Title: State v. Baker-Krofft
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S057958
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: August 19, 2010

FILED: August 19, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
NANCY BAKER-KROFFT,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 06C53978; CA
A135939; SC S057958 (Control))
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
TIMOTHY LEE MCCANTS,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 06C44334; CA A134846
(Control); SC S058148)
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
CYNTHIA GENEVA WALKER,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC
06C45185; CA A134848)
En Banc
On review from the Court of
Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 19, 2010, at Ashland
High School, Ashland, Oregon.
Erica Herb, Deputy Public Defender, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review Baker-Krofft. 
With her on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public
Defense Services.
Ryan T. O'Connor, Deputy Public Defender, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioners on review McCants and
Walker.  With him on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of
Public Defense Services.
Inge D. Wells, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review
State of Oregon.  With her on the briefs were John R. Kroger, Attorney General,
and Jerome Lidz, Solicitor General.
KISTLER, J.
In State v. Baker-Krofft, S057958, the decision of
the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are reversed.
In State v. McCants/Walker, S058148, the decision of
the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are reversed. 
*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Thomas
M. Hart, Judge. State v. Baker-Krofft, 230 Or App 517, 216 P3d 335 (2009).
Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Albin
W. Norblad, III, Judge. State v. McCants/Walker, 231 Or App 570, 220 P3d 436 (2009).
KISTLER, J.
The question in
these two cases is what constitutes "withhold[ing] necessary and adequate
* * * physical care" within the meaning of ORS 163.205 and ORS 163.200,
two statutes that prohibit first- and second-degree criminal mistreatment.  In
both cases, defendants had children under their care who were well fed and
healthy but who lived in homes with potential safety hazards.  Following its
precedent, the Court of Appeals held that creating or failing to correct
potential safety hazards in the home constitutes "withhold[ing] * * *
physical care" within the meaning of ORS 163.200 and ORS 163.205.  State
v. Baker-Krofft, 230 Or App 517, 523-24, 216 P3d 335 (2009); State v.
McCants/Walker, 231 Or App 570, 584, 220 P3d 436 (2009).  We allowed defendants'
petitions for review and now reverse the Court of Appeals decisions.
We summarize the
facts briefly to put the legal issue in context.(1) 
In both cases, defendants were arrested and indicted for "withhold[ing]
necessary and adequate physical care" from their dependent children.  In
both cases, defendants' children, who ranged in age from five and one-half months to 11 years old,
appeared healthy and well fed.  Defendants were arrested "based solely on
the condition of the home."  Baker-Krofft, 230 Or App at 520; accord
McCants/Walker, 231 Or App at 572.  The conditions in both homes were
similar.  Both homes were unusually full of clutter in a way that posed
potential safety hazards.  In Baker-Krofft, the house posed specific
fire hazards (such as a space heater sitting on a pile of straw in a chicken
coop in the backyard), did not contain working fire alarms, and was so full of
clutter that it would have been difficult to escape from any fire.  230 Or App at
520, 524.  In McCants/Walker, the home was filled with debris, which
included some small items on the floor that posed a potential choking hazard to
the young children who lived in the home.  231 Or App at 573.
In each case,
defendants moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence, the
trial court denied the motion, and the trier of fact found that defendants had
"with[eld] necessary and adequate physical care" from their children.(2)  Defendants appealed
from the resulting judgments of conviction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
In both cases, the Court of Appeals relied on its precedent for the proposition
that "physical care" under ORS 163.200 and ORS 163.205
"'necessarily includes attention to dangers in the body's
environment.'"  Baker-Krofft, 230 Or App at 523 (quoting State
v. Damofle/Quintana, 89 Or App 620, 624, 750 P2d 518 (1988)); accord
McCants/Walker, 231 Or App at 580.  In Baker-Krofft, the Court of
Appeals held that the "present risk of fire in the home" -- the piles
of flammable material that presented a heavy fuel load and the space heater
placed on top of straw in a chicken coop in the backyard as well as the lack of
smoke alarms -- was "sufficient for the jury to find that defendant failed
to give sufficient attention to her son's bodily safety and well-being." 
230 Or App at 523-24.  In McCants/Walker, the court noted the growing
number of cases involving ORS 163.200 and ORS 163.205 and set out several
factors to be used in "the assessment of the legal sufficiency of asserted
'dangers in the body's environment.'"  231 Or App at 581-83.  After
considering those factors, the court held that "[t]he trier of fact could
reasonably infer that there were multiple choking hazards easily accessible to
children for an extended period of time and that defendants, notwithstanding their
awareness of the attendant risk, had done little, if anything, to rectify that
condition."  Id. at 584.
We allowed
defendants' petitions for review to consider whether creating or failing to
correct a safety hazard constitutes "withhold[ing] necessary and adequate
* * * physical care" within the meaning of ORS 163.200 and ORS 163.205. 
We begin with the wording of those statutes.  ORS 163.200(1) provides, in part:
"A person commits the crime of criminal
mistreatment in the second degree if, with criminal negligence and:
"(a) In violation of a legal duty to
provide care for another person, the person withholds necessary and adequate
food, physical care or medical attention from that person * * *."
ORS 163.205(1) provides, in part:
"A person commits the crime of criminal
mistreatment in the first degree if:
"(a) The person, in violation of a legal
duty to provide care for another person, or having assumed the permanent or
temporary care, custody or responsibility for the supervision of another
person, intentionally or knowingly withholds necessary and adequate food,
physical care or medical attention from that other person * * *."
The state must prove three elements to
establish a violation of those statutes:  (1) the defendant acted with the
requisite mental state; (2) the defendant had a duty to provide care for a
person; and (3) the defendant "withh[eld] necessary and adequate food,
physical care or medical attention" from that person.(3)
The issue that these
cases pose is narrow.  Defendants do not argue that there was insufficient
evidence to find that they either owed a duty to provide care for their
children or that they lacked the requisite mental state.  Nor were defendants
charged with withholding food or medical attention.  Rather, defendants were charged
with withholding "necessary and adequate physical care" from their
children and can be convicted only of that charge.  See State v. Schoen,
348 Or 207, 213 n 2, 228 P3d 1207 (2010) (noting that a defendant who is
charged with "tamper[ing]" with property cannot be found guilty of
"interfering" with property, when those words provided alternative
definitions of the same criminal act).  The question in these cases accordingly
reduces to whether creating or failing to correct potential fire and choking hazards
constitutes "withhold[ing] necessary and adequate * * * physical
care" within the meaning of ORS 163.200 and ORS 163.205.
On that point,
defendants argue that "necessary and adequate * * * physical care"
means "attention that is applied to the body and is sufficient to satisfy
the dependent's essential bodily needs."  Defendants reason that the
prohibition against withholding "physical care" does not include a
prohibition against creating or failing to correct "potential dangers in
the dependent's environment."  The state, on the other hand, interprets
the statutory prohibition more broadly.  It contends that "[t]he plain
meaning of 'withholding necessary and adequate physical care' is to fail to
meet the essential needs of a dependent person * * * with respect to bodily
safety and well-being."  The state reasons that potential environmental
dangers are covered by the statutes because "[k]eeping a child safe
necessarily includes protecting him from dangers in his environment."
In analyzing the parties'
arguments, we begin with the statutory text.  The operative text of both
statutes makes it a crime to "withhol[d] necessary and adequate * * *
physical care."  Because the legislature has not defined those terms, we
look to the dictionary to determine their ordinary meaning.  See State v.
Briney, 345 Or 505, 511, 200 P3d 550 (2008).  We begin with the phrase
"physical care."  In this context, to provide "care" means
to "provide for or attend to needs or perform necessary personal services
(as for a patient or a child)."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary
338 (unabridged ed 2002).(4) 
The word "physical" modifies "care."  "Physical"
means "of, or relating to the body."  Id. at 1706.  Reading
those two definitions together, we conclude that providing "physical
care" means providing for or attending to another person's bodily needs.
Another statutory
term is relevant.  ORS 163.200 and ORS 163.205 impose liability only when a
person with a duty to provide care "withholds" necessary and adequate
physical care "from th[e] person" to whom the duty is owed. 
"Withhold" means:
"to desist or refrain from granting, giving, or
allowing : keep in one's possession or control : keep back
 &lt; ~ permission&gt;."
