Title: Porter v. Stormont-Vail Hospital
Citation: 228 Kan. 641, 621 P.2d 411
Docket Number: 51,136
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: December 6, 1980

228 Kan. 641 (1980)
621 P.2d 411
DANNY R. PORTER, Appellant,
v.
STORMONT-VAIL HOSPITAL, Appellee.
No. 51,136

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 6, 1980.
Leonard W. McAnamey, of Lyndon, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Justice B. King, of Fisher, Patterson, Sayler &amp; Smith, of Topeka, argued the cause and Edwin D. Smith, of the same firm, and Wayne T. Stratton and Patrick Salsbury, of Goodell, Cogswell, Stratton, Edmonds, Palmer &amp; Wright, of Topeka, were with him on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOLMES, J.:
Plaintiff-appellant, Danny R. Porter, appeals from an order of the district court granting summary judgment to the defendant-appellee, Stormont-Vail Hospital. This case grows out of an action originally filed by Stormont-Vail against Porter in the magistrate court of Shawnee County to collect a hospital bill for services rendered to Porter. Stormont-Vail recovered a default judgment against Porter for the sum of $478.18. The judgment remains unpaid. Post-judgment collection procedures were instituted in the magistrate court and on three occasions between April, 1974, and January, 1977, Porter was arrested on bench warrants issued by the judge of the magistrate court upon Porter's failure to appear in response to court orders directing him to appear. Porter was incarcerated briefly on the first two bench warrants and posted a bond at the time of his arrest on the third. He then filed this action in the district court seeking actual and punitive damages based upon allegations of malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment and abuse of process. Following discovery both parties filed motions for summary judgment and the motion of the defendant was sustained.
K.S.A. 60-256(c) provides in part:
We do not deem it necessary to once again set forth the basic principles which apply when a motion for summary judgment is before the court. They were recently set forth at length in Fredricks v. Foltz, 225 Kan. 663, 666, 594 P.2d 665 (1979).
The learned trial judge filed an extensive memorandum decision and order as follows:
"MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
"The Court finds and concludes as follows:
"The issue, stated simply, is this:
A legal excuse exists:
1. When an officer arrests with a valid warrant.'
Dated April 26, 1979."
Regardless of what might be said about the procedures followed by the magistrate court in the original collection action, the fact remains that such procedures did comply with the appropriate statutes and the orders and bench warrants were legally issued by the magistrate judge and not by Stormont-Vail. On the record before us, no other conclusion can be reached.
We have carefully considered all points raised by the appellant together with the record on appeal and conclude that the trial court was correct in its final determination of this case.
Appellee seeks attorney fees and costs under Rule 7.07(b) on the grounds that the appeal herein was frivolous and taken only for the purpose of harassment and delay. While much of what *648 defendant says in its brief about the merits of this appeal is true, and while the comments of the trial judge in the penultimate paragraph of his memorandum opinion would also apply to the brief of the plaintiff, we cannot say the appeal was totally without merit and therefore defendant's request for attorney fees and costs is denied.
The judgment is affirmed.
SCHROEDER, C.J., dissenting:
The facts disclosed by the record in this case, as viewed on a motion for summary judgment, portray a shocking experience for one subjected to Kansas law. To say the judgment debtor is a "dead beat" and brush the case aside is not the proper disposition of this case.
My dissent is confined to the specific claim of Danny R. Porter (plaintiff-appellant) as to abuse of process alleged in his petition.
The statute upon which Stormont-Vail Hospital, through its counsel, relied in the magistrate court is K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 61-2204. The 1979 version of the statute has not changed in any material respects from the 1973 version which governed the proceedings below.
In capsule form my dissent is based upon a failure to comply with 61-2204 in three particulars:
When this action was finally filed against Stormont-Vail Hospital, all proceedings in aid of execution and contempt were dismissed. The record on the magistrate judge's docket sheet is incomplete and leaves much to be desired.
Setting forth my reasons in full in the present posture of the case will establish on the part of the judgment creditor: (1) an ulterior purpose; (2) improper acts in the use of the foregoing process, and (3) damage resulting to Porter.
The trial court in ruling on Porter's claim as to abuse of process simply stated: "The post judgment activities of the defendant were conducted in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 61 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated and the rules, practices and procedures of the Shawnee County Magistrate Court." If this is true, the legislature is admonished to take a good look at K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 61-2204. The rules, practices and procedures of the Shawnee County Magistrate Court, of course, cannot go beyond statutory authorization.
The allegations of Porter setting forth his specific claims as to abuse of process are contained in paragraph six of his petition, which is quoted in the trial court's "Memorandum of Decision and Order" and incorporated in Supreme Court's opinion.
The established law in an action for malicious abuse of process is accurately set forth in the trial court's "Memorandum of Decision and Order," but it was not applied to the facts in this case. See Welch v. Shepherd, 169 Kan. 363, 366, 219 P.2d 444 (1950).
The law as it has developed through the years on proceedings in aid of execution and contempt is found in In re Burrows, 33 Kan. 675, 7 Pac. 148 (1885); Tatlow v. Bacon, 101 Kan. 26, 165 Pac. 835 (1917); and Threadgill v. Beard, 225 Kan. 296, 590 P.2d 1021 (1979). Proceedings in the magistrate court concerning Porter, presently under scrutiny, pervert the law in these cases.
The record discloses that in early 1973 Danny R. Porter entered Stormont-Vail Hospital in Topeka. He received medical services related to a knee operation. Porter subsequently prosecuted a worker's compensation claim, with the aid of present counsel, Leonard McAnarney. The claim was settled for $2,600. Porter thought the settlement with the worker's compensation insurance carrier included payment by the insurance company of all medical *650 bills. The insurance company paid one of the hospital bills, but a bill for $478.18 remained unpaid.
Stormont-Vail made demand upon Porter to pay the bill, then filed suit against Porter in the magistrate court of Shawnee County, in March 1974. The hospital sought payment of the bill plus interest and costs. Porter contends he never received personal notice of the law suit. At all times relevant, Porter resided in Geneseo, Rice County, Kansas, approximately 200 miles from Topeka. Richard Tucker was then sheriff of Rice County, Kansas. In an affidavit, Sheriff Tucker states that he personally served Porter with summons and a copy of the petition in the Shawnee County civil action. Sheriff Tucker failed to sign his name to the sheriff's return of summons, but nevertheless claims he effected personal service on Porter. Assuming valid service of process, Porter did not file an answer, and a default judgment was entered against Porter on April 24, 1974.
On April 30, 1974, the attorney for Stormont-Vail applied to the magistrate court for a proceeding in aid of execution, in order to determine what assets, if any, Porter had available to be applied toward satisfaction of the judgment. The record does not contain the original, or a copy, of the application for examination of the judgment debtor. However, an affidavit of the magistrate judge states that forms No. 12 and No. 13 of the appendix to Chapter 61, authorized by K.S.A. 61-2605, were deemed sufficient to implement the rights of judgment creditors under K.S.A. 61-2204.
These forms read:
*651 ....
"To ______________________________________, judgment debtor:
There is nothing in the record to indicate the magistrate judge made the statutory finding that to require the judgment debtor who resides in another county to appear before the court in Shawnee County would not cause undue hardship to the judgment debtor. In his affidavit which is part of the record herein the magistrate judge states:
....
*652 The substance of the foregoing procedure described by the magistrate judge shifts the burden of proof to the judgment debtor, who resides outside Shawnee County, to appear prior to the appearance date and show undue hardship. This procedure ignores the statute (61-2204). A proper interpretation of the statute places the burden of proof upon the judgment creditor. The magistrate judge is required to make a finding of no undue hardship before the order to appear is issued.
The court issued an order for Porter to appear before the court on May 22, 1974. The record does not contain the original, or a copy, of the order to appear for a hearing in aid of execution. As heretofore noted, in the affidavit the magistrate judge states that form No. 13 was used. The record shows Porter was personally served with the order to appear.
Porter did not appear for the hearing on May 22, 1974. As a result of Porter's failure to appear on May 22, a citation was issued by the court ordering Porter to appear before the court on July 3, 1974, at 11 a.m., to show cause, if any, why he should not be punished for contempt of court. The citation was personally served on Porter, who failed to appear on July 3, 1974. A bench warrant was issued on July 10, 1974, ordering that Porter be arrested and brought before the court and answer the charge of failure to appear.
Porter was arrested on the bench warrant in Rice County. He was transported in handcuffs to Shawnee County where he was jailed. Porter states in his deposition that he was held in jail for three days. The record is not otherwise clear on the length of time Porter was held in jail. Porter was taken before the magistrate court on September 25, 1974, to answer the charge of failure to appear. No hearing was conducted to determine whether Porter was in contempt. Counsel for Stormont-Vail was present, and Porter was interrogated by such counsel about his assets. In his deposition, Porter states that he informed the Stormont-Vail counsel that the hospital bill was a mistake and should have been paid by the worker's compensation insurance carrier. The matter of contempt was held in abeyance, and Porter was ordered to appear again in two weeks, on October 9, 1974. The record does not disclose whether the order to appear was for the purpose of conducting a hearing in aid of execution, a hearing on the contempt charge, or both.
*653 Porter failed to appear on October 9, 1974. A second bench warrant was issued by the magistrate court. The bench warrant was outstanding for almost twenty months. On July 13, 1976, Porter was arrested in Rice County on the bench warrant. He was again transported to Shawnee County by sheriff's deputies and spent one night in jail.
On July 14, 1976, Porter was taken before the magistrate court. No hearing was conducted on the contempt charge. The matter of contempt was held in abeyance, and Porter was ordered to appear again in one month, on August 11, 1976. In his deposition Porter states he was again examined about his assets by the Stormont-Vail counsel on July 14, 1976. Porter traveled the approximate 200 miles from Geneseo, Kansas, and appeared on August 11, 1976. No hearing was conducted on the contempt charges, and the matter of contempt was again held in abeyance. Stormont-Vail counsel again examined Porter in regard to his assets subject to execution. Porter was ordered to appear again in one month on September 8, 1976.
Porter failed to appear on September 8, 1976, and a bench warrant was issued by the magistrate court. Four months later, in January 1977, Porter was arrested for the third time in Rice County. Porter was permitted to post a $50 bond, and was released from custody upon the condition he appear before the Magistrate Court of Shawnee County, when ordered. There have been no further proceedings against Porter on the judgment since January 1977. The record is not clear, but apparently on March 3, 1977, the bench warrant and citation in contempt were recalled, and the order in aid of execution dismissed.
Porter, prior to the dismissal, filed suit against Stormont-Vail Hospital in January 1977. The civil suit alleged the default judgment against Porter was void and that all actions to collect on that judgment were invalid. Porter alleged Stormont-Vail was guilty of false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution of a civil action, and abuse of process.
In my opinion the trial court properly ruled on all matters in the motion for summary judgment except the allegations charging abuse of process.
The essential elements of an action for malicious abuse of process are (1) the existence of an ulterior purpose, and (2) an act in the use of such process not proper in the regular prosecution of *654 the proceeding which results in damage to the plaintiff. Welch v. Shepherd, 169 Kan. at 366.
The record indicates Stormont-Vail Hospital, through counsel, properly sought magistrate court assistance through proceedings in aid of execution. The request was reasonable and legitimate  to discover what assets, if any, Stormont-Vail Hospital could levy against, or require Porter to apply, to satisfy the default judgment.
But the magistrate failed to make the required finding that it would not be a hardship on Porter, residing in Rice County, to appear on a date certain for examination at a hearing before the magistrate judge, to ascertain what assets Porter had, if any, to apply on the debt. The magistrate judge thereafter completely defaulted in honoring the orders he had issued concerning the proceedings in aid of execution and in contempt. No hearing was ever conducted before the magistrate judge pursuant to any of his orders.
The resultant conduct by Stormont-Vail Hospital, through counsel, was a continual harassment and badgering of the judgment debtor, Porter. The harassment continued until Porter filed this action, at which time all proceedings were dismissed.
It cannot be said this was done under the cloak of the court because the court had completely abdicated its statutory duty to function as a court.
Under these circumstances Stormont-Vail, through counsel, in the conduct of proceedings in the magistrate court, ostensibly pursuant to its application for proceedings in aid of execution, stands charged with an ulterior purpose by its incessant harassment of the judgment debtor. The tactics of Stormont-Vail, through counsel, constitute acts in the use of such process which are not proper in the regular statutory prosecution of the proceedings.
The question may be asked whether Stormont-Vail Hospital is the proper defendant in the action.
The record herein must be reviewed under the rules governing a motion for summary judgment as stated in Lawrence v. Deemy, 204 Kan. 299, 301, 461 P.2d 770 (1969):
Giving Porter the benefit of all inferences that may be drawn from the facts under consideration, Stormont-Vail Hospital is held to be fully aware of, and consented to, the actions of its counsel in prosecuting its application for proceedings in aid of execution.
The Kansas Supreme Court has held where a principal perpetrates a wrong, acting through his agent, the principal is liable for the damage. Thus in Stalker v. Drake, 91 Kan. 142, 136 Pac. 912 (1913), the court held:
In the opinion the court stated:
It is generally held that a person who previously consulted his *656 attorney, or afterward sanctioned, or at least approved, the act committed by his attorney which constituted an abuse of process, is liable. 1 Am.Jur.2d, Abuse of Process §§ 17, 19.
For an analogous case involving action by an in-house attorney that resulted in liability to the plaintiffs for both actual and punitive damages see Ford v. Guarantee Abstract &amp; Title Co., 220 Kan. 244, 553 P.2d 254 (1976). See also Guarantee Abstract &amp; Title Co. v. Interstate Fire &amp; Cas. Co., 228 Kan. 532, 618 P.2d 1195 (1980).
A lucid discussion of an attorney's involvement in an action for abuse of process is found in Fite v. Lee, 11 Wash. App. 21, 28-29, 521 P.2d 964 (1974), where the court said:
....
*657 In the present posture of this case the court is not concerned with the implied authority of the attorney to act as an agent for his client.
Counsel for Stormont-Vail Hospital, who was admitted to the Kansas Bar and is an officer of the court, had a duty to uphold his oath to support the Constitution of Kansas and uphold the statute under which Stormont-Vail proceeded to invoke the jurisdiction of the magistrate court. It was counsel's obligation to see that the magistrate judge did not abdicate responsibility under the orders issued by the court.
The sum and substance of the magistrate judge's failure to honor his orders resulted in a complete lack of due process. Hearings conducted pursuant to the orders entered by the magistrate judge would have given Porter the opportunity to show his indigency and the undue hardship imposed by the orders to appear monthly. At a proper hearing Porter could show that he had no automobile of his own, was unemployed much of the time, and burdened with automobile problems when he borrowed a friend's automobile in an attempt to travel to Topeka from Geneseo. Never was Porter found to be in contempt.
Although the remedies of judgment creditors deserve judicial support, the rights of judgment debtors under Kansas law cannot be ignored.
It is respectfully submitted the trial court erred in sustaining the appellee's motion for summary judgment on the appellant's allegations in his petition on abuse of process.
HERD, J., joins the foregoing dissent.