Title: In re M.Y.P.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 364A20
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: September 24, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-113 
No. 364A20 
Filed 24 September 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: M.Y.P. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 19 
March 2020 by Judge Elizabeth T. Trosch in District Court, Mecklenburg County. 
This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 19 August 2021 
but determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) 
of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Marc S. Gentile, Senior Associate County Attorney, for petitioner-appellee 
Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, Youth and Family Services 
Division. 
 
Amanda S. Hawkins for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Benjamin J. Kull for respondent-appellant father.  
 
 
NEWBY, Chief Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent, the father of M.Y.P. (Max), appeals from the trial court’s order 
terminating his parental rights.1 After careful review, we affirm. 
¶ 2 
 
Max was born on 27 May 2016. His parents have a lengthy history with family 
court, with each parent seeking legal custody at different times.  
                                            
1 A pseudonym is used in this opinion to protect the juvenile’s identity and for ease of 
reading.  
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 3 
 
On 2 October 2018, the Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, 
Youth and Family Services Division (YFS) received a referral regarding Max. A 
neighbor had observed Max, who was then two years old, alone and crying on the 
balcony of his apartment. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department went to the 
residence, and after knocking several times, entered the unlocked apartment, and 
found Max alone inside the home. The apartment had no furniture in it other than a 
pack-n-play. The police and YFS attempted to contact respondent but were 
unsuccessful.  
¶ 4 
 
Accordingly, on 3 October 2018, YFS filed a petition, which it later amended, 
alleging that Max was neglected and dependent and obtained nonsecure custody. 
Respondent did not reappear until he arrived at a hospital on 5 October 2018 seeking 
treatment. Max was placed with the maternal grandfather and his girlfriend 
following a nonsecure custody hearing held on 10 October 2018.  
¶ 5 
 
After a hearing on 4 February 2019, on 8 March 2019, the trial court entered 
an order adjudicating Max neglected and dependent pursuant to respondent’s 
stipulations to allegations in the amended petition. At disposition, the trial court 
found that there had been no alleviation of the conditions which led to Max’s removal 
from respondent’s home, which included domestic violence, lack of stable housing, 
and mental health issues. The trial court specifically noted the history of domestic 
violence between respondent and Max’s mother, as well as between them and other 
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partners, which the trial court labeled as “volatile and violent.” Additionally, 
respondent had failed to provide the court with accurate information regarding his 
housing or work history. The trial court also found that respondent “seems to have 
an irrational view of the facts in this matter” and “[h]is view of the facts is not credible 
and may qualify as delusional.” The trial court further found that respondent had one 
visit with Max, was difficult to contact, and had not made any effort to establish or 
confirm visitation since 24 October 2018. Conversely, the court noted that Max had 
been placed with his siblings with the maternal grandfather, the placement had been 
positive, and Max was thriving. The trial court ordered the primary permanent plan 
for Max as reunification with a secondary plan of adoption. Additionally, the trial 
court ordered that Max remain in his placement with the maternal grandfather and 
granted respondent supervised visitation.  
¶ 6 
 
On 7 June 2019, the trial court entered a review order in which it found that 
respondent had: (1) outstanding orders for his arrest; (2) not visited with Max on a 
consistent basis; and (3) not demonstrated his ability to provide for Max’s basic needs. 
Additionally, the court noted that YFS no longer had valid contact information for 
respondent and last had contact with him on 21 March 2019. The trial court further 
found that respondent had “taken no meaningful steps within the last two months to 
ameliorate the removal conditions” and authorized YFS to file a petition to terminate 
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parental rights. The trial court also changed the primary permanent plan for Max to 
adoption and the secondary permanent plan to reunification.  
¶ 7 
 
The trial court held a permanency planning review hearing on 10 July 2019. 
In an order entered on 6 August 2019, the trial court found that respondent still had 
not engaged in any services nor alleviated the removal conditions. The trial court 
noted that respondent had only visited Max twice since 4 February 2019.  
¶ 8 
 
On 11 July 2019, YFS filed a motion in the cause to terminate respondent’s 
parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (neglect) and (3) (failure to pay 
for the cost of care). On 19 March 2020, the trial court entered an order determining 
that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights pursuant to neglect. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2019). The trial court further concluded it was in Max’s best 
interests that respondent’s parental rights be terminated. Accordingly, the trial court 
terminated respondent’s parental rights.2 Respondent appeals.  
I. 
Adjudication 
¶ 9 
 
