Title: In Re Estate of Bush
Citation: 224 N.W.2d 489
Docket Number: 44707
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: November 22, 1974

224 N.W.2d 489 (1974) In re ESTATE of Archibald G. BUSH, a.k.a. A. G. Bush, Decedent. H. Clifford LEE, et al., Co-Executors of the Estate of Edyth D. Bush, Deceased, Appellants, v. Herschel S. ARROWOOD and Mary Jane Dickman, as Executors of the Estate of Archibald G. Bush, Deceased, Respondents, The Bush Foundation, Respondent, Warren Spannaus, Attorney General of the State of Minnesota, Respondent. No. 44707. Supreme Court of Minnesota. November 22, 1974. Rehearing Denied December 23, 1974. *491 Robins, Davis &amp; Lyons and Sidney S. Feinberg, Minneapolis, Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanual, Smith &amp; Cutler and Edward C. Adkins and Owen Rice, Jr., Tampa, Fla., Arter &amp; Hadden and Thomas V. Koykka, Cleveland, Ohio, for appellants. Blomquist, Vitko, Langlais &amp; Neimeyer, Neil P. Convery, St. Paul, for Arrowood and Dickman. Gray, Plant, Mooty &amp; Anderson and Edward J. Callahan, Jr., Minneapolis, for Bush Foundation. Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Curtis D. Forslund, Sol. Gen., Richard G. Mark, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for Spannaus. Considered and decided by the court en banc. KNUTSON, Justice.[*] This is an appeal from a judgment entered in the District Court of Ramsey County granting summary judgment to defendants and dismissing an appeal from an interlocutory decree of the Probate Court of Ramsey County declaring that Mrs. Bush's purported renunciation of her husband's will was of no force and effect. The case is the culmination of much protracted litigation and many legal skirmishes resulting from the probate and settlement of the will of Archibald G. Bush. The facts and legal maneuvers of the interested parties are so involved that it seems best to relate them in considerable detail even at the risk of an unduly lengthy opinion in the hope that the decision we now make may see an end to this protracted and expensive litigation. The trial court has set forth in detail in his memorandum decision the facts essential to a determination of the issues now before us. We doubt that we could improve upon them. So, we adopt as the facts in this decision that portion of the court's memorandum decision that is relevant to the issues involved. We quote and adopt the following from that decision: The memorandum added: "M.S. 525.212 states: While the case seems quite complicated and much legal argument has been presented to us, it really involves a determination of two issues: (1) May the district court on appeal from an order of the probate court grant summary judgment? (2) Is the decision of the Honorable Otis H. Godfrey, Jr., referred to in the above statement of facts, res judicata of the issues plaintiffs now seek to try? Hereinafter, the opinion of Judge Godfrey will be referred to as the Godfrey decision. The procedure upon an appeal to the district court from an order of the probate court is found in Minn.St. 525.72, which reads: Appellants, who are the executors of Mrs. Bush's estate, contend that under this statutory provision, while the district court may grant judgment on the pleadings, it may not grant summary judgment. We think it best to first dispose of the question of whether the judgment entered pursuant to the Godfrey decision is res judicata so that, if it is, the question of whether the district court had the right to grant summary judgment may be considered in light of the fact that litigation of all the fact issues appellants now seek to litigate in this case is barred by the res judicata effect of the Godfrey judgment. It seems to be the contention of appellants that they have a right to a trial de novo on these issues even if the Godfrey decision is found to be res judicata and a bar to litigation of such issues. Essentially, it is the contention of appellants that the Godfrey decision is not res judicata because (1) Mrs. Bush appeared in the action leading to the Godfrey judgment in her representative capacity as a director of The Bush Foundation and not in her individual capacity; (2) the requisite identity of causes of action between the case culminating in the Godfrey judgment and the case now before us is absent; and (3) the stipulation on which the consent judgment entered by Judge Godfrey was based was made by Mrs. Bush's counsel without her knowledge and without her authority. Each of these arguments can probably be considered separately. Appellants state that the identity of parties in the two actions is lacking because in the one case resulting in the Godfrey decision Mrs. Bush appeared in her representative capacity and in this case she, through her representatives, appears in her individual capacity. The general test is whether the named party is the real party in interest or a mere nominal party. See, Olson v. Linster, 259 Minn. 189, 107 N.W.2d 49 (1960); Schmitt v. Emery, 215 Minn. 288, 9 N.W.2d 777 (1943); Bamka v. Chicago, St. P., M. &amp; O. R. Co., 61 Minn. 549, 63 N.W. 1116 (1895). On the question involving the identity of the parties, the trial court held: It should also be mentioned that in the action involving the Godfrey decision, the attorney general was named as a defendant in the complaint, and, pursuant to Minn.St. 501.12, interposed a counterclaim and cross-claim in behalf of the public in which he alleged that both Class A and Class B directors were in breach of their fiduciary duties. He also alleged that, except for the amount allocable to maintenance of the Bush home in Florida, Mrs. Bush should disgorge the $2,100,000 she had received as part of the prior settlement. Whether this counterclaim was permissible under Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 13.01 and 13.02, which require that a counterclaim be made against any "opposing party," we need not determine. Mrs. Bush answered this counterclaim *500 in her personal capacity without seeking dismissal of it. It is also abundantly clear that the stipulation of settlement upon which the Godfrey decision was based determined Mrs. Bush's personal rights as well as any she might have in a representative capacity. It was agreed, among other things, that she could retain the payment of $2,100,000; and the dispute over the two classes of directors also involved her personal rights. She also agreed to waive any right to renounce her husband's will. Much could be said about the distinction between the doctrine of estoppel by judgment and collateral estoppel, but it would seem that in this case, no matter what basis we put it on, Mrs. Bush has agreed to a consent judgment which has been entered by a court having jurisdiction over the cause of action; that no appeal has been taken from that judgment; and that it still stands as a valid judgment. So, it must be held to be binding on the issues actually settled in that litigation. Whether it be through an estoppel by judgment or a collateral estoppel, the consent judgment is binding upon her. With respect to the consent judgment, we said in the case of Pangalos v. Halpern, 247 Minn. 80, 84, 76 N.W.2d 702, 706 (1956): In the case of In re Application of Schaefer to Register Title, 287 Minn. 490, 493, 178 N.W.2d 907, 910 (1970), we quoted with approval the following from the Pangalos case (247 Minn. 85, 76 N.W.2d 706): Had the case upon which the Godfrey judgment is based been tried and determined instead of disposed of by settlement, we doubt anyone would contend that the facts litigated therein were not res judicata. The stipulation went further than a trial in that the individual rights of Mrs. Bush were disposed of as well as her rights in a representative capacity. Had she tried these issues by consent, even though they were probably not included in the original pleadings, she would likewise be bound by the result. It might be mentioned in passing that the case of Bush v. Arrowood, 293 Minn. 243, 198 N.W.2d 263 (1972), was determined by this court some time ago. In that case the issue directly involved was the right of attorneys retained by the attorney general to be paid their fees out of foundation funds. In our decision in that case, we said in referring to the case upon which the Godfrey judgment was based: While Bush v. Arrowood, supra, is not discussed in appellants' original brief, in their reply brief we find the following: Appellants apparently contend that what we said in Bush v. Arrowood, and quoted above, is dictum and therefore not binding upon the court at this time. It may be true that what we said in the former Bush case was dictum, but if it was, it at least was a strong indication of this court's belief at that time that the Godfrey judgment was res judicata. As a matter of fact, the stipulation and the Godfrey judgment were involved in a determination of the amount of fees the attorneys were entitled to recover if they were entitled to recover from the foundation at all. So, the question was at least directly involved in that case. The court had hopes at that time that by indicating our belief that the Godfrey judgment was res judicata it would end this protracted litigation. Apparently our hopes were not realized. Even dictum, if it contains an expression of the opinion of the court, is entitled to considerable weight. We now hold that the judgment of the district court which decided the very questions appellants now seek to raise and litigate in this action is res judicata and bars any future litigation of these same issues. In the case of State v. Rainer, 258 Minn. 168, 177, 103 N.W.2d 389, 395 (1960), we said: We quoted (258 Minn. 178, 103 N.W.2d 396) from the opinion of Judge Donovan of the United States District Court in the case of Goodson v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 416, 420 (D.Minn.1957), the following: We, therefore, agree with the trial court that, when consideration is given to the stipulation of all the parties and the final disposition of the case and entry of judgment by Judge Godfrey, there is sufficient identity of the parties to meet the test of res judicata. We also hold that there is sufficient identity of causes of action. As a matter of fact, the same causes of action were involved in both cases and once the identity of the parties is established, the causes of action also become identical. Essentially, determination of whether the causes of action are the same depends to some extent on whether Mrs. Bush appealed in her individual capacity. It seems clear that she did. The only other contention that merits discussion is the claim now made that *502 Mrs. Bush did not authorize or consent to the settlement upon which the Godfrey judgment was based. We need not spend time on that issue. That she was represented by competent counsel must be conceded. That she knew what she was doing must likewise be conceded. On a motion for summary judgment we have held on many occasions that a party opposing such motion must do something more than simply rely upon the pleadings. Here there is nothing submitted, by form of affidavit or otherwise except mere conclusionary opinion, to show that the settlement was not made with Mrs. Bush's full consent. Rosvall v. Provost, 279 Minn. 119, 155 N.W.2d 900 (1968); Ahlm v. Rooney, 274 Minn. 259, 143 N.W.2d 65 (1966). It