Title: Bower v. Bournay-Bower
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11478
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 15, 2014

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11478 
 
WILLIAM J. BOWER  vs.  MICHELLE A. BOURNAY-BOWER. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     May 8, 2014. - September 15, 2014. 
 
Present:  Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Divorce and Separation, Parent coordinator.  Constitutional Law, 
Judicial review, Delegation of powers.  Due Process of Law, 
Right to hearing, Delay in rendering decision. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint for divorce filed in the Norfolk Division of the 
Probate and Family Court Department on March 25, 2009. 
 
 
A complaint for contempt, filed on October 13, 2011, was 
heard by Christina L. Harms, J., and entry of judgment was 
ordered by Jennifer M.R. Ulwick, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Susan E. Stenger (Francine Gardikas with her) for Michelle 
A. Bournay-Bower. 
 
Lisa A. Ruggieri & Jocelyn A. Thomsen for William J. Bower. 
 
Kirsten V. Mayer, Nicole P. Cate, Sara Perkins Jones, Susan 
R. Elsen, & Julia E. Schlozman, for Massachusetts Law Reform 
Institute & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  This case raises an issue of first impression in 
the Commonwealth regarding the authority of a judge in a divorce 
2 
 
or custody proceeding in the Probate and Family Court to 
appoint, over the objection of one of the parties, a "parent 
coordinator"1 to assist parents in resolving conflicts that arise 
in implementing the custody and visitation provisions set forth 
in a final judgment of divorce.  Additionally, this case raises 
the issue whether a judge may grant binding decision-making 
authority to the parent coordinator, again without the consent 
of both parties, to resolve conflicts that arise between the 
parents regarding custody or visitation.2  We transferred this 
case from the Appeals Court on our own motion, and we conclude 
that the judge in this case exceeded the bounds of inherent 
judicial authority in appointing, without all parties' approval, 
a parent coordinator with binding decision-making authority.  We 
further conclude that the breadth of authority vested in the 
                     
 
1 The Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, an 
international, interdisciplinary association of professionals 
that has published guidelines for parent coordinator practice, 
describes parent coordination as "a child-focused alternative 
dispute resolution process in which a mental health or legal 
professional with mediation training and experience assists high 
conflict parents to implement their parenting plan by 
facilitating the resolution of their disputes in a timely 
manner, educating parents about children's needs, and with prior 
approval of the parties [or] the court, making decisions within 
the scope of the court order or appointment contract."  The AFCC 
Task Force on Parenting Coordination, Guidelines for Parenting 
Coordination, 44 Fam. Ct. Rev. 164, 165 (2006). 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted in this case by 
the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Community Legal Services 
and Counseling Center, Greater Boston Legal Services, Harvard 
Legal Aid Bureau, Justice Center of Southeast Massachusetts, 
MetroWest Legal Services, and The Second Step. 
3 
 
parent coordinator constitutes an unlawful delegation of 
judicial authority.  Accordingly, we vacate the order.3 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  The parties in this case, whom 
we shall call the mother and the father, are divorced parents of 
four minor children.  The initial complaint for divorce was 
filed in March, 2009.  After more than two years of litigation, 
a judgment of divorce nisi entered on May 11, 2011.  The 
judgment provided for shared legal custody of the parties' four 
children and incorporated and merged the parties' separation 
agreement, which contained a detailed six-page parenting plan.  
The judgment further set forth provisions for visitation with 
the children during winter holidays and summer vacations as the 
parties were unable to reach an agreement regarding visitation 
during those time periods. 
 
By the end of 2011, each of the parties had filed contempt 
complaints alleging that the other had violated various terms of 
the divorce judgment, including the obligation to adhere to the 
parenting time schedule and the obligation to share decision-
making regarding major issues in the children's lives.  The 
father's complaint requested that the mother be adjudged in 
                     
 
3  We do recognize, however, the important role that parent 
coordinators may serve in assisting divorcing or divorced 
parents in resolving custody and visitation disputes outside of 
court.  Consequently, as discussed at the end of this opinion, 
we refer this issue to the Probate and Family Court to consider 
the adoption of a rule governing the appointment of parent 
coordinators in appropriate proceedings. 
4 
 
contempt and that she be ordered to participate in parenting 
coordination and to be bound by the decisions of the parent 
coordinator. 
 
At the hearing on the parties' complaints for contempt, the 
judge declined to hear argument on the allegations contained in 
the complaints for contempt and instead focused on the father's 
request that a parent coordinator be appointed in this case.4   
The mother objected to the appointment of a parent coordinator 
and indicated that she preferred for the judge, who was familiar 
with the case, to enforce the judgment and to resolve disputes 
arising from the parties' implementation of the parenting plan. 
 
Despite the mother's objections at the hearing, the judge 
issued an order requiring the parties to utilize the services of 
the parent coordinator identified in the order.5  In substance, 
the order required the parent coordinator to hear all of the 
                     
 
4 At the hearing, the judge explained that she was focused 
on the issue of the appointment of a parent coordinator because 
she hoped to implement a process that could help to prevent the 
sorts of disputes that had given rise to the complaints for 
contempt in this case.  As the judge stated at the hearing, "I 
have to decide first how to get you out of this cycle where you 
gather up a bunch of stuff, you come in like a volcano 
overflowing, and all the bad stuff has actually already 
happened, and I can't get a handle on how it happened. . . .  
I'm [going to] try to get . . . a system in effect . . . that 
maybe gets a little bit ahead of these problems and starts to 
give some relief." 
 
