Title: State v. Grandberry
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP000173-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 10, 2018

2018 WI 29 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP173-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Brian Grandberry, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 372 Wis. 2d 834, 890 N.W.2d 49 
(2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 10, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 20, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Janet C. Protasiewicz 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
KELLY, J. concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J. dissents (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
and an oral argument by Leon W. Todd, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief and oral 
argument by Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
Amici curiae briefs were filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Carry, Inc. by John R. Monroe and John Monroe Law, P.C., 
Roswell, Georgia. 
 
 
2018 WI 29
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP173-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2014CM4581) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Brian Grandberry, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 10, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court's1 judgment of conviction against 
Brian Grandberry.  State v. Grandberry, No. 2016AP173-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶9 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2016). 
¶2 
Grandberry was convicted of carrying a concealed and 
dangerous weapon contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.23(2) (2013-14)2 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Janet C. Protasiewicz presiding. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
2 
 
(the "Concealed Carry Statute"), resulting from an incident in 
which police discovered a handgun in the glove compartment of 
his motor vehicle during a traffic stop.  Grandberry appealed 
his conviction, arguing that his conduct was in compliance with 
Wis. Stat. § 167.31(2)(b), which regulates the transportation of 
firearms in motor vehicles (the "Safe Transport Statute"),3  and 
that his compliance with the Safe Transport Statute precluded 
his conviction under the Concealed Carry Statute.  The court of 
appeals 
affirmed, 
holding 
that 
compliance 
with 
the 
Safe 
Transport Statute does not preclude conviction for a violation 
of the Concealed Carry Statute. 
¶3 
Grandberry raises two issues.  First, he argues that 
there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction.  He 
reaches this conclusion by asserting that a conflict exists 
between the two statutes that can be resolved only by holding 
that persons in compliance with the Safe Transport Statute do 
not violate the first element of the crime of carrying a 
concealed and dangerous weapon contrary to the Concealed Carry 
Statute.  We hold that the Concealed Carry Statute and Safe 
Transport Statute are not in conflict because Grandberry could 
have complied with both by either obtaining a license to carry a 
                                                 
3 Although we have previously referred to Wis. Stat. 
§ 167.31(2)(b) as the "vehicle statute," Wisconsin Carry, Inc. 
v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, ¶12, 373 Wis. 2d 543, 892 
N.W.2d 233, we adopt the term used by the parties and court of 
appeals, "Safe Transport Statute," because it hews more closely 
to the actual text of the statute, which is entitled "Safe use 
and transportation of firearms and bows." 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
3 
 
concealed weapon pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 175.60 (hereinafter 
"concealed carry license" or "license") or by placing his loaded 
handgun out of reach. 
¶4 
Second, Grandberry argues that the Concealed Carry 
Statute is unconstitutionally vague because a person of ordinary 
intelligence would reasonably believe that complying with the 
Safe Transport Statute is sufficient to lawfully place a loaded, 
uncased handgun in the glove compartment of a motor vehicle.  We 
hold that the Concealed Carry Statute is not unconstitutionally 
vague because a person of ordinary intelligence has sufficient 
notice that carrying a concealed and dangerous weapon is 
unlawful unless one of the enumerated exceptions in the 
Concealed Carry Statute applies. 
¶5 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
Grandberry was charged with one count of carrying a 
concealed 
and 
dangerous 
weapon, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.23(2).  The charge arose out of a traffic stop in the City 
of Milwaukee.  At the bench trial held on the matter, Grandberry 
and the State stipulated to the truth of the facts in the 
criminal complaint.  Accordingly, no testimony was taken.  The 
complaint states, in relevant part: 
On November 9, 2014, [two] City of Milwaukee Police 
Officer[s] . . . conducted 
a 
[traffic] 
stop 
of 
a 
vehicle . . . driven by the defendant [on] N. 60th St.  
Upon stopping the vehicle, the defendant identified 
himself by name but stated he did not have his wallet 
[or] identification.  [One officer] then asked the 
defendant if he had any firearms in the car[,] and the 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
4 
 
defendant stated he did[,] in the glove compartment.  
[The officer] then asked the defendant if he had a 
valid [concealed carry license] and the defendant 
stated he did, but did not have it with him.  Officers 
then conducted a search of the [license] database and 
discovered that the defendant did not, in fact, have a 
valid [concealed carry license].  Officers then went 
to the glove compartment and discovered a loaded, Hi-
Point, .45 [caliber], semi-automatic pistol. 
Upon arresting the defendant and conveying him to the 
station, the defendant made unprovoked statements to 
the effect of[:]  "The gun in the glove compartment is 
mine, I took the [concealed carry license] class but 
never actually got a [license]."  Additionally, the 
defendant is not a peace officer. 
Based upon these facts, the circuit court entered a judgment of 
conviction against Grandberry.  Grandberry then appealed his 
conviction. 
¶7 
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the Safe 
Transport Statute did not apply to Grandberry.4  Grandberry, 
unpublished slip op., ¶9.  The court of appeals then applied the 
                                                 
4 The court of appeals concluded that the Safe Transport 
Statute "only applies [sic] to those who have passed the 
rigorous conditions for obtaining a [concealed carry license]" 
because the Safe Transport Statute borrows the definition of 
"Handgun" from Wis. Stat. § 175.60, which regulates concealed 
carry 
licenses. 
 
State 
v. 
Grandberry, 
No. 
2016AP173-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶9 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2016).   
We pause briefly to expressly note our disagreement with 
this analysis, as it lacks any support in the language of either 
of the relevant statutes. Furthermore, merely defining a term by 
reference to another statute does not expand or limit the scope 
of the original statute.  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit aptly stated this concept when it said "[w]hen 
one 
statute . . . incorporates 
a 
definition 
from 
another . . . it imports only the specified definition and not 
the broader purpose of the statute from which it comes."  Owens 
v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
5 
 
stipulated facts to the elements of Wis. Stat. § 941.23(2), and 
held that the State proved all elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Id., ¶11. 
¶8 
As to the second issue, the court of appeals held that 
the Concealed Carry Statute is not unconstitutionally vague 
because Grandberry had actual knowledge that he needed a 
concealed carry license to lawfully carry a concealed handgun in 
the glove compartment of his motor vehicle.  Grandberry, 
unpublished slip op., ¶19. 
¶9 
Grandberry petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on March 13, 2017. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶10 Grandberry challenges the sufficiency of the State's 
evidence to support his conviction.  "We . . . independently 
review whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a jury 
verdict, but in so doing, we view the evidence most favorably to 
sustaining the conviction."  State v. Hanson, 2012 WI 4, ¶15, 
338 Wis. 2d 243, 808 N.W.2d 390. 
¶11 The 
proper 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 167.31(2)(b) and 941.23(2) is foundational to Grandberry's 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
challenge; 
we 
review 
issues 
of 
statutory interpretation de novo.  Id., ¶15.  "In construing or 
interpreting a statute the court is not at liberty to disregard 
the plain, clear words of the statute."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110 (citations omitted).  We assume that legislative 
intent is expressed in the statutory language.  Id., ¶43.  We 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
6 
 
interpret statutory language in context, "not in isolation but 
as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding 
or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or 
unreasonable results. Statutory language is read where possible 
to give reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid 
surplusage."  Id., ¶46 (citations omitted). 
¶12 This case also requires us to determine whether Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.23(2) 
is 
unconstitutionally 
vague. 
 
The 
constitutional validity of a statute presents a question of law 
that this court reviews de novo.  State v. Pittman, 174 Wis. 2d 
255, 276, 496 N.W.2d 74 (1993).  "It falls to the party 
challenging the constitutionality of a statute to prove that the 
statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt."  State 
v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶11, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328.  The 
court indulges "every presumption to sustain the law . . . and 
if 
any 
doubt 
exists 
about 
a 
statute's 
constitutionality . . . [the court] must resolve that doubt in 
favor of constitutionality."  Id.     
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶13 We begin our analysis by first setting out the 
relevant portions of both the Concealed Carry and Safe Transport 
Statutes.  We then address Grandberry's argument that a person 
in compliance with the Safe Transport Statute cannot, as a 
matter of law, violate the first element of the Concealed Carry 
Statute, which he frames as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
challenge.  Finally, we address Grandberry's argument that the 
Concealed Carry Statute is unconstitutionally vague. 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
7 
 
A.  Statutory Background 
1.  The Concealed Carry Statute 
¶14 The Concealed Carry Statute, with certain exceptions, 
criminalizes the carrying of concealed and dangerous weapons.  
The Concealed Carry Statute states, in relevant part: 
(2) Any person, other than one of the following, who 
carries a concealed and dangerous weapon is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor: 
(a) A peace officer . . .  
(b) A qualified out-of-state law enforcement 
officer . . .  
(c) A former officer . . .  
(d) A 
licensee, 
as 
defined 
in 
s. 175.60(1)(d)[5] . . .  
(e) An individual who carries a concealed and 
dangerous 
weapon, 
as 
defined 
in 
s. 
175.60(1)(j),[6] in his or her own dwelling 
or place of business . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23(2).   
¶15 We read the Concealed Carry Statute as having two 
parts.  First, we refer to the part that creates the crime of 
carrying a concealed and dangerous weapon as the "general 
prohibition:"  "Any person . . . who carries a concealed and 
                                                 
5 "Licensee" is defined as "an individual holding a valid 
license 
to 
carry 
a 
concealed 
weapon." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 175.60(1)(d). 
6 "Weapon" 
is 
defined 
as 
"a 
handgun, 
an 
electric 
weapon, . . . or a billy club."  Wis. Stat. § 175.60(1)(j). 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
8 
 
dangerous weapon[7] is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor."  See id.  
In order to convict a defendant of carrying a concealed and 
dangerous weapon contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.23(2), the State 
must prove three elements: 
1. 
The 
defendant 
carried 
a 
dangerous 
weapon.  
"Carried" means went armed with. 
2. 
The defendant was aware of the presence of the 
weapon. 
3. 
The weapon was concealed. 
Wis JI——Criminal 1335 (2016).   
¶16 Almost 90 years ago, we first used the term "within 
reach" to describe when a person "goes armed" with a concealed 
and dangerous weapon for purposes of the Concealed Carry 
Statute.  Mularkey v. State, 201 Wis. 429, 432, 230 N.W. 76 
(1930) ("[T]he driver of an automobile goes armed, within the 
meaning of [the Concealed Carry Statute], when he has a 
dangerous weapon within reach on a shelf in back of his seat.").  
Nearly 50 years later, the definition was subsequently clarified 
so that "'going armed' [with a concealed and dangerous weapon] 
meant that the weapon was on the defendant's person or that the 
weapon [was] within the defendant's reach . . . ."  State v. 
Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d 411, 433-34, 249 N.W.2d 529 (1977).  We 
articulated the current definition of "went armed with" in State 
                                                 
7 For purposes of the general prohibition, a "dangerous 
weapon" includes "any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded."  
Wis. Stat. § 939.22(10).  We note that, for purposes of the 
exception 
enumerated 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.23(2)(e), 
the 
legislature provided a narrower definition.  See supra note 6. 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
9 
 
v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 182, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986) (emphasis 
added) ("The elements of the crime of carrying a concealed 
weapon are:  (1) the defendant had a dangerous weapon on his 
person or within his reach . . . ."), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 
N.W.2d 97. 
¶17 The statute's second part sets forth enumerated 
exceptions 
to 
the 
general 
prohibition. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.23(2)(a)-(e).  These exceptions are affirmative defenses 
to a charge of unlawfully carrying a concealed and dangerous 
weapon. 
 
