Title: People v. Bull
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 81578
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: November 10, 1998

People v. Bull (Ill. S.Ct.)
Docket No. 81578-Agenda 2-March 
1998.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the 
court:
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Fulton 
County, defendant, Donald Bull, was convicted of the first degree murder of 
Donna Tompkins and her daughter, Justine, the concealment of their homicidal 
deaths, and the aggravated arson of their home. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a), 9-3.1(a), 
20-1.1(a)(1) (West 1992). Defendant chose to have the trial judge determine his 
sentence. At a separate sentencing hearing, the trial judge found defendant to 
be eligible for the death penalty and further determined that there were no 
mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude the imposition of that 
sentence.
Accordingly, the trial judge sentenced defendant to death on 
the murder convictions, to a consecutive five-year prison term on the homicidal 
death convictions, and to a 30-year prison term on the aggravated arson 
conviction, consecutive to the death penalty and concurrent with the other 
prison term. The death sentence has been stayed pending direct review by this 
court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a). We 
affirm.
BACKGROUND
The State's evidence at trial was essentially as follows. 
The victim, 30-year-old Donna Tompkins, worked at the Canton National Bank. 
Beginning in the spring of 1992, she also worked part-time as a waitress at the 
Canton Elks Club. In October 1992, she rented an apartment at 367 S. First 
Avenue in Canton for herself and for the other victim in this case, her 
three-year-old daughter, Justine.
A coworker of Donna's at the Elks Club, Iona Price, 
introduced Donna to defendant. He worked with Price's husband, Mike, delivering 
furniture. Donna told defendant that she wanted to buy a sofa bed for her new 
apartment, and defendant responded that he had one to sell. Later that evening, 
Price warned Donna not to allow defendant into her apartment if she were ever 
there alone.
Defendant soon thereafter sold Donna a used sofa bed. She 
arranged for defendant to deliver the sofa while she and Justine were not at 
home. In her mailbox, she left for defendant a check for the sofa bed and the 
key to her apartment.
At 9 a.m., on January 13, 1993, Donna had not yet arrived at 
the bank. A coworker, Sheila Sisk, reported Donna's absence to her supervisor, 
David Haynes. He telephoned Donna's apartment and received her answering 
machine. A short time later, Sisk again telephoned Haynes and this time reported 
that Justine was not at her day care center. Sisk suggested that Haynes go to 
Donna's apartment and check on her.
At approximately 9:15 a.m., Haynes left the bank and drove a 
few blocks to Donna's apartment. He parked behind Donna's car in the garage 
driveway. He knocked on her apartment door and did not hear an answer. He 
attempted to look into the apartment through windows next to the door, but could 
not see anything. Haynes went to the adjoining apartment to speak with the owner 
of the building, Pauline Newcomb. She did not know if the victims were still at 
home. Haynes telephoned the bank from Newcomb's apartment; Donna was not there. 
Haynes then telephoned the Canton police department for assistance.
While on the phone, Haynes heard knocks on the wall or 
floor. After hanging up, he noticed a faint puff of smoke emanating from the 
adjoining wall. Haynes instructed Newcomb to leave her apartment.
Haynes ran to Donna's door; he still could not open it. He 
ran to a window and pulled out from the window an air conditioner. Smoke, under 
pressure, billowed out from the opening. Haynes ran back to the apartment door, 
broke a window in the door, reached inside and opened the door. He could see 
only smoke and a bright orange glow. Haynes ran to the rear of the building, 
broke out windows, and called out to the victims. Reaching inside for the 
victims, Haynes felt only furniture.
A police officer arrived, who called for the fire 
department. Firefighters soon arrived and extinguished the fire. The fire had 
been intentionally set, and had been fast, intense, and extremely 
hot.
Firefighters discovered the charred remains of the victims. 
They were found on the metal framework of the sofa bed, the bed extending from 
the sofa. Donna lay rigidly face-up on what had been the mattress; her legs hung 
over the edge of the mattress frame. Justine lay curled on her side next to her 
mother.
The victims and the sofa bed had been saturated with 
kerosene, gasoline, and whiskey. A trail of the accelerants had been poured to a 
pool formed by the door. The prosecution pathologist opined that the victims 
probably had been strangled or smothered to death prior to the fire. Also, Donna 
had drunk alcohol prior to her death, but the evidence conflicted as to 
when.
On the night before the fire, defendant was living 
approximately 10 blocks from the victim's home, at the home of his new 
girlfriend, Rochelle Hillemeyer. Also present were David Nell and several 
others. They played cards and drank beer. At approximately 2 a.m., defendant 
borrowed Hillemeyer's car to drive Nell home. Hillemeyer went to bed. When she 
awoke at around 7 a.m., defendant had not yet returned.
Instead of driving Nell directly to his home, defendant 
drove around Canton drinking beer for approximately 30 minutes. Defendant twice 
drove past Donna's apartment. Each time defendant drove past, he pointed to the 
victims' apartment and told Nell that "he would like to f-k her," referring to 
Donna. According to Nell, "he [defendant] said that about all girls 
though."
Hillemeyer's mother, Jacqueline Day, drove to Hillemeyer's 
home on the morning of the fire to take one of her children to school. While Day 
was out doing errands, she noticed Hillemeyer's car parked within a block of the 
victims' apartment. Day stopped and exited her car, and inspected Hillemeyer's 
car. Day did not see a flat tire, or anything else wrong with the car. Day 
returned to Hillemeyer's home at around 8:30 a.m. Defendant had not yet 
returned.
At around 9:45 a.m., defendant returned with Hillemeyer's 
car. Defendant told Hillemeyer that he had a flat tire and had injured his leg 
while attempting to change the tire. Defendant further told Hillemeyer that he 
had entered the car and slept. However, upon inspection, Hillemeyer did not see 
any injury to defendant's leg. Defendant also mentioned that he had bloodstains 
on his coat as a result of his injury. When Hillemeyer told defendant that she 
had not seen any cuts on him, he responded that the stain was probably 
transmission fluid. He washed his coat in their washing machine.
Defendant went to sleep. He stayed home from work even 
though he was scheduled to work that day. When he awoke, defendant took 
Hillemeyer's car to a garage and had all four tires replaced. Sometime during 
the next several months, defendant told Hillemeyer that "if the police ever want 
to search my things, you don't have to let them."
On January 27, 1993, police investigators learned that Donna 
had bought the sofa bed from defendant. On that date, defendant repeated to the 
police what he told to Hillemeyer on the morning of the fire.
On March 21, 1993, Jo Ann Wright overheard defendant talking 
in a bar. He said that "he could kill somebody and get by with it and not get 
caught."
Intact sperm was recovered from Donna's remains. 
Investigators requested blood samples from Donna's estranged husband, Jon 
Tompkins; her then-current boyfriend, Rod Franciskovich; a prior boyfriend, 
Terry Haynes; David Haynes; and defendant. The first four voluntarily complied. 
Defendant refused until around March 24, 1993, when he was arrested in a 
different case. In that case, the State obtained a search warrant for samples of 
defendant's blood, hair, and clothing fibers.
The Illinois State Police Forensic Science Laboratory 
determined that, of the five men, only defendant's DNA matched that of the sperm 
recovered from Donna's remains. Indeed, according to the prosecution DNA expert, 
the chance of the DNA recovered from Donna matching anyone other than defendant 
was at least one in 210 million.
On March 29, 1993, police investigators obtained 
Hillemeyer's consent to search defendant's possessions. Officers found a closed 
box in the bedroom that defendant had shared with Hillemeyer. In the box, 
officers found several rings. Witnesses identified one of these rings as 
belonging to Donna; further, she never took it off.
On July 15, 1993, defendant told Harold Crosier that he had 
sex with Donna a few days prior to her death. Defendant and Crosier were 
watching a television program that discussed DNA. Defendant also told Crosier 
that blood could not have been found in Donna's apartment because it would have 
been incinerated. Defendant also expressed concern over a ring that he had left 
at Hillemeyer's home.
In a letter to Mike Price dated July 17, 1993, defendant 
stated that he had sex with Donna on the Saturday or Sunday prior to her death. 
He further wrote: "that was my second time with her and my last."
