Title: Wisconsin v. Salinas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2013AP002686-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 26, 2016

2016 WI 44 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP2686-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Luis C. Salinas, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 362 Wis. 2d 538, 865 N.W.2d 88 
(Ct. App. 2015 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 26, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 20, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Brown 
 
JUDGE: 
Marc A. Hammer 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON and BRADLEY, A. W., JJ. dissent 
(Opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Katherine D. Lloyd, assistant attorney general, which 
whom on the briefs was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs by Steven D. 
Grunder, assistant state public defender, and oral arguments by 
Steve D. Grunder. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 44
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP2686-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2010CF542) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Luis C. Salinas, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 26, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J.   In this appeal, we are asked 
to determine whether the Brown County Circuit Court erred when 
it granted the State's motion to join intimidation charges 
involving two victims, a mother and her daughter, with already-
pending sexual assault charges where the daughter was the 
victim.  The circuit court1 held that joinder was proper under 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Mark A. Warpinski made the initial joinder 
decision; however, he recused himself on November 9, 2011. 
Ultimately, the Honorable Marc A. Hammer presided. 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1)(2009-10);2 the court of appeals reversed 
in an unpublished per curiam opinion.3 
¶2 
We hold that joinder was proper because the charges 
joined were "2 or more acts or transactions connected together 
or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan," the charges 
were "connected together," and the charges constituted parts of 
a "common scheme or plan."  See Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1).  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and affirm the 
jury's verdicts finding Luis Salinas guilty of:  (1) repeated 
sexual assault of a child; (2) second-degree sexual assault; (3) 
second-degree sexual assault of a child under the age of 16; (4) 
intimidation of witness, M.S.; and (5) intimidation of witness, 
V.G. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Salinas lived with his girlfriend M.S., their son 
A.S., M.S.'s daughter V.G., and M.S.'s two sons.  On October 26, 
2009, police were called to the family home following a domestic 
violence incident. V.G. reported that Salinas slapped her face 
after M.S. left for work, and when M.S. returned home, V.G. 
heard M.S. and Salinas arguing.  V.G. said she saw Salinas with 
both hands on M.S.'s neck in what looked like an attempt to 
choke M.S. to death.  V.G. yelled at Salinas to let M.S. go.  
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 See State v. Salinas, No. 2013AP2686-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2015)(per curiam). 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
3 
 
M.S. yelled for V.G. to get out of the house and call police.  
M.S. reported she grabbed Salinas's hair, escaped his grasp, and 
ran out of the house.  When M.S. looked back, Salinas had their 
then four-year-old son, A.S., in the doorway and Salinas had a 
knife in one hand although the knife was not pointed at A.S.  
Salinas told A.S. to ask M.S. to come back inside.  Salinas 
yelled for V.G. not to call police or Salinas would kill A.S. 
and kill himself.  Police arrived shortly thereafter and 
arrested Salinas. 
¶4 
The next day, October 27, 2009, the State charged 
Salinas with four counts arising from this domestic violence 
incident. Both M.S. and V.G. were domestic violence victims. 
Salinas entered into a plea agreement with the State. On March 
8, 2010, Salinas entered Alford4 pleas to domestic violence 
strangulation and suffocation and domestic violence battery.  
The other two counts were dismissed but read in at sentencing. 
¶5 
While the domestic violence charges were pending, 
Salinas frequently called M.S. from jail.  Between the time 
Salinas was arrested and the date of his sentencing in the 
domestic violence case on May 11, 2010, the jail recorded over 
500 phone calls from Salinas to M.S.  The intimidation charges 
                                                 
4 "An Alford plea is a guilty plea where a defendant pleads 
guilty to a charge but either protests his innocence or does not 
admit to having committed the crime.  The plea derives its name 
from the United States Supreme Court's decision in North 
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)."  State v. Garcia, 192 
Wis. 2d 845, 851 n.1, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995). 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
4 
 
at issue here stem from those phone calls.  The State asserted 
that transcripts from the phone calls show Salinas's attempt to 
pressure M.S. to change her statement to police about the 
domestic violence incident and come to the sentencing to help 
him look good with the sentencing judge. 
¶6 
In two of the calls, Salinas said: 
I thank you so much for having my son, [M.S.]  But you 
really piss me off.  You don't know what I'm able to 
do.  You don't know what I have done or what I could 
do.  You are treating me like a piece of shit.  No, my 
darling, you don't know who I am.  That is why you 
want to send me to prison and you want me to go to 
hell.  Fourteen years and six years for this and that 
and you think you're playing with a piece of shit.  I 
told you long time ago don't call the cops on me 
because we're going – because they are going to take 
me seriously.  And, look, you called the cops and all 
because of [V.G.]. 
I'm telling you, man, I can never talk to you because, 
look, you better start thinking that one day I'm 
coming out.  Daughter of your fucking mother, because 
you're making me tired of always trying to kiss your 
ass.  You better straighten your stinking, your 
fucking stinky ass.  I'm so fucking sick of it.  And 
then they don't want me to kick your ass, man. If you 
hate me so much, why don't you let me fuck myself up?  
You never have the mouth when I was outside.  I know 
you're fucking mouthy.  I'm tired of your shit.  If I 
get out, if I get out, you are going to be sorry, my 
darling.  You better answer me right now and tell me 
what is it that you want to do.  I don't want to be 
mean to you because you're the mother of my son. 
¶7 
The State also asserted that Salinas pressured M.S. to 
convince V.G. to do something to help him with the sentencing 
judge. Salinas spoke with V.G. directly on one occasion. 
Ultimately, both M.S. and V.G. testified at Salinas's sentencing 
hearing on the domestic violence convictions.  Both indicated to 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
5 
 
the sentencing judge that they wanted Salinas to come back home.  
The sentencing court imposed three years of probation with nine 
months of jail time. 
¶8 
On May 13, 2010, two days after Salinas's sentencing 
on the domestic violence convictions, V.G. told her boyfriend, 
E.D., that Salinas had been sexually assaulting her for the past 
three years.  According to E.D., V.G. was scared and shaky when 
she revealed the sexual assaults and her story came out in "bits 
and pieces."  E.D. told V.G. to tell her mom and the police.  
V.G. then told M.S. and M.S. took V.G. to the police station to 
report what had happened. 
¶9 
V.G. told police that when she turned 13, Salinas 
began forcing her to have sexual intercourse.  The first time 
was in the bathroom at their home on Oakland Street.  Salinas 
told her to lie down on the bathroom floor.  He took down her 
sweatpants and underwear and put his penis into her vagina.  
When she said no, he told her that if she refused, he would take 
her little brother away or send her away.  He also hit her, 
punched her, and slapped her to force compliance.  V.G. told 
police the sexual assaults took place 6 to 12 times a month over 
the course of three years.  She said Salinas did this when her 
mother was not home.  V.G. said the assaults occurred in the 
living room and Salinas's bedroom and the assaults continued 
when they moved to a different house on Dousman Street.  V.G. 
explained that Salinas rarely used a condom, but did not 
ejaculate inside of her.  He "pulled out" and then used a white 
rag, which he often made her wash afterwards. 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
6 
 
¶10 V.G. told police that the last sexual assault occurred 
the day Salinas was arrested for the domestic violence.  Salinas 
slapped her that day because she told him she did not want to 
have sex with him.  V.G. reported that she did not tell anyone 
about the sexual assaults because she was afraid and ashamed and 
because Salinas repeatedly threatened that he would take her 
little brother away or send her away. 
¶11 On May 19, 2010, the State charged Salinas with three 
counts related to the sexual assaults:  (1) repeated sexual 
assault of a child in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.01(1)-(2) 
and Wis. Stat. § 948.025(1)(b); (2) second-degree sexual assault 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a); and (3) second-
degree sexual assault of a child under the age of 16 in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).  Salinas pled not guilty 
and denied ever sexually assaulting V.G. 
¶12 In August and September of 2010, the police listened 
to and translated from Spanish all the recorded telephone calls 
between Salinas and M.S. that Salinas made from jail.  Both M.S. 
and Salinas spoke in Spanish.  Police also interviewed M.S. and 
V.G. about all the telephone calls. 
¶13 On October 5, 2010, the State charged Salinas with two 
counts of misdemeanor intimidation of a witness, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.44(1), and Wis. Stat. § 968.075(1)(a).  One 
count listed M.S. as the victim and the second count listed V.G. 
as the victim. 
¶14 On October 18, 2010, the State filed a motion to join 
the intimidation counts with the already-pending sexual assault 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
7 
 
