Title: People v. Lara
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S243975
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: April 11, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
HENRY ARSENIO LARA II, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S243975 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Two 
E065029 
 
Riverside County Superior Court 
INF1302723 
 
 
April 11, 2019 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, and Groban concurred. 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
PEOPLE v. LARA 
S243975 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
This is another case in a series concerning the proper 
interpretation of Proposition 47 (“the Safe Neighborhoods and 
Schools Act”), the 2014 ballot initiative that reduced certain 
felony offenses to misdemeanors.  In addition to prospectively 
reducing the penalty for these offenses, Proposition 47 also 
permitted eligible defendants who were serving felony 
sentences as of the measure’s effective date to retroactively 
obtain relief by petitioning for recall of sentence and 
requesting resentencing.  (Pen. Code, § 1170.18, subd. (a), as 
amended by Stats. 2016, ch. 767, § 1, p. 5313.)  This 
resentencing provision is, however, more restrictive than 
initial sentencing under the statute would be; among other 
things, Penal Code section 1170.18 (section 1170.18) instructs 
that relief be denied if the trial court determines that 
resentencing the defendant “would pose an unreasonable risk 
of danger to public safety.”  (§ 1170.18, subd. (b).) 
The 
differences 
between 
initial 
sentencing 
under 
Proposition 47’s amended penalty provisions and resentencing 
under section 1170.18’s petition procedure have led to 
questions about which set of provisions apply to various classes 
of defendants.  In People v. DeHoyos (2018) 4 Cal.5th 594, 600–
603 (DeHoyos), we concluded that section 1170.18 supplies the 
PEOPLE v. LARA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
 
exclusive path to relief on a current offense under Proposition 
47 for defendants who were serving felony sentences as of the 
measure’s effective date, including those whose judgments 
were on appeal and thus not yet final.  The question now 
before us concerns the application of Proposition 47 to 
defendants who committed their crimes before the measure’s 
effective date but who were tried or sentenced after that date.  
Our answer follows directly from DeHoyos:  Defendants who 
had not yet been sentenced as of Proposition 47’s effective date 
are entitled to initial sentencing under Proposition 47’s 
amended 
penalty 
provisions, 
without 
regard 
to 
the 
resentencing procedures applicable to those who were already 
serving their sentences.  
I. 
On August 15, 2013, defendant Henry Arsenio Lara II 
was found driving a stolen 2000 Honda Civic.  In January 
2015, he was charged by information with unlawfully taking or 
driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and receiving 
the same stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)), both 
alternative felony-misdemeanors (also known as wobblers (see 
People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 789)).  Evidence at trial 
showed the vehicle was taken from in front of the owner’s 
house on August 8 or 9, 2013.  On August 14, police found the 
vehicle parked at a mobile home park known as a dumping 
ground for stolen vehicles.  The vehicle was kept under 
surveillance and, on August 15, was seen being driven in the 
same area.  Police stopped the car and arrested defendant, the 
driver and only occupant.  The car had a broken window and 
was missing its rims.  The ignition had been tampered with, 
allowing the car to be started with keys for other vehicles, two 
PEOPLE v. LARA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
 
of which were found on the floorboard.  No evidence was 
presented directly implicating defendant in the vehicle’s theft. 
Although the information alleged that defendant violated 
Vehicle Code section 10851 in that he “did willfully and 
unlawfully drive and take” the Honda Civic, the court 
instructed the jury only on an unlawful driving theory of 
liability.  Specifically, it instructed that, in order to convict, the 
jury had to find that defendant drove someone else’s vehicle 
without the owner’s consent and with the intent to deprive the 
owner of possession or ownership for a period of time.  
Consistent with that instruction, the prosecutor argued only an 
unlawful driving theory to the jury.  She explained that the 
section 10851 charge “requires that I prove to you that the 
defendant drove a vehicle without the owner’s consent, and 
that’s real easy.”  Later she emphasized that “[t]he question in 
this case is not who stole the car originally.”  There was some 
circumstantial evidence defendant may have taken the car, she 
argued, but “[w]e don’t know.  But that’s okay that we don’t 
know because that’s not the question here. . . .  [¶]  The 
question that you have to answer [is] was he driving it without 
the owner’s consent . . . .”   On rebuttal, she again disavowed a 
theft theory, conceding the evidence defendant stole the car 
was “not enough to convict him beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
The jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of 
“driving a vehicle without permission, as charged under count 
1 of the information.”  Consistent with the court’s instruction 
that receiving a stolen vehicle was an alternative charge to 
unlawful taking or driving, the jury acquitted on the receiving 
PEOPLE v. LARA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
 
