Title: Commonwealth v. Ng
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-10476
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 3, 2022

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SJC-10476 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  YAT FUNG NG. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 4, 2021. - March 3, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  Practice, Criminal, 
Assistance of counsel, New trial, Capital case, Appeal by 
Commonwealth, Opening statement, Request for jury 
instructions.  Judicial Estoppel.  Self-Defense. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 20, 2004. 
 
A motion for a new trial, filed on May 1, 2020, was heard 
by Maynard M. Kirpalani, J. 
 
 
 
Ian MacLean, Assistant District Attorney (Lynn S. 
Feigenbaum, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
James L. Sultan for the defendant. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  In the early morning hours of May 23, 2004, the 
defendant, Yat Fung Ng, met Karriem Brown, the victim, outside a 
bar in the Fenway area of Boston.  A verbal confrontation 
ensued, and minutes later, the defendant shot the victim once in 
2 
 
the forehead, resulting in the victim's death thirty days later.  
A jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree and 
unlawful possession of a firearm.  The trial judge sentenced the 
defendant to imprisonment for life without the possibility of 
parole on the murder conviction.1  Following his convictions, the 
defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied.  
This court consolidated the defendant's appeal from the denial 
of his motion for a new trial with the direct appeal from his 
convictions.  Following oral argument on the consolidated 
appeal, our review of the case pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E 
(§ 33E), alerted us that trial counsel's performance may have 
been constitutionally ineffective, but review of that issue was 
impeded because the defendant did not raise a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in his motion for a new trial 
or appellate brief, and therefore, no evidentiary hearing had 
been conducted on the issue.  This court then remanded the case 
for an evidentiary hearing on the sole issue of trial counsel's 
performance with instructions that, should the judge determine 
that trial counsel had been constitutionally ineffective, the 
judge should order a new trial. 
 
1 The defendant's concurrent sentence of from four years to 
four years and one day on the firearm conviction was deemed 
served at the time of sentencing. 
3 
 
After the case had been remanded but before an evidentiary 
hearing had been held, the defendant's appellate counsel filed a 
second motion for a new trial on the ground that trial counsel 
had provided ineffective assistance, addressing the issues 
identified in this court's order of remand and raising an 
additional issue related to trial counsel's potential 
ineffective assistance.  After an evidentiary hearing, the 
motion judge concluded that the defendant had received 
constitutionally ineffective assistance at trial and, therefore, 
allowed the defendant's second motion for a new trial.  The case 
is now before this court on the Commonwealth's appeal from the 
judge's allowance of the defendant's second motion for a new 
trial.  For the reasons discussed below, we reverse. 
 
Background.  We recite the relevant facts as found by the 
motion judge, supplemented by the record, reserving certain 
facts for later discussion.  We consider the facts in the light 
most favorable to the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Howard, 
479 Mass. 52, 57 (2018); Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 
442-443 (2006). 
 
A bar in the Fenway area of Boston closed at around 2 A.M. 
on May 23, 2004, and the staff ushered out the patrons.  Once 
outside the bar, two groups of patrons engaged in a verbal 
altercation that eventually became physical, with some amount of 
pushing and punching.  The victim did not initiate the fight 
4 
 
but, after witnessing it, joined in the aid of his friends.  
During the fight, the victim "start[ed] throwing bodies," and 
when "somebody tried to hit [the victim], . . . [the victim] hit 
him and punche[d] through."  The victim also pushed a woman and 
a man to the ground.  There is no evidence in the record 
suggesting that either individual was injured.  When the woman 
said that she was going to call the police, the victim grabbed 
her purse and threw it onto the median in the middle of the 
street.  The victim did not pursue the woman as she then 
retrieved her purse.  According to one witness, the victim was 
"waving his arms, kind of ranting," "his eyes were crazy," and 
he appeared to be "on something besides alcohol."  As the fight 
was ending, the victim's friend retrieved a fraternity cane2 from 
his car and began twirling it, telling members of the other 
group involved in the fight, "You don't want any of this."  The 
friend never struck or touched anyone with the cane.  The victim 
was never armed and was observed to have nothing in his hands 
throughout and after the fight. 
 
The defendant was not a member of either group, nor was he 
involved in the fight.  After the victim pushed the woman to the 
ground, the defendant "instinctively took his jacket off and ran 
 
2 A "fraternity cane," also known as a "step cane," is a 
type of cane used by those in some African-American fraternities 
during step dances. 
5 
 
right over to the scene."  The defendant angrily confronted the 
victim and his friends, threatening them by saying, "You think 
you're bullet proof, you think you're bullet proof," "What's up, 
tough guys?  You think you're bullet proof?  I got something for 
you.  I got something for you in my trunk.  You think you're 
bullet proof?"  The defendant then specified that what he had in 
the trunk for the victim and victim's friends was a gun. 
 
The victim and defendant continued to exchange words after 
the victim entered his friend's car.  The victim eventually got 
out of the car, threw his jacket on the ground, and began 
walking toward the defendant while hitting his own chest and 
angrily asking the defendant why the defendant was threatening 
him.  The defendant walked toward the defendant's car, with the 
victim walking after him.  The victim continued to yell at the 
defendant as he walked, at one point telling the defendant that 
he "better run."  The defendant did not respond but quickened 
his pace and continued walking toward his car in a manner that 
one witness described as "with a purpose."  According to this 
witness's uncontroverted testimony, the witness told the 
defendant something to the effect of, "It's over," to which the 
defendant responded, "It's not over for me" or "I have 
business." 
 
When the defendant reached his car, he stopped at the 
driver's side door, and then searched through the trunk and 
6 
 
emerged with a gun.3  The defendant pointed the gun at the victim 
and said, "Yeah, you want this?  You want this?"  The victim, 
who was unarmed, responded, "Go ahead, do it.  Do it," and "What 
are you gonna do, shoot me?  Go ahead, shoot me."  The victim 
and defendant were at least ten feet apart when the defendant 
fired the fatal shot, hitting the victim in the forehead.4  The 
defendant then got into his car and fled the scene. 
 
3 There is conflicting evidence in the record regarding the 
defendant's behavior at his car and where in the car the gun was 
located.  Three witnesses testified that after the defendant 
reached his car, he looked through the trunk, then went to the 
driver's side, opened the door, went or reached into the car, 
and came out with a gun.  Two other witnesses testified that the 
defendant went directly to the driver's side of the car, opened 
the door, reached or went into the car and came out with a gun.  
All of these witnesses also testified that the defendant and 
victim were relatively far apart, with the distance between them 
ranging from "three car lengths" to approximately "twenty-five 
feet," and that the victim was stationary and making no attempt 
to approach the defendant before the defendant shot the victim. 
 
Two other witnesses testified that the defendant went 
directly to, searched in, and retrieved a gun from the trunk of 
the car.  The final two witnesses to testify about the 
defendant's behavior around the car stated that the defendant 
went into the driver's side of the car first, then went to and 
searched through the trunk, and then emerged from the trunk of 
the car with a gun.  These final two witnesses are cited by the 
defendant as those whose testimony is most favorable to him.  
See note 4, infra.  We agree with the defendant's analysis.  
Thus, it is these witnesses' version of the events that we 
adopt. 
 
