Title: United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Parker
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 942184
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 1995

Present:  All the Justices 
 
UNITED STATES FIRE  
INSURANCE COMPANY 
                        OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 942184               November 3, 1995 
 
NORA RIVERA PARKER 
 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG 
 
AND COUNTY OF JAMES CITY 
 
William L. Person, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this insurance coverage case, we deal with the "use" of a 
motor vehicle in connection with a claim for underinsured 
motorist protection afforded by Virginia's uninsured motorist 
statute. 
 
On September 8, 1989, appellee Nora Rivera Parker was 
employed as a landscape gardener by the manager of Ford's Colony, 
a residential development in James City County near Williamsburg. 
 About 12:00 noon on that day, Parker and two other employees 
were planting winter cabbages at the development's entrance 
adjacent to Long Hill Road.  At that time, one Allen Byran Healy 
lost control of a motor vehicle he was operating on the Road and 
struck Parker, injuring her. 
 
Subsequently, Parker filed a personal injury action against 
Healy seeking recovery in damages as the result of his wrongful 
conduct.  The vehicle operated by Healy was underinsured. 
 
Later, appellant United States Fire Insurance Company filed 
the present declaratory judgment suit naming Parker a defendant, 
among others.  The insurer had issued a "Business Auto Policy" 
covering the Ford's Colony pickup truck that had been driven by 
Parker to the site where she was working at the time of the 
 
 
 
 
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injury.  This liability policy provided underinsurance motorist 
coverage in accordance with Code § 38.2-2206, the uninsured 
motorist statute.  Asserting that Parker claimed underinsured 
coverage under its policy, the insurer asked the trial court to 
declare that the policy did not provide such coverage for Parker 
in her claim against Healy. 
 
As pertinent, Code § 38.2-2206 provides that no policy of 
bodily injury or property damage liability insurance "relating to 
the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle" shall be 
issued in the Commonwealth unless it contains provisions 
undertaking to pay "the insured all sums that he is legally 
entitled to recover as damages" from the operator of an uninsured 
or underinsured motor vehicle.  Code § 38.2-2206(B) defines the 
term "insured" as "any person who uses the motor vehicle to which 
the policy applies, with the expressed or implied consent of the 
named insured." 
 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled in 
favor of Parker.  We awarded the insurer this appeal from the 
September 1994 order declaring that the insurer must provide 
underinsured motorist coverage in the event Parker obtains a 
judgment in excess of $25,000, the amount of Healy's coverage. 
 
The facts are not in dispute.  On the day in question, 
Parker and her co-workers used the Ford's Colony pickup truck, 
with Parker driving, to carry them and the cabbages to the 
worksite and to transport a rake, trowel, and shovels they needed 
 
 
 
 
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to perform the task of planting the cabbages.  A two-way radio 
was installed in the truck; they were required to leave the radio 
"on" at all times enabling them to receive messages from their 
supervisor. 
 
At the site, the trio worked as a team performing specific 
tasks directed by Parker.  She was to dig holes for the plants, 
another worker unloaded the cabbages, and the third worker 
planted the cabbages. 
 
Although not directed to do so by their supervisor, they 
parked the truck at the site in such a position as to provide a 
"safety barrier" to protect them from speeding motorists.  They 
left a door of the truck open while planting the cabbages so they 
could hear the radio. 
 
At the time of the accident, Healy's speeding vehicle left 
the paved portion of the Road, struck the truck, and then struck 
Parker as she was digging a hole in a flower bed 12 to 15 feet 
from the truck.  The workers had not completed their task; some 
plants remained in the truck and they needed to clean up the 
area. 
 
In two prior cases dealing with vehicle "use," we considered 
the foregoing statutory provisions.  In Insurance Company of 
North America v. Perry, 204 Va. 833, 134 S.E.2d 418 (1964), the 
question was whether the permissive user of an insured vehicle 
was provided protection in the uninsured motorist statute against 
an injury that occurs to one "while using" such vehicle.  Id. at 
 
 
 
 
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838, 134 S.E.2d at 421.  In Great American Insurance Co. v. 
Cassell, 239 Va. 421, 389 S.E.2d 476 (1990), we said the issue 
was whether the victim's death "arose out of the `use' of" the 
insured vehicle  Id. at 423, 389 S.E.2d at 477. 
 
Portraying the issue in the present case to be "whether 
Parker was using the truck at the time of her accident," the 
trial court concluded that Parker's activities constituted "use" 
of the vehicle for purposes of the statutory provisions.  To 
support this conclusion, the court relied upon the facts that 
Parker remained close to the truck and the work had not been 
completed; also, the truck was being used as a barrier, to load 
and unload the plants, and for communication with the supervisor. 
 
Whether the issue is framed as "while using" or "arose out 
of the use of," the crucial inquiry is:  Was there a causal 
relationship between the incident and the employment of the 
insured vehicle as a vehicle?  See Travelers Ins. Co. v. LaClair, 
250 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (1995), decided today. 
 
In Perry, the deceased claimant, a police officer engaged in 
the act of serving a warrant, was on foot 164 feet away from his 
parked police cruiser, the insured vehicle.  There, we held that 
the officer's fatal injury did not occur while he was using the 
vehicle.  "He was not then under the canopy of the coverage" 
provided by the uninsured motorist statute.  204 Va. at 838, 134 
S.E.2d at 421. 
 
In contrast, we concluded in Cassell that the deceased 
 
 
 
 
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claimant, a fire fighter, was an insured for purposes of the 
statutory uninsured motorist coverage.  There, fire fighters 
parked a pumper truck and a tanker truck, the insured vehicles, 
on a city street near a disabled car that was on fire.  The 
deceased, senior officer in charge, rode to the scene in the 
pumper truck that was parked with its lights burning 20 to 25 
feet from the car. 
 
The fire trucks were being used to restrict or influence the 
flow of traffic and to provide a protective barrier for the fire 
fighters.  A fire hose connected to the deceased's pumper truck 
was used to extinguish the fire; the water came from the truck 
rather than from a street hydrant.  The deceased used a crowbar 
he had taken from the pumper truck to open the hood of the 
disabled car. 
 
While standing in the street approximately 20 to 25 feet 
from his truck, and while completing a required report using a 
clipboard from his truck, the deceased was killed by a hit-and-
run driver.  Other fire fighters were reloading equipment into 
the deceased's truck at the time of the accident. 
 
Notably, we said that employment of the fire truck "to 
extinguish the fire, control traffic and protect the fire 
fighters, including [the deceased], was an integral part of the 
fire fighters' mission.  The mission had not been completed when 
the accident occurred.  Unlike the police officer in Perry, [the 
deceased] was engaged in a transaction essential to the use of 
 
 
 
 
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the fire truck when he was killed."  239 Va. at 424, 389 S.E.2d 
at 477. 
 
Unlike the deceased in Cassell, the claimant in the present 
case was not engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the 
pickup truck when she was injured.  In other words, she was not 
utilizing the truck as a vehicle at that time.  She was 12 to 15 
feet away from the truck with her foot on a shovel in the act of 
digging a hole when struck. 
 
The facts that the workers, independently and not because of 
any requirement by Ford's Colony, positioned the truck (which had 
no special, emergency warning lights) as a barrier, and that the 
radio was operating at the time (it could not be heard unless the 
workers were "in close proximity" to it), does not bring this 
case within the Cassell precedent.  In Cassell, the fire truck's 
lights were burning, a hose connected to the truck used water 
carried on the truck to extinguish the fire, and emergency 
vehicles suitable for use to control traffic were utilized as 
barriers at the scene.  Here, the truck merely was used as a 
means of transportation so that Parker could complete her 
landscaping duties. 
 
Consequently, we hold that the court below erred.  The trial 
court's order will be reversed and final judgment will be entered 
here in favor of the insurer declaring that it does not owe 
underinsured motorist coverage to Parker under the statutorily 
mandated provisions of its insurance contract. 
 
 
 
 
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Reversed and final judgment.