Title: Dressner v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 120496
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 10, 2013

Present: All the Justices 
 
ALISON ANNE DRESSNER 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 120496 
CHIEF JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
JANUARY 10, 2013 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Charles J. Maxfield, Judge 
 
In this appeal challenging a denial of expungement of 
police and court records, we conclude that a possession of 
marijuana charge, amended to a reckless driving charge, was 
"otherwise dismissed" as contemplated by Code § 19.2-
392.2(A)(2).  Therefore, we will reverse the circuit court's 
judgment denying the requested expungement. 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS1 
Alison Anne Dressner was issued a summons for possession of 
marijuana in violation of Code § 18.2-250.1.  Prior to a hearing 
in the General District Court of Fairfax County, the 
Commonwealth amended the charge to reckless driving in violation 
of Code § 46.2-852.  The amendment was noted on the face of the 
original summons.  Dressner was then arraigned on the amended 
charge of reckless driving, entered a guilty plea to that 
charge, and was found guilty.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, the 
general district court imposed a fine of $200. 
                     
1 The relevant facts are set forth in a written statement of 
facts filed pursuant to Rule 5:11(e). 
2 
Subsequently, Dressner filed a "Petition for Expungement of 
Police and Court Records" in the Circuit Court of Fairfax 
County.  At a hearing on the petition, the circuit court found 
that Dressner suffered a loss of employment because an 
employer's background check revealed the possession of marijuana 
charge.  Thus, the court concluded Dressner established that the 
continuing existence of information about the possession of 
marijuana charge would constitute a "manifest injustice" under 
Code § 19.2-392.2(F).  The only issue remaining in dispute, 
according to the court, was whether Dressner was "acquitted" of 
the possession of marijuana charge, or whether the charge was 
"otherwise dismissed" pursuant to Code § 19.2-392.2(A)(1) and 
(2), respectively. 
After hearing argument by the parties, the circuit court 
denied the petition for expungement of the police and court 
records pertaining to the possession of marijuana charge.  The 
court concluded that because the original summons was amended, 
"expunging the [p]ossession of [m]arijuana charge would also 
expunge the record supporting the [r]eckless [d]riving 
conviction" and thereby "distort [Dressner's] record in a manner 
deemed impermissible . . . in Necaise v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 
666, 669[, 708 S.E.2d 864, 866] (2011)." 
We awarded Dressner this appeal.  Dressner asserts that the 
circuit court erred by holding (1) that the possession of 
3 
marijuana charge was not "otherwise dismissed;" (2) that 
expungement of the possession of marijuana charge would distort 
the record; and (3) that Dressner was not eligible for 
expungement because she pled guilty to an amended charge even 
though the amended charge was not a lesser-included offense of 
the offense originally charged on the summons. 
ANALYSIS 
The expungement statute, Code § 19.2-392.2, provides, in 
relevant part, that a person charged with the commission of a 
crime "may file a petition setting forth the relevant facts and 
requesting expungement of the police records and the court 
records relating to the charge" if the person was "acquitted, or 
[a] nolle prosequi is taken or the charge is otherwise 
dismissed, including dismissal by accord and satisfaction 
pursuant to § 19.2-151."  Code § 19.2-392.2(A).  The "threshold 
determination to be made by the trial court on considering any 
petition for expungement . . . is whether the petitioner has a 
right to seek expungement of those records under an applicable 
provision of Code § 19.2-392.2(A)."  Daniel v. Commonwealth, 268 
Va. 523, 530, 604 S.E.2d 444, 448 (2004).  The dispositive 
question in this appeal is whether the possession of marijuana 
charge was "otherwise dismissed" pursuant to Code § 19.2-
392.2(A).  That issue is a question of law that this Court 
4 
reviews de novo.  See Commonwealth v. Morris, 281 Va. 70, 76, 
705 S.E.2d 503, 505 (2011). 
The Commonwealth argues that the possession of marijuana 
charge was not "otherwise dismissed" within the meaning of the 
expungement statute because that charge, as subsequently 
amended, resulted in a conviction.  The Commonwealth further 
asserts that expungement of the records pertaining to the 
possession of marijuana charge would distort the record and 
events resulting in the reckless driving charge and conviction.  
Citing Brown v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 92, 677 S.E.2d 220 (2009), 
Dressner, however, argues that the possession of marijuana 
charge was "otherwise dismissed" because she occupies the status 
of one who is innocent of that particular charge.  Dressner 
points out that she never entered any plea to the possession of 
marijuana charge, that she was not found guilty of the charge, 
that the general district court did not make a finding that the 
evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for possession 
of marijuana, and that no terms were imposed on her in exchange 
for having the charge amended to reckless driving.  According to 
Dressner, the possession of marijuana charge was "otherwise 
dismissed by legal operation [of] the Commonwealth's amendment 
