Title: Atkins v. Rice
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 022479
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 12, 2003

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
SHANNON GAIL ATKINS 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 022479 
JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
September 12, 2003 
ESTELLE BROWN RICE 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge1
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a plaintiff may take a 
nonsuit when a defendant’s motion to dismiss has been filed, 
memoranda of law in support of and in opposition to the motion 
have been submitted, arguments have been made before the trial 
court by both parties, with no further evidence to be presented 
or arguments to be made, and the case has been presented to the 
trial court for its decision. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
On February 14, 2001, Estelle Brown Rice (“Rice”) filed a 
motion for judgment against Shannon Gail Atkins (“Atkins”) 
alleging personal injuries from an automobile accident.  Rice 
requested service of process on January 31, 2002 at Atkins’ last 
known address.  On February 5, 2002, a sheriff’s deputy posted a 
copy of the motion for judgment on the door of Atkins’ last 
known address; however, the Chesterfield County Clerk’s Office 
                     
 
1 The Honorable Herbert C. Gill, Jr. entered the final order 
in the case; however, The Honorable Michael C. Allen presided 
over the motion hearing and issued a letter opinion to counsel 
announcing the judgment of the court. 
was notified by the current residents one day later that Atkins 
no longer resided there.  After learning that service of process 
on Atkins by posting had not been successful, Rice requested 
service of process on Atkins through the Commissioner of the 
Division of Motor Vehicles on February 11, 2002.  The 
Commissioner’s certificate of compliance, however, was not filed 
with the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County until February 25, 
2002.  Therefore, pursuant to Code § 8.01-326.1,2 service of 
process upon Atkins was effective one year and eleven days after 
the motion for judgment was filed. 
 
Atkins made a special appearance on April 10, 2002 and 
filed a motion to dismiss.  The motion requested that Rice’s 
motion for judgment be dismissed pursuant to Rule 3:3 because 
Atkins was served with process more than one year after the 
commencement of the action and Rice failed to exercise due 
diligence to perfect timely service.  Rice filed a motion in 
opposition, and the parties appeared before the trial court on 
July 15, 2002 for a hearing on the motion to dismiss.  After 
hearing oral argument from Atkins’ counsel, the trial court 
heard argument from Rice’s counsel who concluded his 
presentation with the following exchange with the trial court: 
                     
 
2 Code § 8.01-326.1 states the following in pertinent part: 
“Service of process or notice on a statutory agent shall be 
effective as of the date the certificate of compliance is filed 
 
2
Counsel: I don’t think that there can be 
any greater diligence as a matter of fact 
and as a matter of law [than] was undertaken 
by the plaintiff in this case, and for those 
reasons we would ask the Court to overrule 
the motion to dismiss, and in the 
alternative at least permit us to take a 
nonsuit. 
 
Court: 
Is that a motion for a nonsuit? 
 
Counsel: No, sir. 
 
Court: 
You said no? 
 
Counsel: No, sir. 
 
After this exchange, counsel for Atkins made rebuttal argument 
and asked the trial court to dismiss the case with prejudice.  
The trial court responded by beginning to rule on the motion: 
“[Counsel], I sympathize with your frustration but –[.]”  
Counsel for Rice interrupted by stating, “Judge, we take a 
nonsuit.”  Counsel for Atkins argued that it was too late to 
take a nonsuit because the court had begun announcing its ruling 
on the motion.  The trial court took the matter under advisement 
and informed the parties that it would render its judgment in a 
letter opinion. 
 
In its letter opinion dated July 15, 2002, the trial court, 
relying on Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. v. DePew, 247 Va. 240, 
245, 440 S.E.2d 918, 921 (1994), granted Rice’s motion for 
nonsuit, holding that “Code § 8.01-380(A) permits a plaintiff to 
                                                                  
with the clerk of the court in which the action or suit is 
 
3
take a nonsuit during the course of the court’s explanation of 
its proposed ruling.”  Subsequently, the trial court entered a 
final order granting the nonsuit.  Atkins appeals the adverse 
judgment of the trial court. 
II.  Analysis
 
Code § 8.01-380(A) provides in part that a party will not 
be permitted to take a nonsuit “unless he does so before a 
motion to strike the evidence has been sustained or before the 
jury retires from the bar or before the action has been 
submitted to the court for decision.”  The first circumstance 
anticipated by the statute deals with a motion to strike the 
evidence and focuses upon the actual rendering of a decision.  
As we explained in Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co., a party may 
nonsuit even during the trial court’s comments in anticipation 
of its ruling on a motion to strike so long as the ruling has 
not yet been made. 
 
The motion before the trial court was not a motion to 
strike evidence; rather, it was a motion to dismiss based upon 
defects in service of process.  These circumstances are governed 
by that portion of Code § 8.01-380(A) that prohibits a nonsuit 
unless a motion is made “before the action has been submitted to 
the court for decision.” 
                                                                  
pending.” 
 
4
 
When construing the nonsuit statute, for an action to be 
“submitted to the court,” it is necessary for the parties to 
have yielded the issues to the court for consideration and 
decision.  Transcontinental Ins. Co. v. RBMW, Inc., 262 Va. 502, 
514, 551 S.E.2d 313, 319 (2001).  “However, when further 
submissions from the parties are contemplated, a matter has not 
been finally yielded for decision or finally determined.”  
Liddle v. Phipps, 263 Va. 391, 394, 559 S.E.2d 690, 692 (2002). 
 
In the case before us, the matter clearly had been 
submitted to the court for decision, and no further submissions 
were contemplated.  Both parties had filed written memoranda in 
support of their positions concerning Atkins’ motion to dismiss 
for failure of timely service of process.  No further written 
submissions were contemplated, and neither party had sought 
leave to file any further papers.  The parties had the 
opportunity to present oral argument and any evidence in support 
of their respective positions before the trial court on July 15, 
2002.  When asked by the trial court if he wanted to take a 
nonsuit, Rice’s counsel expressly stated twice that he did not.  
After some final statements by Atkins’ counsel, nothing further 
was expected from the parties, and the matter had been submitted 
for decision. 
 
The trial court erred in granting Rice’s nonsuit.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court and 
 
5
remand the case to the trial court for decision on Atkins’ 
motion to dismiss. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
6