Title: State v. Henry F. McCall
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1994AP001213-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 19, 1996

No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-1213-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Henry F. McCall, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 JUNE 19, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The plaintiff-respondent-petitioner State 
of Wisconsin (State) seeks review of an unpublished decision of 
the court of appeals which reversed a judgment of conviction in 
the circuit court for Milwaukee County, the Honorable Charles B. 
Schudson presiding, after a jury found the defendant-appellant 
Henry F. McCall (McCall) guilty of second-degree reckless injury, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.23(2) (1991-92).  The court of 
appeals concluded that McCall's constitutional right to confront 
his accusers
1 was violated when the circuit court would not permit 
                     
     
1  The confrontation clause issue was raised sua sponte by 
the appellate court.  It was not the basis for the defendant's 
response to the State's objection at trial, nor was it argued in 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
2 
his counsel to cross-examine the victim regarding the dismissal of 
three charges
2 pending against him prior to his testimony at 
McCall's trial.  See State v. McCall, No. 94-1213-CR, unpublished 
slip op. at 2 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 1995).  The appellate court 
reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial. 
 Id.  
 
The issue before the court on this review is whether the 
court of appeals erred as a matter of law when it failed to give 
deference to the circuit court's discretionary act of limiting the 
scope of cross-examination.  We hold that the circuit court did 
not erroneously exercise its discretion or otherwise err when it 
concluded that defense inquiry on cross-examination regarding the 
three 
dismissed 
charges 
was 
not 
relevant, 
and 
therefore 
inadmissible.  The circuit court found that any relevance of the 
proffered 
evidence 
was 
outweighed 
by 
other 
considerations, 
including the risk of unfair prejudice, a strong potential for 
confusing the issues, and a waste of valuable trial time.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 904.03 (1993-94).
3 
(..continued) 
his appellate brief. 
     
2  The charges included battery, resisting an officer, and 
operating a motor vehicle without owner's consent. 
     
3  Section 904.03 provides as follows: 
 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
I. 
 
On February 22, 1992, Robert Wade (Wade) entered the 
apartment of his friend McCall, an individual from whom he had 
purchased cocaine in the past.  Wade had been drinking and smoking 
cocaine in celebration of his birthday on that evening, prior to 
going up to McCall's residence.  The facts regarding Wade's entry 
into the apartment and the ensuing scuffle between Wade and McCall 
are disputed.  What is clear is that Wade's wife, Kathleen Wade, 
was in McCall's apartment when Wade arrived.  Some form of 
altercation took place, and Wade was eventually shot in the 
shoulder by McCall.  The bullet permanently lodged in Wade's 
spinal column, resulting in a quadriplegic condition which has 
confined him to a wheelchair.  On the evening of the incident, he 
stated that he and McCall had been arguing, McCall had hit him on 
the head with the gun and shortly thereafter, shot him in the 
shoulder.   
 
In June 1992, several months after the shooting occurred, 
Wade was interviewed by a police detective at his home.  In 
recounting the events which had transpired in February, Wade 
stated to the officer that the only thing that he could remember 
that night was knocking on McCall's apartment door and later 
waking up in the hospital.  At trial, Wade testified that after 
knocking upon McCall's door, McCall opened the door and let him 
in.  McCall then closed and locked the door behind Wade.  
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
4 
According to Wade's testimony, McCall then turned around with a 
gun in his hand and put it at Wade's shoulder.  Wade's wife was 
hiding in the bathroom at the time and did not witness the 
shooting.  Wade could not remember the gun discharging, but simply 
stated that the last thing he could remember was McCall pushing 
the gun into his shoulder.   He then testified that he could not 
recall anything else that happened that evening until he awoke in 
the hospital and was being questioned by a police detective. 
 
McCall's 
version 
of 
the 
events 
that 
evening 
were 
substantially dissimilar.  McCall claimed that he shot Wade in 
self-defense, stating that after answering the knock on the door, 
and seeing that it was Wade, he attempted to shut the door, not 
intending to grant Wade entry into the apartment.  Wade allegedly 
forced his way past the door and made threatening gestures 
directed at McCall.  In response, McCall testified that he hit him 
on the head with the gun, so as to alleviate any further struggle. 
 When Wade persisted, McCall shot him in the shoulder.   
 
Wade represented the State's primary witness to refute 
McCall's self-defense theory.  During cross-examination of Wade, 
McCall attempted to impeach the witness by inquiring into the 
nature of an alleged agreement between Wade and the prosecutor 
regarding the recently dismissed charges pending against him.  
Though Wade specifically denied that any agreement in fact 
existed, the State objected, and a hearing was conducted outside 
the presence of the jury.   
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
5 
 
The circuit court sustained the State's objection, denying 
the defense permission to proceed with this line of questioning 
during cross-examination.  The circuit court judge articulated on 
the record the factors which he had considered in concluding that 
the proffered evidence was irrelevant and why its limited 
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of 
confusing the issues and wasting time on speculative and 
collateral matters.  McCall was subsequently convicted of the 
lesser-included charge, second-degree reckless injury.  Further 
facts will be noted as necessary in this opinion. 
 
II. 
 
McCall argues that it was reversible error for the circuit 
court to prohibit defense counsel from cross-examining Wade 
regarding the dismissal of three charges which had been pending 
prior to the start of McCall's trial.
4  The extent and scope of 
cross-examination allowed for impeachment purposes is a matter 
within the sound discretion of the circuit court.  Rogers v. 
State, 93 Wis. 2d 682, 689, 287 N.W.2d 774 (1980); Chapin v. 
State, 78 Wis. 2d 346, 352, 254 N.W.2d 286 (1977).  "The appellate 
court should reverse a trial court's determination to limit or 
prohibit a certain area of cross-examination offered to show bias 
only if the trial court's determination represents a prejudicial 
                     
     
4  Although McCall did not file a brief in the supreme court, 
this argument was presented in his brief to the court of appeals 
and is relevant to our review today. 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
6 
abuse of discretion."  State v. Lindh, 161 Wis. 2d 324, 348-49, 
468 N.W.2d 168 (1991) (citing State v. Whiting, 136 Wis. 2d 400, 
422, 402 N.W.2d 723 (Ct. App. 1987)).
5  No abuse of discretion 
will be found if a reasonable basis exists for the circuit court's 
determination.  State v. Oberlander, 149 Wis. 2d 132, 140-41, 438 
N.W.2d 580 (1989).   
 
During cross-examination, the defendant sought to probe the 
circumstances surrounding the dismissal of charges which had been 
pending against Wade prior to trial.  As the sole eyewitness for 
the prosecution, the accuracy and truthfulness of Wade's testimony 
were key elements in the State's case.  The nature of the inquiry 
was clearly directed to effectuate an attack on the credibility of 
Wade as a witness, designed to reveal possible biases, prejudices, 
or ulterior motives that Wade may have possessed, as they directly 
                     
     
5  Moreover, in Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 
N.W.2d 16 (1981), this court stated: 
 
A 
discretionary 
determination, 
to 
be 
sustained, 
must 
demonstrably be made and based upon the facts appearing 
in the record and in reliance on the appropriate and 
applicable law.  Additionally, and most importantly, a 
discretionary determination must be the product of a 
rational mental process by which the facts of record and 
law relied upon are stated and are considered together 
for the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable 
determination.  It is recognized that a trial court in 
an exercise of its discretion may reasonably reach a 
conclusion which another judge or another court may not 
reach, but it must be a decision which a reasonable 
judge or court could arrive at by the consideration of 
the relevant law, the facts, and a process of logical 
reasoning. 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
7 
related to his testimony against the defendant.
6  The State, 
however, objected to this line of inquiry on relevancy grounds.  
See Wis. Stat. § 904.01 (1993-94).
7  This court and the United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
have 
recognized 
that 
a 
defendant's 
opportunity to explore the subjective motives for the witness's 
testimony is a necessary ingredient of a meaningful cross-
examination.
8  
 
In Rogers, this court pronounced that "[t]he proper standard 
for the test of relevancy on cross-examination is not whether the 
answer sought will elucidate any of the main issues in the case 
                     
     
6  The change in testimony which McCall suggests is critical 
to the inference that some form of "dismissal for false testimony" 
agreement was in place involved Wade's contention for the first 
time at trial that the last thing he remembered was the defendant 
putting what appeared to be a gun to his shoulder.  As recognized 
by the circuit court, the significance placed upon this minimal 
discrepancy by McCall is misplaced.  At trial, McCall admitted 
that he was the one who had shot Wade in the upper chest, arguing 
that the shooting was in self-defense.  Therefore, there was no 
dispute as to who shot Wade, or how he was shot.  Further inquiry 
into this area would have proven both unnecessarily cumulative and 
a waste of trial time. 
     
7  Section 904.01 provides as follows: 
 
`Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. 
     
8  State v. Lenarchick, 74 Wis. 2d 425, 448, 247 N.W.2d 80 
(1976).  In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), the United 
States Supreme Court suggested that rather than accepting the 
witness's denial concerning bias, cross-examination should be 
permitted "to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as 
the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw 
inferences relating to the reliability of the witness."  Id. at 
318. 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
8 
but whether it will be useful to the trier of fact in appraising 
the credibility of the witness and evaluating the probative value 
of the direct testimony."  Rogers, 93 Wis. 2d at 689 (citing 
McCormick, Evidence, § 30 (2d Ed. 1972)).  Moreover, in Lindh, we 
highlighted the circumstances under which courts have properly 
excluded bias evidence: 
Other courts have delineated some of the prejudice factors 
which may warrant the exclusion of bias evidence.  One 
factor is whether the evidence would divert the trial to 
an extraneous issue.  Hossman v. State, 467 N.E.2d 416, 
418 (Ind. 1984).  A court can and should exclude bias 
evidence which has little bearing on the witness's 
credibility, but which would impugn the witness's 
character because such evidence "opens the door to 
improper considerations and lends to the confusion of 
the jury by placing undue emphasis on collateral 
matters."  People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 833 (Colo. 
1982).  If the bias evidence, taken as a whole, might 
have directed the jury's attention away from the case 
under consideration, it may be prejudicial.  Id. at 834. 
 
The trial court may exclude bias evidence if the very slight 
probative value of the evidence on the issue of bias 
fails to overcome its strong likelihood of confusing the 
issues and undue delay.  United States v. Jarabek, 726 
F.2d 889, 902 (1st Cir. 1984).  The appellate court 
should not find the trial court abused its discretion 
when the relevance of the proffered bias evidence was 
unclear and the risk of prejudice was real.  United 
States v. Sellers, 658 F.2d 230, 232 (4th Cir. 1981).  
The trial court may prohibit cross-examination in a 
certain area where to permit it would open up extraneous 
matters, for the trial court "`has responsibility for 
seeing that the sideshow does not take over the 
circus.'"  United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 438, 446 
(8th Cir. 1977). 
Lindh, 161 Wis. 2d at 363.
9   
                     
     
9  See also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) 
(holding that bias evidence which is only marginally relevant or 
which may confuse the issues is excludable); State v. Williamson, 
84 Wis. 2d 370, 384-85, 267 N.W.2d 337 (1978) (stating that 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
9 
 
Before deciding whether to grant McCall's request to explore 
what he perceived to be a "working relationship" between Wade and 
the prosecutor regarding trial testimony and the dismissal of 
pending charges, the circuit court gave heed to the extensive 
arguments of counsel in a hearing conducted outside the jury's 
presence.  After balancing the relevancy of the proffered evidence 
against the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the 
issues, see Wis. Stat. § 904.03 (1993-94), the circuit court 
demonstrated a logical reasoning process in sustaining the State's 
objection to continued inquiry into this line of questioning.  The 
circuit court reasoned that the dismissal of the three charges did 
not notably affect Wade's testimony at trial, stating: 
 
When we compare the statement given to the police and 
the statement given in court, that's simply not so.  It 
is a very small difference that would be typical.  A 
difference between a summary of the victim's statement 
immediately after an event given to police and testimony 
in court. 
 
 
Next, the difference that does exist relates to whether 
the victim remembers nothing at all or remembers 
something being put to his shoulder.  Well, that is a 
difference on something that as I understand it is not 
in dispute. 
 
 
From what I understand the defense theory is here, there 
is not a denial that there was a gun, there's not a 
denial that there was a gunshot, there's not a denial 
that the defendant was the shooter.  So in this very 
small area of difference, we are not entering any area 
of dispute whatsoever. 
 
(..continued) 
evidence which is relevant to provide bias "must also satisfy sec. 
904.03, Stats., requiring the trial court to weigh the probative 
effect of the evidence against its prejudicial effect"). 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
10 
 
Another way I suppose to phrase that is that if in fact 
the witness had suddenly decided to remember things that 
he didn't really remember, he certainly would be 
remembering much more than he says he remembers today. 
 
 
With all that in mind, I do not see any proper basis on 
which the Court should allow there to be questioning on 
what would prove to be a wholly distracting and 
speculative area. 
The lack of any demonstrable impact of the dismissal of charges on 
Wade's testimony was but one of the various factors considered by 
the circuit court in exercising its discretion to limit the scope 
of cross-examination.  Compare State v. Nerison, 136 Wis. 2d 37, 
46, 401 N.W.2d 1 (1987) (discussing the need for full disclosure 
of terms of agreements struck with witnesses in order to preserve 
defendant's right to fair trial). 
 
In reaching its decision, the court contemplated the 
prosecutor's benign grounds for dismissing the pending charges 
against Wade, namely, his permanently paralyzed state which would 
make incarceration difficult and would effectively prevent Wade 
from committing assaultive crimes or stealing cars in the future. 
 The prosecutor further indicated that Wade's involvement in 
vocational rehabilitation, drug and alcohol therapy, as well as 
physical therapy, did not warrant his placement on probation, as 
to do so would simply be a waste of time and resources.   
 
Though 
given 
the 
opportunity 
to 
discredit 
these 
pronouncements, 
McCall 
was 
unable 
to 
offer 
any 
proof 
to 
substantiate his claim of a clandestine agreement between Wade and 
the prosecutor.  The record in this case bolsters the conclusion 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
11 
that the minimal variance in Wade's trial testimony would not 
support a reasonable inference that Wade was cooperating in accord 
with the terms of a prosecutorial deal, or perhaps, even, that he 
believed he may have been doing so.  Thus, we find that a defense 
inquiry based upon this purely speculative theory is too far 
afield of any rational relationship to the truthful character of 
the witness or his testimony to consider it a prejudicial exercise 
of discretion to exclude the proffered testimony. 
 
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence offered by 
McCall to afford the jury a basis to infer that Wade's credibility 
was such that he would be less likely than the average trustworthy 
citizen to be truthful in his testimony.  Defense counsel was able 
to solicit the following information regarding Wade's character 
for truthfulness during cross-examination:  Wade had ten prior 
criminal convictions; he had been in prison and had problems with 
alcohol; Wade had bought cocaine from McCall on more than one 
occasion; he had been drinking all day and had smoked cocaine 
prior to the shooting; Wade was attending drug and alcohol 
counseling at the time of trial; he had a bad temper but claimed 
to have learned how to control it over the years; and finally, 
Wade could not recall giving a statement to police on June 15, 
even though this was only a month before trial and he had in fact 
given such a statement.  
 
The introduction of this evidence to the jury regarding the 
truthful character of the State's key witness was reiterated again 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
12 
during closing arguments.  The jury's conviction on the lesser-
included offense of second-degree reckless injury would seem to 
support the State's contention that the evidence admitted was in 
fact utilized to discredit the testimony offered by Wade, as the 
jury was not able to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 
McCall had acted with utter disregard for human life, an element 
required for conviction of the charge of first-degree reckless 
injury.  See Wis. Stat. § 940.23(1) (1993-94).  Brief for 
Petitioner at 30. 
 
Although a defendant is entitled to significant latitude 
regarding the extent and scope of an inquiry to explicate the 
witness's bias, it is the duty of the circuit court to curtail any 
undue prejudice by limiting cross-examination, including the 
exclusion of bias evidence which would divert the trial to 
extraneous matters or confuse the jury by placing undue emphasis 
on collateral issues.  The circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion when it concluded that further inquiry 
into the existence of an alleged, though unproven agreement, would 
be wholly distracting and speculative.  The bias evidence which 
McCall wished to introduce would have unnecessarily directed the 
jury's attention away from the case under consideration, and would 
have been unduly prejudicial.   
 
After considering the appropriate law and relevant facts, the 
circuit court exercised its discretionary authority to limit 
cross-examination, concluding that any relevance of the proffered 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
13 
evidence was outweighed by these statutory considerations.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 904.03 (1993-94).  We therefore find that the court 
of appeals erred as a matter of law when it substituted its 
discretion for that of the circuit court. 
 
III. 
 
We now turn to the court of appeals' conclusion, involving an 
issue raised sua sponte, that because the circuit court refused to 
permit cross-examination involving the dismissed charges, McCall 
was impermissibly denied his right to confront witnesses against 
him under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
10 
 McCall, No. 94-1213-CR, unpublished slip op. at 4.  Due to the 
fact that the testimony which McCall sought to elicit was not 
relevant, by definition, we find that McCall's confrontation right 
under the Sixth Amendment was not violated. 
 
 
This court and the United States Supreme Court have 
recognized that a defendant's right to confront the witnesses 
against him is central to the truthfinding function of the 
criminal trial.  Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-47 (1990); 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980); Mattox v. United States, 
156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); Rogers, 93 Wis. 2d at 692-93.  In 
                     
     
10  The sixth amendment to the Constitution provides in part: 
 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
 . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor  . . . ." 
 The Wisconsin Constitution, art. I, § 7 provides as follows: "In 
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . .  
to meet the witnesses face to face; to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf . . . ." 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
14 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), the United States Supreme 
Court declared that "[t]he main and essential purpose of 
confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of 
cross-examination."  Id. at 315-16 (quoting 5 J. Wigmore, 
Evidence, § 1395, p. 123 (3d. ed. 1940)).  The right of cross-
examination is more than a desirable rule of trial procedure.  It 
is, indeed, "an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind 
of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal."  
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).   However, the right 
to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in 
appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests 
in the criminal trial process.  Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 
284, 295 (1973).  As acknowledged in the case of Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1985): 
It does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from 
imposing any limits on defense counsel's inquiry into 
the potential bias of a prosecution witness.  On the 
contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause 
is 
concerned 
to 
impose 
reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on 
concerns 
about, 
among 
other 
things, 
harassment, 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, 
or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally 
relevant.  And as we observed earlier this Term, "the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for 
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that 
is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, 
the defense might wish."  Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 
U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam) (emphasis in original). 
Id. at 679.  This court has similarly stated that while the right 
to confront one's accusers is protected by the constitution, this 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
15 
right is not violated when the court precludes a defendant from 
presenting evidence which is irrelevant or immaterial.  Rogers, 93 
Wis. 2d at 692-93.
11 
 
As indicated earlier, we find that the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretionary authority to limit the scope of cross-
examination, foreclosing the defense from presenting speculative 
and irrelevant evidence designed to confuse the issues in the 
instant case, and interject undue prejudice into the jury's 
decision making process.  We conclude that the circuit court did 
not err in its ruling, and thus, there was no constitutional 
violation in precluding McCall from introducing such evidence. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  
                     
     
11  See also Chapin v. State, 78 Wis. 2d 346, 353, 254 N.W.2d 
286 (1977); State v. Becker, 51 Wis. 2d 659, 666-67, 188 N.W.2d 
449 (1971); Milenkovic v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 272, 286, 272 N.W.2d 
320 (Ct. App. 1978). 
 
No. 94-1213.SSA 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (dissenting).   I write separately 
because I would affirm the court of appeals' holding that the 
circuit court denied the defendant his right to confrontation 
under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.   
 
Shortly before the defendant's jury trial was scheduled to 
begin, three charges--battery, resisting an officer and operating 
a motor vehicle without the owner's consent--then pending against 
the State's star witness (Wade)
12 were dismissed upon motion of the 
prosecutor who had been assigned to try the case against the 
defendant.  Moreover, Wade's testimony changed during the interval 
between his initial interview with the police and his testimony at 
trial.   
 
The defendant should have been afforded an opportunity to 
question Wade regarding whether Wade's testimony at trial was 
influenced by a subjective belief that the State would treat him 
more leniently if his testimony contributed to the defendant's 
conviction.  I conclude that in denying the defendant this 
opportunity, 
the 
circuit 
court 
violated 
his 
right 
to 
confrontation. 
                     
     
12  As the majority points out, Majority op. at 6, "the 
accuracy and truthfulness of Wade's testimony were key elements in 
the State's case" because he was the sole eyewitness who testified 
for the prosecution. 
 
No. 94-1213.SSA 
 
 
 
2 
 
The exposure of a witness's motivation in testifying 
represents 
"a 
proper 
and 
important 
function 
of 
the 
constitutionally protected right of cross-examination."  Davis v. 
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974) (citation omitted).
13  See also 
State v. Lenarchick, 74 Wis. 2d 425, 446, 247 N.W.2d 80 (1976);
14 
State v. Lindh, 161 Wis. 2d 324, 371-72, 468 N.W.2d 168 (1991) 
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting).  
                     
     
13  In Davis, the Court held that it was error to bar cross 
examination of a state witness on probation because he was a 
juvenile.  There was no suggestion in Davis that the State of 
Alaska had actually threatened to revoke the witness's probation 
or that the witness was a suspect in the underlying case.  
Nevertheless, the Court refused to dismiss the possibility that 
the jury, as sole judge of the credibility of a witness, would 
have accepted defense counsel's theory that the witness made a 
mistaken identification because he was anxious that if he did not 
cooperate with the police, his probation might be revoked or he 
himself might become a suspect.  Therefore, stated the Court, 
"[t]he State's policy interest in protecting the confidentiality 
of a juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding of so 
vital a constitutional right as the effective cross-examination 
for bias of an adverse witness."  Davis, 415 U.S. at 320.   
     
14Even though that expectation were absurd, defense 
counsel had the right and duty to explore the 
witness' motives.  When a witness has been 
criminally charged by the state, he is 
subject to the coercive power of the state 
and can also be the object of its leniency.  
The witness is aware of that fact, and it may 
well influence his testimony.  A defendant, 
as 
an 
ingredient 
of 
meaningful 
self-
examination, must have the right to explore 
the 
subjective 
motives 
for 
the 
witness' 
testimony. 
 
Lenarchick, 74 Wis. 2d at 447-48.  
 
No. 94-1213.SSA 
 
 
 
3 
 
I would agree with the majority when it observes that the 
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation does not prevent the 
circuit court from imposing limits on defense counsel's inquiry 
into the potential bias of a prosecution witness.  Majority op. at 
14 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1985)).  
But as the Van Arsdall opinion also makes clear in the very next 
paragraph, it does not follow that a court may prohibit "all 
inquiry into the possibility that [a witness] would be biased as a 
result of the State's dismissal" of pending charges.  Van Arsdall, 
475 U.S. at 679.  In prohibiting defense counsel from questioning 
Wade regarding whether his testimony might have been influenced by 
the State's decision to drop pending charges against him, the 
circuit court imposed precisely the sort of blanket prohibition 
that the Van Arsdall court found unconstitutional.   
 
Accordingly, I conclude that the court of appeals was correct 
when it determined that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation was violated.  I would affirm the court of appeals' 
mandate, reversing the judgment and remanding to the circuit 
court. 
 
For the reasons set forth, I dissent.   
 
 
 
No. 94-1213.wab 
 
 
 
1 
 
   
 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.  (dissenting).   There were only two 
witnesses to the alleged crime: the accuser Wade and the accused 
McCall.  The jury verdict necessarily depended on the word of one 
versus the other.  Credibility of each person as a witness was 
crucial:  the defendant said "self-defense," the accuser changed 
his initial story of "no recollection" to one in which he accused 
the defendant of attacking him.  Yet the circuit court did not 
allow the accused to cross-examine his accuser with respect to an 
essential aspect of Wade's credibility:  some weeks prior to 
trial, the district attorney dropped three pending unrelated 
criminal charges against the accuser Wade.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§904.03 provides in part that this cross-examination may be 
excluded if its probative value is "substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading of the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence" 
(emphasis 
supplied). 
 
Not 
only 
is 
this 
evidence 
not 
"substantially" outweighed by the dangers, but in fact none of 
these factors are present.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
  
My difference  with the majority is easily framed.  Defendant 
McCall maintains that on February 22, 1992, he was in his 
apartment with a woman named Kathleen Wade when her husband, 
Robert Wade, came to the apartment.  McCall testified that Wade 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
2 
pounded on his door, forced his way in when McCall opened the 
door, and came at him in a menacing way.  McCall claims he shot 
Wade in self-defense. 
 
Wade's story was different.  Wade, in fact, had two stories. 
 When first questioned by the police after the shooting, Wade 
stated that all he remembered was knocking on McCall's door, and 
then waking up in the hospital.  At trial, however, Wade stated 
that he remembered being allowed into McCall's apartment, and then 
being shot by McCall for no reason. 
 
At the time of the shooting, Wade had three criminal charges 
pending against him, all unrelated to this incident.  Before 
McCall's trial, at which Wade was to testify for the State, the 
prosecutor dropped the charges against Wade.  McCall claims that 
the circuit court erred when it barred him from cross-examining 
Wade about the dropping of the three pending charges against Wade 
at the time of McCall's trial.  According to McCall, questioning 
Wade about the dropping of the charges goes directly to Wade's 
credibility.  If, from Wade's testimony, the jury is persuaded 
that Wade changed his story because he was expecting some sort of 
leniency in return for his testimony in favor of the State, Wade's 
credibility would be irreparably damaged.  The circuit court, 
however, found that questions relating to the dropping of the 
charges would unnecessarily waste time and confuse the jury, 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
3 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 904.03, and the majority agreed.  I 
disagree. 
 
The majority concedes that since Wade was the sole witness 
for the prosecution, "the accuracy and truthfulness of Wade's 
testimony were key elements in the State's case."  Maj. Op. at 6. 
 The majority also points out that the inquiry into the dropping 
of the charges was clearly directed at Wade's credibility as a 
witness.  Moreover, the majority admits that "a defendant's 
opportunity to explore the subjective motives for the witness's 
testimony is a necessary ingredient of a meaningful cross-
examination."  Id. at 7 (citing State v. Lenarchick, 74 Wis. 2d 
425, 448, 247 N.W. 2d 80 (1976)).  And yet, having made these 
concessions, the majority still finds that an inquiry into the 
dropping of the charges against Wade was properly barred by the 
circuit court, saying that "(t)he bias evidence which McCall 
wished to introduce would have unnecessarily directed the jury's 
attention away from the case under consideration, and would have 
been unduly prejudicial." Id. at 12.   
 
It is inconsistent at best for the majority to say in one 
part of its opinion that "the accuracy and truthfulness of Wade's 
testimony were key elements in the State's case," and say in 
another 
part 
of 
the 
opinion 
that 
this 
evidence 
would 
"unnecessarily direct the jury's attention away from the case . . 
. ."  How can the truthfulness of Wade's testimony be key elements 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
4 
at trial yet cross examination of McCall about the dropping of the 
three charges unnecessarily direct the jury's attention away from 
the case?  How could this have been, in the words of the majority, 
"unduly prejudicial"  when credibility was the only issue? 
   
In State v. Lindh, 161 Wis. 2d 324, 468 N.W.2d 168 (1991), 
this court concluded that evidence relating to the potential bias 
of a witness may be excluded if its slight probative value fails 
to overcome its strong likelihood of confusing the issues and 
undue delay.  The majority cites Lindh to support its conclusion 
that allowing McCall to cross-examine Wade about any possible 
agreement he had with the State would unnecessarily confuse the 
issues and waste valuable trial time.  However, the majority fails 
to tell us how such cross-examination would lead to those 
undesirable results. 
 
Furthermore, Lindh actually supports McCall's claim.  In 
Lindh we said that in cases where there exists a "prototypical 
form of bias," i.e., "a situation in which a witness might have or 
realistically perceive an interest in testifying so as to favor 
the prosecution," Lindh, 161 Wis. 2d at 354, "the possibility of 
bias, motive and interest of the witness is particularly distinct 
and immediate."  Id. at 356.   
 
Where the witness knows that his testimony is of value to the 
prosecution, and the prosecuting attorneys are the same ones who 
charged the witness with other crimes, there is a reasonable 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
5 
inference that the witness considers himself to be in a position 
where his testimony could affect the charges pending against him. 
 In such a situation, a jury might reasonably find that the 
witness had a motive for testifying favorably for the prosecution. 
 Id. at 356-57. 
 
While the witness in Lindh did not exhibit a "prototypical 
form of bias," the witness in this case, Wade, does.  The three 
charges (battery, resisting an officer, and operating a motor 
vehicle without the owner's consent) pending against Wade were 
dropped by the prosecutor, the same one prosecuting McCall, 
immediately before trial.  While the prosecutor claims that the 
charges were dropped solely because Wade was in a permanent state 
of paralysis, nothing in the record indicates whether or not Wade 
himself perceived there to be some sort of deal between himself 
and the prosecutor.   
 
The majority and the circuit court place emphasis on the 
benign motives of the prosecutor in dropping the charges.  The 
prosecutor's motives may have been benign, but his motives are 
irrelevant.  What is relevant here is how Wade perceived the 
situation, not how the prosecutor did.   
 
The jury should have been permitted to see Wade respond to an 
inquiry into his motives for testifying.  If Wade believed that 
the prosecutor would drop the charges against him in exchange for 
his testimony, or if Wade believed that the charges could be 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
6 
resurrected if he failed to testify as he did, his credibility 
could certainly have fallen in the eyes of the jury.     
 
The facts are critical to understanding the basis of my 
dissent.  According to the record, Wade somehow remembered an 
important fact about the shooting that he could not remember 
immediately after the shooting.  Testimony by police officers who 
questioned Wade in the hospital suggests that Wade could not 
remember much at all of what happened the night of the shooting.  
And yet, when testifying in court, Wade stated that he remembered 
McCall pushing him up against a wall and putting "something" 
against his shoulder.  This is an extremely important fact because 
it goes to whether or not McCall was acting in self-defense.   
 
McCall maintains that Wade came after him and that, while 
Wade was attempting to get the gun away from him, McCall shot Wade 
in the shoulder.  McCall's story is just as plausible, if not more 
so, than Wade's story.  According to Elvis Winters' testimony, 
Wade had a habit of drinking heavily and, on the night of the 
shooting, was drinking heavily and picking fights with people in 
his building.  In addition, Wade's wife testified that Wade often 
got drunk, and that he had a bad temper.   
 
As for the testimony of Wade himself, it is clear from the 
record that Wade did not have his story straight.  At the trial, 
Wade remembered some things, but not others, and occasionally 
contradicted himself.  When it comes to believing one witness over 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
7 
the other, Wade's credibility is certainly subject to question.  
And yet the circuit court, and the majority, seem to feel that the 
change in Wade's story was insignificant.  As I see it, it was 
most significant.  
 
There are three possible explanations for Wade's sudden 
recalled memory.  First, he may just have remembered.  This 
explanation, however, while possible, hardly seems plausible in 
light of the testimony given by a number of people regarding 
Wade's condition on the night of the incident.  According to 
testimony given by Wade's wife, the building security guard, and 
by Wade himself, Wade had been drinking heavily and smoking crack 
cocaine that night and was, in the words of a witness, "wasted."  
It is difficult to imagine that someone in that condition could 
remember events in such detail.  Moreover, it is unlikely that 
Wade's memory would be better several months later, i.e., at the 
trial, than it was even one day later, i.e., at the hospital. 
 
The second possible explanation for Wade's recalled memory is 
that he simply wanted to get back at McCall for something.  
However, nothing in the record indicates that Wade had any 
animosity towards McCall.  In fact, the record reflects that the 
two men had a very amicable relationship. 
 
The third possible reason why Wade suddenly "remembered" is 
that he perceived he had an interest in testifying favorably for 
the State in order to receive favorable treatment from the 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
8 
prosecutor for his own crimes.  Although other alternatives might 
exist, this is certainly a highly plausible explanation. 
 
Nothing in the record indicates whether Wade's sudden 
recalled memory came before or after the prosecutor dropped the 
three pending charges against him, and we will never know.  Since 
the defense was prohibited from asking Wade what he perceived 
about the dropping of the charges, the jury was unable to 
determine whether or not Wade's story was fabricated or at least 
enhanced in order to receive more lenient treatment for his own 
crimes from the prosector.    
 
The majority quotes the circuit court's reasoning for not 
allowing cross-examination on this issue, and agrees with the 
circuit court that this discrepancy as to what Wade remembered is 
a "very small difference."  Maj. Op. at 9.  Small?  This 
discrepancy in Wade's story has an enormous effect on the 
credibility of McCall's claim of self-defense.  If Wade could not 
remember anything, there would be reason to believe McCall's 
story.  If Wade does remember the attack being unprovoked, 
McCall's story loses credibility.   
 
How could the issue of whether or not McCall acted in self-
defense be characterized as "small?"  It is the very issue upon 
which this case rests! 
 
The majority goes on to state that the "lack of any 
demonstrable impact of the dismissal of charges on Wade's 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
9 
testimony was but one of the various factors considered by the 
circuit court in exercising its discretion to limit the scope of 
cross-examination."  Id. at 9.  How can the majority say this with 
such certainty when we have no idea how Wade would have responded 
under cross-examination?  Moreover, the circuit court had no idea 
how Wade would have responded. 
 
The majority also states that McCall "was unable to offer any 
proof to substantiate his claim of a clandestine agreement between 
Wade and the prosecutor."  Maj. Op. at 10.  How could he offer any 
proof when he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine Wade on 
this issue?  Furthermore, whether or not there was an actual 
agreement between Wade and the prosecutor is irrelevant.  What 
matters is whether or not Wade believed that testifying favorably 
for the State would help his own situation, and thus compel him to 
fabricate or enhance his story. 
 
The majority points out that McCall solicited a great deal of 
information about Wade regarding his character for truthfulness.  
While this is correct, the problem with the majority's reasoning 
is that none of the information about Wade's character goes to his 
motive to fabricate.  The essential issue in this case is whether 
or not McCall acted in self-defense.  Wade first stated that he 
remembered nothing about being shot.  He then testified in court, 
after the charges against him had been dropped, that Wade attacked 
him unprovoked.  The inquiry into what Wade believed about the 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
10 
dropping of the charges is critical to determining whether or not 
Wade's story about an unprovoked attack is credible. 
 
The circuit court judge erred as a matter of law by not 
allowing  McCall to cross-examine Wade about the dropping of the 
charges against him.  The majority and the circuit court believe 
that such an inquiry into the dropping of the charges against Wade 
would confuse the issues and would be both unnecessarily 
cumulative and a waste of time, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 904.03.  
The majority and the circuit court are in error.   
 
First, in terms of confusing the issues, I fail to discern 
how this inquiry would have confused anything, and the majority 
does not tell us how it would.  Wade's response to such an inquiry 
would merely have affected his credibility one way or the other.   
 
Second, the testimony would not have been unnecessarily 
cumulative.  The majority claims that since we already know who 
shot Wade, and how he was shot, any further inquiry into the area 
would be repetitive.  But the issue was not "who" or "how," the 
issue is "why."  Allowing the jury to hear whether or not Wade 
understood there to be an agreement with the prosecutor would go 
to why Wade was shot, not how or by whom he was shot. 
 
Lastly, this inquiry would not have caused undue delay.  It 
could hardly have taken more than a few short minutes.  For 
something as critical as Wade's motives for testifying, that would 
have been a few minutes well spent. 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
11 
 
Therefore, I would affirm the court of appeals, but on 
different grounds.  I conclude the circuit court misused its 
discretion under Wis. Stat. §904.03 by not allowing any inquiry 
into Wade's motives for testifying as he did.  Accordingly, I 
would not reach the issue of McCall's 6th Amendment Right of 
Confrontation. 
 
No. 94-1213-CR 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-1213-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Henry F. McCall, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant, 
 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
  
 
 
Reported at:  192 Wis.2d 763, 532 N.W.2d 469 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
June 19, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 30, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
CHARLES B. SCHUDSON 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., dissents (Opinion Filed) 
 
 
 
BABLITCH, J., dissents (Opinion filed) 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Daniel J. O'Brien, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief (in the Court 
of Appeals) by Mary Louise Radzimowski, Milwaukee and oral 
argument by Mary Louise Radzimowski.