Title: Estate of Robert C. Parker v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc.
Citation: 2010 WI 71
Docket Number: 2008AP002440-LV
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 2010

2010 WI 71 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP2440-LV 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Michael Leavitt Secretary, Department of Health 
and Human Services, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
Estate of Robert C. Parker by Special 
Administrator Elizabeth Parker and Elizabeth 
Parker, 
          Plaintiffs-Petitioners-Appellants, 
     v. 
Beverly Enterprises, Inc., ABC Insurance 
Company, Beverly Enterprises - Wisconsin, Inc. 
d/b/a Golden Age Nursing Home, DEF Insurance 
Company, Beverly Health and Rehabilitation 
Services, Inc., GHI Insurance Company, GGNSC 
Tomahawk Golden Age, LLC d/b/a Golden Living 
Center-Golden Age, JKL Insurance Company, 
Beverly Indemnity, LTD. and American Home 
Assurance Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A PETITION FOR REVIEW AND A MOTION TO 
DISMISS THE PETITION FOR REVIEW 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 16, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Lincoln   
 
JUDGE: 
Jay R. Tlusty   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
GABLEMAN, J., joins concurrence. 
 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-petitioners-appellants there were briefs 
by Jeffrey A. Pitman, Lisa L. Kritske, and Pitman, Kyle & 
Sicula, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jeffrey A. Pitman. 
 
 
 
2 
For the defendants-respondents there were briefs by Robert 
F. Johnson, Colleen M. Fleming, and Cook & Franke, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Robert F. Johnson. 
 
An amicus curiae brief filed by William C. Gleisner, III 
and the Law Offices of William Gleisner, Milwaukee, and Rhonda 
L. Lanford and Habush, Habush & Rottier, Milwaukee, on behalf of 
the Wisconsin Association for Justice. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 71
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP2440-LV  
(L.C. No. 
2007CV283) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Michael Leavitt, Secretary, Department of 
Health and Human Services, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
 
Estate of Robert C. Parker by Special 
Administrator Elizabeth Parker and Elizabeth 
Parker, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Petitioners-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Beverly Enterprises, Inc., ABC Insurance 
Company, Beverly Enterprises - Wisconsin, Inc. 
d/b/a Golden Age Nursing Home, DEF Insurance 
Company, Beverly Health and Rehabilitation 
Services, Inc., GHI Insurance Company, GGNSC 
Tomahawk Golden Age, LLC d/b/a Golden Living 
Center-Golden Age, JKL Insurance Company, 
Beverly Indemnity, LTD. and American Home 
Assurance Company, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
MOTION to dismiss a petition for review for lack of 
jurisdiction.  Motion denied.  
 
No. 
2008AP2440-LV   
 
2 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  This case is before the court 
in an unusual procedural posture.  Elizabeth Parker and the 
Estate of Robert Parker (collectively, "Parker") filed a 
petition for review of two orders of the court of appeals, which 
dismissed and denied Parker's appeals of a circuit court order 
compelling arbitration.1  In response, Beverly Enterprises-
Wisconsin, Inc. d/b/a Golden Age Nursing Home and other 
defendants (collectively, "Beverly Enterprises") filed a motion 
to dismiss the petition for review.  We address here the motion 
to dismiss the petition. 
¶2 
The decision to accept or deny a petition for review 
is within the discretion of this court.  Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 
809.62(1r).  Normally, questions raised prior to our issuance of 
an order granting or denying a petition for review would not 
merit a published opinion.  However, the questions raised by 
Beverly Enterprises' motion to dismiss presented important and 
unresolved issues of Wisconsin law that warranted supplementary 
briefing and oral arguments.  We publish this order to provide 
needed guidance to litigants and to the court of appeals.   
¶3 
Beverly Enterprises' primary argument is that under 
Teamsters Union Local No. 695 v. County of Waukesha, 57 
Wis. 2d 62, 203 N.W.2d 707 (1973), Worthington v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 64 Wis. 2d 108, 218 N.W.2d 373 (1974), and Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
1 Estate of Parker v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., No. 
2008AP2440-LV, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2008), 
reviewing an order of the circuit court for Lincoln County, Jay 
R. Tlusty, J.   
No. 
2008AP2440-LV   
 
