Title: John C. Stelpflug v. Town Board
Citation: 2000 WI 81
Docket Number: 1997AP003078
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 2000

2000 WI 81 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-3078 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
John C. Stelpflug and Diane L. Stelpflug,  
 
Petitioners-Respondents, 
 
v. 
Town Board, Town of Waukesha, County of  
Waukesha, Wisconsin,  
 
Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
John Schiess and Tanis Schiess, and Mark  
Schwartz and Melody Schwartz,  
 
Respondents-Intervenors-Respondents- 
 
Cross-Appellants-Petitioners.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 6, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
February 8, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Marianne E. Becker 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondents-intervenors-respondents-cross 
appellants-petitioners there were briefs by Donald J. Murn, 
Michelle E. Martin and Murn Law Offices, Waukesha, and oral 
argument by Donald J. Murn. 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant-cross respondent 
there was a brief by James W. Hammes and Cramer, Multhauf & 
Hammes, LLP, Waukesha, and oral argument by James W. Hammes. 
 
2000 WI 81 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-3078 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John C. Stelpflug and Diane L. Stelpflug, 
 
 
Petitioners-Respondents, 
 
 
v. 
 
Town Board, Town of Waukesha, County of 
Waukesha, Wisconsin, 
 
Respondent-Appellant-Cross-
Respondent, 
 
John Schiess and Tanis Schiess, and Mark 
Schwartz and Melody Schwartz, 
 
Respondents-Intervenors-Respondents-
Cross-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   John and Tanis Schiess and 
Mark and Melody Schwartz (the Petitioners) seek review of an 
order by the court of appeals that summarily reversed the 
judgment of the Waukesha County Circuit Court, the Honorable 
Marianne E. Becker presiding.  In ruling on cross-motions for 
summary judgment, Judge Becker held that a portion of the 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 97-3078 
 
2 
Petitioners' properties had been temporarily condemned for a 
highway by the Town of Waukesha (Town).  As a result of this 
temporary taking, the circuit court concluded that art. I, § 13 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
and 
this 
court's 
takings 
jurisprudence, required that just compensation be paid to the 
Petitioners. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
judge 
determined 
that 
Petitioners were to split $4685.86 as compensation for the 
taking.  An award for Petitioners' attorney fees was also 
ordered.  In reversing the circuit court's decision, the court 
of appeals concluded that no temporary taking had occurred.   
¶2 
We hold that the Petitioners' property was temporarily 
taken for use as a public highway pursuant to the procedures set 
forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 80.17 through 80.21 (1991-92).1  As a 
result, just compensation is owed the Petitioners under art. I, 
§ 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  We further conclude that 
there is a material issue of fact on the question of proper 
damages for the taking and remand this case for a trial on 
damages.  Finally, we conclude that attorney fees cannot be 
awarded as damages for a claim brought directly under art. I, 
§ 13. 
Facts and Procedural History 
¶3 
This case has a lengthy background.  The relevant 
facts are as follows. 
                     
1 All subsequent statutory references are to the 1991-92 
volume of the Wisconsin statutes, unless noted otherwise. 
No. 97-3078 
 
3 
¶4 
The Petitioners owned adjoining parcels of land in a 
Town of Waukesha subdivision, Lots 125 and 126.  A third 
subdivision resident, John and Diane Stelpflug (Stelpflugs) 
owned Lot 120.  The Stelpflugs believed Lot 120 to be 
landlocked.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 80.13,2 the Stelpflugs 
applied to the Town of Waukesha Board to lay out a highway to 
the property. 
¶5 
The Town of Waukesha Planning Commission voted to take 
no action on the Stelpflugs' application.  Subsequently, the 
Stelpflugs brought an action in the Waukesha County Circuit 
                     
