Title: P. v. Curl
Citation: 46 Cal. 4th 339 46 Cal. 4th 1006a-modification
Docket Number: S034072, S034072m
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: May 18, 2009

1 
Filed 5/18/09 
 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S034072 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
ROBERT ZANE CURL, 
) 
 
) 
Fresno County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 380748-4 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Defendant Robert Zane Curl was convicted by a jury of the first degree 
murder of Richard Urban (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 as to which the jury found 
that defendant had personally fired one of the shots that caused Urban’s death.  
The trial court then found true the special circumstance allegation that defendant 
had been previously convicted of second degree murder.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)).2
                                            
1  All further unspecified statutory references are to this code. 
2  The basis of the prior murder special circumstance was defendant’s 1977 
conviction for the murder of Michael Conroy while defendant was incarcerated at 
the state prison at Vacaville.  The trial court also found true allegations that 
defendant had suffered two prior convictions for assault with a deadly weapon and 
a third prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon by a prisoner serving less 
than a life sentence (§ 4501).  The prior convictions were stricken by the court 
upon pronouncement of the death sentence, 
  
 
2 
After a court trial, defendant was sentenced to death.  This appeal is automatic.  
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11, subd. (a); § 1239, subd. (b).) 
We affirm the judgment. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Prosecution Guilt Phase Evidence3
On March 23, 1987, Duane Holt shared a residence with Nevallene Joanne 
Holt Routh and her two teen-aged sons at the corner of Hughes and Hedges Streets 
in Fresno.
 
 
1.  Richard Urban’s Disappearance on March 23, 1987 
4
                                            
3  In setting forth this evidence, we apply the familiar appellate standard that, “[o]n 
appeal, we . . . construe the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment.”  
(Woodman Partners v. Sofa U Love (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 766, 771.)  We include 
this reminder because defendant’s rendering of the facts highlights what he deems 
to be inconsistencies and credibility issues with respect to the prosecution’s 
evidence and witnesses.  But defendant’s decision not to attack the judgment as 
unsupported by substantial evidence amounts to a concession that it is supported 
by such evidence.  Even if he had made a sufficiency claim, it is black letter law 
that “[c]onflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not 
justify reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or 
jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts 
upon which a determination depends.”  (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 
403.)  In other words, the jury resolved these credibility issues against defendant 
and we are bound by that resolution.  Accordingly, we set forth the evidence 
without defendant’s extensive commentary regarding its reliability. 
4  The witness was referred to as “Nevi Jo” at trial and is referred to by that name 
for convenience.  As she described it, her relationship with Holt was simply that 
they “just lived in the same house.”  
  Holt was a drug dealer and sold drugs out of his house.  He and Nevi 
Jo were both methamphetamine or “crank” users.  The Holt residence was also 
something of a gathering spot for young men who came and worked on cars in the 
yard.  One of those young men was the victim, Richard Urban, who had 
previously purchased crank from Holt.  Defendant and his girlfriend, Penny 
 
3 
Baxter, were also frequent visitors to the Holt residence in March 1987, visiting 
almost every day.  Like the others, defendant and Baxter were crank users. 
On March 23, defendant and Baxter dropped in at the Holt residence three 
times.  During their final visit, in the evening, Holt received a phone call that made 
him angry.  After he hung up, he told defendant that “Rich” owed him $130 and 
that some people should be made an example of for not paying.  According to 
Baxter, defendant told Holt, “You just have to do what you have to do.”  Holt said 
that “Rich was coming over.”  About 10 minutes after the phone conversation, 
Urban arrived in a van. 
Holt asked Urban where his money was.  Urban told him he did not have it 
because he had been kidnapped earlier that day.  Instead, he offered Holt a set of 
rings in payment; the rings were gold and set with black onyx.5
As they drove home in defendant’s truck Baxter noticed a bag on the seat of 
the truck between defendant and her.  She went to move it, but defendant told her 
  Holt refused but 
did accept some drugs from Urban telling him, however, that he still owed him the 
money.  At some point, Holt said he had to go down the street and he, Urban, and 
defendant left the house in defendant’s truck.  When defendant and Holt returned 
35 to 40 minutes later; they were sweaty and jumpy.  According to Randy Little, 
who was working on cars at Holt’s house, they asked for a rope or a cable to start 
Urban’s van.  Eventually, they pushed it out of the yard.  Defendant and Holt then 
went into the Holt residence.  Baxter saw what she thought might be blood 
smeared on Holt’s face; she remembered that Holt appeared to be nervous.  
Defendant and Holt went into a bedroom.  They emerged a few minutes later and 
then defendant and Baxter left. 
                                            
5  Richard Flanagan, a friend of Urban’s, testified that Urban had come to his 
house around midnight on March 23 and tried to sell him the same rings. 
 
4 
to leave it alone.  On the way to their residence, they stopped for food and cleaned 
the truck, including the floorboards and the bed of the truck.  When Baxter and 
defendant arrived at their home, they took drugs and defendant listened to a police 
scanner.  Baxter overheard a police report about a man who needed assistance and 
was bleeding from his head.  Defendant appeared to be upset and Baxter asked 
him what was wrong.  He said a man had been shot and was bleeding from the 
head; the report, however, had not said anything about a shooting.6
On the morning of March 24, 1987, while delivering newspapers, Eusebio 
Duran saw a man’s body off to the side of Dickinson street between the road and a 
vineyard.  The area surrounding the spot was agricultural and covered with 
vineyards.  Duran delivered a few more papers and then made a U-turn and drove 
slowly past the body.  The man was face up, with his arms to his side, and there 
was a large pool of blood around his head.  Duran drove to a grocery store and 
 
Meanwhile Urban’s “common law” wife, Mardeau Hipp had become 
concerned about Urban’s whereabouts.  Urban had left their house sometime after 
8:30 p.m. in a van that Hipp’s father had loaned her.  She had last spoken to him 
sometime after midnight and asked him when he was going to be home.  He told 
her 15 to 20 minutes.  When he failed to come home, she started calling various 
people, including Holt, to see if Urban was with them.  Hipp called Holt again the 
next morning, still trying to locate Urban, and spoke to Holt. 
 