3 
 
§ 788.15,2 this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition 
for review because orders compelling arbitration are not 
appealable.  It further claims that when the court of appeals 
denies permission to file an appeal, this court is not permitted 
to review the court of appeals' discretionary decision.      
¶4 
Because the reasoning underlying the Teamsters and 
Worthington decisions no longer reflects Wisconsin's approach to 
appellate 
jurisdiction, 
the 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 788.15 advanced by those cases no longer comports with 
Wisconsin law.  Further, although we have repeatedly stated that 
we will not review the court of appeals' decision to deny leave 
to appeal, our refusal is not based on lack of jurisdiction.  
Rather, it is based on practice, rooted in concerns for judicial 
administration and respect for the court of appeals' exercise of 
discretion. 
¶5 
We need not decide here whether appeal of a circuit 
court order compelling arbitration is a permissive appeal or an 
appeal as of right.3  Under either circumstance, Article VII, § 3 
of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that this court has 
jurisdiction to review an order issued by the court of appeals.  
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-
08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Although 
the 
parties 
discussed 
the 
procedures 
for 
appealing orders of the circuit court, they did not brief or 
argue 
whether 
an 
order 
compelling 
arbitration 
should 
be 
understood as a permissive appeal or an appeal as of right. 
No. 
2008AP2440-LV   
 
4 
 
Accordingly, we deny Beverly Enterprises' motion to dismiss the 
petition for review.4     
I 
¶6 
On June 18, 2004, Robert Parker was admitted to the 
Golden Age Nursing Home in Tomah, Wisconsin.  As his durable 
power of attorney, his wife Elizabeth signed various documents 
for the purposes of his admission.  One of these documents was a 
"Resident and Facility Arbitration Agreement."        
¶7 
Robert Parker died six months after his admission.  
Elizabeth Parker and the Estate of Robert Parker filed a 
complaint in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County.  The complaint 
alleged various breach of contract and tort claims against 
Beverly Enterprises.     
¶8 
In 
its 
answer, 
Beverly 
Enterprises 
raised 
the 
arbitration agreement as an affirmative defense.  It then filed 
a notice of motion and motion to stay the judicial proceedings 
and compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement.   
¶9 
In an oral ruling, the circuit court determined that 
the arbitration agreement was valid under Wis. Stat. § 788.01.5  
                                                 
4 This court previously advised the parties that the ordered 
briefing and argument would be limited to the threshold question 
of jurisdiction, not whether we should accept or deny the 
petition for review.  See infra, ¶15.  A separate order 
addressing the merits of the petition for review is also issued 
today.   
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 788.01 provides: 
A provision in any written contract to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of 
the contract, or out of the refusal to perform the 
whole or any part of the contract, or an agreement in 
No. 
2008AP2440-LV   
 
5 
 
It also determined that the agreement was neither procedurally 
nor substantively unconscionable.  Having determined that the 
arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable, the court 
granted Beverly Enterprises' motion to stay proceedings and 
compel arbitration pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 788.02.6   
¶10 Parker filed a petition for leave to appeal.  When a 
party wishes to appeal a judgment or order that is not 
appealable as a matter of right, it is necessary to request 
leave to appeal pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2) and § 809.50. 
¶11 Shortly thereafter, Parker also filed a notice of 
appeal.  A notice of appeal, filed pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.03(1) and § 809.10, indicates an appeal of a final 
judgment or a final order which may be appealed as a matter of 
right.   
                                                                                                                                                             
writing between 2 or more persons to submit to 
arbitration any controversy existing between them at 
the time of the agreement to submit, shall be valid, 
irrevocable and enforceable except upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract. . . .  
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 788.02 provides: 
If any suit or proceeding be brought upon any issue 
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing 
for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is 
pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved 
in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration 
under such an agreement, shall on application of one 
of the parties stay the trial of the action until such 
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms 
of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay 
is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration. 
No. 
2008AP2440-LV   
 
6 
 
¶12 In an unpublished order, the court of appeals stated: 
"To the extent the appellants/petitioners believe the subject 
order is appealable as of right, our supreme court has held that 
an 'order compelling submission of a dispute to arbitration is 
not appealable' under Wis. Stat. § 788.15."  (Citing Teamsters, 
57 Wis. 2d at 67.)  The court of appeals' order dismissed the 
notice of appeal "for lack of jurisdiction." 
¶13 The court of appeals also addressed Parker's petition 
for leave to appeal.  It concluded: "[T]he petition fails to 
establish that granting interlocutory appeal would accomplish 
any of the purposes set out in Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2)."  Thus, 
the court of appeals denied Parker's petition.   
¶14 Parker filed a petition for review in this court.  In 
response, Beverly Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss the 
petition for review, stating that this court lacks jurisdiction 
to review a circuit court order compelling arbitration.  Parker 
replied, asserting that this court has limited jurisdiction to 
address whether an arbitration agreement is valid under Wis. 
Stat. §§ 788.01 and 788.02 prior to arbitration.7  We ordered 
supplemental briefs and oral arguments on the question of this 
court's jurisdiction to consider the petition for review.   
¶15 In an order dated March 4, 2010, we further clarified 
that oral argument would be limited to the question of 
jurisdiction: 
"This 
court 
must 
decide 
whether 
it 
has 
                                                 
