Title: DeHanes v. Rothman
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-167-97
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: April 19, 1999

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). O'HERN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. This appeal concerns the right of an attorney during summation to suggest to a jury an aggregate sum or bottom-line figure to award for a claim of unliquidated economic damages. The Court also reconsidered the doctrine of Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466 (1975), which sanctioned the use of expert opinion evidence to establish the effect of inflation on future wage losses in a wrongful death action, but prohibited the expert from testifying about the aggregate damages. In 1992, Mary Beth DeHanes' (DeHanes) husband, Joseph DeHanes(Joseph), died as a result of a tear in the inside lining of his aorta, the main artery to the heart, which caused the lining of the aorta to rupture and bleed into the area around the heart. Joseph was treated in the emergency room of Raritan Bay Medical Center by Dr. Rothman., who failed to diagnose the condition. Mary Beth DeHanes ultimately filed a survival action and one for wrongful death against Dr. Rothman and others. At trial in the matter, in support of the lost wage claim, DeHanes called an expert witness in labor economics, who projected the wages lost during Joseph's anticipated work expectancy. Although the expert prepared trial exhibits documenting his annual calculations, in keeping with Tenore, the expert did not offer a bottom-line or aggregate figure representing DeHanes' total economic loss, and his exhibits were not entered into evidence. He simply provided the jury with a basis for estimating such damages, suggesting methodologies for calculating the value of fringe benefits, deducting likely income taxes and personal consumption amounts, and reducing the future net losses to reflect the discount to current value. The expert witness also calculated the value of the family's lost household services. Although defense counsel cross-examined the expert, his calculations were not otherwise disputed by a defense expert. During summations, counsel for DeHanes referred to the expert's testimony as undisputed and further specifically calculated for the jury the total amount of the decedent's lost earnings and benefits to be $2,042,246. Following summation, the trial court instructed the jury that summations were not considered evidence and that it was free to disregard any statements made during summation that were inconsistent with the jury's beliefs or with inferences it had drawn from the evidence. The jury awarded DeHanes $75,000 as compensation on the survival claim for pain and suffering; $450,000 for the family's loss of companionship, guidance, and counseling; and $1,500,000 for the lost wages Joseph would have earned. Dr. Rothman appealed, claiming that DeHanes' attorney's summation violated the rule of Tenore. Relying on Lovenguth v. D'Angelo, 258 N.J. Super. 6 (App. Div. 1992), the Appellate Division held that Tenore does not forbid an attorney in summation from stating a bottom-line figure even though an expert may not mention the same aggregate sum. The Appellate Division thus affirmed DeHanes' counsel's provision of a bottom-line figure in summation. The Supreme Court granted Dr. Rothman's petition for certification. HELD: It was not improper for DeHanes' attorney to sum up for the jury the total of the year-by-year economic losses established by competent expert testimony; properly qualified experts may testify to the aggregate net sums of the economic losses that they have calculated and to introduce into evidence the exhibits they have prepared. 1. Given the trial judge's instruction to the jury that summations did not constitute evidence, having an attorney summarize net figures is not an undue intrusion upon the jury's function. (pp. 9-10) 2. Unlike damages for future pain, suffering, disability, and the like, the anticipated loss of future earnings can be calculated simply, accurately, and objectively. Thus, expert testimony is allowed to compute the future economic losses that a widow would suffer from the wrongful death of her husband. (pp. 10-12) 3. Notwithstanding the broadened attitudes about the need for and use of expert economic evidence, cases have regularly held that expert opinion evidence purporting to show a plaintiff's aggregate economic damages is improper. (pp. 12-13) 4. There is nothing so intrinsically unique about economic losses that the subject should cause departure from the regular rules regarding the introduction of expert testimony. Moreover, given their current level of sophistication, it is unlikely that jurors will be psychologically lulled into unquestioning acceptance of an expert's testimony. (pp. 14-16) 5. Other jurisdictions have permitted jurors to hear expert testimony on aggregate economic losses. (pp. 16-17) 6. A jury may rely on its common knowledge and experience to help it assess whether an aggregate sum or bottom-line figure presented by counsel or an expert represents fair and just compensation. Although such evidence should be deemed inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice, there is no empirical evidence that altering the rule of Tenore, which prohibits an expert from testifying to aggregate sums, will increase the likelihood of such risks. (pp. 17-19) 7. Courts should forbid counsel from suggesting that figures are undisputed merely because a defendant has not produced an expert. (pp. 18-19) 8. The Model Civil Jury Charge that is currently in use, which instructs the jury in respect of the relevancy of work-life expectancy tables and the determination of the present or current value of an award, is more complex than is necessary to convey the concept of a present-value discount, and an expert's testimony may simplify the jury's function in that respect. (pp. 19-20) 9. It is permissible to allow properly qualified experts to testify to the aggregate net sums of the economic losses that they have calculated and subject to the same qualifications concerning cautioning the jury against uncritical acceptance, to allow experts to introduce into evidence the exhibits that they have prepared. (p. 20) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion. MARY BETH DeHANES, Administratrix and Administratrix ad Prosequendum of the Estate of JOSEPH F. DeHANES and MARY BETH DeHANES, Individually, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. MICHAEL ROTHMAN, M.D., Defendant-Appellant, and DR. LORKIN, MADHO SHARMA, M.D., MEENA SINHA, M.D., RARITAN BAY MEDICAL CENTER, STEPHEN GERMOND, M.D., A. ABELOWITZ, R.N., M. MURRAY, R.N., R. VORA, R.N., S. SCHMIDT, R.N., JOHN DOE, M.D. (a fictitious name), PAUL SOE, M.D., (a fictitious name), RICHARD HOE, M.D. (a fictitious name), SUE SOE, R.N. (a fictitious name), MARY ROE, R.N. (a fictitious name), JAMES BROWN, R.N. (a fictitious name), R.N. (a fictitious name), SALLY BROWN (a fictitious name), MARY TOE (a fictitious name) and PETER POE (a fictitious name), Defendants. Argued October 27, 1998 -- Decided April 19, 1999 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Joseph P. La Sala argued the cause for appellant (McElroy, Deutsch &amp; Mulvaney, attorneys; Mr. La Sala and John T. Coyne, on the briefs). Michael B. Zerres argued the cause for respondents (Blume Goldfaden Berkowitz Donnelly Fried &amp; Forte, attorneys). Bruce H. Stern argued the cause for amicus curiae, Association of Trial Lawyers of America-New Jersey (Stark &amp; Stark, attorneys; Mr. Stern and Glen D. Gilmore, on the brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by O'HERN, J. This appeal concerns the right of an attorney during summation to suggest to a jury an aggregate sum or "bottom-line" figure to award for a claim of unliquidated economic damages. Specifically, the question is whether it was proper in this wrongful death action for the attorney for a decedent's surviving spouse and children to argue to the jury that the family had suffered a loss of approximately $2 million, of which $1.5 million represented income anticipated to be earned over the remaining years of the interrupted life of their husband and father. We hold that it was not improper for the attorney to sum up for the jury the total of the year-by-year economic losses established by competent expert testimony. This conclusion and other intervening circumstances occasioned us to reconsider the doctrine of Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466 (1975). That decision sanctioned the use of expert opinion evidence to establish the effect of inflation on future wage losses in a wrongful death action, but prohibited the expert from testifying about the aggregate damages for two reasons. Id. at 482. First, the Court found that the expert's tables reflecting aggregate damages assumed findings of fact outside of the expert's scope of expertise. Ibid. Second, the Court found that the "[expert's] projection of a gross figure . . . tends to exert an undue psychological impact leading to the danger of its uncritical acceptance by the jury in the place of its own function in evaluating the proofs." Id. at 482-83. Following oral argument, we requested that the parties brief the issue of whether Tenore should be revisited. Given the current rules governing the admission into evidence of expert testimony, the increased role of jurors in marshaling evidence prior to deliberations, see Rule 1:8-8(b) (allowing jurors to take notes during trial with judge's discretion), and the greater sophistication of current jurors, we are satisfied that it is appropriate to permit properly qualified experts to testify to the aggregate sums of their calculations. Courts should preface that testimony with cautionary instructions. A court should tell the jury that it is about to hear expert opinion testimony concerning the economic losses claimed in the case and that any aggregate figures offered by the expert are necessarily based on the reliability of the assumptions that the expert may have made as to future economic trends. Subject to a better formulation by our Model Civil Jury Charge Committee, the following reflects a possible jury instruction: Members of the jury: In this phase of the case you are about to hear expert opinion testimony on certain of the economic claims made. You will be the ultimate judges of the reliability of the witness' projections of future economic losses. Any net figures offered by the expert are necessarily based on the reliability of each of the assumptions that the expert has made concerning the future trends that the expert regards as probable. In evaluating the reliability of the projections, you will be aided by the cross-examination of the attorneys and by any evidence presented by the opposing parties. At this stage of the case, you should keep an open mind regarding the reliability of these figures and not give uncritical acceptance to any aggregate sums that you will hear. I repeat, it will be your responsibility and your responsibility alone to determine at the close of the case the amount of economic losses suffered by the claimant. The trial court instructed the jury in part: Like the openings the closings are not evidence. . . . So that to the extent that they make a statement as to what the evidence is or shows, to the extent that that's inconsistent with what you believe the evidence to have shown or the inferences that you choose to draw, you can disregard those statements because they are not evidence. The jury awarded plaintiff $75,000 as compensation for DeHanes' survival claim for pain and suffering; $450,000 for the family's loss of companionship, guidance and counseling; and $1,500,000 for the lost wages DeHanes would have earned. After the verdict, the trial court reduced the verdict to reflect the lost chance of seventy percent. On appeal, defendant claimed that the attorney's closing violated the rule of Tenore. The Appellate Division disagreed. Relying on Lovenguth, the Appellate Division held that Tenore does not forbid an attorney in summation from stating a bottom-line figure even though an expert may not mention the same aggregate sum. The Lovenguth court had reasoned that when a trial judge has properly instructed the jury that the attorney's argument should not be considered as evidence, an attorney's closing does not present the dangers posed by an expert's testimony. 258 N.J. Super. at 10. The Appellate Division thus affirmed counsel's provision of a bottom-line figure in summation. Id. at 11. We granted defendant's petition for certification. 153 N.J. 213 (1998). [State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208 (1984).] It strikes us that there is nothing so intrinsically unique about economic losses that the subject should cause us to refrain from following the regular rules regarding the introduction of expert testimony. We already permit experts to testify to subjects far more complex than a wage loss claim. See State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 199-201 (1997) (allowing expert testimony regarding DNA evidence in criminal case), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931, 111 S. Ct. 1336, 113 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1991); Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 125 N.J. 421, 452 (1991) (allowing expert opinion evidence on cancer causation even though full scientific consensus not yet reached). We also have already recognized that in a non-jury case, testimony concerning a gross dollar amount should not be prejudicial, particularly when the testimony is subject to cross-examination. Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 571 (1980). Other jurisdictions have had little difficulty in permitting jurors to hear expert testimony on aggregate economic losses. Chief Judge Becker succinctly stated the reasoning in Salas by Salas v. Wang, 846 F.2d 897 (3d Cir. 1988). Although projection of the aggregate damages and introduction of tables purporting to show the aggregate damages were improper under Tenore, [s]urely performing present value calculations could have assisted the jury here. Had the aggregate damages been excluded, the jury would simply have been presented with the individual damage items identified by the expert and would have had to make the proper present value calculation by itself (presumably guided by instruction from the court or expert testimony on how to perform the calculation). But it would have been more efficient and exact to have the expert do the calculation, and in our view, the spirit as well as the letter of the federal rules makes it appropriate that the district court permit the expert to do so. [John G. Koeltl and Robert B. Pringle, Use of Experts in Commercial Litigation: Discovery and Trial Techniques: The Use of Economic Experts, 345 PLI/Lit 245, 266-67 (Apr. 1, 1988).] In short, there is nothing especially complicated about a wage loss claim. To repeat what we said in Friedman, supra, "the anticipated loss of future earnings can be calculated simply, accurately, and objectively. Therefore, requiring that an award for these damages be discounted to present value is neither artificial nor unrealistic." 108 N.J. at 78. A jury's common knowledge and experience is always available to help it assess whether an aggregate sum or "bottom-line" figure presented by counsel or an expert represents fair and just compensation. This jury reduced the attorney's suggested sum for lost wages by approximately twenty percent. What is wrong is for counsel to say, as this counsel was permitted to say, that such evidence is "undisputed." The only sense in which the figures were undisputed was that for tactical reasons defendant had chosen not to produce its own expert. Courts should forbid counsel from suggesting that figures are undisputed merely because a defendant has not produced an expert. We have recently reinforced our rules to prevent run-away jury awards on this aspect of the law of personal injury reparations. Caldwell v. Haynes, 136 N.J. 422, 441-42 (1994) (setting aside jury verdict that constitutes "miscarriage of justice" because evidentiary deficiencies led to exaggerated award for past and future income). We have disapproved of unguided presentations to juries of lost wage claims: To rectify the uncertainties that surround the application of the net-income-evidence rule and the confusion that arises from the unstructured current practice, the burden of proving net income in personal-injury and wrongful-death actions should be placed clearly and squarely on the plaintiff. In so doing, we note that such a burden on the plaintiff should not be difficult to sustain because he or she should have easy access to proof of net income. Most of that evidence, such as pay stubs or tax returns, is readily at hand and will not involve complicated calculations. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion. NO. A-167 MARY BETH DeHANES, Administratrix and Administratrix ad Prosequendum of the Estate of JOSEPH F. DeHANES and MARY BETH DeHANES, Individually, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. MICHAEL ROTHMAN, M.D., Defendant-Appellant, and DR. LORKIN, et al., Defendants. DECIDED Closing statement. . . . In civil cases any party may suggest to the trier of fact, with respect to any element of damages, that unliquidated damages be calculated on a time-unit basis without reference to a specific sum. In the event such comments are made to a jury, the judge shall instruct the jury that they are argumentative only and do not constitute evidence. The comment to the Rule explains that the compromise effected by the rule is to continue the ban on the suggestion of specific monetary amounts either on a lump sum or time-unit basis but to permit counsel to argue to the trier of fact the appropriateness of employing a time-unit calculation technique for fixing any element of unliquidated damages. . . . The so-called "golden-rule" argument, that is, asking the jury to award an amount it would want for itself in similar circumstances, remains interdicted.