Title: Commonwealth v. Neves
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11173
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2016

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SJC-11173 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ADILSON F. NEVES. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     October 9, 2015. - May 25, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Constitutional Law, Admissions 
and confessions, Waiver of constitutional rights, 
Voluntariness of statement.  Evidence, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Testimony before 
grand jury.  Grand Jury.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, 
Admissions and confessions, Waiver, Voluntariness of 
statement, Grand jury proceedings, Transcript of testimony 
before grand jury, Sequestration of witnesses, Striking of 
testimony, Request for jury instructions. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 15, 2008. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by 
Christine M. Roach, J., and the case was tried before Jeffrey A. 
Locke, J. 
 
 
 
Jeffrey L. Baler for the defendant. 
 
Gail M. McKenna, Assistant District Attorney (Audrey 
Anderson, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant was convicted by a Superior Court 
jury of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder 
in the 2008 shooting death of Edward Conley, a Brockton taxicab 
driver.  Before us is the defendant's appeal from his 
conviction.  The defendant asserts error in four respects:  
(1) the failure to suppress statements later admitted in 
evidence that were made involuntarily to police, in violation of 
his Miranda rights, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-
445 (1966) (Miranda); (2) the introduction over objection of a 
witness's grand jury testimony after the witness claimed a loss 
of memory; (3) the failure to strike, upon request, another 
witness's testimony after learning that he had violated a 
sequestration order; and (4) the failure to give a requested 
instruction on involuntary manslaughter.  The defendant also 
seeks relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  While we conclude that 
some of the defendant's statements to police were not made 
voluntarily and should not have been admitted, any error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  We also conclude that the 
judge's rulings with respect to the contested witness testimony 
and the instruction on involuntary manslaughter were not in 
error.  Having reviewed the entire record, we affirm the 
conviction and discern no reason to exercise our authority to 
grant extraordinary relief. 
3 
 
 
1.  Factual background.  We recite the facts the jury could 
have found, reserving certain details for later discussion.  In 
early February, 2008, the defendant discussed plans to rob a 
drug dealer with Jeffrey Milton, Antonio Fernandes, and Brandon 
Walters.  On February 15, 2008, however, the drug dealer whom 
the defendant had in mind was not available.  The defendant 
proposed to the group that they instead rob a taxicab driver.  
The defendant showed them that he had a gun. 
 
Shortly after midnight, the defendant drove Milton in the 
defendant's automobile, a green Honda, to a pay telephone.  
Using a female-sounding voice, Milton telephoned for a taxicab 
to come to a specific address on Galen Street in Brockton.  The 
defendant previously had identified that address as being 
"perfect" for robbing a taxicab driver:  it was at the end of a 
dead end street, and the nearby street lighting was dim. 
 
The defendant and Milton then picked up Fernandes and 
Walters, and drove to the end of another street that was close 
to Galen Street.  While Milton and Walters waited with the 
defendant's Honda, the defendant and Fernandes went to meet the 
taxicab, which was not visible from where the Honda was parked.  
When the taxicab arrived, the defendant telephoned Walters to 
tell him to start the Honda's engine.  The defendant got into 
the back seat of the taxicab, behind the driver, Conley.  
Fernandes also got into the back seat, but on the passenger's 
4 
 
side.  The defendant then took out the gun and pointed it at 
Conley, and Fernandes told Conley to give them his money. 
 
Conley panicked and grabbed for the gun.  Although the 
progression of the subsequent events is disputed, it is clear 
that, at some point, the gun discharged, and Conley was shot in 
the back of the head behind the right ear at close range.  It is 
also clear that the taxicab accelerated away from the end of 
Galen Street and crashed into a fence near a house farther up 
the street. 
 
The defendant and Fernandes jumped out of the vehicle while 
it was still in motion and ran back to the Honda.  Fernandes 
reached the Honda first, followed closely thereafter by the 
defendant, who was injured and missing a shoe.  The defendant 
said that he had lost his cellular telephone.  He then handed 
something wrapped in a sweatshirt to Walters, and Walters put it 
in the trunk.  They drove away. 
 
In the early morning hours of February 16, 2008, the 
defendant woke up Nicole Resendes, his then girl friend.  He 
told her that his cellular telephone and shoes had been stolen 
from him in a robbery.  He later asked his associate Joao Cruz 
5 
 
explicitly to be his "alibi" for the time of the shooting, 
relating to him a story similar to the one he had told Resendes.1 
 
Soon after the shooting, police found Conley slumped over 
the steering wheel and unresponsive.  Conley was taken to a 
local hospital, where he was pronounced dead between 1 and 
2 A.M.  Police did not find any identifiable fingerprints at the 
scene, but did find a shoe on the street approximately fifty 
yards from the crash that had Conley's blood on it.2  After a tip 
from a suspect in an unrelated crime, the investigation 
eventually turned to the defendant.  Police questioned the 
defendant at the Brockton police station on March 14, 2008, and 
again after his arrest on March 24, 2008.  During the second 
interview, the defendant stated that he shot Conley.  Each 
interview was audio-video recorded. 
 
2.  Procedural background.  On May 15, 2008, a grand jury 
returned an indictment charging the defendant with murder in the 
first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1.  Before trial, the defendant 
                     
 
1 Joao Cruz was granted immunity in exchange for his 
testimony, and the jury were so instructed. 
 
 
2 The deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile of Edward Conley 
matched a DNA sample obtained from swabs of human blood spatter 
found on the left lace area and left heel area of the shoe.  The 
probability of a randomly selected unrelated individual having 
the DNA profile matching that obtained from each of these areas 
was one in 4.895 quadrillion of the Caucasian population, one in 
5.255 quintillion of the African-American population, and one in 
8.41 quadrillion of the Hispanic population. 
6 
 
moved to suppress the statements he made during both police 
interviews.  After an evidentiary hearing on October 21, 2010, a 
Superior Court judge denied the motion.  At trial, the jury were 
shown slightly redacted versions of the interviews. 
 
The defendant did not testify.  His theory of defense was 
that his recorded statements had not been made voluntarily, that 
the Commonwealth's witnesses at trial were not credible, and 
that Conley's death occurred accidentally after the armed 
robbery had ended. 
 
After the close of all the evidence, the jury were 
instructed on murder in the first degree on theories of 
premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder by 
armed robbery or attempted armed robbery.3  On April 15, 2011, 
the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a 
theory of felony-murder.4  The defendant, who was seventeen years 
old at the time of the shooting, was sentenced to the then-
mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of 
                     
 
3 The defendant was not separately indicted for armed 
robbery. 
 
 
4 Antonio Fernandes, who was sixteen at the time of the 
shooting, was tried separately.  He pleaded guilty to 
manslaughter and was sentenced to a term of incarceration of 
from ten to twelve years in State prison.  The record does not 
make clear how Jeffery Milton's case was resolved, but he 
testified pursuant to a plea agreement.  On cross-examination, 
he stated that he expected to receive a sentence of from eight 
to ten years in exchange for his testimony.  Brandon Walters was 
not charged. 
7 
 
parole.5  This appeal followed. 
 
3.  Discussion.  The defendant claims reversible error in 
four respects.  First, he argues that it was error to deny his 
motion to suppress statements he made to police, because the 
waiver of his Miranda rights was not valid and because his 
statements were not made voluntarily.  Second, he argues that it 
was error to permit the introduction of grand jury testimony 
from a witness (Resendes) who claimed memory loss during her 
trial testimony.  Third, he argues that it was an abuse of 
discretion not to strike a witness's testimony after the witness 
(Milton) violated a sequestration order.  Fourth, he argues that 
it was error for the judge not to give an instruction on 
involuntary manslaughter.  Each of the claimed errors was 
preserved.  Finally, the defendant asks that we grant a new 
trial or reduce the verdict to a lesser degree of guilt pursuant 
to our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the defendant's 
conviction and decline his request that we grant him 
extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
a.  Motion to suppress.  The defendant argues that it was 
error to deny his motion to suppress statements made to Brockton 
                     
 
5 See Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 
466 Mass. 655, 658-659, 674 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015) 
(requiring meaningful possibility of parole for juveniles 
convicted of murder in first degree). 
8 
 
police officers during two interviews on March 14, 2008, and 
March 24, 2008.  During the first interview, the defendant 
admitted that the shoe found on Galen Street was his, but denied 
any involvement in the events leading up to Conley's death.  
During the second interview, however, the defendant admitted, 
among other things, to holding the gun when Conley was shot. 
 
Statements of a defendant subject to custodial 
interrogation must be suppressed if the Commonwealth cannot 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt both that the defendant validly 
waived his Miranda rights, see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-445, and 
that he made the statements voluntarily.6  See Commonwealth v. 
Pucillo, 427 Mass. 108, 110 (1998).  The defendant contends that 
he did neither.  He also contends that he explicitly invoked his 
or her right to silence in the middle of the second interview, 
and that the police failed scrupulously to honor that request. 
 
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we "accept 
the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error, but 
conduct an independent review of the judge's ultimate findings 
and conclusions of law."  Commonwealth v. Washington, 449 Mass. 
476, 480 (2007), citing Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 
                     
 
6 Although the defendant was not under arrest at the time of 
the first interview, we assume arguendo that the circumstances 
of the interview established a custodial situation requiring 
that the defendant be informed of his Miranda rights.  See 
Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 201, 211-212 (2001). 
9 
 
646 (2004).  "The determination of the weight and credibility of 
the testimony is the function and responsibility of the judge 
who saw and heard the witnesses, and not of this court."  
Commonwealth v. Moon, 380 Mass. 751, 756 (1980).  Where a 
decision is based on recorded rather than live testimony, 
however, "we will 'take an independent view' of recorded 
confessions and make judgments with respect to their contents 
without deference to the fact finder, who 'is in no better 
position to evaluate the[ir] content and significance.'"  
Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 266 (2004), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Bean, 435 Mass. 708, 714 n.15 (2002). 
 
The motion judge concluded that the defendant validly 
waived his Miranda rights, and that his statements during both 
interviews were voluntary.  Her conclusions were based on her 
analysis of the recorded interviews and her assessment of live 
testimony from two clinicians (one testifying for the 
Commonwealth and one for the defendant) concerning the effect of 
childhood lead poisoning on the defendant's ability to 
understand his rights.7  The judge gave little weight to the 
testimony of either expert. 
                     
 
7 The motion judge also heard testimony from one of the 
police officers who interviewed the defendant; she did not 
address that testimony explicitly in her analysis. 
10 
 
 
For reasons we explain, we agree with the determination of 
the motion judge that the defendant validly waived his Miranda 
rights at both interviews.  We further agree that the defendant 
made voluntary statements at the first interview, and initially 
made voluntary statements at the second interview.  Thereafter, 
however, the police failed to honor scrupulously the defendant's 
repeated requests to end questioning.  The statements he made 
subsequent to those requests therefore should have been 
suppressed.  Nonetheless, given the other properly admitted 
evidence, their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
 
i.  Miranda waivers.  "A valid Miranda waiver is one that 
is made knowingly, intelligently, and in all respects, 
voluntarily."  Commonwealth v. Selby, 420 Mass. 656, 660 (1995), 
S.C., 426 Mass. 168 (1997).  In determining the validity of a 
waiver, relevant considerations include the totality of the 
circumstances, such as "promises or other inducements, conduct 
of the defendant, the defendant's age, education, intelligence 
and emotional stability, experience with and in the criminal 
justice system, physical and mental condition, the initiator of 
the discussion of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or 
the police), and the details of the interrogation, including the 
recitation of Miranda warnings."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. 
Mandile, 397 Mass. 410, 413 (1986). 
11 
 
 
The defendant argues that he did not validly waive his 
Miranda rights at either interview because he was seventeen 
years old at the time of the interviews, and because his 
exposure to lead paint as a child limited his ability to 
understand his rights before waiving them.  In light of the 
totality of the circumstances, however, we conclude that the 
Miranda waivers were valid. 
 
Deferring to the motion judge's assessment, we afford 
little weight to expert testimony concerning the defendant's 
ability to comprehend and validly waive his Miranda rights.  
According to the defendant's expert, a forensic psychologist, 
the defendant's "performance in tests of attention and 
concentration were atrociously poor."  Yet the motion judge 
specifically described as "dubious" the psychologist's 
contention that the defendant's intelligence quotient had 
dropped from ninety-six in 2006 to seventy-five in 2009 
(following his arrest in this case), putting him in the fifth 
percentile for his age group.8  On the other hand, the 
Commonwealth's expert, a physician specializing in childhood 
lead poisoning, asserted that he had never encountered a patient 
with the defendant's level of intelligence and creativity who 
could not understand "simple instructions" like Miranda rights.  
                     
 
8 In 2006, the expert had measured the defendant's 
intelligence quotient as part of an unrelated civil case. 
12 
 
We discern no error in the motion judge's assessment of this 
conflicting testimony. 
 
It is evident from the video recordings that, at the 
beginning of each interview, the police read the defendant the 
Miranda rights and showed him a paper copy of those rights.9  
Both times, the defendant stated that he understood his rights, 
and signed a waiver form.  The recorded interviews do not 
indicate that the police induced the defendant to waive his 
rights in any way.  He appeared confident and composed during 
each interview, and specifically confirmed at the beginning of 
the first interview that he was not under the influence of drugs 
or alcohol.  Although the defendant was only seventeen at the 
time of the interviews, he had prior experience with the Miranda 
warnings.  The totality of the circumstances indicates that the 
defendant validly waived his Miranda rights at each interview. 
 
ii.  Voluntariness of statements.  Whether a defendant has 
validly waived his rights is a separate question from whether 
his or her subsequent statements were voluntary, but one that 
similarly "require[s] us to examine the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the statements to ensure 
that the defendant's will was not overborne."  Commonwealth v. 
                     
 
9 Police also read the defendant his Miranda rights while he 
was being transported to the Brockton police station for the 
second interview. 
13 
 
Hoose, 467 Mass. 395, 403 (2014).  Statements made after a valid 
waiver are considered voluntary if they are the product of a 
"rational intellect" and a "free will" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Davis, 403 Mass. 575, 581 (1988), S.C., 410 
Mass. 680 (1991). 
 
The defendant argues that his free will at both interviews 
was overborne by the aggressive tactics the police employed 
during the first interview, tactics so coercive that they also 
rendered involuntary his statements at the second interview.  We 
do not agree.  While "we expressly disapprove of the tactics of 
making deliberate and intentionally false statements to suspects 
in an effort to obtain a statement," Commonwealth v. 
DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 432 (2004), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Jackson, 377 Mass. 319, 328 n.8 (1979), the use of such 
aggressive interrogation techniques is just one factor to be 
considered in analyzing the totality of the circumstances.  See 
Commonwealth v. Baye, 462 Mass. 246, 256 (2012) (Baye), citing 
Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 210-211 (2011). 
 
During the first interview, police questioning intensified 
as it became clear that the defendant was unwilling to admit to 
having been involved in the shooting.  Police told him that they 
were in possession of his cellular telephone and cellular site 
14 
 
location information, although they were not;10 that they had 
"terrific" surveillance video footage of his Honda near the 
location of the shooting, although they did not; and that his 
fingerprint had been found on the taxicab, although that was not 
the case.  In addition, police encouraged the defendant to "come 
clean" in order to protect his girl friend and to prevent his 
eleven year old brother from thinking that he was a "monster." 
 
These tactics did not, however, overbear the defendant's 
will.  In Baye, supra at 257-258, we concluded that a 
defendant's statements should have been suppressed where 
considerably more aggressive police interrogation over the 
course of ten hours induced the defendant to admit that he had 
committed the crime being investigated.  The defendant here, on 
the other hand, was unshaken by the officers' questioning over 
the course of the first interview, which lasted approximately 
two and one-half hours.  Despite the officers' 
misrepresentations, the defendant had strong reason to suspect 
that the police knew less about the shooting than they claimed,11 
                     
 
10 Police never found the defendant's cellular telephone. 
 
 
11 For example, the officers claimed that they had found the 
defendant's fingerprint on the exterior of the taxicab, but the 
defendant was wearing gloves at the time of the shooting.  They 
also claimed to know that Nicole Resendes, the defendant's girl 
friend at the time, had telephoned for the taxicab.  Yet the 
defendant knew that Milton, not Resendes, called the taxicab 
company, because he had been with him when the call was made. 
15 
 
and repeatedly told them that he did not believe them.  
Throughout that interview, he adhered to a more detailed version 
of the alibi that he previously had related to Resendes and 
Cruz.  He explained that on the night in question his shoes and 
cellular telephone, among other items, were stolen from him at 
gunpoint at a location on the opposite side of Brockton from 
where Conley was found.  These factors, along with the factors 
examined in more detail in our discussion of the defendant's 
valid Miranda waivers, supra, lead us to conclude that the 
defendant's statements at the first interview were voluntary. 
 
The defendant's statements at the second interview also 
initially were voluntary.  From the start of the interview, when 
the defendant knew he was in custody and had been charged with 
murder, he was forthcoming about his involvement in the events 
leading up to Conley's death.12  Although police informed the 
defendant that he had "one shot" to talk, they did not employ 
the other aggressive tactics that they had used during the first 
interview.  Furthermore, the police tactics used during the 
                     
 
12 Immediately after waiving his Miranda rights, the 
defendant stated that he "didn't even pull the trigger down."  
He explained that he and Fernandes had been planning to rob a 
drug dealer and had called a taxicab to go to the drug dealer's 
house, but that, en route, Fernandes unexpectedly pulled out a 
gun.  At that point, the defendant said, he jumped out of the 
vehicle and ran away; he maintained that he was not in the 
vehicle at the time of the shooting.  He later recanted this 
version of events, and stated instead that he had been holding 
the gun when Conley was shot. 
16 
 
first interview were not so coercive as to have rendered 
involuntary the statements that the defendant made ten days 
later.  Moreover, the defendant attempted a number of times to 
invoke his right to remain silent partway through the interview. 
 
iii.  Subsequent invocation of right to silence.  Even if a 
defendant initially waives the right to remain silent, he or she 
may invoke that right at any point during questioning.  
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 343 (2012) (Clarke), 
citing Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 265 (1982).  A 
subsequent invocation "must be clear and unambiguous[], such 
that 'a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would 
understand the statement to be an invocation of the Miranda 
right.'"  See Commonwealth v. Smith, 473 Mass. 798, 808 (2016) 
(Smith), quoting Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass. 721, 731 
(2014).  A postwaiver invocation must be "scrupulously 
honor[ed]" by the police.  See Smith, supra at , quoting 
Miranda, supra at 479.  Although police may seek to clarify a 
defendant's ambiguous expression of an intent to stop 
questioning, they may not "ignore[] the long-standing principle 
that 'postrequest responses to further interrogation may not be 
used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial 
request itself'" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Santos, 
463 Mass. 273, 287 (2012) (Santos). 
17 
 
 
Beginning approximately one hour into the second interview, 
the defendant requested multiple times that the police stop 
questioning him.  He stated, "I don't even feel like talking, 
man.  I just, I just want to see my mom, dog."  Rather than 
seeking to clarify what the defendant meant by that statement, 
one of the officers instead encouraged him to keep talking by 
asking, "Did you tell your mom what happened?"  After additional 
questioning that included several more requests by the defendant 
to see his mother, the following exchange took place: 
Defendant:  "I'm done, I'm done talking now." 
 
Interviewer:  "Listen.  I'm asking you a couple easy 
questions here." 
 
Defendant:  "No, no, I'm straight.  I'm straight." 
 
Interviewer:  "You don't want to talk to me anymore?" 
 
Defendant:  "I mean, I want to s -- , if I could, if I 
could just see my mom.  I just want to see my mom." 
 
After officers continued to question him, the defendant said, 
"no, no, no, no, I want to talk to my mom, dude," and "I'm not 
gonna answer no questions until I talk to my mom."  Questioning 
continued after these statements. 
 
The motion judge acknowledged that the defendant claimed at 
several points that he was finished talking, but downplayed the 
importance of those claims because the defendant continued to 
speak with the police even after making them.  That analysis is 
incorrect.  Standing alone, the defendant's statement that he 
18 
 
"don't even feel like talking" might not have been sufficiently 
clear to invoke his right to silence.13  Given that he was under 
arrest at the time, police did not have to allow him to see his 
mother.14  In light of this initial request, however, the 
defendant's subsequent invocations of his right to silence were 
unambiguous and unequivocal.  See Commonwealth v. Santana, 465 
Mass. 270, 282 (2013) (defendant's postwaiver statement that he 
"couldn't say any more" invoked right to silence); Santos, supra 
at 285 (defendant's postwaiver statement, "I'm not going on with 
this conversation," invoked right to silence). 
 
Police should have stopped questioning the defendant at 
least as soon as he stated that he was "done talking now."  In 
failing to do so, they did not "scrupulously honor[]" his 
invocation of his right to silence.  See Clarke, supra at 351-
353, and cases cited. 
                     
 
13 See Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 351-352 
(2012), quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994) 
("When law enforcement officials reasonably do not know whether 
a suspect wants to invoke the right to remain silent, there can 
be no dispute that it is a 'good police practice' for them to 
stop questioning on any other subject and ask the suspect to 
make his choice clear"). 
 
 
14 But see Commonwealth v. Smith, 471 Mass. 161, 162 (2015) 
(requiring "on a prospective basis" that seventeen year olds 
subject to custodial interrogation have opportunity to consult 
meaningfully with interested adult before waiving their Miranda 
rights). 
19 
 
 
iv.  Harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.  Although the 
statements the defendant made after invoking his right to 
silence during the second interview should have been suppressed, 
their admission in evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).  To 
determine whether erroneously admitted evidence was harmless, we 
consider factors such as "the importance of the evidence in the 
prosecution's case; the relationship between the evidence and 
the premise of the defense; who introduced the issue at trial; 
the frequency of the reference; whether the erroneously admitted 
evidence was merely cumulative of properly admitted evidence; 
the availability or effect of curative instructions; and the 
weight or quantum of evidence of guilt."  Commonwealth v. Tyree, 
455 Mass. 676, 701 (2010) (Tyree), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Dagraca, 447 Mass. 546, 553 (2006). 
 
The defendant continued to speak with police for 
approximately one and one-half hours after they failed 
scrupulously to honor his invocation of his right to silence.  
After that invocation, the defendant admitted for the first time 
that he and his friends had planned specifically to rob a 
taxicab driver on the night of the shooting.  He also identified 
Milton as the person who had called the taxicab company, 
disguising his voice to sound like that of a female.  
Furthermore, the defendant told one of the officers that he had 
20 
 
telephoned the officer after the first interview in order to 
confess, but that the officer had not picked up his telephone.  
The defendant was allowed to call his mother from one of the 
officer's cellular telephones during a break in questioning.  
During that call, which was captured by the audio-video 
recording device, the defendant told his mother that he 
accidentally had shot Conley. 
 
However, before invoking his right to silence at the second 
interview, the defendant already had admitted to police that he 
had shot the taxicab driver, albeit by accident, after Fernandes 
instructed the driver to hand over his money.  Other evidence 
overwhelmingly corroborated essentially that version of events:  
Milton testified that the defendant had proposed robbing a 
taxicab driver and showed him a gun several hours before the 
shooting; he further testified that, after the shooting, the 
defendant ran back to the Honda wearing only one shoe.15  The 
defendant's other shoe was found at the crime scene and tested 
positive for Conley's blood.  Witnesses also observed an 
individual running away from the crashed taxicab with a limp; in 
light of the abandoned shoe, this person reasonably could be 
inferred to be the defendant.  In addition, Cruz testified that 
the defendant specifically had asked him to be his "alibi" for 
                     
 
15 As noted, see note 4, supra, Milton testified pursuant to 
a plea agreement. 
21 
 
the time of the shooting, and provided him with the same story 
about having been robbed himself that he told police during his 
first interview.  Because of the weight of this other evidence, 
the admission in evidence of the defendant's postinvocation 
statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Tyree, 
supra at 701. 
 
b.  Admission of grand jury testimony.  The defendant 
argues that it was error to admit portions of the grand jury 
testimony of Resendes, the defendant's girl friend at the time 
of the shooting.  Before the grand jury, Resendes described her 
interactions with the defendant on the night of the shooting.  
She also recounted statements that the defendant purportedly had 
made to her while he was being held at the police station after 
his arrest.  The defendant told her that "[i]t was an accident" 
and that "he probably is going to be doing a lot of time."  When 
called to testify at trial, however, Resendes repeatedly stated 
that she no longer had any memory of these matters.  The judge 
determined that Resendes was feigning memory loss, and allowed 
her grand jury testimony to be admitted substantively. 
 
"It is an understandable concern . . . that grand jury 
testimony admitted at trial for substantive use be subject to a 
certain level of corroboration before a conviction can be based 
on it."  Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 432 Mass. 735, 744 (2000) 
(Sineiro).  Nonetheless, when a witness feigns memory loss, that 
22 
 
witness's statement before the grand jury may be admitted 
substantively if three general requirements are met:  "(1) there 
must exist an opportunity for effective cross-examination of the 
witness at trial; (2) the witness's statement must clearly be 
that of the witness, rather than the interrogator, and be free 
from coercion; and (3) some corroborative evidence must be 
presented."  Id. at 741, citing Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 
55, 73-75 (1984). 
 
 All three of those requirements were met in this case.  
The trial judge found that the defendant was able to cross-
examine Resendes, and that Resendes's statements to the grand 
jury were hers rather than being merely affirmations of specific 
leading questions by the prosecutor.  In addition, the judge was 
presented with corroborative evidence of Resendes's grand jury 
testimony.  At a voir dire hearing, a victim witness advocate 
testified that Resendes had remembered the night of the shooting 
"clearly" when the advocate interviewed her one week before 
trial.  Although the advocate was not asked specifically to 
recall Resendes's statements about what the defendant told her 
at the police station, the advocate described at length other 
details of what Resendes had said during that conversation.  
Based on this information, the trial judge correctly found that 
Resendes's feigned memory loss was "affecting all aspects of her 
testimony."  The substantive admission of her grand jury 
23 
 
testimony, including her description of the defendant's 
statements at the police station, accordingly was proper.  See 
Sineiro, supra at 744-745. 
 
c.  Violation of sequestration order.  The defendant 
maintains that it was abuse of discretion to deny his motion to 
strike Milton's testimony after Milton violated the 
sequestration order.16  Although Milton was in custody at the 
time of trial, his mother attended the proceedings the day 
before he was scheduled to testify.  She then advised him over 
the telephone on how to testify based on what she had observed 
in court the previous day.  Because Milton's trial testimony 
contradicted earlier statements he had made to police,17 his 
mother suggested that if defense counsel accused him of lying, 
he should explain that he initially had lied to police because 
he was "scared."  Milton followed his mother's advice when 
cross-examined by defense counsel.  The remainder of Milton's 
testimony, however, was consistent with a prior written 
statement he had provided to police, and with a recorded 
interview. 
                     
 
16 The Commonwealth argued at trial that the sequestration 
order had not been violated.  On appeal, however, it does not 
dispute that a violation occurred. 
 
 
17 When first questioned by police, Milton said that he had 
been with his family at the time of Conley's death. 
24 
 
 
"[T]he remedy for violation of a sequestration order rests 
within the sound discretion of the judge."  Commonwealth v. 
Bianco, 388 Mass. 358, 370 (1983).  To establish that a judge 
abused his or her discretion in denying a motion to strike, a 
defendant must show that there was "'a clear error of judgment 
in weighing' the factors relevant to the decision, . . . such 
that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives" (citations omitted).  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 
Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
 
In this case, the remedy the judge employed did not fall 
outside the range of reasonable alternatives.  Defense counsel 
was able to cross-examine Milton regarding his mother's advice, 
and counsel was provided with recordings of the conversations in 
which that advice was given in order to determine exactly how 
Milton's mother had coached him, so that counsel would be in a 
position to propose an adequate remedy.18  The judge ultimately 
instructed the jury after the close of evidence that they could 
consider the fact that Milton's mother had told him to say he 
lied to the police when evaluating his testimony.  Despite his 
earlier motion to strike Milton's entire testimony, defense 
counsel himself stated that he was "satisfied" with the 
instructional remedy.  There was no abuse of discretion. 
                     
 
18 The conversations were recorded by house of correction 
officials. 
25 
 
 
d.  Instruction on involuntary manslaughter.  The defendant 
asserts error in the judge's denial of his request for an 
instruction on involuntary manslaughter.  Essentially, he argues 
that an instruction on involuntary manslaughter was warranted 
because the jury reasonably could have found that the shooting 
was accidental and outside the scope of the alleged armed 
robbery. 
 
The defendant has raised this issue only in the context of 
the theory of felony-murder, notwithstanding that the jury also 
were instructed on the theories of deliberate premeditation and 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Accordingly, we first consider 
whether an involuntary manslaughter instruction was warranted as 
a lesser included offense of murder under the theory of felony-
murder.  Pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we also 
consider whether a manslaughter instruction was warranted under 
the alternate theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty. 
 
"An instruction on [involuntary] manslaughter is required 
where any view of the evidence will permit a finding of 
manslaughter and not murder."  Commonwealth v. Jessup, 471 Mass. 
121, 135 (2015) (Jessup), quoting Commonwealth v. Sires, 413 
Mass. 292, 301 (1992).  "In deciding whether a manslaughter 
instruction is supported by the evidence, all reasonable 
inferences must be resolved in favor of the defendant."  Jessup, 
26 
 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 367 Mass. 743, 746 
(1975). 
 
Resolving all inferences in favor of the defendant here, we 
conclude that an instruction on involuntary manslaughter was not 
warranted as a lesser included offense of murder in the first 
degree on a theory of felony-murder, but that such an 
instruction was warranted under the theories of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Nonetheless, the 
absence of the instruction did not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
For the jury to find a defendant guilty of murder in the 
first degree on a theory of felony-murder with armed robbery as 
the predicate felony, the killing must have occurred during the 
commission or attempted commission of an armed robbery.19  See 
Commonwealth v. Evans, 390 Mass. 144, 151-152 (1983) (Evans).  
Nonetheless, "[w]here the felony-murder rule applies, generally 
the defendant is not entitled to an instruction on 
manslaughter."  Jessup, supra at 135, quoting Evans, supra at 
151.  The defendant argues that the jury could have found that 
he did not commit the homicide while the felony was still 
ongoing.  Pointing to the presence of blood on the taxicab's 
airbags, as well as testimony from witnesses who reported 
                     
 
19 The jury were instructed accordingly. 
27 
 
hearing only one "bang" rather than a separate crash and 
gunshot, the defendant argues that the jury could have inferred 
that the impact of the vehicle during the collision caused the 
gun to go off after the robbery was over. 
 
