Title: Miller v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC2022-0745
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 29, 2024

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2022-0745 
____________ 
 
EVERETT G. MILLER, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
February 29, 2024 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Everett Glenn Miller appeals his convictions and death 
sentences for the first-degree premeditated murders of Kissimmee 
Police Officers Matthew Baxter and Richard “Sam” Howard, both of 
whom were shot twice in the head from close range in 2017.  We 
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons 
we explain, we affirm Miller’s convictions and death sentences.1 
 
 
1.  Miller does not appeal his separate convictions and 
sentences for one count of resisting a law enforcement officer 
without violence, and one count of carrying a concealed firearm in 
an establishment licensed to dispense alcohol. 
 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
On August 18, 2017, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Miller pulled 
his car over and angrily inserted himself into a conversation Officer 
Baxter was having with three individuals who were loitering on a 
street corner.  At Miller’s request, Officer Baxter called his 
supervisor to the scene.  After the supervisor—Sergeant Howard—
arrived, Miller made certain comments that caused Sergeant 
Howard to instruct the three loiterers to leave the area.  Soon 
thereafter, both Officers had been twice shot in the head.  When 
Miller was arrested in Roscoe’s, a local bar later that night, he was 
carrying two firearms, including the murder weapon—a small .22 
caliber revolver capable of being concealed in the palm. 
Before the murders, Miller, a former Marine, had been making 
hateful anti-police and race-based social media posts, including this 
post just hours earlier: “Am I the only one.  Fuck a Cop . . . Racist 
Fuckers.” 
 
At trial, Miller did not dispute that he killed both Officers.  The 
defense instead argued that premeditation was lacking, and that 
Miller committed second-degree murder.  The jury ultimately 
convicted Miller of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder 
 
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and later unanimously recommended death for each murder. 
Guilt Phase 
The State presented the testimony of numerous witnesses, 
including one of the three loiterers, various law enforcement 
officials, a jailhouse informant, medical examiners, and employees 
of Roscoe’s.  The State also introduced, among other things, 
forensic evidence, a video taken by one of the loiterers showing 
some of Miller’s interaction with Officer Baxter, and Miller’s social 
media posts expressing animus against the police.  The evidence 
established the following. 
On the night of the murders—at the location where the 
murders were to occur—Officer Baxter approached Maribel 
Gonzalez King, who had an open beer container, and her two 
friends (nicknamed “Dash” and “Blaze”) who were all loitering on a 
street corner in Kissimmee.  King knew Officer Baxter (and Sergeant 
Howard) from previous interactions.  Officer Baxter was in full 
police uniform, had a marked car, and was, according to King, 
“calm and relaxed, like normal.” 
During Officer Baxter’s interaction with the three individuals, 
Miller pulled up in his vehicle, stopped suddenly, got out, and 
 
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walked toward Officer Baxter.  After an obnoxiously loud Miller told 
Officer Baxter to stop harassing people and requested that Officer 
Baxter call his superior, Officer Baxter radioed his location and that 
a black male wanted to speak to Sergeant Howard.  Within minutes, 
Sergeant Howard arrived in a marked car and full police uniform 
and, according to King, “stayed calm the whole time.”  Neither 
Officer acted aggressively, threatened to use a weapon, or gave any 
commands to Miller.  
Sergeant Howard’s demeanor changed after Miller commented 
that he feared for his life and was eligible to carry a concealed 
weapon.  Upon hearing those words, Sergeant Howard instructed 
King and her friends to move along.  King, the last to walk away, 
made it only halfway down the street when she heard two gunshots, 
a pause, and two more gunshots.  After hearing a car speed away, 
King looked back and saw two officers on the ground.  
A woman who lived close to the murders also heard noises—
interrupted by a pause—that sounded like possible gunshots.  She 
looked outside her house and saw two police vehicles and a dark 
vehicle.  After seeing an individual speed away in the dark vehicle, 
she saw two officers on the ground and called 911. 
 
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The first officers to arrive at the scene, Lieutenant Christopher 
Paul Succi and Officer David Toro, noticed the bodies were 
unusually situated.  That is, Officer Baxter and Sergeant Howard—
each with a fully loaded pistol still securely holstered and an 
undeployed taser—were “both on their backs, feet straight, arms to 
the side,” and were “laying parallel next to each other, a few feet 
apart.”  In other words, their bodies had been positioned. 
Sergeant Howard had no defensive wounds, a “near contact” 
gunshot wound on the left side of his head in the temporal region, 
and a “near contact or intermediate” gunshot wound just above the 
upper lip.  Officer Baxter had some abrasions that were consistent 
with a fight or altercation but also consistent with simply falling 
and being scraped on the pavement.  Officer Baxter also had two 
gunshot wounds to the head—one through the lower lip, the other 
to the back left side of the head—both of which were “contact 
wounds.”  The four bullets were ultimately recovered during the 
Officers’ autopsies. 
Later the night of the shootings, the lead investigator, Corporal 
Charles Hess, became aware that Dash had provided to law 
enforcement a brief video he had taken of Officer Baxter’s 
 
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interaction with the black male.  After an investigator recognized 
Miller in the video, a bulletin was put out, and the video was sent to 
the field units. 
In the meantime, Miller abandoned his vehicle in a woman’s 
yard and eventually made his way to Roscoe’s.  Upon entering 
Roscoe’s, Miller—an unfamiliar face—commented that “there was 
some crazy stuff going on outside” and that he “was gonna stay and 
have a drink.”  Miller proceeded to the bar area, where he was calm 
and coherent until a patron approached and asked if Miller had 
shot two cops.  Miller became agitated, denied shooting any officers, 
and claimed he had been there at Roscoe’s.  Another patron 
overheard Miller say at one point that the Officers “got what they 
deserved.” 
Miller’s behavior at Roscoe’s soon led to his arrest.  After the 
owner of Roscoe’s contacted law enforcement about an agitated 
person and provided a description matching the individual in 
Dash’s video, multiple deputies entered Roscoe’s and arrested 
Miller, who was carrying a black 9mm Sig Sauer, a knife, and a 
 
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small .22 caliber “single action” revolver.2  The .22 revolver—which 
was found in Miller’s front pocket, holds five rounds, and does not 
eject shell casings—had one live round and four that had been 
fired.  Firearms testing later confirmed that the four bullets 
recovered during the Officers’ autopsies were fired from Miller’s 
revolver. 
After Miller’s arrest, law enforcement located his dark blue Kia 
Optima.  Among other things, a latent print was discovered on the 
trunk lid, and bloodstains were found on a rear tire.  Fingerprint 
analysis and DNA testing matched the print and blood to Sergeant 
Howard.  Other items sent for DNA testing—including physical 
samples collected from Miller, and a hat and necklace recovered at 
the crime scene—also tied Miller to the murders.  
Within days of the murders, Corporal Hess discovered Miller 
had a YouTube channel for firearms instruction and review.  One 
video showed Miller using a single-action .22 caliber revolver to 
rapidly fire successive bullets into a target’s head from 
 
 
2.  As explained at trial, “single action” means that an 
individual must perform two actions to fire the gun, namely pulling 
back the hammer and then pulling the trigger.  
 
