Title: State v. Clark
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC92003
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 2012

Supreme Court of Missouri 
en banc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
) 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC92003 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
JERMANE CLARK 
, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS 
The Honorable Bryan L. Hettenbach, Judge 
 
Opinion issued May 1, 2012 
 
I. 
Introduction 
In April 2010, Jermane Clark was convicted of first degree murder and 
armed criminal action in connection with the death of Morris Thompson. The 
prosecution’s case against Clark depended principally on the testimony of two 
witnesses. First, Glenn Shelby claimed to have given the murder weapon to Clark. 
Second, Maurice Payne claimed to have been an eyewitness to the murder. 
Previously, Payne had pleaded guilty to unrelated charges before the same 
judge who presided over Clark’s murder trial. Payne’s decision to testify in 
Clark’s case was not motivated by a plea agreement in his own case, and it was 
unlikely that his decision to testify against Clark would affect Payne’s sentence 
 
favorably. Payne admitted that he subjectively hoped that his testimony against 
Clark would affect his sentence favorably, however. Clark’s attorney was not 
permitted to question Payne concerning this potential bias. 
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the case is remanded. 
II. Facts and Procedural History 
 
A. 
The Initial Investigation 
 
On December 28, 2008, Officer Damon Willis of the St. Louis 
Metropolitan Police Department was called to the 4300 block of Lee Avenue. 
There, behind a vacant four-family flat, Officer Willis found the dead body of 
Morris Thompson face-down in a grassy area. A bullet found inside Thompson’s 
leather jacket was determined to be the cause of death. 
 
Two days later, Officer Willis again was called to the 4300 block of Lee 
Avenue, this time on a report of a suspicious person named “Glenn” who was 
displaying a handgun. When Officer Willis arrived at the scene, a man matching 
the description of the suspicious person took off running, and Officer Willis gave 
chase on foot. Officer Willis eventually caught and arrested the fleeing man, 
Glenn Shelby. Immediately after Officer Willis arrested him, Shelby showed 
Officer Willis where he had hidden a gun in a nearby trash dumpster. Shelby was 
released shortly after this arrest. 
 
Firearms specialists concluded that Shelby’s gun was the weapon used to 
kill Thompson. Homicide detectives immediately began searching for Shelby but 
did not arrest him until January 20. Under interrogation, Shelby told detectives 
 
that, shortly before Thompson’s death, he had given the murder weapon to 
Jermane Clark. Shelby also claimed that Clark had admitted to killing Thompson. 
Shelby told detectives that another man, Maurice Payne, also had been in the area 
of the murder shortly before Thompson was killed. 
 
The police questioned Payne on January 22. Payne claimed that he had 
watched as Clark shot Thompson to death. Based on Shelby’s and Payne’s 
accounts, Clark was charged with first degree murder, first degree robbery and two 
counts of armed criminal action. After learning of the charges, Clark voluntarily 
surrendered to the police on January 23. 
 
B. 
Shelby’s Testimony 
 
At trial, Shelby testified that on the day of the murder he was “hanging 
around” with Payne and Clark in front of 4338 Lee Avenue. Thompson 
approached them and asked to buy crack cocaine. According to Shelby’s 
testimony, Clark then asked Shelby if he could sell Thompson some fake crack 
cocaine. Shelby told Clark to do whatever he liked, gave Clark his gun and left. 
 
Shelby testified that, a few minutes later, while he was walking to the 
market with his sisters, he heard a gun shot. He continued walking to the market, 
and after visiting the market, he went to his grandmother’s house. 
 
Shelby testified that he later saw Clark in an alley as Clark was running 
toward Newstead Avenue. According to Shelby’s testimony, Clark told Shelby 
that he had tried to sell Thompson fake crack cocaine, but that Thompson was not 
 
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falling for it, so Clark decided to rob Thompson instead. Shelby testified that 
Clark told him he had stolen Thompson’s mobile phone1 and then shot Thompson. 
 
C.  
Payne’s Testimony 
 
At trial, Payne testified that on the day of the murder he was with Shelby 
and Clark in the 4300 block of Lee Avenue. Thompson approached them and 
asked to buy crack cocaine. Payne told Thompson that he should go into the 
backyard of a nearby vacant house. Payne also went to the backyard and sold 
Thompson three rocks of crack cocaine for $30. Payne testified that Clark then 
pulled a gun and demanded Thompson’s money. Thompson tried to run, and Clark 
shot Thompson. Clark then approached the body and searched the pockets. 
According to Payne, Shelby appeared immediately after the killing and asked what 
had happened, and Payne told him that Clark had killed Thompson. 
 
Prior to Payne’s testimony, Clark’s attorney notified both the judge and the 
circuit attorney that he planned to elicit testimony that Payne hoped to receive 
favorable treatment during the sentencing phase of his own criminal proceeding in 
return for testifying at Clark’s trial. Payne had been charged with second degree 
burglary and theft in a case that was unrelated to Thompson’s murder. The judge 
sitting in Clark’s murder trial also had sat in Payne’s burglary trial, and Payne had 
pleaded guilty about four weeks earlier. Payne was eligible for a sentence of up to 
                                                 
1 Detectives were unable to recover Thompson’s mobile phone. They did, 
however, obtain records showing the numbers that had been called from the 
mobile phone after Thompson’s death. Approximately 50 calls were made, but 
detectives found no connection between any of them and Clark. 
 
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16 years’ imprisonment, but in lieu of sentencing, Payne’s case had been 
transferred to the City of St. Louis drug courts. Participation in a drug court 
program is conditional on completing drug court requirements and following drug 
court rules. Failure to comply with these requirements would result in retransfer of 
Payne’s case to the circuit court for traditional sentencing. After Payne’s guilty 
plea but before Clark’s trial, Clark’s attorney deposed Payne. During the 
deposition, Payne indicated that he hoped his testimony against Clark might earn 
him leniency should he fail the drug court program. 
 
The circuit attorney agreed that Clark was permitted to cross-examine 
Payne concerning Payne’s guilty plea. But she argued that Clark could not cross-
examine Payne about Payne’s hope for leniency. The circuit attorney argued that 
Clark could not attempt to portray Payne as “dishonest simply based on his 
desires” for leniency. The circuit attorney also argued that, because it was 
uncertain whether Payne would ever face traditional sentencing, whatever hope 
Payne might have entertained was too tenuous to form a basis for impeachment. 
Because Payne might never face sentencing, his hopes were irrelevant, and 
allowing questioning on the subject would be more prejudicial than probative. 
 
In response, Clark argued that prohibiting this avenue of cross-examination 
was a violation of his constitutional right to due process and a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.2 The judge sustained the circuit 
                                                 
2 “[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 2. 
 
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attorney’s objection, noting that Payne had not even been offered a plea deal in 
exchange for his testimony in Clark’s case. The judge allowed Clark’s attorney to 
submit an offer of proof, during which he asked Payne about his subjective hopes. 
The offer of proof demonstrated that Payne would have testified that he hoped for 
leniency in a possible future sentencing as a result of his testimony against Clark. 
 
D. 
Clark’s Conviction and Appeal 
 
The State called 12 witnesses to testify against Clark, including Officer 
Willis, St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department homicide detectives, Shelby and 
Payne. The State did not present any physical evidence tying Clark to Thompson’s 
murder. Clark did not call any witnesses. 
 
The jury convicted Clark of first degree murder and armed criminal action, 
and the circuit court sentenced Clark to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment. 
Clark timely filed a motion for a new trial in which he alleged that the circuit court 
had abused its discretion by preventing Clark from cross-examining Payne on the 
issue of Payne’s hope for leniency. The circuit court overruled Clark’s motion. 
 
Clark appeals his conviction. 
III. Standard of Review 
“The trial court has broad discretion over the extent of cross-examination, 
especially in criminal cases.” State v. Gardner, 8 S.W.3d 66, 72 (Mo. banc 1999). 
“[C]ross-examination may not encompass incompetent, irrelevant, or immaterial 
matters .... However, questions of relevancy are for the trial court, whose ruling 
will be disturbed only for abuse of discretion.” Id. An abuse of discretion occurs 
 
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“when a ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so 
unreasonable as to indicate a lack of careful consideration.” State v. Gonzales, 153 
S.W.3d 311, 312 (Mo. banc 2005). This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to 
admit or exclude evidence “for prejudice, not mere error .... Trial court error is 
prejudicial if there is a reasonable probability that the court’s error affected the 
outcome of the trial.” State v. Winfrey, 337 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. banc 2011) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
“[W]hether a criminal defendant’s rights were violated under the 
Confrontation Clause ... is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” 
State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 664-65 (Mo. banc 2007). Such questions are 
subject to a harmless error test, which means that a conviction must be overturned 
unless “the error be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt ....” Id. at 667. 
IV. Analysis 
 