of the charge to [r]eckless [d]riving." 
Contrary to the circuit court's holding and the 
Commonwealth's assertions, our decision in Necaise is not 
5 
dispositive in this case.  There, the petitioner, who had pled 
guilty to two misdemeanor charges that were lesser-included 
offenses of the two original felony charges, sought expungement 
of the records regarding the felony charges.  281 Va. at 668, 
708 S.E.2d at 865.  This Court affirmed the trial court's 
judgment refusing to expunge those charges.  Id. at 670, 708 
S.E.2d at 866.  Our decision rested on the fact that "[b]ecause 
the misdemeanors of which Necaise was convicted were lesser 
included offenses of the felonies with which he was charged, all 
of the elements of the offenses of which he was convicted were 
subsumed within the felony charges and they form[ed] the sole 
bases for the convictions."  Id. at 669, 708 S.E.2d at 866.  
Therefore, we held that "Necaise, having been found guilty of 
offenses charged within the warrants upon which he was arrested, 
was not an 'innocent citizen' entitled to the benefit of the 
expungement statutes."  Id. at 670, 708 S.E.2d at 866. 
The possession of marijuana charge in the instant case, 
however, was amended to the completely separate and unrelated 
charge of reckless driving in violation of Code § 46.2-852.  
Reckless driving is not a lesser-included offense of possession 
of marijuana.  Compare Code § 46.2-852, with Code § 18.2-250.1.  
In other words, "the elements of the offense[] of which 
[Dressner] was convicted" were not "subsumed within the 
[possession of marijuana charge]" and did not "form the sole 
6 
bas[i]s for the conviction[]."  Necaise, 281 Va. at 669, 708 
S.E.2d at 866.  Thus, the possession of marijuana charge was 
necessarily "otherwise dismissed" within the intendment of Code 
§ 19.2-392.2(A)(2).  Indeed, the Commonwealth can point to no 
other disposition. 
Furthermore, the facts here are analogous to those in 
Brown, where we held that two petitioners each occupied "the 
status of 'innocent' so as to qualify under the expungement 
statute as a person whose charge has been 'otherwise 
dismissed.'"  278 Va. at 102, 677 S.E.2d at 226-27 (quoting 
Gregg v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 504, 507, 316 S.E.2d 741, 743 
(1984)).  There, neither of the petitioners entered any kind of 
plea to the misdemeanor charges for which they sought 
expungement of the records.  Id. at 102, 677 S.E.2d at 225.  
Further, the district courts where the charges were pending made 
no findings that evidence was sufficient to convict, nor were 
the offenses ones for which a deferred disposition or first 
offender status was allowed.  Id.  As we noted, each district 
court took "the criminal charge under advisement while the 
respective petitioner . . . performed certain agreed-upon tasks 
with the understanding that, upon doing so, the charge would be 
dismissed."  Id.   Thus, we "liken[ed] the dismissals . . . to a 
nolle prosequi or accord and satisfaction; each dismissal took 
place without a determination of guilt, without a finding of 
7 
evidence sufficient to establish guilt, and without penalties or 
conditions imposed by judicial authority."  Id.  The petitioners 
occupied the status of innocent and were persons whose charges 
had been "otherwise dismissed" under the expungement statute.  
Id. at 102, 677 S.E.2d at 226. 
Dressner likewise never entered any plea to the possession 
of marijuana charge, nor did the general district court make any 
finding that the evidence was sufficient to establish guilt on 
that charge.  Nothing in the record suggests that the general 
district court even heard any evidence with regard to the 
possession of marijuana charge, and the general district court 
did not take the matter under advisement or defer disposition.  
In fact, Dressner, unlike the petitioners in Brown, did not 
agree to perform any tasks with the understanding that the 
possession of marijuana charge would then be dismissed.  The 
record reveals only that the general district court imposed a 
fine of $200 on the reckless driving conviction pursuant to a 
plea agreement.  Any suggestion that the plea agreement 
contained other terms that would be relevant to the question of 
expungement now before us is pure speculation.  Thus, as in 
Brown, Dressner occupies the "status of 'innocent' [as to the 
possession of marijuana charge] so as to qualify under the 
expungement statute as a person whose charge has been 'otherwise 
8 
dismissed.' "  Id. (quoting Gregg, 227 Va. at 507, 316 S.E.2d at 
743). 
The circuit court's sole basis for refusing to expunge the 
records pertaining to the possession of marijuana charge was 
that such expungement would distort Dressner's record.  While we 
noted that concern in Necaise, it is not a statutory basis that 
makes a petitioner ineligible to seek expungement of records.  
See Code § 19.2-392.2(A).  Thus, we conclude that the circuit 
court erred by finding that Dressner could not, under Code 
§ 19.2-392.2(A), seek expungement of the records pertaining to 
the possession of marijuana charge. 
With that conclusion, the next step is to determine whether 
"the continued existence and possible dissemination of 
information relating to the [marijuana charge] causes or may 
cause circumstances which constitute a manifest injustice to the 
petitioner."2  Code § 19.2-392.2(F), see also Brown, 278 Va. at 
103, 677 S.E.2d at 226 (holding second prong of expungement 
statute is to decide question of manifest injustice). 
                     
2 Code § 19.2-392.2(F) also provides that "if the petitioner 
has no prior criminal record and the arrest was for a 
misdemeanor violation, the petitioner shall be entitled, in the 
absence of good cause shown to the contrary by the Commonwealth, 
to expungement of the police and court records relating to the 
charge, and the court shall enter an order of expungement."  
Although Dressner's possession of marijuana charge was a 
misdemeanor, the record contains no information nor did the 
circuit court make any finding concerning whether Dressner had a 
prior criminal record. 
9 
As already noted, the circuit court found that Dressner 
demonstrated the existence of manifest injustice through her 
loss of employment as a result of a background check that 
revealed the possession of marijuana charge.3  Therefore, 
Dressner has satisfied the requirements of the expungement 
statute and is entitled to have the police and court records 
relating to the possession of marijuana charge expunged.  
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the circuit court's 
judgment and remand for entry of an appropriate order of 
expungement pursuant to Code § 19.2-392.2(F). 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE GOODWYN and JUSTICE McCLANAHAN 
join, dissenting. 
 
 
In this case, the circuit court denied Dressner’s request 
to have a possession of marijuana charge expunged, holding 
that the Possession of Marijuana charge was amended to 
Reckless Driving on the same summons and that 
expunging the Possession of Marijuana charge would 
also expunge the record supporting the Reckless 
Driving conviction and that granting the Petition for 
Expungement would distort the Petitioner's record in a 
manner deemed impermissible by the Supreme Court of 
Virginia in Necaise v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 666, 669 
(2011). 
 
Because I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion 
that a charge that is amended constitutes one that is “otherwise 
                     
3 The Commonwealth did not assign cross-error to this 
holding by the circuit court.  See Rule 5:18(c); Rule 5:25. 
10 
dismissed” for the purpose of having the original charge 
expunged, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
 
Any analysis of the expungement statute must be guided by 
the legislative policy behind that statute, specifically, Code 
§ 19.2-392.1. 
 
The General Assembly finds that arrest records 
can be a hindrance to an innocent citizen’s ability to 
obtain employment, an education and to obtain credit.  
It further finds that the police and court records of 
those of its citizens who have been absolutely 
pardoned for crimes for which they have been unjustly 
convicted can also be a hindrance.  This chapter is 
intended to protect such persons from the unwarranted 
damage which may occur as a result of being arrested 
and convicted. 
 
Code § 19.2-392.1 (emphasis added).  When an individual is 
acquitted or “[a] nolle prosequi is taken or the charge is 
otherwise dismissed, including dismissal by accord and 
satisfaction pursuant to [Code] § 19.2-151, he may file a 
petition setting forth the relevant facts and requesting 
expungement of the police records and the court records relating 
to the charge.”  Code § 19.2-392.2(A)(2).  However, the policy 
is clear: expungement should only be available to an innocent 
citizen. 
 
As the majority states, this case turns on the meaning of 
“otherwise dismissed” as used in Code § 19.2-392.2(A).  “When 
the legislature has used words of a plain and definite import, 
courts cannot construe them in a manner which amounts to holding 
11 
that the legislature did not mean what it actually stated.”  
Jones v. Jones, 249 Va. 565, 570, 457 S.E.2d 365, 368 (1995). 
“When . . . a statute contains no express 
definition of a term, the general rule of 
statutory construction is to infer the 
legislature’s intent from the plain meaning of 
the language used.”  Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. 
Partnership, 255 Va. 335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 335, 
338 (1998) (citing City of Virginia Beach v. 
Flippen, 251 Va. 358, 362, 467 S.E.2d 471, 473-74 
(1996); Marsh v. City of Richmond, 234 Va. 4, 11, 
360 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1987)).  An undefined term 
must be “given its ordinary meaning, given the 
context in which it is used.”  Dep’t. of Taxation 
v. Orange-Madison Coop. Farm Serv., 220 Va. 655, 
658, 261 S.E.2d 532, 533-34 (1980).  “The context 
may be examined by considering the other language 
used in the statute.”  City of Virginia Beach v. 
Bd. of Supervisors of Mecklenburg County, 246 Va. 
233, 236-37, 435 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1993). 
 
