Title: State v. Harvill
Citation: 106 Ariz. 386, 476 P.2d 841
Docket Number: 1983
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: November 16, 1970

106 Ariz. 386 (1970) 476 P.2d 841 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Kenneth Wayne HARVILL, Appellant. No. 1983. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. November 16, 1970. *387 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Carl Waag, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender, by James H. Kemper, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant. HAYS, Justice. Appellant, Kenneth Wayne Harvill, was tried before a jury and convicted of attempted armed robbery and sentenced to serve not less than four nor more than five years in prison. Appellant now comes to this court alleging that the trial court committed reversible error in denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict and for improperly instructing the jury on the probative value of circumstantial evidence. The testimony at the trial revealed the following factual situation. The Phoenix Police Department received a tip that the El Maya Restaurant was to be robbed on October 22, 1967. On this date five officers from the police department staked out the restaurant. Two officers concealed themselves in a camper parked in the restaurant parking lot. Two officers concealed themselves across the street from the restaurant. A fifth officer, Officer Dowdy, went into the restaurant at approximately closing time, identified himself, and explained his purpose. Shortly thereafter, Officer Dowdy left the restaurant carrying a money bag and started walking across the restaurant parking lot toward a white Pontiac belonging to the owner of the El Maya. As the officer crossed the parking lot he observed a man approaching him. This man, later identified as Peter Barraza, Jr., followed behind Officer Dowdy until they approached the white Pontiac. At this time Officer Dowdy dropped the money bag, turned and identified himself as a police officer, and ordered the man to halt. When this man appeared to raise his right arm Officer Dowdy fired at him. When Officer Dowdy began firing on Barraza another officer, Officer Ysasi, began firing at Barraza from the camper. Barraza was wounded three times by the officers' gunfire. At the time of the incident in question appellant was standing near a tree at the rear of the restaurant parking lot. Officer Hemphill, who was concealed in the camper testified that he had observed appellant standing near this tree approximately fifteen to twenty minutes prior to the shooting. The officer testified that he kept appellant under surveillance from the time he first saw him until Officer Dowdy came out of the restaurant. He momentarily looked at Officer Dowdy and then turned his attention back to appellant until the incident was over. On direct examination, Officer Hemphill testified as follows regarding his observation of appellant: Officer Hemphill also testified that after he took Harvill over to the camper he went back to where Harvill had been standing. While inspecting the area he observed a gun lying approximately six to eight feet southwest of where appellant had been standing. At the trial, Barraza testified for the state. His testimony indicated that appellant had first approached him about committing a robbery. Barraza testified that according to the plan he was supposed to actually commit the robbery while appellant would act as a back-up man. He also testified that both he and appellant were armed with .22 caliber pistols. The state also introduced the testimony of Gary Hocker who lived behind the restaurant. Hocker testified that he observed appellant and Barraza talking earlier in the evening and that he observed the entire incident at the restaurant. At the close of the state's case appellant moved for a directed verdict as to the charge of attempted armed robbery. The motion was denied. The defense presented no witnesses so the case went to the jury upon the basis of the testimony of the state's witnesses. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the charge of assault with a deadly weapon, however; appellant was convicted of the charge of attempted armed robbery. We will first consider appellant's argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict on the charge of attempted armed robbery. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that this court, on review of the lower court's denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict, must view the facts most strongly in favor of upholding the verdict of the jury. State v. Acosta, 101 Ariz. 127, 416 P.2d 560 (1966); State v. Turner, 101 Ariz. 85, 416 P.2d 409 (1966). We have also held that the trial court does not have to direct a verdict where there is substantial evidence that the defendant committed the crime charged. State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 453 P.2d 951 (1969); State v. Williams, 104 Ariz. 319, 452 P.2d 112 (1969). A motion for a directed verdict does not question the competency of the evidence only its sufficiency. State v. Acosta, supra; State v. Holliday, 92 Ariz. 168, 375 P.2d 370 (1962). This court has held that the crime of criminal attempt consists of (1) an intent to commit the crime, and (2) some step or overt act toward the commission of the crime. State v. McCullough, 94 Ariz. 209, 382 P.2d 682 (1963). See also State v. Mandel, 78 Ariz. 266, 278 P.2d 413 (1954); State v. Westbrook, 79 Ariz. 116, 285 P.2d 161, 53 A.L.R.2d 619 (1954); State v. Vann, 11 Ariz. App. 180, 463 P.2d 75 (1970). The testimony of Barraza taken as true, was sufficient to enable the jury to find that appellant had the necessary intent to commit the crime charged. Similarly, the testimony of Barraza coupled with that of the other witnesses was sufficient *389 to enable a jury to find that appellant had committed an overt act or taken a step toward the commission of the crime charged. The testimony reveals that appellant was, as planned, standing near the tree as a back-up man for Barraza. It appears that appellant did all that was required of him up until the time the shooting began. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict. Appellant's second assignment of error is that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that "[T]he law makes no distinction between the weight given to either direct or circumstantial evidence." Appellant cites as authority this court's opinion in State v. Reynolds, 104 Ariz. 149, 449 P.2d 614 (1969) where we said: See also: State v. Parra, 104 Ariz. 524, 456 P.2d 382 (1969); State v. Miller, 104 Ariz. 335, 452 P.2d 509 (1969); State v. Hughes, 102 Ariz. 118, 426 P.2d 386 (1967); State v. Alkhowarizmi, 101 Ariz. 514, 421 P.2d 871 (1966); State v. Thompson, 101 Ariz. 38, 415 P.2d 566 (1966); State v. Turner, 101 Ariz. 85, 416 P.2d 409 (1966); State v. Bearden, 99 Ariz. 1, 405 P.2d 885 (1965); State v. Cox, 93 Ariz. 73, 378 P.2d 750 (1963); State v. Tigue, 95 Ariz. 45, 386 P.2d 402 (1963); State v. Evans, 88 Ariz. 364, 356 P.2d 1106 (1960); State v. Andrade, 83 Ariz. 356, 321 P.2d 1021 (1958); State v. Butler, 82 Ariz. 25, 307 P.2d 916 (1957). The United States Supreme Court in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S. Ct. 127, 99 L. Ed. 150 (1954) held that no distinction exists between circumstantial evidence and direct evidence: A similar view was expressed by the Honorable Learned Hand in United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir.1933). Referring to the alleged error of the trial court in failing to instruct the jury as to the weight of circumstantial evidence, he said: Professor Wigmore discussing the relative probative value of direct and circumstantial evidence concluded: One of the most lucid examinations of the probative value of circumstantial evidence was made by the Honorable Judge Furman in Ex Parte Jefferies, 7 Okl.Cr. 544, 124 P. 924 (1912). Speaking on the issue of the probative value of circumstantial evidence the court said: See: Rodella v. United States, 286 F.2d 306, 312 (9th Cir.1960); Lukon v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 131 F.2d 327 (3d Cir.1942); Commonwealth v. Woong Knee New, 354 Pa. 188, 47 A.2d 450, 454-455 (1946); People v. Hales, 23 Cal. App. 731, 735, 139 P. 667, 668 (1914); State v. Marren, 17 Idaho 766, 107 P. 993, 1000-1001 (1910); Spick v. State, 140 Wis. 104, 121 N.W. 664, 668-669 (1909); 3 Wharton, Criminal Evidence 472 (12 ed. 1955); Wigmore, The Science of Judicial Proof, §§ 320, 321 (3d ed., 1937). It is the opinion of this court that the probative value of direct and circumstantial evidence are intrinsically similar; therefore, there is no logically sound reason for drawing a distinction as to the weight to be assigned each. We expressly overrule that portion of State v. Reynolds, supra, and any other decision of this court which is contra to our holding in the instant case. We are aware that as a result of this holding it is no longer necessary to instruct the jury regarding the "reasonable hypothesis" theory of circumstantial evidence where the jury is properly instructed as to "reasonable doubt." A proper instruction on "reasonable doubt" as applied to all kinds of evidence gives the jury an appropriate standard upon which to make a determination of guilt or innocence; to instruct further is to invite the confusion of semantics. It is necessary, therefore, for us to expressly overrule the many decisions of this court which have held that it is fundamental error for the trial court to fail to instruct on the probative force of circumstantial evidence if the prosecution must rely exclusively thereon for a conviction. See, e.g., State v. Bloom, 105 Ariz. 332, 464 P.2d 615 (1970); State v. Valdez Padilla, 105 Ariz. 214, 462 P.2d 82 (1969); State v. Bradley, 102 Ariz. 482, 433 P.2d 273 (1967); State v. Tigue, 95 Ariz. 45, 386 P.2d 402 (1963); State v. Cox, 93 Ariz. 73, 378 P.2d 750 (1963). Consequently, we find no merit in appellant's contention that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that the law makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed. LOCKWOOD, C.J., STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and UDALL and McFARLAND, JJ., concur.