Title: Commonwealth v. Chappell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11687
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 23, 2015

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SJC-11687 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DESHAWN CHAPPELL. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 11, 2015. - November 23, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Duffly, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Constitutional Law, 
Confrontation of witnesses, Fair trial.  Evidence, Expert 
opinion, Consciousness of guilt, State of mind, Insanity. 
Witness, Expert.  Insanity.  Mental Health.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, State of mind, Confrontation of 
witnesses, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 24, 2011. 
 
 
The case was tried before by Jeffrey A. Locke, J. 
 
 
 
Stephen Neyman for the defendant. 
 
Matthew T. Sears, Assistant District Attorney (Edmund J. 
Zabin, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  On January 20, 2011, Stephanie Moulton, a 
residential counsellor at a mental health facility in Revere, 
was killed while she was at work.  The defendant, a resident of 
the facility, was charged with her murder.  Principally at issue 
2 
 
at the defendant's subsequent jury trial was his mental state at 
the time of the killing; the defendant presented a defense of 
lack of criminal responsibility.  On October 28, 2013, the jury 
found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on the 
theory of deliberate premeditation. 
 
In his appeal from the conviction, the defendant argues 
that the trial judge erred by (1) permitting the Commonwealth to 
present evidence concerning deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing 
through an expert witness who had not performed the DNA testing 
herself; (2) impermissibly limiting the direct examination of 
the defendant's primary mental health expert witness; (3) 
providing the jury with an inadequate instruction regarding the 
consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of lack of 
criminal responsibility; and (4) failing to limit the jury's 
consideration of evidence of consciousness of guilt solely to 
the issue of the defendant's mental state at the time the crime 
was committed.  He also requests relief under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E.  We affirm the defendant's conviction, and after a 
thorough review of the record, we decline to grant relief 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.1  a.  The offense.  We summarize the facts 
the jury could have found.  Prior to January, 2011, the 
                     
1 We summarize here the evidence presented at trial 
concerning the killing of the victim and the defendant's 
3 
 
defendant was a resident of Perkins House, a moderate-intensity, 
residential mental health facility in the Charlestown section of 
Boston.2  Following an altercation between the defendant and 
another resident at that facility, the defendant was transferred 
temporarily to a respite program and, on January 3, 2011, he 
moved to Seagull House, a low-intensity group home in Revere for 
adults with mental illness.3  Seagull House staff helped 
residents to obtain basic social skills and skills required for 
residents eventually to be able to live on their own.  Seagull 
House was a "closed house," meaning that, between the hours of 
9 A.M. and 3 P.M., residents were not allowed to stay inside the 
facility but were expected to go to jobs or attend mental health 
group programs in the community. 
On January 20, 2011, despite the closed house policy, the 
defendant remained at Seagull House past 9 A.M. because he was 
scheduled to have a meeting at 1 P.M. with his "team," a group 
that included the victim and her supervisor, Colette 
                                                                  
criminal responsibility, reserving discussion of other evidence 
to our consideration of the legal issues raised. 
 
 
2 Perkins House is a residential mental health facility 
operated by the North Suffolk Mental Health Association (North 
Suffolk), a nonprofit organization which contracts with the 
Department of Mental Health to provide mental health services to 
clients of the department. 
 
 
3 Seagull House is another residential mental health 
facility operated by North Suffolk. 
 
4 
 
Deneumostier.4  Deneumostier arrived at Seagull House at 
approximately 8:30 A.M. on January 20, but left shortly 
thereafter to perform work-related errands.  The victim also 
arrived around the same time or a little later.  When the 
Seagull House staff member who had been in charge of the 
facility the previous night left sometime after 9 A.M., the 
victim and the defendant were the only two people remaining.  At 
approximately 10 A.M., Deneumostier spoke to the victim by 
telephone; at no point during that conversation did the victim 
report any concerns about the defendant's mental status.  
Deneumostier tried to contact the victim by telephone again 
several times before she (Deneumostier) returned to Seagull 
House at 11:30 A.M., but the calls went unanswered. 
 
When Deneumostier arrived at the facility, she heard the 
fire alarm sounding, saw smoke, and telephoned the Revere fire 
department or 911.  When fire fighters and police officers 
responded, they found no one inside the building, but they did 
observe a stove with two jets left on the high setting, one of 
which had smoke emanating from it; burnt paper on the kitchen 
                     
4 According to Colette Deneumostier, team meetings were 
typically set up shortly after a resident moved into Seagull 
House and began participating in its program.  The purpose of 
the January 20, 2011, meeting of the defendant's team was to 
make sure the staff and he were "on the same page" and to 
address "some concerns with [the defendant] cooking at night, 
not doing his chore[s] all the time, [and] taking other people's 
food.  And . . . to talk about his goals that were being set 
up." 
5 
 
floor; and charred debris in one of the bedrooms, including a 
gray, left boot.  In addition, there was a large amount of blood 
on the floor in the hallway, which appeared to be a drag mark 
that continued down the hallway and outside to the parking lot, 
where a spot of blood and a blood-soaked paper towel were found.  
Under the bed in the defendant's bedroom police found a crumpled 
note that stated: 
"Babycake, what ups?  I still want to kick with you when I 
get something house next year.  Are you down with that?  
How the kids?  WB if you can.  Can you go somewhere, kick 
with me, movies, out to eat?" 
 
