Title: John Bardis v. First Trenton Insurance Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2009

John Bardis v. First Trenton Insurance Co. Annotate this Case (This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). John Bardis and Helen Bardis v. First Trenton Insurance Co. (A-110-07)Argued November 17, 2008 -- Decided June 10, 2009HOENS, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court addresses three questions. First, the Court addresses whether, in a jury trial arising out of Underinsured Motorist (UIM) coverage, the insurer should be identified as the defendant. Second, the Court considers whether, in the UIM trial, evidence that the insurer authorized payment of Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits is relevant to whether there is a causal connection between the accident and the claimed injuries. Third, the Court focuses on whether, in the unusual circumstances of this dispute, the UIM carrier's disavowal of knowledge of the sources of payments for the medical treatment of plaintiff's injuries deprived plaintiff of a fair trial. On February 13, 1997, plaintiff John Bardis was injured when his automobile was involved in a three-car accident caused when a vehicle driven by Joseph Bologna hit the vehicle behind Bardis's, pushing it forward. At the time of the accident, Bardis was insured by defendant First Trenton Insurance Company. The dispute is complicated by the fact that the February 1997 incident was neither Bardis's first, nor his last, automobile accident. At the time of the February 1997 accident, Bardis had degenerative disc disease and a significant history of neck, back, and shoulder complaints. Consequently, there was a continuing series of MRI and other studies and treatment performed on Bardis, which formed much of the basis for the dispute at trial. There was no question that Bologna was the cause of the February 1997 accident, and Bardis settled with him for the full extent of his $15,000 insurance policy. There was also no question raised by First Trenton about the medical treatments that Bardis underwent after the February 1997 accident, all of which were covered under the PIP provisions of his insurance policy. Nor did First Trenton decline to cover, as part of Bardis's PIP benefits, the cost of back surgery performed on Bardis in 2003. It is that surgery, however, that has become the focal point of the dispute between the parties in this appeal. Bardis asserts that the surgery performed in 2003 was causally related to the February 1997 accident. First Trenton, at the UIM trial, contended that in fact it was not. Bardis made two applications prior to or during trial. First, he requested that the judge advise the jury that First Trenton was the defendant rather than referring to Bologna, the tortfeasor, as if he were the defendant. The trial judge denied the application. Second, Bardis asked for permission to call and question Susan Wetherell, a First Trenton employee, about her review of the PIP claims and the basis on which she had authorized their payment. Bardis asserted that Wetherell's evaluation of his claims and her authorization of the payment of PIP benefits to pay for his medical treatment was probative of causation. The trial court granted that request. However, as a result of that ruling, the parties stipulated to the substance of the testimony that Wetherell would have given in place of her appearance at trial as a witness, referring to her by name and describing her as a "representative of the defendant." Counsel for First Trenton, who the jury had been told represented the tortfeasor Bologna, then commented in closing that neither he nor Bologna knew Wetherell and questioned whether her decision to pay for treatment of the injuries was relevant to causation. After the jury returned its verdict in favor of defendant, Bardis appealed. In its published opinion, the Appellate Division expressed its view that "under the circumstances it would have been better to tell the jury, subject to an appropriate instruction, that the carrier was the defendant," but concluded that the trial court's contrary decision was an appropriate exercise of discretion. The panel concluded that the trial judge had erred in permitting evidence of PIP payments, both because those payments were not relevant and because Wetherell was not competent to testify about causation of the injuries. Although critical of the closing argument by defense counsel essentially disavowing knowledge of those payments, the panel reasoned that because the stipulation was inadmissible, those comments did not deprive plaintiff of a fair trial. The panel therefore affirmed the verdict in defendant's favor. The Supreme Court granted certification and thereafter granted amicus status to the Association of Trial Lawyers of America-New Jersey (ATLA-NJ).HELD: The Court concludes that there are strong reasons supporting the rule that the Underinsured Motorist (UIM) litigation proceed in the name of the tortfeasor rather than the insurer, that these reasons ordinarily militate in favor of identifying the defendant in the trial by using the name of that tortfeasor, and that the decision to identify the UIM insurer as the defendant instead remains a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial judge should circumstances dictate. The Court further concludes that payment of PIP benefits for treatment of an injury is irrelevant to the question of causation of that injury. In addition, the closing argument by counsel disavowing his and the actual tortfeasor's knowledge about the insurer's employee and her decisions to make PIP payments had the capacity to confuse the jury, and its admission constituted reversible error.1. Although courts ordinarily identify the real parties in interest in any litigation, and although First Trenton was appropriately named in the UIM complaint as the defendant, that does