Title: Commonwealth v. Pierre
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12154
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 15, 2020

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SJC-12154 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KERON PIERRE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 4, 2020. - December 15, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Prior misconduct, Testimony before grand 
jury, Prior inconsistent statement, Impeachment of 
credibility, Cross-examination, Consciousness of guilt.  
Witness, Impeachment.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, 
Assistance of counsel, Cross-examination by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on January 12, 2010. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Jeffrey A. Locke, J. 
 
 
 
Alan J. Black for the defendant. 
 
Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  On March 29, 2009, Chantal Palmer, Shakora 
Gaines, Anthony Peoples and Sharon Headley were sitting in a 
                     
 
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death.  Justice Lenk participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
Nissan vehicle outside an after-hours establishment in Boston 
when five men, at least three of whom --the defendant, Devon 
Boswell, and Nigel Nichols -- were armed, walked around the 
corner of the building and in front of the vehicle.  They 
approached the driver's side and attempted to converse with the 
women.  The women did not respond.  The defendant asked the 
driver for her telephone number.  When she said she would not 
provide it, he pushed aside another of the men and fired nine 
rounds into the vehicle, killing Palmer, Gaines, and Peoples.  
Headley, who had been in the front passenger seat, ducked when 
the shooting started and later was able to jump from the vehicle 
and run behind a parked van where she remained until the men had 
gone. 
 
The defendant was indicted on three counts of murder in the 
first degree, one count of armed assault with intent to murder, 
and unlawful possession of a firearm.  He was tried and 
convicted of all charges.  In this direct appeal, the defendant 
claims prejudicial error in the admission of prior bad act 
evidence and the substantive use of prior inconsistent grand 
jury testimony by one trial witness.  The defendant contends as 
well that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance 
when his trial counsel declined to pursue the use of certain 
impeachment evidence against one witness after his initial 
objection.  In addition, the defendant argues that the 
3 
 
 
prosecutor's impermissible cross-examination of the defendant as 
to why he had not returned to the United States to defend 
himself from suspicion of having been the shooter violated his 
rights under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
and impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from the 
Commonwealth to him.  The defendant also asks us to exercise our 
extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the 
verdict or to grant him a new trial.  For the reasons that 
follow, we affirm the defendant's convictions and decline to 
exercise our authority to grant extraordinary relief. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts presented to the 
jury in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, leaving 
particular facts for later discussion as necessary to address 
specific arguments. 
 
a.  Commonwealth's case.  Two witnesses -- Headley, who had 
been in the Nissan but escaped uninjured, and Boswell,2 who had 
known the defendant for about one year and who formed part of 
                     
 
2 Boswell testified pursuant to a cooperation agreement.  In 
exchange for his testimony, the Commonwealth agreed to dismiss 
indictments charging Boswell with a nonfatal shooting in Boston 
that took place in March 2010, a year after the events at issue 
here. 
 
 
In addition, Boswell entered into an immunity agreement 
with Rhode Island authorities to testify in a double homicide.  
In that case, Nichols was charged with shooting into an occupied 
vehicle occupied by three people, killing two of them.  Rhode 
Island authorities granted Boswell immunity from prosecution for 
another nonfatal shooting. 
4 
 
 
the group of five at the victims' vehicle -- gave detailed and 
comprehensive testimony about the shooting and its immediate 
aftermath.  Other partygoers described parts of the events in 
less detail but consistent with these descriptions. 
 
The events took place outside an unofficial after-hours 
establishment run by a husband and wife from their home in the 
Dorchester section of Boston.  They hosted parties on Friday and 
Saturday evenings in the basement of their home, where they also 
sold take-out food.  The parties generally continued until about 
3 A.M.  Guests parked where they could find space in the 
residential neighborhood. 
 
In the early morning hours of March 29, 2009, two groups of 
guests converged at the house.  The first group, which included 
Gaines, Palmer, Peoples, Headley, and Terrence Johnson, arrived 
in a white Nissan driven by Palmer.  The three women and Peoples 
had been at a club in Boston where they encountered Johnson, a 
close friend of Peoples, and all five decided to go to the 
after-hours party.  Palmer parked around the corner from the 
house, and the occupants of the Nissan walked to the house and 
went into the basement.  The second group, consisting of the 
defendant and two of his friends, Devon Boswell and Nigel 
Nichols, arrived at some point after having driven from a club 
in Providence.  Boswell drove his own vehicle, while Nichols and 
the defendant arrived in Nichols's vehicle.  The two groups did 
5 
 
 
not interact with each other while they were in the house; 
indeed, none of the people in the first group had ever met the 
defendant before the night of the shooting. 
 
Gaines, Palmer, Peoples, and Headley left the party 
sometime around 4 A.M.  As they were getting ready to leave, 
they realized that Johnson was no longer with them.  They walked 
to the Nissan, and Palmer then drove to the front of the house 
and stopped in the middle of the street to wait for Johnson.  
Headley was in the front passenger's seat, Peoples was in the 
rear passenger's seat behind Palmer, and Gaines was seated 
behind Headley; Peoples intended to telephone Johnson to come 
meet them. 
 
