Title: E-L Enterprises, Inc. v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District
Citation: 2010 WI 58
Docket Number: 2008AP000921
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2010

2010 WI 58 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP921 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
E-L Enterprises, Inc., 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 15 
Reported at: 316 Wis. 2d 280, 763 N.W.2d 231 
(Ct. App. 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 21, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Sankovitz   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
G. Michael Halfenger, William J. Katt, Jr., and Foley & Lardner 
LLP, Milwaukee, and Michael J. McCabe, James H. Petersen, Lauri 
Ann Rollings, and the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by G. Michael Halfenger. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there were briefs by Jerome R. 
Kerkman, Susan A. Cerbins, Joseph R. Cincotta, and Kerkman & 
Dunn, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jerome R. Kerkman. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Daniel M. Olson and the 
League of Wisconsin Municipalities, Madison, on behalf of the 
League of Wisconsin Municipalities. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 58
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP921  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV5505) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
E-L Enterprises, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals,1 which affirmed the 
judgment entered on a jury verdict by Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, Richard J. Sankovitz, Judge.  The jury found that when 
constructing a 
sewer, the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage 
District 
(the 
Sewerage 
District) 
unreasonably 
removed 
groundwater from the property of E-L Enterprises, Inc. (E-L), 
which caused E-L's building to settle and amounted to a taking 
                                                 
1 E-L Enters., Inc. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 2009 
WI App 15, 316 Wis. 2d 280, 763 N.W.2d 231. 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
2 
 
of E-L's property without just compensation.  The jury awarded 
E-L damages in the amount of $309,388.  
¶2 
The Sewerage District filed a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that the damages  
E-L 
suffered 
to 
its 
property 
were 
consequential 
damages 
resulting from governmental action and therefore were not 
compensable 
under 
the 
takings 
clause 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Alternatively, the Sewerage District moved for a 
new trial based on insufficient evidence to support the verdict.  
The circuit court denied the Sewerage District's motions and 
awarded E-L its attorney fees and costs.  The circuit court then 
entered judgment in the amount of $624,375.48 on behalf of  
E-L and against the Sewerage District. 
¶3 
The Sewerage District appealed, and the court of 
appeals affirmed.  The Sewerage District petitioned this court 
for review, and we accepted.  We now reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
¶4 
This case presents the following issues: (1) whether 
the Sewerage District's conduct constituted a taking of E-L's 
property without just compensation in violation of Article I, 
Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Fifth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution;2 and (2) whether E-L has 
                                                 
2 The issue of whether the Sewerage District's conduct 
constituted a taking under the U.S. Constitution was not 
invoked, argued, or appealed below.  However, pursuant to our 
order, the parties briefed the issue before this court. 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
3 
 
established an inverse condemnation claim under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.10 (2007-08),3 entitling E-L to attorney fees and costs.4 
¶5 
As a preliminary matter, we need not decide today the 
panoply of issues 
that relate to an alleged taking of 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 32.10, 
"Condemnation 
proceedings 
instituted by property owner," provides:  
If any property has been occupied by a person 
possessing the power of condemnation and if the person 
has not exercised the power, the owner, to institute 
condemnation proceedings, shall present a verified 
petition to the circuit judge of the county wherein 
the land is situated asking that such proceedings be 
commenced.  The petition shall describe the land, 
state 
the 
person against which the condemnation 
proceedings are instituted and the use to which it has 
been put or is designed to have been put by the person 
against which the proceedings are instituted.  A copy 
of the petition shall be served upon the person who 
has occupied petitioner's land, or interest in land.  
The petition shall be filed in the office of the clerk 
of the circuit court and thereupon the matter shall be 
deemed an action at law and at issue, with petitioner 
as plaintiff and the occupying person as defendant.  
The court shall make a finding of whether the 
defendant is occupying property of the plaintiff 
without having the right to do so.  If the court 
determines 
that the defendant is occupying such 
property of the plaintiff without having the right to 
do so, it shall treat the matter in accordance with 
the 
provisions 
of 
this 
subchapter 
assuming 
the 
plaintiff 
has 
received 
from 
the 
defendant 
a 
jurisdictional offer and has failed to accept the same 
and assuming the plaintiff is not questioning the 
right of the defendant to condemn the property so 
occupied. 
4 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3), "litigation expenses 
shall be awarded to the condemnee if: . . . (c) The judgment is 
for the plaintiff in an action under s. 32.10." 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
4 
 
groundwater.  In this case, E-L introduced no proof as to the 
value of the extracted groundwater.5  Instead, E-L seeks damages 
for the cost to repair its building and for the loss of use of 
its wood piles.  The Sewerage District did not physically occupy 
the 
property 
for 
which 
E-L 
seeks 
compensation, 
and 
no 
government-imposed 
restriction 
deprived 
E-L 
of 
all, 
or 
substantially all, of the beneficial use of its property.  
Accordingly, what remains are mere consequential damages to 
property resulting from governmental action, which are not 
compensable under constitutional takings law.6  The damage to  
E-L's building was caused by the alleged negligent construction 
of the sewer; hence, E-L's claim sounds in tort and seeks 
damages for which the Sewerage District is not liable under the 
doctrine of governmental immunity.  For the same reasons, we 
further conclude that E-L has failed to establish an inverse 
condemnation claim under Wis. Stat. § 32.10.  E-L is therefore 
not entitled to attorney fees and costs under Wis. Stat. ch. 32.  
                                                 
5 E-L sought damages for the cost to repair its building and 
the attorney fees and costs E-L incurred litigating with the 
neighbor who owned the adjacent alley and refused E-L access to 
make the repairs.  At trial, E-L introduced proof of those 
damages.  We are cognizant of the fact that the jury was asked 
to determine the sum of money that would "justly compensate E-L 
for the taking of the groundwater"; however, there was no proof 
introduced 
at 
trial 
as 
to 
the 
value 
of 
the 
extracted 
groundwater.  See infra Part III.A.1. 
6 We have in this case "only damage, without appropriation 
to the public purpose," and therefore, E-L is unable to recover 
its damages on the theory of a constitutional taking for public 
use.  See Wis. Power & Light Co. v. Columbia Cnty., 3 Wis. 2d 1, 
6-7, 87 N.W.2d 279 (1958). 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
5 
 
Accordingly, this court reverses the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶6 
In the 1980s, the Sewerage District constructed the 
Deep Tunnel System, a 19 mile long system of sewers across 
Milwaukee County "that help[s] reduce water pollution by storing 
excess wastewater 140 to 330 feet underground" until the 
wastewater can be treated at reclamation facilities.7  The Deep 
Tunnel included the 1987-88 construction of the Crosstown 7 
sewer (the sewer), a "near-surface collector sewer" that 
collects sewage overflow and diverts it away from the Menomonee 
River and into storage in the Deep Tunnel.  The sewer was 
constructed for the Sewerage District by Bowles Contracting 
Inc./Tomasini 
Construction 
Inc. 
Joint 
Venture 
(BCI/TCI).  
Pursuant to the Sewerage District's contract with BCI/TCI, the 
means and methods of the construction were left to BCI/TCI's 
discretion.  The contract required BCI/TCI to avoid damage to 
neighboring buildings and to repair any damage caused by the 
removal of water from the construction site.  Under the 
contract, BCI/TCI was responsible for any resulting damage to 
surrounding properties. 
¶7 
To 
construct 
the 
sewer, 
BCI/TCI 
dug 
a 
trench, 
installed sewer pipes, and restored the surface.  A portion of 
                                                 
7 See the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District website 
http://v2.mmsd.com/deeptunnelhistory.aspx (providing the history 
of 
the 
Deep 
Tunnel 
System); 
http://v2.mmsd.com/deeptunnelhowitworks.aspx (explaining how the 
Deep Tunnel works). 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
6 
 
the sewer was constructed in the Sewerage District's easement 
under a private alley adjacent to the subject building owned by 
E-L on North 12th Street in Milwaukee.8  E-L's building was built 
in 1928 on "wood piles," long wooden poles that are capped with 
concrete and driven into the ground to provide support for the 
building's foundation.  To prevent the wood piles from rotting 
and weakening, they must be sufficiently saturated with water. 
¶8 
However, in order for BCI/TCI to properly lay the 
sewer pipe and pour concrete, the trench had to be dry.  
Accordingly, BCI/TCI pumped groundwater from the trench for 17 
days.  When the sewer was completed in 1988, groundwater 
measurements 
showed 
that 
the 
level 
of 
groundwater 
near  
E-L's building had been significantly reduced.  It took two 
years for the groundwater level to recover. 
¶9 
In 1998, about ten years after the sewer project was 
completed, E-L's owner, Joseph Loftus, noticed that cracks in 
the foundation of his building appeared to be worsening, so he 
started to monitor the building's settlement rate.  In 2001, an 
engineer examined the building's wood piles and determined that 
the caps of 14 wood piles had rotted and were no longer able to 
support the building.  Those particular wood piles were under 
the south wall of E-L's building, nearest to the 1987-88 sewer 
construction site.  In September 2003, E-L notified the Sewerage 
District of the building damage, and in October, E-L repaired 
                                                 
