Title: P. v. Medina
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S137055
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2007

1
Filed 7/9/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S137055 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/2 B169140 
JUAN MANUEL MEDINA, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. NA054131 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
Several Courts of Appeal have held that the crime of kidnapping during the 
commission of a carjacking (Pen. Code,1 § 209.5, subd. (a); hereafter section 
209.5(a)), requires a completed carjacking.  (People v. Contreras (1997) 55 
Cal.App.4th 760, 765 (Contreras); see also People v. Jones (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 
616, 626 (Jones), following Contreras.)  We must decide whether attempted 
kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking also requires a completed 
carjacking, and whether attempted carjacking and attempted kidnapping are lesser 
included offenses2 of an attempt to violate section 209.5(a).  For reasons that 
                                              
1  
All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
noted. 
2  
We use the term “lesser included offense” interchangeably with the 
equivalent term “necessarily included offense.”  (People v. Ortega (1998) 19 
Cal.4th 686, 704-705 (Ortega) (conc. & dis. opn. of Chin, J.).)  
 
2
follow, we conclude that a completed carjacking is not a prerequisite for an 
attempt to violate section 209.5(a), and that attempted carjacking and attempted 
kidnapping are lesser included offenses of an attempt to violate section 209.5(a).  
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On September 5, 2002, Long Beach Police Officer Mauk observed 
defendant recklessly driving northbound in southbound lanes.  When he and 
another officer stopped defendant, defendant exited his vehicle and ran, refusing to 
stop as ordered by Officer Mauk, who then chased him on foot.  With Officer 
Mauk in close pursuit, defendant ran to a supermarket parking lot and approached 
a parked white van.  
Hubie Perez was sleeping in the front passenger seat of the van; he had left 
the key in the ignition.  Along with his three young sons, Perez was waiting for his 
wife, Zoveida Rodriguez, to get off from work.  Rodriguez arrived at the van and 
had started buckling the children into the backseat when she saw defendant enter 
the van and get into the driver’s seat.  She jumped towards defendant and elbowed 
him so he would get out.  Defendant kept saying, “We got to go, we got to go,” 
and shoved Rodriguez back.  Rodriguez yelled:  “You got to get out of my van.  
My kids are in the van.  I have kids in here.  Get out.  Get out.”  Reaching for the 
ignition, defendant was unable to start it, and could not move the steering wheel or 
put the van in gear.  After defendant and Perez looked at each other, defendant 
muttered, “Oh damn,” and left.  Defendant was later apprehended by other 
officers. 
Later that day, an officer searched defendant’s apartment and found a 
baggie containing methamphetamine and a heavily used glass pipe containing 
residue.  To support a defense of voluntary intoxication, defendant presented an 
expert witness on “addiction medicine,” who testified that defendant’s panicked 
 
3
reaction on seeing police and other behavior were consistent with 
methamphetamine use.   
A jury convicted defendant of five counts of attempted kidnapping during 
the commission of a carjacking, one count for each of the five members of the 
Perez family (§§ 664, 209.5(a) [counts 1-5]), and one count of attempted 
carjacking (§§ 664, 215, subd. (a) [count 6]).  Defendant admitted suffering a prior 
felony conviction.  Staying the sentence for attempted carjacking under section 
654, the trial court sentenced him to the total of 37 years and eight months in 
prison.  Defendant appealed.  Among other claims, he argued that his convictions 
for attempted kidnapping during commission of a carjacking (§§ 664, 209.5(a)) 
must be reversed because the offense requires a completed carjacking for which 
there was insufficient evidence, and that attempted carjacking (§§ 664, 215) is a 
lesser included offense of attempted kidnapping during a carjacking, and he cannot 
be convicted of both.   
The Court of Appeal majority modified defendant’s custody credits, but 
otherwise affirmed the judgment.  The majority explained that an attempt to 
commit a crime does not require that all elements of the crime be completed and 
proven:  “Kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking is an amalgam of two 
offenses, carjacking and kidnapping, insofar as both of those offenses must be 
completed in order to commit the crime.  To attempt to kidnap during commission 
of a carjacking, it is only required that the perpetrator intend to commit each of the 
combined offenses and make an ineffectual act towards accomplishment of the 
kidnapping during commission of the carjacking.  An attempted kidnapping during 
commission of a carjacking is committed when the kidnapping is incomplete or 
the carjacking is incomplete, or both are incomplete.”  It found sufficient evidence 
to support the convictions for attempted kidnapping during the commission of a 
carjacking.  (§§ 664, 209.5(a).)  Based on its conclusion that a completed 
 
