Title: Clark v. New York Life Insurance Co.
Citation: 434 S.W.2d 611
Docket Number: 5-4751
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: December 2, 1968

434 S.W.2d 611 (1968) Myrtle Norris CLARK et al., Appellants, v. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE CO., Appellee. No. 5-4751. Supreme Court of Arkansas. December 2, 1968. Dickey, Dickey &amp; Drake, Pine Bluff, for appellants. Coleman, Gantt, Ramsay &amp; Cox, Pine Bluff, for appellee. JONES, Justice. This is an appeal from the Lawrence County Circuit Court wherein a motion for summary judgment for statutory penalty and attorneys' fees was denied by the court in a suit on a life insurance policy. The appellants are the widow and children beneficiaries under a double indemnity benefit life insurance policy issued by the *612 appellee on the life of the insured, Millard M. Clark. The insured died on March 19, 1967, from a pistol wound in the side of his head. Proof of loss form was filed on April 18, 1967, a homicide charge was filed against the widow on April 25, 1967, and on June 20, 1967, suit was filed for $10,000, the proceeds of the policy under its double indemnity provision for accidental death. Answer was filed on July 11, 1967, admitting the accidental death of the insured and on August 23, 1967, checks were issued and delivered to all the beneficiaries except the widow. On October 6, 1967, the widow's share was paid into the registry of the court. The double indemnity provision of the policy for death by accidental means contains language as follows: Motion for summary judgment for statutory penalties, attorney's fees, interest and cost, was filed on October 11, 1967, and appellee resisted the motion on grounds that there had been no undue delay in the payment of the claims under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. The motion was submitted to the trial court upon stipulations and affidavits tending to prove on behalf of appellants that such evidence as the investigating officers had obtained had been made public and was available to the appellee, and that there was no evidence of suicide that would have voided the double indemnity provision of the policy. On behalf of the appellee the stipulations and affidavits tended to prove that appellee was handicapped in its investigation of the claims in that the prosecuting attorney, as well as the beneficiaries, especially the widow, refused to give it any information concerning the circumstances of the insured's death. On April 12, 1968, appellants' motion for summary judgment was denied and the trial court entered judgment as follows: Appellants set out their points relied on as follows: Arkansas Statute Annotated § 66-3238 (Repl.1966) under which appellants claim penalty, attorneys' fees and cost is highly penal in nature and should be strictly construed. Clark Center v. Nat. Life &amp; Acc. Ins., 245 Ark. 563, 433 S.W.2d 151. This section of the statute, insofar as it applies here, is as follows: The language in § 66-3238, supra, to the effect "shall fail to pay the same within the time specified within the policy, after demand made therefor" contemplates that the insurer shall have a reasonable time to make necessary investigation in reference to the loss and the circumstances thereof after demand. Taylor v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 193 Ark. 251, 98 S.W.2d 944. The insured was found in his apartment dead from a pistol bullet wound in the side of his head. If the death was a suicide, appellee would not have been liable for double indemnity under the provisions of the policy. If the death was the result of homicide committed by the wife and for which she stood indicted, she would not have been entitled to share in policy benefits. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shane, 98 Ark. 132, 135 S.W. 836; Horn v. Cole, 203 Ark. 361, 156 S.W.2d 787. Even though the accused widow agreed to forfeit her rights as beneficiary in this case, the appellee insurer was still entitled to a reasonable time after receipt of proof of loss in which to make its investigation before the statutory penalties for delay would attach. Clark Center v. Nat. Life &amp; Acc. Ins., supra. We conclude, therefore, from the record before us in this case, that there was substantial evidence upon which the trial court based its decision that the appellee was not guilty of such unreasonable delay that would subject it to the statutory penalties under the facts and circumstances of this case, and we conclude that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. Affirmed.