Title: Vaughn v. First Transit, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S055981
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 16, 2009

FILED: April 16, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
CHERYL VAUGHN,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
FIRST TRANSIT, INC.,
a Delaware corporation;
FIRST TRANSIT TRANSPORTATION, LLC,
a Delaware corporation;
and CLARA ZAVORAL,
Respondents on Review,
and
PORT OF PORTLAND,
Intervenor.
(CC
0603-03099; CA A133676; SC S055981)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January 13, 2009.
Helen C. Tompkins, Law Office of Helen Tompkins, P.C., Lake Oswego, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.
Thomas M. Christ, Cosgrave Vergeer Kester LLP, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs
for respondents on review.
William F. Gary, Harrang Long Gary Rudnick, P.C., Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for intervenor Port of Portland.  With him on the brief were Sharon A. Rudnick
and Susan D. Marmaduke.
Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, filed a brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association.
C. Randall Tosh, Salem, filed a brief for amici curiae League of Oregon Cities,
Association of Oregon Counties, Special Districts Association of Oregon,
Multnomah County, Marion County, Deschutes County, Clackamas County, Metro,
City of Portland, City of Eugene, City of Salem, City of Boardman, City County
Insurance Services, Housing Authority of Portland, Oregon School Boards
Association, and City of Hood River.
Karla H. Ferrall, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for amicus curiae State of Oregon.  With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Bruce Hamlin, Judge pro tempore.  218 Or App 375, 180 P3d 185 (2008).
BALMER, J.
This tort case requires us to 
determine the meaning of the word "agent" for purposes of the Oregon
Tort Claims Act (OTCA).  The OTCA permits tort claims against public bodies,
with certain limitations, and provides that the sole cause of action for any
tort committed by officers, employees, and agents of a public body who are acting
within the scope of their employment or duties is one against the public body. (1)  Plaintiff was injured while riding on an airport shuttle bus.  She filed this
action against the shuttle bus driver and the driver's employer, a
transportation company that provides shuttle bus service for the Port of
Portland (the Port) under a contract.  Defendants claimed that, as "agents"
of the Port, a public body, plaintiff did not have a cause of action against
them, but only against the Port.  The trial court agreed that plaintiff did not
have a cause of action against defendants and granted their motion for summary
judgment. (2)  Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion.  Vaughn
v. First Transit, Inc., 218 Or App 375, 180 P3d 185 (2008).  We allowed
review and now reverse.
When reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences that we may draw from
those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party -- here,
plaintiff.  See Oregon Steel Mills, Inc. v. Coopers &amp; Lybrand, LLP,
336 Or 329, 332, 83 P3d 322 (2004) (stating standard).  Defendant First
Transit, Inc., contracted with the Port, a public body that owns and operates
Portland International Airport, to provide shuttle services between the airport
terminal and three airport parking lots.  Under that contract, the Port supplied
office space, utilities, buses, radios, and fuel to First Transit and assumed
responsibility for bus repair and licensing.  First Transit provided the labor,
along with any equipment and materials not provided by the Port.  As a general
matter, decisions regarding hiring and training new employees were left to
First Transit.  When hiring new employees, First Transit agreed to adhere to
all state and federal laws, "ensure that all drivers are properly
qualified and licensed," "research the driving record of each driver
[and] ensure that appropriate safe driving history standards are met,"
implement a drug testing program including random drug tests, and subject each
applicant to a criminal history check.  First Transit also agreed to
"establish a written employee training program," make a "good
faith effort" to modify that program if the Port requested a modification,
ensure appropriate training -- including driver training, customer service
training, and airport security training -- and keep employee training records,
making those records available to the Port upon the Port's request.  First Transit
also agreed to provide the Port with all "reasonable reports requested by
the Port," including "a monthly report of hires and terminations
during the previous month."  The contract provided certain
"appearance and behavior" standards for all employees, and the Port
retained the right to require First Transit to "temporarily or permanently
bar" any employee from performing the duties enumerated in the contract.
In the event of an accident, First
Transit agreed to "immediately notify the Port Police," to "take
photographs to document the circumstances and effects of any accident,"
and to provide those photographs to the Port.  Additionally, First Transit
agreed to maintain automobile liability insurance "covering liability for
bodily injury and property damage arising from the use, loading, and unloading
of the Port's buses," along with commercial general liability insurance
"covering liability for personal injury, bodily injury, death, and damage
to property (including loss of use thereof) arising from, or in any way related
to," the shuttle system.  The limits of those plans were to be not less
than $3,000,000 per incident.  Finally, First Transit agreed to indemnify the
Port against any claims arising out of the negligence of First Transit or its employees.
In 2004, plaintiff was injured while
riding on a shuttle bus driven by defendant Zavoral, an employee of First Transit. 
Plaintiff sued defendants, alleging that Zavoral negligently had caused
plaintiff's injuries when Zavoral "unnecessarily, suddenly and
unexpectedly slammed on the vehicle's brakes to avoid a small rodent in the
roadway," which caused plaintiff to be "thrown against a metal
luggage rack, striking her shoulders and face." (3)
Defendants moved for summary judgment,
arguing that they were "agents" of the Port at the time of the
accident and therefore, under the OTCA, any tort action must be brought against
the Port only.  ORS 30.265(1) provides that the "sole cause of
action" of a person injured by the tort of an officer, employee, or agent
of a public body acting within the scope of his or her employment or duties is
"an action against the public body only." (4)   
Thus, under the OTCA, public officers, employees, and agents are not subject to
actions for torts committed while acting within the scope of their employment
or duties, and the injured person must bring any claim based on their actions against
the public body only.  Defendants argued that, based on the contract described
above, they were "agents" of a public body under the meaning of the
OTCA and that Zavoral had been acting within the scope of her employment --
which was within the scope of First Transit's duties as an agent for the Port
-- when the accident occurred.  Defendants contended that, as a result,
"the sole cause of action" for Zavoral's negligence was one against
the public body, the Port.  As noted, the trial court agreed and granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment.  Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed without opinion.
This case involves two alleged "agency"
relationships:  Zavoral as the agent of First Transit, and First Transit as the
agent of the Port.  It is undisputed that Zavoral was an agent of First Transit;
more specifically, she was an employee of First Transit acting within the scope
of her employment at the time of the accident.  As Zavoral's employer, First
Transit ordinarily would be liable for claims arising out of Zavoral's allegedly
negligent driving.  See Minnis v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co., 334 Or 191,
201, 48 P3d 137 (2002) (employer liable in tort for acts of employees when
acting within the scope of employment).  The issue in this case, however, is
whether First Transit and Zavoral are "agents" -- as that term is
used in the OTCA -- of the Port so as to be protected from tort claims by ORS
30.265. (5)
We begin with an overview of the
statutory scheme.  In 1967, the legislature enacted the OTCA and abrogated, in
part, the state's sovereign immunity.  As originally enacted, the OTCA permitted
claims against public bodies -- with some limitations -- for their own torts
and for the torts committed by their "officers, employe[e]s and agents
acting within the scope of their employment or duties, whether arising out of a
governmental or proprietary function."  Or Laws 1967, ch 627, § 2.  The original
statute provided that the public body was permitted, but not required, to
"defend, save harmless and indemnify any of its officers, employe[e]s and
agents * * * against any tort claim or demand * * * arising out of an alleged
act or omission occurring in the performance of duty."  Id. at § 7. 
In 1975, the legislature amended the OTCA to provide for mandatory
indemnification by the public body.  Or Laws 1975, ch 609, § 16.  Finally, in
1991, the legislature eliminated any tort claim against those officers,
employees, and agents who are eligible for indemnification, making the sole
cause of action one against the public body.  Or Laws 1991, ch 861, § 1.  See
generally Clarke v. OHSU, 343 Or 581, 588-90, 175 P3d 418 (2007)
(discussing history of OTCA, including effect of 1975 and 1991 amendments).
