Title: Petition of Teigen
Citation: 221 N.W.2d 94
Docket Number: 9044
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: August 2, 1974

221 N.W.2d 94 (1974) Petition of Torfin Austin TEIGEN filed with the Secretary of State of North Dakota requesting that his name be placed on the Ballot for the next Primary Election for the Office of a Judge of the Supreme Court of North Dakota William R. PEARCE, Petitioner, v. Ben MEIER, as Secretary of State of the State of North Dakota, Respondent. Civ. No. 9044. Supreme Court of North Dakota. August 2, 1974. William R. Pearce, Bismarck, for petitioner. Robert Brady, Asst. Atty. Gen., Bismarck, for respondent. Torfin Austin Teigen, pro se. ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice. On the 23rd of July 1974 William R. Pearce filed an affidavit with this court, saying: In response to that affidavit it was ordered that the Secretary of State, Mr. Ben Meier, be enjoined from certifying the name of Torfin Austin Teigen to the County Auditors of the State of North Dakota for nomination to the office of judge of the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota or show cause at 2 p.m., Friday, August 2, 1974, in the courtroom of the North Dakota Supreme Court, why he should not be so enjoined from certifying the name of Torfin Austin Teigen to the County Auditors of the State of North Dakota as a candidate for said office. The order authorized Torfin Austin Teigen to present written affidavits in support of his qualification for the office of judge of the Supreme Court and informed him that he might be represented by counsel at the hearing. The order also required that legal briefs be filed with this court and served upon all interested parties by all interested parties at least two days prior to the date of the hearing on the order to show cause. Since the date of the order, to-wit, the 24th day of July 1974, the Secretary of State has filed an answer and return with this court, stating: Mr. Teigen has not filed an affidavit with us, but through the mails our court did receive a document, a photocopy of which follows: *97 *98 In response to the assertion contained in the document received from Mr. Teigen that he is a graduate of the Minneapolis College of Law, Mr. Pearce filed an affidavit in which he states: "That he is the Petitioner in the above entitled proceeding. During oral argument, Mr. Teigen said that he received a Law Degree from the Minneapolis School of Law on June 1, 1931. Since no jurisdictional issue has been raised and we are inclined to believe that none exists, we shall proceed to the determination of the meaning of the words "learned in the law" in context of Section 94 of our State Constitution, believing that that is the only issue before us. The facts are that Mr. Teigen attended the Minneapolis-Minnesota College of Law from the fall of 1930 to the spring of 1931; that he has not submitted any evidence to this court to prove that he received a Law Degree from that school or any other school; and that he has not been admitted to the bar of any State or admitted to the practice of law by the supreme court of any State. Our view is that the phrase "learned in the law" is synonymous with and means "admitted to the bar" or "admitted to practice" by the Supreme Court of our State. In so concluding, we rely on the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota, as contained in In re Daly, 294 Minn. 351, 200 N.W.2d 913 (1972). In that case, Charles Thibodeau, who had never been admitted to practice law in the State of Minnesota, sought to have his name appear on the ballots for the general election to be held on November 7, 1972, as a candidate for the office of judge of the district court. The pertinent provision of the Minnesota Constitution read: *99 In construing that language, the court relied on its earlier case of State ex rel. Jack v. Schmahl, 125 Minn. 533, 147 N.W. 425 (1914), in which it said: The court concluded thereafter that since Mr. Thibodeau was not an attorney at law he was not learned in the law, and accordingly he was not entitled to have his name appear on the ballots. Not only did the Minnesota Supreme Court hold Mr. Thibodeau disqualified from having his name appear on the ballots, but it held that others, including Mr. Daly, who had been disbarred, were also disqualified from having their names appear on the ballots, notwithstanding that they had been once admitted to practice law. From a practical standpoint, if we are to continue our practice of examining through the auspices of the State Bar Board those who have received Law Degrees from the finest law schools in this country to determine their qualifications to practice law before the highest court of this State, it would seem to follow that we must require that those who seek to sit on the highest court of the State demonstrate first that they are qualified. Under our statutes and under the rules of our court, no one may practice law as an attorney and counselor at law before the State Supreme Court or any other court of record of this State unless he has first been admitted to the bar or to the practice of law by the Supreme Court of this State. By this opinion, we hold that one must first be admitted to the bar or to the practice of law by this court before one may have his name placed on the ballot as a candidate for the office of judge of this court. Incidentally, this is not a new philosophy, but is an ancient one. We learn that as early as 1608, King James I of England was told that he was not qualified to determine the law, in that he was not learned in the laws of his realm. For this information we credit Professor Edward S. Corwin: "The `Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law", 42 Harvard Law Review 149 and 365 (1928-1929), reprinted in Selected Essays on Constitutional Law, p. 29 (Foundation Press Inc. 1938). For the reasons stated in this opinion, it is ordered that the Secretary of State, Mr. Ben Meier, be enjoined from certifying the name of Torfin Austin Teigen to the County Auditors of the State of North Dakota for nomination to the office of Judge of the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota. PAULSON, J., and DOUGLAS B. HEEN and NORBERT J. MUGGLI, District Judges, concur. HARVEY B. KNUDSON and ROBERT VOGEL, Associate Justices, being absent from the state did not participate; and J. PHILIP JOHNSON, Associate Justice, deeming himself disqualified did not participate; DOUGLAS B. HEEN, Judge of the Second Judicial District, NORBERT J. MUGGLI, Judge of the Sixth Judicial District, and RALPH B. MAXWELL, Judge of the First Judicial District sitting in their stead. RALPH B. MAXWELL, District Judge (concurring specially). I agree with the joint conclusion of my colleagues that Mr. Teigen is not a person "learned in the law" and therefore lacks the requisite constitutional qualifications to be a candidate for the Supreme Court. However, I reach this result by a different course. I have grave reservations about endorsing the proposition set out in the majority opinion that "learned in the law" is the same as "admitted to the practice of law." The constitutional provision with which we are here concerned reads as follows: Unless "admitted to practice law" is an exact synonym, it should not be used as the sole measure of "learned in the law." I believe that if its concept differs in any degree, it may not constitute the only standard under the constitution. The majority opinion holds that one may not be learned in the law without being admitted to the Bar. However, a law student does not suddenly become learned in the law by his admission to practice. The learning precedes the examination. It exists beforehand. Success in the examination merely confirms the legal learning. Thus there is a lack of identity of concept in the two terms. To require admission to the Bar in addition to legal learning is to add a new qualification to those set out in the constitution. The opinion of the majority seems to operate to supplement explicit constitutional language, which judicial interpretation should be cautious not to do. In this case the result need not rest upon the question of admission to the Bar. The record before us conclusively shows that, irrespective of such issue, Mr. Teigen is not a person learned in the law. His return, as set forth in full in the majority opinion, confirms a woeful lack of legal knowledge. The unprofessional, artless cast of this singular document is alone ruinous to the cause of its author. His oral presentation to the Court gave added dimension to his legal shortcomings. His argument disclosed he was a stranger *101 to even the law and precedents affecting his own case. His return, and his argument, effectively demonstrate his want of the most elementary knowledge or skill in the juridical art. He is therefore without eligibility under the language of the constitution to run for the post he seeks.