Title: State v. Dimitri Henley
Citation: 2010 WI 97
Docket Number: 2008AP000697-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 21, 2010

2010 WI 97 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP697-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Dimitri Henley, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 21, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 20, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson   
 
JUDGE: 
Jacqueline R. Erwin   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J., join the 
dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by 
Katherine D. Lloyd, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there were briefs by Keith A. 
Findley, John A. Pray, Byron Lichstein, and the Frank J. 
Remington Center, University of Wisconsin Law School, Madison, 
and oral argument by Keith A. Findley. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Colleen D. Ball, first 
assistant state public defender, Nicholas L. Chiarkas, state 
public defender, and William J. Tyroler, assistant state public 
defender, Milwaukee, on behalf of the Office of the State Public 
Defender. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 97
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP697-CR  
(L.C. No. 
1998CF486) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Dimitri Henley, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 21, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Jefferson 
County, Jacqueline R. Erwin, Judge.  Reversed and cause 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This case comes before us on 
certification following the circuit court's order granting a new 
trial to Dimitri Henley eight years after his conviction of five 
counts of second degree sexual assault.  The court of appeals 
certified five questions1 to us regarding the authority of 
                                                 
1 For a listing of the questions posed to us by the court of 
appeals and our approach in answering them, see infra note 16. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
2 
 
Wisconsin courts to order a new trial in the interest of 
justice. 
¶2 
The facts of this case put the issues plainly into 
focus.  Following his conviction, Henley utilized the normal 
procedural mechanisms to seek a new trial on multiple grounds, 
including on the ground that the interest of justice required 
giving him a new trial because testimony that he viewed as 
crucial had not been presented.  He first filed a postconviction 
motion in the circuit court under Wis. Stat. § 974.02 (2007-08),2 
which was denied.  He appealed to the court of appeals under 
§ 974.02 and lost there too.  He then filed a petition for 
review in this court, which we denied.  After that, Henley filed 
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court; his 
petition was denied.  A year after that petition was denied, he 
filed a motion in federal court seeking relief from that denial, 
which was also denied.  Henley did not appeal his case to the 
Seventh Circuit. 
¶3 
Years later, after charges against his two co-
defendants had been dismissed, Henley moved for a new trial 
under Wis. Stat. § 805.15(1) in the interest of justice on the 
same grounds——the absence of the purportedly crucial testimony——
that had already been rejected by five different courts.   The 
same trial judge who presided over Henley's conviction and 
sentencing, and who rejected his original postconviction motion 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
3 
 
on the same grounds, this time granted him a new trial.  The 
State appealed, and the court of appeals certified the case to 
us.  Several important procedural questions await our review. 
¶4 
The first two issues concern whether and when certain 
provisions governing civil procedure in Wisconsin may be 
utilized by a convicted criminal defendant seeking a new trial.  
The second two issues relate to the inherent power of Wisconsin 
courts to order a new trial in the interest of justice.  The 
issues we address are as follows: 
1. 
May a circuit court award a new trial to a convicted 
criminal defendant in the interest of justice under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.15(1)? 
 
Relatedly, 
is 
such 
a 
challenge subject to the time limitations contained in 
Wis. Stat. § 805.16(1), or may a convicted criminal 
defendant file a motion for a new trial under 
§ 805.15(1) at any time?  
2. 
May a circuit court award a new trial to a convicted 
criminal defendant in the interest of justice under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(g) or (h)?   
3. 
Do Wisconsin circuit courts possess inherent authority 
to order a new trial in the interest of justice at any 
time for a convicted criminal defendant? 
4. 
Should this court exercise its inherent or statutory 
authority in this case to order a new trial in the 
interest of justice? 
¶5 
We hold that neither Wis. Stat. § 805.15(1) nor 
§ 806.07(1)(g) or (h) are available procedural mechanisms for a 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
4 
 
convicted criminal defendant to challenge his or her conviction 
or sentence.  We further hold that Wisconsin circuit courts do 
not have the inherent authority to order a new trial in the 
interest of justice when a case is not before the court under a 
proper procedural mechanism.  Therefore, the circuit court did 
not have the authority to order a new trial in this case.  
Finally, we decline to exercise our authority to order a new 
trial for Henley because his case was fully tried and justice 
has not miscarried.  Accordingly, the decision of the circuit 
court is reversed with instructions to deny Henley's motion for 
a new trial. 
I. FACTS 
¶6 
These facts are taken from Henley's second trial.3  
Testimony that would have contradicted some of these facts (but 
was not presented in Henley's trial) is explained later as 
needed. 
¶7 
S.E.S., an 18-year-old female freshman, had recently 
moved into the residence dorms of the University of Wisconsin-
Whitewater.  On the night of September 5, 1998, before classes 
had started, S.E.S. and her roommate, Heidi Sheets, returned to 
their dorm building from a party where each had drunk a few 
beers.  They first stopped in the dorm room of Shawn Demain, 
where they met Dimitri Henley, Jarrett Adams, and Rovaughn Hill, 
all of whom had traveled from Chicago to sell cologne. 
                                                 
3 Henley's first trial ended in a mistrial.  Further details 
of the complicated procedural history of this case are related 
in ¶¶11-27, infra. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
5 
 
¶8 
Around 1:00 a.m. on September 6, S.E.S. left to go to 
her room.  S.E.S. testified that she walked up to her room 
alone, but that after she entered her room, she turned and was 
surprised by Henley, Adams, and Hill.  Sheets testified that she 
and S.E.S. invited all three men up to her room, and that they 
left together (although the plan was for Sheets to visit a 
friend and join them 20-30 minutes later). 
¶9 
Once in the room, one of the men put on a CD, and 
Adams began to dance with S.E.S. and fondle her breasts and 
groin, even though she told him to stop.  Henley danced with and 
fondled her as well.  Hill then pulled S.E.S. over to Sheets' 
bed and pulled his pants down.  At this point, Sheets entered 
the room and saw Hill with his pants down.  Sheets assumed that 
S.E.S. was performing or was going to perform oral sex.  Hill 
then said "Do you want some of this, baby?" and Sheets ran out.  
S.E.S. followed, unrestrained by the men, and tried to talk to 
Sheets.  But Sheets refused to speak with her, at one point 
calling her a "slut." 
¶10 S.E.S. went back down the hallway to leave the floor 
via a staircase, but Hill blocked her path and "directed" her 
back to her room, although he did not force her to do so.  Adams 
then told her to lay on the floor, which she did.  Adams tried 
to take her pants and underwear off, which she resisted at 
first, and then permitted.  Over the next several minutes, 
S.E.S. engaged in three acts of vaginal intercourse, though she 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
6 
 
did not know who those acts were with.4  While one of the other 
men was having sex with S.E.S., one of the men rubbed his penis 
on her face, trying to get her to perform oral sex, which she 
did not do.  This happened a second time when another of the 
sexual acts was taking place.  The three men left immediately 
after the assault, and S.E.S. called her new boyfriend, who 
consoled her and eventually convinced her to go to the hospital 
and report the sexual assaults. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶11 The procedural history of this case is unusually 
complex, and vital to understanding the issues in this case, so 
we relate it in detail. 
¶12 On December 1, 1998, the State charged Henley, Hill, 
and Adams each with five counts of first degree sexual assault, 
one count of second degree sexual assault, and one count of 
false imprisonment, all as party to a crime.  After a three-day 
jury trial beginning on August 24, 1999, the State moved to 
amend the charges, which the court granted.5  The defendants 
responded by moving for a mistrial, which the court also 
granted. 
                                                 
4 At some time before the vaginal intercourse, S.E.S. 
received a phone call in her room from a friend and talked with 
her for about five minutes without mentioning that anything was 
wrong.  It is unclear precisely when this happened relative to 
the other events. 
5 The State moved to reduce all five first degree sexual 
assault counts to second degree, the second degree count to 
fourth degree, and to remove "aided and abetted by" language 
from each of the sexual assault counts. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
7 
 
¶13 After this, the State proceeded to try the defendants 
again.  Hill, but not the other two defendants, moved for 
dismissal on double jeopardy grounds.  The court denied the 
motion, and Hill appealed.  The court of appeals ordered Hill's 
case stayed pending appeal, and the circuit court, on the 
State's motion, severed Hill's case so that trial could proceed 
against Henley and Adams. 
¶14 The case against Henley and Adams went to trial on 
February 8, 2000, wherein the facts noted above were adduced.  
The jury found both men guilty of five counts each of second 
degree sexual assault.  Henley was sentenced to five concurrent 
sentences of 20 years each (in effect, a 20-year sentence).6 
¶15 With the aid of new postconviction counsel, Henley 
moved for postconviction relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.02.7  
Among the grounds Henley alleged for dismissal was that his 
trial counsel was constitutionally deficient. 
¶16 During this time, Hill's appeal was unsuccessful and 
he was retried on February 12, 2001.  The trial resulted in a 
hung jury with 11 jurors voting for acquittal and one holding 
out for conviction.  During that trial, Hill testified on his 
                                                 
6 Adams was sentenced to three concurrent sentences of 20 
years each and two concurrent sentences of eight years each to 
be served consecutive to the three 20-year sentences.  The court 
explained that the difference in sentencing was due to Adams' 
anger and lack of remorse. 
7 Under Wis. Stat. § 974.02 and § (Rule) 809.30(2)(b), 
defendants may file postconviction motions for relief up to 20 
days after sentencing. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
8 
 
own behalf.  He also called Shawn Demain, the resident of the 
dorm room where S.E.S. first met the defendants, as a witness.  
Demain testified that of the three African-American men that 
visited his dorm room that night, two of them left with S.E.S. 
and Sheets, while the third remained and played video games for 
20-30 minutes before departing.8  Demain further testified that 
at some point later that evening, he saw S.E.S. and the 
defendants together outside in the smoking area. 
¶17 After learning of Hill's partial success, Henley 
amended his § 974.02 postconviction motion to allege that his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to call Demain. 
¶18 The State attempted to try Hill a third time on May 7, 
2001, but on the second day of trial the State moved to dismiss 
the case with prejudice based on newly-discovered evidence, 
including notes written by a police investigator regarding her 
conversation with Hill.9  The charges against Hill were then 
dropped. 
                                                 
8 This testimony is in accordance with Sheets' testimony 
that the men were invited by her and S.E.S. to their room, and 
conflicts with S.E.S.'s version of events.  However, the 
testimony conflicts with Sheets' and S.E.S.'s testimony that all 
three of the men left Demain's room at the same time. 
9 The investigator's notes indicate that Hill told her that 
while S.E.S., Sheets, Henley, and Hill went upstairs together, 
Adams 
remained 
downstairs, 
joining 
them 
later. 
 
This 
corroborates Demain's testimony that one of the defendants 
remained downstairs playing video games.  Hill also told the 
investigator that S.E.S. and the three defendants had rolled 
marijuana joints in S.E.S.'s room and had gone downstairs to 
smoke them before going back upstairs to S.E.S.'s room. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
9 
 
¶19 After being provided with this previously undisclosed 
evidence, Henley amended his postconviction motion a second time 
to include a claim that a new trial ought to be granted in the 
interest of justice on the grounds that the real controversy of 
S.E.S.'s credibility had not been tried.  He rested in part on 
the content of Demain's testimony and the fact that his trial 
counsel had not called Demain to testify.  On October 2, 2001, 
the circuit court denied Henley's postconviction motion.  It 
held in relevant part that Henley's counsel was not ineffective, 
but rather chose a reasonable trial strategy in not "bullying" a 
sympathetic witness with minor inconsistencies and in presenting 
a witness-less defense.  It further held that a new trial in the 
interest of justice was not warranted because there was not a 
substantial likelihood of acquittal. 
¶20 Adams 
(who 
had 
likewise 
been 
unsuccessful 
in 
postconviction motions) and Henley appealed separately and the 
court of appeals affirmed each case in unpublished decisions.10  
Henley and Adams each petitioned this court for review.  While 
review was pending, Henley filed a Wis. Stat. § 974.0611 motion 
in the circuit court.  The circuit court granted no relief 
because it had no jurisdiction pending the outcome of the 
petition for review filed in this court.  We denied Henley's 
                                                 
10 State v. Henley, No. 2008AP697, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2002); State v. Adams, No. 2002AP39, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2002). 
11 A detailed discussion of § 974.06 is contained in ¶¶50-
54, infra. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
10 
 
petition for review on January 14, 2003, and Adams' petition for 
review on January 21, 2003.  
¶21 On May 12, 2003, Henley filed a pro se petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Wisconsin.  He based his petition on 
multiple grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel 
for failing to call Demain and that he was entitled to a new 
trial in the interest of justice——the same claims asserted in 
his postconviction motion and appeal (and the same claims here).  
The district court dismissed the petition on June 17, 2003.  A 
year later, Henley filed another motion with the district court 
seeking relief from that denial; the district court denied the 
motion.  Henley did not appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals. 
¶22 In April 2004, Adams filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus12 in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin with the assistance of the 
Wisconsin Innocence Project.13  The district court dismissed his 
petition on January 11, 2005.  Unlike Henley, Adams appealed his 
dismissal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 
¶23 On June 30, 2006, the Seventh Circuit ruled in Adams' 
favor.  Adams v Bertrand, 453 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 2006).  It held 
                                                 
