Title: Commonwealth v. Troche
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12984
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 16, 2023

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12984 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JULIAN TROCHE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 15, 2023. - November 16, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Armed Assault with Intent to Murder.  Assault and 
Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.  Identification.  
Evidence, Identification, Credibility of witness, Relevancy 
and materiality, Inflammatory evidence, Photograph.  
Witness, Self-incrimination.  Constitutional Law, Self-
incrimination.  Practice, Criminal, Voir dire, Cross-
examination by prosecutor, Instructions to jury, 
Stipulation, Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 20, 2017. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Mitchell H. Kaplan, J. 
 
 
Robert F. Shaw, Jr., for the defendant. 
Kathryn Sherman, Assistant District Attorney (Mark Zanini, 
Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  The defendant, Julian Troche, was convicted 
of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation in connection with the November 2016 killing of 
2 
 
Dantley Leonard, who was shot eleven times in a "drive-by"1 
shooting in the Dorchester section of Boston.  The defendant was 
also convicted of armed assault with intent to murder and 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon in connection 
with the shooting of Antwuan Mair, who was shot during the same 
incident as Leonard.2 
Mair described the shooter as a light-skinned man, who had 
been a front seat passenger in a silver or grey sedan.  The 
defense at trial centered on mistaken identification.  No 
witness was able to identify the defendant as the shooter.  
Instead, the prosecution chiefly relied on the testimony of one 
witness, who identified the defendant as the driver of a bluish-
silver Nissan sedan that the witness twice had seen a few blocks 
away from the scene of the crime approximately twenty to thirty 
minutes before the shooting. 
In this direct appeal, the defendant contends that the 
judge erred in denying his request to conduct a voir dire 
examination of this key prosecution witness when, following the 
witness's testimony, defense counsel received an anonymous text 
 
1 A drive-by is defined as "an action carried out from a 
passing vehicle."  Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed 
.com/search/dictionary/?scope=Entries&q=drive-by [https:// 
perma.cc/88KY-TLG4]. 
 
2 The defendant was also convicted of unlawful possession of 
a firearm. 
3 
 
message suggesting that the witness had falsely identified the 
defendant as part of a plot to frame him.  The text message was 
accompanied by screenshots3 of what purported to be a 
communication from the witness's social media account; if the 
screenshots were genuine, as presented by the anonymous sender, 
the witness appeared to express discomfort with his allegedly 
false testimony and was buoyed by the unidentified person with 
whom he was communicating. 
The defendant also contends that the prosecutor improperly 
questioned a witness concerning his invocation of his privilege 
against self-incrimination pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and his understanding of his 
grant of transactional immunity in front of the jury, that the 
prosecutor impermissibly questioned lay witnesses about gang 
activity, that the prosecutor introduced inflammatory 
photographs of the defendant's friend's dead body from an 
incident that occurred two months prior to the shooting at 
issue, that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury 
consistent with the parties' stipulation that the defendant was 
first apprehended in connection with an investigation unrelated 
 
3 A screenshot is "[a] photograph or (now usually) a digital 
image of all or part of what is displayed at a given time on a 
screen."  Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/search 
/dictionary/?scope=Entries&q=screenshot [https://perma.cc/ACR8-
89CH]. 
4 
 
to the charged crimes, and that the prosecutor misstated facts 
in closing argument.  The defendant also asks the court to 
exercise its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new 
trial. 
Because the judge erred in denying defense counsel's 
request to conduct a voir dire examination of the key 
identification witness, we vacate the defendant's convictions 
and remand for a new trial.  We also address the defendant's 
other claims of error to the extent they may arise in any 
subsequent retrial. 
1.  Background.  "We recite the facts as the jury could 
have found them, in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, reserving certain details for later discussion."  
Commonwealth v. Niemic, 483 Mass. 571, 573 (2019). 
 
a.  Commonwealth's case.  i.  November 2016 shooting.  On 
the afternoon of November 12, 2016, Leonard and Mair were on 
Ames Street in Dorchester, near the Franklin Field housing 
development.  Their childhood friend, who was helping his 
girlfriend move furniture into an apartment, had asked Leonard 
to move his vehicle to allow the friend to park a moving truck.  
Mair was assisting with the move and stood behind the truck to 
direct it into the parking spot.  Another longtime friend of 
Leonard, Mair, and the truck's driver had accompanied Leonard 
outside and also stood in the vicinity of the truck, though 
5 
 
further away from the street.  As the truck backed into the 
parking spot, a silver car approached the group of friends.  The 
time was approximately 4:45 P.M.  A light-skinned man opened the 
car's front passenger door and fired shots from a firearm in the 
direction of Leonard and Mair.  Leonard was shot eleven times, 
and Mair was shot three times.  Mair survived the shooting but 
suffered two wounds in his arm and one in his back; Leonard died 
from his wounds within minutes. 
 
Ballistics analysis following the shooting determined that 
the bullets that killed Leonard and injured Mair, as well as a 
spent bullet, a bullet fragment, and several casings at the 
crime scene, had all been ejected from a single .40 caliber 
Smith and Wesson firearm.  As discussed infra, this same weapon 
had been one of the weapons used two months earlier during an 
exchange of gunfire involving the defendant.  At that incident, 
the defendant had been injured and his longtime friend had been 
killed. 
None of those present at the November 2016 crime scene 
identified the defendant as the shooter.  Instead, Mair 
generally described the car from which the shooter opened fire 
as silver, the shooter as light-skinned, and the driver as dark-
6 
 
skinned.  The two other witnesses present at the shooting did 
not see the shooter or the vehicle.4 
In addition, a woman who had heard gunshots peered from her 
second-floor apartment on Ames Way and saw a dark-skinned man 
with braids, presumably Leonard, on the ground and bleeding.  
She also saw a gray sedan fleeing the scene.  The woman later 
identified the car she had seen fleeing the scene as having a 
similar body type and color as the Nissan Altima sedan driven by 
the defendant.  However, she too did not identify or provide a 
description of the shooter. 
 
