Title: State ex rel. Lutman v. Honorable Baker
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC99139
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: December 21, 2021

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE ex rel. DARIN LUTMAN 
, 
 
) 
) 
Relator, 
 
 
) 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
) 
No. SC99139 
THE HONORABLE M. BRANDON BAKER, ) 
) 
Respondent.  
 
) 
) 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION 
Darin Lutman petitions this Court for a writ of prohibition to prevent the continued 
release of his medical records from Compass Health Network and Missouri Psychiatric 
Center.  Lutman contends the circuit court erred by ordering the release of his medical 
records because his records were protected by the physician-patient privilege.  Because 
Lutman has neither placed his medical conditions at issue nor taken any action sufficient 
to waive the physician-patient privilege, this Court’s preliminary writ is now made 
permanent.  
Background 
In September 2019, a vehicle driven by Lutman crossed the centerline on Missouri 
Highway 7 and struck a vehicle driven by Sondra Murrell.  Sondra Murrell died as a result 
Opinion issued December 21, 2021
2 
 
of the crash.  Her grandson, D.M., was in her vehicle and allegedly sustained personal 
injuries.  
 
Immediately after the accident, Lutman told investigating police officers he 
“blacked out,” “fainted,” or “had a heart attack” at the time of the accident.  At a later date, 
Lutman wrote a letter to Sondra Murrell’s family, apologizing for the accident and 
attempting to explain what happened.  Lutman wrote, “I simply became [an] alcoholic and 
addicted to medication and lost control of my life.”  He went on, “I want you to know I felt 
like I was having a heart attack and was going to blackout.  I tried to turn in to the gravel 
on the left and that is all I remember.” 
 
Tanya Bush, Sondra Murrell’s daughter, filed a wrongful death suit against Lutman.  
Timothy Murrell, Sondra Murrell’s son and D.M.’s natural father, intervened individually 
and as D.M.’s next friend.1   
 
On May 13, 2021, the Murrell family filed notices of depositions and subpoenas for 
Lutman’s medical records with Compass Health Network and Missouri Psychiatric Center.  
In response, Lutman filed a motion to quash those depositions and subpoenas, arguing the 
requested information was protected by the physician-patient privilege.  Lutman’s motion 
emphasized he did not place his medical condition at issue in any pleading.  
 
On May 20, 2021, the circuit court issued an order overruling Lutman’s motion to 
quash and commanding Compass Health Network and Missouri Psychiatric Center to 
“produce and disclose all medical records and files in their possession related to Darin 
                                              
1 Hereinafter, the plaintiff, Bush, and intervenor, Timothy Murrell, will collectively be 
referred to as the “Murrell family.”  No disrespect is intended. 
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Lutman.”  (Emphasis added).  The order stated, “The medical records at issue contain 
information relevant to the claims raised in the above-referenced case.”  
 
On Friday, May 21, 2021, Lutman filed a petition for writ of prohibition in the court 
of appeals, seeking to prevent the release of his medical records.  Shortly after, Lutman’s 
counsel e-mailed Bush’s counsel to confirm all parties would treat Lutman’s medical 
records as sealed pending a ruling from the court of appeals.  Bush’s counsel promptly 
agreed to treat the records as sealed for the time being.  Later that day, the court of appeals 
denied Lutman’s petition. 
 
On Monday morning, May 24, 2021, Lutman’s counsel e-mailed Bush’s counsel to 
advise Lutman would be filing a writ petition with this Court and reiterated all parties 
should continue to treat Lutman’s medical records as sealed.  Bush’s counsel responded by 
stating, “Your writ was denied.  We sent the records to the court reporters and to [Timothy 
Murrell’s counsel].”  
 
On May 25, 2021, Lutman filed a petition for writ of prohibition with this Court.  
On June 1, 2021, this Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition commanding the circuit 
court to take no further action in this matter other than to show cause as to why this writ 
should not issue. 
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
This Court has jurisdiction to issue original remedial writs pursuant to article V, 
section 4 of the Missouri Constitution.  
A writ of prohibition is appropriate: (1) to prevent the usurpation of judicial 
power when a lower court lacks authority or jurisdiction; (2) to remedy an 
excess of authority, jurisdiction or abuse of discretion where the lower court 
4 
 
lacks the power to act as intended; or (3) where a party may suffer irreparable 
harm if relief is not granted. 
 
