Title: Baromich v. State
Citation: 249 N.E.2d 30, 252 Ind. 412
Docket Number: N/A
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: July 3, 1969

252 Ind. 412 (1969)
249 N.E.2d 30
BAROMICH
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 169-S-22.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed July 3, 1969.
Rehearing denied September 23, 1969.
Max Cohen, Gary, for petitioner.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Robert F. Hassett, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
DeBRULER, C.J.
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 2-40A seeking review of a denial of a Motion to Correct Judgment filed in the trial court under Rule 2-40B. On November 9, 1967, petitioner was charged in two separate indictments with the crime of theft in violation of the Offenses Against Property Act, Acts 1963 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 10, § 3, the same being Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. § 10-3030(a). On September 23, 1968, the petitioner in each of these causes entered a plea of guilty to a lesser included offense of theft of less than $100.00, a violation of Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. § 10-3039(1). The State of Indiana in each case accepted the pleas to the lesser offenses and waived prosecution on the charges in each of the indictments. On October 14, 1968, *413 the court imposed sentence in each of the causes. The petitioner in Cause No. 39470 was sentenced to a term of imprisonment at the Indiana State Farm for a period of not less than one year. In Cause No. 39471 the court again sentenced the petitioner to one year at the Indiana State Farm and then ordered the prison sentence to run consecutively after the sentence imposed in Cause No. 39470. The exact language of the commitment in Cause No. 39471 read as follows:
On November 18, 1968, petitioner, without objection from the State, filed his motion to correct judgment in No. 39471 requesting the sentence be made to run concurrently instead of consecutively. This motion was denied on January 21, 1969, by the Lake County Criminal Court.
At the outset the State argues that this error has been waived on appeal because the petitioner did not object when the sentence was imposed on October 14, 1968, but waited until November 18, 1968, to file his motion to correct judgment under Rule 2-40B.
Rule 2-40B, Supreme Court Rules, reads:
There is no time limit stated in this Rule, on the contrary, the Rule states that the motion may be made at any time. In Sutton v. State (1966), 248 Ind. 1, 221 N.E.2d 430, the Court stated:
See also Dowd v. Todd (1962), 243 Ind. 232, 184 N.E.2d 4.
We believe petitioner followed the proper procedure in raising this issue and we proceed to the merits.
Petitioner argues that the trial court had no authority to order the sentence imposed in No. 39471 to commence at the conclusion of the sentence imposed in Cause No. 39470.
At one time Indiana did have a provision for consecutive sentences. R.S. 1843, § 72, p. 997, stated in part:
This statute was dropped in the codification of 1852 and there has never been such a provision since then. In Miller v. Allen (1858), 11 Ind. 389, this Court said:
After the defendant in Miller was sentenced in 1857, the Legislature passed Acts 1857, ch. 56, § 6, the same now being Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. § 13-210, which says in part:
This Court in interpreting that statute in Kennedy v. Howard (1881), 74 Ind. 87, said:
*416 In Lawson v. State (1931), 202 Ind. 583, 177 N.E. 266, this Court stated:
The rule in this State then is that the court does not have authority to impose sentences which are to run consecutively unless there is a specific statute which authorizes such a thing. The Legislature has enacted several statutes which allow consecutive sentencing in specific situations. For example, Burns' § 10-1807 (where the defendant commits a crime while escaped from prison); § 10-1809 (where defendant commits a crime while escaped from jail); § 10-4709 (committing a crime while armed); § 9-2250 (committing a crime while on parole). In the absence of such a specific statutory provision consecutive sentencing is not permitted.
The respondent argues that Burns' § 13-210, supra, applies only to sentences to a state prison not to sentences to the State Farm. We find no merit whatsoever in this contention. The statute reads:
Petitioner was convicted under Burns § 10-3039, which is a felony. Hunter v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 494, 207 N.E.2d 207. We think, therefore, Burns' § 13-210, supra, does apply to the petitioner.
In neither Kennedy v. Howard, supra, nor Lawson v. State, supra, was any distinction made between sentences to be served at the State Prison and sentences to be served at the State Farm.
In support of this decision is this opinion of the Attorney General:
We see no distinction to be drawn with reference to consecutive sentences based on the place of incarceration.
We hold that the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose consecutive sentences in this case and the judge of the Lake County Criminal Court is hereby ordered to modify the judgment and sentence in Cause No. 39471 to show that said sentence shall run concurrently with the sentence imposed in Cause No. 39470.
Arterburn, Givan, Hunter and Jackson, JJ., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 249 N.E.2d 30.