Title: Zaug v. Virginia State Bar
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 121656
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 2013

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
HEATHER ELLISON ZAUG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 OPINION BY  
v. 
Record No. 121656 
  
    
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   February 28, 2013 
VIRGINIA STATE BAR, EX REL. 
FIFTH DISTRICT - SECTION III COMMITTEE 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
Lon Edward Farris, James F. Almand, and  
John J. McGrath, Jr., Judges Designate 
 
In this appeal of right from a judgment entered by a 
three-judge circuit court in a disciplinary hearing, we 
consider whether an attorney violated Rule 4.2 of the Virginia 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Heather Ellison Zaug is an attorney licensed to practice 
law in the Commonwealth of Virginia and admitted to the Bar of 
this Court.  In April 2010, Zaug and Richard L. Nagle, her 
partner, represented a doctor in a medical malpractice action 
brought by Ian, Yanira, and Vincent W. Copcutt.  The Copcutts 
were represented by Judith M. Cofield. 
On April 15, Yanira Copcutt (“Yanira”) telephoned the 
firm’s office to speak with Nagle.  He could not take the call 
because he was on his way to depose Vincent Copcutt 
(“Vincent”).  A staff member transferred the call to Zaug.  
Zaug admits that she knew the call concerned Vincent’s 
 
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deposition but she denies knowing who the caller was when she 
answered.  There is no recording or transcript of the call. 
The parties agree that Yanira was distraught.  According 
to Zaug, the call lasted approximately 60 seconds.  It is 
undisputed that Yanira told Zaug about the toll the litigation 
was taking on her family and that Vincent’s deposition needed 
to be cancelled.  According to Zaug, she apologized and told 
Yanira that she could not help her and that Yanira needed to 
contact Cofield. 
According to Zaug, she then attempted to terminate the 
call but Yanira resisted “with an outpouring of emotion.”  
Yanira said that she had been unable to reach Cofield and that 
she wanted to speak to Nagle.  Zaug reiterated that “[w]e can’t 
help you.  You need to try to reach Ms. Cofield.  I’ll try to 
contact Mr. Nagle and they’ll have to sort this out.”  She then 
terminated the call.   
Another attorney at the firm witnessed part of the call.  
The witness testified that it lasted about 30 seconds from the 
time Zaug realized who the caller was and corroborated her 
recollection of her side of the conversation from that point 
forward. 
According to Yanira, Zaug addressed her by name when she 
answered the call, saying, “Hi, Mrs. Copcutt.”  Yanira told 
Zaug that Vincent’s deposition needed to be canceled.  When 
 
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Zaug asked what was wrong with the deposition, Yanira started 
crying, rambling, and describing the emotional difficulties 
associated with the injury caused by Zaug’s client’s alleged 
malpractice.  Further, Yanira told Zaug that she wanted to 
dismiss the lawsuit.1 
After Vincent’s deposition, Yanira told Cofield about her 
conversation with Zaug.  Cofield thereafter filed a complaint 
with the Virginia State Bar (“the State Bar”) in which she set 
forth Yanira’s account of the conversation.  The State Bar 
issued a charge of misconduct alleging that Zaug had violated 
Rule 4.2 of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct.   
The charge of misconduct was heard by the Fifth District 
Section III Committee pursuant to Paragraph 13-16 of Part 6, 
Section IV of the Rules of this Court.  After a hearing, the 
district committee issued a determination that Zaug’s conduct 
constituted a violation of the Rule.  The district committee 
imposed the sanction of a dismissal de minimis.   
Zaug appealed the district committee’s determination to 
the circuit court pursuant to Paragraph 13-17(A) of Part 6, 
                                                 
1 Yanira testified at a hearing to disqualify Zaug as 
counsel in the underlying litigation.  Nagle objected that her 
description of Zaug’s statements was inadmissible hearsay.  On 
the basis of Cofield’s response that the statements were not 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, the circuit court 
overruled the objection.  Accordingly, the parties to this 
appeal dispute the evidentiary value of Yanira’s testimony for 
the purpose of the disciplinary proceeding.  For the reasons 
stated herein, we do not address this question. 
 
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Section IV of the Rules of this Court.  Sitting by designation 
pursuant to Code § 54.1-3935(B), a three-judge panel of the 
court affirmed the findings of the district committee and the 
sanction of a dismissal de minimis.  Zaug perfected a timely 
appeal of right from the court’s judgment pursuant to Code 
§ 54.1-3935(E) and Rule 5:21(b)(2)(ii). 
II. ANALYSIS 
When we review a lawyer discipline proceeding, “the State 
Bar has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence 
that the attorney violated the relevant Rules of Professional 
Conduct.”  Weatherbee v. Virginia State Bar, 279 Va. 303, 306, 
689 S.E.2d 753, 754 (2010) (citing Barrett v. Virginia State 
Bar, 272 Va. 260, 268 n.4, 634 S.E.2d 341, 345 n.4 (2006); Blue 
v. Seventh District Committee, 220 Va. 1056, 1062, 265 S.E.2d 
753, 757 (1980); Seventh District Committee v. Gunter, 212 Va. 
278, 284, 183 S.E.2d 713, 717 (1971)). 
We conduct an independent examination of the 
entire record.  We consider the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Bar, 
the prevailing party in the trial court.  We 
accord the trial court’s factual findings 
substantial weight and view those findings as 
prima facie correct.  Although we do not give 
the trial court’s conclusions the weight of a 
jury verdict, we will sustain those conclusions 
unless it appears that they are not justified by 
a reasonable view of the evidence or are 
contrary to law. 
 
 
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Id. at 306, 689 S.E.2d at 754-55 (quoting Anthony v. Virginia 
State Bar, 270 Va. 601, 608-09, 621 S.E.2d 121, 125 (2005) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  The Virginia 
Rules of Professional Conduct are Rules of this Court.  See 
Code § 54.1-3909.  The interpretation of such Rules is a 
question of law we review de novo.  LaCava v. Commonwealth, 283 
Va. 465, 469-71, 722 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2012). 
Rule 4.2 of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct 
states that “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall not 
communicate about the subject of the representation with a 
person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in 
the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other 
lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.”  The commentary 
provides guidance for interpreting the scope and meaning of the 
Rule.  Comment 3 states, 
[t]he Rule applies even though the represented 
person initiates or consents to the 
communication.  A lawyer must immediately 
terminate communication with a person if, after 
commencing communication, the lawyer learns that 
the person is one with whom communication is not 
permitted by this Rule.  A lawyer is permitted 
to communicate with a person represented by 
counsel without obtaining the consent of the 
lawyer currently representing that person, if 
that person is seeking a “second opinion” or 
replacement counsel. 
 
 
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(Emphasis added.)  Further, Comment 4 states, in relevant part, 
“This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented 
person . . . concerning matters outside the representation.” 
Viewed in the light of the commentary, it is clear that 
the Bar must prove three separate facts to establish a 
violation of the Rule:  (1) that the attorney knew that he or 
she was communicating with a person represented by another 
lawyer; (2) that the communication was about the subject of the 
representation; and (3) that the attorney (a) did not have the 
consent of the lawyer representing the person and (b) was not 
otherwise authorized by law to engage in the communication.  
While the first two facts may occur in any order, both must 
occur before an attorney violates the Rule. 
Zaug admits that she was aware of the subject of the 
telephone call when she answered it, and this is reflected in 
the district committee’s factual findings.  However, the record 
does not disclose when she became aware that the caller was a 
represented person.  Although Yanira testified at the hearing 
on her motion to disqualify counsel that Zaug addressed her as 
Mrs. Copcutt when she answered the call, thereby indicating 
Zaug knew the identity of the caller at the time she answered, 
Zaug denied knowing the identity of the caller until Yanira 
described the emotional toll the litigation was having on her 
family. 
 
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The circuit court made no factual findings and merely 
affirmed the district committee’s determination.  However, the 
district committee made no finding resolving this dispute of 
fact.  To the contrary, the district committee found only that 
Zaug “was aware she was speaking with Copcutt either at the 
time she took the telephone call or concomitantly therewith.”  
We are unable to decipher the meaning of this finding.  
“Concomitantly” means “in a concomitant manner.”  Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 471 (1993).  “Concomitant” 
means “accompanying or attending esp[ecially] in a subordinate 
or incidental way[;] occurring along with or at the same time 
as and with or without a causal relationship.”  Id. 
Accordingly, the finding does not determine whether Zaug 
knew the identity of the caller when she answered or soon 
thereafter.  Consequently, this finding does not answer the 
question of when Zaug knew both (a) the identity of the party 
with whom she was communicating and (b) the subject of the 
communication.2  Further, at oral argument, the State Bar 
conceded that there was no evidence of how much time elapsed 
between the instant Zaug knew both pieces of information and 
the end of the call. 
                                                 
2 The district committee found that Zaug knew Copcutt was a 
represented person and that Zaug neither had Cofield’s consent 
nor was authorized by law to engage in the communication.  
Those facts are not in dispute. 
 
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Nevertheless, “[w]e conduct an independent examination of 
the entire record.”  Weatherbee, 279 Va. at 306, 689 S.E.2d at 
754.  Zaug testified that she answered, “This is Heather, how 
can I help you?”  The caller responded, “I need to speak with 
Mr. Nagle.  The deposition needs to be cancelled.”  Nonplussed 
by the response, Zaug then said, “This is Heather Zaug.  I work 
with Mr. Nagle on the case.  Who is this?  How can I help you?”  
At that point, according to Zaug, Yanira began her emotional 
outburst, stating that the litigation was too much for her 
family.  Zaug then knew the identity of the caller.   
According to Zaug, she then said, “I’m sorry.  I cannot 
help you.  You need to try to speak with Ms. Cofield.  Have you 
tried to reach Ms. Cofield?”  Yanira’s emotional outpouring 
continued for an unspecified number of seconds before Zaug 
concluded the call by stating, “I’m sorry.  We can’t help you.  
You need to try to reach Ms. Cofield.  I’ll try to contact Mr. 
Nagle and they’ll have to sort this out.”  Zaug’s witness 
testified that this interval lasted no longer than 30 seconds.  
The dispute between Zaug and the State Bar focuses on this 
uncertain period of time. 
Both parties argue the meaning and intent of the word 
“immediately” in Comment 3.  The State Bar argues that Zaug 
violated the Rule when she failed to terminate the call by 
hanging up during Yanira’s emotional outburst.  Zaug argues 
 
9 
that such conduct would violate the principles of 
professionalism which infuse and imbue the proper practice of 
law.  “Immediately,” she contends, does not mean 
“instantaneously,” and the Rule does not obligate an attorney 
to hang up on a represented person without regard to courtesy.  
We agree with Zaug. 
In the course of being admitted to the Bar of this Court, 
every attorney swears the following oath: 
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that you will 
support the Constitution of the United States 
and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, and that you will faithfully, 
honestly, professionally, and courteously demean 
yourself in the practice of law and execute your 
office of attorney at law to the best of your 
ability, so help you God? 
 
(Emphasis added).  See also Code § 54.1-3903. 
Further, the State Bar publishes principles of 
professionalism on its website.  The preamble states, 
From Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Hill, Virginia 
lawyers have epitomized our profession’s highest 
ideals.  Without losing sight of what lawyers do 
for their clients and for the public, lawyers 
should also focus on how they perform their 
duties. In their very first professional act, 
all Virginia lawyers pledge to demean themselves 
“professionally and courteously.” 
 
Virginia State Bar, Principles of Professionalism, 
http://vsb.org/pro-guidelines/index.php/principles/ (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2013).  The principles state that, “In my 
conduct toward everyone with whom I deal, I should [r]emember 
 
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that I am part of a self-governing profession, and that my 
actions and demeanor reflect upon my profession,” and “I should 
[t]reat everyone as I want to be treated — with respect and 
courtesy.”  Id. 
The Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct are precisely 
what they are described by their title to be:  rules of 
professional conduct.  They exist to further, not to obstruct, 
the professionalism of Virginia attorneys.  Professionalism 
embraces common courtesy and good manners, and it informs the 
Rules and defines their scope.  Accordingly, we will not 
construe the Rule to penalize an attorney for an act that is 
simultaneously non-malicious and polite. 
The State Bar argues that to permit Zaug’s conduct creates 
a so-called “distraught caller exception” or a “60-second call 
exception” to Rule 4.2, obscuring an otherwise bright-line rule 
of ethical conduct.  We agree with the State Bar that attorneys 
must understand that they are ethically prohibited from 
communicating about the subject of representation with a person 
represented by another attorney unless they have that 
attorney’s consent or are authorized by law to do so.  The Rule 
categorically and unambiguously forbids an attorney from 
initiating such communications and requires an attorney to 
disengage from such communications when they are initiated by 
 
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others.  But the Rule does not require attorneys to be 
discourteous or impolite when they do so. 
In this case, it is undisputed that Zaug did not initiate 
the telephone call.  There is no evidence in the record, and 
the State Bar does not assert, that Zaug intended to gain 
advantage from it.  Likewise, there is no evidence that Zaug 
deliberately or affirmatively prolonged it.  On these specific 
and narrow facts, and construing Rule 4.2 to advance behavior 
that is both professional and ethical, we conclude that no 
violation occurred in this case.  For these reasons, we will 
reverse the judgment of the circuit court, vacate the sanction 
imposed, and dismiss the charge of misconduct. 
Reversed, vacated, and dismissed.