Title: State v. City of Oak Creek
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP002188
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 10, 2000

2000 WI 9 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-2188 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
City of Oak Creek,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  223 Wis. 2d 219, 588 N.W.2d 380 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 10, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 6, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Christopher R. Foley 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BABLITCH and BRADLEY, J.J., join the dissent. 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Joanne F. Kloppenburg, assistant attorney general 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
Lawrence J. Haskin, City Attorney and Lawrie J. Kobza, Richard L. 
Bolton, M. Tess O’Brien-Heinzen and Boardman, Suhr, Curry & 
Field, LLP, Madison and oral argument by Lawrence J. Haskin. 
 
2000 WI 9 
  
 
 
1 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 97-2188 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Oak Creek,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   The attorney general, claiming 
to be acting on behalf of the State of Wisconsin, brought an 
action for injunctive relief under Wis. Stat. §§ 30.294, 823.01, 
and 832.02 (1995-96)1 to require the city of Oak Creek to remove 
a concrete channel from a quarter mile length of Crawfish Creek, 
a tributary that flows through the city.  The attorney general 
alleged that Wis. Stat. § 30.056, which exempts the city of Oak 
Creek from certain permit requirements related to the concrete 
channel, is unconstitutional.  The attorney general also alleged 
that the concrete channel creates a public nuisance under both 
Wis. Stat. § 30.294 and the common law.  The Milwaukee County 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 text unless otherwise noted.  
FILED 
 
FEB 10, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark, Acting 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
2 
Circuit Court, the Honorable Christopher R. Foley presiding, 
agreed that the statute is unconstitutional and ordered the 
concrete channel's removal.  The city of Oak Creek appealed.  
The court of appeals reversed in a published decision, State v. 
City of Oak Creek, 223 Wis. 2d 219, 223, 558 N.W.2d 380 (Ct. 
App. 1998), holding that the attorney general may not challenge 
the constitutionality of § 30.056.  We affirm the court of 
appeals.  The legislature has not granted the attorney general 
the statutory authority to attack the constitutionality of 
§ 30.056.  Further, no other constitutional or common law 
doctrine gives the attorney general such authority.  Therefore, 
the attorney general lacks standing to bring this challenge. 
I. 
¶2 
Crawfish Creek is a navigable waterway that flows 
through Oak Creek.  The west branch of Crawfish Creek is an 
intermittent tributary of the Root River System.  In 1985, the 
city of Oak Creek (Oak Creek) lined one-quarter mile of the west 
branch with a concrete channel.  Oak Creek created the concrete 
channel in an effort to prevent local flooding and drainage 
problems that had damaged the area in the past, especially after 
the development of a nearby subdivision.   
¶3 
However, Oak Creek did not notify, or request a permit 
from, the DNR before the channel was built.  The DNR had 
previously warned Oak Creek that it must receive a permit to 
build any structure in the creek that would alter the creek's 
course because the creek is a navigable waterway.  When the DNR 
learned that the creek had been lined with a concrete channel 
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
3 
that alters the creek's course, it filed a petition with the 
Division 
of 
Hearings 
and 
Appeals 
of 
the 
Department 
of 
Administration seeking to restore the creek to its natural 
state.  The DNR alleged violations of Wis. Stat. §§ 30.12,2 
30.195,3 and 30.294.4    
¶4 
In 1991, the hearing examiner found, after a contested 
hearing, that Oak Creek violated Wis. Stat. §§ 30.12, 30.195, 
and 30.294 in lining the creek bed with concrete.  A number of 
findings of fact were made regarding the significance of the 
creek as a wildlife habitat and the concrete channel's adverse 
                     
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 30.12(1) provides, in part: 
[U]nless a permit has been granted by the 
department pursuant to statute or the legislature 
has otherwise authorized structures or deposits 
in navigable waters, it is unlawful: 
(a) To deposit any material or to place any 
structure upon the bed of any navigable water 
where no bulkhead line has been established; or 
(b)  To deposit any material or to place any 
structure upon the bed of any navigable water 
beyond a lawfully established bulkhead line. 
 
  The DNR apparently relied upon the statutory provisions 
from 1987-88, which are essentially the same as the 1995-96 
provisions quoted here. 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 30.195(1) provides:  "No person may 
change the course of or straighten a navigable stream without a 
permit issued under this section or without otherwise being 
expressly authorized by statute to do so."  
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 30.294 provides:  "Every violation of 
this chapter is declared to be a public nuisance and may be 
prohibited by injunction and may be abated by legal action 
brought by any person."  
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
4 
effects on that habitat.  The hearing examiner ordered Oak Creek 
to take out the concrete and restore the creek bed.   
¶5 
Oak Creek pursued judicial review of the decision and 
order in circuit court.  At the same time, the Wisconsin 
Legislature 
enacted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 30.055 
(1991-92),5 
which 
exempted Oak Creek from the necessity of acquiring a permit for 
the concrete channel and also permitted the concrete channel to 
remain in the creek.  The legislature passed § 30.055 as part of 
the state budget bill.  The effect of § 30.055 was to override 
the requirements of Wis. Stat. §§ 30.12, 30.195, and 30.294. 
¶6 
In response to the creation of Wis. Stat. § 30.055, 
the state public intervenor6 moved to intervene in the ongoing 
circuit court case to challenge the statute's constitutionality. 
 The 
Milwaukee 
County 
Circuit 
Court 
granted 
the 
public 
intervenor's motion.  In a decision dated March 2, 1993, the 
                     
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 30.055 provided: 
Exemption 
from 
certain 
permit 
requirements.  
Notwithstanding ss. 30.12, 30.19, 30.195 and 
30.294, the city of Oak Creek may not be required 
to remove any structure or concrete or other 
deposit that was placed in Crayfish Creek in the 
city of Oak Creek before June 1, 1991, and may 
continue to maintain the structure, concrete or 
deposit without having a permit or other approval 
from the department. 
 
6 The 
state 
public 
intervenor 
formally 
intervenes 
in 
administrative proceedings "to protect public rights in water 
and other natural resources, with the approval of the public 
intervenor board."  Wis. Stat. § 23.39(2)(a)-(b).  The public 
intervenor used to be an assistant attorney general, Wis. Stat. 
§ 165.07 
(1981-82), 
but 
the 
position 
now 
exists 
in 
the 
Department of Natural Resources.  Wis. Stat. § 23.39. 
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
5 
circuit 
court, 
the 
Honorable 
George 
A. 
Burns 
presiding, 
concluded that the method by which the statute was created 
violated Wis. Const. art. IV, § 18.7  Moreover, the circuit court 
found that as a navigable waterway, the creek needed to be 
restored.  Finally, the court concluded that the statute 
violated equal protection under Wis. Const. art. I, § 1 and the 
Public Trust Doctrine under Wis. Const. art. IX, § 1. 
¶7 
Oak Creek appealed the decision.  The court of appeals 
affirmed.  The court of appeals held that Wis. Stat. § 30.055 
was unconstitutional according to the two-part "methodology for 
determining whether a bill or statute violates Wis. Const. art. 
IV, § 18."8  City of Oak Creek v. DNR, 185 Wis. 2d 424, 442, 518 
N.W.2d 276 (Ct. App. 1994).  The court of appeals also held that 
credible 
and 
substantial 
evidence 
supported 
the 
hearing 
examiner's findings that the creek is navigable and in need of 
restoration.  Id. at 433-434. 
¶8 
In its 1994 decision, the court of appeals determined 
that Wis. Stat. § 30.055 did not deserve a presumption of 
constitutionality.  Id. at 437-39.  The court of appeals also 
                     
7 Wisconsin Const. art. IV, § 18 provides:  "No private or 
local bill which may be passed by the legislature shall embrace 
more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the 
title."    
8 That methodology was set forth by this court in Davis v. 
Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 520, 480 N.W.2d 460 (1992), which 
stated that the first inquiry involves "whether the process in 
which 
the 
bill 
was 
enacted 
deserves 
a 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality."  The second inquiry involves "whether the 
bill is private or local."  Id.   
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
6 
found that the legislation was a private or local law, because 
it was "geographically specific and entity specific."  Id. at 
440 (quoting Soo Line R.R. Co. v. DOT, 101 Wis. 2d 64, 75, 303 
N.W.2d 626 (1981), for the proposition that "[a] private law is 
generally viewed as one applying to or affecting a particular 
individual or entity").  Therefore, as a private or local law, 
the legislation was subject to Wis. Const. art. IV, § 18, which 
requires private or local laws to be passed in single-subject 
bills.  Id. at 442.  The court of appeals concluded that under 
art. IV, § 18, the statute was unconstitutional because it was 
not passed in a single-subject bill.9  Id. at 442-43. 
¶9 
In 1996 the legislature passed another bill that 
created an exemption for the channel.  This time, the bill was 
not enacted as part of a budget bill.  Assembly Bill 424 was 
introduced in the Assembly on June 1, 1995, as a bill pertaining 
to the destruction or damage of nonconforming structures in 
disasters unrelated to floods.  A later amendment to Assembly 
Bill 424 in the State Senate repealed Wis. Stat. § 30.055 and 
created Wis. Stat. § 30.056.  Senate amendment 1 stated in part: 
 
30.056  Exemption from certain permit requirements.  
Notwithstanding ss. 30.12, 30.19, 30.195 and 30.294, 
the city of Oak Creek may not be required to remove 
                     
9 Since the court determined that Wis. Stat. § 30.055 was 
unconstitutional under Wis. Const. art. IV, § 18, it did not 
address the circuit court's conclusions that § 30.055 violated 
equal protection or the Public Trust Doctrine.  City of Oak 
Creek v. DNR, 185 Wis. 2d 424, 434 n.3, 518 N.W.2d 276 
(1994)(citing Martinez v. DILHR, 160 Wis. 2d 272, 275 n.1, 466 
N.W.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 165 Wis. 2d 
687, 478 N.W.2d 582 (1992)).  
No. 
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7 
any structure or concrete or other deposit that was 
placed in Crayfish [sic] Creek in the city of Oak 
Creek before June 1, 1991, and may continue to 
maintain the structure, concrete or deposit without 
having a permit or other approval from the department. 
The Senate adopted the amendment and passed the amended bill.  
The Assembly also concurred in the bill as it was amended.  
Governor Thompson signed the amended bill, and it was published 
in 1996 as 1995 Wisconsin Act 455.   
 
¶10 In response, the attorney general commenced an action 
against the statutory exemption, claiming that the new statute 
was also unconstitutional.  The attorney general further claimed 
that the channel constituted a statutory public nuisance and a 
common law public nuisance.  The attorney general moved for 
summary judgment, and Oak Creek moved to dismiss the statutory 
public nuisance claim.  In a decision dated April 7, 1997, 
Circuit Court Judge Christopher R. Foley ruled in favor of the 
attorney general.  The circuit court found that the attorney 
general had standing to bring the action, that the statute was 
unconstitutional, and that the channel created a nuisance. 
 
¶11 On a second appeal by Oak Creek, the court of appeals 
reversed.  State v. City of Oak Creek, 223 Wis. 2d at 227.  The 
court of appeals held that the attorney general lacked standing 
to challenge the statute's constitutionality.  Id. at 227.  It 
based 
its 
reasoning 
on 
this 
court's 
decision 
in 
Public 
Intervenor v. DNR, 115 Wis. 2d 28, 339 N.W.2d 324 (1983).  
Public Intervenor held that legislative authority must support 
the actions of both the attorney general and his assistants, and 
that no such authority exists for any person from the attorney 
No. 
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8 
general's office to challenge the constitutionality of a law or 
rule.  115 Wis. 2d at 36-37.  The court of appeals reiterated 
"Public Intervenor's recognition that the attorney general in 
Wisconsin has limited powers and, accordingly, the 'duty to 
defend'not attack'the constitutionality of state statutes.'" 
 Oak Creek, 223 Wis. 2d at 227.  On that basis, the court of 
appeals concluded that the attorney general lacked the necessary 
statutory authority to challenge the constitutionality of the 
statute in this case. 
II. 
 
