Title: State v. Johnson
Citation: 2014 WI 16
Docket Number: 2011AP002864-CRAC
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 26, 2014

2014 WI 16 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2864-CRAC   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
     v. 
Samuel Curtis Johnson, III, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A SUPREME COURT DECISION 
(Reported at 348 Wis. 2d 450, 832 N.W.2d 609) 
PDC No: 2013 WI 59   
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 26, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
         
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
BRADLEY, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concur and 
dissent in part. (Opinion filed.) 
  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
PROSSER, GABLEMAN, J.J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent-petitioner, 
there was a motion for reconsideration by Marguerite Moeller, 
assistant attorney general, and J.B. Van Hollen, attorney 
general. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-cross-appellant, there was a 
motion for reconsideration by Michael F. Hart, Craig S. Powell, 
Geoffrey R. Misfeldt, and Kohler & Hart, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
Mark D. Richards and Richards & Hall, S.C., Racine, and Stephen 
J. Meyer and Meyer Law, Madison. 
 
 
2014 WI 16
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2011AP2864-CRAC 
(L.C. No. 
2011CF376) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent- 
 
Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Samuel Curtis Johnson, III, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 26, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
MOTION for reconsideration.   Reconsideration granted.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   On July 3, 2013, this court issued a per 
curiam opinion in State v. Johnson, 2013 WI 59, 348 Wis. 2d 450, 
832 N.W.2d 609, which modified and affirmed the unpublished 
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Johnson, No. 
2011AP2864-CRAC, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 
2012), and remanded the matter to the circuit court for further 
proceedings.  On July 22, 2013, both Johnson and the State filed 
motions for reconsideration of the court's decision.  Given the 
parties' motions, we acknowledge the necessity of clarifying the 
previous per curiam.  The court hereby grants Johnson's motion 
No. 
2011AP2864-CRAC   
 
2 
 
for reconsideration in order to clarify that this court's 
previous per curiam opinion represented a deadlock and should 
not be read as minority vote pooling.1  Because this court has 
deadlocked, the court of appeals decision must be affirmed. 
¶2 
Specifically, no three justices reach agreement to 
either affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of the court of 
appeals consistent with precedent.  Consequently, the court of 
appeals decision remains the law of the case.  See Phillips v. 
U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 2010 WI 131, ¶¶1-2, 329 Wis. 2d 639, 791 
N.W.2d 190; Hornback v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2008 WI 98, 
¶63, 313 Wis. 2d 294, 752 N.W.2d 862; see also 6A Jay E. Grenig, 
Wisconsin Practice Series: Appeal and Review § 55:18 (5th ed.).  
In light of the motion for reconsideration and the fact that our 
previous per curiam left the parties and the circuit court 
without sufficient guidance or ability to proceed consistent 
with precedent, the court is now compelled to clarify that per 
curiam. 
¶3 
Relevant to the case at issue, our conclusions are 
guided by longstanding precedent.  State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 
253 
Wis. 2d 356, 
646 
N.W.2d 298; 
State 
v. 
Shiffra, 
175 
Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993).  To be clear, as a 
court of five justices, we do not herein overturn or modify any 
precedent.  Very simply stated, the court of appeals is affirmed 
because no three justices conclude either (1) that under 
                                                 
1 The State's motion for reconsideration related to a 
separate issue on jury instructions.  The State's motion for 
reconsideration is denied. 
No. 
2011AP2864-CRAC   
 
3 
 
Shiffra, the victim must produce the records if she is to 
testify, or (2) that under Green, the victim need not produce 
the records in order to testify. 
¶4 
In the case at issue, Shiffra and Green leave each 
justice with any one of the above options, but precedent does 
not provide any justice with the option to consider the 
production of medical records without tethering that production 
determination to its impact upon whether the victim may testify.  
Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶37; Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 612. 
Precedent instructs us that those considerations are necessarily 
tethered together. Simply stated, Shiffra and Green instruct us 
that an alleged victim may:  
 
Produce the medical records and then testify,  
 
Not produce the records and then not testify, or 
 
Not produce the records because the records are not 
required to be produced, and nonetheless testify. 
¶5 
Critically, our previous per curiam did not clearly 
state that the court of appeals must be affirmed because no one 
of the above options were accepted by any three justices.  The 
decision to produce and the consequence of whether testimony is 
allowed cannot be separated.  Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶37; 
Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 612.  The prior per curiam was incorrect 
to convey that a majority could be reached by separating whether 
the medical records must be produced from whether the victim may 
testify because such a separation would produce new criteria 
that a majority of the court has not authorized. 
No. 
2011AP2864-CRAC   
 
