Title: Crown Castle USA, Inc. v. Orion Logistics, LLC
Citation: 2012 WI 29
Docket Number: 2009AP003029
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 22, 2012

2012 WI 29 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP3029 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Crown Castle USA, Inc., Crown Castle Atlantic, 
LLC and  
Crown Castle GT Company, LLC, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Orion Construction Group, LLC, 
          Defendant, 
Orion Logistics, LLC, 
          Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2011 WI App 9 
Reported at: 331 Wis.2d 74, 794 N.W. 2d 272 
(Ct. App. – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 22, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 7, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Outagamie 
 
JUDGE: 
Dee R. Dyer 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. dissents (Opinion filed).  
BRADLEY, J. and CROOKS, J. join dissent.    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the appellant-petitioner there was a brief filed by 
Charles D. Koehler, Michael C. Menghini and Herrling Clark Law 
Firm, LTD., Appleton and oral argument by Nicholas Andrew 
Wagener, Bollenbeck, Wagener, Spaude & Fyfe, S.C., Appleton. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief (in the 
court of appeals) by Erin M. McLeod, Nathan Moenck and Michael 
Best & Friedrich, LLP., Madison and oral argument by Nathan 
Moenck.
 
 
2012 WI 29
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP3029 
(L.C. No. 
2007FJ17) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Crown Castle USA, Inc., Crown Castle Atlantic, 
LLC and Crown Castle GT Company, LLC, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Orion Construction Group, LLC, 
 
          Defendant, 
 
Orion Logistics, LLC, 
 
          Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 22, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
Remanded.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   We review a published 
decision of the court of appeals1 affirming an order of the 
Outagamie County Circuit Court, Dee R. Dyer, Judge.  On the 
motion of Crown Castle USA, Inc., Crown Castle Atlantic, LLC, 
                                                 
1 Crown Castle USA, Inc. v. Orion Constr. Grp., LLC, 2011 WI 
App 9, 331 Wis. 2d 74, 794 N.W.2d 272. 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
2 
 
and 
Crown 
Castle 
GT 
Company, 
LLC, 
(collectively, 
"Crown 
Castle"), the circuit court ordered Orion Logistics, LLC ("Orion 
Logistics"), a non-judgment debtor third party,2 to testify at a 
supplemental proceeding. 
¶2 
The question before us is whether Orion Logistics may 
be compelled to testify at a supplemental proceeding under 
Wisconsin Statutes section 816.06 (2007-08)3 when it is not a 
judgment debtor. 
¶3 
We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 816.06 does not grant a 
judgment creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor 
third party to testify at supplemental proceedings.  We base our 
conclusion on the language of the statute, on its context and 
statutory history, and on our prior holdings.  Because Crown 
Castle had no right, under § 816.06, to compel Orion Logistics 
to testify at a supplemental proceeding, we reverse the court of 
appeals decision and remand the cause to the circuit court for 
further proceedings. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶4 
Orion Construction Group, LLC was a Wisconsin limited 
liability corporation that ceased operations in 2006.  Its 
                                                 
2  We use the phrase "non-judgment debtor third party" 
throughout to refer to an individual or entity that is not a 
party to the underlying action that produced the judgment, is 
not the judgment debtor or an individual who may be compelled to 
testify on behalf of a judgment debtor corporation, and has no 
corporate affiliation with the judgment debtor. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
3 
 
principal business was the construction of cellular telephone 
towers, and its sole member4 was Douglas Larson ("Larson").  
Orion 
Logistics, 
LLC 
is 
a 
Wisconsin 
limited 
liability 
corporation.  Its principal business is the construction of wind 
turbines, 
and 
its 
sole 
member 
is 
also 
Larson. 
 
Orion 
Construction 
and 
Orion 
Logistics 
are 
entirely 
separate 
corporations.  The record reflects only one commonality between 
Orion Construction and Orion Logistics: a common owner, Larson. 
In the course of its business operations, Orion Construction 
incurred a $480,231.50 liability, payable to Crown Castle.5 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. THE PENNSYLVANIA JUDGMENT 
¶5 
Crown 
Castle 
commenced 
an 
action 
against 
Orion 
Construction in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania, seeking monetary damages to satisfy an account 
receivable6 of $480,231.50.  That court entered default judgment 
                                                 
4 "Member" is defined by Wis. Stat. § 183.0102(15) as "a 
person who has been admitted to membership in a limited 
liability company . . . ."  A person is "admitted to membership 
in a limited liability company" when he or she "acquir[es] a 
limited liability company interest . . . ."  § 183.0801(2). 
5 Orion Construction incurred this $480,231.50 liability, 
payable to Crown Castle, in the course of its business 
operations.  Orion Construction states in its briefs that it 
contests the validity of this debt, but the validity of the debt 
is not properly before the court.  Therefore, we assume the debt 
to be valid in the absence of facts in the record to the 
contrary. 
6 An "account receivable" is "[a]n account reflecting a 
balance owed by a debtor; a debt owed by a customer to an 
enterprise for goods or services."  Black's Law Dictionary 19 
(9th ed. 2009). 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
4 
 
against Orion Construction and in favor of Crown Castle for 
$496,239.17.7  Orion Construction did not contest the default 
judgment because it was winding up8 its business operations. 
B. THE WISCONSIN PROCEEDINGS 
¶6 
Crown Castle filed its foreign judgment in the office 
of the Clerk of Court for Outagamie County pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 806.24.9  Notice of the entry of the judgment was 
provided 
to 
Orion 
Construction. 
 
Outagamie 
County 
Court 
Commissioner Mary F. Coughlin ("Commissioner") ordered Orion 
Construction to appear for a supplemental proceeding pursuant to 
§ 816.03(1)(b).10  The Commissioner's order required Orion 
                                                 
7 The judgment was comprised of $480,231.50 in damages and 
$16,007.67 in statutory interest, totaling $496,239.17. 
8 Black's defines "winding up" as "[t]he process of settling 
accounts and liquidating assets in anticipation of . . . a 
corporation's dissolution."  Black's Law Dictionary 1738 (9th 
ed. 2009). 
9 Wis. Stat. § 806.24(2) states, in relevant part: "A copy 
of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with the act 
of congress or the statutes of this state may be filed in the 
office of the clerk of circuit court of any county of this 
state."   
10 Wis. Stat. § 816.03(1)(b) states: "A supplemental court 
commissioner upon application of a judgment creditor shall order 
any judgment debtor to appear before the supplemental court 
commissioner 
and 
answer 
concerning 
the 
judgment 
debtor's 
property at a time and place specified in the order . . . ." 
Black's 
defines 
"supplementary 
proceeding" 
as 
"[a] 
proceeding held in connection with the enforcement of a 
judgment, for the purpose of identifying and locating the 
debtor's assets available to satisfy the judgment."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 1324 (9th ed. 2009); see 6 Jay E. Grenig, Wisconsin 
Pleading and Practice § 44:83 (5th ed. 2010). 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
5 
 
Construction to supply Crown Castle with Orion Construction's 
"tax records for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007, and copies of 
all books, records[,] and documents pertaining to the company's 
assets, financial affairs[,] and transactions . . . ."   
¶7 
Orion Construction responded to the Commissioner's 
order by providing Larson's personal tax returns from 2005, 
2006, and 2007, and an accounting spreadsheet showing an account 
receivable from Crown Castle in the amount of $210,831.  Orion 
Construction also provided records indicating that it had no 
assets (other than the $210,831 account receivable and less than 
$500 dollars in a business banking account), and no outstanding 
liabilities. 
¶8 
Crown Castle, dissatisfied with the information Orion 
Construction provided, moved the circuit court to expand the 
scope of supplemental examination to "copies of all books, 
records, and documents that pertain to the assets, financial 
affairs, and transactions for each and every business entity in 
which [Larson] has any interest."  The requested order was 
issued and subjected Orion Logistics to supplemental examination 
by the Commissioner pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 816.03 and 
816.06.11 
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
¶9 
Orion Logistics appealed the circuit court's order 
subjecting it to supplemental examination.  In a published 
                                                 
