Title: Danny R. Peterson v. Midwest Security Insurance Company
Citation: 2001 WI 131
Docket Number: 1999AP002987
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 7, 2001

2001 WI 131 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
99-2987 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Danny R. Peterson,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
State of Wisconsin Department of Health and 
Family Services, and Community Living Alliance,  
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
Midwest Security Insurance Company,  
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Wisconsin Carpenters' Health Fund, and American 
Family Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 213 
Reported at:  238 Wis. 2d 677, 617 N.W.2d 876 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 7, 2001   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 17, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick J. Fiedler   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Daniel A. Rottier, Virginia M. Antoine and Habush, Habush, Davis 
& Rottier, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Daniel A. 
Rottier. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by James W. 
Mohr, Jr., and Mohr & Anderson, S.C., Hartford, and oral 
argument by James W. Mohr, Jr.. 
 
 
 
2
 
2001 WI 131 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound volume of the official 
reports.   
No.  99-2987  
(L.C. No. 
98 CV 1848) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
Danny R. Peterson,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of Health  
and Family Services, and Community Living  
Alliance,  
 
          Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Midwest Security Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Wisconsin Carpenters' Health Fund, and  
American Family Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
 
          Defendants. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 7, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.       
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  This case requires us to determine 
who qualifies as an "owner" of "property" for purposes of the 
recreational immunity statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.52 (1997-98), 
which immunizes property owners against liability for injuries 
No. 
99-2987   
 
2 
 
to persons engaged in recreational activity on their property.  
More specifically, the issue is whether the owner of a tree 
stand used for deer hunting is entitled to recreational immunity 
when he does not also own the real property upon which the tree 
stand is situated. 
¶2 
The plaintiff, Danny Peterson, was injured when the 
tree stand from which he was bow hunting gave way and he fell to 
the ground.  At the time of his injury, Peterson was hunting 
with permission on land owned by Vernon and Culleen Peterson.1  
The tree stand, however, had been built and was owned by the 
Petersons' nephew, Harold Shaw.2 
¶3 
Peterson 
sued Shaw's 
insurer. The 
circuit 
court 
dismissed the case, concluding that the recreational immunity 
statute applied because 1) Peterson was engaged in recreational 
activity when he was injured; 2) the tree stand from which he 
fell was "property" under the statute; and 3) Shaw was the owner 
of the tree stand.  The court of appeals affirmed. 
¶4 
The recreational immunity statute confers immunity on 
any person who "owns, leases or occupies property" for injuries 
to those engaged in recreational activity on the property.  
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d)1 (1997-98).  "Property" is defined in 
the statute as "real property and buildings, structures and 
improvements 
thereon, 
and 
the 
waters 
of 
the 
state."  
                                                 
1 Vernon and Culleen Peterson are not related to the 
plaintiff in this action. 
2 Harold Shaw was not named as a defendant.  He died in 
1998. 
No. 
99-2987   
 
3 
 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(f) 
(1997-98). 
 
A 
tree 
stand 
is 
a 
"structure" as that term is commonly and ordinarily understood.  
The statute does not require that the owners of "buildings, 
structures and improvements" also own the underlying real 
property in order to qualify for immunity.  Accordingly, as the 
owner of the tree stand, Shaw is entitled to immunity under the 
statute, even though he did not also own the real property on 
which the tree stand was built.  We therefore affirm. 
I 
¶5 
Vernon and Culleen Peterson own 121 acres of wooded 
land in Dane County.  They permitted their nephew, Harold Shaw, 
to hunt deer on their property, and also allowed him to build 
two deer stands in the woods.  Each stand was basically a small 
wooden platform "cinched in against the tree with a chain" about 
20 feet off the ground, accessible by way of a metal ladder. 
¶6 
In the fall of 1996, the plaintiff, Danny Peterson, 
accompanied Shaw to the Petersons' property.  The Petersons gave 
Danny Peterson permission to hunt on their property.  Shaw gave 
Peterson permission to use the tree stands.  Peterson hunted on 
the property two or three times that year.   
¶7 
In October 1997, Peterson returned to the property to 
bow hunt for deer.  Peterson decided to use one of Shaw's tree 
stands.  He climbed up the ladder and through the branches until 
he was level with the tree stand's platform.  After testing the 
tree stand's ability to hold his weight, Peterson stepped out 
onto the platform.  He spotted a deer less than five minutes 
later.  Standing up on the tree stand to get a shot at the deer, 
No. 
99-2987   
 
