Title: Com. v. Devers
Citation: 519 Pa. 88, 546 A.2d 12
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: July 27, 1988

519 Pa. 88 (1988) 546 A.2d 12 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Joseph Francis DEVERS, Appellee. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued May 9, 1988. Decided July 27, 1988. *89 Richard A. Lewis, Dist. Atty., Katherene E. Holtzinger, Yvonne A. Okonieski, Deputy Dist. Attys., William T. Tully, Harrisburg, for appellant. Marilyn C. Zilli, James R. Rosato, Frederick W. Ulrich, Asst. Public Defenders, for appellee. Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and STOUT, JJ. PAPADAKOS, Justice. In this review, we are afforded an opportunity to clarify the meaning of our landmark decision, Commonwealth v. *90 Riggins, 474 Pa. 115, 377 A.2d 140 (1977), and in so doing to clear away the tangled growth of legal misunderstandings which have sprung up around this case. That case firmly established the requirement that a sentencing court must disclose on the record the reasons for the imposition of a particular sentence. We are compelled now to put to rest misconceptions and borderline distinctions which have appeared in our legal literature on the specific issue of the sufficiency of the recorded statement required for sentencing. The Appellee, Joseph Francis Devers, was involved in a drug related murder and robbery which occurred on May 13, 1983. The victim, Charles Chiloro, Jr. ("Chiloro"), was selling drugs, cocaine and marijuana, at his parents' home in Harrisburg. At the time of the killing, Chiloro's parents were in Florida, but returning soon. Devers went to the house to purchase some cocaine. Thereafter, Chiloro's body was found by his girlfriend. The cause of death was strangulation resulting from an electrical cord as well as the loss of blood. There was a stab wound in Chiloro's back and multiple slash and stab wounds around his body. There was blood all over the house. Drug paraphernalia and marijuana were left in the home, but cocaine and some $11,075 in cash were taken. Prior to Devers' jury trial, he pled guilty to third degree murder and robbery, and there was no agreement about sentencing. On February 22, 1985, the trial court sentenced Appellee to ten (10) to twenty (20) years for third degree murder and five (5) to ten (10) years for robbery. Appellee complains that the sentencing judge erred by failing to explain in depth why he did not give greater consideration to mitigating circumstances on his behalf. Appellee relies upon Riggins to support his complaint. At the outset it must be noted that the efficacy of the verdicts is not questioned by the Appellee. Only the sentencing procedure has been placed at issue. Prior to Riggins, our common law on the subject of sentencing implied the need for some degree of recorded *91 explanation.[1] Over a half century ago, in Commonwealth v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 A. 733 (1932), we created the need in a death case for the court to "file a brief memorandum which will reveal the reasons for the sentence imposed." The principle of having a record was reaffirmed in subsequent cases. Commonwealth v. Phelps, 450 Pa. 597, 301 A.2d 678 (1973); Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959); Commonwealth v. Hawk, 328 Pa. 417, 196 A. 5 (1938); and Commonwealth v. Irelan, 341 Pa. 43, 17 A. 897 (1941). In Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 351 A.2d 650 (1976), a non-capital drug case decided one year before Riggins, we found grounds for remand where three judges had agreed on a sentence beforehand, had not requested a pre-sentence report, and had failed to take into account the enumerated balancing factors enunciated in the newly-enacted Sentencing Code, §§ 1321-26.[2] These holdings were derived from two general principles in our jurisprudence: individualized discretionary sentencing and, in Martin, the avoidance of excessive punishment. Under the 1974 Sentencing Code, a defendant could be sentenced alternatively to probation (§ 1322), guilt without further penalty (§ 1323), partial confinement (§ 1324), total confinement (§ 1325), or a fine (§ 1326). Each section included a list of enumerated factors to be "accorded weight" in the selection of that sentence. When these sections were replaced in 1980 by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a), which restated the five sentencing alternatives, and § 9721(b), which did away with the enumerated factors in favor of a scoring system, language was retained which still requires a statement on the record of the reasons for the sentence. The philosophy of indeterminate or individualized sentencing was explicitly recognized by the Pennsylvania Legislature *92 early in this century.[3] Courts are not permitted to mete out punishment based on the mere fact of the crime. On the contrary, sentencing must result both from a consideration of the nature and circumstances of the crime as well as the character of the defendant. The sentencer has broad discretion to choose a penalty from sentencing alternatives and the range of permissible confinements, provided the choices are consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Discretionary sentencing, in sum, means that a defendant cannot be punished on the basis of the crime alone. The central problem, of course, remains the definition of standards by which to determine whether a court has followed the process of weighing these factors. In the pre-Riggins line of cases above, it was not the practice to order pre-sentence reports, and on review, appellate courts then gleaned the entire record for evidence that the weighing process had taken place. In Martin, Mr. Justice Roberts (later Chief Justice) wrote for the majority that pre-sentence reports are of enormous value in