Title: OLR v. Ty Christopher Willihnganz
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2015AP002676-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 31, 2017

2017 WI 4 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP2676-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Ty Christopher Willihnganz, Attorney at 
Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Ty Christopher Willihnganz, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST WILLIHNGANZ 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 31, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
2017 WI 4
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP2676-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Ty Christopher Willihnganz,  
Attorney at Law: 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Ty Christopher Willihnganz, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 31, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   We 
review 
the 
report 
of 
Referee 
Robert E. Kinney who concluded that Attorney Ty Christopher 
Willihnganz's 
professional 
misconduct 
warrants 
a 
public 
reprimand and recommends that we require him to pay the full 
costs of this disciplinary proceeding.  
¶2 
No appeal has been filed from the referee's report and 
recommendation so we review the matter pursuant to Supreme Court 
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
2 
 
Rule (SCR) 22.17(2).1  After considering the referee's report, 
the parties' stipulation, and the record in this matter, we 
agree that Attorney Willihnganz engaged in some, but not all, of 
the acts of professional misconduct alleged in the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation's (OLR) complaint.  We agree that a public 
reprimand is appropriate and we require Attorney Willihnganz to 
pay the full costs of this proceeding, which were $5,028.97 as 
of October 6, 2016.  
¶3 
Attorney Willihnganz was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin on April 11, 1996.  In 2001, his license was 
administratively suspended for failure to comply with continuing 
legal education (CLE) requirements.  In 2004, he received a 
public reprimand for failing to abide by a client's decision 
concerning the objectives of representation and failing to 
consult with the client in violation of SCR 20:1.2(a),2 and for 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) provides:  
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court shall 
review the referee's report; adopt, reject or modify 
the referee's findings and conclusions or remand the 
matter to the referee for additional findings; and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline. 
The 
court, on its own motion, may order the parties to 
file briefs in the matter. 
2 SCR 20:1.2(a) provides:   
Subject to pars. (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by 
a client's decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation and, as required by SCR 20:1.4, shall 
consult with the client as to the means by which they 
are to be pursued.  A lawyer may take such action on 
behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to 
carry out the representation.  A lawyer shall abide by 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
3 
 
failure to cooperate with the OLR's investigation into the 
matter.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Willihnganz, 
2004 WI 31, 270 Wis. 2d 229, 676 N.W.2d 473.  His law license 
was reinstated in June 2007.  In 2008, this court imposed a 
private reprimand on Attorney Willihnganz for practicing law 
during the administrative suspension for non-compliance with CLE 
requirements. 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Willihnganz, No. 2008AP180, unpublished order (S. Ct. July 28, 
2008).   
¶4 
This proceeding arises from Attorney Willihnganz's 
professional involvement with a Green Bay businessman and family 
friend, R.V.  
¶5 
In approximately 2010, Attorney Willihnganz, who had 
taken a break from the practice of law to pursue other career 
interests, returned to Green Bay and the practice of law.  He 
negotiated an agreement with R.V., whereby R.V. agreed to 
provide Attorney Willihnganz with office space for his legal 
practice and to pay his State Bar of Wisconsin bar dues and CLE 
expenses in exchange for Attorney Willihnganz providing certain 
legal services to R.V. and his new energy startup, Green Box.  
                                                                                                                                                             
a client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a 
criminal case or any proceeding that could result in 
deprivation of liberty, the lawyer shall abide by the 
client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, 
as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury 
trial and whether the client will testify.  
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
4 
 
¶6 
The working arrangement proved stressful and Attorney 
Willihnganz described it as a "pretty desperate time" when, in 
March of 2013, an individual who had invested $600,000 in Green 
Box filed a lawsuit in Brown County circuit court against R.V. 
and Green Box, alleging that his investment was obtained by 
fraudulent misrepresentation.  Attorney Willihnganz's brief 
representation of R.V. and Green Box during his administrative 
license suspension gave rise to this disciplinary proceeding. 
¶7 
On 
December 
30, 
2015, 
the 
OLR 
filed 
a 
formal 
disciplinary complaint against Attorney Willihnganz seeking a 
60-day suspension of his license to practice law.  First, it 
alleged that Attorney Willihnganz violated SCR 20:1.16(d)3 by 
failing to take steps to protect the interests of R.V. and Green 
Box upon the termination of his representation of them.  Second, 
it alleged that Attorney Willihnganz violated SCR 22.26(1)(c)4 by 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides:  
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall 
take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to 
protect 
a 
client's 
interests, 
such 
as 
giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred.  The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law. 
4 SCR 22.26(1)(c) provides:  
On or before the effective date of license suspension 
or revocation, an attorney whose license is suspended 
or revoked shall do all of the following . . ..  
Promptly provide written notification to the court or 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
5 
 