State 
v. 
Williamson, 
58 
Wis. 2d 514, 
524, 
206 
N.W.2d 613 (1973) (holding that defendants must raise their 
status as a peace officer as an affirmative defense).  The 
enumerated exceptions were expanded in 2011.  2011 Wis. Act. 35, 
§§ 50-56.  Before the 2011 amendment, only peace officers could 
lawfully carry a concealed and dangerous weapon.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.23(2) (2009-10). 
2.  The Safe Transport Statute 
¶18 The Safe Transport Statute states in relevant part: 
(b) [N]o person may place, possess, or transport a 
firearm[8] . . . in or on a vehicle, unless one of the 
following applies: 
1. The firearm is unloaded or is a handgun.[9] 
                                                 
8 "Firearm" is defined as "a weapon that acts by force of 
gunpowder."  Wis. Stat. § 167.31(1)(c). 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
10 
 
Wis. Stat. § 167.31(2)(b)1.10  This statute was amended in the 
same act that created Wisconsin's concealed carry license 
regime.  2011 Wis. Act. 35, § 31.  Prior to the 2011 amendment, 
the Safe Transport Statute required all firearms (including 
handguns) that were placed within a motor vehicle to be unloaded 
and encased.  Wis. Stat. § 167.31(2)(b) (2009-10).  The current 
version of the statute does not include a requirement that any 
firearm be encased. § 167.31(2)(b).  Further, though the statute 
generally requires firearms be unloaded, it expressly excepts 
handguns from this requirement.  § 167.31(2)(b)1.  Therefore, 
under the terms of the Safe Transport Statute, handguns in a 
motor vehicle may be both loaded and uncased.11  Id. 
B.  Grandberry's Conviction is Supported by Sufficient Evidence. 
1.  The nature of Grandberry's argument 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 "Handgun" 
is 
defined 
as 
"any 
weapon 
designed 
or 
redesigned, or made or remade, and intended to be fired while 
held in one hand and to use the energy of an explosive to expel 
a projectile through a smooth or rifled bore."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 167.31(1)(cm) (citing Wis. Stat. § 175.60(1)(bm)).  Machine 
guns, short-barreled rifles, and short-barreled shotguns are 
specifically excepted from the definition of "handgun."  Wis. 
Stat. § 175.60(1)(bm). 
10 The Safe Transport Statute does not apply "to a firearm 
that is placed or possessed on a vehicle that is stationary."  
Wis. Stat. § 167.31(4)(ag). 
11 The State does not contest that Grandberry complied with 
the Safe Transport Statute, nor do we find any reason to 
conclude he did not.  Thus, we assume without deciding that 
Grandberry did comply with its terms.  
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
11 
 
¶19 Grandberry frames his first issue as a sufficiency-of-
the-evidence challenge; however, Grandberry does not raise the 
challenge in the traditional sense such that he asks us to 
review the evidence and apply it to the elements of the 
Concealed Carry Statute in order to determine whether there is 
"sufficient evidence" to support his conviction.  See State v. 
Smith, 2012 WI 91, ¶41, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817 N.W.2d 410.  
Rather, Grandberry uses his sufficiency of the evidence argument 
as the means by which he argues that the relevant statutes are 
in conflict.   
¶20 Grandberry's argument consists of three components: 
two premises and a conclusion.  His first premise is that the 
two statutes are in conflict because the same conduct——placing a 
loaded handgun in a motor vehicle——can comply with the Safe 
Transport Statute yet violate the Concealed Carry Statute.  His 
second premise is that this purported conflict between the 
statutes must be resolved by a holding from this court that a 
person in compliance with the Safe Transport Statute does not 
"carry" 
for 
purposes 
of 
the 
Concealed 
Carry 
Statute.12  
                                                 
12 Grandberry refers to his second premise as a "safe 
harbor."  His use of this phrase is an improper inversion of 
that term of art, as a safe harbor is defined as "a provision 
(as in a statute or regulation) that affords protection from 
liability or penalty."  Black's Law Dictionary 1536 (10th ed. 
2014).  No statute contains a provision affording the protection 
Grandberry seeks and we decline to either invent one or to 
contort our reading of the plain language of the statutes to 
suit Grandberry's purposes.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 ("If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry."). 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
12 
 
Grandberry's conclusion is that he complied with the Safe 
Transport Statute, and so, as a matter of law, his conduct could 
not violate the first element ("carry") of the offense of 
carrying a concealed and dangerous weapon contrary to the 
Concealed Carry Statute.  
 
2.  The Safe Transport Statute and Concealed Carry Statute are 
not in conflict. 
¶21 Grandberry's first premise is false because the two 
statutes are not in conflict.  In order for two statutes to be 
in conflict, it must be impossible to comply with both.  See 
City News & Novelty, Inc. v. Waukesha, 170 Wis. 2d 14, 22, 487 
N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1992).  The two statutes serve distinct 
purposes: 
 
the 
Safe 
Transport 
Statute 
regulates 
the 
transportation of firearms in motor vehicles to ensure the 
transportation is done safely, see Wis. Stat. § 167.31 (entitled 
"Safe use and transportation of firearms and bows."),13 while the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Grandberry bases his "safe harbor" argument on a footnote 
in a court of appeals decision in which the court clarified that 
its holding, which concerned whether a firearm was concealed for 
purposes of the Concealed Carry Statute, "in no way limits the 
lawful 
placement, 
possession, 
or 
transportation 
of[] 
unloaded . . . and 
encased[] 
firearms . . . in 
vehicles 
as 
permitted by [the Safe Transport Statute]."  State v. Walls, 190 
Wis. 2d 65, 69 n.2, 526 N.W.2d 765 (Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis in 
original).  The "safe harbor" argument is relevant only if the 
statutes are in conflict.  Thus, we decline to further consider 
the merits of Grandberry's reading of Walls because we conclude 
the statutes are not in conflict. 
13 "Although titles are not part of statutes, Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.001(6), they may be helpful in interpretation."  Aiello v. 
Pleasant Prairie, 206 Wis. 2d 68, 73, 556 N.W.2d 697 (1996). 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
13 
 
Concealed Carry Statute regulates the carrying of concealed 
firearms to ensure the safety of the public, see State v. Walls, 
190 Wis. 2d 65, 71, 526 Wis. 2d 765 (Ct. App. 1994) (quoting 
Williams v. Commonwealth, 261 S.W.2d 807, 807-808 (Ky. 1953) 
(governments historically prohibited the carrying of concealed 
weapons "because persons becoming suddenly angered and having 
such a weapon in their pocket[] would be likely to use it, which 
in their sober moments they would not have done, and which could 
not have been done had not the weapon been upon their 
person.")).  When a person places a loaded handgun in a motor 
vehicle, he can both transport a firearm in that motor vehicle 
(an act governed by the terms of the Safe Transport Statute) and 
carry a concealed and dangerous weapon (an act governed by the 
Concealed Carry Statute).  Contrary to Grandberry's assertions, 
compliance with both statutes is not only possible, it is 
required.   
¶22 Grandberry argues that it is impossible to comply with 
the Safe Transport Statute without violating the Concealed Carry 
Statute. 
 
Grandberry 
asserts 
that 
"Wisconsin 
courts 
have . . . generally considered firearms located anywhere inside 
the interior portion of a vehicle to be within a defendant's 
reach and thus 'carried' for purposes of the [Concealed Carry 
Statute]."  According to Grandberry, a person who transports a 
loaded handgun in a motor vehicle that lacks a trunk separate 
from the passenger area (e.g., a minivan, SUV, hatchback, or 
station wagon) complies with the Safe Transport Statute yet is 
always in violation of the Concealed Carry Statute.  This is so, 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
14 
 
he says, because the loaded handgun would always, as a matter of 
law, be "within reach," and thus "carried" for purposes of the 
Concealed Carry Statute.   
¶23 This would be a compelling argument if it were true.  
As it is, however, his assertion is wholly unsupported by any 
statute, case law, or regulation.14 
¶24 Grandberry, perhaps recognizing that no Wisconsin   
court has ever defined "within reach" as broadly as he does, 
seeks to bolster his reading of the statute by drawing an 
analogy to search incident to arrest law under the Fourth 
Amendment.  The Fourth Amendment permits warrantless searches 
"within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to 
grab a weapon or evidentiary [item].'"  New York v. Belton, 453 
                                                 
14 Grandberry cites four cases to support the proposition 
that Wisconsin courts consider the entire passenger area "within 
reach," as a matter of law, for purposes of the Concealed Carry 
Statute.  In two of them, we merely considered whether a 
reasonable finder of fact could conclude that the firearm was 
"within reach" in the circumstances of each particular case.  
State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 182, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986) 
(holding reasonable jury could find handgun in glove compartment 
was within reach of driver), overruled on other grounds by State 
v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97; 
Mularkey v. State, 201 Wis. 429, 432, 230 N.W. 76 (1930) 
(concluding a handgun on a shelf behind the driver's seat is 
within reach of the driver).  The other two were constitutional 
challenges to the Concealed Carry Statute, in which the question 
of whether the firearm was within reach was not at issue.  State 
v. Fisher, 2006 WI 44, ¶¶1-2, 290 Wis. 2d 121, 714 N.W.2d 495; 
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, 
¶49, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 
N.W.2d 328.  Significantly, no decision Grandberry cites——nor 
any decision we could find——has reviewed a factual finding that 
the trunk or cargo area of a motor vehicle was "within reach" 
for purposes of the Concealed Carry Statute.  See id.   
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
15 
 
U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752, 763 (1960)) (alteration in original).  Grandberry construes 
the Court's words in Belton to mean "within reach."  We are not 
so convinced.  Rather, federal courts have described the area 
subject to a warrantless search incident to arrest as the 
arrestee's "grab area."  See, e.g., United States v. Gandia, 424 
F.3d 255, 261 (2d Cir. 2005).15  After equating the grab area of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to "within reach" for purposes of 
the Concealed Carry Statute, Grandberry goes on to argue that 
the terms have the same meaning regardless of the context in 
which they are applied.16  They do not. 
¶25 Grandberry and the concurrence fail to recognize the 
important distinctions between these terms.  Both Grandberry and 
the concurrence conflate judicial interpretations of the Fourth 
Amendment with a factfinder's application of laws to a given set 
of facts.  The determination of whether police conduct comports 
with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence concerning searches incident 
to arrest is a question of law.  State v. Harris, 206 
                                                 
15 Accordingly, 
we 
employ 
the 
term 
"grab 
area" 
when 
referring to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence concerning searches 
incident to arrest and employ the phrase "within reach" for 
discussion related to the Concealed Carry Statute. 
16 The result of Grandberry's argument is that any area 
accessible from the passenger compartment (including the cargo 
area of minivans, station wagons, SUVs, and the like) is within 
reach, as a matter of law, because federal courts consider those 
areas to be within the person's "grab area," United States v. 
Stegall, 850 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing United States 
v. Mayo, 394 F.3d 1271, 1277 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
16 
 
Wis. 2d 243, 249-50, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996).  On the other hand, 
the question of whether a handgun is within reach is one of 
fact.17  See McNair v. Coffey, 279 F.3d 463, 476 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(Coffey, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) 
("It is a basic premise of our legal system that juries are the 
triers of fact only; it is for the judge, not the jury to 
interpret the law and to draw the line in the sand separating 
conduct 
that 
is 
protected 
and 
unprotected 
under 
the 
constitution.").   
¶26 Accordingly, it would be improper for us to set forth 
an exhaustive list of nooks and crannies within the various and 
sundry configurations of motor vehicles wherein the armed, but 
unpermitted, motorist may place his dangerous weapon.  Our 
inability is a matter of legal proscription and not lack of 
will.  Put simply, we do not provide the certainty both 
Grandberry and the concurrence seek because our system of 
criminal justice assigns the task of defining statutory terms to 
this court (as we did when we defined "go armed with" to mean 
"within reach"), but assigns the task of determining whether a 
set of facts fits that definition (in this case, whether a 
                                                 
17 E.g., Fry, 131 Wis. 2d at 182 (affirming jury verdict 
that handgun in glove compartment was within driver's reach); 
State v. Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d 411, 435, 249 N.W.2d 529 (1977) 
(affirming jury verdict that handgun on floorboard of motor 
vehicle was within reach);  Mularkey, 201 Wis. at 432 (affirming 
jury verdict that handgun on shelf behind front seat was within 
reach); State v. Keith, 175 Wis. 2d 75, 79, 498 N.W.2d 865 (Ct. 
App. 1993) (affirming jury verdict that handgun in defendant's 
purse was within reach). 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
17 
 
dangerous weapon is "within reach") to the jury.  State v. 
Leist, 141 Wis. 2d 34, 37-38 & n.2, 414 N.W.2d 45 (Ct. App. 
1987) (citing United States v. Goetz, 746 F.2d 705, 708 (11th 
Cir. 1984) and State v. Christensen, 100 Wis. 2d 507, 510, 302 
N.W.2d 448 (1981)); cf. Curtis v. Montgomery, 552 F.3d 578, 581-
82 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting People v. Curtis, 820 N.E.2d 1116, 
1124 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)) ("whether a particular set of 
circumstances constitutes 'surveillance' as defined in the 
statute is a question of fact for the jury."). 
¶27 Next, Grandberry and the concurrence fail to recognize 
that the two bodies of law developed independently.  As 
discussed above, we first used the term "within reach" to define 
"go armed with" in 1930.  Mularkey, 201 Wis. at 432; see also 
supra, ¶16.  The concept of search incident to arrest originated 
in 1914.  Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755 (citing Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).  However, no phrase that resembles 
"within reach" or "grab area" was used in the search incident to 
arrest context before 1969.  Id. at 763 ("There is ample 
justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person 
and the area 'within his immediate control'——construing that 
phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain 
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."); see also id. 
at 755-762 (recounting development of search incident to arrest 
jurisprudence).   
¶28 This independent development of the two distinct legal 
concepts is significant because we have never conflated the 
concepts of grab area and within reach when construing the 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
18 
 
Concealed Carry Statute.  One example of this separateness is 
Fry.  Most of our decision in that case centers on our 
consideration 
of 
Fourth 
Amendment 
jurisprudence 
concerning 
searches incident to arrest.  See generally Fry, 131 Wis. 2d at 
161-81.  However, in a discreet part of the opinion, we 
separately considered whether the evidence adduced at trial was 
sufficient to uphold the defendant's conviction for carrying a 
concealed and dangerous weapon.  The defendant argued that the 
handgun in his glove compartment could not, as a matter of law, 
be within reach because he testified at trial that his glove 
compartment would not open when the passenger seat was occupied.  
Id. at 182.  We rejected his argument because the jury "was free 
to discount" his testimony in resolving the factual issue of 
whether his handgun was within reach.  Id. (quoted source 
omitted). 
¶29 In Fry, we properly treated the concepts of "grab 
area" and "within reach" as entirely separate concepts, as we 
have for decades and as we do here.  Id.  The two areas of law 
developed separately, and it is only by coincidence that they 
employ similar language.  Confusion between the two contexts 
exists only because Grandberry threw it out like so much chum 
upon the waters and the concurrence took the bait hook, line, 
and sinker.  To define "within reach" in the same way the United 
States Supreme Court defines "grab area" is to:  (1) assign a 
definition to "within reach" that was not and could not have 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
19 
 
been intended when the term was first used;18 (2) confuse two 
entirely separate and distinct areas of the law; and (3) lead 
naturally to the illegal usurpation of the role of the jury.  We 
decline Grandberry's invitation to do so, no matter how 
vociferously the concurrence urges us to accept it. 
 
3.  Grandberry's argument fails because there is no conflict 
between the statutes. 
¶30 We start by observing that no part of a motor vehicle 
is, as a matter of law, within reach.  Rather, defining what 
areas of a motor vehicle are within reach has been, is now, and 
(absent legislative amendment) will continue to be a question to 
be resolved on a case-by-case basis by finders of fact and by 
courts reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in particular 
cases.  See generally Fry, 131 Wis. 2d at 182.  Citizens who 
seek to comply with both statutes have at least two reasonable 
                                                 
18 This court had been using "within reach" for purposes of 
the Concealed Carry Statute for approximately 39 years before 
the United States Supreme Court introduced the phrase "within 
his immediate control" to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  See 
Mularkey, 201 Wis. at 432; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
20 
 
means of doing so:  (1) obtaining a concealed carry license;19 
or, (2) placing their firearms out of reach.   
¶31 Grandberry and the amicus devote a considerable 
portion of their respective arguments within their briefs 
describing the parade of horribles they claim will result from 
our decision to affirm the court of appeals.  They raise the 
specter of promiscuous prosecution of hunters and sport shooters 
who will be left struggling to comply with both statutes.  The 
myriad of hypothetical circumstances that may arise in factual 
backgrounds in prosecutions for carrying a concealed and 
dangerous weapon render it impossible for this court to 
establish a bright-line rule setting forth which parts of a 
vehicle are and are not within reach.  Nor is it, absent 
legislative directive, our place to do so.  See Kittias Cty. v. 
E. Wash. Groth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 256 P.3d 1193, ¶23 (Wash. 
2011) (rejecting proposed bright-line rule where inquiry is "a 
question of fact based on the specific circumstances of each 
case"). 
 
Nonetheless, 
citizens 
and 
factfinders 
can 
find 
                                                 
19 Grandberry argues that requiring citizens to obtain a 
concealed carry license puts an economic barrier on their right 
to bear arms.  This argument is rendered moot by our holding 
that persons without a concealed carry license can comply with 
both statutes by placing their firearms out of reach.  Further, 
Grandberry raises the economic barrier argument as a bare one-
sentence assertion in a footnote and never develops it.  We need 
not address this argument, and given its undeveloped state, it 
would be imprudent to do so.  State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶28 
n.13, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87 ("we do not usually address 
undeveloped arguments"). 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
21 
 
guidance20 in our precedent and common sense, and should consider 
factors such as the location of the dangerous weapon in the 
motor vehicle relative to the location of its possessor, the 
motor vehicle's size, and the possessor's ability to reach the 
dangerous weapon while in the motor vehicle.   
 
C.  Grandberry Failed to Satisfy His Burden to Prove the 
Concealed Carry Statute is Unconstitutionally Vague. 
¶32 We next consider whether the Concealed Carry Statute 
is unconstitutionally vague21 as applied to Grandberry.  He 
admits that "[v]iewed separately, the [Concealed Carry Statute] 
and the [Safe Transport Statute] appear clear."  However, he 
argues 
that 
"read 
together, 
they 
create 
unconstitutional 
vagueness."  This argument is based on the same premise as his 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument——that the two statutes are 
                                                 
20 We resist the invitation of Grandberry and the amicus to 
make broad pronouncements based on hypothetical facts.  See 
State v. Steffes, 2013 WI 53, ¶27, 347 Wis. 2d 683, 832 
N.W.2d 101: 
[T]his court does not issue advisory opinions on how a 
statute could be interpreted to different factual 
scenarios 
in 
future 
cases. 
See 
Grotenrath 
v. 
Grotenrath, 215 Wis. 381, 384, 254 N.W. 631 (1934) 
("[C]ourts 
will 
not 
ordinarily 
render 
advisory 
opinions where the questions propounded have not 
arisen and may never arise."). Rather, it is our job 
to adjudicate the dispute in front of us. It is thus 
not necessary for us to resolve the hypotheticals laid 
out by [the Defendant]. 
21 The terms "unconstitutionally vague" and "void for 
vagueness" 
describe 
the 
same 
concept 
and 
are 
thus 
used 
interchangeably.  See State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 135, 
447 N.W.2d 654 (1989).    
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
22 
 
in conflict——and for the same reasons we hold that the Concealed 
Carry Statute provides sufficient notice of what conduct is 
prohibited. 
¶33 "[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a 
penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement."  Beckles v. United States, 137 S. 
Ct. 886, 892 (2017) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 
357 (1983)).  See also State v. Cissell, 127 Wis. 2d 205, 224, 
378 N.W.2d 691 (1985) (quoting Kolender for the definition of 
void-for-vagueness); Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Substantive Criminal Law 
§ 2.3 (2d ed.), Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2017) ("The void-
for-vagueness doctrine . . . require[s] that a criminal statute 
be declared void when it is so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ to 
its application"). 
¶34 Grandberry's constitutional challenge is as-applied.  
In an as-applied challenge, a court assesses the merits of the 
constitutional claim by considering the facts of the particular 
case, not hypothetical facts in other situations.22  State v. 
Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶43, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785.  
Thus, in this case, we consider whether a person of ordinary 
                                                 
22 This is in contrast to a facial challenge, which requires 
the court to determine whether a statute may be constitutionally 
applied in any circumstance.  Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶30. 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
23 
 
intelligence in Grandberry's situation (i.e., placing a loaded 
handgun in the glove compartment of a motor vehicle) would have 
fair notice that his conduct violates the Concealed Carry 
Statute.  State v. Hahn, 221 Wis. 2d 670, 679, 586 N.W.2d 5 (Ct. 
App. 1998). 
¶35 Grandberry's argument boils down to a complaint that 
the statutes overlap such that placing his loaded handgun in his 
glove compartment constitutes both transporting under the Safe 
Transport Statute and carrying under the Concealed Carry 
Statute, and thus his conduct can comply with one statute while 
simultaneously violating the other.  Grandberry asks how a 
person reading the Safe Transport Statute can possibly know that 
complying with the terms of that statute may, in some 
circumstances, also violate the Concealed Carry Statute.  Unlike 
the bulk of Grandberry's arguments, the answer to his question 
is straightforward and elegant in its simplicity:  read the 
Concealed Carry Statute.  Due process does not demand that every 
regulation on a certain subject be in the same statute; such a 
requirement would be absurd.  Rather, where multiple statutes 
govern a defendant's conduct, due process requires that the 
terms of the statute under which the defendant was charged be 
sufficiently clear.  Cissell, 127 Wis. 2d at 216-17 (citing 
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)). 
¶36 The Concealed Carry Statute provides sufficient notice 
to a person of ordinary intelligence that carrying a concealed 
and dangerous weapon is prohibited unless one of the statutory 
exceptions enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 941.23(2)(a)-(e) applies.  
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
24 
 
See Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d at 435 (holding prior version of the 
Concealed Carry Statute was not unconstitutionally vague).  The 
statute clearly defines what conduct is prohibited:  "Any 
person . . . who carries a concealed and dangerous weapon is 
guilty of a Class A misdemeanor."  § 941.23(2).  The language 
creating the exceptions, "other than one of the following," is 
equally clear that the only way a person can lawfully carry a 
concealed and dangerous weapon is to fall within one of the 
enumerated exceptions.  Id.  Grandberry could not reasonably 
believe that placing a firearm in the glovebox of his motor 
vehicle is permitted under the terms of the Concealed Carry 
Statute23——something Grandberry obliquely acknowledged at the 
time of his arrest when he told the arresting officers 
(untruthfully) that he possessed a concealed carry license.  
Thus, Grandberry's due process challenge fails. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶37 We hold that the Concealed Carry Statute and Safe 
Transport Statute are not in conflict because Grandberry could 
have complied with both by either obtaining a concealed carry 
                                                 
23 Because this is an as-applied challenge, see supra ¶32, 
our 
conclusion 
that 
the 
Concealed 
Carry 
Statute 
is 
constitutionally applied to Grandberry does not mean that the 
Concealed Carry Statute is constitutionally applied in all 
circumstances.  If, for instance, this opinion opens the wide 
floodgates to the variety and volume of prosecutions posited by 
Grandberry and the amicus, it will be up to the relevant courts 
to determine whether the Concealed Carry Statute may be 
constitutionally 
applied 
in 
each 
of 
those 
particular 
circumstances.  See supra ¶29 n.20. 
No. 
2016AP173-CR   
 
25 
 
license pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 175.60 or by placing his loaded 
handgun out of reach.  Further, we hold that the Concealed Carry 
Statute is not unconstitutionally vague because a person of 
ordinary intelligence has sufficient notice that carrying a 
concealed and dangerous weapon is unlawful unless one of the 
enumerated exceptions in the Concealed Carry Statute applies.  
For these reasons, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2016AP173-CR.dk 
 
1 
 
 
¶38 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  Mr. Grandberry tells 
us he did not "carr[y] a concealed and dangerous weapon" when he 
placed a handgun in his vehicle's glove compartment.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 941.23(2).  This is so, he says, because of a statute 
that exempts handguns from the type of firearms one may not 
place in a vehicle.  Today, the court concludes Mr. Grandberry 
was wrong——he did carry a concealed and dangerous weapon, and no 
statute excused his actions.  Therefore, his conviction was and 
is sound.  And I agree with that. 
¶39 But 
in 
reaching 
that 
conclusion, 
we 
created 
unnecessary ambiguity about what it means to "carry" a weapon.  
Whereas that concept bore only one meaning before today, now it 
bears two——one for measuring the propriety of vehicle searches 
under the constitution, and another for espying a violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23(2) (the "Concealed Carry Statute").  This is 
both unnecessary and unwise. 
¶40 The Concealed Carry Statute's proscription is clear, 
and the process of determining whether Mr. Grandberry violated 
it covers well-travelled ground.  The statute says "[a]ny 
person, other than one of the following, who carries a concealed 
and dangerous weapon is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor."  Wis. 
Stat. § 941.23(2).  All agree that Mr. Grandberry did not fit 
within any of the exceptions, so we next inquire into what it 
means to "carry" a weapon.  The Concealed Carry Statute provides 
the 
answer: 
 
"'Carry' 
has 
the 
meaning 
given 
in 
s. 
175.60(1)(ag)."  § 941.23(1)(ag).  Following this cue, we find 
No.  2016AP173-CR.dk 
 
2 
 
in the referenced section that "'[c]arry' means to go armed 
with."  Wis. Stat. § 175.60(1)(ag). 
¶41 We have a long history with the phrase "to go armed 
with" as it relates to the Concealed Carry Statute.  Nearly a 
century ago we decided, as a matter of law, that a person is 
armed when he has a firearm "within reach."  Mularkey v. State, 
201 Wis. 429, 432, 230 N.W. 76 (1930) ("[T]he driver of an 
automobile goes armed, within the meaning of section 340.69, 
Stats.,[1] when he has a dangerous weapon within reach on a shelf 
in back of his seat." (citations omitted)).  We said essentially 
the same thing in State v. Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d 411, 433-34, 249 
N.W.2d 529 (1977), stating that "'going armed' meant that the 
weapon was on the defendant's person or that the weapon must 
have been within the defendant's reach."  We confirmed this 
understanding of the phrase in State v. Fry, another case 
involving a handgun in a vehicle's glove compartment.  131 
Wis. 2d 153, 182, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986) ("The elements of the 
crime of carrying a concealed weapon are:  (1) the defendant had 
a dangerous weapon on his person or within his reach . . . ." 
(citation omitted)), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97. 
¶42 We now arrive at the end of the definitional chain in 
which "carry" means "go armed with," and "go armed with" means 
                                                 
1 This statute was the precursor to the Concealed Carry 
Statute, and provided that "[a]ny person who shall go armed with 
any concealed and dangerous weapon shall be punished."  Wis. 
Stat. § 340.69 (1929-30). 
No.  2016AP173-CR.dk 
 
3 
 
to have a weapon "within reach."  A weapon is "within reach" if 
it is in a vehicle's passenger compartment.  We know this on no 
less an authority than the United States Supreme Court.  In 
describing the permissible scope of a warrantless search 
incident to arrest, the Court said:  "Our reading of the cases 
suggests the generalization that articles inside the relatively 
narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are 
in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area into 
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or 
evidentiary ite[m].'"  New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 
(1981) (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)), 
abrogated on other grounds by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 
(2009).  Some courts include "the hatchback or rear hatch area 
of a vehicle" within the meaning of "passenger compartment," so 
long as "an occupant could have reached [that] area while inside 
the vehicle."  United States v. Stegall, 850 F.3d 981, 985 (8th 
Cir. 2017) (quoted source omitted).  The rear cargo area of an 
SUV may also fall in that category.  See United States v. 
Olguin-Rivera, 168 F.3d 1203, 1205 (10th Cir. 1999); see also 
United States v. Henning, 906 F.2d 1392, 1396 (10th Cir. 1990) 
("Where, . . . the vehicle contains no trunk, the entire inside 
of the vehicle constitutes the passenger compartment and may be 
lawfully searched."). 
¶43 This last definitional step is where we created 
ambiguity.  We said that what is "within reach" for Fourth 
Amendment purposes is something different from what is "within 
reach" for purposes of the Concealed Carry Statute.  The court 
No.  2016AP173-CR.dk 
 
4 
 
offers two reasons for its belief that these are "entirely 
separate concepts."  See majority op., ¶29.  First, it says they 
are substantively different because the court decides one, while 
the jury decides the other.  The second is just a matter of 
rhetoric.  Literally.  The court chose synonymous phrases to 
describe the same concept and then asserted the synonyms created 
a substantive difference.  I'll address each of these reasons in 
turn. 
¶44 "Within reach," the court said, is a question of law 
in the Fourth Amendment context, while in the context of the 
Concealed Carry Statute it is a question of fact.  Id., ¶25.  
Therefore, the court concluded they mean different things 
because the court decides the former and juries decide the 
latter.  See id.  Get it?  I don't.  And I don't think the court 
does either.  Whether it is a question of law or a question of 
fact, both questions address precisely the same consideration:  
Can a person reach the firearm?  The length of a person's arm 
doesn't change because a jury measures it instead of a judge.  
The only real significance presented by the different contexts 
is that one deals with a potentiality and the other with the 
resolution of the potentiality.  Here is what I mean. 
¶45 The lawful scope of a warrantless search incident to 
an arrest is defined by a potentiality, to wit, the space into 
which a person could conceivably reach to retrieve a weapon.  
The purpose of such searches is "'to remove any weapons that 
[the arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or 
effect his escape' and the need to prevent the concealment or 
No.  2016AP173-CR.dk 
 
5 
 
destruction of evidence."  Belton, 453 U.S. at 457 (quoting 
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).  It is the danger created by an 
arrestee's potential access to a weapon that justifies the 
search.  The Supreme Court emphasized this justification in 
Arizona v. Gant, in which it rejected a reading of Belton that 
allowed vehicle searches even when there was no reasonable 
chance the arrestee could access the passenger compartment:  
"Accordingly, we reject this reading of Belton and hold that the 
Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident 
to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is 
unsecured 
and 
within 
reaching 
distance 
of 
the 
passenger 
compartment at the time of the search."  Arizona v. Gant, 556 
U.S. 332, 343 (2009); accord State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶29, 
327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97. 
¶46 The Supreme Court's concern is entirely functional, 
and is focused on the physical reality that a quick movement 
within the passenger compartment could put a weapon in the 
suspect's hand.  The Court has decided, as a matter of law, that 
the entirety of a vehicle's passenger compartment can be reached 
by such a movement.  Presumably, it had a good basis for making 
that determination.  If it did not, we would have to conclude 
that the Court's understanding of the Fourth Amendment in this 
context has its roots in a factual fallacy.  Nothing suggests we 
ought to entertain that possibility, so I must conclude that the 
Court truly meant that a firearm in a vehicle's passenger 
compartment is within an occupant's reach. 
No.  2016AP173-CR.dk 
 
