 
statutory remedies [of the workers' compensation act], the 
worker waives any common-law right to compensation for tort 
injuries").  The various payments, medical and otherwise, 
provide comprehensive recompense for "lost wages and lost 
earnings capacity and medical expenses resulting from work-
related injuries."  Neff v. Commissioner of the Dep't. of Indus. 
Accs., 421 Mass. 70, 75 (1995).  Such payments are in the nature 
of insurance benefits received pursuant to a policy taken out by 
the employer for the employee's benefit, see Derinza's Case, 229 
Mass. at 441; the policy is, in effect, purchased in 
consideration for the employee's waiver of his or her right to 
16 
 
 
sue the employer.  Moreover, the workers' compensation act does 
not implicate the employer-employee relationship -- it concerns 
the relationship between an employee and her insurer.  See 
Insurance Co. of the State of Penn. v. Great Northern Ins. Co., 
473 Mass. 745, 750 (2016) ("although the employer purchases the 
workers' compensation policy, a workers' compensation insurer is 
directly liable to an injured employee for the workers' 
compensation benefits provided by law; the insurer does not 
reimburse the employer for its payment of these benefits").11 
 
Our decision in Springfield, 398 Mass. at 790-791, is not 
to the contrary, notwithstanding certain superficial 
similarities between unemployment and workers' compensation 
benefits.  Enacted in 1935, the unemployment compensation 
statute, G. L. c. 151A, § 24,12 serves as a temporary economic 
stabilization mechanism for terminated employees who meet the 
statutory criteria.   See id. (describing statutory criteria for 
benefits).  The over-all "purpose of the law is to provide 
temporary relief for those who are realistically compelled to 
                     
 
11 The defendant's obligation to make workers' compensation 
payments to its employees stems from its role as a self-insurer 
under the worker's compensation act rather than its position as 
an employer. 
 
 
12 At that time, Federal law required for the first time 
that each State enact and administer a worker's compensation 
program.  See Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, 
55 Yale L.J. 21, 32-35 (1945) (describing development and 
implementation of "[F]ederal-[S]tate system of unemployment 
compensation"). 
17 
 
 
leave work through no 'fault' of their own, whatever the source 
of the compulsion, personal or employer-initiated."  See 
Raytheon Co. v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 364 
Mass. 593, 596 (1974); G. L. c. 151A, §§ 29, 30.  Employers fund 
this mechanism, G. L. c. 151A, § 14, which is administered by 
the department of unemployment assistance, and employees do not 
contribute to it in any manner.  The employee gives up neither 
rights nor money to receive such benefits, which are, in effect, 
a statutorily mandated temporary extension of his or her 
compensation package beyond the employee's termination.  The 
receipt of such benefits is primarily as the result of services 
rendered during employment. 
 
Because workers' compensation benefits do not constitute 
compensation for purposes of the suspension statute, that 
statute accordingly does not proscribe the receipt of such 
benefits by suspended employees. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment is reversed and the matter is 
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.