Title: Commonwealth v. Guzman
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11483
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 25, 2014

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SJC-11483 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSE A. GUZMAN. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 4, 2014. - August 25, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, 
& Lenk, JJ.1 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Global Positioning System Device.  Constitutional 
Law, Sentence.  Due Process of Law, Sentence.  Practice, 
Criminal, Sentence, Probation. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on February 7, 2013. 
 
 
The case was reported by Lenk, J. 
 
 
 
Thomas E. Bocian, Assistant Attorney General (Timothy J. 
Wyse, Assistant Attorney General, with him) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Ryan M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In the case before us, a Superior Court judge 
declined to include global positioning system (GPS) monitoring 
as a condition of the probationary portion of the sentence she 
                                                        
 
1 Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
imposed following the defendant's pleas of guilty to several 
offenses.  One of those offenses was the dissemination of visual 
material depicting a child in a state of nudity or sexual 
conduct, one of the "sex offense[s] involving a child" 
enumerated in G. L. c. 265, § 47, that requires a defendant 
convicted of such an offense to be subject to GPS monitoring as 
a condition of any term of probation, during "the length of his 
probation for any such offense."  We are called upon to decide 
whether the imposition of GPS monitoring in such circumstances 
is mandatory and, if so, whether such statutory mandate either 
constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, or violates 
substantive and procedural due process pursuant to the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and arts. 
1, 10, 11, and 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
 
It is plain that G. L. c. 265, § 47, affords a sentencing 
judge no discretion whether to impose GPS monitoring on a 
defendant sentenced, as here, to a probationary term for an 
enumerated offense.  Although, given the inadequate record 
before us, we do not reach the defendant's Fourth Amendment 
claim, we conclude that G. L. c. 265, § 47, does not violate the 
defendant's right to due process.  Because the statute applied 
to the defendant in the circumstances, and because there was no 
3 
 
constitutional bar to its application, the failure to include 
GPS monitoring as a condition of the defendant's probation was 
error.2 
 
1.  Background.  On August 15, 2011, a Suffolk County grand 
jury issued two indictments charging dissemination or possession 
of obscene matter, G. L. c. 272, § 29; two indictments charging 
dissemination of visual material depicting a child in a state of 
nudity or sexual conduct, G. L. c. 272, § 29B, a predicate 
offense under G. L. c. 265, § 47; and one indictment charging 
purchase or possession of visual material depicting a child 
involved in sexual conduct, G. L. c. 272, § 29C.  The defendant, 
who had no previous convictions of a sex offense, had acquired 
child pornography through LimeWire, an Internet-based file 
                                                        
 
2 On December 9, 2013, approximately one year after she 
initially sentenced the defendant, and after she had denied the 
Commonwealth's subsequent motion that global positioning system 
(GPS) monitoring be imposed, the sentencing judge added GPS 
monitoring as a condition of the defendant's probation, and 
reduced the term of his probationary period from five years to 
two years.  The appellate attorneys did not become aware of this 
modification until after the case had been briefed and argued; 
on March 20, 2014, the Commonwealth notified this court of the 
modified terms of the defendant's probation. 
 
 
Although the Commonwealth's appeal is now moot, "we 
exercise our discretion[, as both parties request we do,] to 
hear the merits of this case because the issue is of significant 
public interest, fully briefed by the parties, and very likely 
to arise again in similar circumstances, yet evade review."  See 
Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 808 n.2 (2013), citing 
Commonwealth v. Cory, 454 Mass. 559, 560 n.3 (2009) (deciding 
whether G. L. c. 265, § 47, applies to juveniles although 
juvenile defendant's case was moot). 
4 
 
sharing system.  The allegation that the defendant engaged in 
distribution stemmed from the fact that the defendant's use of 
LimeWire's default settings3 permitted other users to access his 
files. 
 
