Title: Nat. Bk. of Mishawaka v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp.
Citation: 237 N.E.2d 108, 250 Ind. 453
Docket Number: 31,173
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: May 24, 1968

250 Ind. 453 (1968)
237 N.E.2d 108
FIRST NAT. BANK OF MISHAWAKA ET AL.
v.
PENN-HARRIS-MADISON SCHOOL CORP. ET AL.
No. 31,173.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed May 24, 1968.
*454 William T. Means, Thomas P. Loughlin, of Mishawaka, and Russell C. Kuehl, of South Bend, for appellants.
John Schindler, Jr., F. Richard Kramer, and Schindler, Kramer &amp; O'Malley, of Mishawaka, for appellees.
LEWIS, C.J.
The appellees filed a complaint to condemn the land of the appellants' for use of a new consolidated school. Trial was had on the question of damages to be awarded to the condemnee. After the evidence was heard the jury awarded the condemnee damages of $68,000. The appellees herein then filed a Motion for New Trial, which Motion for New Trial was granted by the Court. The appellants appeal from the ruling *455 of the Court in granting such Motion for New Trial. The Motion for New Trial was sustained on the 7th day of March, 1967. Thereafter, the Court, by a Nunc Pro Tunc Entry stated:
The appellees in their Motion for New Trial had claimed error by the Trial Court in admitting, over objection, the testimony of the two (2) witnesses: Hakes and Pence. Witness Pence gave testimony as to the value of the land as if it were platted and subdivided into lots. Witness Hakes gave his opinion of the value of the land based upon the land being sub-divided with the lots sold over a period of several years in the future. Neither witness gave testimony as to the fair market value of the land as it existed on the date of the taking. The land, on the date of the taking, was unplatted and unimproved. The Trial Court agreed with the appellees, and as heretofore noted, sustained the Motion for New Trial.
*456 Appellants raise the following assigned errors:
Appellants' first assignment of error was raised in appellants' original brief which was written before the Trial Court entered the reasons for granting the Motion for New Trial by Nunc Pro Tunc Entry. The appellants, in their Reply Brief, claim that the reasons are not set out with sufficient certainty. We conclude that the Trial Court noted with sufficient certainty the reasons for granting the new trial in view of the fact that the Trial Court, as noted above, pointed out in great detail the error in the admission of the testimony of witnesses Hakes and Pence.
Appellants' fifth assigned error was raised in their reply brief after the entry was issued and it is now properly before this Court. The Trial Judge and the appellees rely on the case of Northern Indiana Public Service Company v. McCoy et ux. (1959), 239 Ind. 301, 157 N.E.2d 181. In this case an Indiana Public Utility Corporation brought an action to appropriate a right-of-way for a power line. The appellees caused a trial by jury to be had on the issue of damages wherein they recovered damages on the basis of the land being platted and sub-divided when in reality a plat hadn't even been filed in the recorder's office. In holding that evidence based upon the platting of this land as to its fair market value on the day of its taking was inadmissible, this Court said:
There is nothing "magic" about the actual filing of a plat in the recorder's office that immediately enhances the value of land. The measure of damages is still the fair market value of the land on the date of its taking. However, in arriving at this figure, the Court may hear evidence on potential future uses to which the land may be put, but this evidence still only goes to the fair market value of the land on the date of its taking. While evidence establishing that the land in question was potentially useful in the future for development is admissible, evidence as to its value after platting and development on a future date is inadmissible. The issue is the value of the land condemned on the date of its taking and future improvements may not be compensated for when they are not in esse. The Trial Court was entirely correct in its subsequent ruling that the testimony of witnesses Pence and Hakes was admitted in error. The Trial Judge, wisely realizing that an error had been made, ordered a new trial in order to cure this defect at the earliest possible moment.
In their second assigned error, appellants allege that the appellees invited the Trial Court into error by making vague objections in order to have such objections overruled and yet to save the question for appeal. It is the appellants' contention that in objecting to the testimony of witnesses Pence and Hakes that the appellees knew of the Northern Indiana Public Service Company v. McCoy et ux., supra, case, and purposely withheld it from the Trial Court thereby inviting error. The objection in question was as follows:
*458 There is nothing in the record to support the appellant's theory other than the fact that in their objection the appellees didn't cite the case in question to the Court. We know of no ruling that requires a lawyer to cite specific cases on objection to evidence admitted in trial so long as the grounds relied upon are a correct interpretation of the law. Indeed, in many instances, the objections arise in unforeseen situations, and to adopt the requirement that appellants suggest would be to put upon a trial lawyer an unduly burdensome duty. The objection raised was definite enough under the circumstances in which it was raised.
In the third assigned error, appellants suggest that the Trial Judge granted the new trial because the preponderance of the evidence did not prove the verdict rendered by the jury; therefore, such action was an abuse of discretion by the Trial Judge. If this were the case, appellants may indeed have an appealable error. However, after a careful examination of the entry of the Trial Judge, it is manifest that this was not the reason why the new trial was granted. The Trial Judge was not exercising his prerogative to participate as the "thirteenth juror"; but to the contrary, he was only attempting to remedy an error made at trial. It was clearly not an abuse of discretion.
In the fourth assigned error, the appellants request this Court to examine the record and search for errors. Under Supreme Court Rule No. 2-17(h), (1967), we are unable to do this. Rule 2-17(h), supra, states, in part, that:
The ruling of the Trial Court in granting the Motion for New Trial is affirmed, and this cause is remanded to the Trial *459 Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Arterburn, Hunter and Jackson, JJ., concur; Mote, J., not participating.
NOTE.  Reported in 237 N.E.2d 108.