Respondent first argues that the trial court erred by terminating his parental 
rights based on neglect. Specifically, respondent contests several findings of fact, 
asserts that those findings do not support the trial court’s conclusions of law, and 
                                            
2 The trial court’s order also terminated the parental rights of Max’s mother, but she 
did not appeal.  
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argues that terminating his rights here would undermine the legislature’s intent in 
promulgating the neglect ground for termination cases. 
¶ 10 
 
A termination of parental rights proceeding consists of an adjudicatory stage 
and a dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019); In re Montgomery, 311 
N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984). At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner 
bears the burden of proving by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” the existence 
of one or more grounds for termination under section 7B-1111(a) of our General 
Statutes. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2019). We review a trial court’s adjudication “to 
determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing 
evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 
at 111, 316 S.E.2d at 253 (citing In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404, 293 S.E.2d 127, 133 
(1982)). “Findings of fact not challenged by respondent are deemed supported by 
competent evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 
S.E.2d 54, 58 (2019). 
¶ 11 
 
Here the trial court concluded that a ground existed to terminate respondent’s 
parental rights based on N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (neglect). A trial court may 
terminate parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) where it concludes 
the parent has neglected the juvenile within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). A neglected juvenile is defined, in pertinent part, as a 
juvenile “whose parent . . . does not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline; 
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. . . or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare . . . .” N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-101(15) (2019). We have recently explained that 
“Termination of parental rights based upon this statutory 
ground requires a showing of neglect at the time of the 
termination hearing or, if the child has been separated 
from the parent for a long period of time, there must be a 
showing of . . . a likelihood of future neglect by the parent.” 
“When determining whether such future neglect is likely, 
the district court must consider evidence of changed 
circumstances occurring between the period of past neglect 
and the time of the termination hearing.” 
In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. 838, 841, 851 S.E.2d 17, 20 (2020) (first quoting In re D.L.W., 
368 N.C. 835, 843, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2013), then quoting In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. 
207, 212, 835 S.E.2d 425, 430 (2019)). 
¶ 12 
 
In support of its conclusion as to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), the trial court made 
the following findings of fact:  
22. On October 2, 2018 at approximately 10:20 pm, YFS 
received a referral alleging that the juvenile had been left 
alone at his residence and had been in and out of the 
apartment residence crying for the Respondent Father. 
 
23. Law enforcement had been called to the Respondent 
Father’s residence approximately 40 minutes before YFS 
was called. When officers arrived, they knocked on the door 
several times, but no one answered. Because the child was 
so young, the doorknob was checked and it was unlocked so 
officers entered. The child was found alone and without any 
supervision. The only furniture in the residence was a 
pack-n-play. There was a letter addressed to the 
Respondent Father, but a different address was listed. 
Officers knocked on neighbors’ doors but no one knew the 
Respondent Father. The telephone numbers that law 
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enforcement found for the Respondent Father were 
disconnected or were no longer in service so the juvenile 
was transported to a regional substation. 
  
24. The juvenile was left alone without adult supervision 
since at least 8:00 pm on October 2, 2018. The Respondent 
Father was unavailable to provide any care or supervision 
until Friday, October 5, 2018. During the nonsecure 
custody hearing for this juvenile, the Respondent Father 
[sic] testimony was inconsistent and mostly incoherent. In 
sum, he claimed that [Max’s mother] kidnapped him in the 
evening hours of October 2, 2018 and then held him 
hostage and assaulted him repeatedly until October 5, 
2018 when he sought treatment at a local hospital. [Max’s 
mother] has been charged criminally as a result of this 
allegation, but she has not been seen or heard from since 
October 5, 2018 and her charges remain pending. 
 
25. As for the lack of furniture in the apartment where the 
juvenile was found, the Respondent Father and the 
juvenile had been living there for weeks. He claims that 
furniture was being delivered. He and [his wife] were 
married at this time, but he had not lived with her for at 
least three years though he still depended on her for 
support.  
 
26. Prior to the filing of the juvenile petition, [respondent 
and Max] lived together in at least six different residences.  
 
. . . . 
 
28. [Max] was adjudicated neglected and dependent on 
February 4, 2019. [Respondent] was present during the 
adjudication. 
The 
dispositional 
hearing 
occurred 
immediately after the juvenile was adjudicated. 
 