4
carjacking is not required, the Court of Appeal majority also rejected defendant’s 
claim that an attempted carjacking and attempted kidnapping are lesser included 
offenses of attempted kidnapping during commission of a carjacking.  To be 
convicted of the latter offense, the majority reiterated, defendant “had to intend to 
commit that offense (i.e., intend both kidnapping and carjacking) and perform at 
least one ineffectual act towards its commission.  That ineffectual act might be an 
act towards kidnapping or an act towards carjacking, not necessarily an act 
towards each.  If the act was directed at the kidnapping but not the carjacking, the 
elements of attempted carjacking would not be present.  Therefore, attempted 
kidnapping during commission of a carjacking can be committed without 
committing attempted carjacking.  Consequently, the latter offense is not a lesser 
included offense of the former.”   In any event, the majority concluded that even 
assuming error, the trial court’s failure to instruct on the lesser included offenses 
was harmless.      
In her dissent, Justice Ashmann-Gerst agreed with the majority that an 
attempt does not require that all elements of the particular crime be proven; 
however, she disagreed with its characterization of section 209.5(a) as an amalgam 
of the crimes kidnapping and carjacking.  “Section 209.5, subdivision (a) 
establishes a unique crime that cannot be treated as two crimes stitched together.  
It has two elements—a kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking—and 
only the kidnapping element is subject to an attempt analysis.  This is because the 
statute does not presuppose a completed kidnapping, but it does presuppose a 
completed carjacking.”  Focusing on the phrase “during the commission of a 
carjacking” (§ 209.5(a)), the dissent underscored that “[a] carjacking cannot be 
ineffectual during its commission.  This, of course, would amount to a logical 
impossibility.”  The dissent concluded that because defendant did not move the 
Perez van, an element of carjacking, he did not complete the carjacking and, as 
 
5
such, could not be convicted of attempted kidnapping during the commission of a 
carjacking.  (§§ 664, 209.5(a).)  Justice Ashmann-Gerst also dissented from the 
majority’s holding that attempted kidnapping and attempted carjacking are not 
lesser included offenses of an attempted violation of section 209.5(a).   
We granted review limited to the issues noted above.  
DISCUSSION 
At issue here, section 209.5(a) provides:  “Any person who, during the 
commission of a carjacking and in order to facilitate the commission of the 
carjacking, kidnaps another person who is not a principal in the commission of the 
carjacking shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the 
possibility of parole.”  For section 209.5(a) to apply, the victim must be moved 
“beyond [what is] merely incidental to the commission of the carjacking” and “a 
substantial distance from the vicinity of the carjacking,” and “the movement of the 
victim increases the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily 
present in the crime of carjacking itself.”  (§ 209.5, subd. (b).)  
In turn, carjacking is defined as “the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in 
the possession of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, or from 
the person or immediate presence of a passenger of the motor vehicle, against his 
or her will and with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the 
person in possession of the motor vehicle of his or her possession, accomplished 
by means of force or fear.”  (§ 215, subd. (a); see People v. Lopez (2003) 31 
Cal.4th 1051 (Lopez) [carjacking requires asportation or movement].)3  The parties 
                                              
3 
Section 207, subdivision (a), which defines kidnapping generally, provides:  
“Every person who forcibly, or by any other means of instilling fear, steals or 
takes, or holds, detains, or arrests any person in this state, and carries the person 
into another country, state, or county, or into another part of the same county, is 
guilty of kidnapping.” 
 
