Title: State v. Cox
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 94PA19
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: August 14, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 94PA19 
Filed 14 August 2020 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
v. 
JAMES A. COX 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 from the published decision of a 
unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals, 264 N.C. App. 217, 825 S.E.2d 266 (2019), 
finding error and reversing a judgment entered on 16 January 2018 by Judge William 
W. Bland in the Superior Court, Onslow County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 4 
May 2020. 
 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Daniel P. O’Brien, Special Deputy 
Attorney General, for the State.  
 
Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, and Andrew DeSimone, Assistant 
Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee.  
 
MORGAN, Justice.  
 
In this case we must determine whether the trial court erroneously denied 
defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of conspiracy to commit robbery with a 
dangerous weapon and the charge of felonious breaking or entering at the close of all 
of the evidence. In light of our conclusion that the State presented sufficient evidence 
at defendant’s trial to show that defendant possessed the requisite felonious intent 
necessary to support defendant’s convictions of each of these charged offenses, we find 
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no error in the trial court’s ruling. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court 
of Appeals and reinstate these convictions.  
Factual and Procedural Background 
At trial, the State’s evidence tended to show that on 8 August 2015, defendant 
and his girlfriend Ashley Jackson went to the home of Richard Linn. Prior to this 
date, defendant had given $20.00 to Linn so that Linn could purchase, inter alia, 
Percocet tablets on behalf of Jackson. These tablets constituted a prescription 
medication which neither defendant nor Linn could legally possess. After receiving 
the $20.00 amount of funds from defendant, Linn contacted Angela Leisure to obtain 
the controlled substances sought by defendant, added some of Linn’s own money to 
defendant’s $20.00 amount, and ultimately gave Leisure an amount of funds between 
$50.00 and $60.00 for the purchase of drugs. While Leisure had operated as a regular 
“go-between” for Linn in his past efforts to acquire illicit controlled substances, on 
this occasion, Leisure neither obtained the illegal drugs which were requested by 
Linn nor returned any of the drug purchase money to him.  
Upon arriving at Linn’s residence on 8 August 2015, defendant displayed a gun 
to Linn and demanded that Linn accompany defendant and Jackson in going to 
Leisure’s house “to talk with her about their money.” Defendant, Jackson, and Linn 
went to Leisure’s home by vehicle. When they arrived, Leisure’s boyfriend Daniel 
McMinn was standing outside of Leisure’s residence. Defendant, Jackson, and Linn 
STATE V. COX 
 
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entered Leisure’s home, followed by McMinn. Once inside, Jackson pulled Leisure’s 
hair, punched her, and forced her to the floor, demanding “their money.” McMinn 
started to call the police, but he stopped when defendant displayed a handgun “in a 
threatening way.” After a few minutes, Linn told Jackson to stop her assault on 
Leisure, saying: “I think she’s had enough.” As defendant, Jackson, and Linn 
departed Leisure’s residence, defendant kicked a hole in the front door of Leisure’s 
home and fired a shot into the residence, striking a mirrored door inside the home. 
Defendant, Jackson, and Linn did not obtain money or any personal property from 
Leisure’s home.  
Based on the events of 8 August 2015, defendant was arrested and charged 
with first-degree burglary, conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, 
and discharging a weapon into an occupied property.  
Following the State’s presentation of its evidence at trial, defendant moved to 
dismiss the charges against him for insufficiency of the evidence. After the motion 
was denied, defendant presented evidence in his defense, including his own 
testimony. Defendant testified that he went to Linn's home on 8 August 2015 to give 
Linn $20.00 to purchase pain relievers for Jackson, and that later in the day, Linn 
had asked defendant to transport Linn to Leisure’s home because Leisure had taken 
the $20.00 but then would not answer Linn’s telephone calls. According to defendant, 
Linn said that Linn would get defendant’s money back during an in-person encounter 
with Leisure. In his testimony, defendant claimed that neither he, Jackson, or Linn 
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had a weapon during the encounter on 8 August 2015 and stated that it was Jackson 
rather than defendant who had kicked the front door at Leisure’s home. At the close 
of all of the evidence, defendant renewed his motion to dismiss the charges against 
him. The trial court denied the motion. 
After instructing the jury regarding the charges and the pertinent law in the 
case, the trial court further provided the jury with written copies of the jury 
instructions. After deliberating for approximately two hours, the jury submitted two 
questions to the trial court, each relating to the conspiracy to commit robbery charge: 
(1) “Can we get clarification of ‘while the defendant knows that the defendant is not 
entitled to take the property,’ ” [with regard to the definition in the jury instructions 
on Conspiracy to Commit Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon] and (2) “Is it still 
Robbery to take back . . . one owns [sic] property?” After conferring with all counsel, 
and specifically without any objection from defendant, the trial court declined to 
answer the jury’s questions and instead referred the jury to the written jury 
instructions which the trial court had previously provided to it. 
On 16 January 2018, the jury returned guilty verdicts against defendant on 
the charges of conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, felonious 
breaking or entering, and discharging a weapon into an occupied property. The trial 
court sentenced defendant to a consolidated term of 60–84 months of incarceration 
for the offenses of conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon and 
discharging a weapon into an occupied property. For the felonious breaking or 
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entering offense, defendant received a suspended sentence of incarceration of 6–17 
months and was placed on supervised probation for a term of 24 months. Defendant 
appealed to the Court of Appeals.  
The Court of Appeals reversed defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit 
robbery with a dangerous weapon. Although on appeal defendant did not contest his 
conviction for discharging a weapon into an occupied property, nonetheless the lower 
appellate court remanded the case in which defendant was convicted of discharging 
a weapon into an occupied property for resentencing because it was consolidated for 
judgment with the conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon conviction, 
which the Court of Appeals decided to reverse. The court below also reversed 
defendant’s conviction for felonious breaking or entering and remanded the matter in 
order for the trial court to arrest judgment with respect to this felony conviction and 
to enter judgment against defendant for misdemeanor breaking or entering. In 
reversing defendant’s conviction for the offense of conspiracy to commit robbery with 
a dangerous weapon, the Court of Appeals relied upon our decision in State v. Spratt, 
265 N.C. 524, 144 S.E.2d 569 (1965) and its predecessor cases in concluding here that 
defendant could not be guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous 
weapon because defendant did not have the required felonious intent when 
attempting to take property from Leisure under a bona fide claim of right to the 
money which she had been given on defendant’s behalf. Concomitantly, the Court of 
Appeals held that the lack of felonious intent on the part of defendant negated his 
STATE V. COX 
 
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ability to be convicted of the offense of felonious breaking or entering; however, since 
misdemeanor breaking or entering is a lesser-included offense of felonious breaking 
or entering, and since the lesser offense contains all of the elements of the greater 
offense except for felonious intent, the lower appellate court reasoned that the jury’s 
determination that defendant had committed an offense of breaking or entering 
would, under these circumstances, be converted to the commission of a misdemeanor 
breaking or entering offense by defendant. 
The State sought a temporary stay of the operation of the mandate of the Court 
of Appeals, which we allowed on 22 March 2019. On 9 April 2019, the State filed a 
petition for discretionary review, seeking to be heard by this Court on the issue of 
whether the Court of Appeals erred by reversing defendant’s convictions for the 
offenses of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and felonious breaking or entering 
on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence. On 17 April 2019, defendant filed a 
response to the State’s petition for discretionary review, as well as his conditional 
petition for discretionary review. On 14 August 2019, we allowed the State’s petition 
for discretionary review, issued a writ of supersedeas, and denied defendant’s 
conditional petition for discretionary review. 
Analysis 
The test for sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal prosecution is well-
established. “[T]he trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable 
STATE V. COX 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference. If there is 
substantial evidence of each element of the offense charged or lesser included 
offenses, the trial court must deny defendant’s motion to dismiss as to those charges 
supported by substantial evidence and submit them to the jury for its consideration; 
the weight and credibility of such evidence is a question reserved for the jury.” State 
v. Williams, 330 N.C. 579, 584, 411 S.E.2d 814, 818 (1992) (citations omitted).    
Criminal conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to do an 
unlawful act or to do a lawful act in an unlawful way or by unlawful means. State v. 
Arnold, 329 N.C. 128, 142, 404 S.E.2d 822, 830 (1991). Therefore, in the present case, 
the State had the burden to present substantial evidence tending to show that 
defendant and Jackson agreed to commit each element of robbery with a dangerous 
weapon against Leisure. 
For the offense of robbery with a dangerous weapon, the State must prove three 
elements: (1) the unlawful taking or attempt to take personal property from the 
person or in the presence of another; (2) by use or threatened use of a firearm or other 
dangerous weapon; (3) whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened. State 
v. Wiggins, 334 N.C. 18, 35, 431 S.E.2d 755, 765 (1993); N.C.G.S. § 14-87(a) (2019). 
The taking or attempted taking must be done with felonious intent. State v. Norris, 
264 N.C. 470, 472, 141 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1965) (citing State v. Lawrence, 262 N.C. 162, 
163–68, 136 S.E.2d 595, 597–600 (1964)). “Felonious intent is an essential element of 
the crime of robbery with firearms and has been defined to be the intent to deprive 
STATE V. COX 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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the owner of his goods permanently and to appropriate them to the taker’s own use.” 
State v. Brown, 300 N.C. 41, 47, 265 S.E.2d 191, 196 (1980).  
In the present case, the Court of Appeals has been persuaded by defendant’s 
contention, citing our holding in Spratt, that a person cannot be guilty of robbery if 
he or she forcibly takes personal property from the actual possession of another under 
a bona fide claim of right or title to the property, since such a bona fide claim negates 
the requisite felonious intent required for the offense of robbery with a dangerous 
weapon. The State, however, argues that the law does not permit a person to use 
violence to collect on a perceived debt for illegal drugs.  
In the opinion which it rendered in this case, the Court of Appeals exercised 
studious review of our decisions in Spratt and Lawrence, as well as other appellate 
decisions which it considered to involve issues which are similar to those which exist 
in the present case. The lower appellate court went on to conclude that it “remain[ed] 
bound to follow and apply Spratt” in the resolution of this case. 
In Spratt, the defendant entered a convenience store, brought items of 
merchandise to the cashier’s counter for apparent purchase, and when the cashier 
opened the cash register at the counter to conduct the transaction, defendant put his 
hand in the cash register drawer in which money was located. Defendant wielded a 
pistol, told the cashier “it was a stickup,” demanded the money, and reached for it. 
The cashier was able to foil defendant’s effort to obtain the money from the store’s 
STATE V. COX 
 
