Title: Peeples v. Lampert
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S054437
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: August 14, 2008

FILED: August 14, 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
JASON J. PEEPLES,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
ROBERT LAMPERT,
Superintendent,
Snake River Correctional Institution,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 02011658M, CA
A122837 (Control))
JASON J. PEEPLES,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
BRIAN BELLEQUE,
Superintendent,
Oregon State Penitentiary,
Respondent on Review.
(CC03C-21423; A125027;
SC S054437)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals*
Argued and submitted September 5, 2007.
Patrick M. Ebbett,
Chilton, Ebbett &amp; Galli, LLC, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for petitioner on review.
Robert M. Atkinson,
Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. 
With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
Walter J. Ledesma,
Woodburn, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association.
LINDER, J.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.
Durham, J., concurred
and filed an opinion in which Gillette, J., joined.
*Appeal from Marion
County Circuit Court, Malheur County Circuit Court, Joseph V. Ochoa,
Judge, James R. Hargreaves, Senior Judge. 209 Or App 17, 146
P3d 352 (2006).
LINDER, J.
In this post-conviction case, the
trial court dismissed the petition for relief as a sanction for petitioner's
refusal to participate in a scheduled deposition.  On appeal, petitioner argued
that the trial court erred by failing to make special findings to support the
dismissal, as required by Pamplin v. Victoria, 319 Or 429, 877 P2d 1196
(1994).  A panel of the Court of Appeals divided on whether that challenge must
be preserved to be raised on appeal.  Peeples v. Lampert, 209 Or App 17,
25-26, 146 P3d 352 (2006) (preservation rules apply); id. at 29-30
(Ortega, J., dissenting) (under Pamplin, no request for special findings
is required).  Petitioner sought review, which we allowed.  We now hold that a
challenge to a trial court's failure to make the special findings required by Pamplin
is subject to preservation rules.  Because petitioner did not preserve that
challenge in this case, we affirm.
The pertinent facts are procedural in
nature.  After pleading guilty to two criminal offenses, petitioner filed a
first pro se petition for post-conviction relief in Malheur County.  An
attorney was appointed to represent him, and that attorney, about nine months
after the original petition was filed, filed an amended petition for
post-conviction relief.  Trial then was scheduled for a year after that.  On
the day of trial, petitioner asked to amend his petition, to have a new attorney
appointed to represent him, and to have the case continued for further investigation. 
The post-conviction court denied those requests.  When petitioner refused to
proceed, the court dismissed the case without prejudice.
About two months after that dismissal,
petitioner filed a second pro se petition for post-conviction relief, this
time in Marion County.  An attorney was again appointed to represent him, and
that attorney filed an amended petition.  Petitioner expressed concerns to his
counsel about allegations that were in his original pro se petition but
were not included in the amended petition.   His counsel, after corresponding
with petitioner, decided not to restore any of those allegations.   Meanwhile, the
state scheduled petitioner's deposition.(1) Although petitioner and his counsel came to the scheduled deposition,
petitioner refused to be deposed, claiming that he was not ready to proceed.  The
state moved to dismiss the petition as a sanction for petitioner's refusal.  See
ORCP 46 D (authorizing sanctions for party's failure to appear at own
deposition); ORCP 46 B (enumerating possible sanctions, including "an
order * * * dismissing the action").  Alternatively, the state asked that
petitioner be required to pay all costs that the state had incurred due to petitioner's
refusal to be deposed.
Both parties submitted affidavits and
other evidence in the hearing on the state's motion to dismiss.  Counsel for
the state, who also had represented the state in the Malheur County action, by
affidavit described petitioner's unwillingness in that case to proceed and his day-of-trial
efforts to amend his petition, which had been previously amended and had been
awaiting trial for a year.  The state took the position that petitioner's refusal
to be deposed in the Marion County action was unreasonable and that petitioner
was delaying that proceeding in the same way that he had delayed the Malheur
County proceeding.
In opposition to the motion to
dismiss, petitioner disputed that he had refused to be deposed.  In the written
memorandum opposing dismissal, petitioner's counsel urged that, even if the
post-conviction court found that petitioner had refused to be deposed,
dismissal as a sanction was not warranted.  As an alternative, he suggested that
petitioner be required to pay only the cost of the three-page transcript of the
terminated deposition.  Petitioner's written opposition was supported by an
affidavit from his counsel representing that, on the day of the deposition,
petitioner had clarified his objections to the amended petition for
post-conviction relief, which caused counsel to reconsider a possible amendment
to the petition.  Petitioner's counsel asserted that petitioner had wanted the
deposition postponed.
At the hearing on the motion, petitioner
likewise told the court that he wanted to get his petition amended, and was not
refusing to be deposed.  In particular,  petitioner personally represented to
the post-conviction court that, at the time of the scheduled deposition, he had
"no problem being deposed" and that, if the state's attorney had
deposed him at that time, he would have cooperated.  The transcript of the
terminated deposition, however, was also before the post-conviction court.  In
it, petitioner had affirmatively confirmed his attorney's representation that
petitioner was not ready to be deposed and that he wanted the deposition rescheduled
for another time.  Petitioner's counsel acknowledged to the post-conviction
court that petitioner's dissatisfaction with the claims pleaded in the amended petition
might "sound familiar, given the prior proceeding [in Malheur County]." 
Neither counsel nor petitioner identified what claims or allegations might be
added to the amended petition.
The post-conviction court dismissed
the petition with prejudice.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the court orally
observed that petitioner had many opportunities, during the two years after
filing his first post-conviction petition in Malheur County, to amend his
petition.  The court concluded that petitioner was unwilling to participate and
was "wast[ing]" the court's time.  The court directed the state to
prepare the judgment dismissing the action.  In that judgment, the court made
the following findings:
"The court finds that
plaintiff's post-conviction claims were originally filed in Malheur County,
Oregon[,] [o]n September 23, 2002.  [That] petition was dismissed without
prejudice on September 23, 2003[,] in Malheur County, Oregon, because plaintiff
refused to proceed at the date set for his trial.  Plaintiff apparently was not
satisfied with the claims set forth in his amended petition.
"Plaintiff then filed
this petition for post conviction relief on November 4, 2003.  An amended
petition was filed on February 23, 2004.