6
do not dispute that to be convicted of a kidnapping during the commission of a 
carjacking under section 209.5(a), a defendant must complete the carjacking.  
(Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 765; Jones, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 
625.)  The issue here, however, is an attempt to violate section 209.5(a). 
A. Does the crime of attempted kidnapping during a carjacking 
require a completed carjacking? 
An attempted kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking is not 
defined within section 209.5.  We look, therefore, to general principles governing 
attempt crimes.  (See People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227-230 (Toledo) 
[recognizing crime of attempted criminal threat]; see also Lopez, supra, 31 Cal.4th 
at p. 1059.)   
An attempt to commit a crime is comprised of “two elements:  a specific 
intent to commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its 
commission.”  (§ 21a; see § 664 [prescribing punishment].)  Other than forming 
the requisite criminal intent, a defendant need not commit an element of the 
underlying offense.  (See People v. Superior Court (Decker) (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1; 
see also People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 453-454 (Dillon); Jones, supra, 75 
Cal.App.4th at p. 627.)4  We have explained that “under California law, ‘[a]n 
attempt to commit a crime is itself a crime and [is] subject to punishment that 
bears some relation to the completed offense.’  [Citation.] . . . [¶] . . . ‘One of the 
purposes of the criminal law is to protect society from those who intend to injure 
it.  When it is established that the defendant intended to commit a specific crime 
                                              
4 
The parties do not dispute that there was sufficient evidence of defendant’s 
specific intent to commit an attempted kidnapping during the commission of a 
carjacking.  (See People v. Perez (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 856, 860 (Perez); 
CALJIC No. 9.54.1 [“specific intent to facilitate the commission of the 
carjacking”].) 
 
7
and that in carrying out this intention he committed an act that caused harm or 
sufficient danger of harm, it is immaterial that for some collateral reason he could 
not complete the intended crime.’ [Citation.]”  (Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 
229-230.) 
Applying these general attempt principles, we conclude that a completed 
carjacking is not required for an attempt to violate section 209.5(a).  Section 
209.5(a) provides that a “person who, during the commission of a carjacking and 
in order to facilitate the commission of the carjacking, kidnaps another person,” is 
subject to a sentence of life with the possibility of parole.  As the People argue, 
this language suggests that like the offense of robbery (§ 211), which combines 
elements of theft and assault (People v. Sutton (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 264, 270), 
section 209.5(a) combines the offenses of kidnapping and carjacking.  An 
attempted robbery requires a specific intent to commit robbery and a direct, 
ineffectual act (beyond mere preparation) toward its commission.  (Dillon, supra, 
34 Cal.3d at pp. 455-456; People v. Vizcarra (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 858, 861.)  
Under general attempt principles, commission of an element of the crime is not 
necessary.  (See ante, at p. 6.)  As such, neither a completed theft (People v. 
Bonner (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 759, 764) nor a completed assault (see Vizcarra, 
supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at pp. 862-863), is required for attempted robbery.  (See 
People v. Mullins (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1221 [to be guilty of related offense 
of attempted kidnapping to commit robbery (§§ 664, 209, subd. (b)), defendant 
need not complete kidnapping].)  Likewise, the People contend only a specific 
intent to facilitate the commission of the carjacking (CALJIC No. 9.54.1), and “a 
direct but ineffectual act in furtherance of both the planned kidnapping and the 
planned carjacking” are required for an attempt to violate section 209.5(a).  (See § 
21a.)    
 
