Title: Town of Jonesville v. Powell Valley Village L.P.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 961738
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 1997

Present:  All the Justices 
 
TOWN OF JONESVILLE, ET AL. 
 
v.   Record Nos. 961738    OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
            and 962016               June 6, 1997 
 
POWELL VALLEY VILLAGE 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LEE COUNTY 
 
Ford C. Quillen, Judge 
 
 
In 1989, the Town of Jonesville (the Town) adopted a 
zoning ordinance establishing zoning classifications for the 
entire town and procedures for enforcing the ordinance.  In 
1990, pursuant to the ordinance, Powell Valley Village Limited 
Partnership applied for, and received, a zoning permit to 
construct low and moderate income residence apartments on land 
it owned in the Town.  The Town amended its zoning ordinance in 
1993 by requiring a special use permit for buildings with more 
than six residential units.  In 1994, Powell Valley Village 
Limited Partnership and its general partner, Hunt & Associates 
of Virginia, Inc. (collectively "the Housing Group") applied 
for a building permit based on its 1990 zoning permit.  Jack 
Collins, the county building inspector charged with enforcing 
the state building code and town ordinance, ultimately denied 
the building permit stating that the Housing Group had to 
"resubmit" the apartment project for zoning approval.  
 
The Housing Group filed this action seeking a declaratory 
judgment that it had a vested right in the 1990 zoning permit 
or, alternatively, that the 1989 zoning ordinance and "all 
amendments thereto" were void because the Town had not adopted 
a comprehensive plan prior to adoption of the ordinance.  The 
Housing Group's pleadings also contained a petition for 
issuance of a writ of mandamus to require the county building 
inspector to issue a building permit.  Following discovery, the 
Housing Group filed a motion for summary judgment on its 
declaratory judgment count.  The trial court, after considering 
the briefs and arguments of counsel, granted the Housing 
Group's motion for summary judgment, holding that when the 1989 
ordinance was adopted the Town had not adopted a comprehensive 
plan pursuant to Code §§ 15.1-446.1 and -490 and, therefore, 
"the zoning ordinance was void ab initio."  At a subsequent 
hearing on the Housing Group's petition for mandamus, the trial 
court granted the petition and ordered the county building 
inspector to issue the building permit upon payment of the 
building permit fee.  We awarded appeals to the Town and the 
county building inspector from both orders and combined the 
appeals for review. 
 
The Town and the county building inspector raise a number 
of assignments of error on appeal relating to the trial court's 
orders granting the declaratory judgment and the petition for a 
writ of mandamus.  Many of the issues are interrelated and, for 
convenience and clarity, will be considered in categories. 
I.  Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
 
Relying on Gayton Triangle Land Co. v. Board of 
Supervisors of Henrico County, 216 Va. 764, 222 S.E.2d 570 
(1976), and Phillips v. Telum, Inc., 223 Va. 585, 292 S.E.2d 
311 (1982), the Town argues that the Housing Group had to 
exhaust its administrative remedies before it could file a 
declaratory judgment action or a petition for mandamus.
1  
Because the Housing Group did not appeal the county building 
inspector's March 1994 decision denying the building permit to 
the board of zoning appeals, the Town argues, the trial court 
should have dismissed this action.  
 
As a general rule, administrative remedies must be 
exhausted before a court will take cognizance of a zoning 
dispute.  Board of Supervisors of Henrico County v. Market 
Inns, Inc., 228 Va. 82, 86, 319 S.E.2d 737, 739-40 (1984).  In 
Gayton Triangle, the landowner sought a declaratory judgment 
that a rezoning ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to 
its property.  In holding that the landowner had failed to 
exhaust its administrative remedies, the Court reasoned that 
the restrictive rezoning could have been remedied by a variance 
granted by the board of zoning appeals and until that body 
acts, "it cannot be said that the zoning power [had] been fully 
and finally applied."  216 Va. at 767, 222 S.E.2d at 573.  
Similarly, in Phillips, the contract purchaser of land sought a 
writ of mandamus when it was denied a building permit because 
the county planner determined that the proposed use was not 
permitted in the zoning district.  We held that the applicant 
could not file a petition for a writ of mandamus because the 
                     
    
1     
1This assertion was initially raised in the Town's 
special plea to dismiss.  The trial court did not directly rule 
on the plea, but the decision of the trial court implicitly 
ruled on the issue and denied the plea.  Lowry v. Noell, 177 
Va. 238, 241, 13 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1941).   
board of zoning appeals had the power to interpret the zoning 
ordinances and, in a case involving ordinance interpretation, 
the applicant must "exhaust administrative remedies by 
appealing to the appropriate board of zoning appeals before 
resorting to court action."  223 Va. at 589, 292 S.E.2d at 314. 
 
In this case, the Housing Group challenged the validity of 
the ordinance based on the Town's failure to comply with 
§§ 15.1-446.1 and -490.  The authority of zoning administrators 
and boards of zoning appeals is prescribed by statute.  Board 
of Zoning Appeals of James City County v. University Square 
Assocs., 246 Va. 290, 294, 435 S.E.2d 385, 388 (1993).  No 
statute confers the authority to rule on the validity of zoning 
ordinances upon zoning administrators or boards of zoning 
appeals.  While zoning administrators and boards of zoning 
appeals must necessarily interpret zoning ordinances to execute 
their responsibilities, that obligation does not give rise to a 
power to declare these ordinances invalid.  That is a 
determination within the sole province of the judiciary.  See 
Holland v. Johnson, 241 Va. 553, 555-56, 403 S.E.2d 356, 357-58 
(1991).  Thus, in this case, unlike Gayton Triangle and 
Phillips, there was "no administrative remedy equal to the 
relief sought" which the Housing Group could have acquired.  
Board of Supervisors of James City County v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 
133, 216 S.E.2d 199, 205 (1975); see also Notestein v. Board of 
Supervisors of Appomattox County, 240 Va. 146, 153, 393 S.E.2d 
205, 209 (1990).  Accordingly, the Housing Group was not 
required to appeal the county building inspector's 
determination or to apply for a new zoning permit under the 
zoning ordinance as amended in 1993.  
 
II.  The Validity of the 1989 Zoning Ordinance 
 
Municipalities in Virginia can only exercise those powers 
expressly or impliedly granted to them and only in the manner 
prescribed by the General Assembly.  Board of Supervisors of 
Fairfax County v. Horne, 216 Va. 113, 117, 215 S.E.2d 453, 455-
56 (1975).  Failure to abide by the statutory prescriptions for 
the adoption of an ordinance renders the ordinance void ab 
initio.  City Council of Alexandria v. Potomac Greens Assocs. 
Partnership, 245 Va. 371, 378, 429 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1993). 
 
In 1975, the General Assembly enacted legislation which 
required all governing bodies in the state to adopt a 
comprehensive plan by 1980.  § 15.1-446.1.  Such plans must be 
reviewed every five years.  § 15.1-454.  Section 15.1-490 
requires that zoning ordinances be drawn with "reasonable 
consideration for" the comprehensive plan.  Matthews v. Board 
of Zoning Appeals of Greene County, 218 Va. 270, 277 n.1, 237 
S.E.2d 128, 132 n.1 (1977). 
 
The Town asserts that its 1989 zoning ordinance "comports 
with every requirement of a comprehensive plan except that it 
does [not] have a label that calls it a comprehensive plan."  
Relying on cases from other jurisdictions and the provisions of 
§ 15.1-446.1 which allow a comprehensive plan to include a 
zoning ordinance, the Town argues that the contents of the 
document should determine whether the document is a 
comprehensive plan and, in this case, the Town satisfied the 
comprehensive plan requirement when it adopted the 1989 zoning 
ordinance.  The record, however, does not support the Town's 
contention. 
 
