Title: Sandra Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP003015
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 24, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-3015 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Sandra Donaldson, April Schmitt and John D. 
Schmitt, 
 
Plaintiffs, 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Subrogated-Plaintiff 
 
v. 
Urban Land Interests, Inc., 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
The Hanover Insurance Company, 
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Barstow Associates, a Limited Partnership, 
North American Mechanical, Inc., ABC Insurance 
Company and DEF Insurance Company, 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  205 Wis. 2d 404, 556 N.W.2d 100 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 24, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert G. Mawdsley 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Steinmetz, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by David G. Walsh, Douglas B. Clark and Foley & Lardner, 
Madison and oral argument by Douglas B. Clark. 
 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by 
Jeffrey Leavell, Gregory Boe and Jeffrey Leavel, S.C., Racine and 
oral argument by Jeffrey Leavell. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Eric Englund and 
Wisconsin Insurance Alliance, Madison, of cournsel, Laura A. 
Foggan, Marilyn E. Kerst, James R. Knox and Wiley, Rein & 
Fielding, Washington, D.C. for the Insurance Environmental 
Litigation Association and Wisconsin Insurance Alliance. 
 
 
 
No.  95-3015 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-3015 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Sandra Donaldson, April Schmitt and John 
D. Schmitt, 
 
  
Plaintiffs, 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Subrogated-Plaintiff, 
 
 
v. 
 
Urban Land Interests, Inc., 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
The Hanover Insurance Company, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Barstow Associates, a Limited Partnership, 
North American Mechanical, Inc., ABC 
Insurance Company and DEF Insurance 
Company, 
 
 
Defendants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 24, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Urban Land Interests, Inc. 
(ULI) seeks review of a court of appeals' decision which 
affirmed a circuit court grant of summary judgment to ULI's 
 
 
No.  95-3015 
 
 
2 
insurer, the Hanover Insurance Company (Hanover).
1  ULI asserts 
that insurance policies issued to it by Hanover provide coverage 
for 
personal 
injury 
claims 
arising 
from 
the 
inadequate 
ventilation of exhaled carbon dioxide in an office building 
managed by ULI.  The court of appeals and the circuit court 
concluded that exhaled carbon dioxide is a pollutant, and that 
the pollution exclusion clause contained in the Hanover policies 
barred coverage.  Because we conclude that the policies' 
pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous and that ULI could 
reasonably expect coverage from Hanover for the plaintiffs' 
claims, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
¶2 
For purposes of summary judgment, the relevant facts 
are undisputed.  This is a "sick building" case.  The plaintiffs 
in the underlying action allege that an inadequate air exchange 
ventilation system in a ULI-managed office building caused an 
excessive accumulation of carbon dioxide in their work area.
2  
The resultant poor air quality allegedly caused the plaintiffs 
to sustain the following injuries: headaches, sinus problems, 
eye irritation, extreme fatigue, upset stomach, asthma, sore 
throat, nausea, and pounding ears. 
                     
1 See Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 205 Wis. 2d 
404, 556 N.W.2d 100 (Ct. App. 1996)(affirming an order of the 
Circuit Court for Waukesha County, Robert G. Mawdsley, Judge). 
2 Hanover notes that as a result of the inadequate 
ventilation, other "air contaminants" likely accumulated in the 
plaintiffs' work area.  Brief of Hanover at 5.  However, the 
circuit court and court of appeals' decisions have dealt only 
with the accumulation of exhaled carbon dioxide, and we accepted 
the petition for review on the exhaled carbon dioxide issue.  We 
limit the scope of our review accordingly.  
 
 
No.  95-3015 
 
 
3 
¶3 
The 
plaintiffs commenced 
an 
action 
against 
ULI, 
Hanover, and others.  Hanover filed a motion for summary 
judgment on the ground that both its comprehensive general 
liability and umbrella excess liability policies issued to ULI 
excluded coverage for damages arising from the plaintiffs' 
injuries.  Both policies exclude coverage for: 
 
(1) "Bodily injury" or "property damage" arising out 
of the actual, alleged 
or threatened 
discharge, 
dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of 
pollutants: 
 
(a) At or from any premises, site or 
location which is or was at any time owned 
or occupied by, or rented or loaned to, any 
insured . . . . 
 
(2) . . . Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous 
or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, 
vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and 
waste.  Waste includes materials to be recycled, 
reconditioned or reclaimed. 
¶4 
The circuit court granted Hanover's motion for summary 
judgment.  The court determined that the buildup of carbon 
dioxide is a "gaseous irritant," and therefore constitutes a 
"pollutant" under the policies.  On that basis, the circuit 
court concluded that the pollution exclusion clause denied 
coverage to ULI for personal injuries resulting from the buildup 
of carbon dioxide.  ULI appealed. 
¶5 
A divided court of appeals affirmed.  Engaging in a 
two-part analysis, the majority first determined that exhaled 
carbon dioxide is a "pollutant" within the meaning of the 
pollution exclusion clause.  Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, 
Inc., 205 Wis. 2d 404, 410-12, 556 N.W.2d 100 (Ct. App. 1996).  
The majority next determined that the exhaled carbon dioxide 
"was discharged within the meaning of the exclusion clause."  
 
 
No.  95-3015 
 
 
4 
Id. at 412-14.  On these bases, the majority concluded that 
Hanover was not obligated to furnish coverage to ULI for the 
injuries alleged by the plaintiffs.  Finally, the majority 
rejected ULI's assertion that the pollution exclusion clause is 
intended "to apply only in situations of environmental injury or 
damage to soil, air or water—not to nonenvironmental injury 
situations such as the instant case."  Id. at 414.  
¶6 
Judge 
Anderson 
dissented, 
concluding 
that 
the 
pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous, and that it "can be 
read to limit coverage to liability for industrial environmental 
damages as that is understood by a reasonable person."  Id. at 
416.  In Judge Anderson's view, a reasonable insured "would not 
expect [the clause] to include the avoidance of liability for 
the accumulation of carbon dioxide in an office because 
provisions were not made for introducing fresh air into the 
office."  Id.  ULI filed a petition for review in this court. 
¶7 
The sole question before this court is whether the 
circuit court properly granted Hanover's motion for summary 
judgment on the basis that the policies at issue did not provide 
coverage for personal injury claims arising from excessive 
concentrations of exhaled carbon dioxide in the workplace.  We 
first consider whether exhaled carbon dioxide is unambiguously 
within 
the 
pollution 
exclusion 
clause's 
definition 
of 
"pollutant."  If so, we must then determine whether exhalation 
of carbon dioxide constitutes a discharge, dispersal, etc., 
under the terms of the policies.  We agree with the court of 
appeals that "[b]oth inquiries must be answered in the positive 
 
 
No.  95-3015 
 
 
5 
for the pollution exclusion clause to apply."  Donaldson, 205 
Wis. 2d at 409. 
¶8 
We review summary judgment rulings independently, 
Burkes v. Klauser, 185 Wis. 2d 308, 327, 517 N.W.2d 503 (1994), 
using the same methodology as that used by the circuit court.  
Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980).  A 
motion for summary judgment must be granted when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (1995-
96).  We interpret an insurance policy's terms under a de novo 
standard, without deference to the decisions of the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  Kaun v. Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. 
Co., 148 Wis. 2d 662, 667, 436 N.W.2d 321 (1989).   
¶9 
Interpretation of insurance policies is governed by 
the same rules of construction that apply to other contracts.  
Smith v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 155 Wis. 2d 808, 810, 456 
N.W.2d 597 (1990).  Under the doctrine of contra proferentem,
3 
ambiguities in a policy's terms are to be resolved in favor of 
coverage, 
while 
coverage 
exclusion 
clauses 
are 
narrowly 
construed against the insurer.  See Smith, 155 Wis. 2d at 811.  
The principle underlying the doctrine is straightforward.  As 
the drafter of the insurance policy, an insurer has the 
opportunity to employ expressive exactitude in order to avoid a 
misunderstanding of the policy's terms.  Because the insurer is 
the party best situated to eliminate ambiguity in the policy, 
the policy's terms should be interpreted as they would be 
understood from the perspective of a reasonable person in the 
                     
