Title: Wammack v. Root Manufacturing Co.
Citation: 184 Kan. 367, 336 P.2d 441
Docket Number: 41,290
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: March 7, 1959

184 Kan. 367 (1959)
336 P.2d 441
MARVIN WAMMACK, Appellant,
v.
ROOT MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., Appellee, BITUMINOUS CASUALTY CORPORATION, Insurance Carrier, Appellee.
No. 41,290

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 7, 1959.
Sylvan Bruner, of Pittsburg, argued the cause, and Charles J. Rondelli, of Pittsburg, Walter B. Patterson, of Fort Scott, and Joe L. Henbest, of Columbus, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
R.L. White, of Pittsburg, argued the cause and R.L. Letton, of Pittsburg, was with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This was a workmen's compensation case. The commissioner found that as a result of accident sustained in the *368 course of his employment claimant sustained injury to his left thumb, resulting in total loss thereof by amputation between the distal and proximal joint, and injury to his right thumb, which resulted in the permanent loss of 50 per cent of its use. He also found injury was confined to the thumbs and should be compensated as two scheduled injuries. Thereupon he entered an award on that basis. Claimant appealed to the district court which approved the findings and award of the commissioner and entered judgment accordingly. Hence this appeal.
In a preliminary way it may be stated that this is one case where a factual statement is neither necessary nor required in order to understand and dispose of the appellate questions involved. Indeed, in the opening paragraphs of their brief, counsel for appellant frankly admit:
So obvious, as to almost preclude necessity for making it, is the statement that question (1) discloses the basis for the trial court's judgment and appellees' position with respect thereto; question (2) reveals the basic premise on which appellant founds his claims of error with respect to the judgment; and both questions, when read together not only divulge all appellate facts required but also make it appear that no issue is here involved respecting the amount of the award as computed by the trial court if its judgment is affirmed.
Detailed reference to the provisions of our workmen's compensation act, as set forth in the foregoing questions, are essential to a proper understanding of the questions involved for to merely refer to them by section numbers would entail untold research on the part of readers of this opinion and doubtless lead to much confusion. *369 For that reason they should be quoted, as they appear in applicable provisions of G.S. 1955 Supp., at some length.
The section of the statute provisions for compensation is 44-510. Pertinent portions thereof, on which the award was based and are here relied on by appellees in its support, read:
"(3) Where death does not result from the injury.
Pertinent portions of the section (44-510) on which appellant relies to sustain his position, under the allegations of question (2), read:
Having established the essential facts, the issues of law, and the pertinent statutes involved, it can now be said the essence of all contentions advanced by appellant as the basis for reversal of the judgment is that the injuries to appellant's right and left thumbs, arising from the same accident, are not single and separable injuries subject to the scheduled provisions of the compensation act, identified in question (1), but are and should be held to be unscheduled injuries which, under provisions of the statute set forth by him in question (2), are to be measured as disability to the body as a whole, and as a permanent partial disability not covered by any schedule. So, stated in a more definite and concise manner, it appears the crux of this appeal is whether the injuries, limited to appellant's two thumbs, are compensable under the compensation act as two scheduled injuries or as to an injury to his body as a whole.
In approaching its consideration it can be stated, at the outset, the sole appellate issue here involved presents no new or novel question in this jurisdiction. Indeed we are inclined to the view it was decided by this court in Rogers v. Board of Public Utilities, 158 Kan. 693, 149 P.2d 632, where, in giving consideration to the force and effect to be accorded provisions of the compensation act relating to compensation to be paid for scheduled injuries, we held:
And in the opinion said:
Appellant relies on three cases to sustain his position the trial court erred in refusing to hold the involved injuries were not compensable as unscheduled injuries, i.e., Honn v. Elliott, 132 Kan. 454, 295 Pac. 719; Hurst v. Independent Construction Co., 136 Kan. 583, 16 P.2d 540; Stanley v. United Iron Works Co., 160 Kan. 243, 160 P.2d 708. We have no quarrel with these decisions. Even so we believe that upon careful analysis they are clearly distinguishable, from the standpoint of facts and principles here involved, and for that reason cannot be regarded as controlling precedents in this case. Moreover, we do not subscribe to his view that such cases reach decisions which are in conflict with or contrary to our decision in the Rogers case. To illustrate:
In the Honn case a workman sustained a compensable injury to both his feet. We held that compensation should not be computed as a scheduled injury to each foot, but should be computed under *372 the provisions of the statute providing compensation for the loss or injury of both feet. Resort to the opinion, as well as the syllabus, discloses such holding is based squarely upon the provisions of what is now 44-510 (3) (a), as heretofore quoted, prescribing compensation for loss of both eyes, both hands, both arms, both feet or both legs. In fact the opinion points out that, notwithstanding other provisions of the same section relating to schedule injuries, the legislature had seen fit to make dual losses to such members compensable on the basis of total disability in the absence of proof to the contrary. It is to be noted the provisions of the portion of the act just referred to fail to include the loss of two thumbs, hence they afford no basis for a conclusion compensation for injuries to such members are compensable under their terms. Indeed, to hold otherwise would result in reading something into this portion of the act which is not there.
The most that can be said for the Hurst case from the standpoint of appellant's position is that it cites the Honn case with approval and then proceeds to hold that the rule therein announced has no application under the existing facts and circumstances.
The Stanley case requires little if any comment. It was here on appeal by an employer from a district court's judgment allowing an employee an award for scheduled injuries. We affirmed the judgment, holding that permanent partial loss of the sight of an eye and hearing in the ears came within the purview of G.S. 1943, Supp., 44-510 (3) (c) (19) [now G.S. 1957 Supp., 44-510 (3) (c) (21)] and were disabilities compensable as scheduled injuries. It is interesting and of some significance to note that in the opinion we said:
In an attempt to avoid the import of our decision in Rogers v. Board of Public Utilities, supra, appellant argues that what is there said on page 698 of the opinion, as heretofore quoted, with respect to no legal justification or differentiation between two hernias, two great toes, two thumbs or two first fingers in any one accident, is to be treated as obiter dictum and should be disregarded. We disagree. *373 In the opinion of that case we were, as heretofore indicated, giving consideration to the force and effect to be accorded provisions of the workmen's compensation act relating to compensation to be paid for scheduled injuries, particularly dual injuries sustained in one accident; we expressly stated that it was the intention of the legislature to allow compensation for two hernias under the same schedule, in the same manner recovery is permitted for the loss of any two of the other members of the body, mentioned in such opinion, including thumbs; and in the syllabus, in stating the law of the case, we intended to and did hold that two injuries of the character discussed and referred to in the heretofore quoted portion of that opinion, even though but one was listed in the singular number in the statutory schedule, were separate and distinct schedule injuries, for each of which the claimant in a workmen's compensation proceeding was entitled to compensation under facts and circumstances similar to those here involved.
We find nothing in the decisions relied on or in arguments advanced by appellant to warrant the overruling of Rogers v. Board of Public Utilities, supra, and what is there said and held compels a conclusion that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court's judgment, in holding the appellant's injuries were scheduled injuries and therefore compensable as such under existing provisions of the workmen's compensation act, was proper and should be upheld. It follows its judgment must be affirmed.
In reaching the conclusion just announced we have not overlooked arguments advanced by appellant to the effect circumstances may exist where injustice will result to an employee, under our construction of the statute. We can visualize other situations where such construction would be to his benefit. Be that as it may, and conceding the point made by appellant without deciding it, his remedy is by appeal to the legislature, not to this court. Long ago in Anderson v. Oil &amp; Refining Co., 111 Kan. 314, 316, 206 Pac. 900, recently quoted with approval in Marquiss v. Bilwil Mining Co., 166 Kan. 420, 424, 202 P.2d 194, and Riggan v. Coleman Co., 166 Kan. 234, 200 P.2d 271, we said:
The judgment is affirmed.