Title: PIERCE v. PIERCE
Citation: 2001 OK 97, 39 P.3d 791, 72OBJ3408
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: November 13, 2001

PIERCE v. PIERCE Annotate this Case PIERCE v. PIERCE 2001 OK 97 39 P.3d 791 72 OBJ 3408 Case Number: 93764 Decided: 11/13/2001 Modified: 11/27/2001 Mandate Issued: 01/18/2002 As Corrected November 21, 2001 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA ANNE PIERCE, Appellant v. GENE O. PIERCE, Appellee [ 39 P.3d 793 ] ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION IV ¶0 Plaintiff sought to disqualify the trial judge from hearing her divorce proceeding because the judge accepted campaign contributions from the Defendant's lawyer and the lawyer's father while the proceeding was pending. The trial judge, the Honorable Jerry D. Bass, Judge of the District Court of Oklahoma County, declined to disqualify, and when Plaintiff re-presented her motion to the Chief Judge of the District Court he declined to require the disqualification. On appeal from the divorce decree the Court of Civil Appeals determined, among other things, that the disqualification issue should have first been raised before the Supreme Court on an application for writ of mandamus. Plaintiff sought certiorari on that issue. We hold that Plaintiff preserved the error for appellate review, was not required to bring a separate proceeding for extraordinary relief, and that the trial judge should have disqualified. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED, OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED, JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART, AND MATTER REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS Arnold D. Fagin, Tracy Cotts Reed, Fagin, Fagin, Nixon & Reed, P.C., Oklahoma City, for Appellant. R. Scott Adams, Adams & Associates, Oklahoma City, for Appellee. SUMMERS, J. ¶1 Plaintiff Anne Pierce argues that the trial judge should have certified his disqualification because Defendant's counsel and counsel's father each gave $5,000 to the judge's campaign, and counsel solicited other campaign contributions on the judge's behalf while the case was pending before the judge. We hold that the record is sufficient to show that the judge should have disqualified. Defendant's counsel failed to show that his campaign efforts on behalf of the judge were minimal in comparison to the total amount raised and number of people soliciting funds on the judge's behalf. ¶2 The trial judge assigned to adjudicate the Pierce divorce was a candidate for District Judge while the divorce proceeding was pending. Plaintiff sought to disqualify the trial judge on the basis that counsel for Defendant and counsel's father each contributed $5,000.00 to the judge's campaign while[ 39 P.3d 794 ] the divorce was pending. She further stated that Defendant Gene O. Pierce had communicated to her that she would not win in the custody dispute involving their child. The trial judge denied the in camera request to disqualify. ¶3 Plaintiff re-presented her motion to the Chief Judge. At the hearing on that motion Defendant's counsel admitted his donation to the campaign and stated that "[p]eople that I have solicited have donated money, including my father . . . ." No further facts were presented on the degree or nature of counsel's solicitation of funds on behalf of the trial judge. The Chief Judge declined to require disqualification. ¶4 On appeal the Court of Civil Appeals determined that a trial judge's error in not certifying his or her disqualification should be reviewed first in the trial court pursuant to District Court Rule 15, and then by the Supreme Court on an application for mandamus. It stated that when a party does not seek extraordinary relief the alleged error of a judge declining to disqualify is not reviewed on a subsequent appeal unless public policy demands the disqualification. We vacate the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, hold that the plaintiff preserved the disqualification error for review on appeal, and that the trial judge should have disqualified. I. Disqualification Procedure ¶5 The first question presented is whether a party must bring an application for mandamus in this Court to challenge a judge's decision that denies a party's application to disqualify the judge. District Court Rule 15 specifies the procedure for disqualifying trial court judges. Rule 15. Disqualification of Judges in Civil and Criminal Cases. a. Before filing any motion to disqualify a judge, an in camera request shall first be made to the judge to disqualify or to transfer the cause to another judge. If such request is not satisfactorily resolved, not less than ten (10) days before the case is set for trial a motion to disqualify a judge or to transfer a cause to another judge may be filed and a copy delivered to the judge. b. Any interested party who deems himself aggrieved by the refusal of a judge to grant a motion to disqualify or transfer a cause to another judge may re-present his motion to the Chief Judge of the county in which the cause is pending or, if the disqualification of a Chief Judge is sought, to the Presiding Judge of the administrative district by filing in the case within five (5) days from the date of said refusal a written request for re-hearing. A copy of the request shall be mailed or delivered to the Chief Judge or Presiding Judge, to the adverse party and to the judge who entered the original order. If the hearing before the second judge results in an order adverse to the movant, he shall be granted not more than five (5) days to institute a proceeding in the Supreme Court or the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Criminal Appeals will entertain an original proceeding to disqualify a judge or to direct a judge to transfer a cause to another judge unless it is shown that the relief sought was previously denied by the judge to whom the matter was re-presented in accordance with this rule. An order favorable to the moving party may not be reviewed by appeal or other method. c. An original proceeding in mandamus to disqualify a judge in a civil action or proceeding shall be brought in the Supreme Court; an original proceeding in mandamus to disqualify a judge in a criminal case or proceeding shall be brought in the Court of Criminal Appeals. If mandamus is not brought in the appellate court designated as proper by this rule, the case will be transferred to the proper court either on motion or sua sponte. Art. VII, §§ 4 Okla. Const. 12 O.S.1991 Ch. 2, App. 1, Rule 15. Rule 15(c) covers "an original proceeding in mandamus to disqualify a judge in a civil action." This language identifies the court in which to seek extraordinary relief in civil and criminal actions, but does not re- [ 39 P.3d 795 ] -quire that mandamus be sought in one of the supervisory courts. ¶6 The rule-mandated procedure works with the statutory procedure for disqualification. § 1403. Disqualification of judge, claim of__Mandamus Any party to any cause pending in a court of record may in term time or in vacation file a written application with the clerk of the court, setting forth the grounds or facts upon which the claim is made that the judge is disqualified, and request said judge so to certify, after reasonable notice to the other side, same to be presented to such judge, and upon his failure so to do within three (3) days before said cause is set for trial, application may be made to the proper tribunal for mandamus requiring him so to do. 20 O.S.1991 §1403. A review of the history of § 1403 shows its mandatory and discretionary elements. ¶7 The original purposes of § 1403 were to provide a procedure for parties to avoid a trial before a disqualified judge, and to create a court record on the disqualification issue so that the jurisdiction of the replacement judge would appear on the face of the record. Ex parte Hudson, 1910 OK CR 3, 107 P. 735, 737, and 106 P. 540, 544. That court also noted that the statute was created to correct the practice of disqualifying a judge upon a mere affidavit after a case had been called for trial, because abuse of that procedure had "thrown into confusion" the business of the court. Ingles v. McMillan, 1911 OK CR 5, 113 P. 998, 1000, Lewis v. Russell, 1910 OK CR 4, 111 P. 818, 819. ¶8 We have explained that since the adoption of § 14031 where a party had knowledge of the alleged grounds of the disqualification of the trial judge for more than three days prior to the trial, and that party did not use the procedure prescribed by that section, the party cannot urge the disqualification on appeal, or in a collateral attack, on the judgment rendered and orders made by said judge. State ex rel. Dabney v. Ledbetter, 1932 OK 229, 9 P.2d 728 , 729, quoting, Holloway v. Hall, 1920 OK 287, 192 P. 219, 220.2 Thus, when the statute states that a party "may" file a written application with the court clerk to disqualify a judge the language is permissive in the sense that a party may or may not file the application, but if a party seeks judge disqualification we have held that filing the statutory application is mandatory.3 ¶9 Our opinions indicate that when the procedure in § 1403 is followed a party may raise the disqualification issue on a subsequent appeal. Does the term "may" in the language "application may be made to the proper tribunal for mandamus" allow a party the option of raising the disqualification issue on appeal instead of by mandamus, or is "may" used in the same way as in the language stating that a party "may" file a written application for disqualification with the court clerk? The published opinions of this Court indicate the former, i.e., that a mandamus proceeding is not required. We have stated: The procedure, under proper circumstances, may be by mandamus, or the party may object and save his exceptions to the overruling of his petition for disqualification and proceed with his cause, and thus save the question for review. In any [ 39 P.3d 796 ] event, the complaining party must proceed by application to the court as provided by statute, supra. If this is not done the litigant is deemed to have waived the question (State ex rel. Attorney General v. Davenport, [1927 OK 137] 125 Okl. 1, 256 P. 340), unless the circumstances are such that the demands of public policy would require disqualification. In such case the parties may not waive the disability. In re Miller's Estate Miller's Estate ¶10 We conclude that a party seeking disqualification of a judge in a civil proceeding must make an in camera request of the judge to disqualify or to transfer the cause to another judge as required by Rule 15, and then upon the judge's refusal the party must file a written application in the cause, as required by § 1403, and upon refusal of the motion, ¶11 In our case today an application was filed in the trial court and the issue was re-presented as required by Rule 15. We need not address those factual circumstances where failure to follow the rule is legally excused or when the nature of the disqualification involves public policy that may be raised on appeal although not previously raised in the trial court. II. Campaign Contribution and Solicitation of Campaign Contributions ¶12 Some courts have determined that lawyers' contributions to judicial campaigns are normal incidents to the campaigns, and the contributions do not indicate any closer relation between the contributors and the recipients than would ordinarily exist between members of the same local bar. MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332 , 1338 (Fla. 1990), quoting, Frade v. Costa, 342 Mass. 5, 171 N.E.2d 863 , 865 (1961). However, the MacKenzie court noted that a lawyer's contribution in conjunction with an additional factor, such as the lawyer serving as co_chair of the trial judge's judicial election campaign which was ongoing at the time of the underlying lawsuit, may require a judge to disqualify. MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So.2d at n.5, 1338. See also Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Berry, 669 So. 2d 56, 79 (Miss.1996), where the court required disqualification when a lawyer had formerly represented the judge and was acting as a spokesman for the judge's campaign during the decisional period of the litigation. Another court has distinguished ongoing per- [ 39 P.3d 797 ] -sonal relationships and those in the past, and declined to require disqualification when the lawyer was the judge's campaign manager six years prior to the complaint. Gluth Bros. Constr. Co. v. Union Nat. Bank, 548 N.E.2d 1364, 1368 (Ill.App.Ct.1989). ¶13 A judge "should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . ." 5 O.S.Supp. 2000, Ch. 1, App. 4, Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E)(1). ¶14 May a trial judge's impartiality be reasonably questioned when that judge receives campaign contributions and campaign assistance from a lawyer during litigation where that lawyer is appearing before that judge? We have required a judge to disqualify when one of the parties to an action had previously distributed the judge's campaign literature, actively campaigned for the judge and other candidates on behalf of the judge, and had previously attended political conventions with the judge. State ex rel. Larecy v. Sullivan, ¶15 In our case today, counsel and counsel's father each contributed $5,000 to the trial judge's campaign during the litigation and prior to trial. We are not provided with any evidence in the record to show whether this $10,000 represented a significant portion of the judge's total campaign contributions. We are not told whether these two contributions were the only contributions in this maximum amount, or whether the timing of the contributions is of special significance. We are told that counsel solicited other contributions for the judge's campaign, but we are not told the amount of these contributions or the manner in which the solicitations were made. ¶16 We agree with the Oklahoma Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel that the mere fact of a lawyer's contribution to a judge's campaign does not per se require that judge's disqualification when the lawyer comes before him. But we are of the opinion that a judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned" when, as in this case, (1) a lawyer makes a campaign contribution to that judge in the maximum amount allowed by statute, and (2) a member of that lawyer's immediate family makes a comparable maximum contribution, and (3) that lawyer further assists the judge's campaign by soliciting funds on behalf of the judge, and the contributions and solicitations occur during a pending case in which the lawyer is appearing before that judge. If the party resisting the motion to disqualify chooses to defend the motion by showing that the contributions and solicitations were a minimal part of the judicial campaign then facts to that effect should be made part of the record. A party opposing a claim or cause of action may provide evidence for the purpose of denying one of the elements to that claim or cause of action. Long v. Ponca City Hospital, Inc., III. Due Process and an Appellate Remedy ¶17 Not all questions of judicial qualification involve constitutional validity. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 , 820, 106 S. Ct. 1580, 89 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1986). But there is no doubt that due process is violated if a judge has a "direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest" in the proceedings or when a judge has responsibilities over a party independent of any judicial duties and the judge then acts as a decisionmaker in litigation involving that party. Bushert v. Hughes, ¶18 Due process jurisprudence includes the concept of the appearance of a fair trial. The High Court has explained that the reach of due process jurisprudence requires not only a fair tribunal, but also the appearance of a fair tribunal. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 , 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 99 L. Ed. 942 (1955). Due process "preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness, 'generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done,' . . . by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that [ 39 P.3d 799 ] the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him." Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 , 242, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 64 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1980), quoting, Joint Anti_Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 , 172, 71 S. Ct. 624, 649, 95 L. Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). That Court has stated that "'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice,' and this 'stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties,' . . . ." Marshall, 446 U.S.at 243, quoting, Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 , 14, 75 S. Ct. 11, 99 L. Ed. 11 (1954), and In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136. See also, Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 , 465, 91 S. Ct. 499, 27 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1971). ¶19 The common law contains a presumption that a judge is not biased, and a party must point to some fact to overcome the presumption to require disqualification because of bias. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 820, quoting, 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *361. Accord, Carter v. State, ¶20 What is the appropriate appellate remedy for the error of a trial judge in refusing to disqualify in a divorce proceeding where the appearance is that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned? Characterizing the error to disqualify as a violation of due process shows that the decree must be reversed. We have indicated in a divorce case that we would affirm a decree if it was just and equitable even if a trial judge showed bias. White v. White, ¶21 When an order of a judge in a civil proceeding denies a disqualification application that order will not be reversed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Graham v. Graham, ¶22 Plaintiff raises the disqualification issue on appeal and on certiorari. Her appellate brief challenges the child custody determination, the court's order suspending husband's support obligation for a period of time, and the trial court's order that each party pay his or her own attorney's fees. Her brief does not specifically challenge the granting of the divorce. Both parties petitioned for divorce in the trial court, and the court granted a divorce to each party. ¶23 Generally, the judgment of a court rendered by a disqualified judge is not void, but voidable error, and the right to disqualify the judge is a personal privilege that may be waived. Collins v. Mid_Continent Pipeline Co., § 127. Time when judgments in divorce actions become final__Effect of appeal Every decree of divorce shall recite the day and date when the judgment was rendered. If an appeal be taken from a judgment granting or denying a divorce, that part of the judgment does not become final and take effect until the appeal is determined. If an appeal be taken from any part of a judgment in a divorce action except the granting of the divorce, the divorce shall be final and take effect from the date the decree of divorce is rendered, provided neither party thereto may marry another person until six (6) months after the date the decree of divorce is rendered; that part of the judgment appealed shall not become final and take effect until the appeal be determined. This statute separates that part of the decree that grants the divorce from other parts for the purpose of the effect of an appeal. IV. Appellate Attorney's Fees ¶24 Plaintiff requests appellate attorney's fees. The right to appellate attorney's fees for matrimonial litigation is determined by this Court as part of the appeal. Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, A § 1276 counsel fee award does not depend upon the claimant's status as a prevailing party. Where sufficient funds and property are available to pay counsel fees, each party should bear its own litigation expense. Id The record shows that Plaintiff's monthly income was $1789.00 while Defendant's was $3333.00, and Plaintiff points to this fact in her brief. Plaintiff's brief requests that the appellate court engage in "balancing of the equities" in awarding an appellate attorney's fee. ¶25 We decline to award appellate attorney's fees to either party. Chamberlin requires us to examine the availability of funds and property of each party. Id. This requires the parties, in their application for attorney's fees, to point to those facts showing that equity requires one party to pay the other party's attorney's fees. The fact of income, by itself, is thus usually insufficient to show that equity requires one party to bear the cost of appellate attorney's fees. Neither party to the appeal has made the required showing, and both Plaintiff's and Defendant's requests for appellate attorney's fees are denied. ¶26 The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is vacated. The divorce decree of the District Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the matter remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ¶27 HODGES, LAVENDER, OPALA, KAUGER, SUMMERS, BOUDREAU, JJ. - Concur ¶28 HARGRAVE, C.J., WATT, V.C.J., WINCHESTER, J. - Concur in part, dissent in part FOOT