Title: Brugh v. Jones
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 020852
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 10, 2003

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
DANIEL P. BRUGH 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 020852 
JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
JANUARY 10, 2003 
JOHN LEE JONES  
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 
Robert P. Doherty, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in refusing to admit evidence that the defendant in a personal 
injury action left the scene of the accident. 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
Daniel P. Brugh (“Brugh”) was a passenger in an automobile 
operated by Harvey Leonard Poff (“Poff”) when that vehicle was 
struck from behind by an automobile operated by John Lee Jones 
(“Jones”).  The collision pushed the Poff vehicle 60 to 80 feet 
from the point of impact.  Poff’s vehicle came to rest in a 
parking lot off the road.  Poff left the vehicle to speak with 
Jones; however, Brugh was injured and remained in the 
automobile.  When Poff informed Jones that the police would be 
called to the scene, Jones returned to his automobile and left 
the scene of the accident.  Because Jones abruptly left the 
scene, neither Poff nor Brugh had the opportunity to determine 
the extent of damage to Jones’ automobile.  Apparently, police 
did not locate Jones, but Poff and Brugh located him two weeks 
later.  They discovered that Jones worked in an automobile body 
shop. 
 
Although Jones apparently lied under oath at the criminal 
hearing in the general district court stating that he was not 
the driver of the automobile that struck Poff’s automobile, he 
later admitted in responsive pleadings in the civil action for 
damages that he was the driver of that automobile.  
Additionally, Jones admitted negligence in the operation of his 
vehicle and causation of damages to Brugh, leaving the amount of 
damages as the primary issue at trial. 
 
At trial, Jones introduced photographs of his automobile 
showing no damage to the front of the vehicle.  Brugh sought to 
impeach Jones on cross-examination with evidence that Jones 
abruptly left the scene of the accident in his automobile; 
however, the trial court would not permit any mention of Jones’ 
leaving the scene of the accident.  Subsequently, Brugh sought 
to introduce the same evidence in rebuttal.  Again, the trial 
court refused to permit the introduction of such evidence. 
 
In closing argument, counsel for Jones displayed the 
photographs to the jury and argued that the impact from the 
collision was so slight that there was no damage to Jones’ 
vehicle.  With evidence of $1,318 in uncontroverted medical 
expenses, the jury’s verdict for Brugh was $2,000.  In post-
verdict motions, Brugh sought a new trial, arguing that the 
 
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trial court erred in excluding evidence, by impeachment or 
rebuttal, of Jones’ sudden departure from the scene of the 
accident, thereby depriving Brugh and Poff of the opportunity to 
examine the extent of damage to Jones’ automobile.  Brugh argued 
that the trial court’s error was exploited by counsel for Jones 
when he argued to the jury that the photographs depicted an 
undamaged and unrepaired vehicle, suggesting a low impact 
collision that caused limited personal injury to Brugh.  The 
trial court refused to set aside the verdict and order a new 
trial.  Brugh appeals the adverse judgment of the trial court. 
Analysis 
 
When evidence is offered at trial, it is necessary to 
identify the purpose for its introduction.  While evidence may 
be relevant in that it tends to establish the proposition for 
which it is offered, in order to be admissible, it must also be 
material, meaning that the evidence tends to prove a matter that 
is properly at issue in the case.  Also, otherwise admissible 
evidence may nonetheless be excluded based upon specific rule or 
other statutory or common law considerations. 
 
In this case, Jones admitted liability, leaving as the 
primary issue the quantum of damages.  As we have previously 
noted: 
This does not mean, however, that an admission of 
liability precludes a plaintiff in an action for 
personal injuries from showing how the accident 
 
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happened if such evidence is material and 
relevant to the question of damages.  Where 
liability has been admitted and the only issue to 
be determined is the quantum of damages, the 
force of the impact and the surrounding 
circumstances may be relevant to show the extent 
of plaintiff’s injuries. 
 
Eubank v. Spencer, 203 Va. 923, 925-26, 128 S.E.2d 299, 301-02 
(1962). 
In this case, Brugh and Poff testified about the severity 
of the impact and its relationship to the injuries sustained by 
Brugh.  Jones testified that the impact was slight and offered 
photographs of his automobile without damage as support for his 
testimony.  He stated that the automobile had not been repaired 
after the collision and that the photographs accurately 
represented the condition of his automobile immediately after 
the collision.  The degree of impact was already an issue in the 
case; however, when Jones offered evidence that his automobile 
was not damaged and had not been repaired, he placed into issue 
the reliability of the evidence offered and his own credibility 
on the matter. 
It is apparent from the record that the trial court 
misapprehended the plaintiff’s purpose in offering the evidence. 
Concluding that “[t]he law of the Commonwealth does not allow it 
to be presented in evidence at this time[,]” the trial court 
stated: 
 
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[I]t ought to be admissible that somebody left 
the scene of the accident, ought to be some way 
that damages could be considered by a jury, in 
that a person has a duty of care to see to it 
that someone’s not injured, to render aid and 
assistance if necessary, to be present so that 
the information can be delivered to the police so 
that the accident can be properly investigated. 
 
In this case, Brugh did not seek to offer evidence that 
Jones committed the crime of leaving the scene of an accident, 
often referred to as “hit and run.”  Rather, Brugh sought to 
introduce evidence that Jones abruptly removed his automobile 
from the scene of the accident, thereby precluding immediate 
examination of the vehicle by Brugh and Poff.  Additionally, 
Brugh did not offer the evidence as an independent basis for an 
award of damages.  The evidence was offered in support of 
Brugh’s claim that the impact of the collision was severe and in 
opposition to Jones’ claim that the impact was slight. 
Brugh had established on cross-examination that Jones had 
lied under oath in a prior general district court proceeding 
concerning whether he was the operator of the vehicle.  Two 
weeks after the accident, Brugh and Poff located Jones and the 
vehicle.  The evidence revealed that Jones worked in an 
automobile body repair shop.  Jones denied that the vehicle had 
been repaired.  In this context, the evidence offered was 
probative for the purpose of impeachment on cross-examination 
because credibility of a witness is always a matter properly at 
 
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issue.  The evidence was also probative on rebuttal because the 
condition of Jones’ vehicle had been placed into issue by his 
photographic evidence and his testimony.  
 
We hold that, under the specific circumstances of this 
case, the trial court abused its discretion by holding that as a 
matter of law, evidence of Jones’ abrupt leaving of the scene of 
the accident was inadmissible.  However, upon remand, and should 
there be a new trial, the trial court must apply a balancing 
test to determine whether the probative value of the evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect.  “With regard to the admission 
of evidence, the responsibility for balancing the competing 
considerations of probative value and prejudice rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial court.”  Lombard v. Rohrbaugh, 262 
Va. 484, 492, 551 S.E.2d 349, 353 (2001).  In a civil case 
involving introduction of evidence of conduct that may have been 
unlawful, we stated that “[t]he trial judge, in his discretion, 
had the responsibility of weighing the probative value of the 
evidence on this main issue against its possible prejudicial 
effect in showing [the appellant’s] desire to make an illegal 
payment to an unlicensed agent.”  Seilheimer v. Melville, 224 
Va. 323, 328, 295 S.E.2d 896, 899 (1982). 
 
Finally, Jones maintains that any error committed by the 
trial court was harmless.  We disagree.  With liability and 
causation of damages admitted, the only issue remaining in the 
 
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plaintiff’s case was the quantum of damages.  In this case, the 
quantum of damages was directly tied to the severity of the 
impact in the collision.  The evidence was in conflict on this 
subject.  The evidence sought to be introduced by cross-
examination or by rebuttal that Jones removed his automobile 
from the scene would have discredited Jones’ testimony on a 
major issue in controversy.  If the evidence was admissible, its 
exclusion was not harmless. 
Conclusion 
 
 
For the reasons stated above, we will reverse the judgment 
of the trial court and remand for a new trial. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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