Title: Off Campus College Bookstore, Inc. v. University of Alabama in Huntsville, and David Williams as president of the University of Alabama in Huntsville
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1071426
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 29, 2009

REL: 05/29/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1071426
____________________
Off Campus College Bookstore, Inc.
v.
University of Alabama in Huntsville and David Williams, as
president of the University of Alabama in Huntsville
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court
(CV-07-900378)
PER CURIAM.
Off Campus College Bookstore, Inc. ("Off Campus"),
appeals from a judgment of the Madison Circuit Court denying
its information request to the University of Alabama in
1071426
UAH routinely collects the information requested by
1
Off Campus as part of its student-application process.  
2
Huntsville ("UAH") made pursuant to the Alabama Open Records
Act, § 36-12-40, Ala. Code 1975.  We dismiss the appeal based
on the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
The nature of our decision requires only a cursory
rendition of the facts.  Off Campus is a bookstore in the
business of selling books, school supplies, and other
products, primarily to postsecondary students at UAH, as well
as to students at junior colleges and other postsecondary
institutions in the Tennessee Valley.  In July 2006 and again
in May 2007, Off Campus requested from UAH the names and
addresses of individuals (and their parents) who had been
accepted to UAH and who planned to attend, or had attended,
orientation classes preceding their first year at UAH.   Off
1
Campus believed it was entitled to the information under the
Open Records Act.  Off Campus stated that it intended to use
this information to advertise Off Campus's services of
providing required and recommended course materials to
1071426
UAH has its own bookstore that sells course materials to
2
its students.
3
incoming freshmen at a reduced rate.   UAH declined to provide
2
the information on the ground that it believed the information
was protected by the federal Family Education Rights and
Privacy Act ("FERPA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.
On July 9, 2007, Off Campus filed a declaratory-judgment
action against UAH, asking the Madison Circuit Court to
declare whether Off Campus had a right to obtain, and UAH had
a responsibility to provide, the requested information
pursuant to the Alabama Open Records Act.  On August 9, 2007,
UAH answered the complaint, contending that its absolute
immunity, as conferred by Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const. 1901,
deprived the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction to
hear the claims.  It also contended that FERPA protected the
requested information from disclosure and that the requested
information was not within the ambit of the Open Records Act.
On March 20, 2008, Off Campus filed a motion for a
summary judgment, along with a joint stipulation of facts from
both parties in which they averred that "there are no issues
of material fact and this matter is ripe for final judgment as
a matter of law."  UAH filed a motion for a summary judgment
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4
on April 30, 2008.  On May 16, 2008, Off Campus filed an
amended complaint containing the same allegations as its
original complaint but adding David Williams, in his official
capacity as the president of UAH, as a defendant.  Williams
answered the complaint on June 2, 2008, reiterating the
defenses stated by UAH and averring that he joined in UAH's
motion for a summary judgment.  
On June 6, 2008, the trial court held a hearing on the
opposing motions for a summary judgment.  At the outset of the
hearing, the trial court and the parties discussed the
jurisdictional issue created by the fact that Off Campus
originally filed its complaint solely against UAH, a state
entity.  Both the trial court and the parties assumed that
because there was no statute-of-limitations bar to the
addition of Williams as a defendant, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction of the action on May 16, 2008, when the amended
complaint was filed.  The parties proceeded to argue the
merits of the complaint.
On June 8, 2008, the trial court entered a final order
denying the summary-judgment motion filed by Off Campus and
granting the summary-judgment motion filed by UAH and Williams
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5
on the basis that the information sought by Off Campus was
protected under FERPA and was not subject to disclosure under
the Open Records Act.  Off Campus appeals from this judgment.
II.  Discussion -- Sovereign Immunity
Section 14, Ala. Const. 1901, provides: "[T]he State of
Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or
equity."  "The wall of immunity erected by § 14 is nearly
impregnable.  This immunity may not be waived."  Patterson v.
Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137, 142 (Ala. 2002) (citations
omitted). 
"This Court has long held that '"'the circuit
court is without jurisdiction to entertain a suit
against the State because of Sec. 14 of the
Constitution.'"'  Larkins v. Department of Mental
Health & Mental Retardation, 806 So. 2d 358, 364
(Ala. 2001) (quoting Alabama State Docks Terminal
Ry. v. Lyles, 797 So. 2d 432, 435 (Ala. 2001),
quoting in turn Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 229,
250 So. 2d 677, 678 (1971)).  '[A]n action contrary
to the State's immunity is an action over which the
courts 
of 
this 
State 
lack 
subject-matter
jurisdiction.' Larkins, 806 So. 2d at 363."
Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 978 So. 2d 17, 21 (Ala.
2007).  