4 There is conflicting testimony about the moments 
immediately preceding the shooting.  According to most 
witnesses, the victim stopped moving after the defendant 
retrieved the gun, and the two men were at a distance of at 
least two car lengths from each other when the defendant pulled 
the trigger.  According to the witness whose testimony appellate 
7 
 
 
The defendant, who did not testify, did not contest at 
trial that he was the shooter.  The defendant's trial counsel 
had decided before trial to argue that the defendant shot the 
victim in self-defense, largely based on the anticipated 
testimony of Omar Sierra about a call with the defendant that 
occurred approximately twenty minutes after the shooting.  Trial 
counsel anticipated that Sierra would testify that the defendant 
had stated, "[H]e came at me, he came at me, so I had to shoot 
him."  Trial counsel previewed this anticipated testimony in her 
opening statement.  A few days later, after trial counsel had 
argued that the statements would be admissible either for the 
nonhearsay purpose of showing the defendant's state of mind or 
pursuant to the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay 
rule, the trial judge ruled that the defendant's statements to 
Sierra were inadmissible, and Sierra did not testify.  Trial 
counsel continued to argue a theory of self-defense and did not 
pivot to a theory that the shooting was mitigated from murder to 
manslaughter by heat of passion upon reasonable provocation.  
 
counsel claims is most favorable to the defendant, the victim 
continued walking quickly toward the defendant, and the 
defendant fired the gun when the victim was about ten feet away.  
According to another witness whose testimony the defense 
references in its brief, after the defendant retrieved the gun, 
the victim and the defendant walked toward each other until they 
were approximately five feet apart.  They then walked backward 
until there was a distance between them of fifteen to twenty 
feet.  At that point, the defendant raised his gun and fired the 
fatal shot. 
8 
 
Although the Commonwealth and trial counsel previously had 
submitted proposed jury instructions that included instructions 
on both self-defense and heat of passion upon reasonable 
provocation, the Commonwealth did not renew or otherwise discuss 
this request at the charge conference, at which the judge 
discussed only a possible self-defense instruction.  At an 
exchange at sidebar immediately following the jury charge, the 
Commonwealth asked whether trial counsel was "requesting heat of 
passion and sudden combat for manslaughter?"  Trial counsel 
asserted that she was seeking only an instruction on self-
defense, effectively waiving an instruction on reasonable 
provocation.  The Commonwealth then stated, "So you are not 
seeking the other two, any other prongs [other than self-
defense]?  That's fine."  The defendant was convicted of murder 
in the first degree. 
 
At an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the defendant's 
trial counsel's performance, the motion judge credited trial 
counsel's testimony in its entirety.  In granting the 
defendant's second motion for a new trial, the judge found that 
trial counsel's preview of Sierra's anticipated testimony in her 
opening statement and her failure to pivot from a theory of 
self-defense to a theory of reasonable provocation after the 
exclusion of Sierra's testimony were manifestly unreasonable 
strategic errors and her waiver of a jury instruction on 
9 
 
reasonable provocation was not strategic, but was instead an 
error precipitated by the difficult personal circumstances with 
which trial counsel was dealing during trial.  The Commonwealth 
appealed. 
 
Discussion.  We conclude that trial counsel was not 
ineffective for previewing Sierra's anticipated testimony in her 
opening statement, as the decision to preview such testimony was 
strategic and not manifestly unreasonable when made, trial 
counsel's failure to produce the testimony was due to 
circumstances beyond her control, and the failure did not 
deprive the defendant of an available, substantial ground of 
defense.  We also conclude that trial counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to assert a theory of heat of passion 
upon reasonable provocation at trial or for waiving a jury 
instruction on the same where, as here, the circumstances 
surrounding the shooting do not provide legally adequate 
provocation.  As we conclude that there is no other ground on 
which to affirm the motion judge's allowance of the defendant's 
second motion for a new trial, we reverse. 
 
1.  Standard of review.  Under § 33E, a defendant convicted 
of murder in the first degree has an automatic right to appeal 
from that conviction directly to the Supreme Judicial Court and 
receives "a more searching and comprehensive standard of review 
than ordinary appellate procedure."  Commonwealth v. 
10 
 
Billingslea, 484 Mass. 606, 610 (2020).  When a case comes 
before this court pursuant to a direct appeal under § 33E, we 
conduct plenary review of the entire trial record and have "the 
authority to grant relief because of an error that the defendant 
did not raise at trial or on appeal."  Id. at 617.  Where an 
error is unpreserved or unargued, this court will only grant 
relief under § 33E where "the error created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice by having 'likely . . . 
influenced the jury's conclusion.'"  Id., quoting Commonwealth 
v. Goitia, 480 Mass. 763, 768 (2018). 
 
Although the defendant originally appealed from his 
conviction pursuant to § 33E, this case currently is not before 
this court on an appeal by the defendant.  Instead, it is here 
on the Commonwealth's appeal from the motion judge's allowance 
of the defendant's second motion for a new trial.  This court 
has not consolidated the Commonwealth's appeal with the 
defendant's direct appeal but instead considers the 
Commonwealth's appeal on its own.  Therefore, the standard of 
review that typically applies when this court reviews a grant of 
a motion for a new trial applies here.  Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 
433 Mass. 93, 101 n.8 (2000), citing Commonwealth v. Hill, 432 
Mass. 704, 710 n.14 (2000) ("Where the defendant's motion for a 
new trial was allowed and the matter is before us on the 
Commonwealth's appeal, we do not apply the substantial 
11 
 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice standard provided by 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E"). 
 
We review a decision to allow a new trial "to determine 
whether there has been a 'significant error of law or other 
abuse of discretion'" and only reverse the motion judge's 
decision if it is "manifestly unjust" (citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Lessieur, 488 Mass. 620, 627 (2021).  See 
Commonwealth v. Perez, 484 Mass. 69, 73 (2020), citing 
Commonwealth v. Gorham, 472 Mass. 112, 117 (2015).  An appellate 
"court may affirm a ruling . . . on grounds different from those 
relied upon by the motion judge, so long as 'the correct or 
preferred basis for the affirmance is supported by the record 
and the findings.'"  Commonwealth v. Henry, 488 Mass. 484, 495 
(2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Mauricio, 477 Mass. 588, 595 
(2017).  Abuse of discretion occurs "where the judge made a 
clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the 
decision . . . such that the decision falls outside the range of 
reasonable alternatives."  Commonwealth v. Grassie, 482 Mass. 
1017, 1017-1018 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Grassie, 476 
Mass. 202, 214 (2017).  "Judges are to apply the . . . standard 
[under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 
(2001),] rigorously and should grant [a motion for a new trial] 
only if the defendant comes forward with a credible reason that 
outweighs the risk of prejudice to the Commonwealth."  
12 
 
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 672 (2015), S.C., 478 
Mass. 189 (2017), citing Commonwealth v. DiCicco, 470 Mass. 720, 
728 (2015). 
 
A motion judge's "findings of fact after an evidentiary 
hearing on a motion for a new trial will be accepted if 
supported by the record."  Kolenovic, 471 Mass. at 672, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. 213, 224 (2005).  "We consider 
the record in its entirety . . . to determine whether 'there 
exists in the record before us evidence to support the judge's 
decision to order a new trial.'"  Kolenovic, supra at 673, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Preston, 393 Mass. 318, 324 (1984).  
Where, as here, the motion judge did not preside at the trial, 
deference is owed "only to the judge's assessment of the 
credibility of witnesses at the evidentiary hearing on the new 
trial motion, but [an appellate court is] in as good a position 
as the motion judge to assess the trial record" (quotations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Montez, 450 Mass. 736, 754-755 
(2008), quoting Commonwealth v. Haley, 413 Mass. 770, 773 
(1992).  "Where a new trial is sought based on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the burden of proving 
ineffectiveness rests with the defendant."  Montez, supra at 
755, citing Commonwealth v. Comita, 441 Mass. 86, 90 (2004). 
 
2.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  When a defendant 
who has been convicted of murder in the first degree raises an 
13 
 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim as part of a direct 
appeal pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, such claims are not 
reviewed under the familiar test set forth in Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  Commonwealth v. Seino, 479 
Mass. 463, 472 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 
678, 681-682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).  Instead, they 
are analyzed under the more favorable substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice test, which asks whether defense 
counsel erred during trial and, if so, "whether that error was 
likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion," Seino, supra 
at 472-473, quoting Wright, supra at 682.  "Under this standard, 
the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating both error and 
harm."  Seino, supra at 473, citing Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 
Mass. 658, 674 (2017). 
 
As discussed supra, this case currently is not before this 
court on the defendant's direct appeal; it is here on the 
Commonwealth's appeal from the motion judge's allowance of the 
defendant's second motion for a new trial.  Thus, the 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice standard does 
not apply, and we instead apply the typical test for ineffective 
assistance of counsel established in Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96.  
See Commonwealth v. Brescia, 471 Mass. 381, 387 n.6 (2015), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Hill, 432 Mass. 704, 710 n.14 (2000) 
("When the defendant has prevailed on a motion for a new trial 
14 
 
after a conviction of murder in the first degree . . . , the 
[G. L. c. 278, § 33E,] standard [requiring review for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice] does not 
apply, for, if we affirm the allowance of the motion and the 
defendant is convicted at retrial, he receives § 33E review on 
appeal").  We observe, however, that there can be no prejudice 
under either the Saferian standard or the more favorable 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice standard 
where an error purports to deprive a defendant of a ground of 
defense unavailable to him as a matter of law. 
 
Under the Saferian test, when evaluating whether a 
defendant has been deprived of constitutionally effective 
assistance of counsel, we ask whether "representation fell 
'measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary 
fallible lawyer,' and [whether] that . . . performance 
inadequacy 'likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise 
available, substantial ground of defence.'"  Kolenovic, 471 
Mass. at 673, quoting Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96.  See 
Commonwealth v. Domino, 465 Mass. 569, 577 (2013).  
"Essentially, [t]he defendant must demonstrate that better work 
might have accomplished something material for the defense" 
(quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Valentin, 470 Mass. 186, 
190 (2014), quoting Acevedo, 446 Mass. at 442. 
15 
 
 
Where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based 
on a tactical or strategic decision, "the test is whether the 
decision was manifestly unreasonable when made," and involves 
"some deference to avoid characterizing as unreasonable a 
defense that was merely unsuccessful" (quotations and citations 
omitted).  Kolenovic, 471 Mass. at 673-674.  This inquiry is not 
done with the benefit of hindsight and "requir[es] a focus on 
the point in time when counsel made the challenged strategic 
decision."  Id. at 674, citing Commonwealth v. Glover, 459 Mass. 
836, 843 (2011).  "Substantively, [o]nly strategy and tactics 
which lawyers of ordinary training and skill in the criminal law 
would not consider competent are manifestly unreasonable" 
(quotations omitted)  Kolenovic, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Pillai, 445 Mass. 175, 186-187 (2005). 
 
a.  Opening statement.  The defendant asserts that trial 
counsel provided ineffective assistance when she previewed 
certain anticipated testimony in her opening statement that was 
never produced.  "In determining whether failure to produce 
evidence promised in an opening statement is ineffective 
assistance of counsel, we look at whether there was some 
incompetency in the preparation of the statement and whether the 
failure to produce evidence was due to events beyond counsel's 
control or had strategic justifications."  Commonwealth v. 
16 
 
Garvin, 456 Mass. 778, 791 (2010), citing Commonwealth v. 
McMahon, 443 Mass. 409, 425 (2005). 
 
After approximately fourteen months of preparation, trial 
counsel's theory of the case going into trial was that the 
defendant shot the victim in self-defense.  Trial counsel 
believed Sierra's expected testimony as to the defendant's 
statement approximately twenty minutes after the shooting, "[H]e 
came at me, he came at me, so I had to shoot him," "went 
directly to [the defendant's] state of mind to prove that he was 
in fear[,] to solidify his self-defense."  Trial counsel 
expected the Commonwealth to call Sierra to testify but intended 
to call Sierra as a witness herself if the Commonwealth declined 
to do so.  Trial counsel's expectation was based on 
conversations with the Commonwealth, as well as the fact that 
the Commonwealth brought Sierra to Massachusetts from New 
Jersey, where he was then incarcerated, for the sole purpose of 
making him available to testify at trial.  Trial counsel 
interviewed Sierra prior to trial. 
 
These facts do not suggest "inadequate preparation, 
incompetency, or inattention."  Commonwealth v. Nardone, 406 
Mass. 123, 127 (1989).  On the contrary, trial counsel developed 
a theory of the case over several months, and Sierra's testimony 
was central to that theory.  She reasonably expected the 
Commonwealth to call Sierra to testify at trial.  Trial counsel 
17 
 
also reasonably believed that, should the Commonwealth not call 
Sierra as a witness, she herself would be able to call him and 
have Sierra testify to the defendant's statement.5  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 484 Mass. 634, 641 (2020), cert. denied, 
141 S. Ct. 1519 (2021) (preview in opening statement manifestly 
unreasonable where defense counsel did not intend to call 
witness, Commonwealth told judge in presence of defense counsel 
it was unsure whether it would call witness, and Commonwealth's 
opening did not allude to witness's testimony or describe any 
evidence in witness's unique knowledge). 
 
Additionally, trial counsel's failure to produce Sierra's 
testimony at trial was due to circumstances beyond her control.  
Although the Commonwealth had previously taken steps to secure 
Sierra's presence in the Commonwealth for the sole purpose of 
making him available to testify at trial and had listed Sierra 
as a potential witness on the witness list filed with the court, 
on the day of Sierra's scheduled testimony, the Commonwealth 
 
5 We need not and do not reach the issue whether the judge 
erred in excluding the testimony.  For even if trial counsel's 
decision to preview the testimony had been manifestly 
unreasonable at the time of her opening statement, it would 
still not constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of 
counsel where, as discussed infra, the later failure to produce 
the promised testimony did not "deprive[] the defendant of an 
otherwise available, substantial ground of defence."  
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 673 (2015), S.C., 478 
Mass. 189 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 
89, 96 (1974). 
18 
 
announced that it had decided not to call Sierra as a witness.  
Trial counsel argued several times during trial that Sierra's 
testimony was admissible; however, the trial judge ruled 
inadmissible Sierra's testimony as to the defendant's 
statements. 
 
"A promise by defense counsel in [her] opening statement to 
produce key testimony, followed by a failure to deliver it may, 
without more, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel," but 
it does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel in all 
cases.  Commonwealth v. Duran, 435 Mass. 97, 109 (2001), citing 
Anderson v. Butler, 858 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1988).  Here, 
trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel 
in failing to produce key testimony promised in her opening 
statement because her opening statement was not "manifestly 
unreasonable" when given, her failure to produce the promised 
testimony was due to circumstances beyond her control, and the 
failure to produce the promised testimony did not deprive the 
defendant of an available, substantial ground of defense.  Such 
failure could not deprive the defendant of an available, 
substantial ground of defense where, as a matter of law, the 
defendant was not entitled to put before the jury the issue of 
self-defense or excessive use of force in self-defense and would 
not have been so entitled even had Sierra's testimony been 
admitted.  Additionally, there was legally inadequate 
19 
 
provocation to make available to the defendant the defenses of 
heat of passion upon reasonable provocation or heat of passion 
upon sudden combat.  Thus, as will be discussed infra, as a 
matter of law, the defendant was not entitled to an instruction 
on any absolute defense or mitigating circumstance6 of the charge 
of murder in the first degree. 
 
We acknowledge that the loss of credibility suffered by 
trial counsel as a result of her "broken promise" to produce 
Sierra's testimony might have gone to the defendant's case as a 
whole, rather than only to the issue of self-defense.  However, 
any loss of credibility suffered as a result of trial counsel's 
broken promise did not, as required to sustain a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel under the Saferian standard, 
deprive the defendant of an available ground of defense where, 
as a matter of law, none was available to him.  See Kolenovic, 
471 Mass. at 673, quoting Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96. 
 
6 Self-defense, "if warranted by the circumstances and 
carried out properly, constitute[s] a complete defense and not 
merely a mitigating circumstance."  Commonwealth v. Carlino, 429 
Mass. 692, 694 (1999), S.C., 449 Mass. 71 (2007), citing 
Commonwealth v. Mejia, 407 Mass. 493, 496 (1990).  Excessive 
force in self-defense, heat of passion upon reasonable 
provocation, and heat of passion upon sudden combat, on the 
other hand, constitute circumstances that may mitigate an 
unlawful killing from murder to manslaughter.  See Commonwealth 
v. Grassie, 476 Mass. 202, 206-207 (2017), S.C., 482 Mass. 1017 
(2019); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 461 Mass. 100, 107 (2011), 
quoting Commonwealth v. LeClair, 445 Mass. 734, 740 (2006). 
20 
 
 
"A defendant is entitled to have the jury at his trial 
instructed on the law relating to self-defense if the evidence, 
viewed in its light most favorable to him, is sufficient to 
raise the issue."  Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 465 Mass. 672, 682 
(2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Harrington, 379 Mass. 446, 450 
(1980).  "When deadly force is used, . . . a defendant is 
entitled to an instruction on self-defense where there is 
'evidence warranting at least a reasonable doubt' that he '(1) 
had reasonable ground to believe and actually did believe that 
he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, from 
which he could save himself only by using deadly force, (2) had 
availed himself of all proper means to avoid physical combat 
before resorting to the use of deadly force, and (3) used no 
more force than was reasonably necessary in all the 
circumstances of the case.'"  Gonzalez, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Harris, 464 Mass. 425, 432 (2013). 
 
A self-defense instruction is not warranted "unless there 
is some evidence that the defendant availed himself of all 
means, proper and reasonable in the circumstances, of retreating 
from the conflict before resorting to the use of deadly force."  
Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 226-227 (2008).  Even "a 
person attacked with deadly force must retreat whenever it is 
possible to do so in safety."  Commonwealth v. Gagne, 367 Mass. 
519, 524 (1975), citing Commonwealth v. Crowley, 168 Mass. 121, 
21 
 
126 (1897), and other cases.  Here, the defendant had a clearly 
available avenue of escape -- his car -- that he failed to use 
before resorting to deadly force.  As a result, he could not 
claim that he shot the victim in self-defense. 
 
As discussed supra, after exchanging words with the victim, 
the defendant walked back to his car.  The defendant opened the 
driver's side door, then went to the rear of the car, opened the 
trunk and leaned inside it for at least a few seconds, and 
retrieved a gun.  In the light most favorable to the defendant, 
the closest the victim got to the defendant was a distance of 
five feet.  The victim never made or attempted to make physical 
contact with the defendant.  The victim was visibly unarmed.  
The defendant had time to reach and open the driver's side door, 
walk to the rear of the car, open the trunk, search in the 
trunk, and retrieve a gun.  Instead, the defendant could have 
simply entered the car after opening the driver's side door and 
driven away.  In other words, "there is no evidence that raised 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant could not have avoided 
physical combat with the victim or was unable to retreat."  
Gonzalez, 465 Mass. at 684. 
 
We confronted an almost identical issue in Commonwealth v. 
Diaz, 453 Mass. 266, 280 (2009), overruled on other grounds by 
Commonwealth v. Womack, 457 Mass. 268, 273-274 (2010).  There, 
we held that self-defense was unavailable to a defendant who had 
22 
 
access to a vehicle as a means of retreat, but who chose instead 
to reach inside that vehicle to retrieve a firearm and shoot his 
victim.  Diaz, supra.  As in Diaz, nothing stopped the defendant 
from driving away from the fight; indeed, he did so moments 
later after shooting the victim.  See Commonwealth v. Mercado, 
456 Mass. 198, 209 (2010) (no self-defense where defendant free 
to leave but returned with firearm); Commonwealth v. Avila, 454 
Mass. 744, 769 (2009) (defendant reasonably could have retreated 
from altercation on public street).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Ortega, 
480 Mass. 603, 611–612 (2018) (victim's possession and use of 
firearm may make retreat unreasonable).  Here, because the 
defendant reached for his firearm rather than his keys, a self-
defense instruction was unwarranted.7  Thus, because a self-
 
 
7 We do not discount the testimony regarding the violent 
actions of the victim just before the shooting, nor the evidence 
that the defendant may have feared that he was faced with an 
imminent assault.  Nonetheless, even if the defendant believed 
he was threatened with death or serious bodily harm, his failure 
to use reasonable avenues of escape precluded any claim of self-
defense.  See Commonwealth v. Hart, 428 Mass. 614, 616 (1999).  
We also question whether the defendant could have reasonably 
believed that he was in imminent danger of death or serious 
bodily harm from the victim, as required to receive a self-
defense instruction where the defendant has used deadly force.  
At most, the defendant witnessed the victim push two people to 
the ground in the midst of a group melee in which the defendant 
was not a participant, and where the two people so pushed showed 
no signs of any injury, let alone serious injury.  The victim 
did not continue to pursue those individuals after he pushed 
them, apart from grabbing the woman's purse and throwing it onto 
the median in the middle of the street.  Finally, the victim, 
although walking quickly in pursuit of the defendant, made no 
23 
 
defense claim was unavailable to the defendant, any error by 
trial counsel relating to the issue of self-defense did not 
deprive the defendant of an available, substantial ground of 
defense and did not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  The motion judge's determination to the contrary was, 
therefore, an abuse of discretion. 
 
b.  Trial counsel's failure to pivot and waiver of 
instruction on heat of passion upon reasonable provocation.  i.  
Waiver and judicial estoppel.  As a preliminary matter, we note 
that the Commonwealth is not judicially estopped from arguing on 
appeal that a reasonable provocation instruction was not 
warranted, nor has the Commonwealth forfeited or waived such 
argument.  The doctrine of judicial estoppel, which applies in 
both civil and criminal proceedings, "precludes a party in 
certain circumstances from asserting a position in one 
proceeding that is contrary to a position that the party 
previously asserted successfully in another proceeding."  East 
Cambridge Sav. Bank v. Wheeler, 422 Mass. 621, 621 (1996).  See 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 476 Mass. 367, 375 (2017).  "[T]wo 
fundamental elements are widely recognized as comprising the 
core of a claim of judicial estoppel.  First, the position being 
asserted . . . must be 'directly inconsistent,' meaning 
 
overt attempt to strike or otherwise make physical contact with 
him. 
24 
 
'mutually exclusive' of, the position asserted in a prior 
proceeding[;] . . . [and] [s]econd, the party must have 
succeeded in convincing the court to accept its prior position."  
Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 458 Mass. 657, 671 (2011), quoting 
Otis v. Arbella Mut. Ins. Co., 443 Mass. 634, 640-641 (2005). 
 