charge.1  The court sentenced defendant to three years of 
imprisonment for violation of Vehicle Code section 10851.  
With sentence enhancements for prior convictions and prior 
prison terms (Pen. Code, §§ 666.5, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (b)), 
defendant’s aggregate prison sentence was 10 years. 
On appeal, defendant for the first time invoked 
Proposition 47.  After it was approved at the November 2014 
General Election, the ballot measure took effect on November 
5, 2014—that is, after defendant committed his offense but 
before he was charged, tried, or sentenced.  As relevant here, 
Proposition 47 added Penal Code section 490.2, subdivision (a), 
providing in part:  “Notwithstanding Section 487 or any other 
provision of law defining grand theft, obtaining any property 
by theft where the value of the money, labor, real or personal 
property taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars 
($950) shall be considered petty theft and shall be punished as 
a misdemeanor . . . .”2 
                                        
1  
Defendant may have benefited from an incorrect 
instruction in this respect.  Under People v. Garza (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 866, 881, dual convictions for receiving and taking or 
driving the same vehicle are not barred when the Vehicle Code 
section 10851 conviction is based solely on driving the vehicle 
after the theft was complete. 
2  
While reclassifying most thefts of property worth $950 or 
less as misdemeanors, the statute provides for felony 
punishment if the defendant has prior convictions for any of 
certain serious or violent offenses listed in Penal Code section 
667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv) or for an offense requiring 
registration as a sex offender.  (Pen. Code, § 490.2, subd. (a).)  
Neither exception applies here. 
PEOPLE v. LARA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
 
On appeal, defendant argued that his felony Vehicle Code 
section 10851 conviction must be reduced to a misdemeanor 
under this newly added Penal Code provision.  Defendant 
contended that Penal Code section 490.2 applies because a 
section 10851 violation is a theft crime and the jury was never 
instructed to find, and therefore never found, that the value of 
the Honda Civic exceeded $950. 
Rejecting the argument, the Court of Appeal affirmed 
defendant’s felony conviction and sentence.  The majority 
concluded that Proposition 47 has no application to a violation 
of Vehicle Code section 10851.  Justice Slough, in a separate 
concurring opinion, concluded that Proposition 47 does apply to 
a Vehicle Code section 10851 violation, provided that the 
violation is based on theft.  But because defendant’s violation 
was instead based on unlawful driving of a vehicle, Justice 
Slough joined the majority in affirming the judgment.  
We granted defendant’s petition for review and held the 
case for People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page).  In that 
case, we held that Proposition 47 does apply to violations of 
Vehicle Code section 10851 that are based on theft of a vehicle.  
But the procedural history of this case raises another threshold 
question not addressed in Page:  Is a defendant who had not 
yet been sentenced when Proposition 47 took effect entitled to 
initial sentencing under the measure?  Or must he or she 
instead be sentenced under pre-Proposition 47 law—subject to 
his or her ability to later file a petition for resentencing under 
section 1170.18?  That section provides resentencing relief to 
one “who, on November 5, 2014, was serving a sentence” for an 
offense eligible for reduction (section 1170.18, subd. (a)), as 
well as providing for redesignation of the conviction as a 
PEOPLE v. LARA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
 
misdemeanor for one “who has completed his or her sentence 
for a conviction” for such an eligible offense (id., subd. (f)). 
To address this issue, after Page was decided we asked 
the parties to brief the following question:  Does Penal Code 
section 490.2, added by Proposition 47, effective November 5, 
2014, apply directly (i.e., without a petition under Penal Code, 
§ 1170.18) in trial and sentencing proceedings held after 
Proposition 47’s effective date, when the charged offense was 
allegedly committed before Proposition 47’s effective date? 
II. 
In their responsive briefing, defendant and the Attorney 
General agree that defendants who committed theft crimes 
before the effective date of Proposition 47, but who are tried or 
sentenced after the measure’s effective date, are entitled to 
initial sentencing under Proposition 47, and need not invoke 
the resentencing procedure set out in section 1170.18.  We 
agree as well.  
When a new statute decreases the prescribed punishment 
for criminal conduct, as did Proposition 47, whether the change 
applies to preenactment conduct is a matter of legislative 
intent.  (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744.)  We 
articulated the basic framework for discerning that intent in 
Estrada.  In that case, we held that when the Legislature 
enacts a law ameliorating punishment without including an 
express savings clause or a similar indicator of its intent to 
apply the law prospectively only, we infer an intent “that the 
new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to 
be sufficient should apply to every case to which it 
constitutionally could apply.”  (Id. at p. 745.)  In this category 
we included cases in which the criminal act was committed 
PEOPLE v. LARA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
 
before the statute’s passage, so long as the judgment is not yet 
final.  (Ibid.)  Thus, under Estrada, “ ‘[A]n amendatory statute 
lessening punishment is presumed to apply in all cases not yet 
reduced to final judgment as of the amendatory statute’s 
effective date’ [citations], unless the enacting body ‘clearly 
signals its intent to make the amendment prospective, by the 
inclusion of either an express saving clause or its equivalent’ 
[citations].”  (DeHoyos, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 600; see also 
People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 791–794.) 
In DeHoyos, we employed this framework to determine 
whether Proposition 47’s amended penalty provisions apply 
automatically—that is, without need for a resentencing 
petition under section 1170.18—to defendants who were 
serving felony sentences as of Proposition 47’s effective date 
but whose sentences had not yet become final on appeal.  
Proposition 47, we noted, is not silent on the question of 
retroactivity, as was the case in Estrada; rather, Proposition 
47 “contains a detailed set of provisions designed to extend the 
statute’s benefits retroactively.  [Citation.]  Those provisions 
include, as relevant here, a recall and resentencing mechanism 
for individuals who were ‘serving a sentence’ for a covered 
offense as of Proposition 47’s effective date.  (§ 1170.18, subd. 
(a).)”  (DeHoyos, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 603.)  The measure’s 
resentencing provision, we observed, “draws no express 
distinction between persons serving final sentences and those 
serving nonfinal sentences, instead entitling both categories of 
prisoners to petition courts for recall of sentence.”  (Ibid.)  And 
that provision, section 1170.18, “expressly makes resentencing 
dependent on a court’s assessment of the likelihood that a 
defendant’s early release will pose a risk to public safety, 
undermining the idea that voters ‘categorically determined 
PEOPLE v. LARA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
 
that “imposition of a lesser punishment” will in all cases 
“sufficiently serve the public interest.” ’ ”  (DeHoyos, at p. 603.)  
These provisions, together with statements in the Voter 
Information Guide, showed “an intent to apply the provisions 
of section 1170.18, including its risk assessment provision, to 
all previously sentenced defendants who had not yet completed 
their sentences, and not just to those whose judgments had 
become final on direct review.”  (DeHoyos, at p. 603.)   
As the parties before us agree, the same reasoning leads to 
a different answer here.  Unlike the defendant in DeHoyos, 
defendant here had not been sentenced—indeed, he had not 
yet been charged—when Proposition 47 became effective.  By 
its terms, then, the resentencing provision in section 1170.18 
does not apply to him.  Proposition 47 provides resentencing 
relief to one “who, on November 5, 2014, was serving a 
sentence” for an offense eligible for reduction (§ 1170.18, subd. 
(a)), but it does not expressly address reduction of punishment 
for a defendant who had not yet been sentenced on its effective 
date.  On the contrary, Proposition 47’s resentencing provisions 
are simply silent on the subject of retroactivity as to such a 
defendant.  In the absence of contrary indications, we may 
therefore presume under Estrada that the enacting body 
intended Proposition 47’s reduced penalties to apply in this 
category of nonfinal cases. 
 We therefore agree with the parties that the applicable 
ameliorative provisions of Proposition 47 (here, Penal Code 
section 490.2) 
apply 
directly 
in 
trial 
and 
sentencing 
proceedings held after the measure’s effective date, regardless 
of whether the alleged offense occurred before or after that 
date.   
PEOPLE v. LARA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
 
