Title: Caylor v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC09-2366
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 27, 2011

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-2366 
____________ 
 
MATTHEW LEE CAYLOR, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[October 27, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before this Court on direct appeal from a judgment of conviction 
of first-degree murder and a sentence of death.1  The appellant, Matthew Lee 
Caylor, was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder, sexual battery 
involving great physical force, and aggravated child abuse.  The convictions were 
based on the 2008 killing of thirteen-year-old Melinda Hinson in Panama City, 
Florida.  At the end of the penalty phase of Caylor‟s trial, the jury recommended 
the death penalty by a vote of eight to four, and the trial court followed the jury‟s 
recommendation in its sentencing order.  The trial court also imposed sentences of 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
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life in prison for sexual battery involving great physical force and thirty years in 
prison for aggravated child abuse.  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the 
convictions and sentences. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
In July 2008, Melinda Hinson was living with her mother, her mother‟s 
boyfriend, her fifteen-year-old brother, and Daryl Lawton, a family friend, in a 
single room at the Valu-Lodge Motel in Panama City.  The family had moved to 
Florida from Kentucky in December 2007 and Lawton came to live with the family 
soon after.  Due to strained finances, all five moved to the motel in mid-June.  The 
room was crowded and the children did not have school during the summer, so 
Melinda would spend most of her time by the motel‟s pool.  Melinda would also 
walk two dogs belonging to Scott Heinze and Tyler Nichols, who also lived at the 
motel, while Heinze and Nichols were at work. 
According to the motel‟s records, Matthew Caylor checked into the motel on 
June 25, 2008.  At trial, Lawton testified that prior to the date of Melinda‟s 
disappearance, he had only spoken with Caylor a few times and that he had never 
seen Melinda or her brother speak with Caylor.  However, at around noon on July 
8, Caylor came to Lawton and asked to borrow some duct tape, which Lawton took 
to Caylor‟s room.  Later in the day, Caylor called Lawton and asked if he could 
also borrow a steak knife.  Again, Lawton went to Caylor‟s room to take him the 
 
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item.  Lawton recalled that Melinda and her brother accompanied him on one of 
these occasions, but said that they did not speak to Caylor. 
 
Melinda was last seen alive shortly after 5 p.m. on July 8, when she returned 
Heinze and Nichols‟ dogs to their room after taking the dogs for a walk.  When 
Melinda did not return to her family‟s room, the family first asked Heinze and 
Nichols whether they had seen her.  Heinze told the family that he had last seen 
Melinda when she returned the dogs to their room.  The family then searched the 
motel and the surrounding area.  When they could not find Melinda, they called the 
police and reported that the girl was missing. 
 
Melinda‟s body was discovered on the morning of July 10, hidden under a 
bed in a room two doors down from Heinze and Nichols‟ room.  The body was 
found naked and lying face-down.  The discovery was made by a housekeeper who 
was following the motel‟s requirement of checking under the beds for trash.  
Although the room had been cleaned the previous day, the first housekeeper to 
clean the room testified that she did not look under the bed that day because her 
back was hurting.  A review of the motel‟s records revealed that Matthew Caylor 
had been renting the room on the day of Melinda‟s disappearance.  Officers of the 
Panama City Police Department subsequently learned that Caylor had been 
arrested in connection with a different criminal matter and that he was already in 
the custody of the Bay County Sheriff‟s Department. 
 
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Detective Mark Smith of the Panama City Police Department testified at trial 
that he interviewed Caylor after the body was discovered.  He was accompanied by 
Investigator Mike Wesley of the Bay County Sheriff‟s Department, who had 
interrogated Caylor following the initial arrest.  When Smith and Wesley went to 
see Caylor, Caylor said that he was glad to see the officers because he wanted to 
talk to them.  The officers read Caylor his Miranda2 rights, which he waived.  In 
the interrogation that followed, Caylor confessed to the murder of Melinda Hinson 
and described the circumstances leading up to the crime.  Based on Caylor‟s 
statements and evidence recovered from the crime scene, Caylor was charged with 
first-degree murder (based on both premeditation and felony murder theories of the 
offense), see § 782.04(1)(a)1.-2., Fla. Stat. (2008), sexual battery involving great 
physical force, see § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (2008), and aggravated child abuse, see 
§ 827.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). 
In statements made initially to the police officers and later to the trial court, 
Caylor gave the following account of the murder and the events leading up to it.  In 
the summer of 2008, Caylor was on felony probation in the State of Georgia based 
on an incident that had occurred several years before in which he was accused of 
molesting the fourteen-year-old daughter of a neighbor.  Caylor asserted that he 
was falsely accused, but said that on his attorney‟s advice he pled guilty to avoid a 
                                          
 
 
2.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
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possible prison sentence.  He was later required to register as a sex offender after 
violating the terms of his probation by being convicted of possession of cocaine.  
Caylor stated that after several years he became frustrated with the restrictions 
placed on him as a sex offender, and said that he told his probation officer that he 
would rather serve time in jail and be done with the sentence.  Caylor said that he 
then went to Panama City to relax because he thought he would have to spend 
approximately a year and a half in jail.  Caylor admitted that he had not been given 
permission by his probation officer to leave Georgia, even though he knew he was 
required to receive such permission by Georgia law. 
Caylor decided to rent a room at the Valu-Lodge Motel because it was close 
to the beach.  While in Panama City, Caylor began selling cocaine and 
methamphetamines.  He said that he also became friends with “two Russian girls,” 
and that he became romantically involved with one of the girls, Marina.  He said 
that he discovered on July 8 that the women had stolen some of his drugs.  Caylor 
said that he borrowed a knife and duct tape with the intent of using it to threaten 
them to get his drugs back.  He subsequently went to the women‟s apartment, 
taking the knife and duct tape with him.  Caylor said that he became violent during 
 
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that encounter and decided to go back to his room at the motel.  He was later 
arrested for the incident at the apartment.3 
During his interrogation, Caylor told Smith and Wesley that he returned to 
his motel room immediately after the incident at the women‟s apartment.   He said 
that he had been back in his room for only a few minutes when Melinda Hinson 
knocked on his door and asked him for a cigarette.  He told the officers that at the 
time Melinda came to his room, he felt that he had “been through all of this 
because of something I didn‟t do,” and told the officers that he decided he was 
“going to make it worth it.”  When asked during the Spencer hearing what he 
meant by these statements, Caylor responded that he meant he was angry about his 
prior conviction for child molestation.  He told the trial court he felt that “[i]f I‟m 
going to be in trouble for having sex with this girl being in my room, I might as 
well have sex with this girl.” 
After Melinda entered the room, Caylor said that she sat down on the bed 
and that they began smoking.  He asked her what she had been doing.  Melinda 
replied that she had just finished walking a dog that belonged to the men in the 
                                          
 
 
3.  Although a recording of the interrogation was played at trial, certain 
portions of the interrogation, in which Caylor described the circumstances of his 
probation and the assault at the women‟s apartment, were edited out in order to 
prevent the jury from being exposed to potentially prejudicial information.  Caylor 
later described these events in greater detail before the trial court at his Spencer 
hearing.  See Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).  
 
