Title: Town of Mount Pleasant v. Shaw
Citation: 432 S.E.2d 450
Docket Number: 23854
State: south-carolina
Issuer: south-carolina Supreme Court
Date: May 10, 1993

432 S.E.2d 450 (1993) The TOWN OF MOUNT PLEASANT, Appellant, v. Harry O. SHAW, III, Respondent. No. 23854. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard November 16, 1992. Decided May 10, 1993. Mark A. Mason, of Mason &amp; Robertson, Mt. Pleasant, for appellant. Lawrence E. Richter, Jr., and John M. Campbell, both of The Richter Firm, P.A., Charleston, for respondent. PER CURIAM. The Town of Mount Pleasant appeals Circuit Court's reversal of Respondent, Harry 0. Shaw's (Shaw), Municipal Court conviction for Driving Under the Influence (DUI). We reverse and reinstate the conviction. Shaw was arrested and charged with DUI. He was taken to the police station and offered a breathalyzer test. Prior to administration of the test, the following advisory was read to Shaw: The officer administering the test then asked Shaw if he wished to take the test, to which Shaw responded "Yes." The test was administered, resulting in a .25% blood alcohol reading. Shaw was convicted of DUI in Municipal Court. Circuit Court reversed the conviction, holding that the advisory which was read to Shaw prior to administration of the breathalyzer did not adequately advise him of his option to refuse the test. S.C.Code Ann. § 56-5-2950(a) (1991) provides, in part: Shaw claims that the advisory he received was insufficient to place him on *451 notice that he was not required to take the test. We disagree. A common sense reading of the advisory makes clear the consequences of both taking the test and refusing to take the test. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the legislative intent prevails. Truesdale v. S.C. Hwy. Dept., 264 S.C. 221, 213 S.E.2d 740 (1975). "A statutory provision should be given a reasonable and practical construction consistent with the purpose and policy expressed in the statute." Hay v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 273 S.C. 269, 273, 255 S.E.2d 837, 840 (1979). We are unpersuaded by Shaw's contention that the legislature, in passing § 56-5-2950(a), intended any particular verbiage in the breathalyzer advisory. "The purpose of the advisory is not to persuade a driver to refuse testing, but to let a driver know the serious consequences of refusal." McDonnell v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 460 N.W.2d 363, 371 (Minn.App.1990); See also State v. Deets, 234 Neb. 307, 450 N.W.2d 696 (1990). We agree with those jurisdictions which hold that an advisory is sufficient if, construed as a whole, it provides the driver adequate notice that he may, if he so elects, to refuse the test. See State v. DeGier, 387 N.W.2d 227 (Minn.App.1986); Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107 (Wyo.1985). We concur with the rule laid down in Olson: 698 P.2d at 113 (Emphasis supplied). The judgment below is REVERSED and the conviction reinstated. REVERSED.