4 
 
Peterson turned his ankle "just a little bit."  The tree stand 
collapsed "like a trapdoor."  Peterson fell to the ground and 
was seriously injured. 
¶8 
Peterson 
sued 
Shaw's 
liability 
insurer, 
Midwest 
Security Insurance Company, alleging that the tree stand had 
been negligently built and maintained, and that Shaw had 
negligently represented that the tree stand was "in good 
condition" and "safe to use."  Midwest Security moved for 
summary judgment, asserting, among other things,3 that Shaw was 
immune under Wis. Stat. § 895.52 (1997-98), the recreational 
immunity statute.4 
¶9 
The Dane County Circuit Court, the Honorable Patrick 
J. Fiedler, granted the motion, noting that hunting was 
specifically enumerated as a "recreational activity" in the 
statute, and concluding that the tree stand constituted a 
"structure" or "improvement" and therefore fell within the 
statute's definition of "property."  Because Shaw was the owner 
of the tree stand, the circuit court held that he was entitled 
to immunity.  The court of appeals affirmed, and we granted 
review. 
                                                 
3 In addition to asserting recreational immunity, Midwest 
Security 
also 
argued 
that 
Shaw 
was 
not 
negligent, 
that 
Peterson's claim relied upon evidence inadmissible under the 
Dead Man's Statute, and that the claim was barred by laches.  
Because we, like the court of appeals, resolve this case under 
the recreational immunity statute, we do not address the 
alternative arguments.  
4 All statutory references are to the 1997-98 version of the 
Wisconsin Statutes unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
99-2987   
 
5 
 
II 
¶10 We review the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment de novo, using the same methodology as the circuit 
court.  Waters v. Pertzborn, 2001 WI 62, ¶37, 243 Wis. 2d 703, 
627 N.W.2d 497.  A court grants summary judgment when "the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, 
and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). 
¶11 The parties agree that as to the applicability of the 
recreational immunity statute, there are no material factual 
disputes.  The case turns on the interpretation and application 
of a statute, which is a question of law that we review de novo.  
Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 447, 442 N.W.2d 25, 31 
(1989).   
¶12 The recreational immunity statute immunizes property 
owners against liability "for any injury to a person engaged in 
a recreational activity on the owner's property."  Crowbridge v. 
Village of Egg Harbor, 179 Wis. 2d 565, 569, 508 N.W.2d 15, 17 
(Ct. App. 1993).  If the statute applies, a property owner owes 
no duty of inspection, warning or safety to "any person who 
enters the owner's property to engage in a recreational 
activity," and is otherwise immune from liability for injuries 
No. 
99-2987   
 
6 
 
to any person engaged in recreational activity on the owner's 
property.  Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(a) and (b).5 
¶13 While the inquiry in many recreational immunity cases 
focuses on whether the injured plaintiff's "activity" was 
"recreational" within the meaning of the statute, no one here 
disputes that Peterson was engaged in a "recreational activity" 
as that term is defined in Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g).  Hunting 
is specifically listed as a "recreational activity" in the 
statutory definition.  Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g).   
¶14 Whether Shaw is entitled to immunity depends upon 
whether he qualifies as a property owner under the statute.  
"Owner" and "property" are defined terms.  An "owner" is "a 
person . . . that 
owns, 
leases 
or 
occupies 
property." 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d)1.  "Property" is "real property and 
buildings, structures and improvements thereon, and the waters 
of the state."  Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(f). 
¶15 The parties agree that Shaw owned the tree stand from 
which Peterson fell.  Their dispute centers on whether the tree 
stand by itself is "property" under the statute.  The circuit 
court and the court of appeals concluded that the tree stand was 
a "structure" and therefore "property" within the meaning of 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(f).  We agree. 
¶16 The 
term 
"structure" 
is 
not 
defined 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52, and is therefore given its common and 
                                                 
5 The statute contains several exceptions not at issue here.  
See Wis. Stat. § 895.52(3)-(6). 
No. 
99-2987   
 
7 
 
ordinary meaning.  See Ervin v. City of Kenosha, 159 Wis. 2d  
464, 483-84, 464 N.W.2d  654, 662 (1991).  A "structure" is 
"something constructed," or "something made up of a number of 
parts that are held or put together in a particular way."  
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 1782 (3d 
ed. 1992).  "Structure" is also defined as "[a]ny construction, 
or any production or piece of work artificially built up or 
composed of parts joined together in some definite manner."  
Black's Law Dictionary, 1424 (6th ed. 1991). 
¶17 Shaw's tree stand was made of wood and "cinched in 
against the tree with a chain," and had a metal ladder.  In 
other words, it was constructed, built, or put together in a 
particular way, and was made up of parts joined together.  The 
tree stand was therefore a "structure" as that term is commonly 
and ordinarily understood.  Shaw was therefore an owner of 
"property" within the meaning of the recreational immunity 
statute. 
¶18 Peterson 
reads 
the 
definition 
of 
"property" 
differently.  He argues that the phrase "buildings, structures 
and improvements" merely modifies "real property," so that a 
person who owns a building, structure or improvement but does 
not also own the underlying real property does not own 
"property" within the meaning of the statute.  He interprets the 
statute to create two categories of "property": 1) real 
property, along with any buildings, structures, or improvements 
thereon; and 2) the waters of the state.  He bases this 
interpretation on the lack of punctuation between the phrases 
No. 
99-2987   
 
8 
 
"real property" and "buildings, structures and improvements" in 
the definition. 
¶19 We decline to give the absence of a comma such 
interpretive 
significance. 
Peterson's 
punctuation-based 
interpretation operates to impose a requirement that does not 
appear on the face of the statute: that the owner of a building, 
structure or improvement implicated in a recreational injury 
must also own the underlying real property in order to own 
"property" as that term is defined in the statute.  But the 
statute does not say "'[p]roperty' means real property and 
buildings, structures and improvements thereon that are owned by 
the real property owner," and we cannot rewrite it in the  
exercise 
of 
interpreting 
it. 
See 
State 
v. 
Martin, 
162 
Wis. 2d 883, 907, 470 N.W.2d 900, 910 (1991)("Our task is to 
construe the statute, not to rewrite it by judicial fiat.").6   
According to the unambiguous language of the statute, a person 
                                                 
6 See also Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Judicial Process §  4 at 
175 (American Casebook Series 1976)(quoting Lord Blackburn in 
River Wear Comm'rs v. Adamson, 2 App. Cas. 742, 746 (H.L. 1877)) 
("'But it is to be borne in mind that the office of the judges 
is not to legislate, but to declare the expressed intention of 
the Legislature, even if that intention appears to the court 
injudicious; and I believe that it is not disputed that what 
Lord Wensleydale used to say is right, namely that we are to 
take the whole statute together, and construe it all together, 
giving the words their ordinary signification, unless when so 
applied they produce an inconsistency, or an absurdity or 
inconvenience so great as to convince the court that the 
intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary 
signification, and to justify the court in putting on them some 
other signification, which, though less proper, is one which the 
court thinks the words will bear.'"). 
 
No. 
99-2987   
 
9 
 
who owns a "building, structure or improvement" on real property 
owns "property" under the statute, regardless of whether he also 
owns the underlying real estate.  Where the language of a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, we do not look beyond it to 
ascertain its meaning.  Dieter v. Chrysler Corp., 2000 WI 45, 
¶21, 234 Wis. 2d 670, 610 N.W.2d 832.  
¶20 This 
interpretation 
is consistent 
with 
Doane v. 
Helenville Mutual Insurance Co., 216 Wis. 2d 345, 352, 575 
N.W.2d 734, 737 (Ct. App. 1998), in which the court of appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
definition 
of 
"property" 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(f) basically "delineates three categories 
of property whose owners may qualify for immunity: (1) real 
property; (2) buildings, structures and improvements thereon; 
and (3) waters of the state." 
¶21 This 
interpretation 
is also 
consistent 
with the 
expression of legislative purpose that accompanied the repeal of 
the old recreational immunity statute, Wis. Stat. § 29.68, and 
its replacement by Wis. Stat. § 895.52: 
 
Legislative intent.  The legislature intends by this 
act to limit the liability of property owners toward 
others 
who 
use 
their 
property 
for 
recreational 
activities under circumstances in which the owner does 
not derive more than a minimal pecuniary benefit.  
While it is not possible to specify in a statute every 
activity 
which 
might 
constitute 
a 
recreational 
activity, this act provides examples of the kinds of 
activities that are meant to be included, and the 
legislature intends that, where substantially similar 
circumstances or activities exist, this legislation 
should be liberally construed in favor of property 
owners to protect them from liability.  The act is 
intended to overrule any previous Wisconsin supreme 
No. 
99-2987   
 
10 
 
court decisions interpreting section 29.68 of the 
statutes if the decision is more restrictive than or 
inconsistent with the provisions of this act. 
1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1.  
¶22 Thus, while it has often been said that "[t]he intent 
of sec. 895.52, Stats., is to encourage landowners to open up 
their land for recreational activity," Crowbridge, 179 Wis. 2d 
at 572 (citing Ervin, 159 Wis. 2d at 475), it is abundantly 
clear from the language of the statute and the statement of 
legislative intent that the purpose of the statute is broader, 
and recreational immunity is not in fact limited only to 
landowners. 
¶23 As noted above, the legislature specified that Wis. 
Stat. § 895.52 is to be "liberally construed in favor of 
property owners to protect them from liability."  1983 Wis. Act 
418, § 1; see also Ervin, 159 Wis. 2d at 476; Sievert v. American 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 190 Wis. 2d 623, 630, 528 N.W.2d 413, 417 
(1995); Schultz v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 229 Wis. 2d 513, 
518, 600 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Ct. App. 1999); Stann v. Waukesha 
County, 161 Wis. 2d 808, 825, 468 N.W.2d 775, 782 (Ct. App. 
1991).  Peterson's interpretation operates to exclude from the 
definition of "property" any building, structure or improvement 
owned by someone other than the real property owner, or, 
conversely, to include only those buildings, structures or 
improvements that are owned by the real property owner.  This 
sort of restrictive interpretation is inconsistent with the 
No. 
99-2987   
 
11 
 
language of the statute and the legislative directive that it be 
liberally construed in favor of immunity for property owners.7 
¶24 Accordingly, we conclude that a person who owns a 
"building, structure or improvement" on real property owns 
"property" as that term is defined in Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(f), 
even if he does not own the underlying real property.  Shaw's 
tree stand was a "structure" as that term is commonly and 
ordinarily understood.  Therefore, Shaw owned "property" within 
the meaning of the recreational immunity statute.8  Because 
Peterson was engaged in a specifically enumerated "recreational 
activity"——deer hunting——when he fell from Shaw's tree stand and 
was injured, Shaw is entitled to recreational immunity under 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2).9  Summary judgment dismissing the case 
                                                 
7 The dissent argues that our reading of the statute 
violates the rules of grammar and punctuation.  Dissent at ¶¶47-
55.  We do not disagree that courts sometimes look to 
grammatical 
rules 
when 
interpreting 
legal 
texts. 
 
But 
interpreting a legal text is not like diagramming a sentence or 
correcting an English paper.  The rules of grammar and 
punctuation should not be applied at the expense of a natural, 
reasonable reading of the statutory language (taking into 
account the context in which it appears and the purpose of the 
statute), or when the result is an expansion or contraction of 
the statute contrary to its terms.  Here, strict adherence to 
the "rule of the serial comma" as advocated by the dissent 
operates to add a substantive requirement to the statute that it 
otherwise does not contain.     
 
8 The circuit court also held that Shaw was an "occupier" of 
property under the statute.  Because we conclude that Shaw owned 
"property" as that term is defined in the statute, we need not 
address 
whether 
Shaw 
also, 
or 
alternatively, 
"occupied" 
property.   
9 The dissent contends that our interpretation of the 
statute does not "comport with the idea that recreational 
No. 
99-2987   
 
12 
 
was therefore appropriate, and we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
activity takes place outdoors.  How does one enter a building or 
structure in order to engage in an outdoor activity?"  Dissent 
at ¶62.  The suggestion seems to be that one almost never enters 
into a building or structure to engage in outdoor activity.  
However, in addition to the tree stand at issue in this case 
(which the dissent apparently concedes is a structure used for 
outdoor activity, see dissent at ¶64), there are other buildings 
that one does enter for purposes of engaging in outdoor 
recreational activity: open air park pavilions, observation 
towers, gazebos, or screen houses used for picnics, and so on. 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-2987.dtp 
 
 
1
 
¶25 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.  (concurring).  This case 
presents a question of statutory interpretation.  Our objective, 
as always, is to discern the intent of the legislature.  Peters 
v. Menard, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 174, 184, 589 N.W.2d 395 (1999).  
If the language of the statute clearly and unambiguously sets 
forth the legislative intent, the court has a duty to apply that 
intent to the case and not look beyond the text for a different 
meaning.  Reyes v. Greatway Ins. Co., 227 Wis. 2d 357, 365, 597 
N.W.2d 687 (1999).  When one of several interpretations is 
possible, the court must ascertain legislative intent from the 
language of the statute in relation to a number of extrinsic 
factors 
including 
the 
legislative 
object 
intended 
to 
be 
accomplished.  Kelley Co. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 248, 
493 N.W.2d 68 (1992). 
¶26 The punctuation in Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(f) makes the 
subsection ambiguous in the sense that reasonable minds could 
differ as to how many categories of property the subsection 
envisions.  Cf. Hacker v. State Dep't of Health and Social 
Services, 197 Wis. 2d 441, 455, 541 N.W.2d 766 (1995).  This 
ambiguity permits us to look beyond the text for the scope, 
history, context, and subject matter of the statute, as well as 
its purpose or object.  See State v. Piddington, 2001 WI 24, 
¶14, 241 Wis. 2d 754, 623 N.W.2d 528, cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 65 
(2001); Clark v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 218 Wis. 2d 169, 
173, 577 N.W.2d 790 (1998). 
¶27 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 895.52 
creates 
a 
very 
broad 
recreational immunity with certain exceptions.  This immunity 
No. 99-2987.dtp 
 
 
2
applies to owners of property and to agents of owners.10  
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2).  An owner is defined to include a 
"person . . . that 
owns, 
leases 
or 
occupies 
property."  
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d)1.  To prevent summary judgment, the 
petitioners must show that Harold Shaw was not an owner (in any 
of three senses) or an agent of an owner of "property." 
¶28 The statute defines "property" as follows: "'Property' 
means real property and buildings, structures and improvements 
thereon, and the waters of the state, as defined under s. 
281.01(18)."  Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(f). 
¶29 We should not overlook the obvious.  The definition of 
"property" applies to more than land.  It applies to "buildings, 
structures and improvements" on land.  The legislature must have 
had good reason for including more than land in its definition. 
¶30 There should be no question that a tree stand is a 
"structure" and that this structure was owned by Harold Shaw. 
¶31 Petitioners 
contend, 
however, 
that 
the 
statutory 
definition of "property" requires an ownership linkage between 
land and any building, structure, or improvement on the land——
that a building alone, or a structure alone, or an improvement 
alone is not "property" within the statute.  This contention is 
based upon the proposition that the definition creates only two 
categories of property: (1) real property along with any 
buildings, structures and improvements on that property; and (2) 
the 
waters 
of 
the 
state. 
 
The 
dissent 
summarizes 
the 
                                                 
10 The parties pay little attention to the potential 
argument that Harold Shaw was an "agent" of Vernon and Culleen 
Peterson. 
No. 99-2987.dtp 
 
 
3
petitioners' 
position: 
"if 
the 
statute 
defines 
only 
two 
categories of 'property,' the owner of a structure, building, or 
improvement may enjoy immunity only if that owner also owns the 
underlying land."  Dissent at ¶46. 
¶32 The petitioners' position may be stated as follows: An 
owner is a person that owns "property," that is, "real property 
and buildings, structures and improvements thereon."  Shaw owned 
a "structure" on real property but he did not own the real 
property.  Therefore, Shaw did not own "property" as defined 
under the statute. 
¶33 There is a serious flaw in this formulation.  If a 
person does not own "property" unless he or she owns "real 
property" and the "buildings, structures and improvements" on 
that real property, then a person who owns land but does not own 
the "buildings, structures and improvements" on that land does 
not own "property" and is presumably not immune.  This result 
follows a literal reading of the two-category definition but is 
absurd.  An even more absurd reading of the two-category 
definition is that the owner of "real property" is not immune 
unless 
the 
real 
property 
has 
"buildings, 
structures 
and 
improvements thereon." 
¶34 The 
two-category 
definition 
of property must be 
scrutinized in other ways.  For instance, the statute provides 
that an owner is a person that owns, leases or occupies real 
property and buildings, structures and improvements thereon.  
For purposes of this statute, a person who qualifies as a lessee 
or occupier of property has as much right to assert recreational 
immunity as the person who holds title to the property.  The 
No. 99-2987.dtp 
 
 
4
proposition 
that 
an 
owner 
of 
a 
structure, 
building, 
or 
improvement may enjoy immunity only if the owner also owns the 
underlying land unravels if we state the parallel proposition 
that the lessee of a structure, building, or improvement may 
enjoy immunity only if the lessee leases the underlying land, 
because the latter proposition would severely limit recreational 
immunity for lessees. 
¶35 The two-category analysis appears to view buildings, 
structures, and improvements as relatively unimportant to the 
recreational 
immunity 
at 
issue. 
 
The 
petitioners' 
brief 
forthrightly acknowledges examples of buildings and structures 
that are integrally related to recreation: a washroom at a 
campground, Szarzynski v. YMCA, 184 Wis. 2d 875, 517 N.W.2d 135 
(1994); a pier on a lake, Crowbridge v. Village of Egg Harbor, 
179 Wis. 2d 565, 508 N.W.2d 15 (Ct. App. 1993); a beach house at 
the beach, Stann v. Waukesha County, 161 Wis. 2d 808, 468 N.W.2d 
775 (Ct. App. 1991); and a swing in a park, Kruschke v. City of 
New Richmond, 157 Wis. 2d 167, 458 N.W.2d 832 (Ct. App. 1990).  
But it denies that the legislature intended to afford immunity 
if the owners of such buildings or structures do not also own 
the underlying land.  Precise logical constructs do not work 
very well with such enumerated recreational activities as 
"horseback riding," "ballooning," "hang gliding," and "climbing 
observation towers."  See Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g).  Did the 
legislature really intend to deny immunity to the owner of an 
"observation tower" if the owner of the tower does not also own 
the underlying land? 
No. 99-2987.dtp 
 
 
5
¶36 For this court to rely on very subtle distinctions to 
resolve this case would not only miss the big picture but also 
invite 
litigants 
to 
explore 
whether 
condominium 
owners, 
utilities that own utility poles but not the underlying land, 
and land contract purchasers do not have recreational immunity 
because 
their 
ownership 
of 
buildings 
or 
structures 
on 
recreational property is somehow incomplete. 
¶37 "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience."11  In this case, the logic of grammatical rules 
fails to account for the legislative history of the statute. 
¶38 The 1983 legislature approved an expansive revision of 
recreational immunity.  1983 Wis. Act 418.  The revision 
included repeal of Wis. Stat. § 29.68, which provided in part 
that "[a]n owner, lessee or occupant of premises owes no duty to 
keep 
the 
premises 
safe 
for 
entry 
or 
use 
by 
others 
for . . . recreational purposes . . . except as provided in sub. 
(3)."  Wis. Stat. § 29.68(1) (1981-82).  This statute defined 
"premises" to include "lands, private ways and any buildings, 
structures and improvements thereon."  Wis. Stat. § 29.68(5)(a) 
(1981-82). 
¶39 The bill that revised the law was 1983 Senate Bill 
586.  When it was first introduced, the bill carried the 
following 
definition 
of 
property: 
"'Property' 
means 
real 
property, wherever located, lakes and streams adjacent to real 
property, and personal property thereon."  Legislative Reference 
                                                 
11 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881) (based 
upon 1880 Lowell Lecture). 
No. 99-2987.dtp 
 
 
6
Bureau Drafting File for 1983 Wis. Act 418, 1983 Senate Bill 586 
(as introduced February 1, 1984). 
¶40 A 
Senate 
substitute 
amendment 
provided 
a 
new 
definition of property: 
 
 
(f) "Property" means any of the following: 
 
1. 
Unplatted real property owned by any person 
and located outside the corporate limits of a city or 
village, and personal property thereon. 
 
2. 
Unplatted real property within the corporate 
limits of a city or village with a population of less 
than 2,500, and personal property thereon. 
 
3. 
Platted or unplatted real property which is 
within the corporate limits of a city or village and 
which is subject to a recreational agreement, and 
personal property thereon. 
 
4. 
Waters of the state, as defined under s. 
144.01(19), whether or not adjacent to the property 
described under subd. 1 to 3. 
Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1983 Wis. Act 
418, Senate Substitute Amendment 1 to 1983 Senate Bill 586. 
¶41 The Senate approved the substitute amendment and sent 
the amended bill to the Assembly where it was changed.  
Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1983 Wis. Act 
418, Legislative History of 1983 Senate Bill 586.  The drafting 
file indicates that the Wisconsin Paper Council submitted a 
handwritten amendment on behalf of Representative Tommy Thompson 
to this effect: Property "means real property and any buildings, 
structures and improvements thereon under public or private 
ownership, and the waters of the state. . . . "  Legislative 
Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1983 Wis. Act 418, Drafting 
Request (March 28, 1984).  The Legislative Reference Bureau took 
this language and prepared an amendment that read: "'Property'" 
means real property and buildings, structures and improvements 
No. 99-2987.dtp 
 
 
7
thereon, and the waters of the state, as defined under 
144.01(19)."  Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 
1983 Wis. Act 418, Assembly Amendment 1 to 1983 Senate Bill 586. 
¶42 This history demonstrates that the present definition 
was not written under laboratory conditions, free of historical 
and political influence.  For instance, the word "thereon" 
appeared in prior law and in every draft of the bill with 
varying implications.  It appeared in a definition conceived 
outside the legislature.  The record also shows evidence of the 
"serial 
comma 
rule" 
in 
some 
texts 
but 
not 
in 
others.  
Punctuation in the texts is not consistent.  Hence, it would be 
very difficult to conclude that the punctuation now before the 
court dictates a substantive result different from the one 
reached by the court. 
¶43 Consequently, I support the majority's conclusion that 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52 "does not require that the owners of 
'buildings, structures and improvements' also own the underlying 
real property in order to qualify for immunity."  Majority op. 
at ¶4.  This conclusion fairly reflects the intent of the 
legislature. 
 
No.  99-2987.awb 
 
 
 
1
¶44 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
recreational immunity statute defines "property" as: "real 
property and buildings, structures and improvements thereon, and 
the waters of the state."  
¶45 The essence of the majority opinion rests on its 
conclusion 
that this definition of 
property 
unambiguously 
creates three distinctly defined categories of property.  Yet, 
the majority is able to reach this conclusion only by dismissing 
or ignoring rules of grammar and glossing over the ambiguity 
inherent in this definition.  I conclude that the statute's 
definition of property is ambiguous and that the majority's 
bright-line, three-category interpretation conflicts with the 
legislative intent to provide immunity for outdoor activity.  
¶46 The parties have framed the question of immunity in 
this case as dependent on whether the statute creates two or 
three categories of property.  According to Peterson, if the 
statute defines only two categories of property, the owner of a 
structure, building, or improvement may enjoy immunity only if 
that owner also owns the underlying land.  If, however, the 
statute defines three categories of property under the majority 
approach, then an owner of a structure, building, or improvement 
is immune regardless of the ownership of the land on which that 
structure, building, or improvement stands.  Rather than 
focusing on whether there are two or three categories, I 
conclude that there are several constructions of the definition 
of property. 
I. 
USE OF GRAMMAR 
No.  99-2987.awb 
 
 
 
2
¶47 It is only by selectively dismissing or ignoring the 
legislature's use of commas that the majority is able to avoid 
the ambiguity in the statute and give it a reading that creates 
three distinctly defined categories of property.  The majority 
declares, "[w]e decline to give the absence of a comma such 
interpretive significance."  Majority op. at ¶19. 
¶48 I 
question 
whether 
the 
legislature's 
choice 
of 
punctuation in a statute may be dismissed so easily.  Case law 
abounds with disputes that revolve around the placement of a 
comma in a statute or other writing.  See State ex rel. Ahlgrimm 
v. State Elections Bd., 82 Wis. 2d 585, 590, 263 N.W.2d 152 
(1978) 
(use 
of 
comma 
after 
phrase 
in 
statute 
provides 
grammatical support for particular conclusion); see also State 
v. Stepniewski, 105 Wis. 2d 261, 275, 314 N.W.2d 98 (1982); 
Mahon v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 56 Wis. 2d 171, 179, 201 
N.W.2d 573 (1972); Baker v. McDel Corp., 53 Wis. 2d 71, 79, 191 
N.W.2d 846 
(1971) 
("[w]e 
cannot 
ignore 
punctuation 
when 
interpreting a contract"); Georgiades v. Glickman, 272 Wis. 257, 
263, 
75 
N.W.2d 
573 
(1956) 
("the 
insertion 
of 
the 
comma . . . does present an issue of interpretation); Jauqet 
Lumber Co. v. Kolbe & Kolbe Millwork Co., 164 Wis. 2d 689, 700, 
476 N.W.2d 305 (Ct. App. 1991) ("[f]or the trial court's reading 
to be correct there would have to be a comma inserted"). 
¶49 The sentence we are interpreting in subsection (f) 
defines property as "real property and buildings, structures and 
improvements thereon, and the waters of the state."  (Emphasis 
added.)  There are two commas in the above quoted definition.  
No.  99-2987.awb 
 
 
 
3
Why is that important to note?  The foundation of the majority 
opinion rests on dismissing the placement of the first comma and 
completely 
ignoring 
the 
second 
comma. 
 
If 
the 
majority 
acknowledges the placement of these commas, it cannot reach its 
conclusion that the statute unambiguously creates immunity for 
owners of three distinctly defined categories of property. 
¶50 Admittedly, the rules of grammar are only tools to 
assist in interpretation and should not be mechanistically 
applied at the expense of a natural reading of the text and its 
purpose. 
 
Here, 
however, 
in 
examining 
a 
short, 
14-word 
definition, the majority discards or ignores not one, not two, 
but three rules of grammar.  Essentially, without explanation, 
the majority attempts to divorce its interpretation from the 
accepted use of grammar.  Such an attempt calls into question 
the validity of the majority's approach. 
 
 
The First Comma 
¶51 The majority’s interpretation violates the rule of the 
serial comma:  in a series of three or more, a comma shall 
appear after the first term or category listed.  See The Gregg 
Reference Manual 15 (9th ed. 2001).  The majority contends that 
the first distinct category listed is "real property."  Thus, a 
comma should appear after this first category——but none appears.  
Instead, the first comma appears after the word "buildings."  
Such 
a 
placement 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
majority’s 
interpretation. 
 
The 
majority 
cannot 
reconcile 
its 
interpretation with the legislature’s placement of this comma.  
No.  99-2987.awb 
 
 
 
4
Unable to explain it, the majority dismisses the placement of 
the comma as insignificant. 
 
 
The Second Comma 
¶52 A review of the surrounding text of the statute 
demonstrates that the drafter of the statute adheres to the 
rule:  in a series of three or more, no comma is used preceding 
the final conjunction.  Let me illustrate. 
¶53 In the text of the recreational immunity statute, the 
definition of "recreational activity" immediately follows the 
sentence that we are interpreting in this case. The definition 
contains a serial listing.  "Recreational activity" is defined 
as an activity undertaken "for the purpose of exercise, 
relaxation or pleasure."  Consistent with the rule, no comma is 
used preceding the final conjunction, "or." 
¶54 Likewise, the next sentence in the text also contains 
a serial listing of three or more terms which concludes with 
"any other sport, game or educational activity."  Again, 
consistent with the rule, no comma is used before the final 
conjunction. 
¶55 The 
majority’s 
interpretation 
of 
three 
distinct 
categories of property, however, is inconsistent with the rule.  
The drafter placed a comma before the conjunction, "and."  Such 
a placement suggests that the drafter did not intend to create 
three categories. 
¶56 The opinion of the majority fails to discuss or even 
acknowledge the placement of the second comma.  Instead, it 
No.  99-2987.awb 
 
 
 
5
ignores it.  The majority offers no explanation why the 
surrounding text of the statute adheres to the rule while the 
majority’s interpretation is inconsistent with the rule. 
 
