Title: Shaw v. State
Citation: 281 A.2d 610
Docket Number: N/A
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 20, 1971

281 A.2d 610 (1971)
Melvin SHAW, Defendant Below, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.
August 20, 1971.
Bernard Balick, Asst. Public Defender, Wilmington, for defendant below, appellant.
John P. Daley, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellee.
WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.
HERRMANN, Justice:
In this automobile theft case, the conviction obviously rested upon the inference or presumption of guilt[*] arising from exclusive possession of recently stolen property. The defendant admittedly sold the stolen automobile to a dealer approximately 10 days after the theft; but he explained the possession by testifying that he purchased the car from another without knowledge that it had been stolen. The jury obviously refused to accept the explanation; it convicted.
On the appeal, the defendant contends that the State did not fulfill its burden of proof, expressed in State v. Carr, 4 Pennewill, 523, 57 A. 370, 371 (1904) as follows:
From the foregoing language, the defendant argues that his explanation of purchase of the stolen auto from another made it incumbent upon the State to prove the explanation false; that in the absence of evidence that the explanation was false, the presumption or inference of guilt falls; that, otherwise stated, the circumstantial evidence here is as consistent with innocence as with guilt and, therefore, will not support the conviction.
The defendant's contention may not be upheld because it is based upon a misconception of the Carr language. As read by the defendant, the State would be obliged to pursue and attempt to disprove any and all "reasonable" explanations of possession in order to preserve the presumption or inference as part of the State's case. This would be an impractical and unreasonable burden upon the State; and it would be contrary to the time-honored rule governing the presumption or inference in this State. Judge Rodney reviewed the law in State v. White, 4 W.W.Harr. 316, 152 A. 393 (1929), and stated:
It is noteworthy that Judge Rodney recited the first sentence quoted above from Carr, but omitted the second sentence upon which the defendant here relies. The rule as above stated in White currently prevails. E. g., Flamer v. State, Del.Supr., 227 A.2d 123 (1967); Crawley v. State, Del.Supr., 235 A.2d 282 (1967).
In view of the well established rule of law, it seems clear that the Carr language does not prescribe a condition to the survival of the presumption or inference of guilt; rather, it refers to a shifting of the burden of proof to the State, after a "reasonable explanation" of possession has been "satisfactorily proven", if the State hopes to prevail before the jury.
We hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
The defendant also complains that the Trial Court erred in commenting upon the evidence and in making certain remarks to the defendant while on the witness stand.
No useful purpose will be served by reciting the details of this ground of appeal. Suffice it to say that we find no reversible error in this connection.
Affirmed.
[*]  See Flamer v. State, Del.Supr., 227 A.2d 123, 126, f. n. 1 (1967).