As noted, because First Transit does
not claim to be an "officer" or "employee" of the Port, the
question is whether it is an "agent" as that term is used in the
OTCA.  The OTCA does not contain a definition of agent, so we begin by looking
to the well-established legal meaning of that term.  See McIntire v. Forbes,
322 Or 426, 431, 909 P2d 846 (1996) ("Analysis of text also includes
reference to well-established legal meanings for terms that the legislature has
used.").
At common law, "agency" was
defined as a relationship that "results from the manifestation of consent
by one person to another that the other shall act on
behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." 
Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. Jewett, 320 Or 599, 617, 892 P2d 683
(1995) (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).  The
"agent" is the person in that relationship who acts on behalf of the
other, the "principal."  Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1
(1958).
We first consider how much control is
required for an agency relationship to exist.
"Control is a concept that embraces a wide spectrum of
meanings, but within any relationship of agency the principal initially states
what the agent shall and shall not do, in specific or general terms.  Additionally,
a principal has the right to give interim instructions or directions to the
agent once their relationship is established."
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 comment f
(2006).  Thus, the principal's "control" over what the agent shall or
shall not do is necessary for an agency relationship, but it is not, on its
own, sufficient to create such a relationship.  Agency does not result, for
example, when an individual (or entity) simply agrees to provide services for
another, even if the other person -- through contract -- is able to establish general
standards for performance and in that way "control" the individual.  That
individual simply may be a contractor performing services for another, and not
an "agent" at all.  Instead, "[t]he power to give interim
instructions distinguishes principals in agency relationships from those who
contract to receive services provided by persons who are not agents."  Id.
(emphasis added).
Even the ability to control in detail
another's actions does not alone create an agency relationship; to qualify as
an agent, one must also agree to act "on [another's] behalf."  Thus,
for example, a subordinate employee is not the agent of a supervisor simply
because the supervisor has full control over the employee's work activities. 
Instead, both the subordinate and the supervisor are agents of their common
employer, on whose behalf they have agreed to work.  See Restatement (Third)
of Agency at § 1.01 comment g (giving examples).  In sum, to be an
"agent" -- using the well-defined legal meaning of that term -- two
requirements must be met:  (1) the individual must be subject to another's
control; and (2) the individual must "act on behalf of" the other
person.
Our analysis does not end there,
however.  When interpreting statutes, we also consider the context of the
statutory provision, including the pre-existing common law and the statutory
framework within which the statute was enacted.  Denton and Denton, 326
Or 236, 241, 951 P2d 693 (1998).  As noted, the legislature originally enacted
the OTCA to partially waive sovereign immunity, by permitting claims against public
bodies for their own torts and, vicariously, for the torts of their officers,
employees, and agents.  That is, the legislature allowed injured persons to
assert -- albeit with some limitations -- the same tort claims against public
bodies that they could, at common law, assert against other tortfeasors.  Considering
that context, we turn to a discussion of common-law principles of agency and
vicarious liability.
Understanding agency law in the
context of vicarious liability requires an understanding of two types of
agents:  employees (or "servant" agents) and agents who are not
employees (sometimes referred to as "nonservant" agents). (6)  "All servants are agents and all masters, principals.  However, all
principals and agents are not also masters and servants."  Kowaleski v.
Kowaleski, 235 Or 454, 457, 385 P2d 611 (1963).  The common law
distinguishes between the two types of agents using a
"right-to-control" test.  An agent is an employee if the principal
has the right to control the physical details of the work being performed by
the agent; in other words, the principal directs not only the end result, but
also controls how the employee performs the work.  Schaff v. Ray's
Land &amp; Sea Food Co., Inc., 334 Or 94, 100, 45 P3d 936 (2002).  In
contrast, when the agent retains control over the details of the manner in
which it performs its duties, that agent is a nonemployee agent.  Restatement
(Second) of Agency at § 220 comment e.
