Title: Zimmerman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 98487
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: October 21, 2011

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 98,487 
 
ROGER ZIMMERMAN, et al., 
Appellants/Cross-appellees, 
 
and 
 
A.B. HUDSON AND LARRY FRENCH, 
Intervenors/Appellants/Cross-appellees, 
 
v. 
 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF WABAUNSEE COUNTY, KANSAS, 
Appellees/Cross-appellants. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial 
court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. 
 
2. 
 
An appellate court reviews constitutional questions de novo. 
 
3. 
 
Whether there has been a compensable taking of private property for public use is 
a question of law. 
 
2 
 
4. 
 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
which is applicable to the state through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that private 
property shall not be "taken for public use, without just compensation." 
 
5. 
 
The Takings Clause presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a 
valid public purpose. The Clause expressly requires compensation where government 
takes private property for public use. It does not bar the government from interfering with 
property rights but rather requires compensation in the event of otherwise proper 
interference amounting to a taking. 
 
6. 
 
Although reasonableness is the standard by which a court determines whether a 
government's exercise of police power is valid, reasonableness is not the appropriate 
standard to determine whether a government action affecting real property in private 
hands constitutes a taking. 
 
7. 
 
In order to prevail on a takings claim, a party seeking compensation must first 
establish that the property in question is one in which a vested property right exists, i.e., a 
constitutionally cognizable property interest. 
 
8. 
 
A vested right is a right so fixed that it is not dependent on any future act, 
contingency, or decision to make it more secure. 
 
3 
 
9. 
 
Conditional use permits are a device for permitting certain land uses considered to 
be essential or desirable to the community to be placed in zoning districts in which they 
would ordinarily be incompatible. 
 
10. 
 
An applicant has no vested rights in a conditional use permit when its issuance 
depends upon the discretionary approval of a governmental authority. 
 
11. 
 
When a district court has granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
an appellate court must accept the facts alleged by the plaintiff as true, along with any 
inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom. The appellate court then decides 
whether those facts and inferences state a claim based on plaintiff's theory or any other 
possible theory. If so, the dismissal by the district court must be reversed. 
 
12. 
 
Alleged violations of the dormant Commerce Clause are subject to a two-step 
inquiry. First, the court asks whether the challenged law discriminates on its face against 
interstate commerce. Second, if the law is not facially discriminatory, the court then 
engages in the balancing test as set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 90 
S. Ct. 844, 25 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1970). 
 
13. 
 
A law impermissibly discriminates against interstate commerce if it treats in-state 
and out-of-state economic interests differently by benefitting the former and burdening 
the latter. 
 
4 
 
14. 
 
Under the facts of this case, a zoning amendment that regulated evenhandedly and 
affected in-state and out-of-state economic interests equally was not facially 
discriminatory. 
 
15. 
 
Under the balancing test contained in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 90 
S. Ct. 844, 25 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1970), a state law incidentally burdening interstate 
commerce will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefit. 
 
16. 
 
Congress may authorize the states to engage in activities that would otherwise be 
forbidden by the Commerce Clause. However, Congress must provide its unambiguous 
intent, expressed through unmistakably clear language, for a state statute to be outside the 
reach of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
 
 
Appeal from Wabaunsee District Court; TRACY D. KLINGINSMITH and MICHEAL A. IRELAND, 
judges. Opinion filed October 21, 2011. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. 
 
 
Charles C. Steincamp, of Depew Gillen Rathbun and McInteer, L.C., of Wichita, argued the 
cause and was on the brief for appellants/cross-appellees Roger Zimmerman, et al. 
 
 
Scott A. Grosskreutz, of Cavanaugh and Lemon, P.A., of Topeka, argued the cause and was on 
the brief for the intervenors/appellants/cross-appellees A.B. Hudson and Larry French. 
 
 
William L. Frost, of Morrison, Frost, Olsen, Irvine, Jackson and Schartz, L.L.P., of Manhattan, 
argued the cause, and Katharine J. Jackson, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for 
appellee/cross-appellant Board of Wabaunsee County Commissioners. 
 
5 
 
 
Richard H. Seaton, of Seaton, Seaton and Gillespie, L.L.P., of Manhattan, was on the brief for 
amici curiae Audubon of Kansas and the Kansas Wildlife Federation. 
 
 
Michael D. Irvin and Charles Arthur, of Kansas Farm Bureau, of Manhattan, were on the brief for 
amicus curiae Kansas Farm Bureau. 
 
 
Neil R. Shortlidge, of Stinson Morrison Hecker, L.L.P., of Overland Park, Donald L. Moler, Jr., 
and Sandra L. Jacquot, of League of Kansas Municipalities, of Topeka, and Melissa Wangemann, of 
Kansas Association of Counties, of Topeka, were on the brief for amici curiae League of Kansas 
Municipalities and Kansas Association of Counties. 
 
 
Alan Claus Anderson, of Husch Blackwell Sanders, L.L.P., of Kansas City, Missouri, and Derek 
T. Teeter, of the same firm, were on the brief for amicus curiae NextEra Energy Resources, L.L.C. 
 
 
Patrick B. Hughes, of Adams Jones Law Firm, P.A., of Wichita, and Michael J. Davis, of the 
University of Kansas School of Law, of Lawrence, were on the brief for amicus curiae Protect the Flint 
Hills, Inc. 
 
 
Frank A. Caro, Jr. and Kevin J. Breer, of Polsinelli Shughart, P.C., of Overland Park, and 
Timothy S. Bishop and J. Bishop Grewell, of Mayer Brown, L.L.P., of Chicago, Illinois, were on the brief 
for amicus curiae The Wind Coalition. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
 
NUSS, J.:  This case involves a decision by the Board of County Commissioners of 
Wabaunsee County (Board) to amend its zoning regulations. Specifically, the Board 
permitted Small Wind Energy Conversion Systems (SWECS) but prohibited the 
placement of Commercial Wind Energy Conversion Systems (CWECS, i.e., commercial 
wind farms) in the county. Plaintiffs are owners of land in the county. They were later 
joined by plaintiff intervenors (Intervenors), who are not landowners but owners of 
purported wind rights in the county. 
 
6 
 
 
The district court granted the Board's various dispositive motions. Plaintiffs and 
Intervenors appealed, and the Board cross-appealed. Pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3017, we 
transferred the case from the Court of Appeals. 
 
 
In Zimmerman v. Board of Wabaunsee County Comm'rs, 289 Kan. 926, 218 P.3d 
400 (2009) (Zimmerman I), we affirmed the district court's decision on several issues. We 
specifically held that the district court did not err (1) in determining that the Board's 
decision to amend the zoning regulations was lawful; (2) in determining the Board's 
decision to amend was reasonable; (3) in precluding Plaintiffs and Intervenors from 
conducting further discovery on the issue of reasonableness; (4) in dismissing the claim 
that the Board's decision violated the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution; 
(5) in dismissing the claims that the zoning regulation amendments were preempted by 
state and federal law; and (6) in determining that Intervenors' action was commenced in a 
timely manner. 
 
 
Concurrent with the release of Zimmerman I, we ordered the parties to submit 
supplemental briefs on certain questions raised in the issues originally presented on 
appeal by both Plaintiffs and Intervenors. Those general issues, presently before us for 
review after the parties' supplemental oral arguments, focus on whether the district court 
erred in deciding as a matter of law that the Board did not violate the Takings Clause or 
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 
 
 
Our order requiring supplemental briefing on the Takings and Commerce Clauses 
necessarily stayed our resolution of two issues originally presented on appeal by 
Intervenors:  whether the district court erred in dismissing their claims (1) under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) and (2) for inverse condemnation. 
 
 
The first issue on appeal and our holding is as follows: 
 
7 
 
1. 
Did the district court err by disposing of the Takings Clause claim as a 
matter of law? No. 
 
 
Because there was no taking, the district court did not err in also disposing of 
Intervenors' related takings-based claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and their claim for 
inverse condemnation. 
 
 
The second issue on appeal and our holding is as follows: 
 
2. 
Did the district court err in dismissing the Commerce Clause claim as a 
matter of law? We hold there was no discrimination against interstate 
commerce. However, the claim alleging the Board's decision placed 
incidental burdens on interstate commerce that outweighed the benefits is 
remanded to the district court for analysis under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 
397 U.S. 137, 90 S. Ct. 844, 25 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1970). 
 
 
Because Intervenors also made a burden-based claim under the Commerce Clause 
in their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contention, that specific claim also is remanded. 
 
 
Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
Many of our facts come from Zimmerman I. Plaintiffs are owners of land in 
Wabaunsee County who have entered into written contracts for the development of 
commercial wind farms on their properties. Intervenors are not landowners but through 
various contracts are owners of purported wind rights concerning other properties in the 
county. 
8 
 
 
 
Defendant is the three-member Board of County Commissioners of Wabaunsee 
County. The county is roughly 30 miles long and 30 miles wide, containing 
approximately 800 square miles and 7,000 people. It is located in the Flint Hills of 
Kansas, which contain the vast majority of the remaining Tallgrass Prairie that once 
covered much of the central United States. 
 
 
On October 28, 2002, the county zoning administrator told the Board that he had 
been contacted by a company desiring to build a wind farm in the county. At that time, 
the county had no zoning regulations relating specifically to wind farms. However, 
Article 2 of the county's zoning regulations captioned "Agricultural District Regulations," 
did generally provide: 
 
"The purpose of this [Agricultural] District is to provide for a full range of agricultural 
activities on land used for agricultural purposes, . . . and at the same time offer protection 
to land used for agricultural purposes from the depreciating effect of objectional, 
hazardous, incompatible and unsightly uses. The District is also intended to protect 
watersheds and water supplies; to protect forest and scenic areas; to conserve fish and 
wildlife habitat . . . ." 
 
According to the Board, establishing wind farms first would have required the granting of 
conditional use permits to allow for the height of the wind turbine structures, i.e., 
permission was not automatic but within the Board's discretion. 
  
 
On November 12, 2002, the Board adopted a resolution placing a temporary 
moratorium on the acceptance of applications for conditional use permits for wind farm 
projects. The resolution provided, among other things, that during the moratorium the 
zoning administrator was to undertake a comprehensive review of both the current zoning 
regulations and wind farm projects, including the impact, if any, that such projects might 
9 
 
have upon nearby properties. This moratorium, valid for 120 days upon publication, was 
later extended on at least five occasions. 
 