Below that writing was a message in the victim's handwriting 
that read:  "Not just because I work here, but for many reasons, 
this is inappropriate."  Police also recovered from an office 
located in the lower portion of the building a green notebook 
that contained the victim's handwriting; at the time it was 
recovered, the notebook was opened to a page referencing the 
defendant. 
 
At approximately 12:30 P.M. the same day, the victim's body 
was found in the parking lot of St. George's Greek Orthodox 
Church (St. George's) in Lynn.5  The victim's pants and underwear 
were pulled down, and she was wearing one gray boot on her right 
foot that matched the left boot recovered from Seagull House; 
                     
 
5 The defendant had lived for a short period of time in 2005 
or 2006 in Lynn near to St. George's Greek Orthodox Church (St. 
George's), at a time when his then girl friend lived within 
walking distance of the church. 
6 
 
her left foot was bare other than a white sock.  The victim's 
body was covered with a bed sheet that came from the defendant's 
bedroom at Seagull House.  The victim had sustained sharp force 
injuries to her neck and blunt impact injuries to her head, 
torso, and upper extremities, but the cause of death was blood 
loss attributable to a long slash wound to the neck, which 
severed the sternocleidomastoid muscle, the jugular veins, and 
the carotid arteries. 
 
Video surveillance from St. George's dated January 20, 
2011, showed a vehicle, identified as belonging to the victim, 
enter the St. George's parking lot at approximately 11:32 A.M., 
drive to the area where the victim was later found, and leave 
the parking lot at approximately 11:34 A.M.  The video recording 
also showed that, while the vehicle was parked, an individual 
stepped out of the driver's side, made a path around the rear of 
the vehicle to the passenger's side, returned to the driver's 
side, proceeded once more to the passenger's side, and 
eventually drove away.6 
 
Around 1 P.M. on January 20, 2011, the defendant visited a 
cousin in the Dorchester section of Boston and asked her for 
some money and a place to stay for a couple of days; he was 
                     
6 A resident of a building near to St. George's testified 
that at approximately 10 A.M. on January 20, 2011, she saw a man 
who fit the defendant's description in the parking lot.  The 
witness saw the man bending over, but a snow bank blocked her 
view of the man's lower body. 
7 
 
unsuccessful in securing either one.  During the visit, the 
defendant's cousin saw a brown stain on the defendant's pants 
and a brownish or red stain on the defendant's sweatshirt, and 
she noticed that he kept his hands covered with his sleeves.  
When the defendant left the house, he was seen standing in front 
of the victim's vehicle, which he later abandoned.  After 
leaving his cousin's house, the defendant went to a clothing 
store where he stole a white hooded sweatshirt and a hat, and 
then traveled by train to Braintree and inquired about an 
extended-stay room at a hotel.  He then telephoned his 
grandmother, who lived in the Roxbury section of Boston, and 
asked if he could come to her house, insisting that he did not 
kill the victim and that his previous girl friend did,7 and later 
traveled by public transportation to the building where his 
grandmother lived. 
 
Police officers were waiting for the defendant in the lobby 
of his grandmother's building, his grandmother having informed 
the police of his impending arrival.  Following some resistance, 
the defendant was arrested and taken into custody.  Police 
officers handcuffed the defendant and placed him in a chair in 
the lobby.  While the defendant was seated, and as a police 
                     
 
7 Prior to the defendant's telephone call, his grandmother 
had seen the television news regarding the killing of the victim 
in Revere.  When she spoke to the defendant during his call, she 
told him that she heard that the television news coverage about 
the killing in Revere involved him. 
8 
 
officer was administering Miranda warnings to him, the defendant 
blurted out, "The Chinese kid did it."  The defendant did not 
otherwise exhibit bizarre or psychotic behavior or appear or 
sound delusional during the time he was in the lobby. 
 
The defendant was transported to a Boston police station 
and then to the police station in Revere.  During the trip to 
Revere, the defendant was quiet and calm, but crying, and when 
asked if he was all right, he said that people had been chasing 
him all day with guns and that he was worried for his family.  
He was asked if he knew why he was in police custody, and he 
responded that it was "because of what happened at the house."  
Testing of a sample of blood located on fingernail scrapings 
taken from the defendant's right hand revealed that the sample 
contained a mixture of DNA from at least two individuals.  The 
major profile identified matched the defendant, and the victim 
was included as a potential contributor to the minor profile. 
 
b.  The defendant's mental state and criminal 
responsibility.  The defendant was thirty at the time of trial 
in October, 2013.  According to his mother and grandmother, 
while in high school, the defendant had regularly attended 
school and church, was outgoing and well-dressed, played sports, 
and worked at a part-time job.  He graduated from high school 
around 2002 and worked as a sales person at a clothing store and 
then as a bar back at a convention center in Boston.  Around 
9 
 
2004, his mother noticed that he no longer cared about his 
appearance and that he had become withdrawn.  The defendant 
began to have trouble sleeping and would call his mother 
regularly in the middle of the night, asking why he was hearing 
voices in his head.  He also stopped attending weekly family 
dinners at his grandmother's house. 
 
The defendant was first hospitalized in 2006, after he 
informed his mother that he wanted to go to the hospital because 
he felt that he might hurt someone.  His mother took him to the 
emergency department of Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH),8 
and personnel at MGH kept the defendant for observation for two 
to three weeks.  When he was discharged, he went to live with 
his grandmother.  He was prescribed medication, which he 
eventually stopped taking because the side effects caused him 
difficulties with swallowing and speaking, and also caused 
involuntary tremors.  Only months after the first instance, the 
defendant was again hospitalized at MGH.  Around 2006, he was 
diagnosed with schizophrenia9 and, in that year, became a client 
of the Department of Mental Health (department).  In 2006 and 
2007, the defendant was hospitalized briefly at Whidden Memorial 
                     
 
8 The defendant's mother was employed by Massachusetts 
General Hospital as an operations associate. 
 
 
9 Schizophrenia is a mental illness that is long-standing in 
duration, and symptoms of the illness include disorganized 
thoughts and perception, delusions, and auditory and visual 
hallucinations. 
10 
 
Hospital.  From 2006 to 2009, the defendant lived primarily with 
his grandmother.  According to his grandmother, the defendant's 
mental health condition deteriorated during that period, even 
though he resumed taking medication.  For example, the defendant 
was hearing voices and he tried to get the voices out of his 
head by eating large amounts of food and by trying to burn them 
out.  At one point, he also became too frightened to leave the 
house.  In 2009, the defendant was hospitalized at MGH for a 
third time, after which he went to Bridgewater State Hospital 
(Bridgewater) for three weeks.  Around 2009, the defendant was 
placed at Perkins House, and in late 2009, he was hospitalized 
at Arbor Hospital.  The defendant was hospitalized for 
psychiatric reasons on at least five occasions between 2006 and 
the day the victim was killed in January, 2011; the final 
hospitalization ended in December, 2009. 
 
David Thomson, a program coordinator employed by North 
Suffolk Mental Health Association (North Suffolk), first met the 
defendant when he was a resident of Perkins House.  Thomson made 
referrals of the defendant to the Boston Emergency Services Team 
(BEST)10 in October, 2009, and in July and September, 2010, 
because the defendant appeared disorganized and was 
decompensating on these dates.  The defendant's medical record 
                     
10 The Boston Emergency Services Team (BEST) is a team of 
mental health clinicians who respond to emergency calls to 
perform crisis evaluations. 
11 
 
at North Suffolk indicated that on the date of the July, 2010, 
BEST referral, he had an increase in hallucinations, felt 
paranoid, believed that members of the staff were listening to 
his conversations, and made verbal outbursts regarding the 
taking of his powers.  That record also reflected that the 
defendant had a history of traumatic brain injuries, lead 
poisoning, and substance abuse. 
 
Michael Swinchoski, a licensed mental health counsellor 
employed by North Suffolk, first met the defendant in 2007.  
Swinchoski believed the defendant suffered from disorganized 
schizophrenia, and that he responded to an inner stimulus 
unprompted by any external circumstances.  In December, 2010, 
and January, 2011, Swinchoski was working with the defendant in 
an attempt to allow him to live in his own apartment, which 
Swinchoski thought would help reduce the defendant's level of 
stress and, thus, ameliorate his symptoms.  On January 19, 2011, 
one day before the killing, Dr. Daniel Debowey, a psychiatrist 
employed part-time by North Suffolk, met with the defendant for 
the first time; Debowey was going to become the defendant's new 
psychopharmacological treater.  During the meeting, the 
defendant was wearing socks on his hands, which Debowey noted 
because he knew that the defendant had been diagnosed with 
schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder and, at times, bizarre 
elements of clothing can be a sign of relapse.  However, the 
12 
 
defendant did not report any auditory hallucinations, nor did he 
appear to be responding to internal stimuli, and Debowey was not 
left with the impression that the defendant posed an acute risk 
to himself or others. 
 
On January 21, 2011, one day after the victim was killed, 
Dr. Naomi Leavitt, a forensic psychologist employed by the 
department, conducted a court-ordered competency evaluation of 
the defendant.  In Leavitt's opinion, the defendant failed to 
understand her explanation of the fact that what he said to her 
would not be confidential, and made statements not reflective of 
reality including that he did not have a mother, that he had 
only finished the first grade, that he had never been in a 
psychiatric hospital or been diagnosed with a mental illness, 
that there were "rascals" out to hurt him, and that he would 
wake up in the morning with bruises on his body.  During the 
evaluation, the defendant became increasingly agitated.  Leavitt 
questioned the defendant's competence to stand trial and 
recommended that he be further evaluated at Bridgewater.  A few 
weeks thereafter, Dr. Charles Carroll, the director of forensic 
services and psychology at Bridgewater, performed two 
assessments of the defendant's competence to stand trial and his 
need for further hospitalization.  Carroll diagnosed the 
13 
 
defendant with schizophrenia, undifferentiated type.11  Carroll 
opined that the defendant was not competent to stand trial due 
to thought disorganization related to his mental illness and 
that the defendant required further hospitalization. 
 
The defendant's primary mental health expert at trial was 
Dr. David Werner, a psychologist.  Werner met with the defendant 
on three occasions and reviewed the multiple medical and 
psychiatric records of the defendant, including records of all 
the defendant's hospitalizations, and police reports; he also 
interviewed family members.  Based on his personal meetings and 
review of the data, Werner diagnosed the defendant with paranoid 
schizophrenia.  Werner opined that the defendant suffered from 
hallucinations and delusions that made him unable to distinguish 
between voices in his head and memories of a person's voice, and 
that the defendant had been decompensating since July, 2010.  
The defendant told Werner that on January 20, 2011, he (the 
defendant) heard a voice telling him to kill the victim and 
therefore he choked her, and when he thought that she was still 
alive, he obtained a knife and inflicted the wounds that caused 
her death.  Werner ultimately concluded that the defendant was 
not criminally responsible for his acts on January 20, 2011, 
because he could not conform his conduct to the law at that 
                     
 
11 Undifferentiated type means that the affected person 
presents with symptoms of various other subtypes of 
schizophrenia. 
14 
 
time.  In Werner's view, the defendant's attempts to conceal the 
crime after the fact were consistent with the conclusion that 
the defendant could not conform his conduct to the law because 
those attempts were so completely disorganized and ineffective. 
 
The Commonwealth's expert witness, Dr. Martin Kelly, a 
psychiatrist, conducted a criminal responsibility examination of 
the defendant and opined that, at the time of the killing, the 
defendant did not suffer from a mental disease or illness that 
interfered with his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of 
his conduct or conform his conduct to the law.  According to 
Kelly, when a person actually experiences auditory 
hallucinations, the hallucinations are part of a larger, 
consistent, delusional system or "back story."  Kelly opined 
that, although the defendant claimed to experience auditory 
hallucinations that caused him to kill the victim, the 
hallucinations were not part of a larger delusional system and 
were probably made up.  Kelly's opinion was also based on his 
view that the defendant's self-interested acts to try to cover 
up the crime and his participation in it demonstrated that the 
defendant had the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct.  Finally, in reviewing the records and notes prepared 
by the North Suffolk mental health staff and clinicians who had 
seen and interacted with the defendant from July, 2010, to 
15 
 
January, 2011, Kelly observed no decompensation by the 
defendant. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Substitute DNA expert.  On appeal, the 
defendant argues that his constitutional right of confrontation 
guaranteed by the Federal and State Constitutions was violated 
when the Commonwealth's DNA expert, Lynn Schneeweis, was 
permitted to testify about the results of DNA testing performed 
by another analyst, Sarah Hughes, who was no longer employed by 
the State police crime laboratory (crime lab) at the time of 
trial and was not available to testify.12  The argument fails. 
Schneeweis held a master's degree in forensic science, was 
a trained DNA analyst, and also was the section manager for 
forensic biology at the crime lab, overseeing six or seven of 
the crime lab's units, including the criminalistics and crime 
scene units and the DNA unit.  Within the DNA unit, she 
supervised approximately twenty-five to thirty DNA analysts.  
Schneeweis described in her testimony the process by which the 
crime lab conducts DNA analysis, including the specific 
protocols used.  Although Schneeweis did not perform the 
preliminary analysis of the DNA evidence in this case, she was 
the "technical reviewer" and "second reader" of the DNA analysis 
performed by Hughes.  A technical reviewer "is responsible for 
                     
 
12 Immediately before trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion 
in limine to permit Lynn Schneeweis to testify, rather than 
Sarah Hughes, who was in England.  The judge allowed the motion. 
16 
 
. . . going through the file and making sure that everything was 
done in accordance with policy and procedure, and that the 
conclusions that the analyst[] draws are supported by the data 
that was generated during the analysis procedure," and 
Schneeweis performed this work in the present case.  As the 
second reader, Schneeweis independently read all the raw data 
and the reports produced by Hughes, made interpretations, and 
ensured that there was agreement between her findings and those 
of Hughes.  After explaining in some detail the specific work 
that she herself had performed, Schneeweis testified to her 
opinions or conclusions13 concerning the DNA that had been 
collected.  In particular, as stated earlier, she opined that 
that the major profile identified in the DNA sample taken from 
the fingernail scrapings of the defendant's right hand matched 
the defendant, and the victim was included as a contributor to 
the minor profile of the DNA mixture contained in this sample.14  
                     
 
13 With few exceptions, in his direct examination of 
Schneeweis, the prosecutor asked the witness for her 
"conclusions" rather than "opinions," but in the context it is 
clear that the prosecutor was using the two words 
interchangeably. 
 
 
14 The fingernail scrapings were the only deoxyribonucleic 
acid (DNA) sample that included the defendant and the victim as 
possible contributors.  There was no male DNA detected on swabs 
and scrapings collected from the victim's underpants, and 
therefore, testing of that DNA sample was ended.  In addition, 
samples from reddish-brown stains on the defendant's sweatshirt 
and from the victim's hands were submitted for DNA analysis and 
the defendant was excluded from both as a potential contributor. 
 
17 
 
In addition, based again on her own independent work, she 
testified to her opinion that the probability of a random, 
unrelated individual contributing to the DNA mixture of the 
minor profile was approximately one out of 494,400 of African-
Americans, one out of 242,800 of Caucasians, one out of 314,400 
of Hispanics, and one out of 3,204,000 of Asians. 
 
At trial, the defendant objected at the outset of 
Schneeweis's testimony generally on confrontation and chain of 
custody grounds;15 with respect to confrontation, he argued that 
Schneeweis could not testify to any opinions or conclusions 
regarding the DNA evidence because she did not personally 
conduct the laboratory examination and analysis of that 
evidence.  The trial judge overruled the objection.  The parties 
appear to disagree about whether the defendant's confrontation 
argument on appeal is the same or different from his trial 
objection -- an issue that bears on the standard of review to be 
applied -- but we need not resolve the point, because the judge 
committed no error in permitting Schneeweis to testify or with 
respect to any of the particulars of her testimony. 
 
With regard to a defendant's right of confrontation, as the 
defendant recognizes, we have permitted experts to rely on and 
testify to their own opinions based on "the results of tests, 
                     
 
15 The defendant does not raise any argument concerning 
chain of custody on appeal, and in any event, our review reveals 
no error. 
18 
 
experiments, or observations conducted by another" since 
Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516, 532 
(1986), decided nearly thirty years ago.  See Commonwealth v. 
Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 784-785, 790 (2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 2441 (2011).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 
383, 389-391 (2008) (opinions of substitute medical examiner 
based on autopsy report and photographs relating to autopsy that 
he did not perform).  The critical issue with respect to an 
expert, including in particular a DNA analyst, is whether the 
defendant is able to cross-examine the expert in a meaningful 
way regarding possible flaws relating to the underlying data 
that forms the basis of his or her opinion.  See Barbosa, supra 
at 790-791.  Compare Commonwealth v. Greineder, 464 Mass. 580, 
594-599, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 166 (2013) (defendant had 
meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Commonwealth's expert 
about reliability of data), with Commonwealth v. Tassone, 468 
Mass. 391, 399, 401-402 (2014) (defendant could not meaningfully 
cross-examine Commonwealth's expert witness where DNA was 
analyzed at different laboratory in different State from where 
expert worked).16 
                     
 
16 We have recognized that for DNA evidence in particular, 
"the testing techniques are so reliable and the science so sound 
that fraud and errors in labeling or handling may be the only 
reasons why an opinion is flawed" (emphasis in original).  
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 790 (2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2441 (2011).  See Commonwealth v. Tassone, 
468 Mass. 391, 400 (2014). 
19 
 
 
Similar to the defendant in Barbosa, 457 Mass. at 791, and 
particularly like the defendant in Greineder, 464 Mass. at 597-
598, the defendant here certainly was able to cross-examine the 
Commonwealth's expert Schneeweis meaningfully about the 
reliability of the underlying DNA testing procedures and data, 
given that Schneeweis was the crime lab's section manager for 
forensic biology and supervisor of the crime lab's DNA analysts 
(including Hughes) and had been directly involved in this case 
as the second reader and technical reviewer; in those capacities 
she had reviewed both the raw DNA data produced by the crime 
lab's analytic instruments and the DNA samples themselves.  The 
defendant does not claim otherwise, but asserts, based on one 
statement made by Schneeweis during her direct examination,17 
that all Schneeweis did was to parrot and repeat for the jury 
Hughes's conclusions. 
 
The defendant is correct that under Massachusetts law, an 
expert witness is not permitted to testify on direct examination 
to facts or data that another, nontestifying expert has 
generated, or to the nontestifying expert's own opinion, even 
though this information may be an important part of the basis of 
the testifying expert's opinion.  See, e.g., Greineder, supra at 
592, 601-602.  See also Barbosa, 457 Mass. at 785; Nardi, 452 
                     
 
17 Schneeweis testified that, as part of her review of 
Hughes's work in this case, she, Schneeweis, determined whether 
"the conclusions that were generated by [Hughes were] supported 
by the data generated during the analysis procedures." 
20 
 
Mass. at 390-391; Mass G. Evid. § 703 (2015).  But we see no 
indication in Schneeweis's testimony, including the portion of 
her testimony to which the defendant points (see note 17, 
supra), that Schneeweis at any time described any part of 
Hughes's DNA analysis or of Hughes's testing results, opinions, 
or conclusions.  Rather, Schneeweis described the analytic 
process that Hughes, as an analyst in the crime lab, would have 
followed, and Schneeweis's own opinions that she had formed 
independently and directly from the case review and analysis she 
herself had performed.  Schneeweis's testimony was admissible in 
all respects, and the judge did not err in admitting it. 
 
2.  Limited direct examination of defendant's primary 
mental health expert.  At trial, the defendant's counsel argued 
that the defendant' mental health experts, and in particular Dr. 
Werner, were permitted under our case law to testify on direct 
examination about the contents of the defendant's medical 
records, including medical diagnoses and opinions about the 
defendant's mental state that the expert had read and may have 
relied on in forming the expert's own opinion, even though the 
records themselves were not in evidence and the defense did not 
wish to introduce them in evidence.18  The trial judge 
                     
 
18 In support of this argument, the defendant cited to the 
trial judge a number of decisions of this court, including 
Commonwealth v. Greineder, 464 Mass. 580, cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 166 (2013); Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379 (2008); 
Commonwealth v. Markvart, 437 Mass. 331 (2002); Commonwealth v. 
21 
 
disagreed,19 but pointed out that if the defense introduced the 
defendant's medical records in evidence as an exhibit, Werner 
(and any other expert) would then be entitled to testify 
concerning any opinions or other information contained in them.  
The defendant's counsel chose not to introduce the medical 
records, in part because of the voluminous quantity and the 
difficulty he perceived in the jury's attempting to wade through 
them. 
 
On appeal, the defendant repeats the claim that it was 
error to preclude Werner from testifying, during his direct 
examination, to opinions about the defendant's mental illness 
and mental status more generally that were contained in his 
medical records.  He does not focus his argument on the right of 
confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights, but contends that this limitation violated his 
separate right to present a defense that is protected by these 
same constitutional guarantees.  We disagree. 
                                                                  
Waite, 422 Mass. 792 (1996); and Department of Youth Servs. v. A 
Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516 (1986). 
 
 
19 The judge explained:  "I think Greineder makes clear that 
the basis for one's opinion is properly the subject of cross-
examination, but is not generally admissible as part of direct 
examination. . . .  And if the Commonwealth does cross-examine 
him on any basis for opinion[,] that then permits you on 
redirect to explore whatever the sources of information that he 
used were." 
22 
 
 
In Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 Mass. at 
531, we ruled for the first time that an expert may "base an 
opinion on facts or data not in evidence if the facts or data 
are independently admissible and are a permissible basis for an 
expert to consider in formulating an opinion."  However, that 
case also makes clear that although an expert may rely on facts 
or data that have not been admitted but would be admissible in 
evidence, the expert may not testify to the substance or 
contents of that information on direct examination.  Id.  See 
Tassone, 468 Mass. at 399 ("Our evidentiary rules permit the 
facts or data underlying the opinion to be elicited only by the 
defendant on cross-examination and, where this door has been 
opened by the defendant, by the prosecution on redirect 
examination").20  The defendant points out that our cases 
discussing this rule have done so in the context of a 
Commonwealth expert witness, where it is the Commonwealth that 
is precluded from asking the expert on direct examination to 
testify to the content of data or even opinions generated or 
held by others, and the cases have emphasized that the rationale 
for the rule is to protect defendants from the admission of 
hearsay evidence by the Commonwealth.  See, e.g., Greineder, 464 
Mass. at 592-594; Barbosa, 457 Mass. at 785.  The defendant 
                     
 
20 Several cases following Department of Youth Servs. v. A 
Juvenile, 398 Mass. at 531, have reaffirmed this limitation.  
See, e.g., Greineder, 464 Mass. at 583-584; Markvart, 437 Mass. 
at 337-338. 
23 
 
contends that, where the defendant who seeks to ask his or her 
own expert witness about the bases for the expert's opinion, the 
interests are different, and the defendant's ability to present 
a defense is materially impaired if the expert is not permitted 
to explain those bases by pointing to admissible, but not 
admitted, evidence that the expert has reviewed and relied on. 
 
The limitation just discussed on the direct examination 
testimony of an expert witness is a common-law evidentiary rule 
that operates in both civil and criminal cases and applies to 
both sides.  See Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 
Mass. at 531-532; Mass. G. Evid. § 703.  See also Vassallo v. 
Baxter Health Care, 428 Mass. 1, 15-16 (1998); Commonwealth v. 
Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 803 (1996).  "A defendant's right to 
present a full defense . . . is not without limits," United 
States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 350 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
461 U.S. 931 (1983), and as a general rule, "does not entitle 
him to place before the jury evidence normally inadmissible" 
(quotation omitted).  United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 128 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 933 (2003).  See United States 
v. Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508, 1519 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 
U.S. 1004 (1989).  There is no reason to apply an exception to 
our evidentiary rule in this case, particularly because, as the 
judge stated to the defendant's trial counsel, he would have 
been able to elicit from the defense expert on direct 
24 
 
examination the opinions and other information from the 
defendant's medical records in which he was interested by first 
introducing those medical records in evidence.  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 703.  That counsel did not wish to follow this path for 
strategic reasons does not transform the generally applicable 
evidentiary requirement into an unconstitutional burden placed 
on the defendant.21 
 
3.  Mutina instruction.  At trial, the defendant asked for 
a jury instruction about the consequences of a verdict of not 
guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility (Mutina 
instruction).  See Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 823 & 
n.12 (1975).  The defendant's request, however, was that the 
judge modify the Mutina instruction that is part of the Model 
Jury Instructions on Homicide (2013) in several respects; most 
substantively, he sought the addition of language that would 
inform the jury that if the defendant were still suffering from 
a mental illness and still dangerous, "[t]here is no limit to 
additional commitments [following the initial commitment of six 
months] and the defendant could be committed for the rest of his 
life."22  The judge did not adopt the defendant's proposed 
                     
 
21 Furthermore, the record shows that the defendant's expert 
was permitted, on direct and cross-examination, to testify at 
length to specific aspects of the defendant's medical and 
treatment records. 
 
 
22 The instruction proposed by the defendant's trial counsel 
also would have added to the model instruction a statement that 
25 
 
instruction, but gave the model Mutina instruction.  See Model 
Jury Instructions on Homicide, supra at 11-12. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge's Mutina 
instruction created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  He claims that by including references to the number 
of days the defendant might be committed for observation and 
also referencing the initial six-month commitment without a 
mention of the possibility that the defendant could remain 
committed for the rest of his life, the instruction was unfairly 
one-sided, underestimated the likely period of commitment the 
defendant would face, and was likely to distract the jury from 
their essential fact-finding role.  The information about the 
consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of lack of 
criminal responsibility included in the judge's Mutina 
instruction, however, was accurate; the judge did not err in 
giving it in response to the defendant's request for a Mutina 
charge.  See Commonwealth v. Johnston, 467 Mass. 674, 702-703 
(2014).  Nonetheless, the core of the defendant's criticism -- 
that the model Mutina instruction underestimates the potential, 
and in the defendant's view, likely, length of confinement of a 
defendant found not criminally responsible -- is one that has 
                                                                  
if the jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first or 
second degree, he would be sentenced to State prison, not a 
mental health facility.  The defendant does not press the point 
on appeal, and we find no persuasive reason to add this 
language. 
26 
 
been raised as a matter of concern over the years, see, e.g., 
Johnston, 467 Mass. at 701-702; Commonwealth v. Callahan, 380 
Mass. 821, 826-827 (1980), S.C., 386 Mass. 784 (1982), and S.C., 
401 Mass. 627 (1988); Commonwealth v. Loring, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 
655, 659-660 (1982), and warrants our consideration. 
 
In the Mutina case itself, this court did not prescribe or 
even suggest any specific form of instruction.  Moreover, the 
court has made clear that a Mutina instruction need not mention 
the specific time periods for observation or commitment that are 
included in the civil commitment statutes.23  See Callahan, supra 
at 827-828.  A Mutina instruction is designed to avoid 
unnecessary speculation by the jury and ensure that they 
comprehend the possible consequences of a verdict of not guilty 
by reason of lack of criminal responsibility -- and in 
particular, to understand "what protection they and their fellow 
citizens will have if they conscientiously apply the law to the 
evidence and arrive at a verdict of not guilty by reason of 
[lack of criminal responsibility] -- a verdict which necessarily 
requires the chilling determination that the defendant is an 
insane killer not legally responsible for his acts."  See 
Mutina, 366 Mass. at 821-822.  On reflection, we think an 
instruction that omits references to specific time frames for 
observation and mentions the potential for successive commitment 
                     
 
23 See G. L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8, 15 (b), 15 (e), 15 (f), 16, 18 
(a), and 18 (c). 
27 
 
orders that could span the duration of the defendant's life in a 
context that accurately reflects the law governing such 
commitments may better accomplish these purposes.  Accordingly, 
we propose a provisional instruction along the lines set forth 
in an Appendix to this opinion.24 
 
4.  Instruction on consciousness of guilt.  The defendant 
requested that the trial judge omit a jury instruction on 
consciousness of guilt because the defense "pretty much 
stipulated that [the defendant] committed the homicide" and was 
"not contesting it."  The judge denied the request, reasoning 
that there was no actual stipulation that the defendant had 
committed the homicide, and therefore the burden remained on the 
Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did so, and a consciousness of guilt instruction was 
therefore pertinent and appropriate. 
 
On appeal, the defendant's argument is more nuanced.  He 
does not contend that a consciousness of guilt instruction 
should have been omitted in its entirety but rather that the 
judge, in exercising discretion to give such an instruction, 
                     
 
24 With the assistance of a committee of trial court judges, 
this court currently is reviewing the Model Jury Instructions on 
Homicide that were published in 2013.  The proposed instruction 
set out in the Appendix is a possible form of a revised Mutina 
instruction, but we invite the committee to review and, if 
appropriate, propose revisions to this proposed instruction.  
For the present, upon request by a defendant, a judge should 
give the provisional Mutina instruction set forth in the 
Appendix. 
28 
 
committed reversible error in not limiting the jury's 
consideration of consciousness of guilt evidence to the issue of 
the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime, i.e., his 
criminal responsibility or lack thereof.  We do not agree.  As 
the trial judge noted, although the defendant did not contest 
that he had killed the victim, the Commonwealth was still 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did so and 
the evidence of consciousness of guilt was relevant to this 
question.  See Commonwealth v. Lowe, 391 Mass. 97, 108 n.6, 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 840 (1984) (evidence of consciousness of 
guilt is relevant to whether homicide occurred).  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Denis, 442 Mass. 617, 624 (2004) (no error for 
judge to give identification instruction, although 
identification not contested; necessary for Commonwealth to 
prove beyond reasonable doubt identification of defendant as 
person who committed crime, notwithstanding concessions by 
defense at trial).  Moreover, as the defendant's argument on 
appeal recognizes, actions taken by the defendant following the 
killing of the victim that reasonably could be interpreted to 
reflect consciousness of guilt25 were relevant to an assessment 
of the defendant's mental state and whether he was criminally 
                     
 
25 Such acts included, for example, setting a fire in 
Seagull House, arguably seeking to burn evidence of or even burn 
down the locus of the killing; wrapping and discarding the 
victim's body in a church parking lot removed from the scene of 
the killing; stealing and changing into different clothes; and 
trying to secure a place to stay with relatives and out of view. 
29 
 
responsible.  Accordingly, an instruction on consciousness of 
guilt was entirely proper in the circumstances of this case.  
See Commonwealth v. Cardarelli, 433 Mass. 427, 437 (2001). 
 
5.  Relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant argues 
that, based on the extensive evidence of his mental illness 
presented at trial, this court should exercise its power of 
review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt 
or order a new trial.  We recognize that the defendant presented 
substantial evidence that he lacked criminal responsibility at 
the time he killed the victim.  However, the Commonwealth 
presented substantial evidence to the contrary.  The jury were 
entitled to reject the testimony and opinions of the defendant's 
witnesses and instead credit the contrary evidence, including 
the opinion of the Commonwealth's expert, and to conclude that 
the defendant was criminally responsible.  "Tragic as this case 
is, it is a case where the question of criminal responsibility 
was truly for the jury, and justice does not require that their 
verdict be disturbed."  Johnston, 467 Mass. at 706.  In the 
circumstances of this case, based on our careful review of the 
trial record, we decline to reduce the degree of guilt, order a 
new trial, or grant other relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
Appendix. 
 
 
PROVISIONAL MUTINA INSTRUCTION1 
 
 
Consequences of Verdict of Not Guilty by Reason of Lack of 
Criminal Responsibility.  As I have previously instructed, your 
decision should be based solely on the evidence and the law of 
this case, without regard to the possible consequences of the 
verdict[s].  You may not consider sentencing or punishment in 
reaching your verdict[s].  However, I am going to tell you what 
happens to a defendant if he [or she] is found not guilty by 
reason of lack of criminal responsibility. 
 
First, the court may order the defendant to be hospitalized 
at a mental health facility for a period of observation and 
examination.  During this observation period or in any event 
within sixty days after a verdict of not guilty by reason of 
lack of criminal responsibility, the district attorney or other 
appropriate authorities may petition the court to commit the 
defendant to a mental health facility or to Bridgewater State 
Hospital.  If the court concludes that the defendant is mentally 
ill and that his [or her] discharge would create a substantial 
likelihood of serious harm to himself [or herself] or others, 
then the court will grant the petition and commit the defendant 
to a proper mental facility or to Bridgewater State Hospital, 
initially for a period of six months.  At the end of the six 
months and every year thereafter, the court reviews the order of 
commitment.  If the defendant is still suffering from a mental 
disease or defect and is still dangerous, then the court will 
order the defendant to continue to be committed to the mental 
facility or to Bridgewater State Hospital.  There is no limit to 
the number of such renewed orders of commitments as long as the 
defendant continues to be mentally ill and dangerous; if these 
conditions do continue, the defendant may remain committed for 
the duration of his [or her] life. 
 
 
If at some point the defendant is no longer mentally ill 
and dangerous, the court will order him [or her] discharged from 
the mental health facility or from Bridgewater State Hospital 
after a hearing.  The district attorney must be notified of any 
hearing concerning whether the person may be released, and the 
district attorney may be heard at any such hearing.  However, 
the final decision on whether to recommit or release the 
defendant is always made by the court. 
                     
 
1 See Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 823 & n.12 
(1975). 
2 
 
 
This is what happens if you find the defendant not guilty 
by reason of lack of criminal responsibility.