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cash register, and defendant left without the money. Defendant was charged with the 
offense of attempt to commit armed robbery and was found by a jury to be guilty of 
the charged crime. In this Court’s issued opinion in which no error was found in 
defendant’s conviction upon his appeal, we discussed the concept of felonious intent, 
noting that it is an essential element of the offense of attempt to commit armed 
robbery. In this Court’s discussion of felonious intent in Spratt, we cited Lawrence for 
the proposition that  
where the evidence relied on by defendant tends to admit 
the taking but to deny that it was with felonious intent, it 
is essential that the court fully define the ‘felonious intent’ 
contended for by the State and also explain defendant’s 
theory as to the intent and purpose of the taking, in order 
that the jury may understandingly decide between the 
contentions of the State and defendant on that point . . . . 
For instance, as in Lawrence, defendant may contend that 
his conduct in taking the property amounts only to a 
forcible trespass. 
 
265 N.C. at 526, 144 S.E.2d at 571 (citation omitted). 
In the course of our discussion of the role of the element of felonious intent in 
different criminal offenses and our rumination about the courts’ assessment of the 
element of felonious intent in light of different theories of criminal culpability in 
Spratt, we offered the following observation which the Court of Appeals mistakenly 
treats in the instant case as our dispositive holding in Spratt: 
A defendant is not guilty of robbery if he forcibly takes 
personal property from the actual possession of another 
under a bona fide claim of right or title to the property, or 
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for the personal protection and safety of defendant and 
others, or as a frolic, prank or practical joke, or under color 
of official authority. 
 
Id. at 526–27, 144 S.E.2d at 571. 
 
