Title: Patton v. Target Corp.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S057752
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: November 12, 2010

FILED: November 12, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
JAMES PATTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
TARGET CORPORATION,
Defendant,
v.
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Intervenor.
(USCA 08-35177; SC S057752)
En Banc
On certified question
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; certification
order dated September 2, 2009; certification accepted October 7, 2009; argued
and submitted June 8, 2010.
Rolf C. Moan, Supreme
Court Coordinator, Office of the Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and
filed the brief for plaintiff-intervenor.  With him on the brief were John R.
Kroger, Attorney General, and Jerome Lidz, Solicitor General.
Michael A. Griffin, of
Jackson Lewis LLP, Seattle, argued the cause and filed the brief for
defendant.  With him on the brief was John M. Cowden.  Lori
Irish Bauman, of Ater Wynne LLP, Portland, for plaintiff James Patton, adopted
the brief of Michael A. Griffin.
Jennifer J. Middleton,
of Chanti &amp; Middleton, PC, Eugene, filed the brief for amicus curiae
Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
GILLETTE, J.
The certified question
is answered.
GILLETTE, J.
This case is before the court on a
certified question of Oregon law from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.  See Patton v. Target Corp, 580 F3d 942 (9th
Cir 2009) (certifying question); ORS 28.200 - 28.255 (granting authority to
answer certified questions and describing procedure).  Plaintiff Patton sued
his employer, defendant Target, in the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon for wrongful discharge, alleging that Target demoted and
later fired him because of his service in the National Guard.  Patton alleged
that Target's acts violated both federal and state law.  A jury found in
Target's favor on Patton's federal claim, but in Patton's favor on his state
law claim.  The jury awarded Patton approximately $85,000 in compensatory
damages and $900,000 in punitive damages.  Under ORS 31.735, set out post,
the state would be entitled to 60 percent of any eventual punitive damages payment. 

After the verdict was rendered, but
before judgment was entered in the case, Patton and Target reached a settlement
and jointly moved the court to approve a stipulated judgment dismissing the
case.  The terms of the settlement have not been disclosed, but it is
undisputed that the settlement does not include any payment for punitive
damages and, hence, there is no provision in the settlement for any payment to
the state.  The state moved to intervene in the case in order to object to the
stipulated final judgment.  The state argued that the settlement was reached
without regard to the state's interest in a share of the punitive damages award
under ORS 31.735(1), which provides that, "[u]pon the entry of a verdict
including an award of punitive damages, the Department of Justice shall become
a judgment creditor as to the punitive damages portion of the award."  The
court granted that motion, concluding that the state had a significant
protectable statutory interest, but did not make a ruling as to the nature and
scope of that interest under ORS 31.735.  
The state then filed a complaint in
intervention.  There, the state argued that it had a vested interest in 60
percent of the jury's punitive damages award, that the parties therefore were
precluded from settling the case without its consent, and that the court should
reject the settlement.  The district court ultimately held that the state did not
have a vested or enforceable property right in any punitive damages award until
a final judgment was entered awarding such damages, and, therefore, the state's
consent to a settlement was not required.  Patton v. Target Corp., No
03-CV-1722-BR, WL 361201 (D Or, February 8, 2008).  For that reason, the court
granted the original parties' motion to approve the stipulated judgment and it dismissed
the complaint with prejudice.  Id.  The state sought reconsideration,
and the district court affirmed its earlier decision.  
The state appealed the district
court's ruling to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that, under ORS 31.735(1), the
state became a judgment creditor upon the entry of a verdict -- before the
entry of a judgment -- and, therefore, the state's consent was required for any
settlement that would reduce or eliminate the state's share of punitive damages
awarded by the verdict.  The Ninth Circuit concluded that ORS 31.735 did not
clearly indicate what powers the legislature intended the state to possess as a
prejudgment "judgment creditor," and that the correct interpretation
of ORS 31.735 was an important and unanswered question of Oregon law that would
be dispositive in the case.  Patton, 580 F3d at 947-48.  Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit certified to this court the following question:  
"When a jury has returned a verdict that includes an
award of punitive damages under Oregon law, is the State of Oregon's consent
necessary before a court may enter a judgment giving effect to any settlement
between the parties that would result in a reduction or elimination of the
punitive damages to which the State would otherwise be entitled under Oregon
Revised Statutes § 31.735?"
580 F3d at 948-49.  This court accepted the certified
question.
We begin, as usual, by considering
the text and context of the statute at issue.  Since 1987, Oregon has had a
"split recovery" statute that requires that a part of any punitive
damages award be paid into the state's crime victim compensation account.  In
its current iteration, that statute is codified at ORS 31.735 and provides:
"(1) Upon the entry of a verdict including
an award of punitive damages, the Department of Justice shall become a judgment
creditor as to the punitive damages portion of the award to which the Criminal
Injuries Compensation Account is entitled pursuant to paragraph (b) of this
subsection, and the punitive damage portion of an award shall be allocated as
follows:
"(a) Forty percent shall be paid to the
prevailing party.  The attorney for the prevailing party shall be paid out of
the amount allocated under this paragraph, in the amount agreed upon between
the attorney and the prevailing party.  However, in no event may more than 20
percent of the amount awarded as punitive damages be paid to the attorney for
the prevailing party.
"(b) Sixty percent shall be paid to the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Account of the Department of Justice Crime
Victims' Assistance Section to be used for the purposes set forth in ORS chapter
147.  However, if the prevailing party is a public entity, the amount otherwise
payable to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account shall be paid to the
general fund of the public entity.
"(2) The party preparing the proposed
judgment shall assure that the judgment identifies the judgment creditors
specified in subsection (1) of this section.
"(3) Upon the entry of a verdict including
an award of punitive damages, the prevailing party shall provide notice of the
verdict to the Department of Justice.  In addition, upon entry of a judgment
based on a verdict that includes an award of punitive damages, the prevailing
party shall provide notice of the judgment to the Department of Justice.  The
notices required under this subsection must be in writing and must be delivered
to the Department of Justice Crime Victims' Assistance Section in Salem, Oregon
within five days after the entry of the verdict or judgment.
"(4) Whenever a judgment includes both
compensatory and punitive damages, any payment on the judgment by or on behalf
of any defendant, whether voluntary or by execution or otherwise, shall be
applied first to compensatory damages, costs and court-awarded attorney fees
awarded against that defendant and then to punitive damages awarded against that
defendant unless all affected parties, including the Department of Justice,
expressly agree otherwise, or unless that application is contrary to the
express terms of the judgment.
"(5) Whenever any judgment creditor of a
judgment which includes punitive damages governed by this section receives any
payment on the judgment by or on behalf of any defendant, the judgment creditor
receiving the payment shall notify the attorney for the other judgment
creditors and all sums collected shall be applied as required by subsections
(1) and (4) of this section, unless all affected parties, including the
Department of Justice, expressly agree otherwise, or unless that application is
contrary to the express terms of the judgment."
The state argues that subsection (1)
of ORS 31.735, which makes the Department of Justice a "judgment creditor"
at the time that a verdict is entered, clearly demonstrates that the
legislature intended to give the state a protected interest in its share of the
punitive damages award.  The state acknowledges that the text of subsection (1)
creates some ambiguity about the extent of the rights that the state
possesses at that point, but argues that the legislative history makes it plain
that the legislature intended to prevent parties from entering into post-verdict
settlements that reduce or eliminate the state's share of a punitive damages
award without its consent.  Patton and Target, for their part, contend that, in
common understanding and under applicable statutory definitions of the key
terms in ORS 31.735, the notion of a "judgment creditor" is
meaningless before a judgment has been entered and, even if the legislature
intended to give the state the rights of a judgment creditor before a judgment
has been entered, going so far as to include a right to block a settlement that
did not protect its rights, the legislature failed to express that intent in
the words of ORS 31.735.  
It is helpful to begin our analysis
of ORS 31.735 by examining the historical development of that statute.  As
noted, the legislature created the split recovery scheme in 1987, making it
part of chapter 18, dealing with judgments.(1) 
Or Laws 1987, ch 774, § 3.  At that time, former ORS 18.540 (the
original split recovery statute) provided, simply, that half of any part of a
punitive damages award remaining after the plaintiff's attorney was paid was to
be paid to a state crime victim compensation fund.(2)  
Subsequently, in 1990, the Court of Appeals held, in Eulrich v. Snap-On
Tools Corp., 103 Or App 610, 613, 798 P2d 715 (1990), that, under that
statute, the state had no right to any part of a punitive damages award until a
fund that was capable of distribution was created.  In 1991, and apparently in
response to that holding, the legislature amended former ORS 18.540 to add
the following, among other provisions:  
"Upon the entry of a judgment including an award of
punitive damages, the Department of Justice shall become a judgment creditor as
to the punitive damages portion of the award * * *."(3)
Or Laws 1991, ch 862, § 1.
