Title: Fidelity Hail Ins. Co. v. Anderson
Citation: 172 Kan. 253, 239 P.2d 830
Docket Number: 38,472
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: January 26, 1952

172 Kan. 253 (1952)
239 P.2d 830
THE FIDELITY HAIL INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant,
v.
VICTOR ANDERSON, Appellee.
No. 38,472

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 26, 1952.
Ray C. Sloan, of Hoxie, and F.C. Norton, of Salina, were on the briefs for the appellant.
W.H. Clark, and Kenneth Clark, both of Hoxie, and Marion W. Chipman, of Hill City, were on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, J.:
This is an action on a promissory note given to plaintiff by defendant for the premium on a hail insurance policy. The appeal is from an order sustaining defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's second amended petition from the files.
The facts essential to disposition of the appellate issues involved are not in dispute and can be stated briefly.
Following a motion to make its petition more definite and certain plaintiff filed an amended petition. By reference a true copy of the note sued on was made a part thereof. Such pleading also alleged in substance that when received by plaintiff the note called for the payment of $330.25, which was more than the amount of the premium, and that thereafter it placed a credit of $19 on that instrument, thus reflecting the true amount due. Defendant then demurred to the amended petition on the ground it failed to state *254 a cause of action. Thereafter, the trial court sustained this demurrer on the basis the pleading so challenged disclosed a material alteration of the note sued on, within the meaning of G.S. 1935, 52-906 and 52-907, providing a negotiable instrument is avoided when materially altered without the assent of all the parties thereto, and therefore failed to state a cause of action. Plaintiff took no appeal from this ruling. Instead it filed a second amended petition which, it may be said, contained allegations substantially the same as those set forth in the pleading to which the trial court had theretofore sustained the demurrer. The defendant then moved to strike this pleading from the files for the reason it was repetitious of the amended petition to which the demurrer had previously been sustained. Subsequently the trial court found such pleading was repetitious as charged in the motion to strike and struck the second amended petition from the files. Thereupon plaintiff perfected the instant appeal wherein it now asks this court to hold that the trial court erred in sustaining the defendant's motion to strike the second amended petition from the files.
There can be no doubt under our practice, except in cases where the statute of limitations has run in the meantime, a question not here involved, that a plaintiff who has failed to state a cause of action in his petition and has had a demurrer sustained thereto based upon that ground may file an amended petition so long as such pleading contains additional, substantial, material facts which would affect the result as against a demurrer. However, an entirely different rule prevails where  as here  a demurrer has been sustained to a petition and the plaintiff thereafter and notwithstanding the former ruling files an amended petition with allegations so similar they substantially repeat what is to be found in the earlier pleading and require the court to either again review and pass upon what it has already determined or ignore its previous ruling. In that situation the established rule is that courts in the exercise of their discretionary powers have the right to strike such pleading from the files and that in doing so they act properly and commit no error.
For general statements supporting the foregoing rule see 71 C.J.S., Pleading, § 455 (a) (h) and § 462 (a), where the following statements appear:
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See, also, 41 Am. Jur., Pleading, 533 § 356, which states:
For a few decisions from other jurisdictions directly in point and to the same effect, see Butler v. Libe, 81 Neb. 740, 116 N.W. 663; Butler v. Libe (Rehearing denied) 81 Neb. 744, 117 N.W. 700; Neal v. Bank of America, 93 C.A.2d 678, 209 P.2d 825; Sholes v. Bank, 82 Colo. 432, 261 Pac. 456; Hoyt v. Beach, 104 Iowa 257, 73 N.W. 492; Wing v. Dist. Twp. Red Oak, 82 Iowa, 632, 48 N.W. 977.
That this court is in substantial accord with the rule as heretofore stated is definitely indicated by one of its own decisions, Mydland v. Mydland, 153 Kan. 497, 112 P.2d 104, where it is said:
And at pages 499 and 500 of the opinion stated.
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See, also, Dwinnell v. Acacia Mutual Life Ins. Co., 155 Kan. 464, 126 P.2d 221. At page 470 of the opinion, in disposing of an issue similar to the one here involved, we said:
Application of the rule announced in the foregoing decisions and legal treatises makes it crystal clear the trial court did not err in sustaining the motion to strike under the related facts and circumstances. What appellant actually sought to do in the court below by filing the repetitious pleading was to have the trial court reconsider its ruling on the demurrer. That question had already been passed upon, under the foregoing decisions, regardless whether the action respecting it had been correct or not, appellant was not authorized as a matter of right to refile a pleading practically identical with one which had been held insufficient and thereby require appellee to again defend and the trial court to review the appealable order (G.S. 1949, 60-3302, second) theretofore directly involved and determined.
We have held that an order striking an amended petition from the files is a final order and hence appealable (Hicks v. Parker, 143 Kan. 763, 57 P.2d 413). However, even though it must be conceded this court in the past has treated some motions to strike as if they were tantamount to a demurrer, it does not follow, as appellant suggests, that all such motions are entitled to be so regarded on appeal. Under the existing facts and circumstances the involved motion is to be considered in its true light, i.e., as a motion to strike a pleading from the files because the allegations *257 thereof are repetitious and the sole question presented for appellate review is whether, under the rule to which we have heretofore referred, the action of the court below in sustaining it is erroneous. In the instant case, it may be added, decision of that issue hinges upon the action of the court in striking the amended petition from the files, not upon its action in sustaining the demurrer to the appellant's original pleading for there is no appeal from that ruling.
The judgment is affirmed.