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approximately ten yards.  
Corporal Hess also discovered Miller had been making anti-
law-enforcement posts on a Facebook page under the profile name 
of Malik Mohammad Ali.  For example, on August 12, 2017, Miller 
posted comments including this one: “Punk AssBlack Cop.  Here is 
a real nigger!  I would love to meet him.”  That same day, Miller also 
posted a picture of a law enforcement officer, with certain captions 
including “There Are No ‘Good Cops.’ ”  And as previously 
mentioned, on August 18, 2017, hours before the murders, Miller 
posted: “Am I the only one.  Fuck a Cop . . . Racist Fuckers.” 
Lastly, Corporal Hess became aware that a jailhouse informant 
came forward about conversations with Miller regarding the 
murders.  At trial, the informant testified that, among other things, 
Miller used the Officers’ names as though he knew them, said he 
“hated them” for always harassing people, and talked about what he 
would have done if he had his AR-15. 
The defense called one witness, Miller’s half-sister, who 
testified that Miller was loving and caring, and that before the 
murders, he lost his job working for Sonoco, had a breakup with his 
girlfriend, showered less, became jumpy, and started acting like 
 
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somebody was watching him.  She also testified that a few weeks 
before Miller’s arrest, she drove him to the police station; he was 
crying and chanting his military ID number.  
 
After hearing all the evidence, the jury unanimously convicted 
Miller of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder. 
Penalty Phase 
In the penalty phase, the State presented additional witnesses 
and evidence, including additional Facebook posts by Miller. 
The State’s first witness, Julian Albright, who met Miller on 
active duty and later worked with Miller for a military contractor 
before Miller left that job in 2016, testified about a daytime meetup 
he agreed to have with Miller at a 7-Eleven a month or two before 
the murders.  When Albright arrived at the 7-Eleven, he saw plainly 
visible bags of marijuana in Miller’s backseat.  Miller was 
unconcerned about the drugs and at one point showed Albright a 
very small .22-caliber-looking firearm while saying: “I’m not gonna 
be another statistic.  I’m not gonna be caught driving while black, 
you know. . . .  [I]f you’re gonna take me out, you know, I’ve got 
this.”  Miller also showed Albright a 9mm firearm and an AR-15. 
The State then called its anti-government extremism expert, 
 
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J.J. MacNab, a research fellow at George Washington University’s 
program on extremism.  The State originally planned to call MacNab 
during the guilt phase to opine that Miller had become a radicalized 
Moorish sovereign and to explain how she reached that conclusion 
based on the materials she examined.  But after MacNab’s 
testimony was proffered and a Daubert3 hearing was held, the 
parties called what the judge described as “an armistice on the 
Moorish issue,” at least for the guilt phase.  After the hearing, the 
court issued an order qualifying MacNab as an expert to testify 
about “the Moorish Sovereign Citizen Movement, including its 
ideology and underlying customs, symbols and beliefs.”  But the 
court limited the scope of her testimony because of concerns about 
“the danger of allowing her to testify to everything proffered.”  And 
the court limited her to “expository testimony only.” 
During MacNab’s limited penalty phase testimony, she 
described the Moorish belief system, including that it is primarily a 
Muslim group not recognized by standard Muslims, has an 
alternative view of history, is non-violent, and is harmless at its 
 
 
3.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 
- 11 - 
core.  She then described how the white-supremacy-based 
sovereign citizen movement influenced a pocket of Moorish 
believers.  She explained that Moorish sovereigns are “highly 
distrustful of government,” tend to be “anti-white,” and do not have 
a positive view of law enforcement.  She also testified about an 
uptick in Moorish sovereign violence after the 2014 events in 
Ferguson, Missouri, and gave examples of Moorish sovereign 
violence against law enforcement, mostly in 2016 and 2017. 
Following MacNab’s testimony, seven additional Facebook 
posts by Miller were published to the jury.  In the posts, all but one 
of which were made on the day of or within days before the 
murders, Miller expressed animus against white people, indicated 
he identified as a Moor, or suggested an alternative view of history.  
And in a post from a year before the murders, Miller shared a meme 
of someone repeating themes and theories of sovereign citizens. 
The State then presented victim impact statements before 
resting its case.  The State also had victim impact videos but was 
unable to play them before resting; the State needed time to edit the 
videos in response to a last-minute defense objection and had been 
granted permission by the court to play the videos during rebuttal. 
 
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After the State rested, the defense called numerous witnesses, 
including Albright.  Several of the witnesses knew Miller from his 
time as a Marine or his work for a military contractor.  According to 
those witnesses, Miller was a very good Marine and person, was an 
imaging analyst before later becoming a targeteer, was involved in 
targeting strikes into Afghanistan where innocent people were 
occasionally killed, and had been deployed a few times, including to 
Afghanistan in 2013.  One witness testified Miller had problems 
sleeping while in Afghanistan and, upon returning, occasionally had 
nightmares.  Another witness acknowledged Miller’s military 
records included a court martial from 1992 in which one of the 
charges was assault by waving a dangerous weapon.  And one 
witness testified that Miller’s decision to leave military contracting 
was primarily a financial one. 
Some of Miller’s family members testified about his happy 
childhood and how his demeanor changed after leaving the military.  
Miller’s cousin, for example, testified that Miller became depressed 
and remorseful, was in a downward spiral, tried to get help from 
Veterans Affairs (VA), and was committed under the Baker Act due 
to an incident in which he was running around town in his 
 
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underwear.  And Miller’s daughter testified he seemed to be 
suffering and was more paranoid.   
Miller’s father testified to being a Jehovah’s Witness and 
taking Miller to Kingdom Hall every week when Miller was growing 
up, to having a brother who had post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), and to divorcing Miller’s mother, marrying his current wife, 
and being given custody of and raising Miller.  Miller eventually 
went to live with his mother, who was not a Jehovah’s Witness and 
was more likely to allow him to play high school sports.  Miller later 
signed up for the Marines, married, had a daughter, divorced, and, 
after leaving military contracting, worked with his father at Sonoco 
before being laid off and living house to house. 
Dr. Steven Gold, a psychologist and professor, opined that 
Miller met the diagnostic criteria for PTSD and two statutory 
mitigators, namely that Miller was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crimes, and that 
Miller’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially 
impaired.  See § 921.141(7)(b), (f), Fla. Stat.  Dr. Gold further 
opined that something likely triggered Miller’s PTSD on the night of 
 