In March 1994, defendant confessed to Chris Chester that he 
had murdered the victims. Defendant told Chester the following. Defendant had a 
relationship with Donna. On the night of her murder, he had been drinking. He 
took her apartment key from her mailbox and woke her between midnight and 1 a.m. 
Donna told defendant that it was over between them, that it was a bad idea, and 
that all he wanted was money and sex. Donna slapped defendant. The next thing 
defendant remembered was waking up on top of her. When he came to, his hands 
were on Donna's face, leaning on her; she was dead. Defendant heard Justine in 
the next room, and did "the same thing" to her. Defendant then left Donna's 
apartment and walked to Hillemeyer's car, parked around the corner near a 
junkyard. A short time later, defendant returned to the apartment and wiped his 
fingerprints. He set the apartment on fire because he forgot 
something.
On June 30, 1994, defendant was charged in a 10-count 
indictment with seven counts of first degree murder, i.e., the 
intentional, knowing, and felony murder of Donna and Justine (720 ILCS 
5/9-1(a)(1) through (a)(3) (West 1992)); two counts of concealment of homicidal 
death (720 ILCS 5/9-3.1(a) (West 1992)); and one count of aggravated arson (720 
ILCS 5/20-1.1(a)(1) (West 1992)). Defendant was tried on all counts.
The defense case was essentially that the State failed to 
prove defendant guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
defense presented evidence that the victims were not strangled or smothered, as 
charged in most of the murder counts, but rather died from inhaling the 
superheated gases that the fire produced. The defense presented evidence that 
criticized the State's DNA testing method, and showed that defendant's DNA did 
not match that found in the semen recovered from Donna's remains. The defense, 
inter alia, attacked the adequacy and fairness of the police 
investigation, the credibility of Crosier and Chester, and the identification of 
Donna's ring. The defense argued that there was no evidence that Donna had been 
sexually assaulted, as charged in the felony murder count. The defense also 
argued that the true murderer was David Haynes.
At the close of the evidence, the jury returned general 
verdicts of guilty for the crimes charged.
Defendant waived a sentencing jury. The trial judge found 
the presence of a statutory aggravating factor: defendant had been convicted of 
murdering two or more individuals. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1992). Thus, 
the trial judge concluded that defendant was eligible for the death 
penalty.
At the second stage of the capital sentencing hearing, the 
State presented evidence that included the following. In 1983, defendant was 
charged with strangling Donna Rupe, his former sister-in-law, nearly to the 
point of death. He repeated this several times until she eventually escaped. 
Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery and sentenced to a five-year 
prison term.
Defendant was charged with strangling Valerie Hilton, an 
acquaintance. On March 23, 1993, after a few drinks in a bar, defendant asked 
Hilton for a ride home. En route, he directed her to a park. Once there, 
defendant explained that he wanted to have sex with Hilton. She refused and 
started to drive away. Defendant turned off the car and strangled Hilton until 
she passed out. When she regained consciousness, she was face down in the back 
seat of her car. Hilton told defendant that she would not go to the police if he 
drove her home. Defendant drove her home, and she telephoned her brother. 
Hilton's brother took her to the police and then to a hospital. While defendant 
was incarcerated for that offense, he was charged in this case. Defendant was 
ultimately convicted of aggravated battery. Two other women testified about 
their encounters with defendant, which did not result in criminal 
charges.
Defendant's mitigation evidence included the following. 
Defendant's IQ was low average; it ranked at the bottom 2% of the population. 
There were clear indications of brain dysfunction possibly resulting from a 
motorcycle accident. He has a language-based learning disability, thinks slowly, 
and is mentally impaired. Defendant abused alcohol and drugs. Also, defendant 
loved his mother, whose death in 1990 had devastated him. Defendant was not 
close to his father, who had often called defendant stupid or dumb. Defendant 
had always tried to obtain his father's attention and to please him. However, 
defendant's father was an excessive drinker; he also was a gambler, and a 
womanizer; and he left the family when defendant was 15 years old. Defendant had 
married Rupe's sister and had two children. They divorced after defendant 
attacked Rupe.
At the close of the sentencing hearing, the trial judge 
concluded that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude the 
imposition of the death penalty:
"THE COURT: Will the defendant please rise? Mr. Bull, I have 
reviewed the factors in aggravation and mitigation in this case. I find, 
essentially, that [the State's] characterization is the correct one. There are 
no statutory factors in mitigation. In aggravation, you have caused the death of 
two people and you have a criminal record. The other factors in mitigation that 
were brought forth concerning your background and concerning your academic 
problems, concerning the problems you had growing up in your family, do not rise 
to the level of mitigation in the Court's view. In fact they don't even help 
understand, or anyone understand, what you have done here.
You snuck into this young women's [sic] apartment, 
at night, and you raped her. And you strangled her to death. And if you would 
have stopped there I think life without parole would have been an acceptable 
sentence, but you didn't stop there. You heard that little girl and you 
strangled her and then you set them on fire to cover your tracks. But you didn't 
cover your tracks because this isn't a totally circumstantial case. You left 
your little deposit, your DNA, in that young women [sic]. And despite 
your efforts to cover that up, you have been unsuccessful.
Like I said, if would [sic] you have stopped with 
Donna Tompkins I think life without parole would have been acceptable, but you 
didn't. You heard Justine; who couldn't hurt you. Who couldn't identify you. 
Couldn't have testified against you, and you killed her, and for that, Donald 
Bull, I sentence you to death."
As stated earlier, the trial judge also sentenced defendant 
to prison terms on the other convictions. Also, defendant's prison sentences in 
this case were consecutive to the prison sentence he was then serving for his 
attack on Hilton. 
Defendant appeals. Additional pertinent facts will be 
discussed in the context of the issues raised on appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends: (1) the search of his closed box in 
Hillemeyer's bedroom was unreasonable; (2) the questioning of a juror in his 
absence denied him several constitutional rights; and (3) the evidence was 
insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also 
contends that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court: (4) barred 
defense cross-examination of the prosecution DNA expert regarding his 
disciplinary record with the state police crime laboratory, and (5) admitted an 
out-of-court statement of Iona Price during her testimony and portions of the 
testimony of Jon Tompkins. Defendant contends (6) he did not receive a fair 
sentencing hearing at the death eligibility phase because findings were not made 
as to the mental states required for death penalty eligibility. Defendant 
contends (7) the trial court erred by denying his several pro se 
post-trial motions without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant also contends (8) 
that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional because the death 
penalty will inevitably be applied to innocent persons, and the statute 
precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating circumstances.
I. Search of Closed Box
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress as evidence the ring identified as belonging to 
Donna. Defendant claims that the search of his closed box in Hillemeyer's 
bedroom was unreasonable and, consequently, he must receive a new 
trial.
The hearing on the motion to suppress elicited the following 
uncontested facts. In January 1993, defendant moved his belongings into 
Hillemeyer's home. He lived with her and shared her bedroom until his arrest on 
March 23, 1993, regarding the Hilton attack. Included with defendant's 
possessions was a cardboard box, which had been a container for a bottle of 
liqueur. Defendant used the box as a "collection box," or a "piggy bank"; he 
"threw odds and ends in it." Sometimes he kept the box in a dresser; sometimes 
he kept the box beside the dresser. Defendant had never permitted Hillemeyer to 
look in the box; she had never asked to do so.
On March 29, 1993, defendant was in the local jail. Illinois 
State Police Agent Kenneth Kedzior and Canton Police Sergeant David Ayers went 
to Hillemeyer's home and asked if they could search her home. She consented and 
signed a printed consent form. The officials asked Hillemeyer specifically 
whether there was any area of the premises to which she did not have access; she 
answered in the negative.
In the bedroom, the officials discovered the closed box on 
the floor beside a dresser. Hillemeyer stated that the box and its contents 
belonged to defendant. The officials asked her if she had access to the box, and 
she answered that she did. The officials also asked Hillemeyer if she knew what 
was in the box, and she answered that she did not.
The police opened the box. It contained coins, a key, a ring 
with a black setting, and a ring with a clear setting. Hillemeyer told the 
officials that defendant previously had shown her the ring with the black 
setting. She had not previously seen the key or the ring with the clear setting. 