State ex rel. Becker v. Wood, 611 S.W.3d 510, 513 (Mo. banc 2020).  Specifically, 
“[p]rohibition is an appropriate remedy when a party is ordered to produce material that is 
protected from discovery by some privilege.”  State ex rel. Stinson v. House, 316 S.W.3d 
915, 918 (Mo. banc 2010). 
The Physician-Patient Privilege 
 
Section 491.060(5)2 governs the physician-patient privilege in Missouri.  Section 
491.060(5) provides:  
The following persons shall be incompetent to testify:  
… 
(5) A physician licensed pursuant to chapter 334, a chiropractor licensed 
pursuant to chapter 331, a licensed psychologist or a dentist licensed pursuant 
to chapter 332, concerning any information which he or she may have 
acquired from any patient while attending the patient in a professional 
character, and which information was necessary to enable him or her to 
prescribe and provide treatment for such patient as a physician, chiropractor, 
psychologist or dentist. 
 
Notably, while section 491.060(5) speaks in terms of competence to testify, it “is construed 
as a privilege statute.”  State ex rel. Dean v. Cunningham, 182 S.W.3d 561, 566 (Mo. banc 
2006).  “Any information a physician acquires from a patient while attending the patient 
and which is necessary to enable the physician to provide treatment is privileged.”  State 
ex rel. Jones v. Syler, 936 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Mo. banc 1997).  Additionally, the  
physician-patient privilege applies to medical records.  Dean, 182 S.W.3d at 567.  “The 
privilege is for the benefit of the patient and belongs to the patient, not the physician.”  Id. 
                                              
2 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, unless otherwise noted.  
5 
 
at 566 n.5.  Therefore, even when medical records are directly relevant to a party’s claims, 
if they are protected by the privilege, they are not discoverable.  Stinson, 316 S.W.3d at 
919.  “The purpose of the physician-patient privilege is to enable the patient to secure 
complete and appropriate medical treatment by encouraging candid communication 
between patient and physician, free from fear of the possible embarrassment and invasion 
of privacy engendered by an unauthorized disclosure of information.”  Dean, 182 S.W.3d 
at 567. 
  
The physician-patient privilege is not absolute, however, and “[t]he fact that 
documents fall within the scope of the physician-patient privilege does not end the 
inquiry.”  State ex rel. Health Midwest Dev. Grp., Inc. v. Daugherty, 965 S.W.2d 841, 844 
(Mo. banc 1998).  A patient can waive the privilege by either express or implied waiver.  
Dean, 182 S.W.3d at 567.  The most common waiver cases “involve plaintiffs who 
voluntarily place their medical condition in issue by filing a petition alleging that they 
suffered physical or mental injuries.”  Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47, 
63 (Mo. banc 1999).  Nonetheless, “[a] party may also impliedly waive the privilege 
through an act showing a clear, unequivocal purpose to divulge the confidential 
information.”  Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fitzgerald 
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 149 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Mo. App. 1941) (explaining: “To make out 
a case of implied waiver there must be a clear, unequivocal and decisive act showing such 
purpose, or acts amounting to an estoppel.  In other words, the intention to waive must 
plainly appear or else the acts or conduct relied upon as constituting a waiver must involve 
some element of estoppel.”).  
6 
 
