Title: State v. Rasmussen
Citation: 524 N.W.2d 843
Docket Number: 940113
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: December 2, 1994

524 N.W.2d 843 (1994) STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Lynn Byron RASMUSSEN, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. No. 940113. Supreme Court of North Dakota. December 2, 1994. William A. Mackenzie of Mackenzie, Jungroth, Mackenzie &amp; Reisnour, Jamestown, for defendant and appellant. Robert A. Freed, Asst. State's Atty., Jamestown, for plaintiff and appellee. SANDSTROM, Justice. The defendant was convicted of driving under suspension, after the trial court concluded justification or excuse was unavailable as a matter of law. Because we hold justification or excuse could apply, we reverse and remand for a new trial. In the early morning hours of January 13, 1994, the elevator manager at Windsor reported an apparent break-in at the grain elevator. As the Stutsman County deputy sheriffs approached Windsor, they noticed a vehicle about a quarter mile off Interstate 94, near the edge of town. Fresh tracks led from the car, from house to house, and then into the elevator, but they did not exit. When the officers yelled into the elevator, Lynn Rasmussen answered and came out. Rasmussen said he had car trouble and sought shelter from the cold. The night was very cold and it had been snowing quite heavily. Because it appeared Rasmussen had only been seeking shelter, no offense was charged for the break-in. A records check disclosed Rasmussen's driver's license was suspended. The car was registered to Rasmussen. He said another person had been driving the car back from Fargo to Bismarck when engine trouble developed. He said the driver had then started walking and had hitch-hiked. Rasmussen said he sat in the car until he decided he had to get help and find shelter from the cold. He said he managed to drive the car to the edge of Windsor, where it died. He then sought shelter. Rasmussen was charged with driving while his license was under suspension, in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-06-42, a class B misdemeanor. The case was tried to the court. One of the deputies testified damage to the car seemed to reflect it had been driven into a ditch. Damage to the radiator, he said, probably caused the car to over-heat. The deputy said Rasmussen had not named the alleged driver. Rasmussen testified, naming the alleged driver. He said he had bought the car while his license was under suspension. He said *844 he was trying to sell the car to the alleged driver so they took a test drive from Bismarck to Fargo, and had stopped to visit Rasmussen's nephews in Fargo. Rasmussen said they were driving back to Bismarck in very nasty weather when car trouble developed, and the driver had headed off on his own. The alleged driver did not testify. No other witnesses were called. Rasmussen argued justification or excuse as a defense to driving under suspension. The trial court ruled justification or excuse was not permitted and found Rasmussen guilty. Rasmussen appeals from the judgment of conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction under Art. VI, § 8, N.D. Const., and N.D.C.C. § 40-18-15.1. This Court has jurisdiction under Art. VI, § 6, N.D. Const., and N.D.C.C. § 29-28-06(2). The appeal was timely under Rule 4(b), N.D.R.App.P. After the argument of counsel as to the availability of justification or excuse, the court ruled: We interpret the trial court's words as ruling justification or excuse was unavailable as a matter of law under the facts claimed by Rasmussen. N.D.R.Crim.P. Rule 23(d) provides: "In a case tried without a jury, the court shall make a general finding of guilty or not guilty." N.D.R.App.P. Rule 35(c) provides: Therefore, we review the trial court's ruling on the unavailability of justification or excuse. N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-05 justifications and excuses may apply to offenses outside of Title 12.1. See e.g., State v. Nehring, 509 N.W.2d 42 (N.D.1993) (delivery of a controlled substance in violation of N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-23(1)(b)); State v. Mathisen, 356 N.W.2d 129 (N.D.1984) (issuing checks without sufficient funds in violation of N.D.C.C. § 6-08-16); State v. Patten, 353 N.W.2d 30 (N.D.1984) (removing a child from the State contrary to a custody decree in violation of N.D.C.C. § 14-14-22.1). Compare N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02 ("For the purposes of this title....") relating to culpability; State v. North Dakota Ed. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731, 734 (N.D.1978) ("Section 12.1-02-02, N.D.C.C., is a part of a recodified criminal code, and applies only to that code."). Chapter 12.1-05 of the North Dakota Century Code "is an almost complete adoption" of Chapter 6 of the Proposed Federal Criminal Code dealing with defenses of justification and excuse. State v. Fridley, 335 N.W.2d 785, 788 (N.D.1983); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 814 (N.D.1983). As an aid to interpreting the North Dakota statutes, therefore, it is helpful to examine the Comments of the drafters of the Proposed Federal Criminal Code. See, e.g., Fridley; State v. Sadowski, 329 N.W.2d 583, 585 (N.D. 1983); State v. Kaufman, 310 N.W.2d 709, 712 (N.D.1981). Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws at 44 (1971) ("Final Report"). The State argues affirmative defenses are unavailable because driving under suspension is a strict liability offense. In City of Mandan v. Willman, 439 N.W.2d 92, 93 (N.D. 1989), this Court said: While recognizing strict liability does not always preclude affirmative defenses, the case left open the question of the availability of affirmative defenses to the strict liability offense of driving under suspension or revocation. Willman. In State v. Nygaard, 447 N.W.2d 267, 271 (N.D.1989), this Court differentiated Michlitsch to hold the particular "affirmative defense of excuse based on a mistaken belief" is not available for "the strict liability offense of failing to stop after an accident." In Brown, 107 Wis.2d 44, 318 N.W.2d at 376, the Wisconsin Supreme Court discussed policy considerations in determining if particular defenses should be permitted for a particular strict liability offense: We conclude public policy factors would support an affirmative defense to driving under suspension in life-threatening circumstances. The trial court incorrectly concluded the specific justification and excuse provisions of N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-05 do not apply to the facts claimed by Rasmussen. N.D.C.C. § 12.1-05-10 provides: The Comments to the Proposed Federal Criminal Code § 618 reflect that the compulsion may be from any source. Final Report at 54. See also "A Hornbook to the North Dakota Criminal Code," 50 N.D. L.Rev. at 680 (1974). An affirmative defense under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-05-10 is available for driving under suspension when the compulsion is from life-threatening forces of nature.[1] The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. VANDE WALLE, C.J., and NEUMANN, LEVINE and MESCHKE, JJ., concur. [1] While the headnote for N.D.C.C. § 12.1-05-10 is "Duress," and our interpretation of the statute may be broader than the usual meaning of duress, the headnote is not part of the statute and may not be used to determine legislative intent. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-12. Because the statute provides a defense under the facts claimed, we need not reach the broader concept of a defense often referred to as "necessity" or "choice of evils." See State v. Sahr, 470 N.W.2d 185, 188-89 (N.D. 1991).