29. During disposition, the [c]ourt found that issues of 
mental illness, domestic violence, inadequate and unstable 
housing and substance abuse were all conditions that led 
to the aforesaid neglect adjudication. The Respondent 
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Father was awarded a minimum of biweekly supervised 
visitation. 
 
30. Between the dispositional hearing and the First Review 
Hearing (on April 29, 2019), Respondent Father visited 
with the juvenile only twice and during a two-month 
stretch within this review period he contacted YFS only 
once. By this First Review Hearing, which he did not 
attend, he had not taken any steps to demonstrate that he 
was making any progress on alleviating any of the removal 
conditions. During this April hearing, this [c]ourt adopted 
the Respondent Father’s case plan which called for him to 
be screened by the FIRST program which screens for needs 
in the areas of mental health, substance abuse, and 
domestic 
violence 
and 
to 
then 
comply 
with 
all 
recommendations, sign appropriate releases for any 
services, and to demonstrate that he can meet the basic 
needs of himself and the juvenile. 
 
31. The [c]ourt conducted a Permanency Planning Hearing 
(PPH) on July 10, 2019 which the Respondent Father 
attended. Between the aforesaid April hearing and the 
PPH, Respondent Father did not have any visitation with 
the juvenile.  
 
32. With respect to the Respondent Father’s involvement 
with FIRST since the filing of the juvenile petition, he was 
initially referred there in January 2019. He completed 
paperwork at that time and submitted a urine sample that 
was positive for alcohol and marijuana. On or about July 
21, 2019, he provided another marijuana-positive urine 
sample. The Respondent Father eventually submitted to 
the assessment on July 31, 2019. Needs were identified in 
the areas of substance abuse and domestic violence. 
Respondent Father was referred for a substance abuse 
assessment with Anuvia and for a domestic violence 
assessment with Community Support Services. On October 
17, 2019, he provided a urine sample that was positive for 
cocaine and marijuana. A follow up appointment was 
requested after the October sample was received, but 
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Respondent Father never returned. Anuvia’s assessment 
recommended that he complete a 40-hour outpatient 
program, but he never started the program.  
 
33. Respondent Father claimed to the forensic evaluator 
. . . that he had only occasionally consumed alcohol since he 
moved back from California. For this same time frame, he 
claimed that he had not used any illegal drugs. He lived in 
California between August 2017 and February 2018. The 
drug screen results discussed above demonstrate his 
testimony in this regard was not accurate.  
 
34. Overall, the Respondent Father has provided 
inconsistent information to the [c]ourt, the forensic 
evaluator, and YFS. Assessments of his emotional and 
behavioral functioning completed as part of the Personality 
Assessment Inventory were uninterpretable due to his 
scores on the validity scales. The pattern of responses 
suggested a significant level of defensiveness. His 
responses also reflected a considerable distortion and 
minimization of difficulties. It was this personality profile 
and behavioral approach to issues that has led to the 
Respondent Father’s failure to acknowledge any problems 
that impact on his ability to provide adequate care and 
supervision to the juvenile or take any action to address his 
noted problems.  
 
35. As of the date of this TPR proceeding, Respondent 
Father had not initiated any services to address issues 
related to substance abuse or domestic violence so he has 
made no progress in alleviating either condition. He 
maintained that he resides in the apartment where the 
juvenile was found unattended on October 2, 2019. He has 
never made that residence available for inspection to 
determine whether it is structurally safe or otherwise 
appropriate for the juvenile.  
 
36. The Respondent Father testified with clarity and 
certainty about events and circumstances of the custody 
dispute with [Max’s mother] (e.g. the procedural history of 
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the 
family 
court 
proceedings), 
his 
prior 
living 
arrangements, and his work history. However, he offered 
the effects of a traumatic brain injury to excuse or explain 
his absence from his son’s life since he entered YFS 
nonsecure custody, his failure to consistently visit with the 
child during that same time, or otherwise to engage in 
services to alleviate the injurious conditions that led to 
YFS obtaining nonsecure custody. 
 
. . . .  
 
38. . . . . [Respondent] has had only sporadic contact with 
[Max] since [Max] entered YFS nonsecure custody. He has 
not engaged in or remedied any removal conditions and his 
residence has not been confirmed. He is unable to provide 
proper care and supervision within a reasonable period of 
time.  
 
