Title: Mack v. Williams
Citation: 138 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 86
Docket Number: 
State: Nevada
Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court
Date: December 29, 2022

Mack v. Williams Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The Supreme Court held that a private right of action for money damages exists to vindicate questions of search-and-seizure rights under the Nevada Constitution but that a qualified immunity defense does not apply to such an action. Appellant filed a civil rights action in federal district court against Respondents, the warden and then-director of the Nevada Department of Corrections, asserting that her federal and state constitutional rights were violated when she went to High Desert State Prison to visit an inmate and was strip searched and interrogated and refused visitation. The district court denied summary judgment on the state law claims. Upon reconsideration, the district court reconsidered its order and certified four questions of law to the Supreme Court. The Court elected to reframe and answer some of the certified questions, holding (1) Nev. Const. art. I, 18 contains an implied private right of action for retrospective monetary relief; and (2) qualified immunity is not a defense to an implied private right of action for retrospective monetary relief under Nev. Const. art. I, 18. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of Nevada? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of Nevada. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . Opinion Annotation Download PDF 138 Nev., Advance Opinion UP IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA SONMA MACK, Appellant, vs. BRIAN WILLIAMS; JAMES DZURENDA; ARTHUR EMLING, JR.; AND MYRA LAURIAN, Respondents. No. 81.513 1":7751 - Certified questions under NRAP 5 concerning a private citizen's enforcement, through a claim for damages, of due-process and search-andseizure rights guaranteed under the Nevada Constitution and the defense of such actions. United States District Court for the District of Nevad.a; Andrew P. Gordon, :District Judge. Questions answered in part. Gallian Welker & Associates, L.C., and Travis N. Barrick and Nathan E. Lawrence. Las Vegas, for Appellant. Aaron I). Ford, Attorney General, and Kiel B. Ireland, Deputy. Attorney General, Carson City, for Respondents. Institute for Justice and Benjamin A. Field, Arlington, Virginia, and Wesley Hottot, Seattle, Washington; Pisanelli Bice, PL.LC, and jord.an T. Smith, Las 'Vegas, for Amici Curiae institute for Justice and Stephen Lara. SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (D) 1947A 4.0S/, McLetchie Law and Margaret A. McLetchie, Las Vegas; Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center and Megha Ram, Washington, D.C., and Rosalind Dillon and Daniel Greenfield, Chicago, Illinois, for Amicus Curiae Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center. BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC. OPINION By the Court, CADISH, J.: The United States District Court for the District of Nevada certified four questions under NRAP 5 concerning a private plaintiffs ability to enforce by private right of action due-process and search-andseizure rights guaranteed under the Nevada Constitution and a defendant's accompanying ability to defend such actions. While we decline to answer the certified question related to due-process rights, we elect to reframe the remaining certified questions to answer only the determinative issues in this case and., to that end, conclude that a private right of aCtion for money damages exists to vindicate violations of searchand-seizure rights under the Nevada Constitution, hut a qualified-immunity defense does not apply to such an action. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Appellant Sonjia Mack went to High DeSert State Prison (FIDSP) to visit a.n inmate. According to Mack, respondents. Arthur Emling and Myra Laurian, officers at HDSP, escorted her to an administrative building, where "Laurian conducted a strip search of Mack" that did not turn up any contraband. Still, after the strip search, Ending., interrogated Mack. regarding her alleged possession of contraband and knowledge of SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 0) I947A 2 "ongoing crimes." Following th.e strip sear.th an.d. interrogation, the HDSP employees refused to allow Mack visitation. Shortly thereafter, Mack received a letter from HDSP indefinitely suspending her visiting privileges and requiring her to obtain written permission from respondents Brian Williams, the Warden of HDSP, or James Dzurenda, the then-Director of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC), to return to HDSP. As a result of this incident, Mack filed a civil-rights action against respondents ‘;collectively; 'NDOC parties) in federal districurt, asserting violations of 'her federal: and state constitutional rights. 'As relevant to the certified questions, Ma.ck asserted that Emling. -and. Laurian's allegedly • unlawful strip search of her violated-her ±ight to procedural due process under Nevada. Constitution, Article 1, ic.-,lection-8 and her Tight Against unreasonable searches and seizures Under .Article 1, Section 18.1 The NDOC parties mOVed for surnmary judgmentbn all- State and federal claimS; hoWever, their motion foCuSed exthitilvely On the federal claims and -offered no:arguments:specific to the state-law claims. The U.S.. Di:strict Court, denied summary judgment on the state-law clairn. 'under Article 1, Section 8 against Emling and LaUrian based. on its codclusion that qu.alifi!.D.d immunity does not only to claims based on state laAkf. The -court also dethed summary judgment -on the state-law claim Under Article 1, Section 18 against. Emling and La urian based on its conizhisión that genuine disputes of material factexisted :a.S to "whether Mack was 80,ized," 'Mack consented. to the Strip Search.," and "Emling and Laurian -had :reasonable suspicion to 3trip search MaCk." rmack also aisserted state-conStitution.al claims againstWilliams and Dzurenda, butthe district court entered su.mmary judgment agairisther on those claims, a.nd they are not at issue in this matter. SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (th 1,4-17A co., Moving for reconsideration, th.e N.DOC parties argued, for the first time, that there was "no private right of action under the Nevada Constitution." Additionally, they argued. that "if such a right exists, Nevada courts would apply• the doctrine of qualified immunitY.". Based. on these arguments,' the U.S. District Court reconsidered its order to the extent it had allowed the state-law claims to proceed and certified four questions of law to this court: 1. Is there a private right of action un•der the Nevada constitution, Article 1, Se.ction 8? 2, Is there a private right of action under the • Nevada Constitution, Article 1, Section' 18? 3. If there is a private right of action, what immunities, if any, can a state-actor defendant raise as a defense? 4. If there is a private right of action, what remedies are available to a plaintiff for these claims? We accepted the certified questions 'and ordered briefing. • DISCUSSION We elect to refrarne and answer some of the certified questions We have discretion under NRAP 5 to answer questions of Nevada law certified to us by federal courts when no controlling authority exists on those questions of law and they i.nvolve "determinative" matters of the case before the certifying court. NRAP 5(a); see alsa Progressive Gulf Ins. Co. v. Faehnrich, 1.30 Nev. 167, 170, 327 P.3d 10.61, 1063 (2014). "A certified question under NRAP 5 presents A pure question of law, which this cou.rt answers de novo." Echeuerria v. State, 137. Nev., Adv. Op. 49, 495 P.3d 471, 474 (2021). Accepting 'the faCts as stated in the certification order and its attachment[S]," if any, we lithit our role "to answering the questions Of 'law posed." In re Fontainebleau Las Vegas Holdings, 127 Nev. 941, 95556, 267 P.3d 786, 794-95 (2011) (permitting partieS to supply 'an appendix to SUPREM E Couir OF NEVADA ( 1)J 1947A 4 give "a greater understanding of the pending action" but disallowing use of the appendi.x "to contradict the certification order"). We nevertheless maintain "discretion to rephrase-the.certified questions as.. . necessary" to conform to our long-standing prohibition against advisory opinions. Echeverria, 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 49, 495 P.3d at. 474-75 ("[M]ere considerations of efficiency cannot overcome the firm jurisdictional bar on advisory opi.nions."). While "further factual and legal development . . . does not make our answers to . . . certified questions impermissibly ad.visory,." we decline to answer certified questions where our answers are lin]sufficiently outcoine-determinative to satisfy NRAP 5," such as-where "Nevada laW maY [not] resolve the case . . without need of furtherproceedings.". • Parsons b. Colts Mfg. Co., 137 Nev., Ad.v. Op. 72, 499 P.3d 602, 606- (2021). • Applying these principles here, we •find no controlling.authority ot a private plaintiffs ability to • enforce the af-issue provisions of the Nevada Constitution. Nevertheless, as to the determinative nature of the questions, the U.S. District Court asks us to resolve the availability of a Private right of action for violations of procedural due-process .and searchand-seizure rights, yet, unlike the search-and-seizure claim, the certification order yields little information about the nature of the procedural clue-proCess claim: While the order menti.ons that Mack asserts a protected liberty. interest derived from prison regulations related to strip searches, it does'. not identify that claimed' interest. Similarly, the Certification order does not specify those regulations and does .not describe anv process, let alone a deficient one, adopted bY state actors that allegedly denied Mack due process. Cf. Eggleston v. Stuart-, 1.37 NeV., Adv. Op. 51, 495 P.3d 482, 489 (2021) (discussing comparable federal Procedural.' dueprocess rights and observing that "[p]rocedural due process claims arise SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 5 where the State interferes with a. liberty or property interest and the State's procedure was constitutionally insufficient"). Nor does the certifying court ask us to assume, without independently deciding, any legal principles related to the claim. See Parsons, 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 72, 499 P.3d at 606 (recognizing that we "accept the certifying court's determination.s [of] . . . ics own substantive and procedural law"). The insufficient facts, law, or context in the certification order regardin.g the nature of th.e procedural dueprocess claiin wonld require us, in answering the queStion .posed .ànd ifi conflict with our -caselaw, to 'conceive- of-the claim in • the abstract and to apply a framework. to factual and legal uncertainty. -See, e.g., Applebau in v. Applebaum, 97 Nev. 11, 12, (321. P.2d 1110, 11.10 -(1981) ("TffiscoUrt will not render advisory oPinions en. . abštract qUestions:")-:• Even putting. those Concerns aside, Our- .answer on the procedural due-process claim would *lave, at beSt, a speculative' impactin. deterthining the underlying case," as the viability of the• daiin entails further proceedings before this cburt. regardin.g whether a' Cognithble libertY interest exists, and assuming the prison regulationS •proVide a c'process," whether the process satisfies our d.ue -process jurisprUdenco See Volvo Cars: of N. Am., Me.- v. Ricci: 1.22 Nev. 746, 751, 137 P.3d 1161, 1.1(34 (2006). Our answer, then, on that clann may not resolVe the matter pending before the certifying court .a.nd. instead may amount -to. an advisory opiniem By contrast, the Certification order develops the factual and legal nature -of the seareh-and-seizure L.laim, and our anšWer, if affirthative, leaVes onlý. factual determinations regarding well-Settled 'principles on. reasonable suspicion, and cotiSent. Accordinglý; While Nive seiv4re tó answer the.first. question, we determine it proper to answer the second question. SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A Moreover, the U.S. District Court calls on. us to determine what remedies, if any, are available to private plaintiffs and what immunities, if any, are available to state actors if we conclude a private right of action under the Nevada Constitution exists. But Mack's remaining State-law • claims under the Nevada Constitution seek only retrospective monetary relief for the allegedly unlawful strip search. Additionally, the NDOC parties raised only the defense of qualified immunity in their pleadings before the U.S. District Court. We would thus exceed our- jurisdictional authority if we addressed the availability of any and an remedies 'and defenses to such claims, where only monetary relief and qualified irnniiinity remain determinative of the cause before the district court. See.Personhood Neu. u. Bristol, 1.26 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010) ("This court's duty is not to render advisory opinions . . . ."); see dlso Echeverrig, 137 Nev., Adv. op. 49, 495 P.3d at 475 (declining to answer a certified question on the State's immunity from liability based on the argunient that appellants would assert certain claims later in the case). Accordingly, we elect -to rephrase and address the remaining certified questions to the extent necessary to avoid impermissible responses. T-aking our analyses together, we consider the U.S. District Court's certified questions as- follows: 1. is there a private right of acti.on for retrospeaive monetary relief under the Nevada Constitution, Article 1, Section 18? 2. If there is a private right of action, can. a stateactor defendant raise qualified immunity as: defense? SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA I 947A 4Vey, 7 Certified Question f: The Neuada Constitution Article 1; Section 18 contains an implied private right of action for retrospective monetary relief Mack contends that the mere articulation of a right in the Nevada Constitution establishes an implied private cause of action for violations of that right. She urges this court to rely on its inherent power and to analogize to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing a federal right of action for damages for violations of the Fourth Amendment), in recognizing a private right of action under the Nevada Constitution. By•contrast, the NDOC parties argue that neither the Nevada Constitution nor the Nevada Legislature has authorized monetary relief by private right of action.. TheY contend . that the lack of a legislative private right of action for monetary relief in this context forecloses an implied private right of action und.er the Nevada Constitution. As we discuss in more detail below, we do not find either position, by itself, wholly satisfactory tò resolve the first certified question as rephrased. The Nevada Constitution rePresentS "the direct, Positive, and limiting voice of the people." Wren v. Dixon, 40 Nev. 1.70, 187, 161 P. 722, 726 (191.6)- (emphasis added). In discussing our constitution, -we have characterized its "prohibitory provisions" as "self-eXectiting," thus "need[ing] no further legislation to put [them] in force." See id. at 194, 196, 161 P. at 729' (quoting, in part, Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399; 403 (1900)); Wilson v. Koontz, 76 Nev. 33, 36-37, 38-39, 348 P.2d 231, 232, 233-34 (1960) (construing as "self-executing" a provision of-the Nevada Constitution that "ern.power[s]" the people to prOpose and adopt amendments by voter referendum, based in part on express designation. in the language .of the amendment and in part on the nature of the. arnendnient). 'We reaffirMed this principle in Alper u. Clark County, emphasizing that constitutional SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 8 provisions. "as prohibitions on the state and federal government. are selfexecuting." 93 Nev. 589, 572, 571 P.2d 810, 811 (1977) (discussing, specifically, the Takings Clause under the Nevada Constitution).. As one of our sister courts explained. a "seif-executing" provision "prohibit{s] certain conduct" by the government, as opposed to "indicat[ing] a general principle or line of policy," such that it does not depend on or, require legislation for the people to enjoy or enforce the rights therein. Jensen u. Cunningham, 250 .P.3d 465; 481-82 -(Crtali 201.1) (quiiting, in the Second clatiseY.SpaCkhicin u: Bd. of Educ.. of Bboc Elder CO. Sch. Dist., 16 P.3d 533, 535 (Utah 2000)) (concluding that a provision -under the Utah Constitution • Oarahteeink seai'ch-and-seizure protections was '"self-executing"), see'a-lse Gray- u.• Va. Secl,./ of Transp., 662 S.E.2d 66, 71. (Va. 2008) (providing that "constitution.al proviions' in bills of •rights . . . are usually considered: self-executinC aS they "specifically prohibit parti.cular conduct" by the govern t (quoting Shockoe Slip 56u.nd.. 324 S.E.2d 674, 681 (Va. 1985))); Draw•ing on. this. underStanding of self-executing conM:itutional povii.o. 1v.vre. held in that the "effect:' of the Self-executing nature ofthe p-covisio.ns- 'fis that they give rise to-a cause of a.ction regardless Of whether the Legislature h'as provided any statutory procedure authorizing bne. As a corollary; such rightS cannot be 'abridged or impaired by statute." •Alioer; 93 Nev. at 572., 571 P.2d at 812. . .Article • Section 18 of the Nevada .Constitution guaranteeS "Nhe right of the people to •be secure in their persons", dEkts againSt un.reasonable sei.zures a.nd searches. § papctS and N6v. ConSt. art. T; Considering the saine language in the federal constitatisin, *0 'have descyibed sea7cch.-ad-seizu.re rights. as "protect[ion] against 'unreasonable' invaSions of privacy. . by the government:" Hiibel SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 9 1()) 1947A 'Sixth Judieicil Dist. Court, 118 Nev. 868, 872, 59 P.3d 1201, 1204 (2002) (discussing the Fourth Amendment to. the U.S... Constitution, which is substantively . identical: to Article 1., Section 18 of the Nevada Constitution). That is,. the language. of Section 18 imposes "a limitation," as opposed to "an affirmative obligation," on a state actor's "power to act," rendering this provision prohibitory. See DeShaney u. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1.989); cf. Da,niel u. Cook County, 833 F.3d 728, 733 (7th Cir. 2016) (describing the "individual. rights" in the analogous U.S. Constitution'S Bill of Rights as "negative rights, meaning that [the Bill of Rights] prótects indivithials from some forms of government intrusions upon their liberty,'without impo§ing affirmative duties on governments to care for their citizens"); Alper, 93 Nev. at 572, 571 P.2d at 811 (describing "[t]he right to' just Compensation for private property taken for the public use" as "prohibitions on -the [S]tate"). As our casel.aw suggests, the provision, because of its prohibitory nature, is self-exeouting and thus is not dependent on "§ubsequent legislation to carry [it] into effect." Wilson, 76 Nev. at 39, 348 P.2d at 234 (quoting Willis u. St. Paul Sanitation Co., 50 N.W. 11.10, 1111. (Minn. 1892)); It thus follow§ from our decisions in Alper and Wilson that the self-executing search-and-seizure provision of the Nevada Constitution contains a private cause of action to enforce its proscription., regardless of any affirmative legislative authorization. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 1.63 (1803) ("The very essence of civi.1 liberty certainly consist§ in the" right of every individual to claim the protection of the laWs, whenever he receives an injury:). True, a damages remedy does n.ot automatically follow from the conclusion that a private right of action exists. See Brown v.- State, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1138 (N.Y. 1.996). While we held in Alper that' a private iight SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA i()) 1947A 447,as 1 •0 of action for money damages exists under the Takings Clause of the Nevada Constituti.on, that clause specifically contemplates. "compensation," so we did not need to deeply analyze the propriety of a damages remedy there. See Alper, 93 Nev. at 572, 571 P.2d at 811; see also Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Helpfully, several other courts have considered the question we confront today regarding the availability of money damages for violations of self-executing provisions of their respective state constitutions.. See, e.g., Katzherg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 58 P.3d 339, 342.43 (Cal. 2002) (addressing whether the California Constitution's self-executing provisiim on procedural due process supports an action for money, damages); Godfrey v. Iowa, 898 N.W.2d 844, 871 (Iowa 2017) ("The Iowa constitutional provision regarding due process of law ... has traditionally been selfexecuting without remedial legislation for equitable purposes, and'there is no reason tO thin.k it is not F. elf-executing for the purposes of damages at law."); Dorwctrt v. Cara,way, 58 P.3d 128, 136 (Mont. 2002) ("We conclude that the Bivens line of authority buttressed by § 874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts are sound reasons for a.pplying a cause of actiOri for money damages for violations of those self-executing provisions of the Montana Constitution."); Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1139 (recognizing the New York Constitution's equal-protection and search-and-seizure provisions as- "selfexecuting" and considering the availability of money damages for violations thereof); Spackrnan, 16 P.3d at 538 CEA] Utah court's ability 'La 'award damages for" violation of a self-executing constitutional provision 'rests -on the common laW. 'The Restatenient (Second) of Torts supports this.view:"), Most famously, the U.S. Supreme Court in Bivens recognized that, "in the absence of affirmative action. by CongreSs," a private damages action exists for i.njuries that result from violations 'of the Fourth SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA I947A 11 Amendment of the U.S. ConsT:ii:ution by federal actors, -despite that the amendment 'does riot in So many words provide" for such enforcement.2 Biuens, 403 U.S. at 396-97. There, the appellant brought a damages action against federal narcotic agents after they entered his. hom.e, "manacled [him] in front of his wife and children," and conducted a warrantless and suspicionless search of his home. id. at 389. In so recognizing a private da.mages action, the Court observed that its holding "should hardly seem a surprising propbsition," given 'that, "[h]istorically, "damages••have been regarded aS the 'ordinary remedy fór an: invasion Of pers'onal 'interests in liberty." id. at 395: ln . the Court's -view, provision 'of a 'damages remedY simply- accorded with- the common practice of courts to '"adjuSt'• •their remedies" as the circumstances demand.ed "so -as' to 'grant . the necessary at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U,S. 678, 684 (1946)). relief:" Moreover, the Court identified "no'special factorS Counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative "legislative] action;" such as..".federal' fiscal policy,"• •"equally effective" alternative remedies, or explicit • legiStative prohibition of such •claims. See id. at 396-97 (internal qn6tation marlis omitted). While the Bluens decision is persuasive, it :Ls n.everthelss incomplete in our view to resolve the firSt rephrased ,-:.ertified (j'iestio.ii: 'As the California Supreme Court observed, the .Blvens decision ask.ed whether a court should create or recognize a tort action premised upon violation of 2 However, the U.S. Supreme Court did not explicitly 'premise its decision on the principle of self-executing rights. See Biverv, 403 U.S. at 396 (reasoning that while the text of the Fourth Ameridment ..does .not explicitly provide an enforcement mechanism. for viölations 'therein, 'settled. kgal principles nevertheless permit.federal muits proyide Vail:Ale remedy for the invasion of I.egal, rights guaranteed therein). SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA IL.M7A .61*. a constitutional provision7 absent affirmative legislative action, without addressing whether the at-issue constitutional provision evideneed an intent to provide or withhold such an action: Katzberg, 58 P.3d at 347-48.. Moreover, in subsequent'decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has critiqued the normative approach of the Bivens decision. based on its view that;judicial provision of a remedy for a constitutional violation often encroaches on a legislative task. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, _U.S.. _, , 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855-57 -(2017): That is, the Court's Subsequent Bivens jurisPrudence has treated Congress as "better equipped to create a damages remedy," lest the Court "arrogate legislative power." Egbert v. Boule, • U.S. , , 142 S. Ct. 1793, 1.803 (2022) (internal alterations •omitted) (quoting, in the U.S. second clause, Hernandez v. Mesa, ,• 140 S. Ct. •735, 741 (2020)). In so doing, it has narrowed the .appropriate circumstances in which a damages remedy exists and has effectively accomplished the result that only Congress May confer a damages remedy On privaté.plaintiffs. See id. (observing that "Congress is Tar More competent than the judiciary' tõ weigh such policy considerations. And. the judiciary's authority to do so at all is, at best, uncertain" (internal citations omitted) (quoting Sthweiker z). Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988))). However, we remain "free to interpret [our] owri OnstitUticirial provisions" as We see fit, regardless of any similarities between our State and federal constitutions. See State v. Bayard, 119 Nev: 241, 246:71 P.3d 498, 502 (2003) (quoting Osburn v. State, 118 Nev. 323,1 326; 44 .P.3d 523, 525 (2002)) (referencing the search-and-seizure clauses: Of th.e U.S. Constitution.- and the Nevada Constitution); • See also California • v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988). The Nevada Constitution places limitations on legislative action; while i.t leaves interpretation i'ind SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (01 19-17A 13 enforcement of the Nevada Constitution to the judiciary. See Wren, 40 Nev. at 187, 161 P. at 726; cf. Clectn Water Coal. I). M Resort, 127 Nev. 301, 309, 255 P.3d 247, 253 (2011.) (recognizing, in the context of legislative aCtion, the judiciary's obligation "{u]nder constitutional checks and balances principles" to enforce constitutional restrictions on such "law-making authority"). Our caSelaw makes clear that when it comes to the self- executing rights contained within our Constitution's provisions, the Legislature lacks the authority to pass legislation that abrid.ges 6r impairs those ri.ghts; likewise, the availability of remedies that follow from violations of those rightS does not depend on the Legisl.ature's benevolence or foresight. Alper, 93 Nev. at 572, 571 P.2d at 811-12. Thus, we do not view the question before us as simply a battle between judicial and legislative competence. Accordingly, the Bivens decision a.nd its progeny do not by themselves resolve whether Mack may enforce her Search-andseizure rights under • our Constitution by a private aCtion . fer • money damages. By contrast, the California SuPreme Court has recognized its state constitution similarly embodies the- self-executing principle and has developed a framework to approach, on a case-by-case basi.s, whether to recognize- a damages action for violations of an at-issue self-executing constitutional. provision. See Katzberg, 58 P.3d at 342-43, 3501 Its approach--unlike the U.S. Supreme Court s-----focuses first on•"the language and history of the constitutional provision" at 'issue to ascertain whether "an affirmative intent either tc authorize or to withhold a damages action to remedy a violation" exists. Id. at 350. it then enforces any affirmative intent either way. Id. We believe this first step, reflects our general approach to constitutional interpretation in other contexts, •as it treatS the SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 111) 1947A 14 plain language of the Constitution as controlling to the extent the language therein expresses an intention to grant or to withhold a. private right of action. See Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. 732, 745, 382 P.3d 886,. 895 (2016). Moreover, the framework'S recognition that the mere absence of any indicative language within a provision does not foreclose a ptivate damages action comports with our recognition that self-executing rights require no specific language or procedure for•their private enforcement. See .A.lper, 93 Nev. at:572, 571 P:2d at812. But absent such affirmative indication. ofintent,.the-Califörnia Supreme •Court Undertakes second a. "'constitutional tort anallySis-7 Se Katzherg, 58 P.3d at 3.50. While a "Constitutional tort" generally Y.'efrs to A damages Action "for violation of a constitutional.right against a. government or individual defendants," BroWii;•674 N.K2d At 11.32, a ConAituticmaI-tort analysis denote§ a methodology that anSwerS on A. CaseAy-case basis the . . central qiiestion of whether to recognize a private damages action under a state constitutiofi:' s-ee Katzberg, .58 P.3d at 355. To thafend, the California Supreme Court relies on § 874.A 6f the Restatement (Second.) of Tort..5, which several authorities have also deseribed a.S- reflected' or illtistrated . in the Biutms decision, although that decision makes no explicit referehee to the Restatement approach. • See id. at 355.-57: see also BrOtim; .674 l'4'.R26.. at 1138. Section 874A o.F the R.-:statement pr6videS•that if • a • Provision protects a. • -class • 6f personš- by • proscribing,or .3xquiring• certain..conduct but . does. . not provide a civil remedy for the violation,:the • •cOurt may proVide .suCh • rethedy -.if (1): 3:!:•••is. furtherance of the purpose of the .fproviSionj and damages' remain the only remedy at issue in this matter, -we express. no- view on the applicability of this framework to other- formise of 1renei... SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (CPI 1947A .11gr, 15. (2) is needed to .assure the effectiveness of the provision. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A (Am. Law Inst. 1.979); see also id. § 874A crnt. a. 'As we discuss in More detail beloW, the Restatement Uses a factor-based approach that incorporates flexibility, while encouraging • judiciousness in determining whether an at-issue self-executing provision is enforceable by the requested remedy in the absence of affirMative language to the contrary. It also incorporates a degree of deference to legislative determinations insofar as it directs courts to consider the existence of alternative legislatively enacted remedies. NeverthelesS, it does not treat legislative action as dispositive, whi.ch aligns with our acknowledgment in Alper that the Legislature lacks authority to curtail or weaken self-executing rights. See Alper,.93 Nev. at 572, 571 .P.2d.at 12. -Even if the constitutional-tort analysis faVors a damage§ action, the California Supreme Court determines third whether "any special factors counsel" ] hesitation in recognizing a damages action."• -Katzberg,. 58 P.3d at 350. This third step invo.kes Bivens and its progenY, as the U.S. Suprethe Court's Bivens jurispruden.ce has consistently relied on the absence or existence of special factors in ultimately recognizing or 'declining to recognize damages as an available remedy under the IJ.S. COnstitutibn for private actors. See id. at 358; see also Biuens, 403 U.S. at 396; Ziglar; — U.S. at , 137 S. Ct. at 1860. While we do not adopt the 'II& Supreme Court's current test for the so-called "BiVens action," w hold that consideration of these "special factors" further encourages cauticius and prudent judicial decision-making, . while- maintaining, fidelitY to our Separation-of-powers structure of governance.• See Ziglar, U.S. at' 1.37 S. Ct. at 1857-58 (explaining that "separation-of-Powers Principles .are ... central to the analysis" of Whether -a factor is "special". in that it SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10) 1947A 16 • „ cause[s] a court to hesitate"); cf. Comm'n on Ethics v. Hardy, 125 Nev. 285, 291-92, • 2:12 P.3d 1098, 1103 (2009) (explaining that- the Nevada Constitution has "embraced” the separation-of-powers d.octrine. "to prevent one branch of government from encroaching on t.he powers of another branch"). Based on the above discussion, we believe that the Katzberg framework. is persuasive and compatible with our caselaw on self-executing provisions. Accordingly, we formally adopt the Katzberg framework to resolve questions of whether a damages -aCtion• exists• to enforee selfexecuting provisions of the Nevada ConStitution. We now turn to aPplying thi.s framework.Article 1, Section 18 of the Nevada Con.stitution neither establishes nor precludes a private right of action for monetary relief for violations, of its guarantees As noted above, the Nevada Constitution guarantees "Mlle right of the people to be secure in their Persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches." 'Nev. Const. art. 1.; §,18. The provision unambiguously does not explicitly authorize a right of action for money damages; however, it unambiguously does not explicitly preclude a right. of action for money damages,. either. Further, Artici.e 1 of the Nevada Constitution does not otherwise contain a provision that expresslY provides or forecloses a right of action for money damages to enforce indiviclu.al. rights therein." "The two provisions of the Nevada Constitution that provide express rights of action were not ratified by the voters until 2006 and 2018, respectively. See Nev. Const. art. 15, § 16, cl. B (providing a right of"action against" an employer who violates minimum-wage requirements .of the section); Nev. Const. art. 1, § SA, cl. 4 (providing a right cf "action tc.compel a -Public officer or employee to carry oirt.any duty' of the section related tO SUPREME COURT DF NEVADA ith 1947A 'Moreover, nothi.ng in the language of the Nevada Constitution as a whole requires the Legislature to authorize suits against state aCtors for violations of the protections therein. See Alper, 93 Nev. at•572, 571 P.2d at 812. We cannot assume, as the NDOC parties suggest, thatthe absence of language providing a right of action fin- monetary relief establishes the converse. that none exists. Unlike the statutory-rights context, where we treat "legislative intent" as the "determinative factor" in consi.dering wh.ether the judiciary may imply a right of action to enforce-statutory rights, see Baldonado v.. Wynn Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 951, 958-59, 194 P.3d 96, 10001 (2008), in the constitutional-rights context, We "retain[] the authorityL-indeed the. duty—to vindicate the rights guaranteed by our Constitution,' Bauserman v. Unernp't Ins. Agency, No. 160813, N.W.2d , 2022 WL 2965921, at *6 (Mich. July 26, 2022); see also Nev. Const. art. 6, § 1 (vesting judicial power of the state in our courts). As the Michigan Supreme Court said of its own state's constitution, the Legislature's ability to 'create statutory rights "has no bearing on whether the • Legislature has the auth.ority to restrict rights -codified in the ConstitutiOn, ]et• Alone whether those rights rernain fallow without legislative.•ena.ctment." Bausermcin, 2022 WL 2965921, at *12. Constitutional rights must remain enforceable in. the absence of some action by the Legislature, or risk that constitution-al rights become all but "a mere hope." Id. at **1.1, 13. 'Therefore, we reject the. "rights" of a "victim of a crime"). Thus, those provisions do not. support the claim that Article 1, as originally ratified in 1864, provides. nO 'right of action absent express langua.ge or legislative authorization. Cf. Ranisey v. City of North Las Vegas, 133 Nev. 96, 98, 392 P.3d 614, 61.7 (2017) (explaining that "contemporaneous" interpretation "of a . -constitutional provision is a safe guide to its proper interpretation" (quoting Palverson v. Miller, 124 Nev. 484, 488-89, 186 P.3d 893, 897 (2008))). SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 101 1947A ^•k:—. 18 the NDOC parties' invitation to apply a Baldonado-type anAysis to the certified question. Nor can we assume one step further that only the Legislature possesses the authority to create a private damages action. Article 4 of the Nevada Constitution, which creates our state's legislative branch, does not commit to the Nevada Legislature the sole authority to recognize causes of action to enforce individUal rights. Cf. id. at *12 (discussing that a separation-of-powers form of governance eStablishes• eaCh. branch's "authority within its purview" but does not "explore the boundaries of that purview" (emphaSis omitted)), Article 4 states only that "[p]rovision may be made by general law for bringing.suit against the State as to all liabilitieS originating after the adoption of this Constitution." Nev. Const: art. 4, § 22. We haVe previously described. this language as "Vest[ind in the LegislatUre" the authority "to waive sovereign immunity:" 'See Fcheverrict; 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 49. 495 P.3d at 475 ("In: Nevada, •the power to waive so;iereign immunity is vested in the Legislature." (citing Nev. Con.st. art. 4, § 22)). But we do not read the authority to Waive the State's sOvereign itnin.u.n.ty Or the aiithority to establish th.e State's liabilities • to. unequivocally -VeSt•••-the Legislature wi.th the exclusive power to • recognize judicial ineCh.anisms to enforce: rights guaranteed by the .Nevada ConStitution.5 •,§ee: generally 5The waiver statUte 'provides that "[t]he State of Nevada 'hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby consents to have its liability determined in aCcordance wi.th the same rules' of law as are aPplied to civil actions againSt natural persons and corporatiOns,. ekcept as otherwise provided" in the statutory scheme. NRS 41,031(1). State,actrs are also. subject to liability based on the waiver.- cf. ',MIS. 4.1.0349 (indemnifying state actors who have "a judginent- . entered againSC them "based . on any act or ornisainn relating. to [their] publicduty or employment," except in limited, enumerated situations). The statutory scheme even SUPREME COURT or NEVADA t c.)) 1947A 19 Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Lau:: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 (20] 2) ("Noth.i.ng is to be added ta what the text States or reasona.bly implies . . . . That is, a matter not covered is td be treated as. riot covered."). As the NDOC parties point out, we have previously acknowledged the availability of certain forms of relief for constitutional violations that had at the time of our decisions already been legislatively authOrized. See, e.g., City of Sparks v. Sparks Mun. Court, 129 Nev. 348, 357, 362 P.3d 1118, 1124 (2013) (discussing availability 'of preliminary injunctive relief in a constitutional challenge); Tain v. Colton. 94 Nev.. 453, 455-56, 581 P.2d 447, 449-50 (1978) (concluding that appellant "ha[d] the requisite standing to challenge" the constitutionality of NR.S 396.040 and obtin declaratory relief). However, the legislatively •atithorized relief in both the declaratory-relief statute, N.RS 30.040, and-the injunctive-relief staiute, NRS 33.010, does not apply solely to, or even exPressly mention, constitutional challenges. Importantly, we have never suggested. that the av7lability of the relief necessarily depended dn the legislative authorization, as such a suggestion conflicts with ou.r und.erstanding of selfexecuting prOvisions described above. See Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W2d 844, 865 (Iowa 2017) ("It would be ironic indeed if the enforcement of individual rights and liberties in the Iowa Constitution, designed to ensure that basic rights and . liberties were immune •from majoritarian • impulses', 'weTe aPpears to assume that a right of action under the Nevad.a 'Constitution already exists. See, e.g., NRS 41.0334(1.), (2)(b) (providing immunity for situations that fall within the subsection but restoring the. waiver fOr "any • 1 action :for injury, wrongful death • or other damage" that results "from the depiivation of any rights, privileges. or immunities secured by the -United States Constitution or the Constitution of the State of Nevada"). SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA I( 1947A 20 dependent on legislative action for enforcement. It• is the state judiciary that has the responsibility• to protect the state constitutional -rights of the citizens."). And our decisions have, in other contexts, recogn.i.zed a cause of action under the Nevada Constitution, see, e.g., Fritz t). Washoe County, 132 Nev. 580, 583-84, 376 P.3d 794, 796 (2016) (nermitting an aggrieved party to file a claim for inverse condemnation against state actors to recover "just compensation" after "a governmental entity takes property without [such] coMpensation, or [without] initiating an eminent domain action"), defipite that it does not expressly provide one, see Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (guaranteeing "just compensation" for "[p]rivate property . . . taken. for public use"). Accord.ingly, we do not interpret the absence of language -in the Nevada Constitution regarding a private damages .aCtion• to enforce Article 1, Section 1.8 as a limitation on. the judiciary's inherent 'poWers to recognize such an action. See Nev. Const. art.- 6, § 1 (vesting the "[j] udicial power -of this State . . . in a court system, comprisi.ng a Supreme Ceuft,• a. court of appeals, district courts and justices of the peace"); see also Marbury, 5. U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). Ultimately; then, although the Nevada Constitution does not address' enforcernent of individual rights, it also does not foreclose an implied right of action for money damages based on violations of those rights. Confronted with no affirmative indication of inten.t, we accordingly move to step two .of our newly adopted framework. Aprilying the constitutional-tort analysis embodied in the Restatememt favors monetary .relief as an available remedy to vindicate righis guaranteed by the Nevada Constitution Article 1, 8ection As noted above, the Restatement indicates that a remedy should exi.st for violations of a prohibitory constitutional proVision if such a SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10) 19.17A 21. remedy is (1) "in furth.erance of the purpose of the" provision. and (2) "is needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision."6 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A (Am. Law Inst. 1979); se also id. § 874A cmt. a (applying the Restatement approach to constitutional provisions). The Restatement also lists several factors to consider in applying that analysis: (1.). "[t]he nature of the legislative provision," (2) "Mlle adequacy of existing remedies,' (3) the extent to which a tort action "supplement[1 or interfere [sl with" existing remedies and enforcement, (4), "[t]he SiOifiCance of the purpose" of the provision, '(5) "[t]he extent 'of the change in thrt law," .and (6) "[t]he burden" on the judiciary... See id. §. 87.4A cmt. h. However, ultimately, the Restatement recognizes judicial "discretion" and directs courts to use such discretion "cautiously an.d soundly." Id. § 874A cmt. d. As the Restatement's primary test considers • whethei; the proposed remedy iš' consistent with the purpose of and necessary t6 enforce the provision, the analysis necesSarily depends .ori ejdsting= alternative remedies. See id.• § 874A cmt. h(2). While the eXistence of alternative remedies represents only one of many factors, it may, depending on the circumstances, carry more 'weight than some of the other. factors 'set forth in the Restatement. See, e.g., Katzberg, 58 P.3d at 857 (applYing 'several factors hut. ultimately concluding that- "the availability: of -mean:tiled alternative remedies leads [the court] to decline to recognize" a d.amage'S action there); Bivens, 403 U:S. at 397 (discussing that nO "equally effeAiVe 'TY its terms, the Restatement analYsis applies. both tO legislative and constitutional provisions. Restatement (Second) of Torts §.874A cmt. a (Ain. Law Inst. 1979). By adopting the R.estatement in the constitutional• context, we clò not abrogate' our caselaw on ithplied. statutory rights of action: -.See Baidonado, 1.24 Nev. at 958-59, 194 P.3d at 101- (setting fora.). three factcTs for determining whether to "create a private judicial remedy").. SUPFIEME COURT OF NEVADA 1111 14.17A „le. CPQ remed.y was available for .appellant). But, here, the Legislature has not :`crafted a meaningful Alternative remedy for the constitutional violation[sl." See Binette u. Sabo, 71.0, A.2d 688, 697-98 (Conn. 1998). And. even if the Legislature has authorized injunctive and declaratory relief for such claims (an argument we questioned above), equitable relief rarely, if ever, suffices to remedy a past wrong, as Mack has assertedly suffered here. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409-10 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("For 'people in [appellant'si shoes, it is damages or nothing."); see also Bi-own, 674 N.E.2d at 114.1 (reasoning that injunctive and declaratory relief "fall shOrt"- Of deterring "invasion[s] of personal interests in liberty"). Similarly, we reject the NDOC parties' assertion th.at state tort law provides meaningful redress for invasions of the constitutional right at issue here. Although other courts have determined tort remedies suffice to compensate for personal invasions of certain constitutienal rights; See, e.g., Katzberg, 58 P.3d at 340, 356- (deeming defamation tort reinedies sufficient to compensate for harm based on a violation- of appellaiit'S due-proceSs liberty interest over the failure of uniVersity regents to provide him with a timely "name-clearing" hearing after his removal. as department chair a.t a univerSity medical center), we disagree that any commonalities between state tort-law claims and constitutional protections; see Grosjedn v. lniperial Palace, Inc., 125 Nev. 349, 370-71, 212 P.3d 1068, 1082-83 (2009) (precluding certain common-law tort -claims under "the general rule agairiSt double satisfaction" where those claims were premised orr-- violatiOns •of appellant's Fourth Amendthent rights for which he .had brought a cognizable § 1983 claim), provide meaningful recourse -for violatiens Of the constitutional. right against unreasonable searches• and • seizures by government agents, as state tort law ultiMately protects a.nd setves SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (th L9-17A 23 different in.terests than such constitutional guarantees, ixe Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394-95. A state actor's legal obligation under a state- .constitution "extends far beyond that of his or her fellow citizens" under tort law; accordingly, a state actor is "not only . . . required to respect the rights of other citizens" but also "sworn to protect and defend those rights." Binette, 710 A.2d at 698. Absent a damages remedy here, no mechanism exists to deter or prevent violati.on.s of important individual ri.ghts in situations like that allegedly exPerienced by Mack.' Thus, a damages remedy is warranted under this factor of the R.estatement test, as monetary relief remains necessary to enforce the provision for individuals i.n Mack's •shoes, and a damages remedy furthers the purpose of the search-and-seizure provision to the extent it acts as a deterrent to government illegality. Nor do any of the .other factors identified in the ReStatement disfavor a damages remedy here. The nature of the conStitutiOnal provision, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A cmt..h(1), 11(4) (Am. Law Inst. 1979), demands that this court• exercise its authority and respon.sibility tO enforce the limitations that the Nevada Constitution imposes on the State and its actors for such fundamental. rights, see Bauserman, -N.W.2d at _., 2022 WIL 2965921, at '6, 8. Further, conduct proscribed an.d regulated by the search-and-seizure provision has been well developed and mostly well settled by this court, such that a damages action will not create a. new burden on state actors or interfere with existing principles related to searchand-seizure jurisprudence. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A cmt. 'Because we find no. meaningful remedy already exists, we do . not need to reach the issue of what alternative or superseding remedies satisfy our newly ad.opted framework or our caselaw on self-executing provisions. See Alper, 93 Nev. at 572, 571 P.2d at 812 (explaining that self-executing provisions "cannot be abridged or impaired by statute"). SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA in) 1.447A Wjr. 24 h(3), h(5) (Ain. Law Ina. 1979). And, finally, we d.o not believe th.at any additional burden on the judici.ary as a result. of recognizing a' damages action for violations of Article 1, Section 18 of . the Nevada Constitution outweighs the need to recognize one where, as here, a fundamental right is implicated but no civil remedy i.s otherwise available. See id. § 874A cmt. h(6). Because the Restatement's constitutional-tort analysis favors a damages action to vindicate search-and-seizure rights under the Nevad.a Constitution, we accordingly move to the third and final. step of oUr -newly adopted framework. No special factors lead us to hesitate in recognizing a damages action to enforce Article I, Section 18 of the Nevada Constitution As mentioned above, the nonexhaustive "special factors" considered in the third step of the constitutional-tort framework we adopt today derive in part from Bivens, among other cases, and include ."deference to legislative judgment, avoidance of adverse policy conse,quences, considerations of government fiscal policy, practical issues of proof, and, the competence of courts to asseis particular types of damages." See .katzberg, 58 P.3d at 350. Applying theSe. factors, we conclude -that none disfavor a damages action here. First, no legislative judgments regarding a. damages action for constitutional violations exist to which to accord deference. Cf. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 1.1.S. 633, 650 (1990) ("Con.gressional inaction lacks 'persuasive significanee' because 'several equally tenable inferences' may be drawn' from such inaction." (quaing United :States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411. (1962))). Second, as to Policy consequ.ences, a' private right of action for money damages here would not impose new limitations on government conduct, given the already developed -statUs of search-and-seizure jurisprudence. Cf. Stctte v. Bayard., 119 Nev.: 241, 9,47, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (lb I 4/47A 25 P.3d 498, 502 (2003) (recognizing that a.n arrest in violation of NRS 484.795 violates the Nevada Constitution's search-and-seizure guarantees, even though it "does not offend the Fourth Amendment"). The lack of a damages remedy itself produces adverse policy consequences insofar as .it renders illusory the guarantees of the Nevada Constitution in situations like the present. Third, a private right of action fbr money damages does implicate legislative fiscal policy becausei as the Court has recOgriized, the Legislature has already decided to PresumptivelY •v;raive the•• State's sovereign immunity. See Echeverria, 137 Nbv., AdV. Op. 49, -495 -P.3d at 476.. In so doing, the Legislature has consented to damages liability, except as ' speCifically enumerated in the statutory-waiVer 'scheme: • Id:. In Echeverria, this court recognized as much when it held that NRS 41.031's waiver subjected the State to damages liability undet the Fait Labor Stand.ards ACt (HASA), even though: the waiver does not .mentiOn the State's liability under federal law.8 See id. at 476-77. And the Legislature -has airea.dy chosen to indeninify its employee§ for certain judgment§:- See NRS 41.0349 (setting forth parameters- for indemnification): •• Fourth and fifth, a damages action for retrOspective harni presents no practical issues of proof beyond • what the. judiciary handles every day. Nevada- courts routinely and competently a.ssess personal-injury SWe also note that the Legislature has capped damages. for claims "sounding in tort." See NRS 41.085(1). While this matter does not .ptesent the need • to :reach whether the damages action we recognize today falls within the statutory cap's ambit, we observe that the issue nf wheth.ersuch an action "sound[s] in tort has the potential to affect the: extent of the State's [da.mages] liability." See Echeverria, 137 Nev:, Adv.- Op.49, 495 P.34 at 476 n.6 (emphasis omitted). SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA ( 0) 1 ,147A 26 type• d.amages, including inherently subjective damages. See, e.g., Guar. Nat, Ins. Co.. v. Potter, 112 Nev. 199: 206-07, 91.2 P.2d .267, 272 (1996) (affirming an award of compensatory damages unless the a.ward . is '.`k) excessive" a.S to shock the conscience). Damages simply do not represent a "revolutionary" or remarkable remedy. See, e.g., Bauserrnan, N.W.2d at 2022 WL 2965921, at **9-10 ("We share this view and make the unremarkable observation that damages are an available remedy for t.he state's cOnstitutional violations."). Damages remain a traditional-Land indeed, a preferred—remedy for legally recognized wrongs. C4 Korte Constr. Co. u: State ex rel. Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Ethic:, 137 Nev. 378, 378, 492 P.3d 540, 541 (2021) ("Nevada recognizes that equitable remedies are •. generally not avalla.ble where the plaintiff has a full and adequate remedy at law."). And we have observed, seemin:gly- without controversy, the availability of equitable remedies to redress constitutional. violations, despite that none of the at-issue constitution.al ,provisions expressly provide for such remedies. E.g.., City of Sparks u. Sparks Mun. Court, 129 Nev: 348. 357, 302 P.3d 1118, 1- 1.24 (2013) (discussing availability of preliminary injunctive relief in a constitutional. challenge). None of the parties have offered any sou.nd basis to treateqUitable remedies differently from legal remedies for purposes of recognizing a private right of action here. See- Bauserman. N.W.2d at 2022 W.L.2965921, st *1.1 (discussing that there is no "specific reaSon" •to treat enforcement -of constitutional rights through Monetary relief any differently froin cases permitting injunctive relief, despite an absence of explicit legislative authorization). Thus, the "special factors" identified-in the framework ,Vve have adopted today support that Mack maY bring a priVate right 'of action for money damages to enforce her ,search-and-seiziarerights under Nevada SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4(11 I'47A 44,14, 27 • 1.aw, Accordingly, we answer the first rephrased certified questiän in the affirmative: a private right of action under Article 1, Section 18 for retrospective monetary relief exists. Certified Question 2: Qualified immunity is not a defense to an implied private right of action for retrospective monetary relief under the 1Vevada Constitution Article 1, Section 18 Mack argues that qualified im.rnunity i.s not avail.able because it is a federal doctrine that deals only with clearly established federal law. By co-ntraSt, the NDOC payties contend that 'we must - adopt qualified immunity as a defense to mitigate the substantial costs to ensue if we also extend a Bivens rationale to the Nevada Constitution. Qualified immunity is a federal, judicially created. doctrine that immunizes state, local, and federal officials from liability for discretionary functions unless (1) the official violated a federal constitutional right, and (.2) -the right was cl.early established at the time the. challenged .conduCt occurred. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 243 (201.4); see also .Pagán -v. Calderón, 448 F.3d 16, 31 (1st. Cir. 2006) ("Qualified iminunitY is a judgemade doctrine . . . ."). Oth.er courts agree that qualified immunity, as a federal doctrine, does riot protect governin.ent official's from liability under state law. E.g., Johnson v. Bay .4rea Rapid Transit Dist.-, 724. F.3d. 1159, 1171. (9th Cir. 2013); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 200.7); Samuel v. Holmes, 138.F.ad 173, 179 (5th Cir. 1998); Andreu v. SaPp, 919 F.2d 637, 640 (11th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, we have applied-qualified immunity only in the context 'of federal-law claims. See; e:g., GroSjeah, 125 Nev. at 359-61, 212 P.3d at 1076-77 (addressing whether privAte actOrs could claim qualified inimunity from apPellant's 42 U.S.C. § 198.3 ciairn). Instead., the 'availability of qualified immunity for state-law claims depends on whether state law authorizes such an immunity. E.g., Jenkins, 478 F:3d SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 28 at 86 (applying a doctrine "under New York" law that is "similar" to qualified immunity under federal law.). In contrast to our authority to d.etermine that Article 1, Section 18 is enforceable by a damages action, only the Legislature retains "the power to waive sovereign immunity." Echeverria, 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 49, 495 P.3d at 475. As stated above, the Legislature has exercised that power in NRS 41.031(1). Id. "The plain language of NRS 41.031(1) waives the State's [and a state actor's] immunity from liability unleSs an express exception to the waiver app.lies" to restore that immunity. id. at 476. We have emphasized that "Nevada's. qualified waiver of sovereign- immunity is to be broadly construed." Id: (quoting Martinez v. .Mdruszczak, 123' Nev: 433, 441., 168 P.3d 720, 725 (2007)). Accordingly, we have "repeatedly refused to imply provisions not expressly inClu.ded in the legislative scheme regarding Nevada's immunity waiver.. Id. (quOting Zenar -c) State; De,0 Transp., 134. Nev. 109, 11.0, 412 P.3d 28, 30 (2018)). WHe Several "exCeptions to, and limitations On, the waiver" exist-, id.; the LeeiSlature has not provided for a state-law equivalent of qualified iinniurdty in thernanner it exists under federal law, see NRS 41..032-.0337 (providing circumstances under which sovereign immunity has been restored). Absent Such express exception to the Waiver of immunity, we cannot supply the defense-. of qualified immunity to claiins under the Nevada. ConStitution. ..teheyerra; 137 Nev., Adv. fjp. 49, 495 P.3d at.476 ("If the Legislature meant to-pasS'-a law. that waived immunity froth one category of liabilities only, it could easily have done so expressly:). OtherwiSe, we threatOn'to "Un.dermine thi [S]tate'S public policy, refleCtedinNRS 41.031., 'that [state actOzsi should generally take -responsibility when [they]. coinmitif .wrongs.' Id. Accotdingly. qualified immunity, as that doctrine is understood . under SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA ith 1,147A 043:2:fg. 29 federal law, is not a defense available to state actors sued for violations of the _individual rights enumerated in Nevada's Constitution.. Thus, -we answer the second. rephrased certified question, in the negative:. qualified immunity is not a defense to a private damages action under Article 1, Section 18. CONCLUSION Today, we consider four questions certified to us by the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada .regarding the remedies and defenses .available for private plaintiffs to enforce due-process and 'searchand-seizure rights under our Nevada Constitution. However, NR.AP 5 calls on us to exercise our discretion to answer only determinative and concrete certified questions. With those rules in mind, we decline to answer the first certified question and elect to .rephrase the rernaining three certified questio.ns. in answering the certified questions as rephrased, we conclude first that, yes, a private'right of acti.on against state actors for retrospective monetary relief exists to enforce search-and-seizure rights under ArtiCle 1, Section 18 of the Nevada Constitution. ln reaching this conclusion, we recognize that it is not necessary for the Nevada Con.stitution to expressly confer such a remedy, nor for the Nevada Legislature to exPresSly authorize one, because the search-and-seizure rights are self-executing limitations on, and thus inherently enforceable against, arbitrary abuse' of government power. And while we acknowledge our a'uthority And obligation to enforce the Nevada Constitution, we adopt today a framework for anSweririg whether a self-executi.ng provision of the Nevada • Constitution. is enforceable through a damages remedy that we believe harmonizes our understanding of sel.f-executing provi.sions with our 'desire to defer' to SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 1947A 30 ..... '1. 'A- '7 7 legislative judgments, protect fundamental rights, and exercise caution in judicial decision- m a king. Applying this framework, we ask whether the language and history of the at-issue constitutional provision establishes an 'affirmative indication of intent to provide or withhold the requested rernedy. and if so, enforce that apparent intent. However, because the Nevada Constitution specifies no such intent for search-and-seizure rights, we consider whether the several factors set forth in § 874A of the Restatement •(Second) of Torts favor the requested remedy. Applying this constituti.onal-tort analysis, the lack of any remedy for individuals in Mack's shoes- to enforce fundainental rights against unreasOnable searches and seizures leads us to conClude that a damages.remedy remains essential to effectuate and advance the goals of Article 1, Section 18. 'Because we conclude that cOmideration of that and other factors favors a damages action., we turn to the final step• and determine whether any special • factors counsel hesitation 9.gainet recognition. Concluding,• however, that a damages a.ction here -does not implicate any of the identified special factors, we hold that Mack's elairn for money damages under Article 1, Section -18 of the NeVada CenstitutiOn is cogniza.ble. Having answer d the first rephrased certified question in the affirmative, we respond to the second rephrased certified ..qUestion and conclude that, no, qualified immunity, a federally Created doctrine, is'not .a defense to claims under Arti.cle 1, Section 18 -of the Nevada Gonstitiltion in the absence .of legislative authorization.. • As only the Legislature may Waive sovereign immunity of state actors, so too only the Legislature rnify restore sovereign immunity to state actors. • It i.s net within ou.r inherent judicial SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A alia.e, 311 power to create exceptions to sovereign immunity ai.• to the waiver of sovereign immunity. Appellant Sonji.a. Mack visited HDŠP, where; allegedlywithout, consent or suspicion, she was subjected to a strip search by NDOC employees. In holding that she may seek money damages for harm suffered from violations of her search-and.-sei.zure rights under the Nevada Constitution, Article I., Section 18, we do not create a new cause of action.. We simply recognize th.e lóng-Standing legal princiPle that a rit.thtdoes not, as a practical. matter, exist. without any remedy for its enforcement. Cadish We coneur: , Parraguirre Stiglich A Pickering Herndon SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA IC » I 94 7A 32 Primary Holding The Supreme Court held that a private right of action for money damages exists to vindicate questions of search-and-seizure rights under the Nevada Constitution but that a qualified immunity defense does not apply to such an action. Disclaimer: Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. Contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does not create an attorney-client relationship. Mack v. Williams Primary Holding The Supreme Court held that a private right of action for money damages exists to vindicate question... Read the full annotations for this case. Webinars You Might Like: Please visit individual webinar pages for more information about CLE accreditation.