Witnesses subsequently identified the ring with the clear setting as belonging 
to Donna. At the close of the hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion 
to suppress.
Defendant contends that the search of his box violated the 
United States and Illinois Constitutions. See U.S. Const., amends. IV, XIV; Ill. 
Const. 1970, art. I, §6. We note that this court, as a general rule, in 
interpreting the search and seizure provision in the Illinois Constitution, 
looks to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth 
amendment. See People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211, 217-23 (1995); 
cf. People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 74 (1996) ("We knowingly depart 
from that tradition [of applying the lockstep doctrine] here for the reasons set 
forth below"). Also, a reviewing court generally will not disturb a trial 
court's determination of a motion to suppress evidence unless it is manifestly 
erroneous. However, in this case, the parties do not question the facts or the 
credibility of the witnesses. Thus, de novo review is appropriate. See 
People v. Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d 66, 76 (1990).
The fourth amendment prohibits the warrantless search of a 
person's home as per se unreasonable. However, there are a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. One such exception is a search conducted pursuant to consent. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 858, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2043-44 (1973).
This consent may be obtained not only from the individual 
whose property is searched, but also from a third party who possesses common 
authority over the premises. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 
111 L. Ed. 2d 148, 156, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2797 (1990). A court should not infer 
common authority from the mere property interest a third person has in the 
property. The authority that justifies third-party consent is not based on the 
law of property. Rather, such authority is based on mutual use of the property 
by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to recognize that any of the coinhabitants has the 
right to permit the inspection in his or her own right, and that the others have 
assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be 
searched. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 250 n.7, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993 n.7 (1974), adopted in People v. 
Stacey, 58 Ill. 2d 83 (1974). The burden of establishing common authority 
rests on the government. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.  at 181, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 
156, 110 S. Ct.  at 2797.
Defendant does not challenge the voluntariness of 
Hillemeyer's consent, but rather challenges its scope. Defendant argues that 
Hillemeyer could legally consent only to a search of her own property, and not 
to a search of his closed container. "A homeowner's consent to a search of the 
home may not be effective consent to a search of a closed object inside the 
home." United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 725, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530, 548, 
104 S. Ct. 3296, 3308 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, 
J.); accord United States v. Rodriguez, 888 F.2d 519, 523 (7th Cir. 
1989); People v. Gonzalez, 88 N.Y.2d 289, 294 n.1, 667 N.E.2d 323, 325 
n.1, 644 N.Y.S.2d 673, 675 n.1 (1996) (collecting cases). When a homeowner 
permits entry into her home of a guest's private container to which the owner 
does not have the right of access, the homeowner effectively surrenders a 
segment of the privacy of her home to the privacy of the container's owner. Such 
a homeowner lacks the power to give effective consent to the search of the 
closed container. Karo, 468 U.S.  at 726, 82 L. Ed. 2d  at 548-49, 104 S. Ct.  at 3309 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, J.).
In this case, when police officials found defendant's box, 
they questioned Hillemeyer specifically as to her common authority over the 
box, separate from her common authority over the 
premises.
Defendant counters that police officials should have known 
that Hillemeyer's consent was inadequate. However, a warrantless search based on 
the consent of a person having apparent, though not actual, authority to give 
such consent is lawful if, at the time of the search, the police reasonably 
believe that person to have common authority over the place or item to be 
searched. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.  at 186-89, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 160-61, 110 S. Ct.  at 2800-01.
In this case, Hillemeyer stated that she was familiar with 
and had access to the box. The mere fact that defendant alone may have used the 
box does not indicate that Hillemeyer was denied the mutual use, access to, or 
control over it. See Stacey, 58 Ill. 2d at 89-90; People v. 
Ford, 83 Ill. App. 3d 57, 63 (1980); 3 W. LaFave, Search &amp; Seizure 
§8.3(f), at 740 n.92 (3d ed. 1996). Based on these uncontested facts, we hold 
that police officials could reasonably believe that Hillemeyer had common 
authority over the box. We agree with the trial court that Hillemeyer had the 
requisite common authority, either actual or apparent, to consent to the search 
of defendant's box.
II. Defendant's Absence from Juror 
Questioning
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by 
conducting an in camera voir dire of a juror in the presence of the 
attorneys, but in the absence of defendant. He claims that this conference 
denied him several constitutional rights, requiring a new trial.
During the weekend prior to trial, juror Catherine McCormack 
contacted the trial judge to inform him of a conversation she had regarding the 
case. In response, the judge held an in camera conference immediately 
prior to the jury being sworn and opening statements made. Present were 
prosecution and defense attorneys, but defendant was absent.
McCormack stated as follows. On the day after jury 
selection, a former coworker unexpectedly came to McCormack's home. In fact, the 
visitor said that she had stopped by earlier looking for McCormack. They spoke 
of a number of topics. During their conversation, McCormack told the visitor 
that she was on jury duty. The visitor responded: "Oh yeah, the murder trial. I 
hear he's done this before." After the visitor left, McCormack realized that 
they had been discussing the trial, worried about the conversation, and 
telephoned the trial judge.
The trial judge asked McCormack if she had any other 
conversations regarding the trial; McCormack responded that she had not. 
However, McCormack further stated that, subsequent to jury selection, she 
remembered a chapter from her past. During jury selection, the trial judge asked 
if any of the prospective jurors had been crime victims. McCormack failed to say 
that her mother and herself had been battered in past relationships. However, in 
response to the trial judge's further questioning, McCormack added that these 
prior incidents did not result in any criminal charges. In response to 
questioning by defense counsel, McCormack stated that she had undergone therapy, 
she thought that her emotions flowing from these abusive relationships were 
behind her, and she was shocked to discover that they were not. McCormack stated 
that if defendant and the victim knew each other and had an abusive 
relationship, she did not know if she could be impartial.
Defendant's trial counsel requested a recess, left the 
conference, and conferred with defendant. On their return, defense counsel 
informed the judge that they did not object to McCormack remaining on the jury. 
The trial judge instructed McCormack not to consider what she had learned 
outside of the record. The judge noted that every juror brings to a trial his or 
her "baggage," which we take to mean personal history and experiences, and 
expressed to McCormack confidence that she would be fair and impartial. The jury 
subsequently chose McCormack to be their foreperson.
Initially we agree with the State that this issue is waived 
for review. Defendant first raised the issue in his post-trial motion; he did 
not object prior to the jury being sworn. " `An accused may not sit idly by 
and allow irregular proceedings to occur without objection and afterwards seek 
to reverse his conviction by reason of those same irregularities.' " 
People v. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d 498, 522 (1992), quoting People v. 
Ford, 19 Ill. 2d 466, 478-79 (1960). Thus, the issue is waived. See 
People v. Towns, 157 Ill. 2d 90, 99-100 (1993).
Defendant further asks this court to consider the issue 
under the plain error doctrine, claiming the denial of several constitutional 
rights. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). Plain error is a narrow and limited exception to 
the general waiver rule. Plain error is invoked only where the evidence is 
closely balanced, or the alleged error is so substantial that it deprived the 
defendant of a fair trial. People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 100 
(1992).
A criminal defendant has a general right to be present at 
every stage of trial, including jury selection. However, the situations in which 
the denial of this broad right of presence actually violates the Illinois and 
United States Constitutions are limited. Under the Illinois Constitution, a 
criminal defendant "is not denied a constitutional right every time he is not 
present during his trial, but only when his absence results in a denial of an 
underlying substantial right, in other words, a constitutional right; and it is 
only in such a case that plain error is committed." People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 80-81 (1990). Defendant contends that his absence from the McCormack 
conference denied him the right to an impartial jury. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 
§8.
Defendant contends that his absence from the McCormack 
conference also denied him the due process of law under the United States 
Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. XIV. Under the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment, a criminal defendant's right of presence is violated only 
when the defendant's absence results in the denial of a fair and just trial. 
Specifically, in this case, the fairness issue concerns the impartiality of 
defendant's jury. The question we must answer is the same under article I, 
section 8, of the Illinois Constitution: Did defendant's absence from the 
McCormack conference cause him to be tried, convicted, and sentenced by a jury 
prejudiced against him? See Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 82-85.