7 The Wisconsin Association for Justice filed an amicus 
brief in support of Parker and also asserts that this court has 
jurisdiction. 
No. 
2008AP2440-LV   
 
7 
 
jurisdiction to consider the petition for review filed on 
December 12, 2008.  The arguments addressed to the court on 
April 16 are to be limited to whether the court has jurisdiction 
to accept the pending petition.  The merits of the petition for 
review will not be considered at this time."   
II 
¶16 Because this case is before the court in an unusual 
procedural posture, it is important to clarify the issues before 
the court.  Both parties agree that the circuit court had 
jurisdiction over Parker's complaint.  They also agree that the 
circuit court had jurisdiction to evaluate the validity of the 
arbitration agreement under Wis. Stat. § 788.01 and to stay the 
proceedings and compel arbitration under Wis. Stat. § 788.02.   
¶17 The parties disagree, however, about whether the 
circuit court's order staying the proceedings and compelling 
arbitration was appealable.  In this court, the question has 
been phrased by the parties as one of jurisdiction——that is, 
whether this court has jurisdiction to consider the petition for 
review. 
¶18 Beverly Enterprises argues that the question of this 
court's jurisdiction has already been resolved.  It asserts that 
under Wis. Stat. § 788.15 and longstanding case law, orders 
compelling arbitration are not appealable.   
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § 788.15 provides: "An appeal may be 
taken from an order confirming, modifying, correcting or 
vacating an award, or from a judgment entered upon an award, as 
from an order or judgment in an action."  In the mid-1970s, 
No. 
2008AP2440-LV   
 
8 
 
Teamsters and Worthington interpreted this language to mean that 
the supreme court had no jurisdiction to review an order 
compelling arbitration.     
¶20 Beverly Enterprises argues that the legislature's 
failure 
to 
amend 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 788.15 
demonstrates the legislature's agreement with the Teamsters and 
Worthington decisions.  In its memorandum in support of the 
motion to dismiss, it explained:  
Had the Wisconsin Legislature taken issue with the 
interpretation this Court gave to Wis. Stat. § 788.15 
or its predecessor, Wis. Stat. § 298.15, it could have 
taken action.  It could have added the phrase "orders 
compelling 
arbitration" 
to 
the 
types 
of 
orders 
appealable under Wis. Stat. § 788.15.  It has not done 
so.  Thus, its silence with regard to the Court's 
Teamsters 
and 
Worthington 
decisions 
demonstrates 
legislative acquiescence therein.       
¶21 In addition, Beverly Enterprises argues that no review 
of the court of appeals' denial of leave to appeal is permitted.  
We address these arguments in turn.   
A 
¶22 We 
begin 
by 
discussing 
whether 
this 
court 
has 
jurisdiction to consider a petition for review involving an 
order of the circuit court compelling arbitration.  In the 1973 
case Teamsters Union Local 695 v. County of Waukesha, 57 
Wis. 2d 62, this court concluded that an order compelling 
arbitration was not appealable.   
¶23 Teamsters 
involved a dispute under a collective 
bargaining agreement, which provided that unsettled grievances 
would be submitted to arbitration.  Id. at 64-65.  The circuit 
No. 
2008AP2440-LV   
 
9 
 
court entered judgment compelling arbitration.  One of the 
parties filed notice of appeal.   
¶24 In a published opinion, the supreme court raised sua 
sponte the threshold question of jurisdiction, which had not 
been briefed or argued by the parties: 
A number of issues are raised or present themselves on 
this appeal.  However, the threshold that must be 
crossed to reach any of them is the question of 
appealability.  If the order or judgment of the trial 
court directing the parties to proceed to arbitration 
is not appealable, this court is without jurisdiction 
to do more than to dismiss the appeal.  While not 
raised or argued on this appeal, this basic question 
of appealability must be initially resolved as it goes 
to the jurisdiction of this court to hear the appeal 
at all.         
Id. at 65-66. 
¶25 The court determined that the answer to this question 
depended on "the language of the statute of the particular 
jurisdiction, if any, defining appealability or listing or 
describing the kinds of orders which are or are not appealable."  
Id. at 67.  It looked to the predecessor to the current 
Wis. Stat. § 788.15, which provided: 
An appeal may be taken from an order confirming, 
modifying, correcting or vacating an award, or from a 
judgment entered upon an award, as from an order or 
judgment in an action. 
Wis. Stat. § 298.15 (1971-72) (renumbered to Wis. Stat. § 788.15 
by 1979 Wis. Act 32). 
¶26 Based on this statute, the court concluded that only 
those judgments or orders that confirm, modify, correct, or 
vacate an arbitration award are appealable.  Id. at 67.  It 
No. 
2008AP2440-LV   
 
