Title: State v. Garrison
Citation: 154 So. 2d 400, 244 La. 787
Docket Number: N/A
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: June 4, 1963

154 So. 2d 400 (1963) 244 La. 787 STATE of Louisiana v. Jim GARRISON. No. 46686. Supreme Court of Louisiana. June 4, 1963. Rehearing Denied June 28, 1963. *402 Donald V. Organ, Louis P. Trent, New Orleans, for appellant. Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., M. E. Culligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., John E. Jackson, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert S. Link, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. HAMLIN, Justice. The defendant, Jim Garrison, appeals from his conviction of the offense of Defamation[1] (LSA-R.S. 14:47) and his sentence to pay a fine of $1,000.00 or, in default of payment of said fine, to serve four months in the Parish Prison. *403 The Bill of Information charging the defendant with the offense of defamation recites: "`Apparently the judges have called in all their reserves. *404 "`For example, the judge admits in his own statement that the (Leon D.) Hubert office inherited a backlog of 3500 cases. When we came into office in May, the backlog had risen to approximately 4600 cases. The record reflects that the statement or expression set forth in the foregoing Bill of Information was given by the defendant, Jim Garrison, District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans, to the New Orleans press and published by said press, after the judges of the Criminal District Court refused to sign orders for the payment of funds out of the Fines and Fees Fund for expenditures of the District Attorney. The District Attorney had taken no legal steps to compel the judges to sign said orders. The Bill of Information, supra, was filed shortly after defendant's statement was published. On November 13, 1962, the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana appointed Honorable William H. Ponder, Judge of the Eleventh Judicial District Court, to sit as Judge ad hoc for the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans for the trial of the instant cause, No. 177-418 of the Docket of the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans, entitled, "State of Louisiana versus Jim Garrison." Article VII, Section 12, of the LSA-Constitution of 1921. LSA-R.S. 15:307. The order was effective immediately. The Presiding Judge of Section "C" of the Criminal District Court, to which section this case had been assigned, recused himself, and Judge Ponder ascended the Bench for the commencement of trial. The defendant thereafter filed a Motion to Recuse, alleging: The trial judge denied the above Motion to Recuse, and Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was reserved to his ruling. In this Court appellant argues that: Appellant further states: Article VII, Section 10, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, provides that the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana shall have control of and general supervision over all inferior courts. Article VII, Section 12, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, empowers this Court to make an appointment such as was made herein. The appointment was therefore not in violation of any of the provisions of the State Constitution. We find no federal prohibition with respect to an appointment such as the instant one; it therefore follows that defendant's complaints with respect to a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution are without merit. The record is barren of any *408 showing that the defendant suffered prejudice by the refusal of the trial judge ad hoc to recuse himself. LSA-R.S. 15:557. Defendant's arguments that he was deprived of due process of law, and that the Bill of Information should be dismissed because there is no proper judge in the State of Louisiana to try him, are also without merit. LSA-R.S. 15:303[3] sets forth the causes for which any judge in any criminal case shall be recused; none of these causes are applicable to the instant trial judge. A reading of the Motion to Recuse reflects that it contains general statements of conclusions, which do not constitute grounds for recusation. Under the circumstances, the trial judge could rule upon the Motion to Recuse, and he acted properly in ruling upon it. As stated supra, defendant argues that the trial judge had prejudged this case, and had alreadysubconsciouslyfound the accused guilty of defamation when the trial began on January 21, 1963. Defendant cites, among others, the following remarks of the trial judge: We do not agree with counsel's argument;[4] the record is replete to the effect that the trial judge did not prejudge this matter. It is clear to us that an experienced judge such as Judge Ponder (the trial judge herein) meant that he would amplify his rulings in his per curiams in the event of an appeal. Before rendering judgment, he aptly stated: Bill of Exceptions No. 1 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved to the trial court's overruling of defendant's application for a Bill of Particulars. The application set forth the following questions: The State answered the above questions as follows: In this Court defendant contends that: Initially it is to be observed that when a party is charged with criminal defamation, "The words contained in the statement are to be given their ordinary meaning unless it is shown that they were capable of being used and were in fact used with a different meaning. The meaning of the statement is to be determined from an examination of the statement as a whole. The statement is to be interpreted in the light of the surrounding circumstances, and words apparently innocent may be shown to have been defamatory in fact." Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, 1957, Volume II, Section 884, Page 750. In State v. Lambert, 188 La. 968, 178 So. 508, (a prosecution in which the defendant was charged with libel), we held that in analyzing a document and determining its legal effect, the document must be considered as a whole. In interpreting articles of the Louisiana Criminal Code, LSA-R.S. 14:3 provides that the articles of the Code cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for therein; and, in order to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, all of the provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that the State's answer (Art. IV, supra), to the effect that the entire expression and publication as quoted in the Bill of Information would be used as the basis on the trial as the alleged violation of the statute, was sufficient to enable the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. Additionally, the State informed the defendant (Art. III, supra) that it would contend that the statement of the defendant set forth in the Bill of Information constituted malice in law and also malice in fact. We conclude that there was no need for the State to further particularize exact words, phrases, and sentences. The proper function of a Bill of Particulars is to inform the accused in greater detail of the nature of the crime of which he is charged. State v. Simpson, 216 La. 212, 43 So. 2d 585, Cert., denied, 339 U.S. 929, 70 S. Ct. 625, 94 L. Ed. 1350. We find that the answer of the State in the instant case performed the proper function of giving the defendant the details he required. The trial judge exercised the discretion vested in him by LSA-R.S. 15:288 (Footnote 5, supra). We find that he did not abuse his discretion; we also find that the defendant did not suffer prejudice by the *411 trial judge's overruling of the Motion for a Bill of Particulars. LSA-R.S. 15:557. Bill of Exceptions No. 2 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 3 was reserved to the trial court's overruling of defendant's Demurrer and Motion to Quash, which recites: In this Court defendant argues: Defendant also contends that the trial judge committed error in his refusal to apply the "Clear and Present Danger" test to this prosecution. In his per curiam, the trial judge states that he would not pass upon defendant's first contention that the statement set forth in the Bill of Information was not defamatory so as to bring it within the statutory provisions of LSA-R.S. 14:47, because he did not think that the contention was properly presented on a Motion to Quash. He said that qualified privilege and malice were involved, and that proof thereof would require evidence, particularly on the issues of truth or falsity. In State v. Lambert, 188 La. 968, 178 So. 508, we said, "The question as to whether a communication is privileged involves questions of fact as well as of law. State v. Whitmire, 166 La. 195, 116 So. 849. Where the facts are not disputed the question of privilege becomes one of law. Odgers on Libel and Slander, 2d Ed., § 183, p. 216; Newell on Slander and Libel, 4th Ed., § 345, p. 385." In State v. Masino, 214 La. 744, 38 So. 2d 622, we held that evidence may be taken on a Motion to Quash an indictment, but evidence is limited to procedural matters and may not include a defense on the merits. In the publication set forth in the Bill of Information, the defendant states, among other things, that, "* * * it is pretty obvious where the real responsibility lies for the revised backlog of untried cases"; that, "* * * so opposed have the judges been to our vice investigations that they completely blocked us off from our Bourbon Street investigations of B-drinking and other forms of vice"; that, "This raises interesting questions about the racketeer influences on our eight vacation-minded judges. * * *"; that, "* * * a man could wait 19 months before his case is disposed of, during which period the judge enjoyed over 300 days vacation"; and that, "There are now approximately 520 prisoners awaiting trial out of a prison population of 758." These are all assertions of fact which require the hearing of evidence. We therefore find that the trial judge could not have passed upon the contention raised by the defendant in the first paragraph of his Demurrer and Motion to Quash without hearing evidence on matters other than procedural ones; under the jurisprudence, supra, he was correct in his ruling. In his per curiam, the trial judge further states that he would not pass upon defendant's second contention that the Bill of Information is a comment on the conduct of persons in respect to public affairs and as such protected by a qualified privilege, because, "* * * the defendant would necessarily have to have a reasonable belief as to the truth of his comment as set *413 forth in LSA-R.S. 14:49.[7] Also, it is well established that proof of actual malice may destroy a qualified privilege.[8] Therefore, this could only be determined after trial, and was not such as would authorize the sustaining of a motion to quash." We find that the trial judge was correct in not passing on the second contention raised in defendant's Demurrer and Motion to Quash. Reviewed in association with LSA-R.S. 14:48-14:49, it shows that it presents matters on which evidence would have had to be heard during trial; it was therefore not subject to the pleadings advanced. In our discussion of the third contention raised in the Demurrer and Motion to Quash, we initially observe that Article I, Section 3, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, provides that, "No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of the press; any person may speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." (Emphasis ours.) The First Amendment to the United States Constitution recites that, "Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech * * *." The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "* * * No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; * * *." These constitutional provisions will be considered hereinafter in connection with LSA-R.S. 14:47-14:50, quoted supra. They will be considered in the light that, "The freedom of speech and of the press secured by the First Amendment U.S.C.A. Const., against abridgment by the United States is similarly secured to all persons by the Fourteenth against abridgment by a state." Schneider v. State of N.J., Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147-165, 60 S. Ct. 146, 84 L. Ed. 155. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498, we find the following statement with respect to the guaranties of freedom of expression: In Beauharnais v. People of the State of Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S. Ct. 725, 96 L. Ed. 919, the defendant was charged by information in that he "did unlawfully * * * exhibit in public places lithographs, which publications portray depravity, criminality, unchastity or lack of virtue of citizens of Negro race and color and which exposes [sic] citizens of Illinois of the Negro race and color to contempt, derision, or obloquy * * *." Beauharnais challanged the statute under which he was of speech and of the press guaranteed as charged as being violative of the liberty against the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, making the following pertinent statements in its decision: The United States Supreme Court has considered a number of cases cited by defendant, in which the defendants who were charged with contempt pleaded the protection of "Freedom of Speech." Before *415 discussing these cases, we feel it pertinent to remark that under our Louisiana law the offense of defamation and the offenses of contempt and constructive contempt are not the same. Constructive contempt, West's LSA-C.C.P., Art. 224(8), is defined in part as, "Comment by a newspaper or other medium for the dissemination of news upon a case or proceeding, then pending and undecided, which constitutes a clear, present, and imminent danger of obstructing or interfering with the orderly administration of justice by either influencing the court to reach a particular decision, or embarrassing it in the discharge of its judicial duties." In Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470, the United States Supreme Court spoke of "Clear and Present Danger" as follows: In Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192, the defendants were adjudged guilty and fined for contempt of court; their convictions rested upon comments published in newspapers pertaining to pending litigation. Defendants challenged the State's action as an abridgment, prohibited by the Federal Constitution, of freedom of speech and of the press. In reversing the conviction, the United States Supreme Court stated in the beginning of its opinion that, "It is to be noted at once that we have no direction by the legislature of California that publications outside the court room which comment upon a pending case in a specified manner should be punishable." The Court went on to discuss the theory of evil, stating, "Moreover, the likelihood, however great that a substantive evil will result cannot alone justify a restriction upon freedom of speech or the press. The evil itself must be `substantial,' * * *" It found that the evil sought to be avoided was not substantial; it said, "* * * we are convinced that the judgments below result in a curtailment of expressions that cannot be dismissed as insignificant. If they can be justified at all, it must be in terms of some serious substantive evil which they are designed to avert. The substantive evil here sought to be averted has been variously described below. It appears to be double: disrespect for the judiciary; and disorderly and unfair administration of justice."[10] Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 66 S. Ct. 1029, 90 L. Ed. 1295, concerned contempt proceedings in which the defendant, Associate Editor of the Miami Herald, was charged with being contemptuous of the circuit court and its judges, in that he had published two editorials alleged to be unlawfully critical of the administration of criminal justice in certain cases then pending before the court. The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction of *416 the State Court on the theory of "Clear and Present Danger," stating, "The comments were made about judges of courts of general jurisdictionjudges selected by the people of a populous and educated community. They concerned the attitude of the judges toward those who were charged with crime, not comments on evidence or rulings during a jury trial. Their effect on juries that might eventually try the alleged offenders against the criminal laws of Florida is too remote for discussion. Comment on pending cases may affect judges differently. It may influence some judges more than others. Some are of a more sensitive fiber than their colleagues. The law deals in generalities and external standards and cannot depend on the varying degrees of moral courage or stability in the face of criticism which individual judges may possess any more than it generally can depend on the personal equations or individual idiosyncrasies of the tortfeasor. * * * We are not willing to say under the circumstances of this case that these editorials are a clear and present danger to the fair administration of justice in Florida. Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714, 715, 51 S. Ct. 625, 630, 631, 75 L. Ed. 1357 [1366, 1367.]" Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 67 S. Ct. 1249, 91 L. Ed. 1546, involved contempt proceedings for an editorial challenging a Texas court's procedure. In reversing the conviction, the United States Supreme Court stated: In Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569, defendant, an elected sheriff of Bibb County, Georgia, was held in contempt of court for expressing his personal ideas on a matter that was presently before the grand jury for its consideration; his ideas were conveyed to and published by the local press. In reversing the conviction and holding that defendant's right of freedom of speech had been abridged, the United States Supreme Court stated, "Our examination of the content of petitioner's statements and the circumstances under which they were published leads us to conclude that they did not present a danger to the administration of justice that should vitiate his freedom to express his opinions in the manner chosen." As stated supra, Article I, Section 3, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, provides that a person speaking or publishing his sentiments is responsible for an abuse of that liberty. LSA-R.S. 14:47-14:50 were enacted pursuant to this provision, and they are specifically directed at a defined evil. It is unnecessary for us to consider the issues behind the phrase "Clear and Present Danger." See, Beauharnais v. *417 People of the State of Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S. Ct. 725, 96 L. Ed. 919, supra. LSA-R.S. 14:47-14:50 are an expression of Louisiana legislative will and have to do with the exposing of a person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule so as to deprive him of public confidence or social intercourse. We find nothing in the jurisprudence reviewed supra which prohibits such enactments as are herein under consideration. Also, as stated supra, Louisiana treats defamation and contempt as separate offenses; the jurisprudence we have heretofore reviewed dealt with the offense of contempt. As stated in the Roth and Beauharnais Cases, supra, libel has always been an offense under both common and statutory law. There have been many prosecutions under the libel laws; when the law and the evidence justified it, the person found guilty had a fine or prison sentence imposed on him. Freedom of Speech guaranteed under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has not been extended to those found guilty. See, Roth and Beauharnais Cases, supra; State v. Lambert, 188 La. 968, 178 So. 508, supra. We conclude that LSA-R.S. 14:47-14:50 are not null and void and are not prohibited by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, guaranteed to citizens of the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to that Constitution. Defendant's contention that LSA-R.S. 14:47-14:50 fail to provide the procedural safeguard of a trial by jury is without merit and will be discussed hereinafter. In the instant matter, it cannot be gainsaid that the use of the words "racketeer influences" when applied to anyone suggests and imputes that he has been influenced to practice fraud, deceit, trickery, cheating, and dishonesty.[11] The expression that the judges have enjoyed 300 days vacation out of 19 months suggests and connotes a violation of the "Deadhead" statute, LSA-R.S. 14:138, Public Payroll Fraud. Other expressions set out in the Bill of Information connote malfeasance in office. LSA-R.S. 14:134; Art. IX, Sec. 1, La. Const. of 1921. We conclude that the expressions of the defendant, as set out and charged in the Bill of Information were of a defamatory nature; they are alleged to be defamatory and to have been made maliciously; they were not subject to the protection of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. All that we are considering in this Bill of Exceptions is the legal sufficiency of the Bill of Information and defendant's Demurrer and Motion to Quash filed to the Information. The questions of malice and proof of defamation will be discussed hereinafter. Defendant's expressions set out in the Bill of Information are not criticisms of a court trial or of the manner in which any *418 one of the eight judges conducted his court when in session. The expressions charged contain personal attacks upon the integrity and honesty of the eight judges which warranted trial on the merits. Bill of Exceptions No. 3 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 4 was reserved to the denial by the trial judge of defendant's motion for trial by jury, which motion recites in part: In this Court defendant advances the same contentions as set forth in his motion for trial by jury; he raises the additional argument that the reasoning and holding of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, decided March 18, 1963, should be applied to the instant bill. Article VII, Section 41, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, provides: LSA-R.S. 15:340 recites: LSA-R.S. 15:341 states: LSA-R.S. 14:47, under which the defendant was charged, provides that, "whoever commits the crime of defamation shall be fined not more than three thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not more than one year." Amendment VI to the United States Constitution recites: In State v. Hadad, 142 La. 69, 76 So. 243, this Court has held that the provisions of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution relating to jury trials refer to prosecutions for the violation of federal statutes and not to prosecutions in state courts for violations of state statutes. See, 20 La.L.Rev. 680; Cf. State v. Pailet, 139 La. 697, 71 So. 951. See, also, State v. Harvey, 159 La. 674, 106 So. 28, Cert. denied, 273 U.S. 635, 47 S. Ct. 20, 71 L. Ed. 815. In State v. Porter, 176 La. 673, 146 So. 465, we have held that parties may waive or renounce what law establishes in their favor, unless expressly or impliedly prohibited by law or public policy. We stated emphatically, however, that, "The law which provides that persons charged with capital offenses or those necessarily punishable by imprisonment at hard labor shall be tried by juries was made in the interest of both the accused parties and the state and neither is permitted to derogate from it. State v. Thompson, 104 La. 167, 28 So. 882; State v. Jackson, 106 La. 189, 30 So. 309." Cf. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 50 S. Ct. 253, 74 L. Ed. 854. In State v. Livaudais, 161 La. 882, 109 So. 536, we stated: In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595, Betts was indicted for robbery. He was unable to employ counsel, and he was refused his request for such after informing the trial judge of his indigent position. Without waiving his asserted right to counsel, he pleaded not guilty and elected to be tried without a jury. The judge found him guilty and imposed a sentence of eight years. Betts applied for Habeas Corpus while serving his penitentiary term; the writ was granted, but relief was denied by the State court. The United States Supreme Court granted Certiorari and affirmed the lower court, stating: In Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, Gideon was charged in a Florida State court with having broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor. This offense is a felony under Florida law. Gideon was unable to employ counsel, and his request for such was denied by the court. He conducted his own defense and was *420 found guilty by a jury; he was thereafter sentenced to serve five years in the penitentiary. The United States Supreme Court granted Certiorari to review a decision of the Florida Supreme Court on hearing of a Writ of Habeas Corpus to the effect that refusal to appoint counsel for Gideon did not deprive him of his constitutional rights. Betts v. Brady, supra, was reviewed; with respect to its holding in that case, the United States Supreme Court stated: Since the present defendant was only charged with a misdemeanor, and the defendants in the Betts and Gideon Cases were charged with a felony, we do not think that the cases are apposite. As stated supra, Article VII, Section 41, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, provides that a defendant in a felony case shall be tried by a jury. In State v. Porter, supra, we held that trial by jury cannot be waived in certain instances. We do not think that a comparison can be made between a request for counsel in a felony case and a request for trial by jury in a misdemeanor case. In one instance, there is an indigent defendant who cannot afford to have his defense properly presented asking for counsel to be appointed by the court to represent him; in the other, the defendant objects to trial of a misdemeanor by a skilled trier of facts and law (his responsibility is set out in State v. Livaudais, supra) and asks for trial by jury. We conclude that Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, is not controlling of the instant prosecution; here the defendant neither suffered prejudice nor deprivation of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that the provisions of Article VII, Section 41, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, authorizing trial by the judge alone in misdemeanor cases, are constitutional. We find no prohibition against such provisions in the Constitution of the United States or in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Bill of Exceptions No. 4 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 5 is neither a part of the record nor argued in the State's or defendant's brief. We conclude that it has been abandoned. Bill of Exceptions No. 7 is not a part of the record; it is not included in the State's brief, and it is only mentioned by number in the defendant's brief. We conclude that it has been abandoned. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 6, 8, 9, and 11 will be included under one heading because of their similarity of content. Bill of Exceptions No. 6 was reserved when the trial court permitted the State to ask Arthur Roane (a newspaper reporter for the Times-Picayune, a New Orleans paper, who had previously testified that he *421 was present in the District Attorney's office on the morning of November 2, 1962, and that the defendant had made a statement to him), "Did you make a report of this statement to your paper?" The objection of counsel for the defendant was to the effect that the Bill of Information charges defamation resulting from the publication in the New Orleans States-Item, and that the defendant was not charged with defamation as a result of publication in the Times-Picayune. He contended, "That statement is irrelevant and immaterial that he reported to the Times-Picayune." The ruling of the trial court with respect to Bill of Exceptions No. 6 recites: Bill of Exceptions No. 8 was reserved when the trial judge permitted the following testimony of Arthur Roane: "A. Did he make a statement to you on November 9? "A. I suppose he did. He makes statements to me very often. "Q. What was Mr. Garrison's statement to you? "A. You are referring to this particular question there? "Q. The article that you just refreshed your memory on. [Discussion] "Q. Did Mr. Garrison make that statement to you? In overruling the objection of counsel for the defendant to the above testimony, the trial judge stated, "The statement is admitted for the purpose of showing malice and Courts have held that statements made even after the time are admissible if they are connected with it." Bill of Exceptions No. 9 was reserved when the trial judge permitted Jack Kneece, a General Assignment Reporter for the Times-Picayune, to testify with respect to his coverage of a meeting of the Press Association in the International Trade Mart Building on Saturday night, January 12, 1963. His testimony is to the effect that the defendant spoke for fifteen to twenty minutes at the meeting, and that part of the speech was directed to the question of racketeering influences on the judges involved. In admitting the testimony of Kneece, the trial judge stated that he refused to strike the evidence from the record for the reason that "it was found to be introduced under the general ruling that the statement he made with reference to this case was admissible only for the purpose of showing malice, and the evidence is restricted to that and to that alone." Bill of Exceptions No. 11 was reserved when Robert Kelso, a newspaper reporter for the States-Item, was permitted to testify according to his recollection with respect to parts of a talk given by the defendant on January 11, 1963, at the Monteleone Hotel. *422 Kelso's testimony was with respect to statements made by the defendant with regard to the eight judges herein involved and was admitted for the purpose of showing malice. In this Court defendant argues that: In answer to the Application for a Bill of Particulars the State said that it would contend that the statement of the defendant set forth in the Bill of Information constitutes malice in law and also malice in fact. "* * *" Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Sec. 165, p. 320. As stated in the above quotations, "malice" is many things. Herein, the defendant pleaded a qualified privilege, and the State, as plaintiff, assumed the burden of proving malice. In offering the present testimony to which objection was raised, the State was not concerned with prior or subsequent defamations; it was merely trying to show by similar statements the malice it had previously alleged with respect to the Bill of Information. In his Per Curiam Bill of Exceptions No. 8, the trial judge pertinently stated: We agree with the trial judge that intent is involved in malice. In order to show intent, evidence is admissible of similar acts, independent of the act charged as a crime in the Information, for though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact, it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction. LSA-R.S. 15:445. *424 Under Relevancy, in Jones on Evidence, Civil and Criminal, Fifth Edition, Vol. 1, Sec. 159, p. 285, it is well stated: Because the trial judge, the State, and the defense were concerned with malice in the instant prosecution, we find that the trial judge properly admitted the testimony, supra, to which counsel for the defendant objected and made the basis of these bills. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 6, 8, 9, and 11, are without merit. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 12, 13, and 14 are not a part of the record, and they are not argued in the State's brief nor in the defendant's brief. We conclude that they have been abandoned. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 10, 15, 16, and 17 will be discussed jointly; the matters therein involved are similar. Bill of Exceptions No. 10 was reserved when Malcolm V. O'Hara, Judge, Section "A," Criminal District Court, was asked the following question, "As a result of the statement made by Mr. Garrison that I referred to, have you been affected in any way?" and he responded, "Well, I am going to have to answer that this way: Naturally, being in public office and having held public office for a number of years, I know a number of people, and the impression that I get from the people who discuss this matter with meit is done in the following ways: People jokingly ask me if it is true that we get all these vacations, whether or not I am a sacred cow, or whether I am influenced by racketeers. It is no one person or nothing specific; it is a cumulative sort of a thing done in a joking sort of manner, but the one thing my one impression out of the thing, if this is admissibleis that the bench, the criminal bench, seems to be getting the worst of public opinion, that the bench has suffered to some extent as a result of it, but nobody has hit me or threatened me or anything like that." Objection to the above testimony was predicated on the grounds that it was based on impression and on hearsay. In admitting this testimony the trial court stated that it was "allowing the evidence to stand solely for the purpose of showing whether there was any reaction of the public, without the details of the reaction, if there was any reaction of the public to the public article such as it would bring it within the intendment and the definition of defamation as set forth in the [LSA-] Revised Statutes, Title 14, Section 47, and restricting it to that. * * *" Bill of Exceptions No. 15 was reserved when Shirley G. Wimberly, Judge, Section "G," criminal District Court, was permitted to give the following testimony: "A. Yes, it has. "Q. Would you tell the Court how? "A. Well, I have received many telephone calls of derision." The objection to the foregoing testimony was based on the ground that it was strictly hearsay. The ruling of the trial court was as follows: Bill of Exceptions No. 16 was reserved when Oliver Paul Schulingkamp, Judge, Section "F", Criminal District Court, was permitted to answer the following question, which he answered affirmatively: The objection to this question was based on the grounds that it would be purely speculation for the witness to state facts in answer to the question, and that his response would be purely his impression and thus hearsay. The trial judge's ruling with respect to Bill of Exceptions No. 16 was similar to that given to Bills of Exceptions Nos. 10 and 15. Bill of Exceptions No. 17 was reserved when Thomas M. Brahney, Jr., Judge, Division "D", Criminal District Court, was permitted to testify as to whether he had been subjected to hatred, contempt, and ridicule as a result of the publication of November 2, 1962. The objection to the question was based on the ground that the witness would not be in a position to know, except in his own opinion, whether anything that occurred to him after the alleged statement of Mr. Garrison was actually due to the statement. It was contended that the testimony would be irrelevant, immaterial, and not pertinent to the case. The trial judge gave the following ruling with respect to the objection: In this Court defendant contends that the trial judge's rulings, supra, which he incorporated in his per curiams to the instant bills, were a violation of LSA-R.S. 15:434 which provides that hearsay evidence is inadmissible, except as otherwise provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure. We agree with the reasoning of the trial judge to the effect that when a person has been defamed, he has been exposed to hatred, contempt or ridicule (LSA-R.S. 14:47), and that the person's testimony with respect to such exposure is proof of an essential ingredient of the crime charged Defamationand is not hearsay. We conclude that the testimony of each of the four judges was not hearsay; *426 it was given to prove an ingredient of the offense herein charged and alleged. The trial judge has correctly stated the law in his rulings, and we find no abuse of his discretion. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 10, 15, 16, and 17, are without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 18 was reserved when Joseph I. Giarrusso, Superintendent of the New Orleans Police Department, a witness called on behalf of the State, was permitted to answer the following question: "A. No, sir, he has not." The ground of objection was that the question was misleading and involved matters not herein concerned. We do not find that the question was misleading. The following statement of the trial judge reflects his reason for admitting the testimony and shows that he committed no abuse of discretion: Bill of Exceptions No. 18 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 19 is neither made a part of the record nor argued in brief. We consider that it has been abandoned. Bill of Exceptions No. 20 was reserved when the trial judge rejected Proposition of Law No. Eleven. Counsel for the defendant presented the charge to the court before argument in the same fashion as a charge would have been presented had the case been tried by a jury; it recited: In this Court counsel for the defendant states: Section 795 of the Law of Crime, William L. Burdick, p. 165, recites: In Deshotel v. Thistlethwaite, supra, Deshotel, an attorney, brought suit against Thistlethwaite, Editor and Publisher of the Daily World Newspaper, for damages allegedly resulting from defamatory remarks made by Thistlethwaite in a television appearance. Thistlethwaite's defense of truth was found to have no merit. This Court then considered his alternative defense of fair comment and criticism alleged to be enjoyed as a qualified privilege; it held: In rejecting the Proposition of Law, supra, the trial court found that it had no application to the facts of this case and was not a full and correct statement of the law; in its per curiam it stated: After reading the Deshotel case, supra, we agree with the finding of the trial judge herein that the Proposition of Law does not contain the complete and correct holding of the case. It is to be noted that the defendant relied on privilege, and the State contended that the expression of the defendant constituted malice in law and also malice in fact. Malice is presumed where a non-privileged publication or expression is false (LSA-R.S. 14:48); where a qualified privilege exists, malice must be proved (LSA-R.S. 14:49). With respect to the statement from Burdick, supra, the trial judge correctly found: The trial judge made the following factual finding: Under his factual finding, the trial judge was correct in rejecting Proposition of Law No. Eleven. Bill of Exceptions No. 20 is without merit. *429 Bills of Exceptions Nos. 21, 22, and 23 will be jointly discussed. Bill of Exceptions No. 21 was reserved when the trial court qualified Proposition of Law No. Thirteen, which had been submitted to it prior to argument; it recites: The trial court qualified Proposition of Law No. Thirteen by pointing out that Article I, Section 3, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, was not a part of the holding in the case of Wood v. Georgia, supra. This section provides that a person is responsible for the abuse of liberty of speech or of the press. In this Court defendant avers in brief: Bill of Exceptions No. 22 was reserved when the trial court rejected Proposition of Law No. Fourteen, which recites: The trial judge rejected the Proposition, because he "did not find that the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Louisiana grants an absolute privilege to make any statement, particularly a false defamatory or derogatory statement, simply because a person is an elected official, in commenting on matters of public importance, and in so doing, make unsubstantiated and false statements of fact regarding other persons, rather than commenting upon admitted facts, and the party defamed would have no legal remedy." In this Court defendant avers: Bill of Exceptions No. 23 was reserved when the trial court rejected Proposition of Law No. Sixteen, which recites: After differentiating the instant prosecution from Wood v. Georgia, supra, the trial court found: Defendant avers in this Court: We find no merit in Bills of Exceptions Nos. 21, 22, and 23. Our reasons for such finding are set forth in our lengthly discussion of Bill of Exceptions No. 3, which in part pertained to similar matters. The trial judge was correct in his rulings; his reasoning in distinguishing Wood v. Georgia, supra, from the instant prosecution in his per curiams to the instant bills is very similar to that of this Court in Bill of Exceptions No. 3. He did not abuse his discretion nor commit error with respect to the provisions of LSA-R.S. 15:390, supra. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 21, 22, and 23, are without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 24 was reserved when the trial court qualified Proposition of Law No. Seventeen, which recited: The trial judge qualified the Proposition by the following statement from State v. Lambert, 188 La. 968, 178 So. 508: In his per curiam to the instant bill, the trial judge sets forth, as follows, his further reasons for qualifying the Proposition: "Counsel for defendant * * * made the statement as to how he appreciated *431 the ruling in that the effect was that the State must prove malice in cases only involving qualified privilege. I do not see how this appreciation was arrived at as I was discussing nothing more than the law of actual malice and a qualifiedly privileged statement as requested by counsel. In the present bill of exceptions, counsel for the defendant avers that he objected to the ruling of the trial judge for the reason "that the State must prove malice in all cases of criminal defamation, whether a qualified privilege exists or not; that in cases of qualified privilege the State must prove actual malice; in cases where the qualified privilege does not exist, the State must prove legal malice. The State must carry the burden of proof of malice in all cases of criminal defamation." In this Court, counsel for the defendant sets forth in brief: *432 As stated throughout this opinion, the defendant pleaded "qualified privilege," and the State contended that the statement of the defendant constituted malice in law and malice in fact. LSA-R.S. 14:49 provides that actual malice must be proved where a qualified privilege exists under certain enumerated circumstances; the statute does not restrict the proof of malice to extrinsic evidence. We find no prohibition in the law or in the jurisprudence which forbids the use of intrinsic evidence in a prosecution such as the instant one; neither do we find a limitation or restriction. The trial judge was therefore correct in qualifying Proposition of Law No. Seventeen. (See our discussion of Bill of Exceptions No. 6, 8, 9 and 11, supra.) Cf. Miller, Smith and Champagne v. Capital City Press, La.App., 142 So. 2d 462; Jenkins v. D X Sunray Oil Co., 5 Cir., 297 F.2d 244. The trial judge was correct in stating that after he had given his ruling to Proposition of Law No. Seventeen, he could not be compelled to expand to matters not requested in the Propositionthe proof required in all cases of defamation. Bill of Exceptions No. 24 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 25 was reserved to the ruling of the trial judge in denying defendant's Motion for a New Trial. The Motion reurges all of the objections previously raised in Bills of Exceptions Nos. 1 through 24, and with respect to these matters nothing new is presented for our consideration. We have answered the arguments in discussing the bills, all of which we have found to be without merit. The Motion avers that there is no evidence in the record to support the judgment of the trial court. We have read the transcript of testimony (consisting of 741 pages), as well as the numerous pleadings hereinbefore discussed; we have also read the defendant's brief (94 pages) and the State's brief (43 pages), and we find that there is evidence to support the judgment. Where there is some evidence to sustain the conviction, this Court cannot pass upon the sufficiency thereof. State v. Copling, 242 La. 199, 135 So. 2d 271; State v. McDonell, 208 La. 602, 23 So. 2d 230. We are constrained to remark here that the length of this opinion is due to the extensiveness of the pleadings and the voluminous record attached; we are also impelled to state that the learned trial judge and able counsel for both the State and the defendant have treated the matter with dexterity and completeness. Counsel for the defendant argues in brief that there is not one scintilla of evidence to indicate that the accused made the statement herein involved without a reasonable belief of its truth. This contention would have to do with malice, which we have covered in our discussion of Bills of Exceptions Nos. 6, 8, 9, 11 and 24.[14] Cf. State v. Bienvenu, 36 La.Ann. 378. Bill of Exceptions No. 25 is without merit. *433 Bill of Exceptions No. 26 was reserved when the trial court denied defendant's Motion in Arrest of Judgment. The Motion averred "that the entire proceedings against the defendant are null and void for the reasons that the statutes under which the bill of information is laid is unconstitutional and null and void and in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution as a restriction on the freedom of speech." We find no merit in the instant bill. In our disposition of Bill of Exceptions No. 3, we found LSA-R.S. 14:47-14:50 constitutional and not violative of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Bill of Exceptions No. 26 is without merit. For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. HAMITER, J., concurs in the result. [1] "Defamation is the malicious publication or expression in any manner, to anyone other than the party defamed, of anything which tends: "(1) To expose any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefit of public confidence or social intercourse; or "(2) To expose the memory of one deceased to hatred, contempt, or ridicule; or "(3) To injure any person, corporation, or association of persons in his or their business or occupation. "Whoever commits the crime of defamation shall be fined not more than three thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both." LSA-R.S. 14:47. [2] The word "much" is contained in the newspaper article. [3] "The causes for which any judge in any criminal case shall be recused, shall be as follows: (1) His being interested in the cause; but in any cause in which the state, or one of its political subdivisions, or any religious corporation, is interested, the fact that the judge is a citizen of the state or a resident of the political subdivision, or pays taxes thereto, or that he is a member of the religious corporation, shall not constitute a ground for recusation. (2) His being the spouse of the accused or the party injured or one of the attorneys; his being related to the accused or to the party injured or to the spouse of the accused or the party injured within the fourth degree, or to one of the attorneys or to the spouse of one of the attorneys within the second degree. (3) His being a material witness in the cause. (4) His having been employed or consulted as an attorney in the cause or his having been associated with an attorney during the latter's employment in the cause. (5) His having performed any judicial act in the cause in any other court." LSA-R.S. 15:303. [4] Defendant states in brief, "Of course we realize that there was no conscious prejudging of Garrison's case by Judge Ponder. * * *" [5] "Defects in indictments can be urged before verdict only by demurrer or a motion to quash, and the accused is not entitled to any bill of particulars as to the subject-matter charged in the indictment, but the trial judge may, in his discretion, require the district attorney to file in the case such data as, in the opinion of the judge, may be sufficient." [6] In State v. Butler, 229 La. 788, 86 So. 2d 906, the defendant was charged with unlawfully possessing, having under his control, selling, and delivering marijuana. The State refused to answer his application for a bill of particulars. Pertinent information sought was the names of the persons to whom defendant was alleged to have sold and to have delivered the marijuana. This Court granted defendant a new trial, stating, "However, while it is discretionary with the trial judge, he cannot arbitrarily refuse to order the State to furnish `essential particulars.' That is exactly what the trial judge refused to do in this case." In a per curiam written on refusal of an application for rehearing, we stated that this Court must decide each case on the issues presented; and, in the matter involved, after considering the language of the bill of information, we said that we were of the opinion that the accused was entitled to the information sought so that he could adequately prepare his defense, and that in refusing to order the State to furnish the information the trial judge abused his discretion. [7] "A qualified privilege exists and actual malice must be proved, regardless of whether the publication is true or false, in the following situations: (1) Where the publication or expression is a fair and true report of any judicial, legislative, or other public or official proceeding, or of any statement, speech, argument, or debate in the course of the same. (2) Where the publication or expression is a comment made in the reasonable belief of its truth, upon, (a) The conduct of a person in respect to public affairs; or (b) A thing which the proprietor thereof offers or explains to the public. (3) Where the publication or expression is made to a person interested in the communication, by one who is also interested or who stands in such a relation to the former as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing his motive innocent. (4) Where the publication or expression is made by an attorney or party in a judicial proceeding." [8] "Where a non-privileged defamatory publication or expression is false it is presumed to be malicious unless a justifiable motive for making it is shown. "Where such a publication or expression is true, actual malice must be proved in order to convict the offender." LSA-R.S. 14:48. "There shall be no prosecution for defamation in the following situations: (1) When a statement is made by a legislator or judge in the course of his official duties. (2) When a statement is made by a witness in a judicial proceeding, or in any other legal proceeding where testimony may be required by law, and such statement is reasonably believed by the witness to be relevant to the matter in controversy. (3) Against the owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound broadcasting station or network of stations or the agents or employees thereof, when a statement is made or uttered over such station or network of stations by one other than such owner, licensee, operator, agents or employees." LSA-R.S. 14:50. [9] "Libel, slander, and malicious prosecution are all methods of defamation." 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 1, p. 31. [10] It is interesting to note that the Louisiana State Supreme Court followed the Bridges rule in a contempt proceeding, Graham v. Jones, 200 La. 179, 7 So. 2d 702, stating: "However, under the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Bridges v. California and Times-Mirror Company v. Superior Court case, this proceeding for contempt against respondent must be discharged. * * * As we have pointed out in our opinion handed down today on the rules for contempt against the three New Orleans newspapers, [200 La. 137,] 7 So. 2d 688, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in matters of contempt has repudiated the test of reasonable tendency heretofore prevailing and has substituted therefor the test of clear and present danger. Applying that test to the publication under review, we are bound to hold that there was no clear and present danger that the editorial would or could sway the five members of this Court from acting according to their convictions in declaring that the Reorganization Amendment was unconstitutional." [11] racketeer"* * * a person who obtains money illegally, as by bootlegging, fraud, or especially, threats of violence. v. i. to obtain money in any of these ways." (Emphasis ours.) fraud"* * * a) deceit; trickery; cheating. b) in law, intentional deception to cause a person to give up property or some lawful right. 2. something said or done to deceive; trick; artifice. 3. [Colloq.] a person who deceives or is not what he pretends to be; impostor; cheat." (Emphasis ours.) cheat"* * * behave dishonestly or unfaithfully." (Emphasis ours.) influence"* * * 2.a) the power of persons or things to affect others, seen only in its effects. b) the action or effect of such power. 3. the power of a person or group to produce effects without the exertion of physical force or authority, based on wealth, social position, ability, etc. 4. a person or thing that has influence." Webster's New World Dictionary, World Publishing Co., 1957. [12] In Green v. "United States, 356 U.S. 165, 78 S. Ct. 632, 2 L. Ed. 2d 672, the United States Supreme Court held that Criminal Contempt cases are not subject to jury trial as a matter of constitutional right. Cf. Loyola Law Review, 1961-62, p. 49. [13] "The prosecution and the defense have each the right to present to the court, before the argument has begun, any written charge or charges, and request that the same be given. Except as otherwise provided herein, the judge must give every such requested charge that is wholly correct and wholly pertinent, unless the matter contained in such charge have been already given, or unless such charge require qualification, limitation or explanation." LSA-R.S. 15:390. [14] It is appropriate to here observe that if defendant believed the statements he made, he could have pursued the following legal channels open to him: (1) Legal proceedings to compel the judges to sign the orders. (2) Charging the judges with a violation of the "Deadhead" statute, LSA-R.S. 14:138. (3) Conducting an open hearing under the provisions of LSA-R.S. 15:17.1 concerning the alleged actions of the judges and whether or not there was a question of racketeer influences on the eight judges. (4) Institution of removal from office proceedings under the provisions of Art. IX, Sees. 1 and 5, La.Const. of 1921. (5) Availing himself of the services of the Judicial Council of the Supreme Court of Louisiana as provided by its Rule XX, Sec. 6. West's LSA, Vol. 8, Supplement for use during 1963. The record reflects that defendant did not avail himself of the foregoing legal channels.