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 80.13 states: 
Land excluded from highway.  (1)  When any person 
shall present to the supervisors of any town an 
affidavit satisfying them that the person is the owner 
or lessee of real estate (describing the same) within 
said town, and that the same is shut out from all 
public highways, other than a waterway, by being 
surrounded on all sides by real estate belonging to 
other persons, or by such real estate and by water, or 
that the person is the owner or lessee of real estate 
(describing same) and of a private way or road leading 
from said real estate to a public highway but that 
such road or way is too narrow, giving its width, to 
afford that person reasonable access to and from said 
real estate to said public highway, that that person 
is unable to purchase from any of said persons the 
right of way over or through the same to a public 
highway, or that that person is unable to purchase 
from the owner or owners of land on either or both 
sides of that person's way or road land to make such 
way or road of sufficient width, or that it cannot be 
purchased except at an exorbitant price, stating the 
lowest price for which the same can be purchased, the 
said supervisors shall appoint a time and place for 
hearing said matter, which hearing shall be after ten 
days and within thirty days of the receipt of said 
affidavit. 
No. 97-3078 
 
4 
Court seeking the appointment of commissioners pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 80.17.  Section 80.17 provides that "[a]ny person 
aggrieved 
by 
any 
order 
of 
the 
town 
supervisors 
laying 
out . . . any highway, or refusing so to do may . . . appeal 
from the order or determination to the circuit judge for the 
appointment 
of 
commissioners 
to 
review 
the 
order 
or 
determination."3  The statutory provisions related to review of a 
Town's decision on the laying out of a highway are set forth in 
full below, Wis. Stat. §§ 80.18,4 80.19,5 80.206 and 80.21.7   
                     
3 1995 Wis. Act 186 deleted the language in Wis. Stat. 
§ 80.17 that allowed the circuit court to appoint commissioners. 
 As amended, § 80.17 provides that an individual who is 
aggrieved by a town's highway order may seek judicial review of 
the determination under Wis. Stat. § 68.13.  In addition, Act 
186 deleted those sections of Wis. Stat. ch. 80 related to the 
laying out of highways by appeal to a board of commissioners.    
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 80.18 states:   
Bonds; service of notice  Upon filing such appeal 
and a bond executed to the town or towns, or town, 
city or village, as the case may require, with 
sufficient sureties to be approved by the judge 
conditioned to pay all costs arising from such appeal, 
provided such order or determination appealed from 
shall not be reversed, such judge shall issue a notice 
specifying 
therein 
a 
time 
and 
place 
for 
the 
appointment of commissioners which shall be served on 
two or more of the supervisors of each town and on two 
or more commissioners of the city or village, in a 
proper case, at least six days before such time.  
 
5  Wisconsin Stat. § 80.19 states:  
Commissioners, how selected. (1)  At the time and 
place named and upon proof of service of such notice 
the judge shall make a list of 18 disinterested 
resident freeholders of the county, and each party may 
strike 6 names from the list, and from the names not 
struck off the judge shall by lot select 3 as such 
No. 97-3078 
 
5 
                                                                  
commissioners; and shall thereupon annex to the appeal 
a warrant under the judge's hand, directed to the 
persons 
so 
selected, 
requiring 
them 
to 
appear 
personally at a time and place fixed therein, not more 
than 10 days from the date thereof, and directing them 
to view and examine the highway described, and review 
the order or determination appealed from, and make 
return of their decision thereon to the town, city or 
village clerk within 20 days after the date thereof. 
 
(2)  Such warrant shall be served at least 3 days 
before the time fixed therein for their meeting by 
reading the same to each of said commissioners and 
delivering it to one of them.  If for any reason any 
of said commissioners shall fail or decline to act, 
the judge shall, on receiving notice of such failure 
or declination, by lot and without notice to either 
party, select from the names not struck off or drawn 
from said list commissioners to fill the vacancies in 
the commission. 
 
(3)  In case said list is exhausted before 3 
commissioners who can and will act are obtained, the 
judge shall, without notice to either party, summon a 
sufficient number of persons having the qualifications 
above required to complete the commission. 
 