 
5 The order originally issued by the judge contained an 
incomplete sentence, which was corrected in a subsequent 
"clarified order."  As the clarified order was issued later and 
binds the parties, we refer to the clarified order as "the 
order" at issue in this case. 
5 
 
parties' current and future disputes regarding custody and 
visitation in the first instance, before the parties could file 
any action regarding these disputes in court.  The order also 
granted the parent coordinator the authority to make binding 
decisions on matters of custody and visitation and provided that 
these decisions must be complied with by the parties as if they 
were court orders unless one of the parties were to go to the 
court before the decision was to take effect and obtain a 
contrary order.6 
 
After the retirement of the judge who issued this order, 
another judge issued a decision on the parties' contempt 
complaints, and in so doing, ordered the parties to adhere to 
the order appointing the parent coordinator.  After the decision 
on the contempt complaints was entered as a judgment, the mother 
appealed the order appointing the parent coordinator, and we 
transferred this case on our own motion. 
                     
 
6 The order provided in full:  "Effective immediately, a 
Parent Coordinator shall serve to hear all disputes between the 
parties regarding custody and visitation, in the first instance, 
before such matters are brought before the court.  The Parent 
Coordinator shall have BINDING AUTHORITY to issue rulings 
concerning disputes brought to her, and the parties must comply 
with her decisions as if they were court orders, UNLESS either 
party, dissatisfied, comes to court before the decision is to 
take effect, and obtains a contrary order.  The Parent 
Coordinator shall be paid for her services by the father.  
However, nothing herein precludes the Parent Coordinator from 
making a different fee recommendation at any time, if she feels 
that the conduct of the mother so warrants."  (Emphases in 
original.)  The order further named a specific parent 
coordinator with whom the parties were to engage. 
6 
 
 
The mother now argues that the judge lacked both express 
and inherent authority to appoint a parent coordinator, that the 
order here constituted an unlawful delegation of judicial 
authority, and that where the mother did not consent to the use 
of a parent coordinator, the order infringed on her due process 
right of access to the courts.7  Although we recognize, as did 
the judge in this case, that parent coordinators may provide 
valuable assistance to parents in implementing custody and 
visitation plans, we conclude that the order at issue here 
exceeded the bounds of the judge's inherent authority and was so 
broad in scope that it constitutes an unlawful delegation of 
judicial authority.  Accordingly, we vacate the order appointing 
the parent coordinator and so much of the subsequent judgment as 
required the parties to comply with the order. 
 
b.  Role of a parent coordinator.  Generally, parent 
coordinators, whose backgrounds may be in mental health, family 
law, or other relevant fields, are understood to serve as 
neutral third parties who assist separated or divorced parents 
in resolving conflicts that arise in the implementation of 
custody and visitation arrangements in a manner that reduces the 
impact of the parents' conflict on their children.  C.P. 
Kindregan, Jr., M. McBrien, & P.A. Kindregan, Family Law and 
                     
 
7 In the Probate and Family Court, the mother also sought a 
stay of the order appointing the parent coordinator while this 
appeal was pending, which was granted. 
7 
 
Practice § 37:3 (4th ed. 2013).  The specific nature of the role 
of a parent coordinator varies significantly both within and 
among jurisdictions that permit such appointments.  See, e.g., 
Fla. Stat. § 61.125 (2009); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09.2-01 (2009); 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.425 (2008).  In certain circumstances, the 
role of parent coordinator may be analogous to that of a 
mediator, in others to that of a master, and still in others, 
the parent coordinator's role combines multiple functions.  See, 
e.g., Minn. Stat. § 518.1751(1b)(c) (2001) (parent coordinator 
authorized to use "mediation-arbitration process" in which 
parent coordinator facilitates dispute resolution in first 
instance but is permitted to issue decision resolving dispute 
where parents cannot agree); Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 74(E), (F) 
(2011) (parent coordinator is authorized to interview family and 
household members, health care providers, and school officials 
and to make recommendations to court regarding implementation or 
modification of custody and parenting time orders, or to 
recommend that parties or children participate in ancillary 
services such as counselling or substance abuse monitoring); 
Utah Jud. Admin. R. 4-509 (2009) (parent coordinator's role is 
"like that of the mediator," and authority is limited to making 
recommendations directly to parties and facilitating parents' 
creation or revision of parenting plan).  In some jurisdictions, 
the parent coordinator's role is to provide a hybrid of a 
8 
 
mediation and arbitration services in which the parent 
coordinator seeks to facilitate dispute resolution between the 
parties in the first instance, but if the dispute is 
intractable, the parent coordinator is permitted to issue a 
binding decision resolving the conflict.  See, e.g., Fla. Stat. 
§ 61.125(1); Minn. Stat. § 518.1751 (1b)(c) (2001); N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 50-92(b) (2005); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 120.2 (West 
2003); Idaho R. Fam. Law P. 716(G)(1)(e) (2014).  In other 
jurisdictions, a parent coordinator may provide alternative 
dispute resolution services and serve certain quasi judicial 
functions such as gathering facts or making recommendations to 
the court.  See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:358.4(C) (2007); 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.425(3)(a)(A), (C); S.D. Codified Laws § 25-
4-70(5) (2013); Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 74(E), (F). 
 
Over the past several years, the use of parent coordinators 
to assist parents in developing and implementing custody and 
visitation arrangements has become increasingly common across 
the country as well as in Massachusetts.  See Jordan v. Jordan, 
14 A.3d 1136, 1153 (D.C. 2011) (referencing thirty jurisdictions 
in twenty-seven States that permit appointment of parent 
coordinators by statute or court rule).  See also Katzman v. 
Healy, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 589, 594 n.6 (2010) (discerning no 
error in order requiring parents to implement provision of 
separation agreement calling for use of parent coordinator); 
9 
 
Tammaro v. O'Brien, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 254, 255 n.3 (2010) 
(referencing provisions in separation agreement merged into 
final judgment of divorce that required parents to use parent 
coordinator); R.S. v. M.P., 72 Mass. App. Ct. 798, 802 n.8 
(2008) (referencing appointment of parent coordinator in case 
while complaint for modification was pending).  Indeed, judges 
in our courts have acknowledged the potential benefits provided 
by parent coordinators, particularly in more contentious cases.  
See, e.g., R.S., supra (describing probate court judge's 
rationale in appointing parent coordinator as providing parties 
with "convenient, expeditious and economical forum to help them 
to resolve decision making regarding their children"). 
 