Defendant reasons that because McCormack, the jury 
foreperson, possessed knowledge of him outside of the record, and had personal 
history and experiences that caused her to doubt her ability to be impartial, 
then McCormack was prejudiced against him. Defendant notes McCormack's 
statements that if she learned that he and Donna had an abusive relationship, 
then she did not know if she could be impartial. Defendant argues that he was 
forced to rely on his trial counsel's reports of McCormack's statements, rather 
than his own first-hand observation of McCormack. Defendant argues that had he 
been present, he "could have seen how upset the juror had been and how she 
reacted to his presence," and would have "been in a better position *** to judge 
whether the juror was likely to share her prejudicial information and 
experiences with the other jurors."
We cannot accept defendant's argument. The record does not 
indicate in any way that McCormack was "upset" about anything. The record also 
does not indicate how McCormack would have "reacted to his presence" differently 
than during jury selection or, for that matter, during the remainder of the 
trial. This court has observed:
"It is not necessary that jurors be unaware of the case 
before they assume their roles in the jury box. Crimes, especially heinous 
crimes, are of great public interest and are extensively reported. It is 
unreasonable to expect that individuals of average intelligence and at least 
average interest in their community would not have heard of any of the cases 
which they are called upon to judge in court. Total ignorance of the case is 
exceptional, and it is not required. [Citation.] What is required is the 
assurance that a juror will be able to set aside all information he has acquired 
outside the courtroom, along with any opinions he has formed, and decide the 
case strictly on the evidence as presented in the courtroom. [Citation.]" 
People v. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d 377, 386 (1984).
Also, despite McCormack's personal history and experiences, 
she previously stated during voir dire that she would be fair and 
impartial. At the conference, the trial judge was in a position to evaluate 
McCormack's responses to questioning, and to determine that McCormack would be 
fair and impartial. On this record, we cannot set aside the trial judge's 
determination. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 162 Ill. App. 3d 
952, 954-55 (1987).
The record does not even suggest that McCormack, or the jury 
as a whole, was actually prejudiced against him. Thus, we hold that defendant 
failed to show that he did not receive an impartial trial.
We lastly note defendant's related claim that he was denied 
his right to effective assistance of counsel with respect to this issue. U.S. 
Const. amends. VI, XIV. Defendant contends that his trial counsel's failure to 
insist on defendant's presence at the McCormack conference, and to seek 
dismissal of "the prejudiced juror," amounted to constitutionally deficient 
performance requiring a new trial.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
criminal defendant must satisfy the familiar Strickland test. See 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). The test is composed of two prongs: deficiency and prejudice. To 
establish prejudice, the defendant must prove that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. The defendant must show that 
counsel's deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or 
the proceeding fundamentally unfair. People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 
74 (1997).
However, a court need not consider whether counsel's 
performance was deficient prior to examining the prejudice that the defendant 
suffered as a result of the alleged deficiency. If the ineffective-assistance 
claim can be disposed of on the ground that the defendant did not suffer 
prejudice, the court need not decide whether counsel's performance was 
constitutionally deficient. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 74; People v. 
Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 283-84 (1992).
In this case, we previously concluded that defendant failed 
to show that McCormack or the jury as a whole was actually prejudiced against 
him. Thus, defendant fails the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. 
We hold that defendant's absence from the McCormack conference did not deny him 
his constitutional rights to an impartial jury, due process of law, or effective 
assistance of counsel.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant next contends that the evidence was insufficient 
to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Where a criminal conviction is 
challenged based on insufficient evidence, a reviewing court, considering all of 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, must determine 
whether any rational fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the 
essential elements of the crime. A criminal conviction will not be set aside 
unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable 
doubt of the defendant's guilt. People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 191 
(1989).
Defendant argues that the State's case can be explained as 
consistent with his innocence. Defendant points to the defense expert DNA 
testimony and the conflict it created with the prosecution expert DNA testimony. 
Defendant further notes that even if his DNA was found in Donna's remains, it 
can be explained by the evidence that he and Donna had a sexual relationship 
prior to her murder. Defendant also attacks the credibility of Crosier and 
Chester, and the identification of Donna's ring found in defendant's box. 
Defendant also points to evidence which he claims implicates David Haynes in the 
murders.
It is not the function of a reviewing court to retry a 
defendant when considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Rather, it is the function of the fact finder to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence. People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 448-49 
(1995); People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (1990). It is for the fact 
finder to resolve conflicts or inconsistencies in the testimony of the 
witnesses. People v. Phillips, 127 Ill. 2d 499, 514 (1989). When 
weighing the evidence, the fact finder is not required to disregard inferences 
that flow from the evidence, nor is it required to search out all possible 
explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable 
doubt. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 447. Also, speculation that another 
person might have committed the offense does not necessarily raise a reasonable 
doubt of the guilt of the accused. People v. Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d 195, 
206 (1990).
Defendant's arguments address functions of the jury and not 
of this court. After reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, we cannot say that the evidence was so improbable or unsatisfactory 
that no rational fact finder could have found defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
IV. Cross-Examination of Prosecution DNA 
Expert
Defendant contends he was denied a fair trial because the 
trial court barred defense cross-examination of David Metzger, the prosecution 
DNA expert, regarding his disciplinary record with the State Police crime 
laboratory. Prior to trial, the trial court granted the State's motion in 
limine to bar cross-examination of Metzger regarding a disciplinary 
incident. In 1993, Metzger performed the DNA tests in this case. The State 
Police brought administrative charges against Metzger, accusing him of stealing 
a microscope in January 1995. In May 1995, the State Police and Metzger entered 
into a settlement agreement. The State Police agreed not to discharge Metzger, 
and disciplined him with a 100-day suspension without pay. Metzger agreed to 
perform 120 hours of community service as directed and monitored by the State 
Police, and voluntarily forfeited his accrued vacation time.
The sixth amendment right of confrontation includes the 
right to cross-examine a witness regarding the witness' biases, interests, or 
motives to testify. A witness may be impeached by attacking her character. Only 
criminal convictions may be used; proof of arrests or other charges are 
inadmissible. However, another accepted method of impeachment is to show a 
witness' bias, interest, or motive to testify. With this method of impeachment, 
the defendant may show or inquire into the fact that a witness has been arrested 
or otherwise charged with a crime where it would reasonably tend to show that 
the witness' testimony might be influenced by interest, bias, or a motive to 
testify falsely. People v. Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d 461, 491-92 (1992); 
People v. Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d 463, 475 (1985).
Thus, although evidence of arrests or other charges is not 
admissible to impeach credibility generally, such evidence is admissible to show 
that the witness' testimony may be influenced by bias, interest, or motive to 
testify falsely. However, the evidence that is used must give rise to the 
inference that the witness has something to gain or lose by his or her 
testimony. Therefore, the evidence used must not be remote or uncertain. 
Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d  at 475-76.
In the present case, defendant contends that Metzger's 
disciplinary record shows his motive to testify falsely or to embellish his 
testimony to please his employers. Defendant argues as follows. At the time of 
trial, Metzger "remained under a cloud of disgrace" with the State Police. He 
had "perilous job security" with the agency. Indeed, his poor standing increased 
the risk that negative critiques of his job performance, such as from the 
defense DNA expert, would cause him to be fired. Therefore, defendant reasons, 
Metzger "was strongly motivated to testify in a biased manner in defense of his 
performance."
However, we agree with the trial court that Metzger's 
administrative disciplinary record would have been inadmissible to impeach him. 
The record is too speculative and remote to infer that Metzger had something to 
gain or lose by his testimony. As the trial court noted, the administrative 
charges arose approximately two years after Metzger had completed and 
reported his DNA analysis in this case. Further, trial occurred approximately 
one year after Metzger was disciplined. At trial, Metzger's testimony regarding 
his DNA analysis of defendant was based on the three-year-old report. We uphold 
the trial court's order barring defense cross-examination of Metzger regarding 
his administrative disciplinary record.
V. Erroneously Admitted Evidence
Defendant next assigns error to the admission of a portion 
of the testimony of Iona Price and much of the testimony of Jon Tompkins. The 
admission of evidence at trial is a matter within the sound discretion of the 
trial court, and its ruling may not be reversed absent a clear abuse of 
discretion. People v. Ward, 101 Ill. 2d 443, 455-56 
(1984).
