Title: People v. Reyes
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S270723
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ANDRES QUINONEZ REYES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S270723 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Three 
G059251 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
04CF2780 
 
 
June 29, 2023 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred.  
 
1 
PEOPLE v. REYES 
S270723 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Defendant Andres Quinonez Reyes was convicted of 
second degree murder following a homicide committed by a 
fellow member of Santa Ana’s F-Troop gang.  Reyes was one of 
several members or affiliates of F-Troop who were present when 
the killing occurred, although the evidence showed he was not 
the shooter.  The prosecutor’s principal arguments at trial were 
that Reyes had intended to aid either an assault or disturbing 
the peace, or that he had conspired to commit one of those 
offenses.  Under the then-applicable natural and probable 
consequences theory, Reyes could be found guilty of second 
degree murder if the jury determined that he aided and abetted 
one of those target crimes and that murder was a natural and 
probable consequence of the offense.   
The Legislature subsequently eliminated the natural and 
probable consequences theory of liability as a basis for a murder 
conviction in Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) 
(Senate Bill No. 1437) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2).  Reyes 
petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code former section 
1170.95, which has since been renumbered as Penal Code 
section 1172.6 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).  (All statutory 
references are to the Penal Code.)  He argued that the evidence 
against him did not support a conviction under any valid theory 
of murder in light of the limitations imposed by Senate Bill 
No. 1437.  The trial court denied his petition, finding that he 
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of implied malice murder, 
PEOPLE v. REYES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
an alternative theory that remained available after Senate Bill 
No. 1437.  The Court of Appeal affirmed.  (People v. Reyes (Aug. 
4, 2021, G059251) [nonpub. opn.].)  Because the trial court erred 
in denying Reyes’s petition, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment with instructions to remand the case to the trial court 
for further proceedings on Reyes’s resentencing petition. 
I. 
In August 2004, when Reyes was 15 years old, he was in a 
park with a group of older boys and young men between the ages 
of 16 and 21.  All of them, including Reyes, were members of F-
Troop or an affiliated gang.  One of the young men, Francisco 
Lopez, showed the group a revolver he was carrying.  A few 
hours later, after meeting with two other members of F-Troop, 
some of them, including Reyes, proceeded on their bicycles to an 
area on the edge of territory belonging to a rival gang. 
A witness testified that a member of the group of bicycle 
riders called out for a passing car to stop, saying, “Hey, Homey, 
stop.  We want to talk to you.”  The car sped up, and the group 
chased after it, with riders in front yelling to those in back to 
“keep up” and those in back yelling for the riders in front to slow 
down.  The group came together and stopped at an intersection, 
and the car made a U-turn and drove past them.  Moments later, 
there was a gunshot, and the riders fled in different directions.  
The evidence showed that a single gunshot had struck the driver 
Pedro Rosario in the head, killing him.  The prosecutor argued 
that Lopez was the shooter.  There does not appear to be any 
direct evidence that Reyes knew the gun was loaded before 
Lopez shot Rosario. 
Reyes was in possession of the murder weapon 
approximately 40 minutes later when, together with three other 
PEOPLE v. REYES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
bicycle riders, he confronted Felix Nieves.  Nieves, who did not 
belong to a gang, was walking in F-Troop territory near where 
Rosario had been shot.  Reyes asked Nieves what “barrio” he 
belonged to; Nieves denied any gang affiliation and said he did 
not want any problems.  Reyes said he was from “the Troop” and 
challenged Nieves to a fight.  When Nieves saw Reyes reach to 
pull something from his waistband, he fled.  Reyes and his 
companions caught Nieves about two blocks away, and the 
group assaulted him.  At one point, Reyes stood behind Nieves 
and held a gun to the back of his neck.  Nieves managed to hit 
Reyes and grab the weapon.  Reyes and the others fled.   
Two days later, when Reyes was arrested, he admitted he 
was at the scene of the shooting, saying, “I didn’t shoot, but 
because I was there with my homies, I’m going to get charged 
with murder too.”  Reyes was charged with murder.  Conceding 
that Reyes was not the shooter, the prosecutor proceeded on two 
theories of derivative liability.  First, the prosecutor argued that 
Reyes aided and abetted the crime of disturbing the peace or 
that he conspired with Lopez to commit either disturbing the 
peace or assault, and that murder was a natural and probable 
consequence of one of those target offenses.  Alternatively, the 
prosecutor argued that Reyes directly aided and abetted the 
murder by “backing up fellow gang members” during the killing.  
This theory relied on the testimony of David Rondou, a Santa 
Ana Police Department detective who testified for the 
prosecution as a gang expert.  Detective Rondou testified that 
when gang members accompany a fellow gang member who 
commits a murder, “[t]hey’re there for backup.”  He explained 
that among street gangs, having backup means “taking other 
members of that gang or entrusted members of that gang with 
you to commit some sort of crime in case you need help.  They’re 
PEOPLE v. REYES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
there to support whatever you’re doing.  And if you need 
something, whether it be fighting, getting the gun and shooting, 
whatever need be for the incident you’re involved in, those guys 
that are there for backup are there to support whatever you’re 
doing.”   
There was no evidence that Reyes had expressly agreed to 
serve as backup while Lopez committed the murder.  The 
prosecutor argued that there was no need to show an express 
agreement because the jury could “infer from the surrounding 
facts” that Reyes was acting as backup.  The prosecutor pointed 
to Reyes’s “presence” at the time of the shooting and earlier in 
the park when Lopez showed the gun to the others; his 
“companionship” with Lopez, i.e., “[t]he fact that they’re 
homies”; his “flight from the scene” after the killing; and the fact 
that Reyes subsequently possessed the murder weapon and used 
it during a separate assault later that day. 
Reyes was convicted of second degree murder and street 
terrorism, as well as enhancements for committing the murder 
for the benefit of a gang and for vicariously discharging a 
firearm resulting in death.  He was sentenced to 40 years to life 
in prison for the murder and firearm enhancement, with the 
gang enhancement stayed and a two-year sentence for the street 
terrorism charge imposed concurrently.   
Twelve years after Reyes was sentenced, the Legislature 
enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 “ ‘to more equitably sentence 
offenders in accordance with their involvement in homicides.’ ”  
(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 839 (Gentile).)  As 
relevant here, the bill amended section 188 to provide that, 
except in cases of felony murder, “in order to be convicted of 
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice 
PEOPLE v. REYES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
aforethought.”  (§ 188, subd. (a)(3), as amended by Stats. 2018, 
ch. 1015, § 2.)  This change “bars a conviction for first or second 
degree murder under a natural and probable consequences 
theory.”  (Gentile, at p. 846.) 
Reyes petitioned the trial court for resentencing under 
former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6), arguing that he was 
convicted of murder under the now-invalid natural and probable 
consequences theory.  (For clarity, we refer simply to § 1172.6.)  
The court appointed counsel for Reyes and held a hearing, at 
which Reyes argued that the evidence did not support a murder 
conviction under any valid theory because it did not show that 
he committed “an act that actually . . . help[ed], encourage[d], 
[or] facilitate[d] Francisco [Lopez] in the shooting.”  The court 
denied the petition, finding that Reyes was guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of second degree murder.  The court was 
“guided by the principles that are in [CALCRIM No. 520], 
specifically implied malice.”  It found that “the act in this case 
is the defendant, along with several other gang members, one of 
which [was] armed, traveled to rival gang territory,” that the 
natural and probable consequence of their doing so was 
dangerous to human life, that Reyes was aware the act was 
dangerous to human life, and that he deliberately acted with 
conscious disregard for that danger.  Reyes appealed, arguing in 
part that “there was no evidence of any acts taken by appellant 
to aid or assist in or facilitate the commission of the murder.”  
After extensively quoting the trial court’s findings, the Court of 
Appeal held that the evidence was sufficient to establish Reyes’s 
guilt of second degree murder and affirmed.  We granted review. 
PEOPLE v. REYES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
II.  
As noted, in denying Reyes’s resentencing petition, the 
trial court said it was “guided by the principles” of implied 
malice murder in CALCRIM No. 520.  Applying the four 
elements set out in CALCRIM No. 520, the court found that (1) 
Reyes intentionally committed the act of traveling “along with 
several other gang members, one of which [was] armed, . . . to 
rival gang territory”; (2) “[t]he natural and probable 
consequences of the act were dangerous to human life”; (3) Reyes 
knew his act of traveling to rival gang territory was dangerous 
to human life; and (4) he acted deliberately and with conscious 
disregard of that danger.   
