Title: Kennedy v. DFS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 45, 2019
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 11, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MARY KENNEDY,1 
 
Respondent Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DIVISION OF FAMILY 
SERVICES, 
 
Petitioner Below, 
Appellee. 
 
 
§   
§    No. 45, 2019 
§   
§    Court Below—Family Court 
§    of the State of Delaware 
§   
§    File No. CN17-04312 
§    Petition No. 18-37497 
§  
§  
§   
§   
 
Submitted:  August 14, 2019 
 Decided:  October 11, 2019 
 
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
After consideration of the brief and motion to withdraw filed by the 
appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c), the appellee’s response, and 
the Family Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The respondent-appellant (“Mother”) filed this appeal from the Family 
Court’s order dated January 7, 2019, following a preliminary protective hearing, in 
which the court found probable cause to believe that Mother’s then three-year-old 
son (the “Child”) would be dependent, neglected, or abused in her care and ordered 
                                                 
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
 
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that the Child’s Father would have custody of the Child until the resolution of a 
private custody dispute that was pending before another Family Court judge. 
(2) 
In 2017, Mother filed a petition for custody of the Child.  In October 
2018, the Family Court appointed an attorney (the “Child’s Attorney”) to represent 
the Child’s best interests in that case.  In December 2018, the Child’s Attorney filed 
a petition for an order of protection from abuse (“PFA”) on behalf of the Child, 
alleging that Mother or her boyfriend were abusing the Child.  The Family Court 
commissioner who presided over the ex parte PFA hearing2 determined that the 
Child’s Attorney did not have standing to file a PFA petition on the Child’s behalf.  
But the commissioner found the allegations in the PFA petition to be very 
concerning and, on a sua sponte basis, granted custody of the Child to the Division 
of Family Services (“DFS”).  On December 26, 2018, DFS filed a petition for 
emergency custody, which the Family Court granted in an ex parte order. 
(3) 
The Family Court held a preliminary protective hearing on January 2, 
2019.3  Mother and Father were present and requested the appointment of counsel.  
The court determined that Mother was indigent and appointed counsel for her.  
Because Father worked two jobs and was not able to provide the court with 
information concerning his income from one of them, the court declined to appoint 
                                                 
2 See 10 Del. C. § 1043 (governing the process for ex parte and emergency hearings in PFA cases). 
3 DEL. FAM. CT. CIV. R. 214(a). 
 
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counsel for Father at that time, but stated that if the case proceeded to an adjudicatory 
hearing, Father would have an opportunity to seek appointment of counsel before 
that hearing. 
(4) 
The evidence presented at the hearing, which included testimony from 
Mother, Father, and a DFS worker, reflected that, on at least four days over a period 
of several months, the Child arrived at day care with bruises on his face.  Mother, 
her boyfriend, and the Child provided inconsistent or shifting explanations for the 
injuries.  Moreover, two day care providers and one medical professional had 
expressed concerns to DFS regarding physical injuries that appeared on Mother’s 
children when they were in her care.  Mother had removed the Child from two day 
care providers within a short period of time; both moves occurred shortly after the 
provider had contact with DFS.  In addition, Mother had a history with DFS dating 
to 2007, involving all five of her children.  Mother’s parental rights with respect to 
two of her children had been terminated, one involuntarily, and two of her other 
children were in guardianships.  Mother also had a history of mental health issues, 
and she provided inconsistent testimony regarding the status of her treatment. 
(5) 
Father had no history of involvement with DFS.  Father resided in a 
home with his girlfriend and their infant; he also had frequent visitation with his 
five-year-old son.  The DFS worker assigned to the case assessed the home and had 
no concerns.  A hair follicle screening performed on Father in March 2018 indicated 
 
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that he had consumed substantial amounts of alcohol, but Brandywine Counseling 
had evaluated him in April 2018 and determined that he did not need substance abuse 
services.  Mother had alleged that Father engaged in abusive behavior toward her 
and the Child.  In support of her allegations, she presented Facebook posts and text 
messages that purported to have been created by Father, but Father’s testimony and 
the circumstances surrounding the texts and posts suggested that Mother, rather than 
Father, had created the messages.  The evidence presented at the hearing—including 
Mother’s history of making false reports to law enforcement, for which she had 
previously served a year in prison in one instance—also raised significant questions 
about Mother’s credibility more generally.  Father had no criminal convictions, and 
certain charges brought against him as a result of allegations by Mother had been 
dismissed by the prosecutor based on Mother’s lack of credibility. 
(6) 
At the conclusion of the preliminary protective hearing, the court 
determined that there was probable cause to believe that the Child would be 
dependent, neglected, or abused in Mother’s care.4  The court determined that there 
was not probable cause to believe that the Child would be dependent, neglected, or 
abused in Father’s care and therefore rescinded custody of the Child from DFS to 
                                                 
4 See id. (providing that at a preliminary protective hearing, the Family Court must decide “whether 
the evidence establishes that probable cause exists to believe” that “[a]s to each parent, the child 
is dependent, neglected, or abused or there is a substantial imminent risk thereof,” and “[i]t is in 
the best interests of the child to be in the custody” of DFS). 
 
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Father.  Because that decision ended DFS’s involvement in the matter, the court held 
that any further custody determination would be made in the custody case that was 
pending before another Family Court judge. 
(7) 
Mother’s appointed counsel filed a notice of appeal from the Family 
Court’s order.  She also filed a motion to withdraw, in which she stated her belief   
that the appeal is without merit.  This Court denied the motion to withdraw without  
prejudice and, although this case did not end with a termination of parental rights, 
directed Mother’s counsel to proceed in accordance with Rule 26.1.  Mother’s 
counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 
26.1(c), in which she asserts that, based upon a conscientious review of the record 
and the law, the appeal is without merit.  Counsel informed Mother of the provisions 
of Rule 26.1 and provided her with a copy of the motion to withdraw and a draft of 
the Rule 26.1 brief.  Counsel also informed Mother of her right to supplement 
counsel’s presentation.  Mother provided the points that she wanted to present for 
the Court’s consideration, which counsel included in the brief that she filed with the 
Court.  DFS has responded to the Rule 26.1(c) brief and argues that the Family 
Court’s judgment should be affirmed. 
(8) 
On appeal, this Court reviews the Family Court’s factual and legal 
determinations as well as its inferences and deductions.5  We will not disturb the 
                                                 
5 Long v. Div. of Family Servs., 41 A.3d 367, 370 (Del. 2012). 
 
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Family Court’s rulings if the court’s findings of fact are supported by the record and 
result from an orderly and logical deductive process.6  We review legal rulings de 
novo.7  If the Family Court correctly applied the law, then our standard of review is 
abuse of discretion.8 
(9) 
Within ten days of the entry of an ex parte order under 10 Del. C. § 
2512(a),9 the Family Court must hold a preliminary protective hearing.10  At that 
hearing, the court must determine whether there is probable cause to believe that: 
(1) As to each parent, the child is dependent, neglected, or 
abused, or there is a substantial imminent risk thereof, and  
(2) It is in the best interests of the child to be in the custody of 
[DFS].11 
 
If the court finds that such probable cause exists, DFS will have custody of the child 
pending further proceedings.12  If the court finds that such probable cause has been 
established “with respect to only one parent, the Court may rescind custody to the 
                                                 
6 In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995). 
7 Id. 
8 CASA v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth and Their Families, 834 A.2d 63, 66 (Del. 2003). 
9 Section 2512(a) provides that the Family Court may issue an ex parte order awarding emergency 
custody to DFS if it finds that: 
(1) Continuation in the home is contrary to the welfare of the child; and 
(2) Probable cause exists to believe that: 
(a) A child continues to be in actual physical, mental or emotional 
danger or there is a substantial imminent risk thereof or;  
(b) 
Immediate or irreparable harm may result to the child if such an 
order is not issued.  
13 Del. C. § 2512(a) 
10 DEL. FAM. CT. CIV. R. 214(a). 
11 Id. R. 214(b). 
12 Id. R. 214(c). 
 
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fit parent in a custodial arrangement and in a time and manner as determined by the 
Court to be in the best interests of the child.”13  Moreover, the “finding of probable 
cause may be based in whole or in part on hearsay evidence.”14 
(10) The points Mother raises on appeal may be summarized as follows:  (i) 
the witnesses and attorneys were not credible, lied, and presented false and irrelevant 
information at the hearing, and they attacked Mother’s credibility; (ii) the court and 
the attorneys mishandled the hearing; (iii) the court overlooked certain evidence, 
including evidence of Father’s alcohol use, a video of Father dancing with a gun, 
and a prior termination of parental rights; (iv) the court should have ignored certain 
evidence regarding one of Mother’s other children and should have considered other 
evidence regarding that child; (v) the Child’s Attorney lacked standing to file the 
PFA petition; and (vi) the Child’s Attorney never tried to work with Mother. 
(11) After careful consideration of Mother’s arguments and the record on 
appeal, we conclude that the judgment of the Family Court should be affirmed.  We 
find no error in the Family Court’s application of the law to the facts.  The matter 
came before the Family Court in the posture of a preliminary hearing.  The court 
considered the evidence presented at the hearing and found probable cause that the 
Child would be dependent, neglected, or abused in Mother’s care.  That was not a 
                                                 
13 Id. R. 214(e). 
14 Id. R. 214(f). 
 
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final adjudication of the Child’s dependency; rather, it would have been subjected 
to further examination and factual development—and a more exacting legal 
standard15—had the Family Court also found probable cause that the Child would 
be dependent, neglected, or abused in Father’s care.  But because the court did not 
make that finding with respect to Father, DFS’s petition was dismissed and the 
matter was closed, with further proceedings to occur in the pending custody matter 
to determine the custodial arrangement for the parents and the Child going forward.   
(12) At a preliminary protective hearing, the court must weigh all the 
evidence presented, including the hearsay presented by DFS and the parents, 
consider the totality of the circumstances, and determine whether DFS has met its 
burden to prove probable cause.16  When the determination of facts turns on a 
question of the credibility of the witnesses appearing before the trial court, we will 
not substitute our opinion for that of the trier of fact.17  The court in this case was 
free to credit Father’s testimony regarding issues such as the Facebook posts and 
text messages and the video of Father dancing with a gun, and to give more weight 
                                                 
15 See Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families v. Fowler, 122 A.3d 778, 783 n.23 
(Del. 2015) (noting that probable cause “is an elusive concept which avoids precise definition,” 
which generally “lies somewhere between suspicion and sufficient evidence to convict,” and 
“exists when the facts and circumstances [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief” (internal quotations omitted)). 
16 Id. at 783. 
17 Shimel v. Shimel, 2019 WL 2142066, at *2 (Del. May 14, 2019). 
 
9 
to Father’s and others’ testimony than to Mother’s regarding disputed facts.18  The 
court also did not abuse its discretion by considering Mother’s history involving 
other children.19 
(13) We need not decide whether the Child’s Attorney had standing to file a 
PFA petition on the Child’s behalf because the Family Court commissioner 
dismissed the PFA petition.  Mother’s argument that the Child’s Attorney did not try 
to work with Mother does not provide a basis for reversal because the attorney was 
appointed to represent the child’s best interests, not to engage in any particular 
activities that Mother might have wished.20 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot.  
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/  James T. Vaughn, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
18 Fowler, 122 A.3d at 783. 
19 See 10 Del. C. § 901(8), (18) (providing that when making a finding of neglect or dependency, 
“consideration may be given to dependency, neglect, or abuse history of any party”). 
20 See generally 13 Del. C. § 721(c) (providing that, in a custody proceeding, the Family Court 
“may, in the interest of the child, appoint an attorney to represent the child in the proceedings”); 
DEL. FAM. CT. CIV. R. 207(a) (providing that in a dependency, neglect, or abuse proceeding, the 
Family Court “shall appoint an attorney authorized to practice law in this state or a Court 
Appointed Special Advocate (‘CASA’) to represent the best interests of the child.”).