Despite the increasing use of parent coordinators in 
Massachusetts, the specific functions of a parent coordinator, 
including the parent coordinator's duties, necessary 
qualifications, or scope of authority, have not been set forth 
by statute or court rule.  See, e.g., 2007 Senate Doc. No. 895, 
"An Act relative to the appointment of parenting coordinators in 
the probate courts" (never enacted by the Legislature).  
Massachusetts statutes and court rules recognize various types 
of alternative dispute resolution practices and define the roles 
of quasi judicial officers including guardians ad litem and 
masters who may investigate facts and make reports to the court.  
However, no statute or court rule specifically recognizes either 
10 
 
the role of a parent coordinator or the service of parent 
coordination. 
 
For example, S.J.C. Rule 1:18, as amended, 442 Mass. 1301 
(2004) (Uniform Rules on Dispute Resolution), sets forth a 
comprehensive scheme of rules governing court-connected 
alternative dispute resolution services.  The rules address in 
detail the administrative structure for court-connected dispute 
resolution services, the implementation of court-connected 
dispute resolution, the respective duties of the courts and 
approved dispute resolution programs with respect to court-
connected dispute resolution services, and the qualifications 
and ethical standards for providers.  The rules recognize 
"[d]ispute resolution service[s]" that include, but are not 
limited to, "arbitration," "case evaluation," "conciliation," 
"mediation," "mini-trial," and "summary jury trial."  Uniform 
Rule 2.  Rule 2 also separately defines "[d]ispute 
intervention," which is a process used in the Probate and Family 
Court and in the Housing Court in which a neutral identifies the 
areas of dispute between the parties and assists in the 
resolution of differences. 
 
Under the rules, parties may not be compelled to 
participate in dispute resolution services except that the 
Probate and Family Court may require parties to participate in 
dispute intervention.  Uniform Rule 6 (d).  However, any trial 
11 
 
court department may seek authorization from the Chief Justice 
of the Trial Court to implement a mandatory dispute resolution 
program in civil cases.  Uniform Rule 4 (c).  Such mandatory 
programs must meet certain minimum requirements, including that 
each party must be permitted to petition the court to terminate 
dispute resolution services for good cause shown; that the court 
shall give preference to a dispute resolution process upon which 
the parties agree; that the court must explicitly inform parties 
that they are not required to settle their case or resolve their 
dispute in the dispute resolution process; and that no fees may 
be charged to any party that is required to participate in 
dispute resolution.  Uniform Rule 4 (c) (i)-(iv). 
 
Similarly, G. L. c. 215, § 56A, authorizes the appointment 
of a guardian ad litem in any proceeding pending in probate 
court.  The guardian ad litem is required to investigate facts 
involving the care, custody, and maintenance of minor children 
and to report the results of the investigation to the judge in 
writing before issuance of a final judgment or decree in the 
proceeding.  See Probate and Family Court Standing Orders 1-05, 
1-08 (2008) (establishing comprehensive standards governing 
duties, methodologies, and qualifications of guardians ad litem 
who act as custody, visitation, or adoption investigators or 
evaluators).  Further, Mass. R. Civ. P. 53 (b) (1), as appearing 
in 423 Mass. 1408 (1996), permits a court in which a civil 
12 
 
action is pending to appoint a master, subject to the assent of 
the parties, to hear evidence and report facts to the judge.  
Rule 53 further sets forth rules governing a master's 
qualifications, compensation, powers, and responsibilities.  See 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 53 (b) (1), (c), (e), (g), (h). 
 
Although a parent coordinator may be qualified to provide 
many of the services contemplated by S.J.C. Rule 1:18, or G. L. 
c. 215, § 56A, or Mass. R. Civ. P. 53, the father does not argue 
that the authority to appoint the parent coordinator is implicit 
in an existing statute or court rule, nor did the judge appear 
to derive her authority to appoint the parent coordinator from 
an existing statute or court rule.8  Consequently, despite 
                     
 
8  Even if the father had argued that the appointment here 
was authorized by a statute or rule governing court-connected 
alternative dispute resolution or the appointment of masters or 
guardians ad litem, the terms of the appointment here did not 
conform to any of these rule schemes.  For example, the 
appointment here was made over the objection of the mother, but 
there is no indication in the record that a pilot program for 
mandatory dispute resolution was in place at the time as 
required by S.J.C. Rule 1:18, as amended, 442 Mass. 1301 (2004) 
(Uniform Rules on Dispute Resolution).  See Uniform Rule 4 (c) 
(requiring trial court departments to obtain approval from Chief 
Justice of the Trial Court prior to implementing programs 
requiring parties to participate in dispute resolution without 
their consent).  Further, the services of the parent coordinator 
were not free, and the parent coordinator was authorized to 
issue decisions with the binding effect of court orders.  
Compare Uniform Rule 4 (c) (iii), (iv) (outcome of mandatory 
dispute resolution services may not be binding on parties, and 
services must be provided free of charge).  Additionally, 
although the record here indicates that the judge selected the 
particular parent coordinator because of her knowledge of the 
parent coordinator's exceptional qualifications, there is no 
indication in the record that the judge selected the parent 
13 
 
existing rules governing alternative dispute resolution and the 
appointment of quasi judicial officers, either of which may have 
provided a basis for the judge's authority to appoint a parent 
coordinator if the parent coordinator's role had been limited in 
scope and analogous to the services contemplated by these rules, 
we must consider the parties' arguments regarding inherent 
judicial authority as the source of the judge's authority to 
issue the order in this case. 
 