A comprehensive plan, as described by the General 
Assembly, is general in nature and serves as a guide for the 
coordinated development of the territory to meet the present 
and future needs of the community and promote the general 
welfare of its citizens.  § 15.1-446.1.  It is a studied plan 
for zoning, adopted after consideration of public comment.  Id. 
 Prior to its adoption, a local governing body must conduct 
studies covering a wide range of factors including existing 
land use and development, trends and growth, population, 
employment and economic factors, public facilities, 
transportation facilities, and housing needs.  § 15.1-447.  The 
local planning commission must hold public hearings on the 
proposed comprehensive plan, § 15.1-448, and if approved by the 
planning commission, the governing body, after public hearing 
and notice, may adopt, amend, or disapprove the plan.  § 15.1-
450. 
 
The zoning ordinance in this case, while a comprehensive 
zoning regulation, does not contain a number of the elements 
required to be included in a comprehensive plan under § 15.1-
446.1, such as "long-range recommendations for the general 
development of the territory covered by the plan" and 
indications of "where existing lands or facilities are proposed 
to be extended, widened, removed, [or] relocated."  
Furthermore, the record in this case does not indicate that any 
of the studies required by § 15.1-447 were conducted or that 
the planning commission considered, held hearings, or 
recommended the plan to the governing body in accordance with 
§ 15.1-448.
2  Accordingly, we conclude that the 1989 zoning 
ordinance, as amended, did not constitute a comprehensive plan 
under § 15.1-446.1. 
 
Allowing a municipality to adopt a zoning ordinance 
without considering a comprehensive plan, because it does not 
have such a plan, would permit manipulation of the zoning 
statutes and condone violation of §§ 15.1-446.1,  
-454, and -490.  A comprehensive plan provides a guideline for 
future development and systematic change, reached after 
consultation with experts and the public.  "[T]he Virginia 
statutes assure [landowners] that such a change will not be 
made suddenly, arbitrarily, or capriciously but only after a 
period of investigation and community planning."  Board of 
Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va. 
655, 658, 202 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1974).  While the Town is 
correct in its arguments that neither the statutes nor our 
prior cases specifically require a local government to enact a 
comprehensive plan before it enacts a zoning ordinance, 
considering all relevant statutes as we must, Board of 
Supervisors of King & Queen County v. Cox, 155 Va. 687, 707, 
156 S.E. 755, 761 (1931), we conclude that §§ 15.1-446.1 
through -498 reflect a legislative prescription for local 
                     
    
2     
2 The Town does not argue that it was prevented from 
introducing such evidence. 
zoning actions which, after 1980, required the adoption of a 
comprehensive plan prior to the adoption of a zoning ordinance. 
 
III.  Remedy 
A.  Declaratory Judgment Action 
 
The Town urges that, even if the trial court was correct 
in declaring the ordinance void ab initio, it nevertheless 
erred in failing to suspend its order to allow the Town 
sufficient time to take appropriate legislative action.  The 
Town argues that the result of the trial court's action is to 
leave the Town without any zoning regulations.  Under these 
circumstances, the Town suggests that the procedure adopted in 
Board of Supervisors of James City County v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 
216 S.E.2d 199 (1975), should be adopted here.  In Rowe, James 
City County's entire zoning ordinance was declared 
unconstitutional but, because the effect of the trial court's 
decree "was to leave the land unzoned," the case was remanded 
to the trial court with instructions to enter an order 
suspending the decree for a period of time during which further 
legislative action could be considered.  Id. at 148, 216 S.E.2d 
at 215.  Such a procedure, the Town adds, is also consistent 
with this Court's decision in Potomac Greens, in which, after 
declaring an amendment to a zoning ordinance of the City of 
Alexandria void ab initio for failure to comply with certain 
notice requirements, the Court directed that the decision 
"shall operate prospectively only, and shall not affect other 
amendments enacted prior to our decision in this case."  245 
Va. at 378, 429 S.E.2d at 229. 
 
