Title: State v. James M. Moran
Citation: 2005 WI 115
Docket Number: 2003AP000561-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2005

2005 WI 115 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP561-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
James M. Moran,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  272 Wis. 2d 854, 679 N.W.2d 926 
(Ct. App. 2004-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 12, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
David T. Flanagan, III   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
WILCOX, J., concurred (opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK, J., joins the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Colleen D. Ball and Appellate Counsel, S.C., Wauwatosa, and oral 
argument by Colleen D. Ball. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Daniel 
J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Keith A. Findley, Byron 
C. Lichstein, John A. Pray and University of Wisconsin Law 
School, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Innocence Project. 
 
 
2005 WI 115
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP561-CR   
(L.C. No. 
94 CF 1022) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
James M. Moran, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 affirming an order 
of the circuit court for Dane County, David T. Flanagan, Judge.  
The circuit court denied a motion by James M. Moran (Moran) for 
post-conviction deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing of certain 
                                                 
1 State v. Moran, No. 2003AP561-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2004). 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
2 
 
blood samples pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.07 (2001-02),2 enacted 
by the legislature in 2001. 
¶2 
We granted Moran's pro se petition for review which 
raised broad issues about § 974.07, and we appointed Attorney 
Colleen D. Ball to serve as Moran's pro bono counsel.  Attorney 
Ball posed three questions focusing on § 974.07(7).  The 
applicability of § 974.07(6) was raised at oral argument.  After 
supplemental briefing by the parties, we determined that this 
case should be decided on the basis of § 974.07(6). 
¶3 
We conclude that the plain language of § 974.07(6) 
gives a movant the right to conduct DNA testing of physical 
evidence that is in the actual or constructive possession of a 
government agency and that contains biological material or on 
which there is biological material, if the movant meets several 
statutory prerequisites.  First, the movant must show that the 
evidence meets the conditions under Wis. Stat. § 974.07(2).  
Second, the movant must comply with all reasonable conditions 
imposed by the court to protect the integrity of the evidence.  
Third, the movant must conduct any testing of the evidence at 
his or her own expense.  If a movant seeks DNA testing at public 
expense, the movant must proceed under § 974.07(7)(a) or (b), 
and satisfy the heightened requirements in subsection (7).   
¶4 
We remand this case to the circuit court to allow it 
to address whether Moran's motion satisfies the requirements in 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 edition unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
3 
 
§ 974.07(2) and (6), and if it does, to set conditions on the 
availability and integrity of the evidence. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 
Moran met Corrine Pinchard (Pinchard) at an exotic pet 
store he owned and operated in Madison.  The two became 
romantically involved, but their relationship ended.  The 
parties dispute who decided to break off the relationship.  
Pinchard eventually became involved with another man, Jacob 
Jensen (Jensen), who was also employed at Moran's pet store.   
¶6 
At about 1:00 A.M. on June 17, 1994, Pinchard and 
Jensen were together in Pinchard's apartment.  They became 
concerned that Moran would make an unwanted visit to the 
apartment after Pinchard received an anonymous phone call from 
someone pretending to be a maintenance man for the apartment 
building.  Pinchard believed she recognized the anonymous caller 
as Moran.  Pinchard knew that the outer back door to the 
apartment building had been tied open, and so she and Jensen 
decided to go downstairs to shut it.  Before leaving the 
apartment, Jensen armed himself with a brick he found in 
Pinchard's apartment.  
¶7 
Jensen and Pinchard never made it downstairs.  When 
Jensen opened the stairwell fire door, he saw Moran on the 
stairs.  The subsequent events were disputed at trial.  Jensen 
claimed that Moran charged at him while holding a knife and 
pushed him down.  According to both Pinchard and Jensen, Moran 
then pushed Pinchard into her apartment and locked the door 
while yelling that he planned to kill both Pinchard and himself.  
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
4 
 
While Moran and Pinchard were locked inside the apartment, he 
stabbed her multiple times.  
¶8 
Jensen testified that he ran down the hallway to a 
nearby apartment.  He alerted the occupants of what was 
happening and convinced them to call "911."  Jensen testified 
that as he re-entered the hallway area and began to walk back, 
Moran emerged from Pinchard's apartment door.  Leaving the 
apartment, Moran "charged" Jensen in the hallway, wielding the 
knife, and attempted to stab him in the chest.  He succeeded 
only in slashing Jensen's hand and arm.  Neither Pinchard nor 
Jensen could recall how or why Moran left the scene. 
¶9 
Pinchard and Jensen both testified that after the 
stabbings, they did not re-enter Pinchard's apartment.  Instead, 
they waited for the police in the apartment down the hall where 
Jensen had earlier convinced the occupants to dial "911."3 
¶10 Moran's version of these events was very different.  
He admitted that he entered the building through the open back 
door.  He claimed that after he saw Jensen in the stairwell, he 
pushed past Jensen to try to reach Pinchard.  Moran claimed that 
after he passed Jensen, Jensen struck him in the back of the 
head with a blunt object, dazing him.  A struggle between the 
two men ensued in Pinchard's apartment.  Moran claimed that 
                                                 