 
The following month, December 2002, the county planning commission 
conducted its first public meeting to discuss amending zoning regulations regarding 
commercial wind farms. 
 
 
According to Plaintiffs' briefs, in April 2003 8 of the 12 Plaintiffs individually 
entered into "Amended and Restated Wind Farm Easement Agreement[s]" with J.W. 
Prairie Wind Power, L.L.C. for the purpose of providing for the development of CWECS 
on their respective properties. These include Plaintiffs Roger and Angelina Zimmerman, 
Harris and Virginia Zimmerman, Bill and Linda Unruh, and Robert and Janet Goss. 
 
 
According to Plaintiffs' briefs, in June 2003 two more Plaintiffs, Kenneth and 
Colleen Anderson, individually entered into the same agreement with J.W. Prairie Wind 
Power for the purpose of providing for the development of CWECS on their property. 
 
 
On July 24, 2003, the planning commission held a public hearing for discussion of 
the proposed zoning regulations, which included regulations of small and commercial 
wind farms. A month later, the Board ordered the planning commission to review and 
recommend updates to the 1974 Wabaunsee County Comprehensive Plan (Plan) because 
the Plan did not address changes that had occurred in the county in intervening years. 
After the Plan had been reviewed, the Board intended to consider the new proposed 
regulations regarding wind turbines. 
 
 
On February 15, 2004, after input from the public, including a county-wide survey 
and focus groups, the planning commission formally recommended the adoption of the 
revised Comprehensive Plan 2004. 
 
10 
 
 
Eight days later, on February 23, the Board again voted to extend the wind farm 
moratorium, this time from March 31 to June 30, 2004, "to allow adequate time to 
complete a full study of the issues involved with wind energy conversion systems." The 
Board again directed—this time that prior to July 1—the county zoning administrator 
"shall not accept nor process applications for conditional use permits for wind energy 
conversion systems." 
 
 
On March 1, 2004, the two Intervenors, A.B. Hudson and Larry French, were each 
the named "second party" in two separate documents entitled, "Corporation General 
Warranty Deed and Grant of Easement" signed by the first party, Workingman's Friend 
Oil, Inc. Among other things, the documents state they entitle Intervenors to: 
 
"[1] [t]he exclusive and complete rights, titles, interest, and privileges in all the wind and 
air above and passing through the land, along with all related easements and 
covenants . . . and all right, title, and interest to develop or grant wind rights, wind 
easements, wind leases, . . . and [2] all rights to construct or cause to be constructed and 
operate through third party contracts, wind farms with related improvements . . . ." 
 
 
According to Plaintiffs' briefs, on March 10, 2004, the final two Plaintiffs, Glen 
Eberle and Wilson Valley, L.L.C., entered into the same agreement as the other 10 
Plaintiffs with J.W. Prairie Wind Power to develop CWECS on their respective 
properties. None of these agreements between Plaintiffs and J.W. Prairie Wind Power are 
in the record on appeal. 
 
 
The next month, on April 26, 2004, the Board adopted the planning commission's 
recommended changes to the Plan and adopted the Comprehensive Plan 2004. It included 
the goals and objectives previously recommended to the Board. The Comprehensive Plan 
2004 provides in relevant part that the county would endeavor to: 
 
11 
 
A.  Establish an organized pattern of land use with controlled and smart growth that 
brings prosperity to the county while also respecting its rural character. 
B.  Maintain the rural character of the county with respect to its landscape, open spaces, 
scenery, peace, tranquility, and solitude. 
C.  Develop moderate and slight growth of businesses, industries, and services with 
small-scale employment. 
D.  Develop realistic plans to protect natural resources such as the agricultural land, 
landscape, scenic views, and Flint Hills through regulatory policies. 
E.  Promote historic preservation, which protects and restores historic properties, old 
limestone buildings, and landmarks in the county. 
F.  Attract small retail businesses and encourage clustering of retail and service 
businesses. 
G.  Improve school system and other public utilities to address the existing deficiencies 
and needs. 
H.  Develop tourism programs involving historic properties, nature of rural character, and 
scenic landscape. 
I.  Provide affordable and good quality housing with respect to current deficiencies and 
future needs. 
J.  Attract new population, a stronger labor force, and retain youth. 
 
 
The next month, on May 20, 2004, after the Board's adoption of the 
Comprehensive Plan, the planning commission held a public hearing to discuss proposed 
amendments to the zoning regulations regarding small and commercial wind farms. At its 
next meeting, the commission voted 8-2 to recommend that the Board approve the 
proposed zoning amendments which would specifically allow CWECS as a conditional 
use, subject to certain conditions. 
 
 
According to the briefs of the two Intervenors, on June 19, 2004, they entered into 
"Wind Option Agreements" with Zilkha Renewal Energy, LLC. These agreements are not 
in the record on appeal, but Intervenors imply Zilkha is a developer that would use their 
purported wind rights to produce commercial wind energy on the realty of Working Man 
Oil, Co. 
12 
 
 
 
On June 28, the Board voted 2-1 to adopt in part and override in part the planning 
commission's recommended zoning changes. Specifically, the Board adopted the 
commission's recommendations regarding regulation of Small Wind Energy Conversion 
Systems (SWECS, i.e., small wind farms). It rejected, however, the commission's 
recommendations regarding regulation of CWECS by absolutely prohibiting CWECS in 
the county. 
 
 
The Board's decision was formally reflected in Resolution No. 04-18, passed 2 
weeks later on July 12, 2004. The Resolution articulated the following basis for the 
Board's decision: 
 
"The basis of the amendments to the Zoning Regulation is that Commercial Wind Energy 
Conversion Systems would not be in the best interests of the general welfare of the 
County as a whole. They do not conform to the intent and purpose of the Zoning 
Regulations. In light of the historical, existing and anticipated land uses in the County, 
they would adversely affect the County as a whole. They would be incompatible with the 
rural, agricultural, and scenic character of the County. They would not conform to the 
Wabaunsee County Comprehensive Plan, including the goals and objectives that were 
identified by the citizens of the County and incorporated as part of the Plan. They would 
be detrimental to property values and opportunities for agricultural and nature based 
tourism. Each reason stands on its own. This motion is based upon what has been 
presented at public hearings, public meetings, letters and documents that have been 
produced, as well as experience and personal knowledge of the issues involved." 
 
 
The Resolution also added the following definitions to Article 1-104 of the zoning 
regulations adopted in 1995: 
 
"207. Wind Energy Conversion System (WECS). The combination of mechanical and 
structural elements used to produce electricity by converting the kinetic energy of wind to 
electrical energy. Wind Energy Conversion systems consist of the turbine apparatus and 
13 
 
any buildings, roads, interconnect facilities, measurement devices, transmission lines, 
support structures and other related improvements necessary for the generation of electric 
power from wind. 
 
"208.  Commercial Wind Energy Conversion System:  A Wind Energy Conversion 
System exceeding 100 kilowatt or exceeding 120 feet in height above grade, or more than 
one Wind Energy Conversion System of any size proposed and/or constructed by the 
same person or group of persons on the same or adjoining parcels or as a unified or single 
generating system. (Commercial Wind Energy Conversion Systems are specifically 
prohibited as a use in Wabaunsee County.) . . . .  
. . . . 
"210.  Small Wind Energy Conversion System. A wind energy conversion system 
consisting of wind turbine, a tower, and associated control or conversion electronics, 
which has a rated capacity of not more than 100 kilowatt, which is less than 120 feet in 
height and which is intended solely to reduce on-site consumption of purchased utility 
power." (Emphasis added.) 
 
 
A new paragraph (30) also was added to Article 31-105. It reiterated that CWECS 
were prohibited in Wabaunsee County and certainly would not be permitted as a 
conditional use: 
 
"30.  Commercial Wind Energy Conversion Systems are not a use that may be approved 
or permitted as a Conditional Use in Wabaunsee County and are specifically prohibited." 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
Article 31-109 was also amended to include parameters for SWECS. These 
restrictions included a minimum parcel size (no system shall be located on a parcel of 
less than 20 contiguous acres); density (no more than one system shall be located on each 
20 acres of parcel); spacing (no system may be located within 300 feet of another system 
or a commercial wind energy conversion system); setback (a setback from the nearest 
property line a distance equal to twice the height of the system, including the rotor blades 
and a setback from the nearest public road right-of-way a distance equal to the height of 
14 
 
the system, including the rotor blades, plus an additional 50 feet); blade height (the 
lowest point of the rotor blades shall be at least 50 feet above ground level at the base of 
the tower); and advertising restrictions (no advertising of any kind shall be located on the 
system). 
 
 
Article 31-112 (Prohibited Uses) was also amended to include a new paragraph (5) 
concerning CWECS. It reiterated that such systems were prohibited in the county and any 
application for their use would not be considered: 
 
"5.  No Commercial Wind Energy Conversion System, as defined in these Regulations, 
shall be placed in Wabaunsee County. No application for such a use shall be considered." 
 
 
Plaintiffs sued the Board in district court, seeking a judicial declaration that the 
Board's action in passing Resolution No. 04-18 be null and void. Plaintiffs also sought 
damages under a number of different theories. 
 
 
Without filing an answer, the Board filed a motion to dismiss. In decisions dated 
February 23 and July 22, 2005, the district court, Judge Klinginsmith, dismissed five of 
Plaintiffs' claims. These were Count I (state preemption); Count II (failure to follow 
proper procedures under K.S.A. 12-757[d] in adopting Resolution 04-18); Count IV 
(violation of the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution); Count V (violation of 
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution); and Count VI (federal 
preemption). Judge Klinginsmith reserved judgment on the remaining Count III 
(unconstitutional taking) and Count VII (42 U.S.C. § 1983) holding that their 
consideration was premature until the court could determine the reasonableness under 
K.S.A. 12-760 of the Board's adoption of the resolution amending the zoning regulations. 
He ordered the Board to provide the record of the proceedings where it considered and 
adopted the resolution. 
 
15 
 
 
On August 7, 2005, after court approval, Intervenors filed their petition. Their 
claims duplicated all of those brought by Plaintiffs, but Intervenors also brought a claim 
for inverse condemnation. Despite this new petition, the district court refused to 
reconsider its earlier rulings dismissing those Plaintiffs' claims now also brought by 
Intervenors. 
 
