Title: State v. Jensen
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018AP001952-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 18, 2021

2021 WI 27 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1952-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Mark D. Jensen, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 18, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 17, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Chad G. Kerkman   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and in which ZIEGLER and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined except for ¶35.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, in which ZIEGLER, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Aaron R. O’Neil, assistant attorney general; with whom 
on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Aaron O’Neil. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Lauren J. Breckenfelder and Dustin C. Haskell, assistant state 
public defenders. There was an oral argument by Lauren Jane 
Breckenfelder. 
 
 
2021 WI 27 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP1952-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2002CF314) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Mark D. Jensen, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
MAR 18, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and in which ZIEGLER and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined except for ¶35.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, in which ZIEGLER, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Modified 
and, as modified, affirmed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   Fourteen years ago, Mark 
Jensen was on trial for killing his wife, Julie.1  Before the 
start of that trial, we held that certain hearsay statements 
made 
by 
Julie 
were 
testimonial. 
 
State 
v. 
Jensen 
(Jensen I), 2007 WI 26, ¶2, 299 Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518.  
                                                 
1 To avoid confusion——and to remain consistent with previous 
decisions in this case——we refer to Mark Jensen as "Jensen" and 
Julie Jensen as "Julie." 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
2 
 
For that reason, and because Jensen had no opportunity to cross-
examine Julie about those statements, the statements were 
inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.2  We are now asked 
to determine whether the law on testimonial hearsay has since 
changed to such a degree that, at Jensen's new trial,3 the 
circuit court was no longer bound by Jensen I.  We hold that it 
has not.  We therefore affirm the court of appeals' decision.4 
I 
¶2 
Julie died from poisoning in 1998.  Prior to her 
death, she made several statements suggesting that, if she died, 
the police should investigate Jensen.  She wrote a letter and 
gave it to her neighbor with instructions to give the letter to 
the police should anything happen to her.  She also left two 
voicemails with Pleasant Prairie Police Officer Ron Kosman two 
weeks before she died stating that if she were found dead, 
Jensen should be Kosman's "first suspect."  In 2002, Jensen was 
charged with first-degree intentional homicide.  Over the next 
several years, the circuit court held a series of pretrial 
hearings addressing the admissibility of Julie's letter and 
voicemails. 
                                                 
2 U.S. 
Const. 
amend. 
VI, 
cl. 
4 
("In 
all 
criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . ."). 
3 The Honorable Chad G. Kerkman of the Kenosha County 
Circuit Court presiding. 
4 State v. Jensen, No. 2018AP1952-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2020). 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
3 
 
¶3 
The circuit court initially ruled that Julie's letter 
was admissible but her voicemails were not.  After that ruling, 
however, the United States Supreme Court decided Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), which established that an 
unavailable witness's hearsay statement is inadmissible under 
the Confrontation Clause if the statement is testimonial and the 
defendant had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.  
Id. at 50-54.  In light of that decision, Jensen asked the 
circuit 
court 
to 
reconsider 
its 
previous 
ruling. 
 
Upon 
reconsideration, 
the circuit court determined that, under 
Crawford, Julie's letter and voicemails ("Julie's statements") 
were testimonial hearsay and were inadmissible because Jensen 
had no opportunity to cross-examine Julie. 
¶4 
The State appealed and we affirmed, applying Crawford 
and the United States Supreme Court's subsequent decision, Davis 
v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).5  Jensen I, 299 Wis. 2d 267.  
Davis set out what has come to be known as the "primary purpose 
test":  a statement is testimonial if its primary purpose is "to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal proceedings."  547 U.S. at 822.  The Court explained 
that although statements made in response to police questioning 
are generally testimonial, such statements are nontestimonial if 
their primary purpose is to help the police "meet an ongoing 
emergency."  Id. at 822.  Applying that test, we determined in 
                                                 
5 Unless otherwise noted, all references to Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), are also references to Hammon 
v. Indiana, which the Court consolidated with Davis. 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
4 
 
Jensen I that the primary purpose of Julie's statements was not 
to help the police resolve an active emergency but to 
"investigate or aid in prosecution in the event of her death."  
Jensen I, 299 Wis. 2d 267, ¶¶27, 30.  Thus, under Crawford and 
Davis's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, Julie's 
statements were inadmissible.  Id., ¶34. 
¶5 
We remanded the cause to the circuit court to 
determine 
whether 
Julie's 
statements 
were 
nevertheless 
admissible under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, which we 
adopted in Jensen I.  See id., ¶¶2, 52.  At the time, that 
doctrine stated that a defendant forfeits his constitutional 
right to confront a witness when the defendant caused that 
witness's unavailability.  See id., ¶57.  On remand, the circuit 
court found that the State had shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Jensen caused Julie's unavailability.  Therefore, 
the Confrontation Clause notwithstanding, Julie's statements 
were admissible after all.  Relying at least in part on those 
statements, a jury convicted Jensen of Julie's murder. 
¶6 
Jensen 
again 
appealed. 
 
State 
v. 
Jensen 
(Jensen II), 2011 WI App 3, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 794 N.W.2d 482.  
While that appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court 
decided another case directly affecting Jensen, Giles v. 
California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).  There, the Court refined the 
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, holding that it applies only 
when the defendant caused the witness's unavailability with the 
specific intent of preventing the witness from testifying.  See 
id. at 361-68.  In Jensen II, the court of appeals "assum[ed]" 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
5 
 
that Jensen had not killed Julie specifically to keep her from 
testifying at trial; therefore, under Giles, Jensen had not 
forfeited his Confrontation Clause rights and the circuit court 
had erred in admitting Julie's statements.  But the court of 
appeals also held that the circuit court's error was harmless, 
given the "voluminous" other evidence supporting the jury's 
guilty verdict.  See Jensen II, 331 Wis. 2d 440, ¶35. 
¶7 
That harmless error conclusion formed the basis for 
Jensen's federal habeas corpus litigation.6  There, the federal 
courts agreed with Jensen that it was not harmless error to 
admit Julie's testimonial statements in violation of the 
Confrontation Clause.  Jensen v. Schwochert, No. 11-C-0803, 2013 
WL 6708767 
(E.D. 
Wis. 
Dec. 18, 2013), 
aff'd, 
Jensen 
v. 
Clements, 800 F.3d 892, 908 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that was it 
was "beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement" that 
admitting Julie's statements "had a substantial and injurious 
effect" 
on 
the 
jury's 
verdict 
(quoted 
source 
omitted)).  
Concluding that the Wisconsin court of appeals' decision in 
Jensen II 
was 
an 
"unreasonable 
application 
of 
clearly 
established federal law," the federal court ordered Jensen's 
conviction vacated.  Schwochert, 2013 WL 6708767, at *16-17.  
The State immediately initiated new proceedings against Jensen. 
                                                 