counts.  The State argued the charges shared common victims and 
arose within six months of one another; moreover, the State 
argued for joinder because the evidence in the two cases 
overlapped, and if the cases were joined, the victims would only 
have to testify at one trial.  Salinas argued the charges should 
not be joined because the intimidation charges related to the 
domestic violence case, not the sexual assault case.  The 
circuit court joined the cases reasoning:  
 One of the intimidation counts involves the same victim 
of the sexual assaults——V.G.——making it logical to 
"connect those two for purposes of trial." 
 Joining the two cases will not confuse the jury. 
 "There is a strong likelihood that all of this evidence 
in this file would come in under other-acts evidence." 
¶15 After the circuit court's ruling, the State amended 
the Information to include the three sexual assault counts and 
the two intimidation counts.  At the pre-trial conference on 
March 2, 2012, Salinas's lawyer indicated that Salinas would 
plead guilty on the intimidation counts but go to trial on the 
sexual assault counts.  The State advised that even if the 
intimidation counts were pled out, it intended to present 
evidence on the intimidation charges in the sexual assault trial 
because  
it all ties together and that's why they were all 
joined.  It starts with a domestic violence situation 
between the victim's mother and the defendant and 
evolves until we get to the disclosure in this case, 
and so I just want to be clear that [the] State 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
8 
 
intends to put all that evidence forward because 
that's our case. 
¶16 Salinas's 
lawyer 
responded 
that 
the 
intimidation 
charges arose from Salinas "trying to get them to consider a 
better sentencing recommendation" in the domestic violence case 
and "were completely separate from any sort of sexual assault 
allegation."  The State explained "the last sexual assault 
occurred 
on 
the 
day 
[Salinas] 
went 
to 
jail 
for 
this 
strangulation.  So that evidence is coming forward.  [V.G.] 
knows it's that date because that's the date he strangled her 
mother and he went to jail and he was not able to assault her 
any further."  The State argued that this evidence would be 
relevant to explain why V.G. delayed reporting the sexual 
assaults, and, in essence, to provide context.  The circuit 
court 
cautioned 
Salinas's 
lawyer 
that 
pleading 
to 
the 
intimidation counts may not keep the evidence of the domestic 
violence incident out of the sexual assault trial——that it could 
come in as other acts evidence.  The circuit court advised that 
the lawyer should "do with that what you want, and if you want 
to plea him, I'll take it on Tuesday" but "[w]hat I don't want 
is for you to enter a plea with a belief you got some type of 
commitment from the DA's Office or you're able to forecast what 
I'm going to do because that would be wrong."  Salinas decided 
not to enter pleas to the intimidation counts and the joined 
charges were tried to a jury on March 6-7, 2012.  At no time did 
Salinas file a motion seeking severance of the joined charges. 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
9 
 
¶17 During the State's opening statement, the prosecutor 
told the jury the evidence would show a "pattern of violence, 
intimidation, threats, and most disturbingly, [that] repeated 
sexual assault of a child occurred to the victim, [V.G.], 
occurred within a family environment where her mother, [M.S.], 
was also a victim, where she had three younger brothers in that 
household as well."  The prosecutor also explained that "this 
story begins . . . October 26, 2009" the day Salinas was 
arrested for domestic violence——for hitting V.G. and attempting 
to strangle M.S.: 
That is the day ladies and gentlemen, that the 
defendant strangled [M.S.], that he did that in front 
of [V.G.], that in the kitchen she was struggling to 
get away from him, that she yelled to [V.G.] to get 
out, call the police, that she was able to get away 
from the defendant, that she ran out herself, and when 
she turned around, what did she see?  More violence 
and intimidation.  She saw the defendant standing with 
his 4-year-old-son, [A.S.], to one side and a knife to 
the other telling [A.S.], "Tell your mother to come 
back inside." 
That is a day of horror but that is also a day that 
stopped what was happening to [V.G.]  That is a day 
that family got help.  That is the day that [V.G.] 
stopped being assaulted from the defendant.  And we 
also know that day is the last day he assaulted her.  
¶18 In Salinas's opening, his lawyer told the jury:  
 "Just 
because 
he 
might 
be 
a 
bad 
guy 
is 
really 
irrelevant." 
 The intimidation counts relate to a prior conviction for 
hitting M.S. and V.G.  The intimidation is not "about a 
sexual assault." 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
10 
 
 "I hope that you can parse out the difference between Mr. 
Salinas having a jaded past, perhaps having done a bad 
thing to these two people who are going to testify and 
whether the charges that he's here for today actually 
happened 
or 
not. 
 
They're 
very 
separate 
and 
distinguishable[.]" 
¶19 The State's main witnesses included victims V.G. and 
M.S.  V.G. testified: 
 Salinas started sexually assaulting her when she turned 
13 years old.  The assaults occurred when her mother was 
not home and when her brothers were asleep or outside. 
 The first assault was on the bathroom floor; other times 
Salinas assaulted her in the living room where he was 
careful to watch out the window for M.S. to make sure he 
did not get caught.  He also assaulted her in the 
bedroom. 
 He used a condom on only two occasions that she can 
remember; 
typically 
he 
would 
pull 
out 
before 
he 
ejaculated and finish with a white rag, which he often 
made her wash afterwards. 
 The assaults occurred at both the Oakland Street house 
and the Dousman Street house. 
 If she told Salinas she did not want to have sex with 
him, he hit or threatened her.   Salinas struck her many 
times and told her if she refused sex, he would take her 
little brother away or send her away to Mexico or to 
California to live with her dad.  He told her that if she 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
11 
 
told her mother, he would blame her for "coming on to 
him" and if she told police, Salinas told V.G. that the 
police would take the children away from their mother.  
 One time after an argument with her mother, Salinas did 
take her brother A.S. and left for 7-10 days. 
 Salinas assaulted her "more than 40 to 50 times" over two 
and one-half years. 
 On October 26, 2009, after her mother left for work, 
Salinas struck V.G. in the face because she did not want 
to have sex with him; he proceeded to sexually assault 
her. 
 Later that day when her mother returned home from work, 
V.G. heard M.S. and Salinas arguing; Salinas told M.S. he 
had struck V.G., and M.S. was angry.  V.G. saw Salinas 
choking her mother and yelled at Salinas to let go of 
her.  M.S. told V.G. to leave the house and go; V.G. left 
the house and called police from a neighbor's house. 
 When police came, V.G. reported that Salinas hit her but 
did not report the sexual assaults, "[b]ecause I just 
wanted him gone because I thought that with him gone it 
just wouldn't be going through all the things that I was 
going through, and I thought that was just -- I was 
afraid and just embarrassed and ashamed of everything."   
 She was also worried her mom "would be ashamed" and upset 
and "blame herself because she never caught on, and we 
had been living together all of us for so long." 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
12 
 
 She testified that the police took Salinas to jail and 
the phone calls from him started.  She said she spoke 
with Salinas only one time and he asked her to change her 
statement and tell the sentencing court she missed him 
and wanted him home. 
 She went to the sentencing hearing because her mom asked 
her to go.  V.G. thought if she attended the hearing, the 
excessive phone calls would stop and maybe Salinas would 
change.  Also, she had been promised a phone card, and 
her little brother, A.S., was missing his dad. 
 Two days after the sentencing, V.G. told her boyfriend, 
E.D., about the sexual assaults because she wanted to be 
honest with him.  E.D. insisted she tell her mom and her 
mom took her to the police station to report the sexual 
assaults. 
¶20 M.S.'s testimony began by describing what happened on 
October 26, 2009.  She had worked that day and when she arrived 
home, Salinas told her he had hit V.G. for not listening to him.  
This started an argument and Salinas threw a glass candle at her 
that struck her head.  At this point, Salinas’s lawyer objected:  
Your Honor, I just have to object to this line of 
questioning. Mr. Salinas has pled guilty to all these 
things.  They've been litigated before.  There was a 
physical altercation.  Let's move on.  This is 
unfairly prejudicial.  She's just bringing this up to 
try and say later on look how bad Luis Salinas is.  He 
must have done it. 
The prosecutor responded:  "[T]his is all information that is 
part of [M.S.]'s statement.  It is part of the allegations in 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
13 
 
this case.  It certainly goes to the heart of the intimidation."   
The circuit court overruled the objection:  "I'm going to allow 
it.  I think it goes to Counts Four and Five [intimidation 
counts] in terms of giving context or background.  I'm going to 
allow you to cross-examine." 
¶21 M.S. continued describing the events of October 26, 
2009: 
 Salinas put his hands on her neck and tried to choke her; 
she told V.G. to get out of the house; she grabbed 
Salinas's hair and escaped his grasp and ran outside. 
 When she turned back, her son, A.S., was standing in the 
doorway and Salinas was telling A.S. to ask her to come 
back inside.  Salinas had a knife in his hand but it was 
not pointed at A.S. 
 Salinas told V.G. to hang up the phone she was using to 
call police or "he was going to kill the boy and he was 
going to kill himself." 
 Police arrived and arrested Salinas. 
¶22 M.S. also testified about the phone calls Salinas made 
to her from jail.  Salinas told her to change her statement to 
police to say he did not try to strangle her and he did not 
threaten to kill her.  Salinas asked her to convince V.G. to 
change her statement to say Salinas did not hit her.  M.S. told 
the jury she in fact tried to change her statement with police 
because she believed if she did not, Salinas would take her son 
away and he would kill her and her children. 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
14 
 
¶23 M.S. explained why she went to Salinas's sentencing 
hearing on May 11, 2010:  Salinas made her feel guilty, blaming 
M.S. and V.G. for putting him in jail, and Salinas threatened to 
kill himself if she did not come.  He also promised he would 
change and things would be better if she came to the sentencing 
and spoke in favor of him coming home.  M.S. admitted she 
pressured V.G. to come to the sentencing when V.G. did not want 
to go. She promised V.G. a phone card if she would attend and 
tell the court she wanted Salinas to come home. 
¶24 M.S. testified that V.G. told her about the sexual 
assaults on May 13, 2010, and she took V.G. to the police to 
report what had happened.  M.S. also told the jury that for the 
last two years, Salinas refused to let V.G. go out of the house 
with M.S. because Salinas said V.G. "misbehaved."  She testified 
about how Salinas forced V.G. to stay home from school for a 
month in the Fall of 2009, her sophomore year in high school. 
¶25 V.G.'s boyfriend, E.D., also testified.  He talked 
about meeting V.G. in French class at the start of the school 
year, but that V.G. stopped coming to school until after October 
26, 2009.  When V.G. returned, they became friends and then 
boyfriend-girlfriend.  E.D. described how, on May 13, 2010, V.G. 
disclosed the sexual assaults to him, that she was scared and 
shaky, and how it was hard for her to talk about the assaults.  
He told her to tell her mom and the police. 
¶26 The parties stipulated that Salinas made over 500 
phone calls to M.S. from jail.  V.G.'s statement from Salinas's 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
15 
 
sentencing for the domestic violence convictions was read to the 
jury.  The statement provided: 
I wanted to say that -- well, I don't have it on paper 
but I wanted to say that our family has gone through a 
lot the last few months that he hasn't been at our 
house and we're all sad that he's not here so -- and 
we'd really like him to come home.  That's all I 
wanted to say. 
¶27 The circuit court gave jury instructions, including an 
instruction that remarks by attorneys are not evidence and an 
instruction that closing arguments are opinion and not evidence. 
The circuit court cautioned the jury regarding Salinas's prior 
convictions:5 
Now, evidence has been received in this case that 
the defendant, Luis Salinas, has been convicted of 
crimes.  This evidence was received solely because it 
bears upon the credibility of the defendant as a 
witness. You must not use it for any other purpose and 
particularly you should bear in mind that a criminal 
conviction at some previous time is not proof of guilt 
of the offense now charged.  
¶28 During closing argument, the prosecutor recounted what 
happened the evening of October 26, 2009: 
[V.G.] 
hear[s] 
arguing 
between 
her 
mother 
and 
[Salinas].  [V.G.] waits and she goes out and she sees 
the defendant choking her mother and she's yelling.  
Her mother is yelling "get out, get out."  She's able 
to go to the front door.  Her mother is able to get 
away from the defendant and go out the side. 
And, ladies and gentlemen, I would submit at this 
point the defendant is very concerned.  To this point 
                                                 
5 Salinas testified he had been convicted 12 times.  The 
circuit court, in essence, gave the standard jury instruction on 
prior convictions.  See Wis JI——Criminal 327. 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
16 
 
he's been able to keep them from calling the police.  
He's been able to intimidate them, use threats, use 
violence to make sure the police don't get involved.  
But this time they're out of the house.  And what does 
he do in a last [d]itch effort and desperation?  He 
takes a knife and he takes his little boy, the little 
boy he claims to love more than anything.  He has a 
knife in one hand and he's telling [M.S.] get back in 
the house.  He's telling the little boy, "Tell your 
mother to get back in the house or I'm going to kill 
myself and I'm going to kill the boy." 
Salinas's lawyer argued to the jury that this case was not about 
the battery and strangulation, that Salinas was already punished 
for that and "that's not what we're here to decide today."  He 
also pointed out that V.G. and M.S. had "very vivid" and 
detailed memories of the domestic violence incident, but V.G. 
had "very little recall of the sexual assaults."  He argued that 
the "glossing over" of the sexual assault allegations should 
convince the jury that the sexual assaults never happened.  The 
jury convicted Salinas on all three sexual assault counts and 
both intimidation counts. 
¶29 Salinas appealed, arguing that joinder was improper 
and not harmless error.  The court of appeals agreed and 
reversed in a per curiam, unpublished opinion.  See State v. 
Salinas, No. 2013AP2686, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Apr. 21, 2015)(per curiam).  The State petitioned this court for 
review and we granted the petition. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶30 The issue presented on appeal is whether joinder of 
the intimidation and sexual assault charges was proper under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1).  The initial decision on joinder is a 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
17 
 
question of law that we review de novo.  See State v. Locke, 177 
Wis. 2d 590, 596-97, 502 N.W.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. 
Hoffman, 106 Wis. 2d 185, 208-09, 316 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 
1982).  This case does not involve a motion for severance after 
initial joinder, which is reviewed under an erroneous exercise 
of discretion.  See id.  Although neither party disputes the de 
novo standard of review on initial joinder, some Wisconsin cases 
have applied a discretionary standard of review to both the 
initial joinder decision and the decision on a motion to sever.  
See Haldane v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 182, 188-89, 270 N.W.2d 75 
(1978)("Generally, questions of consolidation or severance are 
within the trial court's discretion."); Holmes v. State, 63 
Wis. 2d 389, 395-96, 217 N.W.2d 647 (1974)("What is involved is 
an exercise of trial court discretion."); State v. Brown, 114 
Wis. 2d 554, 559, 338 N.W.2d 859 (Ct. App. 1983)(same).  We make 
clear here that those cases inaccurately described the proper 
standard of review.  As noted, the initial joinder decision and 
a decision to sever properly joined charges are distinct 
considerations that require different standards of review.  As 
Locke explained: 
On appeal, review of joinder is a two-step 
process.  First, the court reviews the initial joinder 
determination.  Whether the initial joinder was proper 
is a question of law that we review without deference 
to the trial court, and the joinder statute is to be 
construed broadly in favor of the initial joinder. 
 . . .  
[Second,] [s]ection 971.12(3) provides that even after 
initial joinder, the court may order separate trials 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
18 
 
of the charges if it appears that a defendant is 
prejudiced by a joinder of the counts.  A motion for 
severance 
is 
addressed 
to 
the 
trial 
court's 
discretion. 
Locke, 177 Wis. 2d at 596-97.  Here, because the issue in 
Salinas's case involves only whether the initial joinder 
decision was proper, our review is de novo.   
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶31 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.12(1) describes when separate 
crimes may be joined together in the same complaint: 
JOINDER OF CRIMES:  Two or more crimes may be charged 
in the same complaint, information or indictment in a 
separate count for each crime if the crimes charged, 
whether felonies or misdemeanors, or both, are of the 
same or similar character or are based on the same act 
or transaction or on 2 or more acts or transactions 
connected together or constituting parts of a common 
scheme or plan. 
The joinder statute is to be broadly construed in favor of 
initial joinder.  See Francis v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 554, 558, 273 
N.W.2d 310 (1979)("A broad interpretation of the joinder 
provision is consistent with the purposes of joinder, namely 
trial convenience for the state and convenience and advantage to 
the defendant."); Locke, 177 Wis. 2d at 596.  The statute 
provides four separate provisions under which initial joinder is 
deemed proper:  (1) when two or more crimes are of the "same or 
similar character"; (2) when two or more crimes are based on the 
"same act or transaction"; (3) when two or more crimes are based 
on two or more acts or transactions that are "connected 
together"; or (4) when two or more crimes are based on two or 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
19 
 
more acts or transactions that constitute "a common scheme or 
plan."  Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1). 
¶32 The State argues joinder was proper under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.12(1) because the intimidation and sexual assault charges 
are either:  (1) two or more acts connected together; or (2) two 
or more acts or transactions constituting parts of a common 
scheme or plan.6  Salinas argues the intimidation and sexual 
assault charges do not fall into either category because the 
intimidating phone calls relate only to the domestic violence 
convictions, not the sexual assaults, and are so different they 
cannot constitute a common scheme or plan.  Salinas also argues 
that the improper joinder of these charges prejudiced him and 
therefore was not harmless error.  We hold that the charges here 
were properly joined because they were "2 or more acts or 
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a 
common scheme or plan", the charges were "connected together" 
and the charges constituted "parts of a common scheme or plan."  
Because we determine joinder was proper, we do not address 
Salinas's harmless error argument. 
¶33 Before we begin our analysis, we note that although 
"connected together" and "common scheme or plan" are separate 
and distinct prongs in the joinder statute, Wisconsin case law 
has, on occasion, merged them into a single concept, suggesting 
                                                 