 
On October 12, 2006, Judge Ireland, as successor to the now-retired Judge 
Klinginsmith, remanded the matter to the Board. Judge Ireland acknowledged the 
findings of fact and conclusions the Board provided. He found, however, the Board had 
not met its responsibility to produce evidence that it had acted reasonably. While 
maintaining its position that it had sufficiently complied, on November 16, 2006, the 
Board supplemented the record with additional findings of fact. 
 
 
After finding the Board now had identified each fact it relied upon in making its 
zoning decision, on February 28, 2007, Judge Ireland then dismissed Plaintiffs' and 
Intervenors' three remaining claims based upon unreasonableness, taking, and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. He also dismissed Intervenors' claim of inverse condemnation. 
 
 
After our decision in Zimmerman I, the following issues remain for our resolution:  
the Takings Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, and inverse condemnation. 
 
 
More facts will be added as necessary to the analysis below.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Issue I:  The district court did not err by disposing of the Takings Clause claim as a 
matter of law. 
 
 
16 
 
 
Plaintiffs and Intervenors both contend the Board's decision to amend the zoning 
regulations constituted a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and that Judge Ireland erred in holding as a matter of law that no 
taking occurred. Because Judge Ireland disposed of their claim partly based upon his 
determination of the reasonableness of the Board's action—which itself considered 
matters outside the pleadings—the takings disposition is characterized as summary 
judgment. See K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6); Perry v. Board of Franklin County Comm'rs, 281 
Kan. 801, Syl. ¶ 1, 132 P.3d 1279 (2006). 
 
 
We ordered the parties in their supplemental briefing to thoroughly analyze the 
particular nature of the rights allegedly taken—from landowners and from 
nonlandowners alike. In their initial brief, Plaintiffs only allege a taking of their lease 
rights with J.W. Prairie Wind Power, LLC, to develop CWECS on their realty. In their 
supplemental brief, Plaintiffs also appear to allege a taking of a second interest:  one "in 
the wind resources that flow across their properties." 
 
 
Unlike Plaintiffs, Intervenors are not realty owners. Based upon their documents 
from Workingman's Friend Oil, Inc. ("deeds and grants of easements" which are in the 
record) and those from Zilkha Renewal Energy, LLC (which are not in the record but are 
denominated "wind option agreements"), they also appear to claim two interests were 
taken. First, through Workingman they claim severed wind estates, including the right to 
construct and operate commercial wind farms. Second, through Zilkha they claim 
contractual interests to utilize the wind rights, i.e., in the commercial development of 
wind power. 
 
 
The Board responds that Plaintiffs' and Intervenors' claim for alleged loss of 
"valuable contractual interests" fails because this court found no violation of the 
Contracts Clause in Zimmerman I. 289 Kan. at 969. Additionally, the Board contends that 
Intervenors only received an easement to use the land for a certain purpose—i.e., to set 
17 
 
up commercial wind farms—and that there is no such thing as a severable wind estate for 
takings analysis. 
 
 
In finding no taking, the district court, Judge Ireland, appeared to rely upon two 
grounds. First, he held that "[o]nce the district court [Judge Ireland] determined the 
zoning action was reasonable there is no taking under Jack [v. City of Olathe, 245 Kan. 
458, 781 P.2d 1069 (1989)] and McPherson Landfill [v. Board of Shawnee County 
Comm'rs, 274 Kan. 303, 49 P.3d 522 (2002)]." 
 
 
Second, Judge Ireland held that as in Jack and McPherson Landfill, the Board did 
not abolish any existing rights, but only refused to expand existing rights: 
 
"The County didn't take any existing rights away but only refused to expand the existing 
rights including wind rights. The plaintiff[s] and plaintiff's interven[o]rs have given this 
Court no cases which either distinguish or overrule Jack or McPherson Landfill. As such 
the taking claim of both the plaintiff[s] and plaintiff interven[o]rs are dismissed."  
 
Standard of Review 
 
 
An appellate court has de novo review of constitutional questions. Steffes v. City of 
Lawrence, 284 Kan. 380, Syl. ¶ 4, 160 P.3d 843 (2007). More particularly, whether there 
has been a compensable taking is a question of law. Estate of Kirkpatrick v. City of 
Olathe, 289 Kan. 554, 559, 215 P.3d 561 (2009) (citing Korytkowski v. City of Ottawa, 
283 Kan. 122, 128, 152 P.3d 53 [2007]). As mentioned, Judge Ireland's disposition can 
be considered a summary judgment and those standards also apply. See Warner v. Stover, 
283 Kan. 453, Syl. ¶ 1, 153 P.3d 1245 (2007) (Summary judgment is appropriate when 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. The court is required to resolve all facts and inferences 
18 
 
which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the 
ruling is sought.). 
 
Discussion 
 
 
We begin by acknowledging that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, which is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, provides that private property shall not be "taken for public use, without just 
compensation." Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 161 L. 
Ed. 2d 876 (2005); Estate of Kirkpatrick, 289 Kan. at 558. The Fifth Amendment's 
guarantee "is designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S. Ct. 1563, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1554 (1960). 
 
 
As the Lingle Court acknowledged, beginning with Penna Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922), the Supreme Court has 
 
"recognized that government regulation of private property may, in some instances, be so 
onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster—and that such 
'regulatory takings' may be compensable under the Fifth Amendment. In Justice Holmes' 
storied but cryptic formulation, 'while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.' 260 U.S. at 415. The rub, of 
course, has been—and remains—how to discern how far is 'too far.' In answering that 
question, we must remain cognizant that 'government regulation—by definition—
involves the adjustment of rights for the public good' [citation omitted] and that 
'Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not 
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law,' Mahon, supra, at 
413." Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537-38. 
 
19 
 
 
The United States Supreme Court has further observed that the "question of what 
constitutes a 'taking' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of 
considerable difficulty." Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123, 
98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978). As a result, the Supreme Court was "unable to 
develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that 
economic injuries caused by public action can be compensated by the government, rather 
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons," with the result being "ad 
hoc, factual inquiries." Frick v. City of Salina, 290 Kan. 869, 886, 235 P.3d 1211 (2010) 
(citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-24). 
 
 
 
a.  Reasonableness 
 
 
Plaintiffs first contend that Judge Ireland applied the wrong legal standard when, 
in summarily granting judgment against them, he ruled that simply because the Board 
action amending the zoning regulations was reasonable, then there was no taking. The 
Board merely responds that "the law clearly is that there is no taking that occurs if the 
zoning action is determined to be reasonable," citing Jack, 245 Kan. at 467, and 
McPherson Landfill, 274 Kan. at 334. If the Board is correct, our takings inquiry ends. 
 
 
We agree with Plaintiffs. McPherson Landfill implicitly rejects the Board's 
position. There, this court addressed plaintiffs' arguments that Shawnee County's denial 
of their application for a conditional use permit was unreasonable and that the denial of 
their application constituted a taking. This court first held that the county's decision was 
reasonable. If the Wabaunsee County Board's position were correct, then the McPherson 
Landfill court would have simply rejected the takings argument because the permit denial 
was reasonable. Instead, the court proceeded to analyze in detail, and eventually deny, the 
takings claim. 
 
20 
 
 
The McPherson Landfill court admittedly gave no specific justification for further 
analyzing the takings issue. Its action is perhaps explained by the Court in Lingle 3 years 
later. More specifically, reasonableness, e.g., arbitrariness, is an issue under the Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution, while takings is a Takings Clause issue. 
544 U.S. at 540. Accordingly, if the governing body action is unreasonable, there cannot 
be a taking. The action is simply void. Only if the action is reasonable does a court 
proceed to address the takings issue: 
 
"The Takings Clause presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid 
public purpose. The Clause expressly requires compensation where government takes 
private property 'for public use.' It does not bar government from interfering with 
property rights, but rather requires compensation 'in the event of otherwise proper 
interference amounting to a taking.' [Citation omitted.] (Emphasis added.) Conversely, if 
a government action is found to be impermissible—for instance because it fails to meet 
the 'public use' requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due process—that is the end of 
the inquiry. No amount of compensation can authorize such action." (Emphasis added.) 
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543. 
 
See also Korytkowski v. City of Ottawa, 283 Kan. 122, Syl. ¶ 5 ("Although 
reasonableness is the standard by which we determine whether a government's exercise 
of police power is valid, reasonableness is not the appropriate standard to determine 
whether a government action affecting real property in private hands constitutes a 
taking."). 
 
 
 
b.  Refusal to expand existing rights 
 
 
We now turn to Plaintiffs' second contention. More specifically, they argue Judge 
Ireland further erred in granting judgment against them on their takings claims by 
declaring that the Board just "refused to expand the existing rights." 
 
21 
 
 
We begin our analysis by agreeing with the Board's assertion that there is no 
vested right in the continuity of zoning in a particular area so as to preclude subsequent 
amendment, i.e., no right to have the existing zoning ordinance continue unchanged. 
Houston v. Board of City Commissioners, 218 Kan. 323, 543 P.2d 1010 (1975); Colonial 
Investment Co., Inc. v. City of Leawood, 7 Kan. App. 2d 660, 646 P.2d 1149 (1982). 
However, under the vested rights doctrine, if a vested property right existed before the 
change in zoning, "the changed law cannot control without being subject to a successful 
takings claim." Laitos, Law of Property Rights Protections:  Limitations on 
Governmental Powers, § 9.02[B][1] (2011 Supp.). See Delaney & Vaias, Recognizing 
Vested Development Rights as Protected Property in Fifth Amendment Due Process and 
Takings Claims, 49 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L., 27, 31 (1996) ("Only after 
landowners acquire vested rights under state law are they free to continue a project in the 
face of subsequent changes to land use regulations that would otherwise preclude 
continuing the project."). 
 