Analysis 
It is undisputed that: (1) Lutman’s medical records fall within the scope of the 
physician-patient privilege; and (2) Lutman never expressly waived the privilege.  The only 
question is whether Lutman placed his medical conditions in issue or took any other steps 
to constitute implied waiver of the privilege.  The Murrell family argues Lutman waived 
the privilege through his statements to the investigating police officers immediately after 
the accident and in his letter to the Murrell family.   
This Court addressed a similar challenge in Rodriguez, 996 S.W.2d at 54, in which 
the plaintiff was seriously injured when the vehicle in which she was a passenger lost 
control and rolled. The plaintiff sued the vehicle’s manufacturer, Suzuki, and the vehicle’s 
driver, Dubis.  Id.  In response, Suzuki brought a cross-claim against Dubis, alleging she 
was intoxicated.  Id.  Significantly, Dubis admitted to having consumed at least three 
sampler glasses and two full glasses of wine shortly before the accident.  Id. at 61.  Suzuki 
sought to discover the results of Dubis blood alcohol tests taken at the hospital immediately 
following the crash.  Id.  Dubis moved to quash Suzuki’s requests, arguing the physician-
patient privilege applied.  Id.  The circuit court sustained Dubis motions, and Suzuki 
appealed.  Id.  
On appeal, Suzuki argued the circuit court erred in quashing its discovery requests 
because Dubis waived her physician-patient privilege by: (1) testifying she was not 
intoxicated in rebuttal to Suzuki’s offer of proof; (2) responding to questions concerning 
her intoxication on cross-examination; and (3) having her counsel elicit testimony from 
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other witnesses about the issue of intoxication.  Id. at 63.3  This Court rejected Suzuki’s 
arguments, stating, “Suzuki has not demonstrated that Dubis waived her statutory privilege 
under any recognized theory.”  Id.  This Court explained Dubis did not bring any action for 
injuries she suffered and did not plead any facts creating an issue about her medical 
condition.  Id.  “For the same reason that Dubis does not waive the privilege by filing an 
answer denying the allegations in Suzuki’s cross-petition that she was intoxicated, she does 
not waive the privilege by introducing non-medical evidence at trial.”  Id. at 63-64.4 
The Murrell family argues Lutman waived the physician-patient privilege at the 
scene of the accident by telling investigating police officers that he “blacked out,” 
“fainted,” or “had a heart attack.”5  This argument is of no merit.  To constitute an implied 
waiver, the patient’s act must show a clear, unequivocal purpose to divulge confidential 
                                              
3 Prior to determining whether Dubis waived the physician-patient privilege, this Court 
held Dubis met her burden of establishing that the blood alcohol tests taken after the 
accident were not ordered by investigating police officers.  Rodriguez, 996 S.W.3d at        
62-63. 
4 Pursuant to Rodriguez, both parties agree Lutman’s denial of the allegations in the Murrell 
family’s pleadings does not constitute a waiver of the physician-patient privilege.  996 
S.W.2d at 63 (stating: “As explained in State ex rel. Hayter v. Griffin, 785 S.W.2d 590, 
593 (Mo. App. 1990), a denial of an allegation cannot constitute a waiver of the physician-
patient privilege because to do so would force the patient to choose between suffering 
judgment by default or waiving the physician-patient privilege.”); see also Stinson, 316 
S.W.3d at 918 (Mo. banc 2010) (holding: “The mere fact that Mr. Stinson has denied 
liability and is defending against the present suit does not constitute a waiver of the 
privilege.”).  
5 Notably, Lutman’s statements to the investigating police officers at the scene of the 
accident are not protected by the privilege because “the physician-patient privilege extends 
only to information acquired by the physician for the purposes of prescribing and 
treatment.”  Hayter, 785 S.W.2d at 595; see also section 491.060(5).  But whether 
Lutman’s statements to the investigating police officers may be admissible has no bearing 
on whether those statements also constitute a waiver of the privilege. 
8 
 
information.  Rodriguez, 996 S.W.2d at 63.  Lutman’s statements to the investigating police 
officers, which did not contain privileged information, do not indicate a clear, unequivocal 
purpose to divulge his confidential medical information.  See id.  In other words, “it would 
not appear that [Lutman’s statements] … were made with an intention and willingness on 
the part of the patient to waive or renounce the secrecy secured by the statute.”  State v. 
Scott, 491 S.W.2d 514, 519 (Mo. banc 1973).  In the same way Dubis’ mention of drinking 
wine did not constitute a waiver in Rodriguez, 996 S.W.2d at 63-64, Lutman’s admission 
of a medical condition does not constitute a waiver here.  See also State v. Ermatinger, 752 
S.W.2d 344, 350 (Mo. App. 1988) (testifying at a deposition that a doctor was his treating 
physician did not waive the confidentiality of discussions pursuant to that treatment).6  This 
Court is not persuaded that Lutman’s brief and nondescript statements to investigating 
police officers constituted an intent to waive the physician-patient privilege. 
Similarly, the Murrell family claims Lutman’s apology letter constituted a waiver 
of the physician-patient privilege because Lutman stated to the Murrell family that he was 
an addict who felt like he was having a heart attack or blacking out right before the crash.  
Again, however, without more, Lutman’s statements in the letter do not clearly and 
unequivocally indicate an intent to waive the physician-patient privilege.  Even when read 
                                              
