Title: State v. Castilleja
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S055472
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 18, 2008

FILED: September 18, 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE
OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
AMBER SERENITY CASTILLEJA,
Respondent on Review.
(CC CR030092; CA A127255 (Control))
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
MICHAEL SANTOS CASTILLEJA,
Respondent on Review.
(CC CR030093; CAA127256; SC S055472)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued
and submitted May 14, 2008.
Rolf
C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
brief for petitioner on review.  With him on the brief were Hardy Myers,
Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Ryan
T. O'Connor, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review Amber Serenity Castilleja.  With him on the
brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
Leland
R. Berger, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on
review Michael Santos Castilleja.
Wayne
Mackeson, Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae the Oregon
Criminal Defense Lawyers Association.
John
C. Lucy IV, Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae the National
Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws.
GILLETTE,
J.
The
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit
court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
*Appeal from
Yamhill Circuit Court, Carol E. Jones, Judge. 215 Or App 235, 168 P3d 1177
(2007).
GILLETTE, J.
This is a criminal case in which the
defendants, who are husband and wife, were charged in a single indictment with
unlawful manufacture of marijuana, unlawful possession of a controlled
substance (marijuana), and both unlawfully neglecting and unlawfully endangering
their two children by permitting them to remain on premises where the alleged
illegal acts involving marijuana had occurred.  The indictment further charged
defendant Michael Castilleja individually with two counts of delivery of a
controlled substance (marijuana).  The state's case was based on evidence
seized pursuant to a search warrant.  Defendants moved to suppress that
evidence or, in the alternative, to controvert the warrant.(1)  The trial judge
addressed only the motion to suppress and ruled that the affidavit supporting
the search warrant did not supply probable cause to issue the warrant.  The
state appealed the trial court's resulting order suppressing evidence.  A
divided Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed the ruling of the trial
court.  State v. Castilleja, 215 Or App 235, 168 P3d 1177 (2007).  We
allowed the state's petition for review and now reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals and the judgment of the trial court.  
The facts of this case are convoluted
but essentially undisputed, at least as they pertain to the issue on review in
this court.  Oregon State Police Trooper Stone executed the warrant at issue in
this case at defendants' home in Yamhill County on October 21, 2002. 
Defendants both held Oregon "medical marijuana cards"(2)
at the time.  The affidavit in support of the warrant alleged the following
facts, among many others:  Stone had been a police officer for 12 years.  In
that time, he had received extensive training in investigating activities related
to controlled substances, and he had extensive training and experience with
operations for growing marijuana, which familiarized him with the appearance
and smell of marijuana, both when growing and in its dried form, as well as in
its various stages of processing.  
Stone first went to defendants'
residence on October 7, 2002, in response to a call concerning an attempted
homicide.  Officers had been summoned because defendant Michael Castilleja had
been shot and seriously wounded by intruders who, it was believed, were
attempting to steal defendants' marijuana plants.  When Stone arrived, Michael
Castilleja already had been transported to the hospital by ambulance,
accompanied by defendant Amber Castilleja.  Officers already at the scene told
Stone that there were six mature marijuana plants growing in a greenhouse on
the premises, that there was a "large amount" of marijuana drying in
the back of the residence, and that marijuana paraphernalia and loose marijuana
were "lying around" the residence.  Stone knew that both defendants
held medical marijuana permits and that defendants therefore were permitted by
law to possess three mature plants each (for a total of six).  
Stone entered the house and spoke to
Loewen, Amber Castilleja's mother.  Loewen told Stone that Amber Castilleja had
called her to tell her about the shooting and to ask her to collect the
children, ages eight and seven, and to secure the house.  Stone's affidavit
continued:  
"[Loewen] was very upset and told me she
knows [defendants] have medical marijuana permits but added that she knew they
were way over their lawful allowable amounts.  [Loewen] then said it was her
understanding that Michael Castilleja's medical marijuana permit was expired or
revoked but she did not know for sure.  [Loewen] told me she believed there was
a lot more than medical marijuana going on at the Castilleja residence.  When I
asked her what she meant, [Loewen] said Michael Castilleja has not worked in a
couple of years and her daughter works for minimum wage, yet they have lots of
stuff.  [Loewen] told me there were boxes of brand new stereo equipment stacked
in [defendants'] closet.  [Loewen] told me she knows what has been going on
because she had once been a drug dealer and was familiar with controlled substances
and signs that go along with drug dealing, as well as the effects that drug
dealing has on children.  [Loewen] told me that she stopped dealing drugs when
her children were very young after her daughter was nearly shot during a search
warrant service at her home.  
"[Loewen] said she knows that [defendants]
were not supposed to have more than three ounces of marijuana apiece in
addition to the growing marijuana.  [Loewen] told me there was two pounds of
marijuana in her daughter's bedroom in the closet as well as marijuana all over
the house, indicating there was marijuana on the floor and marijuana drying in
the back of the residence.  [Loewen] told me the two pounds of marijuana in
[defendants'] bedroom closet was [sic] in two large plastic bags."
After talking to Loewen, Stone walked through the house,
observing marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia in various locations.  
Stone also averred that he later
verified with state officials that both defendants held valid medical marijuana
permits.  
Stone recounted that he had talked to
another police officer, Rosario, who also had talked to Loewen after the
shooting.  In addition to the information that Loewen had given Stone, Loewen
told Rosario about an incident that had occurred over six months earlier, in
which defendants and other adults had smoked marijuana in front of the
children.  
Stone also stated that Rosario had
gone back to defendants' home later on the day of the shooting, October 7,
2002, to talk to Amber Castilleja.  At that time, Rosario observed that the
marijuana that had been growing in the greenhouse a few hours earlier had been
harvested and was in three clothes baskets in the house.  Those baskets
contained stems with the marijuana bud on them, some of which were a foot or more
in length.  Rosario also observed a box full of bare marijuana stems.  Finally,
Stone alleged that he knew, based on his training and experience, that the
average mature marijuana plant will produce more than a pound of marijuana and
can produce well over a pound depending on the plant and the skill of the
grower.  
Based on Stone's affidavit, a
magistrate issued a search warrant.  As noted, police officers executed the warrant
on October 21, 2002.  While searching the house, the officers discovered and
seized marijuana well in excess of the legal limits under the medical marijuana
law.  Again as noted, defendants were charged in a multicount indictment with,
among other things, unlawfully manufacturing a controlled substance, possession
of a controlled substance, and delivery of a controlled substance.  
Before trial, defendants moved to
suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search of their home.  They
also moved at the same time to controvert the warrant by challenging the good
faith, accuracy, and truthfulness of the affiant.  At the subsequent hearing on
those motions, the trial court ruled that it would consider the motion to
suppress first and would turn to the motion to controvert later and only if
necessary.  Accordingly, the court heard testimony from officers Stone and
Rosario, and from Loewen, concerning Loewen's authority to consent to the
initial search of defendants' home immediately after the shooting.(3) 
The court concluded that Loewen did not have authority to consent to that
search and, therefore, the magistrate should not have relied on any facts
derived from the officers' observations during that initial search to support
the warrant that the magistrate ultimately issued.(4)
In light of that ruling, the trial court
excised from Stone's affidavit all information derived from the first, unlawful
search of defendants' home.  It then considered the remaining information in
the affidavit to determine whether that information was sufficient to establish
probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant.  In doing so, the court
reiterated that it was not taking evidence on or otherwise reaching the motion
to controvert.  
Having excised the unlawfully
obtained information, the court concluded that the remaining allegations did
not establish probable cause.  First, the court entirely discounted Loewen's
statements to Stone:
"[A]s I read the affidavit as a whole, I
think that [Loewen] was clearly upset about what she thought was going on.  
"She was clearly mistaken in at least one
regard, and that was in respect to [Mr.] Castilleja's license being revoked or
lapsed.  She was just flat wrong about that. And the manner in which she
presented the statements and the information that she had, I think painted her
as being maybe somewhat less than neutral on the issue.  And I do frankly take
that into account. 
"* * * [The court then summarized Loewen's
statements to the effect that defendants were over the legal limit, that there
was more than medical marijuana going on, that Michael Castilleja's permit had
expired, that she had had her own drug dealing experience, and that defendants
had too much 'stuff' considering how little money they earned.]
"I frankly don't find any of her statements
there to add anything to probable cause.  Again, and I have already mentioned
that I think there's an issue of her own motives and veracity, as [defense
counsel] pointed out.  
"There's some guess work going on.  It is
too vague.  She apparently stated to Detective Rosario [sic] that * * *
she felt that it was more than medical marijuana because, one, it was all over
the house, and two, she thought that [Michael Castilleja's] card had expired. 
"So when she concluded that there was more
than medical marijuana going on, I don't find that there was a basis of
knowledge or particularly the veracity necessary for me to find that added
anything to the probable cause analysis.  And I don't find those statements
added anything.  
"Of somewhat more concern was her statement
about the two pounds in the closet.  But again, I think that because of the
veracity issue, and frankly the basis of her knowledge, and maybe to a lesser
extent the issue of whether it was usable or not, I don't find that there is
much there either in terms of probable cause."
The trial court then considered the remaining allegations in
the affidavit, including, among other things, Rosario's observation that the
mature plants had been harvested and amounted to about three pounds of fresh
marijuana in baskets, and ruled that those allegations also did not establish
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.  Based on those rulings, the
court granted defendants' motion to suppress.  
The state appealed the trial court's
ruling to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's suppression of
the evidence.  However, as we shall explain, the Court of Appeals applied an
erroneous standard of review to the trial court's ruling and, in so doing,
reached an incorrect result.  
Under Oregon law, an application for
a search warrant "shall be supported by one or more affidavits
particularly setting forth the facts and circumstances tending to show that the
objects of the search are in the places, or in the possession of the
individuals, to be searched."  ORS 133.545(4).  A judge reviewing the
application and the supporting affidavits shall issue a search warrant if
"there is probable cause to believe that the search will discover things
specified in the application."  ORS 133.555(2).  In addition, Article I,
section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, provides that "no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, supported by an oath, or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized."                
In a typical search warrant case, such
as this one, the issuing magistrate or judge reviews an affidavit -- a document
-- and does not hear live witness testimony.(5) 
Therefore, the only question before the issuing judge or magistrate is a legal
one:  Does the affidavit establish probable cause?  And probable cause, in this
context, exists when the facts set out in the affidavit would "'lead a
reasonable person to believe that seizable things will probably be found in the
location to be searched.'"  State v. Goodman, 328 Or 318, 325, 975
P2d 458 (1999) (quoting State v. Anspach, 298 Or 375, 380-81, 692 P2d
602 (1984)).
When a court reviews a challenge to
the sufficiency of an affidavit supporting a magistrate's issuance of a
warrant, the question before the reviewing court remains a legal one.  A reviewing
court asks whether, based on the facts shown by the affidavit, a neutral and
detached magistrate could conclude (1) that there is reason to believe that the
facts stated are true; and (2) that the facts and circumstances disclosed by
the affidavit are sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the search
requested.  State v. Villagran, 294 Or 404, 408, 657 P2d 1223 (1983).  In
this case, after having ruled that the initial search of defendants' home was
unlawful and therefore having excised the parts of the affidavit that contained
information derived from that search, the trial court concluded (erroneously,
as we shall explain) that (1) there was insufficient reason to believe that
Loewen's information was true; and, (2) with Loewen's statements also excised,
the remaining facts and circumstances described in the affidavit were not
sufficient to establish probable cause to search.   
On appeal, however, the Court of
Appeals did not apply that standard of review.  Rather, the court held as
follows:  
"Our standard of review dictates our
conclusion.  When, as here, the trial court has excised information from the
affidavit, that court resolves the sufficiency of the warrant independently of
the decision of the magistrate who issued the warrant and, thus, on appeal,
there is no occasion for deference to the issuing magistrate's decision.  * * *
In other words, like the trial court, we are not required to draw all
reasonable inferences that are consistent with the magistrate's decision. 
Instead, we are bound by the trial court's factual findings, including
reasonable inferences that it drew, as long as there is evidence to support
them.  * * * 'Normally, in the absence of other indications of the trial
court's findings, we resolve all disputed factual issues to support its
ultimate conclusion.'  * * * 'On appeal, we do not decide whether we would draw
the same inference if we were the factfinder.  We ask only whether that inference
is one that the trial court reasonably could draw based on the record before
it.'  * * * Thus, when, as here, the trial court has determined that a search
warrant application does not establish probable cause, we are bound by the
court's factual findings and all reasonable inferences that are consistent with
that conclusion.
"In reaching the ultimate conclusion that
the affidavit did not demonstrate probable cause, the trial court necessarily
determined that the affidavit failed to show that defendants probably had more
than six ounces of usable marijuana in their home.  We are bound by that
determination if any evidence in the record supports it.  * * *"
Castilleja, 215 Or App at 248-49 (citations omitted; emphasis
added).   
As is evident from the foregoing, the
Court of Appeals felt obligated to uphold the trial court's determinations
regarding the truth of the information in the affidavit and the existence of
probable cause if there was any evidence to support them.  That was incorrect. 
The sufficiency of the search warrant affidavit presents a legal question for each
reviewing court, beginning with the trial court.  That is, as in the
trial court, the question before the Court of Appeals was whether the
issuing magistrate could have concluded that the affidavit (excluding the
excised parts) established probable cause to search defendants' home.  As to
that question, the Court of Appeals was in the same position as was the trial
court to evaluate the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the affidavit, the
reasonableness of any inferences involved in resolving the legal question
presented by the probable cause determination, and, ultimately, the existence
of probable cause to support the warrant.  No appellate court deference to the
trial court's findings or conclusions was appropriate or warranted.(6)
It follows that the same legal
question is before this court on review:  Does the affidavit (excluding the
excised parts) provide sufficient information to permit the issuing magistrate
to find probable cause for the search?  
To answer those questions, we turn to
the first issue that Villagran (and the cases that have followed it) requires
us to decide:  whether the magistrate reasonably could believe that the facts
stated in the affidavit are true.(7) 
In Villagran, this court reviewed various factors that a court may
consider in reviewing a magistrate's determination of the veracity of a person
who had provided information to the police.  First, the court considered the
connection of the informant to the crime itself.  According to the court, 
"[a]t the one extreme is the participant in the
criminal activity who, for a variety of reasons, decides to become an 'informer'
in the second dictionary sense--one who informs against another, often for
money or for other reward or gain.  Then there is the person who, though not a
party to the crime, is closely connected with the criminal establishment.  A
third category would include witnesses, including victims.  A fourth category
would include other persons unconnected with the crime who provide information,
the significance of which the provider may or may not be aware.  Courts have
held that persons in the latter two categories may be more worthy of belief
than an informant from the criminal establishment.  See State v. Montigue,
288 Or 359, 605 P2d 656 (1980);  United States v. Harris, 403 US 573, 91
S Ct 2075, 29 L Ed 2d 723 (1971).  Identification of the informant by name may
also be a factor to consider."
294 Or at 409-10.  In Villagran, the informant was not
complicit in the crime, and his information did not accuse the defendant of a
crime.  However, the court observed, nothing in the affidavit directly
established the informant's veracity.  Accordingly, the court stated, the
informant's veracity would have to inhere in the circumstances of the inquiry. 
Having considered those circumstances, the court concluded that the magistrate
reasonably concluded that the informant was truthful.  294 Or at 411-12.  
In this case, Loewen was not
complicit in the crime, but might be said to be closely connected to the
criminal establishment, at least insofar as she is related to the defendants. 
However, we think that the issuing magistrate would have been entitled to infer
that her status as such enhanced her credibility, because her statements were
against the criminal interests of her own daughter.  Loewen also was identified
by name, which tends to enhance her credibility.  In addition, Loewen's
statements about her own experience dealing drugs, together with her knowledge
of defendants' income level and acquisition of valuable property, lent
credibility to her conclusions concerning the likelihood that defendants also
were dealing drugs.  Finally, Loewen's statements reflected a familiarity with
the medical marijuana laws and limits, which provided a basis for her asserted knowledge
that defendants possessed more marijuana than the medical marijuana law
permits.  All those factors reasonably permitted the magistrate to conclude
that Loewen was truthful.  Still further, Loewen's information about the
marijuana and stereo equipment in defendants' bedroom closet was very specific,
which supported an inference that that information was based on first-hand
knowledge.  
As noted above, the trial court came
to a contrary conclusion with respect to the information that Loewen provided
to Stone.  Of particular relevance to the trial court was the fact that Loewen
stated that she believed that Michael Castilleja did not hold a valid medical
marijuana permit.  According to the trial court, Loewen was "flat
wrong" about that, and that fact, coupled with the fact that Loewen was
clearly upset about what had happened at her daughter's house, caused the trial
court to doubt Loewen's veracity in every respect.(8) 
As our recitation of the part of Stone's affidavit recounting his conversation
with Loewen shows, however, Loewen did not simply state that she believed that
Michael Castilleja's permit was invalid; she added that "she did not
know for sure."  (Emphasis added.)  Instead of suggesting that Loewen
was not credible, the issuing magistrate was entitled to infer from that
equivocal admission of uncertainty that Loewen was concerned with providing
accurate information to the police.  At the least, no necessary inference can
be drawn from that statement that Loewen lied to the police, an inference which
then might have required the magistrate to find that Loewen was not credible.(9) 
Moreover, nothing in Stone's affidavit supports the inference drawn by the
trial court that Loewen had improper motives in making her statements to the
police.  While the fact that Loewen was upset that her son-in-law had been shot
and that his and her daughter's criminal activities had placed her
grandchildren in danger may show that Loewen was not "neutral," as
the trial court stated, it certainly was a natural response to events, and it did
not require the issuing magistrate to question, much less reject, Loewen's
credibility.  
It follows from the foregoing that
the trial court erred in concluding that it was permitted to make its own
independent findings that the information that Loewen had supplied was not
truthful or reliable, and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming that methodology
and conclusion.  We so hold.
That leads us to the second issue
that Villagran requires us to decide, viz., whether the facts and
circumstances disclosed by the affidavit were sufficient to establish probable
cause to justify the search.  294 Or at 408.  Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals concluded that those facts and circumstances were not sufficient. 
In that regard, the Court of Appeals held that, even if the trial court's
conclusion that Loewen lacked veracity were not reasonable, "the trial
court could reasonably determine that the affidavit failed to establish that
the marijuana in the closet probably was usable."  Castilleja, 215
Or App at 251.  Similarly, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
conclusion that none of the other allegations in the affidavit established that
a search probably would uncover more than six ounces of usable marijuana. 
Again, the Court of Appeals focused on the wrong question, which led it to
apply an incorrect standard of review:  Rather than considering the legal issue
whether the affidavit alleged sufficient facts to permit a neutral and detached
magistrate to determine that seizable evidence probably would be found at the
place to be searched, the court accepted all the trial court's findings
as true, as long as there was evidence in the record to support them.  Because
the Court of Appeals applied the incorrect standard in reviewing the trial
court's ruling, we consider the matter anew.   
Preliminarily, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the issue in the case is not whether there was probable
cause to believe that any marijuana would be found in defendant's house
but, rather, whether there was probable cause to believe that an unlawful
amount of marijuana -- more than six usable ounces -- would be found
there.  With the unlawfully obtained information excised from the affidavit,
but with due consideration to Loewen's statements, the affidavit permitted the
issuing magistrate to find the following facts:  Loewen knew that defendants
were "not supposed to have more than three ounces of marijuana apiece in
addition to the growing marijuana"; Loewen reported that "there [were]
two pounds of marijuana in her daughter's bedroom closet as well as marijuana
all over the house" and that "there was marijuana on the floor and
marijuana drying in the back of the house"; Loewen stated that the two
pounds of marijuana in defendant's bedroom closet were in two large plastic
bags; and, finally, Stone stated that medical marijuana permit holders each are
permitted to possess up to three ounces of usable marijuana, defined as the dried
leaves and flowers of the marijuana plant and, based on his training and
experience, he had reason to believe that evidence of the crimes of, among
other things, manufacturing a controlled substance and possession of a
controlled substance would be found in defendants' home.  
We turn to the question whether a neutral
and detached magistrate could conclude, based on the facts and circumstances
shown by the affidavit, that there was probable cause to believe that the
search would discover things specified in the affidavit in the places requested
to be searched.  Villagran, 294 Or at 408.  In so doing, we also
consider all "inferences that fairly may be drawn from those facts"
to determine whether probable cause exists.  Goodman, 328 Or at 326.  We
further observe, in this connection, that "[p]robable cause is not
certainty;  'there is a vast difference between proof of probable cause and
proof of guilt * * *.'" Id. (quoting State v. Tacker, 241 Or
597, 601, 407 P2d 851 (1965)).  Thus, to uphold the warrant, the reviewing
court need only conclude that the issuing magistrate reasonably could conclude
that the facts alleged, together with the reasonable inferences that fairly may
be drawn from those facts, establish that seizable things probably will be
found at the location to be searched.  We think that the affidavit here was
more than sufficient to meet that standard.  
Apart from Loewen's statements that
marijuana was "all over the place," Loewen specifically stated that
there were two pounds of marijuana in plastic bags in defendant's closet. 
Although that statement alone does not directly convey how much, if any, of
that marijuana was "usable," we think it is fair to infer that the
marijuana in the plastic bags was dry, if for no other reason than because it
was in the closet rather than being dried in the back of the residence.  It
also would be fair for the magistrate to infer that bags containing 32 ounces
of dried marijuana -- even if all of it was not usable marijuana -- would at
least contain more than six ounces of marijuana that was usable.  The issuing
magistrate also might have drawn a number of other inferences in support of
probable cause, but we think that it is sufficient for the purposes of this
case to hold that the foregoing inferences, standing alone, were sufficient to
supply probable cause to justify the search requested.
To summarize, we hold that the facts
that Stone recounted in his affidavit, together with reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, would permit a neutral and detached magistrate to believe that
seizable things probably would be found in defendant's home.  Indeed, taken
together, all the facts and the inferences that reasonably could be drawn from
those facts would have permitted the issuing magistrate reasonably to conclude
that this affidavit was replete with probable cause.  The trial court erred in reaching
a contrary conclusion, and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming that ruling.

The decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
1. Defendants are represented by separate counsel and have not always
taken precisely the same legal positions before the trial court, the Court of
Appeals, or this court.  For the sake of simplicity, however, we choose to
label all arguments made, or motions filed, by either defendant as if they had
been made and argued by both.  
2. Under the version of the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act (OMMA) in force
at the time of defendants' alleged crimes, a person who possessed a
"registry identification card" -- the document more commonly referred
to as a "medical marijuana card" -- could lawfully possess up to
three mature plants, four immature plants, and one ounce of "usable
marijuana" per each mature marijuana plant.  ORS 475.306(1) (2001).  Under
the OMMA, "usable marijuana" was and continues to be defined as
"the dried leaves of and flowers of the plant Cannabis family Moraceae,
and any mixture or preparation thereof, that are appropriate for medical use as
allowed in [other provisions of the OMMA]."  ORS 475.302(11). 
"Usable marijuana" does not include the seeds, stalks and roots of
the plant.  Id.  
3. The testimony taken at the hearing was consistent with its limited
scope.  At the suppression hearing, Loewen was asked about her relationship
with defendants and their children.  She testified that her daughter had asked
her to come to the house to collect the children because Michael Castilleja had
been shot.  She testified that she visited the defendants about once a month
and that she did not have a key to their residence.  She also testified that
she had had conversations with the police after Michael Castilleja had been
taken to the hospital.  She was not asked about her statements to Stone about
the marijuana in the closet or any of her other statements about defendants'
drug activity.  The officers also were examined about their contacts with Loewen,
but they, too, were not asked about any information she gave them about
defendants' drug activity. 
4. The state does not challenge that ruling here, and we therefore have
no reason to inquire into it.
5. Rather than rely on the affidavit alone, the issuing magistrate or
judge may hold a hearing and examine the affiant and the informants.  ORS
133.555(1).  In that case, the magistrate or judge may make factual findings,
and a reviewing court would be bound by those findings as well as all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from them that are consistent with the
magistrate or judge's ultimate conclusion.  
6. In this case, the trial court relied on in-court testimony to
conclude that the initial warrantless entry was unlawful.  The trial court's
factual findings supporting that ruling are entitled to deference on review. 
That is, with respect to the facts that the trial court relied upon to support
its decision to excise certain facts from the affidavit, the Court of Appeals,
as the reviewing court, is bound by the trial court's findings of fact, if
there is evidence in the record to support them.  State v. Johnson, 335
Or 511, 523, 73 P3d 282 (2003); Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487, 443
P2d 621 (1968).  That, however, does not affect the standard of review that the
trial court, or the Court of Appeals, was required to apply in reviewing the remainder
of the affidavit for probable cause.  Rather, those courts were required to
evaluate the sufficiency of the affidavit based on the remaining accurate
allegations in the affidavit after excision.  See, e.g., State v.
Harp, 299 Or 1, 9, 697 P2d 548 (1985) (describing process).     
7. Although the trial court expressly stated that it would not decide
defendants' motion to controvert the warrant under ORS 133.693 unless and until
that became necessary, there appears nonetheless to have been some confusion
among the parties and in the Court of Appeals as to whether the trial court, in
deciding that Loewen's statements should be discounted because she lacked
veracity, was directly or implicitly deciding that motion as well.  The trial
court could not have done so on that stated basis under the plain wording of
ORS 133.693.  That statute provides that, in a motion to controvert, a party
may "contest, by cross-examination or offering evidence, the good faith,
accuracy and truthfulness of the affiant with respect to the evidence
presented to establish probable cause for search or seizure."  ORS
133.693(1) (emphasis added).  This court has held on numerous occasions that
that statute only permits a party to challenge the good faith, accuracy, or
truthfulness of an affiant, not that of an informant. 
Illustrative cases are State v. Esplin, 314 Or 296, 839 P2d 211 (1992); State
v. Coffey, 309 Or 342, 788 P2d 424 (1990); and State v. Hitt, 305 Or
458, 753 P2d 415 (1988).  (And, in this case, defendants' motion to controvert
challenged only the affiant's (Stone's), and not the informant's (Loewen's),
good faith, accuracy, and truthfulness.)  Thus, under ORS 133.693, if Stone
subjectively believed that Loewen was truthful, and if that belief was
objectively reasonable, then defendants could not controvert the warrant even
if Loewen was later proved to have acted in bad faith in providing information
to the police.  See Esplin, 314 Or at 304-05 (stating
principle).  However, the fact that defendants may not controvert a warrant
under ORS 133.693 by attempting to show that an informant lacked veracity does
not relieve the reviewing court of its obligation to determine from the four
corners of the affidavit whether a magistrate reasonably could believe that the
facts set out in the affidavit are true.  
8. As noted, nothing presented at the suppression hearing reflected one
way or another on Loewen's veracity.  The evidence presented at that hearing
was confined to the subject of Loewen's authority to consent to the search of
defendants' home.  
9. We say "might" because, even in the context of a motion to
controvert under ORS 133.693, evidence that an affiant made an inaccurate
statement, in the absence of evidence that the affiant actively lied, is not a
sufficient reason to disregard the affiant's other statements.  See State v.
Keeney, 323 Or 309, 319, 918 P2d 419 (1996) ("A demonstration that an
affiant has supplied inaccurate information in a search warrant affidavit
furnishes no reason for the court to conclude that the affiant's remaining factual
assertions also are inaccurate, in the absence of some showing to support that
conclusion.  By contrast, a demonstration that the affiant lied to the
magistrate may lead the trial court to conclude that the affiant is not
credible and that it should give no weight to the affiant's other
statements.").