Title: Wampler v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14S05-1701-CR-37
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: January 25, 2017

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Mark Small 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Paula J. Beller 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Andrew Kobe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 14S05-1701-CR-37 
 
ANTHONY J. WAMPLER,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA,    
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below).  
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Daviess Superior Court, No. 14D01-1407-FB-714  
The Honorable Dean A. Sobecki, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 14A05-1510-CR-1606 
_________________________________ 
 
January 25, 2017 
 
Per Curiam. 
 
Defendant Anthony Wampler has a history of psychiatric problems and hospitalizations 
dating back to approximately 1981, when he was in his teens.  App. 117-19, 133-34.  Over the 
course of many years, Wampler became obsessed with his former elementary schoolmate, K.S.  In 
the spring of 2014, Wampler made unusual attempts to interact with K.S., such as leaving notes 
for K.S. and sitting outside K.S.’s house.  In the early morning hours of June 29 or 30, 2014, 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Jan 25 2017, 11:29 am
 
2 
 
Wampler removed the window screen in K.S.’s laundry room and entered K.S.’s house.  He 
watched K.S. sleep, took a beer and a photocopied Nelson Mandela quote from K.S.’s refrigerator, 
and left K.S. a note reading, “I love you.  Sorry about the screen.  There are too many as it is.”  
State’s Ex. 1.  The next morning, K.S. found the note and the broken screen and reported the 
incident to the police.  When questioned by police, Wampler explained his obsession by stating, 
“to me, you know, you look up male beauty and there’s [K.S.] . . . he’s just like a portrait in the 
flesh.”  State’s Ex. 4, p. 29. 
Wampler initially was found incompetent to stand trial, received treatment, and was later 
found competent.  After a bench trial, Wampler was convicted of two counts of Class B felony 
burglary and was adjudicated a habitual offender.  The trial court sentenced Wampler to concurrent 
eighteen-year terms on the burglary convictions, enhanced by fifteen years for the habitual 
offender adjudication, for an aggregate sentence of thirty-three years.  Wampler appealed, 
contending his sentence was inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed Wampler’s sentence.  Wampler v. State, 57 N.E.3d 884 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), 
reh’g denied.  Judge Mathias dissented, and would have granted Wampler sentencing relief.  Id. 
at 887-92 (Mathias, J., dissenting).  He noted, “[a]lthough Wampler challenges only the 
appropriateness of his sentence, the most important issue in this case is the clear failure, yet again, 
of our criminal justice system to adequately and properly respond to and treat those with mental 
health issues.”  Id. at 890. 
Judge Mathias referred to what he characterizes as “the large and ironic lapse in the logic 
of our criminal justice system, in which the initial imperative is to determine the competency of 
defendants prospectively, to assist counsel at trial, not to promptly consider whether the defendant 
was competent at the time the crime was committed.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  He further opined, 
 
3 
 
The real tragedy is that Wampler was not tried under the closest alternatives we 
have to humane treatment of the mentally ill: as insane at the time of the behavior 
charged or as someone who was guilty but mentally ill.  Had Wampler been found 
not guilty by reason of insanity, temporary or permanent commitment proceedings 
would have been commenced immediately for the treatment Wampler needs, and 
he might never emerge from the mental health system.  See Ind. Code § 35-36-2-
4(a) (providing that if a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity, the 
prosecuting attorney is required to initiate commitment proceedings against the 
defendant).  Had he been found guilty but mentally ill, at least Wampler would have 
qualified for mandatory evaluation and treatment “in such manner as is 
psychiatrically indicated for the defendant’s mental illness.”  [I.C.] § 35-36-2-5(c).  
If found guilty but mentally ill, that treatment could also have been carried out by 
transfer to a state mental health facility.  Id. 
 
Id. at 891.  We find our colleague’s comments insightful. 
Even where a trial court has not abused its discretion in sentencing, the Indiana Constitution 
authorizes independent appellate review and revision of a trial court’s sentencing decision.  See 
Ind. Const. art 7, §§ 4, 6; Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007).  Appellate courts 
implement this authority through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that we may revise 
a sentence if “after due consideration of the trial court’s decision” we find “the sentence is 
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”   
Pursuant to our authority under Appellate Rule 7(B), and on the strength of Judge Mathias’s 
dissent, we find that an aggregate sentence of thirty-three years is inappropriate.  Accordingly, we 
grant transfer and revise Wampler’s sentences to concurrent six-year terms on the burglary 
convictions, and ten years on the habitual offender adjudication, for an aggregate sentence of 
sixteen years.  In all other respects we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision.  See Ind. 
Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).  We remand this case to the trial court with instructions to enter a revised 
sentencing order consistent with this opinion.   
 
All Justices concur.