This Court has also noted on several occasions that there
are exceptions to the State's sovereign immunity.  One such
exception is when a party "'seeks a declaration under the
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6
Declaratory Judgments Act, § 6-6-220 et seq., Ala. Code 1975,
construing a statute and applying it in a given situation.'"
978 So. 2d at 21 (quoting Latham v. Department of Corr., 927
So. 2d 815, 821 (Ala. 2005)).  In Alabama Department of
Transportation v. Harbert International, Inc., 990 So. 2d 831,
841 (Ala. 2008), this Court clarified, however, that "[t]he
purpose of the so-called 'exception' to § 14 allowing
declaratory-judgment actions is to give direction to State
officers.  Consistent with the other 'exceptions' to § 14
immunity, we hold that only State officers named in their
official capacity -- and not State agencies -- may be
defendants in such proceedings."  
It is undisputed that UAH is a State entity.  Off
Campus's original complaint named UAH as the sole defendant.
Under Harbert and pursuant to § 14, UAH was not a proper
defendant 
for 
Off 
Campus's 
declaratory-judgment 
action 
because
it is absolutely immune from suit.  Accordingly, the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint against
UAH.
As noted above, Off Campus later purported to amend its
complaint, without objection from UAH, adding UAH president
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7
David Williams as a defendant.  Under our recent precedents,
however, this amendment of the original complaint did not cure
the jurisdictional defect that existed at the time the
original complaint was filed.  See Alabama Dep't of Corr. v.
Montgomery County Comm'n, [Ms. 1051455, Dec. 12, 2008] ___
So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2008) (holding that "[b]ecause the
original complaint named only a party that has absolute State
immunity, it failed to trigger the subject-matter jurisdiction
of the circuit court.  Consequently, it was a nullity.  The
purported amendment of a nullity is also a nullity.").
Consistent with Alabama Department of Corrections, we
hold that Off Campus's purported amendment to its complaint
was a nullity, as was the trial court's order purporting to
grant UAH and Williams's motion for a summary judgment and to
deny Off Campus's.  Thus, Off Campus's appeal of the trial
court's order is void and is due to be dismissed.  See
Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc. v. Phillips, 991 So. 2d 697,
701 (Ala.2008) (stating that "a void judgment will not support
an appeal").
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III.  Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, this appeal is dismissed as being
from a void judgment.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Lyons, Woodall, Bolin, Parker, and Shaw, JJ., concur. 
Cobb, C.J., and Murdock, J., dissent.
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3
"[UAH's counsel]:  Well, I would agree with
[Off Campus's counsel].  And that is the reason that
we went ahead and filed an Answer, because there is
9
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
For the reasons explained in my special writings in Cadle
Co. v. Shabani, [Ms. 1070116, Sept. 5, 2008] ___ So. 3d ___
(Ala. 2008) (Murdock, J., dissenting), and Ex parte Alabama
Department of Transportation, [Ms. 1070721, Oct. 24, 2008] ___
So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2008) (Murdock, J., dissenting), I
respectfully dissent.  I note that the instincts of counsel
for both the plaintiff and the defendant in this case, as well
as those of the trial court, appear to have been in line with
my view, as expressed in these cases, that the original
complaint in a case such as this remains pending until it is
dismissed (although the trial court lacks jurisdiction to
actually adjudicate any claims asserted therein), and, if the
plaintiff amends the complaint before the statute of
limitations or some other bar prevents it from doing so and
the amendment alleges one or more claims that the trial court
otherwise could have jurisdiction to adjudicate, then the
trial court acquires jurisdiction of those claims at that
time.3
1071426
no statute of limitations problem here.  They could
re-file, naming David Williams and could go forward.
"I do want to point out to the Court –- and,
[Off Campus's counsel], you probably haven't had a
chance to read the case.  It's pretty darn explicit
that the only power the Court has is to dismiss the
thing if you don't have subject matter jurisdiction.
"[Off Campus's counsel]:  And by bringing in
Dr. Williams, we have subject matter jurisdiction.
"Dr. Williams has consented to moving forward
with this matter. He actually, if I am not mistaken,
has joined in the Motion for Summary Judgment filed
by UAH, that puts him in exactly the same position
as if we dismissed, re-filed tomorrow and move
forward that way. So I really don't think it has to
relate back.
"But I do believe, by adding Dr. Williams, we
have brought this matter properly before the Court
and 
this 
Court 
does 
have 
subject 
matter
jurisdiction.
"The Court:  ....  And I appreciate the
cooperation between the parties in an effort to
resolve the issues.  It's one that I suspect several
state institutions are faced with.  We consider the
Court as having subject matter jurisdiction on this
case by the [addition] of Dr. David Williams, as
President of the University of Alabama, Huntsville."
10
Cobb, C.J., concurs.