Title: State v. Aaron A. Allen
Citation: 2010 WI 89
Docket Number: 2007AP000795
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 16, 2010

2010 WI 89 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP795 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Aaron Antonio Allen, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 311 Wis. 2d 489, 750 N.W.2d 518 
(Ct. App. 2008-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 28,. 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis P. Moroney 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Robert R. Henak and Henak Law Office, S.C., 
Milwaukee. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by William L. 
Gansner, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 89
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP795   
(L.C. No. 
1995CF952095) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Aaron Antonio Allen, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Allen, 
2007AP795, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2008), 
affirming an order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Dennis 
P. Moroney, Judge. 
¶2 
Aaron 
Antonio 
Allen 
brought 
a 
motion 
for 
postconviction relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (2005-06) seven 
years after the direct appeal from his criminal conviction was 
considered by the court of appeals under the procedure for no-
merit review.  The circuit court denied the motion on grounds 
No.  2007AP795 
2 
 
that the issues raised in the motion were issues that Allen 
could have raised in a response to his appellate counsel's no-
merit report, and they were therefore deemed waived.  The court 
of appeals affirmed. 
¶3 
This 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
apply 
the 
procedural 
requirements for postconviction motions set out in State v. 
Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), to the 
no-merit procedure for direct appeals set out in Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.32 (1997-98).1  The question at hand is whether 
Allen is barred from raising issues in his Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
motion because he failed to raise them in a response to his 
attorney's no-merit report.  Allen argues that he was not 
required to raise the issues in a response to the no-merit 
report and has now demonstrated sufficient reason for not 
raising them in a response to the no-merit report. 
¶4 
We conclude, following Wis. Stat. § 974.06, that a 
defendant is not required to file a response to a no-merit 
report.  This means he is not required to raise issues in 
response to a no-merit report.  However, a defendant may not 
raise issues in a subsequent § 974.06 motion that he could have 
raised in response to a no-merit report, absent a "sufficient 
reason" for failing to raise the issues earlier in the no-merit 
appeal.  The fact that the defendant is not required to file a 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to Wis. Stat. § 974.06 are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated.  All subsequent 
references to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32 are to the 1997-98 
version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2007AP795 
3 
 
response to a no-merit report is not, by itself, a sufficient 
reason to permit the defendant to raise new § 974.06 claims. 
¶5 
Here, we conclude that Allen's 2007 postconviction 
motion is barred by Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) and Escalona-Naranjo.  
Allen's § 974.06 motion is based entirely on issues that he 
could have raised in a response to his appellate counsel's no-
merit report.  He has not alleged a sufficient reason for 
failing to raise the issues in a response to the earlier no-
merit report.  The record reflects that the court of appeals 
properly followed no-merit procedure in 2000 and its decision 
carries a sufficient degree of confidence to warrant application 
of the Escalona-Naranjo bar to the issues of this motion.  For 
these reasons, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶6 
On May 14, 1995, Allen robbed the driver of a "Johnny 
cab" at gunpoint.2  He was arrested at a residence the next 
morning.  Later that day, the victim identified Allen in a 
police lineup.  Allen was charged on May 16 in Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court with possession of a firearm by a felon, in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2) (1993-1994) and armed 
robbery 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 943.32(1)(b) 
and 
943.32(2).  He pleaded not guilty to both charges. 
¶7 
These two charges initiated a long and protracted 
series of criminal proceedings.  The record reflects that at 
                                                 
2 A "Johnny cab" is a private vehicle driven by a retired 
person who provides an informal, unlicensed transportation 
service for a fee. 
No.  2007AP795 
4 
 
least nine different attorneys represented Allen from charging 
through sentencing.  His attorneys filed numerous motions, 
including 
several 
motions 
to 
suppress 
Allen's 
lineup 
identification, several motions in limine, and several motions 
to suppress Allen's statements.  Allen also wrote a number of 
pro se letters to the court at various points in the 
proceedings.  When the case finally proceeded to trial, in 
January of 1998, it resulted in a mistrial. 
¶8 
A jury trial was finally completed in October of 1998.  
The jury convicted Allen on both counts, and the circuit court 
sentenced Allen to 37 years of imprisonment.  Allen filed a 
notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief, and Assistant 
State Public Defender Janet L. Barnes was appointed Allen's 
postconviction/appellate counsel.  The record does not reflect 
that Attorney Barnes took any action on the case.  On July 9, 
1999, the Office of the State Public Defender appointed Attorney 
Craig M. Kuhary as Allen's postconviction/appellate counsel. 
¶9 
On March 14, 2000, Attorney Kuhary filed a no-merit 
report with the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.32(1).  Allen did not file a response to the no-merit report 
or a petition for review in this court.  The no-merit report 
raised three potential issues: (1) whether the evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict; (2) whether the trial 
court erred in admitting evidence that Allen initially refused 
to participate in the pre-charging lineup; and (3) whether the 
sentencing court misused its discretion. 
No.  2007AP795 
5 
 
¶10 In an order dated August 1, 2000, the court of appeals 
explained: 
We agree with counsel's description and analysis of 
each of these issues in the no merit report and adopt 
them as our own statement.  We independently conclude 
that an appeal predicated on these issues would lack 
arguable merit. 
 
Upon concluding our independent review of the 
record as mandated by Anders [v. California] and Wis. 
Stat. Rule 809.32(3), we further determine that there 
are no other meritorious issues presented by this case 
and that further proceedings would lack arguable 
merit. 
State v. Allen, No. 1999AP2818, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. 
August 1, 2000) (citations omitted).  The court accordingly 
affirmed Allen’s judgment of conviction and relieved Attorney 
Kuhary from representing Allen. 
¶11 Nearly seven years later, on March 16, 2007, Allen 
filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06.  The motion alleged that Allen's postconviction 
counsel was ineffective for failing to bring an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim against Allen’s trial counsel.  
Allen alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
(1) seek suppression of the fruits of Allen’s unlawful arrest; 
(2) seek suppression of the illegal lineup identification and 
resulting in-court identification; and (3) object to the 
prosecutor’s use of Allen’s conduct at the lineup as evidence of 
consciousness of guilt.  
¶12 On March 21, 2007, the circuit court issued an order 
denying Allen’s postconviction motion. Relying on State v. 
No.  2007AP795 
6 
 
