Title: Grimes v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 24S-CR-00217
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2024

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 24S-CR-217 
William R. Grimes, 
Appellant, 
–v– 
State of Indiana, 
Appellee. 
Argued: January 25, 2024 | Decided: June 26, 2024 
Appeal from the Sullivan Superior Court 
No. 77D01-2212-F2-741 
The Honorable Hugh R. Hunt, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 23A-CR-656 
Opinion by Justice Slaughter 
Chief Justice Rush and Justice Molter concur. 
Justice Goff dissents with separate opinion in which Justice Massa joins. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Jun 26 2024, 12:08 pm
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Slaughter, Justice. 
Indiana Criminal Rule 4 balances two competing interests: a criminal 
defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial and a trial court’s need 
for flexibility in managing its calendar. The rule requires the State to try 
defendants in a prompt manner but also permits trial courts to reschedule 
trials in case of calendar “congestion” or an “emergency”. Ind. Crim. Rule 
4(B)(1). When a trial court postpones a criminal trial due to congestion and 
the defendant objects, we apply a burden-shifting test. Our test first gives 
deference to the trial court’s initial finding of congestion. But if the 
defendant presents a prima facie case that the court’s congestion finding is 
inaccurate, we shift the burden to the trial court to explain why its 
calendar required continuing the trial. If the court fails to meet its burden, 
the defendant is entitled to have the State’s claim against him dismissed or 
discharged.  
Here, we hold the defendant is entitled to discharge. He met his burden 
to show a prima facie case of no court congestion when he submitted the 
court’s docket showing no other scheduling conflicts with priority over 
his criminal trial. This showing shifted the burden to the trial court to 
explain the postponement. But the trial court failed to meet even this low 
bar because it gave no explanation when it denied the defendant’s motion 
for discharge. We grant transfer and reverse and remand with 
instructions.  
I 
A 
The State charged defendant, William R. Grimes, with multiple crimes 
after a disagreement between Grimes and Matthew Pirtle turned violent. 
In September 2022, Grimes was sleeping in his own car near Pirtle’s home. 
Pirtle knew Grimes because he was good friends with Grimes’s father. 
Pirtle grabbed his .17-caliber, bolt-action rifle, which was loaded with five 
bullets, and approached Grimes’s vehicle. Pirtle confronted Grimes and 
asked him to leave since Grimes did not live in the area. The two engaged 
in a heated argument, during which Pirtle accused Grimes’s girlfriend of 
trying to steal from him earlier.  
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The disagreement escalated when Grimes took Pirtle’s rifle. They 
continued to argue, and then Pirtle started walking away. As Pirtle was 
leaving, Grimes came from behind and hit him in the back of the head 
with the butt of Pirtle’s rifle. Pirtle fell unconscious long enough for 
Grimes to get into his car and drive away with the rifle.  
B 
After this incident, the State charged Grimes with theft, a level 5 felony; 
battery resulting in bodily injury, a class A misdemeanor; and unlawful 
possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a level 4 felony. At the 
initial hearing on October 13, Grimes requested a speedy trial under 
Criminal Rule 4, which the trial court granted. The court then set the trial 
date for December 13, which was within seventy days after Grimes filed 
his motion, as Rule 4 requires. Crim. R. 4(B). Throughout the pre-trial 
period, Grimes remained in custody.  
In late November, twenty-two days before trial, the State added a 
habitual-offender-enhancement charge against Grimes. The State also 
added yet another charge, robbery resulting in bodily injury, a level 3 
felony. Then on November 23, the State moved to continue the trial date 
because prosecutors would be at an annual conference the week before the 
December 13 trial date. The trial court granted the motion, moving the 
trial date to December 19, which was still within seventy days of Grimes’s 
speedy-trial request.  
Then in early December, seventeen days before this new trial date, the 
trial judge issued an order informing the parties that he was the 
prosecuting attorney in one of the underlying convictions for the habitual-
offender charge. Because this created a conflict of interest, the judge 
transferred the case from Sullivan Circuit Court to Sullivan Superior 
Court.  
