Title: The Florida Bar v. Andrew R. McGraw
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-1537
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 12, 2005

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC02-1537 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR RE:  
ANDREW R. MCGRAW 
 
[May 12, 2005] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
We have for review a referee's report recommending that Andrew R. 
McGraw be reinstated to the practice of law in Florida.  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained herein, we disapprove the 
referee’s recommendation that McGraw be reinstated.   
FACTS 
After conducting a full hearing, the referee issued a report making the 
following detailed findings of McGraw’s long procedural history before the Bar.  
Criminal and Disciplinary History 
 
In 1997, McGraw pled nolo contendere to a charge of misdemeanor battery 
and was sentenced to eleven months in jail.  On March 25, 1997, this Court issued 
an order imposing an emergency suspension.  Fla. Bar v. McGraw, 691 So. 2d 
1082 (Fla. 1997) (table citation).  Thereafter, McGraw was the subject of two 
 
 
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additional disciplinary proceedings, in which he received suspensions.  See Fla. 
Bar v. McGraw, 717 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1998) (table citation) (imposing two-year 
suspension and requiring respondent to enter into a three-year contract with Florida 
Lawyers Assistance, Inc.); Fla. Bar v. McGraw, 718 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1998) (table 
citation) (imposing ninety-one day suspension).   
Pursuant to this Court’s orders, and upon release from jail, McGraw entered 
into a three-year contract with Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc. (FLA).  Among 
other requirements, he agreed to (1) totally refrain from the use of all mood 
altering substances, including alcohol; (2) report to FLA=s monitor, Stanley Spring, 
on a monthly basis; (3) participate in a twelve-step program; and (4) submit to 
random drug and alcohol tests.  In violation of this agreement, in April 1998, 
McGraw tested positive for cocaine.  Further, in January 1999, McGraw was 
charged with driving under the influence (DUI).  He pled nolo contendere to the 
lesser offense of reckless driving.   
First Petition for Reinstatement 
 
In January 2000, McGraw filed his first petition for reinstatement to the Bar.  
McGraw failed to disclose the 1999 DUI charge in that petition.  Also, in March 
2000, a female employee at a retail store filed a police report stating that while she 
was working, McGraw grabbed her in an inappropriate manner.  Although no 
 
 
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criminal charges were filed, evidence indicated that McGraw had consumed 
alcoholic beverages preceding the incident. 
In April 2000, Myer Cohen, the Executive Director of FLA, provided an 
affidavit detailing McGraw's activities from August 1996 to April 2000.  Mr. 
Cohen concluded that McGraw’s chemical dependency was not in sustained 
remission and that McGraw’s condition would impair his ability to practice law.  
After receiving Mr. Cohen’s affidavit, McGraw’s counsel sought and obtained a 
continuance of the reinstatement hearing.   
Thereafter, on June 5, 2000, McGraw entered the Twelve Oaks Treatment 
Center for substance abuse treatment.  He was released eighteen days later.  In the 
medical discharge summary, the Medical Director for Twelve Oaks Treatment 
Center, Dr. Rick Beach, stated that McGraw=s prognosis for abstinence from 
alcohol and drugs was extremely poor and also expressed serious reservations 
concerning McGraw’s return to the practice of law.   
In December 2000, at the final hearing on the first petition for reinstatement, 
McGraw presented the referee with another three-year FLA contract, which was 
dated December 5, 2000.  Although the contract was dated and signed by Mr. 
Cohen and McGraw, McGraw had not submitted the executed agreement to FLA.  
Next, in January 2001, before the referee finalized his report, McGraw tested 
positive for cocaine during a random drug test.  The Bar moved for an evidentiary 
 