Tillman, 2005 WI App 71, 281 Wis. 2d 157, 696 N.W.2d 574, and 
Escalona-Naranjo, the court concluded that the issues raised in 
Allen's § 974.06 motion were deemed waived because he failed to 
raise them in a response to his appellate counsel's no-merit 
report. 
¶13 Allen appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed in 
an unpublished decision.  Allen, unpublished slip op. at ¶5.  
The court explained: 
Here, nothing in Allen's Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
motion suggests and nothing in the record indicates 
that Allen was, at the time the no-merit report was 
filed, unaware of the issues underlying the claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel ultimately raised in 
his motion.  Although he blames postconviction counsel 
for failing to raise the issues in a postconviction 
motion, he offered no reason as to why he was unable 
to articulate in a response to the no-merit report the 
issues he now raises as the basis for his ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims.  The simple contention 
that counsel could have and should have raised these 
issues is not, without more, a sufficient reason to 
overcome the Escalona-Naranjo/Tillman bar. 
Id., unpublished slip op. at ¶6. 
¶14 Allen filed a petition for review.  This court 
appointed Attorney Robert R. Henak to represent Allen and 
subsequently granted review. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 Whether Allen's claims are procedurally barred depends 
upon the proper interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  This is 
a question of law that we review de novo.  State v. Lo, 2003 WI 
107, ¶14, 264 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 756; Escalona-Naranjo, 185 
Wis. 2d at 175-76. 
No.  2007AP795 
7 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶16 This 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
apply 
the 
procedural 
requirements of Escalona-Naranjo to the no-merit procedure under 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32.  We begin our discussion by 
explaining the no-merit procedure in Wisconsin.  We then turn to 
the basic procedural requirements that must be met to bring a 
postconviction motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.06, particularly as 
they apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims and no-
merit proceedings.  Finally, we apply these legal principles to 
the 
facts 
of 
this case, concluding that Allen has not 
demonstrated a sufficient reason for failing to raise in a 
response to the no-merit report the claims he raises now in his 
postconviction motion. 
A. 
No-Merit Procedure 
¶17 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
requires the state to provide indigent criminal defendants with 
appellate counsel on a first appeal.  Douglas v. California, 372 
U.S. 353, 357 (1963).  An indigent defendant's appellate counsel 
is bound by different ethical considerations than trial counsel.  
At trial, an attorney's belief that his client's defense is 
wholly frivolous "does not qualify his or her duty to the client 
or to the court."  McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 
429, 435 (1988).  Upon appeal, however, the defendant is no 
longer protected by the presumption of innocence.  Id. at 436.  
An indigent defendant's counsel on appeal "cannot serve the 
client's 
interest 
without 
asserting 
specific 
grounds 
for 
No.  2007AP795 
8 
 
reversal."  Id.  For this reason, counsel is ethically 
prohibited from prosecuting a frivolous appeal.  Id.  
¶18 To balance the defendant's right to counsel against 
appellate counsel's ethical obligations, the Supreme Court 
established standards for a no-merit procedure in Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  The Court set out the specific 
procedure that must be followed to preserve the defendant's 
right to counsel on appeal: 
[I]f counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, 
after a conscientious examination of it, he should so 
advise the court and request permission to withdraw. 
That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief 
referring to anything in the record that might 
arguably support the appeal.  A copy of counsel's 
brief should be furnished the indigent and time 
allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the 
court——not 
counsel——then 
proceeds, 
after 
a 
full 
examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether 
the case is wholly frivolous. If it so finds it may 
grant counsel's request to withdraw and dismiss the 
appeal insofar as federal requirements are concerned, 
or proceed to a decision on the merits, if state law 
so requires. On the other hand, if it finds any of the 
legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore 
not frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the 
indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the 
appeal. 
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. 
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(1) closely follows the 
procedure of Anders, with a few additional requirements.3  At the 
                                                 
3 The Supreme Court has specifically held that Wis. Stat. 
(Rule) § 809.32(1), as interpreted by this court, meets the 
constitutional requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 
738 (1967).  McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 
440 (1988). 
No.  2007AP795 
9 
 
time of Allen's direct appeal, the rule set out the following 
no-merit requirements: 
If an attorney appointed [to represent an indigent 
defendant] is of the opinion that further appellate 
proceedings on behalf of the defendant would be 
frivolous and without any arguable merit within the 
meaning of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 
the attorney shall file with the court of appeals 3 
copies of a brief in which is stated anything in the 
record that might arguably support the appeal and a 
discussion of why the issue lacks merit. The attorney 
shall serve a copy of the brief on the defendant and 
shall file a statement in the court of appeals that 
service 
has 
been 
made 
upon 
the 
defendant. 
The 
defendant may file a response to the brief within 30 
days of service. 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(1).4 
¶20 An attorney must discuss with the defendant the 
defendant's rights on appeal, including the option to file a no-
merit report.  State ex rel. Flores v. State, 183 Wis. 2d 587, 
607, 516 N.W.2d 362 (1994).5 
¶21 After submission of the no-merit report and the 
response, if the defendant provides one, the court of appeals 
follows the requirement of Anders: it "not only examines the no-
merit report but also conducts its own scrutiny of the record to 
find out whether there are any potential appellate issues of 
arguable merit."  State v. Fortier, 2006 WI App 11, ¶21, 289 
Wis. 2d 179, 709 N.W.2d 893.  If the court "finds that further 
                                                 
4 The current rule contains a more detailed procedure and 
several additional provisions than the version in effect at the 
time of Allen's no-merit appeal.  See Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.32 
(2007-08). 
5 See Wis. Stat. § 809.32(1)(b) (2007-08). 
No.  2007AP795 
10 
 
appellate proceedings would be frivolous and without any 
arguable merit, the court of appeals shall affirm the judgment 
of conviction and the denial of any postconviction motion and 
relieve the attorney of further responsibility in the case."  
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(3). 
B. 
Procedural Requirements For Postconviction Motions 
¶22 The postconviction procedures in Wis. Stat. § 974.06——
in place since mid-1970——are "designed to replace habeas corpus 
as the primary method in which a defendant can attack his 
conviction after the time for appeal has expired."  Escalona-
Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 176 (quoting Howard B. Eisenberg, Post-
Conviction Remedies in the 1970's, 56 Marq. L. Rev. 69, 79 
(1972)).  Section 974.06(1) allows prisoners to move to vacate, 
set aside, or correct a sentence where the prisoner is claiming 
that 
(1) 
his 
sentence was imposed in violation of the 
constitution; (2) the court imposing the sentence was without 
jurisdiction; or (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum 
or 
otherwise 
subject 
to 
collateral 
attack. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 974.06(1). 
¶23 A motion for relief under § 974.06 "is a part of the 
original criminal action, . . . and may be made at any time."  
Wis. Stat. § 974.06(2).  However, a defendant must meet certain 
requirements: 
All grounds for relief available to a person 
under this section must be raised in his or her 
original, supplemental or amended motion.  Any ground 
finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding 
that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any 
No.  2007AP795 
11 
 
other proceeding the person has taken to secure relief 
may not be the basis for a subsequent motion, unless 
the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for 
sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately 
raised in 
the 
original, supplemental or amended 
motion. 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) (emphasis added).   
¶24 Except for subsection (4), § 974.06 is a "direct 
adaptation" of the federal postconviction statute contained in 
28 
U.S.C. 
§ 2255. 
Escalona-Naranjo, 
185 
Wis. 2d at 
176.  
Subsection (4), on the other hand, is based on the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act, the primary purpose of which was "to 
compel a prisoner to raise all grounds regarding postconviction 
relief in his or her original, supplemental or amended motion, 
thereby cutting off successive frivolous motions."  Id. at 177. 
¶25 In Bergenthal v. State, 72 Wis. 2d 740, 748, 242 
N.W.2d 199 
(1976), 
the 
court 
interpreted 
§ 974.06(4) 
as 
permitting a defendant to raise a constitutional issue in a 
§ 974.06 motion, even if it might properly have been raised on 
appeal.  The court later overruled Bergenthal in Escalona-
Naranjo, concluding that the "plain language of subsection (4) 
clearly provides when a sec. 974.06 motion is appropriate."  
Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 181.  First, all grounds for 
relief 
must 
be 
raised 
in 
the 
petitioner's 
original, 
supplemental, or amended motion, whether or not it was a 
§ 974.06 motion.  Id.  Second, grounds for relief that were 
"finally 
adjudicated, 
waived 
or 
not 
raised 
in 
a 
prior 
postconviction motion" may not be the basis for a § 974.06 
motion.  Id. 
No.  2007AP795 
12 
 
¶26 The court went on to explain that the defendant could 
raise an issue "which for sufficient reason" was not raised or 
was inadequately raised in a prior motion.  Id. at 184.  The 
defendant in Escalona-Naranjo had failed to demonstrate a 
"sufficient reason" for again raising his specific claim: 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The court noted that he had 
already raised that issue twice and, at the same time, knew that 
his counsel "had failed to object to what he believed to be 
inadmissible evidence."  Id.  Yet, "[h]e chose not to make that 
allegation in those motions and has not alleged any sufficient 
reason why a court should now entertain that same claim."  Id. 
¶27 The 
court 
reasoned that this interpretation was 
correct because "[w]e need finality in our litigation."  Id. at 
185.  It further articulated the policy basis for this 
interpretation: 
Section 974.06(4) was not designed so that a 
defendant, 
upon 
conviction, 
could 
raise 
some 
constitutional issues on appeal and strategically wait 
to raise other constitutional issues a few years 
later. 
Rather, 
the 
defendant 
should 
raise 
the 
constitutional issues of which he or she is aware as 
part of the original postconviction proceedings. At 
that point, everyone's memory is still fresh, the 
witnesses and records are usually still available, and 
any remedy the defendant is entitled to can be 
expeditiously awarded. 
Id. at 185-86. 
¶28 We later reaffirmed the holding of Escalona-Naranjo in 
Lo, summarizing the basic rule as follows: 
[C]laims that could have been raised on direct appeal 
or in a previous § 974.06 motion are barred from being 
raised in a subsequent § 974.06 postconviction motion 
No.  2007AP795 
13 
 
absent a showing of a sufficient reason for why the 
claims were not raised on direct appeal or in a 
previous § 974.06 motion. 
Id., ¶44. 
¶29 Shortly after Escalona-Naranjo was decided, the court 
of appeals held that ineffective assistance of postconviction 
counsel may constitute a sufficient reason for not raising 
issues in a previous postconviction motion.  State ex rel. 
Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 556 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. 
App. 1996).  The defendant in Rothering filed a Knight petition: 
a habeas corpus petition filed in the court of appeals 
challenging the effectiveness of appellate counsel.  Id. at 676.6  
The court denied his petition on grounds that he was in fact 
arguing ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel.  Id. at 679.  
Noting that the proper vehicle for review would be either a 
habeas petition in the trial court or a § 974.06 motion, the 
court stated: 
The court has not yet had much occasion to give an 
explication of the circumstances which constitute a 
"sufficient reason."  It may be in some circumstances 
that ineffective postconviction counsel constitutes a 
sufficient reason as to why an issue which could have 
been raised on direct appeal was not. . . .  In some 
cases it may be necessary to undertake factfinding 
regarding postconviction discussions between counsel 
and the defendant to determine if, for a strategy 
reason, 
the 
defendant 
waived 
a 
particular 
issue. . . .  
The 
trial 
court 
can 
perform 
the 
necessary factfinding function and directly rule on 
the sufficiency of the reason.  
                                                 
6  See State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 522, 484 N.W.2d 540 
(1992) (holding that a habeas petition in the court of appeals 
is the exclusive remedy for challenging the effectiveness of 
appellate counsel). 
No.  2007AP795 
14 
 
Id. at 682 (citation omitted).   
¶30 Several years after Rothering, the court of appeals 
held that where the same attorney represents the defendant at 
trial and on appeal, the attorney's inability to challenge his 
or her own effectiveness constitutes a "sufficient reason" for 
not raising ineffectiveness in the original § 974.06 motion.  
State v. Hensley, 221 Wis. 2d 473, 477, 585 N.W.2d 683 (Ct. App. 
1998). 
¶31 The court of appeals has applied the procedural bar of 
Escalona-Naranjo when the defendant's direct appeal followed the 
no-merit process.  Tillman, 281 Wis. 2d 157, ¶2.  The court 
explained that "in some facets, the no merit procedure affords a 
defendant greater scrutiny of a trial court record and greater 
opportunity to respond than in a conventional appeal."  Id., 
¶18.  After detailing the no-merit procedure, the court rejected 
the 
argument 
that 
"the 
no 
merit 
procedure 
is 
too 
perfunctory . . . to 
permit the application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06(4)."  Id., ¶19.  Recognizing, however, that Escalona-
Naranjo is not an "ironclad rule," the court held that courts 
should (1) "pay close attention to whether the no merit 
procedures were in fact followed"; and (2) "consider whether 
[the no merit] procedure, even if followed, carries a sufficient 
degree 
of 
confidence 
warranting 
the 
application 
of 
the 
procedural bar under the particular facts and circumstances of 
the case."  Id., ¶20. 
¶32 The court of appeals again addressed the application 
of Escalona-Naranjo in Fortier.  Fortier failed to raise a 
No.  2007AP795 
15 
 
sentencing issue in a response to a no-merit report but raised 
it in a subsequent § 974.06 motion.  Fortier, 289 Wis. 2d 179, 
¶¶13, 15.  Applying Tillman, the court reasoned that the no-
merit procedures had not been followed because Fortier's counsel 
had not raised the arguably meritorious sentencing issue and the 
court of appeals had overlooked it: 
The issue was hence overlooked not only by Fortier, 
but also by his appellate counsel, who filed the no-
merit report addressing only the issue of erroneous 
exercise of sentencing discretion and concluding that 
no issues of arguable merit remained, and by this 
court, that agreed with the no-merit report. 
Id., ¶24.  Therefore, both counsel——by not identifying the 
issue——and the court——by not performing a "full examination" of 
the record——failed to follow the no-merit procedure.  Id., ¶27. 
¶33 Most recently, the court of appeals took up the 
intersection between the no-merit procedure and the Escalona-
Naranjo bar in State ex rel. Panama v. Hepp, 2008 WI App 146, 
314 Wis. 2d 112, 758 N.W.2d 806.  In Hepp, the state argued that 
because 
Fortier 
"implicitly 
conclude[ed] 
that 
apparent 
ineffective assistance of counsel during a no-merit appeal is a 
sufficient reason for a defendant failing to raise an issue," an 
alternate remedy existed and the defendant could not bring a 
Knight petition.  Id., ¶15. 
¶34 The court of appeals rejected that argument, holding 
that § 974.06 motions were not the sole avenue for raising a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel following no-merit 
proceedings.  Id., ¶3.  It reasoned that the state's theory was 
incorrect 
because 
Fortier 
was 
based 
not 
on 
counsel's 
No.  2007AP795 
16 
 
ineffectiveness, but on a "joint breakdown in the process": the 
failure of either counsel or the court to identify an arguably 
meritorious issue. Id., ¶16. Therefore, the court interpreted 
Fortier to mean that defense counsel's failure to raise an 
arguably meritorious issue is a sufficient reason for the 
defendant's failure to raise an issue, regardless of the 
standards for ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. 
C. 
Application of Escalona-Naranjo to This Case 
¶35 Having surveyed the body of case law that has 
developed around the interaction between no-merit proceedings 
and Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motions, we now address whether Allen's 
claims are procedurally barred by § 974.06(4) and Escalona-
Naranjo.  Allen's appellate counsel, in his brief and at oral 
argument, emphasized that he was not challenging the validity of 
Escalona-Naranjo 
or 
its 
interpretation 
of 
§ 974.06(4).  
Therefore, the primary issue presented is whether Allen is 
procedurally barred under § 974.06(4) from raising issues about 
the alleged ineffective assistance of his postconviction counsel 
for failing to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
against his "pre-trial counsel," because he did not raise these 
issues in response to a prior no-merit report. 
¶36 As part of his pro se § 974.06 motion in 2007, Allen 
wrote: 
Here, 
defendant['s] 
claim 
is 
that 
postconviction 
counsel 
was 
ineffective 
for 
failing 
to 
file 
a 
postconviction motion alleging that pretrial counsel 
was ineffective when he failed to file any motions to 
suppress the unlawful arrest, the illegal lineup, and 
the prosecution's use of defendant['s] conduct prior 
No.  2007AP795 
17 
 
to the lineup to show consciousness of the defendant's 
alleged guilt.  Thus, this petition raises a "mix of 
claims 
of 
ineffective 
postconviction 
counsel 
and 
ineffective trial counsel." 
¶37 The circuit court denied this motion, saying: 
 
The defendant now raises various claims which he 
contends postconviction counsel should have raised in 
the trial court regarding the effectiveness of trial 
counsel . . . . 
 
Defendant could and should have raised all of 
these issues in response to counsel's no merit report, 
but he did not.  Because he did not, they are deemed 
waived.  State v. Tillman, 251 Wis. 2d 157 (Ct. App. 
2005) (defendant's failure to raise issues in response 
to counsel's no merit report constitutes a waiver of 
those issues).  Defendant is barred by State v. 
Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 169, 178 (1994), from 
pursuing the current motion for postconviction relief.  
There is no reason why defendant could not have raised 
the current claims in response to counsel's no merit 
report on appeal . . . . 
¶38 Although we conclude that the circuit court correctly 
decided this motion, we think additional analysis is necessary. 
¶39 A defendant is not required to file a response to a 
no-merit report.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(1).  Consequently, 
the failure to file a response to a no-merit report is not fatal 
per se. 
¶40 On the other hand, a defendant who fails to file a 
response to a no-merit report is not in the same position as a 
defendant who has failed to file a Wis. Stat. § 974.02 motion or 
to pursue a direct appeal.  A defendant who has not filed a 
§ 974.02 motion or pursued a direct appeal is not burdened with 
the requirement of giving a sufficient reason why the claims 
being raised were not raised before.  Lo, 264 Wis. 2d 1, ¶44, n. 
No.  2007AP795 
18 
 
11 (citing Loop v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 499, 222 N.W.2d 694 
(1974)).  The purpose behind Wis. Stat. § 974.06 is to avoid 
successive motions for relief by requiring a defendant to raise 
all grounds for relief in one motion.  State v. Robinson, 177 
Wis. 2d 46, 52, 501 N.W.2d 831 (Ct. App. 1993) (citation 
omitted).  This purpose is not served when there has been no 
previous motion or appeal. 
¶41 A no-merit appeal clearly qualifies as a previous 
motion under § 974.06(4).  Therefore, a defendant may not raise 
issues that could have been raised in the previous no-merit 
appeal, absent the defendant demonstrating a sufficient reason 
for failing to raise those issues previously.  Tillman, 281 
Wis. 2d 157, ¶19.  Hence, the real issue in this case is whether 
Allen demonstrated a sufficient reason for failing to raise in a 
timely response to the 2000 no-merit report the three claims 
related to ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel that 
he set out in his 2007 motion. 
¶42 In his brief to this court, Allen appears to rely on 
three allegedly "sufficient reasons" for failing to raise his 
current claims back in 2000 in response to the no-merit report: 
(1) his unawareness of the claims at the time of the no-merit 
proceedings; (2) the fact that he is not required to respond to 
the no-merit report; and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel.  
We address these reasons in turn. 
1. 
Unawareness of His Claims 
¶43 Allen first argues that he was unaware of the claims 
raised in his § 974.06 motion at the time of no-merit appeal, 
No.  2007AP795 
19 
 
and that his unawareness constituted a sufficient reason for not 
raising the claims in a response to the no-merit report.  
However, Allen's motion does not demonstrate that he was unaware 
of either the legal or factual basis for his claims. 
¶44 With respect to his legal claim, Allen relies upon 
State v. Howard, 211 Wis. 2d 269, 564 N.W.2d 753 (1997), to 
support his contention that he was unaware of the issues raised 
in his § 974.06 motion at the time of his no-merit appeal.  
Howard is inapposite.  It held that, where a subsequent supreme 
court decision "constituted a new rule of substantive law," the 
defendant's lack of awareness of the legal basis for his claim 
could constitute a sufficient reason for not having raised the 
claim earlier.  Id. at 287-88.  There is no question that 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which forms the 
legal basis for Allen's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, was established law at the time of his no-merit appeal.  
Allen does not point to any change in law that has made him 
aware of a claim now that he was not aware of at the time of his 
2000 appeal. 
¶45 Allen also has failed to demonstrate that he was 
unaware of the factual bases for his claims at the time of his 
no-merit appeal.   
¶46 First, Allen's assertion of ignorance of his claims is 
not supported in the text of his § 974.06 motion.  Nowhere in 
his motion does he allege that he was unaware at the time of his 
direct appeal of the claims he now makes.  Defendants must, at 
No.  2007AP795 
20 
 
the very minimum, allege a sufficient reason in their motions to 
overcome the Escalona-Naranjo bar. 
¶47 Second, Allen does not allege any facts outside the 
record that, if proved, would provide a sufficient reason for 
not raising the issues in a response to the 2000 no-merit 
report.  He supports his allegations primarily with citations to 
the record.  The only supporting documents he attached to his 
§ 974.06 motion were (1) a letter from the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court stating that no warrant was in a file; and (2) a 
page from a supplemental police report stating that a temporary 
felony warrant had been issued for Allen.  Neither of these 
documents supports the conclusion that Allen was unaware of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the time of his 
direct appeal. 
¶48 The record itself belies Allen's argument that he was 
unaware of his claims.  All three allegations involve events in 
which Allen was personally involved and had personal knowledge. 
¶49 First, Allen was aware of the circumstances of his own 
arrest on May 15, 1995, and would have had some insight into 
whether police had a warrant.  Allen's attorneys raised several 
Fourth Amendment issues throughout the case.  It is hard to 
believe that Allen never inquired whether a warrant existed, if 
there were any doubts about its existence. 
¶50 Second, Allen was fully aware of his present claim 
that the lineup violated his right to counsel.  This is 
conclusively demonstrated by the fact that Allen requested 
counsel at the time of the lineup. 
No.  2007AP795 
21 
 
¶51 Third, Allen was aware of the claim that evidence of 
his refusal to participate in the lineup was improperly 
admitted.  Allen's trial attorney, Carl Ashley, argued prior to 
trial that the court should not permit the admission of any 
evidence regarding Allen's behavior during the lineup.  Allen 
was present in court when this argument was made.   
¶52 The record reflects numerous motions brought by nine 
different trial attorneys.  Allen's multiple letters to the 
court——many of which are lengthy and articulate——portray Allen 
as a relatively savvy and experienced defendant.  By themselves, 
these facts do not contradict his argument that he did not know 
of his claims, but they tend to support the conclusion that he 
has failed to adequately show his ignorance of these claims as a 
sufficient reason for failing to raise the claims in a response 
to the no-merit report.   
2. 
Requirement of Responding to the No-Merit Report 
¶53 Allen's second argument is that his motion is not 
barred by Escalona-Naranjo because he was not required to 
respond to the no-merit report.  Although he brings this 
argument as a "sufficient reason," Allen's argument cuts 
somewhat deeper.  He argues that applying Escalona-Naranjo to 
these circumstances conflicts with the right to counsel on 
appeal because it requires him to respond to the no-merit report 
or forfeit his claims.   
¶54 Once again, a defendant is not required to file a 
response to the no-merit report.  Wis. Stat. § 809.32(1). 
No.  2007AP795 
22 
 
¶55 However, the fact that a defendant does not file a 
response to a no-merit report is not, by itself, a sufficient 
reason to permit the defendant to raise new Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
claims.  If it were, no defendant would ever be required to 
demonstrate a sufficient reason for failing to respond to a no-
merit report.  A defendant could sit on his hands, with full 
knowledge of meritorious issues, and wait to make his claims in 
a future motion. 
¶56 The dichotomy posed by Allen——a claim brought to the 
court of appeals' attention versus a claim not raised and 
thereby forfeited——does not adequately portray the nature of the 
no-merit process.  A close examination of the no-merit process 
is necessary to explain why defendants must show a sufficient 
reason for failing to raise an issue in a response to a no-merit 
report. 
¶57 In a direct appeal brought pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.30, certain rules of forfeiture apply.  The court 
of appeals does not seek out issues in a direct appeal.  It will 
generally address only those issues raised on appeal.  See Riley 
v. Hamilton, 153 Wis. 2d 582, 588, 451 N.W.2d 454 (Ct. App. 
1989); see also State v. Flynn, 190 Wis. 2d 31, 39 n.2, 527 
N.W.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1994) (court will not address issues 
inadequately briefed or issues raised but not further argued).  
Therefore, on a direct appeal, an issue may be "forfeited," in 
the sense that no court ever addresses it, and the defendant is 
No.  2007AP795 
23 
 
then normally barred from raising it in a subsequent § 974.06 
motion.7 
¶58 Unlike defendants on direct appeal under Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.30, defendants in a no-merit appeal under § 809.32 
need not bring issues to the court's attention for the court to 
address them.  To follow the constitutional requirements of 
Anders, the court must perform a "full examination of all the 
proceedings" to search for any "legal points arguable on their 
merits."  Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.  If the court fails to do so, 
the defendant has been denied the right to effective appellate 
counsel.  Therefore, when an issue is not raised in the no-merit 
report or in a response to the no-merit report, it is not 
"forfeited" in the sense that the defendant has given up or lost 
the opportunity to have it reviewed.  Rather, the defendant 
obtains review of the issue——sufficient review to determine that 
the issue is not of arguable merit——so long as the court of 
appeals follows the process set out in Anders.  See Tillman, 281 
Wis. 2d 157, ¶20. 
¶59 For these reasons, it is incorrect to say that a 
defendant must raise an issue in a response to a no-merit report 
or forfeit it.  In a sense, he "raises" the issue either way.  
However, whether he responds to a no-merit report or not, he is 
                                                 
7 In State v. Tillman, the court of appeals skillfully 
analyzed this aspect of the direct appeal process to support its 
conclusion that the no merit procedure is not "too perfunctory 
as a matter of law to permit the application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06(4)."  State v. Tillman, 2005 WI App 71, ¶18, 281 
Wis. 2d 157, 696 N.W.2d 574. 
No.  2007AP795 
24 
 
barred from raising a claim in a subsequent § 974.06 motion, 
absent a sufficient reason.  Motions that were "finally 
adjudicated" in the original proceeding are barred just as much 
as motions that were "not so raised" in the original proceeding.  
Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4); Escalona, 185 Wis. 2d at 181.  Whereas a 
defendant who fails to raise an issue in a direct appeal under 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30 gets no review of the issue by the 
court of appeals, a defendant who fails to raise an issue in a 
response to a no-merit report gets some review: enough review to 
determine that the issue is not of arguable merit. 
¶60 In theory, Allen obtained the same review under 
§ 809.32 without a response to the no-merit report as he would 
have obtained if he had filed a response identifying specific 
issues, and a better review than the defendant who follows the 
direct appeal process under § 809.30 but does not raise certain 
issues.  See Tillman, 281 Wis. 2d 157, ¶18 (explaining that "in 
some facets, the no merit procedure affords a defendant greater 
scrutiny of a trial court record and greater opportunity to 
respond than in a conventional appeal"). 
¶61 Of course, a defendant certainly should raise any 
issues he is aware of in his response, because doing so will 
decrease the chance that the court of appeals will overlook an 
issue of arguable merit.  As recognized in Fortier, mistakes 
happen.  Fortier, 289 Wis. 2d 179, ¶27.  Performing a detailed 
review of the record, particularly a record that may involve 
detailed trial transcripts, is a complicated and difficult task, 
prone to mistakes by even the most diligent counsel and most 
No.  2007AP795 
25 
 
meticulous judge.  A defendant does himself no harm by raising 
potential issues.  But, to reiterate, so long as the court of 
appeals follows the no-merit procedure required in Anders, a 
defendant is barred (absent a sufficient reason) from raising 
issues in a future Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion, whether or not he 
raised them in a response to a no-merit report, because the 
court will have performed an examination of the record and 
determined that any issues noted or any issues that are 
apparent, to be without arguable merit. 
¶62 There is a necessary corollary to this proposition.  
The Escalona-Naranjo bar may be applied to a no-merit review 
only when the no-merit procedures are properly followed by the 
court of appeals.  A defendant gets review of issues not raised 
only if the court of appeals follows the no-merit protocol.  
Thus, we agree with the holding of Tillman that a court 
reviewing a § 974.06 motion after a no-merit appeal must 
consider whether the no-merit procedures (1) were followed; and 
(2) warrant sufficient confidence to apply the procedural bar of 
Escalona-Naranjo.  Tillman, 281 Wis. 2d 157, ¶20. 
¶63 If the no-merit procedure was followed, then it is 
irrelevant whether Allen raised his claims.  He got review of 
those claims from the court of appeals, and he is barred from 
raising them again.  If it was not followed, it is similarly 
irrelevant whether Allen raised his claims.  His failure to 
raise them may or may not have contributed to the court of 
appeals' failure to identify issues of arguable merit.  But the 
court of appeals and appellate counsel should have found them, 
No.  2007AP795 
26 
 
irrespective of whether Allen raised them, and he may not be 
barred under those circumstances from bringing a subsequent 
§ 974.06 motion if the no-merit procedure was not followed. 
¶64 In sum, a defendant will often provide "sufficient 
reason" to make new § 974.06 claims by showing that his counsel 
and the court of appeals did not follow no-merit procedure. 
¶65 As noted above, no merit procedures have been expanded 
significantly, 
as 
set 
out 
in 
present 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.32(1) (2007-08).  No-merit procedure requires that 
"the attorney shall discuss with the person all potential issues 
identified by the attorney and the person, and the merit of an 
appeal on these issues."  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(1)(b)1. 
(emphasis added).  "The attorney shall inform the person that if 
a no-merit report is filed the attorney will serve a copy of the 
transcripts and the circuit court case record upon the person at 
the person's request."  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(1)(b)2. 
(emphasis added).  The attorney is required to file a detailed 
certification of these protections with the attorney's no-merit 
report.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(1)(c). 
¶66 Today, an alleged and demonstrated failure to comply 
with these detailed no-merit procedural requirements provides a 
sufficient reason to permit new issues to be raised. 
¶67 A more difficult question is presented by the failure 
of either no-merit counsel or the court of appeals to address an 
issue of arguable merit.  Anders explains that an issue of 
arguable merit is an issue that is not frivolous.  Anders, 386 
U.S. at 744.  However, "arguable merit is not synonymous with 
No.  2007AP795 
27 
 
actual merit."  Hepp, 314 Wis. 2d 112, ¶16.  "Therefore, it is 
possible that counsel could miss an issue of arguable merit 
without prejudicing the defendant, if the issue would ultimately 
have failed."  Id. 
¶68 In its penetrating analysis of the no-merit dilemma, 
the court of appeals wrote in Hepp: 
Fortier 
is 
best 
understood 
as 
concluding 
that 
counsel's failure to raise an arguably meritorious 
issue in a no-merit report is a "sufficient reason" 
under Escalona-Naranjo for the defendant's failure to 
raise the issue in a response, thus preventing the no-
merit procedure from serving as a procedural bar in a 
subsequent Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion, regardless of 
whether counsel's failure met both the deficient 
performance and prejudice standards of an ineffective 
assistance claim. 
Hepp, 314 Wis. 2d 112, ¶16. 
¶69 This view is consistent with the language in Anders, 
but it does not address several important realities. 
¶70 The timing of a § 974.06 motion and the actual merit 
of the motion may be important considerations. 
¶71 A defendant who files no response to a no-merit report 
might reasonably expect the court of appeals to address an issue 
of arguable merit, especially an issue of actual merit.  If the 
court of appeals fails to discuss an issue of actual or arguable 
merit, however, the defendant has the opportunity to file (1) a 
motion for reconsideration of the decision under Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.32(1); (2) a petition for review with this court; 
or (3) an immediate Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion, identifying any 
issue of arguable merit that was overlooked and, in the latter 
No.  2007AP795 
28 
 
instance, explaining why nothing was said in a response to the 
no-merit report. 
¶72 Delay in these circumstances can seldom be justified.  
The court of appeals presumably considered all issues of 
arguable merit and resolved them against the defendant, even 
though it did not spell out everything in its opinion.  This can 
be explained promptly by the court of appeals if the defendant 
acts promptly.  If the court of appeals missed an issue, it 
would be required to address that issue, according to no-merit 
procedure, and address the issue promptly.  Failure of a 
defendant to respond to both a no-merit report and the decision 
on the no-merit report firms up the case for forfeiture of any 
issue that could have been raised. 
¶73 Delay can also wreak havoc.  In the Fortier case, the 
defendant waited more than three and a half years after the 
decision on the no-merit appeal before filing his § 974.06 
motion.  Fortier, 289 Wis. 2d 179, ¶¶11-12.  Waiting three and a 
half years before seeking a sentence reduction is one thing; 
waiting three and a half years before seeking a new trial is 
quite another.  The existence of an arguably meritorious issue 
does not provide a sufficient reason for waiting many years to 
raise an issue that could have been raised earlier.  Here, the 
delay was seven years. 
¶74 The actual merit of a § 974.06 motion is much easier 
to handle when the remedy sought is relatively easy to effect.  
For instance, Fortier sought a reduction in his sentence, 
claiming that his no-merit counsel had failed to object in the 
No.  2007AP795 
29 
 
no-merit report that Fortier's sentence had been improperly 
raised.  Id., ¶25.  Fortier later asked for sentence reduction.  
Id., ¶13.  This presented not only an issue of arguable merit, 
but also a remedy easily effected.  Contrast Fortier's request 
with Allen's request for a redo of his 1998 trial. 
¶75 We pose these considerations in response to the Hepp 
analysis.  We are not required to apply them definitively in a 
case in which no issue of arguable merit has been raised. 
¶76 Allen's entire argument presupposes that the issues 
presented here are of arguable merit.  They are not. 
¶77 Allen's 
claim 
that 
his 
arrest 
was 
illegal 
is 
unsupported by the record; one of the documents he has produced 
suggests that the police department did in fact have a warrant 
for his arrest.8  A second document suggests no more than that a 
copy of this warrant was not found in a particular file. 
¶78 His second claim, that the lineup was conducted in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment, is also not of arguable merit.  
See State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 524, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973) 
(no right to counsel in pre-indictment lineup).   
                                                 
8 One of the documents submitted by Allen is a page from a 
police report labeled "Supplemental Report" that states: "A 
temporary felony warrant has been filed for Aaron A. Allen, B/M, 
DOB: 02-02-68, for his involvement in this offense."  It is 
unclear whether this document was part of the record reviewed by 
the no-merit report, although the trial transcript reveals that 
an arrest report and a police report were put into the record as 
trial exhibits.  If this document was in the record reviewed by 
the court of appeals in the no-merit appeal, it further confirms 
the court's conclusion that there were no issues of arguable 
merit. 
No.  2007AP795 
30 
 
¶79 Finally, 
Allen's claim that counsel should have 
objected to testimony regarding his refusal to participate in 
the lineup was specifically rejected by the court of appeals in 
its no-merit decision in 2000.  The court of appeals concluded 
that the issue of the admission of evidence regarding his 
refusal to participate in the lineup was without arguable merit.  
This circumstance is analogous to the circumstance in Tillman, 
where the defendant's § 974.06 claim was "simply a resurrection 
of his prior arguments," the factual bases of which were 
specifically rejected in the no-merit decision.  Tillman, 281 
Wis. 2d 157, ¶¶23-24. 
¶80 Beyond these specific deficiencies, Allen does nothing 
to shake our confidence that the court of appeals properly 
followed the no-merit procedure. 
¶81 In 2000 the court of appeals stated: 
Upon concluding our independent review of the record 
as mandated by Anders [v. California] and Wis. Stat. 
Rule 809.32(3), we further determine that there are no 
other meritorious issues presented by this case and 
that further proceedings would lack arguable merit. 
State v. Allen, No. 1999AP2818, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. 
August 1, 2000).   
¶82 It is of course difficult for us to know the nature 
and extent of the court's examination of the record when the 
court does not enumerate possible issues that it reviewed and 
rejected in its no-merit opinion.  Nonetheless, we think we are 
entitled to rely on the court of appeals when it asserts that it 
has conducted the independent review "mandated by Anders."  This 
No.  2007AP795 
31 
 
is necessary for two reasons.  First, we cannot assume that the 
court of appeals disregarded its duties under Anders when 
deciding a no-merit appeal.  Second, any other rule would 
effectively eliminate the Escalona-Naranjo bar after a no-merit 
appeal, lest the court deciding the no-merit appeal be forced to 
specifically identify and reject the nearly infinite number of 
issues without arguable merit that are present in any trial 
transcript. 
¶83 The defendant has the burden of proof in a § 974.06 
motion.  Wis. Stat. § 974.06(6).  This suggests to us that a 
defendant must do more than identify an issue of arguable merit 
that the court of appeals did not discuss.  To satisfy the 
"sufficient reason" standard, the defendant must do something to 
undermine our confidence in the court's decision, perhaps by 
identifying an issue of such obvious merit that it was an error 
by the court not to discuss it.  Allen's motion failed to do so. 
3. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶84 This brings us to ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Allen argues that ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes 
a sufficient reason for failing to raise the issues in a 
response to his no-merit report.  This argument is unsupported 
by his motion and the record. 
¶85 Rothering 
correctly 
held 
that 
ineffectiveness 
of 
postconviction counsel may constitute a sufficient reason as to 
why an issue that could have been raised on direct appeal was 
not.  Rothering, 205 Wis. 2d at 682.  If the defendant alleges 
that 
he 
did 
not 
raise an issue because of ineffective 
No.  2007AP795 
32 
 
postconviction counsel, "[t]he trial court can perform the 
necessary 
factfinding 
function 
and 
directly 
rule 
on 
the 
sufficiency of the reason."  Id. 
¶86 Once again, Allen's argument is unsupported by the 
text of his motion.  The motion is replete with conclusory 
allegations that postconviction counsel was ineffective.  But he 
does not allege any facts that, if proved, would constitute 
deficient performance, nor does he allege any facts that, if 
proved, would constitute prejudice. 
¶87 Furthermore, Allen's motion does not allege a reason 
why 
the 
failure 
of 
postconviction 
counsel 
to 
bring 
a 
postconviction motion prevented him from raising the issue in a 
response to the no-merit report.  He supports his allegations 
primarily with citations to the record.  His motion did not 
include, 
for 
example, 
any 
allegations 
of 
off-the-record 
discussions with counsel that might demonstrate a sufficient 
reason for not raising a claim in a response to the no-merit 
report.  Nor did he put the no-merit report itself——which may 
have contained relevant information——in the record. 
¶88 Allen's brief suggests that Allen may have had a 
"sufficient reason" because it is unresolved whether the court 
of appeals could even address ineffective assistance of counsel 
in a no-merit appeal when the issue is not preserved by a 
postconviction motion.  The Seventh Circuit has interpreted 
Wisconsin law to mean that the court cannot address ineffective 
assistance of counsel in that circumstance.  See Page v. Frank, 
343 F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2003).  However, the broad scope of 
No.  2007AP795 
33 
 
review mandated by Anders suggests that the court of appeals in 
a no-merit appeal should identify issues of arguable merit even 
if those issues were not preserved in the circuit court, 
especially where the ineffective assistance of postconviction 
counsel was the reason those issues were not preserved for 
appeal.9 
¶89 If Allen's motion had presented even a colorable claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective and provided specific reasons 
why postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to bring 
a postconviction motion, this court might be required to address 
the 
issue.  
But 
the allegations in Allen's motion are 
insufficient to overcome the bar of Escalona-Naranjo, regardless 
of how we might decide this issue. 
¶90 "We need finality in our litigation."  Escalona-
Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 185.  This basic principle is undermined 
if we allow conclusory allegations that postconviction counsel 
was ineffective to constitute a sufficient reason for failing to 
raise an issue in a response to a no-merit report.  The fact 
that Allen brought claims seven years after his appeal without 
any reason for not having raised them earlier simply emphasizes 
the need to uphold this principle of finality.   
                                                 
9 Although not in effect at the time of Allen's no-merit 
appeal, Wis. Stat. § 809.32(1)(g) (2007-08) now permits the 
court of appeals to remand for an evidentiary hearing if the 
defendant and attorney allege disputed facts not in the record 
and that the defendant's alleged facts, if true, would make 
disposition under § 809.32(3) inappropriate. 
No.  2007AP795 
34 
 
¶91 Whatever reason the defendant offers as a "sufficient 
reason"——ignorance of the facts or law underlying the claim, an 
improperly 
followed 
no-merit 
proceeding, 
or 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel——the defendant must allege specific facts 
that, if proved, would constitute a sufficient reason for 
failing to raise the issues in a response to a no-merit report.  
If a defendant fails to do so, the circuit court should 
summarily deny the motion, as the circuit court appropriately 
did. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶92 We conclude, following Wis. Stat. § 974.06, that a 
defendant is not required to file a response to a no-merit 
report.  This means he is not required to raise issues in 
response to a no-merit report.  However, a defendant may not 
raise issues in a subsequent § 974.06 motion that he could have  
raised in a response to a no-merit report, absent a "sufficient 
reason" for failing to raise the issues earlier in the no-merit 
appeal.  The fact that the defendant is not required to file a 
response to a no-merit report is not, by itself, a sufficient 
reason to permit the defendant to raise new § 974.06 claims. 
¶93 Here, we conclude that Allen's 2007 postconviction  
motion is barred by § 974.06(4) and Escalona-Naranjo.  Allen's 
§ 974.06 motion is based entirely on issues that he could have 
raised in a response to his appellate counsel's no-merit report.  
He has not alleged a sufficient reason for failing to raise the 
issues in his § 974.06 motion in a response to the earlier no-
merit report.  The record here reflects that the court of 
No.  2007AP795 
35 
 
appeals properly followed no-merit procedure in 2000 and its 
decision carries a sufficient degree of confidence warranting 
the application of the Escalona-Naranjo bar to the issues 
presented in this motion.  We therefore affirm the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2007AP795.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶94 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  This case 
illustrates the legal house of mirrors that postconviction 
procedure in Wisconsin has become.    
I 
¶95 The court ordered the petitioner to address three 
issues in the present case.  Reviewing these issues, and the way 
in which the majority resolves them, highlights what is and is 
not being decided in this case, and hints at what is at stake. 
¶96 The first issue raised by the court was "whether the 
no-merit procedure requires a defendant to file a response to 
avoid waiver of subsequent claims of error."   
¶97 The majority answers this question "no."  The majority 
treats the no-merit procedure as equivalent to a "motion" for 
purposes of Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4).1  Thus, a defendant may not 
raise issues in a subsequent Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion that he 
could have raised in response to a no-merit report absent a 
sufficient reason.2  The majority treats the defendant who 
responds to a no-merit report the same as a defendant who does 
not respond.3 
                                                 
1 See 
majority 
op., ¶41 ("A no-merit appeal clearly 
qualifies as a previous motion under § 974.06(4).").  Elsewhere 
in the opinion, the majority suggests what to me is a 
potentially 
simpler 
explanation 
for 
application 
of 
the 
procedural bar to a no-merit appeal based on the text of Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06(4).  Issues raised in a no-merit procedure are 
considered "finally adjudicated."  See majority op., ¶59.  In 
other words, the defendant "got review of those claims from the 
court of appeals" at the time of the no-merit appeal. 
2 Majority op., ¶4.   
3 See majority op., ¶¶59-60. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa 
 
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¶98 In 
contrast, 
I 
conclude 
that 
whatever 
its 
idiosyncrasies, a no-merit procedure is a direct appeal under 
the law, albeit "a different breed of appeal."4  I conclude that 
the Escalona-Naranjo procedural bar applies to the defendant in 
this case.  It is well-established that a defendant proceeding 
under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 "requires a sufficient reason to raise 
a constitutional issue in a § 974.06 motion that could have been 
raised on direct appeal."  State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 
Wis. 2d 168, 185, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994); Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4). 
¶99 The second issue raised by the court was "whether 
appointed counsel is required to advise the defendant that a 
response to a no-merit report is necessary to preserve claims 
for further review." 
¶100 The majority answers this question by stating, "An 
attorney must discuss with the defendant the defendant's rights 
on appeal, including the option to file a no-merit report.  
State ex rel. Flores v. State, 183 Wis. 2d 587, 607, 516 
N.W.2d 362 (1994)."5  The majority doesn't otherwise answer the 
                                                 
4 State v. Tillman, 2005 WI App 71, ¶20, 281 Wis. 2d 157, 
168, 696 N.W.2d 574. 
5 Majority op., ¶20.  State ex rel. Flores v. State, 183 
Wis. 2d 587, 607, 516 N.W.2d 362 (1994), cited by the majority, 
states: 
Information about the No Merit option only becomes 
necessary when the No Merit option becomes relevant to 
the defendant's decision as how to exercise the right 
of appeal.  Information about a No Merit report is not 
necessary when the defendant does not desire to pursue 
an appeal.  See, e.g., Jones v. Estelle, 584 F.2d 687, 
691 (5th Cir. 1978).  As pointed out by the amicus 
brief from the Office of State Public Defender, there 
are many possible reasons why a defendant may wish to 
No.  2007AP795.ssa 
 
3 
 
question.  Because the no-merit procedure now decisively 
triggers the procedural bar, which affects the defendant's 
rights on further review, I conclude that counsel must discuss 
with the defendant the consequences of the no-merit procedure. 
¶101 The third issue raised by the court is "whether to 
require a defendant to file a response to a no-merit report 
conflicts with a right to counsel on direct appeal."  
¶102 The majority concludes that because a defendant is not 
required to file a response to a no-merit report, no conflict 
with the right to counsel on direct appeal exists.  I address 
this question later. 
II 
¶103 A no-merit procedure is an appeal.  When the court of 
appeals determines under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(3) that 
further appellate proceedings would be frivolous and would lack 
arguable merit, the court of appeals shall affirm the judgment 
of conviction.  Allen has had what is in effect a final 
adjudication of the judgment of conviction on the direct appeal.  
Therefore, the procedural bar applies under Escalona-Naranjo and 
State v. Lo, 2003 WI 107, 264 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 756.  
                                                                                                                                                             
forego any appeal which are unrelated to the specific 
avenues of appeal available.  For instance, a criminal 
defendant may wish to forego an appeal even when there 
is arguable merit rather than to be exposed to the 
possibility of a greater penalty on resentencing or 
the resurrection of dismissed charges should the 
appeal succeed.  Or the defendant may not wish to 
appeal based upon any number of personal, practical, 
or even idiosyncratic reasons. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶104 That is not to say, however, that the no-merit 
procedure is what one normally thinks of as an appeal.  Under 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(1), the no-merit report is filed when 
the defendant either requests it or when the defendant declines 
to consent to have his or her attorney close the file without 
further representation.  For all practical purposes, the 
representation in which the lawyer served as the client's 
zealous advocate is at an end when the no-merit report is filed.   
¶105 The no-merit procedure has been adopted as a practical 
way to balance the right to effective assistance of counsel with 
an attorney's ethical obligation not to advance frivolous 
arguments before the court.  See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 
738, 744 (1967) (implemented in Wisconsin under Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.32); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 
429 (1988).  See also State v. Parent, 2006 WI 132, ¶¶19-21, 298 
Wis. 2d 63, 725 N.W.2d 915.  In the no-merit procedure, the 
court of appeals "conducts its own scrutiny of the record to see 
if there are any potential appellate issues with arguable 
merit."  Parent, 298 Wis. 2d at 77, ¶21.   
¶106 The majority emphasizes that the court of appeals 
performs a "full examination of all the proceedings" in the no-
merit procedure, majority op., ¶58, and quotes State v. Tillman, 
2005 WI App 71, ¶19, 281 Wis. 2d 157, 696 N.W.2d 574, which 
asserted that "in some facets, the no merit procedure affords a 
defendant greater scrutiny . . . than in a conventional appeal."  
See majority op., ¶31 (quoting Tillman, 281 Wis. 2d 157, ¶18).   
No.  2007AP795.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶107 I agree with the majority that the court must rely on 
the court of appeals' no-merit decision, up to a point, for 
purposes of evaluating the procedural bar issue.  See majority 
op., ¶¶63, 82.  I agree that a demonstrated failure to comply 
with the no-merit procedure provides a "sufficient reason" to 
permit new issues to be raised in a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion.  
Majority op., ¶66.   
¶108 In my view, however, one should not overstate the 
benefits or robustness of the no-merit procedure in comparison 
to an appeal in which the defendant remains represented by 
counsel who raises and argues non-frivolous issues on the 
defendant's behalf.   
¶109 Normally in our court system, "[a] fair adversary 
process presupposes both a vigorous prosecution and a vigorous 
defense."  Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment 
Opportunity 
Comm'n, 
434 
U.S. 
412, 
419 
(1978). 
 
"[T]he 
adversarial process protected by the Sixth Amendment requires 
that the accused have 'counsel acting in the role of an 
advocate.'"  United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984) 
(quoting 
Anders, 
386 
U.S. 
at 
743). 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=868429855339617087&q
=Cronic,+466+us+648&hl=en&as_sdt=400000000000002.  In a no-merit 
procedure, the defendant has no independent advocate:  there is 
no adversarial proceeding.  The court departs from the usual 
adversarial principles in a no-merit procedure.   
¶110 Moreover, as a practical matter, the court of appeals 
reviews a paper record of the case.  If the defendant's case 
No.  2007AP795.ssa 
 
6 
 
presents potential issues that depend on information not 
contained in the record——for instance, a suppression motion that 
was not brought or evidence that was not considered or 
introduced at trial——then it is effectively impossible for the 
court of appeals to identify or address those issues adequately.  
So courts should not too hastily rely on a court of appeals' no-
merit decision without actually evaluating whether issues raised 
in a Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) motion could have been "raised" and 
evaluated by the court of appeals in the no-merit procedure. 
¶111 In light of these considerations I am not persuaded 
that it is equitable to treat the no-merit case different from 
the case in which no appeal has been filed.  The defendant who 
never files a § 974.02 motion or takes a direct appeal is not 
subject to the procedural bar; the defendant in a no-merit 
procedure is.  Majority op., ¶40.  Yet, as far as the "no merit" 
defendant is concerned, he has not had the opportunity for an 
appeal in which he is represented by counsel. 
III 
¶112 The basic idea of the procedural bar following 
Escalona-Naranjo 
is 
that 
absent 
a 
"sufficient 
reason," 
defendants may not raise issues that could have been raised in a 
previous motion or on direct appeal.  Escalona-Naranjo, 185 
Wis. 2d at 185.  In other words, according to the majority at 
¶3, "the question at hand is whether Allen is barred from 
raising issues in his § 974.06(4) motion."  Many pages later one 
discovers that the answer to whether Allen is "barred" from 
raising 
issues 
in 
his 
§ 974.06(4) 
motion 
depends 
on 
an 
No.  2007AP795.ssa 
 
7 
 
examination of what those issues are.  See majority op., ¶¶76-
79.   
¶113 In other words, in order to decide whether the court 
should evaluate the merits of the defendant's constitutional 
claims, the court first must evaluate the merits of the 
constitutional claims.  In my view, this double-refracted way of 
looking at the constitutional issues is a perfectly emblematic 
result of the convolutions that have been wrought in Wisconsin's 
postconviction procedure under Wis. Stat. § 974.06.6  
¶114 The majority suggests that to meet the burden of proof 
on a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion following a no-merit procedure, 
the defendant should identify "an issue of such obvious merit 
that it was an error by the court [of appeals] not to discuss 
it."  See majority op., ¶83.  
¶115 It is not "obvious" what the majority means by 
"obvious merit."  Since it is the obligation of the court of 
appeals in a no-merit procedure to determine whether the issues 
are "without any arguable merit," Wis. Stat. § 809.32(3), 
majority op., ¶21, the court of appeals errs when it overlooks 
issues of "arguable merit," not when it overlooks issues of 
"obvious merit."  The majority's passing articulation of a new 
"obvious merit" standard appears to draw a new line between 
                                                 
6 See Escalonja-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 196 (Abrahamson, J., 
dissenting) ("[I]n the states that have apparently adopted the 
majority's approach . . . the litigation has merely shifted the 
court's attention from the merits of the constitutional claim to 
arcane procedural issues.  Rather than create a procedural 
morass, I would rather see courts deal with significant 
constitutional issues on their merits."). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa 
 
8 
 
those issues the court of appeals must actually "discuss" and 
issues the court of appeals may resolve tacitly.   
¶116 When I apply the new rules set forth in the majority 
opinion, I concur in the mandate.     
¶117 I am not persuaded that the procedure set forth in the 
majority opinion has provided judicial economy, simplicity, or 
finality.  
¶118 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶119 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
 
No.  2007AP795.ssa 
 
 
 
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