Title: Commonwealth v. Pina
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11507
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 12, 2019

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SJC-11507 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EMMANUEL PINA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 5, 2018. - February 12, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, & Lowy, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Accident, Self-defense, Intent, 
Identification.  Self-Defense.  Intent.  Identification.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Instructions to jury, 
Challenge to jurors, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 27, 2009. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Elizabeth B. Donovan, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on November 20, 2015, was 
considered by Christine M. Roach, J. 
 
 
 
Edward B. Fogarty for the defendant. 
 
Sarah Montgomery Lewis, Assistant District Attorney (John 
Pappas, District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant 
of murder in the first degree, on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation, in the shooting deaths of Jovany M. Eason and 
Manuel Monteiro.  At trial, the Commonwealth alleged that the 
2 
 
 
 
defendant and Eason were involved in an altercation inside a 
bar, then the fight spilled out into the street, where the 
defendant grabbed a handgun from his codefendant and fired at 
Eason.1  The defendant missed, but the stray round shattered a 
window in front of the bar and hit Monteiro, a bar employee, in 
the chest.  The defendant, according to the Commonwealth, then 
chased Eason down the street and shot him multiple times in the 
back.  As the defendant fled the scene, one of Eason's friends, 
Timothy Santos, shot at the defendant, and they exchanged 
several rounds of gunfire.2 
 
In this consolidated appeal from his convictions and from 
the denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant 
challenges a number of the judge's rulings and his instructions 
                     
 
1 After a joint trial, the codefendant was convicted of 
murder in the first degree.  Commonwealth v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 
430, 431 (2015).  We vacated the conviction because the judge's 
erroneous instruction to on the law of joint venture created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, where it 
precluded the jury from finding a lesser degree of guilt.  Id. 
at 439-442.  Had it been requested, the codefendant would have 
been entitled to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter, 
based, in part, upon evidence that he brought the gun to the 
scene, pointed the handgun at Eason, did not fire it, and may 
have intended only to scare or intimidate Eason.  Id. at 438-
442. 
 
2 During this exchange, Timothy Santos was shot in the leg.  
The defendant was charged with armed assault with intent to 
murder, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon 
for this shooting.  The jury were instructed on self-defense 
with respect to these charges, and the defendant was acquitted 
on both charges. 
3 
 
 
 
to the jury.  The defendant argues that the judge erred in 
denying his requests for an instruction on accident with respect 
to Eason's death, and instructions on voluntary and involuntary 
manslaughter with regard to Monteiro's death.  The defendant 
maintains that he was denied a fair trial because the judge 
miscalculated the number of preemptory challenges that had been 
exercised by his trial counsel, depriving him of two additional 
challenges that could have been made.  The defendant maintains 
also that the judge erred in allowing identification testimony 
by a police officer who identified the defendant as an 
individual shown in video surveillance footage, as well as by 
many of the others at the scene.  In addition, the defendant 
argues that trial counsel's failure to present an intoxication 
defense through available witnesses constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Finally, the defendant asks this court 
to exercise its extraordinary authority pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, and to grant him a new trial or to reduce the 
conviction to a lesser degree of guilt. 
After considering all of the defendant's arguments, and 
conducting a thorough review of the trial record, we conclude 
that there is no reversible error, and no reason to disturb the 
verdicts. 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts that the jury could 
have found, reserving other facts for our discussion of specific 
4 
 
 
 
issues.  Many of the events, both inside and outside the bar, 
were captured by the bar's security cameras, as well as by 
security cameras mounted on a nearby building. 
In the early morning hours of August 2, 2009, an argument 
broke out at a bar and restaurant on Hancock Street in the 
Upham's Corner neighborhood of Boston.  The argument started 
shortly after the codefendant and a companion entered the bar.  
In the entranceway, the codefendant greeted another patron with 
a hug, then said, "I don't understand why you hang with the 
Draper Street niggas."  The victim, Jovany Eason, who was 
friendly with people from the Draper Street neighborhood, took 
exception.  Eason approached the codefendant and they exchanged 
angry words.  A bouncer moved in and separated the two men.  The 
codefendant and his friend left the bar and walked away from the 
area; Eason did not leave. 
The dispute continued inside the bar, where Eason argued 
with one of the codefendant's friends, Otelino Goncalves.  The 
altercation moved from the entranceway to the rear of the bar 
near the restrooms.  A few minutes later, the defendant, who was 
also a friend of the codefendant, entered the bar and headed 
directly to the men's restroom, where he joined Goncalves in 
arguing with Eason and some of Eason's friends.  A fight broke 
out between the defendant and Eason and their respective 
friends.  The bar owner, some of his employees, and a regular 
5 
 
 
 
customer named Adelberto Brandao separated the combatants.  The 
defendant was escorted out of the bar through the front door.  
Eason left the bar on his own accord immediately before the 
defendant was ejected. 
The hostilities spilled out onto Hancock Street, where 
Eason squared off to fight Goncalves in the middle of the 
street.  Before any punches were thrown, the codefendant walked 
up to Eason and pointed a pistol at him.  A patron inside the 
bar, Joao DePina,3 observed the codefendant attempt to "rack" the 
handgun or, as the witness described it, "He was trying to get 
the bullet to shoot at something."  Eason backed away.  The 
defendant then grabbed the weapon from his codefendant's hand.  
He ran toward Eason, who was standing on the sidewalk in front 
of the bar, and fired.  The defendant missed Eason, but the 
stray round, fired from a .45 caliber weapon, shattered a plate 
glass window near the front door of the bar and struck Monteiro 
in the chest.  Monteiro, who was working a second job as a cook, 
had been watching the altercation on the street from inside the 
bar.  He collapsed in the middle of the bar, and was pronounced 
dead by emergency medical technicians who arrived at the scene. 
                     
 
3 Because Joao DePina shares a last name with multiple 
unrelated individuals who testified or were involved in this 
case, we refer to him by his first name. 
6 
 
 
 
Outside, the defendant chased Eason down Hancock Street 
while firing at Eason.  The two passed a community center on the 
corner of Hancock Street and Jerome Street which had its own 
security cameras.  At the three-way intersection of Hancock 
Street, Jerome Street, and Bird Street, the defendant ran to the 
right onto Jerome Street.  Eason ran to the left onto Bird 
Street, and collapsed near the intersection shortly after he 
turned onto Bird Street.4 
On Jerome Street, near Cushing Avenue, the defendant 
encountered Timothy Santos, one of Eason's friends.  Santos, who 
was armed with a .380 caliber handgun, shot at the defendant, 
who fired back.  Both men fired multiple rounds; the defendant 
hit Santos in the leg above the knee.  A friend dropped Santos 
off at a hospital, where he refused to cooperate with police, 
and told his doctors that he woke up with the gunshot wound.5 
Police officers found Eason lying face down on the ground 
near the intersection of Hancock Street and Bird Street.  He had 
been shot in the lower back, in the upper back near his shoulder 
blade, and through the shoulder or upper arm.  The medical 
                     
4 A vehicle parked on Bird Street (on the side of the street 
opposite from where the victim collapsed) was hit with gunfire.  
The police also recovered a spent .45 caliber projectile in 
front of a funeral home on Columbia Road, more than a block away 
from the shootings on Hancock Street and Jerome Street. 
 
5 The police found two clusters of .45 caliber and .380 
caliber spent shell casings on Jerome Street. 
7 
 
 
 
examiner extracted a .45 caliber projectile from Eason's lower 
back; the other two projectiles passed through his body.  At 
trial, the medical examiner opined that Eason died as a result 
of suffering two gunshot wounds to the torso.6 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Instruction on accident.  Following 
the jury charge, the defendant requested that the judge instruct 
the jury that Eason's death could be excused as an accident.  
Trial counsel argued, "[T]here was a gun battle on top of Jerome 
Street and that the person who was shooting down with a .45 
could, in fact, in self-defense [have] shot Mr. Eason.  And that 
would fall under the category, as I'm thinking about it, 
accident."  Trial counsel also filed a supplemental request for 
jury instructions which read, in part, 
"In this case there is evidence that there was an exchange 
of gunfire between two individuals on Jerome Street . . . 
If you conclude that the government has failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the person who shot Mr. 
Santos did not act in self-defense, then for purposes of 
the following instruction, you may consider whether the 
shooting death of Mr. Eason was or was not an accident." 
 
The prosecutor urged the judge not to instruct on accident, 
on the ground that there was no basis in the evidence for such 
                     
6 Martin Lydon, a Boston police department ballistics 
expert, examined the shell casings and projectiles recovered 
from the crime scenes.  He testified that the projectiles that 
killed Monteiro and Eason, and the projectile found on Columbia 
Road, were all fired from the same .45 caliber handgun.  He also 
testified that the spent .45 caliber shell casings found on or 
near Hancock Street, and the cluster of shell casings found on 
Jerome Street, were fired from the same weapon. 
8 
 
 
 
an instruction because the defendant fatally shot Eason prior to 
the firefight on Jerome Street.  The judge declined the motion 
that the jury be instructed on accident with respect to Eason.  
Because the defendant objected, we review to determine whether 
there was prejudicial error.  Commonwealth v. Martinez, 431 
Mass. 168, 173 (2000). 
Accident, like self-defense and defense of another, is an 
affirmative defense.  Commonwealth v. Podkowka, 445 Mass. 692, 
699 (2006).  In the case of murder in the first or second 
degree, accident negates the element of intent to kill the 
victim.  Commonwealth v. Chambers, 465 Mass. 520, 536 n.15 
(2013); Lannon v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 786, 790 (1980).  If 
"fairly raised" by the evidence, due process requires that the 
Commonwealth disprove accident beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Podkowka, supra; Commonwealth v. Palmariello, 392 Mass. 126, 145 
(1984).  See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 382 Mass. 189, 203 
(1981).  A judge, of course, should not instruct on accident 
where there is no evidence of an accident.  See Commonwealth v. 
Hutchinson, 395 Mass. 568, 578-579 (1985). 
A defendant is entitled to an accident instruction in a 
shooting death "only where there is evidence of an unintentional 
or accidental discharge of a firearm."  Commonwealth v. Millyan, 
399 Mass. 171, 182 (1987).  See e.g., Commonwealth v. Neves, 474 
Mass. 355, 371 (2016) (accident instruction warranted based on 
9 
 
 
 
defendant's statements to police that gun discharged 
accidentally when taxicab driver accelerated and grabbed 
defendant's hand); Commonwealth v. Zezima, 387 Mass. 748, 750, 
756 (1982) (accident instruction predicated on evidence that 
firearm discharged as third party attempted to take gun out of 
defendant's hand); Commonwealth v. Zaccagnini, 383 Mass. 615, 
616 (1981) (reasonable doubt concerning accident raised where 
defendant testified victim had gun and it discharged as they 
struggled for control of it); Lannon, 379 Mass. at 787, 790 
(petitioner testified fatal shot was fired when screen door hit 
gun he was holding, causing it to discharge). 
The circumstances in Millyan, 399 Mass. at 174-176, are 
instructive as to the defendant's claim that it was error not to 
give an accident instruction based on the evidence before the 
jury.  In that case, the defendant entered a bar carrying a 
loaded shotgun; he was seeking to avenge the earlier stabbing of 
one of his friends, and to preempt a threat made to do him 
similar harm.  Id. at 174-175.  The defendant announced that if 
he saw any members of a rival motorcycle gang in the bar, "he 
was going to blow them away."  Id. at 175.  After issuing this 
threat, the defendant pointed the shotgun toward the rear of the 
bar and fired a shell in the victim's direction.  Id. at 176.  
The victim, who was standing in a poolroom adjacent to the bar, 
was fatally struck in the head by a number of pellets.  Id. at 
10 
 
 
 
175-176.  On appeal, the defendant contended that an accident 
instruction was required because he had fired the shotgun 
recklessly in a crowded barroom.  Id. at 182.  We held that the 
defendant's claim that the victim's death was the unfortunate 
by-product of an "intentional discharge of the shotgun" did not 
raise the legal defense of accident.  Id. 
Here, the defendant claimed that he accidentally shot the 
victim while exercising his right to self-defense.  The theories 
of self-defense and accident are "mutually exclusive."  
Commonwealth v. Barton, 367 Mass. 515, 518 (1975).  A defendant 
who shoots another in the lawful exercise of self-defense is 
entitled to an accident instruction where the facts 
independently support an argument that the weapon was discharged 
accidentally.  Id. at 517-518.  See Commonwealth v. Lacasse, 1 
Mass. App. Ct. 590, 598 (1973), S.C., 365 Mass. 271 (1974) 
(discussing "anomalous doctrine of accidental self-defense").  
In Barton, supra at 517, we noted that the evidence warranted an 
instruction on the independent theories of self-defense and 
accident because the defendant claimed that "the gun went off" 
during the fatal struggle.  Similarly, in Zaccagnini, 383 Mass. 
at 616, the defendant's testimony that the victim had a gun, and 
that it "went off" as they wrestled for control of it, raised "a 
reasonable doubt concerning whether the shooting was accidental, 
and . . . whether the defendant acted in self-defense." 
11 
 
 
 
Here, the defendant was not entitled to an accident 
instruction because there was no evidence that he 
unintentionally or accidentally discharged a firearm.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 424 Mass. 242, 246 n.3, cert. denied, 
521 U.S. 1123 (1997) ("defendant's own testimony that he fired 
the gun without aiming eliminated any issue as to accident").  
Based on the number of .45 caliber shell casings deposited on 
Jerome Street, it is clear that the defendant intentionally 
fired multiple rounds at Santos after being fired upon.  The 
defendant's claim that Eason's death was the unfortunate by-
product of an intentional shooting at another person does not 
raise the affirmative defense of accident.  Millyan, 399 Mass. 
at 182. 
b.  Transferred intent self-defense.  The circumstances of 
this case require us, in the exercise of our plenary review 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to consider an issue of first 
impression.  In other States, the shooting death of a bystander 
during an act of self-defense may be excused by application of 
transferred intent self-defense.7  See W.R. LaFave, Criminal Law, 
                     
 
7 We did not reach this issue in Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
425 Mass. 491 (1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 298 (1998) and 428 Mass 
39, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998), even though the issue 
potentially was raised by the evidence in that case.  In 
Santiago, supra at 492-493, the defendant and a rival group shot 
at each other in a public park.  A bystander was fatally struck 
by a bullet fired by either the defendant or one of the men in 
the other group.  Id.  Defense counsel argued that the defendant 
12 
 
 
 
§ 6.4, at 449 (6th ed. 2017) (LaFave).  We conclude that the 
defendant is not entitled to relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, because the facts in this case do not support the 
application of transferred intent self-defense, and we leave its 
adoption as a matter of our homicide jurisprudence for another 
day. 
The theory of transferred intent is well established in the 
Commonwealth and, indeed, forms the basis for the defendant's 
liability for the shooting death of Monteiro.  See Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide at 45-46 (2018).  Under this theory, 
"if a defendant intends to kill a person and in attempting to do 
so mistakenly kills another person, such as a bystander, the 
defendant is treated under the law as if he intended to kill the 
bystander."  Commonwealth v. Taylor, 463 Mass. 857, 863 (2012).  
See Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 478 Mass. 443, 453 (2017) 
(transferred intent applies where defendant misidentifies 
victim); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 Mass. 340, 344 n.5 (2001) 
                     
could not be found guilty, as a matter of law, because the 
Commonwealth could not prove either that he fired the fatal 
shot, or that he had instigated the shootout.  Id. at 503.  We 
rejected the defendant's claim.  As to whether the defendant 
fired the fatal shot, we held, "where the defendant chooses to 
engage in a gun battle with another with the intent to kill or 
do grievous bodily harm and a third party is killed, the 
defendant may be held liable for the homicide even if it was the 
defendant's opponent who fired the fatal shot."  Id.  We held 
also that evidence that the defendant retrieved a gun and made 
no attempt to flee from the hostile group was sufficient to 
disprove self-defense.  Id. 
13 
 
 
 
("the jury need only find that the defendant intended to kill 
one person and, in the course of an attempt to do so, killed 
another" [quotation and citation omitted]). 
 
In a number of States, the theory of transferred "innocent" 
intent has been applied to excuse the shooting death of a 
bystander during the lawful exercise of self-defense.8  See e.g., 
State v. Stevenson, 38 Del. 105, 111 (1936); Pinder v. State, 27 
Fla. 370, 377-379, 383-387 (1891); People v. Jackson, 390 Mich. 
621, 624 (1973); State v. Green, 206 S.E.2d 923 (W. Va. 1974).  
See generally Annot., Unintended Killing of or Injury to Third 
Person During Attempted Self-defense, 55 A.L.R. 3d 620 (1974).  
In LaFave, supra at 449, the concept is explained as follows: 
"There are, of course, some situations where, though A 
intentionally kills or injures B, A is not guilty of murder 
or battery. . . . Now suppose A shoots at B under these 
circumstances but, missing B, hits and kills or injures C, 
an innocent bystander.  If A aims at his attacker B in 
proper self-defense, but hits C instead, he is not 
generally guilty of murder or battery of C.  Once again, he 
is only as guilty as to C as he would have been had his aim 
been accurate enough to have hit B." 
 
                     
8 One way to distinguish between transferred intent and 
transferred intent self-defense is to focus on the intent being 
transferred.  In transferred intent, when a defendant acts with 
the intent to harm an intended victim, but because of bad aim 
harms a third person, the law imposes liability just as if the 
defendant actually had harmed the intended target.  See 
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 463 Mass. 857, 863 (2012).  In 
transferred intent self-defense, the defendant's innocent 
intent, where he or she was privileged to use deadly force in 
the proper exercise of self-defense, is transferred to the 
unintended victim.  See D.A. Dripps, R. N. Boyce, R.M. Perkins, 
Criminal Law and Procedure, at 785 (13th ed. 2017). 
14 
 
 
 
We have not as yet recognized transferred intent self-
defense as a matter of our homicide jurisprudence, and need not 
do so in this case.  Viewed in the light most favorable to the 
defendant, the evidence established that he fired errant 
gunshots in the direction of Bird Street, where Eason collapsed.  
The defendant, however, cannot point to any evidence that he 
fatally shot Eason during his gun battle with Santos.  To the 
contrary, the evidence supported a reasonable conclusion that 
the defendant shot Eason prior to the gunfight on Jerome Street, 
based on shell casings recovered on Hancock Street, surveillance 
footage of Eason grabbing his back in the spot where he suffered 
a fatal gunshot wound, and the fact that Eason was found 
unresponsive a short distance along Bird Street after rounding 
the corner from Hancock Street.  See Commonwealth v. Perry, 432 
Mass. 214, 225 (2000) ("Where a defendant causes injury which, 
along with other contributing factors or medical sequella of the 
injury, leads to death, jurors may determine that the 
defendant's acts were the proximate cause of the injury"); 
Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 379 Mass. 810, 825 (1980) (defendant 
causes victim's death where his actions were "a cause, which, in 
the natural and continuous sequence produced death, and without 
which the death would not have occurred" [citation omitted]).  
Regardless of whether Eason was exposed to additional gunfire 
near Bird Street, after an earlier injury, we are not required 
15 
 
 
 
to apply the theory of transferred intent self-defense to 
correct a miscarriage of justice. 
c.  Instruction on manslaughter.  A manslaughter 
instruction is required if the evidence, considered in the light 
most favorable to a defendant, would permit a verdict of 
manslaughter and not murder.  See Commonwealth v. Nelson, 468 
Mass. 1, 13 (2014); Commonwealth v. Colon, 449 Mass. 207, 220, 
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1079, S.C., (2007), 479 Mass. 1032 
(2017).  "In deciding whether a manslaughter instruction is 
supported by the evidence, all reasonable inferences must be 
resolved in favor of the defendant," Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 
367 Mass. 743, 746 (1975), but a judge should not instruct the 
jury "on a hypothesis not supported by the evidence."  Id. 
We first address the defendant's request for an involuntary 
manslaughter instruction related to the death of Monteiro.  At 
the charge conference, the defendant requested an instruction on 
involuntary manslaughter.9  He agreed that there was some 
circumstantial evidence of "an intent to kill Mr. Eason at that 
point."  He argued, however, that the fatal shot that shattered 
the bar window and struck Monteiro possibly had been fired as "a 
warning shot," or in an "attempt to just injure somebody."  The 
                     
9 In his memorandum in support of this argument, the 
defendant sought an instruction on involuntary manslaughter 
based on wanton or reckless conduct; at the conference itself, 
he did not specify this reasoning. 
16 
 
 
 
judge declined to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter, 
and the defendant objected at the conclusion of the charge.  We 
review to determine whether there was error and, if so, whether 
the error prejudiced the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 
459 Mass. 249, 252-253, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1080 (2011). 
The common-law crime of manslaughter is defined as an 
unlawful killing without malice.  Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 
Cush. 295, 308 (1850).  See Commonwealth v. Vizcarrando, 427 
Mass. 392, 396 (1998), S.C., 431 Mass. 360 (2000) and 447 Mass. 
1017 (2006) ("Malice is what distinguishes murder from 
manslaughter").  The distinction between murder and manslaughter 
"means that a verdict of manslaughter is possible only in the 
absence of malice."  Commonwealth v. Pagan, 471 Mass. 537, 546, 
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 548 (2015).  The lesser included 
offense of involuntary manslaughter, by contrast, is defined as 
"the unintentional result of an act committed with such 
disregard of its probable harm to another as to amount to wanton 
or reckless conduct."  Commonwealth v. Souza, 428 Mass. 478, 
492(1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Nichypor, 419 Mass. 209, 217 
(1994).  See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 396-399 
(1944). 
"In determining whether an involuntary manslaughter 
instruction must be given, we ask whether any reasonable view of 
the evidence would have permitted the jury to find wanton and 
17 
 
 
 
reckless conduct rather than actions from which a plain and 
strong likelihood of death would follow" (quotations and 
citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 331 
(2007).  We agree with the defendant's argument that a judge is 
required to provide an instruction on involuntary manslaughter 
where there is evidence that a defendant "was not pointing or 
aiming a gun at the victim, but was rather aiming in the air or 
at the ground."  Commonwealth v. Iacoviello, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 
231, 245 (2016).  We note also, as we observed in the 
codefendant's case, that a defendant is entitled to an 
instruction on involuntary manslaughter based on evidence that 
he or she pointed a loaded gun at a victim with the intent to 
scare or intimidate.  See Tavares, 471 Mass. at 438. 
The defendant's actions in Commonwealth v. Horne, 466 Mass. 
440 (2013), illustrate the type of behavior that has been 
considered wanton or reckless, as opposed to an act of third 
prong malice, in the context of gunshots fired at a person or 
into a crowd of people.  In Horne, supra at 444, the evidence 
supported a reasonable inference that the defendant, in the 
early morning, fired a rifle through a windows covered by 
venetian blinds and dark curtains.  "There was nothing in the 
evidence to suggest that it was possible to see through the 
window's curtains and blinds, that shadows of people could be 
seen moving behind the covered window, or that sounds indicative 
18 
 
 
 
of human occupation could be heard coming from the room."  Id.  
"[I]t is only when a defendant has reason to believe that he is 
firing in the direction of a person or crowd of people that his 
conduct creates nothing less than a plain and strong likelihood 
of death."  Id. at 445.  Based on this, we held that the jury 
should have been permitted to consider whether the shooting was 
an act of wanton or reckless conduct.  Id. at 444-445.  See 
Commonwealth v. Kinney, 361 Mass. 709, 712 (1972) (involuntary 
manslaughter instruction warranted based on defendant's 
testimony that he produced gun while holding onto railing in 
stairway and being beaten by others, pointed it up towards 
ceiling, and "heard the gun go off"). 
By contrast, we held in Commonwealth v. Dyous, 436 Mass. 
719, 731 (2002), that the defendant, whose coventurer shot into 
an occupied motor vehicle, was not entitled to an instruction on 
involuntary manslaughter.  We noted that "there was no evidence 
that they discharged their weapons believing no one was in the 
automobile," id. at 731, or that the coventurers intended only 
to vandalize the vehicle.  Id. at 732.  Nor was there evidence 
that anyone had fired into the air.  Id.  Rather than wanton or 
reckless conduct, the evidence "pointed singularly to an intent 
to kill."  Id.  See Braley, 449 Mass. at 332 ("Firing a rifle 
multiple times, directed toward specific individuals, provides a 
sufficient basis to conclude that the defendant understood the 
19 
 
 
 
likely deadly consequences of his actions"); Commonwealth v. 
Jenks, 426 Mass. 582, 586 (1998) ("Firing a pistol seven times 
in a crowded room is more than wanton and reckless conduct . . . 
it is malicious conduct in the plainest sense"); Commonwealth v. 
Mack, 423 Mass. 288, 290 (1996) ("Absent some evidence that the 
defendant's knowledge was impaired, intentionally discharging a 
firearm in the direction of another person creates a plain and 
strong likelihood of death" [footnote omitted]). 
In this case, the evidence did not support an instruction 
on involuntary manslaughter.  The jury were presented with 
overwhelming evidence that the defendant fired a gun at Eason, 
in front of a crowded bar.  The projectile missed Eason, 
shattered a window, and struck Monteiro in the chest.  The 
defendant's argument that he meant to fire a warning shot 
(apparently at chest level of the six-foot tall Eason) is 
entirely speculative. See Commonwealth v. Santo, 375 Mass. 299, 
305-306 (1978) ("a judge is not required to instruct on a 
hypothesis that is not supported by the evidence").  The 
defendant's argument that he meant only to injure is equally 
unavailing.  As discussed, discharging a shot at another person, 
regardless of whether the shot is meant to injure or kill, 
suffices to establish second or third prong malice, as it 
"creates a plain and strong likelihood of death."  See Mack, 423 
20 
 
 
 
Mass. at 290.  The judge properly denied the defendant's request 
for an instruction on involuntary manslaughter. 
We turn to the question of voluntary manslaughter.  The 
defendant requested an instruction on voluntary manslaughter at 
the charge conference, without specifying the grounds for his 
request.  On appeal, he contends that the judge should have 
provided an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on the 
theory of excessive use of force in self-defense.  This 
argument, however, is inconsistent with the defendant's earlier 
position concerning the availability of a self-defense claim. 
During the course of the charge conference, the defendant 
conceded that there was no issue of self-defense with respect to 
the shooting in front of the bar.  While discussing the issue of 
self-defense, with respect to the shooting of Santos on Jerome 
Street, the prosecutor requested that the instructions be 
"crystal clear" that self-defense applied only to "what happened 
on Jerome Street with Santos."  Defense counsel responded, "I 
would not argue any differently."  The prosecutor repeated, "It 
[self-defense] has no bearing on what happened at [the bar] or 
up until the point that [the defendant] allegedly went up Jerome 
Street and engaged in whatever happened up there with Mr. 
Santos.  That's all I'm requesting . . . that we're crystal 
clear on that."  The judge stated, "I will be very specific that 
it only applies to [Santos]."  Defense counsel agreed to this, 
21 
 
 
 
and pointed out that his written request for jury instructions 
on self-defense exclusively referenced the shooting of Timothy 
Santos. 
"An objection adequately preserves the claimed error so 
long as counsel makes known to the court the action which he 
desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the 
court" (quotations and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
McDonagh, 480 Mass. 131, 138 (2018); Mass. R. Crim. P 24 (b), 
378 Mass. 895 (1979) (party must specify "the matter to which he 
objects and the grounds of his objection").  An objection to the 
omission of a voluntary manslaughter instruction usually is 
sufficient to alert a trial judge as to the necessity of that 
charge under any viable theory of voluntary manslaughter, and to 
preserve a defendant's appellate rights.  See Commonwealth v. 
Maskell, 403 Mass. 111, 115 (1988).  In this case, however, the 
judge could not reasonably have considered the possibility of an 
instruction on voluntary manslaughter predicated on the use of 
excessive force in self-defense, because the defendant 
specifically disavowed this theory.  We therefore review the 
defendant's unpreserved claim of error for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Wright, 
411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). 
"Voluntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing 'arising not 
from malice, but from . . . sudden passion induced by reasonable 
22 
 
 
 
provocation, sudden combat or excessive force in self-defense.'"  
Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 443 (2006), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Carrion, 407 Mass. 263, 267 (1990).  An 
instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on excessive force 
in self-defense is warranted where there is evidence that the 
defendant was entitled to use some amount of force in self-
defense.  See Commonwealth v. Anestal, 463 Mass. 655, 674 
(2012); Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. 213, 218 (2005).  For 
a defendant to use deadly force, the defendant must have "a 
reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm and a reasonable 
belief that no other means would suffice to prevent such harm."  
See Anestal, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Houston, 332 Mass. 
687, 690 (1955).  In addition, the privilege to use deadly force 
"arises only in circumstances in which the defendant uses all 
proper means to avoid physical combat."  Commonwealth v. 
Mercado, 456 Mass. 198, 209 (2010). 
We conclude that the absence of an instruction on voluntary 
manslaughter did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  In his brief, the defendant contends 
that he was entitled to use deadly force outside the bar to 
protect himself, or his friend Goncalves, for several reasons. 
There was an "explosive" argument between Goncalves and Eason 
outside the bar; the defendant argued with Brandao (who 
23 
 
 
 
allegedly was aligned with Eason); "all the while" Brandao 
pointed "what the defendant suggests is a firearm." 
The defendant did not testify, and the record does not 
otherwise contain sufficient evidence to support an instruction 
on self-defense.  Brandao denied that he possessed a firearm in 
front of the bar, and no witnesses testified that Brandao 
participated in the altercation, or that Brandao threatened the 
defendant with a firearm.10  Moreover, the defendant did not 
establish that he was somehow justified in using deadly force to 
protect himself or another from Eason (who was unarmed). 
d.  Peremptory challenges.  There is no dispute, as the 
transcript indicates and the Commonwealth concedes, that the 
defendant was deprived of the right to exercise two peremptory 
                     
 
10 On appeal, the defendant contends that a bartender, 
Francisco Amado, testified that an unidentified person 
(presumably Adelberto Brandao) was pointing something moments 
before the first gunshot, and that the object in his hand could 
have been a gun.  The defendant mischaracterizes Amado's 
testimony.  On cross-examination, Amado testified: 
 
Q.:  "Does it appear that he's pointing something at 
people?" 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
Q.:  "Does it appear he's possibly pointing a gun?" 
 
A.:  "He's pointing something, but I can't --" 
 
Q.:  "Okay.  So you can't tell?" 
 
A.:  "No." 
24 
 
 
 
challenges.  The issue presented on appeal is whether the 
defendant was able to show prejudice or injury resulting from 
that error.  See Commonwealth v. Bockman, 442 Mass. 757, 762-763 
(2004). 
The judge decided to empanel sixteen jurors.  As a result, 
each party was entitled to sixteen peremptory challenges.  See 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 20 (c) (1), 378 Mass. 889 (1979).  The judge 
began the empanelment process by introducing the case and the 
parties, and asking the entire venire general questions, as then 
required by G. L. c. 234, § 28, and Mass. R. Crim. P. 
20 (b) (1).  Thereafter, she brought each juror to sidebar for 
individual questioning, focused on bias against people from Cape 
Verde, bias against individuals who consumed alcohol, and 
familiarity with the neighborhood bar.  At the conclusion of 
individual questioning, the prosecutor and the two defense 
attorneys were required to exercise peremptory challenges on any 
juror the judge had declared indifferent. 
On the final day of the three-day empanelment, the 
defendant exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse a potential 
juror called to fill seat number 14.  The judge mistakenly 
informed defense counsel, "That takes care of all your 
challenges."  At that point, the defendant had exercised 
fourteen peremptory challenges and had two remaining.  Later, 
defense counsel stated, "It is my understanding, and I might be 
25 
 
 
 
wrong, that I had two challenges left."  Thereafter, the judge 
sat two jurors:  juror no. 69 (seat number 16) and juror no. 80 
(seat number 10) (to replace an excused juror).  The defendant, 
in both instances, did not object to the jurors being seated or 
raise a challenge for cause. 
While not guaranteed by the United States Constitution or 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, peremptory challenges 
"historically [have] performed an important role in assuring the 
constitutional right to a fair trial" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Bockman, 442 Mass. at 762.  See Commonwealth v. 
Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 396 (1995); Commonwealth v. Wood, 389 
Mass. 552, 559 (1983).  The ability to strike a potential juror 
for no reason at all affords a party the option of eliminating 
from the jury an individual who may harbor a subtle bias not 
fully vetted during voir dire.  Bockman, supra. 
In Wood, 389 Mass. at 564, we stated that "the erroneous 
denial of the right to exercise a peremptory challenge is 
reversible error without a showing of prejudice."  See 
Commonwealth v. Green, 420 Mass. 771, 776 (1995); Commonwealth 
v. Hyatt, 409 Mass. 689, 692 (1991).  Nonetheless, we also have 
held that the purposes underlying the "award and exercise of a 
peremptory challenge" are satisfied where no person is seated as 
a juror "against whom the defendant could claim suspected or 
perceived bias, and no person against whom he had exercised or 
26 
 
 
 
attempted to exercise a peremptory challenge."  See Bockman, 442 
Mass. at 763.  See also Commonwealth v. Smith, 461 Mass. 438, 
443 (2012) (no possibility of prejudice where challenged juror 
selected as alternate and did not deliberate); Commonwealth v. 
Leahy, 445 Mass. 481, 497 (2005) (defendant did not establish 
that he would have exercised proper peremptory challenge had 
another been available where he did not use his last challenge 
until final juror was seated); Commonwealth v. Auguste, 414 
Mass. 51, 58 (1992) (defendant "suffered a prejudicial 
diminution of peremptory challenges" based on showing that he 
would have exercised proper peremptory challenge had another 
been available). 
We conclude that the defendant is not entitled to a new 
trial based on the erroneous deprivation of the two preemptory 
challenges.  The defendant has not shown a violation of his 
right to an impartial jury.  He did not object when the judge 
advised him that he had exhausted his peremptory challenges.  He 
did not argue at trial, in his motion for a new trial, or on 
appeal, that he would have used a remaining peremptory challenge 
to exclude either juror no. 69 or juror no. 80.  Indeed, the 
defendant did not contend that juror no. 69 or juror no. 80 were 
partial or biased, and did not otherwise voice any 
dissatisfaction with these jurors.  See Bockman, 442 Mass. at 
762. 
27 
 
 
 
In addition, the defendant received all of the rights 
afforded by State law.  At the time of the defendant's trial, 
G. L. c. 234, § 32, provided, "No irregularity in . . . [the] 
empanelling of jurors shall be sufficient to set aside a 
verdict, unless the objecting party has been injured thereby or 
unless the objection was made before the verdict."11  See 
Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 451 Mass. 566, 570 (2008) (no 
irregularity in empanelment of jurors is sufficient to overturn 
verdict unless defendant objects or demonstrates harm); 
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 251, 256 (2018) 
(defendant objected to reduced number of peremptory challenges 
and asked for additional ones).  As discussed, the defendant has 
not shown that he was injured by the deprivation of the two 
peremptory challenges, and he did not object prior to the 
verdict.  There was no prejudice and no reason to grant a new 
trial on this basis. 
e.  Identification evidence.  The defendant alleges that he 
was deprived of the right to a fair trial due to the erroneous 
introduction of identification testimony.  We address each of 
these claims in turn. 
                     
 
11 The provision was effective until May 10, 2016, and was 
repealed by St. 2016, c. 36, § 1, when attorney voir dire became 
effective.  See St. 2016, c. 36, § 4, inserting G. L. c. 234A, 
§§ 67A-D. 
28 
 
 
 
i.  Police officer's identification of the defendant.  
Surveillance video footage from the bar and from a nearby 
community center building played a prominent role at trial.  In 
his opening statement, the prosecutor characterized the video 
surveillance cameras "working inside and outside of [the bar] 
and . . . down the street at the [community center]" as "silent 
witnesses."  He told the jury, "You're going to be able to see 
what [the defendants] were wearing that night, who they arrived 
with, what time, what they did inside, . . . what they did 
outside and what they did leading up to, during and after the 
time that Jovany Eason and Manuel Monteiro were shot." 
At trial, Boston police Sergeant Detective James Wyse 
testified that an individual, who was depicted in the 
surveillance video entering the bar at 1:04 A.M., wearing a 
white T-shirt, was the defendant.  The defendant objected to 
this testimony, and we therefore review under the prejudicial 
error standard.12  See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 431 Mass. at 
173. 
                     
 
12 For the first time on appeal, the defendant contends that 
Sergeant Detective Wyse impermissibly identified the codefendant 
and other individuals on the surveillance tapes.  We conclude 
that the defendant has not established a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 
Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).  Of these 
individuals, Brandao and Aldison Resende testified at trial and 
identified themselves in the surveillance video.  Other 
witnesses, apart from Wyse, identified all but one of the 
remaining individuals -- three bystanders and the codefendant. 
29 
 
 
 
Making a determination of the identity of a person from a 
photograph or video image is an expression of an opinion.  
Commonwealth v. Pleas, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 321, 323-324 (2000).  A 
lay witness is permitted to identify an individual depicted in a 
video or photograph if that testimony would assist the jurors in 
making their own independent identification.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 701 (2018).  "The general rule is that a witness's opinion 
concerning the identity of a person depicted in a surveillance 
photograph is admissible if there is some basis for concluding 
that the witness is more likely to correctly identify the 
defendant from the photograph than is the jury."  Commonwealth 
v. Vacher, 469 Mass. 425, 441 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Pleas, 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 326.  "Put another way, such 
testimony is admissible  . . . when the witness possesses 
sufficient relevant familiarity with the defendant that the jury 
cannot also possess" (quotations and citation omitted).  Vacher, 
supra.  Absent this foundation, a witness's identification of a 
defendant from a video or photograph invades the province of the 
jury to draw their own conclusions about who is who.  Id. 
We need not dwell on the issue whether Wyse was in a better 
position than the jurors to identify the defendant, and whether 
the testimony was admitted erroneously.  It is clear that Wyse's 
identification testimony, even if erroneous, was not 
prejudicial.  Prior to his testimony, two witnesses, Aldison 
30 
 
 
 
Resende and Brandao, identified the defendant as the individual 
depicted in the surveillance footage walking into the bar, 
wearing a white T-shirt.  The bar owner identified the defendant 
as the person depicted in the surveillance footage being removed 
from the bar after the fight in the restroom.  A fourth witness, 
Joao, identified the defendant, from a still image of the 
surveillance video, as the individual outside the bar who "took 
the gun from the other kid."  See Commonwealth v. Austin, 421 
Mass. 357, 366 (1995).  Thus, although the testimony of a police 
officer, with its possibly greater imprint of authority as to 
identification of a defendant in these circumstances, is not 
permissible absent some compelling reason that the police 
officer is in a better position than the jury to identify the 
defendant, there was no prejudice to the defendant in these 
circumstances. 
 
ii.  Photographic array.  The defendant also challenges the 
fact that, contrary to Boston police department regulations, 
individuals asked to identify him from a photographic array were 
presented only five photographs, including his, from which to 
choose.  In November 2004, the Boston police department adopted 
standard protocols for the collection and preservation of 
eyewitness identification evidence.  Under this protocol, a 
photographic array must "include a total of [eight] photos 
consisting of seven (7) fillers, plus one (1) suspect."  
31 
 
 
 
Pursuant to this protocol, Wyse prepared a photographic array 
consisting of eight photographs arranged in sequential fashion.  
On August 7, 2009, a police officer unconnected to the 
investigation, acting as a blind administrator, displayed the 
eight-person array to Joao.  A month later, Wyse provided the 
folder to a different police detective unconnected with the 
investigation, and that detective displayed the photographs to 
Brandao.  This time, however, three filler photographs were 
missing, and the array consisted of only five photographs.  Wyse 
testified that this was a mistake, and that he had assumed that 
the folder was intact from the prior identification procedures 
and that it contained eight photographs. 
The defendant did not raise this issue in a motion to 
suppress identification evidence as an unnecessarily suggestive 
identification procedure, or object to its admission in evidence 
at trial.  See Commonwealth v. Watson, 455 Mass. 246, 250 
(2009).  On appeal, he contends that the use of a five-person 
array violated this court's ruling in Commonwealth v. Walker, 
460 Mass. 590, 604 (2011), and that he has been prejudiced by 
the error.  We review to determine whether the identification 
procedure created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. at 682. 
In Walker, 460 Mass. at 604, we held that, "[u]nless there 
are exigent or extraordinary circumstances, the police should 
32 
 
 
 
not show an eyewitness a photographic array, whether 
simultaneous or sequential, that contains fewer than five 
fillers for every suspect photograph."  While the procedure used 
inadvertently did not comport with this requirement, the 
defendant has not shown prejudice from it.  Walker was issued 
more than two years after Wyse arranged for the identification 
procedure used in this case.  The defendant does not contend 
that the identification procedure was unduly suggestive.  To the 
extent that the police, albeit inadvertently, violated their own 
internal policies, this was a matter for cross-examination. 
 
iii.  Witness's familiarity with the defendant's name.  The 
defendant contends also that the judge erred in denying his 
request for a voir dire examination of Joao concerning his 
knowledge that the shooter's nickname was "Ima."  The decision 
to conduct a voir dire examination of a witness rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial judge, Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 
425 Mass. 361, 370 n.5 (1997), and the judge's ruling will not 
be disturbed unless it constitutes "a clear error of judgment in 
weighing the factors relevant to the decision . . . such that 
the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives" 
(quotations and citation omitted).  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 
Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
Prior to August 1, 2009, Joao recognized the defendant from 
the neighborhood and knew the street where the defendant lived, 
33 
 
 
 
but did not know his name or nickname.  Sometime after the 
shooting, and before Joao spoke to the police, he learned from 
someone in the community that the shooter's nickname was "Ima."  
On August 7, 2009, Joao identified the defendant's photograph 
from an array and described him as "Ima."  He told the police 
that the person in the photograph was "the person [he saw] shoot 
inside [the bar].  I [saw] him [take] a gun from the other guy 
and shoot. 'Ima Ima.'" 
The defendant requested a voir dire examination of Joao to 
determine "where [Joao] got that information."  The prosecutor 
represented that Joao had heard the nickname from an unknown 
source outside of law enforcement, had known the shooter "by 
face" prior to the incident, and knew where the shooter lived.  
The judge denied the request for a voir dire hearing, and ruled 
that the Commonwealth would be prohibited from suggesting that 
Joao had known the defendant's nickname before the shooting.  
The judge agreed with the Commonwealth that Joao's lack of 
personal knowledge at the time of the shooting would be "fair 
cross-examination." 
On direct examination, Joao testified that he had seen the 
shooter around "once in a while" on a particular street in the 
neighborhood, and that he knew that the defendant's father, 
"Mocho," lived on that street.  Joao further testified: 
34 
 
 
 
Q.:  "Is it fair to say that the person you saw shooting 
the gun, you didn't know that person by name?" 
 
A.:  "Before, no." 
Q.:  "And you didn't know that person by nickname?" 
A.:  "No." 
Q.:  "But you did know, and you told the police, you knew 
that person by sight?" 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
Later, Joao testified that he identified "Ima" from a series of 
photographs.  He stated, however, that he did not know the 
shooter's nickname on August 1, 2009, and only heard the 
nickname from someone else. 
We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision 
to deny the defendant's motion for a voir dire hearing 
concerning the source of Joao's information.  Joao testified 
that someone told him the defendant's nickname prior to the 
identification procedure, and there was no suggestion that Joao 
knew the nickname at the time of the shooting.  The defendant 
chose not to pursue the issue on cross-examination, and did not 
contend that this information tainted Joao's identification 
testimony. 
f.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant moved 
for a new trial, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing 
in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), based on trial counsel's 
"inexplicable" failure to investigate and advance a defense of 
35 
 
 
 
intoxication.  Another judge (the trial judge having retired) 
denied the defendant's motion for a new trial without a hearing.  
The motion judge determined that the defendant had not raised a 
substantial issue that would merit a hearing.  In the motion 
judge's view, trial counsel made a reasoned, strategic decision 
to forgo an intoxication defense based on the available 
evidence.  When the defendant submitted his motion for a new 
trial, evidence that he had been drinking alcohol and smoking 
marijuana throughout the day of the shooting was not newly 
discovered, as it would have been readily discoverable through 
reasonable diligence prior to trial, and, indeed, the 
defendant's counsel had mentioned at the beginning of trial that 
he intended to call the defendant's sister as to her knowledge 
of the defendant's drinking and smoking throughout that day. 
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance in a case of 
murder in the first degree, we apply the more favorable standard 
of review of a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  See Commonwealth v. 
Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 358 (2016).  "We consider whether there 
was an error in the course of the trial (by defense counsel, the 
prosecutor, or the judge) and, if there was, whether that error 
was likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion."  Id., 
quoting Commonwealth v. Lessieur, 472 Mass. 317, 327, cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 418 (2015).  Where the ineffective assistance 
36 
 
 
 
of counsel claim is based on a tactical or strategic decision, 
we apply a more rigorous standard that, to be ineffective, the 
attorney's decision must have been "manifestly unreasonable" 
(citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Lang, 473 Mass. 1, 14 
(2015).  Based upon our review of the record, we agree with the 
motion judge's conclusion that the defendant was not deprived of 
his right to effective representation. 
To support his motion for a new trial, the defendant 
submitted five affidavits from friends and family members (his 
sister and brother) stating that they knew from personal 
observation that the defendant had been intoxicated from 
drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana on August 1, 2009.  The 
defendant's proffer included an affidavit from his sister, who 
stated, "I was at my residence with my brother Emmanuel Pina and 
several other friends and family.  We were hanging out on the 
porch from the early morning into the late evening.  We were 
drinking beer and smoking weed.  I observed my brother . . . to 
be drinking and smoking all day with us and appeared to be high 
and intoxicated." 
The defendant also submitted an affidavit of trial counsel 
detailing counsel's efforts to investigate and raise an 
intoxication defense.  In sum, trial counsel located witnesses, 
including the defendant's sister, who "confirmed that [the 
defendant] had been drinking beer/hard liquor and smoking 
37 
 
 
 
marijuana just before he left for the bar."  Trial counsel 
interviewed the defendant's sister and "became concerned about 
her memory, willingness to testify and her ability to withstand 
cross-examination."  In addition, trial counsel's investigator 
continued to search for other witnesses to corroborate the 
sister's testimony.  The investigator identified at least one 
individual who indicated that the defendant had been intoxicated 
that night.  That person subsequently refused to meet with trial 
counsel.  Other potential witnesses, according to trial counsel, 
"down right refused to speak with [the investigator and trial 
counsel]." 
During the trial, counsel continued to assess the value of 
presenting an intoxication defense through the defendant's 
sister, in light of her vulnerabilities and the possibility that 
the defendant would testify.  On the first day of empanelment, 
trial counsel moved to exempt the defendant's sister from the 
sequestration order.  He informed the judge that she would 
testify "as to [one] narrow area and that is that she was with 
my client the evening of the shooting . . . they were drinking 
shots and beer on the porch of their house. . . .  Her opinion 
would be that [the defendant] had drunk excessively that night." 
As the trial unfolded, counsel waited until the close of 
the Commonwealth's evidence before he decided whether to call 
the sister as a witness.  In his affidavit, trial counsel 
38 
 
 
 
explained that he "assessed this possibility in conjunction with 
[the defendant] testifying himself."  When the Commonwealth 
rested, trial counsel decided not to call the sister or to 
present any evidence.  While he did not recall the details of 
his discussions with the defendant's sister, counsel represented 
that "this conversation reinforced my concerns that she would 
not be a good witness." 
 
A judge is required to grant a defendant an evidentiary 
hearing on a motion for a new trial "only if a substantial issue 
is raised by the motion or affidavits."  Commonwealth v. Torres, 
469 Mass. 398, 402 (2014).  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (3).  
"[A] judge considers the seriousness of the issues raised and 
the adequacy of the defendant's showing on those issues."  
Torres, supra at 402-403.  See Commonwealth v. Shuman, 445 Mass. 
268, 278 (2005). 
The judge had more than adequate grounds on which to deny 
the motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing.  She 
found that trial counsel's affidavit was "very clear about the 
decision he made on the question of intoxication."  Trial 
counsel, she determined, "spotted the possible defense early and 
took reasonable and diligent steps to pursue it."  These steps 
included attempting to identify additional witnesses and 
assessing the value of calling the defendant's sister in light 
of her "difficulties."  The judge determined that trial counsel 
39 
 
 
 
"made the deliberate and strategic decision that [the sister] 
would not be a good witness."  The judge concluded, and we 
agree, that counsel's informed strategic decisions were not 
manifestly unreasonable. 
 
Moreover, the defendant has not demonstrated that he raised 
a substantial issue of newly discovered evidence.  A defendant 
seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence 
bears the burden of demonstrating that (1) the evidence "is in 
fact newly discovered"; (2) the newly discovered evidence is 
"credible and material"; and (3) the newly discovered evidence 
"casts real doubt on the justice of the conviction" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Staines, 441 Mass. 
521, 530 (2004).  The first prong of this test requires a 
defendant to show that reasonable diligence, on the part either 
of the defendant or defense counsel, would not have uncovered 
the evidence by the time of trial, or, if a subsequent motion 
for a new trial, the earlier filing of the first motion for a 
new trial.  See Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 306 
(1986).  See also Commonwealth v. LaFaille, 430 Mass. 44, 55 
(1999) (defendant could be expected to uncover evidence that 
witness observed someone else shoot victim where witness dated 
defendant's sister at time of trial). 
The defendant has not met his burden of demonstrating that 
reasonable pretrial diligence on his part would not have 
40 
 
 
 
produced the statements by the purportedly newly discovered 
witnesses.  The witnesses consisted of the defendant's friends, 
and a family member, who were with him for hours prior to the 
incident.  Further, according to the trial record, two of the 
friends were inside the bar with the defendant and participated 
in the altercation.  We agree with the motion judge that "the 
identity of all these people was readily discoverable by the 
defendant long before trial.  All that can fairly be described 
as new about these affidavits is the witness's new willingness 
to address the particular topic of [the defendant's] 
intoxication, and to go on record doing so."  A posttrial change 
of heart by a witness, well known to the defendant before trial, 
does not constitute newly discovered evidence. 
3.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have carefully 
reviewed the entire record pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and 
we conclude that there is no reason to order a new trial or to 
reduce the conviction to a lesser degree of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgements affirmed.