Title: Maple Grove Country Club Inc. v. Maple Grove Estates Sanitary District
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP002296
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 23, 2019

2019 WI 43 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP2296 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Maple Grove Country Club Incorporated, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
County of La Crosse, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
     v. 
Maple Grove Estates Sanitary District, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 382 Wis. 2d 270,915 N.W.2d 729 
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 23, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 21, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
La Crosse 
 
JUDGE: 
Elliott M. Levine 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, J. did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Mark J. Steichen and Boardman & Clark LLP, Madison; 
with whom on the brief is Patrick J. Houlihan and Lawyers At 
Work, LLC, LaCrosse. There was an oral argument by Mark J. 
Steichen. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Kraig A. Byron and Von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Madison. There was 
an 
oral 
argument 
by 
Kraig 
A. 
Byron.  
 
 
2019 WI 43
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP2296 
(L.C. No. 
2014CV389) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Maple Grove Country Club Incorporated, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
County of La Crosse, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Maple Grove Estates Sanitary District, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 23, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Maple Grove 
Country Club, Inc., seeks review of an unpublished, per curiam 
decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's 
order that dismissed the Country Club's inverse condemnation 
claim against Maple Grove Estates Sanitary District.1  The 
                                                 
1 Maple Grove Country Club Inc. v. Maple Grove Estates 
Sanitary Dist., No. 2016AP2296, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. Apr. 19, 2018) (per curiam) (affirming an order of the 
circuit court for La Crosse County, Elliott M. Levine, Judge). 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
2 
 
Country Club asserts that the court of appeals erred in 
upholding the dismissal based on its noncompliance with Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1d) (2013-14),2 the notice of claim statute, 
despite the fact that the Sanitary District did not raise 
noncompliance with the statute in a responsive pleading. 
¶2 
Specifically, 
the 
Country 
Club 
contends 
that 
noncompliance with the notice of claim statute is an affirmative 
defense that must be set forth in a responsive pleading lest it 
be waived and that it cannot instead be initially raised by 
motion. 
 
Conversely, 
the 
Sanitary 
District 
argues 
that 
noncompliance 
with 
the 
notice 
of 
claim 
statute 
is 
a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit and is not waived by 
the failure to plead it as an affirmative defense in a 
responsive pleading. 
¶3 
We conclude that noncompliance with the notice of 
claim statute is an affirmative defense that must be set forth 
in a responsive pleading.  Because the Sanitary District failed 
to set forth the defense in its answer and it has not amended 
its answer to include it, such a defense is deemed waived. 
¶4 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
I 
¶5 
In 1978, the Town of Hamilton formed the Sanitary 
District.  Approximately twelve years later, Tony Ceresa, the 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
3 
 
Country Club's predecessor in title,3 constructed a sewage 
treatment plant along with related collection and outflow 
facilities for the purpose of serving the Country Club property4 
along with a residential development. 
¶6 
The sewer system was initially operated by the Country 
Club.  However, the Town provided for the election of Sanitary 
District commissioners in 1997 and took over operation of the 
system in 1998.  At that time, the Sanitary District adopted a 
"Sewer Use and User Charge Ordinance," which obligated the 
Sanitary District to either lease or purchase the sewer system 
from the Country Club. 
¶7 
Consequently, the Sanitary District and the Country 
Club entered a five-year lease, ending on December 31, 2004.  
Prior to the expiration of the initial lease, the parties 
negotiated a second five-year lease, extending the term to 
December 31, 2009. 
¶8 
As the second lease neared its end, the Country Club 
informed the Sanitary District that it did not wish to renew the 
lease.  Instead, the Country Club determined that it was in its 
"best interest to sell the Sanitary District facility and 
collection system." 
                                                 
3 Ceresa transferred the property to the Country Club in 
1995, and remained the president of the Country Club. 
4 Consisting of approximately 181 acres, the property 
contained a golf course, banquet facility, indoor swimming pool, 
meeting rooms, exercise room, pro shop, bar, and restaurant. 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
4 
 
¶9 
Likewise, the Sanitary District determined that it 
would not be renewing the lease, and informed the Country Club 
of this position by letter.  It explained that "[t]he Board of 
Commissioners is not in a position to enter into any kind of 
long term agreement until we have an examination of the 
collection system and broader understanding as to what will be 
required by the DNR in regard to upgrades to the wastewater 
treatment plant" and that money would need to be set aside for 
improvements. 
¶10 The Country Club responded to the Sanitary District 
with a letter of its own.  It indicated that it was willing to 
either sell or continue leasing the sewer system to the Sanitary 
District, but that payment of some kind would be necessary: 
Given the fact that I am relatively certain that the 
Town/District is not going to build a new sanitary 
facility, that means that the District will continue 
to use Maple Grove's sanitary facility.  Obviously, 
they have to pay a lease payment for that.  If their 
intent is to operate it without paying any rent, then 
essentially the Town/Sanitary District is condemning, 
i.e. taking for a public purpose, the private property 
of Maple Grove Country Club.  The law requires that 
the District would pay Maple Grove Country Club a fair 
market value for the facility. 
¶11 Despite further communications and offers between the 
parties, no agreement was reached before the lease expired.  The 
Sanitary District continued to physically occupy and operate the 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
5 
 
sewer system, and has not paid any rent to the Country Club 
since 2010.5 
¶12 On July 19, 2011, the Country Club served the Sanitary 
District with a document entitled "Notice of Circumstances of 
Claim Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a)."6  The notice stated 
that "the Sanitary District refuses to negotiate a fair and 
equitable purchase price, Lease Agreement, and/or User Agreement 
with respect to said Wastewater Treatment facility . . . ."  It 
further asserted that the Sanitary District "continues to occupy 
and use said property belonging to Claimant contrary to Section 
32.10, Wis. Stats.,[7] and Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin 
                                                 
5 In 2015, the Sanitary District presented the Country Club 
with a check for $14,000, but the Country Club did not accept 
the check. 
6 At the time the notice was filed, the relevant statute was 
numbered Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a).  Effective April 12, 2012, 
the statute was renumbered as § 893.80(1d)(a).  See 2011 Wis. 
Act 162, § 1g.  After renumbering, the substance remained the 
same. 
7 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 32.10, 
entitled 
"Condemnation 
proceedings instituted by property owner," provides: 
If any property has been occupied by a person 
possessing the power of condemnation and if the person 
has not exercised the power, the owner, to institute 
condemnation proceedings, shall present a verified 
petition to the circuit judge of the county wherein 
the land is situated asking that such proceedings be 
commenced. The petition shall describe the land, state 
the person against which the condemnation proceedings 
are instituted and the use to which it has been put or 
is designed to have been put by the person against 
which the proceedings are instituted. A copy of the 
petition shall be served upon the person who has 
occupied petitioner's land, or interest in land. The 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
6 
 
Constitution" without paying any rent or just compensation.8  The 
notice specified that no claim for damages was made "at this 
time."  The Sanitary District did not respond to the Notice of 
Circumstances of Claim. 
¶13 Almost 
three 
years 
after 
filing 
the 
Notice 
of 
Circumstances of Claim, the Country Club initiated this action 
in the circuit court.  It brought two causes of action against 
the Sanitary District, one for inverse condemnation9 and the 
other for unlawful sanitary sewer charges and levy of taxation.  
In its complaint, the Country Club asserted that it had 
                                                                                                                                                             
petition shall be filed in the office of the clerk of 
the circuit court and thereupon the matter shall be 
deemed an action at law and at issue, with petitioner 
as plaintiff and the occupying person as defendant. 
The court shall make a finding of whether the 
defendant is occupying property of the plaintiff 
without having the right to do so. If the court 
determines that the defendant is occupying such 
property of the plaintiff without having the right to 
do so, it shall treat the matter in accordance with 
the 
provisions 
of 
this 
subchapter 
assuming 
the 
plaintiff 
has 
received 
from 
the 
defendant 
a 
jurisdictional offer and has failed to accept the same 
and assuming the plaintiff is not questioning the 
right of the defendant to condemn the property so 
occupied. 
8 Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution sets 
forth:  "The property of no person shall be taken for public use 
without just compensation therefor." 
9 Inverse condemnation is a procedure by which a property 
owner petitions the circuit court to institute condemnation 
proceedings.  Koskey v. Town of Bergen, 2000 WI App 140, ¶1 n.1, 
237 Wis. 2d 284, 614 N.W.2d 845.  It "allows a property owner to 
institute condemnation proceedings against anyone who possesses, 
but fails to exercise, the power of condemnation."  Id., ¶5. 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
7 
 
"provided the requisite notice under Section 893.80, Wis. 
Stats[,]" specifically referencing the July 19, 2011, Notice of 
Circumstances of Claim. 
¶14 The 
Sanitary 
District 
filed 
an 
answer 
to 
the 
complaint, as well as a counterclaim.  In its answer, it raised 
six affirmative defenses:  (1) the Country Club failed to state 
a claim for which relief can be granted; (2) the Country Club's 
claims are barred by the doctrine of laches; (3) the applicable 
statute of limitations bars the claims; (4) sovereign immunity 
bars the Country Club's claims; (5) the claims are barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata; and (6) the Country Club lacks 
standing.  It denied the Country Club's allegation that the 
notice of claim statute had been complied with, but did not 
affirmatively plead that the Country Club had failed to comply 
with the statute. 
¶15 Both parties filed summary judgment motions.  The 
Sanitary District sought summary judgment on its counterclaim 
that it was entitled to recover delinquent sanitary sewer 
charges from the Country Club.  Conversely, the Country Club 
argued that it was entitled to partial summary judgment 
declaring that the Sanitary District had acquired the Country 
Club's property via inverse condemnation. 
¶16 In its brief opposing the Country Club's motion for 
partial summary judgment, the Sanitary District raised an 
assertion that the Country Club had failed to comply with the 
notice of claim procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.80.  
The Sanitary District argued that the Notice of Circumstances of 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
8 
 
Claim filed by the Country Club suffered from two defects:  that 
it was not timely filed and that it did not contain an itemized 
statement 
of 
the 
relief 
sought 
as 
is 
required 
by 
§ 893.80(1d)(b).10  In response, the Country Club contended that 
the Sanitary District had waived the defense of noncompliance 
with the notice of claim statute by failing to plead the defense 
in its answer. 
¶17 After holding an evidentiary hearing, the circuit 
court dismissed the Country Club's inverse condemnation claim.  
It concluded that the Country Club had failed to comply with the 
notice of claim statute.  Specifically, it determined that the 
notice was "untimely and incomplete."  In the circuit court's 
view, the notice was untimely because it was received over 120 
days after the event giving rise to the claim and it was 
incomplete because it did not include an itemized statement of 
the relief sought.  The circuit court did not address the 
Country Club's argument that the Sanitary District had waived 
the defense. 
¶18 The Country Club sought leave to file an interlocutory 
appeal, and the court of appeals granted its petition.11  On 
appeal, the court of appeals limited the issues to "whether the 
Sanitary District waived its notice of claim defense by failing 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1d)(b) provides in relevant part 
that a notice of claim must contain "the address of the claimant 
and an itemized statement of the relief sought . . . ." 
11 See Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2). 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
9 
 
to plead it, and whether the District's answer should be 
considered as amended to present that defense so as to conform 
to the evidence, under Wis. Stat. § 802.09(2)." 
¶19 Ultimately, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court's dismissal of the inverse condemnation claim.  It 
determined that the "Sanitary District did not waive its notice 
of claim defense by failing to plead it."  Maple Grove Country 
Club Inc. v. Maple Grove Estates Sanitary Dist., No. 2016AP2296, 
unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2018) (per 
curiam). 
¶20 The court of appeals reached this conclusion with 
significant reservations.  Specifically, it determined that it 
was bound to follow Lentz v. Young, 195 Wis. 2d 457, 536 
N.W.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1995), even though it "questioned" the 
correctness of the Lentz decision.  Maple Grove Country Club, 
No. 2016AP2296, unpublished slip op., ¶1. 
¶21 In reviewing relevant case law, the court of appeals 
observed Lentz's broad and unqualified holding that "a defendant 
may raise an affirmative defense by motion."  Id., ¶5 (quoting 
Lentz, 195 Wis. 2d at 467).  Following Lentz, it concluded that 
"the District preserved its notice of claim affirmative defense 
by raising it on summary judgment."  Maple Grove Country Club, 
No. 2016AP2296, unpublished slip op., ¶6. 
¶22 However, the court of appeals opined that "Lentz 
almost certainly misinterpreted prior case law in a way that is 
not consistent with relevant statutes."  Id., ¶7.  Namely, it 
stated that "[t]he statutes do not appear to contemplate that 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
10 
 
affirmative defenses will be asserted for the first time in a 
motion for summary judgment that follows the pleadings."  Id., 
¶8. 
¶23 In conclusion, the court of appeals summarized its 
concern that Lentz upends the statutory scheme: 
In summary, the seemingly unqualified rule that was 
applied in Lentz obliterates the statutory scheme.  
Lentz replaces that scheme with a simple rule that 
affirmative defenses need not be pled, but instead 
need only be raised by motion before trial.  But Lentz 
does not cite any statute or case law that supports 
such a rule.  Nonetheless, we are bound by our own 
prior decision and may not overrule, modify, or 
withdraw its language.  Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 
189-90, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997).  We are permitted to 
"signal" our "disfavor," but may not overrule the 
prior decision.  Id. at 190. 
Maple Grove Country Club, No. 2016AP2296, unpublished slip op., 
¶14. 
II 
¶24 We are asked to determine whether noncompliance with 
the notice of claim statute is an affirmative defense or a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit.  If it is a defense, 
then we additionally are called upon to determine whether the 
Sanitary District waived the defense of noncompliance with the 
notice of claim statute by failing to plead the defense in its 
answer. 
¶25 Our 
review 
of 
these 
questions 
requires 
the 
interpretation 
of 
Wisconsin's 
notice 
of 
claim 
and 
civil 
procedure 
statutes. 
 
Statutory 
interpretation 
presents 
a 
question of law that this court reviews independently of the 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
11 
 
determinations rendered by the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  Metro. Assocs. v. City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 4, ¶24, 
379 Wis. 2d 141, 905 N.W.2d 784. 
III 
¶26 For context, we begin by setting forth background on 
the notice of claim statute and its requirements.  We address 
next whether the notice of claim statute provides for an 
affirmative defense or whether it establishes a jurisdictional 
prerequisite to filing suit.  Subsequently, we consider whether 
noncompliance with the notice of claim statute must be raised in 
a responsive pleading lest it be waived.  This requires an 
examination of the notice of claim statute's relationship with 
the civil procedure statutes. 
A 
¶27 Wisconsin's notice of claim statute is found in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1d).  It has two provisions that serve different 
purposes.  Yacht Club at Sister Bay Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Vill. 
of Sister Bay, 2019 WI 4, ¶19, 385 Wis. 2d 158, 922 N.W.2d 95.  
When referring to the statute as a whole, we refer to it as the 
"notice of claim statute" in accordance with past case law.  Id. 
¶28 The first part of the notice of claim statute is the 
"notice 
of 
injury" 
provision, 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(1d)(a), 
which 
affords 
governmental 
entities 
the 
opportunity to investigate and evaluate potential claims.12  
                                                 
12 We treat the "Notice of Circumstances of Claim" filed by 
the Country Club as the "notice of injury" required by Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1d)(a). 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
12 
 
Griffin v. Milwaukee Transp. Servs., Inc., 2001 WI App 125, ¶15, 
246 Wis. 2d 433, 630 N.W.2d 536.  It provides that a person who 
has a potential claim against an enumerated governmental entity 
must notify the governmental entity of the claim "[w]ithin 120 
days after the happening of the event": 
(1d) Except as provided in subs. (1g), (1m), (1p) and 
(8), no action may be brought or maintained against 
any volunteer fire company organized under ch. 213, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency thereof nor against any officer, official, 
agent or employee of the corporation, subdivision or 
agency for acts done in their official capacity or in 
the course of their agency or employment upon a claim 
or cause of action unless: 
(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the event 
giving rise to the claim, written notice of the 
circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent 
or attorney is served on the volunteer fire company, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency and on the officer, official, agent or employee 
under s. 801.11. Failure to give the requisite notice 
shall not bar action on the claim if the fire company, 
corporation, subdivision or agency had actual notice 
of 
the 
claim 
and 
the 
claimant 
shows 
to 
the 
satisfaction of the court that the delay or failure to 
give the requisite notice has not been prejudicial to 
the defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision 
or agency or to the defendant officer, official, agent 
or employee . . . . 
§ 893.80(1d)(a). 
¶29 Subsection (1d)(b) is the "notice of claim" provision, 
which provides information that gives a municipality the 
opportunity to compromise and settle a claim in order to avoid 
the burdens of litigation.  Griffin, 246 Wis. 2d 433, ¶15.  It 
requires that, in addition to the notice of injury set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1d)(a), a potential claimant must file the 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
13 
 
following specific information with the governmental actor 
against whom the claim is made: 
A claim containing the address of the claimant and an 
itemized statement of the relief sought is presented 
to the appropriate clerk or person who performs the 
duties of a clerk or secretary for the defendant fire 
company, corporation, subdivision or agency and the 
claim is disallowed. 
§ 893.80(1d)(b). 
B 
¶30 As an additional threshold matter, we must clarify 
whether the notice of claim statute creates an "affirmative 
defense" or a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit. 
¶31 The Sanitary District argues that case law compels the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
notice 
of 
claim 
statute 
creates 
a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit rather than an 
affirmative defense.  It cites Mannino v. Davenport, 99 
Wis. 2d 602, 299 N.W.2d 823 (1981), for this proposition.  In 
Mannino, the court determined that a lack of notice of injury in 
the context of a claim made against state employees "is a 
defense which is not waived by the failure to affirmatively 
assert it as part of a responsive pleading."13  Id. at 609. 
                                                 
13 Mannino v. Davenport, 99 Wis. 2d 602, 299 N.W.2d 823 
(1981), examined Wis. Stat. § 895.45 (1975-76), which has since 
been renumbered as § 893.82 (2013-14).  In relevant part, 
§ 893.82 provides: 
(3) Except as provided in sub. (5m), no civil action 
or civil proceeding may be brought against any state 
officer, employee or agent for or on account of any 
act growing out of or committed in the course of the 
discharge of the officer's, employee's or agent's 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
14 
 
¶32 There is a crucial difference between the statute at 
issue in Mannino, Wis. Stat. § 893.82(3), and the statute at 
issue here, § 893.80(1d).  Section 893.82(3) requires strict 
compliance 
while 
§ 893.80(1d) 
does 
not. 
 
Importantly, 
§ 893.80(1d) contains a provision allowing for an action to 
survive if the defendant had actual notice of the claim and was 
not prejudiced by any defect in the notice that was filed.  See 
§ 893.80(1d)(a). 
¶33 Indeed, the Mannino court based its analysis in part 
on the conclusion that "the terms of sec. 895.45 provide that no 
action may be brought unless a notice is served upon the 
attorney general."  Mannino, 99 Wis. 2d at 612 (emphasis added); 
see Wis. Stat. § 893.82(3).  Thus, because strict compliance is 
necessary and there is no way around the statute's notice 
requirements, as there is with the actual notice and lack of 
prejudice provision of the notice of claim statute at issue 
                                                                                                                                                             
duties, and no civil action or civil proceeding may be 
brought against any nonprofit corporation operating a 
museum 
under 
a 
lease 
agreement 
with 
the 
state 
historical society, unless within 120 days of the 
event causing the injury, damage or death giving rise 
to the civil action or civil proceeding, the claimant 
in the action or proceeding serves upon the attorney 
general written notice of a claim stating the time, 
date, location and the circumstances of the event 
giving rise to the claim for the injury, damage or 
death and the names of persons involved, including the 
name 
of 
the 
state 
officer, 
employee 
or 
agent 
involved. Except as provided under sub. (3m), a 
specific denial by the attorney general is not a 
condition precedent to bringing the civil action or 
civil proceeding. 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
15 
 
here, lack of compliance with § 893.82(3) cannot be waived.  See 
Mannino, 99 Wis. 2d at 612.  The fact that § 893.80(1d) does not 
require 
strict 
compliance 
is 
significant. 
 
Accordingly, 
Mannino's interpretation of § 893.82(3) is inapposite to the 
issue before us and does not compel the conclusion the Sanitary 
District seeks. 
¶34 Rather, case law favors the Country Club's assertion 
that the notice of claim statute provides for an affirmative 
defense.  An affirmative defense is "a defendant's assertion 
raising new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the 
plaintiff's or prosecution's claim even if all allegations in 
the complaint are true."  State v. Watkins, 2002 WI 101, ¶39, 
255 Wis. 2d 265, 647 N.W.2d 244 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 
151 (7th ed. 1999)). 
¶35 Noncompliance with the notice of claim statute fits 
within 
this 
definition, 
especially 
given 
our 
case 
law 
determining that the statute is a "'condition in fact requisite 
to liability,' but is not a condition required for stating a 
cause of action."  Rabe v. Outagamie Cty., 72 Wis. 2d 492, 498, 
241 N.W.2d 428 (1976) (citing Majerus v. Milwaukee Cty., 39 
Wis. 2d 311, 317, 159 N.W.2d 86 (1968)).  Case law has further 
referred to noncompliance with the notice of claim statute as a 
"defense."  Weiss v. City of Milwaukee, 79 Wis. 2d 213, 228, 255 
N.W.2d 496 (1977); Elkhorn Area Sch. Dist. v. East Troy Cmty. 
Sch. Dist., 110 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 327 N.W.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1982).  
We have also stated that it must be "affirmatively pled."  Thorp 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
16 
 
v. Town of Lebanon, 2000 WI 60, ¶24, 235 Wis. 2d 610, 612 
N.W.2d 59. 
¶36 We therefore clarify that noncompliance with the 
notice of claim statute set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.80 is an 
affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional prerequisite to 
filing suit. 
C 
¶37 Having clarified that noncompliance with the notice of 
claim statute is properly categorized as an affirmative defense, 
we turn next to consider the question of whether the defense 
must be raised in a responsive pleading, as the Country Club 
argues, or if it can instead be initially raised by motion, as 
the Sanitary District contends. 
¶38 Answering this question requires us to interpret 
Wisconsin's civil procedure statutes.  Statutory interpretation 
begins with the language of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we need 
not further the inquiry.  Id. 
¶39 We begin our examination of the civil procedure 
statutes with Wis. Stat. § 802.02(3), entitled "Affirmative 
defenses," which provides: 
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set 
forth 
affirmatively 
any 
matter 
constituting 
an 
avoidance or affirmative defense including but not 
limited to the following:  accord and satisfaction, 
arbitration 
and 
award, 
assumption 
of 
risk, 
contributory 
negligence, 
discharge 
in 
bankruptcy, 
duress, estoppel, failure of a condition subsequent, 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
17 
 
failure or want of consideration, failure to mitigate 
damages, fraud, illegality, immunity, incompetence, 
injury by fellow servants, laches, license, payment, 
release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, superseding cause, and waiver.  When a 
party has mistakenly designated a defense as a 
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the 
court, if justice so requires, shall permit amendment 
of the pleading to conform to a proper designation.  
If an affirmative defense permitted to be raised by 
motion under s. 802.06(2) is so raised, it need not be 
set forth in a subsequent pleading. 
¶40 We 
observe 
two 
notable 
features 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 802.02(3) in the context of this case.  First, the plain 
statutory language sets forth a general rule that affirmative 
defenses "shall" be set forth in a "pleading to a preceding 
pleading," or in more common terms, a responsive pleading such 
as an answer.  § 802.02(3). 
¶41 Second, we observe that Wis. Stat. § 802.02(3)'s list 
of affirmative defenses that must be set forth in a responsive 
pleading does not include noncompliance with the notice of claim 
statute.  However, the statute explicitly provides that the list 
is nonexhaustive.  § 802.02(3) (setting forth a list of defenses 
that is "including but not limited to the following" (emphasis 
added)). 
¶42 Having set forth the general rule of Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.02(3), we turn next to § 802.06(2)(a), which provides: 
Every defense, in law or fact, except the defense of 
improper venue, to a claim for relief in any pleading, 
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or 3rd-
party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive 
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the 
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be 
made by motion: 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
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1. Lack of capacity to sue or be sued. 
2. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
3. Lack of jurisdiction over the person or property. 
4. Insufficiency of summons or process. 
5. Untimeliness 
or 
insufficiency 
of 
service 
of 
summons or process. 
6. Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. 
7. Failure to join a party under s. 803.03. 
8. Res judicata. 
9. Statute of limitations. 
10. 
Another action pending between the same 
parties for the same cause. 
¶43 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.06(2) confirms the general rule 
of § 802.02(3):  that affirmative defenses shall be raised in a 
responsive pleading.  However, § 802.06(2) provides an exception 
to that general rule, which indicates that the ten enumerated 
defenses "may at the option of the pleader be made by motion."  
If 
any 
of 
the 
listed 
defenses 
are 
raised 
by 
motion, 
§ 802.06(2)(b) dictates that such a motion "shall be made before 
pleading if a further pleading is permitted." 
¶44 For our purposes, it is significant that the ten 
enumerated defenses that may be raised by motion do not include 
noncompliance with the notice of claim statute.  Unlike the list 
of affirmative defenses in Wis. Stat. § 802.02(3), the list of 
ten defenses in § 802.06(2)(a) is exhaustive.  There is no 
language indicating that the list is "not limited to" the 
enumerated defenses as there is in § 802.02(3). 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
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¶45 The plain language of these two statutes in tandem 
therefore indicates that affirmative defenses, except the ten 
enumerated defenses, must be raised in a responsive pleading.  
Because noncompliance with the notice of claim statute is not 
one of the ten enumerated defenses, it likewise must be raised 
in a responsive pleading. 
¶46 Despite the clear statutory language, the court of 
appeals arrived at an opposite result.  Although it questioned 
the decision and signaled its disfavor, the court of appeals 
determined that it was bound by Lentz, 195 Wis. 2d 457.  Maple 
Grove Country Club, No. 2016AP2296, unpublished slip op., ¶14; 
see Cook, 208 Wis. 2d at 190.  In Lentz, the court of appeals 
stated that "a defendant may raise an affirmative defense by 
motion."  Lentz, 195 Wis. 2d at 467.  As the court of appeals 
here correctly observed, such a broad statement is inconsistent 
on its face with Wis. Stat. §§ 802.02(3) and 802.06(2).  See 
Maple Grove Country Club, No. 2016AP2296, unpublished slip op., 
¶7. 
¶47 The Lentz court cited Robinson v. Mount Sinai Medical 
Center, 137 Wis. 2d 1, 16-17, 402 N.W.2d 711 (1987), for the 
broad proposition that any affirmative defense may always be 
raised by motion.  However, Robinson's language explicitly 
limits 
its 
determination 
to 
the 
defense 
of 
statute 
of 
limitations, which was the specific defense raised in that case:  
"The affirmative defense of the statute of limitations must be 
raised in a pleading, or by a motion, or be deemed waived."  Id. 
at 17.  This is an unremarkable proposition given the language 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
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of Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(a)9., which provides that statute of 
limitations is a defense that may be raised by motion prior to a 
responsive pleading. 
¶48 Thus, Lentz misinterpreted this passage from Robinson 
to apply to all affirmative defenses.  Lentz cannot be 
reconciled with the plain statutory language of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 802.02(3) and 802.06(2).  Accordingly, we overrule Lentz 
because it allows a defendant to initially raise by motion an 
affirmative defense not listed in § 802.06(2).14 
¶49 In an attempt to compel the opposite conclusion, the 
Sanitary District argues first that by denying in its answer the 
Country Club's allegation of compliance with the notice of claim 
statute, it has sufficiently raised the defense.  We disagree.  
A plaintiff is not required to plead compliance with the notice 
of claim statute in the first instance.  Rabe, 72 Wis. 2d at 
498.  The Sanitary District's denial was the result of the mere 
fortuity that the Country Club pled compliance. 
¶50 Instead 
of 
simply 
denying 
the 
allegation 
of 
compliance, case law establishes that "[a] governmental entity 
must affirmatively plead that a plaintiff did not comply" with 
the notice of claim statute.  Thorp, 235 Wis. 2d 610, ¶24; 
                                                 
14 The Lentz court's holding that "an employer's intentional 
sexual harassment of an employee is not an 'accident' within the 
parameters of the [Worker's Compensation Act]" retains vitality.  
Lentz v. Young, 195 Wis. 2d 457, 462, 536 N.W.2d 451 (Ct. App. 
1995).  However, that conclusion was subsequently limited by 
Peterson v. Arlington Hosp. Staffing, Inc., 2004 WI App 199, 
¶¶16-21, 276 Wis. 2d 746, 689 N.W.2d 61. 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
21 
 
Weiss, 79 Wis. 2d at 228 ("The city was required to plead the 
lack of compliance with sec. 895.43(1), Stats., as a defense.").  
As analyzed above, Wis. Stat. §§ 802.02(3) and 802.06(2) compel 
this result. 
¶51 After failing to raise the notice of claim statute in 
a responsive pleading, the Sanitary District could have amended 
its answer once "as a matter of course at any time within 6 
months after the summons and complaint [were] filed . . . ."  
Wis. Stat. § 802.09(1).  It could have done so any time 
thereafter "by leave of court," which "shall be freely given at 
any stage of the action when justice so requires."  Id.  Yet it 
has not availed itself of that option. 
¶52 Even 
if 
the 
Sanitary 
District 
could 
raise 
noncompliance with the notice of claim statute in a motion for 
summary judgment, its attempt to do so here would still be 
unsuccessful.  Wisconsin Stat. § 802.06(2)(b) dictates that such 
a motion "shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is 
permitted."  The Sanitary District brought its motion far later 
than this. 
¶53 The Sanitary District contends next that Anderson v. 
City of Milwaukee, 208 Wis. 2d 18, 559 N.W.2d 563 (1997), 
compels the conclusion that noncompliance with the notice of 
claim statute cannot be waived.  This argument misses the mark. 
¶54 In 
Anderson, 
this 
court 
addressed 
the 
damages 
limitation in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3),15 determining that it "is 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(3) provides: 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
22 
 
not an affirmative defense that is deemed waived if not raised 
in a responsive pleading or by motion."  Id., ¶21.  Significant 
in the Anderson court's analysis was its observation that the 
damages cap in § 893.80(3) is not a complete bar to recovery.  
Id. (citing Snyder v. City of Minneapolis, 441 N.W.2d 781, 788 
(Minn. 1989) ("[A]s the cap also does not bar plaintiff's action 
completely it would appear Wright and Miller's surprise factor 
does dictate the cap need not be pled as an affirmative 
defense.").  Stated differently, § 893.80(3) does not prevent a 
plaintiff from maintaining an action, but rather limits the 
amount of damages that may be recovered. 
¶55 In contrast, if noncompliance with either the notice 
of 
injury 
or 
notice 
of 
claim 
provision 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(1d) 
is 
properly 
raised 
and 
established 
and 
the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Except as provided in this subsection, the amount 
recoverable by any person for any damages, injuries or 
death in any action founded on tort against any 
volunteer fire company organized under ch. 181 or 213, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency thereof and against their officers, officials, 
agents or employees for acts done in their official 
capacity 
or 
in 
the 
course 
of 
their 
agency 
or 
employment, 
whether 
proceeded 
against 
jointly 
or 
severally, shall not exceed $50,000. The amount 
recoverable under this subsection shall not exceed 
$25,000 in any such action against a volunteer fire 
company organized under ch. 181 or 213 or its 
officers, 
officials, 
agents 
or 
employees. 
If 
a 
volunteer fire company organized under ch. 181 or 213 
is part of a combined fire department, the $25,000 
limit still applies to actions against the volunteer 
fire company or its officers, officials, agents or 
employees. No punitive damages may be allowed or 
recoverable in any such action under this subsection. 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
23 
 
plaintiff fails to demonstrate actual notice and lack of 
prejudice, 
then 
dismissal 
of 
the 
action 
is 
required.16  
Anderson's analysis was specific to the language, history, and 
context of § 893.80(3) and therefore does not inform our 
analysis of § 893.80(1d). 
¶56 Accordingly, we conclude that noncompliance with the 
notice of claim statute is an affirmative defense that must be 
set forth in a responsive pleading.  Because the Sanitary 
District failed to set forth the defense in its answer and it 
has not amended its answer to include it, such a defense is 
deemed waived.17 
¶57 We therefore reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings. 
                                                 
16 That is, "[f]ailure to give the requisite notice shall 
not bar action on the claim if the fire company, corporation, 
subdivision, or agency had actual notice of the claim and the 
claimant shows to the satisfaction of the court that the delay 
or 
failure 
to 
give 
the 
requisite 
notice 
has 
not 
been 
prejudicial . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1d)(a). 
17 The Country Club also raised in its petition for review 
the 
issue 
of 
whether 
it 
complied 
with 
the 
substantive 
requirements of the notice of claim statute.  It argues that the 
Sanitary District had actual notice of the need to institute 
condemnation proceedings and the relief that the Country Club 
sought, and that the Sanitary District was not prejudiced by the 
lack of a timely formal notice.  Because we deem waived the 
Sanitary District's defense of noncompliance with the notice of 
claim statute, we need not address whether the Country Club met 
the statute's substantive requirements. 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
24 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court. 
¶58 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
J., 
withdrew 
from 
participation. 
 
 
No. 
2016AP2296 
 
 
 
1