6 Other state courts that have addressed similar challenges also have held disclosing basic 
facts about treatment, addiction, or the existence of a physician-patient relationship is 
insufficient to establish a waiver.  See, e.g., In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 567 (Cal. 1970) 
(revealing the existence of psychotherapist-patient relationship did not constitute a waiver); 
Styers v. Superior Ct., Cnty. of Mohave, 779 P.2d 352, 354 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (holding: 
“One may acknowledge the fact of treatment without consenting to the disclosure of its 
confidential details.”).  
9 
 
in the light most favorable to the Murrell family, there is no way to reasonably construe 
Lutman’s apology and explanation as an indication of his desire to share his confidential 
medical records.7  Moreover, contrary to the Murrell family’s claims, “[t]he mere fact that 
the privileged medical records may be relevant … does not mean that the medical records 
are discoverable.  The very nature of an evidentiary privilege is that it removes evidence 
that is otherwise relevant and discoverable from the scope of discovery.”  Stinson, 316 
S.W.3d at 919.  
For these reasons, Lutman did not waive the physician-patient privilege and the 
circuit court erred in ordering the disclosure of his medical records.8 
                                              
7 Furthermore, even had Lutman’s actions constituted an implied waiver of the physician-
patient privilege, “the open-ended scope of [the] authorizations is indefensibly broad.”  
State ex rel. Stecher v. Dowd, 912 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Mo. banc 1995).  Orders must provide 
safeguards to protect the patient’s privacy.  Benoit v. Randall, 431 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo. 
banc 1968) (finding an order impermissible because it did not provide adequate 
safeguards).  Here, the circuit court’s order impermissibly granted the Murrell Family 
access to all of Lutman’s records with the two healthcare providers, irrespective of the age 
of the records or whether they were relevant to the medical conditions at issue.  See also 
State ex rel. Camillo v. Beck, 423 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Mo. App. 2013) (“Vague, broad, or 
open-ended authorizations simply will not do.”). 
8 The Murrell family claims a writ of prohibition is inappropriate because Lutman’s 
medical records were already disclosed.  However, “[p]rohibition will lie to undo acts done 
in excess of [the] court’s [authority], as long as some part of the court’s duties in the matter 
remain to be performed.”  State ex rel. Palmer by Palmer v. Goeke, 8 S.W.3d 193, 196 
(Mo. App. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The United States Supreme Court dealt with a similar challenge in Church of 
Scientology of California v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992), and its holding is 
instructive.  In Church of Scientology, the issue was whether an appeal was moot because 
confidential tape recordings had been disclosed prior to the appeal.  Id.  In holding the 
appeal was not moot, the Supreme Court stated:  
 
Even though it is now too late to prevent, or to provide a fully satisfactory 
remedy for, the invasion of privacy that occurred when the IRS obtained the 
information on the tapes, a court does have power to effectuate a partial 
10 
 
Conclusion 
The preliminary writ of prohibition is made permanent.   
 
 
______________________________ 
Robin Ransom, Judge 
 
All concur. 
                                              
remedy by ordering the Government to destroy or return any and all copies 
it may have in its possession. The availability of this possible remedy is 
sufficient to prevent this case from being moot. 
 
Id. at 13.  This Court is similarly able to effectuate a partial remedy because the harm to 
Lutman is ongoing.  Additionally, given the specific facts of this case, it would be unjust 
to deny relief to Lutman solely because counsel for Bush disclosed Lutman’s medical 
records in the brief period of time between the court of appeals’ denial of Lutman’s petition 
and his petition to this Court.