Sansom v. Board of Supervisors, 257 Va. 589, 594-95, 514 S.E.2d 
345, 349 (1999).  “A related principle is that the plain, 
obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be 
preferred to any curious, narrow, or strained construction.”  
Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 
(1983).  
 
As relevant here, “amend” means “to alter . . . formally by 
modification, deletion or addition . . . .”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 68 (1993).  In the legal context, 
“dismiss,” means “to put . . . out of judicial consideration 
. . . .”  Id. at 652.  Thus, I believe that an amendment to an 
original charge, absent a nolle prosequi being taken on that 
12 
charge, does not constitute the original charge being “otherwise 
dismissed.” 
 
For practical purposes, this case is no different from 
several others in which we have held that expungement was not 
available.∗  Most recently, in Necaise v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 
666, 669-70, 708 S.E.2d 864, 865 (2011), this Court held that 
one who has been convicted of a lesser included offense cannot 
obtain expungement under our statutes.  In that case, the 
original charge of possession of marijuana was never dismissed 
but was merely reduced.  This Court also focused on the 
legislative intent behind the expungement statutes, stating that 
the intent 
was not to distort the record of events that actually 
occurred, but was to avoid injustice to an “innocent 
citizen” falsely accused and unjustly convicted. 
 
One who is found guilty is not an “innocent citizen” 
entitled to the benefit of the expungement statutes.  
The same reasoning applies when a court has found the 
evidence sufficient to support a conviction, even 
where the charge was later dismissed.  Similarly, 
where a defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere but 
the charge is later dismissed without a finding of 
guilt upon successful completion of probationary 
                     
∗ The majority concludes that Brown v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 
92, 677 S.E.2d 220 (2009) controls the outcome of Dressner’s 
case, but I believe that the majority misses the obvious 
difference between the instant case and Brown.  In Brown, this 
Court held that expungement was proper where the defendant 
entered no plea and the court took a case under advisement 
before dismissing the charge without a finding of guilt.  Id. at 
102, 677 S.E.2d at 225.  Here, Dressner entered a guilty plea to 
the amended, not dismissed, charge and the court accepted it. 
13 
terms, the defendant is not an “innocent citizen” 
entitled to expungement of the records. 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  Necaise was not convicted of 
the felonies with which he was originally charged: felonious 
disregard of a police officer’s signal to stop and feloniously 
assaulting a police officer engaged in public duties.  Id. at 
667-68, 708 S.E.2d at 865.  Instead, he pled guilty to the 
lesser-included misdemeanor of each offense after negotiating to 
have his charges reduced.  Id. at 668, 708 S.E.2d at 865. 
 
Although the majority seems to focus on the fact that 
Necaise’s misdemeanors were “subsumed” within his original 
felony charges as the means by which to distinguish that case, I 
believe that this is a distinction without a difference.  As in 
Necaise, where the charges were reduced, Dressner’s original 
charge was amended, not dismissed, and she pled guilty to 
reckless driving instead of possession of marijuana pursuant to 
her plea agreement.  This is different from the situation where 
the defendant is found not guilty of the original charge or a 
nolle prosequi is taken on the original charge.  To hold, as the 
majority does, that Dressner’s marijuana charge was “otherwise 
dismissed” reads something into the record that is not there and 
bestows upon Dressner a status of innocent that is unsupported 
by the record.  Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for Dressner 
conceded that the amendment of her marijuana charge to a 
14 
reckless driving charge was a “bargained for exchange” and that 
the facts would have shown that  
Dressner was in a car with her boyfriend.  Her 
boyfriend had marijuana on him.  Um, there was a small 
degree of concern on the part of the defense that a 
marijuana charge might be made but she had been 
stopped for going 85 miles per hour and hadn’t been 
charged with that so the charge was amended and 
everybody walked away. 
 
Thus, I believe it is clear that this amendment was not a 
dismissal.  Rather, this “bargained for exchange” was entered 
into not because Dressner was “innocent” but because it was a 
plea agreement “and everybody walked away.”  Therefore, I would 
hold that the trial court did not err in denying Dressner’s 
petition for expungement.