The defendant in Lawrence—the case which Spratt primarily relies on in its 
discussion of felonious intent—was the operator of a motor vehicle who offered a ride 
to the prosecuting witness Wimbley, a member of the United States Marine Corps 
who was dressed in civilian clothes on this occasion, as Wimbley walked along the 
street after his own motor vehicle experienced mechanical failure. Wimbley accepted 
the offer of a ride and joined the defendant and a passenger in the vehicle. During 
the journey, the defendant and Wimbley bought some whiskey with all three 
individuals consuming some of it. Later, the defendant stopped the vehicle on a dead-
end road with defendant and his original passenger both striking Wimbley with their 
fists. The defendant said to Wimbley, “You owe me something,” to which Wimbley 
replied, “What do I owe you . . . I would be glad to pay you.” The defendant then said, 
“That’s okay, I’ll get it myself,” and then forcibly seized Wimbley’s wallet and removed 
money from it. The defendant was charged with the offenses of robbery and felonious 
assault. A jury found the defendant guilty of robbery. On appeal, this Court 
determined that the defendant was entitled to a new trial because the trial court 
erred by instructing the jury to determine if there was an unlawful taking rather 
than giving a legal explanation of the term “felonious taking” and directing the jury 
to apply it to the facts. Lawrence, 262 N.C. at 168, 136 S.E.2d at 600. This conclusion 
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was reached upon our evaluation of the defendant’s contention in Lawrence that his 
actions amounted only to a forcible trespass, a crime which required an unlawful 
taking but no felonious intent, which he had the right to have a jury to consider upon 
proper instructions. Id. 
 
This review of the respective facts, analyses, and outcomes of the two cases 
decided by this Court upon which the Court of Appeals expressly relies in its decision 
in the present case—Spratt and Lawrence—serves to place them in proper context 
and assist in determining how they apply in this case. While we recognized in Spratt 
the pivotal nature of felonious intent as an element of the offense of attempt to 
commit armed robbery, the defendant in Spratt, in attempting to take money from a 
convenience store’s cash register while employing a firearm, was not attempting to 
forcibly take personal property from the actual possession of another under a bona 
fide claim of right or title to the property—as defendant contends that defendant was 
undertaking in the instant case in attempting to obtain money that he considered to 
belong to him from Leisure. This distinction between Spratt and the current case 
renders Spratt inapplicable here, including the passage from our opinion in Spratt 
which this Court intended to be illustrative and which the Court of Appeals construed 
here to be dispositive. Lawrence, the predecessor of Spratt, is distinguishable from, 
and hence inapplicable to, the present case in that, although the element of felonious 
intent constituted an issue in Lawrence just as it does in the present case, the position 
adopted by defendant in Lawrence rested on an alternative and lesser measure of 
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criminal culpability regarding the intent which he harbored concerning the money, 
while the position adopted by defendant in the instant case fully rests on a total lack 
of criminal culpability regarding the intent which he harbored concerning the money. 
Significantly neither Spratt, nor Lawrence, nor any other case in this state has 
heretofore authorized a party to legally engage in “self-help” by virtue of the exercise 
of a bona fide claim of right or title to property which is the subject of an illegal 
transaction. Here, defendant was involved with other individuals in an effort to 
regain money which was the subject of an illegal transaction involving the purchase 
of controlled substances.1 In this regard, the Court of Appeals has erroneously 
extended beyond existing legal bounds the right of a party to engage in “self-help” 
and to forcibly take personal property from the actual possession of another under a 
bona fide claim or right to the property. Accordingly, with regard to the trial court’s 
denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of conspiracy to commit robbery 
with a dangerous weapon, we conclude that the trial court did not err. 
We likewise hold that the trial court reached a correct ruling with respect to 
defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of felonious breaking or entering. “The 
essential elements of felonious breaking or entering are (1) the breaking or entering 
(2) of any building (3) with the intent to commit any felony or larceny therein.” 
                                            
1 Indeed, the nature of defendant’s transaction and agreement with Leisure means 
that determining the existence of a bona fide claim would likely require the application of 
commercial law principles to an illegal drug deal. We cannot imagine that the common law 
tradition or the General Assembly would require such an approach.  
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Williams, 330 N.C. at 585, 411 S.E.2d at 818. As already discussed, the trial court 
properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of conspiracy to commit 
robbery with a dangerous weapon because the record contained evidence tending to 
show that defendant possessed the requisite felonious intent to support the charge. 
Since both of the issues presented to this Court concern whether defendant possessed 
the same requisite felonious intent necessary to support both of his convictions, we 
conclude that the trial court also properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
charge of felonious breaking or entering.  
  Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated, we find no error in defendant’s convictions of the 
offense of conspiracy to commit armed robbery with a dangerous weapon and the 
offense of felonious breaking or entering. Due to the existence of sufficient evidence 
regarding felonious intent, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motions to 
dismiss the charges against him. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of 
Appeals and order defendant’s convictions to be reinstated.  
 
REVERSED.