Title: People v. Linder
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 83145, 84014
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: February 19, 1999

People v. Linder &amp; Rice (Ill. S.Ct.) 

Docket Nos. 83415, 84014 
cons.-Agenda 5-September 1998.
Opinion filed February 19, 
1999.
JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the 
court:
The issue in these two consolidated appeals is 
whether a defendant who pleads guilty in exchange for a cap on the length of his 
sentence may challenge a sentence that is imposed within the range of the cap 
without first moving to withdraw his guilty plea. We hold that he may 
not.
In People v. Linder, James Linder was 
charged with three counts of armed robbery, one count of aggravated vehicular 
hijacking, and one count of armed violence. Linder pleaded guilty to one count 
of armed robbery and one count of aggravated vehicular hijacking after the state 
agreed to dismiss the other charges and indicated that it would not seek a 
sentence in excess of 15 years' imprisonment. The circuit court of Lake County 
accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Linder to 11 years on each of the two 
counts, with the sentences to run concurrently.
Although the sentence was within the agreed upon 
range, Linder filed a motion under Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 
604(d)) asking that the sentence be reconsidered. That motion was denied. Linder 
subsequently appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing 
because his attorney failed to file the certificate required by Rule 604(d) 
prior to the hearing on his motion to reconsider.
Under Rule 604(d), defense counsel must certify 
that he or she has reviewed the proceedings, consulted with the defendant, and 
made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any 
defects in the plea or sentencing proceedings. Requiring such a certificate 
enables the trial court to insure that counsel has reviewed the defendant's 
claim and considered all relevant bases for the motion to withdraw the guilty 
plea or to reconsider the sentence. The rule must be strictly adhered to. 
People v. Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d 359, 371 (1998). Where counsel has not 
satisfied the rule's certification requirement, a trial court's denial of a 
defendant's motion to reconsider must be reversed and the cause must be remanded 
to the trial court to permit the filing of a new motion to reconsider and a new 
hearing on that motion. People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27, 35-36 
(1994).
Although the requisite certificate was not filed 
by Linder's trial counsel, the State argued that the absence of the certificate 
was irrelevant. According to the State, Linder would not be entitled to relief 
on appeal even if such a certificate had been filed because he never moved to 
withdraw his guilty plea and to vacate the judgment as required by this court's 
decision in People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996).
The appellate court rejected the State's 
argument. It held Evans inapplicable because here, unlike 
Evans, the trial court retained some discretion in fixing the ultimate 
sentence. The plea agreement merely set a cap. The precise duration of the 
sentence was left to the judge. Under these circumstances, the appellate court 
believed that Linder was required only to move to reconsider his sentence, as he 
had done, in order to secure appellate review. He was not obliged to also file a 
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and vacate the judgment. Because Linder 
had moved for reconsideration of his sentence and because his attorney had not 
filed a Rule 604(d) certificate prior to the hearing on the motion to 
reconsider, the appellate court reversed the circuit court's judgment denying 
Linder's motion for reconsideration of his sentence and remanded the cause for 
the filing of a new motion in compliance with Rule 604(d). No. 2-96-0898 
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
In People v. Rice, Leroy Rice was 
charged with 11 counts of burglary. Rice agreed to plead guilty to four of the 
counts in exchange for the State's dismissing the other counts and recommending 
a maximum sentence of six years' imprisonment. The circuit court of Lake County 
accepted the plea and sentenced Rice to five years on each of the four counts, 
with the sentences to run concurrently. Rice then filed a motion to reconsider 
his sentence, which the trial court denied.
The appellate court subsequently affirmed, 
rejecting an argument by Rice that the certificate filed by his trial attorney 
in support of the motion to reconsider did not comport with the requirements of 
Rule 604(d). People v. Rice, 283 Ill. App. 3d 626 (1996). Rice then 
filed a petition for leave to appeal to this court. Although we denied that 
petition, we recognized that Rice's attorney had only moved to reconsider the 
sentence. As with the attorney in Linder, he had not filed a motion to 
withdraw his client's plea of guilty and to vacate the judgment. Accordingly, we 
issued a supervisory order remanding the cause to the appellate court for 
further consideration in light of Evans.
