Title: MCGHEE v DIST COURT
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12454
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 28, 1973

No. 12454 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1973 STATE ex re1 Re W. McGHEE, He L . McGHEE et al., Petitioners, THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT et al. , Respondents. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Counsel of Record: For Petitioners : Lucas, Jardine and Monaghan, Miles City, Montana James P . Lucas argued, Miles City, Montana For Respondents: Gene Huntley argued, Baker, Montana Submitted: March 5, 1973 t M r . Chief Justice James T, Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court, This i s an original proceeding commenced by R. W. McGhee, H.L. McGhee, and McGhee and McGhee, a partnership, hereinafter referred t o as petitioners. Petitioners request t h i s Court t o take supervisory control of the d i s t r i c t court of Fallon County and vacate an order of that court denying summary judgment i n favor of a l l the petitioners. The petition alleges the d i s t r i c t court erred as a matter of law: "(1)n not concluding 9 : J ; * that the statute of limitations was a valid defense for a l l named Defendants, and that it further erred i n amending i t s PARTIAL SUMNARY JUDGMENT t o l i m i t the r e l i e f t o the Defendant H.L. McGhee, 11 The petition isbasedupon these facts: R. W. McGhee and H.L. 14cGhee are the sole partners i n McGhee and McGhee. The purpose of the partnership i s t o conduct a ranching operation south of Baker, Montana, i n Fallon County. O n December 20, 1968, while employed by the partnership i n the ranching operation, Alva B.McGhee, father of ROW. McGhee, was injured and died the following day. Sometime a f t e r h i s death, Ellen Dockter was appointed administratrix of decedent's estate. She commenced s u i t i n the d i s t r i c t court of Fallon County against petitioners individually and as members of the partnership, alleging they had failed t o provide a safe place t o work and sought damages for the death of Alva McGhee, Complaint was f i l e d on January 4, 1972. Service was had on H.L, McGhee that same day and on R.W. McGhee on M a y 30, 1972, i n Duchesne County, Utah. Petitioners f i r s t moved t o dismiss the complaint, setting up the statute of limitations as a complete bar t o the suit. This motion was overruled. The respondent court then on its own motion, held an evidentiary hearing on the question of the applicability of the statute of limitations. It was determined a t the hearing that H. L. McGhee was present i n Montana during the running of the statute of limitations and therefore the s u i t was dismissed against him because he had not been served within the three year limitation period, R. W, McGhee was found t o have resided i n the s t a t e u n t i l M a y 1971, a t which time he became a resident of Utah. The d i s t r i c t court held that s u i t could be maintained against him because the statute of limitations had been tolled by h i s a,bsence from Montana. The d i s t r i c t court further ordered that the claim against the partnership was barred by the statute; but l a t e r amended that order t o allow s u i t against the partnership, The sole issue here i s whether s u i t against R e W. McGhee and the partnership was barred by the s t a t u t e of limitations. Both parties agree the correct s t a t u t e t o apply i s section 93- 2605 (21, R. C .Me 1947, which provides for a three year period i n which t o bring: "An action t o recover damages for the death of one caused by the wrongful a c t or neglect of another." Petitioners assert s u i t was not f i l e d u n t i l fourteen days a f t e r the time period for f i l i n g such s u i t had expired. Respondent court agrees with t h i s position but asserts the s t a t u t e was tolled by the absence of R. W. McGhee from the s t a t e a f t e r May 1971. As authority for i t s argument respondent c i t e s section 93-2702, R.C.M. 1947, which reads: I t I f , when the cause of action accrues against a person, he i s out of the s t a t e , the action may be commenced within the term herein limited, a f t e r h i s return t o the s t a t e , and i f , a f t e r the cause of action accrues, he departs from the s t a t e , the time of h i s absence i s not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. I t The purpose of section 93-2702, R..C.PI. 1947, i s t o prevent a defendant from defeating a p l a i n t i f f ' s claim for r e l i e f by leaving the s t a t e or by establishing residence i n another s t a t e , But, there i s an exception t o t h i s rule, In cases where the p l a i n t i f f may effect service of process by some method, even though the defendant may be a nonresident or absent from the s t a t e , the s t a t u t e continues t o run during the absence or nonresidency. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma i n Walker v. L.E, Meyers Const. Co., 175 Okl. 548, 53 P.2d 547, 548, established t h i s t e s t t o be applied i n such cases: "The t e s t as t o whether the statute i s tolled or not seems t o be whether it i s possible a t a l l times t o obtain service of the process upon a foreign corporation, upon which a personal judgment could be rendered, even though the for- eign corporation i s absent from the s t a t e * + : *." While the language of the Oklahoma court i s in terms of out of s t a t e corporations, it can be applied here. Respondent court has determined the facts to be: That R e W. McGhee was present i n the s t a t e on the day the accident took place; that he continued t o reside i n the s t a t e u n t i l M a y 1971, and a f t e r that date he resided i n Utah. Based on those facts, it was possible t o obtain service on R. W. McGhee during the entire three years. For the period up t o M a y 1971, he could have been served under Rule 4D(2) (a), M.R,Civ,P. After M a y 1971, service could have been accomplished by what i s commonly referred I I t o as the long arm statute", Rule 4D(3), M.R.Civ.P. As a matter of fact, service was made on R. W. McGhee i n Utah by v i r t u e of t h i s rule. The alleged t o r t was committed by R. W. McGhee while he resided i n Montana and under Rule 4B(l), M,R,Civ.P., t h i s subjects him t o the jurisdiction of the Montana courts. B y being subject t o the jurisdiction of respondent court and capable of being served during the entire t i m e , the statute of limitations was not tolled. This conclusion i s supported by t h i s Court's decision i n State ex r e l . Johnson v. D i s t . Court, 148 Mont. 22, 417 P.2d 109. While the facts i n Johnson are not the same, the effect of the decision there was t o subject a doctor living in California t o the jurisdiction of the Montana courts for a t o r t he committed while living in Montana. In that case, service was obtained by the "long arm statute", Rule 4D(3), Me R,Civ, P. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reached the same conclusion i n construing a s t a t u t e similar i n intent t o ~ o n t a n a ' s section 93-2702, R.C.M, 1947, i n St. Louis and S.F.R.Co. v. Taliaferro, 67 Okl, 37, 168 P. 788. There i t was said: "The theory of the statute of limitations is that it operates t o bar a l l actions, except as against persons and corporations upon whom notice of the action cannot be served because of their being out of the state. I f such notice can be served during the whole of the prescribed period, and a personal judgment can be enforced i n the mode provided by law, then such person or corporation i s not 'out of the state, ' ik ? C ik", This same conclusion was reached by the United States District Court i n Klein v. Lionel Corporation, 130 F.Supp, 725, 727, i n deciding whether the Delaware s t a t u t e of limitations had been tolled i n an a n t i t r u s t suit. The court held: he vast majority of the cases hold that a statutory provision tolling the Statute of Limitations during the time defendant i s not a resident or i s absent from a s t a t e has a direct reference t o the i n a b i l i t y of the p l a i n t i f f t o secure service of personal process on such de- fendant. Thus, most courts hold that such statutes regarding the tolling the Statute of Limitations do not have the effect of tolling the statute, i f notwithstanding such absence, personal service of process can be had. In such case the Statute of Limitations continues to run during the defendant's absence. I I Therefore, because R. W, McGhee was subject t o personal service the the entire running of the statute of limitations, the s t a t u t e as t o him was not tolled. In t h i s case, it was not necessary t o serve R, W e McGhee personally t o secure jurisdiction over the partnership. The alleged t o r t took place while decedent was i n the employ of the partnership of R. W. McGhee and H.L. McGhee. Under Montana law of partnership, they could be sued under the partnership name and they were, a s the court found, This i s provided i n section 93-2827, R.C,M. 1947, which also provides that summons i n such an action may be served one one of the partners and such service s h a l l be binding on a l l partners. See: Rule 4D(2) (e) , M. R. Civ. P. Here, a s determined by the respondent court, H.L. McGhee was present i n Montana during the e n t i r e three year period and could have been served a s a member of the partnership. This i s a proper case f o r t h i s Court t o exercise i t s power of supervisory control under A r t i c l e V I I I , Sec, 2, of t h e 1889 Montana Constitution, and section 93-1106, R.C.M. 1947. Therefore a w r i t of supervisory control i s ordered t o i s s u e directing respondent court t o amend i t s summary judgment i n i t s Cause Y , , 4306, t o grant summary defendants, ssociate