In conjunction with a proposed plea agreement, the 
Commonwealth submitted a sentencing memorandum proposing that 
the defendant be sentenced to from four to five years in State 
prison followed by ten years of probation.4  After conducting two 
lobby conferences and reviewing an expert forensic evaluation of 
the materials found on the defendant's computer, the judge 
convened a plea and sentencing hearing on December 10, 2012.  
During the defendant's plea colloquy, the judge and both counsel 
discussed whether the defendant would be required to wear a GPS 
device as one of the conditions of his probation.  A member of 
the court staff informed the judge that the imposition of GPS 
monitoring as a condition of probation was discretionary.  The 
judge then sentenced the defendant to a one-year term of 
incarceration for his convictions under G. L. c. 272, §§ 29 and 
                                                        
 
3 LimeWire's default settings involve the creation of a 
"Shared" folder on a user's computer.  Any file placed in the 
"Shared" folder is automatically available to any other LimeWire 
user, and, also automatically, any file downloaded through 
LimeWire is saved in the "Shared" folder.  See United States v. 
Lewis, 554 F.3d 208, 211 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1276 
(2009). 
 
 
4 It did not suggest that GPS monitoring be a condition of 
the defendant's probation. 
5 
 
29C, and to a probationary period of five years for his 
convictions under G. L. c. 272, §§ 29 and 29B.  She declined to 
require that the defendant wear a GPS device as a condition of 
probation. 
 
Three days later, the Commonwealth sought and was granted a 
further hearing, at which it argued that, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 265, § 47, GPS monitoring was a required condition of 
probation for the offense of dissemination of visual material 
depicting a child in a state of nudity or sexual conduct to 
which the defendant had pleaded guilty.   The judge again 
declined to impose GPS monitoring.5  In so doing, she noted that 
the statute was "problematic" for its failure to distinguish 
between contact sex offenders and noncontact offenders, and 
explained that "dealing with this case individually" had led her 
to conclude that GPS monitoring was unnecessary.  Several months 
later, the Commonwealth filed a petition for relief in the 
county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, requesting that the 
single justice vacate the defendant's sentence and remand for 
further proceedings in accordance with G. L. c. 265, § 47.6  The 
                                                        
 
5 The judge also indicated that, if the Commonwealth 
appealed and was successful, she would permit the defendant to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (2), as 
appearing in 442 Mass. 1511 (2004). 
 
 
6 One month previously, the Commonwealth had filed a notice 
of appeal in the Appeals Court.  Proceedings in that case have 
been stayed in light of the instant proceedings. 
6 
 
defendant opposed the petition, arguing that GPS monitoring 
would violate his right against unreasonable searches and 
seizures and his right to due process under both the State and 
Federal Constitutions.  The single justice reserved and reported 
the case to the full court. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Requirements under G. L. c. 265, § 47.  
The parties dispute whether G. L. c. 265, § 47, mandates GPS 
monitoring as a condition of the defendant's probation.  The 
Commonwealth contends that, where a defendant is convicted of an 
enumerated offense and subsequently sentenced to a term of 
probation, the sentencing judge has no discretion to decline to 
impose GPS monitoring as a condition of that probation.  The 
defendant maintains, to the contrary, that the judge is 
permitted to determine on a case-by-case basis whether GPS 
monitoring is appropriate given a defendant's risk of reoffense. 
 
To determine whether G. L. c. 265, § 47, affords a 
sentencing judge any discretion concerning the imposition of GPS 
monitoring as a term of probation for certain predicate 
offenses, we begin with the plain language of the statute.  See 
Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 810 (2013), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Raposo, 453 Mass. 739, 743 (2009).  Ordinarily, 
we will "not look beyond the words of the statute where the 
language is plain and unambiguous," State Bd. of Retirement v. 
Boston Retirement Bd., 391 Mass. 92, 94 (1984), nor will we add 
7 
 
words to the statute that the Legislature did not see fit to 
include.  Commissioner of Correction v. Superior Court Dep't of 
the Trial Court for the County of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 126 
(2006). 
 
General Laws c. 265, 47, provides, in relevant part: 
 
 
"Any person who is placed on probation for any offense 
listed within the definition of 'sex offense,' a 'sex 
offense involving a child' or a 'sexually violent offense,' 
as defined in [G. L. c. 6, § 178C,] shall, as a requirement 
of any term of probation, wear a global positioning system 
device . . . at all times for the length of his probation 
for any such offense." 
 
In turn, G. L. c. 6, § 178C, defines the terms "[s]ex offense" 
and "[s]ex offense involving a child" to include the 
dissemination of visual material depicting a child in a state of 
nudity or sexual conduct, as set forth in G. L. c. 272, § 29B. 
 
Because "[t]he word 'shall' is ordinarily interpreted as 
having a mandatory or imperative obligation," Hashimi v. Kalil, 
388 Mass. 607, 609 (1983), we have determined that the GPS 
requirement of G. L. c. 265, § 47, applies to any defendant who 
has been convicted of a predicate offense and sentenced to a 
term of probation.  See Commonwealth v. Canadyan, 458 Mass. 574, 
575 n.2 (2010) ("Having been placed on probation for a 'sex 
offense,' the defendant was required to wear a [GPS device] as a 
condition of his probation"); Commonwealth v. Cory, 454 Mass. 
559, 569 (2009) (GPS requirement of G. L. c. 265, § 47, "applies 
to every person who is convicted of [predicate] crimes and 
8 
 
receives a probationary term as part of the criminal 
proceeding's disposition").  Thus, we conclude that G. L. 
c. 265, § 47, affords judges no discretion to decide whether GPS 
monitoring should apply in any particular set of circumstances; 
where a defendant is convicted of a qualifying offense and is 
sentenced to a term of probation, the sentencing judge must 
impose GPS monitoring as a condition of that probation.7 
 
b.  Constitutional claims.  We turn to the defendant's 
constitutional arguments.  The defendant contends that the 
imposition of GPS monitoring would violate his right to due 
process under both the Federal and State Constitutions.  
Specifically, he objects to the determination that G. L. c. 265, 
§ 47, affords a sentencing judge no discretion to decide whether 
GPS monitoring ought to be imposed on an individual defendant, 
including those who have committed only noncontact offenses.  
Because the Legislature may establish, within constitutional 
limits, mandatory minimum sentences for certain predicate 
offenses, and because G. L. c. 265, § 47, constitutes no more 
than such a sentence, we conclude that the imposition of GPS 
monitoring on the defendant would not offend due process.  The 
                                                        
 
7 As stated, the defendant pleaded guilty to a qualifying 
offense under G. L. c. 6, § 178C, namely, the dissemination of 
visual material depicting a child in a state of nudity or sexual 
conduct, and was sentenced to a probationary term of five years 
for that offense and two others.  He therefore falls within the 
ambit of G. L. c. 265, § 47. 
9 
 
defendant also maintains that GPS monitoring would encroach upon 
his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches 
and seizures.  The record here, however, is too sparse to permit 
an adequate assessment of the defendant's Fourth Amendment 
claim, and we accordingly decline to reach it.8 
 
i.  Due process.  "A probation condition is enforceable, 
even if it infringes on a defendant's ability to exercise 
constitutionally protected rights, so long as the condition is 
'reasonably related' to the goals of sentencing and probation."  
Commonwealth v. Lapointe, 435 Mass. 455, 459 (2001), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Pike, 428 Mass. 393, 403 (1998).  See 
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 17 (2010).  The defendant 
urges that we employ this "reasonably related" test to assess 
whether GPS monitoring constitutionally may be imposed on all 
probationers convicted of predicate offenses. Doing so, he 
contends, would compel the conclusion that G. L. c. 265, § 47, 
offends due process as applied to defendants convicted, as he 
was, of only noncontact sex offenses. 
                                                        
 
8 The defendant does not challenge the mandatory 
requirements of G. L. c. 265, § 47, under either the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. 26 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and the record here would 
not permit a determination of that issue.  Accordingly, we do 
not consider whether the mandatory imposition of GPS monitoring 
could in some circumstances constitute a punishment 
"disproportionate to the magnitude of the crime" in question.  
See Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 369 Mass. 242, 247-248 (1975). 
10 
 
 
The "reasonably related" test, however, is inapplicable 
here.  To date, we have used that test only to analyze the 
validity of conditions of probation that are imposed by a 
sentencing judge in his or her discretion.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 465 Mass. 372, 389 (2013) ("In 
determining a sentence, a judge is authorized . . . to impose 
any conditions that the judge deems proper"); Commonwealth v. 
Lapointe, supra at 459, quoting Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 414 
Mass. 88, 92 (1993) ("A judge, in furnishing an appropriate 
individualized sentence, may consider 'many factors'. . ."); 
Commonwealth v. Pike, supra at 402-403 (discussing sentencing 
judge's latitude in imposing conditions on probation); 
Commonwealth v. Power, 420 Mass. 410, 414 (1995), cert. denied, 
516 U.S. 1042 (1996) (noting that "the judge should consider 
several goals" in imposing sentence).  We have never applied the 
"reasonably related" test to those conditions of probation that 
the Legislature has concluded are mandatory.  Instead, where the 
Legislature has prescribed particular punishments for a given 
offense, we ask only whether that mandatory sentence meets the 
rational basis test.  See Commonwealth v. Therriault, 401 Mass. 
237, 241-242 (1987) (applying rational basis test to due process 
challenge to mandatory minimum sentence); Commonwealth v. 
Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 918 (1976) (legislatively mandated 
11 
 
punishments subject only to rational basis review and need not 
withstand "exacting scrutiny"). 
 
This diminished level of scrutiny is based on our 
recognition that, while "[a] judge's latitude in sentencing is 
great but not infinite," Commonwealth v. Gomes, 73 Mass. App. 
Ct. 857, 859 (2009), the Legislature has broad power to 
determine the appropriate punishment for a given offense.  See 
Commonwealth v. Jackson, supra at 909 ("Legislature has great 
latitude to . . . prescribe penalties to vindicate the 
legitimate interests of society"); Harding v. Commonwealth, 283 
Mass. 369, 374 (1933) ("It is for the General Court in the main 
to establish the maximum terms of sentence for the several 
crimes known to the law").  See also Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 
413 Mass. 224, 233 (1992); Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 369 Mass. 
242, 248 (1975) (Tauro, C.J., concurring); Commonwealth v. 
Morrow, 363 Mass. 601, 610-611 (1973). 
 
We have recognized also that, by establishing mandatory 
minimum sentences for particular offenses, the Legislature 
curtails the ability of a sentencing judge to determine the 
appropriate sentence in a given case.  See Commonwealth v. 
Therriault, supra at 239, citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 
290 (1983) ("the Legislature has latitude in determining limits 
on the discretion that the trial judges possess in sentencing 
convicted criminals").  Since a term of probation constitutes a 
12 
 
"sentence", see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Power, supra at 414, the 
Legislature likewise may restrict a sentencing judge's 
discretion to determine the terms of probation.9  See 
Commonwealth v. Jackson, supra at 919; Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 
Mass. 189, 199 (1969), quoting Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 
576, 586 (1959) ("Unless the punishment exceeds a constitutional 
limit, the task of assigning penalties is for the Legislature").  
Indeed, in construing G. L. c. 265, § 47, we have not questioned 
the Legislature's ability to establish mandatory conditions of 
probation in general or to require GPS monitoring in particular.  
See Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 810-817 (2013); 
Commonwealth v. Raposo, 453 Mass. 739, 748 (2009). 
 
In light of this, we discern no reason to apply the 
"reasonably related" test to such legislatively mandated 
conditions of probation as the requirement of GPS monitoring in 
G. L. c. 265, § 47.  Accordingly, we do not consider whether the 
imposition of GPS monitoring as a mandatory condition of 
probation for those convicted of certain predicate offenses 
pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 47, is reasonably related to the 
                                                        
 
9 In this regard, the Legislature's ability to limit the 
discretion of the sentencing judge does not violate the 
separation of powers by permitting the Legislature to usurp the 
judicial function of sentencing.  See Commonwealth v. 
Therriault, 401 Mass. 237, 242 (1987) (imposition of mandatory 
minimum sentence did not derogate separation of powers); 
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 920-923 (1976) (there is 
no support for proposition that "Legislature cannot limit a 
court's probationary powers"). 
13 
 
goals of sentencing and probation.  Instead, we inquire only 
whether there is a rational basis to support the Legislature's 
determination.  We conclude that there is.  
 
Permissible legislative objectives concerning criminal 
sentencing include deterrence, isolation and incapacitation, 
retribution and moral reinforcement, as well as reformation and 
rehabilitation.  See Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 495, 
499 (1981), citing Commonwealth v. O'Neal, supra at 251 & n.11.  
The provisions of G. L. c. 265, § 47, reasonably can be viewed 
as serving many, if not all, of these goals.  We have noted the 
danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Knapp, 441 Mass. 157, 159 (2004).  The 
Legislature permissibly has determined that the risk of being 
subjected to GPS monitoring might deter future or repeat 
offenders.  See Commonwealth v. Cory, 454 Mass. 559, 571 (2009) 
(penal nature of GPS monitoring promotes deterrence).  The 
Legislature similarly was free to conclude that enabling police 
to track the movements of all convicted sex offenders would 
promote the security and well-being of the general public.  See 
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex Offender Registry 
Board, 450 Mass. 780, 789-790 (2008).  Within constitutional 
limitations, the Legislature may establish harsh punishments for 
particular offenses in order to discourage reoffense and promote 
rehabilitation.  See Commonwealth v. Jackson, supra at 912-913 
14 
 
(Legislature had not "exceeded its prerogative" in imposing 
"harsh, inflexible sentence").  "The present statute," 
therefore, "is obviously an attempt to deter through a 
nondiscretionary penalty."  Id. at 912. 
 
We observed in Commonwealth v. Cory, supra at 572, and note 
again today, that "[t]he sanction [of GPS monitoring] appears 
excessive . . . to the extent that it applies without exception 
to convicted sex offenders sentenced to a probationary term, 
regardless of any individualized determination of their 
dangerousness or risk of reoffense."  At least for purposes of 
due process analysis, however, this is "a debate that has 
already been settled on the floor of the Legislature."  
Commonwealth v. Therriault, supra at 242.  In promulgating G. L. 
c. 265, § 47, the Legislature saw fit to impose GPS monitoring 
as a condition of probation even for those sex offenders 
convicted of noncontact offenses.  See Luk v. Commonwealth, 421 
Mass. 415, 429 (1995) (it is for Legislature to determine best 
means by which to address issues implicating public safety).  We 
cannot say that the Legislature's determination is without 
rational basis. 
 
ii.  Search and seizure.  We generally decline "to consider 
constitutional issues for the first time on appeal in order to 
avoid an unnecessary constitutional decision."  Beeler v. 
Downey, 387 Mass. 609, 613 n.4 (1982).  See Commonwealth v. 
15 
 
Raposo, supra at 743.  This is particularly so where "the record 
accompanying [constitutional claims] is lacking . . . in 
providing a basis for their intelligent resolution."  Gagnon, 
petitioner, 416 Mass. 775, 780 (1994), citing Commissioner of 
Correction v. McCabe, 410 Mass. 847, 850 n.7 (1991). 
 
While the defendant contends that the imposition of GPS 
monitoring constitutes an unreasonable search or seizure of his 
person, questions of reasonableness are necessarily fact-
dependent.  See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (in 
Fourth Amendment context, court must "slosh [its] way through 
the factbound morass of 'reasonableness'"); Commonwealth v. 
Krisco Corp., 421 Mass. 37, 42 (1995) (reasonableness inquiry in 
Fourth Amendment context "is highly dependent on the particular 
facts involved").  Here, neither the Commonwealth nor the 
defendant presented evidence concerning the details of the GPS 
monitoring to which the defendant is subject.  Absent such a 
record, we are unable to address the defendant's Fourth 
Amendment claims.  See Doe v. Doe, 378 Mass. 202, 203 (1979) 
("Where constitutional questions and matters of asserted public 
policy are raised, it is preferable to pass on the issues in 
light of a fully developed trial record rather than, as here, in 
the abstract"); Tardiff, petitioner, 328 Mass. 265, 267 (1952), 
quoting Atlantic Maritime Co. v. Gloucester, 228 Mass. 519, 522 
16 
 
(1917) (fact-finding duty "is not an appropriate function of a 
court of last resort"). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Where the defendant was sentenced to a 
probationary term for a predicate offense pursuant to G. L. 
c. 265, § 7, the sentencing judge was mandated to impose GPS 
monitoring as a condition of probation.  Because the 
Commonwealth's appeal is now moot, however, see note 1, supra, 
we remand the matter to the single justice for entry of a 
judgment dismissing the Commonwealth's petition pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.