Title: Smith v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 515, 2008
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 15, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ALBERT J. SMITH,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 515, 2008 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0312008370 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: April 24, 2009 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: June 15, 2009 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 15th day of June 2009, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Albert J. Smith, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s October 2, 2008 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find 
no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
 
(2) 
In February 2005, Smith was found guilty by a Superior Court 
jury of two counts of Attempted Murder, one count of Attempted Robbery, 
and two weapon offenses.  He was sentenced to life imprisonment, plus an 
 
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additional 45 years.  Smith’s convictions were affirmed by this Court on 
direct appeal.1 
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for 
postconviction relief, Smith claims that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance at trial and in his direct appeal.  Specifically, he argues that his 
counsel failed to properly object at trial, first, to an incriminating letter that 
the prosecution produced in an untimely fashion; second, to his absence 
during a portion of jury selection; and, third, to his forced appearance at trial 
in prison garb.  In addition, he complains that his counsel failed to raise 
those issues on direct appeal.  To the extent that Smith fails to present claims 
that were raised previously, those claims are deemed to be waived and will 
not be addressed by this Court.2 
 
(4) 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the proceedings would have been different.3  Although not insurmountable, 
the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a “strong 
                                                 
1 Smith v. State, 902 A.2d 1119 (Del. 2006). 
2 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).  In his postconviction motion in the 
Superior Court, Smith also claimed that his counsel was ineffective by failing to retain 
experts who would question his competence to stand trial.   
3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
 
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presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.”4  The 
defendant must make concrete allegations of ineffective assistance, and 
substantiate them, or risk summary dismissal.5 
 
(5) 
Smith first claims that his counsel failed to appropriately object 
to an incriminating letter produced in an untimely fashion by the 
prosecution.6  The record reflects that, at trial, Smith’s counsel raised a 
number of objections concerning the letter, but, ultimately, grounded his 
objection on the State’s untimely production of the letter, which prevented 
the retention of a handwriting expert, thereby prejudicing Smith’s case.  
Even assuming that Smith’s attorney did not make the appropriate objection 
regarding the letter, there was eyewitness testimony from three individuals, 
including the victim, the co-defendant, and an independent witness, 
supporting Smith’s convictions.  Thus, even without the letter, there was 
more than sufficient evidence of Smith’s guilt and, as such, any claim of 
prejudice must fail.  We, therefore, conclude that Smith’s first claim is 
without merit. 
                                                 
4 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
5 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
6 The letter was written to a co-defendant by Smith while Smith was in prison awaiting 
trial.  The co-defendant later agreed to plead guilty and testify against Smith.  The letter 
was found in the co-defendant’s room by his mother, who turned it over to the 
prosecutor. 
 
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(6) 
Smith next claims that his counsel should have objected to his 
absence during a portion of jury selection.  This claim is without a factual 
basis, since the record reflects that Smith was present for all phases of the 
jury selection process except for that portion where the judge excused the 
members of the venire who were unable to serve due to hardship.  When the 
jury was impaneled, Smith was present, as was constitutionally required.7  
As such, we conclude that Smith’s second claim is without merit.   
 
(7) 
Smith’s third claim is that his counsel violated his rights by 
failing to object to his forced appearance at trial in prison garb.  This claim 
also is without a factual basis, since nothing in the record reflects that Smith 
was forced to wear prison garb during the trial.  Rather, the record reflects 
that, on the morning of trial, Smith requested a continuance so that he could 
engage private counsel.  He was dressed in prison attire at that time as a way 
of demonstrating to the judge that he and his appointed counsel were not 
prepared for trial.  When the judge denied Smith’s motion for a continuance, 
Smith made no motion to delay the trial until he could change his clothing.  
After the first day of trial, Smith appeared in street clothes.  In the absence 
                                                 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 43(a); Shaw v. State, 282 A.2d 608, 609-10 (Del. 1971). 
 
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of the element of compulsion, there was no constitutional violation.8  We, 
therefore, conclude that Smith’s third claim is without merit.   
 
(8) 
Smith’s fourth, and final, claim is that his counsel failed to raise 
any of these claims in his direct appeal.  Because none of Smith’s claims is 
meritorious, he can demonstrate no prejudice as a result of his attorney’s 
failure to raise those claims on direct appeal.  As such, we conclude that this 
claim, too, is without merit. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976).