 
Similarly, Kansas also recognizes the nonconforming use doctrine. Under this 
doctrine, one can seek to continue—after a restricting change in zoning law—an already 
established use. The party seeking to take advantage of its claimed right must prove that 
the "nonconforming use commenced prior to the enactment of the ordinance restricting 
such use." Crumbaker v. Hunt Midwest Mining, Inc., 275 Kan. 872, 881-82, 69 P.3d 601 
(2003); see Goodwin v. City of Kansas City, 244 Kan. 28, 31-32, 766 P.2d 177 (1988). In 
Crumbaker we held that "[t]he nonconforming use doctrine is codified at K.S.A. 12-
758 . . . :  '. . . [R]egulations adopted under authority of this act [concerning planning and 
zoning in cities and counties] shall not apply to the existing use of any land but shall 
apply to any . . . change in the use of . . . land after the effective date of any regulations 
adopted under this act.'" (Emphasis added.) 275 Kan. at 882. 
 
 
Accordingly, to prevail on a takings claim, a party seeking compensation must 
first establish that the property in question is one in which a vested interest exists, i.e., a 
22 
 
constitutionally cognizable property interest. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 
244, 266, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1994) ("The Fifth Amendment's Takings 
Clause prevents the Legislature [and other government actors] from depriving private 
persons of vested property rights except for a 'public use' and upon payment of 'just 
compensation.'"); Goodwin, 244 Kan. 28, Syl. ¶ 8 (where a party has no vested right in 
the use of land, restriction on that use by a city does not constitute a taking of property). 
 
 
This court has held that "[a] vested right is a right so fixed that it is not dependent 
on any future act, contingency or decision to make it more secure." Vaughan v. Nadel, 
228 Kan. 469, Syl. ¶ 3, 931 P.2d 664 (1980). Moreover, 
 
"[r]ights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the 
property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. [Citation omitted.] 
[On the other hand, a] 'mere expectancy of future benefit, or a contingent interest in 
property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute a 
vested right. [Citation omitted.]'" (Emphasis added.) KPERS v. Reimer & Koger Assocs., 
Inc., 261 Kan. 17, 41, 927 P.2d 466 (1996). 
 
 
The Board and amicus curiae Protect the Flint Hills, Inc. (Protect) present a 
multitude of arguments for why Plaintiffs and Intervenors have no vested property rights. 
We need address only one, for it is dispositive. More particularly, the Board essentially 
argues that whatever interests these parties purportedly possessed before the moratorium, 
those interests were conditioned upon the Board's discretionary issuance of a conditional 
use permit. Accordingly, interests such as developing, constructing, or operating CWECS 
were not vested rights. 
 
 
We begin our analysis of this argument by examining the nature of conditional use 
permits (CUP's). According to one Kansas commentator, CUP's 
 
23 
 
"are a device for permitting certain land uses considered to be essential or desirable to 
the community to be placed in zoning districts in which they would ordinarily be 
incompatible. The permitted use, however, must be reasonable and conform to standards 
or conditions designed to protect the interests of adjoining owners." (Emphasis added.) 
Heim, Kansas Local Government Law, § 4.47, p. 4-12 (4th ed. 2009). 
 
Accord 83 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning and Planning § 755. 
 
 
The Board's authority to issue CUP's is found at K.S.A. 12-755(a), which states 
the governing bodies of Kansas cities and counties are authorized to adopt zoning 
regulations that may include "provisions which . . . (5) provide for the issuance of special 
use or conditional use permits." 
 
 
As evidenced by the Board's November 2002 resolution establishing a moratorium 
on accepting or processing applications for CUP's for wind energy conversion systems, 
CUP's clearly were required for Plaintiffs and Intervenors to proceed. The Board's brief 
declares that CUP's were necessary "in order to construct structures of the height they 
were proposing. Issuance of a conditional use permit would not have been automatic." 
The Intervenors' petition states they "anticipate constructing a generator or generators . . . 
exceeding 125 feet in height, separately or in groups." According to the findings 
proposed by the Board and adopted by the district court, the turbines themselves would 
have been from 260' to 300' tall, with blades 125' in length. 
 
 
We agree that an applicant has no vested rights in a CUP when its issuance 
depends upon the discretionary approval of the Board. See, e.g., R-Goshen LLC v. Village 
of Goshen, 289 F. Supp. 2d 441, 450-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (main element in determining 
the existence of a constitutionally cognizable property interest is the extent to which the 
deciding authority may exercise discretion in reaching its decision).  
 
24 
 
 
The case of Kansas Racing Management, Inc. v. Kansas Racing Comm'n, 244 
Kan. 343, 770 P.2d 423 (1989), provides guidance. There, this court addressed appellants' 
argument that the Kansas Racing Commission's refusal to disclose KBI background 
investigations violated their due process rights under the Kansas and United States 
Constitutions. The court ruled that its analysis first required an examination of the nature 
of an applicant's interest in the grant of a license under the Kansas Parimutuel Racing 
Act, K.S.A. 74-8801 et seq. Appellants contended their license applications created a 
protected property right in being awarded the licenses. 
 
 
The Kansas Racing Management court first observed that to establish a property 
interest in a particular benefit, appellant must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement to 
it." 244 Kan. at 354 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 577, 
33 L. Ed. 2d 548 [1972]). The court then held that appellants could not demonstrate an 
entitlement or property interest in acquiring a license. It based its holding on the 
operative statute which gave the racing commission broad discretion in granting or 
denying the license, even if the applicant had complied with all statutory requirements. 
The statute, K.S.A. 74-8813(e), provided in relevant part: 
 
"'If an application is found to be in compliance [with the provisions of the Kansas 
Parimutuel Racing Act] and the commission finds that the issuance of the license would 
be within the best interests of horse and greyhound racing within this state . . . as 
determined solely within the discretion of the commission, the commission may issue an 
organization license to the applicant.'" (Emphasis added.) 244 Kan. at 355. 
 
The court expressly rejected the appellants' comparison to Rydd v. State Board of Health, 
202 Kan. 721, 451 P.2d 239 (1969), ruling that in Rydd the license sought for a day care 
center "was within the category of licenses which the State must grant if the applicant 
meets certain minimum requirements." (Emphasis added.) 244 Kan. at 355. 
 
25 
 
 
Similarly, in the instant case, at all material times, the zoning regulations granted 
absolute discretion to the Board for issuing conditional use permits. Section 31-101 of the 
1995 Zoning Regulations, as well as of the July 2004 Zoning Regulations, is clear and 
unambiguous: 
 
"Further, it is acknowledged that any property owner may seek a Conditional Use 
[Permit] for any of the types of land uses indicated herein for any property within the 
incorporated cities or the unincorporated portion of Wabaunsee County. The subsequent 
approval of such request by the respective Governing Body is a purely discretionary act 
that will be decided based upon the facts and circumstances discovered in the review of 
each application. There is no implied 'right' for any person or landowner to obtain a 
Conditional Use for any use on any property." (Emphasis added.) 
 
 
Section 31-102 of the zoning regulations further provides that after the CUP 
application is submitted to the planning commission and the commission's 
recommendation is received by the Board, 
 
"the governing body may, within the specifications herein provided, permit such 
buildings, structures, or uses; provided that the public health, safety, morals, and general 
welfare will not be adversely affected . . . and that necessary safeguards will be provided 
for the protection of surrounding property, persons, and neighborhood values. In this 
regard, the Governing Body may impose reasonable conditions on the approval of such 
Conditional Use . . . ." (Emphasis added.) 
 
 
We conclude under these circumstances and under the rationale and holding of 
Kansas Racing Management, that the Board's issuance of a CUP to Plaintiffs and 
Intervenors to develop, construct, or operate CWECS was indeed not "automatic." As a 
result, whatever interest they may have possessed in the CUP could not be a vested 
property right. Cf., McPherson Landfill, Inc. v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 274 
Kan. 303, 334, 49 P.3d 522 (2002) (CUP application for establishing and operating 
construction and demolition landfill on land zoned residential but previously allowed for 
26 
 
quarrying under an earlier CUP; court held denial of CUP application was not a taking 
"but was a decision to deny the expansion of the existing right to use the property" for a 
quarry in the residential zone, i.e., no vested right in operating landfill). 
 
 
While Kansas Racing Management did not involve a discretionary denial of a 
CUP, that case's rationale and holding clearly are applicable to the instant case, as 
evidenced by Beasley v. Flathead County, 350 Mont. 177, 206 P.3d 915 (2009). There, 
the Montana Supreme Court addressed plaintiff's claim that, inter alia, the county Board 
of Adjustment had taken his interest in a CUP without just compensation by refusing to 
transfer it. The Beasley court first observed that plaintiff's constitutional takings claim 
required him to establish he possessed a constitutionally protected property interest. It 
then determined whether a reasonable expectation of entitlement existed, noting that 
"[a]ny significant discretion conferred upon a local agency . . . defeats a claim of 
entitlement." 350 Mont. at 181. 
 
 
The Beasley court observed that "[t]he Regulations vested discretion with the 
Board to determine whether to grant a CUP. Any interest that Beasley may have 
possessed in the CUP did not rise to the level of a protected property or liberty interest 
under these circumstances." 350 Mont. at 181. The court concluded that plaintiff's 
inability to establish that he possessed a protected property interest in obtaining the 
transfer of the CUP precluded him from establishing his takings claims. Without any 
further analysis deemed necessary, the court affirmed the trial court's granting of the 
motion to dismiss plaintiff's constitutional claims. 
 
 
The discretionary decision analysis has been used by courts in cases involving 
other types of land use control as well. See R-Goshen LLC, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 450-51 
(collecting cases); Crowley v. Courville, 76 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1996) (no constitutionally 
cognizable property interest in parking variance for retail building because zoning 
regulations vested zoning board with extremely broad discretion to grant or deny the 
27 
 
variance); Laitos, Law of Property Rights Protections:  Limitations on Governmental 
Powers, § 9.02[B][1], p. 9-13 (2011 Supp.) ("[I]f the developer has merely filed a 
development plan or application for plat/subdivision approval, that act will not constitute 
a vested right if the relevant government body still retains discretion to approve it."). 
 
 
We find additional guidance in the recent case of Jordan-Arapahoe, LLP v. Board 
of County Com'rs, 633 F.3d 1022 (10th Cir. 2011). There, a developer argued that the 
county commissioners had deprived it of a vested property right when, after approval of 
the developer's preliminary development plan, the commissioners changed the zoning and 
denied the final development plan for building a car dealership. The Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals pointed to the commissioners' discretion to deny the final plan as a basis for 
rejecting the claim, stating: 
 
 
"We have explained generally that a landowner's protected interest in a particular 
zoning decision depends on 'whether there is discretion in the [local zoning authority] to 
deny a zoning or other application. Norton v. Vill. of Corrales, 103 F.3d 928, 931-32 
(10th Cir. 1996). . . . Accordingly, 'where the governing body retains discretion and the 
outcome of the proceeding is not determined by the particular procedure at issue, no 
property interest is implicated.' Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elect. Ass'n, 
319 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th Cir. 2003). . . .  
 
