Title: Brame v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 952340
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 13, 1996

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Hassell, and Keenan, 
JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice, and Cochran, Retired Justice 
 
GEORGE BRAME 
                                        OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 952340 
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 
                                    September 
13, 
1996   
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
 
Walter W. Stout, III, Judge 
 
 
This appeal presents two questions, (1) whether the judicial 
suspension of a person's operator's license for one year based 
upon his refusal to submit to a blood or breath test when he has 
already suffered a seven-day administrative suspension for the 
same refusal violates the constitutional prohibition against 
double jeopardy, and (2) whether application of the seven-day 
administrative suspension statute to the defendant in this case 
results in a denial of due process.  Finding that the trial court 
did not err in answering both these questions in the negative, we 
will affirm.  
 
The seven-day administrative suspension of the defendant's 
license was made pursuant to Code § 46.2-391.2(A).  This section 
provides in pertinent part that if a person refuses to submit to a 
breath test in violation of Code § 18.2-268.3, upon issuance of a 
warrant for driving while intoxicated in violation of Code § 18.2-
266 or for refusing to take a blood or breath test in violation of 
Code § 18.2-268.3, his operator's license shall be suspended 
immediately for seven days.   
 
Code 
§ 46.2-391.2(C) 
provides 
that 
any 
person 
whose 
operator's license has been suspended under Code § 46.2-391.2(A) 
may, during the period of the suspension, request the general 
district court where the arrest was made to review the suspension, 
and the request is given precedence over all other matters on the 
docket.  If the person proves by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the arresting officer did not have probable cause for the 
arrest or that the magistrate did not have probable cause to issue 
the warrant, the court shall rescind the suspension.  Otherwise, 
the court shall affirm the suspension. 
 
Code § 18.2-268.3, referred to in Code § 46.2-391.2(A), 
prescribes the procedures to be followed if a person, after having 
been arrested for driving under the influence, refuses to permit 
blood or breath samples to be taken for chemical tests to 
determine the alcohol or drug content of his blood.  Code § 18.2-
268.4 provides that if a person is found guilty of violating Code 
§ 18.2-268.3, the court shall suspend his privilege to drive for a 
period of one year, in addition to the seven-day suspension 
imposed under Code § 46.2-391.2.  
 
The record shows that on February 13, 1995, C. D. Preuss, a 
Virginia Commonwealth University police officer, arrested the 
defendant, George Brame, in the City of Richmond and charged him 
in a warrant issued by a magistrate with driving under the 
influence of alcohol in violation of Code § 18.2-266.  When Brame 
refused, both at the site of the arrest and at the police station, 
to take a blood or breath test, Preuss also charged him in a 
warrant issued by the magistrate with unreasonably refusing to 
take a blood or breath test, and his license was administratively 
suspended for seven days pursuant to Code § 46.2-391.2(A). 
 
The next day, Brame filed in general district court a 
petition under Code § 46.2-391.2(C) for review of the seven-day 
suspension of his license.  The court denied this petition, thus 
affirming the suspension.
1
 
The warrants charging Brame with driving under the influence 
and with unreasonably refusing to take a blood or breath test were 
later tried in general district court.  He was found guilty of 
both charges, and his license was suspended for a period of one 
year on the charge of unreasonably refusing to take a blood or 
breath test.  On a de novo appeal to circuit court, Brame was 
found not guilty of driving under the influence but guilty of 
unreasonably refusing to take a blood or breath test, and his 
license was again suspended for a period of one year. 
 
Because a charge of unreasonably refusing to submit to a 
blood or breath test is not criminal but administrative and civil 
in nature, an appeal lies directly to this Court.  Commonwealth v. 
Rafferty, 241 Va. 319, 323-24, 402 S.E.2d 17, 20 (1991).  Upon 
Brame's petition, we awarded him an appeal. 
 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
 
Citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), Brame 
points out that "the Double Jeopardy Clause 'protects against 
three distinct abuses:  a second prosecution for the same offense 
after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.'"  Id. 
at 440.  Brame then states that "[a]s was the case in Halper, it 
                     
     
1In a brief filed in the trial court, Brame stated that 
the general district court conducted a hearing on his 
petition the same day it was filed. 
is the third of these protections [,i.e., the prohibition against 
multiple punishments,] which is at issue here."   
 