4 
 
¶6 
We 
have 
been 
presented 
with 
a 
motion 
for 
reconsideration because we failed to make clear that no three 
justices have chosen only one of the options above.  As a point 
of clarification, we will briefly expound upon each justice's 
legal conclusions. 
¶7 
In the case at issue, Justice Crooks concludes that 
Shiffra is good law and if the victim will not produce her 
medical records, then she cannot testify.  Justice Crooks' 
position is consistent with precedent.  He would affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
¶8 
Consistent with the precedent in 
Green, Justice 
Ziegler concludes that the defendant did not make a sufficient 
showing to require an in camera review.  Thus, the victim need 
not produce her records and she may nonetheless testify.  
Justice Ziegler would reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
¶9 
Justice Roggensack similarly concludes that the victim 
need not produce her medical records and that she may testify, 
but 
Justice 
Roggensack 
would 
overrule 
Shiffra. 
 
Justice 
Roggensack further concludes that, even if Shiffra is not 
overruled, the requisite showing under Green has not been made 
so as to require the victim to produce her records and that the 
victim may testify.  Thus, Justice Roggensack would also reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶10 Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Bradley, however, 
do not adopt any of the above Shiffra or Green analyses, nor 
would they overrule Shiffra.  Instead, Chief Justice Abrahamson 
No. 
2011AP2864-CRAC   
 
5 
 
and Justice Bradley separate the decision to produce the medical 
records from whether the victim is permitted to testify.  They 
conclude that a majority can be reached by taking a vote on each 
issue separately.  We do not adopt this piecemeal approach, as 
it is inconsistent with precedent. 
¶11 Stated differently, neither Chief Justice Abrahamson 
nor Justice Bradley's conclusions accept any one of the 
following options available under longstanding precedent: (1) 
the victim must produce her medical records, in order to be 
allowed to testify under Shiffra; (2) if the victim refuses to 
produce her medical records, then she is not allowed to testify 
under Shiffra; and (3) if there is no showing so as to require 
the victim to produce her medical records for in camera 
inspection, she may nonetheless testify under Green. 
¶12 Instead, Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Bradley 
would first determine whether a victim must produce her records, 
and then make a separate determination on whether she may 
testify, without accounting for the necessary connection between 
the two considerations.  The procedure espoused by Chief Justice 
Abrahamson and Justice Bradley is a departure from common 
practice and precedent.  Circuit courts and counsel have 
functioned well using the Shiffra/Green analysis for many years, 
and we are mindful not to inadvertently or unintentionally 
overturn that precedent in this five-justice, per curiam opinion 
that has no majority. 
¶13 As a result, since a majority of the court has not 
reached consensus under precedent so as to decide the issue 
No. 
2011AP2864-CRAC   
 
6 
 
presented and the court is deadlocked, the decision of the court 
of appeals must be affirmed. 
By the Court.—The motion for reconsideration is granted. 
¶14 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J., did 
not participate. 
 
No.  2011AP2864-CRAC.awb 
 
1 
 
¶15 ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY, J.   (concurring in part and 
dissenting 
in 
part). 
 
In 
granting 
Johnson's 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, the per curiam purports to "clarify that this 
court's previous per curiam opinion represented a deadlock."1  
Per 
curiam, 
¶1; 
see 
also 
id., 
¶13 
("the 
court 
is 
deadlocked . . . ").  It makes this contention despite the fact 
that the previous per curiam was unanimous in its conclusion and 
direction to the circuit court. 
¶16 There was no deadlock.  All five justices sitting on 
the case unanimously concluded and directed that "[u]pon remand, 
                                                 
1 In its mandate of "Reconsideration granted," the per 
curiam appears to depart from our normal procedure. In its text, 
the per curiam indicates that it is "clarifying the previous per 
curiam."  Per curiam, ¶1; see also id. ("in order to 
clarify . . . 
."); 
¶2 
("the 
court 
is 
now 
compelled 
to 
clarify . . . ."); ¶6 ("As a point of clarification . . .").  If 
the per curiam is truly "clarifying" the previous per curiam, as 
it purports to do, then the appropriate approach is to deny the 
motion and issue a clarification.  See, e.g., Industrial Roofing 
Services, Inc. v. Marquardt, 2007 WI 62, ¶¶3, 4, 301 Wis. 2d 30, 
731 N.W.2d 634 (denying the motion but writing further to 
clarify the opinion); DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC, 2007 WI 40, 300 
Wis. 2d 133, 729 N.W.2d 212 (denying the motion but writing 
further to clarify the opinion); Metropolitan Ventures v. GEA 
Associates, 
2007 
WI 
23, 
299 
Wis. 2d 174, 
727 
N.W.2d 502 
(amending footnote to "clarify our opinion to decide issues 
raised by the parties but not decided by the court.").   
Additionally, at the outset and in its mandate, the per 
curiam refers to a sole motion for reconsideration ("Motion for 
reconsideration.  Reconsideration granted.").  In its first 
paragraph, however, the per curiam notes that the State also 
filed a motion for reconsideration, and denies that motion in a 
footnote, without any accompanying discussion.  Per curiam, ¶1, 
n.1.  Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part. I 
concur in the per curiam's footnote denial of the State's motion 
for reconsideration, and dissent from its mandate, granting 
Johnson's motion for reconsideration.   
No.  2011AP2864-CRAC.awb 
 
2 
 
the circuit court may not require production of the privately-
held, privileged mental health records for in camera review.  
However, upon remand, the privilege-holder may be called to 
testify in this case."  State v. Johnson, 2013 WI 59, ¶9, 348 
Wis. 2d 450, 832 N.W.2d 609.  Additionally, the per curiam fails 
to explain how an odd number of justices can be deadlocked.  
This case is not like the three-three split cases cited by the 
per curiam.  Per curiam, ¶2.2   
¶17 The per curiam mistakenly concludes that Shiffra and 
Green provide only three options regarding production of records 
and testimony of an alleged victim.  It concludes that only 
three options exist because of its belief that "[t]he decision 
to produce and the consequence of whether testimony is allowed 
cannot be separated."  Id., ¶5.  This cribbed view incorrectly 
                                                 
2 To the extent that the per curiam suggests that because we 
are sitting as a court with only five justices that our opinions 
are not precedential, it is simply incorrect.   
This court can and has previously issued opinions with five 
sitting justices, in which the justices were split 3-2 on 
individual issues.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings against 
Humphrey, 2012 WI 32, ¶97, 339 Wis. 2d 531, 811 N.W.2d 363 
("That only five justices participate in a matter before this 
court is not an everyday occurrence, but it is not an 
irregularity. A five-justice decision, with two justices not 
participating after being given the opportunity to do so, is 
valid."); 
see 
also 
State 
v. 
Braun, 
100 
Wis. 2d 77, 
301 
N.W.2d 180 (1981) (Abrahamson, J. and Heffernan, J. dissenting; 
Callow, J. and Coffey, J. not participating); Wussow v. 
Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 97 Wis. 2d 136, 293 N.W.2d 897 
(1980) (Coffey, J. and Hansen, J., dissenting; Abrahamson, J. 
and Steinmetz, J. not participating).    
 
No.  2011AP2864-CRAC.awb 
 
3 
 
interprets Shiffra as if the only remedy available for refusal 
to produce records is to suppress the victim's testimony.   
¶18 This approach ignores the validity of a fourth option—
—the option which was provided for in the previous per curiam, 
which was unanimous.   
¶19 Shiffra provides that there must be some remedy for a 
refusal to produce records, but exclusion of the victim's 
testimony is not the only possible remedy.  The court in Shiffra 
expressly contemplated that a variety of sanctions may be 
appropriate depending on the circumstances.  State v. Shiffra, 
175 Wis. 2d 600, 612, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993) ("The only 
issue 
remaining 
is 
whether 
the 
trial 
court 
misused 
its 
discretion when it suppressed Pamela's testimony as a sanction 
for her refusal to release the records.  In this situation, no 
other sanction would be appropriate.  The court did not have the 
authority to hold Pamela in contempt . . . .  An adjournment in 
this 
case 
would 
be 
of 
no 
benefit . . . . 
Under 
the 
circumstances, the only method of protecting Shiffra's right to 
a fair trial was to suppress Pamela's testimony if she refused 
to disclose her records.")  (Emphasis added.)     
¶20 Indeed, this is the interpretation of Shiffra accorded 
by 
its 
author. 
 
State 
v. 
Johnson, 
No. 
2011AP2864-CRAC, 
unpublished slip op., ¶¶23-28 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2012) 
(Brown, C.J., dissenting).  As he explained, Shiffra does not 
necessarily require suppression of T.S.'s testimony in this 
case, despite the refusal to release medical or counseling 
records.  Id., ¶24.  The central focus of the rationale in 
No.  2011AP2864-CRAC.awb 
 
4 
 
Shiffra was the principle that "[w]hen there are two competing 
and compelling societal interests, it is for the court to 
balance these interests on a case-by-case basis.  The courts are 
especially equipped for this task.  Indeed, it is what judges 
do."  Id., ¶27.         
¶21 The per curiam's citation to Shiffra and Green does 
not show that the decision to produce and the suppression of 
testimony cannot be separated.  See per curiam, ¶¶4-5.  In fact, 
the 
citation 
to 
Shiffra 
only 
reinforces 
the 
point 
that 
suppression of testimony is but one of multiple possible 
sanctions for a refusal to produce records.  See Shiffra, 175 
Wis. 2d at 612.  Likewise, Green does not support the majority's 
contention.  It does not even address whether testimony should 
be allowed, but rather focuses on whether Green had met his 
burden for obtaining in camera inspection of counseling records 
by the court.  State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, ¶37, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 
646 N.W.2d 298.   
¶22 Turning to the motions for reconsideration, I would 
deny both motions and address each in turn.    
¶23 The core of Johnson's motion for reconsideration is 
his claim that this court's prior per curiam is invalid because 
it relies on minority vote-pooling.  Johnson argues that there 
is no "majority-backed rationale for 'modifying' the court of 
appeals' decision" and the "court of appeals' decision requiring 
suppression of T.S.'s testimony must be affirmed."  In support 
of this argument, he cites the rule that "a majority must agree 
on some one specific ground of error fatal to the judgment, or 
No.  2011AP2864-CRAC.awb 
 
5 
 
the judgment must be affirmed."  See State v. Gustafson, 121 
Wis. 2d 459, 461, 359 N.W.2d 920 (1985) (footnote omitted); see 
also Will of McNaughton, 138 Wis. 179, 118 N.W. 997 (1909).   
¶24 Johnson's minority vote-pooling argument should be 
rejected for multiple reasons.  First, the rule is inapplicable 
because this court's decision does not reverse a circuit court 
judgment.  As explained by the Gustafson court, the McNaughton 
rationale for rejecting minority vote-pooling focuses on the 
harm that "would result in reversals without adequate guidance 
to the trial court upon a new hearing."  121 Wis. 2d at 462 
(emphasis added).  Here, the prior per curiam did not reverse a 
judgment.  Rather, it affirmed the circuit court's order 
allowing T.S. to testify.   
¶25 Additionally, the previous per curiam provided the 
guidance 
envisioned 
by 
the 
McNaughton 
court. 
 
Justices 
Roggensack 
and 
Ziegler 
found 
Johnson 
has 
not 
shown 
an 
entitlement to in camera review of the records, and thus no 
production was required.  Accordingly, T.S. may testify.  Chief 
Justice Abrahamson and I found that Johnson had established a 
right to in camera review, and that the circuit court was within 
its discretion to balance Johnson's right against T.S.'s right 
to privacy.  Accordingly, T.S. may testify.  While these are two 
different paths to the same destination, they do not result in 
any risk of confusion upon remand.  Unlike the situation in 
McNaughton, here the circuit court has guidance on the proper 
course to follow: T.S. may testify.          
No.  2011AP2864-CRAC.awb 
 
6 
 
¶26 Second, this court's decision in Ives dictates that 
the rule against minority vote-pooling does not apply in these 
circumstances.  Ives v. Coopertools, 208 Wis. 2d 55, 559 N.W.2d 
571 (1997).  In Ives, all six justices hearing the case decided 
that the court of appeals was wrong to vacate the circuit 
court's order.  One group of three justices agreed on one 
rationale, and the other three justices relied on different 
reasoning.  The court decided that the McNaughton rule did not 
apply because all justices agreed on "the proper resolution of 
the contributory negligence question" despite dividing on the 
rationale.  Id. at 58.  Here, similarly, four of the five 
justices participating in the case agree with the circuit court 
that T.S. may testify, despite dividing on the rationale.  
Following Ives, the rule against minority vote-pooling provides 
no basis for reconsidering this court's prior per curiam, which 
was unanimous. 
¶27  Furthermore, unlike here, the six justices sitting on 
the case in Ives were split down the middle and there was no 
majority on any rationale.  208 Wis. 2d at 57.  Here, as the 
previous per curiam opinion explained, "there is a majority 
regarding each issue presented," but with varying rationales.  
Johnson, 348 Wis. 2d 450, ¶8.  Three of the five justices 
sitting on the case agreed that the circuit court could not 
order production of the records, and four of the five justices 
concluded that T.S. may testify.  To the extent the rationales 
diverge, that simply goes to the precedential value of each 
No.  2011AP2864-CRAC.awb 
 
