Title: Guzman v. Guzman
Citation: 2021 OK 26
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2021

Guzman v. Guzman Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The issue this case presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s review was whether the Court of Civil Appeals properly applied the laws on parental rights in a dispute between a married couple regarding custody and visitation with a minor child who was adopted by only one of the parties prior to marriage. The Supreme Court held that it did not: the child was adopted by Respondent-Appellee Adrieanna Guzman (Adrieanna) prior to the marriage. Petitioner-Appellant Carmen Guzman (Carmen) never adopted the child. As a step-parent, Carmen had no standing to petition the court for paternity of the child. Thus, the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion was vacated, and the trial court's order granting Adrieanna's motion to dismiss was affirmed. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Oklahoma Supreme Court? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Oklahoma Supreme Court. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . GUZMAN v. GUZMAN 2021 OK 26 Case Number: 117918 Decided: 05/25/2021 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. CARMEN GUZMAN, Petitioner/Appellant, v. ADRIEANNA GUZMAN, Respondent/Appellee. ON CERTIORARI FROM THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION II ¶0 Respondent/Appellee Adrieanna Guzman (Adrieanna), an adoptive parent of a minor child, seeks review on certiorari of a published opinion by the Court of Civil Appeals, Division II, filed on January 6, 2020, reversing a decision by the Honorable Barbara Hatfield, District Judge, Canadian County. The trial court dismissed the petition for paternity filed by Petitioner/Appellant Carmen Guzman (Carmen) against her spouse Adrieanna Guzman. The child was adopted by Adrieanna, but was not adopted by Carmen. We hold Carmen, as a step-parent did not have standing, and we vacate the Court of Civil Appeals's opinion and affirm the trial court's order dismissing the petition for paternity. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED. Scott A. Hester, Hester Schem Hester & Dionisio, Edmond, Oklahoma, for Appellant. Lindsay W. Andrews, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellee. KANE, V.C.J.: ¶1 At issue on certiorari is whether the Court of Civil Appeals properly applied our laws on parental rights in a dispute between a married couple regarding custody and visitation with a minor child who was adopted by only one of the parties prior to marriage. We hold that it did not. The child was adopted by Respondent/Appellee Adrieanna Guzman (Adrieanna) prior to the marriage. Petitioner/Appellant Carmen Guzman (Carmen) never adopted the child. As a step-parent, Carmen has no standing to petition the court for paternity of the child. Thus, we vacate the Court of Civil Appeals's opinion and affirm the trial court's order granting Adrieanna's motion to dismiss. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 The parties began their relationship in 2012. In 2015, one of Adrieanna's family members approached her about being a foster parent for their child who was to be placed in state custody upon birth. Adrieanna took physical custody of the child upon the child's release from the hospital in April 2015 and formally adopted the child on December 23, 2015. ¶3 On February 18, 2017, the parties married. It is undisputed that Carmen did not adopt the child. The parties separated in September 2018. On January 4, 2019, Carmen filed a petition for paternity seeking to establish her parental status and for a determination on custody and support. Adrieanna filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on January 11, 2019, wherein she alleged there were no children from the marriage.1 ¶4 On January 28, 2019, Adrieanna filed a special entry of appearance and motion to dismiss in Carmen's paternity action asserting Carmen lacked standing and the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant Carmen any custodial or visitation rights to the child who she never adopted. After a hearing on February 14, 2019, the trial court granted Adrieanna's motion to dismiss for lack of standing by journal entry filed on April 2, 2019. Carmen filed her accelerated appeal following the trial court's dismissal. The case was assigned to the Court of Civil Appeals on June 5, 2019. The Court of Civil Appeals applied this Court's recent decision in Schnedler v. Lee, 2019 OK 52, 445 P.3d 238, to the facts of this case and reversed the trial court's ruling. Adrieanna's petition for writ of certiorari immediately followed. ¶5 The sole remedy available from an erroneous decision of the Court of Civil Appeals is to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.2 See McMinn v. Okla. City, 1997 OK 154, ¶ 25, 952 P.2d 517 , 523; Mehdipour v. Holland, 2000 OK 22, ¶ 9, 18 P.3d 339 . The Supreme Court's power of certiorari review extends to every form of the Court of Civil Appeals' appellate cognizance. See May-Li Barki, M.D., Inc. v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 1999 OK 87, n. 22, 20 P.3d 135 . We granted certiorari in this case to clarify our recent decision in Schnedler, specifically concerning its limited holding and limited application in paternity actions. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶6 The dismissal of a petition, including one for child custody and support, by the trial court is reviewed de novo. See Schnedler, 2019 OK 52, ¶ 11. When ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the trial court and the appellate court must accept the petition's allegations and all inferences that can be drawn from them as true. See Eldredge v. Taylor, 2014 OK 92, ¶ 3, 339 P.3d 888. III. DISCUSSION A. Carmen is a Step-parent and Does Not Have Standing to Seek Paternal Rights of her Spouse's Child. ¶7 Under Oklahoma law, once the final decree of adoption was entered, Adrieanna had all the rights, duties, and legal consequences of a natural parent of the child. See 10 O.S.2011 § 7505-6.5(A). In general, the right of a parent to seek visitation of their child, upon separation or otherwise, derives from the right to custody. See Leake v. Grissom, 1980 OK 114 ¶ 8, 614 P.2d 1107 , 1110. ¶8 Historically, in Oklahoma, step-parents have had extremely limited rights. See Byers v. Byers, 1980 OK 149, ¶ 11, 618 P.2d 930 , 933 (step-parents have no parental rights or support obligations when the relationship terminates); Steinberg v. Frentz, 2002 OK CIV APP 94, ¶¶ 1-4, 57 P.3d 877 (step-parents have no rights under the doctrine of in loco parentis and no statutory rights to custody or visitation with a former spouse's child).3 Because Oklahoma has no statutory provision specifically allowing step-parents to seek custody and/or visitation, step-parents have no right to seek custody or visitation with the child of a former spouse. The fact that a step-parent chooses to lovingly take another's child into his or her home during marriage has never been grounds to either clothe that party with parental rights (custody/visitation) or burden the party with parental obligations (child support). See 43 O.S.2011 § 112.4 ("A stepparent is not required to maintain his or her spouse's children from a prior marriage."). Conversely, if the parent of the child chooses to marry an individual, the parent should not be subjected to later finding out that the result of that marriage was the unintended ceding of parental rights to their spouse, the step-parent. ¶9 In the present case, Adrianna was clothed by law with parental rights by virtue of the adoption. Carmen was legally married to Adrianna and was a step-parent to the minor child. Thus, Carmen does not share the same rights to child custody and visitation as Adrieanna. Carmen, along with all other step-parents, has no statutory right to seek visitation with the child of a former spouse. B. Schnedler's Limited Holding Does Not Apply ¶10 Our decision in Schnedler concerned a question of first impression in Oklahoma: whether our laws recognized a non-biological same-sex co-parent's right to seek custody and visitation on the same grounds as the legal, biological, same-sex co-parent when the couple was unable to legally marry in Oklahoma. Under those specific facts, we held that they must. See Schnedler, 2019 OK 52, ¶ 10. However, Schnedler is limited in nature and does not extend any additional rights to step-parents, grandparents, or others. Id. Schnedler does not apply to legally married couples. ¶11 Because parental rights have not been bestowed on step-parents via statute or the common law, Carmen has no standing to seek custody and visitation with the child. The Court of Civil Appeals appears to have applied Schnedler to the facts of this case solely because the parties were in a same-sex relationship. This was in error. We hold the trial court correctly granted Adrieanna's motion to dismiss Carmen's petition for paternity. IV. CONCLUSION ¶12 Adrieanna solely adopted the child and is clothed by the law with parental rights by virtue of the adoption. After the adoption, the parties chose to marry. Carmen did not adopt the child. We hold Carmen, as a step-parent, has no standing or statutory rights to custody of the adopted child of her spouse. We vacate the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirm the trial court's order dismissing the case. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED. CONCUR: Darby, C.J., Kane, V.C.J., Kauger, Winchester (by separate writing), Edmondson, and Rowe, JJ. DISSENT: Gurich, J. (by separate writing). FOOT