Brame also points out that Halper establishes a three-pronged 
analysis 
for 
determining 
whether 
a 
person 
has 
suffered 
impermissible multiple punishments.  Under this analysis, Brame 
says, a person suffers impermissible multiple punishments if the 
two sanctions result from the same offense, the second sanction is 
imposed in a separate proceeding, and both sanctions constitute 
punishment in the double jeopardy sense.  
 
For the purposes of this appeal, we will assume, without 
deciding, that Brame's two sanctions resulted from the same 
incident and that the subsequent sanction was imposed in a 
separate proceeding.  This leaves for decision only the question 
whether the suspension of Brame's operator's license for refusal 
to submit to a blood or breath test constitutes punishment for 
double jeopardy purposes. 
 
Brame relies heavily upon Halper to support his contention 
that his license suspension does constitute punishment.  There, 
the defendant was convicted of submitting 65 false claims for 
reimbursement 
of 
Medicare 
benefits 
and 
was 
sentenced 
to 
imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of $5,000.  The 
Government then brought an action under the civil False Claims 
Act, in which the defendant could have been subjected to a civil 
penalty of $2,000 for each of the 65 claims for a total of 
$130,000, plus twice the amount of the Government's actual damages 
of $585 and costs of the civil action.  
 
The district court found that the authorized recovery of more 
than $130,000 bore no rational relation to the Government's actual 
loss plus its costs in investigating and prosecuting the 
defendant's false claims and that imposition of the full amount 
would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by punishing the 
defendant twice for the same conduct.  To avoid this violation, 
the district court entered judgment in favor of the Government for 
only twice the amount of its actual damages of $585 plus the costs 
of the civil action. 
 
The Government appealed directly to the United States Supreme 
Court, which noted probable jurisdiction to decide the question 
"whether and under what circumstances a civil penalty may 
constitute 'punishment' for the purposes of double jeopardy 
analysis."  Id. at 436.  Previously, the Court had given deference 
to the labels Congress placed upon statutes and had classified as 
nonpunitive those sanctions labelled as civil.  Helvering v. 
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 404-05 (1938).  In Halper, however, the 
Court stated that "the labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of 
paramount importance," 490 U.S. at 447, and, for the first time, 
held that the imposition of a civil sanction following a criminal 
conviction and sentence could implicate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.  Id. at 448-49. 
 
The Court observed that "in a particular case a civil penalty 
. . . may be so extreme and so divorced from the Government's 
damages and expenses as to constitute punishment."  Id. at 442.  
The Court stated it was announcing "a rule for the rare case . . . 
such as the one before [it]," a rule providing that a civil 
penalty must bear a "rational relation to the goal of compensating 
the Government for its loss" else the penalty will constitute an 
impermissible second punishment.  Id. at 449-50. 
 
The Court stated it agreed "with the District Court that the 
disparity between its approximation of the Government's costs and 
Halper's $130,000 liability is sufficiently disproportionate that 
the sanction constitutes a second punishment in violation of 
double jeopardy."  Id. at 452.  However, the Court remanded the 
case "to permit the Government to demonstrate that the District 
Court's assessment of its injuries was erroneous."  Id.
 
Brame asserts that the Supreme Court held in Halper that "any 
civil sanction which is not exclusively 'remedial' will implicate 
the protection of the double jeopardy clause."  However, we do not 
find this precise language in Halper.  While there is a statement 
in the Halper opinion that may give Brame comfort,
2 that statement 
is inconsistent with the specific holding of the Court, and the 
language of the holding belies Brame's suggestion that a civil 
sanction must be exclusively remedial to pass constitutional 
muster.  This is the way the Court phrased its holding: 
 
We . . . hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a 
defendant who already has been punished in a criminal 
prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil 
sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not 
 fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a 
deterrent or retribution.   
 
Id. at 448-49 (emphasis added). 
 
                     
     
2"[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely 
to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be 
explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent 
purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the 
term."  490 U.S. at 448.  This statement was criticized 
later by the Supreme Court in United States v. Ursery, 
infra.    
 
We read this language to mean that if a given sanction may be 
characterized only as a deterrent or retribution, it runs afoul of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause, but if it may fairly be characterized 
as remedial, even though it incidentally serves the purposes of 
deterrence and retribution, it does not offend the Clause.  And we 
think a decision of the Supreme Court subsequent to Halper makes 
clear that a particular sanction need not be exclusively remedial 
to avoid violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
 
In United States v. Ursery, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 2135 
(1996), the Supreme Court considered the question whether the 
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the Government from both 
punishing a defendant for a criminal offense and forfeiting his 
property for the same offense in a separate proceeding.  ___ U.S. 
at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2138.  The Court answered the question in the 
negative.  In the course of his opinion for the majority, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist responded to an assertion made by Justice 
Stevens in dissent that Halper had established a general rule 
under which a civil sanction must solely serve a remedial purpose 
to avoid violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.  The Chief Justice 
wrote: 
 
Whether a particular sanction "cannot fairly be said 
solely to serve a remedial purpose" is an inquiry 
radically different from that we have traditionally 
employed in order to determine whether, as a categorical 
matter, a civil sanction is subject to the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.  Yet nowhere in Halper does the Court 
purport to make such a sweeping change in the law, 
instead emphasizing repeatedly the narrow scope of its 
decision. . . .  If the "general rule" of Justice 
STEVENS were applied literally, then virtually every 
sanction would be declared to be a punishment:  it is 
hard to imagine a sanction that has no punitive aspect 
whatsoever.  Justice STEVENS' interpretation of Halper 
is both contrary to the decision itself and would create 
an unworkable rule inconsistent with well-established 
precedent.  
 
___ U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2146 n.2 (citation omitted). 
 
Contrary to an argument made by Brame, we think that the 
cases of Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993), and 
Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1937 
(1994), decided subsequent to Halper, do not detract from the view 
that a sanction need not be exclusively remedial to avoid 
implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Austin is inapposite; it 
is not a double jeopardy case but, instead, one applying the 
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 
 
Kurth Ranch actually supports the view we take of the matter. 
 The opinion in Kurth Ranch quotes with approval the specific 
holding in Halper indicating that a sanction need not be 
exclusively remedial to avoid implicating the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.  Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1945.  The 
opinion also states that "an obvious deterrent purpose [does not] 
automatically [make a sanction] a form of punishment," 511 U.S. at 
___, 114 S.Ct. at 1946.  In any event, Ursery counteracts anything 
that may have been said in either Austin or Kurth Ranch that is at 
odds with the view that a sanction need not be exclusively 
remedial to preclude a claim of double jeopardy.
3
                     
     
3In oral argument, Brame cited United States v. 
$405,089.23 in United States Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th 
Cir. 1994), along with Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch, in 
arguing that the sanction of administrative license 
suspension was punitive and not remedial.  However, the 
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's judgment in 
United States v. $405,089.23 at the same time it reversed 
the judgment of the Sixth Circuit in United States v. 
Ursery, cited in the text.  
 
This brings us to the question whether Virginia's license 
suspension statutes serve a remedial purpose.  We think they do.  
 
Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway of 
this Commonwealth shall be deemed, as a condition of such 
operation, to have consented to have samples of his blood or 
breath taken for a chemical test to determine the alcohol or drug 
content of his blood if arrested for driving while intoxicated.  
Code § 18.2-268.2.   
 
Any person who is arrested for driving while intoxicated and 
refuses to submit to a blood or breath test faces two separate and 
distinct proceedings.  One is a criminal action under Code § 18.2-
266 for driving while intoxicated, which carries a sanction of 
fine or imprisonment, or both.  The other is a civil and 
administrative proceeding under Code § 18.2-268.3 for refusing, in 
breach of the person's implied consent, to allow samples of blood 
or breath to be taken, which carries the sanction of a one-year 
license suspension.   
 
The one-year license suspension pursuant to Code § 18.2-268.3 
for refusing to permit the taking of blood or breath samples is 
"'no part of the punishment [for drunk driving nor] is it . . . an 
added punishment for the offense committed.'"  Deaner v. 
Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 290, 170 S.E.2d 199, 203 (1969) 
(quoting Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 462, 17 S.E.2d 393, 395 
(1941)).  Rather, like the provision for implied consent, the 
provision for a one-year license suspension is "a measure flowing 
from the police power of the state designed to protect other users 
of state highways."  Deaner, 210 Va. at 289, 170 S.E.2d at 202. 
 
Hence, we think that the one-year license suspension 
prescribed by Code § 18.2-268.3 has a clear, overriding remedial 
purpose and that the same may be said for the seven-day 
administrative 
suspension 
prescribed 
by 
Code 
§ 46.2-391.2.  
Indeed, this is exactly the view the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
has adopted concerning administrative license suspension. 
 
In Tench v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 200, 462 S.E.2d 922 
(1995), the defendant was convicted for driving while intoxicated 
after he had suffered a seven-day administrative suspension of his 
operator's license pursuant to Code § 46.2-391.2.  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the conviction.
4  Rejecting the defendant's 
contention that he was twice placed in jeopardy as a result of his 
license suspension and his subsequent conviction for driving while 
intoxicated, the Court of Appeals stated as follows: 
 
The General Assembly's consideration of a procedure for 
automatic license suspension was motivated by its desire 
to reduce "alcohol-related crashes, fatalities, and 
injuries."  See S.J.Res. 172, 1989 Va. Acts.  Enactment 
of this procedure was no empty exercise, as states that 
have enacted such laws have experienced a reduction in 
alcohol-related crashes and fatalities.  We hold that 
automatic license suspension under Code § 46.2-391.2 is 
a remedial sanction because its purpose is to protect 
the public from intoxicated drivers and to reduce 
alcohol-related accidents. 
 
21 Va. App. at 205, 462 S.E.2d at 924 (footnote omitted).
5  
                     
     
4Tench sought an appeal to this Court, but his petition 
was dismissed on procedural grounds. 
     
5Senate Joint Resolution 172, cited in the Tench 
opinion, directed several state agencies to study and make a 
report on the subject of administrative license suspension. 
 Brame argues that it was shown in the report filed as a 
result of the study that "the motivation for enacting [the 
administrative suspension] legislation was deterrence of 
drunk driving."  The report cites the testimony of two 
members of the General Assembly given at public hearings 
Furthermore, this view has been adopted by the highest court of 
every state that has reviewed the double jeopardy aspects of 
administrative license suspension since Halper was decided.  
Deutschendorf v. People, 920 P.2d 53 (Colo. 1996); State v. 
Hickam, 668 A.2d 1321 (Conn. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
116 S.Ct. 1851 (1996); State v. Higa, 897 P.2d 928 (Haw. 1995); 
State v. Talavera, 905 P.2d 633 (Idaho 1995); State v. Kocher, 542 
N.W.2d 556 (Iowa 1996); State v. Mertz, 907 P.2d 847 (Kan. 1995); 
Butler v. Department of Pub. Safety & Corr., 609 So. 2d 790 (La. 
1992); State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265 (Me. 1995); State v. Jones, 
666 A.2d 128 (Md. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 
1265 (1996); Luk v. Commonwealth, 658 N.E.2d 664 (Mass. 1995); 
State v. Hanson, 543 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1996); State v. Mayo, 915 
S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1996); State v. Hansen, 542 N.W.2d 424 (Neb. 
1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 2509 (1996); State v. 
Cassady, 662 A.2d 955 (N.H. 1995); State v. Kennedy, 904 P.2d 1044 
(N.M. 1995); State v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d 49 (N.D. 1995); State 
v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510 (Vt. 1992).  
 
We especially note and concur in an observation made by the 
Supreme Court of Vermont in State v. Strong:  "[A] 'bright line' 
has developed [in the decisions] because the nonpunitive purpose 
(..continued) 
conducted by a task force formed by the agencies directed by 
SJR 172 to make the study.  However, while one of these 
members used the word "deter" once, it is obvious that both 
members were merely offering their own opinions on the 
subject under study.  The only real evidence of "motivation" 
is found in SJR 172 itself, where it is noted that "twenty-
three states have enacted administrative revocation laws and 
subsequently experienced a significant reduction in alcohol-
related crashes, fatalities and injuries."  This speaks much 
louder of remedy than deterrence. 
of the [administrative] license suspension is so clear and 
compelling.  We see nothing in Halper that induces us to cross 
that line."  605 A.2d at 514. 
 
