Title: Kenner v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 200027
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 25, 2021

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
LENNY ROCK KENNER 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 200027 
JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL 
 
 
 
 February 25, 2021 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
This appeal arises from convictions of Lenny Rock Kenner (“Kenner”) for animate object 
sexual penetration, in violation of Code § 18.2-67.2, aggravated sexual battery, in violation of 
Code § 18.2-67.3, and custodial sexual abuse, in violation of Code § 18.2-370.1.  On appeal, he 
argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence of child pornography was inadmissible at trial and 
that his motion to have the jury individually polled on its guilty verdict was timely.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
At the age of six, D.T. moved into an apartment with her cousin, Angela Robinson.  
Kenner, Robinson’s fiancé, also lived in the apartment.  D.T. later returned to her mother’s home 
in October 2015, after her seventh birthday.  After her return, D.T. told her mother and a 
neighbor that Kenner touched in and around her “private” when she lived with him.  A warrant 
for Kenner’s arrest was issued and he was arrested in November 2015. 
 
Immediately following Kenner’s arrest, police executed a search warrant at the 
apartment.  Officers recovered a desktop computer from Kenner’s bedroom, a laptop from the 
kitchen, and computer disks from his bedroom closet.  A password-protected user account on the 
desktop contained an email account with Kenner’s name, an autofill profile for Kenner with his 
 
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phone number and address, a student loan document associated with Kenner, and eBay and 
Facebook accounts in Kenner’s name.  The desktop computer also contained information that the 
computer was used to stream, download, or attempt to download numerous child pornography 
videos from “Ares,” a peer-to-peer file sharing site.  The titles of the child pornography videos 
described adults having sex with young children or adults teaching young children to have sex. 
 
On March 14, 2016, a Northampton County grand jury indicted Kenner for animate 
object sexual penetration, aggravated sexual battery, and custodial sexual abuse.  The 
Commonwealth filed a motion in limine asking the Circuit Court of Northampton County (“trial 
court”) to allow it to introduce the child pornography found on the computer.  The 
Commonwealth argued that the titles of the pornographic videos found on the computer were “so 
much like the facts” of the instant offense that the evidence was “highly relevant and probative” 
of Kenner’s “attitude towards his victim,” as well as his intent, plan, motive, and absence of 
mistake.  In response, Kenner asked the trial court to deny the motion in limine and asserted that 
the video titles contained “a bunch of very prejudicial terms” that were “certainly more 
prejudicial than . . . probative” and did not “show a pattern or anything like that . . . of conduct 
that leads up to this.”  The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion and ruled that it 
would allow the Commonwealth to introduce “images or evidence of child pornography” from 
the computer “as well as evidence that the computer had been used to download or attempt to 
download certain files.” 
 
Kenner requested a trial by jury which was held on June 12-13, 2017.  D.T. testified at 
trial that Kenner had her sit on his lap in a red chair in his bedroom while he put his hands both 
on and inside her vagina.  During the abuse, Kenner forced her to watch “sex videos” of naked 
adults engaging in different sex acts.  D.T. testified that the videos were “on his computer.  They 
 
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came from Google.”  D.T. also testified that Kenner had told her that when she grew up, she 
would be “his girlfriend.”  Kenner also instructed D.T. to not tell anyone that he touched her. 
 
Dr. Alicia Meyer (“Dr. Meyer”), a licensed clinical psychologist, evaluated D.T. and 
testified at trial as an expert in the psychological assessment and treatment of childhood trauma.  
Dr. Meyer diagnosed D.T. with post-traumatic stress disorder, which she explained can occur 
after an individual has endured a “big stressful event,” including sexual violence.  D.T. told Dr. 
Meyer “something about a Taser, either witnessing or experiencing [Kenner] using a Taser.”  Dr. 
Meyer testified that D.T.’s symptoms directly correlated with her allegation that Kenner sexually 
abused her. 
 
Dr. Michelle Clayton (“Dr. Clayton”), a child-abuse pediatrician, conducted a physical 
examination of D.T.  Dr. Clayton testified that D.T. had “paired circular marks” on her thighs 
that were consistent with injuries from a Taser or stun gun. 
 