2.  Events on the Days Following March 23 
 
 a.  The Discovery of Urban’s Body 
                                            
6  In Baxter’s preliminary hearing testimony — which was read into the record 
during her trial testimony —  she testified that defendant told her “the kid was shot 
three times,” and that, after the scanner broadcast, defendant told her that “Rich” 
was on his knees when he was shot and had asked Holt, “ ‘How come this is 
happening?’ ” 
 
5 
called the police.  He remained in the area until the police arrived, within three 
minutes of his call, and made a statement to them. 
Pete Chavez, a detective with the Fresno County Sheriff’s Department, 
arrived at the scene about 5:45 a.m.  The weather was cold and wet as there had 
been rain a few days earlier.  Chavez observed that the man’s body was on its right 
side and there was blood beneath his head and upper body area.  The man was clad 
in white pants, a tan jacket, and black tennis shoes.  There were three sets of shoe 
prints around the body; these were photographed.  When Chavez approached the 
body he saw injuries to the head.  In the man’s right hand were car keys.  The keys 
were later identified by Mardeau Hipp as belonging to the van she had borrowed 
from her father.  The man was Richard Urban.  
According to Jerry Nelson, the pathologist, the cause of death was gunshot 
wounds to Urban’s brain, cerebrum and brain stem.  Two bullets were recovered 
from the crime scene and sent to the prosecution’s ballistics expert, Allen 
Boudreau.  A third bullet was removed from Urban’s skull and also examined by 
Boudreau.  Pathologist Nelson concluded that two of the three gunshot wounds 
would likely have been fatal.  He also concluded that two of the shots were fired 
from a distance of six to 12 inches from Urban’s head.  He could not determine the 
distance from which the third shot was fired, except to say that the gun had not 
been pressed against Urban’s head.  The pathologist believed that one of the shots 
was fired while Urban was lying on the ground, while another shot had been fired 
from above his head and in a downward direction.  He could not determine either 
how many individuals had fired the shots or how many guns had been used.  
Based on his examination of the three bullets, Boudreau concluded that all were 
likely the same caliber, but he could not tell whether they had been fired from the 
same weapon. 
 
6 
 
b.  Urban’s Van; Defendant’s Conversation with Holt; Holt’s Arrest 
About 7:40 a.m. on March 24, Kathleen Miller-Winn saw a van drive up 
and come to a stop in front of her house.  She saw a man in his mid-20’s to early 
30’s walking away from the van.  The van was still parked in front of her house 
when she returned home from work that evening and it remained there for about 
two days, until a neighbor called the police.  The van was the vehicle that Urban 
had been driving on March 23. 
The morning of March 24 Baxter and defendant went to Holt’s residence.  
Holt began bragging to a man named Dane, who was also present, “about taking 
out somebody.”  Specifically, he said he had shot Urban.  Defendant said, “you 
shouldn’t talk about anything to anybody.”  Holt told defendant that maybe they 
should not be associated with each other to which defendant replied, “Okay.  
Whatever.”  Later, as they drove home, Baxter asked defendant what was going on 
and what Holt had been talking about.  Defendant told her not to ask any more 
questions about it.  A day or two later defendant presented Baxter with the rings 
that Urban had offered to Holt the night he was killed.  Defendant told her, “We’ll 
fix them and use them for our wedding rings.”7
                                            
7  Baxter, in turn, gave the rings to a man named Mark Bryant. 
 
On March 26, Holt and Nevi Jo were arrested on drug charges and their 
residence was searched.  Holt was charged with murder.  Nevi Jo called Baxter 
and told her about Holt’s arrest.  Defendant was not present at the time, so Baxter 
told him about the arrest later.  The next day he told Baxter he and Holt had taken 
Urban for a ride and were going to drop him off in the country to scare him. 
 
7 
 
3.  The Police Investigation 
 
a.  Footprint impressions 
The footprint impressions photographed at the crime scene were analyzed 
by Frederick Hansen, an identification technician for the Fresno County Sheriff’s 
Department.  Hansen testified that he found two categories of impressions, which 
he associated with a boot and a tennis or athletic shoe.  He said that there was at 
least one pair of boots, or maybe more, at the crime scene.  Holt wore cowboy 
boots.  Urban was wearing tennis shoes when he was killed, but Hansen could not 
positively identify the tennis shoes prints at the scene of the crime as having been 
made by Urban’s shoes. 
 
b.  Interviews with Baxter 
Baxter’s name surfaced in the investigation on November 28, 1987.  On 
December 1, 1987 she was interviewed by Detectives Pete Chavez and Frank 
Martinez of the Fresno County Sheriff’s Department while she was in jail on petty 
theft and drug charges.  She was interviewed a second time by Chavez, Martinez 
and Carla Riba, an investigator for the Fresno County District Attorney’s Office.  
No promises were made to her at either interview.  During the first interview, with 
Chavez and Martinez, Baxter told them about the rings that Urban had offered 
Holt as payment for the money he owed Holt for drugs.  As a result, the detectives 
recovered the rings from Mark Bryant. 
During the second interview, Baxter told Riba, among other things, that 
defendant described Urban’s killing to her.  She told Riba that defendant told her 
he and Holt forced Urban to get on his knees, that he pleaded for help, and that 
both Holt and defendant shot him.  Baxter told Riba that defendant and Holt took 
“[Urban] out and they shot him three times in the head.”  Baxter said specifically 
that defendant shot the victim.  Baxter also said that both defendant and Holt told 
her they had pushed a vehicle — presumably the victim’s van — out of the yard. 
 
8 
 
4.  Defendant’s Statements to David DeSoto 
In April 1987, David DeSoto, a four-time felon, was an inmate in the Los 
Angeles County jail on charges of burglary and assault with intent to commit rape; 
defendant was a fellow inmate.8
Subsequently, at trial, DeSoto testified that he had had a number of 
conversations with defendant in April 1987.  According to DeSoto, defendant told 
him “he committed a murder” and “the guy that was with him got arrested behind 
him.”  Defendant told him the murder involved a person who owed money for 
drugs.  The victim was a “youngster.”  DeSoto testified that defendant told him 
that “[t]he person he was with shot [the victim] twice.  The guy didn’t go down, or 
didn’t die . . . so [defendant] said he had to do it to make sure he was dead.”  He 
said the victim was shot in the head and the chest.  According to DeSoto, 
  DeSoto was interviewed by investigator Riba and 
Detective Martinez at the jail on May 5, 1988.  Riba and Martinez had gone to the 
jail looking for a man named “Mark Conway,” which was one of DeSoto’s several 
aliases.  They had come in response to DeSoto’s calls to the Fresno County 
District Attorney’s Office.  DeSoto hoped that by providing information about 
defendant, he could get his bail reinstated, but it was not.  He admitted that he had 
falsely attempted to make it appear to the investigators as if he had known 
defendant prior to April 1987.  Neither Riba nor Martinez disclosed to DeSoto any 
reports of their investigation into Urban’s murder or any details of the 
investigation.  DeSoto told the investigators that the victim had been shot in the 
head and chest. 
                                            
8  Initially, the trial court issued an order prohibiting DeSoto and other witnesses 
from making reference to certain facts, including the fact that defendant had been 
in custody in Los Angeles, but the defense subsequently asked that this portion of 
the order be lifted as to DeSoto so that the defense could question him about the 
physical environment in which he overheard defendant’s telephone calls. 
 
9 
defendant told him that after the killing, the victim’s body was wrapped up and 
left in a ditch near some fields.  He also told DeSoto that the victim had been in 
possession of some jewelry, which he and Holt removed.  He said defendant told 
him the victim was wearing “a blue western shirt.”9
DeSoto testified that the other person involved was named “Smitty,” and 
that defendant was concerned that Smitty “was gonna . . . tell on him or snitch on 
him behind it.”  DeSoto testified that defendant asked him to make a phone call to 
Smitty’s girlfriend, Jo.
 
10
The defense also presented evidence that Holt alone had done the actual 
shooting of the victim.  According to a witness named Vivian Moore, Holt had 
  DeSoto made the call, and told her he had a message 
from defendant for Holt “to hold his mug and not to say nothin’ and . . . that he felt 
bad about” Holt having been arrested. 
B.  Defense Guilt Phase Evidence 
The defense presented evidence that a man named Steven Farmer, rather 
than defendant, had killed Urban.  Penny Baxter testified that Farmer was present 
at the Holt residence the night Urban was killed and was wearing boots.  A witness 
named David Grajiola testified that, while he and Holt were in custody together, 
Holt told him that he and Farmer had “booked someone’s ass.”  Cliff Garoupa, a 
defense investigator for Duane Holt, testified that when he had visited Farmer in 
custody, after telling him that Grajiola had accused him of being involved in the 
Urban murder, Farmer told him to convey a message to a family member to “get 
rid” of a pair of boots. 
                                            
9  Urban was not wearing this kind of shirt when he was killed. 
10  Nevi Jo testified that, after Holt was arrested, she received a call from DeSoto. 
 
10 
threatened a couple who owed him money for drugs that he had shot someone 
“and that he was not afraid to do it again.” 
C.  Prosecution Penalty Phase Evidence 
The prosecution presented evidence that in December 1975, defendant 
stabbed a man named Craig Segal, who survived.  In April 1977, while an inmate 
at the prison at Vacaville, defendant stabbed and killed a fellow inmate named 
Michael Conroy.  Additionally, the prosecution presented evidence that, while 
incarcerated at the Fresno County Jail in this case, defendant and another inmate 
had attacked two other inmates as they were being escorted by correctional 
officers; the victims were in handcuffs and leg shackles.  Defendant attempted to 
gouge out one of the victim’s eyes.  Finally, the prosecution presented evidence 
that in April 1987, after a routine traffic stop in Beverly Hills, defendant managed 
to gain control of the police car in which he had been placed in handcuffs and tried 
to run down the police officer who had made the stop. 
D.  Defense Penalty Phase Evidence 
The defense presented a social history of defendant through the testimony 
of Dr. Linda Poore.  She testified that his early life was difficult because his 
parents were teenagers when he was born and too immature and inexperienced to 
be parents.  Additionally, defendant was physically abused by his father and both 
parents favored his brother, Stephen.  She testified further that defendant attended 
academically poor schools.  All of this, she concluded, made him vulnerable to 
bad influences, which led him into the juvenile justice system. 
Defendant also presented witnesses who testified to his good character, 
including his former wife, Linda Curl.  She testified that she had been a drug 
addict and a drug dealer before she married defendant.  After they married, she 
was able to remain drug-free and she, defendant, and her two children had a good 
family life together.  Her two children, Chaela Ingles and Richard Upshaw, also 
 
11 
testified on defendant’s behalf; both of them considered defendant to be their 
father and spoke of his care and concern for them. 
Linda Curl testified that defendant had had a positive work history until he 
suffered a severe injury to his left hand while working for a custom cabinetmaker.  
Defendant lost part of his fingers and though they were sewn back on, his manual 
dexterity remained impaired.  As a result of his injury, defendant went on 
disability and became depressed.  Eventually, he got work out of town and, away 
from his family, began using amphetamines because they deadened the pain and 
allowed him to continue working. 
After defendant and Linda Curl divorced, she remained concerned about his 
well-being and asked her friend, Jeanette, to visit him.  Eventually, Jeanette and 
defendant married while he was in custody and she also testified on his behalf.  
She testified about her love for defendant and read the wedding vows he had 
composed for their wedding. 
Numerous other witnesses, friends and family of defendant and Linda Curl, 
testified about his and Linda’s happy family life and defendant’s good character.  
A Catholic priest, Father Gary Luiz, testified to defendant’s spiritual growth while 
in custody in this case and about his poetry.  A literary editor also testified about 
defendant’s poetry and opined that some of it was of high literary quality.  Finally, 
defendant’s former parole agent testified that defendant had successfully 
completed his one year of parole. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
A. Challenge to the Constitutional Validity of Defendant’s Prior Murder 
Conviction 
Defendant contends that the prior-murder special-circumstance finding 
should be reversed because the constitutional validity of the underlying plea, 
which was the basis of the special circumstance allegation, was not proved beyond 
 
12 
a reasonable doubt.  In this connection, he contends that our earlier opinion in this 
case, Curl v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1292, in which we held that a 
defendant does not have a right to a jury trial on the constitutional validity of a 
prior conviction and  bears the burden of proving such invalidity by a 
preponderance of the evidence, was superseded by Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 
530 U.S. 466.  In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a 
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (Id. at p. 490.)  Two years later, in Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 
U.S. 584, the Supreme Court held that Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme ran 
afoul of the Sixth Amendment because it allowed the sentencing judge, sitting 
without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the 
death penalty.  (Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 609.)  The court, citing language from 
Apprendi, stated “The dispositive question, we said, ‘is one not of form, but of 
effect.’  [Citation.]  If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized 
punishment contingent on a finding of fact, that fact — no matter how the State 
labels it — must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Ring, supra, 
536 U.S. at p. 602.)  Concluding that “Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors 
operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,’ [citation], 
the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.”  (Id. at p. 609.) 
As we shall explain, however, the question of the constitutional validity of 
a prior conviction does not fall within the framework set forth in Apprendi and 
Ring for those issues of fact as to which the Sixth Amendment requires a jury trial 
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim. 
In 1977, defendant pled guilty to second degree murder and that conviction 
became the basis of the sole special-circumstance allegation in the instant case.  
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2) [“The defendant was convicted previously of murder in the 
 
13 
first or second degree’].)  “By pretrial motion defendant sought to strike the prior-
murder special-circumstance allegation on grounds that he was under the influence 
of drugs at the time he pled guilty to the murder of an inmate at the California 
Medical Facility in Vacaville, and that he was not properly advised of his Boykin-
Tahl rights (Boykin v. Alabama (1966) 395 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 
1709]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449]) at the 
time he entered his guilty plea.”  (Curl v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at 
p. 1296.)  Following a lengthy evidentiary hearing occasioned by the absence of a 
reporter’s transcript of the 1977 plea, the trial court denied the motion.  (Id. at pp. 
1296-1299.) 
Defendant filed a petition for writ of mandate that ultimately resulted in an 
opinion from this court, the aforecited Curl v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d 
1292.  In Curl, we concluded (1) defendant’s statutory right to a jury trial on the 
truth of the prior-murder special-circumstance allegation (§ 190.4, subd. (a)) did 
not encompass a jury trial on the constitutional validity of the underlying plea, and 
(2) defendant had the burden of proof in establishing the constitutional invalidity 
of the plea by a preponderance of the evidence.  (Id. at pp. 1300-1302, 1306-
1307.)  Following our decision, defendant renewed his attack on the validity of his 
plea, claiming that the first hearing had been conducted without the benefit of our 
decision.  Another evidentiary hearing was held, at the conclusion of which the 
motion was again denied. 
Defendant now asserts that, contrary to our conclusions in Curl, Apprendi, 
and Ring require that the constitutional validity of his 1977 plea be relitigated 
before a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Not so.  As noted, the right 
to a jury trial discussed in Apprendi and Ring applies only to an issue of fact “that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum” 
(Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490), whatever its designation.  
 
14 
Patently, the question of the constitutional validity of a prior conviction does not 
present such an issue of fact.  As the Attorney General points out: “Finding that 
Curl was eligible for the death penalty was not contingent upon the finding that his 
prior murder conviction was constitutionally valid pursuant to Boykin-Tahl.  
Neither section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2) nor section 190.4 suggest such a 
requirement nor do these sections state that the constitutional validity of a prior 
murder conviction must be proved as an element of the offense prior to imposing 
the death penalty.”  A finding that the prior conviction is constitutionally valid 
does not in and of itself “expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that 
authorized by the jury’s verdict [.]”  (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 494, fn. 
omitted.)  The prosecution must still prove the special circumstance beyond a 
reasonable doubt to the trier of fact.  (§ 190.4.) 
Moreover, the constitutional validity of a prior conviction is an inquiry that 
our prior decisions, even those predating Curl, allocated to the trial court and not 
the jury.  (People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, 217 [first step of procedure to 
strike prior conviction is for the trial court to “hold a [pretrial] hearing outside the 
presence of the jury in order to determine the constitutional validity of the charged 
prior or priors”].)  This is because the determination of the constitutional validity 
of a prior conviction is of a very different nature from the determination of 
whether the defendant suffered the prior conviction.  “A prior conviction carries a 
‘ “ strong presumption of constitutional regularity,” ’ and the defendant must 
establish a violation of his or her rights that ‘ “so departed from constitutional 
requirements” ’ as to justify striking the prior conviction.”  (People v. Horton 
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1136, italics omitted.)  Given the presumptive 
constitutional validity of the prior conviction, a motion to strike “presents legal 
questions of a far different nature than the factual determination of the existence of 
the prior conviction” (Curl v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1303.) 
 
15 
Accordingly, we conclude that neither Apprendi nor Ring superseded or 
implicitly overruled our decision in Curl.  Therefore, contrary to defendant’s 
argument, Apprendi did not represent an “intervening change in the law” that 
would bar applying the doctrine of the law of the case.  (People v. Stanley (1995) 
10 Cal.4th 764, 787.)  Thus, our conclusions in Curl, that where a defendant 
challenges the constitutional validity of a plea the defendant must prove such 
invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence, remains the law of case.  Here, the 
trial court conducted a second hearing following our decision in Curl and denied 
the motion to strike.  Because defendant does not challenge that proceeding, we 
assume the trial court correctly applied Curl and affirm its ruling. 
B.  Guilt Phase Claims 
 
 
1. Claims Related to the Testimony of David DeSoto 
The bulk of defendant’s guilt phase claims relate to the testimony of David 
DeSoto and fall into two broad categories.11
                                            
11  Here, as elsewhere, defendant asserts constitutional violations he did not 
advance in the trial court.  “We . . . entertain constitutional claims not raised below 
only to the extent ‘the new arguments do not invoke facts or legal standards 
different from those the trial court itself was asked to apply, but merely assert that 
the trial court’s act or omission, insofar as wrong for the reasons actually 
presented to that court, had the additional legal consequence of violating the 
Constitution. . . .  [¶]  In [this] instance, of course, rejection, on the merits, of a 
claim that the trial court erred on the issue actually before that court necessarily 
leads to rejection of the newly applied constitutional “gloss” as well.  No separate 
constitutional discussion is required in such cases, and we therefore provide none.’  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 984, fn. 11.) 
  The first — alleging prosecutorial 
and trial court misconduct — are based upon the alleged failure of the prosecutor 
to have turned over to the defense notes he made that memorialized conversations 
the prosecutor had with, and about, DeSoto prior to DeSoto’s testimony at 
 
16 
defendant’s trial.  The second claim alleges that the trial court erred by excluding 
impeachment evidence the defense wanted to use against DeSoto. 
 
2. Claims of Prosecutorial and Trial Court Misconduct  
Defendant asserts that DeSoto lied when he testified that “he had neither 
been promised, received nor expected any benefit in return for testifying and that 
any pre-trial communication he had with Mr. Hoff [the prosecutor] had solely 
concerned protection of his safety,” because the prosecutor’s “undisclosed” notes 
of telephone calls with and concerning DeSoto “would have revealed that DeSoto 
had in fact been impliedly assured by Hoff, and expected, that the testimony he 
gave would likely result in benefit to him with respect to charges pending against 
him.”  Thus, according to defendant, Hoff suborned DeSoto’s perjured testimony 
to the extent DeSoto denied expecting or receiving any benefits for his testimony 
and the trial court committed misconduct when, after reviewing Hoff’s telephone 
notes in camera, declined to provide them to the defense. 
The existence of the prosecutor’s telephone notes was revealed during a 
discussion of whether the prosecution had complied with discovery.  Defense 
counsel requested that the prosecutor be ordered to search his records for evidence 
of benefits promised to Penny Baxter or DeSoto.  Specifically, defense counsel 
alleged that “there’s been an exchange of letters between the prosecution and Mr. 
DeSoto or — and/or the prison authorities to afford him certain reasonable 
benefits and accommodations.  We would like to have copies of any of those 
letters to and from.” The prosecutor responded that he had no knowledge of any 
letters with the Department of Corrections but that he had received phone calls 
from the department about DeSoto’s status as a witness for purposes of 
classification and placement.  Defense counsel then requested any record of 
telephone conversations.  The prosecution said he generally made notes of his 
telephone conversations and would search his files.  
 
17 
The following day, the prosecutor said he had spoken to someone in the 
Department of Corrections about whether DeSoto would be testifying and whether 
he would be in any danger if he did so.  When defense counsel asked for a copy of 
the note memorializing that conversation, the prosecutor objected.  The trial court 
sustained the objection on the grounds that “I don’t think this document comes 
within the discovery order or the Penal Code statute, so I’m not going to order to 
you to produce it.”  The prosecutor indicated he was still going through his records 
and the court asked him to complete his search by the following day. 
The next day the prosecutor brought in a file of 57 items consisting of notes 
of his telephone conversations as well as letters he had written to prison or law 
enforcement personnel concerning DeSoto.  He objected to turning over notes of 
his telephone conversations without a preliminary inspection by the trial court to 
determine whether they were discoverable.  The file was designated exhibit C.  
The trial court reviewed the file as well as the transcript of the original discovery 
hearing before another judge and concluded that “I do not see where these notes 
would fall within any of the discovery orders that are provided in there or provided 
for in the Penal Code.”  In response to defense counsel request that any 
exculpatory material in the notes be turned over pursuant to Brady v. Maryland 
(1963) 373 U.S. 83, the trial court responded, “I have reviewed them with that in 
mind, and I found nothing in this file that would so qualify.” 
At trial, DeSoto conceded that his purpose in contacting the prosecution 
was to secure its help in the case for which he was in custody in Los Angeles 
County.  He testified, however, that no promises of help were made to him by 
either the district attorney’s investigators or by the prosecution and that the 
investigators told him they had no jurisdiction over proceedings in a different 
county.  With respect to his calls with Prosecutor Hoff, DeSoto testified that the 
 
18 
purpose of those calls was not to secure a benefit in his Los Angeles case but, 
rather, “It [sic] would have been my safety.” 
“A prosecutor’s misconduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
federal Constitution when it ‘infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the 
conviction a denial of due process.’  [Citations.]  In other words, the misconduct 
must be ‘of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to 
a fair trial.’  [Citation.]  A prosecutor’s misconduct ‘that does not render a criminal 
trial fundamentally unfair’ violates California law ‘only if it involves “ ‘the use of 
deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the 
jury.’ ” ’  [Citations.]”  (People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 242.)  
“ ‘ “Under well-established principles of due process, the prosecution cannot 
present evidence it knows is false and must correct any falsity of which it is aware 
in the evidence it presents . . . .” [Citation.]’ ”  (People v. Richardson, supra, 43 
Cal.3d at p. 1014.) 
As the Attorney General points out, there is no perjury unless the 
challenged testimony was actually false.  (§ 118, subd. (a).)  Defendant fails to 
persuasively point to testimony by DeSoto that fits this description.  Instead, his 
argument relies on a general claim that the “picture presented to the jury” about 
whether DeSoto received any benefits was false.  According to defendant, the jury 
was led to believe that “although DeSoto had initially been induced to inform law 
enforcement of incriminating facts about [defendant] because of his wish to obtain 
bail and other benefits with respect to disposition of his pending charges in Long 
Beach, (1) he had been quickly disabused of any such hope, (2) the only benefit he 
received was protection from retaliation for his cooperation with law enforcement, 
(3) his testimony at [defendant’s] trial was not influenced by any expectation of 
reward, other than a vague hope, and (4) the phone conversations that DeSoto had 
with prosecutor Hoff concerned nothing beside[s] his continued security in jail.  
 
19 
[¶]  That picture was false because neither Mr. Hoff nor the trial judge disclosed to 
the defense or the jury that DeSoto had lied about the nature of his phone calls 
with Hoff and whether, notwithstanding [the district attorney’s investigators] 
telling him that he would get no benefit with respect by cooperating, DeSoto had 
consistently demonstrated his expectation of reward if his testimony was useful to 
the prosecution and been assured that his cooperation would be made known to 
authorities in Long Beach, where his case was pending. This deception was 
especially egregious since prosecutor Hoff, having been a party to those phone 
calls, knew that it was false and deliberately suborned the perjurious testimony.”   
Defendant attempts to support this claim with an extensive analysis of the 
prosecutor’s notes of his telephone calls to and about DeSoto.  We have reviewed 
the prosecutor’s notes and letters and find defendant’s analysis utterly 
unconvincing.  There are four letters from Prosecutor Hoff in exhibit C.  The first 
two letters, both dated December 5, 1989, are addressed respectively to a 
correctional counselor at the state prison at Chino and to DeSoto himself.  They 
were apparently written in response to a letter to Hoff from DeSoto in November 
1989 in which DeSoto expressed concern for his safety should he testify and asked 
Hoff “to confirm his status” as a witness with prison officials.  Hoff’s letter to the 
correctional counsel confirmed that DeSoto would be called as a witness in 
defendant’s trial and, in view of possible threats to his safety from defendant, 
stated his belief that “DeSoto’s welfare and safety may be in danger.  Therefore, I 
request that you consider this information in the classification and placement of 
Mr. DeSoto in your institution.”  His letter to DeSoto simply confirmed that he 
had talked to officials at Chino regarding DeSoto’s classification and placement. 
Another letter, dated April 2, 1990 to a correctional counselor at Corcoran 
State Prison similarly informed the counselor that DeSoto had cooperated with law 
enforcement in defendant’s case, expressed concern for his safety, and supported 
 
20 
DeSoto’s request to be transferred to another facility.  The letter was written in 
response to a letter from DeSoto reporting a confrontation with other inmates over 
his role in defendant’s prosecution. 
The fourth letter, undated, is addressed to the deputy district attorney in 
charge of DeSoto’s case in Los Angeles County at Long Beach.  In it, Hoff stated 
that DeSoto provided information in the Curl case that had been corroborated and 
had agreed to testify.  Hoff went on:  “He has never requested nor has he received 
any promises in exchange for his information other than a promise from me that I 
would notify, in writing, the Los Angeles District Attorney’s office, his attorney 
and/or the Court that he has cooperated with Fresno authorities in the Curl case.  
[¶]  I believe Mr. [DeSoto’s] past and anticipated future cooperation should be 
considered by your office in assessing his own criminal prosecution, and I ask you 
to give whatever weight you deem is appropriate to this matter.” 
Hoff’s notes confirm the information in the letters: many of his 
conversations with DeSoto revolved around DeSoto’s concern for his safety 
because of his cooperation in defendant’s prosecution and, notwithstanding 
DeSoto’s attempts to secure some benefit from that cooperation, the only 
guarantee Hoff made was that he would inform the Los Angeles District 
Attorney’s Office of DeSoto’s cooperation.  For example, in a note dated May 26, 
1988, Hoff stated: “I am making no deals w/ [DeSoto] except to convey to 
L.A.D.A. that [DeSoto] appears to be giving truthful info and said he would 
cooperate and testify.  [¶]  I asked DeLong [the Los Angeles prosecutor] to handle 
his case on its merits w/o consideration of my use of [DeSoto] as a witness . . . .”  
In a note dated June 1, 1988, Hoff records a conversation with DeSoto in which 
DeSoto asked for help with getting a continuance and bail reduction and Hoff told 
him, “I could not control that matter.”  Hoff notes he called the Los Angeles 
 
21 
prosecutor, did not reach him, but was later informed that DeSoto’s case had been 
continued and bail remained the same. 
In a note dated November 11, 1988, Hoff recorded that he had spoken to 
the Los Angeles prosecutor about his intention to use DeSoto as a witness “and 
that there is no deal/consideration being extended to [DeSoto] in exchange for his 
testimony” and “DeLong can deal w/[DeSoto’s] case on its merits.”  To the same 
effect were notations on November 18, 1988, November 28, 1988, February 17, 
1989, May 22, 1989, June 6, 1989 and  June 21, 1989.  Each note confirms that 
Hoff made no promise or inducement to DeSoto for his testimony except that he 
would inform the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office of DeSoto’s cooperation. 
This record does not support defendant’s claim that DeSoto perjured 
himself when he testified that he had not received any benefits in exchange for his 
testimony, much less that Hoff suborned perjury.  Defendant maintains that the 
fact that DeSoto received a reduced sentence on the Los Angeles charges, and that 
the sexual assault charge was dismissed, is evidence that he lied about not having 
received any benefit for his testimony at defendant’s trial.  But there is nothing in 
the record before us that supports his claim that Prosecutor Hoff engineered the 
reduction in the sentence and the dismissal of the charge.  The record is to the 
contrary — Hoff’s notes consistently demonstrate that he did not offer DeSoto any 
inducements or benefits for his testimony.12
                                            
12  Defendant insinuates that Hoff’s references to the absence of any deal with 
DeSoto for his testimony is actually evidence that there was a deal and Hoff was 
creating “a paper record just in case his notes were ever discovered by the 
defense.”  At this point, defendant’s legal analysis devolves into a conspiracy 
theory. 
  Nor do we agree with defendant that 
DeSoto perjured himself when, in response to being asked about his telephone 
 
22 
conversations with Hoff, he said they involved his “safety.”13
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
his request to call Raymond Stevens, a private investigator, as an “expert to 
explain how an inmate informant can obtain information used to concoct a 
confession that was never made.”  Defendant contends that this testimony would 
have been relevant to show how David DeSoto “could assemble information about 
  Defendant claims 
this was misleading because DeSoto left out the fact that he had sought assistance 
with bail reduction and a continuance from Hoff, leaving the impression that his 
safety was the only topic of discussion.  We do not read the record in so narrow a 
fashion; moreover, the jury learned from cross-examination that DeSoto had 
sought other benefits in exchange for his testimony. 
Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct. 
Defendant also asserts the trial court committed misconduct, apparently 
because the trial court declined to furnish Hoff’s notes to the defense at trial after 
determining the notes were not discoverable pursuant to either the discovery order 
in this case or section 1054.1.  On this record, we find no abuse of discretion.  (See 
People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 299 [“We generally review a trial court’s 
ruling on matters regarding discovery under an abuse of discretion standard”].)  A 
fortiori, we find no misconduct. 
 
3. Claims of Evidentiary Error 
 
a.  Expert Witness 
                                            
13  Defense counsel objected to DeSoto’s answer as nonresponsive.  The objection 
was sustained and the answer stricken.  We assume the jury understood and 
followed the court’s directive to disregard the testimony.  (People v. Mickey 
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 7.)  Therefore, even if we were to assume that 
DeSoto’s answer was misleading, it played no part in the jury’s assessment of his 
credibility. 
 
23 
the accusations against [defendant] in order to create a fictitious confession . . . .” 
Defendant specifically disavows any claim that he sought to have Stevens’s 
testimony introduced to have Stevens render an opinion about DeSoto’s credibility 
under Evidence Code section 801.  Rather, he argues the evidence was admissible 
under Evidence Code section 720, which defines the qualifications of an expert 
witness.  Defendant contends that the latter statute would have permitted Stevens 
to testify to “the procedure [in the Los Angeles County jail] whereby inmates can 
gain information about cases which the inmate believes the prosecutors would be 
willing to offer to the inmate . . . and that the procedures are such that the inmate 
can find out the foundational information without in fact having a conversation 
with a particular individual” and from which the informant can cobble together a 
fictitious confession.  After an extended colloquy, the trial court denied the request 
“on grounds of relevancy, speculation, Evidence Code section 801.  It invades the 
province of the jury under Evidence Code section 780.  It calls for inadmissible 
lay opinion testimony.”14
At trial, defendant sought to admit the testimony of Raymond Stevens.  
Stevens was a 24½-year veteran of the Ventura County Sheriff’s Department 
before becoming a private investigator who worked on contract with the State 
Public Defender’s Office.  After the trial court sustained prosecution objections to 
questions about whether Stevens had dealt with inmate informants, a hearing was 
  We find no abuse of discretion. 
                                            
14  The Attorney General contends that defendant forfeited the argument he makes 
on appeal because he did not specifically refer to Evidence Code section 720.  Not 
so.  Defendant advanced the substantive claim he repeats here — that admission of 
Stevens’s testimony was not for his opinion of DeSoto’s credibility but to lay out 
the “procedure” by which inmate informants gather evidence to concoct false 
confessions.  It is immaterial for purposes of preserving the objection that he did 
not specify the precise code section where he made clear the substance, purpose 
and relevance of the excluded evidence.  (Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a).) 
 
24 
held outside the presence of the jury in which the defense made an offer of proof 
as to Stevens’ testimony.  Characterizing DeSoto as an “inmate informant,” 
defense counsel stated that Stevens had “qualified as an expert to render testimony 
about inmate informants, the process, the methods of selecting, evaluating and 
determining the truthfulness of their representations” and would render “his 
opinion regarding the validity of Mr. DeSoto in his role of an inmate informant.”  
In this connection, defense counsel argued that sections of the Penal Code that 
singled out inmate informants recognized them “as a special breed of persons and 
witness [sic].”  Initially, the defense cited Evidence Code section 801 — 
permitting expert opinion testimony — as the basis of its request.  
The prosecution objected on the grounds that there was insufficient 
foundation for the characterization of DeSoto as a long term inmate informant, 
that there was insufficient foundation that the subject of inmate informants was a 
matter for expert testimony, that the proposed testimony was neither material nor 
relevant, and that the proposed testimony would invade the jury’s province as the 
sole evaluator of witness credibility.  The trial court agreed that there was no 
support for permitting expert testimony on the subject of a witness’s credibility.  
At that point, the defense backed away from its offer of proof, claiming it was not 
offering Stevens as an expert on whether DeSoto was being truthful, “but about 
the processes that were operative in L.A. County [jail] which would have been 
operative in the utilization of Mr. DeSoto as an inmate informant in this case . . . .” 
Pressed by the court for specifics, the defense said that Stevens would 
testify “that there’s a regular flow of information in and about the area, how they 
gather it without talking with the person.  The only prerequisite that a person who 
wants to be an inmate informant really has is to be able to show at some point . . . 
being in the physical presence of another person.”  According to the defense, the 
inmate informant “gets that information by the flow of prisoners in and out of his 
 
25 
environment, the use of the media, discussions with other people, phone calls to 
law enforcement officers,” and that law enforcement should use “safeguards” to 
avoid false testimony by inmate informants.  Asked by the court whether 
Stevens’s testimony was, in effect, “ a criticism of the law enforcement conduct in 
interviewing and accepting Mr. DeSoto’s statements” without applying such 
safeguards, defense counsel said, “That’s part of it.” 
The trial court replied that whether police applied such standards or 
procedures was irrelevant when the only issue was DeSoto’s credibility, which 
was a matter for the jury to decide.  The court referred to section 1127a, which sets 
forth the special instruction to be given for the jury to assess the testimony of an 
in-custody informant.15
                                            
15  “ ‘The testimony of an in-custody informant should be viewed with caution and 
close scrutiny.  In evaluating such testimony, you should consider the extent to 
which it may have been influenced by the receipt of, or expectation of, any 
benefits from the party calling that witness.  This does not mean that you may 
arbitrarily disregard such testimony, but you should give it the weight to which 
you find it to be entitled in the light of all the evidence in the case.’ ”  (§ 1127a, 
subd. (b).)  This instruction was given. 
  The court rejected the notion that, because the Legislature 
had adopted this statute, “there is a newly recognized field of expertise concerning 
inmate-informants . . . . [¶]  The relevant part of Mr. DeSoto’s testimony is what 
he had to say, whether there is any evidence of motive, bias, et cetera, which 
would have to be based on facts.  And it is simply a matter of assessing the 
veracity of a witness.  Whether some inmate-informants lie and some don’t is a 
truism . . . . [¶]  I think it comes back to the defense wanting this witness to give 
speculative information as to why this jury should conclude that this witness is not 
telling the truth.  You haven’t given me any specific offer of proof as to evidence 
that would rebut Mr. DeSoto’s testimony that the sole source of [his] information 
 
26 
was [defendant], other than saying there is a methodology and it is something that 
occurs in detention facilities where inmate-informants have access to other 
information, and sometimes or frequently use that information as a basis for 
snitching and then claim that another inmate gave him that information and 
confessed, when it wasn’t the case.  That strikes me as pure speculation, 
something that I can’t let this jury do.” 
In assessing defendant’s claim that the trial court erroneously excluded 
Stevens’s testimony, we apply the deferential abuse of discretion standard.  
(People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 805 [“ ‘[A]n appellate court applies 
the abuse of discretion standard of review to any ruling by a trial court on the 
admissibility of evidence . . . .’ ”].)  We find no abuse here.  We agree with the 
trial court that, to the extent the purpose or effect of Stevens’s testimony was to 
render an opinion about DeSoto’s credibility, the testimony was inadmissible.  
(People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 82 [“The general rule is that 
an expert may not give an opinion whether a witness is telling the truth, for the 
determination of credibility is not a subject sufficiently beyond common 
experience that the expert’s testimony would assist the trier or fact; in other words, 
the jury generally is as well equipped as the expert to discern whether the witness 
is being truthful”].)  To the extent the purpose of the testimony was to demonstrate 
how inmate informants confabulate testimony, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding the evidence on grounds of insufficient foundation in the 
absence of evidence either that DeSoto was a repeat inmate informant or of 
evidence contradicting his testimony that defendant was the sole source of his 
information.  Therefore, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court erred when 
 
27 
it excluded Stevens’s testimony.16
During defendant’s cross-examination of DeSoto, defense counsel asked 
DeSoto whether he had asked to be placed in protective custody in prior cases in 
 
 
b. Exclusion of Newspaper Articles 
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion and violated 
various constitutional provisions when it refused to allow into evidence various 
articles from the Fresno Bee about defendant’s case because, had they been read 
by DeSoto, they may have provided him with information from which he could 
have concocted his testimony.  The trial court rejected the articles on the ground 
that, in the absence of any evidence that DeSoto had seen the newspaper articles, 
defendant’s use of them was speculative. 
His claim is without merit.  Because, as the trial court noted, there was no 
evidence that DeSoto had obtained his information about the case from any source 
other than defendant himself, admission of this evidence was not relevant to any 
disputed fact but would simply have invited the jury to speculate that DeSoto, 
from his jail cell in Los Angeles, had somehow come across these newspaper 
articles and used them to confabulate his testimony.  The trial court properly 
excluded the evidence.  (People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 711 
[“Evidence is irrelevant . . . if it leads only to speculative inferences”].) 
 
c. Limitations on Cross-examination of DeSoto 
                                            
16  We deny defendant’s request that we judicially notice a report of the 1989-
1990 Los Angeles County Grand Jury regarding the involvement of jailhouse 
informants in the criminal justice system in Los Angeles County.  In light our 
conclusion that there was no evidence DeSoto was a repeat inmate informant, the 
report is irrelevant.  (Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 
1063 [“Although a court may judicially notice a variety of matters (Evid. Code, 
§ 450 et seq.), only relevant material may be noticed”].)  
 
28 
order to demonstrate that DeSoto had acted as an informant in those prior cases.  
The trial court permitted defense counsel to ask DeSoto whether he had sought 
protective custody in this case, but not as to an earlier period of time, and 
sustained relevancy objections to those questions.  Defendant maintains this was 
error because the question was relevant to whether DeSoto “was testifying in hope 
of receiving benefits from the prosecutor.”  Not so.  Whether DeSoto sought to be 
placed in protective custody in other cases at earlier times was not relevant to 
whether he had received any benefits in connection with his testimony in this case.  
The trial court did not abuse its considerable discretion in sustaining the objection. 
 
d. Admission of Steven Farmer’s Statement 
Defendant’s theory at trial was that Steven Farmer, and not defendant, 
assisted Duane Holt in the murder of Richard Urban.  Farmer refused to testify, 
invoking his privilege against self-incrimination.  Instead, the defense called Cliff 
Garoupa, a defense investigator for Duane Holt.  He testified that when he had 
visited Farmer in custody, after telling him that Grajiola had accused him of being 
involved in the Urban murder, Farmer told him to convey a message to a member 
his family to “get rid” of a pair of boots.  The purpose of this evidence was to 
establish a consciousness of guilt on Farmer’s part.  In rebuttal, the prosecution 
was allowed to call Detective Pete Chavez.  Chavez testified that Farmer had told 
Chavez he spent the night of the murder at his parents’ house.  The trial court 
admitted the testimony over a defense hearsay objection under Evidence Code 
section 1235, as a prior inconsistent statement. 
On appeal, defendant contends, and the Attorney General concedes, that the 
trial court erred in admitting the testimony under this section because that section 
applies only when “the [prior] statement is inconsistent with [the witness’s] 
testimony at the hearing” (Evid. Code, § 1235, italics added), and, in this case, 
Farmer did not testify.  Nonetheless, the Attorney General contends the statement 
 
29 
was admissible under Evidence Code section 1202 and, in any event, any error 
was harmless. 
Evidence Code section 1202 states in part:  “Evidence of a statement or 
other conduct by a declarant that is inconsistent with a statement by such declarant 
received in evidence as hearsay evidence is not inadmissible for the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of the declarant though he is not given and has not had an 
opportunity to explain or to deny such inconsistent statement or other conduct.”  
“Section 1202 creates ‘a uniform rule permitting a hearsay declarant to be 
impeached by inconsistent statements in all cases, whether or not the declarant has 
been given an opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistency.’  (Cal. Law 
Revision Com. com., 29B, pt. 4 West’s Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 1202, p. 
27.)  [¶]  The purpose of section 1202 is to assure fairness to the party against 
whom hearsay evidence is admitted without an opportunity for cross-
examination.”  (People v. Corella (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 461, 470.) 
We find Evidence Code section 1202 to be inapplicable.  Farmer’s 
statement was not hearsay but simply verbal conduct consisting of a directive that 
was neither inherently true nor false.  Furthermore, the statement was offered for 
the nonhearsay purpose of demonstrating consciousness of guilt.  Accordingly, as 
he was not a “hearsay declarant,” section 1202 does not apply.  Thus, there was no 
basis upon which to permit Chavez’s testimony.  It should be noted, however, that 
the testimony was less than compelling rebuttal since, if Farmer had been involved 
in Urban’s murder, it can be assumed he would have lied to a police detective 
questioning him about it.  Moreover, any error was harmless given the powerful 
evidence of defendant’s guilt that included evidence that he and Holt had left 
Holt’s residence with Urban the day of the murder, defendant’s possession of the 
rings Urban had offered to Holt as payment for drugs and defendant’s admissions 
to Baxter and DeSoto that he had shot and killed Urban. 
 
30 
C.  Penalty Phase Claims 
Defendant advances a number of challenges to the death penalty statute 
which, as he acknowledges, we have previously considered and rejected.  We do 
so again. 
“Section 190.2 is not impermissibly broad in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.”  (People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 755; People v. Richardson, 
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1037.)  “Section 190.3, factor (a), which allows the jury to 
consider ‘[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted 
in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to 
be true pursuant to Section 190.1,’ does not violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth or 
Fourteenth Amendment[s] to the United States Constitution by allowing arbitrary 
imposition of the death penalty.”  (People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 755.)  
“[T]he statute is not unconstitutional because it does not contain a requirement that 
the jury be given burden of proof or standard of proof instructions for finding 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in reaching a penalty determination, 
other than other crimes evidence, and specifically that all aggravating factors must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, or that such factors must outweigh factors in 
mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, or that death must be found to be an 
appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (People v. Panah (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 395, 499.)  “Nothing in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 
[166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856], Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 
or Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 536, affects our conclusions in these regards.  
[Citations.]  [¶]  The failure to require intercase proportionality does not violate 
due process or the Eighth Amendment.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Loker, supra, 44 
Cal.4th at pp. 755-756.)  Finally, “[w]e again reject the argument that the death 
penalty is contrary to international norms of humanity and decency, and therefore 
violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”  (Ibid.; People v. Richardson,  
 
31 
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1037; People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 511 
[“International law does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered in accordance 
with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements”].) 
IV.  DISPOSITION 
We affirm the judgment. 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR:  
GEORGE, C. J. 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
NEEDHAM, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
* 
Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, 
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution.
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Curl 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S034072 
Date Filed: May 18, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Fresno 
Judge: Joseph Stephen Kane 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Musawwir Spiegel, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen, Jennifer M. Poe and Jennevee 
H. De Guzman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Musawwir Spiegel 
P.O. Box 1756 
Davis, CA  95617-1756 
(530) 758-8218 
 
Jennevee H. De Guzman 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5474