(4)  Whenever a new commissioner is so drawn or 
summoned the time for the commissioners to appear, 
view and examine the highway may be enlarged by the 
appointing officer, not exceeding 10 days, and the 
time for making return of their decision, not more 
than 20 days from the date of the filing such vacancy. 
 Any commissioner may be excused from acting by the 
judge for good cause; and, if any commissioner, after 
being duly served with the warrant and not so excused, 
shall, without good cause, refuse to act, that 
commissioner shall forfeit $10, and shall also be 
liable to the party having the costs of the appeal to 
pay the additional costs made in consequence of such 
refusal. 
 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 80.20 states:  
Commissioners; fees; papers where filed.  Before 
proceeding 
to 
act 
under 
said 
warrant 
said 
No. 97-3078 
 
6 
                                                                  
commissioners 
shall 
be 
duly 
sworn 
justly 
and 
impartially 
to 
discharge 
their 
duties 
as 
such 
commissioners; they shall meet at the time and place 
mentioned in such warrant and proceed to examine such 
highway; 
they 
shall 
hear 
the parties 
interested 
therein and any proofs offered by them; the entire 
record of the proceedings before the commissioners 
inclusive of all appearances, petitions, notices, 
testimony 
which 
may 
be 
taken 
only 
under 
oath, 
exhibits, 
findings, 
decisions, 
and 
other 
orders 
relating thereto, shall be so prepared and certified. 
 The review of such order of determination by the 
commissioners shall where such record contains a 
transcript be confined to the basis of such record.  
Their decision shall be reduced to writing, signed by 
them, annexed to the warrant, and together with the 
same, be filed with the town, city or village clerk, 
as the case requires, within the time directed in such 
warrant.  Each commissioner shall receive $5 per day 
and 5 cents per mile for the commissioner's actual 
travel, to be paid by the party appealing; and if the 
order or determination appealed from is reversed the 
party appealing shall be reimbursed such expenses by 
the town, city or village, or if it is a town line 
road the same shall be reimbursed equally by such 
towns or by the town and city or village.  The judge 
shall cause to be filed with the town clerk all the 
other papers and proceedings relating to such appeal, 
duly certified by the judge.  If such highway is on a 
line between 2 towns or between a town and a city or 
village they shall make a duplicate of their decision 
with a copy of the warrant and appeal annexed, which 
shall be filed with the town clerk of the other town 
or of the city or village as the case may be. 
 
7  Wisconsin Stat. § 80.21 states:  
Proceedings on reversal.  When an appeal has been 
taken from an order or determination refusing to lay 
out, widen, alter or discontinue a highway, and such 
determination shall be reversed, the commissioners 
shall make and file the order and agreements and 
awards, which in the judgment of the commissioners 
should have been made by the highway authorities whose 
order or determination has been appealed from. 
 
No. 97-3078 
 
7 
¶6 
Pursuant to the Stelpflugs' appeal, the circuit court 
appointed commissioners.  The commissioners met and issued 
findings. 
 
First, 
the 
commissioners 
determined 
that 
the 
Stelpflug 
property 
was 
indeed 
landlocked. 
 
Second, 
the 
commissioners ordered that the Town of Waukesha should construct 
a public highway, two rods in width, over a portion of Lot 125, 
Lot 126, and a third lot not at issue here.8  Third, the 
commissioners established that the land identified for the 
highway was valued at $2197.36 for Lot 125 and $2311.24 for Lot 
126.  The Stelpflugs were assessed this amount as well as for 
other related expenses.   
¶7 
The 
commissioners' 
decision 
was accepted by the 
circuit court on December 10, 1992.  The circuit court directed 
the clerk to enter judgment in accordance with the decision. 
¶8 
Throughout 1993 numerous motions were offered and 
procedural maneuvers occurred relating to the commissioners' 
order.  In December, and upon receipt from the Stelpflugs of the 
compensation assessed by the commissioners, legal counsel for 
the Town of Waukesha wrote to the Petitioners.  This letter 
informed the Petitioners of the events that had previously 
occurred and notified them that a portion of their land had been 
condemned for a highway.  This was the first notice the 
                     
