Title: MARRIAGE OF GREEN v GREEN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14532
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 12, 1979

No. 14532 IN THE SUPHEME COURT O F THE STATE O F MXTANA 1979 IN RE THE MARRIAGE O F IRENE L A . GREEN, Petitioner and Respondent, Respondent and Appellant. Appeal f m : D i s t r i c t Court of the Fourth Judicial D i s t r i c t , Homrable Edward Dussault, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Balyeat and Kamwrer, Missoula, Pbntana John Balyeat argued, Missoula, Pbntana For Respondent: Tipp, Haven and Skjelset, Missoula, Pbntana Thamas Frizzell argued, Missoula, Mxkana Sutnnitted: March 15, 1979 n - % , A =ided: ;".F ' : 1 3 . 7 -% . ..- Filed: - - . . - ;?:$ M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. D r . Norman Green appeals from t h e findings of f a c t and conclusions of law entered by t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Missoula County, t h e Honorable Edward T. Dussault presiding, r e l a t i n g t o t h e d i v i s i o n of t h e p a r t i e s ' a s s e t s i n conjunction with t h e i r d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage. The court, s i t t i n g without a jury, heard t h e matter on two nonsuccessive days. On t h e f i r s t , February 7, 1978, a decree of d i s s o l u t i o n w a s entered pursuant t o s t i p u - l a t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s ; t h e April 11, 1978, hearing w a s confined t o questions of t h e property settlement. The c o u r t ' s findings and conclusions were f i l e d June 23, 1978. Appellant presents twelve i s s u e s f o r review, many of which are r e p e t i t i v e . D i s t i l l e d t o t h e i r essence, they c e n t e r on t h e following: 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court equitably apportion t h e assets of t h e p a r t i e s a s required by s e c t i o n 48-321, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-4-202 MCA, of Montana's Uniform Mar- r i a g e and Divorce Act? 2. Were t h e findings and conclusions properly made and based on s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence? 3 . Did t h e c o u r t err i n awarding I r e n e Green main- tenance and attorney fees? 4. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n admitting respon- d e n t ' s Exhibit N o . 4 , s u b s t a n t i a l l y prejudicing appellant thereby? The p a r t i e s were married December 5, 1969, a t which t i m e respondent I r e n e Green w a s a cook a t a truck s t o p and a p p e l l a n t w a s , a s now, a physician. Both had been married previously, and each had minor children. Each, too, had a s s e t s : respondent had t h e seller's i n t e r e s t i n a c o n t r a c t f o r deed on r e a l e s t a t e near Lolo, Montana; a p p e l l a n t had $5000 i n a Keough retirement plan, owned an a i r p l a n e , and owned a building used a s a medical c l i n i c i n Shaunavon, Saskatchewan, Canada, t h e s u b s t a n t i a l loans f o r which were paid off during t h e marriage. A t t h e t i m e of t h e i r separation, t h e District Court found t h a t t h e p a r t i e s owned t h e following: t h e seller's i n t e r e s t i n t h e c o n t r a c t on t h e Lolo property, t h e a i r p l a n e , t h e c l i n i c , a house on t e n acres on M i l l e r Creek i n Missoula, and an i n t e r e s t i n t h e Riverside B a r i n Hamilton. I n addi- t i o n , D r . Green had $17,500 i n t h e Keough retirement plan. The p a r t i e s a l s o had various personal property, which appel- l a n t acknowledges was divided evenly. I n addition, t h e p a r t i e s had debts and l i a b i l i t i e s t o t a l i n g some $127,000. The D i s t r i c t Court divided t h e property as follows: t o M r s . Green, t h e s e l l e r ' s i n t e r e s t i n t h e c o n t r a c t f o r deed on t h e Lolo property and t h e half i n t e r e s t i n t h e Hamilton bar, where she works; t o D r . Green, everything else. I t appears t h a t each received property b e s t s u i t e d t o t h a t individual. M r s . Green makes her l i v i n g from t h e bar--it makes sense t h a t she receive t h e p a r t i e s ' i n t e r e s t i n t h a t prop- e r t y . She had acquired t h e Lolo property c o n t r a c t f o r deed from her former husband i n l i e u of monthly support payments f o r her two children by t h a t p r i o r marriage--it makes sense t h a t she receive t h a t , a l s o . D r . Green i s t h e only one of t h e p a i r who has a p i l o t ' s l i c e n s e ; hence, t h a t he should g e t t