Title: State v. Locklear
Citation: 349 N.C. 118
Docket Number: 235A96
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: October 9, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 235A96
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
ROBBIE DEXTER LOCKLEAR
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from  a
judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Britt (Joe
Freeman), J., at the 29 April 1996 Criminal Session of Superior
Court, Robeson County, upon a jury verdict finding defendant
guilty of first-degree murder.  Heard in the Supreme Court
9 February 1998.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by David F. Hoke,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
William L. Davis, III, for defendant-appellant.
FRYE, Justice.
Defendant was indicted by a Robeson County grand jury for
the first-degree murder of James Charles Taylor.  He was tried
capitally, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-
degree murder.  In a capital sentencing proceeding conducted
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000, the jury found as an aggravating
circumstance that defendant had previously been convicted of a
felony involving the use of violence to the person.  No juror
found any mitigating circumstance.  The jury recommended and the
trial court imposed a sentence of death.  For the reasons
discussed herein, we conclude that defendant’s trial and capital
sentencing proceeding were free of prejudicial error and that the
death sentence is not disproportionate.  Accordingly, we uphold
defendant’s conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of
death.
The State’s evidence presented at trial tended to show the
following facts and circumstances.  On 27 January 1994, defendant
and the victim, James Charles “Jay” Taylor, were living in the
same mobile home in Robeson County.  Also living in the home were
defendant’s mother, Angelina Locklear Taylor, who was the
victim’s wife; defendant’s stepbrother, James Reed “J.R.” Taylor,
who was the victim’s son; and defendant’s uncle, James B.
Locklear, Jr.  That evening, defendant and his stepbrother were
inside the bedroom they shared in the home.  According to
defendant’s statement, Jay Taylor came into the room and began
“raising hell” with defendant.  Taylor invited defendant outside,
and a fight ensued.  Defendant was “getting the best of him,” and
Taylor stopped.  Taylor moved toward an outside storage shed,
telling defendant, “I will be right back you son of a bitch.”
Defendant reentered the mobile home, got a twelve-gauge
shotgun and shells, and returned outside.  Taylor was standing in
front of the storage shed, and defendant shot him in the back
from a distance of approximately three to eight feet.  Defendant
reloaded the shotgun and shot Taylor in the neck as he was lying
on the ground, then reloaded and fired a third time, missing the
victim.  Taylor died as a result of the two gunshot wounds
inflicted by defendant.
Defendant had been drinking beer and liquor during the day
of the shooting.  An autopsy showed that the victim had a blood-
alcohol level of .02, the equivalent of approximately half a
beer.
After the shooting, defendant again entered the mobile home
and told his uncle, “You better go check on your brother-in-law.” 
Defendant told his uncle that he had shot Taylor because Taylor
“said he was an S.O.B. and his mother was, too.”  Defendant then
went across the street and told his aunt, Vera Lindsey, what he
had done.  Defendant ran down the road, where he was found by his
cousin, James Belton Locklear, about a mile away.  Locklear drove
defendant back to the scene and summoned police.  After being
advised of his rights and waiving them, defendant voluntarily
gave a statement to Detective Randal Patterson of the Robeson
County Sheriff’s Department in which he admitted shooting Taylor. 
Defendant’s statement was published to the jury.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss made at
the close of the State’s evidence.
Defendant did not testify but did present evidence at trial. 
J.R. Taylor, the victim’s son, testified that his father came
into the bedroom he shared with defendant and asked him to go
into another room.  J.R. heard loud talking and a few minutes
later he heard a shot, but did not think anything of it because
target shooting was common in the neighborhood.  Two of
defendant’s relatives testified that the victim kept one or more
guns in the shed or outbuilding behind the mobile home. 
Mrs. Taylor, defendant’s mother, testified that a week after her
husband’s death, she found a rifle while cleaning out the shed. 
She also testified that when she saw defendant at the jail on the
night of the shooting he was upset and crying.
At defendant’s capital sentencing proceeding, the State
presented evidence of defendant’s prior conviction for assault
with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury in support of the
sole aggravating circumstance submitted to the jury, that
defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the
use of violence to the person.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(3) (1988)
(amended 1994).
Defendant’s evidence during the sentencing phase tended to
show the following:  Defendant’s mother had abused alcohol before
and during her pregnancy.  There was evidence that defendant
suffered from Fetal Alcohol Syndrome.  Defendant was an
illegitimate child who had no contact with his father.  Defendant
was cared for by his grandmother from an early age because his
mother continued to drink heavily.  He was close to his
grandmother and cared for her during her final illness, until she
died when defendant was approximately nine years old.
There was expert testimony that defendant had an IQ of 76,
which placed him in the borderline range of intellectual
functioning.  Defendant had always been small for his age and was
“slow” in school.  He had been retained in school and, as a
teenager, had dropped out.  Defendant also began to abuse alcohol
as a teenager.  He suffered from impulsive behavior and feelings
of insecurity, inadequacy, and dependency, in part because of the
effects of his exposure to alcohol before birth.  At the time of
the shooting, defendant was intoxicated from alcohol, Valium, and
marijuana.
The jury considered twenty-one mitigating circumstances
based on this evidence and the catchall mitigating circumstance. 
No juror found any mitigating circumstance to exist.  The jury
unanimously recommended, and the trial court imposed, a sentence
of death.
Defendant appeals to this Court as of right from the
sentence of death and presents thirty issues based on seventy-
three assignments of error.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred by
arraigning him in violation of the procedures mandated by
N.C.G.S. § 7A-49.3.  Defendant was arraigned on 22 April 1996, at
a Mixed Session of Superior Court, Robeson County, one week
before he was scheduled for trial.  On the day of the hearing,
defendant objected on the grounds that his arraignment was not on
a calendar published for that session.  The trial court continued
the proceeding until later in the day, and in the meantime, a
calendar containing defendant’s arraignment was published. 
Defendant contends that his constitutional right to due process
was violated because the arraignment was scheduled pursuant to an
ex parte communication between the trial court and the
prosecutor, because he was not given proper notice of the
arraignment, and because he was denied the full statutorily
required time to file pretrial motions.  We reject these
contentions.
First, defendant’s allegation of an ex parte communication
between the trial court and the prosecutor implies that his
constitutional right to presence was violated in some manner.  At
most, the record indicates that the prosecutor requested a
hearing on an arraignment.  While it is well settled that a
defendant has an unwaivable right to be present at every stage of
his capital trial, see State v. Payne, 320 N.C. 138, 139, 357
S.E.2d 612, 612 (1987), a defendant does not have a right to be
present when the State makes a routine communication with the
court, prior to trial, concerning a scheduling matter.  Assuming
the State requested a hearing on arraignment outside of
defendant’s presence, this communication occurred prior to trial
and did not constitute a stage of his capital trial.  Cf. State
v. Buckner, 342 N.C. 198, 228, 464 S.E.2d 414, 431 (1995) (no
error where conference between trial judge and counsel was held
without defendant’s presence prior to commencement of trial),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1996).
Second, defendant’s right to due process was in no way
impaired by a lack of notice, if any, that the arraignment was to
be held on 22 April 1996.  An arraignment is “a proceeding
whereby a defendant is brought before a judge having jurisdiction
to try the offense so that the defendant may be formally apprised
of the charges pending against him and directed to plead to
them.”  State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 73, 265 S.E.2d 164, 166
(1980); see N.C.G.S. § 15A-941 (1997).  It is clear from the
record that defendant was fully aware of the charge against him,
and he entered a plea of not guilty to first-degree murder at the
arraignment.  Further, defendant was not prevented, by the
holding of his arraignment on this date, from filing pretrial
motions.  The trial court eliminated any possibility of prejudice
by allowing defendant additional time to file his remaining
pretrial motions.
Finally, defendant’s contention that the State violated
N.C.G.S. § 15A-943, thereby prejudicing him, is also meritless. 
Defendant was arraigned on 22 April 1996, and his trial began on
29 April 1996.  This Court has determined that a defendant’s
interest in N.C.G.S. § 15A-943 arises under subsection (b), which
provides that a defendant may not be tried without his consent in
the same week in which he is arraigned.  State v. Richardson, 308
N.C. 470, 482, 302 S.E.2d 799, 806 (1983); State v. Shook, 293
N.C. 315, 319, 237 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1977).  Thus, defendant’s
“only interest is in his vested right to a week’s interval
between his arraignment and trial.”  Richardson, 308 N.C. at 483,
302 S.E.2d at 807.  Assuming, arguendo, that the State violated
N.C.G.S. § 15A-943(a) by publishing the calendar for defendant’s
arraignment on the same day the arraignment was held, there is no
reversible error because defendant nonetheless had a full week’s
interval between arraignment and trial.  Id. at 482-83, 302
S.E.2d at 806-07.
We next examine defendant’s assignments of error pertaining
to the jury selection process.  Defendant first argues that the
trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to peremptorily
excuse black and Native American prospective jurors on the basis
of race.  The use of peremptory challenges for racially
discriminatory reasons violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986).  The
North Carolina Constitution, Article I, Section 26, also
prohibits the exercise of peremptory strikes solely on the basis
of race.  See State v. Ross, 338 N.C. 280, 284, 449 S.E.2d 556,
560 (1994).
Upon making an objection under Batson, a defendant must
first make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination, which
he may do by showing:  “(1) he is a member of a cognizable racial
minority, (2) members of his racial group have been peremptorily
excused, and (3) racial discrimination appears to have been the
motivation for the challenges.”  State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489,
497, 391 S.E.2d 144, 150 (1990).  Defendant is a Native American. 
We recognize that “[w]here defendant is an American Indian,
people of this heritage are a racial group cognizable for Batson
purposes.”  Id. at 499, 391 S.E.2d at 151.  However, a defendant
also has standing to complain that a prosecutor has used the
State’s peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner
even if there is not racial identity between the defendant and
the challenged juror.  Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 113 L. Ed.
2d 411 (1991); see also State v. Beach, 333 N.C. 733, 430 S.E.2d
248 (1993).  Thus, defendant, although Native American, is not
prohibited from challenging the excusal of black prospective
jurors on the basis of race.
If a defendant succeeds in making a prima facie showing of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the State to come forward
with a race-neutral reason for each challenged peremptory strike. 
State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 16, 409 S.E.2d 288, 296 (1991). 
The rebuttal must be clear, reasonably specific, and related to
the particular case to be tried, but “‘need not rise to the level 
justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.’”  State v.
Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 93, 443 S.E.2d 306, 312 (1994) (quoting
Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1089, 130 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1995).  A defendant is then
entitled to present evidence to show that the prosecutor’s
explanations are a pretext.  State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 668,
483 S.E.2d 396, 408, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. E. 2d.
177 (1997).
Where the trial court rules that a defendant has failed to
make a prima facie showing, our review is limited to whether the
trial court erred in finding that the defendant failed to make a
prima facie showing, even if the State offers reasons for its
exercise of the peremptory challenges.  State v. Hoffman, 348
N.C. 548, 554, 500 S.E.2d 718, 722-23 (1998); State v. Williams,
343 N.C. 345, 359, 471 S.E.2d 379, 386-87 (1996), cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1997).  On the other hand, where
the trial court rules that a defendant has made an initial prima
facie showing of discrimination, it is the responsibility of the
trial court to make appropriate findings as to whether the
prosecution’s stated reasons are a credible, nondiscriminatory
basis for the challenges or simply pretext.  Then the issue
before this Court is whether the trial court properly determined
whether or not the defendant had proven purposeful
discrimination.  “Because the trial court is in the best position
to assess the prosecutor’s credibility, we will not overturn its
determination absent clear error.”  State v. Cummings, 346 N.C.
291, 309, 488 S.E.2d 550, 561 (1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
139 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1998).
In this case, prospective jurors self-reported their race by
so indicating in a space on the printed juror questionnaire. 
Defendant’s first Batson objection came when the prosecutor
peremptorily challenged prospective juror James Love, an African-
American male.  In support of this objection, defendant pointed
out that Mr. Love had given the same answers to questions
concerning the death penalty as white prospective jurors and that
the State had already peremptorily challenged another minority
prospective juror, Mary Brooks, a Native American female.  The
trial court noted that the first juror seated was a black juror
and that there were no other peremptory challenges against black
jurors.  The trial court ruled that defendant had not yet made a
prima facie case and allowed the State’s challenge of Mr. Love.
Defendant next objected when prospective juror Diana
Locklear was challenged by the prosecutor.  Although defendant
initially indicated that he did not care to be heard, after the
trial court inquired, defendant stated that the prosecutor was
using the peremptory challenges “on minorities,” mentioning the
earlier excusals of Ms. Brooks and Mr. Love, and argued again
that white jurors who had answered questions concerning the death
penalty in a similar fashion had been passed.  The trial court
then ruled:
[A]t this point . . . [t]here were only two Indian
jurors removed peremptorily by the State.  One, two,
three, four -- it appears out of nine jurors, the State
has passed, let’s see, one, two, three, four Indian
jurors.  Out of nine selected, four have been Indians.
I do not see that you’ve made out a prima facie
case yet.  However, you may continue to renew your
motion.
We note that while it appears from the transcript of this
particular exchange that both the trial court and defense counsel
presumed prospective juror Locklear to be Native American, her
self-reported race, indicated on the juror questionnaire, was
white.
Jury voir dire continued, and the prosecutor exercised
another peremptory challenge against an African-American
prospective juror, Jimmy Cummings.  Defendant again raised a
Batson objection.  The trial court said, “I understand,” and 
confirmed the race reported on the juror’s questionnaire.  To
this point in the jury voir dire, forty-seven venire members had
been questioned; nine had been seated, including one black, four
Native Americans, and four whites.  Five blacks had been excused
for cause, and Mr. Cummings’ excusal made the second peremptory
challenge of a black prospective juror by the State.  In
addition, the State had exercised peremptory challenges against
two Native American prospective jurors.  While the trial court
did not explicitly rule at this point that defendant had failed
to make a prima facie showing of discrimination so as to require
the State to come forward with reasons for the challenge, we
believe it is clear from the record that this was the trial
court’s decision.  Defendant having made no other showing to
support his Batson objection, we cannot say that the trial court
erred in allowing the challenge and continuing with jury voir
dire.
The State’s next peremptory challenge was to Lisa Locklear,
a Native American female.  After defendant’s objection, the trial
court said, “I understand the objection.  We’ll deal with all of
this later,” and excused Ms. Locklear.  Through the remainder of
the jury selection, the State exercised four more peremptory
challenges -- against two white jurors, a Native American juror,
and a black juror.  Defendant did not raise Batson objections to
any of these challenges.  After a jury of twelve and two
alternates was seated, with a racial makeup of seven Indian, two
black, and five white jurors, the trial court revisited the
“ongoing Batson motion of the defendant.”
The trial court first considered defendant’s contention that
Native American prospective jurors had been excused in a racially
discriminatory manner.  Noting that the State had “passed seven
jurors of the Indian race and struck three,” the trial court
nonetheless found that defendant had made a prima facie case of
discrimination as to the three challenged Native American jurors: 
Mary Brooks, Lisa Locklear, and Connie Hester.  The State gave
the following reasons why these prospective jurors were excused.
[PROSECUTOR]:  As to Hester, family history.  As
to Lisa Locklear, marijuana conviction and her
attitude, smiling and laughing during the time we were
asking the questions.  As to -- I’m not sure what
Brooks’ first name is.  I can’t read that.  Indian
female.  She was undecided about the death penalty and
wavered when I asked her the questions.
Defendant was given an opportunity to give a rebuttal and
responded as follows.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, in rebuttal to
that I would point out to the Court that several white
jurors indicated that they had been -- prior
convictions for drugs and for DWIs and other charges
and the State passed them.  Particularly, I remember
Rodger Britt had DWI and marijuana charges.  Some of
the other jurors had DWI charges.  James Lewis had
several DWI charges.  And the State passed them despite
those prior convictions.
The trial court found that the State had tendered racially
neutral explanations.  We hold that this was not error.
After carefully reviewing the transcripts of jury voir dire,
we find that the reasons articulated by the prosecutor are
supported by the record.  Prospective juror Hester indicated that
she had four relatives who were currently or had been in jail or
prison.  Ms. Locklear admitted to pleading guilty to possession
of marijuana.  Ms. Brooks, after extensive questioning, expressed
her opposition to the death penalty but also indicated that she
might be able to set aside her beliefs.  The State exercised its
peremptory challenge of Ms. Brooks after the trial court had
twice denied a challenge for cause.  A juror’s reservations
“concerning his or her ability to impose the death penalty
constitute a racially neutral basis for exercising a peremptory
challenge.”  Cummings, 346 N.C. at 310, 488 S.E.2d at 561.
Defendant’s only rebuttal was that the State had passed
several white jurors despite drug and DWI convictions, in
apparent response to the prosecutor’s reasons for excusing
Ms. Locklear.  We have previously rejected a defendant’s attempt
to show discriminatory intent by “finding a single factor among
the several articulated by the prosecutor . . . and matching it
to a passed juror who exhibited that same factor.”  Porter, 326
N.C. at 501, 391 S.E.2d at 152; see also State v. Kandies, 342
N.C. 419, 435-36, 467 S.E.2d 67, 75-76, cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 167 (1996).  In this case, the prosecutor
pointed to Ms. Locklear’s demeanor as well as her prior drug
conviction as the basis for the challenge.
The ultimate burden of persuasion in a Batson claim is on
the defendant.  Porter, 326 N.C. at 497-98, 391 S.E.2d at 150. 
On review, deference is given to the trial court’s findings as to
the State’s given reasons for the challenges.  Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 409 (1991); see also
State v. Floyd, 343 N.C. 101, 105, 468 S.E.2d 46, 48, cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1996).  Given the
prosecutor’s articulation of racially neutral reasons for
challenging prospective jurors Hester, Locklear, and Brooks,
which are supported by the record, and given defendant’s
inadequate rebuttal, we cannot conclude that the trial court
erred in denying defendant’s Batson claim as to these three
jurors.
The trial court then inquired into defendant’s Batson
challenge to the excusal of two black prospective jurors,
Mr. Cummings and Mr. Love.  The court noted that these
prospective jurors were not of the same race as defendant. 
However, defendant asserted that they were members of a minority
race who were asked the same questions, and gave the same
responses, as white jurors who were passed by the State.  The
trial court found that defendant had not made a prima facie case
as to the exclusion of these two jurors.  We hold that this was
not error.
As noted above, defendant’s standing to assert a Batson
claim is not impaired by the fact that he is of a different race
than the challenged jurors.  However, the race of a defendant, as
well as the race of the victim and key witnesses, is a relevant
circumstance that the trial court may consider when determining
whether defendant has raised an inference of purposeful
discrimination sufficient to make a prima facie case upon a
Batson motion.  State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 120, 400 S.E.2d 712,
724 (1991).  Furthermore, although the basis for defendant’s
Batson motion was that prospective minority jurors were
challenged while white jurors who gave similar answers were
passed, this Court has held that disparate treatment of
prospective jurors is not necessarily dispositive of
discriminatory intent.  Floyd, 343 N.C. at 105-06, 468 S.E.2d at
48-49.  We conclude that the trial court’s finding that defendant
failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination as to the
State’s challenges of Mr. Cummings and Mr. Love was not clearly
erroneous.
In his brief to this Court, defendant also argues that it
was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause for the trial
court to consider his Batson motion separately as to challenged
Native American and African-American prospective jurors and that
the trial court erred by placing undue emphasis on the fact that
some minority jurors were seated.  We reject both contentions.
As previously stated, discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges on the basis of race is forbidden regardless of the
respective races of the defendant and of the challenged jurors. 
See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411; cf. Georgia
v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 120 L. Ed. 2d 33 (1992) (holding that
racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by a
criminal defendant is also prohibited).  However, we note that
“[r]acial identity between the defendant and the excused person
might in some cases be the explanation for the prosecution’s
adoption of the forbidden stereotype,” Powers, 499 U.S. at 416,
113 L. Ed. 2d at 429, and racial identity between defendant and
some of the challenged jurors in this case was a legitimate
factor for the trial court to consider in ruling on defendant’s
Batson motion.  Likewise, the fact that defendant and the
challenged black jurors were of different races was a relevant
circumstance which the trial court was entitled to weigh.  We
therefore cannot conclude that the trial court erred in
considering defendant’s Batson challenges separately.
Finally, while the excusal of even a single juror for a
racially discriminatory reason is impermissible, see State v.
Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 491, 356 S.E.2d 279, 295, cert. denied,
484 U.S. 918, 98 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1987), the trial court may
consider the acceptance rate of minority jurors by the State as
evidence bearing on alleged discriminatory intent, Smith, 328N.C.
at 121, 400 S.E.2d at 724.  We reject defendant’s contention that
the trial court unduly emphasized this factor.  For the foregoing
reasons, we conclude that there was no violation of defendant’s
right, under either the state or federal Constitution, to a jury
selected in a racially nondiscriminatory manner.
Defendant next contends that the trial court improperly
limited voir dire of several prospective jurors in violation of
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Sections 18 and 19 of the
North Carolina Constitution.  It is well established that while
counsel are allowed wide latitude in examining jurors on voir
dire, the extent and manner of the inquiry rests within the trial
court’s discretion.  State v. Parks, 324 N.C. 420, 423, 378
S.E.2d 785, 787 (1989).  The trial court’s decisions regarding
the extent and manner of voir dire questioning will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.  State v. Jaynes, 342
N.C. 249, 266, 464 S.E.2d 448, 459 (1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S.
1024, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1080 (1996).
Defendant argues that he was prevented from questioning
prospective jurors concerning the credibility of law enforcement
officers and the weight jurors would give their testimony. 
However, the record reveals that the trial court gave defendant
ample opportunity to inquire into jurors’ potential bias in favor
of law enforcement.  The court sustained objections to
hypothetical or confusing questions, but allowed defense counsel
opportunity to rephrase the questions.  We find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court.
Defendant also argues that the trial court limited voir dire
concerning whether jurors would automatically vote for the death
penalty, in violation of Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L.
Ed. 2d 492 (1992).  Again, a careful examination of the
transcript does not bear out defendant’s contention.  Defendant
was permitted to pursue this line of inquiry, albeit with
direction from the trial court to rephrase certain questions.  We
find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion on this point. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court committed error by
limiting voir dire on prospective jurors’ ability to consider
mitigating evidence and to follow the court’s instructions. 
These contentions are without merit.  There is no indication that
the trial court abused its discretion during jury voir dire, and
defendant shows no prejudice from any alleged improper ruling.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court improperly
allowed the prosecutor’s for-cause challenges to excuse certain
prospective jurors based on their responses to questions
concerning capital punishment.  Whether a prospective juror may
be excused for cause because of his or her views on capital
punishment depends upon whether those views will “prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instruction and his oath.”  Wainwright v.
Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 851-52 (1985); see
also State v. Flippen, 344 N.C. 689, 697, 477 S.E.2d 158, 163
(1996).  Prospective jurors may also be properly excused for
cause if they are unable to “‘state clearly that they are willing
to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the
rule of law.’”  State v. Brogden, 334 N.C. 39, 43, 430 S.E.2d
905, 908 (1993) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176,
90 L. Ed. 2d 137, 149-50 (1986)).  We have consistently accorded
deference to a trial court’s judgment concerning a prospective
juror’s ability to impartially follow the law.  See, e.g., id. 
Defendant does not identify any specific contention of error
as to a particular juror.  However, of the thirty-one jurors
listed by defendant as improperly excused for cause, two were in
fact peremptorily challenged, and another was excused for cause
with the approval of defendant.  A careful examination of the
record reveals that none of the remaining twenty-eight was able
to state clearly that he or she could set aside personal
opposition to the death penalty and render a verdict in
accordance with the law and the evidence in the case. 
Accordingly, we reject this assignment of error.
Defendant also contends that the trial court improperly
overruled defendant’s challenge for cause of a prospective juror
based on the juror’s inability to be impartial in weighing the
credibility of law enforcement officers.  The record reveals that
the venire member in question was in fact ultimately dismissed
for cause; thus, this contention is without merit.
By his next four assignments of error, defendant  alleges
that the trial judge improperly and prejudicially conveyed an
opinion by his conduct and participation in the voir dire of
prospective jurors, by his examination of witnesses, by his
nonverbal conduct, and by his comments on the evidence and
witnesses.  These allegations are not supported by the record.
It is indisputable that every person charged with a crime is
“entitled to a trial before an impartial judge and an
unprejudiced jury in an atmosphere of judicial calm.”  State v.
Carter, 233 N.C. 581, 583, 65 S.E.2d 9, 10 (1951).  The relevant
statute directs that a “judge may not express during any stage of
the trial, any opinion in the presence of the jury on any
question of fact to be decided by the jury.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1222
(1997) (emphasis added). 
The bare possibility, however, that an accused may
have suffered prejudice from the conduct or language of
the judge is not sufficient to overthrow an adverse
verdict.  The criterion for determining whether or not
the trial judge deprived an accused of his right to a
fair trial by improper comments or remarks in the
hearing of the jury is the probable effect of the
language upon the jury.  In applying this test, the
utterance of the judge is to be considered in the light
of the circumstances under which it was made.
Carter, 233 N.C. at 583, 65 S.E.2d at 10-11 (citations omitted).
Defendant contends that the judge cast aspersions on 
defense counsel during jury voir dire which diminished the
effectiveness of the defense in the eyes of the jury.  However,
we find nothing in those portions of the record to which
defendant points that suggests the trial judge’s comments or
questions improperly influenced jurors or disparaged defense
counsel.  Furthermore, because prospective jurors were examined
individually, no possible prejudicial impact on the jury could
have occurred as a result of the judge’s remarks to defense
counsel during the questioning of persons who were ultimately
excused.
Defendant also contends that the court’s participation in
the trial, by questioning and by conduct, was improper. 
Defendant points first to an exchange between the trial court and
defense counsel concerning the relevance of a line of questioning
being pursued by defendant.  The trial court was unwilling to
allow defendant to question a witness about the possible
existence of guns in the shed located near the shooting when
there was no record evidence that defendant in fact knew that the
victim kept weapons in the shed and no proffered evidence of
self-defense.  The scope and manner of examination of witnesses
are matters ordinarily governed by the trial judge, who may take
appropriate measures to restrict improper questioning by counsel. 
State v. Searles, 304 N.C. 149, 157, 282 S.E.2d 430, 435 (1981). 
The trial judge in this instance conducted a proper inquiry into
the relevance of defendant’s line of questioning so as to prevent
inadmissable evidence from being presented to the jury. 
Furthermore, the exchange took place outside the presence of the
jury, the judge having sent the jurors from the courtroom prior
to initiating the relevance inquiry.  There was no error and no
prejudicial effect on the jury.
Next, defendant points to the following remarks, made during
the examination of defendant’s mother, Mrs. Taylor:
Q.
BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  What, if anything, happened
to the weapon that you found in the shed?
[PROSECUTOR]:  Object.
THE COURT:  Sustained, without a foundation.  Is
it relevant anyway what happened to it, if there was a
weapon?  If anything -- I don’t know whether anything
happened to it at this point.
While a judge may never express an opinion upon the credibility
of evidence or the merits of a case, State v. Lynch, 279 N.C. 1,
11, 181 S.E.2d 561, 567 (1971), in this situation, the trial
court was merely remarking on the relevancy of the evidence.  We
cannot say that this query by the judge had the probable effect
of improperly influencing the jury and thereby denying defendant
his right to a fair trial.
Defendant points to instances during the sentencing phase
where the judge allegedly commented on evidence, conducted an
examination of a witness, and attempted to present evidence of an
aggravating circumstance.  In the first instance, the record
shows that the trial court, outside the presence of the jury,
acted upon defendant’s objection to the State’s attempt to offer
a certified copy of defendant’s criminal record rather than the
judgment of a prior conviction.  Defendant does not explain, and
we fail to see, how this constitutes an improper comment on the
evidence.
As to the second instance, the prosecutor was examining the
officer who investigated the assault for which defendant had
previously been convicted.  The following testimony was elicited:
Q.
Did you have an occasion to investigate an assault
on a Donnie Wilkins?
A.
Yes, sir, I did.
. . . .
Q.
Is Donnie Wilkins an individual that’s confined to
a wheelchair?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection.
THE COURT:  Overruled.  Go ahead.
THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir, he was.
THE COURT:  Do you mean at the time of the assault
or some later time, Solicitor?
[PROSECUTOR]:  No, sir.  At the time of the
assault, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.
We have held that a trial judge “may question a witness for the
purpose of clarifying his testimony and promoting a better
understanding of it.”  State v. Whittington, 318 N.C. 114, 125,
347 S.E.2d 403, 409 (1986); see also State v. Jackson, 306 N.C.
642, 651, 295 S.E.2d 383, 388 (1982).  In this case, the judge
did no more than interpose a clarifying question.  We find no
objectionable intimation of opinion as to the witness’
credibility, defendant’s culpability, or any factual controversy
to be decided by the jury.  See State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457,
465, 349 S.E.2d 566, 571 (1986).  Therefore, we reject this
contention.
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court “assisted
and coaxed the prosecutor in presenting evidence, making
objections to questions by the defense, and sustaining its own
objections,” and belittled defense counsel.  Defendant points to
an instance during the examination of defendant’s uncle, R.D.
Locklear, when the trial court inquired, “Well, now -- is there
an objection to all that?”  When the prosecutor answered
affirmatively, the trial court sustained the objection.  Later,
during cross-examination of this witness, the trial court asked
whether defendant wished to continue his objection to a line of
questioning.  When defense counsel answered, “Your Honor, you
overruled it,” the judge answered, “Yeah, but we’re getting into
something else now.  Do you object now?”  Defendant did not
object.  These inquiries, made to attorneys for both sides as to
their desire to object to potentially inadmissible testimony, do
not constitute “coaxing the prosecutor in presenting evidence” or
“making objections to questions by the defense.”  Neither do they
indicate that the court was rude to or belittled defense counsel.
In sum, defendant has failed to show that any impermissible
expression of opinion was made by the trial judge in the presence
of the jury or that any conduct or statement by the judge
improperly influenced the jury or prejudiced defendant in any
manner.  Accordingly, these assignments of error are rejected.
Based on six assignments of error, defendant’s next argument
concerns evidentiary rulings made by the trial court.  Defendant
asserts that the court committed reversible error by admitting,
over his objection, evidence that was inadmissible, thereby
violating his state and federal constitutional rights to due
process of law, to a trial by an impartial jury, and to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred by
allowing into evidence certain opinion testimony of Dr. Marvin
Thompson, a medical expert in the field of forensic pathology,
and SBI Agent Al Langley, an expert in firearms.  Defendant
stipulated to the qualification of both witnesses as experts. 
Langley conducted tests with the murder weapon to determine
muzzle-to-target distances based on shotgun-pellet patterns.  He
testified in detail, without objection, about how these tests
were conducted.  The exhibits of the test results and his written
report were then received into evidence, over defendant’s
objections.  Defendant contends that the tests were inadmissible
and prejudicial because the experiments were not conducted under
circumstances sufficiently similar to the conditions at the time
of the crime.
Experimental evidence is competent and admissible if the
experiment is carried out under substantially similar
circumstances to those which surrounded the original occurrence. 
State v. Jones, 287 N.C. 84, 97, 214 S.E.2d 24, 33 (1975); State
v. Carter, 282 N.C. 297, 300, 192 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1972).  The
absence of exact similarity of conditions does not require
exclusion of the evidence, but rather goes to its weight with the
jury.  Id.  The trial court is generally afforded broad
discretion in determining whether sufficient similarity of
conditions has been shown.  State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674,
686, 309 S.E.2d 170, 178 (1983).
Agent Langley used the same twelve-gauge shotgun that fired
the fatal shots and used ammunition consistent with that
recovered at the scene of the shooting to re-create conditions
similar to those that existed at the time of the murder.  The
purpose of the tests was to determine, based on the diameter of
the shotgun-pellet pattern, the distance at which the gun was
fired.  Agent Langley was well qualified by his knowledge,
training, and experience to conduct these tests and render an
expert opinion as to the results.  The trial court did not err in
admitting this evidence.
Likewise, we find no error in the admission of
Dr. Thompson’s opinions.  “It is undisputed that expert testimony
is properly admissible when such testimony can assist the jury to
draw certain inferences from facts because the expert is better
qualified.”  State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 139, 322 S.E.2d 370,
376 (1984); see N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a) (Supp. 1997). 
Dr. Thompson testified that the shot pattern that corresponded
with firing the shotgun from the three-foot range most closely
matched the wound in the victim’s back.  He also rendered his
expert medical opinion as to the effect on the body such a shot
would have produced.  Dr. Thompson performed the autopsy on the
victim, examined and measured the wounds, and reviewed and
measured the shotgun-pellet test patterns, allowing him to form
an opinion as to which shot pattern most closely matched the
gunshot wound in the victim’s back.  By giving his opinion based
on his experience as a pathologist and his personal observation
of the gunshot wounds, Dr. Thompson was undoubtedly in a position
to assist the jury in determining the distance from which the
fatal shots were fired.  Dr. Thompson’s testimony illustrating
the effect such a shot would have had on the human body was
likewise appropriate to assist the jury in understanding the
evidence.  The trial court did not err in overruling defendant’s
objection to this testimony.
Defendant also objected to Dr. Thompson’s testifying that
the victim’s blood-alcohol level, the equivalent of .02 on a
Breathalyzer test, would have been the result of the ingestion of
approximately one-half of a beer.  Dr. Thompson personally drew
the blood sample from the victim during the autopsy and
incorporated the results of the blood-alcohol test into the
autopsy report.  Dr. Thompson measured the victim’s height and
weight and noted that there was “a small amount of partially
digested food” in the victim’s stomach.  Based on his training,
knowledge, and experience as a pathologist, Dr. Thompson gave his
opinion, to a reasonable medical certainty, of the amount of
alcohol that was absorbed into the victim’s bloodstream. 
Defendant points to no basis for his assertion that Dr. Thompson,
as a medical expert, was unqualified to draw this conclusion. 
The assignment of error based on Dr. Thompson’s testimony is
rejected.
Defendant next contends that the trial court committed
reversible error by admitting the prior statement of defendant’s
uncle, James B. Locklear, Jr., given to police on the night of
the shooting.  At trial, the sole basis of defendant’s objection
to the prior statement’s admission into evidence was that
Locklear had not been impeached.  On appeal, defendant now
contends that the prior statement was inadmissible as
corroborative evidence because it was inconsistent with
Locklear’s testimony at trial.  We find no error.
After carefully examining both the testimony and the prior
statement of James B. Locklear, Jr., we conclude that the prior
statement was properly admitted as corroborative evidence. 
Locklear’s prior statement was consistent with his testimony at
trial and contained no significant additional facts.  See Ramey,
318 N.C. at 469, 349 S.E.2d at 573; State v. Riddle, 316 N.C.
152, 156, 340 S.E.2d 75, 77 (1986).  Furthermore, we note that
the trial court gave proper limiting instructions, directing the
jury to consider the evidence only for the purpose of
corroboration.
Defendant also objected to an allegedly hearsay statement
made by James B. Locklear, Jr., concerning the circumstances
under which Locklear had come to live in the victim’s home. 
During direct examination of the witness by the State, the
following occurred:
Q.
How is it you came to live there?
A.
Me and my wife were separated, so I moved in with
them.
Q.
Did Mr. Taylor give his blessings to that?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection.
THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
It does not appear from the transcript that the trial court ruled
on defendant’s objection; nonetheless, the challenged testimony
came in.
It is well settled that “‘[t]he erroneous admission of
hearsay, like the erroneous admission of other evidence, is not
always so prejudicial as to require a new trial.’”  State v.
Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 356, 451 S.E.2d 131, 153 (1994) (quoting 
Ramey, 318 N.C. at 470, 349 S.E.2d at 574).  Defendant has the
burden of showing error and that there was a reasonable
possibility that a different result would have been reached at
trial if such error had not occurred.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a)
(1997); see also State v. Sills, 311 N.C. 370, 378, 317 S.E.2d
379, 384 (1984).
Assuming, arguendo, that James Locklear’s answer constituted
inadmissible hearsay, we are not convinced that there is a
reasonable possibility that a different result would have been
reached at trial had this statement not been admitted.  Thus, we
find no prejudicial error.
Defendant next argues, by three assignments of error, that
numerous evidentiary rulings of the trial court denied him the
right to present a defense.  “The right of a defendant charged
with a criminal offense to present to the jury his version of the
facts is a fundamental element of due process of law, guaranteed
by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal
Constitution and by Article I, Sections 19 and 23 of the North
Carolina Constitution.”  State v. Miller, 344 N.C. 658, 673, 477
S.E.2d 915, 924 (1996).  However, in this case, the record
demonstrates no error in any ruling of the trial court cited by
defendant.
Initially, we note no instance where the trial court erred
or abused its discretion by excluding relevant, admissible
evidence.  With respect to instances of alleged erroneous
exclusion of evidence, the record fails to show what the answer
would have been had the witnesses been permitted to respond.
“It is well established that an exception to the
exclusion of evidence cannot be sustained where the
record fails to show what the witness’ testimony would
have been had he been permitted to testify.”  “[I]n
order for a party to preserve for appellate review the
exclusion of evidence, the significance of the excluded
evidence must be made to appear in the record and a
specific offer of proof is required unless the
significance of the evidence is obvious from the
record.”
State v. Johnson, 340 N.C. 32, 49, 455 S.E.2d 644, 653 (1995)
(quoting State v. Simpson, 314 N.C. 359, 370, 334 S.E.2d 53, 60
(1985)) (citations omitted); see N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 103
(1992).  By failing to preserve evidence for review, defendant
deprives the Court of the necessary record from which to
ascertain if the alleged error is prejudicial.  State v. Miller,
321 N.C. 445, 452, 364 S.E.2d 387, 391 (1988).  Thus, in no
instance where defendant alleges error based on the improper
exclusion of evidence can he show that the ruling was
prejudicial.
By his next assignment of error, defendant argues that the
trial court committed reversible error by permitting the jury to
take evidence into the jury room without defendant’s consent and
without allowing defendant the opportunity to object.  The
controlling statute is N.C.G.S. § 15A-1233, which provides that,
upon a request by the jury to review evidence, the trial court
must conduct all jurors into the courtroom and must exercise its
discretion in determining whether to permit the requested
evidence to be read to or examined by the jury.  N.C.G.S. §
15A-1233(a) (1997); State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 331 S.E.2d 652
(1985).  Additionally, “[u]pon request by the jury and with 
consent of all parties,” the trial court may, in its discretion,
“permit the jury to take to the jury room exhibits and writings
which have been received in evidence.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1233(b).
During its deliberations in the guilt phase of the trial,
the jury sent a note to the trial judge requesting to review two
items:  the testimony of defendant’s uncle, James B. Locklear,
Jr., and defendant’s statement to police.  The trial court, in
accordance with the statutory requirement, summoned the jurors
into the courtroom.  As to the request to “review the testimony
of James B. Locklear,” the trial court ruled:  “In my discretion,
that is denied.  It is the duty of the jurors to remember the
testimony as it was given here in the courtroom.”  The trial
court properly exercised its discretion on this point in
conformance with the statute and applicable case law.
Next, the trial court granted the jury’s request to take
defendant’s statement, State’s Exhibit 28, into the jury room. 
While defendant claims as error that he was not given the
opportunity to object to the submission of the exhibit to the
jury, the record reveals no action by the trial court which
prevented defendant from making such an objection or otherwise
indicating his lack of consent.  However, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1233(b)
requires the consent of all parties, and while defendant did not
object, neither did he give his consent.  Assuming that this was
error, however, we conclude it was harmless in this instance. 
See State v. Cunningham, 344 N.C. 341, 364, 474 S.E.2d 772, 783
(1996); see also State v. Wagner, 343 N.C. 250, 257-58, 470
S.E.2d 33, 37-38 (1996) (no prejudicial error where excerpt of
defendant’s statement was submitted for jury examination over
defendant’s objection); State v. Cannon, 341 N.C. 79, 83-86, 459
S.E.2d 238, 241-43 (1995) (no prejudicial error where crime-scene
and autopsy photographs, defendant’s confession, a witness’
statement, and a diagram were taken into jury room over
defendant’s objection).  Defendant makes no persuasive assertion
of prejudice.  His statement had previously been admitted into
evidence; read to the jury in its entirety during the testimony
of Detective Randal Patterson; and published, individually, to
jurors as the State’s rebuttal evidence.  Under these
circumstances, and in light of the totality of the evidence
against defendant, we conclude that allowing the jury to take
this exhibit into the jury room could not have affected the
outcome of the trial.  Thus, there was no prejudicial error.
By his next eight assignments of error, defendant argues
that the prosecutor was allowed to make improper, inflammatory,
and prejudicial arguments during closing arguments of the guilt
phase of the trial.  This Court has firmly established that:
Trial counsel are granted wide latitude in the
scope of jury argument, and control of closing
arguments is in the discretion of the trial court. 
Further, for an inappropriate prosecutorial comment to
justify a new trial, it “must be sufficiently grave
that it is prejudicial error.”
State v. Soyars, 332 N.C. 47, 60, 418 S.E.2d 480, 487-88 (1992)
(quoting State v. Britt, 291 N.C. 528, 537, 231 S.E.2d 644, 651
(1977)) (citations omitted).  Applying these principles to the
instant case, we find no error.
In the instant case, the prosecutor argued to the jury that
the twelve-gauge shotgun had “to be loaded, breech closed, fired,
unloaded.”  Defendant objected on the basis that there was no
evidence to support this argument.  The trial court ruled that
the prosecutor was holding the weapon and “may argue from the
weapon.”  The shotgun had been introduced as evidence, and the
mechanics of loading and firing it were based directly upon
evidence in the case.  The prosecutor also argued that the very
act of loading and firing the weapon showed premeditation and
deliberation.  As this was a reasonable inference to be drawn
from the evidence, this ruling was not improper.
Defendant also objected to the prosecutor’s assertion that
“defendant is here because of choices that he made” and his
exhortation to the jury not to “let [the defense] put that fault
or blame on you as jurors.”  These remarks fall well within the
wide latitude allowed for forceful persuasion and are not
improper or inflammatory.  Therefore, we find no error in the
trial court’s ruling allowing these arguments.
Next, defendant challenged the following arguments:
And heat of passion?  There was no heat of passion
involved in this.  You won’t hear any instruction from
the [c]ourt on heat of passion.
. . . .
You won’t hear any instruction from the [c]ourt on
self-defense, because there is no evidence to support
it, ladies and gentlemen.  Simply does not exist.
Defendant contends that these remarks, in addition to being
improper and prejudicial, were misstatements of the law.
The record shows that the trial court gave instructions on
first-degree and second-degree murder only, not manslaughter or
“heat of passion.”  The prosecutor’s assertion that the jury
would not hear instructions on heat of passion was correct, not a
misstatement of the law.  Likewise, there was no instruction on
self-defense.  The prosecutor’s attempt to convince the jury that
there was no evidentiary support for heat of passion or self-
defense was permissible within the “wide latitude [granted to
counsel] in the argument of hotly contested cases.”  State v.
Fullwood, 343 N.C. 725, 740, 472 S.E.2d 883, 891 (1996), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 137 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1997).  The prosecutor
did not misstate the law, distort the evidence, or inflame or
prejudice the jury; thus, the trial court did not err in allowing
these arguments.
The prosecutor also told the jury:  “You’re the voice of
this community.  You’re here representing the community in which
we all live.”  Defendant objected and was overruled.  We have
previously upheld virtually identical jury arguments.  See, e.g.,
State v. Bishop, 346 N.C. 365, 396, 488 S.E.2d 769, 786 (1997). 
This assignment of error is rejected.
As to the final line of argument to which defendant points
as improper, the trial court in fact sustained defendant’s
objections at trial and gave the jury a curative instruction. 
Upon an examination of the record, we do not find that the trial
court acted improperly or that defendant was prejudiced.  For all
of the foregoing reasons, we hold that there was no error in the
trial court’s rulings made during the prosecutor’s closing
arguments in the guilt phase of the trial.
Defendant next assigns as error the trial court’s failure to
grant defendant’s request for a jury instruction on voluntary
manslaughter when the evidence supported such an instruction. 
Before the trial court, defendant argued that the evidence
supported an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based upon the
victim’s provocation arousing the “heat of passion” in defendant. 
The State contended that nothing in the evidence suggested
defendant was temporarily incapable of reflection or otherwise
supported the proposed instruction.  After hearing both sides,
the trial court determined that the jury charge would be limited
to first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and not guilty.
Defendant contends that the court’s refusal to instruct the
jury on voluntary manslaughter violated his rights under the
state and federal Constitutions.  We disagree.  This Court has
consistently held that “when a jury is properly instructed on
both first-degree and second-degree murder and returns a verdict
of guilty of first-degree murder, the failure to instruct on
voluntary manslaughter is harmless error.”  State v. East, 345
N.C. 535, 553, 481 S.E.2d 652, 664, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
139 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1997); see also State v. Exxum, 338 N.C. 297,
300, 449 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1994); State v. Wiggins, 334 N.C. 18,
37, 431 S.E.2d 755, 766 (1993).  Assuming, arguendo, that the
evidence warranted an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, the
jury’s verdict of first-degree murder and its rejection of
second-degree murder, upon proper instructions, renders any error
harmless.
By another assignment of error, defendant argues that the
trial court committed reversible error by refusing to give an
instruction on self-defense.  Defendant contends the evidence
showed the following:  that the victim was the aggressor; that
defendant and the victim fought; that defendant bested the victim
in the fight; that the victim then told defendant to wait, he
would be right back; and that the victim then moved toward the
shed, where he kept weapons.  Defendant asserts this was
sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that defendant was in
reasonable apprehension of death or great bodily harm.
We summarized the applicable law in State v. Ross, 338 N.C.
280, 449 S.E.2d 556:
There are two types of self-defense:  perfect and
imperfect.  Perfect self-defense excuses a killing
altogether, while imperfect self-defense may reduce a
charge of murder to voluntary manslaughter.  For
defendant to be entitled to an instruction on either
perfect or imperfect self-defense, the evidence must
show that defendant believed it to be necessary to kill
his adversary in order to save himself from death or
great bodily harm.  In addition, defendant’s belief
must be “reasonable in that the circumstances as they
appeared to him at the time were sufficient to create
such a belief in the mind of a person of ordinary
firmness.”
Id. at 283, 449 S.E.2d at 559-60 (citations omitted) (quoting
State v. McKoy, 332 N.C. 639, 644, 422 S.E.2d 713, 716 (1992)). 
Applying these principles to this case, we conclude that the
trial court did not err in refusing to give a jury instruction on
self-defense.
In Ross, which occurred under similar circumstances, we held
that the evidence was insufficient to merit an instruction on
either perfect or imperfect self-defense, and we reach the same
conclusion here.  In both cases, the defendant’s own statement
acknowledged that the victim was unarmed when the defendant shot
him in the back.  Id.; see also Exxum, 338 N.C. 297, 449 S.E.2d
554 (holding that defendant was not entitled to an instruction on
imperfect self-defense where undisputed evidence showed that
defendant shot victim in the back as victim was walking away from
defendant).  Likewise, in Ross, as here, the “[d]efendant failed
to present evidence to support a finding that he in fact formed a
belief that it was necessary to kill the victim in order to
protect himself from death or great bodily harm.”  Ross, 338 N.C.
at 283, 449 S.E.2d at 560.  Defendant offered no evidence that at
the time of the shooting he believed, reasonably or unreasonably,
that it was necessary to kill the victim in order to protect
himself from imminent death or great bodily harm.  Accordingly,
the trial judge did not err by failing to instruct on self-
defense.
By three assignments of error, defendant next argues  that
the trial court committed reversible error at the beginning of
the capital sentencing proceeding by allowing the prosecutor to
put before the jury a certified copy of his criminal record and
then substitute for that exhibit another exhibit without
retaining the original exhibit as part of the trial record.  We
find no merit in this argument.
The State offered “a certified copy of defendant’s record”
as the method of proof of the sole aggravating circumstance that
defendant had previously been convicted of a felony involving the
use of violence to the person.  Defendant objected, and the trial
court excused the jury from the courtroom.  After hearing
arguments, the judge determined that use of defendant’s criminal
record, which included both charges and convictions, was not
provided for by case law, and he required proof of the prior
felony conviction by introduction of the judgment itself.  The
trial court allowed the prosecutor to withdraw the copy of
defendant’s criminal record and substitute the judgment as
State’s Exhibit S-1.  The testimony of the deputy clerk of
superior court laid the foundation for admission of the judgment
into evidence.
Although a different form of proof may be accepted, so long
as it is sufficiently reliable, this Court has recognized that
the preferred method of proving a prior conviction is
introduction of the judgment itself into evidence.  See State v.
Bishop, 343 N.C. 518, 551, 472 S.E.2d 842, 859-60 (1996), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1997); State v. Thomas,
331 N.C. 671, 679, 417 S.E.2d 473, 479 (1992); State v. Maynard,
311 N.C. 1, 26, 316 S.E.2d 197, 211, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963,
83 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1984).  While the prosecutor initially
proffered a copy of defendant’s criminal record, it was never
admitted into evidence or “put before the jury.”  The trial court
in this case ruled appropriately in requiring the State to prove
the sole aggravating circumstance by the preferred method,
introduction of the judgment itself.  Defendant contends that the
mere proffer of his criminal record insinuated to the jury that
defendant had an extensive criminal history.  However,
defendant’s bare assertion of prejudice is unsupported by the
record.  The trial court did not err in admitting the judgment of
defendant’s prior felony conviction of assault with a deadly
weapon inflicting serious injury as proof of the aggravating
circumstance.
By his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the
trial court erred in overruling defendant’s objections to
improper cross-examination of defendant’s expert witnesses. 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor asked improper questions,
not in good faith, that were intended to prejudice the jury. 
Without identifying how any specific question exceeded the
permissible scope of cross-examination, defendant merely refers
to several portions of the transcript and generally labels the
prosecutor’s cross-examination as abusive and insulting to
defendant’s expert witnesses.
The trial court exercises broad discretion over the scope of
cross-examination and, in a sentencing proceeding, is not limited
by the Rules of Evidence.  State v. Warren, 347 N.C. 309, 317,
492 S.E.2d 609, 613 (1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 140 L.
Ed. 2d 818 (1998).  Generally, the scope of permissible cross-
examination is limited only by the discretion of the trial court
and the requirement of good faith.  See State v. Scott, 343 N.C.
313, 339-40, 471 S.E.2d 605, 621 (1996).
During the sentencing proceeding, defendant objected to
several questions placed to Dr. Brent Dennis, a professional
social worker who testified for defendant.  Defendant now asserts
broadly that these questions were not asked in good faith and
were intended to unduly prejudice the jury.  A careful inspection
of the record, however, reveals no prejudicial error during the
cross-examination of Dr. Dennis.  First, the trial court
sustained defendant’s objection to a question about whether
defendant’s past would be a predictor of his future actions.  The
witness did not answer, and defendant suffered no prejudice. 
Next, three questions concerning the circumstances of defendant’s
prior assault conviction, which defendant now attempts to
challenge on appeal, were not objected to at trial.  Applying the
plain error rule, we conclude that the trial court did not err by
failing to intervene ex mero motu to limit this questioning.  See
id. at 339, 471 S.E.2d at 621.  Finally, the prosecutor’s
remaining inquiries concerned whether defendant’s background
would change, how long defendant had been in prison for his prior
conviction, and how much the witness was compensated for his
services.  These questions were within the scope of permissible
cross-examination.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion
in overruling defendant’s objections.
Defendant also argues that the cross-examination of Dr. John
Warren, a forensic psychologist called by defendant to testify as
an expert, was abusive, insulting, and degrading, and was
intended to distort his testimony.  We disagree.  Dr. Warren was
interrogated as to the amount and method of computation of his
fee.  We have held that the compensation of an expert witness is
a legitimate subject of cross-examination to test the partiality
of the witness.  State v. Brown, 335 N.C. 477, 493, 439 S.E.2d
589, 598-99 (1994).  Defendant also points to portions of the
transcript where the trial court overruled his objections to
questions concerning how Dr. Warren arrived in Robeson County for
the trial, the number of capital trials at which Dr. Warren had
previously testified, and what Dr. Warren did while administering
the MMPI-2 (The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2) to
defendant.  Nothing in the record suggests abusive or improper
interrogation by the prosecutor.  Because we find no untoward or
bad-faith questioning of Dr. Warren or Dr. Dennis, and no abuse
of discretion by the trial court, we reject this assignment of
error.
Defendant next argues that the trial court allowed the
admission of irrelevant, improper, and prejudicial evidence
during the testimony of Detective Ken Sealey in violation of his
rights under the state and federal Constitutions.  During direct
examination of this witness, the prosecutor elicited the
following information, to which defendant objected:  (1) that the
victim of defendant’s prior assault conviction had been confined
to a wheelchair at the time of the assault, and (2) that the
original charge against defendant had been assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury.  We have
previously held that “evidence of the circumstances of prior
crimes is admissible to aid the sentencer” and that “the State is
entitled to present witnesses in the penalty phase of the trial
to prove the circumstances of prior convictions and is not
limited to the introduction of evidence of the record of
conviction.”  State v. Roper, 328 N.C. 337, 364-65, 402 S.E.2d
600, 616, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902, 116 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1991). 
The testimony of Detective Sealey simply conveyed the
circumstances of defendant’s prior conviction, which had already
been introduced as evidence.  The record reveals no prejudicial
insinuations flowing from this testimony as defendant contends. 
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly exercised its
discretion by allowing this evidence during the penalty phase of
the trial and that defendant’s constitutional rights were in no
way infringed thereby.
Defendant next argues that the trial court, during the
sentencing phase, excluded relevant mitigating evidence from
consideration by the jury.  Defendant contends that the trial
court’s rulings prevented the jury from making an appropriate
individualized decision on sentencing, resulting in a violation
of defendant’s rights under the state and federal Constitutions.
The United States Supreme Court, in Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978), held that under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the
sentencer in capital cases may “not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death.”  Id. at 604, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 990.  Consistent with this
constitutional mandate, our capital punishment statute provides
that, during the sentencing phase, evidence may be presented “as
to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence,”
including matters relating to mitigating circumstances.  N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-2000(a)(3) (1997).  The admissibility of mitigating
evidence during the penalty phase is not constrained by the Rules
of Evidence.  See N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 1101(b)(3) (1992); Green
v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 60 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1979).  However, the
trial judge must determine the admissibility of such evidence
subject to general rules excluding evidence that is repetitive,
unreliable, or lacking an adequate foundation.  See State v.
Simpson, 341 N.C. 316, 350, 462 S.E.2d 191, 211 (1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1161, 134 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1996).
During the sentencing proceeding, defendant presented
significant evidence in mitigation by way of seven witnesses.  On
numerous occasions, however, the trial court excluded evidence
upon the prosecutor’s objection, and defendant points to over
forty instances where the trial court allegedly excluded
admissible mitigating evidence.  After conducting an exhaustive
examination of each allegedly erroneous ruling, we conclude that
the trial court did not commit prejudicial error or abuse its
discretion by excluding mitigating evidence proffered by
defendant.
However, one of defendant’s arguments warrants further
discussion.  Defendant sought to attack the character of the
victim of his prior assault conviction, Donnie Wilkins, by
attempting to introduce Wilkins’ criminal record and elicit
testimony as to his reputation for violence.  Defendant claims
that this evidence was relevant to minimize or rebut the State’s
use of defendant’s prior felony conviction as an aggravating
circumstance.  See Bishop, 343 N.C. at 551, 472 S.E.2d at 860. 
We disagree.  The State proved the existence of the aggravating
circumstance by submitting the judgment, on the foundation of
testimony from the clerk of court, and by the testimony of the
investigating officer.  Wilkins did not appear at defendant’s
trial, nor was he a hearsay declarant subject to impeachment as
defendant contends.  The evidence defendant sought to submit did
not serve to illustrate the circumstances of defendant’s prior
felony conviction, nor did it serve to leave with the jury “a
more favorable impression of defendant’s character.”  State v.
Green, 321 N.C. 594, 611, 365 S.E.2d 587, 597, cert. denied, 488
U.S. 900, 102 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1988).  Nothing in the criminal
record of Donnie Wilkins sheds light on defendant’s age,
character, education, environment, habits, mentality,
propensities, or criminal record, or on the circumstances of the
offense for which defendant was being sentenced.  Accordingly,
the evidence was not relevant to mitigation, and the trial court
did not err in excluding it.
Defendant’s next five arguments concern the trial court’s
alleged failure to submit and properly instruct on several
statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  For the
following reasons, we find these arguments to be without merit.
Defendant first asserts that the trial court committed
reversible error by refusing to submit, upon defendant’s written
request, the statutory mitigating circumstance that the victim
was a voluntary participant in defendant’s homicidal conduct,
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(3).  Defendant argues that
this mitigating circumstance was appropriate because the victim
provoked a fight with defendant and, therefore, was a voluntary
participant in the homicidal conduct that followed.  We do not
agree.
This Court recently examined this mitigating circumstance
for the first time in State v. Larry, 345 N.C. 497, 481 S.E.2d
907, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1997).  In
that case, we concluded that the evidence did not support
submission of the mitigating circumstance where the victim
attempted to apprehend the defendant as he fled after committing
armed robbery.  In this case, by defendant’s own admission,
defendant was “getting the best of [Jay Taylor]” in the fight,
and Taylor had “stopped” before defendant reentered the mobile
home to get his shotgun.  Defendant presented no evidence that he
knew the victim kept a weapon in the shed or that the victim
reinitiated the fight.  Nonetheless, defendant asserts that the
victim’s words, “I will be right back, you son of a bitch,”
coupled with the prior altercation, constituted the victim’s
voluntary participation in defendant’s homicidal conduct.  It is
undisputed that defendant’s homicidal conduct consisted of
retrieving his shotgun from inside the mobile home, shooting the
victim in the back, and firing at the victim again as he was
lying on the ground.  The victim was not a voluntary participant
in defendant’s homicidal conduct within the meaning of the (f)(3)
mitigating circumstance.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court committed
reversible error by refusing to submit, upon written request, two
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.
The trial court submitted the nonstatutory mitigating
circumstance that “defendant and James Charles Taylor never
established a stepfather/stepson relationship.”  During the
charge conference, defendant agreed that this was “sufficient.” 
Defendant now contends that the trial court erred by not giving
the circumstance as originally proposed, that “there was an
extenuating relationship between the defendant and James Charles
Taylor.”  We have repeatedly held that “[i]f a proposed
nonstatutory mitigating circumstance is subsumed in other
statutory or nonstatutory mitigating circumstances which are
submitted, it is not error for the trial court to refuse to
submit it.”  State v. Richmond, 347 N.C. 412, 438, 495 S.E.2d
677, 691 (1998); see also State v. Strickland, 346 N.C. 443, 466,
488 S.E.2d 194, 207 (1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L.
Ed. 2d 757 (1998); State v. Bates, 343 N.C. 564, 583, 473 S.E.2d
269, 279 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 873
(1997).  The circumstance that was actually submitted, along with
the statutory (f)(9) catchall mitigating circumstance, which was
also submitted, allowed the jury to consider and give weight to
all evidence presented regarding the nature of defendant’s
relationship with the victim.  Accordingly, the trial judge did
not err in failing to submit the additional nonstatutory
mitigating circumstance as originally proposed by defendant.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by
failing to submit as a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance that
“defendant continues to have family members, such as his mother,
brother, aunts and uncles, who care for and support him.”  This
circumstance, as worded, relates to persons other than defendant. 
Matters which reflect upon “‘defendant’s character, record or the
nature of his participation in the offense’” are properly
considered in mitigation by the jury.  State v. McLaughlin, 341
N.C. 426, 441, 462 S.E.2d 1, 9 (1995) (quoting State v. Irwin,
304 N.C. 93, 104, 282 S.E.2d 439, 447 (1981)) (emphasis added),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1133, 133 L. Ed. 2d 879 (1996); see also
State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 98, 257 S.E.2d 551, 559 (1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941, 64 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1980).  The
feelings, actions, and conduct of third parties have no
mitigating value as to defendant and, therefore, are irrelevant
to a capital sentencing proceeding.  The trial court did not err
in excluding this proposed nonstatutory mitigating circumstance.
By two more assignments of error, defendant argues that the
trial court committed reversible error by refusing to give
peremptory instructions on the existence of all the statutory and
several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  If a mitigating
circumstance is supported by uncontroverted and manifestly
credible evidence, defendant is entitled, upon request, to a
peremptory instruction on that circumstance.  State v. Gregory,
340 N.C. 365, 415, 459 S.E.2d 638, 667 (1995), cert. denied, 517
U.S. 1108, 134 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1996).  However, a defendant must
timely request such an instruction, as the trial court is “not
required to sift through all the evidence and determine which of
defendant’s proposed mitigating circumstances entitle him to a
peremptory instruction.”  Id. at 416, 459 S.E.2d at 667. 
Further, a defendant must specify a proper peremptory instruction
for statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  Id.;
see also Buckner, 342 N.C. at 235-37, 464 S.E.2d at 436.  A
general request for a peremptory instruction on all mitigating
circumstances is insufficient.  Gregory, 340 N.C. at 416-17, 459
S.E.2d at 667.
In this case, defendant did not request peremptory
instructions during the charge conference and only raised the
issue just prior to closing arguments in the penalty phase of the
trial.  Defendant did not make a specific request for peremptory
instructions for statutory and nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances, nor did he make a showing that the evidence
supporting any mitigating circumstance was uncontroverted and
manifestly credible.  Defendant merely raised the issue of
peremptory instructions before the trial court and did little
more than recite several mitigating circumstances.  Even in
arguing to this Court, defendant does not point to any specific
mitigating circumstance, statutory or nonstatutory, on which the
trial court erroneously denied a peremptory instruction after a
proper request and a showing of sufficient evidence.  We conclude
that the trial court did not err in ruling on this issue.
By his next assignment of error, defendant argues that the
trial court committed reversible error by failing to submit and
instruct the jury on a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance, 
defendant’s emotional immaturity at the time of the offense,
after agreeing to submit such circumstance for consideration by
the jury.  The record reveals that defendant initially requested
two nearly identical nonstatutory mitigating circumstances:
number 7, “The Defendant, though 21 at the time of the offense,
is emotionally immature,” and number 24, “Defendant’s emotional
immaturity at the time of the offense reduced his culpability.” 
During the charge conference, defendant agreed to the submission
of number 7 only.  This mitigating circumstance relating to
defendant’s emotional immaturity was in fact submitted and
instructed on.  Therefore, defendant’s assignment of error is
without merit.
Defendant next argues, based on ten assignments of error,
that during the capital sentencing proceeding the trial court
allowed the prosecutor to make arguments that were improper,
inflammatory, prejudicial, and unsupported by the evidence.  In
reviewing defendant’s contentions regarding the guilt phase of
his trial, we examined the law applicable to prosecutors’
arguments.  We note here that “[t]hese principles apply not only
to ordinary jury arguments, but also to arguments made at the
close of the sentencing phase in capital cases.”  Fullwood, 343
N.C. at 740, 472 S.E.2d at 891.  Further, in addition to the wide
latitude generally afforded trial counsel in jury arguments, we
also recognize that “the prosecutor of a capital case has a duty
to zealously attempt to persuade the jury that, upon the facts
presented, the death penalty is appropriate.”  Strickland, 346
N.C. at 467, 488 S.E.2d at 208.  Applying these principles to the
instant case, we find no prejudicial error.
We first note that defendant includes in his assignments of
error several pages of arguments directed toward  defendant’s
mitigating evidence, to which defendant did not object at trial. 
The prosecutor urged the jury, inter alia, that defendant’s
evidence did not establish that he was under the influence of a
mental or emotional disturbance, that defendant’s capacity to
comply with the law was not impaired, and that defendant’s size
in comparison to the victim’s was not a mitigating factor in this
case.  Upon close scrutiny of the arguments, we conclude that
none were so grossly improper as to require the trial court to
intervene ex mero motu.
Defendant also excepts to numerous instances in which his
objections to the prosecutor’s arguments were overruled. 
Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court committed
reversible error by allowing the prosecutor to:  (1) inject his
personal opinion of the significance of the evidence, (2) stress
the character of the deceased and the impact of his death on his
family, (3) assert the possibility of a new trial for defendant,
(4) make improper and inflammatory arguments, (5) stress the
societal impact of crime, (6) negate the jury’s duty to consider
the mitigating circumstances, (7) argue the deterrent effect of
the death penalty, and (8) misrepresent the testimony of
defendant’s mental health experts.  After an exhaustive
examination of the transcript, we conclude that defendant’s
contentions are without merit.
However, three of defendant’s contentions require further
discussion.  First, the prosecutor argued to the jury that J.R.
Taylor, defendant’s stepbrother and the victim’s son, walked
outside and saw “his father laying there on the ground . . . his
life’s blood puddled.”  Defendant objected on the basis that
there was no evidence to support the statement.  The trial court
overruled the objection, stating that “[t]he jury will recall the
evidence.”  We have carefully reviewed the entire record and
agree with defendant that there was no evidence to support the
prosecutor’s assertion that J.R. Taylor saw his father after the
shooting.  The trial court should have disallowed this statement,
as “[i]t is well settled that the trial court is required to
censor remarks not warranted either by the law or by the facts.” 
State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 225, 433 S.E.2d 144, 153 (1993),
cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994).
However, even though the prosecutor’s argument was improper,
defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing only if the
comment “‘so infected the trial with unfairness’” as to deny
defendant due process of law.  Id. at 223-24, 433 S.E.2d at 152
(quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 91 L. Ed. 2d
144, 157 (1986)).  This remark by the prosecutor did not have
such an effect.  The victim’s son testified that he heard a 
gunshot, and there was substantial evidence that the boy was
inside the trailer when his father was killed outside, only
several feet away.  The evidence clearly established J.R.
Taylor’s proximity to the scene of his father’s murder.  We
conclude that the prosecutor’s statement that J.R. saw the body,
while inappropriate, was not prejudicial.  The trial court’s
error in failing to sustain defendant’s objection was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Next, defendant repeatedly objected to the prosecutor’s
argument for the death penalty as an appropriate punishment. 
Defendant contends that speculation about defendant’s future
dangerousness was inflammatory and that the trial court erred by
allowing it.  The record shows that the prosecutor urged the jury
to “save someone else’s life” and to never “let him put his hands
on another gun or another knife and face down another human being
who has made him mad.”  The prosecutor argued that prison would
not do defendant any good and that the death penalty would
prevent defendant from taking another life.  During this
argument, the trial court instructed the prosecutor to make it
clear that his deterrence argument applied only to this
defendant.  We have previously held that arguments invoking
specific deterrence are proper.  See State v. Syriani, 333 N.C.
350, 397, 428 S.E.2d 118, 144, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 948, 126 L.
Ed. 2d 341 (1993).  This argument is rejected.
Finally, defendant contends that the following argument
improperly commented on a possible appeal:  “You’ve got to stop
this now, ladies and gentlemen.  And only you can do it.  Don’t
pick up the paper somewhere down the road and read about a new
trial of [defendant].”  Defendant objected.  Out of the presence
of the jury, defendant argued to the court that this implied to
the jury that defendant could get a retrial.  Defendant requested
a mistrial.  The trial court stated that it did not interpret the
argument that way.  The court denied the motion for a mistrial
and overruled defendant’s objection.  We conclude that the trial
court correctly interpreted the prosecutor’s argument as an
extension of his specific-deterrence argument as to defendant,
rather than a comment on the appellate process.  We decline to
hold that the trial court erred in this ruling.
By another assignment of error, defendant contends that his
state and federal constitutional rights were violated by the
jury’s recommendation of a death sentence because it was returned
under the influence of passion, prejudice, and other arbitrary
factors.  Defendant argues that grossly improper arguments by the
prosecutor, specifically arguments that implied defendant would
get a new trial, get out of jail, and kill again, substantially
influenced the jury’s recommendation of death.  We have already
addressed these assertions and found them to be meritless.  We
have also carefully scrutinized the entire record for any
indication of the influence of passion, prejudice, or other
arbitrary factors in the jury’s recommendation, and having found
none, we reject this assignment of error.
Defendant raises six additional issues which he has
denominated as preservation issues.  As to the first of these,
defendant simply reiterates the arguments he made concerning
allegedly improper and prejudicial comments by the prosecutor
concerning the possibility of a new trial.  Defendant contends
that the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial. 
For the reasons we have already stated, we reject this argument.
Of the remaining five issues raised by defendant, we
initially note that at least four
are not proper preservation issues because they are not
determined solely by principles of law upon which this
Court has previously ruled.  Rather, these assignments
of error are fact specific requiring review of the
transcript and record to determine if the assignment
has merit.  Where counsel determines that an issue of
this nature does not have merit, counsel should “omit
it entirely from his or her argument on appeal.”
Gregory, 340 N.C. at 429, 459 S.E.2d at 675 (quoting State v.
Barton, 335 N.C. 696, 712, 441 S.E.2d 295, 303 (1994)). 
Furthermore, none of these five issues is addressed by any
argument or authority whatsoever.  “Assignments of error . . . in
support of which no reason or argument is stated or authority
cited[] will be taken as abandoned.”  N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(5).
Having concluded that defendant’s trial and capital
sentencing proceeding were free of prejudicial error, we turn now
to duties reserved exclusively for this Court in capital cases. 
It is our duty under N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(d)(2) to ascertain: 
(1) whether the record supports the jury’s finding of the
aggravating circumstance on which the sentence of death was
based; (2) whether the death sentence was entered under the
influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary
consideration; and (3) whether the death sentence is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant.
In this case, the sole aggravating circumstance submitted to
and found by the jury was that defendant had been previously
convicted of a felony involving the use of violence to the
person, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(3).  None of the jurors found the
existence of any submitted statutory mitigating circumstance: 
that defendant had no significant history of prior criminal
activity, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(1); that the murder was
committed while defendant was under the influence of mental or
emotional disturbance, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(2); that the
capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law
was impaired, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(6); or the age of defendant
at the time of the crime, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(7).  The trial
court also submitted seventeen nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances and the catchall mitigating circumstance, N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-2000(f)(9), none of which was found by any juror.
The existence of the (e)(3) aggravating circumstance was
established at trial through the introduction of the judgment of
defendant’s prior conviction of assault with a deadly weapon
inflicting serious injury, as well as the testimony of the
detective who investigated the assault.  After thoroughly
examining the record, transcripts, and briefs in this case, we
conclude that the record fully supports the sole aggravating
circumstance submitted to and found by the jury.  Further, as
stated above, we find no indication that the sentence of death in
this case was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice,
or any other arbitrary consideration.  We must turn then to our
final statutory duty of proportionality review.
We begin our proportionality review by comparing the present
case with other cases in which this Court has concluded that the
death penalty was disproportionate.  We have found the death
penalty disproportionate in seven cases.  State v. Benson, 323
N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352
S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713
(1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C.
647, 483 S.E.2d 396, and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364
S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181
(1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State
v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170; State v. Jackson, 309
N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).  No case in which this Court has
determined the death penalty to be disproportionate has included
the aggravating circumstance that defendant had previously been
convicted of a felony involving the use of violence to the
person.  State v. Burke, 343 N.C. 129, 162, 469 S.E.2d 901, 918,
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1996); State v.
Rose, 335 N.C. 301, 351, 439 S.E.2d 518, 546, cert. denied, 512
U.S. 1246, 129 L. Ed. 2d 883 (1994).  Additionally, although the
jury considered twenty-two mitigating circumstances, it found
none.  We conclude that this case is not substantially similar to
any case in which this Court has found the death penalty
disproportionate.
It is also proper to compare this case to those where the
death sentence was found proportionate.  McCollum, 334 N.C. at
244, 433 S.E.2d at 164.  However, it is unnecessary to cite every
case used for comparison.  Id.; Syriani, 333 N.C. at 400, 428
S.E.2d at 146.  We do note that this Court has previously upheld
a sentence of death in cases in which the sole aggravating
circumstance found by the jury was the conviction of a prior 
felony involving the use of violence to the person.  See
Strickland, 346 N.C. at 469-70, 488 S.E.2d at 209-10.
In the instant case, there was sufficient evidence
introduced to support this aggravating circumstance.  Evidence
presented at trial as to the circumstances of defendant’s
previous conviction of a prior violent felony revealed it was a
knife attack on a victim confined to a wheelchair.  Additionally,
defendant was convicted in this case of first-degree murder under
the theory of premeditation and deliberation.  Defendant shot his
unarmed stepfather in the back and fired the gun twice more as
the victim was lying on the ground.
After comparing this case to other roughly similar cases as
to the crime and the defendant, we conclude that this case has
the characteristics of first-degree murders for which we have
previously upheld the death penalty as proportionate.  We hold
that defendant received a fair trial and capital sentencing
proceeding free of prejudicial error and that the death sentence
in this case is not excessive or disproportionate.
NO ERROR.
Justice WYNN did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this opinion.