Title: State v. Todd M. Jadowski
Citation: 2004 WI 68
Docket Number: 2003AP001493-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2004

2004 WI 68 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-1493-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Todd M. Jadowski,  
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 10, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 27, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan   
 
JUDGE: 
L. Edward Stengel   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by Sandra 
L. Nowack, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Richard 
Hahn and Holden & Hahn, S.C., Sheboygan, and oral argument by 
Richard Hahn. 
 
 
2004 WI 68 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  03-1493-CR  
(L.C. No. 
02 CF 190) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Todd M. Jadowski,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 10, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Sheboygan 
County, L. Edward Stengel, Judge.  Reversed and remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is an appeal from 
an order of the Circuit Court for Sheboygan County, L. Edward 
Stengel, Judge.  Todd M. Jadowski, the defendant, faces 
prosecution on one count of sexual intercourse with a person who 
has not yet attained the age of 16 years contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02 (1999-2000).1  The circuit court granted the 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
2 
 
defendant's motion to introduce evidence of the victim's 
intentional misrepresentation of her age.2 
     
¶2 
This case comes before the court on certification by 
the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61.  
The court of appeals certified the following questions:   
(1) 
Is 
a 
minor 
sexual 
assault 
victim's 
intentional 
misrepresentation of his or her age a defense to a 
charge brought under Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2)?   
(2) 
If 
not, 
do 
Wis. Stat. §§ 939.23, 
939.43(2), 
and 
948.02(2) deny an accused his constitutional rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution? 
¶3 
We answer the questions as follows:  
(1) Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(2) read in conjunction with 
Wis. Stat. §§ 939.23 and 939.43(2) precludes a defense 
predicated on a child's intentional misrepresentation 
of her age.  On the basis of the text of the statutes, 
the history and purpose of the statutes, and the 
practical requirements of law enforcement, and despite 
the severe penalties imposed, we conclude that no 
affirmative 
defense 
of 
the 
victim's 
intentional 
misrepresentation of his or her age exists in a 
prosecution under Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).  We decline 
the 
defendant's 
invitation 
to 
engraft 
such 
an 
                                                 
2 We use "intentional misrepresentation" and "fraudulent 
misrepresentation," and "fraud" interchangeably. 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
3 
 
affirmative defense onto § 948.02(2).  Accordingly, we 
further conclude that the circuit court erred in 
ruling to admit the evidence the defendant proffered.  
If an accused's reasonable belief about the victim's 
age, 
based 
on 
the 
victim's 
intentional 
misrepresentation of age, is not a defense, then 
neither evidence regarding the defendant's belief 
about the victim's age nor evidence regarding the 
cause 
for 
or 
reasonableness 
of 
that 
belief 
is 
relevant.3  Therefore, evidence of the defendant's 
reasonable belief about the victim's age or the 
victim's intentional misrepresentation of her age is 
inadmissible in the guilt-determination phase of a 
criminal 
proceeding 
to 
support 
the 
defendant's 
asserted affirmative fraud defense to the crime.  
(2) The statutes do not violate an accused's rights under 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution.   
 ¶4 We therefore reverse the order of the circuit court 
and remand the cause 
to 
the circuit 
court 
for further 
proceedings consistent with this decision.   
I 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin's rules of evidence define relevant evidence as 
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 904.01. 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
4 
 
¶5 
For purposes of this appeal, the facts are not in 
dispute.  On April 15, 2002, the State filed a complaint against 
the 35-year-old defendant, alleging that on April 3, 2002, he 
had sexual intercourse with a person below the age of 16 in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).  The victim was born on 
September 13, 1986, making her about five and a half months shy 
of her 16th birthday on the date of the alleged assault.   
¶6 
Prior to trial the defendant moved to admit evidence 
that the victim fraudulently induced him to believe she was an 
adult.  The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on the 
motion.  The defendant made an offer of proof that the victim 
was a chronic runaway; that the victim used what appeared to be 
a state-issued identification card showing her to be 19 years 
old; that the victim told the defendant and others that she was 
19 years old; that the victim appeared to be 19 years old; and 
that the victim maintained in the defendant's presence that she 
was old enough to work as an exotic dancer.   
¶7 
The circuit court ruled that evidence of the victim's 
fraud was admissible under Wis. Stat. § 904.04 as relevant to 
the "issue of intent on behalf of the alleged victim as well as 
the absence of mistake or accident."4 
                                                 
4 The parties disagree about the extent of the circuit 
court's order admitting evidence.  The State maintains that the 
circuit court's order was limited to evidence presented at the 
motion hearing.  The defendant argues that the circuit court's 
order also applied to information in his written offer of proof.  
We need not resolve this dispute in light of our holding. 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
5 
 
¶8 
The State timely filed a motion for reconsideration, 
which the circuit court denied.  The State sought leave to 
appeal the order admitting this evidence.  The court of appeals 
granted leave to appeal and then certified the cause to this 
court as an issue of first impression. 
II 
¶9 
The first issue requires us to decide whether a minor 
sexual assault victim's intentional misrepresentation of his or 
her age is a defense to a charge brought under Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(2). 
 
This 
court 
decides 
questions 
of 
statutory 
interpretation independently of the circuit court and court of 
appeals, but benefiting from their analyses.  
¶10 The 
second 
issue 
requires 
us 
to 
determine 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
statutes. 
 
The 
question 
of 
constitutionality 
is 
a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
we 
decide 
independently of the circuit court or court of appeals, but 
benefiting from their analyses.5  Statutes are presumed to be 
constitutional.6 
 
A 
party 
challenging 
a 
statute's 
constitutionality must ordinarily demonstrate that the statute 
is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.7 
                                                 
5 State v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 824, 532 N.W.2d 94 
(1995). 
6 Norquist v. Zeuske, 211 Wis. 2d 241, 250, 564 N.W.2d 748 
(1997).   
7 Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 
WI 98, ¶¶18-20, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849. 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
6 
 
III 
¶11 The first issue we address is whether a minor sexual 
assault victim's intentional misrepresentation of his or her age 
is a defense to a charge under Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).  The 
defendant asserts that his reasonable belief about the victim's 
age based on the victim's fraud regarding her age should be a 
defense to a charge under § 948.02(2).  We read Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(2) with § 939.23 and § 939.43(2) to preclude a defense 
predicated on a child's intentional misrepresentation of her 
age.   
¶12 Section 948.02(2) governs second-degree sexual assault 
of a child and provides that "[w]hoever has sexual contact or 
sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 
16 years is guilty of a Class BC felony."  The defendant and the 
State agree that the State must prove only two elements for a 
conviction:  that the accused had sexual contact or intercourse 
with the victim, and that the victim was under the age of 
                                                                                                                                                             
When a statute implicates First Amendment rights, the State 
has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
statute is constitutional.  State v. Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 116, 
124-25, 589 N.W.2d 370 (1999) (citing State v. Thiel, 183 
Wis. 2d 505, 523, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994); City of Madison v. 
Baumann, 162 Wis. 2d 660, 668-69, 470 N.W.2d 296 (1991)). 
This often-used language of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
is perhaps more pertinent to an evidentiary burden of proof in 
criminal cases than to a burden imposed on a party on a question 
of law.  The burden of proof language recognizes the deference 
due to the legislature.  See, e.g., Davis v. Grover, 166 
Wis. 2d 501, 564 n.13, 480 N.W.2d 460 (1992) (Abrahamson, J., 
dissenting); Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., 2001 WI App 21, ¶4 
n.3, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 623 N.W.2d 776. 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
7 
 
sixteen.8  The defendant asserts, however, that a victim's 
intentional misrepresentation of her age is an affirmative 
defense to the crime.  
¶13 The issue, then, is whether the statutes allow an 
affirmative defense predicated on the victim's intentional 
misrepresentation of his or her age. 
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.23, governing criminal intent as 
an element for crimes, provides guidance in determining whether 
an accused's reasonable belief about a victim's age based on the 
victim's intentional misrepresentation is a defense.   
¶15 Section 939.23 addresses criminal intent as an element 
of all crimes in chapters 939 to 951.  When criminal intent is 
an element of a crime, the statute uses one of several words or 
phrases, such as "intentionally," "know," or "believe."9  The 
                                                 
8 Wis JI——Criminal 2104 (2002).   
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.23(1) provides as follows:  
When criminal intent is an element of a crime in chs. 
939 to 951, such intent is indicated by the term 
"intentionally", the phrase "with intent to", the 
phrase "with intent that", or some form of the verbs 
"know" or "believe".   
Wisconsin Stat. § 939.23(2) and (3) define the words "know" 
and "intentionally" in the criminal code as follows: 
(2)"Know" requires only that the actor believes that 
the specified fact exists. 
(3)"Intentionally" means that the actor either has a 
purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, 
or is aware that his or her conduct is practically 
certain to cause that result.  In addition, except as 
provided in sub. (6) [knowledge of the age of a 
minor], the actor must have knowledge of those facts 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
8 
 
sexual assault offense in the case at bar (§ 948.02(2)) does not 
contain any of the words or phrases denoting criminal intent.  
¶16 Even if Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) included a word of 
criminal intent like "intentionally" or "know," the State would 
not have to prove an accused's knowledge of the age of the 
minor.  Section 939.23(6) expressly provides that criminal 
intent "does not require proof of knowledge of the age of a 
minor even though age is a material element in the crime in 
question."10   
¶17 Thus the sexual assault statute in the case at bar 
read in conjunction with Wis. Stat. § 939.23(6) does not require 
an actor to know the victim's age and does not set forth an 
actor's reasonable (but erroneous) belief about the victim's age 
as a defense.    
¶18 An actor's ability to raise mistake regarding his 
belief about the age of a minor as a defense is explicitly 
negated in Wis. Stat. § 939.43(2).  The general rule about 
mistake, set forth in § 939.43(1), is that "[a]n honest error, 
whether of fact or of law other than criminal law, is a defense 
if it negatives the existence of a state of mind essential to 
                                                                                                                                                             
which are necessary to make his or her conduct 
criminal and which are set forth after the word 
"intentionally." 
10 Wis. Stat. § 939.23(6). 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
9 
 
the crime."11  The exception to this general rule applies here:  
"A mistake as to the age of a minor . . . is not a defense."12  
¶19 The 
defendant 
acknowledges 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 948.02(2), 939.23, and 939.43(2) prohibit an actor from 
raising mistake about the age of the minor as a defense to the 
charge of sexual assault.13  The defendant reasons that although 
these statutes prohibit the defense of mistake, they do not 
prohibit an actor from raising the affirmative defense of a 
victim's 
intentional misrepresentation 
about 
her 
age. The 
defendant distinguishes the defense of mistake from the defense 
of fraud.  He asserts that he, as a victim of fraud, is not in 
the same position as an accused who is mistaken about the 
victim's age or who commits an honest error.  The defendant 
urges that he was not mistaken about the victim's age; he was 
defrauded by the victim.  
¶20 The 
defendant's 
affirmative 
defense 
of 
fraud is 
premised in part upon Wis. Stat. § 939.45, governing privilege 
as a defense to prosecution for a crime.  The defendant relies 
on § 939.45(6), the "catch-all" provision of the privilege 
statute.  The catch-all provision states that the defense of 
                                                 
11 Wis. Stat. § 939.43(1). 
12 Wis. Stat. § 939.43(2). 
13 See, e.g., Flores v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 509, 511, 230 
N.W.2d 637 (1975) (mistake as to age of minor is not a defense); 
Hughes v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 477, 481, 198 N.W.2d 348 (1972) 
(same); Kelley v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 641, 648, 187 N.W.2d 810 
(1970) (same); State v. Lentowski, 212 Wis. 2d 849, 853-54, 569 
N.W.2d 758 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (same).  
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
10 
 
privilege can be claimed "[w]hen for any other reason the 
actor's conduct is privileged by the statutory or common law of 
this state."  The defendant does not explain, however, upon what 
statute or common law rule he is relying under the catch-all 
privilege statute.     
¶21 The crux of the defendant's position is that this  
court should engraft an affirmative defense of fraud onto 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) even though the text of the statutes 
renders an actor mistaken as to a child's age liable for the 
crime.14  We are not persuaded that any reason exists for this 
court to perform such a task.  We agree with the State that 
§ 948.02(2) is a strict liability crime with regard to knowledge 
of the child's age.15  Numerous indicia point to the conclusion 
                                                 
14 The defendant relies on United States v. United States 
District Court, 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988), to support his 
position.  In this federal case, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals engrafted a reasonable mistake of age defense onto a 
statute proscribing the production of materials depicting a 
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, reasoning that the 
First Amendment required a reasonable mistake of age defense and 
that congressional intent was to uphold the statute.  The 
present case is not a First Amendment case, and it is not 
necessary for the court to read any language into these statutes 
to preserve their constitutionality. 
15 This court has frequently been asked to decide whether a 
statute creates a strict liability crime, that is, whether a 
statute includes intent (scienter) as an element of the crime 
when the statute does not explicitly refer to scienter.  See, 
e.g., State v. Danforth, 129 Wis. 2d 187, 385 N.W.2d 125 (1986); 
State v. Stanfield, 105 Wis. 2d 553, 314 N.W.2d 339 (1982); 
State v. Collova, 79 Wis. 2d 473, 255 N.W.2d 581 (1977).  
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
11 
 
that no affirmative fraud defense is part of or should be read 
into § 948.02(2) and that the defendant's proposed affirmative 
defense is contrary to the policy adopted by the legislature.   
¶22 First, an examination of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) in the 
broader context of chapter 948, Crimes Against Children, 
demonstrates that the legislature has, in certain statutes, 
created an affirmative defense of reasonable cause to believe 
that the child had attained the age of 18 years.  See, for 
example, Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(c), pertaining to exhibition of 
harmful materials to a child, and § 948.05, pertaining to sexual 
exploitation of a child.  Inclusion of this "reasonable cause to 
believe" 
affirmative 
defense 
in 
some 
child 
exploitation 
provisions in chapter 948 but not in others supports the 
conclusion that the legislature did not intend to include this 
affirmative defense in § 948.02(2).16  Because the legislature 
did not expressly create the "reasonable cause to believe" 
defense in § 948.02(2), this court should not read it into the 
statute.   
                                                                                                                                                             
In 
making 
this 
determination 
a 
court 
considers 
the 
following factors: (1) the language of the statute; (2) the 
legislative history of the statute; (3) the seriousness of the 
penalty; (4) the purpose of the statute; and (5) the practical 
requirements of effective law enforcement.  State v. Stoehr, 134 
Wis. 2d 66, 76, 396 N.W.2d 177 (1986) (citing Collova, 79 Wis. 
2d at 478-80; Stanfield, 105 Wis. 2d at 560-61). 
16 State v. Polashek, 2002 WI 74, ¶30, 253 Wis. 2d 527, 646 
N.W.2d 330 (inclusion of mental state in one section tends to 
indicate a deliberate legislative choice to exclude a mental 
state from another section). 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
12 
 
¶23 Second, Legislative Council drafting documents of the 
1950-1953 criminal code, since which time Wis. Stat. §§ 939.23 
and 939.43(2) have remained essentially the same, are replete 
with evidence that the drafters intended to impose strict 
liability on an actor regardless of the actor's knowledge or 
belief about a child's age in child sexual assault cases.17  
¶24 Third, the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) is 
furthered by not engrafting onto the statute the affirmative 
defense proposed by the defendant.  The statute is based on a 
policy determination by the legislature that persons under the 
age of sixteen are not competent to consent to sexual contact or 
sexual intercourse.  The statute is intended to protect 
children.  The state has a strong interest in the ethical and 
moral development of its children, and this state has a long 
tradition of honoring its obligation to protect its children 
from predators and from themselves.18  The statutes are designed 
to impose the risk of criminal penalty on the adult, when the 
adult engages in sexual behavior with a minor.   
¶25 Fourth, engrafting the defendant's proposed defense 
onto the statute undermines the policy of protecting minors from 
sexual abuse and would raise practical law enforcement problems.  
Age is difficult to ascertain, and actors could often reasonably 
                                                 
17 See 
Judiciary 
Committee 
Report 
on 
Criminal 
Code, 
Wisconsin Legislative Council Report, vol. V, Bill No. 100A at 
20, 21, 35 (1953).  
18 State v. Fisher, 211 Wis. 2d 665, 674, 565 N.W.2d 565 
(Ct. App. 1997).   
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
13 
 
claim that they believed their victims were adults.19  The 
requirements of practical law enforcement support a conclusion 
that Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) is a strict liability statute with 
regard to the age of the victim.   
¶26 Fifth, the traditional approach, originally accepted 
in 
virtually 
every 
state 
and 
still 
accepted 
in 
many 
jurisdictions, is to impose strict liability regarding the age 
of the victim no matter how reasonable the defendant's belief 
that the victim was old enough to consent, and no matter that 
the belief is based on the victim's own representations.20  The 
need for or desirability of providing a mistake or fraud defense 
regarding the age of the victim has been subject to debate.21  
                                                 
19 See Judiciary Committee Report on the Criminal Code, 
Wisconsin Legislative Council Report, vol. VII at 33 (1953). 
20 See, e.g., 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law 
§ 17.4(c) at 650 (2d ed. 2003); Colin Campbell, Mistake or Lack 
of Information as to Victim's Age as Defense to Statutory Rape, 
46 A.L.R. 5th 499, 509-18 (1997 & Supp. 2004).  
Several jurisdictions have, however, adopted a defense 
based on the reasonable belief of an accused about the age of 
the minor by judicial decision or statute.  Campbell, 46 A.L.R. 
5th at 518-20. 
21 See, e.g., Larry W. Myers, Reasonable Mistake as to Age: 
a Needed Defense to Statutory Rape, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 105 (1965-
66) (arguing that "the time has come for more liberal and 
realistic laws" that permit a reasonable mistake as to age 
defense to a charge of statutory rape); Catherine L. Carpenter, 
On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare 
Offense 
Model, 
53 
Am. 
U.L. 
Rev 
313 
(2003) 
(urging 
reconsideration of the imposition of strict liability in 
statutory rape cases); Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual 
Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48 Buff. L. 
Rev. 703 (2000) (suggesting various revisions to statutory rape 
laws). 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
14 
 
Professor LaFave, to whom this court often turns for assistance, 
concludes that in more recent times the issue of such a defense 
has been recognized as "a policy matter that ought to be 
specifically addressed in the statutory definition of the 
crime."22 
¶27 Historically, the penalty imposed under a statute has 
been a significant consideration in determining whether a 
statute should be construed as dispensing with mens rea.23  
Criminal liability without criminal intent almost always has 
involved 
statutes 
that 
impose 
only 
fines 
or 
short 
jail 
sentences.24  Indeed, some courts have justified the imposition 
of criminal liability without requiring proof of scienter in 
part because the offenses did not bear the same punishments as 
"infamous crimes"25 and questioned whether imprisonment was 
compatible with the reduced culpability required for such 
regulatory offenses.26 
¶28 The severe penalties for violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(2) stand in sharp contrast to the less severe penalties 
                                                 
22 2 LaFave, supra note 20, § 17.4(c) at 650. 
23 See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 
U.S. 64, 71 (1994); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616 
(1994). 
24 See Staples, 511 U.S. at 616.  
25 See Staples, 511 U.S. at 617 (citing Tenement House Dep't 
v. McDevitt, 109 N.E. 88, 90 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1915)). 
26 See Staples, 511 U.S. at 617 (citing People ex rel. Price 
v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 121 N.E. 474, 477 (N.Y. 
Ct. App. 1918)). 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
15 
 
at issue in other strict liability offenses. The maximum penalty 
for a conviction under Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) is a $10,000 fine 
or 30 years imprisonment or both.27  In addition to these 
penalties, an individual convicted of violating § 948.02(2) is 
subject to registration as a sex offender, including annual 
registration requirements.28  The offender is subject to the 
provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 980 governing commitments of 
sexually violent persons.  As a felon, the individual would also 
lose his or her right to possess a firearm,29 to hold an office 
of public trust,30 and to vote.31 
¶29 The severe penalties for violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(2) support an inference that the legislature did not 
intend to impose strict liability regarding knowledge of the age 
of the victim.  Yet this inference drawn from the severe 
penalties is outweighed by the other factors we have set forth.   
¶30 On the basis of the text of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) 
read in conjunction with §§ 939.23 and 939.43(2), the history 
and purpose of the statutes, and the practical requirements of 
                                                 
27 Effective February 1, 2003, the offense became a Class C 
felony with a penalty of a fine not to exceed $100,000 or 
imprisonment not to exceed 40 years or both.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.50(3)(c) (2001-02). 
28 See Wis. Stat. § 301.45. 
29 See Wis. Stat. § 941.29. 
30 See Wis. Const. Art. XIII, § 3(2). 
31 See Wis. Const. Art. III, § 2(4)(a).  For restoration of 
civil rights, see Wis. Stat. § 304.078. 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
16 
 
law enforcement, and despite the severe penalties imposed, we 
conclude that no intentional misrepresentation defense exists in 
a prosecution under Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).  We decline the 
defendant's invitation to engraft an affirmative defense for 
fraud onto § 948.02(2).  
 ¶31  Accordingly, we further conclude that the circuit 
court erred in ruling to admit the evidence the defendant 
proffered.  If an accused's reasonable belief about the victim's 
age, based on the victim's intentional misrepresentation, is not 
a defense, then neither evidence regarding the defendant's 
belief about the victim's age nor evidence regarding the cause 
of or reasonableness of that belief is relevant.32  Therefore, 
evidence of the defendant's belief about the victim's age or the 
victim's 
intentional 
misrepresentation 
of 
her 
age 
is 
inadmissible in the guilt-determination phase of a criminal 
proceeding to support the defendant's asserted affirmative fraud 
defense to the crime. 
IV 
¶32 We turn to the second issue:  If an accused is not 
allowed an affirmative defense that his reasonable belief about 
the victim's age was caused by her intentional misrepresentation 
                                                 
32 Wisconsin's rules of evidence define relevant evidence as 
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 904.01.  Except as provided by law, 
relevant evidence is generally admissible; evidence that is not 
relevant is inadmissible.  Wis. Stat. § 904.02. 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
17 
 
of her age, do Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(2), 939.23, and 939.43(2) 
deny an accused his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution?33  We conclude that 
the statutes do not violate the defendant's constitutional 
rights.   
¶33 The 
defendant 
argues 
that 
these 
statutes 
are 
unconstitutional on the following due process grounds:  The 
statutes are vague, they are overbroad, and they violate the 
defendant's right to substantive due process.   
¶34 The defendant's argument on vagueness is that without 
the fraud defense no actor knows with certainty when he commits 
the crime of sexual assault of a child.  The defendant does not 
argue that he was unaware of the illegality of engaging in 
sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old.  Rather, he argues that 
an actor of normal intelligence does not know that his conduct 
with a particular individual is forbidden because of the 
difficulty of ascertaining the age of the individual.  The 
defendant asserts that unless he can introduce evidence of a 
reasonable mistake as to the age of the victim, caused by the 
victim's intentional misrepresentation of age, the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague.   
¶35 In examining a legislative act for vagueness, we must 
determine whether the statute is sufficiently definite to give 
                                                 
33 Although the briefs refer to Article I, § 8 of the state 
constitution, no state constitutional argument separate from a 
federal constitutional argument is made and we therefore do not 
address the state constitutional issue. 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
18 
 
reasonable notice of the prohibited conduct to those who wish to 
avoid its penalties and to apprise judges and juries of 
standards for the determination of guilt.34 
¶36 Upon reading Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2), we conclude that 
the statute is clear and precise.  The prohibited conduct is 
engaging in sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 16 
years.  The text is not rendered vague by the difficulties that 
might attach to an actor's attempt to ascertain whether the 
person is at least 16 years old.  We are not persuaded that 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) is unconstitutionally vague.   
¶37 The defendant's next argument is that his right to 
intimate association is protected by the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and that Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) is 
unconstitutionally 
overbroad 
and 
violates 
substantive 
due 
process.  The overbreadth and substantive due process challenges 
overlap, and we shall treat them together. 
 ¶38  The defendant contends that the statute is overbroad 
and violates substantive due process because its language is so 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 
(1997); Baumann, 162 Wis. 2d at 676-77 (citing State v. Zwicker, 
41 Wis. 2d 497, 507, 164 N.W. 2d 512 (1969), citing Landry v. 
Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Ill. 1968)). 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
that a criminal statute be declared void when it is so vague 
that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application."  Connally v. Gen. 
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
For a discussion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, see 1 
LaFave, supra note 20, § 2.3. 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
19 
 
sweeping that its sanctions may be applied to conduct that the 
state is not permitted to regulate.35       
¶39 The defendant concedes that the government has a 
significant interest in protecting children and regulating 
sexual contact between minors and adults and agrees with the 
court of appeals decision in State v. Fisher that the state's 
significant interests in protecting children trumped Fisher's 
right to a privacy interest in having sexual intercourse with 
another person.36    
¶40 The defendant argues, however, that because Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(2) does not allow a defense based on the victim's 
intentional misrepresentation 
about 
her 
age, 
the statutes 
impermissibly chill his exercise of his legitimate prerogative 
to have sex with young women who are of the age of consent.  The 
defendant argues that the circumstances in this case, that is, 
the victim's intentional misrepresentation, provide a very 
narrow and necessary exception to the criminalization of sexual 
contact between minors and adults. 
¶41  The crux of the defendant's constitutional argument is 
that he is being held criminally liable for a felony with severe 
penalties when, if given the opportunity, he could prove himself 
morally blameless.  He is morally blameless, he asserts, because 
                                                 
35 City of Milwaukee v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d 11, 19, 291 
N.W.2d 452 (1980). 
36 Fisher, 211 Wis. 2d at 674-75. 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
20 
 
he was fraudulently induced by the minor to have a reasonable 
belief that she was of age.37      
¶42 Substantive due process protects citizens against 
arbitrary or wrongful state actions, regardless of the fairness 
of the procedures used to implement them.38   
   
¶43 It is a fundamental principle of law that an actor 
should not be convicted of a crime if he had no reason to 
believe that the act he committed was a crime or that it was 
wrongful.  An intent requirement was the general rule at common 
                                                 
37 Professor Packer commented on the inappropriateness of 
the criminal sanction in the absence of scienter as follows: 
[To] punish conduct without reference to the actor's 
state of mind is both inefficacious and unjust.  It is 
inefficacious because conduct unaccompanied by an 
awareness of the factors making it criminal does not 
mark the actor as one who needs to be subjected to 
punishment in order to deter him or others from 
behaving similarly in the future, nor does it single 
him out as a socially dangerous individual who needs 
to be incapacitated or reformed.  It is unjust because 
the actor is subjected to the stigma of a criminal 
conviction 
without 
being 
morally 
blameworthy.  
Consequently, on either a preventive or retributive 
theory of criminal punishment, the criminal sanction 
is inappropriate in the absence of mens rea. 
Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 107, 
109.  See also Model Penal Code § 2.05 comment (Official Draft & 
Revised Comments 1985).  
38 Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 2000 WI 60, ¶45, 235 
Wis. 2d 610, 612 N.W.2d 59 (quoting County of Sacramento v. 
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)). 
For a discussion of substantive due process, see 1 LaFave, 
supra note 20, § 3.3.  
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
21 
 
law.39  The absence of a mens rea requirement in a criminal 
statute is a significant departure from longstanding principles 
of criminal law.   
¶44 Nevertheless, strict liability crimes, that is, crimes 
defined without any culpable state of mind, are known at law.  
In general, when strict liability is imposed, the actor is 
deemed to have had sufficient notice concerning the risk of 
penal sanction inherent in the proscribed activity that it is 
not unjust to impose criminal liability without the necessity of 
proving moral culpability.40  "[T]he existence and content of 
the criminal prohibition in these cases are not hidden; the 
defendant is warned to steer well clear of the core of the 
offense (as in the statutory rape case)."41  Adults are well 
aware of the strict liability aspect of statutory rape laws.42   
                                                 
39 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952).   
40 For example, courts have held that if an accused 
knowingly possessed a hand grenade, it is no defense to argue 
that the accused was not aware that the device in question was 
subject to regulation, but if accuseds owned firearms that are 
in 
technical 
violation 
of 
a 
regulation, 
they 
may 
avail 
themselves of a "mistake of fact" defense.  See Staples, 511 
U.S. at 610-11; United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 
(1971).    
41 United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 296 (7th Cir. 
1998) (Posner, C.J., dissenting). 
42 "Sixteen will get you twenty!" is a common exclamation 
expressing the widespread awareness of statutory rape laws and 
the strict liability aspect of the offense. 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
22 
 
¶45 The legislature has broad powers to promote the public 
welfare and to create criminal offenses and impose punishment.43  
A state legislature is free to define a criminal offense and a 
state may bar consideration of a particular defense so long as 
the result does not offend "some principle of justice so rooted 
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked 
as fundamental."44   
¶46 The strict liability crime of statutory rape, in which 
the victim's apparent maturity is not a defense, is a recognized 
exception to the general rule requiring mens rea in criminal 
statutes.45  Traditionally, according to the weight of authority, 
"mistake as to age" has not been a defense against the charge of 
statutory rape.46  This rule is still followed in many 
jurisdictions.47 
¶47 Furthermore, strict liability regarding the age of the 
minor furthers the legitimate government interest in protecting 
                                                 
43 Pauly v. Keebler, 175 Wis. 428, 439, 185 N.W. 554 (1921).  
The legislature's authority to define an offense includes the 
power to exclude the element of knowledge from its definition.  
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957). 
44 Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996) (quoting 
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)).    
45 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251 n.8.  See also X-Citement 
Video, 513 U.S. at 72 n.2. 
46 See, e.g., 2 LaFave, supra note 20, § 17.4(c) at 650; 
Campbell, supra note 20, at 508-09. 
47 Campbell, supra note 20, at 509. 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
23 
 
children from sexual abuse by placing the risk of mistake on the 
adult actor. 
¶48 The long history of statutory rape as a recognized 
exception to the requirement of criminal intent and the well 
accepted legislative purpose for omitting scienter undermine the 
defendant's 
argument 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.02(2) 
offends 
principles of justice deeply rooted in our traditions and 
conscience.48   
 
¶49 We acknowledge that there has been movement away from 
strict liability for statutory rape in recent years.49  Under the 
Model Penal Code, for example, the defense of mistaken belief 
should be available when the critical age is more than 10 years 
of age.50  The theory is that the policies underpinning strict 
liability seem less compelling as the age of the minor 
                                                 
48 See United States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1042 (1992); Garrison v. Elo, 156 
F. Supp. 2d 815, 832 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
49 A minority of states allow some form of a "belief about 
age" defense by judicial decision or by statute.  See, e.g., 
People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964) (apparently the 
first case to allow the defense; ruling on lenity grounds). 
Wisconsin has explicitly rejected the Hernandez case.  See 
Kelley, 51 Wis. 2d at 649. 
For a discussion of the jurisdictions that have allowed 
some form of the defense, see Collins v. Mississippi, 691 So. 2d 
918, 923 (Miss. 1997); Campbell, supra note 20, passim.  For a 
list of states that have revised their statutes to allow the 
defense, see Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 213.6(1) cmt. 
2, n.10 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985). 
50 Model Penal Code § 213.6(1) (Official Draft & Revised 
Comments 1985). 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
24 
 
increases; an accused who mistakenly but reasonably believes 
such a partner is above the critical age should have a defense 
because he "evidences no abnormality, no willingness to take 
advantage 
of 
immaturity, 
no 
propensity 
to 
corruption 
of 
minors."51  
 
¶50 Because the legislature's forbidding a reasonable 
mistake of age defense in statutory rape cases (whether the 
mistake 
is 
induced 
by 
intentional 
misrepresentation 
or 
otherwise) has a significant historical derivation and is 
widespread, 
and 
because 
of 
judicial 
deference 
to 
the 
legislature's discretion in the exercise of its police powers, 
we conclude it is not violative of due process for the state 
legislature to forbid a defense of fraud or reasonable mistake 
about the age of the victim.52   
                                                 
51 Model Penal Code § 213.6, cmt. 2 at 415 (Official Draft & 
Revised Comments 1985).   
Many of the cases upholding the constitutionality of 
statutory rape involve an adult's sexual contact with a much 
younger 
person 
than 
the 
crime 
described 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.02(2). 
52 For cases upholding the constitutionality of  statutory 
rape as a strict liability offense, see, e.g., Ransom, 942 F.2d 
at 776-77; Nelson v. Moriarty, 484 F.2d 1034, 1035-36 (1st Cir. 
1973); People v. Green, 514 P.2d 769, 771 (Colo. 1973); State v. 
Tague, 310 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 1981); Garnett v. State, 632 
A.2d 797, 803-05 (Md. 1993); State v. Stokely, 842 S.W.2d 77, 81 
(Mo. 1992); State v. Moore, 253 A.2d 579, 581 (N.J. 1969); 
Guinyard v. State, 195 S.E.2d 392, 396 (S.C. 1973); State v. 
Martinez, 52 P.3d 1276, 1280-82 (Utah 2002).   
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
25 
 
¶51 In sum, we conclude that the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § 948.02(2), read in conjunction with Wis. Stat. §§ 939.23 
and 939.43, precludes a defense predicated on a child's 
intentional misrepresentation of her age.  We also conclude that 
the statutes do not violate the defendant's rights under the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution.  
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the circuit court and 
remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this 
decision. 
                                                                                                                                                             
For cases concluding that an accused has the right to 
proffer the defense, see, e.g., State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 
838-39 (Alaska 1978) (due process requires that the defendant be 
allowed to introduce evidence regarding mistake as to age);  
Perez v. State, 803 P.2d 249, 250-51 (N.M. 1990) ("While a child 
under the age of thirteen requires the protection of strict 
liability, the same is not true of victims thirteen to sixteen 
years of age.  We recognize the increased maturity and 
independence of today's teenagers and, while we do not hold that 
knowledge of the victim's age is an element of the offense, we 
do hold that under the facts of this case the defendant should 
have been allowed to present his defense of mistake of fact."). 
Analysis of the constitutional issue is also found in 
dissenting opinions in cases in which the majority opinion 
upheld the constitutionality of a strict liability statutory 
rape statute.  See, e.g., State v. Silva, 491 P.2d 1216 (Haw. 
1971) (Levinson, J., dissenting) (arguing that fairness requires 
that the pertinent statute be construed as permitting the 
affirmative defense of reasonable mistake as to age); Owens v. 
Maryland, 724 A.2d 43 (Md. 1999) (Bell, C.J., dissenting) 
(arguing that due process requires that an accused be allowed an 
affirmative defense predicated on reasonable mistake about age); 
Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797 (Md. 1993) (Bell, C.J., 
dissenting) (same). 
 
 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
26 
 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
No. 
03-1493-CR   
 
 
 
1