6 We 
denied 
Jensen's 
petition 
for 
review 
regarding 
Jensen II.  See Jensen v. Schwochert, No. 11-C-0803, 2013 
WL 6708767, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 18, 2013), aff'd, Jensen v. 
Clements, 800 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2015). 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
6 
 
¶8 
In this new pretrial period, Jensen filed a motion to 
exclude Julie's statements, per our holding in Jensen I.  The 
State urged the circuit court to address anew whether Julie's 
statements were admissible, arguing that the United States 
Supreme 
Court 
had 
since 
"narrowed" 
the 
definition 
of 
"testimonial" to such a degree that the circuit court was not 
bound by Jensen I.  The circuit court agreed.  It explained that 
"a lot has happened" since Jensen I and that "based upon the law 
that we have today," Julie's statements were not testimonial.  
The circuit court reached that conclusion by "applying the 
factors in Ohio v. Clark, the more recent cases including 
Michigan v. Bryant, and other cases that came out since Crawford 
v. Washington and Jensen I."7  The State then moved the circuit 
court to forgo a new trial and reinstate Jensen's original 
conviction and life sentence on the grounds that, if Julie's 
statements were again admissible, the evidence now was identical 
to that in Jensen's first trial.  The circuit court granted the 
State's motion.  Jensen appealed. 
¶9 
The court of appeals reversed, holding that neither it 
nor the circuit court was "at liberty to decide" that Julie's 
statements were nontestimonial, given our holding in Jensen I.  
State v. Jensen (Jensen III), No. 2018AP1952-CR, unpublished 
slip op., at 12 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2020).  The court of 
                                                 
7 The circuit court noted, incorrectly, that Davis (and 
Hammon) was decided after Jensen I.  Not only was Davis decided 
before Jensen I but in Jensen I we expressly followed Davis.  
See 
State 
v. 
Jensen 
(Jensen I), 
2007 
WI 
26, 
¶19, 
299 
Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518. 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
7 
 
appeals explained that under Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 560 
N.W.2d 246 (1997), this court is the only one with the power to 
modify or overrule one of our previous decisions.  The court of 
appeals concluded that, because we have never modified or 
overruled Jensen I, the circuit court erred in finding Julie's 
statements admissible and, in turn, failing to hold a new trial.  
It then remanded the cause "for a new trial at which Julie's 
letter and [voicemails] may not be admitted into evidence."  Id.  
Having decided Jensen's appeal under Cook, the court of appeals 
declined to address Jensen's other challenges, including claims 
that the circuit court judge was biased against him and that the 
circuit court violated the federal court's habeas order by 
reinstating his conviction without a trial. 
¶10 We granted the State's petition for review of the 
following three issues:  (1) whether the court of appeals erred 
in reviewing the circuit court's decision under Cook instead of 
the law of the case; (2) if so, whether the circuit court 
permissibly deviated from the law of the case and correctly 
determined that Julie's statements are nontestimonial hearsay; 
and (3) whether we should remand the cause to the court of 
appeals to decide Jensen's remaining challenges. 
¶11 Although we agree with the court of appeals' ultimate 
conclusion that the circuit court is bound by Jensen I, we hold 
that the court of the appeals erred in relying on Cook to reach 
that decision.  In Cook, we held that the court of appeals has 
no power to overrule, modify, or withdraw language from one of 
its own published decisions; only this court has that power.  
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
8 
 
See Cook, 208 Wis. 2d at 189.  The issue here, however, is about 
the law of the case, to which Cook does not apply.  Accordingly, 
we modify the court of appeals' decision to the extent it relies 
on Cook.  Our analysis proceeds under the doctrine of the law of 
the case. 
II 
¶12 Whether a decision establishes the law of the case is 
a question of law that we review de novo.  State v. Stuart 
(Stuart I), 2003 WI 73, ¶20, 262 Wis. 2d 620, 664 N.W.2d 82.  
Although lower courts have the discretion to depart from the law 
of the case when a "controlling authority has since made a 
contrary 
decision 
of 
the 
law," 
State 
v. 
Brady, 
130 
Wis. 2d 443, 448, 388 N.W.2d 151 (1986), whether such a contrary 
decision has been made is a question of law that we review de 
novo.  See Kocken v. Wis. Council, 2007 WI 72, ¶¶25-26, 301 
Wis. 2d 266, 732 N.W.2d 828. 
¶13 The law of the case is a "longstanding rule" that 
requires courts to adhere to an appellate court's ruling on a 
legal issue "in all subsequent proceedings in the trial court or 
on later appeal."  Stuart I, 262 Wis. 2d 620, ¶23 (quoting 
Univest Corp. v. Gen. Split Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 29, 38, 435 
N.W.2d 234 (1989)).  The rule ensures stability for litigants 
and reinforces the finality of a court's decisions.  See Univest 
Corp., 148 Wis. 2d at 37-38.  Courts in subsequent proceedings 
should therefore "be loathe" to revisit an appellate court's 
decision absent "extraordinary circumstances."  Christianson v. 
Colt Indus. Oper. Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988).  That 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
9 
 
admonition aside, absolute adherence to the law of the case is 
not required.  As is relevant here, lower courts may depart from 
the initial decision if "a controlling authority has since made 
a contrary decision of the law" on the same issue.8  Stuart I, 
262 Wis. 2d 620, ¶24 (quoting Brady, 130 Wis. 2d at 448). 
¶14 Our analysis thus proceeds in two parts.  First, we 
determine which case established the law of the case that 
Julie's statements are testimonial hearsay.  Second, we analyze 
whether a controlling court has since issued a contrary decision 
on the same point of law. 
A 
¶15 The parties largely agree that Jensen I established 
the law of the case.  Jensen also argues that either federal 
habeas case, Schwochert or Clements, could establish the law of 
the 
case 
because 
both 
concluded 
that 
admitting 
Julie's 
statements violated the Confrontation Clause.  But a federal 
habeas proceeding cannot establish the law of the case because 
it "is not a subsequent stage of the underlying criminal 
proceedings; it is a separate civil case."  E.g., Edmonds v. 
Smith, 922 F.3d 737, 739 (6th Cir. 2019).  Therefore, Jensen I 
                                                 
8 Courts may also depart from the law of the case in two 
other situations:  when the evidence at a subsequent trial is 
"substantially different" than that at the initial trial; and 
when following the law of the case would result in a "manifest 
injustice." 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Stuart, 
2003 
WI 
73, 
262 
Wis. 2d 620, 664 N.W.2d 82.  Neither of those situations applies 
here. 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
10 
 
is the only decision establishing the law of the case that 
Julie's hearsay statements are testimonial.9 
B 
¶16 We next analyze whether the current law regarding the 
admissibility of testimonial hearsay is contrary to that relied 
upon in Jensen I.  We decided Jensen I under both Crawford and 
Davis.  Therefore, we must determine whether the United States 
Supreme Court has since contradicted Crawford or Davis.  See 
State 
v. 
Stuart 
(Stuart II), 
2005 
WI 
47, 
¶3 
n.2, 279 
Wis. 2d 659, 695 N.W.2d 259.  As Jensen's Confrontation Clause 
issue arises under the federal Constitution, we are bound by the 
United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence interpreting that 
clause.  See, e.g., State v. Delebreau, 2015 WI 55, ¶43, 362 
Wis. 2d 542, 864 N.W.2d 852. 
¶17 Since Jensen I, the United States Supreme Court has 
decided two cases that address the definition of testimonial 
hearsay:  Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011), and Ohio v. 
Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (2015).  The State argues that Bryant and 
Clark narrowed the definition of "testimonial" so extensively 
that Jensen I no longer applies, thereby allowing the circuit 
                                                 
9 Even if Schwochert or Clements could establish the law of 
the case, our conclusion would be the same because both agreed 
with our holding in Jensen I that Julie's statements are 
testimonial hearsay.  See Schwochert, 2013 WL 6708767, at *17 
("Jensen's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment were violated when the trial court admitted" Julie's 
statements); Clements, 800 F.3d at 908 (adding that "there is no 
doubt that" admitting Julie's statements violated "Jensen's 
rights under the Confrontation Clause"). 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
11 
 
court to re-evaluate Julie's statements and conclude that they 
are admissible nontestimonial statements.  Jensen counters that 
neither Bryant nor Clark altered the Confrontation Clause 
analysis set forth in Crawford and Davis in any way that 
undermines our reasoning in Jensen I. 
¶18 We agree with Jensen.  At the time we decided 
Jensen I, the Confrontation Clause barred the admission at trial 
of an unavailable witness's hearsay statement that the defendant 
had no prior meaningful opportunity to cross-examine and that 
was made for the primary purpose of creating prosecutorial 
evidence.  Bryant and Clark represent developments in applying 
the primary purpose test, but neither is contrary to it. 
1 
¶19 Prior to Crawford, an unavailable witness's hearsay 
statement was admissible under the Confrontation Clause if it 
met a certain "reliability" threshold.  See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  A statement met that threshold if it fell 
within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or if it bore some 
other "indicia of reliability."  Id.  The United States Supreme 
Court had read traditional hearsay rules and the Confrontation 
Clause as somewhat redundant, reasoning that "certain hearsay 
exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of 
virtually 
any 
evidence 
within 
them 
comports 
with" 
the 
Confrontation Clause.  See id. 
¶20 Crawford 
"fundamentally 
change[d]" 
that 
analysis.  
Jensen I, 299 Wis. 2d 267, ¶14.  Crawford first focused the 
scope of the Confrontation Clause analysis on the circumstances 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
12 
 
in which one makes a statement, explaining that the Constitution 
is "acute[ly]"——but not exclusively——concerned with "formal 
statement[s] 
to 
government 
officers" 
rather 
than 
"casual 
remark[s] to an acquaintance."  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.  The 
Court then turned to the statement itself, holding that the 
Confrontation Clause's application to an unavailable witness's 
hearsay statement turns on two key factors:  the statement's 
purpose and whether the statement had been "tested" on cross-
examination.  Id. at 50-56.10 
¶21 On the former, Crawford held that the Confrontation 
Clause applied only to statements that are "testimonial," which 
it defined as a statement "made for the purpose of establishing 
or proving some fact."  Id. at 51 (quoted source omitted).  The 
Court 
declined, 
however, 
to 
"spell 
out 
a 
comprehensive 
definition of 'testimonial.'"  Id. at 68; see also Davis, 547 
U.S. at 822 (declining to "produce an exhaustive classification 
of all conceivable statements").  Rather, it identified three 
broad "formulations" of testimonial statements:  (1) "ex parte 
in-court testimony," such as "prior testimony that the defendant 
was 
unable 
to 
cross-examine"; (2) out-of-court 
statements 
"contained in formalized testimonial materials," such as an 
                                                 
10 Before Crawford, cross-examination was but one method of 
proving that a testimonial hearsay statement was acceptably 
reliable.  See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70-73 (1980); 
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972).  But Crawford went 
further, holding that a prior opportunity for meaningful cross-
examination was the only way to show that a testimonial hearsay 
statement was sufficiently reliable under the Confrontation 
Clause.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 55-56 (2004). 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
13 
 
affidavit or a deposition; and (3) "statements that were made 
under circumstances [that] would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for 
use at a later trial."  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (quoted 
sources omitted).  Putting these factors together, but again 
declining to limit its holding to the specific facts in 
Crawford, the Court held that, "at a minimum," the definition of 
"testimonial" includes prior testimony and a statement made 
during police interrogation.  Id. at 68. 
¶22 In Davis and its companion case, Hammon, however, the 
Court 
explained 
that 
not 
all 
statements 
to 
police 
are 
testimonial.  There, the Court analyzed statements made to 
police during their response to two domestic violence incidents.  
It applied Crawford to both situations, but factual differences 
between the two cases led the Court to divergent conclusions.  
In Davis, the victim told the 911 operator that Davis was 
"jumpin' on [her] again" and beating her with his fists.  She 
"described the context of the assault" and gave the 911 operator 
other identifying information about Davis.  Davis, 547 U.S. 
at 817-18.  In Hammon, the police had responded to a report of 
domestic violence, finding the victim on the front porch and 
Hammon inside the house.  The victim allowed the police to go 
inside, where they first questioned Hammon and then her.  At the 
end of that questioning, the victim "fill[ed] out and sign[ed] a 
battery affidavit" in which she explained that Hammon broke a 
glass heater, pushed her into the broken glass, hit her in the 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
14 
 
chest, damaged her van so that she could not leave, and attacked 
her daughter.  Id. at 819-21. 
¶23 The Court held that the victim's statements in Davis 
were not testimonial because their primary purpose was to 
"enable police assistance with an ongoing emergency."  Id. 
at 828.  The Court differentiated these "frantic" statements, 
made "as they were actually happening" and while the victim was 
"in immediate danger," from those in Crawford, which were made 
"hours after the events . . . described had occurred."  Id. 
at 827, 831 (emphasis removed).  The statements also helped the 
police "assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, 
and possible danger to the potential victim."  Id. at 832 
(quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 186 
(2004)).  Thus, the victim "simply was not . . . testifying" 
because 
"[n]o 
'witness' 
goes 
into 
court 
to 
proclaim 
an 
emergency."  Id. at 828. 
¶24 The Court reached the opposite conclusion in Hammon.  
There, it held that the victim's statements were testimonial 
because their primary purpose was to provide a "narrative of 
past events."  Id. at 832.  Even though Hammon was present while 
the police took the victim's statements, there "was no emergency 
in progress."  Id. at 829.  Her statements did not describe what 
was happening at that very moment, as in Davis, but rather what 
happened before the police arrived.  Id. at 830. 
¶25 We decided Jensen I by analyzing Julie's statements 
under the primary purpose test as explained in Davis.  See 
Jensen I, 299 Wis. 2d 267, ¶¶18-19.  We must therefore examine 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
15 
 
the United States Supreme Court's more recent decisions in 
Bryant and Clark to determine if either decision is contrary to 
that test, thereby justifying the circuit court's departure from 
Jensen I. 
2 
¶26 The Court's main task in Bryant was to clarify what it 
means, outside of Davis's specific factual context, for a 
statement to have the primary purpose of "enabl[ing] police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."  See Bryant, 562 U.S. 
at 359 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).  Indeed, the Court 
noted that it "confront[ed] for the first time circumstances in 
which the 'ongoing emergency' discussed in Davis extends beyond 
an initial victim to a potential threat to the responding police 
and the public at large."  Id.  In Bryant, the police found the 
victim, Covington, at a gas station bleeding badly from a 
gunshot wound and having trouble speaking.  They asked Covington 
who shot him and where the shooting occurred.  Covington told 
the police that Bryant shot him through the back door of 
Bryant's house.  Covington was then taken to a hospital, where 
he died a few hours later.  Id. at 349-50.  The Michigan Supreme 
Court 
held 
that 
Covington's 
statements 
were 
inadmissible 
testimonial hearsay similar to those in Hammon because he made 
them after the shooting occurred and the police did not 
"perceive[] an ongoing emergency at the gas station."  Id. 
at 351. 
¶27 The United States Supreme Court reversed.  It held 
that the primary purpose of Covington's statements was to help 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
16 
 
the police resolve an ongoing emergency, because when the police 
arrived on the scene, they did not know whether the person who 
shot Covington posed an ongoing threat to the public.  Id. 
at 371-72.  Covington's behavior——profusely bleeding from the 
stomach, repeatedly asking when an ambulance would arrive, 
having difficulty breathing——objectively revealed that he was 
answering the officers' questions only to give them information 
about what might be an active-shooter scenario.  Id. at 373-74.  
Other evidence supporting that conclusion included the fact 
that, like the 911 call in Davis, Covington's statements were 
"harried" and made during a "fluid and somewhat confused" 
situation.  Id. at 377.  Because the primary purpose of the 
statements was to help the police resolve an ongoing emergency, 
they were not testimonial. 
¶28 In reaching that conclusion, Bryant emphasized that 
the test for determining a statement's primary purpose is an 
objective one.  Id. at 360.  When deciding whether a statement 
is made to assist the police in resolving an ongoing emergency, 
courts must consider the overall circumstances in which the 
statement is made, such as whether the statement is made near 
the scene of the crime or later at the police station.  Id. 
at 360–61.  Ultimately, the crux of the inquiry is whether the 
statement is made to "end[] a threatening situation" (not 
testimonial) or to "prove[] past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution" (testimonial).  Id. at 361 (quoting 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 832).  On that point, the Court 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
17 
 
cautioned 
against 
construing 
Davis's 
"ongoing 
emergency" 
definition too narrowly: 
Domestic violence cases like Davis and Hammon often 
have a narrower zone of potential victims than cases 
involving threats to public safety.  An assessment of 
whether an emergency that threatens the police and 
public is ongoing cannot narrowly focus on whether the 
threat solely to the first victim has been neutralized 
because the threat to the first responders and public 
may continue. 
Id. at 363–64. 
¶29 Bryant also reminded courts that whether an ongoing 
emergency 
exists 
is 
only 
one 
factor 
for 
determining 
a 
statement's primary purpose.  Id. at 366.  Other factors are 
also relevant, such as the statements and actions of both the 
declarant and the interrogators and formality of the encounter.  
Id. at 366-67.  But just as formal police interrogations do not 
always produce testimonial statements, informal questioning 
"does not necessarily indicate . . . the lack of testimonial 
intent."  Id. at 366; see also Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 & n.1.  
Courts 
must 
objectively 
analyze 
the 
declarant's 
and 
the 
interrogator's "actions and statements."  Bryant, 562 U.S. 
at 367-68.  The Court noted that this approach was the one it 
"suggested in Davis" when it first articulated that statements 
made to resolve an ongoing emergency are not testimonial.  Id. 
at 370. 
3 
¶30 Whereas Bryant's contextual analysis focused on the 
person making the statement, Clark focused on the person to whom 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
18 
 
the statement was made.  In Clark, the Court was asked to 
resolve 
"whether 
statements 
to 
persons 
other 
than 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
are 
subject 
to 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause."  576 U.S. at 246.  There, Clark had been convicted of 
assaulting his girlfriend's three-year-old child due, in part, 
to statements the child made to his teachers identifying Clark 
as his abuser.  The child made those statements in response to 
his teachers' inquiries about visible injuries on his body.  
Concerned that the child was being abused, the teachers asked 
him questions "primarily aimed at identifying and ending the 
threat" of potentially letting him go home that day with his 
abuser.  Id. at 247.  When the teachers were questioning the 
child, their objective was "to protect" him, "not to arrest or 
punish his abuser"; they "were not sure who had abused him or 
how best to secure his safety."  Id. 
¶31 The Court held that the Confrontation Clause applied 
to "at least some statements made to individuals who are not law 
enforcement," but not the child's statements here.  Id. at 246.  
Reiterating Bryant's guidance to consider all of the relevant 
circumstances, the Court explained that "[c]ourts must evaluate 
challenged statements in context, and part of that context is 
the questioner's identity."  Id. at 249 (explaining that it is 
"common sense that the relationship between a student and his 
teacher is very different from that between a citizen and the 
police"). 
 
The 
Court 
then 
considered 
"all 
the 
relevant 
circumstances," including the child's age, the school setting, 
the teachers' objective, and the overall informality of the 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
19 
 
situation, and concluded that the primary purpose of the child's 
statements 
was 
not 
to 
"creat[e] 
evidence" 
for 
Clark's 
prosecution.  Id. at 246.  Although the Court again "decline[d] 
to adopt a categorical rule" on the issue, id., it pointed out 
that statements by someone as young as this child "will rarely, 
if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause," id. at 248. 
C 
¶32 Bryant and Clark neither contradicted Crawford or 
Davis nor drastically altered the Confrontation Clause analysis.  
Given 
that 
both 
Crawford 
and 
Davis 
declined 
to 
"comprehensive[ly]" 
define 
"testimonial 
statement," 
it 
was 
inevitable that future cases like Bryant and Clark would further 
refine that term.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; Davis, 547 U.S. 
at 821-22.  In the "new context" of a potential threat to the 
responding police and the public at large, Bryant "provide[d] 
additional clarification with regard to what Davis meant by 'the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.'"  Bryant, 562 U.S. 
at 359.  Similarly, in Clark, the Court applied the primary 
purpose 
test 
to 
answer 
a 
question 
it 
had 
"repeatedly 
reserved:  whether statements made to persons other than law 
enforcement officers are subject to the Confrontation Clause."  
Clark, 576 U.S. at 246. 
¶33 The Court's own reflections on its post-Crawford 
decisions demonstrate that it did not see those decisions as 
contradicting Crawford or Davis but rather as efforts to "flesh 
out" the test it first articulated there.  See id. at 243-46; 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
20 
 
see also id. at 252 (Scalia, J., concurring) (plainly stating 
in 2015 that Crawford "remains the law").  Federal courts of 
appeals' interpretations of Bryant and Clark confirm that 
progression. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
United 
States 
v. 
Norwood, 
982 
F.3d 1032, 1043-44 (7th Cir. 2020); Issa v. Bradshaw, 910 
F.3d 872, 876 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. Lebeau, 867 
F.3d 960, 980 (8th Cir. 2017).  The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, for instance, recently noted that Bryant "further 
elaborated" on Davis's ongoing emergency analysis by "ma[king] 
clear that the totality of the circumstances guides the primary 
purpose test, not any one factor."  Norwood, 982 F.3d at 1043-44 
(emphasis removed).  That court has likewise cited Clark as a 
continuation in the primary purpose test's development.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Amaya, 828 F.3d 518, 528-29, 529 n.4 (7th 
Cir. 2016). 
¶34 Our recent jurisprudence also reveals that Crawford 
and Davis——and therefore our analysis in Jensen I——have not been 
contradicted.  Even after Bryant and Clark, we continue to cite 
Crawford and Davis in resolving whether an unavailable witness's 
statement is testimonial.  See State v. Reinwand, 2019 WI 25, 
¶¶19-22, 385 Wis. 2d 700, 924 N.W.2d 184; State v. Nieves, 2017 
WI 69, ¶¶26-29, 376 Wis. 2d 300, 897 N.W.2d 363; State v. 
Zamzow, 2017 WI 29, ¶13, 374 Wis. 2d 220, 892 N.W.2d 367; State 
v. Mattox, 2017 WI 9, ¶¶24-25, 373 Wis. 2d 122, 890 N.W.2d 256.  
Even more to the point, on the limited occasions we have cited 
Bryant or Clark, we have interpreted them as continuing to apply 
the primary purpose test.  See Reinwand, 385 Wis. 2d 700, 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
21 
 
¶¶22, 24; Mattox, 373 Wis. 2d 122, ¶32 ("Clark reaffirms the 
primary purpose test").  We have never interpreted Bryant or 
Clark to be a departure from Crawford or Davis, much less the 
type of drastic departure required to justify deviating from the 
law of the case. 
¶35 In some ways, Jensen I anticipated Bryant and Clark.  
For instance, we decided Jensen I by not only analyzing the 
content of Julie's statements but also objectively evaluating 
the 
relevant 
"circumstances" 
under 
which 
she 
made 
them.  
Jensen I, 299 Wis. 2d 267, ¶¶26-30.  That is what the United 
States Supreme Court held in Bryant.  See 562 U.S. at 359 
(requiring courts to "objectively evaluate the circumstances" 
surrounding the statement's creation when determining its 
primary purpose).  In Jensen I, we rejected the State's argument 
that "the government needs to be involved in the creation of the 
statement" 
for 
that 
statement 
to 
be 
testimonial. 
 
See 
Jensen I, 299 Wis. 2d 267, ¶24.  This mirrors the holding in 
Clark.  See 576 U.S. at 246 (recognizing that "at least some 
statements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers 
could conceivably raise confrontation concerns").  Far from 
being contrary to Jensen I, Bryant and Clark are consistent with 
it. 
IV 
¶36 Our decision in Jensen I that Julie's statements 
constituted testimonial hearsay established the law of the case.  
Subsequent developments in the law on testimonial hearsay are 
not contrary to Jensen I.  Therefore, the circuit court was not 
No. 
2018AP1952-CR   
 
22 
 
permitted to deviate from our holding in Jensen I.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the court of appeals' decision.  We modify that 
decision, however, to the extent that the court of appeals 
incorrectly relied upon Cook. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified, and as modified, affirmed. 
 
No. 2018AP1952-CR.jjk 
 
1 
 
¶37 JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion, with the exception of ¶35, because I agree 
that 
our 
decision 
in 
Jensen 
I 
that 
Julie's 
statements 
constituted testimonial hearsay established the law of the case 
and a controlling court has not issued a contrary decision on 
the same point of law.  State v. Jensen (Jensen I), 2007 WI 26, 
299 Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518.  I write separately, however, 
because I disagree with the majority's assertion that the Jensen 
I court "objectively evaluat[ed] the relevant 'circumstances' 
under which she made [her statements]."  Majority op., ¶35.  In 
other words, I conclude that the Jensen I court completely 
failed to consider the context in which Julie made her 
statements.   
¶38 Had this court in Jensen I truly considered that 
context, it would have recognized that Julie was undeniably a 
victim of domestic abuse and that prior to her death she lived 
in terror born of the unimaginable fear that her husband was 
going to kill her and claim that her death was a suicide.  It 
was under these circumstances that she left two voicemails for 
Pleasant Prairie Police Officer Ron Kosman and wrote a letter 
which she gave to a neighbor with instructions to give it to the 
police should anything happen to her.  
¶39 This writing begins with a discussion of domestic 
abuse and how Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), 
impacted the prosecution of domestic abuse cases.  Next, I 
summarize the United States Supreme Court's decisions in 
Crawford, Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), and Davis' 
No. 2018AP1952-CR.jjk 
 
2 
 
companion case, Hammon v. Indiana.  I follow with an examination 
of Jensen I, since it was decided less than a year after Davis 
and Hammon, and with a discussion of three cases from the United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
and 
this 
court 
that 
were 
decided 
post-Jensen I.  This case overview reveals how the United States 
Supreme Court and this court have increasingly given weight to 
context when assessing whether the hearsay statement of an 
unavailable witness is testimonial in nature.  Next, to assist 
future courts in assessing context, I supply a non-exhaustive 
list of contextual questions based off the previously summarized 
cases.  Finally, I conclude this concurrence with a discussion 
of assessing context in domestic abuse cases and an objective 
evaluation of the circumstances under which Julie made her 
statements.   
I. 
DOMESTIC ABUSE AND VICTIMLESS PROSECUTION 
¶40 Domestic 
abuse, or interpersonal violence, 
is a 
significant public health issue.  About one in four women and 
one in seven men have experienced an act of physical violence 
from an intimate partner in their lifetime.  Caitlin Valiulis, 
Domestic Violence, 15 Geo. J. Gender & L. 123, 124 (2014).  In 
addition, and far more sobering, the nation's crime data 
suggests that over half of female homicide victims in the United 
States are killed by a current or former intimate partner.  See 
Natalie Nanasi, Disarming Domestic Abusers, 14 Harv. L. & Pol'y 
Rev. 559, 563 & n.16 (2020) (citing statistics from the Center 
for Disease Control and Prevention regarding the role of 
intimate partner violence). 
No. 2018AP1952-CR.jjk 
 
3 
 
¶41 To counteract this public health issue, prosecutors 
have worked to hold abusers accountable.  This is often a 
difficult, if not impossible, task because abusers' actions 
often render their victims unavailable to testify.  Beginning in 
the mid-1990s, prosecutors pursued these so-called "victimless" 
prosecutions by seeking to introduce reliable evidence using 
victims' out-of-court statements through 911 operators, medical 
professionals, social workers, and law enforcement officers.  
See Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v. Washington:  The End of 
Victimless Prosecution?, 28 Seattle U. L. Rev. 301 (2005).  
Victim advocates and prosecutors applauded this approach because 
it maintained victims' safety and avoided retraumatization.  Id.  
This practice, however, came to a screeching halt after the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford,1 in which the 
Court profoundly altered the analysis as to when an unavailable 
witness's 
hearsay 
statement 
is 
admissible 
under 
the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 In a 2004 survey of 64 prosecutors' offices in California, 
Oregon, and Washington, 63 percent of respondents reported that 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) had significantly 
impeded 
domestic 
violence 
prosecution. 
 
Tom 
Lininger, 
Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 Va. L. Rev. 747, 750 
(2005).  Further, 76 percent of respondents indicated that after 
Crawford their offices were more likely to dismiss domestic 
violence charges when the victims refused to cooperate or were 
unavailable.  Id. at 773. 
No. 2018AP1952-CR.jjk 
 
4 
 
II. 
PRECEDENT FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
ABOUT NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY 
¶42 In 
Crawford, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
fundamentally changed the analysis regarding the admissibility 
of an out-of-court witness's statement by deciding that when 
such a statement is testimonial in nature, the witness must 
testify 
and 
face 
cross-examination. 
 
541 
U.S. 
at 
68.  
Consequently, if that witness is unavailable, his or her 
testimony will be excluded.  Id.  The Crawford Court did not 
further explain what it meant by "testimonial."  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Scalia reasoned: 
Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the 
Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required:  
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.  We leave for another day any effort to 
spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.'  
Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum 
to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a 
grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police 
interrogations. 
Id. (Footnote omitted.) 
¶43 The United States Supreme Court first applied its 
reasoning in Crawford to situations of domestic abuse in Davis 
and Hammon.  In doing so, the Court created a primary-purpose 
test to determine whether or not a statement is testimonial.  In 
short, the test is designed to ascertain whether the primary 
purpose of an interrogation is to enable police to meet an 
ongoing emergency.  Statements are "testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is 
to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution."  Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
No. 2018AP1952-CR.jjk 
 
5 
 
¶44 In Davis, the Court analyzed a 911 call in which the 
victim reported that Davis was "jumpin' on [her] again" and 
beating her with his fists.  Id. at 817.  The victim also 
"described the context of the assault" and gave identifying 
information about Davis.  Id. at 818.  The Court held that these 
statements were admissible because their primary purpose was to 
"enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."  Id. at 
828.2  The Court distinguished this statement from the one at 
issue in Crawford, reasoning that the statements were made "as 
they were actually happening" and while the victim was "in 
immediate danger."  Id. at 827, 831 (emphasis in original).  The 
Court also determined that the statements were helpful to the 
police because they allowed them to assess any potential threats 
towards them or the victim.  Id. at 832.  In sum, the Court 
decided that the victim was not testifying because "[n]o 
'witness' goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek 
help."  Id. at 828. 
                                                 
2 The Davis Court described these statements as "frantic," 
547 U.S. at 827, a word that connotes a lack of thought or good 
judgment.  This type of language is emblematic of the obstacles 
domestic abuse victims face in effectively conveying the truth 
of their experiences to institutional gatekeepers.  "[D]omestic 
violence complainants can find themselves in a double bind.  The 
symptoms of their trauma—the reliable indicators that abuse has 
in fact occurred—are perversely wielded against their own 
credibility in court.  [Post-traumatic stress disorder] symptoms 
can . . . contribute to credibility discounts that may be 
imposed by police, prosecutors, and judges."  Deborah Epstein & 
Lisa A. Goodman, Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic Violence 
Survivors' Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. 
Penn. L. Rev. 399, 422 (2019). 
No. 2018AP1952-CR.jjk 
 
6 
 
¶45 The Court reached a different conclusion in Hammon, in 
which police called to a domestic violence incident found the 
victim on the front porch and Hammon inside the house.  Id. at 
819.  As part of their investigation, the officers asked the 
victim to fill out and sign a "battery affidavit."  Id. at 820.  
In filling out the affidavit, the victim described how Hammon 
broke a glass heater, pushed her into the broken glass, hit her 
in the chest, prevented her from leaving by damaging her van, 
and attacked her daughter.  Id.  The Court determined the 
primary purpose of this statement was to provide a "narrative of 
past events," and the Court reasoned that giving a statement 
about past events meant there was "no emergency in progress."  
Id. at 829, 832.  For these reasons, the Court decided the 
victim's affidavit was inadmissible hearsay.  Id. at 834. 
III. JENSEN I 
¶46 Shortly after the United States Supreme Court decided 
Davis and Hammon, this court determined in Jensen I that the 
primary purpose of Julie's letter was not to help the police in 
an ongoing emergency, but to "investigate or aid in prosecution 
in the event of her death."  Jensen I, 299 Wis. 2d 267, ¶27.  
Additionally, the court also reasoned that the voicemails "were 
entirely for accusatory and prosecutorial purposes."  Id., ¶30. 
¶47 In Julie's second voicemail, she told Officer Kosman 
that she thought Jensen was going to kill her.  The letter that 
Julie gave her neighbor read as follows:  
I took this picture [and] am writing this on Saturday 
11-21-98 at 7AM.  This 'list' was in my husband's 
business daily planner—not meant for me to see, I 
don't know what it means, but if anything happens to 
No. 2018AP1952-CR.jjk 
 
7 
 
me, he would be my first suspect.  Our relationship 
has deteriorated to the polite superficial.  I know 
he's never forgiven me for the brief affair I had with 
that creep seven years ago.  Mark lives for work [and] 
the kids; he's an avid surfer of the Internet....  
Anyway—I do not smoke or drink.  My mother was an 
alcoholic, so I limit my drinking to one or two a 
week.  Mark wants me to drink more—with him in the 
evenings.  I don't.  I would never take my life 
because of my kids— they are everything to me!  I 
regularly 
take 
Tylenol 
[and] 
multi-vitamins; 
occasionally take OTC stuff for colds, Zantac, or 
Immodium; have one prescription for migraine tablets, 
which Mark use[s] more than I.  
I pray I'm wrong [and] nothing happens . . . but I am 
suspicious of Mark's suspicious behaviors [and] fear 
for my early demise.  However, I will not leave David 
[and] 
Douglas. 
 
My 
life's 
greatest 
love, 
accomplishment and wish: "My 3 D's"—Daddy (Mark), 
David [and] Douglas.  
Id., ¶7. 
¶48 Although the record in this case was replete with 
references to domestic abuse and the Jensen I majority took 
great pains to explain that it reached its decision by examining 
"[t]he content and the circumstances surrounding the letter" and 
applied the same reasoning to the voicemails, id., ¶27, nowhere 
in the majority opinion, not even in a passing phrase or 
fleeting word, did this court acknowledge that Julie was the 
victim of domestic abuse.  Instead, employing an ill-suited 
analogy, the majority compared Julie's letter and voicemails to 
Lord Cobham's letter at Sir Walter Raleigh's trial for treason.  
Id., ¶29.  Drawing a parallel between a 1603 treason trial—where 
Cobham, the missing (but still very much alive) accomplice, 
wrote a letter maintaining his innocence while accusing Raleigh—
and a 1998 domestic homicide makes for a particularly inapt 
No. 2018AP1952-CR.jjk 
 
8 
 
analogy; it draws a comparison remote in time, place, content, 
and circumstance in every possible aspect. 
IV. 
POST-JENSEN I 
¶49 Post-Jensen I, the United States Supreme Court issued 
two decisions that further illuminated the import of assessing 
context when courts are determining the primary purpose of an 
unavailable witness's hearsay statement, Michigan v. Bryant, 562 
U.S. 344 (2011), and Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (2015).  In 
Bryant, the police found a gunshot victim at a gas station.  562 
U.S. at 349.  Although the victim was bleeding profusely and was 
having trouble speaking, he told police that Bryant shot him 
through the back door of Bryant's house.  Id.  Unfortunately, 
the victim died within hours.  Id.  The Bryant Court decided 
that the victim's statement was admissible because its primary 
purpose was to help the police resolve an ongoing emergency, 
especially in light of the fact that Bryant posed an ongoing 
threat to the community at large.  Id. at 371-73.  The Court 
emphasized that determining the primary purpose of a statement 
is an objective test and clarified that an ongoing emergency is 
only one factor to be considered.  Id. at 360, 366.  The Court 
outlined other important factors, including the statements and 
actions of both the declarant and the interrogators, and the 
formality of the encounter.  Id. at 366-67.  The court noted 
that victims may have "mixed motives" when making a statement to 
the police.  Id. at 368 ("During an ongoing emergency, a victim 
is most likely to want the threat to her and to other potential 
No. 2018AP1952-CR.jjk 
 
9 
 
victims to end, but that does not necessarily mean that the 
victim wants or envisions prosecution of the assailant."). 
¶50 Clark, 576 U.S. 237, involved a different type of 
violence in the home:  child abuse.  In that case, Clark was 
accused of abusing his girlfriend's three-year old son after the 
victim disclosed the abuse to a teacher who observed visible 
injuries on the boy's body.  Id. at 240-41.  The statements to 
the teacher were determined to be nontestimonial because the 
teacher's objective in asking questions was to protect the 
victim, not to arrest or punish his abuser.  Id. at 247.  The 
Clark Court reiterated the importance of context, explaining 
"[c]ourts must evaluate challenged statements in context, and 
part of that context is the questioner's identity."  Id. at 249.  
In considering "all the relevant circumstances," including the 
child's age, the school setting, the teacher's objective, and 
the 
overarching 
informality 
of 
the 
situation, 
the 
Court 
concluded that the primary purpose of the victim's statements 
was not to "creat[e] evidence" for Clark's prosecution.  Id. at 
246.  Rather, the teacher's questions were intended to identify 
the abuser "to protect the victim from future attacks."  Id. at 
247. 
¶51 Subsequently, we interpreted Clark in Reinwand, in 
which Joseph Reinwand was convicted of first-degree intentional 
homicide for killing his daughter's former partner.  State v. 
Reinwand, 2019 WI 25, 385 Wis. 2d 700, 924 N.W.2d 184.  
Reinwand's daughter and the victim were planning to mediate a 
custody dispute and in the days leading up to the mediation, 
No. 2018AP1952-CR.jjk 
 
10 
 
Reinwand threatened to harm or kill the victim if he continued 
to seek custody.  Id., ¶6.  The victim reported these threats to 
family and friends, saying he was scared for his life and that 
if anything happened to him, people should look to Reinwand.  
Id.  A short time later, the victim was found dead in his home.  
This court looked to four relevant factors in deciding whether 
Reinwand's statements were testimonial: 
(1) 
the 
formality/informality 
of 
the 
situation 
producing the out-of-court statement; (2) whether the 
statement is given to law enforcement or a non-law 
enforcement individual; (3) the age of the declarant; 
and (4) the context in which the statement was given. 
Id., ¶25 (citing State v. Mattox, 2017 WI 9, ¶32, 373 Wis. 2d 
122, 890 N.W.2d 256).  
¶52 The Reinwand court concluded that the statements were 
nontestimonial because:  (1) they were given in informal 
situations, primarily inside people's houses and at an Arby's 
restaurant; (2) none of the statements were given to law 
enforcement or intended for law enforcement; (3) the age of the 
victim was irrelevant; and (4) the victim's statements were made 
to friends and family and his demeanor suggested genuine concern 
because 
he 
seemed 
"concerned, 
stressed, 
agitated . . . and 
genuinely frightened."  Id., ¶¶27-30.  The court concluded that 
the victim's "demeanor suggests that he was expressing genuine 
concern and seeking advice, rather than attempting to create a 
substitute for trial testimony."  Id., ¶30. 
V. 
ASSESSING CONTEXT 
¶53 The post-Crawford cases emphasized the importance of 
assessing context when courts are determining whether the 
No. 2018AP1952-CR.jjk 
 
11 
 
hearsay statement of an unavailable witness is testimonial.  The 
following non-exhaustive list of questions summarizes the 
contextual inquiries the United States Supreme Court and this 
court made in post-Crawford cases: 
 Is there an ongoing emergency? (Davis) 
 Do the statements help the police assess whether there 
is a potential threat? (Davis) 
 Is the victim in immediate danger? (Davis) 
 Is the statement a narrative of past events? (Hammon) 
 Is the statement related to an ongoing threat to the 
community at large? (Bryant) 
 What's the declarant's actual statement? (Bryant) 
 What are the actions of the declarant? (Bryant) 
 What 
are 
the 
actions 
and 
statements 
of 
the 
interrogators? (Bryant) 
 Are the interrogators' intentions to protect the 
victim or arrest/prosecute the abuser? (Clark) 
 Is the encounter formal (at a police station) or 
informal? (Bryant) 
 Was the statement given to law enforcement? (Clark) 
 Were the statements intended for law enforcement? 
(Clark) 
 How old is the declarant? (Clark) 
 What is the relationship between the declarant and the 
suspect? (Clark) 
 What was the demeanor of the declarant at the time the 
statements were made? (Reinwand) 
No. 2018AP1952-CR.jjk 
 
12 
 
 Is the statement a prediction of future events? 
(Reinwand) 
VI. 
CONTEXT IN DOMESTIC ABUSE CASES 
¶54 Applying the above considerations to situations of 
domestic abuse can be challenging because domestic abuse rarely 
takes place in a vacuum.  That is, there are often multiple 
incidents and the abuse can span the course of days, weeks, 
months, or years.  See, e.g., Eleanor Simon, Confrontation and 
Domestic Violence Post-Davis: Is There and Should There Be a 
Doctrinal Exception?, 17 Mich. J. Gender & L. 175, 206 (2011) 
("[A] domestic violence victim exists in a relationship defined 
by long-term, ongoing, powerful, and continuous abuse . . . it 
is illogical and impractical to attempt to find the beginning 
and end of an 'emergency' in such a context.").  In addition, 
victims of domestic abuse are often afraid to report acts of 
violence, or they recant or refuse to cooperate after initially 
providing information because they fear retaliation.  Id. at 
184-85.  Therefore, victims may not make a report or they may 
minimize or deny incidents of abuse.  It is also important to 
understand that no one knows an abuser better than the abuser's 
victim.  And the most dangerous time for a victim of domestic 
abuse is when he or she decides to leave the relationship.  See 
Lisa A. Goodman & Deborah Epstein, Listening to Battered Women: 
A Survivor-Centered Approach to Advocacy, Mental Health, and 
Justice 76 (2008) ("Substantial data show that separation from 
the batterer is the time of greatest risk of serious violence 
and homicide for battered women and for their children."). 
No. 2018AP1952-CR.jjk 
 
13 
 
¶55 Having 
suggested 
some 
contextual 
questions 
and 
acknowledging the challenges of understanding context in cases 
of domestic abuse, I conclude this concurrence by objectively 
evaluating the relevant circumstances under which Julie made her 
statements, a task the majority opinion erroneously claims the 
Jensen I court did.  That evaluation reveals that Julie: 
 was a victim of domestic abuse; 
 believed there was an ongoing emergency as she feared 
her husband was going to kill her; 
 perceived herself to be in immediate danger because 
her husband was engaging in behavior that did not make 
sense to her; 
 had significant safety concerns; 
 was afraid her death was going to be made to look like 
a suicide; 
 loved her sons; 
 wanted her sons to know she did not intend to kill 
herself; 
 was making a prediction about her husband's future 
behavior; 
 was not questioned/interrogated in this case; and 
 did not have a formal encounter in a police station. 
¶56 When looking at this evidence in context, it is 
apparent that Julie was a victim of domestic abuse and that 
prior to her death she lived in terror born of the unimaginable 
fear that her husband was going to kill her and claim that her 
death was a suicide.  It was under these circumstances that she 
No. 2018AP1952-CR.jjk 
 
14 
 
left the voicemail messages for Officer Kosman and wrote the 
letter which she gave to a neighbor with instructions to give it 
to the police should anything happen to her.   
¶57 With this context in mind, we must ask:  Was Julie 
making statements for the future prosecution of her husband for 
her murder?  Or was she a woman trying to survive ongoing 
domestic abuse, fearing and predicting an imminent attempt on 
her life, telling her sons that she loved them too much to 
commit suicide?  This is the voice——Julie's voice——that this 
court failed to acknowledge in Jensen I. 
¶58 Although the law of the case prohibits this court from 
reconsidering the determinations reached by the Jensen I court, 
had the Jensen I court actually "objectively evaluat[ed] the 
relevant circumstances" surrounding Julie's statements, it would 
have recognized the atmosphere of domestic abuse that suffused 
the factual background and the relationship at the center of 
this case and possibly reached a different conclusion. 
¶59 For the foregoing reasons, I concur. 
¶60 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this concurrence. 
 
No. 2018AP1952-CR.jjk 
 
 
 
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