Title: THOMAS v SAVAGE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12253
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: January 15, 1973

No. 12253 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1972 PEARL T H O M A S and O R L O T H O M A S , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, G. 0. SAVAGE, SR.; G. 0. SAVAGE, JR. and SAFECO INSURANCE C O M P A N Y O F AMERICA, a corporation, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of t h e Second J u d i c i a l District, Honorable James D. Freebourn, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Arthur P. Acher argued, Helena, Montana. For Respondent : Maurice F. Hennessy, Butte, Montana. Corette, Smith and Dean, Butte, Montana. Kendrick Smith argued, Butte, Montana. F e l t , Speare and Thompson, B i l l i n g s , Montana. Submitted: September 21, 1972 ~ e c i d e d : JAN 1 5 1973 Filed: JAblI51973 M r . Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal by G. 0. Savage, Sr., the moving party i n the d i s t r i c t court. Savage moved the d i s t r i c t court of Silver B o w County "To vacate and s e t aside the judgment entered i n the above entitled cases (Pearl and Orlo Thomas, v. G. 0. Savage e t a1 .) on December 11, 1970, i n favor of Plaintiff and against said Defendant." H e further moved, "To vacate and set aside the judgment entered i n the above entitled cases on December 18, 1970, i n favor of the Third Party Plaintiff Safeco Insurance Company of America, and against the said Defendant." The ground for this motion was that the d i s t r i c t court was without jurisdiction t o enter these judgments because Savage had not been served w i t h process. The underlying action was an automobile accident involving G. 0. Savage, J r , and M r . and Mrs. Thomas. Separate actions were filed by M r . and Mrs. Thomas i n January, 1970, against G. 0. Savage, Jr., (driver), G. 0. Savage, Sr. (owner of car), and Safeco Insurance Company of America, the carrier of Thomas ' uninsured motor- i s t coverage, for damages due t o personal injuries sustained i n collision. Copies of summons and complaint were served on the secretary of state; he mailed the copies (certified mail) t o defendant "G. 0. Savage, Sr., Whitehall, Montana 59759"; the l e t t e r s were returned t o the secretary of state, not del ivered. Meanwhile defendant Safeco cross-complained against the Savages alleging l i a b i l i t y for any judgment Safeco might pay due to the insurance coverage; Safeco also served the secretary of s t a t e and on March 12, 1970, the secretary of state received the l e t t e r he had sent t o Savage, Sr. marked unclaimed. Cases were consolidated for t r i a l ; the Savages made no appearance and their defaults were entered; $15,000 judgment was entered for both plain- t i f f s against a l l three defendants on December 11, 1970. On December 18, 1970, the second default judgment was entered i n favor of cross-plaintiff and respondent herein, Safeco. Over one year following these judgments, on February 14, 1972, defendant G. 0. Savage, Sr. appeared specially and moved t o vacate and set aside the judgments entered December 11, 1970, and December 18, 1970; hearing on the motions was held February 18, 1972 and following oral arguments and submission of affidavits, Judge Freebourn denied the motions to vacate the judgments on March 15, 1972. This appeal followed. The sole issue i n this cause for our determination is whether the district.court was correct i n refusing to grant the motion. Judge Freebourn i n his order stated: "(1) That the Motion was made under Rule 60(b) M.R.Civ.P.; that the Motion could not be confined to the l a s t sentence of Rule 60(b) which provides only for an independent action; and that the Motion can be considered only, and was considered only, under the provisions of said Rule 60(b) which permits the t r i a l court t o allow an answer to the merits w i t h i n 180 days after the rendition of the judgment." H e further stated: "(2) That the Motion was made more than 180 days after rendition of the judgment on the Third Party Complaint which is dated December 18, 1970. * * *" A s i n the d i s t r i c t court, the governing statutory provision i n this case i s Rule 60(b), M.R.Civ.P.; more particularly that portion of Rule 60(b) which reads : " * * * When from any cause the summons i n an action has not been personally served on the defendant, the court may allow, on such terms as may be just, such defendant or his legal representative, a t any time within 180 days after the rendition of any judgment i n such action, to answer to the merits of the original action. * * *I1 This provision i n Rule 60(b) is unique to Montana. O u r research reveals no other state with the same provision. While w e are not able to draw an inter- pretation from another jurisdiction, the wording appears to be cdear. The provision allows a party t o come i n t o the d i s t r i c t court and answer to the merits of an action i f two conditions can be met; (1) the moving party has not been personally served i n the original action, and (2) the motion has been made within 180 days of the rendition of the judgment. Upon the facts i n this case i t can be determined that only the condition concerning service has been satisfied; the time limit was not complied w i t h . The record re- veals that the judgment and notice of that judgment of Pearl and Orlo Thomas against G. 0. Savage, Sr. and Safeco Insurance Company of America were f i 1 ed on December 11 , 1970. Further, the record shows the judgment on the t h i r d party complaint by Safeco against G. 0. Savage, Sr. was filed on December 18, 1970. The motion by G. 0. Savage, Sr. was not filed until February 18, 1972, more than 480 days after the entry of the judgments. Plainly this does not come w i t h i n that portion of the Rule 60(b), M.R.Civ.P., heretofore quoted, and therefore the d i s t r i c t court was correct i n denying the motion. The d i s t r i c t judge after making the above determination went on i n his order to make the following determination: " ( 3 ) That by the Motion there has been a selection of remedies and G. 0. Savage, Jr. [sic] is precluded from bringing an independent action under the 1 a s t sentence of said Rule 60(b)." I t i s our opinion that this ruling is i n error. W e can find nothing i n Rule 60(b) which would lead to the conclusion an election of remedies is required for a party to benefit from its provisions. In Elliston Lime Co. v. Prentice Lumber Co., 157 Mont. 64, 67, 483 P.2d 264, w e held: "An independent action t o s e t aside a default judgment therefore, is not subject to the 60 day limitation for motions t o s e t aside defaults i n the original action. " Following that same reasoning, an independent action to vacate a judgment for failure to receive service is not subject to the 180 day limitation con- tained i n the rule. The final sentence of Rule 60(b) provides: "This rul es [sic] does not 1 imi t the power of a court to entertain an independent action to re1 ieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as may be required by law, or to s e t aside a judgment for fraud upon the court." This independent action provision of the rule according to Professor Moore is to retain the equity provision of not enforcing a judgment obtained against the public conscience. 7 Moore's Federal Practice, para. 60.36, pp. 601, 602. For those reasons w e reverse that portion of the district court's order. In the briefs and during oral argument,,arguments were presented concerning Rule 4(d), M.R.Civ.P. concerning service. Those questions are not properly before the Court a t this time and w e express no opinion concerning them. Accordingly, by what has been heretofore said, the order refusing to grant the motion to vacate and set aside the judgments i s affirmed except as to that portion thereof holding that an election of remedies has been had and that holding i s r order. W e concur: / I ssociate ~ustices' 11