h e plane i s reasonable. H e i s a physician, who came i n t o t h e marriage with an in- terest i n t h e medical c l i n i c ; it is reasonable t h a t he keep t h a t property and t h e attendant share of t h e income from it. ~ i k e w i s e , it i s economically s e n s i b l e t h a t he keep h i s Keough retirement plan. M r s . Green moved o u t of t h e M i l l e r Creek house a t t h e t i m e of separation. D r . Green continued t o l i v e i n t h e home a f t e r t h e separation. It appears reasonable t h a t D r . Green should be awarded a l l of t h e proceeds from t h e s a l e of t h e home. A t t h e t i m e of t h e separation, t h e home was worth a t least $82,000. Appellant had t o provide $43,000 t o r e t i r e t h e d e b t owing on t h e half i n t e r e s t i n t h e Riverside Bar, t h e $4000 f o r e i g h t months of maintenance and, perhaps, a s w i l l be discussed l a t e r , $1500 f o r c o s t s and attorney f e e s . That he assume c e r t a i n of t h e debts does n o t appear inequitable. For example, a s i z e a b l e loan had been taken o u t i n M r s . Green's name t o pay D r . Green's arrearages i n support owed h i s wife and o f f s p r i n g from a p r i o r marriage; t h a t he should assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h a t does not appear inequitable and unreasonable. Unclear from t h e record i s t h e why and t h e wherefore of some of t h e loans. W e cannot speculate about them, b u t absent compelling explanations t o t h e contrary, it does not appear inequitable t h a t D r . Green, t h e p a r t y earn- ing approximately $6000 per month, a s opposed t o M r s . Green, who earns w e l l under $1000 per month, i s t o discharge t h e obligations. The s i t u a t i o n i s not, a s appellant suggests, one of leaving him "with some f u r n i t u r e and an o l d c a r , " while t h e wife i s " s i t t i n g on t h e s i d e laughing." Given t h e nature of t h e property t o be d i s t r i b u t e d and with due consideration of t h e i t e m s elaborated i n s e c t i o n 48-321, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-4-202 MCA, it appears t h a t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n made by t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court indeed was e q u i t a b l e . It i s well s e t t l e d t h a t " [ t ] he apportionment made by t h e District Court w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d on review u n l e s s t h e r e has been a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n a s manifested by a s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n of t h e m a r i t a l assets r e s u l t i n g i n s u b s t a n t i a l i n j u s t i c e . " I n re Marriage of Brown (1978), Mont. 587 P.2d 361, 364, 35 St.Rep. 1733, c i t i n g i n t e r alia, I n re Marriage of B l a i r (1978), Mont. , 583 P.2d 403, 405, 35 St.Rep. 1256, and Eschenburg v. Eschen- burg (1976), 171 Mont. 247, 557 P.2d 1 0 1 4 , 1016, 33 St.Rep. 1198. I n t h e i n s t a n t case, no c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n i s manifest; t h e r e has been no s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n e q u i t a b l e d i v i - s i o n of t h e m a r i t a l assets r e s u l t i n g i n s u b s t a n t i a l i n j u s t i c e t o e i t h e r party. The D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed as t o t h e d i v i s i o n of t h e p a r t i e s ' property. Considering t h e second i s s u e , a f t e r reviewing t h e t r a n s c r i p t of proceedings, w e f i n d t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s and conclusions are based on s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence. I t i s t r u e t h a t some of t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t are more properly conclusions of l a w and v i c e versa, b u t a mislabeling such a s has occurred here w i l l n o t form t h e b a s i s f o r repudiating t h e determinations of t h e District Court. Appellant has s u f f e r e d no s u b s t a n t i a l i n j u s t i c e a s a r e s u l t of t h e m i s - l a b e l i n g . Such e r r o r i s harmless and may n o t be used t o d e f e a t t h e judgment. The D i s t r i c t Court w i l l n o t be r e - versed f o r harmless e r r o r , e.g., Halko v. Anderson (1939), 108 Mont. 588, 593, 93 P.2d 956, 959, and t h e cause w i l l n o t be remanded i n those cases wherein t h e eventual r e s u l t must be t h e same. Green v. Green (1978), - Mont. - , 579 P. 2d 1235, 1237, 35 St-Rep. 800. The t h i r d i s s u e concerns t h e award of maintenance and a t t o r n e y f e e s t o M r s . Green. A c o u r t may g r a n t maintenance f o r e i t h e r spouse only i f it f i n d s t h a t t h e spouse seeking maintenance meets two conditions: (1) he o r she l a c k s s u f f i c i e n t property t o provide f o r h i s o r her reasonable needs; and, (2) i s unable t o support himself o r h e r s e l f through appropriate employment - o r i s t h e custodian of a c h i l d whose condition o r circumstances make it appropriate t h a t t h e c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t n o t be required t o seek employment o u t s i d e t h e home. Section 48-322 (1) ( a ) , (b) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-4-203 (1) ( a ) , (b) MCA. Furthermore, i n making t h e award, t h e c o u r t i s prohibited from considering any marital misconduct of t h e p a r t i e s , b u t must consider t h e following: " t h e f i n a n c i a l resources of t h e p a r t y seeking main- tenance, including m a r i t a l property apportioned t o him, and h i s a b i l i t y t o meet h i s needs independently, including t h e e x t e n t t o which a provision f o r support of a c h i l d l i v i n g with t h e p a r t y includes a sum f o r t h a t p a r t y a s custodian; " t h e time necessary t o acquire s u f f i c i e n t education o r t r a i n i n g t o enable t h e p a r t y seeking maintenance t o f i n d appropriate employment; " t h e standard of l i v i n g e s t a b l i s h e d during t h e m a r - r i a g e ; " t h e d u r a t i o n of t h e marriage; " t h e age, and t h e physical and emotional condition of t h e spouse seeking maintenance; and " t h e a b i l i t y of t h e spouse from whom maintenance i s sought t o m e e t h i s needs while meeting those of t h e spouse seeking maintenance. " Section 48-322 ( 2 ) ( a ) - (f) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-4-203 (2) (a) - ( f ) MCA. I n t h i s case, t h e D i s t r i c t Court t w i c e r e f e r s t o t h e maintenance award: "18. The Respondent should pay and t h e P e t i t i o n e r i s awarded t h e sum of $500.00 per month f o r t h e c a r e and support of P e t i t i o n e r beginning June 1, 1977, and through t h e month of January 1978 f o r a t o t a l s u m of $4,000.00." " 3 . That P e t i t i o n e r with no formal education p a s t high school, having no work experience during t h e marriage of note, s u f f e r i n g from a progressive d i s a b l i n g d i s e a s e of u l c e r a t i v e c o l i t u s a s diagnosed by Respondent, and unable t o hold g a i n f u l employment g r e a t e r than s e v e r a l s h i f t s per week a s a bartender and s h a l l experience a low and reducing r a t e of per- sonal income h e r e a f t e r . " Based on t h e latter, a finding mislabeled a conclusion, t h e D i s t r i c t Court had ample foundation f o r making t h e s h o r t t e r m maintenance award and d i d s o i n s u f f i c i e n t compliance with s t a t u t o r y mandate. Section 48-327, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-4-110 MCA, states: "The c o u r t from t i m e t o t i m e a f t e r considering t h e f i n a n c i a l resources of both p a r t i e s may order a p a r t y t o pay a reasonable amount f o r t h e c o s t t o t h e o t h e r p a r t y of maintaining o r defending any proceeding un- d e r t h i s a c t and f o r a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s including sums f o r l e g a l s e r v i c e s rendered and c o s t s incurred p r i o r t o t h e commencement of t h e proceeding o r a f t e r e n t r y of judgment. The c o u r t may order t h a t t h e amount be paid d i r e c t l y t o t h e a t t o r n e y , who may enforce t h e o r d e r i n h i s name." A s t o t h e award of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s , t h e D i s t r i c t Court found: "19. That Respondent should pay toward t h e P e t i - t i o n e r ' s a t t o r n e y f e e s and t h e P e t i t i o n e r i s here- by awarded t h e sum of $1,500.00 a s f o r and towards t h e P e t i t i o n e r ' s a t t o r n e y f e e s and c o s t s i n t h i s matter." "11. The Respondent should be ordered and i s hereby required t o pay t h e sum of $1,500.00 towards t h e P e t i t i o n e r ' s a t t o r n e y f e e s and c o s t s of s u i t incurred." The D i s t r i c t Court determined t h a t a p p e l l a n t i s "a t r a i n e d , licensed and p r a c t i c i n g medical doctor, age 53, without any claimed physical o r mental impairment, with earnings of approximately $6,000.00 per month" who " s h a l l continue t o have a high rate of personal income." The record supports t h e s e determinations. I n c o n t r a s t , t h e wife, who had no formal education beyond high school and no s i g n i f i c a n t employment experience during t h e p a r t i e s ' marriage, s u f f e r s from u l c e r a t i v e c o l i t i s and i s unable t o hold g a i n f u l employment o t h e r than working s e v e r a l s h i f t s as a bartender. H e r income nowhere approaches t h a t of appel- l a n t and, as t h e D i s t r i c t Court found, it w i l l gradually diminish a s she ages and t h e d i s e a s e progresses. Clearly t h e c o u r t considered t h e f i n a n c i a l resources of both p a r t i e s . Under t h e s e circumstances, an award of $1500 toward payment of her a t t o r n e y f e e s and c o s t s does n o t appear s o i n e q u i t a b l e a s t o mandate r e v e r s a l . W e have held, however, t h a t evidence must be introduced t o support an award of a t t o r n e y f e e s . A s s t a t e d i n S t a t e Highway Comm'n v. Marsh (1978), - Mont. - , 575 P.2d 38, 43, 35 St.Rep. 105, 1 1 0 , ". . . A n award of a t t o r n e y f e e s must be based on a hearing allowing f o r o r a l testimony, t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of e x h i b i t s , and an opportunity t o cross- examine i n which t h e reasonableness of t h e a t t o r n e y f e e s claimed i s demonstrated. . ." A s i n Marriage of Barron (1978) Mont. , 580 P.2d 936, 938, 35 St.Rep. 891, 8 9 4 : "We f i n d a lack of evidence t h a t would s a t i s f y t h e requirements of Crncevich v. Georgetown Rec. Corp. (1975), 168 Mont. 113, 541 P.2d 56, and F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank of Bozeman v. Tholkes (1976), 169 Mont. 422, 547 P.2d 1328, t o support t h e award of a t t o r n e y f e e s i n t h e judgment." A s i n Barron and Hollinger v. McMichael (1978), Mont. , 580 P.2d 927, 35, St.Rep. 856, t h e cause must be remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r an e v i d e n t i a r y hearing on t h e question of a t t o r n e y f e e s . F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t complains of e r r o r i n t h e admission of respondent's E x h i b i t No. 4 , used t o show t h e income of t h e Riverside B a r where respondent w a s working. Appellant objected t o its admission on t h e grounds (1) t h a t M r s . Green could t e s t i f y t o t h e matters contained t h e r e i n ; (2) t h a t he had no opportunity t o examine t h e bookkeeper who prepared it; ( 3 ) t h a t it had no r e l a t i o n t o t h e case; and ( 4 ) t h a t it was very misleading. The D i s t r i c t Court s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t t h e e x h i b i t was being admitted only f o r t h e purpose of showing t h e w i f e ' s n e t income. Immediately p r i o r t o i t s introduction, Irene Green t e s t i f i e d twice, without any objection, a s t o t h e income she received from t h e bar during an eight-month period i n 1977. Thus, t h e information was before t h e c o u r t f o r i t s consideration even before t h e introduction of t h e e x h i b i t . W e need not decide whether t h e r e was e r r o r i n t h e admission of t h i s e x h i b i t , f o r even were t h e r e e r r o r , it w a s n o t p r e j u d i c i a l t o appellant, a f f e c t i n g h i s s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s s o as t o be made t h e b a s i s f o r r e v e r s a l . Rule 6 1 , M.R.Civ.P. Harmless e r r o r w i l l not be made t h e b a s i s f o r r e v e r s a l , e.g., Halko v. Anderson, 108 Mont. a t 593, 93 P.2d a t 959. For t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o be reversed f o r improp- e r l y admitting evidence, s u b s t a n t i a l prejudice t o t h e com- plaining p a r t y must be shown. Rule 103, Mont.R.Evid., states t h a t " [ e l r r o r may n o t be predicated upon a r u l i n g which admits o r excludes evidence unless a s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t of t h e p a r t y i s affected. . ." Appellant has made no show- ing t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t has been a f f e c t e d t o h i s d e t r i - ment so as t o warrant r e v e r s a l . The judgment i s affirmed, except a s noted above regard- i n g remand t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r an evidentiary hearing on t h e question of attorney f e e s and c o s t s . We concur: ~ ~ ! b q q Chief Justice w -' . \ \ \ - . . &$ m y & , --- ,' Justices - i : ' I