8 At a motion hearing before the Waukesha County Circuit 
Court on December 30, 1997, counsel for the Town of Waukesha 
Town Board indicated that at some point in the history of the 
development of this subdivision, a 15-foot easement between Lot 
125 and 126 had been recorded.  Counsel for the Stelpflugs 
stated that this easement was currently being used by Lot 121. 
No. 97-3078 
 
8 
Petitioners received regarding the laying out of a public 
highway over their land. 
¶9 
In January 1994 the Petitioners requested the circuit 
court to reopen the proceedings.  The circuit court reinstated 
the 
commissioners 
for 
the 
sole 
purpose 
of 
allowing 
the 
Petitioners to appear, and provide evidence as to the present 
market value of the land that was to be taken for the highway. 
¶10 The commissioners reconvened, heard evidence from the 
Petitioners, and reaffirmed its order of October 1992, including 
the amount ordered as compensation for the condemned land.  The 
Petitioners appealed this decision to the Waukesha County 
Circuit Court, requesting that a jury be impaneled to assess the 
amount of the award for damages.  
¶11 Prior to the commencement of trial, the Stelpflugs 
found an alternative means to gain access to their lot.  As a 
result, the Stelpflugs agreed to withdraw their petition to lay 
out the road over the Petitioners' property.  The Petitioners 
reserved the right to file a notice of claim. 
¶12 Subsequently, 
the 
Petitioners 
brought 
an 
action 
against the Town for damages as a result of a temporary taking. 
 On cross-motions for summary judgment, Judge Becker held that 
pursuant to art. I, § 13, a constitutional taking of the 
Petitioners' land had occurred.  She concluded that the taking 
had deprived the Petitioners of all or substantially all of the 
beneficial uses of that portion of their property.  Judge Becker 
therefore concluded that the Town was liable for damages during 
the temporary condemnation of these properties.   
No. 97-3078 
 
9 
¶13 The circuit court judge further ruled that although 
the commissioners' initial order to lay out the highway was 
dated October 29, 1992, the property was not legally taken until 
July 29, 1994.  The judge reasoned that the initial order was 
not enforceable between October 1992 and July 1994 because it 
had been entered in violation of the Petitioners' constitutional 
right to due process.  Judge Becker concluded that the taking 
began when the commissioners affirmed their order in July 1994 
and ended on February 28, 1995, when the parties stipulated that 
the Stelpflugs would withdraw their petition for a highway.   
¶14 Judge Becker further ordered that the Petitioners were 
entitled to attorney fees from December 28, 1993, until February 
28, 1995.   
¶15 The Town appealed, and the Petitioners cross-appealed. 
 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
summarily 
reversed. 
 
This 
court 
subsequently granted review.   
¶16 Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. 
Standard of Review 
¶17 This case was decided on summary judgment.  We review 
a motion for summary judgment using the same methodology as 
employed by the circuit court.  Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. 
Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 88, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999).  Summary 
judgment is granted where "there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (1997-98).  In this 
case, we are asked to determine if the actions taken under Wis. 
Stat. ch. 80, and then subsequently withdrawn, constitute a 
No. 97-3078 
 
10
temporary taking of the Petitioners' property that requires 
compensation under art. I, § 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
This is a question of law that we review independently.  Zealy 
v. City of Waukesha, 201 Wis. 2d 365, 372, 548 N.W.2d 528 
(1996).  We are aided in our analysis by the reasoning set forth 
by the circuit court and court of appeals. 
Analysis 
¶18 Article I, § 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution states, 
"The property of no person shall be taken for public use without 
just compensation therefor."  The issue before the court is 
whether the Petitioners' property was taken for a public purpose 
without just compensation.  In its review of this case, the 
court of appeals concluded that a temporary taking had not 
occurred.  This conclusion was based in part upon Reel 
Enterprises v. City of La Crosse, 146 Wis. 2d 662, 431 N.W.2d 
743 (Ct. App. 1988).  The Reel decision stated: 
 