A. Iona Price
Defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting into 
evidence an out-of-court statement of Iona Price that she repeated during her 
testimony. Price testified that after she introduced Donna to defendant, she 
warned Donna not to allow defendant into her apartment if she were ever there 
alone. Defendant argues that Price's out-of-court statement was inadmissible 
because it was irrelevant, prejudicial hearsay.
Although defendant objected to this statement at trial, he 
concedes that trial counsel failed to include this issue in defendant's 
post-trial motion. Thus, the issue is waived. People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 38-40 (1989); People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). 
Defendant invokes the plain error rule (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)), claiming that 
this statement was highly prejudicial because the evidence was closely balanced. 
We disagree; the record contains abundant evidence of defendant's guilt. After 
reviewing the record, we conclude that this issue does not warrant our 
consideration under the plain error doctrine.
B. Jon Tompkins
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by 
admitting into evidence much of the testimony of Donna's estranged husband, Jon 
Tompkins. Defendant characterizes much of Tompkins' testimony as concerning "the 
irrelevant prejudicial aspects of his grief and his loving relationship with his 
daughter prior to her murder." The State responds that this testimony was 
admissible as relevant evidence of the victim's activities prior to their 
murder.
The record shows that trial counsel failed to object at 
trial to these portions of Tompkins' testimony. Thus, the issue is waived. 
Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186-87. We further conclude that this issue does 
not warrant our consideration under the plain error doctrine.
C. Effective Assistance of Counsel
We note defendant's related claim that his trial counsel was 
constitutionally deficient for failing to preserve the above issues for review. 
We conclude that defendant fails the prejudice prong of the Strickland 
test. Even assuming that the above evidence was erroneously admitted, we 
conclude that there is no reasonable probability that the result of the trial 
would have been different. Counsel's allegedly deficient performance in this 
regard did not render the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding 
fundamentally unfair. See Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 74.
VI. Death Eligibility
Defendant next contends he was denied due process of law at 
the death eligibility phase of the sentencing hearing because findings were not 
made as to the mental states required for death penalty eligibility. The 
statutory aggravating factor making defendant eligible for the death penalty was 
that he had been convicted of murdering two or more individuals. This 
aggravating factor includes an intent requirement: either the defendant intends 
to kill more than one person, or kills with knowledge that his separate acts 
create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) 
(West 1992).
Defendant notes that the trial jury was instructed as to all 
three forms of murder-intentional, knowing, and felony murder-but returned only 
a general verdict of guilty each for Donna and Justine. Also, the sentencing 
judge found the presence of the statutory aggravating factor by taking judicial 
notice of the murder convictions, without making an additional, express finding 
as to intent. Defendant claims that this omission requires a new sentencing 
hearing.
We disagree. In People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118 
(1992), this court noted that the general verdict of guilty included a 
conviction of intentional murder, and that the sentencing judge took judicial 
notice of the verdict. This court reasoned that "[s]ince the verdict encompassed 
the necessary finding of intent, there was no omission on the part of the trial 
judge, and defendant's argument must fail." Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d  at 
157. Also, as recently noted in the special concurrence in People v. 
Harris, No. 80084 (April 16, 1998), "the jury's verdicts, when viewed in 
conjunction with all of the evidence adduced at the trial which the trial 
judge heard, form the basis for affirming the trial judge's 
specific finding of death eligibility on appeal." (Emphasis in original.) 
Harris, slip op. at 36 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). 
Defendant's argument must fail.
VII. Pro Se Post-Trial Motions
Defendant next contends the trial court erred by denying his 
pro se post-trial motions without an evidentiary hearing. The record 
shows that defendant filed several pro se post-trial motions, including 
motions for a new trial, substitution of counsel, and delay of sentencing. The 
motions alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant asks us to remand 
this cause for a hearing on his allegations of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, "which may require the appointment of new counsel to investigate and 
argue the failings of trial counsel."
When a defendant presents a pro se post-trial claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court may, under certain 
circumstances, appoint new counsel to assist the defendant in presenting his 
claim. However, the trial court should first examine the factual basis for 
defendant's claims. After this examination, if the trial court determines that 
the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then new 
counsel need not be appointed and the pro se motion can be denied. 
However, if the allegations show possible neglect of the case, new counsel 
should be appointed. People v. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68, 86 (1993); 
accord People v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453, 466 (1996). The appointed 
counsel can then independently evaluate the defendant's claim and would avoid 
the conflict of interest that trial counsel would experience if she had to 
justify her actions contrary to her client's position. People v. Pope, 
284 Ill. App. 3d 330, 333 (1996); People v. Giles, 261 Ill. App. 3d 
833, 847 (1994). "[T]he operative concern for the reviewing court is whether the 
trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into the pro se defendant's 
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel." People v. Johnson, 
159 Ill. 2d 97, 125 (1994).
We conclude that the trial court adequately inquired into 
defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance. Defendant now contends "the 
trial court did nothing to ascertain whether the allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel at trial were spurious or pertained to strategy." However, 
the record shows that the trial court did investigate defendant's allegations. 
The court heard from defendant and his two trial counsel. Only after this 
examination did the court find that defendant's allegations were spurious and, 
accordingly, denied defendant's motions. We uphold the trial court's 
ruling.
VIII. Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute
Defendant lastly contends the Illinois death penalty statute 
is unconstitutional (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 
§§2, 11) for two reasons.
A. Inevitable Execution of Innocent 
Persons
Defendant first claims that the Illinois death penalty 
statute is unconstitutional because of "the inevitability that innocent persons 
will be wrongly convicted of capital crimes and executed." As examples, 
defendant points to several cases in which those defendants have been exonerated 
and released from death row after they had been convicted of capital crimes and 
sentenced to death. Defendant argues that the irreversibility of the death 
penalty "makes the inevitability of error in the imposition of the death penalty 
constitutionally unacceptable."
The State's sole response is a description of the many 
meaningful procedural safeguards that a criminal defendant enjoys throughout the 
various stages of the judicial process, including trial, post-trial, direct 
appellate review, post-conviction and federal habeas corpus review, and 
executive clemency. However, defendant expressly argues:
"No amount of procedural due process can prevent 
all of the errors that can result in such miscarriages of justice. Perjury, 
mistaken identifications, errors in forensic testing, racial bias, and countless 
other sources of factual error will remain, despite the right to counsel, the 
confrontation clause, the right to an impartial jury, or the right of appeal and 
habeas corpus." (Emphasis added.)
An important goal of the criminal justice process is the 
protection of the innocent accused against an erroneous conviction. Many would 
argue that it is the goal of the highest priority. 1 W. LaFave &amp; J. Israel, 
Criminal Procedure §1.6(c), at 44 (1984). The interest in the accuracy of a 
criminal proceeding that places an individual's life or liberty at risk is 
almost uniquely compelling. The many safeguards that the law has developed over 
the years to diminish the risk of erroneous conviction stand as a testament to 
this concern. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53, 63, 
105 S. Ct. 1087, 1093 (1985).
Whatever the number of safeguards in the system, the 
American criminal justice process is necessarily imperfect because it is 
operated by people and people are imperfect. Nonetheless, it remains one of the 
best in the world, and the only system we have. The United States Supreme Court 
has held that "the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be 
imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless of the 
character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in 
reaching the decision to impose it." (Emphasis added.) Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 882-83, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932 
(1976). We view this holding as including the determination of guilt. We note 
that other courts have rejected this exact argument. See, e.g., 
United States v. Bradley, 880 F. Supp. 271, 291-92 (M.D. Pa. 1994); 
United States v. Pretlow, 779 F. Supp. 758, 777-78 (D. N.J. 1991) (both 
citing Gregg); see also State v. Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d 668, 
758 n.24, 940 P.2d 1239, 1284 n.24 (1997) (court acknowledged issue, but 
declined to suspend operation of the death penalty absent finding of 
constitutional deficiency).
One might be tempted to accept defendant's argument that the 
Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional because innocent persons will 
inevitably be convicted of capital crimes, sentenced to death, and executed. 
However, it must be remembered that defendant's argument does not address the 
issue of procedural deficiency in the criminal justice system. We stress that 
defendant argues that "[n]o amount of procedural due process can 
prevent all of the errors that can result in" an innocent person being convicted 
of a capital crime. (Emphasis added.) Thus, defendant's strident protest is 
against the concept of the Anglo-American criminal trial itself as the means of 
determining the guilt or innocence of an accused.
This inexplicable attack on the American criminal trial as 
the means of determining guilt requires a discussion of fundamental 
principles.
"The system of criminal justice America uses to deal with 
those crimes it cannot prevent and those criminals it cannot deter is not a 
monolithic, or even a consistent system. It was not designed or built in one 
piece at one time. Its philosophic core is that a person may be punished by the 
Government if, and only if, it has been proved by an impartial and deliberate 
process that he has violated a specific law. Around that core layer upon layer 
of institutions and procedures, some inspired by principle and some by 
expediency, have accumulated. *** The entire system represents an adaptation of 
the English common law to America's peculiar structure of government ***." 
President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The 
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 7 (1967).
In this country and in this state, a defendant has a 
constitutional right to have the charges brought against him proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The forum for such a determination is a trial. The guilt or 
innocence determination in a criminal trial is a " `decisive and portentous 
event.' `Society's resources have been concentrated at that time and place in 
order to decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt 
or innocence of one of its citizens.' " Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203, 217, 113 S. Ct. 853, 861 (1993), quoting 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594, 610, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2508 (1977).
The purpose of a trial is to have witnesses and evidence 
against the defendant put before the trier of fact so they can be tested by way 
of cross-examination, the belief being that the truth will become apparent as a 
result of this process. At the trial, the defendant has an opportunity to call 
witnesses on his own behalf and to testify should the defendant choose to do so. 
6 L. Pieczynski, Illinois Practice §26.1, at 212 (1989). Additional features of 
an American criminal trial include the presumption of innocence, the right of 
the defendant not to testify on his own behalf, the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel, and the exclusion of evidence illegally obtained by the 
state. 1 W. LaFave &amp; J. Israel, Criminal Procedure §1.4, at 28 (1984); see 
generally 1 W. LaFave &amp; J. Israel, Criminal Procedure §1.6 (1984); 2 W. 
LaFave &amp; J. Israel, Criminal Procedure §§11.1 through 11.10 
(1984).
A criminal defendant, whether guilty or innocent, is 
entitled to a fair, orderly, and impartial trial, as described above, conducted 
according to law. People v. Kalpak, 10 Ill. 2d 411, 428 (1957). This 
right is protected by the United States and Illinois Constitutions. U.S. Const., 
amend. XIV (due process clause); Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2; see People v. 
Hoffman, 379 Ill. 318, 322 (1942); People v. Garrett, 26 Ill. App. 
3d 786, 801 (1975). "It is an unalterable fact that our judicial system, like 
the human beings who administer it, is fallible." Herrera, 506 U.S.  at 
415, 122 L. Ed. 2d  at 226, 113 S. Ct.  at 868. This court has observed that 
trials cannot be conducted without error, and that perfection in trial procedure 
is virtually unattainable. People v. Agnello, 22 Ill. 2d 352, 363 
(1961). Thus, it is fundamental that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled 
to a fair trial, not a perfect one. People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 
90-91 (1997); People v. Ruiz, 94 Ill. 2d 245, 260 (1982), citing 
Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619-20, 97 L. Ed. 593, 605, 73 S. Ct. 481, 490 (1952); accord 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law §1145, at 5 
(1989).
Defendant's complaint is simply that the American criminal 
trial, as the means of determining the guilt or innocence of an accused, is not 
perfect. However, as imperfect as he describes the system, defendant does not 
suggest a substitute for this system as the means of determining guilt or 
innocence. Indeed, in a sense, defendant's protest is unanswerable. Have 
mistakes been made? Will mistakes be made? Certainly.
"The American criminal justice system regards the trial as 
the best method for determining a defendant's guilt. Yet a trial is not a 
scientific process. Instead of calm, consistent evaluations of evidence, trials 
involve unpredictable human perceptions and reactions. *** [T]rials are very 
human processes, and the truth is not guaranteed to emerge in the final 
verdict." G. Cole &amp; C. Smith, The American System of Criminal Justice 372-73 
(8th ed. 1998).
However, the American criminal justice system, like perhaps 
no other system in the world, provides the maximum protection necessary to guard 
against mistakes being made.
"What most significantly distinguishes the [criminal 
justice] system of one country from that of another is the extent and the form 
of the protections it offers individuals in the process of determining guilt and 
imposing punishment. Our system of justice deliberately sacrifices much in 
efficiency and even in effectiveness in order to *** protect the individual. 
Sometimes it may seem too much." President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 7 
(1967).
We note that the partial dissent asserts that "legislatures 
and the courts appear to have abandoned any genuine concern with insuring the 
fairness and reliability of the system." Slip op. at 36 (Harrison, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, both this court and the 
General Assembly have included additional safeguards with the many protections 
that a criminal defendant enjoys in the continuing process of the criminal 
justice system.
Based on the Illinois Constitution, this court has 
recognized that a defendant's right against self-incrimination is violated where 
the police deny an attorney, retained for the defendant without her knowledge, 
physical access to the defendant during the interrogation and where the police 
do not inform the defendant that the attorney is seeking to consult with her at 
the police station. People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414 (1994). Also 
based on the Illinois Constitution, this court has recognized that a free 
standing claim of newly discovered evidence of innocence raises a constitutional 
question properly considered in a post-conviction petition. People v. 
Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475 (1996). Also, the legislature has recently 
enacted a law to allow prisoners to obtain previously unavailable DNA testing of 
relevant pieces of physical evidence. 725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West Supp. 
1997).
This protection reflects the goal of decreasing the chance 
of convicting an innocent person even at the price of increasing the chance that 
a guilty person may escape conviction. True, the basic purpose of a trial is to 
determine the truth. Nevertheless, it is a fundamental value determination of 
the American criminal justice system that it is far worse to convict an innocent 
person than to let a guilty person go free. 1 W. LaFave &amp; J. Israel, 
Criminal Procedure §1.6(c), at 45 (1984). We note that scholars have criticized 
one of the sources defendant has cited (H. Bedau &amp; M. Radelet, 
Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Crimes, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 
21 (1987)) for the proposition that numerous innocent persons have been 
erroneously convicted of capital crimes. Herrera, 506 U.S.  at 415 n.15, 
122 L. Ed. 2d  at 226 n.15, 113 S. Ct.  at 868 n.15, citing S. Markman &amp; P. 
Cassell, Comment, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet 
Study, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 121 (1988).
Indeed, People v. Burrows, 172 Ill. 2d 169 (1996), 
and People v. Gauger, No. 2-94-1199 (1996) (unpublished order under 
Supreme Court Rule 23), referred to in the partial dissent (slip op. at 36 
(Harrison, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)), exemplify how 
careful the American criminal justice system is in imposing the death penalty. 
In Burrows, the defendant was indicted for murder and armed robbery. 
His first trial resulted in a hung jury. He was retried, convicted as charged, 
and sentenced to death. On direct review, this court upheld defendant's 
convictions and death sentence. People v. Burrows, 148 Ill. 2d 196 
(1992). Subsequent to defendant's retrial, his two accomplices recanted their 
incriminating testimony. At the close of a hearing for post-conviction and 
post-judgment relief, the circuit court vacated defendant's convictions and 
death sentence and ordered a new trial. This court affirmed. Burrows, 
172 Ill. 2d 169 (1996). Subsequent to this court's affirmance, the charges 
against defendant were dropped.
In Gauger, the defendant was convicted of two 
counts of murder and sentenced to death. The circuit court subsequently vacated 
the death penalty and sentenced defendant to two terms of natural life 
imprisonment. The appellate court found that defendant's inculpatory statements 
were the fruits of an illegal arrest and, consequently, that the trial court 
erred by denying defendant's motion to suppress. The appellate court reversed 
defendant's conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial. People v. 
Gauger, No. 2-94-1199 (1996) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 
23). The prosecutor dropped the charges. In these two cases, the criminal 
justice system, with its many procedural protections, operated as it should to 
ensure that only truly guilty defendants are convicted.
Since defendant's unanswerable protest is against the 
inherent fallibility of the American criminal trial itself, then his position is 
reduced to a mere attack on the death penalty per se: he feels that it 
is wrong and that it should not be imposed. He notes that other "inferior" 
criminal justice systems have abolished capital punishment. However, at least 
since Gregg, 428 U.S.  at 187, 49 L. Ed. 2d  at 882-83, 96 S. Ct.  at 
2932, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the contention 
"that the imposition of the death penalty under any circumstances is cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929, 936, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2954 (1976). The Court has concluded:
"It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably 
cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is 
not inherently barbaric or an unacceptable mode of punishment for crime; neither 
is it always disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed." Coker 
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591, 53 L. Ed. 2d 982, 989, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 
2865-66 (1977) (plurality).
Thus, it is clear that defendant's personal views regarding 
the propriety of capital punishment are not reflected in eighth amendment 
jurisprudence.
The partial dissent attempts to shift attention from the 
present case to past cases which do not speak to this issue. In People v. 
Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1 (1996), one issue was whether the defendant was 
entitled to a fitness hearing because he allegedly was taking psychotropic 
drugs. Six members of this court were of the opinion that he was not so 
entitled. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d  at 17-20. In In re Marriage of 
Skahan, 178 Ill. 2d 577, this court, pursuant to its supervisory authority, 
ordered the appellate court to consider the appeal on its merits. This court's 
supervisory authority is a constitutional grant of power that is undefined, not 
limited by any specific rules, and is bounded only by the exigencies that call 
for its exercise. McDunn v. Williams, 156 Ill. 2d 288, 300-02 
(1993).
We also note that a dissenting opinion "should be a 
challenge to the decision or to the reasoning supporting the decision; it seeks 
the same objective as the majority opinion-good legal doctrine correctly 
applied." B. Witkin, Manual on Appellate Court Opinions §122, at 233 (1977). "A 
dissent should be impassive in tone rather than angry." R. Aldisert, Opinion 
Writing §11.5, at 170 (1990).
One must be careful not to elevate personal beliefs above 
thoughtful constitutional analysis. The question of whether it is enlightened to 
assess the ultimate penalty against those who commit the most heinous of crimes 
is simply not subject to our review. 
Judicial restraint and deference to legislative judgments 
are required regarding capital punishment. As judges, we may not act as we might 
as legislators. In a democracy, the legislature, not a court, is established to 
respond to the will and moral values of the people. Indeed, the selection of 
punishments is peculiarly a question of legislative policy. Therefore, in 
determining the constitutionality of a punishment selected by a democratically 
elected legislature, a court presumes that the punishment is valid. A court may 
not require the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so long 
as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime 
involved. Gregg, 428 U.S.  at 174-76, 49 L. Ed. 2d  at 875-76, 96 S. Ct. 
at 2925-26. This court has likewise recognized:
"that it is the legislature which has been empowered to 
declare and define conduct constituting a crime and to determine the nature and 
extent of punishment for it. [Citations.] The legislature, institutionally, is 
more aware than the courts of the evils confronting our society and, therefore, 
is more capable of gauging the seriousness of various offenses." People v. 
Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 319 (1985).
We note that although 12 states and the District of Columbia 
do not have a death penalty for any offense, 38 states and the federal 
government have selected the death penalty for the most abominable crimes. 
United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of 
Criminal Justice Statistics 1996 556 (1997); see D. Denno, Getting to Death: 
Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 319, 439-64 
(1997).
The issue is not whether any justice of this court 
personally favors or opposes capital punishment. Rather, the issue solely is 
whether the federal and state constitutions prohibit the legislature from 
mandating capital punishment for certain types of first degree murder. Clearly, 
the legislature is not prohibited in this regard, notwithstanding any personal 
views which we may have on the subject of capital punishment. See District 
Attorney v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, 701, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1303 (1980) 
(Quirico, J., dissenting). This is emphatically a question for the legislature. 
Defendant's protest, accepted by the partial dissent, is properly addressed to 
the General Assembly and not to this court.
B. Meaningful Consideration of 
Mitigation
Defendant lastly claims that the Illinois death penalty 
statute is unconstitutional because it places a burden of proof on the defendant 
that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating circumstances. This court 
has repeatedly rejected this argument. See, e.g., People v. 
Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 203-05 (1996); People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 283 (1993); Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d  at 116-17. We see no reason to 
reach a different result here.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court 
of Fulton County is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an 
order setting Tuesday, March 16, 1999, as the date on which the sentence of 
death entered in the circuit court is to be imposed. The defendant shall be 
executed in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1992). The clerk 
of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the 
Director of Corrections, the warden of Stateville Correctional Center, and the 
warden of the institution where defendant is now confined.
Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE MILLER, specially concurring:
I concur in the judgment of the court, and I join the 
majority opinion. I write separately to add several observations about the 
partial dissent filed in this case.
As Justice Harrison himself once remarked, in dissent, "If 
the law commands a certain result, that is the result this court should reach. 
We do not also need to find personal fault with the parties or establish some 
shortcoming on the part of their attorneys in order to justify our position." 
Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 164 Ill. 2d 29, 51 (1994) 
(Harrison, J., dissenting). Contrary to the admonition in Zimmerman, 
however, Justice Harrison frequently chooses, as he does in this case, to impugn 
the integrity of other members of the court and to impute improper motives to 
those with whom he disagrees. Thus, at various times, he has characterized 
majorities of this court as enemies of labor unions (City of Belvidere v. 
Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 211-12 (1998) 
(Harrison, J., dissenting); American Federation of State, County &amp; 
Municipal Employees v. Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299, 342 (1996) (Harrison, J., dissenting)), as foes of children 
(American Federation of State, County &amp; Municipal Employees, 173 Ill. 2d  at 337 (Harrison, J., dissenting); Barnett v. Zion Park 
District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 393-94 (1996) (Harrison, J., dissenting); 
Mt. Zion State Bank &amp; Trust v. Consolidated Communications, Inc., 
169 Ill. 2d 110, 128 (1995) (Harrison, J., dissenting)), as biased against 
plaintiffs in civil actions (Burrell v. Southern Truss, 176 Ill. 2d 171, 178 (1997) (Harrison, J., dissenting)), and even as vigilantes (People 
v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 60 (1996) (Harrison, J., dissenting)).
Baseless and unfounded imputations of improper motives to 
those members of the court who support a majority opinion are unjustified and 
demean the court. Judges often disagree about what result the law requires in a 
particular case. The existence of these disagreements, and the ability of our 
legal system to thrive on them, are virtues of the judicial process and of our 
system of government. The terms of the debate, however, must be framed by 
civility and respect, and not by suspicion and untruths. When rancor eclipses 
reason, the quality of the debate is diminished, the bonds of collegiality are 
strained, and the judicial process is demeaned. We cannot prescribe civility to 
members of the bar when our own opinions are disfigured by comments as offensive 
as those we have admonished lawyers for making. See, e.g., 
Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d  at 53-54. We should receive no less from our 
colleagues than we expect from those who appear in our courts.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN and JUSTICE McMORROW join in this 
special concurrence.
JUSTICE BILANDIC, also specially concurring:
I join in the majority opinion. I also agree with the 
observation of the dissent that "[m]y colleagues are decent and good people." I 
hasten to add that my colleagues in the majority would return that 
compliment.
In my view, the partial dissent by my learned colleague is a 
plea for abolition of the death penalty. This argument should be directed to the 
legislative branch, which has the power to modify or repeal a statute which it 
enacted.
We must not overlook the fact that in addition to safeguards 
provided by the judicial branch, a defendant in a capital case has the 
additional protection of the executive branch (Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, §12). 
On January 16, 1996, executive clemency was granted to Guinevere A. 
Garcia.
Prior to becoming a judge, Benjamin N. Cardozo argued 
against the death penalty because, " `To me it is far from clear that 
weak-minded creatures would be more deterred by it than by some other form of 
punishment. Beyond and above all this, there is the ever-present chance of 
error. The risk is too great to be incurred by fallible mortals-a class large 
enough unfortunately to include judges, high and low.' " A. Kaufman, 
Cardozo 395 (1998) (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo). However, when he became a 
judge and had responsibility, "[h]e applied New York's death penalty statutes 
and voted to affirm numerous death sentences." A. Kaufman, Cardozo 396 
(1998).
The dissent eloquently expresses a personal conviction but 
does not address the sound and authoritative opinion of the 
majority.
JUSTICE NICKELS joins in this special 
concurrence.
JUSTICE HEIPLE, also specially concurring:
I take issue with but one portion of the majority opinion. 
The majority holds that in interpreting the search and seizure provision in the 
Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6), this court "looks to the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment" to the 
United States Constitution. Slip op. at 10. In light of this court's recent 
opinion in People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60 (1996), I believe this 
statement to be both unfortunate and incorrect.
In Krueger, we noted that this court "has the 
authority to interpret provisions of our state constitution more broadly than 
the United States Supreme Court interprets similar provisions of the federal 
constitution." Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 74. We then proceeded to analyze 
whether the search and seizure provision of the Illinois Constitution is subject 
to an exception for illegal searches conducted by law enforcement authorities in 
"good faith." Concluding that such an exception would fail to adequately protect 
the right of Illinois citizens to be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion, we explicitly rejected, as a matter of state constitutional law, the 
United States Supreme Court's adoption of a good-faith exception to the federal 
constitution. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 75. Our decision in 
Krueger thus firmly establishes the principle that article I, section 
6, of the Illinois Constitution is to be interpreted in a manner independent of 
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, because I believe the search conducted in the 
instant case violated neither the United States Constitution nor the Illinois 
Constitution, I concur in the court's judgment.
JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part:
My colleagues turn aside defendant's constitutional 
challenge with the observation that the American criminal justice system is one 
of the best in the world. The sentiment has a pleasant and reassuring tone, but 
it overlooks an important fact. The supposedly "inferior" justice systems of 
other nations are abandoning capital punishment at an unprecedented rate. Hood, 
The Death Penalty: The USA in World Perspective, 6 J. Transnat'l L. 
&amp; Pol'y 517, 519 (1997). With the exception of Japan, the United States is 
now the only well-established democracy that has not abolished the death penalty 
expressly or in practice. Wyman, Vengeance is Whose?: The Death Penalty and 
Cultural Relativism in International Law, 6 J. Transnat'l L. &amp; Pol'y 
543, 544 (1997). Western Europe is free of capital punishment (6 J. Transnat'l 
L. &amp; Pol'y at 525), as are most countries in our hemisphere (6 J. Transnat'l 
L. &amp; Pol'y at 570). Even in the United States, 12 states and the District of 
Columbia presently have no death penalty for any offense, no matter how severe. 
A. Phillips, Thou Shalt Not Kill Any Nice People: The Problem of Victim 
Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 93, 99 n.54 
(1997).
I do not know enough about international law to judge 
whether the nations who have abolished capital punishment are, in fact, less 
protective of individual human rights than the courts in the United States. I do 
know, however, that the abolitionist nations have at least insured that no one 
will pay the ultimate price for their fallibility. That is decidedly not the 
case in those United States jurisdictions retaining the death penalty, including 
Illinois.
Despite the courts' efforts to fashion a death penalty 
scheme that is just, fair, and reliable, the system is not working. Innocent 
people are being sentenced to death. Examples of innocent people who were 
arrested, tried and convicted of capital offenses are numerous and well 
documented. See Staff of House Subcomm. on Civil &amp; Constitutional Rights, 
Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., Innocence and the Death 
Penalty: Assessing the Danger of Mistaken Executions (1994); H. Bedau &amp; M. 
Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 Stan. 
L. Rev. 21 (1987).
In Illinois, the best-known case of an individual wrongfully 
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death is that of Rolando Cruz, who 
was actually convicted and given the death sentence twice before being found 
innocent in 1995. Cruz's codefendant, Alejandro Hernandez, had the charges 
against him dropped after being convicted of capital murder twice and having the 
death sentence imposed once. In 1996, Verneal Jimerson and Dennis Williams were 
exonerated after being convicted and sentenced to death for the 1978 murders of 
Larry Lionberg and Carol Schmal. The same year, Gary Gauger, who had been placed 
on Death Row for the murder of his parents, was set free after his conviction 
was reversed based on, inter alia, insufficient evidence. Also in 1996, 
Carl Lawson was acquitted on his second retrial after having been sentenced to 
death for the murder of an eight-year-old child. In 1994, Joseph Burrows was 
released after spending five years on Death Row for the murder of William Dulin, 
a crime he did not commit. Finally, in 1987, Perry Cobb and Darby Williams 
(Tillis) were eventually acquitted after having previously been convicted and 
sentenced to death for the 1977 double murder of Melvin Kanter and Charles 
Guccion.
Some would suggest that the freedom now enjoyed by these 
nine men demonstrates that our criminal justice system is working effectively 
with adequate safeguards. If there had been only one or two wrongful death 
penalty cases, I might be persuaded to accept that view. When there have been so 
many mistakes in such a short span of time, however, the only conclusion I can 
draw is that the system does not work as the Constitution requires it 
to.
If these men dodged the executioner, it was only because of 
luck and the dedication of the attorneys, reporters, family members and 
volunteers who labored to win their release. They survived despite the criminal 
justice system, not because of it. The truth is that left to the devices of the 
court system, they would probably have all ended up dead at the hands of the 
state for crimes they did not commit. One must wonder how many others have not 
been so fortunate.
The prognosis for wrongly accused defendants facing capital 
charges is not improving. To the contrary, legislatures and the courts appear to 
have abandoned any genuine concern with insuring the fairness and reliability of 
the system. Achieving "finality" in death cases, and doing so as expeditiously 
as possible, have become the dominant goals in death penalty jurisprudence. 

Not so long ago, the federal courts provided meaningful 
oversight to the way in which state courts exercised their authority to put 
people to death. That oversight has all but disappeared. Callins v. 
Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1158-59, 127 L. Ed. 2d 435, 448-49, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1138 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For all practical purposes, the 
states have been left to their own devices. Based on recent experience in 
Illinois, the consequences are apt to be grave. 
The General Assembly has drastically shortened the period in 
which post-conviction relief can be sought, thereby reducing the time in which 
exonerating evidence may be discovered. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1996). The 
number of death cases is rising, the pace of executions is quickening, and our 
court, which is responsible for reviewing all cases in which the death penalty 
is imposed, has demonstrated an unfortunate willingness to disregard the law in 
order to affirm a sentence of death. See People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 
59-60 (1996) (Harrison, J., dissenting). I note, moreover, that it apparently no 
longer feels constrained to follow its own rules of court, even when they are 
jurisdictional and mandatory (see In re Marriage of Skahan, 178 Ill. 2d 577 (1998) (Harrison, J., dissenting)).
The result, inevitably, will be that innocent persons are 
going to be sentenced to death and be executed in Illinois. A sentencing scheme 
which permits such horrific and irrevocable results cannot meet the requirements 
of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. 
Const., amends. VIII, XIV) or article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution 
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2).
It is no answer to say that we are doing the best we can. If 
this is the best our state can do, we have no business sending people to their 
deaths. As outraged as we may feel personally over the terrible acts committed 
by the defendant in this case, that is no justification for perpetuating a 
system that violates our most basic constitutional principles. 
Before any of us gets too righteous about what a despicable 
character defendant is, we should also stop for a moment and reflect on how easy 
it was to condemn an individual such as Rolando Cruz, who was ultimately 
determined to be innocent. This is not to suggest that the defendant in this 
case was not actually guilty either. My point is simply that when a system is as 
prone to error as our is, we should not be making irrevocable decisions about 
any human life.
My colleagues are decent and good people. Just as the 
execution of an innocent person is inevitable, it is inevitable that one day the 
majority will no longer be able to deny that the Illinois death penalty scheme, 
as presently administered, is profoundly unjust. When that day comes, as it 
must, my colleagues will see what they have allowed to happen, and they will 
feel ashamed.
Donald Bull's conviction should be affirmed, but his 
sentence of death should be vacated, and the cause should be remanded to the 
circuit court for imposition of a sentence other than 
death.