Title: State v. Blurton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC93648
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: March 15, 2016

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
  
Respondent,  
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
No.  SC93648 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
ROBERT BLAKE BLURTON, 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
  ) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CLAY COUNTY 
The Honorable Larry D. Harman, Judge  
 
Opinion issued March 15, 2016 
 
 
Robert Blurton appeals his convictions for three counts of murder in the first 
degree.  Mr. Blurton was sentenced to death after being found guilty by a jury for 
murdering his aunt, uncle, and their 15-year-old granddaughter.  On appeal, Mr. Blurton 
asserts that the trial court erred by refusing his proffered lesser included offense 
instruction, admitting testimony regarding cell phones and fingerprints, excluding 
evidence that someone else had the motive and opportunity to commit the murders, 
excluding bias evidence, and denying mistrial requests.  Because this case involves the 
imposition of the death penalty, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal.  
Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.   
 
This Court finds that the trial court did not err in rejecting Mr. Blurton’s proffered 
lesser included offense instruction because the instruction did not properly conform to the 
MAI requirements.  Nor did the trial court err in admitting testimony from the state’s cell 
phone analyst because his testimony was within the realm of a layperson.  The trial court 
also did not err in admitting testimony from the state’s fingerprint analyst because the 
trial court sustained three of Mr. Blurton’s objections and the fourth objection was 
untimely.  The trial court did not err in excluding evidence that someone else had the 
motive and opportunity to commit the crimes because Mr. Blurton did not attempt to 
present this evidence at trial.  The trial court also did not err in excluding evidence of a 
witness’s alleged bias against a potential witness because the potential witness was not 
called to testify at trial.  Furthermore, the trial court did not err in denying Mr. Blurton’s 
mistrial requests after the state inadvertently displayed crime scene photographs on three 
occasions because the display of the photographs was not intentional and all of the 
photographs were later admitted into evidence.  Accordingly, this Court affirms            
Mr. Blurton’s convictions and sentences.  Additionally, after an independent review of 
the proportionality of Mr. Blurton’s death sentences pursuant to section 565.035,0F1 this 
Court finds that Mr. Blurton’s death sentences were not excessive or disproportionate to 
the penalty imposed in similar cases.  
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
 
Mr. Blurton’s aunt and uncle, Sharon and Donnie Luetjen, and their 15-year-old 
granddaughter, Taron Luetjen,1F2 lived together in Cole Camp.  Mr. Blurton had not been 
to the Luetjens’ home in about five years, but he had visited their home as a child and had 
                                              
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise indicated.  
2 Taron lived with the Luetjens after her father, the Luetjens’ son, died in a car accident 
in 1993 when Taron was a few weeks old.  The Luetjens were awarded custody rather 
than Taron’s mother.  Because Donnie, Sharon, and Taron share the same surname, each 
will be referred to by his or her first name to avoid confusion.  No disrespect is intended.   
3 
 
lived with the Luetjens for a few months in 2004 after he was released from prison.  At 
that time, the Luetjens had helped him buy a vehicle, find a job, and move into a new 
apartment.   
 
On June 7, 2009, at 10:15 p.m., a 911 call was placed from Taron’s cell phone.  
The operator disconnected the call after the caller did not speak for 45 seconds.  A return 
call from the 911 operator was not answered, and the 911 operator did not dispatch the 
police.  At trial, the state submitted a transcript of the original 911 call, which included 
the voices in the background of the call: 
 
Dispatcher:  Nine One One where is your emergency? 
 
 
(unintelligible) 
 
 
Female:  
Ohhh. 
 
 
Dispatcher:   Nine One One do you have an emergency. 
 
 
Male:   
(unintelligible) in place . . . I will kill you. 
 
 
Dispatcher:   Hello? 
 
 
Female:   
I have three hundred dollars in my purse. 
 
 
Male:   
I heard you.  Set right there.  Set right there.  Sharon, I’ll kill 
all you guys.  Set right there.  I liked all of you.  Give me that 
other hand. 
 
 
(unintelligible) 
 
The male voice in the call was identified as Mr. Blurton’s by the Luetjens’ daughter and 
Mr. Blurton’s girlfriend.2F3  A few minutes after the 911 call, at approximately 10:30 p.m., 
                                              
3 The Luetjens’ daughter testified that she was 80 percent certain that the male voice was 
Mr. Blurton’s when she listened to the original 911 recording.  Her certainty increased to 
90 percent when she later listened to an enhanced recording that had some of the 
4 
 
a neighbor, who lived less than a half mile across the valley and who often heard sounds 
coming from the Luetjens’ property, heard three pistol shots from the direction of the 
Luetjens’ house.   
 
Two days later, a neighbor discovered the Luetjens’ bodies in their home.  Each 
victim was found gagged, lying face-down on a pillow in the living room, with their 
hands bound behind their backs with brown fabric from Taron’s canopy bed.  Each had 
been shot once in the back of the head with a .22 caliber pistol.   
 
 
Police found no evidence of forced entry.  Inside the home, three cups – a white 
coffee mug, a plastic Royals souvenir cup, and a red travel mug – were found on the 
living room table.  Mr. Blurton’s fingerprints and DNA were discovered on the white 
coffee mug.3F4  Mr. Blurton also could not be excluded as a contributor to the DNA found 
on the brown fabric used to bind Donnie’s right hand.  The DNA on Sharon’s bindings 
also exhibited male characteristics, but the results were inconclusive as to whether the 
DNA was consistent with Mr. Blurton’s because not enough data could be developed 
from the DNA that was found.  The DNA on the binding on Taron’s right hand exhibited 
male characteristics.  Mr. Blurton was excluded as a contributor, but Donnie could not be 
                                                                                                                                                  
background noise filtered out.  Her certainty increased to 100 percent when she listened 
to a further enhanced recording prior to trial.  When Mr. Blurton’s girlfriend listened to 
the original 911 recording, she did not recognize any voices at first.  After listening to the 
original recording again, she testified she was almost positive she recognized               
Mr. Blurton’s voice and stated, “Oh, my God, I can’t believe that’s him.”  When she later 
listened to the enhanced recording, she testified that there was not any doubt that the 
voice was Mr. Blurton’s. 
4 The DNA profile found on the white coffee cup that was consistent with Mr. Blurton’s 
DNA had a frequency of one in 4.968 quadrillion in the Caucasian population.   
5 
 
excluded.  The DNA on the binding on Taron’s left hand also exhibited male 
characteristics, but Mr. Blurton and Donnie were both excluded as contributors.  
 
In addition to the murders, police found evidence of a robbery.  Donnie’s wallet 
and its contents were found beneath a pillow on a chair near his body.  His wallet 
contained no money although he was known to carry at least $200.  Sharon’s purse was 
sitting on the floor in the hallway near her bedroom.  Her wallet had been removed and 
also did not contain any money.   
 
In the Luetjens’ bedroom, a dresser drawer was sitting on their bed with the 
contents dumped out.  The drawer usually contained a large amount of change and 
Donnie’s sizeable arrowhead collection.  Only a small amount of change remained, and 
the arrowheads were missing.  Mr. Blurton had been caught stealing change from this 
drawer when he was a teenager.  A gun cabinet in the Luetjens’ bedroom was open, and 
three guns, including two .22 caliber pistols, were missing.  Taron’s cell phone was also 
missing.   
On June 27, 2009, based on the daughter’s identification of Mr. Blurton’s voice on 
the 911 recording and the DNA results linking him to the crime scene, Mr. Blurton was 
arrested and charged with three counts of murder in the first degree under section 
565.020.  Prior to his arrest, Mr. Blurton asked his girlfriend to tell the police that he was 
with her that night.  Mr. Blurton lied to her – telling her that he was at his boss’s house in 
Nevada on the night of the murders but was unable to drive home because of severe 
weather and because his boss’s wife was hitting on him.  His boss and his boss’s wife 
later testified at trial that Mr. Blurton had never been to their home.  Mr. Blurton’s 
6 
 
girlfriend agreed to tell the police that Mr. Blurton had been with her on the night of the 
murders but she later recanted, telling the police that Mr. Blurton had asked her to lie for 
him.   
At trial, the state’s evidence included cell phone tower evidence showing that      
Mr. Blurton’s cell phone had traveled from Garnett, Kansas, to Cole Camp between 8:16 
p.m. and 9:59 p.m. on the night of the murders; the DNA and fingerprint evidence linking 
Mr. Blurton to the crime scene; and the identification of Mr. Blurton’s voice as the male 
voice in the background of the 911 call.  As motive for the robbery and murders, the state 
presented evidence that Mr. Blurton had recently lost his job and had been asked to move 
out of the home he had shared with his girlfriend.  The girlfriend testified that              
Mr. Blurton had told her that he owed people money.  Moreover, she testified that        
Mr. Blurton had told her that he would inherit land, a vehicle, and 22 percent of $6.6 
million from the Luetjens.   
 
A jury convicted Robert Blurton of three counts of murder in the first degree under 
section 565.020.  At the penalty phase, the state presented evidence of Mr. Blurton’s prior 
conviction for robbery in the first degree, as well as his convictions for forgery, burglary, 
stealing, and possession of a controlled substance in a department of corrections facility.  
The state also presented victim impact evidence from the Luetjens’ daughter and 
grandson.  Mr. Blurton presented mitigating evidence from his stepmother, two prisoners 
who were previously incarcerated with him, and a psychologist who testified that it was 
unlikely that Mr. Blurton would be violent in prison.   
7 
 
 
The jury recommended a sentence of death on all three counts.  The jury found the 
following statutory aggravators: (1) Mr. Blurton had a prior serious assaultive 
conviction;4F5 (2) each murder was committed while he was engaged in the commission of 
two other murders; and (3) the murders involved depravity of mind and, as a result, the 
murders were outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman insofar as each 
victim was bound or otherwise rendered helpless and Mr. Blurton, therefore, exhibited a 
callous disregard for the sanctity of all human life.  The trial court rejected Mr. Blurton’s 
motion for a new trial, accepted the jury’s recommendations, and sentenced Mr. Blurton 
to death for each offense.  Mr. Blurton now appeals his convictions.  
 
On appeal, Mr. Blurton asserts that the trial court erred by: (1) rejecting his 
proffered jury instruction for felony murder in the second degree; (2) allowing a lay 
witness to testify regarding the location of the cell phone towers to which his cell phone 
connected on the night of the murders; (3) allowing the state’s fingerprint analyst to 
testify that two other “qualified” examiners had “verified” her fingerprint identifications 
as part of her crime laboratory’s peer review process and that “there weren’t any issues”; 
(4) excluding testimony and argument that Taron’s mother had motive and opportunity to 
commit the murders; (5) excluding evidence that the testimony of Donnie and Sharon’s 
                                              
5 In 1988, Mr. Blurton was convicted of robbery in the first degree and sentenced to 15 
years in prison.  Under section 569.020, “[a] person commits the offense of robbery in the 
first degree when he forcibly steals property and . . . [c]auses serious physical injury to 
any person[,] . . . [i]s armed with a deadly weapon . . . or . . . [u]ses or threatens the 
immediate use of a dangerous instrument against any person[.]”  Robbery in the first 
degree is “by definition” a serious assaultive conviction even when evidence of the 
“nature of the assault included in the robbery” is not submitted to the jury insofar as it 
“involves serious physical injury, a dangerous instrument, or a deadly weapon.”  State v. 
Amrine, 741 S.W.2d 665, 672 (Mo. banc 1987) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted); see also State v. Brooks, 960 S.W.2d 479, 496 (Mo. banc 1997).  
8 
 
daughter was biased; (6) excluding testimony from Donnie and Sharon’s friend about 
threatening telephone calls from Taron’s mother and maternal grandmother; and (7) 
denying mistrial requests three times when the state inadvertently showed witnesses and 
the jury graphic crime scene photographs of the victims.   
No Error in Rejecting Second Degree Felony Murder Jury Instruction 
 
Mr. Blurton first claims that the trial court erred in refusing to submit his proffered 
jury instruction for the lesser included offense of second degree felony murder because 
he met the statutory requirements for giving the instruction.  In support of this claim,       
Mr. Blurton cites this Court’s recent decision in State v. Jackson, which held that the trial 
court is obligated to give a “nested” lesser included offense instruction when “a party 
timely requests the instruction,” “there is a basis in the evidence for acquitting the 
defendant of the charged offense,” and “there is a basis in the evidence for convicting the 
defendant of the lesser included offense for which the instruction is requested.”  433 
S.W.3d 390, 396 (Mo. banc 2014).  The state maintains the instruction was properly 
rejected because the instruction was not in proper form or, in the alternative, that         
Mr. Blurton was not prejudiced by the trial court’s rejection of the instruction.   
 
Unlike in Jackson, Mr. Blurton’s offense was not a “nested” lesser included 
offense, i.e., where the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the 
higher offense.  See Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 404.  Instead, Mr. Blurton’s lesser included 
offense of second degree felony murder required proof of additional facts from those 
required to prove the higher offense and was “lesser included” by denomination by 
statute.  See section 556.046.1(2); section 565.025.2(1)(a).  It is not, however, necessary 
9 
 
to address Mr. Blurton’s claim that he was entitled to submission of the lesser included 
offense of felony murder because a trial court’s rejection of a proffered instruction should 
be affirmed “[i]f the trial court was correct . . . for any reason[.]”  State v. White, 936 
S.W.2d 793, 794 (Mo. banc 1997).   
 
At trial, the state objected to Mr. Blurton’s tendered second degree felony murder 
instruction on the ground that it was not in the proper form, stating that it didn’t “believe 
[the instruction] is in proper form, or has the proper accompanied instructions that are 
required to be given under the notes on use.”  The trial court refused to submit the lesser 
included instruction because “[t]he for[m], which the instruction is tendered, is not the 
proper [form].”5F6  Mr. Blurton did not request to modify his proffered instruction in 
response to the trial court’s ruling. 
 
A trial court does not err by rejecting an improper jury instruction.  State v. 
Parkhurst, 845 S.W.2d 31, 37 (Mo. banc 1992); see also State v. Immekus, 28 S.W.3d 
421, 432-33 (Mo. App. 2000); State v. Binnington, 978 S.W.2d 774, 776 (Mo. App. 
1998); State v. Powers, 913 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Mo. App. 1996); State v. Colson, 926 
S.W.2d 879, 883 (Mo. App. 1996).   
 
 
                                              
6 The trial court also stated that it was refusing Mr. Blurton’s second degree felony 
murder instruction because the state had not charged Mr. Blurton with the underlying 
felony of robbery in the second degree, robbery in the second degree was inconsistent 
with Mr. Blurton’s alibi defense, and the facts in evidence did not support a felony 
murder instruction.  Although Mr. Blurton claims these grounds for the trial court ruling 
were erroneous, it is unnecessary to consider these alleged errors where the trial court’s 
ruling can be affirmed on other grounds.  See White, 936 S.W.2d at 794.   
 
10 
 
Mr. Blurton submitted a second degree felony murder instruction that stated:  
As to Count [I/II/III], if you do not find the defendant guilty of murder in the first 
degree, you must consider whether he is guilty of murder in the second degree.   
 
As to Count [I/II/III], if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
 
First, that after 10:17 PM on the 7th day of June, 2009, at 802 South Elm, Cole 
Camp, in the County of Benton, State of Missouri, the defendant took property which 
was owned by Donnie Luetjen and, that defendant did so for the purpose of withholding 
it from the owner permanently, and that defendant in doing so used physical force on or 
against [Donnie/Sharon/Taron] for the purpose of preventing resistance to the taking of 
the property, then you will find that the defendant has committed robbery in the second 
degree. 
 
However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt each and all of these propositions, you cannot find that the defendant has 
committed robbery in the second degree.  
 
Second, that [Donnie/Sharon/Taron] was shot and killed, and 
 
Third, that [Donnie/Sharon/Taron] was killed as a result of the perpetration of that 
robbery in the second degree, 
 
then you will find the defendant guilty under Count [I/II/III] of murder in the 
second degree. 
 
However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt each and all of the propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder 
in the second degree under this instruction, but you must then consider whether he is 
guilty of murder in the second degree under Instruction No. ___.   
 
  Mr. Blurton requested that the trial court submit this instruction in addition to the 
instructions for first degree murder and conventional second degree murder proffered by 
the state.  The trial court was correct in its ruling that the instruction was not in the proper 
form. 
The party submitting a second degree felony murder instruction must submit a 
separate instruction for the underlying felony when the jury is not otherwise instructed to 
11 
 
decide the defendant’s guilt of the underlying felony.  Notes on Use 2(b), MAI-CR 3d 
314.06.  The separate instruction for the underlying felony must be identical to a verdict 
director for the underlying felony except that it must be modified to state that the jury 
must find that the defendant “committed” the felony instead of that the defendant is 
“guilty” of the felony.  Id.  The first paragraph of the second degree felony murder 
instruction must then cross-reference the instruction for the underlying felony.  Id.   
In his brief to this Court, Mr. Blurton admitted that he failed to proffer a separate 
instruction for the underlying felony of robbery in the second degree.  As such,            
Mr. Blurton’s proffered jury instruction was in an incorrect form insofar as it violated the 
Notes on Use for 314.06.  The trial court would have erred in giving Mr. Blurton’s 
incorrect jury instruction.  See State v. Livingston, 801 S.W.2d 344, 348 (Mo. banc 1990) 
(“The giving of an instruction in violation of the Notes on Use under MAI-CR constitutes 
error[.]”).  Because the trial court is not compelled to give an incorrect instruction and 
does not err in refusing a flawed instruction, it is not necessary to consider whether his 
proffered instruction would have prejudicially confused or misled the jury if submitted.  
See State v. Jaco, 156 S.W.3d 775, 782 (Mo. banc 2005); see also State v. Derenzy, 89 
S.W.3d 472, 475 (Mo. banc 2002). 6F7   
                                              
7 In Derenzy, 89 S.W.3d at 475, this Court held that, although a trial court’s rejection of 
an incorrectly worded lesser included offense instruction proffered by the defendant was 
“not error,” the trial court’s failure to correct and submit a properly worded instruction 
was nonetheless plain error resulting in “manifest injustice.”  As reasoning for its 
decision, Derenzy cited Rule 28.02(a), which requires a trial court to “instruct the jury in 
writing upon all questions of law arising in the case that are necessary for their 
information in giving the verdict.”  Rule 28.02(a) applies to those instructions that are 
mandatory even if not requested by the defendant.  The lesser included instruction at 
issue in Derenzy, however, was not an instruction that was necessary for the jury’s 
12 
 
Mr. Blurton argues, however, that his failure to proffer a separate jury instruction 
for the underlying felony of robbery in the second degree is inconsequential because he 
included “all the elements that would have been in the cross-referenced instruction” in 
the first paragraph of his proffered second degree felony murder instruction.  This 
assertion is incorrect.  As stated above, the trial court does not err in refusing a flawed 
instruction and, accordingly, this Court need not consider whether the proffered 
instruction would have prejudicially confused or misled the jury if submitted.  Jaco, 156 
S.W.3d at 782.  But, even if this Court were to consider the prejudicial effect of the 
proffered instruction, Mr. Blurton’s proffered instruction would have confused or misled 
the jury because it did not properly enumerate the elements of robbery in the second 
degree and did not describe the property alleged to have been taken. 
The verdict director for robbery in the second degree requires each element of the 
felony to be listed in separate enumerated paragraphs.  MAI-CR 3d 323.04.  Instead of 
following these requirements, Mr. Blurton included all the elements of robbery in the 
                                                                                                                                                  
information, i.e., a mandatory instruction.  A non-mandatory lesser included instruction is 
governed by Rule 28.02(b), which requires counsel to “submit to the court instructions 
and verdict forms that the party requests be given.”  (Emphasis added).  The rationale 
applied by the Court in Derenzy to find that the trial court plainly erred in not correcting 
and submitting a properly worded instruction should apply only when an instruction is 
mandatory, even when not requested.  In this case, as in Derenzy, the lesser included 
instruction is an instruction that must be requested rather than an instruction the trial 
court is mandated to give.  See Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 396.  Therefore, the provision in 
Rule 28.02(a) cited by this Court in Derenzy does not support its conclusion that the trial 
court plainly erred in not correcting the defendant’s improperly worded lesser included 
jury instruction and is at odds with this Court’s usual rule that the trial court does not 
commit reversible error by refusing to give an incorrect instruction.  Parkhurst, 845 
S.W.2d at 37; see also Immekus, 28 S.W.3d at 432-33; Binnington, 978 S.W.2d at 776; 
Powers, 913 S.W.2d at 142; Colson, 926 S.W.2d at 883.  The trial court, here, was not 
obligated to correct and submit a properly worded lesser included felony murder 
instruction.   
13 
 
second degree in the first paragraph of the second degree felony murder instruction 
without enumerating each element.  In doing so, Mr. Blurton’s proffered instruction blurs 
the distinction between the elements and, therefore, could have confused or misled the 
jury’s understanding of what it was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Moreover, MAI-CR 3d 323.04 requires a description of the property that the defendant 
allegedly took.  See also State v. Johnson, 457 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Mo. 1970).                
Mr. Blurton, however, offered no description of the property alleged to have been taken, 
but instead, merely stated that the defendant “took property.”  Because evidence was 
presented at trial of various items missing from the Luetjens’ home, including $200 from 
Mr. Luetjens’ wallet, his change collection from his dresser drawer, his arrowhead 
collection, and three guns, this failure to specify the alleged property would not have 
required the jury to unanimously find what property Mr. Blurton had taken.  
Accordingly, because Mr. Blurton’s tendered instruction was not in proper form, 
the trial court did not err in rejecting Mr. Blurton’s incorrect second degree felony 
murder instruction.   
No Reversible Error in Admitting or Excluding Evidence 
 
Mr. Blurton further asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 
evidence over his objection and excluding evidence he wished to present at trial.  
Specifically, Mr. Blurton contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence and 
testimony from a lay witness regarding the location of the cell phone towers to which    
Mr. Blurton’s cell phone connected on the night of the murders and testimony from the 
state’s fingerprint analyst who described the Missouri state highway patrol crime 
14 
 
laboratory’s peer review protocol of latent fingerprint analysis as requiring other 
“qualified” examiners to “verify” her identifications.  He further contends that the trial 
court erred by excluding: (1) evidence that someone else had motive or opportunity to 
commit the crime; (2) testimony from the Luetjens’ daughter that she was concerned for 
her safety due to rumors and telephone calls made from Taron’s mother and maternal 
grandmother; and (3) testimony from the Luetjens’ friend about the telephone calls from 
Taron’s mother and maternal grandmother. 
A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence at trial.  State v. 
Hunt, 451 S.W.3d 251, 263 (Mo. banc 2014). A trial court’s decision regarding the 
exclusion or admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.   Id.  A trial 
court abuses its discretion only if its decision to admit or exclude evidence is “clearly 
against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so unreasonable and 
arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate 
consideration.”  Lozano v. BNSF Ry. Co., 421 S.W.3d 448, 451 (Mo. banc 2014) (internal 
quotations omitted).  Claims of trial court error are reviewed “for prejudice, not mere 
error.”  State v. Clark, 364 S.W.3d 540, 544 (Mo. banc 2012) (internal quotations 
omitted).   This Court will reverse the trial court’s decision only if there is a reasonable 
probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial or deprived the defendant of a 
fair trial.  Id. 
A. Cell Phone Tower Evidence 
Mr. Blurton first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting, over 
his objection, evidence of the location of the cell phone towers to which his cell phone 
15 
 
connected on the night of the murders, June 7, 2009, showing that Mr. Blurton was 
traveling from his home in Garnett, Kansas, to Cole Camp.  Mr. Blurton asserts that this 
evidence required an expert witness because it was not within the knowledge or expertise 
of a lay person. 
Expert opinion testimony is required if the witness is testifying “to matters 
requiring special skill or knowledge and is not within the knowledge or understanding of 
mankind generally[.]”  State v. Eaton, 504 S.W.2d 12, 21 (Mo. 1973).  Expert opinion 
“must be based upon a valid and accepted scientific methodology and assist the trier of 
fact in the determination of an issue.”  Smulls v. State, 71 S.W.3d 138, 150 (Mo. banc 
2002).  An expert is qualified to provide an expert opinion if “he has knowledge from 
education or experience which will aid the trier of fact.”  State v. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d 
527, 537 (Mo. banc 1987).  “The qualifications of a witness to render an expert opinion 
lie within the trial court’s discretion.”  State v. Rutter, 93 S.W.3d 714, 729 (Mo. banc 
2002).  The trial court abuses its discretion in admitting such evidence only “when a 
ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so 
arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful 
consideration.”  Id.   
 
To qualify as an expert in the field of telephone toll analysis, the witness needed to 
have specialized training and experience that would aid the trier of fact.  As a criminal 
intelligence analyst for the Missouri highway patrol, the witness routinely performed 
telephone toll analysis on cell phone calls, including those Mr. Blurton made and 
received on the night of June 7, 2009.  The witness testified that he began working in 
16 
 
cellular telephone analysis in 2004 when he worked at the drug enforcement 
administration as an intelligence analyst.  During this time, he went to call analyst 
training school, where he was instructed how to analyze telephone records.  After 
working as an intelligence analyst for three years at the drug enforcement administration, 
he was promoted to an operations sergeant supervising 12 other intelligence analysts.  In 
2009, he began working as a criminal intelligence analyst at the Missouri highway patrol.     
To perform telephone toll analysis on Mr. Blurton’s calls, the witness first 
obtained an Excel spreadsheet of Mr. Blurton’s cell phone records from the telephone 
company.  After obtaining the records from the telephone company, he then sorted these 
records to show only those calls made to and from Mr. Blurton’s cell phone around the 
time of the murders.  The record of each call also provided the exact geographic location 
of the cell tower to which Mr. Blurton’s cell phone was connected at the beginning and 
the end of the call.   Using this information, the witness then mapped the location of each 
of these cell towers using a consumer mapping program.  In doing so, he created a map 
that showed the times of the calls and their respective cell phone towers.   
 
At trial, Mr. Blurton objected that the witness could not testify “about [the] 
analysis of [Mr. Blurton’s cell phone] records” because “he’s not a properly qualified 
expert” and had “no expertise besides attending this one [training] program.”  The trial 
court overruled this objection.  Mr. Blurton also objected that the witness was not 
properly qualified as an expert in cell phone tower plotting.  In overruling this objection 
the trial court stated that, although the state may not have been offering the witness as an 
expert, the state showed that his “qualification[s] were that he did telephone analysis and 
17 
 
telephone toll analysis,” that the state “then described what that was.” The trial court 
concluded, therefore, that the witness was “just testifying, like any other clerk . . . if they 
were given an assigned task, and were told how to do the task[.]”  
Although there may have been sufficient evidence in the record before the trial 
court to support a finding that the witness was an expert qualified in the field of telephone 
toll analysis, it was not necessary for the trial court to make such a finding.  Missouri 
courts have held that “[r]eading the coordinates of cell sites from phone records and 
plotting them on a map is not a scientific procedure or technique” because cell phone 
records are factual records and no special skill is required to plot these records.  State v. 
Patton, 419 S.W.3d 125, 130 (Mo. App. 2013); State v. Ford, 454 S.W.3d 407, 413-14 
(Mo. App. 2015).  Such evidence can be introduced by a lay witness as long as the lay 
witness confines the testimony to the facts contained in the cell phone records.  Patton, 
419 S.W.3d at 130.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting the witness’s 
testimony about his telephone toll analysis of Mr. Blurton’s calls.  
 
Mr. Blurton, nevertheless, asserts that an expert was required in this case because 
the state introduced evidence regarding the location of Mr. Blurton’s cell phone relative 
to the tower to which it connected.  The witness admitted that he was not an expert in 
determining which cell phone tower a cell phone would connect to in a particular location 
based on weather or terrain and therefore, that, Mr. Blurton’s cell phone could have been 
located anywhere around “whatever radius the [cell phone] tower was covering[.]”   
In this argument, Mr. Blurton relies on prior cases holding that an expert witness is 
required if the witness attempts to identify the specific location of a defendant in relation 
18 
 
to the cell phone tower to which the defendant’s cell phone connected.  Patton, 419 
S.W.3d at 130-31.  An expert is required because such an identification requires broad 
inferences due to a cell phone’s ability to connect to a cell tower “as far away as thirty 
miles or as close as thirty feet” depending on myriad factors such as geography, weather, 
or the cell phone itself.  Id. at 131.  Accordingly, to identify the specific location of the 
defendant based on cell phone tower connections, an expert witness must make “an 
expansive range of inferences” that requires “the aid of specialized experience or 
knowledge in the field of cellular communications[.]”  Id. at 132.   
For example, in Patton, a lay witness testified that at the time of the crime the 
defendant’s cell phone was connected to a cell tower near the crime scene.  Id. at 129. 
The defendant alleged that he was at his cousin’s house four miles from the crime scene.  
Id. at 129, 132.  The lay witness drew the inference that the cell phone records proved the 
defendant was near the crime scene and not at his cousin’s house because the defendant’s 
cell phone was connected to the tower closest to the crime scene and not a cell tower near 
his cousin’s house.  Id. at 132.  The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in not 
requiring an expert to present this evidence when the identification of the defendant near 
the crime scene and not at his cousin’s house required technical inferences outside a lay 
witness’s common knowledge.  Id.  Likewise, in Ford, a lay witness improperly testified 
that the defendant was “near the murder scene” because the defendant’s cell phone 
connected to a nearby tower.  454 S.W.3d at 410-11.  Once again, an expert was required.  
Id. at 414-15.   
19 
 
 
In this case, however, the state did not attempt to show the exact location of       
Mr. Blurton’s cell phone in relation to the cell tower to which his cell phone was 
connected at the time the calls were made, and the witness did not testify that the cell 
tower analysis could show that Mr. Blurton was at or near the Luetjens’ house.  Rather, 
the testimony was that “based off the phone associated with Mr. Blurton, the time the 
calls were made, the cell tower locations, it shows a mode of travel highway 7, up 
highway 75 – to Cole Camp.”  Likewise, during closing argument, the state referenced 
the map the witness had created to argue the reasonable inference that Mr. Blurton had 
traveled from Garnett, Kansas, to Cole Camp and that his last two cell phone calls “hit off 
of” cell phone towers located in Cole Camp.   
 
As discussed above, the witness’s utilization of Mr. Blurton’s cell phone records 
to plot the progression of the cell phone towers to which Mr. Blurton’s cell phone 
connected did not require the special skill or knowledge of an expert.  His telephone toll 
analysis showed both a progression of time between Mr. Blurton’s calls from 8:16 p.m. to 
9:59 p.m. on the night of the murders and a corresponding progression of distance as his 
calls connected to various cell phone towers located along the general route from Garnett 
to Cole Camp.  Unlike in Patton and Ford, in which lay witnesses improperly attempted 
to pinpoint the defendants’ exact location within a small geographic area, Cole Camp is 
more than 125 miles away from Garnett, Kansas.  Even if Mr. Blurton’s cell phone 
connected to a cell tower 30 miles away from his actual location at the time of each call, 
the witness could still reasonably infer Mr. Blurton’s general path of travel from Garnett 
20 
 
to Cole Camp without using specialized skill or knowledge.  Accordingly, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence and testimony.  
B. Fingerprint Evidence 
 
Mr. Blurton next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his 
objection to the testimony of the state’s latent fingerprint analyst.  Mr. Blurton objected 
to the witness’s testimony that the results of her fingerprint analysis had been “verified” 
by another “qualified” examiner, which made her confident in her conclusions because 
“there weren’t issues.”  Mr. Blurton asserts that this testimony was inadmissible hearsay, 
a violation of the confrontation clause, and improper bolstering. 
 
Specifically, Mr. Blurton asserts that the trial court erred four times in admitting 
this testimony.  Mr. Blurton’s objections to the witness’s testimony that her results had 
been “verified” followed his objection that the state had not laid a proper foundation for 
her identification of the fingerprints found at the crime scene.  The questions to the 
witness, her answers, and Mr. Blurton’s objections are as follows: 
First objection: 
 
Q: 
And in addition to that, in your lab, do you have a peer review    
       
protocol when you make an identification in a case?  
 
A:   
Yes. 
 
Q:  
And what is a peer review, what is your peer review protocol?  
 
A:  
Anytime we have an identification, at least at the time this was, all  
identifications had to be verified by another examiner going through 
the same process I did when I compared it and identified it. 
 
Q: 
 And was that, in fact, done in this case? 
 
A:  
Yes, it was. 
21 
 
 
Q:  
How many other peer reviewers, if you know. 
 
A:  
I had my official, or primary verifier, and I, I believe there were two  
     
 other individuals, actually. 
 
Following this exchange Mr. Blurton objected on the grounds of Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004), which bars the admission of out-of-court 
testimonial statements of witnesses who do not appear unless they are unavailable to 
testify.  Citing Crawford, Mr. Blurton objected to the witness “relating what other 
analysts have to say about, about this evidence.”  The trial court ruled: 
Okay, she should, she should not testify as to what somebody else may 
have said anything like that, but as part of the foundation, the process was 
that helps her reach her conclusions, I think you’re going to ask her, that 
will be allowed. 
 
So, the objection to hearsay is sustained.  She hadn’t gotten there, but I 
knew you were anticipating that.  Let’s go. 
 
 
Following the court’s ruling, the state again attempted to question the witness 
about the peer review protocol.   
Second objection: 
 
Q:  
And, ma’am, the peer review process that you went 
through, did that help you, I don’t know, feel confident 
in your conclusions that you reached in this case. 
 
A:  
 
 
Sure. 
 
Q:  
 
And don’t, I mean, don’t tell me what these folks 
 
concluded, but there weren’t issues, were there?  
 
A: 
  
 
No, there were not. 
 
Defense counsel: 
Objection, your honor, that question’s, same matter,  
 
 
 
objection as at the bench, it’s asked the same way, or  
 
 
 
in a different  manner. 
22 
 
Court:  
 
Overruled. 
 
Defense counsel: 
Judge – 
 
Court:  
 
Overruled. 
 
Mr. Blurton next objected to the witness’s attempt to identify the second 
fingerprint found on the white coffee mug at the crime scene.   
Third objection: 
 
Q:  
And did you send this through that same peer review process 
that you described at the crime lab?  
 
A:  
 
 
Yes. 
 
Defense counsel:  
Well, objection, your Honor, that’s a violation of Crawford 
versus Washington. 
 
State:   
 
Judge, I – 
 
Court:  
 
Sustained as to the form of the question. 
 
Immediately following this exchange, the state rephrased its question. 
Fourth objection: 
 
Q:  
What is, again, the protocol of the crime lab when you’ve 
made an identification of a fingerprint? 
 
A:  
It is, it is, excuse me, it’s verified by another qualified 
examiner.   
 
Q:  
 
 
And was – 
 
Defense counsel:  
Well, objection, may we approach? 
 
Court:  
 
Sure. 
 
Defense counsel:  
This [] not only violates Crawford versus Washington, but it’s 
also bolstering. 
 
State:   
 
Well, Judge – 
23 
 
 
Court:  
Well, overruled as to bolstering.  The objection is that there 
wasn’t a foundation for this particular exhibit.  The language 
chosen by the witness, the use of the word verified, was, in 
one respect, responsive to the question as to what was the 
protocol.  
 
*** 
 
Defense counsel:  
– I’m sorry, your Honor, but what it boils down to is that 
she’s essentially telling this jury that somebody else looked at 
it and said, yes, you’re right, and that’s, that is the message 
that’s being sent to the jury.   
 
Court:  
Okay.  Would you like for me to instruct the jury to disregard 
her last answer, and I was only, I’m not overly concerned 
about it, but the use of the word, verified, by another, I’ll do 
that, if you’re asking for that. 
 
Defense counsel:   Yes, I would request it.  
 
*** 
 
Defense counsel:   Are we waiting until after lunch to instruct the jury to 
disregard what they heard? 
 
Court:   
 
I’ll do it, thank you, I’ll do it right now. 
 
Defense counsel:  
Thank you. 
 
Court:  
The last answer of the witness, which was with respect to a 
protocol followed in the lab regarding forming opinions, the 
witness offered some information with respect to what some 
other person may have done or said, and the jury is instructed 
to disregard that portion of the answer, not to consider it 
when you retire to deliberate on the case.   
  
This record makes clear that the trial court sustained Mr. Blurton’s first, third and 
fourth objections to the testimony.  He did not ask for any further relief.  After the fourth 
objection, the trial court suggested that it could instruct the jury to disregard the answer.  
Mr. Blurton asked that the trial court do so, and it did.  A defendant who has “received 
24 
 
the relief he requested . . . has no claim of reversible error.”  State v. McFadden, 391 
S.W.3d 408, 423 (Mo. banc 2013).  In none of these instances did Mr. Blurton request 
that the trial court grant him any additional relief.  Accordingly, in response to             
Mr. Blurton’s first, third, and fourth objections, the trial court granted Mr. Blurton the 
relief he requested at trial, so there was no trial court error.  
With regard to his second objection, Mr. Blurton’s objection was untimely and did 
not preserve anything for appellate review.  Mr. Blurton’s second objection came only 
after the witness had answered two questions.  A trial court’s ruling on an objection is 
preserved for appellate review only if the objection was timely or the party timely moved 
to strike the answer.  State v. McFadden, 369 S.W.3d 727, 740 (Mo. banc 2012); see also 
State v. Sykes, 372 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Mo. 1963).  An objection to testimony must be made 
at the earliest possible opportunity to allow the trial court to invoke remedial remedies.  
State v. Borden, 605 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Mo. banc 1980).   
Although the trial court overruled Mr. Blurton’s second objection, Mr. Blurton 
objected only after the witness had completely answered the question: “[D]id [the peer 
review protocol] help you, I don’t know, feel confident in your conclusions that you 
reached in this case?”  An objection made after a witness gives a responsive answer to an 
objectionable question is usually not timely.  Sykes, 372 S.W.2d at 27.  The exception is 
if the witness answers so quickly that it is impossible to object or if the grounds for the 
objection become apparent only when the answer is given.  State v. Smith, 90 S.W.3d 
132, 139 (Mo. App. 2002); State v. Evenson, 35 S.W.3d 486, 491-92 (Mo. App. 2000); 
25 
 
see also State v. Williams, 416 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Mo. 1967).    In these circumstances, the 
opposing attorney must object to the answer as soon as possible.  Id.  
 In this case, the grounds for Mr. Blurton’s objection to the witness’s second 
answer were apparent as soon as the state asked the second question.  The question was 
not open-ended and was little more than a rephrasing of the question immediately 
preceding it, which the witness had responsively answered.  Additionally, admission of 
testimony over objection is not reversible error if similar questions have previously been 
asked and answered without objection.  State v. Taylor, 408 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Mo. 1966); see 
also State v. Goins, 306 S.W.3d 639, 647 (Mo. App. 2010).  Just prior to her answer: 
“No, there were not [issues],” she had answered “sure” to the state’s question: “[T]he 
peer review process that you went through, did that help you . . . feel confident in your 
conclusions that you reached in this case.”  Mr. Blurton did not object at all to this first 
answer.  Because the witness had already stated that the review process made her feel 
confident in her conclusions, her response to the second question and the grounds for the 
objection were apparent as soon as the state asked the second question.  Accordingly,    
Mr. Blurton’s second objection was not timely and preserved nothing for appellate 
review.  
The trial court sustained Mr. Blurton’s first, third and fourth objections and 
granted him all the relief he requested.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err.  In the 
only instance in which the trial court overruled his objection, the trial court did not err 
because the alleged error was unpreserved due to the untimeliness of the objection and 
because similar testimony had already been admitted without objection. 
26 
 
C. Evidence that Someone Else Had a Motive or Opportunity to Commit the 
Crime 
 
Mr. Blurton next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in partially 
granting the state’s motion in limine to prohibit Mr. Blurton from arguing or presenting 
evidence that Taron’s estranged mother could be responsible for the victims’ deaths due 
to her motive and opportunity to commit the crimes.  A pretrial hearing on the motion in 
limine focused on whether the defense could call the Luetjens’ neighbor to testify that she 
saw Taron’s mother outside of the Luetjens’ house at 8 p.m. on the night of the murders.  
The defense stated that the neighbor would testify that she saw Taron’s mother “exit the 
victims’ home, light a cigarette, talk on a cell phone while pacing back-and-forth for 10-
15 minutes, extinguish her cigarette on the bottom of her shoe, put the cigarette butt in 
her jeans’ pocket, flip her phone shut, and go back inside the victims’ home[.]”            
Mr. Blurton contends that these actions outside the Luetjens’ house were acts that directly 
connected Taron’s mother to the murders and that he should have been allowed to argue 
that she may have been involved in the murders.   
In partially sustaining the state’s motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding 
Taron’s mother’s motive and opportunity to commit the crime, the trial court ruled that 
Mr. Blurton could present evidence to the jury that Taron’s mother was “at or near the 
scene of the homicide.”  Additionally, the trial court stated that Mr. Blurton could make 
an offer of proof for any evidence that would directly connect Taron’s mother “with an 
overt act in the commission of the homicides, rather than her mere presence at the scene 
sometime prior to the commission of the homicides.”  If the trial court ruled favorably on 
this offer of proof, Mr. Blurton could present this evidence to the jury alongside argument 
27 
 
that Taron’s mother committed the murders.  The trial court noted, “This is a motion in 
limine.  It’s an interlocutory order, and can be reviewed[.]”   
As correctly stated by the trial court, a ruling on a motion in limine is interlocutory 
and subject to modification at trial.  See State v. Cole, 71 S.W.3d 163, 175 (Mo. banc 
2002).  Accordingly, a “motion in limine, in and of itself, preserves nothing for appeal.”   
Id.  To preserve this claim of error for appellate review, Mr. Blurton was required to 
attempt to present this evidence at trial.  See id.  Despite the trial court’s ruling that       
Mr. Blurton could present testimony regarding Taron’s mother’s presence at the 
Luetjens’ house, Mr. Blurton did not attempt to present any of this evidence at trial by 
calling either the neighbor or Taron’s mother to testify or make an offer of proof as to 
their testimony.  Specifically, Mr. Blurton did not attempt to present the neighbor’s 
testimony that she saw Taron’s mother exit the Luetjens’ home at around 8:00 p.m., light 
a cigarette, talk on her cell phone, place the extinguished cigarette in her pocket, then 
went inside 10 to 15 minutes later.   
Instead, in an attempt to directly connect Taron’s mother to the murders,           
Mr. Blurton made offers of proof of the testimony of the Luetjens’ daughter, the 
Luetjens’ friend, and a police sergeant.  Each offer of proof was made during a recess 
soon after each had testified.  Each took the stand, and Mr. Blurton and the state each had 
an opportunity to question them.  The daughter and the friend both testified that Taron’s 
mother and maternal grandmother made telephone calls to them after the murders.  One 
of the calls from Taron’s maternal grandmother to the friend was threatening insofar as 
Taron’s maternal grandmother stated that if the friend did not tell her what had happened 
28 
 
to Taron “you’ll end up dead just like her.”  The sergeant testified that he had accused 
Taron’s mother of being involved in the murders during a police interview.  She denied 
these accusations.  The sergeant testified that he did not really believe Taron’s mother 
was involved in the crime, that throughout the interview Taron’s mother had remained 
reasonable, had not in any way indicated she was involved, and had agreed to and did 
take a polygraph test.  As is discussed later, Mr. Blurton appeals the trial court’s denial of 
his offer of proof of the friend’s testimony.  Mr. Blurton does not appeal the trial court’s 
denial of his offer of proof of the sergeant’s testimony.  Because Mr. Blurton did not 
attempt to present testimony from the neighbor or Taron’s mother at trial or make an 
offer of proof of their testimony, he did not preserve for appeal his claim that the trial 
court erred in excluding evidence that Taron’s mother had motive and opportunity to 
commit the crimes.   
D. Bias of Victims’ Daughter 
 
 
Mr. Blurton next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding 
evidence that the Luetjens’ daughter felt concerned for her safety from Taron’s mother 
because of rumors about Taron’s mother and a threatening telephone call from Taron’s 
maternal grandmother to the Luetjens’ friend.  Mr. Blurton argues that the Luetjens’ 
daughter’s fear of Taron’s mother may have caused the daughter to be reluctant to 
identify Taron’s mother’s involvement in the murders.  Mr. Blurton further asserts that 
the daughter’s fear of Taron’s mother may have caused the daughter to feel pressure to 
identify Mr. Blurton’s voice in the 911 call.  Mr. Blurton does not appeal the trial court’s 
denial of his offer of proof of the daughter’s testimony on the ground that it would show 
29 
 
an overt act from Taron’s mother that directly connected her to the murders.  Instead,   
Mr. Blurton appeals the trial court’s denial of his offer of proof of the daughter’s 
testimony on the ground the daughter’s testimony would have shown her bias and motive 
to testify untruthfully. 
  
After the daughter testified at trial, Mr. Blurton made an offer of proof of her 
testimony.  In the offer of proof, the daughter testified that she was concerned for her 
safety because two or three days after the murders she heard rumors that “[Taron’s 
mother] was going to try to come and take Taron’s body from [them], so [they] couldn’t 
bury her with [her] family.”  The daughter also stated that she was present during a 
telephone call from Taron’s maternal grandmother to the Luetjens’ friend, and although 
she did not hear the conversation, the friend told her that Taron’s maternal grandmother 
made a threat “along the lines of something to the effect of the same thing [as had 
happened to Taron] [was] going to happen to [the friend].”   
 
The state asserts that this issue is not preserved because Mr. Blurton had only 
argued to the trial court “that he wanted to question [the daughter] as part of his effort to 
develop evidence regarding [Taron’s mother] as an alternative suspect” and not that the 
daughter’s fear of Taron’s mother “might have motivated her to distort or exaggerate her 
testimony.”  For an allegation of error to be preserved for appellate review, the error must 
be presented to or decided by the trial court.  State v. Davis, 348 S.W.3d 768, 770 (Mo. 
banc 2011).  This issue is preserved because, regardless of whether Mr. Blurton expressly 
offered the daughter’s testimony at trial to show her bias, the trial court ruled on this 
issue, stating that “[t]hose questions and answers would be allowed . . . to show bias of 
30 
 
this witness against a witness who, I’m assuming m[a]y testify.”  After Mr. Blurton stated 
that he did not intend to call Taron’s mother to testify, however, the trial court reversed 
its decision. 
 
While the daughter’s proffered testimony could have been relevant to show her 
motive to testify untruthfully about Taron’s mother, Taron’s mother was not an “issue or 
personality” in the case.  A defendant may cross-examine a witness to “reveal[] possible 
biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues 
or personalities in the case at hand” in an attempt to impeach the witness’s credibility.  
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974); see also State v. Johnson, 700 S.W.2d 815, 
817 (Mo. banc 1985).  Here, the trial court did not err because Mr. Blurton did not call 
Taron’s mother to testify at trial, nor did he call the Luetjens’ neighbor who allegedly 
saw Taron’s mother outside of the Luetjens’ home on the day of the murders.  As such, 
the daughter’s testimony about the rumors and telephone calls would not have revealed 
any biases against an issue or personality in the case.  See Davis, 415 U.S. at 316.  
 
In addition to offering the daughter’s testimony to show that her fear of Taron’s 
mother may have caused her to be reluctant to identify Taron’s mother’s involvement in 
the murders, Mr. Blurton also sought to admit the daughter’s testimony as evidence of her 
motive to falsely testify about hearing Mr. Blurton’s voice on the 911 call.  To be 
admissible, evidence must be both logically and legally relevant.  State v. Taylor, 466 
S.W.3d 521, 528 (Mo. banc 2015).  “Evidence is logically relevant if it tends to make the 
existence of a material fact more or less probable.”  Id.  Evidence is legally relevant when 
the probative value of the evidence outweighs “unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
31 
 
misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cumulativeness.”  State v. Johnson, 
406 S.W.3d 892, 902 (Mo. banc 2013) (internal quotations omitted).  A trial court may 
“limit or exclude the use of impeachment evidence whose prejudicial effect far              
out-distances its value to the jury as an aid for determining credibility.”  Johnson, 700 
S.W.2d at 818.   
 
Mr. Blurton presented no evidence that linked the daughter’s fear of Taron’s 
mother to a motive for her to falsely identify Mr. Blurton’s voice on the 911 call.  The 
daughter’s testimony of her fear, therefore, was, of tenuous logical relevance to show that 
the daughter had a motive to falsely accuse Mr. Blurton.  Accordingly, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in excluding this testimony.  The Luetjens’ daughter’s testimony 
about Taron’s mother would have been of little probative value to assist the jury in 
determining the daughter’s credibility and would likely have confused the issues or 
misled the jury.  Johnson, 406 S.W.3d at 902.   
E. Evidence of Threatening Telephone Calls 
 
Mr. Blurton also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded 
testimony from the Luetjens’ friend about telephone calls from Taron’s mother and 
maternal grandmother.  Mr. Blurton contends that this testimony would have confirmed 
and corroborated the daughter’s testimony that she felt concerned for her safety because 
of the telephone calls and rumors about Taron’s mother and the Luetjens’ friend’s 
testimony would have supported the testimony of a neighbor about seeing Taron’s mother 
outside of the Luetjens’ home on the day of the murders.   
32 
 
 
The state argues that this issue is not preserved because Mr. Blurton never 
presented these theories of admissibility to the trial court.  For an allegation of error to be 
preserved for appellate review, the error must be presented to or decided by the trial 
court.  Davis, 348 S.W.3d at 770.  Regardless of Mr. Blurton’s failure to specify why he 
was offering the friend’s testimony, the trial court expressly ruled on whether that 
testimony was admissible as evidence related to whether Taron’s mother may have 
committed an overt act that directly connected her with the murders or as relevant to     
the Luetjens’ daughter’s fear of Taron’s mother.  In its objection to the daughter’s offer 
of proof, the state objected to the friend’s testimony because the state argued that it was 
being offered to support the argument that Taron’s mother had motive or opportunity to 
commit the murders and because the threat had come from Taron’s maternal grandmother 
and not directly from Taron’s mother.  The trial court expressly denied the offer of proof 
for these same reasons.  Accordingly, because these theories of admissibility were 
decided by the trial court, this issue is preserved. 
 
 After the friend testified at trial, Mr. Blurton made an offer of proof of her 
testimony.  In the offer of proof, she testified that on the day the Luetjens’ bodies were 
discovered, her sister had a conversation with Taron’s mother and the friend had several 
conversations with Taron’s maternal grandmother.  The friend testified that Taron’s 
maternal grandmother called her to ask what had happened to Taron, her granddaughter.  
The friend did not disclose any information.  During one of these calls to her, Taron’s 
maternal grandmother stated: “If you do not tell me about my granddaughter, you’ll end 
up dead just like her.”  The friend also overheard the conversation her sister had with 
33 
 
Taron’s mother.  She overheard her sister tell Taron’s mother to call the sheriff’s office to 
find out what happened to Taron and heard her sister refuse to provide Taron’s mother 
with any additional information.  The friend’s sister told the friend that Taron’s mother 
then hung up the telephone.   
As noted previously, to be admissible, evidence must be both logically and legally 
relevant.  Taylor, 466 S.W.3d at 528.  “Evidence is logically relevant if it tends to make 
the existence of a material fact more or less probable.”  Id.  Evidence is legally relevant 
when the probative value of the evidence outweighs “unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cumulativeness.”  Johnson, 
406 S.W.3d at 902 (internal quotations omitted).  
The proffered testimony was not logically relevant to any material fact at issue in 
the case at trial.   The trial court properly excluded the Luetjens’ daughter’s testimony 
that she feared Taron’s mother and that the daughter was with the friend and her sister 
when Taron’s mother and maternal grandmother made the telephone calls to them.  The 
trial court ruled that this evidence was not relevant.  Because the daughter’s proffered 
testimony was properly excluded, the neighbor’s testimony was not relevant without the 
daughter’s testimony.  Additionally, because Mr. Blurton did not attempt to call the 
neighbor who allegedly saw Taron’s mother outside the Luetjens’ home on the day of the 
murders as a witness at trial, the friend’s testimony was not relevant without the 
neighbor’s testimony.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
the friend’s offer of proof.  
 
34 
 
No Error Rejecting Mistrial Request 
 
In his final claim of error, Mr. Blurton asserts that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying his requests for a mistrial after the state inadvertently showed three 
separate witnesses and the jury graphic crime scene photographs of the victims when the 
state was calling up photographs on a PowerPoint presentation.  Mr. Blurton contends 
this evidentiary error warranted a mistrial because the unexpected viewing of the 
gruesome photographs “triggered excess emotions against [Mr. Blurton]” and “caused                 
[Mr. Blurton’s] sentence to be imposed under the influence of passion.”   
 
Although the trial court had the discretion to grant Mr. Blurton’s mistrial requests, 
a mistrial “is a drastic remedy and should be employed only in the most extraordinary 
circumstances.”  State v. Taylor, 298 S.W.3d 482, 512 (Mo. banc 2009) (internal 
quotations omitted).   “This decision is left to the discretion of the trial court, as it is in 
the best position to determine whether the incident had a prejudicial effect on the jury.”  
State v. Ward, 242 S.W.3d 698, 704 (Mo. banc 2008).   A trial court abuses its discretion 
to grant a mistrial only if “its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances 
before it and when the ruling is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the appellate 
court’s sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration.”  Id.  A mistrial 
should only be used “in those extraordinary circumstances in which the prejudice to the 
defendant cannot otherwise be removed.”  Id.  A trial court may also grant a mistrial if 
the evidentiary error is intentionally injected into the trial.  State v. Aguilar, 478 S.W.2d 
351, 355 (Mo. 1972).   
35 
 
 
During the state’s direct examination of the Luetjens’ daughter, the state first 
inadvertently showed her a photograph of the bound hands of one of the victims instead 
of a photograph of a vehicle owned by the Luetjens.  An investigator in the public 
defender’s office testified at a hearing on Mr. Blurton’s motion for a new trial that several 
jurors reacted to the photographs by jolting or leaning forward in their chairs, covering 
their mouths, or widening their eyes.  One juror also said an expletive.  Mr. Blurton 
almost immediately asked the trial court to approach the bench.  During the sidebar, the 
state explained that all of its photographs were organized into a PowerPoint presentation 
on a laptop computer, which was then displayed on a large television screen in the 
courtroom.  To access a photograph, the state would type in the photograph’s exhibit 
number and then press enter.  The state had inadvertently displayed the incorrect 
photograph when it either typed in the incorrect exhibit number or had typed in a number, 
did not press enter, then typed in another number.  After seeing the photograph, the 
daughter began to cry while on the stand in view of the jury.  Mr. Blurton requested a 
mistrial, which the trial court denied.  Mr. Blurton also asked the trial court to grant a 
recess to allow the daughter to compose herself, which the trial court also denied after 
asking the daughter if she wanted to take a break and she declined.    
 
The state then inadvertently showed the daughter’s ex-husband a series of crime 
scene photographs in rapid fashion when it attempted to display a photograph of the 
Luetjens’ house.   The investigator testified that the jury reacted less than it had when the 
first photograph was inadvertently displayed but that a few of the jurors leaned forward, 
covered their mouth with their hands, or lowered their heads.  This time the state 
36 
 
explained that it started with the first photograph on the PowerPoint presentation and 
rapidly flipped through 12 photographs until it reached the correct photograph.              
Mr. Blurton again requested a mistrial arguing it was “highly inflammatory for [the 
photographs] to be shown to the jury in that type of fashion.”  The trial court denied       
Mr. Blurton’s request.   
 
Lastly, the state inadvertently showed a photograph of Donnie’s body to Donnie’s 
acquaintance for three or four seconds.  The investigator testified that, although there 
may have been some reaction by the jurors, the reactions were not clearly evident this 
time.  Mr. Blurton moved for a mistrial, asserting that the photographs had a “negative 
effect on [the] jury.”  The trial court denied the request for a mistrial.  After this denial, 
Mr. Blurton requested the trial court to instruct the jury to disregard the photographs.  
When the trial court agreed to do so, Mr. Blurton withdrew the request before the trial 
court could act because he was afraid that “if the court says anything, it’s just going to 
highlight it here even more than it’s happened.”  The trial court then asked the state if it 
could show the photographs in paper or poster form instead of using the PowerPoint, and 
the state agreed to do so.  Before allowing the state to resume its direct examination, the 
trial court warned that it “really [didn’t] want it to happen again either.”    
 
The state’s inadvertent publication of the crime scene photographs did not require 
the extreme remedy of a mistrial.  Mr. Blurton presents no evidence that the state 
intentionally showed the Luetjens’ daughter or the other witnesses the photographs.  
Additionally, all of the photographs inadvertently shown either had been or were later 
admitted into evidence and shown to the jury.  Although the photographs were gruesome 
37 
 
and may have triggered emotions from the jury, the photographs were gruesome “because 
the crime itself was gruesome.” State v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 144, 161 (Mo. banc 2008).  
“Gruesome crimes produce gruesome, yet probative, photographs, and a defendant may 
not escape the brutality of his own actions.”  State v. Strong, 142 S.W.3d 702, 721 (Mo. 
banc 2004) (internal quotations omitted).  Moreover, Mr. Blurton declined the trial 
court’s offer to instruct the jury to disregard the photographs in an attempt to remove any 
prejudicial effect through means other than a mistrial.  Accordingly, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Blurton’s mistrial requests because the ruling was not 
against the logic of the circumstances and showed careful consideration and an attempt 
by the trial court to remove any potential prejudice.    
Death Sentence is Not Excessive or Disproportional 
 
Although not requested by Mr. Blurton, this Court is required by section 565.035 
to independently review Mr. Blurton’s death sentence.  In its review, this Court 
determines:  
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of 
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and 
 
(2) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or judge’s finding of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in subsection 2 of 
section 565.032 and any other circumstances found;   
 
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the 
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime, the 
strength of the evidence and the defendant.  
 
Section 565.035.3. 
 
 
First, nothing in the record suggests that the jury recommended the death penalty 
under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary factor.  Second, the jury found 
38 
 
the following statutory aggravators: (1) Mr. Blurton had a prior serious assaultive 
conviction; (2) each murder was committed while he was engaged in the commission of 
two other murders; and (3) the murders involved depravity of mind and, as a result, the 
murders were outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman insofar as each 
victim was bound or otherwise rendered helpless and, therefore, Mr. Blurton exhibited a 
callous disregard for the sanctity of all human life.  Each of these statutory aggravators 
was supported in the record.   
 
Lastly, Mr. Blurton’s sentence is proportional to the penalty imposed in similar 
cases, considering the crime, the strength of the evidence and the defendant.  In a 
factually similar case, the death penalty was imposed when the defendant murdered an 
elderly victim who had her hands bound, had been shot in the head, and was robbed.  
State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320, 325-27 (Mo. banc 1993).  The death penalty has been 
imposed when the defendant has rendered his victim helpless before murdering the 
victim.  McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 754-55; State v. Anderson, 306 S.W.3d 529, 544   
(Mo. banc 2010); State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751, 766 (Mo. banc 2002).  This Court has 
affirmed sentences of death in cases when the defendant had one prior serious assaultive 
conviction.  State v. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d 883, 891, 900 (Mo. banc 2015); State v. 
Sidebottom, 753 S.W.2d 915, 926 (Mo. banc 1988); State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 
331-32 (Mo. banc 1996).  The death penalty has been imposed when the defendant has 
murdered more than one person.  State v. Driskill, 459 S.W.3d 412, 432-33 (Mo. banc 
2015); Hosier, 454 S.W.3d at 899-900; State v. Wolfe, 13 S.W.3d 248, 265 (Mo. banc 
2000), abrogated on other grounds by Mitchell v. Kardesch, 313 S.W.3d 667, 670     
39 
 
(Mo. banc 2010); State v. Johnson, 968 S.W.2d 123, 135 (Mo. banc 1998); State v. 
Mease, 842 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Mo. banc 1992).   The death penalty has been imposed when 
the defendant murdered at least one victim and perpetrated a robbery or burglary.  
Driskill, 459 S.W.3d at 432; State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 532-33 (Mo. banc 2010); 
State v. Gilbert, 103 S.W.3d 743, 745-46 (Mo. banc 2003); State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 
462, 466-67, 475 (Mo. banc 2003). 
 
After considering all the statutory factors, the imposition of the death penalty for 
Mr. Blurton’s murder convictions was not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty 
imposed in similar cases.  
Conclusion 
 
Mr. Blurton’s requested jury instruction on the statutory lesser included offense of 
felony murder did not properly conform to the requirements in Notes on Use 2(b) of 
MAI-CR 3d 314.06, and the trial court was not obligated to submit an incorrect 
instruction.  The trial court did not err in refusing to submit an improper instruction to the 
jury.    
 
The trial court also did not err in admitting evidence at trial over Mr. Blurton’s 
objection.  The trial court properly admitted testimony regarding the location of the cell 
phone towers to which Mr. Blurton’s cell phone connected on the night of the murders, 
including his testimony that this analysis showed Mr. Blurton’s cell phone traveling on a 
path from his home in Garnett, Kansas, to Cole Camp.  The witness’s testimony of his 
telephone toll analysis of Mr. Blurton’s cell phone calls did not require expert testimony 
because his testimony was within the realm of a layperson.  Moreover, his statement that 
40 
 
this analysis showed Mr. Blurton’s general path of travel was based only on common 
inferences within the realm of the ordinary experiences of a layperson.  The trial court 
also did not err in admitting testimony from the state’s fingerprint analyst that her 
conclusions had been verified by other analysts.  The trial court sustained three of        
Mr. Blurton’s objections and granted him all the relief he sought, and, in the only 
instance in which his objection was overruled, the trial court did not err because Mr. 
Blurton’s objection was untimely and similar testimony had already been admitted 
without objection.  
 
The trial court also did not err in excluding evidence at trial.  Mr. Blurton’s claim 
that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Taron’s mother’s presence outside the 
Luetjens’ home on the day of the murders was not preserved because Mr. Blurton did not 
attempt to present this evidence at trial.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding the Luetjens’ daughter’s testimony about being fearful of Taron’s mother due 
to rumors and a threatening telephone call to the Luetjens’ friend because this testimony 
was not logically relevant to show the daughter’s bias against or motive to testify 
untruthfully about Taron’s mother when Taron’s mother was not a “personality” in the 
case or even called as a witness at trial and was of little probative value to show the 
daughter’s motive to falsely identify Mr. Blurton on the 911 call.  The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in excluding testimony from the Luetjens’ friend about telephone 
calls from Taron’s mother and maternal grandmother because this testimony would have 
only been admissible to support testimony that the trial court properly excluded or that 
Mr. Blurton did not offer at trial.   
41 
 
 
The trial court also did not err in rejecting Mr. Blurton’s mistrial requests after the 
state inadvertently showed gruesome photographs from the crime scene during the 
testimony of three witnesses.  No evidence was presented that the state intentionally 
showed these photographs to the Luetjens’ friends or family.  Moreover, all of these 
photographs were later shown to the jury, they were gruesome because the crime was 
gruesome, and Mr. Blurton declined the trial court’s offer to instruct the jury to disregard 
the photographs.   
 
An independent review by this Court finds that the record does not show that the 
death sentences were imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any arbitrary 
factor.  Additionally, the evidence supports the jury’s finding that Mr. Blurton had a prior 
serious assaultive conviction, that each murder was committed while he was engaged in 
the commission of two other murders, and that the murders involved a depravity of mind 
and, as a result, the murders were outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman.  
Moreover, this Court finds that Mr. Blurton’s sentence was not excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
Russell, J., concurs; Fischer, J., concurs in 
separate opinion filed; Wilson, J., concurs 
in opinion of Fischer, J.; Draper, J., concurs 
in result in separate opinion filed; Stith and  
Teitelman, JJ., concur in opinion of Draper, J. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Respondent, 
) 
 
) 
v. 
) 
 
No. SC93648 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
ROBERT BLAKE BLURTON, 
) 
 
) 
Appellant. 
) 
 
CONCURRING OPINION 
  
 
Robert Blurton appeals three first-degree murder convictions and death sentences.  
I concur in the principal opinion in all respects, including the principal opinion's 
explanation that State v. Jackson specifically dealt with "nested" lesser-included 
offenses,0F1 433 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Mo. banc 2014), and the holding that the circuit court 
                                              
1 It is clear Jackson dealt only with "nested" lesser-included offenses:  
The question presented in this case is whether the trial court can refuse to give a 
lesser included offense instruction requested by the defendant under section 
556.046 when the lesser offense consists of a subset of the elements of the 
charged offense and the differential element (i.e., the element required for the 
charged offense but not for the lesser offense) is one on which the state bears the 
burden of proof.  The answer, unequivocally, is no.   
 
433 S.W.3d at 392. 
**** 
 
[T]he jury's right to disbelieve all or any part of the evidence, and its right to 
refuse to draw any needed inference, is a sufficient basis in the evidence to justify 
giving any lesser included offense instruction when the offenses are separated 
only by one differential element for which the state bears the burden of proof. 
 
2 
was not required to give a lesser-included offense instruction on second-degree felony 
murder.  Because this Court is affirming three death sentences, which will no doubt 
receive further review by this Court and the federal courts, I write separately to explain 
that, in my view, the circuit court would not have erred in refusing the second-degree 
felony murder instruction, even if it were tendered in the form required by the Notes on 
Use for MAI-CR 314.04 and 314.06.  Regardless, Blurton was not prejudiced by the 
failure to give a second-degree felony murder instruction.  State v. McLaughlin, 265 
S.W.3d 257, 270-71 (Mo. banc 2008); State v. Hall, 982 S.W.2d 675, 682 (Mo. banc 
1998); State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 330 (Mo. banc 1996).   
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
Blurton was charged with three counts of first-degree murder for killing his aunt 
and uncle and their 15-year-old granddaughter.  Police found Donnie, Sharon, and Taron 
Luetjen dead in their home.  Each had been shot once in the back of the head.  Each was 
found lying face down on the floor, head on a pillow, and their hands were bound behind 
their backs.  Donnie's and Sharon's wallets lay empty nearby, and valuable items and 
change were missing from another room.  There was no sign of a forced entry.  The State 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
Id. at 401. 
 
**** 
 
When dealing with "nested" lesser included offenses . . . "it is impossible to 
commit the greater without necessarily committing the lesser."   
 
Id. at 404 (emphasis in original).  
 
 
3 
did not charge robbery or, for that matter, any underlying felony.  Blurton presented no 
evidence during the guilt phase of trial. 
The State did, however, file a "Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty."  The 
purpose of this filing is to put the defendant on notice of the potential aggravating factors 
the State might try to prove during the penalty phase of the trial.  The jury was ultimately 
instructed, during the penalty phase of trial, to consider whether "the defendant was 
engaged in the perpetration of robbery."  Instruction No. 25.  According to the verdict, 
the jury found several aggravating factors existed, listing them in writing on the jury 
verdict form, but it did not find Blurton was engaged in a robbery or, for that matter, any 
felony it was asked to consider other than murder.   
 
In addition to an instruction on first-degree murder, the State requested the circuit 
court to instruct the jury to find Blurton guilty of second-degree murder if he knowingly 
caused the Luetjens' deaths without premeditation ("conventional" second-degree 
murder).  The State's request to instruct solely on this particular lesser-included offense 
was in line with this Court's previous express holdings in McLaughlin, Hall, Kinder, and 
State v. Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475, 485 (Mo. banc 1988).  Blurton's proffered jury 
instruction violated the Notes on Use for MAI-CR 314.04 and 314.06.  Had the circuit 
court given Blurton's proffered, and incorrectly worded, instruction it would have 
committed error.  The circuit court did not, therefore, err in rejecting Blurton's second-
degree felony murder instruction.  Slip op. at 10.  Had Blurton tendered a proper second-
degree felony murder instruction, the refusal to give that instruction was in accord with 
this Court's prior first-degree murder death penalty cases. 
 
4 
 
Blurton, as the other defendants had done in the above cited cases, requested an 
instruction for second-degree felony murder.  The circuit court refused to give the 
proffered instruction.1F2  The State objected on three grounds: (1) that the instruction 
lacked the proper form and accompanying instructions required under the Notes on Use 
for MAI-CR 314.04 and 314.06; (2) that this defense may or may not have been 
supported by the evidence; and (3) that the defense was mutually exclusive of the alibi 
defense that Blurton had inserted into the case.  The circuit court's decision to refuse the 
second-degree felony murder instruction is in accord with this Court's first-degree murder 
                                              
2 "As to [Counts I, II, and III], if you do not find the defendant guilty of murder in the first 
degree, you must consider whether he is guilty of murder in the second degree.   
 
As to [Counts I, II, and III], if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt:  
 
First, that [on or about] the 7th day of June, 2009, . . . in the County of Benton, 
State of Missouri, the defendant took property which was property owned by 
Donnie Luetjen and, that defendant did so for the purpose of withholding it from 
the owner permanently, and that defendant in doing so used physical force on or 
against [Donnie, Sharon, and Taron] Luetjen for the purpose of preventing 
resistance to the taking of the property, then you will find that the defendant has 
committed robbery in the second degree.  However, unless you find and believe 
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of these propositions, 
you cannot find that the defendant has committed robbery in the second degree.   
 
Second, that [Donnie, Sharon, and Taron] Luetjen [were] shot and killed, and  
 
Third, that [Donnie, Sharon, and Taron] Luetjen [were] killed as a result of the 
perpetration of that robbery in the second degree,  
 
then you will find the defendant guilty under [Counts I, II, and III] of murder in the second 
degree.   
 
However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all 
of these propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder in the second degree 
under this instruction, but you must then consider whether he is guilty of murder in the second 
degree under Instruction No. ____." 
 
5 
death penalty cases affirming this approach under similar factual scenarios.2F3  It is also in 
accord with the jury's verdict in this case indicating there was not sufficient evidence 
presented that Blurton committed a robbery.   
 
The jury found Blurton guilty on all three counts and recommended three death 
sentences, which the circuit court imposed.  Blurton appeals directly to this Court, which 
has jurisdiction.  See Mo. Const. art. V, § 3. 
Analysis3F4 
 
Section 556.046 requires circuit courts to give a requested lesser-included offense 
instruction if there is a basis in the evidence to acquit the defendant of the immediately 
higher included offense and convict of the lesser.  An offense is included when "[i]t is 
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged," § 556.046.1(1)—in other words, the elements of the 
lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the higher offense, or "nested."  See 
Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 392.  An offense is also deemed included within the offense 
charged when "[i]t is specifically denominated by statute as a lesser degree of the offense 
                                              
3 The ruling from the bench was as follows: 
[T]his defendant was not charged with any underlying felony whatsoever.  The 
tendered instruction picks a felony that the defendant picks, that the State did not 
charge.  The defense, on this tendered instruction, has picked robbery in the 
second degree.  By picking an underlying offense, it is inconsistent with alibi, and 
I think the defense may be, is maybe allowed to argue inconsistent theories, 
asserting innocence. 
 
The foreman [sic] [form], which the instruction as tendered, is not the proper -- 
the facts in evidence in this case do not support that giving of felony murder.  
More technically -- murder in the second degree, felony.  It is also inconsistent 
with the language that the defense did request with respect to the alibi type 
information.  "A" is refused.       
 
6 
charged."  Section 556.046.1(2).  This second type of lesser-included offense necessarily 
requires proof of additional elements, other than the higher offense.  §§ 565.025.2(1)(a), 
565.021.1(2), RSMo 2000.   
 
As explained in the principal opinion, the circuit court's refusal to give Blurton's 
second-degree felony murder instruction was not error because it was not in the form 
required by the Notes on Use for MAI-CR 314.04 and 314.06.  Moreover, neither 
Blurton, the principal opinion, nor the separate opinion of Judge Draper, cite to a single 
case in which this Court permitted, let alone required, the submission of a second-degree 
felony murder instruction based on an uncharged felony.  Furthermore, the jury in this 
case did not find that the State proved that Blurton was engaged in a robbery or any other 
felony.     
Even if Blurton Had Tendered an Instruction on Second-Degree Felony Murder in 
Accordance with the Notes on Use for MAI-CR 314.04 and 314.06, It Was Not 
Prejudicial to Refuse to Submit the Instruction 
 
 
Even assuming the circuit court erred by refusing to instruct on second-degree 
felony murder in this case, which has not been demonstrated, this Court held in 
McLaughlin that the State had overcome the presumption of prejudice in this same 
factual scenario.  McLaughlin, a unanimous decision authored by Judge Stith, is directly 
on point.  In that case, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder, forcible rape, 
and armed criminal action.  265 S.W.3d at 260-61.  The defendant requested an 
instruction on second-degree felony murder, based on the rape charge, but the circuit 
                                                                                                                                                  
4 Statutory citations are to RSMo Supp. 2013 except where otherwise indicated.  
 
7 
court refused to give it and instead instructed on conventional second-degree murder.  Id. 
at 261.  This Court's opinion states as follows: 
 
Mr. McLaughlin next argues that the trial court erred in submitting 
only first-degree and conventional second-degree murder and in refusing to 
also submit second-degree felony murder. He notes that the state argued 
that he raped the victim in the same incident in which he murdered her and 
submitted counts of both forcible rape and first-degree murder. The jury in 
fact found that Mr. McLaughlin forcibly raped the victim and that he 
murdered her. Therefore, Mr. McLaughlin argues, the trial court should 
have submitted felony murder so that he could have argued that if the jury 
found that he killed the victim in furtherance of the rape, it should convict 
him of second-degree felony murder rather than first-degree murder. 
 
 
Mr. McLaughlin is correct that a trial court is obligated to charge the 
jury with respect to lesser-included offenses that are supported by the 
evidence, so as to give it a third choice beyond either acquittal or first-
degree murder. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637–38, (1980); State v. 
Hall, 982 S.W.2d 675, 682 (Mo. banc 1998); Sec. 556.046, RSMo 2000. 
Felony murder is a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder. Sec. 
565.025.2(1)(a). Conventional second-degree murder is also a lesser-
included offense of first-degree murder, however. For this reason, as Mr. 
McLaughlin recognizes, Hall held that it was not error to refuse to submit 
felony murder so long as the trial court did submit second-degree murder, 
for when "a jury convicts on first-degree murder after having been 
instructed on second-degree murder, there is no prejudice to the defendant 
by the refusal to submit a second-degree felony murder instruction." Hall, 
982 S.W.2d at 682, (quoting State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 330 (Mo. 
banc 1996)). 
 
 
Mr. McLaughlin acknowledges Hall, but argues that it is 
distinguishable because in that case the prosecution did not also submit the 
felony that underlies the felony murder charge, whereas here the prosecutor 
did submit both murder and forcible rape. He also argues that he should 
have had the option, at least, of choosing which form of second-degree 
murder to submit in this situation. 
 
 
While the prosecution in Hall did not submit the underlying felony, 
the case on which it relied, Kinder, did submit both first and conventional 
second-degree murder and rape, just as in the case at bar. Thus, it is directly 
on point. Kinder held that because the pattern criminal jury instructions 
require the jury to find defendant not guilty of first-degree and conventional 
second-degree murder before considering the felony murder instruction, no 
 
8 
prejudice could result from failing to submit felony murder. Kinder, 942 
S.W.2d at 330. 
 
 
Of course, Mr. McLaughlin is correct that the trial court could have 
submitted felony-murder rather than or in addition to submitting 
conventional second-degree murder without committing error if both were 
supported by the evidence. But, the issue is not what the trial court could 
have done, but whether prejudice resulted from its failure to submit felony 
murder. Hall, Kinder, and numerous other cases hold that no prejudice 
results from refusing to submit a felony murder instruction where a 
conventional second-degree murder instruction was given because the latter 
sufficiently tests the evidence of deliberation by giving the jury the option 
of convicting the defendant of a lesser offense. This Court reaffirms these 
holdings. 
 
Id. at 270-71 (some internal citations omitted).   
 
Likewise, in Hall, this Court held as follows:  
 
Hall asserts the trial court erred by refusing to submit to the jury an 
instruction for the offense of second-degree felony murder. "Under section 
556.046.2, RSMo 1986, the trial court is obligated to charge the jury with 
respect to a lesser included offense when there is a basis for a verdict 
acquitting him of the offense charged and convicting him of the included 
offense." 
 
 
We have consistently held that when "a jury convicts on first-degree 
murder after having been instructed on both first degree and second-degree 
murder, there is no prejudice to the defendant by the refusal to submit a 
second degree felony murder instruction." The trial court did not err. Point 
denied. 
 
982 S.W.2d at 682 (citations omitted).   
 
Likewise in Kinder, this Court unanimously held as follows: 
 
Kinder's next claim is that the trial court erred in refusing his second 
degree felony murder instruction, which was patterned after MAI-CR 3d 
313.06. We disagree. The trial court did submit Kinder's conventional 
second degree murder instruction, which was patterned after MAI-CR 3d 
313.04. Under § 556.046.2, RSMO 1986, the trial court is obligated to 
charge the jury with respect to a lesser included offense when there is a 
basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense. Murder in the second degree is a 
 
9 
lesser-included offense of murder in the first degree. § 565.025.2(1)(a). In 
reviewing similar claims, this Court has held that "[t]he appropriate      
MAI-CR 3d requires that the jury find the defendant not guilty of first 
degree murder and then conventional second degree murder before it may 
consider second degree felony murder."  When a jury convicts on first 
degree murder after having been instructed on both first degree and second 
degree murder, there is no prejudice to the defendant by the refusal to 
submit a second degree felony murder instruction. This is the exact scenario 
in the current case, and thus Kinder was not prejudiced by the trial court's 
refusal to submit his second degree felony murder instruction. 
 
942 S.W.2d at 330 (citations omitted).   
 
And likewise in Griffin, this Court again expressly held:  
 
Defendant's next point is his assertion that the jury should have been 
instructed on the lesser included offense of second degree felony murder 
with respect to each count. Trial courts are obligated to instruct on lesser 
included offenses supported by the evidence. Section 556.046, RSMo 1986. 
See also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 635–43 (1980). Although second 
degree felony murder is not a lesser included offense of first degree murder 
under the traditional "elements test," it has been specifically denominated 
as such, see §§ 556.046 and  565.025, RSMo 1986. 
 
 
As the evidence in this case of defendant's state of mind was not 
conclusive, it did support an instruction on second degree felony murder 
and the trial court should have so instructed the jury. Defendant, however, 
was not prejudiced by the court's failure to do this. The jury was 
instructed on the lesser-included offense of second degree conventional 
murder. It is a second degree conventional murder instruction, not a 
second degree felony murder instruction, which sufficiently tests a 
jury's belief of the crucial facts for a conviction of first degree murder. 
. . . The jury had the opportunity to convict defendant of second degree 
conventional murder but did not do so. An additional instruction on second 
degree felony murder would have made no difference. 
 
756 S.W.2d at 485 (emphasis added) (some internal citations omitted).   
 
In this case, the jury was given a choice other than capital murder and acquittal: 
conventional second-degree murder.  It chose to find Blurton guilty of first-degree 
 
10 
murder and sentenced him to death based on its determination that the State proved all of 
the aggravating factors submitted except:  
"4. Whether the defendant murdered [Donnie/Sharon/Taron] Luetjen for the 
purpose of the defendant receiving money or any other thing of monetary 
value from [Donnie/Sharon] Luetjen or another."   
"6. Whether the murder of [Donnie/Sharon/Taron] Luetjen was committed 
while the defendant was engaged in the perpetration of burglary.  A person 
commits the crime of burglary when the person knowingly enters 
unlawfully or knowingly remains unlawfully in a building or inhabitable 
structure for the purpose of committing stealing."   
"7. Whether the murder of [Donnie/Sharon/Taron] Luetjen was committed 
while the defendant was engaged in the perpetration of robbery.  A person 
commits the crime of robbery when he forcibly steals property."   
Conclusion 
 
Second-degree felony murder is not a "nested lesser" and requires proof of a 
felony in addition to murder.  If the jury chose to disbelieve all or any part of the State's 
evidence it would result in acquittal of first-degree murder and would not necessarily 
result in the conviction of second-degree felony murder, which in this case would require 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an uncharged felony.  The jury was specifically asked 
to consider whether the State had demonstrated an underlying felony of robbery in the 
context of considering aggravating factors for purposes of punishment.  The jury did not 
 
11 
find a robbery or any felony it was instructed to consider had been committed except 
three first-degree murders.     
 
In conclusion, I concur in the principal opinion affirming the circuit court's 
judgment that the instruction on second-degree felony murder was not in the proper form 
and, therefore, the circuit court did not err in refusing to give it as tendered.  For the 
additional reasons articulated above, it would not have been error to reject a second-
degree felony murder instruction even if it was tendered in compliance with the Notes on 
Use for MAI-CR 314.04 and 314.06.4F5   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
                                              
5 But even assuming it was an error, the State, as it did in McLaughlin, Hall, Kinder, and Griffin, 
has overcome the presumption of prejudice. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
  
Respondent,  
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
No.  SC93648 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
ROBERT BLAKE BLURTON, 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
  ) 
 
OPINION CONCURRING IN RESULT 
 
 
I diverge from the principal opinion’s analysis in several aspects.  First, I would 
find that a trial court is required to submit any lesser-included offense requested by a 
defendant.  Second, I would find the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-
included offense of second-degree felony murder when Robert Blake Blurton 
(hereinafter, “Blurton”) requested the instruction and the instruction was supported by 
evidence presented at trial, but due to Blurton’s failure to submit a properly worded 
instruction or to request the opportunity to modify his instruction, there was no prejudice.  
Third, there was no need to overrule State v. Derenzy, 89 S.W.3d 472 (Mo. banc 2002), 
sub silentio.  Accordingly, I concur in result only. 
The trial court is required to instruct on the lesser-included offense 
 
Blurton’s first point on appeal alleges, “The trial court failed to give a lesser-
included offense instruction (felony murder) that was supported by the evidence and was 
2 
 
the theory primarily argued by the defense ….”  Review of a trial court’s decision 
whether to give a requested jury instruction pursuant to section 556.046, RSMo Supp. 
2002,0F1 is de novo.  State v. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d 390, 395 (Mo. banc 2014).  When “the 
statutory requirements for giving such an instruction are met, a failure to give a requested 
instruction is reversible error.”  Id.   
Section 556.046.1 sets forth three situations wherein an offense is considered 
“included” in another offense.  An offense is considered to be a lesser-included offense 
when: 
(1) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
 
(2) It is specifically denominated by statute as a lesser degree of the offense 
charged; or 
 
(3) It consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or to commit an 
offense otherwise included therein. 
 
Section 556.046.1.   
 
While second-degree felony murder does not meet the traditional “elements test” 
as set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 
306 (1932), it is denominated specifically as a lesser-included offense by our Missouri 
legislature.  State v. Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475, 485 (Mo. banc 1988).  Section 
565.025.2(l)(a), RSMo 2000,1F2 provides that felony murder and conventional second-
degree murder are both lesser-included offenses of first-degree murder.  The requirement 
of section 556.046.1(2) is met. 
                                              
1 All further references to this section are RSMo Supp. 2002. 
2 All further references to this section are RSMo 2000. 
3 
 
Section 556.046 next contemplates when a trial court is required to instruct a jury 
on a lesser-included offense.  Section 556.046.2 states that the trial court is not required 
to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense “unless there is a basis for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him [or her] of the 
included offense.”  Further, section 556.046.2 provides that a “charged offense” is one 
that is included in the indictment or information or “is an offense submitted to the jury 
because there is a basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting the defendant of the included offense.”  Here, the state presented evidence that 
there was missing property from the victims.  Accordingly, this subsection is met.  
Finally, section 556.046.3 provides the trial court is “obligated to instruct the jury 
with respect to a particular included offense only if there is a basis in the evidence for 
acquitting the defendant of the immediately higher included offense and there is a basis in 
the evidence for convicting the defendant of that particular included offense.”   
“The decision of what evidence to believe or disbelieve belongs solely to the 
jury.”  State v. Pierce, 433 S.W.3d 424, 432 (Mo. banc 2014).  The trial court “is required 
to decide what facts a reasonable jury may find from the evidence, but it is never 
permitted to go further and decide what facts the jury must find.”  Id. (Emphasis in 
original).  A trial court may not usurp the jury’s duty by limiting its inquiry.   
Here, the state requested the instructions for first-degree murder and the lesser-
included offense of conventional second-degree murder.  The trial court accepted both 
instructions.  Thereby, it implicitly recognized there was a basis upon which the jury 
could acquit Blurton of first-degree murder because it instructed the jury on the lesser-
4 
 
included offense of second-degree murder.  Blurton additionally requested the instruction 
for second-degree felony murder be submitted as a lesser-included offense.  Yet, the trial 
court refused Blurton’s request. 
There is no prohibition on submitting two lesser-included instructions.  It is clear 
that both conventional second-degree murder and second-degree felony murder may be 
submitted to the jury as lesser-included offenses of first-degree murder.  MAI-CR 3d 
314.06 Note 5.  The only qualification in submitting all lesser-included instructions is 
that there must be a basis in the evidence to support the instructions and the instructions 
are “requested by one of the parties or the court.”  Section 565.025.3.   
In Jackson and its progeny, this Court found that any lesser-included offense that 
meets the traditional “elements test” as set forth in Blockburger is a “nested” offense and 
meets the requirement of section 556.046.1.  When reviewing whether the trial court 
erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense as required by section 
556.046.2 and .3, Jackson and Pierce determined that a trial court commits reversible 
error in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included, “nested” offense.  This occurs 
because if the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant of the greater charged 
offense, there is always sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of the lesser-included 
offense in that the jury may “disbelieve all or any part of the evidence concerning that 
differential element.”  Pierce, 433 S.W.3d at 430 (citing Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 404-06).  
Further, this Court stated that a 
defendant not only does not need to introduce affirmative evidence, he [or 
she] does not have to ‘cast doubt’ over the state’s evidence via cross-
examination or explain to the judge or jury precisely how or why the jury 
5 
 
can disbelieve that evidence and so acquit him [or her] of the greater 
offense and convict him [or her] of the lesser. 
 
Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 401-02. 
While the lesser-included instruction at issue in this case is not a “nested” 
instruction, it still is a lesser-included instruction because it has been denominated as 
such by statute.  Rather than ignore our legislators’ directive in section 556.046, I would 
find that the statutory requirements were met and, just as in Jackson, find that a trial court 
is obligated to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense, provided “there is a basis in 
the evidence for convicting the defendant of that particular included offense.”  Section 
556.046.3.  “Doubts concerning whether to instruct on a lesser-included offense should 
be resolved in favor of including the instruction, leaving it to the jury to decide.”  
Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 399 (quoting Derenzy, 89 S.W.3d at 474-75).  Should the jury not 
believe the defendant, it will convict on the “higher” offense without regard to the lesser-
included instruction.  Inclusion of a requested, lesser-included instruction that complies 
with our legislators’ mandate in section 556.046 should be given. 
Here, the evidence submitted by the state during the trial supported the submission 
of Blurton’s requested second-degree felony murder instruction.  To prove felony 
murder, there must be evidence showing that the homicide occurred during the 
commission or attempted commission of a felony.  State v. Agee, 350 S.W.3d 83, 91-92 
(Mo. App. S.D. 2011).  In this case, the state presented evidence, which may or may not 
be believed by the jury, that a robbery occurred at the victims’ home.  Further, the jury 
may or may not believe that there was an intent to kill as opposed to merely committing a 
6 
 
robbery.  Each of these two types of second-degree murder are of equal status, and 
Blurton was entitled to submit both theories to the jury.  I would find that the trial court 
erred in failing to submit the requested lesser-included instruction.  While the trial court 
committed reversible error in failing to submit a requested lesser-included instruction, 
reversal of the underlying conviction is mandated only when the trial court’s error was 
prejudicial to the defendant.  State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 548 (Mo. banc 2010).   
Prejudice 
Blurton’s proffered lesser-included instruction failed to comply with MAI-CR 3d 
323.04 because his instruction did not contain a description of the property that he 
allegedly took.  “The giving or failure to give an instruction or verdict form in violation 
of this Rule 28.02 or any applicable Notes On Use shall constitute error, the error’s 
prejudicial effect to be judicially determined ….”  Rule 28.02(f).  While the trial court 
was not required to give an instruction that failed to comply with the MAI, the law is 
unclear as to whether the trial court should have provided Blurton the opportunity to 
modify his proffered instruction to comply with the MAI before tendering the instructions 
to the jury.2F3  However, this point need not be resolved at this time. 
Missouri places a “great emphasis on legally correct instructions, and this Court 
has made it clear that criminal defendants should be freely allowed to argue their 
contentions arising from the facts.”  State v. Westfall, 75 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Mo. banc 
                                              
3 This is especially so in this case as the state’s objection was that the instruction was not 
in the proper form or had the proper accompanying instructions.  There was no specific 
reference to the failure to comply with MAI-CR 3d 323.04.  Additionally, Blurton did not 
request, on the record, to modify his proffered instruction in order to comply with the 
proper form. 
7 
 
2002).  The presumption of prejudice, which arises from the failure to provide an 
instruction, can be overcome if the state clearly establishes the error did not result in 
prejudice.  Id.  “An appellate court will not remand for a new trial on the basis of an error 
that did not violate a defendant’s constitutional rights unless ‘there is a reasonable 
probability that the trial court’s error affected the outcome of the trial.’”  Jackson, 433 
S.W.3d at 424 n.4 (quoting State v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 224 (Mo. banc 2006)).    
 
I believe that under the circumstances of this case, Blurton was not prejudiced by 
the trial court’s failure to provide an instruction for second-degree felony murder that was 
predicated upon a robbery because the jury explicitly rejected the facts that would have 
established the robbery by rejecting those applicable aggravating factors in the penalty 
phase.  Further, Blurton did not request an opportunity to modify his proffered instruction 
to comply with the MAI.  Hence, while it was error to not submit the lesser-included 
instruction, Blurton is unable to demonstrate he was prejudiced by this error. 
Derenzy’s Validity 
 
In reaching its result, the principal opinion overruled, by implication, the holding 
in Derenzy, which allowed plain error review of improperly worded jury instructions.  
Slip Op. at 11-2 n.7.  I believe the principal opinion overreached in interpreting the 
intersection between Rule 28 and the holding in Derenzy.   
 
Derenzy found that because the defendant submitted an incorrect lesser-included 
offense instruction, the defendant was unable to avail himself of the mandatory review 
included in Rule 28.  Derenzy, 89 S.W.3d at 475.  Derenzy recognizes that, “A trial court 
does not commit error by rejecting an instruction that either misstates the law or would 
8 
 
have confused the jury.”  Id.  However, because the defendant could not take advantage 
of Rule 28 review, he could only receive plain error review to determine whether there 
was a manifest injustice in failing to instruct the jury on the requested, lesser-included 
instruction.  Id.  The Court then found that because submitting the requested lesser-
included instruction was mandatory and the defendant could have been acquitted on the 
greater offense, there was plain error in not submitting a proper lesser-included offense 
instruction.  Id. 
 
I believe that there is no conflict in Derenzy between our general principles of 
instructional review and Rule 28.  Derenzy provides clear guidance regarding review of 
an incorrectly worded, requested, lesser-included instruction.  This is the analysis that I 
believe should be followed and, as detailed in this concurrence, I demonstrated could be 
used to reach the same result.  By the principal opinion’s assertion that Derenzy’s review 
provided by Rule 28 is in conflict with the proposition that a trial court does not commit 
error by submitting an incorrect instruction, the principal opinion overrules Derenzy sub 
silentio. 
I believe that as justice requires, this Court should always be able to invoke plain 
error review as Rule 30.20 allows.  There is no need to limit this Court’s ability to review 
errors that result in manifest injustice.  Plain error review is discretionary; it is not 
mandatory review.  Rule 30.20; see also State v. Taylor, 466 S.W.3d 521, 533 (Mo. banc 
2015) and State v. Collings, 450 S.W.3d 741, 769 (Mo. banc 2014). 
A “decision of this Court should not be lightly overruled.”  Eighty Hundred 
Clayton Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 111 S.W.3d 409, 411 n. 3 (Mo. banc 2003).   Stare 
9 
 
decisis “promotes stability in the law by encouraging courts to adhere to precedents.”  
State v. Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d 410, 422 (Mo. banc 2013). 
This Court consistently, and recently, has allowed plain error review of 
instructions “when it is clear that the trial court has so misdirected or failed to instruct the 
jury that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted.”  State v. Hunt, 451 
S.W.3d 251, 260 (Mo. banc 2014) (citing State v. Ousley, 419 S.W.3d 65, 75 (Mo. banc 
2013)).  I would not limit this Court’s ability to provide plain error relief when there is a 
manifest injustice that results in prejudice to a defendant.  I see no need to diminish this 
Court’s holding in Derenzy in a footnote without further guidance and explanation to 
future litigants and defendants as to the implications of that decision. 
Conclusion 
Accordingly, I concur with the principal opinion in result only. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, JUDGE