Title: Welch v. Miller and Long Co. of Maryland
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 982534
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 5, 1999

Present:  All the Justices 
 
 
MONENNE Y. WELCH, ADMINISTRATOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF BERNIE PRESTON 
WELCH, JR. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 982534 
November 5, 1999 
 
MILLER AND LONG COMPANY OF 
MARYLAND, INC., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Kathleen H. MacKay, Judge 
 
 
The question presented in this wrongful death action, 
stemming from an accident at a construction site, is whether the 
uninsured motorists statute, Code § 38.2-2206, permits the 
personal representative of a deceased employee to prosecute a 
common-law action against the statutory employer and a fellow 
servant, as well as two uninsured motorist carriers, and collect 
a judgment from the insurers despite the exclusive remedy 
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act).  We answer 
that question in the negative. 
 
The facts are not disputed.  In October 1997, the 
plaintiff's decedent, Bernie P. Welch, was operating a dump 
truck for his employer, C. W. Strittmatter, Inc., at a 
construction site in Fairfax County.  At that time and place, 
defendant Miller & Long Company of Maryland, Inc., owned a 
mobile crane being operated in the work by its employee, 
defendant Nathan Gunn.  As a result of the alleged negligence of 
Gunn, the crane "toppled over," crushing the truck's cab and 
causing Welch's death. 
 
Welch's administrator filed this common-law action against 
the foregoing defendants seeking recovery of damages under the 
Death By Wrongful Act statutes, Code § 8.01-50, et seq.  The 
plaintiff joined as defendants Royal Insurance Company of 
America, the uninsured motorist carrier for the dump truck, and 
Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO), the uninsured 
motorist carrier for the decedent's personal motor vehicle. 
 
The parties agreed that the deceased was operating the 
truck in the scope of his employment with Strittmatter; that 
Miller & Long, Strittmatter, the deceased, and Gunn were all 
engaged in construction work on one project at one site; that 
Miller & Long and Strittmatter were subcontractors on the job; 
and that Miller & Long and Gunn fell within the jurisdiction of 
the Act. 
 
Defendants Miller & Long (the decedent's statutory 
employer) and Gunn (the decedent's fellow servant) filed a plea 
in bar, asserting that a common-law action against them for 
negligence was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the 
Act, Code § 65.2-307 (rights and remedies granted to employee 
for payment of workers' compensation on account of death by 
accident exclude all other rights and remedies of employee's 
personal representative at common law on account of such death). 
 
2
 
Defendant Royal Insurance Company filed a motion for 
summary judgment (treated by the trial court as a plea in bar), 
in which GEICO joined.  The insurers asserted that the plaintiff 
could not recover any uninsured motorist benefits because 
plaintiff, not being legally entitled to recover any damages 
against either Miller & Long or Gunn, could not satisfy the 
condition precedent to such uninsured motorist liability.  The 
uninsured motorist statute requires motor vehicle liability 
policies to contain provisions undertaking to pay "the insured 
all sums that he is legally entitled to recover as damages" from 
an uninsured motorist.  Code § 38.2-2206(A). 
 
The plaintiff urged application of 1997 amendments to Code 
§ 38.2-2206(B)(v) and (F), which generally provided that 
"immunity" from liability for negligence of the operator of a 
motor vehicle shall not be a bar to an insured obtaining a 
judgment against the insurer.  The plaintiff asserted that the 
crane was an uninsured motor vehicle by statutory definition 
because Miller & Long and Gunn were "immune" from liability for 
negligence under the Act.  The plaintiff further asserted that 
the 1997 amendments now allow "the deceased insured" to proceed 
with the action against the "immune" defendants and that any 
judgment obtained would be enforceable only against the 
insurers. 
 
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Following consideration of argument of counsel, the trial 
court, in a letter opinion, sustained the respective pleas in 
bar.  We awarded the plaintiff this appeal from a September 1998 
order dismissing the action with prejudice. 
 