Clark argues that the circuit court’s failure to allow cross-examination of 
Payne on his hope for leniency violated his constitutional rights. But there is no 
need to resort to constitutional analysis. Under Missouri’s law of evidence, the 
circuit court’s decision to prohibit this cross-examination was an abuse of 
discretion. “It has long been the rule in Missouri that on cross-examination a 
witness may be asked any questions to test his accuracy, veracity or credibility.” 
Mitchell v. Kardesch, 313 S.W.3d 667, 670 (Mo. banc 2010). “It is well-
established that the interest of a witness is never irrelevant .... Consequently, 
cross-examination ... is permissible if it shows the bias or interest because a 
 
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witness’s bias or interest could affect the reliability of the witness’s testimony on 
any issue .... Although the trial court has discretion in limiting the scope and extent 
of cross-examination bearing on the witness’s bias or interest, the court cannot bar 
cross-examination into that subject completely.” Winfrey, 337 S.W.3d at 8 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 
 Here, Payne admitted during Clark’s offer of proof that, in the event that 
his own case was retransferred to the circuit court for sentencing, he hoped he 
would reap a benefit because he had testified against Clark. A reasonable jury 
could have concluded that Payne’s subjective hope was a source of bias. Because a 
witness’s potential bias is always relevant, Clark should have been allowed to 
cross-examine Payne on this issue. 
 
As a rationale for its decision to exclude this evidence, the circuit court 
relied heavily on the fact that the State had never, in fact, offered Payne a plea 
deal. But this reasoning fails to account for the subjective nature of “bias.” “The 
term ‘bias’ includes all varieties of hostility or prejudice against the opponent 
personally or of favor to the proponent personally .... Evidence showing bias 
includes circumstances of the witness’s situation that make it probable that he or 
she has partiality of emotion for one party’s cause.” State v. J.L.S., 259 S.W.3d 39, 
44 (Mo. App. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). It is possible for a 
witness to mistakenly perceive a fact and yet to be biased as a result of his or her 
mistaken perception. Payne’s belief that his testimony would have a favorable 
effect on future sentencing may have been mistaken or speculative, but what is 
 
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important is what he believed. A reasonable jury could have concluded that 
Payne’s misplaced hope made him want to help the State. 
 
Clark was prejudiced by the circuit court’s abuse of discretion. The State 
presented no physical evidence linking Clark to Thompson’s murder. The State’s 
case against Clark relied mainly on the testimony of Payne and Shelby. Shelby 
owned the gun used to kill Thompson, and a police officer recovered the gun from 
Shelby himself after he had arrested Shelby. Shelby failed to come forward with 
his information concerning Thompson’s death before he was arrested. Thus, 
Shelby’s testimony suffered from its own credibility problems. And Shelby’s 
version of events diverges from Payne’s version at key points, including whether 
Shelby arrived at the murder scene shortly after the murder and how Thompson, 
Payne and Clark came to be standing in the backyard. 
 
Payne, too, failed to come forward with his information before detectives 
approached him, and Payne had pleaded guilty to burglary and theft just weeks 
before Clark’s trial. Given these additional credibility problems, it is possible that 
the additional testimony that Clark would have elicited on cross-examination 
would have tipped the balance in the minds of the jurors and caused them not to 
believe Payne. Having made that judgment, jurors might have concluded that 
Shelby’s testimony alone, plagued by problems as it was, was insufficient to 
convict Clark beyond a reasonable doubt. There is a reasonable probability that the 
circuit court’s decision to exclude the evidence affected the outcome of the trial. 
See Winfrey, 337 S.W.3d at 5. 
 
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V. 
Conclusion 
 
The circuit court abused its discretion by refusing Clark the opportunity to 
cross-examine a key witness on whether the witness was biased, and there is a 
reasonable probability that that error affected the outcome of the trial. Therefore 
the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the case is remanded. 
 
 
______________________________________ 
                                     
        William Ray Price, Jr., Judge 
 
 
Teitelman, C.J., Russell, 
Breckenridge, Fischer and Stith, JJ., 
and Manners, Sp.J., concur. 
Draper, J., not participating.