Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Ronald A. Arthur
Citation: 2005 WI 40
Docket Number: 2001AP001914-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 2005

2005 WI 40 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2001AP1914-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Ronald A. Arthur, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation f/k/a Board  
of Attorneys Professional Responsibility,  
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Ronald A. Arthur,  
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ARTHUR 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 15, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 6, 2004 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent there were briefs by Ronald A. Arthur, 
Lake Geneva, and oral argument by Ronald A. Arthur. 
 
For the complainant there was a brief by James C. Reiher 
and Domnitz, Mawicke & Goisman, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by James C. Reiher. 
 
 
2005 WI 40 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2001AP1914-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Ronald A. Arthur, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, f/k/a Board  
of Attorneys Professional Responsibility,  
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Ronald A. Arthur,  
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
 APR 15, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding. 
 
Attorney's 
license 
revoked.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Ronald A. Arthur seeks review 
of 
a 
referee's 
report 
and 
recommendation, 
recommending 
revocation of his license to practice law in Wisconsin, and 
recommending further that Arthur be required to pay the costs of 
this disciplinary proceeding, which are substantial. 
¶2 
Arthur 
challenges 
the 
referee's 
findings 
and 
conclusions and urges the court to:  (1) reject the referee's 
report in its entirety; (2) dismiss all allegations in the 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
2 
 
Office of 
Lawyer 
Regulation's 
(OLR) 
complaint; 
(3) accept 
Arthur's voluntary resignation from the State Bar of Wisconsin; 
(4) order the OLR to reimburse Arthur for his legal fees and 
expenses; (5) vacate a decision of the Juneau County Circuit 
Court; (6) issue an order enjoining the grievants from ever 
asserting another claim against him; and (7) direct the OLR and 
Judicial Commission to take appropriate disciplinary action 
against the other parties to this litigation. 
¶3 
We determine that the referee's findings of facts are 
not clearly erroneous.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 243, 562 N.W.2d 137 (1997). 
Those findings were supported by the clear, satisfactory, and 
convincing evidence presented at the public hearing held in this 
disciplinary matter and reflected in the record.  After our 
de novo review of the referee's conclusions of law, see In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248 
Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 718, we agree with the referee that the 
extensive pattern of misconduct found by the referee reflects 
serious, widespread, and repeated violations of the Rules of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility, warranting the revocation 
of Arthur's license to practice law in Wisconsin.  
¶4 
Accordingly, we reject Arthur's requests, adopt the 
referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law, and revoke 
Arthur's license to practice law in Wisconsin.  We further agree 
with the referee that Arthur should be required to pay to the 
OLR all the costs connected with this disciplinary proceeding 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
3 
 
totaling $145,548.73 as of the date of the final statement of 
costs filed on October 19, 2004. 
¶5 
Arthur was admitted to practice in Wisconsin in 1982.  
He has no significant disciplinary history.  His license to 
practice law in Wisconsin is currently suspended for failure to 
comply with continuing education requirements.   
¶6 
In December 1995, William ("Jack") Keefe filed a 
grievance against Arthur through the (former) Board of Attorneys 
Professional Responsibility (BAPR).  The allegations derived 
from a failed business venture involving Keefe and his adult 
son, Randy Keefe (the "Keefes"), Arthur, as the Keefes' attorney 
and business advisor, and Arthur's wife, Mary Kathleen Arthur, 
also an attorney.1  The matter also implicated allegations of 
damage done to property in Juneau County owned by Barbara Doyle.  
These events will be discussed in a chronological sequence. 
¶7 
A lengthy disciplinary investigation ensued.  On July 
13, 2001, the BAPR's successor, the OLR, filed a complaint 
against 
Arthur 
alleging 
six 
counts 
of 
misconduct, 
and 
recommending revocation of Arthur's license to practice law.   
¶8 
On October 14, 2003, following extensive pre-hearing 
proceedings, admission of thousands of pages of documentary 
evidence, 22 days of hearings, and post-hearing proceedings, the 
referee 
filed 
a 
report 
and 
recommendation, 
recommending 
                                                 
1 Attorney Mary Kathleen Arthur stipulated to a 90-day 
suspension for her misconduct in proceedings related to some of 
the allegations herein.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Arthur, 2004 WI 66, 272 Wis. 2d 252, 680 N.W.2d 758. 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
4 
 
revocation of Arthur's license to practice law.  Arthur sought 
review.   
¶9 
A discussion of the incidents giving rise to this 
disciplinary proceeding is unavoidable.  These incidents have 
been the subject of several lawsuits by various individuals and 
entities, in various courts.  In some cases, different courts 
have made differing factual findings, depending on the cause of 
action presented or procedural posture of the matter.  However, 
we are mindful that our task today is not to review the 
decisions of other courts that are not before us on appeal, or 
to permit "re-litigation" of old grievances.  To that end, 
certain details we deem not relevant to the issues before us 
will be omitted.  Our task is to review Arthur's challenge to 
the referee's report and recommendation.  The court will adopt 
the referee's findings of fact unless they are "clearly 
erroneous."  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Swartwout, 
116 Wis. 2d 380, 382, 342 N.W.2d 406 (1984). We will review the 
referee's conclusions of law de novo.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Hetzel, 118 Wis. 2d 257, 259, 346 N.W.2d 782 
(1984). 
¶10 In August 1992, Randy Keefe retained Arthur to 
represent him in a pending action, unrelated to the present 
disciplinary action, in which Keefe had previously appeared 
pro se.  Arthur worked on the matter until approximately 
February 1994, when the action was dismissed.  He also 
represented the Keefes in "certain other small legal matters" 
from approximately August 1992 to August 1994.  Arthur was not 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
5 
 
the only lawyer the Keefes worked with.  Other counsel 
represented the Keefes in various other matters, including 
bankruptcy and divorce proceedings.  The Keefes and Arthur 
dispute whether Arthur continued to represent the Keefes from 
the fall of 1994 through spring of 1995.   
¶11 In any event, early in 1994, Randy Keefe and Arthur 
discussed a possible business arrangement whereby Arthur would 
purchase parcels of wooded land, and a corporation owned by the 
Keefes would harvest the marketable timber and pay Arthur a 
higher price for the timber than other loggers would.  The 
anticipated benefit to the Keefes was that their corporation 
would not have to pay Arthur for the timber up front; Arthur 
would be paid from the proceeds received from the sale of the 
harvested timber.   
¶12 From approximately June to November 1994, Arthur 
purchased four parcels of wooded land in southwestern Wisconsin.  
The parties entered into four separate Timber Purchase and Sale 
Agreements to harvest timber on those sites.  Each of these 
agreements was by and among Ronald Arthur and Halco Financial 
and Realty Corporation2 d/b/a Forest Hills Reserve, Ltd., and 
Statewide Log and Lumber Co., Inc. ("Statewide").3  Randy Keefe, 
                                                 
2 Arthur was president and legal counsel to Halco Financial 
and 
Realty 
Corporation 
(HALCO), 
an 
entity 
created 
and 
incorporated by Arthur, and owned by Mary Kathleen Arthur, as 
custodian for the Arthurs' then minor child.  HALCO was a 
business involved in real estate development.   
3 Statewide was formed in March 1993, with Randy Keefe as 
its president.  Statewide was owned by Ivan Schairer, a man who 
apparently financed business ventures for the Keefes.    
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
6 
 
on behalf of Statewide, and Arthur signed each of the four 
contracts.  Each contract identified Statewide as the purchaser 
of the timber.  The parties dispute whether Arthur provided 
legal services to Statewide.  Arthur notes that he did not 
prepare the articles of incorporation for this entity.  He 
acknowledges that he "attempted to find a source for certain 
financing that the Keefes were seeking [for Statewide]," but 
maintains that he and the Keefes viewed financial advice as 
separate and distinct from the rendering of legal advice.  In 
subsequent litigation, evidence was produced that reflected 
Arthur did submit a bill for legal services he purported to have 
rendered for Statewide. 
¶13 Logging operations on the four parcels commenced in 
the summer of 1994.  Progress on one of the parcels, referred to 
as the "Viroqua" parcel, was apparently slow.  By the late fall 
of 1994, it is apparent from all versions of events, that the 
relationship between the Keefes and Arthur was deteriorating.   
¶14 Arthur avers that the Keefes did not pay him for the 
timber they harvested, and that he lost some $50,000 as a 
result.  The Keefes testified that Arthur tried to "coerce" them 
into accepting a $150,000 loan, and testified that they believed 
the money was part of an illegal Russian money laundering 
operation.  They later testified that they felt threatened by 
Arthur.   
¶15 The record reflects conflicting testimony about the 
state of the business venture in January 1995.  About this time 
Arthur sent a letter to Tri-City National Bank seeking financing 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
7 
 
for a "Joint Venture Business Plan" between HALCO and Statewide.  
However, this plan was not financed.  As such, this proposed 
"joint venture" did not materialize.   
¶16 Around the same time, the Keefes testified that they 
had a meeting with Arthur in which they expressed their desire 
to restructure the agreements to relieve Statewide of its 
obligations under the timber contracts.  It is suggested that 
their financier wanted out of the deal.4   
¶17 On or about January 23, 1995, Arthur sent a letter to 
the Keefes in connection with an offer to purchase, advising 
them for the first time that they should seek independent legal 
counsel or sign a waiver pursuant to SCR 20:1.8.  The Keefes did 
not execute either document.   
¶18 Meanwhile, Arthur independently entered a business 
relationship with Thomas Zupfer, a logger hired by Arthur or 
HALCO, to pursue logging on the parcels.  Arthur alleges that 
Randy Keefe "caused Statewide" to stop harvesting timber at the 
Viroqua site and moved the logging operations to another parcel 
owned by Arthur in Juneau County.  The Juneau County parcel 
owned by Arthur was adjacent to a four-acre parcel owned by 
Barbara Doyle. 
¶19 At some point in early 1995, Ms. Doyle discovered that 
a logging road had been cut across the corner of her property, 
                                                 
4 It appears that the decision to physically alter the 
contracts to replace the name Statewide with "Keefes" occurred 
around this time.  The Keefes testified Arthur was aware of this 
decision and acceded to it; Arthur disputes this. 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
8 
 
without her permission.  Ms. Doyle felt the aesthetic damage to 
her property was significant.  This incident was the origin of a 
separate dispute between Ms. Doyle and Arthur, which eventually 
culminated in litigation implicated in this disciplinary action.   
¶20 Meanwhile, in the spring of 1995, the Keefes removed 
"hundreds of logs" from Arthur's parcel of property located in 
Lyndon Station and transferred them for storage on the Keefes' 
property in Endeavor, Wisconsin ("Endeavor property").  The 
parties vigorously dispute the Keefes' authority to remove the 
logs. 
¶21 On April 18, 1995, the Keefes delivered a letter to 
Arthur, 
terminating 
the 
business 
and 
attorney-client 
relationship with Arthur.  The referee found that on the same 
day, Arthur acknowledged the termination, and directed the 
Keefes to stop logging and to make an accounting of the logs 
stored on the Endeavor property.  The referee also found that 
Arthur submitted a settlement proposal to the Keefes and 
directed 
them 
to 
find and 
consult 
a 
lawyer, 
all 
while 
transferring his interest in the logs at the Endeavor property 
to 
Thomas 
Zupfer's 
company, 
Zupfer 
Timber 
Corporation 
International ("Zupfer Timber").   
¶22 On April 24, 1995, Attorney Mary Kathleen Arthur, on 
behalf of Arthur, HALCO, and Zupfer Timber, filed a summons, 
complaint and ex parte motion for temporary injunction against 
the Keefes seeking to remove the logs on the Endeavor property.  
The motion was denied; Attorney Mary Kathleen Arthur dismissed 
the action.  
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
9 
 
¶23 On April 25, 1995, Arthur, together with a deputy from 
the Marquette County Sheriff's Department, went to the Endeavor 
property to "recover" logs taken from the Lyndon Station and 
Viroqua properties.  No court order was in effect at this time.  
Randy Keefe was arrested during this incident, purportedly for, 
inter alia, preventing the removal of the logs.   
¶24 Later that same day, Arthur commenced a second action 
and obtained a temporary injunction giving him control of the 
logs, including those he had seized from the Keefes.  Randy 
Keefe was served with a copy of this order after the logs had 
been removed.  A series of lawsuits arose as a result of these 
incidents.  Our discussion of the litigation that arose as a 
result of these incidents is, in keeping with our objective of 
avoiding 
"re-litigation" 
of 
settled 
matters, 
somewhat 
abbreviated. 
¶25 Returning 
to the 
incident 
involving 
Ms. Doyle's 
property, some correspondence between Arthur and Ms. Doyle's 
attorney, Eli Schmukler, ensued, including a statement by 
Arthur, warning Attorney Schmukler that Ms. Doyle "might find 
the litigation process unpleasant."   
¶26 On August 31, 1995, Arthur commenced a lawsuit in 
Dodge County, alleging numerous contract and tort claims against 
the Keefes and Statewide still related to their business 
dispute, but also seeking a declaratory judgment that neither 
Arthur nor HALCO were liable for the trespass to Ms. Doyle's 
property ("Dodge County lawsuit").  Eleven days later, Ms. Doyle 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
10 
 
sued Arthur in trespass, filing the action in Juneau County 
where she lived on the property in question. 
¶27 In response to Arthur's Dodge County lawsuit, the 
Keefes asked the court to transfer the matter to Marquette 
County, where another case filed against them by Arthur was 
pending.   
¶28 Meanwhile, correspondence between Attorney Schmukler 
and Arthur was increasingly acrimonious.  Arthur informed 
Attorney Schmukler that his wife, Mary Kathleen Arthur, was a 
former district attorney for Dodge County.  Attorney Schmukler 
later asserted that he believed this statement was intended to 
intimidate him in the context of the pending litigation in Dodge 
County.  He also avers that Arthur stated he would sue Attorney 
Schmukler, personally, for abuse of process and conspiracy if 
the action Ms. Doyle had commenced in Juneau County was not 
dismissed. 
¶29 On or about December 11, 1995, Arthur filed a severed 
complaint in the Dodge County action, alleging that Ms. Doyle 
and the Keefes had acted in concert to defame and otherwise 
injure him.  Ms. Doyle moved to strike that complaint.  
¶30 In February 1996, the Dodge County Circuit Court 
transferred venue of Arthur's claims against the Keefes to 
Marquette County, and dismissed Arthur's declaratory judgment 
claim against Ms. Doyle.  The court also transferred Arthur's 
conspiracy claims and Doyle's motion to dismiss those claims, to 
Juneau County.  
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
11 
 
¶31 Throughout late 1995 and well into 1996, Arthur filed 
numerous sets of interrogatories, requests for admission, and 
requests 
for 
production 
of 
documents 
in 
these 
matters.  
Apparently, several of those requests went unanswered by the 
Keefes, who were still proceeding pro se.  Arthur then filed a 
motion contending the Keefes had engaged in discovery violations 
and seeking sanctions. 
¶32 Eventually, the Dodge and Marquette County cases were 
consolidated, and the Keefes filed additional counterclaims. 
Additional motions followed.  On May 1, 1998, the circuit court 
ruled that the Keefes were in default for failing to appear at a 
pretrial conference and dismissed all of their claims.   
¶33 The matter went to trial on Arthur's claims. The trial 
court ultimately dismissed Arthur's claims against the Keefes on 
the 
grounds 
that 
Arthur 
had 
misused 
his 
attorney-client 
relationship 
with 
the 
Keefes 
by 
engaging 
in 
a 
business 
relationship without advising them of a conflict of interest, 
instead seeking to protect his own self-interest. 
¶34 Meanwhile, 
Arthur 
effectively 
failed 
to 
file 
a 
necessary pleading in the case pending in Juneau County Circuit 
Court; Ms. Doyle was granted a default judgment.  The court 
later denied Arthur's motion to set aside the default judgment, 
and ordered a hearing on the amount of damages to which Ms. 
Doyle was entitled.   
¶35 In a memorandum decision dated July 31, 1997, the 
Juneau County Circuit Court found that Arthur "intentionally and 
maliciously used his and his wife's position and knowledge as 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
12 
 
attorneys in an all out effort to intimidate [Ms.] Doyle 
. . . ."  In addition, the circuit court found that Arthur had 
threatened to sue Ms. Doyle and her attorneys for conspiracy and 
extortion without any factual basis for such a complaint.  Ms. 
Doyle was eventually awarded $34,720 in compensatory damages and 
$75,000 in punitive damages.  To date, this judgment remains 
unsatisfied.5   
¶36 The 
Juneau County 
court 
also dismissed Arthur's 
"severed complaint" as untimely, and deemed Arthur's amended 
complaint "incomprehensible."  The court expressly added that 
Arthur could refile the complaint.  
¶37 Arthur opted to appeal.  The court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court decision, concluding "Arthur's claim that the 
trial court 'disregarded' this action while it proceeded with 
Doyle's case is without support in the record."  Arthur v. 
Keefe, No. 98-1897, unpublished slip op. at 1 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Nov. 4, 1999).   
¶38 Having been assessed punitive damages in the Juneau 
County case, Arthur proceeded to file an action seeking 
indemnification from his legal malpractice carrier.  He also 
filed a cross-claim against Ms. Doyle in this action, naming Ms. 
Doyle's attorneys as third-party defendants, and, despite the 
                                                 
5 Arthur spends a good portion of his brief to this court 
challenging this decision and challenging the extent to which it 
formed the basis for some of the referee's factual findings.  
Indeed, he asserts that the real question for this court is 
whether a lawyer can be disbarred "based upon putative facts 
that have been deemed into existence by a circuit court judge, 
even though said deemed facts are in conflict with real facts 
that can be readily ascertained." 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
13 
 
circuit court's previous findings, alleging that Ms. Doyle and 
her attorneys had engaged in conspiracy and extortion against 
him.  This action was later dismissed.  
¶39 A number of other legal proceedings arose as a result 
of these incidents as well.  With competing actions in Dodge, 
Marquette, Juneau, Milwaukee and Adams Counties, not to mention 
federal and bankruptcy court proceedings, the "civil procedure 
aspects of the litigation" were, to quote the Marquette County 
Circuit Court, "a mess."   
¶40 The disciplinary complaint ultimately filed against 
Arthur alleged six counts of professional misconduct.  These 
will be addressed seriatim. 
COUNT I: SCR 20:1.8(a) 
¶41 The 
disciplinary 
complaint 
alleged 
that 
Arthur 
violated SCR 20:1.8(a), which provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business 
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an 
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary 
interest adverse to a client unless: 
(1) the transaction and terms on which the 
lawyer 
acquires 
the 
interest 
are 
fair 
and 
reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed 
and transmitted in writing to the client in a 
manner which can be reasonably understood by the 
client; 
(2) 
the 
client 
is 
given 
a 
reasonable 
opportunity to seek the advice of independent 
counsel in the transaction; and 
(3) the client consents in writing thereto. 
¶42 The question for this court is whether the OLR 
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Arthur 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
14 
 
violated SCR 20:1.8(a).  The referee concluded that it had, 
finding, inter alia, that Arthur and the Keefes were involved in 
a "series of complex business transactions . . . while [Arthur] 
was representing them as their attorney between 1992 and 1995."  
Referencing 
the 
four 
separate 
Timber 
Purchase 
and 
Sale 
Agreements, the referee found that Arthur "failed to obtain any 
written waivers from the Keefes and/or Statewide consenting to 
his legal 
representation 
notwithstanding the 
conflicts of 
interest 
in 
his 
personal 
business 
dealings 
with 
the 
Keefes . . . ."   
¶43 Arthur 
challenges 
the 
referee's 
findings 
and 
conclusion.  He contends he never entered into a "business 
transaction" with the Keefes as that term is used in SCR 
20:1.8(a).  Arthur acknowledges that he entered a "logging 
contract" with Statewide, but essentially asserts that a 
transaction with the entity, Statewide, is not the same as a 
business transaction with the Keefes.  He points out that the 
proposed joint venture with the Keefes was never formalized, 
noting that the financing proposal submitted to Tri-City was 
never approved.  He contends that Attorney Schmukler committed 
misconduct 
by 
suggesting 
otherwise 
in 
the 
Juneau 
County 
proceedings.6  
                                                 
6 Specifically, Arthur maintains that Attorney Schmukler 
engaged in misconduct, misleading the court, when he attached a 
copy of one of the logging contracts between Statewide and 
HALCO, on which the name "Statewide" had been crossed out and 
the Keefes' names handwritten in, together with a copy of the 
unexecuted "joint venture" financing plan. 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
15 
 
¶44 We consider the comment to SCR 20:1.8, which indicates 
that this rule "does not, however, apply to standard commercial 
transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or 
services that the client generally markets to others, for 
example, 
banking or brokerage services, medical 
services, 
products 
manufactured 
or 
distributed 
by 
the 
client, 
and 
utilities services."  The comment states further:  "In such 
transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the 
client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary 
and impracticable." 
¶45 However, the referee explicitly found that "[t]hese 
were not standard commercial transactions."  Although Arthur 
disparages the referee's understanding in his effort to persuade 
us that these were in fact run-of-the-mill transactions in which 
he was actually at the mercy of the Keefes' superior knowledge 
of logging operations, we are not persuaded that the referee's 
finding on this point is clearly erroneous.  
¶46 Arthur has not identified sufficient record evidence 
that 
the 
logging 
operations 
conducted 
by 
Statewide 
were 
demonstrably of the sort that Statewide generally marketed to 
others.  More significantly, while we appreciate the distinction 
Arthur draws between the Keefes, as individuals, and Statewide, 
as a discrete entity owned by Ivan Schairer, in this matter we 
deem this a distinction without a difference.  Here, Arthur 
started as a business associate and legal advisor to the Keefes, 
then proceeded to sue them in different venues when their 
business dealings went awry, without obtaining a waiver.  SCR 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
16 
 