39. Due to [respondent’s] failure . . . to engage in any 
services or to establish that [he] can provide proper care 
and supervision [of Max], YFS cannot recommend that 
[Max] be returned [to his care]. Consequently, multiple 
barriers to reunification are still present, [Max] remains in 
YFS nonsecure custody, and there is a high probability of 
the repetition of neglect. 
 
¶ 13 
 
We first consider respondent’s challenges to findings of fact 25, 29, and 31. 
Respondent contends that in finding of fact 25, the following portions of the finding 
were unsupported by the evidence: that he had been living “for weeks” in the 
apartment where Max was found; that he “claimed that furniture was being 
delivered” for the apartment; and that he depended on his then wife for support. We 
agree. Accordingly, we disregard these portions of finding of fact 25. See In re S.M., 
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375 N.C. 673, 684, 850 S.E.2d 292, 302 (2020) (disregarding findings of fact that are 
unsupported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence). 
¶ 14 
 
Respondent next contends that finding of fact 29 incorrectly states that during 
disposition, the trial court found that substance abuse was one of the conditions which 
led to the adjudication of neglect. While the dispositional order states that respondent 
“seems to have a substance abuse history,” respondent is correct that the trial court 
only explicitly listed “domestic violence,” “stable housing,” and “mental health” to be 
“the problems which led to adjudication and must be resolved to achieve 
reunification.” Therefore, we disregard this portion of finding of fact 29 to the extent 
it was considered as a problem that led to adjudication. We note, however, that 
respondent does not challenge finding of fact 32, which states that respondent’s 
assessment in July of 2019 identified needs “in the area[ ] of substance abuse.” As 
such, the fact that respondent had a history of substance abuse is a proper 
consideration when determining whether the trial court properly terminated 
respondent’s rights.  
¶ 15 
 
Respondent next argues that finding of fact 31 incorrectly states that he did 
not visit with Max between 29 April and 10 July 2019. We agree. A social worker 
testified that respondent visited Max on 7 June 2019. Therefore, we disregard this 
portion of the trial court’s finding of fact since respondent had a visit with the child 
during this four-month period.  
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 16 
 
Regardless of our conclusion that the above findings of fact are unsupported, 
such error is harmless as the remaining findings in the trial court’s order still support 
its conclusion that respondent’s rights were subject to termination based on neglect. 
The trial court found that Max was adjudicated neglected on 4 February 2019. 
Notably, respondent stipulated to the findings of fact supporting the adjudication of 
neglect and did not appeal from the trial court’s order. This Court has repeatedly 
stated that “[w]hen determining whether a child is neglected, the circumstances and 
conditions surrounding the child are what matters, not the fault or culpability of the 
parent.” In re Z.K., 375 N.C. 370, 373, 847 S.E.2d 746, 748–49 (2020); see also In re 
S.D., 374 N.C. 67, 75, 839 S.E.2d 315, 322 (2020) (“[T]here is no requirement that the 
parent whose rights are subject to termination on the grounds of neglect be 
responsible for the prior adjudication of neglect.”); In re J.M.J.-J., 374 N.C. 553, 564, 
843 S.E.2d 94, 104 (2020) (rejecting the respondent’s argument “that the trial court’s 
conclusion of neglect was erroneous because he was not responsible for the conditions 
that resulted in [his daughter’s] placement in DSS custody”). Consequently, based 
upon its finding that there had been a prior adjudication of neglect, we conclude the 
trial court’s findings were sufficient to support its conclusion that Max was previously 
neglected.3  
                                            
3 Respondent also challenges findings of fact 9–14, 17, and 19 as being unsupported 
by the evidence. These findings of fact concern events between October 2016 and October 
2017. They detail respondent’s relationship with Max’s mother, claims of substance abuse by 
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¶ 17 
 
Respondent next argues that the trial court’s determination that there was a 
likelihood of future neglect was erroneously based on his failure to comply with his 
case plan. Respondent asserts that allowing termination under N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(1) based on a parent’s non-compliance with his case plan would rob the 
parent of the important safeguards provided by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), which 
would have afforded him a full twelve months to show improvement. Again, 
respondent’s argument is unpersuasive.  
¶ 18 
 