 
"Jordan-Arapahoe [developer] must show, therefore, that under Colorado law 
Arapahoe County had limited discretion to change the zoning and to disapprove Jordan-
Arapahoe's final development plan. Like the district court, we conclude Jordan-Arapahoe 
failed to make this showing and thus has not demonstrated a vested property interest. . . ." 
633 F.3d at 1026. 
 
 
Because at all material times the Board's zoning regulations did not just provide 
that issuance of a CUP was purely discretionary but additionally the July 2004 regulation 
changes completely eliminated the possibility of a CUP issuance for CWECS in 
28 
 
particular, we conclude no vested property right of any type has been taken from 
Plaintiffs or Intervenors by the Board. 
 
 
We recognize none of the cases we cite involved a moratorium on accepting or 
processing CUP applications as in the instant case. And only Jordan-Arapahoe, LLP 
involved any type of moratorium:  a 4-week moratorium on all applications of 
development proposals which was extended 7 months, during which time the commission 
altered its zoning to make building a car dealership impossible. The Jordan-Arapahoe, 
LLP court did not address the moratorium factor, however, in its opinion. Nevertheless, 
we hold the presence of a moratorium here does not modify our rationale or holding for a 
number of reasons, several of which suffice. 
 
 
First, the existence of a moratorium on accepting or processing applications for 
CUP's in which no vested property right ever existed can hardly support a takings 
argument. 
 
 
Second, as the Board suggests, its moratorium on permits while a zoning 
amendment was pending with the planning commission, and ultimately the Board, is 
hardly a revolutionary concept. This court recognized the efficacy of moratorium 
ordinances, i.e., "interim development controls," in Frick v. City of Salina, 290 Kan. 869, 
235 P.3d 1211 (2010). There, for almost 3 years, the city prohibited the construction of 
driveways, culverts, or other improvement within the right of way of its project and on a 
city street. We acknowledged that "comparable moratoria are widely used among land-
use planners to preserve the status quo while formulating more permanent development 
strategies." 290 Kan. at 890. We eventually denied the plaintiffs' claims of a 3-year 
temporary taking under Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 152 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2002). 
 
29 
 
 
Accordingly, we agree with the sentiments of one well-known commentator who 
has stated: 
 
 
"The adoption of moratoria while studies are being made and public meetings or 
hearings are being held on the formulation or reformulation of the municipality's 
comprehensive plan has become general practice. . . . The purposes of the study might be 
completely frustrated if, while the study was being conducted and suggestions for change 
were being discussed, landowners could secure permits to build structures that might be 
nonconforming in height or bulk, or that might be intended for uses which would be 
forbidden in locations to which the permits related. The new plan, when adopted, might 
be defeated by uses and structures constructed during the period of study or for which the 
owners secured vested rights because of the issuance of permits therefor. Consequently, it 
is common practice to impose a moratorium on the issuance of: . . . (2) permits for 
particular types of structures or uses." (Emphasis added.) Ziegler, Rathkopf's The Law of 
Zoning and Planning, Section 69:15, pp. 69-39 to 69-40 (2007). 
 
See Ziegler, §§ 13:3; 13:8; 13.13. Cf. Ecogen, LLC v. Town of Italy, 438 F. Supp. 2d 149 
(W.D.N.Y. 2006) (moratorium on permits for, or actual construction of, wind turbine 
powers and facilities in town "for a reasonable time pending the completion of a plan for 
control of construction of such structures in [town] as part of adoption of comprehensive 
zoning regulations"; original duration was for 6 months but eventually extended to 2 
years; court denied business' request for preliminary injunction). 
 
 
Because we have held there was no property for purposes of a takings claim, it is 
unnecessary to proceed with a full takings analysis, e.g., per se (Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 161 L. Ed. 2d 876 [2005] [citing Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 
(1992)]) or de facto (Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 
2646, 124, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 [1978]; see Vanek v. State, Board of Fisheries, 193 P.3d 283, 
294 (Alaska 2008). 
 
30 
 
 
 
c.  Inverse condemnation and takings claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
 
 
Given our ruling there was no violation of the Takings Clause because no vested 
property right had been taken, it logically follows that there was no inverse condemnation 
and no violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because both causes of action require loss of 
property or right. See Estate of Kirkpatrick v. City of Olathe, 289 Kan. 554, Syl. ¶ 1, 215 
P.3d 561 (2009) (To succeed on a claim for inverse condemnation, a party must establish 
that a taking has occurred.); McPherson Landfill, Inc., 274 Kan. at 334 (one seeking 
relief under § 1983 must establish deprivation of a federal right). 
 
 
Accordingly, Judge Ireland did not err in dismissing the takings-based § 1983 
claim on this ground:  He held that because there was no deprivation of an existing 
federal right, i.e., no taking, the claim failed. While he disposed of the inverse 
condemnation claim as a matter of law for the erroneous reason that the Board merely 
acted reasonably in passing the Resolution barring CWECS, a district court's decision 
may be upheld even though it relied on the wrong ground. See Frick, 290 Kan. at 904-05. 
 
Issue 2:  The issue of whether the Board's decision to amend the zoning regulations 
violates the Commerce Clause is remanded to the district court. 
 
 
We ordered the parties in their supplemental briefing to thoroughly address all 
steps in the analysis of whether the Board's decision to amend its zoning regulations 
violated the "dormant" aspect of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution:  
(1) discrimination against interstate commerce and (2) burden on interstate commerce. 
We also ordered them to thoroughly address why, or why not, future discovery was 
necessary to resolve the Board's alleged violation of the Commerce Clause. 
 
 
Plaintiffs and Intervenors both contend the district court erred in dismissing their 
claim that the Board's decision to amend the zoning regulations violates the dormant 
31 
 
Commerce Clause. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim the Resolution formally reflecting the 
Board's decision to amend facially discriminates against interstate commerce because it 
permits wind generation for personal use (i.e., SWECS) but prohibits wind generation for 
commercial use (i.e., CWECS). Intervenors agree, adding that even if the ordinance is not 
facially discriminatory, it excessively burdens interstate commerce in relation to the local 
benefit. 
 
 
In finding no dormant Commerce Clause violation, the district court, Judge 
Klinginsmith, explained: 
 
"The Commerce Clause precludes local legislation that benefits in-state commerce while 
unfairly burdening out-of-state competitors. Resolution 04-18 makes no distinction 
between providers whose energy is transported across state lines and those whose energy 
remains within the boundaries of the county or the State of Kansas. It does not therefore 
violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution." 
 
 
Standard of review 
 
 
When a district court has granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
an appellate court must accept the facts alleged by the plaintiff as true, along with any 
inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom. The appellate court then decides 
whether those facts and inferences state a claim based on plaintiff's theory or any other 
possible theory. If so, the dismissal by the district court must be reversed. Rector v. 
Tatham, 287 Kan. 230, 232, 196 P.3d 364 (2008). 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 
We begin by acknowledging that the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution empowers Congress to "regulate Commerce . . . among the several states." 
Within this express grant to Congress, the United States Supreme Court recognizes a 
32 
 
negative command, called the dormant Commerce Clause. American Trucking Assns., 
Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 433, 125 S. Ct. 2419, 162 L. Ed. 2d 
407 (2005) (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179, 
115 S. Ct. 1331, 131 L. Ed. 2d 261 [1995]). 
 
 
The dormant Commerce Clause is intended to protect the free flow of commerce 
and to safeguard Congress' latent power from encroachment by the states. Merrion v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 154, 102 S. Ct. 894, 71 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1982). The 
dormant Commerce Clause effectuates the framers' purpose of preventing "'a State from 
retreating into [the] economic isolation,' [citations omitted] 'that had plagued relations 
among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.'" 
Department of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 170 L. Ed. 
2d 685 (2008) (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26, 99 S. Ct. 1727, 60 L. 
Ed. 2d 250 [1979]). In essence, the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits "regulatory 
measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state 
competitors." New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74, 108 S. Ct. 
1803, 100 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1988). 
 
 
State regulations affecting interstate commerce are not immune from Commerce 
Clause scrutiny because they attach only to a local or intrastate activity. Commonwealth 
Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 615, 101 S. Ct. 2946, 69 L. Ed. 2d 884 (1981). 
Instead, alleged violations of the dormant Commerce Clause are subject to a two-step 
inquiry. Davis, 553 U.S. 338-39; United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid 
Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330, 338, 346, 127 S. Ct. 1786, 167 L. Ed. 2d 
655 (2007). 
 
 
First, a court asks whether the challenged law discriminates on its face against 
interstate commerce. "In this context, '"discrimination" simply means differential 
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and 
33 
 
burdens the latter.' [Citations omitted.]" United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 338-39. "A 
discriminatory law is 'virtually per se invalid,' [citation omitted] and will survive only if it 
'advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.' [Citations omitted.]" Davis, 553 U.S. at 338-39. 
 
 
Second, if the law is not facially discriminatory, the court then engages in a 
balancing test as set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 90 S. Ct. 844, 25 
L. Ed. 2d 174 (1970). See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 345-46 (recognizing the second 
step as Pike analysis); Davis, 553 U.S. at 338-39 (same). In other words, a state law only 
incidentally affecting interstate commerce will be upheld "'unless the burden imposed on 
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.'" United 
Haulers, 550 U.S. at 346 (citing Pike, 397 U.S. at 142). 
 
 
a.  Facial discrimination 
 
 
 
In finding no violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, Judge Klinginsmith 
appeared to analyze whether the Board's zoning amendments facially discriminated 
against interstate commerce:  step 1. The Board argues neither Plaintiffs nor Intervenors 
make a discrimination claim. We need not address this Board argument because we agree 
with the judge's conclusion that no facial discrimination exists. 
 
 
More specifically, we cannot discern any "'differential treatment of in-state and 
out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.' [Citations 
omitted.]" United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 338-39. The amended zoning regulations prohibit 
all commercial wind energy conversion systems in the county, regardless of whether the 
producer wishes to sell the wind-generated electricity in other states, in other Kansas 
counties, or within Wabaunsee County itself, e.g., to the producer's next door neighbor. 
See Blue Circle Cement v. Board of County Com'rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1512 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(a county zoning ordinance that banned all industrial waste recycling, disposal, or 
34 
 
treatment was not discriminatory because it "confer[ed] no advantages on in-state entities 
seeking to store, treat, recycle, or dispose of [waste] as against out-of-state firms"). As 
the amended regulations themselves make clear, qualifying as an allowable "small wind 
energy conversion system" requires the wind-generated electricity to be "intended solely 
to reduce on-site consumption of purchased utility power." Article 1-104, § 210. 
 
 
 
b.  Pike analysis 
 
 
Absent this discrimination, the zoning amendments "'will be upheld unless the 
burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefits.'" Davis, 553 U.S. at 338-39 (citing Pike, 397 U.S. at 142). It does not 
appear that Judge Klinginsmith engaged in this next analytical step, i.e., the Pike 
balancing test, "which is reserved for laws 'directed to legitimate local concerns, with 
effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental.'" United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 
346. The Pike court described its test as follows: 
 
 
"Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes affecting 
interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general rule that emerges can be 
phrased as follows:  Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate 
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to 
the putative local benefits. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443. If a 
legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the 
extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local 
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on 
interstate activities." 397 U.S. at 141-42. 
 
 
A number of federal circuit courts of appeal have distilled the Pike test as follows:  
The court considers (1) the nature of the putative local benefits advanced by the statute; 
(2) the burden placed on interstate commerce by the statute; and (3) whether the burden is 
35 
 
"clearly excessive" when weighed against these local putative benefits. See 
Pharmaceutical Care Management. Ass'n. v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 312 (1st Cir. 2005); 
Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 169 (2d Cir. 2005); 
Star Scientific Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 357 (4th Cir. 2002). The Tenth Circuit 
apparently also retains Pike's reference to "whether the local interests can be promoted as 
well with a lesser impact on interstate commerce." Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1512. 
In Zimmerman I, we essentially held that the zoning regulation amendments were 
directed to legitimate local public concerns, e.g., aesthetics. Accordingly, our remaining 
analysis focuses on weighing the burdens placed on interstate commerce by the Board's 
decision against the local putative benefits. 
 
 
For additional guidance, we first turn to United Haulers, 550 U.S. 330. There, a 
trade association of solid waste management companies and six haulers that operated in 
two New York counties sued the counties under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis that the 
counties' flow control laws violated the Commerce Clause. The laws allegedly not only 
discriminated against interstate commerce but also placed an incidental burden on 
interstate commerce that outweighed the ordinances' benefits. 
 
 
After finding no discrimination, the Court determined that the counties' ordinances 
were properly analyzed under Pike. It first noted: 
 
 
"After years of discovery, both the Magistrate Judge and the District Court could 
not detect any disparate impact on out-of-state as opposed to in-state businesses. The 
Second Circuit alluded to, but did not endorse, a 'rather abstract harm' that may exist 
because 'the Counties' flow control ordinances have removed the waste generated in 
Oneida and Herkimer Counties from the national marketplace for waste processing 
services.'" 550 U.S. at 346 (citing 438 F.3d at 160). 
 
 
The Court then stated: 
 
36 
 
"We find it unnecessary to [proceed to] decide whether the ordinances [actually] impose 
any incidental burden on interstate commerce because any arguable burden [as expressed 
by the lower courts] does not exceed the public benefits of the ordinances." (Emphasis 
added.) 550 U.S. at 346. 
 
 
The Court then explained its rationale, concluding:  "For these reasons, any 
arguable burden the ordinances impose on interstate commerce does not exceed their 
public benefits." 550 U.S. at 347. 
 
 
The Court's particular handling of the Pike analysis, by a 4-justice plurality in Part 
II.D of the opinion, could support the argument of the Board and amicus curiae Protect 
that no discovery is needed in the instant case on the Commerce Clause issue. In other 
words, there simply is no "arguable burden" to exceed the public benefits, and this court 
could decide the issue as a matter of law. 
 
 
In rejecting this argument, we first observe that unlike the instant case, the Pike 
analysis was performed in United Haulers at all three court levels "after years of 
discovery." 550 U.S. at 337, 346. We next observe that instructive caselaw disagrees with 
the Board and Protect. In Lebanon Farms Disposal, Inc. v. County of Lebanon, 538 F.3d 
241 (3d Cir. 2008), the parties agreed that United Haulers, which was released while the 
case was on appeal, controlled the outcome of the appeal. However, they disagreed about 
the appropriate disposition. The County and the Greater Lebanon Refuse Authority 
argued that their ordinances passed the Pike balancing test because they were 
indistinguishable from the ordinances considered in United Haulers. On the other hand, 
the disposal company argued that applying the Pike balancing test, instead of the strict 
scrutiny standard required after finding discrimination, yielded the same result as the 
district court's erroneously applied strict scrutiny review:  the ordinances still violated the 
dormant Commerce Clause. 
 
37 
 
 
The Third Circuit vacated the district court's grant of partial summary judgment 
and the resulting permanent injunction and remanded, ordering the court to make 
necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law and to perform the Pike balancing test. 
 
 
"Considering the strong language of the Supreme Court's holding in United 
Haulers, which found 'it unnecessary to decide whether the ordinances impose any 
incidental burden on interstate commerce because any arguable burden does not exceed 
the public benefits of the ordinances,' 550 U.S. at 346, we perhaps could conduct the 
balancing test on the record as it exists and even conclude that any incidental burden on 
interstate commerce does or does not exceed the public benefits of the presently 
considered ordinances. We will not do so, however. We find the Second Circuit's opinion 
in United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management, 261 F.3d 245 (2d 
Cir.2001), to be particularly instructive. The Second Circuit correctly predicted the 
Supreme Court's eventual holding that '[f]low control regulations like the Oneida-
Herkimer ordinances, which negatively impact all private businesses alike, regardless of 
whether in-state or out-of-state, in favor of a publicly owned facility, are not 
discriminatory under the dormant Commerce Clause.' Id. at 263. It then 'admit[ted] a 
temptation to undertake the Pike balancing test in the first instance, . . . [a] temptation[, 
which] . . . arises from the well-settled principle that waste disposal is a traditional local 
government function.' Id. at 263-64. The court nonetheless decided to 'resist the 
temptation to rule as a matter of law prior to adequate discovery and further argument 
by the parties, which will undoubtedly assist the District Court in this fact-intensive 
determination.' Id. at 263-64. It concluded: 
 
'We . . . hold . . . that although it does not, in and of itself, give a 
municipality free reign to place burdens on the free flow of commerce 
between the states, the fact that a municipality is acting within its 
traditional purview must factor into the District Court's determination of 
whether the local interests are substantially outweighed by the burdens 
on interstate commerce. With that understanding, we reverse and remand 
for a determination of whether the Counties' flow control laws pass 
constitutional muster under the Pike balancing test.' 
38 
 
 
Id. at 264. Only after the district court conducted the Pike balancing test and the Second 
Circuit affirmed did the Supreme Court's plurality in Part II.D affirm the application of 
the test. See United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1797-98." (Emphasis added.) Lebanon Farms 
Disposal, Inc., 538 F.3d at 251-52. 
 
 
The Third Circuit concluded in Lebanon Farms Disposal, Inc., that remand was 
appropriate:  
 
 
"We will follow the approach of the Second Circuit. We will remand to the 
District Court to conduct the Pike balancing test and make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law for the record. In its present form, the record is incomplete regarding 
the burden on interstate commerce and, more importantly, the putative local benefits. 
Because the District Court did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in 
United Haulers and because we do not have the benefit of the District Court's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law under the now relevant standard, we will remand with 
instructions to apply the Pike balancing test in accordance with Part II.D of United 
Haulers. After development of a proper factual record, this court will be in a better 
position to review the District Court's factual and legal conclusions, if asked." 
(Emphasis added.) 538 F.3d at 252. 
 
 
We find further guidance in Selevan v. New York Thruway Authority, 584 F.3d 82 
(2d Cir. 2009). There, similar to the instant case, the district court granted the defendant's 
motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Commerce Clause claim because it failed to allege that the 
defendant's policy discriminates against interstate commerce. And identical to the instant 
case: 
 
"[T]he District Court incorrectly failed to further inquire if the policy otherwise violated 
the Commerce Clause. Specifically, the District Court did not acknowledge the well-
established rule that, under the so-called Pike test, a nondiscriminatory regulation that 
'regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,' Pike v. Bruce 
Church. Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), is nevertheless unconstitutional if 'the burden imposed 
on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.' 
39 
 
United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Autho., 550 U.S. 330, 
346 (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142)." Selevan, 584 F.3d at 95. 
 
 
The Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to state a 
claim under the Commerce Clause and the district court erred in dismissing. Instead of 
attempting to perform further analysis, e.g., under Pike, the Second Circuit reversed and 
remanded, directing that the district court perform the analysis to determine whether the 
dormant Commerce Clause had been violated by the policy. 
 
 
See also Association of Intern. Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Abrams, 84 F.3d 602, 612-13 
(2d Cir. 1996) (summary judgment on Commerce Clause claim concerning preemption 
inappropriate; "[s]ince there are genuine factual issues as to both the claimed burdens and 
the putative benefits created by the New York bumper statute, we remand for further 
development of the record in order to permit the district court to apply the Pike v. Bruce 
Church balancing test"); Blue Circle Cement, Inc., 27 F.3d at 1512 (district court 
erroneously failed to conduct the Pike analysis after plaintiff had presented evidence 
creating material fact issues as to the Commerce Clause implications of the county 
ordinance and suggested it possessed other evidence of same; summary judgment 
reversed and remanded). 
 
