Title: Concord v. Water Department of Littleton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12947
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 11, 2021

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SJC-12947 
 
TOWN OF CONCORD  vs.  WATER DEPARTMENT OF LITTLETON & another.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 2, 2020. - March 11, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Water.  Municipal Corporations, Water supply, Special act.  
Statute, Construction, Repeal, Special law. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on 
November 8, 2018. 
 
The case was heard by Jennifer S.D. Roberts, J., on motions 
for summary judgment. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Bryan F. Bertram for the defendant. 
Jeffrey L. Roelofs for the intervener. 
Peter F. Durning for the plaintiff. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The Legislature passed the Water Management Act 
(WMA), G. L. c. 21G, in 1985, establishing a Statewide 
regulatory program for water withdrawals, prohibiting withdrawal 
 
 
1 Town of Acton, intervener. 
2 
 
of more than 100,000 gallons per day from any water source 
without a registration or permit.  See G. L. c. 21G, §§ 2, 4, 5, 
7.  Under the WMA, an existing user of a water source could 
register their previous usage, and a new user had to apply for a 
permit.  G. L. c. 21G, §§ 2, 5, 7.  This case concerns whether 
the WMA impliedly repealed the special act, passed by the 
Legislature in 1884, that granted Concord the right to use Nagog 
Pond, located in Littleton and Acton, as a public water supply.  
St. 1884, c. 201 (1884 act).  The 1884 act not only granted 
Concord the right to "take and hold" the waters of Nagog Pond 
for water supply purposes, but it also provided that Littleton, 
Acton, or both towns could take the waters of the pond if needed 
and that in the case of such taking, the water supply needs of 
Littleton and Acton "shall be first supplied" if "the supply of 
water in [Nagog Pond] shall not be more than sufficient for the 
needs of the inhabitants of the towns of Acton and Littleton."  
St. 1884, c. 201, §§ 2, 10.  In 1909, Concord exercised its 
rights under the 1884 act to take the waters of Nagog Pond, and 
it still uses the pond as a public water supply.  Littleton and 
Acton have not exercised their rights under the 1884 act, and 
the issue before us is whether those rights still exist after 
the passage of the WMA. 
 
Concord commenced this action against the Littleton water 
department (Littleton), seeking declaratory relief in the Land 
3 
 
Court, and Acton's motion to intervene was allowed.  A judge 
concluded that the 1884 act was impliedly repealed by the WMA, 
thereby extinguishing Littleton and Acton's rights under the 
1884 act.  Our holding narrows the judge's decision, as we 
conclude that the WMA impliedly repealed the provision of the 
1884 act that provided that the needs of the inhabitants of 
Littleton and Acton "shall be first supplied."  See St. 1884, 
c. 201, § 10.  We further determine that the WMA did not 
impliedly repeal the provisions of the 1884 act that granted 
Concord the right to "take and hold" the Nagog Pond waters, 
St. 1884, c. 201, § 2, and that provided Littleton and Acton 
with the right to take the water if needed, St. 1884, c. 201, 
§ 10. 
 
Background.  1.  Concord's use of Nagog Pond.  In the late 
Nineteenth Century, Concord, a neighboring town of Acton, 
petitioned the Legislature to authorize Concord to withdraw 
water from Nagog Pond.  In 1884 the Legislature passed "An Act 
to authorize the town of Concord to increase its water supply."  
St. 1884, c. 201.  The 1884 act allowed Concord to "take and 
hold" the waters of Nagog Pond and adjacent land necessary for 
"raising, holding, diverting, purifying and preserving such 
waters, and conveying the same."  St. 1884, c. 201, § 2. 
 
A provision of the 1884 act related to the reservation of 
rights of Littleton and Acton, providing that nothing in the 
4 
 
1884 act prevented the towns from taking the waters of Nagog 
Pond "whenever said towns or either of them may require" for 
water supply purposes.  St. 1884, c. 201, § 10.  It further 
provided that "if from any reason the supply of water in [Nagog 
Pond] shall not be more than sufficient for the needs of the 
inhabitants of the towns of Acton and Littleton, then the needs 
of the inhabitants of said towns shall be first supplied" 
(priority provision).  Id. 
 
In 1909, Concord exercised its rights under the 1884 act.  
It registered an instrument of taking in the Middlesex registry 
of deeds for all the waters of Nagog Pond, all the land beneath 
it, and certain plots and rights of way around the pond.  
Concord since has obtained more land in Acton and Littleton in 
connection with its water supply needs. 
 
