Title: Solomon v. Morse
Citation: 188 Kan. 156, 360 P.2d 1049
Docket Number: 42,187
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 8, 1961

188 Kan. 156 (1961)
360 P.2d 1049
ALBERT SOLOMON and FREDERICK SOLOMON, Appellants,
v.
LYNN F. MORSE, NELLIE GUNTHER, OSCAR KIMZEY, OLEN SOLOMON, HOWARD L. STAUFFER, GLADYS L. WATSON, RUTH BIRD and BEULAH F. BUMCROT, Appellees.
No. 42,187

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 8, 1961.
L.H. Cable, of Chanute, was on the briefs for appellants.
Clyde Hill, of Yates Center, and Rex A. Lafferty, of Fredonia, were on the briefs for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FATZER, J.:
The action was to construe the will of Frances Solomon, deceased, and to quiet title in the plaintiffs to 180 acres of land in Woodson County. Trial was by the court which construed the will and entered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs have appealed.
*157 The facts are not in dispute, and the sole question presented is the proper construction of the decedent's will.
Frances Solomon executed her will on October 29, 1908, and died on April 1, 1923, the owner of the real estate in question. She was survived by her seven children: Minnie Solomon, Albert Solomon, Ida Morse, John Solomon, Lillie Stauffer, Frederick Solomon, and Nellie Kimzey. On April 6, 1923, the decedent's will was admitted to probate in Woodson County, and her executor was discharged June 25, 1925. The pertinent provisions of the will read:
Minnie Solomon, the life tenant, died January 4, 1959. Ida Morse, John Solomon, Lillie Stauffer, and Nellie Kimzey died prior to January 4, 1959, each leaving surviving children who are the appellees.
The appellants, Albert Solomon and Frederick Solomon, are the only surviving children of the testatrix. They contend the correct interpretation of their mother's will requires the conclusion that she intended only those of her children who survived the life tenant to have the remainder, and since they are the only two "surviving heirs" they should take to the exclusion of descendants of deceased children.
The appellees contend that the testatrix used the word "heirs" in the second paragraph of her will in its ordinary legal sense so as to include descendants of her deceased children, and that upon the death of the life tenant they are entitled to their per stirpes share.
In the second paragraph of her will the testatrix gave her daughter Minnie a life estate in the real estate and provided she was not to *158 sell, mortgage or in any way dispose of it during her lifetime. She then provided that at Minnie's death, the "property be sold and divided equally share and share alike between my then surviving heirs, all of whom are hereinafter named...." The third paragraph provided: "I give devise and bequeath to my beloved children (naming them, except Minnie), all the residue of my property both real and personal of which I may die possessed, share and share alike."
At the time this case was decided, the learned judge of the district court filed a memorandum decision, and as it clearly sets forth the issues and the reasons for the decision, it is quoted in full:
In harmony with the court's memorandum decision judgment was entered that the real estate was owned in fee simple as tenants in common and in the fractional interests by the parties as set forth in the pleadings, and partition was ordered.
We think the district court correctly interpreted and construed the decedent's will. It is clear from a reading of the will that upon the death of the life tenant the real estate was to be sold and the proceeds divided equally, but it is not clear among whom the proceeds are to be divided. The crux of the problem is that the use *159 of the word "heirs" and the phrase that follows, "all of whom are hereinafter named," must be reconciled. We think that, as the district court found, the proper construction to be given the will is that the testatrix used the word "heirs" in its ordinary legal sense so as to include descendants of her deceased children. To adopt the appellants' contention would in effect change the word "heirs" to the word "children" which the testatrix could easily have done, but she did not do so. Again, as found by the district court, we think by the phrase "all of whom are hereinafter named," the testatrix intended to designate her living potential heirs at the time of making her will. Moreover, no provision is made in the will in case any of the children named in the third paragraph should predecease the testatrix, and there is no language to indicate any intention on her part to disinherit anyone or to divide the property otherwise than equally among those sharing. Construing all the language of the will, we think it must be said the testatrix did not intend to exclude children of her deceased children from sharing in the proceeds of the sale of the land as directed in the second paragraph of her will.
We have not overlooked the authorities cited by the appellants, but in view of the conclusion just announced, it is unnecessary to discuss them.
We find no error in the record and the judgment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.