"On May 7, 2004,
plaintiff again expressed that [he] was not satisfied with the claims set forth
in his amended petition, and refused to participate in his deposition.
"Plaintiff has delayed
his own post conviction proceedings for almost two years.  Plaintiff had
knowledge that refusal to participate in court proceedings could result in
dismissal of his case.  Plaintiff chose not to participate in his deposition.
"For these reasons and
those set forth by the defendant, defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Prosecution is allowed.  Because of plaintiff's history of delay in this matter
and the same underlying matter in the Malheur County Circuit Court, the Petition
for Post Conviction Relief is dismissed with prejudice."
By way of footnote, the post-conviction court explained why
it found that petitioner "chose not to participate in his
deposition":
"While [petitioner]
stated at this hearing that he did not refuse, the transcript, plaintiff's
attorney's statement, and plaintiff's past history show that treating his
request for further delay as a refusal is not unreasonable, and well-founded
under the circumstances."
On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
petitioner argued that, procedurally, the post-conviction court had failed to
make the findings that Pamplin identified as necessary for meaningful
appellate review.  In particular, petitioner contended that the post-conviction
court was required to explain expressly why lesser sanctions were not
appropriate.  As noted earlier, the Court of Appeals panel divided on whether
petitioner had to preserve that issue.  Two members of the three-judge panel
concluded that he was required to do so; one judge would have held that
preservation rules did not apply to the findings required by Pamplin.  Peeples,
209 Or App at 23-26 (majority); id. at 27-30 (Ortega, J., dissenting).  We
allowed review to resolve that issue.
We begin by examining the legal authority
for the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition for post-conviction
relief and the court's obligation to make findings in support of that action.  Under
ORCP 46 D, if a party fails to cooperate in a properly scheduled deposition, a
trial court may sanction the party by "mak[ing] such orders in regard to
the failure as are just[.]"(2) 
Among the orders that the rule specifically authorizes is dismissal of the
action, pursuant to ORCP 46 B(2)(c).(3) 
In Pamplin, this court held that, for dismissal under ORCP 46 B(2)(c) to
be "just," an uncooperative party must act with "willfulness,
bad faith, or fault of a similar degree on the part of the disobedient
party."  319 Or at 434.  This court further held that, to support a
sanction of dismissal, a trial court must make specific findings resolving any factual
disputes and explaining why such a sanction is warranted.  Id. at
436-37.(4)
In so holding, this court determined
that dismissal as a sanction under ORCP 46 B(2)(c) is analogous to awarding
attorney fees as a sanction under ORS 20.105(1).  319 Or at 436.  Pursuant to
that statute, a trial court has discretion to impose such fees in appropriate circumstances
in civil proceedings.  The statute does not expressly require a court to make
special findings in support of the award.(5) 
Nevertheless, in Mattiza v. Foster, 311 Or 1, 10, 803 P2d 723 (1990),
this court held that a court must make such findings, reasoning that they are
necessary for meaningful appellate review of an award under ORS 20.105(1).  Pamplin
relied on Mattiza in concluding that special findings likewise
should be necessary when a trial court dismisses an action under ORCP 46
B(2)(c):
"Here, as in Mattiza, the
sanction of dismissal under ORCP 46 B(2)(c) is a situation in which special
findings are a prerequisite to meaningful review by an appellate court.  As
discussed above, that sanction is appropriate only when it is 'just' and only
when there is willfulness, bad faith, or other fault of like magnitude by the
disobedient party.  To assess the propriety of imposing that sanction, an
appellate court needs to know (1) the historical facts on which the trial court
based its decision to impose it and (2) the analytical process by which the
trial court concluded that dismissal is 'just' in view of those facts and in
view of the other sanctions that are available.  The present case provides a
classic example of the difficulty of meaningful appellate review, because of
the unresolved factual questions in the record."
319 Or at 436-37 (internal quotation marks omitted; citation
omitted).
In this case, in opposing the state's
motion to dismiss, petitioner disputed whether he in fact had refused to be
deposed.  He also disputed whether dismissal was an appropriate sanction for
his conduct.  In the written judgment, the post-conviction court set forth an
explanation, together with findings, for its dismissal of the action.  The
court found that petitioner had refused to be deposed, thus resolving that factual
dispute.  The court further found that petitioner did so with knowledge that
his refusal to proceed could result in a dismissal, as it had in Malheur
County; that petitioner had delayed his post-conviction proceeding for almost
two years; and that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate because of
petitioner's "history of delay in this matter and the same underlying matter
in * * * Malheur County[.]"  The post-conviction court did not, however,
explain -- at least not explicitly -- why dismissal, rather than a lesser
sanction, was appropriate in those circumstances.
On appeal, petitioner assigned error
not only to the post-conviction court's substantive decision to dismiss,
but also to the court's procedural failure to make an express special
finding that dismissal was more appropriate than a lesser sanction.  Petitioner
raised that claim of error on appeal even though he had not argued to the
post-conviction court that it was obligated to make an explicit finding in that
regard.  Nor had he argued that the findings that the post-conviction court did
make were otherwise inadequate.  Petitioner did not present those concerns to
the post-conviction court, even though -- as we describe in greater detail
later in this opinion -- he had an opportunity to do so.
Thus, petitioner preserved whether,
as a substantive matter, a sanction of dismissal was warranted, but he did
not preserve his argument that the post-conviction court was obligated, as a procedural
matter, to make additional or more specific findings than it made in explaining
its ruling.  Petitioner's failure to preserve that procedural issue is
undisputed.  What is disputed is whether rules of preservation should apply to
a claim that the trial court failed to make special findings as required by Pamplin. 

Preservation was not an issue in Pamplin. 
Nor was it an issue in Mattiza, on which Pamplin relied.(6) 
In concluding that ordinary rules of preservation should apply to such a challenge,
the Court of Appeals' majority examined the policy reasons that underlie
preservation rules and determined, in essence, that those policies would be
ill-served if a party has no obligation to object to a failure to make findings
that the party believes are necessary to support dismissal.  Peeples,
209 Or App at 24-26.  In reaching the opposite conclusion, the dissent viewed
it as inconsistent with Pamplin to require petitioner to request special
findings to ensure meaningful review of his substantive challenge, given that
he had otherwise preserved that challenge by arguing that a lesser sanction
should be imposed.  Id. at 30 (Ortega, J., dissenting).  On review, the
parties' arguments to this court similarly reflect competing views of how to
reconcile the policies favoring preservation with Pamplin's requirement
of express special findings as a way to facilitate meaningful review of a
dismissal under ORCP 46 B(2)(c).  We turn to that inquiry.
The general requirement that an issue,
to be raised and considered on appeal, ordinarily must first be presented to
the trial court is well-settled in our jurisprudence.  See, e.g.,
State v. Laundy, 103 Or 443, 509-10, 206 P 290 (1922) (identifying
preservation rule; citing earlier cases).  For some years, the requirement also
has been part of Oregon's Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provide that "[n]o
matter claimed as error will be considered on appeal unless the claimed error
was preserved in the lower court[.]"  ORAP 5.45(1).  The principal
exception to preservation requirements is for so-called "plain error"
-- that is, an error apparent on the record, about which there is no reasonable
dispute.  See, e.g., State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 355-56,
800 P2d 259 (1990) (describing plain error).  An appellate court has discretion
to consider such an error, but it must do so with the "utmost caution,"
because of the strong policy reasons favoring preservation.  Ailes v.
Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 382, 823 P2d 956 (1991) (identifying
procedure and bases for consideration of plain error).
Those policies are prudential in
nature.  Preservation gives a trial court the chance to consider and rule on a
contention, thereby possibly avoiding an error altogether or correcting one
already made, which in turn may obviate the need for an appeal.  See Shields
v. Campbell, 277 Or 71, 77, 559 P2d 1275 (1977) ("A party owes the
trial court the obligation of a sound, clear and articulate motion, objection
or exception, so as to permit the trial judge a chance to consider the legal
contention or to correct an error already made.").  Preservation also
ensures fairness to an opposing party, by permitting the opposing party to
respond to a contention and by otherwise not taking the opposing party by
surprise.  Davis v. O'Brien, 320 Or 729, 737-38, 891 P2d 1307 (1995) (preservation
ensures that "the positions of the parties are presented clearly to the
initial tribunal and that parties are not taken by surprise, misled, or denied
opportunities to meet an argument").  Finally, preservation fosters full development
of the record, which aids the trial court in making a decision and the
appellate court in reviewing it.  See Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State
of Oregon, 331 Or 634, 659-60, 20 P3d 180 (2001) (to promote judicial
efficiency, unpreserved alternative ground for affirmance may be raised on
appeal when, among other considerations, record has been fully developed).  Our
jurisprudence, thus, has embraced the preservation requirement, "[not] to
promote form over substance but to promote an efficient administration of
justice and the saving of judicial time."  Shields, 277 Or at 77-78.
Preservation rules are pragmatic as
well as prudential.  What is required of a party to adequately present a
contention to the trial court can vary depending on the nature of the claim or
argument; the touchstone in that regard, ultimately, is procedural fairness to
the parties and to the trial court.  See generally State v. Hitz, 307 Or
183, 188, 766 P2d 373 (1988) (distinguishing requirements for "raising an
issue at trial, identifying a source for a claimed position, and making a
particular argument").  In some circumstances, the preservation requirement
gives way entirely, as when a party has no practical ability to raise an
issue.  See, e.g., McCarthy v. Oregon Freeze Dry, Inc., 327
Or 84, 95 n 6, 957 P2d 1200, modified on recons, 327 Or 185, 957 P2d
1200 (1998) (party not required to take action to preserve an issue that first arose
when court issued its order).(7) 
The same is true if the record establishes that preservation would have been
futile, because the trial court would not have permitted an issue to be raised
or the record to be developed.  See, e.g., State v. Olmstead,
310 Or 455, 461, 800 P2d 277 (1990) ("When the trial court excludes an entire class
of evidence by declaring, in advance, that it is inadmissible as a matter of
law, the ruling renders a further offer futile.").  Finally, a legal right may
not be subject to preservation requirements due to the unique nature of the
right itself.  See, e.g., State v. Barber, 343 Or 525,
530, 173 P3d 827 (2007) (unique wording of constitutional requirement of
written jury trial waiver precluded ordinary rules of preservation for claim
relating to denial of jury trial right).
We have not, however, foregone preservation
requirements in contexts involving mandatory trial court findings.  In State
v. Bucholz, 317 Or 309, 855 P2d 1100 (1993), this court required
preservation of a claim that a trial court had erred in failing to make special
findings.  In that case, the defendant challenged the trial court's failure to
make express findings in imposing consecutive sentences on his convictions. 
Without deciding whether the trial court had a statutory obligation to make
such findings,(8)
this court declined to reach the issue for lack of preservation, reasoning that
the defendant was aware that the sentences were being imposed consecutively,
but he neither objected to the lack of findings nor requested findings to be
made.  Id. at 320.  Citing ORAP 5.45(2), this court declared that "silence
provides no basis for considering a claim of error on later appeal" and
observed that the defendant sought relief on appeal for an error that, had it
been brought to the trial court's attention, could easily have been remedied.  Id.
at 320-21.(9)
Similarly, in McCarthy, which
was decided after Matizza, this court assumed that preservation
requirements apply to the special findings that a court must make in imposing a
discretionary award of attorney fees.(10) 
The court held, as it had in Matizza, that a court making such an award
must explain the basis for its award "through special findings of fact or
otherwise[.]"  327 Or at 95.  In so holding, this court noted that
plaintiff had raised his challenge to the Court of Appeals' failure to make
special findings for the first time in the petition for review.  Id. at
95 n 6.  The court concluded, however, that plaintiff "was not required to
take action to preserve that issue below, because it arose when the Court of
Appeals issued its order."  Id.  In other words, McCarthy did
not declare that the issue was not subject to preservation requirements.  The
court determined instead that, under the circumstances, the plaintiff did not
have an adequate opportunity to raise the deficiency in the findings to the
Court of Appeals and, for that reason, he did not have to do so.(11)
In light of our prior decisions and
with the policy reasons for rules of preservation in mind, we conclude that
there is no principled basis to abandon preservation requirements in this
context.  Requiring a party to alert a trial court to its failure to make
special findings that are material to the decision, given the issues framed by
the parties, serves the salutary purpose of permitting the trial court to avoid
making an error or to correct an error already made.  The policies of using
judicial resources efficiently and not blindsiding a trial court are strong ones
that underlie preservation requirements in other contexts.  Those policies are
no less strong here. 
Requiring preservation in this
context also is fair to opposing counsel.  It may be, as petitioner argues,
that the party moving for dismissal has no interest in opposing special findings. 
But the moving party does have an interest in ensuring that the record is
adequately developed, and in avoiding an unnecessary remand for proceedings
that could have been conducted before the appeal.(12)
Finally, requiring preservation in
this context is consistent with our holding in Pamplin.  Preservation
serves the twin goals of ensuring procedural fairness and judicial efficiency. 
The findings required by Pamplin facilitate meaningful review.  Those
objectives are complementary.  A party that does not preserve an issue, when it
is reasonably possible to do so, is not entitled to appellate review of it,
meaningful or otherwise.  Said another way, in any number of circumstances, a
party's very right to appellate review of an issue is that party's to
preserve or lose.  Requiring a party to take reasonable steps to ensure that
such review is meaningful is consistent with, rather than contrary to, Pamplin.

We therefore hold that the usual
rules of preservation apply to a challenge to a trial court's failure to make
express special findings required by Pamplin.  We further conclude that
petitioner failed to preserve that challenge in this case.  The post-conviction
court expressly resolved the factual dispute presented -- i.e., whether
petitioner refused to be deposed -- and explained why dismissal was warranted. 
But the court did not explain or make findings directed to the "analytical
process" by which it concluded that a lesser sanction would not do, as Pamplin
held is required.  319 Or at 436-37.  Petitioner did nothing to call that
omission to the post-conviction court's attention, however.  That is true even
though petitioner had at least two opportunities to do so.  First, petitioner
could have requested special findings pursuant to Pamplin, either by
noting the request in his written submission in advance of the hearing, or by
orally asking the court to make special findings at the outset of the hearing.  Pamplin
is settled case law, and a generic request for findings pursuant to Pamplin,
given the substantive issues framed by petitioner's opposition to the motion to
dismiss, would have sufficed to place the post-conviction court on notice of
the need to make the omitted finding.  Petitioner's second opportunity to
preserve the issue came when he was served with the proposed judgment by the
state.  At that point, before judgment was entered, petitioner could have objected
to the absence of a finding or other explanation as to why a lesser sanction would
not suffice.(13)
In holding that the usual rules of
preservation apply to a challenge to a trial court's failure to make the express
special findings required by Pamplin, we emphasize that nonpreservation
of that issue precludes only a procedural challenge to the failure to
make one or more special findings; it does not preclude review of a substantive
challenge to the merits of the dismissal, if that challenge is preserved, as it
was in this case.  The Court of Appeals therefore properly reached the merits
of petitioner's argument that dismissal was too harsh a sanction, while
properly declining to consider, as an independent claim of error, petitioner's
challenge to the lack of a finding that dismissal was warranted.  Peeples,
209 Or App at 26-27.(14)
Finally, we again emphasize the importance
of special findings to meaningful appellate review of a dismissal under ORCP
46(B)(2)(c).  Dismissal with prejudice is the "ultimate sanction"
that a trial court may impose.  The special findings that Pamplin enjoins
are of particular assistance to an appellate court's review of a trial court's
exercise of discretion in imposing that sanction.  In some cases, as happened
in this case, incomplete findings, together with an adequately developed
record, may provide a minimally adequate basis for a reviewing court to
consider the merits of the trial court's exercise of discretion in ordering the
dismissal.  But that will not always be true.  As a result, both the moving
party and the trial court run the risk that, without special findings, the
appellate court will not be able to conclude that dismissal as a sanction is
warranted.   See, e.g., Seely v. Hanson, 317 Or 476, 483-84, 857 P2d 121
(1993) (unaided by specific findings, court was unable to conclude that
attorney fee award under ORS 20.105(1) was warranted).   Because of the value
of special findings in reviewing a dismissal decision, all participants in that
decision -- the moving party, the opposing party, and the trial court -- have
an interest in ensuring that the requisite findings are made.
The decision of the Court of Appeals
and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.
DURHAM, J.
The majority concludes that the Court
of Appeals correctly declined to review petitioner's argument that the trial
court had failed to make the express special findings of fact that this court
identified in Pamplin v. Victoria, 319 Or 429, 877 P2d 1196 (1994), as
necessary for appellate review of the dismissal of an action as a sanction
under ORCP 46 D.  According to the majority, this court's cases, including Pamplin,
require lower courts to make findings of fact supporting the court's order in
this and similar circumstances to facilitate meaningful appellate review. 
However, according to the majority, those cases fail to address whether a party
must request findings of fact, or object to the court's failure to make
findings, to preserve for appellate review the issue of the absence of findings
of fact to support the court's order.  Addressing what the majority perceives
as this court's past silence on the topic, the majority presents a dissertation
on the presumed advantages of requiring preservation of error and concludes
that this case presents no occasion for relieving petitioner of the obligation
to preserve for appellate review the issue of the trial court's failure to make
findings of fact.
The problem, as I see it, with the
majority's opinion is that it misstates the substance of this court's prior
analysis in its cases the requirement of findings of fact in this context.  As
a result of that incorrect premise, the majority opinion's exposition on the
relative advantages of requiring preservation of error regarding issues raised
on appeal is an abstract exercise.
The majority's faulty analysis is a
serious concern for two reasons.  First, that error leads the majority to
examine and decide an issue that this case does not raise; I discuss that
concern below at greater length.  Second, the majority's analysis incorrectly
states the true history of this court's multiple decisions to require findings
of fact by lower courts to permit meaningful appellate review of awards of
attorney fees and discovery sanctions.  An accurate portrayal of that history
will be an essential first consideration should this court in the future decide
whether to require lower courts to observe specific procedures to safeguard
meaningful appellate review by this court.
I begin by acknowledging that the
result reached by the majority is correct.  That is so, however, because
certain rule changes have taken effect following certain decisions of this
court, discussed below.  It is those after-the-fact rule changes, not the
abstract merits of requiring preservation of errors asserted on appeal, that
satisfy me that this court should decline to review petitioner's argument
regarding the inadequacy of the trial court's findings of fact to support the
dismissal of his petition.
