Title: Fix v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 22S-CR-00007
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: May 16, 2022

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 22S-CR-7 
Zachary Fix, 
Appellant (Defendant below) 
–v– 
State of Indiana, 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
Argued: February 24, 2022 | Decided: May 16, 2022 
Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court,  
No. 48C03-1803-F2-792 
The Honorable Andrew Hopper, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, 
No. 20A-CR-1566 
Opinion by Justice Goff 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David and Massa concur. 
Justice Slaughter concurs in Part I and in the judgment without separate 
opinion. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
May 16 2022, 3:10 pm
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Goff, Justice. 
Burglary is the breaking into and entering of a building or structure of 
another person with the intent to commit a felony. Because the burglar 
need not actually carry out the underlying intended felony for criminal 
liability to attach, the offense is complete, for purposes of prosecution, at 
the moment the building or structure is broken into and entered. But does 
the offense itself end simply because the State has established criminal 
liability? We conclude that it does not, and hold that burglary is an ongoing 
crime that encompasses a defendant’s conduct inside the premises, 
terminating only when the unlawful invasion ends.  
So, despite the defendant here having armed himself after the breaking 
and entering, we affirm his conviction for level-2 felony burglary while 
armed with a deadly weapon. But because the length of the defendant’s 
aggregate sentence exceeds the consecutive-sentencing cap imposed by 
Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2, we reverse and remand for resentencing 
consistent with this opinion.  
Facts and Procedural History 
During the early morning hours of July 7, 2017, Zachary Fix and his 
friend, Bobby Yeagy, drove through Anderson, Indiana, in search of a 
place to rob—the loot from which they intended to eventually trade for 
drugs. Fruitless in their efforts, the two men—both high on heroin and 
meth—headed north to Alexandria. Their drive ultimately led them to the 
home of Robert Mudd, a paraplegic man to whom Yeagy had delivered 
pizza on several occasions. The medical condition from which Mudd 
suffered, arteriovenous malformation, resulted in a gradual paralysis of 
his lower body. Confined to a hospital bed in his living room, Mudd 
depended on family and healthcare workers for support.  
When the perpetrators arrived at their victim’s house, Fix cut the power 
and cable lines and disabled the security system. The two men then 
entered the residence through the back door, approached the bedridden 
Mudd, demanded that he direct them to anything of value, and 
threatened to kill him should he fail to cooperate. As Yeagy ransacked the 
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home looking for medication, Fix took Mudd’s cell phone, wallet, 
necklace, and life-alert pendant. At some point, Mudd reached for a 
handgun he kept under his pillow. A struggle ensued. Fix eventually 
wrested control of the weapon and pistol-whipped his victim, leaving 
Mudd with a laceration on the side of his head. 
After about an hour, Fix and Yeagy left Mudd’s home to unload their 
plundered goods, but not before drugging their victim with tranquilizers 
and warning him that they’d soon be back to finish the job. True to their 
word, Fix and Yeagy—pausing only to boost their meth-fueled high—
returned about forty-five minutes later for a second round of looting. In 
the end, the perpetrators made off with an estimated $11,000 worth of 
Mudd’s property, including a dozen firearms, thousands of rounds of 
ammunition, various tools, medications, a safe, two cell phones, two 
cameras, a radio, and several debit and credit cards. Careless in covering 
their tracks, Fix and Yeagy left a trail of evidence that eventually led 
police to their doorstep. 
The State charged Fix with several offenses: one count of level-2 felony 
burglary while armed with a deadly weapon; two counts of level-3 felony 
robbery (one based on bodily injury, and one based on the use of a deadly 
weapon); and one count of level-6 felony theft. See Ind. Code §§ 35-43-2-1, 
35-42-5-1(a), 35-43-4-2(a) (2017). A jury found him guilty as charged. At the 
State’s request, the trial court withheld judgment of conviction for level-3 
felony armed robbery (to avoid double jeopardy) and sentenced Fix for 
the remaining offenses as follows: thirty years for level-2 felony burglary; 
six years for level-5 felony robbery as a lesser-included offense of level-3 
felony robbery resulting in bodily injury (also to avoid double jeopardy); 
and two and a half years for level-6 felony theft. The trial court ordered 
Fix to serve these sentences consecutively, culminating in an aggregate 
term of thirty-eight and a half years. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding 
that insufficient evidence supported Fix’s conviction for level-2 felony 
burglary while armed with a deadly weapon. Fix v. State, 177 N.E.3d 837, 
847 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Because the “criminal transgression of burglary is 
committed” when the defendant crosses the threshold of the premises in 
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which he intends to commit a felony, and because Fix acquired the 
handgun only after crossing that threshold, the panel reasoned, the 
elevated offense had no leg to stand on. Id. at 845. Had the legislature 
intended to expand culpability to include acts committed after the 
breaking and entering, the panel added, it could have drafted the burglary 
statute accordingly. Id. The panel remanded with instructions for the trial 
court to enter judgment of conviction for a lesser-included form of 
burglary. Id. at 847.  
In Part II of its opinion, the Court of Appeals (A) found no double-
jeopardy violation for Fix’s burglary and robbery convictions and (B), 
having vacated the conviction for the elevated burglary offense, instructed 
the trial court to enter judgment of conviction for level-3 felony armed 
robbery. Id. at 847–49. Finally, in Part III of its opinion, the panel held that, 
because level-3 felony armed robbery amounted to a “crime of violence,” 
the trial court’s sentencing for that offense on remand need not count 
toward the aggregate statutory cap imposed by Indiana Code section 35-
50-1-2. Id. at 849–50. 
The State petitioned for transfer, which we granted, vacating the Court 
of Appeals opinion. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 
Standards of Review 
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting a 
conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of 
witnesses. Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767, 770 (Ind. 2016). We consider 
instead only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences 
supporting the trial court’s verdict, affirming “unless no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” Id. When, like here, resolution of a sufficiency claim turns on our 
interpretation of a statute, we’re presented with a pure question of law, to 
which a de novo standard of review applies. Id.  
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Discussion and Decision 
We begin our decision by summarily affirming Part II.A of the Court of 
Appeals opinion. See App. R. 58(A)(2). Because we disagree with the 
panel’s holding on the elevated burglary offense, we vacate that portion of 
its opinion (Part II.B) instructing the trial court to enter judgment of 
conviction for level-3 felony armed robbery. See App. R. 58(A). But 
because the trial court withheld judgment of conviction for that offense, 
there’s no double-jeopardy issue for us to resolve.  
We write, then, to address two issues: (I) whether the State presented 
sufficient evidence to convict Fix of level-2 felony burglary; and (II) 
whether the aggregate sentence for Fix’s felony convictions (burglary, 
armed robbery, and theft) exceeds the sentencing cap imposed by Indiana 
Code section 35-50-1-2.  
I. Fix committed the elevated burglary offense by 
arming himself after entering the victim’s home.  
Indiana Code section 35-43-2-1 defines burglary, a level-5 felony, as the 
breaking and entering of a “building or structure of another person, with 
intent to commit a felony or theft in it.” The offense becomes a level-2 
felony if it “is committed while armed with a deadly weapon.” Id. The 
question here centers on the scope of the phrase “committed while 
armed.” 
Fix argues that the statute’s “plain language” precludes his conviction 
for the elevated offense “because he was not armed at the time [the] act of 
burglary was committed.” Resp. to Pet. to Trans. at 6. According to his 
theory, the burglary offense was complete once he crossed the threshold 
of Mudd’s residence, and because he wasn’t armed at that precise 
moment, there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for the 
elevated offense.  
The State, on the other hand, argues that burglary is “an ongoing crime” 
which doesn’t end “until the unlawful invasion ends and the burglar exits 
the premises.” Pet. to Trans. at 10. So, for the statutory enhancement to 
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apply, the State submits, it makes no difference whether Fix was armed at 
the threshold of the premises or whether he armed himself after entering the 
home. In support of its argument, the State cites the language of the statute 
itself, its underlying goals and policies, “basic principles underlying 
common-law burglary,” and judicial construction of similar enhancing 
language in other criminal statutes. Id. at 7. 
When asked to interpret a statute, we start with the text of the statute 
itself. Study v. State, 24 N.E.3d 947, 952 (Ind. 2015). When the statute is clear 
and unambiguous, we avoid judicial construction by interpreting its words 
in their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. But when a statute permits more 
than one reasonable interpretation, we consider that statute ambiguous. 
Mi.D. v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809, 813 (Ind. 2016). And when a statute is 
ambiguous, we resort to the rules of statutory construction to determine its 
meaning. Id. In criminal cases, this includes the rule of lenity—a rule that 
requires us to construe a penal statute strictly against the State while 
resolving any ambiguities in favor of the defendant. Meredith v. State, 906 
N.E.2d 867, 872 (Ind. 2009). But even under this rule, we avoid construing a 
statute so narrowly “as to exclude cases they fairly cover.” Id. Ultimately, we 
presume the “legislature intended for the statutory language to be applied 
in a logical manner consistent with the statute’s underlying policy and 
goals.” Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 2010). 
A. Indiana courts have long adhered to the res gestae 
theory of burglary. 
On first impression, the language of our burglary statute seems clear 
enough. Rather than contemplating acts committed after the breaking and 
entering of a premises, the statute elevates the offense only if “committed 
while armed with a deadly weapon.” See I.C. § 35-43-2-1 (emphasis added). 
Consistent with this reading of the statute is the view that culpability “is 
established at the point of entry, with the criminal transgression” 
complete “at the moment the building or structure is broken into and 
entered.” Swaynie v. State, 762 N.E.2d 112, 114 (Ind. 2002). On the other hand, 
“[t]his Court has long declined to define the phrase ‘while committing’ in 
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terms of the chronological completion of the statutory elements of the 
underlying felony.” Eddy v. State, 496 N.E.2d 24, 28 (Ind. 1986).  
So where does that leave us? Does the “doctrine of completion” apply 
simply because the State has established the burglar’s criminal liability? See 
Callahan v. State, 246 Ind. 65, 69, 201 N.E.2d 338, 340 (1964). Or is burglary an 
ongoing offense that encompasses a defendant’s conduct so long as he 
remains in the premises? 
Courts in several jurisdictions have rejected the theory “that a felony is 
‘complete’ when the definitional elements of an offense have been satisfied.” 
Yates v. State, 33 A.3d 1071, 1079 (Md. App. 2011) (citing cases). In Florida, for 
example, while “a burglary may be complete for purposes of prosecution, it 
is not complete for all other purposes until the defendant reaches safety, and 
a defendant’s crime may be aggravated and his sentence may be enhanced 
based upon acts committed up until that point.” Williams v. State, 502 So. 2d 
1307, 1309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), approved, 517 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1988).  
Likewise, in felony-murder cases, “the period during which a burglary 
is deemed to be in progress has ordinarily been extended.” 2 J.D. Olin, 
Wharton’s Crim. L. § 21.14 at 204 (16th ed. 2021). Indiana is no exception. 
In fact, in one of the first cases to address the scope of the felony-murder 
statute, this Court, in 1876, interpreted the phrase “in the perpetration of” 
broadly to include acts beyond the elements of the predicate felony.1 
In Bissot v. State, the defendant stood convicted of felony murder after 
shooting a marshal who confronted him during a break-in of a local 
pharmacy. 53 Ind. 408, 410–11 (1876). The Court, in what has become a 
widely cited opinion, upheld the conviction, rejecting the defendant’s 
 
1 The current felony-murder statute defines the offense as the killing of “another human being 
while committing or attempting to commit” one of several enumerated crimes, including 
burglary. I.C. § 35-42-1-1(2) (emphasis added). 
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argument that the burglary was “consummated” before the killing.2 Id. at 
412. “Although we must construe criminal statutes strictly, adhere closely 
to the definition of crimes, and interpret technical words according to 
their fixed meaning,” the Court explained, adopting the defendant’s 
theory would render it “quite impracticable to ever convict” for felony 
murder—whether committed during a burglary, robbery, arson, or rape. 
Id. at 412–13. When “the homicide is committed within the res gestae of the 
felony charged,” the Court concluded, “it is committed in the perpetration 
of, or attempt to perpetrate, the felony within the true intent and fair 
meaning of the statute.”3 Id. at 413. This statutory construction, the Court 
reasoned, “is safe to the State and the citizen, and the only one by which 
the intention of the legislature can be practically carried into effect.” Id. at 
414. “It has long been the law in Indiana,” we observed more than a 
century after the decision in Bissot, “that the shooting of a person by a 
robber or burglar while leaving the premises in an attempt to complete the 
crime is part of the res gestae of the [offense] such that the shooting is, for 
felony murder purposes, committed in the perpetration of the robbery or 
burglary.” Seeley v. State, 544 N.E.2d 153, 157 (Ind. 1989) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
This well-established precedent leads us to conclude that burglary—
even if “complete” for purposes of establishing culpability—is an ongoing 
crime that encompasses a defendant’s conduct after the breaking and 
entering, not just at the threshold of the premises.  
