Title: Anderson v. FRED WAGNER, ETC.
Citation: 402 So. 2d 320
Docket Number: 52663
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 1981

402 So. 2d 320 (1981) Shane ANDERSON, a Minor, by and through Brenda Anderson, his Mother and next Friend, and James Anderson and Brenda Anderson v. FRED WAGNER AND ROY ANDERSON, JR., INCORPORATED. No. 52663. Supreme Court of Mississippi. July 15, 1981. Rehearing Denied September 2, 1981. Neil W. White, Jr., Gulfport, for appellants. William M. Rainey, White &amp; Morse, James O. Dukes, Bryant &amp; Stennis, Gulfport, for appellees. Before PATTERSON, C.J., and LEE and HAWKINS, JJ. LEE, Justice, for the Court: Shane Anderson, a minor, and his parents, James Anderson and Brenda Anderson, filed separate suits in the Second Circuit Court District of Harrison County, against Fred Wagner and Roy Anderson, Jr., Inc., for personal injuries sustained by Shane Anderson when he thrust his arm through a glass door while leaving Murphy Elementary School. The cases were consolidated, pleas in bar were filed by the defendants and sustained by the presiding judge, Honorable Kosta N. Vlahos. The Andersons appeal from the judgment of dismissal and assign the following error in the trial below: Appellant's declaration alleged that Shane Anderson's injuries were due to the negligence of appellees, who were the architect and contractor of the building, in that they failed to specify and install a door with safety glass or a safety material when they *321 knew or should have foreseen the likelihood of injuries to students using the door. The parties agree that more than ten (10) years elapsed from the date of construction and acceptance of the Murphy Elementary School building until the time of the child's injury on March 3, 1978. Consequently, appellees' pleas in bar and the resulting judgment of dismissal were based on Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-41 (1972), which follows: Appellants contend that the statute is unconstitutional and violates the following sections of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890: In considering whether a statute is offensive to the Constitution, we recognize that, to be declared unconstitutional, a statute must appear unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Peterson v. State, 268 So. 2d 335 (Miss. 1972); Masonite Corp. v. State Oil &amp; Gas Board, 240 So. 2d 446 (Miss. 1970). Persons attacking the constitutionality of a statute have the burden of showing clearly that it violates constitutional provisions. Carter v. Harrison County Election Comm'n., 183 So. 2d 630 (Miss. 1966); Board of Education v. State Educational Finance Comm'n., 243 Miss. 782, 138 So. 2d 912 (1962). In Mississippi State Tax Comm'n. v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 239 Miss. 191, 116 So. 2d 550 (1959) appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 290, 81 S. Ct. 61, 5 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1960), this Court said: Statutes similar to that here involved are commonly called statutes of repose because they relax the potential liability of possible defendants. Approximately forty-seven (47) states and the District of *322 Columbia have enacted such statutes, and it has been noted that "[w]hile the statutes thus enacted are not uniform in content, the purpose for which they were enacted was uniformly to limit the time within which actions for deficiencies in the design, construction, and supervision of construction of improvements to real property, for which architects, engineers, and others in the construction industry were responsible, could be brought against such persons." 93 A.L.R.3d 1243, 1246, § 2(a) (1979). Twenty-five (25) states have addressed the constitutionality of such statutes. Fifteen (15) of those states have upheld the statute[1] while ten (10) have held it unconstitutional.[2] Appellants have digested the decisions in those ten states which struck statutes similar to ours and rely strongly on Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980), a Wyoming case, wherein that state's high court held the statute void on the theory that it was not a statute of limitations but a grant of immunity from suit. As does the Mississippi statute, the Wyoming statute limited to ten (10) years the liability of persons involved in the design, planning, supervision, construction or supervision of construction. Phillips, supra, rested in large part on the decision and reasoning in Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 431 N.E.2d 588 (1967), wherein the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated a similar statute as (1) arbitrarily insulating architects and contractors from liability while deleting other potential defendants in the same situation, (2) setting up irrational classifications, and (3) existing devoid of any reasonable legislative purpose. Other jurisdictions have relied upon Skinner in striking down their statutes. Conversely, appellee relies upon and discusses to some extent cases from those fifteen states which have declined to accede to the constitutional challenge to their statutes. In Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), the Arkansas court said that the true issue in assembling such statutes (as ours) is whether it is fair and reasonable and an appropriate action by the legislature or whether it impinges and frustrates basic rights guaranteed by the constitution. Those statutes upholding the constitutionality of such statutes have held that they are legitimate exercises of the legislative power. In Joseph v. Burns, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971), the Oregon Supreme Court interpreted a legislature's function with reference to claims barred or prohibited by the statute, as follows: The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Rosenburg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972), deemed it error to view such statutes as applying only to the narrow field of architecture and contractors, as follows: Appellee's position is supported by strong reasoning and precedent embodied in the Pennsylvania decision of Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978), where the Court said: More regional support is received from Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage District # 2, 366 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1978), wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court, upholding its statute of repose, said: Persons owning or in possession of property can make changes on the property and remove any danger or hazard existing thereon while those persons who have completed construction and/or design on the property have no right to enter upon same or to make any change in it. These distinctions have been discussed in the decisions cited above. They are real and not arbitrary or capricious and support a valid legislative exercise which the courts should recognize. Appellant contends that in the instant case, the statute bars a cause of action before it exists, but clearly, "there is no vested right in any remedy for torts yet to happen, and except as to vested rights the state legislature has full power to change or abolish existing common-law remedies and methods of procedures." Walters v. Blackledge, 220 Miss. 485, 518, 71 So. 2d 433, 446 (1954). The class of persons covered by the statute is large and we think the statute is a general law rather than local. Further, definition of the class to which the section refers is a reasonable exercise of legislative authority. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the statute is constitutional and was correctly applied by the lower court. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, BOWLING and HAWKINS, JJ., concur. [1] Arkansas, Oregon, New Jersey, Washington, Virginia, Utah, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Nebraska, Montana, Texas, New Mexico, Michigan, California and Louisiana. [2] Wyoming, Illinois, Kentucky, Hawaii, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Minnesota, South Carolina, Florida and Alabama.