In 
the 
absence 
of 
its 
physical 
occupancy 
or 
possession, private property can be taken for public 
use only by state, county or municipal action which 
imposes a legally enforceable restriction on the use 
of the property.  If a legally enforceable restriction 
is imposed on that use, then a taking occurs only if 
the 
restriction 
deprives 
the 
owner 
of 
all, 
or 
practically all, of the use. 
Id. at 674.  Reel was subsequently overruled in part by our 
decision in Eberle v. Dane County Board of Adjustment, 227 
Wis. 2d 609, 621, 630, 595 N.W.2d 730 (1999).  Eberle reiterated 
that "[t]akings which do not involve physical invasions of land 
are called regulatory takings" and that "a regulation or 
No. 97-3078 
 
11
government action must deny the landowner all or substantially 
all practical uses of a property in order to be considered a 
taking for which compensation is required."  Eberle 227 Wis. 2d 
at 622 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
Applying the "all or substantially all practical uses" test, the 
court of appeals concluded that the Petitioners' properties were 
not temporarily taken, in part because there was no evidence 
that their incidents of ownership were affected by the orders of 
the commission.  We disagree, and conclude that a temporary 
taking did occur for which just compensation is owed under art. 
I, § 13. 
¶19 Government, through its eminent domain authority, may 
condemn certain property and assign it to public use, subject to 
reasonable compensation to the owner of the land.  1 Nichols, 
Eminent Domain, § 1.11, p. 1-10 (3d ed. 1999) ("Authority is, 
therefore, universal in support of the amplified definition of 
eminent domain as the power of the sovereign to take property 
for public use without the owner's consent upon making just 
compensation.") (footnote omitted).  In Zinn v. State, 112 
Wis. 2d 417, 426-27, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983), we held that a taking 
occurred 
where 
a 
state 
agency, 
exercising 
its 
statutory 
authority, converted private property into public land by 
operation of law.  This court stated that "[i]t is difficult to 
conceive of a greater restriction on the property, in the 
absence of actual physical occupancy, than the loss of title to 
private land."  Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 427.  In this case, the 
Petitioners lost ownership interest in the affected land due to 
No. 97-3078 
 
12
the condemnation of their property for a public highway.  As a 
result, a taking of the Petitioners' property occurred. 
¶20 The events in this case were more than the preliminary 
plotting or planning, but a condemnation that was actually 
accomplished.  Thus, we are not presented with "'condemnation 
blight,'" the "'debilitating effect upon value of a threatened, 
imminent or potential condemnation.'"  Howell Plaza, Inc. v. 
State Highway Comm., 92 Wis. 2d 74, 82, 284 N.W.2d 887 (1979) 
(quoting 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 12.3151[5], p. 475 (3d 
ed.).  This is further illustrated by the fact that Judge 
Becker, in her decision on summary judgment, ordered that the 
litigants be equally responsible for costs to clear the 
Petitioners' titles and assure that no lingering title defect 
existed.   
¶21 It is undisputed that this taking was temporary.  The 
Stelpflugs ultimately withdrew their petition for a road, and 
the decision of the board of commissioners was vacated by the 
circuit court.  The Petitioners did not cash the checks issued 
to them as compensation for the condemnation of their property. 
 We stated in Eberle that "once action by the government results 
in sufficient deprivation in use of the property, 'there has 
been taking even though the property owner has regained full use 
of the property due to the government's recession of the 
restriction.'"  Eberle, 227 Wis. 2d at 633 (quoting Zinn, 112 
Wis. 2d at 419).  We hold that the temporary condemnation for a 
public road in this case was sufficient a deprivation of the 
incidents of ownership to constitute a taking.  
No. 97-3078 
 
