Title: D.M.T. v. T.M.H.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC12-261
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 7, 2013

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-261 
____________ 
 
D.M.T.,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
T.M.H.,  
Appellee. 
 
[November 7, 2013] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
“The intangible fibers that connect parent and child have infinite variety.  
They are woven throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with strength, 
beauty, and flexibility.  It is self-evident that they are sufficiently vital to merit 
constitutional protection in appropriate cases.”  Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 
256 (1983).   
The parents in this case are two women, D.M.T. and T.M.H., who were 
involved in a long-term committed relationship when they agreed to jointly 
conceive and raise a child together as equal parental partners.  Their child was 
conceived through the couple’s use of assisted reproductive technology, with 
 
 
 
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T.M.H. providing the egg and D.M.T. giving birth to the child.  After the child was 
born, the couple gave her a hyphenation of their last names, and both T.M.H. and 
D.M.T. participated in raising their child until their relationship soured and D.M.T. 
absconded with the child.  T.M.H. now seeks to establish her parental rights to the 
child and also to reassume parental responsibilities.  D.M.T., conversely, seeks to 
prevent T.M.H. from doing either.  D.M.T. asserts that she, and she alone, should 
have the fundamental right to be the parent of the child.  No other individual has 
asserted parental rights to the child, and no party or amicus curiae in this case other 
than D.M.T. takes the position that T.M.H. should be denied her rights.1
In T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011), the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal held that Florida’s assisted reproductive technology statute—
section 742.14, Florida Statutes (2008)—did not apply to T.M.H., and that the trial 
court’s application of the statute was unconstitutional because it prevented T.M.H., 
who provided the egg for the couple, from asserting her parental rights to the child.  
Id. at 792, 798, 800.  Because the Fifth District declared section 742.14 
  
                                         
 
1.  The following organizations filed amicus curiae briefs, all in support of 
T.M.H.: the American Academy of Assisted Reproductive Technology Attorneys; 
the University of Florida Levin College of Law Center on Children and Families, 
University of Miami School of Law Children and Youth Law Clinic, Nova 
Southeastern University Law Center Children and Families Clinic, and Barry 
University School of Law Children and Families Clinic; the American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation, American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, and 
Lambda Legal; and the National Association of Social Workers and National 
Association of Social Workers, Florida Chapter.   
 
 
 
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unconstitutional as applied to T.M.H., we have mandatory jurisdiction under article 
V, section 3(b)(1), of the Florida Constitution to review this case.  In addition, the 
Fifth District certified a question of great public importance regarding whether the 
statute was unconstitutional, and we also have jurisdiction on that basis.  See art. 
V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.2
We conclude that the statute is unconstitutional (1) as a violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution and separately as a violation of 
the Due Process Clause and privacy provision of the Florida Constitution; and (2) 
as a violation of the federal Equal Protection Clause and separately as a violation 
of the Florida Equal Protection Clause.  In reaching our conclusion, we rely on 
long-standing constitutional law that an unwed biological father has an inchoate 
interest that develops into a fundamental right to be a parent protected by the 
   
                                         
2.  The question certified by the Fifth District as one of great public 
importance was as follows:  
  
DOES APPLICATION OF SECTION 742.14 TO DEPRIVE 
PARENTAL RIGHTS TO A LESBIAN WOMAN WHO 
PROVIDED HER OVA TO HER LESBIAN PARTNER SO BOTH 
WOMEN COULD HAVE A CHILD TO RAISE TOGETHER AS 
EQUAL PARENTAL PARTNERS AND WHO DID PARENT THE 
CHILD FOR SEVERAL YEARS AFTER ITS BIRTH RENDER 
THE STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND PRIVACY CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS? 
 
T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 803.   
 
 
 
 
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Florida and United States Constitutions when he demonstrates a commitment to 
raising the child by assuming parental responsibilities.  It is not the biological 
relationship per se, but rather “the assumption of the parental responsibilities 
which is of constitutional significance.”  Matter of Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 
741, 748 (Fla. 1989).   
Because the application of section 742.14 operated to automatically deprive 
T.M.H. of her ability to assert her fundamental right to be a parent, we conclude, 
based on the circumstances of this case, that the statute is unconstitutional as 
applied under the Due Process Clauses of the Florida and United States 
Constitutions and under the privacy provision of the Florida Constitution.  Further, 
we hold that section 742.14, in combination with the restrictive definition of the 
term “commissioning couple” in section 742.13(2), also violates state and federal 
equal protection by denying same-sex couples the statutory protection against the 
automatic relinquishment of parental rights that it affords to heterosexual 
unmarried couples seeking to utilize the identical assistance of reproductive 
technology.   
Accordingly, we affirm the Fifth District’s determination of statutory 
unconstitutionality and also answer the certified question in the affirmative, but we 
disapprove the Fifth District’s holding that the statute does not apply in this 
situation.  Our holding that T.M.H. has rights deserving of constitutional protection 
 
 
 