3 Moran exposed some inconsistency in Jensen's account 
through testimony from occupants of the other apartment.  They 
said that Jensen came in the second apartment only once, after 
he had been wounded, not twice, as his story went. 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
5 
 
Pinchard attempted to intervene in the struggle, and while she 
did so, she was inadvertently stabbed multiple times.4  
¶11 Moran also admitted that he "cut" Jensen.  Dr. Stuart 
Stitgen testified that Jensen suffered permanent muscle damage 
to his left wrist and that Moran severed nerves and tendons in 
Jensen's hand.  Moran also cut Jensen deeply enough that he 
chipped one of the bones in Jensen's hand.  Moran argued, 
however, that he inflicted all these injuries in self-defense 
while the two men struggled inside Pinchard's apartment, not in 
the hallway, as Jensen claimed.  
¶12 Moran admitted that after this altercation, he fled 
the scene, discarded his shirt into a storm drain, and threw 
away his knife.  He then either attempted or faked his own 
suicide, stole a vehicle, and drove to La Crosse.  Upon arriving 
in La Crosse, he turned himself in to authorities and confessed 
to the stabbings, making no mention of self-defense.5 
                                                 
4 Dr. Nicholas Augelli treated Pinchard for nine stab 
wounds, some of which were deep enough that they may have 
penetrated Pinchard's chest cavity.  One caused her right lung 
to collapse.  Dr. Augelli testified that Pinchard was "in shock" 
when he treated her.  
5 The arresting officer read Moran his Miranda warnings.  
Moran replied that he was aware of his rights and nevertheless 
wanted to "tell [the officer] what happened."  Moran stated 
"that he had been involved in a stabbing in Madison, that he 
thought he may have killed two people."  Moran stated that he 
couldn't be sure whether Pinchard and Jensen were alive or dead 
and "for that reason it was getting the best of him, he couldn't 
live with himself because of not knowing."  Moran also confessed 
the stabbings to the booking officer at the La Crosse County 
Sheriff's Department.  
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
6 
 
¶13 During the investigation of the crime scene, the 
police obtained numerous blood samples in Pinchard's apartment, 
some of which are at issue here.  Specifically, the police 
obtained a blood sample from the kitchen floor, a sample from a 
bloody brick near the bedroom, and a sample from the bedroom 
door.  A private detective working for Moran obtained blood 
samples from the door of an apartment across the hall.  
¶14 On the day of the incident, June 17, 1994, the State 
charged 
Moran 
with 
two 
counts 
of 
attempted 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide, 
contrary 
to 
§ 939.32(1)(a) 
and 
§ 940.01(1).  On August 11, 1994, the State amended the 
complaint, adding the element of "using a dangerous weapon" 
(contrary to § 939.63(1)(a)2.) to each of the two attempted 
homicide counts and adding one count of taking and driving a 
vehicle without the owner's consent in violation of § 943.23(2).  
On January 13, 1995, the State again amended the complaint, 
adding two counts of first-degree reckless injury while using a 
dangerous 
weapon 
in 
violation 
of 
§ 940.23(1) 
and 
§ 939.63(1)(a)2.  
¶15 Attorney Dennis E. Burke was initially appointed to 
represent Moran, but he withdrew on the grounds that his 
continued representation could result in a violation of the Code 
of Professional Responsibility.6  
                                                 
6 The reasons for Attorney Burke's withdrawal are not 
material to this case. 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
7 
 
¶16 Moran thereafter declined counsel and represented 
himself.  The jury trial was held between February 27 and March 
3, 1995.  During trial, Moran pled guilty to one count of 
reckless injury and to the charge of taking and driving a 
vehicle without the owner's consent.  
¶17 The jury trial on the remaining three counts developed 
into a credibility contest among Pinchard, Jensen, and Moran.  
Essentially, Pinchard and Jensen testified that the injuries 
they sustained occurred during separate encounters with Moran——
Pinchard's after Moran locked her inside her apartment with him, 
and Jensen's in the hallway after Moran emerged from the 
apartment.  By contrast, Moran testified that all the injuries 
to Pinchard and Jensen occurred at the same time, inside the 
apartment, while the three of them grappled together.   
¶18 While testifying on his own behalf in narrative form, 
Moran decided to play for the jury the tape of his confession to 
the La Crosse police.  He was later subjected to devastating 
cross-examination by the State.  In addition to exposing the 
inconsistencies between Moran's trial theory of the case and his 
confession to the police, the State successfully introduced 
multiple letters and statements in which Moran repeated his 
confession to the stabbings. 
¶19 In 
a 
rambling 
closing 
argument, 
Moran 
turned 
repeatedly to the subject of the "bloody brick," with which he 
alleged Jensen assaulted him. 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
8 
 