 
2 To date, Westlaw shows citing references to Bissot from appellate courts in nineteen states. 
See, e.g., Yates v. State, 33 A.3d 1071, 1079 (Md. App. 2011) (analyzing Bissot’s “detailed 
discussion” of the res gestae theory); People v. Gillis, 712 N.W.2d 419, 429 (Mich. 2006) (relying 
heavily on Bissot to “conclude that the term ‘perpetration’ encompasses acts beyond the 
definitional elements of the predicate felony, to include those acts committed within the res 
gestae of that felony”). 
3 Res gestae refers to the “events at issue, or other events contemporaneous with them.” Black’s 
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). See also McMillian v. State, 450 N.E.2d 996, 999 (Ind. 1983) 
(“Evidence of happenings near in time and place which complete the story of a crime are 
properly admissible under the theory of res gestae.”). 
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To be sure, as the Court of Appeals points out, statutes in other states, 
unlike in Indiana, expressly contemplate situations in which a burglar 
arms himself after breaking and entering. Fix, 177 N.E.3d at 845. See, e.g., 
Alaska Stat. Ann. § 11.46.300(a)(2) (elevating burglary to an offense in the 
first degree when the offender “is armed with a firearm,” whether “in 
effecting entry or while in the building or immediate flight from the 
building”). But when, like here, “a long line of cases” applies “the same 
construction” to a specific statutory phrase, “such construction should not 
then be disregarded or lightly treated.” Study, 24 N.E.3d at 952 (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted). And we find support for this 
construction in decisions from other states with burglary statutes similar 
to ours. See, e.g., Williams, 502 So. 2d at 1309; People v. Montoya, 874 P.2d 903, 
913 (Cal. 1994) (holding that burglary is “ongoing during the time the 
perpetrator remains inside the structure”). 
B. Principles of common-law burglary support our reading 
of the statute.  
The common law defined burglary as “the breaking and entering in the 
nighttime of the dwelling house of another with intent to commit a felony 
therein.” Carrier v. State, 227 Ind. 726, 730–31, 89 N.E.2d 74, 75–76 (1949) 
(citing, among other sources, 1 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Criminal Law § 559, at 
407–08 (9th ed. 1923)). Of course, “the contemporary understanding of 
‘burglary’ has diverged a long way from its common-law roots.” Taylor v. 
United States, 495 U.S. 575, 593 (1990). But the basic principles of common-
law burglary provide a foundation on which our statute was built. See Smith 
v. State, 477 N.E.2d 857, 862 (Ind. 1985) (referring to Indiana as one of several 
jurisdictions “which retain the common law definition of burglary”); Carrier, 
227 Ind. at 731, 89 N.E.2d at 76 (analyzing common-law definition of 
“dwelling-house” to aid in the interpretation of Indiana’s burglary statute 
using the same term). 
With its inchoate element of intent to commit a felony, burglary may have 
originated “to overcome certain defects in the law of attempt,” namely 
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difficulties in proof and disproportionately low penalties.4 3 J.D. Olin, 
Wharton’s Crim. L. § 32.1, at 2 (16th ed. 2021). But the common-law offense 
evolved principally to protect the “security of the habitation,” Smart v. State, 
244 Ind. 69, 72, 190 N.E.2d 650, 652 (1963) (internal citations omitted), the 
“gist of the crime being the felonious invasion of a man’s dwelling,” Carrier 
v. State, 227 Ind. 726, 731, 89 N.E.2d 74, 76 (1949) (internal citations omitted).5 
After all, “it was the circumstance of midnight terror” threatening “the 
sanctuary of the home” the law sought to punish, “not the fact that the 
intended felony was successful.” Smart, 244 Ind. at 72, 190 N.E.2d at 652 
(internal citations omitted).  
Burglary, then, “is not so much an offense against the property as it is an 
offense against the sanctity and security of the habitation.” Howell v. State, 53 
N.E.3d 546, 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). And from the victim’s perspective, the 
threat to this security doesn’t end upon the burglar’s entry—to the contrary, 
it’s just the beginning. See People v. Munguia, 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332, 338 (2016) 
(observing that a person who “becomes aware not only of the entry itself, 
but of the burglar’s continued presence, would not agree the offense was 
completed once the entry was accomplished”). 
With these principles in mind, we find it illogical to criminalize the 
offender’s acts only at the threshold of the premises.  
C. Our interpretation of the burglary statute comports with 
its underlying policy and purpose. 
By subjecting offenders who commit crimes “while armed” with a deadly 
weapon to higher penalty ranges, several statutes in our criminal code 
 
4 We emphasize “may” because burglary, as some scholars have concluded, “was a common 
law offense long before attempts were made generally punishable.” Helen A. Anderson, From 
the Thief in the Night to the Guest Who Stayed Too Long: The Evolution of Burglary in the Shadow of 
the Common Law, 45 Ind. L. Rev. 629, 639 (2012). 
5 See also Anderson, Evolution of Burglary, 45 Ind. L. Rev. at 631 (characterizing burglary as a 
“combination of offenses: criminal trespass plus the attempt to commit another offense, or 
criminal trespass plus a completed offense”). 
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embody a clear policy of public safety. See, e.g., I.C. § 35-42-3-2 (kidnapping); 
I.C. § 35-42-4-1 (rape); I.C. § 35-42-4-3 (child molesting); I.C. § 35-42-4-8 
(sexual battery). Indeed, by imposing “a greater penalty for a ‘crime of 
violence’ committed with a weapon,” these statutes recognize “the increased 
danger to human life.” St. Germain v. State, 267 Ind. 252, 255, 369 N.E.2d 931, 
932 (1977). 
With its incremental penalty enhancements, Indiana’s burglary statute is 
no exception to this policy of public safety. Whether for possessing a 
weapon or for injuring another, the offender faces “greater penalties the 
closer the offense comes to endangering another’s life or well-being.”6 Ferrell 
v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1070, 1072 (Ind. 1991). See, e.g., Whitener v. State, 982 
N.E.2d 439, 446 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (finding sufficient evidence to sustain a 
conviction for burglary resulting in bodily injury where defendant raped the 
victim after breaking and entering). 
It’s important, of course, to distinguish between an enhancing event that 
occurs “while committing” a crime and an enhancing event that “results” 
from commission of the crime. An enhancing event that “results” from a 
criminal act implicates proximate causation, which “requires that the injury 
would not have occurred but for the defendant’s conduct.” Patel v. State, 60 
N.E.3d 1041, 1052 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Paragon Family Rest. v. 
Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d 1048, 1054 (Ind. 2003)). Because proximate causation 
characterizes the injury as “a natural and probable consequence” of the 
defendant’s criminal acts, Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d at 1054, the injury need not 
coincide with those criminal acts to establish culpability. See, e.g., Reaves v. 
State, 586 N.E.2d 847, 855 (Ind. 1992) (finding evidence sufficient to support 
conviction for felony murder where “the robbery was the mediate or 
immediate cause of the [victim’s blood] clotting” that ultimately led to his 
death several weeks later).  
 
6 Burglary becomes a level-4 felony if committed in a “dwelling,” a level-3 felony if it results 
in “bodily injury” to another, a level-2 felony if committed while armed or if it results in 
“serious bodily injury” to another, and a level-1 felony if committed in a “dwelling” and 
results in “serious bodily injury” to another. I.C. § 35-43-2-1. 
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Still, the policy of public safety embodied in the burglary statute 
persuades us that the legislature intended for the armed enhancement to 
apply, even if the enhancing event followed the act of breaking and entering. 
Indeed, whether the offender arrives with a deadly weapon or whether he 
arms himself once inside the premises, the danger posed is the same. And to 
terminate culpability at the threshold would circumvent the enhancement 
for any burglar wise enough to retrieve a deadly weapon (e.g., a standard 
kitchen knife) once inside the premises, effectively defeating the statutory 
goal of ensuring public safety. Our construction of our burglary statute, we 
believe, “is safe to the State and the citizen, and the only one by which the 
intention of the legislature can be practically carried into effect.” See Bissot, 
53 Ind. at 414. 
II. Fix’s aggregate sentence exceeds that permitted by 
Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2. 
As noted above, the trial court withheld judgment of conviction for 
level-3 felony armed robbery (to avoid double jeopardy) and sentenced 
Fix for the remaining offenses as follows: thirty years for level-2 felony 
burglary; six years for level-5 felony robbery as a lesser-included offense 
of level-3 felony robbery resulting in bodily injury (also to avoid double 
jeopardy); and two and a half years for level-6 felony theft. The trial court 
ordered Fix to serve these sentences consecutively, culminating in an 
aggregate term of thirty-eight and a half years. 
Fix argues that the length of his aggregate sentence exceeds the 
maximum aggregate sentence allowed by Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2 
(the Sentencing Cap Statute or Statute). 
Generally, “it is within the trial court’s discretion whether to order 
sentences be served concurrently or consecutively.” Myers v. State, 27 
N.E.3d 1069, 1082 (Ind. 2015). But because our legislature is responsible 
for fixing criminal penalties, a trial court’s sentencing discretion must not 
exceed the limits prescribed by statute. Pritscher v. State, 675 N.E.2d 727, 
729 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). With exceptions for “crimes of violence,” our 
Sentencing Cap Statute limits the aggregate sentence a trial court may 
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impose “for felony convictions arising out of an episode of criminal 
conduct.” I.C. §§ 35-50-1-2(c), (d).  
Having vacated that portion of the panel’s opinion instructing the trial 
court to enter judgment of conviction for level-3 felony armed robbery, 
we’ve left in place Fix’s convictions for level-2 felony burglary, level-5 
felony robbery, and level-6 felony theft. The Sentencing Cap Statute 
defines level-2 felony burglary as a “crime of violence.” I.C. § 35-50-1-
2(a)(13). So, Fix’s conviction and sentencing for that offense falls outside 
the statutory restriction. The Statute, however, does not define as crimes 
of violence either level-5 felony robbery or level-6 felony theft. See I.C. § 
35-50-1-2(a).  
In Ellis v. State, we recognized the Statute’s “ambiguity as to whether 
the existence of one crime of violence is sufficient to exempt each of the 
consecutively sentenced convictions” from the sentencing cap. 736 N.E.2d 
731, 737 (Ind. 2000). Adherence to the rule of lenity, we concluded, 
“requires that we interpret the [S]tatute to exempt from the sentencing 
limitation (1) consecutive sentencing among crimes of violence, and (2) 
consecutive sentencing between a crime of violence and those that are not 
crimes of violence.” Id. But the sentencing cap, we added, “should apply 
for consecutive sentences between and among those crimes that are not 
crimes of violence.” Id. (emphasis added).  
Under Ellis, then, the Sentencing Cap Statute permits consecutive 
sentences between Fix’s crime of violence (level-2 felony burglary) and 
those offenses not defined as crimes of violence (level-5 felony robbery 
and level-6 felony theft). See id. The remaining question is whether the 
sentencing cap applies to the “consecutive sentences between and among” 
level-5 felony robbery and level-6 felony theft. See id. The answer depends 
on whether these two non-violent offenses arose “out of an episode of 
criminal conduct.” See I.C. § 35-50-1-2(d). 
An “episode of criminal conduct” refers to “offenses or a connected 
series of offenses that are closely related in time, place, and circumstance.” 
I.C. § 35-50-1-2(b). “Whether certain offenses constitute a ‘single episode 
of criminal conduct’ is a fact-intensive inquiry” determined by the trial 
court. Schlichter v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (Ind. 2002). While “the 
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ability to recount each charge without referring to the other” offers 
“guidance on the question of whether a defendant’s conduct constitutes 
an episode of criminal conduct,” we focus our analysis on “the timing of 
the offenses” and “the simultaneous and contemporaneous nature of the 
crimes,” if any. Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1200 (Ind. 2006) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted). 
The facts here show that Fix committed level-5 felony robbery when he 
knowingly or intentionally took property from Mudd by using force 
(pistol-whipping Mudd) or by putting Mudd in fear (threatening to kill 
Mudd should he fail to cooperate). See I.C. § 35-42-5-1(a). The facts further 
show that Fix committed level-6 felony theft when he and Yeagy made off 
with an estimated $11,000 worth of Mudd’s property. See I.C. § 35-43-4-
2(a)(1)(A). Fix committed both offenses on the same night at the same 
location. And we find it difficult to account for one charge “without 
referring to details of the other charge.” See O’Connell v. State, 742 N.E.2d 
943, 951 (Ind. 2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). To be sure, Fix 
and Yeagy temporarily left Mudd’s home before returning a second time. 
And the State emphasizes this fact, arguing that the “second theft was not 
contemporaneous in time with the initial burglary of Mudd’s residence 
and robbery of him.” Appellee’s Br. at 37. But the State’s amended 
charging information belies this argument, as it failed to distinguish the 
first round of looting from the second round of looting in its level-6 felony 
theft count. In fact, the charging information lists several items of property 
(guns, credit and debit cards, tools, and medication) stolen during the first 
theft. What’s more, both Fix and Yeagy left only to unload their plundered 
goods, promising to return to finish the job, which they did less than an 
hour later.  
In short, the two offenses were clearly connected in both place and 
circumstance and, “although not precisely ‘simultaneous’ or 
‘contemporaneous,’” were sufficiently connected in time. See Reed, 856 
N.E.2d at 1201. Cf. Yost v. State, 150 N.E.3d 610, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) 
(holding that multiple acts of criminal recklessness amounted to a single 
episode of criminal conduct where defendant, during a “period of twenty 
minutes,” fired multiple gunshot rounds “at different people but from the 
same location and apparently for the same reason”); Slone v. State, 11 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CR-7 | May 16, 2022 
Page 15 of 16 
N.E.3d 969, 972–73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that a string of burglaries 
that occurred over the course of several months did not amount to a single 
episode of criminal conduct); Reynolds v. State, 657 N.E.2d 438, 441 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that three burglaries committed on the same night 
but at different locations constituted separate episodes of criminal 
conduct). 
Because the two non-violent crimes of level-5 felony robbery and level-
6 felony theft amount to a single episode of criminal conduct, “the total of 
the consecutive terms of imprisonment may not exceed seven (7) years.” 
See I.C. § 35-50-1-2(d)(2). Because the trial court sentenced Fix to an 
aggregate sentence of eight and a half years for these two offenses, we 
reverse and remand accordingly for resentencing. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons above, we conclude that burglary is an ongoing crime 
that encompasses a defendant’s conduct inside the premises, terminating 
only when the unlawful invasion ends. We thus affirm the trial court’s 
conviction of Fix for level-2 felony burglary while armed with a deadly 
weapon.7 But because Fix’s commission of level-5 felony robbery and 
level-6 felony theft amounted to a single episode of criminal conduct, we 
hold that the length of his aggregate sentence exceeds the maximum 
aggregate sentence permitted by our Sentencing Cap Statute. We thus 
remand for the trial court to resentence Fix to consecutive terms of 
imprisonment for those two non-violent offenses “not exceed seven (7) 
 
7 In addition to challenging the timing of the aggravating offense, Fix also calls into question 
the definition of “armed,” insisting that “there must be something” to indicate “the use or 
involvement of the weapon in the crime,” not just its mere possession. Resp. to Trans. at 8 
(quoting State v. McHenry, 74 N.E.3d 577, 581 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)). But the evidence here 
clearly shows that Fix was “armed with a deadly weapon” when, after wresting control of the 
handgun, he pistol-whipped Mudd on the side of the head. Cf. Phelps v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1062, 
1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (finding sufficient evidence to support conviction for battery while 
armed with a deadly weapon where defendant struck the victim with a pair of brass 
knuckles). For this reason, and because the issue here is when the arming occurred, we need 
not reach the outer limits of what constitutes “armed.” 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CR-7 | May 16, 2022 
Page 16 of 16 
years,” see I.C. § 35-50-1-2(d)(2), capping his aggregate term for all 
offenses at thirty-seven years. 
Rush, C.J., and David and Massa, JJ., concur. 
Slaughter, J., concurs in Part I and in the judgment without separate 
opinion. 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N T  
Paul J. Podlejski 
Anderson, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Theodore E. Rokita 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Andrew Kobe 
Ian McLean 
Megan Michelle Smith 
Jodi Kathryn Stein 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Indianapolis, Indiana