That argument, requiring speculation rather than reasonable 
inferences, does not withstand scrutiny.  For the jury to infer 
that any blood found on the airbags was the result of a 
postcollision shooting, they would have had to ignore evidence 
that Conley continued to bleed after the shooting.  They also 
would have had to ignore evidence that the airbags already had 
deployed when emergency personnel attempted to remove the 
bleeding Conley from his vehicle.  Any inference from the fact 
that witnesses heard only a single noise to the effect that the 
taxicab's collision therefore caused the gun to fire would have 
been similarly far-fetched.  To the contrary, extensive 
evidence, including the defendant's own recorded statement, 
indicated that the defendant jumped out of the vehicle before 
the collision, still in possession of the gun.20  Because the 
                     
 
20 Before the defendant invoked his right to silence during 
the second interview, the following exchange took place. 
 
Interviewer A:  "The, the car is moving right now.  You 
said [Conley] hit the gas.  He's pulling on the gun.  The 
gun went off, so the car is moving now right?" 
 
Defendant:  "Yeah." 
 
 
28 
 
inferences the defendant suggests the jury could have made would 
not have been reasonable, the judge correctly rejected his 
argument regarding the scope of the felony.  See Jessup, supra 
at 135. 
 
In Jessup, however, the jury were instructed only on murder 
in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder.  Id. at 135-
136.  Because the jury were instructed on all three theories of 
murder in this case, the judge also should have considered 
whether involuntary manslaughter was a lesser included offense 
with respect to murder in the first degree on the theories of 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.  We 
conclude that an involuntary manslaughter instruction was 
warranted on these theories. 
 
"In a nonfelony-murder case, the fact that the shooting was 
accidental negates the malice element required for murder."  
Commonwealth v. Griffith, 404 Mass. 256, 260 (1989).  The judge 
recognized the possibility of accident in this case:  the jury 
                                                                  
Interviewer B:  "Yeah, you guys are moving down the street 
at a pretty good clip, too, eventually." 
 
Interviewer A:  "What happens next?" 
 
Defendant:  "I hopped out." 
 
Other corroborating evidence included eyewitness testimony that 
an individual was running with a limp at a substantial distance 
from the taxicab immediately after it crashed.  In addition, the 
defendant's shoe was found with Conley's blood on it at a 
substantial distance from where the vehicle finally crashed. 
29 
 
were instructed that an accident resulting in death would negate 
malice under the theories of deliberate premeditation and 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The jury were not, however, 
similarly provided with a manslaughter instruction based on 
these theories.  Such an instruction should have been given, 
because the jury reasonably could have concluded that the 
shooting was accidental, based on the defendant's statements to 
police that the gun discharged accidentally when the taxicab 
driver accelerated and grabbed at the defendant's hand.  See 
Jessup, supra at 135. 
 
Yet even if the jury also had been instructed on 
involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense, the 
evidence supporting a conviction on the theory of felony-murder 
was overwhelming, and the jury ultimately convicted the 
defendant on this theory.  "A defendant who kills a victim in 
the commission or attempted commission of a robbery, while the 
defendant is armed with a gun, is guilty of murder by 
application of the felony-murder rule. . . .  The fact that, 
according to the defendant, the gun was discharged accidently is 
of no consequence."  Evans, supra at 151-152.  As noted, supra, 
the defendant admitted to police that he shot Conley by accident 
after his codefendant told Conley to hand over his money.  See 
Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 447 (2004) 
(noting "exceptionally potent quality of a defendant's statement 
30 
 
or confession" as evidence).  Milton's testimony similarly 
established that the defendant had proposed robbing a taxicab 
driver and was in possession of a gun several hours before the 
shooting.  In light of this evidence, the absence of an 
involuntary manslaughter instruction did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
e.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
examined the record carefully pursuant to our duty under G.L. 
c. 278, § 33E, and discern no basis on which to grant the 
defendant relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.