Approximately twenty to thirty minutes before the shooting, 
Yordany Rodriguez and a companion were on the corner of Ames 
Street and Westview Street, a few blocks from where the shooting 
took place; they were cleaning the companion's stepfather's 
vehicle.  A silver sedan5 approached a stop sign on the opposite 
side of the street from where Rodriguez and his companion were 
working.  The silver sedan's driver, a light-skinned man with a 
goatee and a short haircut and wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt, 
 
4 The prosecutor also elicited testimony about gang activity 
in and around Franklin Field from these two witnesses.  One 
testified that each of the four men had been part of a Franklin 
Field gang during their youth, but the other witness responded 
that he knew nothing about gangs in the area. 
 
 
5 Rodriguez described the color of this vehicle as "two-
toned" with "silver throwing to like baby blue."  His companion 
described it as "silver or gray." 
7 
 
and the passenger, a dark-skinned man with a hooded sweatshirt 
pulled close to his face, gave Rodriguez and his companion a 
look, as if they were "trying to see if they recognized 
somebody."  The driver asked Rodriguez and his companion "what 
the f*ck [they] was looking at" and "if [they] were from there."  
To the latter question, Rodriguez replied "no."6 
Rodriguez testified that the passenger appeared surprised 
when he apparently noticed a security camera on a nearby utility 
pole.  The passenger "laid back" in his seat, and the sedan 
left.  A few minutes later, the sedan returned and the driver 
and passenger "mean-mugged"7 the two men. 
Concerned because of these two encounters,8 Rodriguez and 
his companion gathered their cleaning supplies and went inside a 
nearby building where the companion lived.  Anywhere from ten to 
 
6 Another witness, Phillipe Woods, Sr. (Woods Senior), 
testified that residents of Franklin Field and the nearby 
neighborhood of Franklin Hill generally and at unspecified times 
experienced "disagreements" that resulted in violence, including 
"[s]hootings, stabbings." 
 
7 "Mean-mugging" is "the act of glowering at someone with an 
intimidating, irritated, or judgmental facial expression."  
Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/e/slang/mean-mugging/ 
[https://perma.cc/S2KC-JJ8J].  Rodriguez testified about being 
"mean-mugged" during his grand jury testimony, but at trial he 
denied making this statement. 
 
 
8 At trial Rodriguez testified, "That sh*t . . . always 
happens around that neighborhood.  That happened to us.  That's 
the only thing that needs to happen to us for us to be, like, 
all right, we gotta get outta here." 
8 
 
thirty minutes later, Rodriguez and his companion heard 
gunshots. 
At 4:31 P.M., a surveillance video camera at the 
intersection of Blue Hill Avenue and Westview Street captured a 
car generally matching the appearance of the one identified by 
Rodriguez and his companion turn left from Westview Street onto 
Stratton Street.9  The video shows a similar vehicle driving on 
Westview Street at 4:35 P.M. and slowing near the Stratton 
intersection before turning right onto Blue Hill Avenue.10  The 
video resolution was insufficient to show the car's license 
plates or to identify its occupants. 
Rodriguez spoke to police officers on the night of the 
shooting but did not report the car he had seen earlier; he 
explained that he thought that his prior encounter was unrelated 
to the shooting.  Six months after the shooting, Rodriguez was 
called to testify before a grand jury.11  Before giving his 
 
9 By turning onto Stratton Street, the car headed back 
towards the Franklin Field development where the shooting 
occurred. 
 
10 By taking a right on Blue Hill Avenue, the car was 
heading away from the eventual crime scene.  The prosecutor 
contended that the defendant did this to loop around and avoid 
the surveillance camera at the Ames Street and Westview Street 
intersection. 
 
11 Rodriguez testified that he had no intention of sharing 
his information or testifying until police approached him about 
testifying in front of the grand jury. 
9 
 
testimony, he was shown a photographic array of eight men, and 
Rodriguez selected the defendant's photograph, identifying the 
defendant as the driver of the silver sedan Rodriguez had seen 
prior to the shooting.  At trial, Rodriguez confirmed this 
identification and identified the defendant in court.  Rodriguez 
was the only witness who identified the defendant as being near 
the scene of the shooting, albeit twenty to thirty minutes prior 
thereto when the defendant was the driver, not the passenger, of 
the silver sedan. 
 
ii.  Nightclub shooting.  At trial, the Commonwealth's 
theory was that the defendant had shot Leonard and Mair in 
retaliation for the killing of his longtime friend, Phillip 
Woods, Jr. (Woods Junior), approximately two months before the 
November shooting.  Specifically, on September 17, 2016, at 
about 2:25 A.M., the defendant, along with Woods Junior and 
another friend, Corey Jacques, were outside a nightclub in 
Dorchester when an exchange of gun fire transpired.  Woods 
Junior was killed, and the defendant and Jacques were injured. 
Ballistics analysis following the shooting determined that 
one of the weapons used in the shootout was a nine millimeter 
Luger; inferably, this was the weapon used to kill Woods Junior 
and to injure the defendant and Jacques.  Based on ballistics 
analysis of shell casings found near Woods Junior's body, the 
other weapon was a .40 caliber Smith and Wesson, eventually 
10 
 
determined to be the same weapon that had been used to shoot 
Leonard and Mair two months later. 
At trial, the defendant called a witness who, minutes after 
the nightclub shooting, encountered the defendant while walking 
to his parked car behind the nightclub.  The witness testified 
that the defendant, bleeding and "kinda hysterical," asked the 
witness to drive him to the hospital.  The witness, who saw no 
one else nearby, agreed.  An officer, whom the defendant also 
called at trial, spotted the witness's car speeding and pulled 
him over for a routine traffic stop.  The witness reported that 
he was taking the defendant to the hospital because the 
defendant had been shot.  At trial, the officer testified that, 
because he was aware that a shootout had occurred near the 
nightclub moments earlier, he searched the witness, the 
defendant, and the witness's vehicle for firearms.  Finding 
none,12 the officer called for an ambulance to take the defendant 
to the hospital. 
iii.  Defendant's activities following the nightclub 
shooting.  Two days after the nightclub shooting, Phillipe 
Woods, Sr. (Woods Senior) –- Woods Junior's father -- sent a 
text message to the defendant; the message, which contained no 
 
12 The .40 caliber firearm used at the September and 
November shootings was not found either at the Ames Street crime 
scene or on the defendant's person after the September nightclub 
shooting. 
11 
 
words, consisted of a photograph depicting the upper body of a 
broad-shouldered Black man with shoulder-length braids.  The 
photographed man somewhat resembled Leonard insofar as the two 
had similar skin tones, braided shoulder-length hair, and large 
builds; they were otherwise distinguishable.13 
Approximately one week after the nightclub shooting, the 
defendant engaged in the following text message exchange with an 
unidentified person: 
Anonymous:  "I wish I was home so f*cking bad!" 
 