11 Wis. Stat. § 816.06 states: "At the hearing upon such 
order or warrant such judgment debtor may be examined on oath 
and testimony on the part of either party may be offered." 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
6 
 
decision, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court.  
Crown Castle USA, Inc. v. Orion Constr. Grp., LLC, 2011 WI App 
9, 331 Wis. 2d 74, 794 N.W.2d 272.  The court of appeals 
considered a single issue: whether Wis. Stat. § 816.06 grants a 
judgment creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor 
third party to testify at a supplemental proceeding. 
¶10 The court of appeals determined, based on its prior 
holding in Courtyard Condo. Ass'n v. Draper, 2001 WI App 115, 
244 Wis. 2d 153, 629 N.W.2d 38, that Wis. Stat. § 816.03 and 
§ 816.06 are ambiguous.  Crown Castle, 331 Wis. 2d 74, ¶10.12  In 
resolving this perceived ambiguity, it concluded that § 816.06 
grants a judgment creditor the right to compel a non-judgment 
debtor third party to testify at a supplemental proceeding.  
Id., ¶12. 
¶11 The court of appeals supported its conclusion with the 
proposition that "[p]roperty transfers between a judgment debtor 
and 
related 
business 
entities 
present 
the . . . risk 
of 
fraud . . . ."  Id., ¶12.  Therefore, the court of appeals 
ultimately concluded that court-ordered examination of non-
judgment debtor third parties provides the only avenue for the 
judgment creditor to protect itself against fraud.  Id., ¶12.  
Orion Logistics then sought review before this court. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
                                                 
12 The court of appeals wrote that "§ 816.03 and § 816.16 
remain ambiguous."  Given the fact that "§ 816.16" is not 
contained in Wis. Stat. ch. 816, we understand the court of 
appeals to have determined that § 816.03 and § 816.06 are 
ambiguous. 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
7 
 
¶12 This case requires us to construe the supplementary 
proceeding 
statutes 
found 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
ch. 816. 
The 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review 
de novo. Hocking v. City of Dodgeville, 2010 WI 59, ¶17, 326 
Wis. 2d 155, 
785 
N.W.2d 398. 
 
We 
interpret 
statutes 
independently, but benefit from both our prior analyses and that 
of the lower courts.  State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶29, 328 
Wis. 2d 544, 787 N.W.2d 350, cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 132 
S. Ct. 784 (2011). 
IV. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
¶13 When interpreting a statute, "we begin with the 
language of the statute, because it is the language that 
expresses the legislature's intent." Hocking, 326 Wis. 2d 155, 
¶18 (citing State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 
2004 
WI 
58, 
¶¶44-45, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
681 
N.W.2d 110).  
"Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases are given their technical or special definitional 
meaning." Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45. We attempt to give 
reasonable effect to every word, avoiding both surplusage and 
absurd or unreasonable results. Id., ¶46; see also Hocking, 326 
Wis. 2d 155, ¶18. 
¶14 In addition to the language of the statute, "scope, 
context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning 
interpretation 
of 
an 
unambiguous 
statute." 
 
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶48.  So too is statutory history.  Richards v. 
Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
8 
 
N.W.2d 581 ("A review of statutory history is part of a plain 
meaning analysis."); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel 
Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 ("By 
analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course 
of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning 
of a statute.") (citation omitted).  Accordingly, we examine the 
language, context, and history of the statute here while 
undertaking our plain meaning analysis. 
V. DISCUSSION 
¶15 This 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 816.06, Wisconsin's supplemental proceeding statute, in order 
to determine whether it grants a judgment creditor the right to 
compel a non-judgment debtor third party to testify at a 
supplemental 
proceeding. 
 
Originally 
codified 
in 
1856, 
Wisconsin's supplemental proceeding legislation replaced the 
creditor's bill,13 the common law proceeding that allowed a 
                                                 
13 A "creditor's bill" is "[a]n equitable suit in which a 
judgment creditor seeks to reach property that cannot be reached 
by the process available to enforce a judgment."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 426 (9th ed. 2009). 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
9 
 
judgment creditor to enforce a judgment.14  Clark v. Bergenthal, 
52 Wis. 103, 107, 8 N.W. 865 (1881).  Because the supplemental 
proceedings statute provided a new right to judgment creditors 
that did not exist at common law, it is a statutory right.15  
Holton v. Burton, 78 Wis. 321, 328, 47 N.W. 624 (1890) ("[T]he 
right to institute and carry on supplementary proceedings is a 
mere statutory right, and may be taken away or modified at the 
pleasure of the legislature."); see also Clark, 52 Wis. at 107.  
¶16 Statutory rights——like those at issue in this case——
are rights granted by the legislature, not the United States or 
Wisconsin constitutions.  See State ex rel. R. v. Schmidt, 63 
Wis. 2d 82, 89, 216 N.W.2d 18 (1974); cf. Harvot v. Solo Cup 
Co., 2009 WI 85, ¶50, 320 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 176.  Because 
there is no constitutional guarantee to a statutory right, "it 
                                                 
14 See In re Remington, 7 Wis.  541 (*643), 547 (*649) 
(1858) ("It is very evident from an examination of the code——and 
it was so conceded on the argument of this case——that the remedy 
given by this provision, and other sections following in the 
same chapter, was intended as a substitute for a creditor's bill 
. . . ."); Graham v. La Crosse & Milwaukee R.R. Co., 10 Wis. 403 
(*459), 406 (*462) (1860) ("[T]he proceedings supplemental to 
execution, established by the code, are a substitute therefor, 
and constitute the only manner of obtaining the relief formerly 
had under a creditor's bill."); Seymour v. Briggs, 11 Wis. 204 
(*196), 213 (*204) (1860) ("[T]he remedy by creditor's bill was 
abrogated by the code, and that the proceedings supplementary to 
an execution provided by that enactment, were intended as a 
substitute therefor."); Second Ward Bank v. Upmann, 12 Wis. 555 
(*499), 561-562 (*504-05) (1860) (holding that the statutes 
abrogated the common law). 
15 In Wisconsin, supplemental proceedings are a creature of 
statute, not of the common law.  Clark v. Bergenthal, 52 
Wis. 103, 107, 8 N.W. 865 (1881); see 6 Jay E. Grenig, Wisconsin 
Pleading and Practice § 44:83 (5th ed. 2010).   
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
10 
 
is for the legislature, not the courts, to prescribe" the scope 
of the right.  Schmidt, 63 Wis. 2d at 89; see Harvot, 320 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶50; In re Ogg's Estate, 262 Wis. 181, 186, 54 
N.W.2d 175 (1952); Relyea v. Tomahawk Paper & Pulp Co., 102 
Wis. 301, 304, 78 N.W. 412 (1899) ("[M]ere statutory rights may 
be conferred upon such conditions as in the wisdom of the 
legislature may seem best, and the conditions may be changed 
from time to time, even as to existing rights, or such rights 
may be taken away entirely, at the legislative will.").  
Therefore, 
we 
recognize 
statutory 
rights 
only 
where 
the 
legislature has, through the legislative process, specifically 
acted to create them.  In re Fidelity Assurance Ass'n, 247 
Wis. 619, 624, 20 N.W.2d 638 (1945) (holding that a statutory 
right is "a creature of the legislature, and does not exist 
where the legislature has not acted"). 
¶17 When interpreting statutory rights, we have previously 
declined to undertake "[a]d hoc judicial discovery of implied 
statutory rights," because such an approach would impinge on the 
purview of the legislature and "would not yield a meaningful 
legal test that could carry over from case to case."  Harvot, 
320 Wis. 2d 1, ¶50 ("[D]iscover[ing] an implied statutory right 
. . . where the legislature has not prescribed such a right and 
where the constitution does not afford such a right would open a 
can of worms.").  Therefore, "this court will not legislatively 
engraft a judicially conceived . . . right" onto a statute.  
Schmidt, 63 Wis. 2d at 89. 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
11 
 
