Title: Bellsouth Telecommunications v. Meeks
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-1033
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 16, 2003

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC02-1033
____________
BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
LINDA MEEKS, etc.,
Respondent.
[October 16, 2003]
BELL, J.
We have for review Meeks v. Florida Power & Light Co., 816 So. 2d 1125
(Fla. 5th DCA 2002), in which the Fifth District Court of Appeal certified the
following question as one of great public importance:
ARE THE DAMAGES RECOVERABLE BY A MINOR CHILD
PURSUANT TO SECTION 768.21(3), FLORIDA STATUTES,
LIMITED TO THE PERIOD OF MINORITY?
Id. at 1133.  We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida
Constitution.  For the reasons stated below, we answer the certified question in the
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negative.  We approve the district court’s decision that the damages recoverable by
a minor child under section 768.21(3), Florida Statutes (2002), should be calculated
based on the joint life expectancies of the minor child and the deceased parent.
BACKGROUND
The claim in this case arises from the wrongful death of Herbert Meeks, and
relates to the damages recoverable by his son, Kevin Meeks.  Kevin was twenty-
four at the time of his father’s death, a minor under the statute.  Herbert Meeks was
electrocuted by downed Florida Power & Light (FP&L) electric wires suspended
from a fallen pole allegedly owned by BellSouth.  At the time of his death, Meeks
was driving on a rural road.  The pole had rotted at its base and fallen across the
road.  Meeks got out of his truck, approached the pole, and was killed.
The parties dispute whether BellSouth or FP&L was responsible for
maintaining and inspecting the pole.  BellSouth’s predecessor installed the pole in
1952.  In 1997, when the accident occurred, the pole was tagged with a metal
BellSouth tag and was identified on BellSouth plats as a BellSouth pole.  However,
before the 1997 accident, BellSouth had removed its wires from the pole and from
all the other poles in that pole line.  At the time of the accident that killed Meeks,
only FP&L had wires running on the pole line that included the fallen pole.
FP&L’s use of BellSouth’s poles was governed by their Joint Use
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Agreement (JUA), a contract covering the joint use of poles.  Under the JUA, each
company had the right to use the other’s poles.  The owner of a joint-use pole was
responsible for maintaining the pole in a safe condition, and could charge the joint
user a licensing fee.  The JUA provided a formal procedure for a pole owner to
abandon a pole, including a requisite thirty-day notice to the joint user.  Under this
procedure, a pole abandoned by its owner would become the property of the joint
user, who would then be solely responsible for the pole’s condition.   
With respect to the pole involved in Meeks’ death, when BellSouth removed
its wires from the pole, BellSouth did not give formal written notice to FP&L of the
abandonment, as the JUA required.  However, the JUA expressly provided that the
parties could modify its terms through their course of conduct, i.e., the parties
could adopt working practices that were different from the express contractual
terms.  Neither party followed the formal abandonment procedures the JUA
prescribed.  Nonetheless, despite BellSouth's claim that it informally abandoned the
pole to FP&L, FP&L denies having assumed ownership or responsibility. 
BellSouth continued to collect a licensing fee from FP&L for the pole, up to the
time of the accident that killed Meeks.  
Meeks was survived by his wife and by two children, a twenty-eight-year-old
daughter and a twenty-four-year-old son.  Where a decedent has a surviving
1 Section 768.21(3) gives damages for lost parental companionship and 
mental pain and suffering based on the wrongful death of a parent.  A parallel
provision, section 768.21(1), gives damages for lost support and services due to a
parent’s death.  Dependent adult children may recover these damages.  Section
768.21(1) damages are not at issue in this appeal.
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spouse, Florida’s wrongful death statute permits a minor child, but not an adult
child, to recover damages for loss of parental companionship and for mental pain
and suffering.  § 768.21(3), Fla. Stat. (2002).  The statute defines a minor as a
person under twenty-five years of age.  Id. § 768.18(2).  Meeks’ survivors filed suit
against both FP&L and BellSouth.  FP&L settled for $1,300,000.  The trial court
dismissed the claim of Meeks’ daughter for section 768.21(3) damages,1 because
an adult child may not recover these damages under the statute.  She does not
dispute the dismissal. 
BellSouth filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the two issues it
continues to argue on review in this Court.  First, BellSouth argued that FP&L was
solely responsible for maintaining and inspecting the pole, so that BellSouth owed
no duty of care to Meeks.  Second, BellSouth argued that any damages awarded
under section 768.21(3) to Kevin Meeks should be calculated only for the time until
Kevin reached twenty-five, the statutory age of majority.
The trial court granted summary judgment to BellSouth on both grounds. 
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The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed.  The district court first concluded that
material fact questions existed regarding whether BellSouth had effectively
abandoned the utility pole to FP&L and that, therefore, the trial court had erred in
granting summary judgment relieving BellSouth of its duty to maintain the pole in a
safe condition.  See Meeks v. Florida Power & Light Co., 816 So. 2d 1125, 1129-
30 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).  Next, the district court held that a minor child’s damages
for lost parental companionship and for mental pain and suffering based on a
parent’s death were not limited to the period of minority, but should be calculated
based on the joint life expectancies of the minor child and the deceased parent.  Id.
at 1133.  The district court certified the question of the correct measure of damages
under section 768.21(3) as a question of great public importance.
DISCUSSION
1.  Standard of Review
Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review.  State
v. Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297, 301 n.7 (Fla. 2001).  Our purpose in construing a
statute is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.  State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105,
109 (Fla. 2002).  In attempting to discern legislative intent, we first look to the
actual language used in the statute.  Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432,
435 (Fla. 2000).  If the statutory language is unclear, we apply rules of statutory
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construction and explore legislative history to determine legislative intent.  Id.;
Weber v. Dobbins, 616 So. 2d 956, 958 (Fla. 1993).
2.  Controlling Statute
Section 768.21, Florida Statutes (2002), describes the damages recoverable
in a wrongful death action, including the following:
(1) Each survivor may recover the value of lost support and
services from the date of the decedent's injury to her or his death, with
interest, and future loss of support and services from the date of death
and reduced to present value. . . . In computing the duration of future
losses, the joint life expectancies of the survivor and the decedent and
the period of minority, in the case of healthy minor children, may be
considered.
(2) The surviving spouse may also recover for loss of the
decedent's companionship and protection and for mental pain and
suffering from the date of injury.
(3) Minor children of the decedent, and all children of the
decedent if there is no surviving spouse, may also recover for lost
parental companionship, instruction, and guidance and for mental pain
and suffering from the date of injury. . . .
(4) Each parent of a deceased minor child may also recover for
mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.
§ 768.21, Fla. Stat. (2002). 
The dispute in this case centers on the measure of damages recoverable by a
minor child under section 768.21(3).  Section 768.21(3) provides no express
guidance regarding the length of time for which a minor child may recover
damages.  BellSouth argues that the statute should be interpreted to limit a minor
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child’s recovery to the child’s period of minority.  BellSouth points out that, where
a decedent leaves a surviving spouse, only minor children can recover under
subsection (3).  Therefore, if there is a surviving spouse, BellSouth argues that a
child’s recovery must be cut off when the child is no longer a minor.  We agree
with the district court that this is not a proper interpretation of the measure of
damages to be awarded a minor child under section 768.21(3).
Contrary to BellSouth’s interpretation, Meeks argues that section 768.21(3)
does not limit a minor child’s damages to the period of minority.  Instead, Meeks
points out that the statute gives a starting date “from the date of injury” for
measuring damages, but provides no ending date for the calculation.  Meeks argues
that the statute should be interpreted to vest recovery rights in a child who is a
minor on the date of injury, and to allow recovery through the child’s life.  The
district court found Meeks’ argument persuasive, and we agree.
3.  Liberal Construction
As the district court accurately observed, our analysis is guided by the
Legislature’s general intent that the remedial provisions of the wrongful death
statute should be liberally, rather than strictly or narrowly, construed.  While the
general rule is that statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed,
the general rule of strict construction does not, in Florida, apply to a remedial
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statute in derogation of the common law.  With respect to the wrongful death
statute, the Florida Legislature has stated:  
It is the public policy of the state to shift the losses resulting
when wrongful death occurs from the survivors of the decedent to the
wrongdoer.  Sections 768.16-768.26 are remedial and shall be liberally
construed.
§ 768.17, Fla. Stat. (2002) (emphasis added).  With this rule of liberal construction
in mind, we examine the specific provisions of section 768.21(3).
4.  Parallel Provisions
To ascertain the meaning of a specific statutory section, the section should
be read in the context of its surrounding sections.  See Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So.
2d 294, 298 (Fla. 2000) (stating that "statutes must be read together to ascertain
their meaning"); Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.
2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992) (stating that, "[w]here possible, courts must give full effect
to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with
one another").  Section 768.21 contains four parallel provisions awarding wrongful
death damages to survivors.  To determine the appropriate measure of damages
under section 768.21(3), we look to the three surrounding subsections.  We
conclude that harmony among all of these provisions is achieved by permitting a
minor child to recover damages under subsection (3) based on the joint life
2 Section 768.21(1) gives these damages to “survivors.”  Survivors include
minor children.  § 768.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2002).
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expectancies of the child and deceased parent.
a.  Section 768.21(1)
A generally accepted canon of construction provides that when the
legislature includes a provision in one section of a statute but excludes it in another,
courts will deem the difference intentional and will assign meaning to the omission. 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987).  In Florida’s wrongful death
statute, the Legislature provided in section 768.21(1) for a discretionary limitation
of a minor’s damages in light of the period of minority, but excluded this
discretionary limitation from section 768.21(3).   Section 768.21(1) gives minor
children damages for lost parental support and services.2  Subsection (1) provides
that a minor child's recovery may be limited to the period of minority, in the
factfinder's discretion.  See id. (stating that the period of minority is a factor that
"may be considered" in computing the duration of future losses).  Section
768.21(3) gives minor children damages for lost parental companionship and for
mental pain and suffering.  In contrast to subsection (1), subsection (3) contains no
limitation of damages in light of the period of minority.  If the Legislature had
intended a minor's damages under section 768.21(3) to be limited to the period of
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minority, this limitation could have been expressly added to subsection (3), either
as an absolute limitation or as a discretionary factor as provided in subsection (1). 
Instead, the Legislature excluded the limitation from subsection (3).  This indicates
that the Legislature did not intend a minor child's damages under section 768.21(3)
to be limited to the period of minority.
b.  Section 768.21(2)
A second parallel provision to section 768.21(3) is section 768.21(2), which
grants a surviving spouse damages for the loss of the decedent’s companionship
and for the surviving spouse’s pain and suffering.  § 768.21(2), Fla. Stat. (2002). 
As noted by the district court below, the measure of damages under this section is
not limited to any time period.  When the damages provisions of section 768.21
were first enacted in 1972, subsection (3) precisely mirrored subsection (2), giving
minor children the same damages as a surviving spouse.  In 1990, the Legislature
amended subsection (3) to add damages for adult children.  However, the
amendment limited an adult child's damages under subsection (3) only to cases
where there is no surviving spouse.  BellSouth argues that this amendment should
also apply to limit a minor child’s damages if there is a surviving spouse.  We
disagree.  We find nothing in the language of section 768.21(3) or in the legislative
history of the 1990 amendment to indicate that the Legislature intended the
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existence of a surviving spouse to affect the preexisting recovery rights of minor
children.
c.  Section 768.21(4)
Section 768.21(4), the final parallel provision to section 768.21(3), gives
damages to parents for their pain and suffering based on the death of a minor child. 
Like the district court below, we are persuaded by the reasoning of the Second
District Court of Appeal in calculating the appropriate measure of damages for
bereaved parents under section 768.21(4).  See Gross Builders, Inc. v. Powell, 441
So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).  Gross Builders held that parents' damages
should not be measured based on the remaining minority years of the child, but
should be calculated based on the life expectancies of the parents.  Id. at 1143-44. 
The court reached this conclusion because the evidence in Gross Builders indicated
the parents' pain and suffering could be lifelong.  Id. at 1144.  Similarly, in this case
Kevin Meeks' pain and suffering could be lifelong.  Thus, under Gross Builders’
rationale, Kevin's damages should be calculated based on his life expectancy. 
However, because it would be expected that a child would lose his or her parents
due to natural causes during the child’s lifetime, a child’s pain and suffering
damages related to a parent’s premature death should be limited by the parent’s
normal life expectancy.  This is, in fact, the measure of damages indicated by the
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district court below.
In summary, our review of the four parallel subsections granting wrongful
death damages to survivors indicates that a minor child's recovery under section
768.21(3) should be measured by the joint life expectancy of the child and the
deceased parent.  Of particular significance, a comparison of subsection (3) to
subsection (1) reveals the significant omission from subsection (3) of any limitation
on a minor child’s damages with respect to the period of minority.  As the
Legislature included a discretionary limitation by the period of minority in
subsection (1), the omission of the limitation from subsection (3) indicates an intent
that subsection (3) damages should not be limited by the period of minority. 
Further, this interpretation of subsection (3) preserves the symmetry presumptively
intended by the legislature among subsections (2), (3), and (4)–the three
subsections awarding damages to survivors for lost companionship and for pain
and suffering.   
5.  Standard Jury Instruction
Finally, we note that the interpretation we affirm today comports with the
accepted judicial construction of damages under section 768.21(3), as reflected by
the standard jury instructions published by this Court.  Standard jury instructions
are not binding precedent; however, the instructions are published under this
3 The standard instruction to be given to the jury in a wrongful death case
regarding a surviving minor child’s damages is:
The loss by (name all minor children) of parental companionship,
instruction and guidance, and [his] [her] [their] mental pain and
suffering as a result of the decedent's injury and death. In determining
the duration of such losses, you may consider the [joint life
expectancy of the decedent and [the surviving child] [each of the
surviving children]] [life expectancy of [the surviving child] [each of
the surviving children]] together with the other evidence in the case.
In re Standard Jury Instructions Civil Cases, 522 So. 2d 364, 368 (Fla. 1988).
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Court’s authority and are presumed to be correct.  Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d
1055, 1071 (Fla. 2000).  The standard jury instruction for section 768.21(3)
indicates that damages are to be based on the life expectancies of the minor child
and deceased parent.  In re Standard Jury Instructions Civil Cases, 522 So. 2d 364,
368 (Fla. 1988) (instruction 6.6g).3  We find no case that has directly addressed the
appropriate measure of damages under this section.  In the absence of a definitive
case, instruction 6.6g provides a useful indication of the prevailing judicial
understanding regarding a surviving minor child’s damages in a wrongful death
action.  In the present case, we find no persuasive reason to depart from this
understanding of the Legislature’s intended measure of damages under section
768.21(3).
We therefore hold that the damages recoverable by a minor child under
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section 768.21(3) are not limited to the period of minority, but should be calculated
based on the joint life expectancies of the minor child and the deceased parent.
We decline to address BellSouth’s collateral argument that BellSouth had
transferred its responsibility for the utility pole to Florida Power & Light before
Herbert Meeks’ accident in 1997, because this issue is outside the scope of the
certified question.  See Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1080
n.26 (Fla. 2001) (stating that this Court generally declines to address a claim that is
outside the scope of the certified question and that has not passed jurisdictional
muster).  
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we answer the certified question in the negative
and approve the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs specially with an opinion.
CANTERO, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
ANSTEAD, C.J., specially concurring.
While I concur in the majority's determination that a minor child's recovery
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of section 768.21(3) damages are not limited to the period of minority, I write
briefly only to note that neither the statutory language nor the legislative history
adequately answers all of the troubling questions raised by this case.  Nevertheless,
I particularly commend the thoroughness of Judge Sawaya's opinion for the Fifth
District which we approve today.  When all is said and done, however, we are still
left with a result that allows one adult child to recover for lifetime pain and suffering
for the loss of a parent, while another adult child only a few years older is entitled
to no recovery at all.  
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Great Public Importance 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D01-1805
(St. Johns County)
John R. Hargrove of Heinrich, Gordon, Hargrove, Weihe & James, P.A., Fort
Lauderdale, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert P. Avolio and Tracy L. Markham of Avolio & Hanlon, P.C., St. Augustine,
Florida,
for Respondent