We agree with the Town's assertion concerning the 
prospective nature of the decision and direct that the holding 
in this case -- that adoption of a comprehensive plan is a 
prerequisite to the adoption of a zoning ordinance -- is 
limited to the instant case and shall operate prospectively 
only.  See also Perkins v. County of Albemarle, 214 Va. 416, 
418, 200 S.E.2d 566, 568 (1973).  We disagree, however, that 
suspension of the decision in this case is consistent with, or 
required by, our previous cases. 
 
The relief awarded in Rowe was based on facts materially 
different from the facts in this case.  In Rowe, the trial 
court declared a zoning amendment, which rezoned an area of the 
county from a B-1 to a B-2 classification, unconstitutional.  
The effect of this decision was to leave unzoned territory that 
previously had been zoned.  Thus, the decision did not return 
the territory to the same zoned status it held prior to the 
enactment of the unconstitutional zoning amendment.  216 Va. at 
148, 216 S.E.2d at 215.  In the instant case, prior to 1989, 
the Town had no zoning ordinance at all.  Therefore, the effect 
of the decision of the trial court is to return the territory 
to the same unzoned status it held prior to the enactment of 
the void ordinance.  See Matthews v. Board of Zoning Appeals of 
Greene County, 218 Va. at 283, 237 S.E.2d at 135-36. 
 
In Potomac Greens, while we directed that our decision 
apply prospectively only and that it not affect other 
amendments to the city's zoning ordinance, we held that the 
zoning amendment at issue was void ab initio and could not be 
enforced by the City of Alexandria.  245 Va. at 378, 429 S.E.2d 
at 228.  Likewise, the Town's 1989 zoning ordinance challenged 
in this case, including "all amendments thereto," is void ab 
initio and may not be enforced by the Town.  Accordingly, under 
the facts of this case, we hold that the trial court was not 
required to suspend the effective date of its decision until 
the Town could take further legislative action. 
 
B.  Mandamus 
 
The Town also argues that the trial court erred in issuing 
a writ of mandamus because the issuance of the building permit 
was not a ministerial function, the building permit fee had not 
been paid, and the county building inspector had no authority 
to issue the permit.  These arguments are not well taken. 
 
The record is clear that the county building inspector 
denied the building permit for the sole reason that the Housing 
Group did not have a zoning permit under the Town's zoning 
ordinance.  When the trial court's decision eliminated this 
requirement, issuing the building permit was "'no longer 
discretionary but ministerial and mandatory.'"  Phillips, 223 
Va. at 591, 292 S.E.2d at 314 (quoting Planning Commission of 
Falls Church v. Berman, 211 Va. 774, 777, 180 S.E.2d 670, 672 
(1971)).  Additionally, the trial court conditioned the 
issuance of the writ upon the Housing Group's payment of the 
building permit fee. 
 
Finally, we reject the Town's argument that the county 
building inspector had no authority to issue the permit once 
the ordinance was declared invalid.  The county building 
inspector is charged with enforcing the Virginia Uniform 
Statewide Building Code (the Building Code) in Lee County.  The 
Building Code requires issuance of a permit prior to 
construction of any building to insure that the proposed work 
conforms to the requirements of the Building Code.  U.S.B.C. 
§§ 105.1, 109.1 (1994).  Towns such as Jonesville, with 
populations of less than 3,500, may elect to administer the 
Building Code; however, if the town does not so elect, the 
county in which the town is located is responsible for the 
administration and enforcement of the Building Code.  Code 
§ 36-105.  There is nothing in the 1989 zoning ordinance or the 
record in this case which indicates that the Town has elected 
to undertake the responsibility of administering or enforcing 
the Building Code.  Therefore, the county building inspector 
has the authority to issue the permit in this case. 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we will affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
 
Affirmed.