 
The Use of the Term "thereon" 
¶57 The majority concludes that "buildings, structures and 
improvements 
thereon," 
is 
one 
of 
three 
clearly 
distinct 
categories.  In arriving at this conclusion, it ignores the 
dictionary meaning of "thereon."  The term means "on that" or 
"concerning that subject."  Webster's New Universal Unabridged 
Dictionary 1894 (2d ed. 1983) (emphasis added). 
¶58 The definition of property set forth in subsection (f) 
states: 
 
"real 
property 
and 
buildings, 
structures 
and 
improvements thereon, and the waters of the state."  If the 
drafter had intended "buildings, structures and improvements 
thereon," to be a distinct category, the statute should read 
"buildings, structures and improvements on real property."  
Instead, the drafter used the term "thereon," which signals that 
the buildings, structures and improvements are to be on that 
specific real property referred to in the first part of the 
definition.  The plain meaning of the term "thereon" conflicts 
with the majority's conclusion that the drafter clearly intended 
to create three distinctly defined categories of property.    
II. THE DEFINITION OF "PROPERTY" IS AMBIGUOUS. 
 
¶59 We cannot ignore punctuation when interpreting a 
statute.  The above discussion demonstrates, at the very least, 
that the definition of "property" is ambiguous.  The majority is 
No.  99-2987.awb 
 
 
 
6
simply incorrect in its conclusion that the statute clearly and 
unambiguously creates immunity for owners of three distinctly 
defined categories of property. 
¶60 I conclude that there are several constructions of the 
language in subsection (f).  First, as Peterson advances, the 
definition could be interpreted to identify two categories of 
property: 
 
(1) 
real 
property 
along 
with 
the 
buildings, 
structures, and improvements on that real property, and (2) the 
waters of the state.  Second, as a variation on Peterson's 
approach, the definition could be interpreted to include three 
categories, but a different three than those identified by 
Midwest and the majority:  (1) real property, (2) buildings, 
structures and improvements on that real property, and (3) the 
waters of the state.  Third, as Midwest argues, the definition 
could be interpreted to identify the following three categories:  
(1) 
real 
property, 
(2) 
any 
buildings, 
structures, 
and 
improvements on any real property, and (3) the waters of the 
state.  Fourth, the definition could be interpreted to identify 
three categories of property, but again a different three than 
those identified by Midwest and the majority:  (1) real property 
and buildings, (2) structures and improvements thereon, and (3) 
the waters of the state.  Rather than addressing the ambiguity, 
the majority summarily concludes that the "clear" language is 
consistent with legislative intent. 
III. LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
¶61 Having concluded that the definition of "property" is 
ambiguous, I look to the purpose of the statute as evidence of 
No.  99-2987.awb 
 
 
 
7
legislative intent.  McDonough v. DWD, 227 Wis. 2d 271, 277, 595 
N.W.2d 
686 
(1999); 
Miller 
v. 
Mauston 
School 
Dist., 
222 
Wis. 2d 540, 548, 588 N.W.2d 305 (Ct. App. 1998).  Based on the 
purpose of the recreational immunity statute, it is difficult to 
determine that the legislature intended to create the three 
categories the majority has identified.   
¶62 The purpose of the statute focuses on recreational 
activity.  Because recreational activity is defined as outdoor 
activity under the statute, it makes little sense for the 
majority to define all buildings and structures as "property."  
The 
majority's 
definition 
of 
property 
that 
includes 
any 
buildings and structures, regardless of where they stand, can 
hardly be said to comport with the idea that recreational 
activity takes place outdoors.  How does one enter a building or 
structure in order to engage in an outdoor activity? 
¶63 Although I agree with the majority's analysis of the 
legislative purpose that accompanied the repeal of the old 
recreational 
immunity 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 29.68, 
and 
its 
replacement 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52, 
this 
analysis 
offers 
little assistance in resolving the issues in this case.  The 
majority notes that the purpose of the statute has been stated 
as:  to immunize "property owners" against liability "for any 
injury to a person engaged in a recreational activity on the 
owner's property."  Majority op. at ¶12.  However, this 
statement of purpose serves only to beg the question in this 
case because it says nothing about who is an "owner" or what is 
"property," which are precisely the issues before us. 
No.  99-2987.awb 
 
 
 
8
¶64 In short, the recreational immunity statute, by its 
very essence, contemplates activities that take place out-of-
doors.  Nonetheless, the majority has immunized an entire class 
of property owners, where the underlying property, by its very 
nature, will usually encompass indoor activity.  In this case, 
the fact that Peterson was hunting upon a "structure" that 
happened to be nothing more than a non-enclosed platform 
attached to a tree obscures the breadth of the majority's three-
category rule.  The result may appear to comport with the 
legislative intent in this case, but what of others down the 
road? 
¶65 I disagree with the majority's basic premise that the 
statute unambiguously creates immunity for owners of three 
distinctly defined categories of "property."  Additionally, I 
conclude that the majority's broad definition cannot be what the 
legislature intended.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
No.  99-2987.awb 
 
 
 
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