In its second Rice opinion, the 
appellate court reached a different conclusion than the panel had in 
Linder. It held that Evans does apply when the plea agreement 
calls for the State to recommend a sentencing cap and the defendant receives a 
sentence within the range recommended by the State. In order to challenge the 
sentence and obtain appellate review, the court concluded, the defendant cannot 
simply move for reconsideration of the sentence. He must file a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment. 291 Ill. App. 3d 9, 
12.
Although the appellate court construed 
Evans as applying to negotiated pleas involving sentencing caps, it 
held that application of the Evans rule to bar Rice's claims would be 
unfair where, as here, the proceedings to challenge the sentence were initiated 
well before Evans was announced. Accordingly, the court reversed the 
trial court's judgment and remanded the cause to allow Rice to initiate new 
proceedings in accordance with Evans if he so desired. 291 Ill. App. 3d 
at 12.
The State petitioned for leave to appeal from 
the appellate court's decisions in both Linder and Rice. We 
allowed the State's petitions (166 Ill. 2d R. 315; 134 Ill. 2d R. 612(b)) and 
consolidated the two cases for argument and decision.
Resolution of both appeals turns on the first 
sentence of Rule 604(d). It provides:
Linder and Rice contend that because they are 
challenging only the sentences they received, the rule requires only that they 
move to reconsider the sentences. They assert that moving to withdraw their 
guilty pleas and to vacate the circuit court's judgments is not a prerequisite 
to preserving their right to appeal. We disagree.
In People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 
(1996) our court held that the motion-to-reconsider-sentence clause of Rule 
604(d) applies only to open, as opposed to negotiated, guilty pleas. When a 
defendant pleads guilty to certain charges in exchange for the State's agreement 
to dismiss other charges and recommend a specific sentence, the defendant may 
not seek reconsideration of that sentence after it has been imposed unless he 
also moves to withdraw his guilty plea. As we wrote in 
Evans,
We reached this conclusion by reasoning that if 
a defendant pleads guilty to certain charges in exchange for an agreement by the 
State to dismiss other charges and recommend a specific sentence, allowing the 
defendant to subsequently challenge only his sentence violates basic contract 
law principles. In effect, the defendant would be attempting to hold the State 
to its part of the bargain while unilaterally reneging on or modifying the terms 
he had previously agreed to accept. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 
327.
The rule announced in Evans was 
subsequently applied by this court in People v. Clark, 183 Ill. 2d 261 
(1998). In Clark the defendant pleaded guilty in exchange for the 
State's agreement to recommend a particular sentence. There was an issue, 
however, as to whether that sentence would be served consecutively to or 
concurrently with sentences imposed by another state. The State and the 
defendant agreed to have the issue resolved by the trial court.
The circuit court accepted the parties' plea 
agreement, then set a hearing on the question of whether the Illinois sentence 
should be served concurrently or consecutively. Following that hearing, the 
court ruled that the sentence had to be served consecutively to the other 
state's sentences. Defendant then filed a motion to reconsider his sentence. He 
did not seek to have his guilty plea set aside. He merely argued that making the 
sentence consecutive was not required by law and was too severe under the 
circumstances.
The circuit court denied defendant's motion, and 
he appealed. When the appeal reached us for a decision on the merits, we held 
that "a plea agreement that leaves open only the applicability of a mandatory 
sentencing statute constitutes a negotiated plea agreement, as contemplated in 
Evans." Clark, 183 Ill. 2d  at 262. Accordingly, we concluded 
that the defendant, who wanted to challenge the sentence imposed by the court, 
could not merely move to have the sentence reconsidered. Under 
Evans,
We believe that the reasoning employed by this 
court in Evans and followed in Clark applies with equal force 
where, as here, the defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for the State's 
dismissal of certain charges and recommendation of a cap on his sentence. By 
agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for a recommended sentencing cap, a 
defendant is, in effect, agreeing not to challenge any sentence imposed below 
that cap on the grounds that it is excessive. See People v. Catron, 285 
Ill. App. 3d 36, 37 (1996) (defendant who agrees to a potential range of 
sentences implicitly concedes that a sentence imposed within the range cannot be 
excessive). While the defendant may not like the sentencing court's ultimate 
disposition, that is a risk he assumes as part of his bargain. A defendant who 
is unwilling to accept that risk should not agree to a cap rather than a fixed 
term. Where the sentence imposed is within the agreed upon cap, as the sentences 
here were, allowing the defendant to seek reconsideration of his sentence 
without also moving to withdraw his guilty plea unfairly binds the State to the 
terms of the plea agreement while giving the defendant the opportunity to avoid 
or modify those terms. That is precisely the situation the Evans rule 
was designed to prevent.
