Title: Garrett v. Corry Foam Products, Inc.
Citation: 596 S.W.2d 808
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: March 24, 1980

596 S.W.2d 808 (1980) John Turner GARRETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CORRY FOAM PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant-Appellee. Supreme Court of Tennessee. March 24, 1980. Mack H. Cherry, Memphis, for plaintiff-appellant. Harold W. McLeary, Jr., Humboldt, for defendant-appellee. BROCK, Chief Justice. The plaintiff filed this action on August 28, 1978, under the workmen's compensation laws for an alleged injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The complaint was met with a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant and supporting affidavit of the clerk of the court with exhibits demonstrating that plaintiff had previously brought an action in the same court against the same defendant upon the same cause of action and that said prior action had been terminated on May 9, 1978, by a consent order signed by attorneys for the parties, but not by the parties, which purported to dismiss that action "with prejudice." The plaintiff did not respond with counter affidavits and the matter was submitted to the Court upon the complaint, the motion for summary *809 judgment, the affidavit of the clerk of the court and exhibits consisting of the pleadings and orders in the prior action. It was the defendant's contention that the record thus submitted showed conclusively that the defense of res judicata had been made out and that the complaint should be dismissed. The trial court agreed with the position of the defendants and dismissed the action and the plaintiff appealed. Because a determination of this appeal turns upon a proper construction of the dismissal order of May 9, 1978, we copy that order verbatim: The question presented for our determination is whether the quoted order is sufficient, as a matter of law, to make out the plea of res judicata. A party who asserts the defense of res judicata, or estoppel by judgment, has the burden of proving it and must show that the right in question was determined on the merits in the former judgment. And, if the judgment itself leaves the matter uncertain then it must be proved by other evidence. Lindsay v. Allen, 112 Tenn. 637, 82 S.W. 171 (1904); Carter County v. Street, 36 Tenn. App. 166, 252 S.W.2d 803 (1952); Ragsdale v. Hill, 37 Tenn. App. 671, 269 S.W.2d 911 (1954); Long v. Kirby-Smith, 40 Tenn. App. 446, 292 S.W.2d 216 (1956). Under Rule 56.03, T.R.C.P., the trial judge is required to deny a motion for summary judgment unless upon the record submitted "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." We, therefore, proceed to determine the legal effect of the "consent order of dismissal with prejudice" along with the remainder of the record submitted to the trial judge and whether it is sufficient, as a matter of law, to make out the defense of res judicata. The subject order, in itself, and the remainder of the court record in the case in which that order was entered demonstrate that it was not a determination of the plaintiff's right of action on the merits, unless the words "with prejudice" can be held to have had that effect. The nature and effect of an order of dismissal "with prejudice" was considered at length in a scholarly opinion by Judge Felts of the Court of Appeals, later a distinguished member of this Court, in Long v. Kirby-Smith, supra, in which he made certain observations which are pertinent here, to wit: The Court in Long v. Kirby-Smith, supra, went on to hold that an order of dismissal "with prejudice" should be treated as a mere nonsuit and the words "with full prejudice" disregarded as surplusage, since the court did not have power to enter an order of retraxit. This holding of the Court of Appeals in Long v. Kirby-Smith, supra, has been recently reaffirmed by this Court in Patrick v. Dickson, Tenn., 526 S.W.2d 449, 452 (1975), in which we held that an order of a juvenile court purporting to dismiss an action "with prejudice" was not effective to prevent the filing of a second suit on the same cause of action. Mr. Justice Henry, speaking for the Court, stated flatly: And further: Rule 41 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure governs both voluntary and involuntary dismissals of actions and nothing in either the text of that rule or in the committee comments thereto changes the law hereinabove discussed, i.e., that retraxits are not recognized in Tennessee. We, therefore, conclude that the words "with prejudice" contained in the order here in issue should be treated as surplusage and that the order of dismissal entered May 9, 1978, served only to operate as a voluntary dismissal of that action and does not constitute a judgment on the merits. Accordingly, that order does not make out the defense of res judicata and, so, does not support the judgment of the trial court sustaining the defendant's motion for summary judgment. See 27 C.J.S. Dismissal and Nonsuit § 5 (1959). There is an additional reason why the dismissal order here in issue was insufficient on its face to constitute a retraxit or judgment on the merits, if such an order were recognized in this State, and that is that the order was not signed by the plaintiff but only by his attorney who had no implied authority to release or surrender the plaintiff's right of action. "Attorneys have no power to surrender substantial rights of their clients without express authority. 3 Am. &amp; Eng. Enc. of Law (2nd Ed.) 357; Holms v. Johnston, 12 Heisk. [155] 158." (Emphasis added.) Davis v. Home Ins. Co., 127 Tenn. 330, 337, 155 S.W. 131, 133, 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 626 (1913); 7 Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at Law § 125 (1963); 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 198 (1980). Again, we quote from the opinion of Judge Felts in Long v. Kirby-Smith, supra, in which the court was dealing with an order of dismissal "with full prejudice," as follows: Finally, because this is a proceeding for benefits under the workmen's compensation laws, the order of dismissal "with prejudice" relied upon by the defendant to make out the defense of res judicata is insufficient for that purpose for the additional reason that it does not comply with T.C.A., § 50-1006, which requires that in order for a settlement of an employee's rights under the workmen's compensation laws to be effective it must first be reduced to writing and approved by the trial court only if "such settlement is found by the court to be for the best interest of the employee." The instant order contains no such finding and for this reason, too, is invalid as a judgment on the merits of the plaintiff's rights under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The judgment of the trial court sustaining the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant and dismissing the complaint is reversed and this cause is remanded to that court for appropriate further proceedings. Costs incurred upon this appeal are taxed against the defendant. FONES, COOPER, HENRY and HARBISON, JJ., concur.