Title: Breidler v. Industrial Commission
Citation: 383 P.2d 177, 94 Ariz. 258
Docket Number: 7784
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 1963

94 Ariz. 258 (1963) 383 P.2d 177 George BREIDLER, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona and R.O. Classon, dba Serrita Marble Products Company, Respondents. No. 7784. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Division. June 26, 1963. *259 Riley &amp; Riley, Tucson, for petitioner. C.E. Singer, Jr., Phoenix, for respondent Industrial Commission, Donald J. Morgan, Lorin G. Shelley, Ben P. Marshall, Robert D. Steckner and Raymond E. Peterson, Phoenix, of counsel. BERNSTEIN, Chief Justice. This is a petition for certiorari to review an award of the Industrial Commission. In its award petitioner's compensation was restricted to medical expenses resulting from the lodging of some foreign bodies in his eye and their removal. The commission refused compensation for "Bell's palsy" which petitioner contracted at the same time and it is of this refusal that petitioner complains. The commission recognized the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. See, e.g., Watson v. Sam Knight Mining Lease, 78 Ariz. 114, 120, 276 P.2d 536, 539: On the day of the injury petitioner was shoveling rock into a marble crusher. The temperature was approximately 114 degrees and he had been working in the sun without a break for about four hours. He was perspiring heavily. The switch box which controlled the marble crusher was protected from the sun by a canopy so that the fuses would not get too hot. The petitioner's testimony as to how the accident happened is not contradicted: Petitioner also testified that he had always been in excellent health and had never had Bell's palsy prior to the accident. The petitioner's paralytic condition was diagnosed as "Bell's palsy", a paralysis of the side of the face caused by a blockage of the seventh cranial nerve. The commission's medical advisor, Dr. Edwards, in a memorandum to the claims' department stated: The only other medical testimony was given by Dr. Saylor. On May 25, 1962, he wrote the commission: At the hearing Dr. Saylor testified: *261 The doctor also testified that the disease "could have" been caused by the draft. He further testified that the disease could also be caused by infection or virus but that neither of these were present. As to petitioner's condition at the time of the rehearing the doctor testified: It is the commission's position that the doctor's testimony was too uncertain as to the cause of the "Bell's palsy" and that the commission cannot base an award on conjecture or possibilities. The commission is of the opinion that the petitioner has not affirmatively established all of the material elements necessary to sustain an award to him. In other words the commission is of the opinion that petitioner has not made out a prima facie case. The commission relies on the fact that at one point the doctor testified in answer to a hypothetical question, which assumed facts contrary to those in evidence, that it was "possible not probable" that the draft caused the disease. This is not a case of conflicting or equivocal medical testimony. Rather it is a case in which the commission feels compelled to deny liability because of a lack of medical proof on the question of causation. It is agreed that the accident arose out of and was in the course of employment. It is agreed that the petitioner did not have the condition prior to the accident and did have it after the accident. The only testimony is that a cold draft hit him on the right side of the face. The doctor testified that the development of the condition was consistent with what had happened to petitioner.[1] At other times the doctor weakened this by use of the words "could have" and "possible". But in any event, although Doctor Saylor did not use the occult words "reasonable medical certainty" nor "reasonable *262 medical probability" in expressing his opinion on medical facie case in all circumstances.[2] One of the circumstances is where there is expert testimony that the accident "could" produce the injury coupled with the fact that the petitioner did not have the injury before the accident but did have it after the accident. In that circumstance the petitioner has put on a prima facie case. As was said in Charlton Bros. Transp. Co. v. Garrettson, 188 Md. 85, 94, 51 A.2d 642, 646: And the Supreme Court of Florida said in Eli Witt Cigar &amp; Tobacco Co. v. Matatics, Fla., 55 So. 2d 549, 551: See, e.g., Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Industrial Comm., 19 Ill. 2d 236, 166 N.E.2d 582; Perkins v. Sunset Tel. and Tel. Co., 155 Cal. 712, 103 P. 190; Boland v. Vanderbilt, 140 Conn. 520, 102 A.2d 362; Carney v. Hellar, 155 Kan. 674, 127 P.2d 496; Cole v. Simpson, 299 Mich. 589, 1 N.W.2d 2; Ketcham v. Thomas, Mo., 283 S.W.2d 642; Ford v. Blythe Bros. Co., 242 N.C. 347, 87 S.E.2d 879. For further cases approving the use of the words "possible", "likely", "probable", "might", or "could" see 66 A.L.R.2d 1082, 1118 Sec. 7(b), Anno. "Admissibility of Opinion Evidence as to Cause of Death or Disease." *263 In the instant case petitioner did not have Bell's palsy prior to the accident and did have it afterward. The doctor testified that this condition was usually preceded by a cold draft on the face and negatived the other possible medical causes as they applied to petitioner. He "assumed" that the cause of the condition was the cold draft. He stated that it "could" have been caused by the draft which hit petitioner in the face. The petitioner made out a prima facie case and without more sustained his burden of proof. The commission cites Helmericks v. Airesearch Mfg. Co. of Arizona, 88 Ariz. 413, 357 P.2d 152, in support of the proposition that the word "possibility" may never be considered in assuming medical causation. That case illustrates precisely the distinction we are here making. In the Helmericks case we held that where a doctor could not testify with any certainty whether petitioner's ear condition was a result of having been subjected to high frequency noises or whether it was due to the progression of a pre-existing disease that the medical testimony of causation was equivocal. In the instant case it is not disputed that petitioner did not have the condition prior to the accident. Award set aside. STRUCKMEYER and JENNINGS, JJ., concur. [1] At least two workman's compensation cases dealing with Bell's palsy have been decided by other courts. Lurye v. Stern Bros. Dept. Stores, 275 N.Y. 182, 9 N.E.2d 828, and Zaft v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 59 Ohio App. 290, 18 N.E.2d 122 In both cases it was assumed the Bell's palsy was caused by a sudden cold draft on the side of the face. [2] Cf. Southwestern Freight Lines Ltd. v. Floyd, 58 Ariz. 249, 119 P.2d 120, where a doctor's testimony as to what "might happen" as a result of an injury was held to be proper.