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next room.  Caylor asked how old she was and she told him that she was thirteen.  
He said that he asked her why she hung out with the guys next door.  Melinda 
responded that “they think they‟re hot stuff” but said that she “[did]n‟t really like 
them.”  According to Caylor, Melinda then told him that she thought he was “hot,” 
moved close to him on the bed and put her arm around him.  Caylor said that they 
started kissing, that he took her clothes off, and that they started having sex. 
 
Caylor said that at some point he “just started choking her.”  He claimed that 
they had stopped having sex just before he began to strangle her.  He said that he 
“wasn‟t into it” and that the intercourse lasted for only thirty to forty-five seconds.  
However, he said that they were still naked when he began to strangle her and that 
he was still on top of her.  Caylor said that when he began to choke Melinda, “she 
was flipping out and I just wanted her to go away.”  He said that she began fighting 
him and saying, “[L]et me ask you a question, let me ask you a question,” and that 
during the struggle they fell from the bed to the floor.  Caylor told the officers that 
he then unplugged the phone cord from the wall and wrapped it around her neck.  
The officers asked whether Melinda was moving when he began to strangle her 
with the cord, and Caylor responded:  “Well, yeah, it was like no, no.”  When he 
thought Melinda was dead, he released her and plugged the phone cord back into 
the wall.  He then lifted up the mattress and placed Melinda and her clothes under 
the bed.  He said that he gathered his things and left the room. 
 
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Detective Smith asked Caylor why he decided to kill Melinda: 
[Detective Smith:]  Well, is your thoughts that now I‟ve had sex with 
her she‟s going to tell?  Is that what led to that she has to die? 
 
[Caylor:]  No, it wasn‟t like that, no, it wasn‟t like that, it was just 
like, it was like, more or less like you‟re the fucking reason why I‟m 
in this situation I‟m in now because I did the right thing.  I think it 
was more of a hate, like a hate, like I was really angry, I think is what 
it was. 
 
[Detective Smith:]  A hate for her or a hate the fact [sic] that she‟s 13 
years old. 
 
[Caylor:]  That she was 13 coming on to me. 
 
Caylor said that when Melinda came into his room, he was “all pissed off about 
everything that has happened, not to mention the fact of what just happened at 
Marina‟s house.”  He said that Melinda “just kind of walked up at the wrong, with, 
you know, with that same bull shit, man, at the wrong time.” 
 
At trial, the State called several witnesses to describe physical evidence 
recovered from the crime scene.  Brenda Pelfrey, a crime scene investigator, 
identified photographs of the motel room where the body was discovered.  She 
stated that the victim‟s clothes, which were found underneath the body, were not 
ripped or torn and that there was no blood on the victim‟s underwear.  Pelfrey was 
also present during the autopsy, where she collected a sexual assault kit.  Trevor 
Seifert, a crime lab analyst, testified that he found Melinda‟s DNA on portions of 
the phone cord removed from the motel room, and that Caylor was a possible 
 
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contributor to scrapings taken from under Melinda‟s fingernails.  Seifert also stated 
that vaginal swabs from the victim tested positive for blood and semen, and that 
Caylor‟s DNA profile matched these samples.4 
The jury also heard testimony from Dr. Michael Hunter, the medical 
examiner who conducted the autopsy.  Dr. Hunter stated that during the 
examination he observed considerable injuries to the victim‟s neck.  He found that 
some of these injuries were consistent with strangulation by hand, while other 
straight-line markings showed strangulation by ligature.  He agreed that the latter 
markings could have been inflicted through the use of a telephone cord.  Dr. 
Hunter noted that there were multiple straight-line abrasions, which indicated 
application and reapplication of the ligature.  He determined that these markings 
were most likely inflicted while the victim was still alive.  He also observed 
bleeding in the victim‟s eyes, which provided further evidence of strangulation.  
Dr. Hunter ultimately concluded that the cause of death was strangulation.  He said 
that the victim would have been in pain while she was conscious, and noted that 
there was no evidence of any head trauma that might have impaired her ability to 
feel pain or made her unaware of what was happening around her. 
                                          
 
 
4.  Seifert stated that the likelihood that a person unrelated to Caylor was the 
source of the semen was approximately one in 6.5 trillion Caucasians and one in 23 
trillion Southeastern Hispanics. 
 
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In addition to evidence of strangulation, Dr. Hunter observed other injuries 
on the body, including a bruise on the victim‟s arm, a small abrasion on her left 
ankle, and another large bruise that extended over the length of the left side of her 
clavicle.  He said that there was considerable bleeding underneath the clavicle 
bruise.  Additionally, Dr. Hunter observed discoloration in the victim‟s pubic area, 
although he said that this injury could have occurred during consensual sex.  He 
noted that the victim was menstruating at the time of death, but found no indication 
as to whether she was sexually active.  He said that the victim‟s blood tested 
positive for nicotine but negative for drugs or alcohol. 
 
After the jury convicted Caylor of all three charged offenses, a penalty 
proceeding was held.  The State‟s only witness at this proceeding was Thomas 
Shakitra, who testified that he was employed as a probation officer with the State 
of Georgia.  Shakitra stated that in 2008, he was supervising Caylor, who was on 
felony probation.  Following this testimony, the defense stipulated that Caylor had 
a prior felony conviction in Georgia.   
The defense called four witnesses during the penalty phase.  The appellant‟s 
parents, Kimberly and Kerry Caylor, testified that they were both addicted to 
amphetamines while the appellant was a child and that for a time the family had no 
money and lived in a trailer with no power.  Both parents testified that the 
appellant had an abusive relationship with his father, began abusing drugs at a 
 
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young age, and suffered from emotional problems.  A third defense witness 
testified that he worked with the appellant as a mechanic in Jasper, Georgia, and 
described the appellant‟s drug problems.  The final defense witness was a 
veterinarian who testified that Matthew Caylor had worked in the kennel area of 
his office for several months.  He stated that Caylor was a good employee and 
treated the animals well.  At the end of the proceeding, the jury recommended the 
death penalty by a vote of eight to four. 
 
The trial court held a Spencer hearing on November 18, 2009.  Caylor 
testified in his own defense and described the events preceding the murder.  He 
said that contrary to his initial statement to the police, he had used a large amount 
of drugs on the day of the homicide.  He stated that he decided to have sex with 
Melinda because he was angry about the fact that he had been on probation for 
eight years for an offense he did not commit, and that he was angry because he 
found himself in a similar situation with a thirteen-year-old girl.  He said that he 
did not rape Melinda and that he was remorseful for killing her. 
 
In its written sentencing order, the trial court found and assigned weight to 
the following aggravating circumstances: (1) the capital felony was committed by a 
person previously convicted of a felony and under a sentence of imprisonment or 
placed on community control or on felony probation (great weight); (2) the capital 
felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of 
 
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sexual battery and aggravated child abuse (great weight); and (3) the capital felony 
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (“HAC”) (great weight).  The court 
found the following mitigating circumstances: (1) dysfunctional family (little 
weight); (2) under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
(some weight); (3) compassionate to animals and good employee (little weight); 
(4) learning difficulties (very little weight); and (5) remorse (little weight). 
The trial court concluded that the nature and quality of the mitigating factors 
“pale[d] in comparison” to the enormity of the aggravating circumstances.  
Furthermore, the court determined that the aggravating circumstances clearly and 
convincingly outweighed the mitigating factors.   Based on these determinations, 
the trial court imposed a sentence of death. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
Caylor raises the following claims on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in 
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the offense of aggravated child 
abuse; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on 
the offense of sexual battery involving great force; (3) the trial court erred in 
finding as an aggravating circumstance that he committed the murder while on 
felony probation; (4) the trial court erred in assigning “little weight” to the 
“dysfunctional family” and “remorse” mitigating circumstances; (5) death is a 
disproportionate punishment; and (6) Florida‟s death penalty is unconstitutional 
 
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under the holding of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).   Because this is a 
death penalty case, we must also address whether the evidence is sufficient to 
support a conviction for first-degree murder.  See Phillips v. State, 39 So. 3d 296, 
308 (Fla.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 520 (2010). 
Aggravated Child Abuse 
 
As his first issue, Caylor contends that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion for judgment of acquittal on the offense of aggravated child abuse.  In 
Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2005), this Court held that where the murder 
of an infant was accomplished by the single act of stabbing the victim once in the 
chest, the act of abuse merged with the homicide.  We determined that it was 
therefore improper to convict the defendant of both aggravated child abuse and 
first-degree murder.  Further, because the appellant could not be convicted of 
aggravated child abuse as a separate offense,5 we held that aggravated child abuse 
could not serve as an underlying offense to support a felony murder conviction, 
and that the trial court could not consider aggravated child abuse as an aggravating 
circumstance to support the death penalty.  See id. at 198-99.6 
                                          
 
 
5.  In contrast to the instant case, Brooks was not actually charged with or 
convicted of aggravated child abuse as a separate felony.  Nonetheless, the trial 
court in that case relied on aggravated child abuse as an aggravating circumstance 
to support the death sentence.  See Brooks, 918 So. 2d at 199. 
 
6.  We acknowledge that the scope and continued validity of Brooks have 
recently been called into question by several district courts of appeal.  See Rosa v. 
 
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In his motion, Caylor argued that because the murder of Melinda Hinson 
was similarly accomplished by a “single act”—in this case, strangulation—the act 
of aggravated child abuse, as in Brooks, merged with the homicide.  The trial court 
denied the motion.  Caylor argues here that, pursuant to Brooks, the trial court 
should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal.  He also argues that 
aggravated child abuse cannot be used as an underlying felony to support his first-
degree felony murder conviction, and that it was error for the trial court to rely on 
the offense as an aggravating circumstance in support of its decision to impose the 
death penalty.  “In reviewing a motion for judgment of acquittal, a de novo 
standard of review applies.  Generally, an appellate court will not reverse a 
conviction that is supported by competent, substantial evidence.”  Johnston v. 
State, 863 So. 2d 271, 283 (Fla. 2003) (citations omitted).  We find that the offense 
of aggravated child abuse was supported by sufficient evidence in this case. 
Brooks followed our decision in Mills v. State, 476 So. 2d 172, 177 (Fla. 
1985), in which an appellant‟s dual convictions for aggravated battery and first-
                                                                                                                                        
State, 58 So. 3d 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Lewis v. State, 34 So. 3d 183 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2010), review granted, 53 So. 3d 230 (Fla. 2011); Sturdivant v. State, 35 Fla. 
L. Weekly D1993 (Fla. 1st DCA Sept. 7, 2010), review granted, 47 So. 3d 1290 
(Fla. 2010).  However, for the reasons discussed herein we find that the facts of the 
instant case are distinguishable from Brooks.  Therefore, we do not need to address 
the scope or validity of Brooks here. 
 
- 15 - 
degree murder were held to be improper.  In Brooks, we described the facts and 
reasoning of Mills as follows: 
In Mills, the defendant broke into a house in the middle of the 
night intending to steal something.  When the homeowner awoke to 
investigate, the defendant shot and killed him.  The defendant was 
charged with one count of felony murder, one count of burglary while 
armed with a firearm, and one count of aggravated battery with a 
firearm.  This Court held that while the defendant could be found 
guilty of all three charges, it was not proper to convict him for 
aggravated battery and simultaneously for homicide as a result of one 
shotgun blast.  Mills, 476 So. 2d at 177.  In that limited context, we 
concluded that the felonious conduct merged into one criminal act.  
Id.  As we explained in Mills, “We do not believe that the legislature 
intended dual convictions for both homicide and the lethal act that 
caused the homicide without causing additional injury to another 
person or property.”  Id. 
 
Brooks, 918 So. 2d at 198.  As we further explained in Brooks, our determination 
in Mills was based on the fact that under the specific circumstances presented in 
that case, “the aggravated battery has merged into the homicide.”  Id.  Thus, it was 
improper to convict the appellant for both the lesser offense of aggravated battery 
and the greater offense of first-degree murder. 
 
