Title: Julin v Julin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 77, 2001
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 17, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CAMILLE L. JULIN,
§
§
Respondent Below,
§ No. 77, 2001
Appellant/Cross-
§
Appellee,
§ Court Below: Family Court
v.
§ of the State of Delaware in and
§ for New Castle County 
BRUCE G. JULIN,
§ File No. CN90-7664
§ Petition No. 99-35799
Petitioner Below,
§
Appellee/Cross-
§
Appellant.
§
Submitted: November 29, 2001
Decided:
December 17, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and BERGER, Justices.
Appeal from Family Court.  AFFIRMED.
Francine R. Solomon, Esquire, Ferrara, Haley, Bevis & Solomon,
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Curtis P. Bounds, Esquire, The Bayard Firm, Wilmington, Delaware, for
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Per Curiam 
2
In this appeal from the Family Court, the appellant-former wife (“Wife”)
seeks review of a decision modifying past due alimony and denying an award of
counsel fees.  The appellee-former husband (“Husband”) cross-appeals from the
Family Court’s determination that the Wife was incapable of full time work.  We
conclude that the Family Court’s decision that the Wife acquiesced in the Husband’s
reduced alimony payments is fully supported by the record.  We further conclude
that the court did not abuse its discretion in requiring each party to defray its own
counsel fees.  Our denial of the principal appeal renders the cross-appeal moot.
I
The parties were divorced in 1992 and, incident to the divorce decree, the
Family Court entered a property division and alimony award which, inter alia,
ordered the Husband to pay monthly alimony in the amount of $2,350.  The court
also entered an order granting the Wife a share of the Husband’s pension when he
reached retirement age.  
In January 1995, Husband began receiving pension benefits and the Wife
simultaneously began receiving related benefits in the amount of $1,504 per month.
The Husband thereupon reduced his direct alimony payment by a corresponding
3
amount each month.  The Wife accepted the new arrangement, without protest, until
October 5, 1999 when she filed a Rule to Show Cause Petition seeking to have the
Husband held in contempt for failure to honor the original alimony award.  The
Husband filed a counterclaim, seeking a reduction or discontinuance of alimony
because of a substantial change in circumstances, alleging that the Wife was able to
engage in full-time employment.  The Family Court, after trial, determined that
Wife’s acceptance of the revised payment arrangement for more than five years
constituted acquiescence and she was thereby estopped from asserting a right to
additional payments.  The court specifically rejected the Wife’s claim that her
medical condition prevented her from “focusing” on the payment discrepancy. 
Acquiescence is an equitable defense which is assertable against a party who
remains inactive for a considerable period of time, or who recognizes the validity of
the complained of act or who acts in a manner inconsistent with the subsequent
repudiation and thus leads the other party to believe the act has been approved.  28
Am. Jur. Estoppel and Waiver, § 57 (1996); Salomon Bros. Inc. v. Interstate
Bakeries Corp., Del. Ch., 576 A.2d 650 (1989).  Application of the standards
underlying the defense of acquiescence is fact intensive, often depending, as here,
on an evaluation of the knowledge, intention and motivation of the acquiescing party.
4
In this case, the Family Court’s determination of acquiescence turns, in large part,
on the  court’s evaluation of the Wife’s testimony.  Under a deferential standard of
review, we find no basis to interfere with that evaluation.  Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband
(O.W.V., Jr.), Del. Supr., 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (1979).  Accordingly, we conclude
that the Family Court’s determination that the Wife acquiesced in the Husband’s
conduct is supportable both legally and factually.
II
We next address the question of whether the Family Court properly
determined that each party should bear its own counsel fees.  The Wife
acknowledges that an award of counsel fees is a matter of broad discretion but
complains that the Family Court gave no reasons for its order that “each party shall
be responsible for their own attorney fees and costs associated with the
proceedings.”
The principal source of the Family Court’s authority to award counsel fees is
13 Del. C. § 1515.  This statute, which permits the court to “order a party to pay all
or part of the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding ...
and for attorney’s fees,” is in derogation of the American Rule which requires a
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party in litigation to bear its own costs, including counsel fees.  Brice v. Dept. of
Corrections, Del. Supr., 704 A.2d 1176 (1998).  This Court has ruled that an
“award of fees may not be made arbitrarily and a statement as to the reasons for an
award of costs and fees should appear in the record.”  Lee v. Green, Del. Supr., 574
A.2d 857 (1990) (emphasis supplied).  While this Court encourages the trial courts,
as a matter of policy, to provide reasons for rulings, there is no such requirement
when the court declines to depart from the norm in the denial of affirmative relief.
Accordingly, we find no basis in this case  to require the court to explain the reason
for its adherence to the American Rule.  Accordingly, its ruling is affirmed.
III
In view of our affirmance of the Family Court’s denial of Wife’s claim for
retroactive alimony, it is unnecessary to consider the Husband’s claim that the Wife
was capable of full-time employment in the intervening years.  Accordingly, the
cross-appeal is denied as moot.