Because neither Linder nor Rice moved to 
withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the circuit court's judgment, as required by 
Rule 604(d) and by Evans, the circuit court correctly refused to 
reconsider their sentences. In addition, the appellate court should not have 
entertained defendants' appeals. Where a defendant fails to comply with the 
motion requirements of Rule 604(d), as these defendants did, the appellate court 
must dismiss the appeal (People v. Jamison, 181 Ill. 2d 24, 28-29 
(1998)), leaving the Post-Conviction Hearing Act as the defendant's only 
recourse (People v. Foster, 171 Ill. 2d 469, 471 (1996)).
Finally, we reject the appellate court's view 
that Evans' construction of Rule 604(d) should not be applied in 
Rice because Rice arose prior to issuance of our opinion in 
Evans. Rice was pending when Evans was announced, and 
when Rice first came before us, we remanded it to the appellate court 
for the express purpose of having the court reconsider its decision in light of 
Evans. People v. Rice, 171 Ill. 2d 580 (1997). If we believed 
that Evans were inapplicable, we would not have ordered that remand. As 
a general rule, this court's decisions apply to all cases that are pending when 
the decision is announced, unless this court directs otherwise. People v. 
Granados, 172 Ill. 2d 358, 365 (1996). The appellate court cited no 
authority for deviating from that general rule here.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the 
judgment of the appellate court in Linder and affirm the circuit 
court's judgment denying defendant's motion to reconsider his sentence. We 
likewise reverse the appellate court's judgment in Rice and affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court.
No. 83415-Appellate court 
judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment 
affirmed.
No. 84014-Appellate court 
judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment 
affirmed.
JUSTICE RATHJE took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially 
concurring:
Since the filing of our decision in People 
v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), both this court and our appellate court 
have been beset with appeals which continue to raise questions concerning the 
proper application of Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) once a 
plea agreement has been accepted by the circuit court. The procedural history of 
this case is typical of these appeals. See slip op. at 2-3. See also People 
v. Clark, 183 Ill. 2d 261, 264-65 (1998) (noting procedural history of the 
case). That these questions continue to arise indicates, to me at least, that 
our previous opinions have provided inadequate guidance in this area for either 
bench or bar. I am concerned that today's opinion does not go far enough in 
interpreting the motion-to-reconsider provisions contained in the language of 
Rule 604(d) so as to provide this needed guidance. I, therefore, write 
separately to explain why I believe both of the defendants in this consolidated 
appeal must move to vacate their pleas in order to challenge their 
sentences.
In Evans, this court concluded that the 
motion-to-reconsider sentence provisions contained in Rule 604(d) are 
inapplicable to situations where a defendant pleads guilty to certain charges in 
exchange for the State's agreement to (i) dismiss other charges and (ii) 
recommend a specific sentence, a plea arrangement which we characterized as 
"negotiated." Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 327. Under these circumstances, a 
defendant who attempts to reduce the agreed-upon sentence seeks "to hold the 
State to its part of the bargain while unilaterally modifying the sentence" 
earlier agreed upon. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 327. We noted that such a 
practice "flies in the face of contract law principles" (Evans, 174 
Ill. 2d at 327) because "the guilty plea and the sentence 'go hand in hand' as 
material elements of the plea bargain." Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 332. 
Therefore, in order to avoid "gamesmanship of a most offensive nature" 
(Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327), we held that, in such situations, a 
defendant must first move to vacate the plea even if he or she only wishes to 
challenge the imposed sentence. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 332. In reaching 
this decision, we contrasted the "negotiated" plea at issue with an "open" 
guilty plea. An open guilty plea is one in which a defendant pleads guilty 
"without receiving any promises from the State in return." Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 332. Because the defendant receives no inducements to plead guilty 
from the prosecutor in such cases, "[b]oth good public policy and common sense 
dictate that defendants who enter open guilty pleas be allowed to challenge only 
their sentences without being required to withdraw their guilty pleas." 
Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 332. We then held that the motion-to-reconsider 
sentence provisions contained in Rule 604(d) apply only to open guilty pleas. 
Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 332.
Unfortunately, our use of the term "negotiated" 
plea, without elaboration on its meaning beyond the facts in Evans, has 
led to a certain amount of confusion in our lower courts. The reason is 
simple-not all "negotiated" pleas are the same. See, e.g., People 
v. Smith, 288 Ill. App. 3d 308 (1997) (and cases cited therein). In my 
view, there are four distinct plea scenarios that usually occur whenever a 
defendant decides to forgo the right to trial:
These four scenarios, by and large, represent 
the many variations of plea agreements which come under the scrutiny of a court 
of review. See 2 W. LaFave &amp; J. Israel, Criminal Procedure §20.1 (2d ed. 
1984) (discussing history of plea bargaining and giving examples). The above 
scenarios demonstrate that several plea bargaining options can fall under the 
generic label of a "negotiated" plea. A review of Illinois decisional law 
postdating Evans indicates that the appellate court has found the 
application of Rule 604(d)'s motion-to-reconsider sentence provisions 
problematic in cases which involve "negotiated" pleas which fall under the 
second and third scenarios. See People v. Sanders, 286 Ill. App. 3d 
1042 (1997); People v. Johnson, 286 Ill. App. 3d 597 (1997); People 
v. Leach, 284 Ill. App. 3d 4 (1996).
The present case concerns negotiated pleas which 
arise under the third plea bargain scenario identified above. I agree with the 
majority's conclusion that to allow defendants in that situation to seek 
reconsideration of their sentences without also moving to withdraw their pleas 
"unfairly binds the State to the terms of the plea agreement while giving the 
defendant[s] the opportunity to avoid or modify those terms." Slip op. at 5. The 
majority reaches this conclusion because
I have no quarrel with this rationale; however, 
I believe that the majority's decision to focus primarily on defendant's view of 
the bargain does not go far enough in addressing the question presented for our 
review. Equally critical to the analysis, if not more so, are the sentencing 
concessions, if any, the State agrees to make as part of its bargain with a 
defendant. It is the existence of a sentencing concession which triggers the 
application of the holding in Evans to the agreements at issue today, 
as I explain below.
Here, the State's sentence cap recommendations, 
in addition to its agreement to drop certain charges, are part and 
parcel of its agreements with defendants. As a result, the State, by virtue 
of its bargain with defendants, had limited its ability to argue at sentencing 
for a sentence from the full panoply of penalties contained in the Code of 
Corrections. Thus, when a defendant only seeks reconsideration of this type of 
bargained-for sentence, such actions "fl[y] in the face" of the contract 
principles enunciated in Evans and should not be condoned. 
Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 327. Just as the specific sentence and plea went 
"hand in hand" as material elements of the plea bargain in Evans, so 
too does the sentence cap and plea at issue here. See Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 332. As such, defendant has received a sentencing benefit from the 
agreement-the State has not sought a sentence above the cap. Thus, it is the 
State's sentencing concession, clearly a material component of its bargain with 
defendant, which distinguishes the "negotiated" plea in the third scenario from 
the "negotiated" plea contemplated in the second scenario identified above. In 
the latter scenario, the State has not made any facet of sentencing an element 
of its bargain with defendant. Stated differently, defendant in such situations 
pleads guilty without receiving any promises from the State with respect to 
sentencing in return. When the State does not provide any sentencing inducement 
for a defendant in its plea bargain, such a "negotiated" plea, at least for 
purposes of the sentencing hearing, more closely resembles the "open" plea than 
the "negotiated" plea at issue in Evans. Therefore, in such cases, a 
defendant's motion to reconsider sentence would not run afoul of his or her 
agreement-the parties never made the sentence a part of their bargain-and all 
contract principles are honored. None of the concerns of Evans arise in 
such cases, and its holding necessarily is inapplicable to them. On the other 
hand, the holding in Evans applies to all plea agreements in which the 
State, as part of its agreement, forgoes or limits its ability at sentencing to 
seek a sentence from the full range of penalties set forth in the Code of 
Corrections. These negotiated agreements raise the same type of "gamesmanship" 
concerns that were present in Evans. See Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 
327-28. Thus, even if a defendant wishes to challenge only the sentence imposed, 
he or she must first move to vacate the plea. If the court grants the relief, 
both parties would then be returned to the status quo as it existed prior to the 
acceptance of the plea.