¶18 Accordingly, our analysis of Wisconsin's supplemental 
proceeding statute is now, as it has been since 1856, focused 
exclusively on the statute that provides creditors the statutory 
right to supplemental proceedings.  In interpreting Wis. Stat. 
§ 816.06, we confine ourselves to its language, context, and 
statutory history to determine the scope of the statutory right 
that Wis. Stat. § 816.06 confers.  Considering each facet of 
this plain meaning analysis in turn, we conclude that § 816.06 
does not grant a judgment creditor the right to compel a non-
judgment debtor third party to testify at a supplemental 
proceeding. 
A. THE LANGUAGE OF WIS. STAT. § 816.06 DOES NOT GRANT A JUDGMENT 
CREDITOR THE RIGHT TO COMPEL A NON-JUDGMENT DEBTOR THIRD PARTY 
TO TESTIFY AT A SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDING 
¶19 The question before us is whether a judgment creditor 
has the right to compel a non-judgment debtor third party to 
testify at a supplemental proceeding.  That question requires us 
to evaluate the only section of the supplemental proceeding 
statute, 
ch. 816, 
that 
explains 
the 
procedure 
for 
the 
examination of parties and witnesses.  The language of this 
section, Wis. Stat. § 816.06, states that testimony may be 
offered on behalf of either party at a supplemental proceeding.  
Specifically, it provides: 
Examination of debtor and witnesses. At the hearing 
upon such order or warrant such judgment debtor may be 
examined on oath and testimony on the part of either 
party may be offered. 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
12 
 
Wis. Stat. § 816.06.  It is clear that the only compelled 
testimony expressly authorized by this provision is that of the 
judgment debtor.  No language in § 816.06 expands that authority 
to include the compelled testimony of a non-judgment debtor 
third party.  Indeed, no mention whatsoever is made of such a 
party. 
¶20 The circuit court determined that Larson could be 
called to testify about not only Orion Construction, but also 
Orion Logistics.  The circuit court relied on the fact that 
Larson owned both Orion Construction and Orion Logistics in 
making its decision to compel Orion Logistics to testify at the 
supplemental proceeding.  However, this reliance was not 
grounded in a sound interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 816.06.  In 
particular, it disregarded our admonition that "a corporation is 
treated as an entity separate from its shareholders and that 
separateness is not to be lightly disregarded."  Rasmussen v. 
GMC, 2011 WI 52, ¶25, 335 Wis. 2d 1, 803 N.W.2d 623 (citing 
Consumer's Co-op v. Olsen, 142 Wis. 2d 465, 474, 419 N.W.2d 211 
(1988)).  
¶21 We acknowledge that Wis. Stat. § 816.06 must allow 
testimony by at least some individuals who are not named 
parties.  If the statute allowed for testimony by only the 
parties 
to 
the 
action, 
an 
absurd 
result 
would 
follow: 
corporations would be permitted to testify but would then find 
it impossible to do so.  Section 816.03(1)(a) permits a judgment 
creditor to compel corporations to testify.  However, because 
corporations are legal fictions, Milwaukee Toy Co. v. Indus. 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
13 
 
Comm'n of Wisconsin, 203 Wis. 493, 495, 234 N.W. 748 (1931), 
they are incapable of testifying except through their officers 
and agents.  See Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. News Pub. Co., 174 
Wis. 107, 119, 182 N.W. 919 (1921) ("A corporation can act only 
through its officers and agents."); see also Wilson v. United 
States, 221 U.S. 361, 377 (1911) ("As the corporation can only 
act through its agents, the courts will operate upon the agents 
through the corporation.") (citation omitted).  Consequently, 
some individual must testify on behalf of the corporation.  
Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co., 174 Wis. at 119.  Therefore, if we 
were to interpret § 816.06 to preclude testimony by anyone other 
than the parties to the underlying action, a corporation could 
never 
"appear" 
at 
a 
supplemental 
proceeding, 
despite 
§ 816.03(1)(b) expressly authorizing them to do so.  Such an 
interpretation would create internal incoherence in ch. 816, 
thereby undermining the efficacy of the chapter.   
¶22 We must interpret Wis. Stat. § 816.06 to allow for at 
least some testimony by individuals who are not named parties 
because failure to do so would undermine the efficacy of § 816 
where the judgment debtor is a corporation.  Clearly, a judgment 
debtor corporation cannot merely decline to provide testimony 
simply because it is a corporation.  See § 816.03(1)(a).  
Instead, it must give testimony the only way it can: through 
some representative of the corporation.  Cf. Nekoosa-Edwards 
Paper Co., 174 Wis. at 119.  Supplemental proceedings are 
designed to provide full discovery of that property belonging to 
the judgment debtor that could be used to satisfy the judgment.  
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
14 
 
Courtyard, 244 Wis. 2d 153, ¶12.  Therefore, the judgment 
creditor must be able to compel testimony from individuals who, 
because 
of 
their 
relationship 
to 
the 
judgment 
debtor 
corporation, have information relevant to the judgment debtor's 
property that could satisfy the judgment. 
¶23 These individuals may include corporate officers, 
employees, former employees, and similarly situated individuals 
who 
have 
information 
relevant 
to 
the 
judgment 
debtor 
corporation's assets.  The scope of testimony these individuals 
may provide, however, is limited to that information relevant to 
the judgment debtor corporation, that is, the actual entity that 
is subject to the supplemental proceeding.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that because ch. 816 states that corporations may be 
judgment debtors, the language of § 816.06 allows for compelled 
testimony from some individuals who are not named parties to the 
action. 
¶24 That does not mean, however, that Wis. Stat. § 816.06 
necessarily allows for a judgment creditor to compel the 
testimony of a non-judgment debtor third party at a supplemental 
proceeding.  No language in Wis. Stat. § 816.06 grants this 
right to the judgment creditor.  Therefore, to accept Crown 
Castle's argument, we would have to conclude that even though 
the statute is silent, it nonetheless confers a right on the 
judgment creditor to compel testimony from non-judgment debtor 
third parties.   
¶25 We cannot interpret the silence of the statute to 
create a statutory right.  Instead, we conclude that § 816.06 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
15 
 
does not grant judgment creditors the right to compel the 
testimony of a non-judgment debtor third party at a supplemental 
proceeding.  This is so because courts are not entitled to grant 
or expand statutory rights based solely on a statute's silence.  
See Harvot, 320 Wis. 2d 1, ¶50 (holding that the courts should 
not undertake "[a]d hoc judicial discovery of implied statutory 
rights"); Relyea, 102 Wis. at 303-04 (holding that statutory 
rights "are entirely the subject of legislative discretion," not 
judicial discretion).  Therefore, because § 816.06 confers a 
statutory right to examine witnesses, but does not confer as a 
part of that right the power to compel their testimony, we 
decline to infer from the statute's silence that it grants a 
judgment creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor 
third party to testify at a supplemental proceeding.  Were we to 
do so, we would legislatively create a right where the 
legislature chose to remain silent.16 
                                                 
