Title: Ex parte Larry Ray Dunn. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CRIMINAL (In re: State of Alabama v. Larry Ray Dunn)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1071267
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 31, 2008

REL: 10/31/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1071267
____________________
Ex parte Larry Ray Dunn
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: State of Alabama v. Larry Ray Dunn)
(Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, CC-05-1539;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-07-0644)
STUART, Justice.
Larry Ray Dunn petitions this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the Court of Criminal Appeals to vacate its
order granting the State's petition for a writ of mandamus.
In that order the Court of Criminal Appeals directed the trial
1071267
Rule 15.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., provides:
1
"(b) Admissibility of Evidence.  Upon motion of
either party or upon its own motion, the court may
order that the question of the admissibility of any
specified 
evidence be submitted for pre-trial
determination as if a motion to suppress had been
timely 
filed 
by 
the 
party 
opposed 
to 
the
introduction of the evidence."
A request by the State for a pretrial ruling on the
admissibility of evidence permits the State, if its evidence
is suppressed, to appeal the trial court's suppression order
to the Court of Criminal Appeals.  See Rule 15.7, Ala. R.
2
court to set aside its order granting Dunn's motion to
suppress, to accept the jury's verdict, and to sentence Dunn.
Dunn, in effect, asks this Court to direct the Court of
Criminal Appeals to enter an order denying the State's
petition for a writ of mandamus.  We grant the petition and
issue the writ.
Facts
Dunn moved the trial court to suppress evidence that was
seized from his residence and that provided the basis for a
criminal charge against him.  After conducting a suppression
hearing outside the presence of the jury, the trial court
stated that it was taking Dunn's suppression motion "under
advisement" and that the trial would proceed.  The State did
not move, pursuant to Rule 15.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P.,  for a
1
1071267
Crim. P.  See also State v. A.R.C., 873 So. 2d 261, 267 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2003)(recognizing that if the State filed a motion
in limine seeking a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of
the evidence and the trial court suppressed the evidence, the
State could appeal the ruling, pursuant to Rule 15.7, Ala. R.
Crim. P., to the Court of Criminal Appeals). 
3
pretrial determination on the admissibility of the evidence.
At the close of the State's case, Dunn renewed his motion to
suppress.  The trial court stated that it would continue to
take Dunn's suppression motion under advisement.  After the
jury returned a verdict of guilty, the trial court and counsel
for both sides discussed a schedule for briefing Dunn's
suppression issues.  The parties briefed the issues, and,
after considering the briefs, the trial court granted Dunn's
motion to suppress. 
The State then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus
with the Court of Criminal Appeals, asking that court to
prohibit the trial court from granting Dunn's motion to
suppress and to direct the trial court to enter a judgment of
guilt finalizing the jury's verdict and to pronounce sentence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State's petition and
ordered the trial court to set aside its suppression order, to
accept the jury's verdict, and to sentence Dunn.  State v.
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4
Dunn (CR-07-0644, May 28, 2008), ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim.
App. 2008)(table).  
Dunn petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the Court of Criminal Appeals to vacate its order
granting the State's petition and to enter an order denying
the State's petition.  
Standard of Review
"Our review of a decision of the Court of
Criminal Appeals on an original petition for a writ
of mandamus is de novo. Rule 21(e)(1), Ala. R. App.
P.; Ex parte Sharp, 893 So. 2d 571, 573 (Ala. 2003).
The standard for issuance of a writ of mandamus is
well settled:
"'A 
writ 
of 
mandamus 
is 
an
extraordinary remedy, and is appropriate
when the petitioner can show (1) a clear
legal right to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
(3) the lack of another adequate remedy;
and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction
of the court.'
"Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272
(Ala. 2001)(citing Ex parte Inverness Constr. Co.,
775 So. 2d 153, 156 (Ala. 2000))."
Ex parte McCormick, 932 So. 2d 124, 127-28 (Ala. 2005).
Discussion
Dunn contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in
issuing the writ because, he says, among other reasons, the
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State did not establish that the trial court had "an
imperative duty ... to perform" and that it "refus[ed] to do
so."  
"Mandamus 
is 
relief 
to 
be 
issued 
only 
in 
rare
circumstances."  Ex parte United Equitable Life Ins. Co., 595
So. 2d 1373, 1374 (Ala. 1992).  Here, the materials before us
clearly establish that the State failed to satisfy the
requirement for mandamus relief of "an imperative duty upon
the [trial court] to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do
so."  Because the State did not move for a pretrial
determination on the admissibility of the evidence, the trial
court had the discretion to take Dunn's suppression motion
under advisement, proceed with the trial, and issue a ruling
after the jury returned its verdict.  Thus, nothing before us
indicates that at the time the trial court entered its order
suppressing the evidence it had an imperative duty to perform
and refused to do so.  Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary
remedy that "will be denied, [when] there is another specific
and sufficient remedy provided by law."  Arrington v. Van
Houton, 44 Ala. 284, 286 (1870).  Because the State failed to
1071267
Although Justice Murdock did not sit for oral argument
2
of this case, he has viewed the video recording of that oral
argument.
6
satisfy the requirements for mandamus relief, the Court of
Criminal Appeals erred in issuing the writ.  
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we grant Dunn's petition and
direct the Court of Criminal Appeals to vacate its writ and to
enter an order denying the State's petition. 
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Smith, Bolin, and Parker,
JJ., concur.
Woodall and Murdock,  JJ., concur in the result.
2
1071267
7
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
I believe the main opinion reaches the right result, but
for the wrong reason.  The State was not entitled to a writ of
mandamus from the Court of Criminal Appeals if it could not
establish all four of the elements necessary for the issuance
of such a writ: 
"(1) a clear legal right to the relief sought;
(2) an imperative duty upon the trial court to
perform, accompanied by its refusal to do so;
(3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the
properly invoked jurisdiction of this Court." 
Ex parte Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc., 927 So. 2d 792, 798 (Ala.
2005).  The main opinion concludes, wrongly in my view, that
the State failed to establish the second element, i.e., that
the trial court was under "an imperative duty ... to perform"
but refused to do so.  I believe the proper ground upon which
to base our decision in this case, however, is that the State
failed to establish the first element, i.e., that it had  "a
clear legal right to the relief sought."
If the State had a clear legal right to the entry of a
judgment based on the jury's verdict, then I do not see how it
would not be "imperative" for the trial court to enter that
judgment at the procedural juncture at which the trial court
1071267
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and the parties had arrived when the State sought mandamus
relief from the Court of Criminal Appeals.  The trial was at
an end.  The jury had returned its verdict against the
defendant.  The trial court had ruled that some of the
evidence upon which the jury had reached its verdict should
have been suppressed.  The only thing left for the trial court
to do –- indeed, the very next thing for the trial court to do
–- was to consider the entry of an order granting the
defendant a new trial or a judgment of acquittal.  If the
State was to obtain the relief it sought –-  the avoidance of
an order for a new trial or a judgment of acquittal, and
instead the procurement of a judgment of conviction based upon
the jury's verdict –- it obviously was imperative for the
State to obtain that at the juncture at which it sought it.
Further, the trial court's posttrial, postverdict order
granting the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence was
tantamount, at least in this particular case, to a refusal to
enter a judgment of conviction based on the jury's verdict.
The problem in my view is not that the duty, if any, on
the part of the trial court to perform was not imperative; it
is that there simply was no such duty –- at least not as this
1071267
9
case has been argued.  In other words, the problem for the
State as I see it is that it has no "clear legal right to
relief" in the circumstances presented.
The order of the trial court suppressing the evidence in
question has not been challenged on its merits in the Court of
Criminal Appeals or in this Court.  The only other challenge
to this ruling that the State could make, and the only
challenge that it has in fact attempted to make, is that the
suppression 
order 
by 
the 
trial 
court 
came 
too 
late
procedurally –- specifically, that the trial court could not
suppress the evidence at the late date (posttrial and
postverdict) at which it purported to do so.  It is not
necessary to address the merits of this argument in order to
determine that the State does not have a clear legal right to
relief based upon it.  This is so because it is an argument
that the State did not make to the trial court.  To the
contrary, the State repeatedly had the opportunity throughout
the litigation –- before, during, and after the trial –- to
assert this position but did not do so.  It repeatedly
acquiesced in the trial court's continued reservation of the
1071267
10
issue of suppression until after the trial had been concluded
and a verdict returned.
Our appellate courts do not grant relief based on
arguments presented for the first time to the appellate court.
Ex parte Farley, 981 So. 2d 392, 397 (Ala. 2007) (quoting
Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So. 2d 409, 410 (Ala. 1992),
and Baldwin County Elec. Membership Corp. v. Catrett, 942
So. 2d 337, 348 (Ala. 2006)).  See also Baltimore & Carolina
Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 659 (1935) ("The verdict
for the plaintiff was taken pending the court's rulings on the
motions and subject to those rulings.  No objection was made
to the reservation or this mode of proceeding, and they must
be regarded as having the tacit consent of the parties.").
Thus, the State did not seek in its petition to the Court of
Criminal Appeals to vindicate a "clear legal right to relief."
It is on this basis that I concur in the result.