Title: Harris v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 091177
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 25, 2010

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
JUDSON JEFFREY HARRIS 
 
v.  Record No. 091177 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
    FEBRUARY 25, 2010 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in imposing the terms of a plea agreement executed in 
conjunction with the defendant’s participation in a drug 
treatment court program. 
Judson Jeffrey Harris was charged with possession of heroin 
in violation of Code § 18.2-250.  He entered a plea agreement in 
which he pled guilty to the charge of possession of heroin and 
waived his right to trial by jury and to appeal.  The 
Commonwealth agreed to recommend three years incarceration with 
all but six months suspended conditioned upon good behavior for 
five years, with active, supervised probation and payment of 
court costs.  The plea agreement also provided that Harris would 
seek admission to the Rappahannock Area Regional Drug Treatment 
Court Program (“drug treatment court program”) and, if admitted 
to the program, the finding of guilt and imposition of sentence 
would be deferred.  Upon successful completion of the drug 
treatment court program, the charge would be dismissed.  The 
agreement also provided that violations of the conditions “may 
result in my dismissal from the program and the imposition of 
the sentence” contained in the agreement. 
The circuit court for the City of Fredericksburg accepted 
the plea agreement by entering an order consistent with the plea 
agreement.  That order recited that the court advised Harris 
that “if he fail[ed] to successfully complete the Rappahannock 
Area Regional Drug Treatment Court Program, . . . he may be 
found guilty of possession of a controlled substance, as charged 
in the [i]ndictment and be sentenced . . . in accordance with 
the plea agreement.”  On August 27, 2007, an order was entered 
in the circuit court reciting that Harris was terminated from 
the drug treatment court program and setting a sentencing 
hearing. 
 
At the sentencing hearing, Harris argued that he was a 
“different person” and had rehabilitated himself.  He also 
argued that the trial court should consider the reasons he was 
terminated from the drug treatment court program before 
sentencing him to incarceration.1  Harris argued that he had a 
liberty interest in his continued freedom under the drug 
treatment court program and he did not receive notice or an 
opportunity to be heard regarding the termination decision.  
                                                 
1 The circuit court judge that accepted the plea agreement 
recused himself from presiding in Harris’ sentencing hearing 
because he had participated in the termination decision as the 
drug court judge.  
 
2
According to Harris, he was terminated because he was “poking 
fun” at persons working in the drug treatment court program 
through internet postings. 
 
The Commonwealth argued again that substantial compliance 
with the plea agreement terms was insufficient and that once a 
plea agreement is accepted by the court, the disposition must be 
in accord with the agreement. 
 
The trial court concluded that the drug court judge 
“presided over a hearing at which [Harris] was deemed not to 
have completed the program” and “for that reason” the trial 
court entered an order imposing the terms of the plea agreement.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction and 
sentence.  Harris v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0208-08-2 (May 12, 
2009).  We awarded Harris an appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
 
The plea agreement and proceedings involved in this appeal 
were undertaken pursuant to the Rappahannock Area Regional Drug 
Treatment Court Program.  This is the first instance in which we 
have considered the procedures utilized in a drug treatment 
court program. 
In 2004, the General Assembly enacted the Drug Treatment 
Court Act, Code § 18.2-254.1, to enhance effective treatment 
programs for reducing drug use and its impact on families and 
drug-related crimes.  As part of this program, the General 
 
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Assembly designated “drug treatment courts” as “specialized 
court dockets within the existing structure of Virginia’s court 
system offering judicial monitoring of intensive treatment and 
strict supervision of addicts in drug and drug-related cases.”  
Code § 18.2-254.1(D).  The legislation provided that drug 
treatment court programs could be created by localities under 
the administrative implementation oversight of this Court, 
pursuant to standards created by a state drug treatment court 
advisory committee.  Code § 18.2-254.1(E),(F).  A local 
jurisdiction creating this program must also have an advisory 
committee that sets policies and procedures for the operation of 
the program.  Code § 18.2-254.1(G),(H),(I).  Potential 
participants are screened according to eligibility criteria 
established by the local program.  No defendant is entitled to 
participate in the program and it is not available to every 
defendant.  Code § 18.2-254.1(M).  The Drug Treatment Court Act 
does not mandate specific procedures for the operation of the 
drug treatment court program. 
In his appeal, Harris raises a number of assignments of 
error; however, the dispositive issue is whether the trial court 
erred in refusing to consider the reasons that Harris was 
terminated from the drug treatment court program before making a 
decision regarding the imposition of the plea agreement terms 
and sentencing him to incarceration.  Harris argues that the 
 
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trial court erred because he had acquired and enjoyed a liberty 
interest when he was admitted to and participated in the drug 
treatment court program pursuant to the plea agreement terms.  
Harris contends that the only opportunity he had to maintain his 
liberty was at the hearing before the trial court because he had 
no notice or opportunity to be heard in conjunction with the 
decision to terminate him from the drug treatment court program. 
 
