Title: Tilton v. Riley County
Citation: 194 Kan. 250, 398 P.2d 287
Docket Number: 44,007
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: January 23, 1965

194 Kan. 250 (1965)
398 P.2d 287
MAXINE H. TILTON, Widow of Freddie Tilton, Deceased, Appellant,
v.
RILEY COUNTY and RILEY COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Appellee.
No. 44,007

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 23, 1965.
C.K. Sayler, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Richard Wells, of Manhattan and E. Dudley Smith, of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Donn J. Everett, County Attorney, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This workmen's compensation case was instituted by Maxine H. Tilton (hereinafter referred to as the claimant or appellant), as the widow of Freddie Tilton, deceased, against The Board of County Commissioners of the County of Riley (hereinafter referred to as the respondent or appellee). The appeal is from a judgment rendered by the district court of Riley County in favor of appellee.
The facts are not in dispute.
Freddie Tilton had worked for the Riley County Road and Bridge Department for about twenty years. On February 18, 1963, he and five or six other road and bridge employees had been engaged in reconstructing an old township road. The reconstruction of the road involved cutting and pulling down trees, some of which were thirty feet high, so that the road could be graded and resurfaced. Tilton was killed when a branch came off one of the trees, that was being pulled over by a bulldozer, and struck him in the chest.
The parties stipulated that Tilton was employed by Riley County, which regularly employed more than five employees in the road and bridge department; that his death resulted from an accident arising *251 out of and in the course of his employment; that at the time of such accident claimant (Maxine) was the lawful wife of Freddie; that she was wholly dependent upon him for support; and that there were no other dependents.
The Workmen's Compensation Examiner found:
The award was made against the claimant and in favor of the respondent, "Riley County and Riley County Board of Commissioners."
Claimant appealed to the district court which approved the award. She then appealed to this court from the judgment of the district court.
Appellant contends that, as the work being performed was dangerous, the Riley County Road and Bridge Department was under the Workmen's Compensation Act by virtue of the term "county and municipal work" as used in G.S. 1961 Supp., 44-505 which, so far as here pertinent, provides:
Determination of the question thus raised by appellant requires consideration of the language of the original enactment, its amendments and this court's interpretative opinions. The section of the *252 statute now under consideration was first enacted in 1911 (Laws of 1911, Chapter 218, Section 6.). It was amended in 1913 (Laws of 1913, Chapter 216, Section 2.). So far as here material the 1913 amendment, which first received consideration by this court, provided as follows:
In Gray v. Sedgwick County, 101 Kan. 195, 165 Pac. 867, an employee of Sedgwick County was injured while working on a county road which was being resurfaced. He sued the county under the Workmen's Compensation Act. A demurrer to the petition was overruled and the county appealed contending that it was not an employer engaged in a trade or business within the terms of the statute. This court held:
And in the opinion said:
The statutory section, now under consideration, was again considered in Robertson v. Labette County Comm'rs, 122 Kan. 486, 252 Pac. 196, and it was held:
The appellee lays great stress on the fact that in 1927 (Laws of 1927, Chapter 232, Section 5) the legislature eliminated the phrase "which is conducted for the purpose of business, trade or gain." The amendment did nothing more than to eliminate a nonsensical phrase. As the act stood before the 1927 amendment it read in substance:
After the elimination of the last quoted phrase the act still applied only to "employment in the course of the employer's trade or business," a phrase which eliminates "county and municipal work" performed in a governmental capacity.
This court had the section under consideration after the 1927 amendment in Simpson v. Kansas City, 137 Kan. 915, 22 P.2d 955, (decided June 10, 1933) where it said and held:
We are impelled to conclude that if the legislature intended to create a compulsory liability against counties and municipalities where none existed, it would have done so in language so clear that it could not well be misunderstood.
The appellant next contends that Riley County had filed its election with the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner to come under the act and that the election had never been withdrawn.
The determination of this question requires the consideration of additional facts.
Laws of 1927, Chapter 232, Section 5 provided in part:
In July, 1931, the County Commissioners of Riley County filed a paper with the Workmen Compensation Commissioner which read:
"To the Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation:
In Kopplin v. Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 139 Kan. 837, 32 P.2d 1058, (decided June 9, 1934), this court, in considering the authority of a municipality to elect to come under the Workmen's Compensation Act, held:
and in the opinion said:
In 1935, following rendition of the foregoing decisions, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner addressed a communication to all counties, including Riley County, informing them that their elections were invalid. That notice read:
*256 The bulletin enclosed with the foregoing communication read:
[Laws of 1935, Chapter 202, Section 1]
There has been no subsequent election filed.
The appellant contends that legislative enactment of 1935 (Laws of 1935, Chapter 202, Section 1) and subsequent enactments (now G.S. 1961 Supp., 44-505 and 44-505a) authorizing all governmental subdivisions to elect to come under the Workmen's Compensation Act, gave legality to the unlawful election attempted by Riley County in 1931.
We cannot agree with the appellant's contention. Political subdivisions have only such powers as are expressly granted or necessarily incident to those granted. (State, ex. rel., v. Rural High School District No. 7, 171 Kan. 437, 233 P.2d 727; Wichita Public Schools Employees Union v. Smith, 194 Kan. 2, 397 P.2d 357.)
There was no legislative authority prior to the enactment of Laws of 1935, Chapter 202, Section 1, authorizing a political subdivision to elect to come under the provisions of the workmen's compensation act. There being no legislative authority, any attempt to make such election was void and of no effect. Subsequent *257 legislation does not breathe life or validity into prior unauthorized acts except by specific curative provisions.
This court's function is to interpret and not to rewrite a statute. (Dougan, Administratrix v. McGrew, 187 Kan. 410, 357 P.2d 319.) Courts should not judicially legislate to broaden the plain letter of a statute. (State v. One Bally Coney Island No. 21011 Gaming Table, 174 Kan. 757, 258 P.2d 225; State, ex rel., v. City of Kansas City, 181 Kan. 870, 317 P.2d 806.)
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and it is so ordered.