It wasn't even taken into evidence.  It was never 
tested for the type of blood on it.  It was never 
tested for skin on it.  It was never tested for hair. 
. . . .  
I wish nothing more than to have that brick as 
evidence.  I wish nothing more than blood samples 
would have been taken from all over that apartment.  
One drop of Jake's blood in that apartment and both 
their stories is a lie, all lies, because Jake was 
never inside the apartment[,] so he says. 
. . . .  
How did the blood get on that brick?  Is it Jake's 
blood?  It doesn't have to be my blood.  See if it is 
Jake's blood, that puts Jake in possession of that 
brick right there.  Right?  He has to have a hold of 
the brick before I cut him, or he has to have the 
brick after I cut him.  But, in any case, he has still 
got that brick.  You can't refute the fact that Jake 
was in possession of that brick at the time he 
received his injuries. 
¶20 Ultimately, the jury accepted Pinchard and Jensen's 
version of the facts and convicted Moran on the remaining counts 
on March 3, 1995.  On July 18, 1995, Dane County Circuit Judge 
Mark A. Frankel sentenced Moran to 72 years in prison.7  
¶21 Moran appealed, still proceeding pro se.  An attorney 
appointed to represent him filed a "no merit" brief pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32 and Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 
                                                 
7 The court sentenced Moran to 25 years, consecutively, for 
each count of attempted homicide; 10 years, consecutively, for 
each count of reckless injury; and 2 years for the vehicle 
theft. 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
9 
 
738 (1967).8  Moran filed a pro se response to the no merit brief 
and several amendments to his response.9  The court of appeals, 
upon consideration of the no merit brief and Moran's responses, 
affirmed.10  It also independently reviewed the record and found 
no additional potentially meritorious issues for review.11  This 
court denied Moran's petition for review on September 2, 1997.12 
¶22 Some time after the denial of his appeal, Moran 
retained Attorney George A. Limbeck.  On November 15, 1999, 
Attorney Limbeck sent a letter to Assistant District Attorney 
Jac G. Heitz "ask[ing] your consent and cooperation in having 
DNA typing done on all four[13] blood samples . . . ."  Attorney 
                                                 
8 State v. Moran, No. 96AP1575-CRNM, unpublished slip op. at 
2 (June 12, 1997).  In Anders, the court held that appointed 
counsel, upon finding the petitioner's case wholly frivolous, 
could file a letter brief with the court so stating, and thus 
discharge his or her duty of representation.  Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).  However, the letter brief 
must contain references to anything in the record supporting the 
petitioner's appeal, and the petitioner must be allowed to 
proceed pro se if he so chooses.  Id. 
9 State v. Moran, No. 96AP1575-CRNM, unpublished slip op. at 
2 (June 12, 1997). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 10. 
12 State v. Moran, 212 Wis. 2d 689, 569 N.W.2d 590 (1997) 
(Table). 
13 Attorney Limbeck's letter referenced four blood samples: 
(1) blood found at the scene on the door to an apartment across 
the hall from Pinchard's apartment; (2) Moran's blood; (3) 
Pinchard's blood; and (4) Jensen's blood. 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
10 
 
Limbeck promised that "my client would pay all expenses 
associated with the testing . . . ."14  
¶23 Approximately three years later, on April 22, 2002, 
Moran filed a motion seeking DNA testing of a number of blood 
samples found at the scene, including three "unknown blood 
samples" taken from inside Pinchard's apartment and the blood 
sample from the door across the hall.15  The motion did not 
reference Wis. Stat. § 974.07, which was in effect at the time 
Moran filed his motion, having been included in the 2001 Budget 
Bill.  See 2001 Wis. Act 16, § 4028j.  Instead, Moran cited 
State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996), and 
"point[ed] out to the court that the defendant has tried to have 
D.N.A. evidence tested for years."  The circuit court denied the 
motion on August 21, 2002, stating that "[t]he defendant's 
motion offers no explanation as to how the testing of the five 
blood samples could have impact upon . . . the jury verdicts in 
this matter," and that "[s]uch evidence would not make more 
credible the defendant's absurd theory that he stabbed Ms. 
Pinchard nine times inadvertently."  
¶24 In response, Moran filed another motion, this time 
citing Wis. Stat. § 974.07.  Specifically, Moran alleged that 
his motion satisfied all the criteria set out in § 974.07(2).  
The circuit court denied this second motion on February 5, 2003.  
                                                 
14 According to the State, "Moran fired Attorney Limbeck 
before any action was taken in response to Limbeck's letter." 
15 On April 22, 2002, Moran also asked the court to maintain 
"any/all D.N.A. evidence that relates" to his case.  
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
11 
 
On 
February 
13, 
2003, 
Moran 
filed 
a 
"motion 
for 
reconsideration."  The circuit court denied this "motion," 
stating that Moran had the right to appeal the order.  Moran 
appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.16  Moran filed a 
petition for review, which we granted on November 16, 2004.   
¶25 In their briefs, the parties focused our attention 
almost exclusively on § 974.07(7), pertaining to court-ordered 
DNA testing.  However, at oral argument on April 12, 2005, 
Moran's counsel directed our attention to § 974.07(6), under 
which a movant may request certain biological material from the 
district attorney.  We requested supplemental briefs from both 
parties 
regarding 
the 
impact 
of 
Moran's 
argument 
under 
§ 974.07(6).   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶26 We must determine whether, under Wis. Stat. § 974.07, 
Moran has a right to obtain and test certain biological 
material.  Statutory interpretation and the application of a 
statute to specific facts are questions of law that we review de 
novo.  See State v. Harris, 2004 WI 64, ¶25, 272 Wis. 2d 80, 680 
N.W.2d 737.  This court clarified the proper method of statutory 
interpretation last term in State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
In Kalal, we stated: "statutory interpretation 'begins with the 
                                                 
16 State v. Moran, No. 2003AP561-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2004).  Moran's case was decided in the 
circuit court and the court of appeals before the decision in 
State v. 
Hudson, 
2004 WI 
App 99, 
273 Wis. 2d 707, 681 
N.W.2d 316.  See ¶¶49-51, infra. 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
12 
 
language of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is 
plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  Id., ¶45 (internal 
citations omitted).  The court should assign the words in the 
statute their ordinarily accepted meaning.  Id.  The court may 
also consider the context and structure of the statute.  Id., 
¶46.  "'If this process of analysis yields a plain, clear 
statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the statute 
is applied according to this ascertainment of its meaning.'  
Where statutory language is unambiguous, there is no need to 
consult extrinsic sources of interpretation, such as legislative 
history."  Id. (internal citations omitted).   
III. ANALYSIS 
¶27 Moran seeks to test blood samples obtained from the 
crime scene pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.07.  That statute 
provides, in relevant part: 
974.07 Motion for postconviction deoxyribonucleic acid 
testing of certain evidence. 
. . . .  
(2) At any time after being convicted of a 
crime . . . a person may make a motion in the court in 
which he or she was convicted . . . for an order 
requiring forensic deoxyribonucleic acid testing of 
evidence to which all of the following apply: 
(a) The 
evidence 
is 
relevant 
to 
the 
investigation or prosecution that resulted in the 
conviction . . . . 
(b) The 
evidence 
is 
in 
the 
actual 
or 
constructive possession of a government agency. 
(c) The 
evidence 
has 
not 
previously 
been 
subjected to forensic deoxyribonucleic acid testing 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
13 
 
or, if the evidence has previously been tested, it may 
now be subjected to another test using a scientific 
technique that was not available or was not utilized 
at the time of the previous testing and that provides 
a reasonable likelihood of more accurate and probative 
results. 
. . . .  
(6)(a) 
Upon demand the district attorney shall 
disclose to the movant or his or her attorney whether 
biological material has been tested and shall make 
available to the movant or his or her attorney the 
following material: 
1. 
Findings based on testing of biological 
materials. 
2. 
Physical evidence that is in the actual or 
constructive possession of a government agency and 
that contains biological material or on which there is 
biological material.   
(b) Upon demand the movant or his or her 
attorney shall disclose to the district attorney 
whether biological material has been tested and shall 
make available to the district attorney the following 
material: 
1. 
Findings based on testing of biological 
materials. 
2. 
The movant's biological specimen.   
(c) Upon motion of the district attorney or the 
movant, the court may impose reasonable conditions on 
availability of material requested under pars. (a)2. 
and (b)2. in order to protect the integrity of the 
evidence. 
(d) This subsection does not apply unless the 
information being disclosed or the material being made 
available is relevant to the movant's claim at issue 
in the motion made under sub. (2). 
(7)(a) 
A court in which a motion under sub. 
(2) is filed shall order forensic deoxyribonucleic 
acid testing if all of the following apply: 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
14 
 
1. 
The movant claims that he or she is innocent 
of the offense at issue in the motion under sub. (2). 
2. 
It is reasonably probable that the movant 
would 
not 
have 
been . . . convicted . . . if 
exculpatory deoxyribonucleic acid testing results had 
been 
available 
before 
the 
prosecution 
[or] 
conviction . . . . 
3. 
The 
evidence 
to 
be 
tested 
meets 
the 
conditions under sub.(2)(a) to (c).   
. . . .  
(b) A court in which a motion under sub.(2) is 
filed may order forensic deoxyribonucleic acid testing 
if all of the following apply: 
1. 
It is reasonably probable that the outcome 
of 
the 
proceedings 
that 
resulted 
in 
the 
conviction . . . would have been more favorable to the 
movant if the results of  . . . testing had been 
available before he or she was prosecuted [or] 
convicted . . . . 
2. 
The 
evidence 
to 
be 
tested 
meets 
the 
conditions under sub.(2)(a) to (c).   
. . . .  
¶28 Moran argues that he is entitled to testing under 
either Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6) or § 974.07(7).   
A. 
Waiver 
¶29 Before addressing the substance of Moran's position, 
we must address the State's argument that Moran has waived any 
reliance on Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6) by not raising that argument 
until very late in this appeal.  The State notes that (1) Moran 
never filed a motion in the circuit court citing § 974.07(6); 
(2) Moran did not mention § 974.07(6) in his briefs to the court 
of appeals and, therefore, that court did not mention the 
subsection in its opinion; (3) Moran did not cite § 974.07(6) in 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
15 
 
his petition for review to this court, and this court did not 
mention that subsection in granting the petition; (4) Moran did 
not mention § 974.07(6) in his briefs to this court, except for 
a "passing reference" in his reply brief; and (5) Moran 
"expressly abandoned" any claim for relief under § 974.07(6) in 
his pro se brief to the court of appeals.17   
¶30 Moran responds that while he "did not precisely label 
the relief he sought, the substance of [the] request [was] clear 
enough."  See bin-Rilla v. Israel, 113 Wis. 2d 514, 521, 335 
N.W.2d 384 (1983) ("Neither a trial nor an appellate court 
should deny a prisoner's pleading based on its label rather than 
on its allegations.  If necessary the court should relabel the 
prisoner's pleading and proceed from there."). 
¶31 While we agree with the State that "the general rule 
is that issues not raised in the circuit court are deemed 
waived," State v. Polashek, 2002 WI 74, ¶25, 253 Wis. 2d 527, 
646 N.W.2d 330, the rule is not absolute.  Id.  The waiver rule 
articulates 
this 
court's 
general 
policy 
of 
judicial 
administration, not the extent of our power to hear issues.  See 
Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis. 2d 433, 444, 287 N.W.2d 140 (1980).  
Thus, when an issue involves a question of law, has been briefed 
                                                 
17 The State relies on Moran's assertion that "My parents 
[are] unable to [pay for DNA testing] now, as this situation has 
been drug out for nearly four (4) years and at an enormous cost 
to my parents which they can not afford to do forever."  The 
State argues that as Moran admitted in the past that he could 
not pay for the testing, there is no reason to authorize him to 
do so under (6).   
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
16 
 
by the opposing parties, and is of sufficient public interest to 
merit a decision, this court has discretion to address the 
issue.  Apex Elecs. Corp. v. Gee, 217 Wis. 2d 378, 384, 577 
N.W.2d 23 (1998).  Having determined that the interpretation of 
§ 974.07(6) presents an issue of sufficient public interest to 
merit a decision, we gave both parties the right to fully brief 
the issue of § 974.07(6).  They did so, and we now exercise our 
discretion to address the issue. 
B. 
Section 974.07(6) 
¶32 We begin our interpretation of § 974.07(6) with the 
plain language of the statute.   
¶33 First, subsection (6) requires that, upon demand, the 
district attorney must disclose "whether biological material has 
been tested . . . and make available . . . [f]indings based on 
testing of biological materials."  Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6)(a)1.  
This provision serves as a limited post-conviction discovery 
statute that complements Wis. Stat. § 971.23. 
¶34 The 
pretrial 
"discovery 
and 
inspection" 
statute 
requires a district attorney, "upon demand," to disclose 
any reports . . . of experts made in connection with 
the case or, if an expert does not prepare a report or 
statement, a written summary of the expert's findings 
or the subject matter of his or her testimony, and the 
results of any . . . scientific test, experiment or 
comparison that the district attorney intends to offer 
in evidence at trial. 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(e) 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
The 
district 
attorney is also required to turn over "[a]ny physical evidence 
that the district attorney intends to offer in evidence at the 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
17 
 
trial," 
§ 971.23(1)(g), 
and 
"[a]ny 
exculpatory 
evidence."  
§ 971.23(1)(h) (emphasis added). 
¶35 The post-conviction discovery statute, § 974.07(6)(a), 
permits a person to obtain information about findings based on 
testing of biological materials that the district attorney was 
not required to disclose before trial or that a government 
agency obtained after trial. 
¶36 The statute also requires the district attorney to 
disclose 
"[p]hysical 
evidence 
that 
is 
in 
the 
actual 
or 
constructive possession of a government agency and that contains 
biological material or on which there is biological material."  
Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6)(a)2.   
¶37 The scope of § 974.07(6)(a)2. is problematic because 
§ 974.07 does not define the term "biological material."  A 
newly adopted supreme court rule regarding record retention, SCR 
72.01(46m), provides in part: "Any criminal case exhibit 
identified by the parties, the clerk, or the court as containing 
biological material and that remains in the court's custody 
shall be retained for 50 years after entry of final judgment or 
until the court otherwise orders the disposition of the evidence 
under s. 974.07, Stats."  (Emphasis added.)  This rule suggests 
a process for identifying exhibits that must be retained.  
However, Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6)(a)2. is more open ended, as it 
requires 
a 
district 
attorney 
to 
disclose 
"physical 
evidence . . . that contains biological material or on which 
there is biological material" that was obtained and retained 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
18 
 
before the above-cited rule was adopted as well as "physical 
evidence" that was never used at a trial. 
¶38 The State argues that it need make available only 
materials that have already been tested.  Essentially, the State 
claims that the statute requires the district attorney to "make 
those test results available to the defense . . . along with the 
biological material that has been so tested."  (Emphasis added.)  
For good or ill, the plain language of the statute leads us to a 
different conclusion.   
¶39 We would have to add language to the statute in order 
to 
justify 
the 
State's 
interpretation. 
 
If 
the 
State's 
interpretation were correct, the following underlined language 
would have to be added to § 974.07(6)(a)2:  
(6)(a) 
Upon demand the district attorney shall 
disclose 
to 
the 
movant . . . whether 
biological 
material has been tested and shall make available to 
the movant . . . the following material: 
1. 
Findings based on testing of biological 
materials. 
2. 
Physical evidence that has been tested and 
is in the actual or constructive possession of a 
government 
agency 
and 
that 
contains 
biological 
material or on which there is biological material. 
Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6) (underlined text supplied). 
¶40 The second subdivision does not contain the emphasized 
language.  By contrast, subdivision (6)(a)1. does contain 
language specifying that the State must release findings "based 
on 
testing." 
 
The 
second 
subdivision 
contains 
no 
such 
qualification, and it is not this court's role to supply such 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
19 
 
language.  We are simply "'not at liberty to disregard the 
plain, clear words of the statute.'"  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46 (citation omitted).   
¶41 Nonetheless, because subdivision (6)(a)2. is so open 
ended in terms of the "physical evidence" that a district 
attorney is required to disclose, there is a practical necessity 
that 
a 
motion 
to 
disclose 
should 
comply 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 971.30(2), 
stating 
"with 
particularity" 
the 
evidence or the type of evidence that the movant is seeking.18 
¶42 Second, the plain language of the statute requires 
that the requested material be "relevant to the movant's claim 
at 
issue 
in 
the 
motion 
made 
under 
sub. 
(2)."  
Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6)(d).  Subsection (2), in turn, imposes 
three requirements.  First, the evidence containing biological 
material must be "relevant to the investigation or prosecution 
that resulted in the conviction . . . ."  Second, the evidence 
must be in the government's possession.  Third, the evidence 
must not have been subjected to forensic DNA testing or, if so 
tested, "may now be subjected to another test that was not 
available or was not utilized at the time of the previous 
testing and that provides a reasonable likelihood of more 
accurate and probative results."  The third requirement listed 
in subsection (2) provides an additional reason why subsection 
                                                 
18 Cf. 
State 
v. 
Caban, 
210 
Wis. 2d 597, 
605-06, 
563 
N.W.2d 501 (1997); State v. Garner, 207 Wis. 2d 520, 532, 558 
N.W.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1996). 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
20 
 
(6) does not apply only to material that has already been 
tested. 
¶43 Assuming that the State possesses material that the 
movant wishes to test, the circuit court must undertake the 
three-pronged analysis in Wis. Stat. § 974.07(2).  If these 
requirements are satisfied, the plain language of the statute 
dictates that the movant should receive access to the evidence, 
and may subject the material to DNA testing at his or her own 
expense.  At that point, the circuit court may set conditions on 
the testing pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6)(c).   
¶44 In this case, the circuit court did not evaluate 
whether the evidence met the requirements in sub. (2) because it 
concluded that "[t]he defendant's motion offers no explanation 
as to how the testing of the five blood samples could have 
impact upon . . . the jury verdicts in this matter," and that 
"[s]uch evidence would not make more credible the defendant's 
absurd 
theory 
that 
he 
stabbed 
Ms. 
Pinchard 
nine 
times 
inadvertently."  
¶45 Because the circuit court did not analyze the language 
of § 974.07(2), it did not specifically determine whether the 
evidence 
was 
relevant. 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 904.01 
defines 
"relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence 
of 
any 
fact 
that 
is 
of 
consequence 
to 
the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence."  We have noted that the 
circuit court has "considerable discretion" in determining 
whether a particular piece of evidence is "relevant."  Chart v. 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
21 
 
Gen. Motors Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 91, 102, 258 N.W.2d 680 (1977).  
We have described the appropriate inquiry as "'whether there is 
a logical or rational connection between the fact which is 
sought to be proved and a matter of fact which has been made an 
issue in the case.'"  Shapiro v. Klinker, 257 Wis. 622, 626, 44 
N.W.2d 622 (1950) (citation omitted). 
¶46 It will be Moran's burden on remand to show that the 
tests he seeks to conduct will be relevant to his prosecution 
(namely, his conviction or his sentence).  For instance, Moran 
will have to show that the determination of whose blood is on 
the "bloody brick" is evidence having a tendency to make the 
existence 
of 
any 
fact 
that 
is 
of 
consequence 
to 
the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence. 
¶47 We note that allowing Moran to test the evidence at 
his expense does not guarantee that he will get a new trial, or 
even an evidentiary hearing.  Rather, if the testing is done, 
the circuit court will determine whether or not the results 
"support the movant's claim."  Wis. Stat. § 974.07(9)-(10).  If 
the results support the 
claim, the 
court 
will hold an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
to 
determine 
the 
appropriate 
relief.  
Wis. Stat. § 974.07(10). 
¶48 Because it did not consider Moran's motion under the 
standards set out in § 974.07(2) and (6), the circuit court 
proceeded on the wrong theory of law.  Accordingly, we remand 
this case to the circuit court in order to allow it to analyze 
Moran's motion under the proper standard. 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
22 
 
¶49 We acknowledge the plausibility of the position that 
all motions for testing, as opposed to inspection, should 
proceed 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 947.07(7). 
 
Nonetheless, 
our 
conclusion that a person willing to pay for the testing himself 
may proceed under subsection (6) is buttressed by State v. 
Hudson, 2004 WI App 99, 273 Wis. 2d 707, 681 N.W.2d 316.  In 
Hudson, the court of appeals considered a prisoner's motion for 
DNA testing under § 974.07(6) and (7).19  In Hudson, the State 
"concede[d] the trial court erred by construing [subsection 6] 
to prevent independent testing of certain items at [the 
defendant's] expense, subject to protective conditions imposed 
by the trial court," id., ¶12, so that the court of appeals did 
not address the issue. 
¶50 Although it had argued before the circuit court that 
§ 974.07(6) did not apply, the State changed its position in 
Hudson before the court of appeals and conceded that the 
defendant had a right to test the qualifying material at his own 
expense.  In its brief in Hudson, the State argued that 
§ 974.07(6) is ambiguous because it "does not state the purposes 
for 
which 
the 
state 
must 
make 
the 
biological 
material 
available . . . nor does it impose any limitations on what the 
defendant may do with the material."  Significantly, the State 
did not advance the argument it makes in this case that 
                                                 
19 Hudson filed a post-conviction motion for DNA testing of 
ten items not previously tested, seven containing blood.  State 
v. Hudson, 2004 WI App 99, ¶18, 273 Wis. 2d 707, 681 N.W.2d 316. 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
23 
 
subsection (6) applies only to material that has already been 
tested.   
¶51 After 
examining 
the 
legislative 
history 
of 
the 
statute, the State's Hudson brief concluded that, "the better 
interpretation of sub. (6)(a) is that if the defendant has the 
ability to have the requested material tested at his own 
expense, the statute requires the state to make those materials 
available for testing subject to any protective order entered 
under sub. (6)(c) to protect the integrity of that material." 
¶52 In the present case, the State has reversed course and 
reasserts the position it took at the circuit court level in 
Hudson.  The State argues that "Moran has no right to relief 
under § 974.07(6) because he has demonstrated no right to relief 
under sub. (7)."  The State correctly notes that when a movant 
invokes subsection (6), the court must determine whether the 
"material being made available is relevant to the movant's claim 
at 
issue 
in 
the 
motion 
made 
under 
sub. 
(2)."  
Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6)(d).  However, the State then jumps to the 
conclusion that, "[a] claim for relief under sub. (2) then 
channels directly and narrowly into a request for mandatory 
testing under sub. (7)(a), and/or for discretionary testing 
under sub. (7)(b)."  
¶53 That interpretation of sub. (6) was advanced by the 
circuit court in Hudson.  On appeal, the State took the position 
that such an interpretation was incorrect and the court of 
appeals therefore reversed the circuit court as to that issue.  
Hudson, 273 Wis. 2d 707, ¶12.  We think the position the State 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
24 
 
advanced in Hudson is more defensible than the position it takes 
here, and we disagree that resort to legislative history is 
necessary to reach the Hudson result. 
¶54 In this case, the State relies on legislative history 
to support its interpretation that a motion under sub. (6) 
"channels directly and narrowly" into sub. (7).  Nothing in the 
plain language of the statute "channels" subsection (6) or 
subsection (2) "directly and narrowly" into subsection (7).  
Indeed, subsection (7) is not even mentioned in either of the 
other two subsections.  Because we resolve this case based on 
the plain language of the statute, we "stop the inquiry."  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  Murky legislative history should 
not be permitted to undermine plain statutory language.   
¶55 Because we conclude that § 974.07(6) applies, we need 
not address the parties' arguments relating to § 974.07(7), 
except to note our disagreement with the State's argument that 
our holding marginalizes the importance of (7).  As we see it, 
the statutory text makes clear that subsections (6) and (7) are 
intended for different purposes.  Subsection (6) allows the 
movant access to the test results and/or material under some 
circumstances, but the movant must decide whether to test the 
material and must pay for the testing himself.  Subsection (7), 
on the other hand, pertains to court-ordered testing at the 
State's expense. 
¶56 The harsh reality of life is that some persons who 
have been convicted of crime may have the means to hire 
attorneys or investigators post-conviction under circumstances 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
25 
 
that would never justify the expenditure of public money.  The 
court is being asked in this case to prevent a person from 
conducting DNA testing at his own expense.  We are unable to 
discern from the plain language of § 974.07 a clear legislative 
intent to block testing demanded by a person willing and able to 
pay until that person satisfies the requirements for publicly 
funded DNA testing.  We encourage the legislature to revisit 
Wis. Stat. § 974.07 to define undefined terms, set limits to the 
evidence that must be provided, and give courts clear guidelines 
in procedure. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶57 We conclude that the plain language of § 974.07(6) 
gives the defendant the right to test the sought-after evidence 
containing biological material if the circuit court determines 
that Moran meets all statutory prerequisites.  First, Moran must 
show 
that 
the 
evidence 
meets 
the 
conditions 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 974.07(2).  Second, Moran must comply with all 
reasonable conditions imposed by the court to protect the 
integrity of the evidence.  Third, Moran must conduct any 
testing of the evidence at his own expense.  If a movant seeks 
DNA testing at public expense, the movant must proceed under 
§ 974.07(7)(a) or (b), and satisfy the heightened requirements 
in subsection (7).  Subsection (6) provides free access to 
evidence but it does not provide free testing.  Moran must pay 
for any testing permitted under subsection (6) himself.   
¶58 We remand this case to the circuit court to allow it 
to address whether Moran's motion satisfies the requirements in 
No. 2003AP561-CR  
 
26 
 
Wis. Stat. § 974.07(2) 
and 
(6), 
and 
if 
it 
does, 
to 
set 
conditions on the availability and integrity of the evidence. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2003AP561-CR.jpw 
 