8
We agree with the People’s reasoning.  Thus, we conclude that neither a 
completed kidnapping nor a completed carjacking is necessary for an attempted 
kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking  
Defendant, however, argues to the contrary.  Tracking the Court of Appeal 
dissent, he maintains that section 209.5(a) establishes “a species of kidnapping in 
which the completed commission of a carjacking provides the context.”  He adds 
that the phrase “during the commission of a carjacking” in section 209(a) should 
be viewed “as an enhancement or aggravator which punishes more severely a 
more serious species of kidnapping,” and that an attempted kidnapping during an 
attempted carjacking is a “non-crime.”  In other words, defendant maintains that 
this conduct is not a violation of section 209.5.  Defendant relies on the reasoning 
of Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at pages 763-764, which concerned a 
completed violation of section 209.5(a).  (See also Jones, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 624-625; id. at p. 627, fn. 3 [“it appears a completed carjacking would be a 
requirement” for an attempt to violate § 209.5(a)].)  Arguing that the Legislature 
knows how to distinguish between a completed offense and attempted offense, he 
also points to the wording of various sentence enhancement statutes as support.5  
                                              
5  
See, e.g., sections 422.75, subdivision (a) (“person who commits . . . or 
attempts to commit a felony that is a hate crime”), 12021.5, subdivision (a) 
(“person who carries a loaded or unloaded firearm . . . during the commission or 
attempted commission of any street gang crimes”), 12022, subdivision (a)(1) 
(“person who is armed with a firearm in the commission of a felony or attempted 
felony”), 12022, subdivision (b)(1) (“person who personally uses a deadly or 
dangerous weapon in the commission of a felony or attempted felony”), 12022.2, 
subdivision (b) (person who wears bullet-resistant vest “in the commission or 
attempted commission of a violent offense”), 12022.5, subdivision (a) (“person 
who personally uses a firearm in the commission of a felony or attempted 
felony”), 12022.7, subdivision (a) (“person who personally inflicts great bodily 
injury . . . in the commission of a felony or attempted felony”). 
 
9
Contrary to defendant’s argument, we conclude that section 209.5 should not be 
treated differently from other criminal offense statutes for purposes of defining the 
requirements of an attempt. 
First, there is no indication that the Legislature, which did not define 
attempts within section 209.5, intended the “during the commission of a 
carjacking” language to remove section 209.5(a) from the ambit of the general 
attempt statutes.  (§§ 21a, 664.)  As section 209.5(a)’s legislative history reveals, 
the Legislature added section 209.5 in 1993 while creating the new crime of 
carjacking (§ 215).  (Stats. 1993, ch. 611, §§ 5, 6, p. 3508.)  It previously included 
“the attempt to take, a vehicle” in the definition of carjacking.  (Sen. Bill No. 60 
(1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 17, 1993.)  After the Senate Judiciary 
Committee criticized that “[p]roponents have not indicated why attempted 
carjacking should be [punished] differently from virtually all other attempts,” the 
Legislature deleted the phrase.  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 
60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 17, 1993, p. 4; Sen. Bill No. 60 
(1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 8, 1993; Lopez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 
1059-1060.)  We concluded that “the Legislature’s subsequent deletion of the 
‘attempt to take’ language from the definition of carjacking reflected a desire to 
maintain the general punishment scheme for attempted offenses, rather than a 
commentary on the substantive elements of the crime.”  (Lopez, supra, 31 Cal.4th 
at p. 1059.)  We likewise conclude that the Legislature most likely intended to 
treat attempted kidnappings during the commission of a carjacking (§§ 664, 209.5) 
the same way; that is, to be governed by the general attempt statutes (§§ 21a, 664).  
(See Phelps v. Stostad (1997) 16 Cal.4th 23, 32 [“ ‘ “the various parts of a 
statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or 
section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole” ’ ”]; Dillon, supra, 
34 Cal.3d at p. 453 [target offense need not be completed].)  “A statute is passed 
 
10
as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and 
intent.  Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with 
every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.”  (2A Sutherland, 
Statutory Construction (6th ed. 2000) § 46:05.)  
Second, although defendant relies on Contreras’s interpretation of the 
phrase “during the commission of a carjacking” (§ 209.5(a)), that case is 
distinguishable and its reasoning does not extend to attempts.  Defendant 
Contreras was convicted of both carjacking (§ 215) and kidnapping during the 
commission of a carjacking (§ 209.5(a)).  Seeking reversal of the carjacking 
conviction, Contreras maintained that carjacking is a necessarily included offense 
of section 209.5 because the phrase “during the commission of a carjacking” 
implies a completed carjacking.  (Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 763.)  
The Court of Appeal agreed. 
The Contreras Court of Appeal looked to the special circumstances statute 
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), to determine the meaning of “during the commission” 
under section 209.5(a).  Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), provides for either the 
death penalty or life without possibility of parole if the “murder was committed 
while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of, 
attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting 
to commit” one of the enumerated felonies.  (Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 764.)  Noting a “distinct difference” between the commission and attempted 
commission language in section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), the Court of Appeal 
reasoned that “[t]he Legislature must have meant the phrase, ‘during the 
commission,’ as used in section 209.5 to have the same meaning as ‘in . . . the 
commission’ as used in section 190.2, to wit, to refer to a completed offense.  In 
fact, there is no semantic difference between the two phrases.”  (Contreras, supra, 
55 Cal.App.4th at p. 764.)  Thus, the Court of Appeal concluded that “a violation 
 
11
of section 209.5 ‘during the commission of a carjacking’ requires a completed 
offense of carjacking,” and held carjacking is a necessarily included offense of 
section 209.5.  (Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 765.) 
Contreras is inapposite because it did not deal with an attempted violation 
of section 209.5(a).  Its emphasis on section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), along with 
defendant’s reliance on other sentence enhancement statutes, is misplaced here.  
These statutes set forth an enhanced penalty for a conviction under certain 
circumstances; they do not outline the elements of a substantive crime.  The 
distinction is important.  (See People v. Le (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1, 11 [“if the 
Legislature had intended to include attempts in the enhancement provisions, it 
would have specifically stated the enhancement applies to the ‘commission or 
attempted commission’ of specific crimes”].)  As a practical matter, prison or jail 
terms for attempt crimes are generally one-half of that for completed crimes.  (§ 
664, subds. (a) & (b).)  Because a sentence enhancement is “ ‘an additional term of 
imprisonment added to the base term’ ” (Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 894, 898), it makes sense that sentence enhancement statutes expressly 
encompass both completed and attempted offenses, which would result in different 
sentences.  In contrast, attempts of most crimes are not defined within a statute, 
but are governed by the general attempt statute (§ 21a).  (See Toledo, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at pp. 227-230.)  Thus, it is reasonable that such attempt language would 
not be necessarily included within section 209.5(a).   
Defendant claims, however, that requiring a completed carjacking for an 
attempted violation of section 209.5(a) would somehow further the Legislature’s 
intent to protect victims from being removed from the scene of a carjacking.  He 
posits that “the evils to be remedied are better targeted by punishing those who 
actually accomplish a carjacking.”  We fail to see the logic in this argument, which 
is also contrary to section 209.5(a)’s legislative history. 
 
12
A “direct offshoot of robbery,” carjacking “was made a separate offense 
because of perceived difficulties with obtaining convictions under the robbery 
statute.  [Citation.]”  (Lopez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1059, 1057.)  The Legislature 
was specifically concerned with the “ ‘considerable increase in the number of 
persons who have been abducted, many have been subjected to the violent taking 
of their automobile and some have had a gun used in the taking of the car.  This 
relatively “new” crime appears to be as much thrill-seeking as theft of a car.  If all 
the thief wanted was the car, it would be simpler to hot-wire the automobile 
without running the risk of confronting the driver.  People have been killed, 
seriously injured, and placed in great fear, and this calls for a strong message to 
discourage these crimes.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1057, quoting Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 1993, p. 1.)  Such 
concern for the abduction and safety of a driver or passenger is particularly 
evident in section 209.5, which provides for significant punishment if the victim is 
also moved a substantial distance with the risk of increased harm.  (§ 209.5, subd. 
(b).)  While simple carjacking exposes a defendant to a prison term of three, five, 
or nine years (§ 215, subd. (b)) and simple kidnapping sets forth a prison term of 
three, five, or eight years (§ 208, subd. (a)), kidnapping during the commission of 
a carjacking carries a prison term of life with the possibility of parole.  (§ 209.5, 
subd. (a).)6  The Legislature evidently viewed the combination of kidnapping and 
carjacking as far more dangerous and serious than either one alone. 
                                              
6  
The Legislature’s intent was to extend the same penalty in section 209 
(kidnapping for the purpose of robbery) to section 209.5.  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 17, 1993, p. 
2; see also Perez, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 860 [§§ 209.5 & 209 are 
analogous].) 
 
13
As discussed above, “ ‘one of the purposes of the criminal law is to protect 
society from those who intend to injure it.  When it is established that the 
defendant intended to commit a specific crime and that in carrying out this 
intention he committed an act that caused harm or sufficient danger of harm, it is 
immaterial that for some collateral reason he could not complete the intended 
crime.’ [Citation.]”  (Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 230.)  Indeed, “no public 
purpose is served by drawing fine distinctions between those who have managed 
to satisfy some element of the offense and those who have not.”  (Dillon, supra, 34 
Cal.3d at p. 453, fn. omitted.)  Given the Legislature’s view on the seriousness and 
dangerousness of section 209.5(a), it follows that the Legislature would perceive 
attempts to commit section 209.5(a) the same way.  We conclude that extending 
the reach of this provision to encompass attempted kidnappings during an 
attempted commission of a carjacking would send a “strong message to 
discourage” such crimes.  (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 
60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 1993, p. 1.) 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the rule of lenity does not assist 
defendant.  (People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 58 [“although true ambiguities 
are resolved in a defendant’s favor, an appellate court should not strain to interpret 
a penal statute in defendant’s favor if it can fairly discern a contrary legislative 
intent”].)   
Next, we address defendant’s sufficiency of evidence claim in view of our 
holding above.  “Our role is limited here.  We review the entire record in the light 
most favorable to the judgment, and affirm the convictions as long as a rational 
trier of fact could have found guilt based on the evidence and inferences drawn 
therefrom.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Lewis & Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1044.)  
We agree with the Court of Appeal majority that sufficient evidence supports 
 
14
defendant’s five convictions for attempted kidnapping during the commission of a 
carjacking.   
Defendant’s actions provide clear circumstantial evidence of his specific 
intent to kidnap the Perez family to facilitate a carjacking.  Fleeing from the 
police, defendant ran to the Perez van, where he jumped into the driver’s seat and 
tried to start the engine.  Struggling with Rodriguez, defendant urged, “[w]e got to 
go, we got to go.”  All the while wrestling with Rodriguez, who yelled at him to 
get out because her “kids [were] in the van,” he continued in vain to try to start the 
engine and move the van.  When he saw the officer approaching the van, 
defendant ran off.  The reasonable inference is that defendant intended to take the 
van and its occupants in order to escape from the police; there was also no 
evidence defendant told the family to get out. 
There was also sufficient evidence of defendant’s direct but ineffectual acts 
to commit a kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking.  (§§ 209.5(a), 
21a.)  There was uncontroverted evidence that defendant jumped into the Perez 
van and tried in vain to drive it.  Despite the struggle with Rodriguez, defendant 
tried to start the ignition, put the van in gear, and move the steering wheel.    
Defendant’s actions were ineffectual because he failed to start and move the van, 
thus failing to complete a carjacking or a kidnapping.  However, we agree with the 
People that defendant’s conduct from the time he approached the van until he gave 
up trying to start the engine and ran away was a direct but ineffectual act in 
furtherance of a kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking.   
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that defendant’s five convictions for 
attempted kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking should be affirmed.  
 
15
B. Are attempted carjacking and attempted kidnapping lesser 
included offenses of attempted kidnapping during a carjacking? 
As discussed above, the Court of Appeal majority held that neither 
attempted carjacking nor attempted kidnapping were lesser included offenses of an 
attempt to violate section 209.5(a).  (See ante, at pp. 3-4.)  Defendant argues the 
majority erred because “acts which facilitate the carjacking through the 
kidnapping are acts toward both crimes.  So, where the intent of the kidnapping is 
to carjack, then the ineffectual acts toward the kidnapping must, necessarily, also 
be acts toward the carjacking.”  Thus, defendant asserts his conviction for the 
lesser included offense of attempted carjacking must be reversed.  (People v. 
Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 355 (Pearson) [“multiple convictions may not be 
based on necessarily included offenses”]; People v. Moran (1970) 1 Cal.3d 755, 
763 (Moran) [“If the evidence supports the verdict as to a greater offense, the 
conviction of that offense is controlling, and the conviction of the lesser offense 
must be reversed”].) 
The People concede that both attempt offenses are lesser included offenses, 
but disagree with defendant on the consequences that flow from this proposition.  
Even if the trial court did not instruct sua sponte on the lesser included offense of 
attempted kidnapping as to counts 1 through 5, and attempted carjacking as to 
counts 2 through 5, the People contend there was no prejudicial error. 
Although a defendant has a constitutional right to have a jury determine 
every material issue presented by the evidence and the failure to so instruct is 
error, a trial court is not required to instruct the jury as to all lesser included 
offenses, only those that “find substantial support in the evidence.”  (People v. 
Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 312.)  In this context, substantial evidence is 
evidence from which reasonable jurors could conclude “ ‘that the lesser offense, 
but not the greater, was committed.’ ”  (Ibid.)  In this case, there was no 
 
16
substantial evidence that the offense committed was less than that charged.  As the 
Court of Appeal majority concluded:  “If the jury found that [defendant] intended 
to kidnap the Perez family, it must have also found that he intended to carjack, as 
he was running from the police and jumped into the van and attempted to start it, 
knowing the Perez family was inside.  If [defendant] had successfully started the 
van and driven away, he would have simultaneously committed carjacking and 
kidnapping.  There was no evidence he intended only one of those offenses and 
not the other, or, under the facts, he would have committed only one.” 
Defendant also argues the Court of Appeal majority erroneously failed to 
dismiss count 6 against Rodriguez as duplicative because he was convicted of the 
greater offense of kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking in count 1.  
However, the People contend, reversal is not required because the court’s stay of 
the count 6 sentence (§ 654) more than adequately protected defendant from 
double punishment.  At bottom, the People ask that we modify the so-called 
Moran/Pearson rule to permit courts to stay, instead of strike, convictions for 
lesser included offenses to prevent defendants from receiving a windfall if a 
greater offense conviction is reversed or otherwise rendered unenforceable.  (See 
Moran, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 763; Pearson, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 355.)  Defendant 
counters that this issue is beyond the scope of issues on which we granted review, 
and, more importantly, the People offer no sound basis to abandon this long-
standing rule.  Because this issue is “fairly included” within the issues on which 
we granted review (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.516(b)(1)), we will address it.  For 
reasons that follow, we conclude that both attempted carjacking and attempted 
kidnapping are lesser included offenses of an attempt  to violate section 209.5(a), 
and that the rule against multiple convictions for lesser included offenses should 
remain unchanged.   
 
17
“Under California law, a lesser offense is necessarily included in a greater 
offense if either the statutory elements of the greater offense, or the facts actually 
alleged in the accusatory pleading, include all the elements of the lesser offense, 
such that the greater cannot be committed without also committing the lesser.  
[Citations.]”  (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 117 (Birks).)  In general, a 
defendant “may be convicted of any number of the offenses charged” (§ 954), but 
section 654 prohibits multiple punishment.  “When section 954 permits multiple 
conviction, but section 654 prohibits multiple punishment, the trial court must stay 
execution of sentence on the convictions for which multiple punishment is 
prohibited.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1227 (Reed).)   
However, an exception to this general rule allowing multiple convictions prohibits 
multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.  (Ibid.; Pearson, 
supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 355.)    
At the outset, we agree with both parties that attempted carjacking (§§ 664, 
215) and attempted kidnapping (§§ 664, 207) are lesser included offenses of 
attempted kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking (§§ 664, 209.5(a)).   
If a defendant has a specific intent to commit both a kidnapping and a 
simultaneous carjacking intended to facilitate that kidnapping, it follows that he 
necessarily has the intent to commit each offense individually.  Likewise, if a 
defendant performs a direct but ineffectual act towards both the kidnapping and 
carjacking, that same act also constitutes a direct but ineffectual act towards each 
offense individually.  In other words, attempted kidnapping during the commission 
of a carjacking cannot be committed without also committing an attempted 
carjacking or an attempted kidnapping.  (See Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 117.) 
However, we reject the People’s urging to modify the rule against multiple 
convictions based on necessarily included offenses.  (Pearson, supra, 42 Cal.3d at 
p. 355; Moran, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 763.)  Notwithstanding several cases which 
 
18
have questioned the foundation of the Pearson rule, including Pearson itself, we 
see no justification to modify the rule here.  (See Pearson, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 
355 [“the reason for the rule is unclear”]; People v. Scheidt (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 
162, 168 [same]; People v. Rush (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 20, 29 (dis. opn. of 
Woods, J.) [same; rule “is of murky origin”].)7  There is logic behind the rule 
prohibiting convictions for both a greater offense and a necessarily included 
offense:  “If a defendant cannot commit the greater offense without committing 
the lesser, conviction of the greater is also conviction of the lesser.  To permit 
conviction of both the greater and the lesser offense ‘ “ ‘would be to convict twice 
of the lesser.’ ” ’ (People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 306.)  There is no 
reason to permit two convictions for the lesser offense.”  (Ortega, supra, 19 
Cal.4th at p. 705 (conc. & dis. opn. of Chin, J.).)  There is also no prejudice to the 
People if a court strikes, rather than stays, the conviction.  If a greater offense is 
reversed on appeal, the lesser included offense may be revived by operation of 
law.  (§ 1260; see People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 528 [prosecutor has option 
to retry greater offense or accept reduction to lesser included offense]; People v. 
Edwards (1985) 39 Cal.3d 107, 118 [same].)8 
                                              
7  
A long line of cases has affirmed the rule under Pearson (see, e.g., Reed, 
supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1227; People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034; 
People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 987; People v. King (2000) 81 
Cal.App.4th 472, 475; People v. Watterson (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 942, 946), and 
cases long predating Pearson have held similarly.  (See, e.g., People v. Greer 
(1947) 30 Cal.2d 589, 598-599 [defendant may not be convicted for both greater 
and lesser offenses]; People v. Miranda (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 517, 525 [rule 
against convictions for both greater and lesser offenses “has long been established 
and consistently followed”].)   
8  
We therefore do not address defendant’s double jeopardy and due process 
claims. 
 
 
 
19
Based on our conclusion that defendant’s five convictions for attempted 
kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking be affirmed (in particular, count 
1 with respect to victim Rodriguez) (see ante, at p. 14), his conviction for count 6 
for the lesser included offense of attempted carjacking against Rodriguez is 
reversed.  
DISPOSITION 
We reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment to the extent it is inconsistent 
with our opinion.  The matter is remanded to that court with directions to strike 
count 6 for attempted carjacking.  In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Medina 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 131 Cal.App.4th 493 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S137055 
Date Filed: July 9, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Mark C. Kim 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
John A. Colucci, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Kristofer Jorstad, Marc E. Turchin and Richard 
S. Moskowitz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John A. Colucci 
13273 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 101 
Studio City, CA  91604 
(818) 990-1507 
 
Richard S. Moskowitz 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2286