16 Crown Castle offers an alternative to our interpretation 
of the statute.  It argues that the final phrase of Wis. Stat. 
§ 816.06, "testimony on the part of either party may be 
offered," 
when 
viewed 
in 
conjunction 
with 
the 
heading 
"[e]xamination of debtor and witnesses," grants a judgment 
creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor third party 
to testify at a supplemental proceeding.  However, we are not 
bound by the content of statutory headings.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.001(6) ("The titles to subchapters, sections, subsections, 
paragraphs and subdivisions of the statutes and history notes 
are not part of the statutes."); Blum v. 1st Auto & Cas. Ins. 
Co., 2010 WI 78, ¶21 n.3, 326 Wis. 2d 729, 786 N.W.2d 78 ("In 
statutory construction, the title or heading of a statute is not 
part of the statute itself.").   
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
16 
 
¶26 Accordingly, we conclude that the language of Wis. 
Stat. § 816.06 does not grant a judgment creditor the right to 
compel a non-judgment debtor third party to testify at a 
supplemental proceeding. 
B. THE CONTEXT OF WIS. STAT. § 816.06 CONFIRMS OUR CONCLUSION 
THAT IT DOES NOT GRANT A JUDGMENT CREDITOR THE RIGHT TO COMPEL A 
NON-JUDGMENT DEBTOR THIRD PARTY TO TESTIFY AT A SUPPLEMENTAL 
PROCEEDING 
¶27 Although the plain meaning of a statutory provision 
may be clear in isolation, we nonetheless review the provision 
in the context of surrounding provisions to ascertain its full 
meaning.  Therefore, we next evaluate Wis. Stat. § 816.06 in the 
context of ch. 816. 
¶28 The only provision of Wis. Stat. ch. 816 other than 
§ 816.06 that mentions testimony on behalf of the parties at a 
supplemental proceeding is § 816.11.  Section 816.11 states:  
Costs, fees. The court or judge may allow to the 
judgment creditor or to any party so examined, whether 
a party to the action or not, witness' fees and 
disbursements and a fixed sum, in addition, not 
exceeding $25, as costs, and require their payment by 
order. 
Like § 816.06, § 816.11 contains no language that would grant a 
judgment creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor 
third party to testify at a supplemental proceeding. 
¶29 The language of § 816.11 is in harmony with our 
reading of § 816.06.  As the language of § 816.11 indicates, 
both the judgment debtor and the judgment creditor have the 
opportunity 
to 
provide 
testimony 
in 
their 
favor 
through 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
17 
 
witnesses. 
 
This 
corresponds 
with 
our 
interpretation 
of 
§ 816.06, which explicitly states that "testimony on the part of 
either party may be offered." (emphasis added).  Again, though, 
the ability of a party to offer testimony in no way implies the 
power to compel it.     
¶30 Therefore, we conclude Wis. Stat. § 816.11 offers no 
language 
that 
conflicts 
with, 
controverts, 
or 
compels 
a 
different interpretation of the language of § 816.06 than the 
one we reached.  Simply put, neither the language of § 816.11 
nor that of § 816.06, nor any other part of ch. 816, supports 
Crown Castle's assertion that § 816.06 grants a judgment 
creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor third party 
to testify at a supplemental proceeding.   
¶31 Accordingly, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 816.06, 
even when viewed in conjunction with § 816.11, does not grant a 
judgment creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor 
third party to testify at a supplemental proceeding. 
C. THE STATUTORY HISTORY OF CH. 816 CONFIRMS OUR CONCLUSION THAT 
WIS. STAT. § 816.06 DOES NOT GRANT A JUDGMENT CREDITOR THE RIGHT 
TO COMPEL A NON-JUDGMENT DEBTOR THIRD PARTY TO TESTIFY AT A 
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDING 
¶32 We turn next to the statutory history of ch. 816, and 
determine that prior versions support our construction of the 
language and context of § 816.06. 
1. PRE-1935 SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS 
¶33 The 
statutory 
provisions 
that 
eventually 
became 
chapter 816 first appeared in Wisconsin in an 1856 statute.  
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
18 
 
That statute, Wis. Stat. ch. 120, § 202 (1856), was "adopted 
with the intent to substitute supplementary proceedings for the 
relief formerly obtainable in equity by a creditor's bill."17  
This enactment granted a judgment creditor the right to compel a 
"judgment debtor to appear and answer concerning his property 
before [a] judge," and stated that "either party may examine 
witnesses on his behalf, and the judgment debtor may be examined 
in the same manner as a witness."  Another section of the 1856 
statute, Wis. Stat. ch. 120, § 206 (1856), authorized the 
circuit court to require witnesses to "appear and testify . . . 
in the same manner as upon a trial of an issue." 
2. THE 1935 REVISIONS 
¶34 With minor revisions, the sections in the supplemental 
proceeding statute relating to the examination of witnesses 
remained the same until 1935.18  In that year, the Wisconsin 
                                                 
17 Robert S. Moss, Supplementary Proceedings in Wisconsin, 
23 Marq. L. Rev. 49, 49 (1939) (citing Remington, 7 Wis. at 547 
(*649); Graham, 10 Wis. at 406 (*462); Seymour, 11 Wis. at 213 
(*204); Clark, 52 Wis. at 107. 
18 Portions of the common law creditor's bill that allowed 
the judgment creditor to proceed against any individual in a 
supplemental proceeding were added in the 1860 version of the 
Wisconsin statute.  Wis. Stat. ch. 303, § 3029 (1860).  These 
provisions were repealed in 1878 by Wis. Stat. ch. 131, § 3030 
(1878), and are not relevant to our examination of the statutory 
history of Wis. Stat. § 816.06 (2007-08). 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
19 
 
legislature significantly amended the supplementary proceeding 
statutes.  See § 271, ch. 541, Laws of 1935. 
¶35 This amendment specifically deleted the prior language 
stating that "witnesses may be required to appear and testify on 
the part of either party in the same manner as upon the trial of 
an issue."  § 271, ch. 541, Laws of 1935; Wis. Stat. § 273.06 
(1933) (emphasis added).19  In removing this language, the 
legislature removed the only provision from the supplemental 
proceeding statutes that granted a judgment creditor the right 
to compel a non-judgment debtor third party to testify at a 
supplemental proceeding.  See § 271, ch. 541, Laws of 1935; see 
also Wis. Stat. § 273.06 (1935).   
¶36 The language that remained after the legislature 
amended Wis. Stat. § 273.06 (1933) is identical to the language 
contained in § 816.06 (2007-08).  See Wis. Stat. § 273.06 
                                                                                                                                                             
By 1935, the legislature had renumbered the Wisconsin 
statutes so that all of the provisions relating to supplemental 
proceedings were contained in Wis. Stat. ch. 273.  See § 1, 
ch. 4, Laws of 1925 (renumbering the Wisconsin Statutes).  In 
1973, the legislature once again renumbered the statutes.  See 
Ch. 189, Laws of 1973 (renumbering the Wisconsin Statutes).  
Thereby, the supplementary proceedings chapter was once again 
renumbered, this time from chapter 273 to chapter 816, the 
number it retains today.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 816 (2007-08). 
19 Compare Wis. Stat. § 273.06 (1933) with Wis. Stat. 
§ 273.06 (1935).  Section 271, ch. 541, Laws of 1935 removed a 
significant amount of additional language from Wis. Stat. 
§ 273.06 (1933), none of which is relevant to our analysis. 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
20 
 