3 Literally, "against the offeror." 
 
 
No.  95-3015 
 
 
6 
position of the insured.  See  General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin v. 
Hills, 209 Wis. 2d 167, 175, 561 N.W.2d 718 (1997). 
¶10 In determining whether the 
policy 
definition of 
"pollutant" unambiguously includes exhaled carbon dioxide, we 
begin with the well-established rule that words or phrases in an 
insurance policy are ambiguous if, when read in context, they 
are susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.  
Tempelis v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 169 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 485 N.W.2d 
217 (1992).  Absent a finding of ambiguity, this court will not 
use the rules of construction to rewrite the language of an 
insurance contract.  See Gonzalez v. City of Franklin, 137 Wis. 
2d 109, 122, 403 N.W.2d 747 (1987). 
¶11 Under the policies, a "pollutant" is defined as: 
 
any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or 
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, 
acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.  Waste includes 
materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.
4 
The majority of the court of appeals concluded that the policy 
definition of "pollutant" unambiguously includes exhaled carbon 
dioxide because carbon dioxide is a gaseous substance which, at 
higher concentrations, can become an irritant.  Donaldson, 205 
Wis. 2d at 411.  We disagree. 
¶12 The pollution exclusion clause at issue here was 
intended by both Hanover and ULI to have broad application.  
                     
4 In United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Ace Baking Co., 164 Wis. 
2d 499, 476 N.W.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1991), the court of appeals 
furnished a definition of "pollutant" where the insurance policy 
was silent on the meaning of the term.  However, unlike the Ace 
Baking policy, the policy at issue here provides a definition of 
"pollutant."  We therefore conclude that the gloss given to the 
term "pollutant" in Ace Baking is not germane to the instant 
analysis.   
 
 
No.  95-3015 
 
 
7 
However, we are not satisfied that this fact brings exhaled 
carbon dioxide unambiguously within the policy definition of 
"pollutant."  Instead, we agree with Judge Anderson's dissent 
that the pollution exclusion clause does not plainly and clearly 
alert a reasonable insured that coverage is denied for personal 
injury 
claims 
that 
have 
their 
genesis 
in 
activities 
as 
fundamental as human respiration. 
¶13 As Judge Anderson noted in his dissent below, the 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire 
Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1992), is instructive on this 
point: 
 
The terms "irritant" and "contaminant," when viewed in 
isolation, are virtually boundless, for there is 
virtually no substance or chemical in existence that 
would not irritate or damage some person or property. 
Without 
some 
limiting 
principle, 
the 
pollution 
exclusion clause would extend far beyond its intended 
scope, and lead to some absurd results.  To take but 
two simple examples, reading the clause broadly would 
bar coverage for bodily injuries suffered by one who 
slips and falls on the spilled contents of a bottle of 
Drano, and for bodily injury caused by an allergic 
reaction to chlorine in a public pool.  Although Drano 
and chlorine are both irritants or contaminants that 
cause, under certain conditions, bodily injury or 
property damage, one would not ordinarily characterize 
these events as pollution.
5   
Id. at 1043 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
¶14 Like the examples cited by the Pipefitters court, 
inadequately ventilated carbon dioxide from human respiration 
would not ordinarily be characterized as a "pollutant."  Exhaled 
                     
5 The pollution exclusion clause at issue in Pipefitters 
Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037 
(7th Cir. 1992), is essentially identical to the one in question 
in the instant case. 
 
 
No.  95-3015 
 
 
8 
carbon dioxide can achieve an injurious concentration in a 
poorly ventilated area, but it would not necessarily be 
understood by a reasonable insured to meet the policy definition 
of a "pollutant."   
¶15 The reach of the pollution exclusion clause must be 
circumscribed by reasonableness, lest the contractual promise of 
coverage be reduced to a dead letter.  As the Pipefitters court 
further explained: 
 
[C]ourts have taken a common sense approach when 
determining 
the 
scope 
of 
pollution 
exclusion 
clauses. . . .  The bond that links these cases is 
plain.  All involve injuries resulting from everyday 
activities gone slightly, but not surprisingly, awry. 
 There is nothing unusual about paint peeling off of a 
wall, 
asbestos 
particles 
escaping 
during 
the 
installation or removal 
of insulation, 
or 
paint 
drifting off the mark during a spraypainting job.  A 
reasonable 
policyholder, 
these 
courts 
apparently 
believed, 
would 
not 
characterize 
such 
routine 
incidents as pollution.     
Id. at 1043-44 (citations omitted).  The plaintiffs' injuries in 
the instant case also resulted from an everyday activity "gone 
slightly, but not surprisingly, awry."  We conclude that the 
pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous because ULI could 
reasonably expect coverage on the facts of this case.
6      
¶16 It is also significant that, unlike the nonexhaustive 
list of pollutants contained in the pollution exclusion clause, 
exhaled carbon dioxide is universally present and generally 
harmless in all but the most unusual instances.  In addition, 
the respiration process which produces exhaled carbon dioxide is 
                     
6 Because our ambiguity determination is dispositive in this 
case, we do not consider whether exhalation of carbon dioxide is 
a discharge, dispersal, etc., under the pollution exclusion 
clause.  See Leverence v. United States Fidelity & Guar., 158 
Wis. 2d 64, 462 N.W.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 
 
No.  95-3015 
 
 
9 
a necessary and natural part of life.  We are therefore hesitant 
to conclude that a reasonable insured would necessarily view 
exhaled carbon dioxide as in the same class as "smoke, vapor, 
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste."  
¶17 Finally, our conclusion that ULI could reasonably 
expect 
coverage 
for 
personal 
injury 
claims 
arising 
from 
inadequately ventilated exhaled carbon dioxide is supported by 
case law from foreign jurisdictions.  Several courts have found 
coverage in the context of substances which arguably fit the 
broad definition of "pollutant" in the standard comprehensive 
general liability policy.  See, e.g., Westchester Fire Ins. Co. 
v. City of Pittsburgh, Kansas, 768 F. Supp. 1463 (D. Kan. 1991) 
(malathion, an organic phosphate insecticide); Atlantic Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. McFadden, 595 N.E.2d 762 (Mass. 1992)(lead-based 
paint); Minerva Enterprises, Inc. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 851 
S.W.2d 403 (Ark. 1993) (raw sewage); Center for Creative Studies 
v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 871 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Mich. 1994) 
(photographic chemicals); West Am. Ins. Co. v. Tufco Flooring 
East, Inc., 409 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (fumes from 
styrene monomer resin).
7 
¶18 We conclude that the insurance policies' definition of 
"pollutant" is ambiguous, and that ULI could reasonably expect 
coverage from Hanover for personal injury claims arising from 
the inadequate ventilation of exhaled carbon dioxide.  The 
                     
7 But see West Am. Ins. Co. v. Band & Desenberg, 925 
F. Supp. 758 (M.D. Fla. 1996); American States Ins. Co. v. 
F.H.S., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 187 (S.D. Miss. 1994); City of Maple 
Lake v. American States Ins. Co., 509 N.W.2d 399 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1993).  
 
 
No.  95-3015 
 
 
10
circuit court therefore erred in granting Hanover's motion for 
summary judgment.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals, and remand to the circuit court for further 
consideration of the issues remaining in this case. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and cause remanded.  
 
 
 
 
No. 95-3015.dws   
 
1 
¶19 DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J. (Dissenting).   I 
conclude that the pollution exclusion at issue in this case 
is unambiguous and that exhaled carbon dioxide is a 
"pollutant" that was "discharged" into the workplace under 
the definitions of the policy. Coverage was properly denied 
in this case because a "reasonable insured" would not 
expect coverage for injuries resulting from exhaled breath. 
I would therefore affirm the court of appeals decision 
upholding the grant of summary judgment to the Hanover 
Insurance Company. 
 ¶20 The insurance policies at issue in this case 
contain 
a 
clear 
and 
unambiguous 
absolute 
pollution 
exclusion.  The policies define "pollutant" with careful 
specificity, intending the term to encompass a broad range 
of pollutants.  See majority op. at 3, 6-7.  The majority 
attempts to create ambiguity where none exists so that it 
might interpret the  contract in favor of coverage for the 
insured.  It writes that "the pollution exclusion clause is 
ambiguous because ULI could reasonably expect coverage on 
the facts of this case."  Majority op. at 8-9.  However, 
the mere fact that the parties disagree over coverage is 
insufficient to render a term ambiguous. See United States 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Ace Baking Co., 164 Wis. 2d 499, 504, 476 
N.W.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1991), citing Bartel v. Carey, 127 
Wis. 2d 310, 314, 379 N.W.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1985). 
¶21 A word, phrase, or term is not ambiguous merely 
because the parties involved may disagree about its 
 
 
No. 95-3015.dws   
 
2 
meaning.  Id.  As the majority notes, if a word, phrase, or 
term is plain on its face, then this court should not apply 
the rules of construction to rewrite the language of the 
contract.  Majority op. at 6 (citation omitted).  Instead, 
this court is required to apply the meaning of the language 
as it is used in the contract or policy.   
¶22 In the case at bar, the term "pollutant" is 
clearly, plainly, and explicitly defined in unambiguous 
terms as:  
 
any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or 
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, 
acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.  Waste 
includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned 
or reclaimed. 
Like the court of appeals, I conclude that the term 
"pollutant" unambiguously includes exhaled carbon dioxide 
because 
it 
is 
a 
"gaseous 
irritant" 
in 
certain 
concentrations, and carbon dioxide is "waste" that is 
expelled from the human body. 
¶23 Although 
the 
majority 
quickly 
dismisses 
its 
importance in a footnote, see majority op. at 6, note 4, 
the Ace Baking case is relevant to the issues involved in 
the case at bar.  In Ace Baking, ice cream cones 
manufactured by Ace were stored in a warehouse next to some 
fabric softener.  One of Ace's customers complained that 
the cones had an odd taste and an investigation was 
subsequently conducted.  The investigation revealed that a 
fragrance additive, linalool, from the fabric softener 
rendered the ice cream cones unusable.  Ace Baking 
 
 
No. 95-3015.dws   
 
3 
presented a claim to its insurer, who subsequently denied 
coverage under the insurance policy's pollution exclusion 
clause. 
¶24 The language of the pollution exclusion policy in 
Ace Baking was similar to that of Hanover at issue in this 
case.  It excluded losses "caused by or resulting from . . 
. [r]elease, discharge or dispersal of 'pollutants.'"  Ace 
Baking, 164 Wis. 2d at 501.  However, the policy did not 
include a definition of "pollutant."  Id.  For this reason 
alone, the majority cursorily concludes that Ace Baking "is 
not germane to the instant analysis."  Majority op. at 6, 
note 4.  I conclude that Ace Baking is indeed germane to 
the instant analysis. 
¶25 The Ace Baking court concluded that the linalool 
was a "pollutant" within the meaning of the pollution 
exclusion clause and, therefore, coverage was excluded 
under the terms of the policy.  It decided this despite the 
fact that "[t]he parties agree that linalool is harmless 
when properly used in appropriate products."  164 Wis. 2d 
at 502.  The court explained that a normally harmless and 
commonplace product can still be a "pollutant" within the 
commonly accepted definition of the term.  "[I]t is a rare 
substance indeed that is always a pollutant; the most 
noxious of materials have their appropriate and non-
polluting uses."  Id. at 505.  In fact, the court explains, 
even something as universal and generally harmless as water 
may be a pollutant under the wrong conditions.  Id.     
 
