Title: People v. Davis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 95614
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 2004

Docket No. 95614-Agenda 1-January 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 							
TAIWAN M. DAVIS, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 16, 2004.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	On October 1, 1998, defendant Taiwan Davis was charged by
indictment with two counts of first degree murder of Richard Skelton.
Count I alleged first degree knowing murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2)
(West 1998)), and count II alleged first degree felony murder
predicated on mob action (720 ILCS 5/25-1(a)(1) (West 1998)). At
the jury instructions conference, the trial court indicated it would give
defendant's tendered involuntary manslaughter instructions only as an
alternative to count I knowing murder. The State then moved to
dismiss count I, which the court allowed. As a result, the trial court
declined to give involuntary manslaughter instructions. The jury
convicted defendant of felony murder.
	The appellate court affirmed. 335 Ill. App. 3d 1102. We granted
leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d Rs. 315, 612(b)) to address two issues: (1)
whether defendant's conviction for felony murder was based on a
predicate felony inherent in the killing so that it must be vacated under
People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404 (2001); and (2) whether the trial
court committed reversible error by refusing to give involuntary
manslaughter instructions. For the following reasons, we affirm the
appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	Late in the evening of August 10, 1998, Richard Skelton learned
that his recently purchased television set was missing. Richard
believed his girlfriend and his two sisters had sold it for crack cocaine.
Richard's younger brother, Fred, picked him up at a bar called Wick's
with Richard's son Jason, Jason's girlfriend Dawn Herrin, Richard's
daughter Shelly Garrett, and Jill Walter. In two cars, the group drove
to the 1100 block of Seventh Street in Alton, Illinois, where they
believed the television may have been sold.  
	Members of the group exited the cars and began knocking on
doors and asking about the television. The group had some familiarity
with the area. During their search, Fred met a prior acquaintance,
Bruce Stewart. Fred asked Stewart about the television and then
asked some men on a porch "if they had heard of any television set
being sold in this area for drugs." Richard also asked individuals about
the television. Dawn testified that Jason was trying to get his father to
leave before anything started, but Richard refused, saying that he was
not going to leave until he got his television back. The pair continued
across the street to Timothy Lee's duplex, where Lee and several
friends were sitting on the porch.
	An argument began, and Lee told them to get off his property.
Fred testified that, "they told us that we were in the wrong
neighborhood to even be asking questions." Fred heard a door slam
across the street, turned, and saw "several guys coming from behind
[him]." Fred stated, "It was a pretty scary situation at that time when
they started coming at me." According to Fred, defendant was not
part of either group; however, Shelly was able to identify defendant
at that time. Fred turned back around and was "split in the head with
a club" and "knocked out" for 20 to 30 seconds. Shelly testified that
she was also attacked by four or five persons.
	When Fred woke up he saw "ten or better" men beating Richard.
Shelly stated that it was 20 men. "Every one of them" was beating
Richard. They kicked Richard in the head, face, and ribs for about five
minutes. "He didn't have a chance to fight back," stated Fred.
According to Fred, "They was saying slurs, you know, shouldn't have
been in this area, and they'd kick him. They was cussing and yelling
and hollering like kind of rejoicing that he got whopped like he did."
Shelly described the situation by stating, "They was actually pulling
each other out of the way and they was, you know laughing, kick him,
you know hitting him, kick his ass, and so, you know, everything was,
I was trying to get to him. I was yelling that's my father." Jason
testified similarly, stating, "Most all the guys that I could see that was
there was participating in it like it was, you know, fun or something,
a game to them." The crowd "was cheering them on and rooting them
on and trying to get in there to help their friends basically kill him."
None of the group around Richard attempted to stop the incident,
according to Jason.
	Shelly identified defendant hitting Richard more than six times
with a stick. Fred saw defendant with a stick in his hand, and observed
defendant throw the stick down as he fled. Jason testified that he saw
defendant in the group around Richard, but did not see anyone with
a stick. Jason did not know if defendant hit Richard because Jason was
trying to get his girlfriend out of the fray. Dawn Herrin did not see the
crowd of 15 or 20 people hit Richard, but did see defendant holding
something as he was crossing the street to join the crowd. Jill testified
that she was a block away and saw a fight with Richard in the center,
but could not identify anyone specifically in the beating. Each of the
witnesses admitted that they omitted reference to defendant in their
initial reports to police, but, according to the witnesses, such
omissions were because they were not asked or they were still
emotional from the incident.
	As the police were arriving, the group beating Richard fled. Alton
police officer Michael Bazzell was called to the scene of a fight
"around midnight." He observed a "white male laying partially in the
roadway." Richard was not conscious and did not have a pulse. Bazell
unsuccessfully performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation. He observed
"the majority of his face was covered with blood." The victim arrived
by ambulance at the Alton Memorial Hospital emergency room in
cardiac arrest. According to a nurse, Richard had abrasions on his
forehead and bruises to both sides of his face. After attempts to revive
Richard failed, Richard was pronounced dead at 12:50 a.m. on August
11, 1998.
	Dr. Raj Nanduri performed a postmortem examination on the
victim. Dr. Nanduri testified to bruises, abrasions, and scratches about
Richard's face. He stated there was a "massive hemorrhage
underneath the scalp in the temple region" and that the wounds were
consistent with blunt force injury to the head. Dr. Nanduri did not
observe fractures of the skull or intracranial hemorrhage. Richard's
chest exhibited a wound consistent with blunt-force injuries and the
left fifth and sixth ribs were broken. There were injuries to the back of
the neck consistent with a beating of the victim. Dr. Nanduri
additionally stated that Richard had very advanced coronary
atherosclerosis and a 0.183 blood-alcohol level. He determined the
cause of death to be "cardiac arrythmia precipitated by blunt trauma
to head and chest in patient with advanced atherosclerotic
cardiovascular disease" with "acute ethanol intoxication" being a
significant contributing condition of death.
	Dr. Nanduri testified it was possible that a stick could have
caused some of Richard's blunt-force injuries. However, he could not
state whether the blunt-force injuries were actually caused by a stick.
Dr. Nanduri explained, "[A] stick can cause a pattern which is
consistent with the object. And if you have that, then you can for sure
take the dimensions and measurements of the stick and the injuries on
the body and you would be able to say that, in all probability this
weapon or similar object would have caused the particular injury." He
did not find that pattern in this case. Dr. Nanduri would expect that if
someone hit a victim six times directly with a stick, then a pattern
would be observable on the victim.
	Several police officers canvassed the area soon after the incident.
Officer Anthony Ventimiglia, the crime scene technician, arrived to the
scene after Richard had been removed. The beating occurred around
a Ford Escort parked on the south side of 7th Street. A light blue
broom stick was found just to the west of the Ford Escort.
Ventimiglia identified the broom stick in court, which was
approximately three feet in length and one-half inch in diameter.
Photographs also depicted Richard's eyeglass lens, a wrist watch,
medical supplies, and "some blood that was in the roadway" near the
Ford Escort. Photographs depicted numerous severe bruises and
lacerations about Richard's head. Ventimiglia did not notice any blood
on the stick.
	Alton detective Scott Golike testified that he first saw defendant
in a duplex belonging to Lisa Haynes at 1118 East 7th Street at
approximately 2 a.m., August 11, 1998. Golike testified that defendant
stated that he had been inside and did not see the incident. In a witness
statement at 2:23 a.m. on August 11, defendant stated that he heard
a commotion outside, so he looked outside through the window. He
saw Timothy Lee arguing with a bunch of people about a television
set, but he never saw a fight because his friend's mom told them to
stay out of it.
	Golike interviewed defendant again several hours later at the
police station. After being advised of his constitutional rights,
defendant altered his story. According to Golike, defendant stated,
with a tear in his eye, that he had, in fact, beaten the victim three or
four times with a stick. In his written statement, signed at 7:45 a.m.
on August 11, defendant stated that he previously lied because he was
scared. He stated that he had been sitting on Lisa Hayne's front porch
with friends when the two cars pulled up. After the argument started,
he saw a man he knew as T.A. hit Fred on the head. Fred fell to the
ground. At this point, defendant ran across the street to the fight,
carrying a broomstick that he already had in his hand. He stated, "I
don't know why, but when this fight started, I got excited and wanted
to get in it. I don't know why I did it because this dude hadn't done
nothing to me. But I ran across the street with a bunch of other people
to help beat him up." Defendant's statement continued,
		"I think I hit him twice on his head, but I didn't really mean
to hit him there. I meant to hit him on his body, but he kept
moving around and it was hard to hit him right where I
wanted to. I'm sure I hit him only three or four times and one
or two of those times were just on his body somewhere.
After I hit him the last time, I threw the stick down on top of
him and took off running back to Lisa's house. This older
guy was hurt pretty bad and this was when I realized that I
done something wrong and I felt bad about it. *** The last
time I saw the white dude, he was still laying in the street and
everybody was running away from him. I heard later that he
died. I'll admit that I hit him in the head a couple times, but
I did not mean for the guy to die."
	Defendant was 17 years old at the time of his arrest and was 5
feet 8 inches tall and weighed 160 pounds. At trial, defendant stated
that he twice swung the stick into the crowd, but that he did not hit
Richard. He hit Bruce Stewart instead. Defendant denied telling the
police otherwise. At trial, he stated that when he swung the stick at
Richard, "I know he would probably get hurt, but I didn't think the
man would die." Defendant testified that he was not part of any mob,
but he also stated, "By me being there, I'm pretty sure I was
involved."
	Defendant called Kathryn Kessler and Lisa Haynes as witnesses
at trial. Kessler stated that she saw the incident, but did not see
anyone with a stick, but admitted she had told police after the incident
that she had. Haynes testified that defendant was in her house during
the entire incident, but admitted she reported to the police after the
incident that "Taiwan Davis then ran from the altercation and went
inside of Haynes residence."
	On August 12, 1998, the State information charged defendant by
information with knowing first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2)
(West 1998)). On September 3, 1998, the grand jury returned a three-count indictment against defendant for knowing first degree murder
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 1998)), armed violence (720 ILCS
5/33A-2 (West 1998)), and mob action (720 ILCS 5/25-1(a)(1)
(West 1998)). This indictment was superceded by the October 1,
1998, two-count amended indictment noted above.
	After the evidence described above was adduced before the jury,
the trial court denied defendant's motion for acquittal on both the
knowing-murder and felony-murder counts.
	At the instructions conference, defense counsel asked for an
instruction on involuntary manslaughter, stating, "If they believe Mr.
Davis, if they believe what he told them, they can find involuntary
manslaughter." Defense counsel also argued that the evidence
demonstrated that defendant was not acting together with the mob.
The State responded that because there was no evidence of
recklessness, defendant was not entitled to an involuntary
manslaughter instruction. The State also raised the possibility of
inconsistent verdicts. Defense counsel replied, "Well, I mean we want
a just verdict and we think that the jury can reach a just verdict. And
we think, in fact, the just verdict would be involuntary manslaughter."
Relying on People v. DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d 239 (1998), the court
allowed the involuntary manslaughter instruction on count I (knowing
first degree murder). However, the court did not allow the instruction
on count II because involuntary manslaughter was not a lesser-included offense of felony murder.
	The State sought to dismiss count I and proceed only on count
II, felony murder. Over the defense objection, the trial judge granted
the motion to dismiss count I.
	The jury was instructed, inter alia, that "a person commits the
offense of mob action involving violent infliction of injury when he,
acting together with one or more persons and without authority of
law, knowingly disturbs the public peace by the use of force or
violence; and one of the participants in the mob action violently inflicts
injury to the person of another." The jury deliberated and found
defendant guilty of felony murder premised on mob action. The trial
court denied defendant's posttrial motion. On April 30, 1999, the trial
court sentenced defendant to 20 years' imprisonment.
	On appeal, after reviewing the evidence, the appellate court
concluded that "[t]he trial court's refusal to allow involuntary
manslaughter instructions was a proper use of its discretion where the
evidence established that defendant did not act recklessly." 335 Ill.
App. 3d at 1108-09. We granted defendant's petition for leave to
appeal. 177 Ill. 2d Rs. 315, 612(b).
ANALYSIS
	Defendant argues: (1) his conviction for felony murder must be
vacated under the reasoning set forth in our decision in People v.
Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404 (2001); and (2) the trial court committed
reversible error by refusing to give the involuntary manslaughter
instruction.
Felony Murder
	The State preliminarily maintains that the first argument is waived
because it was not included in defendant's petition for leave to appeal
nor was it presented to the appellate court. We note that this court
released the Morgan decision after this case was argued in the
appellate court and before that court issued its opinion. Defense
counsel acknowledges his failure to raise the Morgan issue in a
supplemental brief to the appellate court or in the petition for leave to
appeal. Under Supreme Court Rules 341(e)(7) and 315(g), a party is
required to raise its arguments and provide citation to legal authority
in its appellate brief and in its petition for leave to appeal to avoid
waiver. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(g); 188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); see also People
v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 454-55 (1992). Waiver limits the parties'
ability to raise an issue, not this court's ability to consider an issue.
People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 127 (1998). We choose to address
the merits.
	The Criminal Code defines the offense of felony murder as:
			"(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful
justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the
acts which cause death:
* * *
			(3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other
than second degree murder." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West
2002).
	The Code defines the term "forcible felony" to encompass several
enumerated felonies, including "aggravated battery resulting in great
bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement" as well as "any
other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or
violence against any individual." 720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 2002). The
Code section at issue here defines "mob action" as consisting of "[t]he
use of force or violence disturbing the public peace by 2 or more
persons acting together and without authority of law." 720 ILCS
5/25-1(a)(1) (West 2002). Defendant makes no argument that the
felony of mob action is not a "forcible felony" within the felony-murder statute.
	The lack of an intent to kill for felony murder distinguishes it
from the other forms of first degree murder, which require the State
to prove either an intentional killing (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West
2002)) or a knowing killing (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2002)).
Given this fact, we have acknowledged a concern that the State will
effectively eliminate second degree murder and will avoid the burden
of proving an intentional or knowing killing in first degree murder
cases by often charging felony murder because certain predicate
felonies tend to accompany all murders. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d  at 447;
People v. Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d 434, 441 (2003). This problem is
particularly prevalent in cases where the same evidence is used to
prove the underlying felony as to prove the killing. See, e.g., Morgan,
197 Ill. 2d 404 (predicate felonies of aggravated battery and
aggravated discharge arose from the shooting which also caused the
killing); Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d 434 (predicate felony of aggravated battery
of a child arose from the throwing of an infant which also caused the
killing). In these cases, it is difficult to conclude that the predicate
felony underlying the charge of felony murder involved a felonious
purpose other than the killing of the victim. Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d  at 442.
	Thus, where the evidence of the conduct underlying the felony
and the killing is the same, the felony-murder statute may absolve the
State of its duty to prove to the fact finder that the defendant
possessed either an intent to kill or do great bodily harm or knowledge
of a strong probability of death or great bodily harm, thereby allowing
the State to take a shortcut to a murder conviction. To address this
problem, we held in Morgan that where "the acts constituting forcible
felonies arise from and are inherent in the act of murder itself, those
acts cannot serve as predicate felonies for a charge of felony murder."
Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d  at 447; see also Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d  at 441. This
holding ensured that in this type of case, the prosecution must prove
an intentional or knowing killing to the fact finder in order to punish
the defendant like a murderer. Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d  at 442.
	We review the facts of Morgan and Pelt to illustrate this
problem. In Morgan, the 14-year-old defendant was indicted on eight
counts for killing his grandparents, Lila and Keith Cearlock. Following
an argument between the defendant and Keith about the defendant
receiving detention in school, Keith administered corporal punishment
on the defendant with a razor strap and also attempted to punch him.
The defendant retrieved Keith's gun shortly thereafter, intending to
use it to kill himself in the bathroom. Instead, the defendant fired the
gun at a bottle on the bathtub. The defendant exited the bathroom to
find Lila screaming. Keith had threatened in the past to kill him, so he
feared for his life when he saw how angry Keith had become. The
defendant shot Keith as he approached to prevent Keith from reaching
him. He then shot Lila in the back as she tried to flee the house.
Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d  at 411-12. Regarding each victim, the defendant
was charged with first degree intentional murder (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1994)), first degree knowing murder (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(2) (West 1994)), first degree felony murder (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(3)) (West 1994)) predicated on aggravated battery (720
ILCS 5/12-4(a) (West 1994)), and first degree felony murder
predicated on aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS
5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 1994)). Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d  at 444. The
defendant was found guilty of first degree murder of Lila and second
degree murder of Keith.
	The defendant argued on appeal that he could not be found guilty
of first degree felony murder of Lila because the charged predicate
felonies were not independent of the killing. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d  at
444-45. We agreed and held that the trial court erred in instructing the
jury on felony murder. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d  at 447-48. We noted that
defendants cannot be convicted of felony murder when the predicate
felonies "arose from and were inherent in the murders." Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d  at 447-48.
	In People v. Pelt, the defendant was found guilty of aggravated
battery of a child, his infant son, and first degree felony murder
predicated on aggravated battery of a child. The evidence showed that
the defendant threw the infant into a dresser causing injuries which led
to the infant's death. We held that aggravated battery improperly
served as the predicate for felony murder. Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d  at 442-43.
Following the same analysis we created in Morgan, we focused on
whether the "defendant's aggravated battery was an act that was
inherent in, and arose out of, the killing of the infant." Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d 
at 442. We found that the act of throwing the infant formed the basis
of the aggravated battery conviction and that it was also the same act
underlying the killing. Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d  at 442-43. We could not
conclude that the predicate felony underlying the charge of felony
murder involved conduct with a felonious purpose other than the
conduct which killed the infant. Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d  at 442-43. This case
demonstrated our apprehension that to permit such a felony-murder
charge of this nature would " 'eliminate the need for the State to
prove an intentional or knowing killing in most murder cases.' "
Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d  at 447, quoting People v. Morgan, 307 Ill. App.
3d 707, 712 (1999). It was improper to find the defendant to be a first
degree murderer when the predicate felony was inherent in the killing
and when the State had failed to prove another form of first degree
murder to the jury. Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d  at 442.
	With these precedents in mind, we turn to the facts of the instant
case. The evidence at trial demonstrates defendant's conduct was not
an act that was inherent in, and arose out of, the killing of Richard
Skelton. Simply stated, the same evidence was not used to prove both
the predicate felony, mob action, and the murder. The following
evidence was adduced at trial. Defendant joined the crowd after the
argument began. According to defendant's statement, he hit Richard
twice in the head, and once or twice on the body. Defendant testified
that he swung twice at Richard, but did not hit him. The only person
he succeeded in hitting, according to defendant's testimony, was
Bruce Stewart. The testimony of Richard's family and friends-save
Shelly Garrett, who testified that defendant struck Richard six or more
times-was unclear as to whether defendant actually hit Richard. It is
undisputed that many of the blows Richard received were from the 10
to 20 other assailants. The jury found that defendant acted together
with one or more persons without authority of law; knowingly
disturbed the public peace by the use of force or violence; and one of
the participants in the mob action violently inflicted injury to Richard.
In essence, to convict defendant of mob action, it was not necessary
to prove that defendant struck Richard, much less performed the act
that caused the killing. Unlike Morgan and Pelt, we are able to
conclude that the predicate felony underlying the charge of felony
murder involved conduct with a felonious purpose other than the
conduct which killed Richard. Therefore, under the facts of the instant
case, mob action was a proper predicate felony for felony murder. Our
holding in Morgan does not preclude defendant's felony-murder
conviction.
	 We further note that this outcome is consistent with our holding
in People v. Viser, 62 Ill. 2d 568 (1975), a case preceding Morgan. In
Viser, there was an altercation among approximately seven men and
two off-duty law enforcement officers, Smith and Jordan. Although
guns were present, injuries to the officers were inflicted through
punching and kicking rather than gunshots. Jordan died two weeks
later due to severe abdominal injuries he received during the
confrontation. Viser, 62 Ill. 2d  at 573-74. As here, it was not obvious
which of the defendants caused the fatal blow to the victim, who died
two weeks later "of pancreatitis caused by severe abdominal injuries
he received" during the beating. Viser, 62 Ill. 2d  at 576. Therefore, the
individual conduct of each defendant in beating the victim, which
formed the basis of the individual forcible felonies of aggravated
battery for each defendant, did not arise from nor was inherent in the
killing itself.
Involuntary Manslaughter Jury Instructions
	We initially note that defendant's argument on this issue is less
than clear. What is consistent throughout defendant's arguments
before the trial court, appellate court, and before this court is a
general argument that the jury was entitled to determine if the
defendant acted recklessly, in the form of an involuntary manslaughter
instruction. Therefore, defendant argues that the trial court erred by
refusing that instruction. This court reviews a court's decision to
decline to give an instruction under the abuse of discretion standard.
People v. DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d 239, 249 (1998).
	We have adopted and applied the charging instrument approach
to determine if one offense is a lesser-included offense of a charged
offense so that jury instructions can be given for the lesser-included
offense. People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 106-14 (1994); People v.
Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d 319, 324 (1997). Under this approach, we
analyze whether: (1) the charging instrument includes " 'a broad
foundation or main outline' " of the lesser-included offense so that it
can be considered a lesser-included offense; and (2) the evidence at
trial rationally could support a conviction for the lesser-included
offense. People v. Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d 332, 360-61 (2003), quoting
People v. Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (2002).
	Under the first step, we have traditionally looked to the
indictment or information when conducting this analysis. People v.
Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d 332, 361 (2003); People v. Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d 319, 324-25 (1997); People v. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d 126, 135 (1997);
People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 115-16 (1994); People v. Landwer,
166 Ill. 2d 475, 491-92 (1995). The trial court allowed the State's
motion to dismiss count I of the indictment, leaving only count II, the
felony-murder count.
	Count II of the amended indictment in this case provided:
			"FIRST DEGREE (FELONY) MURDER-in that said
defendant, without lawful justification, while committing
Mob Action, a felony which involved the use or threat of
physical force or violence against an individual, in violation
of 720 ILCS 5/25-1(a)(1), beat and kicked Richard L.
Skelton, and thereby caused the death of Richard L. Skelton,
all in violation of 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3), and against the
peace and dignity of the People of the State of Illinois."
Count II does not specify any mental state as to the killing. As
discussed above, the statutory definition of felony murder does not
indicate a mental state for the killing (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West
2002)), and we have confirmed that the offense of felony murder does
not include an intent to kill (Viser, 62 Ill. 2d at 581). The Criminal
Code describes involuntary manslaughter as follows:
			"A person who unintentionally kills an individual without
lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his
acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are
such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some
individual, and he performs them recklessly ***." 720 ILCS
5/9-3(a) (West 1998).
Accordingly, this statutory definition clearly specifies that a
perpetrator must have a reckless mental state to be guilty of
involuntary manslaughter.
	A lesser-included offense is an offense proven by lesser facts or
a lesser mental state, or both, than the charged offense. Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d  at 324; 720 ILCS 5/2-9 (West 2002). Therefore, for
involuntary manslaughter to be a lesser-included offense of felony
murder, the felony-murder count must include a more culpable or
equally culpable mental state as involuntary manslaughter. Felony
murder as described in defendant's indictment does not include a
culpable mental state as to the killing while the offense of involuntary
manslaughter requires a reckless mental state. Thus, the charging
instrument does not include a broad outline of involuntary
manslaughter. Involuntary manslaughter is not a lesser-included
offense of felony murder in this case. See People v. McCarroll, 168
Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1023 (1988); People v. Ellis, 93 Ill. App. 3d 981,
984 (1981); People v. Weathers, 18 Ill. App. 3d 338, 345-46 (1974);
but see People v. Golden, 29 Ill. App. 3d 502, 507 (1975). In light of
this conclusion, we need not reach the second step of the charging
instrument approach, the evaluation of whether the evidence at trial
could rationally support a conviction for involuntary manslaughter.
Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d  at 361.
	In the alternative, defendant argues that even if involuntary
manslaughter is not a lesser-included offense of felony murder in this
case, evidence at trial supports the defense theory that defendant acted
recklessly so that defendant could have been found guilty of the less
serious, though not included, offense of involuntary manslaughter. As
a result, the involuntary manslaughter instructions should have been
given.
	A defendant is entitled to have the jury be instructed on defense
theories about which there is at least "slight" evidence. People v.
Everette, 141 Ill. 2d 147, 156 (1990). It is permissible for such
instructions to address alternative theories that are inconsistent so
long as each has support in the trial record. Everette, 141 Ill. 2d  at
156. Defense theories typically provide affirmative defenses to or
mitigation of the charged offenses. See, e.g., People v. Spears, 112 Ill. 2d 396, 402 (1986) (the defendant asserted theory that shootings were
unintentional, so he tendered jury instructions on reckless conduct as
a lesser-included offense of armed violence); Everette, 141 Ill. 2d  at
150 (the defendant tendered self-defense instructions on homicide
case). As we recently explained, "[t]he controlling principles are quite
settled. A defendant generally may not be convicted of an offense for
which the defendant has not been charged. However, in an appropriate
case, the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on less
serious offenses that are included in the charged offense." Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d  at 359.
	In other words, while a defendant may assert theories to try to
mitigate or rebut responsibility for charged offenses, the defendant
cannot argue responsibility for less serious, but unrelated, offenses
which were not charged. Defendant objects that this case
demonstrates how the prosecutor can use this principle to preclude the
giving of an involuntary manslaughter instruction by dismissing a
knowing or intentional first-degree murder charge and proceeding on
only a felony-murder charge. We have already explained why this
objection is unpersuasive: "[T]he State's Attorney is vested with
exclusive discretion in the initiation and management of a criminal
prosecution. That discretion includes the choice of which charges shall
be brought. A criminal does not have the right to choose his or her
prosecution or punishment." Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d  at 362; see also People
v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 113 (1994).
	The United States Supreme Court has taken the same position.
In Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 141 L. Ed. 2d 76, 118 S. Ct. 1895
(1998), a defendant, indicted on two counts of first degree felony
murder, requested jury instructions on second degree murder and
manslaughter. The trial court refused to give the instructions because
they are not lesser-included offenses of felony murder under Nebraska
law. The Nebraska Court of Appeals held that the instruction should
have been given. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals,
explaining:
		"Almost all States *** provide instructions only on those
offenses that have been deemed to constitute lesser included
offenses of the charged crime. [Citation.] We have never
suggested that the Constitution requires anything more. The
Court of Appeals in this case, however, required *** that an
instruction be given on some other offense *** when no
lesser included offense exists. Such a requirement is not only
unprecedented, but also unworkable. Under such a scheme,
there would be no basis for determining the offenses for
which instructions are warranted. The Court of Appeals
apparently would recognize a constitutional right to an
instruction on any offense that bears a resemblance to the
charged crime and is supported by the evidence. Such an
affirmative obligation is unquestionably a great [ ]limitation
on a State's prerogative to structure its criminal law ***."
(Emphasis in original.) Hopkins, 524 U.S.  at 96-97, 141 L. Ed. 2d  at 85, 118 S. Ct.  at 1901.
In light of Ceja and Hopkins, we hold that a trial court need not allow
a defendant's request to have the jury instructed on offenses that are
less serious, but not included, offenses to those offenses for which he
or she was charged regardless of whether the evidence at trial could
support the less serious offense. We note defendant makes no
argument that the trial court erred in dismissing count I of the
indictment. Therefore, the trial court properly refused to give
defendant's tendered involuntary manslaughter instructions on the
remaining count of the indictment.
CONCLUSION
	Defendant's felony-murder conviction was not improper under
Morgan because the predicate felony of mob action was not inherent
in the killing of Richard Skelton. In addition, the trial court properly
refused to give defendant's tendered involuntary manslaughter
instructions because involuntary manslaughter is not a lesser-included
offense of felony murder in this case and defendant is not entitled to
receive instructions on less serious offenses unless they are included
offenses.
	The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
		Affirmed.


JUSTICE GARMAN, specially concurring:
	Defendant argues that although he committed the intentional
felony of mob action, his conduct with respect to the target of the
mob action was merely reckless. Thus, he contends, if his actions
caused or contributed to the death of Richard Skelton, he is guilty of
involuntary manslaughter (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 1998)), not first
degree felony murder.  
	However, under our felony-murder statute, a defendant is
properly convicted of felony murder if, while "performing the acts
which cause[d] the death" of a person, he was "attempting or
committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder." 720
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1998). The felony with which defendant was
charged, mob action (720 ILCS 5/25-1(a)(1) (West 1998)), is not
among those crimes enumerated in the provision defining forcible
felonies (720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 1998)). However, the term "forcible
felony" includes not only those listed, but also "any other felony which
involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any
individual." (720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 1998)). Mob action, under
subsection (a)(1), consists of the "use of force or violence disturbing
the public peace by 2 or more persons acting together and without
authority of law." 720 ILCS 5/25-1(a)(1) (West 1998). Thus, if the
mob action was directed at an individual and caused his death, a
charge of felony murder may lie. See also People v. Belk, 203 Ill. 2d 187, 193 (2003) (even a nonviolent felony may serve as the predicate
felony for felony murder if, under the facts of the case, it was
committed in a manner that involved the use or threat of physical
force or violence against an individual).
	I, therefore, concur with the court's conclusion that, under the
facts of this case, defendant was properly convicted of felony murder.
He committed mob action as defined in section 25-1(a)(1) of the
Criminal Code, and the physical force and violence of the mob action
was directed at a single individual who died as a result of the injuries
inflicted by members of the mob.  
	The present case marks the third time in two years in which this
court has granted a petition for leave to appeal to determine whether
a particular felony was a proper basis for a conviction of felony
murder. See People v. Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d 434 (2003); Belk, 203 Ill. 2d 187. The law on this question was well settled for many years (see
People v. Viser, 62 Ill. 2d 568 (1975)), with only the occasional
unusual factual circumstance requiring this court's guidance (see
People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462 (1997)). With the decision in People
v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404 (2001), however, well-settled law seems
to have become unsettled, resulting in the frequent need to revisit the
question. Although I agree with the holding in the present case, I write
separately to explore how this confusion has arisen and how it might
be resolved.
	Courts and scholars have identified at least two significant
concerns with the unfettered application of the felony-murder rule.
See, e.g., R. Gerber, The Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without
Principle, 31 Ariz. St. L.J. 763 (1999). First, "absent some limitations
on the felonies which can invoke the rule, even nondangerous felonies
in the pursuit of which a defendant cannot reasonably be thought to
have manifested a man-endangering state of mind, can turn an
accidental death into felony murder." Baker v. State, 236 Ga. 754,
755, 225 S.E.2d 269, 270 (1976). This has been called the
"nondangerous felony problem." Baker, 236 Ga. at 755, 225 S.E.2d 
at 270. In Illinois, the nondangerous felony problem has been
addressed by the legislature, which has defined felony murder to
include only those deaths that occur as a result of the commission or
the attempt to commit a forcible felony (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West
1998)), and has provided a clear definition of that term (720 ILCS
5/2-8 (West 1998)).
	The second problem arises when "the homicide grows out of an
initial aggressive act which is itself a felony." In such cases, the State
can "bootstrap practically all killings with dangerous weapons into
murder simply by showing that the assault out of which the death
arose was a felony." Baker, 236 Ga. at 755-56, 225 S.E.2d  at 271.
This is the "merger problem." Baker, 236 Ga. at 756, 225 S.E.2d  at
271. The concern, of course, is that unless there is some limitation on
felony murder, every death caused by conduct that could be described
as assault would be first degree murder, and a defendant's ability to
argue that he is guilty of a lesser offense, such as second degree
murder or involuntary manslaughter, would effectively be eliminated.
Such was the concern in Morgan. Some jurisdictions have adopted
rules, variously described as the "merger doctrine," the "same-act
doctrine," or the "collateral-felony doctrine," in response to the
merger problem. Illinois courts continue to grapple with it.
Merger Doctrine
	The merger doctrine is a judicially created limitation on the
felony-murder rule that addresses this potential for abuse. Under the
merger doctrine, the felony-murder rule cannot be applied if the
underlying felony is an offense that is an "integral part" or is "included
in fact" in the homicide. See, e.g., People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522,
539, 450 P.2d 580, 590, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188, 198 (1969). In
jurisdictions that have adopted the merger doctrine, the act of
personal violence that causes the death of the victim is deemed
insufficiently independent of the death to constitute a separate felony.
It merges with the homicide. Thus, the defendant may be convicted of
some form of homicide, but not of felony murder. See W. LaFave &amp;
A. Scott, Criminal Law §7.5, at 638 (2d ed. 1986).  
	As a result, some jurisdictions hold that a felonious assault can
never serve as the basis of a charge of felony murder. For example, in
Barnett v. State, 783 So. 2d 927, 930 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), the
court held that because the felony-murder statute applies not only to
enumerated crimes but also to any other felony "clearly dangerous to
human life," even a killing that would otherwise constitute
manslaughter could be charged as felony murder. To avoid an absurd
reading of the statute, the court concluded, a felonious assault that
results in the victim's death merges with the homicide and cannot
serve as the underlying felony for a charge of felony murder. Barnett,
783 So. 2d  at 930. See also State v. Essman, 98 Ariz. 228, 235, 403 P.2d 540, 545 (1965) (defendant who shot and killed his wife under
circumstances that may have been accidental or may have been
deliberate may not be convicted of felony murder based on assault
with a deadly weapon because the "acts of assault merge into the
resultant homicide, and may not be deemed a separate and
independent offense which could support a conviction for felony
murder").
	Other jurisdictions have rejected the merger doctrine entirely. The
Supreme Court of Minnesota has repeatedly rejected the suggestion
that it should adopt the merger doctrine. See State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1981); State v. Jackson, 346 N.W.2d 634 (Minn.
1984); State v. Abbott, 356 N.W.2d 677 (Minn. 1984). The court
concluded that the state legislature was presumably aware of the
doctrine and chose not to adopt it when it amended the murder statute
in 1981, reclassifying felony murder as second degree rather than third
degree murder. Jackson, 346 N.W.2d  at 636.  
	The Supreme Court of South Dakota rejected the merger rule in
a case involving a defendant who killed his four-month-old daughter
by intentionally dropping her on the floor. State v. O'Blasney, 297 N.W.2d 797 (S.D. 1980). Citing this court's opinion in Viser, the
South Dakota court observed that the "decision to adopt or reject the
merger doctrine has resulted largely from an analysis of that
jurisdiction's statutes." O'Blasney, 297 N.W.2d  at 799. Courts that
have adopted the merger doctrine have done so because, absent such
a limitation, "all homicides not justified or excused would become
first-degree murder under their statutes." O'Blasney, 297 N.W.2d  at
799. Because adoption of the merger doctrine was not necessary to
"prevent the nullification of other provisions" of the state's homicide
statutes, the court concluded that adoption of the doctrine "would
represent an exercise of judicial oversight that would have no
warrant." O'Blasney, 297 N.W.2d  at 800.  
	The Supreme Court of Tennessee has noted that "the merger
doctrine has not been widely accepted." State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 774 (Tenn. 2001). The court agreed with the State's contention
that "the merger doctrine is a rule of statutory construction" that
applies "only when the legislature has not enumerated the felonies that
will support a conviction for felony murder." Godsey, 60 S.W.3d  at
774. Because aggravated child abuse is one of the enumerated
predicate felonies under Tennessee law, Godsey's act of squeezing the
seven-month-old victim's head between his biceps and forearm did not
merge into the homicide, even though it was the same assaultive act
that caused the infant's death. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d  at 775.  
	The Supreme Court of Georgia also relied on the intent of the
legislature and the construction of the state's various homicide
statutes when it concluded that it was "not free to adopt the merger
doctrine" urged by the appellant in Baker. Baker, 236 Ga. at 757, 225 S.E.2d  at 271-72.  	
	Still other jurisdictions adopted the merger doctrine and then
abandoned it. In State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101, 117 (Mo. App.
1993), the court concluded that the state legislature abrogated the
merger doctrine by excluding only murder and manslaughter as
predicate felonies. See also State v. Bouser, 17 S.W.3d 130, 140 (Mo.
App. 1999) (holding that if legislature intended merger doctrine to
limit felony murder it could easily have excluded felonies other than
murder or manslaughter from the reach of the felony-murder statute). 	A century-old case from New York provides an example of the
merger doctrine. In People v. Huther, 184 N.Y. 237, 77 N.E. 6
(1906), the defendant shot and killed a police officer while attempting
to evade arrest. The court held that he could not be convicted of
felony murder based on the felony of assaulting a police officer to
prevent arrest because the underlying felony was a part of and,
therefore, merged into the homicide. Huther, 184 N.Y.  at 288, 77 N.E.  at 8. The court held that when "the gist of the offense is the
assault and when it is by violence inflicting an injury to the person so
assaulted, resulting in death, the act becomes a constituent part of the
homicide and is merged in the charge therefor." (Emphasis omitted.)
Huther, 184 N.Y.  at 244, 77 N.E.  at 8-9. It does not follow, however,
that "the act which caused the death must be a different one from that
done in the commission of the collateral felony." If the act causing the
death is "committed with a collateral and independent felonious design
it is sufficient" to serve as the underlying felony for a charge of felony
murder. Huther, 184 N.Y.  at 244, 77 N.E.  at 9.  
	In 1973, New York's highest court explained that it had
developed the merger doctrine "to remedy a fundamental defect in the
old felony-murder statute." People v. Miller, 32 N.Y.2d 157, 159,
297 N.E.2d 85, 87, 344 N.Y.S.2d 342, 345 (1973). However, the
court noted, that defect was remedied in 1965 when the legislature
revised the statute to include a list of specified felonies that may form
the basis for felony murder. Miller, 32 N.Y.2d  at 160, 297 N.E.2d  at
87, 344 N.Y.S.2d  at 345; see also Saenz v. State, 976 S.W.2d 314,
317 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (judicially created merger doctrine is
trumped by "express language of the current penal code," which
exempts only manslaughter as an underlying felony under the felony-murder rule).
	It is noteworthy that even in some states that have adopted the
merger doctrine, the doctrine itself is limited by the language of the
felony-murder statute. Under Kansas law, the felony-murder doctrine
applies only if the underlying felony, viewed in the abstract, is
inherently dangerous to human life and if the elements of the
underlying felony are so distinct from the homicide so as not to be an
ingredient thereof. State v. Smallwood, 264 Kan. 69, 91, 955 P.2d 1209, 1226 (1998). Thus, the judicially created rule had been a "single
assaultive incident of abuse of a child which results in the death of the
child merges with the killing and constitutes only one offense."
Smallwood, 264 Kan. at 91, 955 P.2d  at 1226. Further, evidence of
prior acts of abuse could not be used to escalate the charge into felony
murder. Such prior acts could be prosecuted as separate crimes of
abuse but could not be used to bootstrap felony child abuse into a
felony-murder charge. Smallwood, 264 Kan. at 92, 955 P.2d  at 1226.
However, the Smallwood court noted, subsequent to the cited
decisions dealing with the merger doctrine in the context of felony
child abuse, the Kansas legislature amended the first degree murder
statute as well as the statute defining inherently dangerous felonies.
Smallwood, 264 Kan. at 93, 955 P.2d  at 1227. In the revised statute,
felony abuse of a child is one of the enumerated felonies. The
definition also provides that the enumerated felonies shall be deemed
inherently dangerous "whether or not" they are so distinct from the
homicide that they are an ingredient thereof. Smallwood, 264 Kan. at
93, 955 P.2d  at 1227, citing Kan. Stat. Ann. §21-3436 (1995). The
state supreme court concluded that "the legislature intended that
anyone who causes the death of a child while committing the act of
abuse of a child to be guilty of the crime of first-degree felony
murder." Smallwood, 264 Kan. at 94, 955 P.2d  at 1228. Thus, the
merger doctrine may still be a part of Kansas law, but it may not be
applied when the felony is one that the legislature has explicitly
identified as a proper predicate felony for a charge of felony murder.
See also State v. McCann, 907 P.2d 239, 240-41 (Okla. Crim. App.
1995) (legislature's enumeration of a crime in the felony-murder
statute shows its "intent to punish deaths which occur during the
commission of an enumerated felony as felony murder," thus the
merger rule is not applicable in such cases).
Same-Act Doctrine
	Under the same-act doctrine, application of the felony-murder
rule is precluded whenever the act that constitutes the predicate felony
is the same act that results in the death of the victim. Although this
may appear to be a mere restatement of the merger doctrine, it is in
fact an expansion of the merger doctrine to any predicate felony,
whether or not it involves assaultive conduct.
	For example, under this doctrine, the defendant who commits
arson for profit cannot be convicted of felony murder if, unknown to
the arsonist, there is a person inside the structure who dies in the
flames. Because the act that constitutes the felony-starting the fire-is
the same dangerous felonious act that causes the death of the victim,
a conviction for felony murder is precluded. In contrast, application
of the merger doctrine would not bar application of the felony-murder
rule to this arsonist.
	Massachusetts appears to have adopted the same-act doctrine,
which, perhaps, is more accurately described as the "different act
rule." In Commonwealth v. Kilburn, 438 Mass. 356, 359, 780 N.E.2d 1237, 1240 (2003), that state's highest court stated that the doctrine
of felony murder requires that the conduct constituting the felony be
separate from the act of personal violence that causes the death.
Kilburn was properly convicted of felony murder based on the
predicate felony of armed assault in a dwelling because he committed
two separate assaults-first, brandishing a pistol with the intention of
arousing fear in the victim and, second, shooting him. Kilburn, 438
Mass. at 359, 780 N.E.2d  at 1241. See also Commonwealth v. Smiley,
431 Mass. 477, 489, 727 N.E.2d 1182, 1192 (2000) (defendant was
properly convicted of felony murder because the initial assault
designed to gain entry into the victim's dwelling was separate from the
act necessary to commit the unlawful killing).  
Collateral-Felony Doctrine
	New Mexico courts have adopted a third approach to address the
concern that "most second degree murders might be charged as first
degree murders" under the felony-murder statute, "absent some
limitation on the range of appropriate felonies." State v. Varela, 128
N.M. 454, 460, 993 P.2d 1280, 1286 (1999). To convict a defendant
of first degree felony murder, the State must show not only a causal
relationship between the felony and the homicide and that the felony
is inherently or foreseeably dangerous to human life, but also that the
felony was "independent or collateral to the homicide." Varela, 128
N.M. at 460, 993 P.2d  at 1286. As applied, this rule requires that the
predicate felony not be a lesser-included offense of second degree
murder, which, under New Mexico law, is "knowing" murder. In
other words, the court asks whether, in the abstract, "it is possible to
commit second degree murder without committing some form of the
dangerous felony ***." Varela, 128 N.M. at 461, 993 P.2d  at 1287.
"Under this analysis, it would be impossible to be convicted of felony
murder if the underlying felony was aggravated assault or aggravated
battery because it would be impossible to commit second degree
murder without committing some form of both ***." Varela, 128
N.M. at 461, 993 P.2d  at 1287.  
Analysis of Illinois Decisions
	In the stereotypical felony-murder case, an armed robber enters
a store and demands money. The clerk hesitates, or resists, or perhaps
merely makes a sudden movement that startles the robber, who fires
his weapon, killing the clerk. It is immaterial whether the robber pulls
the trigger intending to kill the clerk, or knowing that the clerk's death
is substantially likely to result, or wanting only to impress the clerk
with the seriousness of his demand, or entirely by accident. People v
Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d 498 (1992); see also People v. McCarty, 329 Ill.
App. 3d 969, 982 (2002) (State is not required to prove that
defendant could foresee the death or intended to commit murder;
State need only show intent to commit the underlying felony). The
armed robber is guilty of felony murder because when he performed
the act that caused the death, he was committing the forcible felony of
armed robbery. See, e.g., People v. Casillas, 195 Ill. 2d 461 (2000);
People v. Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d 322 (1988). It is certain in such a
case that the robber entered the store for the purpose of robbing it.
Indeed, the predicate felony of armed robbery is complete before he
ever pulls the trigger. Thus, there is clear evidence of his intent to
commit the predicate felony. In addition, the separate conduct of
shooting the store clerk after the felony is complete makes it obvious
that the robbery-gone-wrong constitutes felony murder.
	The hard case arises when the actus reus of the charged predicate
felony is the same act that causes the death. This court has never
expressly adopted the same-act doctrine by holding that a charge of
felony murder may not stand unless the conduct that caused the death
of the victim is separate from and in addition to the actus reus of the
underlying felony. On the contrary, this court affirmed the defendant's
conviction of felony murder in Viser, in which there was no conduct
other than that necessary to carry out the predicate felony of
aggravated battery. Viser, 62 Ill. 2d  at 580. Further, Illinois has not
adopted the merger doctrine or the collateral-felony doctrine, either
by statute or by judicial decision. Indeed, in Viser, this court expressly
rejected the "theory of merger" in light of the legislature's "forthright
characterization of aggravated battery as one of the forcible felonies
that will trigger a charge of felony murder." Viser, 62 Ill. 2d  at 579-80.  
	Twenty-four years later, in Morgan, the appellate court held that
"the predicate felony underlying a charge of felony murder must
involve conduct with a felonious purpose other than the killing itself."
(Emphasis added.) People v. Morgan, 307 Ill. App. 3d 707, 714
(1999). That is, the actus reus of the underlying felony (conduct) must
be committed with an "independent felonious purpose." Morgan, 307
Ill. App. 3d at 714. If, as in Morgan, the forcible felonious conduct is
committed with the intent to kill, rather than with the purpose of
committing the independent felony, a charge of felony murder may not
stand.
	The concurring justice in the appellate court decision in Morgan
noted that, under this rule, some aggravated batteries and aggravated
discharges of firearms would remain the basis for a felony-murder
charge, so long as the crimes were not merely incidental to murder.
Morgan, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 719 (Steigmann, J., concurring). He then,
however, suggested an additional requirement that the appellate court
did not adopt. The concurring justice suggested that such crimes
could serve as the predicate felony only where they involved "conduct
other than that inherent in the killing itself." Morgan, 307 Ill. App. 3d
at 719 (Steigmann, J., concurring). This is the same-act doctrine,
which requires that the predicate felony involve criminal conduct in
addition to the act that causes the death of the victim. Adoption of
such a rule would have had the effect of overruling Viser, which this
court continues to reaffirm even in the present case.  
	This court affirmed the appellate court's judgment that the
felony-murder counts against Morgan were improper. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404. However, in doing so, it altered the focus of the analysis.
First, this court stated, incorrectly, that the appellate court concluded
that "felony murder was limited to cases in which the predicate felony
consisted of conduct other than that inherent in the killing itself."
(Emphasis added.) Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d  at 444. This was not the
holding of the appellate court. Instead, it is the formulation suggested
by the concurring justice and is inconsistent with Viser. This court
noted the inconsistency and, later in the opinion, referred with
approval to the appellate court's requirement of an independent
felonious purpose. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d  at 446.  
	This court also noted that the forcible felonies committed by
Morgan "were inherent in, and arose out of, the fatal shootings" of his
grandparents. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d  at 447. This is true as a statement
of fact. Jon Morgan admitted that he pointed a gun at each of his
grandparents and pulled the trigger with the intent to kill. He offered
evidence of provocation and imperfect self-defense in an effort to
mitigate his crimes to second degree murder. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d  at
411-12. However, while the phrase "inherent in and arising out of" is
an accurate description of the facts of the case, it is not a useful rule
for other cases. When one commits the forcible felony of aggravated
discharge of a firearm and unintentionally causes a death, it cannot be
said that the firing of the gun was inherent in and arose from the
killing. The opposite is true-the killing arises or flows from the
defendant's intent to commit the independent felony and his acting on
that intent. Nevertheless, this court adopted this language as the
statement of the rule for determining when a forcible felony may serve
as the predicate felony to a charge of felony murder. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d  at 447.
	Our opinion in the present case states that "in this type of case"
(slip op. at 9), the State must prove intentional or knowing murder to
punish the defendant like a murderer. The Morgan "type of case" is
one where the defendant admits intent to kill, but argues that his crime
is second degree murder rather than first degree murder. Having
admitted the intent to kill, he must be given the opportunity to present
his case for provocation or imperfect self-defense to the fact finder.
The State may not short-circuit his ability to mitigate his crime to
second degree murder by characterizing the act of murder as felony
murder, at least not without offering proof that the defendant acted
for the specific purpose of committing the underlying felony.
		Pelt was not a Morgan "type of case." Slip op. at 9. In Pelt, this
court noted its prior approval of the appellate court's holding in
Morgan that to convict a defendant of felony murder the State is
required to prove that in committing the predicate felony the
defendant acted with an independent felonious purpose. Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d  at 441. However, the majority then went on to consider whether
Pelt's aggravated battery of an infant "was an act that was inherent in,
and arose out of, the killing" of the child. Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d  at 442. The
majority not only failed to recognize that it was Morgan's intent to kill
that rendered his conduct "inherent" in the act of killing, it also
breathed new life into the same-act doctrine by stating that the "act of
throwing the infant" that was the basis for the aggravated battery
conviction was "also the same act underlying the killing." Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d  at 442. Further, the Pelt majority reformulated the question as
whether the predicate felony "involved conduct with a felonious
purpose other than the conduct which killed the infant." (Emphases
added.) Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d  at 442.  
	The only reasonable reading of the language used in Pelt is that
the predicate felony must not only have a felonious purpose apart
from killing the victim, such as rape, robbery, or kidnaping, but also
must involve at least two separate acts-first, the actus reus necessary
to prove the elements of the felony itself and, second, the conduct that
kills or causes the death of the victim. As I noted in my dissent in Pelt,
this rule, "which focuses on the defendant's conduct rather than his
mental state, if literally applied, would preclude a charge of felony
murder unless the defendant engaged in forcible felonious conduct in
addition to the act that caused the killing." Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d  at 446
(Garman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This rule
would apparently preclude a conviction for felony murder based on
kidnaping where the kidnaper commits only one act, luring a child into
his car with a promise of candy, and then the child dies from an
asthma attack for lack of access to her inhaler.  
	Less than a year after this court issued its decision in Pelt, we are
faced with a case in which the defendant committed only one criminal
act yet we are affirming his conviction for felony murder. Although I
dissented, in part, in Pelt, and I am troubled by this court's reasoning
in Morgan, I am bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to accept these
cases as settled law. Reasoning from Morgan and Pelt, this court now
suggests that the way to determine whether a defendant's conduct was
inherent in and arose out of the killing is to ask whether the "same
evidence" was used by the State to prove both the predicate felony
and the murder. Slip op. at 10. In the present case, "to convict
defendant of mob action, it was not necessary to prove that defendant
struck Richard, much less performed the act that caused the killing."
Slip op. at 11. Thus the predicate felony of mob action "involved
conduct with a felonious purpose other than the conduct which killed
Richard." Slip op. at 11. Apparently, Davis engaged in conduct with
a felonious purpose and the members of the mob, cumulatively,
engaged in the additional conduct that killed Richard Skelton. Further,
my colleagues conclude that this result is consistent with Viser, in
which the defendant was one of several individuals who punched and
kicked the victim and it was not clear which attacker "caused the fatal
blow." Slip op. at 11.  	
	What our opinion says, in effect, is that if it is possible to prove
the elements of the underlying forcible felony and also, using different
evidence, to prove that "in performing the acts which cause the death"
the defendant was "attempting or committing a forcible felony other
than second degree murder" (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1998)),
conviction of felony murder is proper. This is the same-act doctrine,
under which the State must prove that the defendant committed the
actus reus of the underlying felony and, in addition, caused the death
of the victim by engaging in some other conduct as he attempted or
committed the forcible felony. I suggest that if this court is going to
adopt this doctrine, it should do so unequivocally and thereby give
clear guidance to prosecutors and trial courts.
	In my opinion, however, the same-act doctrine completely
ignores the intent of the legislature as expressed in the statutory
definition of forcible felony, which includes "predatory criminal sexual
assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual
assault, robbery, burglary, residential burglary, aggravated arson,
arson, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping" and other crimes. 720 ILCS
5/2-8 (West 1998). Nothing in this statutory definition or in the
felony-murder statute itself suggests a legislative intent that the
provision apply only in cases such as the stereotypical store robbery
case described above where the defendant commits two separate acts,
one that constitutes the felony and one that causes the death of the
victim. Indeed, the inclusion of arson on this list indicates a legislative
intent that the single felonious act of lighting a fire with the intent to
defraud an insurer (720 ILCS 5/20-1 (West 1998)) can serve as the
predicate felony for a charge of felony murder if someone present in
the structure, entirely unknown to the arsonist, is killed as a result.  
	In sum, although I agree with the result in this case, and although
I accept Morgan and its progeny as the law of this state, I cannot
agree that either the merger doctrine or the same-act doctrine are
proper limits on the application of our felony-murder statute. The
General Assembly has clearly expressed its intention that an act
constituting a forcible felony-other than second degree murder-is a
sufficient basis for the imposition of liability for felony murder, thus
precluding our adoption of the same-act doctrine.  
	The merger doctrine is similarly precluded by the purpose of the
felony-murder doctrine, which is to hold a felon is responsible for the
direct and foreseeable consequences of his actions. People v. Lowery,
178 Ill. 2d 462, 470 (1997). The logic behind the felony-murder
statute is that one who chooses to commit a forcible felony will
endeavor to limit his use of violence to avoid being automatically
subject to a murder prosecution if someone dies as a result of the
commission of the felony. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 322
(1998). See also 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide §64 (1999) ("The
common-law rule was that if a person killed another in doing or
attempting to do an act amounting to a felony, the killing was murder.
Practically all jurisdictions have enacted statutes providing that a
homicide perpetrated during the commission, or attempted
commission, of any felony, or more frequently, of certain specified
felonies *** shall be deemed murder or murder in the first degree. The
effect of such statutes is to impute malice or deliberation to a felon so
as to make the incidental homicide murder in the first degree. Hence,
under most, but not all, such statutes, where the killing occurs in the
perpetration of any of the specified crimes, whether or not the
defendant had the intent to kill is immaterial and irrelevant. Thus, any
time the commission of a felony causes death, even though
unintentional or accidental, the legal malice from the felony is
sufficient to transform the killing into murder. The defendant need
only intend to commit the underlying felony, no other mens rea is
required" (emphasis added)).
	Thus, in each case where felony murder is charged, the inquiry
should be whether the State has charged a forcible felony as the
predicate felony, whether the defendant set out to commit the forcible
felony, and whether the death of the victim occurred during the
attempt or the commission of and as a result of the felony.
	In Morgan, the defendant admitted that he acted with the intent
to kill. He could not be convicted of felony murder because he
committed the fatal assaults for the sole purpose of carrying out that
intent.  
	In Pelt, there was no evidence of the defendant's mens rea aside
from the forcible felonious conduct itself. No one, other than Pelt,
knows whether he threw the infant against the dresser with the intent
to kill, with the knowledge that he would likely cause death or grave
bodily harm, or "merely" with the intent to batter the child. As I
indicated in my dissent in that case, in my opinion, the answer to this
question should be within the province of the jury. If the State charges
intentional, knowing, and felony murder in such a case, the jury should
be permitted to consider all three counts of murder and to infer the
defendant's mental state from his actions. Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d  at 447
(Garman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also
Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759 (affirming felony-murder conviction based on
aggravated child abuse of seven-month-old victim); O'Blasney, 297 N.W.2d 797 (affirming felony-murder conviction based on felony child
abuse of four-month-old victim).
	In the present case, defendant intended to participate in the
forcible felony of mob action, which resulted in the death of Richard
Skelton. He is guilty of felony murder.
	I am fearful, however, that our latest pronouncement on the
question of proper predicate felonies for felony murder obscures,
rather than clarifies, this important issue. I hope that when the next
case arises, the members of this court will either unequivocally adopt
the merger doctrine or the same-act doctrine, thus overruling Viser,
or else reject them, overrule Pelt, and clearly state that a conviction
for felony murder may stand if and only if the State has proven that
the defendant acted for the purpose of committing an independent
felony apart from the homicide.