The trial court did not mention direct aiding and abetting, 
and its findings can be read to indicate that it upheld Reyes’s 
murder conviction on the theory that he was a direct perpetrator 
who harbored implied malice.  At oral argument, the Attorney 
General said there is “no doubt” this reading is correct.  But the 
prosecutor relied only on aiding and abetting theories to prove 
Reyes’s liability for murder, and the trial court, prior to the 
resentencing hearing, asked the parties to review People v. Soto 
(2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, a resentencing matter that involved 
aider and abettor liability for an implied malice murder, and 
then questioned the parties about that case at the hearing.  In 
this context, the trial court’s findings arguably could be read to 
uphold Reyes’s murder conviction on the theory that he directly 
aided and abetted implied malice murder.  Given the lack of 
clarity on this point, and out of an abundance of caution, we 
address the trial court’s consideration of Reyes’s resentencing 
petition under both direct perpetrator and direct aiding and 
abetting theories.  In so doing, we express no view on whether a 
court may deny a section 1172.6 resentencing petition based on 
PEOPLE v. REYES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
a theory of murder not argued by the prosecution at trial.  Nor 
do we have occasion, given the parties’ contentions and the 
procedural posture of this matter, to consider the overall scope 
of section 1172.6 resentencing proceedings.  (See People v. Curiel 
(Nov. 4, 2021, G058604) [nonpub. opn.], review granted Jan. 26, 
2022, S272238.) 
Ordinarily, a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 
petition is reviewed for substantial evidence.  (See, e.g., People 
v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951.)  Under this standard, 
we review the record “ ‘ “in the light most favorable to the 
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial 
evidence — that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and 
of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 277, italics omitted.)  But where 
there is an issue as to whether the trial court misunderstood the 
elements of the applicable offense, the case presents a question 
of law which we review independently.  (See Crocker National 
Bank v. City and County of San Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881, 
888 [“Questions of law relate to the selection of a rule; their 
resolution is reviewed independently.”].)  As we explain, 
assuming without deciding that the trial court permissibly 
upheld Reyes’s murder conviction on a theory that was not 
presented at trial, its conclusion that Reyes’s conviction was 
sustainable on a direct perpetrator theory was not supported by 
substantial evidence.  And to the extent the trial court purported 
to uphold Reyes’s murder conviction on a direct aiding and 
abetting theory, the court misapprehended what is required as 
a matter of law to prove aiding and abetting implied malice 
murder. 
PEOPLE v. REYES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
A. 
We first address simple implied malice murder.  Murder 
is committed with implied malice when “the killing is 
proximately caused by ‘ “an act, the natural consequences of 
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately 
performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers 
the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for 
life.” ’ ”  (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143 (Knoller).)  
“ ‘To be considered the proximate cause of the victim’s death, the 
defendant’s act must have been a substantial factor contributing 
to the result, rather than insignificant or merely theoretical.’ ”  
(People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 643 (Jennings).)   
On this record, it cannot be said that Reyes committed an 
act that “proximately caused” Rosario’s death.  (Knoller, supra, 
41 Cal.4th at p. 152.)  The prosecutor proceeded on the theory 
that Lopez shot Rosario, and no evidence was presented that 
Reyes’s conduct was a “substantial factor” that contributed to 
the shooting.  (Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 643.)  The 
evidence established that Reyes proceeded to an area on the 
edge of territory belonging to a rival gang and, alongside the 
other bikers, chased after Rosario’s car.  But acts that merely 
create a dangerous situation in which death is possible 
depending on how circumstances unfold do not, without more, 
satisfy this causation requirement.  There was no evidence that 
Reyes’s acts precipitated or provoked the shooting.  And there is 
no reason to believe that the killing of Rosario would not have 
occurred if Reyes had not accompanied his fellow gang members 
on the ride or participated in the chase.  (See People v. Cervantes 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 866 [“In homicide cases, a ‘cause of the 
death of [the decedent] is an act . . . that sets in motion a chain 
of events that produces as a direct, natural and probable 
PEOPLE v. REYES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
consequence of the act . . . the death . . . and without which the 
death would not occur.’ ”].)  Reyes’s acts of bicycling into rival 
territory and chasing after Rosario’s car with Lopez and other 
fellow gang members were too attenuated in the chain of events 
to have proximately caused the killing; any causal link between 
Reyes’s conduct and Rosario’s death is tenuous at best.  
Accordingly, we find no substantial evidence to support the trial 
court’s denial of Reyes’s resentencing petition based on his 
liability for second degree murder on a direct perpetrator theory. 
Although lack of proximate causation suffices to establish 
that the trial court erred in denying Reyes’s resentencing 
petition on a direct perpetrator theory, we also take issue with 
the trial court’s conclusion that “[t]he natural and probable 
consequences” of Reyes’s act of traveling to rival gang territory 
with several other gang members, one of whom was armed, 
“were dangerous to human life.”  To suffice for implied malice 
murder, the defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to 
life in some vague or speculative sense; it must “ ‘involve[] a high 
degree of probability that it will result in death.’ ”  (Knoller, 
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152; see ibid. [under the objective 
component of implied malice, “ ‘ “dangerous to life” ’ ” means the 
same thing as a “ ‘high degree of probability that’ ” the act in 
question “ ‘will result in death’ ”]; People v. Cravens (2012) 53 
Cal.4th 500, 513 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [“Although an act that 
will certainly lead to death is not required, the probability of 
death from the act must be more than remote or merely 
possible.”].) 
As noted, the prosecutor conceded that Reyes was not the 
shooter; the evidence established that Reyes and his fellow gang 
members, one of whom was armed, bicycled to an area on the 
edge of territory belonging to a rival gang.  It may have been 
PEOPLE v. REYES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
likely that this act would result in some sort of gang 
confrontation, and it is possible that someone would get hurt or 
killed.  But the act does not by itself give rise to a high degree of 
probability that death will result.  In issuing its ruling, the trial 
court mentioned Detective Rondou’s testimony suggesting that 
Reyes was providing “backup” to the shooter, as well as Reyes’s 
use of the same gun in the subsequent attack on Nieves.  But 
this evidence is insufficient to support a conclusion that Reyes 
committed an act that carried a “ ‘high degree of probability’ ” of 
death.  (Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152.)  Even if the gang 
expert’s testimony and the attack on Nieves might shed light on 
Reyes’s role and mental state in the sequence of events, those 
pieces of evidence do not speak to whether Reyes’s act itself —
in the trial court’s words, “the act in this case is the defendant, 
along with several other gang members, one of which [was] 
armed, traveled to rival gang territory” — was dangerous to life 
such that it satisfied the actus reus element of implied malice 
murder. 
B. 
To the extent the trial court purported to sustain Reyes’s 
conviction on a theory of directly aiding and abetting implied 
malice murder, the trial court’s findings rested on an error of 
law.  As noted, the prosecutor relied on two theories of aiding 
and abetting to establish Reyes’s liability for murder.  After 
conceding that Reyes was not the shooter, the prosecutor 
informed the jury that it could find Reyes guilty of second degree 
murder under a theory of direct aiding and abetting or under a 
natural and probable consequences theory.  Because Senate Bill 
No. 1437 eliminated the latter theory (see Gentile, supra, 10 
Cal.5th at p. 839), we examine whether the trial court properly 
understood the elements of direct aiding and abetting.   
PEOPLE v. REYES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
At the outset, we note that Reyes does not contest the 
validity of a direct aiding and abetting theory of second degree 
murder, but the Office of the State Public Defender as amicus 
curiae does.  Case law has recognized and applied this theory, 
and we see no basis to abrogate it.  In Gentile, we observed that 
“notwithstanding Senate Bill 1437’s elimination of natural and 
probable consequences liability for second degree murder, an 
aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing 
can still be convicted of second degree murder if the person 
knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and 
acts with conscious disregard for life.”  (Gentile, supra, 10 
Cal.5th at p. 850.)  Since our decision in Gentile, the Courts of 
Appeal have held that a defendant may directly aid and abet an 
implied malice murder.  (See People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77 
Cal.App.5th 576, 588–591, review granted July 27, 2022, 
S274792; People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela) (2021) 73 
Cal.App.5th 485, 499; People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 
689, 710–714 (Powell); see also People v. Langi (2022) 73 
Cal.App.5th 972, 979–983.) 
The Court of Appeal in Powell explained the elements as 
follows:  “[D]irect aiding and abetting is based on the combined 
actus reus of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own 
mens rea.  ([People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1122.])  In 
the context of implied malice, the actus reus required of the 
perpetrator is the commission of a life endangering act.  For the 
direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts 
constitute aiding the commission of the life-endangering act.  
Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider 
and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of 
the life-endangering act, not the result of that act.  The mens 
rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and 
PEOPLE v. REYES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit 
the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the 
act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and 
acting in conscious disregard for human life.”  (Powell, supra, 63 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 712–713, fn. omitted; see id. at p. 713, fn. 27 
[“The relevant act is the act that proximately causes death.”], 
citing People v. Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 507, and 
Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 143.) 
Powell further explained:  “The reason why there is a 
dearth of decisional law on aiding and abetting implied malice 
murder may be the heretofore availability of the natural and 
probable consequences doctrine for second degree murder, 
which was easier to prove. . . .  [T]he natural and probable 
consequences doctrine did not require that the aider and abettor 
intend to aid the perpetrator in committing a life-endangering 
act . . . .  What was natural and probable was judged by an 
objective standard and it was enough that murder was a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the crime aided and 
abetted.”  (Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 711, fn. 26.) 
In denying Reyes’s resentencing petition, the trial court 
said it was “guided by the principles” of implied malice murder 
in CALCRIM No. 520.  That instruction alone, however, does not 
encompass the elements of aiding and abetting implied malice 
murder as set out in Powell.  By relying exclusively on the legal 
principles outlined in CALCRIM No. 520, the trial court did not 
appear to recognize that implied malice murder requires, among 
other elements, proof of the aider and abettor’s knowledge and 
intent with regard to the direct perpetrator’s life endangering 
act.  (See Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 712–713.)   
PEOPLE v. REYES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
The trial court’s factual findings illustrate the nature of 
its error.  The court found that “the defendant, along with 
several other gang members, one of which [was] armed, traveled 
to rival gang territory” and then considered whether that act 
was done with the mental state required for implied malice.  In 
particular, after finding the natural and probable consequence 
of the act to be “dangerous to human life,” the trial court asked 
whether Reyes “at the time he acted, . . . knew that the act was 
dangerous to human life,” and whether “he deliberately acted 
with conscious disregard for human life.”  But implied malice 
murder requires attention to the aider and abettor’s mental 
state concerning the life endangering act committed by the 
direct perpetrator, such as shooting at the victim.  (See Powell, 
supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713, fn. 27 [“The relevant act is the 
act that proximately causes death.”].)  Here, assuming the life-
endangering act was the shooting, the trial court should have 
asked whether Reyes knew that Lopez intended to shoot at the 
victim, intended to aid him in the shooting, knew that the 
shooting was dangerous to life, and acted in conscious disregard 
for life.  (See id. at pp. 712–713.)  Because the court did not do 
so, its decision was based on an error of law insofar as the court 
sustained Reyes’s murder conviction on a direct aiding and 
abetting theory. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the trial court erred in sustaining Reyes’s second 
degree murder conviction, whether it relied on a direct 
perpetrator theory or on a direct aiding and abetting theory.  We 
find no substantial evidence to support a finding that Reyes was 
the direct perpetrator of Rosario’s murder.  And to the extent 
the trial court denied Reyes’s petition under a direct aiding and 
abetting theory, the court committed reversible error by 
PEOPLE v. REYES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
misunderstanding the legal requirements of direct aiding and 
abetting implied malice murder.  We agree with the Attorney 
General that remand is appropriate under these circumstances; 
given the nature of this error, it is “uncertain whether the trial 
court would have reached the same result using correct legal 
standards.”  (Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 158.)  Accordingly, 
we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal with directions 
to remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  We express no view on the merits 
of Reyes’s resentencing petition under a proper application of 
the elements of implied malice murder on a direct aiding and 
abetting theory. 
 
LIU, J. 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Reyes 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 8/4/21 – 4th Dist., 
Div. 3 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S270723 
Date Filed:  June 29, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Orange  
Judge:  Richard M. King 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and 
Richard A. Levy, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Mary K. McComb, State Public Defender, Samuel Weiscovitz and 
Jennifer Hansen, Deputy State Public Defenders, for Office of the 
State Public Defender as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Christopher Hawthorne and Marisa Harris for Juvenile Innocence & 
Fair Sentencing Clinic as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland and Charles C. 
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Eric A. Swenson, Meredith 
 
 
White, Jennifer B. Truong and Junichi P. Semitsu, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Richard A. Levy 
Attorney at Law 
3868 West Carson Street, Suite 205 
Torrance, CA 90503-6706 
(310) 944-3311 
 
Junichi P. Semitsu 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9103