Webster's at
2627.  As the text of the statutes makes clear, the statutes apply only if the
person with the duty to provide care withholds or keeps back food, physical
care, or medical attention "from th[e dependent] person"; that is,
the statutes rest on the premise that the actor keeps back something (food,
physical care, or medical attention) from a person who would not otherwise be
able to obtain it for him or herself.
Reading those definitions
together, we conclude that a defendant withholds physical care from a dependent
person when the defendant keeps back from the dependent person those physical
services and attention that are necessary to provide for the dependent person's
bodily needs.  As noted, the state argues that the statutes reach a broader
range of conduct.  It notes that one definition of "care" is
"responsibility for or attention to safety and well being ."  Webster's at 338.   Focusing on the use of the word
"safety" in that definition, the state reasons that "[k]eeping a
child safe necessarily includes protecting him from dangers in his
environment."  It follows, the state concludes, that creating or failing
to correct any and all dangers to the child's safety comes within the
prohibition against withholding necessary and adequate physical care.
The state's
interpretation is difficult to square with the statutes' texts in three
respects.  First, it converts the verb "withhold" into
"create" or "fail to correct."  Second, it converts a
prohibition against withholding specific services (food, physical care, and
medical attention) into a prohibition against creating any and all risks to a
dependent person's health.  Third, it converts a statute that prohibits a
present deprivation of services or attention into one that prohibits creating a
risk of future harm.  To be sure, presently withholding necessary and adequate
physical care can impair a child's health and safety.  But it does not follow
that every risk of future harm to a child's health or safety that a parent
either creates or fails to correct constitutes withholding physical care.  The former
set of risks is far broader than the latter, but the statutory prohibition
extends only to the latter set (or subset) of risks.
Two contextual clues
reinforce that conclusion.  ORS 163.200 and ORS 163.205 prohibit withholding
necessary and adequate "food" and "medical attention," as
well as physical care.  Both food and medical attention are essential to
maintain bodily health.  Grouping physical care together with food and medical
attention suggests that the legislature understood that physical care was
similarly limited to those essential physical services and attention that are
necessary to provide for a dependent person's bodily needs.  Cf. White v.
State Ind. Acc. Com., 227 Or 306, 317, 362 P2d 302 (1961) (under the
doctrine of noscitur a sociis, "general words, found in a statute,
may take the color and meaning of words of specific connotation").
Additionally, when
the legislature enacted ORS 163.200 and ORS 163.205 in 1973, it did so against
a backdrop of civil statutes that authorized juvenile courts to take
jurisdiction over children "[w]hose * * * condition or circumstances are
such as to endanger [their] own welfare" and make them wards of the
court.  ORS 419.476(1)(c) (1971); see Stevens v. Czerniak, 336 Or
392, 401, 84 P3d 140 (2004) (context includes "'the preexisting common law
and the statutory framework within which the law was enacted'") (quoting Denton
and Denton, 326 Or 236, 241, 951 P2d 693 (1998)).  In enacting those civil
statutes, the legislature sought to protect a child's safety while working to
reunite and reintegrate the child, if possible, into the parents' home.  See,
e.g., ORS 418.485 (1971) (declaring the policy of the state "to
strengthen family life and to insure the protection of all children either in
their own homes or in other appropriate care"); ORS 419.523(2) (1973)
(providing for termination of parental rights only when the "integration
of the child into the home of the parent or parents is improbable in the
foreseeable future due to conduct or conditions not likely to change").
Under those statutes,
if parents either created unsafe conditions in the home or failed to correct
those conditions, as defendants did here, the juvenile court could take
jurisdiction over the children to protect their safety while the Children's
Services Division, as the agency was then known, worked with the parents to
correct those conditions so that the family could be reunited.  The state's
position -- that the legislature also intended to criminalize all conduct that
endangers a child's safety -- does not readily square with the policy expressed
in those civil statutes.
We recognize that
those civil and criminal statutes may overlap in some circumstances.  For
example, if a parent intentionally withheld necessary and adequate food from
his child, that conduct could give rise both to juvenile court jurisdiction and
also to criminal liability.  As our discussion of the text demonstrates,
however, we do not think that the legislature intended that the phrase
"withhold[ing] necessary and adequate * * * physical care" would
sweep within it all the safety risks within a home that can give rise to
juvenile court jurisdiction.  Rather, it left the sort of risks at issue in
these cases to the civil law, with its salutary focus on protecting the child
while working to reunite the family.