- 14 - 
the murders and that Miller was weighed down by stressful 
circumstances, including that he had been subjected to fire while 
deployed, and was involved in strikes that resulted in civilian 
deaths.  At one point, after being asked by defense counsel about 
Miller’s Facebook posts, Dr. Gold noted that the posts expressed 
hateful anger towards white people and that anger can be a 
symptom of PTSD. 
Dr. Gold was not the only defense witness asked by defense 
counsel about Miller’s anti-white posts or whether Miller was a 
racist.  Indeed, at one point during a sidebar, the trial judge 
commented that the defense had “repeatedly brought up, through 
every single witness, the racism issue.” 
When the defense’s final witness was temporarily unavailable, 
the State began calling rebuttal witnesses, including two who 
provided additional context regarding Miller’s Baker Act incident.  
One testified that Miller described the incident as follows: Miller had 
a disagreement with his uncle and stripped down to prove he was 
unarmed; on Miller’s way back to his car, a man flashed a gun at 
Miller, who then went to retrieve his AR-15; when Miller was told 
the police were coming, he ditched the AR-15 in the woods and later 
 
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asked someone to retrieve and hide it in Miller’s trunk. 
After the State’s initial rebuttal witnesses, the court recessed 
for a long weekend.  When the proceedings resumed, the victim 
impact videos were played first thing, with limiting instructions 
given before and after the videos were played. 
The defense then called its final witness, Dr. Robert Cohen, a 
behavioral health officer and neuropsychologist.  Dr. Cohen opined 
that Miller was likely suffering from PTSD at the time of the 
murders, was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
“disorder,” and had cumulative trauma stemming from deployments 
and a hospital bombing.  
The State then called its remaining two rebuttal witnesses.  
One testified regarding the incident that led to Miller’s court 
martial.  The other, Dr. Michael Gamache, a psychologist, rebutted 
the defense experts’ conclusions that Miller suffered from PTSD.  
Dr. Gamache also opined that the evidence was insufficient to 
support “extreme mental disorder or extreme mental illness” at the 
time of the crimes.  According to Dr. Gamache, four factors affected 
Miller’s conduct in the summer of 2017: alcohol, cannabis, 
adjustment disorder (from stress), and ego (adjustment to post-
 
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military life). 
The jury unanimously recommended death sentences for each 
murder, finding beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of all four 
proposed aggravators, namely: (1) the victim was a law enforcement 
officer engaged in the performance of his official duties; (2) the 
defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a 
felony involving the use or threat of violence to another person 
(based on the contemporaneous murders of Officer Baxter and 
Sergeant Howard); (3) the capital felony was a homicide and was 
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without 
any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP); and (4) the capital 
felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any 
governmental function or the enforcement of the laws.  Each juror 
also found that no mitigating circumstance was established. 
Spencer4 Hearing 
At the Spencer hearing, the State presented additional victim 
impact testimony before the defense called a handful of witnesses.   
One defense witness testified regarding the events that led to 
 
 
4.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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Miller’s court martial, including that he was with Miller and never 
saw Miller with a gun.  And two witnesses testified Miller received 
the least amount of punishment possible in a court martial 
proceeding. 
Another witness, Adam Thomas, who was twice deployed to 
Iraq with Miller, explained what imagery analysis entails and 
testified regarding the lasting impact (upon Thomas) of the threats 
of indirect fire attacks they received while deployed.  After returning 
from Iraq, Thomas noticed things about Miller that were out of 
character, including Miller’s extreme Facebook posts. 
Dr. Elizabeth McAlister, who teaches Africana religions at 
Wesleyan University, opined that Miller did not like participating as 
a Jehovah’s Witness when growing up and was spiritual but not 
religious.  She also testified that in the summer of 2017, Miller 
became interested in Moorish Science and tracing his heritage.  She 
acknowledged the increase in sovereign Moors but opined that 
Miller was a normative Moor—as distinct from Moors influenced by 
sovereign citizens—although she conceded there is racial animus 
within the Moorish sovereign group and that Miller’s social media 
posts were out of character for a normative Moor. 
 
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Sentencing 
The trial court agreed with the jury regarding the four 
aggravators.  The court merged them to three, as follows: (1) prior 
capital felony or felony involving the use or threat of violence to 
another person (based on the contemporaneous murders); (2A) the 
capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful 
exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of the 
laws, merged with (2B) the victim was a law enforcement officer 
engaged in the performance of his official duties; and (3) CCP.  The 
court assigned each aggravator very great weight. 
Regarding mitigation, the court explained that Miller “offered 
three statutory . . . mitigating circumstances” as well as thirty-three 
proposed other factors in Miller’s background that would mitigate 
against imposition of the death penalty under section 921.141(7)(h), 
Florida Statutes.  The court found that one “statutory” mitigator 
had been proven, namely no significant history of prior criminal 
activity (moderate weight).5  As to the remaining proposed 
 
 
5.  The court concluded that Miller failed to establish two 
other statutory mitigators, namely that he was under the influence 
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and that his capacity 
 
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mitigation, which Miller grouped into seven “categories,” the court 
found that the mitigation was generally established and assigned it 
varying weight.6   
In the end, the court imposed a sentence of death for each 
murder after concluding “that the aggravating factors far 
outweigh[ed] the mitigating circumstances and support[ed] the 
recommendations of the jury for a sentence of death as to [each 
murder].”  The court further found that “any of the considered 
aggravating factors found in this case, standing alone, would be 
sufficient to outweigh the mitigation in total.”  This appeal followed. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Miller raises seven issues in this appeal.  We also 
 
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. 
 
6.  Specifically, the court found as follows regarding the 
remaining proposed mitigation: (1) Miller’s service to his 
country/United States Marine Corps and contracting (considerable 
weight); (2) Miller’s service-related traumatic experiences (little 
weight); (3) Miller’s downward spiral into mania and madness (little 
weight); (4) statutory mental health mitigators (previously 
discussed); (5) Miller’s mental and physical health symptoms and 
diagnosis (some weight); (6) Miller’s family life and relationships 
(very little to no weight); and (7) good citizen; service to the 
community (little weight). 
 
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independently review whether the evidence was sufficient to support 
the murder convictions. 
Race, Religion, and Political Beliefs 
Miller first argues that, although evidence of his animus 
against law enforcement was admissible, the State crossed the line 
in the penalty phase by introducing his anti-white and pro-Moor 
Facebook posts and the testimony of MacNab, the State’s expert 
who provided expository testimony regarding Moorish sovereigns.  
Miller asserts the State was erroneously permitted “to inject race, 
politics and religion into th[e] case,” thereby denying him a fair 
penalty phase.  He argues the testimony and additional Facebook 
posts were not relevant—in part because neither victim was white—
and in any event unfairly prejudicial.  See § 90.403, Fla. Stat. 
(“Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”). 
At the outset, we note that the arguments Miller presents are 
not entirely consistent with those he presented (or failed to present) 
below.  As an example, Miller argues relevance and unfair prejudice 
with respect to MacNab’s testimony and the additional posts, but 
the defense below effectively conceded the relevance of the posts.  
 