The Commonwealth, acknowledging at oral argument that 
Harris had “some sort” of liberty interest while in the drug 
treatment court program, contends that the record is 
insufficient in this case to determine what transpired at the 
meeting at which the decision to terminate Harris from the 
program was made, and therefore, we cannot address Harris’ 
claim. 
 
We agree with Harris and the Commonwealth that Harris had a 
liberty interest while he was participating in the drug 
treatment court program as part of the plea agreement accepted 
by the trial court.  Over 30 years ago, the United States 
Supreme Court declared that persons on parole or probation 
enjoyed a conditional liberty interest.  Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 
(1973).  Continuation of that liberty interest depends on 
compliance with certain conditions.  This conditional liberty 
interest is entitled to the protection of the 14th Amendment to 
 
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the United States Constitution and its “termination calls for 
some orderly process” in which the defendant has notice and 
opportunity to be heard.  Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 782.  Like a 
person on probation or parole, Harris enjoyed a conditional 
liberty interest dependant on his observing certain conditions 
and, like the probationer or parolee, before that interest can 
be revoked, Harris was entitled to an orderly process providing 
him notice and an opportunity to be heard.  Although the United 
States Supreme Court has not addressed the nature of the liberty 
interest under these circumstances, virtually every jurisdiction 
that has addressed the issue has concluded that a liberty 
interest exists and is entitled to the protection of the 14th 
Amendment.  See, e.g., People v. Bishop, 7 P.3d 184, 188 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1999); State v. Rogers, 170 P.3d 881, 884-85 (Idaho 
2007); People v. Anderson, 833 N.E.2d 390, 393-94 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2005); Hopper v. State, 546 N.E.2d 106, 108 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1989); Hager v. State, 990 P.2d 894, 898 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1999). 
 
We now turn to the Commonwealth’s contention that 
regardless of Harris’ liberty interest, the lack of a sufficient 
record in this case precludes our consideration of Harris’ 
claims.  In doing so, we are mindful that Harris is not arguing 
here that the trial court should have reversed the termination 
decision made by the drug court judge.  Rather he is asserting 
 
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only that the trial court should have considered the reasons for 
the termination thereby giving him the opportunity to “present 
his side of the story.”  
In this case, there is no transcript or other record of 
what specifically transpired when the decision to terminate 
Harris from the drug treatment court program was made.  As the 
trial court noted, the circuit court judge designated as the 
“drug court judge” made the final decision terminating Harris 
from the program.  Nothing in the record suggests, however, that 
the process was a formal hearing before the drug court judge in 
which Harris had the opportunity to address the issue.  There is 
no doubt in this record that Harris was neither present nor had 
an opportunity to participate in that process.  
 
The drug treatment court program termination decision 
itself, however, did not constitute a revocation of the liberty 
interest created pursuant to acceptance of the plea agreement.  
Harris’ liberty interest could be revoked only by order of the 
circuit court.  Nevertheless, under the terms of the plea 
agreement accepted by the court, termination of the drug 
treatment court program would be a very significant factor in a 
decision of the circuit court to impose the terms of the 
agreement and revoke Harris’ liberty.  Consequently, because 
Harris had no opportunity to participate in the termination 
decision, the trial court’s refusal to consider evidence of the 
 
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reasons for termination from the program when deciding whether 
to revoke Harris’ liberty and impose the terms of the plea 
agreement deprived Harris of the opportunity to be heard 
regarding the propriety of the revocation of his liberty 
interest.  That decision was error.2 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we will reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the conviction and 
sentencing order of the trial court, and remand the case to the 
Court of Appeals with instructions that the case be remanded to 
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
                                                 
2 The Court of Appeals held that this issue was not preserved 
because Harris did not proffer the evidence that he intended to 
offer.  Harris, Record No. 0208-08-2, slip op. at 3-4.  The trial 
court’s decision deprived Harris of his right to be heard, and 
was not dependent on the substance of the evidence. 
 
 
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