I also agree with the majority's
implicit assumption that, in analyzing this court's cases, the court properly
can disregard the fact that those cases relied on different sources of
statutory and rule-based authority to award attorney fees and to impose
discovery sanctions.  Regardless of those differing sources of authority, the
court relied on the same prudential principles in requiring lower courts to
make specific findings of fact supporting their decisions in those contexts.
I turn, then, to a brief review of
this court's cases discussing the necessity of findings of fact by a trial
court in these settings.  In Tyler v. Hartford Insurance Group, 307 Or
603, 771 P2d 274 (1989), the plaintiff sought review of an award by the Court
of Appeals of attorney fees to certain defendants in the case.  The court did
not set out any assignment of error by the plaintiff concerning the absence of
findings of fact; neither did the court describe the plaintiff's arguments
concerning the Court of Appeals order.  Instead, the court stated:
"The order does not cite any statutory or other
authority for the award of attorney fees.   Both petitions for attorney fees,
however, were based solely on ORS 20.105(1), which provides:
"'In any civil action, suit or other
proceeding in a district court, a circuit court or the Oregon Tax Court, or in
any civil appeal to or review by the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, the
court may, in its discretion, award reasonable attorney fees appropriate in the
circumstances to a party against whom a claim, defense or ground for appeal or
review is asserted, if that party is a prevailing party in the proceeding and
to be paid by the party asserting the claim, defense or ground, upon a finding
by the court that the party wilfully disobeyed a court order or acted in bad
faith, wantonly or solely for oppressive reasons.'
"That statute does not expressly require the Court of
Appeals to make findings on the record.  Nevertheless, we conclude that
findings are required.  Otherwise, we have no basis upon which to review the
award of attorney fees, nor to consider what the Court of Appeals understood
the relevant statutory words to mean.  Accordingly, we remand this case to the
Court of Appeals to make the necessary findings  to support its order.
"The petition for
review is allowed.  The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated.  The case
is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings."
Id. at 605.
This court's disposition in Tyler
demonstrates what in later cases became even more explicit:  It is virtually
impossible to engage in appellate review of awards of attorney fees, often
totaling many thousands of dollars, unless the lower court explains, in findings
of fact, the factual basis for the award and the authority on which the court
relied.  The court stated that findings were required.  It used that
term advisedly:  even though the statute authorizing the award was silent
regarding the need to make findings of fact, the court itself required the
trial court to make those findings to protect its ability to conduct meaningful
appellate review of the award.  The court took that step not in response to any
apparent objection by the plaintiff or the defendants but, instead, for
prudential reasons tied to the court's strong interest in safeguarding
meaningful appellate review.
Tyler left open the question
whether trial courts had the same responsibility as did the Court of Appeals to
make findings of fact to support an award of attorney fees under ORS
20.105(1).  This court answered that question in the affirmative the following
year in Mattiza v. Foster, 311 Or 1, 803 P2d 723 (1990).  In Mattiza,
a conservator brought an action asserting that the defendant had exercised
undue influence over the plaintiff's elderly aunt, causing financial injury. 
The trial court rejected that claim.  After making extensive findings of fact,
the trial court determined that the plaintiff had asserted her claim in bad
faith and awarded $7,620 in attorney fees to the defendant.  The Court of
Appeals affirmed.  On review, this court construed the phrase "bad
faith" in ORS 20.105(1) to require a finding, supported by evidence, that
the plaintiff had pursued her claim for a reason other than the procurement of
the fair adjudication of an authentic claim.  The court also addressed the
requirement of findings of fact to allow meaningful review by an appellate
court of the relevant issues:
"The Need for Findings
"Although, in the absence of a request for
special findings by one of the parties, the court 'may' make special findings
or general findings, ORCP 62 A, the award of attorney fees under ORS 20.105(1)
is a situation in which special findings are a prerequisite to meaningful
review by an appellate court.  See Tyler v. Hartford Insurance Group,
307 Or 603, 771 P2d 274 (1989) (requiring findings by Court of Appeals in cases
under ORS 20.105(1)); see also Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract &amp; Title, Inc.,
758 F2d 1486, 1508 (11th Cir 1985), cert den 475 US 1107 (1986) (under
Florida law, the trial court 'must make a specific finding of "complete
absence of justiciable issue of either law or fact" or face reversal or
remand on the award of attorneys fees.').  Not only should the trial court make
findings regarding the merit of the party's claim, defense, or ground for
appeal or review, and which of the three grounds under ORS 20.105(1) the court
is considering, but it should also specify which actions of the party are
violative of the statute."
Id. at 10-11.
The Mattiza court noted that
the trial court had discussed the facts extensively but had failed to resolve
the key disputed fact, i.e., it had failed to make a finding of fact
about whether the plaintiff had had an improper motive in bringing and
maintaining the action:
"Did plaintiff act in bad faith?  Even
assuming that the trial court's conclusions noted above are supported by the
evidence in this case, there was no finding -- and the evidence would not
support a conclusion -- that plaintiff's actions constituted conduct, the primary
aim of which was something other than the procurement of the fair adjudication
of an authentic claim.  We conclude that, regardless of other motives she may
have had, plaintiff's primary aim was to obtain an adjudication of a bona fide
dispute.  Defendant is not entitled to attorney fees under ORS 20.105."
Id. at 12.  (Emphasis in original.)
Tyler and Mattiza, read
together, indicate that trial and appellate courts were required to make
findings of fact supported by evidence to facilitate meaningful appellate
review of an award of attorney fees.  Because those cases addressed fee awards
under ORS 20.105(1), they logically did not answer the question whether the
same requirement applied to the imposition of other significant sanctions.
In Pamplin, this court
answered that question.  In that case, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's
personal injury action under ORCP 46 B(2)(c) as a sanction for the plaintiffs'
failure to provide discovery materials requested by the defendant.  ORCP 46
B(2)(c) authorized the trial court to sanction a party's failure to provide
discovery by making "such orders in regard to the failure as are just,
including" dismissal of the action.  The trial court heard the parties'
conflicting arguments about whether the plaintiffs had complied adequately with
the defendant's discovery requests.  Without making any findings of fact to
resolve those issues, the court ordered the action dismissed.  This court
construed the rule to permit dismissal only when that sanction is
"just," and only if there is "willfulness, bad faith, or other
fault of like magnitude by the disobedient party."  Pamplin, 319 Or
at 436.  To confirm compliance with those criteria, this court required the
trial court to satisfy the requirement of findings of fact that the court had
discussed in Mattiza:
"We turn now to consideration of whether findings
of fact are required to support the sanction of dismissal under ORCP 46
B(2)(c).
"In a similar context, this court has noted
the importance of findings for 'meaningful review by an appellate court.'  Mattiza
v. Foster, 311 Or 1, 10, 803 P2d 723 (1990).  Mattiza involved an
award of attorney fees under ORS 20.105(1).  Although that statute does not
expressly require findings, this court held that findings are required,
reasoning:
"'Although, in the absence of a request for
special findings by one of the parties, the court "may" make special
findings or general findings, ORCP 62 A, the award of attorney fees under ORS
20.105(1) is a situation in which special findings are a prerequisite to
meaningful review by an appellate court.  311 Or at 10 (citations omitted).'
"Here, as in Mattiza, the sanction
of dismissal under ORCP 46 B(2)(c) is a 'situation in which special findings
are a prerequisite to meaningful review by an appellate court.'  As discussed
above, that sanction is appropriate only when it is 'just' and only when there
is willfulness, bad faith, or other fault of like magnitude by the disobedient
party.  To assess the propriety of imposing that sanction, an appellate court
needs to know (1) the historical facts on which the trial court based its
decision to impose it and (2) the analytical process by which the trial court
concluded that dismissal is 'just' in view of those facts and in view of the
other sanctions that are available.  The present case provides a classic
example of the difficulty of meaningful appellate review, because of the
unresolved factual questions in the record.
"In summary, we hold that a trial court
that imposes the sanction of dismissal under ORCP 46 B(2)(c) must make findings
of fact and must explain why that sanction is 'just'; that a finding of
willfulness, bad faith, or fault of a similar degree on the part of the
disobedient party is required; and that a finding of prejudice to the party
seeking discovery is not required."
Pamplin, 319 Or at 436-37.  (Footnote omitted.)
In Pamplin, the defendant
argued that the court should disregard the plaintiff's objection, raised for
the first time on appeal, to the insufficiency of the trial court's factual
findings to support dismissal.(15) 
The court's response -- reversal and remand to the trial court because the
court's factual findings were insufficient to justify dismissal -- demonstrates
that the court accorded no weight to the defendant's preservation argument.
Finally, this court later explained
why it did not accept a preservation of error argument when the trial court
failed to make the necessary findings of fact.  In McCarthy v. Oregon Freeze
Dry, Inc., 327 Or 84, 957 P2d 1200, modified on recons, 327 Or 185,
957 P2d 1200 (1998), the Court of Appeals granted attorney fees to a defendant
in an appeal.  The trial court had dismissed the underlying employment
discrimination action and the plaintiff had appealed, but lost.  The defendant
sought attorney fees, arguing that it was the prevailing party and that the
appeal was frivolous.  The plaintiff filed objections.  Without making any
findings of fact, the Court of Appeals granted attorney fees to the defendant
in the sum of $12,000.
On review in this court, the
plaintiff argued, among other things, that the Court of Appeals had failed to
make required findings of fact to support the award of attorney fees.  This
court acknowledged that the plaintiff had "raised the issue of the lack of
special findings in his petition for review to this court."  The court
explained, however, that preservation of that issue before the Court of Appeals
was not required:
"He was not required to take action to
preserve that issue below, because it arose when the Court of Appeals issued
its order."
Id. at 95 n 6.(16)
On reconsideration, this court
explained why it regarded the lack of findings of fact as a reversible error,
even though the plaintiff had asserted that issue for the first time on review:
"Efficient and meaningful appellate review
for abuse of discretion cannot occur on the present record, because we can only
speculate about the possible relevant facts and legal criteria relied on for
the court's award of attorney fees.  Adequate findings about those matters need
not be complex or lengthy.  Rather, they must describe the relevant facts and
legal criteria for the court's decision to award or deny attorney fees in any
terms that are sufficiently clear to permit meaningful appellate review.  Our
opinion in this case adopted that description of the requirement of findings on
appellate review of an award of attorney fees from Mattiza and Tyler
and, after reconsideration, we adhere to that description."
Id. at 190-91.
The
foregoing cases demonstrate that this court has applied consistent principles
regarding appellate review of the lack of factual findings to support a serious
sanction, whether the facts concerned either an award of attorney fees for
frivolous litigation or the dismissal of an action for noncooperation with
discovery obligations.  At the time of its prior decisions, no rule obligated a
party to request findings of fact regarding those decisions, or compelled the
adversely affected party to object to an insufficiency or lack of factual
findings after-the-fact.
The court did not analyze the
requirement of adequate findings of fact in those cases as the source of a
procedural right that a party was free to invoke by requesting findings or,
failing a request, to abandon.  Rather, the court consistently has treated the
duty to make findings of fact as an intrinsic part of the trial court's
decisional responsibility.  It is for that reason that McCarthy observed
that the issue concerning the absence of findings arose when the Court of
Appeals made its decision without entering the required findings of fact. 
Additionally, McCarthy noted that the plaintiff was not required (by any
statute, rule, or court decision) to assert that issue at an earlier point because
the issue arose solely from the unexplained decision of the Court of Appeals.
Under the extant rules of appellate
procedure, this court's announcement of the lower court's obligation to
accompany its decision on the merits with explanatory findings of fact was a
perfectly reasonable one.  It cannot be gainsaid that requiring findings of
fact in this context safeguards meaningful appellate review that, without
findings, would be difficult, if not virtually impossible.
Several of the pertinent rules have
changed since this court decided those cases.  Effective January 1, 2000, the
legislature, acting through the Council on Court Procedures, amended ORCP 68,
concerning the allowance of attorney fees in the trial courts, in two
significant ways.  First, the amendment deleted the following sentence in ORCP
68 C(4)(c)(ii):  "No findings of fact or conclusions of law shall be
necessary."  Second, the amendment added ORCP 68 C(4)(e), which provides:
"On the request of a party, the court shall
make special findings of fact and state its conclusions of law on the record
regarding the issues material to the award or denial of attorney fees.  A party
shall make a request pursuant to this paragraph by including a request for
findings and conclusions in the title of the statement of attorney fees or
costs and disbursements or objections filed pursuant to paragraph (a) or (b) of
this subsection.  In the absence of a request under this paragraph, the court
may make either general or special findings of fact and may state its
conclusions of law regarding attorney fees."
The latter
amendment is important because it creates a procedure, tied specifically to the
recovery of attorney fees, authorizing either party to request special findings
of fact and conclusions of law regarding any award of attorney fees.  The
amendment to ORCP 68 C(4)(c)(ii) also is important for purposes of this
discussion, because a party now may employ a simple motion, under ORCP 14 A, to
point out to the trial court that its findings of fact -- general or specific
-- fail to apply the applicable legal criteria or to explain why the award or
denial of fees is justified.
Another important rule, ORAP
13.10(7), also has changed.  Before 1999, that rule was silent regarding any
procedure for requesting findings of fact regarding an award of attorney fees
in an appellate court.  However, in 1999, the rule was amended to authorize a
party to request findings regarding the facts and pertinent legal criteria, and
to declare that a party's failure to request findings constituted a waiver of
any objection to the absence of findings.  A further amendment, made a
permanent part of the rule in 2003, obligated every party who requests findings
to incorporate the request into the caption of that party's petition, objection,
or reply.  ORAP 13.10(7) now provides:
"A party to a proceeding under this rule may request
findings regarding the facts and legal criteria that relate to any claim or
objection concerning attorney fees. A party requesting findings must state in
the caption of the petition, objection, or reply that the party is requesting
findings pursuant to this rule.  A party's failure to request findings in a
petition, objection, or reply in the form specified in this rule constitutes a
waiver of any objection to the absence of findings to support the court's
decision."
(Footnote omitted.)
Those rule changes place in
perspective the real issue that this case poses:  In light of the new rules of
procedure now in effect, should the court continue to follow the prudential
rule announced in its prior cases?  My answer is no.  A contrary answer would
create one set of requirements for trial court fact-finding and another,
different set of requirements for appellate court fact-finding.  The need for
uniformity in this area trumps any benefit that might result from different
requirements concerning the obligation to request findings of fact in the trial
and appellate courts.
It is of no consequence that Pamplin
addressed the requirement of findings in the context of discovery sanctions and
the rule amendments discussed above address procedures concerning attorney
fees.  Pamplin demonstrates that this court readily borrowed the
rationale for its decision regarding a discovery sanction from cases concerning
attorney fee disputes.  The same interest in uniformity regarding procedural
matters, noted above, indicates that, if the vitality of the findings
procedures adopted in the attorney fee cases on which Pamplin relied is
superseded or undermined by later rulemaking, so is the rationale for the
prospective application of Pamplin in the context of discovery
sanctions.
Petitioner failed to object to the
sufficiency of the trial court's findings of fact to support the sanction of
dismissal, although he easily could have done so.  That failure prevents this
court from addressing petitioner's contention on appeal that the findings
failed to explain why dismissal, rather than a lesser sanction, was necessary. 
That is so because intervening rulemaking has undermined this court's prior
caselaw that, in the absence of later rulemaking, would have supported
petitioner's argument.  Accordingly, I concur in the result that the majority
reaches, but not in its rationale.(17)
I concur.
Gillette, J., joins in this
concurring opinion.
1. When a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief is imprisoned in a
state institution, as is petitioner in this case, the defendant in the
proceeding is the state official charged with the petitioner's confinement. 
ORS 138.570.  For ease of reference and clarity, we refer to the defendants in
petitioner's Malheur County and Marion County proceedings as "the
state."
2. ORCP 46 D provides, in part:
"If a party * * * fails * * * to appear
before the officer who is to take the deposition of that party * * *, after
being served with a proper notice, * * * the court in which the action is
pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just,
including among others it may take any action authorized under subsection
B(2)(a), (b), and (c) of this rule.  In lieu of any order or in addition
thereto, the court shall require the party failing to act or the attorney
advising such party or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure
was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust."
3. In particular, ORCP 46 D specifically cross-references the
"action[s] authorized under subsection B(2)(a), (b), and (c)," which
are:
"B(2)(a)  An order that the matters
regarding which the order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken
to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim
of the party obtaining the order;
"B(2)(b)  An order refusing to allow the
disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or
prohibiting the disobedient party from introducing designated matters in
evidence; [or]
"B(2)(c)  An order striking out pleadings
or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or
dismissing the action or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party[.]"
4. Pamplin arose under ORCP 46 B, which addresses a trial court's
authority to sanction noncompliance with a discovery order.  This case arises
under ORCP 46 D, which controls the court's authority to sanction
noncooperation with a scheduled deposition.  The operative wording of the two provisions
is the same, however.  In both circumstances, the court may "make such
orders in regard to the failure as are just" and specifically may dismiss
the action pursuant to ORCP 46 B(2)(c).  Given those parallels, Pamplin's
rationale applies equally to a trial court's dismissal authority under ORCP 46
D.  Neither party, we note, urges us to hold otherwise.
5. When this court decided Pamplin, ORS 20.105(1) gave trial and
appellate courts authority, in civil proceedings, to award reasonable attorney
fees against a party who has "'willfully disobeyed a court order or acted
in bad faith, wantonly, or solely for oppressive reasons.'"  319 Or at 436
n 4 (quoting statute).
6. The
concurrence asserts that preservation was raised in the briefing in Pamplin. 
__ Or at ___ (slip op at 7) (Durham, J., concurring).  We disagree.  The
defendant in Pamplin summarily argued that a court is under no legal
obligation to make special findings, except pursuant to the procedures set
forth in ORCP 62, which the plaintiff had not followed.  Plaintiff responded
only by urging that ORCP 62 applied to bench trials only and therefore was
inapplicable in that case.  The parties' dispute thus was over the existence of
a legal obligation to make findings; neither party framed the point as a
disagreement over the applicability of preservation rules for purposes of
appellate review.
7. The circumstances presented in State v. DeCamp, 158 Or App
238, 241, 973 P2d 922 (1999) provide another example of when preservation can
be a practical impossibility.  There, the trial court modified a criminal
defendant's sentence without giving either party notice and without a hearing
in which the parties were present.  The Court of Appeals held that, under those
circumstances, the defendant could challenge the modification on appeal without
first preserving the issue before the trial court. 
8. The issue arose under ORS 137.123(4) (1989) (currently ORS
137.123(5)), which gives a trial court "discretion to impose consecutive
terms of imprisonment for separate convictions arising out of a continuous and
uninterrupted course of conduct only if the court finds" certain facts
prescribed by the statute.  The Court of Appeals previously had held that, to
satisfy the statute, a trial court must expressly make special findings at the
time the consecutive sentences are imposed pursuant to that statute.  State
v. Racicot, 106 Or App 557, 809 P2d 726 (1991).
9. Petitioner attempts to distinguish Bucholz, urging that the
statutory findings involved in that case did not "implicate" an
appellate court's ability to meaningfully review the sentence imposed.  As we
have observed, however, express trial court findings are always helpful
to appellate review.  See, e.g., State v. Hart, 329 Or
140, 148, 985 P2d 1260 (1999) (trial courts are encouraged to state findings on
the record, which "always are useful and, on occasion, could even be
critical" to appellate review).  When the legislature requires trial
courts to make express findings, and further provides for  appellate review of
the decision made, we properly may presume that the legislature does so, at
least in part, to facilitate appellate review.  
10. In McCarthy, this court considered a trial court's authority to
impose a discretionary award of attorney fees pursuant to ORS 20.075(1), which
the court deemed to be "analogous" to the awards under ORS 20.105(1)
that concerned the court in Matizza.  327 Or at 95.  ORS 20.075(1) sets
forth factors that a trial or appellate court must consider whenever a statute
gives a court discretion to award attorney fees.  The factors include
considerations relevant to the conduct of the parties in the case, the merit or
frivolousness of their claims, and the effect of an award on others who might
assert good faith claims in similar cases.  See ORS 20.075 (1)(a) - (h)
(enumerating factors).  If the court decides to grant an award of attorney
fees, the court considers those same factors, in addition to others, in
determining the amount of the award.  See ORS 20.075(2) (so stating).
11. Indeed, after Matizza was decided, both this court and the
legislature adopted express preservation requirements for the special findings
that Mattiza held are required.  See ORAP 13.10(7) (party may
"request findings regarding the facts and legal criteria that relate to
any claim or objection concerning attorney fees"; request must be in the
caption of the petition, objection, or reply filed by the party; failure to
request findings is a waiver of objection to the absence of findings to support
the decision); ORCP 68 C(4)(e) (on a party's request, a trial court "shall
make special findings of fact and state its conclusions of law on the record
regarding the issues material to the award or denial of attorney fees";
request must be in the title of the statement supporting the award or the
objection to it; in the absence of a request, court may make either general or
special findings).
12. This case illustrates that point.  Here, petitioner argued in his
written memorandum that dismissal, rather than a lesser sanction, was not
warranted.  On that point, he summarily urged that he should be required to pay
for the three-page cost of the deposition transcript (as opposed to what
defendant proposed as an alternative, which was to bear defendant's full costs
of the terminated deposition).  At the hearing on the motion to dismiss,
however, petitioner did not argue the point.  Nor did he present any evidence (e.g.,
his financial circumstances) as to how a lesser sanction would deter him from
the dilatory tactics he had engaged in for the past two years.  Had petitioner
put the state as well as the post-conviction court on notice of his position
that a special finding on the point was required, the record and the parties'
arguments to the post-conviction court likely would have addressed the issue
directly.
13. That opportunity arose pursuant to UTCR 5.100(1).  At the conclusion of
the hearing, as earlier noted, the post-conviction court directed the state to
prepare the judgment.  Under UTCR 5.100(1), the state was obligated to serve
the proposed judgment on petitioner's counsel not less than three days before
submitting it to the court, unless petitioner's counsel stipulated that he had
no objections to the judgment or unless it was presented in open court with all
parties present.  Implicit within that provision is the other party's ability
to raise objections to the form of the judgment in the time period before it is
entered, which could encompass an objection to a missing finding.  Nothing in
the record suggests that the state did not comply with its obligation to serve
the petitioner with a copy of the proposed form of judgment.  Nor has
petitioner argued in this case that preservation was not possible.  
14. In his petition for review to this court, petitioner also sought review
of the Court of Appeals' resolution of the merits of his substantive challenge,
arguing that the record does not support a conclusion that he refused to be
deposed, and also that dismissal was, in all events, too harsh a sanction for
his conduct.  As earlier noted, we allowed review to consider whether the
findings required by Pamplin are subject to preservation requirements.  We
decline to consider petitioner's challenge to the merits of the dismissal
decision.  See ORAP 9.20(2) (Supreme Court opinion need not address each
question raised in petition for review).
15. The defendant's brief to this court in Pamplin stated, in part:
"Plaintiffs argue that the trial court's
decision to impose the sanction of dismissal against plaintiffs should be
reversed because the court's order was not accompanied by specific findings of
fact or law.  The court's order in this matter was issued pursuant to ORCP 46
B.  There is no requirement under that provision for the court to issue special
findings.  Normally, courts are free to rule on motions without being required
to make special findings.  Under ORCP 62, a court is not required to make
special findings unless demanded to do so by a party.  There was no such demand
in this matter."
16. The court's phrase, "because [the issue] arose when," perhaps
better could have been stated as "because [the issue] did not arise
until," but the meaning is the same.
17. The majority concludes its opinion by reinforcing "the importance
of special findings to meaningful appellate review of a dismissal under ORCP
46(B)(2)(c)[]" and draws particular attention to the vital rule that the
specific findings required in Pamplin play when an appellate court
examines a trial court's exercise of discretion under that rule.  Peeples,
___ Or at ____ (slip op at 18-19).  The majority also observes that a failure
by a trial court to enter the necessary findings of fact may prevent the
appellate court from concluding that a dismissal is warranted.  Id. at
19.  I join fully in those statements.