20:1.8 clearly provides that a lawyer shall not "knowingly 
acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary 
interest adverse to a client" without satisfying the rule's 
written waiver requirements.   
¶47 The 
first 
written 
documentation in 
which 
Arthur 
advises the Keefes of a conflict between the parties' interests 
was in a letter dated January 23, 1995.  It is undisputed that 
the Keefes did not consent to or waive the conflict.   
¶48 The waiver requirements of SCR 20:1.8 cannot be 
satisfied solely by a client signing the underlying loan 
documents, the terms of which are already required to be in 
writing under sub. (a)1.  "[T]he client must give separate 
consent to the transaction with the lawyer, waiving the conflict 
of interest, and the client must indicate in writing he or she 
has been given a reasonable opportunity to consult with 
independent counsel."  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Trewin, 2004 WI 116, ¶38, 275 Wis. 2d 116, 684 N.W.2d 121. 
¶49 We conclude that there are sufficient facts of record 
to support the referee's findings of fact made in connection 
with this allegation, and we conclude that Arthur violated SCR 
20:1.8(a) by engaging in business transactions in which the 
Keefes had a significant personal and financial interest, 
without having first obtained written waiver as required by SCR 
20:1.8.  
COUNT II:  SCR 20:3.1(a)(3) 
¶50 We turn to the second count in the disciplinary 
complaint filed against Arthur.  The disciplinary complaint 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
17 
 
alleged 
and 
the 
referee 
found 
that 
Arthur 
violated 
SCR 
20:3.1(a)(3) which provides that, in representing a client, a 
lawyer shall not "file a suit, assert a position, conduct a 
defense, delay a trial or take other action on behalf of the 
client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such an 
action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure 
another." 
¶51 Arthur levies several challenges to the referee's 
findings and conclusion.  We will address the most significant 
of these arguments.  The referee's extensive findings in 
relation to this court are summarized as follows: 
Arthur told Attorney Schmukler that Ms. Doyle 
might find the litigation process "unpleasant."   
Arthur and his wife, Attorney Mary Kathleen 
Arthur, sent a series of letters attempting to 
intimidate Attorney Schmukler, such as indicating that 
Mary Kathleen was a former district attorney in Dodge 
County, alleging conspiracy and abuse of process, and 
threatening to sue Attorney Schmukler personally if 
the Doyle action was not dismissed.   
In response to Ms. Doyle's complaint, filing an 
amended complaint alleging Ms. Doyle acted in concert 
with the Keefes to defame or otherwise injure him.   
Approving Attorney Mary Kathleen Arthur's filing 
of a petition for supervisory writ in the court of 
appeals, 
including 
the 
execution 
of 
affidavits 
accusing the judge of ulterior motives and bias 
without specific facts to support the claims.   
Following 
the 
default 
judgment 
against 
him, 
filing an indemnification claim with his insurance 
carrier, 
impleading 
Ms. 
Doyle and 
her 
attorney, 
alleging they had maliciously conspired with the 
Keefes to harm him, notwithstanding previous rulings 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
18 
 
that they had not so conspired.  See Heritage Mutual 
Ins. Co. v. Arthur et al., 97 CV 9686. 
Filing 
a 
complaint 
with 
the 
Department 
of 
Agriculture against the Keefes one day before Randy 
Keefe was scheduled to testify in the disciplinary 
matter.   
Other examples of harassing litigation tactics 
employed by Arthur in other cases, such as suing 
judges and opposing counsel in various actions in 
order to harass or induce them to withdraw from cases, 
in one instance commenting that he had an attorney "by 
the nuts" and was going to "jerk them for the next 
five years" by filing an action unless they agreed to 
his terms. 
¶52 Arthur suggests that any findings made in connection 
with the Juneau County lawsuit should be considered void based 
on his contention Attorney Schmukler committed misconduct by 
submitting certain documents to the court.  With respect to the 
specific comment made to Attorney Schmukler that Ms. Doyle might 
find the litigation process "unpleasant," Arthur defends this 
statement and expresses incredulity that he would be disciplined 
for what he deems to be his effort to take the "moral high-
ground."  He suggests "the Referee's Report seems to assert that 
it constitutes professional misconduct for a lawyer to indicate 
in writing that he or she even intends to abide by SCR 20:8.3."  
Similarly, he disputes that he intended to "intimidate" opposing 
counsel.   
¶53 The referee obviously found otherwise. Discerning the 
"intent" behind an attorney's statement to opposing counsel 
frequently requires a credibility determination by the referee.  
Here, Arthur did not persuade the referee that the Juneau County 
default judgment should be wholly ignored because of Attorney 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
19 
 
Schmukler's conduct, or that his own comments to Attorney 
Schmukler were made in good faith.  Nor, apparently, did he 
persuade the referee that the Keefes were wholly lacking in 
credibility, 
or 
that 
he, 
himself, 
was 
entitled 
to 
much 
credibility.  It is well settled that where there is conflicting 
testimony, the referee, as finder of fact, is the ultimate 
arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses.  See, e.g., 
Swartwout, 116 Wis. 2d 380; Cogswell v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 
87 Wis. 2d 243, 274 N.W.2d 647 (1979).  We will not disturb the 
referee's credibility determinations here. 
¶54 Arthur generally defends his litigation style and 
strategy.  He blames the Keefes, who certainly contributed to 
the extent of the litigation.  Arthur also challenges the 
referee's findings regarding his conduct in litigation not 
mentioned in the disciplinary complaint.  He asserts that he had 
inadequate notice of these allegations, and suggests this 
implicates his due process rights.  While the complaint contains 
specific allegations regarding the transactions and litigation 
among the Keefes and Ms. Doyle, it is true that the complaint 
does not reference allegations of Arthur's conduct in other 
court proceedings. 
¶55 The referee made findings that Arthur has engaged in a 
pattern of harassing conduct for more than a decade, finding, 
specifically, that Arthur has sued opposing counsel and judges 
in various matters, and has threatened to file disciplinary 
grievances against lawyers and judges in other matters; noted 
other trial courts have found such tactics to be "frivolous, 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
20 
 
commenced, used, and continued in bad faith and solely for the 
purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring another." The 
referee also made reference to statements by several judges that 
Arthur was not credible.7   
¶56 We conclude that there is no need for this court to 
decide whether there was sufficient notice of the findings 
regarding Arthur's misuse of the litigation process beyond the 
Doyle and Keefe matters, because these findings are not 
necessary to sustain a conclusion that Arthur violated SCR 
20:3.1(a). 
COUNT III:  SCR 20:3.2 
¶57 We turn to the third count alleged in the disciplinary 
complaint.  The disciplinary complaint alleged that Arthur 
violated SCR 20:3.2, which provides:  "A lawyer shall make 
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the 
interests of the client."  The referee found that Arthur 
"undertook numerous efforts to unreasonably delay and impede the 
course of litigation and needlessly increase the cost related 
thereto."  The referee identified five specific examples of 
Arthur's 
duplicative 
litigation, 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
discovery requests, or other conduct that frustrated the 
discovery process. 
                                                 
7 For example, during a June 1998 trial proceeding, the 
Honorable Richard Wright said "the court just can't buy your 
testimony . . . . [I]t is a conflict of interest because you 
have a stake in that . . . business deal . . . . [Y]ou did not 
make sure your clients have this protection as an attorney who 
wasn't self-dealing. . . . Instead of taking steps to protect 
them, you took steps to protect yourself, including litigation."  
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
21 
 
¶58 Arthur 
challenges 
the 
referee's 
findings 
and 
conclusion.  He asserts, again, that the Keefes engaged in 
similar litigation tactics and seeks to justify his extensive 
discovery filings in this disciplinary matter, explaining that 
he was attempting to "pin down [the] OLR's allegations and/or 
limit the scope of the proceedings."  However, it is not these 
discovery tactics for which he is being disciplined.   
¶59 We are mindful that the situation before the court is 
somewhat unusual in that Arthur or his wife, Attorney Mary 
Kathleen Arthur, were acting as counsel on behalf of the 
Arthurs' own business interests——albeit interests adverse to 
Ronald Arthur's former clients. 
¶60 As there is little case law directly on point we are 
guided in part by the comment to this rule, which recognizes 
that dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute.   
Delay 
should 
not 
be 
indulged 
merely 
for 
the 
convenience of the advocates, or for the purpose of 
frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain 
rightful redress or repose.  It is not a justification 
that similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench 
and bar.  The question is whether a competent lawyer 
acting in good faith would regard the course of action 
as having some substantial purpose other than delay.  
Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise 
improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate 
interest of the client. 
SCR 20:3.2 cmt.   
¶61 Notwithstanding Arthur's protestations, the record 
reflects 
numerous 
examples 
of 
duplicative 
or 
excessive 
litigation, such as the fact that the Juneau County Circuit 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
22 
 
Court deemed Arthur's amended complaint "incomprehensible" and 
as the Marquette County Circuit Court noted, "one of the 
lengthiest and most difficult [complaints] to follow . . . that 
[this Court] had ever reviewed."  This observation is not 
dependent on the underlying facts of record, however disputed.  
We are not persuaded that the referee's findings of fact are 
clearly erroneous and we have little difficulty concluding that 
the record contains clear and convincing evidence that Arthur 
violated SCR 20:3.2. 
COUNT IV:  SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) 
¶62 The referee also concluded that Arthur violated SCR 
20:3.3(a)(1), which provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly 
"make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal."  Here, 
the referee found that Arthur made "numerous" false statements 
to a tribunal, including the following, which are distilled from 
the referee's findings of fact: 
The Juneau County Circuit Court, the Honorable 
John Brady presiding, found that Arthur "falsely 
testified that, in the latter part of 1994, his 
relationship with the Keefes became adversarial." The 
referee noted that this statement was contradicted by 
a letter dated January 4, 1995 from Arthur to Tri-City 
National Bank in which he sought financing for himself 
and Statewide and asserted that he had a "good 
relationship" with the Keefes. 
The Juneau County court found that Arthur falsely 
testified that he could not remember the specific 
nature of HALCO's activities, notwithstanding the fact 
that Arthur's wife owned HALCO, for the benefit of 
their minor child, and that he served as its president 
and acted as its attorney for many years. 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
23 
 
The Juneau County court found that Arthur falsely 
testified on May 16, 1997, that he was insolvent and 
owed $100,000 when on December 31, 1996, he submitted 
a statement of net worth to Tri-City National Bank 
that indicated he and his wife's net worth exceeded 
$500,000.  When questioned how he had lost $600,000 in 
five months, he attributed it to the litigation with 
the Keefes and Ms. Doyle, despite the fact he and his 
wife were representing themselves. 
The Juneau County court found that Arthur falsely 
testified about the property lines on Ms. Doyle's 
property. 
¶63 Arthur vigorously challenges these findings.  He 
emphasizes that the Juneau County Circuit Court order was on a 
default judgment, suggesting that the court simply took the 
facts alleged in the complaint, and adopted them without further 
scrutiny.  He claims, further, that the judges quoted by the 
referee lacked "personal knowledge" of the circumstances.  He is 
aggrieved that the referee adopted almost none of his proposed 
findings of fact, but accepted the OLR's proposed findings 
almost verbatim. 
¶64 We are not persuaded that the reliance on statements 
by the circuit court should be disregarded.  A number of these 
findings were based, for example, on the court's consideration 
of Arthur's own testimony, which it characterized as "evasive, 
inaccurate and unworthy of belief."   
¶65 Arthur also specifically challenges the referee's 
findings regarding his representation of the relationship with 
the Keefes, noting that the Keefes had also testified that the 
relationship was adversarial by fall of 1994.  He challenges the 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
24 
 
finding regarding HALCO, noting that he did describe some of the 
company's activities.   
¶66 We are not persuaded that the referee's findings of 
fact made in connection with this count can be deemed clearly 
erroneous.  The record in this disciplinary proceeding includes 
more than six boxes of documents, and, as already noted, there 
have been multiple actions filed in connection with the 
underlying 
disputes. 
 
Inconsistencies 
in 
testimony 
are 
inevitable, from all parties, including Arthur.  Moreover, as 
the 
situation 
involving 
Arthur's 
financial 
circumstances 
exemplifies, "[t]here are circumstances where failure to make a 
disclosure 
is 
the 
equivalent 
of 
an 
affirmative 
misrepresentation."  SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) cmt. (Representation by a 
Lawyer).  Even if we disregard the two findings Arthur 
specifically challenges in ¶65 of this decision, there is still 
sufficient record evidence to sustain the referee's conclusion 
that Arthur made false statements before a tribunal in violation 
of SCR 20:3.3(a)(1). 
COUNT V:  SCR 20:3.4(b) 
¶67 The 
disciplinary 
complaint 
alleged 
that 
Arthur 
violated SCR 20:3.4(b), which provides that a lawyer shall not 
"falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify 
falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited 
by law."   
¶68 This allegation stems from Thomas Zupfer's claim that 
Arthur instructed him to lie about an illness in order to avoid 
appearing at a properly noticed deposition.  As previously 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
25 
 
noted, Zupfer was the log buyer and timber broker that Arthur 
engaged in 1995, around the time he was parting company with 
Statewide and the Keefes.   
¶69 During 
these 
disciplinary 
proceedings, 
Zupfer 
testified that Arthur was his lawyer and that Arthur had told 
him to call in sick on December 4, 1995, to avoid having to 
attend a deposition.  Arthur vigorously disputes this charge.  
He challenges the existence of an attorney-client relationship 
between the two, noting that Zupfer earlier denied having an 
attorney-client relationship with Arthur.  He asserts, further, 
that Zupfer "was not a credible witness."   
¶70 This 
finding 
turned 
almost 
exclusively 
on 
the 
referee's credibility assessment.  The referee noted that Mary 
Kathleen Arthur appeared as counsel of record for Zupfer and/or 
his 
corporation 
from 
April 
1995 
through 
December 
1995.  
Ultimately, the referee decided that Arthur had advised Zupfer 
to claim he was ill and later to testify "I don't remember" in 
response to deposition questions about his relationship and 
dealings with Arthur.   
¶71 We see no reason to disturb the referee's credibility 
determination with respect to this incident, and these findings 
certainly support the conclusion that Arthur violated SCR 
20:3.4(b).  
COUNT VI: SCR 20:8.4(c) 
¶72 Finally, 
the 
disciplinary 
complaint 
alleged 
that 
Arthur violated SCR 20:8.4(c), which provides that it is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
26 
 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."  The 
referee made a number of findings in support of his conclusion 
that Arthur violated this rule.  Some of these findings are 
summarized as follows: 
Making false statements to Ms. Doyle about his 
intentions with respect to his use of the Lyndon 
Station property, as found by the Juneau County 
Circuit Court. 
Making false statements to the Keefes about the 
exact location of the Doyle property line, as found by 
the Juneau County Circuit Court. 
Falsely accusing Ms. Doyle, her attorneys, and 
the Keefes of engaging in a conspiracy to defraud him, 
as found by the Juneau County Circuit Court. 
The Honorable Richard Wright's observation that 
"the court has never found such a liar on the stand 
and would probably refer him to the DA for perjury." 
"[P]resent[ing] a false defense and [making] 
misrepresentations to the court" as found by the 
Juneau County Circuit Court. 
Falsely denying that he advised Zupfer to fake an 
illness and avoid testifying at his deposition, as 
found by the Juneau County Circuit Court. 
Falsely testifying about his net worth, as found 
by the Juneau County Circuit Court. 
Misrepresenting to the court, the Honorable Frank 
Crivello, that an evidentiary hearing was conducted 
before Judge Wright on a discovery motion, which 
Juneau County Circuit Court later stated "that just 
plain isn't true." 
Presenting a false claim against the Keefes to 
the Bankruptcy Court, the Honorable Margaret Dee 
McGarity presiding, which warranted a referral to the 
U.S. Attorney. 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
27 
 
Submitting 
a 
claim 
to 
the 
Department 
of 
Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection against the 
Keefes that falsely alleged a court ordered judgment 
entered against them in Arthur's favor. 
Transferring his personal assets to his wife in a 
marital 
property 
agreement 
to 
fraudulently 
avoid 
payment of claims, debts and judgments against him; 
facilitated the transfer of assets to various non-
profit corporations in which he was actively involved 
and had received things of value to fraudulently avoid 
payment of claims. 
¶73 Arthur contends that the "actual verbatim transcripts" 
do not support these findings.  He blames the OLR, suggesting it 
"deliberately engaged in conspicuously fraudulent misconduct."8   
¶74 Specifically, Arthur challenges the referee's finding 
that he made a misstatement of fact before Judge Crivello, 
regarding whether an evidentiary hearing had taken place on a 
discovery issue.  Arthur concedes that "he vacillated by saying 
both that it was and was not an evidentiary hearing."  He 
nonetheless maintains that "no reasonable trier of fact could 
possibly conclude that Mr. Arthur violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by 
deceiving the court."  He reiterates his position "that the 
decision of the Juneau County Court in Case No. 95 CV 182 must 
be considered void because of Attorney Schmukler's misconduct."  
However, this is not an appeal from the Juneau County court 
decision.   
                                                 
8 Arthur suggests further that the OLR behaved improperly by 
refusing to provide a party deponent to whom Mr. Arthur could 
pose questions regarding what admissible evidence OLR had to 
support the allegations in its complaint, on the grounds that 
Wis. Stat. § 804.05(2)(e) (2001-02) did not apply to it because 
OLR is not a governmental agency.  We deem this allegation not 
properly before us and decline to comment further on it. 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
28 
 
¶75 With respect to the finding that he fraudulently 
conveyed his assets to his wife in order to avoid payment of 
debts and other claims against him, Arthur defends his actions, 
asserting 
there 
is 
nothing 
inherently 
improper 
about 
a 
fraudulent conveyance.   
¶76 Arthur is adept at using various conflicting testimony 
from the many court proceedings to raise questions about the 
referee's findings of fact in this disciplinary matter.  Having 
engaged in an independent review of the record, including 
individual pleadings filed by Arthur that alleged various 
unsupported claims against Ms. Doyle, her counsel, and others, 
we have no difficulty concluding that there are sufficient facts 
of record to support the conclusion that Arthur repeatedly 
violated SCR 20:8.4(c).   
¶77 We appreciate that we may not have addressed each and 
every one of the arguments presented by Arthur.  To the extent 
we have not, it is deemed denied.  See Libertarian Party of 
Wisconsin v. State, 199 Wis. 2d 790, 801, 546 N.W.2d 424 (1996) 
(appellate court need not discuss arguments unless they have 
"sufficient merit to warrant individual attention"). 
¶78 We turn to the question of the appropriate sanction 
for Arthur's misconduct.  In considering the appropriate 
sanction, we first consider the seriousness of the conduct.  See 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Charlton, 174 Wis. 2d 
844, 875, 498 N.W.2d 380 (1993).  We also consider the need to 
protect the public, courts, and legal system from the attorney's 
repetition of misconduct, to impress upon the attorney the 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
29 
 
seriousness of the misconduct, and to deter other attorneys from 
engaging in similar misconduct.  Id. at 847.  
¶79 The OLR seeks revocation of Arthur's license to 
practice law in Wisconsin.  The referee observed that these 
proceedings were "very lengthy and complete" observing further: 
"it is not possible to avoid the conclusion that there are a 
number of patterns of substantial improper conduct."  
¶80 We 
agree. 
 
After 
careful 
consideration 
of 
the 
arguments of counsel, review of the extensive record, and the 
relevant case law, we conclude that revocation of Arthur's 
license to practice law is the appropriate sanction for Arthur's 
serious pattern of misconduct and abuse of the litigation 
process. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Hinners, 162 Wis. 2d 728, 470 N.W.2d 309 (1991).   
¶81 We turn to the question of the costs incurred in this 
matter.  Although we directed the parties to brief the issue, 
they had relatively little to say about the costs.  Suffice it 
to say that Arthur maintains that he should not be financially 
responsible for any amount of costs, but, as the OLR observes, 
he has failed to object to the statement of costs with 
specificity.  It is readily apparent to this court that Arthur's 
own litigation tactics are the primary cause of the unusually 
high costs of this proceeding.  As the OLR states: 
[This] is the same lawyer who claims on page 18 of his 
brief that this is a "petty" matter and then files 
over 
500 
pages 
of 
discovery 
documents 
to 
OLR, 
including fourteen motions, seven separate discovery 
demands, and a 1,000+ page pre-hearing compendium.  In 
the process, Arthur complains in his brief on page 43 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
30 
 
that OLR did not respond in a manner he wished 
concerning 
his 
pre-trial 
motions. 
 
Arthur 
has 
requested OLR respond to all of his demands, which it 
did, and now he doesn't want to pay for the time and 
costs involved. 
¶82 We accept the referee's recommendation and order 
Arthur to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding.   
¶83 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Attorney Ronald A. 
Arthur to practice law in Wisconsin is revoked effective the 
date of this order. 
¶84 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney Ronald A. Arthur 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning duties of a 
person whose license to practice law has been revoked. 
¶85 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Attorney Ronald A. Arthur pay to the OLR the costs 
of the proceeding. 
¶86 PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 
2001AP1914-D   
 
 
 
1