Title: Bobby Scott v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC94-701
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 3, 2002

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC94701
____________
BOBBY SCOTT,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[January 3, 2002]
QUINCE, J.
We have for review the following three questions certified by the Fifth
District Court of Appeal to be of great public importance:
DOES THE ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE RAISE A
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION (OR INFERENCE)
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD KNOWLEDGE OF
ITS ILLICIT NATURE?
  
IF SO, IF THE DEFENDANT FAILS TO RAISE THE
ISSUE THAT HE WAS UNAWARE OF THE ILLICIT
1   This Court decided Chicone in October 1996.
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NATURE OF THE SUBSTANCE, IS HE
NEVERTHELESS ENTITLED TO A CHICONE
INSTRUCTION?  
CAN THE FAILURE TO GIVE THE REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION BE HARMLESS ERROR?
See Scott v. State, 722 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).  We have jurisdiction
pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution.  For the reasons stated
below, we answer questions one and three in the negative and question two in the
affirmative.  In answering these questions we hold that the defendant’s knowledge
of the illicit nature of the controlled substance is an element of the offense of
possession, and an instruction that the State must prove this element must be given
as a part of the standard jury instructions.  Thus, we quash the district court’s
decision and remand for a new trial.
Factual and Procedural Background
Bobby Scott was charged in an information filed on January 6, 1997, with
introduction or possession of contraband in a correctional facility.  At the
conclusion of his two-day jury trial, defense counsel requested an instruction
pursuant to this Court’s opinion in Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996).1 
When asked by the trial judge if counsel was requesting something more than the
2   State v. Medlin, 273 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1973).
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Medlin2 instruction, counsel said yes and indicated, reading from the Chicone
opinion, that the jury should be instructed that the element of knowledge means the
defendant had knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance allegedly possessed. 
Such an instruction was not given, and Scott was convicted as charged. 
Scott filed a timely appeal to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, arguing the
trial court reversibly erred in denying his request for a special instruction under
Chicone.  Scott further claimed the burden was on the State to prove that he knew
the substance was cannabis, even if he did not raise the issue.  Thus, he opined,
the trial court erred by failing to give the requested Chicone instruction.  
The Fifth District rejected this argument, concluding that “the supreme court
has not yet decided whether a special instruction concerning [a] defendant’s
knowledge is required if he challenges only his possession of the substance.” 
Scott, 722 So. 2d at 257.  The Fifth District stated in reference to the presumption
of knowledge that “[a]lthough Chicone places the burden of proof on the State to
prove knowledge of the illicit nature of the contraband, it does not, at least
expressly, overrule the Medlin presumption.”  Id. at 258.  This statement is based
on the fact that the Fifth District, as well as other district courts of appeal, has
interpreted our opinion in State v. Medlin, 273 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1973), to say that
3   The State argues we should not address the issues raised by the certified
questions because Scott did not submit a proposed instruction.  This argument on
preservation is not addressed in the district court opinion.
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the doing of the act, i.e., possessing the controlled substance, raises a rebuttable
presumption that the possessor was aware of the nature of the drug possessed. 
Finally, the Fifth District opined that any failure to give the requested instruction
was harmless error because Scott’s defense was not based on lack of knowledge
of the illicit nature of the substance.3  The Fifth District has misinterpreted Chicone
and Medlin.
Chicone Decision  
In Chicone, we accepted jurisdiction to resolve the conflict between the
district court’s decision in Chicone v. State, 658 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA
1994), and numerous other district court opinions on the issue of whether guilty
knowledge is an element of possession of a controlled substance or possession of
drug paraphernalia.  We answered the question in the affirmative for both
possession of the substance and the paraphernalia.  In resolving this question we
explained that the “guilty knowledge” element of possession actually involves two
elements, knowledge of the presence of the substance and knowledge of the illicit
nature of the substance.  In the final analysis we clearly said both knowledge of the
4   While the charged crime in the present case is possession of contraband in
a correctional facility (section 944.47, Florida Statutes (1995)) and the charged crimes
in Chicone were possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia, we note
that elements of these offenses are substantially identical.
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presence of the substance and knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance are
essential elements of the crime of possession of an illegal substance.4  Thus, we
found the State was required to prove that Chicone knew of the illicit nature of the
items in his possession.  See Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d at 744. 
Accord Lambert v. State, 728 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).  
We further indicated that lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of the
substance is not an affirmative defense to be raised and proven by the defendant. 
We said:
     The State, to its credit, does not claim that a
defendant shown to be without guilty knowledge could be
convicted under the possession statute.  Rather, the State
contends that lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of the
item possessed should be raised and proven as an
affirmative defense.  We disagree.  Nowhere has the
legislature provided for such an affirmative defense. 
Furthermore, if the statute did not require guilty
knowledge, then obviously a person who possessed an
illicit object even without knowledge of its illicit nature
would be as guilty of violating the statute (that had no
scienter requirement) as one who did have knowledge. 
Lack of knowledge could hardly be a defense to a statute
that did not require such knowledge.  Hence, the State’s
position really supports our holding and we commend the
State for its forthright approach and candor.
5   In the Chicone opinion this Court went to great lengths to discuss the guilty
knowledge requirement that is implicit in the statute, as well as the law applicable to
this subject dating back to Reynolds v. State, 111 So. 285 (Fla. 1926); Spataro v.
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Chicone, 684 So. 2d at 744.
  
Furthermore, we indicated that a jury instruction is required if requested.  We
specifically held:
     We stated earlier that the State must prove guilty
knowledge to establish the defendant’s possession of a
controlled substance or drug paraphernalia.  At trial,
Chicone proffered instructions that required the jury to
find that the substance he possessed was known to him
to be cocaine and that the object he possessed was
known to him to be drug paraphernalia in order to convict
him.  The trial court denied these instructions and gave
the standard jury instructions set out above along with the
standard jury instructions on reasonable doubt, which the
trial judge read twice.
     While the existing jury instructions are adequate in
requiring “knowledge of the presence of the substance,”
we agree that, if specifically requested by a defendant, the
trial court should expressly indicate to jurors that guilty
knowledge means the defendant must have knowledge of
the illicit nature of the substance allegedly possessed.
Chicone, 684 So. 2d at 745-746.  It is implicit in this holding that the standard jury
instructions on possession do not adequately inform the jury of the “illicit nature of
the substance” requirement of the guilty knowledge element.  See State v. Delva,
575 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. 1991).  It is with this backdrop that we address the
issues left open in our Chicone decision.5
State, 179 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); Frank v. State, 199 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1967); Rutskin v. State, 260 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972);  State v. Medlin,
273 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1973); and State v. Oxx, 417 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
Therefore, this history will not be repeated in this opinion.
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Analysis   
In reaching its conclusion that Scott was not entitled to the requested jury
instruction on knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance, the Fifth District
found that what the defense argued, that Scott did not possess the illegal substance,
was inconsistent with an argument that Scott had no knowledge of the illicit nature
of the drugs.  Additionally, the district court opined that Scott would only be
entitled to the requested instruction if there was some evidence presented to the jury
which responded to the presumption discussed in State v. Medlin, 273 So. 2d 394
(Fla. 1973).  Thirdly, the Fifth District in Scott found the failure to give the
instruction harmless because there was no evidence before the jury which 
responded to the presumption that Scott had knowledge of the illicit nature of the
substance.  We find these reasons unpersuasive.
The rationale that Scott’s defense is internally inconsistent is flawed and
appears to be premised on a proposition that we rejected in Chicone, that is, that
the defendant has the burden to put forth evidence on this issue.  As we previously
said and reiterate here, guilty knowledge of the illicit nature of the possessed
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substance is an element of the offense of possession of a controlled substance. 
The State has the burden of proof in any prosecution to demonstrate each element
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181
(Fla. 1991); Butler v. State, 715 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).  Since knowledge
is an element of the offense, the State has the burden of proving the defendant’s
possession was knowing.  Moreover, the jury is entitled to be instructed on the
elements of an offense.  In Gerds v. State, 64 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1953), we held:
     It is an inherent and indispensable requisite of a fair
and impartial trial under the protective powers of our
Federal and State Constitutions as contained in the due
process of law clauses that a defendant be accorded the
right to have a Court correctly and intelligently instruct the
jury on the essential and material elements of the crime
charged and required to be proven by competent
evidence. 
Id. at 916.  See also State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1991).   Since the jury is
entitled to be instructed on the elements of the offense, it cannot be harmless error
to fail to do so especially when the omission is brought to the attention of the trial
court by the defendant.    
Furthermore, Scott is not arguing two alternative defenses, as the Fifth
District suggests.  See Scott, 722 So. 2d at 258.  Rather, it is a single argument that
he did not possess the drugs.  Scott’s argument that he did not possess the drugs
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and had no knowledge of the drug’s presence in his locker encompasses the
argument that he was unaware of the illicit nature of the substance.  With this kind
of argument and defense, each element of the offense is a disputed element on
which the jury must be instructed.  Moreover, the requirement that an instruction
must be given does not depend on the defense espoused.  Because knowledge of
the illicit nature is an element of the crime and the jury must be instructed on each
element of the crime, an instruction must be given even when the defendant simply
requires the State to prove its case and offers nothing by way of an affirmative
defense.   
Although the Fifth District correctly states Chicone does not expressly
overrule the Medlin presumption, the court’s interpretation of the presumption is
erroneous.  The Fifth District’s statement that the State did prove the element of
knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance by the presumption or inference
raised by the proof of his possession of the substance assumes several facts which
are not a part of this record.  Such a statement would be applicable if the Medlin
presumption was applicable to this case and if the jury was properly informed of
both the knowledge element and the operation of the presumption.  A close reading
of  Medlin and Chicone, however, yields the inescapable conclusion that the
presumption of knowledge applies only to cases of actual possession, and we said
6 The Medlin inference may be applicable to some cases of exclusive
constructive possession.  However, its applicability depends on the particular
circumstances of each individual case.
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as much in Chicone when we indicated, “Medlin stands for the proposition that
evidence of actual, personal possession is enough to sustain a conviction.  In other
words, knowledge can be inferred from the fact of personal possession.”  684 So.
2d at 739.6  In reaching this conclusion, the Court contrasted the facts in Medlin
with those in Frank v. State, 199 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967), and Rutskin v.
State, 260 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972).  In both Frank and Rutskin, the district
court indicated, although the statute was silent on the matter of scienter or
knowledge, it was necessary to prove that the defendant had knowledge he
delivered a substance proscribed by the statute.  Moreover, in Frank and Rutskin
the defendants were convicted based on their constructive possession of drugs.  In
distinguishing the Medlin facts we said:
     Neither the Frank nor the Rutskin decisions are
applicable to the factual situation presented in the instant
case.  Defendant admittedly had actual possession of the
drug and obviously was aware that he had the drug in his
possession.  He admittedly delivered the capsule to the
Driggers girl which contained the prescribed drug.  Proof
of these facts established defendant’s guilt of the crime
charged.  The State was not required to prove intent to
violate the Statute or defendant’s specific knowledge of
the contents of the capsule.
7   Because knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance is an essential
element of the crime of possession of a controlled substance or possession of drug
paraphernalia, the standard jury instructions should be amended to provide for this as
an element.  The standard instructions should also provide for the Medlin presumption
or inference in the appropriate cases.  Therefore, the Committee on Standard Jury
Instructions in Criminal Cases is charged with proposing a standard instruction which
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 Medlin, 273 So. 2d at 396.  In situations where a Medlin instruction is applicable,
the elements of the possession offense, including the element of the illicit nature of
the drug, must first be explained to the jury by proper instructions.  Only then
would the Medlin presumption instruction come into play.  
The defendant in this case was not in actual, personal possession of drugs. 
The drugs were found in his locker in an eyeglass case.  There was testimony
presented at trial that the locker was bent in some manner which may have made it
accessible to persons other than Scott.  The drugs were not on Scott’s person and
there was even a question raised as to whether he had exclusive constructive
possession.  
Conclusion    
We therefore reiterate our holding in Chicone that knowledge of the illicit
nature of the contraband is an element of the crime of possession of a controlled
substance, a defendant is entitled to an instruction on that element, and it is error to
fail to instruct on that element.7  It is error to fail to give an instruction even if the
includes knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance. 
8   Because there was error in the denial of the defendant’s request for a jury
instruction based on guilty knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance, the
defendant will be entitled to a new trial.  If the defendant is convicted, there will be a
new sentencing proceeding and the defendant will have any opportunity to raise any
pertinent sentencing issues.  We therefore deny Scott’s motion to file a supplemental
point concerning Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000), without prejudice to raise
the issue at any new sentencing.
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defendant did not explicitly say he did not have knowledge of the illicit nature of the
substance.  Additionally, the Medlin presumption or inference is applicable to those
cases where the defendant has actual, personal possession of the substance.  The
Fifth District’s view that any error was harmless because the jury found Scott to be
in exclusive control and thus properly inferred knowledge begs the question.  How
could the jury infer guilty knowledge without being properly instructed on the
element of knowledge as well as being instructed on when knowledge can be
inferred?  The defendant in this case requested a Chicone instruction.  The trial
court denied that request; the denial was reversible error.
Therefore, this cause is remanded to the trial court8 for further proceedings
in accordance with this decision.  
It is so ordered.  
SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., dissents with an opinion.
HARDING, J., dissents with an opinion, in which WELLS, C.J., concurs.
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, C.J., dissenting.
I dissent.  I would answer the first question in the affirmative, the second
question in the negative, and the third question in the affirmative.  I would affirm the
decision of the Fifth District.  I join in the decision and opinion of Justice Harding
because I believe the better course would be to discharge jurisdiction for the
reasons he states.
I write further because I conclude that the majority’s opinion will further
complicate issues which have resulted from what I believe are problems in the
opinion by this Court in Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996).  I conclude
Chicone is internally conflicted on the vital question of whether the Court or the
Legislature defines elements of crimes.  I find the Fifth District’s reading of
Chicone to be a fair reading of it and that the present majority fails to explain why it
is not.
Initially, Chicone states that “since the legislature is vested with the authority
to define the elements of the crime, determining whether scienter is an essential
element of a statutory crime is a question of legislative intent.”  Id. at 741.  Then the
Chicone opinion states:
9State v. Medlin, 273 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1973).
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There is no such indication of legislative intent to dispense with means
rea here.  Our holding depends substantially on our view that if the
legislature had intended to make criminals out of people who were
wholly ignorant of the offending characteristics of items in their
possession, and subject them to lengthy prison terms, it would have
spoken more clearly to that effect.  Interpreting the statutes as
dispensing with scienter would “criminalize a broad range of
apparently innocent conduct.”
Id. at 743 (footnote and citations omitted).  But Chicone then makes a leap by
stating, “Although by statutory construction we find that guilty knowledge is an
element of the crimes defined in [section] 893.13(6)(a) . . . .”  Id. at 744.  I agree
with the Fifth District and fail to see how it follows that it is for the Legislature to
define elements of crimes but, when the Legislature does not include an element,
that this Court corrects the Legislature’s definition by writing the element into the
crime.
I conclude that what the State proposed in Chicone and which the Chicone
Court rejected would be a more logical and less problematic approach.  Lack of
knowledge should be an affirmative defense.  The State carries its burden by
proving the possession of the contraband.  This gives rise to the Medlin9
presumption, and the defendant should then proceed to prove lack of knowledge
and overcome the presumption through an affirmative defense.
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The present majority, by now assuming that this Court can write elements of
crimes, has opened the door to many complications.  I believe the Legislature
should close this particular one by amending the statute to say that possession of
contraband gives rise to a presumption of knowledge.  More importantly, I believe
that this Court should not write elements into statutory crimes.
HARDING, J., dissenting.
I would decline to answer the certified question from the district court
because my review of the record reveals that the issue raised and certified was not
preserved for appellate review.  Florida courts have consistently required that
proposed jury instructions that are not part of the standard jury instructions must
be submitted  to the trial court in writing if the issue is to be preserved for appellate
review.  See Gavlick v. State, 740 So. 2d 1212, 1213 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); 
Watkins v. State, 519 So. 2d 760, 761 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988);  Pittman v. State, 440
So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983);  Holley v. State, 423 So. 2d 562, 564 (Fla.
1st DCA 1982).  See also  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.390(c).  This was the assumption
under which I worked as a trial judge in the Fourth Judicial Circuit for many years.
In Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 377, 384 (Fla. 1968), this Court stated that
ordinarily, a proposed instruction must be submitted in writing in order to preserve
10 On July, 10, 1997, this Court adopted the following standard jury instruction:
Give if applicable  See Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736
(Fla.1996):
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the issue for appellate review.   However, this Court recognized that there may be
limited exceptions to the “in writing” requirement.  In Brown, the record was clear
that the matter had been brought to the trial court’s attention and the trial court had
no intention of giving the instruction regardless of whether the request was made in
writing.
Other courts have also recognized limited exceptions to the “in writing”
requirement.  In Cooper v. State, 742 So. 2d 855, 857 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), the
district court held that reference by the defendant’s counsel to the charging
document  was sufficient.  Similarly, in Steele v. State, 561 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1990), reference to the statute and the information was satisfactory because
both constituted written requests of the desired instruction. 
In the present case, there is no basis for recognizing an exception to the “in
writing” requirement.  The majority opinion reflects that the defense attorney in this
case requested a Chicone instruction.  A review of the record reveals that defense
counsel did not submit in writing a requested jury instruction based on Chicone;
rather, the request for the Chicone instruction was oral. 10  The trial judge asked for
If a thing is in a place over which the person does not have
control, in order to establish constructive possession the State must
prove the person's (1) control over the thing, (2) knowledge that the thing
was within the person's presence, and (3) knowledge of the illicit nature
of the thing.
Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (97-1), 697 So. 2d 84, 87 (Fla. 1997).
As stated above, the First District Court of Appeal has stated that the requirement of
written jury instructions is inapplicable when a Florida standard jury instruction is
requested on the record.  See Holley v. State, 423 So. 2d 562, 564 (Fla. 1st DCA
1982).  The trial in the present case took place on July 8 and 9, 1997.  Thus, at the time
of the trial, the Chicone instruction was not part of the standard jury instructions.
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a specific proposed instruction twice.  Defense counsel did not comply nor did
counsel refer to the information or the statute.  Counsel merely repeated the oral
request for a Chicone instruction.  It is obvious from the dialogue that the judge
was uncertain regarding the exact instruction that counsel was requesting.  
A mere oral request for an instruction falls short of the requirements of
Watkins, Pittman, Holley, and Gavlick.  In answering the certified question in this
case, the majority disregards this established precedent.  I fear the majority’s
holding will open the door for attorneys to make vague, unwritten requests for jury
instructions, thus “sandbagging” judges who fail to grant them or give what they
thought should be given.  The mischief which will be caused by the majority’s
opinion is greater than any uncertainty that may otherwise occur if this Court were
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to decline to answer the certified question.   
In a footnote, the majority points out that the preservation issue was not
addressed by the court below.  Regardless, this Court should not simply ignore this
important issue.  One option would be to remand this case to the district court for
further consideration of the preservation issue.  But even if this Court declines this
option, we would still not be precluded from addressing the issue on the merits. 
See, e.g., Fulton County Adm'r. v. Sullivan, 753 So. 2d 549, 553 n. 3 (Fla. 1999)
("Given our jurisdiction on the basis of the certified question, we have jurisdiction
over all of the issues raised in this case.").   At the very least, this Court should ask
the parties for further briefing on the preservation issue.  See Savona v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America, 648 So. 2d 705, 707 (Fla. 1995) (“[W]e have the authority to
consider issues other than those upon which jurisdiction is based, but this authority
is discretionary and should be exercised only when these other issues have been
properly briefed and argued . . . .”). 
For all of these reasons, I would decline to answer the question without first
resolving whether the issue has been preserved.  Thus, I dissent.
In the event that the issue was preserved for review, the majority should be
crystal clear regarding the impact of today’s holding on possession cases. 
Unfortunately, our previous opinions have created substantial confusion regarding
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the applicability of the Chicone instruction and the Medlin presumption to cases of
actual and/or constructive possession.  I fear that the present majority opinion only
adds to the confusion.  The majority in the present case requests the Committee on
Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases to propose an instruction which
provides for the Medlin presumption in “appropriate cases.”  Easier said than done. 
At one point in the opinion, the majority states that “[a] close reading of Medlin and
Chicone, however, yields that inescapable conclusion that the presumption of
knowledge only applies to cases of actual possession.”  Majority op. at 9-10
(emphasis added).  In a footnote on page 10, the majority states that “[t]he Medlin
inference may be applicable to some cases of exclusive constructive possession. 
However, its applicability depends on the particular circumstances of each
individual case.”  With guidance such as this, no committee charged with
formulating the Medlin instruction nor any the trial judge will know what to do.   
Finally, assuming the majority is able to clearly articulate the situations where
the Medlin presumption is applicable, I think we can avoid even further confusion
by clarifying the specific knowledge elements to which the presumption applies. 
As currently written, the standard jury instructions provide that “If a person has
exclusive possession of a thing, knowledge of its presence may be inferred or
assumed.”   Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) Drug Abuse - Possession (emphasis
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added).  The instructions further provide that “[i]f the defense seeks to show a lack
of knowledge as to the nature of a particular drug, an additional instruction may be
required.  See State v. Medlin, 273 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1973).”  Id. (emphasis added). 
It is not clear to me whether this latter instruction is referring to a second  Medlin
presumption which, in addition to allowing the jury to infer knowledge of the
presence of a substance, would also allow the jury to infer knowledge of the illicit
nature of the substance.  Given that the majority has now determined that the
defendant’s knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance is an element of the
offense of possession, it is important for this Court and the Committee to clarify
this point. 
WELLS, C.J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Certified Great Public Importance 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D97-2333 
(Putnam County)
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Susan A. Fagan, Assistant Public
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorney
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General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent