Title: People v. Eichelberger
Citation: 620 P.2d 1067
Docket Number: 80SA159
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: December 22, 1980

620 P.2d 1067 (1980) The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jack EICHELBERGER, Defendant-Appellee. No. 80SA159. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. December 22, 1980. *1068 Dale Tooley, Dist. Atty., O. Otto Moore, Asst. Dist. Atty., Brooke Wunnicke, Chief Appellate Deputy Dist. Atty., Denver, for plaintiff-appellant. Lawrence J. Schulman, Denver, for defendant-appellee. ERICKSON, Justice. The prosecution, pursuant to Rule 4.1(a), C.A.R., has taken an interlocutory appeal to review an order suppressing certain evidence and statements made by the defendant. The district court concluded that there was not probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest of the defendant, and ordered that the statements and evidence seized be suppressed as fruit of the illegal arrest. We do not agree with the district court. In our view, probable cause to arrest was established.[1] Therefore, we reverse the district court's ruling on the suppression of the evidence and statements, and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On September 9, 1979, a criminal complaint was filed in the county court of the City and County of Denver charging the defendant, Jack L. Eichelberger, and Coyote Lightfeather, with arson and with the murder of Erwin Bell. Following a preliminary hearing, the defendants were bound over to the district court to answer charges of murder in the first degree and arson in the first degree. The defendants were subsequently granted separate trials and entered pleas of not guilty. The defendant, Eichelberger, filed a motion to suppress statements and physical evidence which he claimed were the product of an illegal arrest. An extended evidentiary hearing was held on his motion to suppress. The trial judge made findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied the motion to suppress. Thereafter, a motion to reconsider ruling on defendant's motion *1069 to suppress statements and evidence was filed, supported by People v. Bookman, Colo.App., 615 P.2d 44 (1980), cert. granted, No. 80SC116 (1980). The trial judge, after reviewing the testimony at the preliminary hearing and the suppression hearing, and adopting the rationale of People v. Bookman, supra, granted the defendant's motion to suppress. In our view, People v. Bookman, supra, which is before us for review on certiorari, is not applicable to the facts in this case. Probable cause is the touchstone for measuring the right to arrest without a warrant. The circumstances in every case must be considered to determine the existence of probable cause and the reasonableness of the police conduct. People v. Fratus, 187 Colo. 52, 528 P.2d 392 (1974). The burden of proof was on the prosecution to establish the existence of probable cause to arrest the defendant without a warrant. People v. Gomez, 193 Colo. 208, 563 P.2d 952 (1977), People v. Bates 190 Colo. 291, 546 P.2d 491 (1976). In Bates, the Court said: At the conclusion of the first hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress, the trial judge made the following findings of fact, which we conclude, establish probable cause to arrest the defendant: An extended discussion of the fellow officer rule is not necessary. People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 225, 519 P.2d 951 (1974). In assessing probable cause, all the evidence within the knowledge of the police, as a whole, may be considered. People v. Nanes, 174 Colo. 294, 483 P.2d 958 (1971). Accord People v. Baca, Colo., 600 P.2d 770 (1979); People v. Saars, 196 Colo. 294, 584 P.2d 622 (1978). In People v. Nanes, supra, we set forth the following test to be used in considering whether information available to the police under the fellow officer rule provides probable cause to arrest: Bell was found with stab wounds on a burning mattress which had been saturated with a flammable liquid. Firemen at the scene informed the police that the fire had been deliberately set. The discovery of Bell's body with his pants on fire and the mattress in flames would cause a man of reasonable caution to believe that the offenses charged had been committed. People v. Bates, supra. Section 16-3-102(1)(c), C.R.S.1973. Police interviewed several witnesses for leads, pooled their information, and concluded that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant. The trial judge properly found in the first instance that: * * * * * * None of the foregoing facts, alone, rises to the level of probable cause, but the facts known to the police, taken as a whole, provided probable cause to arrest.[2] See People v. Branin, 188 Colo. 235, 533 P.2d 1138 (1975). Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the trial court which suppressed statements and evidence, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [1] The trial court correctly determined that the defendant was properly advised of his rights, and that his statements to the police were voluntary and that the motion to suppress should be denied. [2] We note that one of the purposes of the exclusionary rule is to deter willful or flagrant actions by the police. The rule is not intended as a barrier to prevent the police from carrying out their functions and duties when the police action is reasonable. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980).