Title: State v. Parisi
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2014AP001267-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 24, 2016

2016 WI 10 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP1267CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Andy J. Parisi, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 360 Wis. 2d 491, 864 N.W.2d 121) 
(Ct. App. 2015 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 24, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 5, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel J. Bissett 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, ABRAHAMSON, J.J., dissent. 
(Opinion Filed) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Tristan S. Breedlove, assistant state public defender, and 
oral argument by Tristan S. Breedlove. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.  
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 10
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2014AP1267-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2013CF242) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Andy J. Parisi, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
FEB 24, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Parisi, 
No. 2014AP1267-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 
2015) (per curiam), which affirmed the Winnebago County circuit 
court's1 judgment of conviction and denial of defendant Andy J. 
Parisi's ("Parisi") motion to suppress evidence of heroin 
possession. 
¶2 
The circuit court below upheld a warrantless draw of 
Parisi's blood as justified under the exigent circumstances 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Daniel J. Bissett presided. 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
2 
 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, § 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  The court of appeals below affirmed on 
different grounds.  Relying on our decisions in State v. Foster, 
2014 WI 131, 360 Wis. 2d 12, 856 N.W.2d 847, and State v. 
Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, 359 Wis. 2d 454, 856 N.W.2d 834, the court 
of appeals determined that the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule applied to prevent suppression of the drug-
related evidence in this case. 
¶3 
We conclude that the blood draw in this case was 
constitutional 
because 
it 
was 
supported 
by 
exigent 
circumstances.  We therefore need not address whether the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule also applies in this 
case.  See State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶¶4-5, 359 
Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120 (declining to address State's 
argument that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
justified warrantless blood draw where blood draw had been found 
constitutional under exigent circumstances doctrine). 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶4 
On October 16, 2012, at 12:38 a.m., several officers 
were dispatched to an address in Winnebago County, Wisconsin, to 
respond to a report of a male subject who was possibly not 
breathing.2  One of the officers who responded to the call was 
Officer Kaosinu Moua ("Officer Moua") of the Oshkosh Police 
                                                 
2 The facts in this section are taken from testimony 
provided at the July 12, 2013 suppression hearing. 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
3 
 
Department, who arrived at the residence "within five to ten 
minutes or so" after dispatch along with "a couple other 
officers." 
¶5 
Officer Moua testified that when he arrived at the 
residence, "one of the roommates[,] I believe one of the girls 
was outside waving us--trying to get us directed to the proper 
residence."  Officer Moua entered the residence.  During the 
medical call, police officers, members of the Oshkosh Fire 
Department, and the four roommates who lived at the residence in 
question were at the residence. 
¶6 
Inside, a male individual was lying in the living room 
on the floor on his side.  There was vomit on the floor and on 
the sofa.  The individual was not immediately identified by 
Officer Moua because the individual "wasn't able to talk to" 
Moua or the other officers.  Eventually, the individual was 
identified as Parisi.  
¶7 
Members of the fire department were "checking for 
[Parisi's] vitals and making sure he was breathing."  Officer 
Benjamin Fenhouse ("Officer Fenhouse"), who arrived at the 
residence at an unspecified time, was told that Narcan had been 
administered to Parisi.  Officer Fenhouse testified that he had 
seen Narcan administered "between five and ten times" in the 
course 
of 
his 
employment, 
and 
that 
Narcan 
is 
"usually 
administered for people who have overdosed on heroin[,] and it 
reverses the effects and usually brings them back to a 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
4 
 
responsive state pretty rapidly."3  According to Officer 
Fenhouse, the Narcan "work[ed]" when administered to Parisi. 
¶8 
Officer Moua spoke with two of the roommates, who said 
that they did not know why Parisi was ill because they had been 
asleep.  The roommates explained that Parisi had come over 
between 9:00 p.m. and 9:30 p.m. to watch "the game."  "After the 
game," Parisi told his friends "that he wanted to go to the gas 
station, get something to eat and drink, so he did walk to the 
gas station and walked back," alone.  After midnight, and after 
the roommates had gone to sleep, one of the roommates went to 
get a drink of water and "could hear some[body] breathing hard 
or [somebody] having problems breathing."  The roommate entered 
the living room and saw Parisi.  
¶9 
There were a total of five to seven officers "working 
on [the] case" that evening.4  Because at least one of the 
                                                 
3 Narcan is the trade or brand name of the narcotic 
antagonist naxolone.  2 Robert K. Ausman and Dean E. Snyder, 
Ausman & Snyder's Medical Library: Lawyers Edition § 3:45 
(1988).  "Naxolone is a narcotic antagonist indicated for the 
complete or partial reversal of narcotic depression, including 
respiratory 
depression, 
induced 
by 
narcotics 
such 
as . . . heroin . . . .  Naxolone is also indicated for the 
diagnosis of suspected acute narcotic overdosage."  Id.    
4 Counsel for Parisi asked Officer Moua on cross-examination 
whether each of six specific officers had been present at the 
residence.  Officer Moua confirmed that five out of the six 
named officers were present, but could not remember whether the 
sixth named officer had also been present.  Officer Moua then 
volunteered that there had also been a sergeant present at the 
residence, bringing the potential number of officers at the 
residence to seven.  Yet when counsel for Parisi then asked 
Officer Moua, in summary, if a total of "possibly five to six 
officers were involved" in the case, Officer Moua responded, 
(continued) 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
5 
 
officers had had "prior contact involving drugs with" Parisi, 
there was "suspicion" that drug use had been the cause of 
Parisi's condition. 
¶10 A search of the upstairs was performed.  The officers 
located, in a room separate from the room in which Parisi was 
found, "a bindle of what looked to be heroin wrapped in tinfoil, 
some cut ends, and [a] marijuana pipe."  Officer Moua testified 
that Parisi did not live at the residence, but that Officer Moua 
had been told by the roommates that "everybody had access to 
[the] room [where the drug-related items were found]." 
¶11 Officer Moua testified that the officers were at the 
apartment investigating "probably about an hour."5  At some point 
during the investigation, Parisi was taken to the hospital by 
ambulance.  Some officers continued their investigation at the 
residence after Parisi's departure.  Officer Fenhouse followed 
the ambulance to the hospital in order to "investigate a heroin 
overdose and obtain . . . an evidentiary test of [Parisi's] 
                                                                                                                                                             
"Sure."  Officer Fenhouse similarly testified that there had 
been between five and six officers involved in the medical call. 
5 On direct examination Officer Moua testified that the 
officers were at the apartment "probably within the hour."  On 
cross-examination counsel for Parisi asked: 
Q:  And when the State asked you how long you--
the officers were on scene, you said within an hour? 
A:  I said probably about an hour, sure. 
Q:  So maybe slightly less than an hour? 
A:  I couldn't even remember. 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
6 
 
blood."  Officer Fenhouse estimated that he was at the residence 
"like 20 minutes to a half hour" before leaving with the 
ambulance.  Officer Moua also followed the ambulance. 
¶12 At the hospital, according to Officer Fenhouse, 
"Parisi's medical condition was[,] I guess for lack of a better 
term[,] up in the air.  [Hospital staff] were tending to him and 
then it seemed things were getting better and then it would 
deteriorate again."  At some point in time, Officer Fenhouse 
asked for Parisi's consent to take a blood sample, but "did not 
get [it]."  Officer Fenhouse asked a phlebotomist to draw a 
sample of Parisi's blood without Parisi's consent in order "[t]o 
analyze it for evidence of a crime . . . [specifically, for] 
evidence of heroin."  When asked on direct examination whether 
"there [was] something beyond administration of Narcan that 
suggested" to Officer Fenhouse that Parisi might have used 
heroin, Officer Fenhouse responded: 
I was on the scene for a period of time and then I 
went to [the hospital].  I was in contact with persons 
that were still on scene, mainly officers, who 
provided me information that there was evidence of 
drug use and that led the investigation in a way that 
it could be heroin overdose. 
¶13 Officer Fenhouse filled out a form specifying, among 
other things, the time that Parisi's blood was drawn.  The form 
originally read that Parisi's blood was taken at "1:55 a.m.," 
but that time was crossed out and the time "3:10" was written in 
its place.  Next to "3:10" were initials belonging, apparently, 
to Officer Fenhouse and the phlebotomist.  Officer Fenhouse 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
7 
 
testified that according to his report, the time on the form was 
changed because  
[Parisi's] health deteriorated or there was something 
else happening inside the room where it didn't kind of 
go as planned.  That was filled out and we were 
intending on drawing [Parisi's blood] at a certain 
time, 
however, 
based 
on 
the 
medical 
needs 
of 
Mr. Parisi, it was obtained at a later time.  
¶14 Officer Fenhouse testified that in his experience——
which consisted of the acquisition of "about 12" search 
warrants——it takes approximately two hours to obtain a search 
warrant.  Officer Fenhouse did not attempt to obtain a search 
warrant prior to the blood draw.  Later testing of Parisi's 
blood at the State Crime Lab "indicated the presence of opiates 
and morphine (a metabolite of heroin)."6  
II.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶15 On March 25, 2013, the State filed a criminal 
complaint against Parisi, charging him with possession of 
narcotic drugs (heroin), second and subsequent offense, contrary 
to Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(3g)(am), 939.50(3)(i), and 961.48(1)(b) 
(2013-14).7  On June 14, 2013, Parisi filed a motion to suppress 
the evidence of drug possession taken from the draw of Parisi's 
blood as unconstitutionally obtained without a warrant and 
without consent.  
                                                 
6 This last fact was taken from the affidavit in support of 
the criminal complaint against Parisi.  
7 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
8 
 
¶16 On July 12, 2013, a hearing on Parisi's suppression 
motion was held in Winnebago County circuit court.  The State 
argued that exigent circumstances justified the blood draw at 
issue because the rapid rate of heroin dissipation in the human 
body rendered obtaining a warrant infeasible.  The State based 
its assertions in part on a scientific article that summarized 
various studies on the metabolism of heroin in the human body.  
See 
Elisabeth 
J. 
Rook 
et 
al., 
Pharmacokinetics 
and 
Pharmacokinetic Variability of Heroin and its Metabolites: 
Review of the Literature, 1 Current Clinical Pharmacology 109 
(2006) ("Rook article").  The article was admitted without 
objection from the defense.8 
¶17 The article defines heroin as "a semi-synthetic 
morphine derivative."  Id. at 109.  Before the circuit court, 
the State cited the article to explain that heroin breaks down 
in human blood into 6-monoacetylmorphine, which breaks down 
further 
into 
morphine. 
 
The 
State 
offered 
the 
relevant 
timeframes for the metabolism of heroin, as set forth in the 
Rook article: "When heroin is used, the heroin that's actually 
in the blood lasts just basically a few minutes, and I don't 
recall the exact numbers . . . but it's in the neighborhood of 
                                                 
8 The defense informed the circuit court, "I guess I would 
have no objection to the [c]ourt considering the scientific 
article because I certainly think there's been some peer review 
of that." 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
9 
 
five 
minutes.[9] . . . 6-monoacteylmorphine 
was 
detected 
in 
plasma for one to three hours."  The State did not dispute that 
morphine was detectable in the blood for some time thereafter, 
but argued that unlike 6-monoacetylmorphine, morphine "can be 
created by a number of different substances.  It could indicate 
somebody used heroin and it's been a number of hours or it could 
indicate something like they used morphine and there are other 
prescription drugs that break down into morphine as well." 
¶18 Thus, "while the presence of morphine in someone's 
blood is relevant to whether they possessed heroin, it's 
certainly not conclusive evidence."  The thrust of the State's 
argument, then, was that 
if it's going to be more than that one to three-hour 
range that means that the State would be losing what 
could be necessary evidence in proving possession of 
heroin.  And in this case . . . we don't know the 
exact time of use . . . .  And it was approximately 
two and a half hours after the dispatch when the blood 
draw actually occurred. 
The State concluded by arguing for a per se rule, maintaining 
that "in basically any case where we have heroin use, it's 
creating an exigency because of the short timeframe." 
¶19 Parisi did not contest any of the scientific data set 
forth by the State.  Nor did he contest Officer Fenhouse's 
testimony that obtaining a warrant required approximately two 
                                                 
9 As the State clarified on appeal, the Rook article 
indicates a window of 10 to 40 minutes.  Elisabeth J. Rook et 
al., Pharmacokinetics and Pharmacokinetic Variability of Heroin 
and its Metabolites: Review of the Literature, 1 Current 
Clinical Pharmacology 111 (2006). 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
10 
 
hours.  Instead, he argued that a totality-of-the-circumstances 
analysis applied under Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. 
Ct. 
1552 
(2013), 
and 
that, 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, 
no 
exigent 
circumstances 
justified 
the 
warrantless blood draw.  In particular, Parisi argued: there was 
no evidence the officers knew the scientific evidence the State 
presented; evidence of heroin's metabolites in the blood could 
be coupled with corroborating evidence to show possession of 
heroin; there were multiple officers involved with the case, so 
at least one of them could have attempted to obtain a search 
warrant; and a search warrant could have been obtained while 
Parisi was in the process of being medically stabilized.  
¶20 The circuit court denied Parisi's motion, finding that 
the warrantless blood draw was constitutional because it was 
supported by exigent circumstances.  With regard to the 
elimination of heroin from the human body, the court stated:  
The study that [the State] has included . . . does 
indicate generally that heroin does dissipate fairly 
quickly from the human body.  I think it's safe to say 
that it dissipates quicker than that of alcohol and 
that the half-lives are such that the breakdown causes 
a fairly quick inability to detect the heroin in the 
blood. 
However, the court refused to adopt a per se rule that the 
dissipation of heroin in the blood constitutes an exigent 
circumstance in all cases.  The court instead used a totality-
of-the-circumstances analysis, relying on Missouri v. McNeely.  
The court concluded:   
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
11 
 
 
In this case, it does appear that there [were] 
exigent circumstances that were present here in 
regards 
to 
the 
unknown 
time 
of 
intake 
of 
the 
substance, the delay that took place in trying to 
determine what the defendant may or may not have 
taken, and what his medical condition was, the delays 
that were involved in regards to the treatment of him 
at the hospital setting, the time that it would take 
for obtaining the warrant, the dissipation of the 
heroin within the human body, and the speed in which 
it does that[;] so I think those are all factors in 
this particular case.  And when the [c]ourt does look 
at the totality of those factors, I do think that the 
officer was justified in not pursuing a warrant in 
this case. 
¶21 On September 13, 2013, Parisi pled no contest to 
possession of narcotic drugs; the State agreed to dismissal of 
the second and subsequent offense enhancer.  On November 25, 
2013, the court withheld sentence and placed Parisi on probation 
for 24 months.  On May 23, 2014, Parisi filed a notice of 
appeal. 
¶22 On January 21, 2015, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court's judgment of conviction and denial of Parisi's 
suppression motion in an unpublished decision.  See State v. 
Parisi, No. 2014AP1267-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶1, 12 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2015) (per curiam).  The court of appeals 
upheld the search as constitutional under the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule.  Id., ¶12.  
¶23 The court of appeals explained that on the date that 
Officer Fenhouse ordered the blood drawn from Parisi, State v. 
Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), abrogated by 
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), "was 
the law of this state."  Parisi, unpublished slip op., ¶9.  
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
12 
 
Bohling, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
reasoned, 
"held 
that 
the 
dissipation of alcohol in a person's bloodstream, alone, 
constituted an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless 
blood draw."  Id.  Although Bohling was later abrogated by 
McNeely, the court of appeals cited two of our recent cases for 
the proposition that "the good faith exception precludes 
application of the exclusionary rule where police searched a 
suspect's blood without a warrant in objectively reasonable 
reliance on Bohling."  Id., ¶11 (citing State v. Kennedy, 2014 
WI 132, 359 Wis. 2d 454, 856 N.W.2d 834; State v. Foster, 2014 
WI 131, 360 Wis. 2d 12, 856 N.W.2d 847). 
¶24 Finding "no legal difference between drawing blood to 
test it for alcohol or controlled drugs," the court of appeals 
concluded that the challenged evidence in Parisi's case was 
"obtained in conformity with [Bohling]" and that Kennedy and 
Foster were "controlling precedent applicable to this case."  
Id., ¶¶11-12.  "Thus, regardless of whether the warrantless 
blood draw of Parisi may or may not have been retroactively 
unlawful under new United States Supreme Court precedent, the 
good faith exception precludes application of the exclusionary 
rule to exclude the evidence obtained."  Id., ¶12. 
¶25 On February 19, 2015, Parisi filed a petition for 
review in this court.  On June 12, 2015, we granted the 
petition.   
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶26 "Our review of an order granting or denying a motion 
to suppress evidence presents a question of constitutional 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
13 
 
fact."  Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶27 (quoting State v. 
Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463). 
"When presented with a question of constitutional fact, this 
court engages in a two-step inquiry."  Id. (quoting Robinson, 
327 Wis. 2d 421, ¶22).  "We accept the circuit court's findings 
of historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  We review 
the application of constitutional principles to those historical 
facts de novo."  Foster, 360 Wis. 2d 12, ¶27 (citations 
omitted).  
¶27 "We apply this two-step inquiry when determining 
whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search."  
Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶28. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
¶28 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution prohibit 
"unreasonable searches and seizures."  U.S. Const. amend. IV; 
Wis. Const. art. 1, § 11.10  When the police draw a sample of a 
person's blood in order to test it for evidence of a crime, a 
search under the Fourth Amendment has occurred.  See Tullberg, 
359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶31; State v. Faust, 2004 WI 99, ¶10, 274 
Wis. 2d 183, 682 N.W.2d 371.  "[W]arrantless searches are per se 
unreasonable unless they fall within a well-recognized exception 
to the warrant requirement."  Foster, 360 Wis. 2d 12, ¶32.  
                                                 
10 "[T]his court interprets [these] two constitutional 
provisions in concert."  State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, ¶18 
n.9, 255 Wis. 2d 98, 648 N.W.2d 385 (citations omitted). 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
14 
 
¶29 The State argues, and the circuit court below agreed, 
that the warrantless search in this case was justified under the 
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.  
This exception "applies when the exigencies of the situation 
make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a 
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment."  Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 
1558 (2013) (citation omitted).  
¶30 Application of the exigent circumstances exception 
requires probable cause and exigent circumstances.  See, e.g., 
State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶¶17-18, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 
N.W.2d 621 (citations omitted).  See generally 44 Geo. L.J. Ann. 
Rev. Crim. Proc. 95 (2015) (citations omitted).  The burden is 
on the State to establish both.  Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, ¶17; 
State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 228, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986), 
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Felix, 2012 WI 36, 339 
Wis. 2d 670, 811 N.W.2d 775.  In analogous cases involving 
warrantless blood draws of suspected drunken drivers, we have 
also required that the police draw the blood in a reasonable 
manner, and that the suspect not raise any reasonable objections 
to the blood draw.  See, e.g., Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶31.  
There is no reason these two concerns should lose their 
relevancy in scenarios not involving drunk driving, given the 
familiar refrain that "[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment 
is reasonableness."  Faust, 274 Wis. 2d 183, ¶32 (quoting 
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)).  Cf. State v. 
Payano-Roman, 2006 WI 47, ¶38, 290 Wis. 2d 380, 714 N.W.2d 548 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
15 
 
("The Fourth Amendment neither forbids nor permits all bodily 
intrusions.  Rather, the Amendment's function is to constrain 
against 
intrusions 
'which 
are 
not 
justified 
in 
the 
circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.'" 
(quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985)). 
¶31 In his petition to this court, however, Parisi does 
not allege that his blood was drawn in an unreasonable manner or 
that he offered a reasonable objection to the blood draw.  Nor 
does he argue that the State lacked probable cause to conduct 
the search in question.  Parisi instead contends that exigent 
circumstances did not support the drawing of his blood.  Cf. 
Foster, 360 Wis. 2d 12, ¶43 n.12 ("Aside from exigency, [the 
defendant] does not contest that the four requirements we set 
forth in Bohling for conducting a lawful search and seizure of a 
person's blood incident to arrest were satisfied.").11 
                                                 
11 In any event, we would conclude that such requirements 
are met in this case.  First, Parisi's blood was drawn in a 
reasonable manner.  Blood tests "are a commonplace in these days 
of periodic physical examination and experience with them 
teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and 
that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, 
trauma, or pain."  Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 
(1966) (footnote omitted).  Further, the draw was conducted in a 
hospital by a phlebotomist.  See id. ("[T]he record shows that 
the test was performed in a reasonable manner.  Petitioner's 
blood was taken by a physician in a hospital environment 
according to accepted medical practices.").  
Second, there is no evidence in the record that Parisi 
reasonably objected to the blood draw, such as "on grounds of 
fear, concern for health, or religious scruple."  Id.  
(continued) 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
16 
 
¶32 Although "[a] variety of circumstances may give rise 
to an exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless search," 
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558, one "well-recognized exigent 
circumstance is the threat that evidence will be lost or 
destroyed if time is taken to obtain a warrant."  State v. 
Bohling, 
173 
Wis. 2d 529, 
537-38, 
494 
N.W.2d 399 
(1993) 
(citation omitted).   
¶33 Consequently, the State argues that, based on the 
limited knowledge possessed by the officers at the time, there 
was no time for police to obtain a warrant before performing a 
draw of Parisi's blood because Parisi's body was rapidly 
metabolizing any heroin he may have taken and because the "best 
evidence of heroin use" would therefore have been gone before a 
warrant was secured.  
¶34 In response, Parisi presents three challenges to the 
circuit court's determination that exigent circumstances existed 
                                                                                                                                                             
Third, there was "a 'fair probability' that contraband or 
evidence of a crime [would] be found in" Parisi's blood.  State 
v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶33, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120; 
State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶21, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 
N.W.2d 621.  One of the roommates found Parisi having difficulty 
breathing, and the police, responding to the medical call, found 
Parisi on the floor and surrounded by vomit.  Officer Fenhouse 
testified that Parisi reacted positively to the administration 
of Narcan, a drug which Officer Fenhouse knew was used to 
counteract the effects of heroin overdose.  While at the 
hospital, Officer Fenhouse was told by officers still at the 
residence that "there was evidence of drug use."  Police at the 
residence in fact uncovered evidence of drug use.  "[U]nder the 
totality of the circumstances," Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶34, 
Officer Fenhouse had probable cause to believe that Parisi's 
blood contained evidence that Parisi had used heroin. 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
17 
 
in this case: (1) evidence of heroin use remains detectable in 
the human body for "many hours, or even days"; (2) the officers 
could have, but did not attempt to obtain a warrant before 
conducting the blood draw at issue; and (3) because this is not 
a drunk driving case, Parisi's Fourth Amendment protections were 
not "relaxed."  
¶35 When examining whether exigent circumstances premised 
on the imminent destruction of evidence justified a warrantless 
search, we employ an objective test: "Whether a police officer 
under the circumstances known to the officer at the time 
reasonably 
believes 
that 
delay 
in 
procuring 
a 
warrant 
would . . . risk destruction of evidence."  Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 
at 230, abrogated on other grounds by Felix, 339 Wis. 2d 670; 
see also Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 538 (citation omitted); 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (citing 
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)). 
A. Whether Exigent Circumstances Existed 
¶36 The State has sufficiently established that an officer 
in this case, under the circumstances known to him or her at the 
time, might reasonably have believed that the delay necessary to 
obtain a warrant would have risked destruction of evidence.  
¶37 The officers in this case were confronted with a 
medical emergency in which there were several unknown facts.  
The officers did not know with certainty what Parisi had 
ingested and, once heroin was suspected, did not know when he 
had ingested it or how much he had ingested. 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
18 
 
¶38 Based on the uncontested evidence before it, which 
indicated that both heroin and its first metabolite could become 
undetectable in blood plasma in as little as one hour, the 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
heroin 
"dissipates 
quicker 
than . . . alcohol" and that "the breakdown causes a fairly 
quick inability to detect . . . heroin in the blood."  The court 
rested its finding of exigent circumstances in part on "the 
dissipation of . . . heroin within the human body, and the speed 
in which it does that."  Given the data in the Rook article, 
these findings were not clearly erroneous.  See State v. Popke, 
2009 WI 37, ¶20, 317 Wis. 2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569 (under clearly 
erroneous standard, "we are bound not to upset the trial court's 
findings of historical or evidentiary fact unless they are 
contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence" (citation omitted)).  
¶39 Further, in Officer Fenhouse's experience, obtaining a 
warrant took approximately two hours.  The circuit court 
implicitly 
found 
Officer 
Fenhouse's 
undisputed 
testimony 
regarding the time required to obtain a warrant credible, 
because 
the 
circuit 
court 
referenced 
Officer 
Fenhouse's 
testimony in its ruling12 and based its ruling in part on "the 
time that it would take for obtaining the warrant," while 
Officer Fenhouse provided the only testimony regarding the time 
                                                 
12 The circuit court stated, "The officer did testify as to 
his experience in regards to trying to obtain and obtaining 
search warrants in the past." 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
19 
 
needed to obtain a warrant.  See State v. Echols, 175 
Wis. 2d 653, 672, 499 N.W.2d 631 (1993) ("A trial court is not 
required to recite 'magic words' to set forth its findings of 
fact.  An implicit finding of fact is sufficient when the facts 
of record support the decision of the trial court." (citations 
omitted)); see also id. at 673 ("When a trial court does not 
expressly make a finding necessary to support its legal 
conclusion, an appellate court can assume that the trial court 
made the finding in the way that supports its decision." 
(citation 
omitted)). 
This 
finding 
was 
also 
not 
clearly 
erroneous.  See Popke, 317 Wis. 2d 118, ¶20 (citation omitted). 
¶40 Finally, Parisi's health was unstable.  At the 
hospital, "[hospital staff] were tending to him and then it 
seemed things were getting better and then it would deteriorate 
again."  Under the circumstances, Officer Fenhouse might 
reasonably have feared that if he attempted to obtain a warrant 
before drawing Parisi's blood, Parisi's condition could again 
lapse, 
causing 
Officer 
Fenhouse 
to 
miss 
his 
window 
of 
opportunity.  Cf. Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶48 (deputy sheriff 
investigating drunk driver performed blood draw in part because 
hospital staff planned to perform a CT scan and because the 
deputy sheriff did not know whether the CT scan would lead to 
subsequent medical treatment).  
¶41 Given all of these factors——the multiple unknown 
facts, the rapid dissipation of heroin in the blood, the time 
needed to obtain a warrant, and Parisi's unstable condition——
"[t]he officer in the present case . . . might reasonably have 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
20 
 
believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the 
delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, 
threatened 'the destruction of evidence.'"  Schmerber, 384 U.S. 
at 770 (citation omitted).  Critical evidence of heroin use in 
Parisi's body was disappearing by the minute, and had been since 
an unknown time that evening.  Officer Fenhouse could reasonably 
conclude that waiting two hours for acquisition of a warrant, 
with no guarantee that Parisi would be available for a blood 
draw once a warrant was acquired, would mean loss of access to 
that evidence. 
¶42 Before proceeding, we take a moment to emphasize that 
this case does not establish a per se rule that the dissipation 
of heroin in the blood always constitutes an exigency justifying 
a warrantless blood draw.  We instead resolve this case "based 
'on its own facts and circumstances.'"  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 
1559 (citations omitted).  Any number of factual variations 
might change the result in a future case: police might initially 
have more facts at their disposal, such as the type and amount 
of an ingested drug, as well as the time it was ingested; other 
jurisdictions might allow for more rapid acquisition of search 
warrants; scientific evidence on heroin dissipation may become 
clearer in the future; and so on. 
 
B. 
Whether the Presence of Morphine in Parisi's Blood 
Precludes a Finding of Exigent Circumstances 
¶43 Before the circuit court, Parisi did not object to 
admission of the Rook article and did not provide any scientific 
evidence of his own.  Indeed, Parisi concedes on appeal, "Heroin 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
21 
 
converts to its first metabolite, 6-[mono]acetylmorphine[,] 
within a few minutes.  6-[mono]acetylmorphine then converts to 
morphine.  6-[mono]acetylmorphine is detectable in plasma for 1-
3 hours after heroin use."13  
¶44 Citing the Rook article, however, Parisi argues that 
because morphine resulting from the metabolism of heroin 
"remains in the system for many hours after heroin use," exigent 
                                                 
13 Parisi has provided further scientific evidence for the 
first time on appeal before this court in the appendix to his 
brief.  In particular, Parisi cites a scientific article which 
was not before the circuit court for the proposition that 6-
monoacetylmorphine is detectable in urine for an average of five 
hours and as much as 34.5 hours.  See Alain G. Verstraete, 
Detection Times of Drugs of Abuse in Blood, Urine, and Oral 
Fluid, 26 Therapeutic Drug Monitoring 200 (2004) ("Verstraete 
article"). 
 
The 
passage 
relied 
upon 
states, 
"After 
administration of 3, 6, and 12 mg heroin intravenously, 6-
acetylmorphine is detectable in urine during respectively 2.3, 
2.6, 
and 
4.5 
hours. . . .  
In 
the 
Lübeck 
study, 
6-
acetylmorphine . . . was detectable for 5 hours on average 
(maximum 34.5 hours) . . . in urine."  Id. at 203.  In contrast, 
the Rook article states, "6-monoacetylmorphine was detectable 
for 1.2-4.3 hrs in urine after intravenous injection or 
inhalation of 2.6-20 mg heroin."  Rook, supra, at 111.  Based on 
the evidence, then, 6-monoacetylmorphine can become undetectable 
in urine in as little as 1.2 to 2.3 hours, as opposed to the 
Rook article's indication that 6-monoacetylmorphine can become 
undetectable in blood in as little as one hour.  Id.  Parisi's 
article does not affect our analysis. Even assuming that an 
involuntary urine test was feasible in this case——a contention 
the 
State 
questions——the 
amount 
of 
time 
before 
6-
monoacetylmorphine is potentially undetectable in urine is not 
materially different for our purposes from the amount of time 
before 
6-monoacetylmorphine 
is 
potentially 
undetectable 
in 
blood.  
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
22 
 
circumstances did not exist.14  Parisi points out that morphine 
was found in Parisi's blood sample, which was drawn "almost two 
and a half hours after police encountered him."  He agrees that 
morphine indicates that a person used either heroin or morphine, 
but argues:  
Because the presence of drugs in blood is not 
sufficient by itself to support a conviction of 
possessing a controlled substance, any blood test 
result would be coupled with other corroborating 
evidence from the case in order to convict.  State v. 
Griffin, 220 Wis. 2d 371, 381, 584 N.W.2d 127 (Ct. 
App. 1998).  That other evidence in a case will inform 
which of [the] two Schedule 1 narcotics, heroin or 
morphine, the individual unlawfully consumed. 
¶45 The flaws in Parisi's reasoning are two-fold.  First, 
the test we use to analyze whether or not exigent circumstances 
exist is an objective one based on "the circumstances known to 
the officer at the time," Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 230, and 
although an officer might reasonably have believed that a two-
hour delay would risk the destruction of evidence in this case 
because of, among other things, the rapid dissipation of heroin 
in the blood, it is not clear that an officer would have 
knowledge 
of 
the 
specific 
metabolic 
processes 
involved 
subsequent to ingestion of heroin, or the specific rates of 
each.  Whether morphine was eventually found in Parisi's blood 
                                                 
14 We do not possess, but do not require, information 
regarding precisely how long morphine remains in the human body 
after ingestion of heroin.  According to the State, the Rook 
article indicates that "one quarter of the morphine [that was 
initially in the blood] can still be detected . . . about three 
to nine hours later."  
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
23 
 
is not relevant to what a police officer might reasonably have 
believed prior to conducting the blood draw.  See State v. 
Jennifer Parisi, 2014 WI App 129, ¶12, 359 Wis. 2d 255, 857 
N.W.2d 472 ("The exigent circumstances exception . . . does not 
require 
that 
officers 
observe 
actual 
destruction 
of 
evidence . . . . 
The 
exception 
rather 
requires 
only 
that 
officers have a reasonable belief 'that delay in procuring a 
search warrant would risk destruction of evidence.'" (citing 
Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, ¶24)).  
¶46 Second, even assuming for the sake of argument that a 
reasonable police officer knows that heroin is detectable in 
blood as morphine for several hours after ingestion, the officer 
in this case did not know what corroborating evidence of heroin 
or morphine use police would ultimately find, or what alibis 
Parisi might raise.  Parisi might have a plausible defense to a 
charge based on heroin found in the residence and morphine found 
in his blood, but no defense to a charge based on heroin found 
in the residence and heroin or 6-monoacetylmorphine found in his 
blood.  In other words, heroin or its first metabolite, 6-
monoacetylmorphine, remained the most probative evidence that 
Parisi had used heroin. 
¶47 Parisi argues that "this Court will be making new law 
if it adopts the [S]tate's argument that no warrant is required 
when seeking one will risk the destruction of the 'best 
evidence.'"  Parisi instead contends that McNeely dictates 
application of the exigent circumstances exception "when waiting 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
24 
 
for a warrant means the only evidence of the crime may be 
destroyed." 
¶48 We do not agree with Parisi's reading of McNeely.  The 
McNeely court held that, "In those drunk-driving investigations 
where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a 
blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the 
efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they 
do so."  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561 (emphasis added).  Here, 
assuming that an officer possessed full knowledge of the manner 
in which heroin is metabolized, the officer could reasonably 
believe that waiting two hours to obtain a warrant would 
"significantly undermin[e] the efficacy" of a blood draw by 
leading to ambiguous test results; evidence of heroin or 
morphine use, rather than of heroin use alone, might result if 
sufficient time has passed (this was in fact the result in this 
case).  Depending on the corroborating evidence eventually 
obtained in the case, and testimony given by the defendant or 
other witnesses, the State might not be able to prove illegal 
possession of any drug.  
¶49 The McNeely court also alluded to a "best evidence" 
approach when it stated:  
While experts can work backwards from the [blood 
alcohol concentration] at the time the sample was 
taken to determine the [blood alcohol concentration] 
at the time of the alleged offense, longer intervals 
may 
raise 
questions 
about 
the 
accuracy 
of 
the 
calculation.  For that reason, exigent circumstances 
justifying a warrantless blood sample may arise in the 
regular course of law enforcement due to delays from 
the warrant application process.   
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
25 
 
Id. at 1563.  In other words, a warrantless blood sample may be 
justified even where an inferior form of evidence may be 
available.  Chief Justice John Roberts, joined by Justices 
Stephen Breyer and Samuel Alito, was even more forceful: 
McNeely contends that there is no compelling need 
for a warrantless blood draw, because . . . the State 
can use math and science to work backwards and 
identify a defendant's [blood alcohol concentration] 
at the time he was driving.  But that's not good 
enough.  We have indicated that exigent circumstances 
justify warrantless entry when drugs are about to be 
flushed down the toilet.  We have not said that, 
because 
there 
could 
well 
be 
drug 
paraphernalia 
elsewhere in the home, or because a defendant's co-
conspirator might testify to the amount of drugs 
involved, the drugs themselves are not crucial and 
there is no compelling need for warrantless entry. 
The same approach should govern here.  There is a 
compelling need to search because alcohol——the nearly 
conclusive evidence of a serious crime——is dissipating 
from the bloodstream.  The need is no less compelling 
because the police might be able to acquire second-
best evidence some other way. 
Id. at 1571 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).  See also State v. 
Peardot, 119 Wis. 2d 400, 404, 351 N.W.2d 172 (Ct. App. 1984) 
("Exigent circumstances existed here.  The marked currency was 
the best evidence linking defendant with the sale of the LSD.  
If the police had not moved quickly, defendant could easily have 
disposed of the money in any of several ways." (emphasis 
added)).  
¶50 In sum, the fact that morphine remains in the body for 
several hours after the ingestion of heroin does not mean that 
it would be unreasonable for Officer Fenhouse to believe that 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
26 
 
taking the time to obtain a search warrant in this case risked 
destruction of evidence of heroin use.15  
 
C. 
Whether a Finding of Exigent Circumstances is Precluded 
Because this is not a Drunk-Driving Case  
¶51 Finally, Parisi notes that in both Bohling and 
McNeely, the public safety risk presented by drunk-driving was 
balanced against the defendant's privacy interest "in preventing 
an agent of the government from piercing his skin."  McNeely, 
133 S. Ct. at 1565.  
¶52 In Bohling, we noted in passing, "[O]ur interpretation 
of Schmerber makes sense from a policy standpoint.  It strikes a 
                                                 
15 For all of the reasons discussed, we reject Parisi's 
arguments that a warrant could have been pursued because of (1) 
the number of officers involved in this case (five to seven 
officers) and (2) the delay that occurred while hospital staff 
stabilized Parisi.  Officer Fenhouse could reasonably believe 
that asking another officer to obtain a warrant would be futile, 
given the short timeframe before evidence of heroin use 
disappeared.  For instance, if officers suspect drugs are being 
flushed behind a closed door, see, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 
U.S. 452 (2011), the exigency is not eliminated merely because 
there are multiple officers at the scene.  See United States v. 
Fiasche, 520 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2008).  
Similarly, Officer Fenhouse had no way of knowing, at the 
hospital at 1:55 a.m., that Parisi would be unavailable for a 
blood draw until 3:10 a.m.  Based on Officer Fenhouse's 
testimony, it is unlikely that a warrant process begun at 1:55 
a.m. would have been completed by 3:10 a.m. anyway.  It was not 
so unreasonable as to render the blood draw unconstitutional for 
Officer Fenhouse to fail to begin the warrant process when 
Parisi's health lapsed.  "[T]he calculus of reasonableness must 
embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often 
forced to make split-second judgments——in circumstances that are 
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving."  King, 563 U.S. at 466 
(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)). 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
27 
 
favorable balance between an individual's right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and Wisconsin's interest in enforcing its 
drunk driving laws.  Wisconsin's interest is vital whereas the 
resulting intrusion on individual privacy is minimal."  Bohling, 
173 Wis. 2d at 545.  Further, we recognized that "in the context 
of driving on public highways, public safety concerns reduce a 
driver's expectation of privacy."  Id. at 541. 
¶53 In McNeely the Supreme Court likewise acknowledged 
both "the compelling governmental interest in combating drunk 
driving" and "the fact that people are 'accorded less privacy 
in . . . automobiles because of th[e] compelling governmental 
need for regulation.'"  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1565 (alteration 
in original) (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 
(1985)).  The Court also stated that "a blood test conducted in 
a medical setting by trained personnel . . . is concededly less 
intrusive 
than 
other 
bodily 
invasions 
we 
have 
found 
unreasonable," while adding that "any compelled intrusion into 
the 
human 
body 
implicates 
significant, 
constitutionally 
protected privacy interests."  Id.  At bottom, however, the 
Court found no reason to depart from "the traditional Fourth 
Amendment totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to determine 
whether an exigency justified a warrantless search."  McNeely, 
133 S. Ct. at 1565-66.  
¶54 Here, Parisi argues that he "never operated a vehicle 
or put anyone other than himself at risk.  . . .  Heroin use is 
dangerous[,] but if the user does not get behind the wheel, the 
threat it poses is to the person who uses it, not to the public 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
28 
 
at large. . . .  [T]he warrant requirement should not be 
'relaxed' in [t]his case as it is in drunk driving cases." 
¶55 We agree that, because this is not a case involving 
intoxicated driving, the reduced privacy interest in such cases 
does not apply.  Likewise, we agree that the governmental 
interest in preventing intoxicated driving is less relevant 
because Parisi was not found driving a vehicle.  But these 
considerations only carry Parisi so far.  It does not follow 
that, because Parisi's privacy interests are somewhat greater in 
this case than if he had been stopped on a highway, we must 
therefore abandon our totality-of-the-circumstances analysis and 
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.  
¶56 Our discussion of a "relaxed" warrant requirement in 
the 
context 
of 
driving 
on 
state 
highways 
supported 
our 
conclusion that Schmerber created a per se rule that dissipation 
of alcohol alone constitutes an exigency.  Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 
at 539-40.  But Bohling was later abrogated by the Supreme 
Court's McNeely decision, as were the decisions of other state 
supreme courts.  See Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, abrogated by 
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552; State v. Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538 
(Minn. 2008), abrogated by McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552; State v. 
Woolery, 116 Idaho 368 (1989), abrogated by McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 
1552. 
¶57 In McNeely the Court explained that without a warrant, 
"'the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry' 
demands that we evaluate each case of alleged exigency based 'on 
its own facts and circumstances.'"  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1559 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
29 
 
(citations omitted).  Schmerber, the Court continued, "applied 
this 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances 
approach. . . . 
[W]e 
considered all of the facts and circumstances of the particular 
case and carefully based our holding on those specific facts."  
Id. at 1559-60. 
¶58 The question Parisi essentially raises is whether the 
search at issue was "unreasonable" simply because this is not a 
drunk driving case.  U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wis. Const. art. 1, 
§ 11.  In effect, Parisi is asking for a per se rule of his own.  
Instead, taking our cue from McNeely, we analyze this case on 
its facts.  Parisi unquestionably possessed "significant, 
constitutionally protected privacy interests" in avoiding the 
warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw that occurred in this 
case.  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1565.  But that Parisi never used 
a car in this case does not thereby elevate his privacy 
interests to such heights as to render any warrantless blood 
draw under exigent circumstances unreasonable.  Cf. Payano-
Roman, 290 Wis. 2d 380, ¶38 ("The Fourth Amendment neither 
forbids nor permits all bodily intrusions.  Rather, the 
Amendment's function is to constrain against intrusions 'which 
are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an 
improper manner.'" (quoting Winston, 470 U.S. at 760). 
¶59 The warrantless blood draw at issue was justified 
under the circumstances, regardless of the presence or not of an 
automobile.  As we have already determined, under the facts of 
this case, the police reasonably feared destruction of evidence 
of a crime.  Further, "[t]he intrusion in the usual blood draw 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
30 
 
is slight," State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, ¶60,255 Wis. 2d 98, 
648 N.W.2d 385, and the draw in this case was performed 
reasonably, in a hospital by a phlebotomist.  Finally, we would 
be remiss if we failed to recognize the State's own compelling 
interest in countering heroin use and addiction.  Cf. State v. 
Peck, 143 Wis. 2d 624, 634, 422 N.W.2d 160 (1988) ("Preservation 
of the public health and safety is the obvious purpose 
underlying Wisconsin's drug laws, and we see a compelling state 
purpose in the regulation of marijuana and other controlled 
substances.")16  Adoption of Parisi's argument would lead to the 
                                                 
16 Heroin use and addiction is a problem that has become a 
state and national epidemic.  See, e.g., Jerry L. Halverson, 
Michael M. Miller, and George L. Morris, We Have a Heroin and 
Opioid Problem; Let's Fix It, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 
Aug. 16, 
2015, 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/we-have-a-
heroin-and-opioid-problem-lets-fix-it-b99556485z1-
321917961.html; Kathleen Hennessey, Obama: U.S. Will Tackle 
'Epidemic' of Heroin, Prescription Drug Abuse, NBC New York, 
Oct. 
21, 
2015, 
http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/national-
international/Obama-Prescription-Drug-Abuse-Epidemic-
335251301.html; 
Nate 
Beck, 
Former 
UWO 
Athlete 
Guilty 
of 
Homicide-By-Heroin, 
Oshkosh 
Northwestern, 
Dec. 
17, 
2015, 
http://www.thenorthwestern.com/story/news/crime/2015/12/17/forme
r-uwo-athlete-guilty-homicide--heroin/77493166/ 
("Though 
attorneys sparred over the timeline of events that led to [the] 
overdose, neither disputed heroin's grip on Winnebago County.").  
From 2002 to 2013 "the rate of heroin-related overdose 
deaths [in the United States] nearly quadrupled, according to 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention."  The Numbers 
Behind America's Heroin Epidemic: A Guide to the Drug's Spread 
and 
Impact, 
N.Y. 
Times, 
Oct. 
30, 
2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/30/us/31heroin-
deaths.html?_r=0.  In Wisconsin, "the number of overdose deaths 
annually involving prescription painkillers and heroin now 
exceeds the number of traffic fatalities."  Halverson, supra. 
(continued) 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
31 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
We vigorously reject any suggestion that "the threat 
[heroin] poses is to the person who uses it, not to the public 
at large."  The heroin epidemic is destroying lives across the 
country, and not just those of heroin users.  See, e.g., Krystle 
Kacner, "It's a Nightmare:" Menomonee Falls Father Wants to Help 
Others After Son Dies of Overdose," Fox6 News, Nov. 17, 2015, 
http://fox6now.com/2015/11/17/its-a-bloody-nightmare-menomonee-
falls-father-wants-to-help-others-after-son-dies-of-overdose/.  
Kacner's article features the father of a 22-year old who died 
from a heroin overdose.  According to Kacner, the father is 
"living proof that the addict's life may not be the only thing 
the drug takes.  'We got divorced, went bankrupt, foreclosure, 
lost the company.  . . .  It's terrible for the other children——
not only losing a brother, but going through the addiction 
process——because they don't get the attention growing up that 
they deserved.'"  See also Deborah Sontag, Heroin's Small-Town 
Toll, and a Mother's Grief, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/11/us/heroins-small-town-toll-
and-a-mothers-pain.html (discussing story of woman from Hudson, 
Wisconsin, whose 21-year-old daughter "was a heroin abuser" and 
died after overdosing on "a mix of drugs" in 2013).  Federal 
data show that nearly 20 percent of those who died from heroin 
in 2010 were ages 15 to 24.  Id. 
The Wisconsin Legislature is working to address the heroin 
problem in our state.  See, e.g., Jessie Opoien, Led by State 
Rep. John Nygren, Wisconsin Families Caught in Heroin's Grasp 
Fight 
Back, 
The 
Capital 
Times, 
Dec. 
2, 
2015, 
http://host.madison.com/ct/news/local/govt-and-politics/led-by-
state-rep-john-nygren-wisconsin-families-caught-
in/article_640a242f-91d6-5dd6-a8c4-ca46a14304d8.html.  Wisconsin 
State Representative John Nygren, whose own daughter struggled 
with heroin addiction,  
has become the Wisconsin Legislature's torchbearer for 
combating the state's heroin and opiate epidemic.  In 
2014, he ushered a package of bills aimed at curbing 
heroin abuse and deaths through the Legislature with 
unanimous support.  In September, he introduced a 
second package focusing on prescription painkillers. 
As the crisis has deepened, other politicians and 
affected families have gotten involved. 
 
Id. 
No. 
  2014AP1267-CR 
 
32 
 
loss of police access to critical evidence in countless 
situations in which obtaining a warrant in time is simply not 
practical, through no fault of the officers seeking the 
evidence.  Cf. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561.  That this case is 
distinguishable from Bohling and McNeely on the ground that 
Parisi did not operate a vehicle does not make the drawing of 
his blood automatically unreasonable.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶60 We conclude that the blood draw in this case was 
constitutional 
because 
it 
was 
supported 
by 
exigent 
circumstances.  We therefore need not address whether the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule also applies in this 
case.  See State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶¶4-5, 359 Wis. 2d 
421, 857 N.W.2d 120 (declining to address State's argument that 
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule justified 
warrantless 
blood 
draw 
where 
blood 
draw 
had 
been 
found 
constitutional under exigent circumstances doctrine). 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 2014AP1267-CR.awb  
 
1 
 
 
¶61 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting).   The primary 
issue addressed by the majority is whether Parisi's warrantless 
blood draw is an exigent circumstance justifying an exception to 
the warrant requirement.  If it is not, then the warrantless 
blood draw was a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States 
Constitution 
and 
the 
evidence 
obtained 
must 
be 
suppressed. 
¶62 All agree that absent an emergency, search warrants 
are required for intrusions into the human body.  Missouri v. 
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (citing Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966)).   
¶63 Likewise, it is undisputed that pursuant to McNeely a 
per se rule authorizing warrantless blood draws based on 
dissipation of evidence in the bloodstream is prohibited under 
the Fourth Amendment.  See id.  Nevertheless, the majority 
creates a per se rule by inventing a new best evidence rule for 
every heroin case, concluding that exigent circumstances exist 
due to the rapid speed at which heroin dissipates in the blood.  
¶64 Not only does the majority opinion disregard McNeely’s 
prohibition of a per se rule based on dissipation, it also 
ignores the circumstances under which McNeely directs that the 
police must always obtain a warrant.  McNeely instructs that 
"where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a 
blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the 
efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they 
do so."  Id. at 1561.  
No. 2014AP1267-CR.awb  
 
2 
 
¶65 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that the State 
has failed to show there were exigent circumstances justifying 
an 
exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement. 
During 
the 
approximately two and one-half hours available, at least one of 
the five to seven officers involved in the investigation could 
have and should have obtained a warrant.  The warrantless blood 
draw violated Parisi's Fourth Amendment rights and the evidence 
resulting 
from 
it 
should 
be 
suppressed.1 
 
Therefore, 
I 
respectfully dissent. 
I. 
¶66 The majority determines that the circuit court's 
finding of exigent circumstances based on "the dissipation of 
 . . . heroin within the human body, and the speed in which it 
does that" were not clearly erroneous.  Majority op. ¶38.  
According to the majority, "critical evidence of heroin use in 
Parisi’s body was disappearing by the minute, and had been since 
an unknown time that evening."  Majority op. ¶41.   
                                                 
1 Parisi asserts a violation of both the Fourth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution and a violation of Article I, § 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  When we refer to the Fourth Amendment 
in this discussion, we intend the discussion to be equally 
applicable to Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
"Generally, we have interpreted provisions of the Wisconsin 
Constitution consistent with the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation 
of 
their 
counterparts 
in 
the 
federal 
constitution.  However, on occasion, we have interpreted a 
provision in the Wisconsin Constitution more broadly than the 
United States Supreme Court has interpreted a parallel provision 
in the United States Constitution."  State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, 
¶19, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748 (citations omitted).   
No. 2014AP1267-CR.awb  
 
3 
 
¶67 Repeatedly, the majority focuses on dissipation.  See, 
e.g., majority op. ¶45 ("a two-hour delay would risk the 
destruction of evidence in this case because of, among other 
things, the rapid dissipation of heroin in the blood"); see also 
majority op. ¶48 ("waiting two hours to obtain a warrant would 
'significantly undermin[e] the efficacy' of a blood draw by 
leading to ambiguous test results; evidence of heroin or 
morphine use, rather than heroin use alone, might result if 
sufficient time has passed"); majority op. ¶50 ("the fact that 
morphine remains in the body for several hours after the 
ingestion of heroin does not mean that it would be unreasonable 
for Officer Fenhouse to believe that taking the time to obtain a 
search warrant in this case risked destruction of evidence of 
heroin use").  
¶68 In asserting that the rapid dissipation of heroin is 
an exigent circumstance, the majority relies on scientific 
literature provided by the State.  See Elisabeth J. Rook et al., 
Pharmacokinetics and Pharmacokinetic Variability of Heroin and 
its Metabolites: Review of the Literature, 1 Current Clinical 
Pharmacology 109, 111 (2006).  Of particular import is the 
scientific evidence that "[h]eroin converts to its first 
metabolite, 6-[mono]acetylmorphine[,] within a few minutes.  6-
[mono]acetylmorphine 
then 
converts 
to 
morphine. 
 
6-
[mono]acetylmorphine is detectable in plasma for 1-3 hours after 
heroin use."  Majority op. ¶43.  According to the majority, 
heroin or its first metabolite, 6-monoacetylmorphine, are the 
No. 2014AP1267-CR.awb  
 
4 
 
most probative evidence of heroin use and therefore the best 
evidence.  Majority op. ¶46.  
¶69 The majority concedes that morphine is evidence of 
heroin use that remains in the blood for hours after heroin and 
6-monoacetylmorphine dissipate.  See, e.g., majority op. ¶50.  
Nevertheless, it rejects this evidence as not being sufficiently 
probative.2  Consequently, the majority creates a best evidence 
rule in heroin cases.  
¶70 Oddly, the majority ends up arguing that the very 
evidence of morphine the State wishes to preserve in the 
suppression motion is really not good enough because it is less 
probative than heroin or 6-monoacetylmorphine.  Majority op. 
¶46.  It contends, "Parisi might have a plausible defense to a 
charge based on heroin found in the residence and morphine found 
in his blood, but no defense to a charge based on heroin found 
in the residence and heroin or 6-monoacetylmorphine found in his 
blood."  Majority op. ¶46.   
II. 
                                                 
2 The majority goes to such lengths to minimize the 
evidentiary value of morphine in the blood that it does not even 
bother to determine how long morphine is detectable after heroin 
use.  According to the majority: "We do not possess, but do not 
require, information regarding precisely how long morphine 
remains in the human body after ingestion of heroin."  Majority 
op. ¶44 n.14. 
The majority is incorrect.  At oral argument, Parisi's 
counsel explained that according to the Rook article supplied by 
the State, "the metabolites of heroin stay in the system for 12, 
could be even 24 hours..." 
No. 2014AP1267-CR.awb  
 
5 
 
¶71 In our prior decisions, this court properly recognized 
that McNeely "changed the landscape of warrantless blood draws 
in Wisconsin."  State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶42, 359 Wis. 2d 
421, 857 N.W.2d 120; see also State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, 
¶29, 359 Wis. 2d 454, 856 N.W.2d 834 ("in 2013, the United 
States Supreme Court issued its decision in McNeely, effectively 
abrogating our holding in Bohling that the rapid dissipation of 
alcohol alone constitutes an exigent circumstance sufficient for 
law enforcement officers to order a warrantless investigatory 
blood draw.").3 In Kennedy, this court concluded that under 
McNeely, "the Fourth Amendment does not allow such per se rules 
in the context of warrantless investigatory blood draws."  359 
Wis. 2d 454, ¶29 (citing McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561).    
¶72 Despite this court’s prior adherence to McNeely, the 
cornerstone of the majority’s opinion rests on its repeated 
assertion that the rapid dissipation of heroin in the blood 
                                                 
3 Bohling makes clear that it is specific to the drunk 
driving context.  It stated that "a warrantless blood sample 
taken at the direction of a law enforcement officer is 
permissible under the following circumstances: (1) the blood 
draw is taken to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person 
lawfully arrested for a drunk-driving related violation or 
crime, (2) there is a clear indication that the blood draw will 
produce evidence of intoxication, (3) the method used to take 
the blood sample is a reasonable one and performed in a 
reasonable manner, and (4) the arrestee presents no reasonable 
objection to the blood draw."  State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 
529, 533-34, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993) (emphasis added) abrogated by 
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013). 
The majority opinion fails to accurately state these 
requirements.  It omits the first factor, which provides an 
essential distinction between Bohling and this case.  See 
majority op. ¶31 & n.11.    
No. 2014AP1267-CR.awb  
 
6 
 
risks the destruction of evidence.  See, e.g., majority op. 
¶¶40-45.  Yet, the majority admonishes that this case "does not 
establish a per se rule that the dissipation of heroin in the 
blood always constitutes an exigency justifying a warrantless 
blood draw."  Majority Op. ¶42.   
¶73 Contrary to the above admonition, the author of the 
majority opinion got it right at oral argument.  The State's 
argument, which the majority now adopts, is really "Bohling for 
heroin":   
 
Justice Ziegler:  Ok, but it has never been the law 
that just because evidence is really good, you don't 
need a warrant.  That's almost what you are saying and 
you are losing me on that. 
Counsel for the State:  ... What I am saying is that 
because 
this 
really 
good 
evidence, 
this 
really 
probative evidence dissipates so quickly, at least in 
the case of heroin, and the public defender brought up 
some other drugs like marijuana and things like that,  
this is a whole different animal.  I agree if this is 
a marijuana case, we would be done.  We would be done 
because marijuana being a natural substance–cocaine 
being a natural substance-it doesn't break down.  
Heroin is a not natural substance–it's a synthetic and 
it does break down.  That is why you need to get the 
evidence quickly.  And that is why you have exigent 
circumstances because you need to get it quickly. 
Justice Ziegler:  So to be clear, you are basically 
asking us to revive Bohling in terms of heroin cases 
or substances that are not natural. 
... [W]hat I really hear you saying is that in heroin 
cases there is an exigency because it dissipates so 
quickly.  That's Bohling for heroin, isn't it? 
¶74 The majority now asserts that "[w]e instead resolve 
this case 'based on its own facts and circumstances.'"  Majority 
op. ¶42.  Yet, all of the facts and circumstances the majority 
No. 2014AP1267-CR.awb  
 
7 
 
discusses relate only to dissipation: the type and amount of an 
ingested drug, the time it was ingested, the time it takes to 
get a warrant in relation to dissipation, and scientific 
evidence on the rapid dissipation of heroin.  Id.  Its best 
evidence rule places the focus on facts and circumstances 
relating only to dissipation.  By inventing a best evidence rule 
for every heroine case and concluding that exigent circumstances 
exist because of the rapid dissipation of heroin, the majority 
creates a per se rule for heroin cases.  
¶75 If the majority is correct that heroin is in the blood 
for only a few minutes and 6-monoacetylmorphine is present in 
the blood for only one to three hours before metabolizing into 
morphine, this would be the circumstance in every case.4  Even if 
the scientific evidence regarding the rate of dissipation 
changed, it would change for every case.  
¶76 Likewise, the time it takes to obtain a warrant will 
always cause some delay in every case.  In this case, Officer 
Fenhouse testified that that it takes approximately two hours to 
obtain a search warrant.  Majority op. ¶14.  However, McNeely 
sounds a note of caution, explaining that consideration of the 
time it takes to obtain a warrant "might well diminish the 
incentive for jurisdictions to pursue progressive approaches to 
warrant acquisition that preserve the protections afforded by 
                                                 
4 The majority opinion dismisses the scientific articles 
Parisi submitted and instead relies on a solo article submitted 
by the State.  See majority op. ¶43 n.13.     
No. 2014AP1267-CR.awb  
 
8 
 
the warrant while meeting the legitimate interests of law 
enforcement."  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1563 (citations omitted).  
¶77 Underlying the majority's conclusion that the rate of 
dissipation of heroin in the blood justifies an exception to the 
warrant requirement is the majority's newly minted best evidence 
rule for heroin cases.  According to the majority, "the officer 
could reasonably believe that waiting two hours to obtain a 
warrant would 'significantly undermin[e] the efficacy' of a 
blood draw by leading to ambiguous test results; evidence of 
heroin or morphine use, rather than heroin use alone, might 
result if sufficient time has passed."  Majority op. ¶48. 
¶78 The majority errs in its creation of a best evidence 
rule for heroin cases.  It contradicts well-established law when 
it contends that a blood draw showing "heroin or its first 
metabolite, 6-monoacetylmorphine, remained the most probative 
evidence that Parisi had used heroin."5  Majority Op. ¶46.  
"Neither Wisconsin law nor federal law recognizes a 'best 
evidence rule' that established a hierarchy of evidence.  In 
effect, all evidence is created equal."  7 Daniel D. Blinka, 
Wisconsin Practice Series: Wisconsin Evidence § 1001.1 at 928 
                                                 
5 The majority fails to adequately explain its singular 
focus of needing to find heroin——not morphine——in the blood.  
Parisi was charged with Possession of a Schedule I or II 
narcotic drug.  Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(am) provides that: "If a 
person possesses or attempts to possess a controlled substance 
included in schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug... the 
person is guilty of a Class I felony."  Even if the police had 
only been able to convict Parisi of possession of morphine, both 
heroin and morphine carry the same criminal penalty.  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 961.14(3)(k) and 961.16(2)(a)10. 
No. 2014AP1267-CR.awb  
 
9 
 
(3rd ed. 2008) (explaining the "myth of the best evidence 
rule").  
¶79 Even if there were a best evidence rule, evidence of 
drugs in the bloodstream alone is not enough to support a 
possession charge.  Here, Parisi was charged with possession of 
a schedule I or II narcotic drug.  In Wisconsin, "the mere 
presence of drugs in a person’s system is insufficient to prove 
that the drugs are knowingly possessed by the person or that the 
drugs are within the person’s control."  State v. Griffin, 220 
Wis. 2d 371, 381, 584 N.W.2d 127 (1998).  Evidence of drugs in 
the bloodstream is "circumstantial evidence of prior possession" 
and must be "combined with other corroborating evidence of 
sufficient probative value" in order to prove possession.  Id.    
¶80 The majority’s reasoning is flawed because even if the 
police had been able to detect heroin or its first metabolite 6-
monoacetylmorphine in the bloodstream, they still would need 
corroborating evidence to convict Parisi of heroin possession.  
In this case, police found "a bindle of what looked to be heroin 
wrapped in tinfoil, some cut ends, and [a] marijuana pipe" at 
the scene of the overdose.  Majority op. ¶10. Additionally, 
Parisi was given Narcan before he was transported to the 
hospital, which Officer Fenhouse knew was "usually administered 
for people who have overdosed on heroin."  Majority op. ¶7.  
Thus, the heroin found in the apartment where Parisi overdosed 
and the fact that he was treated with Narcan present key 
corroborating evidence.   
No. 2014AP1267-CR.awb  
 
10 
 
¶81 The majority’s reliance on McNeely for support of a 
best evidence rule is misplaced.  The term "best evidence" does 
not appear in the McNeely majority opinion.  Additionally, there 
are distinctions between the presence of alcohol in the 
bloodstream and the presence of heroin.   
¶82 Evidence of heroin or 6-monoacetylmorphine in the 
bloodstream is less probative than evidence of alcohol in the 
bloodstream because a BAC level alone is enough to obtain a 
drunk driving conviction.  In contrast, evidence of drug use in 
the 
blood 
stream 
requires 
corroborating 
evidence 
for 
a 
possession conviction.  Moreover, the amount of alcohol in the 
blood is relevant to a conviction, but the amount of heroin in 
the blood is not.  Unlike a BAC level, the police need find only 
a trace of heroin or its metabolites in the bloodstream.   
¶83 In State v. Jones the Nevada Supreme Court articulated 
this distinction.  It determined that the dissipation of cocaine 
in the defendant’s bloodstream was not an exigent circumstance 
that justified a departure from the normal procedure of 
obtaining a warrant.  895 P.2d 643, 644 (1995).  The Jones court 
explained that evidence of alcohol and drugs in the blood 
differ.  Id.  That analysis is applicable here: "a conviction 
for driving under the influence requires a specific minimum 
concentration of blood alcohol, whereas a conviction for being 
under the influence of a controlled substance requires only a 
trace amount of the substance or its metabolites."  Id. 
¶84 The majority also misunderstands State v. Peardot, 119 
Wis. 2d 400, 351 N.W.2d 172 (1984), when it cites to that case 
No. 2014AP1267-CR.awb  
 
11 
 
as support for the adoption of a best evidence rule.  The term 
"best" was used merely as an adjective to describe the evidence. 
There is no discussion in Peardot supporting the adoption of a 
best evidence approach.     
¶85 Finally, the majority's insistence that evidence of 
morphine in the bloodstream is less probative evidence than 
heroin or 6-monoacetylmorphine ignores the facts of this case.  
The warrantless blood draw performed on Parisi revealed evidence 
of 
morphine 
in 
his 
bloodstream, 
not 
heroin 
or 
6-
monoacetylmorphine.  It is this very evidence of morphine in 
Parisi's bloodstream that the State seeks to use and Parisi 
seeks to suppress. 
III. 
¶86 Not only did McNeely reject a per se rule based on 
dissipation, it also set forth circumstances in which the police 
must obtain a warrant without exception.  133 S. Ct. at 1561.  
McNeely instructs that "where police officers can reasonably 
obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without 
significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth 
Amendment mandates that they do so."  Id.; see also Tullberg, 
359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶42.   
¶87 In a footnote, the majority rejects Parisi's arguments 
that a warrant should have been pursued because of the number of 
officers involved in the case.  Majority op. ¶50 n.15.  It 
advances that "Officer Fenhouse could reasonably believe that 
asking another officer to obtain a warrant would be futile, 
No. 2014AP1267-CR.awb  
 
12 
 
given the short timeframe before evidence of heroin use 
disappeared."  Id.   
¶88 However, the McNeely court explained that in "a 
situation in which the warrant process will not significantly 
increase the delay before the blood test is conducted because an 
officer can take steps to secure a warrant while the suspect is 
being 
transported 
to 
a 
medical 
facility 
by 
another 
officer . . . there would be no plausible justification for an 
exception to the warrant requirement."  Id. at 1561.  That is 
exactly the circumstance here, yet the majority's decision 
directly contravenes McNeely. 
¶89 Under McNeely, there is no plausible justification for 
the majority's decision.  It is undisputed that there were a 
total of five to seven officers working on Parisi's case.  See 
majority op. ¶9.  Officer Fenhouse and Officer Moua both 
followed Parisi's ambulance to the hospital.  Majority op. ¶11.  
Any of the five to seven officers working on the case could have 
applied for a warrant while Officer Fenhouse followed Parisi to 
the hospital.   
¶90 In addition, there was no reason for delay in 
obtaining a warrant given that the officers had probable cause 
as soon as they arrived at the scene.  As referenced above, 
Parisi was given Narcan before he was transported to the 
hospital, which Officer Fenhouse knew was "usually administered 
for people who have overdosed on heroin."  Majority op. ¶7.  The 
officers at the scene also found "a bindle of what looked to be 
No. 2014AP1267-CR.awb  
 
13 
 
heroin wrapped in tinfoil, some cut ends, and [a] marijuana 
pipe."  Majority op. ¶10. 
¶91 There is also no explanation for the delay in 
obtaining a warrant once Officer Fenhouse arrived at the 
hospital.  Although Officer Fenhouse intended to have Parisi's 
blood drawn immediately, Parisi was initially deemed to be too 
unstable for the procedure.  During the two hours that Officer 
Fenhouse waited at the hospital before Parisi's blood could be 
drawn, there was nothing that prevented him from obtaining a 
warrant. 
¶92 After McNeely, this court has allowed only one 
exception to the warrant requirement for blood draws based on 
exigent circumstances.  Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶30.  The 
majority contends that Tullberg is an analogous case involving 
warrantless blood draws.  Majority op. ¶¶30, 40.  It is not. 
¶93 At the outset, the Tullberg court noted that the 
investigating officer "did not improperly delay in obtaining a 
warrant.  He did not have probable cause to believe that 
Tullberg operated the motor vehicle while under the influence of 
an intoxicant until nearly three hours after the accident.  If 
anything, 
Tullberg's 
actions, 
rather 
than 
the 
deputy's, 
necessitated the warrantless blood draw."  359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶44. 
¶94 In contrast to the facts of this case, only one deputy 
was initially dispatched to the chaotic scene of the fatal 
collision in Tullberg.  Id., ¶¶9-11.  Additionally, Tullberg was 
not at the scene of the collision and the investigating deputy 
did not know he was the driver.  Id., ¶¶8-10.  When he was 
No. 2014AP1267-CR.awb  
 
14 
 
finally interviewed at the hospital, Tullberg told the deputy 
that he was a passenger in the vehicle.  Id., ¶12.  It was not 
until 
nearly 
three 
hours 
after 
the 
collision 
when 
the 
investigation uncovered evidence that helped identify Tullberg 
as the driver responsible for the fatal collision.  Id., ¶¶15-
16. 
¶95 Given the extraordinary facts and circumstances of 
that case, the Tullberg court explained that the deputy, when 
"confronted with such an accident scene and obstruction of his 
investigation, conducted himself reasonably."  Id., ¶47.  Under 
McNeely, and as it is applied in Tullberg, an exception to the 
warrant requirement for a blood draw is permissible only when 
circumstances prevent an officer from timely obtaining a 
warrant.  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561; Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 
421, ¶42.  Here, however, the majority's analysis focuses only 
on facts and circumstances relating to dissipation because there 
were no facts and circumstances preventing at least one of the 
five to seven officers from timely obtaining a warrant. 
¶96 In its effort to excuse the multiple officers' 
inexplicable failure to obtain a warrant, the majority conflates 
dissipation in the bloodstream with cases involving the imminent 
destruction of physical evidence.  See majority op. ¶50 n.15.  
Relying on destruction of evidence cases, the majority asserts 
that "if officers suspect drugs are being flushed behind a 
closed door, [] the exigency is not eliminated merely because 
there are multiple officers at the scene."  Id. (citing Kentucky 
v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2001); United States v. Fiasche, 520 F.3d 
No. 2014AP1267-CR.awb  
 
15 
 
694, 698 (7th Cir. 2008)).  The majority then analogizes Officer 
Fenhouse’s failure to obtain a warrant at the hospital to 
destruction of evidence cases where "split—second judgments-in 
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving."  
Id. (citing King, 563 U.S. at 466 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 
U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)). 
¶97 Such reliance on destruction of evidence cases is 
unpersuasive, because "[t]he context of blood testing is 
different in critical respects from other destruction-of-
evidence cases in which the police are truly confronted with a 
'now or never' situation."  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561 (citing 
Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973)).  Dissipation of a 
substance in the blood differs from circumstances "in which the 
suspect has control over easily disposable evidence."  Id.    
¶98 It is quite a stretch to compare the apparent 
availability of five to seven officers including a police 
officer sitting in a hospital waiting room for two hours, with a 
drug raid where officers hear evidence being flushed away.  
Likewise, the five to seven officers at the scene of the 
overdose knew that Parisi was not about to imminently destroy 
evidence.  The police certainly did not have to break through 
the door on a moment's notice because Parisi's friends met the 
officers outside to help direct them to the proper location.  
Majority op. ¶5.  When the police entered the apartment, Parisi 
was laying unresponsive on the living room floor in his own 
vomit.  Majority op. ¶6.  Unlike making a split-second decision 
to preserve evidence, the steady dissipation of heroin in the 
No. 2014AP1267-CR.awb  
 
16 
 
blood is just not the kind of emergency that justifies foregoing 
a warrant. 
¶99 I determine that under the facts and circumstances of 
this case, one of the five to seven officers could have secured 
a warrant in the two and one-half hours before Parisi's blood 
was drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the 
search.  Officers were dispatched to the scene at 12:38 a.m. and 
arrived five to ten minutes after dispatch.  Majority op. ¶4.  
Shortly thereafter, Narcan, the antidote for heroine, was 
administered.  Majority op. ¶7.  The blood draw did not occur 
until 3:10 a.m.  Majority op. ¶13. 
¶100 The State has the burden of proving the existence of 
exigent circumstances.  State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶29, 235 
Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29.  It has utterly failed to do so 
here.  Even if Officer Fenhouse's failure to seek a warrant is 
excusable——and it is not——there is a complete dearth of 
information as to why none of the available five to seven 
officers failed to seek a warrant. 
¶101 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that there were 
no exigent circumstances justifying an exception to the warrant 
requirement.  As a result, the warrantless blood draw violated 
Parisi's Fourth Amendment rights.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶102 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON, J. joins this dissent. 
No. 2014AP1267-CR.awb  
 
 
 
1