Title: OKLAHOMA CITY URBAN RENEWAL AUTHORITY v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY
Citation: 110 P.3d 550, 2005 OK 2
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 2005

OKLAHOMA CITY URBAN RENEWAL AUTHORITY v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY Annotate this Case OKLAHOMA CITY URBAN RENEWAL AUTHORITY v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY 2005 OK 2 110 P.3d 550 Case Number: 100413, Consol. w/ No. 100538 Decided: 01/11/2005 As Corrected: March 28, 2005 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority, a public body corporate, Plaintiff/Appellee/Appellant, v. The City of Oklahoma City, OK, a municipal corporation, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff/Appellee/Appellant, v. Moshe Tal, a resident taxpayer of The City of Oklahoma City, OK, and Taxpayers for Honest Government, an unincorporated association of resident taxpayers of the City of Oklahoma City, OK, Third-Party Defendants/Appellants/Appellees and Qui Tam Counterclaim Plaintiffs, v. Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority, a public body corporate, Qui Tam Counterclaim Defendant, and The State of Oklahoma ex rel. Moshe Tal and Taxpayers for Honest Government, Qui Tam Third-Party Plaintiffs/Appellants/Counter-Appellees, v. Kirk D. Humphreys, in his personal and official capacity as the Mayor of the City, James D. Couch, in his personal capacity as the City Manager & MAPS Director, James E. Thompson, in his personal and official capacity as Assistant City Manager; William R. Burkett, in his personal and official capacity as City Municipal Counselor; William O. West, in his personal and official capacity as former City Municipal Counselor; Daniel T. Brummitt, Kenneth D. Jordan, Richard C. Smith, and Diane Lewis, in their personal and official capacities as Assistants and/or deputies to Municipal Counselor; Mick Cornett, Lawrence F. McAtee, Jr., Ann Simank, Willa Johnson, and Guy Liebmann, in their personal and official capacities as Councilpersons of the City; Amy U. Brooks, in her personal and official capacity as former City Councilwoman, Tiana P. Douglas, in her personal and official capacity as the Executive Director of Urban Renewal; James R. Tolbert III, Fred Jones Hall, J. Larry Nichols, Stanton L. Young, and Warren Gardner, in their personal and official capacities as Commissioners of Urban Renewal; James (Dan) Batchelor, and Leslie V. Batchelor, in their personal and official capacities as legal counselor of Urban Renewal; Bass Pro, Inc.; Bass Pro Outdoor World, L.L.C.; Gaylord Entertainment Company; The Estate of Edward L. Gaylord (deceased); Dan Randolph Hogan; Mark D. Elgin; TMK/Hogan Joint Venture and/or commercial Real Estate Services Joint Venture; Bricktown TMK/Hogan Entertainment, L.L.C. (a.k.a. Bricktown Entertainment, L.L.C.), Hogan Property Management, L.L.C.; Bricktown Parking Investors, L.L.C., Bricktown-TMK/Hogan Parking, L.L.C. (a.k.a. Bricktown SMC/Hogan, L.L.C.); BAP-Bricktown, L.L.C.; Stonegate Management Company, L.L.C.; Elgin Development Company, L.L.C.; TDC Company, L.L.C.; Oklahoma City Athletic Club, Inc.; OKC Athletic Club L.P.; Clayton Bennett; Tim O'Toole; The City of Oklahoma City; and John Does No. 1-50, Qui Tam Third-Party Defendants, with Qui Tam Third-Party Defendants Burkett, Brummitt, Jordan, Smith, Lewis, James (Dan) Batchelor and Leslie V. Batchelor Qui Tam Third-Party Defendants/Appellees/Counter-Appellants and Qui Tam Third-Party Defendant William O. West Qui Tam Third-Party Defendant/Appellee. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY Honorable Noma D. Gurich, Trial Judge ¶0 Moshe Tal, (Tal) a resident taxpayer of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and a group of citizens known as Taxpayers for Honest Government (Taxpayers) filed a written demand with the City of Oklahoma City (City) under the qui tam statutes, 62 O.S. 2001 §372-373. The demand challenged various transactions of the City and the Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority (Authority) concerning the development of an area in Oklahoma City known as Bricktown. In response to the demand, the Authority and the City filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking to have the challenged transactions declared lawful under the Oklahoma statutes. The City also filed a third-party petition for declaratory judgment against Tal and the Taxpayers. Tal and the Taxpayers asserted qui tam claims against the City and the Authority. After numerous motions were filed by both sides, the trial court held hearings on the motions and issued several orders. The trial court certified the orders for appeal pursuant to APPEALS DISMISSED AS PREMATURE; CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. Leslie V. Batchelor, James Dan Batchelor, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Qui Tam Third-PartyDefendants/Appellees/Counter-Appellants, James Dan Batchelor and Leslie V. Batchelor and Plaintiff/Appellant Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority. Moshe Tal, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Pro Se. James E. Dunn, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Third-Party Defendants/Appellants/Appellees and Qui Tam Counterclaim Plaintiffs, Qui Tam Third-Party Plaintiffs/Counter-Appellees, Taxpayers for Honest Government. Kenneth D. Jordon, Richard C. Smith, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff/Appellant/The City of Oklahoma City and Qui Tam Third-Party Defendants/Appellees/Counter-Appellants William R. Burkett, Daniel T. Brummitt, Kenneth D. Jordan, Richard C. Smith and Diane Lewis and Qui Tam Third-Party Defendant/Appellee William O. West. KAUGER, J: ¶1 We retained this cause to address whether the trial court erred in advancing several orders for appeal pursuant PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS ¶2 This cause concerns another of the challenges to the development of an area in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, known as Bricktown, brought by Moshe Tal (Tal) ¶3 On April, 3, 2003, the City filed a third-party petition for declaratory judgment against Tal and Taxpayers, alleging that the written demand was invalid because it was unverified. ¶4 Subsequently, various motions to dismiss/strike the petitions and motions for summary judgment were filed by the parties. The trial court, in a September 9, 2003, journal entry granted summary judgment in favor of the City and the Authority. It determined that the transactions were lawful under the Oklahoma statutes and advanced its ruling for appeal pursuant to ¶5 On January 29, 2004, the trial court issued several orders which: 1) declined to strike the third-party qui tam petition or to dismiss the qui tam counterclaims; 2) dismissed the qui tam action against the third-party defendant attorneys representing the parties involving the various disputed transactions; 3) determined that a good faith effort was made to verify the written demand; and 4) declined to dismiss the qui tam third-party petition against the City, or third-party defendant's Humphreys and Liebmann. In another order filed March 9, 2004, the trial court reaffirmed its September 9, 2003, order, upheld the lease and the use tax appropriation as constitutional, and advanced the ruling for appeal. ¶6 On March 10, 2004, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial concerning the lease and the use tax appropriation, but granted it regarding the redevelopment agreement based on newly discovered evidence. It also vacated its previous advancement of the September 9, 2003, order for appeal, and then advanced its denial of the new trial for appeal. ¶7 On March 1, 2004, Tal filed an appeal (No. 100,413), seeking review of the September 9, 2003, order, and a January 29, 2004, order which dismissed the third party defendant attorneys. On March 9, 2004, the qui tam third-party defendant attorneys filed a counter-petition in error also seeking review of a January 29, 2004, order. ¶8 BECAUSE THE ORDERS APPEALED EITHER LEFT ISSUES PENDING ON ADVANCED CLAIMS OR WERE SO INTERRELATED AND INTERTWINED WITH THE PENDING CLAIMS, THE TRIAL COURT PREMATURELY ADVANCED THE ORDERS. ¶9 The Authority and City contend that after the trial court advanced the September 9, 2003, order, pursuant to ¶10 Title ¶11 A judgment is unsuitable for §994 certification when the court disposes of but a portion of the contest by leaving unresolved any issue on the merits of the partly-decided claim. ¶12 While the trial court is permitted to determine the appropriate time when each final decision upon which one or more, but less than all of the claims in a multiple claims action is ready for appeal, A. Advancement of the September 9, 2003, and January 29, 2004, orders. ¶13 It appears from the record that the September 9, 2003, order was prematurely advanced by the trial court because the summary judgment on the declaratory judgment claims left unresolved issues on the partially-decided claims. For instance, the appellate record shows that the trial court, when considering the declaratory judgment action at the summary judgment stage on July 16, 2003, held in abeyance any determination as to the constitutional infirmity of any of the transactions it was considering. B. Advancement of the March 9 and 10, 2004 orders. ¶14 Eventually, in the March 9 and 10, 2004, orders the trial court: 1) upheld two of the disputed transactions -- the lease and the use tax appropriation ---- as constitutional; and 2) granted a partial new trial regarding the redevelopment agreement. Nevertheless, we determine that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that there was no just reason for delay in advancing the March 9, and 10, 2004, orders prior to a final adjudication of all of the remaining claims. ¶15 This is so because the qui tam claims, with the exception of the claim asserted against the third-party defendant attorneys, are still pending. The obvious function in filing the declaratory judgment suit was to divert the filing of a qui tam suit by reaching the same issues which would have been decided, had a qui tam suit become necessary. The declaratory judgment claims and the still pending qui tam claims, under the facts of this case, largely involve the same transactions and occurrences, an identity of parties, and an identity of facts ---- both actions were brought to resolve the challenges in the written demand. ¶16 In short, because the declaratory judgment claims and the qui tam claims CONCLUSION ¶17 In multi-party/multi-claim cases, advancement of orders pursuant to THE APPEALS ARE DISMISSED AS PREMATURE; CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL JUSTICES CONCUR. FOOT