As they pulled up in front of the house, a group of at 
least five men, including the defendant, Boswell, and Nichols, 
came around the corner from the party and approached the 
driver's side of the white Nissan; the defendant was wearing a 
sleeveless white T-shirt, and Boswell was wearing a gray 
"hoodie."  The men, at least three of whom were carrying 
firearms (the defendant, Boswell, and Nichols), attempted to 
talk to the women.  Boswell, who was standing between the front 
and rear doors on the driver's side, put his hands on the 
Nissan.  The defendant was close to and slightly behind Boswell. 
 
The group of men attempted to start a conversation with the 
women by asking, "What's good ladies?" or "What's good girls?"  
6 
 
 
The women did not respond.  From the rear seat, Peoples told the 
men, "They're good, they're straight."  The defendant asked 
Palmer for her telephone number, but she declined to provide it.  
Peoples then asked the men, "Can you please back up off the 
car?"  When they did not move, he said, "Back the fuck off the 
car." 
 
The defendant responded by pushing Boswell out of the way 
and saying to Peoples, "What, n--?  We're strapped."  He then 
produced a handgun and pointed it at Peoples for three or four 
seconds, while Peoples looked at him.  When Peoples turned his 
head away, the defendant shot him, then turned the weapon and 
fired at Palmer in the front seat.  The defendant leaned in and 
continued firing, while Boswell ran to his vehicle as the 
defendant continued shooting. 
 
When she heard the first shot, Headley ducked; from her 
vantage point in the front passenger's seat, she had been able 
to see only the shooter's torso.  She told police that the 
shooter had been wearing a white T-shirt and added that she 
could see his arms so the shirt was sleeveless.  After the shots 
ended, Headley was able to jump out of the vehicle and run for 
cover (a parked van), where she stayed a few minutes before 
returning to the after-party to get help.  She was examined at 
the scene and found to be physically unharmed, but when she got 
7 
 
 
to the police station, she discovered that one of the bullets 
had passed through her leather jacket, leaving two bullet holes. 
 
The medical examiner later determined that Palmer had 
sustained four bullet wounds to her neck and torso, which, 
combined, caused her death; Gaines had sustained four bullet 
wounds to her torso and her arm, with the wound to her torso 
being fatal; and Peoples had sustained five bullet wounds, of 
which the wound to his torso was fatal.  Most of the injuries 
moved from the left to the right sides of the victims' bodies; 
all of the shell casings and projectiles found in the vehicle or 
next to it had been fired by the same .40 caliber weapon. 
 
On March 30, 2009, the day after the shootings, at the 
defendant's request, his fiancée's mother purchased for him an 
airline ticket to Trinidad, leaving on April 2 and returning on 
April 24, 2009.  The defendant had a son in Trinidad, and he 
generally visited the country two times a year for three to five 
weeks.  His fiancée's mother testified that the defendant had 
been paying her for the ticket over time, starting in March, for 
a planned trip in April.  After a while, she realized that the 
defendant had not returned as scheduled, although he assured her 
during their telephone calls that he would be returning.  
Ultimately, the defendant remained in Trinidad until he was 
extradited to the United States in 2013 so that he could be 
tried in this case. 
8 
 
 
 
b.  Defendant's case.  The defendant testified on his own 
behalf.  He said that he had gone to the after-hours party with 
Nichols and Boswell, a party he had attended frequently, and had 
arrived after 3 A.M.  He had not had a firearm with him, nor had 
he been in possession of a firearm on any previous occasion.  
The defendant had arrived at the party wearing a black button-
down shirt with a purple pattern, but he had taken it off while 
waiting in line to buy food because it had been hot in the 
basement and someone named "Yellows" had spilled a drink on it.  
The defendant had been wearing a white tank top under his dress 
shirt.  At some point, Boswell joined the party.  He, too, was 
wearing a white "body-builder T-shirt." 
 
Once he received his take-out food, the defendant put on 
his black shirt and told Nichols he was ready to leave.  Nichols 
was busy talking to a woman and did not want to leave at that 
point.  Boswell also remained in the basement.  Nichols gave the 
defendant his keys, and the defendant left to wait in Nichols's 
car.  The defendant sat in the vehicle, with the heat on, 
listening to music, until Nichols returned approximately fifteen 
minutes later.  While the two were driving away, Nichols 
telephoned Boswell using the defendant's cellular telephone 
because his had no charge.  Nichols asked Boswell in an agitated 
fashion, "What's that all about?", and then "Well, is it 
finished?"  Despite the defendant's questions and Nichols's 
9 
 
 
evident agitation, Nichols refused to explain the nature of the 
problem. 
 
After the defendant had been extradited, Boswell telephoned 
him at the jail to explain that Boswell falsely accused him of 
being the shooter because Boswell mistakenly had believed that 
he could not be extradited from Trinidad.  Boswell said that he 
had been forced to implicate the defendant in order to get out 
of a situation. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant asserts that errors in 
certain of the judge's evidentiary rulings (on the introduction 
of prior bad act evidence and the substantive use of a witness's 
grand jury testimony); ineffective assistance by defense counsel 
because he failed to pursue efforts to introduce specific 
impeachment evidence; and improprieties in the prosecutor's 
cross-examination of the defendant require a new trial.  We do 
not agree. 
 
a.  Defendant's prior possession of a firearm.  The 
defendant argues that the judge erred in allowing the 
introduction of testimony by two witnesses regarding the 
defendant's possession of a firearm on two occasions months 
before the shootings during games of cards or dominos.  The 
prosecutor filed a motion in limine to permit these witnesses to 
testify.  In one instance, he pointed it at the witness's face 
in a "joking" manner. 
10 
 
 
 
The first witness testified that at a long-standing game of 
dominos in October or November of 2008, while sitting at the 
table, the defendant was "toying with a gun" and then pointed it 
"directly at" her.  The witness "got on his case for pointing it 
directly at [her], playing around," as did other players.  She 
described the firearm as "a black handgun" that was not a 
revolver.  While couched in layman's terms, her description made 
clear that she understood the distinction.  Immediately 
following this testimony, the judge instructed the jury that 
they could consider the evidence only to show "the defendant's 
access to or familiarity with handguns," and not to show "the 
defendant's character or to his propensity to commit crime." 
 
The second witness, who, like the first, had met the 
defendant at a game of dominos a few months earlier, testified 
that, "[a] couple of months" before the shooting, the defendant 
had been playing cards in the kitchen.  During the game, the 
defendant took out and displayed "a black handgun."  Immediately 
after this testimony, as well as in the final charge, the judge 
gave proper limiting instructions. 
 
The defendant sought to exclude the testimony as improper 
propensity evidence.  He argued that it would be used only to 
show a propensity to commit crimes; it portrayed him as violent 
and law-breaking; and that there was no evidence the particular 
firearm had been used in the shootings.  The judge found that 
11 
 
 
the evidence of the defendant's prior possession of a firearm 
"similar in appearance and design to the weapon at issue in this 
case" was admissible to demonstrate "the defendant's access to 
and familiarity with firearms."  The judge determined as well 
that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its 
potential for unfair prejudice, and therefore allowed the 
Commonwealth's motion. 
 
Evidence is not admissible if its purpose is solely "to 
show the defendant's bad character or propensity to commit the 
charged offense."  See Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 
532 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Snyder, 475 Mass. 445, 456 
(2016).  Evidence related to prior bad acts may be admissible, 
however, for other purposes, including "to show that the 
defendant ha[d] the means to commit the crime."  See 
Commonwealth v. Ridge, 455 Mass. 307, 322 (2009), citing 
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 448 Mass. 548, 560 (2007). 
 
Evidence regarding a weapon that "could have been used in 
the course of a crime is admissible, in the judge's discretion, 
even without direct proof that the particular weapon was in fact 
used in the commission of the crime."  Holley, 478 Mass. at 533, 
quoting Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 156 (2014).  See 
Commonwealth v. Corliss, 470 Mass. 443, 449-450 (2015) (trial 
judge properly allowed introduction of evidence of defendant's 
access to firearm that could have been used to commit robbery).  
12 
 
 
Evidence of previous possession of a firearm other than the one 
used to commit the crime also may be admissible "to show that 
the defendant had access to or knowledge of firearms."  See 
McGee, supra at 157, citing Ridge, 455 Mass. at 322–323. 
 
Nonetheless, "[e]ven if the evidence is relevant to one of 
these other purposes, the evidence will not be admitted if its 
probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to 
the defendant."  Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 
(2014).  Because the defendant objected at trial, we consider 
the introduction of this evidence for abuse of discretion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Tassinari, 466 Mass. 340, 353 (2013). 
 
The judge determined that the evidence of a firearm that 
was "similar in appearance and design to the [murder] weapon" 
was admissible to demonstrate "the defendant's access to and 
familiarity with firearms."  The probative value of this 
evidence, he concluded, outweighed its potential for unfair 
prejudice.  See McGee, 467 Mass. at 157.  There was no abuse of 
discretion in the judge's decision to allow the introduction of 
evidence concerning a weapon that could have been the one used 
in the shooting, and to show more generally that the defendant 
had access to and familiarity with firearms. 
 
The defendant argues that the evidence had little probative 
value because "it was undisputed that the two separate 
incidences involving two separate guns involved guns that were 
13 
 
 
not the murder weapon."  "Where a weapon definitively could not 
have been used in the commission of the crime, [this court has] 
generally [has] cautioned against admission of evidence related 
to it."  Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 122 (2012).  
This is because the prejudicial impact on the jury is likely to 
outweigh the "tenuous relevancy of evidence of a person's 
general acquaintance with weapons."  Commonwealth v. Toro, 395 
Mass. 354, 358 (1985). 
 
The defendant's characterization of the evidence, however, 
overstates its nature.  At trial, the prosecutor indeed did 
concede that there was no evidence that the weapons the 
witnesses saw in the defendant's possession at the dominos games 
were the same as the one used in the shootings.  That, however, 
would not have been the proper test even if the weapon had been 
admitted for the purpose of showing access to the means to have 
committed the killings.  See McGee, 467 Mass. at 156.  The 
purpose for which the judge allowed the testimony to be admitted 
did not depend on which particular weapon or type of weapon had 
been in the defendant's possession; the purpose was merely to 
show the defendant's knowledge of and access to firearms. 
 
Moreover, while there was no evidence that the firearm that 
the two witnesses saw was the murder weapon, equally there was 
no evidence that it was not, and, based on the descriptions of 
the black firearm that was not a revolver, it could have been 
14 
 
 
the one used in the shootings in this case.  Both witnesses 
described the weapon the defendant had been holding as black, 
and one explained that it was not a revolver.  The parties 
stipulated that the weapon used in the shootings, which was 
introduced in evidence, was a black semiautomatic handgun.  
Thus, the weapon the witnesses saw in the defendant's possession 
months before the shooting generally matched the description of 
the firearm at issue in this case.  Contrast Commonwealth v. 
Collazo, 481 Mass. 498, 501-502 (2019) (error to permit 
admission of evidence that defendant possessed second firearm 
that could not have been murder weapon); Commonwealth v. Imbert, 
479 Mass. 575, 585 (2018) (error where weapon definitely could 
not have been used in commission of offense). 
 
In addition, any risk of unfair prejudice was reduced by 
the Commonwealth's limited use of the evidence.  The prosecutor 
did not dwell on the defendant's handling of the weapon either 
during the evidentiary portion of the trial or at closing 
argument.  The relevant testimony by both witnesses consists of 
approximately five transcript pages.  Neither the witnesses' 
testimony, nor the prosecutor's characterization of the 
defendant's behavior while he was displaying the firearm at the 
dominos games, suggested that it had been threatening.  Rather, 
the prosecutor observed that "they saw [the defendant] with a 
gun on a prior occasion.  Forget it.  Forget about the gun on 
15 
 
 
the prior occasion.  It's only offered for a limited purpose 
anyway." 
 
Thus, there was no abuse of discretion in the judge's 
decision to allow the introduction of the evidence of the 
defendant's possession of a firearm on two prior occasions. 
 
b.  Prior inconsistent statements.  The defendant contends 
that the judge abused his discretion in allowing the 
Commonwealth to introduce Johnson's grand jury testimony as 
substantive evidence.  The defendant argues that introduction of 
the grand jury minutes as substantive evidence was error because 
the Commonwealth did not establish the necessary prerequisites 
for the substantive admission at trial of the prior inconsistent 
statement before the grand jury, as set forth in Commonwealth v. 
Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 73-74 (1984). 
 
When a witness gives testimony at trial that is 
inconsistent with that witness's prior testimony before the 
grand jury, the testimony before the grand jury may be admitted 
substantively at trial if two conditions are met:  (1) "the 
witness can be effectively cross-examined as to the accuracy of 
the statement," and (2) "the statement was not coerced and was 
more than a mere confirmation or denial of an allegation by the 
interrogator."  Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 466 Mass. 742, 754-
755, cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1125 (2014), quoting Daye, 393 Mass. 
16 
 
 
at 75.3  See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(A) (2020).  Prior 
inconsistent statements are not limited to instances of direct 
and clear contradiction.  Rather, prior testimony is 
inconsistent if, when, "taken as a whole, either by what it says 
or by what it omits to say, [it] affords some indication that 
the fact was different from the testimony of the witness."  See 
Daye, supra at 73 n.16, quoting Commonwealth v. Simmonds, 386 
Mass. 234, 242 (1982). 
 
Johnson testified before the grand jury that he had left 
the after-hours party in the basement and came around the corner 
of the house to see an African-American man in a white 
sleeveless shirt shooting into a vehicle, and that sparks were 
"flashing" in front of the man while this was happening.  When 
Johnson was approached about testifying at the defendant's 
trial, he requested immunity because a portion of his trial 
testimony would be that he had not been truthful before the 
grand jury.  The Commonwealth, as a result, granted Johnson 
immunity for his testimony at the defendant's trial. 
                     
 
3 In Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 75 (1984), this 
court explained that the Commonwealth must present "other 
evidence tending to prove the issue . . . presented."  In 
Commonwealth v. Clements, 436 Mass. 190, 193 (2002), however, we 
clarified that, although the first two requirements concern 
admissibility, the need for corroborating evidence is relevant 
to the separate question of the sufficiency of the evidence. 
17 
 
 
 
On direct examination, Johnson testified that he never saw 
the man in the white T-shirt shooting at the vehicle stopped in 
the middle of the road.  Rather, Johnson explained, his grand 
jury testimony actually had been an account of the incident that 
had been provided to him by Alvin Leacock,4 which Johnson then 
told to a friend.  On cross-examination, Johnson testified that 
he had lied to the grand jury under pressure, because he was 
being threatened with incarceration if he did not explain that 
he had seen the man in the white T-shirt shooting into the 
vehicle that had been standing in the road.  Johnson explained 
that police had told him that if he did not tell the grand jury 
"what I told my friend," the police "were going to put me in 
jail." 
 
The defendant argues that Johnson could not be cross-
examined effectively because Johnson did not remember the 
underlying events, and also did not remember testifying before 
the grand jury.5  "When the witness at trial has no recollection 
                     
 
4 At the time, Leacock's father was dating Johnson's aunt, 
and Johnson described Leacock as his "cousin." 
 
 
5 Although counsel raised this issue at trial, this does not 
appear to be a case where the judge found that the witness was 
feigning a lack of memory of the underlying events.  See 
Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 481 Mass. 641, 660–661 (2019); 
Commonwealth v. Andrade, 481 Mass. 139, 142 (2018).  The record 
on this point is somewhat confusing.  The prosecutor initially 
asked for a finding of loss of memory.  When the prosecutor 
showed Johnson his grand jury testimony, however, Johnson, while 
asserting that he did not remember his testimony before the 
18 
 
 
of the events to which the statement [before the grand jury] 
relates, [the] requirement of an opportunity for meaningful 
cross-examination is not met."  Commonwealth v. McGhee, 472 
Mass. 405, 422 (2015), quoting Daye, 393 Mass. at 73.  The 
defendant overstates Johnson's lack of memory about that night.  
Certainly, there are places in the testimony where Johnson's 
recollection is uncertain, and where he made broad statements 
such as, "I don't remember that night."  Johnson was clear, 
however, on the key points for effective cross-examination:  his 
reasons for having lied to the grand jury and his statement that 
he did not see what he claimed to have seen. 
 
Moreover, during his trial testimony, Johnson also 
testified to important details about the night of the shooting.  
He said, inter alia, that Palmer had picked him up and they had 
driven to the after-hours party in her white vehicle.  At the 
party, Johnson became separated from Peoples and the three 
women, and Leacock came to get him from the basement.  Johnson 
testified that he and Leacock were walking toward the front of 
the house and saw a group of people standing around the white 
vehicle; the driver's side was closer to the party house.  None 
                     
grand jury, agreed that he must have said what was written in 
the transcript; the prosecutor then indicated that he was 
satisfied with the testimony.  Because Johnson effectively had 
adopted his grand jury testimony, the prosecutor stopped 
pursuing any finding as to a loss of memory. 
19 
 
 
of the people standing near the automobile was wearing a 
sleeveless white T-shirt.  Johnson testified that he then heard 
gunshots and ran behind the house with Leacock. 
 
While case law is scant concerning the question of just how 
detailed a recollection of the underlying events a witness must 
retain in order effectively to be cross-examined, Johnson's 
testimony certainly does not evince "no recollection."  See 
Daye, 393 Mass. at 73.  More importantly, Johnson's trial 
testimony was sufficient to delineate what Johnson had been able 
to see on the night of the shooting, as well as the accuracy of 
Johnson's grand jury testimony.  See id. (opportunity for 
effective cross-examination existed where witness "testified as 
to the circumstances of his presence at the scene of the 
shooting and as to the accuracy of his statement to the grand 
jury").  Thus, it was not only possible that Johnson 
theoretically could have been effectively cross-examined; the 
transcript shows that counsel actually did so. 
 
The second Daye criterion that must be established is that 
the prior inconsistent statement be "'that of the witness, 
rather than the interrogator,' i.e., the statement must not be 
coerced."  Commonwealth v. Stewart, 454 Mass. 527, 533 (2009), 
quoting Daye, 393 Mass. at 74-75.  The judge reviewed the grand 
jury transcripts and determined that the Commonwealth had met 
this requirement.  The judge explained, 
20 
 
 
"I find that the manner of questioning and the answers 
given by Mr. Johnson, the manner in which he testified, are 
such that the Commonwealth would be permitted under the 
principles of Commonwealth v. Daye to make use of the grand 
jury testimony. . . . I find that the information given was 
not merely the response to either suggestive or leading 
questioning as to critical events, but rather the questions 
put to Mr. Johnson appear fairly open-ended, allowing the 
witness to provide his version of what he had done and 
observed." 
 
The defendant does not dispute the judge's finding.  Thus, the 
defendant's claim that Johnson's grand jury testimony was that 
of the interrogator is unavailing. 
 
Moreover, the issue of coercion was not raised prior to the 
judge's ruling that Johnson's grand jury testimony was 
admissible substantively.  On cross-examination, Johnson 
asserted that police had threated to put him in jail if he did 
not testify to the version of events supplied by Leacock.  The 
defendant did not ask the judge to reconsider his ruling in 
light of this testimony concerning coercion.  See Commonwealth 
v. McDonagh, 480 Mass. 131, 137-138 (2018) (counsel was required 
to raise basis for objection in order to bring asserted error to 
judge's attention).  The judge, therefore, was deprived of an 
opportunity to assess the validity of Johnson's claim that his 
grand jury testimony had been the product of police coercion.  
See Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 293-294 (2002). 
 
In any event, Johnson's grand jury testimony that the 
shooter had been wearing a white sleeveless T-shirt could not 
21 
 
 
have caused prejudice for the defendant, regardless of its 
admissibility.  It was cumulative of Headley's and Boswell's 
testimony concerning the shooter's clothing.  Johnson did not 
otherwise recognize or identify the defendant as the person in 
the white shirt.  The testimony also effectively was cast into 
doubt on cross-examination, where Johnson said repeatedly that 
his grand jury testimony had been a coerced lie. 
 
c.  Failure to impeach witness concerning pending criminal 
charges.  Leacock testified before the grand jury that, towards 
the end of the after-hours party, as Palmer, Peoples, Headley, 
and Gaines were waiting in their vehicle, Leacock went back down 
to the basement to retrieve Johnson and bring him to his 
friends.  Leacock testified that, immediately before he heard 
the shots fired, he saw a man in a white shirt standing near the 
vehicle.  Leacock did not see the man actively shooting, and did 
not notice whether the white shirt had sleeves.  On cross-
examination, Leacock testified that many people at the party had 
been wearing white T-shirts. 
 
Well after his grand jury testimony, Leacock was indicted 
on charges of money laundering and conspiracy to defraud the 
United States in conjunction with an incident in which he tried 
to bring $400,000 into the United States, undeclared, through 
Logan Airport.  Before Leacock was to testify at the defendant's 
trial, the Commonwealth moved to exclude any evidence of this 
22 
 
 
indictment for impeachment purposes.  The prosecutor noted that 
Leacock would not be testifying under any agreement with the 
Commonwealth and had not been offered any promises, rewards, or 
inducements for his testimony.  While the judge initially 
appeared to agree with the Commonwealth, he then mused that it 
could be appropriate to allow impeachment with the then-pending 
money laundering charges to show that Leacock "might feel that 
he might obtain some sort of benefit [from the Federal 
government] as a result of testifying favorably . . . ."  See 
McGhee, 472 Mass. at 424-425 (evidence of pending criminal 
charges is admissible for impeachment purposes within trial 
judge's discretion in order to demonstrate witness's bias or 
motive to curry favor with government). 
 
Defense counsel stated that, as long as Leacock's testimony 
at trial was consistent with his grand jury testimony, counsel 
would not raise the issue of the Federal prosecution.  Defense 
counsel did not attempt to impeach Leacock with the implication 
that, by his testimony, he might be attempting to obtain a 
favorable result in his Federal case.  Counsel also did not ask 
the judge to reconsider his ruling on impeachment, despite the 
judge's previous reservation of a decision on the question.  
There is no suggestion that Leacock's trial testimony was 
inconsistent with his grand jury testimony; to the contrary, the 
record indicates that, at trial, both the defendant and the 
23 
 
 
Commonwealth were satisfied with Leacock's testimony and viewed 
it as consistent with his grand jury testimony. 
 
The defendant claims generally that the preceding events 
violated his rights to confront the witnesses against him under 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; it is 
unclear whether, in his view, it was the action of the judge, 
his counsel, or some combination that infringed upon that right.  
Although the particular legal basis upon which the defendant 
intended to rely is unclear, all of the conceivable bases are 
unavailing. 
 
The decisions the defendant cites in support of his 
arguments are inapposite because, in each, the judge made a 
definitive ruling that limited or eliminated the defendant's 
right to cross-examine.  See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 310-
313, 317-320 (1974) (judge barred cross-examination on juvenile 
witness's probation status); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 
401, 406-407 (1965) (full deprivation of right to cross-examine 
absent witness where previous testimony of that witness, which 
had not been subject to cross-examination, had been introduced); 
Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 693-694 (1931) 
(prejudicial error to preclude cross-examination showing witness 
was incarcerated and therefore could have motive to curry 
favor).  Here, by contrast, the judge ultimately did not rule on 
trial counsel's initial opposition, which counsel in any event 
24 
 
 
did not pursue when Leacock's testimony was introduced.  For 
this reason, the defendant's claim properly sounds as one for 
ineffective assistance of counsel, either for precipitously 
withdrawing the objection, or for not cross-examining Leacock 
about his then-pending Federal case. 
 
When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in a case subject to review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
we review for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 62 (2018).  
"Impeachment of a witness is, by its very nature, fraught with a 
host of strategic considerations, to which [this court] will, 
even on § 33E review, still show deference" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Moore, 480 Mass. 799, 815 (2018). 
 
Here, Leacock's testimony was of limited value to the 
Commonwealth, particularly because he did not claim to have seen 
the shooting, nor could he state whether the shirt the shooter 
had been wearing had had sleeves.  Leacock also testified, 
contrary to the Commonwealth's theory, that many other 
individuals also had been wearing white T-shirts that night.  
Any effectiveness from using the pending Federal charges to 
impeach Leacock would have been substantially undercut by the 
fact that Leacock testified before the grand jury months prior 
to his arrest on Federal charges, and Leacock's testimony at 
trial was entirely consistent with his grand jury testimony.  
25 
 
 
Nothing in the record suggests Leacock's testimony was given in 
order to curry favor with Federal or State officials.  Further, 
there is no indication that, had Leacock's testimony not been 
before the jury, its absence would have had any impact on their 
thinking.  In sum, there was no substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice from counsel's decision not to attempt to 
impeach Leacock with his prior grand jury testimony. 
 
d.  Prearrest silence.  The defendant argues that certain 
of the prosecutor's questions during cross-examination of the 
defendant, as well as the prosecutor's discussion of those 
answers in closing argument, resulted in a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
During cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecutor 
asked three separate times why the defendant had not returned to 
the United States in order to clear his name once he learned 
from the Internet or direct telephone calls from friends about 
the stories that were circulating regarding his purported 
involvement in the shootings. 
 
The Commonwealth concedes that these questions, and the 
exploitation of them in closing argument, was error and should 
not have been allowed.  As the Commonwealth argues, however, the 
error did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice. 
26 
 
 
 
The prosecutor asked a series of questions designed to 
imply that the defendant remained in Trinidad, despite his 
awareness that he was being investigated in relation to the 
shootings, due to consciousness of guilt.  The questioning 
implied that the defendant had had an obligation to "clear his 
name." 
 
There were several particularly problematic questions.  
First, the prosecutor asked, "[Y]ou decided that you were going 
to stay in Trinidad and not come back and clear your name?"  He 
then asked, "You said that you were being accused on the 
Internet of doing this thing [in Boston].  Did you do anything 
while you were there [in Trinidad] to clear your name?"  
Unprompted by defense counsel, the judge, sua sponte, gave a 
limiting instruction.  The judge explained, 
"a person accused of a crime has no burden of disproving 
that crime in any way. . . .  [Y]ou may consider the 
questions put to [the defendant] by [the prosecutor] in 
this regard of doing something or not doing anything 
insofar as you assess the credibility of this particular 
witness's testimony, but not as implying that there is any 
affirmative obligation on [the defendant's] part to have to 
do anything." 
 
 
A defendant's decision not to speak with police, or not to 
comply with a police request for an interview, may not be used 
as substantive evidence of consciousness of guilt.  See 
Commonwealth v. Conkey, 430 Mass. 139, 141 (1999), S.C., 443 
Mass. 60 (2004) and 452 Mass. 1022 (2008) ("evidence of a 
27 
 
 
defendant's refusal to comply with a police request may not be 
admitted because in so refusing a defendant furnishes evidence 
against himself, and admission of that evidence would violate 
art. 12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights]").  
Therefore, insofar as the judge instructed that the jury could 
not consider the defendant's purported failure to "clear his 
name" as evidence of consciousness of guilt, or as any other 
type of substantive evidence, the first part of the instruction 
was correct.  The second part of the instruction, however, was 
erroneous, further compounding the error. 
 
If a defendant chooses to testify at trial, the defendant's 
prearrest silence may be used, in certain circumstances, for 
impeachment purposes.  See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 
239 (1980).  See also Commonwealth v. Gardner, 479 Mass. 764, 
768-769 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 386 Mass. 54, 
59 (1982).  "[I]mpeachment of a defendant with the fact of his 
pre-arrest silence should be approached with caution, and, 
wherever it is undertaken, it should be prefaced by a proper 
demonstration that it was 'natural' to expect the defendant to 
speak in the circumstances."  Gardner, supra at 770, quoting 
Nickerson, supra at 62. 
 
In Gardner, 479 Mass. at 767-768, the defendant testified 
that he met the victim in order to complete a drug transaction, 
but a fight broke out and the defendant killed the victim in 
28 
 
 
self-defense.  We concluded that it would not have been natural 
for the defendant to contact the police, as doing so would have 
furnished evidence against him regarding the victim's death and 
regarding various other crimes.  See id. at 772.  See also 
Commonwealth v. Niemic, 472 Mass. 665, 673 (2015), S.C., 483 
Mass. 571 (2019) (defendant, who claimed self-defense at trial, 
would not naturally have contacted police prior to arrest).  
Conversely, in Commonwealth v. Barnoski, 418 Mass. 523, 534 
(1994), the defendant testified that his friend had been shot by 
the friend's son, that the son then threatened the defendant's 
wife, and that, when the defendant intervened, the gun went off, 
hitting the son.  We held that it would have been natural for 
the defendant to contact the police to get help for the father, 
who had not yet died.  See id. at 536-537. 
 
Here, the defendant argues that it would not have been 
natural for him to contact the police to give his side of the 
story.  The defendant asserts that he "had reasons for not 
coming home, such as exercising his right to a full and fair 
extradition proceeding under the law."  The Commonwealth 
concedes this point.  Unlike in Barnoski, 418 Mass. at 534, 
there was no immediate danger to another that could have created 
an incentive to contact the police to get help.  Therefore, the 
introduction of the testimony as impeachment evidence was an 
abuse of discretion, and the instruction that the jury could 
29 
 
 
consider that testimony for impeachment purposes was error.  See 
Gardner, 479 Mass. at 772; Niemic, 472 Mass. at 673.  Because 
the defendant did not object at trial, we review for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
The Commonwealth maintains, by contrast, that there was no 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice for two 
reasons.  First, the judge's instruction cured any error.  As 
stated, however, the instruction only foreclosed the use of the 
testimony as substantive evidence of guilt.  The instruction 
specifically told the jury that they could use the testimony to 
assess the defendant's credibility, precisely the use prohibited 
by Gardner, 479 Mass. at 772; Niemic, 472 Mass. at 673; and 
Nickerson, 386 Mass. at 60. 
 
The Commonwealth notes that the impermissible questioning 
was wrapped up in a longer thread of questioning regarding the 
defendant's trip to Trinidad.  The mother of the defendant's 
fiancée purchased a plane ticket to Trinidad for the defendant 
on the day after the shootings, and he flew there three days 
later.  The defendant did not use the return ticket some weeks 
later, and he remained in Trinidad until his arrest and 
extradition.  This line of questioning was proper evidence of 
consciousness of guilt.  See Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 
291, 309-310 (2014).  The erroneous questioning regarding the 
defendant's failure to "clear his name" was to some extent 
30 
 
 
cumulative of the properly admitted evidence that the defendant 
fled, arguably to avoid apprehension.  See Commonwealth v. 
Thompson, 431 Mass. 108, 117, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 864 (2000) 
(improper impeachment based on prearrest silence did not create 
substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice partly because 
evidence was cumulative with other, properly admitted evidence). 
 
Another factor, not raised by the parties, weighs against 
ordering a new trial on this ground.  In his direct examination, 
prior to the impermissible questioning at issue, the defendant 
testified that, shortly after his arrival in Trinidad, a Boston 
police detective telephoned him.  The detective informed the 
defendant that he was "wanted in Boston for a triple murder," 
and asked the defendant when he was returning from Trinidad.  
The defendant testified that this was the first time he had 
heard about the accusations, and it took him by surprise.  
Therefore, the basic, impermissible point made by the prosecutor 
regarding the defendant's nonexistent obligation to clear his 
name had been raised obliquely by the defendant himself. 
 
Considering the strength of the evidence against the 
defendant, we conclude that these impermissible comments by the 
prosecutor did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Thompson, 431 Mass. at 116-117 
(testimony that defendant looked at floor for thirty seconds 
without speaking, after being told that his wife was dead, was 
31 
 
 
error, but did not create substantial likelihood of miscarriage 
of justice; "this testimony was a brief event in the course of a 
long trial, cumulative of other evidence that the defendant 
acted in a manner inconsistent with the behavior of an innocent 
person, and there was substantial evidence against the 
defendant" [quotations and citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. 
Springer, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 469, 478 (2000) (no substantial risk 
of miscarriage of justice in case of murder in second degree, 
where impermissible reference "was a vague and fleeting comment" 
[citation omitted]). 
 
e.  Burden shifting.  The defendant also contends that the 
line of questioning about clearing his name constituted 
impermissible burden shifting.  All of the cases he cites in 
support of this proposition, however, involve an assertion or an 
implication by a prosecutor that a defendant failed to meet a 
purported burden at trial.  See Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 
792, 805 (1996) (defendant argued that judge's charge created 
"risk that jurors [would] evaluate the evidence with a burden on 
the defendant"); Commonwealth v. Amirault, 404 Mass. 221, 240 
(1989) (prosecutor argued that "[the defendant] was unable to 
point to one single thing in the whole world that would account 
for why all these children and parents have turned against 
him"); Commonwealth v. Matos, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 352 (2019) 
("prosecutor impermissibly argued that key elements and facts 
32 
 
 
supporting the prosecution's case were undisputed").  See also 
United States v. Glover, 558 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(prosecutor, discussing evidence, stated, "Does it make sense?  
Or turn the question the other way:  Is there anything that 
doesn't make sense" [emphasis in original]). 
 
Here, by contrast, there was no such implication.  Rather, 
the prosecutor implied that the defendant had had an obligation 
prior to arrest to clear his name.  To the extent that the 
prosecutor's comments implied that the defendant had any burden 
at trial, there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice, because the judge immediately and unequivocally 
instructed the jury that the defendant had no burden. 
 
f.  Relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have carefully 
reviewed the record, pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, and discern no reason to order a new trial or to reduce 
the degrees of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.