8 It is undisputed that neither BCI/TCI, the construction 
trench, nor the Sewerage District ever entered E-L's property. 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
7 
 
the building.  To repair the building, the damaged portions of 
the wood piles were sawed off and replaced with concrete.  The 
repairs cost a total of $309,388, which includes E-L's attorney 
fees incurred in litigation with a neighbor who owned the 
adjacent alley and refused E-L access to make the building 
repairs.  It is undisputed that E-L continued to lease the 
building throughout this entire period. 
¶10 On June 23, 2004, E-L filed suit against the Sewerage 
District and CNA Insurance Companies (CNA), the insurer for the 
now defunct BCI/TCI.  E-L alleged causes of action against the 
Sewerage District for negligence, continuing nuisance, and 
inverse condemnation and alleged causes of action against CNA 
for negligence and continuing nuisance.9  The circuit court 
dismissed E-L's negligence and nuisance claims against the 
Sewerage District on the basis of governmental immunity under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).10  Accordingly, only E-L's inverse 
condemnation claim remained.11 
                                                 
9 Before trial, CNA settled E-L's negligence and nuisance 
claims in a confidential agreement. 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(4) provides:  
No suit may be brought against any volunteer fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employees nor may any suit be 
brought 
against 
such 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
agency or volunteer fire company or against its 
officers, officials, agents or employees for acts done 
in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
8 
 
¶11 As to the inverse condemnation claim, E-L's complaint 
alleged that the Sewerage District's operation and maintenance 
of the Deep Tunnel System and the pipes constructed as a part of 
the sewer "physically took portions of the wood piles which 
rendered 
them 
unusable 
and 
damaged 
the 
E-L 
Building."   
E-L alleged that the Sewerage District's acts constituted a 
taking: 
[The Sewerage District's] conduct constitutes a 
taking of E-L Enterprises' property for public use.  
Specifically, 
[the 
Sewerage 
District's] 
conduct 
constitutes a physical invasion that deprived and 
continues to deprive E-L Enterprises of all beneficial 
use of the wood piles in violation [of] the Fifth 
Amendment 
of 
the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
. . . . 
[The Sewerage District] took E-L Enterprises' 
property without paying E-L Enterprises its just 
compensation. 
                                                                                                                                                             
E-L did not appeal the circuit court's dismissal of its 
negligence and nuisance claims against the Sewerage District; 
accordingly, that issue is not before this court. 
11 Within its cause of action for "inverse condemnation,"  
E-L alleged both a constitutional takings claim and an inverse 
condemnation claim under Wis. Stat. § 32.10, although § 32.10 
was not expressly referenced. 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
9 
 
In addition to damages, E-L's complaint demanded attorney fees 
and costs relating to E-L's claim for inverse condemnation.12 
¶12 E-L's takings claim under Article I, Section 13 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution proceeded to a jury trial.  The special 
verdict form asked the jury whether the Sewerage District's 
removal of groundwater from E-L's property was a taking.  To 
assist the jury in answering that question, the circuit court 
instructed the jury that the law bars the government from taking 
property for public use without compensating the owner and that 
"[g]roundwater is considered property of the person who owns the 
land under which it flows."13  If the jury found that the 
                                                 
12 In its order on July 19, 2007, before trial, the circuit 
court denied E-L's request for attorney fees and costs on the 
grounds that E-L did not have a claim for inverse condemnation 
under Wis. Stat. § 32.10.  After the trial, the circuit court 
reconsidered its earlier order and decided that E-L was entitled 
to attorney fees and costs under ch. 32.  Accordingly, E-L's 
entitlement to attorney fees and costs is an issue before this 
court on appeal. 
13 The Sewerage District objected to the circuit court's 
instruction that "[g]roundwater is considered property of the 
person who owns the land under which it flows": 
[The Court]: . . . [The Sewerage District] deleted the 
sentence 
or 
propose 
to 
delete 
the 
sentence, 
"Groundwater is considered property of the person who 
owns the land under which it flows."   
That statement is true.  It's not their exclusive 
property.  They don't have the right to exclude others 
from using it, but they do have the right to use it, 
and Michels [State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 
63 Wis. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339 (1974)] recognizes that 
they have a property interest in it. 
So as a matter of fact, it is E-L's property, not 
its 
property 
alone, 
but 
it 
is 
E-L's 
property.  
No. 
2008AP921   
 
10 
 
Sewerage District's removal of groundwater from E-L's property 
was a taking, the jury was required to answer whether the 
removal of groundwater from E-L's property caused E-L's building 
to settle.  If the jury answered that question in the 
affirmative, the jury had to determine the sum of money that 
would "justly compensate E-L for the taking of the groundwater 
beneath the south end of [E-L's] building." 
                                                                                                                                                             
Otherwise if E-L doesn't have any property interest in 
here, game over.  This case ends.  If it has no 
property interest in it, they cannot make a claim for 
just compensation. 
[Attorney James H. Petersen, counsel for the Sewerage 
District]: Your Honor, I guess that's precisely the 
point the District is getting at.  Groundwater is a 
common good.  If you have property, you have a right 
to use the groundwater that passes underneath your 
land, and even some of the groundwater that's under 
your neighbor's land, by virtue of your property 
ownership.   
But it doesn't mean that that groundwater is 
yours to the exclusion of others. 
[The Court]: I'm not saying that either, and my 
instructions don't say that either. 
[Atty. Petersen]: These instructions allow that.  They 
allow that to be argued. 
[The Court]: First of all, it doesn't matter whether 
they allow that or not.  The jury is not being asked 
to find that this was E-L's property exclusively. 
In fact, the jury is being instructed to the 
opposite, that both the District and E-L and anybody 
else in that neighborhood had the right to use that 
property as long as they used it reasonably. 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
11 
 
¶13 The jury found that the Sewerage District's removal of 
groundwater from E-L's property was unreasonable, constituted a 
taking, and caused E-L's building to settle.  The jury awarded 
E-L $309,388 "for the taking of groundwater" beneath its 
building——an amount equal to the cost to repair E-L's building 
and the attorney fees E-L incurred litigating with the neighbor 
who owned the adjacent alley and refused E-L access to make the 
repairs. 
¶14 In its November 7, 2007 order, the circuit court 
denied 
the 
Sewerage 
District's 
motion 
for 
judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial 
and granted E-L's request for attorney fees and costs under Wis. 
Stat. ch. 32.14   
¶15 The Sewerage District appealed, and the court of 
appeals affirmed, concluding that the jury verdict supported  
E-L's inverse condemnation claim under Article I, Section 13 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution and Wis. Stat. ch. 32.  E-L Enters., 
Inc. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 2009 WI App 15, ¶11, 
316 Wis. 2d 280, 763 N.W.2d 231.  The court of appeals applied 
Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Columbia Cnty., 3 Wis. 2d 1, 87 
N.W.2d 279 (1958), and reasoned that although mere consequential 
damage to property resulting from government action is not a 
taking, E-L Enters., 316 Wis. 2d 280, ¶9, "the Sewerage District 
had 'reason to anticipate that damage would result from its 
acts,'" id., ¶10 (quoting Wis. Power & Light, 3 Wis. 2d at 7).  
                                                 
14 See supra note 12. 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
12 
 
Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that "this case is 
on the 'taking' side of the line recognized by Wisconsin Power & 
Light."  E-L Enters., 316 Wis. 2d 280, ¶10.   
¶16 According to the court of appeals, this case is "most 
analogous" to this court's decision in Damkoehler v. City of 
Milwaukee, 124 Wis. 144, 101 N.W. 706 (1904), later clarified in 
Dahlman v. City of Milwaukee, 131 Wis. 427, 439-40, 111 N.W. 675 
(1907), in which we held that the removal of a building's 
lateral support by street grading constituted a compensable 
taking as opposed to consequential damages for which there was 
no remedy.  E-L Enters., 316 Wis. 2d 280, ¶9.  The court of 
appeals "[saw] no logical basis to distinguish between the 
removal of soil providing lateral support and the diversion of 
groundwater performing essentially the same function."  Id., 
¶11.  Because "Wisconsin law already recognizes that a property 
owner's interest in the integrity of water may give rise to a 
protectable right," id. (citing State v. Michels Pipeline 
Constr., Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339 (1974); Price v. 
Marinette & Menominee Paper Co., 197 Wis. 25, 221 N.W. 381 
(1928)), the court of appeals concluded that the Sewerage 
District's 
diversion 
of 
groundwater 
from 
E-L's 
property 
constituted a taking.  E-L Enters., 316 Wis. 2d 280, ¶11. 
¶17 In concluding that the Sewerage District's conduct 
constituted an "occupation" under Wis. Stat. § 32.10, id., ¶7, 
the court of appeals explained that "[t]he law in Wisconsin is 
settled that an entity with the power of condemnation may 
'occupy' land without physical entrance onto that land," id., 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
13 
 