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That is, shortly before MacNab testified, the defense objected to the 
posts on relevance grounds before conceding they “would become 
relevant” if the State “put Ms. MacNab on first,” which is precisely 
what the State did.  The defense then stated its objection was on 
prejudice grounds. 
To the extent Miller’s arguments have not been waived, we 
review this issue for abuse of discretion.  See Hudson v. State, 992 
So. 2d 96, 107 (Fla. 2008) (“We review a trial court’s decision to 
admit evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.”).  We 
recognize that evidence of religious or political beliefs or of racial 
slurs can be unfairly prejudicial, particularly in a penalty phase.  
But here, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
permitting the State to present MacNab’s testimony and the 
additional posts, the probative value of which related to the State 
attempting to establish an all-encompassing motive for the murders 
and was not “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.”  § 90.403, Fla. Stat.  Even assuming an error occurred, 
we deem it harmless.7 
 
 
7.  Miller’s “politics” argument is undeveloped.  To the extent 
the beliefs he references are those of being “highly distrustful of 
 
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We have said that “[t]he CCP aggravator pertains specifically to 
the state of mind, intent, and motivation of the defendant.”  Hilton 
v. State, 117 So. 3d 742, 753 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Wright v. State, 19 
So. 3d 277, 298 (Fla. 2009)).  Here, the trial court permitted the 
State to introduce the items at issue for that purpose—i.e., to 
explain the intent and motivation underlying bizarre murders 
committed by an otherwise decorated Marine.  The State’s plausible 
theory was that Miller became radicalized online and adopted an 
extremist anti-government and anti-law-enforcement belief system 
under which he came to view—and abhor—all law enforcement as 
the tyrannical arm of a racist and oppressive system.  So much so 
that police officers, no matter their skin color, represented a 
constant threat to black people, including Miller.  The evidence 
contextualized the things going on in Miller’s mind, with his anti-
white posts being intimately tied up with his view of the police as 
institutionally racist.  Cf. United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 
1528 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[E]vidence of [the defendant’s] racist views 
 
government and having a dislike for law enforcement,” they clearly 
had probative value, as explained below. 
 
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not only demonstrated the context, motive, and setup of the crime, 
but was necessary to complete the story . . . .”).  The items 
presented could help show that Miller had anger and hatred that 
could lead to the very violence in which he engaged, and against 
precisely the victims he chose.  Allowing the State to show that 
Miller acted on the hatred of law enforcement fueled by that 
mindset was not unfairly prejudicial. 
Even if the trial court erred in allowing some of the evidence, 
any error was harmless.  The State did not make religion a feature 
of the penalty phase.8  And Miller’s arguments regarding race are 
undermined by the fact that the defense itself made Miller’s racism 
or lack thereof a theme in the penalty phase.  The defense’s 
approach was to essentially establish that Miller had an untreated 
mental illness, had never been racist, and that his extreme 
Facebook posts (and other things) expressing hatred and anger 
 
 
8.  We reject Miller’s suggestion that the State painted him as 
a post-9/11 “Islamic extremist.”  Moreover, this case was “not the 
prosecution of a religion.”  Beasley, 72 F.3d at 1526 n.7.  Indeed, 
MacNab made clear that the Moorish belief system is non-violent 
and has core beliefs or ideals that are harmless, including the 
promotion of entrepreneurialism and self-reliance.  
 
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were the product of that illness.  In painting that picture, the 
defense brought up the racism issue through numerous defense 
witnesses, including Dr. Gold, who opined that Miller’s anti-white 
posts supported a PTSD diagnosis.  Another defense witness, 
Martin Hamann, who worked with Miller for a military contractor 
and became friends with Miller, even referenced anti-white posts 
the State had not introduced.  Namely, Hamann testified on direct 
that he spoke with Miller after the August 2017 violent events that 
occurred in Charlottesville, Virginia, and could not understand why 
Miller would post things like “kill whitey.”  Unsurprisingly, the State 
used Hamann’s testimony to then introduce a post Miller made, 
just days before the murders, about killing “all the whitety i see.” 
The defense made racism a theme to the point that the trial 
judge at sidebar during Hamann’s testimony commented that 
defense counsel “repeatedly brought up, through every single 
witness, the racism issue.”  The record reflects that the judge was 
keenly aware and did not want the “anti-white sentiment” to 
become a theme.  But the defense largely made it one. 
The one case cited by Miller in his initial brief, McDuffie v. 
State, 970 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2007), does not support a new penalty 
 
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phase.  McDuffie—which had nothing to do with race, religion, or 
politics, and which involved cumulative error in the guilt phase—
held that the trial court erroneously admitted, over objection, 
unfairly prejudicial testimony of the “inflammatory contents of a 
voice mail [the defendant left for someone who was not one of the 
victims] depicting [the defendant] as a person with a vicious temper 
who wishes on another individual a fate similar to that of the 
victims of the Washington, D.C./Baltimore area snipers.”  Id. at 
326-28.  According to McDuffie, the voice mail details “bore no 
relationship to the crimes” and were not “probative of whether [the 
defendant] committed robbery and murder.”  Id. at 328.  Here, 
rather than bearing “no relationship to the crimes,” MacNab’s 
testimony and the additional Facebook posts could help to 
contextualize the crimes. 
The four additional cases cited in Miller’s reply brief are also 
not on point.  See Robinson v. State, 520 So. 2d 1, 5-8 (Fla. 1988) 
(vacating death sentence where prosecutor’s examination of 
defense’s medical expert “was a deliberate attempt to insinuate that 
[defendant] had a habit of preying on white women,” which “had no 
bearing on any aggravating or mitigating factors”); Johnson v. State, 
 
- 26 - 
61 So. 2d 179, 179 (Fla. 1952) (affirming a conviction and death 
sentence even though defendant’s confession presented to the jury 
contained “expressions of [defendant’s] political beliefs” that “were 
wholly immaterial and irrelevant”); Torres v. State, 124 So. 3d 439, 
442 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (remanding for resentencing because 
sentencing judge’s comments improperly suggested the judge’s 
“condemnation of [defendant’s] behavior was based on the court’s 
own religious beliefs”); Guerrero v. State, 125 So. 3d 811, 812, 816 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (reversing conviction because prosecutor made 
defendant’s alleged racial slurs “a feature,” even though the slurs—
unsurprisingly—“did not tend to prove any element of [battery or 
trespass]”).  Here, the items were relevant and not unfairly 
prejudicial, and the defense made Miller’s racial prejudice “a feature 
of” the penalty phase.  We deny this claim. 
MacNab’s Expert Status and Testimony 
Related to the previous issue, Miller claims the trial court 
erred in even qualifying MacNab as an expert witness.  Miller 
advances two undeveloped arguments in his initial brief, namely 
that MacNab’s expository testimony during the penalty phase was 
“not relevant” and was “pure opinion testimony,” and that she 
 