13
¶22 Having 
concluded 
that 
an 
actual 
taking 
of 
the 
Petitioners' property for a public purpose occurred, we next 
consider the issue of just compensation.  Our holding in Zinn is 
again analogous here.  In Zinn, the Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR) issued a declaratory ruling under Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.06 (1975) that resulted in the state taking title to 
Zinn's property.  Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 426-27.  When the DNR 
ruling was later rescinded, title to the land was transferred 
back to Zinn.  Id. at 427.  This court concluded that a taking 
had occurred within the meaning of art. I, § 13 for which just 
compensation was owed.  Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 429.  Similarly in 
this case, title to the Petitioners' land was transferred to the 
Town and then subsequently returned to the Petitioners.  We find 
that this is a compensable temporary taking.  
¶23 The Town points out that in Zinn this court stated 
that "the legislature can provide specific procedures governing 
the recovery of such compensation as long as the procedure 
provides 'just compensation.'"  Id. at 437-38.  In this case, 
the Town contends that the procedure set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 80.30(1) governs, and, pursuant to that statute, damages are 
not awarded until a highway is opened by lawful order.  Section 
80.30(1) provides that "[a]ll damages awarded against a town, 
city or village upon laying out, widening or altering any 
highway shall not be paid until the highway is open by lawful 
order.  No liability for damages shall exist for any highway 
discontinued before being opened."  Based upon this statute the 
Town asserts that no damages are owed to the Petitioners because 
No. 97-3078 
 
14
the highway never opened.  We are not persuaded by the Town's 
argument.   
¶24 The damages discussed in Wis. Stat. § 80.30(1) refer 
to the amount owed to the property owner pursuant to the order 
laying out a highway.  In construing Wis. Stat. §§ 80.13 and 
80.30(1) (1957)9 in Larsen v. Town of Supervisors, 5 Wis. 2d 240, 
243, 92 N.W.2d 859 (1958), we stated that under § 80.13: 
 
[T]he only sum which an applicant is required to pay 
is the amount assessed as advantages and that amount 
is to be paid to the town treasurer.  The damages are 
to be paid by the town to the landowner whose land is 
taken when the highway is opened.  Sec. 80.30(1).  
¶25 Thus, under the facts of this case, the damages 
discussed in Wis. Stat. § 80.30(1) relate to the sum the 
commissioners ordered to be paid by the Stelpflugs for the 
advantages they gained from the new highway.  We are not 
considering an award of damages for condemnation here; instead, 
we are addressing compensation for a temporary taking under the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  No statutory remedy is necessary to 
enforce the provisions of art. I, § 13.  Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 
438.  The circuit court judge, when reviewing the affect of Wis. 
Stat. § 80.30(1) in her ruling on summary judgment, concluded 
that § 80.30(1) was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of 
this 
case. 
 
We 
conclude, 
however, 
that 
§ 80.30(1) 
is 
inapplicable to the temporary taking arising under these 
circumstances.  
                     
9 The text of Wis. Stat. § 80.30(1) (1957) is identical to 
the text of Wis. Stat. § 80.30(1) (1991-92).  
No. 97-3078 
 
15
¶26 We further conclude that there exists a genuine issue 
of material fact as to the amount of damages to which the 
Petitioners are entitled as just compensation for the taking.  
It is unclear from the record what, if any, damages the 
Petitioners will be able to prove that they have incurred.  The 
motion before the circuit court requested a jury trial on the 
issue of damages.  Judge Becker awarded the Petitioners $4685.86 
as just compensation.  In her order, she wrote that because this 
was the sum ordered by the commissioners as adequate to provide 
just compensation for the permanent acquisition of Petitioners' 
land for a public highway, it was adequate as compensation for 
the temporary taking as well.  Judge Becker noted in her 
decision that the method used by the commissioners to determine 
this amount was unclear.  We hold that appropriate resolution of 
the question of damages should be resolved at a jury trial on 
remand. 
¶27 In addition, we disagree with the circuit court's 
conclusion as to the time period in which the temporary taking 
occurred.  The circuit court held that the temporary taking 
began in July 1994, after the Petitioners received notice 
regarding the condemnation and were given an opportunity to be 
heard by the board of commissioners.  We conclude that a 
compensable temporary taking began at the time the initial 
condemnation order was issued in 1992.  Although the Petitioners 
were successful in obtaining reconsideration on the issue of 
fair market value, the condemnation order itself was not 
reconsidered 
subsequent 
to 
the 
initial 
order 
by 
the 
No. 97-3078 
 
16
commissioners.  As a result, we conclude the taking began on the 
date the order of the commissioners was filed with the clerk.  
See Wis. Stat. § 80.20 (providing that the decision of the 
commissioners is to be reduced to writing and filed with the 
town clerk). 
¶28 Finally, we consider whether the Petitioners may 
recover attorney fees pursuant to art. I, §  13 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Petitioners point out that under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.28 (1997-98), a condemnee in an eminent domain action may 
be 
allowed 
to 
recover 
reasonable 
attorney 
fees.10 
 
The 
Petitioners contend that extending the law to allow recovery of 
attorney fees when an action for a temporary taking is brought 
directly under art. I, § 13 is warranted in order to further 
several public policy goals.   
¶29 First, Petitioners assert that allowing for attorney 
fees would result in just compensation being provided to the 
litigant by ensuring that no part of the compensation award 
would have to be used for litigation expenses.  As a result, the 
litigant in a takings claim would be made whole.  Second, the 
Petitioners assert that an award of attorney fees will act as a 
deterrent to a governmental entity from failing to voluntarily 
                     
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.28 (1997-98) states: 
Costs. (1)  In this section, "litigation expenses" 
means the sum of costs, disbursements and expenses, 
including 
reasonable 
attorney, 
appraisal 
and 
engineering 
fees 
necessary 
to 
prepare 
for 
or 
participate 
in 
actual 
or 
anticipated 
proceedings 
before 
the 
condemnation 
commissioners, 
board 
of 
assessment or any court under this chapter.  
No. 97-3078 
 
17
compensate 
landowners 
for 
the 
temporary 
taking 
of 
their 
property.  Petitioners also contend that unless an award of 
attorney fees is permitted for an action brought under the 
Wisconsin Constitution, the government has no incentive to 
comply with procedural statutes in which attorney fees may be 
awarded.  Although we might well agree with these arguments, the 
legislature did not see fit to authorize attorney fees for this 
type of taking under Wis. Stat. ch. 80.   
¶30 Wisconsin follows the American Rule on the award of 
attorney fees.  Gorton v. Hostak, Henzl & Bichler, S.C., 217 
Wis. 2d 493, 510, 577 N.W.2d 617 (1998).  Under this rule, "'the 
prevailing litigant is generally not entitled to collect 
attorney fees from the opposing party as damages or costs.'"  
Id. at 511 (quoting Winkelman v. Beloit Memorial Hosp., 168 
Wis. 2d 12, 28, 483 N.W.2d 211 (1992)).  As a result, attorney 
fees are normally allowed only when authorized by statute, 
contract or pursuant to certain limited circumstances such as 
where application of the common fund doctrine is warranted.  
Retired Teachers Ass'n v. Employe Trust Funds Bd., 207 Wis. 2d 
1, 36-39, 558 N.W.2d 83 (1997). 
¶31 In 
this 
case 
there 
is 
no 
statute 
or 
contract 
warranting an award of attorney fees.  The Petitioners offer no 
recognized equitable exception that would apply in this case.  
We conclude that creating an exception from the American Rule is 
unwarranted.  Therefore, although we conclude that a compensable 
taking has occurred, an award of attorney fees is not available. 
  
No. 97-3078 
 
18
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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