As I noted at the beginning of this special 
concurrence, our decision in Evans has generated considerable questions 
about its applicability to various types of plea bargains. The majority today 
unfortunately misses the opportunity to distinguish definitively those 
"negotiated" pleas that fall under the Evans rule from those that do 
not. As a result, I fear that today's opinion regarding the current 
motion-to-reconsider sentence provisions contained in Rule 604(d) will not be 
our last.
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting::
The majority holds that a defendant who pleads 
guilty in exchange for a cap on the length of his sentence may not challenge a 
sentence that is imposed within the range of that cap without first moving to 
withdraw his guilty plea. This holding is not only inconsistent with this 
court's precedents, it is illogical as well.
In People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 
(1996), we held that when a defendant agrees to plead guilty to certain charges 
in exchange for the State dismissing other charges and recommending to the trial 
court a specific sentence, the defendant may not seek reconsideration of that 
sentence once imposed by the trial court unless he also moves to withdraw his 
guilty plea. We reached this conclusion by reasoning that, under the 
circumstances presented in Evans, a defendant who challenges only his 
sentence violates the terms of his plea agreement with the State. Such a 
defendant seeks to obtain the benefits of his plea agreement (the dismissal of 
certain charges) without fulfilling his obligations under that agreement (the 
acceptance of the specific sentence specified in the agreement). Evans, 
174 Ill. 2d  at 327. We thus held that in order to challenge a sentence which the 
trial court has entered upon a specific recommendation made by the State as part 
of a plea agreement, a defendant must also move to withdraw his guilty plea and 
vacate the judgment so that, in the event the motion is granted, the parties are 
returned to the status quo. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 332.
The majority contends that the reasoning 
employed by this court in Evans also applies to cases in which the 
defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for the State's dismissing certain 
charges and recommending to the trial court a cap on his sentence. The majority 
argues that, just as in Evans, allowing such a defendant to seek 
reconsideration of his sentence without also moving to withdraw his guilty plea 
unfairly binds the State to the terms of the plea agreement while excusing the 
defendant from compliance with those terms. Slip op. at 5. The majority is 
incorrect.
When the instant defendants agreed to plead 
guilty, they did so because the State agreed to recommend that they serve no 
more than a particular length of time in prison. Presumably, if the State 
and the defendants had been able to agree on an appropriate sentence, they would 
have decided to recommend that specific sentence to the trial court. In the 
absence of such agreement, neither party was entitled to expect the entry of any 
particular sentence within the recommended range. In other words, at the time a 
plea agreement involving a sentencing cap is accepted by the trial court, the 
appropriate sentence, as far as the two parties are concerned, has yet to be 
determined. A defendant thus does not violate any term of such an agreement by 
seeking reconsideration of the sentence imposed by the trial court. This 
situation is no different than that where a defendant enters an open or blind 
plea, thus exposing himself to the maximum statutory sentence. In such a case, 
the maximum sentence is the cap. In that situation, the defendant may challenge 
the length of his sentence without moving to withdraw his plea of guilty. 
People v. Wallace, 143 Ill. 2d 59 (1991).
The reason this court required the defendants in 
Evans to move to withdraw their guilty pleas before challenging their 
sentences is that the specific sentences contained in the plea agreements there 
demonstrated that the parties had already settled on appropriate sentences. In a 
sentencing cap situation, however, there is no such consensus, and so a 
defendant does not renege on his plea agreement if he seeks to have the trial 
court or an appellate tribunal review the sentence initially imposed. The 
majority's argument implies that in agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for a 
recommended sentencing cap, defendants were also agreeing not to challenge any 
sentence imposed below that cap. No such term was ever a part of the defendants' 
bargains, and the majority is wrong to rewrite the agreements to include such a 
term.
For these reasons, I respectfully 
dissent.