Title: Simmons Group, LTD v. Caine O'Rear, Jr. Family Trust
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1150475
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 24, 2017

Rel: 03/24/2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
1150475
____________________
Simmons Group, LTD
v.
Caine O'Rear, Jr. Family Trust et al.
Appeal from Walker Circuit Court
(CV-11-900396)
BRYAN, Justice.
This case began as an interpleader action filed by El
Paso E&P Production, L.P. ("El Paso"), to determine who owns
the mineral interest in a piece of property located in Walker
County, Alabama ("the Landon parcel"), on which El Paso
1150475
operates a methane well.1  The competing claimants for the
mineral interest are Simmons Group, LTD ("Simmons Group"), on
the one hand, and the Caine O'Rear, Jr. Family Trust, Mary Lou
Foy, Susan Foy Spratling, Paula Robertson Rose, Stacy Baker
Carson, and Warren Dane Baker (hereafter referred to
collectively as "O'Rear"), on the other hand.  Simmons Group
claims ownership by an unbroken chain of conveyances starting
with an 1883 quitclaim deed from one Elizer Taylor to Musgrove
Bros. purporting to convey the mineral interest ("the 1883
deed").  O'Rear claims ownership by a separate chain of
conveyances originating in the adverse possession of the
Landon parcel by one J.K.P. Chilton and allegedly ripening
into ownership sometime before 1921.  O'Rear does not argue
that 
Chilton 
adversely 
possessed 
the 
mineral 
interest 
separate
from the surface estate.2  Rather, O'Rear argues that the 1883
1The original owner of the disputed interest was John W.
Landon, who acquired the property by patent from the United
States government in 1858. 
2When the mineral interest in a property is severed from
the surface estate, adverse possession of the surface does not
constitute adverse possession of the mineral interest. 
Sanford v. Alabama Power Co., 256 Ala. 280, 288, 54 So. 2d
562, 569 (1951) ("To acquire by adverse possession the title
to the mineral interests so severed, there must be an actual
taking or use under claim of right of the minerals from the
land for the period necessary to affect the bar."). 
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deed did not validly convey the mineral interest and that the
mineral interest was not severed from the surface estate until
after Chilton adversely possessed the Landon parcel.3  O'Rear
does not dispute Simmons Group's chain of title subsequent to
the 1883 deed.  Thus, it is undisputed that, if the 1883 deed
validly conveyed the mineral interest to Musgrove Bros.,
Simmons Group is the rightful owner.  Ownership of the mineral
interest is the dispositive issue in this case.
The case was tried before the circuit court upon
stipulations, admissions of fact, and briefs.  The court did
not hear oral testimony.  The circuit court determined that
Chilton had adversely possessed the Landon parcel with the
mineral interest still attached and that O'Rear therefore owns
the mineral interest.
3When the mineral interest has not been severed from the
surface estate, adverse possession of the surface is
sufficient for adverse possession of the mineral interest. 
Black Warrior Coal Co. v. West, 170 Ala. 346, 351, 54 So. 200,
201 (1910) ("Had [the adverse possessor not attempted to
sever] the coal and mineral interest in said lands ... there
could be no question but that his adverse possession would
have ripened into a perfect title to the entire interest in
the land several years before his death." (emphasis added)). 
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Standard of Review
Because the circuit court did not hear oral testimony,
our standard of review is de novo.  § 12-2-7, Ala. Code 1975
("[I]n deciding appeals, no weight shall be given the decision
of the trial judge upon the facts where the evidence is not
taken orally before the judge, but in such cases the Supreme
Court shall weigh the evidence and give judgment as it deems
just.").  See also Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So. 2d 1113, 1122
(Ala. 1999) (stating that "where no testimony is presented ore
tenus, a reviewing court will not apply the presumption of
correctness to a trial court's findings of fact and ... the
reviewing court will review the evidence de novo").
Discussion
Neither Simmons Group nor O'Rear can trace its chain of
title to Landon, the original owner.  Indeed, there is a break
in the chain of title to the Landon parcel because in 1877 a
fire destroyed the Walker County courthouse along with the
Walker County land records.  Consequently, Simmons Group
argues that its chain of title, which begins with the 1883
deed, is superior to O'Rear's under Whitehead v. Hester, 512
So. 2d 1297 (Ala. 1987).  In Whitehead, this Court held that
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when all land records have been destroyed, the first
conveyance 
recorded 
thereafter becomes 
the 
new 
beginning 
point
of the chain of title.  In this case, the first recorded
conveyance subsequent to the total destruction of the land
records in Walker County is the 1883 deed.
O'Rear argues that Whitehead is distinguishable from the
present case for two reasons.  First, O'Rear argues that
Simmons Group failed to establish that all land records in
Walker County were destroyed in the 1877 fire and that,
therefore, Whitehead does not apply.  Second, O'Rear argues
that the evidence shows that Elizer Taylor did not own the
mineral interest when she executed the 1883 deed and that the
deed was therefore ineffective to sever the mineral interest
from the surface estate.  
I.  Destruction of the Walker County Land Records
This Court based its decision in Whitehead on the fact
that "neither side in th[at] case [could] trace its title back
to the sovereign or to a common grantor because of the total
destruction of all the land records by the 1890 fire that also
destroyed the Franklin County Courthouse."  Whitehead, 512 So.
2d at 1301.  O'Rear argues that Simmons Group failed to
5
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establish that all the land records were destroyed in the 1877
fire and that, therefore, Whitehead is inapplicable.  We
disagree.  It is undisputed that the Walker County courthouse
burned to the ground in 1877.  Furthermore, the record on
appeal contains no evidence of any land records having
survived that fire.  The total destruction of the building
housing the county records, along with the absence in the
record of any surviving records, is substantial evidence that
the Walker County land records were totally destroyed in the
1877 fire.  O'Rear has offered no evidence to suggest that any
records survived.  Accordingly, the rule from Whitehead
applies to reestablish the beginning point of the chain of
title to the disputed mineral interest.  
II. Evidence That Elizer Taylor Did Not Own the Mineral
Interest in 1883
Under Whitehead, this Court presumes that the first
recorded conveyance after the total destruction of land
records to a property is the beginning point of a disputed
chain of title.  The Court looks to instruments that actually
purport to convey an interest, rather than instruments merely
6
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concerning ownership of the land.4  This is because the
purpose of the Whitehead rule is to bring clarity to title
disputes where the best evidence of ownership -- i.e., the
intact chain of title -- is lost.5  Only instruments that
actually purport to convey an interest can serve the purpose
of Whitehead; instruments that, by their terms, cannot convey
an interest also cannot form part of the chain of title. 
Furthermore, by pinning the new beginning point of the chain
of title to the first conveyance recorded after the
destruction of the land records, the Whitehead rule protects
parties from undertaking the onerous task of showing who owned
certain property more than a century after the best evidence
of ownership has been lost.  As the Court stated in Whitehead: 
"To require [the parties] to somehow locate the
originals of the instruments that were destroyed in
the fire and, thus, establish their chain of title
from the present date completely back to a
government patent or to a common grantor, would
4We say "purports to convey" because in lost-chain-of-
title cases it is not possible to unequivocally determine the
true owner of the disputed property at the time of the first-
recorded conveyance.  Indeed, this is the problem the
Whitehead rule is intended to remedy. 
5"While the legal title to real property can be shown by
a valid deed, the record title is the highest evidence of
ownership of real property and is not easily defeated."  63C
Am. Jur. 2d Property § 39 (2009) (emphasis added). 
7
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place an unreasonable burden on them, or on others
similarly situated."  
512 So. 2d at 1302. 
Of course, the Whitehead rule does nothing to disturb the
basic property rule that a grantor cannot convey more than the
grantor actually owns.  See, e.g., Chancy v. Chancy Lake
Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 55 So. 3d 287, 297 (Ala. Civ. App.
2010)(stating that "[a] landowner cannot convey a greater
interest in property than he possesses").  Thus, proof that
the grantor of the first-recorded deed did not actually own
the property at the time of the purported conveyance will
defeat the presumption underpinning the Whitehead rule. 
O'Rear, however, presents no such proof.  
In this case, the only post-fire evidence concerning
ownership of the mineral interest before the 1883 deed is an
1871 agreement, recorded in 1879, between one Nancy Landon and
one Luiza Taylor ("the 1871 agreement"), and three 1920
affidavits sworn to by G.W. Kilgore, E.S. Hutto, and W.R.
Brown ("the 1920 affidavits").  The 1871 agreement states, in
pertinent part:
"Contract made and executed the 28th day of November
one thousand eight hundred and seventy one by and
between Nancy Landon of the first part and Luiza
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Taylor of the second part both of the County of
Walker and the State of Alabama[.] [T]he said Nancy
Landon agrees to give to her daughter Luiza Taylor
her property to take care of her her life time and
the said Luiza Taylor agrees to take care of her
mother Nancy Landon her life time for the property
of her mother all the following described Land ...
[describing the Landon parcel] ... and if either of
the above named parties fails to comply with the
above named duty this obligation is void and set
aside." 
O'Rear argues that this agreement shows that the mineral
interest had not been severed from the surface estate of the
Landon parcel and that, therefore, Elizer Taylor did not own
the mineral interest when she purported to convey it to
Musgrove Bros. in 1883.  This argument is unpersuasive.  At
most, the 1871 agreement is evidence that someone besides
Elizer Taylor owned the mineral interest in 1871.  Evidence
that Elizer Taylor did not own the mineral interest in 1871 is
not inconsistent with her ownership of the interest 12 years
later in 1883.  Thus, the 1871 agreement cannot defeat the
presumption that the 1883 deed is the beginning point of the
chain of title.6
6Furthermore, the 1871 agreement cannot itself serve as
the presumed beginning point of the chain of title under
Whitehead.  The agreement is executory in nature and does not
purport to convey an interest in the Landon parcel. 
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The 1920 affidavits, which are each identical in
substance, allege that, when the 1883 deed was executed,
Elizer Taylor had been in adverse possession of both the
mineral interest and surface of the Landon parcel for "more
than one year."  O'Rear argues that, because those affidavits
establish that Taylor had been in adverse possession of the
as-yet-unsevered 
mineral 
interest 
for 
less 
than 
the
prescriptive period when she executed the 1883 deed, that deed
could not convey title.  This argument is also unpersuasive. 
The assertion in the 1920 affidavits that Taylor was in
adverse possession of the mineral interest is a legal
conclusion, not a factual allegation.7  Furthermore, the
nonspecific assertion that Taylor had been in adverse
possession for longer than a year does not support O'Rear's
argument that Taylor had been in adverse possession for less
than the prescriptive period. That assertion is, in fact,
fully 
consistent 
with 
Taylor's 
possession for 
the 
prescriptive
period. The 1920 affidavits contain no factual allegations
7Section 
35-4-70, 
Ala. 
Code 
1975, 
governs 
the
admissibility of affidavits as evidence in litigation over
title to land and states that affidavits "shall be admissible
as evidence of the facts therein recited and shall be
sufficient to prima facie establish such facts." (Emphasis
added.)  
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inconsistent with Taylor's actual ownership of the mineral
interest and therefore cannot defeat the presumption that the
1883 deed is the beginning point of the chain of title to the
mineral interest.
Conclusion
In this case, the first conveyance of the mineral
interest recorded after the total destruction of the Walker
County land records is the 1883 deed.  As such, the 1883 deed
is the presumed beginning point of the chain of title under
the Whitehead rule.  O'Rear has offered no evidence sufficient
to rebut this presumption.  Therefore, we hold that title to
the mineral interest in the Landon parcel vests in Simmons
Group.  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's judgment
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Bolin, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Shaw, J., concurs specially.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result. 
Stuart and Parker, JJ., concur in the result in part and
dissent in part.
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SHAW, Justice (concurring specially).  
I concur.  I write specially to note the following, which
I discuss not as an independent theory on which to decide this
case, but simply as a broader discussion of the facts
presented here.
There are two chains of title to two different estates. 
One chain shows a transfer of a mineral estate only.  This is
the chain claimed by the appellant, Simmons Group, LTD
("Simmons").  The other, with some aberrations, shows a
transfer of a surface estate.  This is the chain claimed by
the appellees.  The evidence before us tends to explain how
these two chains came into being.  
We have evidence indicating that John Landon received the
property from the United States.  We have an agreement dated
1871 indicating that a later Landon, Nancy, agreed to transfer
the property to her daughter, Luiza Taylor.  In 1883, another 
Taylor, Elizer, transferred the mineral estate to Simmons's
predecessor in title.  Then, there is the 1887 deed by R.A.
Baker and J.A. Baker conveying the property to A.H. Johnston; 
the nature of the interest they owned is not clear.  However,
in 1898, Johnston conveyed the surface rights of the property
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to William M. Wallace.  Thus, we see Taylors receiving the
property from Landons, and then Taylors selling the mineral
estate.  Subsequent history shows that the mineral estate and
the surface estate were being separately transferred.  
All of this appears to help explain what happened: The
Landons transferred the property to the Taylors, and the
surface estate and mineral estates where subsequently
transferred separately by the Taylors.  We have some evidence
confirming or tending to confirm those transfers, but records
showing other transfers were lost in the 1877 fire that
destroyed the Walker County courthouse.  Nevertheless, we do
have some explanation as to how the two chains of title exist,
and it tends to confirm the holding that results in this case
by the application of the rule in Whitehead v. Hester, 512 So.
2d 1297 (Ala. 1987).
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PARKER, Justice (concurring in the result in part and
dissenting in part).
I concur in the result insofar as the majority reverses
the circuit court's judgment in favor of the O'Rear
defendants.
I dissent in part because I believe that the main opinion
unnecessarily limits 
a 
trial 
court's 
discretion 
in 
considering
relevant evidence in a property dispute when it is presented
with the situation, as in this case, where competing chains of
title cannot be traced to a common grantor or to a patent deed
from the United States as a result of the destruction of the
relevant land records.  I agree that the rule from Whitehead
v. Hester, 512 So. 2d 1297 (Ala. 1987), applies in this case;
I disagree, however, with the majority's interpretation and
application of this rule.
Initially, I note that the Whitehead rule was created by
this Court in 1987 to resolve a very specific factual
situation before it and that it has not been applied since.8 
8Not surprisingly, given that the Whitehead rule has been
applied only once, Jesse Evans's Alabama Property Rights and
Remedies, the preeminent property treatise in the state, does
not cite Whitehead or provide any discussion of the Whitehead
rule.  I have researched cases from other jurisdictions and
have not discovered any 
uniform rule concerning disposition of
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The Whitehead Court made very clear that its decision
announcing this novel, judicially created rule was to be
limited to the facts before it.  See Whitehead, 512 So. 2d at
1301-02 (using language like "under the facts of this case"
and "[i]n such circumstances").  The Whitehead Court did not
have before it any evidence of recorded instruments other than
deeds.  The question now before this Court was not decided by
the Whitehead Court.  I do not think it would be wise to try
to make the rule created by the Whitehead Court -- intended to
resolve a specific factual situation before it -- into a "one-
size-fits-all" rule with rigid application.  With this in
mind, I turn to a discussion of Whitehead.
In Whitehead, the parties disputed the ownership of a
mineral interest.  This Court stated that "[t]he parties
derive their respective claims of title to the minerals under
two separate chains of title which do not emanate from a
common grantor and which are not traced back to a patent from
the United States."  512 So. 2d at 1298.  This Court noted
that the parties were unable to trace their claims of title
property given the situation raised in this case.  Rather, in
such a situation the various states have appeared to develop
differing rules based on the specific facts before the
respective courts.
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back to the patent title from the United States "because in
1890, a fire destroyed the courthouse in which land records
were maintained."  Id.  Accordingly, there was a "break in
each party's chain of title."  Id.
The appellees in Whitehead claimed ownership of the
mineral interest "by virtue of a direct and unbroken chain of
conveyances commencing in 1892."  512 So. 2d at 1298.  The
original conveyance in the appellees' chain of title was a
quitclaim deed dated October 7, 1892.  It was undisputed that
the October 7, 1892, deed was "the first documentary
evidence," 512 So. 2d at 1298-99, concerning the ownership of
the at-issue mineral interest following the 1890 fire that had
destroyed the relevant land records.  The appellants in
Whitehead "trace[d] their surface ownership through a 
chain of
conveyances commencing with a warranty deed ... dated October
27, 1906, which was 14 years after the initial quitclaim deed
conveying 
the 
mineral 
interest 
to 
[the 
appellees']
predecessor."  512 So. 2d at 1299.
The trial court in Whitehead had held that the quitclaim
deed dated October 7, 1892, severed the mineral interest from
the surface estate of the at-issue property.  The appellants
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argued that the October 7, 1892, deed was "ineffective  to
transfer title, because there [was] no evidence which trace[d]
title back to the United States or to a common grantor."  512
So. 2d at 1301.  This Court noted that, "[o]f course, neither
side in this case can trace its title back to the sovereign or
to a common grantor because of the total destruction of all
the land records by the 1890 fire."  Id.  This Court then
stated:
"We cannot accept the assertion that [the
grantor of the October 7, 1892, deed] was not the
holder of legal title to the land and was not
legally empowered to sever the mineral interest,
under the facts of this case. The first conveyance
covering the disputed mineral interest which was
filed for record after the destruction of county
records by fire was the conveyance in 1892 from [the
grantor of the October 7, 1892, deed] to [the
grantee]. This conveyance was competent and relevant
evidence of a separate mineral estate, in which [the
grantor of the October 7, 1892, deed] claimed an
interest. Since the conveyance from [the grantor of
the October 7, 1892, deed] to [the grantee] in 1892,
the mineral interest has passed through a clear and
unbroken chain of title directly to [the appellees].
If the argument of the [appellants] were sustained,
then one who acquired a mineral interest created in
Franklin County prior to 1890 might have difficulty
in establishing the validity of his title. To
require [the appellees] to somehow locate the
originals of the instruments that were destroyed in
the fire and, thus, establish their chain of title
from the present date completely back to a
government patent or to a common grantor, would
17
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place an unreasonable burden on them, or on others
similarly situated.
"The initial conveyance in the [appellants']
chain of title was from W.H. Tipton to J.A. Thorn in
1906. Again, because of the destruction of the
courthouse records by fire, there is nothing in the
records to indicate that W.H. Tipton had any title
whatsoever to convey in 1906. After the patent in
1844, the next conveyance concerning the subject
property filed for record -- so far as the present
records indicate -- was the 1892 quitclaim deed from
[the grantor of the October 7, 1892, deed] to [the
grantee]. Some 14 years later, the [appellants']
chain of title begins with a deed from one W.H.
Tipton to J.A. Thorn. In such circumstances, when
dealing with two separate and distinct titles to the
same property, as here, the Court should acknowledge
the superiority of the title of those obtaining
interests by the earliest recorded instruments.
Pollard v. Simpson, 240 Ala. 401, 199 So. 560
(1941)."
512 So. 2d at 1301-02.  Thus, this Court concluded that the
appellees had established "paramount legal title" to the
mineral interest.  512 So. 2d at 1304.
In summary, this Court determined in Whitehead that, in
that it was impossible for the claimants of the property to
trace their chains of title to the original grantor because
the land records needed to do so had been destroyed by fire,
the Court presumed that the grantor of the earliest recorded
instrument subsequent to the destruction of the land records
owned a fee-simple interest in the land the grantor was
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conveying.  Accordingly, this Court determined that the party
able to trace his chain of title to the earliest recorded
instrument indicating ownership of the land had paramount
legal title.
The Whitehead rule is one of practicality; it operates to
establish a new starting point when there is a break in the
chain of ownership concerning a disputed property as the
result of the destruction of the relevant land records.  The
purpose of the Whitehead rule is to establish this new
starting point as close in time as possible to the destruction
of the relevant land records.  Unlike the majority, I believe
that the trial court should be permitted to consider any
admissible evidence in applying the Whitehead rule in order to
be as certain as possible that the new starting point begins
with the actual owner of the property.
The majority decision, however, interprets Whitehead to
hold that the earliest recorded instrument purporting to
convey title is the only evidence that can establish a new
starting point under the Whitehead rule.  I disagree with this
interpretation of the Whitehead rule because it deprives the
trial court of the discretion to consider admissible evidence,
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other than a recorded deed, for purposes of establishing a new
starting point.9  Whitehead did not establish such a rigid
precedent, and I see no reason to make the judicially created,
fact-specific Whitehead rule rigid at this time.
In Whitehead, this Court noted that the first recorded
documentary evidence concerning ownership of the at-issue
property following the destruction of the land records was the
October 7, 1892, deed.  However, nothing in Whitehead
indicates that the first documentary evidence must be a deed. 
It just so happened that in Whitehead a recorded deed was the
first documentary evidence; deeds were the only evidence
9I note that the majority decision includes the following
statement:
"Of course, the Whitehead rule does nothing to
disturb the basic property rule that a grantor
cannot convey more than the grantor actually owns. 
See, e.g., Chancy v. Chancy Lake Homeowners Ass'n,
Inc., 
55 
So. 
3d 
287, 
297 
(Ala. 
Civ. 
App.
2010)(stating that '[a] landowner cannot convey a
greater interest in property than he possesses').
Thus, proof that the grantor of the first-recorded
deed did not actually own the property at the time
of the purported conveyance will defeat the
presumption 
underpinning 
the 
Whitehead 
rule. 
O'Rear, however, presents no such proof."
___ So. 3d at ___.  However, based on its interpretation of
the Whitehead rule, the only evidence contemplated by the
majority that may be considered by the trial court concerning
ownership of the property is a recorded deed.
20
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presented concerning ownership of the property in Whitehead. 
It is within this context that the Whitehead Court stated: "In
such circumstances, when dealing with two separate and
distinct titles to the same property, as here, the Court
should acknowledge the superiority of the title of those
obtaining interests by the earliest recorded instruments." 
512 So. 2d at 1302 (emphasis added).  Black's Law Dictionary
defines "instrument" as "[a] written document; a formal or
legal document in writing, such as a contract, deed, will,
bond, or lease."  Black's Law Dictionary 719 (5th ed. 1979). 
In the present case, the earliest recorded instrument
concerning ownership of the property following the alleged
destruction of all the land records is the November 28, 1871,
agreement between Nancy Landon and Luiza Taylor, a legal
instrument recorded in the Walker County Probate Court on
March 21, 1879.  The agreement does not convey an interest in
the property; however, I do not find this fact to be
dispositive.  The agreement is reliable evidence.  It even has
all the formalities of a deed: It is signed by both parties,
witnessed by two parties, contains a metes-and-bounds
description of the property, and is recorded in the deed book
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of the probate court.  Why is this agreement, which clearly
identifies the owner of the property as Nancy Landon, any less
reliable than a quitclaim deed in determining the actual owner
of the property after the destruction of all the relevant land
records?10
I also present the following hypothetical to demonstrate
the danger of adopting the majority's position of divesting
the trial court of discretion to consider admissible evidence
for the purpose of establishing a new starting point under the
Whitehead rule in cases such as the present one.  Suppose in
10The earliest recorded instrument in Whitehead was a
quitclaim deed, which does not always convey an interest in
property.  Of course, "if a grantor in a quitclaim deed has a
good legal title, the quitclaim is as effectual to pass the
title as a warranty deed."  Jesse P. Evans III, Alabama
Property Rights and Remedies § 4.5 (5th ed. 2012).  However,
"[a] quitclaim conveys nothing more than the interest owned by
the grantor at the time of this execution and no more."  Id. 
Further,
"[a] quitclaim deed purports to convey only the
grantor's present interest in the land, if any,
rather than the land itself. Since such a deed
purports to convey whatever interest the grantor has
at the time, its use excludes any implication that
he has good title, or any title at all. Such a deed
in no way obligates the grantor. If he has no
interest, none will be conveyed."
Robert Kratovil and Raymond J. Werner, Real Estate Law 60 (8th
ed. 1983) (final emphasis added).
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the present case that, instead of the recorded agreement,
Nancy Landon had recorded an affidavit concerning the
ownership of the property.  Assume that Nancy Landon had, at
some time before the courthouse was destroyed and with it all
of the land records, obtained an easement over her neighbor's
property.  Also assume that Nancy Landon recorded the
instrument conveying to her the easement before the land
records were destroyed.  The land records are then destroyed
by fire.  Suppose that Nancy Landon and the subservient
property owner did not have a copy of the instrument conveying
to Nancy Landon the easement to re-record.  However, after the
land records were destroyed, wanting to protect their
respective interests, assume that Nancy Landon and the
subservient property owner recorded a joint affidavit in the
probate court stating that Nancy Landon owned her property and
had obtained an easement over the property of the subservient
property owner sometime prior to the destruction of the
courthouse and the land records.
Adopting the majority's strict application of the
Whitehead rule, the trial court would not be allowed to
consider this admissible evidence concerning the actual
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ownership of the property for purposes of establishing a new
starting point.  I do not see the wisdom in adopting such a
strict application of the Whitehead rule.  I suggest that
allowing courts to consider evidence beyond recorded deeds in
order to determine the owner of the property following the
destruction of all records is consistent with the spirit of
the Whitehead rule.
Under the actual facts of the present case, the November
28, 1871, agreement precedes the May 14, 1883, deed, which was
not recorded until March 8, 1884; it is the first documentary
evidence concerning the ownership of the property following
the alleged destruction of all the records concerning the
conveyances of property in Walker County.11  Accordingly, as
11Nancy Landon's agreement with Luiza Taylor was recorded
on March 21, 1879, more than four years before Elizer Taylor
executed the May 14, 1883, deed in favor of Musgrove Bros. 
This Court has stated that "[t]he purpose of recording is to
affect purchasers subsequent to the recording ... with
notice."  Williams v. White, 165 Ala. 336, 337, 51 So. 559,
559 (1910); see also Jesse P. Evans III, Alabama Property
Rights and Remedies § 5.3[a] (5th ed. 2012) ("[T]he recording
of an instrument under the recording statutes is conclusive
notice to any third person of everything that appears on the
face of an instrument so recorded."(footnote omitted)).  As
the earliest recorded instrument, the agreement put Elizer
Taylor, Musgrove Bros., and all other third parties on notice
of the fact that Nancy Landon claimed fee-simple ownership of
the property.
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did the circuit court, I would apply the Whitehead rule in the
present case to presume that Nancy Landon, not Elizer Taylor,
owned a fee-simple interest in the property.
The practical result of my approach would be that Elizer
Taylor's deed to Musgrove Bros. did not severe the mineral
interest from the property because, at that time, Elizer
Taylor had no interest in the property to convey.  Therefore,
I would affirm the circuit court's judgment against Simmons
Group.  However, I do not agree with the circuit court's
judgment in favor of the O'Rear defendants because I believe
that Simmons Group has demonstrated that the trial court erred
in determining that "Chilton was the owner of the property in
fee by adverse possession as of 1921."  The evidence in the
record does not support the trial court's conclusion. 
Therefore, having concluded that the mineral interest had
never been severed from the property, I would send the matter
back to the circuit court and allow it to conduct further
fact-finding in light of this holding.  The property remaining
one entire "bundle of sticks," either party could then
establish ownership of the property through the principle of
adverse possession of the surface.
Stuart, J., concurs.
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