Subsequent to the Mills decision, in Brooks, the defendant was charged with 
killing a three-month-old infant by stabbing the child a single time in the chest.  
The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.  
Although the defendant was not convicted of aggravated child abuse during the 
guilt phase of trial, the trial court determined in its sentencing order that he had 
committed the elements of that offense and therefore relied on aggravated child 
 
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abuse as an aggravating circumstance supporting the death penalty.  See § 
921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2002).  On direct appeal, this Court determined that 
under Mills, the trial court‟s action was improper.  First, we observed that while 
Mills concerned a conviction for aggravated battery rather than aggravated child 
abuse, that case was nonetheless applicable “because aggravated child abuse is an 
aggravated battery, the only difference being that the victim is a child.”  Brooks, 
918 So. 2d at 198 (citing § 827.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2002)).  Second, we determined 
that because, as in Mills, the act of battery was entirely subsumed within the 
homicide offense, it was improper for the trial court to rely on aggravated child 
abuse as an underlying felony in a felony murder conviction or as an aggravating 
circumstance to support the death sentence.  See id. at 199. 
 
Importantly, however, we also stated that “[g]enerally, aggravated child 
abuse can be a separate charge and serve as the felony in a felony murder charge.”  
Id. at 198 (emphasis added).  We compared the facts of Brooks‟ case to those in 
Mapps v. State, 520 So. 2d 92, 93 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), where the defendant was 
convicted of felony murder with the underlying offense of aggravated child abuse 
after committing numerous separate acts of striking, throwing, and shaking a ten-
month-old child, leading to a skull fracture that caused the child‟s death.  While we 
approved of the Fourth District‟s observation that “the underlying felony need not 
always be independent of the killing as a prerequisite for a conviction of felony 
 
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murder,” we explained that the result in Mapps was correct precisely because 
“there were separate acts of striking, shaking, or throwing which led to the killing 
of the child.”  Brooks, 918 So. 2d at 198 (emphasis added).  By contrast, we 
observed that Brooks‟ offense “involved the single act of stabbing which caused a 
single injury.”  Id. 
 
As in Mapps, the evidence presented in the instant case clearly demonstrates 
that the victim suffered from more than a single act of aggravated battery.  Caylor 
told the interrogating officers that he first strangled Melinda by hand, and then 
removed a telephone cord from the wall and used it as a ligature.  Dr. Hunter, the 
medical examiner, testified that bruises on the victim‟s neck were indicative of 
both manual and ligature strangulation.  Dr. Hunter observed other injuries, 
including a bruise on the victim‟s arm, an abrasion on her ankle, and another large 
bruise that extended over the left side of her clavicle.  Thus, unlike the 
circumstances we reviewed in Brooks, Caylor‟s conduct was not entirely subsumed 
within the act that caused the victim‟s death; rather, there is competent, substantial 
evidence that Caylor committed numerous acts of aggravated battery that were 
separate from the homicide.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the 
appellant‟s motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of aggravated child 
abuse, or in relying on that offense as an aggravating circumstance in its 
sentencing order. 
 
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Sexual Battery 
 
In his second claim, Caylor argues that the trial court should have granted 
his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the offense of sexual battery involving 
great physical force.  Section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (2008), states: 
A person who commits sexual battery upon a person 12 years of age 
or older, without that person‟s consent, and in the process thereof uses 
or threatens to use a deadly weapon or uses actual physical force 
likely to cause serious personal injury commits a life felony, 
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084, or s. 
794.0115. 
 
“Sexual battery” is defined as “oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, 
the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any 
other object; however, sexual battery does not include an act done for a bona fide 
medical purpose.”  § 794.011(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2008).  “„Consent‟ means 
intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent and does not include coerced 
submission.  „Consent‟ shall not be deemed or construed to mean the failure by the 
alleged victim to offer physical resistance to the offender.”  § 794.011(1)(a), Fla. 
Stat. (2008). 
A trial court‟s ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed on 
appeal under the de novo standard of review.  See Troy v. State, 948 So. 2d 635, 
645 (Fla. 2006).  An appellate court will generally not reverse a conviction that is 
supported by competent, substantial evidence.  Id. (citing Johnston, 863 So. 2d at 
283).  However, 
 
- 19 - 
[w]here the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how 
strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a conviction cannot be 
sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence.  The question of whether the evidence fails 
to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for the jury to 
determine, and where there is substantial, competent evidence to 
support the jury verdict, we will not reverse. 
 
Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 155 (Fla. 2002) (quoting State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 
187, 188 (Fla. 1989)).  “In meeting its burden, the State is not required to „rebut 
conclusively, every possible variation of events‟ which could be inferred from the 
evidence, but must introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the 
defendant‟s theory of events.”  Johnston, 863 So. 2d at 283 (quoting Darling, 808 
So. 2d at 156). 
 
In this case, Caylor‟s hypothesis of innocence was that the sexual activity 
occurred with the victim‟s consent.  He acknowledged both during his 
interrogation and at trial that sexual activity occurred, but contended that Melinda 
Hinson consented to and in fact initiated the sexual activity.  He claimed that all 
injuries were inflicted not in the course of a sexual assault, but rather in the course 
of a nonsexual assault that occurred after they had sex.  Because there is no 
eyewitness testimony or other direct evidence that a sexual battery occurred 
without consent, we review this claim under the circumstantial evidence standard 
of review.  See Thomas v. State, 894 So. 2d 126, 132 (Fla. 2004).  However, 
because we find that the State presented competent evidence that was inconsistent 
 
- 20 - 
with Caylor‟s account, we hold that the trial court‟s denial of the motion is 
supported by the record. 
 
