Title: Daryl Williams v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC05-2163
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 24, 2007

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-2163 
____________ 
 
 
DARYL WILLIAMS,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[May 17, 2007] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have on appeal a decision of a district court of appeal that certifies 
conflict with decisions of the First, Second, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal.  
Williams v. State, 913 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the reasons set out below, we quash the 
decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal and hold that a claim asserting a 
discrepancy between an oral and written sentence is cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) 
proceeding for correction of an illegal sentence.   
BACKGROUND 
 
Daryl Williams pleaded guilty to burglary of a dwelling and was sentenced 
on December 21, 1999.  On February 4, 2005, Williams filed a motion for 
correction of an illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.800(a), alleging that the sentence that was pronounced orally was “eleven years 
straight up,” but that his written sentence reflected a longer term of 175 months 
(fourteen years, seven months).  The trial court denied Williams’ motion as legally 
insufficient.  The trial court noted that the court clerk’s minutes from the 
sentencing in the record demonstrated that the oral pronouncement was the same as 
the written sentence and attached both to its order denying relief, but did not attach 
a transcript of the sentencing proceedings. 
 
On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s 
denial of Williams’ motion and certified conflict with Fitzpatrick v. State, 863 So. 
2d 462 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), and Berthiaume v. State, 864 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2004).  Williams, 913 So. 2d at 1239.  The district court further concluded 
that “a mere allegation of a difference between the oral pronouncement and the 
written judgment is insufficient to comply with [rule 3.800(a)]” and certified 
conflict with Watts v. State, 790 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), on that issue.  
Williams, 913 So. 2d at 1240. 
JURISDICTION 
 
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Williams sought review here based upon the district court’s certification that 
its decision expressly conflicted with decisions of other district courts.  During 
proceedings for review before this Court, Williams obtained a copy of the 
transcript of the hearing, which reflects that the oral pronouncement of sentence 
did not conflict with the written judgment and sentence.  Williams concedes his 
claim is now moot but advocates our retention of jurisdiction because of the 
continuing existence of express and direct conflict among the district courts.  Upon 
reflection, we have determined to retain jurisdiction in the instant action to address 
the conflict in decisions certified by the district court and resolve the uncertainty 
with regard to the utilization of rule 3.800(a) to resolve discrepancies between 
written sentences and oral pronouncements.  See State v. Matthews, 891 So. 2d 
479, 483-84 (Fla. 2004).  “The mootness doctrine does not destroy our jurisdiction 
because the question before this Court is of great public importance and is likely to 
recur.”  Id. at 483 (citing Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 218 n.1 (Fla. 1984)).   
ANALYSIS 
 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) provides:  
 
(a) Correction.  A court may at any time correct an illegal 
sentence imposed by it, or an incorrect calculation made by it in a 
sentencing scoresheet, or a sentence that does not grant proper credit 
for time served when it is affirmatively alleged that the court records 
demonstrate on their face an entitlement to that relief, provided that a 
party may not file a motion to correct an illegal sentence under this 
subdivision during the time allowed for the filing of a motion under 
subdivision (b)(1) or during the pendency of a direct appeal. 
 
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Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a).  We have explained that this procedural rule allows for 
petition to the courts to correct sentencing errors that may be identified on the face 
of the record and, because such errors may be resolved as a matter of law, do not 
require contested evidentiary hearings.  See Renaud v. State, 926 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 
2006); State v. Mancino, 714 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1998); Hopping v. State, 708 So. 2d 
263 (Fla. 1998); State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983, 988 (Fla. 1995).   
We have generally defined an “illegal sentence” as one that imposes a 
punishment or penalty that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes 
and laws could impose under any set of factual circumstances.  Carter v. State, 786 
So. 2d 1173, 1181 (Fla. 2001).  The First, Second, Third, and Fifth Districts have 
interpreted this to include an otherwise legal sentence set out in a written judgment 
and sentence that does not comport with the sentence orally pronounced in open 
court; these courts have authorized correction of this type of error in a rule 3.800(a) 
postconviction proceeding.  See Hood v. State, 851 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2003); Greene v. State, 853 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Cote v. State, 841 
So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), quashed, 913 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2005); Fitzpatrick, 
863 So. 2d at 463; Watts, 790 So. 2d at 1176; Dobarganes v. State, 930 So. 2d 765 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Berthiaume, 864 So. 2d at 1258.  These courts have also held 
that a trial court cannot summarily deny a movant’s motion to correct a sentence 
under rule 3.800(a) without attaching the portion of the record that refutes the 
 
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movant’s assertion.  See Melton v. State, 908 So. 2d 1136, 1136-37 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2005); Berthiaume, 864 So. 2d at 1258; Fitzpatrick, 863 So. 2d at 463; Watts, 790 
So. 2d at 1176.  Only the Fourth District holds that such a claim in not cognizable 
under a rule 3.800(a) motion.  See Williams, 913 So. 2d at 1239-40.   
 
In Fitzpatrick, the First District found that since no portion of the sentencing 
transcript had been attached to the order denying the movant’s motion, or 
otherwise provided in the record on appeal, the order had to be reversed and 
remanded so that the trial court could either attach the transcript or take other 
necessary action.  863 So. 2d at 463; see also Byers v. State, 916 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 
1st DCA 2005).  
 
In Watts, the Second District held that an allegation that a written sentence 
differs from the oral pronouncement is cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) proceeding 
and ordered the trial court to review the record on remand to determine whether 
there was in fact a discrepancy.  790 So. 2d at 1176.  The Second District reversed 
the order denying relief and directed the trial court to attach the portions of the 
sentencing proceedings record that would conclusively refute the movant’s claim 
should the court determine there was no discrepancy.  Id.; see also Ferguson v. 
State, 778 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).  But see Williams v. State, 705 So. 2d 
1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (claims of discrepancy between oral and written 
sentence should be brought under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850).    
 
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In Melton, the Third District essentially mandated a similar procedure 
requiring the trial court to determine whether the record establishes that the movant 
is entitled to relief.  908 So. 2d at 1136 (applying the Third District’s standard to 
motions filed under rules 3.800, 3.850, and 3.853).  See also Dobarganes, 930 So. 
2d at 765.   
 
Finally, the Fifth District has agreed that movants may seek redress for 
discrepancies between written and oral sentences under rule 3.800(a).  See 
Berthiaume, 864 So. 2d at 1257; see also England v. State, 879 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2004); Pittman v. State, 859 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Polite v. State, 
847 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Thomas v. State, 778 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2001).  But see Chico v. State, 734 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (rule 
3.800 motion not cognizable because relief was not apparent on the face of the 
record). 
 
In Williams, the Fourth District concluded that “a mere allegation of a 
difference between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment is insufficient 
to comply with [rule 3.800(a)].”  913 So. 2d at 1240.1  Unlike the other district 
courts, the Fourth District has suggested that a motion to correct illegal sentence is 
                                          
 
 
1.  The Fourth District relied on its earlier decision in Campbell v. State, 718 
So. 2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).  Williams, 913 So. 2d at 1239.  The Fourth 
District’s holding in Campbell is no different than its reasoning in Williams––the 
law that provides primacy to the oral pronouncement cannot be used to claim that a 
sentence is illegal.  See Campbell, 718 So. 2d at 886. 
 
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only available where the sentence either exceeds the statutory maximum or 
otherwise defies statutory limitations.  Campbell, 718 So. 2d at 886.  However, in 
Covell v. State, 891 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), the Fourth District affirmed 
a trial court’s denial of an appellant’s rule 3.800(a) motion without prejudice to file 
a rule 3.850 motion.  Similarly, in Rinderer v. State, 857 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2003), the Fourth District chose to treat a rule 3.800 motion as a rule 3.850 motion 
and held such motion met the requirements for stating a claim under rule 3.850.   
Oral Pronouncement of Sentence 
This Court has held that a court’s oral pronouncement of a sentence controls 
over the written sentencing document.  See Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265, 1268 
(Fla. 2003); Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123, 126 (Fla. 1996).  When the written 
document results in a sentence that is more severe than the sentence announced in 
court, this Court has considered it a potential violation of the constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy.  See Ashley, 850 so. 2d at 1268-69; Justice, 
674 So. 2d at 126.  In effect, under our decisions in Ashley and Justice, we have 
determined that a written sentence that conflicts with the oral pronouncement of 
sentence imposed in open court is an illegal sentence.  Indeed, we have restricted 
the authority of a trial court to enter a conflicting written sentence in this manner.  
State v. Jones, 753 So. 2d 1276, 1277 n.2 (Fla. 2000).  Accordingly, no court has 
the authority to enter such a sentence, since the oral pronouncement controls and 
 
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constitutes the legal sentence imposed.  For this reason, we agree with the 
decisions of the First, Second, Third, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal that a 
motion alleging a discrepancy between the oral and written sentences should be 
cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) proceeding. 
Rule 3.800(a) provides that a court may at any time correct a multitude of 
sentencing errors at any time the error is discovered, provided that a party may not 
file a motion under 3.800(a) during the time allowed for filing under 3.800(b)(1).  
Certainly, rule 3.800(a) encompasses any sentencing discrepancy apparent on the 
face of the record that may be resolved as a matter of law without the need for an 
evidentiary hearing to resolve issues of fact.  The policy underlying this rule 
includes concerns that a defendant not be subject to punishment or imprisonment 
beyond that which was lawfully imposed.  Although the Fourth District opinion 
suggests that corrections under the rule may be limited to sentences that are 
statutorily unfounded, the rule and our case law do not support such a limitation, 
since, for example, the rule itself allows correction for a calculation error or credit 
for time served.  It follows, then, that an error in recording the actual sentence 
pronounced in open court during sentencing (much like the time allotted for credit 
for time served, or the time calculated on the scoresheet) may also be determined 
from an examination of the record and should also be included in the type of error 
the courts can correct under 3.800(a).   
 
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It appears that resolution of this issue has also been affected by our 
pronouncements that rule 3.800(a) errors should appear “on the face of the record.”  
Although obviously important and controlling, sentencing proceedings are not 
always transcribed and placed in written form in the trial court record, while the 
written formal judgment and sentence, often entered later, is filed in the record like 
other court orders.  In some cases where the district courts have considered a 
discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the written sentence the movant 
was able to show the discrepancy on the face of the record.  See Byers, 916 So. 2d 
at 923; England, 879 So. 2d at 661; Pittman, 859 So. 2d at 556.  However, in other 
instances where the district courts have approved of the use of rule 3.800(a) to 
resolve this issue, the district courts have required trial courts to attach the relevant 
portion of the sentencing records to any order denying relief.  See, e.g., 
Dobarganes, 930 So. 2d at 765; Berthiaume, 864 So. 2d at 1258.  
This issue arises in part because we have not yet been able to ensure that a 
written judgment and sentence is always issued simultaneously with the oral 
pronouncement of sentence.  While Florida’s criminal trial courts are working with 
diligence towards that goal, there remains the chance that a conflicting written 
sentence may be issued sometime after the oral pronouncement.  However, since 
we have held that the oral pronouncement is, in effect, the controlling disposition, 
we also conclude that the oral imposition of sentence should at all times be 
 
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considered a necessary part of the official record if a transcript of the sentencing 
proceeding is in the court file or, alternatively, a petitioner attaches a certified copy 
of the sentencing transcript to the rule 3.800(a) motion.  In this way the burden 
remains with the petitioner to demonstrate an entitlement to relief on the face of 
the record.  If the sentencing transcript is neither in the file nor attached to the 
motion, the motion should be denied without prejudice to the filing of an amended 
motion properly attaching the sentencing transcript.  
Until we have achieved the simultaneous entry of a written judgment and 
oral pronouncement, and since the oral pronouncement controls, we urge trial 
courts to continue to be diligent in ensuring that the written sentence does conform 
with the oral pronouncement.  However, in the meantime, when a claim of a 
conflict is asserted, trial courts should be able to determine by an examination of 
the record of the sentencing proceeding, but without the need for an evidentiary 
hearing, whether the written sentence conforms with the oral pronouncement and 
rule accordingly.2   
CONCLUSION 
Because we conclude that a discrepancy between oral and written sentence is 
cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) proceeding, we disapprove the district court’s 
                                          
 
 
2.  It is also within the trial court’s authority to direct the State to file a 
response to the rule 3.800(a) motion so that the State may have an opportunity to 
explain an apparent discrepancy before the matter is adjudicated. 
 
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decision to the extent it conflicts with this opinion.  We recognize that the issue has 
been rendered moot in this case so that no further proceedings are necessary. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D05-1537 
 
 
(Palm Beach County) 
 
Beverly A. Pohl of Broad and Cassel of Fort Lauderdale, Florida and Cynthia 
Morales of Broad and Cassel of Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia Terenzio, Bureau 
Chief, and Jeanine M. Germanowicz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm 
Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
 
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