Title: People v. Lee
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 87089
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: July 26, 2001

Docket No. 87089-Agenda 4-September 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								ERIC LEE, Appellant.
Opinion filed February 16, 2001.-Modified on denial of
rehearing July 26, 2001.

	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Kankakee County
convicted defendant, Eric Lee, of first degree murder (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1996)) of a police officer and aggravated
vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(3) (West 1996)). At a
subsequent death penalty hearing, a jury found defendant eligible
for the death penalty and concluded that there were no mitigating
factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of a death sentence.
The trial court sentenced defendant to death for the murder and to
30 years' imprisonment for the aggravated vehicular hijacking.
Defendant's execution has been stayed pending direct review by
this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603,
609(a).

BACKGROUND
	The evidence at trial established that defendant killed Officer
Anthony Samfay during a routine traffic stop at approximately 4
p.m. on October 17, 1996. Gary Dehmer identified defendant as
the man he saw shoot Officer Samfay. The police recovered
defendant's driver's license from the front fender of Officer
Samfay's squad car and defendant's automobile insurance card
two feet east of the squad car. Officer Samfay died of multiple
gunshot wounds to the head, neck, shoulder, chin and forearm.
	The evidence at trial also established that defendant hijacked
Joann Story's car. At approximately 6:30 p.m. on October 17,
1996, defendant approached Story as she opened her car door in a
shopping center parking lot. Defendant asked Story for her keys.
She refused. Defendant opened his coat and started to pull a gun
from his waistband. Story tossed the keys in the air and ran back
into the store she had just left. Store personnel called 911 and
Story gave a description of her vehicle to the police.
Approximately one hour later, the police arrested defendant as he
drove Story's car on Interstate 57.
	The police recovered a loaded .357 Magnum revolver from
the passenger side floorboard of Story's car. A forensic scientist
testified that six empty cartridge cases recovered from defendant's
bedroom, a bullet recovered from the fender of Officer Samfay's
squad car, a bullet recovered from Officer Samfay's bulletproof
vest, and bullet jackets recovered from Officer Samfay's body
during the autopsy were fired from the .357 Magnum  revolver to
the exclusion of all other revolvers.
	The State also introduced into evidence a videotape of
defendant's confession to the shooting and the vehicular hijacking.
The defense did not present any testimony at trial, but introduced
an exhibit into evidence and made another exhibit part of the
record. As noted above, the trial judge convicted defendant of
murder and aggravated vehicular hijacking.
	The State sought a death penalty hearing based on the
statutory aggravating factor that the murder victim was a police
officer killed in the course of performing his official duties. 720
ILCS 5/9-1(b)(1) (West 1996). Defendant elected to have a jury
determine his eligibility for the death penalty and hear evidence in
aggravation and mitigation. At the conclusion of the first, or
eligibility, phase of the death penalty hearing, the jury determined
that defendant was at least 18 years of age when he committed the
murder, and that the State had shown the existence of a statutory
aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.
	At the second, or aggravation and mitigation, phase of the
death penalty hearing, the State presented evidence that defendant
shot Officer Samfay with hollow point bullets, with some of the
shots fired while Officer Samfay was on the ground. The
testimony also showed that, in defendant's bedroom, the police
found a federal firearms license application form; law enforcement
and military equipment periodicals; gun and ammunition
periodicals; and a catalog advertising automatic weapons and
silencers. In his confession, defendant stated that, when
transporting his gun, he kept it under the passenger side seat of his
car. A witness testified that defendant carried a firearms owner's
identification card in his wallet. However, a firearms owner's
identification card does not allow a person to carry a concealed
weapon or to carry a loaded weapon in the passenger side
compartment of a car.
	In mitigation, defendant's adoptive parents testified regarding
problems that he had as a child. Several members of defendant's
biological family testified regarding mental disorders and
substance abuse in defendant's biological family. Defendant also
presented expert testimony regarding his current mental condition
and his mental condition at the time of the shooting. One expert
testified that the shooting could be viewed as a manifestation of
the mental disorders from which defendant suffers. Another expert
testified that defendant was experiencing mental and emotional
distress at the time of the shooting.