Shortly after the case was transferred, the new trial judge issued an 
order on December 6 continuing the jury trial from December 19 to 
January 25, 2023, “[d]ue to Court congestion”. The new trial date was 104 
days after Grimes’s October 13 request for a speedy trial. The new judge 
did not explain further why he continued the trial. Grimes received notice 
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of this continuance a day later and immediately objected in writing, 
arguing he “should not be prejudiced due to the transfer of the case”. 
Without explanation, the trial court overruled the objection.  
Pre-trial proceedings continued as the seventy-day deadline to try 
Grimes neared. On December 14, the State amended two charges. It 
replaced the level 3 felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury with 
a level 2 felony, and it replaced the class A misdemeanor battery resulting 
in serious bodily injury with a level 5 felony. Then on December 19, the 
State moved for appointment of a special prosecutor because the 
prosecuting attorney then assigned to Grimes’s case participated as a 
magistrate judge in one of the felonies underlying the habitual-offender 
charge. The court granted the State’s motion.  
On December 21, Grimes filed a motion for discharge under Indiana 
Criminal Rule 4, challenging the trial court’s finding of calendar 
congestion when it moved his trial. Grimes explained that on December 
15, he obtained certified copies of the court’s docket for December 19 to 
21, which revealed that no jury trials were scheduled for those days. 
Grimes also learned from the trial clerk that no jurors were summoned for 
jury duty for that time. A bench trial in another case was scheduled for 
December 20. But the defendant in that case was not in custody and did 
not request a speedy trial. Thus, Grimes argued, his case should have 
received priority scheduling. While his motion stated the seventy-day 
deadline was December 20, in fact the seventieth day after his October 13 
speedy-trial request was December 22. Again, the trial court denied 
Grimes’s motion without explanation.  
Before his jury trial started on January 25, Grimes renewed his speedy-
trial objection, which the court again denied. At trial, the jury found 
Grimes guilty of battery, a level 5 felony; theft, a level 5 felony; possession 
of a firearm, a level 4 felony; and the habitual-offender enhancement. The 
court sentenced him to five years on the battery count, five years on the 
theft count, ten years on the firearm-possession count, and twenty years 
on the habitual-offender enhancement, all to be served consecutively for a 
total of forty years. 
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Grimes appealed the denial of his motion for discharge, and the court 
of appeals affirmed. Grimes v. State, No. 23A-CR-656 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 
2023) (mem.). The appellate panel held that Grimes failed to show he was 
entitled to discharge because he presented no evidence that the trial 
court’s congestion finding was clearly erroneous on the date it continued 
the trial. Id. at *6–8. 
Grimes then sought transfer, which we now grant, thus vacating the 
appellate opinion, Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 
II 
Criminal Rule 4 implements a criminal defendant’s constitutional right 
to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 12; Crim. R. 4. 
Rule 4 places the onus on the State to bring defendants to trial and gives 
them a procedure to invoke their speedy-trial right. Austin v. State, 997 
N.E.2d 1027, 1037 (Ind. 2013). The rule is not meant to give defendants a 
“technical means to avoid trial but rather to assure speedy trials.” Cundiff 
v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 (Ind. 2012).  
Under Rule 4, a defendant may move for a speedy trial, which obliges 
the State to bring the defendant to trial within seventy days, or else the 
defendant is “discharged”. Crim. R. 4(B)(1) (effective to Dec. 31, 2023). But 
this obligation has exceptions. A court may delay the start of trial past the 
seventy-day window due to congestion of the court’s calendar or an 
emergency. Ibid. Though we recently amended the rule, its substance as 
relevant here remains unchanged. See Crim. R. 4 (effective Jan. 1, 2024). 
The prior rule said the defendant must be “discharged”; the current rule 
says he must be “dismissed”. Compare Crim. R. 4(B)(1) (effective to Dec. 
31, 2023), with Crim. R. 4(B) (effective Jan. 1, 2024). Because Grimes 
moved for discharge before we amended the rule, all references to the rule 
throughout this opinion are to the version effective to December 31, 
2023—the version, that is, providing the remedy of “discharge”. That said, 
our opinion today applies with equal force to the current version of 
Criminal Rule 4. 
Here, both the congestion and emergency exceptions are at play—the 
trial court cited court congestion when it delayed Grimes’s trial, and the 
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State raises the emergency exception as an alternative basis to affirm the 
trial court’s judgment. First, we hold the trial court erred in denying 
Grimes’s motion for discharge because his motion made an unrebutted 
prima facie case that the court’s congestion finding was erroneous. Then, 
we hold the State’s alternative emergency-exception argument is waived.  
A 
We use a burden-shifting test to evaluate a trial court’s decision to 
reschedule a trial past the seventy-day deadline for calendar congestion. 
We provide a roadmap below for both defendants and trial courts to 
navigate this test. We then apply the roadmap here, finding that Grimes 
made a prima facie case for discharge, and the trial court failed to rebut 
that showing. Because Grimes made a prima facie case, we afford no 
deference to the trial court’s summary order postponing his trial due to 
congestion. Grimes is thus entitled to discharge. 
1 
The burden-shifting test starts with the trial court’s order finding the 
court’s schedule is congested and continuing the trial date. A trial court 
may order a continuance due to congestion without providing further 
explanation. Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1039 (quoting Clark v. State, 659 N.E.2d 
548, 552 (Ind. 1995)). This finding is presumed correct and reviewed for 
clear error. Ibid. (quoting Clark, 659 N.E.2d at 552). The burden then shifts 
to the defendant to object and rebut the court’s congestion finding.  
The defendant has two steps to meet his burden. First, the defendant 
must object at the “earliest opportunity” when the trial court continues the 
trial. Smith v. State, 477 N.E.2d 857, 861–62 (Ind. 1985). At this point, the 
defendant may present evidence to convince the court it must schedule 
the trial within the seventy-day deadline, thus preventing a speedy-trial 
violation in the first place. See Brown v. State, 725 N.E.2d 823, 825 (Ind. 
2000) (noting defendants must object to a Criminal Rule 4 violation to 
“facilitate[] compliance by trial courts with the speedy trial requirement”). 
Second, if the seventy-day deadline passes without a trial, the defendant 
must move for discharge. Clark, 659 N.E.2d at 552. To succeed on this 
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motion, the defendant must show that the court’s congestion finding was 
“factually or legally inaccurate” when it continued the trial. Ibid.  
The level of the defendant’s burden depends on whether the court 
gives a factual basis for finding court congestion in its continuance order 
or in response to the defendant’s discharge motion. If the court does not 
explain its congestion finding, the defendant need only make a prima facie 
case for discharge. Ibid. This is a low bar. But once the defendant makes a 
prima facie case, the burden then shifts back to the trial court to explain its 
congestion finding. If the trial court gives no further explanation, the 
defendant is entitled to discharge. Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1042. But if the 
court explains its finding, either in its continuance order or in response to 
the defendant’s discharge motion, the defendant must show the trial 
court’s finding was clearly erroneous. Clark, 659 N.E.2d at 552. This is a 
much steeper burden for the defendant.  
2 
Here, the trial court did not explain its congestion finding in its order 
continuing the trial date. Grimes thus needed to make only a prima facie 
case in his motion for discharge, which he did. Because the trial court did 
not provide further findings in response, Grimes is entitled to discharge. 
a 
At the first step of the test, the trial court met its initial burden when it 
issued its order continuing the trial. While the trial date was initially set 
for December 19, within the seventy-day limit, the trial court on its own 
motion moved the trial to January 25 because of calendar congestion. The 
court did not explain how its calendar was congested, but this summary 
finding was enough to shift the burden to Grimes to object at the outset 
and then show in a discharge motion that the finding was legally or 
factually inaccurate. Ibid.; Smith, 477 N.E.2d at 861–62. Because the court’s 
order included no explanation, Grimes had to make only a prima facie 
case to meet his burden for discharge. Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1042.    
An alternative option, and the preferable one, would have been for the 
trial court to provide the factual basis for finding congestion in its initial 
continuance order. At each step of the process, the trial court’s burden is 
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low. It need not include a factual basis in its initial continuance order, and 
we defer to a court’s explanation in response to a discharge motion. Clark, 
659 N.E.2d at 552. Even so, we encourage trial judges to take a few extra 
moments and include the factual basis in their initial continuance order.  
Adding a factual basis in the initial order serves two functions. First, 
with the heavy docket many trial courts face, judges may forget the reason 
for a continuance when they rule on a discharge motion days or weeks 
later. Including the basis for continuance helps judges remember at the 
later date what prompted the continuance. Second, giving a factual basis 
tells defendants what they must disprove to obtain a discharge. Indeed, if 
a defendant finds the court’s explanation satisfactory, he may decide not 
to move for discharge at all. After all, if the judge provides a detailed 
explanation in the continuance order, the defendant’s burden to challenge 
the ruling in a later motion for discharge increases significantly. Had the 
court here explained its congestion finding, Grimes would have had to 
make more than a prima facie case; he would have had to prove clear 
error. Ibid. 
Though including a factual basis in the court’s initial continuance order 
is preferable, it is not necessary. The court here found court congestion 
when continuing Grimes’s trial. This was enough to shift the burden to 
Grimes to rebut the court’s finding. 
b 
When the court continued his trial past the seventy-day deadline, 
Grimes had to clear two hurdles to be discharged. First, he had to object at 
the earliest opportunity. Smith, 477 N.E.2d at 861–62. Grimes met this first 
hurdle by filing an objection the same day he received notice of the 
continuance. Though the trial court overruled his objection in a summary 
order, Grimes preserved his objection for discharge in the future.   
Second, once the court denied his objection, Grimes had to make a 
prima facie case in his motion for discharge. Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1042. 
Grimes cleared this hurdle as well. To make a prima facie case, a 
defendant may submit the court’s docket and show a date when the 
defendant’s trial could have occurred before the seventy-day deadline. 
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Ibid. The issue here is whether attaching a copy of the trial court’s docket 
that was obtained after the trial court ordered the continuance (as Grimes 
did here) is enough to make out a prima facie case. We hold that it is, and 
that Grimes met this low burden here.  
i 
In his discharge motion, Grimes attached a court docket to show an 
opening in the court’s schedule, but the docket he submitted was dated 
December 15, which was nine days after the December 6 continuance 
order. The relevant time to assess court congestion is when the court 
issued the continuance. Clark, 659 N.E.2d at 552. A defendant must show 
the congestion finding was incorrect “at the time the trial court made its 
decision to postpone trial”. Ibid. While a docket from the same day that the 
trial court issued its continuance order would be ideal, a post-dated 
docket obtained before the seventy-day speedy-trial deadline can be 
enough to make a prima facie case.  
Prima facie means “such evidence as is sufficient to establish a given 
fact and which will remain sufficient if uncontradicted.” Johnson v. State, 
283 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ind. 1972). Prima facie does not mean “conclusive”. 
Earl v. Am. States Preferred Ins. Co., 744 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2001) (quoting Floyd v. Jay Cnty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 405 N.E.2d 
630, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)), trans. denied. To be sure, the defendant 
must show the court’s congestion finding was incorrect when the court 
continued the trial. But with no conflicting evidence, a later docket can 
reflect the court’s schedule as of the continuance date. If the court’s 
schedule often changes, and its schedule on the continuance date had no 
openings, then the court can provide this information after the defendant 
presents his prima facie case. But the defendant need not in the first 
instance prove conclusively that the docket reflects the court’s schedule on 
the continuance date. After all, it is not the defendant but the court that 
controls and has ready access to this information. Here, Grimes’s tendered 
docket from December 15—a full seven days before the December 22 
speedy-trial deadline—is enough to cast doubt on the court’s congestion 
finding. 
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The State would require that the defendant either pull the court’s 
schedule as of the date the court ordered the continuance or submit 
testimony from a court clerk about the court’s schedule on that date. This 
case is a good example of why we do not require defendants to obtain 
dockets as of the day of the continuance order. Here, the trial court issued 
its order on December 6, but Grimes did not receive notice of this order 
until the next day. Thus, it was impossible for Grimes to obtain the court’s 
docket the day of the order. Under the State’s standard, Grimes’s only 
practical option would be to submit testimony from court staff. But such 
measures are unnecessary to establish a prima facie case, which requires 
only sufficient, not conclusive, evidence.  
The State cites only Truax v. State as an example of the court of appeals 
imposing the State’s proposed standard. 856 N.E.2d 116, 121 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2006). But in citing Truax, the State confuses the prima facie and 
clear-error standards. There, the court of appeals held that a docket pulled 
nine months after the trial court ordered the continuance did not show 
that the trial court’s congestion finding at the time of the continuance was 
inaccurate. Ibid. But Truax did not address what a defendant must prove 
to make a prima facie case. The trial court there explained its congestion 
finding. Id. at 120. Thus, to meet his burden, the defendant had to show 
clear error. Ibid. Truax does not prescribe what evidence may establish a 
prima facie case for discharge. Besides, Truax is factually distinct. The 
docket was dated nine months after continuance and eight months after 
the speedy-trial deadline. Id. at 120–21. With this significant time gap, the 
docket in Truax was far less likely to reflect the trial court’s schedule as of 
the date of continuance than the docket here. 
Finally, the State’s proposed prima facie standard is untenable as a 
practical matter. The State acknowledges that trial courts handle their 
scheduling in “a number of different ways”. In other words, there is no 
guarantee a defendant could belatedly re-create the court’s schedule as of 
the date of continuance. But the defendant needs a “reasonable 
opportunity to demonstrate violations of the rule and to obtain the relief 
provided therein.” Clark, 659 N.E.2d at 551. A defendant does not have a 
“reasonable opportunity” if his counsel must drop all other 
responsibilities and obtain the court’s docket the day the trial court orders 
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a continuance. The State’s approach would require the defendant to obtain 
testimony from court staff about the court’s schedule the day of the 
continuance. But to meet the low bar of a mere prima facie case, this kind 
of evidence is unnecessary. We decline the State’s proposed standard for 
making a prima facie case and hold that a defendant may meet his burden 
by submitting the court’s schedule obtained after the continuance order 
and before the seventy-day deadline, as is the case here. 
ii 
Having established that Grimes can submit a docket dated nine days 
after the trial court ordered the continuance and before the seventy-day 
speedy-trial deadline, we must decide whether the docket he submitted 
refutes the judge’s finding of congestion. We hold that it does.   
To show an opening on the court calendar, a defendant must show that 
no other cases with priority were scheduled before the defendant’s 
seventy-day deadline to prevent the defendant’s trial from taking place. 
Ibid. For example, a criminal case typically has a higher priority than a 
civil case, unless the civil case involves a long-scheduled, complex trial 
that poses extenuating circumstances to litigants and witnesses. Austin, 
997 N.E.2d at 1041. Among criminal cases, one with a defendant who filed 
a speedy-trial motion takes priority over one with a defendant who did 
not, and a criminal case with a longer-incarcerated defendant takes 
priority over one with a more recently charged defendant. Id. at 1040–41. 
To make a prima facie case, the defendant need only show that no trials or 
hearings with obvious priority were scheduled at a time that would have 
prevented the defendant’s trial from taking place within the seventy-day 
window.  
The court docket Grimes attached to his motion was enough to meet his 
burden because it showed no other trials or hearings with priority over his 
trial. While a bench trial was scheduled for December 20, the defendant in 
that case was not in custody, as bond was posted beforehand, and the 
defendant did not request a speedy trial. Because no other criminal trials 
with speedy-trial requests were scheduled from December 19 to 21, 
Grimes’s trial should have received priority. Ibid. He thus made his prima 
facie case. 
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c 
Grimes’s prima facie case returned the burden to the trial court to 
explain its congestion finding. Here, the court’s burden was a low bar to 
meet. But the court denied Grimes’s motion with no explanation. We 
afford this unexplained, bare-bones finding no deference at this juncture. 
Thus, the trial court failed to meet its burden. 
If the trial court had met its burden, Grimes would have had to prove 
clear error. Showing a congestion finding is clearly erroneous depends on 
the specific reason the trial court gave for the continuance. See id. at 1039 
(explaining that “the ultimate reasonableness of the trial court’s findings 
depends very much upon the facts and circumstances of the particular 
case”). Showing an open court calendar with no other trials with priority 
scheduled is often necessary but not sufficient to prove clear error. For 
example, a docket from nine months after a continuance order is not 
enough to show a trial court’s congestion finding is clearly erroneous. 
Truax, 856 N.E.2d at 121. A reviewing court needs more evidence, such as 
testimony from court staff, that the docket accurately reflects the schedule 
as of the continuance order. This higher evidentiary burden makes sense 
because we give the trial court’s congestion finding and accompanying 
explanation great deference. Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1043. 
Because Grimes made his prima facie case, and the trial court provided 
no additional findings on court congestion in response, Grimes is entitled 
to discharge. 
B 
Finally, we address the State’s alternative argument for affirming the 
trial court’s judgment—the emergency exception under Criminal Rule 
4(B)(1). The State argues the need for a special prosecutor was an exigent 
circumstance that required delaying the trial and resulted from Grimes’s 
refusal to waive the prosecutor’s conflict. We are loath to affirm the 
continuance of a trial for court congestion on a basis the trial court never 
considered. The State did not request a special prosecutor from the trial 
court until December 19—after the trial court continued the trial. The State 
could have raised its emergency-exception argument in response to 
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Grimes’s motion for discharge. Even when the court moves a trial on its 
own motion, the State must still ensure the defendant’s trial is not delayed 
in error. See id. at 1037 (holding State has affirmative duty to bring 
defendant to trial under Rule 4). The State’s failure to raise the issue in the 
trial court means it is waived. Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 98 (Ind. 2021).  
*  
* 
* 
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand 
with instructions to discharge Grimes.  
Rush, C.J., and Molter, J., concur. 
Goff, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Massa, J., joins. 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N T  WI LL IA M R .  G R IME S  
Cara Schaefer Wieneke 
Wieneke Law Office, LLC 
Brooklyn, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  S TA TE  OF  I N D IA NA  
Theodore E. Rokita 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Daylon L. Welliver 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-217 | June 26, 2024 
Page 1 of 3 
Goff, J., dissenting. 
I respectfully disagree with the Court’s holding that Grimes carried his 
burden of showing that the trial court’s congestion finding was inaccurate 
at the time it continued the trial. In my view, Grimes failed to meet this 
burden by submitting a copy of the court’s docket dated nine days after 
the court rescheduled trial and by merely alleging, without testimony or 
affidavit from court staff, that “no jurors were summoned for duty” the 
week of the original trial date. See Appellant’s Br. at 12. 
A trial must generally begin for an incarcerated defendant within 
seventy days from the date that he or she moves for an early trial. Ind. 
Crim. Rule 4(B). The Rule, though, recognizes several exceptions to this 
deadline, including “delays due to congestion of the court calendar or 
emergency.” Id. In Clark v. State, this Court created a simple burden-
shifting test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to discharge 
for a speedy-trial violation: When a trial court invokes congestion, without 
further explanation, as a reason for continuing trial, the defendant may 
challenge that decision by making an initial, prima facie showing that, “at 
the time” the court ordered the continuance, its finding was “factually or 
legally inaccurate.” 659 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ind. 1995). A successful showing 
that no other case required “particularized priority treatment” compels 
the defendant’s discharge unless the trial court offers rebuttal findings to 
justify the delay (in which case the defendant must show clear error). Id. at 
551, 552. But until the defendant makes this showing, the court’s 
congestion finding—even one that lacks contemporaneous explanation or 
documentation—is “presumed valid.” Id.  
The question here is whether submitting a copy of the trial court’s 
docket, as it stood several days after the court ordered the continuance, is 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case. See ante, at 9.  