12 The record is unclear as to why Adams' habeas corpus 
petition was filed so much later than Henley's. 
13 Henley, who filed his habeas corpus petition a year 
earlier than Adams, had requested assistance from the Wisconsin 
Innocence Project, but did not receive assistance. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
11 
 
that Adams' counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing 
to investigate and call Demain as a witness.  Id. at 437.  The 
court explained that Demain could have resolved a discrepancy 
between S.E.S. and Sheets regarding whether Sheets and S.E.S. 
invited the defendants to their room.  Id.  The court also found 
great relevance in Demain's testimony in Hill's trial that he 
saw S.E.S. and the three men in a smoking area outside the dorm 
room later that night.  Id.  These things, the court explained, 
went right to the heart of the issue of consent.  Id.  The court 
held that counsel could not have made an informed choice about 
trial strategy without first investigating Demain.  Id. 
¶24 Turning to the prejudice prong of the ineffective 
assistance analysis, the court held that had Demain testified, 
there was "a reasonable probability that the outcome of Adams's 
trial would be different."  Id. at 438.  Specifically, the court 
believed 
that 
Demain's 
testimony 
would 
have 
critically 
undermined 
S.E.S.'s 
version 
of 
events 
and 
impugned 
her 
credibility.  Id.  The court also took notice of the hung jury 
in and eventual dismissal of Hill's case, in which Demain had 
testified.  Id. 
¶25 Following the Seventh Circuit's decision, the State 
dismissed all charges against Adams. 
¶26 Henley learned of Adams' success in federal court, and 
on November 5, 2007, he filed a motion for a new trial in the 
interest of justice under Wis. Stat. § 805.15(1)14 based on the 
                                                 
14 A detailed discussion of § 805.15(1) is contained in Part 
III.A., infra. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
12 
 
same claims that had already been rejected.15  On February 7, 
2008, the circuit court——still presided over by the same judge 
who oversaw his trial and denied his earlier postconviction 
motions——granted Henley a new trial, finding that the Seventh 
Circuit's decision in the Adams case showed that "the issue of 
consent, the real controversy, was not fully tried."  It also 
held that a motion for a new trial in the interest of justice 
under 
§ 805.15(1) 
is 
not 
restricted 
by 
the 
20-day 
time 
limitation set forth in Wis. Stat. § 805.16(1). 
¶27 The State appealed the decision, and the court of 
appeals certified the case to this court.16  We accepted the 
certification. 
                                                 
15 At this point, Henley was represented by the Wisconsin 
Innocence Project. 
16  The five questions certified by the court of appeals 
were:  
1) whether the circuit court is permitted to grant a 
new trial in the interest of justice under Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.15(1) without time limit; 
2) if it is not, whether the circuit court has 
inherent authority to grant this relief; 
3) if it does not, whether [the court of appeals] may 
use its power of discretionary reversal under Wis. 
Stat. § 752.35 to reach back to the original judgment 
of conviction and grant the same relief; 
4) if it does not, whether [the court of appeals] has 
inherent authority to grant such relief; and 
5) if it does not, whether the supreme court should 
exercise its inherent authority to grant relief in 
this case. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
13 
 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶28 Under Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(3), by accepting the 
certified appeal, this court acquires jurisdiction of the entire 
appeal, not merely the questions certified.  Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Golke, 2009 WI 81, ¶18, 319 Wis. 2d 397, 768 
N.W.2d 729. 
¶29 This case requires the court to decide the judicial 
authority of the circuit court and to interpret various statutes 
relating to judicial authority.  The issue of judicial authority 
is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.  State v. 
McClaren, 2009 WI 69, ¶14, 318 Wis. 2d 739, 767 N.W.2d 550.  
Likewise, the interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
that this court reviews de novo, but benefiting from the 
analysis of the prior courts.  Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal Pra, 
2009 WI 76, ¶18, 319 Wis. 2d 274, 767 N.W.2d 898. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
¶30 This 
case 
raises 
several 
interesting 
questions 
regarding the interaction between post-trial civil and criminal 
procedure, as well as regarding the inherent authority of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Because we conclude that the district court does not have the 
power to order a new trial under these facts, we need not 
address the power of the court of appeals; its jurisdiction is 
appellate and is premised on a valid suit in the circuit court.  
Thus, we have chosen not to address the third and fourth 
questions certified to us.  We do, however, address one 
additional issue raised by Henley for the first time before this 
court regarding ordering a new trial for Henley on the basis of 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(g) or (h). 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
14 
 
courts.  We will address these issues as they arise in the 
context of Henley's claims in this case. 
¶31 Henley asks that the circuit court's award of a new 
trial in the interest of justice be upheld on any of three 
bases: (1) Wis. Stat. § 805.15(1); (2) Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(g) 
or (h); or (3) the circuit court's inherent authority.  In 
essence, Henley suggests that a circuit court has inherent and 
statutory authority to grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice to a convicted criminal defendant regardless of the 
case's procedural posture, regardless of how many times the same 
issues have been litigated, and regardless of how many years may 
have passed since the defendant's conviction.  In the event that 
we reject Henley's arguments for the circuit court's authority 
(which we do), Henley asks that we use our inherent or statutory 
authority to grant him a new trial. 
¶32 In Part A, we analyze whether the circuit court had 
authority to order a new trial in the interest of justice under 
Wis. Stat. § 805.15(1).  We conclude that § 805.15(1) is not an 
available procedural mechanism for Henley to seek a new trial.  
In Part B, we examine whether the circuit court's award of a new 
trial 
can 
be 
upheld 
alternatively 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.07(1)(g) or (h).  Again, we conclude that these provisions 
are not available to Henley.  In Part C, we address whether 
Wisconsin circuit courts possess inherent authority apart from 
any statutory or common law procedural mechanism to order a new 
trial at any time for any criminal defendant.  We conclude that 
they do not.  Finally, in Part D, we address, in the exercise of 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
15 
 
our statutory authority, whether Henley is entitled to a new 
trial in the interest of justice.  We ultimately conclude that 
Henley is not entitled to a new trial. 
A. Wisconsin Stat. § 805.15(1) 
¶33 Henley 
first 
urges 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
had 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 805.15(1) to grant him a new trial.  
He argues both that § 805.15(1) provides statutory grounds for a 
circuit court to order a new trial in the interest of justice 
for criminal defendants, and that such a motion may be brought 
at any time because the time limits governing such motions in 
§ 805.16(1) are inapplicable in criminal cases. 
¶34 The State agrees that § 805.15(1) is a proper vehicle 
for criminal defendants to seek a new trial in the interest of 
justice.  However, it maintains that any such motion must be 
brought 
within 
20 
days 
following 
conviction 
pursuant 
to 
§ 805.16(1). 
¶35 In its amicus brief, the Office of the State Public 
Defender argues that neither § 805.15(1) nor § 805.16(1) are 
applicable to criminal cases; these govern new trials in the 
interest of justice in only civil cases.17 
¶36 Thus, the question is whether § 805.15(1) is a proper 
statutory vehicle for criminal defendants seeking a new trial in 
                                                 
17 The amicus brief from the Office of the State Public 
Defender nonetheless urges us to affirm the circuit court's 
award of a new trial, but on the grounds of the circuit court's 
inherent authority. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
16 
 
the interest of justice, and if it is, whether such a motion is 
governed by the time restrictions in § 805.16(1). 
¶37 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.15(1) provides: 
Motion.  A party may move to set aside a verdict and 
for a new trial because of errors in the trial, or 
because the verdict is contrary to law or to the 
weight of evidence, or because of excessive or 
inadequate damages, or because of newly-discovered 
evidence, or in the interest of justice.  (Emphasis 
added.) 
¶38 Wisconsin 
Stat. § 805.16 is entitled, "Time for 
motions after verdict."  It provides in relevant part: 
(1) Motions after verdict shall be filed and served 
within 20 days after the verdict is rendered, unless 
the court, within 20 days after the verdict is 
rendered, sets a longer time by an order specifying 
the 
dates 
for 
filing 
motions, 
briefs 
or 
other 
documents. 
¶39 We 
agree 
with 
the 
State 
Public 
Defender 
that 
§ 805.15(1) does not provide statutory grounds for a criminal 
defendant to seek a new trial in the interest of justice.  We 
reach this conclusion because: (1) the text of § 805.15(1) 
suggests that it applies to civil cases only; (2) the text of 
§ 805.16(1) suggests that the 20-day time limit applies to 
motions under § 805.15(1), but such a time limit is absurd in 
the criminal context; (3) §§ 974.02 and 974.06, by their terms, 
provide the primary statutory means of postconviction, appeal, 
and post-appeal relief for criminal defendants, and allowing 
motions under § 805.15(1) renders these provisions irrelevant; 
and (4) the statutory history of §§ 805.15, 805.16, and 974.02 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
17 
 
reveal that §§ 805.15(1) and 805.16(1) do not apply to criminal 
cases. 
¶40 First, § 805.15(1) provides textual clues that it does 
not apply to criminal cases.  This subsection refers to motions 
after "verdict."  In a criminal case, such motions are called 
"postconviction" motions.  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(1)(c) 
& (2)(a).  Additionally, § 805.15(1) refers to "excessive or 
inadequate damages" as one of the grounds for a motion.  Such a 
motion would apply only in civil cases.  While not dispositive, 
these textual clues support our conclusion that § 805.15(1) does 
not apply to criminal defendants. 
¶41 Second, the text of § 805.16(1) makes clear that it 
applies to motions made under § 805.15(1).  The time limits in 
§ 805.16(1) apply to "[m]otions after verdict."  A motion "for a 
new trial . . . in the interest of justice" under § 805.15(1) 
is, by definition, a motion after the verdict.  If this does not 
make it plain enough, § 805.16(4) states that the 20-day post-
verdict time limit in § 805.16(1) does not apply to motions for 
a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  Newly 
discovered evidence is one of the motions, along with a new 
trial in the interest of justice, authorized by § 805.15(1).  In 
other words, by creating an exception, the statute clearly 
assumes that a motion for a new trial because of newly 
discovered evidence authorized by § 805.15(1) is a motion after 
the verdict and would otherwise be governed by the 20-day time 
limit. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
18 
 
¶42 Henley does not appear to dispute this textual 
evidence limiting motions under § 805.15(1) to those filed 
within the time limits specified in § 805.16(1).  Rather, Henley 
points to § 972.11(1), which states that civil rules apply to 
criminal cases "unless the context of a section or rule 
manifestly requires a different construction."  Henley maintains 
that the 20-day time limit in § 805.16(1) cannot apply to 
motions under § 805.15(1) in the criminal context because such a 
construction would be absurd.  The statute, Henley recognizes, 
requires motions after verdict to be filed and served within 20 
days after the "verdict" is rendered.  But Henley points out 
that in criminal cases, the verdict is not the end of the case; 
sentencing still must follow.  This means that a motion for a 
new trial in the interest of justice would, in many cases, need 
to be filed before the sentence has been imposed and before 
appellate counsel has even been appointed.  This would create 
piecemeal consideration of postconviction issues, and if a 
§ 805.15(1) 
motion 
were 
raised, 
might 
foreclose 
the 
consideration of issues before a full review of the case by 
appellate counsel.  The State's position, Henley argues, simply 
does not make sense. 
¶43 We agree with Henley that the State's interpretation 
of the statute does not work.  However, neither does Henley's.  
Henley argues that the time limits, clearly applicable in the 
civil context, do not apply in the criminal context.  Rather, 
under Henley's approach, § 805.15(1) is available to criminal 
defendants without a time limit!  This cannot be, either. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
19 
 
¶44 Henley should not be looking to the civil statutes for 
guidance regarding his postconviction options.  The legislature 
has already created § 974.02 and § 974.06, which, by their 
terms, provide the primary statutory means of postconviction 
relief for criminal defendants.  See State ex rel. Coleman v. 
McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, ¶16, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714 N.W.2d 900 
(noting 
that 
a 
convicted 
criminal 
defendant 
may 
seek 
postconviction relief with a postconviction motion and direct 
appeal under § 974.02 and §  (Rule) 809.30, and may collaterally 
attack his conviction under § 974.06 or via a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus). 
¶45 Chapter 974 of the Wisconsin Statutes is entitled, 
"Criminal Procedure——Appeals, New Trials and Writs of Error."  
Thus, 
although 
civil 
procedural 
mechanisms 
exist, 
the 
legislature 
has 
specifically 
created 
a 
separate 
chapter 
governing criminal procedure. 
¶46 Within that chapter, § 974.02 applies to, as its title 
states, "[a]ppeals and postconviction relief in criminal cases."  
Subsection (1) states in relevant part: 
A motion for postconviction relief other than under s. 
974.06 or 974.07(2) by the defendant in a criminal 
case shall be made in the time and manner provided in 
s. 809.30.  An appeal by the defendant in a criminal 
case from a judgment of conviction or from an order 
denying a postconviction motion or from both shall be 
taken in the time and manner provided in ss. 808.04(3) 
and 809.30.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶47 The language here is exclusive and unequivocal.  With 
the exception of motions under § 974.06 (discussed below) or 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
20 
 
under § 974.07(2) (relating to DNA testing), a motion for 
postconviction relief by a criminal defendant "shall be" 
governed by § (Rule) 809.30.  Similarly, an appeal by a criminal 
defendant from a judgment of conviction or denial of a 
postconviction motion or both "shall be" governed by § 808.04(3) 
and § (Rule) 809.30.  Section 808.04(3) states, "Except as 
provided in subs. (4) and (7), an appeal in a proceeding under 
s. 971.17, a criminal case, or a case under ch. 48, 51, 55, 938, 
or 980 shall be initiated within the time period specified in s. 
809.30(2) or 809.32(2), whichever is applicable."  (Emphasis 
added.)  Subsection (4) applies to appeals by the State, and 
subsection (7) relates to adoption orders.  Section (Rule) 
809.32 applies only to no-merit reports.  In other words, 
§ 974.02 states that postconviction relief and appeals by 
criminal defendants like Henley "shall be" governed by § (Rule) 
809.30. 
¶48 Section 
(Rule) 
809.30 
establishes 
very 
specific 
procedures and time limitations for pursuing postconviction 
relief.  It delineates procedures and deadlines for giving 
notice of intent to move for postconviction relief or appeal.18  
It also gives instructions for creating the record19 and securing 
appointment of counsel.20  Section (Rule) 809.30(2) makes clear 
                                                 
18 Notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief must be 
made within 20 days after sentencing.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.30(2)(b). 
19 See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(e)-(g). 
20 See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(d)-(e). 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
21 
 
that persons seeking postconviction relief——defined in § (Rule) 
809.30(1)(c) as an appeal or a motion for postconviction relief—
—"shall comply with this section." 
¶49 Thus, § 974.02 and § (Rule) 809.30 indicate that 
convicted 
criminal 
defendants 
wishing 
to 
challenge 
their 
conviction through a postconviction motion, appeal, or both, 
must abide by these sections. 
¶50 Similarly, § 974.06 provides the primary statutory 
mechanism for convicted criminal defendants "[a]fter the time 
for appeal or postconviction remedy provided in s. 974.02 has 
expired."  Section 974.06(1) provides: 
After the time for appeal or postconviction remedy 
provided in s. 974.02 has expired, a prisoner in 
custody under sentence of a court or a person 
convicted and placed with a volunteers in probation 
program under s. 973.11 claiming the right to be 
released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed 
in 
violation 
of 
the 
U.S. 
constitution 
or 
the 
constitution or laws of this state, that the court was 
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that 
the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized 
by law or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, 
may move the court which imposed the sentence to 
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 
¶51 Section 974.06 was created in 1969.  According to the 
annotations, the section "represents the first Wisconsin attempt 
at a comprehensive post-conviction statute which will afford an 
all 
encompassing 
remedy 
for 
defendants 
challenging 
their 
convictions."  (Emphasis added.)  This statute was "designed to 
replace habeas corpus as the primary method in which a defendant 
can attack his conviction after the time for appeal has 
expired."  State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 176, 517 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
22 
 
N.W.2d 157 (1994) (quoting Howard B. Eisenberg, Post-Conviction 
Remedies in the 1970's, 56 Marq. L. Rev. 69, 79 (1972)).  The 
goal of § 974.06 was to create a comprehensive strategy that 
involved: 
(1) providing a single, unitary, postconviction remedy 
to be used in place of all other state remedies 
(except direct review); (2) providing a remedy for all 
grounds for attacking the validity of a conviction or 
sentence in a criminal case; and (3) requiring a 
defendant to present all of his or her claim(s) for 
attack on a conviction or sentence in his or her 
initial postconviction proceeding, unless there exists 
a sufficient reason why the claim(s) were not raised 
in the initial proceeding. 
State v. Lo, 2003 WI 107, ¶20, 264 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 756.  
Since its adoption, the substantive portions of § 974.06 have 
remained unchanged, except for the addition in 1977 that 
§ 974.06 is only available "[a]fter the time for appeal or 
postconviction remedy provided in s. 974.02 has expired." 
¶52 After a convicted criminal defendant's rights under 
§ 974.02 have been exhausted, the primary method of challenging 
a conviction is § 974.06.  We have stated that a § 974.06 motion 
"is 
limited in scope to matters of jurisdiction or of 
constitutional dimensions.  The motion must not be used to raise 
issues disposed of by a previous appeal."  Peterson v. State, 54 
Wis. 2d 370, 381, 195 N.W.2d 837 (1972).  We have further 
explained that issues cannot form the basis for a § 974.06 
motion unless a "sufficient reason" exists for the failure to 
allege or adequately raise the issue on appeal or in a previous 
§ 974.06 motion.  Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 181—82.   
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
23 
 
¶53 Section 974.06, then, was clearly designed to be the 
primary statutory vehicle21 for a convicted criminal defendant to 
challenge his confinement following the exhaustion of his 
postconviction and appeal rights under § 974.02.  The goal of 
this statute, a goal central to the fair and efficient 
administration of justice, is finality.  Escalona-Naranjo, 185 
Wis. 2d at 185 ("We need finality in our litigation."). 
¶54 In § 974.02, the legislature has created a process 
where 
claims 
must 
be 
raised 
immediately 
through 
the 
postconviction and/or appeals process.22  Then, once this process 
is finished, a limited right of review exists pursuant to 
§ 974.06 to challenge the conviction on the grounds that it 
violates the state or federal constitution, that the court 
lacked jurisdiction, or that the sentence was in excess of the 
                                                 
21 Outside of § 974.06, defendants may still file the 
following: 
(1) a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court 
(28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000)); 
(2) a writ of error coram nobis (see Jessen v. State, 95 
Wis. 2d 207, 290 N.W.2d 685 (1980)); 
(3) a state habeas petition challenging the effectiveness 
of postconviction counsel (see State ex rel. Rothering v. 
McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 556 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1996)); 
and 
(4) 
a 
petition 
challenging 
his 
appellate 
attorney's 
effectiveness (see State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 
N.W.2d 540 (1992)). 
22 A separate statute governs appeals by the State.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 974.05. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
24 
 
law or is subject to collateral attack on some other basis.  
Such claims, of course, are subject to the procedural bar 
articulated in Escalona-Naranjo. 
¶55 Allowing motions in the interest of justice under 
§ 805.15(1) at any time renders limitations under § 974.02 and 
§ 974.06 irrelevant.  These statutes would make no sense if 
motions under § 805.15(1) could be brought at any time.  No 
criminal defendant would limit themselves to bringing a motion 
under § 974.06, for example, if the broader grounds in § 805.15 
were always available, no matter how many times a motion on 
those same grounds had been brought, and no matter how long it 
had been since the conviction.  Henley's construction of 
§ 805.15(1) and § 805.16(1), then, which would allow convicted 
criminals to bring a motion for a new trial whenever they want, 
is plainly unreasonable.  Indeed, the context of § 805.15(1) 
manifestly requires a different construction than the one 
offered by Henley.  See § 972.11(1). 
¶56 Finally, the statutory history of §§ 805.15, 805.16, 
974.02, and (Rule) 809.30 make clear that §§ 805.15(1) and 
805.16(1) do not apply to criminal cases. 
¶57 Before 1975, the Wisconsin Statutes had separate, 
nearly identical provisions governing motions for new trials.  
Section 270.49(1) (1971-72) governed motions for new trials in 
civil cases.  It provided: 
Motion for new trial. (1) A party may move to set 
aside a verdict and for a new trial because of errors 
in the trial or because the verdict is contrary to law 
or to the evidence, or for excessive or inadequate 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
25 
 
damages or in the interest of justice; but such motion 
must be made and heard within 2 months after the 
verdict is rendered. 
Section 270.50 (1971-72) provided separate grounds for a new 
trial in the event of newly discovered evidence; such a motion 
was required to be made within one year of the verdict or 
finding. 
¶58 Section 974.02(1) (1971-72), on the other hand, was 
the analogous and nearly identical provision covering criminal 
cases: 
New trial. (1) In felonies,23 a defendant may move in 
writing or with the consent of the state on the record 
to set aside a judgment of conviction and for a new 
trial in the interest of justice, or because of error 
in the trial or because of error in the jury 
instructions, or because the judgment of conviction is 
not supported by the evidence or is contrary to law, 
or based on newly discovered evidence; but such motion 
must be made, heard and decided within 90 days after 
the judgment of conviction is entered.  (Emphasis and 
footnote added.) 
Thus, this criminal procedure statute expressly provided for a 
new trial in the interest of justice.  Such a motion was 
required to be heard and decided within 90 days of the judgment 
of conviction. 
¶59 In 1975, § 270.49 and § 270.50 were rewritten and 
relocated. 
 
Two 
new 
statutes 
were 
created——§ 805.15 
and 
§ 805.16.  The Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974, to 
§ 805.15 stated its purpose: "The first sentence of sub.(1) 
restates the grounds on which new trials have been allowed in 
                                                 
23 Misdemeanor appeals were separately governed by Wis. 
Stat. § 974.01 (1971-72). 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
26 
 
Wisconsin under ss. 270.49-.50."  The new § 805.15 did not 
contain the time limitations for such motions; these were placed 
in 
the new § 805.16.  These statutes continued to use 
substantially the same language from the old § 270.49, basing 
the opportunity and time frame for such motions on the verdict. 
¶60 At the same time it made these changes to civil post-
verdict procedure, the legislature left untouched the analogous 
passage in § 974.02.  It still provided for motions for a new 
trial in the interest of justice, among other reasons, and 
retained the requirement that such motions be "made, heard and 
decided within 90 days after the judgment of conviction is 
entered," unless extended.  § 974.02 (1975-76). 
¶61 Thus, the statutory history makes clear that § 805.15 
was not intended to apply to criminal appeals, and that the 
legislature retained separate (though similar) processes and 
grounds for criminal appeals in § 974.02. 
¶62 The legislature acted again in 1977 to revise the 
criminal code.  It made several changes, including changes to 
§ 974.02.  The new version provided that criminal appeals and 
motions for postconviction relief in felony cases (along with 
several other violations) were required to "be taken in the time 
and manner provided in ss. 809.30 and 809.40."  Sections (Rule) 
809.30 and (Rule) 809.40 were newly created sections, the former 
applying to felony criminal cases, among other things, and the 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
27 
 
latter applying to misdemeanors.24  Left out of the new version 
of 
§ 974.02 
were 
the 
various 
grounds 
for 
appeal 
or 
postconviction relief, including a new trial in the interest of 
justice.  The legislative history does not indicate why the 
legislature 
removed 
these 
stated 
grounds. 
 
Though 
the 
legislature made minor wording variations in the intervening 
years, 
§§ 805.15(1), 
805.16(1), 
and 
974.02 
have 
remained 
substantially the same since the 1977 revisions. 
¶63 This 
raises 
the 
question——can 
convicted 
criminal 
defendants still seek a new trial in the interest of justice?  
The answer is certainly yes.  The elimination of the specific 
grounds for relief in § 974.02 did not eliminate the right to 
seek postconviction relief on those grounds; those grounds are 
simply not itemized in the statute.  Motions for a new trial in 
the interest of justice are routinely brought during the 
postconviction motion and appeals process under § 974.02 and 
§ (Rule) 809.30.25  See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 135 Wis. 2d 453, 
455, 400 N.W.2d 502 (Ct. App. 1986) (as part of defendant's 
appeal, considering whether defendant was entitled to a new 
trial in the interest of justice); L. Michael Tobin & Patrick J. 
                                                 
24 The current version of § (Rule) 809.30 applies, with some 
exceptions, to all criminal cases, including misdemeanors.  See 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(a). 
25 For the reasons explained above, a motion for a new trial 
in the interest of justice under § 974.06 would not pass muster 
unless it involved one of the types of claims allowed by the 
statute, and unless it was associated with a more specific 
"sufficient reason" allowing it to pass the Escalona bar.  
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
28 
 
Devitt, 
Wisconsin 
Criminal 
Defense 
Manual, 
§ 9.11 
(2008) 
(stating that a motion for a new trial is generally part of 
postconviction practice under § (Rule) 809.30, and one of the 
grounds for such a motion is the interest of justice).  During 
the appellate process under § 974.02 and § (Rule) 809.30, 
defendants may also appeal to the discretionary power of the 
court of appeals to order a new trial in the interest of justice 
under § 752.35,26 and to our similar power in an appeal before 
this court under § 751.06. 
¶64 The confusion over this appears to be the reason why 
some courts have considered a criminal defendant's motion for a 
new trial in the interest of justice to be under § 805.15.  
Henley points, for example, to State v. Harp (Harp II), which 
affirmed the circuit court's discretionary authority to order a 
new trial in the interest of justice under § 805.15(1).  161 
Wis. 2d 773, 775, 469 N.W.2d 210 (Ct. App. 1991).  Importantly, 
the award of a new trial in the interest of justice in Harp II 
came in response to the defendant's motion for postconviction 
relief under § 974.02.  See State v. Harp (Harp I), 150 
Wis. 2d 861, 867, 443 N.W.2d 38 (Ct. App. 1989).  It was not a 
separate 
motion 
untethered 
from 
the 
normal 
criminal 
postconviction process (§ 974.02).  The court of appeals in Harp 
                                                 
26 The 
court 
of 
appeals' 
jurisdiction 
is 
primarily 
appellate, with original jurisdiction "only to issue prerogative 
writs."  Wis. Stat. § 752.01(1)-(2).  Therefore, a motion 
seeking a new trial under § 752.35 would have to occur during an 
appeal under Wis. Stat. § 974.02.  The text of § 752.35 also 
limits its applicability to "an appeal to the court of appeals." 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
29 
 
II rightly concluded that the circuit court may order a new 
trial in the interest of justice, and stated that the standard 
was identical to the standard outlined for the court of appeals 
in § 752.35.  Harp II, 161 Wis. 2d at 779.  The court's focus in 
that case was on the proper standard for a new trial in the 
circuit court in the interest of justice, not whether the motion 
was properly brought under § 805.15(1).  Other courts, including 
this court, have similarly construed a criminal defendant's 
motion for a new trial in the interest of justice during the 
postconviction and appeals process as one under § 805.15(1).  
See, e.g., State v. Vennemann, 180 Wis. 2d 81, 85-86, 508 
N.W.2d 404 (1993); State v. Williams, 2006 WI App 212, ¶10, 296 
Wis. 2d 834, 723 N.W.2d 719; State v. Bellows, 218 Wis. 2d 614, 
618, 582 N.W.2d 53 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Brewer, 195 
Wis. 2d 295, 311-12, 536 N.W. 2d 406 (Ct. App. 1995).  Other 
Wisconsin courts have recognized that motions under § 805.15(1) 
are not available to criminal defendants.  See, e.g., State v. 
Olson, No. 2009AP2894, unpublished slip op., ¶6 (Wis. Ct. App. 
May 18, 2010). 
¶65 We 
are 
aware 
of 
no 
Wisconsin 
court 
that 
has 
countenanced a motion by a criminal defendant for a new trial in 
the interest of justice under § 805.15(1) untethered from the 
normal postconviction motions and appeals process specified in 
§ 974.02 and § (Rule) 809.30.  We therefore make clear that  
criminal defendants may request a new trial in the interest of 
justice as part of their postconviction motions and appeal under 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
30 
 
§ 974.02 and § (Rule) 809.30.  Such motions should not be 
construed as motions under § 805.15(1). 
¶66 Accordingly, § 805.15(1) is not a proper vehicle for a 
criminal defendant to seek a new trial in the interest of 
justice.  Therefore, the circuit court erred in relying on this 
statute when it granted Henley a new trial. 
B. Wisconsin Stat. § 806.07 
¶67 Henley also argues that Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(g) and 
(h) are independent grounds upon which the circuit court's award 
of a new trial may be sustained.  Though it was not raised in 
the lower courts, we choose to address this argument as it was 
briefed by the parties and will assist in clarifying the law. 
¶68 Section 806.07(1) provides in relevant part: 
(1) On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court, subject to subs. (2) and (3) may relieve a 
party or legal representative from a judgment, order 
or stipulation for the following reasons: 
. . .  
(g) It is no longer equitable that the judgment should 
have prospective application; or 
(h) Any other reasons justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. 
Section 806.07(2) further provides that "[t]he motion shall be 
made within a reasonable time." 
¶69 Wisconsin law is clear that § 806.07(1)(g) applies 
only in equitable actions.  Nelson v. Taff, 175 Wis. 2d 178, 
187-88, 499 N.W.2d 685 (Ct. App. 1993).  This is a criminal 
action, not an equitable action, and therefore the circuit court 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
31 
 
does not have authority under this subsection to grant Henley a 
new trial. 
¶70 Section 806.07(1)(h) is a civil procedure statute, and 
is unavailable for many of the same reasons § 805.15(1) is 
unavailable. 
 
If 
convicted 
criminal 
defendants 
can 
use 
§ 806.07(1)(h) to challenge their conviction, why would they 
ever use §§ 974.02 and 974.06?  The answer is, they would not.  
Henley cites no cases holding that this provision is available 
for criminal defendants.27  Sections 974.02 and 974.06 were 
written 
to 
provide 
the 
primary 
statutory 
means 
of 
postconviction, appeal, and post-appeal relief for convicted 
criminal defendants.  See supra ¶¶44-55. 
¶71 The catch-all provisions in § 806.07(1)(g) and (h), 
then, cannot provide an alternative ground to uphold the circuit 
court's grant of a new trial to Henley. 
C. The Circuit Court's Inherent Authority 
¶72 Henley argues, and the dissent agrees, that even if 
the circuit court does not have authority under § 805.15(1) or 
§ 806.07, it nonetheless has inherent authority to order a new 
trial in the interest of justice without regard to time limits.  
Dissent, ¶128  The State agrees that circuit courts may order a 
                                                 
27 Henley does cite In Interest of H.N.T., 125 Wis. 2d 242, 
371 N.W.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1985), and our approval of it in State 
v. Vairin M., 2002 WI 96, ¶¶36-39, 255 Wis. 2d 137, 647 
N.W.2d 208.  But this court authorized § 806.07 motions only for 
reconsideration in juvenile cases regarding waiver into adult 
court.  See id., ¶¶38-39.  No cases hold that this provision is 
available for criminal defendants. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
32 
 
new trial in the interest of justice, but only if done through a 
proper procedural mechanism. 
¶73 It 
is 
beyond 
dispute 
that 
circuit 
courts 
have 
"inherent, implied and incidental powers."  State ex rel. 
Friedrich v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 192 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 
531 N.W.2d 32 (1995).  These powers are those that are necessary 
to enable courts to accomplish their constitutionally and 
legislatively mandated functions.  Id.  Wisconsin courts have 
generally exercised inherent authority in three areas: (1) to 
guard against actions that would impair the powers or efficacy 
of the courts or judicial system; (2) to regulate the bench and 
bar; and (3) to ensure the efficient and effective functioning 
of the court, and to fairly administer justice.  Sun Prairie v. 
Davis, 226 Wis. 2d 738, 749-50, 595 N.W.2d 635 (1999).  A court 
is understood to retain inherent powers when those powers are 
needed to "maintain [the courts'] dignity, transact their 
business, [and] accomplish the purposes of their existence."  
State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 536, 221 N.W. 603 (1928).  A 
power is inherent when it "is one without which a court cannot 
properly function."  State v. Braunsdorf, 98 Wis. 2d 569, 580, 
297 N.W.2d 808 (1980). 
¶74 Recognizing a circuit court's inherent authority to 
order a new trial in this case would unwisely broaden the scope 
of the circuit court's inherent powers.  As outlined above, we 
should only invoke inherent power when such power is necessary 
to the functioning of the court.  Recognizing inherent authority 
to order a new trial here, where Henley seeks another crack at 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
33 
 
the same arguments that failed earlier, would take us far beyond 
the more modest justifications for inherent authority.28  We 
would 
effectively 
be 
extending 
an 
ongoing 
invitation 
to 
litigants to keep asking the circuit courts to revisit the same 
arguments over and over again, with no stopping point, much less 
a sensible one. 
¶75 Put simply, the circuit court's authority to revisit 
old arguments must end somewhere.  While defendants deserve a 
                                                 
28 The dissent envisions a broad view of the circuit court's 
inherent power.  See dissent, ¶105.  As a practical matter, the 
dissent would hold that, not just for 10 years, but 20, 30, or 
50 years after a conviction, a defendant can bring the exact 
same claims already denied multiple times and obtain a new 
trial. 
The dissent draws support for this from dozens of cases——
notably, almost all of them decades old (the first five cases it 
cites, for example, are from 1972, 1913, 1942, 1965, and 1963, 
respectively).  See id.  Why is this? 
The reason is, early cases invoked inherent authority more 
often because the procedural rules governing courts were 
somewhere 
between 
non-existent 
and 
non-exhaustive. 
 
See 
generally Thomas O. Main, Judicial Discretion to Condition, 79 
Temp. L. Rev. 1075, 1111-15 (2006) (noting generally that the 
scope of a court's inherent authority is inversely related to 
the breadth of procedural statutes and rules the court is 
subject to).  As federal and state courts became subject to more 
comprehensive rules schemes, the need for inherent authority 
lessened.  Id.  The dissent fails to recognize the historical 
justifications 
for 
and 
evolution 
of 
a 
court's 
inherent 
authority. 
Because 
it 
glosses 
over 
the 
rationale 
for 
inherent 
authority, the dissent is led to propose a sweeping, all-
encompassing authority that effectively turns our criminal 
procedure statutes, including § 974.02 and § 974.06, into mere 
regulatory suggestions at best, and unconstitutional usurpations 
of judicial power at worst. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
34 
 
fair hearing, defendants do not deserve unlimited, duplicative 
hearings.  The fair administration of justice is not a license 
for courts, unconstrained by express statutory authority, to do 
whatever they think is "fair" at any given point in time.29  
Rather, any conception of the fair administration of justice 
must include the principle of finality.  Thus, while circuit 
courts do have inherent powers, we do not recognize a broad, 
                                                 
29 To support its expansive views of inherent authority, the 
dissent 
cites 
Article 
1, 
Section 
9 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  See dissent, ¶¶111, 115, 120-21.  This provision 
states in relevant part, "Every person is entitled to a certain 
remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may 
receive in his person, property, or character."  Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 9. 
But we have made clear that this provision does not entitle 
litigants to the remedy they desire, but only to their day in 
court.  Wiener v. J.C. Penney Co., 65 Wis. 2d 139, 222 
N.W.2d 149 (1974).  Here, Henley has more than had his day in 
court.  He forwards the exact same claims that were previously 
rejected by the circuit court, the court of appeals, this court, 
and the Western District of Wisconsin. 
Moreover, we have made clear that the legislature can 
impose "reasonable limitations upon the remedies available to 
parties."  Id. at 151.  The legislature has imposed reasonable 
limitations; it created § 974.06. 
Finally, we note that this court's unwarranted expansion of 
its own powers through Article 1, Section 9 has recently been 
checked.  In Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin held that this court's holding in Thomas v. Mallett, 
2005 WI 129, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701 N.W.2d 523, which created a 
new remedy under Article 1, Section 9, was arbitrary and 
irrational and violated the Fourteenth Amendment.  Gibson, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59378, slip op., *16-18 (E.D. Wis. June 15, 
2010).  Despite the dissent's broad description of our inherent 
authority, we simply do not have the authority to craft any 
remedy we want. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
35 
 
inherent power to order a new trial in the interest of justice 
at any time, unbound by concerns for finality and proper 
procedural mechanisms. 
¶76 Moreover, if a circuit court has the inherent power to 
order a new trial in the interest of justice at any time for any 
reason, including when the litigant has already raised the same 
claims (as is the case here), we must again ask——what would be 
the point of § 974.06?  No criminal defendant challenging his 
conviction following the postconviction motion and appeals 
process would limit themselves to the restrictive grounds and 
high bar in § 974.06.  Recognizing or granting a circuit court's 
inherent authority here would open the courts to claim after 
claim and render the restrictions in § 974.06 illusory. 
¶77 For these reason, we conclude that the circuit court 
did not have the inherent power to order a new trial for Henley 
in the interest of justice. 
D. Our Inherent and Statutory Authority 
¶78 Thus far, we have determined that the circuit court 
did not have authority to order a new trial for Henley in the 
interest of justice under § 805.15(1), § 806.07(1)(g) or (h), or 
under its inherent powers.  Its actions were not based on any 
legal authority. 
¶79 Henley asks that even if we do not recognize the 
circuit court's authority to act, we consider using our inherent 
or statutory authority to order a new trial for Henley in the 
interest of justice. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
36 
 
¶80 We decline to use our inherent authority in this case 
and instead choose to conduct our review under our broad 
statutory powers.  We have been given statutory authority to 
order a new trial under § 751.06.  That statute provides: 
Discretionary reversal. In an appeal in the supreme 
court, if it appears from the record that the real 
controversy has not been fully tried, or that it is 
probable that justice has for any reason miscarried, 
the court may reverse the judgment or order appealed 
from, regardless of whether the proper motion or 
objection appears in the record, and may direct the 
entry of the proper judgment or remit the case to the 
trial court for the entry of the proper judgment or 
for a new trial, and direct the making of such 
amendments in the pleadings and the adoption of such 
procedure 
in 
that 
court, 
not 
inconsistent 
with 
statutes or rules, as are necessary to accomplish the 
ends of justice. 
¶81 Under this authority, Henley may be awarded a new 
trial if "the real controversy has not been fully tried" or if 
"it is probable that justice has for any reason miscarried."  
Id.  The real controversy has not been fully tried when "the 
jury was erroneously not given the opportunity to hear important 
testimony that bore on an important issue of the case."  State 
v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 160, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996).  The 
court need not find a substantial probability of a different 
result to make this finding.  See State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 
119, ¶114 n.26, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 700 N.W.2d 98 (2005).  A 
miscarriage of justice occurs if a defendant can show a 
substantial probability of a different outcome.  State v. 
Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 400-01, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988). 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
37 
 
¶82 We conclude that the controversy here has been fully 
tried.  Henley's main assertion is that Demain's testimony 
should have been included at trial.  But we are not as persuaded 
as the Seventh Circuit that the absence of this evidence was so 
critical. 
 
Demain's 
testimony 
would 
have 
been 
largely 
duplicative of what Sheets related in her testimony regarding 
the circumstances of S.E.S. and the men going to their room.  It 
cannot be said that such evidence was not placed before the 
jury.  That Demain saw S.E.S. standing outside with the 
defendants at some unspecified time that evening, furthermore, 
is not critical.  Counsel for both defendants vigorously cross-
examined S.E.S. and challenged her credibility.  Although 
Demain's testimony may have added some benefit to that issue, we 
cannot say that her credibility was not tried to the jury.  
¶83 We also do not see a miscarriage of justice.  Demain's 
testimony would not, in our view, have created a substantial 
probability of a different result.  The fact of the Seventh 
Circuit's decision is revelatory of nothing new, and was 
essentially a disagreement with the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
in regard to the import of Demain's testimony.  Demain's 
testimony might have added some doubt regarding how many of the 
men accompanied her to her room, and whether they were invited.  
The import of S.E.S. possibly smoking with the men is difficult 
to ascertain because we do not know whether this was before or 
after the sexual assault.  While it is possible that Demain's 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
38 
 
testimony would have affected the outcome,30 we cannot say there 
is a substantial probability that this is so. 
¶84 To say Henley has had his day in court is an 
understatement; the circuit court, Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 
this court (by virtue of previously declining to take the case), 
and the U.S. District Court all reviewed the claim that Henley 
was entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice to permit 
Demain to testify.  Henley lost on all levels, and did not 
appeal to the Seventh Circuit.  Since those denials, nothing has 
changed regarding the underlying bases for Henley's efforts to 
secure a new trial.  Like the courts that reviewed and denied 
these claims previously, we do not believe that justice requires 
a new trial now. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶85 In cases like this, the temptation may arise for 
courts to create a new procedural protection or new remedy 
unfounded in the law to fit the facts of a very difficult case.  
But the old adage is still true——hard facts make bad law.  We 
choose to not make bad law. 
¶86 We hold that neither Wis. Stat. § 805.15(1) nor 
§ 806.07(1)(g) and (h) are available procedural mechanisms for a 
criminal defendant to challenge his or her conviction or 
sentence.  We further hold that circuit courts in Wisconsin do 
                                                 
30 We also note that the Seventh Circuit may have given more 
weight to the power of Demain's testimony in Hill's second trial 
(which resulted in a hung jury) than is warranted.  Hill himself 
testified in that trial, while Henley and Adams did not.  Thus, 
Demain's testimony may not explain any part of Hill's success. 
No. 
2008AP697-CR   
 
39 
 
not have the inherent authority to order a new trial in the 
interest of justice when a case is not before it under a proper 
procedural mechanism.  Therefore, the circuit court did not have 
the authority to order a new trial in this case.  Finally, we 
decline to exercise our authority to order a new trial for 
Henley because his case was fully tried and justice has not 
miscarried.  Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is 
reversed with instructions to deny Henley's motion for a new 
trial. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause remanded for entry of an order denying Henley's 
motion.
No.  2008AP697-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶87 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  Understanding 
the procedural background of this case is vital to understanding 
its importance. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶88 Dimitri Henley was one of three defendants charged 
with the sexual assault of a young student at the University of 
Wisconsin-Whitewater in 1998.  His first trial in 1999 ended in 
a mistrial.  His second trial in 2000 ended in a conviction of 
five counts of second-degree sexual assault. 
¶89 Henley's postconviction counsel was different from his 
trial counsel, and his postconviction counsel argued to the 
circuit 
court 
that 
Henley's 
trial 
counsel 
had 
provided 
ineffective assistance for failing to present testimony from 
Shawn Demain.  Henley's motion led to a Machner1 hearing, but the 
motion was denied. 
¶90 Henley then appealed.  Among the issues argued to the 
court of appeals was that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to call Shawn Demain as a witness for the defendant at 
trial.  The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. 
¶91 Henley petitioned this court for review, but his 
petition was denied. 
¶92 Henley filed a pro se motion pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06 in late 2002.  It was denied, and he did not appeal. 
                                                 
1 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No.  2008AP697-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
¶93 He then petitioned the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Wisconsin for a writ of habeas 
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  The court denied relief, and 
Henley did not appeal. 
¶94 Considering this background, Henley is similar to 
hundreds, if not thousands, of other criminal defendants in 
Wisconsin who have filed successive postconviction motions in an 
effort to overturn their convictions.  His case is different 
only because his two co-defendants are not behind bars: Rovaughn 
Hill was never convicted and Jarrett Adams's conviction was 
overturned by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit. 
¶95 Henley has always claimed that the sexual contact for 
which he was convicted was consensual, but the essence of his 
claim now is that he has not been treated the same as his two 
co-defendants and deserves a new trial. 
POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
¶96 A defendant, of course, has the right to appeal a 
criminal conviction.  Apart from the appeal, the defendant may 
file a whole host of motions after verdict in an effort to 
secure a new trial. 
¶97 Wisconsin 
Stat. § 974.02 governs motions in the 
immediate aftermath of the trial.  This is the time for a 
defendant to make motions for a new trial in the interest of 
justice.  A defendant also may seek a discretionary reversal 
under Wis. Stat. §§ 751.06 (supreme court) or 752.35 (court of 
appeals) on direct appeal. 
No.  2008AP697-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
¶98 When the time for appeal or the postconviction remedy 
provided in Wis. Stat. § 974.02 has expired, a defendant may 
seek relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  However, there is no 
authority for the circuit court to grant a new trial in the 
interest of justice under § 974.06.  This statute narrows the 
grounds for relief.  Wis. Stat. § 974.06(1).  Moreover, if 
§ 974.06 motions were open to requests for a new trial in the 
interest of justice, the well-known limitations in § 974.06(4), 
as interpreted in State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 
177-78, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), and State v. Lo, 2003 WI 107, 
¶14, 264 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 756, would become meaningless. 
¶99 Henley 
has 
had 
multiple 
opportunities 
to 
seek 
postconviction relief.  Thus, he knew he would have difficulty 
proceeding under § 974.06.  His novel response was to file a 
motion in the circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.15(1) 
and/or Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(g) or (h).  The court is unanimous 
in its conclusion that these statutes may not be used to seek a 
new trial in the interest of justice in a criminal case. 
¶100 This brings us to the nub of this appeal.  Three 
justices suggest that the circuit court has inherent authority 
to grant a new trial in the interest of justice, notwithstanding 
the 
long-standing, 
well-understood 
procedural 
barriers 
of 
§ 974.06(4).  The majority opinion of Justice Gableman rejects 
this proposition without qualification.  I certainly do.  The 
circuit court has no statutory power and no inherent authority 
to grant a new trial in the interest of justice except during 
the trial or in a timely motion under § 974.02. 
No.  2008AP697-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
¶101 If this court were to embrace the inherent authority 
espoused by the dissent, it would create an entirely new basis 
for postconviction relief in circuit courts and destroy the 
utility 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 974.06(4). 
 
The 
standards 
for 
postconviction motions set out in Escalona-Naranjo and explained 
again in State v. Allen, 2010 WI 89, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___, would be pointless.  Decisions like State v. 
Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, and State 
v. Littlejohn, 2010 WI 85, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 
would not mean anything because defendants would say, "Like 
Henley, I'm being treated differently, so I get another shot." 
¶102 In this instance, rejecting inherent authority and 
limiting circuit court review to the terms of § 974.06, protects 
circuit courts from a deluge of successive claims.  In this 
regard, quality is better than quantity.  That is why this case 
is important. 
¶103 For the reasons stated, I join the majority opinion 
and respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶104 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
poses the question, "[C]an convicted criminal defendants still 
seek a new trial in the interest of justice?" It responds, "The 
answer is certainly yes."1  Except, as here, when the answer is 
"certainly not."  The majority's decision limits a circuit 
court's authority to grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice to those cases where the motion is filed within a 20-day 
window following sentencing2——a rule that implies that circuit 
courts cannot be trusted with the inherent authority to grant 
and reject such motions and implies as well that the majority 
can envision no case where "the interest of justice" cannot be 
ascertained and pursued within 20 days of a case's completion.   
¶105 The stakes in this case are just about as high as any 
case a court decides: a man in his early 20s faces a 20-year 
prison sentence that has been stayed pending the outcome of this 
appeal.  The unusual circumstances surrounding our review make 
it, as the majority acknowledges, "a very difficult case."3  What 
brings the case to us is the fact that the circuit court——the 
same court which presided over Henley's trial——was sufficiently 
troubled by the potential significance of evidence not presented 
at Henley's trial that it took the rare step of granting 
Henley's motion for a new trial, so that a jury could evaluate 
the competing claims with the previously omitted testimony fully 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶63. 
2 Id., ¶¶46-49, 63. 
3 Id., ¶85. 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
presented.  I disagree with the majority that the circuit court 
erred in the act of granting the motion;4 in fact, in so doing, 
it did exactly what circuit courts are asked to do.  As one 
county court put it,  
This Court has the responsibility of safeguarding both 
the rights of the accused and the interests of the 
public in the administration of criminal justice.  In 
addition it has the obligation on its own initiative 
to correct real or apparent improprieties which would 
tend to lower esteem for the system of justice which 
it is bound to uphold.   
People v. Krstovich, 338 N.Y.S.2d 132, 137-38 (N.Y. County Ct. 
1972) (citing Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial 
Judge. American Bar Association Tentative Draft 1972, Standard 
1.1 (subsequently adopted and published with commentary in ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice:  Special Functions of the Trial 
Judge, 
2d 
ed. 
1980)). 
 
We 
have 
recognized 
this 
great 
responsibility put upon the circuit court in stating that, 
"[T]his court is very loath to interfere with the discretion to 
grant new trials that is vested in circuit judges. It is a power 
that should be courageously and fearlessly exercised whenever a 
trial judge is convinced that to enter judgment on a verdict 
returned would result in a miscarriage of justice."  Schlag v. 
Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 152 Wis. 165, 169-70, 139 
N.W. 756 (1913).  This court has said that a circuit court's 
authority to grant a new trial is "so necessary to the judicial 
                                                 
4 It is true that the circuit court failed to identify the 
proper grounds for its authority to grant the new trial; I agree 
with the majority that Henley’s motion is not properly brought 
under Wis. Stat. §§ 805.15(1), 805.16 and 806.07(g), (h).  
Majority op., ¶¶56, 69, 70-71. 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
3 
 
process, and so essential to fair trials, that its existence is 
a necessary incident to the exercise of judicial power by the 
[circuit] court."  In re Noe's Estate, 241 Wis. 173, 177, 
5 N.W.2d 726 (1942).  Discussing "the authority of a trial court 
to grant a new trial on its own motion," another court observed 
that "in those jurisdictions that have considered the question, 
the power is firmly established." Freeman v. Chi. Transit Auth., 
210 N.E.2d 191, 194 (Ill. 1965).  It went on to explain, "These 
decisions are based upon a recognition that the role of a trial 
judge is not that of a presiding officer or an umpire, and that 
he is responsible for the justice of the judgment that he 
enters."  Id.  We should be grateful for judges who care deeply 
about the cases before them and strive mightily to see that just 
outcomes are reached.  As one judge was quoted as saying, rather 
forcefully, "If we judges do not care about the way these cases 
are decided, and if we do not care enough to fight about them, 
then we are not worth the powder to blow us to hell, in my own 
personal 
opinion." 
 
People 
on 
Complaint 
of 
Follar 
v. 
Finkelstein, 239 N.Y.S.2d 835, 839 n.5 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1963) 
(Shalleck, J., dissenting).  The point of a trial is to figure 
out what happened. "There is no gainsaying that arriving at the 
truth is a fundamental goal of our legal system." U.S. v Havens, 
446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980).  "[T]he central purpose of a criminal 
trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt 
or innocence . . . ."  Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 
681 (1986).  In this situation, the stark consequences of the 
failure to present crucial available evidence could not be more 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
4 
 
clear:  in cases with identical charges based on the same facts, 
the trial outcomes were vastly different.  That troubling fact 
is evident in the circuit court's order granting Henley's motion 
for a new trial. The circuit court who presided over Henley's 
trial cited as grounds for its decision to grant the motion for 
a new trial that "Mr. Henley is uncontrovertibly in the same 
position as co-defendant Jarrett Adams," the co-defendant whose 
trial counsel's failure to call crucial witnesses was deemed by 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  It is implicit in the circuit court's 
order that the justice system's disparate treatment of two 
equivalently situated defendants is repugnant to fundamental 
fairness, and such outcomes undermine the public's trust in the 
court system.  Of course, the remedy for the disparity is no 
more than a new trial in which Henley is permitted to bring 
forth the testimony he wishes to put before the jury. 
¶106 I would hold that a circuit court has inherent 
authority to grant a motion for a new trial where the real 
controversy has not been fully tried or there has been a 
miscarriage of justice. If a circuit court, exercising its 
inherent authority, grants a new trial in the interest of 
justice on the grounds that the real controversy has not been 
fully tried or there has been a miscarriage of justice, such a 
decision is, of course, appealable as an erroneous exercise of 
discretion and reviewable by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals and 
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  See e.g., Totsky v. Riteway Bus 
Serv., Inc., 2000 WI 29, ¶46, 233 Wis. 2d 371, 607 N.W.2d 637; 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
5 
 
Behning v. Star Fireworks Mfg., Co., Inc., 57 Wis. 2d 183, 186, 
203 N.W.2d 655 (1973) ("An order for a new trial in the interest 
of justice is within the discretion of a trial judge, and will 
be reversed only upon a clear showing there has been an abuse of 
discretion.").  I would therefore review, and on the facts of 
this case, affirm, the circuit court's grant of Henley's motion 
for a new trial on the grounds that the real controversy in this 
case, the issue of whether the sex was consensual, was not fully 
tried because crucial testimony concerning the complainant's 
witnessed conduct was not presented to the jury.  Under such 
circumstances, the grant of the motion for a new trial was not 
an erroneous exercise of the circuit court's discretion.  For 
clarification, I would hold that the court of appeals has the 
inherent and statutory authority to grant a new trial where the 
real controversy has not been fully tried or there has been a 
miscarriage of justice.  I would further reaffirm this court's 
inherent and statutory authority to do the same.   
I. BACKGROUND 
¶107 As the majority noted, this case has a fairly complex 
factual and procedural background, so it is helpful to highlight 
a few critical points.  Henley, Jarrett Adams (Adams), and 
Rovaughn Hill (Hill) were, for all intents and purposes, in the 
same situation at the time charges were filed against them.  
There is no evidence suggesting that any one of the defendants 
had a greater or lesser role in the alleged crime.  The three 
were initially tried together, but that resulted in a mistrial.  
Henley and Adams were then tried together as co-defendants a 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
6 
 
second time, and both were convicted.  At that trial, both of 
their attorneys decided not to call any witnesses.   
¶108 At Hill's separate trial, Hill called Shawn Demain 
(Demain) to testify.  His testimony provided an account of the 
events of the evening in question that supported Heidi Sheets' 
(Sheets) testimony and contradicted much of the testimony of the 
alleged victim, S.E.S.  Demain confirmed that Sheets and S.E.S. 
invited the men up to their room, which corroborated Sheets' 
testimony and contradicted S.E.S.'s statement that they entered 
her room uninvited.  Additionally, Demain testified that he saw 
S.E.S., Hill, Adams, and Henley smoking outside together at 
least twenty minutes after Adams, Henley, and S.E.S. first left 
Demain's room.5  This contradicted S.E.S.'s testimony because 
that would have been sometime during or after she stated that 
the sexual assault began.  Hill's trial resulted in a hung jury. 
On the second day of Hill's third trial, as a result of newly-
discovered evidence, the State moved to dismiss the case because 
the prosecutor stated that he did not believe he could "bear 
[his] burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt at [that] 
point."  The court dismissed Hill's case with prejudice, and he 
was later released from custody.   
                                                 
5 Demain did not actually name the people he saw outside 
smoking; however, it is clear from the context of his testimony 
to whom he was referring. He stated that he saw the "three black 
men," referring to Henley, Adams, and Hill as discussed in his 
version of the events of that night.  Demain also stated he saw 
"the tall one" outside smoking, referring to S.E.S., as he had 
previously stated S.E.S. was taller than Sheets.  
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
7 
 
¶109 Henley and Adams both unsuccessfully appealed their 
convictions, and after those appeals failed, they sought 
assistance from the Wisconsin Innocence Project.  Unfortunately 
for Henley, by the time the Innocence Project reviewed Henley's 
file, the statute of limitations for filing a petition for 
habeas corpus in federal court had passed.6  Adams still had a 
short time left before the statute of limitations ran out, and 
with the help of the Innocence Project, he filed a federal 
habeas petition.  Though the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Wisconsin denied his petition, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, 
finding that Adams' attorney acted unreasonably in failing to 
call Demain who "could [have] shed considerable, perhaps 
conclusive, light on the events of that night."  Adams v. 
Bertrand, 453 F.3d 428, 437 (7th Cir. 2006). The Seventh Circuit 
found that Henley's co-defendant, Adams, was prejudiced by his 
counsel's ineffective representation; namely, his counsel's 
decision not to call Demain as a witness.  Id. at 436-38.   
¶110 After Adams' success in the Seventh Circuit, Henley 
filed a motion for a new trial in the interest of justice in the 
Jefferson County Circuit Court.  The circuit court, the 
Honorable Jacqueline R. Erwin presiding, was persuaded by the 
Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Adams and granted Henley a new 
                                                 
6 Even though Henley and Adams were tried and convicted 
together, Henley's state appeal concluded before Adams' appeal.  
Because the statute of limitations for federal habeas relief 
commences when a defendant's direct state appeal process 
concludes, Henley's statute of limitations ran out before that 
of Adams.  
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
8 
 
trial in the interest of justice, concluding that "the issue of 
consent, the real controversy, was not fully tried."   
II. DISCUSSION 
A. 
The Circuit Court's Inherent Authority. 
¶111 After giving a brief nod to a circuit court's well 
recognized inherent authority, the majority so limits that 
inherent authority to the point that it is meaningless.  First, 
the 
majority 
narrowly 
limits 
a 
circuit 
court's 
inherent 
authority to that which "is necessary to the functioning of the 
court."  Majority op., ¶74.  Second, the majority asserts that 
the circuit court's inherent authority may be exercised only 
when a case is "before it under a proper procedural mechanism."  
Id., ¶86.  With these limitations, a circuit court's inherent 
authority is little more than its statutory authority along with 
whatever, 
in 
the 
majority's 
view, 
is 
"necessary 
to 
the 
functioning of the court."  In its quest to ensure finality and 
thus deny Henley a new trial, the majority largely ignores the 
Wisconsin Constitution's grant of broad inherent authority to 
the circuit court.  While a circuit court's inherent authority 
has its roots in the Wisconsin Constitution, Wis. Const. art. I 
§ 9, art. VII, § 8, and has been broadly defined by this court, 
State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 536, 221 N.W. 603 (1928), the 
majority suggests that there exist only "modest justifications 
for inherent authority."  Majority op., ¶74.  After citing the 
test we developed in City of Sun Prairie v. Davis, 226 
Wis. 2d 738, 750-51, 595 N.W.2d 635 (1999), for determining when 
an action is in excess of a circuit court's authority, the 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
9 
 
majority 
skips 
over 
this 
analysis 
and 
instead 
seemingly 
justifies its rejection of the circuit court's authority here 
based on the majority's desire to ensure a swift end to criminal 
appeals.  Majority op., ¶¶74-76.  
¶112 The majority incorrectly asserts that recognizing the 
circuit court's inherent authority to grant a new trial would 
"unwisely broaden the scope of the circuit court's inherent 
powers."  Id., ¶74.  To the contrary, the scope was already 
broad.  We have recognized previously the circuit court's 
inherent authority to grant a new trial.  See e.g., In re Noe's 
Estate, 241 Wis. at 176-77; Behning, 57 Wis. 2d at 188; Fontaine 
v. Fontaine, 205 Wis. 570, 577, 238 N.W. 410 (1931) ("It has 
long been settled in this state that the court has power to 
grant a new trial in the interests of justice upon its own 
motion." (citing Eggen v. Fox, 124 Wis. 534, 102 N.W. 1054 
(1905); Koss v. A. Geo. Schulz Co., 195 Wis. 243, 218 N.W. 175 
(1928)).  It follows that where a defendant has not received a 
fair trial, a circuit court must have the authority to correct 
such error as well, where either the case has not been fully 
tried or there has been a miscarriage of justice.   
¶113 While 
the 
majority and concurrence suggest that 
statutory time limits restrict a circuit court's inherent 
authority, majority op., ¶74-76; concurring op., ¶¶100-102, we 
have consistently held that the legislature lacks the power to 
impose limits on a court's inherent authority because such 
authority is derived from the Wisconsin Constitution.  State v. 
Lee, 88 Wis. 2d 239, 245-47, 276 N.W.2d 268 (1979).  In Lee, 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
10 
 
this court addressed the question squarely and minced no words:  
"[I]t is within the discretion of the court, in its inherent 
power to do justice, to entertain the [untimely] motion at a 
later date."  Id. at 246.   
¶114 Contrary to the majority's conclusion, in my view the 
circuit 
court 
has 
inherent 
authority 
to 
grant 
criminal 
defendants a new trial where the real controversy has not been 
fully tried or there has been a miscarriage of justice.  As 
noted, this inherent authority is derived from the Wisconsin 
Constitution's broad grant of original jurisdiction: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, the circuit court 
shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil 
and criminal within this state and such appellate 
jurisdiction in the circuit as the legislature may 
prescribe by law.  The circuit court may issue all 
writs necessary in aid of its jurisdiction. 
Wis. Const. art. VII § 8. 
¶115 The Wisconsin Constitution further provides that one 
of the court's most basic functions is to provide a remedy for 
wrongs, including in appropriate situations fashioning relief 
where no adequate remedy exists.  Wis. Const. art. I. § 9; see 
D.H. v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 286, 294, 251 N.W.2d 196 (1977); but 
see Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 
98, ¶43, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849 (noting that Wis. Const. 
art. I § 9 does not confer any legal rights, but rather 
"preserves the right 'to obtain justice on the basis of the law 
as it in fact exists'"). 
¶116 Consistent with this broad directive, this court has 
broadly defined the circuit court's authority to include powers 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
11 
 
specifically granted by the Wisconsin Constitution and the 
legislature along with certain inherent powers.  As we have 
stated, 
"The 
[constitution's] 
general 
grant 
of 
original 
jurisdiction is substantially without limit by anything found in 
the constitution, over all actions, civil and criminal."  State 
ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Portage City Water Co., 107 Wis. 441, 
447, 83 N.W. 697 (1900).  We have recognized that courts have 
the "inherent, implied and incidental powers" which "must 
necessarily be used to enable the judiciary to accomplish its 
constitutionally or legislatively mandated functions."  State ex 
rel. Friedrich v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 192 Wis. 2d 1, 
16, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995) (internal quotations omitted).  This 
court further recognized the type of inherent authority that 
allows a circuit court to grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice, stating "[t]he inherent power of the court is . . . the 
power to administer justice whether any previous form of remedy 
has been granted or not . . . and the power to provide process 
where none exists."  Cannon, 196 Wis. at 536 (quoting In re 
Bruen, 172 P. 1152 (Wash. 1918)).  We have established that, 
even on its own motion, a circuit court has the inherent 
authority to grant a new trial when an injustice has occurred.  
Fontaine, 205 Wis. at 577 ("It has long been settled in this 
state that the court has power to grant a new trial in the 
interests of justice upon its own motion."); In re Noe's Estate, 
241 Wis. at 177 (holding a circuit court's authority to grant a 
new trial is "so necessary to the judicial process, and so 
essential to fair trials, that its existence is a necessary 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
12 
 
incident to the exercise of judicial power by the [circuit] 
court"); Behning, 57 Wis. 2d at 188 (recognizing a circuit 
court's inherent authority to order a new trial in the interest 
of justice even when a proper motion is not before the court).   
¶117 That does not mean that the circuit court's inherent 
authority is limitless, however.  We discussed the boundaries of 
the 
court's 
inherent 
authority 
at 
length 
in 
Davis, 
226 
Wis. 2d 738.  While recognizing the circuit court's broad 
inherent authority, we stated that it is limited to three main 
areas: (1) to perform the court's internal operations, (2) "to 
regulate members of the bench and bar," and (3) "to ensure that 
the court functions efficiently and effectively to provide the 
fair administration of justice."  Id. at 749-50.  Focusing on 
the third category, which is the relevant category here, we 
emphasized that the central inquiry into whether a power is 
inherent is whether it is "necessary for the efficient and 
orderly functioning of the court or to maintain the court's 
dignity, transact its business or achieve the purpose of its 
existence."  Id. at 750-51.  In other words, the circuit court 
has inherent authority to perform its most crucial and basic 
functions in order to fulfill its essential role in the justice 
system. 
¶118 In Davis, we determined that the municipal court 
overstepped its authority in ordering an out-of-state defendant 
to appear personally because it did not serve any of the above 
functions.  Id. at 752.  Since counsel for the defendant was 
required to be present at trial, prepared to present evidence 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
13 
 
and speak on behalf of the client, we determined that the court 
could promptly and completely dispose of the case without 
infringing upon these functions, and thus it did not have the 
authority to compel his appearance.  Id. at 753-54. 
¶119 Thus, the proper test to determine whether a circuit 
court has the inherent authority to grant a new trial where the 
real controversy was not fully tried or where justice has 
miscarried is whether that authority is "necessary for the 
efficient and orderly functioning of the court or to maintain 
the court's dignity, transact its business or achieve the 
purpose of its existence."  Id. at 750-51.   
¶120 The 
Wisconsin Constitution demands, and we have 
consistently confirmed, that one essential function of the 
circuit court "to maintain [its] dignity . . . [and] achieve the 
purpose of its existence" is the court's authority to correct 
errors where an injustice has occurred.  Id.; see Wis. Const. 
art. I § 9; see e.g., In re Noe's Estate, 241 Wis. at 177 
(circuit court's authority to grant a new trial is "so essential 
to fair trials, that its existence is a necessary incident to 
the exercise of judicial power by the [circuit] court"); Pulaski 
v. State, 23 Wis. 2d 138, 142, 126 N.W.2d 625 (1964) (circuit 
court has inherent authority to hear motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea and for a trial in the interest of justice); Lee, 88 Wis. 
2d at 246 (inherent authority in similar circumstances); State 
v. Schill, 93 Wis. 2d 361, 377-79, 286 N.W.2d 836 (1980) 
(inherent authority in similar circumstances).  Specifically, we 
have continuously confirmed a circuit court's inherent authority 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
14 
 
to allow withdrawal of an improperly accepted guilty plea and to 
grant a trial with little need to discuss this power's relation 
to the essential nature of the court.  Pulaski, 23 Wis. 2d at 
142; Lee, 88 Wis. 2d at 246; Schill, 93 Wis. 2d at 377-79.  We 
have also held that a circuit court has the inherent authority 
to order a new trial, "even though no motion is before" the 
court, where a judge concluded that the question presented to 
the jury was misleading.  Behning, 57 Wis. 2d at 188.  The 
court's authority to correct errors in the interest of justice 
is certainly one of its most basic functions, and thus it is 
within its inherent authority to do so. 
¶121 It follows that if we recognize a court's inherent 
authority to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea and to grant a 
trial, we must also recognize its authority to grant a new trial 
where there has been an error denying the defendant a fair 
trial.  Contrary to the majority's assertion, this would not 
"unwisely broaden the scope of the circuit court's inherent 
powers."  Majority op., ¶74.  As discussed above, the Wisconsin 
Constitution states, and we have confirmed, that the circuit 
court's inherent authority to correct injustice is broad.  Wis. 
Const. art. I § 9, art. VII § 8; Cannon, 196 Wis. at 536; In re 
Noe's Estate, 241 Wis. at 177.  Recognizing the circuit court's 
inherent authority to grant a new trial in this case will not 
have the disastrous effect on finality that the majority 
suggests, majority op., ¶¶75-76, because circuit courts will 
exercise this inherent authority as prudently here as they do in 
other respects, and this court and the court of appeals have 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
15 
 
developed standards for when that authority may be exercised.  
If a circuit court, exercising its inherent authority, grants a 
new trial in the interest of justice on the grounds that the 
real controversy has not been fully tried or there has been a 
miscarriage 
of 
justice, 
such 
a 
decision 
is, 
of 
course, 
appealable as an erroneous exercise of discretion and reviewable 
by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals and by the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court. 
¶122 While we have not explicitly addressed the standard 
that a circuit court must apply when deciding whether to 
exercise its inherent authority to grant a new trial, I would 
hold that such a standard is evident from previous decisions of 
this court and the court of appeals.  The legislature developed 
standards for when this court or the court of appeals, 
respectively, may grant a new trial under § 751.06 and § 752.35.  
Under its statutory reversal authority, a court may grant a new 
trial where (1) "the real controversy has not been fully tried," 
or (2) "it is probable that justice has for any reason 
miscarried."  Wis. Stat. §§ 751.06, 752.35 (2007-08).  In State 
v. Harp, the court of appeals held that a circuit court must 
also apply this standard when deciding on a motion for a new 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
16 
 
trial under its statutory authority in § 805.15.7  161 Wis. 2d 
773, 777-79, 469 N.W.2d 210 (Ct. App. 1991).  In State v. 
Armstrong, we concluded that this statutory standard also 
applies to our inherent authority to grant a new trial in the 
interest of justice.  2005 WI 119, ¶114 n.26, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 
700 N.W.2d 98.  It follows, then, that this standard also 
applies to a circuit court's inherent authority to grant a new 
trial. 
¶123 Thus, I would hold that a circuit court may grant a 
new trial under its inherent authority only where (1) "the real 
controversy has not been fully tried," or (2) "it is probable 
that justice has for any reason miscarried."  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 751.06, 752.35; see State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 160-61, 
549 N.W.2d 435 (1996).  As we have previously noted, a request 
for a new trial is an extraordinary remedy, and a court should 
grant such a request only "in exceptional cases."  See 
Armstrong, 283 Wis. 2d 639, ¶114.   
¶124 With this standard and these limitations, recognizing 
a circuit court's inherent authority to grant a new trial does 
not give a defendant endless opportunities for a new trial or 
                                                 
7 In Harp, the court of appeals addressed the proper 
standard with which a circuit court must decide a motion for a 
new trial under § 805.15 brought by a criminal defendant.  It is 
important to note that, in my view, and consistent with the 
majority's holding, Wis. Stat. § 805.15 is not an available 
means for a criminal defendant to seek postconviction relief.  
The court of appeals did not directly address this issue in 
Harp, but its holding, that a circuit court may grant a new 
trial only when the real controversy has not been fully tried or 
justice has miscarried, is instructive and consistent with the 
appropriate standard I am satisfied should be applied. 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
17 
 
upset the principle of finality as the majority asserts.  
Majority op., ¶¶74-76.  Rather such a remedy is restricted to a 
limited number of defendants. Henley is within the standard and 
the limitations since he remains without the opportunity for a 
full trial of the real controversy in this case unless he 
receives a new trial.     
¶125 The majority insists that a circuit court's inherent 
authority is restricted by statutory procedures and time limits, 
id., ¶¶76, 86; however, a court's inherent authority is entirely 
independent 
of 
its 
statutory 
authority. 
 
The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution confers circuit court jurisdiction, and therefore 
circuit court authority is not constrained by legislative 
directives.  Wis. Const. art. VII § 2; In the Matter of the 
Guardianship of Eberhardy v. Circuit Court for Wood County, 102 
Wis. 2d 539, 548, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981).  We have continuously 
affirmed that a circuit court's inherent authority is entirely 
independent of any statutory authority.  Pulaski, 23 Wis. 2d at 
142-43 (noting the circuit court's authority to allow withdrawal 
of a guilty plea is not derived from a statute, but rather 
stands upon the circuit court's inherent authority).   
¶126 In 
Lee, 
we 
addressed 
whether 
this 
independent 
authority was subject to time limits imposed by statute and 
conclusively stated that it is not.  88 Wis. 2d at 245-47.  We 
concluded that the statutory time limit was "regulatory only" 
and 
not 
a 
jurisdictional 
bar 
to 
the 
circuit 
court's 
consideration of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.  Id. at 
246-47.  We held that the statute was not a jurisdictional 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
18 
 
constraint on the authority of the court.  Moreover, we stated 
that any "contention that [the statute] imposes a legislative 
restriction on the power of the courts to do justice would pose 
a serious constitutional question."  Id. at 247.  We concluded 
that such a limitation was not the legislature's intent, and the 
circuit court has the authority to consider a motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea filed after the statutory deadline.  Id.  Despite 
this clear statement, neither the majority nor the concurrence 
acknowledges 
the 
consistency 
with 
which 
this 
court 
has 
explicitly affirmed the circuit court's inherent authority: 
It is clear, therefore, that Pulaski did not set a 
jurisdictional time limit for considering a motion to 
withdraw a plea. Pulaski also makes clear that a 
motion to withdraw a plea could be made beyond the 
one-year regulatory period but, unless exceptional 
circumstances were shown, it would be an abuse of 
discretion to consider a motion made beyond the time 
period. 
The analysis of Pulaski conclusively demonstrates that 
a defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea after the 
regulatory time period would indeed have to show by 
clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
exceptional 
circumstances warranted the invocation of the court's 
inherent power. Pulaski holds that a defendant has the 
right to move for withdrawal of his plea within the 
one-year period but that it is within the discretion 
of the court, in its inherent power to do justice, to 
entertain the motion at a later date. 
Pulaski did not set a jurisdictional time limit. 
Neither, we conclude, does the statute. In the 
interests of sound court administration, the statute 
reduces the regulatory time to one hundred twenty 
days. The statute, however, does not deprive the court 
of jurisdiction.  . . .  
We 
conclude 
that 
it 
was 
within 
the 
power 
and 
jurisdiction of the county court to consider the 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
19 
 
motion even though it was brought after the one-
hundred-twenty-day period set forth in the statute. 
Id. at 246-47 (emphasis added).  Thus, the circuit court's use 
of its inherent authority is not constrained by statutory 
limitations.8 
¶127 This does not mean that the statutory framework for 
postconviction relief under Wis. Stat. ch. 974 is meaningless, 
however, or that a defendant may ignore the statutory time 
limits and instead seek relief only under a court's inherent 
authority.  As we have stated, a court should grant a new trial 
in the interest of justice under its inherent authority only "in 
exceptional cases" because it is such an extraordinary remedy.  
Armstrong, 283 Wis. 2d 639, ¶114.  Therefore, a defendant who 
ignored statutory means for postconviction relief would do so at 
his peril.    
¶128 Recognizing the circuit court's inherent authority to 
perform its justice-seeking function will ensure that the 
justice system is not so inflexible that it cannot correct 
errors.  As explained above, this will not upset the principle 
of finality as the majority asserts.  Therefore, I would hold 
                                                 
8 The Escalona bar is similarly not a restriction on a 
court’s inherent authority to grant a new trial in the interest 
of justice.  See State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 
N.W.2d 157 (1994).  As discussed above, legislatively  created 
limits are not applicable to a court’s inherent authority, which 
is derived from the Wisconsin Constitution.  Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 
2d at 548; Lee, 88 Wis. 2d at 247.  We emphasized throughout 
Escalona that our decision was based on an interpretation of the 
language, purpose, and legislative history of the postconviction 
relief statute.  185 Wis. 2d at 175-78.  It would appear, then, 
that the limitations on postconviction relief described in 
Escalona do not apply to a case invoking a court’s inherent 
authority. 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
20 
 
that the circuit court had the inherent authority to grant a new 
trial here because the real controversy in this case has not 
been fully tried, as I now explain in detail.  
B. 
Review of the Circuit Court's Decision. 
¶129 I would hold that the circuit court has inherent 
authority to grant a new trial where the case has not been fully 
tried or there has been a miscarriage of justice. I would then 
carefully review the circuit court's decision to grant a new 
trial.9 The circuit court mistakenly based its authority to hear 
                                                 
9 As is evident from the majority's discussion of the 
standard of review, the majority does not address whether the 
circuit court's decision to grant Henley a new trial was an 
appropriate exercise of its discretion.  Majority op., ¶¶28-29.  
Since I would hold the circuit court has the authority to grant 
a new trial here, I would review that decision under the 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  Totsky, 233 Wis. 2d 
371, ¶46; Pulaski, 23 Wis. 2d at 142 ("A motion to withdraw a 
plea of guilty and for a trial, as we deem the defendant's 
motions to be . . . is a motion directed to the discretion of 
the court in the interest of justice which the court has the 
inherent power to hear."); Lee, 88 Wis. 2d at 246 (quoting 
Pulaski for this proposition); Schill, 93 Wis. 2d at 378 
(holding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and grant trial "is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and [the 
supreme court] will not upset the court's ruling unless there is 
a sufficient showing of abuse of discretion"); Behning, 57 Wis. 
2d at 186 ("An order for a new trial in the interest of justice 
is within the discretion of a trial judge and will be reversed 
only upon a clear showing there has been an abuse of 
discretion."); Van Gheem v. Chi. & Northwestern R.R. Co., 33 
Wis.2d 231, 236, 147 N.W.2d 237, 239 (1967) (stating that order 
granting a new trial in interest of justice will be reversed 
only where there has been a clear abuse of discretion); Bartell 
v. Luedtke, 52 Wis.2d 372, 377, 190 N.W.2d 145, 148 (1971) 
(citing Van Gheem); Werren v. Allied American Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co., 3 Wis.2d 313, 315, 316, 88 N.W.2d 348 (1958) ("An order for 
a new trial in the interests of justice is highly discretionary 
and, in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of 
discretion, it will be affirmed.").  
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
21 
 
Henley's motion for a new trial on Wis. Stat. § 805.15, but 
there was a valid basis for that determination, so a review of 
its determination is therefore proper.  The circuit court's 
decision should not be disturbed unless there is "a clear 
showing" of an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Totsky, 233 
Wis. 2d 371, ¶46; Behning, 57 Wis. 2d at 186 ("An order for a 
new trial in the interest of justice is within the discretion of 
a trial judge and will be reversed only upon a clear showing 
there has been an abuse of discretion."); McFarlin v. Hewitt, 5 
Wis.2d 488, 493, 93 N.W.2d 445 (1958) (stating that the court in 
reviewing a trial court's order for a new trial "seeks to 
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
ordering a new trial. It seeks reasons to sustain the finding of 
the trial judge."); McCoy v. Terhorst, 188 Wis. 512, 517, 205 
N.W. 420 (1925) ("[W]e do not reverse [a trial court's grant of 
a new trial in furtherance of justice] merely because, upon the 
record before us, we come to a different conclusion.  It must 
clearly appear that there was an abuse of discretion before we 
reverse."); John v. Pierce, 176 Wis. 220, 224-25, 186 N.W. 600 
(1922) ("A discretion is vested in the trial court to grant a 
new trial when he feels that the verdict is against the weight 
of the evidence, and this court will not disturb his action in 
that respect where the evidence is such that conflicting 
conclusions may be reached by different persons.").  I am 
satisfied that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise 
its discretion in granting Henley a new trial. 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
22 
 
¶130 The circuit court determined that a new trial was 
warranted because the real controversy, S.E.S.'s consent, had 
not been fully tried.  A case or controversy has not been fully 
tried "when the jury was erroneously not given the opportunity 
to hear important testimony that bore on an important issue in 
the case . . . ."  Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 160.  The court need 
not find "the probability of a different result on retrial" to 
find that the real controversy was not fully tried.  Id.  In its 
ruling that the real controversy was not fully tried here, the 
circuit 
court 
seemed 
persuaded 
by 
the 
Seventh 
Circuit's 
reasoning in Adams, 453 F.3d at 436, as am I.   
¶131 In Adams, the Seventh Circuit analyzed Adams’ trial 
and the testimony given by Demain at Hill’s trial, and concluded 
that Adams' counsel made an unreasonable decision in failing to 
call 
Demain, 
as 
Demain's 
testimony 
could 
have 
"shed 
considerable, perhaps conclusive, light on the events of that 
night."  Id. at 436-37.  The Seventh Circuit noted several 
points that would have made Demain's testimony particularly 
valuable to Adams', and thus also Henley's, defense.  First, 
Demain was "a witness to several key moments in the chronology" 
of what occurred that night, "where the evidence [was] sharply 
conflicting."  Id.  Second, unlike all the other parties 
involved in the events of that night, Demain had no prior 
relationship with anyone involved, "thus rendering him [an] 
impartial and independent" witness.  Id.  Third, Demain could 
have testified that the women invited the men up to their room, 
corroborating Sheets' testimony and "completely undercut[ting] 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
23 
 
S.E.S.'s version of uninvited strangers bursting into her room."  
Id. at 437.  Fourth, Demain could have testified to seeing 
S.E.S. and the three men together later in the night, 
"support[ing] a plausible theory of a consensual encounter."  
Id.  
¶132 The 
Seventh 
Circuit's 
description 
of 
Demain's 
testimony and the transcript of Demain's testimony at Hill's 
trial sharply contradict the majority's characterization of this 
evidence.  The majority dismisses the importance of Demain's 
testimony as "largely duplicative of what Sheets related in her 
testimony," and thus concludes that "[i]t cannot be said that 
such evidence was not placed before the jury."  Majority op., 
¶82.  To the contrary, the fact that Demain’s testimony would 
have 
corroborated 
Sheets' 
testimony 
and 
contradicted 
the 
statements by S.E.S. supports the argument that this evidence 
would have been extremely valuable to the jury’s credibility 
determination, which was the crux of this case.  One such 
critical point is Demain's testimony that Sheets and S.E.S. 
invited the men up to their room.  This testimony would have 
significantly undermined S.E.S.'s credibility since he would 
have been a second witness who contradicted S.E.S. and confirmed 
Sheets' statements.  
¶133 The majority also asserts that Demain's testimony on 
seeing the group smoking outside together "is not critical."  
Id.  The majority further downplays the importance of this 
testimony by stating that "we do not know whether this was 
before or after the sexual assault."  Id., ¶83.  This 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
24 
 
mischaracterizes Demain's testimony.  While Demain was unsure of 
the exact time he saw the group outside, his testimony 
demonstrates that it was at least twenty minutes after S.E.S., 
Adams, and Henley left Demain's room together.  Thus, according 
to S.E.S.'s own testimony, this would have been sometime during 
or after the assault had begun.  Also, while Demain did not 
specifically name Adams, Henley, and Hill, it is clear from the 
context of his testimony that he was referring to them when he 
said "[a]ll three of them were out there."  Demain further 
identified S.E.S. by referring to her as the "tall one," which 
is how he had previously described her when distinguishing her 
from Sheets.  Such testimony certainly seems to undermine 
S.E.S.'s credibility because she did not mention smoking outside 
with the men later that night, and it also "support[s] a 
plausible theory of a consensual encounter between the men and 
S.E.S."  Adams, 453 F.3d at 437.   
¶134 Furthermore, as the majority points out, there is a 
police report that further undermines S.E.S.'s credibility, 
which was not presented at Henley's trial but contributed to the 
State's dismissal of Hill's case during his third trial.  
Majority op., ¶18 n.9.  This report indicates that Hill 
previously told a police investigator that (1) Hill and Demain 
remained downstairs together for approximately twenty minutes 
after S.E.S., Henley, and Adams went up to S.E.S.'s room, and 
(2) S.E.S., Henley, Adams, and Hill rolled marijuana joints 
together in S.E.S.'s room that they later smoked together 
downstairs.  This documentation of Hill's statements to the 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
25 
 
police 
further 
corroborates 
Demain's 
testimony, 
and 
thus 
Henley's version of the events, and calls S.E.S.'s credibility 
into question. 
¶135 Thus, the circuit court, armed with the analysis and 
ruling by the Seventh Circuit, did not err in determining that 
the real controversy was not fully tried, where the jury was 
denied the opportunity to hear Demain's critical testimony that 
went to the heart of the case:  S.E.S's credibility and the 
issue of consent.   
C. 
Court of Appeals' Statutory and Inherent Authority. 
¶136 The majority’s holding that the circuit court lacked 
any inherent authority to grant a new trial in this case would 
seem to require the majority to address whether the court of 
appeals has such inherent authority.  However, the majority does 
not answer that certified question.10  Of course, this court is 
not required to answer all of the certified questions when we 
accept a certification, but generally there should be a good 
reason for not doing so.  See, e.g., State v. Konkol, 221 Wis. 
184, 266 N.W. 174 (1936) (refusing to answer a certified 
question where we determined that jurisdiction was lacking).  
¶137 In this case, where the majority has found that the 
circuit court did not have the inherent or statutory authority 
                                                 
10 In passing the majority notes that the court of appeals 
has the discretionary authority under Wis. Stat. § 752.35 to 
grant a new trial in the interest of justice.  Majority op., 
¶63.  However, the majority does not further address this issue, 
nor does it address the question of whether the court of appeals 
also has the inherent authority to grant a new trial where the 
real controversy has not been fully tried or there has been a 
miscarriage of justice. 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
26 
 
to grant a new trial, even though that court held that the real 
controversy has not been fully tried, it is appropriate to 
address whether the court of appeals has such authority.  While 
under the majority's holding this court can still hear a motion 
for a new trial, "the question of whether justice has been done 
in an individual case is primarily and initially the concern of 
the court of appeals.” State v. McConnohie, 113 Wis. 2d 362, 
368, 334 N.W.2d 903 (1983).  For the reasons stated below, I 
would hold that the court of appeals has both statutory and 
inherent 
authority 
to grant a new trial when the real 
controversy has not been fully tried or when justice has 
miscarried. 
¶138 The legislature has given the court of appeals broad 
statutory reversal authority:  
In an appeal to the court of appeals, if it appears 
from the record that the real controversy has not been 
fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has 
for any reason miscarried, the court may reverse the 
judgment or order appealed from, regardless of whether 
the proper motion or objection appears in the record 
and may direct the entry of the proper judgment or 
remit the case to the trial court for entry of the 
proper judgment or for a new trial, and direct the 
making of such amendments in the pleadings and the 
adoption 
of 
such 
procedure 
in 
that 
court, 
not 
inconsistent with statutes or rules, as are necessary 
to accomplish the ends of justice. 
Wis. Stat. § 752.35. 
¶139 In State v. Allen, the court of appeals adopted a 
narrow interpretation of its own statutory authority, concluding 
that it authorized the court of appeals to grant such relief 
only on a direct appeal, and not on a collateral attack.  159 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
27 
 
Wis. 2d 53, 55-56, 464 N.W.2d 426 (Ct. App. 1990); Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.35.  The court in Allen reached that conclusion by 
focusing on the language authorizing it to "reverse the judgment 
or order appealed from" and determined that the language limited 
its authority to a direct appeal from a judgment and did not 
authorize the court of appeals to go around a motion for 
postconviction relief to reverse the underlying judgment.  159 
Wis. 2d at 55-56.     
¶140 We criticized that holding in Armstrong and have found 
no such limitation on our own statutory discretionary reversal 
authority under a nearly identical statute.  283 Wis. 2d 639, 
¶113 n.25; Wis. Stat. § 751.06.  We determined that the language 
of the statute need not be read so narrowly and that the court 
of appeals has the authority to "vacate the trial court's order 
denying the motion for new trial with directions for the circuit 
court to grant the motion."  Armstrong, 283 Wis. 2d 639, ¶113 
n.25.  Because I conclude that Allen improperly interpreted 
§ 752.35, I would clearly overrule Allen and hold that the court 
of appeals has statutory authority to grant a new trial, both on 
a direct appeal and on a collateral attack, where the real 
controversy has not been fully tried or there has been a 
miscarriage of justice.  
¶141 Furthermore, the court of appeals has the same broad 
inherent authority to grant a new trial where the case has not 
been fully tried or there has been a miscarriage of justice, as 
this court and the circuit court.  See State v. Johannes, 229 
Wis. 2d 215, 229, 598 N.W.2d 299 (Ct. App. 1999); Wis. Const. 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
28 
 
art. VII §§ 2, 5; Cannon, 196 Wis. at 536 ("The inherent power 
of the court is . . . the power to administer justice whether 
any previous form or remedy has been granted or  . . . and the 
power to provide process where none exists.") (quoting In re 
Bruen, 172 P. 1152 (Wash. 1918)).  Thus, consistent with the 
reasoning 
above 
regarding 
the 
circuit 
court's 
inherent 
authority, I would hold that the court of appeals also has the 
inherent authority to grant Henley a new trial in this case.   
D. 
Our Statutory and Inherent Authority. 
¶142 While the majority recognizes that we have the 
inherent and statutory authority to grant a new trial, majority 
op., ¶¶79-81, given the majority's desire to limit the lower 
court's authority in this respect, it is important to emphasize 
that we retain the authority to do so.  As we unequivocally 
stated in Hicks and Armstrong, this court has "inherent power 
and express statutory authority to reverse a judgment of 
conviction and remit a case for a new trial in the interest of 
justice, even where the circuit court has exercised its power to 
order or to deny a new trial."  Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 159; 
Armstrong, 283 Wis. 2d 639, ¶113; Wis. Stat. § 751.06.  This 
case is an appropriate one to emphasize our inherent and express 
statutory authority.   
¶143 Furthermore, for the same reasons that I would hold 
that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in granting Henley a new trial, I would hold that 
since the real controversy in this case was not fully tried, and 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
29 
 
in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice, we must affirm the 
order of the circuit court for a new trial. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶144 In its pursuit of finality at all costs, the majority 
has ignored the analysis and reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, 
has failed to apply the correct standard of review to the 
appropriate exercise of discretion by the circuit court, and has 
unnecessarily restricted the circuit court's inherent authority 
and limited its ability to ensure that defendants get a fair 
trial in every case.  
¶145 For the reasons set forth herein, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶146 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
No.  2008AP697-CR.npc 
 
 
 
1