Caylor is correct that some of the evidence was consistent with an initially 
consensual sexual encounter.  A crime scene investigator testified that the victim‟s 
clothes were found with the body and that they were not ripped or torn, which 
would have been evidence of forced removal.  Dr. Hunter, the medical examiner, 
testified that although he observed some discoloration of the victim‟s genitals 
during the autopsy, the injury could have occurred during consensual intercourse.  
Cf. Darling, 808 So. 2d at 156 (finding sufficient evidence of lack of consent to 
sexual activity where “the medical examiner was unequivocal in testifying that the 
abrasions in the victim‟s vaginal area were evidence of forced sex”). 
However, the State presented other evidence that was inconsistent with 
Caylor‟s account.  In Hitchcock v. State, 413 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1982), we reviewed 
a similar claim, in which a defendant asserted that he had consensual intercourse 
with his thirteen-year-old niece, but that he subsequently killed her because she 
threatened to tell her mother about the encounter.  We concluded that the evidence 
was sufficient for the jury to determine that the encounter was not consensual: 
[T]he total circumstances, including the time of night, entry through a 
window, the victim‟s tender years, and medical testimony that the 
child was of previously chaste character, refuted Hitchcock‟s claim of 
consent and could be a basis to find that the sexual battery was 
committed on the victim by force and against her will, thus warranting 
the instruction on felony murder.  Under these circumstances, the jury 
 
- 21 - 
could easily have considered Hitchcock‟s contention that the girl 
consented to have been unreasonable.  
 
Id. at 745. 
 
Similarly, based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury in this case could 
have determined that Caylor‟s account was unreasonable.  It was undisputed that 
the victim was thirteen years old, while Caylor was thirty-three.  Witnesses who 
were familiar with the victim testified that she was shy, that it would take her a 
long time to meet new people, and that she would generally only speak with an 
unfamiliar person if her older brother was with her.  These witnesses testified that 
they were not aware of any prior relationship between Caylor and the victim.  
Caylor himself stated that they had never spoken before she allegedly knocked on 
his door to ask for a cigarette.  As the trial court wrote in its sentencing order:  
“Although the Defendant argues that all of the sexual contact he had with Melinda 
Hinson was consensual and that she initiated it, the jury did not believe that this 
child consented to be sexually battered by this 33 year old, 195-pound man, whom 
she barely knew.”  We find that sufficient evidence was presented to allow the jury 
to make this determination, and we reject Caylor‟s claim of error. 
Felony Probation Aggravator 
Caylor‟s third claim of error is directed toward the trial court‟s sentencing 
order.  Caylor argues that the trial court erred in finding as an aggravating 
circumstance that “[t]he capital felony was committed by a person previously 
 
- 22 - 
convicted of a felony and under a sentence of imprisonment or placed on 
community control or on felony probation.”  § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008).  
When determining whether a trial court has properly found an aggravating 
circumstance, this Court applies the following standard of review: 
[I]t is not this Court‟s function to reweigh the evidence to determine 
whether the State proved each aggravating circumstance beyond a 
reasonable doubt—that is the trial court‟s job.  Rather, our task on 
appeal is to review the record to determine whether the trial court 
applied the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if 
so, whether competent substantial evidence supports its finding. 
 
Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997) (footnote omitted). 
 
Caylor challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court‟s 
finding that he was under a sentence of felony probation at the time of the 
homicide.  Caylor does not challenge the fact that he was on felony probation; the 
defense stipulated at trial that Caylor had a prior felony conviction in Georgia and 
his probation officer testified that he was on probation at the time of the murder.  
Instead, he argues that the evidence was insufficient because the State failed to 
demonstrate a nexus between the fact that he was on probation and the murder 
itself.  Caylor contends that without a nexus requirement, the aggravator fails to 
sufficiently narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, as required 
by Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410 (1982). 
 
As an initial matter, we find that this claim is procedurally barred because 
Caylor did not raise any challenge to the constitutionality of the aggravator in the 
 
- 23 - 
trial court.  “[A]n argument attacking the constitutionality of an aggravating factor 
must be specifically raised at trial to be pursued on appeal.”  Hutchinson v. State, 
882 So. 2d 943, 957 (Fla. 2004).  In this case, the record does not contain any 
challenge to the constitutionality of the felony probation aggravator or to the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting it, even though the defense filed several 
motions challenging the constitutionality of other aggravators.7  The defense in fact 
conceded in its sentencing memorandum that the aggravator had been proven.  
Because the defense did not argue below that the trial court was required to find a 
connection between the defendant‟s status as a person on felony probation and the 
murder, this claim is unpreserved.  See id. (declining to address the appellant‟s 
argument that the trial court improperly found the victims‟ ages as mitigating 
circumstances where there was no causal link between the children‟s ages and their 
deaths, because the appellant failed to raise that argument before the trial court). 
 
Even if this claim were not barred, we would find it to be without merit.  As 
noted above, Caylor does not dispute that he was on felony probation at the time of 
the murder.  Instead, he argues that because this Court has imposed a nexus 
                                          
 
 
7.  Following Caylor‟s conviction for first-degree murder, the defense filed 
motions challenging the constitutionality of the HAC aggravator, the 
constitutionality of Florida‟s death penalty under Ring, and the constitutionality of 
a death sentence based on the commission of aggravated child abuse as an 
aggravating circumstance.  The record does not contain a similar motion 
challenging the constitutionality of the felony probation aggravator. 
 
- 24 - 
requirement on the “avoid arrest” aggravator, a similar requirement should apply to 
the felony probation aggravating circumstance.  See Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 
598, 610 (Fla. 2001) (holding that to establish that a murder was committed for the 
purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest, “the State must show beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the sole or dominant motive for the murder was the elimination of a 
witness”). 
 
However, the felony probation aggravator is substantively different from the 
avoid arrest aggravator.  While the avoid arrest aggravator necessarily has a 
specific relationship to the crime, the felony probation aggravator deals with the 
status of the perpetrator.  See Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938, 958 (Fla. 2007) 
(“The . . . aggravator rests on the defendant‟s status as a community controllee at 
the time of the murder.”).  This Court has rejected a similar nexus requirement for 
aggravators that deal with the status of the victim.  In Woodel v. State, 804 So. 2d 
316, 325 (Fla. 2001), we held that the “advanced age or disability” aggravator did 
not depend on whether the defendant targeted the victim based on the victim‟s 
advanced age.  Similarly, in Smith v. State, 28 So. 3d 838, 865 (Fla. 2009), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 3087 (2011), we held that with regard to the “victim under the 
age of twelve” aggravator, “the State need not demonstrate that the defendant 
targeted the victim based upon her age.”  We cited United States v. Minerd, 176 F. 
Supp. 2d 424, 447 (W.D. Pa. 2001), in which a federal district court rejected a 
 
- 25 - 
similar claim, noting that under “the plain language of the statute the aggravator 
refers to the age or physical characteristics of the victim, and not to whether she 
was targeted because of those qualities.”  See Smith, 28 So. 2d at 865. 
 
Here, the plain language of Florida‟s capital sentencing statute does not 
make any reference to whether the defendant committed the murder because of his 
or her status as a person on felony probation.  It merely sets out as an aggravating 
circumstance that “[t]he capital felony was committed by a person previously 
convicted of a felony and . . . placed on . . . felony probation.”  § 921.141(5)(a).  
Because the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the trial 
court‟s finding that Caylor was in fact on felony probation at the time he 
committed the capital offense, we reject this claim of error. 
Mitigating Evidence 
In the trial court‟s sentencing order, the court found as mitigating 
circumstances that the defendant was raised in a dysfunctional family and that he 
felt remorse for his crimes.  Caylor argues here that the trial court‟s evaluation of 
these mitigating circumstances was deficient and that it erred in assigning them 
little weight.  We find no error. 
“[A] trial court‟s written order must carefully evaluate each mitigating 
circumstance offered by the defendant, decide if it has been established, and assign 
it a proper weight.”  Hurst v. State, 819 So. 2d 689, 697 (Fla. 2002) (citing 
 
- 26 - 
Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1990)).  “Determining whether a 
mitigating circumstance exists and the weight to be given to existing mitigating 
circumstances are matters within the discretion of the sentencing court.”  Id. (citing 
Campbell, 571 So. 2d at 420).  “Furthermore, the trial court‟s conclusions as to the 
weight of mitigating circumstances will be sustained by this Court if the 
conclusions are supported by sufficient evidence in the record.”  Id. (citing 
Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 636, 646 (Fla. 2000); Ferrell v. State, 653 So . 2d 
367, 371 (Fla. 1995)).  The evidence is sufficient when it is both competent and 
substantial.  See Mansfield, 758 So. 2d at 646. 
 
First, with regard to the “dysfunctional family” mitigator, the sentencing 
order states in full: 
The Defendant was the product of a dysfunctional family.  The 
Defendant‟s parents abused drugs and the Defendant began 
experimenting with drugs by the age of 13.  The Defendant‟s father 
would physically discipline and beat him as well as psychologically 
abuse him.  This factor will be given little weight, especially since the 
Defendant‟s brother raised in the same environment has been a law 
abiding citizen. 
 
These findings are supported by sufficient evidence in the record.  Caylor‟s parents 
testified that they abused drugs while the defendant was a child and that Caylor 
was abused by his father.  With regard to the trial court‟s decision to assign little 
weight to this mitigator, the court‟s observation regarding Caylor‟s brother is 
supported by the testimony of Caylor‟s mother. 
 
- 27 - 
Additionally, although Caylor argues that the trial court erred in failing to 
discuss the allegation that he was sexually abused by a family friend when he was 
twelve years old, we note that this allegation was presented only in the testimony 
of Caylor‟s father, who said merely that he learned about the abuse years later.   
The appellant himself never testified regarding the allegation and never gave any 
description of the abuse or how it may have affected him.  In light of the minimal 
nature of the evidence that was presented, we find that any error in the trial court‟s 
failure to discuss this allegation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See 
Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1258 (Fla. 2004) (concluding that even if the 
trial court had erred in rejecting some mitigating circumstances, any error was 
harmless in light of the minimal amount of mitigation the circumstances would 
have provided). 
Second, with regard to Caylor‟s assertion that he felt remorse for the crime, 
the trial court acknowledged in its sentencing order that Caylor had discussed his 
remorse for killing the victim.  However, the court observed that Caylor “also tried 
to shift some of the blame to the victim for being in his room.”  The trial court 
further concluded that “[i]n such self-serving statements, [Caylor] tried to 
minimize his responsibility in the instigation of the events.”  Accordingly, the trial 
court assigned “little weight” to the mitigating circumstance. 
 
- 28 - 
 
Again, this finding is supported by competent and substantial evidence.  On 
one hand, Caylor stated on several occasions that he felt remorse for the murder.  
Caylor was asked during his interrogation whether he was remorseful and he 
responded in the affirmative.  He also said that he was sorry to the family during 
the Spencer hearing, offered the family a letter he had written that he said he hoped 
would help them, and said that what happened to Melinda “wasn‟t her fault.”  On 
the other hand, Caylor made several statements that could be construed as 
attempting to shift the blame to the victim for what happened.  Specifically, he told 
the interrogating officers and the trial court that he killed Melinda because he was 
angry at her for being the sexual aggressor in the encounter. 
It is not error for a trial court to discuss evidence of a defendant‟s lack of 
remorse when that evidence is used to negate a proposed mitigating circumstance.  
See Walton v. State, 547 So. 2d 622, 625 (Fla. 1989); Agan v. State, 445 So. 2d 
326, 328 (Fla. 1983).  We find that the trial court‟s discussion of the aggravator, 
and its decision to assign little weight to the defendant‟s remorse, are supported by 
the record. 
Proportionality of the Death Sentence 
We next address the proportionality of the death sentence.  In capital cases, 
this Court compares the circumstances presented in the appellant‟s case with the 
circumstances of similar cases to determine whether death is a proportionate 
 
- 29 - 
punishment.  See Wade v. State, 41 So. 3d 857, 879 (Fla. 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 1004 (2011).  The purpose of this review is “to prevent the imposition of 
„unusual‟ punishments contrary to article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution.”  
Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270, 291 (Fla. 2004).  As we have previously stated:  
“[T]he death penalty is „reserved only for those cases where the most aggravating 
and least mitigating circumstances exist.‟”  Smith v. State, 28 So. 3d 838, 874 (Fla. 
2009) (quoting Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 965 (Fla. 1996)).   However, the 
proportionality analysis “is not a comparison between the number of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances.”  Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d 923, 935 (Fla. 2000) 
(quoting Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990)).  “Rather, [the 
analysis] entails „a qualitative review by this Court of the underlying basis for each 
aggravator and mitigator.‟”  Simpson v. State, 3 So. 3d 1135, 1148 (Fla. 2009) 
(quoting Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416 (Fla. 1998)). 
In this case, the trial court found three aggravating circumstances: (1) the 
capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and 
under a sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control or on felony 
probation; (2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged 
in the commission of sexual battery and aggravated child abuse; and (3) HAC.8  
                                          
 
 
8.  Although Caylor asserts in the “Proportionality” section of his brief that 
the murder was not HAC, his statements during his police interview, as well as the 
testimony of the medical examiner, establish that the victim was strangled to death 
 
- 30 - 
The court found one statutory aggravating circumstance: Caylor was under the 
influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  The court also found 
four nonstatutory mitigators:  (1) dysfunctional family; (2) compassionate to 
animals and a good employee; (3) learning difficulties; and (4) remorse. 
This Court has previously affirmed death sentences in cases involving 
similar aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  In Hitchcock, 413 So. 2d at 
743-45, we affirmed a death sentence where the defendant entered his brother‟s 
house through a dining room window at 2:30 a.m., entered the room of his thirteen-
year-old niece, sexually battered her by force and against her will, and choked and 
beat her to death.  The trial court found in aggravation that the murder was 
committed in the course of an involuntary sexual battery, that the purpose of the 
murder was to eliminate a witness, and that the murder was especially heinous, 
wicked, or cruel.  The sole mitigating factor was the defendant‟s age of twenty 
years.  Id. at 747. 
In Davis v. State, 698 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1997), the defendant entered the 
home of his ex-girlfriend, kidnapped her eleven-year-old daughter, digitally 
penetrated the child, and then strangled her to death.  The trial court found the 
                                                                                                                                        
and that she was conscious when the attack began.  “[B]ecause strangulation of a 
conscious victim involves foreknowledge and the extreme anxiety of impending 
death, death by strangulation constitutes prima facie evidence of HAC.”  Orme v. 
State, 25 So. 3d 536, 551 (Fla. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3391(2010). 
 
- 31 - 
following aggravating circumstances: the defendant was under a sentence of 
imprisonment at the time of the murder; the murder was committed in the course of 
a kidnapping and sexual battery; the murder was committed for the purpose of 
avoiding arrest; and HAC.  Id. at 1187.  The only statutory mitigating circumstance 
found was that the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance at the time of the murder.  The trial court also found ten 
mitigating circumstances, which included the defendant‟s acceptance of 
responsibility and remorse for his actions, his lack of a history of violence, his 
cooperation with police, and the fact that he had suffered the effects of being 
placed in institutional settings at an early age and had spent a significant portion of 
his life in such settings.  Id.  This Court found that the death sentence was 
proportionate.  See id. at 1194. 
 
Finally, in Smith, 28 So. 3d at 844-48, we upheld the imposition of a death 
sentence where the defendant abducted an eleven-year-old girl while she was 
walking home from the home of a friend, had forcible sex with her, and killed her 
by strangulation.  Based on the markings on the victim‟s neck, a medical examiner 
testified that the victim died from strangulation by ligature.  Id. at 849-50.  In 
aggravation, the trial court found:   
(1) Smith committed the felony while he was on probation (moderate 
weight); (2) the murder was committed while Smith was engaged in 
the commission of a sexual battery or kidnapping (significant weight); 
(3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding lawful 
 
- 32 - 
arrest (great weight); (4) HAC (great weight); and (5) the victim was 
under twelve years of age (great weight). 
 
Id. at 874.  The trial court found no statutory mitigating circumstances and thirteen 
nonstatutory mitigators, which included the defendant‟s long history of mental 
illness and drug abuse, the fact that he was repeatedly denied or given inadequate 
treatment for his problems, that he maintained gainful employment, and that he 
was a loving father.  See id. at 852-53. 
 
We find that when compared with the cases cited above, the death sentence 
is proportionate.  With regard to the aggravating circumstances, in all three cases 
cited above, as in the instant case, a defendant committed forcible sexual battery on 
a child and killed the child by strangulation.  We observe that Caylor was also on 
felony probation at the time of the murder.  Moreover, the trial court found that the 
murder in this case was heinous, atrocious and cruel, which we have stated “is 
among the weightiest [aggravators] in the statutory scheme.”  Johnson v. State, 969 
So. 2d 938, 958 (Fla. 2007).  With regard to the mitigating circumstances, the only 
statutory mitigator, as in Davis, was that the defendant was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  The trial court in this case assigned little 
weight to each of the remaining mitigating circumstances.  In weighing the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial court in this case stated:  “The 
nature and qualities of [the mitigating] factors pales in comparison to the enormity 
 
- 33 - 
of the circumstances in this case.”  In light of these considerations, we find that 
death is a proportionate sentence. 
Ring v. Arizona 
We next address the appellant‟s challenge to the constitutionality of 
Florida‟s death penalty under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  In Ring, the 
United States Supreme Court held that where an aggravating circumstance operates 
as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense in capital 
sentencing, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that 
the aggravating circumstance must be found by a jury.  As Caylor acknowledges, 
this Court has repeatedly held that Florida‟s death penalty does not violate Ring.  
See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002) (observing that the United 
States Supreme Court did not direct this Court to reconsider Florida‟s capital 
sentencing statute in light of Ring); King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002) 
(same); see also Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 366, 387 (Fla. 2007) (“This Court has 
repeatedly and consistently rejected claims that Florida‟s capital sentencing 
scheme is unconstitutional under Ring . . . .”). 
Furthermore, Caylor was contemporaneously convicted of aggravated child 
abuse and sexual battery involving great physical force by a unanimous jury during 
the guilt phase of his trial.  Ring is not implicated when, as here, the trial court has 
found as an aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed in the course 
 
- 34 - 
of a felony that was found by the jury during the guilt phase.  See McGirth v. State, 
48 So. 3d 777, 795 (Fla. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2100 (2011).  Evidence was 
also presented that Caylor was on felony probation at the time of the murder based 
on a prior conviction, which the defense conceded during the penalty phase.  For 
the purposes of a claim under Ring, the fact of a prior conviction does not need to 
be found by a jury.  See Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 1255, 1262 (Fla. 2003).  
Accordingly, Ring is not implicated in this case. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Finally, we must address whether the evidence was sufficient to support a 
conviction for first-degree murder: 
In death penalty cases, this Court conducts an independent 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence.  See Insko v. State, 969 So. 
2d 992, 1002 (Fla. 2007).  Regardless of whether the appellant raises 
this issue, the Court must “determine whether sufficient evidence 
exists to support a first-degree murder conviction.”  Snelgrove v. 
State, 921 So. 2d 560, 570 (Fla. 2005) (citing Mansfield v. State, 758 
So. 2d 636, 649 (Fla. 2000)).  Whether the evidence is sufficient is 
judged by whether it is competent and substantial.  See Blake v. State, 
972 So. 2d 839, 850 (Fla. 2007). 
 
Phillips, 39 So. 3d at 308.  “In conducting this review, we view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational trier of fact could 
have found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d 655, 674 (Fla. 2006) (citing Bradley v. State, 787 So. 
2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001)).  In this case, Caylor was charged with both first-degree 
 
- 35 - 
premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder, and the jury returned a 
general verdict of guilty.  “A general guilty verdict rendered by a jury instructed on 
both first-degree murder alternatives may be upheld on appeal where the evidence 
is sufficient to establish either felony murder or premeditation.”  Crain v. State, 
894 So. 2d 59, 73 (Fla. 2004). 
First, there is sufficient evidence in this case to support a conviction for first-
degree premeditated murder.   
Premeditation is defined as more than a mere intent to kill; it is a fully 
formed conscious purpose to kill.  This purpose may be formed a 
moment before the act but must exist for a sufficient length of time to 
permit reflection as to the nature of the act to be committed and the 
probable result of that act.  
 
Bradley, 787 So. 2d at 738 (quoting Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d 980, 985 (Fla. 
1999)).  Premeditation may be inferred from such facts as “the nature of the 
weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous 
difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was committed, 
and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted.”  Id. (quoting Norton v. State, 
709 So. 2d 87, 92 (Fla. 1997)).  
Here, Caylor stated in his interrogation that while he was engaged in sexual 
contact with the victim, he began choking her and that, at that moment he “just 
wanted her to go away.”  He admitted taking the phone cord off the wall and using 
it as a ligature to continue strangling her.  Caylor‟s statements were corroborated 
 
- 36 - 
by the testimony of the medical examiner, who said that the straight-line bruises on 
the victim‟s neck were consistent with multiple applications of a ligature.  The 
medical examiner also testified that the strangulation would have to have been 
constant for a minimum of two to five minutes to cause the victim‟s death.  Based 
on this evidence, the jury could have found that Caylor had a fully formed 
conscious purpose to kill at the time of the homicide.  Accordingly, there was 
sufficient evidence that Caylor committed the homicide with “a premeditated 
design to effect the death of the person killed.”  See § 782.04(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. 
(2008). 
Second, with regard to first-degree felony murder, Caylor was 
contemporaneously convicted of aggravated child abuse and sexual battery during 
the guilt phase of his trial.  The unlawful killing of a human being constitutes 
murder in the first degree “[w]hen committed by a person engaged in the 
perpetration of” any qualifying felony listed in the felony murder statute, including 
sexual battery and aggravated child abuse.  See § 782.04(1)(a)2.  As discussed 
previously, the State presented sufficient evidence to support the convictions for 
both underlying offenses.  The jury could properly have found that Caylor 
committed the murder while engaged in the perpetration of sexual battery or 
aggravated child abuse or both, thus supporting a conviction for first-degree felony 
murder. 
 
- 37 - 
Because competent and substantial evidence was presented to support a jury 
finding in favor of either first-degree murder alternative, we affirm the appellant‟s 
first-degree murder conviction. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the appellant‟s convictions for 
sexual battery involving great physical force, aggravated child abuse, and first-
degree murder.  We also affirm the sentence of death. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs in result. 
QUINCE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
QUINCE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I dissent in part from today‟s decision because I conclude that the State did 
not present sufficient evidence to support the offense of sexual battery involving 
great physical force.  Section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (2008), requires the 
State to prove that the act of sexual battery occurred without the victim‟s consent 
where the victim is twelve years of age or older.  In its opinion, this Court observes 
that because no direct evidence was presented concerning the issue of consent, the 
conviction should only be affirmed if the record contains competent evidence that 
 
- 38 - 
is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.  See Darling v. State, 
808 So. 2d 145, 155 (Fla. 2002).  The appellant argued at trial that he engaged in 
consensual sex with the victim and that all injuries were inflicted after the sexual 
act.  Thus, in order for this Court to affirm the conviction, the record must contain 
evidence that is inconsistent with this claim. 
 
However, a review of the record demonstrates that all of the physical 
evidence was in fact consistent with the appellant‟s account.  While significant 
evidence was presented concerning the victim‟s injuries, nothing in the record 
establishes whether any of those injuries were inflicted before or after the sexual 
act.  There was no evidence that the victim‟s clothes had been forcibly removed.  
Further, the medical examiner could not state with certainty whether she had been 
sexually battered against her will.  These facts are not refuted or contradicted by 
the evidence of the victim‟s age and character on which the majority relies.  
Accordingly, I would vacate the appellant‟s conviction for sexual battery involving 
great physical force and the accompanying sentence of life in prison. 
 
Additionally, because I conclude that the evidence does not support the 
conviction for sexual battery, I would also find that the trial court erred in relying 
on that offense as an aggravating circumstance in its sentencing order.  
Nonetheless, I concur in this Court‟s decision to affirm the death sentence because 
I believe that any error was harmless beyond any reasonable doubt.  See Turner v. 
 
- 39 - 
State, 37 So. 3d 212, 226 (Fla.) (“When this Court strikes an aggravating factor on 
appeal, „the harmless error test is applied to determine whether there is no 
reasonable possibility that the error affected the sentence.‟”) (quoting Jennings v. 
State, 782 So. 2d 853, 863 n.9 (Fla. 2001)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 426 (2010). 
Even without sexual battery as an aggravating circumstance, the record still 
establishes that the murder was committed in the course of an aggravated child 
battery, and thus leaves undisturbed the trial court‟s finding that the murder was 
committed in the course of a felony.  See § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2008).  The 
trial court also assigned “great weight” to its finding that the murder was especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and to the fact that at the time of the murder, the 
appellant was on felony probation for a prior act of child molestation.  Further, 
although not charged as a lesser offense, the appellant‟s actions clearly 
encompassed the elements of a lewd and lascivious battery, a second-degree 
felony, since it was not disputed at trial that the victim was thirteen years old.  See 
§ 800.04(4), Fla. Stat. (2008) (defining lewd and lascivious battery as “sexual 
activity with a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age”). 
In light of the extensive aggravation remaining in the record, I conclude that 
the trial court‟s finding of sexual battery involving great physical force as an 
aggravating circumstance was harmless error.  Therefore, I agree with the Court 
that the appellant‟s death sentence should be affirmed. 
 
- 40 - 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bay County,  
Dedee S. Costello, Judge - Case No. 08-2244-CFMA 
 
Nancy A. Daniel, Public Defender, and David A. Davis, Assistant Public Defender, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Meredith Charbula, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee