Title: Bryan v. Itasca County
Citation: 228 N.W.2d 249
Docket Number: 44947
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: March 28, 1975

228 N.W.2d 249 (1975) Russell BRYAN, Individually, and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Appellant. v. ITASCA COUNTY, Minnesota, Respondent. No. 44947. Supreme Court of Minnesota. March 28, 1975. *250 Gerald L. Seck, Leech Lake Reservation Legal Services Project, Cass Lake, for appellant; Thomas L. Smithson, Daniel H. Israel, John E. Echohawk, Native American Rights Fund, Boulder, Colo., of counsel. Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Peter W. Sipkins, Sol. Gen., Dann L. Parsons and Steven G. Thorne, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., St. Paul, William J. Spooner, County Atty., Grand Rapids, for respondent. Kent P. Tupper, Walker, and Bernard P. Becker, St. Paul, amicus curiae, for Minn. Chippewa Tribe (seeking reversal). Wallace H. Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jacques B. Gelin, Charles E. Biblowit, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., amicus curiae, for United States (seeking reversal). Considered and decided by the court en banc. YETKA, Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court, holding plaintiff, an enrolled *251 member of the Minnesota Chippewa tribe,[1] liable for the payment of personal property taxes on his mobile home.[2] We affirm. Plaintiff is the owner of a certain 1972 Skyline mobile home, in which he resides with his wife and family. The mobile home is located on land held in trust for the Chippewa tribe of Minnesota by the United States Government within the boundaries of the Greater Leech Lake Indian Reservation. On September 12, 1972, plaintiff commenced an action in the District Court of Itasca County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the tax in question on grounds the county has no authority to levy such a tax upon plaintiff and others similarly situated. The matter was heard by the district court on March 15, 1973, which thereafter issued findings of fact and conclusions of law determining that plaintiff was not immune from the personal property tax. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment entered on December 8, 1973. The issue raised on this appeal is whether the State of Minnesota, or its political subdivisions, may impose a personal property tax upon a mobile home owned and occupied by an enrolled member of the Chippewa tribe of Minnesota who resides within a reservation upon land held in trust by the United States government for the tribe. As will be shown hereafter, Indians have traditionally enjoyed a unique status both under decisions of this court and those of the Federal judiciary. It has been uniformly held that no state may levy a tax upon an Indian tribal member unless authorized by Congress to do so. In the recent case of McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm., 411 U.S. 164, 93 S. Ct. 1257, 36 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1973), the court was confronted with an attempt by the State of Arizona to impose a state income tax upon the income of an enrolled member of the Navajo tribe who lived and derived her income from activities upon the reservation. The court held the tax imposition to be unlawful on grounds that no treaty or Federal law authorized this tax. It is relevant to note that Arizona was not included within the scope of Public Law 280, 67 Stat. 583,[3] 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162, and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360. The court stated: In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 93 S. Ct. 1267, 36 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1973), a companion case of McClanahan, the court was confronted with an attempt by the State of New Mexico[4] to impose a tax upon receipts of a ski resort operated by plaintiff tribe under the auspices of the Indian Reorganization Act upon land leased from the United States Forest Service. The state also imposed a compensating use tax upon the purchase price of materials used to construct ski lifts upon the leased property. *252 The court upheld the receipts tax upon the ground that off-reservation Indian activities are subject to more extensive state authority. The court then held such activities were subject to state law, absent express Federal law to the contrary. However, the court held the ski-lift equipment to be exempt from state taxation because that equipment had been permanently attached to the realty and thus it was exempt in the same manner as was the land itself. Mescalero is relevant to our inquiry as a reaffirmance of the principle that Therefore, the current status of the law as set forth in McClanahan and Mescalero may be summarized as follows: (1) The doctrine of Indian sovereignty is relevant as a backdrop in determining the applicability of state laws to reservation Indians. (2) Congress has plenary jurisdiction over reservation Indians. That jurisdiction may be ceded to the states only by express grants of jurisdiction. In absence of such grants, no state power exists. Thus we must first determine whether Congress vested authority in the State of Minnesota to levy this tax upon a reservation Indian. Defendant advances three sources of power to tax plaintiff: The Minnesota Enabling Act is silent as to any Indian lands located within the territorial boundaries of Minnesota. Defendant points out that such is not the case with the enabling acts of certain of our sister states.[8] Thus, defendant concludes that state jurisdiction, including the power to tax reservation Indians, was granted by the enabling act. Defendant also contends that Article 15, § 2, of the Minnesota Constitution[9] expressly allows for taxation of Indians and was approved by Congress. However, the above two arguments must fail in light of State v. Jackson, 218 Minn. 429, 16 N.W.2d 752 (1944). That case involved an attempt by the state to enforce its game laws against a reservation Indian while upon the reservation. In holding such Indians immune from prosecution under state game laws, this court stated: The language of Public Law 280 lends support to defendant's assertion of power to levy the tax at issue. Specifically, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360, provides as follows: Defendant logically argues that unless paragraph (a) is interpreted as a general grant of the power to tax, then the exceptions contained in paragraph (b) are limitations on a nonexistent power. Plaintiff contends that Public Law 280 was intended as a "law and order" statute *254 not intended to grant such sweeping powers to state and local governments. A review of the legislative history of the act discloses that this provision was enacted in furtherance of the congressional policy of "termination" as expressed in H.R.Con.Res. 108, 83rd Cong. 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132, which states: At oral argument, one of the attorneys representing the United States Department of Interior advised this court that the government's policy of assimilation was no longer working, and the department now supports plaintiff's position. However, this court is bound to interpret the statutes according to the intent of Congress at the time of passage of Public Law 280. If Congress today intends a different result, it can easily repeal or modify Public Law 280. However, we accept the logic of defendant's position that it would make little sense for Congress to grant full civil and criminal powers to the state over all Indian territory and all Indian tribes in Minnesota (except the Red Lake Band) and specifically exempt certain property from taxation if the power to tax were not included within the original civil powers granted. See, Note, 39 Minn.L. Rev. 853. The case most directly in point is a recent decision reached in the Federal District Court for the District of Nebraska in Omaha Tribe of Indians v. Peters, 382 F. Supp. 421 (D.Neb.1974). That court held that Public Law 280 granted the State of Nebraska the power to levy a state income tax upon the income derived by an Indian from employment on the reservation. The following excerpts from the court's opinion are relevant: The Peters case appears to be the only case relevant to the instant inquiry. Defendant relies upon Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184 (9 Cir. 1971), certiorari denied, 405 U.S. 933, 92 S. Ct. 930, 30 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1972). However, as plaintiff points out in his reply brief, that case dealt with an attempt to impose a leasehold tax upon a non-Indian. Commissioner of Taxation v. Brun, 286 Minn. 43, 174 N.W.2d 120 (1970), is also not relevant here. That case dealt with the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, which occupies a distinct position and is not subject to Public Law 280. The recent case of Tonasket v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 164, 525 P.2d 744 (1974), which reconsidered Tonasket v. State, 79 Wash. 2d 607, 488 P.2d 281 (1971), upon remand from the United States Supreme Court, 411 U.S. 451, 93 S. Ct. 1941, 36 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1973), is not particularly helpful since it actually dealt only with the narrow issue of the power of a state, following its assumption of jurisdiction over Indian tribes pursuant to Public Law 280, to impose a tax upon the sale of cigarettes within the reservation boundaries by an Indian seller to nonreservation customers. Plaintiff's strongest argument lies in the application of rules of construction, the most prominent of which was repeated in McClanahan as follows: *256 Plaintiff cites the absence of any specific grant of taxing power in Public Law 280 and thus characterizes the granting of such a power as doubtful.[11] Of course, herein lies the crux of the entire case. Defendant's position, and the opinion of the court in Peters is that Public Law 280 is a clear grant of the power to tax, and we so hold. Although it is conceded that Indians have had a unique legal status in our society since earliest times, the various Indian tribes are not sovereign states. They only have such powers as Congress allows them to retain. It has been the Federal government, through its vacillation in determining the best course to follow for over 100 years, that has led to the present confusion, including the issues raised by this lawsuit. The government first appears to move toward termination and assimilation, then to retreat from those objectives, and retrenches, this indecision has resulted in a great deal of confusion. However, insofar as Public Law 280 is concerned, we think the Federal District Court which decided the Peters case was correct when it stated: It appears to us that Congress must decide whether to continue the program of assimilation which was outlined in the Hoover Commission Report of 1949, and embodied in Public Law 280 or to return greater sovereign immunity to the various Indian tribes, including the return to them of full civil and criminal jurisdiction free from all state control, and the freeing of the states from some liability for the care, support, and administration of the various Indian tribes. To choose the latter alternative without freeing the states of their responsibilities would appear to raise a serious question of violation of the equal protection clauses of both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Minnesota. Plaintiff has, for the first time, alleged in his brief that his mobile home was in fact annexed to tribal trust land, and thus is exempt under Public Law 280. However, in his complaint plaintiff does not allege that the mobile home is real property. In fact, paragraph 9 of his complaint states the defendant has no lawful authority "to assess or impose a tax upon his personal property." (Italics supplied.) This entire lawsuit and appeal were predicated on the assumption that this mobile home was in fact personal property. The trial court in its findings stated: Therefore, we do not rule as to whether the mobile home can be taxed if in fact it is permanently affixed to the realty and cannot be removed by the owner, and thus is assessable in the manner of real estate taxes. This court has repeatedly refused to decide issues first raised on appeal. Rathbun v. W. T. Grant Co., Minn., 219 N.W.2d 641 (1974); Tourville v. Tourville, 292 Minn. 489, 198 N.W.2d 138 (1972). In summary, the question raised is whether Public Law 280 provides authority for defendant to levy the tax at issue. The language of the act, case law, and logic lend support to defendant's position. *257 The trial court therefore must be and hereby is affirmed. KELLY and KNUTSON, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. [1] The Minnesota Chippewa tribe is organized and recognized as an Indian tribe by the United States pursuant to the Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984) as amended, under a Federal charter of incorporation issued by the then Secretary of Interior, and ratified by the tribe on November 13, 1937. [2] The taxes challenged by plaintiff were imposed for the years 1971 and 1972 pursuant to the applicable provisions of Minn.St. 168.012, subd. 9, and § 272.01, subd. 1. Mobile homes during 1971 and 1972 were classified as 2a property. Minn.St. 273.13, subd. 3. [3] Subsequently amended by 69 Stat. 795, 72 Stat. 545, and 84 Stat. 1358. [4] New Mexico was not included within the scope of 67 Stat. 589, as amended, 18 U.S. C.A. § 1162, and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360. [5] 11 Stat. 166. [6] Minn.Const. art. 15, § 2, which subsequent to the commencement of this action was removed by the 1974 amendment to the constitution. [7] 67 Stat. 588, as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162, and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360. [8] Arizona and New Mexico, 36 Stat. 557; Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington, 25 Stat. 676, 677; Oklahoma, 34 Stat. 267; and Utah, 28 Stat. 107. The Arizona statute is typical, providing that Indian lands in Arizona shall remain "under the absolute jurisdiction and control" of the United States. 36 Stat. 557, 569. [9] Minn.Const. art. 15, § 2, prior to its removal in 1974, stated: "§ 2. Residents on Indian lands. "Sec. 2. Persons residing on Indian lands within the State shall enjoy all rights and privileges of citizens, as though they lived in any other portion of the State, and shall be subject to taxation." [10] See, also, Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 76 S. Ct. 611, 100 L. Ed. 883 (1956); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 32 S. Ct. 565, 59 L. Ed. 941 (1912). [11] In Omaha Tribe of Indians v. Peters, 382 F. Supp. 421, 425 (1974), the court stated that the rule of construction as set forth in McClanahan does not apply "when the taxing authority has jurisdictional power over the tribe." This statement presupposes resolution of the crucial questionwhether jurisdiction in fact exists. Thus, the McClanahan rule of construction is applicable if in fact P.L. 280 contains a doubtful expression.