Title: STATE v HENSLEY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13055
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: September 20, 1976

No. 13055 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A H A 1976 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -VS - RILEY HENSLEY, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l District, Honorable Peter Meloy, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Ralph Randono argued, Great F a l l s , Montana E. F. G i a n o t t i appeared, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. tJoodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Charles E. Erdman, Assistant Attorney General, argued, He1 ena , Montana Robert L. Deschamps, County Attorney, argued, Missoula, Montana Submitted: September 1, 1976 Decided : 5EP 2 O 1976 TE$Z 0 13-76 F i l e d : M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This is a n appeal by defendant from a judgment entered following h i s conviction by a jury i n Missoula County of t h e crime of bribery of a j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r . The record d i s c l o s e s t h a t on October 4 , 1973, Missoula Deputy County Attorney Ed McLean m e t with defendant and Floyd Wright a t a r e s t a u r a n t i n Missoula, Montana, t o d i s c u s s McLean disposing of gambling charges pending a g a i n s t defendant. The discussion centered around t h e a v a i l a b l e methods of disposing of t h e s e charges, including a deferred sentence. A t t h e c l o s e of t h e meeting defendant gave $190 t o Wright who added $60 of h i s own and Wright then gave $250 t o McLean. The e n t i r e meet- ing was observed by a s u r v e i l l a n c e t e a m of t h e Missoula County s h e r i f f ' s department. Thereafter, defendant and Wright w e r e charged j o i n t l y by information a s committing " * * * t h e o f f e n s e of Giving a Bribe t o a Deputy County Attorney, a felony, a s spec- i f i e d i n Section 94-801, R.C.M. 1947 * * *." The c a s e s w e r e severed f o r t r i a l and defendant was convicted January 15, 1975. The f i r s t i s s u e presented is whether a deputy county a t t o r n e y is a " j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r " within t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 94-801, R.C.M. 1947. W e have never defined t h e term " j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r " as it i s used i n s e c t i o n 94-801, R.C.M. 1947. However, i n P o r t e r v. D i s t r i c t Court, 124 Mont. 249, 274, 220 P.2d 1035, t h e Court s a i d : "So i n Montana, a s i n Washington, t h e county a t t o r n e y is a public o f f i c e r , a p a r t of t h e j u d i c i a l system, vested with power over t h e criminal prosecutions i n h i s county and a s such o f f i c e r responsible t o t h e people f o r t h e per- formance of t h e d u t i e s e n t r u s t e d t o him." (Emphasis added.) W e f i n d a d d i t i o n a l support f o r t h i s r u l i n g i n o t h e r j u r i s - d i c t i o n s . The Idaho Supreme Court held t h a t a d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y is a " j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r " , n o t a n executive o f f i c e r , within t h e meaning of a b r i b e r y s t a t u t e concerning executive o f f i c e r s . State v. Wharfield, 4 1 Idaho 1 4 , 236 P. 862, 863. The stat- u t e construed i n Wharfield i s i d e n t i c a l t o s e c t i o n 94-3903, R.C.M. 1947, our s t a t u t e concerning b r i b e s given o r o f f e r e d t o executive o f f i c e r s . The Idaho c o u r t ' s d e f i n i t i o n was based upon a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r e a t i o n of t h e o f f i c e of d i s t r i c t a t t o r - ney under t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a r t i c l e devoted t o t h e j u d i c i a l department. Rationale i d e n t i c a l t o t h a t of t h e Idaho c o u r t was in- corporated by New Mexico i n d e f i n i n g " j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r " w i t h i n a b r i b e r y s t a t u t e t o include a d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y . S t a t e v. C o l l i n s , 28 N.M. 230, 210 P. 569; S t a t e v. Chambers, 86 N.M. 383, 524 P.2d 999. A r t i c l e V I I I of t h e 1889 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , which i s e n t i t l e d " J u d i c i a l Departments" c r e a t e s t h e o f f i c e of county a t t o r n e y . A r t i c l e V I I I , Sec. 19, 1889 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . Although t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n does n o t c l a s s i f y county a t t o r n e y s w i t h i n t h e j u d i c i a l department, it was t h e 1889 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n which was i n e f f e c t a t t h e t i m e t h e L e g i s l a t u r e enacted s e c t i o n 94-801, R.C.M. 1947. I n doing so t h e L e g i s l a t u r e must have been aware of and w a s bound by t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l class- i f i c a t i o n s of p u b l i c o f f i c e r s . Our c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a s s i f i c a - t i o n of a county a t t o r n e y being i d e n t i c a l t o Idaho and New Mexico, w e a g r e e with t h o s e j u r i s d i c t i o n s and hold t h a t a county a t t o r n e y is a j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r within t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 94- 801, R.C.M. 1947. W e have n o t ignored t h e C a l i f o r n i a a u t h o r i t y c i t e d by defendant, b u t under our circumstances such a u t h o r i t y is n o t a p p l i c a b l e . A s s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Wharfield, 31 Idaho 1 4 , 236 P. 862, 863: " I n t h i s d e c i s i o n we a r e not unmindful of t h e c a s e of Singh v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.App. 64, 185 P. 985, holding t h a t a prosecuting a t t o r n e y i s an executive o f f i c e r of t h e state; but i n C a l i f o r n i a a d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y i s an o f f i c e r of t h e county, and i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of C a l i f o r n i a , divided i n t o a r t i c l e s t r e a t i n g of t h e executive, l e g i s l a t i v e and j u d i c i a l departments, t h e o f f i c e of d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y i s n o t mentioned, a s i n o u r s under t h e j u d i c i a l department. * * *" Defendant f u r t h e r contends t h e a c t t o which t h e b r i b e attempt applied was not within t h e lawful a u t h o r i t y and power of McLean. The testimony o f f e r e d was t h a t McLean w a s being o f f e r e d t h e b r i b e t o have pending gambling charges disposed o f . This Court has s t a t e d i n Halladay v. S t a t e Bank of F a i r f i e l d , 66 Mont. 1 1 1 , 118, 212 P. 861: " * * * The county a t t o r n e y i n t h i s state, n o t only d i r e c t s under what conditions a criminal a c t i o n s h a l l be commenced, but from t h e t i m e it begins u n t i l it ends h i s supervision and c o n t r o l i s complete, l i m i t e d only by such r e s t r i c t i o n s a s t h e law imposes. * * *" It seems t h e defendant was w e l l aware of t h i s a u t h o r i t y a t t h e time of t h e bribe, but now contends only t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t could have dismissed t h e charges involved. It would be unreasonable f o r t h i s Court t o disregard t h e f a c t t h a t i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y a county a t t o r n e y ' s d e c i s i o n and request t o dismiss would be followed by a d i s t r i c t court. The remaining i s s u e s d e a l with t h r e e a s p e c t s of McLean's testimony. The f i r s t of t h e s e is when McLean t e s t i f i e d on r e d i r e c t examination t h a t it was t h e policy of t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e t o delay f i l i n g charges u n t i l t h e o f f i c e f e l t they could prove defendant's g u i l t beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant contends such testimony was an improper and p r e j u d i c i a l comment. W e must remember t h a t t h i s testimony followed an extensive cross-examin- a t i o n by defendant's counsel a s t o t h e l e n g t h of t i m e between t h e i n i t i a l b r i b e r y o f f e r and t h e charging of t h e defendant. Since defendant r a i s e d t h e question of delay i n f i l i n g t h e charges, and repeatedly asked why such delay occurred, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t allowed t h e testimony i n question t o explain t h a t delay. The scope of r e d i r e c t examination is within t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . S t a t e v. Simanton, 1 0 0 Mont. 292, 49 P.2d 981. W e f i n d no abuse of t h a t d i s c r e t i o n i n t h i s instance, nor i s it a comment on t h e evidence by t h e prosecution as contended by de- fendant. A s phrased by t h e S t a t e i n t h e i r b r i e f , "The defendant opened t h e door, and cannot now complain because t h e S t a t e drove a t r u c k through i t . " Secondly, McLean t e s t i f i e d t h a t during t h e d i s c u s s i o n wherein t h e b r i b e occurred, defendant expressed h i s d i s p l e a s u r e of using a deferred sentence on t h e pending charges, because de- fendant had such a sentence imposed on a p r i o r offense. The p r i o r o f f e n s e was n o t s p e c i f i e d and t h i s was t h e only mention of o t h e r o f f e n s e s a l l e g e d t o have been committed by defendant. The state- ment of defendant w a s a p a r t of t h e res gestae. Res g e s t a e statements are u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d with t h e hearsay r u l e , b u t t h e s t a t u t e and c a s e s explaining t h e r u l e apply generally t o any s t a t e - ments made i n conjunction with t h e f a c t i n i s s u e . Section 93-401-7, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "Declarations which are a p a r t of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n . Where, a l s o , t h e d e c l a r a t i o n , act, o r omission forms p a r t of a t r a n s a c t i o n , which i s i t s e l f t h e f a c t i n d i s p u t e , o r evidence of t h a t f a c t , such d e c l a r a t i o n , a c t , o r omission i s evidence as p a r t of t h e transaction." I n S t a t e v. Newman, 162 Mont. 450, 458, 513 P.2d 258, t h e Court quoted approvingly t h i s language from In re P e t i t i o n of Peterson, 155 Mont. 239, 467 P.2d 281: "'Res g e s t a e a r e t h e circumstances, f a c t s , and d e c l a r a t i o n s which grow o u t of t h e main f a c t , a r e contemporaneous with it, and s e r v e t o i l l u s t r a t e its c h a r a c t e r . ' S t a t e v. Broadwater, 75 Mont. 350, 243 P. 587." Applying t h e s e r u l e s t o t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , it is c l e a r the conversation which immediately preceded the passing of the bribe money was res gestae statements. The Information charged the defendant with giving a bribe to McLean " * * * with the intent to influence his decision on how to handle the prosecution of gambling cases * * * . " Certainly the discussion on how he was to handle Hensley's case formed a part of the bribery transaction, was contemporaneous with it, and served to illustrate its charac- ter. Moreover, the discussion constituted an essential part of the State's proof of the crime as charged to show the defendant's intent when he gave McLean the money. As noted, proof of other offenses is admissible in order to show guilty knowledge, motive or intent. Thus, the res gestae discussion of Hensley's deferred sentence in some prior unspecified crime was proper to show his knowledge of what he was talking about; his motive to get the pending gambling charges completely dismissed; and his intent to influence McLean's prosecutorial decisions. The final issue is whether or not the testimony as to the conversation, wherein the bribe occurred, should have been allowed, since the conversation took place after defendant had been charged for gambling operations, he had retained counsel on those charges, and the conversation occurred outside the presence of retained counsel. Defendant relies on Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L Ed 2d 246. His argument, however, is similar to the one struck down in United States v. Missler, 414 F.2d 1293, 1302, cert.den. 397 U.S. 913, 90 S.Ct. 912, 25 L Ed 2 d 93, where the court said: "Clearly, Massiah and Beatty are without applica- bility here. In both of those cases, the Govern- ment souqht to use the defendant's self-incrim- inating post-indictment statements to prove the charge in the pendinq indictment. Here, by con- trast, Missler was under indictment for hijackinq, but the trial in which the statements were-used - was not for that offense. The agents' testimony was received in proof of a distinct and separate offense--obstruction of justice--committed after the hijacking indictment. * * *" Defendant's statements, like Missler's, were used against him in proving a distinct and separate offense--bribery--committed after the gambling charges. Defendant's argument is without merit. The judgment is £fir e m Chief Justice We concur: \