2.  Judge's inherent authority to appoint a parent 
coordinator.  The mother argues that without express 
authorization by statute or court rule, and without agreement of 
the parties, the judge was without authority to appoint a parent 
coordinator in this case.  The father argues that the use of 
parent coordinators in Massachusetts has become increasingly 
common, and that in the absence of a statutory prohibition, it 
                                                                  
coordinator from a list maintained by the Probate and Family 
Court as contemplated by Uniform Rule 4 (a), requiring 
maintenance of an appointment docket for fee-generating 
appointments in all courts.  Further, the parent coordinator in 
this case was not ordered to act in a role akin to that of a 
quasi judicial officer investigating or finding facts or 
reporting them to the court.  Rather, the parent coordinator was 
authorized to issue binding decisions on the merits of the 
parties' present and future disputes regarding custody or 
visitation, a role that exceeds the scope of authority of either 
a master or a guardian ad litem.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 53 (a) 
(i) (masters hear evidence in any action and report facts to 
court); Probate and Family Court Standing Orders 1-05, 1-08 
(2008) (guardian ad litem investigators gather and report 
factual data to court and guardian ad litem evaluators gather 
and report data and offer clinical opinions when competent to do 
so). 
14 
 
was a permissible exercise of the judge's discretion to appoint 
a parent coordinator.  See Matter of Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 561 
(1982) (recognizing broad, equitable power of probate court to 
act in best interests of persons in its jurisdiction).  We 
conclude that judges in the Probate and Family Court possess the 
inherent authority to appoint parent coordinators in appropriate 
circumstances but that the appointment in this case exceeded the 
bounds of that authority. 
 
We have long recognized that courts in this Commonwealth 
possess certain inherent powers whose exercise is "essential to 
the function of the judicial department, to the maintenance of 
its authority, or to its capacity to decide cases."  Sheriff of 
Middlesex County v. Commissioner of Correction, 383 Mass. 631, 
636 (1981), citing Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 613 
(1932).  See Blankenburg v. Commonwealth, 260 Mass. 369, 372-373 
(1927).  These powers are necessary to "secure the full and 
effective administration of justice" and thus extend beyond 
adjudication to ancillary functions such as rule-making and 
judicial administration.  O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of the 
County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507, 510, 514 (1972). 
 
Moreover, by statute, divisions of the Probate and Family 
Court Department are courts of "superior and general 
jurisdiction with reference to all cases and matters within 
which they have jurisdiction."  G. L. c. 215, § 2.  
15 
 
Specifically, the Legislature has granted probate courts 
jurisdiction over, among other areas, the appointment of 
guardians and conservators, along with exclusive original 
jurisdiction over actions for divorce and actions related to the 
care, custody, education, and maintenance of minor children.  
G. L. c. 215, §§ 2, 3, 4.  This jurisdiction extends to 
equitable powers.  G. L. c. 215, § 6.  Thus, we have recognized 
that a probate court possesses broad and flexible inherent 
powers essential to the court's duty to act in the best 
interests of persons under its jurisdiction.  See Matter of Moe, 
385 Mass. at 563.  For example, we have recognized the inherent 
authority of a probate court to appoint a guardian ad litem in 
order to protect the interests of a person in a proceeding 
before it or to ensure the proper functioning of the court.  See 
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 
728, 755 (1977), citing Lynde v. Vose, 326 Mass. 621 (1951), and 
Buckingham v. Alden, 315 Mass. 383 (1944).  Further, we have 
recognized the inherent authority of a probate court to rule on 
a petition by a guardian seeking court authorization to permit 
an extraordinary medical procedure to be undertaken on behalf of 
a ward.  See Matter of Moe, supra at 556, 562. 
 
Indeed, referral of appropriate cases to parent 
coordination or other alternative dispute resolution services 
may help to expedite the disposition of those cases and provide 
16 
 
a more satisfying and timely resolution of certain custody- and 
visitation-related disputes for the parties.  One recognized 
feature of parent coordination services is that parent 
coordinators can help to resolve disputes about "day-to-day" 
custody and visitation issues.  See Sullivan, Parenting 
Coordination:  Coming of Age?, 51 Fam. Ct. Rev. 56, 56 (2013).  
See also The AFCC Task Force on Parenting Coordination, 
Guidelines for Parenting Coordination, 44 Fam. Ct. Rev. 164, 172 
(2006).  Such disputes could arise from determining how to 
adjust visitation if school is unexpectedly canceled, which 
family members will attend a special event such as an award 
ceremony or athletic competition, whether both parents may 
attend a parent-teacher conference, or how accommodations will 
be made if a parent or child becomes ill.  In light of the 
number of cases filed daily in the Probate and Family Court, a 
parent coordinator may be available to assist the parties in 
resolving such a dispute sooner than a hearing before a probate 
court judge becomes available -- and perhaps before the dispute 
at issue gives rise to a complaint for contempt or other formal 
proceeding. 
 
Therefore, probate court judges possess the inherent 
authority to refer parties to a parent coordinator in 
appropriate circumstances in order to conserve limited judicial 
resources and aid in the probate court's functioning and 
17 
 
capacity to decide cases, or if in the judge's discretion such 
referral is necessary to ensure the best interests of the 
children in a divorce- or custody-related proceeding.  See State 
Realty Co. of Boston v. MacNeil Bros., 358 Mass. 374, 379 
(1970), quoting Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-631 
(1962) (courts possess inherent power to "manage their own 
affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition 
of cases"); Bahceli v. Bahceli, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 446, 449 
(1980) (in custody proceeding, "[t]he overriding concern of the 
court must be the best interest of the child").  However, this 
authority is not without limit. 
 
The inherent powers of the courts of the Commonwealth, 
including the Probate and Family Court, operate within certain 
boundaries.  For example, we held that a Juvenile Court judge 
does not possess the inherent authority to order parents to open 
their home to investigators from the Department of Social 
Services seeking a nonemergency home visit following an 
anonymous report of child abuse because the power to issue such 
an order was not in aid of the court's ability to function as a 
court.  See Parents of Two Minors v. Bristol Div. of the 
Juvenile Court Dep't, 397 Mass. 846, 851-853 & n.3 (1986) 
(contrasting G. L. c. 119, § 22 [1984], which authorized 
Juvenile Court judges to issue warrants permitting agents of 
Department of Social Services to enter foster homes to 
18 
 
investigate treatment and condition of children therein).  
Further, we have held that a probate court does not possess the 
inherent authority to levy an obligor's property in order to 
recover child support arrearages where the authority to collect 
such arrearages was delegated by statute to the Department of 
Revenue and the recovery of unpaid support by the probate court, 
as compared to the authority to order prospective support 
payments, was not essential to the court's functioning, 
authority, or capacity to decide cases.  See Gray v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, 422 Mass. 666, 672-673 (1996) 
(interpreting G. L. c. 209C, § 9 [a], and G. L. c. 119A, § 6 
[a], [b] [1]). 
 
Moreover, we have stated that inherent judicial powers 
arise from the individual right to the "impartial interpretation 
of laws, and administration of justice" guaranteed by art. 29 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights along with the right to 
seek recourse under the laws and to obtain justice freely, 
completely, promptly, and conformably to the laws, as provided 
by art. 11.9  See First Justice of the Bristol Div. of the 
Juvenile Court Dep't v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Bristol Div. of 
                     
 
9 Article 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
states in full:  "Every subject of the commonwealth ought to 
find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all 
injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, 
or character.  He ought to obtain right and justice freely, and 
without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without 
any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably to the 
laws." 
19 
 
the Juvenile Court Dep't, 438 Mass. 387, 396-397 (2003) ("It is 
from these lofty principles that flows the concept of inherent 
judicial powers . . .").  Therefore, we have held that judges 
must exercise their inherent powers to secure the full and 
effective administration of justice.  Querubin v. Commonwealth, 
440 Mass. 108, 114-115 (2003).  O'Coin's, Inc., 362 Mass. at 
514. 
 
What follows, then, is that inherent judicial powers should 
not be exercised in a manner that undermines the very 
constitutional rights from which those powers arise.  Here, the 
nature of the authority granted to the parent coordinator in the 
order of appointment, combined with the procedural requirements 
in the order, including the limits on the parents' right to file 
an action in court, and the limits on judicial review of the 
parent coordinator's decisions, raise significant due process 
concerns, implicating, among other rights, those guaranteed by 
art. 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Therefore, 
these due process concerns assist us in identifying the outer 
limits of a judge's inherent authority to refer parties to a 
parent coordinator. 
 
a.  Binding authority of parent coordinator.  A judge's 
inherent authority does not extend to compelling a party to 
submit to the binding decision-making authority of a parent 
coordinator without that party's consent.  Among other 
20 
 
protections, art. 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
safeguards an individual's right to seek recourse under the law 
for all injuries or wrongs to persons, property, or character.  
The order here infringed upon this right because it required the 
mother, without her consent, to submit all disputes to a parent 
coordinator, rather than to a judge, for binding resolution.  
This sort of binding decision-making authority is a power 
commonly held by an arbitrator.  See, e.g., Uniform Rule 2 
("'Arbitration' means a process in which a neutral renders a 
binding or non-binding decision after hearing arguments and 
reviewing evidence").  We held in Gustin v. Gustin, 420 Mass. 
854, 857-858 (1995), that a judge may not compel parties to 
submit to binding arbitration without their consent.  Further, 
although our rules governing the implementation of court-
connected dispute resolution services contemplate pilot programs 
for mandatory participation in alternative dispute resolution, 
such programs may extend only to nonbinding dispute resolution 
services.  See Uniform Rule 4 (c).  A court in at least one 
other State has held that granting a parent coordinator binding 
decision-making authority without the consent of the parties 
violates the parents' due process rights.10  See Kilpatrick v. 
Kilpatrick, 198 P.3d 406, 410 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008). 
                     
 
10 We also observe that the order does not set forth, nor 
does the record indicate, whether any provision was made for 
representation by counsel in appearances before a parent 
21 
 
 
b.  Deferral of decision on pending contempt complaint.  
Moreover, the order infringed on the mother's right to have the 
merits of her pending contempt complaint screened by a judge 
early in the proceedings before referral to a parent 
coordinator.  Indeed, the judge issued the order in this case 
during the parties' hearing on their cross complaints for 
contempt without hearing the parties on the merits of their 
claims or issuing a ruling on those complaints.  The order 
appointing the parent coordinator therefore served to defer the 
judge's decision on the mother's claims regarding disputed 
actions that had already taken place that may have constituted a 
violation of the final divorce judgment.  To defer this decision 
over the mother's objection effectively infringed upon her right 
to seek recourse under the law for the father's alleged failure 
to adhere to the terms of the judgment.11 
                                                                  
coordinator or whether any other standards were imposed by the 
court governing the procedures a parent coordinator must follow 
prior to issuing a binding decision which could affect the 
parents' fundamental rights in the custody and visitation 
context.  Consequently, the absence of both parents' consent to 
the appointment raises significant procedural due process 
concerns as well. 
 