failing to promptly provide written notification to the court 
and opposing counsel of a June 4, 2013, law license suspension. 
Third, 
it 
alleged 
that 
Attorney 
Willihnganz 
violated 
SCR 31.10(1)5 and 22.26(2)6 by practicing law after his law 
                                                                                                                                                             
administrative agency and the attorney for each party 
in a matter pending before a court or administrative 
agency of the suspension or revocation and of the 
attorney's consequent inability to act as an attorney 
following the effective date of the suspension or 
revocation.  The notice shall identify the successor 
attorney of the attorney's client or, if there is none 
at the time notice is given, shall state the client's 
place of residence. 
5 SCR 31.10(1) provides:  
If a lawyer fails to comply with the attendance 
requirement of SCR 31.02, fails to comply with the 
reporting requirement of SCR 31.03(1), or fails to pay 
the late fee under SCR 31.03(2), the board shall serve 
a notice of noncompliance on the lawyer. This notice 
shall advise the lawyer that the lawyer’s state bar 
membership 
shall 
be 
automatically 
suspended 
for 
failing to file evidence of compliance or to pay the 
late fee within 60 days after service of the notice. 
The board shall certify the names of all lawyers so 
suspended under this rule to the clerk of the supreme 
court, all supreme court justices, all court of 
appeals and circuit court judges, all circuit court 
commissioners appointed under SCR 75.02(1) in this 
state, all circuit court clerks, all juvenile court 
clerks, all registers in probate, the executive 
director of the state bar of Wisconsin, the Wisconsin 
State Public Defender’s Office, and the clerks of the 
federal district courts in Wisconsin.  A lawyer shall 
not engage in the practice of law in Wisconsin while 
his or her state bar membership is suspended under 
this rule. 
6 SCR 22.26(2) provides:   
An attorney whose license to practice law is suspended 
or revoked or who is suspended from the practice of 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
6 
 
license was suspended.  Fourth and finally, it alleged that 
Attorney Willihnganz violated SCR 20:8.4(c)7 by giving false 
testimony in a deposition.   
¶8 
The Honorable Robert E. Kinney was appointed as 
referee.  The OLR filed a motion for summary judgment.  At a 
July 2016 telephonic hearing on the OLR's motion, Attorney 
Willihnganz admitted to count one of the complaint.  The parties 
indicated that a comprehensive stipulation of facts would 
follow.  
¶9 
Referee 
Kinney 
accepted 
Attorney 
Willihnganz's 
admission to count one of the complaint, found that the 
complaint alleged sufficient facts to support the misconduct 
charge, and concluded that Attorney Willihnganz committed the 
misconduct alleged in count one.  The parties reserved the right 
to 
argue 
whether 
the 
stipulated 
facts 
substantiated 
the 
remaining 
allegations 
of 
misconduct 
and 
the 
appropriate 
sanction. 
¶10 The referee conducted a hearing on August 15, 2016.  
At 
the 
hearing, 
the 
parties 
submitted 
a 
comprehensive 
                                                                                                                                                             
law may not engage in this state in the practice of 
law or in any law work activity customarily done by 
law 
students, 
law 
clerks, 
or 
other 
paralegal 
personnel, except that the attorney may engage in law 
related work in this state for a commercial employer 
itself not engaged in the practice of law. 
7 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
7 
 
stipulation of facts, whereby Attorney Willihnganz reiterated 
his admission to the misconduct alleged in count one of the 
complaint and agreed that the referee could use the stipulated 
facts to determine whether Attorney Willihnganz committed the 
misconduct alleged in counts two through four of the complaint. 
Attorney Willihnganz testified at the evidentiary hearing.  
¶11 The parties' stipulation and the testimony from the 
evidentiary hearing focused on events between March 2013 and 
January 2014.   
¶12 In March 2013, M.A. filed a complaint in Brown County 
circuit court against R.V. and Green Box alleging that R.V. used 
misrepresentations and false promises to induce M.A. to invest 
$600,000 in Green Box.  Attorney Willihnganz filed an Answer on 
behalf of the defendants.  Discovery commenced. 
¶13 On June 4, 2013, Attorney Willihnganz's law license 
was administratively suspended for failure to comply with 2011-
2012 CLE requirements.  Attorney Willihnganz told R.V. about the 
suspension and urged him to retain new counsel, but did not 
promptly provide formal written notification to the court or to 
opposing counsel.  
¶14 In a June 5, 2013, letter to opposing counsel, 
Attorney Willihnganz sent some undated discovery answers, 
stating:  "Attached are the answers to Plaintiffs First Set of 
Interrogatories.  I will provide you with a signed version as 
soon as [R.V.] returns to town."   
¶15 In a June 27, 2013 letter, opposing counsel responded, 
informing Attorney Willihnganz that the defendants' discovery 
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
8 
 
responses were deficient and reminding him that defendants had 
failed to respond to a document request.  A July 12, 2013, 
letter from opposing counsel reiterated these issues.   
¶16 Attorney Willihnganz did not inform R.V. of this 
correspondence.  A motion to compel ensued; Attorney Willihnganz 
received notice of a September 20, 2013 scheduling conference.   
¶17 On August 13, 2013, Attorney Willihnganz filed a 
motion to withdraw as counsel.  A hearing on the withdrawal 
motion was scheduled for September 30, 2013.  
¶18 On September 20, 2013, Attorney Willihnganz appeared 
on behalf of R.V. and Green Box for the telephonic scheduling 
conference on the scheduling conference.  During the conference, 
Attorney Willihnganz stated that he was not intending to 
withdraw his motion, and the scheduling conference proceeded. 
Attorney Willihnganz did not inform the court, the clerk, or 
opposing 
counsel 
that 
his 
license 
was 
administratively 
suspended.    
¶19 On September 30, 2013, opposing counsel appeared at 
the scheduled hearing on Attorney Willihnganz's motion to 
withdraw as counsel. Attorney Willihnganz did not appear.  
¶20 On October 4, 2013, the circuit court granted the 
plaintiff's motion to compel and ordered R.V. and Green Box to 
produce the requested documents and to serve responses to the 
Interrogatories on or before November 1, 2013.   
¶21 On or about November 1, 2013, another administrative 
suspension was imposed on Attorney Willihnganz's law license for 
failure to pay State Bar of Wisconsin dues and failure to 
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
9 
 
certify 
compliance 
with 
trust 
account 
recordkeeping 
requirements.   
¶22 On 
November 
5, 
2013, 
with 
discovery 
still 
not 
forthcoming, plaintiff's counsel moved to strike the defendants' 
answer and sought a default judgment.   
¶23 On January 2, 2014, a new lawyer filed a notice of 
appearance on behalf of Green Box.  On January 21, 2014, another 
attorney filed a notice of appearance on behalf of R.V.   
¶24 In a January 22, 2014 deposition in the Green Box 
litigation, 
Attorney 
Willihnganz 
was 
asked 
the 
following 
questions and gave the following answers:   
Q. Did you tell him ([R.V.]) why it was you 
participated in the scheduling conference when you 
didn't have a license to practice law?   
A. Yes, I just said, you know, I felt uncomfortable 
about it; but since I took the call, I just went 
through with it.   
Q. So did you tell him even though you did that you 
can't represent him, he needs to get some other 
lawyer?   
A. I don't remember if I specifically said that. 
Again, I thought it was understood that since I did 
not have a license I was not the lawyer.   
 . . .  
Q. I looked you up on the State Bar of Wisconsin 
website, and it indicated that you're currently 
suspended?   
A. That is correct.  
Q. And if I recall correctly, you have been subjected 
to discipline by the Supreme Court on at least one 
occasion?   
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
10 
 
A. Yes.  
Q. And when was that?  
A. That was 2004, I believe.   
¶25 After testifying to the facts of his 2004 discipline, 
Attorney Willihnganz was asked the following question and gave 
the following answer:   
Q. Is that the only time you have been disciplined by 
the Supreme Court?   
A. Yes.   
Attorney 
Willihnganz 
did 
not 
disclose 
his 
2008 
private 
reprimand.  
¶26 R.V. maintained that "neither he nor Green Box knew, 
or had reason to know, that Attorney Ty Willihnganz was failing 
to properly manage the case, failing to respond to the 
Plaintiff's communications and failing to comply with the orders 
of this court."   
¶27 In his accompanying affidavit, R.V. stated:   
In or around June 2013, Attorney Willihnganz informed 
me that his license was suspended due to his failure 
to complete continuing education classes and pay state 
bar dues.  I was informed that Attorney Willihnganz 
was working towards having his license reinstated.    
¶28 R.V. also stated:   
Following the filing of the Motion to Withdraw, I did 
not receive any mail from either the plaintiffs 
counsel or the court.  At the time of Attorney 
Willihnganz's withdrawal, I also did not receive any 
documents from him that were provided to him from 
plaintiff's counsel regarding the discovery issues.   
¶29 Attorney 
Willihnganz 
complied 
with 
his 
CLE 
requirements in April 2014; his law license remained suspended 
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
11 
 
until June, 2014, when he resolved all remaining administrative 
obligations and his law license was reinstated.   
¶30 On October 23, 2014, nine months after successor 
counsel replaced Attorney Willihnganz, the circuit court granted 
plaintiff's motion for default judgment against R.V. and Green 
Box and entered judgment against them in the amount of 
$813,735.34.  The defendants appealed but the court of appeals 
affirmed, noting that after retaining replacement counsel, the 
defendants did not attempt to rectify the discovery violation 
for almost eleven months.  The court remanded the case, 
directing the circuit court to amend the judgment to require the 
plaintiff to transfer his membership units back to Green Box 
upon payment of the judgment.   
¶31 In its decision, the court of appeals stated:   
At his deposition, Willihnganz testified that, around 
the time of his motion, he strongly advised [R.V.] and 
Green Box to obtain new counsel. Nonetheless, because 
he expected to be reinstated, he participated in a 
scheduling conference on September 20, 2013. After the 
scheduling conference, Willihnganz failed to open his 
mail, did not respond to telephone calls, and did not 
provide 
any 
additional 
discovery 
to 
[plaintiff's 
counsel].  
Araujo v. Van Den Heuvel, No. 2014AP2846-FT unpublished slip 
op., ¶3 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2015). 
¶32 The referee rendered his report and recommendation in 
this disciplinary proceeding on September 20, 2016.  The referee 
had already accepted Attorney Willihnganz's admission to the 
misconduct alleged in count one of the OLR complaint so the 
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
12 
 
report focused on the remaining allegations and the appropriate 
sanction. 
¶33 The complaint alleged that Attorney Willihnganz failed 
to promptly provide written notification to the court and 
opposing counsel of his law license suspension, in violation of 
SCR 22.26(1)(c).  An attorney who fails to abide by mandatory 
continuing legal education requirements may be suspended. See 
SCR 31.01(1).  Supreme Court Rule 22.26(1) provides that an 
attorney whose license is suspended shall - on or before the 
effective date of license suspension - do a number of things, 
including, as pertinent here, promptly providing: 
[W]ritten notification to the court or administrative 
agency and the attorney for each party in a matter 
pending before a court or administrative agency of the 
suspension 
or 
revocation 
and 
of 
the 
attorney's 
consequent inability to act as an attorney following 
the effective date of the suspension or revocation. 
The notice shall identify the successor attorney of 
the attorney's client or, if there is none at the time 
notice is given, shall state the client's place of 
residence. 
SCR 22.26(1)(c). 
¶34 It is undisputed that Attorney Willihnganz's law 
license was administratively suspended on June 4, 2013, and that 
he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on August 13, 2013.  
¶35 Attorney Willihnganz testified that he thought he had 
a "reasonable amount of time" before he provided notice of his 
license suspension. The referee observed that "even under the 
most liberal interpretation" of the rule, Attorney Willihnganz's 
delay in this matter was unreasonable.  Moreover, the referee 
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
13 
 
noted that "the record is devoid of any evidence that [Attorney 
Willihnganz] furnished notice of his suspension in the manner 
contemplated by the rule."  The referee thus concluded that by 
failing to promptly provide written notification to the court 
and opposing counsel of his June 4, 2013, law license suspension 
and his consequent inability to act as an attorney after June 4, 
2013, Attorney Willihnganz violated SCR 22.26(1)(c) as alleged 
in count two of the OLR complaint.   
¶36 The 
referee 
next 
considered 
whether 
Attorney 
Willihnganz practiced law after his license had been suspended 
in violation of SCRs 31.10(1) and 22.26(2).  Specifically, as 
alleged in the complaint and as stipulated by the parties, 
Attorney 
Willihnganz 
sent 
a 
letter 
and 
answers 
to 
interrogatories to opposing counsel on June 5, 2013, one day 
after his administrative license suspension, and he appeared on 
his clients' behalf at a September 20, 2013 telephone scheduling 
conference, during that suspension.  
¶37 Attorney Willihnganz argued that he qualified for a 
narrow exception to the prohibition against a suspended lawyer 
practicing law, on the theory that he was engaged in law related 
work for a commercial employer itself not engaged in the 
practice of law, namely Green Box. Supreme Court Rule 22.26(2) 
provides: 
An attorney whose license to practice law is suspended 
or revoked or who is suspended from the practice of 
law may not engage in this state in the practice of 
law or in any law work activity customarily done by 
law 
students, 
law 
clerks, 
or 
other 
paralegal 
personnel, except that the attorney may engage in law 
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
14 
 
related work in this state for a commercial employer 
itself not engaged in the practice of law. 
(Emphasis added). See also In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Hyndman, 2002 WI 6, 249 Wis. 2d 650, 638 N.W.2d 293.   
¶38 The 
referee 
was 
not 
persuaded. 
 
The 
referee 
specifically found that Attorney Willihnganz was not an employee 
of Green Box.  The referee thus rejected Attorney Willihnganz's 
contention that his work for Green Box fell within the exception 
to SCR 22.26(2). 
¶39 The 
referee 
also 
rejected 
Attorney 
Willihnganz's 
effort to characterize his actions as permissible because they 
were "purely administrative."  For example, Attorney Willihnganz 
claimed he had drafted the discovery responses before his 
suspension and merely mailed them after the suspension and noted 
that lay persons sometimes attend scheduling conferences.  
¶40 The referee rejected these arguments.  He noted that 
SCR 
22.26(2) 
broadly 
encompasses 
"any 
law 
work 
activity 
customarily done by law students, law clerks, or other paralegal 
personnel" and concluded that it was impermissible for Attorney 
Willihnganz to send the discovery responses or participate in 
the scheduling conference while suspended.  Accordingly, the 
referee concluded that Attorney Willihnganz practiced law after 
his privilege to do so had been suspended, thereby violating 
SCRs 31.10(1) and 22.26(2).   
¶41 The 
referee 
next 
considered 
whether 
Attorney 
Willihnganz violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by giving false testimony at 
his January 22, 2014, deposition.  Specifically, when asked 
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
15 
 
about 
his 
professional 
disciplinary 
history, 
Attorney 
Willihnganz did not affirmatively disclose having received a 
private reprimand in 2008.    
¶42 At 
the 
evidentiary 
hearing, 
Attorney 
Willihnganz 
testified that he was nervous during the deposition and he just 
"forgot" about the private reprimand.  He said he had nothing to 
gain by not disclosing it, noting he had disclosed the public 
reprimand which he considered more serious.  The OLR argued this 
was "just not credible." 
¶43 The referee stated, "I frankly do not know, based on 
this record, whether [Attorney Willihnganz] remembered or forgot 
that he had been privately reprimanded."  At the hearing and in 
his report, the referee raised questions about the scope of a 
lawyer's 
obligation 
to 
affirmatively 
disclose 
a 
private 
reprimand.  Ultimately, the referee recommended the court 
dismiss count four of the complaint. 
¶44 Supreme Court Rule 22.17(1) provides that within 20 
days after the filing of the referee's report, the director or 
the respondent may file with the supreme court an appeal from 
the referee's report. Neither party appealed.  Accordingly, we 
review this matter pursuant to SCR 22.17(2). 
¶45 This court will affirm a referee's findings of fact 
unless they are found to be clearly erroneous, but we review the 
referee's conclusions of law on a de novo basis.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 
Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We determine the appropriate level 
of 
discipline 
given 
the 
particular 
facts 
of 
each 
case, 
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
16 
 
independent of the referee's recommendation, but benefitting 
from it.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 
34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.  
¶46 There is no showing that any of the referee's findings 
of fact, which are largely derived from the parties' stipulation 
and the referee's credibility determinations, are clearly 
erroneous.  Accordingly, we adopt them.   
¶47 We also accept the referee's conclusions with respect 
to the alleged misconduct.  We agree with the referee's analysis 
and share his conclusion that Attorney Willihnganz committed the 
misconduct alleged in counts one, two, and three of the 
complaint.   
¶48 The facts of record in this case do not support a 
conclusion that Attorney Willihnganz's deposition testimony 
constituted conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  Omissions 
that cause a statement to be false can constitute unethical 
conduct in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  See, e.g., In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Knickmeier, 2004 WI 115, 275 
Wis. 2d 69, 683 N.W.2d 445, cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1041 (2005); 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Urban, 2002 WI 63, 253 
Wis. 2d 194, 645 N.W.2d 612.  Here, the referee did not find 
that Attorney Willihnganz's omission was dishonest, fraudulent, 
deceitful, or that he communicated an untruth, either knowingly 
or with reckless disregard.  See SCR 20:1.0(h) (defining 
misrepresentation).  Mindful that the referee is the ultimate 
arbiter of witness credibility, In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
17 
 
Against 
Riordan, 
2012 
WI 
125, 
¶28, 
345 
Wis. 2d 42, 
824 
N.W.2d 441, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence on 
this record to establish that Attorney Willihnganz's deposition 
testimony constituted conduct involving dishonestly, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). 
Accordingly, we dismiss count four of the OLR's complaint.   
¶49 We next consider the appropriate discipline for 
Attorney 
Willihnganz's 
misconduct. 
 
The 
referee 
properly 
considered relevant factors, including, (1) the seriousness, 
nature and extent of the misconduct; (2) the level of discipline 
needed to protect the public, the courts and the legal system 
from repetition of the attorney's misconduct; (3) the need to 
impress upon the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct; and 
(4) the need to deter other attorneys from committing similar 
misconduct.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis, 2011 
WI 3, ¶39, 331 Wis. 2d 19, 793 N.W.2d 884; see also In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grogan, 2011 WI 7, ¶15, 331 
Wis. 2d 341, 795 N.W.2d 745 (recognizing the ABA Standards as a 
guidepost).   
¶50 The referee acknowledged that this court generally 
follows a policy of progressive discipline.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Ray, 2004 WI 45, 270 Wis. 2d 651, 678 
N.W.2d 246; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Louderman, 
230 Wis. 2d 200, 601 N.W.2d 625 (1999).   
¶51 Indeed, in this case, the OLR's recommendation for a 
60-day suspension was predicated on the OLR's policy of 
progressive discipline. The OLR acknowledged that Attorney 
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
18 
 
Willihnganz's conduct in this matter was not egregious.  The OLR 
observed:  
In and of themselves in a vacuum, these violations are 
relatively minor in that they don't involve harming 
anyone, stealing any money or anything of that 
severity.  The reason for the recommendation of a 60-
day suspension is in weighing the pros and cons, the 
merits and the balancing test, there is a desire in 
the system that, for attorneys like Mr. Willihnganz, 
that there be a system of progressive discipline.  
Progressive 
discipline 
meaning 
that 
where, 
unfortunately, there are subsequent violations, that 
the penalties become increasingly more severe, Mr. 
Willihnganz's first violation was - resulted in a 
private reprimand. His second violation resulted in a 
public reprimand.  Had it not been for those two 
cases, the OLR's recommendation in this case would 
probably be for either a private or public reprimand 
because that's the level of severity in a vacuum which 
they reach. 
¶52 The referee declined to impose progressive discipline 
in this case.  The referee opined that the cases cited by the 
OLR involved more serious misconduct than was committed here.  
He observed that Attorney Willihnganz provided representation in 
only one case, over a brief period of time, and performed 
minimal legal work. The referee found Attorney Willihnganz's 
testimony credible when he said that he repeatedly urged the 
client to provide more extensive discovery responses.  The 
referee also believed that Attorney Willihnganz "repeatedly 
urged the client to engage the services of another lawyer."  
¶53 The referee cited several cases where this court opted 
to impose a successive public reprimand despite the OLR's 
recommendation for progressive discipline in the form of a 
license suspension.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
19 
 
Kremkoski, 2006 WI 59, 291 Wis. 2d 1, 715 N.W.2d 594 (imposing 
public reprimand despite prior private and public reprimand); In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brandt, 2009 WI 43, 317 
Wis. 2d 266, 766 N.W.2d 194 (imposing public reprimand despite 
two 
private 
reprimands 
and 
a 
public 
reprimand); 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Hudec, 
2014 
WI 
46, 
354 
Wis. 2d 728, 848 N.W.2d 287 (imposing public reprimand despite 
three prior private reprimands and one public reprimand).  The 
referee noted the absence of other aggravating factors and the 
presence of mitigating factors, including his cooperativeness 
and remorse.  The OLR has not appealed this recommendation and 
we accede to the referee's recommendation that a public 
reprimand is sufficient discipline for Attorney Willihnganz's 
misconduct. 
¶54 Finally, although the referee recommends we dismiss 
one of the alleged counts of misconduct, he recommends that we 
impose all of the costs of this disciplinary proceeding.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Polich, 2005 WI 36, ¶¶29-30, 
279 Wis. 2d 266, 694 N.W.2d 367 (holding that even when a 
respondent prevails on a number of counts, it is still the 
court's policy to assess full costs).  We agree.  Nothing about 
this case warrants deviating from our general policy of imposing 
all costs upon the respondent.  See SCR 22.12.  Attorney 
Willihnganz is ordered to pay the full costs of the proceeding, 
which are $5,028.97 as of October 6, 2016.   
¶55 We accept the OLR's October 6, 2016 statement that 
restitution is not warranted in this matter.  
No. 
2015AP2676-D   
 
20 
 
¶56 IT IS ORDERED that count four of the complaint is 
dismissed. 
¶57 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ty Christopher Willihnganz 
is publicly reprimanded for his professional misconduct.  
¶58 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Ty Christopher Willihnganz shall pay to the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which 
total $5,028.97 as of October 6, 2016. 
¶59 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the director of the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation shall advise the court if there has not 
been full compliance with all conditions of this order. 
 
 
No.  2015AP2676-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶60 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
per curiam but write separately to state that I would have the 
court address count 4, namely giving false testimony at a 
deposition.   
¶61 When Attorney Willihnganz was asked at a deposition if 
he had been disciplined only once by this court, he responded 
"Yes," apparently referring to a public reprimand he had 
received from this court. 
¶62 In 
addition 
to 
the 
public 
reprimand, 
Attorney 
Willihnganz had received a private reprimand from this court.   
¶63 The referee decided to dismiss count 4 but raised 
questions 
about 
the 
scope 
of 
a 
lawyer's 
obligation 
to 
affirmatively disclose a private reprimand to a tribunal.      
¶64 I do not object to the referee's recommendation to 
dismiss count 4.  I do, however, conclude that the court ought 
to answer whether an attorney should consider a private 
reprimand as discipline by this court in answering questions 
about court discipline.  Lawyers, as well as the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation and referees, ought to know the answer to this 
question for the future.      
 
 
 
 
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