 
As mentioned, we ordered the parties to thoroughly address why, or why not, 
future discovery was necessary to resolve the Board's alleged violation of the Commerce 
Clause. We acknowledge the numerous additional arguments the Board makes to contend 
no remand for factual development is necessary, i.e., the impact on interstate commerce 
is speculative and "[i]f this Court were to conclude that a Pike style test should be 
applied, there are numerous factors weighing overwhelmingly in favor of Wabaunsee 
County." The Board further points out that the zoning regulation is an exercise of police 
power, not commerce power, and for that reason enjoys a strong presumption of validity, 
citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 91 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1986). 
40 
 
 
 
All of the Board's arguments converge on a single point, however:  that we should 
decide the balancing as a matter of law, when we only have the Board's arguments to 
consider. No fact-based arguments have been developed for the Plaintiffs and 
Intervenors. For example, this court cannot know how much electricity would be 
generated from Wabaunsee County wind and eventually kept out of the interstate power 
grid if there were no Board prohibition against CWECS. This type of information would 
be relevant in a Pike analysis. Cf. Pike, 397 U.S. at 145 (compelling grower to build 
packing facilities that would cost approximately $200,000 constituted unlawful burden on 
interstate commerce). 
 
 
Over objection of the Plaintiffs and Intervenors, they were denied a meaningful 
opportunity to discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Plaintiffs specifically argued in their 
response to the Board's motion to dismiss that "at best, no information has been 
developed to allow the Court to balance burdens and benefits of the County's ban of 
commercial wind energy generation systems." 
 
 
After reading the briefs, hearing arguments and considering the case law stated 
above, we conclude this issue should be reversed and remanded to the district court. The 
court should allow discovery, conduct the Pike balancing test, and make findings of fact 
and conclusions of law for the record. After development of a proper factual record, this 
court will be in a better position to review the district court's factual and legal 
conclusions, if asked. See Lebanon Farms Disposal, 538 F.3d at 251. 
 
 
 
c.  Other arguments 
 
 
We have reviewed the multitude of other arguments of the parties and amici 
curiae. We conclude they have no merit. Several warrant addressing in the opinion. 
 
41 
 
 
The Board argues that because the amended zoning regulation concerns local land 
use, it is not the type of regulation that is within the protection of the dormant Commerce 
Clause. We disagree. In Blue Circle Cement, Inc., a cement manufacturer challenged a 
zoning ordinance targeting hazardous waste. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
concluded the zoning regulation affected the dormant Commerce Clause and was subject 
to the Pike test. See also Wood Marine Service, Inc. v. City of Harahan, 858 F.2d 1061 
(5th Cir. 1988) (zoning ordinance survived Commerce Clause scrutiny because "there is 
no evidence of even an incidental burden on interstate commerce"); BFI Waste System of 
North America v. Dekalb County, GA, 303 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2004) 
(zoning ordinance survived Pike balancing test and did not violate dormant Commerce 
Clause); Island Silver & Spice v. Islamorada, Village of Islands, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 
1352 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (zoning ordinance did not survive Pike balancing test and violated 
dormant Commerce Clause). 
 
 
We further observe that the Pike test itself contains the element of "local" public 
interests. It provides:  "If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes 
one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend 
on the nature of the local interest involved." (Emphasis added.) Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
 
 
In an argument the Board admits is quite similar to the one above, the Board 
argues that we need not apply the Pike test to the facts of the instant case. It claims that 
two recent United States Supreme Court opinions are the latest of several where the Court 
found that "some state regulations simply do not require an analysis under the Pike test." 
They cite United Haulers, 550 U.S. 330, and Department of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 
U.S. 328, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 170 L. Ed. 2d 685 (2008). We disagree. As discussed above, 
and as acknowledged by the Davis Court, "United Haulers included a Pike analysis." 553 
U.S. at 353. 
 
 
As for Davis, we note that the Court acknowledged:  
42 
 
 
 
"Concluding that a state law does not amount to forbidden discrimination against 
interstate commerce is not the death knell of all dormant Commerce Clause challenges, 
for we generally leave the courtroom door open to plaintiffs invoking the rule in Pike, 
that even nondiscriminatory burdens on commerce may be struck down on a showing that 
those burdens clearly outweigh the benefits of a state or local practice." (Emphasis 
added.) 553 U.S. at 353.  
 
Additionally, Davis is easily distinguishable:  it is not a land use case. It involved the 
State of Kentucky's income tax structure that exempted the interest on bonds issued by 
Kentucky or its subdivisions from state income tax, while taxing interest income on 
bonds from other states and their subdivisions. Moreover, the Court admitted: 
 
"It would miss the mark to think that the Kentucky courts, and ultimately this Court, are 
being invited merely to tinker with details of a tax scheme; we are being asked to apply a 
federal rule to throw out the system of financing municipal improvements throughout 
most of the United States, and the rule in Pike was never intended to authorize a court to 
expose the States to the uncertainties of the economic experimentation the Davises 
request." (Emphasis added.) 553 U.S. at 356. 
 
 
By contrast, the instant case involved one county and its zoning regulations. 
United Haulers involved two counties; the Court performed the Pike analysis. 
 
 
Amicus curiae Protect plays a variation on this basic theme. It argues that through 
enactment of federal statutes, Congress has eliminated any role for dormant negative 
Commerce Clause analysis in the siting of wind energy electric generation facilities. 
More particularly, Protect contends that Congress has expressly left the regulation of the 
generation of electric energy to the states.  
 
 
Before beginning, we should acknowledge the Supreme Court's declaration that 
"[i]t is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than electric 
43 
 
energy, a product used in virtually every home and every commercial or manufacturing 
facility. No state relies solely on its own resources in this respect." F.E.R.C. v. 
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757, 102 S. Ct. 2126, 72 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1982). Accordingly, as 
a general rule electric energy would be afforded protection under the Commerce Clause. 
See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 341, 102 S. Ct. 1096, 71 
L. Ed. 2d 188 (1982). 
 
 
As support for Protect's argument, it relies upon two sections of the Federal Power 
Act :  (1) 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2006), and (2) § 731 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 
Public Law 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776, which is reprinted as a statutory note at 16 U.S.C. § 
796 (2006) and 16 U.S.C. § 824. 
 
 
 
 
1.  The Federal Power Act of 1935:  16 U.S.C. § 824(a) 
  
 
Protect argues that in the area of the generation of electricity, "Congress has said 
that federal regulatory jurisdiction, even in matters impacting interstate commerce, 
extends 'only to those matters that are not subject to state regulation.' 16 U.S.C. § 
824(a)." (Emphasis added.) This snippet of quoted language is from § 201(a) of the 
Federal Power Act, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824(a), which provides: 
 
"It is declared that the business of transmitting and selling electric energy for ultimate 
distribution to the public is affected with a public interest, and that Federal regulation of 
matters relating to generation to the extent provided in this subchapter and subchapter III 
of this chapter and of that part of such business which consists of the transmission of 
electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in 
interstate commerce is necessary in the public interest, such Federal regulation, however, 
to extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States." 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
44 
 
 
We start our analysis of Protect's argument by agreeing with its underlying 
premise:  Congress may authorize the states to engage in activities that would otherwise 
be forbidden by the Commerce Clause. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138, 106 S. Ct. 
2440, 91 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1986) (citing Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 
325 U.S. 761, 769, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed. 1915 [1945]); New England Power Co. v. 
New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (Congress may confer "upon the states an ability to restrict 
the flow of interstate commerce that they would not otherwise enjoy"). 
 
 
The Supreme Court has also held, however, that "because of the important role the 
Commerce Clause plays in protecting the free flow of interstate trade, [the] Court has 
exempted state statutes from the implied limitations of the Clause only when the 
congressional direction to do so has been 'unmistakably clear.'" (Emphasis added.) 
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138-39 (citing South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. 
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 81 L. Ed. 2d 71 [1984]). Stated by the Court 
another way, "Congress must manifest its unambiguous intent before a federal statute will 
be read to permit or to approve such a violation of the Commerce Clause . . . ." 
(Emphasis added.) Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458, 112 S. Ct. 789, 117 L. Ed. 
2d 1 (1992). As a result, the Court has declared that "[w]hen Congress has not 'expressly 
stated its intent and policy' to sustain state legislation from attack under the Commerce 
Clause," the courts lack "authority to rewrite legislation based on mere speculation as to 
what Congress 'probably had in mind.'" New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 
U.S. at 343. After reviewing the plain language of § 824(a), we have difficulty 
concluding it is a manifestation of Congress' unambiguous intent, expressed through 
unmistakably clear language, to permit the states to regulate the generation of electric 
energy free from Commerce Clause restraint. 
 
 
Instead, the statute more properly appears to merely define the extent of the 
federal preemptive effect on state law. In New England Power Co., the Court held that a 
related statute, 16 U.S.C. § 824(b), did not provide an affirmative grant of authority to the 
45 
 
states to restrict interstate commerce inconsistent with the Commerce Clause. The Court 
first observed that "Section 201(b) of the Act [16 U.S.C. § 824(b)] provides, inter alia, 
that the provisions of Part II 'shall not . . . deprive a State or State commission of its 
lawful authority now exercised over the exportation of hydroelectric energy which is 
transmitted across a State line.'" 455 U.S. at 341. But the Court then concluded this 
language did not support New Hampshire's position of exemption from the Commerce 
Clause: 
 
"However, this provision is in no sense an affirmative grant of power to the states to 
burden interstate commerce 'in a manner which would otherwise not be permissible.' 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, supra, at 769. In § 201(b), Congress did 
no more than leave standing whatever valid state laws then existed relating to the 
exportation of hydroelectric energy; by its plain terms, § 201(b) simply saves from pre-
emption under Part II of the Federal Power Act such state authority as was otherwise 
'lawful.' The legislative history of the Act likewise indicates that Congress intended only 
that its legislation 'tak[e]no authority from State commissions.' H.R.Rep.No.1318, 74th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1935) (emphasis added)." 455 U.S. at 341. 
 
The New England Power Co. Court went on to explain: 
 
"Nothing in the legislative history or language of the statute evinces a congressional 
intent 'to alter the limits of state power otherwise imposed by the Commerce Clause,' 
United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n of California, supra, 345 U.S., at 304, 73 S. Ct., 
at 712, or to modify the earlier holdings of this Court concerning the limits of state 
authority to restrain interstate trade. E.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 
(1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911)." 455 U.S. at 341. 
 
 
The Court concluded instead that "Congress' concern was simply 'to define 
the extent of the federal legislation's pre-emptive effect on state law.' Lewis v. BT 
Investment Managers, Inc., supra, [447 U.S.] at 49." 455 U.S. at 341. 
 