(1935).20  Therefore, since 1935, Wisconsin's supplemental 
proceeding law has been bereft of any language that would grant 
a judgment creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor 
third party to testify at a supplemental proceeding. 
3. THE RESULT OF THE 1935 REVISIONS 
¶37 We conclude that the legislature has deliberately 
removed the statutory right of judgment creditors to compel a 
non-judgment debtor third party to testify at a supplemental 
proceeding.  As a general matter, courts may not find a 
statutory right in legislative silence alone.  See Harvot, 320 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶50, (holding that the courts should not undertake 
"[a]d hoc judicial discovery of implied statutory rights").  
This is so because statutory rights "are entirely the subject of 
legislative discretion," not judicial discretion.  Relyea, 102 
Wis. at 303-04.  In light of this well-established law, we 
cannot sustain the right claimed by Crown Castle.  Indeed, we 
are especially reluctant to detect a right where the pertinent 
statute is not only silent on the issue, but where the 
legislature has in fact expressly removed the precise right the 
court is asked to grant.  Clearly, the legislature could have 
continued to grant power to courts to compel third party 
witnesses to testify in supplemental proceedings, but it 
                                                 
20 The legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 273.06 to read:  "At 
the hearing upon such order or warrant such judgment debtor may 
be examined on oath and testimony on the part of either party 
may be offered."  § 271, ch. 541, Laws of 1935; see Wis. Stat. 
§ 273.06 (1935).  Compare Wis. Stat. § 273.06 (1935) with Wis. 
Stat. § 816.06 (2007-08). 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
21 
 
specifically chose to remove that power.  Thus, if we were to 
confirm the existence of the right in question, we would be 
effectively 
writing 
back 
into 
the 
statute 
language 
the 
legislature expressly removed.  This we may not do.  See 
Schmidt, 63 Wis. 2d at 89; see also C. Coakley Relocation Sys., 
Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI 68, ¶24 310 Wis. 2d 456, 750 
N.W.2d 900 (declining to insert a word into a "plainly worded 
and easily understood statute"). 
¶38 Accordingly, we conclude that the plain meaning of 
Wis. Stat. § 816.06 is clear: the language, context, and 
statutory history of Wis. Stat. § 816.06 demonstrate that a 
judgment creditor does not have the right to compel a non-
judgment debtor third party to testify at a supplemental 
proceeding. 
D. OUR HOLDING THAT WIS. STAT. § 816.06 DOES NOT GRANT A 
JUDGMENT CREDITOR THE RIGHT TO COMPEL A NON-JUDGMENT DEBTOR 
THIRD PARTY TO TESTIFY AT A SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDING IS IN 
HARMONY WITH OUR PRIOR HOLDINGS 
¶39 Turning from the plain meaning analysis of Wis. Stat. 
§ 816.06, we review prior Wisconsin cases regarding supplemental 
proceedings.  Few cases have addressed supplemental proceedings 
at all, much less the precise question presented by this case.  
However, a review of the limited prior jurisprudence on 
supplemental proceedings in Wisconsin reveals that it is all in 
harmony with our holding that the judgment creditor has no right 
to compel a non-judgment debtor third party to testify at a 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
22 
 
supplemental proceeding.  We now review the two cases that form 
the basis of the jurisprudence in this area. 
1. HEILBRONNER 
¶40 We first review our prior holding in Heilbronner v. 
Levy, 64 Wis. 636, 26 N.W. 113 (1885).  While the facts of 
Heilbronner are distinct from the facts of the present case, it 
was one of our first cases to address issues relating to 
individuals 
examined 
at 
supplemental 
proceedings. 
 
In 
Heilbronner, the judgment debtor and named defendant was an 
individual, not a corporation.  Id.  The single issue in the 
case was whether a judgment debtor could be compelled to testify 
about the profitability of a corporation of which he was part 
owner.21  Heilbronner, 64 Wis. at 636.  The testimony the 
judgment creditor wished to compel was highly relevant to the 
financial 
condition 
of 
the 
judgment 
debtor, 
because 
the 
profitability of the corporation would have a direct effect on 
the value of his ownership rights.  Brief of Appellant at 5, 
Heilbronner, 64 Wis. 636. 
                                                 
21 This question was part of a larger string of questions 
that related to the judgment debtor's monetary involvement with 
the corporation.  The precise question the judgment debtor 
refused to answer was: "Do you know whether the company has made 
a profit, or not, in the last year?"  Brief of Appellant at 5, 
Heilbronner v. Levy, 64 Wis. 636, 26 N.W. 113 (1885).  The 
commissioner immediately overruled an objection by the judgment 
debtor's counsel, ruling that "the object and effect of the 
question and answer is to ascertain and determine the value of 
this share and the amount of any dividends accumulated."  Id.  
Because the question related to the value of the judgment 
debtor's assets, the commissioner concluded that it was "a 
proper one."  Id. 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
23 
 
¶41 Unlike the present case, the judgment creditor in 
Heilbronner did not seek to compel the testimony of a third 
party at the supplemental proceeding incident to that case.  As 
the respondent's brief indicates, the point of questioning the 
judgment debtor was to determine the value of his property, not 
to undertake an examination of the corporation.  Brief of 
Respondent at 6, Heilbronner, 64 Wis. 636. 
¶42 Crown Castle suggests that we should interpret the 
Heilbronner opinion to allow a court to compel a non-judgment 
debtor third party to testify at a supplemental proceeding.  
Crown Castle relies upon the single statement that "[u]nless a 
comprehensive and searching examination be allowed, an artful 
debtor might defeat the discovery sought" to support its 
assertion.  Heilbronner, 64 Wis. at 637.  While we agree with 
the Heilbronner court that supplemental proceedings should 
entail a comprehensive and searching examination of the judgment 
debtor, 
we 
cannot 
agree 
with 
Crown 
Castle 
that 
this 
"comprehensive and searching" examination should extend to non-
judgment debtor third parties.  To do so would take the language 
in Heilbronner out of context and apply it to a very different 
fact situation.22 
                                                 
22 Commentators have questioned the scope of Heilbronner's 
holding.  See Robert Pasch, Wisconsin Collection Law § 16:4 (2d 
ed. 2006) (stating that Heilbronner's holding is unclear).  
However, they have also recognized that no case has provided a 
clear statement supporting the assertion that § 816.06 grants a 
judgment creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor 
third party to testify at a supplemental proceeding.  See, e.g., 
id. 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
24 
 
¶43 The issue in Heilbronner was the scope of examination 
to which a judgment debtor may be subjected, not whether a 
judgment creditor has the right to compel a non-judgment debtor 
third party to testify at a supplemental proceeding.  Therefore, 
Heilbronner's applicability is limited to questions relating to 
the scope of examination of the judgment debtor; the decision 
says nothing about who may be compelled to testify at a 
supplemental proceeding.23   
¶44 Accordingly, we conclude that Heilbronner does not 
allow a judgment creditor to compel the examination of a non-
judgment debtor third party at a supplemental proceeding. 
2. COURTYARD 
¶45 The only published Wisconsin case that has previously 
interpreted the current version of Wis. Stat. § 816.06 is 
Courtyard.  In that case, the court of appeals addressed whether 
the spouse of a judgment debtor could be compelled to testify at 
a supplemental proceeding.  Id., ¶1.  The court of appeals' 
analysis 
relied 
on 
the 
interplay 
between 
§ 816.06 
and 
                                                 
23 It is worth noting that Heilbronner was decided under a 
different statutory scheme that would have allowed the judgment 
creditor to compel a non-judgment debtor third party to testify 
at a supplemental proceeding.  Wis. Stat. ch. 131, § 3030 
(1883).  As such, even if Heilbronner had stated that third 
parties could be compelled to testify, it would not change our 
analysis, because the statutory scheme has since changed.  See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 816.06 
(2007-08). 
 