is also evident that Mrs. Bush was kept apprised of what was being done and of the action taken in her behalf by her attorneys. Whether or not she consented to the stipulation is a question of fact. The Godfrey court having determined that issue adversely to her, and no appeal having ever been taken from that determination, she is clearly now bound by it. We then come to the question of whether the district court on appeal from an order of the probate court may grant summary judgment. This, in turn, revolves around the proper interpretation of the language in Minn.St. 525.72, where we find the following: The crux of appellants' argument relates to the proper interpretation of Rule 81, Rules of Civil Procedure. Apparently it is the contention of appellants that since Minn.St. 525.72 does not expressly authorize the district court to entertain a motion for summary judgment on appeal from the probate court, its power to do so, if any, must be derived from Rule 56, Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes a district court in the exercise of its trial jurisdiction to order summary judgment, but that Rule 81.02 prohibits recourse to Rule 56. Rule 81.02 provides that the Rules of Civil Procedure "do not supersede the provisions of statutes relating to appeals to the district courts." While much could be said in disposing of this contention, we think it sufficient to refer to the case of Nationwide Corp. v. Northwestern National Life Ins. Co., 251 Minn. 255, 87 N.W.2d 671 (1958). We there held that the Rules of Civil Procedure would apply to a mandamus proceeding where the relevant statute, Minn.St. 586.08, provided that "proceedings [shall be] had, in the same manner as in a civil action." We held this language sufficient to invoke Rule 81.03, which states that "[w]here any statute * * * provides that any act in a civil proceeding shall be done in the manner provided by law, such act shall be done in accordance with these rules." In so holding, we attempted to outline a definite test for determining the applicability of the rules to a particular statute. We said: Appellants argue in substance that Minn.St. 525.72 does not state that the proceedings shall be conducted in the same manner as a civil action but merely that they shall be "tried, and determined" in the same manner as a civil action. Thus, they argue, Rule 81.03 does not operate to incorporate by reference into Minn.St. 525.72 any of the Rules of Civil Procedure which govern pretrial proceedings. We think this argument is simply a play upon words. The words "tried, and determined in the same manner as if originally commenced in that court" must include the right to dispose of the case the same as if it had been commenced in *503 the district court. We think this carries with it the right to grant summary judgment where there are no issues of fact to be tried or where the law bars litigation of such issues. A motion for summary judgment calls for a determination of the issues of law when there are no material fact issues to be tried and results in a decision on the merits. In the authors' comment to Rule 56, Hetland and Adamson point out: Appellants argue in substance that one of the elements of the Nationwide test is absent in the instant case because Rule 56 is inconsistent with the provisions of Minn.St. 525.72. First, they argue, that Minn.St. 525.72 grants a substantive right to a trial de novo while Rule 56 permits summary dismissal with no trial at all. They argue in fact that in a trial de novo a court should have no power to cut short the proceeding except by granting judgment on the pleadings. In the case of Grier v. Estate of Grier, 252 Minn. 143, 145, 89 N.W.2d 398, 401 (1958), we rejected the contention that the district court's granting of judgment on the pleadings denied appellants the right to a trial de novo, stating: The same would seem to be true of a motion for summary judgment. If there are no fact issues that can be litigated due to the bar of res judicata in the former action, it would make little sense to require a trial de novo. To construe the statute involved as permitting a motion for judgment on the pleadings while forbidding a motion for summary judgment where there are no fact issues to be tried would simply be reviving the technicalities which the Rules of Civil Procedure seek to avoid and which were condemned by this court in House v. Hanson, 245 Minn. 466, 72 N.W.2d 874 (1955). In view of our determination that the decision in the Godfrey judgment is res judicata as to all the issues appellants seek to litigate, we need not decide whether estoppel or waiver also bars the litigation of these issues. If they are barred by res judicata, that ends the matter. We think that is the case here. It is difficult to understand what appellants expect to accomplish by this litigation. The estate has now been largely, if not wholly, distributed according to the wishes of both Mr. and Mrs. Bush. If Mrs. Bush's right to have some control over the operation of the Foundation had any value during her life, that right has now vanished by virtue of her death. She no longer could have any voice in controlling the affairs of the Foundation and it seems to us that these claims are now moot. Inasmuch as we hold that the Godfrey decision was res judicata of all of the issues appellants seek now to try, it must follow that the summary judgment of the court must be, and is, affirmed. Affirmed. SHERAN, C. J., and OTIS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. [*] Retired Chief Justice acting pursuant to Minn.St. 2.724. [1] Ancillary proceedings were pending in Florida. [2] Italics supplied. [3] Italics supplied.