 
11 A judge's inherent authority likely extends to a 
recommendation to the parties to use the services of a parent 
coordinator prior to a scheduled contempt hearing, perhaps with 
the hope that the parties will resolve the conflict that gave 
rise to the contempt complaint and withdraw the complaint or 
present a resolution to the judge at the hearing.  However, 
deferring a party's right to be heard on a contempt complaint 
during the contempt hearing approaches an infringement of the 
parties' right to seek recourse under the law.  Similarly, if 
22 
 
 
c.  Prior restraint on future litigation.  Additionally, 
the order here functionally placed a prior restraint on the 
parents' ability to file any future claim related to custody or 
visitation in court.  Indeed, the order expressly required the 
parties to submit all disputes regarding custody or visitation 
to the parent coordinator "before such matters are brought 
before the court."  This provision is unlike programs which may 
permit referral of a case to mediation or other alternative 
dispute resolution once the claims are reviewed by a judge and 
determined to be appropriate for such referral.  G. L. c. 211B, 
§ 19 (authorizing mandatory, nonbinding dispute resolution pilot 
program which requires screening and referral after action 
filed).  The order here denies the parents the right even to 
obtain access to the court regarding future disputes or other 
issues without first engaging with the parent coordinator.  This 
prior restraint on the ability to file future claims without 
both parents' consent may also infringe upon the parties' right 
to seek "recourse to the laws."12  Art. 11.  In an analogous 
                                                                  
the parties were before a judge in another type of proceeding in 
which immediate judicial action were necessary, for example, to 
enjoin an ongoing violation of a divorce judgment or temporary 
visitation plan, a judge should not defer the decision and refer 
the parties to a parent coordinator. 
 
 
12 Further, although the father in this case consented to 
pay for the services of the parent coordinator, requiring 
parties to use the services of a parent coordinator prior to 
filing any future actions related to custody and visitation 
could amount to conditioning the right of access to the courts 
23 
 
context, one State court held that a judge's bar on future 
postjudgment filings by parties to a divorce proceeding, absent 
demonstrated, good-faith participation in a "four-way settlement 
conference," constituted an impermissible burden on the parties' 
due process right of access to the courts.13  Parish v. Parish, 
988 A.2d 1180, 1182, 1190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
                                                                  
on the use of a costly service.  Although the record before us 
does not reflect the fees charged by the parent coordinator 
appointed in this case, the amici state that parent coordinators 
may charge several hundred dollars per hour.  See, e.g., Segal 
v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 230, 236 (2012) (parent coordinator's 
proposed retainer agreement provided for initial joint retainer 
of $5,000 against which fee of $325 per hour would be billed); 
Raviv v. Raviv, 64 A.D.3d 638, 638 (N.Y. 2009) (parent 
coordinator fee called for $2,500 retainer and $250 per hour 
after retainer).  Parent coordinator fees in Massachusetts are 
not regulated by statute or court rule.  Such a precondition on 
filing a claim implicates the right to access justice "without 
being obliged to purchase it" under art. 11, and the 
precondition offends Federal due process values where it could 
operate to foreclose a party's opportunity to access the court 
as a result of the party's inability to pay.  See Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-382 (1971). 
 
 
13 We also observe that a prior restraint on litigation is 
especially concerning in cases that may involve domestic 
violence.  Although not at issue in this case, requiring a party 
who is or has been a victim of domestic violence at the hands of 
the other party to submit to binding alternative dispute 
resolution with a parent coordinator as a prerequisite to filing 
a claim in court could result in requiring a party effectively 
to choose between safety and access to the courts.  See 2007 
Senate Doc. No. 895 (proposed parent coordinator legislation, if 
enacted, would have permitted court to terminate parent 
coordinator's appointment upon showing of past or present 
domestic violence that put victimized parent or child at risk of 
physical or emotional harm).  In related contexts, the Probate 
and Family Court has recognized that cases involving domestic 
violence should be exempt from certain procedures requiring the 
parties to meet outside of court.  See, e.g., Probate and Family 
Court Standing Order 1-06(4)(a) (2006) (in cases where domestic 
24 
 
 
d.  Impediments to judicial review.  Finally, the form of 
judicial review of the parent coordinator's decisions in the 
order at issue in this case is insufficient to cure the 
limitations on access to the courts created by compelling a 
parent to submit to binding dispute resolution.  Particularly in 
a case where one parent did not consent to this arrangement, it 
is not clear that merely providing for review of a parent 
coordinator's binding decision upon motion by a party is 
adequate to safeguard the parties' constitutional right of 
access to the court.  Indeed, even where both parties consent to 
participate in arbitration, the arbitrator's award is generally 
made binding by court order.  See Glenn Acres, Inc. v. Cliffwood 
Corp., 353 Mass. 150, 156 (1967) (statutory scheme governing 
commercial arbitration contemplates that finality of 
arbitrator's award is "subject to and dependent upon the entry 
of a judgment or decree by the court"). 
 
Further, by the express terms of the order, judicial review 
of a parent coordinator's binding decision may be entirely 
unavailable in many circumstances.  Specifically, the order 
provides in relevant part that decisions of the parent 
coordinator are binding as if court orders "unless either party, 
                                                                  
violence restraining order has been issued, parties not expected 
to confer out of court for purposes of agreeing on proposed 
schedule for trial); Probate and Family Court Standing Order 1-
10(B) (2010) (in cases where domestic violence restraining order 
has been issued, parties exempted from "introductory meeting" 
requirement). 
25 
 
if dissatisfied, comes to court before the decision is to take 
effect, and obtains a contrary order."  Thus, the temporal 
restrictions on the face of the order make clear that meaningful 
judicial review may be unavailable for any decision of the 
parent coordinator that will take effect before the party can 
obtain review by a judge.  Indeed, parent coordination services 
may be particularly beneficial to families in which disputes 
arise that require resolution sooner than a court may be 
available to hear a claim.  See Sullivan, Parenting 
Coordination:  Coming of Age?, 51 Fam. Ct. Rev. 56, 56 (2013).  
See also The AFCC Task Force on Parenting Coordination, 
Guidelines for Parenting Coordination, 44 Fam. Ct. Rev. 164, 172 
(2006).  Although expediency may be a beneficial feature of 
parent coordination services, the nature of these disputes also 
diminishes the practical availability of judicial review of a 
parent coordinator's decisions.  Indeed, conflicts over day-to-
day issues could arise and be decided by a parent coordinator 
within days of the event but without sufficient time to appeal 
the decision to the court before the appeal of the parent 
coordinator's decision is effectively moot.  Even disputes that 
arise within a few weeks or months of the event in issue must 
first be decided by the parent coordinator, which could leave 
little time between the issuance of the parent coordinator's 
decision and the disputed event.  Thus, by the plain wording of 
26 
 
this order, judicial review of some, if not many, of the parent 
coordinator's decisions could be completely unavailable. 
 
Consequently, a judge in the Probate and Family Court 
possesses the inherent authority to refer parties to a parent 
coordinator.  However, the appointment in this case exceeded the 
bounds of that authority by granting the parent coordinator 
binding decision-making authority without the consent of a 
party, deferring the decision on the parties' pending contempt 
complaints during the hearing on those complaints, placing a 
prior restraint on future claims also without the parties' 
consent, and potentially impeding judicial review of the parent 
coordinator's binding decisions. 
 
If the parties had consented to the appointment, or if the 
parent coordinator's authority had been limited to assisting the 
parties in resolving their disputes by issuing recommendations 
to the parties, the referral to the parent coordinator may have 
been permissible as a way to further the court's capacity to 
decide cases by encouraging resolution of the parties' disputes 
by the parties themselves.  Similarly, if the referral had not 
been made in lieu of a hearing and ruling on the parties' 
contempt complaints, but had been ordered while the parties were 
waiting for a scheduled hearing on the contempt, or as a way to 
expedite the negotiation of a settlement agreement or visitation 
plan while a divorce proceeding or complaint for modification 
27 
 
were pending, such an order may have been justified by the 
court's inherent authority.  However, in this case, the order, 
both in the nature of the authority granted to the parent 
coordinator and at the point in the proceedings in which it was 
issued, undermined the parties' right of access to the courts 
and therefore exceeded the scope of the judge's authority.  
Moreover, even if the order had arisen from a valid exercise of 
the judge's inherent authority, the scope of authority granted 
to the parent coordinator in this case constituted an unlawful 
delegation of judicial decision-making authority and must be 
vacated on that ground. 
 
3.  Judge's delegation of authority to the parent 
coordinator.  The order appointing the parent coordinator in 
this case provided that the parent coordinator "shall serve to 
hear all disputes between the parties regarding custody and 
visitation."  The mother argues that the scope of this order is 
so broad that it constitutes an unlawful delegation of judicial 
authority because nothing in this order prevents the parent 
coordinator from making structural changes to the custody 
arrangement without regard to the statutory standards which 
govern modification of final divorce judgments and because the 
judge abdicated her statutory authority to decide whether 
modifications to the custody arrangement are warranted.  We 
agree. 
28 
 
 
By statute, if a party seeks a modification of a final 
judgment of divorce, a judge may make a judgment modifying his 
or her earlier judgment provided the judge finds that "a 
material and substantial change in the circumstances of the 
parties has occurred and the judgment of modification is 
necessary in the best interests of the children."  G. L. c. 208, 
§ 28.  No such standard governs the parent coordinator in the 
order at issue in this case.  Indeed, if a dispute were to arise 
between the parents regarding the fundamental terms of the 
custody arrangement set forth in the final judgment of divorce, 
nothing in this order would prevent the parent coordinator from 
issuing a binding decision altering those fundamental terms 
without considering either a material change in the 
circumstances or the best interests of the children.14  Thus, the 
order is unlawful because it empowers the parent coordinator to 
make alterations to the parties' custody and visitation 
arrangements without regard to statutory criteria governing such 
changes.  See G. L. c. 208, § 28. 
                     
 
14 The father argues that the order does not exceed the 
scope of the judge's authority because neither the judge nor the 
father intended for the parent coordinator to be permitted to 
make significant, structural changes to the parties' custody and 
visitation plan.  However, the plain language of the order 
conveys no such limitation.  For example, if a dispute were to 
arise between the parents regarding winter visitation, such a 
dispute would appear to fall within the ambit of the authority 
granted to the parent coordinator to resolve, yet it could also 
involve a fundamental change to the parenting schedule set forth 
in the final judgment of divorce. 
29 
 
 
Moreover, even if the order had required the parent 
coordinator to apply the same statutory standard that governs a 
judge in ruling on a complaint for modification, the statute 
authorizes, and indeed obligates, the judge to issue the final 
decision on any modification to the family's custody 
arrangement.  See Gustin, 420 Mass. at 857-858 (statute granting 
probate judge discretion to make fair and equitable division of 
property upon divorce grants judge "authority" and "obligation" 
to make determination); Heistand v. Heistand, 384 Mass. 20, 26 
(1981) (in complaint for modification of divorce judgment, 
determination of "extent and palpability" of changed 
circumstances lies in discretion of trial judge).  In similar 
cases we have held that a judge cannot shift the final decision-
making authority granted by statute to a third party.  See 
Silverman v. Spiro, 438 Mass. 725, 736-737 (2003) (judge could 
not grant therapist "sole authority" to determine when parent-
child visitation would be appropriate where statute obligated 
judge to make specific findings on issue of visitation); 
Worcester County Trust Co. v. Marble, 316 Mass. 294, 301 (1944) 
(judge could not delegate to trustee authority to determine what 
constitutes "reasonable" legal fees where statute requires judge 
to make that determination).  See also P.W. v. M.S., 67 Mass. 
App. Ct. 779, 785-786 (2006) (judge cannot delegate wholesale to 
guardian ad litem statutory duty to conduct in camera review of 
30 
 
documents over which privilege asserted).  Consequently, the 
scope of the authority granted to the parent coordinator in this 
case renders the order an unlawful delegation of judicial 
authority, and it must be vacated. 
 
