Title: Cook v. Katiba
Citation: 190 So. 2d 309
Docket Number: 35137
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 21, 1966

190 So. 2d 309 (1966)
Mariam V. Katiba COOK and Audrey M. Katiba, Petitioners,
v.
J.J. KATIBA and Katiba Holding Company, a Florida Corporation, Respondents.
No. 35137.

Supreme Court of Florida.
September 21, 1966.
Rehearing Denied October 19, 1966.
*310 Willard Ayres of Greene, Ayres, Swigert &amp; Cluster, Ocala, for petitioners.
Sturgis &amp; Ritter, Ocala, for respondents.
ERVIN, Justice.
This is a petition for writ of certiorari by Audrey M. Katiba and Mariam V. Katiba Cook, her daughter, the sole remaining heirs at law of A.J. Katiba, deceased, to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Cook v. Katiba, 182 So. 2d 454, where in a suit to quiet title it was adjudged that Respondent J.J. Katiba was the owner of an undivided one-half interest in a parcel of real estate situated in Marion County, and Petitioners were adjudged to be the owners of the remaining undivided one-half interest therein.
Petitioners contend that we have jurisdiction because of conflict between the instant decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, and a decision of this Court relating to the same principle of law (Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Lobean, Fla., 127 So.2d 98). We find conflict and accept jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 4, Florida Constitution, F.S.A.
It is the basic contention of the Petitioners that the District Court applied to the evidence an incorrect principle relating to the law of estoppel by deed. The facts set forth by the District Court are as follows: (supra, 182 So.2d at p. 455)
At this point we shall focus our attention on the issues confronting us in this cause: Whether the District Court has correctly applied either the principles of estoppel by deed or of equitable estoppel. After thorough analysis and study we find that we do not agree with the result reached herein by the District Court. We do not believe that the pertinent principles and language of this court in Lobean, supra, have been properly utilized and applied.
In Lobean we discussed and defined the doctrines of legal and equitable estoppel as follows (127 So.2d at page 102):
We note, and the District Court stated, that the deed herein from J.J. Katiba to Assad Katiba described several parcels of land in which respondent owned the entire interest, as well as the parcel involved in this proceeding, title to which he held only an undivided one-half interest. Nor should the factual setting and conduct of the parties in the case at bar be overlooked. Respondent's cause is not aided by the fact that he was not in an arm's length relationship with petitioners, nor could he be classified as a bona fide purchaser from Wardie's heirs without knowledge.
The relationship of Assad Katiba and his heirs and respondent J.J. Katiba should be weighed with the following facts in mind: (1) Possession of the parcel in issue by petitioners for more than thirty years; (2) payment by petitioners of purchase money mortgage representing the bulk of the purchase price over a period of more than twenty-five years; (3) claim of homestead on a portion of the parcel by Assad from 1921 until his death; and (4) payment of taxes on the parcel by petitioners for more than thirty years. For these facts, see page 506 of Cook v. Katiba (Fla.App. 1963), 152 So. 2d 504, in which the District Court held petitioners' complaint stated a cause of action. These facts closely approximate the facts in Daniell v. Sherrill (Fla.) 48 So. 2d 736, 23 A.L.R.2d 1410, which resulted in estoppel. These facts, all clearly known to J.J. Katiba, the respondent, when combined with the significant pronouncements in Lobean regarding the actual language of the instrument, are potent weapons in the petitioners' arsenal of transcendent equities and we find them controlling.
Significant is the fact that from October, 1942, forward, Assad J. Katiba and petitioners have had possession and color of title to the parcel of land in issue by virtue of said deed executed by J.J. Katiba. This title status stood undisturbed by any claim of J.J. Katiba from 1942 to 1959. However, in 1959, J.J. Katiba procured the deed covering an undivided one-half interest in the parcel from Wardie's heirs and therefrom asserted his adverse claim to petitioners' title. But at all relevant times, J.J. Katiba knew that the titles he and his sister Wardie received at the instance of Assad constituted only naked legal title to the parcel which they held in resulting trust for Assad. He was in pari delicto with his brother and Wardie insofar as any intent to defraud creditors was involved in the original transactions. J.J. Katiba was at no time an innocent purchaser from Wardie's heirs. The reliance placed by Assad upon his brother J.J. Katiba's deed of 1942 resulted in Assad and his family over a long period of years treating the parcel as part of their homestead property, paying off the mortgage thereon and keeping the taxes paid. This *313 reliance we conclude equitably estops J.J. Katiba from thereafter seeking to avoid the effect of his 1942 deed through an after acquired title obtained from the very source which he knew was held in trust for his brother, Assad.
Where the grantor's knowledge was as great as the grantee's he can not rely on such knowledge of the grantee to avoid being estopped by his deed. (31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 21, at 312.)
The factual situation above recited results in this case being governed by the principles of estoppel appearing in Lobean and in the earlier case of Daniell v. Sherrill (Fla.), supra.
We note that the District Court in Cook v. Katiba, 152 So. 2d 504, points out that in Daniell v. Sherrill, supra, "* * * the Supreme Court quoted with approval from many authorities the principle of law that a title acquired by a grantor subsequent to conveyance will inure to the benefit of his grantee even though covenants of warranty are not included in the deed." (Text 506 of 152 So.2d.)
In all probability, equity would not have lent its aid in compelling J.J. Katiba to execute the deed to Assad in 1942 because the title placed in him was in furtherance of a design to defraud Assad's creditors (24 Am.Jur., pp. 267, et seq.); nevertheless, where a transferee voluntarily restores property to the transferror, the legal title and equitable ownership becomes reunited and as against the transferee the reconveyance is valid and effectual. See 24 Am. Jur., p. 295.
F.S. Section 95.23, F.S.A. the twenty-year statute rendering recorded deeds indefeasible after the lapse of twenty years, has no application in the instant case. The legal and equitable estoppel arising from J.J. Katiba's 1942 deed is not avoided by his procurement in 1959 of the deed from Wardie's heirs on the ground the title of Wardie had become indefeasible by virtue of said statute. Respondent was estopped by his 1942 deed and § 95.23 does not relieve him from the consequences flowing from the execution of said deed.
Thus, for the reasons heretofore stated, we find the decision herein of the District Court of Appeal, First District erroneous and do accordingly quash and reverse the same.
It is so ordered.
THOMAS, ROBERTS and CALDWELL, JJ., concur.
THORNAL, C.J., dissents with opinion.
THORNAL, Chief Justice, (dissenting):
It is my view that the whole transaction was initially infected with fraud and that equity should leave the parties where it finds them.