 
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hearing before the referee.  In response, McGraw submitted a sworn affidavit to the 
referee stating under oath that he had not used cocaine since 1997.  Yet, i
n March 
2001, McGraw withdrew his first petition for reinstatement, and the referee 
recommended that the petition for reinstatement be dismissed.  This Court entered 
an order on November 21, 2001, approving the referee’s report.   
Second Petition for Reinstatement 
In July 2001, McGraw signed still another FLA contract, which was to 
extend from July 2001 to July 2003.  A year later, in July 2002, McGraw submitted 
a second petition for reinstatement.  Two months later, i
n September 2002, 
McGraw voluntarily entered Health Care Connection (HCC), a chemical 
dependency treatment program.  Upon arrival at HCC, McGraw tested positive for 
cocaine and HCC employees observed beer bottles in the trunk of his car.  Further, 
according to McGraw’s HCC counselor, McGraw stated “that he wanted to ‘tuck 
himself away from society for approximately two months’ so that he did not have 
any client contact as an attorney, get a speeding ticket, or something like that for 
the next two months before he has a chance of getting his law license back.”  
McGraw remained at HCC from September 2002 until he was discharged in 
January 2003.     
With regard to the second petition for reinstatement, an affidavit of Judy 
Rushlow, Assistant Director of FLA, dated November 2002, was filed and outlined 
 
 
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that McGraw had been under contract with FLA since August 1996.  Ms. Rushlow 
indicated that random drug and alcohol tests were conducted monthly from January 
2001 through July 2002.  Within that period, from May 2001 through April 2002, 
McGraw missed nine days of random drug and alcohol tests.  Further, in 
September 2002, McGraw had telephoned Ms. Rushlow and had stated that he was 
entering HCC.  McGraw did not provide Ms. Rushlow with any explanation for 
this decision.  In early 2003, McGraw signed yet another FLA contract, extending 
from January 2003 to January 2008.   
While investigating McGraw=s second petition for reinstatement, the Bar 
discovered that McGraw had failed to disclose, in both his first and second petition 
for reinstatement, the existence of two final judgments against him.  In September 
1996, a final judgment was entered against him for past rent and related costs in 
the amount of $926.50.  As of December 2002, McGraw had not satisfied the final 
judgment.  Next, McGraw had failed to disclose a delinquent student loan.  Based 
upon this student loan, a final judgment in the amount of $16,806.80 had been 
entered against him.   
Further, in June 2003, McGraw violated the terms of his latest FLA contract.  
Pursuant to the terms of the FLA contract, McGraw was required to attend an 
Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meeting each day.  On Thursday morning, June 12, 
2003, McGraw did not attend a 7:30 a.m. meeting and all efforts to contact him 
 
 
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were unsuccessful.  Finally, on Monday, June 16, 2003, McGraw called his 
monitor, Mr. Spring, and asserted that he had gone out of town and lost his cell 
phone.  Further, Mr. Spring discovered that McGraw had failed to call for the FLA 
required drug and alcohol tests on Thursday and Friday, June 12 and 13.  Also, Mr. 
Spring had been informed by a credible source that McGraw had been consuming 
alcohol and that McGraw had advised people who were familiar with his situation 
that he had permission to do so.  McGraw denied the allegations.   
Based on Mr. Spring=s report about these events, FLA Director Cohen wrote 
McGraw in June 2003 and terminated his FLA contract.  Mr. Cohen stated that 
McGraw’s unwillingness to comply with the terms of his FLA contract indicated 
that the inordinate amount of time FLA had spent on his case simply represented 
an exercise in frustration.  Mr. Cohen removed McGraw from the drug and alcohol 
testing program.   
In regard to McGraw’s struggle for sobriety, HCC Director Timothy 
Sweeney, who was deposed while the second petition for reinstatement was 
pending, stated that McGraw “needs to clock some more clean time.”  Mr. 
Sweeney recommended against McGraw being reinstated because he believed that 
McGraw still has serious problems with chemical dependency. 
Further, Ms. Rushlow stated in a second affidavit, dated July 2003, that the 
pertinent provisions of McGraw's recently terminated FLA contract were that he 
 
