Title: PEOPLE OF MI V TERRY LYNN KATT
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 120515
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 30, 2003

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 30, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 120515  
TERRY LYNN KATT,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
KELLY, J.  
The issue in this case is whether the trial court  
properly admitted under MRE 803(24) the victim's hearsay  
statement made to a social worker that defendant sexually  
abused her.  The statement did not qualify for admission under  
MRE 803A, the tender-years rule.  
We conclude that the trial court properly admitted the  
statement.
 MRE 803(24) permits the admission of hearsay  
statements that narrowly miss the categorical exceptions of  
 
 
MRE 803, but satisfy the requirements of MRE 803(24), under  
circumstances 
such 
as 
those 
present 
in 
this 
case.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
A jury convicted defendant of three counts of first­
degree 
criminal 
sexual conduct, sexual penetration of a victim  
under thirteen years of age (CSC I).  MCL 750.520b(1)(a). The  
Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.  
A. THE TRIAL COURT  
In the trial court, the prosecution charged defendant  
with the sexual assaults of a seven-year-old boy (DD) and his  
five-year-old sister (AD) in the autumn of 1998.  Defendant  
lived in a home with the children, their mother, her  
ex-husband, and another individual.  
Before 
trial, 
the prosecutor moved to admit the testimony  
of Angela Bowman, a child-protective-services specialist with  
the Family Independence Agency (FIA).  During the hearing,  
Bowman testified that she had visited DD at his elementary  
school after the FIA received an anonymous report that the  
children's mother was physically abusing them.  
In the course of their conversation, Bowman asked DD to  
name the members of his household.  He named defendant as a  
relative and spontaneously told Bowman that defendant was  
doing "nasty stuff" to him.  
Bowman further testified that, when she asked DD what he  
2  
  
meant by nasty stuff, he was initially guarded, but, then,  
made the following statement:  
[Defendant] would come into his room, which 
[DD] shared with his sister [AD] and dis-
-
-totally 
disrobed, and take off his clothes, which would be 
a shirt, an underwear-
-
-some underwear or pajamas 
bottoms, if he were wearing them, and get on top of 
[DD].  And I ask-
-
-I asked him to describe now-
-
-at  
the time, because I wasn't prepared for this 
interview, I didn't have any anatomically correct 
dolls or anything, so I ask him to show-
-
-to  
demonstrate to the best of his ability what he was 
describing.  
Bowman related the details of this and numerous other specific  
instances of defendant's abuse as DD had revealed them to her.  
The prosecution conceded that DD's statement to Bowman  
was not admissible under the tender-years exception to the  
hearsay rule, MRE 803A, because it was his second statement  
about the abuse. Defendant argued that MRE 803A "covers the  
field," meaning that, if a statement falls in the category of  
a tender-years statement and is inadmissible under MRE 803A,  
it cannot be admitted under MRE 803(24).  
The trial court rejected defendant's argument and  
admitted the evidence under MRE 803(24).  In ruling that DD's  
statements satisfied the requirements of MRE 803(24), the  
court stated:  
[I]n the Court's opinion there are several 
indicia of trustworthiness in the statements given 
by [DD] to Miss Bowman. First is the spontaneity 
of 
[DD's] 
first 
statements 
to 
Miss 
Bowman.  
Recall-
-
-The Court's [sic] heard the testimony, that 
Miss Bowman was not there to talk about sexual  
abuse, she was there to talk about physical abuse.  
3  
 
 
 
 
 
I would also note that as far as this Court's  
record is concerned [DD and AD's mother] did not 
know that her child was going to be interviewed on 
October 27.  Accordingly, there doesn't appear to  
be anything on the record here which would  
establish that somehow [DD] was prepped by somebody 
to mouth sentences to Miss Bowman that were not  
true.  Miss Bowman first inquired of [DD] about 
physical abuse.  Then, [DD,] and in this Court's 
opinion this is important, not in response to any 
questioning by Miss Bowman regarding sexual abuse, 
spontaneously spoke about abuse-
-
-sexual abuse by 
the defendant.  It's clear that [DD] spoke from his 
personal knowledge. 
And, as her duty as a  
protective service worker, Miss Bowman inquired 
further.  Now, Miss Bowman's qualifications to 
interview children were obvious from the record.  
She is aware of how to . . . interview children.  
She testified that she avoided leading questions 
and avoided other pitfalls of questioning young 
children.  And the Court finds that she was totally 
aware how to get truthful information from [DD]. 
The Court finds that the record and the dynamics of 
this exchange between Miss Bowman and [DD] provided 
a form [sic] that an accurate statement would be 
uttered by [DD].
 The Court finds no plan of 
falsification by [DD] under the circumstances in 
the record that I have before me, and no-
-
-and I do  
find a lack of motive to fabricate on the child's  
part.
 The Court also notes that Miss Bowman  
testified, and I believe her testimony, she had no 
preconceived notion that anything of a sexual 
nature occurred when she walked into the room on  
October 27, [19]97.  Indeed, as I've stated before, 
she was there to talk about physical abuse.  
* * *  
Accordingly, the Court finds-
-
-from the  
totality of the circumstances here, I find the 
required trustworthiness guarantees that [MRE] 
803(24) requires.  
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS  
On appeal, defendant again contended that DD's statement  
to Bowman was not admissible under MRE 803(24).  He urged that  
4  
  
 
the Court adopt what has been dubbed the "near-miss" theory,  
which "maintains that a hearsay statement that is close to,  
but that does not fit precisely into, a recognized hearsay  
exception is not admissible under [the residual hearsay  
exception.]" United States v Deeb, 13 F3d 1532, 1536 (CA 11,  
1994).  
The Court of Appeals rejected the near miss-theory and  
defendant's 
narrow 
interpretation 
of 
MRE 
803(24) 
and, 
instead,  
adopted the approach taken by the United States Court of  
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States v Earles, 113  
F3d 796 (CA 8, 1997):  
The meaning of the catch-all's "specifically 
covered" language has caused considerable debate. 
See, e.g., McKethan v United States, 439 US 936; 99 
S Ct 333; 58 L Ed 2d 333 (1978) (Justices Stewart 
and Marshall dissenting from the Court's denial of 
writs of certiorari and contending that the Court 
should resolve the circuit split on this issue[.]). 
However, the majority of circuit courts have held 
that the phrase "specifically covered" means only 
that if a statement is admissible under one of the  
prior exceptions, such prior subsection should be 
relied upon instead of [the residual hearsay 
exception].  If, on the other hand, the statement  
is inadmissible under the other exceptions, these 
courts allow the testimony to be considered for 
admission under [the residual hearsay exception]. 
[248 Mich App 282, 292; 639 NW2d 815 (2001), 
quoting Earles, supra at 800 (emphasis in 248 Mich 
App 292).]  
Defendant next argued that DD's statement did not meet  
two of the requirements of MRE 803(24).  Specifically, (1) the  
evidence 
did 
not 
possess 
"equivalent 
circumstantial 
guarantees  
of trustworthiness" and (2) it was not more probative than  
5  
DD's first statement about the abuse, which was made to his  
mother before the Bowman interview.  
The Court of Appeals rejected the first challenge,  
stating that it agreed with the trial court's "thorough and  
well-reasoned assessment that DD's statement implicating  
defendant in these crimes contained ample 'circumstantial  
guarantees of trustworthiness' as required by MRE 803(24)."  
248 Mich App 297.  Regarding DD's statements to his mother,  
the panel found that  
there is no indication in the record that either DD  
or AD recounted the circumstances of the assaults  
with the same detail. Nor is there any indication 
that their alleged statements to their mother 
contained 
particularized 
guarantees 
of  
trustworthiness
 similar to those regarding the 
statement given to Bowman.  Indeed, when defense  
counsel inquired of the mother during trial  
regarding her knowledge of the alleged sexual 
abuse, she indicated only that AD had told the 
children's uncle about the abuse, who in turn told 
the mother . . . ." [Id. at 299-300.]  
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's  
admission of the evidence.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
The decision whether to admit evidence is within a trial  
court's discretion. This Court reverses it only where there  
has been an abuse of discretion.  People v Lukity, 460 Mich  
484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).  However, the decision  
frequently involves a preliminary question of law, such as  
whether a rule of evidence or statute precludes the admission  
6  
 
 
of the evidence.  We review questions of law de novo. Id.;  
People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).  
Therefore, when such preliminary questions are at issue, we  
will find an abuse of discretion when a trial court admits  
evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law. Id.  
III. ANALYSIS  
The Michigan Rules of Evidence contain two residual  
exceptions:  MRE 803(24) and MRE 804(b)(7). MRE 803(24), the  
exception at issue here, provides:  
(24) Other Exceptions. 
A statement not  
specifically covered by any of the foregoing 
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness, 
if 
the 
court  
determines that (A) the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact, (B) the statement is 
more probative on the point for which it is offered 
than any other evidence that the proponent can 
procure through reasonable efforts, and (C) the 
general purposes of these rules and the interests 
of justice will best be served by admission of the 
statement into evidence. However, a statement may 
not be admitted under this exception unless the 
proponent of the statement makes known to the 
adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the trial 
or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's 
intention 
to 
offer 
the 
statement 
and 
the  
particulars of it, including the name and address 
of the declarant.  
Thus, evidence offered under MRE 803(24) must satisfy  
four elements to be admissible: 
(1) it must have  
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equal to the  
categorical exceptions, (2) it must tend to establish a  
material fact, (3) it must be the most probative evidence on  
7  
 
  
that fact that the offering party could produce through  
reasonable efforts, and (4) its admission must serve the  
interests of justice.  Also, the offering party must give  
advance notice of intent to introduce the evidence.  
MRE 803(24) is nearly identical to FRE 807.1
 "The  
Michigan Rules of Evidence were based on the Federal Rules of  
Evidence." People v Kreiner, 415 Mich 372, 378; 329 NW2d 716  
(1982).  As a result, Michigan courts have referred to federal  
cases interpreting rules of evidence when there is a dearth of  
related Michigan case law. See, e.g., People v VanderVliet,  
444 Mich 52, 60 n 7; 508 NW2d 114 (1993); People v Welch, 226  
Mich App 461, 466; 574 NW2d 682 (1997).  
1FRE 803(24) contained one of the Federal Rules' residual 
exceptions until 1997.  At that time, FRE 803(24) was combined 
with FRE 804(b)(5) and moved to FRE 807. FRE 807 provides:  
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 
803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by 
the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) 
the statement is offered as evidence of a material  
fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the 
point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence which the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of 
these rules and the interests of justice will best 
be served by admission of the statement into  
evidence.  However, a statement may not be admitted 
under this exception unless the proponent of it 
makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in 
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to 
meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the 
name and address of the declarant.  
8  
Given that Michigan did not adopt residual exceptions to  
its rules of evidence until 1996, there is little case law  
interpreting them.  Before this case, no Michigan court had  
considered whether evidence that is similar to a categorical  
hearsay exception could still be admitted under one of the  
residual 
exceptions. 
 Therefore, it is appropriate to consider  
the federal courts' discussions of the issue.  
A.  THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTIONS AND THEIR APPLICATION  
IN "NEAR MISS" SITUATIONS  
The residual exceptions are designed to be used as  
safety valves in the hearsay rules.  They will allow evidence  
to be admitted that is not "specifically covered" by any of  
the categorical hearsay exceptions under circumstances  
dictated by the rules.  Differing interpretations of the words  
"specifically covered" have sparked the current debate over  
the admissibility of evidence that is factually similar to a  
categorical hearsay exception, but not admissible under it.2  
1. THE NEAR-MISS THEORY  
"The Near Miss theory . . . states that a piece of  
hearsay evidence may be offered only under the exception that  
most nearly describes it.  If it is excluded under that  
exception, it may not be offered under the residual  
2There is no doubt, of course, that statements completely 
alien to any of the categorical exceptions may be candidates 
for admission under the residual exceptions.  
9  
  
 
exceptions." 
In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust  
Litigation, 723 F2d 238, 302 (CA 3, 1983), rev’d on other  
grounds Matsushita Electric Industrial Co, Ltd v Zenith Radio  
Corp, 475 US 574, 580; 106 S Ct 1348; 89 L Ed 2d 538 (1986).  
Judge Easterbrook gave a concise statement of the rationale  
behind the near-miss theory in his concurring opinion in  
United States v Dent, 984 F2d 1453, 1465-1466 (CA 7, 1993):  
[The residual exception] reads more naturally 
if we understand the introductory clause to mean 
that evidence of a kind specifically addressed 
("covered") by one of the [categorical exceptions] 
must satisfy the conditions laid down for its 
admission, and that other kinds of evidence not 
covered 
(because 
the 
drafters 
could 
not 
be  
exhaustive) are admissible if the evidence is  
approximately as reliable as evidence that would be 
admissible under the [categorical exceptions].  
The 
United 
States District Court for the Eastern District  
of Pennsylvania described another basis for the theory in  
Zenith Radio Corp v Matsushita Electric Industrial Co, Ltd,  
505 F Supp 1190 (ED Penn, 1980):  
The [near-miss theory] is also supported by a 
basic principle of statutory construction, which we 
find equally applicable to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence: that the specific controls the general. 
As the Supreme Court stated in Radzanower v Touche  
Ross & Co, 426 US 148, 153, 48 L Ed 2d 540, 96 S Ct 
1989 (1976):  
"It 
is 
a 
basic 
principle 
of 
statutory 
construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, 
precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a 
later enacted statute covering a more generalized 
spectrum.  'Where there is no clear intention  
otherwise, 
a 
specific 
statute 
will 
not 
be  
controlled 
or 
nullified 
by 
a 
general 
one, 
regardless of the priority of enactment.'  Morton v  
10  
 
 
Mancari, 417 US 535, 550-551 (1974)." [Citations 
omitted.]  
In conformity with this rule we conclude that 
the residual exceptions cannot be invoked when 
there is a specific exception which sets forth  
conditions governing the admissibility of a clearly 
defined category of hearsay evidence.  [Zenith,  
supra at 1263 n 91 (discussing former FRE 803[24] 
before the adoption of FRE 807).]  
Thus, the near-miss theory is based on a broad reading of  
the term "specifically covered."  Evidence is "specifically  
covered" if there is a categorical hearsay exception dealing  
with 
the 
same 
subject 
matter 
or 
type 
of 
evidence.  
Accordingly, under the near-miss theory, a party could never  
use a residual exception to admit evidence that was  
inadmissible under, but related to, a categorical exception.  
For example, a strict application of this theory would  
preclude admission of a business document unless it met the  
requirements of MRE 803(6).  The residual exception would not  
be available for it under any circumstances.  
Although the near-miss theory would simplify the  
resolution 
of 
disputes regarding the admission of hearsay, few  
courts in the nation have adopted it.  Those that have done so  
have softened the rule.3  Even the Zenith court declined to  
3See United States v Mejia-Valez, 855 F Supp 607, 617-618 
(ED NY, 1994)(holding that defendant could not use the 
residual exception to admit hearsay statements from an  
available declarant when the covered exception required 
unavailability); In re Fill, 68 BR 923, 931 (SD NY, 
1987)(holding that "highly unusual case[s]" may be exempted 
from the near-miss theory).  
11  
 
 
hold that the residual exception could never  be used to admit  
evidence that fell within a categorical exception, but was  
inadmissible under it:  
Some of the . . . specific hearsay exceptions 
similarly apply to a clearly defined category of 
evidence, and we would follow the "near miss" 
doctrine with respect to them . . . if the evidence 
before us were within those categories.  E.g., Rule 
803(18) (learned treatises); Rule 803(22) (judgment 
of previous conviction.)  
However, most of the hearsay exceptions which 
plaintiffs invoke are not of this type.  They do 
not apply to a clearly defined category of  
evidence, as the former testimony exception does. 
Instead, they apply to a relatively amorphous 
category of evidence which is delimited solely by 
the requirements set forth in the rule itself.  For  
instance, the business records exception applies to 
any 
"memorandum, 
report, 
record, 
or 
data  
compilation, in any form" which satisfies certain 
additional requirements. . . . We do not see how  
the "near miss" doctrine which defendants urge  
could practically be applied to those rules,  
without 
negating 
the 
residual 
exceptions  
altogether, a result which is plainly contrary to  
the intent of Congress. [Id. at 1264 (emphasis 
added), accord Acme Printing Ink Co v Menard, Inc, 
812 F Supp 1498, 1527 (ED Wis, 1992).]  
2. REJECTING THE NEAR-MISS THEORY  
The great majority of courts have rejected the near-miss  
theory by interpreting the residual exception to omit as  
"specifically 
covered" 
only 
those 
hearsay 
statements  
admissible under a categorical exception. 
A statement not  
admissible under the categorical exceptions would not be  
"specifically covered" by those exceptions, and thus could be  
a candidate for admissibility under the residual exceptions.  
12  
 
  
 
  
In United States v Clarke,4 the United States Court of  
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained the rationale for  
rejecting the near-miss theory.  
Appellant 
asks 
us 
to 
construe 
"not  
specifically covered" narrowly, limiting [the 
residual exceptions] to cases in no way touched by 
one of the [categorical] exceptions. According to 
appellant, admitting testimony that was a "near 
miss" 
under 
804(B)(1) 
would 
undermine 
the  
protections of the evidentiary rules, as well as 
violate the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.  
We disagree. 
Appellant's view of "not  
specifically covered" would effectively render [the 
residual exception] a nullity. The plain meaning, 
and the purpose, of [the residual exception] do not 
permit such a narrow reading.  We believe that  
"specifically covered" means exactly what it says:  
if 
a 
statement 
does 
not 
meet 
all 
of 
the  
requirements for admissibility under one of the  
prior exceptions, then it is not "specifically  
covered." United States v. Fernandez, 892 F2d 976, 
981 (11th Cir. 1989).  This reading is consistent 
with the purposes of [the residual exception]. 
That rule rejects formal categories in favor of a 
functional inquiry into trustworthiness, thus  
permitting the admission of statements that fail 
the strict requirements of the prior exceptions, 
but are nonetheless shown to be reliable.  If we  
were to adopt appellant's reading of the rule, we 
would deprive the jury of probative evidence  
relevant to the jury's truth-seeking role.  
* * *  
To adopt the "near miss" theory would create 
an odd situation where testimony that was equally 
trustworthy would be distinguishable based merely 
on its proximity to a specified exception.  For  
instance, in United States v Ellis, 951 F.2d 580 
(4th 
Cir. 
1991), 
this 
circuit 
approved 
the  
admission of the statement made by a later-deceased 
witness 
pursuant 
to 
a 
plea 
agreement 
under  
42 F3d 81 (CA 4, 1993).  
13  
  
804(b)(5), even though that statement was very 
different from any of the specified exceptions. 
Given our holding in Ellis, it would contradict 
common sense to exclude equally reliable testimony 
here simply because it fell closer to one of the 
specified exceptions.  We thus reject the "near 
miss" theory of interpreting Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) 
and 804(b)(5). [Clarke, 2 F3d 83-84 (emphasis 
added) (discussing the former residual exceptions 
before the adoption of FRE 807).]  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit  
followed suit in United States v Laster,5 stating:  
Although some courts have held that if  
proffered evidence fails to meet the requirements 
of the Fed. R. Evid. 803 hearsay exception, it 
cannot qualify for admission under the residual 
exception, the court declines to adopt this narrow 
interpretation of Fed. R. Evid. 807 as suggested by 
defendants. Rather, this court interprets Fed. R. 
Evid. 807, along with the majority of circuits, to 
mean that "if a statement is admissible under one  
of the hearsay exceptions, that exception should be 
relied on instead of the residual exception."  5  
Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's 
Federal Evidence § 807.03(4) (2d ed. 2000).  We  
endorse the reasoning in United States v Earles, 
113 F3d 796 (8th Cir, 1997), which held that "the 
phrase 
'specifically 
covered' 
[by 
a 
hearsay 
exception] means only that if a statement is  
admissible under one of the [residual] exceptions, 
such [] subsection should be relied upon" instead 
of the residual exception. Id. at 800 (emphasis in 
original).  Therefore, the analysis of a hearsay 
statement should not end when a statement fails to  
qualify as a prior inconsistent statement, but 
should be evaluated under the residual hearsay  
exception. [Laster, 258 F3d 530.]  
In this case, the Court of Appeals followed the weight of  
the authority and rejected the near-miss theory. Because we  
agree that the language of the rule does not support the near­
5258 F3d 525 (CA 6, 2001).  
14  
miss theory, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
3. OUR APPROACH TO THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTION  
We agree with the majority of the federal courts and  
conclude 
that 
a 
hearsay statement is “specifically covered” by  
another exception for purposes of MRE 803(24) only when it is  
admissible under that exception.  Therefore, we decline to  
adopt the near-miss theory as part of our method for  
determining when hearsay statements may be admissible under  
MRE 803(24).  
In our view, the arguments in favor of the near-miss  
theory are unpersuasive and do not conform to the language of  
the rule.  Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1995)  
defines "cover" as "8. to deal with or provide for; address:  
The rules cover working conditions." (Emphasis in original.)  
Therefore, a rule concerning the same subject matter as a  
piece of evidence, or from a similar source, arguably could be  
said to "cover" that evidence.  
If the rule applied to all evidence not "covered" by  
other exceptions, the near-miss theory would be more  
persuasive.6  However, the rule modifies the term "covered"  
6We do not hold, however, that similarity in subject 
matter or scope leads to the conclusion that a particular 
exception 
"covers" 
evidence; we simply note that the near-miss 
theory would be more persuasive if the residual exception used 
the term "covered" alone rather than "specifically covered." 
In fact, we note that at least one commentator has stated that 
a statement is not "covered" by an exception if it is not 
admissible under that exception:  
15  
____________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
with the adjective "specifically."  Hence, more than simple  
"coverage" is required.  Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed)  
defines "specific" as "1. Of, relating to, or designating a  
particular or defined thing; explicit . . . . 2. Of or  
relating to a particular named thing . . . . 3. Conformable to  
specific requirements . . . ." (Emphasis added.)  
Reading the words "specifically covered" together and  
giving each its normally understood meaning, we conclude that  
to be "specifically covered" requires more than to be  
"covered."  
Since 
"specific" can mean "conformable to specific  
Judge 
Easterbrook's 
literalism, 
while  
ingenious, assumes both an unconvincing clarity and 
a peculiar meaning of "covered."156 His complaint 
that the authors of the rule did not use the term  
"admissible" 
ignores 
the 
fact 
that 
hearsay 
exceptions do not make evidence admissible. It may 
be 
inadmissible 
under 
other 
rules 
(such 
as  
relevancy 
rules), 
acts 
of 
Congress, 
or 
the  
Constitution. 
 
156 The Webster's dictionary lists 23 meanings 
of the term "cover," including "to have width or 
scope enough to include or embrace."  Webster's  
Third New International Dictionary, 524 (1986).  It  
does not mean "is somewhat similar to," which seems 
to be the meaning ascribed by Judge Easterbrook to 
the rule's "specifically covered" language.  
[Robinson, From Fat Tony and Matty the Horse to the sad case  
of A.T.: Defensive and offensive use of hearsay evidence in  
criminal cases, 32 Hous L R 895, 917 (1995).]  
Moreover, although not deciding the meaning of "covered" 
in the rule, we note that "specifically covered" must mean 
more than "covered," no matter what meaning is given to the 
latter term.  
16  
 
 
requirements" and "cover" can mean "addressing" or "dealing  
with," we understand that a statement is only "specifically  
covered" by a categorical exception when it is conformable to  
all the requirements of that categorical exception.7  To hold  
otherwise would read "specifically" out of the rule.8  
7 The dissent notes that the drafters of the rule used  
the phrase "specifically covered" rather than "specifically 
admissible."  In our view, this terminology merely reflects 
that a statement satisfying all requirements of a categorical 
exception 
and, 
thus, 
admissible under that exception may still 
be inadmissible for other reasons. For example, a statement 
that 
would 
be 
admissible 
under 
the 
excited-utterance 
exception 
may nonetheless be inadmissible if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
See MRE 403. This is why MRE 803 begins, "The following are 
not excluded by the hearsay rule," rather than, "The following 
are admissible. (Emphasis added.)  See also n 6.  Notably, the 
dissent does not provide an alternate construction of the 
residual 
exception 
to support the near-miss theory, but relies 
on the history surrounding the Congressional enactment of the 
rules.  
8Accord Fenner, The residual exception to the hearsay  
rule: The complete treatment, 33 Creighton L R 265, 274-275 
(2000):  
Specific is defined as “a: constituting or 
falling into a specifiable category b: sharing or 
being those properties of something that allow it 
to 
be 
referred 
to 
a 
particular 
category.” 
[Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary CD-ROM  
(Zane Pub. Co. 1996).]  "Specifically covered" by 
one of those exceptions in 803 or 804, then, seems 
to mean falling within one of those exceptions.  It  
does not seem to mean falling outside the  
exception. No matter how close it came, a miss is 
still a miss.  This seems to be the plain meaning 
of the rule, as written.  
That 
is, 
each 
exception 
has 
certain  
foundational elements, and if there is sufficient 
evidence of each foundational element for any one 
exception then the statement is "specifically  
17  
We also disagree with the Zenith court that interpreting  
the residual exceptions in this manner will "nullify" the  
categorical exceptions.  Indeed, by their own language the  
residual exceptions cannot apply to statements admissible  
under the other exceptions.  Moreover, the requirements of the  
exceptions are stringent and will rarely be met, alleviating  
concerns that the residual exceptions will "swallow" the  
categorical exceptions through overuse.  
We stress that this interpretation of the residual  
exceptions does not subvert the purpose of the hearsay rules.  
Each of the categorical exceptions requires a quantum of  
trustworthiness and each reflects instances in which courts  
have 
historically 
recognized 
that 
the 
required 
trustworthiness  
is present.9
 The residual exceptions require equivalent  
covered" by the exception.  It is specifically 
covered by this exception whether it fits under any 
other exception or not. 
And, if one of the 
foundational elements is missing, then it is not 
"specifically covered" by this exception—no matter 
how close it comes.  In fact, in this latter 
situation, the statement is specifically not  
covered by the barely missed exception.  
9The dissent and proponents of the near-miss theory treat 
the recognized exceptions like hermetically sealed, insular 
categories.  However, many of the exceptions overlap.  A  
present-sense impression under MRE 803(1) could also be an 
excited utterance under MRE 803(2).  Does a statement that  
"nearly missed" being a present-sense impression, but was 
admitted 
as 
an 
excited utterance, undermine the hearsay rules? 
No, because the statement still had equivalent guarantees of 
trustworthiness.  
Moreover, the overlap among the categorical exceptions  
18  
 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness.  Thus, if a near-miss statement  
is deficient in one or more requirements of a categorical  
exception, those deficiencies must be made up by alternate  
indicia of trustworthiness.  To be admitted, residual hearsay  
must reach the same quantum of reliability as categorical  
hearsay; simply it must do so in different ways.10  
Thus, we affirm that the residual exceptions may be used  
to admit statements that are similar to, but not admissible  
under, the categorical hearsay exceptions.  Next, we turn our  
attention to the requirements of the residual exceptions  
themselves.  We focus on MRE 803(24), the applicable exception  
in this case.  
The 
language 
of 
MRE 
803(24) 
provides 
substantial 
guidance  
in determining the proper method of analysis.  As we noted  
above, the rule contains four elements.  To be admitted under  
MRE 803(24), a hearsay statement must: (1) demonstrate  
circumstantial 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness 
equivalent 
to 
the  
further undermines the near-miss theory because one could 
always argue that a statement is generally addressed by one of 
the categorical exceptions.  For example, under the near-miss  
theory, nearly any explanation or description could be 
"specifically covered" by the present-sense impression  
exception.  
10We fail to understand why achieving equivalent 
guarantees of trustworthiness through alternate means makes a 
residual 
hearsay 
statement less reliable than a statement that 
satisfies 
a 
categorical 
exception. 
 
The 
categorical 
exceptions 
provide prescribed ways to assess hearsay; we do not accept 
that they are the only ways in which that assessment can be 
made.  
19  
  
categorical exceptions, (2) be relevant to a material fact,  
(3)  be the most probative evidence of that fact reasonably  
available, and (4) serve the interests of justice by its  
admission.  
The first and most important requirement is that the  
proffered 
statement 
have 
circumstantial 
guarantees 
of  
trustworthiness 
equivalent 
to 
those 
of 
the 
categorical 
hearsay  
exceptions.  As the United States Court of Appeals for the  
Fourth 
Circuit 
noted 
in 
Clarke, 
"the 
inquiry 
into  
trustworthiness aligns with the inquiry demanded by the  
Confrontation Clause, which requires courts to examine the  
'totality of the circumstances that surround the making of the  
statement' 
for 
'particularized 
guarantees 
of  
trustworthiness.'" Clarke, supra at 84. Thus, courts should  
consider the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding each  
statement to determine whether equivalent guarantees of  
trustworthiness exist.  
There is no complete list of factors that establish  
whether 
a 
statement 
has 
equivalent 
guarantees 
of  
trustworthiness.11  However, the Confrontation Clause forbids  
11In discussing the trustworthiness requirement, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence Manual states:  
There are certain standard factors all courts  
consider in evaluating the trustworthiness of a 
declarant's statement under the residual exception. 
These include:  
20  
 
(1) The relationship between the declarant and 
the person to whom the statement was made.  For  
example, a statement to a trusted confidante should 
be considered more reliable than a statement to a  
total stranger.  
(2) The capacity of the declarant at the time 
of the statement.  For instance, if the declarant 
[were] drunk or on drugs at the time, that would 
cut against a finding of trustworthiness . . . .  
(3) 
The 
personal 
truthfulness 
of 
the  
declarant.  If the declarant is an untruthful  
person, this cuts against admissibility, while an 
unimpeachable character for veracity cuts in favor 
of admitting the statement. The government cannot 
seriously argue that the trust due an isolated  
statement should not be colored by compelling 
evidence of the lack of credibility of its source: 
although a checkout aisle tabloid might contain 
unvarnished truth, even a devotee would do well to 
view its claims with a measure of skepticism.  
(4) 
Whether 
the 
declarant 
appeared 
to  
carefully consider his statement.  
(5) 
Whether 
the 
declarant 
recanted 
or  
repudiated the statement after it was made.  
(6) Whether the declarant has made other  
statements 
that 
were 
either 
consistent 
or  
inconsistent with the proffered statement.  
(7) Whether the behavior of the declarant was 
consistent with the content of the statement.  
(8) 
Whether 
the 
declarant 
had 
personal 
knowledge of the event or condition described.  
(9) Whether the declarant's memory might have 
been impaired due to the lapse of time between the 
event and the statement.  
(10) Whether the statement, as well as the 
event described by the statement, is clear and 
factual, or instead is vague and ambiguous.  
21  
  
  
the 
use 
of 
corroborative 
evidence 
to 
determine 
the  
trustworthiness of statements offered under the residual  
exception in criminal cases if the declarant does not testify  
at trial. Idaho v Wright, 497 US 805, 823; 110 S Ct 3139; 111  
L Ed 2d 638 (1990).12  Beyond this limitation, courts should  
(11) Whether the statement was made under 
formal circumstances or pursuant to formal duties, 
such that the declarant would have been likely to 
consider the accuracy of the statement when making 
it.  
(12) Whether the statement appears to have 
been made in anticipation of litigation and is 
favorable to the person who made or prepared the 
statement.  
(13) Whether the declarant was cross-examined 
by one who had interests similar to those of the 
party against whom the statement is offered.  
(14) 
Whether 
the 
statement 
was 
given 
voluntarily or instead pursuant to a grant of 
immunity.  
(15) Whether the declarant was a disinterested 
bystander or rather an interested party. [Federal 
Rules of Evidence Manual (Matthew Bender & Co Inc, 
2002), § 807.02(4) (citations omitted).]  
The list is not intended to be all-inclusive, but to 
provide general guidelines.  
12If the declarant does testify at trial and is subject 
to cross-examination, corroborative evidence may be used to  
determine 
the 
trustworthiness 
of 
statements 
in 
criminal 
cases.  
The reason is that the Confrontation Clause is not implicated. 
United States v Owens, 484 US 554, 560; 108 S Ct 838; 98 L Ed  
2d 951 (1988); United States v NB, 59 F3d 771 (CA 8, 1995). 
Similarly, in civil cases, corroborative evidence is always 
appropriate. Larez v Los Angeles, 946 F2d 630, 643 n 6 (CA 9,  
1991).  
22  
  
consider all factors that add to or detract from the  
statement's reliability.  
The second requirement is self-explanatory.  To be  
admissible under the residual exceptions, the proffered  
statements must be directly relevant to a material fact in the  
case.  A material fact is "[a] fact that is significant or  
essential to the issue or matter at hand."  Black's Law  
Dictionary (7th ed).  
The third requirement is that the proffered statement be  
the most probative evidence reasonably available to prove its  
point.
 
It 
"essentially 
creates 
a 
'best 
evidence'  
requirement." Larez, supra at 644. This is a high bar and  
will effectively limit use of the residual exception to  
exceptional circumstances.  For instance, nonhearsay evidence  
on a material fact will nearly always have more probative  
value 
than 
hearsay 
statements, 
because 
nonhearsay 
derives 
from  
firsthand knowledge.  Thus, the residual exception normally  
will not be available if there is nonhearsay evidence on  
point.  
The final requirement is that admission of the proffered  
statement conforms to the "rules [of evidence] and serve the  
interests of justice."  Accordingly, a court may refuse to  
admit a statement into evidence, even though the first three  
requirements of the exception have been met. This may occur if  
the court determines that the purpose of the rules and the  
23  
interests of justice will not be well served by the  
statement's admission.13  
Finally, we note that the facts of each case determine  
the answers to questions about the admissibility of evidence.  
Here, the trial court did an exemplary job of making clear and  
concise findings on the record.  In order to facilitate review  
in the future, we ask that courts faced with MRE 803(24)  
questions of the type presented here make similarly explicit  
supportive findings on the record.  
B. THE LOWER COURTS CORRECTLY APPLIED  
MRE 803(24) IN THIS CASE 
 We now turn to the facts of this case.  In order to  
invoke MRE 803(24), the proffered statement must "not [be]  
specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions" of  
MRE 803.  MRE 803(24). 
As described above, we interpret  
"specifically covered" to mean "admissible." Defendant does  
not assert that DD's statement would be admissible under any  
of the MRE 803 categorical exceptions.  Therefore, the  
statement is a proper candidate for admissibility under MRE  
803(24).14  
13If a statement is otherwise admissible under the  
residual exceptions, the interest-of-justice requirement will 
not preclude its admission for the sole reason that it is 
hearsay.  If this were the case, the residual exceptions would 
be rendered useless.  
14Because we interpret "specifically covered" by an 
exception to mean admissible under that exception, we are not  
24  
 
With respect to the rule's requirements, there is no  
dispute that the prosecution gave proper notice to defendant  
of its intent to submit DD's hearsay statements under MRE  
803(24).  Moreover, it cannot be disputed that DD's statements  
described the material facts of defendant's abusive acts.  
The trial court made extensive findings on the record  
regarding DD's statement to Ms. Bowman and detailed the manner  
in which it satisfied each element of MRE 803(24).  The court  
particularly elaborated on its findings regarding the  
trustworthiness of the statement, noting several times that  
its spontaneity and the fact it was  unanticipated made it  
particularly reliable.  
The trial court also noted that the timing of the  
statement negated any motive to fabricate. No investigation  
had begun when the statement was made, and no one knew that  
Ms. Bowman was to interview DD that day.  Additionally, DD  
spoke from firsthand knowledge and in terms appropriate for a  
child 
of 
his 
age. 
Under 
the 
"totality" 
of 
these  
circumstances, the court concluded that the statement had  
circumstantial 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness 
equivalent 
to 
any  
troubled by the proximity of DD's statement to MRE 803A.  The  
statement is not admissible under  803A and is thus not  
"specifically covered" by 803A.  The fact that 803A, which 
relates to the same subject matter as the proffered statement 
in this case, is not a "foregoing" exception of MRE 803(24) is 
thus irrelevant. None of the categorical hearsay exceptions 
"specifically covers" DD's statement.  
25  
 
 
 
of the categorical exceptions.  
The trial court next found that DD's statement was the  
most 
probative 
evidence 
available 
concerning 
the 
actual 
abuse.  
DD did not anticipate the interview, and Ms. Bowman did not  
intentionally elicit incriminating information about someone  
other than the mother.  Ms. Bowman also possessed the training  
to make a proper assessment of DD's credibility at the time.  
Defendant argues before this Court that DD's first  
corroborative statement, made to his mother, was more  
probative than his statement to Ms. Bowman.  However, the  
record contains no information about what DD said to his  
mother.  All that is known is that both parties stipulated at  
trial that DD's mother had asked him some questions about  
defendant's abuse before DD spoke to Ms. Bowman.15  It is not  
possible to compare the value of a statement of known content  
with a statement of unknown content.  
Moreover, the statement made to Ms. Bowman is more  
probative than DD's testimony at trial for the same reasons  
that underscore the tender-years rule.  As time goes on, a  
child's perceptions become more and more influenced by the  
reactions of the adults with whom the child speaks.  It is for  
15The prosecution also contends that DD's mother prompted  
this statement by repeatedly asking questions and that 
defendant discovered this fact at trial through cross­
examination.  As a result, the prosecution argues that DD's 
first statement would not have been admissible under MRE 803A  
in any event because the statement was not spontaneous.  
26  
that reason that the tender-years rule prefers a child's first  
statement over later statements.  By analogy, the child's  
second statement is preferable to still later statements.  
Similarly, if DD's mother had a motive to induce her son to  
lie, she would have had much more opportunity to influence him  
before trial than before the Bowman interview.16  
In aggregate, the trial court found that these  
circumstances justified the admission of DD's statement under  
MRE 803(24).  The spontaneity of the interview, lack of motive  
to lie, and Ms. Bowman's interviewing methods combine to give  
the statement circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness  
equivalent to the categorical exceptions.  The unavailability  
of DD's first statement, the timing of the interview, and Ms.  
Bowman's careful conduct in eliciting information make this  
statement the most probative evidence of defendant's abusive  
acts.  Having found that DD's statement met the first three  
requirements of MRE 803(24), the court concluded that  
admission would not endanger the interests of justice and  
ruled the statement admissible.  
We agree with the Court of Appeals and hold that (1) the  
trial court properly analyzed DD's statement under MRE  
803(24), and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the  
16The prosecution also contests defendant's assertions 
that DD's mother "coached" DD by noting that, after the Bowman 
interview, DD's mother told Bowman she did not believe DD's 
story.  
27  
trial court's findings.  Consequently, we conclude that the  
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the  
statement under MRE 803(24), even though the statement was not  
admissible under MRE 803A.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
The trial court properly admitted DD's statement to Ms.  
Bowman under MRE 803(24), although it did not qualify for  
admission under MRE 803A.  All the elements of MRE 803(24)  
were satisfied.  Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion  
and we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.  
Marilyn Kelly 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Stephen J. Markman  
28  
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 120515  
TERRY LYNN KATT,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
YOUNG, J. (dissenting).  
I disagree that evidence failing admissibility under one  
of the enumerated exceptions can nevertheless be admitted  
under the catch-all exception, MRE 803(24).  Because the  
majority concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent. I fully  
acknowledge that I advocate a minority position; however, I  
believe that this position best comports with the text of the  
residual hearsay exception as well as our time-honored  
prohibition against the admission of hearsay evidence.  
The rule against the admissibility of hearsay is a  
venerable doctrine deeply rooted in our common law.  The  
 
 
principle has been called “a rule which may be esteemed, next  
to jury trial, the greatest contribution of that eminently  
practical legal system to the world’s methods of procedure.”1  
Traditionally, witnesses were required to be present at  
trial, be placed under oath, and be subject to cross­
examination in order to testify. Under those circumstances,  
a witness’s credibility, memory, perception, and narration  
could be evaluated by the trier of fact.  2 McCormick,  
Evidence (5th ed), Hearsay Rule, § 245, p 93. 
The rule  
against hearsay is designed to maintain the integrity of  
witness testimony.2  
Over the years, a number of exceptions to the general  
rule 
prohibiting 
the 
admission of hearsay have been developed.  
Generally, the exceptions rest on the conclusion that the  
circumstances of the making of particular statement provide  
circumstantial 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness. 
These  
guarantees 
are 
found 
because 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
the  
1 5 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev, 1974), § 1364, p  
28.  According to Wigmore, the prohibition against hearsay 
became entrenched in the common law between 1675 and 1690. Id.  
at 18.  
2 “Hearsay testimony is from the very nature of it 
attended with all such doubts and difficulties and it cannot  
clear them up.  ‘A person who relates a hearsay is not obliged 
to enter into any particulars, to answer any questions, to 
solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to 
explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; he 
entrenches himself in the simple assertion that he was told 
so, and leaves the burden entirely on his dead or absent 
author.’”  McCormick, supra, quoting Coleman v Southwick, 9 
Johns 45, 50 (NY, 1812).  
2  
 
 
 
making of the statement minimize or negate the hearsay  
dangers, such as insincerity or failure of memory.  
In this case, the hearsay testimony at issue is  
specifically covered by MRE 803A, but cannot be admitted under  
that exception because, as the state concedes, the evidence  
was not the first corroborative statement regarding the  
incident.  Accordingly, under the plain language of MRE  
803(24), the evidence is “specifically covered” by MRE 803A  
and cannot be admitted under MRE 803(24).3  
The approach advanced by the majority subverts our  
historical prohibition against the admission of hearsay  
evidence.
 In the majority view, evidence that is clearly  
inadmissible under one of the enumerated hearsay exceptions  
gets a second chance at admissibility under the residual  
exception 
if, 
among 
other factors, “the interests of justice”,  
MRE 803(24)(C), would be served by its admission.  The  
criterion, particularly when coupled with the deferential  
3 MRE 803(24) provides:  
Other 
Exceptions. 
A 
statement 
not  
specifically covered by one of the foregoing 
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness, 
if 
the 
court  
determines that (A) the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact, (B) the statement is 
more probative on the point for which it is offered 
than any other evidence that the proponent can 
procure through reasonable efforts, and (C) the 
general purposes of these rules and the interests 
of justice will best be served by admission of the 
statement into evidence. [Emphasis added.]  
3  
 
 
 
abuse 
of 
discretion 
standard 
for 
appellate 
review,4  
essentially renders the general prohibition against hearsay,  
and the development of what hearsay is excepted and not  
excepted, hollow and meaningless.5 
 Against the nearly four hundred-year-old historical  
development of our hearsay rules, it is clear that the  
drafters of the rules did not intend a wholesale trampling of  
the enumerated hearsay exceptions when the federal residual  
hearsay exceptions were enacted.6  The advisory committee  
noted that the residual exceptions “do not contemplate an  
unfettered exercise of judicial discretion, but they do  
provide 
for 
treating 
new 
and 
presently 
unanticipated  
situations which demonstrate a trustworthiness within the  
spirit of the specifically stated exceptions.”7  
In this case, DD’s statement to Angela Bowman was not a  
4 We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude  
evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Starr, 457 Mich 
490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998); People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 
289; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).  
5 “The residuals are a ‘Trojan Horse’ that has been set 
upon the judiciary to wreak havoc and to emasculate the rule 
against hearsay.  Advocates for the exception, like the fated 
inhabitants of ancient Troy, erroneously believed that the 
exceptions could be adequately controlled by adding strict 
requirements for admission.”  Beaver, The residual hearsay  
exception reconsidered, 20 Fla St U L R 787, 794-795 (1993).  
6 
 Originally, the federal residual hearsay exceptions 
were found at FRE 803(24) and FRE 804(b)(5).  In 1997, the two 
rules were combined and transferred to FRE 807.  
7 Advisory committee note on FRE 803(24), 56 F R D 183, 
320 (1973) (emphasis added).  
4  
 
“new and presently unanticipated situation.” 
In fact,  
evidence 
of 
second 
and 
subsequent 
corroborative 
statements 
are  
specifically 
contemplated 
and 
explicitly 
rejected 
by 
the 
clear  
language of MRE 803(A)—“[i]f the declarant made more than one  
corroborative statement about the incident, only the first is  
admissible under this rule.” (Emphasis added.)  
When construing a court rule, which includes a rule of  
evidence, this Court applies the legal principles that govern  
the construction of statutes. McAuley v Gen Motors Corp, 457  
Mich 513, 518; 578 NW2d 282 (1998). Accordingly, we begin with  
the plain language of the rule. When the language of the rule  
is unambiguous, we enforce the meaning expressed, without  
further judicial construction or interpretation.  Tryc v  
Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135; 545 NW2d 642  
(1996).  
The majority treats the residual hearsay exception as if  
it read “A statement not specifically admissible under any of  
the 
foregoing 
exceptions”8 
rather 
than 
“specifically 
covered.”  
Clearly, the plain language of the rule does not support such  
a reading.  
8 See also United States v Dent, 984 F2d 1453, in which, 
in 
his 
concurring 
opinion, Judge Easterbrook noted that United  
States v Boulahanis, 677 F2d 586 (CA 7, 1982), treated the 
residual exception as if it began “‘A statement not  
specifically admissible under any of the foregoing exceptions 
. . . ’. Evidence that flunks an express condition of a rule 
can come in anyway.”  
5  
 
This Court made deliberate choices in deciding what  
varieties of hearsay would be admissible and reflected those  
choices in the words of the hearsay exceptions.  The line­
drawing 
efforts 
reflected 
in 
the 
enumerated 
hearsay 
exceptions  
are rendered purposeless if hearsay that does not meet the  
textual requirements of a specific hearsay exception is  
alternatively admitted under the residual exception.9  
I believe that the trial court erred in allowing the  
hearsay testimony to be admitted into evidence.  Furthermore,  
I do not believe that the error was harmless. The testimony  
of the children at trial was at times vague and inconsistent,  
and 
the 
physical 
examination of the children was inconclusive.  
While the alternative construction proffered by my  
colleagues in the majority is a principled one, I believe my  
construction best harmonizes with the actual text of the  
evidentiary rule as well as our general and historical  
prohibition against the admission of hearsay evidence.  The  
clear language of the residual hearsay exception precludes  
admissibility where the evidence does not meet the specific  
textual requirements of an enumerated hearsay exception.  
I urge this Court to consider repealing MRE 803(24) and  
MRE 804(b)(5).  
9See Jonakait, Text, texts, or ad hoc determinations:  
Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 71 Ind L J 
551 (1996), who favors a textualist approach to the residual 
hearsay exception.  
6  
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Clifford W. Taylor  
7