Title: Jan Paul Fruiterman M.D. and Assoc. v. Waziri
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 990376
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 3, 2000

Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton1, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
JAN PAUL FRUITERMAN, M.D. 
AND ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 990376 
SENIOR JUSTICE RICHARD H. POFF 
 
 
 
March 3, 2000 
AHMAD WAZIRI AND HASSINI WAZIRI, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE OF  
SYAWACH WAZIRI  
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
M. Langhorne Keith, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal from a judgment entered in a medical 
malpractice, wrongful death action, the appellant, Jan Paul 
Fruiterman, M.D. and Associates, P.C., a professional 
corporation (the P.C.), contends that the trial court erred in 
denying coverage of the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological 
Injury Compensation Act, Code § 38.2-5000 et seq. (the 
Compensation Act), to professional corporations. 
 
Ahmad and Hassini Waziri, individually and as personal 
representatives of the estate of their son, Syawach, filed an 
amended motion for judgment entitled "Medical Malpractice-
Wrongful Death" against Dr. Fruiterman, individually, and 
against the P.C.  Applying the rights and remedies defined in 
the Compensation Act, the trial court sustained Dr. Fruiterman's 
                     
1 Justice Compton participated in the hearing and decision 
of this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 
February 2, 2000. 
demurrer.  The court denied the co-defendant's demurrer on the 
ground that the rights and remedies of the Compensation Act do 
not apply to  professional corporations.  The jury returned a 
verdict against the P.C. for $750,000 which the court reduced by 
remittitur to $730,000. 
 
The sufficiency of the evidence of medical malpractice and 
proximate cause are not in issue on appeal.  Expert witnesses 
called by the plaintiffs testified that Dr. Fruiterman's 
performance of the fetal delivery by Caesarian section was 
conducted too late to avoid severe brain damage.  In response to 
medical opinion, the parents agreed to suspend life support 
systems, and Syawach, their first-born child, died eight days 
after birth. 
 
The General Assembly enacted Chapter 50 of the Code of 
Virginia, the Compensation Act, in 1987.  That act "established 
the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation 
Program."  § 38.2-5002(A).  The act provided that, subject to 
two exceptions2, "the rights and remedies herein granted to an 
infant on account of a birth-related neurological injury shall 
exclude all other rights and remedies of such infant, his 
                     
2 The Compensation Act expressly provides that "a civil 
action . . . shall not be foreclosed against a nonparticipating 
physician or hospital", § 38.2-5002(D), or "against a physician 
or hospital where there is clear and convincing evidence that 
such physician or hospital intentionally or willfully caused or 
 
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personal representative, parents, dependents or next of kin, at 
common law or otherwise arising out of or related to a medical 
malpractice claim with respect to such injury."  Id. 
 
The Compensation Act established an "Injury Compensation 
Fund to finance the . . . Compensation Program."  § 38.2-5015.  
To capitalize that fund, the Compensation Act provided that "[a] 
physician who otherwise qualifies . . . may become a 
participating physician in the Program . . . by paying an annual 
participating physician assessment to the Program in the amount 
of $5,000", § 38.2-5020(A), and that "a participating hospital 
with a residency training program . . . may pay an annual 
participating physician assessment to the Program for residency 
positions,"  § 38.2-5020(B).  To administer the Compensation 
Program, "[t]he Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission [was] 
authorized to hear and pass upon all claims filed pursuant to 
this chapter", § 38.2-5003, and to "make an award providing 
compensation for . . . items relative to . . . [a covered] 
injury," § 38.2-5009. 
I 
 
The principal issue raised by the assignments of error is 
whether a professional corporation is entitled to the rights and 
benefits of the Compensation Act.  The trial court ruled that it 
                                                                  
intended to cause a birth-related neurological injury."  § 38.2-
5002(C). 
 
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was not.  The P.C. contends that the trial court misconstrued 
legislative intent.  We disagree with the P.C. 
 
On brief, the P.C. acknowledges that the Compensation Act 
was intended to serve several interrelated purposes: 
 
"Enacted in 1987 in direct response to the grossly 
lessening availability of medical malpractice insurance for 
obstetricians in the Commonwealth of Virginia, the 
Compensation Act was intended to assure affordable 
malpractice insurance and therefore a sufficient pool of 
obstetricians practicing throughout the Commonwealth." 
 
 
The legislative intent is reflected in the legislative 
history recorded by legislators in the reports of subcommittees 
of the two Houses of the General Assembly.  See Senate Document 
No. 11 (1987); House Joint Resolution No. 297 (1989); House 
Document No. 63 (1990); House Joint Resolution No. 641 (1997).  
See also King v. Neurological Injury Comp. Program, 242 Va. 404, 
409-10, 410 S.E.2d 656, 660 (1991) (rejecting constitutional 
challenge to Compensation Act). 
 
As we have said, the Compensation Act provides that "the 
rights and remedies herein granted to an infant . . . shall 
exclude all other rights and remedies of such infant, his 
personal representative, parents, dependents or next of kin, at 
common law . . . ."  § 38.2-5002(B).  "Statutes in derogation of 
the common law are to be strictly construed and not to be 
enlarged in their operation by construction beyond their express 
 
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terms."  Schwartz v. Brownlee, 253 Va. 159, 166, 482 S.E.2d 827, 
831 (1997) (citation omitted). 
 
The Compensation Act begins with expressly restrictive 
definitions.  A "[p]articipating physician" is "a physician 
licensed in Virginia to practice medicine, who practices 
obstetrics or performs obstetrical services", § 38.2-5001, and 
"a licensed nurse-midwife who performs obstetrical services", 
id., and pays "an annual participating physician assessment to 
the Program", § 38.2-5020(A). 
 
"'Participating Hospital' means a hospital . . . which 
. . . had in force an agreement with the Commissioner of Health 
. . . to participate in . . . a program to provide obstetrical 
care to patients eligible for Medical Assistance Services and to 
patients who are indigent, and . . . had in force an agreement 
. . . whereby the hospital agreed to submit to review of its 
obstetrical service . . . and  . . . had paid the participating 
assessment pursuant to § 38.2-5020 . . . ." 
 
"Where the legislature has used words of a plain and 
definite import the courts cannot put upon them a construction 
which amounts to holding the legislature did not mean what it 
has actually expressed."  Barr v. Town and Country Properties, 
240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990)(quoting Watkins v. 
Hall, 161 Va. 924, 930, 172 S.E. 445, 447 (1934)). 
 
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Clearly, the General Assembly did not intend to immunize 
all health-care providers from tort liability for birth-related 
neurological injury caused by medical malpractice.  The 
legislature expressly identified those entitled to that immunity 
as "participating physicians" and "participating hospitals"; 
then expressly defined "physicians" as obstetricians and nurse-
midwives who perform obstetrical services; and then expressly 
specified that the term "participating" includes payment of an 
annual assessment by qualified physicians and hospitals to 
finance the costs of the benefits provided by the Compensation 
Program.  No such assessment was imposed upon a professional 
corporation. 
 
In summary, the Compensation Act expressly limits those 
entitled to its rights and benefits to selected health-care 
providers and expressly excludes "a nonparticipating physician 
or hospital." § 38.2-5002(D).  The legislative omission of other 
health-care providers serving during the course of child birth, 
such as pediatricians, radiologists, and medical partnerships, 
confirms our conclusion that participating physicians and 
hospitals were intended to be the only health-care providers 
afforded immunity from civil liability by the Compensation Act.  
A professional corporation, the employer of a participating 
physician, is conspicuous by its absence. 
II 
 
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In support of a second assignment of error, the P.C. 
contends that "[t]he award for non-economic loss bears no 
reasonable relation to the evidence and therefore is excessive." 
The P.C. is referring to the jury's award of $655,973.46, a sum 
in addition to its award for expenses incurred in "the care, 
treatment and hospitalization of the decedent". 
 
The wrongful death statute, § 8.01-52, provides that "[t]he 
jury or the court . . . may award such damages as to it may seem 
fair and just" and that "[t]he verdict or judgment . . . shall 
include, but may not be limited to, damages for . . . [s]orrow, 
mental anguish, and solace . . . ." 
 
We find the evidence of sorrow, mental anguish, and solace 
contained in this record fully sufficient to support the jury's 
award, and finding no merit in the assignments of error, we will 
affirm the judgment entered by the trial court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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