FBI Special Agent David Desy (“Agent Desy”) testified that the desktop computer found 
in Kenner’s bedroom contained forty files of child pornography that included thirty-eight images 
and two videos.  Over the Commonwealth’s objection, the trial court refused to allow the 
photographs and videos to be shown to the jury.  The trial court did allow the Commonwealth to 
introduce the titles of the files at trial.1  The titles included: “Fuck young naked nude little girl 
cum,” “6 year old fucked,” “Toddler Fucked In Pussy,” “10 yr fuck little girl,” “Teaching sex to 
daughter,” “6 years old kid how to fuck 16 year old boy,” and “dad on daughter full penetration 
sex.”  Agent Desy testified that the files were downloaded, or attempted to be downloaded 
 
 
1 Kenner did not request a limiting instruction with respect to this evidence, and one was 
not given. 
 
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between November 2014 and September 2015, during the time D.T. lived with Kenner and 
Robinson. 
 
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence, Kenner moved to strike the 
Commonwealth’s evidence and the trial court denied the motion.  Kenner presented testimony 
from several witnesses including himself.  He testified that he did not know how the child 
pornography downloads were on the computer.  He further testified that he did not know the 
computer’s password and that it was a “public” computer in the home.  Kenner denied having 
D.T. in his bedroom and denied touching her.  Kenner instead blamed D.T.’s mother for 
“coaching her.” 
 
Following guilt phase deliberations, the jury found Kenner guilty on all counts.  The trial 
court’s clerk read the verdicts and asked the jury “so say you all . . . ?” to which the jurors 
responded affirmatively.  The trial court explained that during a bifurcated criminal trial, the jury 
would conduct “further deliberations to determine a sentence.”  The jury was then excluded from 
the courtroom. 
 
While the jury was excluded, the parties submitted their sentencing instructions to the 
trial court.  The jury then returned to the courtroom.  The trial court read the sentencing 
instructions, which included the life sentence for the animate object sexual penetration of a child 
under the age of 13 offense.  The parties gave their arguments regarding sentencing.  At the end 
of his argument, Kenner asked to have the jury individually polled to ensure that the guilty 
verdict was unanimous.  The trial court denied the request. 
 
After the jury retired to deliberate sentencing, Kenner’s trial counsel offered argument to 
support his motion to poll the jury pursuant to Rule 3A:17(d).  The trial court again denied the 
motion to poll the jury as untimely, finding that it was not “appropriate to wait until the jury is 
 
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instructed as to what the punishment is to ask that they be polled on their vote for guilt or 
innocence.”  The jury returned a sentencing verdict of life plus seven years’ imprisonment. 
 
Following the imposition of sentence by the trial court, Kenner appealed to the Court of 
Appeals.  The Court of Appeals affirmed Kenner’s convictions in a 2-1 decision.  Kenner v. 
Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 279 (2019). 
 
A majority of the judges on the Court of Appeals’ panel affirmed Kenner’s convictions 
and disagreed with the dissenting judge’s reliance on Blaylock v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 
579 (1998).  The majority found that Blaylock did not dictate a reversal of Kenner’s convictions 
for several reasons.  First, the majority found that the ground for reversal in Blaylock was the 
exclusion of reputation evidence about the victim, a fact not at issue in this case.  All other 
information in the opinion, as relied on by the dissent, was “non-binding dicta.”  Kenner, 71 
Va. App. at 290-91.  Second, the majority determined that Moore v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 72 
(1981) and Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 705 (2008), governed the outcome of this case.  Id. 
at 291.  Third, the majority found that the dicta of Blaylock only applied to the use of other 
crimes evidence as proof of intent and did not address any of the other proper uses of the 
evidence that applied in Kenner’s case.  Id.  Finally, to the extent that Blaylock applied to the use 
of other crimes evidence as proof of intent, the majority believed that Blaylock was wrongly 
decided, was contrary to Moore and/or was implicitly overruled by Ortiz.  Id. at 294-95. 
 
The majority ultimately held that the evidence of the titles of the child pornography 
downloads was relevant and admissible and that the probative value outweighed any prejudice.  
“[T]he evidence was relevant to show Kenner’s conduct or attitude toward D.T., to prove motive 
or method of committing the sexual assaults, as evidence of Kenner’s specific intent to engage in 
sex with a minor, and to corroborate D.T.’s allegations.”  Id. at 293. 
 
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Regarding the request to poll the jury under Rule 3A:17(d), the majority held that 
Kenner’s request was untimely because a motion to poll the jury 
must be made before the guilt phase has concluded and the 
sentencing phase has begun.  To conclude otherwise would ignore 
the finality of the verdict once the sentencing phase commences 
and would also ignore the statutory mandate that the sentencing 
phase of the trial is limited to determining punishment. 
Kenner, 71 Va. App. at 299. 
 
The dissent agreed with the majority’s decision regarding jury polling, however it 
concluded that the child pornography was not admissible under any of the “other crimes” 
exceptions.  Id. at 300 (Malveaux, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).  The dissent 
argued that, as in Blaylock, intent was not an issue in dispute at Kenner’s trial.  Id. at 302.  In the 
dissent’s view, the only relevant question for the jury to decide was whether the acts had actually 
occurred.  The dissent thus contended that the evidence was not relevant to prove intent, 
knowledge, mistake or accident, motive, or the conduct or feeling of Kenner.  Id. at 302-03.  The 
dissent also disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that “any kind of pornography” on the 
computer corroborated D.T.’s testimony.  Id. at 304.  The dissent noted that D.T. had stated that 
Kenner showed her pornography involving adults, therefore, the evidence of child pornography 
should not have been admissible to corroborate D.T.’s testimony.  Id.  The dissent argued that 
Ortiz was distinguishable because there was no indication that D.T. watched the child 
pornography.  The dissent further noted that in Ortiz, unlike the facts presented in Kenner, the 
evidence of pornography and a receipt for vaginal cream actually corroborated the victim’s 
testimony. 
 
This appeal followed. 
 
 
 
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II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Evidence 
 
Kenner argues that he was prejudiced by the introduction of the titles of the child 
pornography downloads at trial.  He argues that the titles were not probative of whether he was 
guilty of the sexual abuse of D.T., which he denied committing during his testimony at trial.  He 
also asserts that the child pornography titles did not corroborate D.T.’s testimony that Kenner 
showed her adult pornography.  In response, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court was 
correct in allowing the titles of the child pornography to be admitted into evidence because it 
demonstrated evidence of Kenner’s motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, and absence of 
mistake or accident. 
 
“[W]e review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence using an abuse of 
discretion standard and, on appeal, will not disturb a trial court’s decision to admit evidence 
absent a finding of abuse of that discretion.”  Avent v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 175, 197 (2010).  
“In evaluating whether a trial court abused its discretion, . . . we do not substitute our judgment 
for that of the trial court. Rather, we consider only whether the record fairly supports the trial 
court’s action.”  Carter v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 537, 543 (2017) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  “The abuse-of-discretion standard [also] includes review to determine 
that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.”  Id. at 543-44 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
An abuse of discretion can occur in three principal ways: when a 
relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is 
not considered; when an irrelevant or improper factor is considered 
and given significant weight; and when all proper factors, and no 
improper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing those 
factors, commits a clear error of judgment. 
 
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Commonwealth v. Proffitt, 292 Va. 626, 634 (2006) (internal quotation marks and alteration 
omitted). 
 
Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:401 describes “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact in issue more probable or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence.” 
As a general rule, evidence which shows or tends to show that the 
accused is guilty of other crimes and offenses at other times, even 
though they are of the same nature as the one charged in the 
indictment, is not admissible to show the accused’s commission of 
the particular crime charged.  However, numerous exceptions to 
this rule authorize the admission of “bad acts” evidence.  
Specifically, other crimes evidence is admissible when it “shows 
the conduct or attitude of the accused toward his victim[;] 
establishes the relationship between the parties[;] or negates the 
possibility of accident or mistake[;]” or shows motive, method, 
intent, plan or scheme, or any other relevant element of the offense 
on trial.  Evidence that falls into the enumerated exceptions must 
meet an additional requirement: its legitimate probative value must 
exceed its incidental prejudice to the defendant. 
Ortiz, 276 Va. at 714-15 (quoting Moore, 222 Va. at 76).  The responsibility for balancing the 
probative value versus the prejudicial effect rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.  
Proffitt, 292 Va. at 634. 
 
The Court of Appeals majority relied on Moore and Ortiz in concluding that the child 
pornography titles were relevant evidence and were properly admitted.  The dissent, on the other 
hand, argued that Blaylock applied to bar the child pornography evidence because intent was not 
in dispute at Kenner’s trial and the evidence did not meet any of the “other crimes” exceptions. 
 
In Moore, the defendant’s theory of the case was that the touching of the victim was 
accidental or was misunderstood by the victim.  We held that the evidence of a subsequent 
offense involving a third party was admissible to show Moore’s conduct or attitude toward the 
victim.  Moore, 222 Va. at 77.  In Ortiz, the defendant insisted that he did not rape the victim and 
 
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that she might have had sex with him when he was asleep or drunk.  The evidence he sought to 
exclude was a receipt for vaginal cream and pornography, however, the Court held that the 
evidence was admissible to corroborate the victim’s statements that the defendant had put cream 
on her and had her watch pornography prior to the sexual abuse.  Ortiz, 276 Va. at 716. 
 
Here, Kenner testified on his own behalf in support of his theory of the case that he had 
not abused D.T.  Kenner denied having D.T. in his bedroom, denied touching her, and blamed 
D.T.’s mother for “coaching her.”  He also denied knowing how the child pornography came to 
be on the computer, claimed that he did not know the password to the computer, and stated that it 
was a “public” computer in the home.  Kenner urges the Court to reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals because the Commonwealth’s child pornography evidence was either (1) not 
relevant or (2), if it was relevant, was too prejudicial to be heard by the jury.  We decline his 
invitation. 
 
“Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove or disprove, or is pertinent to, matters in issue.”  
Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 257 (2001).  “[T]he Due Process Clause requires the 
prosecution to ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
charged.’”  Hodge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 338, 341 (1976) (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 
U.S. 684, 685 (1975)).  The burden of going forward with proof “may shift from one side to the 
other” at trial, yet the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt remains with the 
Commonwealth.  Neal v. Commonwealth, 124 Va. 842, 848 (1919). 
 
Code § 18.2-370.1(A) provides the elements that the Commonwealth must prove in order 
to obtain a conviction for custodial sexual abuse. 
Any person 18 years of age or older who, except as provided in 
§ 18.2-370, maintains a custodial or supervisory relationship over a 
child under the age of 18 and is not legally married to such child 
and such child is not emancipated who, with lascivious intent, 
 
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knowingly and intentionally (i) proposes that any such child feel or 
fondle the sexual or genital parts of such person or that such person 
feel or handle the sexual or genital parts of the child; or (ii) 
proposes to such child the performance of an act of sexual 
intercourse, anal intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, or anilingus or 
any act constituting an offense under § 18.2-361; or (iii) exposes 
his or her sexual or genital parts to such child; or (iv) proposes that 
any such child expose his or her sexual or genital parts to such 
person; or (v) proposes to the child that the child engage in sexual 
intercourse, sodomy or fondling of sexual or genital parts with 
another person; or (vi) sexually abuses the child as defined in 
subdivision 6 of § 18.2-67.10 is guilty of a Class 6 felony. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Therefore, in order to prove custodial sexual abuse, the Commonwealth had to present 
evidence that Kenner acted “with lascivious intent” and “knowingly and intentionally [felt] or 
handle[d] the sexual or genital parts of the child.”  Code § 18.2-370.1(A).  The Commonwealth’s 
evidence showed that Kenner played adult pornography on his computer while he touched D.T. 
in and around her genitals.  D.T. also testified that Kenner told her that when she grew up, she 
could be his girlfriend, thus evincing his improper attitude toward the six-year-old.  The titles of 
the child pornography found on Kenner’s computer were particularly relevant to illustrate 
Kenner’s inappropriate sexualized attitude toward children in general and toward D.T. in 
particular.  The titles included: “Fuck young naked nude little girl cum,” “6 year old fucked,” 
“Toddler Fucked In Pussy,” “10 yr fuck little girl,” “Teaching sex to daughter,” “6 years old kid 
how to fuck 16 year old boy” and “dad on daughter full penetration sex.”  Moreover, the titles 
were relevant to establishing the elements of “lascivious intent” and that the acts were 
accomplished “knowingly and intentionally.” 
 
As we have stated, the Commonwealth is required to prove every element of its case.  
Hodge, 217 Va. at 341; Neal, 124 Va. at 848.  It is entitled to do so by presenting relevant 
evidence in support of the offense charged.  The Commonwealth cannot have its evidence barred 
 
11 
or “sanitized” simply because the defendant takes the position that the offense did not occur and 
therefore intent is not genuinely in dispute.2  See Scott v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 519, 526 
(1984) (holding that “[w]here a course of criminal conduct is continuous and interwoven, 
consisting of a series of related crimes, the perpetrator has no right to have the evidence 
‘sanitized’ so as to deny the jury knowledge of all but the immediate crime for which he is on 
trial”).  In summary, the evidence was relevant to show Kenner’s conduct or attitude towards the 
victim, motive, method and intent. 
 
In addition to being relevant and material, other crimes evidence “is subject to the further 
requirement that the legitimate probative value of the evidence must exceed its incidental 
prejudice to the defendant.”  Rose v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 3, 11 (2005).  Accord Va. R. Evid. 
2:404(b) (stating the requirement that “the legitimate probative value of such proof outweighs its 
incidental prejudice”).  The responsibility for balancing the two considerations rests in the trial 
court’s discretion and we will not disturb the trial court’s determination in the absence of a clear 
abuse of discretion.  Ortiz, 276 Va. at 715; Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 90 (1990).  
Here, the trial court balanced the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect and 
only allowed the titles of the child pornography to be admitted into evidence.  As we said in 
Ortiz, “[a]ssuming, arguendo, that the pornographic material . . . do[es] constitute evidence of 
other crimes or bad acts under these facts, the real issue is whether evidence of [Kenner’s] 
possession” of the child pornography videos “is relevant to prove the commission of” custodial 
sexual abuse.  Ortiz, 276 Va. at 715.  Kenner’s assaults on D.T. mirrored or were closely akin to 
 
 
2 To the extent that the decision in Blaylock is inconsistent with the holding we express 
here, we overrule that portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision. 
 
 
12 
the titles of the child pornography found on his computer.3  Kenner told D.T. that when she grew 
up, she could be his girlfriend.  He told her this while he sexually abused her and showed her 
adult pornography.  The Commonwealth’s evidence of the child pornography titles was relevant 
to show the defendant’s attitude and conduct towards the victim, to prove motive or method of 
committing the sexual assault and served to prove elements of the offense.  Ortiz, 276 Va. at 715; 
Scott, 228 Va. 527; Moore, 222 Va. at 76.  Accordingly, the legitimate probative value of the 
evidence received by the trial court in the present case outweighed its incidental prejudice to 
Kenner, and the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that the evidence of child pornography 
was properly admitted at trial. 
B.  Polling the Jury 
 
Kenner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of his 
motion to poll the jury because the jury had not begun its sentencing phase deliberations, and 
that therefore, his request was timely.  The Commonwealth responds that there was no error due 
to the nature of the bifurcated procedure in criminal trials. 
 
“A lower court’s interpretation of the Rules of this Court, like its interpretation of a 
statute, presents a question of law that we review de novo.”  LaCava v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 
465, 469-70 (2012).  While we have not previously had an opportunity to address this specific 
issue, we have a Code section, a Rule of Court, and several opinions from the Court of Appeals 
to guide our analysis. 
 
Code § 19.2-295.1 provides in pertinent part that “[i]n cases of trial by jury, upon a 
finding that the defendant is guilty of a felony . . . a separate proceeding limited to the 
 
 
3 Cf. Quinones v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 634, 642 (2001) (implying that the 
evidence is admissible if “the videotapes displayed acts . . . similar to the acts [the defendant] 
allegedly performed on the victim”). 
 
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ascertainment of punishment shall be held as soon as practicable before the same jury.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Rule 3A:17(d) provides that: 
When a verdict is returned, the jury shall be polled individually at 
the request of any party or upon the court’s own motion.  If upon 
the poll, all jurors do not agree, the jury may be directed to retire 
for further deliberations or may be discharged. 
The Court of Appeals has addressed the application of Code § 19.2-295.1, specifically its 
use of the phrase “a separate proceeding,” and Rule 3A:17(d) in several cases which we find 
persuasive.  That court has interpreted the relevant provisions and found that the guilt phase and 
the sentencing phase of a jury trial are distinct.  The Court of Appeals has specifically held that, 
“a guilty verdict becomes final when it has been ascertained by the circuit court that a jury has 
unanimously reached a determination of guilt and the verdict may not thereafter be disturbed, 
even during the punishment phase.”  Tyler v Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 702, 706 (1996).  The 
Court of Appeals has also addressed, in a manner that we find persuasive, the purpose for 
treating the two phases as separate proceedings, stating that 
[Code § 19.2-295.1] divides the trial into two distinct phases. . . .  
“[U]pon a finding that the defendant is guilty . . . , a separate 
proceeding limited to the ascertainment of punishment shall be 
held. . . .”  [Id.] (emphasis added).  The procedure assures the jury 
access to “information specific only to sentencing, apart from 
considerations of guilt or innocence.” 
Daye v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 688, 691 (1996) (fourth alteration in original) (quoting 
Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 519, 525 (1996)).  Indeed, the Court of Appeals has held 
that a bifurcated trial procedure “promotes ‘a punishment appropriate to the circumstances 
without corrupting the initial determination of guilt or innocence with prejudice.’” Ford v. 
Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 262, 269 (2006) (quoting Daye, 21 Va. App. at 691). 
 
Reading the statute, the Rule and the persuasive rulings of the Court of Appeals together, 
we hold that in a bifurcated trial, for purposes of determining the timeliness of a request to poll 
 
14 
the jury, the guilt phase is a separate proceeding that ends when the jury returns its verdict of 
guilt or innocence.  At the point during trial where the punishment phase has begun, a motion to 
poll the jury as to its guilty verdict generally comes too late.  That is particularly true under the 
facts of this case.  Here, the trial court had heard the guilt phase verdict by the jury and told the 
jury that the second, separate proceeding to determine sentencing would begin.  By the time 
Kenner asked to have the jury polled at the end of his sentencing phase argument, the following 
sentencing phase procedures had already been completed:  (1) selection of jury instructions; (2) 
introduction of two additional exhibits showing the jury Kenner’s prior convictions; (3) reading 
of the sentencing jury instructions to the jury; and (4) delivery of closing arguments. 
 
At the time counsel requested to poll the jury, the jury was already aware that Kenner 
was subject to multiple years of imprisonment for two of the offenses and a term of life 
imprisonment for the crime of object sexual penetration where the victim was under 13 years of 
age.  Having heard the potential sentencing ranges for Kenner, the Commonwealth could have 
been prejudiced if the jury were permitted to answer a poll relating to the guilt phase. 
 
In addressing the appropriate time to poll the jury the plain language of Rule 3A:17 states 
only that it may be done “when a verdict is returned.”  Construing this language in the context of 
a bifurcated trial proceeding, the request to poll the jury should occur directly after the verdict 
for which counsel wants the jury to be polled.  As the guilty verdict had already been announced 
and the sentencing phase of the trial was well underway, since all that was left to do was for the 
jury to deliberate and determine sentencing, the trial court did not err in denying Kenner’s 
request to poll the jury as to guilt or innocence.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in 
affirming the judgment of the trial court. 
 
 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
Kenner’s convictions. 
Affirmed.