This Court has stated that “[a] parent’s failure to make progress in completing 
a case plan is indicative of a likelihood of future neglect.” In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865, 
870, 844 S.E.2d 916, 921 (2020) (quoting In re M.J.S.M., 257 N.C. App. 633, 637, 810 
S.E.2d 370, 373 (2018)); see also In re W.K., 376 N.C. 269, 278–79, 852 S.E.2d 83, 91 
(2020) (noting that “[b]ased on respondent-father’s failure to follow his case plan and 
the trial court’s orders and his continued abuse of controlled substances, the trial 
court found that there was a likelihood the children would be neglected if they were 
returned to his care”).  
                                            
respondent and improper care and supervision of Max, various custody orders entered 
concerning Max, and a motion for contempt filed by respondent against Max’s mother and 
her purging of contempt. We decline, however, to review these findings of fact. These findings 
of fact all concern events and allegations that were unrelated to and preceded the claims 
which led to the filing of the juvenile petition and the adjudication of Max as a neglected 
juvenile. Consequently, because they are not necessary to the trial court’s determination that 
respondent previously neglected Max, we need not review them. See In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 
at 407, 831 S.E.2d at 58–59 (“[W]e review only those findings necessary to support the trial 
court’s determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights.” (citing 
In re Moore, 306 N.C. at 404, 293 S.E.2d at 133)). 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 19 
 
Here the trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact demonstrate that mental 
illness, domestic violence, and unstable housing were conditions the trial court 
identified which led to Max’s removal from respondent’s custody and the adjudication 
of neglect. To address these issues, the trial court adopted respondent’s case plan, 
which required him to be screened for needs in these areas and to comply with all 
recommendations. Respondent submitted to the screening, which identified a need in 
the area of domestic violence. The trial court found, however, that respondent failed 
to initiate any services to address domestic violence and made no progress in 
ameliorating this issue. In addition to those findings regarding respondent’s failure 
to address domestic violence concerns, the trial court found that, consistent with 
respondent’s prior issues with unstable housing, YFS was unable to confirm 
respondent’s residence.  
¶ 20 
 
Furthermore, though awarded visitation, respondent failed to consistently 
visit with Max. Additionally, the trial court’s determination that there was a 
likelihood of future neglect did not rest solely on respondent’s failure to complete his 
case plan. For example, substance abuse was also identified as an area of need for 
services, and the trial court could properly conclude that failure to address this issue 
could lead to a repetition of neglect. See In re D.L.A.D., 375 N.C. 565, 572, 849 S.E.2d 
811, 817 (2020) (stating that “a substance abuse problem that likely went untreated 
could inhibit a parent’s capability or willingness to consistently provide adequate care 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
to a child” and thus would support a determination that neglect would likely repeat 
in the future). The trial court found that during the relevant periods of time during 
this proceeding, respondent twice tested positive for marijuana, tested positive once 
for cocaine, and failed to begin a recommended forty-hour outpatient substance abuse 
program. Thus, based on respondent’s failures to address all of these issues, the trial 
court properly determined that there was a high probability of repetition of neglect 
should Max be returned to his father’s care and custody.  
¶ 21 
 
Notably, though respondent disputes the trial court’s assessment of his 
culpability, i.e., whether he was responsible for the neglect, it was within the trial 
court’s authority to pass on respondent’s credibility. Having interacted with 
respondent throughout the proceeding, the trial court was in the best position to 
determine respondent’s credibility regarding his culpability as it relates to neglect. 
See In re C.A.H., 375 N.C. 750, 759, 850 S.E.2d 921, 927 (2020) (noting that the trial 
court, given its unique position, is the proper entity to make credibility 
determinations and thus appellate courts should not reweigh such determinations). 
Therefore, the trial court’s remaining findings of fact support its conclusion of law 
that a ground existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(1). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s determination that a ground 
existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights based on neglect.  
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II. 
Disposition 
¶ 22 
 
We next consider respondent’s arguments regarding disposition. If the trial 
court finds at least one ground to terminate parental rights under N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a), it proceeds to the dispositional stage where it must “determine whether 
terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest” based on the 
following factors:  
(1) The age of the juvenile. 
 
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile. 
 
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in 
the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the 
juvenile. 
 
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent. 
 
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and 
the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or 
other permanent placement. 
 
(6) Any relevant consideration. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019).  
¶ 23 
 
Respondent contends the trial court committed reversible error when it 
prevented him from testifying about his concerns regarding Max being placed with 
the maternal grandfather. At the termination hearing, respondent began testifying 
that before Max was born, the following events occurred:  
[Max’s mother] called me ranting and raving, saying that 
[the maternal grandfather] was yelling and being 
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belligerent. But when I was on the phone with him -- or 
with her, I guess he whipped out his penis and peed on the 
door. She told me to get over there. I left my apartment at 
-- 
DSS’s attorney objected to respondent’s testimony and the trial court sustained the 
objection, noting that the allegation about the maternal grandfather’s suitability as 
a placement for Max had already been litigated and resolved.  
¶ 24 
 
Respondent asserts that the trial court’s exclusion of his testimony was based 
on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Respondent contends that the trial court 
misapplied the doctrine because there was no prior order in the case regarding the 
incident about which he sought to testify. Respondent argues that the exclusion of 
the testimony was prejudicial because it directly undermined its determination of 
Max’s best interests. We are not persuaded.  
¶ 25 
 
Importantly, to preserve an argument concerning the exclusion of evidence, a 
party is required to make an offer of proof in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 
103(a)(2). State v. Atkins, 349 N.C. 62, 79, 505 S.E.2d 97, 108 (1998). This Court has 
stated: 
[W]e would hold that, whether an objection be to the 
admissibility of testimony or to the competency of a witness 
to give that, or any, testimony, the significance of the 
excluded evidence must be made to appear in the record if 
the matter is to be heard on review. Unless the significance 
of the evidence is obvious from the record, counsel offering 
the evidence must make a specific offer of what he expects 
to prove by the answer of the witness. 
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Currence v. Hardin, 296 N.C. 95, 99–100, 249 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1978). Here 
respondent failed to make an offer of proof regarding the excluded testimony and the 
substance of the excluded testimony regarding the maternal grandfather is not 
obvious from the record.  
¶ 26 
 
Furthermore, even assuming that this argument was preserved for appeal, we 
would decline to find that the trial court abused its discretion by curtailing 
respondent’s testimony. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) provides that at the dispositional 
hearing, the trial court “may consider any evidence, including hearsay evidence as 
defined in G.S. 8C-1, Rule 801, that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and 
necessary to determine the best interests of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) 
(emphases added). Additionally, this Court has stated that  
during the adjudication stage of a termination proceeding, 
the trial court must apply the provisions of the North 
Carolina Rules of Evidence that apply in all civil cases. 
During the dispositional stage, conversely, the trial court 
retains significantly more discretion in its receipt of 
evidence and may admit any evidence that it considers to be 
relevant, reliable, and necessary in its inquiry into the 
child’s best interests[.] 
In re R.D., 376 N.C. 244, 250–51, 852 S.E.2d 117, 124 (2020) (emphasis added).  
¶ 27 
 
Notably, here the same trial judge who presided over the termination hearing 
had presided over Max’s case since the filing of the initial petition in October 2018. 
Furthermore, though respondent’s testimony was curtailed, some of his concerns 
regarding the maternal grandfather were described in his testimony. Importantly, 
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the trial court had previously heard the concerns regarding the maternal 
grandfather’s fitness and determined they were without merit. Given the wide 
discretion afforded the trial court in making evidentiary rulings during the 
dispositional hearing, even assuming that the issue had been preserved for appellate 
review, we would conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding 
further testimony from respondent on this issue. See id. at 253, 852 S.E.2d at 126 
(stating that N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110 “gives the trial court broad discretion regarding the 
receipt of evidence in its quest to determine the best interests of the child under the 
particular circumstances of the case”). 
¶ 28 
 
Respondent next argues that the trial court applied the wrong evidentiary 
standard when deciding whether it was in Max’s best interests to terminate his 
parental rights. Specifically, respondent claims that the trial court applied the clear, 
cogent, and convincing evidentiary standard that is required for adjudicatory 
findings. Respondent argues that the failure to apply the correct standard was 
necessarily prejudicial.  
¶ 29 
 
At the adjudication stage, the burden “shall be upon the petitioner or movant 
and all findings of fact shall be based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence[,]” 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2019), whereas “no burden of proof should be imposed upon 
either party at the dispositional stage,” In re R.D., 376 N.C. at 256, 852 S.E.2d at 127. 
A trial court is not required to bifurcate the adjudicatory and dispositional hearing, 
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and the evidence from both stages may be intertwined. See In re S.M.M., 374 N.C. 
911, 915, 845 S.E.2d 8, 12 (2020) (“Although the dispositional evidence was 
intertwined with adjudicatory evidence, a trial court is not required to bifurcate the 
hearing into two distinct stages.”). The trial court must still apply the correct 
standard of proof at each stage of the proceedings. See In re R.B.B., 187 N.C. App. 
639, 643–44, 654 S.E.2d 514, 518 (2007) (stating that a trial court may combine the 
adjudicatory and dispositional stages into one hearing so long as it applies the correct 
evidentiary standard to each stage), disc. rev. denied, 362 N.C. 235, 659 S.E.2d 738 
(2008). Nevertheless, this Court has recognized that even an incorrect recitation of 
the standard of proof may not constitute reversible error where it is not prejudicial. 
See In re L.E.W., 375 N.C. 124, 128, 846 S.E.2d 460, 465 (2020) (concluding that the 
trial court’s incorrect statement that it applied a clear, cogent, and convincing 
evidentiary standard to review a permanency planning order worked in the 
respondent’s favor as it required DSS to present stronger proof than actually 
required, thus rendering any error harmless); see also In re A.J.A.-D., 269 N.C. App. 
677, 837 S.E.2d 483 (2020) (noting that the trial court’s improper designation of the 
“clear, cogent, and convincing” standard of proof to its dispositional findings was 
harmless error since it worked to benefit the respondent by requiring DSS to meet a 
higher burden than would normally apply).   
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¶ 30 
 
Here with respondent’s consent, the trial court consolidated the adjudicatory 
and dispositional hearings. In its written order, the trial court noted that it made its 
findings of fact by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.” The trial court did not, 
however, state in open court or in its order that it recognized that there was no burden 
of proof applicable to the best interests determination at the dispositional stage.  
¶ 31 
 
Despite the trial court’s failure to state the different evidentiary standards 
applied to each portion of the proceeding, the trial court noted that it determined that 
terminating respondent’s rights was in the child’s best interests. It did so after 
assessing each factor listed in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110, finding that: 
38. While [respondent] did appear to have a bond when he 
visited with [Max], it was not a particularly strong 
bond. . . .4 
 
. . . .  
 
40. That the goal of the case is adoption. 
                                            
4 Respondent also challenges as being unsupported by clear, cogent, and convincing 
evidence the portion of finding 38 which stated that “[w]hile [respondent] did appear to have 
a bond when he visited with [Max], it was not a particularly strong bond.” Notably, this 
finding of fact concerns the trial court’s determination of the child’s best interests under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) and was not necessary to the trial court’s conclusion that a ground 
existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights.  
We review this argument as a challenge to one of the trial court’s dispositional 
findings. Respondent notes that there was testimony in the record that respondent interacted 
appropriately with Max and that their visits were positive. Notably, this evidence that 
respondent cites does not concern the strength of the bond between respondent and Max. 
Importantly, the record contains evidence that the bond between respondent and Max could 
not be described as a parent/child bond due to, inter alia, the infrequency of respondent’s 
visits and his general lack of effort. Thus, there is competent evidence in the record that 
supports the trial court’s finding here.  
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
 
41. [Max] resides with his maternal grandfather . . . . In 
that home, [Max’s] two older siblings also reside along with 
[the maternal grandfather’s] paramour . . . . That home is 
a loving, caring, stable, and potentially adoptive home. The 
likelihood 
of 
adoption 
is 
very 
high. 
Terminating 
[respondent’s] 
parental 
rights 
will 
aid 
in 
the 
accomplishment of the permanent plan of adoption. [Max] 
cannot be adopted unless [respondent] consent[s] to an 
adoption or [his] parental rights are terminated. During 
observations of [Max] in [the maternal grandfather and his 
paramour’s] residence, he appears happy and very 
attached to everyone who resides there. Terminating 
[respondent’s] parental rights is in the child’s best interest. 
 
¶ 32 
 
Therefore, it is clear that the trial court understood what it must consider when 
determining the best interests of the child. Moreover, even if the trial court applied 
the wrong evidentiary standard, respondent has not shown he was prejudiced by the 
trial court’s failure to articulate the lower standard employed for the dispositional 
phase. Applying a “clear, cogent, and convincing” standard to the dispositional phase 
here meant that the trial court would have required YFS to overcome a heightened 
standard to show that terminating respondent’s rights was in the child’s best 
interests. See In re L.E.W., 375 N.C. at 128, 846 S.E.2d at 465. Thus, respondent’s 
argument is overruled.  
¶ 33 
 
As such, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental 
rights.  
AFFIRMED.