Title: Powell v. Delaware
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 270, 2011
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 9, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DERRICK POWELL, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
Nos.  266/270, 2011 
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware, in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
Sussex County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0909000858 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
Submitted: July 5, 2012 
 
Decided: 
August 9, 2012  
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices, and 
STRINE, Chancellor,1 constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.  
 
 
Bernard J. O’Donnell, Nicole M. Walker (argued) and Santino Ceccotti 
(argued), Esquires, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware; for 
Appellant. 
 
 
Paul R. Wallace (argued), Abby L. Adams and Gregory E. Smith, Esquires, 
Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware; for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
JACOBS, Justice:
                                          
 
1 Sitting by designation pursuant to Art. IV, § 12 of the Delaware Constitution and Supreme 
Court Rules 2 and 4.      
 
 
Pending before this Court is Derrick Powell’s direct appeal from a judgment 
of conviction and death sentence for the murder of Georgetown Police Officer, 
Chad Spicer.  Powell claims that legal flaws in the police investigation of the 
homicide and in the jury trial fatally tainted his conviction, and that his death 
sentence is both unconstitutional and disproportionate to sentences handed down in 
similar past cases.  We conclude Powell’s claims lack merit and affirm. 
I. FACTS 
 
 
On the evening of September 1, 2009, Derrick Powell, Luis Flores 
(“Flores”) and Christopher Reeves (“Reeves”) drove to a McDonald’s restaurant in 
Georgetown, planning to rob a drug dealer.2  An acquaintance of Reeves, Thomas 
Bundick (“Bundick”), had arranged for Darshon Adkins (“Adkins”) to sell Reeves 
marijuana.  Bundick did not know that Powell, Flores and Reeves were actually 
planning to take the drugs by force, specifically by robbing the dealer while he was 
sitting inside Flores’ Chrysler Sebring.  
Because Bundick knew only Reeves, Reeves was chosen to drive the 
Sebring.  The front passenger seat was left empty for either Bundick or Adkins to 
occupy.  Powell sat in the rear seat behind Reeves, and was carrying a gun.  Flores 
sat in the rear seat behind the seat reserved for Bundick or Adkins.  The three men 
                                          
 
2 A detailed recitation of relevant events preceding that meeting at McDonald’s is set forth in the 
Superior Court’s opinion, upon which our more abbreviated factual recitation is based.  State v. 
Powell, 2011 WL 2041183, at *3-7 (Del. Super. May 20, 2011). 
2 
 
parked the car in the McDonald’s parking lot and waited for Bundick and Adkins, 
who arrived separately.   
The robbery plan went awry because Adkins refused to get into the Sebring.  
Bundick soon fled the scene.  Adkins remained and walked towards the 
McDonald’s, followed by Powell.  Outside the restaurant, Powell pulled his gun 
and fired the weapon at Adkins, while Adkins was fleeing.  Reeves, meanwhile, 
began to drive off in the Sebring, but at Flores’ insistence, Reeves stopped so that 
Powell could get back into the car.  Flores remained seated in the rear passenger’s 
side seat.  Powell returned to the same rear driver’s side seat he had occupied 
before leaving the car in search of Adkins.  After Powell re-entered the car, Flores 
and Powell began to argue about Powell’s decision to confront and shoot at 
Adkins. 
 
At 6:42 p.m., a call was made to 911 reporting the gunshot fired outside the 
McDonald’s.  The police responded promptly, but by then Powell, Flores and 
Reeves had driven away.  As the three men drove past a school in Georgetown, 
Reeves told his companions that he wanted to stop the car.  Powell ordered Reeves 
to continue driving.  Reeves complied.  By the time the three men reached The 
Circle in Georgetown, they were being followed by a police car which was 
attempting to pull them over.  At that point, Powell threatened out loud that if 
3 
 
Reeves stopped the car, he (Powell) would shoot at the pursuing police, who (it 
later developed) were Officers Shawn Brittingham and Chad Spicer. 
 
After turning on North King Street, Reeves decided to pull his car over—
despite Powell’s earlier threat.  Reeves stopped abruptly and opened his driver’s 
side door to leave the car.  That, in turn, caused the police cruiser to stop quickly 
and strike Reeves’ door as it opened.  The two cars then came to a halt about two 
feet apart.  Reeves jumped out of the Sebring, climbed over the hood of the police 
cruiser, and fled.  As Officer Brittingham got out of the police car to chase Reeves, 
he heard a gunshot.  Flores testified that he saw Powell fire his gun at the stopped 
police car.  The bullet struck Officer Spicer and fatally wounded him.  At 6:46 
p.m., only four minutes after the first 911 call from McDonald’s, Officer 
Brittingham, who was then pursuing Reeves, reported that he and Officer Spicer 
had been fired at. 
 
After hearing the shot, witnesses reported seeing Powell get out of the 
Sebring holding a gun, and then flee.  Flores also exited the car, but remained at 
the scene and expressed immediate shock, exclaiming “Why did you do that?”  
Flores then approached the police cruiser and tried to help Officer Spicer out of the 
car.  Flores had to move the Sebring several feet so that the door on Officer 
Spicer’s side could open fully.  Officer Spicer, who by then was immobile, was 
4 
 
laid down on the sidewalk, and died of his gunshot wound shortly thereafter, 
despite efforts to revive him. 
 
Less than 20 minutes later, Powell was found with the gun used to kill 
Officer Spicer, and was taken into custody.  Powell had been inside a nearby 
house, having just persuaded the owner to allow him to use the bathroom.  Flores 
was also detained by the police, but later was released.  Reeves escaped, but 
eventually turned himself in.   
At the crime scene, the police gathered samples from Flores’ hands to be 
tested for gunshot residue.  Later that evening, while Powell was in a holding cell, 
the police also gathered samples from Powell’s hands for testing.  The test results 
were positive for gunshot residue.  While Powell was in custody, the police also 
gathered his clothing and later sent Powell’s shirt, together with ballistic evidence 
from the crime scene, to a State Police firearms examiner.  The examiner tested 
one section of Powell’s shirt—the left shoulder area—for gunshot residue, to 
determine the angle or position from which the gun had been fired.3  No gunshot 
residue was found on that portion of Powell’s shirt.  The police also collected DNA 
samples from the gun that was used in the shooting, and took DNA samples from 
Powell, Flores and Reeves.  State officials found Powell’s DNA to be consistent 
with the DNA found on the gun in “every comparison area.”  Those officials also 
                                          
 
3 The investigator testified that if the shot were fired “across [Powell’s] shirt,” then it could have 
left residue on Powell’s shirt as the shot “bl[ew] past.”   
5 
 
determined that “there was not enough consistency between Flores’ [and] Reeves’ 
DNA and [the DNA found] on the gun to draw any conclusions definitively linking 
the gun to Reeves or Flores.”4   
On November 23, 2009, Powell was indicted on 14 charges arising from 
Officer Spicer’s killing and the attempted robbery of Adkins.  Those charges 
included two counts of first-degree murder—one count for recklessly causing the 
death of a law enforcement officer during the lawful performance of his duties 
(Officer Spicer); and the other, for recklessly causing the death of Officer Spicer 
while fleeing from an attempted robbery.  Reeves was charged with Resisting 
Arrest and Failure to Stop at a Police Signal.  Flores was not charged with any 
offense.  
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
A. Pre-Trial Proceedings 
During the period between Powell’s November 23, 2009 indictment and the 
beginning of trial in January 2011, Powell’s counsel filed several pre-trial motions.  
On March 12, 2010, Powell moved to transfer the venue of the trial from Sussex 
County to either Kent or New Castle County.  Powell claimed that the entire 
Sussex County jury pool had been irreparably prejudiced by the intense media 
                                          
 
4 A defense expert later testified that “she obtained one full [DNA] profile that was consistent 
with Flores from the trigger swab.” 
 
6 
 
coverage of Officer Spicer’s death and Powell’s arrest.  The Superior Court denied 
that motion on April 21, 2010, finding that neither the news coverage nor the other 
evidence presented was sufficient for the court to “presume” juror prejudice.  The 
denial of that motion, however, was without prejudice to a later motion to transfer 
venue, if the jury selection process disclosed evidence that a venue transfer was 
warranted.   
Powell’s counsel also moved, before trial, to preclude the State from seeking 
the death penalty, claiming that the imposition of a death sentence in Powell’s case 
would be constitutionally infirm.  On September 3, 2010, the Superior Court 
denied that motion, relying primarily on Tison v. Arizona5 and this Court’s 
adoption of the Tison ruling in Lawrie v. State.6  The trial court concluded that if 
“the State presents evidence at trial that Powell . . . recognized the substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that Officer Spicer would be killed if Powell pointed a gun at 
Officer Spicer and fired it[,] then the jury could find Powell acted with a reckless 
disregard [for] human life.”7 
 
 
                                          
 
5 481 U.S. 137 (1987).  
 
6 643 A.2d 1336 (Del. 1994). 
 
7 State v. Powell, 2010 WL 5551767, at *3 (Del. Super. Sept. 3, 2010). 
 
7 
 
B. The Guilt Phase 
Beginning January 20, 2011, a jury trial on the “guilt phase” was held in the 
Sussex County Superior Court.  At the conclusion of trial, but before the jury 
began its deliberations, Powell requested the trial judge to give two jury 
instructions at issue on this appeal: (1) a “lesser-included offense” instruction that 
would permit the jury to find that Powell was criminally negligent, as distinguished 
from reckless, in causing Officer Spicer’s death; and (2) a “Deberry instruction,”8 
to the effect that the State’s failure to collect certain “missing” evidence—
specifically, Flores’ shirt—warranted an inference that that missing evidence 
would have been exculpatory.   
The Superior Court denied both requests.  The court declined to give the 
“lesser-included” instruction because it found no rational basis in the evidence to 
support the defense’s theory that the gun had discharged accidentally at the time 
the police cruiser struck the Sebring driver’s side door.  The court denied Powell’s 
request for a Deberry instruction because it concluded that the police had no duty 
to collect and preserve Flores’ shirt at the crime scene as potential evidence. 
During their deliberations, the jurors sent the following note to the trial 
court: “Please clarify the difference between Count 1 [reckless murder of a police 
officer] and Count 3 [reckless murder in the course of fleeing a robbery].  Both 
                                          
 
8 Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d 744 (Del. 1983). 
8 
 
charges are murder in the first degree.”  The court responded by instructing the 
jury that: 
I think that where that may have created a puzzle or a question, there 
was the death of only one person, but they are charging two separate 
counts of murder.  Some may ask: How can that be if you only have 
the death of one person?  Under the law of the State of Delaware, a 
person can be convicted under different subsections of the murder 
statute and can be convicted of murder two times for one death . . .   
What distinguishes [Counts 1 and 3] is, Count 1, you caused the death 
recklessly of a law enforcement officer engaged in his official duties.  
Count 3 is recklessly causing the death of a person while committing 
or attempting to commit robbery or flight therefrom.  So there are two 
separate theories.  They are not one or the other.  Count 3 does have a 
lesser of manslaughter which the other count does not have.9 
 
 The “guilt phase” of Powell’s case ended with the jury returning guilty 
verdicts on 8 of the 12 counts presented.10  The jury acquitted Powell of the first-
degree murder charge that was predicated upon Officer Spicer being a law 
enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duties when Powell 
killed him.  The jury returned a guilty verdict, however, on the charge that Powell 
recklessly caused Officer Spicer’s death while fleeing the attempted robbery.  That 
is, the jury found Powell guilty of one capital offense, but acquitted him of a 
                                          
 
9 The jury was instructed on a lesser-included manslaughter charge, in the event that it could not 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Powell was fleeing from an attempted robbery when he 
recklessly killed Officer Spicer. 
 
10 Two of the 14 counts originally charged were dismissed and were not considered by the jury.   
 
9 
 
second capital offense, although both offenses arose from the killing of Officer 
Spicer.11 
C. The Penalty Phase 
 
The “penalty phase” of the trial began on February 14, 2011.  A hearing was 
held to present evidence to the jury on two issues: (1) whether the State had proved 
at least one statutory aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) 
whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the aggravating factors outweighed 
the mitigating factors.12 
 
On the first issue, the jury found that the State had proved two statutory 
aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt, namely, that: (i) the murder was 
committed while Powell was fleeing from the attempted robbery,13 and (ii) the 
murder was committed “for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest.”  On 
the second issue the jury, by a seven-to-five vote, found that the aggravating 
                                          
 
11 Powell was also convicted of resisting arrest with force or violence by shooting at the officers 
with a handgun; first-degree attempted robbery; first-degree reckless endangering by shooting at 
the victim of the attempted-robbery; and four weapons charges related to each of those offenses 
(including the reckless murder charge for which he was convicted).  Besides being acquitted of 
the other reckless murder charge, Powell was also acquitted of second-degree assault and two 
weapons charges related to those counts.  See State v. Powell, 2011 WL 2041183, at *1 (Del. 
Super. May 20, 2011). 
 
12 11 Del. C. § 4209(d)(1). 
 
13 Because of Powell’s reckless murder and attempted robbery convictions, that statutory 
aggravator was established as a matter of law.  See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 
10 
 
factors outweighed the mitigating factors, and recommended that Powell be 
sentenced to death.14 
 
As required by statute, the Superior Court then independently evaluated all 
the relevant evidence.  The court chose to give the jury’s recommendation “great 
weight” and found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 
factors.  The court also considered Powell’s personal circumstances, and found that 
his “path toward a violent and deadly event was set in motion not by others but by 
the decisions of Powell,” who “chose to be a career criminal.”  The court also 
found that, “twice before he shot Officer Spicer, [Powell] informed others he 
would take care of the police . . . establish[ing] that a policeman seemed destined 
to become a victim of some crime [of Powell’s, and] Powell’s propensity for 
violence.”  The Superior Court cited, among other factors, Powell’s “criminal 
lifestyle, disregard of others and use of firearms” as “weigh[ing] heavily in 
aggravation.”  The Superior Court sentenced Powell to death.   
This appeal followed. 
III. POWELL’S “GUILT PHASE” CLAIMS OF ERROR 
 
 
On appeal Powell presents six claims of error: three addressed to the “guilt 
phase” of his trial, and three relevant to the “penalty phase.”  Powell’s three guilt-
                                          
 
14 The jury’s vote on this issue was not binding on the trial court, which by statute has the 
ultimate authority to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty. 11 Del. C. § 
4209(d)(1). 
11 
 
phase claims raise three questions: (1) did the Superior Court commit legal error by 
declining to grant a transfer of venue; (2) was there a rational evidentiary basis for 
a jury to find that Powell’s gun accidentally discharged because of the two cars 
colliding—as distinguished from Powell having fired the gun intentionally; and (3) 
did the police have a duty to collect and preserve Flores’ shirt at the scene in order 
to test it for gunshot residue?  
For the reasons next discussed, our answer to these questions is no.  
A. Powell’s Motion to Change Venue Was Properly Denied. 
 
Powell first claims that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a trial 
by an impartial jury, because the Superior Court erroneously denied his request for 
a transfer of venue out of Sussex County.  This Court has long held that Superior 
Court Criminal Rule 21(a) is the provision that applies to criminal defendants in 
Delaware “to comply with the requirement of the Sixth Amendment . . . that in all 
criminal prosecutions, an accused has a right to trial by an impartial jury.”15  We 
review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion to transfer venue under that Rule 
for abuse of discretion.16   
Rule 21(a) provides as follows: 
                                          
 
15 Parson v. State, 275 A.2d 777, 785 (Del. 1971); see also McBride v. State, 477 A.2d 174, 185 
(Del. 1984). 
 
16 Sykes v. State, 953 A.2d 261, 272 (Del. 2008) (citing Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1015 (Del. 
1985)). 
 
12 
 
(a) For prejudice in the county.  The court upon motion of the 
defendant shall transfer the proceeding . . . to another county . . . if the 
court is satisfied that there exists in the county where the prosecution 
is pending a reasonable probability of so great a prejudice against the 
defendant that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in 
that county. 
 
The Superior Court denied Powell’s motion to transfer venue, because it found that 
the news coverage and the other evidence Powell presented were insufficient for 
the court to “presume” juror prejudice.  The court denied Powell’s motion without 
foreclosing a later venue transfer if the voir dire process established that, in fact, 
the jury pool was prejudiced.  In this capital case there was individual voir dire of 
the jurors.  No evidence of juror prejudice was developed during the voir dire 
process.  Ultimately, a jury of Sussex County residents was empaneled to decide 
Powell’s case.  As a consequence, the only venue-related claim before us is that the 
Superior Court reversibly erred by refusing to “presume” prejudice from the 
evidence Powell submitted in his initial venue transfer motion.17 
The fact that a criminal case generates publicity does not, without more, 
require a change of venue to preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial.18  Rather, a 
defendant must present “highly inflammatory or sensationalized pre-trial publicity” 
that on its face is “sufficient for the court to presume prejudice [of the potential 
                                          
 
17 Riley, 496 A.2d at 1014. 
 
18 Id. 
 
13 
 
jurors].”19  The newspaper articles discussed in Powell’s brief confirm the Superior 
Court’s finding that the coverage reflected “media and public interest as to such 
matters [the facts related to Powell’s case] at a level that could be reasonably 
expected,” and amounted to a “historical reporting of events concerning which an 
informed citizenry would want to know.”20  Nor did the media coverage (the court 
found) “inject[] race into the case” or otherwise “sensationaliz[e] the coverage . . . 
or persecut[e]” Powell.  The trial court’s characterization of the news coverage—
which is supported by the record—does not establish the requisite risk of prejudice 
that, as a matter of law, would require a change of venue.21 
 
In addition to, and apart from, the press reports, Powell points to other 
evidence that, he claims, demonstrates that a venue transfer was constitutionally 
required.  Specifically: (1) Officer Spicer’s killing prompted a highly publicized 
memorial service attended by several prominent Delaware public officials, as well 
as the Vice President of the United States; (2) during Officer Spicer’s also well-
                                          
 
19 Id. (italics added). 
 
20 Although Powell argues that those articles are a mere sampling of the coverage, we are given 
no reason to doubt that the sampling accurately captures the tone of the entirety of the news 
coverage for purposes of determining whether that coverage was “highly inflammatory” or 
“sensationalized.” 
 
21 Powell relies on two earlier Superior Court cases, State v. Reed, 1990 WL 161229 (Del. Super. 
Oct. 2, 1990), and State v. Robinson, Cr. I.D. 9411016190 (Del. Super. March 9, 1995), where a 
venue transfer was granted.  The trial court rejected Robinson as having “no value,” because the 
court’s reasons for transferring the case were not set forth, and Powell did not establish that the 
trial judge’s characterization was wrong.  The Superior Court also properly distinguished Reed, 
which involved a defendant who was a well-known, controversial local political figure, whereas 
Powell was not.   
14 
 
attended funeral service, which was broadcast on local radio, a clergyman’s eulogy 
referred to “a person . . . obviously guilty beyond a shadow of a doubt,” and called 
for justice for “that guilty criminal;” (3) vitriolic messages were posted online by 
unidentified readers of news Web sites.  And lastly, (4) a poll commissioned by 
Powell’s counsel disclosed that (a) nearly all Sussex County residents knew 
something about the case, (b) between 69.9% and 78.9% who knew about the case 
believed Powell could get a fair trial, and (c) a nearly identical percentage believed 
that Powell was either probably or definitely guilty of killing Officer Spicer.  From 
this evidence Powell argues that “it is at least reasonable to presume” that the jury 
pool was prejudiced.   
Powell has established that Officer Spicer’s killing and the facts surrounding 
it, including Powell’s arrest for that crime, were well-publicized and a source of 
notable public concern in Sussex County and Delaware generally.  But, publicity, 
even if continuous and prominent, will not alone establish a presumption of 
prejudice.22  The test is whether that publicity was so “highly inflammatory or 
sensationalized,” as to justify that presumption.23   
The only “highly inflammatory” language to which Powell specifically 
points is attributable to a handful of anonymous Internet comments from persons 
                                          
 
22 Sykes v. State, 953 A.2d 261, 272 (Del. 2008) (citing Riley, 496 A.2d at 1014). 
 
23 Id. 
15 
 
who, as the Superior Court noted, “may or may not be Sussex Countians, or for 
that matter may or may not be Delawareans.”  Those online comments deserved 
the minimal weight the court gave them.  Nor did the reverend’s remarks, 
inferentially accusing Powell of “obvious[] guilt,” in a eulogy at Officer Spicer’s 
funeral service create a presumption of prejudice that would compel a venue 
change.  Those remarks, although improper, constituted the only exception to what 
was generally (as the trial court found) a “historical reporting of events.”  
Whatever adverse force those remarks may have had at the time of the funeral had 
dissipated by the time of trial, more than one year later. 
 
Nor did the poll commissioned by Powell require a transfer of venue.  That 
poll showed that a high percentage of those polled believed Powell was probably 
or definitely guilty of Officer Spicer’s murder, reflecting the reported fact that 
Powell had been arrested for and charged with the crime.  As the Superior Court 
observed, that fact must be balanced against the fact that the same number of 
polled persons also believed that, were they selected for the jury, they “could be 
fair and impartial.”  That evidence does not establish that “[t]he community and 
media . . . reaction [was] so hostile and so pervasive as to make it apparent that 
even the most careful voir dire process would be unable to assure an impartial 
jury.”24 
                                          
 
24 Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.3d 736, 754 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 
16 
 
For those reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Powell’s motion to transfer venue.     
B. The Trial Court Correctly Denied Powell’s Request for 
    Lesser-Included Negligence and Deberry Instructions.  
 
Powell next challenges the Superior Court’s refusal to grant two requested 
jury instructions, each relating to an alternative defense theory that (Powell argues) 
should have been presented to and considered by the jury.  We review de novo the 
Superior Court’s denial of Powell’s request for jury instructions.25 
1. Because Powell’s “Accident” Theory Lacks a Rational  Basis  in  the     
              Record, No “Lesser-Included” Negligence Instruction Was Required. 
 
 
Powell first claims that the Superior Court reversibly erred in denying his 
request for a jury instruction for a “lesser-included” criminal negligence offense.  
He urges that the jury could have found that Powell was criminally negligent, as 
distinguished from reckless, when firing his weapon at Officer Spicer.   
The Superior Court is legally required to give a “lesser-included” instruction 
if there exists a rational basis in the record to acquit the defendant of the charged 
offense and convict him of an alternative, lesser-included crime.26  Powell claims 
that there was a rational evidentiary basis for the jury to conclude that he killed 
                                          
 
25 McNair v. State, 990 A.2d 398, 403 (Del. 2010); Miller v. State, 893 A.2d 937, 948 (Del. 
2006). 
 
26 Parker v. State, 981 A.2d 551, 553 (Del. 2009); see also Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 631 
(Del. 2001) (“Allowing a conviction on the basis of speculation would be inconsistent with . . . 
our prior case law requiring a ‘rational basis’ standard.”). 
 
17 
 
Officer Spicer negligently.  Powell insists that the gun went off accidentally while 
resting on his lap, as a result of the police cruiser striking the Sebring’s door.  The 
evidentiary argument for this claim runs as follows: First, Flores testified that 
Powell was carrying the gun in his lap while seated in the car, and he (Flores) 
heard the automobile collision and the gunshot “all at the same time.”  Because 
“[i]t was like everything happened right there,” the jury could conclude that the 
collision caused the gun to go off.  Second, the forensic evidence showed that the 
gun was fired not more than 12 inches from the car window and that the bullet 
went through the window glass; therefore, the jury could infer that the gun had 
discharged accidentally.  Neither argument, considered alone or together, provides 
a rational evidentiary basis for a jury to conclude that the gun went off 
accidentally.   
Powell’s argument rests on an out-of-context portion of Flores’ testimony, 
where Flores stated that he “heard the sound and the shot ‘all at the same time.  It 
was like everything happened right there.’”27  If considered in a vacuum, that 
testimony might be understood to mean the accident and gunshot occurred 
                                          
 
27 Powell also claims that Officer Brittingham testified “that the gunshot occurred simultaneously 
with the car crash and Reeves’ exit from the Chrysler,” based on a similar general description of 
the accident and the gunshot “seem[ing]” to occur “at the same time.”  But, Officer Brittingham 
clearly stated that Reeves “was in the process of jumping over the hood of [the police cruiser]” 
when the shot went off.  Officer Brittingham also testified that Reeves jumped over the hood of 
the police cruiser immediately after that car struck the Sebring’s door because, given the position 
of the stopped cars, that was Reeves’ only way to escape.   
 
18 
 
simultaneously.  Powell’s “spin” of Flores’ testimony, however, ignores the fact 
that Flores himself later clarified the precise sequence of events that he witnessed.  
Specifically, Flores testified that (i) the police car struck the Sebring; (ii) Reeves 
fled; and then (iii) Powell shot at the police.28 
Even more problematic for Powell is the forensic evidence, which 
affirmatively disproves his “accidental gunshot” theory.  That theory rests on 
Flores’ testimony that the gun was sitting on Powell’s lap—and was not pointed 
outside from behind the window—at the moment the car collision occurred.  Even 
if that were true, it does not exclude the possibility that Powell later picked up the 
gun and intentionally fired it.  Nor does this version of the events explain how the 
gun could have spontaneously fired so that the bullet penetrated the rear side 
window at the precise angle that enabled the bullet to strike Officer Spicer.  
Specifically, Powell cannot explain how, if the gun was positioned on his lap, the 
gun would have accidentally discharged, causing a bullet to penetrate the Sebring’s 
                                          
 
28 The relevant portion of the transcript reads as follows: 
 
State:  You said the police car hit your car and you heard that sound? 
Flores: Yeah. 
State:  Was that before or after Christopher Reeves got out of your car? 
Flores: Before. 
. . .  
State:  What happened after Christopher Reeves got out of the car? 
Flores: Derrick [Powell] shot out the window. 
 
Transcript of Proceedings at R-149-50, Testimony of Luis Garza-Flores, State v. Powell (Del. 
Super. Feb. 2, 2011) (Cr. I.D. No. 0909000858). 
 
19 
 
rear side window and proceed directly into the adjacent police cruiser.  Powell’s 
theory is wholly speculative and unsupported by any evidence.  What the evidence 
does show is that the gun was held up to the height of the rear driver’s side window 
of the Sebring, and that when it discharged it was aimed at the police—an act that, 
at a minimum, could only have evidenced recklessness, not negligence.29  The 
Superior Court properly concluded that there was no rational basis in the evidence 
to give the jury a lesser-included negligence instruction. 
2. Powell Was Not Entitled to a “Deberry” Instruction.  
 
Powell next claims that the police should have, but did not, collect Flores’ 
shirt at the crime scene to test it for gunshot residue.  As a consequence, Powell 
argues, he was entitled to a Deberry instruction that the jury could draw an 
inference that Flores’ “missing” shirt would have been exculpatory evidence.  
Delaware case law prescribes an elaborate doctrinal framework for determining 
when a Deberry instruction is or is not warranted.30  We need only address one 
                                          
 
29 Zebroski v. State, 715 A.2d 75, 82 (Del. 1998); Lawrie v. State, 643 A.2d 1336, 1341 (Del. 
1994). 
 
30 That analytic framework requires the court to address the following questions: 
 
(1) Would the requested material, possessed by the State at the time of the defense 
request, have been subject to disclosure under Criminal Rule 16 or Brady v. 
Maryland? 
 
(2) If so, did the State have a duty to preserve the material? 
 
(3) If the State breached its duty to preserve the material, what consequences 
should “flow from a breach”? 
20 
 
element of that analysis to dispose of Powell’s claim—whether the police had a 
duty to collect and preserve Flores’ shirt. 
In Weber v. State, this Court recently held that “[a]bsent any basis for the 
police to believe the shirt exculpated [the defendant], we fail to see what duty the 
police had to preserve [it].”31  Although Weber involved materially different facts, 
it articulated a broadly applicable principle—for the police to have a duty to collect 
and preserve specific evidence, the police must have had a reason, at that time, to 
believe the evidence might be exculpatory.  In that regard, we have also held that 
“the duty to preserve exculpatory evidence does not include a duty to seek out 
exculpatory evidence.”32  
At the scene where Officer Spicer was shot, the police learned that: (1) a 
gunshot had been fired through the Sebring’s rear driver’s side window; (2) Flores 
                                                                                                                                        
The “consequences” analysis, in turn, calls for a separate three-part balancing test of the 
following factors: 
 
(1) The degree of negligence or bad faith involved; 
 
(2) The importance of the missing evidence considering the probative value and 
reliability of secondary or substitute evidence that remains available; and 
 
(3) The sufficiency of the other evidence produced at trial to sustain the 
conviction. 
 
Johnson v. State, 27 A.3d 541, 545-46 (Del. 2011). 
 
31 Weber v. State, 38 A.3d 271, 275 (Del. 2012). 
 
32 Mason v. State, 963 A.2d 139 (Del. 2009) (italics added). 
 
21 
 
remained at the scene, unarmed and distraught, and tried to help the mortally 
wounded officer; and (3) Powell immediately fled but was found nearby less than 
20 minutes later with a gun that, it was later determined, was used to shoot Officer 
Spicer.   
Under Delaware law, the police had a duty to conduct a reasonably thorough 
investigation.33  The police did that: they exercised diligence by collecting a 
sample from Flores’ hands for gunshot residue testing.34  The police were not 
required, however, to seek out and exhaust every exculpatory possibility, 
especially given the considerable evidence that Powell had shot Officer Spicer.  
The State credibly argues that, because of the limited evidentiary value of gunshot 
residue testing35 and because samples from Powell’s and Flores’ hands were 
collected, there was little reason to collect and test Flores’ shirt.  Nor does the 
record disclose any reason to infer that a positive test would have meaningfully 
                                          
 
33 This Court has repeatedly “declined to prescribe the exact procedures that are necessary for the 
various [state] law enforcement agencies . . . to follow, in order to fulfill their duties to preserve 
evidence,” but we have exhorted agencies to develop rules and practices that “are broad enough 
to [capture] any material that could be favorable to a defendant.”  Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 
81, 88 (Del. 1989) (citation omitted).  The “extent of the duty [of law enforcement] to gather and 
test evidence in any case will vary with the circumstances.”  Id. at 90, n. 21. 
 
34 In addition to the shooting of Officer Spicer, the police were also called to investigate the 
earlier shooting incident at McDonald’s. 
 
35 As the State’s expert witness testified, the presence of gunshot residue supported one of three 
possibilities: (1) the person discharged the gun; (2) the person was nearby the gun when it was 
shot; or (3) the person made contact with an area that contained gunshot residue.  That witness 
also testified that gunshot residue is transferable.   
 
22 
 
altered the ability of the police (or ultimately a jury) to identify the shooter.36  
Because there was no reason to believe that Flores’ shirt might be exculpatory 
evidence, the Superior Court properly held that the police had no duty to collect 
that shirt. 
Even if (arguendo) the State had breached a duty to collect Flores’ shirt as 
evidence, Powell still would not have been entitled to a Deberry instruction.  A 
Deberry instruction is not required in cases where: (1) the defendant cannot show 
negligence or bad faith on the part of the police, and (2) the missing evidence 
“does not substantially prejudice the defendant’s case.”37  Powell has not shown 
that these criteria are satisfied. 
To show the police were negligent in failing to gather his shirt, Powell 
emphasizes a purported discrepancy in the evidence collection process: the police 
gathered samples from both Flores’ and Powell’s hands for gunshot residue testing, 
but collected only Powell’s (not Flores’) clothing.  That argument, although 
accurate, overlooks the fact that Powell was arrested and imprisoned, while Flores 
was not.  Powell attempts to minimize that fact by describing Flores as having been 
                                          
 
36 Flores testified that he had shot the gun about a week earlier while with Powell, and that he 
had handled it again the night before, when Powell was staying with him.  Flores was seated next 
to Powell when the shot was fired, and tried to help Officer Spicer out of the police cruiser, after 
Spicer was shot.  See also supra note 35. 
 
37 McCrey v. State, 941 A.2d 1019 (Del. 2008) (citing Wainer v. State, 869 A.2d 328 (2005)); 
see also Turner v. State, 894 A.2d 407 (Del. 2006). 
23 
 
“taken into custody,” but that overstates what actually occurred: Flores was 
detained by the police, but was later released and was never charged. 
Powell’s argument also fails to address the overwhelming evidence, at the 
crime scene, that pointed to Powell having shot Officer Spicer, and the limited 
evidentiary value of testing Flores’ shirt (samples already having been taken of 
Flores’ hands).  The possibility that Flores’ shirt also contained gunshot residue 
did not carry the exculpatory significance that Powell now seeks to attribute to it.  
Powell has failed to show that the police were negligent in failing to collect and 
preserve Flores’ shirt. 
Nor can a speculative possibility of “missing evidence” fairly be said to have 
“substantially prejudice[d]” Powell’s case.  Powell claims that a positive result for 
gunshot residue on Flores’ shirt would have constituted relevant, admissible 
exculpatory evidence.  Even if that were so, Powell has not shown that that 
evidence, alone and without more, would have significantly altered the mix of the 
totality of evidence, let alone exonerated Powell, whose hands tested positive for 
gunshot residue.   
For these reasons, we reject Powell’s claim of error relating to the denied 
Deberry instruction.   
 
 
 
 
24 
 
IV. POWELL’S “PENALTY PHASE” CLAIMS OF ERROR 
 
We turn next to Powell’s penalty phase claims of error, which generate three 
separate issues.  The first is whether the imposition of the death penalty in Powell’s 
case violates the Eighth Amendment.  The second is whether the Superior Court 
mistakenly believed it was required to afford “great weight” to the jury’s 
recommendation that Powell be sentenced to death.  The third is whether this 
Court, in conducting its statutorily-mandated review of Powell’s death sentence, 
must overturn that sentence as disproportionate to sentences imposed in similar 
cases.   
 
We conclude that the answer to each of these questions is no.38 
 
A. Imposing the Death Penalty Did Not Violate the Eighth Amendment. 
 
Powell’s first “penalty phase” claim is that imposing the death sentence in 
his case violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  We 
review questions of law, including constitutional claims, de novo.39  Controlling 
United States Supreme Court precedent holds that a death sentence is 
constitutionally proper where it is shown that a defendant displayed “reckless 
indifference to human life.”40    
                                          
 
38 We address Powell’s “proportionality” claim infra in Part V, which focuses on the statutorily-
mandated review of his sentence. 
 
39 Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 840 (Del. 2009). 
 
40 See generally Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987). 
25 
 
Powell contends that standard was not satisfied, for two reasons.  First, 
Powell claims that the evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion that either 
Powell or Flores killed Officer Spicer, thereby likening his case to State v. 
Rodriguez,41 where the Superior Court imposed a life sentence on Eighth 
Amendment grounds.42  The Rodriguez court found that the constitutional 
“culpability” requirement had not been satisfied, in part because a “reasonable 
inference could be drawn from the record evidence that either of the two robbers 
fired the fatal shots.”43  But that finding is what distinguishes Rodriguez from this 
case.  Here, no such reasonable but opposing inferences can be drawn from the 
Superior Court record.44  Powell’s defense was that Flores—not Powell—shot 
Officer Spicer.  The jury flatly rejected that defense, by convicting Powell of both 
reckless murder and resisting arrest with force by firing a gun at the police officers.  
Those verdicts, together with the Superior Court’s independent penalty phase 
finding that Powell chose to point the gun at the police and pull the trigger, were 
amply supported by the evidence. 
                                          
 
41 656 A.2d 262 (Del. Super. 1994). 
 
42 Id. at 280-81. 
 
43 Id. (italics added).   
 
44 The Superior Court in Rodriguez also stated that “[a]lthough it is not known for certain, it may 
be inferred that . . . [Rodriguez’s] conviction on the felony murder charge was based upon his 
accomplice status.”  Id. at 265.  
 
26 
 
Second, Powell argues that even if he was guilty of reckless murder for 
shooting Officer Spicer, his conduct did not evince “reckless indifference to human 
life,” because the killing was “sudden or impulsive.”  Powell’s argument conflates 
“premeditation to kill” with “reckless indifference to human life.”  The former 
requires planning.  The latter does not.  Awareness of, and conscious disregard for, 
a substantial, unjustifiable risk will suffice to constitute recklessness.45  Whether or 
not Powell specifically intended to kill Officer Spicer, the record evidence 
establishes that Powell evinced “reckless indifference” to the unjustified risk of 
death, by firing his weapon at the police to avoid apprehension.46  Powell’s 
constitutional claim therefore fails. 
B.  The Superior Court Did Not Err By Giving the Jury’s 
     Death   Sentence   Recommendation   “Great Weight.” 
 
Powell next claims that the Superior Court misapprehended the statutory 
allocation of authority as between the judge and jury under Delaware’s death 
penalty sentencing law.  The Delaware death penalty statute mandates that the trial 
                                          
 
45 Cf. 11 Del. C. § 231(e). 
 
46 Lawrie v. State, 643 A.2d 1336, 1348-49 (Del. 1994) (concluding, based on the “clear and 
supportable finding that [the defendant] acted recklessly,” that “there is no constitutional 
obstacle to the imposition of the death penalty”).  See also Workman v. Mullin, 342 F.3d 1100, 
1111 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen a felony murderer has ‘actually killed’ his victim . . . the Eighth 
Amendment’s culpability determination for imposition of the death penalty has then been 
satisfied.”). 
 
27 
 
judge, not the jury, has the ultimate authority to impose a death sentence.47  Powell 
argues that the Superior Court’s decision to afford “great weight” to the jury’s 
death sentence recommendation contravenes that statutory mandate.  Powell’s 
claim of error rests on the premise that the Superior Court believed itself required 
to afford the jury recommendation “great weight.”  That premise is unfounded. 
The Superior Court did not articulate any such belief.  The record establishes 
that the court, as was its prerogative,48 chose to give the jury’s recommendation 
“great weight.”  The court did not hold that it was bound to do so, and there is no 
basis in the record to infer otherwise.  For that reason, this claim lacks merit as 
well. 
V.  STATUTORILY-MANDATED REVIEW 
    OF  POWELL’S   DEATH  SENTENCE 
 
 
Finally, we turn to that portion of our review of Powell’s sentence that is 
legislatively mandated.  11 Del. C. § 4209(g) requires this Court to review 
Powell’s death sentence to determine: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to 
support the jury’s finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the existence of 
applicable statutory aggravating circumstances; (2) whether the sentence was 
arbitrarily or capriciously imposed; and (3) whether the sentence is 
                                          
 
47 11 Del. C. § 4209(d)(1). 
 
48 Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 759 (Del. 2005) (“[A] sentencing judge may choose to” give 
“great weight” to the jury recommendation “on the particular facts before [that court]”). 
28 
 
disproportionate to other penalties imposed in similar cases under Section 4209.  
We answer the first question in the affirmative, and the second and third in the 
negative. 
A. Statutory Aggravators 
 
Powell was convicted after a jury trial for recklessly causing Spicer’s death 
during the course of fleeing from an attempted robbery.  Powell’s conviction of 
that first-degree murder charge, coupled with his conviction for the underlying 
attempted first-degree robbery charge, established one statutory aggravator as a 
matter of law and beyond a reasonable doubt—that the defendant committed the 
murder while fleeing from the commission of an attempted robbery.49  The jury 
also unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that Powell committed the 
murder for the purpose of avoiding arrest—a second statutory aggravator.  The 
Superior Court accepted that conclusion as well-founded in the evidence, as do we.   
Reeves testified that Powell threatened that he (Powell) would shoot at the 
police if Reeves stopped the car while the police were in pursuit.  That testimony, 
together with Flores’ eyewitness testimony recounting the shooting, with the fact 
that Powell fled the scene with the gun, and with the forensic evidence establishing 
that the shot was fired through the rear driver’s side window, all support the jury’s 
                                          
 
49 Sykes v. State, 953 A.2d 261, 273 (Del. 2008) (citing Dawson v. State, 637 A.2d 57, 66 (Del. 
1994)); see also Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 127 (Del. 1984). 
 
29 
 
finding that Powell shot at Officer Spicer to avoid arrest.  That evidence also 
supports the jury’s separate conviction of Powell for intentionally resisting arrest 
by firing his gun at the police (thereby establishing the second statutory 
aggravator).  The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that both 
statutory aggravating circumstances were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  
B. Arbitrary or Capricious Sentence 
 
The second issue is whether the imposition of Powell’s sentence was 
arbitrary or capricious.50  The trial court’s reasoned and detailed sentencing 
opinion dispels any such concern.  Extensive mitigating evidence was presented to 
the trial court, which carefully weighed “all [the] relevant evidence”51 before 
articulating its decision to impose the death penalty.  The trial court’s conclusion 
was neither arbitrary nor capricious.  
 
C. Disproportionality 
 
The final issue this Court is statutorily required to determine is whether 
Powell’s death sentence was disproportionate to other sentences “recommended or 
                                          
 
50 11 Del. C. § 4209 (g)(2)(a). 
 
51 11 Del. C. § 4209 (d)(1). 
 
30 
 
imposed in similar cases arising under [Section 4209].”52  To support his claim that 
his sentence is disproportionate, Powell seeks to limit the universe of “similar 
cases” to those instances where the jury (like the jury here) made a nonbinding 
recommendation to impose the death penalty by a 7-to-5 vote.  Powell emphasizes 
that a death sentence has been imposed under Section 4209 by a 7-to-5 vote in only 
two cases—Outten v. State53 and Swan v. State.54  Powell further claims that his 
case is distinguishable because in Outten and Swan the killings bespoke a level of 
brutality or cruelty that was not involved here.   
 
Powell’s effort to limit the universe of past cases applicable to our 
proportionality review has no support in our case law or in the statutory text.  The 
statute broadly requires a comparison of this case with “similar cases” arising 
under Section 4209.  This Court has repeatedly defined the universe of cases, for 
purposes of judging the proportionality of a particular defendant’s death sentence, 
as “those First Degree Murder cases which have included a penalty hearing and in 
which a sentence of either life or death has become final, without or following a 
                                          
 
52 11 Del. C. § 4209 (g)(2)(a).  References to Section 4209 are intended in this Opinion to be 
only to that version of the statute in existence since 1991.  This Court has held that only cases 
decided under the post-1991 version of the statute are “directly applicable,” and therefore are 
“more persuasive” than cases decided under the previous statutory scheme, which required a 
unanimous jury verdict to impose a death sentence.  Clark v. State, 672 A.2d 1004, 1010 (Del. 
1996); Lawrie v. State, 643 A.2d 1336, 1345-46 (Del. 1994). 
 
53 650 A.2d 1291 (Del. 1994). 
 
54 820 A.2d 342 (Del. 2003). 
 
31 
 
review by this Court.”55  Because capital cases involve many variables, “this Court 
looks to the factual background of relevant cases to determine the proportionality 
of the sentence imposed” in the specific case on appeal.56   
 
This Court’s proportionality review therefore starts by acknowledging a 
unique element of the factual background of this case.  Powell is the first person to 
be sentenced under Delaware’s current statutory scheme for the first-degree 
murder of an on-duty police officer.57  That unique fact adds to the already inherent 
difficulty that a “definitive comparison of the ‘universe’ of cases is almost 
impossible.”58  For that reason this Court’s function is not to search for proof that 
the defendant’s death sentence is perfectly symmetrical to that imposed by another 
case within that universe.  Rather, it is to determine whether a death sentence in a 
                                          
 
55 Sykes v. State, 953 A.2d 261, 273 (Del. 2008) (citation omitted).  The current universe of cases 
relevant to our analysis here appears as Appendix A to this Opinion. 
 
56 Clark v. State, 672 A.2d 1004, 1010 (Del. 1996) (italics added) (citation omitted). 
 
57 About forty years ago, Marilyn Ann Dobrolenski was convicted of the first-degree murder of 
Delaware State Troopers Ronald Carey and David Yarrington.  She was sentenced to death by a 
Pennsylvania court.  Dobrolenski’s death sentence was later vacated on constitutional grounds in 
light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  See 
Commonwealth v. Dobrolenski, 334 A.2d 268 (Pa. 1975).  Nearly fifty years ago, Thomas 
Winsett was convicted of first-degree murder by a Delaware court for the shooting of Delaware 
State Trooper Robert Paris, and received a life sentence according to the jury’s prerogative.  See 
State v. Winsett, 205 A.2d 510 (Del. Super. 1964).  
 
58 Reyes v. State, 819 A.2d 305, 318 (Del. 2003) (citing Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d 1368, 1376 
(Del. 1992)). 
 
32 
 
particular case markedly diverges from the norm as established by our precedent.59  
Because this case involves an important circumstance of first impression, our 
scrutiny requires us to consider a broader legal context in assessing the 
proportionality of Powell’s death sentence.  
The Delaware General Assembly, when enacting our criminal code, 
embraced the widespread60 policy determination that violent crimes committed 
against on-duty police officers are considered to be more serious offenses because 
of the identity of the victim.  Accordingly, those offenses are eligible for harsher 
penalties than in cases where the victim is not an on-duty police officer.61  The 
                                          
 
59 Lawrie v. State, 643 A.2d 1336, 1346 (Del. 1994) (“In order for a death sentence to be 
disproportionate, the circumstances of the crime, the character of the defendant, and the statutory 
scheme must be so similar to those of other cases where a life sentence without parole was 
imposed that it would be fundamentally unfair to sustain the death sentence.”).  
 
60 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(14)(D) (making murder of a federal law enforcement officer an 
aggravating circumstance when determining whether to impose a death sentence); U.S. v. 
Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming death sentence of defendant convicted of 
killing a law enforcement officer); State v. Jones, 744 N.E.2d 1163 (Ohio 2011) (same); Bailey v. 
State, 998 So.2d 545 (Fla. 2008) (same); State v. Reynolds, 836 A.2d 224 (Conn. 2003) (same).  
 
61 See, e.g., 11 Del. C. § 636(a)(4) (defining first-degree murder based on victim’s status as 
police officer); see also 11 Del. C. § 4209(e)(1)(c) (same for statutory aggravating factor in 
capital sentencing); 11 Del. C. § 613(a)(5) (same for first-degree assault); 11 Del. C. 
§§ 612(a)(3), (6) (same for second-degree assault); State v. Roberts, 1968 WL 93266, at *1 (Del. 
Super. Sept. 16, 1968) (describing 1967 legislative amendment increasing the penalty for 
assaulting a police officer as reflecting that the legislature “must have considered it to be a 
serious offense”).   
 
Recently, the legislature amended 11 Del. C. § 636(a)(4) to include any “paramedic, 
emergency medical technician, fire marshal or fire police officer,” so as to “ensur[e] that any 
person who recklessly kills one of Delaware’s first responders is eligible to be punished to the 
fullest extent of the law.”  DE B. Summ., 2009 Reg. Sess. H.B. 204 (titled “Michelle Smith’s 
Law”). 
33 
 
United States Supreme Court has approved that principle.  It has recognized that a 
“special interest” in protecting police officers justifies its application to death 
penalty sentencing.62   
The principle of increased sentencing severity based on the identity of the 
victim has not been restricted to police officers;63 it has also been applied in cases 
involving other categories of victims.64  In the case of law enforcement victims, 
that sentencing principle protects officers’ physical security, and condemns as 
particularly egregious crimes committed against public officials who responsible 
                                          
 
62 In Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down as 
unconstitutional a statute that imposed the death penalty for the murder of a police officer 
without regard for the defendant’s particularized mitigating circumstances.  In so ruling, 
however, the Court also stated as follows:  
 
“To be sure, the fact that the murder victim was a peace officer performing his 
regular duties may be regarded as an aggravating circumstance.  There is a special 
interest in affording protection to these public servants who regularly must risk 
their lives in order to guard the safety of other persons and property.”   
 
Id. at 637 (italics added). 
 
63 See, e.g., 11 Del. C. § 4209(e)(1)(d) (making murder victim’s status as a judicial officer, 
prosecutor, state detective or investigator a statutory aggravating circumstance for death penalty 
sentencing); id. at (e)(1)(p)-(s) (same for persons who are pregnant, disabled, elderly or 
children). 
 
64 Sykes v. State, 953 A.2d 261, 273, n. 55 (Del. 2008) (describing cases involving “defenseless, 
helpless” victims) (citing Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 144 (Del. 1983) (“[W]e discern a 
pattern of death sentences . . . involving multiple unprovoked murders of helpless elderly 
victims”)); Lawrie v. State, 643 A.2d 1336, 1350 (Del. 1994) (addressing “young, helpless, and 
frightened” child victims). 
 
34 
 
for upholding our laws and ensuring public safety.65  Powell’s repeated indications 
that he intended to use deadly force on law enforcement officers to avoid arrest, 
and his decision to shoot at the police, thereby causing Officer Spicer’s death, 
properly implicates that principle.    
The jury’s mixed verdict—acquitting Powell of the separate substantive 
charge of the reckless murder of a police officer, but convicting him of the charge 
of the reckless murder of the same victim (Officer Spicer) in the course of fleeing 
from an attempted robbery—does not alter our disproportionality analysis.  The 
jury convicted Powell of intentionally resisting arrest “by shooting at the officers 
with a handgun.”  That same jury later found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Powell murdered Officer Spicer “for the purpose of avoiding” arrest.  The statute 
requires a review of “all relevant evidence,”66  which inescapably includes Officer 
Spicer’s status as an on-duty police officer.   
Powell does not dispute that Officer Spicer’s status as a police officer was 
properly considered as an aggravating factor.  Instead, Powell argues that his 
                                          
 
65 See, e.g., State v. Golphin, 533 S.E.2d 168, 247 (N.C. 2000) (“The murder of a law 
enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his duties . . . is a direct attack upon the rule 
of law”) (citation and emphasis omitted).  See also Frederick M. Lawrence, Commentary, 
Symposium: Federal Bias Crime Law, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 1437, 1447 (2000) (“Many states . . . 
have special penalties for crimes against police officers.  The justification for such laws includes 
the recognition that a crime against a public peace officer is a crime that affects the society well 
beyond the harm done to that individual.”). 
 
66 11 Del. C. § 4209 (d)(1); see also 11 Del. C. § 4209 (g)(2)(a) (requiring appellate review of 
“totality of evidence”). 
 
35 
 
conduct does not justify grouping him with “the worst of the worst,” because he 
did not “intentionally kill anyone,” and did not kill Officer Spicer “in a manner that 
was gruesome, vicious, or brutal.”  Powell instead describes his shooting of Spicer 
as occurring “at the time of impact of an unexpected car accident following a 
police chase . . . [which] is not nearly as heinous” as other cases, such as Outten.   
The short answer to this argument is that it attempts to resurrect, in the 
proportionality context, Powell’s “accident” defense which, for reasons earlier 
discussed, has no basis in the evidentiary record.  To reiterate: (1) Powell shot 
Spicer after—not “at the time of”—the “impact” with the cruiser, (2) Powell 
expressed his intention to shoot at the police immediately before the accident, (3) 
Powell previously alluded to his intention to fire at the police if they attempted to 
interfere with his criminal activity, and (4) the jury unanimously and explicitly 
found two statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: that 
Powell killed Officer Spicer “for the purpose of avoiding . . . arrest,” and also 
while fleeing from the commission of the attempted robbery.  In assessing the 
“heinous[ness]” of Powell’s crime, the Superior Court properly emphasized that “a 
policeman seemed destined to become a victim of [Powell’s crimes].”  That court 
found that Powell brought that “destin[y]” to fruition by purposefully “firing his 
handgun at the police” to prevent being arrested for a violent attempted robbery 
that he chose to commit.     
36 
 
Powell also attempts to distinguish cases from other jurisdictions where 
defendants who killed police officers were sentenced to death, on the ground that 
those cases involved an intentional, not reckless, killing.  That distinction does not 
help Powell.  This Court has previously upheld the imposition of the death penalty 
for reckless murder under Section 4209, even though “[m]ost of the persons who 
have been sentenced to death in Delaware have committed ‘an unprovoked, cold-
blooded murder of a helpless person (or persons),’” and “[w]ith few exceptions, 
deliberation has preceded the murder.”67  In Lawrie v. State,68 we upheld the death 
penalty imposed on a defendant convicted of reckless murder, following our 
consideration of the defendant’s “intentions, expectations, and actions.”69  Because 
the defendant “intentionally set in motion lethal forces . . . which had the likely 
consequence of causing death to innocent victims, and he did so without concern 
for those consequences,”70 we found that imposing the death penalty for a 
reprehensible reckless killing was not disproportionate to similar past cases.  
                                          
 
67 Lawrie v. State, 643 A.2d 1336, 1349, 1351 (Del. 1994) (“To rule otherwise would establish a 
precedent that only intentional murders are subject to the death penalty despite the egregious 
circumstances (as here) of recklessly-caused felony murder.  Such a precedent would clearly be 
contrary to the law passed by the General Assembly.”). 
 
68 Id. 
 
69 Id. at 1349 (“An analysis of [the defendant’s] ‘intentions, expectations, and actions’ is 
appropriate to determine whether [his] level of culpability is sufficient to justify the death 
penalty under the proportionality analysis.”). 
 
70 Id. at 1350-51. 
 
37 
 
Similarly, we conclude here that Powell’s sentence is not disproportionate to 
the sentences imposed in similar cases arising under Section 4209. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. 
 
APPENDIX A* 
 
Name: 
 
 
Robert Ashley 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9605003410 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment (following retrial and second penalty  
 
 
 
 
 
hearing) 
Decision on appeal: 
2006 WL 797894 (Del. Mar. 27, 2006) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Meri-Ya C. Baker 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
90011925DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1993 WL 557951 (Del. Dec. 30, 1993) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Jermaine Barnett 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9506017682 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  (following second penalty hearing) 
Decision on appeal: 
749 A.2d 1230 (Del. 2000) (remanding for new  
 
 
 
 
 
sentencing) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Hector S. Barrow 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9506017661 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment (following second penalty hearing) 
Decision on appeal: 
749 A.2d 1230 (Del. 2000) (remanding for new 
sentencing) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Tyreek D. Brown 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9705011492 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1999 WL 485174 (Del. Mar. 1, 1999) 
 
                                          
 
*The universe of cases prior to 1991 is set forth in appendices to prior opinions by this Court, and 
those appendices are incorporated herein by reference.  See, e.g., Lawrie v. State, Del. Supr., 643 
A.2d 1336, 1352-56 (1994). 
 
 
 
A-2 
Name: 
 
 
Justin L. Burrell 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9805012046 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
766 A.2d 19 (Del. 2000) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Luis G. Cabrera 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9703012700 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
747 A.2d 543 (Del. 2000) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Luis G. Cabrera 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9904019326 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death 
Decision on appeal: 
840 A.2d 1256 (Del. 2004) 
 
Name: 
 
 
James B. Clark, Jr. 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9406003237 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death (judge only) 
Decision on appeal: 
672 A.2d 1004 (Del. 1996) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Charles M. Cohen 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
90001577DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
No direct appeal taken 
 
Name: 
 
 
Donald Cole 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0309013358 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment 
Decision on appeal: 
922 A.2d 364 (Del. 2007) 
 
 
 
 
A-3 
Name: 
 
 
James T. Crowe, Jr. 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9508008979 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1998 WL 736389 (Del. Oct. 8, 1998) 
 
Name: 
 
 
David F. Dawson 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
88K00413DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle (venue changed) 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death 
Decision on appeal: 
637 A.2d 57 (Del. 1994) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Byron S. Dickerson 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
90011926DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1993 WL 541913 (Del. Dec. 21, 1993) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Cornelius E. Ferguson 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
91009926DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
642 A.2d 772 (Del. 1994) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Donald Flagg 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9804019233 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
No direct appeal taken 
 
Name: 
 
 
Freddy Flonnory 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9707012190 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment (following second penalty hearing) 
Decision on appeal: 
893 A.2d 507 (Del. 2006) 
 
 
 
 
A-4 
Name: 
 
 
Sadiki J. Garden 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9912015068 
County: 
 
 
New Castle  
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment ordered on appeal  
Decision on appeal: 
844 A.2d 311 (Del. 2004) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Robert J. Garvey 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0107010230 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Appeal: 
 
 
873 A.2d 291 (Del. 2005) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Robert A. Gattis 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
90004576DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death (death sentence commuted in 2012) 
Decision on appeal: 
637 A.2d 808 (Del. 1994) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Arthur Govan 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
92010166DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1995 WL 48359 (Del. Jan. 30, 1995) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Tyrone N. Guy 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0107017041 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
913 A.2d 558 (Del. 2006) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Jason Anthony Hainey 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0306015699 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Appeal: 
 
 
878 A.2d 430 (Del. 2005) 
 
 
 
 
A-5 
Name: 
 
 
Ronald T. Hankins 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0603026103A 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
976 A.2d 839 (Del. 2009) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Akbar Hassan-El 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
010701704 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
911 A.2d 385 (Del. 2006) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Robert W. Jackson, III 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
92003717 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
684 A.2d 745 (Del. 1996) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Larry Johnson 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0309013375 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
878 A.2d 422 (Del. 2005) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Shannon Johnson 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0609017045 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
983 A.2d 904 (Del. 2009) 
 
Name: 
 
 
David Jones 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9807016504 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
798 A.2d 1013 (Del. 2002) 
 
 
 
 
A-6 
Name: 
 
 
Michael Jones 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9911016309 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
940 A.2d 1 (Del. 2007). 
 
Name: 
 
 
Michael Keyser 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0310021647 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
893 A.2d 956 (Del. 2006) 
 
Name: 
 
 
David J. Lawrie 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
92K03617DI 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
643 A.2d 1336 (Del. 1994) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Thomas M. Magner 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9509007746 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1998 WL 666726 (Del. July 29, 1998) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Michael R. Manley 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9511007022 
County: 
 
 
New Castle  
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
918 A.2d 321 (Del. 2007) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Frank W. Moore, Jr. 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
92S03679DI 
County: 
 
 
Sussex 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1994 WL 202289 (Del. May 9, 1994) 
 
 
 
 
A-7 
Name: 
 
 
Adam Norcross 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0002006278A 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
816 A.2d 757 (Del. 2003) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Juan Ortiz 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0104013797 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
869 A.2d 285 (Del. 2005) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Darrel Page 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9911016961 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
934 A.2d 891 (Del. 2007) 
 
Name: 
 
 
James W. Perez 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
93001659 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
No. 207, 1993, Moore, J. (Del. Feb. 3, 1994) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Gary W. Ploof 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0111003002 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
856 A.2d 539 (Del. 2004) 
 
Name: 
 
 
James Allen Red Dog 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
91001754DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death (judge only) 
Decision on appeal: 
616 A.2d 298 (Del. 1992) 
 
 
 
 
A-8 
Name: 
 
 
Luis Reyes 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9904019329 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
819 A.2d 305 (Del. 2003) 
 
Name: 
 
 
James W. Riley 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0004014504 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment (following retrial)  
Decision on appeal: 
2004 WL 2085525 (Del. Oct. 20, 2004) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Jose Rodriguez 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
93001668DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment 
Decision on appeal: 
1994 WL 679731 (Del. Nov. 29, 1994) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Richard Roth, Jr. 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9901000330 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
Life imprisonment 
Decision on appeal: 
788 A.2d 101 (Del. 2001) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Reginald N. Sanders 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
91010161DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle (venue changed) 
Sentence: 
Life imprisonment (following 1992 resentencing) 
Decision on appeal: 
585 A.2d 117 (Del. 1990) (remanding for new       
 
 
 
 
sentencing) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Nelson W. Shelton 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
92000788DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
652 A.2d 1 (Del. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
A-9 
Name: 
 
 
Donald J. Simmons 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
92000305DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
No direct appeal taken 
 
Name: 
 
 
Chauncey Starling 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0104015882 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death (on two counts) 
Decision on appeal: 
903 A.2d 758 (Del. 2006) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Brian David Steckel 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9409002147 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
711 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998) 
 
Name: 
 
 
David D. Stevenson 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9511006992 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
918 A.2d 321 (Del. 2007) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Willie G. Sullivan 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
92K00055 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
636 A.2d 931 (Del. 1994) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Ralph Swan 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0002004767A 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
820 A.2d 342 (Del. 2003) 
 
 
 
A-10 
Name: 
 
 
Ambrose L. Sykes 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
04011008300 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
953 A.2d 261 (Del. 2008) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Antonio L. Taylor 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9404018838 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
685 A.2d 349 (Del. 1996) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Emmett Taylor, III 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0708020057 
County: 
 
 
Sussex 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
28 A.3d 399 (Del. 2011) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Milton Taylor 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0003016874 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
822 A.2d 1052 (Del. 2003) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Desmond Torrence 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
0205014445 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
2005 WL 2923501 (Del. Nov. 2, 2005) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Charles H. Trowbridge 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
91K03044DI 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1996 WL 145788 (Del. Mar. 4, 1996) 
 
 
 
 
A-11 
Name: 
 
 
James W. Virdin 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9809015552 
County: 
 
 
Kent  
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
780 A.2d 1024 (Del. 2001) 
 
Name: 
 
 
John E. Watson 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
91008490DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
No direct appeal taken 
 
Name: 
 
 
Dwayne Weeks  
Criminal ID: 
 
 
92010167 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
653 A.2d 266 (Del. 1995) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Joseph Williams 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9809018249 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
2003 WL 1740469 (Del. Apr. 1, 2003) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Roy R. Williamson 
Criminal ID: 
93S02210DI 
County: 
 
 
Sussex 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
669 A.2d 95 (Del. 1995) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Craig A. Zebroski 
Criminal ID: 
 
 
9604017809 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
715 A.2d 75 (Del. 1998)