Title: State v. Juiquin A. Pinkard
Citation: 2010 WI 81
Docket Number: 2008AP001204-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 2010

2010 WI 81 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP1204-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Juiquin Anthony Pinkard, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 319 Wis. 2d 234, 769 N.W.2d 573 
(Ct. App. 2009-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 7, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
M. Joseph Donald   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and PROSSER, J., join the 
dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Richard L. Zaffiro, Wauwatosa, and oral argument by Richard L. 
Zaffiro. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by James 
M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 81
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2008AP1204-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2006CF4557) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Juiquin Anthony Pinkard,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court  
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 affirming the circuit court's2 amended 
judgment 
convicting 
Juiquin 
Anthony 
Pinkard 
(Pinkard) 
of 
possession of cocaine with intent to deliver.  In upholding the 
judgment of conviction, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court's denial of Pinkard's motion to suppress evidence 
seized from his bedroom subsequent to the officers' warrantless 
entry of his home based upon an anonymous tip that two 
                                                 
1 State v. Pinkard, No. 2008AP1204-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2009) (per curiam). 
2 The Honorable M. Joseph Donald of Milwaukee County 
presided. 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
2 
 
individuals in Pinkard's house appeared to be sleeping next to 
drugs, money and drug paraphernalia and that the door to the 
residence was standing open.  The dispositive issues in this 
case are whether the officers' warrantless entry into Pinkard's 
home came about during the exercise of a bona fide community 
caretaker function, and if so, whether that function was 
reasonably exercised, thereby permitting the subsequent seizure 
of evidence that was in plain view.  We conclude that under the 
circumstances of this case, the officers' warrantless home entry 
to ensure the health and safety of the occupants was undertaken 
as 
a 
bona 
fide 
community 
caretaker 
function, 
which 
was 
reasonably exercised.  Accordingly, the officers lawfully seized 
evidence of a crime that was in plain view. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
On August 24, 2006 at 8:55 a.m., City of Milwaukee 
Police Officer Mike Lopez (Lopez), received an anonymous tip in 
which the caller stated that he had just left 2439 South 7th 
Street, Pinkard's residence, in Milwaukee.  The caller stated 
that inside that residence two people, "Big Boy" and his 
girlfriend, "Amalia," appeared to be sleeping; that located next 
to them was cocaine, money and a digital scale; and that the 
rear door to the residence was standing open.  Lopez called City 
of Milwaukee Police Officer John Osowski (Osowski), a member of 
the Intelligence Division Gang Crimes Unit, on his cell phone 
and relayed what he had learned from the anonymous caller.  
Lopez further stated that he was concerned about the occupants 
of the residence.  Lopez could not investigate the complaint 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
3 
 
because of a prior engagement, so he asked Osowski if he would 
check on the occupants of the residence. 
¶3 
Osowski received Lopez's call at 9:00 a.m. and 
afterward responded to Pinkard's residence,3 which he admitted 
"sounded like a drug house," with four other police officers 
from the Gang Crimes Unit.  Pinkard's residence is the rear unit 
of a three-family house.  The officers went to the back entrance 
that Osowski explained is the "main door" to Pinkard's residence 
that leads exclusively to Pinkard's unit.  This entrance had one 
heavy, aluminum door that was standing three-quarters open.  
Remaining outside Pinkard's residence, the officers knocked on 
the open door and announced their presence.   
¶4 
After waiting 30-45 seconds and receiving no response, 
the officers then entered Pinkard's residence to "check the 
welfare of the occupants."  Specifically, Osowski testified that 
they entered "[t]o make sure that the occupants that the caller 
had referred us were not the victims of any type of crime; that 
they weren't injured; that they weren't the victims of like a 
home invasion, robbery; that they were okay, and to safeguard 
any life or property in the residence."   
¶5 
From the officers' position just inside the rear door, 
they could see a bedroom directly to their left.  That bedroom 
door also was standing open.  The officers could see two people 
                                                 
3 It is unclear from the record how soon after Osowski 
received Lopez's call that he and his fellow officers arrived at 
Pinkard's residence.  However, the parties agree that the 
officers arrived at approximately 9:00 a.m. 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
4 
 
inside the bedroom, Pinkard and a woman, who "appeared to be 
sleeping."  The officers entered the bedroom "just to see if 
[they] could awake [the occupants]" and again loudly announced 
themselves as the police.  Neither of the occupants in the bed 
responded.  The officers had to physically shake Pinkard to wake 
him.  In plain view inside the bedroom, the officers seized 
cocaine, crack cocaine, marijuana and a digital scale.  The 
officers then arrested Pinkard and seized a gun from underneath 
the mattress on which Pinkard had been sleeping. 
¶6 
Pinkard was charged with possessing a firearm as a 
felon, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver as a second 
or subsequent offense and felony bail-jumping.  Pinkard waived 
his preliminary hearing.  He then filed a motion to suppress all 
of the evidence the officers seized from his residence arguing 
that the officers' warrantless entry into his residence violated 
his rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 
of the federal and state constitutions, respectively. 
¶7 
At 
the 
suppression 
hearing, 
the 
circuit 
court 
implicitly found Osowski's testimony was credible because it 
found, as Osowski testified, that the officers arrived at 
Pinkard's residence "to inquire as to the health and safety of 
the individuals that were sleeping."  The circuit court denied 
Pinkard's motion to suppress the evidence seized from in plain 
view, concluding that the officers' warrantless entry into 
Pinkard's residence was not unlawful because they were operating 
reasonably within their community caretaker function.  However, 
the circuit court granted Pinkard's motion to suppress the gun 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
5 
 
seized from underneath his mattress because the court concluded 
the search went beyond the reasonable exercise of the officers' 
community caretaker function. 
¶8 
Pursuant to a plea agreement that encompassed three 
other pending cases against Pinkard, he pled guilty in the 
present case to the possession of cocaine with the intent to 
deliver and to felony bail-jumping.  The charge of possession of 
a firearm as a felon was dismissed.   
¶9 
Pinkard moved for reconsideration of the circuit 
court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence of drug 
possession seized from in plain view.  In support of his motion, 
Pinkard attached two supplemental police reports, which he 
claimed demonstrated that the officers entered his residence "to 
commence a drug investigation, not because they were concerned 
about the occupants as community caretakers."  The court denied 
Pinkard's motion, reiterating that the officers entered the 
residence as community caretakers. 
¶10 Pinkard appealed the circuit court's "orders denying 
his suppression and related reconsideration motions."  State v. 
Pinkard, No. 2008AP1204-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶4 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Apr. 21, 2009).  The court of appeals affirmed.    Id., ¶1.  
Following our recent decision in State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, 
315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598, the court of appeals concluded 
that the officers' actions based on the anonymous tip were 
"sufficient pursuant to Kramer to satisfy an articulation of an 
objectively reasonable basis to engage in a community caretaker 
function even if there [also] was a potential to exercise law 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
6 
 
enforcement functions during that investigation."  Pinkard, No. 
2008AP1204-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶10 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 
2009). 
¶11 We granted review and now affirm. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶12 In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress 
evidence, 
we 
will 
uphold 
a 
circuit 
court's 
findings 
of 
historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  See State v. 
Fonte, 2005 WI 77, ¶11, 281 Wis. 2d 654, 698 N.W.2d 594.  
However, we independently review the circuit court's application 
of constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. Arias, 
2008 WI 84, ¶11, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748.  "Accordingly, 
we independently review whether an officer's community caretaker 
function satisfies the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and 
Article I, Section 11 of the federal and state Constitutions."  
Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶16 (citing State v. Kelsey C.R., 2001 
WI 54, ¶34, 243 Wis. 2d 422, 626 N.W.2d 777). 
B.  Community Caretaker Function 
Exercised in a Residence 
¶13 The federal and state constitutions do not protect 
against all searches and seizures, but only "unreasonable 
searches and seizures."  Arias, 311 Wis. 2d 358, ¶25 (citing 
U.S. Const. amend. IV;4 Wis. Const. art. I, § 11).5  "The 
                                                 