Defendant:  "Don't even sweat it I'm here just gotta get 
back mobile" 
 
Anonymous:  "But all this teaching me a hard lesson[.]  I 
should've did so much more out there, set the tone for what 
actions like this would bring" 
 
Defendant:  "Like I said don't sweat it trust me" 
 
Anonymous:  "I got all the faith in world in you my dude, I 
know your work but a extra hand lightens up the load" 
 
Defendant:  "This run going be a pleasure it ain't just for 
the sport no more" 
 
Anonymous:  "And I respect that!  Your pleasure is the 
pleasure of everyone who feels this loss" 
 
Defendant:  "Real sh*t" 
 
 
13 The Commonwealth theorized that the defendant shot 
Leonard wrongly believing him to be the person photographed who, 
the Commonwealth contended, was identified as the shooter of 
Woods Junior.  At trial, Woods Senior testified pursuant to a 
grant of immunity.  He stated that he did not remember sending 
the photograph and that he did not know the man it depicted.  At 
trial, the Commonwealth argued that Leonard was not Woods 
Junior's actual killer. 
12 
 
Anonymous:  "I would say leave some for me but f*ck them 
suckas any way you can"14 
 
 
iv.  The defendant's activities prior to the November 2016 
shooting.  At about 12:30 A.M. on the day Leonard was killed, 
the defendant received a text message from Hassaun Daily, who 
was a longtime friend of Woods Junior, the victim of the 
nightclub shooting.  Daily stated, "let's get up tomorrow." 
At about noon that same day, cell site location information 
(CSLI)15 showed the defendant's cellular telephone near his own 
apartment in the Fenway neighborhood of Boston.  At 3:57 P.M., 
the defendant called Daily, after which Daily sent a text 
message to the defendant that included an address in the 
Mattapan neighborhood of Boston. 
At 4:15 P.M., the defendant placed a six-second telephone 
call to Daily; CSLI showed that the defendant's cellular 
 
14 At trial, the Commonwealth argued that this exchange 
showed that the defendant was planning to retaliate for Woods 
Junior's killing. 
 
 
15 CSLI does not provide the precise location of a given 
cellular telephone.  Instead, it shows that a device is within a 
cell tower's coverage area when that device uses the tower to 
send a text or make a call; the smaller the coverage area, the 
more precise the location information becomes.  See Commonwealth 
v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 237 (2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 and 
472 Mass. 448 (2015) ("A cellular service provider has a network 
of base stations, also referred to as cell sites or cell towers, 
that essentially divides the provider's service area into 
'sectors.' . . .  Cell site antennae send and receive signals 
from subscribers' cellular telephones that are operating within 
a particular sector."). 
13 
 
telephone was near the address sent by Daily and Daily's 
cellular telephone.  CSLI also showed that Daily's cellular 
telephone was near the crime scene at 4:30 P.M.  The shooting on 
Ames Street occurred at 4:45 P.M. 
v.  The defendant's activities following the November 2016 
shooting.  No CSLI data were available from the defendant's 
cellular telephone from 4:15 P.M., when he placed a call to 
Daily from a location near Daily's home address, until 4:48 
P.M., three minutes after the shooting.16  At that latter time, 
CSLI data showed that the defendant's cellular telephone was 
near a tower one mile south of the crime scene, near the Morton 
Street train station.  At 4:51 P.M., the defendant's cellular 
telephone used a tower less than a mile east of the tower used 
at 4:48 P.M.  No CSLI data were presented concerning the 
location of Daily's cellular telephone from 4:30 P.M., when he 
was near the scene of Leonard's killing, to 4:57 P.M., when 
Daily's cellular telephone used the same tower that the 
defendant's cellular telephone had accessed six minutes earlier. 
 
Around 5:30 P.M., approximately forty-five minutes after 
the shooting, the defendant engaged in a brief, six-second 
 
16 At trial, the Commonwealth argued that the defendant was 
travelling with Daily, and that Daily was the dark-skinned 
occupant of the silver sedan described by several witnesses, 
including Rodriguez.  The Commonwealth entered a photograph of 
Daily in evidence but elicited no testimony identifying Daily as 
the driver. 
14 
 
telephone call with Daily, followed by a one-minute call with 
Woods Senior.  The defendant had several brief calls with Daily 
and Woods Senior between 8:20 P.M. and 8:55 P.M.  From 9:12 P.M. 
to 9:52 P.M., the defendant and Woods Senior engaged in the 
following text message exchange: 
Woods Senior:  "You good" 
 
Defendant:  "Yes sah" 
 
Woods Senior:  "Is whooo kid good"17 
 
Defendant:  "Yeah he with me" 
 
Woods Senior:  "Figure it out and be careful please" 
 
Defendant:  "U already" 
 
Woods Senior:  "Lol to hood."18 
 
 
vi.  The defendant's arrest.  On November 14, 2016, two 
days after Leonard's and Mair's shooting, a Boston police 
officer arrested the defendant outside his apartment in 
connection with a different matter.19  At the time of his arrest, 
 
17 Daily's nickname was "Hu." 
 
18 At trial, Woods Senior testified that "Lol to hood" meant 
"Laugh out loud" to the "Dorchester area," specifically "Blue 
Hill."  The prosecutor argued that Woods Senior had actually 
meant Franklin Hill as the "hood." 
 
19 The parties stipulated that the defendant was arrested 
for a matter not concerning the case at hand.  The judge gave 
the following instruction to the jury: 
 
"So the testimony you just heard about [the defendant] 
being arrested on November 16, the parties stipulate that 
that arrest had to do with an investigation that was 
15 
 
the defendant was wearing a black sweatshirt and driving a blue-
gray Nissan Altima sedan.  In the vehicle was a black, wool and 
leather jacket bearing a pin with a photograph of Woods Junior 
and the words "Forever in Our Hearts Phillip Woods Jr."  
Subsequent forensics testing of the sweatshirt showed a positive 
result for gunshot primer residue; the jacket did not.20  The 
sedan was not tested. 
 
b.  Defense at trial.  The defense at trial centered on 
misidentification.  As discussed supra, in the Commonwealth's 
case-in-chief, one witness who lived near the scene of the 
shooting testified that she had observed a gray sedan fleeing 
the crime scene.  By contrast, the woman's daughter testified in 
the defendant's case that, from a different room in the same 
 
unrelated to anything having to do with this case.  And 
obviously you shouldn't draw any adverse inference against 
[the defendant] because he was the subject of investigation 
that was not related to this case." 
 
 
20 It was the Commonwealth's theory that the defendant was 
wearing the same black sweatshirt on the day of the shooting.  
Rodriguez, however, had testified before the grand jury that the 
driver of the gray sedan, whom he identified as the defendant, 
was wearing a "gray hoodie sweatshirt." 
 
A forensic scientist explained at trial that, pursuant to 
the laboratory's policy, three particles of gunshot residue on a 
tested item were required to register as a positive.  The 
sweatshirt had three such particles, but the jacket only had 
one.  The forensic scientist further testified that gunshot 
residue particles are transferable such that a police officer 
might transfer one onto a defendant when taking him or her into 
custody. 
16 
 
apartment, she saw two Black men wearing gray hooded sweatshirts 
shooting toward a gate in front of her building.  She saw one of 
the men fall, while the other man continued to shoot before 
taking his fallen companion's gun and leaving the scene.  She 
also testified that she saw no car in the vicinity of the 
shooting.21 
 
Another witness who also lived on Ames Street heard 
gunshots and looked out her front door.  She also saw two men; 
they were running and yelling "Dub is down, Dub is down."22  As 
they were running by, she noticed a dark blue or black vehicle 
stop in the road before speeding off quickly. 
c.  Procedural history.  On June 20, 2017, the defendant 
was indicted for murder in the first degree for the killing of 
Leonard, G. L. c. 265, § 1; armed assault with intent to murder, 
G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b), and assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A, in connection with Mair; 
and unlawful possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).23 
 
21 In his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the 
witness's testimony regarding seeing two shooters was 
contradicted by the ballistics evidence that casings from only 
one firearm were found at the scene.  There was, however, 
evidence that certain firearms do not emit casings. 
 
22 There was testimony that "3-Dub" was Leonard's nickname. 
 
23 The trial took place before our decision in Commonwealth 
v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, 690 (2023), in which we held that 
"the absence of a license is an essential element of the offense 
of unlawful possession of a firearm pursuant to G. L. c. 269, 
17 
 
 
Following a jury trial in August 2019, the defendant was 
found guilty on all counts.  As to the charge of murder in the 
first degree, the jury found the defendant guilty on the theory 
of deliberate premeditation.  The defendant filed a timely 
notice of appeal. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Voir dire.  The defendant first 
maintains that the judge abused his discretion in denying 
defense counsel's request to conduct a voir dire examination of 
Rodriguez when, following the completion of Rodriguez's 
testimony, defense counsel received an anonymous text message 
and accompanying screenshots of a social media account, which 
purported to show that Rodriguez falsified his identification 
testimony.  More particularly, defense counsel received a series 
of text messages from an anonymous sender who claimed to be 
Rodriguez's cousin.  The first text message stated:  "This is 
annoyoms [sic] person I have your card I am one of the witness 
family I think it's so wrong how they are setting up your 
client[.]  [M]y cousin and his friends are lying on this poor 
guy I found this in his phone the other day."  The accompanying 
text messages were screenshots of the following conversation 
 
§ 10 (a)."  Here, the judge did not instruct the jury on this 
element.  At any new trial, the Commonwealth must prove this 
element.  Id. 
18 
 
with a Facebook social media account bearing the name "Yordany 
Rodriguez":24 
Anonymous:  "What's good bro 
 
"Heard you went to court did you say what we told you to 
say to set that n**** up" 
 
Rodriguez:  "Yeah bro I went up sh*t was wild 
 
"Nervous as f*ck 
 
"Bro I think it's wrong that we lying that n****" 
 
Anonymous:  "Man f*ck that n**** 
 
"He's all set 
 
"We can't say to [sic] much on this sh*t cause the feds be 
watching you heard" 
 
Rodriguez:  "Snm bro we talk in person soon" 
 
Anonymous:  "Ight bet" 
 
 
Defense counsel notified the judge and the prosecutor of 
the messages.  On the next trial day, the judge held a sidebar.  
Defense counsel reported that, although he had sent a text 
message to the telephone number noted in the message he had 
received asking the sender to meet him that morning, no one had 
appeared.  The prosecutor stated that he had asked the 
investigating officers on the prosecution team to call the 
cellular telephone number, but they received no response.  The 
 
 
24 The screenshots also show that the social media account 
includes a small profile photograph of a bearded man with a 
child.  Under the photograph, the name "Yordany Rodriguez" is 
shown, as well as the phrase "You're friends on Facebook." 
19 
 
officers had been unable to determine the identity of the 
anonymous sender; the prosecutor explained that the text 
messages were sent through voice over Internet protocol (VoIP), 
an application that allowed the user to send the text messages 
from a randomly generated number, making it difficult to 
identify their source.25  The prosecutor also reported that 
officers had been unable to access the social media account or 
to confirm its authenticity.  The officers had told the 
prosecutor that they had found "many Yordany Rodriguezes on 
Facebook." 
The judge stated, "[I]t would seem to me that the police 
ought to pay a visit to Mr. Rodriguez, I suspect as nice a visit 
as possible, and ask if he would allow them to look at his 
[social media] page."26  The judge added, "[I]t seems to me, on 
 
25 The prosecutor noted that "the app[lication] assigns that 
particular phone a phone number . . . which is essentially 
anonymous without . . . serving legal process of some company." 
 
 
26 The judge later expanded on his comments: 
 
"The question is whether or not first that comes from the 
Yordany Rodriguez Facebook account that is actually 
involved in this case, and secondly, that those postings on 
Facebook were not postings that could be made by anybody 
associated with the public . . . .  But we need to 
investigate it to see if that is so."27 The prosecutor 
reported that he had asked a detective to get in touch with 
Rodriguez, and the detective called Rodriguez's telephone 
number during lunch.  Ten or so minutes later, the 
detective's telephone received a call, indicating that it 
was from Rodriguez; the detective was out of the room.  The 
prosecutor answered the telephone and spoke with Rodriguez 
20 
 
the face of this, one would think that this is a blatant attempt 
to obstruct justice."  He also said that he did not "intend to 
slow down the trial at this point." The prosecutor noted that 
Rodriguez was a hostile witness who would be hostile to any 
further interaction with the prosecution team, but the judge 
responded that "there's no point in our speculating as to what 
Mr. Rodriguez's response will be."   The judge also noted that 
Rodriguez's trial testimony was consistent with his grand jury 
testimony and his photographic array identification of the 
defendant, although he "didn't see anything that suggested that 
. . . this was anything other than Mr. Rodriguez being pulled 
here against his will to provide his testimony."  At the end of 
this sidebar, the judge said, "[W]e're going to now stop 
speculating on the record.  [The prosecutor] has indicated that 
he will have somebody interview Mr. Rodriguez.  And then when we 
have the results of that interview we will come back." 
 
After the jury recessed for the day, defense counsel 
requested to recall Rodriguez as part of the defendant's case-
in-chief to inquire about the anonymous message and social media 
screen shots.  The judge denied the request, reasoning that "if 
you had that when he was first being questioned, without more I 
wouldn't let you inquire with respect to that."  For his part, 
 
for ten to fifteen minutes, during which Rodriguez denied 
the Facebook communications. 
21 
 
the prosecutor reported that, during the lunch break, he had 
spoken with Rodriguez, who "adamantly denied ever having any 
communication of this sort about this case."27 
The next morning, the judge asked the prosecutor to 
describe again his conversation with Rodriguez.  The prosecutor 
stated that Rodriguez had denied having the conversation shown 
in the screenshots, denied that someone else might have had 
access to his cellular telephone, and stated that he did not 
know who had sent the anonymous text to defense counsel; 
Rodriguez also mentioned that he had received some messages on 
his social media account "to the effect that people in jail have 
labeled him a snitch, a rat." 
 
Defense counsel asked to conduct a voir dire examination of 
Rodriguez concerning the messages.  Denying this request, the 
judge explained, "I tried to determine whether there was some 
basis on which I'd have to close the court room to do the voir 
dire and conclude it, and I couldn't come up with a theory on 
which I could close the court room to do the voir dire."  He 
also said that "bringing [Rodriguez] into Court to say 
 
27 The prosecutor reported that he had asked a detective to 
get in touch with Rodriguez, and the detective called 
Rodriguez's telephone number during lunch.  Ten or so minutes 
later, the detective's telephone received a call, indicating 
that it was from Rodriguez; the detective was out of the room.  
The prosecutor answered the telephone and spoke with Rodriguez 
for ten to fifteen minutes, during which Rodriguez denied 
the Facebook communications. 
22 
 
essentially the same thing that he said to [the prosecutor] with 
detectives over the telephone, albeit under oath . . . did not 
seem to me a useful thing to do, and fraught with additional 
obvious dangers, and so I've concluded not to do that."  The 
judge further reasoned that he would not allow defense counsel 
to cross-examine Rodriguez regarding the screenshots of the 
social media account absent "materials from [the social media 
company], which would take a very long time to acquire, as [the 
social media company] tends not to turn this over until they 
have been served with process and required to do that by a Court 
order."  The judge had previously told defense counsel that, 
should an investigation later show the authenticity of the 
social media account as belonging to Rodriguez and of the screen 
shots thereof, it might form the basis of a motion for 
postconviction discovery.   The judge noted the defendant's 
objection to his decision. 
i.  Standard of review.  "The decision to conduct a voir 
dire examination of a witness rests in the sound discretion of 
the trial judge . . . ."  Commonwealth v. Pina, 481 Mass. 413, 
431 (2019), citing Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 425 Mass. 361, 370 
n.5 (1997).  The judge's decision "will not be disturbed unless 
it constitutes 'a clear error of judgment in weighing the 
factors relevant to the decision . . . such that the decision 
falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives.'"  Pina, 
23 
 
supra, quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 
(2014). 
ii.  Analysis.  To be sure, there was reason to doubt the 
authenticity of this new information, and not every stray 
anonymous comment can form the basis for a voir dire.  The 
information in this case was sent by an anonymous sender, who 
did not respond to defense counsel's request for a meeting, and 
the telephone number associated with the message had not been 
identified as belonging to a particular individual because of 
the use of the VoIP technology –- an apparent attempt to shield 
the sender's identity.  Moreover, Rodriguez arguably had been a 
reluctant witness; he testified that he had no intention of 
sharing his information with police until they found him and 
that he did not want to take time to testify -- conduct that 
arguably was inconsistent with someone involved in a plot to 
frame the defendant. 
Still, the information was troubling, suggesting that the 
Commonwealth's key identification witness was fabricating his 
testimony; indeed, the judge recognized the need to investigate 
the allegations.  Contrast Commonwealth v. McLeod, 394 Mass. 
727, 740, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985) (no abuse of 
discretion to deny request to conduct voir dire of witness whose 
change in testimony was not relevant to crimes at hand).  For 
this reason, the judge concluded that further investigation was 
24 
 
warranted in view of the potential effect of the new 
information, if shown to be from Rodriguez's social media 
account.  Relying on a brief investigation, involving a ten- to 
fifteen-minute telephone conversation between the prosecutor and 
Rodriguez, however, the judge denied defense counsel's request 
to conduct a voir dire examination.  He based the denial on 
several grounds, which we examine in turn. 
The judge believed that he could not conduct a voir dire 
without basis to close the court room.  The judge did not 
explain why closure might be necessary in this situation, and we 
fail to identify any such reason in the record.  The purpose of 
the voir dire would have been to examine Rodriguez about the new 
information and determine whether it was authentic.  Nothing 
about the proposed voir dire would have required, or justified, 
the court room to be closed.  See Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 
456 Mass. 94, 107 (2010) ("courts recognize a strong presumption 
in favor of a public trial overcome only by an overriding 
interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve 
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest" 
[quotations and citations omitted]). 
The judge also concluded that a voir dire would be a waste 
of judicial resource because, the judge believed, Rodriguez 
would say nothing different in court under oath from what he had 
reported to the prosecutor when questioned telephonically.  But 
25 
 
"ensuring that a witness will give his statements under oath 
. . . impresses upon him the seriousness of the proceedings and 
importance that he testify truthfully."  Commonwealth v. 
Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 543 (1988).  Moreover, a voir dire 
examination would have provided the ability to observe 
Rodriguez's demeanor while testifying.  Id. at 547 ("Evaluating 
a witness's credibility is one of the most difficult tasks 
facing a trier of fact.  Personal observation of a witness aids 
immeasurably this process" [citation omitted]).  The information 
provided to defense counsel by the anonymous sender raised 
significant questions regarding the truthfulness of Rodriguez's 
identification testimony, which was a key element of the 
Commonwealth's case; in short, the new information directly 
called into question the integrity of the trial itself.  Under 
the circumstances, allowing a voir dire examination of 
Rodriguez, during which he would be under oath, was critical. 
Further, the judge reasoned that defense counsel would not 
be able to question Rodriguez regarding the screenshots without 
first obtaining a subpoena for the social media company to 
authenticate the new information.  Specifically, the judge 
stated that defense counsel "would have no means of cross 
examining [Rodriguez] without materials from [the social media 
company]," presumably because the materials otherwise could not 
be authenticated.  "Evidence that . . . [an] electronic 
26 
 
communication originates from . . . a social networking Web site 
. . . that bears the [witness's] name is not sufficient alone to 
authenticate the electronic communication as having been 
authored or sent by the [witness]."  Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 
Mass. 442, 450 (2011).  Instead, "[t]here must be some 
'confirming circumstances' sufficient for a reasonable jury to 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the [witness] 
authored the [electronic communication]" (citation omitted).  
Id.  A voir dire examination of Rodriguez might have elicited 
the requisite confirming circumstances or alternatively might 
have confirmed the messages' lack of authenticity.28 
Significantly, the inadmissibility of the social media 
messages without authentication formed the basis for the judge's 
denial of the defendant's request to question Rodriguez in the 
defendant's case in chief.  See Purdy, 459 Mass. at 447 & n.5 
("because the relevance and admissibility of the communications 
 
 
28 These confirming circumstances include, inter alia, 
acknowledgement by the witness that the account is his; the 
messages being found on a computer or hard drive owned by the 
witness; third-party testimony indicating the witness sent the 
messages; and the messages containing details about the 
witness's personal life.  See Commonwealth v. Welch, 487 Mass. 
425, 441 (2021); Purdy, 459 Mass. at 450-451.  Authentication 
may benefit from but does not require testimony that others 
could not access the witness's account.  See Purdy, supra at 451 
& n.7; Commonwealth v. Williams, 456 Mass. 857, 868-869 (2010).  
Here, the prosecutor reported that Rodriguez had told him that 
no one else had access to his cellular telephone and that his 
telephone was not even working. 
27 
 
depended on their being authored by the defendant, the judge was 
required to determine" authenticity).  Far from providing a 
basis to deny the defendant's request to conduct a voir dire 
examination, the judge's reasoning highlights the need for a 
voir dire.  In particular, because he was deprived of the 
opportunity to try to authenticate the social media conversation 
through a voir dire of Rodriguez, the defendant was further 
deprived of the opportunity to marshal his defense by calling 
into question Rodriguez's credibility.  Cf. Pina, 481 Mass. at 
431-433 (no abuse of discretion to deny request to conduct voir 
dire of witness concerning source of witness's knowledge of 
defendant's nickname where witness testified he had learned of 
nickname from "someone" prior to identification procedure and 
defendant had opportunity but "chose not to pursue the issue on 
cross-examination"); McLeod, 394 Mass. at 740-741 (no abuse of 
discretion to deny request to conduct voir dire of one witness 
whose change in testimony was not relevant to any material 
aspects of her testimony and of second witness who was cross-
examined at length about change in his testimony). 
In addition, the judge had previously reasoned that a voir 
dire examination was unnecessary because, if the defendant were 
convicted, he could seek to authenticate the materials 
thereafter and bring motions for postconviction discovery and a 
new trial once he was able to do so.  But allowing a voir dire 
28 
 
of Rodriguez might have elicited information authenticating the 
new information, which could have been used by the defendant to 
undermine Rodriguez's credibility.  Given that Rodriguez was the 
only witness to place the defendant near the scene of the crime, 
calling into question Rodriguez's credibility might have planted 
sufficient doubt in jurors' minds such that a conviction might 
have been avoided in the first place. 
Finally, we reject the Commonwealth's contention that 
Rodriguez's hostility as a witness put to rest all questions 
regarding the authenticity of the social media information.  
Arguably, as the Commonwealth asserts, Rodriguez's reticence to 
testify was inconsistent with the suggestion in the social media 
information that he had plotted to frame the defendant.  On the 
other hand, Rodriguez's reticence arguably was consistent with 
the social media information, reflecting his doubts about the 
correctness of his participation in the alleged plot.  A voir 
dire examination of Rodriguez could have provided information to 
resolve these questions and thus was critical to determining 
Rodriguez's credibility. 
 
In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the judge erred 
in "weighing the factors relevant to the decision."  L.L., 470 
Mass. at 185 n.27. 
 
iii.  Prejudice.  Because the defendant objected to the 
judge's decision not to allow a voir dire examination of 
29 
 
Rodriguez, we review for prejudicial error.  Commonwealth v. 
Durand, 475 Mass. 657, 670 (2016), cert. denied, 583 U.S. 896 
(2017).  "[W]e do not determine whether there was prejudicial 
error by examining what a reasonable jury might have done if the 
errors had never happened.  Instead, we determine whether there 
is a 'reasonable possibility that the error[s] might have 
contributed to the jury's verdict.'"  Commonwealth v. Crayton, 
470 Mass. 228, 253 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 
Mass. 8, 23 (1999).  See Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 
348, 353 (1994) ("if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after 
pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous 
action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially 
swayed by the error," then error is prejudicial [citation 
omitted]). 
We recognize the question to be a close one.  There was 
powerful circumstantial evidence that the defendant was the 
person in the silver sedan who was with Daily at the time and in 
the vicinity of the shooting.  Nevertheless, Rodriguez's 
identification testimony was critical to the Commonwealth's 
case.  Rodriguez was the only witness who had identified the 
defendant as being near the scene of the shooting, approximately 
twenty minutes prior thereto; according to Rodriguez, the 
defendant was the driver in a silver sedan circling the 
neighborhood, which vehicle matched the description of the 
30 
 
vehicle identified as fleeing the scene of the killing.  The 
text message and screenshots, which were sent to defense counsel 
after Rodriguez's testimony was complete, suggested that he had 
falsely identified the defendant in connection with a scheme to 
frame him.  We cannot exclude a "reasonable possibility" that 
depriving the defendant of an opportunity to conduct a voir dire 
examination of Rodriguez and put to rest questions regarding the 
social media information "might have contributed to the jury's 
verdict," and the defendant was prejudiced thereby.  Crayton, 
470 Mass. at 253, quoting Alphas, 430 Mass. at 23.  Accordingly, 
we vacate the convictions and remand for a new trial. 
 
We review the defendant's additional claims of error to 
provide guidance to the extent that they may resurface at any 
new trial. 
b.  Questioning Woods Senior's immunity.  Woods Senior 
appeared on the first day of trial in response to a subpoena, 
along with counsel; he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.  On the seventh trial day, before 
Woods Senior was called in the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, he 
was granted transactional immunity,29 which the judge explained 
 
 
29 Transactional immunity provides a witness protection from 
prosecution for the crime about which the witness testifies.  
See Attorney Gen. v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 797 (1982). 
31 
 
"immunized [him] from any possible prosecution as a result of 
anything [he] might testify to in the course of this trial." 
i.  Questions directed at assertion of privilege.  The 
defendant contends that the prosecutor's questions regarding 
Woods Senior's invocation of the privilege were improper.  
Specifically, when Woods Senior was asked about his text 
messages with the defendant, Woods Senior provided answers, some 
of which were inconsistent with the documentary record.  For 
example, he testified that he began communicating more 
frequently with the defendant "two weeks to a month" after Woods 
Junior's shooting; but there was evidence that he had sent the 
defendant a text message two days after his son's shooting.  
When confronted with the text message, in which he sent a 
photograph of a man who somewhat resembled Leonard, Woods Senior 
testified that he could not recall sending the photograph and 
that he did not know the man photographed. 
Similarly, Woods Senior testified that he could not recall 
the conversations with the defendant following Leonard's 
killing, testifying that the calls were "just to see how the 
[defendant was] doing."  He denied having learned about the 
shooting from those telephone calls.  The prosecutor then asked 
Woods Senior about his appearance on the first day of trial, and 
whether he had appeared at that time with counsel to give 
32 
 
testimony; not surprisingly Woods Senior responded that he had 
"pled the Fifth." 
A witness's invocation of the privilege against self-
incrimination has little to no probative value and may have a 
disproportionate impact on the jury.  "[W]hen a witness actually 
invokes the Fifth Amendment in front of the jury, the jury's 
immediate (and inaccurate) assessment of what that means is more 
difficult to dispel -- the jury have heard the witness state 
that the answer would tend to incriminate him, and a juror would 
not think it was inappropriate speculation to interpret that as 
a substantive admission of wrongdoing."  Commonwealth v. 
Rosario, 444 Mass. 550, 559 (2005).  Generally, it is improper.  
See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 408 Mass. 185, 196 & n.5 (1990), 
S.C., 430 Mass. 348 (1999), and cases cited (improper to call 
witness "for the sole purpose of invoking his or her privilege 
against self-incrimination"); Commonwealth v. Hesketh, 386 Mass. 
153, 157 (1982), and cases cited. 
Here, the prosecutor improperly elicited the witness's 
testimony regarding his invocation of the privilege against 
self-incrimination apparently to impeach his credibility after 
he testified that he could not recall certain communications 
with the defendant.  We have repeatedly recognized that there 
are a myriad of reasons why a person might invoke the privilege 
unrelated to the crimes with which a defendant has been charged 
33 
 
or unrelated to any criminal conduct at all.  See, e.g., Gagnon, 
408 Mass. at 196.  Given the communications between Woods Senior 
and the defendant in the wake of Woods Junior's killing, the 
prosecutor's questions seeking to highlight Woods Senior's 
invocation of the privilege were particularly improper, with the 
potential to taint the defendant. 
 
ii.  Questions regarding immunity.  The defendant further 
contends that the prosecutor's questions to Woods Senior 
concerning the grant of immunity were in violation of the 
attorney-client privilege.  We disagree.  A witness who has 
received immunity may be questioned about the immunity for 
impeachment purposes.  See Commonwealth v. Michel, 367 Mass. 
454, 459 (1975), S.C., 381 Mass. 447 (1980), citing Commonwealth 
v. Bosworth, 22 Pick. 397, 400 (1839) ("Within the scope of 
. . . cross-examination it is proper to inquire whether the 
witness expects more favorable treatment from the government in 
return for his testimony").  Attorney-client privilege "should 
present no obstacle to inquiry into" immunity because the 
privilege only protects confidential information, which excludes 
information known by third parties.  Michel, supra at 460.  In 
particular, "the details of what the prosecutor told counsel or 
the witness, or what counsel conveyed from the prosecutor to the 
witness, are subject to examination without violating attorney-
client privilege."  Commonwealth v. Birks, 435 Mass. 782, 788 
34 
 
(2002), S.C., 462 Mass. 1013 (2012), 484 Mass. 1014 (2020), and 
490 Mass. 1018 (2022). 
Contrary to the Commonwealth's position, however, the judge 
was well within his discretion to intervene and halt the 
prosecutor's numerous and repeated questions about Woods 
Senior's understanding of the immunity agreement, which could 
have led Woods Senior to divulge privileged communications 
regarding, for example, "whether to accept the terms offered by 
the prosecutor."  Birks, 435 Mass. at 788.30 
 
c.  Gang-related testimony.  The defendant asserts that the 
prosecutor's questions posed to several witnesses regarding 
gang-related activity, some of which was several years old, were 
improper absent some nexus between the crime and that activity.31  
We agree. 
 
30 In any retrial, the judge should instruct the jury that 
immunized testimony cannot serve as the sole basis for a 
conviction, see G. L. c. 233, § 20I, and ensure that the jury 
"in assessing an immunized witness's testimony . . . take into 
consideration whether the witness had been promised some benefit 
that may have induced the testimony."  Commonwealth v. Webb, 468 
Mass. 26, 35 (2014). 
 
 
31 One of the Commonwealth's theories was that the defendant 
had, in part, retaliated against Leonard ostensibly because of a 
purportedly long-running feud between the Franklin Field and 
Franklin Hill housing projects.  The defendant and Woods Junior 
had grown up in Franklin Hill, while Leonard and his friends 
present at the shooting had grown up in Franklin Field.  The 
shooting happened outside the Franklin Field housing project. 
 
 
The prosecutor asked two of Leonard's friends about gangs 
in and around Franklin Field.  One witness testified that he had 
35 
 
 
"We have recognized repeatedly that evidence of a 
defendant's gang membership risks prejudice to the defendant in 
that it may suggest a propensity to criminality or violence."  
Commonwealth v. Phim, 462 Mass. 470, 477 (2012).  "Although the 
prosecution may not introduce [this] so-called prior bad act 
evidence to illustrate a defendant's bad character, such 
evidence may be admissible if relevant for a nonpropensity 
purpose."  Commonwealth v. Chalue, 486 Mass. 847, 866 (2021).  
Gang evidence therefore can be introduced to show a defendant's 
motive, see Commonwealth v. Leng, 463 Mass. 779, 783 (2012), but 
"it will not be admitted if the judge determines that its 
probative value is outweighed by risk of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant, taking into account the effectiveness of any limiting 
instruction."  Chalue, supra.  As the Commonwealth admits, there 
 
no information regarding gangs, to which the prosecutor 
responded, "And would you tell us, sir, if you did know these 
things?"  The prosecutor also asked a second witness present at 
the shooting whether he knew about gangs growing up.  That 
witness explained that the gang in Franklin Field went by 
different names.  He also said that Leonard and the three men at 
the shooting (including himself) were each at some point 
affiliated with this gang.  On the prosecutor's prompting, the 
witness testified that the Franklin Field gang had conflict with 
groups outside of Franklin Field, including Franklin Hill.  The 
prosecutor also asked Woods Senior about the relationship 
between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field.  Woods Senior 
responded that the two sides had disagreements involving 
"shootings, stabbings."  The prosecutor then asked whether Woods 
Senior's text to the defendant on the night of the shooting –- 
saying "LOL to hood" –- referred to any neighborhood in 
particular.  Woods Senior responded, "All of Dorchester, 
Roxbury, Mattapan.  They all hoods." 
36 
 
was no evidence that the defendant had gang affiliations or that 
the crime had any gang-related motive.  Suggestions that the 
defendant grew up and lived in an area where there may have been 
gang activity implied only that he had a propensity to 
participate in gang violence.  These questions were improper. 
 
d.  Photographs of Woods Junior's body.  The defendant 
maintains that four photographs of Woods Junior's body were 
improperly admitted.  Evidence is generally admissible if its 
probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair 
prejudice.  Commonwealth v. Spencer, 465 Mass. 32, 48 (2013).  
The photographs were relevant to the Commonwealth's case.  They 
depict shell casings near Woods Junior's body, which were later 
found to have been ejected from the same .40 caliber firearm 
used in the shooting of the Leonard and Mair.  The proximity of 
the shell casings to Woods Junior's body could have supported 
the inference that Woods Junior -- or someone close to him, 
including perhaps the defendant, who was also injured in the 
September shootout –- had used the weapon.  In turn, this 
supported the Commonwealth's theory that the firearm belonged to 
the defendant or one of his friends.  The judge was well within 
his discretion to conclude that the probative value of this 
evidence was therefore not substantially outweighed by unfair 
prejudice.  See Spencer, supra. 
37 
 
 
e.  November 16 arrest.  We discern no error in the 
testimony regarding the assignment32 of the officer who arrested 
the defendant nor in the agreed-to instruction to the jury that 
the arrest "was unrelated to anything having to do with this 
case" and that the jury should not "draw any adverse inference 
against [the defendant] because he was the subject of [an] 
investigation that was not related to this case." 
 
f.  Closing argument.  The defendant maintains that the 
prosecutor's closing argument was improper because, responding 
to defense counsel's argument that the defendant did not shoot 
Leonard because no gunshot residue was found in the defendant's 
mother's car, the prosecutor contended that no such residue 
would have been found because Mair testified that the shooter 
"got out of the passenger side and started shooting, swung the 
door open and started shooting."  "[C]ounsel may argue the 
evidence and the fair inferences which can be drawn from the 
evidence."  Commonwealth v. Sun, 490 Mass. 196, 221 (2022), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Hoffer, 375 Mass. 369, 378 (1978).  But 
he or she "should not misstate the evidence or refer to facts 
not in evidence."  Sun, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Kozec, 
399 Mass. 514, 516 (1987).  Here, Mair testified at trial that 
 
32 The officer briefly testified that, at the time of the 
arrest, he was assigned to the special operations unit, whose 
responsibilities included special weapons and tactics duties. 
38 
 
"[n]obody got out of the car" and that a light-skinned man 
opened the sedan's front passenger door and fired shots from a 
firearm in the direction of the Leonard and Mair.  Thus, the 
prosecutor's statement that Mair said the shooter "got out" of 
the vehicle was not faithful to Mair's words; still, the 
inference that the shooter at least leaned out of the car when 
he opened the passenger-side door was not contradicted by the 
evidence.33 
 
Finally, we see no error in the prosecutor's argument that 
the defense witnesses' observations of two gunmen was not 
supported by the ballistics evidence.  Officers found only .40 
caliber casings at the crime scene, later determined to be from 
a single firearm.  While the defendant correctly notes that 
experts testified that certain firearms, such as revolvers, do 
not eject casings, the prosecutor's assertion was not incorrect. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgments are vacated, the verdicts 
set aside, and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court for 
a new trial. 
So ordered. 
 
33 The prosecutor did not misstate the evidence in 
describing the gunshot residue expert's equivocal statements 
about whether officers might find residue in the interior of a 
vehicle.  The witness testified, "There's a wide variety of 
factors that come into play as to whether you will or will not 
find [gunshot residue] on a surface.  It's time, friction, 
washing of that surface.  So it's really very circumstantial 
based on the case at hand."