III. 
Because defendant had not yet been sentenced at the time 
Proposition 47 became effective, its ameliorative provisions 
apply.  The question remains whether they make a difference 
in defendant’s case.  Defendant argues they do, for two 
reasons:  First, he claims, the prosecution presented 
insufficient evidence to establish a felony violation of Vehicle 
Code section 10851, as opposed to an offense rendered a 
misdemeanor by newly added Penal Code section 490.2.  
Second, he contends, the trial court erred in instructing the 
jury on the Vehicle Code section 10851 charge.  We consider 
each claim in turn, and conclude neither claim has merit. 
A. 
Proposition 47 did not reduce to misdemeanors all 
violations of Vehicle Code section 10851.  That statute, which 
prohibits taking or driving a vehicle without the owner’s 
consent and with the intent to temporarily or permanently 
deprive the owner of title or possession, can be violated by a 
range of conduct, only some of which constitutes theft.  And 
only theft-based violations fall within Penal Code section 
490.2, making them misdemeanors unless the vehicle stolen 
was worth more than $950.  (Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 
pp. 1182–1183.) 
As we explained in Page, we had recognized the distinction 
between the theft and nontheft forms of the Vehicle Code 
section 10851 offense long before Proposition 47 was enacted.  
In People v. Garza, supra, 35 Cal.4th 866, “we considered 
whether dual convictions under Vehicle Code section 10851 
and Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a) (receiving stolen 
property) violated the statutory rule against convicting a 
PEOPLE v. LARA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
 
person for both stealing and receiving the same property.  We 
concluded the answer depended on the basis for the Vehicle 
Code section 10851 conviction—whether it was for stealing the 
automobile or for taking or driving it in another prohibited 
manner:  ‘Unlawfully taking a vehicle with the intent to 
permanently deprive the owner of possession is a form of theft, 
and the taking may be accomplished by driving the vehicle 
away.  For this reason, a defendant convicted under section 
10851(a) of unlawfully taking a vehicle with the intent to 
permanently deprive the owner of possession has suffered a 
theft conviction and may not also be convicted under section 
496(a) of receiving the same vehicle as stolen property.  On the 
other hand, unlawful driving of a vehicle is not a form of theft 
when the driving occurs or continues after the theft is 
complete . . . .  Therefore, a conviction under section 10851(a) 
for posttheft driving is not a theft conviction . . . .’  (Garza, at 
p. 871, italics omitted.)”  (Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1183.)   
In Page, we shed further light on the distinction between 
vehicle theft and posttheft driving as forms of the Vehicle Code 
section 10851 offense:  “Posttheft driving in violation of Vehicle 
Code section 10851 consists of driving a vehicle without the 
owner’s consent after the vehicle has been stolen, with the 
intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the owner of title 
or possession.  Where the evidence shows a ‘substantial break’ 
between the taking and the driving, posttheft driving may give 
rise to a conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851 distinct 
from any liability for vehicle theft.”  (Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 
p. 1188, quoting People v. Kehoe (1949) 33 Cal.2d 711, 715.)  
While a theft-based violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 
may be punished as a felony only if the vehicle is shown to 
have been worth over $950, a violation committed by posttheft 
PEOPLE v. LARA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
 
driving may be charged and sentenced as a felony regardless of 
value.3 
With this understanding of the relationship between Penal 
Code section 490.2 and Vehicle Code section 10851, defendant’s 
contention that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support 
a felony conviction of Vehicle Code section 10851 is easily 
rejected.  Although no evidence was presented of the vehicle’s 
value, the evidence amply supported a theory of posttheft 
driving, which does not require proof of vehicle value in order 
to be treated as a felony.  The evidence showed that defendant 
was apprehended driving the stolen car six or seven days after 
it was taken from its owner.  Whether or not he was involved 
in the theft—a point the prosecutor conceded was not proved at 
trial—the evidence clearly establishes a substantial break 
between the theft and defendant’s act of unlawful driving.  (See 
People v. Strong (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 366, 375 [four days 
between theft and driving].)  Defendant did not have the 
owner’s consent to drive the vehicle and the circumstances 
indicated he intended to keep the car from the owner for some 
period of time.  The evidence was thus sufficient to show a 
felony violation of Vehicle Code section 10851. 
                                        
3  
In Page, we left for another day the question of whether a 
violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 committed by taking a 
vehicle with the intent only of depriving the owner temporarily 
of possession (sometimes referred to as joyriding) must be 
treated as the equivalent of vehicle theft for purposes of Penal 
Code section 490.2.  (Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1188, fn. 5.)  
As the facts of this case would not support such a theory, we 
leave that question unaddressed here as well. 
PEOPLE v. LARA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
 
B. 
We next consider defendant’s claim of instructional error.  
We find no reversible error on that score, either. 
As noted earlier, the jury in this case was instructed only 
on an unlawful driving theory of the Vehicle Code section 
10851 offense.  Specifically, the instruction required the People 
to prove that defendant “drove someone else’s vehicle” with the 
requisite intent and without the owner’s permission.  The 
verdict form similarly restricted the theory of guilt; it allowed 
the jury to find defendant guilty only of driving a vehicle 
without permission. 
Defendant argues that the instruction was insufficient, 
relying on People v. Gutierrez (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 847 
(Gutierrez).  In that case, the court reversed a felony conviction 
under Vehicle Code section 10851 for a post-Proposition 47 
offense because the jury instructions did not distinguish 
between theft and nontheft forms of the offense and did not 
require that the jury find a vehicle value greater than $950 in 
order to convict on a theory of vehicle theft.  (Gutierrez, at 
pp. 856–857.) 
The instruction here did not suffer from the same error, 
however.  As the Court of Appeal explained in Gutierrez, the 
instructions in that case “allowed the jury to convict Gutierrez 
of a felony violation of [Vehicle Code] section 10851 for 
stealing the rental car, even though no value was proved—a 
legally incorrect theory—or for a nontheft taking or driving 
offense—a legally correct one.”  (Gutierrez, supra, 20 
Cal.App.5th at p. 857.)  On the record before it, the appellate 
court could not determine which theory the jury had based its 
verdict on; the court concluded this uncertainty required 
PEOPLE v. LARA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
 
reversal.  (Ibid.; accord, People v. Jackson (2018) 26 
Cal.App.5th 371, 378–381; People v. Bussey (2018) 24 
Cal.App.5th 1056, 1061–1062.)4  In this case, by contrast, the 
court’s instruction—supported by the lawyers’ arguments—
focused exclusively on the nontheft variant of the Vehicle Code 
section 10851 offense. 
Of course, as defendant also correctly points out, the 
unlawful driving instruction was incomplete:  While the 
instruction specified driving as the alleged illegal act, it did not 
refer expressly to posttheft driving.  Taking the instruction on 
Vehicle Code section 10851 in isolation, the jury thus could 
theoretically have understood guilt to be proved if defendant 
stole the vehicle by driving it away from where the owner had 
parked it. 
The trial court’s omission was, however, harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 
18, 24.)  The evidence showed that defendant was apprehended 
driving the vehicle six or seven days after it was stolen from its 
owner, a time gap that indisputably qualifies as a “ ‘substantial 
break’ ” between the theft and the driving.  (Page, supra, 3 
Cal.5th at p. 1188.)  In the absence of any direct evidence tying 
defendant to the theft—or indeed, any circumstantial evidence 
beyond defendant’s later possession of the stolen vehicle—
there was nothing to show he also drove it while effectuating 
the theft, and neither party so argued to the jury.  Indeed, the 
                                        
4  
This 
court 
is 
currently 
considering 
the 
correct 
harmlessness standard for instruction on alternative legal 
theories when one is correct and the other is incorrect.  (People 
v. Aledamat, review granted July 5, 2018, S248105.)   
PEOPLE v. LARA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
 
prosecutor expressly informed the jury it lacked sufficient 
evidence to convict defendant of the theft.  Given these 
circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to 
specify that unlawful driving must occur after the theft of the 
car, and not during, did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.  It 
is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would 
have rendered the same verdict had it received a complete 
instruction.  (See Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 17; 
People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 414.)   
IV. 
Although the Court of Appeal in this case erred in holding 
Proposition 47 inapplicable to violations of Vehicle Code 
section 10851, it was correct to affirm defendant’s conviction on 
that charge.  Even considering the ameliorative changes 
wrought by Proposition 47, the evidence at trial was sufficient 
to sustain a felony conviction under Vehicle Code section 
10851, and the trial court’s instructions on the offense were not 
prejudicially erroneous.   
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
  
 
 
  
 
KRUGER, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Lara 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 7/19/17 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S243975 
Date Filed: April 11, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Riverside 
Judge: Samuel Diaz, Jr. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Julie Sullwold and Neil Auwarter, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Peter Quon, Jr., Anthony 
DaSilva, Michael Pulos, Stacy Tyler and Joshua Patashnik, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Neil Auwarter 
Appellate Defenders, Inc. 
555 West Beech Street, Suite 300 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 696-0282 
 
Joshua Patashnik 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 738-9057