	In rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Mathew
Markos. Dr. Markos disagreed with the defense experts. In his
opinion, defendant was not suffering from any significant
psychopathology at the time of the shooting. Three of defendant's
former coworkers also testified on the State's behalf. They stated
that defendant was able to deal with stress and frustration at work,
that there was no change in defendant's behavior on the day of the
shooting, and that defendant did not complain about being upset
on the day of the shooting.
	At the conclusion of the second phase of the death penalty
hearing, the jury determined that there were no mitigating factors
sufficient to preclude the imposition of a death sentence.
Accordingly, the trial court sentenced defendant to death.
	Defendant does not question the sufficiency of the evidence
of his guilt. Nor does he claim error in any ruling made at the guilt
and innocence phase of his trial. Rather, defendant asserts that
numerous errors occurred at the death penalty hearing.

DISCUSSION
	Defendant contends that he was denied a fair death penalty
hearing because: (1) the trial judge ordered that defendant submit
to a psychiatric examination by Dr. Markos; (2) the trial judge
denied defendant's request for a continuance to adequately prepare
a rebuttal to the evidence presented by Dr. Markos; and (3) the
trial judge failed to admonish defendant that he had a right to
refuse to be examined by Dr. Markos. Defendant also contends
that his rights under the fourth amendment and fifth amendment
to the Constitution were violated because he was forced to submit
to the psychiatric examination and give evidence against himself.
The facts related to this contention follow.
	In November 1996, defendant requested, and the trial court
allowed, appointment of a forensic psychiatrist and a clinical
psychologist to assist defense counsel in trial preparation. In June
1997, defendant requested, and the trial court allowed,
appointment of a neurologist and a neuropsychologist to further
assist defense counsel. At a hearing on August 20, 1997, defense
counsel represented in open court that it was not currently
counsel's intention to raise the insanity defense, nor did counsel
anticipate raising the insanity defense at a later date.
	On August 26, 1997, the State filed a motion requesting that
the trial court order the disclosure of any expert opinions on
defendant's mental status at the time of the commission of the
offense. The State also requested that, prior to trial, the court order
defendant to submit to an examination by a psychiatrist retained
by the State. The defense protested there were no rules or statutes
requiring defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination. The
defense also maintained that the State's request for disclosure of
any expert opinions must be denied because Supreme Court Rule
413 (134 Ill. 2d R. 413), governing discovery, applies to criminal
trials but not to sentencing hearings. At a hearing on September 3,
1997, the trial court noted the inconsistency between the State's
current position and the State's position in earlier pretrial motions
contesting defendant's right to discovery at a sentencing hearing
in a death penalty case. The trial court reasoned:
			"Speaking rhetorically, if there's no right to discovery
at a sentencing hearing, what basis can there be in the law
for appointing a psychiatrist and authorizing a psychiatrist
or a psychologist to examine the defendant prior to a
sentencing hearing?
* * *
			There is no authority cited for the appointment of a
psychiatrist when the issue of insanity or sanity at trial
does not exist. It seems to me that it's an issue of
symmetry of application of the law.
			Clearly, I think things have somehow ended up
differently maybe than both sides thought they were or
maybe traditionally how they end up in a case like this. I
think typically it is the Defense attempting to get as much
information as possible before sentencing hearing and, as
was evidenced in these pretrial hearing, the State
opposing that.
			And the rule has been fashioned. There is no right to
discovery in a sentencing hearing.
			I am not convinced, [I] would not be violating this
defendant's rights, including his constitutional right to
exercise his 5th Amendment privilege, if I were to appoint
a psychiatrist or psychologist and authorize them to go
into his cell, with the defendant *** prior to trial, when
the law in Illinois is that anything said by a defendant to
a psychiatrist or psychologist *** can be used at a
sentencing hearing."
The trial court denied both the request for a psychiatric
examination and the request for disclosure of expert opinions.
	On October 28, 1997, the State renewed its motion for an
order requiring defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination.
The State believed that defendant intended to plead guilty but
mentally ill. The State argued that it had the right to have
defendant examined by its own psychiatrist or psychologist,
pursuant to section 115-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-6 (West 1996)). At a hearing on October
30, 1997, defendant stated that he would waive a jury on the issue
of guilt or innocence and be tried by the court. The State withdrew
its motion for a psychiatric examination.
	The bench trial commenced on November 3, 1997, and ended
on November 7, 1997, with the trial court finding defendant guilty
of two counts of murder and one count of aggravated vehicular
hijacking. The State then renewed its motion for disclosure of
expert opinions and for a psychiatric examination of defendant.
The State argued that, pursuant to section 9-1(e) of the Criminal
Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(e) (West 1996)), it was entitled to
a fair opportunity to rebut any information defendant might
present at the death penalty hearing regarding his mental health.
On November 10, 1997, the trial court ruled that defendant must
transmit any written reports or statements of experts to the State
no less than 72 hours prior to the date the expert would testify.
However, the trial court denied the State's request for a psychiatric
examination, finding that the court had no authority to order that
defendant submit to such an evaluation.
	Jury selection and the eligibility phase of the death penalty
hearing followed. On December 1, 1997, opening arguments were
presented in the aggravation and mitigation phase of the death
penalty hearing. In his statement to the jury, defense counsel
intimated that defendant was mentally ill at the time of the
shooting. Also, the defense informed the jurors that defense
experts would testify about the mental illness from which
defendant suffers. On December 2, 1997, the State renewed its
motion for a psychiatric examination of defendant. The State
remarked that a defendant is afforded less constitutional
safeguards once he has been convicted. Thus, there is more reason
then to allow a psychiatric examination of the defendant by an
expert retained by the State once the defendant places his mental
health at issue in the death penalty hearing. On December 3, 1997,
the trial court determined that defendant should be examined by
the State's expert. The trial court noted the State's representation
that, in the event the court should deny the State's request for a
psychiatric examination, the State would call an expert to testify
as to defendant's mental health without benefit of an actual
examination. The trial court believed that it was a lesser evil to
allow the State's expert to examine defendant than to allow the
State's expert to testify without benefit of an examination, and,
possibly persuade the jury that defendant should be sentenced to
death. The court reasoned "that the least that should be required of
a psychiatrist whose opinion may subject a defendant to a death
penalty is that he examine, and not perfunctorily, the individual
who[se] mental state he purports to evaluate."
	On December 8, 1997, defendant filed a motion asking the
trial court to reconsider its rulings requiring disclosure by the
defense of opinions prepared by defense experts, and requiring that
defendant submit to a mental examination. Defendant maintained
that the trial court could not require disclosure of the experts'
opinions because Supreme Court Rule 413 does not apply to a
death penalty hearing. Defendant also maintained there was no
legal precedent for the trial court's order requiring a psychiatric
examination. The trial court denied the motion.
	At the second phase of the death penalty hearing, three experts
testified on defendant's behalf. Dr. Antonio Yaniz, a board
certified psychiatrist and neurologist, testified regarding
defendant's hospitalization in 1989 in the mental health unit at
Riverside Medical Center. Defendant had been admitted to the unit
because he exhibited explosive and violent behavior, he
experienced mood changes, his grades at school had deteriorated,
he had threatened to run away and was threatening to hurt his
adoptive parents, and he was depressed over his adoptive parents'
divorce. Upon observation and testing in the mental health unit,
defendant was unable to view his situation realistically and to react
appropriately. He appeared to lack a basic moral sense and was
deficient in his ability to distinguish between right and wrong. The
results of his Rorsach test suggested an absence of empathy for
others, withdrawal, and emotional flatness. Dr. Yaniz testified that
defendant's symptoms were consistent with a latent psychotic
process. Dr. Yaniz believed there was a strong probability that the
symptoms would become overt. His prognosis for defendant upon
discharge was extremely guarded. Dr. Yaniz felt that defendant
would have problems and that those problems could be severe and
dangerous to others. Dr. Yaniz recommended residential treatment
for defendant. Such being unavailable, Dr. Yaniz worked with
defendants' parents and ordered community aids to minimize the
risk defendant posed to others. On cross-examination, Dr. Yaniz
testified that defendant's discharge summary from the mental
health unit did not contain any reference to a latent psychosis.
	Dr. Michael Gelbort testified as an expert in the field of
neuropsychology. He performed a psychological assessment of
defendant in July, 1997, consisting of a review of defendant's
background, an interview of defendant, and administration of
psychological tests to defendant. Dr. Gelbort found that defendant
exhibited symptoms and problems reflective of underlying
disorders. Defendant's thought processes were not logical and
sequential; there were indications that defendant used autistic
logic; defendant exhibited problems with reality contact, that is his
perceptions were not always as accurate as a normal individual's
would be; and defendant was unable to recognize what was more
important or less important. In Gelbort's opinion, the testing lent
greatest support to a diagnosis of a paranoid schizophrenic
disorder or a schizotypal personality disorder.
	Dr. Gelbort testified that there were correlations and
consistencies between the test results and personality assessment
during defendant's hospitalization at Riverside Medical Center
and the test results obtained during his psychological assessment
of defendant. Dr. Gelbort also testified that defendant is not
constantly and consistently psychotic. Defendant will perceive, in
a normal fashion, things that are fairly concrete, simple, and
straightforward. There are other times when defendant will
misconstrue, misunderstand, or misperceive reality. Certain
stressors in defendant's life, especially his family situation, his
feelings of being abandoned and misunderstood, tend to decrease
defendant's ability to think and behave in a normal way.
Furthermore, defendant has fewer, and less effective, mechanisms
for coping with stress. In Dr. Gelbort's opinion, the murder of
Officer Samfay could be viewed as an extreme or acute
manifestation of the disorders from which defendant suffers.
	Dr. Daniel Hardy, an expert in the field of forensic psychiatry,
performed a psychiatric assessment of defendant. He interviewed
defendant and defendant's adoptive parents, and he reviewed
defendant's adoption file, hospitalization records, and two
psychological evaluations, along with records of the psychiatric
hospitalizations of defendant's biological uncle. Dr. Hardy also
reviewed the videotape of defendant's confession and the
testimony of the officers who arrested defendant. In Dr. Hardy's
opinion, defendant suffers from dysthymic disorder compounded
by periodic episodes of recurrent major depressive disorder. At the
time of the shooting, defendant was experiencing extreme mental
and emotional distress which, although not sufficient to constitute
a legal defense of insanity, was a contributing factor to the
commission of the crime.
	In rebuttal, Dr. Markos, an expert in the field of forensic
psychiatry, testified that he examined defendant on December 13,
1997. He questioned defendant at length regarding the
circumstances leading to the shooting and defendant's state of
mind. On the day of the shooting, defendant's adoptive mother
informed defendant of her intention to marry Wellington Mack, a
convicted murderer who was staying at her home following his
release from prison. Defendant was not happy about the proposed
marriage and the discussion with his adoptive mother turned into
an argument. Defendant loaded his gun, intending to go target
shooting at a range. On the way to the range, Officer Samfay
stopped defendant for a traffic violation. Officer Samfay did not
handcuff defendant or provoke him in any other way. Defendant,
however, was still mad and upset over the argument with his
adoptive mother. Defendant shot Officer Samfay, drove back
home, reloaded his gun, and decided to leave town. When
defendant's car failed to start, defendant obtained a ride to a
bowling alley at a shopping center, where he proceeded to hijack
a car and drive away from town. Defendant denied experiencing
any delusions, hallucinations, and paranoid ideation, and also
denied using any drugs or alcohol. Defendant stated further that,
since the time of his arrest, he had not received any psychiatric
treatment or been prescribed any psychotropic medication.
	Dr. Markos also testified that he reviewed defendant's
adoption file, evaluations and reports prepared by the defense
experts and by Dr. Yaniz, and a summary prepared by Barbara
Mann, a psychologist who examined defendant during his
hospitalization at Riverside Medical Center. In Dr. Markos'
opinion, defendant had integrated well with his adoptive family,
and the adoption process was reasonably satisfactory. Defendant
experienced some difficulties with his adoptive parents as an
adolescent but, generally, adolescence is a difficult period.
Defendant's hospitalization as a teenager at Riverside Medical
Center related to feelings of depression that defendant was
experiencing. Defendant did not exhibit any thought process
disorders, such as delusions, while at Riverside, or later.
Defendant had adjusted to life in the general prison population. He
participated in various prison programs, conducted himself
reasonably well, and did not exhibit any psychiatric symptoms. Dr.
Markos concluded that defendant was not currently suffering from
any mental illness or defect. Further, Dr. Markos concluded that,
at or about the time of the shooting, defendant was not suffering
from any significant psychopathology.
	In arriving at his conclusions, Dr. Markos reviewed the Tinley
Park Mental Health Center records regarding the hospitalizations
of defendant's biological uncle. Defendant's uncle suffered from
adjustment disorder, a condition where an individual who is
subjected to a particular stress or stressful situation manifests
some psychiatric or mental symptoms like depression or anxiety.
Dr. Markos explained that adjustment disorder is not a genetically
transmitted illness. The fact that defendant's uncle suffers from
adjustment disorder does not necessarily mean that defendant will
also suffer from that disorder.
	It is clear that Dr. Markos' testimony at the death penalty
hearing was critical. For purposes of this appeal, however, the
critical question is whether the trial court could require that
defendant submit to the examination by Dr. Markos. The State
concedes, and we agree, that section 115-6 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure does not authorize the psychiatric examination
in question. Section 115-6 comes into play if a defendant gives
notice that he may rely upon the defense of insanity at trial or if
the defendant indicates that he intends to plead guilty but mentally
ill or the defense of intoxicated or drugged condition. See 725
ILCS 5/115-6 (West 1996); People v. Harlacher, 262 Ill. App. 3d
1, 7-8 (1994). Defendant informed the trial court and the State that
he would not rely upon any of these defenses at trial. Indeed,
defendant did not present any testimony at trial.
	The State also concedes, and we agree, that Supreme Court
Rule 413 does not authorize a psychiatric examination of a
defendant. Pursuant to Rule 413, a judicial officer may require that
an accused submit to a reasonable physical or medical inspection
of his body. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 413(a)(ix). However, a psychiatric
examination is not "a 'medical inspection' of the type
contemplated by the rule." People v. Larsen, 74 Ill. 2d 348, 352
(1979).
	Nevertheless, the State maintains that the trial court's order
requiring that defendant submit to the psychiatric examination was
proper because the examination was necessary to provide the State
a fair opportunity to rebut the expert testimony defendant
presented in mitigation. Defendant counters that the supreme court
rules governing discovery in criminal trials (134 Ill. 2d Rs. 411
through 415) are not applicable at a death penalty hearing. We
agree that, as presently written, the supreme court rules governing
discovery do not apply to death penalty hearings.
	In People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69 (1987), this court
considered the defendant's claim that the State was required to
disclose notes on interviews it conducted with witnesses testifying
in aggravation. The court noted that Rule 411 provides that the
criminal discovery rules shall be applied in all criminal cases
wherein the accused is charged with an offense for which, upon
conviction, he might be imprisoned in the penitentiary. Thus, the
criminal discovery rules were designed for use in connection with
criminal trials. The court reasoned:
			"[A] defendant at the sentencing stage of a felony
prosecution has already been convicted and, therefore, is
'entitled to fewer procedural safeguards than one who has
not been convicted at all.' [Citations.] Indeed, it has
repeatedly been held that the admissibility of evidence at
the aggravation and mitigation phases of a sentencing
hearing is not governed by the restrictive rules of evidence
in effect at the guilt stage of the trial. [Citations.] As
stated, discovery is not constitutionally required. We
consider that the defendant's request to change our
discovery rules to include sentencing hearings is
unnecessary in light of the present safeguards afforded a
defendant in sentencing hearings." Foster, 119 Ill. 2d  at
102-03.
See also People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 264 (1991).
	In the case at bar, the trial court convicted defendant of
murder and aggravated vehicular hijacking on November 7, 1997.
On December 3, 1997, following opening arguments at the second
phase of the death penalty hearing, the trial court ordered that
defendant submit to a psychiatric examination by the State's
expert. The trial court's order was not authorized either by statute
or by rule. As such, the trial court's order was improper.
	The State maintains that it must be afforded an opportunity to
rebut the mitigation evidence presented by defendant. The State
argues that the only way it could effectively rebut the mitigation
evidence was to have its expert perform the psychiatric
examination in question. The State requests that this court "impose
a rule which is grounded in equity" allowing the psychiatric
examination. We are cognizant of the problems confronting the
State. However, the actions of the trial court and the actions of this
court must be guided by the supreme court rules as presently
written. At the time the trial court ordered defendant to submit to
the psychiatric examination, such action was not authorized.
	Having determined that the trial court's order requiring that
defendant submit to a psychiatric examination was improper, we
must determine whether the error prejudiced defendant. We find
that it did. Defendant was 23 years old when he killed Officer
Samfay. Defendant did not have a criminal history; the murder and
aggravated vehicular hijacking were his first criminal offenses.
Defendant presented substantial evidence in mitigation, including
the testimony of three experts regarding defendant's mental health.
Discounting Dr. Markos' testimony, the State's evidence in
aggravation consisted of the facts of the offenses defendant
committed; defendant's admission that he transported a gun under
the passenger seat of his car; testimony that defendant possessed
certain periodicals and catalogs related to weapons and
ammunition; and testimony that defendant was able to deal with
stress at work and did not appear to be upset on the day of the
shooting. With respect to the periodicals and catalog, the State did
not, and could not, contend that it is illegal to possess these items.
As to the testimony that defendant did not appear to be upset at
work, defendant left work at 3 p.m., had a discussion with his
adoptive mother regarding the proposed wedding when he returned
home, left the house to go target shooting, and had the tragic
encounter with Officer Samfay shortly thereafter.
	Dr. Markos' testimony was critical to the State. Dr. Markos
contradicted the defense theories that mental disorders ran through
defendant's biological family; that defendant suffered harm from
his abandonment by his biological mother, placement in foster
care, separation from his foster care family and adoption by his
adoptive family after he had bonded with his foster care family;
that defendant was a troubled adolescent who was hospitalized for
latent psychotic problems, but did not receive follow-up care after
his discharge from the hospital; that defendant continued to
experience problems after his discharge from the hospital and was
less capable than others of dealing with stress; and that the murder
of Officer Samfay was an explosive manifestation of the mental
disorders from which defendant suffered. Dr. Markos also testified
that defendant had adjusted to prison life and was not receiving
psychiatric treatment in the penitentiary, even though, having been
convicted of the present offenses, defendant was in a situation
most people would find very stressful. Moreover, Dr. Markos'
testimony had several indicia of reliability. The jury was informed
that Dr. Markos' examination of defendant was done pursuant to
a court order. Further, Dr. Markos was able to relate to the jury
information given by defendant regarding defendant's state of
mind on the day of the shooting.
	We believe that defendant was prejudiced by the order
requiring that he submit to the psychiatric examination.
Accordingly, we remand to the trial court with instructions to hold
a new death penalty hearing.
	In light of our holding, we need not address defendant's
remaining contentions regarding the psychiatric examination. Nor
need we consider either the other errors allegedly made at the
sentencing hearing, or defendant's contentions regarding the
propriety of his death sentence and the constitutionality of the
death penalty.

CONCLUSION
	For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm defendant's
convictions of murder and aggravated vehicular hijacking, but we
vacate the sentence of death. We remand the matter to the trial
court with instructions to hold a new sentencing hearing.
Convictions affirmed;
death sentence vacated;
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE GARMAN took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	During defendant's death penalty hearing, defense counsel for
the first time intimated to the death penalty jury that defendant was
mentally ill at the time of the shooting, and told the jurors that
defense experts would testify concerning the mental illness
suffered by defendant. At this point, the trial court granted the
State's motion for a psychiatric examination of defendant. At the
second phase of the death penalty hearing, defense counsel
presented three expert witnesses to testify on defendant's behalf.
Dr. Markos then testified for the State in rebuttal. Under the
circumstances, I believe the trial court acted within its discretion
in granting the State's motion for a psychiatric examination of
defendant.
	The majority notes that neither section 115-6 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-6 (West 1996)), nor
Supreme Court Rule 413 (134 Ill. 2d R. 413), authorized the
psychiatric examination of defendant. The majority states that "the
actions of the trial court and the actions of this court must be
guided by the supreme court rules as presently written." Slip op.
at 12. The majority then concludes that "[a]t the time the trial
court ordered defendant to submit to the psychiatric examination,
such action was not authorized." Slip op. at 12. I do not agree that
the lack of express authorization in section 115-6 or in any
supreme court rule compels the conclusion that the trial court's
order was improper.
	Although authorization for the examination at issue cannot be
found in section 115-6, I note that the limitation of section 115-6
is not applicable at a sentencing hearing. People v. Silagy, 101 Ill. 2d 147, 174 (1984). Likewise, the admissibility of evidence during
the aggravation and mitigation phase of a death penalty sentencing
hearing is not governed by the restrictive rules of evidence in
effect during the guilt phase of a trial. People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 102 (1987). This is because a defendant who has been
convicted and is at the sentencing stage is entitled to fewer
procedural safeguards than a defendant that has not yet been
convicted. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d  at 102.
	The psychiatric examination of defendant took place during
defendant's death penalty sentencing hearing. Section 9-1(e) of
the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(e) (West 1996))
provides for the introduction of evidence during a death penalty
sentencing hearing. That section provides, in relevant part, that:
		"Any information relevant to any additional aggravating
factors or any mitigating factors indicated in subsection
(c) may be presented by the State or defendant regardless
of its admissibility under the rules governing the
admission of evidence at criminal trials. The State and the
defendant shall be given fair opportunity to rebut any
information received at the hearing." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(e)
(West 1996).
Section 9-1(e) suspends the rules of evidence so that a jury may
have all relevant information before it. People v. Del Vecchio, 105 Ill. 2d 414, 438 (1985). Accordingly, section 9-1(e) allows the
introduction of evidence during a sentencing hearing that
ordinarily would not be admissible during the guilt phase of a trial.
People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 322 (1998). In fact, section
9-1 "is free from any limitation but relevance in sentencing
hearings in death penalty cases." Silagy, 101 Ill. 2d  at 174. A
sentencing judge, then, has wide discretion concerning the sources
and types of evidence used to assist in determining the kind and
the extent of punishment to be imposed, within the limits fixed by
law. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 322.
	Based upon the foregoing, I believe that the decision to allow
Dr. Markos to examine defendant was a matter within the trial
court's discretion. The only limitation on the trial court's
discretion was relevance. Dr. Markos' examination of defendant
and testimony concerning that examination during defendant's
sentencing hearing were relevant to defendant's claim of mental
illness. Because the examination and evidence were relevant, the
trial court acted within its discretion in allowing the State a fair
opportunity to rebut defendant's claim of mental illness. To hold
otherwise would allow a defendant to "sandbag" the prosecution
by waiting until after trial to raise questions concerning his
competency. The defendant could then produce numerous expert
witnesses to testify concerning his competency, knowing that the
State would have no effective means to rebut that evidence. I do
not believe our supreme court rules and case law require such a
result. Although this court has never addressed the issue of a
psychiatric examination similar to the one in this case, I note that
prior decisions of this court recognize that where a defendant, at
his sentencing hearing, raises the issue of his mental competency
when he committed his offense, the State is entitled to rebut the
defendant's claim. See People v. West, 137 Ill. 2d 558, 592 (1990);
People v. Ramirez, 98 Ill. 2d 439, 467 (1983). Because defendant
raised the issue of his mental competency at the time of the
offense during his sentencing hearing, the State was entitled to
rebut defendant's claim. For that reason, I would affirm the trial
court's order requiring defendant to submit to a psychiatric
examination by the State's expert.



Supplemental Opinion Upon Denial of Rehearing
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	At the time of defendant's trial, the supreme court rules did
not provide for discovery at a death penalty hearing. See Foster,
119 Ill. 2d  at 102-03. Our holding in this case followed the dictates
of the rules then in effect. Shortly after this opinion was filed, this
court determined that the discovery rules should be extended to
death penalty hearings. At a death penalty hearing, the sentencing
authority is asked to impose the ultimate penalty upon the
defendant. We believe it is important that the sentencing authority
possess the fullest information possible with respect to the
defendant's life, character, criminal record and the circumstances
of the particular offense. People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 62-63
(1994); People v. Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d 201, 236 (1993). Allowing
discovery furthers the goal of presenting complete information
regarding the defendant to the sentencing authority.
	Allowing discovery also addresses the concerns expressed by
the legislature in section 9-1(e) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720
ILCS 5/9-1(e) (West 1996)) that both the State and the defense
have a fair opportunity to rebut testimony at the death penalty
hearing. We recognize, however, that in the context of a death
penalty hearing, discovery will not necessarily be reciprocal.
Whereas the defendant cannot be compelled to provide discovery
unless the State makes reciprocal disclosures, disclosure of
information by the prosecution does not automatically entitle the
State to disclosure from the defense. People v. Williams, 87 Ill. 2d 161, 165-66 (1981). Certain procedural safeguards embodied in
our constitution serve to limit discovery by the defendant to the
State to the end that a defendant will not be sentenced to death by
the use of evidence he unwittingly provides. As the Supreme Court
observed in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359, 101 S. Ct. 1866 (1981):
		"Just as the Fifth Amendment prevents a criminal
defendant from being made ' "the deluded instrument of
his own conviction," ' [citation] it protects him as well
from being made the 'deluded instrument' of his own
execution." Estelle, 451 U.S.  at 462, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 369,
101 S. Ct.  at 1873.
	Pretrial discovery of defense information, whether for use at
the guilt phase of trial or at the death penalty hearing, remains
subject to constitutional limitations and limitations based on
attorney-client or other privilege. The trial courts must do all they
can to ensure that each defendant receives a fair trial and a fair
sentencing hearing.
	Our amended discovery rules are effective as of March 1,
2001. In the case at bar, upon remand, the State and defendant may
renew their requests for discovery. In granting any request by the
State, the trial court should consider and safeguard defendant's
constitutional rights.
	JUSTICE GARMAN took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Supplemental Dissent Upon Denial of Rehearing
	The supplemental opinion begins:
			"At the time of defendant's trial, the supreme court
rules did not provide for discovery at a death penalty
hearing. [Citation.] Our holding in this case followed the
dictates of the rules then in effect. Shortly after this
opinion was filed, this court determined that the discovery
rules should be extended to death penalty hearings." Slip
op. at 16.
Thus, the supplemental opinion expressly concedes that the
original opinion rests upon a premise that no longer is valid.
Oddly, however, the supplemental opinion contains not a trace of
analysis as to whether the demolition of that premise actually
affects the outcome of this case. Because I am convinced that the
decision to vacate defendant's death sentence cannot survive the
recent amendment to Rule 411, I respectfully dissent from the
supplemental opinion.
	Effective March 1, 2001, this court amended Supreme Court
Rule 411 to state that the supreme court rules governing discovery
in criminal cases "shall be applied to the separate [capital]
sentencing hearing provided for in section 9-1(d) of the Criminal
Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-(d))." (Emphasis added.) 188 Ill. 2d
R. 411. Such rules include Rule 413(e), which provides that:
			"Upon a showing of materiality, and if the request is
reasonable, the court in its discretion may require
disclosure to the State of relevant material and
information ***." 134 Ill. 2d R. 413(e).
As the supplemental opinion recognizes, the amended version of
Rule 411-and consequently Rule 413(e)-will apply to defendant's
new capital sentencing hearing on remand. See slip op. at 17.
Thus, the only limitations upon the trial court's authority to enter
the identical discovery order on remand are those set forth in Rule
413(e)-i.e., materiality, relevance, and reasonableness.
	Now, there is no question that information relating to
defendant's mental health is both material and relevant. Indeed, an
alleged mental illness formed the cornerstone of defendant's
mitigation strategy. Likewise, there is no question that the State's
request to have defendant examined by Dr. Markos was
reasonable, as defendant waited until his sentencing hearing to
first raise a claim of mental illness, and the State is entitled to
rebut that claim. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(e) (West 1998) ("[t]he State
*** shall be given fair opportunity to rebut any information
received at the hearing"). Thus, assuming that Rule 413(e) applied
to defendant's original sentencing hearing, the trial court would
not have abused its discretion by ordering defendant to submit to
a psychiatric examination by Dr. Markos.
	To be sure, the amendment to Rule 411 does not undermine
the majority's conclusion that the trial court's original discovery
order was improper.(1) See slip op. at 11. An order that was
unauthorized when entered remains so, irrespective of any
subsequent action by this court. However, the amendment to Rule
411 unquestionably renders that error harmless. As demonstrated
above, the trial court's discovery order is perfectly appropriate
under Rule 413(e), which the majority acknowledges will apply on
remand. In other words, a remand will result in a new sentencing
hearing at which the trial court may lawfully enter the very order
that forms the basis for the remand. And the entry of that order
will result in a new jury hearing the very same testimony that was
heard by the original jury. I cannot discern-and the supplemental
opinion does not even attempt to identify-the prejudice that
defendant suffers from the entry of an order that, while improper
the first time around, will be proper the second time around.
	Given this court's recent amendment to Rule 411, I see no
justification for the majority's continued commitment to vacating
defendant's death sentence and remanding this cause for a
new-and quite possibly identical-sentencing hearing. I therefore
respectfully dissent from the supplemental opinion.
	 
1.      1A conclusion with which I strongly disagree. See slip op. at 14-16
(Thomas, J., dissenting).