Title: Shannon v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 141455
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 26, 2015

VIRGINIA: 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond, on Thursday, the 26th day of 
February, 2015. 
 
 
Danny Patrick Shannon, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
 against  
Record No. 141455 
 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Upon an appeal from a 
judgment rendered by the Court 
of Appeals of Virginia. 
 
 
 
This is an appeal from an order denying pretrial bail in a 
felony case.  The circuit court granted bail, but its order was 
subsequently vacated by the Court of Appeals.  Upon consideration 
of the record, briefs, and argument of counsel, the Court is of 
opinion that there is no reversible error in the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
 
Danny Patrick Shannon was arrested in Fairfax County on 
warrants charging him with abduction with intent to defile, sodomy, 
and attempted sodomy.  At a preliminary hearing on August 19, 2014, 
the general district court found probable cause to refer the 
charges to the grand jury and admitted Shannon to bail.  The next 
day, the Commonwealth appealed the bail decision to the Circuit 
Court of Fairfax County.  Following oral arguments on August 21 and 
22, 2014, the circuit court by an order entered on August 22, 2014, 
admitted Shannon to bail pending trial, setting his bond at $60,000 
 
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cash or corporate surety on condition that he have no contact with 
the victim and remain on a supervised release program. 
 
The Commonwealth appealed the bail decision to the Court of 
Appeals which, by a brief per curiam order entered September 16, 
2014, found that Shannon had failed to rebut the statutory 
presumption against bail in the circumstances of the case, revoked 
the circuit court's order setting bond, and ordered Shannon's 
incarceration pending trial.  We awarded Shannon an appeal with 
expedited review pursuant to Rule 5:18(d). 
 
Shannon's single assignment of error contends that the Court 
of Appeals erred by "misapplying the standard of review and finding 
the rebuttable presumption against bail had not been rebutted based 
on the record."  Rule 5A:2(b) expressly provides that an order 
setting or denying bail shall be reviewable by the Court of Appeals 
"for abuse of discretion."* 
 
The dispositive sentence of the Court of Appeals' order is 
succinct:  
   Upon consideration of the motions, briefs, 
exhibits, and record, and applying the requisite 
standard of review, the Court finds that the 
respondent failed to rebut the statutory 
presumption against bail under the circumstances 
presented. 
 
                     
* There is no corresponding rule regarding review of a bail 
decision in this Court, but our review of the question whether the 
Court of Appeals has misapplied the Rules of Court necessarily 
presents a question of law, which we review de novo.  LaCava v. 
Commonwealth, 283 Va. 465, 470, 722 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2012); Brown 
v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 210, 217, 688 S.E.2d 185, 189 (2010). 
 
 
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This appeal does not require us to make an independent 
determination whether the circuit court abused its discretion in 
admitting Shannon to bail.  Rather, we must decide whether the 
Court of Appeals erred in its appellate review of that decision.  
We examine the record with which the Court of Appeals was 
confronted to ascertain whether the conclusion it reached had 
factual and legal support. 
 
Because the Court of Appeals' statement that it had applied 
the "requisite standard of review" is conclusory, and is coupled 
with a statement of "findings," we are unable to determine whether 
the Court of Appeals used the proper standard.  Assuming, without 
deciding, that the Court of Appeals applied an incorrect standard 
of review, we examine the record made in the circuit court to 
determine whether it supports the conclusion reached by the Court 
of Appeals. 
 
Forcible sodomy and abduction with intent to defile are both 
felonies punishable by possible life sentences.  For that reason, a 
presumption against bail applies to those charges by virtue of Code 
§ 19.2-120(B)(2).  In addition, all three charges involve "acts of 
violence," to which the same statute provides a presumption against 
bail.  Code § 19.2-120(B)(1); Code § 19.2-297.1 (defining "act of 
violence"). 
 
The case was submitted to the circuit court at the bond 
hearing entirely on the proffers of counsel as to the evidence they 
would present, supplemented by certain exhibits.  Proffers 
represented that Shannon was a retired man, 64 years old, who lived 
in a condominium development in Fairfax County.  The victim, a 
woman 79 years of age, was a neighbor in the same development.  The 
 
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two were acquaintances and had visited each other's homes on prior 
occasions.  On July 27, 2014, the victim visited Shannon at his 
home for the purpose of watching television.  During the visit, the 
victim experienced an attack of vertigo.  Shannon told her he was a 
doctor and attempted to take her blood pressure.  The victim 
resisted Shannon's efforts, but he persisted and became angry at 
her continued refusal.  Shannon then threw her onto a bed, removed 
her clothing and forcibly tied her wrists and ankles to the bed.  
She tried to scream, but he tied a scarf around her mouth to muffle 
her outcries.  He attached nipple clamps to both of her breasts.  
He informed her that they were going to have sex and attempted anal 
intercourse, but was unable to complete the act.  He then untied 
her, turned her over, attached her hands to a "some type of 
handcuff device" and forced fellatio upon her, but again found 
himself unable to complete the act.  Frustrated, he allowed the 
victim to leave.  Later, the police took photographs of bruises on 
the victim's wrists and arms and reported finding bruises on both 
breasts consistent with the use of nipple clamps. 
 
The Commonwealth informed the court that Shannon was a 
registered sex offender in Virginia as a result of two convictions 
in Colorado in 1998: "unlawful sexual contact with a minor" and 
"sexual assault on a child by one in trust."  In rebuttal, defense 
counsel proffered that Shannon had lived in the Fairfax area for 
about ten years and in his present home for more than five years 
without any police record or complaints in his condominium 
community. He remained at home, living on a modest retirement 
income, and could not afford extensive travel.  Shannon denied that 
he had committed any offense. 
 
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The Sexual Offender and Crimes Against Minors Registry Act, 
Code § 9.1-900 et seq., requires any person convicted after July 1, 
1994 of a sexual offense as described in Code § 9.1-902 in the 
courts of the United States or any of its political subdivisions to 
register as a sex offender in Virginia.  Code § 9.1-901.  Those 
convicted of violent sex offenses must remain on the registry for 
life.  Code § 9.1-908.  The purpose of the Act is stated in its 
opening section.  It is not to further punish or stigmatize the 
offender, but rather to "assist . . . law-enforcement agencies and 
others to protect their communities and families from repeat sex 
offenders."  Code § 9.1-900.  That purpose evinces clear 
recognition by the General Assembly of the unfortunate tendency of 
many sex offenders to recidivate, even long after release from 
incarceration.  That purpose would be nullified if a defendant's 
presence on the sex offender registry were not given great weight 
in deciding whether he should be released into the community when 
he appears in court charged with a new sex offense, especially one 
characterized by violence.   
 
The only explanation given of its ruling by the circuit court, 
after hearing the proffers of counsel, was: "Under the 
circumstances of this case[,] bond will be set at $60,000 cash or 
corporate surety."  By Code § 19.2-124, the General Assembly has 
provided three tiers of appeals, free of filing or service fees, 
from decisions granting or denying bail: to the circuit court, to 
the Court of Appeals and to this Court.  Our Rule 5:18(d) provides 
for expedited review.  That appellate framework exists because of 
the vital and urgent importance of bail decisions to the liberty 
interests of the accused as well as to the safety of the public. 
 
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The important public policy underlying that appellate 
framework would be entirely nullified if the courts called upon to 
review bail decisions were bound to find no abuse of discretion 
where the court making the decision had merely rested its ruling on 
the "circumstances of the case" or some similar conclusory and 
uninformative formula.  If such were the law, all appeals from bail 
decisions so expressed would be futile. 
 
There is no general requirement that trial courts must state 
for the record the reasons underlying their decisions.  
Nevertheless, in light of the public policy underlying the laws 
providing for prompt and meaningful review of bail decisions, a 
court making such a decision has a duty to articulate the basis of 
its ruling sufficiently to enable a reviewing court to make an 
objective determination that the court below has not abused its 
discretion. 
 
In Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 213, 738 S.E.2d 847, 
861 (2013), we reiterated that there are three principal ways by 
which a court abuses its discretion.  The first of these is "when a 
relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is 
not considered."  Id. (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  It was impossible for the Court of Appeals to determine 
from the circuit court's ruling what, if any, consideration or 
weight the circuit court might have given to the statutory 
presumption against bail, the effect of Shannon's presence on the 
sex offender registry, and his pending charges involving a repeat 
sexual offense involving violence.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals 
was required to look to the record made in the circuit court to 
 
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ascertain whether the conclusion the circuit court reached had 
factual support. 
 
We cannot, on this record, find that the Court of Appeals 
erred in reaching the conclusion, necessarily implicit in its 
holding, that the circuit court abused its discretion by not 
considering a relevant factor which should have been given 
substantial weight, specifically, Shannon's status as a registered 
sex offender.  We therefore conclude that the Court of Appeals 
reached the correct result.  Accordingly, the order appealed from 
is affirmed.  The appellant shall pay to the Commonwealth of 
Virginia two hundred and fifty dollars damages. 
 
This order shall be certified to the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia and to the Circuit Court of Fairfax County and shall be 
published in the Virginia Reports. 
 
_______________ 
 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, concurring. 
I agree with the majority's holding in this case.  I write 
separately because I disagree that we should, by virtue of dicta and 
based on a "public policy," attempt to change the general rule that 
a trial court is not required to recite for the record the reasons 
underlying its rulings.  Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 615, 
627, 292 S.E.2d 798, 805 (1982)("Absent a statutory mandate . . . a 
trial court is not required to give findings of fact and conclusions 
of law."); see, generally, Freeman v. Peyton, 207 Va. 194, 196, 148 
S.E.2d 795, 797 (1966); see also Findlay v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 
111, 116, 752 S.E.2d 868, 872 (2014). 
 
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If a "duty" should be imposed on a trial court to recite its 
underlying reasoning on the record, such a requirement, as an 
exception to the general rule, should be imposed and designed by the 
legislature, not this Court.  See, e.g., Code § 20-08.1(B)(requiring 
courts to recite the underlying reasons for certain rulings in the 
context of domestic relations support determinations); see also Code 
§ 8.01-654(B)(5) (requiring courts to articulate both findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in habeas proceedings, to be made part 
of the record and transcribed).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Copy,   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk