Title: STATE v KNAPP
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13774
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: November 1, 1977

No. 13774 I N T H E SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, T O N Y M. KNAPP, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Frank E. B l a i r , Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Schulz, Davis and Warren, D i l l o n , Montana John Warren argued, D i l l o n , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, F4ontana Daniel Kernmis argued, Missoula, Montana W. G. G i l b e r t , 111, argued, County Attorney, D i l l o n , Montana Submitted: September 2 9 , 1977 F i l e d : ' . . - . 6 ~ , - - , l e r k M r . Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court: Defendant appeals from an order of the District Court, Beaverhead County, revoking a deferred imposition of sentence for failure t o make regular reports t o a probation officer, and sentencing the defendant t o two concurrent 10-year terms i n prison for two counts of robbery. On appeal defendant alleges the d i s t r i c t judge abused h i s discretion when he revoked defendant's deferred imposition of sentence. He claims the judge was unduly influenced by public opinion when he revoked, that he mistook the defendant for an- other defendant being sentenced the same day i n the same court, that the judge misunderstood the offenses involved i n the defendant's own case, and that he based h i s decision on in- sufficient evidence. Because of the apparent confusion a s t o the crimes involved, which confusion may have existed before the revocation order, w e are compelled t o s e t aside the revocation and sentencing. W e find no merit in defendant's other allegations of abuse of discretion. Defendant was charged with two counts of robbery and one count of burglary by Information f i l e d March 13, 1975. He pled guilty t o the two robbery counts on arraignment May 20, 1975. The court dismissed the burglary count on motion of the county attorney. On June 17, 1975, the court imposed a three year deferred imposition of sentence on both counts of robbery. A s a condition of the deferred imposition, the court required de- fendant t o abide by the rules and r e g u l a t i o n ~ of the State Board of Pardons. One of the rules required defendant t o make monthly reports t o a parole officer. Defendant reported regularly t o a parole officer from June 17, 1975 t o June 15, 1976, but then failed t o report for the next four months, a t which point the probation department issued a report of violation .and issued an a r r e s t warrant. Defendant was arrested February 28, 1977, and appeared with counsel March 10, 1977, a t a hearing on the s t a t e ' s motion t o revoke the defendant's deferred imposition of sentence. The probation officer t e s t i f i e d t o the failure t o make monthly reports and h i s violation report was admitted in evidence. De- fendant did not explain h i s failure t o report. After granting the motion to revoke, the d i s t r i c t judge commented that he was "subject t o untold criticism" for h i s original decision t o defer the defendant' s imposition of sentence. Although he commented on the two counts of robbery before he revoked the deferred sentence, almost immediately a f t e r the order of revocation he sentenced defendant t o s i x months i n j a i l and a $500 fine for misdemeanor theft, and 10 years i n prison for felony theft. Counsel for defendant pointed out t o the judge that the offenses to which the defendant had pled guilty were two counts of robbery. A t that point the judge reexamined the Information charging the defendant, and sentenced him t o 10 years on felony t h e f t and 10 years on burglary. Counsel for defendant again corrected the judge as t o the offenses in- volved, and the judge imposed a sentence of 10 years i n prison on each count of robbery, the terms t o run concurrently. W e do not agree with defendant's contention that the judge was unduly influenced by public opinion. H i s comment that he had been "subjected t o untold criticism" by imposing the original sentence was made i n the permissible context that the judge originally had conf idence i n defendant but defendant had not upheld that; confidence. Such comment i s not necessarily an indication of passion o r prejudice as defendant asserts. In Commonwealth ex r e l . Hendrickson v. Myers, 182 Pa.Super. 169, 126 A.2d 485, 488 (1956), the reviewing court stated in a similar situation: '"Judge ~ o y e r ' s remarks * * * were characteristically phrased in terms of almost personal concern that relator had not seen f i t to p r o f i t by the prior con- sideration given him by the juvenile court probation. W e cannot believe that there was any element of * * * or unfairness present i n h i s mind. I t 1 The same is true i n the instant case. Here, the t r i a l judge as much as stated he had confidence i n defendant and com- passion for h i s wife and child, but defendant did not uphold h i s confidence. Furthermore, the evidence clearly showed a violation of the probation conditions. Defendant admitted he agreed t o follow the rules and regulations of the parole board, one of which required regular reports t o a probation officer. Montana Administrative Code 5 5 20-3.10(18)-S10150; 20-3.10(6)-S10060 (1) ( f ) . Section 95-3305, R.C.M. 1947, provides that failure t o abide by a condition of probation is grounds for revocation of probation. A failure t o report is sufficient grounds for revocation. People v. McCaster, 19 111.App.3d 824, 313 N.E.2d 308,309 (1974); Moore v. State, 0kla.Cr. 1971, 489 P.2d 1359, 1360. While revoking solely m that ground should be sparingly used, here there was an 8 month period between defendant's failure t o report and ultimate arrest. Moreover, a t the hearing he did not explain h i s failure to report, nor h i s conduct during those 8 months. One of the reasons for requiring a report is t o have a t l e a s t some idea of what defendant had been doing during the interim period. The probation office had no idea. I n f a c t , it did not even know where he was during that time. Section 95-2206(1), R . C . M . 1947, gives the court discretion t o revoke a deferred sentence and w e cannot say that discretion was abused under the above facts. Even though a d i s t r i c t court has the discretionary power t o revoke a deferred sentence, that discretion must be exercised i n such manner that the sentencing judge knows who the defendant is and the charges upon which the s t a t e is seeking t o have a sentence imposed. I n the present case we cannot say with any certainty that the d i s t r i c t judge before he revoked the deferred sentence, knew defendant had pled guilty only t o two counts of robbery. Here, immediately a f t e r the judge revoked the deferred sentence, he sentenced the defendant for misdemeanor t h e f t and felony theft. For misdemeanor theft he sentenced defendant t o the maximum, 6 months i n the county j a i l and a $500 fine. For felony t h e f t he sentenced defendant t o 10 years i n prison. Defendant was never convicted of misdemeanor theft. A charge of felony theft, f i l e d along with the robbery charges, was dismissed. It was only a f t e r a prolonged discussion between defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the judge that the judge realized the only charges before the court were 2 counts of robbery. Defendant was then sentenced t o 10 years on each count of robbery, the sentences t o run concurrently. - 5 - Although the record does not reveal what was i n the judge's mind before he revoked the deferred sentence, w e can only speculate a s t o whether h i s mistaken impression that defendant had been convicted of felony theft and misde- meanor t h e f t influenced h i s decision t o revoke the deferred sentence. Since defendant had been convicted of neither, the order of revocation, and consequently, the sentencing, must be s e t aside. Incorrect o r misunderstood information regarding a de- fendant may be grounds f o r vacating a sentence imposed upon him on the basis of that information. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L ed 1690,1693 (1948); United States ex r e l . Jackson v. Myers, 374 F.2d 707 (3rd C i r . 1967); United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th C i r . 1971) ; United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553 (5th C i r . 1973); State v. Gowin, 97 Idaho 146, 540 P.2d 808*(1975). I n Townsend the sentencing court considered two dismissed charges against the defendant and two charges of which the defendant had been acquitted. O n setting aside the sentence and remanding for resentencing, the United States Supreme Court stated: "* * * W e are not a t liberty t o assume that items given such emphasis by the sentencing court, did not influence the sentence which the prisoner is now serving. "We believe that on the record before us, it is evident that t h i s uncounseled defendant was e i t h e r overreached by the prosecution's submission of m i s - information t o the court or was prejudiced by the court's own misreading of the record. * * * Conse- quently * * * t h i s prisoner was sentenced on the basis of assumptions concerning h i s criminal record which were materially untrue. Such a result, whether caused by carelessness or design, i s inconsistent with due process of law, and such a conviction cannot stand." 92 L ed 1693." W e recognize that counsel was not present in Townsend, but was present in the instant case, and the i n i t i a l hearing in t h i s case was a revocation hearing, as opposed to a sentencing hearing. However, not much could be done here by counsel to correct an erroneous impression i n the judge's mind that could have existed before his revocation order. The information did not come out u n t i l a f t e r the revocation order. Surely a de- fendant can be prejudiced as much by mistaken assumptions concerning his criminal background when a deferred sentence is revoked, as he can when he i s sentenced, In United States v. Weston, supra, the court stated: "In Townsend v. Burke * * * the Supreme Court made it clear that a sentence cannot be predicated on false information. * * * A rational penal system must have some concern for the probable accuracy of the informational imputs i n the sen- tencing process ." 448 F. 2d 634. In Ryan v. C r i s t , Mont . , 563 P.2d 1145, 34 St,Rep. 342 (1977), this Court held the sentencing court to rigorous standards with regard to the use of information before the court i n a presentence report. Rigorous standards are equally as important when the t r i a l court is passing upon the s t a t e ' s motion to revoke a deferred or suspended sentence. W e hold the t r i a l judge must have, and the record must reflect that he has, substantially correct information concerning the de- fendant before he can affect a defendant's substantial rights by entering an order of revocation. The order of revocation and sentence is set aside and the cause is remanded for further hearing on the s t a t e ' s petition t o revoke. W e Concur:. * - L ' - 6 :A ,.; $ , ' . Chief M t i c e Y Justices.