46 
 
 
Ten years later the Court rejected a similar Commerce Clause exemption argument 
in Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437. There, Wyoming challenged an Oklahoma 
statute that required Oklahoma's coal-fired electric generating plants to burn a coal 
mixture containing at least 10 per cent Oklahoma coal. Oklahoma argued that the 
"savings clause" in § 824(b)(1) of the Federal Power Act delivered its statute from 
Commerce Clause scrutiny. That section provided for federal regulation of "electric 
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce," but reserved to the states the regulation of 
"any other sale of electric energy." 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). 
 
 
Accordingly, Oklahoma argued its quota statute was a proper exercise of its 
authority to regulate local retail electric rates which in turn permitted discriminatory 
impact on the movement of Wyoming coal in interstate commerce. More specifically, 
Oklahoma contended that included in its authority to ensure lower local utility rates was 
the authority to, among other things, reduce over-dependence on a single source of 
supply, e.g., Wyoming. 
 
 
The Court agreed that Oklahoma had certain authority under the Federal Power 
Act. But after reviewing the holding and rationale in New England Power Co., including 
the determination that § 824(b)(1) simply saved from preemption under the Act such state 
authority as was otherwise "lawful," the Wyoming Court held Congress had not 
manifested its unambiguous intent to permit Oklahoma's Commerce Clause violation. 
The Court also observed it had "uniformly subjected Commerce Clause cases implicating 
the Federal Power Act to scrutiny on their merits," i.e., Congress had not unambiguously 
empowered states to burden or discriminate against interstate commerce. 502 U.S. at 458. 
 
 
Based upon this Federal Power Act caselaw, we conclude § 824(a) of the Act does 
not, through unmistakably clear language, affirmatively grant power to the states to 
burden interstate commerce. Rather, the statute means that (1) Congress has not 
preempted the Board's zoning regulations; but (2) these regulations are nevertheless still 
47 
 
subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny. See also Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 
458 U.S. 941, 960, 102 S. Ct. 3456, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1254 (1982) (although water statutes 
demonstrate Congress' deference to state law, they do not indicate Congress wished to 
remove federal constitutional constraints on state laws); Lewis v. BT Investment 
Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 49, 100 S. Ct. 2009, 64 L. Ed. 2d 702 (1980) ("[I]t appears 
that Congress' concern was to define the extent of the federal legislation's pre-emptive 
effect on state law." Thus, the federal act "applies only to state legislation that operates 
within the boundaries marked by the Commerce Clause."). Contrast, e.g., In Western & 
Southern L. I. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 653-54, 101 S. Ct. 2070, 68 
L. Ed. 2d 514 (1981). 
 
 
 
 
2.  The Energy Policy Act of 1992 
 
 
Protect next argues that even greater support for its claim of exemption from 
Commerce Clause scrutiny is found in recent federal legislation, suggesting there can 
now be no real debate about the persuasiveness of its position. It argues:  "Moreover, 
more recent legislation makes it clear that although the federal government now regulates 
such things as maximum emissions levels and rates, supervises interstate activity, and 
oversees other public safety standards, the siting of specific power facilities is left at the 
state level." (Emphasis added.) 
 
 
In support of Protect's argument, it points out that the Energy Policy Act of 1992 
provides: 
 
"Nothing in this title or in any amendment made by this title shall be construed as 
affecting or intending to affect, or in any way to interfere with, the authority of any State 
or local government relating to environmental protection or the siting of facilities." 
(Emphasis added.) Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 731, 106 Stat. 
2776, 2921 (1992). 
 
48 
 
 
Among other things, Protect also relies upon Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 
2d 428, 436 (Fla. 2000). There, based upon this statutory language (§ 731), the Florida 
Supreme Court rejected appellee's arguments that the state statute on siting of generating 
plants violated the dormant Commerce Clause and was preempted by the Energy Policy 
Act of 1992. The court concluded that "power-plant siting and need determination are 
areas that Congress has expressly left to the states." 767 So. 2d at 436. 
 
 
 
We begin our analysis of this argument by repeating the standards of review 
described above:  Congress' language authorizing states to engage in activities that would 
otherwise be forbidden by the Commerce Clause must be "unmistakably clear," and 
Congress must manifest its "unambiguous intent" to do so. As a result, it makes sense 
that we first look for guidance in a Supreme Court decision involving statutory language 
very similar to the language Protect cites from the Energy Policy Act:  Sporhase v. 
Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941. 
 
 
In Sporhase, the Supreme Court considered whether a Nebraska state water law 
impermissibly interfered with interstate commerce. Nebraska argued that Congress had 
"authorized the States to impose otherwise impermissible burdens on interstate commerce 
in ground water." 458 U.S. at 958. In support of its argument, Nebraska cited to 37 
statutes in which Congress deferred to state water law, as well as to a number of interstate 
compacts dealing with water rights that received congressional approval. 
 
 
The Court determined that the statute discussed by Nebraska, Section 8 of the 
Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 390, was typical of the 37 statutes. Section 8 of the Act 
contains language quite similar to the statute, § 731, upon which Protect relies: 
 
"'[N]othing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any 
way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, 
use, or distribution of water used in irrigation.'" 458 U.S. at 959. 
49 
 
 
In comparison, § 731 of the Energy Policy Act cited by Protect provides: 
 
"Nothing in this title or in any amendment made by this title shall be construed as 
affecting or intending to affect, or in any way to interfere with, the authority of any State 
or local government relating to environmental protection or the siting of facilities." 
 
 
The Sporhase Court first held that the cited language "defines the extent of the 
federal legislation's pre-emptive effect on state law." (Emphasis added.) 458 U.S. at 959 
(citing New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 341; Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 
447 U.S. at 49). It then quickly rejected Nebraska's contention: 
 
 
"Although the 37 statutes and the interstate compacts demonstrate Congress' 
deference to state water law, they do not indicate that Congress wished to remove federal 
constitutional constraints on such state laws. The negative implications of the Commerce 
Clause, like the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment, are ingredients of the valid state 
law to which Congress has deferred. Neither the fact that Congress has chosen not to 
create a federal water law to govern water rights involved in federal projects, nor the fact 
that Congress has been willing to let the States settle their differences over water rights 
through mutual agreement, constitutes persuasive evidence that Congress consented to 
the unilateral imposition of unreasonable burdens on commerce. In the instances in which 
we have found such consent, Congress' '"intent and policy" to sustain state legislation 
from attack under the Commerce Clause' was "expressly stated."'" (Emphasis added.) 458 
U.S. at 959-60. 
 
 
Just as the Sporhase Court rejected Nebraska's argument, we reject for the same 
reasons the same argument by Protect based upon virtually the same language. 
 
 
The case of Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, cited in 
Sporhase, provides additional support. There, the state of Florida argued that the federal 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 permitted the state to pass legislation that might 
50 
 
otherwise violate the Commerce Clause, i.e., prohibiting out of state banks from owning 
or controlling businesses within the state that provided investment advisory services. 
Section 7 of the Act (12 U.S.C. § 1846) stated: 
 
"'The enactment by the Congress of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 shall not be 
construed as preventing any State from exercising such powers and jurisdiction which it 
now has or may hereafter have with respect to banks, bank holding companies, and 
subsidiaries thereof.' 70 Stat. 138." (Emphasis added.) 447 U.S. at 45-46 n.12. 
 
 
The Lewis Court held the legislation was an invalid restriction on interstate 
commerce. It first acknowledged that § 7 "does reserve to the States a general power to 
enact regulations applicable to bank holding companies. This section was intended to 
preserve existing state regulations of bank holding companies, even if they were more 
restrictive than federal law." 447 U.S. at 48-49. However, the Court held § 7 was not 
"intended to extend to the states new powers to regulate banking that they would not have 
possessed absent the federal legislation. Rather, it appears that Congress' concern was to 
define the extent of the federal legislation's pre-emptive effect on state law." 447 U.S. at 
49. The Court concluded that § 7 applied "only to state legislation that operates within the 
boundaries marked by the Commerce Clause." 447 U.S. at 49. 
 
 
Finally, we observe that while the commentary is limited regarding the case upon 
which Protect relies, Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, it has been unanimously negative. See 
Ramsey, Power Plant Siting in a Deregulated Electric Energy Industry; Discerning the 
Constitutionality of Siting Statutes under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 21 J. Land Use 
& Envtl. L. 91 (Fall 2005); Note, Federalism, Electric Industry Restructuring, and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause:  Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia and State Restrictions on the 
Development of Merchant Power Plants, 43 Nat. Resources J. 615 (Spring 2003); Fels & 
Lindh, Lessons from the California "Apocalypse":  Jurisdiction over Electric Utilities, 22 
Energy L.J. 1 (2001). 
51 
 
 
 
As the authors wrote in Lessons from the California "Apocalypse," 22 Energy L.J. 
at 30: 
 
 
"We believe that the Florida court's reliance on Section 731 of the Energy Policy 
Act was misplaced . . . United States Supreme Court precedent requires an 'unambiguous' 
expression of congressional intent in order to shield protectionist state regulation from 
invalidation under the Commerce Clause. By its terms, section 731 does no more than 
leave unaffected whatever authority the states had, prior to enactment of the Energy 
Policy Act, to regulate siting decisions; certainly nothing in section 731 can be read as 
an affirmative grant of authority to the states to discriminate in favor of their own 
residents against interstate commerce." (Emphasis added.) 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
1. We affirm the district court's disposition of (a) the claim under the Takings 
Clause; (b) the related takings-based claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (c) the 
inverse condemnation claim. 
 
2. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the dormant Commerce Clause claim 
alleging discrimination against interstate commerce. 
 
3. We reverse the district court's apparent dismissal of the Commerce Clause 
claim alleging the Board's decision to amend the zoning regulations placed 
incidental burdens on interstate commerce that outweighed the benefits. As a 
result, the court's dismissal of the related burden-based claim under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 is also reversed. See United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid 
Waste Management, 550 U.S. 330, 337, 127 S. Ct. 1786, 167 L. Ed. 2d 655 
(2007) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim included allegation that counties' ordinances 
52 
 
violated the Commerce Clause by placing an incidental burden on interstate 
commerce that outweighed the ordinances' benefits). 
 
4. We remand to the district court with instructions to allow discovery on the 
Commerce Clause burden-based claim, to conduct the Pike balancing test, and 
to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on that claim and any other 
issues that may remain.