Here, the Commonwealth requested an instruction on 
reasonable provocation at trial.  However, the Commonwealth 
appeared to change course at some point, indicating after the 
jury instructions had been given that it was "fine" that the 
judge had not instructed on reasonable provocation and that 
trial counsel had waived instruction on the same.  Thus, it is 
unclear that the Commonwealth's argument on appeal is 
inconsistent with the Commonwealth's final position at trial on 
the reasonable provocation instruction.  Even assuming arguendo 
that the relevant position at trial arises out of the 
Commonwealth's earlier written request for jury instructions, 
"the trial judge . . . rejected the Commonwealth's position with 
respect to" an instruction on reasonable provocation.  
Rodriguez, 476 Mass. at 376.  Where, contrary to the 
Commonwealth's request, the trial judge did not provide a 
reasonable provocation instruction, the Commonwealth did not 
"succeed[] in convincing the court to accept its . . . position" 
such that judicial estoppel would apply.  DiBenedetto, 458 Mass. 
at 671.  Thus, judicial estoppel does not preclude the 
25 
 
Commonwealth from now arguing on appeal that such instruction 
was not warranted. 
 
Nor has the Commonwealth waived or forfeited the argument.  
The defendant relies on Commonwealth v. Dery, 452 Mass. 823 
(2008), and Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To, 391 Mass. 301 (1984), 
for the proposition that the Commonwealth may not now argue that 
the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on heat of 
passion upon reasonable provocation.  Neither case supports this 
conclusion. 
 
Contrary to the defendant's assertion, in Dery, this court 
considered the Commonwealth's constitutional argument that the 
defendant could not be tried by a jury of five members, despite 
that position being inconsistent with its acceptance of such 
jury at trial.  Dery, 452 Mass. at 824.  In Lam Hue To, this 
court concluded that the prosecution had waived its right to 
argue that certain evidence it had withheld in violation of 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), was not exculpatory 
or material.  Lam Hue To, 391 Mass. at 307-308.  The court 
nevertheless went on to conclude that "it [was] clear . . . that 
the evidence was exculpatory and material."  Id. at 309.  The 
waiver analysis in both cases applied because the party's 
position at trial was inconsistent with an argument asserted on 
appeal. 
26 
 
 
Here, as noted supra, the Commonwealth's position on appeal 
is not inconsistent with its final position at trial such that 
its argument on appeal should be deemed waived.  Thus, the 
Commonwealth has not waived the argument that the defendant was 
not entitled to a jury instruction on reasonable provocation. 
Because neither judicial estoppel nor waiver prevents the 
Commonwealth from arguing on appeal that the defendant was not 
entitled to a jury instruction on heat of passion upon 
reasonable provocation, the argument is properly before us. 
 
ii.  Unavailability of a reasonable provocation 
instruction.  The motion judge found that trial counsel's 
failure to pivot midtrial to a theory of reasonable provocation 
was a manifestly unreasonable tactic and that her waiver of a 
reasonable provocation jury instruction "was not conscious or 
strategic, but a mistake."  Deferring to the motion judge's 
findings, we nevertheless hold that trial counsel's errors did 
not deprive the defendant of constitutionally effective 
assistance of counsel where, as here, there was no legally 
adequate provocation to support a reasonable provocation 
instruction.8 
 
8 As with the defendant's claim of self-defense, any error 
relating to trial counsel's failure to pursue a defense of 
reasonable provocation cannot give rise to a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, because that defense was 
unavailable to the defendant as a matter of law. 
27 
 
 
"If any view of the evidence in a case would permit a 
verdict of manslaughter rather than murder, a manslaughter 
[instruction] should be given."  Commonwealth v. Brooks, 422 
Mass. 574, 578 (1996), citing Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 
724, 726 (1980).  "Voluntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing 
arising not from malice, but from . . . sudden passion induced 
by reasonable provocation, sudden combat, or excessive force in 
self-defense" (quotation omitted).  Acevedo, 446 Mass. at 443, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Carrion, 407 Mass. 263, 267 (1990).  
"Reasonable provocation is provocation [deemed adequate in law] 
by the person killed . . . that would be likely to produce such 
a state of passion, anger, fear, fright, or nervous excitement 
in a reasonable person as would overwhelm his capacity for 
reflection or restraint and did actually produce such a state of 
mind in the defendant."  Commonwealth v. Brea, 488 Mass. 150, 
156 (2021), citing Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 75-76 
(2018).  A jury instruction on reasonable provocation is 
warranted only if there is sufficient evidence "to create a 
reasonable doubt in the minds of a rational jury that a 
defendant's actions were both objectively and subjectively 
reasonable."  Brea, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. McLeod, 394 
Mass. 727, 738, cert. denied sub nom. Aiello v. Massachusetts, 
474 U.S. 919 (1985). 
28 
 
 
Mere "[i]nsults and quarreling alone cannot provide a 
reasonable provocation."  Commonwealth v. Vatcher, 438 Mass. 
584, 588 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, 425 Mass. 
507, 514 (1997), S.C., 433 Mass. 439 (2001).  While physical 
contact is not required, see Commonwealth v. Morales, 70 Mass. 
App. Ct. 526, 532 (2007), S.C., 464 Mass. 302 (2013), "mere 
insulting words and threatening gestures, alone, with nothing 
else do not constitute adequate provocation to reduce a killing 
from murder to manslaughter" (citation omitted), Howard, 479 
Mass. at 61.  Conversely, "physical contact between a defendant 
and a victim is not always sufficient to warrant a manslaughter 
instruction, even when the victim initiated the contact."  
Commonwealth v. Felix, 476 Mass. 750, 757 (2017), quoting 
Walden, 380 Mass. at 727. 
 
The defendant contends that sufficient evidence of 
reasonable provocation existed where he "interceded as a Good 
Samaritan to assist a woman after she was pushed to the ground 
by [the victim] during a violent melee," and was then threatened 
and pursued by the victim.  This argument is unavailing for two 
reasons. 
 
First, the only evidence in the record to suggest that the 
defendant's intervention toward the end of the melee was "as a 
Good Samaritan" is the timing of his initiation of the 
altercation with the victim; according to one witness, the 
29 
 
defendant "instinctively took his jacket off and ran right over 
to the scene" after the victim pushed a woman to the ground.  
However, the defendant's only action on reaching the scene was 
to threaten deadly force against the victim and his friends.  
The defendant made no attempts to speak with, check on, or 
otherwise assist the woman or anyone else.  While we must draw 
"[a]ll reasonable inferences . . . in favor of the defendant" 
(emphasis added), we will not speculate as to the defendant's 
motivations where there is no supporting evidence in the record.  
Commonwealth v. Camacho, 472 Mass. 587, 602 (2015), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Nichypor, 419 Mass. 209, 216 (1994). 
 
Second, it is well established that the provocation must 
"come from the victim" and be directed at the defendant.  
Commonwealth v. LeClair, 445 Mass. 734, 741-743 (2006).  For 
example, in LeClair we expressly rejected the Model Penal Code 
approach to reasonable provocation, under which a defendant's 
"belie[f] that the deceased is responsible for some injustice to 
another" would constitute reasonable provocation.  Id. at 741-
742.  We also more recently have held that being a witness to a 
physical altercation in which the victim is a participant -- 
even a violent participant -- is inadequate provocation as a 
matter of law.  See Brea, 488 Mass. at 156-157 (no reasonable 
provocation where defendant, at most, "witnessed a casual 
acquaintance being punched before he joined in and fired"); 
30 
 
Commonwealth v. Medina, 430 Mass. 800, 809-810 (2000) 
(inadequate provocation where defendant witnessed victim assault 
third party with axe, but victim had not "directly threatened or 
assaulted the defendant" before he struck victim with baseball 
bat). 
 
Here, at most, the defendant witnessed a violent melee 
involving nearly a dozen people, in which there was punching, 
pushing, and shoving, including by the victim.  One individual 
was briefly armed with a fraternity cane, but did not use it on 
anyone that night, and the victim was unarmed.  As the defendant 
was not a participant in the melee, none of the pushing, 
shoving, or punching was directed at him, and the actions of the 
victim or others in the melee could not provide a basis adequate 
at law for the defendant's reasonable provocation.  Indeed, the 
victim exchanged no words or gestures of any kind with the 
defendant until the defendant approached the victim and 
threatened to use deadly force against him. 
 
According to uncontroverted evidence in the record, the 
first interaction between the victim and the defendant was the 
defendant approaching the victim and saying, "You think you're 
bullet proof, you think you're bullet proof," "What's up tough 
guys?  You think you're bullet proof?  I got something for you.  
I got something for you in my trunk.  You think you're bullet 
proof?" and then specifying that what he had in the trunk was a 
31 
 
gun.  Because no event broke the chain between the defendant's 
unprovoked threat of deadly force against the unarmed victim, 
the defendant's walk back to his car, his search for and 
retrieval of his firearm, and the defendant's fatal shooting of 
the victim, the defendant was the first aggressor not just in 
his argument with the victim but also in the fatal confrontation 
with the victim.  Because there existed an unbroken chain of 
events between the defendant's threat of deadly force and his 
shooting of the victim, any reasonable provocation would have 
had to exist before such chain began.  As discussed supra, no 
such reasonable provocation existed at the time the defendant 
threatened deadly force against the victim.  Thus, as a matter 
of law, the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on 
reasonable provocation. 
 
During plenary review of a case pursuant to § 33E, this 
court declined to reduce a defendant's conviction of murder in 
the first degree to manslaughter, concluding that "there [was] 
no evidence suggesting that the defendant killed the victim 
because he was provoked or engaged in sudden combat" on facts 
remarkably similar to those here.  Commonwealth v. Coleman, 434 
Mass. 165, 171 (2001).  In Coleman, "the defendant was involved 
in an altercation involving several persons outside a nightclub 
. . . .  At some point during or after the fight in which 
several persons had thrown punches, the defendant left the brawl 
32 
 
and went to a nearby automobile where he retrieved a gun from 
the trunk.  He then turned in the direction from which he had 
come and shot the victim at close range.  There was evidence 
that the victim had followed the defendant to the automobile, 
but no evidence that the victim was armed at the time of the 
shooting."  Id. at 166. 
 
Here, the facts are even less favorable to the defendant.  
The defendant witnessed, but was not involved in, a physical 
altercation involving several persons outside a bar.  After the 
fight had ended, the defendant walked to his nearby automobile, 
where he retrieved a gun from the trunk.  The victim had 
followed the defendant, but he was unarmed.  The victim either 
walked quickly to a distance of ten feet from the defendant when 
the defendant fired the fatal shot, or both the defendant and 
victim had walked toward each other until they were five feet 
apart and then backed away to a final distance of fifteen to 
twenty feet when the defendant fired the fatal shot.9 
 
9 The defense claims that the testimony asserting that the 
victim walked quickly to a distance of ten feet from the 
defendant was the most favorable evidence for the defendant.  
However, the defense also cited in its brief to evidence that 
the victim walked to a distance of five feet from the defendant.  
In reviewing such evidence, we look at the record as a whole.  
The same witness who testified that the defendant and victim 
walked to within five feet of each other also stated that, after 
the defendant had retrieved a gun, the victim began backing up 
and was from fifteen to twenty feet away from the defendant when 
the defendant shot the victim. 
33 
 
 
The defense contends that the victim's relatively greater 
size than the defendant gave rise to reasonable provocation.  
However, where the defendant had access to a firearm and the 
victim remained unarmed, we find this argument unavailing.  In 
Commonwealth v. Whipple, 377 Mass. 709, 711-712, 715-716 (1979), 
this court declined to disturb a conviction of murder in the 
first degree where the victim and defendant engaged in a 
fistfight, with the victim weighing over 200 pounds and the 
defendant weighing only 145 pounds.  During that altercation, 
the victim had struck the defendant with a "two-by-four" but was 
unarmed at the time of the shooting.  Id. at 712, 715.  In the 
course of the altercation, the defendant procured a gun and shot 
the victim, who was then approximately ten feet away.  Id. at 
712.  There was evidence that the victim may have been moving 
toward the defendant at the time.  Id.  Nevertheless, the court 
concluded that, despite the exchanged blows, "there was no 
serious injury at any point from the blows exchanged, and no 
threat of serious injury at least after the two-by-four was 
discarded."  Id. at 715.  The court thus analogized the 
"defendant's taking up of the gun" to cases "in which a 
defendant, party to a dispute or affray, leaves the scene, 
procures a weapon, and returns to do murderous work."  Id.  We 
also conclude that such an analogy is applicable to the case 
here. 
34 
 
 
Also informative are our cases where we have concluded that 
the evidence presented adequate provocation, particularly in 
light of the requirement that "[a] victim's conduct must present 
a 'threat of serious harm' to be considered reasonable 
provocation."  Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 482 Mass. 823, 827 
(2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 442 Mass. 826, 839 (2004).  
In Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 427 Mass. 714, 715 (1998), the issue 
of provocation "was plainly presented by the evidence" where the 
victim "was pursuing the defendant with a baseball bat" and, in 
a confrontation shortly before the fatal incident, "had chased 
the defendant with a baseball bat and struck [the defendant] 
several times."  We also concluded that there was adequate 
provocation where, "[a]t trial, the defendant presented evidence 
that the victim violently attacked [the defendant] with a bat, 
beat his brother, and chased the defendant with a knife, all 
immediately prior to the killing."  Commonwealth v. Randolph, 
438 Mass. 290, 299 (2002).  In Commonwealth v. Berry, 431 Mass. 
326, 335 (2000), following a verbal argument, "[t]he victim 
charged the defendant and swung at him with his bare hands" and 
"hit the defendant with a beer bottle."  This "escalating 
hostility" was sufficient to warrant a reasonable provocation 
instruction.  Id.  In Commonwealth v. Little, 431 Mass. 782, 
786-787 (2000), there was adequate provocation where the victim 
was the first aggressor, the defendant was on crutches and 
35 
 
unable to flee, the defendant believed the victim had a handgun 
and knew him to carry one in the past, and the victim "made a 
move with his hand to his hip, as if he were reaching for a 
handgun."  Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Niemic, 427 Mass. 718, 
719, 721 (1998), S.C., 451 Mass. 1008 (2008), there was adequate 
provocation where the victim, after reaching into his pants and 
threatening to shoot a group of young men, threatened to shoot 
the defendant and then shoved him against a house. 
 
The above cases all share one fact in common:  the victim 
was either visibly armed or at least suspected of being armed.10  
We rarely have concluded that a defendant was reasonably 
provoked where a victim was unarmed, and such cases are easily 
distinguishable from the case currently before us.  For example, 
this court concluded that there was adequate provocation in 
Commonwealth v. Boucher, 403 Mass. 659, 661, 663 (1989), where 
the victim, a student of karate, fought with the defendant and 
"delivered a kick to the defendant's head and continued to 
attack the defendant."  No evidence was presented here that the 
victim was trained in hand-to-hand combat or any sort of martial 
 
10 Additional cases where we determined there was adequate 
provocation include Commonwealth v. Richards, 485 Mass. 896, 919 
(2020) (victim stabbed defendant in chest); Commonwealth v. 
Triplett, 398 Mass. 561, 565, 569 (1986) (defendant testified 
victim lunged at him with knife); Commonwealth v. Ransom, 358 
Mass. 580, 582-583 (1971) (victim stabbed defendant in arm and 
chased him with knife). 
36 
 
arts.  Other cases where we determined that there was adequate 
provocation in light of an unarmed victim required a physical 
attack by the victim prior to the use of deadly force by the 
defendant.  See Acevedo, 446 Mass. at 443-444 (victim and 
friends surrounded defendant, knocked defendant to ground, and 
repeatedly punched defendant in head); Commonwealth v. Young, 
326 Mass. 597, 601 (1950) (struggle started "with a battery 
committed by [the victim] on the defendant"); Morales, 70 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 533-534 (victim and two others, at direction of 
third party, "were approaching [defendant] in order to 'get 
him,' 'jump him,'" and "victim threw some punches").11  The 
situation here is not analogous to these cases where, here, the 
victim was alone, it was not clear that the victim intended 
serious bodily harm against the defendant, and there is no 
evidence the victim ever attempted to strike or otherwise 
physically attack the defendant. 
 
11 The Appeals Court concluded that there was adequate 
provocation in Commonwealth v. Fortini, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 701, 
703, 706 (2007), where, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the defendant, the victim lunged at the defendant 
and reached for the defendant's gun, and then continued to reach 
for the weapon after the defendant stepped back.  Although the 
victim was not armed at the time the defendant pulled the 
trigger, he was making overt and repeated attempts to arm 
himself with the defendant's shotgun.  Id. at 703.  Nothing 
approaching that set of facts occurred in this case, where the 
victim, at most, continued walking toward the defendant after 
the defendant retrieved the gun from his car. 
37 
 
 
While we have often concluded that a defendant was 
reasonably provoked when faced with an armed victim, we also 
have concluded that there was inadequate provocation where a 
victim was armed, particularly where the victim was responding 
to an attack or confrontation by the defendant.  See 
Commonwealth v. Brum, 441 Mass. 199, 206 (2004) (victim 
brandished hammer against third party who had victim in 
headlock); Commonwealth v. Roderick, 429 Mass. 271, 278-279 
(1999) (victim brandished machete against armed robber); 
Commonwealth v. Curtis, 417 Mass. 619, 629 & n.6 (1994) (victim 
attempted to strike defendant with "quart bottle full of liquor" 
after defendant confronted victim). 
 
Where the victim was unarmed, this court frequently has 
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a 
reasonable provocation instruction.  It is well settled that 
"[n]ot all physical confrontations, even those initiated by the 
victim, are sufficient" to warrant an instruction on reasonable 
provocation.  Commonwealth v. Lugo, 482 Mass. 94, 104 (2019), 
citing Curtis, 417 Mass. at 629 & n.6, and other cases. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Bertrand, 385 Mass. 356, 363 (1982), 
quoting Walden, 380 Mass. at 728, we concluded that where a 
victim, "at most[,] 'put his hand up to swing,'" even where the 
victim "was taller and heavier than" the defendant, there was 
insufficient evidence to "warrant a reasonable doubt that 
38 
 
something happened which would have been likely to produce in an 
ordinary person such a state of passion, anger, fear, fright, or 
nervous excitement as would eclipse his capacity for reflection 
or restraint, and that what happened actually did produce such a 
state of mind in the defendant."  In Commonwealth v. Burgess, 
450 Mass. 422, 438 (2008), we held that the evidence did not 
warrant a finding of reasonable provocation where the victim 
told the defendant, "I'll hurt you," and "the victim pushed [the 
defendant] hard enough to cause the defendant to strike his back 
against the refrigerator or some object and bruise him."  In 
Commonwealth v. Bianchi, 435 Mass. 316, 329 (2001), this court 
held that the victim arguing with the defendant and punching him 
in the face "was inadequate as a matter of law" where the victim 
was unarmed, the defendant had precipitated the confrontation in 
violation of a protective order, the defendant "outweighed the 
victim by more than 170 pounds," and the defendant "was armed 
with a fully loaded weapon."  We also determined that there was 
inadequate provocation where the defendant's wife "choked [the 
defendant] on the neck with [his] shirt."  Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 387 Mass. 220, 227 (1982).  In Felix, 476 Mass. at 758, 
we determined that there was inadequate provocation where the 
victim "'lunged at' and punched" the defendant. 
 
These cases counsel that "a victim's offensive use of 
physical force against a defendant will not necessarily 
39 
 
constitute 'adequate provocation,' particularly where the 
defendant responds with excessive force."  Vatcher, 438 Mass. at 
589.  We also have stated previously that where, as here, "there 
is no evidence that [the victim] initiated physical contact," 
the evidence "did not support a finding of sudden passion 
induced by reasonable provocation, sudden combat, or excessive 
use of force in self-defense."  Commonwealth v. Gulla, 476 Mass. 
743, 748 (2017).  Further, "[c]ourts are reluctant to find 
mitigation warranting an instruction on a lesser included 
offense when the defendant confronts the victim while armed with 
a deadly weapon."  Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 Mass. 418, 420, 
429-430 (2009) (no mitigation of armed assault with intent to 
murder where defendant and victim were part of melee involving 
"pushing and shoving, arguing, and yelling," victim was unarmed, 
and defendant shot victim with firearm at close range).  
Accordingly, where a single unarmed victim12 responds, albeit 
angrily, to an unprovoked threat of deadly force by a defendant, 
and where the victim pursues the defendant by walking quickly 
after him but makes no attempt to make physical contact with 
him, we have never held that such behavior could constitute 
 
12 The record evidence shows that the victim was visibly 
unarmed.  Where there is no evidence that the defendant 
suspected the victim to be armed and the defense does not argue 
such, it would be mere speculation for this court to consider 
that such a suspicion existed here. 
40 
 
"adequate provocation" to support a reasonable provocation 
instruction.  We decline to do so now. 
 