 I would answer this question in the negative. To determine the 
accuracy of a congestion finding, our precedent considers it “necessary to 
view the trial court’s calendar on the date that the court granted the trial 
continuance.” Truax v. State, 856 N.E.2d 116, 121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) 
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(emphasis added).1 Cf. Clark, 659 N.E.2d at 552 (holding that the defendant 
was entitled to discharge by showing “that, on the day the trial court 
made the decision to postpone the trial and enter the order finding 
congestion, no conflicting jury trial was scheduled and no jurors had been 
summoned”) (emphasis added). Indeed, given the frequency with which a 
trial court’s schedule changes, a docket dated several days after the 
continuance order is not, in my view, presumptively “sufficient to 
establish a given fact”—here, the state of the court’s calendar at the 
material time. See ante, at 9 (quoting Johnson v. State, 283 N.E.2d 532, 534 
(Ind. 1972)). 
To be sure, depending on when the defendant receives notice of the 
continuance order, it may be difficult to obtain the court’s docket on the 
day it ordered the continuance. But that doesn’t mean we should lower 
the defendant’s evidentiary burden. After all, the Rule’s purpose is “to 
assure speedy trials” in line with constitutional protections, not to give 
defendants a “technical means to avoid trial.” Cundiff v. State, 967 N.E.2d 
1026, 1028 (Ind. 2012). And even when delayed notification renders it 
impossible to secure a copy of the court’s docket on the day it ordered the 
continuance, a defendant may still support a motion for discharge with 
testimony or affidavits from court staff attesting to the lack of congestion. 
Clark, 659 N.E.2d at 550. This alternative, a relatively easy task for counsel, 
gives the defendant a “reasonable opportunity to demonstrate violations 
of the rule and to obtain the relief provided therein.” Id. at 551.  
Still, the Court holds that, given the “low bar” of establishing a prima 
facie case, Grimes is entitled to discharge. Ante, at 9, 11. While 
acknowledging that “a docket from the same day that the trial court 
issued its continuance order would be ideal,” the Court nevertheless 
 
1 I disagree with the Court that Truax is inapt. See ante, at 10. To be sure, the trial court in that 
case had explained its congestion finding, requiring the defendant to show clear error. 856 
N.E.2d at 120. But with “no evidence” that the court’s calendar, “on the date” of the 
continuance order, showed prospective congestion on the originally scheduled trial date, the 
defendant there couldn’t even make a prima facie showing that the court’s congestion finding 
was legally or factually inaccurate. See id. at 121. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-217 | June 26, 2024 
Page 3 of 3 
concludes that, in the absence of “conflicting evidence” that would 
support a congestion finding at the time of the continuance, “a post-dated 
docket obtained before the seventy-day speedy-trial deadline” may suffice 
to establish a prima facie case, even when the defendant submits no 
supporting evidence from court staff. Id. at 9, 10.  
This holding, in my view, improperly shifts the burden to the trial 
court, effectively rejecting the presumed validity of the court’s initial 
congestion finding if it lacks contemporaneous explanation or 
documentation.2  
Finally, it’s worth emphasizing that the trial court, whether on rebuttal 
or when issuing its initial continuance order, can meet its low burden by 
offering a simple factual basis to support its congestion finding—e.g., 
noting the case and cause number requiring priority treatment—and thus 
avoid cases like this. 
For the reasons above, I respectfully dissent. 
Massa, J., joins. 
 
2 In concluding that the defendant had met his initial burden of showing an inaccurate 
congestion finding, this Court, in Austin v. State, referred simply to the defendant’s motion 
and “attached exhibits highlighting the trial calendar and apparent scheduling vacancy on 
August 15,” the last day of the speedy-trial window. 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1042 (Ind. 2013). The 
Court made no reference to a date on which the defendant secured a copy of the trial court 
calendar, see id., suggesting that it may have been obtained anytime within a thirteen-day 
window—from August 4 (when the court continued trial) to August 17 (when the defendant 
filed his motion). But to conclude that a post-dated copy of the trial court’s calendar sufficed 
requires speculation beyond the facts discussed in that case. And, in any event, the Austin 
Court wasn’t presented with the issue before us today.