Title: In re N.L.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12183
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 14, 2017

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SJC-12183 
 
IN THE MATTER OF N.L. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 5, 2016. - March 14, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Mental Health.  Practice, Civil, Commitment of mentally ill 
person, Continuance, Moot case.  Moot Question. 
 
 
 
 
Petitions for civil commitment and to authorize medical 
treatment filed in the Cambridge Division of the District Court 
Department on November 3, 2014. 
 
 
A motion for a continuance was heard by Roanne Sragow, J., 
and the petitions were also heard by her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Karen Owen Talley for the respondent. 
 
Diane M. Geraghty Hall for the petitioner. 
 
Anna Krieger, Robert D. Fleischner, Jennifer Honig, & 
Phillip Kassel, for Center for Public Representation & another, 
amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  N.L. appeals from the order for his civil 
commitment to a mental health facility (hospital), pursuant to 
2 
 
 
G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, and the order authorizing his 
treatment with antipsychotic medications pursuant to G. L. 
c. 123, § 8B.  He argues that the District Court judge 
improperly denied his prehearing request for a continuance to 
allow time for his counsel to prepare an adequate defense and an 
independent medical examiner to complete a psychiatric 
evaluation.  We transferred the case from the Appeals Court to 
this court on our own motion. 
 
We dismiss the appeal as moot but exercise our discretion 
to address the issue before us, which is whether a judge may 
deny a person's (or the person's counsel's) first request for a 
continuance of a hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 7 (c) or 
8B.  We hold that where a person or his or her counsel requests 
such a continuance, the grant of the continuance is mandatory 
where a denial thereof is reasonably likely to prejudice a 
person's ability to prepare a meaningful defense.1 
 
Background.  1.  Facts.  N.L. was admitted to the hospital 
on October 30, 2014, under the emergency hospitalization 
provisions of G. L. c. 123, § 12.  On November 3, the hospital 
filed a petition for commitment pursuant to G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 
and 8, and a petition for determination of incompetency and for 
authorization for medical treatment for mental illness pursuant 
                                                          
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Center 
for Public Representation and the Mental Health Legal Advisors 
Committee. 
3 
 
 
to G. L. c. 123, § 8B.  Counsel was appointed for N.L.  The 
hearing on the petitions was scheduled for November 6.  Due to 
administrative delays, counsel for N.L. did not receive a copy 
of N.L.'s medical records until November 5, the same day that an 
independent psychiatrist retained by counsel first met with N.L.  
On November 6, counsel for N.L. filed a motion to continue the 
hearing to allow him time to prepare a meaningful defense and to 
allow the independent medical examiner time to complete his 
evaluation.  The hospital opposed the motion on the grounds that 
delay would jeopardize N.L.'s safety.  The judge denied the 
motion to continue without stating her reasons, and proceeded 
with the commitment hearing.  The judge then ordered N.L. to be 
involuntarily committed to the hospital for a period not to 
exceed six months.  Immediately following the commitment 
hearing, the incompetency and medical treatment hearing 
commenced.  The judge allowed the hospital's petition to treat 
N.L. with antipsychotic medication against his will. 
 
N.L. timely appealed this decision to the Appellate 
Division of the District Court Department.  In September 2015, 
that court dismissed N.L.'s appeal as moot because he had since 
been discharged from the hospital, and the court declined to 
reach his arguments because it held that the circumstances of 
the case were not "capable of repetition." 
4 
 
 
 
2.  Statutory overview.  General Laws c. 123, as is 
relevant here, provides for procedures to allow the involuntary 
civil commitment of persons with mental illness, and for the 
involuntary medical treatment of such persons. 
 
a.  Civil commitment hearings.  Sections 7 and 8 of G. L. 
c. 123 address the long-term commitment of persons with mental 
illness.  Under § 7 (a), the superintendent of any facility2 may 
petition the District Court for the commitment of any patient3 
already at the facility.4  A hearing on this petition must be 
conducted within five days of its filing, "unless a delay is 
requested by the person or his counsel."  G. L. c. 123, § 7 (c).  
Section 8 (a) provides that no person shall be committed unless 
the District Court finds after a hearing that "(1) such person 
is mentally ill, and (2) the discharge of such person from a 
facility would create a likelihood of serious harm." 
                                                          
 
 
2 A "facility" is "a public or private facility for the care 
and treatment of mentally ill persons." G. L. c. 123, § 1. 
 
 
3 A "patient" is "any person with whom a licensed mental 
health professional has established a mental health 
professional-patient relationship." G. L. c. 123, § 1. 
 
 
4 Often, as was the case here, the individual is at the 
facility under the emergency restraint and temporary 
hospitalization provisions of G. L. c. 123, § 12, which allow 
for the commitment of an individual for a three-day period.  
G. L. c. 123, § 12 (a). See Newton-Wellesley Hosp. v. Magrini, 
451 Mass. 777, 778-781 (2008), for a discussion of the temporary 
commitment provisions of G. L. c. 123, § 12. 
5 
 
 
 
b.  Involuntary medical treatment hearings.  Section 8B of 
G. L. c. 123 deals with the treatment of committed persons with 
antipsychotic medications.  If a civil commitment petition is 
filed under the provisions of G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, the 
superintendent of the facility may also petition the District 
Court under § 8B to allow the treatment of the person with 
antipsychotic medications against the person's will.  The 
involuntary medical treatment petition may not be considered by 
the court unless it has already issued a civil commitment order 
for the person under §§ 7 and 8.  G. L. c. 123, § 8B (b)  If an 
involuntary medical treatment petition is filed concurrently 
with a civil commitment petition -- as was the case here -- a 
hearing on both must commence on the same day.5  G. L. c. 123, 
§ 8B (c).  In such circumstances, this means that a continuance 
of a civil commitment hearing results in a continuance of the 
involuntary medical treatment hearing. 
 
c.  Individuals' rights at hearings.  Section 5 of G. L. 
c. 123 pertains to a person's rights at civil commitment and 
involuntary medical treatment hearings, including the right to 
counsel and the right to present independent testimony at the 
                                                          
 
 
5 If the involuntary medical treatment petition is not filed 
concurrently with the civil commitment petition (i.e., the 
petition is filed after the person has been committed for some 
period of time), a hearing must occur within fourteen days of 
the filing of the petition, "unless a delay is requested by the 
person or his counsel."  G. L. c. 123, § 8B (c). 
6 
 
 
hearing.  G. L. c. 123, § 5.  An indigent person must be 
appointed counsel (unless he or she refuses the appointment of 
counsel), and the court may provide such a person with an 
independent medical examination.  Id.  A person is allowed "not 
less than two days after the appearance of his counsel" to 
prepare the case, and after this minimum period the hearing 
"shall be conducted forthwith . . . unless counsel requests a 
delay."  Id. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Mootness.  Before N.L.'s appeal reached 
the Appellate Division, he was discharged from the hospital.  
Accordingly, the case is moot.  "However, '[i]ssues involving 
the commitment and treatment of mentally ill persons are 
generally considered matters of public importance' and present 
'classic examples' of issues that are capable of repetition, yet 
evading review."  Newton-Wellesley Hosp. v. Magrini, 451 Mass. 
777, 782 (2008), quoting Acting Supt. of Bournewood Hosp. v. 
Baker, 431 Mass. 101, 103 (2000).  Therefore, we exercise our 
discretion and decide the issue. 
 
2.  Continuances for civil commitment and involuntary 
medical treatment hearings.  General Laws c. 123, § 7 (c), 
provides that civil commitment hearings "shall be commenced 
7 
 
 
within [five] days of the filing of the petition, unless a delay 
is requested by the person or his counsel."6 
 
Here, the word "unless" provides an exception to the 
general rule that civil commitment hearings must commence within 
five days of the filing of the petition.  G. L. c. 123, § 7 (c).  
See Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 Mass. 607, 609 (1983).  When a 
"request" for a delay is made by either the person or his 
counsel, that general rule no longer applies and the hearing may 
commence beyond the mandatory five-day window.  G. L. c. 123, 
§ 7 (c). 
 
Although the statute is silent as to whether the presiding 
judge must grant such a "request," we conclude that the plain 
language as well as the legislative intent of the statute 
require that the grant of a requested first continuance be 
mandatory where a denial thereof is reasonably likely to 
prejudice a person's ability to prepare a meaningful defense.  
See Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001) ("statutory 
language should be given effect consistent with its plain 
meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do 
                                                          
 
 
6 For clarity, the analysis will focus on the specific 
language of G. L. c. 123, § 7.  However, G. L. c. 123, § 8B (c), 
and G. L. c. 123, § 5, contain language that is nearly identical 
to the "unless" clause of G. L. c. 123, § 7.  Therefore, when a 
person or his or her counsel requests a delay under any of these 
provisions, the grant of it is mandatory when a denial thereof 
is reasonably likely to prejudice a person's ability to 
meaningfully prepare a defense. 
8 
 
 
so would achieve an illogical result").  The Legislature could 
have provided discretion to a judge when a party makes a 
"request" and did so elsewhere in the same statute.  See G. L. 
c. 123, § 17 (b) ("If the court in its discretion grants such a 
request . . .").  Further, any interpretation not making the 
grant of a continuance mandatory (absent a showing that denial 
of the continuance is not reasonably likely to prejudice a 
person's ability to prepare a meaningful defense) ignores the 
word "unless" in the statute.  See Sullivan v. Ward, 304 Mass. 
614, 615-616 (1939). 
 
This interpretation is consistent with the Legislature's 
intent to afford individuals more due process in civil 
commitment and medical treatment hearings than had been 
available previously.  Newton-Wellesley Hosp., 451 Mass. at 784.  
Prior to 2000, the statutory period for conducting the hearing 
was fourteen days and has since been statutorily reduced to 
five.7  G. L. c. 123, § 7 (c), as amended by St. 2004, c. 410, 
§ 1.  These amendments make it clear that the Legislature 
intended to protect the individual's due process rights by 
minimizing the length of time for which he or she could be 
involuntarily committed prior to judicial review.  See District 
                                                          
 
 
7 In 2000, the number of days was reduced from fourteen to 
four and in 2004 the number was increased to five, and has 
remained there since.  See G. L. c. 123, § 7 (c), as amended by 
St. 2000, c. 249, § 1, and St. 2004, c. 410, § 1. 
9 
 
 
Court Committee on Mental Health and Retardation, Report of the 
Ad Hoc Committee to Review G. L. c. 123, § 12, at 1, 4 (Oct. 21, 
1997) (recommending reduction in period between filing of 
petition and commencement of hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 123, 
§§ 7 and 8).  This reduced time frame may be insufficient to 
prepare a meaningful defense in some cases, but the person's due 
process right are further protected by the "unless" clause in 
the statute, which creates a mechanism by which a person could 
delay the proceeding.  See G. L. c. 123, § 7 (c).  See also 
G. L. c. 123, § 8B (c).  It is illogical that the Legislature 
would shorten the period for conducting these hearings and have 
it inure to the detriment of the individual's due process right 
to prepare a meaningful defense. 
 
The length of the continuance is within the sound 
discretion of the judge.  The length of the delay, however, 
should be only as long as is reasonably necessary to protect the 
individual's right to prepare a meaningful defense.8  In 
                                                          
 
 
8 We note that the legislative scheme contemplates that an 
adequate case may be prepared in two days, although this time 
frame may not be appropriate in all cases.  See G. L. c. 123, 
§ 5 ("The person shall be allowed not less than two days after 
the appearance of his counsel in which to prepare his case and a 
hearing shall be conducted forthwith after such period unless 
counsel requests a delay"). 
10 
 
 
addition, this determination should be made solely with the 
patient's interests in mind.9 
 
Where a judge denies the requested continuance she must 
state with particularity the reasons why the denial is not 
reasonably likely to prejudice a person's ability to prepare a 
meaningful defense on the record.  Because the denial of a 
continuance will require the careful balancing of the due 
process rights of the person against any countervailing factors, 
these findings will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. 
 
We recognize that tension exists between a person's 
potentially urgent medical needs and that person's due process 
right to prepare a meaningful defense.  Although the task of 
medical professionals in treating such persons may be 
challenging, under the statutory provisions at issue, expediency 
of treatment may not impinge on a person's right to prepare a 
defense.  Procedures are in place to temporarily treat 
individuals while they await civil commitment hearings.  See, 
e.g., Rogers v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Mental Health, 390 
Mass. 489, 510-511 (1983).  The infringement of a person's 
                                                          
 
 
9 Although the statutes are designed to protect a person's 
right to prepare a meaningful defense, any delay will 
necessarily require that a person remain committed without 
judicial review for an additional length of time.  A lengthy 
delay also may adversely affect a patient's medical situation, 
and it may be appropriate for a judge to consider this when 
determining the length of the continuance. 
11 
 
 
liberty interest resulting from involuntary commitment for six 
months is "massive" and should only be undertaken after the 
person has the opportunity to prepare a meaningful defense.  See 
Newton-Wellesley Hosp., 451 Mass. at 784, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Nassar, 380 Mass. 908, 917 (1980). 
 
Conclusion.  The grant of a first request for a continuance 
pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 7 (c) or 8B (c), is mandatory where 
a denial thereof is reasonably likely to prejudice a person's 
ability to prepare a meaningful defense.  N.L.'s appeal is 
dismissed as moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.