Title: City of Indianapolis v. Pollard
Citation: 169 N.E.2d 405, 241 Ind. 66
Docket Number: 29,932, 29,933
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: October 3, 1960

241 Ind. 66 (1960)
169 N.E.2d 405
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS ET AL.
v.
POLLARD ET AL. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS ET AL.
v.
PRODUCERS REALTY, INC. ET AL.
Nos. 29,932 and 29,933.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed October 3, 1960.
*67 Michael B. Reddington and John J. Dillon, both of Indianapolis, for appellants.
Karl J. Stipher, Paul W. Marrs, Duge Butler, John C. O'Connor, Baker &amp; Daniels, of counsel, and Ruckelshaus, *68 O'Connor &amp; Ruckelshaus, of counsel, all of Indianapolis, for appellees.
ARTERBURN, J.
The two above entitled cases were consolidated for the purposes of briefing and consideration on appeal.
The appeals are from injunctions granted against the City of Indianapolis, enjoining it from annexing separate parcels of territory located in separate corners of Center Township in Marion County. These parcels were not contiguous with each other, but were each individually contiguous with the City of Indianapolis. In 1955 by Special Ordinance No. 26 the City of Indianapolis attempted to annex the three parcels (or corners of the townships) under one ordinance. Remonstrances were filed in the Marion Circuit Court pursuant to the statute. Burns' § 48-702, 1960 Cum. Supp. Upon a hearing the Marion Circuit Court found that the City was not entitled to annex in one ordinance the three separate tracts of territory which were not contiguous with each other. Shortly after this adverse decision the City then enacted Special Ordinances Nos. 22, 23 and 24, 1959, for the purpose of annexing the same three parcels which had been included in the original Special Ordinance No. 26, 1955. The appellees thereupon filed the two injunction cases against the City in the Marion Circuit Court to enjoin the City from completing steps to enforce such ordinances numbered 22 and 24.[1]
The Marion Circuit Court upon trial entered a judgment granting an injunction against the City in each of the cases, enjoining it from taking any further action in such annexation matter for a period of two years. *69 Burns' § 48-702, 1960 Cum. Supp. This appeal is taken from those two judgments.
The appellants claim error upon the overruling of the motion for a new trial. The first proposition relied upon by the appellants is Item 8 in the motion for a new trial which reads as follows:
Appellants in the argument portion of their brief condensed this point as follows:
The assignment in the motion for a new trial is insufficient for the reason that no question and answer with *70 objections thereto nor an offer to prove, are set forth with the court's ruling thereon for us to give this specification adequate consideration. We should not be compelled to search the record to find the particular ruling to which objection was made. Kimmick v. Linn (1940), 217 Ind. 485, 29 N.E.2d 207; Sertel v. Graeter (1887), 112 Ind. 117, 13 N.E. 415; Discher et al. v. Klapp et al. (1954), 124 Ind. App. 563, 117 N.E.2d 753; Reese et al. v. Caffee et al. (1892), 133 Ind. 14, 32 N.E. 720. We point out, however, that the finding and judgment in the "Bowser case" is in the record brought before us.
Appellant's second proposition is that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the decision of the court and that the finding and decision are contrary to law.
The appellants argue under this point that the City should not be restrained for a period of two years, as provided under Burns' § 48-702, for the reason that there was no determination in the first and original hearing on the remonstrances in the annexation proceeding (Bowser case) on the merits. The appellants contend that the decision in favor of the remonstrators in the trial court was merely a technical victory because the City erroneously attempted to include in one ordinance three separate tracts of land not contiguous with each other. It is admitted, however, that if there had been a hearing on the merits, the pertinent statute barring further annexation proceedings for a period of two years would have been applicable.
An examination of the statute reveals that upon the filing of a remonstrance against annexation, the judge shall proceed to hear same:
The primary determinants are set out in the statute as follows:
The remonstrance in the Bowser case alleged specifically:
That allegation was put in issue. The trial court found that the territory sought to be annexed were three separate parcels not contiguous with each other, *72 or in other words, not a "compact area abutting the municipality." (Our italics.) The appellees contend that "taking into consideration the area already a part of the City of Indianapolis, the area annexed does constitute a compact adjoining area." The statute however states it must be "a compact area abutting the municipality," (our italics) using the singular with reference to the area to be annexed. In our opinion, separate non-contiguous parcels are not a compact area even though they each may abut the municipality at some point. Such a condition is a "primary determinant," and the law states:
On appeal, if there are any facts to support the judgment of the trial court, it is our duty to affirm same. 2 I.L.E., Appeals, § 571, p. 481 and § 583, p. 531.
Finally, the appellants urge upon us that injunctive relief was not the proper remedy in this case, for the *73 reason that the appellees had an adequate remedy by remonstrating a second time under the statute. We point out that the statutory method of remonstrating requiring either a majority of the owners of the land in the territory sought to be annexed or that the owners of more than 75% in assessed valuation of the real estate in such territory must join in a remonstrance, is quite onerous. To eliminate injunctive relief the remedy must be "adequate." Equity in this case offers that relief, since under the statute, the City is expressly prohibited for a period of two years from attempting a subsequent annexation of the same territory "in case the decision is adverse to such annexation," on the determinants specified in the statute. Burns' § 48-702, 1960 Cum. Supp.; King et al. v. City of Bloomington (1959), 239 Ind. 548, 159 N.E.2d 563; Haines v. Trueblood (1918), 67 Ind. App. 456, 119 N.E. 383.
The judgment in each case is affirmed.
Jackson, C.J., and Bobbitt, Landis and Achor, JJ., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 169 N.E.2d 405.
[1]  Special ordinance number 23 was not the subject of any injunctive action and is not involved in these appeals.