2.  Water Management Act.  The Legislature passed the WMA 
in 1985, in "direct response to calls for action issued by two 
separate studies, one commissioned by the executive branch and 
the other by the Legislature, that reviewed the Commonwealth's 
water supply and related policies in the late 1970's and early 
1980's."  Water Dep't of Fairhaven v. Department of Envtl. 
Protection, 455 Mass. 740, 745 (2010) (Fairhaven).  The studies 
identified the need for an improved legal framework and 
management of demand to accommodate users and protect water 
conservation.  See id., quoting Massachusetts Water Supply 
5 
 
Policy Statement:  Summary Report 2 (1978) ("if all reasonable 
uses are to be accommodated, if resource and environmental 
values are to be protected, a new response in the form of 
managing demand will be required"), and 1983 Senate Doc. No. 
1826.  The Legislature established a special commission, which 
hired an independent law firm, to research the existing 
groundwater legal structure and identify areas for improvement.  
Fairhaven, supra at 745.  The Legislature adopted the 
commission's proposed legislation "essentially as proposed" as 
the WMA.  Id. at 746.  See G. L. c. 21G. 
 
The WMA established a Statewide regulatory program with a 
registration and permitting framework, with registration 
reserved for users with existing2 water usage and permits for new 
users.  See G. L. c. 21G, §§ 2, 5, 7; Fairhaven, supra at 747.  
Pursuant to the WMA, Concord submitted a registration for its 
historic water withdrawal from Nagog Pond, and the Department of 
Environmental Protection (department) issued Concord a 
registration in 1991. 
 
3.  Present proceedings.  Littleton commissioned a report 
on its water needs, completed in 2017, which concluded that "to 
meet future water demands, additional withdrawals at existing 
 
 
2 "Existing withdrawals" are those that were in place and 
registered with the predecessor to the Department of 
Environmental Protection on or before January 1, 1988.  G. L. 
c. 21G, §§ 2, 5.  See note 5, infra. 
6 
 
well facilities or permitting of withdrawals at new facilities 
will be necessary."  Littleton identified Nagog Pond as a 
potential new source of water and notified Concord that it 
intended to exercise its rights under St. 1884, c. 201, § 10. 
 
Concord objected and, after negotiations did not resolve 
the issue, commenced this action in the Land Court for 
declaratory judgment.  Concord sought a "judicial determination 
on the extent to which the WMA repealed and superseded the 1884 
[a]ct and the extent to which Concord's [r]egistration pursuant 
to the WMA is superior to any assertion by Littleton that it has 
rights to Nagog Pond." 
 
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and 
the judge granted Concord's motion and denied Littleton and 
Acton's motions.  The judge concluded that "the 1884 [a]ct was 
impliedly repealed by the WMA, as a result of which any rights 
granted to [Littleton] and Acton under the 1884 [a]ct were 
extinguished."  She further determined that to the extent that 
the holders of water withdrawal rights under special acts3 
 
 
3 A special act usually refers to "legislation addressed to 
a particular situation, that does not establish a rule of future 
conduct with any substantial degree of generality, and may 
provide ad hoc benefits of some kind for an individual or a 
number of them."  Commissioner of Pub. Health v. Bessie M. Burke 
Memorial Hosp., 366 Mass. 734, 740 (1975).  In the memorandum of 
decision, the judge noted that "[r]esearch has revealed 
approximately 650 special acts enacted between 1840 and 1984 
granting the right to take and hold waters in the Commonwealth.  
The subjects of these acts are various:  permitting 
7 
 
preceding the WMA, including the 1884 act, "were actually using 
[those rights] and, upon enactment of the WMA, registered their 
water withdrawals pursuant to them, the special acts and the WMA 
are consistent."  Littleton and Acton timely appealed, and we 
granted the parties' joint application for direct appellate 
review. 
 
Discussion.  "As the case was decided below on motions for 
summary judgment on an undisputed record, one of the moving 
parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (quotation 
and citation omitted).4  Arias-Villano v. Chang & Sons Enters., 
Inc., 481 Mass. 625, 627 (2019).  "The single issue raised is 
one of statutory interpretation, and we review the motion 
judge's decision de novo" (citation omitted).  Id. 
 
In addition, "[q]uestions of statutory construction are 
questions of law, to be reviewed de novo."  Meyer v. Veolia 
Energy N. Am., 482 Mass. 208, 211 (2019), quoting Bridgewater 
State Univ. Found. v. Assessors of Bridgewater, 463 Mass. 154, 
 
municipalities to take waters within their own borders; 
permitting one municipality to take waters situated within 
another municipality's borders; permitting one or more 
municipalities to take water from a particularly identified body 
of water; and acts incorporating water companies so that they 
might do the same." 
 
 
4 The judge noted that Littleton and Acton objected to 
certain statements in Concord's statement of undisputed material 
facts but did not seek relief pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 
56 (f), 365 Mass. 824 (1974), and did not file a motion to 
strike those statements. 
8 
 
156 (2012).  "We interpret a statute according to the intent of 
the Legislature, which we ascertain from all the statute's 
words, 'construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the 
language' and 'considered in connection with the cause of its 
enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the 
main object to be accomplished.'"  Meyer, supra, quoting Harvard 
Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 
Mass. 745, 749 (2006).  "Ordinarily, where the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to 
legislative intent."  Meyer, supra at 211-212, quoting Cianci v. 
MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 178 (2019). 
 
1.  Implied repeal.  "[T]he provisions of a special act 
generally prevail over conflicting provisions of a subsequently 
enacted general law, absent a clear legislative intent to the 
contrary."  Dartmouth v. Greater New Bedford Regional Vocational 
Tech. High Sch. Dist., 461 Mass. 366, 374 (2012), quoting Boston 
Teachers Union, Local 66 v. Boston, 382 Mass. 553, 564 (1981).  
The WMA does not contain an express provision repealing the 1884 
act, and therefore we must look to whether the WMA impliedly 
repealed the 1884 act. 
 
Repeal of a statutory enactment by implication is 
disfavored under our jurisprudence.  See Dartmouth, 461 Mass. at 
374, and cases cited.  See also George v. National Water Main 
Cleaning Co., 477 Mass. 371, 378 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
9 
 
Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 725 (2005) ("Where two statutes appear to 
be in conflict, . . . we 'endeavor to harmonize the two statutes 
so that the policies underlying both may be honored'"). 
 
"This strong presumption against implied repeal of a prior 
law is overcome only when the earlier statute 'is so repugnant 
to and inconsistent with the later enactment covering the 
subject matter that both cannot stand.'"  Dartmouth, 461 Mass. 
at 374-375, quoting Doherty v. Commissioner of Admin., 349 Mass. 
687, 690 (1965).  Implied repeal may also exist "where the 
subsequent legislation comprehensively addresses a particular 
subject and impliedly supersedes related statutes and common law 
that might frustrate the legislative purpose" (citation 
omitted).  Skawski v. Greenfield Investors Prop. Dev. LLC, 473 
Mass. 580, 586 (2016).  See Dartmouth, supra at 375, quoting 
Doherty, supra ("[r]epugnancy and inconsistency may exist when 
the Legislature enacts a law covering a particular field but 
leaves conflicting prior prescriptions unrepealed").  However, 
the comprehensive nature of a statute alone does not 
automatically result in implied repeal; "[i]n the absence of 
irreconcilable conflict between an earlier special statute and a 
later general one the earlier statute will be construed as 
remaining in effect as an exception to the general statute."  
Dartmouth, supra at 375, quoting North Shore Vocational Regional 
Sch. Dist. v. Salem, 393 Mass. 354, 359 (1984). 
10 
 
 
2.  Scope of the WMA.  It is clear from the statutory text 
that the WMA is comprehensive as it relates to the regulation of 
water withdrawals.  As discussed supra, the Legislature passed 
the WMA in 1985 to address the framework for management of the 
demand for the Commonwealth's water resources.  Fairhaven, 455 
Mass. at 745.  At the time of the WMA's passage, there was no 
Statewide regulatory system to coordinate water withdrawals.  
1983 Senate Doc. No. 1826.  The Legislature therefore created a 
program to regulate water withdrawals, which was to be overseen 
by the department and the Water Resources Commission.5  Id. at 7-
8.  See G. L. c. 21G, § 3. 
 
Through the WMA's regulatory system, private and public 
water suppliers could withdraw water by registration or by 
permit.6  See G. L. c. 21G, §§ 2, 5, 7; Fairhaven, 455 Mass. at 
747.  Users who had taken from a water supply before the WMA's 
passage went through the registration process, whereas new users 
went through the permitting process.  G. L. c. 21G, §§ 2, 5, 7.  
If a registrant timely filed a registration statement and 
renewals, the registrant was entitled to existing withdrawals.  
Fairhaven, supra ("registrant is not required to obtain 
 
5 At the time of the WMA's passage, the department was known 
as the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering. 
 
 
6 The act only regulates water withdrawals of 100,000 
gallons per day or more.  G. L. c. 21G, § 4. 
11 
 
permission to continue existing withdrawals").  See G. L. 
c. 21G, §§ 2, 5.  By registering and timely renewing, a 
registrant "may continue forever to withdraw water at the rate 
of its existing withdrawal," except in the case of a declared 
water emergency.  Fairhaven, supra at 742 & n.4.  See G. L. 
c. 21G, §§ 5, 15, 17. 
 
Unlike the process established for withdrawal by 
registration, potential users who previously had not established 
water usage needed a permit from the department, which required 
the applicant, among other things, "to detail the anticipated 
environmental impact of the proposed withdrawal and to consider 
alternatives to lessen that impact."  Fairhaven, 455 Mass. at 
748.  See G. L. c. 21G, §§ 2, 7, 8; Fairhaven, supra at 747 
("Withdrawal by registration is treated very differently from 
withdrawal by permit"). 
 
3.  Repugnancy and inconsistency.  We next look to whether 
the 1884 act is within the comprehensive nature of the WMA 
described above, and if so, whether any part of it is "repugnant 
to and inconsistent with the [WMA]."  Dartmouth, 461 Mass. at 
374-375, quoting Doherty, 349 Mass. at 690.  The parties make 
various arguments in support of their positions, which can be 
distilled to the following.  Littleton argues that the two acts 
can be harmonized, and specifically that the priority provision 
is not in conflict with the WMA because the priority provision 
12 
 
relates to Littleton's and Acton's power to take ownership 
rights and interest in Nagog Pond, and not to administrative 
regulation of withdrawals.  Acton similarly contends that there 
is not an implied repeal and that the "statutory rights 
established in the 1884 [a]ct . . . are separate and distinct 
from the [WMA's] regulatory rights and requirements."  Concord 
disagrees, arguing that the WMA impliedly repealed Littleton's 
and Acton's unexercised withdrawal rights and the priority 
provision in the 1884 act.  We conclude that the priority 
provision is inconsistent with and repugnant to the WMA, and 
therefore that the WMA resulted in a partial repeal of the 1884 
act. 
 
The priority provision provides that "in case of such 
taking by [Acton or Littleton], if from any reason the supply of 
water in [Nagog Pond] shall not be more than sufficient for the 
needs of the inhabitants of the towns of Acton and Littleton, 
then the needs of the inhabitants of said towns shall be first 
supplied."  St. 1884, c. 201, § 10.  By providing that Littleton 
and Acton "shall be first supplied," this provision falls within 
the WMA's comprehensive regulatory scheme. 
 
Littleton argues that this priority provision provides it 
and Acton with a reserved property right, and because the WMA 
concerns regulatory registration and permitting -- not property 
rights -- harmony between the acts is straightforward.  The 
13 
 
priority provision, however, is repugnant to the WMA because it 
directly interferes with the WMA's comprehensive regulatory 
provisions.  See Dartmouth, 461 Mass. at 374-375.  Rather than 
the department following the WMA's provisions to allocate water 
withdrawals through the registration and permitting process, the 
priority provision would in effect require the department to 
allow Littleton and Acton to begin withdrawals based on the 
towns' needs.  Depending on the water needs of Acton, Littleton, 
or both, their prioritization could require the department to 
displace partially or completely Concord's water usage, 
overriding the procedures put in place by the WMA.  See G. L. 
c. 21G, §§ 5, 7. 
 
On the other hand, the 1884 act's provisions providing 
Concord the right to "take and hold" Nagog Pond, St. 1884, 
c. 201, § 2, and of Littleton and Acton to take the waters of 
Nagog Pond when they may require them for water supply purposes, 
St. 1884, c. 201, § 10, are not repugnant to the WMA.  Unlike 
the priority provision, these rights differ from the allocation 
of water withdrawals and can be handled by the department 
through the WMA's registration and permitting process.  The 1884 
act's provision allowing Littleton and Acton to take the waters 
of Nagog Pond if they so require just puts Littleton and Acton 
into the WMA's regulatory process -- it does not force the 
department's hand to prioritize water withdrawal rights in 
14 
 
contravention of the WMA.  Similarly, the continued validity of 
the provision allowing Concord to "take and hold" the waters of 
Nagog Pond does not interfere with the WMA's regulatory scheme, 
as it also simply resulted in Concord taking part in the WMA's 
regulatory process.  Therefore, these provisions are not within 
the comprehensive scope of the WMA and are consistent with it. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 
the WMA impliedly repealed the priority provision in St. 1884, 
c. 201, § 10, but that it did not impliedly repeal the 
provisions of the 1884 act that granted Concord the right to 
"take and hold" the Nagog Pond waters, St. 1884, c. 201, § 2, 
and that provided Littleton and Acton the right to take the 
water if needed, St. 1884, c. 201, § 10.  Therefore, should 
Littleton, Acton, or both, choose to exercise their rights to 
take the waters of Nagog Pond and apply for a permit under the 
WMA, the 1884 act will not provide it with a priority right over 
Concord's registration. 
So ordered.