Title: Anderson v. Lale
Citation: 216 N.W.2d 152
Docket Number: 11002
State: south-dakota
Issuer: south-dakota Supreme Court
Date: March 19, 1974

216 N.W.2d 152 (1974) Darrell C. ANDERSON, Special Administrator of the Estate of Denise Anderson, Deceased, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Pete LALE, Defendant and Appellant. No. 11002. Supreme Court of South Dakota. March 19, 1974. *153 Morman &amp; Smit, Sturgis, for plaintiff and respondent. Costello, Porter, Hill, Banks &amp; Nelson, Rapid City, for defendant and appellant. DOYLE, Justice. This is an action for wrongful death pursuant to SDCL 21-5. The decedent was a seven-year-old girl who was fatally injured in an automobile-pedestrian accident in Butte County, South Dakota, on September 16, 1969. The action was brought by her father, Darrell C. Anderson, as special administrator of her estate. Prior to trial, the defendant moved for a change of venue on the ground that an impartial trial could not be had in Butte *154 County. The defendant contended that the acquittal by a jury in November of 1969 of the second degree manslaughter charges, which had been brought against him in regard to the same accident herein involved, had caused adverse and hostile reactions of the people of the community. These reactions, he alleged, made it impossible to obtain a fair and impartial trial. The motion was denied. Before the jury was empaneled, the defendant moved to have those prospective jurors, who had heard a similar wrongful-death action in November 1970, disqualified on the ground that their prior exposure to the law in this area may have a prejudicial effect upon the present case. This motion was also denied. The defendant admitted liability and the issue of damages alone was tried to the jury. A verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $16,500. The defendant made a motion for a new trial upon the ground that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury concerning the elements of damage they were to consider and, therefore, the verdict reached was excessive. This motion was also denied and the defendant appeals. The first issue considered involves the motion for a change of venue. Both parties presented affidavits and other evidence to the judge supporting their respective positions in regard to the question of whether the defendant could obtain a fair and impartial trial. SDCL 15-5-11, in applicable part, provides that: It is, therefore, discretionary on the part of the trial judge whether the circumstances warrant a change of venue. In the absence of clear abuse of its discretion, this court will not interfere with a trial court's exercise thereof. Root v. Bingham, 1910, 26 S.D. 118, 128 N.W. 132. The civil case was brought to trial over a year after the appellant had been acquitted on the criminal charges. It was the trial judge's opinion that this passage of time was sufficient to dim the memories of the prospective jurors. An examination of the record discloses nothing to indicate any abuse of discretion in this regard and we accordingly uphold the order denying the motion for change of venue. The question involving the jury panel also involves the discretion of the trial judge. The voir dire examination of the jury panel as it appears in the record discloses that the participation of certain jurors in a former wrongful death case would not affect their decision in the present one. Again we find no abuse of discretion and uphold the denial of the motion to disqualify certain jurors. The final issue considered involves whether the trial court erred in giving what is in substance South Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, 31.02 as its Instruction No. 6. The questioned portion of that instruction is as follows: It is the defendant's contention that in a wrongful death action in South Dakota there is no right to recover for the loss of companionship and association of the decedent and, therefore, the trial court erred in utilizing the above language in its instructions. SDCL 21-5-7 provides: Tracing the history of this statute we see that it had its genesis in § 677, 1877 Code of Civil Procedure, wherein a version of the Lord Campbell Act was adopted which allowed a claim for punitive damages for wrongful death. This statute was amended in 1887 by Chap. 33, § 5499, Comp.Laws by the striking of the word "punitive". We first construed the statute in Belding v. Black Hills &amp; Ft. P. R. Co., 1892, 3 S.D. 369, 53 N.W. 750, holding that the statute gave the beneficiaries the right to recover "the damages resulting to them from the loss of the life of the deceased." Following this interpretation, it was held in Smith v. Chicago, Mil. &amp; St. P. Ry. Co., 1895, 6 S.D. 583, 62 N.W. 967, that the measure of damages recoverable was only the probable "pecuniary loss" suffered by the beneficiaries. In 1909 the legislature codified the term "pecuniary injury". Ch. 301, S.L.1909. The 1909 law was then carried forward in Rev.Code of 1919, § 2931 and SDC 37.2203 verbatim. In two wrongful death cases brought before the court during this period, the court ruled first in Rowe v. Richards, 1913, 32 S.D. 66, 142 N.W. 664, that recovery in a death action "is limited to loss of means of support, loss of society, comfort, and care suffered by the plaintiff in the death of the decedent." However, in Smith v. Presentation Academy of Aberdeen, 1933, 61 S.D. 323, 248 N.W. 762, the court stated that: This latter position was adopted by the court in Tufty v. Sioux Transit Co., 1943, 69 S.D. 368, 10 N.W.2d 767; Hodkinson v. Parker, 1944, 70 S.D. 272, 16 N.W.2d 924, and McCleod v. Tri-State Milling Co., 1946, 71 S.D. 362, 24 N.W.2d 485, where this court held in all three cases that the amount of recovery must be based upon expenses necessarily incurred and a reasonable expectation of benefits which would have resulted from the continued life of the deceased. In 1947 the wrongful death statute was again amended removing the word "pecuniary" and inserting the word "all" in its place, Ch. 173, § 1, S.L.1947, thus enlarging the measure of damages which could be recovered. Under this language, the court in Simons v. Kidd, 1950, 73 S.D. 306, 42 N.W.2d 307, found that: See also, Western Surety Co. v. Addy, 1950, 73 S.D. 322, 42 N.W.2d 660. In Lanning v. Schulte, 1967, 82 S.D. 528, 149 N.W.2d 765, decided under the 1947 law, this court in reversing an order denying a new trial, stated: The 1967 legislature enacted the present statute changing the term "all injury" back to "pecuniary injury". SDCL 21-5-7. (There were other prior amendments, but all related to monetary increases on the limit of recovery.) It is the contention of the defendant that it was the intention of the legislature in making the 1967 changes to return to the more restrictive measure of damages in wrongful death actions of prior times. We believe that the wrongful death statute is remedial in character and, therefore, *156 should be construed liberally in light of current social conditions. We, therefore, do not feel constrained to follow our past decisions. In cases involving this problem from other jurisdictions we note the landmark case of Wycko v. Gnodtke, 1960, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118. In Wycko v. Gnodtke, supra, the Michigan court rejected the child-labor or economic-value measure of pecuniary loss suffered through the death of a minor child, stating: Wycko v. Gnodtke, supra, was purportedly overruled by Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Company, 1970, 383 Mich. 251, 174 N.W.2d 836. However, the later case of Smith v. City of Detroit, 1972, 388 Mich. 637, 202 N.W.2d 300, stated that the Breckon court was incorrect in its interpretation of Wycko and held the "loss of companionship is an element of pecuniary damages under [their] wrongful death act * * *." The Minnesota Supreme Court, recognizing its pecuniary-loss measure of damages was antiquated when applied to present-day needs and experience, stated in Fussner v. Andert, 1962, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355, that: Washington also modernized its measure of damages in wrongful death actions wherein the decedent was a child. In Lockhart v. Besel, 1967, 71 Wash. 2d 112, 426 P.2d 605, the court said: Recently, Iowa held in Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, 1971, Iowa, 190 N.W.2d 439, that: Nebraska has similarly broadened its concept of the measure and elements of damages in cases such as this. In doing so, the court in Selders v. Armentrout, 1973, 190 Neb. 275, 207 N.W.2d 686, stated: We, too, feel as the courts did in the above cited cases, that the better rule is to include loss of companionship, society, advice, assistance and protection as elements of damages in wrongful death cases wherein the decedent was a minor. It is evident that any court where more than nominal damages have been awarded must have tacitly accepted this rule in that, except in rare cases, never would a child's earnings be more than his cost of upbringing. We are also of the opinion that the 1967 legislature was well aware of the newer interpretations of pecuniary loss of injury, and it was their intent to only eliminate any recovery for sorrow, mental distress and grief suffered by the parents or any pain or suffering on the part of the decedent. Comment: South Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, 31.03. In reaching this decision we are not unmindful of the proposition pointed out in Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, supra, that where a statute has received a judicial construction and is substantially reenacted, such construction may be regarded as having been adopted by the legislature. However forceful this presumption may be, it is not without qualification or exception. As stated in Stormo v. City of Dell Rapids, 1955, 75 S.D. 582, 70 N.W.2d 831: Also in Reynolds v. Continental Mortgage Co., 1962, 85 Idaho 172, 377 P.2d 134, the court said: We are also well aware of the doctrine of stare decisis. However, we note Chancellor Kent's language in this regard when he stated in his Commentaries of 1884: We have in our past decisions adopted his viewpoint. Brekke v. Crew, 1920, 43 S.D. 106, 178 N.W. 146 (quotes the above language from Kent's Commentaries); LaFleur v. Kolda, 1946, 71 S.D. 162, 22 N.W.2d 741. As succinctly stated in Paul v. Davis, 1884, 100 Ind. 422: We, therefore, hold that in a wrongful death action, wherein the decedent was a minor, it is proper for the court to instruct the jury that loss of companionship and society, which may be expressed by, but is not limited to, the words "advice", *159 "assistance" and "protection" are proper elements of damage for them to consider in reaching their verdict. We note that the word "comfort" was used in the instruction given in this case. Comfort may connote alleviation of mental distress and we, therefore, find it objectionable since if an award for mental distress of the parents is not permitted confusion may arise. It is, however, only harmless error. In addition to South Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, 31.02, the court gave the following instruction: This instruction is the same as South Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, 31.03, except that the court added: We expressly disapprove of this addition to the instruction in view of this opinion. We do not believe that our decision will result in demanding too much of a jury to place a dollar value on loss of companionship and society. In Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 1959, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669, we said: We further believe that our decision will not cause excessive verdicts. The defendant contends that the jury's verdict of $16,500 was excessive and requested a new trial. It is the general rule that an application for a new trial upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his discretion will only be reviewed by this court in case of manifest abuse of that discretion. Shann v. Disbrow and Co., 1936, 64 S.D. 528, 268 N.W. 700. The record in this case shows that the decedent was seven years of age and a bright, affectionate, kindly child who did well in school and church activities. She was an energetic, active, obedient, helpful child and an integral part of a close-knit family. Upon this record and in view of *160 our decision we find that the verdict was not excessive. Affirmed. WINANS, J., concurs. BIEGELMEIER, C. J., concurs in result. WOLLMAN and DUNN, JJ., dissent. BIEGELMEIER, Chief Justice (concurring in result). While I am in accord with some of the opinion, I cannot agree with all the quotations from the cases cited nor with some of the statements of law and dictum therein. During the consideration of this appeal it appeared there was, and now remains, a difference of opinion among the members of the court as to the propriety of part of Instruction No. 6. Although pertinent provisions of Instructions 6 and 8, which are hereby referred to, are quoted in different parts of Justice Doyle's opinion, I believe it well to again set out portions of Instruction 6 and, as I read its grammar, Instruction 8 as follows: Defendant's objection was to the use of the words "advice", "protection" and "comfort" in Instruction No. 6 while in Instruction No. 8 the court advised the jury that no recovery could be allowed for "loss of the comfort" and "protection" used in Instruction 6 (as well as "society" and "companionship" not appearing therein). Defendant did not object to the apparent contradictions of Instructions 6 and 8 (although plaintiff did so). In this state of the record defendant had a favorable instruction that advised the jury not to consider loss of comfort, society, protection and companionship in any award of damages, and it tempered, if it did not eliminate, the items complained of in Instruction 6. The only question remaining is whether the award was excessive. I conclude it was not. Advice and assistance may have pecuniary value, but I do not reach that under this record. That children may be liable for the support of their parents, SDCL 25-7-28 through 25-7-30, gives a basis to the use of the word "assistance", and it may be said that such assistance and aid by children in later years has been and may in the future be of value. Experience has shown this to be true in some instances. Our opinions in Rowe v. Richards, 32 S. D. 66, 142 N.W. 664, 57 L.R.A. 1915E 1069, and 35 S.D. 201, 151 N.W. 1001, 57 L.R.A. 1915E 1075, Ann.Cas.1918A, 294, contain the reasoning and observations of our court on this subject which is also discussed in the recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, Administratrix (1974), ___ U.S. ___, 94 S. Ct. 806, 39 L. Ed. 2d 9. For the above reasons I concur in the result. WOLLMAN, Justice (dissenting). There is no question but that under the pre-1947 amendment to our wrongful death statute there could be no recovery for loss of companionship, society, association and advice, nor for the elements encompassed within those terms. See, e. g., Smith v. Presentation Academy of Aberdeen, 61 S. D. 323, 248 N.W. 762; Tufty v. Sioux Transit Co., 69 S.D. 368, 10 N.W.2d 767; Hodkinson v. Parker, 70 S.D. 272, 16 N. *161 W.2d 924; Comment, South Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction No. 31.02. We must assume that the legislature was familiar with this court's interpretation of the pre-1947 law when it reenacted the exact wording of the pre-1947 law in 1967 and that the legislature intended to adopt that interpretation along with the exact wording of the old statute. Proper judicial deference to legislative intent requires us to follow our interpretation of the pre-1947 law, however appealing it might be to fulfill the wishful thinking of the drafters of Pattern Jury Instruction No. 31.02. See the dissenting opinions in Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, Iowa, 190 N.W.2d 439, and Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 207 N.W.2d 686. I would reverse the judgment. I am authorized to state that Justice Dunn joins in this dissent. [*] The above three cases, Wycko, Fussner and Lockhart, are cited as authority for South Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, 31.02.