Distinguishing between employees and
agents who are not employees is important for vicarious liability purposes,
because a principal's liability for the torts of its agents varies based upon
the type of agent.  In general, a principal is liable for all torts committed
by its employees while acting within the scope of their employment.  Minnis,
334 Or at 201.  But a principal ordinarily is not liable in tort for physical
injuries caused by the actions of its agents who are not employees.  Jensen
v. Medley, 336 Or 222, 230, 82 P3d 149 (2003).  Rather, a principal is
vicariously liable for an act of its nonemployee agent only if the principal
"intended" or "authorized the result []or the manner of
performance" of that act.  Restatement (Second) of Agency at §
250; see also Jensen, 336 Or at 231 (principal liable for acts of
nonservant agents only if those acts "within the actual or apparent
authorization of the principal"). (7) 
 In other words, for a principal to be vicariously liable for the negligence of
its nonemployee agents, there ordinarily must be a connection between the
principal's "right to control" the agent's actions and the specific
conduct giving rise to the tort claim.
This court applied those principles
in Jensen, where the issue was whether an international union could be
vicariously liable for the wrongful termination of an employee of an affiliated
local union by the local union's manager.  We explained that
"whether one entity can be liable to a third party for
the wrongful conduct of another entity in a context other than master-servant
depends not only on whether the second entity is an 'agent' of the first for
some purpose, but also on whether the principal authorized or intended the
agent to act on its behalf with respect to the conduct that gave rise to the
third party's claim."
336 Or at 237 (emphasis added).  Applying that rule, we held
that an instruction permitting the jury to find the international vicariously
liable for the wrongful acts of the local simply because it had the "right
to control" the local in the abstract was erroneous.  That instruction was
erroneous because it failed to ask whether the jury found that the "[l]ocal
had been authorized to act for and had been subject to the control or right to
control of [the international] with respect to [the local's] hiring and
firing of an employee."  Id. at 238 (emphasis in original).  We
observed that, if a principal were liable for all the torts of an agent
performed in furtherance of the principal's business, whenever the principal
had a "right to control" the agent in some respects (which was
necessary to create the agency in the first place), then the principal could
face liability for conduct of the agent that the principal did not in fact
control or have a right to control.  "The law of agency," we stated,
"does not extend that far."  Id.
The comments to the Restatement
provision regarding liability for nonemployee agents expand on the requirement
that, to be vicariously liable for the torts of such an agent, a principal must
have a right to control the physical details of the manner of performance of
the conduct that is the basis for the tort claim:
"It is only when to the relation of principal and
[nonservant] agent there is added that right to control physical details as
to the manner of performance which is characteristic of the relation of
master and servant that the person in whose service the act is done becomes
subject to liability for the physical conduct of the actor."
Restatement (Second) of Agency at § 250 comment
a (emphasis added).  Similarly, a principal that "authorizes" a nonemployee
agent to act on the principal's behalf is not, for that reason alone, liable
when the agent injures a third party because the agent was negligent in
carrying out its authorized activities.  See id. at comment b
("There is no inference that because a principal has authorized an act to
be done which would be non-tortious if done carefully, he is liable for the act
of a non-servant if the latter was negligent in his performance.").  Put
differently, only when the principal's control over the agent with respect to
the actions of the agent that gave rise to the tort claim is similar to the
control that an employer exercises over an employee will the principal be
vicariously liable for the negligence of its nonemployee agent.
With that understanding of when, at
common law, a principal may be vicariously liable for the negligence of an
agent who is not an employee, we return to the OTCA.  The OTCA provides that
the sole cause of action for a tort committed by a public body's
"employees" or its "agents," when acting "within
the scope of their employment or duties," is an action against the public
body.  ORS 30.265(1).  Because the legislature used the word "agent"
in addition to the word "employee," it apparently intended that statute
to apply to at least some category of persons who are not subject to the kind
of detailed control of performance by the public body so as to be employees,
but who nevertheless act on behalf and under the control of the public body. 
But did the legislature intend to bring within the OTCA all torts of persons or
entities that are "agents" under the common law?
The purpose of the OTCA provides
important context for considering that question.  See Restatement (Second)
of Agency at § 1 comment f ("Whether the word 'agent' as used in a statute
corresponds to the [common-law] meaning * * * depends, with other factors, upon
the purpose of the statute.").  As discussed above, the legislature
enacted the OTCA to abrogate sovereign immunity and make public bodies, with
some limits, liable for their torts to the same extent as private persons and
corporations.  Given that purpose, it would not make sense to interpret the
OTCA to bring all torts of a public body's common-law "agents"
(when acting with the scope of their agency) within the statute.  Such a
definition would impose liability on the public body far beyond that imposed on
private entities.  As the discussion above demonstrates, principals ordinarily are
vicariously liable for the torts of their nonemployee agents only when the
principal had the right to control the physical details of the conduct of the agent
that gave rise to the tort claim.  In our view, when the legislature made
public bodies vicariously liable for the torts of their "agents"
through the OTCA, it intended to impose that same vicarious liability on public
bodies for the torts of their nonemployee agents, subject of course to the
specific procedural and other limitations of the OTCA.  Thus, when the OTCA makes
a public body liable for tort claims based on the conduct of an
"agent" of the public body, it does not mean all tort claims involving
any agent of a public body, but only those for which the agent's
principal would be liable under common-law standards of vicarious liability.
Returning to the facts of this case, we
consider whether First Transit and Zavoral were agents of the Port for purposes
of asserting that, because of the OTCA, plaintiff's sole cause of action for
her injuries based on Zavoral's allegedly negligent driving is one against the
Port.  The only evidence before us is the contract between First Transit and
the Port.  As discussed above, that contract demonstrates that First Transit
agreed to act on behalf of the Port by providing shuttle bus service at the
airport, and it gives the Port substantial control over First Transit's
operations, including the ability "to give interim instructions."  See
Restatement (Third) of Agency at § 1.01 comment f (explaining control in
the context of agency).  For example, the contract gives the Port the authority
to "unilaterally adjust" First Transit's annual operating budget and
to take control of the shuttle buses in the event of an interruption in
service.  Therefore, First Transit was an "agent" of the Port, in the
common-law meaning of that term, because it agreed to act on behalf of and
subject to the Port's control.  It follows that, for the Port to be vicariously
liable under the OTCA for First Transit's (or Zavoral's) negligence -- and for plaintiffs
to be limited to bringing an action against the Port only -- defendants must be
able to show that the Port had the right to control the physical details of the
manner of performance of the conduct giving rise to the tort -- Zavoral's
driving.
Defendants argue that the contract "leaves
First Transit with very little discretion over how to [run the shuttle bus operation]"
and point to several provisions in the contract that give the Port control over
various aspects of the shuttle bus business.  Plaintiff responds that the
contract does not demonstrate that the Port maintained the right to control the
physical details of the conduct giving rise to the claim, namely, the driving
of First Transit's employees.  See Jensen, 336 Or at 231, 236-38
(discussing principal's liability for actions of nonservant agents and focusing
on specific allegedly wrongful conduct).
We agree with plaintiff.  Although
the Port retained the right to reject unilaterally any of First Transit's
employees, including its operations manager, that provision is not equivalent
to one expressly retaining the right to control the day-to-day performance of
those employees.  The contractual provision instead appears to be a way for the
Port to protect its interests if First Transit hires (or, more likely, fails to
fire) an employee whom the Port thinks is particularly incompetent.  We
recognize that the contract does provide other limits on First Transit's
hiring; for example, First Transit was obligated to ensure that all its drivers
were properly licensed.  However, those general hiring standards do not serve
to grant control to the Port over the day-to-day performance of First Transit's
employees.  The performance standards, as they relate to the drivers, are
general requirements that First Transit "provide high quality customer
service" and assure "the neat appearance, courtesy, efficiency, and
conduct" of its employees.  For the Port to be vicariously liable for the
negligent driving of First Transit's employees, the Port would have to have the
same right to control that driving as it would have over the driving of its own
employees.
