Title: STATE, EX REL. v. Shanahan
Citation: 178 Kan. 400, 286 P.2d 742
Docket Number: 39,989
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 1955

178 Kan. 400 (1955)
286 P.2d 742
STATE OF KANSAS, ex rel. HAROLD R. FATZER, Attorney General, Appellant,
v.
PAUL R. SHANAHAN, as Secretary of State of the State of Kansas, Appellee.
No. 39,989

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 6, 1955.
Paul E. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Harold R. Fatzer, Attorney General, of Topeka, was with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Mark L. Bennett, of Topeka, argued the cause, and William P. Trusdale, J.E. DuMars and Clayton M. Davis, all of Topeka were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
Arthur J. Stanley, Jr., and William H. Pringle, of Kansas City, filed a brief Amicus Curiae for Frances Vaughn, Bertha Hall and Louise Rahner, members of the Kansas State Board of Review, Kansas City, Kansas.
Robert L. Webb, Ralph W. Oman, Philip E. Buzick, Robert A. McClure and James D. Waugh, all of Topeka, filed a brief Amicus Curiae for the Kansas-Missouri Theatre Association.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARVEY, C.J.:
This was an action in the nature of a declaratory judgment to determine the constitutional validity of Senate Bill No. 222 of the 1955 Kansas Legislative Session. The bill, as introduced by the Senate Committee on Judiciary, read:
By regular procedure the bill was passed by the Senate in the above form and messaged to the House where it was duly referred to the House Committee on Judiciary. That committee amended the bill so as to read:
In this form the bill passed the House and was messaged to the Senate where the Senate concurred in the House amendments. In due course it was duly enrolled, presented to the governor for his signature, and signed by him.
Section 1 of Ch. 82 of the Laws of 1929 which the Senate sought to repeal was the principal part of an act concerning the registration of motor vehicles belonging to nonresidents. It reads:
The following sections of G.S. 1949 are the ones attempted to be repealed by the amendment made by the House:
*403 The trial court held this statute to be valid. The appeal presents the question of the correctness of that holding.
The pertinent part of Art. 2 of our constitution pertaining to the legislature, § 16, reads:
This provision of our constitution has been held mandatory. In Comm'rs of Sedgwick Co. v. Bailey, 13 Kan. 600, it is said:
In Division of Howard Co., 15 Kan. 194, it was held:
See, also, the following cases and authorities cited therein: Swayze v. Britton, 17 Kan. 625; Davis v. Turner, 21 Kan. 131; City of Eureka v. Davis, 21 Kan. 578; In re Holcomb, Petitioner, &amp; c., 21 Kan. 628; The State, ex rel., v. Bankers', etc., Association, 23 Kan. 499; Philpin v. McCarty, Supt., &amp; c., 24 Kan. 393; The State v. Lewin, 53 Kan. 679, 37 Pac. 168; The State v. Haun, 61 Kan. 146, 151, 59 Pac. 340; and, The State v. Sholl, 58 Kan. 507, 49 Pac. 668, where it was held:
In support of the trial court's ruling counsel for appellee say there is a strong presumption of the constitutionality of the bill. Naturally, *404 there is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of any bill passed by the legislature. This court has many times asserted that fact, but the legislature, like other departments of the government, is subject to our constitution which contains some limitations on legislative acts. It can no more disobey those limitations than can any other branch of the government.
Counsel for appellee next contend that the constitutional provision above quoted should not be construed narrowly or technically to invalidate legislation. We have never so construed it, and do not care to do so now.
It is next argued that the "subject" of the legislation is "repeal"; and even if there are plurality of objects, the subject is single. This contention has been previously suggested, and discounted. The subject of the bill is the matter to which the legislation pertains. The subject of the bill as introduced by the Senate is the registration of motor vehicles brought into this state by nonresidents. The subject of the amendment added by the House relates to the Kansas State Board of Review and to censorship of motion pictures by that agency. The amendment pertains to an entirely different subject matter than that of the bill as first introduced.
Counsel Amicus Curiae in their brief for the Kansas-Missouri Theatre Association argued that the petition filed in the trial court did not state a cause of action under the declaratory judgment statute. The trial court found "that an actual controversy exists between the parties within the contemplation of G.S. 1949, 60-3127" which is the declaratory judgment statute. We agree. There is no cross-appeal. Nothing further need be said on this point.
In its petition plaintiff asked to have the defendant enjoined from publishing Senate Bill No. 222 in the statute. The trial court denied that request. We are asked to reverse the trial court on that point. We decline to do so. We are told the publication of the 1955 Session Laws is almost completed and that taking out of it Senate Bill No. 222 would cause considerable expense and delay. More than that, the publication of a statute otherwise void does not render it valid.
The result is the judgment of the trial court should be reversed in part and affirmed in part. It is so ordered.