Regardless, 
Heilbronner 
addressed neither the supplementary proceeding statute, nor 
whether a judgment creditor may compel a non-judgment debtor 
third party to testify at a supplemental proceeding, and it 
therefore has no bearing on this case. 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
25 
 
§ 803.045(3),24 and it ultimately concluded that § 816.06 is 
ambiguous when viewed in juxtaposition with § 803.045(3) and 
§ 765.55.25 
 
Courtyard, 
244 
Wis. 2d 153, 
¶¶11, 
12. 
 
To 
"harmonize" these statutes and "to give each full force and 
effect," the court of appeals held that a court may compel the 
spouse of a judgment debtor to testify at a supplemental 
proceeding.  Id., ¶¶13, 16. 
¶46 The court of appeals holding was particularly narrow.  
It stated: 
Where, as in this case, the judgment debtor pleads 
ignorance when asked about marital property during a 
supplementary examination, the right of the judgment 
creditor to satisfy a judgment from marital property 
would be frustrated if the creditor could not examine 
the spouse. Without examining the spouse of the 
judgment debtor, the judgment creditor would lack the 
                                                 
24 Wis. Stat. § 803.045(3) specifically relates to the 
satisfaction 
of 
spousal 
obligations. 
 
It 
states: 
"After 
obtaining a judgment, a creditor may proceed against either or 
both 
spouses 
to 
reach 
marital 
property 
available 
for 
satisfaction of the judgment."  Id. 
25 Wis. Stat. § 765.55 states, in relevant part: 
An obligation incurred by a spouse during marriage, 
including one attributable to an act or omission 
during marriage, is presumed to be incurred in the 
interest of the marriage or the family. . . .  An 
obligation incurred by a spouse in the interest of the 
marriage or the family may be satisfied only from all 
marital property and all other property of the 
incurring spouse.   
§ 765.55(1) & (2)(b).  This statutory provision is part of 
Wisconsin's Marital Property Act.  See generally Palma Maria 
Forte, Comment, The Wisconsin Marital Property Act: Sections in 
Need of Reform, 79 Marq. L. Rev. 859 (1996). 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
26 
 
information needed to proceed against the spouse under 
Wis. Stat. § 803.045 to reach marital property. 
Id., ¶15 (emphasis added).   
¶47 Yet Crown Castle argues Courtyard's holding is broad, 
and applies to more than marital property.  It argues that 
Courtyard sets forth a general rule that § 816.06 grants a 
judgment creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor 
third party to testify at a supplemental proceeding.  We 
disagree.  Crown Castle's interpretation strains the language of 
Courtyard.  In that decision, the court of appeals clearly 
distinguished cases that involve marital property from cases 
that involve all other types of property.26  Therefore, the 
                                                 
26 The plaintiff-appellant in Courtyard did not even attempt 
to brief an argument that § 816.06 grants a judgment creditor 
the right to compel testimony from any non-judgment debtor third 
party at a supplemental proceeding.  Brief of Plaintiff-
Appellant at 11, Courtyard Condo. Ass'n v. Draper, 2001 WI App 
115, 244 Wis. 2d 153, 629 N.W.2d 38 (No. 00-1817).  Instead, it 
focused on the narrow issue before the court, conceding that 
Courtyard 
presented 
a 
conflict 
between 
§ 816.06 
and 
§ 803.045(3), not an opportunity to expand the scope of 
§ 816.06.  See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 11, Courtyard, 
244 Wis. 2d 153 (No. 00-1817).  
The fact that the court of appeals focused on the interplay 
between Wis. Stat. § 816.06 and § 803.045 only strengthens our 
holding.  At no point did the court of appeals determine that 
§ 816.06, standing alone, grants a judgment creditor the right 
to compel a non-judgment debtor third party to testify at a 
supplemental 
proceeding. 
 
See 
generally 
Courtyard, 
244 
Wis. 2d 153. 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
27 
 
decision applies only where the judgment creditor seeks to 
satisfy its judgment out of marital property.27 
¶48 Accordingly, we conclude that in correctly deciding 
Courtyard, the court of appeals created a narrow rule to 
harmonize two statutes that were otherwise in conflict, but did 
not create a general rule that § 816.06 grants a judgment 
creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor third party 
to testify at a supplemental proceeding.28 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶49 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 816.06 does not grant a 
judgment creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor 
third party to testify at supplemental proceedings.  We base our 
conclusion on the language of the statute, on its context and 
statutory history, and on our prior holdings.  Because Crown 
                                                 
27 Courtyard, 
244 
Wis. 2d 153, 
¶18 
("Harmonizing 
the 
statutes involved to permit the supplementary examination of the 
judgment debtor's spouse gives full force and effect to the 
tenor of the statutes allowing the judgment creditor to reach 
marital property.") (emphasis added) 
28 We emphasize that our holding does not leave a judgment 
creditor without remedy against a non-judgment debtor third 
party who may be concealing the property of a judgment debtor.  
A receiver could be appointed under Wis. Stat. § 816.04, see 
generally Mann v. Bankruptcy Estate of Badger Lines, Inc., 224 
Wis. 2d 646, 590 N.W.2d 270 (1999), and the receiver could 
proceed against a non-judgment debtor third party in possession 
of the judgment debtor's property.  Wis. Stat. § 816.08.  The 
receiver could also proceed under Wis. Stat. ch. 242 to undo a 
fraudulent transfer by the judgment debtor.  See § 242.07.  
Alternatively or additionally, the judgment creditor could 
commence a garnishment action against the non-judgment debtor 
third party under § 812.01(1), or proceed under § 128.08 
(discussing the appointment of a receiver). 
No. 
2009AP3029   
 
28 
 
Castle had no right, under § 816.06, to compel Orion Logistics 
to testify at a supplemental proceeding, we reverse the court of 
appeals decision and remand the cause to the circuit court for 
further proceedings. 
By the Court.—The decision by the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
No.  2009AP3029.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶50 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority opinion is an anti-creditor opinion that emasculates 
Chapter 816 of the statutes.  It empowers debtors to hide their 
assets from creditors who have procured valid, enforceable 
judgments.  It will hinder the ability of all judgment creditors 
(individuals and corporations alike) to recover payment from all 
judgment debtors (individuals and corporations alike).   
¶51 The court of appeals, in contrast to the majority 
opinion, got it right:  Circuit courts and court commissioners 
have authority under Wis. Stat. §§ 816.03 and 816.06 to require 
a third party to submit to a supplemental examination so that a 
judgment creditor can discover assets of a debtor. 
¶52 The text of Wis. Stat. § 816.06, the purpose of 
supplemental proceedings, and the statutory history of § 816.06 
lead to the conclusion that the statutes permit the compelled 
examination of third parties who have information about the 
judgment debtor's property.     
¶53 Text. 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 816.03(1) 
provides 
that 
circuit courts and court commissioners have the authority under 
certain circumstances to order a judgment debtor to appear and 
answer concerning the judgment debtor's property.1  Section 
816.06 further states that "[a]t the hearing upon such order or 
warrant such judgment debtor may be examined on oath and 
                                                 
1 Wis. Stat. § 816.03(1)(a) ("When an execution against 
property has . . . been returned unsatisfied . . . the court 
. . . shall, upon motion of the judgment creditor, order such 
judgment debtor, whether an individual, firm, corporation or 
other association, to appear before the court or judge and 
answer concerning the judgment debtor's property . . . ."). 
No.  2009AP3029.ssa 
 
2 
 
testimony on the part of either party may be offered." (emphasis 
added). 
¶54 The court of appeals has declared that "the last 
phrase of Wis. Stat. § 816.06, 'testimony on the part of either 
party may be offered,' creates an ambiguity."2      
¶55 Emphasizing the word "may," the majority appears to 
conclude that the phrase "testimony on the part of either party 
may be offered" allows either party to present testimony through 
witnesses, but only if the witness voluntarily agrees to 
testify.  Majority op., ¶26.  Thus, the majority acknowledges 
that Wis. Stat. § 816.06 allows third parties to testify at 
supplemental proceedings, but concludes that the parties, the 
circuit court judge, and the court commissioner have no 
authority to compel third-party testimony.   
¶56 The majority purports to conduct a "plain meaning 
analysis," ¶18, but then simply asserts that its conclusion is 
"clear."  Majority op., ¶19.  Insisting that the holding is 
driven by the statute's "plain" language and meaning and 
insisting that the answer is clear does not make the language or 
meaning of the statute any more plain or the majority opinion 
any more persuasive.  The statute's language and meaning were 
not so clear to the court of appeals in Courtyard Condominium 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Draper, 2001 WI App 115, ¶9, 244 Wis. 2d 153, 629 
N.W.2d 38,3 or to the author of the supplemental proceedings 
                                                 
2 Courtyard Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Draper, 2001 WI App 115, 
¶9, 244 Wis. 2d 153, 629 N.W.2d 38. 
3 See ¶54, supra. 
No.  2009AP3029.ssa 
 
3 
 
chapter of the Wisconsin Practice Series.4  The court of appeals 
and the experienced commentator both concluded that Wis. Stat. 
§ 816.06 was ambiguous and interpreted the provision to allow 
witnesses to be compelled.   
¶57 The word "may" in the phrase "testimony on the part of 
either party may be offered" has nothing to do with whether 
witnesses may be compelled to testify.  The word "may" means 
that a party may call witnesses, but is not required to do so.  
It is not mandatory for parties to call witnesses to offer 
testimony; hence, the legislature provided that testimony "may" 
be offered.5  The majority's reliance on the word "may" in Wis. 
Stat. § 816.06 is misplaced. 
¶58 I would hold that the phrase "testimony on the part of 
either party may be offered" allows either party to call third 
parties to testify.  The subpoena statutes applicable to special 
proceedings apply to chapter 816 and allow the circuit court 
judge or court commissioner to compel witnesses to appear.  
¶59 Purpose.  Although the majority correctly acknowledges 
that a statute's purpose should guide this court's "plain 
meaning" 
interpretation, 
majority 
op., 
¶14, 
the 
majority 
opinion's interpretation is at odds with the statute's purpose. 
                                                 
4 See ¶77, infra. 
5 Cf. Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2012 WI 26, 
¶37, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (recognizing that the word 
"may" in Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) allows, but does not require, 
property owners whose property is damaged by forest fires to 
bring a civil action to recover double damages).  
No.  2009AP3029.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶60 The purpose of chapter 816 of the Wisconsin Statutes 
is 
to 
help 
judgment 
creditors 
when 
their 
judgments 
go 
unsatisfied.  It provides "a post-judgment discovery procedure 
used where the judgment creditor is uncertain of the nature, 
location, extent, and amount of the debtor's property. . . .  In 
most 
instances 
without 
the 
information 
obtained 
at 
a 
supplemental examination, it is very difficult to discover the 
debtor's non-exempt property."6   
¶61 Interpreting Wis. Stat. § 816.06 to compel third 
parties to submit to examination furthers the purpose of 
supplemental proceedings, while the majority's interpretation 
undermines it. 
                                                 
6 See Robert A. Pasch, Wisconsin Collection Law § 16:1 (2d 
ed. 2006).   
Long 
ago, 
this 
court 
explained 
that 
supplemental 
proceedings 
exist 
because 
"[u]nless 
a 
comprehensive 
and 
searching examination be allowed, an artful debtor might defeat 
the discovery sought."  Heilbronner v. Levy, 64 Wis. 636, 637, 
26 N.W. 113 (1885). 
See also Eclipse Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Compliance Co., 886 
N.E.2d 349, 355 (Ill. App. 2007) ("[The supplementary proceeding 
statute] provides a mechanism by which a judgment creditor may 
initiate supplementary proceedings, against a judgment debtor or 
a 
third 
party, 
to 
discover 
the 
assets 
of 
a 
judgment 
debtor . . . . 
[The 
statute] 
is 
to 
be 
liberally 
construed . . . .").  
See also 30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions § 557 ("[Supplemental 
proceedings] address the circumstance where vital information 
regarding assets which ought to be subjected to the lien or 
discharge of a judgment is in the hands of third persons, and 
provide methods by which a judgment creditor may discover assets 
belonging to the judgment debtor in the possession of those 
third parties . . . ."). 
No.  2009AP3029.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶62 The 
majority 
allows 
judgment 
creditors 
to 
call 
witnesses who will voluntarily testify but not witnesses who 
must be compelled to provide relevant information.  Limiting the 
statute in this way robs supplemental proceedings of their 
effectiveness as a discovery device for judgment creditors with 
unsatisfied judgments.   
¶63 Judgment creditors have no need to compel witnesses 
who will voluntarily provide information.  They can obtain this 
information outside of the courtroom.  Supplemental proceedings 
are intended to allow judgment creditors the opportunity to 
gather information that would not be made available to them 
voluntarily.  It seems that many of the witnesses most likely to 
have relevant information about the location of assets are those 
who would be most likely to prefer that the information remain 
unknown——i.e., those whose testimony would need to be compelled.   
¶64 The court of appeals in the present case, as in 
Courtyard, endeavored to square the text of the statute with its 
purpose.  
¶65 Courtyard asked whether the spouse of a judgment 
debtor could be required to testify in a supplemental proceeding 
regarding the fate of marital property.7  A statute allowed the 
creditor to proceed against marital property, even if it was 
held by a spouse who was not a judgment debtor, and the court of 
appeals reasoned that "the right of the judgment creditor to 
satisfy a judgment from marital property would be frustrated if 
                                                 
7 Courtyard, 244 Wis. 2d 153, ¶¶1-4. 
No.  2009AP3029.ssa 
 
6 
 
the creditor could not examine the spouse."8  The court of 
appeals concluded that unless the judgment debtor's spouse 
testified, "the judgment creditor would lack the information 
needed to proceed against the spouse . . . ."9  Specifically, the 
court of appeals stated that:  
It would be an unreasonable and absurd result to 
conclude that although a judgment creditor may reach 
all marital property to satisfy a judgment, the spouse 
of the judgment debtor does not have to submit to a 
supplementary examination in which the amount and 
location of marital property could be determined.  
Harmonizing the statutes involved to permit the 
supplementary examination of the judgment debtor's 
spouse gives full force and [e]ffect to the tenor of 
the statutes allowing the judgment creditor to reach 
marital property.10  
¶66 In the present case, the considerations are similar. 
Chapter 242 of the Wisconsin Statutes, the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act, provides a remedy for judgment creditors when 
their judgment debtors seek to fraudulently protect their assets 
by transferring them to other entities.11  Prior to bringing suit 
under chapter 242, a judgment creditor needs evidentiary support 
for his or her allegations and factual contentions.12  Thus, if a 
judgment debtor pleads ignorance and the judgment creditor is 
not able to discover information from other sources, the 
                                                 