 
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would (1) abstain from the consumption of all mood-altering substances, including 
alcohol; (2) reside in a halfway house for a period of time to be determined by 
HCC; (3) regularly attend AA meetings as well as attorney support meetings; and 
(4) comply with a system for random drug and alcohol testing.  Ms. Rushlow 
reported that in February 2003, McGraw left the halfway house without discussing 
the matter with anyone at HCC or FLA.  Also, Ms. Rushlow established that in 
July 2003, Mr. Spring filed a monitor report stating that McGraw was 
noncompliant with his contract because he had failed to comply with the random 
drug and alcohol testing and failed to meet his twelve-step requirements, and there 
were reports that McGraw had been consuming alcohol and had lied by 
representing that FLA now permitted him to drink alcohol.  As a result of Mr. 
Spring's reports, FLA concluded that McGraw was not fit for reinstatement to the 
Bar. 
After the final hearing on the second petition for reinstatement, McGraw 
submitted a September 2003 affidavit from his FLA monitor, Mr. Spring, which 
was in conflict with FLA’s official positions and Mr. Spring’s previous reports.  
Mr. Spring’s new affidavit stated (1) Mr. Spring and McGraw attended a FLA 
workshop together and that McGraw’s participation was exemplary; (2) McGraw 
chaired at least one meeting at the workshop; (3) since the workshop, McGraw 
worked closely with Mr. Spring and spoke with him virtually every single day; (4) 
 
 
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McGraw=s attitude towards his recovery program was excellent, and it was obvious 
that he was enjoying his work for his father, an attorney; and (5) based on Mr. 
Spring’s continued close interaction with McGraw since the final hearing, and 
taking into account that even after FLA terminated his contract, McGraw 
continued to work closely with Mr. Spring, Mr. Spring had changed his position 
and now concluded that McGraw should be reinstated. 
In response to Mr. Spring=s new affidavit, the Bar submitted an additional 
affidavit from Ms. Rushlow, dated September 22, 2003, which stated: (1) 
McGraw=s January 2003 contract with FLA was terminated by FLA due to 
McGraw’s noncompliance, and no random drug and alcohol testing or monitoring 
had been accomplished by FLA since that termination; (2) Mr. Spring=s affidavit 
was based only on his own opinions and did not represent FLA=s position; (3) 
FLA=s opinion regarding McGraw=s fitness for reinstatement was unchanged; and 
(4) based on several years= experience with McGraw, FLA was of the view that he 
should not be reinstated until he is able to strictly comply with a one-year 
rehabilitation program. 
Referee’s Recommendations 
 
The referee recognized in his report that McGraw=s two incidences of 
insobriety prevented his satisfactory completion of the HCC program, but that 
McGraw had satisfied many aspects of the program before FLA terminated the 
 
 
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contract.  The referee noted that McGraw admitted using cocaine from April 1998 
through September 2002, but that there was no evidence McGraw possessed or 
used any nonprescribed controlled substances since his entry into HCC in 
September 2002.  Further, McGraw had actively participated in a twelve-step 
program.  The referee reported that McGraw had also actively participated in a 
program of recovering professionals, including attendance at not less than one 
attorney support meeting per week.  McGraw had also assisted with the 
establishment of an additional attorney support meeting in Pensacola.  The referee 
noted that McGraw had attended the FLA Annual Workshop, which occurred 
subsequent to the final hearing and after FLA terminated the January 2003 
contract.  The referee did recognize, however, that McGraw struggles with his 
alcohol and drug dependency, and noted that McGraw has made significant strides 
in dealing with his addiction and recovery.  It is important to note, however, that 
the referee specifically found that McGraw had been untruthful in his testimony.  
The referee also found that McGraw failed to include required and relevant 
information regarding financial issues in his petitions.  Further, even as recently as 
June 2003, McGraw had not been completely forthcoming with his monitor, Mr. 
Spring, about his sobriety and whereabouts.  Thus, the referee was concerned with 
McGraw=s history of deception. 
 
 
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After considering numerous aspects of this extensive case, the referee 
recommended that McGraw be reinstated to the Bar, subject to a three-year 
probationary period.  The Florida Bar petitioned for review of the referee’s report.  
ANALYSIS 
 
A petitioner seeking reinstatement to The Florida Bar must establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that he has met the criteria set forth in Rule Regulating 
the Florida Bar 3-7.10, “Reinstatement and Readmission Procedures,” and the 
decisions of this Court.  See In re Wolf, 257 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1972).  The factors in 
Wolf are similar to those set forth in rule 3-7.10(f), regarding reinstatement factors 
and procedures.1   
                                        
1  Rule 3-7.10(f) provides, in part, the following factors.   
 
(1) Disqualifying Conduct. A record manifesting a deficiency 
in the honesty, trustworthiness, diligence, or reliability of a petitioner 
may constitute a basis for denial of reinstatement. The following shall 
be considered as disqualifying conduct: 
(A) unlawful conduct; 
(B) academic misconduct; 
(C) making or procuring any false or misleading statement or 
omission of relevant information, including any false or 
misleading statement or omission on any application 
requiring a showing of good moral character; 
(D) misconduct in employment; 
(E) acts involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation; 
(F) abuse of legal process; 
(G) financial irresponsibility; 
(H) neglect of professional obligations; 
(I) violation of an order of a court; 
 
 
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(J) evidence of mental or emotional instability; 
(K) evidence of drug or alcohol dependency; 
(L) denial of admission to the bar in another jurisdiction on 
character and fitness grounds; 
(M) disciplinary action by a lawyer disciplinary agency or other   
professional disciplinary agency of any jurisdiction; and 
(N) any other conduct that reflects adversely upon the character 
or fitness of the applicant.  
 
(2) Determination of Character and Fitness. In addition to 
other factors in making this determination, the following factors 
should be considered in assigning weight and significance to prior 
conduct: 
(A) age at the time of the conduct; 
(B) recency of the conduct; 
(C) reliability of the information concerning the conduct; 
(D) seriousness of the conduct; 
(E) factors underlying the conduct; 
(F) cumulative effect of the conduct or information; 
(G) evidence of rehabilitation; 
(H) positive social contributions since the conduct; 
(I) candor in the discipline and reinstatement processes; and 
(J) materiality of any omissions or misrepresentations. 
(3) Elements of Rehabilitation. Any petitioner for 
reinstatement from discipline for prior misconduct shall be required to 
produce clear and convincing evidence of such rehabilitation 
including, but not limited to, the following elements:
 
(A) strict compliance with the specific conditions of any 
disciplinary, judicial, administrative, or other order, where 
applicable; 
(B) unimpeachable character and moral standing in the 
community; 
(C) good reputation for professional ability, where applicable; 
(D) lack of malice and ill feeling toward those who by duty 
were compelled to bring about the disciplinary, judicial, 
administrative, or other proceeding; 
(E) personal assurances, supported by corroborating evidence, 
of a desire and intention to conduct one's self in an 
exemplary fashion in the future; 
(F) restitution of funds or property, where applicable; 
 
 
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On review in connection with a reinstatement proceeding, “the party seeking 
review of the referee's recommendation has the burden to demonstrate that the 
report is erroneous, unlawful, or unjustified."  Fla. Bar re Dunagan, 775 So. 2d 
959, 961 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Fla. Bar re Grusmark, 662 So. 2d 1235, 1236 (Fla. 
1995)).  Thus, in the instant case, the burden is on the Bar to demonstrate that the 
referee’s recommendation is erroneous or unjustified.  Further, with “regard to the 
referee's legal conclusions and recommendations, the Court's scope of review is 
wider because we have the ultimate responsibility to enter the appropriate 
judgment.”  Id. (quoting Grusmark, 662 So. 2d at 1236); see also Fla. Bar re Inglis, 
471 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1985).   
The Bar argues that clear and substantial evidence in the record 
demonstrates that McGraw is not fit to return to the practice of law.  McGraw has 
an extensive history of cocaine and alcohol abuse.  He has failed to comply with 
numerous FLA contracts.  He has also failed to appear for several drug/alcohol 
                                                                                                                              
(G) positive action showing rehabilitation by such things as a 
person's occupation, religion, or community or civic 
service. 
 
Merely showing that an individual is now living as and doing 
those things that should be done throughout life, although necessary to 
prove rehabilitation, does not prove that the individual has undertaken 
a useful and constructive place in society. The requirement of positive 
action is appropriate for persons seeking reinstatement to the bar as 
well as for applicants for admission to the bar because service to one's 
community is an essential obligation of members of the bar. 
 
 
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screens.  The Bar further argues that McGraw's deceitful conduct alone, during the 
reinstatement proceedings, demonstrates that he lacks moral character and fitness.  
The Bar asserts that these are crucial elements to resuming a position of trust and 
confidence among the ethical practitioners of the Bar.  According to the Bar, 
McGraw has continued to display a lack of truthfulness and honesty, which should 
prevent him from being reinstated.   
 
We agree with the Bar.  With due respect to the referee and his extensive 
work with this most unfortunate situation, the facts of the instant case demonstrate 
that McGraw simply has not satisfied the criteria for reinstatement.  The criteria for 
reinstatement include a petitioner's strict compliance with the specific conditions of 
a previous disciplinary order.  See Wolf, 257 So. 2d at 548-49.  Pursuant to 
McGraw’s second disciplinary case, see 717 So. 2d at 540, he was specifically 
required to complete a three-year contract with FLA.  Since 1997, McGraw has 
totally failed to comply with any one of his numerous FLA contracts due to his 
cocaine use and alcohol abuse.  He tested positive for cocaine in April 1998, 
January 2001, and September 2002.  He also admitted that he used crack cocaine 
from April 1998 through September 2002.  Further, during the period of the FLA 
contracts, McGraw also consumed alcohol, contrary to the requirements with 
regard to his behavior (DUI arrest in January 1999; alcohol involved when he 
harassed the beach store employee in March 2000; beer bottles in trunk at HCC in 
 
 
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September 2002; witnesses saw him drinking beer on two occasions around June 
2003).  McGraw also disappeared for several days in June 2003, when he allegedly 
went out of town.  He missed two possible drug and alcohol tests during that 
purported trip. 
During the course of his most recent FLA contracts (from May 2001 through 
April 2002), McGraw failed to attend a total of nine random drug and alcohol tests.  
Further, since FLA terminated his last contract for noncompliance, McGraw has 
not been subject to drug and alcohol testing since June 2003.  After working with 
McGraw, both FLA and HCC officially recommended that McGraw not be 
reinstated because he has not demonstrated that he is fit to resume the practice of 
law.     
In considering whether McGraw should be reinstated, Florida Bar v. Liroff, 
582 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1991), provides guidance.  Initially, Liroff was privately 
reprimanded for engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice 
law.  Liroff’s misconduct arose from his addiction to a synthetic opiate cough 
syrup.  This Court ordered Liroff to undergo treatment recommended by FLA.  
Thereafter, the Bar initiated a subsequent case against Liroff for failing to adhere 
to the conditions of probation.  The Court agreed with the Bar, found Liroff in 
contempt, and suspended him for sixty days.  When considering Liroff's failure to 
comply with the terms of probation, the Court stated that the standard  
 
 
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is not merely that the attorney presently suffers no addiction.  Serious 
impairment--perhaps resulting in serious harm to a client--can occur 
in a single episode, without the attorney ever actually becoming 
addicted again.   
More to the point, an attorney previously addicted to impairing 
substances is under a continuing obligation to comply with the terms 
of probation imposed by this Court, including good-faith compliance 
with treatment programs administered by FLA.  Even a single episode 
of substance abuse is a violation of this obligation, whether or not 
renewed “addiction” results.  Impaired attorneys are a serious problem 
that this Court takes very seriously.   
 