6 The State conceded the facts do not support joinder based 
on the sexual assaults and intimidation being crimes: (1) of the 
"same or similar character," or (2) based on the "same act or 
transaction." 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
20 
 
the same analysis applies to both.  See Francis, 86 Wis. 2d at 
560.  In Francis, neither victim could identify Francis, but 
after police were able to link Francis to the crimes against one 
of the victims, they were able to connect Francis to the crimes 
against the other victim based on similar modus operandi.  Id. 
at 555-56, 560.  The State filed a complaint charging Francis 
with three crimes against the two victims; the circuit court 
denied his motion to sever, and a jury found him guilty of all 
charges.  Id. at 556.  On appeal to this court, Francis argued 
only that initial joinder was improper, making no argument on 
whether the circuit court's severance decision caused prejudice.  
Id. at 555, 561-62.  We upheld joinder as proper based on "the 
phrase 'connected together or constituting parts of a common 
scheme or plan.'"  Id. at 555-56, 560.  We so held because this 
phrase had been interpreted by other courts to mean:  "inter 
alia that the crimes charged have a common factor or factors of 
substantial factual importance, e.g., time, place or modus 
operandi, so that the evidence of each crime is relevant to 
establish the identity of the perpetrator."  Id. at 560. 
¶34 We have also, at least implicitly, upheld joinder 
based solely on the "connected together" language and solely on 
the "constituting parts of a common scheme or plan" language of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1).  In State v. Bettinger, 100 Wis. 2d 691, 
303 N.W.2d 585 (1981), we held there could be "no dispute" that 
joinder of the sexual assault charge with the bribery charge was 
proper under Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1) because the two acts were 
"connected together."  Id. at 694.  In Bettinger, the identity 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
21 
 
of the perpetrator was not in dispute as he was a friend of the 
family.  Id. at 692-93.  Bettinger sexually assaulted the victim 
and then offered her a bribe to drop the charges or not 
cooperate with the prosecution.  Id. at 693.  No one disputed 
that these two separate crimes were properly joined because they 
were "connected together."  Id. at 694.  They were connected 
together because both crimes involved the same victim and the 
same perpetrator and because the bribery was an attempt to avoid 
conviction on the sexual assault. 
¶35 In State v. Kramer, 45 Wis. 2d 20, 171 N.W.2d 919 
(1969), this court upheld joinder on five separate crimes of two 
unrelated victims using the "common scheme or plan" provision.  
Id. at 24, 36.7  Kramer was convicted of false imprisonment, 
injury by conduct regardless of life, armed robbery and two 
counts of physical damage to property.  Id. at 24.  The "common 
scheme or plan" involved crimping the gas line of women's cars 
to disable the vehicle and then offering to give the stranded 
women a ride.  Id. at 24-26.  We held joinder proper based on 
this common scheme or plan.  Id.  at 36. 
                                                 
7 In State v. Kramer, 45 Wis. 2d 20, 171 N.W.2d 919 (1969), 
Wisconsin was still using the prior joinder statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 955.14(1)(1967), 
which 
provided: 
"Different 
crimes 
and 
different degrees of the same crime may be joined in one 
information, indictment or complaint."  However, in Kramer this 
court cited Federal Criminal Rule 8(a), the federal joinder 
statute, which is substantially similar to the language of our 
current joinder statute at issue here.  
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
22 
 
¶36 This case presents us with the opportunity to analyze 
whether the charges joined in Salinas's case should be upheld 
because they were "2 or more acts or transactions connected 
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan," the 
charges were "connected together," and the charges constituted 
"parts of a common scheme or plan."  Before we proceed with that 
analysis, we emphasize that this court "has historically 
favored" initial joinder particularly when the charged crimes 
were all "committed by the same defendant."  See Francis, 86 
Wis. 2d at 559 (citations and quotemarks omitted).  We interpret 
initial joinder decisions broadly because of the goals and 
purposes of the joinder statute:  (1) trial economy and 
convenience; 
(2) 
to 
promote 
efficiency 
in 
judicial 
administration; and (3) to eliminate multiple trials against the 
same defendant, which promotes fiscal responsibility.  See id., 
at 560; State v. Leach, 124 Wis. 2d 648, 671, 370 N.W.2d 240 
(1985). 
A.  Connected together or  
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan 
¶37 As we have seen, in Francis, we held joinder proper 
because the separate crimes were connected together by a common 
scheme or plan.  In doing so, we did not analyze "connected 
together" separately from "constituting parts of a common scheme 
or plan."  Citing several federal cases, we observed that the 
entire phrase "connected together or constituting parts of a 
common scheme or plan" has been interpreted, among other things, 
to mean "that the crimes charged have a common factor or factors 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
23 
 
of substantial factual importance, e.g., time, place or modus 
operandi, so that the evidence of each crime is relevant to 
establish a common scheme or plan that tends to establish the 
identity of the perpetrator."  Id., 86 Wis. 2d at 560.  In other 
words, Francis's modus operandi connected the separate crimes 
together and helped identify Francis as the person who had 
committed these separate crimes.  Id. at 560-61.  Thus, in  
joinder cases following Francis, most of which are unpublished, 
the "common factor or factors of substantial factual importance" 
test has been used both to analyze whether joinder is proper 
under the entire phrase, under connected together, and under 
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. 
¶38 Using the Francis test, we hold the crimes joined 
against Salinas are "connected together or constituting parts of 
a common scheme or plan" because Salinas's crimes share common 
factors or factors of substantial factual importance.  First, 
V.G. was a victim of both the sexual assaults and the 
intimidation crimes, which were charged after the domestic 
violence conviction.  Second, the last sexual assault occurred 
on the same day as the domestic violence incident.  Third, 
Salinas's domestic violence toward V.G. immediately preceded the 
sexual assault; Salinas used the physical abuse to accomplish 
the sexual assault.  Fourth, the intimidation charges and sexual 
assault charges were close in time, involved the same people, 
and Salinas arguably engaged in one crime to prevent disclosure 
and punishment for another. 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
24 
 
¶39 Although Francis discusses joinder in terms of the 
crimes having substantial factors of a common scheme or plan 
that establish identity, the law is not so limited.  In Francis, 
we indicated this statutory phrase had "been interpreted to mean 
inter alia" what is quoted above.  Id., 86 Wis. 2d at 560.  
Inter alia means "among other things."  In other words, the 
identity link was one meaning given to the statutory phrase in 
cases where identity is at issue.  In cases where identity is 
not at issue, however, the statutory phrase is not so limited. 
¶40 Here, as in Bettinger, the perpetrator is known 
because the situation involves a family.  Salinas is the 
perpetrator in both the intimidation and sexual assault crimes.  
The perpetrator and victims resided together as part of the same 
familial unit with daily interactions.  V.G. was a victim of  
the domestic violence, intimidation, and sexual assault crimes.  
Salinas used domestic violence toward V.G. to overcome her 
objections to having sexual intercourse with him.  Salinas 
created an atmosphere of fear, engaging in a scheme or plan of 
manipulation, coercion, and intimidation to control and abuse 
M.S. and V.G.  The crimes of domestic violence and sexual 
assault are connected because Salinas used both to establish 
control over V.G. and M.S. that allowed him to break the law 
without legal repercussions.  Once incarcerated, Salinas could 
no longer use physical or sexual abuse to control his victims so 
he attempted to influence and control them through the use of 
the telephone.  Salinas made 500-plus phone calls including 
threats that he would still be able to exert control from jail.  
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
25 
 
The phone calls show manipulation done by phone to force V.G. 
and M.S. to recant their claims of physical abuse and help get 
him out of jail so he could continue his illegal acts without 
legal repercussions.  The intimidation charges arising from the 
phone calls are part of Salinas's scheme or plan to manipulate 
and control V.G. and M.S. so he could physically abuse and 
sexually assault these victims without legal repercussions.  
That is the evidence the State presented. 
¶41 We also face the situation here where V.G. reported 
the domestic violence but delayed reporting the sexual assault 
crimes, even though one count of each crime occurred on the same 
day.  Had V.G. reported the sexual assault crimes at the same 
time she reported the domestic violence incident, both the 
sexual assault crimes and the domestic violence crimes would 
have been charged in a single complaint.  Had the intimidation 
counts arisen after a trial on both the domestic violence and 
sexual assault crimes, there would be no question that the 
intimidation charges were connected to the sexual assaults.  A 
subsequent trial on intimidation would have necessarily included 
evidence on both the domestic violence incident and the sexual 
assaults.  Delayed reporting on the sexual assaults should not 
operate to disconnect these inextricably intertwined events.  
These charges are closely related and interconnected.  Likewise, 
failure to come forward on the sexual assaults does not 
extinguish the relatedness of these crimes or render initial 
joinder improper.  These crimes were logically connected, grew 
out of related interactions, and had a concrete connection. 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
26 
 
B.  Connected together 
¶42 The "connected together" provision of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.12(1) is used to join together offenses committed by the 
same defendant that are based on separate acts or transactions 
against the same victim or separate victims.  "Connected 
together" is not defined in the statute, nor has it been 
specifically defined by Wisconsin courts.  This is so because 
the words are self-defining. 
¶43 Salinas 
argues 
the 
intimidation 
counts 
are 
not 
connected to the sexual assaults; rather, he argues the 
intimidation counts relate only to the domestic violence 
convictions. 
 
In 
assessing 
whether 
separate 
crimes 
are 
sufficiently "connected together" for purposes of initial 
joinder, we look to a variety of factors, including but not 
limited to:  (1) are the charges closely related; (2) are there 
common factors of substantial importance; (3) did one charge 
arise out of the investigation of the other; (4) are the crimes 
close in time or close in location, or do the crimes involve the 
same victims; (5) are the crimes similar in manner, scheme or 
plan; (6) was one crime committed to prevent punishment for 
another; and (6) would joinder serve the goals and purposes of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.12.  See Francis, 86 Wis. 2d at 560; State v. 
Hall, 103 Wis. 2d 125, 139, 307 N.W.2d 289 (1981)(connected 
because "closely related in terms of time, place and modus 
operandi, scheme, or plan"); Bettinger, 100 Wis. 2d at 694; 
Leach, 124 Wis. 2d at 671 (The purpose of joinder is to promote 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
27 
 
economy and efficiency in judicial administration and avoid 
multiple trials.).  
¶44 Many of these factors apply in this case.  The 
intimidation charges and the sexual assaults are connected 
together because they are closely related, share common factors 
of substantial importance, are connected by time, location and 
victims, and joinder serves the goals and purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.12.  These crimes are closely related as a series of 
events within one household involving one defendant and two 
victims.  The crimes joined were connected together because the 
domestic violence against V.G. and M.S. occurred on the same day 
that Salinas sexually assaulted V.G., and the intimidation 
charges involved coercion and threats to manipulate V.G. and 
M.S. to withdraw their statements of physical abuse and to 
persuade the sentencing judge to let Salinas go home.  The goals 
behind the joinder statute are clearly satisfied here because 
all of Salinas's outstanding crimes against V.G. and M.S. were 
resolved in one trial, the victims had to testify only once, and 
the judicial resources utilized to mete out justice were 
efficiently conserved.  See Leach, 124 Wis. 2d at 671.  Thus, 
the intimidation counts and the sexual assaults are "connected 
together" and joinder was proper under that provision of 
§ 971.12(1). 
C.  Constituting parts of a common scheme or plan 
¶45 We also hold that initial joinder was proper because 
the intimidation and sexual assault charges constituted parts of 
a "common scheme or plan."  Neither the statute nor this court 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
28 
 
has specifically defined "common scheme or plan" as that term is 
used in Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1).  Because these are common words 
with known meanings, it is not necessary for us to provide a 
particular definition here.8 
¶46 In analyzing whether Salinas's intimidation charges 
and sexual assault charges constitute a "common scheme or plan," 
we look to what evidence the State presented to support its 
position that the charges were properly joined under this 
provision.  The State presented evidence that all of Salinas's 
crimes constituted parts of his common scheme or plan to use 
threats, intimidation, physical and sexual abuse to maintain 
power and control over the woman with whom he lived, as well as 
her daughter, so he could break the law without risk of getting 
caught.  The State argued he created a pattern of violence, 
threats, 
and 
intimidation 
so 
that 
he 
could 
continue 
to 
physically and sexually abuse his girlfriend and her daughter 
without consequence or reporting. In order to continue to engage 
in his illegal acts and ensure neither M.S. or V.G. reported 
Salinas's illegal behavior, he used threats and physical and 
sexual abuse.  On October 26, 2009, V.G. and M.S. broke the veil 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin case law has defined the term "plan" as "plan" 
is used in Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) to mean "a design or scheme 
formed to accomplish some particular purpose."  See State v. 
Cofield, 2000 WI App 196, ¶13, 238 Wis. 2d 467, 618 N.W.2d 214 
(citing State v. Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d 89, 99, 252 N.W.2d 
94(1977)).  The phrase in Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1), however, is 
"common scheme or plan" whereas Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) uses 
solely "plan." 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
29 
 
of silence by calling police.  As a result, Salinas lost his 
ability to physically and sexually assault them.  But he still 
had the ability to threaten and manipulate with his words via 
the telephone.  He did this by calling M.S. over 500 times from 
jail, convincing her to lie to police and tell them he did not 
try to strangle her as she had reported.  He did this by trying 
to get V.G. to lie and say he did not hit V.G. as she had 
reported.  He did this by trying to get M.S. to pressure or 
bribe V.G. with the phone card.  Salinas, in fact, succeeded in 
his threats and intimidation because both M.S. and V.G. attended 
his sentencing for the domestic violence and testified on his 
behalf.  The jail phone calls used to intimidate and control 
V.G. and M.S. were an integral part of Salinas's common plan or 
scheme to continue his illegal acts.  The evidence presented by 
the 
State 
sufficiently 
supported 
initial 
joinder 
of 
the 
intimidation and sexual assault counts as parts of Salinas's 
"common scheme or plan" to control and assault his girlfriend 
and her daughter in his home.  Thus, initial joinder was also 
proper under this provision of Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1). 
D.  Harmless Error 
¶47 Because initial joinder was proper, we need not 
address harmless error.  See Leach, 124 Wis. 2d at 669.  We do 
note, however, that this case is unusual because often joinder 
cases concomitantly involve a severance claim.  See, e.g., State 
v. Linton, 2010 WI App 129, ¶¶15-16, 329 Wis. 2d 687, 791 N.W.2d 
222; Locke, 177 Wis. 2d at 596-99.  That is, a defendant will 
argue both that initial joinder was improper and that even if it 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
30 
 
was proper, severance was necessary based on prejudice as set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 971.12(3):  "If it appears that a 
defendant . . . is prejudiced by a joinder of crimes . . . the 
court may order separate trials of counts, grant a severance of 
defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires."  
In fact, some cases present only the issue of severance on 
appeal as there is no dispute that the initial joinder decision 
was proper.  See, e.g., Bettinger, 100 Wis. 2d at 694 ("There 
can be no dispute in this case that joinder of these two charges 
was authorized by sec. 971.12(1), Stats.")(footnote quoting 
statute omitted). 
¶48 It is unclear from the record why Salinas did not 
request severance based on prejudice.  The record shows that 
Salinas's lawyer did make one objection when M.S. testified 
about the domestic violence incident, but the circuit court 
overruled the objection finding the testimony was relevant to 
context and background.  See State v. Marinez, 2011 WI 12, ¶26, 
331 Wis. 2d 568, 797 N.W.2d 399 (evidence admissible for context 
"to provide a more complete story of the sexual assault . . . as 
well as to provide greater information from which the jury could 
assess [the child victim's]credibility").  The record also shows 
the circuit court cautioned Salinas against pleading on the 
intimidation counts if his only reason for doing so was an 
expectation that the pleas would result in total exclusion of 
the domestic violence evidence.  The circuit court explained 
that the domestic violence evidence would most likely come in 
anyway under Wis. Stat. § 904.04's "other acts" test.  See Hall, 
No. 
2013AP2686-CR 
31 
 
103 
Wis. 
2d 
at 
142-43 
(other 
acts 
evidence 
otherwise 
inadmissible may come in when offered for an accepted purpose, 
as long as they are relevant and not unfairly prejudicial). 
¶49 Salinas's lawyer represented at oral argument that 
although the reason for failing to file a severance motion was 
not clear from the record, it most likely stemmed from the 
circuit court's repeated indications that the domestic violence 
evidence would be admitted.  Failing to make a severance motion, 
regardless of the reason, however, results in this issue not 
being ripe for our consideration.  Thus, our opinion is limited 
to our holding that initial joinder here was proper. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶50 In sum, we hold that the initial decision to join the 
intimidation charges with the sexual assault charges was proper 
because these crimes were "2 or more acts or transactions 
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or 
plan."  See Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1).  Initial joinder was proper 
under this entire phrase, under the "connected together" 
provision, and under the "common scheme or plan" provision.  
Because initial joinder was proper, we do not address harmless 
error. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶51 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  At issue in 
the instant case is whether joinder of several criminal charges 
against the defendant, Luis Salinas——two charges of intimidation 
of a victim and one charge each of repeated sexual assault of a 
child, second-degree sexual assault with use of force, and 
second-degree sexual assault of a child——was proper under the 
criminal joinder statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1) (2009-10).1  
¶52 Construing Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1) "broadly,"2 the 
majority opinion concludes that the sexual assault charges and 
the victim intimidation charges were properly joined because 
they "were '2 or more acts or transactions connected together or 
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.'"3 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Majority op., ¶¶30, 31, 36. 
3 The following sentences of the majority opinion are 
difficult to understand and are not necessarily consistent:   
We hold that joinder was proper because the charges 
joined were "2 or more acts or transactions connected 
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or 
plan," the charges were "connected together," and the 
charges constituted parts of a "common scheme or 
plan." 
Majority op., ¶2 (citing Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1)). 
[I]nitial joinder is deemed proper: . . . (3) when two 
or more crimes are based on two or more acts or 
transactions that are "connected together"; or (4) 
when two or more crimes are based on two or more acts 
or transactions that constitute "a common scheme or 
plan." 
Majority op., ¶31. 
(continued) 
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶53 I disagree with the majority opinion.  I would affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals that joinder was improper.   
I write separately in dissent for three reasons.   
¶54 First, the majority opinion's discussion of the 
criminal joinder statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1),4 is confusing 
and appears internally inconsistent.   
¶55 The joinder statute sets forth four different bases 
for joinder: (1) the charged crimes are of the same or similar 
character; or (2) the charged crimes are based on the same act 
or transaction; or (3) the charged crimes are based on two or 
                                                                                                                                                             
This case presents us with the opportunity to analyze 
whether the charges joined in Salinas's case should be 
upheld 
because 
they 
were 
"2 
or 
more 
acts 
or 
transactions connected together or constituting parts 
of 
a 
common 
scheme 
or 
plan, 
the 
charges 
were 
"connected together," and the charges constituted 
"parts of a common scheme or plan." 
Majority op., ¶36. 
In sum, we hold that the initial decision to join the 
intimidation charges with the sexual assault charges 
was proper because these crimes were "2 or more acts 
or transactions connected together or constituting 
parts of a common scheme or plan." 
Majority op., ¶50. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.12(1) states (in relevant part):  
971.12 Joinder of crimes.  (1) Two or more crimes may 
be charged in the same complaint, information or 
indictment in a separate count for each crime if the 
crimes charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors, or 
both, are of the same or similar character or are 
based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more 
acts 
or 
transactions 
connected 
together 
or 
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. . . .   
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
more acts or transactions connected together; or (4) the charged 
crimes constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.  The first 
two bases are not relevant in the instant case and are not 
discussed by the majority opinion.  Only the third and fourth 
bases are discussed by the majority opinion. 
¶56 After noting that "'connected together' and 'common 
scheme or plan' are separate and distinct prongs of the joinder 
statute," the majority opinion conflates the two prongs as well 
as analyzing them separately.  See majority op., ¶¶32, 33, 37, 
42, 45.   
¶57 Second, I question whether the "broad" construction of 
the joinder statute adopted in Francis v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 554, 
558, 273 N.W.2d 310 (1979), and applied by the majority opinion 
is warranted in the instant case.  Both the relevant text of the 
joinder statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1), and the overwhelming 
evidence that joinder of multiple charges prejudices criminal 
defendants militate against a "broad" interpretation of joinder 
in criminal cases.5   
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold & Hossein A. Abbasi, The 
Impact of Joinder and Severance on Federal Criminal Cases: An 
Empirical 
Study, 
59 
Vand. 
L. 
Rev. 
349, 
383-84 
(2006) 
(concluding, based on empirical data, that a "defendant's 
chances of conviction increase by more than 10% if he stands 
trial on more than one count."); James Farrin, Note, Rethinking 
Criminal Joinder: An Analysis of the Empirical Research and Its 
Implications for Justice, 52 Law & Contemp. Probs. 325, 327-31 
(1989) (reviewing a variety of empirical studies showing joinder 
of multiple charges may result in jury confusion, incorrect 
weighing of the evidence, and improper jury inferences of 
criminality; studies unanimously found an increase in the 
likelihood of conviction of defendants facing joined charges).    
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶58 Third, regardless of how Wis. Stat. § 971.12 is 
interpreted ("broadly" or otherwise), the majority opinion 
overstates the factual and legal connections between the sexual 
assault charges and the victim intimidation charges.  I agree 
with the court of appeals' decision that the sexual assault 
charges and the victim intimidation charges are, at most, 
tangentially related.  As a result, the majority opinion's 
conclusion that the sexual assaults and victim intimidation 
charges are "2 or more acts or transactions connected together 
or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan" is mistaken.   
¶59 For the reasons set forth, I dissent and write 
separately.   
I 
 
¶60 I begin with the criminal joinder statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.12(1).  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.12(1) states (in relevant 
part and with emphasis added):  
971.12 Joinder of crimes.  (1) Two or more crimes may 
be charged in the same complaint, information or 
indictment in a separate count for each crime if the 
crimes charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors, or 
both, are of the same or similar character or are 
based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more 
acts 
or 
transactions 
connected 
together 
or 
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. . . .   
 
¶61 As I stated previously, the joinder statute sets forth 
four different bases for joinder.  The parties do not dispute 
that the sexual assaults and victim intimidation charges are not 
"of the same or similar character" and are not "based on the 
same act or transaction . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1).  
Rather, the parties' arguments and the majority opinion's 
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
discussion focus on whether the sexual assaults and victim 
intimidation 
constitute 
"2 
or 
more 
acts 
or 
transactions 
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or 
plan."  Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1).   
 
¶62 The majority opinion's treatment of this language——"2 
or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting 
parts of a common scheme or plan"——is confusing and appears to 
be internally inconsistent.   
¶63 The majority opinion restates this language in several 
different ways.  See note 3, supra.   
¶64 Although the majority opinion states that "'connected 
together' and 'common scheme or plan' are separate and distinct 
prongs in the joinder statute," the majority opinion begins its 
analysis by conflating the two, analyzing whether "the separate 
crimes were connected together by a common scheme or plan."  See 
majority op., ¶¶33, 37.  Later, however, the majority opinion 
analyzes each of these prongs of the joinder statute separately.  
See majority op., ¶¶42-46.   
¶65 In sum, these differing approaches at different parts 
of the opinion are confusing and potentially inconsistent.   
¶66 In my view, Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1) sets forth four 
bases for joinder including when two or more acts or transactions 
are connected together or two or more acts or transactions 
constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.  These two bases for 
joinder do not have the same meaning, but the same fact situation 
may satisfy both bases.    
II 
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶67 Next, I question whether the "broad interpretation" of 
the joinder statute stated in Francis v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 554, 
558, 273 N.W.2d 310 (1979), and repeated in the majority opinion 
and other cases without careful analysis is warranted in the 
instant case.6   
 
¶68 Two factors militate against "broadly" interpreting 
the joinder statute in the instant case: (1) The text of the 
joinder statute; and (2) empirical evidence that joinder of 
multiple charges prejudices criminal defendants.  
¶69 The text of Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1), the criminal 
joinder statute, does not state, as the majority opinion does, 
that the statute should be given a broad interpretation in favor 
of joinder.  The legislature has not instructed, as it sometimes 
does, how the text should be construed: broadly, narrowly, 
liberally, or strictly.7 
 
¶70 Rather, the directive of broad interpretation of the 
joinder statute stems from a 1979 case, Francis v. State, 86 
Wis. 2d 554, 558-59, 273 N.W.2d 310 (1979).  In Francis, this 
court recognized that the joinder statute does not require 
joinder of two or more charges, and joinder of two or more 
                                                 
6 See majority op., ¶¶30-31, 36; see also State v. Prescott, 
2012 WI App 136, ¶15, 345 Wis. 2d 313, 825 N.W.2d 515; State v. 
Bellows, 218 Wis. 2d 614, 622, 582 N.W.2d 53 (Ct. App. 1998); 
State v. Hoffman, 106 Wis. 2d 185, 208, 316 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 
1982).   
7 See, e.g., Wis. DWD v. Wis. DOJ, 2015 WI 114, ¶¶30-34, 365 
Wis. 2d 694, 875 N.W.2d 545 (refusing to liberally construe Wis. 
Stat. §§ 230.80-.89 despite clear legislative directive in Wis. 
Stat. § 230.02 to "construe[ ] [the statutes] liberally in aid 
of the purposes declared . . . .").   
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
charges does not require a joint trial on the charges.8  The 
Francis court observed that "[a] broad interpretation of the 
joinder provision is consistent with the purposes of joinder, 
namely trial convenience for the state and convenience and 
advantage to the defendant."9  The majority opinion agrees that a 
broad 
interpretation 
of 
the 
joinder 
statute 
fits 
these 
convenience and efficiency goals.10 
¶71 In support of its "broad interpretation" of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.12, the Francis court relied on a 1961 article by Frank J. 
Remington and Allan J. Joseph, titled Charging, Convicting, and 
Sentencing the Multiple Criminal Offender, 1961 Wis. L. Rev. 
528, 538-39.  Remington and Joseph stated that joinder of 
multiple charges generally promotes convenience and efficiency 
and can be beneficial to defendants.  The traditional policy in 
favor of joinder is one of administrative convenience.11   
                                                 
8 Francis v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 554, 558, 273 N.W.2d 310 
(1979).    
9 Francis, 86 Wis. 2d at 558-59 (citing Frank J. Remington & 
Allan J. Joseph, Charging, Convicting, and Sentencing the 
Multiple Criminal Offender, 1961 Wis. L. Rev. 528, 538-39).   
10 See majority op., ¶36 ("We interpret initial joinder 
decisions broadly because of the goals and purposes of the 
joinder statute: (1) trial economy and convenience; (2) to 
promote efficiency in judicial administration; and (3) to 
eliminate multiple trials against the same defendant, which 
promotes fiscal responsibility.") (citing Francis, 86 Wis. 2d at 
560; State v. Leach, 124 Wis. 2d 648, 671, 370 N.W.2d 240 
(1985)).    
11 See Note, Criminal Law——Joinder and Severence Under the 
New Wisconsin Criminal Procedure Code, 1971 Wis. L. Rev. 604, 
606. 
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶72 Although 
Francis 
was 
correct 
that 
a 
broad 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1) is consistent with the 
purposes of joinder discussed therein, namely trial convenience, 
judicial efficiency, and convenience to a defendant,12 Remington 
and Joseph cautioned that "joinder of several offenses in a 
single proceeding may, under some circumstances, be prejudicial 
to the defendant."13  The defendant in the instant case in effect 
objected to the joinder of charges because joinder would enable 
the prosecution to introduce evidence irrelevant and unrelated 
to the other criminal charges.  
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.12(1) is modeled after Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 8.  In interpreting and applying Wis. 
Stat. § 971.12(1), federal authorities assist in my analysis.  
See State v. Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d 431, 439, 529 N.W.2d 225 
(1995).   
In analyzing Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8, Wright's 
Federal 
Practice 
and 
Procedure 
states 
that 
a 
broad 
interpretation of the joinder statute will allow joinder 
regardless of whether it is just or fair.  1A Charles Alan 
Wright et al., Federal Practice And Procedure § 143 (3d ed. 
1999); see also Thomas C. Wales, Note, Harmless Error and 
Misjoinder Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: A 
Narrowing Division of Opinion, 6 Hofstra L. Rev. 533, 536-37 
n.14 (1978): 
For the defendant who goes to trial properly joined 
under [federal] rule 8, the chances of receiving a 
separate trial at a later time are unlikely at the 
trial level and even less likely on appeal . . . .  It 
is for this reason that the courts' interpretation of 
[federal] rule 8 and what they first determine to be 
the 
bounds 
of 
proper 
joinder 
are 
of 
central 
importance.  A broad interpretation of rule 8 means 
broad joinder. 
13 Frank 
J. 
Remington 
& 
Allen 
J. 
Joseph, 
Charging, 
Convicting, and Sentencing the Multiple Criminal Offender, 1961 
Wis. L. Rev. 528, 538-39.   
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶73 The emphasis in Francis was on the value of joinder to 
the administration of justice.  The language in Francis 
regarding a "broad interpretation" of the joinder statute makes 
sense when limited to the administrative convenience purposes 
stressed therein.  Efficiency is an important value.  Outside of 
joinder for pretrial purposes, however, we should not broadly 
interpret the joinder statute because the efficiency gained by 
joining multiple charges for trial may result in significant 
prejudice to the defendant.  Interpreting the joinder statute 
according 
to 
its 
text, 
without 
the 
patina 
of 
"broad 
interpretation," avoids undue prejudice——another important value 
in criminal law.   
¶74 We should not broadly interpret and apply the text of 
the four bases for joinder because, as recent empirical studies 
of joinder have demonstrated, joinder of multiple charges has a 
prejudicial effect on criminal defendants.   
¶75 Empirical research, like other forms of evidence, can 
and should inform decision making (as it does elsewhere in the 
criminal justice system) in interpreting and applying the four 
bases for joinder.  Indeed, Wisconsin has been a leader in 
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
evidence-based decision making.14  Examples of empirical studies 
describing the prejudice to defendants who face joinder of 
multiple charges are as follows:   
• Edie Greene & Brian H. Bornstein, Nudging the Justice 
System Toward Better Decisions, 103 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 1155, 1163 (2013) (reviewing Dennis J. 
Devine, Jury Decision Making: The State of the Science 
(NYU Press 2012)): 
[J]oinder of criminal charges biases 
jurors' judgments against a defendant 
because 
jurors 
attribute 
multiple 
instances 
of 
wrongdoing 
to 
a 
defendant's criminal disposition and 
confuse evidence relevant to multiple 
charges. 
• Andrew D. Leipold & Hossein A. Abbasi, The Impact of 
Joinder and Severance on Federal Criminal Cases:  An 
Empirical Study, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 349, 383 (2006) 
(emphasis added): 
Joinder of counts has a significant 
impact on the outcome of trials.  A 
                                                 
14 See, 
e.g., 
Judge 
Elliot 
M. 
Levine, 
Evidence-Based 
Decision Making: EBDM in Wisconsin: A Primer, Wis. Counties, 
Aug. 2015, at 22; Planning & Policy Advisory Committee, 
Effective Justice Strategies Subcommittee, Phase II: Progress 
and Accomplishments 7 (Nov. 13, 2013) ("In the past 5 years, 
evidence-based practices in Wisconsin have gained strides in 
their 
use 
and 
understanding 
. 
. 
. 
."), 
available 
at  
https://www.wicourts.gov/courts/programs/docs/finalreport.pdf; 
Mary Beth Kirven, National Center for State Courts, The Use of 
Evidence-Based Practices in Wisconsin Adult Drug Courts: An 
Overview 1 (2011-12) (identifying "court-related evidence-based 
strategies that enhance public safety, reduce recidivism, and 
address criminal and addictive behaviors . . . .") (quotation 
omitted).       
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
defendant who stands trial on a single 
count is roughly 9 percentage points 
less 
likely 
to 
be 
convicted 
than 
defendants who face multiple counts.   
• Andrew 
D. 
Leipold, 
How 
the 
Pretrial 
Process 
Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 1123, 1142-43 (2005) (footnotes omitted):  
Joining charges or defendants in a 
single trial is a great resource saver, 
and it helps avoid the "scandal of 
inconsistent verdicts."  The risks of 
joinder for the defense, however, are 
many.  A defendant who is guilty of one 
charge but innocent of another may find 
it 
difficult 
to 
present 
separate 
defenses 
to 
separate 
charges, 
particularly if he wants to take the 
stand on the second count but not the 
first.  More significantly, a jury 
considering 
an 
innocent 
defendant 
charged with multiple counts may infer 
a 
criminal 
disposition, 
or 
"may 
cumulate the evidence of the various 
crimes charged and find guilty, when, 
if considered separately it would not 
so find."   
• James Farrin, Note, Rethinking Criminal Joinder: An 
Analysis 
of 
the 
Empirical 
Research 
and 
Its 
Implications for Justice, 52 Law & Contemp. Probs. 
325, 330-31 (1989) (footnotes omitted):  
[T]he studies are unanimous in finding 
that 
defendants 
do 
face 
a 
greater 
likelihood of conviction if offenses 
are 
tried 
jointly 
rather 
than 
separately. . . . A 
cumulative 
compilation of all the joinder research 
findings 
shows 
that 
the 
effect 
of 
joinder of offenses is robust; there is 
a significantly greater likelihood of 
conviction 
for 
defendants. 
These 
findings have been constant despite 
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
varying 
methodologies 
by 
the 
researchers.  
• Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Information 
Processing in Joined and Severed Trials, 13 J. Applied 
Soc. Psych. 351, 369 (1983): 
[J]urors in a joined trial situation 
cannot keep the two charges separate 
and arrive at independent verdicts.  
¶76 These studies identify several reasons why joinder of 
multiple charges for trial leads to a significantly higher 
likelihood of conviction:  Juries may be confused, may struggle 
to remember evidence going to numerous charges, may selectively 
remember 
only 
the 
evidence 
that 
confirms 
their 
ultimate 
conclusion, or may infer "that the defendant has a criminal 
personality type"15 because of the multiple charges.16    
¶77 Wisconsin case law echoes these concerns.  "The 
potential problem as a result of a trial on joint charges is 
that a defendant may suffer prejudice since a jury may be 
incapable of separating the evidence relevant to each offense or 
because the jury may perceive a defendant accused of several 
crimes is predisposed to committing criminal acts."17   
                                                 
15  Farrin, supra note 5, at 330.   
16 Although these writings focus largely on the risks of 
jury bias and confusion, at least one study concluded that the 
prejudicial effect of joining multiple charges is actually more 
substantial in bench trials than jury trials.  See Leipold & 
Abbasi, supra note 5, at 383.   
17 State v. Leach, 124 Wis. 2d 648, 672, 370 N.W.2d 240 
(1985) (citing State v. Bettinger, 100 Wis. 2d 691, 696-97, 303 
N.W.2d 585 (1981)).   
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶78 As a result, I conclude that a "broad" interpretation 
of the joinder statute is not justified in the instant case.  
Rather, the joinder statute should be interpreted using the 
interpretative 
tools 
ordinarily 
used 
in 
statutory 
interpretation.   
III 
 
¶79 I 
turn 
now 
to 
the 
application 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.12(1) in the instant case.  The majority opinion concludes 
that the circuit court properly joined the multiple sexual 
assault charges and the victim intimidation charges because they 
are "2 or more acts or transactions connected together or 
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan . . . ."18  Wis. 
Stat. § 971.12(1).  The instant case involves a third set of 
charges, not at issue here, that involve domestic abuse.   
¶80 In reaching its conclusion, the majority opinion 
relies on the following:   
• V.G. was the alleged victim of both victim intimidation 
and sexual assault.  See majority op., ¶38.   
• The last sexual assault allegedly took place on the same 
day as the domestic violence incident (to which the 
victim intimidation charge is related).  See majority 
op., ¶38.   
• "Salinas's domestic violence toward V.G. immediately 
preceded the [last] sexual assault."  Namely, Salinas 
                                                 
18 See majority op., ¶2.   
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
allegedly slapped V.G. on the date of the domestic 
violence incident.  See majority op., ¶38.   
• The victim intimidation charges and sexual assault 
charges "were close in time, involved the same people, 
and Salinas arguably engaged in one crime to prevent 
disclosure and punishment for another."  See majority 
op., ¶38.   
• The majority opinion asserts that "[t]he State presented 
evidence that all of Salinas's crimes constituted parts 
of 
his 
common 
scheme 
or 
plan 
to 
use 
threats, 
intimidation, physical and sexual abuse to maintain power 
and control over the woman with whom he lived, as well as 
her daughter, so he could break the law without risk of 
getting caught."  Majority op., ¶46.   
¶81 The majority opinion's recounting of the "connections" 
between the sexual assault charges and the victim intimidation 
charges is seriously flawed.  I agree with the decision of the 
court of appeals.  It carefully applied Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1) 
and concluded that joinder of the sexual assault charges and the 
victim intimidation charges was improper.   
¶82 First, although the sexual assault charges and the 
victim intimidation charges do have one victim in common, V.G., 
the majority opinion ignores the fact that M.S. was a victim 
only of the victim intimidation.   
 
¶83 Second, the majority opinion overstates the facts it 
claims connect the sexual assault charges and the victim 
intimidation charges by relying on a third set of charges——the 
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
domestic violence charges——that were not joined and are not at 
issue in the instant case.   
 
¶84 Although the majority opinion correctly asserts that 
the last sexual assault allegedly occurred the same day as the 
domestic violence incident (which, in turn, led to the victim 
intimidation charges), V.G. alleged that Salinas sexually 
assaulted her dozens of times over a period of two and one-half 
years.  Even if the last sexual assault incident were connected 
to the victim intimidation charges (through the domestic 
violence incident that is not at issue in this case), that 
single incident does not connect 2.5 years of sexual assaults to 
the intimidating phone calls.  The intimidating phone calls were 
made nearly six months after the last of the sexual assaults 
allegedly occurred and one month before the sexual assaults were 
reported.      
 
¶85 Likewise, the majority opinion overstates the scope of 
the alleged victim intimidation.  Although the majority opinion 
correctly states that Salinas made hundreds of phone calls from 
jail to M.S. and V.G. while awaiting sentencing on the domestic 
abuse charges,19 the majority opinion conveniently omits the fact 
that only a handful of such calls were actually completed.   
¶86 Third, the sexual assault charges and the victim 
intimidation charges were not based on the same act or 
transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected 
                                                 
19 Majority op., ¶5.   
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
together.  No connection existed between the jail phone calls 
and the sexual assault charges.  
¶87 With no factual support whatsoever, the majority 
opinion asserts that "Salinas arguably engaged in one crime to 
prevent disclosure and punishment for another."20  As the court 
of appeals put it, "[t]here was no connection between the jail 
phone calls and the sexual assault allegations.  The coercive 
phone calls were related only to sentencing in the domestic 
abuse case.  Indeed, the sexual assault allegations and charges 
did not arise until after the domestic abuse case sentencing 
hearing had concluded."21   
¶88 Simply 
put, 
the 
only 
support 
for 
the 
majority 
opinion's assertion that Salinas made the intimidating phone 
calls in an effort to prevent disclosure of and punishment for 
the 
sexual 
assaults 
is 
the 
majority's 
speculation 
about 
Salinas's motives.   
 
¶89 Fourth, the majority opinion makes the unsupported 
assertion that "[t]he State presented evidence that all of 
Salinas's crimes constituted parts of his common scheme or plan 
to use threats, intimidation, physical and sexual abuse to 
maintain power and control over" M.S. and V.G. "so he could 
break the law without risk of getting caught."22     
                                                 
20 See majority op., ¶38.   
21 See State v. Salinas, No. 2013AP2686, unpublished slip 
op., ¶24 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2015) (emphasis added).   
22 See majority op., ¶46.   
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶90 No evidence was presented that Salinas had a common 
scheme or plan to intimidate and control M.S. and V.G.  The only 
"evidence" of such a scheme is the offenses themselves and the 
majority's unsupported inferences and conjecture.  As the court 
of appeals put it, "[i]t appears the State may believe it was 
appropriate to join the cases because the victim intimidation 
and sexual assault allegations generally demonstrated Salinas's 
character trait of being manipulative.  If so, that does not 
satisfy the joinder requirements of [Wis. Stat.] § 971.12(1)."23     
¶91 I agree with the court of appeals.  Neither the State 
nor this court can justify joinder under Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1) 
by speculation and conjecture.   
¶92 Moreover, I agree with the defendant and the court of 
appeals that the circuit court's decision that it was correct as 
a matter of law under Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1) to permit joinder 
of the sexual assault charges and the victim intimidation 
charges against Salinas was prejudicial to the defendant.    
Improper joinder is presumptively prejudicial, and the State 
must rebut the presumption of prejudice by proving the error was 
harmless.24 
¶93 The State argues that any error in joining the sexual 
assault charges and the victim intimidation charges against 
Salinas was harmless because (1) the evidence of Salinas's guilt 
                                                 
23 State v. Salinas, No. 2013AP2686, unpublished slip op., 
¶27 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2015).   
24 See Leach, 124 Wis. 2d at 672-73.   
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
on the sexual assault charges was overwhelming; and (2) the 
evidence of the domestic abuse incident would have been admitted 
in a separate trial as contextual "other acts" evidence.25   
¶94 I disagree with the State's arguments.   
¶95 First, the evidence of Salinas's guilt of the sexual 
assaults was not overwhelming.  As the court of appeals put it, 
this was "a classic 'he-said, she-said' case," in which there 
was no physical evidence or third-party witness reinforcing 
V.G.'s allegations.26   
¶96 Second, in assessing "other acts" evidence, we ask 
whether (1) the evidence is offered for a permissible purpose 
under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2); (2) the evidence is 
relevant under Wis. Stat. § 904.01; and (3) the probative value 
of the evidence outweighs the potential prejudice or risk of 
confusion.27   
¶97 Even assuming for the sake of argument that the 
evidence of the victim intimidation charges (and domestic 
violence) was relevant and offered for a permissible purpose, 
the potential prejudice and risk of confusion far outweigh the 
                                                 
25 See State v. Shillcutt, 116 Wis. 2d 227, 236, 341 
N.W.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1983) ("[A]n accepted basis for the 
admissibility of evidence of other crimes arises when such 
evidence furnishes part of the context of the crime or is 
necessary to a full presentation of the case.") (internal 
quotation marks and quoted source omitted).   
26 See State v. Salinas, No. 2013AP2686, unpublished slip 
op., ¶36 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2015).   
27 See 
State 
v. 
Sullivan, 
216 
Wis. 2d 768, 
783, 
576 
N.W.2d 30 (1998).   
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
probative value.  V.G. alleged 40 to 50 sexual assaults over a 
period of two and a half years.  The fact that one of the 
alleged sexual assaults occurred on the same day as the domestic 
violence incident (which in turn led to the intimidating phone 
calls——all of which occurred after the last sexual assault and 
before the sexual assaults were reported) is simply not 
sufficiently probative to outweigh the substantial risk of 
prejudice to Salinas.   
¶98 In sum, I would affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.   
¶99 In closing, I note that the court of appeals' decision 
in the instant case was an unpublished per curiam decision.  
When the court granted review in the instant case, I wrote 
separately, in a comment appended to the order, noting: 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals Internal Operating 
Procedures explains that per curiam opinions do not 
involve 
"new 
or 
unsettled 
questions 
of 
general 
importance." 
 . . . . 
I write to urge the court to keep in mind 
Attorney Michael S. Heffernan's cautionary comment at 
§ 23.14 in his book entitled Appellate Practice and 
Procedure in Wisconsin (6th ed. 2014):  "[There is] 
considerable 
discrepancy 
in 
the 
quality 
of 
the 
petitions [the Wisconsin Supreme Court] grants.  To 
control its calendar [in fear of being inundated] the 
court may deny arguably meritorious petitions and then 
may end up granting petitions for little apparent 
reason other than filling its calendar."     
¶100 This court's criteria for granting review are set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r) and emphasize the law-
developing role of this court.  Despite this court's law-
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
20 
 
developing role, 26% of the court's docket this term is expected 
to be reviews of per curiam decisions of the court of appeals——
the highest rate in more than 20 years.28   
¶101 Neither this court nor the court of appeals developed 
the law in the instant case.  Without developing the law, this 
court is not fulfilling its role and is instead serving as an 
error-correcting court.  Unfortunately, it is the majority 
opinion, not the court of appeals, that errs in the instant 
case.   
¶102 For the reasons set forth, I dissent and write 
separately. 
¶103 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
                                                 
28 See Alan Ball, Is the Court of Appeals Responsible for 
the Supreme Court's Per Curiam Diet?, SCOWStats, Apr. 26, 2016, 
http://www.scowstats.com/2016/04/26/is-the-court-of-appeals-
responsible-for-the-supreme-courts-per-curiam-diet/; 
see 
also  
Alan Ball, Justice Abrahamson's Concerns Over the Docket - An 
Update, 
SCOWStats, 
 
Mar. 
20, 
2016, 
http://www.scowstats.com/2016/03/20/justice-abrahamsons-
concerns-over-the-docket-an-update/; 
Alan 
Ball, 
Justice 
Abrahamson's Concerns Over the 2015-16 Docket, SCOWStats, Oct. 
15, 
2015, 
http://www.scowstats.com/2015/10/15/justice-
abrahamsons-concerns-over-the-2015-16-docket-2/.    
No.  2013AP2686-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1