On appeal, the plaintiff advances the same arguments 
presented below, and contends the trial court erred in 
dismissing the action.  We do not agree. 
 
In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Dodson, 235 Va. 346, 
367 S.E.2d 505 (1988), we considered a case with facts virtually 
identical to those presented here, and interpreted the version 
of the uninsured motorist statute effective at that time.  We 
held that Virginia law did not permit recovery by an insured's 
estate under the uninsured motorist provisions of the insured's 
motor vehicle liability policy issued by Aetna, when the insured 
was killed in a work-related motor vehicle accident and when the 
employer/vehicle owner and co-employee/vehicle operator both 
were insured under other policies, but when the exclusive remedy 
provision of the Act barred recovery under those other policies. 
 
In Dodson, we said:  "Because workers' compensation 
afforded the exclusive remedy against the decedent's employer 
and fellow employees for his accidental death, his statutory 
beneficiaries are not 'legally entitled to recover' damages 
against them.  It follows that a condition precedent to Aetna's 
 
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liability under its [uninsured motorist] endorsement was not 
met."  Id. at 351, 367 S.E.2d at 508. 
 
Nine years after Dodson, the General Assembly amended 
portions of the uninsured motorist statute pertinent here.  See 
Acts 1997, ch. 170, 191.  The statutory definition of "Uninsured 
motor vehicle" was amended to provide that the term "means a 
motor vehicle for which . . . (v) the owner or operator of the 
motor vehicle is immune from liability for negligence under the 
laws of the Commonwealth or the United States, in which case the 
provisions of subsection F shall apply and the action shall 
continue against the insurer."  Code § 38.2-2206(B). 
 
At the same time, subsection (F) was amended to provide:  
"Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection A [containing the 
'legally entitled to recover' language], the immunity from 
liability for negligence of the owner or operator of a motor 
vehicle shall not be a bar to the insured obtaining a judgment 
enforceable against the insurer for the negligence of the immune 
owner or operator, and shall not be a defense available to the 
insurer to the action brought by the insured."  Code § 38.2-
2206(F). 
 
We reject the plaintiff's argument that only the foregoing 
amendments control here.  Initially, we disagree with the 
plaintiff that, because the alleged tortfeasors, defendants 
Miller & Long and its employee Gunn, are not subject to a 
 
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common-law judgment in an action by the plaintiff, due to the 
exclusive remedy provision of the Act, the amendment terms 
"immune" and "immunity" describe the status of those defendants. 
 
In this context, the terms contemplate total exemption from 
tort liability, such as that generally enjoyed by state and 
local governments.  In the present situation, the tortfeasors 
were not exempt from liability.  Rather, they, and their 
workers' compensation insurance carrier, were strictly liable to 
the plaintiff for payment of workers' compensation benefits. 
 
Moreover, a clear statutory mandate trumps the plaintiff's 
effort effectively to disregard provisions of the Workers' 
Compensation Act and to focus solely on the uninsured motorist 
statute, a part of the insurance laws.  Code § 38.2-900, 
contained within the insurance title of the Code, provides: 
"All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the 
provisions of this title are hereby repealed to the 
extent of the inconsistency.  However, the provisions 
of this title shall not amend or repeal any provisions 
of Title 65.2 relating to workers' compensation." 
 
 
Therefore, the exclusive remedy provision of the Act is not 
affected by the amendments to the uninsured motorist statute.  
Acceptance, as here, of workers' compensation benefits on behalf 
of the deceased employee excludes all other rights and remedies 
of such employee, his personal representative, and next of kin 
at common law or otherwise on account of the death. 
 
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Accordingly, because the Act afforded the exclusive remedy 
against the decedent's statutory employer (Miller & Long) and a 
fellow servant (Gunn), the decedent's statutory beneficiaries 
under the wrongful death statutes are not legally entitled to 
recover damages against them.  Thus, a condition precedent to 
the insurers' liability under the uninsured motorist statute was 
not met. 
 
Consequently, the judgment of the trial court will be 
Affirmed. 
 
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