Id. at 1179-80.  McGraw has failed to meet this standard, due to his unfortunate, 
egregious lapses in sobriety.  He has tested positive for cocaine and consumed 
alcohol during periods when he should have been on his finest behavior.  He has 
also missed several drug and alcohol tests.  Further, McGraw has failed to comply 
with a single FLA contract.  The record demonstrates that McGraw still has serious 
problems with refraining from the use of illegal drugs and alcohol.  Thus, McGraw 
has totally failed to comply with the conditions set forth by this Court’s previous 
order.   
The record also demonstrates that McGraw has failed to meet another 
fundamental element for reinstatement, that is, providing evidence of 
unimpeachable character and moral standing.  See Wolf, 257 So. 2d at 548-49.  In 
In re Dawson, 131 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1961), this Court stated:  
In the ultimate, we will look to the evidence in each case to 
ascertain whether it supports a conclusion that the errant lawyer has so 
conducted himself personally . . . to justify a conclusion that he has 
repented of his misdoings, that the disciplinary order has impressed 
 
 
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him with the vital importance of ethical conduct in the practice of law, 
and that he is morally equipped to resume a position of honor and 
trust among the ethical practitioners at the Bar.  This is the pattern 
which an applicant for reinstatement must fit. 
 
Id. at 474. 
McGraw has repeatedly engaged in misrepresentations to the referee and 
others.  First, McGraw testified before the referee in December 2000 that the drug 
test of April 1998, which was positive for cocaine, was incorrect.  McGraw 
claimed that he never used cocaine, only to later admit that he was using cocaine 
during that period of time.  Second, when McGraw tested positive for cocaine in 
January 2001, he submitted a sworn affidavit to the referee testifying that he had 
not used cocaine.  He later admitted that this was also a misrepresentation.  Third, 
McGraw failed to disclose the existence of two final judgments entered against 
him.  Fourth, in September 2002, upon admission to HCC, McGraw lied to HCC 
doctors and staff that he had been clean and sober for two years.  When he arrived 
at HCC, he tested positive for cocaine and empty beer containers were in his car.  
Fifth, in June 2003, McGraw lied to others that he had permission to drink alcohol 
and he lied to his monitor, Mr. Spring, by claiming that he had not been consuming 
alcohol.  The referee found that he could not rely on McGraw’s credibility due to 
McGraw=s history of deception.  See Fla. Bar re Jahn, 559 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 
1990) (finding a lack of good moral character includes acts and conduct that would 
cause a reasonable person to have substantial doubts about an individual's 
 
 
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honesty).  Based on the record, McGraw has failed to demonstrate that he has 
unimpeachable character and moral standing. 
The referee in this case was very conscientious and provided an exceptional 
report, detailing extensive facts and outlining numerous aspects of McGraw’s 
activities.  We extend our appreciation to the referee for providing such an 
exemplary report and for taking the time necessary to explore and reveal the 
numerous issues presented in the web woven by this case.  Also, we understand 
and recognize the difficulties encountered in the life of an addict and recognize that 
human compassion is crucial and necessary in the healing process.  However, this 
Court must abide by a higher calling and protect the members of the public by 
demanding and requiring the utmost in professional standards for attorneys.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Cox, 794 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 2001); Fla. Bar v. Cibula, 725 So. 2d 360 
(Fla. 1998).  McGraw continues in the battle against returning to the use of illegal 
drugs or alcohol.  He was even consuming alcohol within weeks of his final 
hearing.  Further, experts intimately familiar with attorney substance abuse 
problems, who were either treating McGraw or completely familiar with his 
situation, stated that he is not yet ready to resume the practice of law.  Thus, based 
on the record, the criteria for reinstatement, and case law, we conclude that the 
referee’s recommendation of reinstatement is erroneous and cannot be upheld.   
 
 
 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, we disapprove the referee’s recommendation that McGraw be 
reinstated.  Andrew R. McGraw’s petition for reinstatement is denied.   
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Andrew R. McGraw 
in the amount of $12,968.50, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, John Anthony Boggs, Staff Counsel, 
Tallahassee, Florida, and Olivia Paiva Klein, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
John A. Weiss, of Weiss and Etkin, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent