Title: In re Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 697
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-98-05
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: December 8, 2006

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 98 September Term 2005 IN RE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OPINION NO. 697 Argued September 25, 2006 Decided December 8, 2006 On Petition for review of an opinion of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics. Frederick J. Dennehy argued the cause for appellant, Wilentz, Goldman &amp; Spitzer, P.A., (Wilentz, Goldman &amp; Spitzer, P.A., attorneys). Dean Jablonski, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent, Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics (Anne Milgram, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Aney K. Chandy, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief). David H. Dugan, III, argued the cause for amicus curiae, New Jersey State Bar Association (Stuart A. Hoberman, President, attorney). JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal requires that we re-examine the proscription governing concurrent representation by a lawyer or law firm of both a public entity and a private client before one of the boards or agencies of that public entity. Responding to two specific inquiries posed by appellant Wilentz, Goldman &amp; Spitzer, P.A., the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics (Advisory Committee) concluded that an attorney, law firm, or office associates of that attorney or law firm, representing a municipal body subject to the governing entity s budgetary, membership, or decision-making control, is precluded from representing a private client before (or in a litigated matter against) the governing body, its executive, its legislature, any policy making official in an official capacity, or any office, department, division, bureau, board, commission, or agency, or other body subject to that governing entity s budgetary, membership, or decision making control, and specifically in this case, before the municipal court. [Opinion 697, 181 N.J.L.J. 536, 14 N.J.L. 1563 (Aug. 8, 2005) (footnote omitted).] In light of the 2004 amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct that eliminated New Jersey s long-standing prohibition against the appearance of impropriety and the contemporaneous adoption of R.P.C. 1.8(k), See footnote 1 we hold that the appearance of impropriety standard no longer retains any continued validity. We further hold that the provisions of R.P.C. 1.8(k) govern all instances in which a lawyer or a law firm employed or retained by a public entity, either as a lawyer or in some other capacity, seeks to undertake the representation of another client before that public entity or its board or agencies, including, if applicable, its municipal court. In respect of the application of R.P.C. 1.8(k), we reaffirm the continuing vitality of the municipal family doctrine, See footnote 2 albeit in a scope less expansive than the one urged by the Advisory Committee. We therefore reverse Opinion 697, and specifically hold that an attorney who plenarily represents a municipal governing body is barred from representing private clients before that governmental entity s governing body and all of its subsidiary boards and agencies, including its courts. However, an attorney who plenarily represents an agency subsidiary to the governmental entity s governing body is barred from representing private clients before that subsidiary agency only. Finally, if the scope of an attorney s engagement by a governmental entity is not plenary but limited, that attorney and his or her law firm are exempt from the strictures of the now-limited municipal family doctrine; however, the scope of the engagement is relevant in determining whether the proscriptions of R.P.C. 1.8(k) have been observed. In the final analysis, the response to the two specific inquiries posed by appellant in respect of limited scope engagements is that there is no per se bar. [Kevin H. Michels, New Jersey Attorney Ethics The Law of New Jersey Lawyering 4 (2006) (N.J. Attorney Ethics) (formatting added).] That commentator also explained that [p]erhaps the most significant change effected by the 2004 amendments to the R.P.C.s certainly the most anticipated was the elimination of New Jersey s appearance of impropriety doctrine. Id. at 359. That change, coupled with the contemporaneous adoption of new R.P.C. 1.8(k), lies at the core of this appeal. Is a law firm per se precluded from serving simultaneously as special litigation counsel for the governing body of a municipality and representing a private client before one of the boards or agencies (including the municipal court) of the municipality, assuming it has received no non-public information from that board or agency that is not specifically related to the discrete litigation in question? By a letter dated September 6, 2005, the Advisory Committee formally responded to appellant s inquiries. As background, the Advisory Committee explained that appellant s inquiries regarding the propriety of a law firm simultaneously representing a municipality and private clients before boards or bodies controlled by that municipality is similar to another query recently addressed by this Committee. It concluded that [f]or the reasons set forth in Opinion 697, the contemplated representation would pose a direct conflict in violation of R.P.C. 1.7. (citation omitted). Pursuant to Rule 1:19-8(a), appellant filed its petition for review before this Court and, as required by Rule 1-19:8(f), the Attorney General responded. We granted the petition, In re Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 697, 186 N.J. 250 (2006). We also granted the application of the New Jersey State Bar Association (State Bar) for leave to appear amicus curiae. [Ibid. (citation omitted).] It further explained that, [t]o aid practitioners in determining if a particular public body is an adjunct agency of a municipal government, the test is whether the agency is subject to the municipal government s budgetary, membership, or decision-making control. Ibid. (citation omitted). Although the logic supporting that conclusion is commendable -- and, indeed, hortatory to all lawyers -- we hold that the conclusion ultimately reached by the Advisory Committee can no longer obtain. Although appearance of impropriety concerns have not been rendered wholly moribund[,] State v. Davis, 366 N.J. Super. 30, 44 (App. Div. 2004), echoing nearly 20 years of criticism of the doctrine [this Court has adopted] the deletion of all appearance of impropriety language from the R.P.C.s. N.J. Attorney Ethics, supra at 359. In its stead, joint representations of both public and private entities that were banned under the appearance doctrine should now be evaluated under both R.P.C. 1.7 and R.P.C. 1.8(k). Id. at 361. We now turn to that shift -- from the appearance of impropriety standard to actual conflicts -- and to the necessary adjustments in how public/private dual representation conflicts are gauged as occasioned by that change. [Ibid.] That is the conclusion challenged by appellant, a conclusion we reject as overbroad. [Opinion 4, 86 N.J.L.J. 357 (June 27, 1963).] In the Advisory Committee s traditional view, the proposition is succinctly stated: Unless the governing body of the municipality controls the agency, in the sense of controlling its membership or its budget, the agency is not an adjunct of the municipality. Opinion 292, 97 N.J.L.J. 809 (Oct. 17, 1974). The genesis of this view is found in former R.P.C. 1.7(c)(2), which provided that in certain cases or situations creating an appearance of impropriety rather than an actual conflict, multiple representation is not permissible, that is, in those situations in which an ordinary knowledgeable citizen acquainted with the facts would conclude that the multiple representation poses substantial risk of disservice to either the public interest or the interest of one of the clients. [R.P.C. 1.7(c)(2) (repealed Nov. 17, 2003, effective Jan. 1, 2004).] As the pre-2004 Comment to R.P.C. 1.7 explained, [t]he court has also included language in new paragraph (c) so as to expressly preserve in New Jersey the appearance of impropriety rule. See, e.g., In re Garber, 95 N.J. 597, 609-10 (1984); Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 470 (1980); Perillo v. Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, 83 N.J. 366, 373 (1980); Higgins v. Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, 73 N.J. 123, 128-29 (1977). That appearance rule is intended to instill public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. In re Opinion No. 415, 81 N.J. 318, 323 (1979); see id. at 323-34. [N.J. Attorney Ethics 1190 (formatting added).] However, as part of the 2004 amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct and as recommended by the Pollock Commission, we [e]liminated the appearance of impropriety language from the Rules of Professional Conduct[.] Supreme Court of New Jersey, Administrative Determinations in Response to the Report and Recommendation of the Supreme Court Commission on the Rules of Professional Conduct (Sep. 10, 2003), reprinted in N.J. Attorney Ethics 1134. We relied on the recommendation of the Pollock Commission, which remarked that [n]o rule has engendered as much criticism as that constituting the appearance of impropriety as a separate ethics violation. Id. at 1141. The Pollock Commission concluded that [b]ecause of their vagueness and ambiguity, [the appearance of impropriety provisions of the R.P.C.s] are not appropriate as ethics standards[,] noting that [a]s an ethics concept, the appearance of impropriety is too vague to support discipline. See footnote 5 Id. at 1142. Hence, [f]or the reasons stated by the [Pollock] Commission