not answer the question posed by plaintiff about whether the insurer should be identified in the UIM trial by its own name. In other circumstances, the Supreme Court has expressed its concern that references to insurance coverage might distract jurors from a fair evaluation of the evidence, recognizing, as has the Appellate Division, that references to insurance might motivate an award of damages based on a jury's perception of an insurer as having "deep pockets." Similar concerns are voiced in the Rules of Evidence, for example N.J.R.E. 411. Not only are these matters of concern when the tortfeasor is the defendant, but they are relevant as well in the UIM context. In reality, it is the accident and the driver who caused it, rather than the insurer from which plaintiff now seeks a recovery for noneconomic damages, that is in any way relevant to the issues to be decided. The claim against the insurer is a derivative one; the sole focus is on whether the injuries, and the medical treatment that followed, were caused by the accident and, therefore, whether plaintiff is entitled to a verdict to compensate him or her for noneconomic damages that resulted, and none of those facts have to do with the insurer; the identity of the insurer is entirely irrelevant to any issue in the proceeding. Nor is it accurate to say, as does plaintiff, that the trial court's decision to shield the insurer's identity created confusion in the trial. In the context of a UIM claim, in which the identity of the insurer is not relevant to any issue, and in which the jury's decision must focus on the behavior of the actual tortfeasor, the rule advanced by plaintiff carries the greater risk of confusion. The Court thus rejects the request for a rule compelling the insurer in a UIM trial to be identified as the defendant. The Court disagrees with the appellate panel's suggestion that such a rule would be preferable and instead leaves it to the sound discretion of the trial judge to conclude, and to act accordingly, if circumstances in a particular trial suggest otherwise. (Pp. 10-15)2. By statute, the Legislature has required that "every standard automobile liability insurance policy . . . contain personal injury protection [PIP] benefits for the payment of benefits without regard to negligence, liability or fault of any kind." N.J.S.A. 39: 6A-4. The Court has previously held that this statute advances an important legislative goal of ensuring that persons injured in automobile accidents will receive medical care and that the bills for that care will be promptly paid. In order to achieve this important goal, the Court has understood the PIP statute to afford the "broadest possible coverage." The Legislature has also enacted a statute that makes evidence of amounts paid or collectible pursuant to PIP inadmissible in an ordinary suit for damages arising from an automobile accident. The principal goal of that statute is to avoid double recovery for a loss. Although the Legislature has not extended that prohibition to UIM suits, the underlying logic still pertains. A UIM action is essentially a contract-based substitute for a tort action against the tortfeasor. In theory, then, there should be no different application of the rules governing liability in a UIM case than those that apply in the trial of an ordinary tort action arising from a motor vehicle accident. The prohibition on admissibility of PIP payments should apply regardless of whether the tortfeasor or the plaintiff's own insurer is defending against the claim. The insurer that pays PIP claims in the ordinary course should do so safe in the knowledge that the evidence of that payment will not be admissible in the event that there is a civil suit, in order to avoid creating an incentive to decline payment. The Court therefore agrees with the Appellate Division that the trial court erred in deeming the PIP payments admissible. (Pp. 15-20)3. Although the Court concludes that the PIP payments were irrelevant to any of the issues that were before the jury in this UIM trial, it cannot avoid the implications that flowed from the trial court's contrary decision. The closing argument to the effect that defendant, and the attorney, had no idea who Wetherell was and why she had elected to make the payments for the medical bills may well have confused the jury and caused it to reach an unjust result. The stratagem inappropriately sought to undo the trial court's ruling about the relevance of those payments. The 2Court therefore is constrained to reverse the verdict in defendant's favor and remand the matter for a new trial in which the evidence of PIP payments shall be inadmissible. (Pp. 20-21) JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate, CONCURRING opinion, stating that although he concurs that this case must be remanded for a new trial, in his opinion, the primary error ­ the one that set the stage for the other missteps identified by the majority ­ was allowing First Trenton's attorney to falsely claim that he represented Bologna, and not the insurance company. He would hold that the jury in a UIM coverage case, as in every other case, is entitled to know who the true parties are to the action. The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, WALLACE, and RIVERA- SOTO join in JUSTICE HOENS's opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate, concurring opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 110 September Term 2007JOHN BARDIS and HELEN BARDIS, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.FIRST TRENTON INSURANCE CO., Defendant-Respondent. Argued November 17, 2008 ­ Decided June 10, 2009 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 397 N.J. Super. 138 (2007). David T. Wheaton argued the cause for appellants (Levinson Axelrod, attorneys; Mr. Wheaton and Matthew P. Pietrowski, on the briefs). Stephen A. Rudolph argued the cause for respondent (Monte & Rudolph, attorneys; Michael J. Lynch, on the brief). Bruce H. Stern submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Association of Trial Lawyers of America-New Jersey (Stark & Stark, attorneys). JUSTICE HOENS delivered the opinion of the Court. In this matter, we are called upon to answer threequestions. First, we address whether, in a jury trial arisingout of Underinsured Motorist (UIM) coverage, the insurer shouldbe identified as the defendant. Second, we consider whether, inthe UIM trial, evidence that the insurer authorized payment ofPersonal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits is relevant to whetherthere is a causal connection between the accident and theclaimed injuries. Third, we focus on whether, in the unusualcircumstances of this dispute, the UIM carrier's disavowal ofknowledge of the source of payments for the medical treatment ofplaintiff's injuries deprived plaintiff of a fair trial. We first conclude that there are strong reasons supportingthe rule that the UIM litigation proceed in the name of thetortfeasor rather than the insurer, that these reasonsordinarily militate in favor of identifying the defendant in thetrial by using the name of that tortfeasor, and that thedecision to identify the UIM insurer as the defendant insteadremains a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial judgeshould circumstances dictate. Applying that reasoning, we willnot disturb the trial court's decision to preclude plaintifffrom identifying the UIM carrier as the defendant at trial inthis matter. Second, we conclude that payment of PIP benefits fortreatment of an injury is irrelevant to the question ofcausation of that injury. We further conclude that admittingevidence of PIP benefits to infer a causal relationship would beantithetical to the purposes of PIP, namely, the prompt paymentfor medical care rendered after an accident. We therefore agree 2with the Appellate Division's analysis that the trial court'sdecision to admit evidence of PIP payments was in error. Third, however, the trial court's error in admittingevidence of PIP payments led to the use of a stipulationidentifying an employee of the insurer as having authorizedthose payments, and to the closing argument by counseldisavowing both his own and the actual tortfeasor's knowledgeabout that employee and her decisions. Because under thecircumstances, that argument had the capacity to confuse thejury, we disagree with the appellate panel's view that itamounted to harmless error. We therefore reverse the verdictand remand for a new trial at which the UIM carrier will not beidentified as the defendant and in which evidence of PIPpayments shall be excluded. I. This appeal arises in the context of a UIM claim followingan automobile accident. On February 13, 1997, plaintiff JohnBardis was injured when his automobile was involved in a three-car accident caused when a vehicle driven by Joseph Bologna hitthe vehicle behind plaintiff's, pushing it forward. At the timeof the accident, plaintiff was insured by defendant FirstTrenton Insurance Company. The dispute is complicated by the fact that the February1997 incident was neither plaintiff's first, nor his last, 3automobile accident. Although we need not detail the proofs attrial, all of which are explained in the Appellate Division'spublished decision, see Bardis v. First Trenton Ins. Co., 397 N.J. Super. 138, 142-47 (App. Div. 2007), it is noteworthy thatat the time of the February 1997 accident, plaintiff haddegenerative disc disease and a significant history of neck,back, and shoulder complaints and treatments. Plaintiff did not seek any treatment immediately followingthe accident, but instead went to work at the diner he owns andto which he was headed when the accident occurred. The next dayhe went to the emergency room, complaining of neck, back,shoulder, and knee pain. In the months that followed, both x-ray and MRI studies were performed that disclosed certaininjuries to his neck, back, and shoulder, as well as pre-existing and degenerative conditions of his neck and back. Plaintiff was in two subsequent motor vehicle accidents, ahead-on collision in September 1997 and an accident in 1999, thespecifics of which plaintiff could not recall. The particularsof those events are not important; the relevance of each wasthat there was a continuing series of MRI and other studies andtreatment performed on plaintiff, which formed much of the basisfor the dispute at trial. There was no question that Bologna was the cause of theFebruary 1997 accident, and plaintiff settled with him for the 4full extent of his $15,000 insurance policy. There was also noquestion raised by First Trenton about the medical treatmentsthat plaintiff underwent after the February 1997 accident, allof which were covered under the PIP provisions of his insurancepolicy. Nor did First Trenton decline to cover, as part ofplaintiff's PIP benefits, the cost of back surgery performed onplaintiff in 2003. It is that surgery, however, that has becomethe focal point of the dispute between the parties in thisappeal. Plaintiff asserts that the surgery performed in 2003 wascausally related to the February 1997 accident. First Trenton,at the UIM trial, contended that in fact it was not, but that itwas caused either by continued degenerative processes thatpreceded the accident or by one of the subsequent accidents inwhich plaintiff was involved. Both sides presented significantexpert testimony on the question of causation of the plaintiff'svarious injuries, all of which related, of course, to his claimfor noneconomic damages in the context of his UIM coverageclaim. The three discrete issues that confront this Court arosebecause of two applications plaintiff made to the court prior toor during the trial. First, he requested that the judge advisethe jury that First Trenton, his insurer, was the defendantrather than referring to Bologna, the tortfeasor, as if he were 5the defendant. The trial judge denied that application based onthe guidance he derived from appellate level precedents andconsistent with his prior experience in conducting UIM trials. Second, plaintiff asked for permission to call and questionSusan Wetherell, a First Trenton employee, about her review ofthe PIP claims and the basis on which she had authorized theirpayment. As part of that application, plaintiff asserted thatbecause the dispute in the UIM trial depended on which injurieswere causally related to the February 1997 accident, Wetherell'sevaluation of his claims and her authorization of the payment ofPIP benefits to pay for his medical treatment was probative ofcausation. Over defendant's strong objections about both therelevance of PIP payments and Wetherell's qualifications totestify about causation, the trial court granted that request. However, as a result of that ruling, the parties stipulatedto the substance of the testimony that Wetherell would havegiven in place of her appearance at trial as a witness,referring to her by name and describing her as a "representativeof the defendant." Counsel for First Trenton, who the jury hadbeen told represented the tortfeasor Bologna, then commented inclosing that neither he nor Bologna knew Wetherell andquestioned whether her decision to pay for treatment of theinjuries was relevant to causation. After the jury returned its verdict in favor of defendant, 6plaintiff appealed. In its published opinion, the AppellateDivision first expressed its view that "under the circumstancesit would have been better to tell the jury, subject to anappropriate instruction, that the carrier was the defendant,"but concluded that the trial court's contrary decision was an Id. at 151. The panel appropriate exercise of discretion.concluded that the trial judge had erred in permitting evidenceof PIP payments, both because those payments were not relevantand because Wetherell was not competent to testify aboutcausation of the injuries. Id. at 152-54. Although critical ofthe closing argument by defense counsel essentially disavowingknowledge of those payments, the panel reasoned that because thestipulation was inadmissible, those comments did not depriveplaintiff of a fair trial. Id. at 155. The panel thereforeaffirmed the verdict in defendant's favor. We granted certification, 194 N.J. 444 (2008), and wethereafter granted amicus status to the Association of TrialLawyers of America­New Jersey (ATLA-NJ). II. The contentions of the parties and amicus may be summarizedbriefly. Plaintiff urges us to adopt a rule that requires thatthe insurer in a UIM trial be identified as the defendant,describing the current practice as "hiding the identity of . . .the real defendant." He argues that we should embrace the logic 7of the Appellate Division in Krohn v. New Jersey Full InsuranceUnderwriters Ass'n, to the effect "[s]o long as the insurance isnot featured or made the basis at the trial for an appeal toincrease or decrease the damages, the information would seem tobe without prejudice." 316 N.J. Super. 477, 482 (App. Div.1998), certif. denied, 158 N.J. 74 (1999). He argues that anyrisk of prejudice can be neutralized with limiting instructionsexplaining that a defendant's identity as an insurance companyis irrelevant to the issue of damages. He asserts that thiscase is a perfect example of the genuine risk of confusion,pointing out that defendant's improper disavowal of itsstipulation would not have happened had the jury been soadvised. Second, plaintiff argues that counsel's summation commentswere "highly prejudicial because [they] made it appear that[plaintiff] was hiding something" or "trying to pull a fast oneover on [the jury]." He argues that defendant should not havebeen allowed to enter into the stipulation to preventWetherell's appearance as a witness and then repudiate thestipulation at trial. He urges us to reject the AppellateDivision's focus on the inadmissibility of the PIP evidence andconsider the effect of the summation on the jury's evaluation ofthe evidence. Third, plaintiff argues that the Appellate Division erred 8in its conclusion that the stipulation about PIP payments shouldhave been excluded at trial. Plaintiff urges us to concludethat the stipulation was relevant to the question of whether theinjuries were causally related to the accident, that it was notan impermissible medical opinion of a lay witness, and that theAppellate Division's policy rationale for excluding PIP paymentevidence was unfounded. First Trenton argues that the trial court properlyexercised its discretion in declining to identify it as thedefendant at trial. First Trenton cites Krohn for theproposition that, "[a]s a general rule, the probative value ofinformation regarding whether a person is insured or not issubstantially outweighed by the potential for undue prejudice"based upon the perceived "deep pockets" of the insurance Id. at 481-82. company. Second, First Trenton argues that the Appellate Divisionproperly rejected plaintiff's contentions regarding thestipulation, asserting that those arguments are moot because thejury returned a verdict of no cause in spite of the trialcourt's improper ruling about the admissibility of PIP paymentsthat led to the stipulation. As part of its analysis, FirstTrenton contends that if evidence of an insurer's payment ofmedical expenses is admissible, there will be a "rippling andchilling effect of making all PIP insurers fight, dispute and 9litigate all PIP bills," contrary to the intent of thelegislative scheme. With regard to the closing argument, First Trenton urges usto agree with the Appellate Division that the comments were truebecause the defendant ­- meaning Bologna ­- did not knowWetherell and played no part in determining whether to paymedical bills. Asserting that its argument did no more thanexplain to the jury that they could, but were not obligated to,accept the stipulation as true, First Trenton urges us to agreewith the appellate panel that there was no error. Amicus ATLA-NJ addressed only the issue of whether toidentify the insurer or the tortfeasor as the defendant attrial. It argues that the trial court created a fiction byfailing to advise the jury that First Trenton was the defendantand urges us to compel courts to identify the insurer as thedefendant in UIM trials, albeit with limiting instructions.Describing the practice followed by the trial court as "unfairand prejudicial to both parties," it asks us to adopt a newrule. III. Although we ordinarily identify the real parties ininterest in any litigation, and although First Trenton wasappropriately named in the UIM complaint as the defendant, thatdoes not answer the question posed by plaintiff about whether 10the insurer should be identified in the UIM trial by its ownname. In other circumstances, we have expressed our concernthat references to insurance coverage might distract jurors froma fair evaluation of the evidence. See Roman v. Mitchell, 82 N.J. 336, 347-48 (1980) (commenting on risk that voir direquestions might create inappropriate focus on insurance). OurAppellate Division has likewise recognized that references toinsurance might motivate an award of damages based on a jury'sperception of an insurer as having "deep pockets." Krohn,supra, 316 N.J. Super. at 482. Similar concerns are voiced in our Rules of Evidence.N.J.R.E. 411, for example, provides that "[e]vidence that aperson was or was not insured against liability is notadmissible on the issue of that person's negligence or other The theory that supports that Rule is not a wrongful conduct."concern that jurors will equate insurance with an insuredindividual's lack of due care, but instead "that if jurors knowthat an insurance company will be paying a judgment, they [thejurors] might be reckless in awarding damages to a plaintiff."Biunno, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment on N.J.R.E. 411(2008). Not only are these matters of concern when thetortfeasor is the defendant, but they are relevant as well inthe UIM context. In point of fact, the UIM claim is a contractual one, 11arising out of the insurance policy issued to plaintiff by hisown insurer. See Zirger v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 144 N.J. 327, 333 (1996); Krohn, supra, 316 N.J. Super. at 483. Theclaim, however, has little to do with the contract of insuranceand everything to do with the accident in which plaintiff wasinvolved. It is only the happenstance of the tortfeasor'sminimal coverage as compared with plaintiff's injuries thatbrings plaintiff's insurer, with its more generous UIM coverage,into the courtroom. In reality, it is the accident and thedriver who caused it, rather than the insurer from whichplaintiff now seeks a recovery for noneconomic damages, that isin any way relevant to the issues to be decided. In a sense, the claim against the insurer is a derivativeone; the sole focus is on whether the injuries, and the medicaltreatment that followed, were caused by the accident and,therefore, whether plaintiff is entitled to a verdict tocompensate him or her for noneconomic damages that resulted.None of those facts has any connection to the insurer; they haveonly to do with the accident, the treatments, and the opinionsof the doctors that bear on the question of a causalrelationship. Indeed, in a UIM trial, a judgment against theUIM carrier can only be entered if a noneconomic damage award isreturned that exceeds the coverage available from thetortfeasor's insurance. Seen in that light, the identity of the 12insurer is entirely irrelevant to any issue in the proceeding. Nor is it accurate to say, as does plaintiff, that thetrial court's decision to shield the insurer's identity createdconfusion in the trial. On the contrary, the confusion in thetrial was caused by the confluence of the erroneous decisionthat PIP payments were relevant to the question of causation ofthe claimed injuries, and the closing arguments in which counselfor defendant sought to disavow knowledge of the decision-makingprocess that led to those payments. Had the trial proceeded inthe ordinary fashion of a UIM claim, in which the claimedinjuries and their causal relationship, if any, to the accidentwere the focus, there would have been no need to identify theinsurer at all. In considering the issues on appeal, the Appellate Divisioncommented that it "questioned the wisdom" of our general ruleabout not identifying the insurer in a UIM trial as the Bardis, supra, 397 N.J. Super. at 151 n.3. Although defendant.the panel opined that a contrary rule would be preferable, ifcoupled with an appropriate instruction that the defendant'sidentity is irrelevant, see Wenz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 316 N.J.Super. 570, 580 (App. Div. 1998), we disagree. In the contextof a UIM claim, in which the identity of the insurer is notrelevant to any issue, and in which the jury's decision mustfocus on the behavior of the actual tortfeasor, the rule 13advanced by plaintiff and the amicus carries the greater risk ofconfusion. That rule would increase the risk of jury confusionbecause the jury would first be told that the defendant is aninsurer, but would then be advised that this is irrelevant andshould play no role in their evaluation of the claim. Thatrule, by injecting an entirely irrelevant fact into the trial,creates a risk that far outweighs the remote possibility thatthe jury might be confused if they are not so advised. Contraryto the view expressed by our concurring colleague, this rule isnot designed "to hide . . . the fact that the case [is] aboutinsurance coverage," post at (slip op. at 1), because in aUIM trial it is the judge who decides the coverage question whenmolding the verdict to account for the tortfeasor's coverage.Nor is it an effort to "feed[] fictions to the jury" or to Post at (slip op. at 2). Rather, the protect insurers.rule is intended only to protect the integrity of thefactfinding process by leaving wholly irrelevant considerationsaside. Notwithstanding that view, our decision is a narrow one; wereject the request for a rule compelling the insurer in a UIMtrial to be identified as the defendant, and we disagree withthe panel's suggestion that such a rule would be preferable.Instead, in the context of a UIM trial, in which thecircumstances of the underlying accident are the focus, we are 14persuaded that the insurer's identity is ordinarily irrelevant.Nonetheless, we leave it to the sound discretion of the trialjudge to conclude, and to act accordingly, if circumstances in aparticular trial suggest otherwise. IV. We turn, then, to the dispute between the partiesconcerning the relevance, if any, in a UIM trial, of thecarrier's payment of PIP benefits for injuries claimed to havebeen caused by the accident. By statute, our Legislature hasrequired that "every standard automobile liability insurancepolicy . . . contain personal injury protection [PIP] benefitsfor the payment of benefits without regard to negligence,liability or fault of any kind." N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4. We have previously held that this statute advances animportant legislative goal of ensuring that persons injured inautomobile accidents will receive medical care and that thebills for that care will be promptly paid. Caviglia v. RoyalTours of Am., 178 N.J. 460, 467 (2004) (recognizing, as primaryamong Legislature's goals, "providing benefits promptly andefficiently to all accident injury victims"); see also Johnsonv. Scaccetti, 192 N.J. 256, 269 (2007) (noting that "the primaryaim of the various no-fault statutory schemes has been toachieve lower premiums and prompt payment of medical expenses"(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); DiProspero v. 15Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 485 (2005) (acknowledging the importance ofour "system of first-party self-insurance . . . [for]provid[ing] an automobile accident victim prompt payment of out-of-pocket medical expenses" (citation and internal quotationmarks omitted)); Aponte-Correa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 N.J. 318, 323-24 (2000) (recognizing that primary goal of statute wasto "assure that injured plaintiffs are compensated promptly"). In order to achieve this important goal, we have understoodthe PIP statute to afford the "broadest possible coverage."Palisades Safety & Ins. Ass'n v. Bastien, 175 N.J. 144, 148(2003) (quoting Svenson v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 322 N.J.Super. 410, 416 (App. Div. 1999)); see Bowe v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins.Co., 367 N.J. Super. 128, 139 (App. Div. 2004) (acknowledgingLegislature's intent "to provide PIP claimants the broadestpossible coverage"). The Legislature has also enacted a statute that makesevidence of amounts paid or collectible pursuant to PIPinadmissible in an ordinary suit for damages arising from an See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12. As we have noted, automobile accident.the principal goal of that statute is to avoid double recoveryfor a loss. See Cirelli v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 72 N.J. 380, 387(1977) (noting statutory objective to ensure that "injuredperson who was the beneficiary of the PIP payments could not andshould not recover from the tortfeasor the medical, hospital and 16other losses for which he had already been reimbursed"). Wehave also identified easing court congestion and loweringautomobile insurance costs as the ancillary goals served by thestatute. Roig v. Kelsey, 135 N.J. 500, 513 (1994). Althoughthe Legislature has not extended that prohibition to UIM suits,the underlying logic still pertains. A UIM action is essentially a contract-based substitute fora tort action against the tortfeasor. Krohn, supra, 316 N.J.Super. at 483 (stressing that UIM cases are tried in manner ofthird-party tort actions). The same is true of uninsuredmotorist (UM) coverage claims as well. Midland Ins. Co. v.Colatrella, 102 N.J. 612, 617 (1986) ("In effect, an uninsuredmotorist provision is a contractual substitute for a tort actionagainst an uninsured motorist."). In theory, then, there shouldbe no different application of the rules governing liability ina UIM case than those that apply in the trial of an ordinary See Stabile tort action arising from a motor vehicle accident.v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 263 N.J. Super. 434, 441 (App. Div.1993). As our Appellate Division has observed, "whether [thetortfeasor's] inadequacy is no insurance at all orunderinsurance has no conceptual consequence" because "[i]n bothinstances, the insured victim's recovery is . . . a substitutefor that which would have been derived from a third-party suit 17but for the inadequacy of the tortfeasor's insurance." Ibid.;see Montedoro v. City of Asbury Park, 174 N.J. Super. 305, 308-09 (App. Div. 1980) (noting that in UM context, "[t]he insured'slegal entitlement to damages for the uninsured driver'snegligence imports into the UM policy all of the normal rulesgoverning tort liability and damages"). Therefore, theprohibition on admissibility of PIP payments should applyregardless of whether the tortfeasor or the plaintiff's owninsurer is defending against the claim. There are two reasons why this is so. First, there isnothing in the decision to pay a PIP claim that is probative ofcausation. For one thing, as this matter well illustrates, theindividual charged by the insurer with deciding whether toauthorize payment for medical care is ill-equipped to make adecision on causation; he or she simply lacks the expertiseneeded to decide that the medical treatment was caused by oneaccident rather than another about which the employee may noteven be aware. That is, the defense at trial, that the injurywas actually caused by a later event, may be unknown to theemployee making the PIP decision; it may only be discoveredafter litigation is in progress. Second, there are strong reasons why evidence relating toPIP payments should be excluded from a UIM trial that go beyondpreventing a double recovery. Because the goal of the PIP 18system is to ensure both prompt medical care and prompt paymentof those who provide that care, see Caviglia, supra, 178 N.J. at 467, any collateral impact of the decision to make a PIP paymentmust be carefully evaluated and circumscribed. That is to say,the insurer that pays PIP claims in the ordinary course shoulddo so safe in the knowledge that the evidence of that paymentwill not be admissible in the event that there is a civil suit,in order to avoid creating an incentive to decline payment. Byensuring that the fact of a payment is inadmissible at trial,the insurer has every incentive to make payments and to do so byusing a rather broad interpretation of the relationship betweenthe claimed treatment and the underlying motor vehicle accident.In the end, even if the causal relationship is weak, theinsurer, knowing its obligations, more likely will pay the claimbecause the risk of an inappropriate denial outweighs any otherpossible result of that choice. If we were to agree with plaintiff and hold that the factof a PIP payment is relevant to the question of the causalconnection between a claimed injury and an accident, we wouldcreate a strong disincentive to the insurer faced with a claimfor payment. The insurer, knowing that its decision to make apayment on a PIP claim might later be admissible in evidence onthe question of whether the accident was causally related to theinjury for which the PIP-authorized treatment was rendered, 19might well decline payment. At a minimum, the process ofdeciding whether to make a PIP payment will become more complexas decisions are made, inevitably, with the possibility of thecollateral use of the payment decision in mind. The costs ofinsurance will rise, as additional layers of more sophisticatedreviewers and decision makers become involved in the process,all out of a concern that the payment will become evidence of afar different question, namely, causation. It would not servethe larger legislative goal of creating a simple and expeditiousmethod for treatment and for prompt payment if we were toconclude that the decision to pay for any particular treatmentmight later be used against the insurer in litigation. Wetherefore decline to do so, and we agree with the AppellateDivision that the trial court erred in deeming the PIP paymentsadmissible. V. Although we therefore conclude that the PIP payments wereirrelevant to any of the issues that were before the jury inthis UIM trial, we cannot avoid the implications that flowedfrom the trial court's contrary decision. The insurer, facedwith the adverse ruling and being required to present itsemployee who had authorized the PIP payments to testify, enteredinto a stipulation that the bills had been paid. Thatstipulation identified Susan Wetherell, who otherwise would have 20been required to appear and testify, described her as arepresentative of defendant, and advised the jury that all ofthe bills for medical treatment for the injuries that were indispute had been paid. In that context, the closing argument to the effect thatdefendant, and the attorney, had no idea who Wetherell was andwhy she had elected to make the payments for the medical billsmay well have confused the jury. The stratagem inappropriatelysought to undo the trial court's ruling about the relevance ofthose payments. Although the decision to admit the PIP paymentsinto evidence was error, we cannot have any confidence that thesummation to the effect that the payments and their source wereunknown to defendant did not cause the jury to reach an unjustresult. We are therefore constrained to reverse the verdict indefendant's favor and to remand this matter for a new trial inwhich the evidence of PIP payments shall be inadmissible. VI. The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and thematter is remanded to the Law Division for proceedingsconsistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, WALLACE, and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE HOENS's opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate, concurring opinion. 21 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 110 September Term 2007JOHN BARDIS and HELEN BARDIS, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.FIRST TRENTON INSURANCE CO., Defendant-Respondent. JUSTICE ALBIN, concurring. In this case, plaintiffs sued their underinsured motorist(UIM) coverage carrier, First Trenton Insurance Co. (FirstTrenton), for uncompensated damages from an automobile accidentcaused by Joseph Bologna. With the trial court's approval, theattorney defending First Trenton misrepresented to the jury thathis client was the tortfeasor, Bologna, and not the insurancecompany. That deception, echoed by the trial court, wasintended to hide from the jury the fact that the case was aboutinsurance coverage. The majority now holds that the deceptionthat occurred in this case is a permissible approach -- anecessary evil -- to ensure an insurance company a fair trial. Whether in a UIM case or any other insurance coverage case,I believe that the jury can handle the truth, that the jury canbe trusted to be fair to the true parties in interest, and thatfeeding fictions to the jury is an unacceptable way to run atransparent court system. I also believe that a properlyinstructed jury -- even in an insurance coverage case -- iscapable of rendering a fair verdict. In courtrooms throughoutthis State, juries hear sensational cases widely reported in thepress, sometimes involving notorious defendants or plaintiffs,but we have faith that carefully selected jurors given properlegal guidance will do justice. I see no reason to depart fromthat paradigm for an insurance company in a UIM coverage case. I concur with the majority that this case must be remandedfor a new trial, but in my opinion the primary error -- the onethat set the stage for the other missteps identified by themajority -- was allowing First Trenton's attorney to falselyclaim that he represented Bologna, who apparently had no cluethat his name had been misappropriated for the benefit of theinsurance company. Significantly, the Appellate Division questioned the"wisdom of not telling the jury the truth about who the Bardis v. First Trenton Ins. Co., 397 N.J. defendant is."Super. 138, 151 n.3 (App. Div. 2007). Here, the trial judgeinstructed the jury that Bologna was the defendant, id. at 147,when, in truth, First Trenton was the defendant. The appellatepanel was uneasy with the patronizing approach taken with thejury. The panel noted that "[j]udges routinely instruct jurors 2to disregard testimony improperly admitted or otherinappropriate behavior that occurs during a trial," and that thejury is presumed to follow the limiting instructions. Id. at151 n.3. Indeed, the panel "perceive[d] no difference betweenthose circumstances," and those in which a "plaintiff hasinstituted a lawsuit against its own insurance carrier" and thejury is instructed that the insurance company's status as aparty "`has no relevancy on the issue of damages.'" Id. at 151& n.3 (quoting Wenz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 316 N.J. Super. 570,580 (App. Div. 1998)). It bears repeating that in a multitude of instances, suchas where other-crime evidence is introduced at trial, seeN.J.R.E. 404(b), we depend on limiting instructions to avert anyprejudice that might flow from the improper use of such See N.J.R.E. 105 ("[T]he judge, upon information by the jury.request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope andshall instruct the jury accordingly, but may permit a party towaive a limiting instruction."). In an insurance coverage case,as in Wenz, the jury is told that the value of the damages mustbe determined based on the evidence "unaffected by the fact thatplaintiff seeks recovery from his insurer." Wenz, supra, 316 N.J. Super. at 580. In such cases, the presumption that thejury follows the trial court's instructions is "[o]ne of thefoundations of our jury system." State v. Burns, 192 N.J. 312, 3335 (2007). I do not understand the purpose of having a special carve-out from our judicial policy of transparency in UIM coveragecases. After all, the complaint is a public record availablefor inspection in the courthouse, see R. 1:38, and from a reviewof the complaint anyone would be able to identify the trueparties and the nature of the claim, see R. 4:5-1 and -2.Moreover, once our jurisprudence permits a judge to lie to thejury to avoid the necessity of giving a limiting instruction tocabin in potentially prejudicial information, where will the lawof unintended consequences take us? Will a fast-food giantargue that it should be allowed to take the pseudonym of Joe'sCafé so the jury will not be swayed that a deep pocket can betapped? Will a defendant charged with committing a sensationalcrime contend that he should be allowed to cloak himself with afictitious identity to ensure a fair trial? Other jurisdictions that have considered similar issueshave rejected the approach taken by the majority. See, e.g.,Lamz v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 803 So. 2d 593, 595-96 (Fla. 2001)("[W]hen the uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier isproperly named as a party defendant, it must be identified assuch. We have made it clear that the jury should know who theparties are, and in this case, the jury was not fully apprisedof Geico's specific party status. This was reversible error."); 4Earle v. Cobb, 156 S.W.3d 257, 260 (Ky. 2004) ("Kentucky is notalone in recognizing the right of a plaintiff to bring acontract claim against his or her UIM carrier and have that UIMcarrier identified as such at trial."); Tucker v. McQuery, 107 Ohio Misc. 2d 38, 42 (1999) ("[J]urors have the right to knowwho the real party in interest is. In the case of automobileaccidents, there is almost invariably an insurance companyinvolved."); Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 , 285 (Utah 1982)("The identity of the intervening insurance company should bemade known to the jury . . . ."); State ex rel. State Farm Mut.Auto. Ins. Co. v. Canady, 475 S.E.2d 107, 113 (W. Va. 1996)(recognizing case law holdings in other jurisdictions that "thejury is entitled to be aware of the uninsured carrier'sidentity"). In closing, I would hold that the jury in a UIM coveragecase, as in every other case, is entitled to know who the trueparties are to the action. Here, the initial misrepresentationto the jury, which was responsible for the cascading mistakesthat followed, proves the old adage: "Oh, what a tangled web weweave, / When first we practice to deceive!" Sir Walter Scott,Marmion, canto I, intro., st. 17 (1808), quoted in Bartlett'sFamiliar Quotations 378 (John Bartlett & Justin Kaplan eds.,16th ed. 1992). 5 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEYNO. A-110 SEPTEMBER TERM 2007ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior CourtJOHN BARDIS and HELEN BARDIS, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.FIRST TRENTON INSURANCE CO., Defendant-Respondent.DECIDED June 10, 2009 Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Hoens CONCURRINGG OPINION BY Justice Albin DISSENTING OPINION BY REVERSE AND CHECKLIST CONCUR REMAND CHIEF JUSTICE X RABNER X JUSTICE LONG X JUSTICE LaVECCHIA (X) X JUSTICE ALBIN X JUSTICE WALLACE X JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO X JUSTICE HOENS TOTALS 7