The phrase "judgment
creditor" was not defined in the statute in 1991, nor is it today.(4) 
However, there is no indication that, at the time of the 1991 amendments, the
legislature intended that phrase to be understood other than according to its
common and usual meaning -- that is, as a term that was intrinsically dependent
on the existence of a judgment.  At that time, Black's Law Dictionary
defined "judgment" as the 
"final decision of the court resolving the dispute and
determining the rights and obligations of the parties.  The law's last word in
a judicial controversy, it being the final determination by a court of the
rights of the parties upon matters submitted to it in an action or
proceeding."
Black's Law Dictionary 841-42 (6th ed 1990).  "Judgment
creditor" was defined as "[a] person in whose favor a money judgment
is entered or a person who becomes entitled to enforce it."  Id. at
844-45.  Those concepts are consistent with the common understanding of the
phrase "judgment creditor" today.  See Black's Law
Dictionary 921 (9th ed 2009) ("judgment creditor" is a person
with "a legal right to enforce execution of a judgment for a specific sum
of money"); see also Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1223
(unabridged ed 2002) ("judgment creditor" is "creditor having a
legal right to enforce execution of a judgment for a sum of money").  It also
is consistent with later-enacted definitions of key words and phrases set out
in ORS chapter 18.  For example, chapter 18 defines the term
"judgment" as follows:  
"'Judgment' means the concluding decision of a court on
one or more requests for relief in one or more actions, as reflected in a
judgment document."
ORS 18.005(8).  "Judgment document," in turn, is
defined as "a writing in the form provided by ORS 18.038 that incorporates
a court's judgment."  ORS 18.005(9).  In addition, "judgment remedy"
is defined to include the "ability of a judgment creditor to enforce a
judgment through execution."  ORS 18.005(11)(a).
In 1995, the legislature again
amended former ORS 18.540, changing the word "judgment" in the
first sentence of subsection (1) to "verdict," so that that
subsection provided that, "upon entry of a verdict including an
award of punitive damages, the Department of Justice shall become a judgment
creditor as to the punitive damages portion of the award."  Former ORS
18.540(1) (1995) (emphasis added); Or Laws 1995, ch 688, § 1.(5)
 At that time, the legislature did nothing to signal that it intended to alter
the common understanding of any term used in the statute.  That is, without
changing the definition of the word "judgment" or the phrase
"judgment creditor," or otherwise clarifying through definitions or in
some other way what it intended to accomplish, the legislature purported to
make the state a judgment creditor upon entry of a verdict, before there is any
judgment in a case.  
The state suggests that, although
chapter 18 "generally declares that 'judgment creditor' status is
created by a judgment," the more "particular intent" to give the
state rights at the time of a verdict reflected in chapter 31 renders "the
more general provisions in chapter 18 * * * essentially irrelevant." 
(Emphasis in original.)  That is, according to the state, 
"although chapter 18 * * * suggests that a 'judgment
creditor' generally is a creditor whose entitlement to a debt is documented by
a 'concluding' judgment, chapter 18 makes no effort to apply any such
definition to ORS 31.735 or to any other provision outside of chapter 18. 
Similarly, nothing in ORS 31.735, and nothing in any other portion of chapter
31, purports to incorporate definitions from chapter 18.  In short, nothing in
chapter 18 suggests that the legislature was without authority to declare, via
ORS 31.735, that the state becomes a 'judgment creditor' -- as a matter of law
-- upon entry of a punitive-damages verdict." 
That argument does not advance the state's position.  As our
description of the historical development of ORS 31.735 makes clear, at the
time that the legislature made the state a "judgment creditor" upon
entry of a judgment that included a punitive damages award in 1991, the split
recovery statute was a part of chapter 18.  As we explained above, although the
definitions set out in ORS 18.005 were not part of chapter 18 in 1991 or 1995,
those definitions are consistent with the common understanding of the relevant
terms at that time.  It is true that, when former ORS 18.540 was
renumbered as ORS 31.735 in 2003, the legislature did not expressly make
applicable the newly enacted definitions set out in ORS 18.005.  However, it
goes without saying that the mere fact that the split recovery statute was
renumbered in 2003 and now is found in chapter 31 has no bearing on the intent
of the legislature in 1991 or 1995, when it enacted the amendments at issue in
this case.  
Of course, the legislature is free to
define words to mean anything that it intends them to mean, including defining
words "in a manner that varies from a dictionary definition or common
understanding."  Cook v. Workers' Compensation Department, 306 Or
134, 143 n 5, 758 P2d 854 (1988) (for purposes of workers' compensation
reimbursement, a nurse practitioner is a "doctor or physician" under
applicable statute, which defined "doctor or physician" as person
licensed to practice in the "healing arts").  The problem, however,
is that the legislature never purported to expand or otherwise redefine the
phrase "judgment creditor" when, in 1995, it changed the word
"judgment" to "verdict" in former ORS 18.540(1), or
in 2003, when former ORS 18.540 was renumbered. 
The question before the court thus
comes down to what it means for the state to be a "judgment creditor"
before there is a judgment.  The state concedes that it does not mean
that the state has the right to execute on the verdict alone to collect its
share of the punitive damages awarded by the jury -- a right ordinarily
associated with the status of judgment creditor.  Indeed, collection at the
time of the verdict would seem to be precluded by the fact that, under ORS
31.730, any award of punitive damages is subject to court review and reduction
if the court determines, inter alia, that the amount is not
within the range that a rational jury would be entitled to award, or that the
defendant has taken reasonable remedial measures to prevent recurrence of the
conduct that gave rise to the punitive damages award.  See ORS 31.730(2)
and (3) (so providing).  It follows that, upon entry of a verdict, the state
has, at most, an economic expectancy of 60 percent of whatever portion of
punitive damages, if any, eventually is memorialized in a judgment.  However,
the statute is silent as to what rights a "judgment creditor" with such
an expectancy interest deriving from a verdict would have before entry of
judgment.  
The state further concedes that ORS
31.735 does not expressly define the extent of the state's rights as a prejudgment
"judgment creditor," but it argues that the plain text of the statute
does give the state a "protected interest" in 60 percent of a
punitive damages award upon entry of a verdict.(6) 
And that "protected interest," the state asserts, means that the
parties may not agree to settle a case in such a way as to reduce or eliminate
the state's share of any punitive damages award.  The problem with the state's
position is that nothing in ORS 31.735(1) -- where the "judgment
creditor" status at issue in this case is created -- speaks to, much less expressly
requires the state's consent to, a settlement.  By contrast, subsections (4)
and (5) each provide that certain actions may not be taken "unless all
affected parties, including the Department of Justice, expressly agree
otherwise."(7) 
In our view, that contrast prevents us from reading the wording in subsection
(1) as making the state's consent a prerequisite to any post-verdict settlement
between the parties.  
As noted above, however, the state
contends that, to the extent that its rights as a prejudgment "judgment
creditor" under ORS 31.735 remain undefined after an examination of the
text of that statute, the legislative history fleshes out the nature of its protected
interest.(8) 
The legislative history that the state asserts to be compelling was quoted at
length in a recent Court of Appeals opinion, MAN Aktiengesellschaft v.
DaimlerChrysler AG, 218 Or App 117, 179 P3d 675 (2008), rev dismissed,
346 Or 214 (2009).  In particular, the state points to certain statements made
to a committee of the 1995 legislature.  First, with respect to the proposed
amendment to change, among other things, the word "judgment" to "verdict"
in former ORS 18.540(1), Senator Miller commented, 
"'I heard Attorney General Kulongoski describe that in
some situations after a verdict is reached that maybe the parties go back and
rework the settlement * * *.  The State's interest in these awards sometimes is
defeated by some maneuvering that seems to enrich and maybe even more than -- windfall
might be a kind of a gentle phrase to describe the activity but it seems like
maybe the plaintiff and their lawyer come out a lot better than perhaps they
should.'"
MAN Aktiengesellschaft, 218 Or App at 128, quoting
Tape Recording, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil Process, SB 482, Feb 27,
1995, Tape 28, Side A (statement of Randy Miller).  In addition, John
DiLorenzo, a spokesperson for the sponsor of the amendment, testified the same
day as follows:  
"'The Attorney General's right does not vest until
after the judgment is entered.  And so if the parties are smart and if there is
a large punitive damages award entered, the parties will sit down and construct
a * * * settlement which will provide that no final judgment will be awarded or
that they will stipulate to a final judgment that will provide an award of general
damages of a certain amount.  And parties do that quite often, by the way,
because they like to avoid the expense of appeal potentially.  But they can
under the present statute essentially cut out the Attorney General from that
portion of the award because again, the Attorney General does not have the
right to intervene until the judgment is entered.'"  
Id. (statement of John DiLorenzo).  Finally, DiLorenzo
also made the following statement:  
"I don't think you can discount too much * * * what
happens to parties when the verdict comes in and before judgment is rendered. 
There is a real incentive for both parties to settle the case and to change the
judgment around a little bit so that the Attorney General does not take half of
whatever is available."
Tape Recording, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil
Process, SB 482, Feb 27, 1995, Tape 27, Side B.
Although the comment of a single
legislator at one committee hearing generally is of dubious utility in
determining the intent of the legislature in enacting a statute (and the
comment of a nonlegislator witness even less helpful),(9)
we can agree that those passages clearly describe a problem that the
legislature appears to have been attempting to address:  Under the 1991 version
of the statute, the parties to litigation sometimes eliminated the state's potential
interest in a punitive damages award by settling the case before a judgment was
entered.  The passages quoted above do speak directly about the state's
interest in a punitive damages award being "defeated" and the parties
sometimes achieving a "windfall."  However, that legislative history
does not disclose how the legislature intended to solve that problem.  The
state's argument, essentially, is that the legislature clearly intended to give
the state some right that it did not have before the amendment, and
because, in the state's view, the best way to address the legislature's clear concern
over collusive settlements was to give the state the right to block all
settlements, then that right must be what the legislature intended to confer.  
The problem, however, is that there
is an unbridged gap between what the legislature is said to have intended and
what the words that the legislature chose to use actually do:  The statute
simply does not create any right or rights in the state as a prejudgment "judgment
creditor" to accomplish that possible objective.  Moreover, even assuming,
arguendo, that the legislative history showed that the legislature
did intend to enable the state to block parties from settling without its
consent by bestowing "judgment creditor" status on the state upon
entry of a verdict that includes punitive damages, the method that the
legislature chose -- changing the word "judgment" to
"verdict" in subsection (1) -- failed to "translate [that]
intent into operational language" to accomplish that goal.  Monaco v.
US Fidelity &amp; Guar., 275 Or 183, 188, 550 P2d 422 (1976).  The court is
"not at liberty to give effect to any supposed intention or meaning in the
legislature, unless the words to be imported into the statute are, in substance
at least, contained in it."  Whipple v. Howser, 291 Or 475, 480,
632 P2d 782 (1981) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  As we
have discussed, the statute does not provide that the state's consent to a
settlement is required, although it does plainly require the state's consent to
the application of payments made by or on behalf of a defendant after
judgment.  ORS 31.735 (4) and (5).  Thus, even if the legislative history
clearly suggested that the 1995 amendment was intended to require the state's
consent to settlement, "the words to be imported into the statute" are
not, in substance, contained in it.  
In this case, it simply is not
possible for us to conclude that ORS 31.735 as presently worded makes the
state's consent necessary before a court may enter a judgment giving effect to a
settlement between the parties that would reduce or eliminate punitive damages
to which the state otherwise would be entitled, even if that is what the
legislature intended.  The answer to the certified question is "no."
The certified question is answered.
1. In
2003, former ORS 18.540 was moved to a newly created chapter -- chapter
31 -- and renumbered as ORS 31.735.  
2. Former
ORS 18.540 (1987) provided:
"The punitive damage portion of an award shall be
distributed as follows:
"(1) The attorney for the prevailing party
shall be paid the amount agreed upon between the attorney and the prevailing
party.
"(2)  One-half of the remainder shall be
paid to the prevailing party.
"(3) One-half of the remainder shall be paid
to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account to be used for the purposes set
forth in ORS chapter 147."
3. Former
ORS 18.540 (1991) also included provisions, among others, requiring the party
preparing the proposed judgment to ensure that the judgment identified all
judgment creditors, and requiring the prevailing party to provide notice of any
judgment that included punitive damages to the Department of Justice.  Or Laws
1991, ch 862, § 1.  
4. In
fact, chapter 18 included no definitions whatsoever until 2003.  Or Laws 2003,
ch 576, § 1 (adding ORS 18.005, which sets out definitions).
5. In
addition to that change, the 1995 amendment increased the state's share of the
punitive damages award from 50 to 60 percent, former ORS 18.540(b)
(1995); limited the amount of the punitive damages award that the prevailing
party's attorney was entitled to receive, former ORS 18.540(a) (1995);
and required the prevailing party to notify the Department of Justice of the
entry of a verdict awarding punitive damages, former ORS 18.540(3)
(1995).  Or Laws 1995, ch 688, § 1.  The 1995 amendment to subsection (3)
actually erroneously required the prevailing party, on "entry of a verdict
including an award of punitive damages," to "provide notice of the judgment
to the Department of Justice."  Former ORS 18.540(3) (1995)
(emphasis added).  That error was corrected in 1997.  Or Laws 1997, ch 73, §
1.  The 1997 version provided (and continues to provide):
"Upon the entry of a verdict including an award of
punitive damages, the prevailing party shall provide notice of the verdict to
the Department of Justice.  In addition, upon entry of a judgment based on a
verdict that includes an award of punitive damages, the prevailing party shall
provide notice of the judgment to the Department of Justice."  
Former ORS 18.540(3) (1997).  
6. The
state has abandoned the argument, which it made in the federal district court,
that it has a "vested" interest in its share of a punitive damages
award.  It was correct to do so.  As this court explained in DeMendoza v.
Huffman, 334 Or 425, 449, 51 P3d 1232 (2002), in the context of a
discussion of the constitutionality of former ORS 18.540,
"The question is whether a vested property right in a
punitive damages award can accrue before entry of a final judgment for
the purposes of Article I, section 18.  The answer is that it cannot." 
(Emphasis in original.)  As the court further stated,
"'A vested right must be something more than a mere
expectation based upon the anticipated continuance of existing laws;  it must
have become a title legal or equitable to the present or future enjoyment of
property.'"  
Id., quoting
Coshun v. Hurlburt et al., 102 Or 240, 243, 201 P 870 (1921).
7. Subsection
(4) provides:
"Whenever
a judgment includes both compensatory and punitive damages, any payment
on the judgment by or on behalf of any defendant * * * shall be applied first to compensatory damages, costs
and court-awarded attorney fees awarded against that defendant and then to
punitive damages awarded against that defendant unless all affected parties,
including the Department of Justice, expressly agree otherwise * * *."
(Emphasis added.)  Similarly, subsection (5) provides:
"Whenever any judgment creditor of a
judgment which includes punitive damages governed by this section receives
any payment on the judgment by or on behalf of any defendant, the
judgment creditor receiving the payment shall notify the attorney for the other
judgment creditors and all sums collected shall be applied as required by
subsections (1) and (4) of this section, unless all affected parties, including
the Department of Justice, expressly agree otherwise * * *."
(Emphasis added.)
It is also noteworthy that, as the
emphasized wording above highlights, the state's express consent only is
required when there is a judgment in the case -- that is, a time when a
"judgment creditor" ordinarily has rights.
8. Under
ORS 174.020(3), the court may consider legislative history to the extent it
deems appropriate to assist in its construction of a statute.  See State v.
Gaines, 346 Or 160, 166, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (construing ORS 174.020 to
that effect).  Accordingly, we consider the legislative history that the state
has presented to us in this case.  Id. (court may limit its
consideration of legislative history to the information provided by the parties;
court need not independently research legislative history).  
9. See
Thompson v. IDS Life Ins. Co.,  274 Or 649, 652-53, 549 P2d 510 (1976)
(whether or not comment before legislative committee could be construed as
favoring one interpretation of statute, "it is only the comment of one
individual and of little or no help in determining legislative intent"); State
v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 260, 906 P2d 272 (1995) (nonlegislator's statements
say little about the intent of the Oregon Legislative Assembly as a whole).