¶8.  In particular, the court of appeals cited Wikel v. 
Department of Transportation, 2001 WI App 214, 247 Wis. 2d 626, 
635 N.W.2d 213, for the proposition that "there may be a taking 
when the entity with the power of condemnation does something 
outside of the affected property that adversely impacts the 
owner's use of that property."  E-L Enters., 316 Wis. 2d 280, 
¶8. 
¶18 Finally, the court of appeals concluded that the 
circuit court did not err in awarding attorney fees and costs to 
E-L because E-L prevailed on its inverse condemnation claim 
under Wis. Stat. § 32.10.  Id., ¶21. 
¶19 We now reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶20 Whether government conduct constitutes a taking of 
private property without just compensation is a question of law 
that this court reviews de novo.  R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 
2001 WI 73, ¶13, 244 Wis. 2d 497, 628 N.W.2d 781; Howell Plaza, 
Inc. v. State Highway Comm'n, 92 Wis. 2d 74, 80, 284 N.W.2d 887 
(1979) (hereinafter Howell Plaza II).  In addition, whether an 
inverse condemnation claim has been established under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.10 involves the interpretation and application of a 
statute, which presents a question of law that we review de novo 
while 
benefiting 
from 
the 
lower 
courts' 
analyses.   
C. Coakley Relocation Sys. v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI 68, 
¶14, 310 Wis. 2d 456, 750 N.W.2d 900; see also Koskey v. Town of 
Bergen, 2000 WI App 140, ¶4, 237 Wis. 2d 284, 614 N.W.2d 845. 
III. ANALYSIS 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
14 
 
A. Takings Claim 
¶21 Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides: "The property of no person shall be taken for public 
use without just compensation therefor."  Likewise, the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, made 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
provides that private property shall not "be taken for public 
use, without just compensation."  Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 
544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005) (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. 
Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)).  In order to 
trigger 
the 
"just 
compensation" 
clause 
under 
either 
the 
Wisconsin Constitution or the U.S. Constitution, there must be a 
"taking" of private property for public use.  Zinn v. State, 112 
Wis. 2d 417, 424, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983); Howell Plaza II, 92 
Wis. 2d at 80. 
¶22 Under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
two 
types 
of 
governmental conduct can constitute a taking: (1) "an actual 
physical occupation" of private property or (2) a restriction 
that deprives an owner "of all, or substantially all, of the 
beneficial use of his property."  Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State 
Highway Comm'n, 66 Wis. 2d 720, 726, 226 N.W.2d 185 (1975) 
(hereinafter Howell Plaza I).  Similarly, under the U.S. 
Constitution, governmental conduct gives rise to a takings claim 
when there is either (1) "direct government appropriation or 
physical invasion of private property" or (2) government 
regulation of private property that is "so onerous that its 
effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation."  Lingle, 544 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
15 
 
U.S. at 537.  The latter category, deemed a "regulatory taking," 
is per se compensable under the Fifth Amendment if the 
regulation "requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical 
invasion of her property" or "completely deprives an owner of 
'all economically beneficial us[e]' of her property."  Id. at 
538 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 
(1992)).  
¶23 In this case, E-L does not claim that the Sewerage 
District's conduct constituted a regulatory taking.  Rather, E-L 
claims that the Sewerage District "physically took" E-L's 
property.15  E-L's brief asserts that the Sewerage District 
                                                 
15 In its brief, E-L "asserts that the [Sewerage] District's 
taking was a physical, not regulatory, taking."  Although E-L 
asserts that it is not claiming a regulatory taking, E-L's brief 
contradicts that by likening the Sewerage District's conduct to 
government regulatory action analyzed in Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).   
No. 
2008AP921   
 
16 
 
"physically took E-L's groundwater and deprived E-L of the use 
of that groundwater, resulting in the diminished value of E-L's 
property."  E-L argues that by pumping groundwater from the 
trench, thereby extracting the groundwater from beneath E-L's 
adjacent building, the Sewerage District physically occupied or 
directly appropriated E-L's groundwater for the construction of 
the sewer.  The removal of the groundwater damaged the 
building's wood piles, causing the building to settle and 
reducing the value of E-L's property.  Because the groundwater 
was appropriated in connection with the installation of the 
sewer, which was created for the public's use and benefit, E-L 
                                                                                                                                                             
Loretto is an example of one of two categories of 
regulatory action that is deemed a per se taking under the Fifth 
Amendment.  See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 
(2005) (citing Loretto as an example of a regulatory taking); 
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) 
(same).  In Loretto, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
New York law requiring landlords to permit cable companies to 
install cable facilities in apartment buildings amounted to a 
permanent physical invasion of private property and thus 
required compensation as a matter of law.  458 U.S. 419.  A 
permanent physical invasion of private property, like the 
installation of cable facilities occupying portions of a 
property owner's roof, is different than the "classic taking in 
which government directly appropriates private property or ousts 
the owner from his domain."  Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.  The 
former is a per se taking that requires just compensation, id. 
at 538, "without regard to the public interests that it may 
serve," Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 
1015 
(stating 
that 
permanent 
physical 
invasions 
require 
compensation "no matter how weighty the public purpose behind 
it").  
At oral argument, E-L reiterated that its claim is based on 
the classic, not regulatory, category of taking: the Sewerage 
District's actual occupation or direct appropriation of E-L's 
property. 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
17 
 
claims that it is entitled to just compensation under both the 
Wisconsin Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. 
¶24 E-L's takings claim must fail.  E-L's claim morphed 
from a complaint that the Sewerage District "physically took 
portions of the wood piles which rendered them unusable and 
damaged the E-L Building" into a special verdict form that asked 
the jury to determine the sum of money that would "justly 
compensate E-L for the taking of [the] groundwater."  The 
groundwater was indeed that which was extracted by the Sewerage 
District, but E-L introduced no proof as to the value of the 
extracted 
groundwater. 
 
Therefore, 
whether 
E-L 
owns 
the 
extracted groundwater is inapposite in this case.16  E-L instead 
seeks damages for the cost to repair its building and for the 
loss of use of its wood piles.  However, the Sewerage District 
did not physically occupy the property for which E-L seeks 
compensation, and no government-imposed restriction deprived E-L 
of all, or substantially all, of the beneficial use of its 
property.  What remains are mere consequential damages to 
property resulting from governmental action, which are not 
compensable under Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
                                                 
16 While we recognize the significance of this issue, it is 
our position that its resolution is better reserved for a future 
case. 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
18 
 
1. Whether E-L owns the extracted groundwater  
is inapposite in this case. 
¶25 To determine whether a taking occurred, E-L argues 
that "the first question that must be addressed is whether 
property owners have a property right in groundwater."  As E-L 
correctly points out, there can be no takings claim if that 
which the Sewerage District allegedly took is not E-L's 
property.  However, E-L introduced no proof as to the value of 
the extracted groundwater.  Instead, E-L seeks damages that flow 
from the allegation that when the Sewerage District pumped 
groundwater from the trench, the groundwater level beneath E-L's 
building was lowered, causing the wood piles to dry out and the 
building to settle.  E-L's opening and closing arguments at 
trial make clear that instead of seeking damages for the value 
of the extracted groundwater, E-L seeks damages for the cost to 
repair the wood piles and E-L's building. 
¶26 In its opening argument, E-L claimed that the Sewerage 
District took E-L's groundwater but consistently spoke of damage 
to E-L's wood piles and building: 
[The Sewerage District] knew that its partial 
taking of the property, taking of groundwater would 
result in a lower value of E-L's building.  You take 
the groundwater, the piles rot, your building sinks, 
your building is not worth what it was.  
. . . . 
As a result of [the Sewerage District] taking 
groundwater, E-L's property lost value, the entire 
property.  We believe the value of the building lost 
the value equal to the amount of the repairs that had 
to be done. 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
19 
 
If I'm going to sell a house and you think it's 
worth $400,000, and I know the roof needs to be 
repaired for $30,000, somebody buying that is going to 
say, no, it's not $400,000, it's worth 370. 
They're going to take out the value.  And that's 
what E-L contends is the amount taken.  The loss in 
the value of their property.  And the amount that 
we're seeking on that is just the amount E-L paid out 
of pocket.  
. . . . 
Everything we show you at trial is for you to see 
why E-L should be compensated for the taking of the 
groundwater by [the Sewerage District].  And how much 
money will equal the value of the groundwater taken by 
[the Sewerage District] and the harm caused to E-L 
from the damage to its piles. 
¶27 Similarly, in its closing argument, E-L reiterated to 
the jury that E-L was seeking damages for the cost to repair its 
building: 
The next question [on the special verdict form] 
asks what amount should E-L be paid for its just 
compensation.  And here's where we're going on this.  
. . . . 
. . . The reduction in the fair market value was what 
were the repairs that had to be done on this place. 
And 
the 
repairs 
that 
had 
to 
be 
done 
are 
summarized in Exhibit 5117 for you.  There's multiple 
                                                 
17 E-L's repeated reference to Exhibit 51 as a summary of 
its damages makes it readily apparent that E-L seeks damages for 
the cost to repair its building, as opposed to the value of the 
extracted groundwater.  Exhibit 51, a five-page document titled 
"Costs 
to 
Repair 
the 
Valley 
Business 
Center 
[or 
E-L's 
building]," is a comprehensive list of the repairs made to E-L's 
building and the costs thereof.  The document has a "Detail" 
list of the repairs made, which includes "Window work," 
"Foundation, 
Interior . . . ," 
"Installed 
baseboard, 
etc.," 
"Electrical work for wall," "Wall repairs," "Demo piping, etc.," 
and like repairs. 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
20 
 
exhibits that have all the invoices, but if you look 
at Exhibit 51, you're going to find a summary.  
. . . . 
. . . The number we're asking for when you add up all 
the number [sic] for the 2003 work, the 2004 work, and 
the attorney fees, we had to fight, you know, we had 
an easement that was a very standard easement.18 
We 
had 
an 
[sic] 
to 
get 
permission 
to 
go 
underneath and dig under that building. . . .  
. . . . 
So, ladies and gentlemen, when you add to the 
2,300 from Dahlman, the 2003 expenses, the 2004, and 
legal fees, the number I come to is 309,388, and 
that's what I'm going to ask that you find as 
compensation for the amount of the taking. 
¶28 It is clear from E-L's opening and closing arguments 
that instead of seeking damages for the value of the extracted 
groundwater, E-L seeks damages for the cost to repair the wood 
piles and E-L's building.   
¶29 Because E-L introduced no proof as to the value of the 
extracted groundwater, the court of appeals' reliance on Dahlman 
                                                 
18 The circuit court instructed the jury that it was 
permitted to award E-L, as part of its just compensation, the 
attorney fees that E-L incurred in litigation with the neighbor 
who owned the adjacent alley and refused E-L access to make the 
building repairs.  We conclude that the circuit court's 
instruction was improper.  As the circuit court and the court of 
appeals 
correctly 
noted, 
under 
negligence 
law, 
when 
the 
defendant's wrongful acts caused the plaintiff to expend legal 
fees with another party, the expenditure is recoverable against 
the defendant.  See Weinhagen v. Hayes, 179 Wis. 62, 65, 190 
N.W. 1002 (1922).  However, in this case, the Sewerage District 
is not liable in negligence. 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
21 
 
is misplaced.19  It is true, as noted by the court of appeals,  
E-L Enters., 316 Wis. 2d 280, ¶9, that in Dahlman, this court 
held that the removal of a building's lateral support by street 
grading constituted a compensable taking.  131 Wis. at 436-40.  
There is a significant distinction, however, between Dahlman and 
this case.  In Dahlman, we concluded that even though the 
                                                 
19 E-L also relies on Dahlman v. City of Milwaukee, 131 
Wis. 427, 111 N.W. 675 (1907), but not for the same proposition 
as the court of appeals did.  E-L relies on Dahlman as Wisconsin 
Supreme Court precedent that "allows the recovery of property 
losses accompanying a taking of private property where there are 
foreseeable but unintended consequences."  To that end, E-L also 
relies on Price v. Marinette & Menominee Paper Co., 197 Wis. 25, 
221 N.W. 381 (1928).  Similarly, in its order denying the 
Sewerage District's motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, the circuit court cited Dahlman and Price, stating that 
"at least twice the supreme court has found a taking in 
circumstances in which the plaintiff's property losses although 
foreseeable were nonetheless unintended." 
We reject E-L's and the circuit court's characterization of 
Dahlman and Price.  In Dahlman, this court concluded that 
because a property owner, as against the city, is entitled to 
the lateral support of the soil underlying the owner's property, 
there was a taking of the soil when the city removed the lateral 
support in the course of street grading.  131 Wis. at 439-40.  
Our conclusion that the city's actions constituted a taking 
hinged on the property owner's right to the lateral support of 
the soil, id., not on the foreseeability of the property loss.  
Likewise, 
in 
Price, 
this 
court 
held 
that 
the 
plaintiff 
established a claim under the then-existing inverse condemnation 
statute when the construction and maintenance of dams across the 
Menominee 
River 
caused 
the 
river 
to 
overflow 
onto 
the 
plaintiff's land, moistening the soil to the point of destroying 
the land's agricultural value.  197 Wis. at 26, 28.  In that 
case, our conclusion that the plaintiff stated a takings claim 
centered on the plaintiff's allegation that the flood waters 
physically 
invaded 
the 
plaintiff's 
property 
and 
entirely 
destroyed its value, id.; again, the foreseeability of the 
property loss played no part in the analysis. 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
22 
 
subsidence of the soil caused no depreciation in the value of 
the property owners' premises, the property owners were still 
entitled to recover nominal damages for the value of the 
property taken for public use, which in that case, was soil.  
Id.  In this case, E-L introduced no proof as to the value of 
the extracted groundwater.  Instead, E-L seeks damages for the 
cost to repair its building and for the loss of use of the wood 
piles.  Because E-L introduced no proof as to the value of the 
extracted groundwater, we need not decide today whether E-L owns 
the groundwater.  Accordingly, the issue of whether a landowner 
owns the groundwater beneath his property is not before us 
today.20 
                                                 
20 While we take no position on the issue of whether a 
landowner 
owns 
the 
groundwater 
beneath 
his 
property, 
we 
nevertheless 
determine 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
by 
instructing the jury that "[g]roundwater is considered property 
of the person who owns the land under which it flows."  Contrary 
to the circuit court's contention, the jury instruction is not 
consistent with Michels Pipeline, 63 Wis. 2d 278.  In that case, 
the State claimed that the defendants (the Sewerage District, 
Michels Pipeline Construction, and Milwaukee County) created a 
public nuisance by pumping water from wells in order to 
sufficiently 
dewater 
the 
soil 
to 
permit 
tunneling 
for 
construction of a sewer.  Id. at 281-82.  According to the 
complaint, citizens "were caused great hardship by the drying up 
of wells, decreasing capacity and water quality in others, and 
by the cracking of foundations, basement walls and driveways, 
due to subsidence of the soil."  Id. at 282.  Concluding that 
the complaint stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of 
action in tort, this court adopted section 858A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, providing that a landowner may 
not withdraw groundwater in a manner that causes unreasonable 
harm to another's property.  Id. at 302-03.   
No. 
2008AP921   
 
23 
 
2. Mere consequential damage to property resulting from 
governmental action is not a taking thereof. 
¶30 Both the United States Supreme Court and this court 
have consistently recognized that "government action outside the 
owner's property that causes consequential damages within" does 
not constitute a taking.  Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
                                                                                                                                                             
Our holding in Michels Pipeline recognized that while a 
landowner is permitted to withdraw groundwater for a beneficial 
purpose, he or she may be liable in tort for excessively 
withdrawing groundwater to the detriment of another's property.  
The circuit court dismissed E-L's negligence and nuisance claims 
against the Sewerage District on the basis of governmental 
immunity.  As we previously noted, supra note 10, E-L did not 
appeal the dismissal of those tort claims. 
Despite the dismissal of E-L's negligence and nuisance 
claims against the Sewerage District, the jury was nevertheless 
asked to determine if the Sewerage District's removal of 
groundwater from E-L's property was "unreasonable."  As we have 
just explained, the withdrawal of groundwater in a manner that 
causes unreasonable harm to another's property may give rise to 
a tort claim.  Because the circuit court dismissed the tort 
claims against the Sewerage District, the jury should not have 
been asked to evaluate the reasonableness of the groundwater 
removal. 
Likewise, the jury was erroneously asked to determine 
whether the Sewerage District's removal of groundwater from E-
L's 
property 
was 
a 
taking. 
 
Whether 
government 
conduct 
constitutes 
a 
taking 
of 
private 
property 
without 
just 
compensation is a question of law.  R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 
2001 WI 73, ¶13, 244 Wis. 2d 497, 628 N.W.2d 781.  While a jury 
may properly be asked to determine questions of fact pertinent 
to a takings claim, e.g., the amount of damages that will justly 
compensate a property owner for a taking, see Stelpflug v. Town 
Bd., Town of Waukesha, Cnty. of Waukesha, 2000 WI 81, ¶26, 236 
Wis. 2d 275, 612 N.W.2d 700, the ultimate determination of 
whether government conduct constitutes a taking is a question of 
law that is not properly placed before a jury. 
In this case, the special verdict form, which questioned 
the jury as to reasonableness and causation, was framed in terms 
of a negligence claim rather than a takings claim. 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
24 
 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982); see also Howell Plaza II, 92 
Wis. 2d at 80; Howell Plaza I, 66 Wis. 2d at 725; Wis. Power & 
Light, 3 Wis. 2d at 6.  "Sec. 13, art. I, like its equivalent in 
the 
federal 
constitution, 
'does 
not 
undertake, 
. . . 
to 
socialize all losses, but only those which result from a taking 
of property.'"  Id. (quoting United States v. Willow River Power 
Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945)).  As we pointed out previously, 
the U.S. Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution, unlike the 
constitutions of other states,21 provide only that the property 
of no person shall be "taken" for public use without just 
compensation; there is no mention of just compensation for 
property that is merely "damaged" for public use.  Howell Plaza 
II, 92 Wis. 2d at 81; Howell Plaza I, 66 Wis. 2d at 726; Wis. 
Power & Light, 3 Wis. 2d at 6.  Therefore, "in the absence of a 
physical invasion which ousts the owner from full or partial 
possession or a total deprivation of beneficial use, mere damage 
to property (or property value) does not constitute a taking."  
2A Julius L. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 6.01[11], at 
6-19 (3d ed. 2009). 
¶31 In Wisconsin Power & Light, this court recognized that 
under the Wisconsin Constitution and the U.S. Constitution, 
"mere consequential damage to property resulting from government 
                                                 
21 For example, Article I, Section 15 of the Illinois 
Constitution provides: "Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation as provided by 
law." (Emphasis added.)  For a list of other states with similar 
constitutional provisions, see 2A Julius L. Sackman, Nichols on 
Eminent Domain § 6.01[11], at 6-22 n.52 (3d ed. 2009). 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
25 
 
action is not a taking thereof."  3 Wis. 2d at 6.  In that case, 
a utility company alleged a takings claim against Columbia 
County.  Id. at 4.  In the process of building a road, the 
county deposited sand and gravel in a swamp adjacent to the 
utility company's electrical power line and close to one of its 
towers.  Id. at 3.  The sand and gravel extended under the 
surface of the swamp, "displacing the muck and peat so as to 
create mounds of earth eight to 10 feet high above the surface 
of the swamp under the power line and to move [the utility 
company's] tower horizontally and tilt it."  Id.  As a result, 
the tower was twisted and bent and had to be replaced.  Id. 
¶32 Like E-L's damaged building and wood piles in this 
case, the damaged tower "was not taken for public use in the 
usual sense of those words."  Id. at 4.  Just as E-L's building 
and wood piles were not used in connection with the sewer 
installation, the tower in Wisconsin Power & Light was not used 
in connection with the county's highway project.  Id.  Rather, 
the tower "was merely damaged by accident" as a result of the 
highway project.  Id.  Because the issue was one of "only 
damage, without appropriation to the public purpose," id. at 6, 
this court concluded that the utility company was unable to 
recover its damages on the theory of a constitutional taking for 
public use, id. at 7.22  
                                                 
22 To reach its conclusion that the county's conduct did not 
constitute a taking, this court gave weight to the following 
facts:  
[T]he tower had no utility, direct or indirect, to the 
highway project, that the county did not need or 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
26 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
desire the tower or the land on which it rested and 
did not intend to acquire or affect either the tower 
or the land, that the public obtained no benefit from 
injuring it, that the county had no reason to 
anticipate that damage would result from its acts, and 
that the injury to the tower was purely accidental. 
Wis. Power & Light, 3 Wis. 2d at 7.   
Here, the court of appeals erroneously distinguished those 
facts from the facts in this case to conclude that the Sewerage 
District's conduct "is on the 'taking' side of the line 
recognized by Wisconsin Power & Light."  E-L Enters., 316 
Wis. 2d 280, ¶10.  The court of appeals first reasoned that 
"unlike the situation in Wisconsin Power & Light, the Sewerage 
District had 'reason to anticipate that damage would result from 
its acts.'"  Id.  Specifically, evidence "indicated that the 
Sewerage District was aware of a potential groundwater problem 
in connection with buildings near the project and, indeed, had 
directed its contractor to be careful to avoid damage to those 
buildings 
as 
the 
result 
of 
'removal 
or 
disturbance 
of 
groundwater . . . .'"  Id.  The court of appeals further 
reasoned that "unlike the situation in Wisconsin Power & Light, 
where 'the public obtained no benefit from injuring' the tower, 
. . . 
draining 
the 
groundwater 
facilitated 
the 
Sewerage 
District's construction" and therefore had utility to the sewer 
project.  Id. 
The court of appeals' reasoning is flawed in two respects.  
First, the fact that this court recognized in Wisconsin Power & 
Light that "the county had no reason to anticipate that damage 
would result from its acts," 3 Wis. 2d at 7, does not establish 
that foreseeability of damages supports a takings claim.  To the 
contrary, we expressly declined to place significance on any of 
the Wisconsin Power & Light facts standing alone.  Id.  Rather, 
we concluded that the facts "collectively" negated a taking in 
the constitutional sense.  Id.  Second, the court of appeals' 
distinction between this case and Wisconsin Power & Light 
presupposes that E-L is seeking damages for the extracted 
groundwater.  As we pointed out previously, E-L is seeking 
damages for the cost to repair its building and the loss of use 
of its wood piles.  Accordingly, the issue here is not whether 
the public obtained a benefit from the draining of the 
groundwater but instead whether the public obtained a benefit 
from the damaged wood piles.  The public did not. 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
27 
 
¶33 Similarly, in this case, we conclude that the damages 
E-L 
suffered 
are 
mere 
consequential 
damages 
to 
property 
resulting from governmental action, which are not compensable 
under Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution or the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  E-L seeks damages for 
the cost to repair its building and the loss of use of the wood 
piles.  However, the Sewerage District did not physically occupy 
E-L's building or wood piles.  The Sewerage District did not use 
the building or wood piles in connection with the sewer 
installation, and the public obtained no benefit from the 
damaged building or wood piles.  Rather, the wood piles were 
damaged as a result of the Sewerage District's alleged negligent 
construction of the sewer.  Accordingly, we have in this case 
"only damage, without appropriation to the public purpose."  Id. 
at 6.  Such damage is not recoverable in a takings claim but 
instead sounds in tort.  The circuit court already dismissed  
E-L's tort claims against the Sewerage District on the grounds 
of governmental immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).23 
¶34 The court of appeals relied upon our decision in 
Damkoehler for authority that the Sewerage District's diversion 
of groundwater that supported the structural integrity of E-L's 
building constituted a compensable taking, as opposed to mere 
consequential damage to property for which there is no remedy.  
                                                 
23 Still, E-L is not without a remedy for the damage to its 
building caused by the alleged negligent construction of the 
sewer.  Subject to the parties' confidential agreement, E-L has 
already been compensated an undisclosed amount by CNA, the 
insurer for the now defunct contractor. 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
28 
 
See E-L Enters., 316 Wis. 2d 280, ¶¶9, 11.  In Damkoehler, this 
court recognized that a landowner has the right to have her 
property protected against an excavation that causes her 
property to subside.  124 Wis. at 151.  In that case, for 
purposes of improving the highway, the city of Milwaukee 
excavated a street adjacent to the plaintiff's property and 
caused "a considerable part of her land to subside and fall into 
the street."  Id. at 150.  We held that the city's actions, in 
removing the lateral support of the soil of the plaintiff's 
property, amounted to a compensable taking.  Id. at 150-51.  In 
so holding, we distinguished the underlying case from our 
holding in Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 247 (1862), 
in which we concluded that the damages to the plaintiff's 
property 
caused 
by 
the 
city's 
harbor 
improvements 
were 
consequential to the public improvement and were not recoverable 
from the city.  Damkoehler, 124 Wis. at 150.  We concluded that 
the Damkoehler facts fell within an exception to the general 
rule that consequential damage to property resulting from 
governmental action is not a taking thereof:  
[T]he court [in Alexander] expressly declare[d] that 
it [did] not wish 'to be understood as asserting the 
doctrine that there must be an actual taking or 
appropriation of the property itself in order to 
entitle the owner to compensation for damages done 
him.  The city might so build a bridge, or open a 
street, or excavate a canal along or upon a lot, only 
appropriating a small amount of it, or perhaps none of 
the land itself, and yet entirely destroy the value of 
the property for all purposes.'  The instant case, in 
its facts, comes within the exception so distinguished 
by the court, and cannot be held to be ruled by the 
decision of that case.   
No. 
2008AP921   
 
29 
 
Id. (quoting Alexander, 16 Wis. at 253) (emphasis added).  
Accordingly, in Damkoehler, the city's actions amounted to a 
compensable taking because the city, by removing the lateral 
support of the soil of the plaintiff's property, caused a 
substantial part of the plaintiff's land to subside and fall and 
"'entirely destroy[ed] the value of the property for all 
purposes.'"  Id. at 150 (quoting Alexander, 16 Wis. at 253). 
¶35 The distinction between Damkoehler and this case is 
significant.  In this case, E-L does not claim that by diverting 
the groundwater beneath E-L's building and thereby reducing the 
building's structural integrity, the Sewerage District deprived 
E-L of all, or substantially all, of the beneficial use of its 
building.  Nor can E-L so claim.  The fact that E-L continued to 
lease the building throughout this entire period is alone 
sufficient to show that the value of E-L's building was not 
destroyed for all purposes.  Therefore, this case does not fall 
under the Damkoehler exception to the well-recognized rule that 
mere 
consequential 
damage 
to 
property 
resulting 
from 
governmental action is not a taking thereof. 
B. Inverse Condemnation Claim 
¶36 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.10 is based on Article I, Section 
13 of the Wisconsin Constitution and "is the legislative 
direction as to how the mandate of the just compensation clause 
is to be fulfilled."  Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 433.  "[A] landowner, 
who believes that his or her property has been taken by the 
government without instituting formal condemnation proceedings," 
may bring an inverse condemnation claim under § 32.10 to recover 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
30 
 
just compensation for the taking.  Id. at 432-33 (recognizing 
that Wis. Stat. ch. 32 sets out the procedure the government 
must follow in acquiring private property for public use, and 
§ 32.10 provides a remedy for when the government takes property 
without first condemning it and paying just compensation under 
ch. 32).  Wisconsin Stat. § 32.10 provides in relevant part:  
 
