Title: Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc. v. Superior Court of Alameda County
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S250047
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: April 30, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
NATIONWIDE BIWEEKLY ADMINISTRATION, INC., et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, 
Respondent; 
THE PEOPLE,  
Real Party in Interest. 
 
S250047 
 
First Appellate District, Division One 
A150264 
 
Alameda County Superior Court 
RG15770490 
 
 
 April 30, 2020 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the 
Court, in which Justices Chin, Corrigan and Groban concurred. 
 
Justice Kruger filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices 
Liu and Cuéllar concurred.  
 
1 
NATIONWIDE BIWEEKLY ADMINISTRATION, INC. v. 
SUPERIOR COURT 
S250047 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
Under two of California’s most prominent consumer 
protection statutes — the unfair competition law (UCL)1 and the 
false advertising law (FAL)2 — the Attorney General or local 
prosecuting authorities may bring a civil action against a 
business that has allegedly engaged in an unfair, unlawful or 
deceptive business act or practice or false or misleading 
advertising and may obtain civil penalties as well as injunctive 
relief and restitution in such an action.  In this case we must 
decide whether, when the government seeks civil penalties as 
well an injunction or other equitable remedies under those 
statutes, the causes of action are to be tried by the court (that 
is, the trial judge) or, instead, by a jury. 
For more than 45 years, a uniform line of California Court 
of Appeal decisions has held that such causes of action under the 
UCL and FAL are to be tried by the court rather than by a jury.  
                                        
1  
The unfair competition law is set forth at Business and 
Professions Code section 17200 et seq.  Although the Legislature 
has not given an official name to these statutory provisions, the 
legislation has generally been referred to as the unfair 
competition law, and we will refer to this statute as the UCL.  
(See Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular 
Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 169, fn. 2.)   
2  
The false advertising law (FAL) is set forth at Business 
and Professions Code section 17500 et seq.   
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In the current writ proceeding in this case, however, the Court 
of Appeal, relying primarily on a decision of the United States 
Supreme Court applying the civil jury trial provision of the 
Seventh Amendment to the federal Constitution — Tull v. 
United States (1987) 481 U.S. 412 (Tull) — disagreed with the 
earlier line of decisions and held that the jury trial provision of 
the California Constitution should be interpreted to require a 
jury trial in any action brought under the UCL or FAL in which 
the government seeks civil penalties in addition to injunctive or 
other equitable relief.  We granted review to resolve the conflict 
in the Court of Appeal decisions. 
For the reasons discussed hereafter, we conclude that the 
causes of action established by the UCL and FAL at issue here 
are equitable in nature and are properly tried by the court 
rather than a jury.  As we explain, the legislative history and 
underlying purpose of the statutory provisions in question 
demonstrate that these very broadly worded consumer 
protection statutes were fashioned to permit courts to utilize 
their traditional flexible equitable authority, tempered by 
judicial experience and familiarity with the treatment of 
analogous business practices in this and other jurisdictions, in 
evaluating whether a challenged business act or practice or 
advertising should properly be considered impermissible under 
these statutory provisions. 
With regard to petitioners’ constitutional claim, it is firmly 
established that California’s constitutional jury trial provision 
preserves the right to jury trial in civil actions comparable to 
those legal causes of action in which the right to jury trial 
existed at the time of the first Constitution’s adoption in 1850 
and does not apply to causes of action that are equitable in 
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nature.  At early common law, “legal” causes of action (or 
“actions at law”) typically involved lawsuits in which the 
plaintiff sought to recover money damages to compensate for an 
injury caused, for example, by the defendant’s breach of contract 
or tortious conduct, whereas “equitable” causes of action (or 
“suits in equity”) sought relief that was unavailable in actions 
at law, such as an injunction to prohibit ongoing or future 
misconduct or an order requiring a defendant to provide specific 
performance or disgorge ill-gotten gains.  The consumer 
protection statutory causes of action at issue here are quite 
different from any early common law cause of action that was in 
existence at the time the civil jury trial provision of the 
California Constitution was first adopted.  Given the nature of 
the substantive standard to be applied and the remedies 
afforded by the statutes, we conclude that the gist of both the 
UCL and FAL causes of action at issue here is equitable and 
consequently such actions are properly tried by the court rather 
than by a jury. 
As further explained, the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Tull, supra, 481 U.S. 412, relied upon by the Court 
of Appeal below, does not govern this case for a variety of 
reasons.  To begin with, the Tull decision rests upon the federal 
high court’s interpretation of the civil jury trial provision of the 
Seventh Amendment to the federal Constitution, and that 
court’s decisions explicitly hold that the Seventh Amendment 
applies only to federal court proceedings, not state court 
proceedings.  The constitutional right to jury trial in state court 
civil proceedings is governed only by the civil jury trial 
provisions of each individual state’s own state constitution.  In 
several important respects, California decisions have construed 
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the civil jury trial provision of the California Constitution in a 
manner differently from how the federal high court has 
interpreted the federal civil jury trial provision.  These 
differences are significant in this context and serve to 
distinguish the Tull decision from this case.  Second, unlike the 
broad, flexible standards embodied in the two consumer 
protection statutes at issue in this case, there is no indication 
that the relevant substantive statutory standard at issue in Tull 
called for the exercise of a court’s traditional equitable authority 
and discretion in determining whether a violation of the statute 
had occurred.  Accordingly, the court in Tull had no occasion to 
determine how the federal constitutional civil jury trial 
provision should be interpreted or applied in such a setting. 
Because the nature of the substantive statutory standards 
and remedies embodied in the civil causes of action under the 
UCL and the FAL establish the equitable nature of the actions, 
we limit the holding in this case to the UCL and FAL setting 
and express no opinion regarding how the state constitutional 
jury trial right applies to other statutory causes of action that 
authorize both injunctive relief and civil penalties. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Petitioners Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc., 
Loan Payment Administration LLC, and Daniel S. Lipsky, the 
alleged alter ego, principal and sole shareholder of both entities 
(hereafter collectively referred to as Nationwide) operated a 
debt payment service in California and other states.  
Nationwide’s program claimed to save debtors money through a 
process in which the debtor would reduce the amount of interest 
owed over the life of a loan by having the debtor accelerate the 
repayment of the debt through an extra monthly payment each 
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year.  Under the program, a debtor would pay to Nationwide 
one-half the debtor’s ordinary monthly loan payment every two 
weeks (biweekly) rather than one full payment once a month, 
resulting in an extra month’s payment each year (26 half-
payments equal 13 full payments), and Nationwide would in 
turn pay those amounts to the debtor’s lender.  Nationwide 
advertised its services statewide, mostly through direct mailers 
to consumers with outstanding residential mortgages, and 
through follow-up telephone conversations with consumers who 
responded to the mailers. 
In May 2015, the district attorneys of four counties, acting 
on behalf of the People, filed a civil complaint alleging that 
Nationwide had violated the UCL and FAL by, among other 
things, employing business practices that:  (1) misleadingly 
implied that Nationwide was affiliated with the consumer’s 
lender; (2) disguised the amount that Nationwide’s services 
actually cost by failing to fully and adequately disclose the 
amount, payment schedule, and effect of Nationwide’s fees; and 
(3) overstated the amount of savings a consumer could 
reasonably expect to receive through Nationwide’s services.3  
The complaint also stated that Nationwide’s practices have been 
                                        
3  
As initially filed, the complaint also alleged that 
Nationwide’s practices violated the Check Sellers, Bill Payers, 
and Proraters Law (Fin. Code, § 12200 et seq.) and asserted 
causes of action under that statute.  While this case was pending 
before this court, those causes of action were dismissed as part 
of a larger settlement between the Department of Business 
Oversight and Nationwide.  The underlying action now rests 
solely on the causes of action under the UCL and FAL set forth 
in the complaint.   
 
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the subject of numerous consumer complaints and regulatory 
and law enforcement activities around the country, including an 
action brought by the federal Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB).4 
The complaint’s prayer for relief requested that the court 
(1) issue an injunction prohibiting the business practices found 
to violate the provisions of the UCL or FAL, (2) order restitution 
of all money wrongfully acquired by Nationwide from California 
consumers in violation of the UCL and FAL, and (3) impose civil 
penalties up to $2,500 for each violation of the UCL or FAL 
found by the court.5  
                                        
4 
In the action brought by the CFPB, the federal district 
court, after a seven-day bench trial, found that although some 
of the claims advanced by the CFPB were not meritorious, 
Nationwide had made a variety of misleading statements in its 
marketing materials.  The court imposed injunctive relief and 
civil penalties of more than $7 million against Nationwide based 
on that misleading conduct.  (Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau v. Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. (N.D.Cal., Sept. 8, 
2017, No. 15-cv-02106-RS) 2017 WL 3948396, pp. *6-9, *12-13.)  
Both parties filed appeals from the district court’s decision, that 
are pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.  (Case Nos. 18-15431 & 18-15887, filed Mar. 15, 2018 
& May 10, 2018.)  
5  
In the answer brief filed in this court, Nationwide claims 
that the government seeks to impose “over $19.25 billion in civil 
penalties.”  The complaint, however, seeks no specific amount in 
penalties, and, as explained hereafter, the applicable statutes 
and case law grant trial courts broad, but not unlimited, 
discretion to impose penalties in a reasonable amount (up to 
$2,500 per violation) in light of the nature and severity of an 
offending business’ conduct.  (Post, pp. 13, 28, 38.)  The answer’s 
hyperbole in this regard does not advance its legal argument.   
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In its amended answer to the complaint, Nationwide 
demanded a jury trial “on all issues so triable,” and the People, 
in response, filed a motion to strike the jury demand “based on 
well settled law that this is an equity action requiring a court 
trial.”  After briefing, the trial court granted the People’s motion 
to strike the jury demand. 
Nationwide then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the 
Court of Appeal, challenging the trial court’s ruling striking the 
jury demand.  After the Court of Appeal initially summarily 
denied the writ petition, this court granted Nationwide’s 
petition for review and retransferred the matter to the Court of 
Appeal with directions to issue an order requiring the People to 
show cause why Nationwide does not have a right to jury trial 
when the government seeks the civil penalties authorized under 
the UCL and FAL. 
After briefing and argument, the Court of Appeal held that 
under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution — the 
jury trial provision — Nationwide has a right to a jury trial in 
this matter and that the trial court erred in striking the jury 
demand.  (Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc. v. Superior 
Court (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 438 (Nationwide Biweekly).)  The 
Court of Appeal, relying heavily on the reasoning of the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Tull, supra, 481 U.S. 412, 
concluded that because the People are seeking civil penalties as 
well as injunctive relief and restitution, the “gist” of the People’s 
UCL and FAL causes of action against Nationwide should 
properly be considered legal rather than equitable, “giving rise 
to a right to a jury trial” under article I, section 16.  (Nationwide 
Biweekly, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 442.)  At the same time, 
the Court of Appeal, again following the approach adopted by 
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the United States Supreme Court in Tull, held that 
Nationwide’s jury trial right is limited to the issue of liability — 
that is, to whether Nationwide’s business practices violated the 
provisions of the UCL or FAL — and does not extend to the issue 
of remedy, including the amount of civil penalties to be imposed.  
(Nationwide Biweekly, at p. 456.) 
In the course of its opinion, the Court of Appeal rejected 
the People’s contention that there is “ ‘an unbroken line of 
appellate decisions finding no right to a jury trial [under the 
California Constitution] in UCL or FAL actions . . . where the 
People sought penalties’ ” (Nationwide Biweekly, supra, 
24 Cal.App.5th at p. 457), finding instead that most of the cases 
relied upon by the People held only that such actions under the 
UCL and FAL were not criminal in nature and thus that the 
jury trial provision of the Sixth Amendment of the federal 
Constitution did not apply to such actions.  (Nationwide 
Biweekly, at pp. 457-459.)  Although the Court of Appeal 
acknowledged that at least one appellate court decision — 
People v. Bhakta (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 973 — clearly held that 
the gist of an action under the UCL is equitable in nature and 
that there is no right to a jury trial in such an action under the 
California constitutional jury trial provision, the Court of 
Appeal disagreed with that decision’s analysis and declined to 
follow its holding.  (Nationwide Biweekly, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th 
at pp. 459-460.)  In addition, the Court of Appeal questioned the 
validity of another appellate court decision relied upon by the 
People — DiPirro v. Bondo Corp. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 150 
(DiPirro) — which held that there is no right to a jury trial in an 
action seeking injunctive relief, restitution, and civil penalties 
under the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 
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1986 (Health & Saf. Code, § 25249.5 et seq.) (commonly known 
as Prop. 65).  The Court of Appeal found that the DiPirro 
decision had not adequately analyzed the United States 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Tull.  (Nationwide Biweekly, 
supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at pp. 461-463.) 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded that a writ of 
mandate should issue, directing the trial court to vacate its 
order striking Nationwide’s request for jury trial and to grant a 
jury trial on all issues except the amount of any statutory 
penalties to be awarded.  (Nationwide Biweekly, supra, 
24 Cal.App.5th at p. 463.) 
We granted the People’s petition for review to determine 
whether there is a right to a jury trial in a UCL or FAL action 
brought by the government when the government seeks civil 
penalties as well as injunctive relief and restitution. 
II.  GENERAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING THE 
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN CIVIL CASES 
UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW 
 
As this court recently explained in Shaw v. Superior Court 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 983 (Shaw):  “Under California law, the right 
to a jury trial in a civil action may be afforded either by statute 
or by the California Constitution. . . .  [¶]  As a general matter, 
the California Legislature has authority to grant the parties in 
a civil action the right to a jury trial by statute, either when the 
Legislature establishes a new cause of action or with respect to 
a cause of action that rests on the common law or a 
constitutional provision.  [Citations.]  Given the Legislature’s 
broad general legislative authority under the California 
Constitution and in the absence of any constitutional 
prohibition [citations], the Legislature may extend the right to 
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a jury trial to instances in which the state constitutional jury 
trial provision does not itself mandate a right to a jury trial.  
[¶]   . . .  But even when the language and legislative history of 
a statute indicate that the Legislature intended that a cause of 
action established by the statute is to be tried by the court rather 
than a jury, if the California constitutional jury trial provision 
itself guarantees a right to a jury trial in such a cause of action, 
the Constitution prevails and jury trial cannot be denied.”  
(2 Cal.5th at pp. 993-994, fn. omitted.) 
III.  IS THERE A STATUTORY RIGHT TO JURY 
TRIAL UNDER EITHER THE UCL OR FAL WHEN 
THE GOVERNMENT SEEKS CIVIL PENALTIES AS 
WELL AS INJUNCTIVE RELIEF? 
Neither the UCL nor the FAL explicitly addresses the 
question whether the causes of action created by the two 
statutes — both of which authorize the government to seek civil 
penalties as well as injunctive relief and restitution — are to be 
tried by the court or by a jury.  As we shall see, however, the 
legislative history and legislative purpose of both statutes 
convincingly establish that the Legislature intended that such 
causes of action under these statutes would be tried by the court, 
exercising the traditional flexible discretion and judicial 
expertise of a court of equity, and not by a jury, including when 
civil penalties as well as injunctive relief and restitution are 
sought. 
A.  The UCL 
Prior to 1933, former section 3369 of the Civil Code 
provided simply that “[n]either specific nor preventive relief can 
be granted to enforce a penal law, except in a case of nuisance, 
nor to enforce a penalty or forfeiture in any case.”  The current 
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provisions of the UCL — set forth in Business and Professions 
Code section 17200 et seq. — derive from a 1933 amendment of 
Civil Code former section 3369.  (Stats. 1933, ch. 953, § 1, 
p. 2482.)  The 1933 amendment broadened the exception in the 
statute to include “unfair competition” as well as “nuisance” 
(Civ. Code, former § 3369, subd. (1)) and added additional 
subdivisions that:  (a)  provided that “[a]ny person performing 
or proposing to perform an act of unfair competition within this 
State may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction” 
(id., subd. (2), italics added); (b) defined “unfair competition” as 
used in the statute to “mean and include unfair or fraudulent 
business practice and unfair, untrue or misleading advertising” 
(id., subd. (3), italics added)6; and (c) authorized actions for 
injunction under the statute to be brought “by the Attorney 
General or any district attorney in this State in the name of the 
people of the State of California” or by “any board, officer, . . . 
corporation or . . . person acting for the interests of itself, its 
members or the general public” (Civ. Code, former § 3369, subd. 
(5)).  Because the unfair competition cause of action established 
by the 1933 amendment of former section 3369 authorized the 
government (as well as private parties) to seek only injunctive 
relief, there is no question that the civil cause of action created 
in 1933 was equitable in nature and, as such, was intended to 
be tried by the court and not a jury.  (See 3 Witkin, Cal. 
Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Actions, § 126, p. 205 [“Actions seeking 
                                        
6  
The 1933 amendment also defined “unfair competition” to 
include any violation of the then-existing provisions of Penal 
Code former sections 654a, 654b, or 654c, all of which prohibited 
different specific forms of false advertising.  (Stats. 1933, 
ch. 953, § 1, p. 2482 [Civ. Code, former § 3369, subd. (3)].) 
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injunctive relief are, of course, equitable in nature”].)  
Nationwide does not suggest otherwise. 
In 1972, as part of a legislative measure that expanded the 
reach of former section 3369 of the Civil Code to include 
“deceptive,” as well as “unfair,” “untrue,” or “misleading,” 
advertising (Stats. 1972, ch. 1084, § 1, p. 2020), the Legislature 
added former section 3370.1 to the Civil Code, authorizing the 
Attorney General or any district attorney (but not private 
parties) to seek and obtain, in addition to injunctive relief, “a 
civil penalty not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars 
($2,500) for each violation” of former section 3369 (Stats. 1972, 
ch. 1084, § 2, p. 2021 [enacting Assem. Bill No. 1937 (1971-1972 
Reg. Sess.])).  The 1972 legislation was proposed by the Attorney 
General and district attorneys who were charged with enforcing 
the prohibition on unfair competition embodied in former 
section 3369.  In support of the legislation, the proponents 
maintained that “[i]t is our experience that an injunction 
without a civil penalty is not a deterrent to future consumer 
fraud abuses.”  (Atty. Gen. Evelle J. Younger, letter to Sen. 
Alfred H. Song re Assem. Bill No. 1937 (1971-1972 Reg. Sess.) 
July 13, 1972.)  A legislative committee analysis of the proposed 
bill after its final amendment set forth the purpose of the 
legislation as intended to “[p]ermit the Attorney General and a 
district attorney to collect civil penalties in addition to either 
specific or preventive relief in actions they commence to enjoin 
acts of unfair competition,” explaining that “[i]t is felt that the 
allowance of civil penalties, in addition to the requested 
injunctive relief, will provide a sufficient deterrent to the 
resumption of these unlawful practices.”  (Sen. Com. on 
Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1937 (1971-1972 Reg. 
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Sess.) as amended May 25, 1972, pp. 1, 2.)  There is no indication 
in the legislative history of the 1972 enactment that the 
Legislature, in providing an additional remedy that could be 
sought in actions under former section 3369 to enjoin acts of 
unfair competition, intended to transform such actions from 
ones that were to be tried by the court into actions that were to 
be tried by a jury.  Civil actions under the UCL that were filed 
by private parties, in which only injunctive relief was 
authorized, continued to be tried by the court. 
In 1977, the Legislature moved the relevant sections of the 
Civil Code embodying the unfair competition law into the 
Business and Professions Code at sections 17200 to 17206.  
(Stats. 1977, ch. 299, § 1, p. 1202.)  Former section 3370.1 of the 
Civil Code — the section authorizing the Attorney General or a 
district attorney to seek civil penalties as well as injunctive 
relief — was moved to Business and Professions Code section 
17206.  In 1992, the Legislature added subdivision (b) to 
Business and Professions Code section 17206, which provides in 
relevant part that “[i]n assessing the amount of the civil penalty, 
the court shall consider any one or more of the relevant 
circumstances presented by any of the parties to the case, 
including, but not limited to, the following: the nature and 
seriousness of the misconduct, the number of violations, the 
persistence of the misconduct, the length of time over which the 
misconduct occurred, the willfulness of the defendant’s 
misconduct, and the defendant’s assets, liabilities, and net 
worth.”  (Stats. 1992, ch. 430, § 4, p. 1708, italics added.)  
Nothing in these further amendments suggests that in an action 
under the UCL in which the government seeks civil penalties as 
well as injunctive or other equitable relief, the Legislature 
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intended that the action would be tried by a jury rather than by 
the trial court, and the language of Business and Professions 
Code section 17206, subdivision (b) clearly indicates that the 
amount of civil penalties is intended to be determined by the 
court.7 
The factors just discussed — namely (1) the origin of the 
government’s cause of action under the UCL as an action simply 
to enjoin an unfair business practice and (2) the language of the 
statutory provision relating to the awarding of civil penalties in 
such an action — clearly support the conclusion that the 
Legislature, in enacting the UCL, intended to create an 
equitable, rather than a legal, cause of action.  Furthermore, 
from the statute’s inception, California decisions interpreting 
and applying both the provisions of former section 3369 and its 
current counterparts have explained that the exceedingly broad 
and general language that the Legislature incorporated in the 
statute to define the business practices that are proscribed by 
the statute — in the original language, “unfair or fraudulent 
business practice and unfair, untrue, or misleading advertising” 
— was adopted with the specific understanding that this broad 
                                        
7  
In the statewide election held in November 2004, the 
voters approved Proposition 64, an initiative statute that 
restricted the kinds of private plaintiffs that may seek an 
injunction or other equitable relief under the UCL or FAL 
(Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17203, 17204, 17535) and provided that 
the revenue from the civil penalties imposed under the UCL or 
FAL may be used only by the Attorney General and local public 
prosecutors for the enforcement of consumer protection laws.  
(Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17206, subd. (c), 17536, subd. (c).)  The 
changes effectuated by Proposition 64 have no direct bearing on 
the issue before us. 
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language would be applied by a court of equity in determining 
whether a challenged business practice violated the statutory 
prohibition. 
For example, in Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. 
(1972) 7 Cal.3d 94 (Barquis) — one of this court’s seminal 
decisions applying the UCL — we emphasized that past cases 
under the statute “have frequently noted that the section was 
intentionally framed in its broad, sweeping language, precisely 
to enable judicial tribunals to deal with the innumerable ‘ “new 
schemes which the fertility of man’s invention would 
contrive.” ’ ”  (Barquis, at p. 112, italics added.)  Quoting from 
American Philatelic Soc. v. Claibourne (1935) 3 Cal.2d 689, 698-
699 — one of the earliest decisions discussing the appropriate 
reach of the broad language of the statute at issue — Barquis 
observed: “ ‘When a scheme is evolved which on its face violates 
the fundamental rules of honesty and fair dealing, a court of 
equity is not impotent to frustrate its consummation because the 
scheme is an original one.  There is a maxim as old as law that 
there can be no right without a remedy, and in searching for a 
precise precedent, an equity court must not lose sight, not only 
of its power, but of its duty to arrive at a just solution of the 
problem.’ ”  (Barquis, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 112, italics added.) 
The objective that the Legislature sought to accomplish 
through its adoption of the broad standard embodied in the UCL 
fits perfectly with the role historically exercised by a court of 
equity.  As Pomeroy explained in his classic treatise on equity 
jurisprudence:  “[Equity is] much more elastic and capable of 
expansion and extension to new cases than the common law.  Its 
very central principles, its foundation upon the eternal verities 
of right and justice, its resting upon the truths of morality rather 
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than arbitrary customs and rigid dogmas, necessarily gave it 
this character of flexibility, and permitted its doctrines to be 
enlarged so as to embrace new cases as they constantly arose.  
It has, therefore, as an essential part of its nature, a capacity of 
orderly and regular growth, — a growth not arbitrary, according 
to the will of individual judges, but in the direction of its already 
settled principles.  It is ever reaching out and expanding its 
doctrines so as to cover new facts and relations, but still without 
any break or change in the principles or doctrines themselves.”  
(1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed. 1941) § 59, p. 76.)  As 
the Court of Appeal observed in A-C Co. v. Security Pacific Nat. 
Bank (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 462, 473:  “The tradition and 
heredity of the flexible equitable powers of the modern trial 
judge derive from the role of the trained and experienced 
chancellor and depend upon skills and wisdom acquired through 
years of study, training and experience which are not 
susceptible of adequate transmission through instructions to a 
lay jury.”8 
                                        
8  
The very broad consumer protective language set forth in 
the UCL closely tracks the broad language that Congress 
embodied in the Federal Trade Commission Act to reach 
business practices that were not specifically forbidden by the 
common law or other statutes.  (See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) [“Unfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” are 
declared unlawful]; see generally Baker & Baum, Section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act: A Continuing Process of 
Redefinition (1962) 7 Vill. L.Rev. 517, 525-542.)  California 
decisions have long recognized the close relationship between 
the language of the UCL and the Federal Trade Commission 
 
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Over the more than 80-year history of the UCL, scores of 
decisions of both this court and the Courts of Appeal have 
uniformly recognized that the cause of action established by this 
statute is equitable in nature.  (See, e.g., Solus Industrial 
Innovations, LLC v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 316, 340 
[the UCL “ ‘provides an equitable means through which both 
public prosecutors and private individuals can bring suit to 
prevent unfair business practices’ ” (italics added and omitted)]; 
Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 
1134, 1144 [“A UCL action is equitable in nature; damages 
cannot be recovered. . . . Civil penalties may be assessed in 
public unfair competition actions, but the law contains no 
criminal provisions” (citation omitted)].) 
In Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular 
Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163 (Cel-Tech), our court 
addressed questions arising from the expansive scope of the 
language of the UCL in a case in which the plaintiff cell phone 
                                        
Act.  (See, e.g., People ex rel. Mosk v. National Research Co. 
(1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 765, 772-773.) 
 
The United States Supreme Court, in discussing the 
Federal Trade Commission’s exercise of its authority to 
determine whether a trade practice is “unfair” under the 
Federal Trade Commission Act in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson 
Co. (1972) 405 U.S. 233, 244, concluded that “legislative and 
judicial authorities alike convince us that the Federal Trade 
Commission does not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in 
measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally 
mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, 
considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the 
letter or encompassed in the spirit of antitrust laws.”  (Italics 
added.) 
 
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vendor challenged the business practices of the defendant 
competitor cell phone company as unfair under the UCL.  In that 
case, the plaintiff contended that the defendant had assertedly 
taken improper advantage of its privileged position as one of 
only two cell phone companies licensed to provide cellular 
service in the Los Angeles area when it engaged in the practice 
of selling cell phones to its cellular service customers at below 
cost.  In Cel-Tech, we noted that our court had not yet defined 
the term “unfair” as used in the UCL and determined that 
although two Court of Appeal decisions had attempted such a 
definition,9 the suggested definitions in those appellate 
decisions were “too amorphous and provide too little guidance to 
courts and businesses.”  (Cel-Tech, at p. 185.) 
Thereafter, in devising “a more precise test for 
determining what is unfair under the unfair competition law”, 
the court in Cel-Tech “turn[ed] for guidance to the jurisprudence 
arising under the ‘parallel’ section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45(a))” (FTC Act), observing that 
“ ‘[i]n view of the similarity of language and obvious identity of 
purpose of the two statutes, decisions of the federal court on the 
subject are more than ordinarily persuasive.’ ”  (Cel-Tech, supra, 
                                        
9  
See People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc. (1984) 
159 Cal.App.3d 509, 530, which stated that “an ‘unfair’ business 
practice occurs when it offends an established public policy or 
when 
the 
practice 
is 
immoral, 
unethical, 
oppressive, 
unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers,” and 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 
45 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1104, which declared that in determining 
whether a business practice is unfair “ ‘the court must weigh the 
utility of the defendant’s conduct against the gravity of the harm 
to the alleged victim.’ ” 
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20 Cal.4th at p. 185.)  After describing a number of federal high 
court decisions considering the types of practices that would be 
considered 
“ ‘unfair 
methods 
of 
competition’ ” 
between 
competitors under section 5 of the FTC Act (Cel-Tech, at p. 186) 
— federal decisions that the Cel-Tech court emphasized it 
considered persuasive but not “controlling or determinative” 
(id. at p. 186, fn. 11) — the court in Cel-Tech concluded that “to 
guide courts and the business community adequately and to 
promote consumer protection, we must require that any finding 
of unfairness to competitors under [Business and Professions 
Code] section 17200 be tethered to some legislatively declared 
policy or proof of some actual or threatened impact on 
competition.  We thus adopt the following test:  When a plaintiff 
who claims to have suffered injury from a direct competitor’s 
‘unfair’ act or practice invokes section 17200 [(the relevant 
provision of the UCL)], the word ‘unfair’ in that section means 
conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, 
or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its 
effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or 
otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition”  
(20 Cal.4th at pp. 186-187, italics added). 
It is clear from both the language and nature of the test 
adopted in Cel-Tech — that is, whether the challenged business 
practice “threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law” or 
“violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws” — that such a 
standard is one that may reasonably be applied only by a court. 
(Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 187.)  This standard is too 
indeterminate to be adequately conveyed by jury instructions or 
applied by a jury.  Indeed, the Cel-Tech court’s detailed 
description of the analysis that would have to be undertaken on 
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remand of that case in determining whether the challenged 
practice meets the test of unfairness adopted in Cel-Tech makes 
it clear that our opinion in that case recognized that the test was 
to be applied by the trial court and not a jury.  (See Cel-Tech, 
supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 188-191; cf. F. T. C. v. Motion Picture 
Adv. Co. (1953) 344 U.S. 392, 396 [“The point where a method of 
competition becomes ‘unfair’ . . . will often turn on the exigencies 
of a particular situation, trade practices, or the practical 
requirements of the business in question”].) 
The court in Cel-Tech explicitly noted that the case before 
it involved “an action by a competitor alleging anticompetitive 
practices” and emphasized that the specific test adopted in that 
decision was limited to that context and did not apply to “actions 
by consumers or by competitors alleging other kinds of 
violations of the unfair competition law.”  (Cel-Tech, supra, 
20 Cal.4th at p. 187, fn. 12.)  Subsequent to the decision in Cel-
Tech, our court has not addressed the question whether in 
actions under the UCL brought on behalf of consumers rather 
than competitors, the term “unfair” in the UCL needs to be 
similarly defined in a more prescribed standard or test, and, if 
so, what that test should be.  In the years since Cel-Tech, a split 
of authority has developed in the Courts of Appeal with regard 
to the proper test for determining whether a business practice 
is unfair under the UCL in consumer cases, with appellate 
decisions adopting three different tests for determining 
unfairness in the consumer context.  (See, e.g., Zhang v. 
Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 380, fn. 9 [describing split 
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of authority].)10  The issue of the proper test for defining the 
term “unfair” as used in the UCL in the consumer context is not 
                                        
10  
One line of Court of Appeal decisions has held that a 
balancing test, which the Cel-Tech court declined to adopt in the 
competitor context (see Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 184-
185), should nonetheless be applied in the consumer context, 
under which the determination whether a business practice is 
unfair to consumers “ ‘ “involves an examination of [that 
practice’s] impact on its alleged victim, balanced against the 
reasons, justifications and motives of the alleged wrongdoer.  In 
brief, the court must weigh the utility of the defendant’s conduct 
against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim.” ’ ”  (Smith 
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 
700, 718; see, e.g., Ticconi v. Blue Shield of California Life & 
Health Ins. Co. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 528, 539; cf. FTC v. 
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., supra, 405 U.S. 233, 244-245, fn. 5 
[quoting with approval similar test adopted by FTC in 1964 for 
determining unfairness under § 5 of the FTC Act].) 
 
A second line of Court of Appeal decisions has adopted 
what has been termed a “tethering test,” requiring that “the 
public policy which is a predicate to [a consumer unfair 
competition action under the ‘unfair’ prong of the UCL] must be 
‘tethered’ to specific constitutional, statutory or regulatory 
provisions” in a manner similar to which Cel-Tech requires a 
competitor’s cause of action to be tethered to the antitrust laws.  
(Gregory v. Albertson’s, Inc. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 845, 854; 
see, e.g., Scripps Clinic v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 
917, 940.) 
 
A third line of Court of Appeal cases has adopted the three-
part definition of unfairness applied under section 5 of the FTC 
Act since 1980, namely that: “(1) The consumer injury must be 
substantial; (2) the injury must not be outweighed by any 
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition; and (3) it 
must be an injury that consumers themselves could not 
reasonably have avoided.”  (Camacho v. Automobile Club of 
Southern California (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1403; see, 
e.g., Rubenstein v. The Gap (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 870, 880.)  
This test has sometimes been termed the “section 5 test.”   
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raised in the present case, and we have no occasion to address it 
here.  Nonetheless, we note that all the tests that have been 
proposed in the appellate court decisions are ones that, like the 
test adopted in Cel-Tech, can reasonably be applied only by 
courts, rather than by juries. 
Accordingly, both (1) the fact that the cause of action 
under the UCL originated solely as an action to enjoin an unfair 
or misleading business practice — an equitable action triable 
only by a court and not a jury — and (2) the fact that the broad 
and general standard of unfair competition that was 
incorporated into the statute contemplated that the standard 
would be applied by a court exercising its traditional, flexible 
equitable authority rather than by a jury, support the conclusion 
that the Legislature, in enacting the UCL, intended that a cause 
of action under the UCL would be tried by the court and not a 
jury, even when the government seeks civil penalties as well as 
injunctive relief. 
We note that the nature of the principal issue presented 
in a great many UCL actions additionally supports the 
conclusion that such causes of action were intended to be 
decided by the court rather than a jury.  A cursory review of the 
numerous UCL actions that have been brought in recent years 
(see Stern, Cal. Practice Guide: Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 
Practice (The Rutter Group 2019) § 3:131, pp. 3-39 to 3-44 
[describing 41 recent UCL cases]) reveals that such cases often 
concern a nuanced and qualitative determination regarding 
whether a business practice should properly be considered 
unfair or deceptive within the meaning of the UCL.  (See, e.g., 
Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1376-
1382 [considering whether failing to sell temperature-adjusted 
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motor fuel or to disclose the effect of temperature increases on 
the volume of fuel sold could constitute an unfair or fraudulent 
business practice]; Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 
213 Cal.App.4th 872, 907-908 [considering whether bank’s 
practice of “dual tracking” — agreeing to a loan modification 
while continuing to pursue foreclosure — could constitute an 
unfair or fraudulent business practice].)  This type of qualitative 
determination — often requiring the consideration of a variety 
of factors or circumstances identified in prior cases in California 
or other jurisdictions or in administrative guidelines developed 
by the Federal Trade Commission or other consumer protection 
administrative agencies — is the type of decision that has 
traditionally been viewed as the province of courts rather than 
juries. 
Moreover, we have emphasized that “ ‘the overarching 
legislative concern [in enacting the UCL is] to provide a 
streamlined procedure for the prevention of ongoing or 
threatened acts of unfair competition’ ”  (Cortez v. Purolator Air 
Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 173-174), an 
objective that is inconsistent with the unavoidable delays and 
increased costs inherent in a jury, as compared to a court, trial.  
Furthermore, having a court, rather than a jury, decide the 
question whether a business practice is properly considered 
unfair or deceptive for purposes of the UCL has the additional 
significant benefit — for both defendants and plaintiffs — of 
facilitating appellate review of that determination, because a 
trial court, unlike a jury, is required to provide, upon request of 
any party, “a statement of decision explaining the factual and 
legal basis for its decision.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 632.)  And having 
appellate courts in the position in which they can adequately 
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review trial courts’ evaluations of the validity of business 
practices under the UCL, in turn, promotes the creation of a 
cumulative body of precedent that improves the consistency of 
future determinations under the UCL and provides needed 
guidance to companies in the formulation of their business 
practices. 
In sum, for all of the foregoing reasons, we believe that it 
is clear that the Legislature intended that a cause of action 
under the UCL — including an action brought by the 
government that seeks both injunctive relief and civil penalties 
— is to be tried by the court rather than by a jury. 
B.  The FAL 
The FAL (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq.) has been 
accurately described as “the major California legislation 
designed to protect consumers from false or deceptive 
advertising.”  (People v. Superior Court (Olson) (1979) 
96 Cal.App.3d 181, 190.)  The procedures set forth in the FAL 
and UCL are in many respects parallel to one another, and the 
UCL specifically provides that any practice that violates the 
FAL is also prohibited by the UCL.  (See Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 17200.)  
The original version of the FAL creating a civil cause of 
action was enacted in 1941.  (Stats. 1941, ch. 63, § 1, pp. 727-
729 [enacting Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17500-17535].)11  The 
                                        
11 
The FAL traces its origin to the 1915 version of former 
Penal Code section 654a (Stats. 1915, ch. 634, § 1, pp. 1252-
1253), which, in turn, was based upon a model false advertising 
statute that was first proposed in 1911 in Printer’s Ink 
magazine, an advertising journal.  (See Note, The Regulation of 
 
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statute broadly prohibited false or misleading advertising, 
declaring that it is unlawful for any person or business to make 
or distribute any statement to induce the public to enter into a 
transaction “which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, 
or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to 
be untrue or misleading.”  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500.)  Like 
the civil cause of action authorized by the original version of the 
UCL, the FAL, as originally enacted, explicitly authorized only 
injunctive relief (Bus. & Prof. Code, former § 17535), permitting 
civil actions for injunction under the act to be prosecuted by the 
Attorney General or any district attorney on behalf of the 
People, and also “by any [entity or] person acting for the 
interests of itself, its members or the general public.”  (Ibid.)   
Because the civil action established by the 1941 legislation 
authorized only injunctive relief, it is clear that, as originally 
enacted, a civil action under the FAL, like that under the UCL 
as originally enacted, was equitable in nature and was intended 
                                        
Advertising (1956) 56 Colum. L.Rev. 1018, 1058; Note, Enforcing 
California’s False Advertising Law: A Guide to Adjudication 
(1974) 25 Hastings L.J. 1105, 1106.)  The 1911 model statute 
proposed to make it a misdemeanor to publish an advertisement 
containing “ ‘any assertion, representation or statement of fact 
which is untrue, deceptive or misleading’ ” and was quite 
stringent, omitting any requirement that the advertiser be 
shown to have intended to deceive or to know the improper 
character of the advertisement.  (Note, The Regulation of 
Advertising, supra, 56 Colum. L.Rev. at pp. 1058-1059 & 
fn. 245.)  In adopting the statute in California in 1915, however, 
the Legislature added a scienter requirement, requiring a 
showing that the advertiser knew or, in the exercise of 
reasonable care, should have known of the false, deceptive or 
misleading character of the advertisement.  (Stats. 1915, 
ch. 634, § 1.) 
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to be tried by a court and not a jury.  Again, Nationwide does 
not argue otherwise. 
In 1965, the Legislature added Business and Professions 
Code section 17536 to the FAL, authorizing the Attorney 
General or a district attorney, but not a private party, to seek a 
civil penalty not to exceed $2,500 for each violation of the FAL.  
(Stats. 1965, ch. 827, § 1, pp. 2419-2420.)  The enactment of 
section 17536 as part of the FAL in 1965 predated the enactment 
in 1972 of the comparable provision of the UCL, discussed above, 
authorizing the Attorney General or a district attorney to seek 
civil penalties as well as injunctive relief in an action under the 
UCL.  (See, ante, pp. 11-12.)  As with the comparable provision 
of the UCL, the legislative history of the 1965 enactment of 
section 17536 indicates that the legislation was introduced at 
the request of the Attorney General to provide an additional 
remedy in actions to enjoin fraudulent sales schemes.  (See 
Assemblyman George E. Danielson, letter to Gov. Edmund G. 
Brown, June 14, 1965 [urging approval of 1965 bill introduced 
by Danielson].)  Nothing in the legislative history of the 1965 
enactment indicates any legislative intent to change the nature 
of a civil action under the FAL from an equitable action that is 
tried to the court to one that is tried by a jury.  As under the 
UCL, actions under the FAL that were filed by private parties, 
in which injunctive relief was the prescribed remedy, continued 
to be tried by the court, not a jury. 
In People v. Superior Court (Jayhill Corp.) (1973) 9 Cal.3d 
283 (Jayhill), this court addressed a number of issues arising in 
a civil action filed by the Attorney General under the FAL in 
which the Attorney General sought injunctive relief, restitution 
and civil penalties for alleged false and misleading advertising 
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engaged in by door-to-door encyclopedia salespersons.  The trial 
court had permitted the action to go forward with respect to 
injunctive relief but had struck all other forms of relief. 
On appeal, the court in Jayhill first addressed the 
question of the availability of restitution in an FAL action under 
Business and Professions Code section 17535.  At the time the 
complaint in Jayhill was filed, section 17535 provided simply 
“that false or misleading advertising ‘may be enjoined’ in an 
action by the Attorney General, but was silent as to the power 
of the trial court to order restitution in such a proceeding.”  
(Jayhill, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 286.)  Relying on the general 
principle that “[i]n the absence of such a restriction a court of 
equity may exercise the full range of its inherent powers in order 
to accomplish complete justice between the parties, restoring if 
necessary the status quo ante as nearly as may be achieved,” the 
Jayhill court held that “in an action by the Attorney General 
under section 17535 a trial court has the inherent power to 
order, as a form of ancillary relief, that the defendants make or 
offer to make restitution to the customers found to have been 
defrauded.”  (Ibid, first italics added.)12  Thus, the court in 
Jayhill clearly recognized that a civil action under the FAL is 
an equitable action triable to the court.       
                                        
12   
After the trial court ruling but prior to our decision in 
Jayhill, the Legislature had explicitly amended Business and 
Professions Code section 17535 to authorize the court to order 
restitution as well as injunctive relief.  (Stats. 1972, ch. 244, § 1, 
p. 494.)  In Jayhill, the court found that in light of its legislative 
history, the 1972 amendment was not intended “to create a new 
power in the trial court but simply to clarify existing law on the 
point.”  (Jayhill, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 287, fn. 1.) 
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In Jayhill, supra, 9 Cal.3d 283, this court also addressed 
a separate issue concerning the application of Business and 
Professions Code section 17536, the provision of the FAL 
authorizing the trial court to impose civil penalties in a civil 
action under the FAL.  We found that the trial court in that case 
had erred in determining that “ ‘each claim for penalty is a 
separate cause of action’ ” which must be separately stated, 
concluding instead that “[t]he Attorney General has only one 
cause of action against a particular defendant for violating 
section 17500; for this he seeks several forms of relief, including 
the civil penalty of $2,500 set forth in section 17536.  Since 
multiple victims are involved he prays for a penalty for each 
violation, but this does not elevate each violation to a separate 
cause of action. . . .  We hold that the Attorney General has only 
one cause of action against a defendant for violating section 
17500, but that the amount of civil penalties which may be 
imposed under section 17536 is dependent upon the number of 
‘violations’ committed by a defendant.”  (9 Cal.3d at p. 288, 
italics added.)  Because, as we have seen, the court in Jayhill 
had already explained that the cause of action for violating 
section 17500 is an equitable action (Jayhill, at p. 286), the clear 
implication of the decision in Jayhill is that even when the 
Attorney General or a district attorney seeks civil penalties as 
well as injunctive relief in such an action, the action under the 
FAL remains an equitable action, and, as such, is to be tried by 
the court, rather than by a jury. 
In 1992, Business and Professions Code section 17536 was 
amended to provide that “[i]n assessing the amount of the civil 
penalty, the court shall consider any one or more of the relevant 
circumstances presented by any of the parties to the case, 
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including, but not limited to, the following:  the nature and 
seriousness of the misconduct, the number of violations, the 
persistence of the misconduct, the length of time over which the 
misconduct occurred, the willfulness of the defendant’s 
misconduct, and the defendant’s assets, liabilities, and net 
worth.”  (Stats. 1992, ch. 430, § 5, p. 1709, italics added.)  This 
wording directly tracks the language that was added to section 
17206 of the UCL in the same 1992 legislation.  (See, ante, p. 13.)   
Again, this terminology makes it clear that the Legislature 
intended that the amount of civil penalties under the FAL is to 
be determined by the court, not by a jury. 
As with respect to the UCL, past decisions of both this 
court and the Courts of Appeal have consistently described the 
civil cause of action authorized by the FAL as an equitable 
action that is to be tried by the court rather than a jury, 
including when the action is one brought by a government 
attorney and seeks civil penalties as well as injunctive relief.  
(See, e.g., Jayhill, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 286; Fletcher v. Security 
Pacific National Bank (1979) 23 Cal.3d 442, 452 [“the basic 
equitable principles underlying [Business and Professions Code] 
section 17535 arm the trial court with broad discretionary power 
. . . ‘. . . to accomplish complete justice between the parties’ ”]; 
People v. Overstock.com, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1064, 1091 
(Overstock.com) [the “ ‘ “equitable” . . . “remedial power granted 
under [the UCL and FAL] is extraordinarily broad” ’ ”].)  
Like the choice of the term “unfair” in the UCL, the 
governing substantive standard of the FAL — prohibiting 
advertising that is “untrue or misleading” (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 17500, italics added) — is set forth in broad and open-ended 
language that is intended to permit a court of equity to reach 
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any novel or creative scheme of false or misleading advertising 
that a deceptive business may devise.  (See, e.g., Kwikset Corp. 
v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 320; Overstock.com, 
supra, 12 Cal.App.5th 1064, 1091 [“ ‘ “Probably because false 
advertising and unfair business practices can take many forms, 
the Legislature has given the courts the power to fashion 
remedies to prevent their ‘use or employment’ in whatever 
context they may occur” ’ ”].)  As this court explained in Kasky 
v. Nike (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, the FAL prohibits “ ‘not only 
advertising which is false, but also advertising which[,] 
although true, is either actually misleading or which has a 
capacity, likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.’  
[Citation.]  Thus, to state a claim under either the UCL or the 
false advertising law, based on false advertising or promotional 
practices, ‘it is necessary only to show that “members of the 
public are likely to be deceived.” ’ ” (Kasky, at p. 951, quoting 
Leoni v. State Bar (1985) 39 Cal.3d 609, 626 and Committee on 
Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 
35 Cal.3d 197, 211 (Com. on Children’s Television).)13 
It is true that the broad reach and scope of the FAL’s 
untrue or misleading standard is often framed in language 
(whether members of the public are likely to be deceived) that is 
not, on its face, beyond the ken of a jury.  As employed in the 
FAL (as well as in the UCL), however, a determination that 
advertising poses a sufficient risk or tendency to deceive or 
                                        
13 
As noted above (ante, p. 11), the UCL contains an 
overlapping prohibition of impermissible advertising, barring, 
in addition to “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act 
or practice,” any “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading 
advertising.”  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) 
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confuse the public may potentially result in an injunctive order 
prohibiting what may be a common and widely utilized 
advertising, labeling, or promotional practice.  (See, e.g., Chern 
v. Bank of America (1976) 15 Cal.3d 866, 875-876 [challenge to 
common bank practice of calculating interest rate advertised as 
“per annum” on the basis of a 360-day year]; Com. on Children’s 
Television, supra, 35 Cal.3d 197, 205-215, 222-223 [challenge to 
children’s television advertising representing that breakfast 
foods with high sugar content are “ ‘healthful and nutritious,’ ” 
and labeling such foods “ ‘ “cereals” ’ ” rather than “ ‘candy 
breakfasts’ ”].)  In the FAL and UCL settings, this standard — 
whether  members of the public are likely to be deceived — has 
been understood to call for the exercise of the type of equitable 
discretion and judgment traditionally employed by a court of 
equity.  As in the case of the UCL, the crucial issue in cases 
under the FAL does not typically involve the type of ordinary 
factfinding assigned to a jury, but rather calls for an equitable 
judgment to determine whether an often undisputed advertising 
or promotional practice presents a sufficient tendency to deceive 
or confuse the public so as to support invocation of the FAL’s 
remedies.  As the breadth of the cases arising under the FAL 
attests, this determination calls for consideration of a wide 
variety of factors that prior cases and past administrative 
experience have shown may render an affirmative statement (or 
a failure to disclose) in a product label, packaging, or in other 
advertising or promotional practices misleading in a particular 
context.14  And, again as in the UCL context (see ante, p. 23), 
                                        
14  
For a general discussion of the numerous and complex 
factors and considerations that may affect the determination 
 
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given the capacity of the FAL’s standard to be applied 
expansively to encompass all of the novel ways in which 
advertising or promotional material may be misleading, it is 
important that trial courts are required to set forth their 
reasoning for a determination that the FAL has been violated so 
that a body of precedent can evolve to inform businesses of 
advertising practices they must avoid. 
In Brady v. Bayer Corp. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1156, for 
example, the Court of Appeal determined that the One A Day 
label on a bottle of gummy vitamins that required, in 
“miniscule” instructions on the back of the label (id. at p. 1159), 
that two gummies be taken daily to provide the recommended 
daily vitamin dosage was sufficiently potentially misleading to 
support a cause of action for violation of the FAL.  The Brady 
court pointed out that despite the well understood traditional 
meaning of the One A Day brand, consumers who take one 
gummy a day “end up receiving only half the daily vitamin 
coverage they think they are getting.”  (Brady at p. 1160.)  In 
the course of its opinion, the Brady court discussed at some 
length a number of factors that past decisions had considered 
and balanced in determining whether a product label could be 
found sufficiently misleading to violate the FAL, including 
“common sense,” the factual context in which literally true or 
literally false statements are made, the degree to which back-of-
the-label qualifiers ameliorate any tendency to mislead, and the 
tendency of particular brand names to mislead.  (Brady, at 
                                        
whether advertising should properly be viewed as deceptive or 
misleading, see Developments in the Law — Deceptive 
Advertising (1967) 80 Harv. L.Rev. 1005, 1038-1063. 
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pp. 1165-1174.)  Considering these factors as a whole, the Brady 
court found that the One A Day label had a sufficient “ ‘capacity, 
likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public’ ” to 
support a cause of action under the FAL.  (Brady, at p. 1173.)  
As a further example, in Day v. AT&T Corp. (1998) 
63 Cal.App.4th 325, the Court of Appeal determined that 
although the defendant phone company’s policy of rounding up 
charges for phone calls longer than a minute to the next full 
minute was permissible under the “filed rate” doctrine, the 
failure of the packaging of defendant’s prepaid phone cards to 
disclose this rounding-up practice was sufficiently misleading to 
violate the FAL.  In reaching this conclusion, the Day court 
considered but distinguished two earlier out-of-state decisions 
that had rejected a claim by ordinary phone subscribers that a 
telephone company’s failure to disclose the rounding-up practice 
was misleading.  The court relied on the fact that unlike 
ordinary phone bills that disclosed to consumers that all phone 
calls were charged for full minutes, “[t]he phone cards in 
question, whose outer packagings do not reveal the practice of 
rounding up, are prepaid.  A consumer cannot read any 
materials provided by the carrier with the card before buying the 
card, which will advise him or her of the practice.  Based on the 
advertising a consumer will not know that whole minutes are 
being credited for each fraction of a minute until the card has 
been used.”  (Day, at p. 334.)  Under these circumstances, the 
Day court concluded “that the practices alleged here were likely 
to mislead, confuse or deceive members of the public.”  (Ibid.) 
And in Overstock.com, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th 1064, the 
Court of Appeal upheld a trial court finding that the defendant 
online bargain retailer had violated the FAL through its online 
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advertising practices.  The defendant had used a number of 
different methods to indicate the purported bargain nature of its 
prices.  At first, its advertisements displayed a “list price” that 
was shown stricken through, along with the retailer’s own lower 
price and the difference that the consumer would assertedly 
save.  Later, the advertisements changed “list price” to “compare 
at,” and thereafter, to “compare.”  The evidence at trial showed, 
however, that (1) the defendant failed to have a reliable 
procedure in place to verify that the comparator prices were 
realistic and (2) that the prices being compared frequently were 
not for the same or similar item.  In affirming the trial court’s 
finding that the challenged advertising was false or misleading 
within the meaning of the FAL, the Overstock.com court relied 
in part on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Guides Against 
Deceptive Pricing (16 C.F.R. § 233 (2020)).  (Overstock.com, 
supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1081.)  That FTC guide sets forth in 
considerable detail the numerous ways in which advertised 
pricing practices may be misleading or deceptive.  (See 16 C.F.R. 
§§ 233.1-233.5 (2020).)  Specifically with respect to retail value 
comparisons, the guide provides that the advertiser “should be 
reasonably certain that the higher price he advertises does not 
appreciably exceed the price at which substantial sales of the 
article are being made in the area — that is, a sufficient number 
of sales so that a consumer would consider a reduction from the 
price to represent a genuine bargain or saving” and also that the 
compared merchandise is “of essentially similar quality and 
obtainable in the area.”  (16 C.F.R. § 233.2(a), (c) (2020).) 
The Court of Appeal decision in Overstock.com illustrates 
that, as with the determination whether a business practice is 
unfair within the meaning of the UCL, the complexities and 
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nuances that are often involved in the determination whether 
an advertisement should properly be considered untrue or 
misleading for purposes of the FAL are often ameliorated by 
judicial reference to the relevant guidelines developed by the 
FTC regarding deceptive advertising.  (See generally Stern, Cal. 
Practice Guide:  Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 Practice, supra, 
§§ 4:46-4:80.4, pp. 4-14 to 4-32.)  The great variety and 
complexity of contexts in which the potentially misleading 
nature of advertising may arise and must be evaluated can be 
gleaned from a simple listing of the numerous guidelines, in 
addition to the Guides Against Deceptive Pricing relied upon in 
Overstock, that the FTC has published relating to deceptive 
advertising.  (See Guides Against Bait Advertising [16 C.F.R. 
§§ 238.0-238.4 (2020)]; Guides for the Advertising of Warranties 
and Guarantees [16 C.F.R. §§ 239.1-239.5 (2020)]; Guides for 
Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments 
and Services [16 C.F.R. §§ 240.1-240.15 (2020)]; Guide 
Concerning Use of the Word “Free” and Similar Representations 
[16 C.F.R. § 251.1(a)-(i) (2020)]; Guides for Private Vocational 
and Distance Education Schools [16 C.F.R. §§ 254.0-254.7 
(2020)]; Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and 
Testimonials in Advertising [16 C.F.R.§§ 255.0-255.5 (2020)]; 
Guide Concerning Fuel Economy Advertising for New 
Automobiles [16 C.F.R. §§ 259.1-259.4 (2020)]; Guides for the 
Use of Environmental Marketing Claims [16 C.F.R. §§ 260.1-
260.17 (2020)].) 
And a brief look at just one of these FTC guidelines — the 
Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in 
Advertising — provides a good indication of the type of equitable 
consideration and evaluation of a substantial variety of factors 
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that often goes into the determination whether advertising is 
properly considered untrue or misleading for purposes of the 
FAL.  The guide on endorsements declares, for example, that 
“[e]ndorsements must reflect the honest opinions, findings, 
beliefs, or experience of the endorser,” and that “[a]n advertiser 
may use an endorsement of an expert or celebrity only so long 
as it has good reason to believe that the endorser continues to 
subscribe to the views presented.  An advertiser may satisfy this 
obligation by securing the endorser’s views at reasonable 
intervals where reasonableness will be determined by such 
factors as new information on the performance or effectiveness 
of the product, a material alteration in the product, changes in 
the performance of competitors’ products, and the advertiser’s 
contract commitments.”  (16 C.F.R. § 255.1 (a), (b) (2020).)  This 
FTC guide also distinguishes between advertising that uses 
“consumer endorsements” and advertising that uses “expert 
endorsements.”  (Id., §§ 255.2, 255.3 (2020).)  With respect to 
consumer endorsements, the guide provides in part: “An 
advertisement employing endorsements by one or more 
consumers about the performance of an advertised product or 
service will be interpreted as representing that the product or 
service 
is 
effective 
for 
the 
purpose 
depicted 
in 
the 
advertisement.  Therefore, the advertiser must possess and rely 
upon adequate substantiation, including, when appropriate, 
competent and reliable scientific evidence, to support such 
claims made through endorsements in the same manner the 
advertiser would be required to do if it had made the 
representation directly, i.e., without using endorsements.” (Id., 
§ 255.2(a) (2020).)  With respect to expert endorsements, the 
guide requires that “the endorser’s qualifications must in fact 
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give the endorser the expertise that he or she is represented as 
possessing with respect to the endorsement,” and that “the 
endorsement must be supported by an actual exercise of that 
expertise in evaluating product features or characteristics with 
respect to which he or she is expert and which are relevant to an 
ordinary consumer’s use of or experience with the product and 
are available to the ordinary consumer.  This evaluation must 
have included an examination or testing of the product at least 
as extensive as someone with the same degree of expertise would 
normally need to conduct in order to support the conclusions 
presented in the endorsement.”  (Id., § 255.3(a), (b) (2020).)  
Further, the guide provides with respect to all endorsers that 
“[w]hen there exists a connection between the endorser and the 
seller of the advertised product that might materially affect the 
weight or credibility of the endorsement (i.e., the connection is 
not reasonably expected by the audience), such connection must 
be fully disclosed.”  (Id., § 255.5 (2020).)  Finally, the guide 
discusses numerous hypothetical examples that further explain 
the guide’s provisions.  (See id., §§ 255.1-255.5 (2020).) 
Thus, as past FAL decisions and the numerous FTC 
guidelines indicate, the determination whether an advertising 
or promotional practice should properly be found untrue or 
misleading within the meaning of the FAL depends upon the 
exercise of the type of equitable discretion and judgment 
typically employed by a court of equity.  Federal cases 
examining whether an advertising practice is sufficiently 
deceptive to violate analogous federal consumer protection 
statutes also support this conclusion.  (See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co. (1965) 380 U.S. 374, 385-392 [discussing 
competing considerations involved in determining whether an 
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undisclosed televised mock-up of a product demonstration could 
properly be found to constitute deceptive advertising even if the 
underlying product claim was true]; FTC v. Mary Carter Paint 
Co. (1965) 382 U.S. 46, 47-48 [upholding FTC finding that 
advertisement offering a free can of paint if the consumer 
bought a can of the same paint at the advertised price was 
deceptive when the manufacturer never sold single cans of 
paint, even if the advertised price was a fair price for a single 
can of comparable paint]; FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc 
(D.Mass. 2008) 569 F.Supp.2d 285, 298-299 [discussing 
numerous factors to be considered in determining whether an 
advertiser had sufficient “substantiation for the representation 
prior to making it in an advertisement” so as to render the 
advertisement nondeceptive].)15 
                                        
15   
At oral argument, counsel for Nationwide suggested that 
in federal court juries often decide such questions in actions 
under the FTC Act in which civil penalties are sought.  Under 
the FTC Act, however, civil penalties may be sought only for a 
defendant’s violation of a prior cease and desist order (15 U.S.C. 
§§ 45(l), 45(m)(1)(B)) or for a defendant’s knowing violation of a 
specific trade regulation rule (45 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A)).  
Although federal courts have held that there is a right to a jury 
trial in such actions, the jury in such actions does not determine 
whether the practice is unfair or deceptive within the meaning 
of the FTC Act, but rather determines only whether the 
defendant violated the existing cease and desist order or the 
specific trade regulation rule.  (See, e.g., United States v. J.B. 
Williams Co. (2d Cir. 1974) 498 F.2d 414, 421-430; U.S. v. Dish 
Network, LLC (C.D.Ill. 2010) 754 F.Supp.2d 1002, 1003-1004.  
See also 45 U.S.C. § 45(m)(2) [providing that when the cease and 
desist order was not issued against the particular defendant 
from whom civil penalties are sought, upon request “the court 
shall . . . review the determination of law made by the 
 
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Furthermore, past FAL decisions also make clear the 
propriety and importance of a court’s exercise of its equitable 
authority not only in determining whether an advertisement is 
untrue or misleading, but also in determining (1) the number of 
violations for which a defendant may properly be held 
responsible (see, e.g., Jayhill, supra, 9 Cal.3d 283, 288-289; 
Overstock.com, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th 1064, 1087-1088; People 
v. JTH Tax, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1249-1255; People 
ex rel. Kennedy v. Beaumont Investment, Ltd. (2003) 
111 Cal.App.4th 102, 127-130 (Beaumont Investment); People v. 
Toomey (1985) 157 Cal.App.3d 1, 22-23; People v. Superior Court 
(Olson), supra, 96 Cal.App.3d 181, 197-198), and (2) the 
reasonable amount of civil penalties to be imposed for each 
violation.  (See, e.g., Overstock.com, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 1087-1091; Beaumont Investment, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 130-131; People v. First Federal Credit Corp. (2002) 
104 Cal.App.4th 721, 733-734.) 
In sum, in light of the language and legislative history of 
the FAL and the relevant judicial precedent, we believe it is 
clear that, as with the UCL, the Legislature intended that the 
civil cause of action embodied in the FAL would be tried by a 
court of equity rather than by a jury in all FAL actions, 
including instances in which the Attorney General or another 
governmental entity seeks civil penalties for a violation of the 
FAL as well as injunctive relief. 
 
                                        
Commission . . . that the act or practice which was the subject of 
such proceeding constituted an unfair or deceptive act or 
practice in violation of subsection (a)” (italics added)].) 
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IV.  UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, IS 
THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN 
A UCL OR FAL ACTION WHEN THE PEOPLE SEEK 
BOTH INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND CIVIL PENALTIES? 
As already noted, in our recent decision in Shaw, we 
explained that “even when the language and legislative history 
of a statute indicate that the Legislature intended that a cause 
of action established by the statute is to be tried by the court 
rather than by a jury, if the California constitutional jury trial 
provision itself guarantees a right to a jury trial in such a cause 
of action, the Constitution prevails and a jury trial cannot be 
denied.”  (Shaw, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 994.)  Thus, we turn to 
the question whether, notwithstanding the Legislature’s intent 
that such actions be tried by the court rather than a jury, the 
jury trial provision of the California Constitution itself 
guarantees a right to jury trial in an action brought by the 
People under the UCL or FAL that seeks both injunctive relief 
and civil penalties. 
A.  General California Constitutional Jury Trial 
Principles  
Article I, section 16 of the California Constitution — the 
jury trial provision — states in relevant part that “[t]rial by jury 
is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all. . . .”  From the 
outset of our state’s history, our courts have explained that this 
provision was intended to preserve the right to a civil jury as it 
existed at common law in 1850 when the jury trial provision was 
first incorporated into the California Constitution.  (See, e.g., 
Cassidy v. Sullivan (1883) 64 Cal. 266, 266; Koppikus v. State 
Capitol Comm’rs (1860) 16 Cal. 248, 253-255.)  As this court 
observed in People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe (1951) 37 Cal.2d 
283 (One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe):  “ ‘The right to trial by jury 
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guaranteed by the Constitution is the right as it existed at 
common law at the time the Constitution was adopted. . . .  It is 
the right to trial by jury as it existed at common law which is 
preserved; and what that right is, is a purely historical question, 
a fact which is to be ascertained like any other social, political 
or legal fact.  The right is the historical right enjoyed at the time 
it was guaranteed by the Constitution.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 286-287.)  
“Our state Constitution essentially preserves the right to a jury 
in those actions in which there was a right to a jury trial at 
common law at the time the Constitution was first adopted.”  
(Crouchman v. Superior Court (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1167, 1175 
(Crouchman).) 
Pursuant to this historical approach, as a general matter 
the California Constitution affords a right to a jury trial in 
common law actions at law that were triable by a jury in 1850, 
but not in suits in equity that were not triable by a jury in 1850.  
(C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 
23 Cal.3d 1, 8-9 (C & K Engineering).)  In applying this test, our 
cases have explained that the form or title of a statutory cause 
of action is not controlling and that if the substance of the cause 
of action is one that would have been triable by a jury at common 
law, there is a right to a jury trial even if the statute’s 
designation might suggest that it is an equitable proceeding.  
(See, e.g., One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 299.)  
“ ‘In determining whether the action was one triable by a jury at 
common law, the court is not bound by the form of the action but 
rather by the nature of the rights involved and the facts of the 
particular case — the gist of the action.  A jury trial must be 
granted where the gist of the action is legal, where the action is 
in reality cognizable at law.’ ”  (Ibid.)  In the One 1941 Chevrolet 
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Coupe decision, for example, the court held that the gist of the 
action at issue in that case — a civil lawsuit by the government 
seeking forfeiture of an automobile that was allegedly used to 
illegally transport a prohibited drug — was legal because at 
common law a similar cause of action for forfeiture of otherwise 
lawful property that was allegedly used for unlawful purposes 
was triable by a jury in a court of law.  (Id. at pp. 297-300.)  The 
court ruled that the fact that the statutory provision authorizing 
the cause of action designated the forfeiture action as a “ ‘special 
proceeding’ ” did not change the legal nature of the action.  (Id. 
at p. 299.) 
The court in One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, supra, 37 Cal.2d 
283, further explained that the fact that the statute under which 
the forfeiture proceeding in that case was brought was enacted 
after the adoption of the California Constitution did not in itself 
bring the statutory cause of action outside the guarantee of the 
constitutional jury trial provision.  The court observed in this 
regard:  “ ‘The constitutional right of trial by jury is not to be 
narrowly construed.  It is not limited strictly to those cases in 
which it existed before the adoption of the Constitution but is 
extended to cases of like nature as may afterwards arise.  It 
embraces cases of the same class thereafter arising.”  (One 1941 
Chevrolet Coupe, at p. 300.)  In explaining why the lawsuit at 
issue was of “ ‘like nature’ ” or “ ‘the same class’ ” as the common 
law action at law, the court stated:  “ ‘At common law, prior to 
the adoption of the Constitution, a party against whom the 
forfeiture of property used in violation of law (then a carriage, 
wagon, horse or mule, now usually an automobile), was sought 
to be enforced was entitled to a trial by jury.  Consequently such 
right exists now.’ ”  (Ibid.; see also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior 
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Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1006, 1012 [“We look to whether a claim 
arising under a modern statute is ‘of like nature’ or ‘of the same 
class’ as a common law right of action”].)     
In a case like One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe that involves a 
single cause of action that at common law in 1850 was triable 
only by a jury, or conversely a case involving a single cause of 
action that at common law was triable only by the court (see, 
e.g., People v. Englebrecht (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1245 
[action for injunctive relief to abate a nuisance]), the 
determination whether the gist of the action in question is legal 
or equitable is relatively straightforward.  When a case involves 
multiple causes of action or multiple issues, some of which are 
legal in nature and would have been triable by a jury at common 
law and some of which are equitable in nature and would have 
been triable by the court at common law, the analysis is 
somewhat more complex. 
B.  Cases Involving Severable Legal and Equitable 
Issues 
When the legal and equitable causes of action or issues 
presented in a case are severable, past California decisions 
establish that a party retains the right to a jury trial of the 
severable legal issues and a court trial of the severable equitable 
issues.  (See, e.g., Connell v. Bowes (1942) 19 Cal.2d 870, 871 [“It 
is now established in this state . . . that if a complaint states two 
complete rights of action, one legal and one equitable, a jury trial 
may be obtained upon the issues raised by the legal cause”]; see 
generally 7 Witkin, supra, Trial, § 86, p. 113 [“Where the action 
is of a hybrid character, raising legal and equitable issues, a 
party is entitled to a jury trial of the severable legal issues”].) 
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At the same time, California decisions have also 
repeatedly held that when severable legal and equitable causes 
of action or issues are present in a single proceeding, the trial 
court generally has authority to determine in what order the 
matters should be heard, and if the equitable issue is tried by 
the court first and if the court’s resolution of that issue 
determines a matter that would otherwise be resolved by a jury 
with regard to the legal claim or issue, the court’s resolution of 
the matter will generally be binding and may leave nothing for 
a jury to resolve.  (See, e.g., Raedeke v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan 
Assn. (1974) 10 Cal.3d 665, 671 (Raedeke) [“It is well established 
that, in a case involving both legal and equitable issues, the trial 
court may proceed to try the equitable issues first, without a jury 
. . . , and that if the court’s determination of those issues is also 
dispositive of the legal issues, nothing further remains to be 
tried by a jury”].)  And although a trial court retains discretion 
regarding the order in which the issues should be tried, the 
governing California cases express a preference that the 
equitable issues be tried first.  (See, e.g., Orange County Water 
Dist. v. Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 252, 
355 [citing cases].)  This general “equity first preference” is a 
long standing feature of California law and has always been 
viewed as fully compatible with the right to jury trial embodied 
in the California Constitution.  (See, e.g., Raedeke, supra, 
10 Cal.3d at pp. 670-671;16 Connell v. Bowes, supra, 19 Cal.2d 
                                        
16  
In Raedeke itself, the court, after confirming the existence 
and validity of the “equity first preference,” held that a plaintiff 
who brings an action presenting both legal and equitable issues 
can avoid the potential loss of a jury trial on common issues by 
electing to forgo the equitable claim and thus removing the 
 
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870, 872; Thomson v. Thomson (1936) 7 Cal.2d 671, 682-683; 
Angus v. Craven (1901) 132 Cal. 691, 699 (conc. opn. of 
Henshaw, J.); Swasey v. Adair (1891) 88 Cal. 179, 180; Fish v. 
Benson (1886) 71 Cal. 428, 433-435; Lestrade v. Barth (1862) 
19 Cal. 660, 671-672.)17 
C.  Cases Involving Nonseverable Legal and 
Equitable Issues 
Unlike proceedings in which multiple legal and equitable 
causes or issues are severable, when a cause of action involves 
                                        
equitable issues from the case.  (See Raedeke, supra, 10 Cal.3d 
at pp. 671-672.) 
17 
Contrary to the implication of the Court of Appeal decision 
below (see Nationwide Biweekly, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 456), this court’s recent decision in Shaw, supra, 2 Cal.5th 
983 did not purport to abrogate or change this state’s well-
established “equity first preference” doctrine.  In Shaw, we 
interpreted one provision of the statute before the court — 
Health and Safety Code section 1278.5, subdivision (m), which 
provided that nothing in the new legislation “abrogate[s] or 
limit[s] any other theory of liability or remedy otherwise 
available at law” — as preserving in full a plaintiff’s 
complementary cause of action under Tameny v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, including the plaintiff’s right 
to obtain a jury resolution of the Tameny claim.  (Shaw, supra, 
2 Cal.5th at p. 1006.)  Shaw did not purport to overrule or 
disapprove the numerous California decisions cited above that 
have applied the “equity first preference” doctrine for more than 
a century. 
 
Because in this case the equitable and legal aspects of the 
UCL and FAL actions are nonseverable and because Nationwide 
has not questioned the continued vitality of the “equity first 
preference” doctrine, we have no occasion to consider whether 
there is any reason to reevaluate this doctrine or to determine 
its proper application in a particular context.   
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legal and equitable aspects that are not severable California 
decisions have relied upon “the gist of the action” standard in 
determining whether the action should be considered legal or 
equitable for purposes of the constitutional jury trial issue.  (See, 
e.g., C & K Engineering, supra, 23 Cal.3d 1, 9-11 [in action 
seeking damages for breach of contract (“in form an action at 
law”) but relying solely on “the equitable doctrine of promissory 
estoppel,” court concluded “[t]he ‘gist’ of such an action is 
equitable”]; Central Laborers’ Pension Fund v. McAfee, Inc. 
(2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 292, 344-350 [in action by shareholders 
seeking money damages for breach of corporate directors’ and 
officers’ breach of fiduciary duty, court concluded that the gist of 
the action was equitable]; Interactive Multimedia Artists, Inc. v. 
Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1552-1556 [in action 
seeking money damages for breach of a trustee’s fiduciary duty, 
court held that the gist of the action was equitable when, under 
the applicable Delaware law, the determination of whether a 
breach occurred turned on a multifactor “ ‘entire fairness test’ ” 
that required the application of equitable principles in 
“weighing various considerations in order to reach a just 
result”]; Martin v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 
688, 695-697 [although a tort defendant’s claim for “equitable 
indemnity” seeking recovery of money damages for the 
proportional fault of a cotortfeasor involved application of 
equitable principles, court concluded the gist of the claim was 
legal because ascertaining the relative fault of cotortfeasors for 
equitable indemnity “involves determinations of rights and 
liabilities traditionally arising in common law suits for 
negligence”].)  In our decision in C & K Engineering, we noted 
that “[a]lthough we have said that ‘the legal or equitable nature 
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of a cause of action ordinarily is determined by the mode of relief 
to be afforded . . . ,’ the prayer for relief in a particular case is 
not conclusive” and “ ‘[t]he fact that damages is one of a full 
range of possible remedies does not guarantee . . . the right to a 
jury.’ ”  (C&K Engineering, at p. 9, citations omitted.)   
Two Court of Appeal decisions that have grappled with the 
proper characterization of an action as legal or equitable 
involved statutory causes of action, like those at issue in the 
present case, in which both equitable and legal relief may be 
awarded. 
In the first case, Southern Pac. Transportation Co. v. 
Superior Court (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 433 (Southern Pac. 
Transportation), the plaintiffs, who claimed that they had made 
improvements to real property in the good faith belief that they 
were the owners of the property, brought the underlying action 
against the true owner of the property seeking damages as good 
faith improvers of the property.  The action was brought 
pursuant to a recently enacted “good faith improver” statutory 
scheme (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 871.1-871.7) that authorized a good 
faith improver of real property to bring an independent civil 
cause of action for relief.  (Id., § 871.3.)  The legislation provided 
that in such an action the court, under appropriate 
circumstances, “may . . . effect such adjustment of the rights, 
equities, and interests of the good faith improver, the owner of 
the land, and other interested parties . . . as is consistent with 
substantial justice to the parties under the circumstances of the 
particular case.”  (Id., § 871.5.) 
The question before the Court of Appeal in Southern Pac. 
Transportation was whether the plaintiffs had a right to a jury 
trial in their action against the owner.  The plaintiffs claimed 
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that because their complaint sought only money damages from 
the landowner, the action was one at law in which they had a 
right to a jury trial.  The Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiffs’ 
contention.  After noting that the right to a jury trial under the 
California Constitution is the right “existing at common law at 
the time the Constitution was adopted” (Southern Pac. 
Transportation, supra, 58 Cal.App.2d at p. 436), the court 
explained:  “Because the provisions of [Code of Civil Procedure] 
sections 871.1-871.7 have no counterpart in English law, 
classification of the action as either legal or equitable depends 
upon characterization of the nature of the relief sought.  
Although [the plaintiffs] assert that they seek damages only, by 
bringing an action under section 871.3, they have invited the 
court to ‘effect such an adjustment of the rights, equities, and 
interests’ of the parties as is consistent with substantial justice.  
(§ 871.5.)  ‘Under this section, the court has considerable 
discretion to select appropriate relief from the full range of 
equitable and legal remedies.’  (Legislative Committee 
Comment — Assembly, to § 871.5.)”  (Southern Pac. 
Transportation, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d at p. 437.) 
The Court of Appeal continued:  “The fact that damages is 
one of a full range of possible remedies does not guarantee [the 
plaintiffs] the right to a jury for their good faith improver action.  
We recognize that where a complaint raises both legal and 
equitable issues, a jury trial may be obtained upon the issues 
raised by the legal cause.  [Citation.]  Here, however, there is no 
possibility of severing the legal from the equitable.  The trier of 
fact must determine whether to quiet title in the improver on 
the condition he pay to the landowner the value of the 
unimproved land, or whether and in what amount, to award 
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damages to the improver, or whether to require a completely 
different form of relief.  [Citation.]  Such a determination is not 
susceptible of division into one component to be resolved by the 
court and another component to be determined by a jury.  Only 
one decision can be made, and it must make a proper adjustment 
of the ‘rights, equities, and interests’ of all the parties involved.”  
(Southern Pac. Transportation, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d at pp. 437-
438.) 
Under 
these 
circumstances 
the 
Southern 
Pac. 
Transportation court concluded:  “Because of the wide range of 
equitable and legal relief authorized by Code of Civil Procedure 
section 871.5, it would be an impossible task for a jury to 
determine the appropriate relief and to resolve the rights, 
equities, and interests of all of the parties. . . .  We have 
concluded, therefore, that it is the function of the court and not 
the jury to be the trier of fact in a good faith improver action.”  
(Southern Pac. Transportation, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d at p. 438.) 
In this court’s subsequent decision in C & K Engineering, 
supra, 23 Cal.3d 1, we specifically cited and discussed the 
Southern Pac. Transportation decision with approval, quoting at 
some length the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in that case.  
(C & K Engineering, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 11.) 
In the second case, DiPirro, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th 150, 
the Court of Appeal addressed whether there is a right to a jury 
trial in an action seeking enforcement of the provisions of the 
Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (Health 
& Saf. Code, §§ 25249.5-25249.13), a legislative measure 
adopted by the voters through the initiative process and most 
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commonly known as Proposition 65.18  That measure — which 
generally prohibits businesses from (1) knowingly discharging 
chemicals known to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity into 
any source of drinking water (Health & Saf. Code, § 25249.5) or 
(2) knowingly exposing any individual to such chemicals 
without first giving clear and reasonable warning (id., 
§ 25249.6) — authorizes government officials and, under 
specified circumstances, private persons, to bring a cause of 
action seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties against any 
person who violates the statute.  (Id., § 25249.7.)  Like the UCL 
and FAL, Proposition 65 provides that once a statutory violation 
is found, the court may issue an injunction and shall impose a 
civil penalty not to exceed $2,500 per day for each violation 
(Health & Saf. Code, § 25249.7, subds. (a), (b)(1)), and, again 
like the UCL and FAL, Proposition 65 sets forth a list of multiple 
factors, including “[a]ny other factor that justice may require,” 
that the court is to consider in determining the amount of the 
civil penalties to be imposed.  (Health & Saf. Code, § 25249.7, 
subd. (b)(2)(G).)19  Because the determination whether a 
                                        
18    The legislation was adopted by the voters at the 
November 4, 1986 General Election.  The Legislature has 
amended relevant provisions of the act on numerous occasions 
since its inception.  (See Stats. 1999, ch. 599, § 1; Stats. 2001, 
ch. 578, § 1; Stats. 2002, ch. 323, § 1; Stats. 2003, ch. 62, § 185; 
Stats. 2013, ch. 581, § 1; Stats. 2014, ch. 71, § 90; Stats. 2014, 
ch. 828, § 1; Stats 2017, ch. 510, § 1.)  For convenience, we shall 
refer to the legislation in its current form as Proposition 65. 
19  
Health & Safety Code section 25249.7, subdivision (b)(2) 
provides in full:  “In assessing the amount of a civil penalty for 
a violation of this chapter, the court shall consider all of the 
following: 
 
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statutory violation has been established itself triggers the 
availability of both injunctive relief and civil penalties, the 
equitable and legal aspects of the action are not severable. 
In deciding whether the plaintiff had a right to a jury trial 
in the civil action authorized by Proposition 65, the DiPirro 
court examined the statutory scheme as a whole to determine 
whether the gist of the action was legal or equitable.  (DiPirro, 
supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at pp. 180-184.)  In concluding that the 
legislation is “thoroughly infused with equitable principles that 
must be considered and adjudicated in an enforcement action” 
(id. at p. 180), the court relied in part on the fact that 
“Proposition 65 is ‘ “a remedial statute intended to protect the 
public” ’ ” (ibid.),  along with its determination that the remedies 
authorized by the act were primarily equitable in nature, 
including injunctive relief to prevent the sale of offending 
products that lack the required warning.  (Id. at p. 181.) 
The DiPirro court acknowledged that Proposition 65 also 
authorized an award of civil penalties (DiPirro, supra, 
                                        
 
“(A) The nature and extent of the violation. 
 
“(B) The number of, and severity of, the violations. 
 
“(C) The economic effect of the penalty on the violator. 
 
“(D) Whether the violator took good faith measures to 
comply with this chapter and the time these measures were 
taken. 
 
“(E) The willfulness of the violator’s misconduct. 
 
“(F) The deterrent effect that the imposition of the penalty 
would have on both the violator and the regulated community 
as a whole. 
 
“(G) Any other factor that justice may require.” 
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153 Cal.App.4th at p. 181) and explicitly recognized “ ‘the 
“general rule” ’ that monetary relief is a legal remedy, ‘and an 
award of statutory damages may serve purposes traditionally 
associated with legal relief, such as compensation and 
punishment.’ ”  (Id. at p. 182.)  The Court of Appeal pointed out, 
however, that the civil penalties that are authorized by 
Proposition 65 are to be determined by a highly discretionary 
consideration of multiple factors “that do not primarily take into 
account any harm suffered by the plaintiff . . . [and are] the kind 
of calculation traditionally performed by judges rather than a 
jury . . . .”  (DiPirro, at p. 182, fn. omitted.)  Emphasizing that 
“[t]he Act is informational and preventative rather than 
compensatory in its nature and function” (ibid.) and that “[t]he 
primary right to bring an action for civil penalties pursuant to 
the Act is . . . given to the state rather than individuals seeking 
compensation” (id. at p. 183), the DiPirro court determined that 
“the statutory remedies afforded by the Act, including civil 
penalties, are not damages at law, but instead constitute 
equitable relief appropriate and incidental to enforcement of the 
Act, which do not entitle the plaintiff to a jury trial” (id. at 
p. 184).     
D.  Application of Constitutional Principles to UCL 
and FAL Actions 
As we shall explain, in light of the particular nature of the 
civil causes of action authorized by the UCL and FAL, we 
conclude that the gist of a civil action under the UCL and FAL 
is equitable rather than legal in nature.  Such causes of action 
are equitable either when brought by a private party seeking 
only an injunction, restitution, or other equitable relief or when 
brought by the Attorney General, a district attorney, or other 
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governmental official seeking not only injunctive relief and 
restitution but also civil penalties.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that there is no right to a jury trial in such actions under the 
California Constitution. 
To begin with, the statutory causes of action established 
by the UCL and FAL are clearly not of like nature or of the same 
class as any common law right of action.  (Cf. One 1941 Chevrolet 
Coupe, supra, 37 Cal.2d 832, 300.)  As the leading treatise on 
California’s consumer protection statutes explains, under the 
common law only a business adversely affected by trademark or 
trade name infringement by a business competitor could file an 
action for unfair competition against the competitor and such an 
action could be brought only as a suit in equity.  (See Cal. 
Practice Guide:  Stern, Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 Practice, 
supra, § 2:1, p. 2-1.)  “At common law, deceived consumers had 
no claim for unfair competition.  This made little sense, since 
ultimately it is the consumer who is harmed by a business that 
passes off goods or services as genuine, or as those of 
another. . . .  No matter; consumers were left without a claim or 
remedy.  This was the era of caveat emptor [that is, let the buyer 
beware].”  (Id., § 2:3, p. 2-1) 
The UCL and FAL were enacted for the specific purpose of 
creating new rights and remedies that were not available at 
common law.  (See, e.g., Bank of the West v. Superior Court 
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1263-1264.)  The statutes deliberately 
broaden the types of business practices that can properly be 
found to constitute unfair competition (see, e.g., Barquis, supra, 
7 Cal.3d at p. 112), and eliminate a number of elements that 
were required in common law actions for fraud (see, e.g., In re 
Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 312; Com. on Children’s 
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Television, supra, 35 Cal.3d 197, 211).  The statutes explicitly 
authorize government officials and injured private individuals 
to obtain injunctive relief to prevent a business from continuing 
to use the practice to the detriment of other consumers and to 
obtain restitution and other clearly equitable relief.  (Bus & 
Prof. Code, §§ 17203, 17204.)  Such causes of action for unfair 
competition that authorize injunctive relief against unfair or 
deceptive business practices had no close or analogous 
counterpart at common law.   
Furthermore, when the Legislature adopted the civil 
penalty provisions of the UCL and FAL in 1972 and 1965 
respectively, permitting government officials, and government 
officials alone, to seek civil penalties along with injunctive or 
other equitable relief in the civil actions such officials bring 
under the UCL and FAL (see Jayhill, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 288), 
the causes of action under the UCL and FAL continued to 
constitute causes of action that were not of like nature or of the 
same class as any common law action.  Prior to 1850, early 
English law embodied numerous statutes imposing civil 
penalties for a variety of specifically delineated impermissible 
business practices — like using false weights and measures in 
the sale of a product or failing to pay the appropriate excise 
taxes due — that were enforced by the government through a 
civil action in the Court of Exchequer in which a jury was 
available.  (See One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, supra, 37 Cal.2d at 
pp. 295-296 & fn. 15.)  We are unaware, however, of any early 
English statute that defined the business conduct proscribed by 
the statute in the type of broad and sweeping language adopted 
in the UCL and FAL, which was specifically intended to reach 
novel but offensive business practices that were not 
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encompassed by more specific statutory prohibitions.  (See, e.g., 
Barquis, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 112.)  Furthermore, the early 
English statutes generally set forth a specific amount of civil 
penalty that was to be imposed for each violation; again, we are 
aware of no such statute that required the amount of the civil 
penalty to be determined by a consideration of multiple factors 
comparable to those set out in the relevant provisions of the 
UCL and FAL.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17206, subd. (b), 17536, 
subd. (b).)  Finally, and perhaps most significantly, unlike the 
UCL and FAL, none of the early English statutes authorized a 
prosecuting official to seek and obtain, in the same action, a civil 
penalty and an injunction that would explicitly restrain the 
business from committing the prohibited conduct in the future.20 
                                        
20  
In his seminal article on the right to civil jury trial, 
Professor Fleming James observed that, at common law, when 
a plaintiff was seeking to obtain both injunctive relief and civil 
penalties for a defendant’s alleged statutory violation, the 
plaintiff would have been required to bring two separate actions 
— one in equity and one in law.  As Professor James explained:  
“B’s violation of A’s statutory right . . . might entitle A to an 
injunction, to compensatory damages, and to a penalty.  The 
right to any relief would turn on whether B violated the statute.  
A might get a determination of that issue without a jury in an 
equity suit, seeking an injunction and perhaps compensatory 
damages as incidental to an injunction.  Or he might get such 
determination in an action at law for damages or for the penalty.  
Since equity refused to enforce a penalty and the law would not 
give an injunction, two suits would be required for complete 
relief.  A had the choice which to bring first.  And the first 
determination of the common issue (violation vel non) would 
bind the parties in the second action.  The plaintiff then had the 
power to choose the mode of trial of the common issue, and he 
could so exercise it as to leave no room for judicial discretion.”  
 
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Accordingly, in the absence of a comparable common law 
counterpart, in deciding whether there is a right to a jury trial 
under the California Constitution, we must look to the statutory 
scheme as a whole to determine whether the gist of a cause of 
action under the UCL or the FAL seeking both injunctive relief 
and civil penalties is legal or equitable. 
For nearly a half century, Court of Appeal decisions have 
explicitly and uniformly held that actions under the UCL and 
FAL are equitable in nature and are to be tried by the court and 
not by a jury, including when the remedies sought are civil 
penalties as well as injunctive or other equitable relief.  (See, 
e.g., People v. Witzerman (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 169, 176-177 
(Witzerman); 
People 
v. 
Bestline 
Products, 
Inc. 
(1976) 
61 Cal.App.3d 879, 915-916; People v. First Federal Credit Corp. 
(2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 721, 732-733; People v. Bhakta, supra, 
162 Cal.App.4th 973, 977-979; People ex rel. Feuer v. Superior 
Court (Cahuenga’s The Spot) (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1360, 
1384.)  Although this court has not previously been directly 
asked to decide this issue itself, we note that as recently as 2015, 
in Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 298, 
our court, in responding to the defendant’s concern that the 
plaintiff’s false advertising and unfair competition claims in 
that case “would be evaluated by a lay jury applying a nebulous 
                                        
(James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions (1963) 72 Yale L.J. 
655, 671-672, fns. omitted.)  Thus, as a general matter, at 
common law when a plaintiff sought both injunctive relief and 
civil penalties based upon a business’s alleged violation of a 
statute, the business was by no means guaranteed that the 
question whether it violated the statute would be determined by 
a jury rather than by a court. 
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‘reasonable consumer’ standard,” stated that “these claims are 
decided by a judge, not a jury.”  (Id. at p. 322, citing Hodge v. 
Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 278, 284-285 [action 
brought by private plaintiff seeking equitable relief] and 
Witzerman, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d 169, 176-177 [action brought 
by public official seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties].) 
The Court of Appeal decision under review here was the 
first appellate decision to reach a contrary conclusion.  Although 
the Court of Appeal suggested that the numerous prior Court of 
Appeal decisions cited above were either not on point or did not 
fully analyze the jury trial issue (Nationwide Biweekly, supra, 
24 Cal.App.5th at p. 457), our review of those appellate court 
decisions 
does 
not 
support 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeal’s 
characterization of those decisions.  Those prior decisions, 
contrary to the Court of Appeal’s suggestion, directly analyze 
the question whether there is a right to a jury trial in such 
actions under the California Constitution and conclude that 
there is no state constitutional right to a jury trial in such 
actions. 
The 1972 decision in Witzerman, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d 169 
— the initial decision in this line of cases — demonstrates this 
point.  Witzerman was an enforcement action brought by the 
Attorney General under the FAL seeking both injunctive relief 
and civil penalties.  After noting that the defendants’ jury trial 
claim relied on both the federal and state constitutional jury 
trial rights, the court initially addressed the state constitutional 
claim and rejected the defendants’ argument that the trial 
court’s denial of a jury trial was improper under the California 
Constitution because the issues to be tried were assertedly legal 
rather than equitable in nature.  (Witzerman, at p. 176.)  The 
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court in Witzerman explained:  “Assuming, without so deciding, 
that the civil penalties sought represent legal rather than 
equitable relief, we do not believe that in this case such issues 
could have been severed from the equitable ones.  The same 
alleged misconduct on the part of appellants was the basis for 
both types of relief sought by the People.  (Cf. Jaffe v. Albertson 
Co. [(1966)] 243 Cal.App.2d 592, 610 [53 Cal.Rptr. 25].)  Under 
these circumstances trial to the court of the People’s case for 
injunctive relief disposed of as well the People’s case for relief by 
way of civil penalties.  (Cf. Veale v. Piercy [(1962)] 
206 Cal.App.2d 557, 562-563 [24 Cal.Rptr. 91].)”  (Witzerman, 
supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at pp. 176-177.)  Contrary to the Court of 
Appeal’s critique below, only after rejecting the defendants’ 
state constitutional jury trial claim did the court in Witzerman 
turn to and reject the defendants’ federal Sixth Amendment 
claim.  (Witzerman, at p. 177.) 
Although the Witzerman decision directly addressed and 
rejected the defendant’s state constitutional jury trial claim, it 
is not clear that the decision applied the proper mode of analysis.  
After correctly observing that the equitable and legal aspects of 
the FAL action before it were nonseverable, the court did not 
explicitly apply the “gist of the action” test but instead appears 
to have applied the “equity first preference” doctrine.  
(Witzerman, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at pp. 176-177.)  Nonetheless, 
we conclude that the Witzerman court reached the correct result. 
All parties before us agree that the legal and equitable 
aspects of the UCL and FAL actions at issue are nonseverable 
and that the gist of the action standard applies.  The legal and 
equitable aspects of these actions are nonseverable not only 
because, as the Witzerman court indicated (Witzerman, supra, 
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29 Cal.App.3d at pp. 176-177), the determination whether a 
defendant’s alleged conduct constitutes a violation of the statute 
provides the basis for all of the relief authorized by the statutes, 
but also because the amount of civil penalties that would be 
appropriate may well depend on the equitable remedies, 
including restitution, that are or are not imposed.  (See, e.g., 
Overstock.com, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th 1064, 1088-1089; People 
ex rel. Harris v. Sarpas (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1567.) 
 With respect to the application of the gist of the action 
standard, our independent analysis of the UCL and FAL causes 
of action as a whole convinces us that the gist of the civil causes 
of action authorized by the UCL and FAL must properly be 
considered equitable, rather than legal, in nature. 
To begin with, the bulk of the remedies provided for in the 
statutes — injunctive relief, restitution, and other clearly 
equitable remedies such as the appointment of a receiver (see 
Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17203, 17535) — are clearly equitable in 
nature.  As the legislative history of both the UCL and FAL 
make clear, the primary objective of both statutes is preventive, 
authorizing the exercise of broad equitable authority to protect 
consumers from unfair or deceptive business practices and 
advertising. 
Second, although the statutes also authorize in actions 
brought by the Attorney General, a district attorney, or other 
government officials (but not private parties), the imposition of 
civil penalties — a type of remedy that in some contexts is 
properly considered legal in nature — the UCL and FAL 
statutes specify that in assessing the amount of the civil penalty 
to be imposed under these statutes, the court is afforded broad 
discretion to consider a nonexclusive list of factors that include 
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the relative seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and the 
potential deterrent effect of such penalties, the type of 
qualitative evaluation and weighing of a variety of factors that 
is typically undertaken by a court and not a jury.  (Bus. & Prof. 
Code, §§ 17206, 17536.)   Notably, the civil penalties that may 
be awarded under the UCL and FAL, unlike the classic legal 
remedy of damages, are noncompensatory in nature; they 
require no showing of actual harm to consumers and are not 
based on the amount of losses incurred by the targets of unfair 
practices or misleading advertising.  Like the civil penalties at 
issue in Kizer v. County of San Mateo (1991) 53 Cal.3d 139, 147-
148, although the civil penalties under the UCL and FAL “may 
have a punitive or deterrent aspect, their primary purpose is to 
secure obedience to statutes and regulations imposed to assure 
important public policy objectives. . . .  The focus of [both] 
statutory scheme[s] is preventative.”  (Kizer, at p. 147-148, 
citation omitted.)  And like the civil penalties in Kizer (id. at 
p. 147), the civil penalties obtained by the government in actions 
under the UCL and FAL are to be utilized for the enforcement 
of the statutes in question.  (See Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17206, 
subd. (c), 17536, subd. (c).)   
Finally, as discussed above (ante, pp. 14-21, 29-37), the 
expansive and broadly worded substantive standards that are 
to be applied in determining whether a challenged business 
practice or advertising is properly considered violative of the 
UCL or FAL call for the exercise of the flexibility and judicial 
expertise and experience that was traditionally applied by a 
court of equity.  Particularly in light of the equitable nature of 
the substantive standards that apply in UCL and FAL actions 
— both in actions brought by private parties and by government 
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officials — we conclude that the gist of the civil causes of action 
authorized by the UCL and FAL must properly be considered 
equitable in nature.  Accordingly, we conclude that under the 
California Constitution, there is no right to a jury trial in a cause 
of action under the UCL and FAL, including when the action is 
brought by a government official and seeks both injunctive relief 
and civil penalties. 
We emphasize that this conclusion does not deprive a 
defendant in a UCL or FAL action of any constitutional right 
afforded by the jury trial provision of the California 
Constitution.  As we have explained (ante, p. 41), that 
constitutional provision grants the right to jury trial in actions 
“ ‘of like nature’ ” “ ‘or of the same class’ ” in which a jury trial 
was provided at common law in 1850, when the jury trial 
provision of the California Constitution was first adopted.  (One 
1941 Chevrolet Coupe, supra, 37 Cal.2d 283, 300.)  The consumer 
protection actions authorized in the UCL and FAL are not of like 
nature or of the same class as an action that was triable by jury 
at common law.  In actions like those under the UCL and FAL, 
in which the equitable and legal aspects are nonseverable, there 
is no constitutional right to a jury trial when, as here, the gist of 
the action is equitable rather than legal. 
In sum, we conclude that there is no right to a jury trial 
under the California Constitution in a cause of action under the 
UCL or FAL, including an action in which civil penalties as well 
as an injunction or other equitable relief are sought.  Because 
our conclusion rests in significant part on the fact that the 
substantive standards embodied in the UCL and FAL 
contemplate the exercise of the type of equitable discretion and 
judgment traditionally applied by a court of equity, we have no 
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occasion in this case to decide how the California constitutional 
jury trial provision applies to other statutory causes of action 
that authorize both injunctive relief and civil penalties.21 
                                        
21  
In concluding that the gist of the causes of action created 
by the UCL and FAL is equitable even when civil penalties as 
well as injunctive relief are sought, we have relied on the specific 
attributes of the California UCL and FAL statutes, as well as 
the established understanding of the scope of the California 
constitutional jury trial provision. 
 
Every other state has adopted consumer protection 
legislation somewhat comparable to the UCL and FAL.  (See, 
e.g., Stern, Cal. Practice Guide:  Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 
Practice, supra, §§ 2:54-2:62, pp. 2-22 to 2-24; Nat. Consumer 
Law Center, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices (9th ed. 
2016) § 1.1., p. 1.)  Although the numerous unfair or deceptive 
practice statutes in other jurisdictions differ from the California 
statutes in a variety of respects, we note that a substantial 
majority of other state courts that have addressed the question 
whether there is a right to a jury trial in civil actions brought 
under those states’ unfair or deceptive practice laws have 
concluded that there is no right to a jury trial in such actions.  
(See Nunley v. State (Ala. 1993) 628 So.2d 619, 621-622; People 
v. Shifrin (Colo.App. 2014) 342 P.3d 506, 512-513; Associated 
Inv. Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Williams Assocs. IV (Conn. 1994) 
645 A.2d 505, 508-512; Martin v. Heinold Commodities (Ill. 
1994) 643 N.E.2d 734, 753; Nei v. Burley (Mass. 1983) 
446 N.E.2d 674, 678-679; State by Humphrey v. Alpine Air 
Products, Inc. (Minn.Ct.App. 1992) 490 N.W.2d 888, 895; State 
ex rel. Douglas v. Schroeder (Neb. 1986) 384 N.W.2d 626, 629-
630; State v. State Credit Assoc. (Wn.Ct.App. 1983) 657 P.2d 
327, 330.)  Several states have reached a contrary conclusion, 
but none of those cases involved a statute that created a cause 
of action in which both injunctive relief as well as damages or 
civil penalties could be obtained.  (See Robinson v. McDougal 
(Ohio Ct.App. 1988) 575 N.E.2d 469, 474; State v. Credit Bureau 
of Loredo, Inc. (Tex. 1975) 530 S.W.2d 288, 290-292; State v. 
 
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E.  Inapplicability of Tull 
As already noted, in reaching a contrary conclusion, the 
Court of Appeal relied heavily upon the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Tull, supra, 481 U.S. 412.  As we explain, for 
a variety of reasons we conclude that the Court of Appeal’s 
reliance upon Tull was unwarranted. 
Tull involved a civil action filed by the federal government 
against a real estate developer, alleging that the developer had 
dumped fill on wetlands without a permit in violation of the 
federal Clean Water Act.  (33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.)  As 
authorized by that act, the government sought both injunctive 
relief (id., § 1319(b)) and civil penalties (id., § 1319(d)).  The 
court in Tull observed, however, that at the time the complaint 
in that case was filed the developer had sold most of the 
properties in question to a third party, and “[i]njunctive relief 
was therefore impractical except with regard to a small portion 
of the land.”  (Tull, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 415.)  After denying the 
developer’s demand for a jury trial, the trial court conducted a 
15-day bench trial, concluded that the property on which the 
defendant had admittedly dumped fill constituted “wetlands” 
within the meaning of the federal statute, and ultimately 
imposed injunctive relief and civil penalties on defendant. 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, 
concluding that the developer was entitled to a jury trial under 
the Seventh Amendment to the federal Constitution.  (Tull, 
                                        
Abbott Labs. (Wis. 2012) 816 N.W.2d 145, 156-159.)  (See 
generally Annot., Constitutional Right to Jury Trial in Cause of 
Action under State Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices Law 
(1997) 54 A.L.R.5th 631.) 
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supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 417-425.)  The court in Tull acknowledged 
that a proceeding under the Clean Water Act seeking both 
injunctive relief and civil penalties is analogous to two different 
common law causes of action — an action to abate a nuisance in 
which there was no right to a jury trial and an action in debt to 
impose a civil penalty in which there was a right to a jury trial.  
(Tull, at pp. 420-421).  However, the court concluded that it need 
not decide which common law action was the closer historical 
analog, because prior Supreme Court precedent established that 
“characterizing the relief sought is ‘[m]ore important’ than 
finding a precisely analogous common-law cause of action in 
determining whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a 
jury trial.”  (Id. at p. 421, citing Curtis v. Loether (1974) 415 U.S. 
189, 196.) 
Thereafter, in discussing the relief sought in the action, 
the court in Tull focused primarily on the civil penalties that 
had been sought and obtained in the action, emphasizing that 
“[a] civil penalty was a type of remedy at common law that could 
only be enforced in courts of law” (Tull, supra, 481 U.S. 
at p. 422) in which a jury trial was available.  Although the 
government had also sought and obtained injunctive relief in the 
action, the Tull court observed that under the applicable federal 
statute the government was free to seek an equitable remedy 
independent of legal relief (id. at p. 425) and further explained 
that prior federal decisions established that “if a ‘legal claim is 
joined with an equitable claim, the right to jury trial on the legal 
claim, including all issues common to both claims, remains 
intact.  The right cannot be abridged by characterizing the legal 
claim as “incidental” to the equitable relief sought’ ” (ibid., citing 
Curtis v. Loether, supra, 415 U.S. at p. 196, fn. 11).  (See also, 
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e.g., Ross v. Bernhard (1970) 396 U.S. 531, 537-538 [“where 
equitable and legal claims are joined in the same action, there 
is a right to jury trial on the legal claims which must not be 
infringed either by trying the legal issues as incidental to the 
equitable ones or by a court trial of a common issue existing 
between the claims”]; Dairy Queen v. Wood (1962) 369 U.S. 469, 
473 [requiring “that any legal issues for which a trial by jury is 
timely and properly demanded be submitted to a jury” “whether 
the trial judge chooses to characterize the legal issues presented 
as ‘incidental’ to equitable issues or not”]; Beacon Theatres v. 
Westover (1959) 359 U.S. 500, 510-511 [“only under the most 
imperative circumstances . . . can the right to a jury trial of legal 
issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims”].)  
Thus, because prior federal decisions had interpreted the 
Seventh Amendment generally to require a jury trial whenever 
a legal claim is joined with an equitable claim, the court in Tull 
held that, for Seventh Amendment purposes, the fact that the 
government sought civil penalties in the action before it was 
itself sufficient to conclude that the developer had “a 
constitutional right to a jury trial to determine his liability on 
the legal claims.”  (Tull, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 425.)22 
                                        
22  
Although the court in Tull held that the Seventh 
Amendment granted the developer a right to a jury trial on the 
issue of liability, the majority went on to hold that the Seventh 
Amendment did not require a jury trial on the amount of civil 
penalties.  The majority explained that because “highly 
discretionary calculations that take into account multiple 
factors are necessary in order to set civil penalties under the 
Clean Water Act” and “[t]hese are the kinds of calculations 
traditionally performed by judges,” “the Seventh Amendment 
 
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For a number of reasons, we conclude that the Court of 
Appeal erred in relying upon the Tull decision.  First and most 
fundamentally, the decision in Tull rested exclusively on the 
United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the right to 
civil jury trial embodied in the Seventh Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  The federal civil jury trial provision 
of the Seventh Amendment applies only to civil trials in federal 
court; federal decisions explicitly hold that the civil jury trial 
provision of the Seventh Amendment does not apply to state 
court proceedings.  (See, e.g., Osborn v. Haley (2007) 549 U.S. 
225, 252, fn. 17; Gasperini v. Ctr. For Humanities, Inc. (1996) 
518 U.S. 415, 432; Curtis v. Loether, supra, 415 U.S. at p. 192, 
fn. 6; Minn. & St. Louis R. R. v. Bombolis (1916) 241 U.S. 211, 
217-223.)  Instead, the right to jury trial in state court 
proceedings is governed by the provisions and judicial 
interpretation of each state’s own constitutional jury trial 
provision.23 
                                        
does not require a jury trial for that purpose in a civil action.”  
(Tull, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 427.)   
 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented from 
the latter holding, objecting that by fashioning a civil action in 
which liability but not the amount of damages is to be decided 
by a jury, “the Court creates a form of civil adjudication I have 
never encountered.”  (Tull, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 428 (dis. opn. of 
Scalia, J.).) 
23  
We note that since the decision in Tull, a number of state 
courts, in interpreting and applying their own state 
constitutional civil jury trial provisions, have concluded, unlike 
the Tull decision, that there is no right to a jury trial in statutory 
causes of action authorizing both injunctive relief and civil 
penalties.  (See, e.g., State ex rel. Darwin v. Arnett (Ariz.Ct.App. 
2014) 330 P.3d 996, 1002; Commissioner of Environmental 
 
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In California, the constitutional right to a civil jury trial 
under the California Constitution is entirely independent of the 
federal constitutional civil jury trial right under the Seventh 
Amendment (Cal. Const., art. I, § 24), and past California cases 
have not hesitated to decline to follow the federal interpretation 
of the Seventh Amendment when the federal interpretation has 
been found inconsistent with a proper reading of the California 
provision.  (See, e.g., Jehl v. Southern Pacific Co. (1967) 
66 Cal.2d 821, 835 & fn. 17; Rankin v. Frebank Co. (1975) 
47 Cal.App.3d 75, 91-92.)  The Tull decision rested on several 
points in which the federal interpretation of the Seventh 
Amendment departs from California’s interpretation of the 
California jury trial provision. 
Initially, unlike actions under the UCL and FAL in which 
the equitable (injunctive relief) and legal (criminal penalties) 
nature 
of 
the 
available 
remedies 
are 
unquestionably 
nonseverable features of a single cause of action (see Jayhill, 
supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 288), in Tull the court held that under the 
applicable Clean Water Act, the equitable (injunctive relief) and 
                                        
Protection v. Connecticut Bldg. Wrecking Co. (Conn. 1993) 
629 A.2d 1116, 1121-1123; Dept. of Environmental Protection v. 
Emerson (Me. 1992) 616 A.2d 1268, 1271; 
Dept. of 
Environmental 
Quality 
v. 
Morley 
(Mich.Ct.App. 
2015) 
885 N.W.2d 892, 897; State v. Irving Oil Corp. (Vt. 2008) 
955 A.2d 1098, 1106-1108; State v. Evergreen Freedom 
Foundation (Wn.Ct.App. 2002) 49 P.3d 894, 908-909.)  A few 
states that have traditionally looked to the Seventh Amendment 
in interpreting their own state jury trial provision have followed 
Tull.  (See, e.g., Dept. of Revenue v. Printing House (Fla. 1994) 
644 So.2d 498, 500-501; Bendick v. Cambio (R.I. 1989) 558 A.2d 
941, 943-944.) 
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legal (criminal penalties) remedies were severable.  (See Tull, 
supra, 481 U.S. at p. 425 [“[T]he Government was free to seek 
an equitable remedy in addition to, or independent of, legal 
relief.  Section  1319 [the relevant provision of the Clean Water 
Act] does not intertwine equitable relief with the imposition of 
civil penalties.  Instead each kind of relief is separably 
authorized in a separate and distinct statutory provision.  
Subsection (b), providing injunctive relief, is independent of 
subsection (d), which provides only for civil penalties.”].)  And 
the Tull court went on to rely on the severable nature of the 
claims at issue in finding that the issue of liability was to be 
tried by a jury rather than by the court, because federal 
decisions dictate that in cases involving severable legal and 
equitable issues, the legal issues should be tried prior to the 
equitable issues.  (Tull, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 425 [“In such a 
situation, if a ‘legal claim is joined with an equitable claim, the 
right to jury trial on the legal claim  . . . remains intact. . . .  
Thus, petitioner has a constitutional right to a jury trial to 
determine his liability on the legal claims”].)  By contrast, as 
noted above, the governing California decisions hold that when 
the legal and equitable aspects are severable, there is a 
preference for trying the equitable issues first and that if 
common facts are resolved in a manner that obviates the need 
to try the legal issue, there is no right under the California 
Constitution to have the legal issues submitted to the jury.  (See 
ante, pp. 43-44; Hoopes v. Dolan (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 146, 
156-158 [discussing difference in California and federal rules]; 
see also Hamilton, Federalism and the State Civil Jury Rights 
(2013) 65 Stan. L.Rev. 851, 864-865, 869-870 [same].)  Thus, the 
conclusion reached in Tull under the Seventh Amendment is not 
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necessarily the same result as would follow under California 
law. 
Moreover, the Tull court’s analysis of the jury trial 
question also demonstrates a second difference between the 
interpretation and application of the federal and state 
constitutional civil jury trial provisions.  As we have explained, 
in cases in which a cause of action contains nonseverable legal 
and equitable aspects, California cases undertake a qualitative, 
holistic analysis of the action in its entirety to determine 
whether the gist of the action is legal or equitable, that is, 
whether the legal or equitable aspects predominate.  (See ante, 
pp. 44-51.)24  In Tull, by contrast, the court, in determining that 
                                        
24  
California is by no means alone in employing a holistic, 
qualitative standard for determining whether an action 
involving both legal and equitable aspects should be 
characterized as legal or equitable for purposes of an applicable 
constitutional jury trial provision.  (See, e.g., Miller v. Carnation 
Co. (Colo.App. 1973) 516 P.2d 661, 663 [“Where there are legal 
and equitable claims joined in the complaint the court must 
determine whether the basic thrust of the action is equitable or 
legal in nature”]; Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. 
Connecticut Bldg. Wrecking Co., supra, 629 A.2d 1116, 1121 [“In 
a case that involves both legal and equitable claims, ‘ “whether 
the right to a jury trial attaches depends upon the relative 
importance of the two types of claims” ’ ”]; Shaner v. Horizon 
Bancorp. (N.J. 1989) 561 A.2d 1130, 1139 [“we have eschewed a 
focus solely on the remedy sought and have espoused a more 
eclectic view of the standards that serve to characterize the 
essential nature of a cause of action in giving meaning and scope 
to the right to a jury trial conferred by article I, paragraph 9 of 
the New Jersey Constitution”]; Insurance Financial Services, 
Inc. v. So. Carolina Ins. Co. (S.C. 1978) 247 S.E.2d 315, 318 
[“Since the appellant has prayed for money damages in addition 
to seeking equitable relief, characterization of the action as 
 
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under the Seventh Amendment there is a right to a jury trial for 
the statutory cause of action for civil penalties at issue in that 
case, relied primarily on its determination that the civil 
penalties in question were intended, at least in part, to be 
punitive in nature, which in the court’s view was apparently 
sufficient to render the action legal in nature and require a jury 
trial.  (Tull, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 422-424.)  In reaching this 
conclusion, however, the Tull court did not take into account a 
number of nonseverable equitable aspects of the action for civil 
penalties at issue there.  Thus, the court does not appear to have 
thought it at all significant that the civil penalties were also 
intended in part to further the equitable purpose of restitution.  
(Ibid.)  Moreover, and significantly, the court did not consider 
that, unlike actions for civil penalties at common law that 
                                        
equitable or legal depends on the appellant’s ‘main purpose’ in 
bringing the action”]; Norback v. Bd. of Directors of Church 
Extension Soc. (Utah 1934) 37 P.2d 339, 345 [“If the issues are 
legal or the major issues legal, either party is entitled upon 
proper demand to a jury trial; but, if the issues are equitable or 
the major issues to be resolved by an application of equity, the 
legal issues being merely subsidiary, the action should be 
regarded as equitable and the rules of equity apply”]; Brown v. 
Safeway Stores (Wn. 1980) 617 P.2d 704, 709 [“In determining 
whether a case is primarily equitable in nature or is an action 
at law, the trial court is accorded wide discretion [which] should 
be exercised with reference to a variety of factors including, but 
not necessarily limited to, [seven factors set forth in an earlier 
Washington decision]”]; Hyatt Bros. ex rel. Hyatt v. Hyatt (Wyo. 
1989) 769 P.2d 329, 333 [“the right to a jury trial in cases 
involving mixed issues of law and equity [is] resolved by 
examining the entire pleadings and all the issues raised to 
determine whether the action is primarily legal in nature or 
primarily equitable in nature”].)   
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typically provided a specific and fixed penalty for each violation, 
the civil penalties authorized by the statutory cause of action at 
issue in that case were to be determined by the equitable 
weighing and balancing of a number of factors similar to the list 
of factors set forth in the UCL and FAL (see Tull, supra, 
481 U.S. at p. 422, fn. 8) — a determination that the Tull court 
itself recognized was more appropriate for a court than a jury.  
(Id. at p. 427.)  Thus, rather than determining whether the 
statutory cause of action for civil penalties at issue should be 
characterized as legal or equitable by considering all of the legal 
and equitable aspects of that cause of action holistically, the Tull 
court somewhat artificially severed the cause of action for civil 
penalties into two parts — one that the court held is to be 
decided by a jury and one that is to be decided by the court — 
creating a novel type of cause of action that, as Justice Scalia’s 
dissent in Tull pointed out, was unknown at common law.  (Id. 
at pp. 427-428 (dis. opn. of Scalia, J.).)  As Tull demonstrates, in 
applying the Seventh Amendment federal courts generally have 
not applied the type of holistic gist of the action standard that 
California decisions have utilized in applying California’s 
constitutional jury trial provision, and thus the Tull decision is 
distinguishable from the case before us on this ground as well. 
Finally, in addition to the differences attributable to 
disparate interpretations of the federal and state constitutional 
civil jury trial provisions, the decision in Tull is distinguishable 
from the present case in yet another significant respect.  Unlike 
the relevant broadly worded and expansive substantive 
standards embodied in the UCL and FAL — which, as we have 
explained, call for the exercise of the type of equitable discretion 
and judgment traditionally employed by a court of equity — 
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under the statute at issue in Tull, the question of liability turned 
simply on the question whether the defendant had, without a 
permit, deposited fill into an area constituting “wetlands” within 
the meaning of the Clean Water Act.  (Tull, supra, 481 U.S. at 
pp. 414-415.)  The parties in Tull apparently did not dispute 
that the substantive statutory standard of liability at issue in 
that case involved the type of factual determination that in other 
contexts has traditionally been made by juries.  Accordingly, the 
court in Tull had no occasion to decide whether a jury trial is 
constitutionally required under the Seventh Amendment 
whenever a statute permits the recovery of civil penalties, even 
when the applicable substantive statutory standard clearly 
contemplates the exercise of equitable judicial discretion and 
judgment.  We note in this regard that when the court in Tull 
addressed a substantive standard as to which the exercise of 
such equitable discretion was contemplated — that is, in 
assessing the amount of civil penalties to be imposed through 
“highly discretionary calculations that take into account 
multiple factors . . . traditionally performed by judges” (Tull, at 
p. 427) — the Tull court found that the trial court could properly 
resolve that matter without violating the federal constitutional 
civil jury trial right.  (Ibid.)   
Because of the significant differences in the manner in 
which the federal and California constitutional civil jury trial 
provisions have been interpreted and applied and because the 
court in Tull did not address a statutory standard, like those 
involved in the UCL and FAL, which contemplates the exercise 
of the type of equitable discretion typically undertaken by a 
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court of equity, we conclude that the Court of Appeal’s reliance 
upon the Tull decision was misplaced.25 
 
                                        
25  
In its answer brief filed in this court, Nationwide 
maintains that if this court rejects its state constitutional claim, 
we should address the question whether it has a right to a jury 
trial under the Sixth or Seventh Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and should hold, notwithstanding the 
absence of federal decisional support, that it has a right to jury 
trial in a state court action under those federal provisions.  The 
Court of Appeal did not address these issues, neither the 
petition for review nor any answer to the petition raised these 
issues, and thus we decline to address those issues.  (See Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 8.516(b)(1).)    
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V.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that in causes 
of action under the UCL or FAL seeking injunctive relief and 
civil penalties, the gist of the actions is equitable, and there is 
no right to a jury trial in such actions under California law 
either as a statutory or constitutional matter.  Given the specific 
attributes of the UCL and FAL discussed above, we have no 
occasion to determine whether there is a right to a jury trial in 
other settings in which the government seeks injunctive relief 
and civil penalties under other statutes authorizing those 
remedies. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal, holding that 
Nationwide has a right to a jury trial under the California 
Constitution in such actions, is reversed and the matter is 
remanded to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
We Concur: 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
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S250047 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Kruger 
 
I concur in the judgment.  I agree with the majority that 
article I, section 16 of the California Constitution does not 
guarantee a jury trial in this action for equitable relief and civil 
penalties under the unfair competition law (UCL; Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 17200 et seq.) and false advertising law (FAL; Bus. & 
Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq.).  But I arrive at that conclusion by a 
somewhat different—and narrower—path. 
As the majority notes, California courts have assumed for 
decades that the UCL and FAL create causes of action that are 
equitable in character and thus must be tried to a judge rather 
than a jury.  This assumption only makes sense, since, at their 
inception, the only remedy under both statutes was injunctive 
relief, the quintessential equitable remedy.  Even today, only 
equitable remedies are available to private parties who bring 
UCL and FAL actions.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17203 [injunction 
and restitution as remedies for UCL violation], 17535 [same for 
FAL].) 
But many years after the statutes were first passed, the 
Legislature authorized certain public officials—including, 
primarily, the Attorney General and district attorneys—to seek 
civil penalties as well as injunctive relief.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§§ 17206 [UCL], 17536 [FAL].)  This development has called into 
question the courts’ long-held assumption about the availability 
of jury trial.  That is because government actions seeking civil 
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Kruger, J., concurring 
 
2 
penalties, generally speaking, sound in law rather than equity 
and thus carry with them a constitutional right of jury trial 
under both the Seventh Amendment to the United States 
Constitution (applicable in federal courts) and article I, section 
16 of the California Constitution (applicable in state courts).  
(Tull v. United States (1987) 481 U.S. 412, 420 (Tull); People v. 
One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe (1951) 37 Cal.2d 283, 295 & fn. 15.) 
It is not uncommon for the Legislature to enact a statutory 
cause of action that has some equitable features and some legal 
features.  Our case law instructs that in such cases, we are to 
determine which feature predominates in defining its essential 
character—which, in the distinctive terminology of our 
precedents, represents the “gist” of the action.  (People v. One 
1941 Chevrolet Coupe, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 299; C & K 
Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 23 Cal.3d 1, 
9.)  If the gist is legal, then the parties are constitutionally 
entitled to a jury.  If the gist is equitable, then they are not.1  
                                        
1 
Despite what the term “gist” might otherwise call to mind, 
the aim of this inquiry is not to identify a single essential 
element at the action’s theoretical core.  We instead try to 
understand how the statutory cause of action, considered as a 
whole, relates to the historical division between law and equity, 
the goal being to place the cause of action appropriately among 
its possible historical analogues. 
 
I do not believe federal law differs a great deal on this 
basic point.  Though the majority reads Tull as establishing a 
strict rule that the plea for a legal remedy carries a jury trial 
right 
notwithstanding 
any 
other 
substantial 
equitable 
characteristics the action might have (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 67–
69), I do not read Tull this way.  The high court’s case law has 
long made clear that the federal jury trial inquiry turns on a 
 
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3 
Our cases also instruct that the nature of the remedies 
sought is an important—if not necessarily controlling—
consideration in this analysis.  (C & K Engineering Contractors 
v. Amber Steel Co., supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 9.)  In some cases 
where plaintiffs seek both equitable and legal remedies, courts 
have determined whether jury trial is available by comparing 
the relative significance of the two kinds of remedies.  Where the 
government asks for massive penalties and only very minor 
injunctive restrictions on the defendant—or, conversely for 
highly burdensome injunctive orders and only nominal 
penalties—one form of relief might be deemed incidental to the 
other and the jury trial right recognized, or not, accordingly.  (Cf. 
Tull, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 424–425 [where relief “would be 
limited primarily to civil penalties, since petitioner had already 
sold most of the properties at issue[, the] potential penalty of 
                                        
holistic examination of both “the nature of the action and of the 
remedy sought”—a rule Tull cited without signaling any intent 
to depart from it.  (Tull, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 417; see also id. at 
p. 422, fn. 6 [“Our search is for a single historical analog, taking 
into consideration the nature of the cause of action and the 
remedy as two important factors.”]; accord, e.g., Feltner v. 
Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. (1998) 523 U.S. 340, 348 [7th 
Amend. to the U.S. Const. intended to apply to actions “ ‘in 
which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined’ ” 
(italics omitted and added)].) 
In any event, Tull is distinguishable from this case on 
other, more case-specific grounds, which I discuss later in this 
opinion.  We need not rely here on any broad generalizations 
about how, if at all, the federal approach to the civil jury right 
differs from California’s. 
 
NATIONWIDE BIWEEKLY ADMINISTRATION, INC. v. 
SUPERIOR COURT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
4 
$22 million hardly can be considered incidental to the modest 
equitable relief sought”].)   
But that is not this case.  The present case comes to us in 
an early procedural posture—on a motion to strike the jury trial 
demand from defendant’s answer—and the parties dispute both 
the size of potential penalties and the significance of the 
injunctive relief sought.  It does not appear possible here to 
characterize either form of relief as clearly predominant over, or 
incidental to, the other.  We must therefore look more broadly 
at the bases for liability alleged in the complaint and the 
relationships between these causes of action and between the 
liability and remedy issues presented. 
Taking this broader look at the UCL, I agree with the 
majority that the gist of the statutory action is equitable.2  
Whatever type of relief a government plaintiff might seek in a 
particular case, liability under the UCL inherently rests on 
equitable considerations—considerations of a sort that only the 
trial court can effectively weigh and determine.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
                                        
2  
The majority discusses the equitable character of the UCL 
and FAL in detail only in part III of the opinion, which addresses 
statutory jury trial rights.  The majority concludes there that in 
enacting and amending both statutes, “the legislative history 
and legislative purpose of both statutes convincingly establish 
that the Legislature intended that such causes of action under 
these statutes would be tried by the court, exercising the 
traditional flexible discretion and judicial expertise of a court of 
equity . . . .”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.)  In its constitutional 
analysis, the majority simply cross-references this discussion.  
(Id. at p. 59.)  Readers should not be confused, however, by this 
organizational choice:  The Legislature’s intent does not control 
whether there is a constitutional right to jury trial.  (See id. at 
p. 39.) 
NATIONWIDE BIWEEKLY ADMINISTRATION, INC. v. 
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Kruger, J., concurring 
 
5 
at pp. 17–21.)  The central provision of the UCL, Business and 
Professions Code section 17200, prohibits “unfair competition,” 
which it defines to include “unfair” business practices.  
Determining what is unfair calls on courts to exercise the sort of 
flexible discretion that characterized the courts of equity—a 
kind of judgment that juries have not historically made, nor are 
well suited to make.  It is hard to imagine drafting jury 
instructions, for example, to embody the “unfairness” test 
enunciated in Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles 
Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 187, which refers 
to “conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust 
law, or violates the policy or spirit” of those laws. 
The liability determinations at issue in Tull were of a 
different character.  The question was whether the defendant 
had, without a permit, dumped fill into an area constituting 
“wetlands” within the meaning of the Clean Water Act.  (Tull, 
supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 414–415.)  The statutory rules governing 
this determination were certainly complicated and technical.  
(See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2020).)  But they 
did not call on the decisionmaker’s equitable discretion, and no 
one in Tull, including the court, disputed that this was the type 
of factual determination that has traditionally been made by 
juries in otherwise appropriate cases.  Indeed, the Clean Water 
Act also provides for criminal penalties for willful or negligent 
violations (33 U.S.C. § 1319(c))—which means that in some set 
of Clean Water Act cases, the relevant factual disputes are, of 
necessity, resolved by juries.  Tull is thus distinguishable from 
this case by the nature of the liability decision there, which 
required only the determination of the historical facts and the 
application of legal standards to those facts—tasks central to 
NATIONWIDE BIWEEKLY ADMINISTRATION, INC. v. 
SUPERIOR COURT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
6 
the traditional role of trial juries—in contrast to the balancing 
of interests typically called for in assessing liability under the 
UCL. 
But here is where my analysis differs from the majority’s:  
While UCL liability can readily be characterized as dependent 
on equitable considerations, I do not believe the same can be 
said of liability under the FAL.  To be sure, the FAL, much like 
the UCL, is broadly written:  The statute is designed to  
encompass any novel scheme for misleading the public.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 29.)  The statute makes claims relatively easy 
to prove, compared to common law fraud, by employing a 
negligence standard and omitting the elements of reliance and 
injury; the plaintiff need show only that the challenged 
advertisement or promotion is likely to mislead members of the 
public.  (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 951.)3  But at 
least by its text, the FAL does not create a standard of liability 
that depends on the exercise of a court’s equitable judgment.  No 
balancing of harms and benefits or weighing of the parties’ and 
public interests are involved in determining liability; no 
                                        
3  
Business and Professions Code section 17500 defines the 
scope of false advertising liability:  “It is unlawful for any person 
. . . with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or personal 
property or to perform services . . . to make or disseminate or 
cause to be made or disseminated before the public . . . any 
statement, concerning that real or personal property or those 
services . . . which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, 
or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to 
be untrue or misleading, or for any person . . . to so make . . . any 
such statement as part of a plan or scheme with the intent not 
to sell that personal property or those services, professional or 
otherwise, so advertised at the price stated therein, or as so 
advertised.”   
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Kruger, J., concurring 
 
7 
equitable principles like laches or unclean hands come into play.  
Rather, as other state courts have observed in evaluating 
similar laws, the FAL in significant respects resembles the 
common law cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, a 
species of the tort of deceit.  (See Bily v. Arthur Young & 
Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 407; cf. State v. Abbott Laboratories 
(2012) 341 Wis.2d 510, 533 [816 N.W.2d 145, 156] [holding that 
Wisconsin’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act, as “an essential 
counterpart to the common law claim of ‘cheating,’ ” carries a 
right to jury trial].)  Though the FAL requires only a misleading 
advertisement, 
not 
necessarily 
one 
containing 
express 
falsehoods, the same is true for tortious deceit in California.  
(Universal By-Products, Inc. v. City of Modesto (1974) 43 
Cal.App.3d 145, 151 [“A misrepresentation need not be express 
but may be implied by or inferred from the circumstances.”]; 
Sullivan v. Helbing (1924) 66 Cal.App. 478, 483 [“Fraudulent 
representations may consist of half-truths calculated to deceive.  
Thus a representation literally true is actionable if used to 
create an impression substantially false.”].)  At least considered 
in isolation, then, nothing about the nature of liability 
determination under the FAL suggests it sits beyond the scope 
of the jury right. 
In characterizing the nature of the FAL action as 
equitable, the majority emphasizes that appellate courts 
analyzing FAL liability have discussed a “variety of factors” 
relevant to whether a particular advertisement is misleading.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 31.)  These appellate discussions, though, 
tell us little about the legal or equitable character of FAL 
liability.  The issues before the appellate courts were ones of 
legal sufficiency:  whether allegations of misleading advertising 
NATIONWIDE BIWEEKLY ADMINISTRATION, INC. v. 
SUPERIOR COURT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
8 
were sufficient to survive demurrer (Brady v. Bayer Corp. (2018) 
26 Cal.App.5th 1156; Day v. AT & T Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 
325) or whether substantial evidence supported a trial court’s 
finding of an FAL violation (People v. Overstock.com, Inc. (2017) 
12 Cal.App.5th 1064 (Overstock.com)).  In answering these 
questions, the courts did cite a number of factual considerations 
that supported the complaint’s or evidentiary showing’s 
sufficiency, but those factual discussions are not particularly 
suggestive of an inherently equitable approach to FAL liability.  
What the appellate courts did in these cases does not differ in 
any meaningful way from what courts do when they review 
evidentiary sufficiency questions in cases involving causes of 
action that are tried to juries, such as common law fraud.  (See, 
e.g., Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 393 
[in suit for fraudulent inducement to enter into at-will 
employment contract, evidence was insufficient to show reliance 
where employment offer did not specifically guarantee the 
plaintiff “would be employed there so long as his work was 
satisfactory or that he could be fired only for good cause” or 
contain any other “promises of long-term employment”]; AREI 
II Cases (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1022 [detailing several 
“facts and circumstances that permit a reasonable inference” 
defendant participated in fraud].)  Indeed, even in criminal 
cases tried to juries, appellate decisions on sufficiency of 
evidence often articulate a number of factual considerations to 
guide the analysis.  (See, e.g., People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 
788, 804–811 [detailed analysis of sufficiency of evidence to 
show major participation in felony and reckless indifference to 
human life]; People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1081–1082 
NATIONWIDE BIWEEKLY ADMINISTRATION, INC. v. 
SUPERIOR COURT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
9 
[discussing three nonexclusive factors relevant to sufficiency of 
evidence for premeditation and deliberation].) 
None of the cases the majority cites discusses the 
possibility of a jury trial when civil penalties are sought.  Indeed, 
the only case in which the issue could have arisen is 
Overstock.com—the only action brought by a public plaintiff 
entitled to seek civil penalties—but it was not raised there.  Nor 
do any of the cases hold or state that determining an FAL 
violation requires weighing competing interests, applying 
equitable doctrines such as laches, estoppel, or unclean hands, 
or balancing the harms and benefits of a requested remedy.  
Indeed, the considerations discussed in the opinions appear 
fairly typical of issues that, in a jury trial, might be used by the 
jury to resolve the question of liability under the FAL:  the 
inability of consumers to learn the terms of a prepaid phone card 
before buying the card (Day v. AT & T Corp., supra, 63 
Cal.App.4th at p. 334); the application of “common sense” 
(Brady v. Bayer Corp., supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 1165); the 
possibility that a brand name by itself would mislead consumers 
(id. at p. 1170); and the likelihood a consumer would understand 
“ ‘Compare at’ ” in an advertisement boasting of a low price to 
refer to another seller’s price for the same item (Overstock.com, 
supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1081).   
The Overstock.com court did cite as consistent with its own 
analysis a regulation of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
part of the agency’s Guides Against Deceptive Pricing (FTC 
Guides), stating that price comparisons to other merchandise 
can be “ ‘useful and legitimate’ ” when the comparison items are 
of essentially similar quality and are obtainable in the area.  
(Overstock.com, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1081, quoting 16 
NATIONWIDE BIWEEKLY ADMINISTRATION, INC. v. 
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Kruger, J., concurring 
 
10 
C.F.R. § 233.2(c) (2017).)  The majority holds this up as an 
example of how “the complexities and nuances” of FAL liability 
“are often ameliorated by judicial reference to the relevant 
guidelines developed 
by 
the 
FTC 
regarding 
deceptive 
advertising.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 34, citing Stern, Cal. 
Practice Guide:  Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 Practice (The Rutter 
Group 2019) §§ 4:46–4:80.4, pp. 4-14–4-32.) 
This overstates the significance of the FTC Guides to the 
question before us.  For one thing, the link between the FTC 
Guides and liability under the FAL appears rather tenuous.  The 
FTC Guides are not comprehensive or definitive regulations 
even for interpreting the FTC Act, and certainly nothing 
suggests they were intended, or have functioned, to define 
deceptive practices for purposes of state law.4  In any event, 
while the FTC Guides offer guidance on what sort of practices 
will be considered deceptive, none of this guidance appears to 
turn on the application of equitable judgment.  For example, the 
                                        
4 
The FTC Guides on testimonials and endorsements, for 
example, simply “provide the basis for voluntary compliance 
with the law by advertisers and endorsers.”  (16 C.F.R. 
§ 255.0(a) (2020); see also id., § 260.1(a) (2020) [Guides on 
environmental 
claims 
“help 
marketers 
avoid 
making 
environmental marketing claims that are unfair or deceptive,” 
but “do not operate to bind the FTC or the public.”]; FTC v. Mary 
Carter Paint Co. (1965) 382 U.S. 46, 47–48 [“These, of course, 
were guides, not fixed rules as such, and were designed to inform 
businessmen of the factors which would guide Commission 
decision.”].)  And while the Stern treatise describes some of the 
FTC Guides as potentially relevant to FAL liability, it gives no 
examples of their use by courts for this purpose and does not 
describe such use as common.  (See Stern, Cal. Practice Guide:  
Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 Practice, supra, §§ 4:46, 4:72, 4:80.2–
4:80.4.) 
NATIONWIDE BIWEEKLY ADMINISTRATION, INC. v. 
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Kruger, J., concurring 
 
11 
Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in 
Advertising, which the majority describes as illustrating the 
type of “equitable consideration” that goes into an FAL liability 
determination (maj. opn., ante, at p. 35), covers such questions 
as when an advertiser should confirm that the endorser’s views 
have not changed (16 C.F.R. § 255.1(b) (2020)) and what kind of 
substantiation must support the claims of effectiveness implied 
by a consumer endorsement (id., § 255.2(a), (b) (2020)).  The 
FTC Guides illustrate the potential factual complexity of 
deceptive advertising claims, but they do not support the 
majority’s conclusion that deciding the merits of an FAL claim 
“depends upon the exercise of the type of equitable discretion 
and judgment typically employed by a court of equity.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at pp. 36–37.)5 
The majority also argues that because of the FAL’s 
potential breadth, it is important that the FAL liability 
standard be administered by trial courts, which can “set forth 
their reasoning for a determination that the FAL has been 
violated so that a body of precedent can evolve to inform 
businesses of advertising practices they must avoid.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 31.)  As an argument for cabining the scope of the 
constitutional 
jury 
trial 
right, 
I 
find 
this 
reasoning 
unpersuasive.  Binding precedent is made only by appellate 
courts, and an appellate decision on sufficiency of the evidence 
                                        
5  
The same is true of the cited federal decisions upholding 
FTC findings of deceptiveness (maj. opn., ante, at p. 37), such as 
FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (1965) 380 U.S. 374, 384–390 and 
FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., supra, 382 U.S. at pages 47 to 48:  
They may show that deceptiveness can be factually complicated, 
but not that it depends on application of equitable principles. 
NATIONWIDE BIWEEKLY ADMINISTRATION, INC. v. 
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Kruger, J., concurring 
 
12 
fills out the precedential picture regardless of whether trial was 
to a jury or to the bench.  And while it might be thought 
desirable from some points of view to have all FAL actions heard 
by judges, the same might be said for any number of civil causes 
of action.  Defendants in insurance bad faith cases, for example, 
might well prefer bench trials and could argue that they, too, 
need a body of precedent to guide their actions.  But they get 
such precedential guidance from appellate decisions on legal 
issues.  (E.g., Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 
713, 721–726 [propriety of summary judgment].)  It would not 
be consistent with the constitutional mandate that trial by jury 
“is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all” (Cal. Const., 
art. I, § 16) for us to pick out categories of civil actions that, 
because they sometimes raise complicated factual issues or 
implicate common business decisions, we regard as more 
suitable for trial to the court. 
In the end, however, while it seems to me the majority 
comes up short in its effort to show that FAL claims implicate 
inherently equitable judgment uniquely suited to a court, I 
agree that the present action was nonetheless predominantly 
equitable in character.  
First, as the majority explains, even if liability for civil 
penalties is deemed a legal question, the amount of such 
penalties under the UCL and FAL is decided by the court on an 
equitable basis, along with questions of injunctive relief and 
appropriate restitution.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 58 [“[T]he UCL 
and FAL statutes specify that in assessing the amount of the 
civil penalty to be imposed under these statutes, the court is 
afforded broad discretion to consider a nonexclusive list of 
factors that include the relative seriousness of the defendant’s 
NATIONWIDE BIWEEKLY ADMINISTRATION, INC. v. 
SUPERIOR COURT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
13 
conduct and the potential deterrent effect of such penalties, the 
type of qualitative evaluation and weighing of a variety of 
factors that is typically undertaken by a court and not a jury.  
(Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17206, 17536.)”].)  The parties do not 
dispute that even if the request for civil penalties triggered a 
jury trial right, the right would extend only to the trial on 
liability; the ultimate amount of any penalties awarded would 
be decided by the court.  Such an arrangement is not 
unprecedented (see Tull, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 425–427), but 
this allocation of remedial authority does diminish the practical 
importance of the jury’s factfinding role and, in my view, strains 
the idea that the gist of the action is predominantly legal. 
Second, and equally important, the causes of action under 
the UCL and the FAL are inherently intertwined.  This is 
because “unfair” competition under the UCL expressly includes 
“any act prohibited by” the FAL (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200), 
meaning that every violation of the FAL is therefore also a 
violation of the UCL.  When, as here, allegedly deceptive conduct 
is pleaded as a violation of both statutes, the same liability 
questions that a jury would decide for purposes of the FAL 
would be decided by the court for purposes of the UCL.  And 
while it might be theoretically possible to separate out the UCL 
claims that depend on equitable principles from those that do 
not, in practice the effort to keep the claims separate would be 
bound to collapse, since each UCL cause of action in a complaint 
is not necessarily limited to a single type of conduct or a single 
legal theory of liability.   
In these circumstances, trying liability under the FAL to 
the jury, while the rest of the action was decided by the court, 
would create procedural complications without significant 
NATIONWIDE BIWEEKLY ADMINISTRATION, INC. v. 
SUPERIOR COURT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
14 
benefit to the defendant demanding jury trial.  Because the FAL 
and the UCL are intertwined in this manner, a trial court that 
considered the defendant’s advertising deceptive could impose 
liability under the UCL before even putting the FAL liability 
question to the jury.  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 43 [trial court 
has discretion as to order of trying severable legal and equitable 
issue].)  The court could then exercise its equitable judgment to 
impose both injunctive relief and substantial civil penalties for 
the UCL violation, regardless of the jury’s view as to FAL 
liability.  In other words, although every found violation of the 
FAL triggers civil penalties under the UCL, the inverse is not 
true; a jury’s finding of no FAL liability would not preclude a 
judge from awarding substantial civil penalties under the UCL.  
Because of the way these intertwined causes of action relate 
when the same conduct is at issue, the jury’s verdict does not 
ultimately determine whether civil penalties are imposed.  
Plaintiffs here seek a traditionally legal remedy, civil 
penalties, along with the equitable remedies of injunction and 
restitution.  They also plead causes of action under the FAL, for 
which liability appears to rest on factual determinations rather 
than equitable judgment, as well as the UCL.  But in the end, 
the equitable facets of this action predominate over the legal 
ones.  The amount of any civil penalties would be determined by 
the trial court on the basis of equitable principles, allowing the 
court to all but nullify any jury finding of an FAL violation.  
What is more, the court could effectively override any jury 
decision against FAL liability by imposing liability for the same 
conduct under the UCL before the FAL issue is ever tried, then 
awarding plaintiffs injunctive relief and penalties for that 
NATIONWIDE BIWEEKLY ADMINISTRATION, INC. v. 
SUPERIOR COURT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
15 
violation.  For these reasons, I agree with the majority that the 
action is predominantly equitable in nature.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
We Concur: 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc. v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XXX 24 Cal.App.5th 438 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S250047 
Date Filed: April 30, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Alameda 
Judge:  George C. Hernandez, Jr. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Law Office of Alan S. Yockelson, Alan S. Yockelson; Ponist Law Group, Sean E. Poinst; Jones Day, 
Nathaniel Garrett and James R. Saywell for Petitioners.   
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Jeannine M. Pacioni and Dean D. Flippo, District Attorneys (Monterey), Cynthia J. Zimmer and Lisa 
Green, District Attorneys (Kern), Nancy E. O’Malley, District Attorney (Alameda), Lori Frugoli, Edward 
Berberian and Jeremy M. Fonseca, District Attorneys (Marin), Matthew L. Beltramo, Assistant District 
Attorney (Alameda), John F. Hubanks and Christopher Judge, Deputy District Attorneys (Monterey), John 
Thomas Mitchell, Deputy District Attorney (Kern), Andres H. Perez, Deputy District Attorney (Marin); 
Mary Ann Smith, Sean Rooney, Robert R. Lux and William Horsey for Real Party in Interest. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Nicklas A. Akers, Assistant Attorney General, Michele Van Gelderen, 
Sheldon H. Jaffe and Vivian F. Wang, Deputy Attorneys General, for the Attorney General as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.   
 
Mark Zahner; Matthew T. Cheever, Deputy District Attorney (Sonoma) and Patrick Collins, Deputy 
District Attorney (Napa) for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real 
Party in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
James R. Saywell 
Jones Day 
901 Lakeside Avenue East 
Cleveland, OH 44144 
(216) 586-3939 
 
Matthew Beltramo 
Assistant District Attorney 
7677 Oakport St., Suite 650 
Oakland, CA 94621 
(510) 383-8600