Similarly, the remedial purpose of Virginia's seven-day 
administrative suspension provision is so clear and compelling 
that it overrides any incidental punitive effect the provision may 
have.  Accordingly, we have no difficulty in holding that Brame's 
rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause were not violated by the 
subsequent judicial suspension of his license for one year.   
 
Brame contends, however, that the inquiry does not end with 
the Double Jeopardy Clause.  He argues that Code § 19.2-294 
"provides [him] a separate protection against double jeopardy."  
In pertinent part, this Code section reads: 
 
If the same act be a violation of two or more statutes, 
or of two or more ordinances, or of one or more statutes 
and also one or more ordinances, conviction under one of 
such statutes or ordinances shall be a bar to a 
prosecution or proceeding under the other or others. 
 
 
The ready answer to Brame's argument is that this Court has 
already interpreted the foregoing statute adversely to his 
position.  Quidley v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 1029, 59 S.E.2d 52 
(1950), involved a gaming conviction and a proceeding to forfeit 
property.  There, the accused contended that § 4775 of the Code of 
1942, now Code § 19.2-294, barred the forfeiture proceeding.  
Rejecting the contention, this Court held as follows:  
 
[S]ection 4775 . . . is applicable only to criminal 
proceedings.  The proceeding to forfeit property is 
against the property and not against the owner of the 
property or any other person.  It is in rem wholly and 
not in personam.  It is not a criminal proceeding.  It 
is a civil case.  
 
Id. at 1036, 59 S.E.2d at 56.  Here, Brame's administrative 
license suspension is not a criminal proceeding.  It is a civil 
proceeding and, hence, could not serve as a bar to a proceeding 
under Code § 18.2-268.3 for refusing to submit to a blood or 
breath test, which is itself civil in nature. 
 
Brame argues further that because he was found not guilty of 
driving while intoxicated, there is no rational relationship 
between his administrative license suspension and the need to 
protect the public from intoxicated drivers.  What Brame 
overlooks, however, is that his arrest for driving while 
intoxicated was based upon probable cause, as determined by the 
magistrate and confirmed by the general district court.  Hence, at 
the time of his arrest, Brame posed at least a potential threat to 
the safety of others using the highway, a potentiality whose 
existence was unaffected by the subsequent acquittal on the charge 
of driving while intoxicated.  Brame further overlooks the fact 
that he was also arrested for refusing to submit to a blood or 
breath test notwithstanding his implied consent to take such a 
test, a refusal that survived the subsequent acquittal on the 
drunk driving charge.  There was a rational relationship, 
therefore, between Brame's administrative license suspension and 
the need to protect the public from intoxicated drivers and those 
who refuse to honor their assumed obligations. 
 
Brame also argues that the legislative choice of seven days 
for an administrative suspension is arbitrary, bearing no rational 
relationship to any remedial purpose of protecting the public.  
The arbitrariness is apparent, Brame says, when it is considered 
that alcohol in the blood stream tends to dissipate within several 
hours of consumption, making the suspension sanction, in the words 
of Halper, "so divorced from any remedial goal that it constitutes 
'punishment' for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis."  490 
U.S. at 443. 
 
We disagree.  The length of the period necessary to protect 
the safety of the public in this situation is a matter within the 
sound discretion of the General Assembly.  It can hardly be said 
the discretion has been abused in light of the fact that 
Virginia's seven-day period is shorter than any of the periods 
considered in the out-of-state cases listed above, where double 
jeopardy claims similar to those advanced here were rejected.  
Indeed, the majority of the states listed have suspension periods 
of ninety days or more and, in some instances, substantially 
longer than ninety days. 
 
DUE PROCESS 
 
Brame's 
entire 
due 
process 
claim 
is 
based 
upon 
the 
proposition that because the arresting officer did not appear at 
the hearing in general district court, he did not have the 
opportunity to cross-examine the officer.  However, Brame 
certainly had the opportunity to secure the officer's testimony by 
requesting his voluntary appearance or obtaining a subpoena 
compelling his attendance.  Yet, so far as the record shows, Brame 
made no effort whatsoever to procure the officer's presence.  In 
the absence of any such effort, Brame has no standing to complain.  
 
For the reasons assigned, we will affirm the judgment of the 
trial court. 
 
Affirmed.