If any property has been occupied by a person 
possessing the power of condemnation and if the person 
has not exercised the power, the owner, to institute 
condemnation proceedings, shall present a verified 
petition to the circuit judge of the county wherein 
the land is situated asking that such proceedings be 
commenced. . . . The court shall make a finding of 
whether the defendant is occupying property of the 
plaintiff without having the right to do so.  If the 
court determines that the defendant is occupying such 
property of the plaintiff without having the right to 
do so, it shall treat the matter in accordance with 
the provisions of this subchapter . . . assuming the 
plaintiff 
is 
not 
questioning 
the 
right 
of 
the 
defendant to condemn the property so occupied. 
(Emphasis added.)  By its terms, § 32.10 "is designed solely to 
deal with the traditional exercise of eminent domain by the 
government: the government has occupied private property, plans 
to continue such occupation and the landowner is merely 
requesting just payment for this land."  Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 
433. 
¶37 To state a cause of action under Wis. Stat. § 32.10 in 
the absence of actual possession or occupation, this court 
concluded in Howell Plaza I that the facts alleged must "show 
that the property owner has been deprived of all, or practically 
all, of the beneficial use of his property or of any part 
thereof."  66 Wis. 2d at 730.  We later clarified that holding 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
31 
 
in Howell Plaza II, concluding that short of actual occupation, 
there must be a legal restraint by the condemning authority that 
deprives the owner of all, or substantially all, of the 
beneficial use of his property.  92 Wis. 2d at 81-82, 87-89 
(affirming circuit court's judgment in favor of the State 
Highway Commission in the property owner's inverse condemnation 
action under Wis. Stat. § 32.10 because if the property owner 
"was in fact unable to develop its property, it was not due to 
any restriction imposed upon it by the commission").  Therefore, 
under this court's jurisprudence, in order to state a claim of 
inverse condemnation under § 32.10, the facts alleged must show 
either that there was an actual physical occupation by the 
condemning authority or that a government-imposed restriction 
deprived the owner of all, or substantially all, of the 
beneficial use of his property. 
¶38 Still, when a property owner alleges a constitutional 
taking, the remedy provided by Wis. Stat. § 32.10 is not 
necessary to enforce the right to just compensation.  Zinn, 112 
Wis. 2d at 438.  The property owner has stated a claim based 
directly on Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Id.  
¶39 In this case, E-L has failed to establish an inverse 
condemnation claim under Wis. Stat. § 32.10.  It is undisputed 
that the Sewerage District did not physically occupy the 
property for which E-L seeks compensation, its building or the 
wood piles, and no government-imposed restriction deprived E-L 
of all, or substantially all, of the beneficial use of its 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
32 
 
property.24  Therefore, the remedy provided in § 32.10 is simply 
inapplicable. 
                                                 
24 In concluding that the Sewerage District's conduct 
constituted an "occupation" under Wis. Stat. § 32.10, the court 
of appeals explained that "[t]he law in Wisconsin is settled 
that an entity with the power of condemnation may 'occupy' land 
without physical entrance onto that land."  E-L Enters., 316 
Wis. 2d 280, ¶8.  In particular, the court of appeals cited 
Wikel v. Department of Transportation, 2001 WI App 214, 247 
Wis. 2d 626, 635 N.W.2d 213, for the proposition that "there may 
be a taking when the entity with the power of condemnation does 
something outside of the affected property that adversely 
impacts the owner's use of that property."  E-L Enters., 316 
Wis. 2d 280, ¶8.   
In Wikel, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
order 
dismissing 
the 
plaintiff's 
petition 
for 
inverse 
condemnation under Wis. Stat. § 32.10.  247 Wis. 2d 626, ¶1.  
The Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT) condemned a 
five-foot 
strip 
of 
plaintiff's 
land 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
constructing a retaining wall to prevent groundwater from 
entering a new highway.  Id., ¶3.  The plaintiff accepted $4,000 
from the DOT as just compensation for the acquisition of that 
strip of her property.  Id.  However, according to the 
plaintiff's petition, in connection with the construction of the 
retaining wall, the DOT caused structural damage to her 
residence, rendering her property valueless.  Id., ¶4.   
As the court of appeals recognized, "'Land may be taken for 
public purposes, within the meaning of the constitutional 
provision, without actual occupancy or seizure by the taker.'"  
Id., ¶12 (citing Wis. Power & Light, 3 Wis. 2d at 4; Eberle v. 
Dane County Bd. of Adjustment, 227 Wis. 2d 609, 621, 595 
N.W.2d 730 (1999)).  The court of appeals rejected the DOT's 
argument that the plaintiff's petition was insufficient because 
it failed to establish either that the government occupied the 
alleged damaged property or that the property was valueless.  
Wikel, 247 Wis. 2d 626, ¶11.  The plaintiff was "entitled to the 
opportunity to prove her allegation that the [DOT's] actions 
rendered 
her 
property 
'uninhabitable 
and 
unsaleable' 
and 
therefore, constituted a 'total, permanent taking.'"  Id., ¶17.   
No. 
2008AP921   
 
33 
 
¶40 Because E-L has failed to establish an inverse 
condemnation claim under Wis. Stat. § 32.10, E-L is not entitled 
to its attorney fees and costs under Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶41 In summary, we need not decide today the panoply of 
issues that relate to an alleged taking of groundwater.  In this 
case, E-L introduced no proof as to the value of the extracted 
groundwater.  Instead, E-L seeks damages for the cost to repair 
its building and for the loss of use of its wood piles.  The 
Sewerage District did not physically occupy the property for 
which 
E-L 
seeks 
compensation, 
and 
no 
government-imposed 
restriction deprived E-L of all, or substantially all, of the 
beneficial use of its property.  Accordingly, what remains are 
mere 
consequential 
damages 
to 
property 
resulting 
from 
governmental 
action, 
which 
are 
not 
compensable 
under 
constitutional takings law.  The damage to E-L's building was 
caused by the alleged negligent construction of the sewer; 
hence, E-L's claim sounds in tort and seeks damages for which 
the Sewerage District is not liable under the doctrine of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wikel is readily distinguishable from this case.  In Wikel, 
the plaintiff claimed that the DOT's construction of the 
retaining 
wall 
rendered 
her 
property 
"uninhabitable 
and 
unsaleable" and therefore constituted a "total, permanent 
taking."  Id., ¶4.  As discussed supra Part III.A.2, in this 
case, E-L does not claim that the Sewerage District's diversion 
of groundwater beneath E-L's building, which reduced the 
building's 
structural 
integrity, 
rendered 
E-L's 
building 
valueless.  E-L cannot so claim because it is undisputed that  
E-L continued to lease the building throughout this entire 
period. 
No. 
2008AP921   
 
34 
 
governmental immunity.  For the same reasons, we further 
conclude 
that 
E-L 
has 
failed 
to 
establish 
an 
inverse 
condemnation claim under Wis. Stat. § 32.10.  E-L is therefore 
not entitled to attorney fees and costs under Wis. Stat. ch. 32.  
Accordingly, this court reverses the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  2008AP921.awb 
 
1 
 
¶42 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the 
majority 
that 
mere 
consequential 
damage 
to 
property 
resulting from government action is not a taking.  Majority op., 
¶24.  I also agree with the majority that the essence of this 
case sounds in tort.  Id., ¶5.  Given the circuit court's 
conclusion that the District is immune from tort liability, I 
conclude that the District is not liable for these damages to E-
L's property. 
¶43 Over three decades ago, this court established that a 
property owner's remedy for unreasonable interference with its 
use of groundwater sounds in tort.  State v. Michels Pipeline 
Constr., Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339 (1974).  The 
Michels Pipeline court adopted the portion of the then-existing 
draft 
of 
the 
Restatement 
(Second) 
Torts 
which 
addressed 
liability for use of groundwater.  In relevant part, that 
section provided: 
A possessor of land or his grantee who withdraws 
ground water from the land and uses it for a 
beneficial purpose is not subject to liability for 
interference with the use of water by another, unless 
(a) The withdrawal of water causes unreasonable harm 
through lowering the water table or reducing artesian 
pressure . . . .  
Restatement (Second) Torts, Tentative Draft No. 17, April 26, 
1971, § 858A.1   
                                                 
1 This section was modified slightly before it was approved 
by the American Law Institute in 1979 as Restatement (Second) 
Torts § 858.  
No.  2008AP921.awb 
 
2 
 
¶44 Under the circumstances presented here, the withdrawal 
of groundwater may have caused unreasonable harm to E-L.  But 
the remedy for this wrong sounds not in takings, but in tort.2  
¶45 Indeed, as this case was presented to the jury, E-L's 
"takings" claim strongly resembled a tort claim.  E-L argued 
that the District should have foreseen the harm and could have 
taken measures to avoid it.  Additionally, E-L sought as damages 
the amount of money that it lost in rent and the amount of money 
that it paid out of pocket to repair the building.3    
¶46 Further, portions of the jury instructions and special 
verdict also resembled a tort inquiry.  For instance, the jury 
was instructed to determine whether the District's use of 
groundwater was unreasonable:  
                                                 
2 In addition to filing tort and takings claims against the 
District, E-L also filed tort claims against the insurance 
company that insured BCI/TCI, the now-defunct subcontractor that 
constructed the tunnel.  E-L and BCI/TCI settled the dispute for 
an undisclosed sum of money.  Based on this record, it is 
unclear whether E-L has already been compensated in whole, or in 
part, for the cost of repairing its building. 
3 At closing arguments, E-L's attorney explained: "And the 
cost to E-L in the District's use of that groundwater . . . it's 
roughly $309,000 is what it's cost E-L, plus loss of rent, what 
it's cost E-L because of the removal of the groundwater outside 
the trench by the District." 
When there has been a partial taking, compensation is 
typically measured as either (1) the fair market value of the 
portion of the property that was taken; or (2) "severance 
damages," measured as the difference between the fair market 
value of the property before the taking and the fair market 
value of the remaining parcel after the taking.  Russell M. 
Ware, The Law of Damages in Wisconsin § 19.12 (5th ed. 2010); 
Arents v. ANR Pipeline Co., 2005 WI App 61, ¶14, 281 
Wis. 2d 173, 696 N.W.2d 194. 
No.  2008AP921.awb 
 
3 
 
The burden is on E-L to satisfy you by the greater 
weight of the credible evidence, to a reasonable 
certainty, 
that 
the 
District's 
use 
of 
E-L's 
groundwater was unreasonable.  In determining whether 
the 
District's 
use 
of 
E-L's 
groundwater 
was 
unreasonable, you should consider the District's need 
for the groundwater, E-L's need for the groundwater, 
the cost to E-L, if any, of the District's use of the 
groundwater, the cost to the District, if any, of not 
using the groundwater or of replacing the groundwater 
and whether the District's purposes for using E-L's 
groundwater could have been achieved through other 
means.   
The reasonableness or unreasonableness of the District's actions 
is not a takings question——it is a tort question. 
¶47 The circuit court determined that the District is 
immune from tort liability.  E-L's attempt to dress up its tort 
claim in takings clothes to circumvent the District's immunity 
is unavailing.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
 
No.  2008AP921.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶48 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  At trial, a jury 
found that E-L Enterprises, Inc. (E-L) suffered $309,388 in 
damages caused by the Metropolitan Milwaukee Sewerage District 
(MMSD).  The majority does not dispute the accuracy of these 
findings.  Rather, it concludes that E-L may not collect the 
damages awarded because they are "consequential damages" that 
are not available to an injured party under Wisconsin takings 
law. 
¶49 Put in context, this ruling not only overturns a 
reasonable jury verdict but also deprives E-L of any meaningful 
remedy for its injury.  This case, then, is important beyond the 
specific 
issues 
decided. 
 
It 
exposes 
the 
chasm 
between 
government wrongdoing and citizen redress.  For the reasons 
stated below, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶50 In the 1980s, MMSD undertook construction of deep 
tunnels to hold sewage until it can be treated, thereby reducing 
water pollution.  As part of this project, MMSD constructed the 
Cross Town 7 Collector System (CT-7) tunnel, which was located 
next to E-L's property.  Before construction, MMSD detected the 
presence of groundwater in the vicinity.  To construct the 
tunnel, 
project 
managers 
deemed 
it 
necessary 
to 
remove 
groundwater from the trench that would house the tunnel. 
¶51 In the process of removing groundwater from the soil 
around the tunnel, MMSD also removed groundwater from E-L's 
property.  The loss of groundwater caused 14 wood piles that 
were supporting E-L's building to rot.  The jury determined that 
No.  2008AP921.dtp 
 
2 
 
$309,388 was just compensation for E-L's costs to repair the 
piles. 
¶52 On June 23, 2004, after repairing the piles, E-L filed 
suit against MMSD and CNA Insurance Companies, the insurers for 
the private contractors that participated in the construction of 
the deep tunnel project.  E-L's complaint alleged five causes of 
action: (1) negligence against MMSD; (2) continuing nuisance 
against MMSD; (3) inverse condemnation;1 (4) negligence against 
CNA; and (5) continuing nuisance against CNA.  E-L settled with 
CNA prior to the trial of the case. 
¶53 E-L did not enumerate five causes of action to 
increase its damages.  E-L pled five causes of action because it 
was confronted with the challenge of grounding its claim for 
recovery in traditional legal theory.  Because the facts of the 
case were unusual, the appropriate theory for the case was 
uncertain. 
¶54 In 
its 
complaint, 
E-L 
presented 
its 
inverse 
condemnation claim as follows: 
51. MMSD's operation and maintenance of the Deep 
Tunnel and the 48 inch sewer pipes which were 
constructed as a part of the Cross Town 7 Collector 
System physically took portions of the wood piles 
which rendered them unusable and damaged the E-L 
Building. 
                                                 
1 "Inverse condemnation" describes "a cause of action 
against a governmental defendant to recover the value of 
property which has been taken in fact by the governmental 
defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of 
eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency."  U.S. 
v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (quoting D. Hagman, Urban 
Planning & Land Development Control Law 328 (1971)). 
No.  2008AP921.dtp 
 
3 
 
52. MMSD's conduct constitutes a taking of E-L 
Enterprises' property for public use.  Specifically, 
MMSD's conduct constitutes a physical invasion that 
deprived and continues to deprive E-L Enterprises of 
all beneficial use of the wood piles in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
13 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶55 By the time the case went to the jury, E-L had shifted 
the theory of its takings claim: MMSD did not "take" E-L's wood 
piles; MMSD "took" E-L's groundwater, thereby causing damage.  
The jury ultimately answered "yes" to the verdict question: "Was 
the District's removal of groundwater from E-L's property a 
taking?" 
II 
¶56 E-L also claimed negligence and nuisance.  Both of 
these claims were dismissed by the circuit court.  Initially, in 
March of 2006, the circuit court refused to dismiss these claims 
on grounds of governmental immunity.  At the summary judgment 
stage, MMSD argued that its acts were "discretionary," not 
"ministerial," and therefore it was immune from liability.  E-L, 
on the other hand, pointed to DNR-approved and –mandated 
groundwater depletion specifications, which prohibited MMSD and 
its contractors from lowering groundwater below existing levels. 
¶57 Based on E-L's argument, the circuit court initially 
concluded that "the act for which E-L seeks to hold MMSD liable—
—exceeding the groundwater depletion limitation——constitutes a 
transgression in which MMSD had no discretion to engage."  
Relying on Lister v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Wisconsin System, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976), 
No.  2008AP921.dtp 
 
4 
 
the court concluded that "nothing remain[ed] for judgment or 
discretion."  The court, therefore, denied MMSD's summary 
judgment motion. 
¶58 In February of 2007, nearly one year after denying 
MMSD's motion for summary judgment and six months before the 
case proceeded to trial, the court revisited its earlier 
decision.  In the course of deciding other motions, the court 
acknowledged a different provision in the same DNR-approved and 
–mandated specification.  This provision required the contractor 
to control groundwater to perform work in the trenches in the 
dry, and to remove water when concrete is being placed and pipe 
is being laid.  The circuit court concluded that "[d]iscretion 
is conferred [by the specification] because MMSD must exercise 
some judgment on how to obey both the duty to keep the 
excavation dry and safe as well as its duty not to draw the 
water down too low."  Acknowledging that it made this ruling 
"relatively late in the game," the court dismissed both the 
negligence and nuisance claims.  As a result, the parties 
proceeded to trial on the inverse condemnation claim alone. 
¶59 Query: Isn't the natural remedy for the wrong in this 
case to be found in the law of negligence?  Not if the court 
persists in unreasonably broad notions of governmental immunity 
and unreasonably narrow exceptions for tort recovery.2  In any 
event, because the jury awarded E-L damages under a different 
legal theory from negligence, questions about governmental 
immunity were not raised in the petition for review, and the 
                                                 
2 See Umansky v. ABC Ins. Co., 2009 WI 82, ¶¶37-81, 319 
Wis. 2d 622, 769 N.W.2d 1 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
No.  2008AP921.dtp 
 
5 
 
case before us involves only questions pertaining to the inverse 
condemnation claim. 
III 
¶60 In the absence of an adequate remedy in tort law, the 
only remedy available to E-L comes from the Takings Clauses of 
the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.3  Yet the majority 
rejects E-L's takings claim, reasoning that, even if the removal 
of E-L's groundwater was a taking, the damages E-L seeks are 
consequential damages, which are unavailable under takings law.  
In my view, this analysis interprets the scope of damages under 
takings law too narrowly. 
¶61 In Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 276, 177 
N.W.2d 380 (1970), this court rejected the argument that 
consequential damages arising from a taking were "to be suffered 
in legal silence."  The court noted that the rule against 
consequential damages in eminent-domain cases had been attacked 
on the grounds that the rule ignores the "economic implications 
of the situation."  Id. at 279 (quoting Frank A. Aloi & Arthur 
Abba Goldberg, A Reexamination of Value, Good Will, and Business 
Losses in Eminent Domain, 53 Cornell L. Rev. 604, 631 (1968)).  
The court held: 
The 
importance 
of 
allowing 
recovery 
for 
incidental losses has increased significantly since 
condemnation powers were initially exercised in this 
                                                 
3 See U.S. Const. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be 
taken for public use without just compensation"); Wis. Const. 
art. 1, § 13 ("The property of no person shall be taken for 
public use without just compensation therefor.").  The majority 
decides that E-L's damages are not compensable under both the 
United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  Majority op., ¶24. 
No.  2008AP921.dtp 
 
6 
 
country.  During the early use of such power, land was 
usually 
undeveloped 
and 
takings 
seldom 
created 
incidental losses.  Thus the former interpretation of 
the 'just compensation' provision of our constitution 
seldom resulted in the infliction of incidental 
losses.  The rule allowing fair market value for only 
the physical property actually taken created no great 
hardship.  In modern society, however, condemnation 
proceedings are necessitated by numerous needs of 
society and are initiated by numerous authorized 
bodies.  Due to the fact people are often congregated 
in given areas and that we have reached a state 
wherein re-development is necessary, commercial and 
industrial property is often taken in condemnation 
proceedings.  When such property is taken, incidental 
damages are very apt to occur and in some cases exceed 
the fair market value of the actual physical property 
taken. 
Id. at 279-80. 
¶62 In this case, although E-L seeks recovery for damages 
beyond the value of the groundwater, it does not go so far as to 
seek the kinds of consequential damages sought in Luber.  Luber 
dealt with consequential damages beyond the reduction in "fair 
market value" of the property——the landowner sought lost rent.  
In this case, however, the jury awarded E-L the reduction in 
fair market value of its property.  The circuit court instructed 
the jury: 
If the government takes private property for a 
public use, the government must pay the owner the fair 
market value of the property that is taken.  If only 
part of an owner's property is taken, and if taking 
part of the property reduces the value of the property 
that remains, the government must pay the difference 
between the fair market value of the property before 
the taking and the fair market value of the property 
after the taking. 
¶63 Based on this instruction, the jury determined that E-
L should be compensated in the amount of $309,388.  Even though 
E-L presented this evidence in terms of the cost of repairing 
No.  2008AP921.dtp 
 
7 
 
the piles, the cost of these repairs amounted to the reduction 
in value to E-L's property that resulted from MMSD's taking.  
The majority now reverses the decision of a properly instructed 
jury that determined the amount of compensation based on the 
evidence before it. 
¶64 This point is further emphasized by E-L's initial 
claim that the "taking" was the taking of "portions of the wood 
piles" supporting the building.  Whether MMSD "took" the wood 
piles or "took" the groundwater, the result was the same: MMSD 
took a portion of E-L's property, causing a reduction in fair 
market value to the remainder of that property. 
¶65 Two early Wisconsin cases support the conclusion that 
damages are available in the circumstances here.  In Damkoehler 
v. City of Milwaukee, 124 Wis. 144, 145, 151, 101 N.W. 706 
(1904), the city removed the lateral support for a building when 
grading an adjacent street, causing portions of the lot "to 
subside and slide into the excavated street." The court rejected 
the argument that the damages caused by the excavation of 
highways were "purely consequential," and permitted recovery 
under the Takings Clause.  Id. at 152.  The same situation arose 
in Dahlman v. City of Milwaukee, 131 Wis. 427, 439-440, 111 
N.W. 675 (1907), and the court adopted the holding in Damkoehler 
for the proposition that "where a substantial part of the 
adjoining owner's land falls into the street by reason of the 
removal of its lateral support in the course of grading, there 
was a taking of the soil for public purposes and not a mere 
consequential damage."  Id. 
No.  2008AP921.dtp 
 
8 
 
¶66 In upholding the jury verdict in the present case, the 
court of appeals correctly saw "no logical basis to distinguish 
between the removal of soil providing lateral support and the 
diversion 
of 
groundwater 
performing 
essentially 
the 
same 
function——that is, supporting the structural integrity of a 
building like that owned by E-L Enterprises."  E-L Enters., Inc. 
v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 2009 WI App 15, ¶11, 316 
Wis. 2d 280, 763 N.W.2d 231.  In neither Damkoehler nor Dahlman 
were the landowners seeking compensation for the specific 
physical property "taken" by the city: in both cases, the damage 
was caused by the city's act of grading a street.  In both 
cases, like this case, a pattern of events took place: (1) the 
government 
performed 
an 
action 
that 
"took" 
part 
of 
the 
landowner's property; and (2) the direct consequence of that 
taking was a reduction in the value of the landowner's property. 
¶67 The majority distinguishes Damkoehler on grounds that 
the landowner lost the entire value of the property.  The court 
in Damkoehler, however, did not limit its holding in that way.  
It required that the city, in grading a street, "cause no 
unnecessary damage to an adjoining landowner," and asserted that 
the city's actions resulted in a taking "to the extent of such 
injury."   Damkoehler, 124 Wis. at 150-51 (emphasis added). 
¶68 Furthermore, the court in Dahlman held that a takings 
claim could be maintained "where a substantial part" of the 
property fell into the street.  Dahlman, 131 Wis. at 440-41.  In 
Dahlman, the jury found that the loss of soil "caused no 
depreciation in the value of the premises."  Id. at 439.  Yet 
No.  2008AP921.dtp 
 
9 
 
the court permitted the landowner to recover nominal damages 
against the city.  Id. at 440.  This case is legally 
indistinguishable 
from 
Dahlman, 
save 
that 
the 
jury 
here 
determined that the fair market value of E-L's property was 
reduced by $309,388. 
¶69 The 
Damkoehler 
case 
has 
been 
cited 
in 
other 
jurisdictions, including South Carolina.  In White v. Southern 
Railway Co., 140 S.E. 560, 564 (1927), the South Carolina court 
wrote: 
The word "taken" in the constitutional provision cited 
is not limited in its meaning and application to cases 
in which there is an actual physical seizure and 
holding of property, but is broad enough to include 
cases in which the access to abutting premises is 
obstructed by the change of grade of a highway or 
there is such physical injury to property as results 
in destruction 
or substantial impairment of its 
usefulness.  See 20 C.J. 697, and the following cases 
therein cited: Nevins v. Peoria, 41 Ill. 502, 89 Am. 
Dec. 392; Tinker v. Rockford, 36 Ill. App. 460; 
Hendershott v. Ottumwa, 46 Iowa 658, 26 Am. Rep. 182; 
Offutt v. Montgomery County, 94 Md. 115, 50 A. 419; 
Vanderlip v. Grand Rapids, 73 Mich. 522, 41 N.W. 677, 
3 L.R.A. 247, 16 Am. St. Rep. 597; Broadwell v. 
Kansas, 75 Mo. 213, 42 Am. Rep. 406; Mosier v. Oregon 
Nav. Co., 39 Or. 256, 64 P. 453, 87 Am. St. Rep. 652; 
Stearns v. Richmond, 88 Va. 992, 14 S.E. 847, 29 Am. 
St. Rep. 758; Kincaid v. Seattle, 74 Wash. 617, 134 P. 
504, 135 P. 820; Damkoehler v. Milwaukee, 124 Wis. 
144, 101 N.W. 706; Forbes v. Orange, 85 Conn. 255, 82 
A. 559; Walters v. Baltimore [& Ohio R.]R. Co., 120 
Md. 644, 88 A. 47, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1128; Coyne v. 
Memphis, 118 Tenn. 651, 102 S.W. 355; Hamilton County 
v. Rape, 101 Tenn. 222, 47 S.W. 416. 
IV 
¶70 At the end of the twentieth century, the United States 
Supreme Court observed that the Takings Clause of the United 
States Constitution prohibits government "from forcing some 
No.  2008AP921.dtp 
 
10 
 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."  Dolan v. 
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Armstrong v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).  The Damkoehler court 
said much the same thing 90 years earlier: 
We are not unmindful that other jurisdictions hold 
that damages resulting from landslides caused by 
excavations on highways in the course of improving 
them for public use are purely consequential, and not 
recoverable by the owner.  We find the doctrine of 
liability under such circumstances more consonant with 
reason and justice . . . . 
Damkoehler, 124 Wis. at 152 (emphasis added). 
¶71 Because the majority expects E-L to suffer in legal 
silence, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP921.dtp 
 
1