- 27 - 
lacked credentials and had “inherent bias.”9   
The parties agree our standard of review is abuse of discretion.  
See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997) (holding 
that “abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard” that “an 
appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision to 
admit or exclude expert testimony under Daubert”).  We conclude 
that to the extent this issue is adequately briefed—most of Miller’s 
“argument” is merely a summary of MacNab’s proffer, defense 
counsel’s arguments at the Daubert hearing, and MacNab’s penalty 
phase testimony—the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
qualifying MacNab as an expert to provide expository testimony. 
First, Miller asserts that MacNab’s expository testimony was 
“not relevant” in that it “was not directly related to [Miller’s] actions 
or beliefs,” and was “pure opinion testimony” that “is no longer 
 
 
9.  In his reply brief, Miller asserts new arguments, including 
assailing MacNab’s brand of “content analysis” and claiming that 
“whether to hold that content analysis as used in this case has 
sufficient scientific reliability is of first impression to this Court.”  
But these “new arguments . . . were not raised in his initial brief” 
and are therefore “waived.”  Truehill v. State, 358 So. 3d 1167, 1186 
n.12 (Fla. 2022).  In any event, MacNab never discussed content 
analysis or offered an opinion during her penalty phase testimony. 
 
- 28 - 
admissible” in the wake of the Legislature’s “Daubert 
amendment[s].”  See ch. 2013-107, Laws of Fla. (“WHEREAS, by 
amending s. 90.702, Florida Statutes, the Florida Legislature 
intends to prohibit in the courts of this state pure opinion 
testimony as provided in Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 
2007) . . . .”).  But Miller fails to show that the defense objected on 
these grounds.  The most we find in the record is a general 
objection of “I object to that as well” after the trial judge, shortly 
before MacNab’s testimony, stated that MacNab was “[t]here for 
expository testimony only, which is she has certain specialized 
training and experience to describe a belief system.”  This issue was 
not preserved.  
Notwithstanding this waiver, Miller’s argument is without 
merit.  Although unclear, it appears he conflates “pure opinion 
testimony” and “expository testimony.”  But pure opinion testimony 
requires, at a minimum, “an expert’s opinion.”  Marsh v. Valyou, 977 
So. 2d 543, 548 (Fla. 2007) (emphasis added) (quoting Flanagan v. 
State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993)), receded from by In re 
Amends. to Fla. Evidence Code, 278 So. 3d 551, 551-52 (Fla. 2019).  
MacNab’s non-opinion expository testimony, by definition, was not 
 
- 29 - 
pure opinion testimony. 
To the extent Miller suggests expository testimony is always 
inadmissible in the wake of the Daubert amendments and this 
Court’s adoption of “the Daubert standard . . . for expert testimony 
found in Federal Rule of Evidence 702,” In re Amends. to Fla. 
Evidence Code, 278 So. 3d at 551-52 (footnote omitted), we 
disagree.  Section 90.702, Florida Statutes, amended as part of the 
Daubert amendments, expressly contemplates that an expert may 
testify without offering an opinion.  § 90.702, Fla. Stat. (2023) 
(permitting an expert to testify “in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise” if it “will assist the trier of fact” (emphasis added)).  
Miller offers no authority to the contrary.  See State v. Dobbs, 945 
N.W.2d 609, 621, 624 (Wis. 2020) (concluding that state evidence 
code, modeled after Federal Rule of Evidence 702, “permit[s] an 
expert witness to testify in the form of an opinion ‘or otherwise,’ 
including exposition testimony on general principles without 
explicitly applying those principles to, or even having knowledge of, 
the specific facts of the case” (quoting Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1))); 
United States v. Galatis, 849 F.3d 455, 462 (1st Cir. 2017) 
(concluding that expert testimony explaining the Medicare 
 
- 30 - 
“regulatory framework” without “appl[ying] the regulations to the 
facts of the case” or opining on the legality of the conduct at issue 
“was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702”). 
Miller’s second argument is that MacNab “has no academic 
credentials” and “no academic study” relating to “Moor beliefs or 
sovereign citizen extremists,” and is purportedly “a pro-state zealot.”  
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that MacNab had sufficient qualifications and in 
determining that certain “deficiencies,” including her lack of any 
“degrees in the subject of her proposed testimony,” would be “ripe 
for cross examination” if she testified at trial, but were “not a basis 
to exclude her testimony.” 
After an extensive proffer and Daubert hearing, the trial court 
concluded that MacNab had “sufficient knowledge and experience” 
regarding “the Moorish Sovereign Citizen Movement.”  The trial 
court reasoned in part as follows: 
The hearing transcript . . . sets forth years of work 
history, including research, lectures, consultations and 
training for organizations, on the subject of her proposed 
testimony.  Although MacNab has no formal education or 
degrees in the subject of her proposed testimony, a lack 
of peer reviewed publications in the subject of her 
proposed testimony, and has never been qualified as an 
 
- 31 - 
expert in the subject of her proposed testimony, she has 
devoted nearly 20 years of her life to the subject.  While 
these deficiencies are ripe for cross examination . . . , it is 
not a basis to exclude her testimony.   
  
The court later explained that MacNab “has used [the knowledge 
she gained over the years] in the past to present, lecture and 
consult with various organizations, such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and local law enforcement agencies.” 
We find no abuse of discretion.  Section 90.702 permits a trial 
court to qualify an expert witness based on “knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education.”  (Emphasis added.)  MacNab’s 
extensive “knowledge” and “experience”—acquired over twenty 
years—supports the trial court’s decision.  See Jackson v. 
Household Fin. Corp. III, 298 So. 3d 531, 536 n.3 (Fla. 2020) (“Even 
with respect to expert testimony, oftentimes, the amount of training 
or experience required is minimal.” (citing Bell v. State, 179 So. 3d 
349, 357 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015))).  To the extent Miller asks us to hold 
that any expert—in anti-government extremism or otherwise—must 
possess certain academic credentials or study, we decline to rewrite 
section 90.702.  We deny this claim. 
 
- 32 - 
CCP 
Miller next argues the trial judge erred in finding the CCP 
aggravator.  That aggravator requires proof of four elements, namely 
that 
the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection 
and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a 
fit of rage (cold); that the defendant had a careful plan or 
prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal 
incident (calculated); that the defendant exhibited 
heightened premeditation (premeditated); and that the 
defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification. 
 
Joseph v. State, 336 So. 3d 218, 239 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Franklin v. 
State, 965 So. 2d 79, 98 (Fla. 2007)).  Miller claims the “calculated” 
and “heightened premeditation” elements are lacking.  See Campbell 
v. State, 159 So. 3d 814, 831 (Fla. 2015) (“Evidence proving 
heightened premeditation can sometimes overlap with evidence 
proving the prearranged plan necessary to establish CCP.”).  He 
argues the murders were “unplanned” and that premeditation 
formed only after he was alone with both Officers. 
Miller largely asks this Court to reweigh or reassess evidence, 
something we do not do “[w]hen reviewing claims alleging error in 
the finding of aggravating factors.”  Id. at 830 (citing Franklin, 965 
So. 2d at 98).  “Rather, this Court’s role is to review the record to 
 
- 33 - 
determine whether the trial court applied the correct rule of law . . . 
and, if so, whether competent, substantial evidence exists to 
support its findings.”  Id. (citing Franklin, 965 So. 2d at 98).  Here, 
the sentencing order thoroughly addresses each element of CCP 
and how it was established by the evidence.  Our review of the 
record leaves undisturbed the finding of CCP. 
 
“A determination of whether CCP is present is properly based 
on a consideration of the totality of the circumstances.”  Colley v. 
State, 310 So. 3d 2, 13 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Gill v. State, 14 So. 3d 
946, 962 (Fla. 2009)).  We have said that “CCP can be indicated by 
the circumstances showing such facts as advance procurement of a 
weapon, lack of resistance or provocation, and the appearance of a 
killing carried out as a matter of course.”  Ballard v. State, 66 So. 
3d 912, 919 (Fla. 2011) (citing Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270 
(Fla. 1988)).  Those are plainly “the circumstances” here, given the 
execution-style killings committed without provocation or much if 
any resistance, with a weapon Miller had shown Albright weeks 
earlier while discussing a potential police encounter.  In any event, 
we address the two disputed elements. 
 
- 34 - 
The “calculated” element of CCP requires “a careful plan or 
prearranged design to commit murder.”  Joseph, 336 So. 3d at 239 
(quoting Franklin, 965 So. 2d at 98).  Here, competent, substantial 
evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Miller had a 
“prearranged design to commit violence upon law enforcement 
officers” and that he expressed that prearranged design “before and 
after the murders in several different ways.”  That evidence 
includes: Miller’s Facebook posts; Miller showing Albright the small 
firearm and claiming he was “not gonna be another statistic”; 
Miller’s jailhouse comments; Miller’s comment in Roscoe’s that the 
Officers “got what they deserved”; Miller summoning a second 
officer to the scene; and the execution-nature of the killings using a 
concealable firearm Miller was proficient in using to shoot bullets 
into a target’s head.  One can conclude from this body of evidence 
that the killings were “calculated.”  See Russ v. State, 73 So. 3d 
178, 194 (Fla. 2011) (“[W]here a defendant arms himself in advance, 
kills execution-style, and has time to coldly and calmly decide to 
kill, the element of ‘calculated’ is supported.”). 
The “premeditated” element of CCP “is heightened 
premeditation, defined as ‘deliberate ruthlessness.’ ”  Ballard, 66 
 
- 35 - 
So. 3d at 919 (quoting Wuornos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1000, 1008 
(Fla. 1994)).  Although “heightened premeditation” requires some 
period of reflection, there is no “bright-line rule for how much 
reflection suffices.”  Colley, 310 So. 3d at 14.  Miller certainly had 
time to reflect, given that he requested the presence of a second 
officer and then managed to shoot two armed officers with point-
blank shots to the head.  The execution-style nature of the murders 
supports this element, see Chamberlain v. State, 881 So. 2d 1087, 
1107 (Fla. 2004) (“[W]holly unnecessary, execution-style murders 
are prime examples of the ‘deliberate ruthlessness’ for which 
application of the CCP aggravating factor is reserved.”), as does the 
other evidence relied on by the trial court.  The court quite sensibly 
determined the most “reasonable sequence of events” was that 
Miller shot each Officer to the back left side of the head (shooting 
the larger Sergeant Howard first), and then positioned the bodies 
before shooting each Officer directly in the face.  Needless to say, 
such “conduct . . . exhibited deliberate ruthlessness.”  Bonifay v. 
State, 680 So. 2d 413, 419 (Fla. 1996). 
Miller’s fact-based arguments are unavailing.  For example, 
his assertion that he “was always armed” is irrelevant, even more so 
 
- 36 - 
given that he showed Albright a similar weapon and made 
comments indicating preparedness for a police encounter.  Just as 
irrelevant—even if true—is Miller’s claim he did not target these two 
specific Officers.  See Bell v. State, 699 So. 2d 674, 678 (Fla. 1997) 
(“The focus of the CCP aggravator is the manner of the killing, not 
the target.” (citing Sweet v. State, 624 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (Fla. 
1993))).  In any event, at a minimum, Miller targeted “law 
enforcement personnel” generally.  See Howell v. State, 707 So. 2d 
674, 682 (Fla. 1998) (upholding CCP where defendant “had 
sufficient opportunity to formulate the intent that law enforcement 
personnel would be the bomb’s intended victim”). 
Lastly, we have upheld CCP in certain cases in which the 
defendant murdered a police officer not long after becoming 
ensnared in a police inquiry.  See Jackson v. State, 704 So. 2d 500, 
501-02, 504-05 (Fla. 1997) (defendant self-vandalized her car and 
then murdered officer who was preparing the police report and who 
attempted to arrest defendant); Valle v. State, 581 So. 2d 40, 43, 48 
(Fla. 1991) (defendant executed officer during traffic violation stop).  
CCP is far more compelling here, where Miller, who had been 
making hateful anti-law-enforcement posts, executed two officers 
 
- 37 - 
after inserting himself into a situation having nothing to do with 
him.  We deny this claim. 
Miller’s Mental Health “Defense” 
In Miller’s only guilt phase claim, he argues the trial judge 
erroneously excluded what Miller describes as “heat of passion 
evidence through the use of mental health experts.”  Miller asserts 
the trial judge “erroneously believed that [Miller] was attempting to 
present a diminished mental capacity defense.”  We conclude that 
the trial court carefully and correctly ruled on the issue.  
During guilt phase opening, defense counsel conceded the 
murders and argued it was “appropriate for a lesser included 
offense to be considered by the jury,” on the ground that 
premeditation was lacking.  Defense counsel argued Miller’s life 
leading up to the murders was “the perfect storm” in that Miller: 
had worked in Kabul; began having nightmares and being jumpy 
“around 2013”; “deteriorate[d] through 2016 after he return[ed] 
to . . . Kissimmee”; had “difficulty adjusting to civilian life”; was 
“laid off” in May 2017; was “drinking” and “smoking weed” to self-
medicate; “sought help from the VA”; had a breakup with his 
girlfriend and “didn’t have any place to live”; “started posting crazy 
 
- 38 - 
things on Facebook”; was committed under the Baker Act one 
month before the murders; and “suffered from depression, anxiety, 
nightmares.”  And defense counsel stressed that “the why” was 
important. 
The State responded by filing a motion arguing that evidence 
of Miller’s drinking or marijuana use was prohibited by section 
775.051, Florida Statutes, and that the defense was otherwise 
presenting a “general, abnormal mental condition defense” long 
deemed inadmissible by this Court.  The trial court largely agreed, 
concluding that: evidence Miller was self-medicating with drugs or 
alcohol was inadmissible under section 775.051, which provides 
that “[v]oluntary intoxication . . . is not a defense”; evidence 
regarding Miller being committed or suffering from depression or 
anxiety was inadmissible evidence of abnormal mental condition; 
and all other items would only be excluded if the defense attempted 
to relate them to a mental condition.  The trial court did not err in 
precluding Miller’s approach to negating premeditation. 
Premeditation, of course, “is the key element that separates 
first-degree murder from second-degree murder.”  Twilegar v. State, 
42 So. 3d 177, 190 (Fla. 2010) (citing Randall v. State, 760 So. 2d 
 
- 39 - 
892, 901 (Fla. 2000)).  Although a defendant is free to argue that 
premeditation is lacking, a defendant may not—as Miller attempted 
to do—present “evidence of diminished mental capacity . . . to 
negate the specific intent required to convict of first-degree 
premeditated murder.”  Chestnut v. State, 538 So. 2d 820, 820 (Fla. 
1989);10 see also Evans v. State, 946 So. 2d 1, 11 (Fla. 2006) 
(“[D]iminished capacity is not a viable defense in Florida.”); Hodges 
v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 352 n.8 (Fla. 2004) (“[E]vidence of an 
abnormal mental condition not constituting legal insanity is 
inadmissible to negate specific intent.”); Kight v. State, 512 So. 2d 
922, 929 (Fla. 1987) (“[I]n the absence of a plea of not guilty by 
reason of insanity, testimony concerning a defendant’s mental state 
is inadmissible during the guilt phase of a trial.”), disapproved of on 
other grounds by Owen v. State, 596 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 1992); Zeigler 
v. State, 402 So. 2d 365, 373 (Fla. 1981) (“During the guilt phase of 
the trial, testimony regarding the mental state of a defendant in a 
criminal case is inadmissible in the absence of a plea of not guilty 
 
 
10.  Chestnut recognized that such evidence might, however, 
be “appropriate” in “mitigation.”  538 So. 2d at 825.  Here, Miller 
did present the evidence in mitigation. 
 
- 40 - 
by reason of insanity.” (citing Tremain v. State, 336 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 
4th DCA 1976))). 
The clear import from defense counsel’s opening statement is 
that Miller was mentally unwell and thus did not—or could not—
form the specific intent to commit premeditated first-degree murder.  
Indeed, Miller acknowledges his “theory of defense” was that “an 
unspecified mental illness . . . should permit the jury to find a 
verdict of second[-]degree murder.”  Our caselaw does not permit 
that type of “defense.”   
The cases Miller cites are easily distinguished, as they involve 
evidence regarding seizures, e.g., Bunney v. State, 603 So. 2d 1270, 
1273 & n.1 (Fla. 1992), or certain “state-of-mind evidence” to prove 
self-defense, e.g., State v. Mizell, 773 So. 2d 618, 620-21 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2000).  Miller’s case does not involve seizures or self-defense.  
We deny this claim. 
Adequacy of Florida’s Capital Scheme 
Miller argues that “Florida’s capital scheme, as administered 
in 2021, fails to adequately reduce the risk of arbitrary infliction of 
death sentences.”  Miller asserts that “multiple vital safeguards for 
[Florida’s] system have either been eliminated or eroded” since 
 
- 41 - 
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).  Miller’s “safeguards” 
argument is based on these three developments in our law: (1) 
Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020), which eliminated 
comparative proportionality review; (2) Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 
179 (Fla. 2020), which eliminated what Miller describes as “the 
‘reasonable hypothesis of innocence’ motion for judgment of 
acquittal”; and (3) “aggravator creep.”  Miller’s argument fails under 
our caselaw. 
Recently, this Court in Wells v. State, 364 So. 3d 1005 (Fla. 
2023), upheld a death sentence against a constitutional challenge 
based on two of the three purported infirmities alleged by Miller, 
namely “the sheer number of aggravating factors in the statute 
combined with [this Court’s comparative proportionality] holding in 
Lawrence.”  Id. at 1015.  Wells first noted that this Court, “even 
with the statute in its current form,” had “repeatedly rejected the 
argument that the death-penalty statute violates the Eighth 
Amendment because it fails to sufficiently narrow the class of 
murderers eligible for the death penalty.”  Id. (citing cases).  Wells 
then explained that Lawrence “d[id] not alter our analysis.”  Id.  On 
that point, Wells reasoned that “Lawrence recognized that 
 
- 42 - 
comparative proportionality review was not an integral component 
of the Eighth Amendment.”  Id. (citing Lawrence, 308 So. 3d at 548-
50, 552).  
Our decision in Bush similarly “does not alter our analysis.”  
Id.  Bush merely abandoned a “special appellate standard” that 
“used a different standard to evaluate evidence on appeal in a 
wholly circumstantial evidence case than in a case with some direct 
evidence.”  295 So. 3d at 184.  Bush discontinued the use of that 
standard because it was “unwarranted, confusing, and out of sync 
with both the jury instructions currently used in this state and the 
approach to appellate review used by the vast majority of the courts 
in this country.”  Id. at 199.  Miller fails to explain how eliminating 
a confusing and unwarranted standard of review creates a 
constitutional problem.  We deny this claim. 
Mercy Instruction 
Miller next argues the trial court committed “structural” error 
by denying his request for an express jury instruction on mercy and 
instead reading Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 7.11.  
Miller’s “argument that he was entitled to a jury instruction on 
mercy is . . . without merit.”  Bush, 295 So. 3d at 210.  Indeed, 
 
- 43 - 
Miller acknowledges this issue is foreclosed by our caselaw.   
In Woodbury v. State, 320 So. 3d 631 (Fla. 2021), for example, 
the trial court rejected similar requested special jury instructions 
on mercy and instead read Standard Jury Instruction 7.11, the 
relevant portion of which provided: “Regardless of the results of 
each juror’s individual weighing process . . . the law neither 
compels nor requires you to determine that the defendant should be 
sentenced to death.”  Id. at 655-56.  Woodbury affirmed, reasoning 
that Standard Jury Instruction 7.11 “adequately informed the 
jurors of the applicable legal standard” and was “not ambiguous 
when it comes to addressing the jurors’ options.”  Id. at 656.  
Woodbury also noted that this Court has “referred to the relevant 
provision of Standard Instruction 7.11 as the ‘mercy instruction.’ ”  
Id. (quoting Reynolds v. State, 251 So. 3d 811, 816 n.5 (Fla. 2018)).  
According to Woodbury, the trial court thus “did read an instruction 
on mercy.”  Id.  Here, although Miller “might have preferred the 
wording of his proposed instruction,” id., the trial court did not err 
in reading Standard Jury Instruction 7.11.  We deny this claim. 
Victim Impact Evidence 
Miller next argues that introduction of the victim impact 
 
- 44 - 
videos “in penalty phase rebuttal” rendered the trial fundamentally 
unfair.  The videos, played without music, span approximately eight 
minutes and show photo montages of both Officers.  Miller does not 
take issue with any specific photos or the length of the videos, just 
“the timing and placement of the evidence” that was purportedly 
played “just before jury deliberations.” 
The parties agree our standard of review is abuse of discretion.  
See Kalisz v. State, 124 So. 3d 185, 211 (Fla. 2013) (“A trial court’s 
decision to admit victim impact testimony is reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion.”).  Under that deferential standard, we “will not find 
an abuse of discretion unless the trial court makes a ruling which 
no reasonable judge would agree with.”  Wells, 364 So. 3d at 1013.  
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under 
the circumstances.  Even assuming an error occurred, it was not 
“so unduly prejudicial that it render[ed] the trial fundamentally 
unfair.”  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).  In other 
words, no fundamental error or due process violation occurred.  See 
Braddy v. State, 111 So. 3d 810, 858 (Fla. 2012) (“The analysis to 
determine if admission of victim impact evidence has violated a 
defendant’s due process rights in the penalty phase of a capital trial 
 
- 45 - 
parallels the analysis for fundamental error.” (quoting Wheeler v. 
State, 4 So. 3d 599, 607 (Fla. 2009))).  
The record establishes that two nights before the penalty 
phase began, the defense objected to portions of the videos despite 
being provided the videos “months in advance.”  When the penalty 
phase began on Tuesday, November 5, 2019, the prosecutor 
informed the judge that edits to the videos would take time and 
requested permission to play the videos during rebuttal.  In 
agreeing to that request, the court relied on “the lateness of the 
objections,” juror inconvenience, the absence of constitutional 
“limits on when [victim impact information] can be provided,” and 
limiting instructions that would be given. 
By Friday, November 8, 2019, the State had presented its 
case-in-chief and certain victim impact statements, and the defense 
had called all but one witness, Dr. Cohen, who was unavailable.  
So, the State called some rebuttal witnesses, and the court 
adjourned for a long weekend.  On Tuesday, November 12, 2019—
the day before closing arguments—the videos were played before the 
remaining witnesses were called so that the videos were not the 
final items of evidence introduced before closing argument.  The 
 
- 46 - 
court explained to the jurors why the information had not “been 
played earlier” with “the victim impact statements.”  The court also 
read a limiting instruction before and after the videos were played, 
explaining the purpose for which the videos were presented and 
instructing the jurors not to consider the information as evidence of 
an aggravating factor.  The defense then called Dr. Cohen, followed 
by the State calling the remaining rebuttal witnesses. 
As recognized by the trial judge, there does not appear to be 
any authority for the proposition that victim impact information 
“can only be presented in the State’s case-in-chief.”  The statute 
governing the admission of victim impact evidence, section 
921.141(8), Florida Statutes, does not squarely address the issue, 
although the statute arguably suggests the information will 
generally be presented during the State’s case-in-chief.  
§ 921.141(8), Fla. Stat. (allowing the prosecution to introduce and 
argue victim impact evidence after “the prosecution has provided 
evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating factors”).  Nor 
has our caselaw addressed this issue.11  Indeed, neither party cited 
 
 
11.  The State cites Morris v. State, 219 So. 3d 33 (Fla. 2017), 
but the “additional victim impact testimony” there was presented 
 
- 47 - 
any case—from any jurisdiction—addressing victim impact evidence 
presented during penalty phase rebuttal. 
Given the circumstances (caused by the defense), the 
reasonable steps taken by the trial court (including the explanation 
and unobjected-to limiting instructions given to the jury), the highly 
deferential standard of review, and the absence of a per se bar to 
ever presenting victim impact evidence during rebuttal, we deny 
this claim. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Lastly, even though Miller does not challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence, this Court independently reviews the record in all 
death penalty cases to determine whether competent, substantial 
evidence supports the murder convictions.  See Fla. R. App. P. 
9.142(a)(5); Pham v. State, 70 So. 3d 485, 501 (Fla. 2011).  In 
conducting this review, we “view[] the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State” and ask whether “a rational trier of fact 
could have found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond 
 
“[a]t the subsequent Spencer hearing,” not during penalty phase 
rebuttal.  Id. at 39 (footnote omitted). 
 
- 48 - 
a reasonable doubt.”  Allen v. State, 322 So. 3d 589, 603 (Fla. 2021) 
(quoting Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001)).   
To prove first-degree premeditated murder, the State was 
required to establish the following three elements: (1) the victim is 
dead; (2) the death was caused by the criminal act of the defendant; 
and (3) the victim’s death was premeditated.  Id. (citing Glover v. 
State, 226 So. 3d 795, 804 (Fla. 2017)).  Here, sufficient evidence 
supported the convictions. 
The State presented extensive evidence, including eyewitness 
testimony, video evidence, forensic evidence, and the murder 
weapon itself, that placed Miller at the scene and directly tied him 
to the murders.  Premeditation, which “may be inferred” from the 
evidence, Glover, 226 So. 3d at 806 (quoting Sochor v. State, 619 So. 
2d 285, 288 (Fla. 1993)), was also sufficiently established, given 
that, among other things, Miller had been making hateful anti-
police social media posts leading up to the murders, angrily 
inserted himself into a situation having nothing to do with him, 
requested the presence of a second officer and then shot both 
Officers execution-style—using a single-action firearm requiring two 
separate decisions for each bullet fired—while taking the time to 
 
- 49 - 
pose the bodies. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm Miller’s convictions 
and death sentences. 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and 
SASSO, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., concurring in result. 
 
I continue to adhere to my dissent in Lawrence v. State, 308 
So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020), wherein this Court abandoned this Court’s 
decades-long practice of comparative proportionality review in the 
direct appeals of sentences of death.  For this reason, I can only 
concur in the result.  
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Osceola County, 
Greg Allen Tynan, Judge 
Case No. 492017CF002906XXXAXX 
 
Matthew Metz, Public Defender, George D.E. Burden, Assistant 
Public Defender, and Kathryn R. Radtke, Assistant Public Defender, 
Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
 
- 50 - 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Patrick 
Bobek, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee