Title: MARRIAGE OF MARKEGARD
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-051
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 28, 1980

No. 80-51 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF MERRIE DAWN MARKEGARD , Petitioner and Appellant, VS . JOHN ERIC MARKEGARD , Respondent and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone. Honorable Diane G. Barz, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Davidson, Veeder, Baugh, Broeder & Poppler, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Berger, Anderson, Sinclair & Murphy, Billings, Montana Filed: /\u & 2 , Submitted on briefs: April 24, 1980 ~ecided : A11 6 2 ; 1 9 8 8 M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Merrie Markegard (herein r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e mother) appeals from t h a t p o r t i o n of a marriage d i s s o l u t i o n decree entered i n Yellowstone County D i s t r i c t Court awarding cus- tody of t h e p a r t i e s ' twenty-month o l d son t o John Markegard (herein r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e f a t h e r ) . The mother contends t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n t h e following respects: (1) t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ignored t h e r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s i n s e c t i o n 40-4-212, MCA, with regard t o a determination of custody; (2) t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t f a i l e d t o properly consider t h e presumption t h a t a mother i s e n t i t l e d t o custody of a c h i l d of tender years; and (3) t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n i s bottomed on a determination which i n essence d i s c r i m i n a t e s a g a i n s t t h e mother because she i s now an Oregon r e s i d e n t . W e vacate t h e order of t h e t r i a l c o u r t because it d i d n o t consider t h e appropriate f a c t o r s con- tained i n s e c t i o n 40-4-212. The marriage was of s h o r t duration. The p a r t i e s w e r e married on May 30, 1976 and i n October 1978, t h e mother f i l e d a p e t i t i o n t o d i s s o l v e the marriage. A son was born of t h e marriage. The mother i s a nurse and c u r r e n t l y r e s i d e s i n Portland, Oregon, where her p a r e n t s a l s o r e s i d e . The f a t h e r l i v e s on a farm between Laurel and Park City, Montana. He has resided i n Montana a l l of h i s l i f e and farms land leased from h i s f a t h e r . After f i l i n g a d i s s o l u t i o n a c t i o n , t h e mother continued t o l i v e i n Montana f o r a s h o r t t i m e , l i v i n g with f r i e n d s . She w a s , however, unable t o f i n d employment and moved from B i l l i n g s t o Portland i n November 1978 t o f i n d employment. She had temporary custody of the c h i l d and t h e f a t h e r w a s paying temporary c h i l d support. A f t e r a hearing on c h i l d custody, t h e t r i a l c o u r t entered judgment finding t h a t both p a r e n t s loved t h e c h i l d , both w e r e f i t and proper parents, and both parents wanted custody. The c o u r t concluded t h a t a l l t h i n g s being equal, t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d would be b e t t e r served by keeping t h e c h i l d i n Montana and t h e r e f o r e awarding custody t o t h e f a t h e r . The apparent reasoning of t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s t h a t a c o u r t of t h i s state would be a b l e t o continue t o p r o t e c t t h e c h i l d and promote the c h i l d ' s welfare and b e s t i n t e r e s t s . W h y a c o u r t i n Oregon, should t h e need a r i s e , n o t be a b l e t o do t h e same thing, we a r e n o t informed. The mother was given v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s . This appeal followed. Section 40-4-212 s e t s f o r t h t h e c r i t e r i a f o r a t r i a l c o u r t t o consider and weigh i n deciding t h e i s s u e of c h i l d custody. Although t h r e e of t h e f i v e f a c t o r s a r e n o t per- t i n e n t here, t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s on t h e o t h e r two f a c t o r s a r e nothing more than conclusory statements, n o t r e f l e c t i n g a t a l l t h e e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s f o r t h e decision. I n determining c h i l d custody, t h e t r i a l c o u r t s must consider t h e s t a t u t o r y criteria, Counts v. Chapman (1979), - Mont. , 589 P.2d 151, 36 St.Rep. 89, 93; and a s a reviewing - c o u r t w e can only determine i f t h e p e r t i n e n t f a c t o r s were considered and i f t h e t r i a l c o u r t s made appropriate find- i n g s with r e l a t i o n t o t h e s e c r i t e r i a . I n Re Marriage of Capener (1978) , - Mont. - , 582 P.2d 326, 328, 35 St.Rep. 1026. Admittedly, s e v e r a l f a c t o r s s e t f o r t h i n t h e s t a t u t e are n o t p e r t i n e n t t o t h i s case. Section 40-4-212(3), how- ever, r e q u i r e s t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o consider t h e i n t e r a c t i o n and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e c h i l d with h i s p a r e n t o r parents, h i s s i b l i n g s , and any o t h e r person who may s i g n i - f i c a n t l y a f f e c t t h e c h i l d ' s b e s t i n t e r e s t . The f i n d i n g s with r e s p e c t t o the f a t h e r a r e s u f f i c i e n t b u t they a r e i n s u f f i - c i e n t with r e s p e c t t o t h e mother. W e cannot overlook t h i s f a c t o r i n l i g h t of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e c h i l d l i v e d with t h e mother i n Portland f o r approximately one year before t h e d i s s o l u t i o n hearing and t h a t t h e c h i l d ' s maternal grand- p a r e n t s a l s o l i v e i n Portland. Section 40-4-212 ( 4 ) , MCA, r e q u i r e s the t r i a l c o u r t t o consider t h e c h i l d ' s adjustment t o h i s home, school, and community. School i s n o t a f a c t o r here, b u t the c h i l d ' s adjustment t o h i s home i s an important f a c t o r which must be considered and f i n d i n g s made. N o such f i n d i n g s were made here. Section 40-4-212(5), MCA, r e q u i r e s t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o consider the mental and physical h e a l t h of a l l i n d i v i d u a l s involved. There a r e no f i n d i n g s a t a l l with r e l a t i o n t o t h i s f a c t o r . Although t h e record i s r e p l e t e with evidence re- l a t i n g t o t h e mother's mental and physical h e a l t h , t h e r e are a b s o l u t e l y no f i n d i n g s with r e l a t i o n t o her health. Further- more, t h e c h i l d has an eye problem which has required medical and s u r g i c a l a t t e n t i o n which was n o t expressly addressed. A 1 though w e must vacate the judgment and remand f o r another hearing, t h e r e a r e two m a t t e r s t h a t w e w i l l address. The mother contends t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t consider o r apply t h e presumption t h a t a mother i s e n t i t l e d t o custody of a c h i l d of tender years. This presumption i s no longer s t a t u t o r y , W e s t a t e d i n t h e case of I n R e ~ a r r i a g e of Tweeten (1977), 172 Mont. 404, 409, 563 P.2d 1 1 4 1 , 1 1 4 4 , t h a t t h i s presumption s t i l l e x i s t s . Reflection on t h i s question, however, causes us t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e presumption should not e x i s t i n the absence of a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u t e so declar- ing. W e do not believe t h a t there i s a sound theory o r r a t i o n a l e i n support of a j u d i c i a l d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t such a presumption e x i s t s . W e f u r t h e r believe t h a t t h i s presump- t i o n i s outdated i n l i g h t of the enactment of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act i n t h i s state. The presumption serves only t o confuse t h e p a r t i e s and t o burden t h e courts. For t h i s reason, w e overrule Tweeten with r e s p e c t t o the tender years presumption. The second matter upon which w e choose t o comment i s t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s determination t h a t the c h i l d would be b e t t e r off i n Montana. Although we cannot say t h a t resi- dence w a s the s o l e b a s i s underlying the t r i a l c o u r t ' s deci- s i o n awarding custody t o the f a t h e r , it appears from the t r i a l c o u r t ' s findings t h a t the residence of the p a r t i e s was an important consideration. Under s e c t i o n 40-4-212, MCA, residency i s a f a c t o r t o be considered i n determining custody. But the c l e a r implication here i s t h a t somehow the Montana courts could p r o t e c t t h e welfare of t h e c h i l d but t h e Oregon courts could not. Because t h e r e i s no evidence t h a t the c h i l d needed c o u r t protection o r intervention--bo t h par t i e s w e r e declared f i t and proper and both wanted custody--we see nothing t h a t a Montana c o u r t could do t h a t an Oregon c o u r t could n o t a l s o do. Any concept of parens p a t r i a e under these f a c t s i s misapplied. To hold contrary would r e s u l t i n penalizing a parent because he o r she has moved t o another s t a t e . There i s nothing i n the record here t o show t h a t a c o u r t probably would be involved i n t h e f u t u r e with r e l a t i o n t o the c h i l d . W e vacate t h e decree with r e l a t i o n t o c h i l d custody and remand f o r another hearing, and d i r e c t t h a t appropriate findings and conclusions be entered c o n s i s t e n t with t h i s opinion. W e concur: Chief ~ u s t c c ; - M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy concurring i n p a r t and d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t : I concur with t h e majority t h a t t h e mother should n o t have custody of a c h i l d of tender years a s a matter of presumption. However, t h e majority opinion does n o t s t a t e , a s I think it should, t h a t when a c h i l d i s of tender years i n a custody dispute, t h e tender age of t h e c h i l d should be a f a c t o r i n considering whether custody should be given t o t h e mother. A s t o t h e rest of t h e opinion, I d i s s e n t . The wife d i d not come t o t h i s a p p e l l a t e c o u r t contending t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court had n o t made findings on t h e c r i t e r i a i n s e c t i o n 40-4-212(4), MCA t h a t a r e set o u t i n t h e majority opinion. The wife does not contend f o r t h a t i n t h i s appeal a t a l l . Rather, t h e wife contended t h a t as between t h e mother and t h e f a t h e r , " t h e t r i a l c o u r t [had] s p e c i f i c a l l y found t h a t a l l t h i n g s a r e equal between t h e p a r t i e s " and t h a t i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n , t h e presumption e n t i t l e d t h e mother t o t h e custody of t h e minor c h i l d . I n t h e language of t h e w i f e ' s b r i e f , h e r contention under s e c t i o n 40-4-212 w a s : " I f t h e presumption t h a t t h e mother is e n t i t l e d t o custody of c h i l d r e n of tender years is t o have any bearing a t a l l , s u r e l y i n t h i s case where a i l t h i n g s --- n o t only werepequal b u t a l s o -- were declared s o by t h e c o u r t , custody must --- r e s i d e i n t h e mother . . ." - The majority is t h e r e f o r e reversing t h e D i s t r i c t Court on i s s u e s n o t r a i s e d by t h e wife and moreover, not sub- s t a n t i a t e d by evidence i n t h e record a t t h e t r i a l . For example, t h e majority r e f e r s t o t h e " i n t e r a c t i o n and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e c h i l d with h i s parent" and s t a t e s t h a t t h e findings with r e s p e c t t o t h e f a t h e r were s u f f i c i e n t but a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t with r e s p e c t t o t h e mother. The reason t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court can make no findings with r e s p e c t t o t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e c h i l d with t h e -7- mother, and the maternal grandparents, is that for some reason not disclosed by the record, the mother offered no evidence of how her child was reacting to the family environ- ment in Portland where the child had been residing with the mother and the maternal grandparents at the time of the trial. Thus, the decision of the District Court here in favor of the father is being reversed out of the failure of the mother to produce the evidence which this Court says should result in findings. Nor do I agree that the trial court did not consider the mental and physical health of all the individuals involved. The mother made a point during the trial that her husband had not kept the ch d's glasses on the child when he had @ C temporary c h i l d = ' The father refuted this by producing eighteen pictures of himself with Eric, all showing the child wearing his glasses. The father's health is evident from the fact that he is an active farmer near Laurel, working long hours in pursuing his occupation. The mother's health indicated that she had had a very difficult labor in the childbirth of Eric; that she had gone to the hospital after using hashish; that she was diagnosed as manic depressive at the time; that she had been on a number of medications which her second doctor thought were unnecessary; that she "couldn't stand sitting at home" after the baby was born, volunteered to do nursing work at Planned Parenthood, and celebrated this occupation by going out with a Mr. Schuster and buying him a bottle of wine. It was during her evening with Mr. Schuster that the hashish incident happened and she was removed to the hospital. I think the court fully considered her health in determining the custody of Eric. Nor do I construe the District Court's placing custody of Eric with the father in Montana implicitly meant that Montana -8- was a better place than Oregon to raise children. The finding of the District Court provides in part: ". . . that in the immediate area of the respondent's home are the respondent's father and mother and the respondent's brother and sister-in-law together with their children; that during the course of the marriage the sister-in-law baby-sat the minor child from time to time; that the entire Markegard family is well thought of in the community, is a good and substantial family, and are all concerned as to the welfare of the minor child and his opportunity to grow up within the family; to grow up with his cousins, his uncles and aunts, and his grandparents; that the welfare of the child would be best promoted by having an opportunity to grow up in the environment of the Markegard community. The interest of the Markegard family in the welfare of the minor child is so great that a number of the aunts and uncles traveled to Portland, Oregon, on two occasions to visit the child, in the custody of the mother, during the year 1979." I do not derive any implicit statement that Montana is a better place to grow up than Oregon from the above finding. In the face of the lack of evidence regarding the Oregon environment for this child, the court had no choice but to decide that the Laurel community was in the best interests of the child. What the District Court did in this case was to choose between certainty and uncertainty. If this Court had granted custody to the mother, I should have been greatly concerned about the uncertainty of the mother's occupation, her ability to cope with pressure situations, of the situation at the home of the maternal grandparents, from which home both the mother and her sister departed because of the unrefuted contention of the mother that her parents were "crazy". For the foregoing reasons, I would sustain the custody decision of the District Court. Justice