8 Id., ¶15. 
9 Id. 
10 Id., ¶18 (citation omitted). 
11 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 242.04(1)(a).  
12 Wis. Stat. § 802.05(2)(c). 
No.  2009AP3029.ssa 
 
7 
 
judgment creditor may not be able to establish the factual basis 
necessary to proceed against the third party.   
¶67 Just as in Courtyard, the supplemental proceedings in 
the present case could have been used to protect the judgment 
creditor and counsel from having to risk sanction under 
§ 802.05(3) for filing a factually unsupported complaint or to 
forgo collection of a valid judgment.13  The majority has 
frustrated the purpose of the statute by cutting off an 
important avenue of discovery that aids in the collection of 
judgments.  
¶68 We need not fear an unreasonable, far-flung fishing 
expedition by the judgment creditor.  The judge or court 
commissioner has discretion as to the scope of the examination.14  
                                                 
13 The 
majority 
asserts 
that 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
disregarded the corporate form by compelling Larson to testify 
regarding his two entirely separate corporations.  Majority op., 
¶20.  This misconstrues the court of appeals' opinion.  It was 
the likelihood of relevant evidence being discovered from Orion 
Logistics that justified the compelled testimony. 
As an aside, although the majority opinion and I refer to 
Larson's 
businesses 
as 
"corporations," 
they 
are 
limited 
liability companies, unique corporate structures governed by 
Wis. Stat. ch. 183.  
The majority's preoccupation with "the corporate form" 
suggests that it fears affirming the court of appeals would be 
damaging to businesses.  Yet the majority's holding undermines 
the ability of all judgment creditors (including businesses) to 
satisfy judgments against elusive judgment debtors. 
14 Heilbronner v. Levy, 64 Wis. 636, 637, 26 N.W. 113 
(1885).  See also Robert A. Pasch, Wisconsin Collection Law 
§ 16:4 (2d ed. 2006) ("A logical conclusion to be drawn from 
[Heilbronner] is that the judge or court commissioner has 
discretionary power as to who, in addition to the judgment 
debtor, may provide testimony and information at a supplemental 
examination."). 
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Thus, it would be left to the judge's or commissioner's 
discretion to determine when a third party's testimony justifies 
the burden that being compelled to testify might place on that 
third party. 
¶69 Statutory History.  Although the majority opinion 
relies heavily on the history of ch. 816, examining the 
evolution of Wis. Stat. § 816.06 from the 1856 version to its 
present form actually reveals that the legislature never 
intended the result reached by the majority today. 
¶70 As the majority notes, Wis. Stat. ch. 120, §§ 202 and 
206 (1856) explicitly allowed judgment creditors to compel the 
testimony of third parties.  Majority op., ¶33.  Section 202 
provided that "either party may examine witnesses on his behalf" 
and section 206 provided that "[w]itnesses may be required to 
appear and testify on any proceedings under this chapter, in the 
same manner as upon the trial of an issue." 
¶71 In 1878, after a renumbering, Wis. Stat. ch. 131, 
§ 3033 provided that "such judgment debtor may be examined on 
oath, and witnesses may be required to appear and testify on the 
part of either party, in the same manner as upon the trial of an 
issue."  The statute remained substantially in that form save 
some renumbering until 1935. 
¶72 The majority focuses intently on the 1935 revisions 
appearing in chapter 541 of the Laws of Wisconsin.  In that 
revision, the language of § 273.06 (now § 816.06) was shortened 
to its current form: "At the hearing upon such order or warrant 
such judgment debtor may be examined on oath and testimony on 
No.  2009AP3029.ssa 
 
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the part of either party may be offered."  The caption and text 
that emerged from the 1935 revisions are identical to the 
current caption and text of Wis. Stat. § 816.06.   
¶73 Although the reference to witnesses being "required" 
to appear and testify was removed in 1935, a holistic look at 
the 1935 revisions reveals that the legislature's intent was not 
necessarily to change the scope of supplemental proceedings.  
The title of the session law is "An Act to revise portions of 
Title XXV proceedings in civil actions in courts of record and 
Title XXVI actions relating to real estate for clarity and 
conciseness of language and simplifying and improving said 
proceedings and for harmonizing the substantive provisions with 
the procedural rules which are being revised by the Supreme 
Court."15 
¶74 In this instance, the statutory change from (1) 
"witnesses may be required to appear and testify on the part of 
either party" to (2) "testimony on the part of either party may 
be offered" seems more likely to have been motivated by a desire 
for conciseness or accuracy than a desire to make a dramatic 
substantive change.   
¶75 The 1935 legislature may have removed the language 
explicitly stating that "witnesses may be required to appear and 
testify" because the language is unnecessary in light of a 
related provision, which the majority ignores.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 885.01 
provides 
a 
broad 
grant 
of 
subpoena 
power.  
Specifically, it allows "any judge or clerk of a court or court 
                                                 
15 Title, ch. 541, Laws of 1935.   
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commissioner . . . to require the attendance of witnesses and 
their production of lawful instruments of evidence in any 
action, matter, or proceeding . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 885.01(1) 
(emphasis added).   
¶76 Supplemental 
proceedings 
certainly 
qualify 
as 
"proceedings" under Wis. Stat. § 885.0116 and either a judge or 
court commissioner presides over them.  Nothing in chapter 816 
clearly states that the legislature has prohibited compelling 
testimony of third parties at supplemental proceedings.  There 
is no conflict between the phrase "such judgment debtor may be 
examined on oath and testimony on the part of either party may 
be offered," Wis. Stat. § 816.06, and the general subpoena power 
of Wis. Stat. § 885.01.  The circuit judge or court commissioner 
can rely on the provisions of § 885.01 to compel testimony that 
either party wants to offer in supplemental proceedings.  
¶77 As the author of a chapter on supplemental proceedings 
in the Wisconsin Practice Series concluded, "[w]hile the current 
statute is perhaps more ambiguous than its predecessor, there 
appears to be no reason for excluding the ability of a judgment 
creditor to call and examine third parties who may have 
information about the judgment debtor's property."17  
                                                 
16 See Wis. Stat. § 816.03(2) ("The fact that garnishee 
proceedings have been commenced in aid of or that property has 
been 
levied on under a second execution shall not bar 
proceedings under this section . . . .") (Emphasis added.)   
17 Robert A. Pasch, Wisconsin Collection Law § 16:4 (2d ed. 
2006). 
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¶78 The majority disregards the reasonable view of an 
experienced Wisconsin commentator, disregards the purpose of 
supplemental proceedings, and disregards the interaction between 
general 
subpoena 
powers 
and 
the 
supplemental 
proceedings 
statutes.  It makes too much of a statutory revision that may 
well have been intended to be purely non-substantive. 
¶79 In sum, the majority's interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 816.06 undermines the purpose of supplemental proceedings.  It 
will hinder the ability of all judgment creditors (individuals 
and corporations alike) to satisfy outstanding judgments against 
all judgment debtors (individuals and corporations alike).  
¶80 I agree with the court of appeals that the circuit 
court properly exercised its discretion when it ordered Orion 
Logistics to submit to a supplemental examination.  
¶81 For the reasons stated above, I dissent. 
¶82 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this opinion. 
 
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