We also look to
legislative history to confirm the text and context.  See State v. Gaines,
346 Or 160, 172, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (looking to
legislative history to confirm text).  As originally proposed in 1973, Senate
Bill (SB) 780 made anyone who "cruelly mistreats or maltreats any person
over the age of 65 years" guilty of a misdemeanor.  Bill File, Special
Committee on Aging, SB 780 (1973).  Senator Fadeley introduced the bill in
response to reports of nursing home abuse and to protect the residents of those
facilities.  Minutes, Special Committee on Aging, April 9, 1973, 1.  Commenting
on the bill as originally proposed, he explained that the "bill doesn't go
as far as the child neglect bill [enacted in 1971 did]."  Tape Recording,
Special Committee on Aging, SB 780, April 9, 1973, Tape 4, Side 2 (statement of
Senator Edward Fadeley).  He distinguished SB 780 from the child neglect laws,
which he described as making it a crime to leave a child
"unattended at any place where it may be likely to
endanger [the child's] welfare.  We weren't going to that.  We were talking
about some action or nonaction * * * that resulted in cruel deprivation or the
undue threat of fear."
Id.  As Senator Fadeley explained, SB 780 was
intended to focus more narrowly on withholding food and other necessities from
seniors.  Id.
The
bill, as drafted, raised vagueness concerns, and Senators Fadeley and Carson
undertook to redraft the bill.  Their work produced a bill that is
substantially in the same form as the wording in the current statutes.  As
redrafted, the bill applied to dependent persons generally while specifying
more particularly the actions that the bill prohibited -- withholding necessary
and adequate food, physical care, and medical attention.  The Senate committee
considered the bill at its next two hearings.  No tape recording of those
hearings exists, and the minutes of those hearings do not provide any guidance
on the meaning of the redrafted bill.  The only explanation of the redrafted
bill comes from Senator Carson's discussion of the bill before the full Senate.
Before
the full Senate, Senator Carson began by referring to the testimony presented
before the committee about the abuse of the elderly that had taken place in
assisted living facilities.  Tape Recording, Senate Floor, SB 780, June 29,
1973, Tape 32, Side 1 (statement of Senator Wallace P. Carson).  He then
stated:
"[The bill is] a little different than the
bill that was originally introduced, but I believe it goes to the same point.  We
[heard] considerable testimony in committee [about] some of the practices in
some of the homes for the aged, or, in fact, where any citizen of Oregon may be
housed.  Sometimes people can hurt other people by intentionally or negligently
withholding adequate food, physical care or medical attention from the people
when they have an affirmative duty to provide that attention. We felt that the
criminal code, if it's a physical abuse thing where somebody actually hits
someone, the criminal code takes care of that [already].
"Where it's nonfeasance rather than
malfeasance, in other words, where it's withholding of some food or some other
thing, the criminal code perhaps did not speak directly to that.  * * * The
only difference [between first- and second-degree criminal mistreatment] being
that the second degree is, is a misdemeanor, a Class A misdemeanor that relates
to negligently or unintentionally withholding the services from this
individual and the more serious crime of criminal mistreatment in the first
degree is where one who has an affirmative duty to provide the food, or the
physical care or medical attention intentionally withholds that service."
Id. (emphasis added).  Immediately after Senator
Carson's statement, the Senate voted to pass the bill.  The House also passed
the bill, and the Governor signed it into law.
We
note two observations regarding the legislative history.  First, Senator Carson
explained that persons who have an affirmative duty to provide food, physical
care, or medical attention violate the statutes when, with the requisite mental
state, they "withhol[d] that service."  (Emphasis added.) 
Senator Carson's explanation that the statutes prohibit withholding specific
services is at odds with the state's position that the statutes criminalize any
and all acts that create or fail to correct a future safety risk.  The second
point is related to the first.  Nowhere in the available legislative history
does anyone mention creating or failing to correct environmental dangers as the
focus of the bill.  Rather, the examples mentioned before either the committee
or the Senate involved the failure to provide essentials, such as food, from
dependent persons.  We find nothing in the legislative history to support the
broad reading that the state urges.  Rather, the legislative history is
consistent with the narrower view of the statutes that we draw from their text
and context.
Considering
the text and context of ORS 163.200 and ORS 163.205 in light of their legislative
history, we hold that a person withholds necessary and adequate physical care
from a dependent person when the person keeps back from the dependent person those physical services and attention that are necessary
to provide for the dependent person's bodily needs.(5)  In this case, the
question is whether creating or failing to correct safety hazards in the home
constitutes withholding adequate and necessary physical care, and we turn to
the facts of the two cases.  
In Baker-Krofft, the evidence taken in the light most
favorable to the state showed that some electrical devices and a space
heater positioned on a stack of straw in a chicken coop in the backyard posed
potential fire hazards, that there were no fire alarms in the house, and that
the house was full of clutter that would impede an escape.(6)  On the
other hand, it was uncontested that the child was in good health and that the
fire dangers posed only a risk of future harm.  Put differently, there was no
evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that the defendant
in Baker-Krofft had withheld from her child some physical service
necessary to provide for the child's bodily needs, nor was there any evidence
that defendant failed to protect her child from an immediate harm.
In McCants/Walker, the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the
state showed an incredibly dirty home with small pieces of plastic that posed
potential choking hazards within reach of the children.  However, the children
were well fed and healthy.  No evidence permitted a reasonable inference that
defendants had failed to provide for their children's bodily needs or protect
them from an immediate harm.
This
is not to say that defendants in either case were exemplary parents.  It may
well be that, in light of the conditions of defendants' homes and the attendant
risks to their children's safety, the juvenile court could have taken
jurisdiction over the children to protect them while the Department of Human
Services (the successor to the Children's Services Division) worked with
defendants to correct the unsafe conditions in their homes.  Those conditions,
however, were not sufficient to give rise to criminal liability under either
ORS 163.200 or ORS 163.205.
In State v. Baker-Krofft, S057958, the decision of the Court of
Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are reversed.
In State v. McCants/Walker, S058148, the decision of the Court of Appeals
and the judgment of the circuit court are reversed.
1. Because
these cases arise from defendants' motions for judgments of acquittal, we state
the facts in the light most favorable to the state.  State v. Casey, 346
Or 54, 56, 203 P3d 202 (2009).  The facts are set out more fully in the Court
of Appeals decisions.
2. In
Baker-Krofft, defendant was convicted of violating ORS 163.200.  In McCants/Walker,
defendants were convicted of violating ORS 163.205.
3. The
criminal mistreatment statutes differ in two respects, neither of which bears
on the issue on review.  The second-degree criminal mistreatment statute
requires proof of criminal negligence and applies only to persons who have a
legal duty to provide care for another.  ORS 163.200(1).  The first-degree
statute, by contrast, requires proof that the defendant acted knowingly or
intentionally, and it applies not only to persons who have a legal duty to
provide care for another but also to persons who "hav[e] assumed the
permanent or temporary care, custody or responsibility for the supervision of
another person."  ORS 163.205(1)(a).
4. Care
is both a noun and a verb.  See Webster's at 338 (defining both forms of
the word).  Care, used as a noun, means "CHARGE, 
SUPERVISION, MANAGEMENT: responsibility for or attention to
safety and well being ."  Id.  Care, used
as verb, means "to give care" or to "provide for or attend to
needs or perform necessary personal services (as for a patient or a
child)."  Id.  The former definition focuses on the relationship
between the caregiver and the recipient, while the latter focuses on the nature
of the care that is given or, in these statutes, withheld.  Because the latter
definition comes closer to the way in which the legislature used the word, we
quote that definition in text.
5. The
services necessary to maintain a dependent person's bodily health will vary
depending on the person's needs.  They may include, for example, periodically
turning a bedridden person who is unable to move on her own so that she does
not develop bed sores or maintaining a child or elderly person's personal
hygiene so that the person does not develop infections or some other illness. 
This case does not require us to explore all the types of physical care that
might be required.  Rather, the question in this case is limited to whether the
prohibition against withholding physical care includes creating or failing to
correct a safety hazard in the home.
6. At
trial, there was testimony that the child had head lice at some point and that
the house and the child's bedding were filthy.  However, because the state
concedes in its brief that "those conditions, by themselves, are
insufficient to support a conviction," we do not consider them.