10 
 
reached this conclusion by applying the rule of construction, 
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius," which means that 
express mention of one matter excludes other similar matters not 
mentioned.  Id. at 67.  Because an order compelling arbitration 
is not an order confirming, modifying, correcting, or vacating 
an arbitration award, the Teamsters court determined that it was 
not appealable, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to review 
the order.8  Id. at 67. 
¶27 The court further stated that public policy supported 
its determination that orders compelling arbitration were not 
appealable: "[I]f at the very threshold of the proceeding the 
defaulting party could appeal and thereby indefinitely delay the 
matter of arbitration, the object of the law and the purpose of 
the written agreement"——presumably, speedy resolution of the 
dispute——"would be entirely defeated."  Id. at 68 (quoting 
Corbett v. Petroleum Maintenance Co., 258 P.2d 1077 (Cal. App. 
1953)).  Nevertheless, the court recognized that the public 
policy decision was a determination for the legislature to make: 
"If [the legislature] sees wisdom in permitting such appeals, it 
has only to add orders compelling arbitration to the list of 
those made appealable."  Id. at 69.   
                                                 
8 The Teamsters court explained that "[n]o right . . . is 
lost by holding that the order to proceed with arbitration is 
not appealable.  Under the construction given the statute, such 
issues may be raised by either party, following the resort to 
arbitration, but not before.  They are not erased or cut off by 
such deferral."  Teamsters Union Local No. 695 v. County of 
Waukesha, 57 Wis. 2d 62, 70, 203 N.W.2d 707 (1973). 
No. 
2008AP2440-LV   
 
11 
 
¶28 One year later, the court decided Worthington v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 64 Wis. 2d 108.  There, the circuit 
court compelled an insured and her insurer to arbitrate their 
dispute under the terms of their arbitration agreement.  This 
court applied the holding and rationale from Teamsters and 
concluded that the circuit court's order was not appealable.          
¶29 In the 37 years following Teamsters, the legislature 
has not added orders compelling arbitration to the list of 
appealable orders in Wis. Stat. § 788.15.  Aside from being 
renumbered, the statute has not been amended.    
¶30 However, in the years since Teamsters was decided, the 
legislature has made significant and substantive changes to the 
law governing appellate jurisdiction.  These changes were 
introduced by constitutional amendment and by statute when the 
court system was reorganized in 1977.  After these changes, the 
Teamsters 
court's 
analysis 
does 
not 
accurately 
reflect 
Wisconsin's construct of appellate jurisdiction.   
¶31 Prior to 1977, the supreme court was the only 
appellate court in the state.  Under Wis. Stat. § 817.09(2) 
(1975-76),9 final judgments were appealable to the supreme court 
as a matter of right.  In addition, some specified non-final 
orders were also 
appealable as a matter of right, and 
                                                 
9 This section was renumbered in the years prior to the 
court reorganization.  When Teamsters and Worthington were 
decided, the relevant statute was Wis. Stat. § 274.09 (1971-72).    
No. 
2008AP2440-LV   
 
12 
 
Wis. Stat. § 817.33 (1975-1976) enumerated a long list of those 
orders.10      
                                                 
10 Wis. Stat. § 817.33 (1975-76) provided in part: 
Appealable orders.  The following orders when made by 
the court may be appealed to the supreme court: 
(1) An order affecting a substantial right, made in 
any action, when such order in effect determines the 
action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal 
might be taken. 
 . . . . 
(3) 
When an order: 
(a) 
Grants, 
refuses, 
continues 
or 
modifies 
a 
provisional remedy; 
(b) 
Grants, 
refuses, 
modifies 
or 
dissolves 
an 
injunction; 
(c) Sets aside or dismisses a writ of attachment; 
(d) Grants a new trial; 
(e) Grants or overrules a motion to dismiss under s. 
802.06(2) or a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
based on total insufficiency of pleaded defenses under 
s. 802.06(3) or a motion to strike based on the 
insufficiency of one or more pleaded defenses under s. 
802.06(6); 
(f) Decides a question of jurisdiction; 
(g) Grants or denies a motion for stay of proceeding 
under s. 801.63; or  
(h) Denies a motion for summary judgment.   
(3m) A party on whose motion a new trial has been 
ordered may nevertheless appeal from such order for 
the purpose of reviewing a denial of his motion after 
verdict for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or to 
change answers in the verdict. 
No. 
2008AP2440-LV   
 
13 
 
¶32 Orders compelling arbitration were not on the list of 
appealable 
orders 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 819.33. 
 
Therefore, 
to 
determine whether such an order was appealable, the Teamsters 
court looked to the statutes governing arbitration.  Not finding 
an order compelling arbitration in the list of appealable orders 
within the statutory chapter on arbitration either, the court 
concluded that such an order was not appealable and that it had 
no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  The Teamsters decision 
comports with Wisconsin's approach to appellate jurisdiction at 
the time it was decided. 
¶33 Effective August 1, 1978, the organization of the 
Wisconsin court system was significantly and substantively 
changed.  The most significant change was the creation of the 
court of appeals.  See Wis. Const. art. VII, § 5 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.03.  Due to the addition of an intermediate appellate 
court, the legislature reconfigured concepts of appellate 
jurisdiction. 
¶34 Article VII, § 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution is 
titled "Supreme court: jurisdiction."  It now provides that this 
court "has appellate jurisdiction over all courts," and "[t]he 
supreme court may review judgments and orders of the court of 
                                                                                                                                                             
(4) Orders made by the court vacating or refusing to 
set aside orders made at chambers, when an appeal 
might have been taken in case the order so made at 
chambers had been made by the court in the first 
instance.  For the purpose of appealing from an order 
either party may require the order to be entered by 
the clerk of record.   
No. 
2008AP2440-LV   
 
14 
 
appeals . . . ."  Sections 3(2), 3(3).  Review by the supreme 
court is a matter of the court's discretion, not of right.  Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.62.    
¶35 The constitutional amendments also set forth the 
jurisdiction of the court of appeals.  Wisconsin Const. Art. 
VII, § 5(3) now provides that the court of appeals "shall have 
such 
appellate 
jurisdiction 
in 
the 
district . . . as 
the 
legislature may provide by law . . . ."  To fulfill its 
obligation to provide for the jurisdiction of the court of 
appeals, the legislature passed 1977 Wis. Act 187.  That act 
created Wis. Stat. § 808.03, titled "Appeals to the court of 
appeals."   
¶36 Section 808.03 provides as follows: 
(1) Appeals as of right.  A final judgment or a final 
order of a circuit court may be appealed as a matter 
of right to the court of appeals unless otherwise 
expressly provided by law. . . .  
(2) Appeals by permission.  A judgment or order not 
appealable as a matter of right under sub. (1) may be 
appealed to the court of appeals in advance of a final 
judgment or order upon leave granted by the court if 
it determines that an appeal will: 
(a) 
Materially 
advance 
the 
termination 
of 
the 
litigation or clarify further proceedings in the 
litigation; 
(b) 
Protect 
the 
petitioner 
from 
substantial 
or 
irreparable injury; or 
(c) Clarify an issue of general importance in the 
administration of justice.  
¶37 The explanatory note in 1977 Senate Bill 525, which 
became 1977 Wis. Act. 187, explained that Wis. Stat. § 808.03 
No. 
2008AP2440-LV   
 
15 
 
replaced the former §§ 817.09 and 817.33.  It further explained 
that section 808.03 "represents a major substantive change."  
¶38 The 
"major 
substantive 
change" 
created 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 808.03 is described in the leading treatise on 
Wisconsin appellate procedure as follows:  
[T]he reorganization of the Wisconsin court system 
replaced 
a 
long 
list 
of 
appealable 
orders 
and 
judgments with a simple test allowing appeals as of 
right only from final orders or judgments.  The 
corollary to this limitation on appeals as a matter of 
right is to allow appeals from nonfinal orders and 
judgments with permission of the court of appeals.   
Michael S. Heffernan, Appellate Practice and Procedure in 
Wisconsin § 9.1 (4th ed. 2006).  The treatise further explains: 
"This discretionary jurisdiction to consider nonfinal orders and 
judgments replaces the exceptions in the prior procedure that 
allowed appeals as of right from many types of nonfinal orders 
and judgments."  Id., § 2.3.    
¶39 Following the court reorganization, we no longer look 
to statutory language "listing or describing the kinds of orders 
which are or are not appealable" to determine whether we have 
appellate jurisdiction over a particular circuit court order.  
See Teamsters, 57 Wis. 2d at 67.  Rather, under the constitution 
and the applicable statutes, appellate courts now have broad 
jurisdiction over all orders and judgments of the circuit court.  
The reasoning of the Teamsters and Worthington decisions no 
longer reflects Wisconsin's approach to appellate jurisdiction. 
¶40 Nevertheless, some of the policy rationale underlying 
Teamsters and Worthington still ring true.  The object and 
No. 
2008AP2440-LV   
 
16 
 
purpose of a written arbitration agreement could be easily 
defeated at the very threshold of the proceeding if appeals were 
permitted on a regular basis.  See Teamsters, 57 Wis. 2d at 68 
(quoting Corbett v. Petroleum Maintenance Co., 258 P.2d 1077 
(Cal. App. 1953)).  It has been the policy of this state and 
this 
court 
to 
foster 
arbitration 
as 
an 
alternative 
to 
litigation.  State v. P.G. Miron Constr. Co., Inc., 181 
Wis. 2d 1045, 1055, 512 N.W.2d 499 (1994).  The advantages of 
arbitration "lie[] in the avoidance of the formalities, delay, 
and expense of litigation."  Id.  When the parties have 
voluntarily agreed to arbitrate their disputes, both their 
intentions and these advantages are of paramount importance.      
B 
¶41 Having concluded that Teamsters, Worthington, and Wis. 
Stat. § 788.15 do not prevent this court from considering the 
petition for review, we turn to Beverly Enterprises' second 
argument.  It asserts no review of the court of appeals' denial 
of leave to appeal is permitted.  
¶42 Section 808.03(2) provides the standard by which the 
court of appeals exercises its discretion in determining whether 
to grant a permissive appeal.  The court of appeals will grant 
leave only if it concludes that doing so will (a) materially 
advance the termination of the litigation or clarify further 
proceedings in the litigation; (b) protect the petitioner from 
substantial or irreparable injury; or (c) clarify an issue of 
general importance in the administration of justice.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 808.03(2).  
No. 
2008AP2440-LV   
 
17 
 
¶43 Further, the court of appeals seldom grants permissive 
appeals when the party seeking leave does not demonstrate likely 
circuit court error and is therefore unlikely to prevail on the 
merits.  "[T]he court will want to ensure that an appeal will 
not simply serve to delay and defeat the ends of justice, rather 
than expedite and clarify the proceedings."  Heffernan, supra, 
§ 9.4.   
¶44 Here, the court of appeals denied leave to appeal, 
explaining that the criteria in 808.03(2) were not met.  We have 
frequently stated that we will not review, case by case, the 
court of appeals' discretionary determination to grant or deny a 
permissive appeal.  See State v. Whitty, 86 Wis. 2d 380, 272 
N.W.2d 842 (1978); Aparacor, Inc. v. DILHR, 97 Wis. 2d 399, 403,  
293 N.W.2d 545 (1980) (citing State v. Jenich, 94 Wis. 2d 74, 77 
n.2, 288 N.W.2d 114 (1980) ("When the parties agree that the 
order of the circuit court is not a final order appealable as of 
right, this court will not review the court of appeals' exercise 
of its discretion whether to hear the appeal.").       
¶45 The language of our case law is strong.  We have 
stated that "[w]here the court of appeals denies permission to 
appeal from an order conceded by the parties to be nonfinal, no 
review by this court is permitted."  Aparacor, 97 Wis. 2d at 
403. 
¶46 Yet, these cases do not indicate that this court lacks 
jurisdiction to review the court of appeals' order.  Nothing in 
the Wisconsin Constitution or the Wisconsin statutes indicates 
that this court has no jurisdiction over the case.  To the 
No. 
2008AP2440-LV   
 
18 
 
contrary, the Wisconsin Constitution provides that we have 
"appellate jurisdiction over all courts" and we "may review 
judgments and orders of the court of appeals." 
¶47 Rather than a matter of jurisdiction, our refusal to 
review the court of appeals' denial of a permissive appeal is a 
matter of practice, based on judicial administration and respect 
for the court of appeals' exercise of discretion.  "It is well 
settled that petitions seeking review of a court of appeals' 
denial of leave to appeal are generally not permitted."  
Engelhaupt v. United Transp. Union, No. 2007AP18-LV, unpublished 
slip op., ¶5 (Wis. June 10, 2008).  As we explained in Aparacor, 
"[a] contrary practice would divest the court of appeals of the 
discretion entrusted to it by sec. 808.03(2)."  97 Wis. 2d at 
404. 
III 
¶48 In sum, because the reasoning underlying the Teamsters 
and 
Worthington 
decisions 
no 
longer 
reflects 
Wisconsin's 
approach to appellate jurisdiction, the interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 788.15 advanced by those cases no longer comports with 
Wisconsin law.  Further, although we have repeatedly stated that 
we will not review the court of appeals' decision to deny leave 
to appeal, our refusal is not based on lack of jurisdiction.  
Rather, it is based on practice, rooted in concerns for judicial 
administration and respect for the court of appeals' exercise of 
discretion. 
¶49 We need not decide here whether appeal of a circuit 
court order compelling arbitration is a permissive appeal or an 
No. 
2008AP2440-LV   
 
19 
 
appeal as of right.  Under either circumstance, Article VII, § 3 
of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that this court has 
jurisdiction to review an order issued by the court of appeals.  
Accordingly, we deny Beverly Enterprises' motion to dismiss the 
petition for review. 
By the Court.—The motion to dismiss the petition for review 
is denied. 
 
No.  2008AP2440-LV.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶50 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion but write separately to emphasize that the sole 
reason for hearing this matter was to address the unresolved 
question of jurisdiction. 
¶51 In response to Parker's petition for review, Beverly 
Enterprises contended that the court lacked jurisdiction to 
review a circuit court order compelling arbitration.  Making an 
argument that this court lacks jurisdiction to review a circuit 
court order is roughly equivalent to a minnow taunting a 
muskellunge.  Neither the argument nor the minnow is likely to 
survive. 
¶52 Nonetheless, no reader should view this opinion as an 
invitation for parties to appeal circuit court orders compelling 
arbitration, or file petitions for review from orders like the 
order issued by the court of appeals.  See Majority op., ¶40. 
¶53 Under Wis. Stat. § 788.01, arbitration agreements are 
enforceable "except upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract."  In this case, the 
circuit court admirably performed its duty to determine whether 
the arbitration agreement was enforceable before ordering the 
parties to proceed to arbitration.  It analyzed in detail the 
enforceability 
of 
the arbitration agreement, including an 
assessment of both procedural and substantive unconscionability.  
Beginning 
with 
procedural 
unconscionability, 
the 
court 
considered, among other factors, that the plaintiffs had other 
options for nursing homes, the defendant's attorney drafted the 
No.  2008AP2440-LV.dtp 
 
2 
 
agreement, the agreement was conspicuously written and was not 
in 
fine 
print, 
the 
terms 
of 
the 
agreement 
were 
not 
contradictory, and the agreement was not a "take it or leave it 
proposition." 
 
Addressing 
the 
issue 
of 
substantive 
unconscionability, the court considered that the agreement was a 
bilateral one, arbitration was to be done by a professional 
arbitrator, and the limitation of claims in the agreement 
affected both parties equally. 
¶54 In short, the circuit court meticulously considered 
the factors set out in Wisconsin law for determining both 
substantive and procedural unconscionability.  See Wis. Auto 
Title 
Loans, 
Inc. 
v. 
Jones, 
2006 
WI 
53, 
¶¶34-36, 
290 
Wis. 2d 514, 714 N.W.2d 155. 
¶55 In a very rare case in which this court reviewed a 
court of appeals decision on appeal from an order compelling 
arbitration we "recognize[d] that the courts of this state must 
act 
with 
extreme 
care when they become involved in an 
arbitration proceeding.  After all, a fundamental tenet of 
arbitration is that of avoiding the court system."  See, e.g., 
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Jackson, 190 Wis. 2d 597, 613, 527 
N.W.2d 681 (1995).  This consideration is particularly strong 
when appellate review could delay proceedings for several years 
before arbitration could begin.   
¶56 Appellate courts have jurisdiction to review orders 
compelling arbitration, but that does not mean they should 
exercise that jurisdiction.  When, as in this case, a circuit 
court performs the proper legal analysis and orders the parties 
No.  2008AP2440-LV.dtp 
 
3 
 
to proceed to arbitration based upon a written arbitration 
agreement, appellate courts should review such an order only in 
the most extraordinary of circumstances.   
¶57 For the foregoing reasons, I write separately. 
¶58 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this concurrence. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP2440-LV.akz 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶59 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority and agree that this court has jurisdiction to 
consider this petition for review.  Majority op., ¶5.  However, 
the majority declines to address whether an order compelling 
arbitration is appealable as of right or only by permission.  
Id.  I write separately because I would go further and decide 
that an order compelling arbitration is not appealable as of 
right.  A conclusion otherwise would contravene our long-
standing policy of encouraging arbitration as an alternative to 
litigation.  For that reason I respectfully concur. 
¶60 I conclude that an order compelling arbitration is 
appealable only by permission under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2).  An 
order compelling arbitration is not appealable as of right 
because it is not a "final order."  § 808.03(1).  A final order 
is an order "that disposes of the entire matter in litigation as 
to one or more of the parties."  Id.  In this case, there is no 
question 
that 
the 
order 
compelling 
arbitration 
did 
not 
"dispose[] of the entire matter in litigation" as to either 
party, id.; rather, the order stayed the proceedings while the 
case proceeded to arbitration.  The Estate of Parker (the 
Estate) does not argue otherwise.  In its brief before this 
court, the Estate conceded that the court of appeals "was 
correct in reviewing the order compelling arbitration as a non-
final order."  Because an order compelling arbitration is a non-
final order, it may be appealed only upon leave granted by the 
court of appeals.  See § 808.03(2) (providing that the court of 
No.  2008AP2440-LV.akz 
 
2 
 
appeals may grant leave to hear an appeal from a non-final 
judgment or order if the court determines that an appeal will 
"(a) [m]aterially advance the termination of the litigation or 
clarify further proceedings in the litigation; (b) [p]rotect the 
petitioner from substantial or irreparable injury; or (c) 
[c]larify an issue of general importance in the administration 
of justice"). 
¶61 More 
importantly, 
to 
allow 
an 
order 
compelling 
arbitration to be appealable as of right would contravene our 
long-standing 
policy 
of 
encouraging 
arbitration 
as 
an 
alternative to litigation.  "It has been the policy of this 
state and this court to foster arbitration as an alternative to 
litigation.  The advantage of such a process lies in the 
avoidance of the formalities, delay, and expense of litigation."  
State v. P.G. Miron Constr. Co. Inc., 181 Wis. 2d 1045, 1055, 
512 N.W.2d 499 (1994) (internal citations omitted).  Indeed, we 
have recognized that "the goal of arbitration is 'to resolve the 
entire controversy out of court without the formality and 
expense that normally attaches to the judicial process.'"  Borst 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2006 WI 70, ¶61, 291 Wis. 2d 361, 717 
N.W.2d 42 (quoting 2A Jay E. Grenig & Nathan A. Fishbach, 
Wisconsin Practice Series: Methods of Practice § 86.40, at 272 
(4th ed. 2004)); see also Franke v. Franke, 2004 WI 8, ¶24, 268 
Wis. 2d 360, 674 N.W.2d 832 ("[P]ublic policy favors arbitration 
as promoting the efficient resolution of disputes, and as giving 
the parties what they bargained for, that is, an arbitrator's, 
not a court's decision.").  Arbitration is supposed to take 
No.  2008AP2440-LV.akz 
 
3 
 
place outside the province of the court until a party applies to 
the court for an order confirming, see Wis. Stat. § 788.09, 
vacating, see Wis. Stat. § 788.10, or modifying, see Wis. Stat. 
§ 788.11, the arbitrator's award.  The court may then enter 
judgment in conformity with its order confirming or modifying 
the award.  Wis. Stat. § 788.12.  Thus, the parties still have 
the opportunity to have their day in court, if necessary, after 
arbitration is complete.  The goal and structure of arbitration 
would be completely undermined should we allow an order 
compelling arbitration to be appealable as of right, thereby 
inviting the arbitration system into the appellate process 
before the arbitration even occurs.  Arbitration is designed to 
be the first step, not the last step.  For that very same 
reason, an order denying arbitration, which requires the case to 
proceed in court, should be appealable as of right.  See Wis. 
Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 2006 WI 53, 290 Wis. 2d 514, 
714 N.W.2d 155. 
¶62 In summary, I would go further than the majority and 
decide that an order compelling arbitration is not appealable as 
of right.  A conclusion otherwise would contravene our long-
standing policy of encouraging arbitration as an alternative to 
litigation. 
¶63 For the foregoing reason, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
No.  2008AP2440-LV.akz 
 
 
 
1