1 
 
 
¶59 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring).  I reluctantly agree 
with the majority's holding in this case.  I write separately, 
however, to address the serious concerns raised by the broad 
language in Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6) (2001-02),20 and I strongly 
urge the legislature to take a hard look at the practical 
consequences of this subsection.  Although I am personally 
troubled with the end result, the plain language of § 974.07(6) 
gives Moran the right to access the "bloody brick" for DNA 
testing if, on remand, the circuit court determines that Moran 
meets all of the statutory prerequisites.   
¶60 First, the plain language of § 974.07(6)(a)2. requires 
the district attorney to make available to the defendant 
"[p]hysical evidence that is in the actual or constructive 
possession of a government agency and that contains biological 
material or on which there is biological material."  Contrary to 
the State's position, nothing in subsection (6) requires the 
district attorney to make available only materials that have 
already been tested.  In contrast, § 974.07(6)(a)1., explicitly 
contains language specifying that the district attorney must 
release "[f]indings based on testing of biological materials."  
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, while subdivision 1. is expressly 
limited to material that has been tested, I fully agree with the 
majority that "[t]he second subdivision contains no such 
                                                 
20 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No.  2003AP561-CR.jpw 
 
2 
 
qualification, and it is not this court's role to supply such 
language."  Majority op., ¶40.     
¶61 Second, the plain language of § 974.07(6) states that 
"[t]his subsection does not apply unless the information being 
disclosed or the material being made available is relevant to 
the movant's claim at issue in the motion made under sub. (2)."  
Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6)(d).  Subsection (2), in turn, requires 
that the evidence "has not previously been subjected to forensic 
[DNA] testing or, if the evidence has previously been tested, it 
may 
now 
be 
subjected 
to 
another 
test . . . ."  
Wis. Stat. § 974.07(2)(c). 
 
Thus, 
§ 974.07(2)(a) 
further 
demonstrates that subsection (6) is not limited to material 
previously tested.   
¶62 Therefore, based on the plain language of the relevant 
statutes, I am compelled to conclude that § 974.07(6) requires 
the district attorney to make available for DNA testing all 
physical evidence containing biological material, regardless of 
whether it was previously tested, if the requirements of 
§ 974.07(2) are satisfied.   
¶63 I fully acknowledge the value and importance of DNA 
evidence and testing to the criminal justice system.  However, 
in light of this court's holding that recently-discovered DNA 
evidence not available during trial results in the real 
controversy not being tried and warrants a reversal of a 
conviction, see State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, __ Wis. 2d __, 
__ N.W.2d __, the majority opinion in this case will have far-
reaching consequences for the finality of convictions.  While I 
No.  2003AP561-CR.jpw 
 
3 
 
am sensitive to the problem of false convictions, Armstrong and 
today's majority opinion have the potential to overburden our 
justice system and work great mischief for numerous legitimate 
convictions.   
¶64 In Armstrong, this court held that the defendant was 
entitled to a new trial based on newly-discovered DNA evidence 
because it concluded that such DNA evidence proved "the real 
controversy was not fully tried," id., ¶2, despite the "mountain 
of other evidence incriminating Armstrong that [was] not 
affected in any way by the DNA test results at issue."  Id., 
¶174 (Roggensack, J., dissenting).  Essentially, the Armstrong 
majority, "equate[d] the idea of the 'matter not being fully 
tried' with new scientific identification procedures in a way 
that threatens to reopen convictions statewide every time a 
scientific improvement occurs, regardless of the lack of a 
probable effect on the issues underlying the jury's verdict."  
Id., ¶180 (Roggensack, J., dissenting).  Thus, the combined 
result of Armstrong and the present case is that convicted 
criminals now have easy access to biological material for DNA 
testing and a lower threshold to meet to overturn their 
conviction based on the results of that testing, even if there 
is a mountain of evidence supporting their conviction.   
¶65 I note that the legislative history of § 974.07(6) 
indicates that the provision was added by a Legislative 
Reference Bureau attorney who suggested that a "discovery 
provision for postconviction DNA testing" was necessary.  Letter 
from Robin Ryan and Michael Dsida, Legislative Attorneys, to 
No.  2003AP561-CR.jpw 
 
4 
 
Scott Walker, Waukesha Representative in the Wisconsin State 
Assembly (Dec. 8, 2000) (on file with the Legislative Reference 
Bureau).  However, the drafting records contain very little 
commentary on this new provision.  It seems that no one involved 
considered this provision as an additional means of obtaining 
material for testing; rather, the provision was viewed merely as 
a discovery provision of material that had already been tested.  
The drafters apparently assumed there were two possible ways 
that postconviction DNA testing could happen:  mandatory court-
ordered testing and discretionary court-ordered testing.   
¶66 Also, I note that the majority opinion seems to open 
up § 974.07(6) to an attack on equal protection grounds.  The 
majority states that under subsection (6) "the movant must 
conduct any testing of the evidence at his or her own expense."  
Majority op., ¶3.  It would seem that there is no reason why 
someone who cannot afford to pay for such testing would not be 
equally entitled to such evidence.    
¶67 In sum, the plain language of § 974.07(6) leads me to 
reluctantly join the majority opinion.  As such, I respectfully 
concur.   
¶68 I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence.   
 
No. 2003AP561-CR 
 
 
 
1