Title: Seay v. Lea County Sand and Gravel Company
Citation: 292 P.2d 93, 60 N.M. 399
Docket Number: 5983
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: January 4, 1956

292 P.2d 93 (1956) 60 N.M. 399 Mark O. SEAY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEA COUNTY SAND AND GRAVEL COMPANY and Houston Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellants. No. 5983. Supreme Court of New Mexico. January 4, 1956. Neal &amp; Girand, Hobbs, for appellants. Easley, Quinn &amp; Stout, Hobbs, for appellee. McGHEE, Justice. The claimant (appellee) received an award following a jury trial for one hundred percent disability for a period of twenty-six weeks and for fifty percent disability thereafter because of a back injury suffered while working for the defendant employer. The employer and insurer appeal. The first claim of error which the appellants urge is the trial court erred in refusing to give their requested instruction No. 13, which reads: The extent of disability was established by the expert testimony of orthopedic surgeons and the testimony of claimant himself wherein he detailed his inability to work at his trade of a welder or any other work except such as did not require physical exertion, and also his inability to procure employment in Lea County, where he resided. Some two weeks before the trial he had procured employment as a telephone operator at forty percent of the rate of pay he had received prior to the injury for which compensation was sought. The appellants make a strong plea for us, in effect, to overrule our holding in Elsea v. Broome Furniture Co., 1943, 47 N.M. 356, 372, 143 P.2d 572, 582, where we said in answer to a like contention: This holding was followed in Lemon v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 1954, 58 N.M. 830, 277 P.2d 542 (a back injury case) and in Gilbert v. E.B. Law and Son, Inc., 1955, 60 N.M. 101, 287 P.2d 992. We believe the rule of these cases on the subject is sound and we decline to overrule them. Neither do we find fault with the findings in view of the testimony of Dr. Breck, an orthopedic surgeon who according to the testimony has a nation-wide reputation in his specialty, that the claimant was fifty percent disabled for doing heavy work. It is true Dr. Breck testified the claimant was able to handle a welding torch and do welding if he did not have to lift heavy objects or get into awkward positions, and in this he was corroborated by the claimant, but there are no such jobs available, according to the record. An orthopedic surgeon from Midland, Texas, who for the United States Veterans Administration performed surgery on the back of claimant because of a floating disc and made a fusion of two of the vertebra, stated the claimant had only a ten percent disability and was able to do welding or other heavy work and that it would be beneficial to claimant if he did such work; but it was within the province of the jury to accept or reject his testimony. The claimant had suffered previous back injuries while serving in the armed forces during World War II, and in private employment. The next claim of error is that the trial court erred in refusing to give appellants' requested instruction No. 14, which reads: In lieu of the foregoing instruction the court gave its instruction No. 13, which reads: Again the appellants find themselves confronted with previous adverse decisions of this court, the latest being Gilbert v. E.B. Law and Son, Inc., supra, wherein previous cases on the effect of aggravation of a pre-existing infirmity are collected. The undisputed testimony in the case is that claimant had been doing heavy work for years up to the time of his injury while working for the appellant employer, and, for all that appears in the record, he would have continued to so work except for the accident for which he sought compensation in this case; so, conceding all appellants say about the case of Gonzales v. Pecos Valley Packing Co., 1944, 48 N.M. 185, 146 P.2d 1017, we feel appellants were given all they were entitled to receive on the subject covered by the requested instruction by the court's instruction No. 13, supra. The appellants next complain of the refusal of the trial court to give their requested instruction which stated in a compensation case in New Mexico the attorneys' fees are paid by the employer and insurer and are not paid by the claimant. The basis for the argument in support of such instruction is that Lea County adjoins the State of Texas where the attorneys' fees up to one-third for a court recovery are paid out of the award to claimant and not by the insurer; that knowledge of such fact is bound to be general in Lea County, and appellants feel something additional might have been allowed for attorney fees in this case. There is nothing in the record to indicate their fears in this regard are well founded unless it be the extent of disability found, and the writer cannot refrain from saying it is his belief most of the attorneys defending compensation cases in this part of the state would have been happy of the award made, had they been defending in this case. If awards are being increased by juries in Lea County because of a belief a claimant must pay his attorney, such fact would be known to the resident Judge who tries these cases, and we are sure he would take proper steps to stop such practice. In fact, he did give a cautionary instruction in this very case which seems to be sufficient to hold the jury to the actual disability they believed existed. It reads: The final ground relied upon for reversal is the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury the claimant was not entitled to an award in excess of sixty percent, for the reason at the time of the trial the claimant was earning $50 per week (as a telephone operator) as compared to his former earnings of $125 per week. The claimant had secured such employment only two weeks before the trial, and it was questionable whether the job would last more than three months. The trial court, without objection, gave the long accepted instructions in Lea County on total and partial disability which we deem sufficient in this case. First, the trial court gave instruction No. 2, which reads: In instruction No. 3, the jury was told partial disability meant partial impairment of earning capacity, and it was told to take into consideration: The evidence shows the claimant had only an eighth grade education, that he was a welder by trade and when not doing such work for his employer he did heavy manual labor, and that he was not fitted by training for other work. The judgment will be affirmed and the claimant will be awarded the sum of $600 for the services of his attorney in this court. It is so ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and LUJAN, SADLER and KIKER, JJ., concur.