Title: Mabon v. Myers
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S48518
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: November 8, 2001

FILED:  November 8, 2001 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
		
LON T. MABON,
		Petitioner,
	v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
	Respondent,
        and
ANN JACKSON,
HANNAH DAVIDSON, JEANA FRAZZINI,
STEPHANIE VAN ZUIDEN, and JANN CARSON,
Intervenors.
(SC S48518)

	En Banc
	On petition to review ballot title.
	Submitted on the record July 19, 2001.
	Lon T. Mabon, pro se, filed the petition.
	Holly A. Vance, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the
answering memorandum for respondent.  With her on the memorandum
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds,
Solicitor General.  
	Charles F. Hinkle, ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc.,
Portland, filed the memorandum for intervenors Stephanie Van
Zuiden and Jann Carson.
	Eli D. Stutsman, Portland, filed the memorandum for
intervenors Ann Jackson, Hannah Davidson, and Jeana Frazzini.
	LEESON, J.
	Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
	Durham, J., dissented and filed an opinion in which Riggs
and Balmer, JJ., joined.
		LEESON, J.
		This ballot title review proceeding, brought under ORS
250.085(2), concerns the Attorney General's certified ballot
title for a proposed initiative measure that the Secretary of
State has denominated as Initiative Petition 34 (2002). (1) 
Petitioner challenges the caption, the "yes" and "no" vote result
statements, and the summary of the Attorney General's certified
ballot title.  For the reasons explained below, we hold that the
caption does not comply substantially with statutory
requirements.  We refer the ballot title to the Attorney General
for modification.  ORS 250.085(8); Flanagan v. Myers, 332 Or 318,
323-24, 30 P3d 408 (2001).
		The proposed measure would amend the Oregon
Constitution by adding to Article I, section 1, the following
text:
		"(1) God Almighty gives Human Life.  In the womb,
He forms a Human Being.  At the beginning of that
process, it is God, not man, who establishes Human
Personhood.  Therefore, we the People of the state of
Oregon, in humility and obedience to Nature's God, the
Lord of Heaven and earth, shall keep safe from mortal
harm all innocent Human Life, acknowledging and
protecting the Human Person from the moment of
fertilization until natural death, so help us God."
		The Attorney General certified the following ballot
title:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION.  PROHIBITS:  ABORTION; PHYSICIAN AID-IN-DYING; CERTAIN PAIN-CONTROL, BIRTH-CONTROL METHODS; OTHER 'MORTAL  HARM'
		"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE:  'Yes' vote prohibits
abortion, physician aid-in-dying, certain pain-control
and birth-control methods, other 'mortal harm';
'protects' 'person' from fertilization until 'natural
death.'
		"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE:  'No' vote retains current
laws allowing abortion, physician aid-in-dying, pain-control and birth-control methods; rejects 'protecting'
'person' from fertilization until 'natural death.'
		"SUMMARY:  Amends constitution.  Under current
law, abortion permitted before fetus becomes viable
outside womb; after viability, abortion allowed if
women's life endangered; woman may use birth-control
methods effective after fertilization, including IUD's,
morning-after pill, some oral contraceptives; pain
control permitted that may hasten death; competent
terminally-ill patient may choose physician-hastened
death under Death with Dignity Act.  Measure declares
that 'God Almighty,' not man, establishes 'Human
Personhood' at fertilization.  Measure requires
citizens, 'in humility and obedience to Nature's God,'
to 'protect' from 'mortal harm' all 'innocent Human
Life,' [']acknowledging,' 'protecting' 'Human Person'
from fertilization until 'natural death.'  Measure does
not define terms quoted above.  Measure prohibits
abortion, physician aid-in-dying, birth-control methods
taken after conception, pain control that may hasten
death."
		ORS 250.035(2)(a) provides that a ballot title for a
proposed state measure shall include "[a] caption of not more
than 15 words that reasonably identifies the subject matter of
the state measure."  The caption is the "cornerstone for the
other portions of the ballot title."  Greene v. Kulongoski, 322
Or 169, 175, 903 P2d 366 (1995).  As the "headline" for the
ballot title, the caption "provides the context for the reader's
consideration of the other information in the ballot title."  Id. 
A caption complies substantially with the requirements of ORS
250.035(2)(a) if it identifies the subject matter of the proposed
measure in terms that will not confuse or mislead potential
petition signers and voters.  Id. at 174-75.  A caption that
catalogues the effect of a proposed measure, without identifying
its subject matter, is inadequate.  Carson v. Myers, 326 Or 248,
254, 951 P2d 700 (1998).
		Petitioner contends that the Attorney General's caption
fails to comply substantially with ORS 250.035(2)(a) because it
fails to identify reasonably the subject matter of the proposed
measure.  Instead, petitioner contends, the Attorney General's
caption is a "mini-summary" that lists conduct that the proposed
measure would prohibit, thereby describing its major effects on
Oregonians' existing legal rights and duties.  The Attorney
General defends the caption on the ground that it provides what
the Attorney General believes to be the "critical information"
that voters should receive about conduct that the proposed
measure would prohibit if it were to become the law of Oregon.
		In determining whether a caption reasonably identifies
the subject matter of a proposed measure, this court examines the
text of the proposed measure itself.  Earls v. Myers, 330 Or 171,
175, 999 P2d 1134 (2000).  In this case, the proposed measure
consists of four sentences.  The fourth sentence states that the
people of the State of Oregon "shall keep safe from mortal harm
all innocent Human Life, acknowledging and protecting the Human
Person from the moment of fertilization until natural death." 
The first three sentences in the proposed measure explain the
rationale for the fourth sentence.  The text of the proposed
measure thus makes clear that its subject matter is stated in the
fourth sentence, that is, in the promise that the people of
Oregon will protect some human life from fertilization until
natural death.  The Attorney General must identify that subject
matter. (2)  Although there is no categorical prohibition against
also listing certain consequences, such as prohibited conduct, in
the caption, any such list may not interfere with reasonably
identifying the subject matter of the proposed measure. 
		In this case, the Attorney General's catalogue of
conduct that the Attorney General believes the proposed measure
would prohibit has interfered with the Attorney General's task of
reasonably identifying the subject matter of the proposed
measure.  To the extent that the Attorney General's caption
identifies the subject matter of the proposed measure at all, the
caption states only that the proposed measure would prohibit
"other 'mortal harm.'"  That truncated statement demonstrates the
problem of choosing to describe some of the likely effects of the
proposed measure, rather than identifying its subject matter. 
The statement in the caption that the proposed measure would
prohibit "other mortal harm" implies that the subject matter of
the proposed measure includes a promise to prohibit all "mortal
harm" to human life, including abolishing the death penalty.  The
text of the proposed measure makes clear that its subject matter
is a promise to protect only some human life from mortal harm.  
Because even that part of the Attorney General's caption does not
identify reasonably the subject matter of the proposed measure,
the caption does not comply substantially with the statutory
requirement, and the Attorney General must modify it.  We refer
the ballot title to the Attorney General for that purpose.
		We turn to petitioner's challenge to the "yes" and "no"
vote result statements.  A "yes" vote result statement must
describe in simple and understandable terms of 25 words or fewer
the result if a proposed measure is approved.  ORS 250.035(2)(b). 
A "yes" vote result statement must describe accurately the result
if the proposed measure is approved, Prozanski v. Myers, 326 Or
391, 395, 952 P2d 531 (1998), and it should be written so that an
affirmative response to the statement corresponds to an
affirmative vote on the proposed measure, ORS 250.035(4).  A "no"
vote result statement should be written so that, to the extent
possible, the wording of the "yes" vote result statement and "no"
vote result statement is parallel.  ORS 250.035(3).
		Petitioner asserts that he objects to the Attorney
General's "yes" and "no" vote result statements, but he advances
no argument about why those statements do not comply
substantially with the statutory requirements.  We therefore
decline to require the Attorney General to modify the "yes" and
"no" vote result statements on remand.  We note, however, this
court's observation that, when a caption must be modified, it
also may be appropriate to make conforming changes to the result
statements.  See Phillips v. Myers, 325 Or 221, 227, 936 P2d 964
(1997) (describing court's practice of making conforming changes
to result statements when modifying caption). 
		We turn to petitioner's contention that the Attorney
General's summary fails to comply with ORS 250.035(2)(d) because
it does not summarize concisely and impartially the proposed
measure and its major effect.  This court has explained that the
purpose of a summary is to "help voters understand what will
happen if the measure is approved" and "the breadth of its
impact."  Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Roberts, 308 Or 169, 175, 777 P2d
406 (1989).  We have considered petitioner's arguments in light
of that purpose and conclude that his arguments are not well
taken.  Nonetheless, in light of the changes that the Attorney
General must make to the caption and may choose to make to the
result statements, he may find it appropriate to reconsider the
wording of the summary as well.  Our holding that the summary
complies substantially with the statutory requirement should not
be understood as preventing the Attorney General from modifying
the summary, should he find it appropriate to do so.
		Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
	DURHAM, J., dissenting.
	I dissent from the majority's decision to require the
Attorney General to modify the caption of the ballot title
certified by the Attorney General.
	Two errors of law undermine the majority's conclusion. 
The first concerns the majority's failure to comply with ORS
250.085(6), which provides:
		"When reviewing a title prepared by the Attorney
General, the court shall not consider arguments
concerning the ballot title not presented in writing to
the Secretary of State unless the court determines that
the argument concerns language added to or removed from
the draft title after expiration of the comment period
provided in ORS 250.067."
	ORS 250.085(6) forbids this court to consider any
argument about asserted deficiencies in the Attorney General's
ballot title unless the petitioner presented the same argument in
writing to the Secretary of State.   ORS 250.067(1)
(describing procedure for submission of written comments to
Secretary of State regarding Attorney General's draft ballot
title).  This court has not hesitated to apply the prohibition in
ORS 250.085(6) when other petitioners have attempted to challenge
ballot titles on grounds not raised in written comments to the
Secretary of State.   Starrett/Nichols v. Myers, 330 Or 139,
143-44, 998 P2d 671 (2000) (declining to consider arguments not
raised in written comments to Secretary of State); McCoid v.
Kulongoski, 321 Or 452, 454, 900 P2d 1028 (1995) (same).  In
other contexts, this court applies differing standards regarding
the preservation of error by a party on appeal.   State v.
Hitz, 307 Or 183, 188, 766 P2d 373 (1988) (drawing attention to
distinctions between raising issue at trial, identifying source
for claimed position, and making particular argument; stating
that "[t]he first ordinarily is essential, the second less so,
the third least").  In the ballot title context, ORS 250.085(6)
establishes an unambiguous, bright-line standard that confines
the court's review to the arguments that the petitioner raised in
comments to the Secretary of State.  The statute also permits
consideration of arguments regarding wording added to or removed
from the draft ballot title after expiration of the comment
period, but that qualification plays no role in the present
proceeding.
	The reasons for the legislative policy embodied in ORS
250.085(6) are both obvious and important.  The Attorney General
has the principal statutory responsibility for preparing ballot
titles for certain state measures,  ORS 250.065(3), (4)
(describing role of Attorney General in drafting ballot titles);
ORS 250.067(2) (same), and must do so within short time periods. 
ORS 250.067(2) requires the Attorney General, in deciding whether
to revise a draft ballot title, to "consider any written comments
submitted" by members of the public under ORS 250.067(1). 
Consideration by this court of arguments that a petitioner failed
to submit during the comment phase frustrates the Attorney
General's responsibility to consider written comments under ORS
250.067(1) before certifying a ballot title, wastes the time of
those who perform the ballot title drafting function under
demanding conditions, and effectively substitutes this court for
the Attorney General as the entity that bears principal
responsibility for the preparation of ballot titles.
	In the present case, petitioner submitted written
comments regarding the Attorney General's draft ballot title. 
Petitioner complained that the beginning phrase, "Bans Abortion,"
was a main effect of the proposal but not its subject matter.  He
acknowledged that the proposal also would terminate certain other
practices mentioned in the Attorney General's caption.  He
argued, however, that the Attorney General's caption fell short
for one reason: it failed to disclose, in the words of the
proposal, that "God Almighty gives Human Life," and he emphasized
repeatedly that that was the proposal's subject matter and the
very reason for the proposal's emphasis on protecting human life
from fertilization until natural death.  In summary, petitioner
complained that the Attorney General's caption was inadequate
because it failed to disclose the reason that the proposed
measure would ban certain practices, such as abortion, i.e.,
"that Almighty God is the Source of that Life and that is why it
should be protected."
	ORS 250.085(6) permits the court to address only the
argument that petitioner submitted in writing to the Secretary of
State.  However, the majority never addresses that complaint. 
Instead, the majority recasts the issue concerning the caption as
a debate over the Attorney General's use of the acknowledged
consequences of the proposal to describe its subject matter,
rather than the proposal's more general wording that it would
protect "innocent human life" from fertilization until natural
death.  In addition, the majority goes on to consider another
argument that petitioner never submitted to the Secretary of
State, i.e., whether the Attorney General's phrase, "other mortal
harm," might be misleading, because it might suggest that the
proposal would abolish the death penalty.
	At no time, including on review in this court, has
petitioner ever claimed, as the majority now suggests, that the
phrase "other mortal harm" in the Attorney General's caption is
misleading or inaccurate, (3) or conveys a false message about the
proposal's possible impact on the death penalty.  In my view, the
majority's decision to require a modification of the caption for
reasons that petitioner never submitted to the Secretary of State
or this court violates the prohibition expressed in ORS
250.085(6).
	The second flaw in the majority's analysis is its
failure to conclude that the Attorney General's description of
the principal consequences of the proposal substantially complies
with his obligation to state accurately the proposal's "subject
matter."  The parties' legal dispute centers on their differing
constructions of the requirement in ORS 250.035(2)(a) that the
ballot title caption must "reasonably identif[y]" within 15 words
"the subject matter" of the proposed measure.  Instead of
addressing the meaning of those key statutory phrases, the
majority lists a series of words or phrases, drawn from this
court's cases, that describe the function of a ballot title
caption, such as "cornerstone," "headline," and "context for the
reader's consideration of the other information in the ballot
title."  Mabon v. Myers, ___ Or ___, ___, ___ P3d ___ (September
___, 2001) (slip op at 3) (quoting Greene v. Kulongoski, 322 Or
163, 175, 903 P2d 366 (1995)).  That approach to statutory
construction fails to answer the legal issue before the court and
departs markedly from this court's precedents regarding statutory
construction.  
	The majority opinion invites the reader to assume that
the statutory phrase, "subject matter," has an accepted
definition, which the majority never articulates, and asserts
that that unstated definition precludes the Attorney General's
description of the subject matter here.  As the following
discussion demonstrates, the correct construction of "subject
matter" in this context supports the Attorney General's approach
to drafting the caption.  At a minimum, the Attorney General's
caption substantially complies with the requirement that it
"reasonably identif[y]" the proposed measure's subject matter.
	The task of determining the meaning of the phrase,
"subject matter," involves a search for the legislature's
intention in using that phrase in ORS 250.035(2)(a).  A plethora
of this court's cases describe how this court ordinarily
approaches that task, including the following recent statement in
Coast Security Mortgage Corp. v. Real Estate Agency, 331 Or 348,
354-55, 15 P3d 29 (2000):
	"To determine the legislature's intent, we first
examine the text and context of the statute.  PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859
P2d 1143 (1993).  Context includes other provisions of
the same statute and other related statutes.  Id. at
611.  In analyzing text and context, 'words of common
usage typically should be given their plain, natural,
and ordinary meaning.'  Id.  If the legislature's
intent is clear from the examination of text and
context, then our inquiry is at an end.  Id."
	No statute provides a special definition of the
statutory phrase "subject matter."  Accordingly, we must construe
that phrase in accordance with its plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning.  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 2276 (unabridged
ed 1993), defines "subject matter" in the following pertinent
ways:
	"2 : matter presented for consideration: as a : the
essential facts, data, or ideas that constitute the
basis of spoken, written, or artistic expression or
representation; often : substance as distinguished from
the form esp. of an artistic or literary production b :
a subject of thought or study; often : conveyable
material (as information, knowledge, skill) actually
made available by a branch of knowledge or in a course
of study : the available factual content of a branch or
course as distinct from technique or method of
instruction or factors inherent in the individual
learner c : the topic of dispute in a legal matter." 
	Several features of that definition are noteworthy. 
The initiative petition proposes an amendment to the Bill of
Rights of the Oregon Constitution.  One reasonable method of
describing accurately the "matter presented for consideration" in
a proposed constitutional amendment is to specify the changes
that the initiative would produce regarding the legal rights that
Oregon citizens enjoy under the current Oregon Bill of Rights or
other laws.  The Attorney General has taken that approach, and he
contends that his description of the proposed constitutional
changes is accurate.  Neither petitioner nor the majority makes
any attempt to demonstrate that the Attorney General is wrong.
	The definition of "subject matter" also refers to
	"the essential facts, data, or ideas that constitute
the basis of spoken, written, or artistic expression or
representation; often : substance as distinguished from
the form * * *."
Id. (some emphasis added).  That definition permits the Attorney
General to focus the caption, as he did here, on the impact of
the proposed constitutional amendment on the rights of the people
under current law, rather than on the wording that the drafter of
the initiative amendment has chosen.
	The majority knows that those who draft proposed
initiatives sometimes seek to achieve significant legal
consequences without identifying those consequences in the
wording of the proposed measure.  In preparing a caption, on the
other hand, the Attorney General's touchstones are accuracy and
clarity, which often preclude a slavish devotion to the
particular words or phrases selected by the proponent of the
measure.  Indeed, in Earls v. Myers, 330 Or 171, 176, 999 P2d
1134 (2000), this court concluded that the Attorney General had
acted improperly in incorporating the phrase "freedom to choose"
from the text of a proposed measure into the ballot title
caption:
		"We agree with petitioner that, in this context,
the phrase 'freedom to choose' is likely to prejudice
voters regarding the measure.   Marr v. Thornton,
237 Or 503, 504, 392 P2d 458 (1964) (deleting phrase
'right-to-work' from ballot title caption as slogan
that amounted to argument for measure and that likely
would create prejudice).  It is true that the phrase
'freedom to choose' appears in the measure itself. 
However the Attorney General and this court are not
constrained to certify a ballot title that is slanted
toward passage or defeat of the measure.   Dirks v.
Myers, 329 Or 608, 616, 993 P2d 808 (2000) (court has
resisted attempts to incorporate into ballot title
terms or phrases that 'tend more to promote or defeat
passage of the measure than to describe its substance
accurately').  Proponents of a measure are not entitled
to engineer a favorable ballot title by incorporating
politically inflated terms or phrases in the text of
the measure in order to advance its passage.  Cf.
Bernard v. Keisling, 317 Or 591, 596-97, 858 P2d 1309
(1993) (court will not hesitate to look beyond words of
measure if those words obfuscate subject, chief
purpose, summary, or major effect of measure)."
	In this case, the Attorney General has done exactly
what this court said that he should have done in Earls.  The
proposed initiative addresses legal and moral topics that are
among the most controversial in contemporary life, i.e., the
moment at which human life begins and the extent to which society
should regulate activities that affect the beginning and end of
human existence.  The proposal incorporates repeated references
to God as well as various undefined terms and phrases, such as
"keep safe from mortal harm" and "innocent Human Life" that,
according to the Attorney General, fail to disclose the
proposal's substance and simply tend to promote its passage.  The
Attorney General has resisted inserting undefined and politically
charged phraseology from the proposal to avoid creating prejudice
or sympathy for the proposed measure.  The Attorney General has
chosen, instead, to set out the practical consequences of the
proposed initiative on the existing legal rights of Oregon's
citizens.  Earls expressly supports that approach.  The majority
faults the Attorney General for doing so, but fails to
demonstrate why the Attorney General's approach is not within the
range of his permissible options under ORS 250.035(2)(a) and
Earls to "reasonably identif[y]" the proposal's "subject matter."
	I agree with the majority's decision to decline to
modify the Attorney General's certified "yes" and "no" vote
result statements and the summary, because petitioner raises no
argument about why those segments of the certified ballot title
fall short of statutory requirements.  In light of the majority's
decision, the Attorney General may alter the result statements or
the summary if he deems a change necessary, but he has discretion
to decide whether to change those parts of the ballot title.  The
Attorney General is not under any compulsion from the court to
change those parts of the certified ballot title in any way.  The
only opinion that the court reaches, in its review under ORS
250.085(5) of the Attorney General's result statements and
summary, is the unanimous conclusion that those segments
substantially comply with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2)(b),
(c), and (d).
	For the reasons stated above, I dissent from the
majority's decision to require a modification of the Attorney
General's certified caption.
	Riggs and Balmer, JJ., join in this opinion.



1. 	Intervenors filed a motion to intervene on June 25,
2001.  Petitioner filed a document entitled "Petition for
Declaratory Judgment" on July 13 challenging this court's
authority to permit intervenors to respond to petitioner's
challenge to the Attorney General's certified ballot title.  We
treat that document as a response to intervenors' motion to
intervene and dismiss it as untimely.   ORAP 7.05(3) (setting
14-day limit on time for filing response to motion).


2. 	The text of the proposed measure uses the phrase
"innocent human life."  This court has criticized the Attorney
General for using terminology in a ballot title that mirrors
wording used in the proposed measure itself, if the terminology
"is not neutral and might mislead voters into supporting the
proposal without understanding its true effects."   Earls, 330
Or at 176 (declaring phrase "freedom to choose" likely to
prejudice voters).  The Attorney General might conclude that the
adjective "innocent" is not neutral and might mislead voters.  
Nothing in this opinion prohibits the Attorney General from
exercising his judgment in identifying the subject matter of the
proposed measure using neutral terms.


3. 	It is worth noting that petitioner himself incorporated
the unqualified phrase "mortal harm" in the caption of the ballot
title that he recommended to the Attorney General.  Petitioner's
recommended caption stated:  "Amends Constitution:  God Gives
Life, All Human Beings Protected from Mortal Harm, From
Fertilization until Natural Death."  The Attorney General could
not have divined, from petitioner's proposed caption and the
accompanying argument, that petitioner believed that the
reference to a prohibition on "mortal harm" somehow expanded the
subject of the measure into a ban on the death penalty, as the
majority now claims.