4 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides in relevant part:  "The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated 
. . . ." 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
7 
 
ultimate 
standard 
set 
forth 
in 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
is 
reasonableness."  Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973).  
"Subject 
to a few well-delineated exceptions, warrantless 
searches are deemed per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment."  State v. Faust, 2004 WI 99, ¶11, 274 Wis. 2d 183, 
682 N.W.2d 371; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) 
("It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches 
and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively 
unreasonable.") (internal quotations omitted). 
¶14 The United States Supreme Court and courts of this 
state have recognized that a police officer serving as a 
community caretaker to protect persons and property may be 
constitutionally permitted to perform warrantless searches and 
seizures.  See Cady, 413 U.S. at 448; State v. Ziedonis, 2005 WI 
App 249, ¶14, 287 Wis. 2d 831, 707 N.W.2d 565.  Because we 
"interpret the provisions of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, 
Section 11 as equivalent in regard to community caretaker 
analyses," we look to the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the community caretaker exception to the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 
414, ¶18. 
¶15 The community caretaker exception has its origins in 
Cady.  In Cady, Dombrowski's car was disabled on the side of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides in relevant part:  "The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated 
. . . ." 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
8 
 
road as the result of an accident.  Cady, 413 U.S. at 443.  
Because the officers knew Dombrowski was a Chicago police 
officer and believed he was required to carry a service revolver 
at all times, the officers conducted a warrantless search of the 
vehicle "to protect the public from the possibility that a 
revolver would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands."  
Id. at 436, 443. 
¶16 The Court upheld the warrantless search, concluding 
that "[l]ocal police officers . . . frequently investigate 
vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal 
liability and engage in . . . community caretaking functions, 
totally 
divorced 
from 
the 
detection, 
investigation, 
or 
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal 
statute."  Id. at 441.  In so concluding, the Court noted that 
"'for 
the 
purposes 
of the Fourth Amendment there is a 
constitutional difference between houses and cars,'" explaining 
that a warrantless search of a car deemed reasonable may be 
unreasonable in the context of a search of a home.  Id. at 439 
(quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)). 
¶17 In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), an 
officer conducted a warrantless "routine inventory search of an 
automobile lawfully impounded by police."  Id. at 365.  The 
Court upheld the warrantless inventory search, explaining that 
the 
officers 
were 
exercising 
a 
"'community 
caretaking 
function[]'" in the interest of public safety.  Id. at 368 
(quoting Cady, 413 U.S. at 441).  The Court explained that it 
"has consistently sustained police intrusions into automobiles 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
9 
 
impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody where the 
process is aimed at securing or protecting the car and its 
contents."  Id. at 373.  As in Cady, the Court in Opperman 
relied on the diminished expectation of privacy in automobiles 
as part of its rationale for permitting the officers' search to 
secure the car's contents.  Id. at 368-69.   
¶18 Officers may exercise two types of functions:  law 
enforcement functions and community caretaker functions.  See 
Cady, 413 U.S. at 441; see also Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶32.  
An officer exercises a community caretaker function "when the 
officer discovers a member of the public who is in need of 
assistance."  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶32.   
¶19 Pinkard's 
interpretation 
limits 
law 
enforcement's 
community caretaker function to automobiles.  Pinkard argues 
that Cady and Opperman's emphasis on the distinction between 
automobile searches and home searches and the heightened 
expectation of privacy in one's home suggests that a community 
caretaker function is not sufficient to support a warrantless 
home intrusion.  
¶20 First, we note that there is no language in Cady or 
Opperman that limits an officer's community caretaker functions 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
10 
 
to incidents involving automobiles.6  We read Cady not as 
prohibiting officers from entering a residence without a warrant 
while exercising a community caretaker function, but instead as 
"counsel[ing] a cautious approach when the exception is invoked 
to justify law enforcement intrusion into a home."  South Dakota 
v. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 221, 239 (S.D. 2009); see also United 
States v. Gillespie, 332 F. Supp. 2d 923, 929 (W.D. Va. 2004) 
(citing Cady, the court explained that relying on the community 
                                                 
6 We are not alone in our interpretation of Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), and South Dakota v. Opperman, 
428 U.S. 364 (1976), and our conclusion that the community 
caretaker exception to the warrant requirement may be applied to 
residences.  See United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1523, 
1522 (6th Cir. 1996) (concluding that because "an important 
'community caretaking' interest motivated the officers' entry," 
the officers' "failure to obtain a warrant [did] not render that 
entry unlawful" where officers entered defendant's home to 
"abat[e] an ongoing nuisance by quelling loud and disruptive 
noise"); South Dakota v. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 221, 226, 239 (S.D. 
2009) (noting that it was deciding "[i]n a case of first 
impression . . . whether the community caretaker doctrine . . . 
should also be applied to a home search" and concluding that the 
exception may be "invoked to justify law enforcement intrusion 
into a home"); California v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 934 (Cal. 1999) 
(concluding that the community caretaker doctrine did not apply, 
but noting that "[u]nder the community caretaking exception, 
circumstances short of a perceived emergency may justify a 
warrantless entry" of a home); New Jersey v. Garbin, 739 A.2d 
1016, 1019, 1018 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1999) (in concluding that the 
officers' warrantless entry into a garage was justified under 
the community caretaker exception, the court explicitly stated 
that the performance of community caretaking functions "may 
provide the requisite authority for entry into a private 
residence without a warrant"); Virginia v. Waters, 456 S.E.2d 
527, 530 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that "no language in . . . 
Cady restricts an officer's community caretaking actions to 
incidents 
involving 
automobiles" 
and 
concluding 
that 
"an 
officer's community caretaker functions are not limited solely 
to automobile stops"). 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
11 
 
caretaker exception to support a warrantless entry into a home 
is "more suspect" than when a community caretaker function is 
involved in the search of an automobile).  Although a multitude 
of activities fall within the community caretaker function, not 
every intrusion that results from the exercise of a community 
caretaker function will fall within the community caretaker 
exception to permit a warrantless entry into a home.  Whether a 
given community caretaker function will pass muster under the 
Fourth Amendment so as to permit a warrantless home entry 
depends 
on 
whether 
the 
community 
caretaker 
function 
was 
reasonably exercised under the totality of the circumstances of 
the incident under review.   
¶21 Second, Wisconsin case law, dating back to our very 
first discussion of the community caretaker exception to the 
warrant requirement, supports our conclusion that the community 
caretaker exception may be applied to residences.  In Bies v. 
State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977), our first 
discussion of the community caretaker exception, a police 
officer received a radio message "directing him to investigate a 
noise complaint" near Bies' garage.  Id. at 461.  The officer 
walked around the garage and saw in plain view through the open 
rear doorway what he believed was stolen telephone cable.  
Without permission or a warrant, the officer seized the cable 
from inside the garage.  Id. at 461–62.  We noted that Bies' 
garage was located on the "curtilage of his dwelling, and it was 
not in any sense a semi-public area" and, therefore, was "within 
the Fourth Amendment's protection."  Id. at 462.  In concluding 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
12 
 
that the officers' observation and seizure of the cable from 
Bies' garage were constitutionally permissible because the 
officer was exercising a bona fide community caretaker function, 
id. at 474, we explained that: 
Checking noise complaints bears little in common with 
investigation of crime.  As a general matter it is 
probably more a part of the "community caretaker" 
function of the police . . . .  The officer was 
clearly justified in proceeding to the alley in 
question and conducting a general surveillance of the 
area 
to 
determine 
whether 
some 
noise 
or 
other 
disturbance was present. 
Id. at 471. 
¶22 While Bies did not explicitly state that a bona fide 
community caretaker function may support a warrantless home 
entry, it necessarily implies such an interpretation.  This is 
so because Bies involved an officer's warrantless entry of the 
curtilage of the defendant's residence, id. at 462, which "is 
actually 'considered part of the home itself for Fourth 
Amendment purposes,'" State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶26, 231 
Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 
466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).7  It is well-settled that "[t]he 
protection provided by the Fourth Amendment to a home also 
extends to the curtilage of a residence."  Id. (citing Oliver, 
466 U.S. at 180).   
                                                 
7 Without citing State v. Bies, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 251 
N.W.2d 461 (1977), the dissent mistakenly asserts:  "Further, 
like the Supreme Court, this court has never extended the 
exception to justify warrantless entry of a home.  Never, until 
now." 
 
Dissent, 
¶35. 
 
We 
disagree 
with 
the 
dissent's 
representation. 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
13 
 
¶23 In State v. Horngren, 2000 WI App 177, 238 Wis. 2d 
347, 617 N.W.2d 508, the court of appeals applied a community 
caretaker analysis to Horngren's motion to suppress evidence 
obtained in a warrantless entry of his home.  Id., ¶7.  The 
police were dispatched to Horngren's apartment based on a 
reported suicide threat.  Id., ¶11.  The court of appeals 
determined that police response based on their concern for the 
safety of an individual threatening suicide was a bona fide 
community caretaker function, reasonably undertaken.  Id., ¶14.  
¶24 In State v. Ferguson (Shane Ferguson), 2001 WI App 
102, 244 Wis. 2d 17, 629 N.W.2d 788, the court of appeals again 
applied a community caretaker analysis to the search of a 
residence.  A 911 call that reported a fight at Ferguson's 
residence brought the police to the scene.  Id., ¶2.  Upon their 
arrival, they encountered a teenage woman who was highly 
intoxicated.  Id.  The young woman unlocked her apartment and 
the police followed her inside where they observed two other 
teenagers who were also intoxicated.  Id., ¶¶3-4.  They also saw 
several empty gallon containers for hard liquor and empty beer 
bottles, from which they surmised that the underage occupants 
had consumed a significant amount of alcohol.  Id., ¶4.  During 
their review of the apartment, the police came upon a locked 
bedroom door.  Id., ¶5.  They called out repeatedly, but 
received no response.  Id.  Based on their concern that someone 
inside may need assistance, they jimmied the lock and found 
Ferguson and marijuana plants.  Id.   
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
14 
 
¶25 In applying the community caretaker analysis, the 
court of appeals explained that police presence at Ferguson's 
apartment was occasioned by a 911 call to report a fight, and 
that while at his apartment, they encountered underage drinking, 
which is not a crime.  Id., ¶13.  Their concern in entering 
Ferguson's bedroom was that an underage person may have passed 
out inside and was in need of assistance.  Id., ¶14.  In 
concluding that the community caretaker function had been 
reasonably undertaken, the court of appeals balanced the public 
interest in providing assistance with Ferguson's interest in 
preventing the intrusion given the facts and circumstances 
presented.  Id., ¶20.  
¶26 As the above examples show, where the community 
caretaker function has been held to have supported a warrantless 
home entry, Wisconsin courts have carefully examined the 
expressed concern for which the community caretaker function was 
undertaken to determine if it was bona fide.  Id., ¶14; 
Horngren, 238 Wis. 2d 347, ¶11.  Then, the courts balanced the 
public interest in acting on the stated concern with the Fourth 
Amendment right to preclude unreasonable searches or seizures in 
one's home.  See Shane Ferguson, 244 Wis. 2d 17, ¶20; Horngren, 
238 Wis. 2d 347, ¶14.  This analysis is consistent with the 
approach we took in Bies where entry into the curtilage was made 
without a warrant.  See Bies, 76 Wis. 2d at 462, 474.  We shall 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
15 
 
employ a similar analysis of the community caretaker function8 
currently under review. 
                                                 
8 Some courts have mistakenly conflated the community 
caretaker exception and the emergency exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  See, e.g., Garbin, 739 
A.2d 
at 
1018–19 
(holding 
that 
the 
officers' 
warrantless 
intrusion was justified under the community caretaker exception, 
but in setting forth the community caretaker exception, the 
court cited to and quoted from a series of emergency exception 
cases); Maryland v. Alexander, 721 A.2d 275, 281-84 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1998) (citing both emergency aid and community 
caretaker 
cases 
in 
discussing 
the 
community 
caretaker 
exception); Massachusetts v. Bates, 548 N.E.2d 889, 891 n.2 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (opining that the emergency exception is 
"[s]ometimes 
called 
the 
'community 
caretaker 
exception'"); 
Nevada v. Rincon, 147 P.3d 233, 237 (Nev. 2006) (asserting that 
the community caretaker exception requires an "objectively 
reasonable belief that emergency assistance is needed").   
However, the exceptions are not one and the same.  The 
community caretaker exception does not require the circumstances 
to rise to the level of an emergency to qualify as an exception 
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.  See Cady, 413 
U.S. at 447-48 (invoking the community caretaker exception for 
the first time). 
Confusion arises when an officer's conduct under the 
emergency exception is spoken of as "one of many 'community 
caretaking functions' of the police."  Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 6.6(a) n.6 (4th ed. 2004).  Even though police 
conduct that falls within the emergency exception constitutes 
one of the many community caretaking functions, "it must be 
assessed separately and by a distinct test, as all such 
functions are not 'judged by the same standard.'"  Id.; accord 
Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 546, 554 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting 
that the community caretaker exception and the emergency 
exception "have different intellectual underpinnings") (internal 
quotations 
and 
brackets 
omitted). 
Stated 
otherwise, 
"the 
community caretaking function of police is an aspect of the 
emergency exception . . . .  The community caretaker exception, 
however, is an independent and broader exception to the Fourth 
Amendment."  Deneui, 775 N.W.2d at 251-52 (Meierhenry, J., 
dissenting). 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
16 
 
¶27 Furthermore, the analysis of Wisconsin courts is also 
consistent 
with 
the 
approach 
taken 
by 
courts 
in 
other 
jurisdictions.  See Michigan v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 919–20 
(Mich. 1993); Deneui, 775 N.W.2d at 239.  Assisting members of 
the public in the context of automobiles is only one of many 
circumstances in which police officers may exercise their 
community caretaker function.  We agree with the Supreme Court 
of South Dakota's recent statement that "homes cannot be 
arbitrarily isolated from the community caretaking equation.  
The need to protect and preserve life or avoid serious injury 
cannot be limited to automobiles."  Deneui, 775 N.W.2d at 239. 
C.  The Entry into Pinkard's Residence 
¶28 Because 
we 
have 
concluded 
that 
under 
certain 
circumstances 
a 
reasonably 
exercised 
community 
caretaker 
function may permit a warrantless entry into a home, we now 
                                                                                                                                                             
Maintaining the distinction between the community caretaker 
exception and the emergency exception is important because the 
United States Supreme Court has recognized the application of 
the 
emergency 
exception, 
unlike 
the 
community 
caretaker 
exception, as justifying the warrantless entry of a home.  See 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978).   
We have consistently maintained the appropriate distinction 
between the two exceptions and have formulated distinct analyses 
for the two exceptions.  Compare State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d 
443, 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983) (employing an emergency exception 
rationale) with State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 
759 N.W.2d 598 (employing a community caretaker rationale).  
Before us, the State argued the emergency exception as an 
alternative rationale for the officers' warrantless entry into 
Pinkard's residence.  Because we employ the community caretaker 
exception to resolve this case, we decline to address the 
emergency exception. 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
17 
 
determine whether the warrantless entry into Pinkard's residence 
was permissible under the Fourth Amendment.9   
1.  The three-step test 
¶29 We apply a three-step test to determine whether an 
officer's conduct properly falls within the scope of the 
community caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
requirement.  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶21.  When a community 
caretaker function is asserted as the basis for a home entry, 
the circuit court must determine:  (1) whether a search or 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred; 
(2) if so, whether the police were exercising a bona fide 
community caretaker function; and (3) if so, whether the public 
interest outweighs the intrusion upon the privacy of the 
individual such that the community caretaker function was 
reasonably exercised within the context of a home.10  See id.  
The State bears the burden of proof.  Id., ¶17. 
                                                 
9 Because we interpret Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution consistent with the Fourth Amendment for 
purposes of community caretaker analyses, Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 
414, ¶18, we have not repeated a reference to Article I, Section 
11 of the Wisconsin Constitution each time we have referred to 
the Fourth Amendment.   
10 The three-step test as laid out in State v. Anderson, 142 
Wis. 2d 162, 169, 417 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1987), as applied in 
State v. Kelsey C.R., 2001 WI 54, ¶35, 243 Wis. 2d 422, 626 
N.W.2d 777, and as expressly adopted in Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 
¶21 & n.8, was employed to determine whether a seizure conducted 
as a community caretaker function was reasonable.  We have 
tailored the three-step test to apply to a warrantless search of 
a residence, the conduct at issue here, instead of a warrantless 
seizure of a person or property. 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
18 
 
2.  Application of the three-step test 
i.  Search requirement 
¶30 The home "is accorded the full range of Fourth 
Amendment protections," Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 
211 (1966), as "the physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed," 
State v. Ferguson (Kelly Ferguson), 2009 WI 50, ¶17, 317 
Wis. 2d 586, 767 N.W.2d 187 (internal quotations omitted).  "It 
is beyond question, therefore, that an unconsented police entry 
into a residential unit . . . constitutes a search . . . ."  
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3(b) (4th ed. 2004).  
Accordingly, the officers' warrantless entry into Pinkard's home 
and their subsequent entry into his bedroom were searches within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  See State v. Boggess, 115 
Wis. 2d 443, 449, 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983) (concluding that 
officers' warrantless "entry into the Boggess residence was a 
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment"). 
                                                                                                                                                             
We 
recognize 
that 
searches 
and 
seizures 
"are 
constitutionally and analytically distinct" concepts.  State v. 
Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶25, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748.  "A 
seizure differs from a search, as it deprives the individual of 
dominion over his or her person or property."  Id. (internal 
quotations 
omitted). 
 
"A 
search 
invades 
different 
constitutionally protected interests——the privacy interests of a 
person."  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶40 n.10 (citing Arias, 311 
Wis. 2d 358, ¶31).  The community caretaker three-step test 
applies with equal force to both warrantless searches and 
warrantless seizures as both are interests protected under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
19 
 
ii.  Bona fide community caretaker function 
¶31 The second step requires us to determine whether, 
under the circumstances as they existed at the time of the 
police conduct, an officer was engaged in a bona fide community 
caretaker function.  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶23.  We recently 
rejected the argument that Cady's statement that community 
caretaker functions be "totally divorced from the detection, 
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the 
violation of a criminal statute," Cady, 413 U.S. at 441, means 
"that if the police officer has any subjective law enforcement 
concerns, he cannot be engaging in a valid community caretaker 
function," Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶30.11  Instead, we concluded 
that: 
                                                 
11 The dissent notes that the evidence seized by the 
officers "can be used in court if the officers were engaged in 
'a bona fide community caretaker function' that was 'totally 
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of 
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute."  
Dissent, ¶65 (quoting Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶23).  In 
isolation, this quote from Kramer is misleading because it fails 
to explain our interpretation of this language.  Kramer 
clarified: 
[T]he "totally divorced" language from Cady does not 
mean that if the police officer has any subjective law 
enforcement concerns, he cannot be engaging in a valid 
community caretaker function.  Rather, we conclude 
that in a community caretaker context, when under the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances 
an 
objectively 
reasonable basis for the community caretaker function 
is shown, that determination is not negated by the 
officer's subjective law enforcement concerns. 
Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶30. 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
20 
 
[A] court may consider an officer's subjective intent 
in evaluating whether the officer was acting as a bona 
fide 
community 
caretaker; however, if the court 
concludes 
that 
the 
officer 
has 
articulated 
an 
objectively reasonable basis under the totality of the 
circumstances for the community caretaker function, he 
has met the standard of acting as a bona fide 
community 
caretaker, 
whose 
community 
caretaker 
function is totally divorced from law enforcement 
functions. 
Id., ¶36. 
¶32 In the case before us, we conclude that the officers 
were engaged in a bona fide community caretaker function based 
on the following findings of the circuit court:  (1) police 
received a reliable anonymous tip that the occupants of 
Pinkard's home appeared to be sleeping near drugs, money and 
drug paraphernalia and that the rear door of the home was 
standing open; (2) the officers responded to Pinkard's house 
because they were concerned about the "health and safety" of the 
occupants; (3) the officers' corroboration that the rear door 
was indeed standing open; and (4) the officers repeatedly 
knocked and announced their presence before entering the house 
and before entering the bedroom with no response of any type 
from Pinkard or his companion.   
¶33 Concededly, this is a close case.  However, on these 
facts, we heed the Horngren court's caution against "taking a 
too-narrow view" in determining whether the community caretaker 
function is present.  Horngren, 238 Wis. 2d 347, ¶18. 
"An 
officer less willing to discharge community 
caretaking functions implicates seriously undesirable 
consequences for society at large:  In that event, we 
might reasonably anticipate the assistance role of law 
enforcement 
. . . 
in 
this 
society 
will 
go 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
21 
 
downhill. . . .  The police cannot obtain a warrant 
for . . . entry.  [W]ithout a warrant, the police are 
powerless.  In the future police will tell such 
concerned citizens, 'Sorry.  We can't help you.  We 
need a warrant and can't get one.'" 
Id. (quoting California v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 939 (Cal. 1999) 
(further internal quotations omitted)); see also Ziedonis, 287 
Wis. 2d 831, ¶15 (quoting with favor the same passage from Ray). 
¶34 First, we note that Osowski articulated two legitimate 
community caretaker functions underlying the warrantless entry 
into Pinkard's residence:  to ensure that the occupants were not 
the "victims of any type of crime" and "to safeguard any life or 
property in the residence."  The circuit court implicitly found 
this testimony credible, finding that the officers arrived at 
Pinkard's residence "to inquire as to the health and safety of 
the individuals that were sleeping."  These findings of fact are 
not clearly erroneous.12  See Steinbach v. Green Lake Sanitary 
Dist., 2006 WI 63, ¶10, 291 Wis. 2d 11, 715 N.W.2d 195.   
¶35 Based on the facts and circumstances here, an officer 
could reasonably be concerned that Pinkard and his companion may 
have overdosed on drugs.  Both the anonymous caller and Lopez 
indicated that drugs and drug paraphernalia were present.  The 
open doors to Pinkard's house and bedroom, along with Pinkard's 
unresponsiveness to law enforcement's repeated efforts to rouse 
him and his companion by knocking on the door also could 
                                                 
12 The 
dissent 
does 
not 
acknowledge 
this 
finding 
of 
historical fact by the circuit court.  It appears that the 
dissent rejects such finding, but fails to explain why it is 
clearly erroneous.  See State v. Fonte, 2005 WI 77, ¶11, 281 
Wis. 2d 654, 698 N.W.2d 594. 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
22 
 
indicate an overdose of drugs.  Accordingly, the police officers 
had an objectively reasonable basis for deciding that entry into 
Pinkard's home was necessary to ensure the health and safety of 
the occupants. 
¶36 The anonymous call "'exhibited sufficient indicia of 
reliability to justify'" concern for the health and safety of 
the occupants of Pinkard's residence and warranted further 
investigation.  See State v. Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, ¶23, 241 
Wis. 2d 729, 623 N.W.2d 516 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 
U.S. 325, 332 (1990)).  "[I]n cases where the police receive a 
tip from an unidentifiable informant, the tip nonetheless may be 
deemed reliable if it contains 'inside information' or a similar 
verifiable explanation of how the informant came to know of the 
information in the tip, which the police in turn independently 
corroborate."  Id., ¶25.  Here, the anonymous caller explained 
how he "came to know of the information in the tip," id.; 
namely, that he had just been at Pinkard's house and witnessed 
what he described to Lopez.  Further, the officers independently 
corroborated the tip upon arriving outside Pinkard's residence 
and seeing the rear door was standing open, just as the caller 
described. 
¶37 In 
addition 
to 
independently 
corroborating 
the 
anonymous caller's basis of knowledge, thereby demonstrating the 
reliability of the anonymous tip, the door to Pinkard's 
residence that was standing open is significant for at least two 
other reasons.  First, the open door suggests that something 
untoward may have occurred inside the house and that the 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
23 
 
occupants may require assistance, i.e., that the occupants had 
been victims of a crime in which the assailant fled and left the 
door open or that they had ingested an overdose of drugs and 
were not able to close the door.  Second, the open door reduces 
an individual's expectation of privacy.  In Bies, we noted that 
had the garage door been closed, the officer "would not have 
been justified in opening it."  Bies, 76 Wis. 2d at 472.  
¶38 After seeing the rear door standing three-quarters 
open, the officers' knocked on the door and announced their 
presence.  After waiting approximately 30-45 seconds and 
receiving no response, the officers' concern for the health and 
safety of the individuals was heightened.  If the occupants were 
victims of a crime or had ingested an overdose of cocaine and 
therefore were unconscious, then the absence of any response to 
the officers' knock-and-announce, coupled with the open door, 
reasonably warranted the officers entering the residence to 
ensure the occupants' health and safety.   
¶39 Once the officers entered the house, from their 
position just inside the doorway, the officers could see through 
the open bedroom door.  Inside that bedroom, the officers saw 
exactly what the anonymous caller described, two occupants who 
appeared to be sleeping.  The officers loudly announced their 
presence again, and the occupants remained unresponsive.  The 
continued unresponsiveness of the occupants failed to alleviate 
the officers' concern for the health and safety of the 
occupants. 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
24 
 
¶40 Although this could have been nothing more than a drug 
house, "given the multifaceted nature of police work," community 
caretaker and law enforcement functions "are not mutually 
exclusive."  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶39.  Simply because 
Osowski could have had subjective law enforcement concerns, it 
does not necessarily follow that he also could not have been 
engaging in a bona fide community caretaker function as he 
entered Pinkard's residence.  See id., ¶30.  To preclude an 
officer from exercising his community caretaker function anytime 
a situation involves an illegal drug, i.e., cocaine, would 
prevent officers from rescuing those who have ingested an 
excessive amount of drugs and are in need of medical assistance.  
Such a "result is neither sensible nor desirable."  Id., ¶34.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the officers were engaged in a 
bona fide community caretaker function when they entered 
Pinkard's residence.  
iii.  Balance of interests 
¶41 The third step requires us to determine whether the 
officers' exercise of a bona fide community caretaker function 
was reasonable.  Id., ¶40.  To make this determination, we 
balance the public interest or need that is furthered by the 
officers' conduct against the degree and nature of the intrusion 
on the citizen's constitutional interest.  Id.  "The stronger 
the public need and the more minimal the intrusion upon an 
individual's liberty, the more likely the police conduct will be 
held to be reasonable."  Id., ¶41. 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
25 
 
¶42 In balancing these competing interests, we consider 
four factors: 
"(1) the degree of the public interest and the 
exigency 
of 
the 
situation;13 
(2) 
the 
attendant 
circumstances 
surrounding 
the 
[search], 
including 
time, location, the degree of overt authority and 
force 
displayed; 
(3) 
whether 
an 
automobile 
is 
involved; and (4) the availability, feasibility and 
effectiveness of alternatives to the type of intrusion 
actually accomplished." 
Id. (quoting Kelsey C.R., 243 Wis. 2d 422, ¶36). 
¶43 We look to Ziedonis and Shane Ferguson for guidance on 
applying the first factor to an officer's warrantless entry into 
a residence.  In Shane Ferguson, as we explained briefly above, 
officers responded to a 911 call about a fight and encountered 
an intoxicated juvenile who let them into the apartment.  Shane 
Ferguson, 244 Wis. 2d 17, ¶¶2–3.  Once inside, the officers saw 
several other intoxicated juveniles, one of whom was ill and 
vomiting.  Id., ¶4.  The officers became concerned about a 
bedroom that was locked from the inside because they feared 
"that additional underage persons were in the bedroom, either 
ill or passed out."  Id., ¶5.  After about 30 minutes of 
knocking-and-announcing their presence and yelling with no 
                                                 
13 Assessing the "exigency of the situation" under the 
community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement is 
distinct from the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement, which requires "both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances [to] overcome the individual's right to be free 
from government interference."  State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, 
¶17, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621. 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
26 
 
response, the officers jimmied the lock and entered the bedroom.  
Id.   
¶44 In Ziedonis, the officers responded to a complaint of 
animals running at large.  Ziedonis, 287 Wis. 2d 831, ¶2.  Upon 
arriving at the house, the officers encountered two vicious dogs 
that they tried unsuccessfully to corral.  Id., ¶3.  A neighbor 
informed the officers that the dogs' owner lived in the back 
portion of the house and that he was home.  Id., ¶4.  The 
officers made numerous unsuccessful attempts to contact the 
occupant, including sounding sirens and air horns and using a 
loud speaker to announce their presence.  Id.  Through a glass 
storm door, the officer thought he saw "something wrong with the 
person inside."  Id., ¶5.  Out of "fear for the safety of the 
occupant" the officer opened the unlocked storm door and entered 
the residence.  Id. (internal quotations and brackets omitted). 
¶45 In both Ziedonis and Shane Ferguson, the court 
concluded that the officers reasonably exercised a bona fide 
community caretaker function in the context of a home.  Id., 
¶34; Shane Ferguson, 244 Wis. 2d 17, ¶16.  In comparing its case 
to Shane Ferguson, the Ziedonis court noted that in both cases 
there was a significant public interest in ensuring the safety 
of the occupants because the officers could not ascertain their 
physical condition and "reasonably concluded" that assistance 
was needed.  Ziedonis, 287 Wis. 2d 831, ¶29.  
¶46 The case before us is analogous to Shane Ferguson and 
Ziedonis in that the officers entered Pinkard's home out of 
concern for the safety of Pinkard and his companion.  Further, 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
27 
 
as in Shane Ferguson and Ziedonis, the officers here did not 
know the physical condition of Pinkard and his companion and 
reasonably concluded that the situation required intervention.  
See id. 
¶47 If Pinkard and his companion had been suffering from a 
cocaine overdose, a reasonable inference based on these facts, 
the officers were presented with a significant exigency, for 
every passing minute could have been the difference between life 
and death.  This exigency weighs in favor of concluding that the 
entry of the home was reasonable.  As Shane Ferguson explained, 
the fear that an occupant was severely intoxicated was an 
exigent situation weighing in favor of the officers' entry into 
the locked room.  See Shane Ferguson, 244 Wis. 2d 17, ¶16. 
¶48 Since the public has a substantial interest in police 
ensuring the well-being and safety of citizens who may be 
suffering from a drug overdose or were the victims of a crime, 
and attached to both concerns are considerable exigencies, the 
first factor favors the conclusion that the officers' community 
caretaking function was reasonably exercised.  
¶49 In considering the second reasonableness factor, we 
assess whether the "'time, location, the degree of overt 
authority and force displayed'" were appropriate under the 
circumstances.  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶41 (quoting Kelsey 
C.R., 243 Wis. 2d 422, ¶36).  We first note that the officers 
did not control the time of day or location, but were responding 
to an anonymous tip.  See Horngren, 238 Wis. 2d 347, ¶15.  We 
recognize that in Shane Ferguson and Ziedonis the amount of time 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
28 
 
that passed prior to entry was significant.  See Shane Ferguson, 
244 Wis. 2d 17, ¶5 (waiting about 30 minutes prior to entering); 
Ziedonis, 287 Wis. 2d 831, ¶28 (waiting about 90 minutes prior 
to entering).  However, in light of a more severe medical 
concern at issue here, that is, a possible drug overdose, 
waiting 30 minutes was not feasible. 
¶50 The court in Horngren recognized this.  Horngren, 238 
Wis. 2d 347, ¶15.  In Horngren, the officers were responding to 
a suicide threat that the court noted had obvious exigency.  Id.  
Almost immediately upon arriving, and without knocking and 
announcing their presence, the officers entered the front door 
of the apartment.  Id., ¶3.  As soon as the door opened, a 
struggle ensued between the officers and Horngren.  Id.  The 
court concluded that the immediate no-knock entry was reasonable 
in light of the officers' belief that Horngren "was in danger of 
death or physical harm."  Id., ¶17. 
¶51 The situation the officers faced here is similar to 
that in Horngren in regard to the effect time had on their 
actions.  The officers believed that the occupants of Pinkard's 
residence were "in danger of death or physical harm"; therefore, 
it was not unreasonable for them to wait only 30-45 seconds 
prior to entering.  See id.  Further, the officers exercised 
more restraint than those in Horngren in that they loudly 
knocked and announced their presence before entering the house 
and again before entering the bedroom.   
¶52 An additional factor here that was not present in 
Horngren, Shane Ferguson or Ziedonis, is the condition of the 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
29 
 
entry door to Pinkard's residence.  It was standing three-
quarters open, and the bedroom door was open as well.  One could 
reasonably conclude that if Pinkard and his companion were able 
to provide privacy for themselves, they would have done so by 
closing the entry door.  The open doors could be reasonably 
interpreted to indicate Pinkard's and his companion's inability 
to look after their own interests.  
¶53 Pinkard argues that arriving at his residence with 
five Gang Unit officers demonstrates unreasonable force and 
overt authority.  We do not agree.  As we have explained, an 
officer is charged with both law enforcement and community 
caretaker functions.  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶32.  "As an 
officer goes about his or her duties, an officer cannot always 
ascertain which hat the officer will wear——his law enforcement 
hat or her community caretaker hat. . . .  Therefore, from the 
point of view of the officer, he or she must be prepared for 
either eventuality . . . ."  Id. 
¶54 Here, the circuit court found that the officers 
entered Pinkard's residence because they were concerned about 
the "health and safety" of the occupants.  This demonstrates the 
officers' concern for the occupants.  However, Osowski admitted 
that Pinkard's house sounded like a "drug house."  Accordingly, 
sending five officers who belong to the Gang Unit, which 
performs 
narcotics 
investigations, 
was 
a 
reasonable 
precautionary measure to prepare for another eventuality. 
¶55 We further note that there is no indication that any 
of the five officers employed any force or drew their weapons.  
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
30 
 
The officers' search was limited to minimize the intrusion into 
Pinkard's home.  Upon entry, the officers' went straight to the 
bedroom in which they saw the occupants from their position at 
the doorway; the officers did not enter any other rooms of the 
residence.  Therefore, we conclude that the second factor weighs 
in favor of concluding that the officers' exercise of the 
community caretaker function was reasonable. 
¶56 Under the third factor, we consider whether an 
automobile was involved in the exercise of the community 
caretaker function.  Id., ¶44.  Such a consideration is relevant 
because "[i]n some situations a citizen has a lesser expectation 
of privacy in an automobile" than in his or her home.  Anderson, 
142 Wis. 2d at 169 n.4.  This is not a relevant factor here 
except to recognize that one has a heightened privacy interest 
in preventing intrusions into one's home. 
¶57 Finally, we consider the feasibility and availability 
of alternatives to entering Pinkard's residence without a 
warrant.  Pinkard argues that the officers could have telephoned 
the house or checked with the neighbors to determine whether an 
emergency situation existed.  We agree that a number of 
alternatives were available, but none were feasible in light of 
the circumstances.  See Horngren, 238 Wis. 2d 347, ¶15 ("While 
there were a number of less intrusive alternatives available, 
those less intrusive means, under the circumstances in this 
case, were simply not feasible."). 
¶58 If Pinkard and his companion had indeed been victims 
of a crime or were suffering from a cocaine overdose, both 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
31 
 
reasonable inferences based on these facts, telephoning the 
house 
would 
have 
been 
a 
fruitless 
exercise 
because 
the 
individuals would not have been capable of answering the 
officers' phone call.  Similarly, the officers could have 
checked with Pinkard's neighbors to determine whether they had 
seen anything suspicious; however, this was not a feasible 
option here in light of the exigency perceived by the officers. 
¶59 Principles 
of reasonableness demand that we ask 
ourselves whether "'the officers would have been derelict in 
their duty had they acted otherwise.'"  Deneui, 775 N.W.2d at 
239 (quoting State v. Hetzko, 283 So.2d 49, 52 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1973)).  Indeed, if the officers had done otherwise, perhaps by 
leaving the scene to obtain a warrant or waiting for an 
ambulance to arrive, we are convinced the citizens of the 
community would have understandably viewed the officers' actions 
as poor police work.  Further, "'[i]t must be emphasized that 
the fact that, as it turned out, no one was injured is of no 
moment.'"  Id. (quoting State v. Hedley, 593 A.2d 576, 582 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1990)).  Therefore, we conclude that the fourth 
factor favors concluding that the officers reasonably exercised 
their community caretaker function. 
¶60 Because three of the four factors weigh in favor of 
concluding 
that 
the 
officers 
reasonably 
performed 
their 
community caretaker function, the third step has been satisfied.   
¶61 Accordingly, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
officers' 
warrantless entry into Pinkard's residence constituted a search, 
that the officers were engaged in a bona fide community 
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
32 
 
caretaker function and that the community caretaker function was 
reasonably exercised under the totality of the circumstances. 
D.  Plain View Exception 
¶62 Pinkard concedes that the evidence seized in his 
bedroom was in plain view.  Moreover, Pinkard does not dispute 
that if we conclude that the officers lawfully entered his home, 
the officers lawfully seized the items in plain view.  See State 
v. Johnston, 184 Wis. 2d 794, 809, 518 N.W.2d 759 (1994) (citing 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971)) (concluding 
that where an initial intrusion that brings the police within 
plain view of contraband is lawful under one of the recognized 
exceptions to the warrant requirement, the subsequent seizure of 
the contraband is legitimate).  Accordingly, because we conclude 
that the officers' initial intrusion into Pinkard's home falls 
within the scope of the community caretaker exception to the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the seizure of the items 
within plain view was lawful. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶63 The dispositive issues in this case are whether the 
officers' warrantless entry into Pinkard's home came about 
during the exercise of a bona fide community caretaker function, 
and if so, whether that function was reasonably exercised, 
thereby permitting the subsequent seizure of evidence that was 
in plain view.  We conclude that under the circumstances of this 
case, the officers' warrantless home entry to ensure the health 
and safety of the occupants was undertaken as a bona fide 
community caretaker function, which was reasonably exercised.  
No. 
2008AP1204–CR   
 
33 
 
Accordingly, the officers lawfully seized evidence of a crime 
that was in plain view.  Therefore, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP1204-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶64 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The question in 
this case is not whether officers could have entered Pinkard's 
residence without a warrant if they believed that medical 
assistance was needed.  Of course they could have.   
¶65 Rather, the question is whether the evidence they 
seized during this warrantless entry can be used in court to 
secure a criminal conviction.  This evidence can be used in 
court if the officers were engaged in "a bona fide community 
caretaker 
function" 
that 
was 
"totally 
divorced 
from 
the 
detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to 
the violation of a criminal statute."  State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 
14, ¶23, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 750 N.W.2d 941.  
¶66 The majority acknowledges that this case presents a 
close call.  Nevertheless, it transforms a warrantless home 
search executed by five armed members of a drug unit acting on a 
tip about drugs into a community caretaker function.  I fear 
that today's close call will become tomorrow's norm.    
¶67 Given that the exceptions to the warrant requirement 
are to be carefully delineated, I cannot endorse the broad 
application of the community caretaking exception employed by 
the majority.  Instead, I conclude that the five drug unit 
officers were not engaged in a bona fide community caretaker 
function that was totally divorced from an investigation of a 
criminal offense, and further that the officers' execution of 
the warrantless home search was unreasonable because of the 
substantial degree of invasion.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent.    
No.  2008AP1204-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
I 
¶68 The facts are briefly set forth below.  Additional 
facts appear later in the discussion.   
¶69 An individual who wished to remain anonymous called 
the police station and reported that the tenants of the rear 
apartment at 2439 South 7th Street were sleeping, the back door 
of the apartment was open, and the tipster observed cocaine, 
money, and a scale.  The informant advised that he had just been 
at the apartment.  After receiving this tip, Officer Lopez 
called Officer Osowski, a member of the drug unit, on his 
personal cell phone.  Officer Osowski arrived at the residence 
with four other armed members of the drug unit.  They found that 
the rear door to the apartment was about three-quarters open.    
¶70 From their vantage point at the door, the officers 
could not see into the bedroom, and there was no incriminating 
evidence in plain view.  The officers knocked on the door, 
announced their presence, and waited for 30 to 45 seconds.  
After hearing no response, they entered the apartment.  They 
first went into the living room.  To the left of the living room 
was a bedroom.  They entered through the doorway of the bedroom 
and found Pinkard and his girlfriend sleeping in bed.  They also 
found cocaine, marijuana, and currency.  Officers roused Pinkard 
and arrested him.  Officer Osowski then searched the bedroom 
area, lifted the mattress, and seized a revolver that was 
underneath it.   
¶71 Upon reviewing the facts, the majority concludes that 
"officers responded to Pinkard's house because they were 
No.  2008AP1204-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
concerned about the 'health and safety' of the occupants."  
Majority op., ¶32.  It brushes aside Officer Osowski's testimony 
that he was responding to a tip about a house that "sounded like 
a drug house to me."  It explains: "Simply because Osowski could 
have had subjective law enforcement concerns, it does not 
necessarily follow that he could not have also been engaging in 
a bona fide community caretaker function as he entered Pinkard's 
residence."  Id., ¶40.  Although the testimony does not reveal 
that the officers were concerned about the possibility of an 
overdose, the majority hypothetically concludes that "an officer 
could reasonably be concerned that Pinkard and his companion may 
have overdosed on drugs."  Id., ¶35.   
¶72 The majority advances a second hypothetical when it 
cautions that "a too-narrow view" of the community caretaker 
function is undesirable.  Id., ¶33.  It explains that if the 
exception is interpreted narrowly, officers will be "less 
willing to discharge community caretaking functions" and will 
instead inform distressed citizens: "Sorry.  We can't help you."  
Id., ¶33 (quoting State v. Horngren, 2000 WI App 177, ¶18, 238 
Wis. 2d 347, 617 N.W.2d 508).   
¶73 Undoubtedly, officers who are genuinely concerned 
about the safety and wellbeing of occupants of a home can and 
should enter to provide needed assistance——even when they have 
no warrant.  If the officers' concerns are realized and they 
succeed in preventing harm, they have performed an invaluable 
service.  Yet, the majority presumes that officers will refuse 
to act in a caretaking role if the evidence that they uncover 
No.  2008AP1204-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
while caretaking cannot be used to secure a criminal conviction.  
See majority op., ¶33.   
¶74 I do not agree with the majority's presumption.  Every 
day, law enforcement officers across this state perform vital 
community caretaker functions.  I believe these dedicated 
officers 
will 
continue 
to 
act 
as 
caretakers 
when 
their 
assistance is needed——even if they happen upon evidence that 
later cannot be used to secure a conviction.   
¶75 I likewise cannot agree with the majority's broad 
application of the community caretaking exception.  A broad 
application raises the specter that the exception will be 
misused as a pretext to engage in unconstitutional searches that 
are executed with the purpose of acquiring evidence of a crime.  
If courts are not cautious in applying this exception, the 
presumptive unreasonableness of warrantless home searches will 
be undermined.     
II 
¶76 When I examine the facts of this warrantless home 
search, I conclude that the community caretaking exception does 
not apply.  The five members of the drug unit were not engaged 
in a bona fide community caretaker function that was totally 
divorced from their law enforcement function, but rather were 
conducting a warrantless home search pursuant to a criminal 
investigation.  Further, even if the officers had been engaged 
in a bona fide community caretaker function, their execution of 
this function was not reasonable because of the substantial 
degree of intrusion.  I address these conclusions in turn. 
No.  2008AP1204-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
A 
¶77 Our cases have held that "in order for police conduct 
to be upheld" under the community caretaker exception, "the 
officer must be engaged in a bona fide community caretaker 
function." Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶23.  "Bona fide" means 
authentic, genuine, true, or sincere. A community caretaker 
function is "totally divorced from the detection, investigation, 
or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a 
criminal statute."  Id.1   
¶78 The requirement that the exercise of the community 
caretaker function be bona fide means that the officers must be 
able to articulate an objectively reasonable belief that entry 
into the home is necessary to prevent harm.  An officer's 
subjective motivations may be considered within the totality of 
circumstances.  Id., ¶27.   
¶79 As we indicated in Kramer, an officer's subjective 
conclusions are not dispositive of the inquiry.  However, the 
pretextual, subjective motivations of an officer are factors 
that "warrant consideration" when police conduct takes place in 
                                                 
1 In Kramer, this court explained how an officer meets the 
standard "of acting as a bona fide community caretaker, whose 
community caretaker function is totally divorced from law 
enforcement functions."  State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶36, 315 
Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598.  It explained: "[A] court may 
consider an officer's subjective intent in evaluating whether 
the officer was acting as a bona fide community caretaker; 
however, if the court concludes that the officer has articulated 
an objectively reasonable basis under the totality of the 
circumstances for the community caretaker function, he has met 
the standard of acting as a bona fide community caretaker, whose 
community caretaker function is totally divorced from law 
enforcement functions."  Id. 
No.  2008AP1204-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
the absence of probable cause.  Kramer, ¶27 (citing Wayne R. 
LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 3.1(d) (3d ed. 2007)).        
¶80 The 
circumstances 
in 
Kramer 
provide 
a 
useful 
illustration as to the kinds of situations in which the 
community caretaker exception should apply.  In that case, a 
patrolling officer stopped to check on a truck that was pulled 
to the side of the road after dark with its hazard lights turned 
on.  Id., ¶4.  The officer explained that he stopped to "check 
to see if there actually was a driver, and to offer any 
assistance."  Id., ¶5.  He explained, "when a car is on the 
shoulder on the side of the road with its hazards on, there are 
typically vehicle problems."  Id.  As it turned out, Kramer had 
pulled over and turned on his hazards to make a call on his cell 
phone——and he was intoxicated. 
¶81 On cross-examination, the officer was asked why, if he 
was acting in his community caretaker function, he shined his 
flashlight through the window of the truck and put his hand on 
his holstered gun as he approached.  The officer explained, "I 
always do that for safety considerations.  I don't know who is 
in the vehicle or what the situation dictates.  I am just at the 
ready."  Id., ¶6.  When asked if he thought that a crime might 
be taking place, the officer responded: "It was in my mind.  I'm 
not sure any time I come upon a vehicle what the situation is, 
so, yes."  Id.   
¶82 It is one thing to recognize, as we did in Kramer, 
that officers who are performing bona fide community caretaker 
functions are wise to avoid "let[ting] down their guard and 
No.  2008AP1204-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
unnecessarily expos[ing] themselves to dangerous conditions" 
when approaching an unknown situation.  Id., ¶33.  It is quite 
another thing to label a warrantless search by five officers of 
the drug unit a bona fide community caretaker function solely 
because one officer testified that he entered what "sounded like 
a drug house" to "check the welfare of the occupants."2    
¶83 Here, in contrast with the situation in Kramer, the 
officers' actions do not evince that the warrantless home search 
was conducted as a bona fide exercise of the community caretaker 
function out of a concern for the safety of the occupants of the 
house.  Instead, the officers' actions indicate that they 
considered the anonymous tip provided to be a "complaint" about 
                                                 
2 The majority takes this dissent to task for failing to 
acknowledge the circuit court's findings of historical fact.  
Majority op., ¶34, n.12.  It asserts that the circuit court 
found "that the officers arrived at Pinkard's residence to 
inquire as to the health and safety of the individuals that were 
sleeping."  Id., ¶34.  Although the transcript does reflect that 
the circuit court made specific findings of fact, this is not 
one of them.   
Rather, the court made this comment when explaining its 
reasons for suppressing the gun that officers found under 
Pinkard's mattress.  It appeared to conclude that the officers' 
search for the gun was incompatible with their stated reasons 
for entering Pinkard's home: "Mr. Pinkard was then under arrest, 
in custody, in cuffs, and therefore, the search of [Pinkard's] 
lunge area, as a search incident to arrest, I find is 
inappropriate under the community caretaker function. . . . I 
understand that there were many gray areas within this, but the 
purpose that the police were there was, in essence, to inquire 
as to the health and safety of the individuals that were 
sleeping.  And so the Court is suppressing the gun[.]"    
  
No.  2008AP1204-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
criminal 
activity 
and 
their 
subsequent 
home 
entry 
an 
"investigation" rather than a rescue.   
¶84 The 
majority 
seizes 
upon 
a 
snippet 
in 
Officer 
Osowski's testimony during the suppression hearing to conclude 
that "the officers responded to Pinkard's home because they were 
concerned about the health and safety of the occupants."  
Officer Osowski testified that over the phone, Officer Lopez 
stated he was "concerned" about the occupants.  However, there 
is 
nothing 
in 
the 
record 
indicating 
that 
Officer 
Lopez 
articulated anything about how or why he was concerned.   
¶85 Officer Osowski's mention of this purported concern 
was brief and ambiguous:   
Prosecutor: What was the nature of that investigation? 
Osowski: I had received a phone call from Officer 
Lopez from District 6 that stated an anonymous caller 
had called him and stated that there were two 
individuals who appeared to be sleeping at that 
residence, and there was cocaine, money, and scales 
present there.  
Prosecutor: Did Officer Lopez tell you anything else 
about the condition of the residence . . . or people 
there?   
Osowski: He did.   
Prosecutor: What else did he tell you?   
Osowski: He said the door was wide open, and he was 
concerned about them.     
¶86 Officer Osowski and Officer Lopez each wrote an 
investigation report shortly after the incident.  It is telling 
that Officer Lopez's purported "concern" for the occupants was 
No.  2008AP1204-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
not mentioned by either officer in his investigation report.3   
Rather, both investigation reports state that Officer Osowski 
went to the home to "investigate this complaint."  
¶87 After Officer Lopez received the tip, he did not call 
for an ambulance or paramedics.  Further, he did not send a 
transmission over the police scanner asking any officer in the 
area to drop by the apartment to make sure everything was okay.  
Rather, he called Officer Osowski, a member of the drug unit, on 
his personal cell phone and asked him to "investigate this 
complaint." 
¶88 Although Officer Osowski stated that he "made the 
determination to enter and check the welfare of the occupants," 
he acknowledged that there was no indication that the occupants 
of the house needed medical attention.  Further, he had no 
knowledge that the occupants of the house were in danger:   
Defense: [Officer Lopez] didn't tell you at least, or 
at least you had no knowledge, that these people were 
                                                 
3 In full, Officer Lopez's report provides:  
On Thursday, August 24, 2006, at approximately 8:55 
a.m., I sqd 246A received a phone call at District Six 
from a citizen who wished to remain anonymous.  The 
citizen reported to me that it was just at the 
location of 2439 South 7th Street, in the rear 
apartment.  The citizen stated that the tenants of the 
residence, "Big Boy" and his girlfriend "Amalia" 
appeared to be sleeping and the back door to the 
residence was open.  The citizen further stated that 
it observed cocaine, money and a scale next to the 
subjects.  I was unable to investigate this complaint 
because of a prior engagement, I subsequently notified 
Officer John OSOWSKI of the Criminal Intelligence 
Division, Gang Squad.  Officer OSOWSKI stated that he 
would investigate the complaint.   
No.  2008AP1204-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
in some medical —— needed some medical attention; did 
they?   
Osowski: Not at that time.   
Defense: He didn't say that they were in fear of 
something happening inside the residence that in fact 
would jeopardize the safety of those people inside?   
Osowski: No, he didn't relay that to me on the phone, 
just the information that I told you.   
Defense: He actually indicated to you that it was 
basically a drug investigation.  These people are 
sound asleep, and there's drugs and scales and guns in 
there; right?   
Osowski: He did not say that, no.   
Defense: Well, your report indicates that in fact 
that's why you went there is because there appeared to 
be cocaine, money and scales there?   
Osowski: That's correct.  It appeared to be —— sounded 
like a drug house to me.   
Defense: Officer Lopez did not indicate to you that 
there was some emergency with regard to the people at 
the residence themselves that needed some type of 
medical attention or were in some need of the Police 
Department rescuing them; did he?   
Osowski: No.       
¶89 After receiving the phone call, Officer Osowski went 
to "investigate the complaint" of a house that, he testified, 
"sounded like a drug house to me."  He took four additional 
members of the drug unit with him.  After arriving at the 
residence, noticing the open door, and knocking and waiting for 
30 to 45 seconds, Officer Osowski and the other officers decided 
to enter the residence.   
¶90 Perhaps the majority tacitly acknowledges that the 
facts, as articulated by the officers, do not add up to a bona 
No.  2008AP1204-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
fide exercise of community caretaking.  The majority assembles a 
hypothetical rationale to justify application of the exception.  
It concludes that "an officer could reasonably be concerned that 
Pinkard and his companion may have overdosed on drugs."  
Majority op., ¶35. 
¶91 This rationale is troubling for two reasons.  First, 
the officers never articulated any concern about the possibility 
of an overdose.  As mentioned above, courts should consider an 
officer's subjective intent in evaluating whether the officer 
has articulated an objectively reasonable basis under the 
totality of the circumstances for the community caretaker 
function. Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶36.  
¶92 Second, an unarticulated concern about the possibility 
of an overdose can always be later invoked by a court when 
officers arrive at what they think is a "drug house" and the 
inhabitants fail to respond to the officers' knock.  If that 
unarticulated concern now permits officers to enter the home 
without a warrant and without probable cause, then it is unclear 
what constraints remain on warrantless home searches when there 
is a suspicion of drug activity. 
¶93 The United States Supreme Court has cautioned against 
blanket rules applied to categories of offenders.  "Those 
suspected of drug offenses are no less entitled to that 
protection [provided by the Fourth Amendment] than those 
suspected of nondrug offenses."  United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 
705, 717 (1984).  The majority's assertions should not be read 
No.  2008AP1204-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
as permitting warrantless entry of a home whenever there is a 
suspicion of drug use and the residents do not answer. 
¶94 Under the totality of circumstances, I conclude that 
the five drug unit officers were not exercising a "bona fide 
community caretaker function" when they entered Pinkard's home 
without a warrant.  Rather, it appears that they entered for the 
law 
enforcement 
purpose 
of 
"detection, 
investigation, 
or 
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal 
statute."  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶11 (quoting Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)). 
B 
¶95 Even if the officers' community caretaking had been 
bona fide, the exercise of the caretaker function was not 
reasonable.  In evaluating the reasonableness, courts must 
determine whether "a public interest or need that is furthered 
by the officer's conduct" outweighs "the degree of and nature of 
the restriction upon the liberty interest of the citizen."  
Kramer, 315 Wis. 
2d 414, ¶40.  Despite the majority's 
conclusion, the balancing test is not satisfied here.   
¶96 The 
facts 
reveal 
that 
the 
officers' 
entry 
was 
invasive, consistent with a drug bust rather than a rescue.  
Five armed officers, all members of the drug unit, waited 
outside for less than a minute before making a warrantless entry 
into Pinkard's home.  Nothing in the record suggests that the 
No.  2008AP1204-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
officers paused to consider less invasive alternatives.4  Little 
in the record would support a public interest or need. 
¶97 An important consideration in the balance is that this 
case is unlike the majority of cases addressing the community 
caretaking exception: this search involves the warrantless entry 
of a home.  In my estimation, the fact that this search involved 
a home weighs heavily against concluding that the officers' 
highly invasive search was reasonable.   
¶98 It is noteworthy that the United States Supreme Court 
has never extended the community caretaker exception to justify 
a warrantless entry of a home.  Rather, all three cases 
addressing the exception are in the context of inventory 
searches of vehicles.  See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 
(1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).  Further, like the Supreme 
                                                 
4 It is helpful to compare the facts of this case to the 
facts in State v. Ziedonis, which also involved a warrantless 
search of a home.  2005 WI App 249, 287 Wis. 2d 831, 707 
N.W.2d 565.  There, the police spent an hour and a half trying 
to corral six vicious dogs before they entered the defendants' 
home.  Id., ¶6. The court of appeals concluded that the officers 
"did everything they could to avoid entering the house"——they 
made numerous attempts to contact the occupant of the house, 
including 
using 
sirens, 
air 
horns, 
and 
a 
loud 
speaker.  
Immediately prior to entering, they yelled loudly and banged on 
the door frame with a metal baton for over two minutes.  Id., 
¶27. 
 
No.  2008AP1204-CR.awb 
 
14 
 
Court, this court has never extended the exception to justify 
warrantless entry of a home.5  Never, until now. 
¶99 A reasonable warrantless search of a vehicle may be 
unreasonable in the context of a search of a home.  See Cardwell 
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590-91 (1974).  It is particularly 
troubling that the majority uses a case it deems a "close call" 
to break new ground and circumscribe constitutional rights.  The 
majority should heed the United States Supreme Court's warning 
from over a century ago: "illegitimate and unconstitutional 
practices get their first footing . . . by silent approaches and 
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure."  Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).  
                                                 
5 The majority asserts that State v. Bies, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 
251 N.W.2d 461 (1977), "necessarily implies" that the community 
caretaker function may support a warrantless home entry.  
Majority op., ¶22.  It assumes that because the community 
caretaker function may permit entry onto the curtilage, it would 
also permit entry into a home.  This assumption is directly 
undermined by the language of Bies.     
In Bies, an officer walked behind the defendant's garage to 
investigate a noise complaint. Bies, 76 Wis. 2d at 461.  The 
court held that the community caretaker function justified the 
officer's 
presence 
behind 
the 
garage 
on 
the 
defendant's 
curtilage.  Id. at 471.  Once he was lawfully behind the garage, 
the officer looked through an empty doorframe and saw a stolen 
cable.  Id. at 472.  The language in Bies makes clear that 
although 
the 
community 
caretaker 
function 
justified 
the 
officer's presence behind the garage, it would not have 
permitted the officer to enter the open garage door: "The 
officer could see [the stolen wire] from his position outside 
the empty doorframe . . . .  The cable was in plain view."  Id. 
at 473.  In Bies, it was the plain view doctrine, not the 
community caretaker exception, that supported warrantless home 
entry.  
No.  2008AP1204-CR.awb 
 
15 
 
¶100 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully 
dissent.   
¶101 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice DAVID T. PROSSER join this dissent. 
 
No.  2008AP1204-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1