Title: State v. Fierro
Citation: 101 Ariz. 118, 416 P.2d 551
Docket Number: 1587
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: July 14, 1966

101 Ariz. 118 (1966) 416 P.2d 551 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee v. Robert FIERRO, Appellant. No. 1587. Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc. July 14, 1966. Darrell F. Smith, Atty. Gen., Gary K. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, Jack I. Redhair, Deputy County Atty., Tucson, for appellee. Octavio G. Marquez, Michael J. Brown, Tucson, for appellant. McFARLAND, Justice: Robert A. Fierro, hereinafter designated defendant, was convicted and sentenced to serve not less than ten nor more than twelve years in the Arizona state prison for the crime of robbery, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-641 and 13-642. We granted defendant's application to file a delayed appeal pursuant to Rule 16(a), as amended, Rules of the Supreme Court, 17 A.R.S. The statement of facts on conviction, submitted by the Pima County Attorney and approved by the Superior Court of Pima County, set forth the following facts: The defendant, seventeen years of age at the time of commission of the crime, raises two assignments of error. He first contends the trial court erroneously used information furnished by the Pima County Probation Office pertaining to defendant's juvenile record in determining the sentence to be imposed. In the record on appeal is a "Pre Sentence Report" compiled by the Pima County Probation Office which includes as a part thereof a copy of defendant's record from the Tucson Police Department listing some twenty-one instances in the period beginning September 21, 1957 through January 13, 1964 in which that department had some contact with defendant. Defendant contends A.R.S. § 8-228, subsec. B prohibits the use of such information by a trial court in determining a sentence. We do not have before us a transcript of proceedings at the time of sentencing. We have no information as to what portion of the Tucson Police Department record in fact constitutes a juvenile court record in order to fall within the purview of the statute. Assuming, arguendo, some portion of the record does fall within its bounds and the trial court referred to the report, the issue thus presented is whether a defendant's record of juvenile offenses may be used by the trial court in determination of the sentence to be imposed. The matter herein presented was before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth ex rel. Hendrickson v. Myers, 393 Pa. 224, 144 A.2d 367, where the court in interpreting a statutory provision almost identical to A.R.S. § 8-228, subsec. B stated: The record introduced in the instant case was not used as evidence in a trial, nor was it considered to determine any factual issue, but was presumably taken into consideration by the trial court after a plea of guilty, and then used in determination of the sentence to be imposed. The matters to be considered and the theory behind the sentencing of criminal defendants were well stated by this court in State v. Castano, 89 Ariz. 231, 360 P.2d 479, in which we said: It is the opinion of this court that the construction of A.R.S. § 8-228, subsec. B, found by the Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth ex rel. Hendrickson v. Myers, supra, is correct, and we therefore hold that in the instant case the trial court did not err in using the information before it as found in the "Pre Sentencing Report" concerning defendant's juvenile record. Defendant's second assignment of error is that the lower court abused its discretion *121 in imposing a sentence of not less than ten nor more than twelve years. This court has been given the authority to modify a sentence when in its opinion the conviction is proper, but the punishment imposed is greater than should be inflicted under the circumstances of the case. A.R.S. §§ 13-1716, 13-1717. The general rule is that if a sentence is within the limits of the penalty prescribed by the appropriate statute, it will not be revised or reduced on appeal unless it clearly appears the sentence is excessive. State v. Logan, 98 Ariz. 179, 403 P.2d 279; State v. Cuzick, 97 Ariz. 130, 397 P.2d 629; State v. Monks, 96 Ariz. 354, 395 P.2d 711; State v. Vineyard, 96 Ariz. 76, 392 P.2d 30. In State v. Valenzuela, 98 Ariz. 189, 403 P.2d 286, we said: The crime with which defendant was charged and found guilty is punishable "by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than five years", A.R.S. § 13-643, with no maximum. Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of not less than ten nor more than twelve years. The sentence being within the discretion of the trial court, there is no requirement a first offender be given a minimum sentence. State v. Killian, 91 Ariz. 140, 370 P.2d 287; State v. Benton, 78 Ariz. 85, 276 P.2d 516. The record indicates this is his first felony conviction. The Pima County Attorney, in his "Statement of Facts on Conviction", stated that "I would term defendant's chances of rehabilitation possible." An affidavit supplied by defense counsel was to the effect that defendant sat in the car while a companion committed the robbery in question. The "Pre Sentence Report" of the Pima County Probation office reaffirmed this position. A boy who has been in prison from the time he was 17 years of age generally has not learned a trade or occupation. He is dependent upon what he has learned during his imprisonment, or what he may learn after his release, to prepare himself for a job in order to earn a livelihood. He is forced to compete with those of his own age upon his release. Frequently, the longer the individual is kept in the penitentiary, the more difficult it is for him to compete. The greater the difficulty he encounters, the greater is his temptation to return to a life of crime. While it is one of the avowed purposes of our penal system to protect the public from criminals, we must recognize that rehabilitation of such offenders is also of primary importance. It is the feeling of this court that because defendant was only 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, justice will be better served with a lesser minimum sentence, thus allowing the Pardon and Parole Board to examine defendant's case within a shorter period and parole him if it finds he has taken advantage of the rehabilitation facilities offered by our penal institution and that he has been rehabilitated to the extent that society may be better served by his release. The conviction is affirmed and the sentence of defendant is hereby reduced to that of not less than five nor more than twelve years in the Arizona State Prison. Judgment affirmed as modified. BERNSTEIN, V.C.J., and UDALL, J., concur. STRUCKMEYER, Chief Justice (dissenting in part): I disapprove of the reduction of sentence but otherwise concur in the conviction. NOTE: Justice LORNA E. LOCKWOOD did not participate in the determination of this appeal.