Title: FENT v. CONTINGENCY REVIEW BOARD
Citation: 163 P.3d 512, 2007 OK 27
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 2007

FENT v. CONTINGENCY REVIEW BOARD Annotate this Case FENT v. CONTINGENCY REVIEW BOARD 2007 OK 27 163 P.3d 512 Case Number: 103714 Decided: 05/01/2007 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA JERRY R. FENT, as a resident taxpayer, citizen and voter of the State of Oklahoma, and all other similar persons, Petitioner, v. CONTINGENCY REVIEW BOARD, a State of Oklahoma Agency; BRAD HENRY, Governor of Oklahoma; TODD HIETT, Speaker of the House, and MIKE MORGAN, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Respondents. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FOR A PREROGATIVE WRIT ¶0 Petitioner brought in this court an original proceeding for a declaration that the Contingency Review Board's approval of expenditures to be made out of the Oklahoma Opportunity Fund usurps the power of the executive and is void ab initio and for injunctive relief to prevent the Board's continued participation in the approval process. ORIGINAL COGNIZANCE TAKEN; DECLARATORY RELIEF GRANTED Jerry R. Fent, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, pro se Edwin Kessler, Norman, Oklahoma, pro se OPALA, J. ¶1 The dispositive issues tendered by this original proceeding are: (1) Is the mandatory participation by the legislative members of the Contingency Review Board (CRB) in the process of approval of expenditures from appropriations to the Oklahoma Opportunity Fund3 (Opportunity Fund) an impermissible intrusion upon the executive branch's powers in violation of Art. 4, §1, Okl.Const.?4 and if so (2) Are the offending provisions of 62 O.S.Supp.2006 §485 severable from the remainder of the Act? and (3) Is the CRB's approval of funding to the Ardmore Development Authority for two related projects void ab initio? We answer the first two questions in the affirmative and the third in the negative.6 I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 Petitioner Jerry R. Fent (petitioner or Fent), a resident taxpayer, invokes this court's original jurisdiction to challenge the legality of the CRB, of the status of the two legislator members who sit on that board, as well as of the CRB's approval of funding that was to flow from the Opportunity Fund to the Ardmore Development Authority (Authority) for two projects in the Ardmore area. ¶3 The Opportunity Fund, created by the terms of 62 O.S.Supp.2006 §48,7 is a revolving fund for the Department of Commerce to be used for economic development projects. The enactment establishes explicit criteria for determining whether proposed expenditures are expected to result in a substantial economic benefit to the State. The Director of the Department of Commerce is authorized to administer the Opportunity Fund8 and to propose expenditures from the fund in accordance with the legislative guidelines.9 Appropriations to the fund may be budgeted and expended by the Governor for proposed projects subject to the unanimous approval of the CRB.10 The CRB is composed of the Governor, Speaker of the House of Representatives, President Pro Tempore of the Senate and Director of State Finance (an ex officio nonvoting member).11 The Opportunity Fund received a $45,000,000 appropriation during the second extraordinary legislative session in 2006.12 The CRB approved Authority's application for two grants in the aggregate amount of $20,000,000 for a project related to a new MG automobile plant:13 (1) a $5,000,000 loan to Oklahoma Global Motors, LLC to assist it in start-up operations to manufacture MG automobiles in Ardmore and (2) a $15,000,000 award for improvements to be made at the Ardmore Municipal Airport, which would enable the airport to accommodate cargo aircraft for use in transporting manufactured MG automobiles.14 II THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS ¶4 Fent claims the CRB's mandated participation in the approval process for all expenditures from appropriations to the Opportunity Fund (for economic development projects) contravenes the State's constitutional separation-of-powers provision.15 This is so because two legislators, who sit as members of the CRB, have the power to veto funding for proposed projects selected by the executive service. He challenges the legitimacy of the CRB as an "executive" board because it is composed of two legislator-members who sit ex officio.16 He claims the legislators sitting on the CRB are both serving simultaneously in the executive as well as in the legislative capacities in violation of the state constitutional prohibition against holding dual state offices.17 ¶5 Respondents counter the CRB is essentially a legislative body acting in support of a legislative function - the determination of State fiscal policy on a matter of great public importance. They claim the CRB acts in a cooperative, not coercive, manner, when it participates in the approval process. According to Respondents, even if we assume the statutory approval regime is unlawful, the offending language is severable from the remainder of the act without any harm to its essential character. III FENT'S STANDING ¶6 Fent claims he has standing ¶7 Standing refers to a person's legal right to seek relief in a judicial forum. ¶8 This court has long-recognized the right of a taxpayer to challenge illegal taxation or expenditure of public funds. ¶9 The claimed public injury in this case consists of the Legislature's usurpation of the executive branch's power (to use appropriated funds) through legislative post-passage interposition of an improper veto barrier which legislative officials may use when sitting on the CRB. That injury is redressable by judicial severance of the offending provisions of IV ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ¶10 Respondent Morgan submits there is no urgency or pressing need for an early decision. ¶11 This case is appropriate for the court's assumption of original jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief. In controversies where (as here) this court and the district court both have concurrent jurisdiction, this court's decision to assume original jurisdiction constitutes an exercise of discretionary power. V THE STATE'S FUNDAMENTAL LAW PROHIBITS THE LEGISLATURE FROM INTERPOSING ITS POWER OVER AN APPROPRIATION THAT HAS ALREADY BECOME ENACTED LAW ¶12 Oklahoma's fundamental law ¶13 Legislative control over an appropriation bill may continue until the bill passes beyond the point at which the Legislature may recall it from the Governor's office. ¶14 When the 2006 appropriation to the Opportunity Fund became enacted law, all legislative control over the funds ceased and passed to the executive branch to expend them for economic development projects selected by that service of government based on the expressly imposed legislative criteria. By statutorily requiring the CRB's unanimous approval of all expenditures from the Opportunity Fund, ¶15 In In re Oklahoma Department of Transportation for Approval of Not to Exceed $100 Million Oklahoma Department of Transportation Grant Anticipation Notes, Series 2002 ¶16 In short, the Legislature cannot participate, either directly or through administrative boards having legislators as members, in the administration of funds appropriated by enacted legislation. The CRB's participation in the approval process constitutes a legislative usurpation of the powers assigned to the executive branch. VI SEVERABILITY ANALYSIS ¶17 Respondents submit that even if the CRB's statutory role in approving expenditures from the Opportunity Fund be declared constitutionally infirm, the provisions claimed to be offending are clearly severable. ¶18 Severability analysis is a necessary process when some, but not all, provisions of an enactment are to be condemned as unconstitutional and hence void. ¶19 Because the CRB's statutory role in the supervision of money that is to flow to the Opportunity Fund is constitutionally infirm, we must next determine whether upon severance of the offending portions the remainder of the statute can be saved. The obvious legislative purpose of the Opportunity Fund is to promote economic development by funding projects that would result in a significant benefit to the State. This is to be accomplished by utilizing the Department of Commerce to administer the appropriations for selected projects that meet the statutory criteria. ¶20 We therefore hold the provisions of VII THE ART. 10 §§15, 20, OKL.CONST. CHALLENGES ¶21 Fent claims the "subject matter" of the Ardmore grants contravenes two state constitutional provisions - Art. 10 §§1552 and 20.53 First, he argues the $15,000,000 grant violates the Art. 10 §20 prohibition against the imposition of taxes "for the purpose of any county, city, town, or other municipal corporation."54 He states the airport and its runway are not state facilities. He next asserts the $5,000,000 loan to Oklahoma Global Motors, a private entity, expressly violates the terms of Art. 10 §15, which prohibit the State from offering its credit to a private corporation. ¶22 There is a strong presumption which favors the constitutionality of legislative acts.55 A party challenging the constitutionality of legislation has a heavy burden of showing its infirmity by persuasive argument and analysis cum authority.56 Fent has failed to pierce that presumption. The tendered issues and analysis, presented by text that covers only one-half of a page in the summary section of his brief, stand alone without any citation to Oklahoma jurisprudence or to that of other states with like or similar constitutional prohibition.57 We need not consider challenges that are not rested on convincing argument firmly supported by legal authority.58 ¶23 When the failure of advocacy occurs, its presence distorts the adversarial positions of the parties. There is here only a request for relief without supporting argumentation or legal authority material. This absence alters the nature of the appellate process by imposing upon the court the burden of researching and testing unsupported legal propositions sought to be pressed for victory. Appellate courts cannot be forced to become an active advocate for the party whose failure to brief or argue has produced a total intellectual vacuum for that party's asserted position. ¶24 Because Fent's constitutional arguments are undeveloped and unsupported by clear argument with authority, he has failed to demonstrate any infirmity in the acts of state executive officials by which appropriated funds were awarded to a private industry and to a municipal airport. We hence decline to reach and resolve these issues today. VIII RELIEF GRANTED ¶25 We hold that the CRB's mandatory participation in the grant approval process is tainted by a constitutional infirmity that invalidates those provisions of ¶26 Because Fent did not seek any pendente lite relief in order to prevent payments due in advance of the court's pronouncement from being made, we make today's opinion prospective only. It will apply with effect to post-pronouncement payments to the designated recipients of funds to be made under the Act. IX THE KEY QUESTION'S MOOTNESS ¶27 Although the CRB's usurpation of power, interposed into the approval process, did not in this case interfere with the executive service's payout to the selected applicant, the fact of the board's tainted authority cannot be deemed to have been mooted as a legal issue to be resolved. It presents an important question of public law which is likely to recur at some point in the future when other appropriations to the Opportunity Fund are sought to be expended for the benefit of qualified recipients.62 X SUMMARY ¶28 Fent has standing as a taxpayer to challenge the Legislature's usurpation of the executive branch's power over the expenditure of enacted appropriations to the Opportunity Fund. ¶29 This case is appropriate for the court's assumption of its original jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief. The present litigation tenders a matter of public interest and there is a pressing need for an early decision. ¶30 The Legislature cannot participate, either directly or through administrative boards having legislators as its members, in the administration of funds appropriated by enacted legislation. The CRB's participation in the approval process for expenditures from appropriated funds, as it is mandated by the terms of 62 O.S.Supp.2006 §48, constitutes legislative usurpation of powers belonging to the executive branch. Those constitutionally infirm provisions of §48 which relate to the CRB are severable and the remainder of the statute can stand alone as untainted by today's sentence of nullity. ¶31 Original cognizance is taken and declaratory relief granted. ¶32 EDMONDSON, V.C.J., LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, OPALA, WATT, TAYLOR and COLBERT, JJ., concur. ¶33 WINCHESTER, C.J., disqualified. ¶34 KAUGER, J., recused. FOOT