in its report and as set forth above, the Court approve[d] the elimination of the appearance of impropriety language from the R.P.C.s. Id. at 1142-43 (formatting added). Contemporaneously, we adopted a specific Rule of Professional Conduct to address multiple representation issues in the context of public entities: A lawyer employed by a public entity, either as a lawyer or in some other role, shall not undertake the representation of another client if the representation presents a substantial risk that the lawyer's responsibilities to the public entity would limit the lawyer's ability to provide independent advice or diligent and competent representation to either the public entity or the client. [R.P.C. 1.8(k).] We explained that the shift in emphasis from the appearance of impropriety rule to the standard set forth in new R.P.C. 1.8(k) was to place[] an obligation on lawyers for public entities to assess whether client representation would present a substantial risk to the lawyer s responsibilities to the public entity. N.J. Attorney Ethics 1145. See footnote 6 In a multiple representation involving public entities, representations that were banned under the appearance doctrine should now be evaluated under both R.P.C. 1.7 and R.P.C. 1.8(k). Id. at 361. [(citation omitted).] Based on the prohibition against the appearance of impropriety and in the context of the municipal family doctrine, the Advisory Committee has consistently barred the concurrent multiple representation of public entities and private parties. See Opinion 374, 100 N.J.L.J. 646 (July 21, 1977) (environmental commission member barred from appearing for private clients before that municipality s municipal court and agencies); Opinion 292, 97 N.J.L.J. 809 (Oct. 17, 1974) (attorney for fire district barred from appearing for private clients before the municipality s municipal court); Opinion 281, 97 N.J.L.J. 362 (May 16, 1974) (senior citizen housing association attorney barred from appearing for private clients before that municipality s governing body and agencies); Opinion 137, 91 N.J.L.J. 797 (Dec. 12, 1968) (municipal attorney barred from filing workmen s compensation claim against municipality s board of education); Opinion 123, 91 N.J.L.J. 97 (Feb. 15, 1968) (redevelopment agency s attorney barred from appearing for private clients before that municipality s governing body or board of adjustment; tax sale foreclosure attorney barred from appearing for private clients before that municipality s governing body or agencies; and city sewer authority attorney barred from appearing for private clients before that municipality s governing body or agencies); Opinion 98, 89 N.J.L.J. 641 (Oct. 6, 1966) (inter-municipal sewer authority attorney barred from appearing for private clients before each participating municipality s governing body and agencies); Opinion 79, 88 N.J.L.J. 460 (July 15, 1965) (municipal housing authority attorney barred from appearing for private clients before that municipality s governing body, court and agencies); Opinion 52, 87 N.J.L.J. 610 (Sep. 24, 1964) (municipal parking authority attorney barred from appearing for private clients before that municipality s court and agencies); Opinion 18, 86 N.J.L.J. 734 (Dec. 26, 1963) (city housing authority attorneys barred from appearing for private clients before that municipality s governing body and agencies). Compare Opinion 77, 88 N.J.L.J. 453 (July 15, 1965) (attorney serving on appointed board of education barred from appearing for private clients before that municipality s court and agencies), with Opinion 41, 87 N.J.L.J. 285 (May 7, 1964) (elected board of education attorney permitted to appear for private clients before that municipality s governing body, court and agencies, and against the municipality in which school district is located). SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-98 SEPTEMBER TERM 2005 ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS IN RE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OPINION NO. 697 DECIDED December 8, 2006 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY We have explained that [a] municipal family frequently includes a municipal attorney, who serves as counsel to the governing body; a municipal prosecutor, who prosecutes minor criminal offenses such as violations of traffic laws and ordinances; an attorney for the board of adjustment; and an attorney for the planning board. The avoidance of the appearance of impropriety in holding more than one of those positions has been a matter of continuing concern to this Court. In re Opinion 452, supra, 87 N.J. at 48. The doctrine also has been described as encompassing those who are on the same team , Perillo v. Advisory Comm. on Prof l Ethics, 83 N.J. 366, 378 (1980) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), or those who are part of an official family, Opinion 104, 90 N.J.L.J. 49 (Jan. 26, 1967).