4.  Referral to the Probate and Family Court.  Although the 
order appointing the parent coordinator in this case must be 
vacated because it exceeds the bounds of the judge's inherent 
authority and constitutes, by its terms, an unlawful delegation 
of judicial decision-making authority, we recognize the valuable 
role that parent coordinators may play in assisting families 
involved in the Probate and Family Court system.  Consequently, 
we refer this matter to the Probate and Family Court to review 
and consider the promulgation of a rule governing the 
appointment of parent coordinators. 
 
A rule will help to ensure that procedural and substantive 
safeguards are in place in any appointment of a parent 
coordinator to address issues including the selection of a 
parent coordinator, the points in proceedings when parties may 
be referred to a parent coordinator, the nature and scope of the 
authority that may be granted to a parent coordinator, and 
issues related to the apportionment and payment of the parent 
coordinator's fees.  For example, a list of approved providers 
should be maintained and appointments distributed fairly 
therefrom in order to address the concerns regarding favoritism 
31 
 
in fee-generating appointments set forth in S.J.C. Rule 1:07, as 
amended, 431 Mass. 1301 (2000).  Further, a judge may not 
require the parties to use the services of the parent 
coordinator if the order would require one or both parents to 
pay for the services without his or her consent.  Additionally, 
even in a case where the parties consent to pay, various 
divisions of a parent coordinator's fee may be appropriate 
depending on the financial circumstances of each parent or the 
posture of the case.  However, care should be taken to ensure 
that the apportionment of fees does not give rise to the 
appearance of bias by the parent coordinator or give rise to 
problematic incentives of the parties. 
 
Additionally, a rule could assist in delineating the scope 
of authority that may be delegated to a parent coordinator 
without constituting an unlawful delegation of judicial 
authority.  For example, we have held that in some circumstances 
the delegation of certain judicial tasks to quasi judicial 
officers or third-party neutrals is permissible.  See Gustin, 
420 Mass. at 857-858 (judge could, in his discretion, require 
parties to submit dispute over property division to court-
appointed intermediary to find facts and make recommendations 
provided that intermediary was not authorized to make binding 
decisions without consent of parties); Jones v. Jones, 349 Mass. 
259, 264 (1965) (judge may delegate fact-finding functions to 
32 
 
guardian ad litem and consider recommendations contained in 
reports, provided judge retains ultimate responsibility to make 
custody decision).  Additionally, many jurisdictions that 
authorize the appointment of parent coordinators by statute or 
court rule expressly restrict the range of the parent 
coordinator's decision-making authority.  See, e.g., Fla. Stat. 
§ 61.125(1) (2009) (with prior approval of parents and court, 
parenting coordinator may be authorized to make limited 
decisions within scope of court's order of referral); La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 9:358.4(C) (2007) (parenting coordinator may not 
issue decisions but may submit recommendations in report to 
judge for final determination of disputes); N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 50-92(b) (2005) ("court may authorize a parenting coordinator 
to decide issues regarding the implementation of the parenting 
plan that are not specifically governed by court order"); Okla. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 120.3 (West 2003) ("The appointment of a 
parenting coordinator shall not divest the court of its 
exclusive jurisdiction to determine fundamental issues of 
custody, visitation, and support, and the authority to exercise 
management and control of the case"); S.D. Codified Laws § 25-4-
70 (2013) ("A parenting coordinator shall not have the authority 
to make any decision affecting child support, a change of 
custody, or a substantial change in parenting time"); Tex. Fam. 
33 
 
Code Ann. § 153.606(c) (West 2009) ("The parenting coordinator 
may not modify any order, judgment, or decree"). 
 
Further, the Probate and Family Court may wish to consider 
other issues such as the training, licensing, or monitoring of 
parent coordinators, whether and how parents may file complaints 
or seek removal of parent coordinators, confidentiality 
policies, impartiality, and case screening procedures.  In so 
doing, the Probate and Family Court may wish to draw on S.J.C. 
Rule 1:18 in crafting a rule governing parent coordinators as 
S.J.C. Rule 1:18 reflects many important limitations on the 
authority of individuals who play a role in assisting litigating 
parties in resolving their disputes out of court.  The court may 
also wish to consider whether to propose an amendment to S.J.C. 
Rule 1:18 recognizing parent coordination as a form of dispute 
resolution services that may be covered by the rule.  
Ultimately, the Probate and Family Court should be guided by the 
boundaries on a judge's inherent authority referenced in this 
opinion. 
 
We further acknowledge that parent coordination services 
are being used with increasing frequency in Massachusetts and 
that such services may provide an important benefit to families 
and to the court system.  Therefore, nothing in this decision 
should be construed to limit the ability of parties to agree to 
use the services of a parent coordinator or for a judge to 
34 
 
incorporate that agreement into a judgment of divorce or to 
otherwise enforce the agreement using contract principles. 
 
5.  Conclusion.  The terms of the appointment of the parent 
coordinator in this case exceed the bounds of the judge's 
inherent authority, and the breadth of the order constitutes an 
impermissible delegation of judicial decision-making authority. 
Accordingly, we vacate the original order of appointment, the 
clarified order, and the portion of the judgment issued 
requiring the parties to comply with the order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.