7 
 
justice's rationale, see Ives, 208 Wis. 2d at 57-58.  It is not 
minority vote-pooling.   
¶28 Johnson's final basis for seeking reconsideration is 
his argument that the decision violates Wis. Const. art. I, § 9, 
because the court as a whole recognized that he had a 
constitutional right to in camera review, but at the same time 
denied him any remedy.  This argument is without merit.   
¶29 Johnson fails to appreciate the scope and history of 
the "right to remedy" clause of Article I, § 9.3  It has been 
interpreted in terms of existing legal rights, and applies only 
where "an individual has an independent legislatively-recognized 
right" or "common-law right to bring a cause of action."  Estate 
of Makos v. Wiscosnin Masons Health Care Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 
62-63, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997) (Crooks, J., concurring).4  This 
definition cannot stretch to include Johnson's alleged "right" 
in this case.  Further, this court has explained that, based on 
the history of the "right to remedy" clause, it is to be 
understood as "primarily addressed to the right of persons to 
have access to the courts and to obtain justice on the basis of 
the law as it in fact exists."  Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 
                                                 
3  "Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws 
for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, 
property, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and 
without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without 
denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws."  
Wis. Const. art. I, § 9. 
 
4 Although Estate of Makos was overruled by Aicher v. 
Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 
N.W.2d 849, Justice Crooks' discussion of the history and 
purpose of the "right to remedy" clause remains useful.  
 
No.  2011AP2864-CRAC.awb 
 
8 
 
95 Wis. 2d 173, 189, 290 N.W.2d 276 (1980).5  This case does not 
involve any concern about Johnson's access to the courts, nor 
does he allege as much.  Accordingly, the "right to remedy" 
clause 
provides 
no 
basis 
for 
reconsidering 
this 
court's 
decision. 
¶30 I examine next the State's motion for reconsideration.  
Essentially, the State seeks direction on whether the circuit 
court's proposed remedy of a curative jury instruction is 
permissible.   Specifically, it asks the court to reconsider or 
clarify "that portion of its decision regarding the propriety of 
a special instruction allowing the jury to draw an inference 
favorable to the defense from T.S.'s invocation of her statutory 
privilege regarding her therapy records."  The prior per curiam 
did not discuss the jury instruction issue, but included a 
footnote stating that Chief Justice Abrahamson and I both 
concluded that the jury instruction here was impermissible.  
Johnson, 348 Wis. 2d 450, ¶4 n.4. 
¶31 Due to the previous per curiam's silence as to the 
position of the other three participating justices on the 
curative instruction, the State is concerned the decision could 
be 
read 
to 
mean 
that 
the 
instruction 
is 
permissible.  
Technically, however, no real clarification is needed.  The 
                                                 
5 Similarly, other decisions have recognized that the "right 
to remedy" clause originated out of concern that citizens should 
have access to the courts to remedy existing legal rights, as to 
a medical malpractice action, and should not have to bribe 
public officials in order to obtain access to courts.  Aicher, 
237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶¶41-44; James A.O. v. George C.B., 182 Wis. 2d 
166, 175, 513 N.W.2d 410 (Ct. App. 1994).   
 
No.  2011AP2864-CRAC.awb 
 
9 
 
previous per curiam affirmed the court of appeals subject to 
modification, and the court did not modify that part of the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
opinion 
that 
rejected 
the 
curative 
instruction.  As such, the court of appeals' rationale and 
rejection of the proposed curative instruction stands as the 
last word on the subject.  State v. Johnson, No. 2011AP2864-
CRAC, unpublished slip op., ¶18 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2012).   
¶32 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully concur 
in part and dissent in part.   
¶33 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion. 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP2864-CRAC.awb 
 
1