The contract itself does not provide
that the Port has the right to control the physical manner in which First
Transit employees carried out their driving duties.  Thus, the contract does
not support the conclusion that First Transit or its employees, including
Zavoral, were acting as agents of the Port for purposes of imposing vicarious
liability on the Port for the alleged negligence of First Transit's shuttle bus
drivers.  Accordingly, defendants have not demonstrated that they are
"agents" of the Port for purposes of ORS 30.265(1) and that plaintiff's
only permissible tort action is one against the Port.  The trial court
therefore erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. ORS
30.265(1), one of several statutes that together comprise the OTCA, provides,
in part:
"[E]very public body is subject to action
or suit for its torts and those of its officers, employees and agents acting
within the scope of their employment or duties * * *.  The sole cause of
action for any tort of officers, employees or agents of a public body acting
within the scope of their employment or duties and eligible for
representation and indemnification under ORS 30.285 or 30.287 shall be an
action against the public body only.  The remedy provided by ORS 30.260 to
30.300 is exclusive of any other action or suit against any such officer,
employee or agent of a public body whose act or omission within the scope of
the officer's, employee's or agent's employment or duties gives rise to the
action or suit.  No other form of civil action or suit shall be permitted.  If
an action or suit is filed against an officer, employee or agent of a public
body, on appropriate motion the public body shall be substituted as the only
defendant."
(Emphasis added.)  Because the accident giving rise to the
lawsuit in this case occurred in 2004, the version of the OTCA then in effect
applies.  That statute has since been amended in ways that do not affect our
analysis.  For ease of reference, we refer to the present version of the OTCA.
2. The
trial court stated that the OTCA "immunizes" agents of public bodies
from liability for torts committed within the scope of their agency, and the
parties generally discuss the issue in this case as whether defendants have
"immunity."  However, the OTCA does not, by its terms,
"immunize" those persons.  The effect of the OTCA is to protect an
officer, employee, or agent from tort liability in certain circumstances by
providing that the sole cause of action of an injured person is one against the
public body and that the public body "shall be substituted as the only
defendant."  ORS 30.265(1).  The use of the term "immunity" to
describe that protection should be avoided because the OTCA uses that term in a
different context -- and subsection -- that is not involved in this case.  See
ORS 30.265(2) (providing that a public body is "immune" from
liability for injuries caused by an officer, employee, or agent, if the
officer, employee, or agent "is immune from liability").
3. In
addition to Zavoral and First Transit, Inc., plaintiff sued First Transit
Transportation, LLC.  Defendants argued before the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that First Transit Transportation, LLC, should not have been named as a
defendant because it is not Zavoral's employer and is not a party to the contract
between First Transit, Inc., and the Port.  However, defendants never filed a
motion to dismiss First Transit Transportation, LLC, and neither lower court
addressed the issue.  There is, therefore, no issue before this court with
respect to the status of that defendant.
4. The
"sole cause of action" aspect of ORS 30.265(1) applies only when the
officer, employee, or agent is "eligible for representation and
indemnification under ORS 30.285 or 30.287."  Those statutes provide that
the indemnification requirement does not apply "in case of malfeasance in
office or willful or wanton neglect of duty" and also set out the
procedures that officers, employees, and agents must follow to request that the
public body defend a claim against them.  The Port argues that defendants were
not "eligible for representation and indemnification" and therefore
did not fall within the terms of ORS 30.265 because they did not fulfill the
procedural requirements in ORS 30.285 and ORS 30.287.  Because we conclude that
defendants were not "agents" for purposes of ORS 30.265(1), we do not
reach the Port's argument.
5. If
First Transit is an agent of the Port, then Zavoral -- an employee who First
Transit hired to aid in performing its duties for the Port -- is also an agent
of the Port.  See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.15(1) (2006) ("A
subagent is a person appointed by an agent to perform functions that the agent
has consented to perform on behalf of the agent's principal and for whose
conduct the appointing agent is responsible to the principal.  The
relationships between a subagent and the appointing agent and between the
subagent and the appointing agent's principal are relationships of agency * *
*.").
6. The
Restatement (Third) of Agency eliminates the terms "master"
and "servant," as well as variations such as "nonservant," see
id. at § 2.04 comment a, but the prior editions and many cases continue to
use those terms.
7. Of
course, a principal may be directly liable for the tortious act of an agent if
the principal had "a duty to have the act performed with due care," Restatement
(Second) of Agency at §§ 214, 250, or if the principal itself was negligent
in hiring, instructing, or supervising the agent.  Id. at § 213.