providing the court with relevant defense information for consideration in sentencing, and called for changes to amend our rules: "We are therefore requesting that the Criminal Procedural Rules Committee prepare a recommendation for the Court amending Rule 1403 to require that, whenever a sentencing court fails to order a pre-sentence report in any of these situations, it shall place in the record its reasons for dispensing with such report." Id., 466 Pa. at 135, 351 A.2d 650. We note at this point that the present Pa.R.Crim.P. 1403 continues to provide that: In this fashion, under Martin, sentencing courts must inquire whether the sentence imposed was considered within the context of the defendant's character: In deciding upon a sentence, therefore, judges must possess sufficient and accurate information in order to formulate their judgment. Where Martin determined that a court must consider these factors, Riggins took the next step of requiring that the rationale employed by the sentencer must appear on the record.[4] Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Roberts grounded the new requirement on Pa.R.A.P. 1925: In addition, as already noted, the new Code enumerated specific factors to be used as "guidelines for the articulation of reasons for its sentencing decision. Absent a statement of reasons, the record will not reveal whether the legislatively mandated factors have been considered." Construed together, therefore, Martin and Riggins decided that courts are obligated to consider the defendant's *95 character before handing down a sentence, and that the judge has to articulate his reasons on the record. As suggested in Martin, a full pre-sentence report will help to rationalize the sentencing process. Subsequent interpretations of Riggins by this Court, largely under the authorship of Mr. Justice Roberts, quickly brought our law within the ambit of Martin-Riggins. In Commonwealth v. Kostka, 475 Pa. 85, 379 A.2d 884 (1977), a defendant complained successfully that the sentencing court sent him to prison without weighing the possibility of probation as required by the Sentencing Code despite defense counsel's specific references to code provisions which would not favor incarceration. There was no record that the "legislatively mandated factors have been considered." In Commonwealth v. Knight, 479 Pa. 209, 387 A.2d 1297 (1978), remand was unwarranted because a court-ordered pre-sentence report sufficiently articulated for the record the judge's consideration of mitigating factors. In Commonwealth v. Butch, 487 Pa. 30, 407 A.2d 1302 (1979), the case was remanded because the sentencer failed to give accorded weight on the record to the alternative of probation. By contrast, in Commonwealth v. Edrington, 490 Pa. 251, 416 A.2d 455 (1980), the sentence was upheld where a full pre-sentence report had been prepared, and the judge had articulated the basis of the punishment at the time of sentence. While these cases formed the present case law,[5] they offered little guidance as to the sufficiency of detail and particularity required to pass review. That task has fallen largely to the Superior Court. In Commonwealth v. Walton, 289 Pa.Superior Ct. 411, 433 A.2d 517 (1981), the per curiam opinion noted that, "Our Court is not of one mind, however, with respect to how technical our review of sentences should be." A survey of *96 that Court's decisions reveals two broad and divergent schools of thought on this issue with ambiguities even present within each school. Mandating specificity on the one hand is a series of opinions by Judge Spaeth interpreting Riggins generally beginning with Commonwealth v. Wicks, 265 Pa.Superior Ct. 305, 401 A.2d 1223 (1979), and Commonwealth v. Valentin, 259 Pa.Superior Ct. 496, 393 A.2d 935 (1978). Although the latter case acknowledged that a full pre-sentence report satisfied Riggins, in Wicks Judge Spaeth insisted on a more elaborate demonstration of the weighing process: Wicks went on to hold that: Three years later, Judge Spaeth dissented sharply in Commonwealth v. Rooney, 296 Pa.Superior Ct. 288, 442 A.2d 773 (1982), which determined that the court below had established a sufficiency of recorded explanation of the reasons for the penalty. There he called for what has become known as a "dual responsibility" procedure. First, the sentencing judge must satisfy a "fact-finding" responsibility by which sufficient information is gathered to determine the circumstances of the offense and character of the defendant. The second responsibility involves "application-and-explanation," the means by which the information is applied to statutory requirements. Five months later, and now in the majority, the "dual responsibility" analysis was repeated: Commonwealth v. Edwards, 303 Pa.Superior Ct. 454, 450 A.2d 15 (1982).[6] Other decisions further reinforced the argument that Riggins required legal fastidiousness on the record. The sentencing judge must state "the thought processes by which he arrives at a particular sentence." Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 282 Pa.Superior Ct. 193, 422 A.2d 894 (1980). On another occasion, the Superior Court went so far as to shift the burden of proof to the court as against a psychologist's report: Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa.Superior Ct. 304, 473 A.2d 1103 (1984). In Commonwealth v. Cruz, 291 Pa.Superior Ct. 486, 436 A.2d 220 (1981), the Court held: Emphasis on detailed explanations, according to this approach, must take precedence even where the sentencing *99 court has indicated that it has looked at the defendant's background: Commonwealth v. McDonald, 322 Pa.Superior Ct. 110, 469 A.2d 206 (1983). Also see, Commonwealth v. Bryner, 285 Pa.Superior Ct. 305, 427 A.2d 236 (1981). Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Fisher, 261 Pa.Superior Ct. 82, 395 A.2d 953 (1978), it was held: *100 Identical conclusions were reached in Commonwealth v. Mahan, 271 Pa.Superior Ct. 396, 413 A.2d 725 (1979), and Commonwealth v. Fornataro, 257 Pa.Superior Ct. 399, 390 A.2d 1297 (1978). This sampling of cases amply demonstrates an interpretation of Riggins as requiring a detailed, highly technical statement which must appear on the record, and we take special note of that portion of the argument which holds that the mere existence of a pre-sentence report alone cannot fulfill the requirements of Riggins where elaboration does not occur in the sentencing process. Contrasting holdings of the Superior Court, however, have rejected this line of reasoning. In Commonwealth v. Walton, for example, the per curiam opinion held: Also see, Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 282 Pa.Superior Ct. 286, 422 A.2d 1119 (1980), which concluded that "a statement of reasons should not be held insufficient when it is apparent that the court considered and applied the Code even though it made no explicit reference to those guidelines." Finally, we point to the concurring opinion of Judge Price in Commonwealth v. Doyle, 275 Pa.Superior Ct. 373, 418 A.2d 1336, 1345-1346 (1979): Nor do we agree with Wicks or its progeny cited above. Judge Price was correct, for the technical punctiliousness of those cases erected a cathedral of philosophical speculation far beyond what we ever intended in Riggins. Today, of course, ordering of pre-sentence reports is the practice everywhere. We are indebted to Martin-Riggins for teaching the judiciary that a convicted defendant cannot be sentenced on the basis of the crime alone and that a full pre-sentence report informs the sentencing procedure. We emphatically reject, therefore, interpretations of our law in this area which call for separate, written opinions embodying exegetical thought. Where pre-sentence reports exist, we shall continue to presume that the sentencing *102 judge was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant's character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. A pre-sentence report constitutes the record and speaks for itself. In order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our intention of engaging in an effort of legal purification, we state clearly that sentencers are under no compulsion to employ checklists or any extended or systematic definitions of their punishment procedure. Having been fully informed by the pre-sentence report, the sentencing court's discretion should not be disturbed. This is particularly true, we repeat, in those circumstances where it can be demonstrated that the judge had any degree of awareness of the sentencing considerations, and there we will presume also that the weighing process took place in a meaningful fashion. It would be foolish, indeed, to take the position that if a court is in possession of the facts, it will fail to apply them to the case at hand. For that reason, Wicks and its voluminous progeny represent an intolerable deviation from our original intent on this issue. In the instant case under our review, the Superior Court remanded the case for resentencing because "the trial court appears to have fulfilled the fact-finding responsibility but not the explanation responsibility. The trial court did order and review a pre-sentence report. It also reviewed numerous letters dealing with Appellant's character.... The problem is not that the court had insufficient information before it. Rather, the court failed to make a meaningful explanation of which facts it considered to be significant and what weight it allotted to these factors." (p. 13). In support of this per curiam argument,[7] the Superior Court cites Wicks, Holler and Cruz, the very cases which we have criticized herein. We criticize them again, for we fail utterly to see how, based on the Superior Court's own statement of the case above, it is at all rational to believe that the sentencing *103 judge could not have been so informed as to have arrived at a balanced judgment in imposing judgment. As we recall the words of Judge Price quoted above, we vacate the order of the Superior Court and reinstate the sentence. ZAPPALA, J., concurs in the result. [1] Compare the dissent of then Justice, now Chief Justice, Nix in Commonwealth v. Kostka, 475 Pa. 85, 379 A.2d 884 (1977), that before Riggins, supra, there was no such requirement in our law. [2] Act of December 30, 1974, P.L. 1052, No. 345, as amended, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1301, et seq., (Supp.1977), now codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9701 et seq. (1980). [3] The Act of June 19, 1911, P.L. 1055, § 6, as amended, 19 P.S. § 1057 (1964). [4] The numerous familiar benefits to the administration of justice which accrue from this procedure are detailed in Riggins, and it is not necessary to repeat them here. Also see, Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974); and Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 297 A.2d 127 (1972). [5] Mr. Justice Nix, now Chief Justice, dissented vigorously in Martin and Kostka, supra. Generally speaking, these dissents take the position that appellate courts should stay their hand in deference to the lower court. In particular cases, Mr. Justice Nix argued that the crimes speak for themselves and that the records, even in the absence of pre-sentence reports, demonstrate ample evidence of judges weighing all information in the exercise of discretion. [6] Rooney was filed on March 5, 1982, and Judge Spaeth was in dissent. Edwards was filed on August 20, 1982, and Judge Spaeth wrote for a unanimous panel. The shifting sands of the law on this subject are demonstrated vividly by this comparison. [7] Judge Tamilia dissented.