Title: Hilyer v. Fortier
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1131174
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 20, 2015

REL:  02/20/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
_________________________
1131174
_________________________
Adam Dan Hilyer
v.
Betti Fortier, individually and as mother 
and next friend of M.M., a minor
Appeal from Elmore Circuit Court
(CV-13-900405)
WISE, Justice.
The defendant below, Adam Dan Hilyer, appeals from the
denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment entered
against him and in favor of the plaintiff, Betti Fortier.  We
reverse and remand.
  
1131174
Facts and Procedural History
On the evening of July 29, 2013, Hilyer was backing a
tractor-trailer rig used to transport logs into his private
driveway on Kennedy Avenue.  At the time, Hilyer was blocking
both lanes of traffic on Kennedy Avenue.  M.M., a minor, was
driving Fortier's van and was traveling westbound on Kennedy
Avenue.  B.D., M.M.'s brother; R.W., M.M.'s fiancé; and B.H.,
a friend of B.D.'s, were also in the vehicle with M.M.  M.M.'s
vehicle collided with Hilyer's trailer, and M.M. sustained
injuries.  
On October 30, 2013, Fortier, individually and as the
mother and next friend of M.M., sued Hilyer, asserting claims
of negligence and wantonness.  In her complaint, Fortier
alleged that, at the time of the accident, it was dark and
that Hilyer's tractor-trailer was blocking both lanes of
travel on Kennedy Avenue, which caused M.M.'s vehicle to
collide with the trailer.  Fortier alleged:
1. 
 
That Hilyer 
negligently 
and 
wantonly 
blocked
both lanes of travel on Kennedy Avenue in the dark
while attempting to back the tractor-trailer rig
into his private driveway;
2. That Hilyer negligently and wantonly failed
to give adequate warnings to motorists approaching
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on Kennedy Avenue that the tractor-trailer rig was
blocking both lanes of travel on Kennedy Avenue; 
3. That Hilyer negligently and wantonly failed
to have adequate and/or proper lighting on the truck
and/or the trailer.
4. 
That 
Hilyer 
negligently 
and 
wantonly 
violated
certain provisions of the Alabama Rules of the Road.
A summons and a copy of the complaint were served on Hilyer by
certified mail on November 6, 2013.  On January 27, 2014,
Fortier filed a motion for a default judgment against Hilyer
and requested a hearing on damages.  
On January 28, 2014, the trial court entered an order
granting Fortier's motion for a default judgment and stating:
"Damages to be proven by affidavit and proposed judgment in 15
days." 
 
Subsequently, 
Fortier 
submitted 
a 
"proposed 
judgment,"
in which she requested that the trial court enter a judgment
against Hilyer in the amount of $550,000 and "to find that the
proposed settlement of the claim of the minor, M.M. is just,
fair, reasonable, in keeping with the evidence, and is in the
minor's best interest."  In support of her request, Fortier
attached an affidavit from her counsel regarding the injuries
sustained by M.M. and the expenses that had been incurred as
a result of those injuries.
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On February 12, 2014, the trial court entered a judgment
against Hilyer in the amount of $550,000 and found "that the
proposed settlement of the claim of the minor, M.M. is just,
fair, reasonable, in keeping with the evidence, and is in the
minor's best interest." 
On March 7, 2014, Hilyer filed a motion to set aside the
default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.  In
his motion, Hilyer addressed the requirements for setting
aside a default judgment set forth in Kirtland v. Fort Morgan
Authority Sewer Service, Inc., 524 So. 2d 600 (Ala. 1988).  He
also attached to his motion his affidavit; an affidavit from
his neighbor, Wyman Earl Jackson, who witnessed the accident;
an affidavit from Roberto Lozano, a claims manager for Alteris
Insurance Services ("Alteris"), which was the third-party
administrator for Hilyer's commercial-insurance policy;
letters Fortier's counsel had sent to Lozano; an affidavit
from Christopher Wyatt, an employee of Crawford & Company,
which Alteris had hired to investigate the accident; copies of
letters Wyatt had sent to Fortier's counsel; and a copy of a
letter Fortier's counsel had sent to Wyatt after the default
judgment had been entered.  On that same date, Hilyer filed
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his answer to the complaint and affirmative defenses.  The
trial court subsequently entered an order setting a hearing on
Hilyer's motion to set aside the default judgment. 
On April 11, 2014, Fortier filed her opposition to
Hilyer's motion to set aside.  In support of her opposition,
Fortier attached her affidavit; affidavits from M.M., B.D.,
and R.W.; an affidavit from Marc McHenry, an investigator with
Fortier's counsel's law firm; copies of correspondence from 
Fortier's counsel; 
an 
affidavit from Fortier's counsel; and an
affidavit from Shannon Rattan, the secretary for Fortier's
counsel. 
On April 16, 2014, the trial court entered an order
stating that the hearing on the motion to set aside had been
held and that the issue remained under advisement.  The record
does not include a transcript of the hearing.
On May 13, 2014, Hilyer filed a supplement to his motion
to set aside the default judgment, in which he submitted an
affidavit from Scott Kramer, a member of the Coosada Volunteer
Fire Department ("the CVFD"), who was the on-scene supervisor
for the accident.  On May 21, 2014, Fortier filed a reply to
Hilyer's supplement to his motion to set aside the default
5
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judgment and a motion to strike Kramer's affidavit.  Hilyer's
motion to set aside the default judgment was denied by
operation of law on June 5, 2014.  Hilyer appealed.
Standard of Review
"Typically, this Court reviews a trial court's
decision granting or denying a motion to set aside
a default judgment to determine whether the trial
court, in so deciding, exceeded its discretion.
Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Auth. Sewer Serv., Inc., 524
So. 2d 600, 603 (Ala. 1988).  However, this Court
has previously determined that the judgment that
results from a trial court's failure to rule on a
motion subject to denial by operation of law under
Rule 59.1 is not automatically entitled to the same
deference that is afforded a judgment arrived at
after due deliberation.  Edgar v. State, 646 So. 2d
683, 686–87 (Ala. 1994); and Perdue v. Gates, 403
So. 2d 165 (Ala. 1981).  ...  [B]ecause the trial
court took no valid action indicating that the
decision to deny Jeffery's motion was the product of
due deliberation, we review Jeffery's motion to set
aside the default judgment de novo, applying the
analysis mandated by Kirtland.
"'Under Kirtland, the trial court must
first presume that cases should be decided
on the merits whenever it is practicable to
do so.  This presumption exists because the
right to have a trial on the merits
ordinarily outweighs the need for judicial
economy.  Second, the trial court must
apply 
a 
three-factor 
analysis 
in
determining whether to set aside a default
judgment: it must consider "1) whether the
defendant has a meritorious defense; 2)
whether the plaintiff will be unfairly
prejudiced if the default judgment is set
aside; and 3) whether the default judgment
6
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was a result of the defendant's own
culpable conduct." Kirtland, 524 So. 2d at
605.'
"Sampson v. Cansler, 726 So. 2d 632, 633 (Ala.
1998)."
Steele v. Federal Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 69 So. 3d 89, 91 (Ala.
2010).
Discussion
Hilyer argues that the trial court erred when it allowed
his motion to set aside the default judgment to be denied by
operation of law.  
"Pursuant to Rule 55(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., '[t]he
court may ... set aside a judgment by default on the
motion of a party filed not later than thirty (30)
days after the entry of the judgment.'  ...  In
Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Authority Sewer Service,
Inc., 524 So. 2d 600 (Ala. 1988), our supreme court
established an analysis for trial judges to follow
when 
exercising 
the 
discretionary 
authority
conferred under Rule 55(c). As this court recently
summarized in Brantley v. Glover, 84 So. 3d 77 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2011):
"'"A trial court has broad
discretion in deciding whether to
grant or deny a motion to set
aside 
a 
default 
judgment.
Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Auth.
Sewer Serv., Inc., 524 So. 2d 600
(Ala. 1988).  In reviewing an
appeal from a trial court's order
refusing to set aside a default
judgment, 
this 
Court 
must
determine whether in refusing to
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set aside the default judgment
the trial court exceeded its
discretion.  524 So. 2d at 604. 
That discretion, although broad,
requires 
the 
trial court to
balance 
two 
competing 
policy
interests associated with default
judgments:  the need to promote
judicial economy and a litigant's
right to defend an action on the
merits.  524 So. 2d at 604. These
interests must be balanced under
the two-step process established
in Kirtland.
"'"We begin the balancing
process with the presumption that
cases should be decided on the
merits whenever it is practicable
to do so.  524 So. 2d at 604. 
The trial court must then apply a
three-factor 
analysis 
first
established in Ex parte Illinois
Central Gulf R.R., 514 So. 2d
1283 (Ala. 1987), in deciding
whether to deny a motion to set
aside 
a 
default 
judgment.
Kirtland, 524 So. 2d at 605.  The
broad 
discretionary 
authority
given to the trial court in
making that decision should not
be exercised without considering
the 
following 
factors: 
'1)
whether 
the 
defendant 
has a
meritorious defense; 2) whether
the plaintiff will be unfairly
prejudiced 
if 
the 
default
judgment is set aside; and 3)
whether the default judgment was
a result of the defendant's own
culpable conduct.'  524 So. 2d at
605."
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"'Zeller v. Bailey, 950 So. 2d 1149,
1152–53 (Ala. 2006).
"'As we stated in Richardson v.
Integrity Bible Church, Inc., 897 So. 2d
345 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004):
"'"Because of the importance of
the interest of preserving a
party's right to a trial on the
merits, this court has held that
where a trial court does not
demonstrate 
that 
it 
has
considered the mandatory Kirtland
factors in denying a motion to
set aside a default judgment,
such as where a Rule 55(c)[, Ala.
R. Civ. P.,] motion is denied by
operation of law, the denial of
the motion to set aside the
default judgment will be reversed
and the cause remanded for the
trial 
court 
to 
address 
the
Kirtland factors."
"'897 So. 2d at 349.  However, in order to
trigger the mandatory requirement that the
trial court consider the Kirtland factors,
the party filing a motion to set aside a
default judgment must allege and provide
arguments and evidence regarding all three
of the Kirtland factors.  See Carroll v.
Williams, 6 So. 3d 463, 468 (Ala. 2008)
("Because Carroll has failed to satisfy his
initial burden under the Kirtland analysis
[of providing allegations and evidence
relating to all three 
Kirtland factors], we
will not hold the trial court in error for
allowing Carroll's motion to set aside the
default judgment to be denied by operation
of law without having applied the Kirtland
analysis.").  See also Maiden v. Federal
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Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 69 So. 3d 860, 867 n.
3 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (noting that we
will not reverse the denial by operation of
law of a motion to set aside a default
judgment when the movant fails to argue the
existence of the Kirtland factors in his or
her motion).'
"84 So. 3d at 80–81(footnote omitted).  As such, the
defaulting 
party 
has 
the 
initial 
burden 
of
demonstrating the existence of the three Kirtland
factors."  
 
D.B. v. D.G., 141 So. 3d 1066, 1070-71 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). 
Accordingly, we must first determine whether Hilyer satisfied
his initial burden under Kirtland.  See Carroll v. Williams,
6 So. 3d 463 (Ala. 2008); D.B., supra.
A. Meritorious Defense
"The first Kirtland factor is whether the
defaulting party presented a meritorious defense. 
To present a meritorious defense, for Rule 55(c)
purposes, does not require that the movant satisfy
the trial court that the movant would necessarily
prevail at a trial on the merits, only that the
movant show the court that the movant is prepared to
present a plausible defense.  Kirtland, 524 So. 2d
at 605.
"'The defense proffered by the defaulting
party must be of such merit as to induce
the trial court reasonably to infer that
allowing the defense to be litigated could
foreseeably alter the outcome of the case. 
To be more precise, a defaulting party has
satisfactorily 
made 
a 
showing 
of 
a
meritorious defense when allegations in an
answer or in a motion to set aside the
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default 
judgment 
and 
its 
supporting
affidavits, if proven at trial, would
constitute a complete defense to the
action, or when sufficient evidence has
been adduced either by way of affidavit or
by some other means to warrant submission
of the case to the jury.
"'The allegations set forth in the
answer and in the motion must be more than
mere 
bare 
legal 
conclusions 
without 
factual
support; they must counter the cause of
action averred in the complaint with
specificity -- namely, by setting forth
relevant legal grounds substantiated by a
credible factual basis. Such allegations
would constitute a "plausible defense."'
"Kirtland, 524 So. 2d at 606."
Sampson v. Cansler, 726 So. 2d 632, 634 (Ala. 1998).
"In Kirtland, we noted that a trial court should
begin its analysis of whether it should exercise
discretionary authority under Rule 55(c) with the
presumption that a case 'should be decided on the
merits whenever practicable.'  524 So. 2d at 604.
The presumption is undercut, however, if the answer
to the first of three inquiries a court must make --
whether the defendant has a meritorious defense --
is negative.  The existence of a meritorious defense
is a 'threshold prerequisite,'  Kirtland, 524 So. 2d
at 605, because without a meritorious defense, a
finding that the plaintiff would not be prejudiced
and a finding that the defendant was not culpable
would matter little.  A meritorious defense need not
be a perfect defense, nor one that would necessarily
prevail at trial.  Rather, a meritorious defense is
merely a 'plausible' defense.  Kirtland, 524 So. 2d
at 605.  That is, a meritorious defense must simply
'induce the trial court reasonably to infer that
allowing 
the 
defense 
to 
be 
litigated 
could
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foreseeably alter the outcome of the case.' 524 So.
2d at 606 (emphasis added).
"We have specifically stated that a defendant
can successfully present a meritorious defense
either by setting forth allegations that, if proven
at trial, would constitute a complete defense or by
submitting evidence that would at least create a
jury question.  Kirtland, 524 So. 2d at 606.  The
defendant's allegations 'must be more than mere bare
legal conclusions without factual support'; they
must set forth 'relevant legal grounds substantiated
by a credible factual basis.'  524 So. 2d at 606."
Royal Ins. Co. of America v. Crowne Invs., Inc., 903 So. 2d
802, 808 (Ala. 2004).
In the complaint, Fortier asserted negligence and
wantonness claims against Hilyer.  In his motion to set aside
the default judgment, Hilyer argued that he had a complete
defense to the claims against him.  Specifically, he argued
that M.M. was contributorily negligent and that there was
evidence to establish that Hilyer had not acted negligently
and/or wantonly.  In support of his motion to set aside,
Hilyer submitted his affidavit and the affidavit of Wyman Earl
Jackson, a neighbor of Hilyer's who witnessed the accident. 
The affidavits included facts that controvert some of the
allegations included in the complaint.  Specifically, Hilyer
and Jackson stated that, when Hilyer was backing his trailer
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into his driveway, the headlights of the tractor-trailer were
on and its hazard lights were flashing and that Hilyer flashed
the headlights and honked the horn when he saw M.M.'s vehicle. 
Hilyer also stated that there was reflective tape running
along the length of the side of the trailer and that, at the
time of the accident, the tractor-trailer was positioned so
that 
there 
was 
a 
street 
light 
located 
behind 
it. 
Additionally, as to Hilyer's argument that M.M. was
contributorily negligent, both Hilyer and Jackson stated that
it appeared that M.M. was driving in excess of the speed limit
of 35 miles per hour at the time of the accident.  Both
Jackson and Hilyer stated that M.M. never slowed down before
she ran into the tractor-trailer.  Additionally, Hilyer
asserted that M.M. should have seen the tractor-trailer.  
Hilyer also argued that the facts included in the
affidavits supported his argument that he had not acted
wantonly.  Specifically, he presented evidence regarding the
number of times he had backed his tractor-trailer into the
driveway at his house; the manner in which he backed the
tractor-trailer in; the fact that the stretch of road in front
of his house was not very busy and that he seldom saw other
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vehicles while he was backing his tractor-trailer into his
driveway; and the fact that, on the few occasions other
vehicles had approached the area after he had started backing
up, those vehicles had stopped and waited for him to finish
backing his tractor-trailer into the driveway.  
Hilyer supplemented his motion to set aside with an
affidavit from Scott Kramer, a member of the CVFD who
responded to the accident.  Kramer's affidavit offered 
further
support for Hilyer's contributory-negligence defense to the
negligence claim.  Additionally, it offered further support
for Hilyer's assertion that his actions while backing the
tractor-trailer into his driveway did not amount to
wantonness.   Specifically, Kramer stated that he drove the
1
fire engine from the station to the scene of the accident;
that he was traveling north on Kennedy Avenue and approached
Fortier filed a motion to strike Kramer's affidavit in
1
which she argued that the affidavit was not timely filed
pursuant to Rule 6(d), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Even if the affidavit
was not timely filed, however, Rule 6(d) affords a trial court
discretion to accept an untimely affidavit.  However, the
trial court did not rule on that motion before it allowed
Hilyer's motion to set aside the default judgment to be denied
by operation of law.   See Weldon v. Cotney, 811 So. 2d 530,
533 (Ala. 2001).  Because the trial court could have
considered Kramer's affidavit, we will consider Kramer's
affidavit in determining whether Hilyer satisfied his initial
burden under Kirtland.
14
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the accident scene from the south; that, in the area just
south of the accident, Kennedy Avenue curves from west to
north; that, when he entered the curve, he could see across
his right to the area where the curve ended; that he could see
the lights of Hilyer's tractor-trailer and the lights of a
police vehicle that was at the accident scene; that he could
clearly see the running lights and headlights of the tractor-
trailer; that the hazard lights on the tractor-trailer were
flashing; and that the tractor-trailer and the police vehicle
were approximately one-quarter of a mile away when he first
saw them.  He further stated that, when he arrived at the
scene, M.M.'s vehicle was on fire; that the tractor-trailer
was parked in the road and its running lights were on; that he
looked at the running lights to maneuver the fire engine
between the police vehicle and the tractor-trailer; that he
did not see anything that night to explain why M.M. would not
have seen the tractor-trailer; and that anyone traveling the
35 mph speed limit would have had ample time to avoid an
accident.  Finally, Kramer stated that he lived in Coosada;
that he was familiar with traffic on Kennedy Avenue; that
Kennedy Avenue was not a heavily traveled road; that he had
previously seen Hilyer backing his tractor-trailer into his
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driveway; and that it never took Hilyer very long to get his
tractor-trailer out of the road.  
In this case, Hilyer asserted defenses and presented
legal arguments and evidence to support those defenses. 
Additionally, the defenses asserted in Hilyer's motion to set
aside were not clearly frivolous or no defense at all.  In her
opposition to the motion to set aide, Fortier argued that
Hilyer had not established a complete defense because
contributory negligence is not a defense to wantonness. 
However, Hilyer did not merely argue that M.M. was
contributorily negligent.  Rather, he also argued that there
was evidence indicating that Hilyer had not acted wantonly. 
Fortier also submitted arguments, affidavits, correspondence,
and a photograph disputing the facts and evidence submitted by
Hilyer.  However, that evidence did not establish that Hilyer
did not have a meritorious defense.  At most, it raised
factual disputes that would be properly submitted to a jury.
In this case, the trial court conducted a hearing on
Hilyer's motion to set aside, but the record on appeal does
not include a transcript of that hearing.  Thus, we cannot
determine whether the parties presented any arguments to the
16
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trial court other than those presented in the pleadings.  In
its order entered after the hearing, the trial court stated
that the motion to set side would remain under advisement. 
However, it subsequently allowed the motion to be denied by
operation of law.  Thus, there is no indication that the trial
court denied the motion to set aside after due deliberation. 
Also, there is no indication as to whether the trial court
actually considered this first Kirtland factor and/or made a
determination as to whether Hilyer had satisfied his burden of
establishing that he had a meritorious defense. 
B. Absence of Substantial Prejudice to the Plaintiff
With regard to the absence-of-substantial-prejudice
factor of Kirtland, this Court has stated:
"The second factor that a trial court must
consider in ruling on a motion to set aside a
default judgment is whether the plaintiff will be
unfairly prejudiced if it grants the motion.
Kirtland, 524 So. 2d at 606–07.  This prejudice
cannot take the form of mere delay or increased
costs, because those can be remedied by imposing
additional costs on the defendant if the plaintiff
later prevails.  524 So. 2d at 607.  Rather, the
prejudice must be substantial, facilitating fraud or
collusion, resulting in the loss of evidence, or
hindering discovery. 524 So. 2d at 607.
"Although 
common 
sense 
dictates 
that 
a 
plaintiff
is usually in a far better position to know what
prejudice might befall him from the delay, and more
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importantly how substantial that prejudice would be,
we have placed upon the defendant the initial burden
of demonstrating that the plaintiff will not be
substantially prejudiced.  As we have stated:
"'We hold that when a party files a motion
to set aside a default judgment, the movant
has the initial burden of making a prima
facie showing that the plaintiff will not
be unfairly prejudiced if the default
judgment is set aside.  If the movant makes
a prima facie showing that the plaintiff
will not be unfairly prejudiced, the burden
then shifts to the plaintiff to present
facts showing that the plaintiff will be
unfairly 
prejudiced 
if 
the 
default 
judgment
is set aside.'
"Phillips v. Randolph, 828 So. 2d 269, 278 (Ala.
2002).  Additionally, a defendant cannot simply
state that the plaintiff will not be prejudiced if
the motion to set aside the default judgment is
granted.  Phillips, 828 So. 2d at 275."
903 So. 2d at 811.  
In this case, Hilyer did more than simply state that
Fortier would not be prejudiced if the motion to set aside was
granted.  In his motion to set aside, Hilyer asserted that
Fortier would not be prejudiced by setting aside the default
judgment because:
"This accident occurred less than eight months ago. 
Hilyer and Jackson are both Coosada residents and
are available for deposition.  All of the vehicles
involved in the accident are still available for
inspection, Hilyer still drives the tractor, and his
father owns the trailer.  M.M.'s medical care is
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documented in her hospital records.  It is believed
the minivan is currently being held at Coosada
Towing.  But, even if this is not the case, 
[Fortier's] 
counsel 
had 
an 
investigator
investigating this accident fairly soon after it
occurred, and he likely was able to photograph and
inspect the minivan.  ... While [Fortier's] counsel
has been inconvenienced by the delay in answering
the complaint, she has not expended any significant
time or expense in obtaining the default judgment. 
M.M. has not been required to attend any hearings or
proceedings in obtaining the default judgment."
In her opposition to the motion to set aside, Fortier
argued that setting aside the default judgment would, in fact,
result in substantial prejudice to her, and she submitted
affidavits to support that assertion.  Specifically, she
argued:
"Four days after the accident, on August 2,
2013, [Fortier's] Investigator, Marc McHenry, spoke
with Mr. Hilyer's wife and asked her to have Mr.
Hilyer contact him so that they could coordinate an
inspection of the truck and trailer.  (Ex. F, Marc
McHenry 
Affidavit). 
[Fortier] 
also 
sent 
a
preservation letter to Defendant Hilyer's address on
August 6, 2013 -- just one week after the accident
-- asking him to not 'make any repairs, remove any
parts, make any modifications or changes, or destroy
this log truck or trailer which is material and/or
is supportive evidence.'  (Ex. G, August 6, 2013
Letter to Hilyer).  [Fortier] also sent this
preservation letter to Pierce Towing, where the
trailer was stored,[ ] and to Defendant Hilyer's
2
In her opposition, Fortier refers to Pierce Towing as the 
2
facility where the trailer was stored following the accident. 
However, Exhibit H, a copy of the letter Fortier's counsel
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insurance company on August 6, 2013.  (Ex. H, August
6, 2013 Letter to Pierce Towing; Ex. I, August 6,
2013 Letter to Sparta Insurance).  [Fortier] then
began trying to set up a time to inspect the truck
and trailer.  [Fortier] contacted [Hilyer], his
insurance company, and the investigator/adjuster
hired by his insurance company regarding inspection
of the truck and trailer multiple times between
August 2 and September 30, 2013. (Ex. F, Marc
McHenry Affidavit).  All attempts to inspect the
truck and trailer were rebuffed. (Id.)
"Mr. Brian Wyatt is the investigator/adjustor
for Defendant Hilyer's insurance company. Mr. Wyatt
informed [Fortier] on September 18, 2013 that
Defendant Hilyer did not preserve his truck and
trailer as asked by preservation letter. (Ex. F,
Marc McHenry Affidavit).  Instead, Defendant Hilyer
took it upon himself to repair his truck and trailer
and resume operation days after the accident. (Id.)
Defendant Hilyer made changes to his truck despite
knowledge that [Fortier's] attorneys needed to
inspect the truck and trailer. (Id.)"
Fortier's argument in this regard and the affidavits she
submitted in support of her opposition do not establish that
the delay caused by setting aside the default judgment will
result in the loss or destruction of evidence.  At best, the
evidence before this Court establishes that any loss of
evidence occurred two days after the accident and well before
any action had been filed in this case.  Additionally, in his
affidavit, McHenry stated that he had been told that Hilyer's
sent to Pierce Towing, indicates that it was the vehicle M.M.
was driving that was being stored at that facility.
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tractor-trailer had been repaired two days after the accident
and had been in use since that date.  Thus, it appears that
the repairs to the tractor-trailer were made before the first
time McHenry had talked to Hilyer's wife and before Fortier's
counsel had sent the preservation letter to Hilyer. 
Additionally, McHenry stated that Wyatt had told him that he
had already inspected and photographed the tractor-trailer
rig.  Although Fortier's investigator had not yet received any
responses to requests for copies of the photographs, Fortier
has not made any assertions to show that she would not be able
to obtain such photographs during discovery.
As noted earlier, the trial court conducted a hearing on
the motion to set aside, and the record on appeal does not
include a transcript of that hearing.  Thus, we cannot
determine whether any evidence or arguments other than those
presented in the pleadings were presented to the trial court
regarding this factor.  Because the trial court allowed the
motion to set aside the default judgment to be denied by
operation of law, there is not any indication that the trial
court actually considered this Kirtland factor and/or made a
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determination as to whether granting the motion would result
in substantial prejudice to Fortier.
C. Lack of Culpable Conduct on the Part
of the Defaulting Party 
With regard to the final Kirtland factor, this Court has
stated:
"To warrant a refusal to set aside a default
judgment, the defaulting party's actions that
resulted in the entry of the default judgment must
constitute willful conduct or conduct committed in
bad faith. Negligence alone is not sufficient. Bad
faith or willfulness is identified by 'incessant and
flagrant disrespect for court rules, deliberate and
knowing 
disregard 
for 
judicial 
authority, 
or
intentional nonresponsiveness.'  Kirtland, 524 So.
2d at 608 (citing Agio Indus., Inc. v. Delta Oil
Co., 485 So. 2d 340, 342 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986))."
Zeller v. Bailey, 950 So. 2d 1149, 1154 (Ala. 2006).   In
Sanders v. Weaver, 583 So. 2d 1326, 1328-29 (Ala. 1991), this
Court 
addressed 
the 
lack-of-culpable-conduct 
prong 
as 
follows:
"Negligence by itself is insufficient for refusing
to grant a Rule 55(c) motion.  A reasonable
explanation for inaction and noncompliance may
preclude a finding of culpability and cause this
Court to reverse a trial court's refusal to set
aside a default judgment, if the other two factors
are satisfied.  See Ex parte Illinois Central Gulf
R.R., 514 So. 2d 1283, 1288 (Ala. 1987); Kirtland,
524 So. 2d at 608.
"Sanders and the law firm forwarded the summons
and the complaint to their insurance carrier the day
they received them.  In keeping with Murphy's Law,
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the claims adjuster (who had been handling the
problems for Sanders and the law firm that had
resulted from acts and omissions of Sander's legal
secretary that had occurred because of what Sanders
and the law firm describe as the secretary's
obsessive, compulsive personality) was away from the
office for several weeks, and the summons and the
complaint in the Weaver suit were placed on his
desk.  The claims adjuster was in the process of
obtaining a divorce from his wife, who was being
treated for depression; he was looking after his
three minor children, one of whom was being treated
for emotional problems, one of whom was being
treated for a learning disability, and one of whom,
a five-year-old, was being treated for a severe
asthmatic condition; and his department was being
reorganized and his job duties were being changed.
He did not find the summons and the complaint until
after the default judgment had been entered.  The
default was attributable not to willful disregard of
court rules, but to negligence.  Reasonable
explanations for defaults, such as attorney neglect
(Ex parte Illinois Central Gulf R.R., supra) and
liability insurance company neglect (Lee v. Martin,
533 So. 2d 185 (Ala. 1988)), attributable to
innocent inadvertence, militate in favor of a
finding of an absence of culpability and provide a
basis for setting aside a default judgment. 
Kirtland, 524 So. 2d at 607–08."
In his affidavit submitted in support of his motion to
set aside, Hilyer stated that, on the day after the accident,
he notified his insurance agent of the accident. He also
stated that it was his understanding that his insurance
company was investigating the accident and that his insurance
company would defend him if a lawsuit was filed.  In his
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motion, Hilyer also alleged that his insurance agent notified 
his insurance carrier,  
Sparta 
Insurance ("Sparta"), about the
accident; that Alteris was the third-party adjuster for
Sparta; and that  the claim was initially assigned to Roberto
Lozano, a claims manager for Alteris.  In his affidavit
attached to the motion to set aside, Lozano asserted that, on
August 2, 2013, he hired Crawford &  Company to investigate
the accident; that, on August 8, 2013, he received a letter of
representation from Fortier's counsel; that he intended to
assign the claim to another adjuster; and that, because he
thought that he had assigned the claim to another adjuster, he
did not continue to follow Hilyer's claim.  Lozano stated
that, on October 21, 2013, Fortier's counsel forwarded a copy
of the complaint that had been filed; that, on January 2,
2014, Fortier's counsel forwarded a letter inquiring as to
whether Sparta would file an answer on Hilyer's behalf; and
that, on 
February 
12, 2014, Fortier's counsel notified Alteris
that a default judgment had been entered against Hilyer. 
Lozano stated that, because he thought he had assigned the
claim to another adjuster, he did not read or respond to the
correspondence 
from 
Fortier's 
counsel. 
 
However, 
Lozano 
stated
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that, as soon as the default judgment was brought to his
attention, he investigated the claim and realized that, in
fact, it had not been assigned to another adjuster and that he
then retained counsel to defend Hilyer in the lawsuit. 
Finally, he stated that, "had [he] realized sooner a complaint
had been filed, [he] would have immediately retained counsel
to defend Hilyer." 
Further, in his affidavit attached to the motion to set
aside, Wyatt stated that he had talked to Fortier's counsel in
September 2013 and had requested a letter of representation
and all medical records relating to M.M.'s treatment after the
accident; that, in October 2013, he talked to Fortier's
counsel again and asked if she would allow him to take a
statement from M.M. about 
the 
accident; that Fortier's counsel
told him that she would talk to her client and call him back;
and that he did not hear back from Fortier's counsel.  Wyatt
stated that, throughout the end of 2013 and in January 2014,
he left voice mails for Fortier's counsel.  He also talked to
Fortier's counsel's paralegal on December 30, 2013, and was
told that Fortier's counsel was off for the holidays.  Wyatt
stated that in January and February 2014 he also sent letters
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to Fortier's counsel.  However, Fortier's counsel did not
respond to Wyatt until after the trial court had entered a
default judgment against Hilyer.  
Fortier again presented arguments and evidence to
controvert the arguments and evidence submitted by Hilyer.  As
we noted previously, the trial court conducted a hearing on
the motion to set aside, but the record on appeal does not
include a transcript of that hearing.  Thus, we cannot
determine whether any evidence or arguments in addition to
those presented in the pleadings were presented to the trial
court regarding this factor.  In Phillips v. Randolph, 828 So.
2d 269, 279 (Ala. 2002), this Court stated:
"In Jones v. Hydro–Wave of Alabama, Inc., 524
So. 2d 610, 616 (Ala. 1988), the Court, discussing
the culpability of the defaulting party, stated,
'[W]e acknowledge that, due to a trial judge's
superior vantage point, the trial court is the more
suitable arbiter for determining with accuracy the
culpability of the defaulting party's conduct, and,
for this reason, we will show great deference toward
the trial court's decisions with respect to such
culpability.'"
However, in this case, the trial court allowed the motion to
set aside to be denied by operation of law.  Therefore, there
is no indication as to whether the trial court actually
considered this Kirtland factor and/or made a 
determination 
as
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to whether Hilyer's conduct was culpable.  In light of the
conflicting arguments and evidence presented by the parties,
the trial court is in a better position than is this Court to
determine the culpability of Hilyer's conduct.
Conclusion
In this case, Hilyer, in his motion to set aside the
default judgment, met the threshold showing of each of the
three Kirtland factors.  Additionally, Hilyer supported his
motion with affidavits and copies of correspondence.  Fortier
submitted evidence in support of her opposition to the motion
to set aside that controverted the facts and evidence
submitted by Hilyer.  However, after conducting a hearing and
taking the matter under advisement, the trial court allowed
the motion to set aside to be denied by operation of law
without any indication that the denial of the motion was the
product of due deliberation and without any indication that
the denial was based upon a consideration of the Kirtland
factors.  Therefore, we reverse the denial by operation of law
of Hilyer's motion to set aside the default judgment and
remand this case for the trial court to consider the Kirtland
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factors in determining whether to set aside the default
judgment.  As the Court of Civil Appeals noted in D.B.: 
"'[O]ur mandate in this case "is not to be construed
to mean that the trial court must set aside the
default judgment, [but] only that the trial court
must apply the Kirtland factors in deciding whether
to set aside the default judgment."'  Richardson v.
Integrity Bible Church, Inc., 897 So. 2d 345, 349
(Ala. 
Civ. 
App. 
2004), 
quoting 
White 
v.
Westmoreland, 680 So. 2d 348, 349 (Ala. Civ. App.
1996)."
141 So. 3d  at 1072-73.3
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Parker, and Shaw, JJ., concur.
Based on our disposition of this case, we pretermit
3
discussion of Hilyer's remaining claims.
28