Title: New Jersey v. Boone
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: December 18, 2017

New Jersey v. Boone Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Defendant Akeem Boone faced seven charges related to drugs and a weapon found during an August 2012 search of his apartment in Hackensack. He sought to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant police had secured for his apartment, Unit 4A, because the warrant application did not include any evidence as to why that specific unit should be searched. The trial court denied Boone’s motion to suppress. It found, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the warrant application sufficiently detailed hand-to-hand transactions, counter-surveillance techniques, and past interactions with Boone to establish probable cause for a search. Subsequently, Boone pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and a related weapons offense. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the application contained “adequate circumstantial indicia” to support issuing a warrant to search Boone’s apartment unit. The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed: although police submitted a detailed warrant application that included information about Boone’s alleged drug-dealing in the general area, nothing in the application specified how police knew Boone lived in Unit 4A or why that unit -- one of thirty units in the building -- should have been searched. Because the warrant affidavit failed to provide specific information as to why Boone’s apartment and not other units should be searched, the warrant application was deficient. Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed and Boone's convictions vacated. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State v. Akeem Boone (A-3-16) (077757)Argued September 25, 2017 -- Decided December 18, 2017FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether a warrant application that did not include evidence as to why a specific apartment unit should be searched fell short of establishing probable cause for the search of that apartment. Over the course of two months during the summer of 2012, the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office Narcotics Task Force set up surveillance of defendant Akeem Boone for suspected distribution of crack cocaine, marijuana, and heroin. On August 27, 2012, police observed Boone drive to a parking lot in River Edge and retrieve a duffel bag from an unoccupied vehicle. He later drove to an apartment building, 211 Johnson Avenue, where police suspected he lived. Boone did not bring the bag into the thirty-unit building. An hour later, Boone went to retrieve the bag but, noticing the vehicle from which police were monitoring him, returned the bag to the car and drove away. Several times that day, police saw him drive to and from the Johnson Avenue apartment complex. That same evening, police followed Boone from Johnson Avenue to Main Street in Hackensack, where they observed what appeared to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction. Boone then drove back to the apartment complex. On August 29, 2012, Detective Dennis Conway of the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office applied for a warrant to search Boone, his car, and Unit 4A of 211 Johnson Avenue—identified as Boone’s apartment—among other things. The detective did not note that the building was a thirty-unit apartment building, nor did he provide any details about Unit 4A or how police knew Boone was a tenant in that unit. Although the warrant application frequently mentions 211 Johnson Avenue, it never discusses the inside of the apartment building, and it fails to mention Unit 4A other than in passing. However, the detective concluded that “my investigation reveals that Boone is distributing Controlled Dangerous Substances, 211 Johnson Avenue, Apartment 4A, Hackensack.” The trial court subsequently issued a warrant to search Boone, his residence, and his car. Police executed the search warrant on September 7, 2012, and found between one-half and five ounces of cocaine and an illegal handgun in Unit 4A. They then arrested Boone. In February 2013, a grand jury charged Boone with seven counts of drug, weapons, and child endangerment offenses. Boone sought to suppress the evidence found in Unit 4A on the ground that the search warrant lacked a factual basis to establish probable cause to search his apartment. The trial court denied the motion. Although the court acknowledged that police offered no support to justify a search of Unit 4A, it noted that Detective Conway provided extensive details of the police surveillance of Boone. The court found that Boone’s activity, coupled with the detective’s investigative experience and Boone’s criminal history, established probable cause to search Unit 4A. After the denial of his motion to suppress, Boone pled guilty to two second-degree drug offenses. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress in an unpublished opinion. The panel held that the totality of the circumstances presented in the affidavit justified a finding of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. The panel found that the issuing judge had “ample grounds to anticipate” that narcotics would be in Boone’s apartment “given the furtive conduct of defendant the surveilling officers had observed and his two recent apparent hand-to-hand drug transactions at another location.” The Court granted certification. 227 N.J. 356 (2016).HELD: Because the warrant affidavit failed to provide specific information as to why defendant’s apartment and not other units should be searched, the warrant application was deficient. 1 1. The search-and-seizure provision in Article I, Paragraph 7 of New Jersey’s Constitution affords a higher level of protection for citizens than the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Searches without a warrant are presumed unreasonable unless they fall within an exception to the warrant requirement. (pp. 9-10)2. The application for a warrant must satisfy the issuing authority that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, or is being committed, at a specific location or that evidence of a crime is at the place sought to be searched. The requirement for a search warrant is not a mere formality, and the showing necessary to secure one should be based not merely on belief or suspicion, but on underlying facts or circumstances which would warrant a prudent man in believing that the law was being violated. (p. 10)3. Reviewing courts accord substantial deference to the discretionary determination resulting in the issuance of the search warrant. Courts consider the totality of the circumstances and should sustain the validity of a search only if the finding of probable cause relies on adequate facts. The probable cause determination must be based on the information contained within the four corners of the supporting affidavit, as supplemented by sworn testimony before the issuing judge that is recorded contemporaneously. The analysis into sufficient probable cause to issue a warrant for an arrest or for a search involves two separate inquiries. (pp. 10-12)4. In State v. Keyes, the Court held that a confidential informant’s tip could serve as the basis for issuing a warrant provided that there is “substantial evidence in the record to support the informant’s statements.” 184 N.J. 541, 555 (2005). Although police could not observe the informant enter the home in that case, under the totality of the circumstances, there was a sufficient basis to issue the warrant based on the controlled drug buy. Id. at 559-60. The Court credited the informant’s past contributions to drug sale arrests, his description of the defendant, the controlled buy, and the fact that known drug users were entering and exiting the area as contributing to the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 558-60. Because police had that corroborating evidence and the informant’s tip linking the defendant to the apartment, the Court held that the warrant had a sufficient basis. (pp. 12-13)5. Here, no independent documentary evidence, such as a voting record, utility bill, or lease, was offered to corroborate Boone’s address. No neighbor, informant, or controlled transaction demonstrated that Boone lived in Unit 4A. Police failed to provide the issuing judge a basis of knowledge from which to conclude that contraband would be found in the particular apartment. That is true regardless of whether the warrant application provided a basis for Boone’s arrest because, as noted, probable cause to arrest a suspect is not synonymous with probable cause to search that suspect’s apartment. Police lacked the facts important in Keyes, namely a reliable informant who could identify where Boone lived. Police here listed Boone’s apartment unit as the targeted property in a conclusory manner, without any evidential basis as to how they knew that specific unit in a thirty-unit building contained contraband. The Court recognizes that the error here was likely an innocent oversight by the police. However, because New Jersey does not recognize an officer’s good faith alone as an exception to the warrant requirement, the error demands reversal. (pp. 13-16)6. Because the State’s warrant application did not include specific evidence as to why a judge should issue a search warrant for a specific apartment unit, the search warrant issued on the basis of that application was invalid. And, because the police search of Unit 4A was not supported by a valid warrant or justified by an exception to the warrant requirement, the search was unconstitutional. Therefore, the Court suppresses all evidence seized from Boone’s apartment. The Court emphasizes that judges issuing search warrants must scrutinize the warrant application and tie specific evidence to the persons, property, or items the State seeks to search. Without that specificity and connection to the facts, the application must fail. (pp. 16-17) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and Boone’s convictions are VACATED. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 3 September Term 2016 077757STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.AKEEM BOONE, Defendant-Appellant. Argued September 25, 2017 – Decided December 18, 2017 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Daniel V. Gautieri, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Daniel V. Gautieri, of counsel and on the briefs). Suzanne E. Cevasco, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney; Suzanne E. Cevasco, of counsel and on the briefs, and Catherine A. Foddai, of counsel). Jenny M. Hsu, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Jenny M. Hsu, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, we consider whether a warrant applicationthat did not include evidence as to why a specific apartment 1 unit should be searched fell short of establishing probablecause for the search of that apartment, in violation of theFourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and ArticleI, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. Defendant Akeem Boone faced seven charges related to drugsand a weapon found during an August 2012 search of his apartmentin Hackensack. He sought to suppress the evidence seizedpursuant to a search warrant police had secured for hisapartment, Unit 4A, because the warrant application did notinclude any evidence as to why that specific unit should besearched. The trial court denied Boone’s motion to suppress. Itfound, based on the totality of the circumstances, that thewarrant application sufficiently detailed hand-to-handtransactions, counter-surveillance techniques, and pastinteractions with Boone to establish probable cause for asearch. Subsequently, Boone pleaded guilty to possession of acontrolled substance with intent to distribute and a relatedweapons offense. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding thatthe application contained “adequate circumstantial indicia” tosupport issuing a warrant to search Boone’s apartment unit. We disagree. Although police submitted a detailed warrantapplication that included information about Boone’s allegeddrug-dealing in the general area, nothing in the application 2 specified how police knew Boone lived in Unit 4A or why thatunit -- one of thirty units in the building -- should besearched. Because the warrant affidavit failed to providespecific information as to why Boone’s apartment and not otherunits should be searched, the warrant application was deficient.Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Divisionand vacate Boone’s convictions. I. A. Over the course of two months during the summer of 2012,the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office Narcotics Task Force setup surveillance of Boone for suspected distribution of crackcocaine, marijuana, and heroin. Police observed Boone engage indrug-related activities in Englewood, River Edge, andHackensack. On August 27, 2012, police observed Boone drive to aparking lot in River Edge and retrieve a duffel bag from anunoccupied vehicle. He later drove to an apartment building,211 Johnson Avenue, where police suspected he lived. Boone didnot bring the bag into the thirty-unit building. An hour later,Boone went to retrieve the bag but, noticing the vehicle fromwhich police were monitoring him, returned the bag to the carand drove away. Several times that day, police saw him drive toand from the Johnson Avenue apartment complex. 3 That same evening, police followed Boone from JohnsonAvenue to Main Street in Hackensack, where they observed whatappeared to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction between Boone anda man in a black Acura. Police checked the license plates onthe Acura and learned the car was registered to a person who hadpreviously been arrested for narcotics possession. Boone thendrove back to the Johnson Avenue apartment complex. On August 29, 2012, Detective Dennis Conway of the BergenCounty Prosecutor’s Office applied for a warrant to searchBoone, his car, and Unit 4A of 211 Johnson Avenue -- identifiedas Boone’s apartment -- among other things. Specifically,Conway described Boone’s residence as a “multi-family dwelling,constructed of tan brick. . . . The [principal] entrance forthe premise[s] has the number #211 on the front glass door.There are three (3) steps to get to the glass front doors.” The detective did not note that the building was a thirty-unit apartment building, nor did he provide any details aboutUnit 4A or how police knew Boone was a tenant in that unit. In describing the basis of his knowledge, the detectivestated that he had been investigating Boone since July 29, 2012.He indicated that he learned that Boone had been arrested inApril 2011 in New York for burglary. He wrote that police hadobserved Boone entering an Englewood apartment where a knowndrug dealer lived. He also included information about Boone’s4 August 27, 2012 activity. Although the warrant applicationfrequently mentions 211 Johnson Avenue, it never discusses theinside of the apartment building, and it fails to mention Unit4A other than in passing. However, the detective concluded that“my investigation reveals that Boone is distributing ControlledDangerous Substances, 211 Johnson Avenue, Apartment 4A,Hackensack.” The trial court subsequently issued a warrant to searchBoone, his residence, and his car. Police executed the searchwarrant on September 7, 2012, and found between one-half andfive ounces of cocaine and an illegal handgun in Unit 4A. Theythen arrested Boone. B. In February 2013, a grand jury charged Boone with first-degree operating a facility used to manufacture a controlledsubstance, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4 (count one); second-degree possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute,contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(2) (count two);second-degree possession of a firearm while committing acontrolled substance offense, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a)(count three); third-degree receiving stolen property, contraryto N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7 (count four); second-degree endangering thewelfare of a child, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) (countfive); third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, contrary 5 to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) (count six); and second-degree certainpersons not permitted to have a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A.2C:39-7 (count seven). Boone sought to suppress the evidence found in Unit 4A onthe ground that the search warrant lacked a factual basis toestablish probable cause to search his apartment. The trial court denied the motion in a written opinion.Although the court acknowledged that police offered no supportto justify a search of Unit 4A, it noted that Detective Conwayprovided extensive details of the police surveillance of Boone.The court found the detective credible. Despite the lack ofspecificity, the court found that “[t]here is no bindingauthority that prompts the officer to state a reason whyApartment 4A was the subject of the search warrant and not anyother apartment in the complex.” The court noted that police established “suspiciouscircumstances” based on Boone’s furtive movements, hand-to-handdrug transactions, use of the apartment building -- “a commonfactor in the surveillance” -- and erratic driving to justifyprobable cause to search his apartment unit. In denying themotion, the court found that Boone’s activity, coupled with thedetective’s investigative experience and Boone’s criminalhistory, established probable cause to search Unit 4 A. 6 After the denial of his motion to suppress, Boone pledguilty to second-degree possession of a controlled substancewith the intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(2), and second-degree possession of a weaponwhile committing a controlled substance crime, contrary toN.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a). He was sentenced to three years ofimprisonment with one year of parole ineligibility for the drugoffense, to run consecutively with the sentence of five years ofimprisonment with three years of parole ineligibility on theweapons offense. In total, Boone faced eight years ofimprisonment with four years of parole ineligibility, inaddition to concurrent sentences for unrelated offenses. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion tosuppress in an unpublished opinion. The panel held that thetotality of the circumstances presented in the affidavitjustified a finding of probable cause for the issuance of thesearch warrant. Further, the panel noted that “[t]here wereadequate circumstantial indicia here to support a reasonablebelief that the apartment that was searched was indeeddefendant’s.” Specifically, the panel found that the issuingjudge had “ample grounds to anticipate” that narcotics would bein Boone’s apartment “given the furtive conduct of defendant thesurveilling officers had observed and his two recent apparenthand-to-hand drug transactions at another location.” 7 We granted certification, 227 N.J. 356 (2016), and alsogranted the Attorney General amicus curiae status. II. Boone argues that the warrant application was deficientbecause it listed Unit 4A as Boone’s residence in a conclusorymanner, without a sufficient factual basis. He argues thatpolice could have easily verified his residence throughsurveillance or government records. Additionally, he arguesthat there was similarly no basis to conclude that narcoticswere in his apartment because the affidavit never established anexus linking the hand-to-hand drug transactions with Boone’sresidence. Although the State concedes that it did not provide afactual basis to indicate why Unit 4A should be searched, itcounters that the totality of the circumstances justified theissuance of a search warrant because surveillance placed Booneat 211 Johnson Avenue before and after drug transactions. TheState argues that omission of facts supporting the apartmentunit does nothing to diminish the direct evidence of thosetransactions. Amicus curiae, the Attorney General, further argues thatBoone did not overcome the presumption of validity attached tosearch warrants. Amicus argues that the omission of facts 8 connected to the apartment unit is a technical error that shouldnot invalidate an otherwise well-supported warrant application. III. A. An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress evidencein a criminal case must uphold the factual findings underlyingthe trial court’s decision, provided that those findings are“supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.”State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 40 (2016). The suppressionmotion judge’s findings should be overturned “only if they areso clearly mistaken 'that the interests of justice demandintervention and correction.’” State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224,244 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).However, we owe no deference to conclusions of law made by lowercourts in suppression decisions, which we instead review denovo. State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015). B. The search-and-seizure provision in Article I, Paragraph 7of New Jersey’s Constitution affords a higher level ofprotection for citizens than the Fourth Amendment of the UnitedStates Constitution. See State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 541(2008). Great protection applies especially in one’s home, thesanctity of which “is among our most cherished rights.” Statev. Bryant, 227 N.J. 60, 69 (2016) (quoting State v. Frankel, 1799 N.J. 586, 611 (2004)). Therefore, our courts have announced apreference for law enforcement to secure warrants from detachedjudges prior to a search, and searches without a warrant arepresumed unreasonable unless they fall within an exception tothe warrant requirement. Id. at 69-70; see also State v.Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 129 (2012); Johnson, 193 N.J. at 552. The application for a warrant must satisfy the issuingauthority “that there is probable cause to believe that a crimehas been committed, or is being committed, at a specificlocation or that evidence of a crime is at the place sought tobe searched.” State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 388 (2004)(emphases added) (quoting State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 210(2001)). A neutral magistrate, not the police, should determinewhether an application for a search warrant is based onsufficient probable cause. State v. Chippero, 201 N.J. 14, 26(2009). The “requirement for a search warrant is not a mereformality,” and the showing necessary to secure one should bebased “not merely [on] belief or suspicion, but [on] underlyingfacts or circumstances which would warrant a prudent man inbelieving that the law was being violated.” State v.Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 107 (1987) (brackets removed) (quotingState v. Macri, 39 N.J. 250, 255 (1963)). A search that is executed pursuant to a warrant is“presumptively valid,” and a defendant challenging the issuance 10 of that warrant has the burden of proof to establish a lack ofprobable cause “or that the search was otherwise unreasonable.”Watts, 223 N.J. at 513-14 (quoting State v. Keyes, 184 N.J. 541,554 (2005)). Reviewing courts “accord substantial deference tothe discretionary determination resulting in the issuance of the[search] warrant.” Jones, 179 N.J. at 388 (quoting Sullivan,169 N.J. at 211 (alteration in original)). Courts consider the“totality of the circumstances” and should sustain the validityof a search only if the finding of probable cause relies onadequate facts. Id. at 388-89. “[T]he probable causedetermination must be . . . based on the information containedwithin the four corners of the supporting affidavit, assupplemented by sworn testimony before the issuing judge that isrecorded contemporaneously.” State v. Marshall, 199 N.J. 602,611 (2009) (quoting Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 363(2000)). As this Court recognized in Chippero, the analysis intosufficient probable cause to issue a warrant for an arrest orfor a search involves two separate inquiries. 201 N.J. at 28.In adopting Professor LaFave’s language, we noted that [t]wo conclusions necessary to the issuance of the [search] warrant must be supported by substantial evidence: that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be searched. By comparison, the right of arrest 11 arises only when a crime is committed or attempted in the presence of the arresting officer or when the officer has “reasonable grounds to believe” -- sometimes stated “probable cause to believe” -- that a felony has been committed by the person to be arrested. Although it would appear that the conclusions which justify either arrest or the issuance of a search warrant must be supported by evidence of the same degree of probity, it is clear that the conclusions themselves are not identical. [Ibid. (emphases added) (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 3.1(b) at 9-10 (4th ed. 2004) (footnotes omitted)).] Ultimately, we determined that “a probable causedetermination to search a home where the suspect lives may bevalid irrespective of whether probable cause to arrest thatparticular individual has crystallized.” Id. at 31. We have upheld the issuance of a search warrant for anapartment unit based only on an informant’s description of thatunit. Keyes, 184 N.J. at 548-49, 555. There, police conductedsurveillance of a housing project but could not view theentrance of a suspected drug house where an informant engaged ina controlled narcotics buy. Id. at 548-49. An informantprovided the description of a “two (2) story red brick apartmentrow home . . . . 236 Rosemont Place is a one story apartmentand is on the ground floor.” Id. at 549. The police includedthe informant’s statement in their warrant application, whichwas granted by the municipal court. Id. at 550. The Appellate 12 Division reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion tosuppress, holding that, among other reasons, police did notindependently verify the informant’s description of the propertyand did not actually observe him entering the defendant’sapartment. Id. at 551. In Keyes we reversed, holding that a confidentialinformant’s tip could serve as the basis for issuing a warrantprovided that there is “substantial evidence in the record tosupport the informant’s statements.” Id. at 555. Althoughpolice could not observe the informant enter the home, under thetotality of the circumstances, there was a sufficient basis toissue the warrant based on the controlled drug buy. Id. at 559-60. We credited the informant’s past contributions to drug salearrests, his description of the defendant, the controlled buy,and the fact that known drug users were entering and exiting thearea as contributing to the totality of the circumstances. Id.at 558-60. Because police had that corroborating evidence andthe informant’s tip linking the defendant to the apartment, weheld that the warrant had a sufficient basis. Id. at 560. IV. With those principles in mind, we now evaluate the factualbasis underpinning the issuing judge’s decision to authorize asearch warrant for Unit 4A. We conclude that, because there 13 were no facts specifically pointing to that unit, the warrantapplication failed to establish probable cause. The State concedes that there are no facts in the warrantapplication related to Unit 4A, and the Attorney General agreesthat a warrant authorizing a search of an entire apartmentcomplex rather than an individual unit would be invalid.Instead, the State relies on a more general totality-of-the-circumstances argument to justify the issuance of the warranthere. That argument, however, ignores the obligation of courtsto independently verify an officer’s submissions as to eachaspect of the application that must be supported by probablecause for a warrant to issue; we cannot infer facts that are notsupported in an affidavit, even something as simple as a missingaddress. No independent documentary evidence, such as a votingrecord, utility bill, or lease, was offered to corroborateBoone’s address. No neighbor, informant, or controlledtransaction demonstrated that Boone lived in Unit 4A. The Stateargued that it could have learned Boone’s residence from pastarrests, but at oral argument defense counsel asserted thatBoone’s criminal record indicates an Englewood address. Beyondthat, nothing in the warrant affidavit ties Unit 4A to thecriminal activity alleged elsewhere in the affidavit. Policefailed to provide the issuing judge a basis of knowledge from 14 which to conclude that contraband would be found in theparticular apartment. The State, in its submission and at oral argument, hasasserted that it presented voluminous evidence based on a month-long investigation that established sufficient probable causeimplicating Boone in drug dealing. That may be sufficient toissue a warrant to arrest Boone; however, there was nothing inthe affidavit to indicate where Boone lived, how police knewwhich apartment was his, or how the apartment was connected tohis drug dealing. As we recognized in Chippero, 201 N.J. at 30,probable cause to secure an arrest warrant and probable cause tosecure a warrant to search are distinct inquiries. ThoughChippero dealt with a lawfully issued search warrant thatinsufficiently stated a basis for probable cause to arrest, theinverse logic holds true here. Because the warrant applicationlacks a basis for knowledge of Boone’s address, the applicationin this case is not sufficient to support a warrant to searchUnit 4A. That is true regardless of whether the warrantapplication provided a basis for Boone’s arrest because, asnoted, probable cause to arrest a suspect is not synonymous withprobable cause to search that suspect’s apartment. Thus,although police may arguably have demonstrated in theapplication that they had probable cause to believe Boone hadcommitted a crime, nothing on the face of the warrant 15 application gave rise to probable cause to believe that evidenceof any of Boone’s wrongdoing might be specifically found in Unit4A rather than any of the other thirty units in the JohnsonAvenue building. Unlike in Keyes, 184 N.J. at 559-60, where police includedin their warrant affidavit an informant’s description from acontrolled drug buy directing them to a specific apartment unit,here no evidence points to Boone’s apartment unit. Policelacked the facts important in Keyes, namely a reliable informantwho could identify where Boone lived. Police here listedBoone’s apartment unit as the targeted property in a conclusorymanner, without any evidential basis as to how they knew thatspecific unit in a thirty-unit building contained contraband. We recognize that the error here was likely an innocentoversight by the police. However, because New Jersey does notrecognize an officer’s good faith alone as an exception to thewarrant requirement, Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 120, the errordemands reversal. Because the State’s warrant application did not includespecific evidence as to why a judge should issue a searchwarrant for a specific apartment unit, the search warrant issuedon the basis of that application was invalid. And, because thepolice search of Unit 4A was not supported by a valid warrant orjustified by an exception to the warrant requirement, the search 16 was unconstitutional. Therefore, this Court suppresses allevidence seized from Boone’s apartment. See id. at 148. We emphasize that judges issuing search warrants mustscrutinize the warrant application and tie specific evidence tothe persons, property, or items the State seeks to search.Without that specificity and connection to the facts, theapplication must fail. V. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the AppellateDivision and vacate Boone’s convictions. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. 17