Title: Musselman v. The Glass Works
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 992887
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 15, 2000

Present:  All the Justices 
 
PEGGY A. MUSSELMAN, EXECUTOR OF THE 
ESTATE OF ROBERT C. YOUNG, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 992887   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
September 15, 2000 
THE GLASS WORKS, L.L.C., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 
Robert P. Doherty, Jr., Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider the issue whether the death of 
a party to a non-competition agreement, which was executed as 
part of the sale of a business, relieved the purchaser of the 
business of its obligation to make payments under the agreement. 
 
The facts in this case are undisputed.  In July 1995, The 
Glass Works, L.L.C. (Glass Works) entered into an Asset Purchase 
Agreement (the purchase agreement) with B & L Auto Glass & 
Mirror, Inc. (B & L Auto) and its principals, Robert C. Young, 
Peggy A. Musselman, and Marian L. Gray (collectively, the 
sellers).  Under the purchase agreement, Glass Works purchased 
from the sellers, among other things, the inventory, equipment, 
and business name of B & L Auto in Roanoke.*
 
In paragraph 2 of the purchase agreement, Glass Works 
agreed to pay B & L Auto a total purchase price of $515,000.  As 
provided in that paragraph, the purchase price was payable as 
follows: $1,000 deposit, $114,000 cash at closing, $340,000 in 
the form of a secured promissory note to the sellers, and a 
total of $60,000 in payments to Young, Musselman, and Gray under 
three non-competition agreements. 
 
The non-competition agreements were executed at the same 
time as the purchase agreement.  Young agreed in his non-
competition agreement with Glass Works (the non-competition 
agreement) not to engage for five years in any business similar 
to that of B & L Auto as an owner, shareholder, employee, or 
consultant within a 100-mile radius of Roanoke.  The non-
competition agreement provided that "in consideration of 
[Young's] agreements," Glass Works would pay Young $615 per 
month for 60 months, for a total payment of $36,900.  The 
principals of Glass Works, Lury W. Goodall, Jr., Charles C. 
Nimmo, and Michael E. Puckett, also executed a Guarantee 
Agreement, personally guaranteeing Glass Works' obligations 
under the purchase agreement, the promissory note, and the non-
competition agreements. 
 
After its purchase of the business in July 1995, Glass 
Works began making the monthly payments to Young under the non-
competition agreement.  When Young died on April 18, 1998, Glass 
Works stopped making the payments.  Musselman qualified as 
executor of Young's estate and filed this breach of contract 
                                                                  
 
*After the sale, B & L Auto Glass & Mirror, Inc. changed its 
corporate name to Bobs, Inc. 
 
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action against Glass Works, Goodall, Nimmo, and Puckett 
(collectively, the defendants), seeking recovery of the amounts 
allegedly due Young's estate under the non-competition 
agreement. 
 
Musselman alleged in her motion for judgment that the 
amount due under the non-competition agreement was "part of the 
purchase price" for B & L Auto and, thus, did not abate when 
Young died.  She also alleged that B & L Auto agreed to 
"separate the value for the Non-Competition Agreement out of the 
principal balance of the [promissory] note . . . to allow [Glass 
Works], at its request, to report a lower 'notes payable' for 
credit reporting purposes." 
 
The parties submitted the case to the trial court on 
stipulated evidence.  The trial court ruled that the purchase 
agreement was ambiguous because its initial declaration, that 
the purchase price was consideration for the sale of the 
specified business assets, conflicted with the purchase 
agreement's later recitation that the purchase price included 
consideration for the non-competition agreements.  The trial 
court concluded from this language that the parties intended 
"separate contracts and separate consideration for the non-
competition agreements."  The trial court held that the non-
competition agreement was a personal service contract that 
terminated on Young's death, and that no further payments were 
 
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due under the agreement.  The court entered final judgment in 
favor of the defendants. 
 
On appeal, Musselman argues that the payments due under the 
non-competition agreement were an integral part of the purchase 
price of B & L Auto's assets, which effectively represented 
payment for the good will of the business, and did not 
constitute consideration for a separate personal service 
contract.  She asserts that Glass Works should not receive a 
lesser price for the business simply because Young agreed to 
accept monthly payments under the non-competition agreement 
rather than a lump sum payment.  Musselman also contends that 
since the non-competition agreement did not require Young to 
provide any personal service to Glass Works, but simply required 
him to refrain from competing with Glass Works, the agreement 
did not constitute a personal service contract that terminated 
on his death. 
 
In response, the defendants contend that the non-
competition agreement was a separate, personal service contract 
that required Glass Works to make payments only to Young, rather 
than to B & L Auto, and that Young's death prevented him from 
fully performing the contract.  The defendants also assert that 
Young's estate is not entitled to further payment under the non-
competition agreement because that agreement did not obligate 
 
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Glass Works to continue making payments in the event of Young's 
death.  We disagree with the defendants' arguments. 
 
When a business transaction is based on more than one 
document executed by the parties, we will construe the documents 
together to determine the intent of the parties.  First Am. Bank 
of Va. v. J.S.C. Concrete Constr., Inc., 259 Va. 60, 67, 523 
S.E.2d 496, 500 (2000); Daugherty v. Diment, 238 Va. 520, 524, 
385 S.E.2d 572, 574 (1989); American Realty Trust v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 222 Va. 392, 403, 281 S.E.2d 825, 830 (1981).  
In ascertaining the parties' intent, we consider the plain 
meaning of the language the parties used in the documents.  
Pollard & Bagby, Inc. v. Pierce Arrow, L.L.C., 258 Va. 524, 528, 
521 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1999); Waynesboro Village, L.L.C. v. BMC 
Properties, 255 Va. 75, 79-80, 496 S.E.2d 64, 67 (1998). 
 
When the terms of the parties' documents are clear and 
unambiguous, the interpretation of those terms presents a 
question of law.  Pollard & Bagby, 258 Va. at 528, 521 S.E.2d at 
763; Gordonsville Energy, L.P. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 
257 Va. 344, 352-53, 512 S.E.2d 811, 816 (1999).  The issue 
whether particular documents are ambiguous is also a question of 
law.  Pollard & Bagby, 258 Va. at 528, 521 S.E.2d at 763; 
Donnelly v. Donatelli & Klein, Inc., 258 Va. 171, 180, 519 
S.E.2d 133, 138 (1999); Tuomala v. Regent Univ., 252 Va. 368, 
374, 477 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1996).  Thus, on appeal, we are not 
 
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bound by the trial court's resolution of these questions of law, 
and we are afforded the same opportunity as the trial court to 
consider the terms of the documents at issue.  Pollard & Bagby, 
Inc., 258 Va. at 528, 521 S.E.2d at 763; Donnelly, 258 Va. at 
180, 519 S.E.2d at 138; Gordonsville Energy, L.P., 257 Va. at 
352-53, 512 S.E.2d at 816. 
 
We conclude that the purchase agreement and the non-
competition agreement are unambiguous, and that their terms 
formed an integrated business transaction in which the various 
non-competition agreements effectively represented a purchase of 
the business good will of B & L Auto.  The language of the 
purchase agreement demonstrates the integrated nature of the 
purchase transaction by stating that the sum due under the three 
non-competition agreements was part of the purchase price of the 
business, B & L Auto.  Glass Works' payment of $60,000 for the 
three non-competition agreements was referred to specifically as 
part of "the purchase price for all of the property referred to 
in Paragraph 1."  In that paragraph, which is entitled "Sale of 
Business," the property purchased included all "inventory, 
equipment, supplies, appliances, vehicles and office furniture 
owned by [B & L Auto] and used in [its] business." 
 
Our conclusion that the non-competition agreement was an 
integrated part of the purchase transaction, rather than a 
separate, personal service contract, also is supported by the 
 
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terms of the non-competition agreement.  Those terms did not 
require Young to perform any affirmative duties or services for 
Glass Works after it purchased B & L Auto.  Thus, the agreement 
entered into by Glass Works and Young manifested only their 
intent to benefit Glass Works in its purchase of the business, 
and not to benefit Glass Works in obtaining Young's expertise or 
skill in the performance of personal services related to the 
conduct of the business. 
 
We find no merit in the defendants' argument that Glass 
Works is not obligated to continue performing its duties under 
the non-competition agreement because the agreement does not 
state that Glass Works' duty to make payments under the 
agreement would continue in the event of Young's death.  Since 
the non-competition agreement represented part of the purchase 
price of the business, Glass Works' payments under the non-
competition agreement remain due as part of that purchase, which 
was fully executed and was not conditioned on Young's survival 
for any period of time.  If Glass Works had intended to be 
excused on Young's death from its duty to pay this particular 
part of the purchase price for B & L Auto, Glass Works should 
have inserted a provision to this effect in the purchase 
agreement.  We will not, by construction, insert a term in a 
contract that the parties to the contract omitted.  Lansdowne 
Dev. Co. v. Xerox Realty Corp., 257 Va. 392, 400, 514 S.E.2d 
 
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157, 161 (1999); Hutter v. Heilmann, 252 Va. 227, 231, 475 
S.E.2d 267, 270 (1996); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Prince 
William Square Assocs., 250 Va. 402, 407, 463 S.E.2d 661, 664 
(1995). 
 
Glass Works' argument that Young's death prevented him from 
performing his duty of forbearance from competition does not 
alter this result.  It is self-evident that Young's death did 
not constitute a breach of his agreement to refrain from 
competition with B & L Auto and did not deprive Glass Works of 
the benefit of its bargain. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the trial court's 
judgment and remand the case to the trial court for entry of 
judgment in favor of Musselman, as executor of Young's estate, 
for the remaining amount due under the non-competition 
agreement. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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