Title: Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Small
Citation: 829 So. 2d 743
Docket Number: 1001819
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 15, 2002

829 So. 2d 743 (2002)
ALFA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
Gladys L. SMALL.
1001819.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 15, 2002.
Alex L. Holtsford, Jr., and David P. Stevens of Nix, Holtsford, Gilliland, Lyons &amp; Higgins, P.C., Montgomery, for appellant.
Mark Allen Treadwell III of Oliver &amp; Sims, Dadeville, for appellee.
HARWOOD, Justice.
Alfa Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as "Alfa") appeals the trial court's declaratory judgment in favor of Gladys L. Small. We affirm.
*744 On March 9, 2001, Alfa sent a letter to the trial judge stating its arguments concerning this declaratory-judgment action. Small sent a similar letter on March 12, 2001. On that same day, the parties submitted the following stipulation of undisputed facts to the trial court:
On May 29, 2001, the trial court entered an order that stated, in pertinent part:
On July 2, 2001, the trial court made its order final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.
Our review of a declaratory judgment is generally governed by the ore tenus standard of review. However, in cases such as this, where there are no disputed facts and where the judgment is based entirely upon documentary evidence, no such presumption of correctness applies; our review is de novo. As this Court has stated:
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 668 So. 2d 539, 540 (Ala.1995)(citing Parker v. Barnes, 519 So. 2d 945 (Ala.1988)).
Alfa argues that the trial court erred in determining that Barclift had Young's "express permission" to drive her vehicle. The insurance policy at issue stated, in regard to covered persons, in pertinent part:
(Bold type in original.) Alfa correctly asserts that the clause at issue, also referred to as an "omnibus clause," requires a finding that Young gave Barclift her express permission to use her vehicle and that a finding of implied permission would not support Alfa's liability on any claim asserted by Small. See Pharr v. Beverly, 530 So. 2d 808 (Ala.1988). Alfa also offers caselaw from other jurisdictions holding that for coverage to be found under an omnibus clause, permission must be a voluntary act of the insured, and that permission is not shown when another driver has taken the insured's vehicle without the insured's knowledge. See Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Makover, 654 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir.1981)(permittee's husband did not have the implied permission of the permittee or the insured *746 and was not, at the time of the accident, operating the vehicle within the scope of permission given to the permittee); Insurance Co. of North America v. Norris, 116 Misc.2d 314, 455 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1982)(thief who was driving vehicle, while not a permissive user, was covered under the policy because of the insurer's failure to validly disclaim liability and deny coverage, and the insurer therefore waived the defense of lack of permissive use); Cutler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 138 Vt. 113, 412 A.2d 284 (1980)(thief did not have the insured's express or implied consent to operate vehicle).[1]
Alfa further argues that the law relating to bailment should be applied in determining whether Young had "delivered" her vehicle to Barclift in order to determine whether Young had knowingly given Barclift her express permission to drive her vehicle. In this regard, Alfa cites S/M Industries, Inc. v. Hapag-Lloyd A.G., 586 So. 2d 876 (Ala.1991), in which this Court, adopting the trial court's findings of fact, defined a bailment as follows:
586 So. 2d  at 881-82. Alfa's argument is not persuasive, however, because the clear language of the policy requires only that the insured or a family member give express permission to use the vehicle, not that a delivery, as required for a bailment, occur.
In regard to Young's directive to Barclift to return her vehicle once she had discovered that he was driving it, Alfa quotes from Pettis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 286 Ala. 344, 239 So. 2d 772 (1970), the statement that a "subsequent expression of ratification of the use by [the owner] cannot serve to impose retroactive liability on the insurer under the omnibus clause of the policy." 286 Ala. at 348, 239 So. 2d  at 776. In Pettis, a 16-year-old drove, without permission, an automobile entrusted to his 17-year-old friend by the friend's father; he was involved in a collision with another vehicle. Two days later, the 16-year-old asked his friend whether he was mad with him. The friend replied, "[N]o, that it would have been all right if [the 16-year-old] had not wrecked the car." 286 Ala. at 348, 239 So. 2d  at 776. This Court simply held that, to the extent that this "ex post facto statement" could be deemed a ratification of the 16-year-old's use of the vehicle, it did not lessen the intervening right of the vehicle's insurerfixed at the time of the collisionto deny coverage for the then nonpermissive use. This argument is not persuasive in the context of this case *747 because the liability sought to be imposed here arose as the result of an event that occurred after Young had told Barclift to return her vehicle.
In Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 286 Ala. 414, 240 So. 2d 664 (1970), a case discussed at length in Pharr, supra, this Court stated:
286 Ala. at 418, 240 So. 2d  at 667-68 (capitalization original; emphasis added). Other jurisdictions similarly define what constitutes express permission. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Ins. Cos. v. AMCO Ins. Co., 9 Neb.App. 872, 621 N.W.2d 553 (2001); American Family Ins. Group v. Howe, 584 F. Supp. 369 (D.S.D.1984); Truck Ins. Exchange v. Hunt, 590 S.W.2d 425 (Mo.Ct.App.1979).
Although Barclift initially did not have Young's express permission when he drove her vehicle from their home to Opelika, that trip was a separate occurrence; had the accident occurred while Barclift was en route to Opelika, Alfa would have a strong argument that it was not required to provide coverage under the terms of the policy, and any ex post facto attempt by Barclift to grant permission retroactively would have been unavailing as to the insurer. However, once Barclift telephoned Young and told her that he had her vehicle, she clearly and unmistakably ordered that he get in the vehicle and return it to their home. This represents a change in circumstances because, as the trial court found, Young easily could have ordered Barclift to leave her vehicle parked. Therefore, we conclude that, in the final analysis, Barclift had Young's "before-the-fact" express, if begrudging, permission to drive the vehicle, by virtue of her expressly ordering him to get in it and drive it back to their home. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
[1]  Alfa also cites Motor Club Fire &amp; Casualty Co. v. New Jersey Manufacturers Co., 73 N.J. 425, 375 A.2d 639 (1977), which held that a passenger had the insured's permission to occupy the vehicle as a passenger and his subsequent "ouster" of the insured from the vehicle and assumption of control as its driver did not constitute "theft and the like" so as to negate that permission under the New Jersey Supreme Court's "broadest and most liberal approach, known as the `initial permission rule,'" 73 N.J. at 432, 375 A.2d  at 643, and that state's legislative policy to provide protection to innocent victims. Except in the broadest sense of a discussion of permission, we conclude that this case is not relevant to our consideration of the facts and law applicable to the instant case.