¶12 We begin by briefly relating the history of the 
attorney general's office in Wisconsin, because that history 
plays a significant role in our holding in the present case.  
The position of attorney general, as it now exists in the United 
States, had its genesis in England.  Scott Van Alstyne & Larry 
J. Roberts, The Powers of the Attorney General in Wisconsin, 
1974 Wis. L. Rev. 721, 723.  The kings of England appointed 
attorneys to represent them in court because they could not 
appear personally.  Id.  Of those attorneys, "the attorney 
general had become the only person who could take legal action 
in the name of the crown without special authorization."  Id. at 
724.  Essentially, "the attorney general became the legal 
advisor to the crown."  Id. at 724 n.17. 
 
¶13 Colonial 
governments 
preserved 
the 
position 
in 
America.  Id. at 726.  In approximately 1643, the first attorney 
general in the colonies appeared in Virginia.  Id.   
No. 
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9 
 
¶14 The office of attorney general in Wisconsin existed 
from the beginning of the Wisconsin territory in 1836.  Id. at 
731.  The Organic Act that created the territory provided for 
the appointment of an attorney10 to serve the territory.  Id. 
(citing Act of April 20, 1836, ch. 54, § 10, 5 Stat. 10.)   
¶15 The attorney general's office was proposed in a draft 
article at the first state constitutional convention in 1846.  
Van Alstyne & Roberts, 1974 Wis. L. Rev. at 731 (citing Wis. 
Const. art. IV, § 3 (1846)(proposed)).  The proposed article 
specified that the attorney general's powers and duties "shall 
be prescribed by law."  Id.  (quoting Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3 
(1846)(proposed)).  Wisconsin had two constitutional conventions 
because the first constitution was not ratified.  State v. 
Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 235 n.11, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998).  
Although the proposed 1846 constitution was rejected, the 
article pertaining to the attorney general was included in the 
1848 constitution, the constitution that was adopted.  Van 
Alstyne & Roberts, 1974 Wis. L. Rev. at 732. 
 
¶16 The territorial statutes and later the state statutes 
constituted the only law prescribing the attorney general's 
duties in 1848.  Id. (citing An Act Concerning the Attorney 
General, Wis. Laws 1848).  A revision of certain statutes in 
1849, as well as other miscellaneous references in the statutes 
to the attorney general, further defined those powers.  Id. at 
                     
10 The attorney general later became an elected office.  See 
Scott Van Alstyne & Larry J. Roberts, The Powers of the Attorney 
General in Wisconsin, 1974 Wis. L. Rev. 721, 732.    
No. 
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10
733.  Significantly, the statutes made no reference to any 
common-law powers.  Id. at 735-36. 
III. 
 
¶17 With this brief history in mind, we now address the 
issue presented before us:  whether the attorney general has 
standing to attack the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 30.056. 
A party has standing to challenge a statute's constitutionality 
if the party has a sufficient interest in the outcome of a 
justiciable controversy "'to obtain judicial resolution of that 
controversy.'"  Norquist v. Zeuske, 211 Wis. 2d 241, 247, 564 
N.W.2d 748 (1997)(quoting State ex rel. First Nat'l Bank of Wis. 
Rapids v. M&I Peoples Bank of Coloma, 95 Wis. 2d 303, 307-08, 
290 N.W.2d 321 (1980)).  Standing is determined by a two-step 
analysis.  Id.  A court must determine "(1) whether the 
plaintiff has suffered a threatened or actual injury, and (2) 
whether the interest asserted is recognized by law."  Id. at 
247-48 (citations omitted).   
¶18 We examine the second question in the standing 
analysis 
first 
because 
it 
is 
dispositive 
in 
this 
case.  
Determining whether the attorney general's asserted interest is 
recognized by law requires us to interpret Wis. Const. art. VI, 
§ 3.11  Interpretation of a constitutional provision is subject 
to de novo review.  Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d at 234; Thompson v. 
Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 N.W.2d 123 (1996)(citing Polk 
                     
11 The 1848 constitution moved the article pertaining to 
administrative officers to Article VI from its previous position 
in Article IV in the 1846 constitution.  
No. 
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11
County v. State Pub. Defender, 188 Wis. 2d 665, 674, 524 N.W.2d 
389 (1994)).  This court examines three sources in determining a 
constitutional provision's meaning:  "the plain meaning of the 
words in the context used; the constitutional debates and the 
practices in existence at the time of the writing of the 
constitution; and the earliest interpretation of the provision 
by the legislature as manifested in the first law passed 
following adoption."  Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 680.    
 
¶19 We begin with the plain meaning of Wis. Const. art. 
VI, § 3.  As stated above, art. VI, § 3 defines the scope of the 
attorney 
general's 
powers: 
 
"[t]he 
powers, 
duties 
and 
compensation of the . . . attorney general shall be prescribed 
by law."  This court has consistently stated that the phrase 
"prescribed by law" in art. VI, § 3 plainly means prescribed by 
statutory law.    
No. 
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12
¶20 The first case that examined this phrase was State v. 
Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 179, 190, 116 N.W. 900 
(1908).12  This court very clearly stated: 
 
In Wisconsin, otherwise than in many if not most 
states, the powers of the attorney general are 
strictly limited.  He is a constitutional officer, but 
by the constitution he is given only such powers as 
"shall be prescribed by law."  Sec. 3, art. VI, Const. 
 It is therefore essential to the maintenance of an 
action brought by the attorney general ex officio and 
sua 
sponte 
that 
we 
should 
find 
some 
statute 
authorizing it. 
Id.  The court held that the attorney general could not bring an 
action in circuit court to reclaim a corporation's assets and 
suspend or remove the corporation's officers, because the 
legislature had not "assert[ed] a public interest in some such 
situation sufficiently direct to warrant the state to bring 
suit."  Id. at 185.      
 
¶21 Similarly, this court held in State ex rel. Haven v. 
Sayle, 168 Wis. 159, 163, 169 N.W. 310 (1918), that the attorney 
                     
12 The dissent suggests at ¶84 that State v. Milwaukee Elec. 
Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 179, 116 N.W. 900 (1908), is 
"unpersuasive" precedent.  We recognize that Milwaukee Electric 
does 
not 
delve 
into 
an 
extensive 
exploration 
of 
the 
constitutional history underlying its decision.  However, that 
does not mean that Milwaukee Electric's holding is incorrect.  
State 
constitutional 
history 
strongly 
supports 
Milwaukee 
Electric's holding, as will be discussed later in this opinion. 
 Moreover, the rationale in Milwaukee Electric is logical.  The 
court examined the language in Wis. Const. art. VI, § 3 and 
appeared to base its holding on the plain meaning of the phrase, 
"prescribed by law."  Id. at 190.  As we stated in Thompson v. 
Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 N.W.2d 123 (1996), "the plain 
meaning of the words in the context used" is a valid method for 
interpreting a constitutional provision.     
No. 
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13
general "must find authority in the statute when he sues in the 
circuit court in the name of the state or in his official 
capacity."  In State v. Snyder, 172 Wis. 415, 417, 179 N.W. 579 
(1920), we reiterated that "[i]n this state the attorney general 
has no common-law powers or duties."  See also State ex rel. 
Jackson v. Coffey, 18 Wis. 2d 529, 538, 118 N.W.2d 939 (1963); 
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Smith, 19 Wis. 2d 577, 584, 120 N.W.2d 
664 (1963); State ex rel. Beck v. Duffy, 38 Wis. 2d 159, 163, 
156 N.W.2d 368 (1968)(abrogated on other grounds by State v. 
Antes, 74 Wis. 2d 317, 246 N.W.2d 671 (1976)).     
 
 
¶22 This court has further stated that "[t]he attorney 
general is devoid of the inherent power to initiate and 
prosecute 
litigation 
intended 
to 
protect 
or 
promote 
the 
interests of the state or its citizens and cannot act for the 
state as parens patriae."  In re Estate of Sharp, 63 Wis. 2d 
254, 261, 217 N.W.2d 258 (1974)(citing Arlen C. Christenson,13 
The State Attorney General, 1970 Wis. L. Rev. 298).  This is 
because the Wisconsin Constitution removed all of the attorney 
general's "powers and duties which were found in that office 
under common law."  Id.  Therefore, "[u]nless the power to 
[bring] a specific action is granted by law, the office of the 
attorney general is powerless to act."  Id.  Accordingly, this 
court held that the attorney general lacked statutory authority 
                     
13 Arlen C. Christenson was the Deputy Attorney General of 
Wisconsin from 1966-68, and he was the Executive Assistant 
Attorney General from 1968-69.  Arlen C. Christenson, The State 
Attorney General, 1970 Wis. L. Rev. 298.    
No. 
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14
to intervene in estate proceedings, and as such, he was not an 
interested party and had no standing in the litigation.  Id.    
   
 
¶23 The most recent case in which we examined the attorney 
general's powers was Public Intervenor v. DNR, 115 Wis. 2d 28, 
339 N.W.2d 324 (1983).  In Public Intervenor, we held that the 
public 
intervenor 
lacked 
standing 
to 
challenge 
the 
constitutionality of an administrative code rule.  115 Wis. 2d 
at 41.  The court noted that not only was there no "statutory 
provision giving the attorney general or his assistants the 
power to challenge the constitutionality of a law or rule of 
this state or one of its agencies," but, "[t]o the contrary, it 
is the attorney general's duty to defend the constitutionality 
of state statutes."14  Id. at 36-37 (citation omitted).  The 
court explained that the rules applicable to the attorney 
general applied to the public intervenor, who was an assistant 
attorney general at the time.  Id. at 37. 
 
¶24 In sum, it is well established by case law that 
according to the plain meaning of Wis. Const. art. VI, § 3, the 
attorney general's powers are prescribed only by statutory law. 
  
 
¶25 Underlying the long-settled decisions regarding the 
attorney general's powers and duties is the history of art. VI, 
                     
14 The attorney general has similarly recognized his duty to 
defend the constitutionality of the statutes stating, "[o]nce 
legislation is enacted it becomes the affirmative duty of the 
Attorney General to defend its constitutionality."  71 Op. Att'y 
Gen. 195, 196 (1982).  
No. 
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15
§ 3.  The history of art. VI, § 3 suggests that the drafters of 
the Wisconsin Constitution intended the Wisconsin statutes to be 
the sole authority for the attorney general's powers. 
 
¶26 The first convention did not preserve a record of its 
debates.  Alice E. Smith, 1 The Hist. of Wis. at 656 (1985).  
However, 
the 
provision 
as 
stated 
in 
the 
rejected 
1846 
constitution is still helpful.  It stated:  "[t]he powers, 
duties, and compensation of the . . . attorney general, shall be 
prescribed by law.  Each of said officers shall receive as a 
compensation for his services yearly, a sum to be prescribed by 
law."  Wis. Const. art. IV, sec. 3 (1846).  The statement 
concerning compensation clearly refers to statutory law, since a 
salary cannot be determined by the common law.  This point was 
borne out in the 1848 statutes, which set the attorney general's 
salary at 800 dollars per year.  An Act Concerning the Att'y 
Gen., Sec. 8.  Laws of Wis., 1848 St.  Approved June 21, 1848. 
 
¶27 A debate from the second constitutional convention 
further illustrates that the drafters meant statutory law when 
they used the phrase, "provided by law."  Administrative Article 
sec. 3 was submitted in the same form as it was ultimately 
ratified.  Journal and Debates of the 1848 Const. Convention, 
Wednesday, Dec. 22, 1847.  A debate ensued, however, over a 
proposed amendment to the section that would "empower the 
governor to remove the treasurer from office in case of 
malfeasance."  Journal at 91.  Mr. Estabrook, a drafter, 
responded that he 
 
No. 
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16
thought they were encroaching too much upon the 
business of ordinary legislation.  The convention 
could not provide in detail how, by whom, and for what 
causes officers should be removed; and he gave notice 
that if this amendment should not prevail, he would 
offer one to the effect that officers might be removed 
in such manner as might be provided by law.  
Journal at 91 (emphasis added).  This passage, while discussing 
the state treasurer, exemplifies the drafters' intent that the 
law they referred to in this constitutional provision meant 
statutory law.  Mr. Estabrook's comment is also instructive 
because it explains why the drafters did not further detail the 
powers and duties of the attorney general or the treasurer.  
They carefully refrained from specifying the nature of these 
offices because they wanted the legislature to provide that 
detail.         
¶28 Smith likewise explained the attitude prevailing at 
the second constitutional convention toward the relationship of 
the state constitution and legislation: 
 
What [Marshall M. Strong-a drafter] found pleasing in 
the work of the second convention was a confidence in 
the discretionary ability of the people.  Rather than 
attempting 
to 
embody 
reform 
measures 
in 
the 
constitution, the convention was willing to leave 
decision-making 
to 
the 
people's 
elected 
representatives.  
Time 
and again 
the 
permissive 
phrases appeared in the document: "the Legislature may 
confer," "the Legislature shall provide for," "as the 
Legislature shall direct," "shall be fixed by law." 
Smith, 1 The Hist. of Wis. at 675.  In short, the drafters 
intended the constitution's phrase, "prescribed by law," to 
leave the decision-making regarding the attorney general's 
powers and duties to the legislature.   
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
17
¶29 Finally, we examine the early legislation interpreting 
art. VI, § 3.  We conclude that the legislature's codification 
of the attorney general's powers in specific statutes has 
precluded any common-law powers.  
¶30 The legislature manifested its interpretation of Wis. 
Const. art. VI, § 3 by prescribing the attorney general's powers 
in statutes.  Two weeks after the first elected attorney general 
took office in 1848, the state legislature passed An Act 
Concerning the Att'y Gen., Wis. Laws 1848, which precisely 
defined his powers and duties.15  Van Alstyne & Roberts, 1974 
                     
15 The act is quoted in full: 
The people of the State of Wisconsin, represented in 
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:  
 
Section 1.  The attorney general shall appear for 
the state in the supreme court in all prosecutions for 
crime, and also in the trial and argument in said 
court of all causes criminal or civil in which the 
state may be a party or interested. 
Sec. 2.  The attorney general shall also when 
required by the governor or either branch of the 
legislature, appear for the state in any court or 
tribunal in any other causes criminal or civil in 
which the state may be a party or be interested. 
Sec. 3.  The attorney General [sic] shall consult 
with and advise the district attornies of the several 
counties of the state whenever requested by them or 
any or either of them in all matters appertaining to 
the duties of their offices, and shall make and submit 
to the legislature at the commencement of the annual 
session thereof a report of all the official business 
done by him during the preceding year:  specifying the 
suits and prosecutions to which he may have so 
attended:  the number of persons prosecuted:  the 
crime 
for 
which, 
and 
the 
counties 
where 
such 
prosecutions were had:  the result thereof:  and the 
punishment awarded therefor. 
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
18
                                                                  
Sec. 4.  The attorney general shall when required 
attend the legislature during their session:  and 
shall give his opinion upon all questions of law 
submitted to him by either branch of the legislature; 
or by the governor; and shall give his aid and advice 
in the arrangement and preparation of legislative 
documents and business when required by either branch 
of the legislature. 
Sec. 5.  Whenever any demand shall be made of the 
executive of this state conformably to law for the 
delivery over any person charged with any crime 
committed in any other state or territory, it shall be 
the duty of the attorney general upon request of the 
governor, to give his opinion in writing upon all 
matters appertaining to such demand; and upon an 
arrest of such person so charged, shall when required 
appear in any court of this state to sustain the 
executive authority in ordering such arrest. 
Sec. 6.  The attorney general, before he enters 
upon the duties of his office shall execute unto the 
state of Wisconsin, a bond in duplicate, in the penal 
sum of ten thousand dollars, with not less than three 
sureties to be approved by the governor conditioned 
faithfully to perform and discharge the duties of 
attorney general for the state of Wisconsin, and to 
discharge 
the 
duties 
of 
one 
of 
the 
board 
of 
commissioners 
for 
the 
sale 
of 
the 
school 
and 
university lands and for the investment of the funds 
arising therefrom conformably to law, one of which 
bonds so executed in duplicate shall be filed in the 
office of the secretary of state, and the other in the 
office of the clerk of the supreme court. 
Sec. 7.  The legislature may from time to time 
require the attorney 
general 
to 
give 
additional 
security whenever it may be deemed expedient or 
necessary. 
Sec. 8.  The attorney general shall receive a 
salary of eight hundred dollars per annum to be paid 
to him out of the treasury of the state in equal 
quarterly payments which shall be in full for all 
services by him rendered both as attorney general, and 
as one of the board of commissioners for the sale of 
the school and university lands. 
Laws of Wis., 1848 St.  Approved June 21, 1848. 
   
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
19
Wis. L. Rev. at 732 n.64.  A number of statutes further defined 
the attorney general's powers in 1849.16  Id. at 733-34. 
¶31 Significantly, the chief revisor of the 1849 statutes, 
Charles M. Baker, relied primarily on New York law in drafting 
the statutory sections relating to the powers and duties of the 
attorney general.  Charles M. Baker Papers, Ms. Wis. State 
Historical Library, Box 10.  See also Van Alstyne & Roberts, 
1974 Wis. L. Rev. at 733 n.67.  His handwritten draft, “Of the 
Attorney General,” cites to 1 N.Y. R.S. 165 in the margins.  New 
York’s 1846 constitution describes the attorney general’s powers 
                     
16 The following 1849 statutory provisions relating to the 
attorney general were similar to the 1848 provisions:  the 
attorney general was to represent the state in all civil and 
criminal matters before the supreme court, and at the request of 
the governor or legislature at the circuit court; he was to 
represent the state in bond or contract actions if requested by 
the governor or other state officer; he was to advise the 
district attorneys, as well as render legal opinions to the 
legislature, executive officers, and state superintendent; he 
was to prepare legal forms for certain state officers and report 
to them on his cases; he was to pay all state funds that had 
been deposited into the state treasury; he was to record the 
actions he had been involved in; he was to take a constitutional 
oath and file bond; and he would be paid a salary of 800 dollars 
per year.  Van Alstyne & Roberts, 1974 Wis. L. Rev. at 733 
(citing Wis. 
Rev. 
Stat., 
ch. 
9, 
§§ 36-43 
(1849). 
 The 
legislature further expanded the attorney general's duties in 
other chapters.  He was ex officio member of the Board of 
Canvassers.  Wis. Rev. Stat. ch. 6 (1849).  At the governor's 
request, he was to investigate corporations and examine its 
records and officers.  Wis. Rev. Stat. ch. 54, § 22 (1849).  He 
also could bring quo warranto  actions.  Wis. Rev. Stat. ch. 
126, § 1 (1849).  Finally, he could prosecute visitorial powers 
over corporations, Wis. Rev. Stat. ch. 114, § 5 (1849), and 
subpoena witnesses without a fee and prosecute for contempt, 
Wis. Rev. Stat. ch. 131, § 57 (1849).  Van Alstyne & Roberts, 
1974 Wis. L. Rev. at 733. 
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
20
and duties almost exactly as Wisconsin does:  “the powers and 
duties of the attorney-general shall be such as now are or 
hereafter may be prescribed by law.”  People v. Dorsey, 29 
N.Y.S.2d 637, 642 (Queens County Ct. 1941).  In Dorsey, the 
court looked to that constitutional language to hold that the 
New York attorney general does not have any common law powers, 
and that the only powers the attorney general has are those 
specifically prescribed in the New York statutes.  Id. at 643.  
Therefore, Baker relied on laws that had similarly precluded the 
attorney general’s common-law powers.    
¶32 Essentially, as the legislature's conception of the 
attorney general's office grew, the legislature granted him more 
statutory powers.  Van Alstyne & Roberts, 1974 Wis. L. Rev. at 
734-35.  This evidence indicates that the legislature intended 
to prescribe specifically the attorney general's powers:  by 
defining what the attorney general's powers are in the statutes, 
the legislature demonstrated its intent to create a limited set 
of powers and duties for the attorney general.  
¶33 Therefore, 
in 
accord 
with 
almost 
100 
years 
of 
precedent and with constitutional history, we conclude that the 
attorney general's actions must be authorized by statute.  The 
attorney 
general 
is 
barred 
from 
challenging 
the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 30.056 because no statute 
grants him that authority. 
¶34 In this case, the attorney general lacks the statutory 
authority to bring suit for several reasons.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 165.25 sets forth the attorney general's powers and duties.  
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
21
Although § 165.25(1) grants the attorney general the authority 
to represent the state as a party in civil cases in circuit 
court, that authority is not equivalent to authority to 
challenge the constitutionality of state statutes.  Public 
Intervenor, 115 Wis. 2d at 36 (noting that even though § 165.25 
includes “representing the state” as one of the attorney 
general’s duties, that duty does not give rise to the power to 
challenge a statute’s constitutionality).  See also Sharp, 63 
Wis. 2d at 261.  Public Intervenor, 115 Wis. 2d at 36-37, 
expressly stated that the attorney general's duty is to defend, 
not challenge the state statutes' constitutionality.     
 
¶35 Furthermore, the attorney general has recognized that 
he has 
a statutory duty 
to defend 
the 
state 
statutes' 
constitutionality.  80 Op. Att'y Gen. 124, 128 (1991).  This 
court has similarly acknowledged the attorney general's duty to 
defend the state statutes.  In O'Connell v. Board of Educ., Jt. 
Dist. # 10, 82 Wis. 2d 728, 733, 264 N.W.2d 561 (1978), we 
stated that Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11) "recognizes that it is the 
duty of the attorney general to appear on behalf of the people 
of this state to show why [a] statute is constitutional."  See 
also Public Intervenor, 115 Wis. 2d at 37, Chicago & N. W. R. 
Co. v. La Follette, 27 Wis. 2d 505, 523, 135 N.W.2d 269 (1965); 
White House Milk Co. v. Thomson, 275 Wis. 243, 247, 81 N.W.2d 
725 (1957).  We therefore agree with Oak Creek's argument that 
because the attorney general must defend the constitutionality 
of the statutes, any challenge to the statutes on his part would 
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
22
conflict with his duty to defend, unless specifically authorized 
by statute.  (Resp. Br. at 13.)     
 
¶36 Finally, 
the 
attorney 
general 
attempts 
to 
find 
statutory authority to challenge the constitutionality of Wis. 
Stat. § 30.056, by claiming that if he has "specific statutory 
authority to sue," he can attack the constitutionality of the 
statute in that suit.  (Pet. Br. at 20.)  We find this argument 
unpersuasive.  The attorney general appears to argue that Wis. 
Stat. §§ 30.294, 823.01, and 832.0217 provide the necessary 
statutory authority to abate a public nuisance under Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.056.  However, those statutes do not provide specific 
authority to sue in this case because § 30.056 expressly negates 
                     
17 The attorney general’s brief appears to differ from the 
record as to the statutory provisions under which the attorney 
general brought this action.  The attorney general claims that 
he brought the action pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 30.294 and 
821.01-.02 (Pet. Br. at 11), but the complaint actually refers 
to the statutory provisions stated above.  (R. at 1:3.)   
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
23
the effect of § 30.294.18  Therefore, none of the statutory 
sections the attorney general cites give him the specific 
authority to challenge § 30.056.      
 
IV. 
 
¶37 The attorney general additionally argues the he has 
the authority to challenge the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.056 
without 
further 
statutory 
authority 
under 
other 
constitutional and common law principles.  The attorney general 
claims that several doctrines give him this power:  the great 
public concern doctrine, the state as polity doctrine, and the 
core function doctrine.  These doctrines are more fully defined 
later in this opinion.  For the reasons that are discussed 
                     
18 The dissent asserts in ¶¶67-78 that the attorney general 
has the statutory authority to bring a public nuisance claim and 
can argue the unconstitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 30.056 as part 
of that claim.  We agree that the attorney general has the 
statutory authority to bring a claim for public nuisance under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 30.294, 823.01, and 823.02, but he cannot bring a 
claim that depends on § 30.056 for its validity.  All that the 
nuisance statutes permit him to bring is a nuisance claim, not 
an attack on a statute's constitutionality.  The attorney 
general attempted to bury his claim of unconstitutionality 
within his statutory public nuisance claim.  (R. at 9.)  Simply 
attempting to combine those two claims does not mean that the 
attorney general has statutory authority under § 30.294 to bring 
the unconstitutionality claim.  The claims are separate, and 
therefore he needs different statutory authority to bring both 
claims.  See Public Intervenor v. DNR, 115 Wis. 2d 28, 35, 339 
N.W.2d 324 (1983)(stating that the public intervenor's enabling 
legislation only permits him or her to intervene in proceedings, 
not to challenge a rule's constitutionality).  
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
24
hereinafter, we reject the attorney general's use of these 
doctrines in this case.19 
 
¶38 The attorney general first argues that according to 
the great public concern doctrine, he can challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute.  The great public concern 
doctrine is an exception to the general rule that "state 
agencies 
or 
public 
officers 
cannot 
question 
the 
constitutionality of a statute unless it is their official duty 
to do so, or they will be personally affected if they fail to do 
so and the statute is held invalid."  Fulton Found. v. Dep't of 
Taxation, 13 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 108 N.W.2d 312 (1961).20  "[N]o one 
can question in the courts the constitutionality of a statute 
already enacted except one whose rights are impaired . . . . 
This rule extends to public officers whose private rights are 
not involved."  Id. at 11-12.  However, when an issue is of 
great public concern, a state agency can challenge a statute's 
constitutionality.  Id. at 13.  This court appeared to define an 
                     
19 At ¶94, the dissent discusses these doctrines being "read 
separately and read together" in order to find for the attorney 
general.  We suggest that these three doctrines are no more 
persuasive for the attorney general in this case when "read 
together" than when they are analyzed separately.  
20 In the Fulton case, this court noted in a footnote that 
it was not deciding the question of the attorney general's right 
to raise an issue concerning the constitutionality of a state 
statute.  Fulton Found. v. Dep't of Taxation, 13 Wis. 2d 1, 13 
n.3, 108 N.W.2d 312 (1961) (stating that "[w]e have no issue 
present in the instant case of the attorney general's right to 
question the constitutionality of a state statute.  This is 
because the attorney general is not a party in the instant case 
and only appears as counsel for the department.")   
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
25
issue of great public concern as a "matter of great public 
interest."  Id.   
 
¶39 The attorney general argues that the great public 
concern exception applies in this case because he is a state 
officer.  In support of that argument, the attorney general 
notes that Fulton did not expressly limit the exception to state 
agencies.  Fulton, 13 Wis. 2d at 13.   
¶40 The 
attorney general's argument lacks 
merit for 
several reasons.  First, it is not the attorney general's 
official duty to challenge the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.056.  While Fulton did not expressly reject the use of the 
exception in cases concerning the attorney general, this common-
law doctrine cannot supersede the requirement of art. VI, § 3, 
under which the attorney general must have statutory authority 
to attack a statute's constitutionality.  The constitution 
places limits on the attorney general's actions that are not 
placed on state agencies, or even on other public officers.  The 
attorney general also will not be personally affected if he does 
not challenge the statute's constitutionality.   
¶41 Moreover, the great public concern exception does not 
apply "to suits between two creatures of the state."  City of 
Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 112 Wis. 2d 224, 240, 332 N.W.2d 
782 (1983)(citing Kenosha v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 317, 331, 151 
N.W.2d 36 (1967)).  In Columbia County v. Board of Trustees of 
the Wisconsin Retirement Fund, 17 Wis. 2d 310, 318, 116 N.W.2d 
142 (1962), we declined to extend the exception to "suits 
between two agencies of the state government or between an arm 
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
26
of the government and the state itself."21  See also City of Eau 
Claire v. DNR, 60 Wis. 2d 751, 752, 210 N.W.2d 771 (1973)(per 
curiam)(stating that the exception does not apply between a 
state agency and a municipality).  Because the attorney 
general's office and Oak Creek are both "creatures of the 
state," the great public concern exception does not apply.  
 
¶42 It is true that the attorney general can petition to 
invoke this court's original jurisdiction without the governor 
or the legislature's authorization, but even so, it is this 
court's prerogative to accept or deny such a petition.22  
                     
21 See also Employe Trust Funds Board, et al. v. Lightbourn, 
et al., Case No. 99-3297, Order dated of even date (properly 
applying Columbia County to deny the Employe Trust Funds Board 
standing 
to 
commence 
a 
suit 
against 
the 
Department 
of 
Administration, challenging the constitutionality of recent 
legislation concerning public employee pensions).  
22 We 
emphasize 
that 
this 
court 
accepts 
original 
jurisdiction actions only in rare instances.  The specific and 
limited circumstances in which this court will accept original 
jurisdiction 
are 
detailed 
in 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
Internal 
Operating Procedures II(B)(3)(citing to Petition of Heil, 230 
Wis. 428 (1939)).  Wis. S. Ct. IOP II(B)(3)(May 24, 1984).  See 
also Christenson, who states:   
The Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction 
through the traditional writs such as mandamus and 
prohibition, the exercise of its superintending powers 
over inferior courts, and in certain other cases of 
great public moment and urgency.  If the Attorney 
General can invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court through one of these means, he may himself 
initiate litigation. 
 
Christenson, 1970 Wis. L. Rev. at 303.  
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
27
However, the attorney general did not petition this court to 
invoke its original jurisdiction in this case. 
 
¶43  The attorney general next argues that he has authority 
to attack Wis. Stat. § 30.056's constitutionality under the 
"state as polity" doctrine.  He cites State ex rel. Reynolds v. 
Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 553, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964), and State 
ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 500-01 (1892), 
claiming that those cases stand for the proposition that "the 
public 
injury 
that 
results 
from 
. 
. 
. 
unconstitutional 
legislation can only adequately be redressed by the attorney 
general."  (Pet. Br. at 16.)  The attorney general appears to 
define "state as a polity" as a public injury, as opposed to an 
individual injury.23  (Pet. Br. at 16.)  He cites The Attorney 
Gen. v. The City of Eau Claire and Others, 37 Wis. 400, 447 
(1875), in support of his argument that a violation of the 
public trust is "a violation of the duty assumed by the state, 
in its aggregate and sovereign character."  The attorney general 
argues that a violation of the public trust is therefore a 
violation to the state as polity because it constitutes a public 
injury.  (Pet. Br. at 16.)  It is difficult to separate this 
claim from the attorney general's argument involving the great 
public concern doctrine.   
 
¶44 The attorney general's argument is only partially 
correct. The attorney general may in certain instances bring 
                     
23 Black's Dictionary defines "polity" as "[t]he total 
governmental organization as based on its goals and policies."  
Black's Law Dictionary 1179 (7th ed. 1999).  
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
28
suit against a perceived violation of the public trust.  City of 
Eau Claire, 37 Wis. at 447.  However, the attorney general does 
not have the authority to bring suit every time a public injury 
occurs.  If the attorney general lacks specific statutory 
authority, he must meet one of two additional conditions to act. 
 He may act if the governor or legislature directs him to do so. 
 Wisconsin Stat. § 165.25(1) permits the attorney general to 
bring suit in "any cause or matter . . . if [he is] requested by 
the governor or either house of the legislature."  It appears to 
be an anomaly, but he may also act if the case results in the 
granting of a petition for original jurisdiction.  State ex. 
rel. Haven v. Sayle, 168 Wis. 159, 163, 169 N.W. 310 (1918).24 
                     
24 Specifically, this court stated in State ex. rel. Haven 
v. Sayle, that 
[w]ere the case within the original jurisdiction of 
the supreme court, i.e. were state officers charged 
with violation of law, and were the attorney general 
filing an information in equity in this court to 
restrain such act, the suit might be entertained 
simply by obtaining leave of court, but this results 
from the grant of prerogative jurisdiction to this 
court by the constitution, as explained in the case of 
Att'y Gen. v. Railroad Cos. 35 Wis. 425.  See, also, 
Income Tax Cases, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N.W. 673, 135 N.W. 
164. 
 
168 Wis. 159, 163-64, 169 N.W. 310 (1918).  We recognize that 
arguably, the attorney general has statutory authority to 
petition this court for original jurisdiction in a matter.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 165.25(1).  However, we caution that his authority 
to petition for original jurisdiction does not mean that this 
court will automatically accept original jurisdiction in any 
case. 
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
29
¶45 In all of the cases the attorney general cites, at 
least one of these additional conditions was met.  Zimmerman was 
an original jurisdiction action, in which special counsel for 
the governor challenged the constitutionality of a state 
reapportionment plan.  22 Wis. 2d at 552.  This court recognized 
that either the governor or the attorney general could challenge 
the constitutionality of a state reapportionment plan.  Id. at 
552-53.  Cunningham was also a case involving a reapportionment 
of state senate and assembly districts.   
¶46 In Cunningham, the court quoted with approval from 
City of Eau Claire in explaining why granting a petition for 
original jurisdiction was important in cases where the subject 
matter was of public rightpublici juris: 
 
To warrant the assertion of original jurisdiction 
here, the interest of the state should be primary and 
proximate, not indirect or remote; peculiar, perhaps, 
to some subdivisions of the state, but affecting the 
state at large in some of its prerogatives; raising a 
contingency requiring the interposition of this court 
to preserve the prerogatives and franchises of the 
state in its sovereign character, this court judging 
of the contingency in each case for itself. 
Cunningham, 81 Wis. at 473 (quoting Eau Claire, 37 Wis. at 444). 
 As explained in paragraph 42, City of Eau Claire and Cunningham 
were both cases in which the anomaly is demonstrated, since this 
court accepted original jurisdiction and, therefore, permitted 
the 
attorney 
general 
to 
attack 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
legislative action.   
¶47 The case before us now was not commenced in this court 
on a petition for original jurisdiction, and the attorney 
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
30
general did not bring this action at the request of the governor 
or the legislature.  Therefore, the attorney general's "state as 
a polity" argument must fail. 
¶48 Finally, the attorney general argues that he is able 
to bring suit in this case because doing so is one of his core 
functions as attorney general.  He claims that his core function 
is to "enforce the law and uphold the constitution."  (Pet. Br. 
at 17.)  Two statutes, he asserts, evince the legislature's 
recognition of his authority to uphold the constitution.  First, 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11), the attorney general must be 
served when a claim is made that a statute is unconstitutional. 
 Second, under Wis. Stat. § 14.11(2)(a)4, the attorney general 
may use "his opinion as to the validity of any law" in deciding 
which side to take in a case.  (Pet. Br. at 18.)  The attorney 
general also points to Arizona case law, which permits the 
Arizona 
attorney 
general 
to 
attack 
an 
Arizona 
statute's 
constitutionality 
in 
attempting 
to 
defend 
the 
state 
constitution.  Fund Manager v. Corbin, 778 P.2d 1244, 1250 
(Ariz. App. 1988).  The attorney general appears to reason that 
he may attack the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 30.056 in 
attempting to defend the public trust doctrine, which emanates 
from Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1. 
¶49 The attorney general must cite to another state's case 
law to support his core function theory because no Wisconsin 
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
31
case supports it.25  Instead, as stated in Part III of this 
opinion, in Wisconsin, any authority the attorney general has is 
found in the statutes.  There is no "core function" derived from 
the constitution that is superior to the attorney general's 
statutorily-provided powers because the constitution provides 
that the attorney general's "core functions" are to be defined 
by the statutes.  The attorney general's constitutional powers 
                     
25 In note four of his brief, the petitioner attempts to set 
forth a number of Wisconsin cases in which "attorneys general 
have challenged the constitutionality of legislative acts."  
(Pet. Br. at 19, n.4.)  These cases can all be differentiated 
because in each instance, a legally prescribed condition was 
met.  The governor, legislature, state agencies and departments, 
or public officers requested the attorney general to challenge 
the constitutionality of a statute according to Wis. Stat. 
§ 165.25(1), or it was an original action, or it was a quo 
warranto action.  Quo warranto is a proceeding that the attorney 
general was first authorized to bring by the statutes enacted in 
1849.  He continues to have such statutory authorization in the 
present statutes.  See Wis. Stat. § 784.04(1).  In the following 
actions the attorney general was requested by a state department 
or a public officer to bring suit:  Martinez v. DILHR, 165 
Wis. 2d 687, 478 N.W.2d 582 (1992)(on behalf of the Department 
of Industry, Labor, and Human RelationsDILHR); Fulton Found. v. 
Dep't of Taxation; 13 Wis. 2d 1, 108 N.W.2d 312 (1961)(on behalf 
of the Department of Taxation); State ex rel. Jones v. 
Froehlich, 115 Wis. 32, 91 N.W. 115 (1902)(on behalf of the 
Secretary of State, a public official).  The following cases 
were original actions:  Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 546 
N.W.2d 123 (1996); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 
Wis. 2d 544, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964); State ex rel. Larson v. 
Giessel, 266 Wis. 547, 64 N.W.2d 421 (1954); State ex rel. 
Martin v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 101, 23 N.W.2d 610 (1946); State 
ex rel. Raymer v. Cunningham, 82 Wis. 39, 51 N.W. 1133 (1892); 
State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 
724 (1892); Attorney Gen. v. City of Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400 
(1875).  The following cases were quo warranto actions:  State 
ex rel. Hicks v. Stevens, 112 Wis. 170, 88 N.W. 48 (1901); State 
ex rel. Brayton and another v. Merriman, 6 Wis. 17 (1857); 
Attorney Gen. v. McDonald, 3 Wis. 703 (1854).     
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
32
are equivalent to his statutory powersthey are one and the 
same.  That is precisely why the history of art. VI, § 3 is so 
important:  it demonstrates conclusively that the framers 
intended the attorney general not to have any core function 
except as defined in the statutes.        
¶50 Moreover, this court has already rejected the attorney 
general's core function argument.  As noted earlier, this court 
previously stated that "[t]he attorney general is devoid of the 
inherent power to initiate and prosecute litigation intended to 
protect or promote the interests of the state or its citizens . 
. . ."  Sharp, 63 Wis. 2d at 261 (emphasis added).  Sharp's 
language referring to "inherent power" is the same as the 
attorney 
general's 
"core 
function" 
terminology. 
 
Public 
Intervenor likewise addressed this issue and found that the 
attorney general cannot attack a statute's constitutionality in 
attempting to uphold the public trust doctrine.  115 Wis. 2d at 
38-40.  Public Intervenor explained that 
 
[t]he public intervenor is not the state, but is an 
office created by the legislature with stated and 
limited authority to intervene in proceedings.  He 
does not have authority to bring direct court actions 
challenging the constitutionality of rules adopted by 
the DNR, an agency created also by the legislature. 
Id. at 38.  In the same manner, the position of attorney general 
and the authority of the state are not synonymousthe attorney 
general's office is a constitutional office with authority 
defined and limited by the legislature.  While the state, or any 
person suing in the name of the state, may use the public trust 
doctrine to attempt to establish standing, id. (citing State v. 
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
33
Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974)), the attorney 
general may not use the doctrine in this case because the 
attorney general is not the state, as was explained in Public 
Intervenor, and because he lacks statutory authority to sue in 
this case.  Moreover, we reiterate Public Intervenor's point 
that the DNR is dominant to the attorney general in protecting 
state waters, and as such, it is the DNR's duty to protect 
Crawfish Creek.  Id. at 38-39 (citing Wis. Envtl. Decade, Inc. 
v. DNR, 85 Wis. 2d 518, 527-28, 271 N.W.2d 69 (1978)). 
¶51 We also note that the attorney general's reliance on 
Wis. Stat. §§ 14.11(2)(a)4 and 806.04(11) is misguided.  The 
former statute permits the governor to employ special counsel 
"[t]o institute and prosecute an action or proceeding which the 
attorney general, by reason of the attorney general's opinion as 
to the validity of any law, or for any other reason, deems it 
the duty of the attorney general to defend rather than 
prosecute."  Wis. Stat. § 14.11(2)(a)4.  This provision does not 
apply to the present case because here the attorney general is 
attempting to prosecute, not defend in the action.  Moreover, 
the provision deals with the employment of special counsel, 
which also renders it inapplicable to this case.  The latter 
statute deals with the attorney general's ability to defend the 
state 
statutes, 
not 
his 
ability 
to 
defend 
the 
state 
constitution. 
¶52 In sum, none of the theories that the attorney general 
advances supplant the necessity that he derive his authority 
from the statutes to bring suit in this case. 
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
34
¶53 We hold that the attorney general lacks the necessary 
statutory authority to attack the constitutionality of Wis. 
Stat. § 30.056, and therefore, we do not address whether the 
statute is constitutional.   
V. 
¶54 In this case the attorney general brought both a 
statutory public nuisance claim and a common law public nuisance 
claim.  The circuit court granted summary judgment to the 
attorney general on the common law public nuisance claim.  
Because we hold that the attorney general lacks standing to 
attack 
the 
underlying 
statute's 
constitutionality, 
the 
presumption of the statute's constitutionality remains.  County 
of Kenosha v. C & S Management, Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 373, 383, 588 
N.W.2d 
236 
(1998). 
 
Since 
the 
statute 
is 
presumptively 
constitutional, the court of appeals properly reversed the 
circuit court's grant of summary judgment.26 
VI. 
¶55 We conclude that the attorney general lacks standing 
to bring this action because the legislature has not granted him 
the statutory authority to attack the constitutionality of Wis. 
Stat. § 30.056.  Our conclusion rests on a strong foundation of 
                     
26 Oak Creek's motion to strike portions of the attorney 
general's brief, filed in this court, is denied, since the 
matters argued therein have been considered.  
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
35
precedent and constitutional history.27  We also conclude that 
the great public concern doctrine, the state as polity doctrine, 
                     
27 It does not rest on a "rickety and unsteady" basis, as 
alleged in the dissent.  Nor does it lead to "an absurd result," 
as claimed in the concurrence in Employe Trust Funds Board, et 
al. v. Lightbourn, et al., Case No. 99-3297, Order dated of even 
date.  With this decision, we continue to recognize the pre-
eminence of precedent.  For, as we have stated earlier: 
Fidelity to precedent, the doctrine of stare decisis 
'stand by things decided', is fundamental to 'a 
society governed by the rule of law.'  Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 
420 (1983).  When legal standards 'are open to 
revision in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere 
exercise 
of 
judicial 
will, 
with 
arbitrary 
and 
unpredictable 
results.' 
 
Appeal 
of 
Concerned 
Corporators of Portsmouth Savings Bank, 129 N.H. 183, 
227, 525 A.2d 671 (1987) (Souter, J. dissenting, 
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
36
and the core function doctrine do not give the attorney general 
such authority.  We accordingly affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals.    
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
                                                                  
quoting 
Thornburgh 
v. 
American 
College 
of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 786-87 
(1986), White, J. dissenting). 
 
State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 441-42, 511 N.W.2d 591 
(1994)(Abrahamson, J., concurring) (overruled on other grounds, 
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997)).  
No. 
97-2188 
 
 
1 
 
 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
1 
¶56 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  I 
dissent from the majority opinion’s holding that the Attorney 
General lacks standing to bring this action. 
¶57 The lengthy majority opinion gives many reasons, none 
persuasive, for reaching the wrong result.  I shall limit my 
dissent to six points. 
¶58 I.  A major reason the majority opinion reaches the 
wrong result is that it begs the question presented in the case. 
 Specifically, the majority asks whether the Attorney General 
has 
specific 
statutory 
authority 
to 
challenge 
the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 30.056.  But the question 
properly presented by this case is whether the Attorney General 
has statutory authorization to bring the action to abate this 
alleged public and common law nuisance.  I conclude the Attorney 
General clearly has statutory authority to bring this action and 
therefore he may challenge the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.056 as one of the arguments to support the litigation.  See 
¶¶ 64-78 below. 
¶59 II.  In answering the questions it poses, the majority 
opinion errs in implying that regardless of the Attorney 
General’s statutory powers to initiate an action the Attorney 
General must also have specific statutory authority to challenge 
the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 30.056.  See ¶¶ 79-83 
below. 
¶60 III.  In reaching beyond this case to limit the powers 
of the Attorney General, the majority opinion rests on a 1908 
case (and its progeny).  Wisconsin state constitutional law 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
2 
scholars 
characterize 
the 
1908 
case 
and 
its 
progeny 
as 
“dubious.”  See ¶¶ 84-85 below.  
¶61 IV.  The majority opinion’s simple recitation of state 
constitutional history to support its decision makes the history 
simpler than it really is.  The omitted part of the story 
supports the position that the Attorney General has common law 
powers.  See ¶¶ 86-93 below.  
¶62 V.  Three important doctrines — the great public 
concern doctrine, the Attorney General’s power to bring an 
original action in the court challenging the constitutionality 
of a statute, and the public trust doctrine — read together, 
support the position that the Attorney General has standing to 
bring the action in the present case.  See ¶¶ 94-113 below. 
¶63 VI.  The majority opinion offers no compelling 
justification for reading the Attorney General’s powers in such 
a restrictive manner.  See ¶¶ 114-118 below. 
 
I 
 
¶64 The majority opinion fails to ask and answer the 
determinative question presented in this case.  The majority 
asks does the Attorney General have statutory authority to 
attack the constitutionality of § 30.056.  Majority op. ¶¶ 1 and 
55.  The majority opinion correctly answers this question in the 
negative.  I agree with the majority opinion that no statute 
expressly 
authorizes 
the 
Attorney 
General 
to 
attack 
the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 30.056 (1995-96). 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
3 
¶65 The majority opinion also implicitly asks, does the 
Attorney General have authority to attack the constitutionality 
of a statute in a lawsuit that the Attorney General has 
statutory authority to bring?  The majority opinion correctly 
suggests 
that 
this 
question 
should 
be 
answered 
in 
the 
affirmative.  Majority op. ¶¶ 42, 44-46, 49 and n.25.28  I agree 
with the majority opinion that when a statute expressly 
authorizes the Attorney General to bring a lawsuit, the Attorney 
General may attack the constitutionality of a statute in 
pursuing that lawsuit.  The majority opinion, however, also 
implies that the Attorney General needs express statutory 
authority to challenge the constitutionality of a particular 
statute.29 
                     
28 In n.25 the majority opinion apparently accepts that the 
Attorney 
General 
has 
the 
power 
to 
challenge 
the 
constitutionality of statutes in quo warranto actions because 
Wis. Stat. § 784.04(1) authorizes the Attorney General to bring 
quo warranto.  Similarly, the majority opinion accepts the 
Attorney General’s power to challenge the constitutionality of 
statutes at the behest of the legislature or governor because of 
Wis. Stat. § 165.25(1), which states that the Attorney General, 
“if 
requested 
by 
the 
governor 
or 
either 
house 
of 
the 
legislature, appear for and represent the state . . . [in any 
matter] in which the state or people of the state may be 
interested.”  
The majority opinion also recognizes that the Attorney 
General may attack the constitutionality of a statute in an 
original action in this court despite no statute authorizing the 
Attorney General to bring the original action.  I will address 
this issue in Part V, ¶¶ 94-113 below. 
29 I will discuss this aspect of the majority opinion in 
Part II, ¶¶ 79-83 below.  
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
4 
¶66 The majority opinion fails to ask and answer the 
question posed by the present case: Does any statute expressly 
authorize the Attorney General to bring the present lawsuit?  I 
answer this question in the affirmative.  Wis. Stat. §§ 30.924 
and 823.01-.02 (1995-96)30 expressly provide a statutory basis 
for the Attorney General’s power to initiate this lawsuit to 
enjoin a statutory and common law public nuisance. 
¶67 In 1996 the Attorney General initiated this lawsuit in 
circuit court to enjoin a public nuisance (whether a statutory  
or a common law nuisance) created by the City of Oak Creek in 
Crawfish (a.k.a. Crayfish) Creek.  As the majority opinion 
correctly 
acknowledges, 
this 
case 
is 
about 
the 
Attorney 
General’s action to abate a public nuisance.  Majority op. ¶ 1. 
 The challenge to the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 30.056 
is part of the underlying litigation brought against Oak Creek 
to enjoin the public nuisance. 
¶68 The Attorney General sought injunctive relief under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 30.294 and 823.01-.02 to require the City of Oak 
Creek to remove a concrete channel from Crawfish Creek, claiming 
that the concrete was a public nuisance.  Majority op. ¶ 1.  
These statutes by their express language authorize the Attorney 
General to seek injunctive relief against what the Attorney 
General alleges is a public nuisance.   
                     
30 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 1995-96 version unless otherwise stated. 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
5 
¶69 Section 30.294 governing chapter 30 statutory public 
nuisances provides that “[e]very violation of this chapter [30] 
is declared to be a public nuisance and may be prohibited by 
injunction and may be abated by legal action brought by any 
person.” 
¶70 Section 
823.01, 
governing 
common 
law 
nuisances, 
expressly authorizes any person to bring an action to enjoin a 
public nuisance.31  The parties do not dispute that the Attorney 
General 
qualifies 
as 
“any 
person” 
under 
these 
statutes.  
Furthermore 
§ 823.02 
specifically 
authorizes 
the 
Attorney 
General to bring an action to enjoin a public nuisance.32 
¶71 The majority opinion dismisses the Attorney General’s 
claim to these express statutory powers to initiate this action 
to enjoin a public nuisance in one conclusory sentence.  The 
majority opinion states that “those statutes do not provide 
specific authority to sue in this case because § 30.056 
expressly negates the effect of § 30.294.”  Majority op. ¶ 36. 
¶72 This sentence begs the question raised in this case.  
The question in the present case is whether Wis. Stat. § 30.294 
or §§ 823.01-.02 authorize the Attorney General to bring an 
                     
31 Wis. Stat. § 823.01 provides that "any person . . . may 
maintain an action to recover damages or to abate a public 
nuisance from which injuries peculiar to the complainant are 
suffered . . . ." 
32 Wis. Stat. § 823.02 provides that “an action to enjoin a 
public nuisance may be commenced and prosecuted in the name of 
the state, either by the attorney general on information 
obtained by the department of justice, or upon relation of a 
private individual. . . . ” 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
6 
injunction action against Oak Creek for what the Attorney 
General concludes is a public nuisance.  The answer to this 
question is clearly yes.  It is clearly yes, even though 
§ 30.056 declares that Oak Creek cannot be required to remove 
any deposit it placed in Crawfish Creek before June 1, 1991.  
¶73 Section 30.056 provides that “notwithstanding ss. 
30.12,33 30.19,34 30.19535 and 30.294,” Oak Creek may not be 
required to remove any concrete placed in Crawfish Creek before 
                     
33 Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1) provides, in part:  
[U]nless a permit has been granted by the department 
pursuant to statute or the legislature has otherwise 
authorized structures or deposits in navigable waters, 
it is unlawful:  
(a) To deposit any material or to place any structure 
upon the bed of any navigable water where no bulkhead 
line has been established; or  
(b) To deposit any material or to place any structure 
upon the bed of any navigable water beyond a lawfully 
established bulkhead line. 
 
34 Wis. Stat. § 30.19(1)(a) provides: 
(1) Permits required. . . . Unless a permit has been 
granted by the department or authorization has been 
granted by the legislature, it is unlawful: 
(a) To construct, dredge or enlarge any artificial 
waterway, canal, channel, ditch, lagoon, pond, lake or 
similar 
waterway 
where 
the 
purpose 
is 
ultimate 
connection with an existing navigable stream, lake or 
other navigable waters, or where any part of the 
artificial waterway is located within 500 feet of the 
ordinary high-water mark of an existing navigable 
stream, lake or other navigable waters. 
 
35 Wis. Stat. § 30.195(1) provides that "[n]o person may 
change the course of or straighten a navigable stream without a 
permit issued under this section or without otherwise being 
expressly authorized by statute to do so." 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
7 
June 1, 1991.  The Attorney General’s statutory power to 
initiate this action against Oak Creek under § 30.294 to enjoin 
what he thinks is a public nuisance remains in effect after the 
enactment of § 30.056.  If § 30.056 is a constitutional 
enactment, a court might not grant the Attorney General the 
injunction he seeks.  
¶74 Although a court may disagree with the Attorney 
General that Oak Creek’s conduct constitutes a nuisance, the 
legislature has not vitiated in Wis. Stat. § 30.056 the Attorney 
General’s express statutory authority to bring an action to 
enjoin what the Attorney General considers a nuisance.  The 
legislature could have expressly stated in § 30.056 that no 
person may bring an action under § 30.294 against Oak Creek for 
its pre-1991 conduct regarding Crawfish Creek.  The legislature 
did not enact such a law.  Rather, the legislature in adopting 
§ 30.056 eliminated one remedy available against Oak Creek, 
namely ordering removal of the concrete.  After the adoption of 
§ 30.056, any person may sue Oak Creek for its conduct, but 
§ 30.056, if valid and applicable, may bar one remedy. 
¶75 Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 30.056 is silent about the 
Attorney General’s powers under § 823.01-.02 relating to common 
law nuisances.  The Attorney General alleges in this litigation 
that the concrete channel in Crawfish Creek constitutes a common 
law nuisance. 
¶76 Section 30.056 does not refer to § 823.01-.02 and does 
not in any way address the Attorney General’s power to enjoin an 
alleged common law nuisance under these sections.  Oak Creek’s 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
8 
defense in any injunction suit brought under these sections 
might be that the legislature has retroactively declared in 
§ 30.056 that Oak Creek’s conduct does not violate the listed 
statutory provisions in chapter 30 and is therefore not a common 
law public nuisance.  One of the Attorney General’s responses 
might be that § 30.056 is unconstitutional. 
¶77 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that the 
Attorney General is authorized by three statutes to bring this 
action against Oak Creek for maintaining a public nuisance.36  
Professor Christenson, upon whom the majority opinion relies, 
describes the power to enjoin public nuisances as “perhaps the 
most important of all the Attorney General’s initiative powers” 
and allows the Attorney General to play an important role in the 
protection of the environment.37 
                     
36 The court of appeals and majority opinions’ reliance on 
Public Intervenor v. DNR, 115 Wis. 2d 28, 35, 339 N.W.2d 324 
(1983), as a limitation on the powers of the attorney general is 
misplaced.  As noted at the outset of that opinion, the court 
was considering the power of a legislatively created official, 
not the constitutionally created office of the Attorney General. 
 Public Intervenor, 115 Wis. 2d at 29.  Furthermore, the public 
intervenor’s statutory authority in that case only allowed the 
Public Intervenor to intervene in an existing action, not to 
initiate a lawsuit.  Public Intervenor, 115 Wis. 2d at 34-35.  
In the case at bar Wis. Stat. §§ 30.294 and 823.01-.02 expressly 
give the attorney general the power to initiate actions to abate 
public nuisances. 
37 Arlen C. Christenson, The State Attorney General, 1970 
Wis. L. Rev. 298, 317-18 (citing Wis. Stat. § 280.02, renumbered 
as § 823.02).  See also Scott Van Alstyne and Larry J. Roberts, 
The Powers of the Attorney General in Wisconsin, 1974 Wis. L. 
Rev. 721, 743 (noting the power of the attorney general to abate 
public nuisances). 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
9 
¶78 The majority opinion’s cavalier dismissal in one 
sentence of three statutes expressly authorizing the Attorney 
General to bring an action regarding a public nuisance is 
contrary to law and logic.  In holding that the Attorney General 
does not have standing to bring this action against a public 
nuisance, this court is fundamentally restricting the Attorney 
General’s express statutory powers. 
 
II 
 
¶79 Although I have shown above that the majority opinion 
acknowledges that the Attorney General has authority to attack 
the constitutionality of a statute in a lawsuit that the 
Attorney General has statutory authority to bring, majority op. 
¶¶ 42, 44-46, 49 and n.25, the majority opinion also suggests 
the contrary position.  The majority opinion states that 
regardless of the Attorney General’s statutory powers to 
initiate an action, the Attorney General must also have specific 
statutory authority to challenge the constitutionality of Wis. 
Stat. § 30.056.38 
¶80 The majority opinion states at ¶ 35, for example, that 
“because the attorney general must defend the constitutionality 
of the statutes, any challenge to the statutes on his part would 
conflict with his duty to defend, unless specifically authorized 
by statute.”  It further states at ¶ 36 that “none of the 
                     
38 Oak Creek takes this position in its brief.   
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
10
statutory sections the attorney general cites gives him the 
specific authority to challenge § 30.056.”  See also majority 
op. ¶ 40.  The majority opinion cites no authority for these 
sentences limiting the powers of the Attorney General in 
conducting litigation expressly authorized by statute, and I 
could find none.39  These inconsistent positions in the majority 
opinion are puzzling. 
¶81 There is no statute or case law supporting the 
majority's position that when the Attorney General has express 
statutory authority to bring a cause of action he needs specific 
authority to challenge the constitutionality of a statute.  
Prohibiting the state’s chief legal officer from challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute in the course of enforcing his 
statutory authority has no statutory or constitutional basis.  
Indeed the rule appears to be that the Attorney General has 
inherent discretion to act in furtherance of lawful litigation 
unless his action is palpably illegal.40 
                     
39 The cases cited by the majority at ¶ 35 saying that the 
Attorney 
General 
has 
a 
duty 
to 
defend 
a 
statute’s 
constitutionality do not support the conclusion that the 
Attorney General may not challenge the constitutionality of a 
statute. 
40 See State ex rel. Reynolds v. Smith, 19 Wis. 2d 577, 120 
N.W.2d 664 (1963)(Attorney General has inherent discretion with 
respect to prosecuting litigation at the Governor’s direction; 
Attorney 
General 
could 
determine 
propriety 
of 
incurring 
particular expense in absence of showing that the action was 
palpably illegal). 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
11
¶82 In numerous cases in which the Attorney General was 
authorized to appear, the Attorney General has challenged the 
constitutionality of legislative acts.  See majority op. ¶ 49 
n.25.  No statute or case law prohibits the Attorney General 
from challenging the constitutionality of a statute in an action 
that he has authority to bring.  
¶83 I agree with the Attorney General that holding that 
the Attorney General needs specific statutory authority to sue 
is significantly distinct from the majority opinion holding that 
when the Attorney General has express statutory authority to 
bring an action, he or she needs additional express statutory 
authority to challenge the constitutionality of a statute.  The 
law is clear that if the Attorney General has authority to bring 
an action, he or she does not need express authority to 
challenge the constitutionality of a statute. 
 
III 
 
                                                                  
See Fund Manager v. Corbin, 778 P.2d 1244, 1250 (Ariz. App. 
1988), affirmed in part and dismissed in part on other grounds, 
942 P.2d 428 (Ariz. 1989), in which the court stated that 
although the attorney general does not have common law powers 
and is limited to statutory powers, there is “nothing that would 
disable 
the 
attorney 
general 
from 
attacking 
the 
constitutionality of an Arizona statute in the process of 
exercising his specific statutory powers.”  This language was 
quoted with approval in State ex rel. Woods v. Block, 942 P.2d 
428 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc), holding that the attorney general 
can raise a constitutional challenge to a statute if he has 
statutory authority to bring the lawsuit. 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
12
¶84 In reaching beyond the facts of this case to limit the 
powers of the Attorney General, the majority opinion rests on a 
1908 case, State v. Electric Railway & Light Co., 136 Wis. 179, 
116 N.W. 900 (1908).  This was the first case in which the court 
declared that the Attorney General is without power to initiate 
a suit without express statutory authority.  Professors Scott 
Van Alstyne and Larry J. Roberts, in their article entitled The 
Powers of the Attorney General in Wisconsin, 1974 Wis. L. Rev. 
721, 
736-37, 
upon 
which 
the 
majority 
opinion 
relies, 
characterize Electric Railway as unpersuasive and lacking in 
historical analysis and in basic logic.  They concluded that the 
case is “dubious.”  Van Alstyne and Roberts criticize the cases 
subsequent to Electric Railway, several of which are cited by 
the majority opinion, as adding nothing to the unpersuasive 
analysis of the original holding.41 
¶85 The 
majority 
opinion’s 
discussion 
of 
the 
constitutional and judicial history relating to the powers of 
the Attorney General unfortunately fails to acknowledge or 
correct the errors in our early cases.  More importantly, the 
majority does not explain why these cases are persuasive.  Stare 
decisis does not mean that the court should continue to adhere 
to unexplained and unpersuasive prior statements of this court. 
 
IV 
 
                     
41 1974 Wis. L. Rev. at 738. 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
13
¶86 The 
majority 
opinion’s 
recitation 
of 
state 
constitutional history to support its decision makes the history 
simpler and clearer than it is.  The omitted part of the story 
supports the position that the Attorney General has common law 
powers.  
¶87 The majority opinion relies on Charles M. Baker’s 1849 
revision of the Wisconsin laws to support its interpretation 
that the Wisconsin constitution denies the Attorney General 
common law powers.  
¶88 The majority opinion attempts to persuade the reader 
that “Baker relied on [New York] laws that had similarly 
precluded the attorney general’s common law powers.”  Majority 
op. ¶ 31.  Nothing in the New York laws upon which Baker relied 
declared that the attorney general had no common law power. 
¶89 The majority opinion’s sole authority that the New 
York attorney general does not have common law powers is a 1941 
New York case, People v. Dorsey, 29 N.Y.S.2d 637, 642 (Queens 
County Ct. 1941), that was decided almost 100 years after 
Charles Baker consulted the New York statutes.  
¶90 Dorsey poses two problems for the majority opinion 
which the opinion chooses to ignore.  First, in Dorsey itself, a 
1941 case, the New York court wrote that “[a]s to the rights, 
powers and authority of the Attorney General, the decisions are 
in conflict.”  Dorsey, 29 N.Y.S.2d at 641.  The Dorsey court 
went on to explain that in some earlier cases the New York 
courts held that the attorney general possesses common law 
powers.  The Dorsey court’s ultimate conclusion was that the New 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
14
York attorney general had only those powers that are granted by 
the constitution and legislature.  Dorsey, 29 N.Y.S.2d at 643-
44.  This statement does not help the majority opinion because 
it comes long after Charles Baker looked to New York law about 
the powers of the attorney general.  Apparently whether the New 
York attorney general had common law powers was not a settled 
question when Baker examined New York law. 
¶91 Second, Dorsey is of limited value in this case 
because Dorsey is a criminal case relating to the criminal 
prosecution powers of the New York attorney general.  Dorsey was 
concerned with the authority of the New York attorney general 
versus the power of the county district attorneys to conduct 
criminal investigations.  Most New York cases that cite to 
Dorsey do so for its holding that the New York attorney general 
lacks the common law power to prosecute criminal offenses.42  
This purely criminal context renders Dorsey of limited value in 
the case before this court.  
¶92 Third, in addition to New York law, Charles Baker also 
relied on the laws of Missouri in drafting the 1849 Wisconsin 
                     
42 See, e.g., People v. DiFalco, 377 N.E.2d 732, 735 (NY 
1978); People v. Goldwater, 358 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817 (Schoharie 
Cty. Ct. 1974); People v. Hopkins, 47 N.Y.S.2d 222, 225 (N.Y. 
Cty. 1944). 
The 
basic 
scheme 
established 
by 
the 
1849 
Wisconsin 
legislature is like that in New York.  The district attorneys 
are the state’s trial lawyers and the Attorney General, the 
state’s appellate lawyer.  Arlen C. Christenson, The State 
Attorney General, 1970 Wis. L. Rev. 298, 301.  
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
15
laws regarding the Attorney General.43  Like the Wisconsin 
constitution, the Missouri constitution grants to the Missouri 
attorney general powers “prescribed by law” (Missouri Const. 
art. V, § 1).  However, the Missouri courts have held that its 
attorney general retains the powers available at common law, 
unless specifically excluded by the legislature.  McKittrick v. 
Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm., 175 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Mo. 1943) (en 
banc)(relying on a statute similar to Wis. Const. art. XIV, 
§ 13, which retains the common law that is not inconsistent with 
the constitution or statutes).  Van Alstyne and Roberts 
carefully discuss Charles Baker’s work and assert that the 
Wisconsin cases have ignored the possibility that the statutes 
drafted by Baker might have incorporated the common law.44 
¶93 The 
majority 
opinion’s 
recitation 
of 
the 
constitutional history, although superficially persuasive, is an 
oversimplification.  The history does not unambiguously support 
the majority’s position that the Attorney General has no common 
law powers, as the majority opinion would have us believe.   
 
V 
 
¶94 Three important doctrines — the great public concern 
doctrine, the Attorney General’s power to bring an original 
                     
43 Scott Van Alstyne and Larry J. Roberts, The Powers of the 
Attorney General in Wisconsin, 1974 Wis. L. Rev. 721, 733. 
44 Scott Van Alstyne and Larry J. Roberts, The Powers of the 
Attorney General in Wisconsin, 1974 Wis. L. Rev. 721, 736.  
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
16
action in the court challenging the constitutionality of a 
statute, and the public trust doctrine — read separately and 
read together, support the position that the Attorney General 
has standing to bring the action in the present case. 
 
A. The Great Public Concern Doctrine 
¶95 The general rule is that state agencies, public 
officers, and municipalities have no standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of statutes.  Fulton Foundation v.  Department 
of Taxation, 13 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 108 N.W.2d 312 (1961).  One 
exception to this rule is that these governmental entities may 
challenge constitutionality of a statute when the issue is of 
great public concern.  In Fulton Foundation we described great 
public concern as a “matter of great public interest.”  Fulton 
Foundation, 13 Wis. 2d at 13. 
¶96 As was made clear in The Attorney General v. The City 
of Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400 (1875), protecting Wisconsin rivers, 
which is exactly what this case is about, is a matter of great 
public interest to the state as a whole.  This case involves a 
navigable stream and the “forever free” and public trust 
doctrines, which I discuss in greater detail below.  It easily 
falls within our prior cases determining what constitutes “great 
public concern.”  
¶97 The majority opinion holds that the great public 
concern doctrine does not apply in this case for two reasons.  
First, it states that “it is not the attorney general’s duty to 
challenge 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 30.056.”  
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
17
Majority op. at ¶ 40.  The question is not duty in this case but 
authority.  I previously have discussed the Attorney General's 
authority to challenge the constitutionality of a statute when 
the Attorney General has express statutory authority to initiate 
an action. 
¶98 Second, the majority opinion says that the “great 
public concern” doctrine does not apply ”to suits between two 
creatures of the state,” majority op. ¶ 41, and the Attorney 
General and Oak Creek are creatures of the state.  Several cases 
have stated that the great public concern exception applies only 
between a state agency or municipality and a private litigant, 
not between two “creatures” of the state.45 
¶99 These cases fail to explain, however, how this 
judicially created limitation relates to the question whether an 
issue is of great public concern.  Furthermore, the cases fail 
to give any compelling reason for excluding disputes between 
arms of the government from the great public concern doctrine. 
¶100 Indeed this court has ignored its own created bar and 
allowed suits between arms of the government.  This court has, 
for 
example, 
allowed 
a 
municipality 
to 
challenge 
the 
                     
45 This limitation on the great public concern exception 
seems to have been first established in Columbia Cty. v. Board 
of Trustees of Wis. Retirement Fund, 17 Wis. 2d 310, 318, 116 
N.W.2d 142 (1962).  In that case the court merely stated, “[w]e 
are not disposed to extend the [great public concern] exception 
to 
the 
general 
rule 
between 
two 
agencies 
of 
state 
government . . . ." 
 Id. 
at 
318. 
 
There 
is 
no further 
explanation of the court’s "not being disposed" in that case or 
the subsequent cases that rely on it.  See, e.g., City of Eau 
Claire v. DNR, 60 Wis. 2d 751, 752, 210 N.W.2d 771 (1973). 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
18
constitutionality of a collective bargaining statute in its suit 
against a state agency.  See Unifed S.D. No. 1 of Racine Cty. v. 
WERC, 81 Wis. 2d 89, 259 N.W.2d 724 (1977).  The cases are thus 
inconsistent about the application of the rule. 
¶101 Furthermore, 
several 
of 
this 
court’s 
holdings, 
including Fulton Foundation, the case that first recognized the 
great public concern exception, have suggested that the great 
public concern doctrine is most needed when private citizens are 
not apt to bring an action.46  In this case the Attorney General 
plays a critical role because no individual litigant is likely 
to challenge Oak Creek’s conduct or § 30.056. 
¶102 As is apparent from our own cases, the judicially 
created rule excluding suits between arms of government from the 
great public concern doctrine has no logical foundation and is 
not consistently applied.  A doctrine that has been judicially 
created should be overturned when the rationale for the doctrine 
is not evident and the application of the doctrine has not been 
                     
46 See Fulton Foundation, 13 Wis. 2d 1, 14b, 108 N.W.2d 312 
(1961) (motion for rehearing) (noting that a further reason for 
allowing 
the 
department 
of 
taxation 
to 
challenge 
the 
constitutionality of a statute is that “there is little 
likelihood that any taxpayer will”).  See also, City of Madison 
v. Ayers, 85 Wis. 2d 540, 545, 271 N.W.2d 101 (1978); S.C. 
Johnson & Son Inc., v. Town of Caledonia, 206 Wis. 2d 292, 304, 
557 N.W.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1996). 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
19
coherent or consistent.47  I would overturn the judicially 
created rule excluding suits between arms of government from the 
great public concern doctrine.  I would allow the present suit 
to continue because it falls within the great public concern 
doctrine. 
 
B. The Attorney General's Original Action Jurisdiction 
¶103 The majority opinion recognizes, as it must, that this 
court has for more than 125 years permitted the Attorney General 
to challenge the constitutionality of statutes in original 
actions in this court without specific statutory authority to 
bring the action to challenge the constitutionality of the 
statute.  Majority op. ¶¶ 42, 45 n.22.  See also Arlen C. 
Christenson, The State Attorney General, 1970 Wis. L. Rev. 298, 
303 (noting that the question of the Attorney General's 
authority to bring an original action has been assumed); Jack 
Stark, The Wisconsin State Constitution: A Reference Guide 
(1998) at 132 (noting that the power to bring original actions 
                     
47 For an informative discussion about the Columbia County 
case, 17 Wis. 2d 310, and its progeny and how these cases fail 
to establish any reason for excluding disputes between state 
entities from the great public concern exception, see Silver 
Lake Sanitary Dist. v. DNR, 1999 WL 1125252, Dec. 9, 1999 (Ct. 
App.) (Vergeront, J. concurring).  J. Vergeront urges this court 
to re-examine this limitation on the great public concern 
doctrine and clarify the existing case law.  Id. 
The Columbia County case was applied most recently in an 
order denying the Employe Trust Funds Board leave to commence an 
original action against the Department of Administration for 
lack of standing.  Employe Trust Funds Board, et al. v. 
Lightbourn, Case No. 99-3297, Order dated of even date. 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
20
is an example of this court expanding the powers of an Attorney 
General beyond a strict reading of the constitution).  
¶104 Original 
action 
cases 
by 
the 
Attorney 
General 
challenging the constitutionality of statutes do not square with 
today’s holding.  The majority opinion shrugs these cases off by 
writing that the Attorney General’s power to bring original 
actions “appears to be an anomaly.”  Majority op. ¶ 44.  Anomaly 
means deviation.  But since the majority takes the position that 
the 
Attorney 
General 
is 
constitutionally 
prohibited 
from 
bringing 
actions 
or 
challenging 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
statutes unless the Attorney General has specific statutory 
authorization to do so (¶ 35), the majority opinion's allowing a 
deviation from this constitution-based rule is impermissible.  
Simply because this court has the power to accept or decline the 
Attorney General’s petition for an original action does not mean 
that the agreement of four members of this court can permit what 
would otherwise be an unconstitutional exercise of authority by 
the Attorney General. 
¶105 I believe that the original action cases are best 
understood as a subset of the great public concern line of 
cases.  A brief review of several cases will demonstrate that 
original actions brought by the Attorney General are allowed 
only if the matter is important to the state as a whole. 
¶106 In The Attorney General v. The City of Eau Claire, 37 
Wis. 400 (1875), the Attorney General brought an original action 
to challenge the constitutionality of a statute delegating 
authority to the city of Eau Claire to obstruct a navigable 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
21
river.  In that case, remarkably similar to the one at bar, the 
court concluded that allowing a city to dam a navigable river 
violated the public trust and merited the granting of original 
jurisdiction.  37 Wis. at 446-47.  See also Petition of Heil, 
230 Wis. 428, 440, 284 N.W. 42 (1939) (obstruction of navigable 
river invokes supreme court's original jurisdiction). 
¶107 In State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham, 81 
Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 (1892), the court considered an original 
action brought by the Attorney General against the secretary of 
state challenging the constitutionality of a statute in order to 
enforce Wisconsin citizens’ equal representation in government. 
 "[T]he rights vindicated and protected from the prejudicial 
effect of an unconstitutional act of the legislature . . . were 
rights of sovereignty which the state in its political capacity 
held and was bound to guard and protect . . . ."  Cunningham, 81 
Wis. at 500-501.  The court analogized the right of equal 
representation to the rights discussed in City of Eau Claire, 
the right of citizens to have the public trust doctrine enforced 
and protected.  Cunningham, 81 Wis. at 500-01.  In State ex rel. 
Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 552, 126 N.W.2d 551 
(1964), the court similarly stated that it "has consistently 
held that the state, acting either through the Governor or the 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
22
Attorney General, may challenge the constitutionality of a state 
reapportionment plan . . . ."48 
¶108 These and other cases demonstrate that the court 
allows an original action to proceed when the matter is publici 
juris (of importance for the state as a whole).  But there are 
criteria other than publici juris for this court granting leave 
to bring an original action: the need for speedy resolution is 
one; no adequate remedy in the circuit court or disputed facts 
are others.  Petition of Heil, 230 Wis. at 440-41.  Thus even if 
a matter is publici juris this court might not grant original 
jurisdiction if, for example, facts are in dispute.  According 
to the majority decision, then, if the court would have granted 
the Attorney General leave to bring an original action in this 
case 
then 
the 
Attorney 
General 
might 
challenge 
the 
constitutionality of § 30.056.  See majority op. ¶ 42 n.22.  But 
since the facts are in dispute, as Oak Creek claims in this 
case, we would not take the original action and the majority 
opinion would bar the Attorney General from bringing the publici 
juris lawsuit in circuit court.  If this court would refuse 
original jurisdiction and remand the case to the circuit court, 
the Attorney General would have express statutory power to 
appear.  See Wis. Stat. § 165.25(1).  If this court merely 
                     
48 See also, State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 
101, 111, 23 N.W.2d 610 (1946) (noting that because the issue 
affected the state in a sovereign capacity the court would have 
granted original jurisdiction and allowed the Attorney General 
to proceed if the underlying cause of action would have been 
valid). 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
23
dismisses the petition for original action, under the majority 
opinion the Attorney General could not bring the suit.  This 
jurisprudence makes no sense.  Judicially created law should 
make sense.  If it doesn't, the court should try again. 
¶109 This court’s continuing recognition of the power of 
the Attorney General for the past 125 years, cases preceding the 
1908 Electric Railway case, 137 Wis. 179, see ¶¶ 84-85 above, 
cannot be squared with today’s holding.  These original action 
cases are not anomalies; they are sound precedent that this 
court should follow and hold that the Attorney General has 
standing to bring this action. 
 
C. Public Trust Doctrine 
¶110 The third doctrine of importance here is the state 
public trust doctrine.  This doctrine recognizes that the state 
holds beds underlying navigable waters in trust for all 
Wisconsin citizens.  Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 
492, 501-02, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952). 
¶111 Although the legislature has the primary authority to 
administer the public trust, the public trust doctrine allows a 
person, including the Attorney General, to sue on behalf of, and 
in the name of, the State “‘for the purpose of vindicating the 
public trust.’”  Gillen v. City of Neenah, 219 Wis. 2d 806, 822, 
580 N.W.2d 628 (1998) (quoting State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 
224 N.W.2d 407 (1974)).  The importance of the public trust 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
24
doctrine and the state’s role in enforcing that doctrine have 
been emphasized for over 100 years.49 
¶112 The public trust doctrine is clearly implicated in 
this case.  The Attorney General claims that Oak Creek’s 
concrete channel creates a public nuisance and that in trying to 
legalize that nuisance the legislature has violated the “forever 
free” clause of art. IX, § 1, of the Wisconsin Constitution and 
the public trust doctrine.50  Whether the legislature has 
abdicated the public trust in the navigable waters of the state 
is, without question, an issue of great public concern.  
                     
49 See, e.g., Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade v. Department 
of Natural Resources, 85 Wis. 2d 518, 526, 271 N.W.2d 69 (1978) 
(“[t]he state’s responsibility in the area [of protecting 
navigable waters] has long been acknowledged”); Muench v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 513, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952)(when 
navigable waters may be damaged by the erection of a dam “it is 
clearly the duty of the state to appear in behalf of the public 
in the proceedings”); City of Eau Claire, 37 Wis. at 447 
(“[public rivers] are the charge of the state, and the state 
cannot abdicate its charge of them”).  
50 Wis. Const., art. IX, § 1 provides: 
Jurisdiction on rivers and lakes; navigable waters.  
The state shall have concurrent jurisdiction on all 
rivers and lakes bordering on this state so far as 
such rivers or lakes shall form a common boundary to 
the state and any other state or territory now or 
hereafter to be formed, and bounded by the same; and 
the river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading 
into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the 
carrying places between the same, shall be common 
highways 
and 
forever 
free, 
as 
well 
as 
to 
the 
inhabitants of the state as to the citizens of the 
United States, without any tax, impost or duty 
therefor. 
 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
25
¶113 The state’s constitutional history and our cases 
setting forth the three doctrines I have discussed support the 
proposition that the Attorney General has standing to bring this 
action.51 
 
VI 
 
¶114 Finally, 
the 
majority 
provides 
no 
compelling 
justification for reading the Attorney General’s powers in such 
a restrictive manner.  The majority offers two rationales to 
explain why the Attorney General lacks standing to bring this 
action.  Both are weak and unpersuasive.   
¶115 First, the majority argues that it is the duty of the 
Attorney General to defend the constitutionality of statutes.  
Majority op. at ¶ 35 (citing cases).  The majority opinion 
refers to Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11) as setting forth this duty.  
That statute says nothing of the kind.  It merely requires that 
the Attorney General be given notice when the constitutionality 
of a statute is challenged and allows the Attorney General to be 
heard on the issue.   
                     
51 Professor Christenson, upon whose article the majority 
opinion relies, concludes that the power delegated by the 
legislature to the Attorney General to initiate litigation in a 
broad range of cases to protect the public interest gives him 
the ability to “initiate litigation in almost any civil case in 
which his English predecessors or his counterparts in other 
states possessed of inherent authority or 'common law powers’ 
may act."  Arlen C. Christenson, The State Attorney General, 
1970 Wis. L. Rev. 298, 320-21.  
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
26
¶116 There is no requirement, in the statutes or otherwise, 
that the Attorney General defend the constitutionality of all 
statutes.  Indeed, such a duty would be completely at odds with 
original action cases in which the Attorney General has attacked 
the constitutionality of statutes.52  A duty to defend the 
constitutionality of all statutes contravenes the Attorney 
General’s oath of office, the same oath judges take, to defend 
the Wisconsin constitution.  Defending the constitution includes 
a duty to assert the unconstitutionality of legislative or 
executive 
acts.53 
 
The 
authority 
to 
challenge 
the 
constitutionality of a statute is properly located in the 
constitutionally created state law enforcement officer elected 
directly by the citizens. 
¶117 The majority’s second rationale for restricting the 
powers of the Attorney General is that the Department of Natural 
Resources is dominant to the Attorney General in protecting 
state waters and it is therefore the Department’s duty to 
                     
52 See, e.g., City of Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 440 (1875); State 
ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 126 N.W.2d 551 
(1964).  See also Jack Stark, The Wisconsin State Constitution: 
A Reference Guide, at 132 (“occasionally an attorney general has 
declined 
to 
defend 
a 
statute 
he 
or 
she 
thinks 
is 
unconstitutional.”) 
See also Wis. Stat. § 14.11(2)(a)4, which provides that the 
governor may employ special counsel.  This statute apparently 
anticipates that the Attorney General may take positions 
opposite the Governor about the constitutionality of a statute. 
53 State v. Chastain, 871 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tenn. 1994) 
(concluding that most states recognize that the attorney general 
has "not only the authority, but the duty . . . to seek to have 
certain legislation declared unconstitutional"). 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
27
protect Crawfish Creek.  See majority op. at ¶ 50 (citing Public 
Intervenor v. DNR, 115 Wis. 2d 28, 38-39, 339 N.W.2d 324 
(1983)).  This very argument, that it is the sole province of 
the DNR to decide when a public trust violation has occurred and 
how it should be addressed, was handily rejected by this court 
in Gillen v. City of Neenah, 219 Wis. 2d 806, 831-32, 580 N.W.2d 
628 (1998).  In that case we declined to adopt such an 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 30.294, 
noting 
that 
the 
legislature authorized any person to abate public nuisances 
years before the DNR was even created and retained this statute 
after it created the DNR.  Gillen, 219 Wis. 2d at 832. 
¶118 Both of the rationales offered by the majority opinion 
to justify its result do not pass muster.  Essentially, the 
majority opinion has strung together statements taken out of 
context from various cases.  A careful reading of the opinion 
and the materials on which it relies demonstrates that the 
decision rests on rickety and unsteady foundations. 
 
* 
* 
* 
 
¶119 More than 25 years ago Van Alstyne and Roberts 
suggested in their article that this court reexamine the 
judicial limitation it has placed on the Wisconsin Attorney 
General’s powers.54  The majority opinion is the latest in a 
series of questionable cases relating to the powers of the 
                     
54 1974 Wis. L. Rev. at 721-722. 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
28
Attorney General.  The result is that Wisconsin’s jurisprudence 
about the power of the Attorney General is unduly restrictive 
and intellectually confusing and inconsistent.  Our task is to 
clarify the confusion, not continue the confusion.  We have 
failed in this case.  I therefore dissent. 
¶120 I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
No. 97-2188.ssa 
 
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