6 
 
¶47 Now for the court's rhetorical distinction between 
"within reach" and "within reach."  The court says the federal 
judiciary "describe[s] the area subject to a warrantless search 
incident to arrest as the arrestee's 'grab area,'" majority op., 
¶24 (quoting United States v. Gandia, 424 F.3d 255, 261 (2d Cir. 
2005)), whereas our court uses "within reach" to describe the 
area subject to the Concealed Carry Statute.  And then the court 
says "Grandberry and the concurrence fail to recognize the 
important distinctions between these terms."  Id., ¶25.  Well, 
that much is certainly true.  But I take comfort in the fact 
that the Belton court——upon which the court relies for its 
rhetorical 
distinction——shares 
the 
same 
purported 
failure.  
Belton said the "the passenger compartment of an automobile" is 
subject to search because it is "within 'the area into which an 
arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary 
ite[m].'"  Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (quoted source omitted).  
This is the actual sentence in which the court says it 
discovered a substantive difference between "grab area" and 
"within reach."  See majority op., ¶24. 
¶48 The problem with the court's discovery is twofold.  
First, there is not even a theoretical difference between "grab 
area" and an area that is "within reach."  To conclude otherwise 
would be to say that one may grab something beyond one's reach, 
or that one may reach something one cannot grab.  The second 
problem is grammatical.  The court reads Belton as using "grab" 
to define an area.  That's not what Belton was doing.  It was 
describing what a suspect might do in an already defined area——
No.  2016AP173-CR.dk 
 
7 
 
to wit, "grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]."  Belton, 453 U.S. 
at 460 (quoted source omitted).  How did the Belton court define 
where that might be done?  It said a weapon might be grabbed 
from "within the area into which an arrestee might reach."  Id.  
Or, with the judicious use of one's editing pencil, this 
definition can be shortened——without losing a jot or tittle of 
meaning——to "within . . . reach."  So the court's discovery of a 
substantive difference between "within reach" and "within reach" 
is both illogical and ungrammatical.  I am confident the Belton 
court would find no "important distinctions between these 
terms."  See majority op., ¶25. 
¶49 The court also faults me (and Mr. Grandberry) for not 
substantively distinguishing "within reach" (Fourth Amendment) 
from "within reach" (Concealed Carry Statute) based on the 
separate lines of cases in which the concept has been used.  See 
id., ¶27.  I acknowledge that I find this to be a distinction 
without a difference, but I don't think it's a fault.  The 
Concealed Carry Statute concerns itself with the same physical 
reality addressed by Belton and Gant.  In the Fourth Amendment 
context, the concern is whether there could be a weapon within 
reach.  In the Concealed Carry Statute context, the concern is 
whether there actually was a weapon within reach. 
¶50 This just means that the jury resolves as a factual 
matter the potentiality described by our Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
 
The 
Fourth 
Amendment 
defines 
the 
outer 
parameters of what could be lawfully within a defendant's reach; 
the jury decides whether a specific defendant could actually 
No.  2016AP173-CR.dk 
 
8 
 
reach that location under the circumstances of a specific case.  
If he could, then the weapon was "within reach" within the 
meaning 
of 
the 
Concealed 
Carry 
Statute. 
 
However, 
if 
circumstances arise that make it impossible for a defendant to 
obtain a weapon from the area described by Belton and Gant, the 
jury may acquit.  The defendant attempted this very gambit in 
State v. Fry.  He argued that the glove compartment in which he 
placed his gun would not open when the passenger seat was 
occupied, so the gun was not within reach.  See Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 
at 176.  The jury convicted him anyway, and we found no error.  
Id. at 156.  Nor did we address the concealed-carry question as 
anything 
other 
than 
a 
particularized 
inquiry 
into 
the 
relationship between the weapon and the area described by Belton 
and Gant. 
¶51 Mr. Grandberry's concerns have a good foundation, and 
we shouldn't have dismissed them as abruptly as we did.  The 
court said that "[a]ccording to Grandberry, a person who 
transports a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle that lacks a 
trunk separate from the passenger area (e.g., a minivan, SUV, 
hatchback, or station wagon) complies with the Safe Transport 
Statute yet is always in violation of the Concealed Carry 
Statute."  Majority op., ¶22.  We then concluded that this would 
be a compelling argument but for the lack of any "statute, case 
law, or regulation" to support it.  Id., ¶23.  But in actuality 
we are the ones who lack a statute, opinion, or regulation to 
answer Mr. Grandberry's concern.  No law defines "within reach" 
more narrowly in the concealed-carry context than in the Fourth 
No.  2016AP173-CR.dk 
 
9 
 
Amendment context.  Consequently, if Mr. Grandberry encases a 
handgun and puts it in the furthest corner from the driver's 
seat in an SUV, he is at risk of prosecution for violating the 
Concealed Carry Statute. 
¶52 Ultimately, the court doesn't finish the job it set 
out for itself.  It proposed that the concept of "within reach" 
could describe one area for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, 
and a different area for purposes of the Concealed Carry 
Statute.  But the court went no further than opining on why it 
believes the concept should describe different areas.  That is 
to say, the opinion doesn't describe what the difference 
actually is.  In fact, we affirmatively refused to say what it 
might be.  Instead, we chillingly advised the people of 
Wisconsin to risk criminal liability on multi-factor tests and 
common sense:  "[C]itizens and factfinders can find guidance in 
our precedent and common sense, and should consider factors such 
as the location of the dangerous weapon in the motor vehicle 
relative to the location of its possessor, the motor vehicle's 
size, and the possessor's ability to reach the dangerous weapon 
while in the motor vehicle."  Id., ¶31 (footnote omitted).  
Anent the last clause of this formulation:  How does "ability to 
reach the dangerous weapon while in the motor vehicle" differ 
from "within the area into which an arrestee might reach"?  
Common sense will utterly exhaust itself trying to find any room 
between the two, and we aren't saying what the difference might 
be.  And yet, a person placing a firearm in a vehicle hazards 
No.  2016AP173-CR.dk 
 
10 
 
criminal prosecution if he can't figure out a distinction that 
we refuse to describe. 
¶53 The Concealed Carry Statute is not unconstitutionally 
vague, but only because its proscription reaches the entirety of 
the passenger compartment.  This is a readily-ascertainable 
prohibition.  But if criminality depends on a non-exclusive list 
of variables like the size of a vehicle, the placement of a 
weapon, and "common sense," then we have denied the people of 
Wisconsin the ability to identify with any certainty what the 
statute prohibits with respect to vehicles.  So, ironically, in 
the 
process 
of 
explaining 
why 
the 
statute 
is 
not 
unconstitutionally vague, we have made it so.  See Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) ("[T]he void-for-vagueness 
doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal 
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does 
not 
encourage 
arbitrary 
and 
discriminatory 
enforcement." 
(citations omitted)). 
* 
¶54 I 
agree 
with 
the 
court's 
mandate 
because 
Mr. 
Grandberry could comply with both the Concealed Carry Statute 
and Wis. Stat. § 167.31(2)(b) (the "Safe Transport Statute").  
As we have described elsewhere, the Safe Transport Statute (as 
relevant here) simply exempts handguns from a prohibition 
against placing loaded firearms in a vehicle.  Wis. Carry, Inc. 
v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, ¶¶12, 47-51, 373 Wis. 2d 543, 
892 N.W.2d 233 (referring to the "Safe Transport Statute" as the 
No.  2016AP173-CR.dk 
 
11 
 
"Vehicle Statute").  Nothing about its terms excuses the 
individual from complying with all other applicable laws.  So, 
although Mr. Grandberry did not violate the Safe Transport 
Statute when he placed his handgun in the glove compartment, he 
most assuredly violated the Concealed Carry Statute. 
¶55 And now, a postscript of sorts:  Given Wisconsin's 
proud hunting heritage, it's worth noting the Concealed Carry 
Statute's shockingly broad proscriptions.  In amending our 
statutes to offer the opportunity to carry concealed handguns, 
the legislature simultaneously made it unlawful to carry a 
concealed rifle or other long gun.  This may have been 
inadvertent, but we give effect only to what the legislature 
does, not what it tried to do.2  The Concealed Carry Statute 
prohibits an individual from carrying a "dangerous weapon."  
Wis. Stat. § 941.23(2).  A "[d]angerous weapon" is, inter alia, 
"any 
firearm, 
whether 
loaded 
or 
unloaded." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.22(10).  There is no exception for rifles, shotguns, or 
other long guns.  A person can, of course, obtain a permit to 
carry a concealed weapon, but they are available only for 
handguns, electric weapons, and billy clubs.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.23(2)(d) (2015-16); Wis. Stat. § 175.60(1)(j) (2015-16).  
So if you hunt, you may not put your rifle in a case.  And if 
you put your rifle in the passenger compartment of a vehicle, 
                                                 
2 "We assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in 
the statutory language. . . .  It is the enacted law, not the 
unenacted intent, that is binding on the public."  State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
No.  2016AP173-CR.dk 
 
12 
 
you must display it in such a way that it is readily observable.  
Mularkey, 201 Wis. at 432 ("If the weapon is hidden from 
ordinary observation it is concealed.  Absolute invisibility to 
other persons is not indispensable to concealment.  The test is, 
was it carried so as not to be discernible by ordinary 
observation." (citation omitted)).  The State is aware of this 
overbreadth, which is why it instructs game wardens to ignore 
the Concealed Carry Statute as it relates to hunters and their 
long guns.  In the course of arguing this case, the State 
acknowledged that "as a practical matter, the DNR does not treat 
rifles in a case as 'concealed.'" 
¶56 Finally, a post postscript.  The Concealed Carry 
Statute also puts at risk all those who do not have concealed 
carry permits who nonetheless bring their handguns to shooting 
ranges.  To comply with the statute, one would have to keep the 
handgun uncased at all times, and if placed in the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle, it would have to be situated so that 
it is readily observable. 
¶57 Neither of these postscripts, however, affect Mr. 
Grandberry, so his conviction remains sound.  Therefore, I 
concur and join the court's mandate. 
 
 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶58 REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority's interpretation of the carrying concealed weapons 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 941.23, ("Concealed Carry Statute"), the 
license to carry a concealed weapon statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 175.60, (the "Concealed Carry Licensing Statute"), and the 
safe use and transportation of firearms and bows statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 167.31, ("Safe Transport Statute"), criminalizes hunters 
transporting long guns to hunting grounds, domestic violence 
victims transporting handguns to shooting ranges, and archers 
transporting crossbows to archeries.  I instead construe these 
statutes 
to 
enable 
citizens 
who 
lawfully 
own 
firearms, 
crossbows, and bows to safely transport their weapons without 
subjecting themselves to criminal liability.  The majority 
concludes the statutes clearly instruct how to comply with the 
law.  I disagree.  The interplay of these statutes does not 
provide clear notice or effective direction on how to comply 
with the law, and the lack of clarity allows for selective 
enforcement of Wis. Stat. § 941.23 (2013-14).1  Consequently, the 
application of the Concealed Carry Statute and the Safe 
Transport Statute here is unconstitutional under the void for 
vagueness doctrine.  Grandberry's conviction should be reversed.   
¶59 In a 1930 case, Mularkey v. State, 201 Wis. 429, 432, 
230 N.W. 76 (1930), this court adopted a definition of "go 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
armed" to mean "on the defendant's person" or "within the 
defendant's reach."  See State v. Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d 411, 433-
34, 
249 
N.W.2d 529 
(1977) 
(reciting 
Mularkey's 
holding).  
Mularkey pulled this definition from Texas cases interpreting 
Texas' "unlawfully carrying arms" statute, 1911 Tex. Crim. Stat. 
475, which proscribed carrying a weapon "on or about his person, 
saddle or in his saddle bags."  See Wagner v. State, 188 S.W. 
1001, 1002 (1916).2  The Mularkey court's reliance on Texas case 
law to import "within reach" into Wisconsin's definition of "go 
armed" 
should 
be 
overruled 
for 
three 
reasons. 
 
First, 
Wisconsin's concealed carry statute never had language similar 
to the Texas statute.  Compare Wis. Stat. § 340.69 (1930) ("Any 
person who shall go armed with any concealed and dangerous 
weapon shall be punished . . .") with Tex. Penal Code Art. 475 
(1911) ("[I]f any person in this state shall carry on or about 
his person, saddle or in his saddle bags, any [weapon] he shall 
                                                 
2 Mularkey v. State, 201 Wis. 429, 432, 230 N.W. 76 (1930) 
cited additional cases from Texas purportedly using the "within 
reach" terminology:  Leonard v. State, 119 S.W. 98 (1909); Hill 
v. State, 100 S.W. 384 (1907); Mayfield v. State, 170 S.W. 308 
(1914); DeFriend v. State, 153 S.W. 881 (1913); and Garrett v. 
State, 25 S.W. 285 (1894).  None of these cases use the term 
"within reach."  Defriend comes close to "within reach," but 
does not use that wording.  It says: 
"[O]n or about his person," as used in our statutes in 
connection with the carrying a pistol, is meant that 
the pistol that is alleged to have been carried must 
have been within easy access of the person carrying 
it; that the pistol could have been secured with 
practically no effort on the part of the person 
charged. 
Id., 153 S.W. at 882.  
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
be punished . . .").  Second, the Texas cases did not interpret 
"go armed" or specifically the word "carry"; instead, the Texas 
courts focused on the "about his person" language in Texas' law.  
Third, the United States Supreme Court's decision in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008) (quoting Muscarello 
v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998)), identifies the 
"natural meaning" of "bear arms" as to "wear, bear, or 
carry . . . upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket." 
Accordingly, this court should abandon Mularkey's "within reach" 
expansion of what it means to "go armed."  Doing so would honor 
the textual distinction between going "armed with" a concealed 
weapon and transporting a weapon in a vehicle, while confining 
the Fourth Amendment standard as to what is within a person's 
reach or immediately accessible to vehicle searches incident to 
arrest.  See State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 181, 388 N.W.2d 565 
(1986) (holding that when police search a vehicle incident to an 
arrest, "the area in the defendant's reach or presence" within 
the vehicle is authorized under the Fourth Amendment). 
I.  VOID FOR VAGUENESS 
¶60 Grandberry argues the interplay of Wis. Stat. § 941.23 
and Wis. Stat. § 167.31 renders the Concealed Carry Statute void 
for vagueness as applied to a person who transports a firearm in 
a vehicle in a manner consistent with the Safe Transport 
Statute.  Specifically, he contends the ordinary person would 
not have fair notice that if he complies with the Safe Transport 
Statute, he nevertheless might be guilty of violating the 
Concealed Carry Statute.  He also points out common scenarios in 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
which it would be impossible to comply with the Concealed Carry 
Statute when transporting a firearm. 
A.  Standard of Review & Applicable Principles of Law 
¶61 Whether a statute is constitutional presents an issue 
of law reviewed de novo.  State v. Pittman, 174 Wis. 2d 255, 
276, 496 N.W.2d 74 (1993).  Although statutes are generally 
presumed constitutional, when the challenge is not to the 
statute itself, but to how it is applied, no presumption exists.  
Soc'y Ins. v. LIRC, 2010 WI 68, ¶27, 326 Wis. 2d 444, 786 
N.W.2d 385 ("While we presume a statute is constitutional, we do 
not presume that the State applies statutes in a constitutional 
manner.").  "As such, neither the challenger nor the enforcer of 
the statute face a presumption in an as-applied challenge."  Id.   
¶62 The void for vagueness doctrine protects individuals 
from unreasonable prosecution.  The Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution declares that no state may "deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV.  This constitutional guarantee is 
protected when courts declare a statute invalid that would 
otherwise violate individual procedural due process.  Kolender 
v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).  Courts may invalidate 
unconstitutional statutes by applying the void for vagueness 
doctrine.  Id.  "[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires a 
penal statute to define the criminal offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement."  Id. 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
¶63 This court set forth a two-part test in applying the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine:  (1) is the statute "sufficiently 
definite to give persons of ordinary intelligence who seek to 
avoid its penalties fair notice of the conduct required or 
prohibited"? and (2) does the statute "provide standards for 
those who enforce the laws and adjudicate guilt" so the statute 
can be applied consistently?  State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 
135, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989).  "If the statute is so obscure that 
people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning 
and 
differ 
as 
to 
its 
applicability, 
it 
is 
unconstitutional."  City of Oak Creek v. King, 148 Wis. 2d 532, 
546, 436 N.W.2d 285 (1989).  Of particular relevance here, if a 
statute lacks adequate notice of what is prohibited, causing 
"basic policy matters [being left] to policemen, judges, and 
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis," it is 
unconstitutional.  Dog Fed'n of Wis., Inc. v. City of So. 
Milwaukee, 178 Wis. 2d 353, 359-60, 504 N.W.2d 375 (1993) 
(quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 
(1972)). 
¶64 In assessing the clarity of a statute, normally only 
"a reasonable degree of clarity" is required for it to be 
constitutional; however, when the statute infringes on a 
constitutionally protected right, the law requires more exacting 
precision, and "a more stringent vagueness test should apply."  
Id. (first quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
609, 629 (1984); then citing Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110; Vill. of 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
6 
 
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 
489, 499 (1982)).3 
B.  Application 
¶65 The Concealed Carry Statute makes it a crime to carry 
"a concealed and dangerous weapon" unless an exception applies.  
Wis. Stat. § 941.23.  The exception at issue here covers a 
"licensee" who obtained a license under Wis. Stat. § 175.60.  
Wis. Stat. § 941.23(2)(d).  Section 175.60 allows a person who 
owns a handgun, electric weapon, or billy club to get a license, 
which authorizes carrying the weapon concealed.  However, the 
Safe Transport Statute allows any person to "place, possess, or 
transport a firearm, bow, or crossbow in or on a vehicle" as 
long as the "firearm is unloaded or is a handgun" and as long as 
a bow does "not have an arrow nocked" and a crossbow is not 
"cocked 
or 
is 
unloaded 
and 
enclosed." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 167.31(2)(b).  The Safe Transport Statute does not delineate 
where in a vehicle the weapon must be placed and it does not 
contain any licensing requirements. 
                                                 
3 Grandberry's failure to make an argument grounded in the 
Second Amendment does not mean we should ignore the fundamental 
constitutional right to bear arms in analyzing his void for 
vagueness challenge.  See State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶20, 264 
Wis. 2d 520, 
665 
N.W.2d 328 
("We 
find 
that 
the 
state 
constitutional right to bear arms is fundamental.").  Article I, 
Section 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides:  "The people 
have the right to keep and bear arms for security, defense, 
hunting, recreation or any other lawful purpose."  The Second 
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:  "A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not 
be infringed."  U.S. Const. amend. II.  I note that Grandberry 
did raise this fundamental right in the circuit court. 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
7 
 
¶66 The question is whether these statutes give fair 
notice that a person who wants to transport a weapon in his 
vehicle must either have a concealed carry license or put the 
weapon out of reach.  And, does the State's admission that law 
enforcement looks the other way when a hunter has a long gun 
concealed in his vehicle demonstrate that Wis. Stat. § 941.23 
violates constitutional due process guarantees? 
1. Fair Notice 
¶67 This court reviews whether fair notice exists from the 
perspective of a person of ordinary intelligence.  McManus, 152 
Wis. 2d at 135.  Would a person of ordinary intelligence know 
from reading the statutes that in order to transport a firearm 
in his vehicle he must get a license or put it out of reach?  
Not likely.  Instead, Wis. Stat. § 941.23 when read together 
with the Safe Transport Statute is more likely to "trap the 
innocent by not providing fair warning" of what is permissible 
and what is prohibited under law.  Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09. 
¶68 Wisconsin Stat. § 941.23 broadly proscribes carrying a 
concealed weapon unless certain exceptions apply.  This statute 
informs any person who is not a current or former law 
enforcement officer that in order to lawfully carry a concealed 
handgun, electric weapon, or billy club outside of that person's 
own home, land, or business4 a license is required under Wis. 
Stat. § 175.60.  A license is available only for those three 
weapons——but not a rifle, shotgun, crossbow or bow.  Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 941.23(2)(e) allows a person to carry 
concealed weapons in these places. 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
8 
 
§ 175.60(1)(j).  Section 941.23(1)(ag) adopts the definition of 
"carry" given in § 175.60(1)(ag), which tells a person that 
"'[c]arry' means go armed with."  Neither statute defines 
"carry" to mean "have within reach."  Section 175.60 also 
prohibits licenses for those "less than 21 years of age."  Wis. 
Stat. § 175.60(3)(a). 
¶69 These statutes certainly give fair notice that anyone 
over the age of 21 who wants to carry a concealed handgun, 
electric weapon, or billy club outside his property or business 
must get a license.  But the language of these statutes does not 
mention vehicles or transportation at all; further, these 
statutes do not allow the owner of a long gun, bow, or crossbow, 
or any gun owner under the age of 21 to get a license.  
Significantly, these statutes define "carry" only as "go armed 
with."  There is nothing in the statutory text suggesting that 
"carry" means having a weapon "within reach" in a vehicle.    
The "within reach" part of the "carry" definition comes from our 
case law, not from the statutes.   
¶70 Although, generally speaking, every person is presumed 
to know the law, see Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., 
Ltd. P'ship, 2002 WI 108, ¶13 n.4, 255 Wis. 2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 
626, this case turns on whether the statutory language gives 
fair notice to a person of ordinary intelligence, not whether 
this court's decisions interpreting the statutory language do. 
¶71 In addressing "fair notice" this court observed: 
Actual notice of the statute may be irrelevant in 
applying the concept of fair notice.  Courts require 
the law be clear so that those who consult the law are 
not confused or misled.  Justice Holmes observed that 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
9 
 
"[a]lthough it is not likely that a criminal will 
carefully consider the text of the law before he 
murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair 
warning should be given to the world in language that 
the common world will understand, of what the law 
intends to do if a certain line is passed.  [To make 
the warning fair, so far as possible the line should 
be clear.]" 
State v. Neumann, 2013 WI 58, ¶50 n.29, 348 Wis. 2d 455, 832 
N.W.2d 560 (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 
(1931)).  The line is far from clear in the matter before this 
court, except perhaps to a lawyer so well-versed in the laws 
governing weapons as to be aware of this court's reach into 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which transfigured the rather 
simple concept of "carrying" into something altogether detached 
from the person. 
¶72 A person of ordinary intelligence who is trying to 
learn the legal ways to transport a firearm (or bow or crossbow) 
would logically turn to the Safe Transport Statute because it 
addresses transportation of these weapons in vehicles.  The text 
of the Safe Transport Statute allows a person to "place, 
possess, or transport a firearm, bow, or crossbow in or on a 
vehicle" if the firearm is unloaded or is a handgun, if a bow 
does not have an arrow nocked, and if a crossbow is either not 
cocked or is unloaded and encased.  The Safe Transport Statute 
says nothing about where any weapon must be placed in the 
vehicle, and specifically requires concealment of one type of 
weapon as one method of compliance.  The Safe Transport Statute 
plainly gives fair notice that:  (1) a loaded handgun can be 
placed, possessed or transported in a vehicle; (2) any other 
unloaded firearm can be placed, possessed or transported in a 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
10 
 
vehicle; (3) a bow without an arrow nocked can be placed, 
possessed or transported in a vehicle; and (4) a crossbow can be 
placed, possessed or transported in a vehicle if it is either 
not cocked or is unloaded and in a carrying case.  The Safe 
Transport Statute's text does not say that only a concealed 
carry licensee can place, possess or transport a handgun in a 
vehicle.  Further, it gives no instruction on specifically where 
in the vehicle these weapons must be placed. 
¶73 The majority concludes that these statutes are not 
void for vagueness because Grandberry could have complied with 
both by either getting a concealed carry license or putting his 
handgun out of reach in his vehicle.5  How would a person of 
ordinary intelligence know this?  The text of both statutes does 
not alert a gun owner of any connection between the two, much 
less a dependency of the Safe Transport Statute on the Concealed 
Carry Licensing Statute.  Other states' statutes combine their 
carrying a weapon statute with transportation of a weapon in a 
vehicle statute so a person clearly knows what is lawful and 
what will subject a person to prosecution.  See, e.g., Tex. 
Penal Code Ann. § 46.02 (West 2017); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2923.12 (West 2017-18).  Wisconsin's Concealed Carry Licensing 
                                                 
5 According to the record, Grandberry had lawfully purchased 
the firearm involved, passed a background check, attended the 
concealed carry licensing class, and had sent in his paperwork 
to obtain the license at the time of the traffic stop in this 
case.  Further, according to Grandberry, he did not lie to the 
police when asked whether he had a concealed carry license; 
instead, he told the officer he had sent in the paperwork for 
his license.  His application for a license was denied because 
of this case. 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
11 
 
Statute limits licenses to handguns, billy clubs, and electric 
weapons and requires all licensees to be at least 21 years old.  
If the majority's conclusion is correct, then a large group of 
gun (and all bow/crossbow) owners, for whom concealed carry 
licenses are unavailable, are treated differently than handgun 
owners 21 years old or older.  Under the majority's statutory 
construction, it is impossible for long gun owners who drive 
small vehicles without trunks to lawfully transport their guns.  
Additionally, most gun ranges require weapons to be encased when 
they are brought into these facilities.6  However, such 
concealment is prohibited by the Concealed Carry Statute, making 
it impossible to lawfully take a long gun from a car into a 
range.   
¶74 The majority's conclusion absolves the legislature 
from enacting laws that give fair notice to Wisconsin citizens 
who exercise their Second Amendment right to bear arms on how to 
lawfully transport them.  Instead, the majority declares it 
reasonable to expect the ordinary person reading the statutes to 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Range Safety Rules, Wisconsin Firearms Training 
Center, https://www.wifirearms.com/rangemanagement/info.cfm?titl
e=range-safety-rules (last visited Feb. 27, 2018) ("All firearms 
are to be unloaded, cased, with actions open when entering or 
leaving 
the 
facility."); Range Rules, The Range of Richfield,  
https://therangewi.com/range-rules/ (last 
visited 
Feb. 
27, 
2018) ("All firearms are to be unloaded, cased, with actions 
open when entering or leaving the facility."); Shooting Range 
Indus. LLC, First Time at Shooting Range? Proper Indoor & 
Outdoor Gun Range Etiquette & Rules for Beginners http://www.sho
otingrangeindustries.com/first-time-shooting-range-proper-
indoor-outdoor-gun-range-etiquette-rules-beginners/ (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2018) ("It is proper to have your gun in a gun 
case of some type. You never want to walk in with a naked gun.") 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
12 
 
do the work of a lawyer and study, analyze, and properly 
interpret case law (assuming he can find it) in order to 
reconcile two conflicting statutes.  Even more absurdly, the 
majority 
expects, 
indeed 
requires 
a 
person 
of 
ordinary 
intelligence to know what is "within reach" despite the 
inability of the justices on this court to define it.  See 
majority op., ¶31 (recognizing "it [is] impossible for this 
court to establish a bright-line rule setting forth which parts 
of a vehicle are and are not within reach"). 
¶75 Even if a person of ordinary intelligence was able to 
find and read every applicable Wisconsin case and to understand 
that a gun placed "within reach" in a vehicle violates Wis. 
Stat. § 941.23, that person would also have necessarily read 
footnote 2 in State v. Walls, 190 Wis. 2d 65, 69 n.2, 526 
N.W.2d 765 (Ct. App. 1994), which provides: 
We are mindful "that there is a long tradition of 
widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals 
in this country."  Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 
600 (1994).  Thus, our conclusion in this case in no 
way limits the 
lawful placement, possession, or 
transportation of, unloaded (or unstrung) and encased, 
firearms, bows, or crossbows in vehicles as permitted 
by § 167.31(2)(b) . . . . 
¶76 After reading this footnote, a person of ordinary 
intelligence would turn to the current Safe Transport Statute, 
which allows transportation of a handgun in a vehicle.  Walls, 
in essence, says transportation of a gun in a vehicle does not 
violate Wis. Stat. § 941.23 as long as a person follows the Safe 
Transport Statute. 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
13 
 
¶77 The text of these statutes leads to uncertainty and 
lacks "sufficient definiteness [such] that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited."  Kolender, 461 U.S. at 
357.  The statutes here do not even give a reasonable degree of 
clarity, let alone meet the heightened standard required for 
statutes that infringe upon constitutionally protected rights.  
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110; Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 
499.  These statutes do not give fair notice to the person of 
ordinary intelligence who needs to transport her firearm or bow 
or crossbow from her home to another destination of how to 
lawfully accomplish this routine activity; therefore, the first 
part of the void for vagueness test is satisfied. 
2. Standards for Enforcement 
¶78 The second part of the void for vagueness test 
requires this court to analyze whether the text of the statutes 
give clear guidance to those who enforce and adjudicate the 
laws.  Our statutes must be capable of being enforced 
objectively and should not result in ad hoc, discriminatory, or 
subjective enforcement.  Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09; Kolender, 
461 U.S. at 357-58.  Here, the State conceded that law 
enforcement looks the other way when hunters carry their long 
guns concealed in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.23.  This is 
necessary because hunters must transport their long guns to 
reach their hunting destinations, and Wisconsin does not issue 
concealed carry licenses for long guns.  Finding a place in most 
vehicles where a group of hunters traveling together could place 
multiple long guns without violating § 941.23 is highly unlikely 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
14 
 
if not altogether impossible.  If law enforcement arrested 
hunters every time they violated § 941.23, our court system 
would be overwhelmed with thousands of such cases and repeat 
offenders every hunting season.7  
¶79 The text of these statutes unavoidably encourages 
selective enforcement and prosecution, thereby satisfying the 
second part of the void for vagueness test because the statutes 
currently permit "a standardless sweep allow[ing] policemen, 
prosecutors and juries to pursue their personal predilections."  
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 
566, 575 (1974)). 
II. "GO ARMED WITH" DEFINITION 
¶80 I 
also 
write 
separately 
because 
our 
continued 
adherence to Mularkey's importation of "within reach" as 
Wisconsin's 
definition 
for 
"go 
armed" 
is 
textually 
and 
constitutionally unsound.  Wisconsin Stat. § 941.23 says:  "Any 
person, other than one of the following, who carries a concealed 
and dangerous weapon is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor."  
Section 941.23 does not define "carries," but rather cross 
references to a definition provided in Wisconsin Stat. § 175.60.  
See § 941.23(1)(ag) ("'Carry' has the meaning given in s. 
175.60(1)(ag)").  Section 175.60 defines "[c]arry" to mean "go 
                                                 
7 A variety of other problematic scenarios further support 
my conclusion.  For example, how is a 19-year-old who owns a 
handgun for personal protection supposed to transport her 
handgun from her home to her grandmother's house for the 
holidays while driving her subcompact hatchback car?  She simply 
cannot 
do 
so 
without 
violating 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.23 
and 
subjecting herself to criminal liability. 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
15 
 
armed with."  Wis. Stat. § 175.60(1)(ag).  Section 175.60 is 
additionally linked to § 941.23 because the latter exempts 
concealed carry licensees from its prohibition of concealed 
carry.  See Wis. Stat. § 941.23(2)(d). 
¶81 As noted, our case law holds that to "go armed" means 
to have the weapon "on the defendant's person or that the weapon 
must have been within the defendant's reach and that the 
defendant was aware of the presence of the weapon."  Asfoor, 75 
Wis. 2d at 433-34 (citing Mularkey, 201 Wis. at 432). 
¶82 This judicial expansion of the "go armed" definition 
to encompass having a firearm "within reach" has no basis in 
Wisconsin law and contradicts the definition of "bear arms" 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Heller.  We 
should take this opportunity to discard the judicially-invented 
"within reach" part of this definition and align our definition 
of "go armed" with Heller's definition of "bear arms."  The 
Court in Heller explained that "bear" means "carry," and adopted 
the "most familiar meaning" of "carries a firearm" as:  to 
"wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or in the clothing 
or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed and ready 
for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with 
another person."  554 U.S. at 584 (quoting Muscarello v. United 
States, 524 U.S. 125, 130, 143 (1998)) (interpreting the meaning 
of "carries a firearm" in a federal criminal statute)). 
¶83 Wisconsin should adopt Heller's definition of "carry" 
to mean the weapon is "upon the person or in the clothing or in 
a pocket."  Both the United States Constitution and the 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
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Wisconsin Constitution protect the right of the people to "bear" 
arms.  The United States Supreme Court recognizes that "bear" 
means "carry" and what it means to carry is the pivotal word in 
this case.  Wisconsin statutes define "carry" to mean "go armed 
with."  Constitutionally and textually, this can only mean upon 
the person or in the person's clothing. 
¶84 When the Mularkey court injected "within reach" into 
our definition of "go armed" in 1930, it did so based on a Texas 
case interpreting Texas' unlawfully carrying arms statute, which 
contains language Wisconsin's statute never used.  Specifically, 
the Texas statute provided: 
Unlawfully carrying arms.——If any person in this state 
shall carry on or about his person, saddle, or in his 
saddle bags, any pistol, dirk, dagger, slung shot, 
sword cane, spear, or knuckles made of any metal or 
any hard substance, bowie knife, or any other knife 
manufactured or sold for purpose of offense or 
defense, he shall be punished by fine or not less than 
one hundred dollars nor more than two hundred dollars, 
or by confinement in the county jail not less than 
thirty days nor more than twelve months, or by both 
such fine and imprisonment. 
1911 Tex. Crim. Stat. 475 (second emphasis added).  The crucial 
difference between the Texas statute and Wisconsin's is the 
presence of "about his person" in Texas' statute, language that 
never appeared in Wisconsin's concealed carry statute.  See 
State v. Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d 654, 672, 594 N.W.2d 780 (1999) 
(summarizing the history of Wis. Stat. § 941.23).  One Texas 
court equated "about his person" with having a pistol on a wagon 
seat nearby——in other words, within reach.  Garrett v. State, 25 
S.W. 285 (1894).  In contrast, the Wisconsin legislature enacted 
the first concealed weapons law in 1872, and it used "person 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
17 
 
shall go armed with" language.  Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d at 671 
(quoting § 1, ch. 7, Laws of 1872).  Although the statute was 
amended in 1878, this "shall go armed" language remained 
essentially the same:  "Any person who shall go armed with any 
concealed 
and 
dangerous 
weapon shall 
be 
punished . . . ."  
Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d at 672 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 4397 (1878)).  
The legislature did not change the "go armed with" language 
until it enacted 2011 Wis. Act 35, which included both the 
current version of § 941.23 and the licensing statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 175.60.  And then the change was merely structural and 
not substantive; the legislature replaced the "go armed with" 
language with "carries" and said "'[c]arry' has the meaning 
given in s. 175.60(1)(ag)."8  Section 175.60(1)(ag) defines 
"carry" to mean "go armed with."  Wisconsin never enacted 
language like the Texas statute; therefore, Mularkey's reliance 
upon Texas cases was improper in 1930 and remains improper now.  
Nothing in the text of Wisconsin's concealed carry statutes, 
historically or currently, proscribes concealment of a weapon 
"within 
reach" 
in 
a 
vehicle. 
 
This 
criminalization 
was 
accomplished by the judiciary reading something into § 941.23 
that is not there, resulting in a statutory construction without 
basis in the text and therefore unknowable to the average 
citizen responsible for complying with the law. 
¶85 Some states apply these statutes only "where the 
weapon is worn on the person of the defendant."  W.M. Moldoff, 
                                                 
8 See Wis. Stat. § 941.23(1)(ag). 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
18 
 
Annotation, Offense of carrying concealed weapon as affected by 
manner of carrying or place of concealment, 43 A.L.R.2d 492, 
§ 4(d); see State v. Weston, 94 S.E. 871 (S.C. 1918) (holding 
that pistol placed in a satchel or suitcase does not constitute 
"carrying an unlawful weapon"); Watson v. Stone, 4 So. 2d 700 
(Fla. 1941) (holding that pistol in the glove pocket attached to 
the inside of the dash of his vehicle did not violate statute).  
The Florida Supreme Court in Watson distinguished cases from 
those states that specifically use the "on or about the person" 
language in their statutes, concluding that because the Florida 
statute does not include the "on or about" language, the pistol 
placement in the glove pocket did not violate Florida's law 
prohibiting carrying or having a pistol in one's manual 
possession.  4 So. at 702.  The Florida Supreme Court 
specifically 
distinguished 
Florida's 
statutory 
language 
of 
"carrying" or "having a pistol in his manual possession" from 
foreign statutes "making it unlawful for the weapon of the 
defendant to be on, under or behind the seat, cushion, door, 
side floor or pockets of an automobile."  Id.  This same 
reasoning should have been applied when Mularkey was decided——
the Wisconsin statute does not use the "on or about" language 
and instead prohibits concealed "carrying"; therefore, this 
court misguidedly added the "within reach" language to the 
definition of "go armed." 
¶86 While adhering to precedent is an important doctrine 
for lending stability to the law, not every decision deserves 
stare decisis effect.  After all, the purpose of stare decisis 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
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"is to make us say that what is false under proper analysis must 
nonetheless be held to be true, all in the interest of 
stability."  Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:  
Federal Courts and the Law 138-40 (1997).  However, "[t]he 
principle of stare decisis does not compel us to adhere to 
erroneous precedents or refuse to correct our own mistakes."  
State v. Outagamie Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, ¶31, 244 
Wis. 2d 613, 628 N.W.2d 376.  This is particularly true when 
following flawed precedent criminalizes behavior that a person 
of ordinary intelligence would reasonably consider statutorily 
permissible.  "Reflexively cloaking every judicial opinion with 
the adornment of stare decisis threatens the rule of law, 
particularly when applied to interpretations wholly unsupported 
by the statute's text."  Manitowoc v. Lanning, 2018 WI 6 (R. 
Grassl Bradley, J., concurring). 
¶87 "Stare decisis is neither a straightjacket nor an 
immutable rule."  Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of 
Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶100, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257 
(quoting Carpenters Local Union No. 26 v. United States Fid. & 
Guar. Co., 215 F.3d 136, 141 (1st Cir. 2000)).  There are 
circumstances in which a court may overturn "outdated or 
erroneous holdings."  Johnson Controls, Inc. 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶96 
(quoted source omitted).  Among other factors, in deciding 
"whether to depart from stare decisis" this court considers 
"whether the prior decision is unsound in principle" and 
"whether it is unworkable in practice . . . ."  Id., ¶99 
(citations omitted).  This case vividly exemplifies both 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
20 
 
factors.  The foundation of Mularkey's adoption of "within 
reach" rests not on the text of Wisconsin's statute but on 
Texas' markedly different statutory language.  This court's 
interpretation of "go armed with" as encompassing having a 
firearm "within reach" clouds a plain reading of the statutes, 
thereby impairing the ability of any person of ordinary 
intelligence to comply with the law. 
¶88 In this case, "[i]t is well to keep in mind just how 
thoroughly [the Mularkey court's opinion] rewrote the statute it 
purported to construe."  Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 
616, 670 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Because Mularkey's 
interpretation of the statute's "go armed with" language reaches 
well beyond the statutory text, I decline to perpetuate this 
court's error on the altar of stare decisis, particularly when 
the error creates a trap for the well-intentioned but unwary 
citizen. 
¶89 Correcting the error that originated in Mularkey and 
survived for nearly 90 years would quite appropriately eliminate 
"within reach" from concealed carry cases, confining the "within 
reach" concept to Fourth Amendment incident to arrest searches 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
21 
 
where it belongs.9  The majority opinion instead attempts to 
ascribe a different meaning of "within reach" in concealed carry 
cases than Fourth Amendment search incident to arrest cases give 
it,10 but it could avoid this linguistic fallacy by applying the 
definition of "go armed" as set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court in Heller to mean "upon the person or in the 
clothing or in a pocket."  Because this court continues to 
define "go armed" under Wis. Stat. § 941.23 to include "within 
                                                 
9 The Fourth Amendment vehicle search incident to arrest 
cases broadly define what is in within reach (or accessible to 
the defendant without leaving the vehicle) and therefore 
searchable without a warrant.  See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 
332, 335 (2009) (clarifying Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 
(1969) and New York Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), but agreeing 
that police who search incident to arrest may search any area 
"within an arrestee's 'immediate control,' meaning 'the area 
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or 
destructible evidence.'").  Courts have held this includes the 
cargo area in a hatchback car, the trunk area if accessible from 
the back seat, and a covered cargo area in a sport utility 
vehicle.  See United States v. Stegall, 850 F.3d 981, 985 (8th 
Cir. 2017); United States v. Allen, 469 F.3d 11, 15-16 (1st Cir. 
2006); United States v. Arnold, 388 F.3d 237, 239-41 (7th Cir. 
2004) (collecting cases) (protective search case); United States 
v. Olguin-Rivera, 168 F.3d 1203, 1206 n.1 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(collecting cases). 
10 The majority's attempt to separate "within reach" in the 
concealed carry context from the incident to arrest framework 
may create more problems than it purports to resolve.  Going 
forward, the majority's decision prevents the State from using 
any "within reach" incident to arrest cases as the basis for 
argument in a concealed carry case.  It also necessitates a 
trial in every concealed carry "within reach" case, regardless 
of where the weapon is located in the car.  Consequently, even 
if a handgun is sitting on a defendant driver's seat, a jury 
would need to decide whether the handgun was "within reach" 
instead of allowing the circuit court to conclude as a matter of 
law that the carrying element of the test was satisfied. 
No.  2016AP173-CR.rgb 
 
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reach," I cannot join it.  I would align Wisconsin law with the 
constitutions of both this state and the United States and apply 
the original meaning of "go armed with" as defined in Heller.  
Because the majority renders many of Wisconsin's law-abiding gun 
owners criminals, but for the benevolence of law enforcement and 
the discretion of prosecutors, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
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