 
No. 95-3015.dws   
 
4 
¶26 Like the linalool in Ace Baking, exhaled carbon 
dioxide can be a "pollutant" under certain circumstances 
even though it is characterized by the majority as 
"universally present and generally harmless."  Majority op. 
at 9.  The summary judgment record in this case presents 
affidavits and exhibits which clearly demonstrate that this 
"generally harmless" substance can become extremely harmful 
in high concentrations.  The mere fact that it is a common 
and natural product does not, as the majority suggests, 
mean that it cannot also be considered a "pollutant" within 
the meaning of the policy.  See Ace Baking, 164 Wis. 2d at 
505. 
¶27 I am further compelled to conclude that the 
pollution exclusion clause unambiguously covers exhaled 
carbon dioxide by the fact that it clearly falls within one 
of the specific examples of a "pollutant" listed in the 
policy—"waste."  It is a commonly accepted fact that 
exhaled carbon dioxide is a waste product of the natural 
process of breathing.  Because the language of the policy 
uses only the general term "waste," it makes sense to 
assume that the insurer and the insured anticipated that 
all waste would be covered under the exclusion.   
¶28 Despite the fact that Hanover made the argument 
regarding waste before this court, the majority opinion 
fails to discuss, or even mention, this issue.  Perhaps 
this is because the majority sees no way to get around this 
unambiguous example provided in the language of the policy. 
 
 
No. 95-3015.dws   
 
5 
¶29 The majority also never reaches the second issue 
in this case: whether the exhalation of carbon dioxide is a 
"discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or 
escape" of a pollutant.  I conclude that it is a 
"discharge" that falls within the language of the pollution 
exclusion. 
¶30 The dictionary describes a "discharge" as "a 
flowing out or pouring forth; emission; secretion."  The 
American Heritage Dictionary 530 (3d ed. 1992).  Similarly, 
the dictionary defines "exhale" as "to emit air or vapor." 
 Id. at 641.  Based on these common definitions, exhaled or 
emitted breath is clearly a discharge within the meaning of 
the pollution exclusion because it is an "emission" from 
the human body that "pours forth" into the air. 
¶31 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I stress 
that the standard to be applied is whether a reasonable 
insured 
would 
anticipate 
coverage 
in 
a 
certain 
circumstance.  See General Cas. Co. v. Hills, 209 Wis. 2d 
167, 561 N.W.2d 718, 722 (1997).  I conclude that a 
reasonable insured would not expect that insurance would 
cover injuries caused from breathing in exhaled breath.  If 
we accept the majority's assertion, then it follows that 
one would expect coverage for illnesses caused from 
inhaling secondhand smoke.  After all, secondhand cigarette 
smoke, like carbon dioxide, is "universally present" and is 
"generally harmless" if inhaled in small quantities.  Would 
a tavern owner expect coverage in a suit by bar patrons who 
 
 
No. 95-3015.dws   
 
6 
have become sick from inhaling exhaled cigarette smoke?  I 
think not.  Similarly, I conclude that a "reasonable 
insured" would not expect coverage for injuries resulting 
from breathing exhaled carbon dioxide. 
¶32 The language of the pollution exclusion in this 
case is unambiguous.  Exhaled carbon dioxide is both a 
"pollutant" 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
policy, 
and 
"discharged" 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
policy. 
 
A 
reasonable insured would not have anticipated coverage in 
this case.  Consequently, I conclude that the Hanover 
Insurance Company properly denied coverage to ULI under the 
pollution exclusion clause.  The court of appeals should be 
affirmed in this case. 
¶33 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.