Here, the defendant initiated a confrontation with the 
victim by threatening deadly force.  In response, the victim 
never lunged at the defendant.  Cf. Felix, 476 Mass. at 758.  
The victim never "put his hand up to swing."  Cf. Bertrand, 385 
Mass. at 363, quoting Walden, 380 Mass. at 728.  The victim did 
not push the defendant.  Cf. Burgess, 450 Mass. at 438.  The 
victim did not punch the defendant in the face, nor even attempt 
to do so.  Cf. Bianchi, 435 Mass. at 329.  Although the victim 
had recently pushed two people to the ground in the midst of a 
chaotic melee between nearly a dozen people, the record provides 
no evidence that either person was injured at all, let alone 
seriously, and as discussed supra, because the pushing was not 
directed at and did not involve the defendant in any way, it 
could not provide the basis for reasonable provocation. 
 
Finally, the defendant reasonably could not have felt so 
trapped by the victim's pursuit nor have been in such fear of 
imminent danger as could have provided a basis for reasonable 
provocation where he walked back to his car and searched through 
it for at least several seconds while the victim engaged in no 
behavior that could serve as adequate provocation, such as an 
attempt to attack the defendant or otherwise make physical 
contact.  Cf. Glover, 459 Mass. at 842 ("victim's conduct that 
41 
 
caused the defendant to believe he was in imminent danger may be 
sufficient to support a theory of reasonable provocation" 
despite reasonable opportunity to retreat).  There is no view of 
the evidence under which the victim's conduct prior to the 
shooting would provide legally adequate provocation to warrant 
an instruction on reasonable provocation. 
 
Even if the victim's conduct might have provided legally 
adequate provocation, there was also no evidence here that the 
defendant was subjectively provoked, as is required to warrant a 
reasonable provocation instruction.  Bertrand, 385 Mass. at 363, 
quoting Walden, 380 Mass. at 728.  The defense points to no 
evidence in the record indicating the defendant's subjective 
provocation.  An independent review of the trial record shows 
that the defendant did not testify or otherwise affirmatively 
present evidence of his subjective provocation; no witness, 
including the witness standing next to and speaking with the 
defendant immediately before the fatal altercation began, 
offered any testimony addressing the defendant's subjective 
provocation.  We, therefore, conclude that no such evidence 
exists in the record before us. 
 
The evidence going to the defendant's state of mind showed 
that (1) the defendant took off his jacket and "instinctively" 
ran over to the scene of a melee that was then dispersing; (2) 
the defendant threatened the use of deadly force against the 
42 
 
victim, "gritting" and "putting his hands together"; (3) the 
defendant informed the victim that the tool of such deadly force 
was in the defendant's trunk; (4) the defendant walked 
"purposefully" back to the defendant's car, ignoring the 
victim's continuing taunts; (5) the defendant quickened his 
walking pace after the victim said he "better run"; (6) the 
defendant searched for and then retrieved a gun from the trunk 
of his car; (7) the defendant turned and taunted the victim with 
the gun, saying, "Yeah, you want this?  You want this?" and, 
finally, (8) the defendant shot the unarmed victim in the 
forehead from a distance of at least ten feet.  Even drawing all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the defendant, these actions 
"reflect[] a presence of mind that is inconsistent with the 
emotional state required under a theory of reasonable 
provocation."  Glover, 459 Mass. at 844.  Any conclusion to the 
contrary would require mere speculation.13  Thus, where, as here, 
there was no evidence of the defendant's subjective provocation, 
he was not entitled to a reasonable provocation instruction.  
Therefore, we must conclude that the determination that trial 
counsel's failure to pivot and waiver of a reasonable 
 
13 Instructions are not warranted where the evidence would 
require the jury "to speculate on whether the defendant in the 
course of the struggle might have been roused to the heat of 
passion."  Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 422, 439 (2008), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 728 (1980). 
43 
 
provocation instruction constituted constitutionally ineffective 
assistance of counsel was an abuse of discretion.14 
 
c.  Excessive force in self-defense.  "To receive an 
instruction on the excessive use of force in self-defense, 'the 
defendant must be entitled to act in self-defense . . . .'"15  
Commonwealth v. Anestal, 463 Mass. 655, 674 (2012), quoting 
Berry, 431 Mass. at 335.  See Commonwealth v. Espada, 450 Mass. 
687, 695 (2008), citing Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. 213, 
218 (2005).  As discussed supra, the defendant was not entitled 
to act in self-defense.  Therefore, because the defendant was 
not entitled to receive an instruction on self-defense, he 
likewise was not entitled to receive an instruction on the 
excessive use of force in self-defense. 
 
d.  Sudden combat.  "Sudden combat is 'a form of reasonable 
provocation.'"  Brea, 488 Mass. at 157, quoting Howard, 479 
Mass. at 58.  "It 'involves a sudden assault by the person 
killed . . . and the defendant upon each other.'"  Brea, supra, 
quoting Model Jury Instructions on Homicide, supra at 78.  
 
14 We acknowledge that our existing case law on this issue 
provided little guidance to the motion judge, who did an 
admirable job at the evidentiary hearing of preparing the issue 
for our review. 
 
15 We emphasize that an excessive force instruction is only 
warranted if the alleged excessive force occurred in self-
defense, not defense of another.  Commonwealth v. Medina, 430 
Mass. 800, 809-810 (2000). 
44 
 
Generally, "the combat was unplanned and the defendant was often 
the one subject to the first physical attacks that escalated 
into mutual violence."  Commonwealth v. Benson, 453 Mass. 90, 97 
(2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 321 
(2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1181 (2009).  "In cases where 
sudden combat is the claimed provocation, the victim generally 
must attack the defendant, or at least strike a blow against the 
defendant in order to warrant a manslaughter instruction."  
Lugo, 482 Mass. at 104-105. 
 
As discussed supra, the victim did not provide legally 
adequate provocation to raise the issue of heat of passion upon 
reasonable provocation.  Even viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the defendant, as we must, the victim never 
struck or made any physical contact with the defendant, nor 
attempted to make physical contact with the defendant, "[n]or is 
there evidence that the defendant objectively believed at the 
time of the shooting that the victim was armed with a firearm."  
Lugo, supra at 105.  Here, the defendant struck the first blow 
when he shot the unarmed victim in the forehead from a distance 
of at least ten feet.  Such a scene cannot reasonably be 
characterized as sudden combat.  Therefore, the defendant was 
45 
 
not entitled to a jury instruction on heat of passion upon 
sudden combat.16 
 
Conclusion.  Because, as a matter of law, the defendant was 
not entitled to an instruction on self-defense or voluntary 
manslaughter instructions based on excessive force in self-
defense, heat of passion upon reasonable provocation, or heat of 
passion upon sudden combat, any error committed by the 
defendant's trial counsel did not deprive the defendant of an 
available, substantial ground of defense.  Thus, the defendant's 
trial counsel did not provide constitutionally ineffective 
assistance, and it was an abuse of discretion to hold that she 
did.  The motion judge's allowance of the defendant's second 
motion for a new trial is reversed. 
 
The defendant's consolidated appeal from his convictions 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and from the denial of his 
first motion for a new trial is still pending before this court.  
The parties may submit new briefs on that appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
16 As with the defendant's claims of self-defense and 
reasonable provocation, any error relating to trial counsel's 
failure to pursue a defense of sudden combat cannot give rise to 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, because 
that defense is unavailable to the defendant as a matter of law.