Title: Cosden v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 210, 2023
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 29, 2024

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              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
JACKIE COSDEN, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Defendant Below,             
§ 
No.  210, 2023 
 
      
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
Court Below:  Superior Court 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  
of the State of Delaware 
§  
 
STATE OF DELAWARE  
 
§ 
Cr. ID Nos. 2009013056 &  
 
 
                                         § 
2205008772  
 
     
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Submitted:  February 14, 2024 
Decided:  
April 29, 2024 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
 
After considering the parties’ briefs, the record on appeal, and the arguments 
of counsel, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Defendant Below-Appellant Jackie Cosden seeks to vacate his 
convictions for Burglary First Degree, Offensive Touching, Criminal Mischief 
Under $1,000, Terroristic Threatening, and Strangulation.  Cosden’s convictions 
arose from a domestic violence incident involving his girlfriend, Sequoia Warren.  
During trial, the State presented evidence that Cosden left the crime scene after 
learning that police had been called and that he later attempted to flee from police 
when they arrived at his father’s residence.  Based on that evidence, the Superior 
Court issued a flight instruction to the jury over Cosden’s objection.  On appeal, 
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Cosden challenges both the trial court’s decision to issue the flight instruction and 
the language of the instruction itself. 
(2) 
Cosden first argues that the trial court’s decision to issue the flight 
instruction was based on the State’s inaccurate representation that the charges at trial 
were Cosden’s only “active case” at the time of his arrest.  In Cosden’s view, had the 
trial court been made aware that he had another “active case,” giving him another 
reason to flee from police, the court would not have issued the flight instruction.  
Second, Cosden contends that the flight instruction’s language was a comment on 
the evidence in violation of Del. Const. art. IV, § 19.  We conclude that neither 
argument has merit, and we therefore affirm Cosden’s convictions. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
(3) 
On September 26, 2020, shortly after midnight, Warren and her friend, 
Alsanarda Carr, drove to Warren’s apartment following a night out together.  When 
the two friends arrived at Warren’s apartment, Cosden approached their car and 
began yelling at Warren.  Warren and Carr drove away, and when they returned a 
few minutes later, it appeared that Cosden had left the apartment complex. 
(4) 
Warren and Carr entered Warren’s apartment alone.  While they were 
in Warren’s bedroom, the two women heard someone attempting to forcibly enter 
through the apartment’s front door.  Carr testified that, after hearing the noise, she 
and Warren attempted to barricade the door with a dresser, but they were unable to 
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do so.  Cosden entered Warren’s apartment by force and continued yelling at her.  
According to Carr, as soon as he broke through the door, Cosden slapped and 
punched Warren before putting his hands around her throat.  
(5) 
Carr testified that during the attack, Cosden threatened to kill them both 
if Carr called 9-1-1.  Because of Cosden’s threat, Carr discreetly called 9-1-1, put 
her phone down, and allowed the 9-1-1 operator to listen.  At trial, the State played 
for the jury a recording of the 9-1-1 call.  Cosden could be heard telling Carr that 
Warren was not okay because she was “getting her a-- whooped.”  He yelled that he 
intended to “f--- [Warren] up” every time he saw her.  Cosden eventually stopped 
his attack, at which point Carr told him that the police were on their way, and he left 
the apartment. 
(6) 
Officer James Kiser and an EMT responded to Warren’s apartment.  
Officer Kiser observed signs of forced entry, testifying that the door’s locking 
mechanism was “completely knocked off the frame.”  He described Warren as 
“clearly shaken-up” and noted small lacerations on her hand, a bite wound, bruising, 
and faint redness around her neck.  Warren told the EMT that the marks on her body 
were from biting and scratching.  Despite the EMT’s recommendation, Warren 
refused to go to the hospital. 
(7) 
Officer Kiser was unable to locate Cosden immediately after the 
incident at Warren’s apartment.  At 5:40 a.m. on September 26, 2020, Officer Kiser 
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obtained a warrant (the “First Warrant”) for Cosden’s arrest for Burglary Second 
Degree, Strangulation, Terroristic Threatening, Assault Third Degree, Offensive 
Touching, and Criminal Mischief Under $1,000.  Those were the charges for which 
Cosden later went to trial and that he now challenges on appeal. 
(8) 
Cosden remained at large and continued to text Warren throughout that 
day.  At 5:07 p.m., Cosden texted Warren saying “B---- ima kill you…”  Warren 
called the police and showed them the text message.  At 8:53 p.m. on September 26, 
2020, police obtained another warrant (the “Second Warrant”) for Cosden’s arrest 
on one separate charge of Terroristic Threatening arising from the text message.  
Both the First and Second Warrants, issued less than fourteen hours apart, involved 
acts perpetrated by Cosden against Warren on the same day. 
(9) 
Sixteen days after the domestic violence incident, on October 12, 2020, 
police located Cosden at his father’s house and arrested him based on the First and 
Second Warrants.  When Officer Kiser arrived at the house, Cosden looked right at 
him before fleeing out the back door.  Shortly thereafter, Officer Kiser apprehended 
Cosden, who told Officer Kiser that he “knew it was stupid” to run. 
(10) During Officer Kiser’s trial testimony, the State asked him what 
occurred when he went to arrest Cosden on October 12th.  This line of questioning 
prompted an objection from Cosden’s trial counsel.  At sidebar, the State informed 
the trial court that, although Cosden did have an unrelated “pending case,” the 
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charges at trial were his “only active case” at the time of his arrest.  This was 
incorrect.  At the time Cosden fled from Officer Kiser, the First and Second Warrants 
were both active.  The State then informed the trial court that the testimony was 
relevant because the State intended to request a flight instruction.  Cosden objected, 
arguing that because of the passage of time between the domestic violence incident 
and his eventual arrest, it was unknown what caused him to flee.  The trial court 
reasoned that “there [was] nothing else that anyone knew of that [Cosden] was 
wanted for at the time,” and the Court therefore allowed limited testimony from 
Officer Kiser regarding Cosden’s flight.  
(11) The trial court later granted the State’s request for a flight instruction 
over Cosden’s objection.  At the prayer conference, the trial court explained that, 
because there were disputed contentions as to why Cosden fled, the parties were free 
to argue “the weight of that evidence and whether they believe there is some disputed 
reasons as to why [Cosden fled].”  Neither party, however, commented on Cosden’s 
flight during their closing arguments to the jury.  Cosden did not object to the flight 
instruction’s phrasing or propose an alternative instruction.  On appeal, Cosden 
renews his argument that the evidence did not support a flight instruction in this case.  
He additionally contends for the first time that the instruction’s wording violated the 
Delaware Constitution. 
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ANALYSIS 
(12) “This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to issue a jury 
instruction over the defendant’s objection.”1  This Court also considers whether the 
instructions, examined as a whole, correctly stated the law.2  When, however, 
objections to jury instructions are not fairly preserved in the trial court, we will 
“review[] the content of jury instructions for plain error.”3  “Under the plain error 
standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to 
substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”4  
“[T]he doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which are apparent on the 
face of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and 
which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show 
manifest injustice.”5 
A. The Superior Court did not err in giving the jury a flight instruction 
based on the evidence presented at trial. 
(13) Cosden’s first argument on appeal is predicated on his contentions that: 
(i) had the State properly represented the existence of the Second Warrant, the trial 
 
1 Robertson v. State, 41 A.3d 406, 408 (Del. 2012). 
2 Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278, 1282 (Del. 1991). 
3 Dupree v. State, 295 A.3d 1099, 2023 WL 2783164, at *3 (Del. 2023) (TABLE) (quoting Brooks 
v. State, 40 A.3d 346, 351 (Del. 2012)). 
4 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986).  
5 Id. 
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court would not have issued the flight instruction; and (ii) it was “just as likely” that 
Cosden was fleeing from the Second Warrant as it was that he was fleeing from the 
First Warrant.  But under the unique facts of this case, the trial court did not err in 
holding that the evidence presented at trial supported the jury instruction related to 
Cosden’s flight.   
(14) A defendant’s motive for fleeing is a question of fact for the jury.6  
Evidence of a defendant’s flight from the crime scene or evasion of arrest following 
the commission of a crime is generally admissible to show consciousness of guilt.7  
This Court has held that a flight instruction is proper “where there is evidence of 
flight or concealment and the evidence reasonably supports an inference that 
defendant fled because ‘of a consciousness of guilt and a desire to avoid an 
accusation based thereon, or for some other reason. . . .’”8 
(15) Here, Cosden fled from Warren’s apartment—the crime scene—
immediately after learning that the police were on their way.  He then fled when 
Officer Kiser located Cosden two weeks later at his father’s house.  When Officer 
Kiser ultimately apprehended him, Cosden stated that he “knew it was stupid” to 
run.  Cosden does not dispute that this evidence, standing alone, constituted a 
 
6 Tice v. State, 382 A.2d 231, 233 (Del. 1977). 
7 Robertson, 41 A.3d at 409; Tice, 382 A.2d at 233. 
8 Thomas v. State, 467 A.2d 954, 958 (Del. 1983) (citing Tice, 382 A.2d at 233). 
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sufficient factual basis to support a flight instruction.  Instead, he argues that the 
Second Warrant’s existence renders unreasonable any inference that he fled because 
of the charges relating to the incident at Warren’s apartment.  We disagree. 
(16) The charges in the First and Second Warrants were not wholly 
unrelated; to the contrary, they stemmed from incidents occurring on the same day 
and involving the same victim.  The First Warrant was based on the domestic 
violence incident between Cosden and Warren and was issued in the early morning 
hours of September 26, 2020.  Police obtained the Second Warrant later that night 
based on a text message that Cosden sent to Warren in which he threatened to kill 
her mere hours after he fled from her apartment. 
(17) Although the State incorrectly informed the trial court that Cosden only 
had one “active case” at the time of his arrest, that mistaken statement of fact does 
not render the trial court’s flight instruction improper.  Even if the trial court had 
been made aware of the Second Warrant, the related nature of the events on 
September 26, 2020, including the fact that they occurred on the same day and 
involved the same victim, supported a reasonable inference that Cosden fled because 
he knew that police had been called to Warren’s apartment and he wanted to avoid 
arrest for that incident.  The record therefore supports the trial court’s decision to 
issue a flight instruction. 
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B. The flight instruction given to the jury did not amount to plain error. 
(18) Cosden’s second argument on appeal is that the particular flight 
instruction given in this case was unconstitutional.  Del. Const. art. IV, § 19 provides 
that “[j]udges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state 
the questions of fact in issue and declare the law.”9  The trial court issued the 
following instruction to the jury:  
In this case, the State contends that the defendant evaded arrest and took 
flight following the commission of or after committing the offenses 
charged in the indictment.  Evidence of evasion of arrest and flight is 
admissible in a criminal case as a circumstance tending to show 
consciousness of guilt.  You may consider any evidence for this limited 
purpose only.  You may not consider evidence of evasion of arrest or 
flight as poof that the defendant is a bad person and, therefore, probably 
committed the offenses charged in the indictment.  You may use this 
evidence only to help you in deciding whether the defendant committed 
the offenses contained in the indictment.  The evidence of evasion of 
arrest or flight, if proved, may be considered by you in light of all the 
facts proven.  Whether or not such evidence shows consciousness of 
guilt and the significance to be attached to such evidence are matters 
solely for your determination.10 
 
(19) On appeal, Cosden argues that this instruction commented on the 
evidence in violation of Del. Const. art. IV, § 19 in three ways: (i) the phrase “tending 
to show guilt” suggested a heightened likelihood of guilt; (ii) the language 
highlighted only one permissible inference—guilt; and (iii) the instruction failed to 
recognize that consciousness of guilt was not “all or nothing.”   
 
9 Del. Const. art. IV, § 19. 
10 App. to Opening Br. at A387-88 (Trial Tr.). 
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(20) At trial, Cosden did not object to the instruction based on Del. Const. 
art. IV, § 19.  Although this Court generally reviews constitutional issues de novo, 
constitutional issues that are not raised in the trial court are reviewed for plain error.11 
(21) To begin, we note that Cosden has not argued that flight instructions are 
per se unconstitutional under the Delaware Constitution.  In Robertson v. State,12  
this Court rejected the defendant’s contention that flight instructions necessarily 
violate Del. Const. art. IV, § 19, and Cosden has not asked us to revisit that ruling.  
As the State correctly points out—and as Cosden concedes—the instruction at issue 
on appeal is substantively similar to the instruction upheld by this Court in Robertson 
and the flight instruction provided in Delaware’s pattern criminal jury instructions.13  
Cosden nevertheless contends that our decision in Robertson did not pass on the 
precise wording of the instruction and only addressed the constitutionality of flight 
instructions generally.  Cosden now challenges the instruction’s wording, 
specifically whether the language of the trial court’s instruction improperly 
commented on the facts.  We hold that the instruction’s wording was not so clearly 
prejudicial to Cosden’s substantial rights as to jeopardize the trial’s fairness and 
integrity.14  Accordingly, we affirm the challenged instruction. 
 
11 Nance v. State, 903 A.2d 283, 285 (Del. 2006). 
12 41 A.3d at 409. 
13 Id. at 408. 
14 Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100. 
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(22) First, Cosden argues that this jury instruction violated Del. Const. art. 
IV, § 19 because the words “tending to show guilt” suggest a heightened likelihood 
of guilt instead of framing guilt as one permissible inference.  This argument, 
however, misquotes the challenged flight instruction, which described flight as “a 
circumstance tending to show consciousness of guilt.”15  Labeling the legal 
significance of Cosden’s flight as one circumstance that “tend[ed] to show 
consciousness of guilt” was not a comment on the evidence. 
(23) Second, Cosden contends that the instruction “highlights one 
permissible inference—guilt—over all others.”16  This assertion is misplaced when 
the instruction is considered as a whole.17  In the last paragraph, the challenged 
instruction advised the jury that flight evidence “may be considered in light of all of 
the facts proven,” and that whether Cosden’s flight showed his consciousness of guilt 
were matters solely for the jury’s determination.  The trial court did not limit the 
jury’s inference exclusively to guilt; rather, by stating the questions of fact at issue 
and declaring the applicable law, the trial court properly reserved issues of fact for 
the jury.   
 
15 App. to Opening Br. at A388 (Trial Tr.). 
16 Opening Br. at 13. 
17 Claudio, 585 A.2d at 1282. 
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(24) Finally, Cosden argues that the court’s flight instruction improperly 
generalized consciousness of guilt as “all or nothing” because it “suggested to the 
jury that Cosden fled because of guilt of ‘the offenses charged in the indictment.’”18  
In Cosden’s view, had the jury been informed of the Second Warrant, it may have 
reached a different conclusion regarding the significance of the flight evidence.  But 
nothing prevented trial counsel from arguing to the jury that Cosden may have fled 
for reasons other than the charges being tried.  Further, there is nothing in the record 
to indicate that Cosden proposed alternative language or sought changes to the 
proposed instruction.  Because the language in the instruction did not clearly 
prejudice Cosden’s rights under the Delaware Constitution, the trial court did not 
commit plain error by instructing the jury in the manner that it did. 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there is no merit to Cosden’s 
appeal.  NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Abigail M. LeGrow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
18 Opening Br. at 12-13.