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does not mean that D.M.T.’s parental rights are not deserving of constitutional 
protection—quite the opposite.  Our decision does not deny D.M.T. the right to be 
a parent to her child, but requires only that T.M.H.’s right to be a parent of the 
child be constitutionally recognized.  D.M.T.’s preference that she parent the child 
alone is sadly similar to the views of all too many parents who, after separating, 
prefer to exclude the other parent from the child’s life.  As the Fifth District wisely 
observed: 
[D.M.T.] suggests that because she and [T.M.H.] have separated, a 
choice must be made.  She posits that, as the birth mother, she should 
have exclusive parental rights to the child and that [T.M.H.], as the 
biological mother, should have no rights at all.  If we were to accept 
[D.M.T.’s] argument that a choice must be made between the two, 
perhaps a Solomonic approach to resolving this dispute would be 
preferable, but we are neither possessed of the wisdom of Solomon 
nor are we able to apply his particular methodology under the law as 
we know it today.  Parental rights, which include the love and 
affection an individual has for his or her child, transcend the 
relationship between two consenting adults, and we see nothing in this 
record that makes either [T.M.H. or D.M.T.] an exception that places 
those rights in one to the exclusion of the other.  It is unknown what 
caused these two women to cross the proverbial line between love and 
hate, but that is a matter between [T.M.H. and D.M.T.].  Their 
separation does not dissolve the parental rights of either woman to the 
child, nor does it dissolve the love and affection either has for the 
child. 
T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 802-03. 
We remain ever mindful that although our resolution of the constitutional 
issues revolves around the rights of T.M.H., the biological mother, we cannot and 
should not lose sight of the fact that there is a child at the center of this dispute 
 
 
 
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whose best interests will ultimately determine the extent to which each parent will 
play a role in her life through legal rights and legal responsibilities.  We therefore 
remand this case to the trial court to determine, based on the best interests of the 
child, issues such as parental time-sharing and child support, and we emphasize, as 
did the Fifth District, that an all-or-nothing choice between the two parents is not 
necessary. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The child at the center of this dispute was born on January 4, 2004.  Her 
birth mother, D.M.T., and her biological mother, T.M.H., were in a long-term 
committed relationship at the time of the child’s birth, and the child began her life 
by living with both parents.3
[T.M.H.] and [D.M.T.] were involved in a committed relationship 
from 1995 until 2006.  They lived together and owned real property as 
joint tenants, evidenced by a deed in the record.  Additionally, both 
women deposited their income into a joint bank account and used 
those funds to pay their bills. 
  The Fifth District set forth the undisputed facts of 
this case as follows: 
The couple decided to have a baby that they would raise 
together as equal parental partners.  They sought reproductive medical 
assistance, where they learned [D.M.T.] was infertile.  [T.M.H.] and 
                                         
 
3.  The dissent criticizes our use of the term “biological mother,” contending 
that the term is confusing because it ignores the birth mother’s biological relation 
to the child.  We use the term “biological mother,” which was used by the Fifth 
District majority, because the term serves to distinguish the undeniable facts of this 
case from one where an individual provides genetic material for use in assisted 
reproductive technology without any intention of parenting the child.   
 
 
 
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[D.M.T.], using funds from their joint bank account, paid a 
reproductive doctor to withdraw ova from [T.M.H.], have them 
fertilized, and implant the fertilized ova into [D.M.T.].  The two 
women told the reproductive doctor that they intended to raise the 
child as a couple, and they went for counseling with a mental health 
professional to prepare themselves for parenthood.  The in vitro 
fertilization procedure that was utilized proved successful, and a child 
was conceived. 
The child was born in Brevard County on January 4, 2004.  The 
couple gave the child a hyphenation of their last names.  Although the 
birth certificate lists only [D.M.T.] as the mother and does not indicate 
a father, a maternity test revealed that there is a 99.99% certainty that 
[T.M.H.] is the biological mother of the child.  [T.M.H.] and [D.M.T.] 
sent out birth announcements with both of their names declaring, “We 
Proudly Announce the Birth of Our Beautiful Daughter.”  Both 
women participated at their child’s baptism, and they both took an 
active role in the child’s early education. 
The women separated in May 2006, and the child lived with 
[D.M.T.].  Initially, [T.M.H.] made regular child support payments, 
which [D.M.T.] accepted.  [T.M.H.] ended the support payments 
when she and [D.M.T.] agreed to divide the child’s time evenly 
between them.  They continued to divide the costs of education. 
 
T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 788-89. 
Eventually, the couple’s relationship severely deteriorated, and, as is all too 
commonly seen in child custody proceedings, one parent, D.M.T., unfortunately 
severed the other parent’s, T.M.H.’s, contact with the daughter the couple had 
jointly planned for, conceived, and raised as a family.  Id.  Until that time, the child 
“did not distinguish between one [woman] being the biological or the birth parent.”  
Id. at 789.  Each party was simply a parent to this child up until and including the 
point at which D.M.T., the birth mother, absconded to an undisclosed location with 
the child after the parties’ relationship soured.  See id. 
 
 
 
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After finally locating the birth mother in Australia, T.M.H., the biological 
mother, served the birth mother with a petition to establish parental rights to the 
couple’s child and for declaratory relief, including an adjudication of parentage 
pursuant to chapter 742, Florida Statutes (2008), and a declaration of statutory 
invalidity with respect to section 742.14, the assisted reproductive technology 
statute.  T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 789 n.1, 799.  Section 742.14 provides that, except in 
the case of a “commissioning couple”—defined in section 742.13 as the intended 
mother and father of a child who will be conceived through assisted reproductive 
technology using the biological material of at least one of the intended parents—
and fathers who have executed a preplanned adoption agreement, an egg or sperm 
donor must relinquish any claim to parental rights or obligations to the donation or 
the resulting child.  See §§ 742.13(2), 742.14, Fla. Stat. 
In response to the biological mother’s action, the birth mother filed a motion 
for summary judgment, alleging that the biological mother lacked parental rights as 
a matter of law regardless of the couple’s original intent with respect to raising the 
child.  The trial court held a hearing and granted the birth mother’s summary 
judgment motion, explaining that it felt constrained by the current state of the law 
and expressing hope that an appellate court would reverse its ruling by stating as 
follows: 
 
First, let me say, I find that [the birth mother’s] actions to be—
this is my phraseology—morally reprehensible.  I do not agree with 
 
 
 
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her actions relevant to the best interest of the child.  However, that is 
not the standard.  There is no distinction in law or recognition of 
rights of the biological mother verses a birth mother
. . . .  
. . . . 
 
Same-sex partners do not meet the definition [in section 
742.13(2)] of commissioning couple
. . . . 
.  There really is no protection for 
[the biological mother] under Florida law because she could not have 
adopted this child to prevent this current set of circumstances.  I do 
not agree with the current state of the law, but I must uphold it. . . .  
 
And, [to the biological mother], if you appeal this, I hope I’m 
wrong. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The trial court therefore found both that the birth mother and 
the biological mother, as a same-sex couple, could not meet the definition of a 
“commissioning couple,” as the term is defined in section 742.13(2) and used in 
section 742.14, to be exempt from the relinquishment of parental rights, and that 
Florida law does not recognize the rights of a biological mother versus a birth 
mother. 
The biological mother appealed the trial court’s ruling to the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal.  Identifying this as a case of first impression in Florida, the Fifth 
District reversed the trial court’s decision and held that the trial court’s 
interpretation and application of the statute violated the biological mother’s 
constitutional rights.  T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 800.  Recognizing the rich body of 
federal and state constitutional law that would unquestionably give constitutionally 
protected rights to a biological father in the exact situation presented by the facts of 
this case, id. at 797-98, the Fifth District concluded that the biological mother is 
 
 
 
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“entitled to constitutionally protected parental rights to the child and that the 
statutory relinquishment of those rights under section 742.14 is prohibited by the 
Federal and Florida Constitutions.”  Id. at 798. 
 In its analysis of the issues presented, the Fifth District reviewed the trial 
court’s determination that the biological mother is a “donor” as that term is used in 
section 742.14 and that the statute therefore applies to deprive her of parental 
rights to her child.  Id. at 790-91.  Acknowledging that the facts in this case are 
undisputed, the Fifth District found that the biological mother “would not be a 
donor . . . because she did not intend to give her ova away.”  Id. at 792.  “Rather,” 
the Fifth District explained, “she always intended to be a mother to the child born 
from her ova and was a mother to the child for several years after [the child’s] 
birth.”  Id. 
After concluding that section 742.14 did not apply to the biological mother, 
the Fifth District then addressed the birth mother’s contention that the biological 
mother had relinquished her parental rights to the child, rejecting two aspects of 
this argument.  First, the Fifth District explained that the biological mother’s 
protected parental rights could not, consistent with the Florida and United States 
Constitutions, be extinguished through the trial court’s application of section 
742.14, stating as follows: 
Here, it is undisputed that [the biological mother] formed and 
maintained a parental relationship for several years after the child was 
 
 
 
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born, and she did so as an equal parental partner with [the birth 
mother] who, for all that time, never suggested that [the biological 
mother] had relinquished her parental rights to her child.  We believe 
that [the biological mother] has constitutionally protected rights as a 
genetic parent who has established a parental relationship with her 
genetic offspring that transcend the provisions of section 742.14.   
Id. at 797. 
 
 
Second, the Fifth District addressed and rejected the contention that the 
biological mother had relinquished her rights by signing an informed consent form 
in the reproductive doctor’s office, concluding that the preprinted form did not 
constitute a waiver.  Id. at 802.  In explaining its reasoning regarding the 
“significant factors” that informed this conclusion, the Fifth District stated that 
“both women agreed to raise any child born with the ova supplied by [the 
biological mother] as equal parental partners and both women complied with that 
agreement for several years after the child was born.”  Id. at 801.  The Fifth 
District found it “very revealing” that the birth mother “never attempted to assert 
this waiver claim until she decided to take the child to Australia and deprive [the 
biological mother] of any further contact with the child.”  Id. 
 
Judge Monaco separately wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined by 
Judge Sawaya, further emphasizing the Fifth District’s conclusion that section 
742.14 does not apply to T.M.H. because the statute “was not designed to resolve 
the problem of how to treat children born by in vitro fertilization to a same-sex 
couple.”  Id. at 803 (Monaco, J., concurring).  Judge Lawson dissented both as to 
 
 
 
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the Fifth District’s statutory construction and constitutional analysis, based on his 
belief that the birth mother is the sole legal mother of the child under established 
common law and Florida’s statutory scheme.  Id. at 805-06 (Lawson, J., 
dissenting).  
ANALYSIS 
With this factual and procedural background established, we now proceed to 
analyze the important constitutional issues presented in this case.4
                                         
 
4.  Although the dissent asserts that the constitutional claims were not 
preserved by T.M.H., we agree with the Fifth District majority that the 
constitutional claims were raised in the trial court, and certainly, by being raised 
and the focus of the Fifth District’s opinion, the constitutional claims are properly 
before this Court for review.   
  Our analysis 
begins with a brief overview of the statutory provisions implicated, including our 
determination of whether section 742.14 is applicable to the circumstances 
presented.  Concluding that the statute applies, we then turn to a discussion of 
T.M.H.’s constitutional challenges to the statute’s validity.  In this regard, we 
review the constitutional protections for parenting, determine the nature of 
T.M.H.’s interest, and analyze whether sections 742.13(2) and 742.14 violate the 
state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process, privacy, and equal 
protection.  Finally, we address and reject D.M.T.’s argument that T.M.H. waived 
any interest she may have in the child by signing a standard informed consent form 
 
 
 
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in the course of the couple’s use of assisted reproductive technology to conceive a 
child. 
I.  Sections 742.13 and 742.14  
In the decision below, the Fifth District determined that section 742.14, the 
assisted reproductive technology statute, did not apply to T.M.H., the biological 
mother, in this situation because she is not a “donor” as that term is used in the 
statute.5
Our interpretation of section 742.14 and the related provision in section 
742.13 defining the term “commissioning couple,” as well as our determination of 
the statutes’ constitutionality, are pure questions of law, subject to de novo review.  
See City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143, 146 (Fla. 2002).  “A court’s 
purpose in construing a statute is to give effect to legislative intent, which is the 
polestar that guides the court in statutory construction.”  Larimore v. State, 2 So. 
3d 101, 106 (Fla. 2008).  “As with any case of statutory construction, [the Court 
must] begin with the ‘actual language used in the statute.’ ”  Heart of Adoptions, 
  We disagree with the Fifth District as to the statutory construction 
analysis because we conclude that the statute does, on its face, apply to T.M.H. as 
the provider of the egg for the couple. 
                                         
 
5.  Both the Fifth District majority opinion, authored by Judge Sawaya and 
joined by Judge Monaco, and Judge Monaco’s concurring opinion, in which Judge 
Sawaya also concurred, adopted this approach.  Since both opinions had a 
majority, the views expressed in each represent the holdings of the Fifth District in 
this case. 
 
 
 
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Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 198 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Borden v. East-European Ins. 
Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006)).  “A basic tenet of statutory interpretation is 
that a ‘statute should be interpreted to give effect to every clause in it, and to 
accord meaning and harmony to all of its parts.’ ”  Jones v. ETS of New Orleans, 
Inc., 793 So. 2d 912, 914-15 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Acosta v. Richter, 671 So. 2d 
149, 153-54 (Fla. 1996)).  Further, we necessarily must read sections 742.13 and 
742.14 together.  See Fla. Dep’t of State, Div. of Elections v. Martin, 916 So. 2d 
763, 768 (Fla. 2005).   
Section 742.14, which is Florida’s assisted reproductive technology statute, 
is entitled “Donation of eggs, sperm, or preembryos” and has provided as follows 
since 1993: 
The donor of any egg, sperm, or preembryo, other than the 
commissioning couple or a father who has executed a preplanned 
adoption agreement under s. 63.212, shall relinquish all maternal or 
paternal rights and obligations
§ 742.14, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).  The term “commissioning couple,” as used 
in section 742.14, is defined in section 742.13(2) as “the intended mother and 
father of a child who will be conceived by means of assisted reproductive 
 with respect to the donation or the 
resulting children.  Only reasonable compensation directly related to 
the donation of eggs, sperm, and preembryos shall be permitted. 
 
 
 
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technology using the eggs or sperm of at least one of the intended parents.”  
§ 742.13(2), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).6
The Fifth District concluded that the assisted reproductive technology statute 
did not apply to T.M.H. since she always intended to parent the child conceived 
through her provision of biological material to her partner.  T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 
792, 803-04.  Therefore, according to the Fifth District, T.M.H. is not considered a 
“donor” as that term is used in the statute.  Id.   
 
We reject the Fifth District’s construction of the assisted reproductive 
technology statute.  The plain language of section 742.14 does not provide for the 
subjective intentions of someone in T.M.H.’s position to be taken into 
consideration in determining whether he or she is a “donor” under the terms of the 
statute.  Rather, the statute identifies only two categories of individuals who do not 
relinquish parental rights as to their provision of biological material during the 
course of assisted reproductive technology—(1) members of a “commissioning 
couple”; and (2) fathers who have executed a preplanned adoption agreement.  
Indeed, the structure of section 742.14 designates these groups as fitting within the 
term “donor,” and then provides that they are specifically exempted from the 
statutory relinquishment of parental rights.  See § 742.14, Fla. Stat.  If the statute 
                                         
 
6.  These statutory provisions have remained unchanged since first adopted 
in 1993. 
 
 
 
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did not apply to these groups, then they would not need to be exempted from its 
requirements. 
In providing for these two exceptions, the Legislature expressed its intent 
not to allow the subjective intentions of all other individuals who provide eggs, 
sperm, or preembryos during the course of assisted reproductive technology to 
become an issue in need of litigation.  See Pro-Art Dental Lab, Inc. v. V-Strategic 
Group, LLC, 986 So. 2d 1244, 1258 (Fla. 2008) (“Under the canon of statutory 
construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies 
the exclusion of another.” (quoting State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 219 (Fla. 
2007))).  Instead, the Legislature articulated a policy of treating all individuals who 
provide eggs, sperm, or preembryos as part of assisted reproductive technology as 
“donor[s]” bound by the terms of the statute, and then exempting two specific 
groups in accordance with the purpose behind the statutory enactment. 
To hold that section 742.14 does not apply to T.M.H. in this case because of 
her subjective intention not to give her egg away would essentially create a third 
exception in the statute.  This Court, however, is “not at liberty to add words to the 
statute that were not placed there by the Legislature.”  Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc. 
v. Seeger, 990 So. 2d 503, 512 (Fla. 2008).   
It is clear that the primary purpose behind the Legislature’s enactment of the 
assisted reproductive technology statute was to ensure that couples taking 
 
 
 
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advantage of medical advances in reproductive science to conceive a child are 
protected from a claim to parental rights by a third-party provider of the genetic 
material used for assisted reproductive technology.  In this regard, we emphasize 
that our resolution of the constitutional issues presented in this case does not 
undermine the statutory protections or certainty provided to commissioning 
couples in any way.  Rather, the specific constitutional question we address next is 
whether these very protections against the statutory relinquishment of parental 
rights can be denied to an unmarried woman who was part of a same-sex couple 
seeking the assistance of reproductive technology to conceive a child to jointly 
raise and who provided biological material to her partner with the specific intent to 
become a parent. 
II.  The Constitutionality of the Statutes 
 
We begin our constitutional analysis of section 742.14, and the 
corresponding provision in section 742.13 defining the term “commissioning 
couple,” by addressing T.M.H.’s due process and privacy arguments that 
application of the assisted reproductive technology statute abridges her 
fundamental right to be a parent.  We then address the equal protection argument 
that section 742.14, in combination with section 742.13(2), unconstitutionally 
creates an unreasonable classification based on sexual orientation.  We hold that 
 
 
 
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section 742.14 is unconstitutional as applied on each basis under both the United 
States Constitution and separately under the Florida Constitution. 
A.  Denial of Due Process Under the Florida and United States Constitutions 
and Denial of Right to Privacy Under the Florida Constitution 
 
1.  Constitutional Right of Parenting 
It is a basic tenet of our society and our law that individuals have the 
fundamental constitutionally protected rights to procreate and to be a parent to 
their children.  These constitutional rights are recognized by both the Florida 
Constitution and the United States Constitution.  As stated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000), “the interest of 
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest 
of the fundamental liberty interests recognized” in American law.  See also Skinner 
v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that procreation is 
“one of the basic civil rights of man” and is “fundamental to the very existence and 
survival of the race”); Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996) 
(recognizing that parents’ fundamental right to raise their children is protected by 
Florida’s state constitutional right of privacy); In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 
So. 2d 961, 966 (Fla. 1995) (“The United States Supreme Court has held that 
natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and 
management of their children.” (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 
(1982))).   
 
 
 
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This Court has previously explained that the fundamental right to have 
children is a right “so basic as to be inseparable from the rights to ‘enjoy and 
defend life and liberty, (and) to pursue happiness.’ ”  Grissom v. Dade Cnty., 293 
So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. 1974) (quoting art. I, § 2, Fla. Const.).  A “parent’s desire for 
and right to ‘the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her 
children’ is an important interest that ‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a 
powerful countervailing interest, protection.’ ”  Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).   
Both the Florida and the United States Constitutions “protect individuals 
from arbitrary and unreasonable governmental interference with a person’s right to 
life, liberty, and property.”  State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1212 (Fla. 2004); 
see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”); art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. (“No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law . . . .”).  In addition, the Florida Constitution contains a separate privacy 
protection declaring that an individual in this state “has the right to be let alone and 
free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life.”  Art. I, § 23, Fla. 
Const. 
This Court has interpreted the Florida Constitution’s privacy provision to 
provide “greater protection than is afforded by the federal constitution” and to 
 
 
 
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include specific protection against State interference in “parents’ fundamental right 
to raise their children except in cases where the child is threatened with harm.”  
Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1275-76.  Indeed, we have previously stated that, in Florida, 
an individual’s “fundamental liberty interest in parenting . . . is specifically 
protected by our [state constitutional] privacy provision.”  Id. at 1275. 
Moreover, “we recognize the sanctity of the biological connection” between 
parents and children, and thus, “we look carefully at anything that would sever the 
biological parent-child link.”  Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 967.  With respect to the 
link between a biological father and his child, we have previously explained that 
constitutional protection of the individual’s right to be a parent applies “when an 
unwed [biological] father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood by coming forward to participate in raising his child.”  Id. at 966-67.  
The approach this Court has taken regarding the rights of biological but unwed 
fathers echoes the United States Supreme Court’s recognition that a biological 
father’s constitutional rights are inchoate and develop into a fundamental right to 
be a parent “[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood by ‘com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of 
his child,’ . . . [because] his interest in personal contact with his child acquires 
substantial protection under the due process clause.”  Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 
 
 
 
- 21 - 
(alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 
380, 392, 398 n.7 (1979)).   
When the Due Process Clause is “invoked in a novel context,” the United 
States Supreme Court has explained that the inquiry should begin “with a 
determination of the precise nature of the private interest that is threatened by the 
State.”  Lehr, 463 U.S. at 256.  Although the dissent asserts that the majority skips 
an important step in analyzing the due process claim, the case it relies on for this 
proposition, Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), concerns an issue 
of criminal procedure, a far cry from the “liberty” interest in parents’ fundamental 
right to the “care, custody, and control of their children.”  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.  
As explained by the United States Supreme Court in Troxel: 
The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents 
in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the 
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.  
More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 
401 (1923), we held that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process 
Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a home and bring up 
children” and “to control the education of their own.”  Two years 
later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925), we 
again held that the “liberty of parents and guardians” includes the 
right “to direct the upbringing and education of children under their 
control.”  We explained in Pierce that “[t]he child is not the mere 
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny 
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare 
him for additional obligations.”  Id., at 535.  We returned to the 
subject in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), and again 
confirmed that there is a constitutional dimension to the right of 
parents to direct the upbringing of their children.  “It is cardinal with 
us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the 
 
 
 
- 22 - 
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for 
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”  Id., 
In subsequent cases also, we have recognized the fundamental 
right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
control of their children.  
at 166. 
See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 
651 (1972) (“It is plain that the interest of a parent in the 
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children 
‘come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when 
appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting 
economic arrangements’ ” (citation omitted)); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western 
civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the 
nurture and upbringing of their children.  This primary role of the 
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond 
debate as an enduring American tradition”); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 
U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions 
that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally 
protected”); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Our 
jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts 
of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor 
children.  Our cases have consistently followed that course”); 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing “[t]he 
fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and 
management of their child”); [Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702, 720 (1997)] (“In a long line of cases, we have held that, in 
addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the 
‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the 
righ[t] . . . to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children” 
(citing Meyer and 
 
Pierce)).  In light of this extensive precedent, it 
cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make 
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. 
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66. 
Further, in the dissent’s assertion that the majority of this Court “improperly 
constitutionalize[s]” its preferences and “impose[s] them upon the rest of the 
citizenry,” dissenting op. at 64, the dissent relies on a plurality opinion written by 
 
 
 
- 23 - 
Justice Scalia in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989), and a view 
actually called into question by two of those concurring in the plurality.  See id. at 
132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part).  Rather, it would appear that it is the dissent 
that is attempting to impose its personal preferences for a view of family.   
The legal parameters and definitions of parents, marriage, and family have 
undergone major changes in the past several decades, from holding a state’s ban on 
interracial marriage unconstitutional, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), to 
recognizing the fundamental right to be a parent even for unmarried couples, see 
Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.  In fact, although not impacting our ultimate analysis, as the 
United States Supreme Court has recently declared in acknowledging that many 
states have extended the definition of family to permit the legal marriage of same-
sex couples, federal law may not infringe upon the rights of those couples “to 
enhance their own liberty” and to enjoy protection “in personhood and dignity.”  
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).     
In this case, the biological mother asserts that she has a protected 
constitutional interest to be a parent to her child, which is a fundamental right 
unquestionably protected by the Florida and federal Due Process Clauses and 
specifically by Florida’s state constitutional privacy provision.  While 
acknowledging that a mere biological link between parent and child is insufficient 
to merit substantial constitutional protection, the biological mother argues that we 
 
 
 
- 24 - 
should analogize the nature of her interest to the interest possessed by unwed 
biological fathers, whose parental rights are inchoate but develop into a 
fundamental right to be a parent when the biological father demonstrates “a full 
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood.”  T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 261.  We 
agree. 
 
This Court has previously stated that the biological relationship between 
parent and child provides “the opportunity to assume parental responsibilities.”  
Doe, 543 So. 2d at 748.  In other words, although an unmarried man who 
impregnates an unmarried woman does not automatically have a fundamental right 
to be a parent to the child, his right to be a parent develops substantial 
constitutional protection as a fundamental right if he assumes responsibility for the 
care and raising of that child.  See Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 966-67. 
In Lehr, the United States Supreme Court articulated the “significance of the 
biological connection” between parent and child, which the Court described as the 
biological father’s “opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a 
relationship with his offspring.”  463 U.S. at 262.  If the biological father “grasps 
that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child’s future,” 
the Court explained, then “he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child 
relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s development.”  
Id.  As the United States Supreme Court has pronounced and this Court has stated, 
 
 
 
- 25 - 
therefore, a biological connection gives rise to an inchoate right to be a parent that 
may develop into a protected fundamental constitutional right based on the actions 
of the parent.  See Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 966-67. 
In this case, the biological connection between mother and daughter is not in 
dispute.  See T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 789.  Additionally, T.M.H. and her former 
partner D.M.T. demonstrated an intent to jointly raise the child through their 
actions before and after the child’s birth, and T.M.H. actively participated as a 
parent for the first several years of the child’s life.  Importantly for constitutional 
purposes, T.M.H. also assumed full parental responsibilities until her contact with 
her child was suddenly cut off.  In this way, this case is wholly unlike cases such as 
Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So. 2d 316, 319 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), relied on by the 
dissent, where the parties seeking the assistance of reproductive technology “joined 
forces solely for the purpose of artificially inseminating Ms. Lamaritata” and 
specifically agreed that the individual providing genetic material would not have 
any rights or obligations with respect to the child.  
This case is also completely different from cases involving nonparents 
seeking to establish legal rights to a child, such as Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, which 
involved grandparents’ rights, and Troxel, which is relied on by the dissent.  
Troxel concerned a state nonparental visitation statute described as “breathtakingly 
broad,” permitting “[a]ny person” to petition the court for visitation rights “at any 
 
 
 
- 26 - 
time,” and the court to grant such visitation rights whenever “visitation may 
serve the best interest of the child.”  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61, 67. 
Contrary to Troxel, which involved a nonparent, there is no doubt that the 
common law would grant constitutional due process and privacy protection, in the 
form of a fundamental right to be a parent, to an unwed biological father in this 
situation who had the proverbial one night stand with a mother but then assumed 
parental responsibilities for the first several years of the child’s life.  Of course, the 
common law was developed before the scientific advancements in reproductive 
technology that allow individuals to exercise their basic right and desire to have 
children in ways that were not contemplated by society centuries or even decades 
ago.   
As explained by the Fifth District in this case, it is difficult to understand 
how rigid legal rules “established during a time so far removed in history when the 
science of in vitro fertilization was a remote thought in the minds of the scientists 
of the times [have] much currency today.”  T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 796.  Although the 
right to procreate has long been described as “one of the basic civil rights” 
individuals hold, Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541, advances in science and technology 
now provide innumerable ways for traditional and non-traditional couples alike to 
conceive a child and, we conclude, in so doing to exercise their “inalienable 
rights . . . to enjoy and defend life and liberty, [and] to pursue happiness.”  Art. I, 
 
 
 
- 27 - 
§ 2, Fla. Const.; see Grissom, 293 So. 2d at 62.  The Fifth District cogently 
explained this proposition as follows: 
Our analysis reveals that there is nothing in chapter 742, and 
specifically section 742.14, that addresses the situation where the 
child has both a biological mother and a birth mother who were 
engaged in a committed relationship for many years and who decided 
to have a child to love and raise together as equal parental partners.  
This is a unique case, and the appellate courts in Florida have never 
before considered a case quite like it.  Based on the facts and 
circumstances of this case, we can discern no legally valid reason to 
deprive either woman of parental rights to this child.  The women 
were in a committed relationship for many years and both decided and 
agreed to have a child born out of that relationship to love and raise as 
their own and to share parental rights and responsibilities in rearing 
that child.  Specifically, when it was discovered that [the birth mother] 
was infertile, both women agreed to have ova removed from [the 
biological mother], to have them artificially inseminated with the 
sperm of a donor, and to have the ova inserted into [the birth 
mother’s] womb, in order to conceive a child that they would raise 
together as parental partners.  After the child was born, both women 
were parents to the child and equally cared for the child for several 
years.  
T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 790. 
It would indeed be anomalous if, under Florida law, an unwed biological 
father would have more constitutionally protected rights to parent a child after a 
one night stand than an unwed biological mother who, with a committed partner 
and as part of a loving relationship, planned for the birth of a child and remains 
committed to supporting and raising her own daughter.  As the Fifth District stated, 
“it would pose a substantial equal protection problem to deny an unwed genetic 
mother the ability to assert parental rights after she established a parental 
 
 
 
- 28 - 
relationship with her child while allowing an unwed genetic father to do so.”  
T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 797 n.8.   
Although the biological mother in this case is seeking vindication of her 
right to be a parent to her child, this right comes with critical legal and financial 
responsibilities, including possible child support payments.  See § 61.29, Fla. Stat. 
(2012) (“The following principles establish the public policy of the State of Florida 
in the creation of the child support guidelines: (1) Each parent has a fundamental 
obligation to support his or her minor or legally dependent child.”).  
Unquestionably, these responsibilities are part and parcel of the fundamental right 
to be a parent.  T.M.H., the biological mother, demonstrated her commitment to 
accepting these responsibilities until her contact with the child was cut off.  
Because T.M.H. accepted responsibility for raising her child from the beginning 
and did in fact parent and support the child until D.M.T. prevented her from doing 
so, we hold that T.M.H.’s inchoate interest has developed into a protected 
fundamental right to be a parent to her child.   
2.  Abridgment of Fundamental Right 
We subject statutes that interfere with an individual’s fundamental rights to 
strict scrutiny analysis, which requires the State to prove that the legislation 
furthers a compelling governmental interest through the least intrusive means.  See 
N. Fla. Women’s Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 625 
 
 
 
- 29 - 
n.16 (Fla. 2003); see also Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep’t of Bus. 
Regulation, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985) (stating that Florida’s “right of privacy 
is a fundamental right which . . . demands the compelling state interest standard”).  
It is well settled that “a law that impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or 
implicitly secured by the Constitution is presumptively unconstitutional.”  City of 
Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76 (1980).  Indeed, the Constitution 
“provides heightened protection against government interference with certain 
fundamental rights and liberty interests,” including the right “to have children.”  
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. 
In this case, it is clear that application of section 742.14 forces the automatic 
statutory relinquishment of T.M.H.’s “right to form a parental relationship with her 
child and to continue to participate in raising the child as a parent as she had done 
for several years after the child was born.”  T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 796.  We have 
concluded that T.M.H.’s right to maintain that relationship, as the biological parent 
of the child who has demonstrated “a full commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood,” Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261, is a fundamental right deserving of 
constitutional protection under the Due Process Clauses of the Florida and United 
States Constitutions and Florida’s constitutional privacy provision.  Therefore, the 
burden falls on the birth mother to demonstrate that application of the assisted 
reproductive technology statute to deprive the biological mother of her 
 
 
 
- 30 - 
fundamental right to be a parent furthers a compelling governmental interest 
through the least intrusive means.  This showing has not been made.   
We recognize the important role section 742.14 plays in protecting couples 
seeking to use assisted reproductive technology to conceive a child from parental 
rights claims brought by typical third-party providers of the genetic material used 
in assisted reproductive technology, as well as the State’s corresponding interest in 
furthering that objective.  This case, however, does not implicate those concerns.  
Quite simply, based on the factual situation before us, we do not discern even a 
legitimate State interest in applying section 742.14 to deny T.M.H. her right to be a 
parent to her daughter.   
This is significant to our as-applied constitutional analysis of the statutory 
scheme, which is intended to provide statutory protection to a “commissioning 
couple” from a parental rights claim by a third-party provider of biological 
material used in assisted reproductive technology.  We therefore reject the 
dissent’s assertion that our analysis has no “logical end point” or “obvious 
stopping point,” dissenting op. at 68, as our conclusion is based on the specific 
facts presented in this case, as set forth in the Fifth District’s certified question, 
 
 
 
- 31 - 
which establish that T.M.H. was an intended parent and assumed full parental 
responsibilities until her contact with the child was cut off.7
In recently addressing a comparable claim brought by a parent who provided 
biological material for use in conceiving a child through assisted reproductive 
technology and thereafter demonstrated a commitment to raising that child, the 
Virginia Supreme Court explained that “there is no compelling reason why a 
responsible, involved, unmarried, biological parent should never be allowed to 
establish legal parentage of her or his child born as a result of assisted conception.”  
L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 722 (Va. 2013).  While the Virginia assisted 
conception statute is different from our own, we embrace the Virginia Supreme 
Court’s conclusion regarding whether a compelling interest exists.  
 
                                         
 
7.  Although the dissent raises the spectre of unintended results of our 
decision by listing a series of different scenarios, see dissenting op. at 68, we have 
confidence that courts can, will, and must adjust to the “ever-continuing 
development of artificial reproductive technologies” and judge each case based on 
the specific factual situation presented.  In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 117 
(Md. 2007).  As the American Academy of Assisted Reproductive Technology 
Attorneys has pointed out in an amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of T.M.H. in 
this case, the number of children born through assisted reproductive technology 
“has increased dramatically” over the past few decades.  Technological advances 
in science and medicine “that permit in vitro fertilization and egg harvesting . . . 
help intended parents who are otherwise unable to have children of their own 
create a family” and are used by “opposite-sex married couples . . . , same-sex 
couples, unmarried heterosexual couples, and single individuals who seek the 
opportunity to become parents.”  Undoubtedly, the “law is being tested as . . . new 
techniques [of assisted reproduction] become more commonplace and accepted,” 
In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 117, but courts must ensure that the constitutional 
rights of those individuals who intended to be parents to the child are protected.  
 
 
 
- 32 - 
Like the parties in the Virginia case, T.M.H. and D.M.T. were known to 
each other, lived together as a couple, and jointly assumed rights and 
responsibilities for their daughter after her birth.  Indeed, the child in the Virginia 
case was over one year old at the time the intended father’s contact was cut off, see 
id. at 715, but the child in this case was almost four years old at the time D.M.T. 
prevented T.M.H. from having further contact with her. 
We conclude that the State does not have a compelling interest in depriving 
T.M.H. of her right to be a parent in this situation.  Accordingly, we hold that 
section 742.14 is unconstitutional as applied to abridge T.M.H.’s fundamental right 
to be a parent.   
B.  Classification Based on Sexual Orientation 
We next address the equal protection challenge to the statute, as confronted 
by the Fifth District, under both the Florida and United States Constitutions.  
Specifically, as encompassed in the certified question, we address whether the 
statute is unconstitutional as applied under the Florida and federal Equal Protection 
Clauses by exempting heterosexual couples, but not same-sex couples, from the 
automatic relinquishment of parental rights when seeking the assistance of 
reproductive technology to conceive a child with the intent to become the child’s 
parents.  Put another way, as Judge Monaco succinctly explained in his concurring 
opinion below, “[b]ut for the fact that [the biological mother] and [the birth 
 
 
 
- 33 - 
mother] are of the same sex, we would probably consider them to be a 
‘commissioning couple’ under the statute, and the outcome of this case would be 
easy.”  T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 804 (Monaco, J., concurring). 
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection “is essentially a direction 
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”  City of Cleburne, Tex. 
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202, 216 (1982)).  Indeed, “the Constitution ‘neither knows nor tolerates classes 
among citizens,’ ” which is an assurance that the law remains neutral “where the 
rights of persons are at stake.”  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (quoting 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
“In the absence of a fundamental right or a protected class, equal protection 
demands only that a distinction which results in unequal treatment bear some 
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.”  Duncan v. Moore, 754 So. 2d 
708, 712 (Fla. 2000).  Conversely, where the equal protection challenge does 
abridge a fundamental right or adversely affect a protected class, a higher level of 
scrutiny is appropriate.  See Lane v. Chiles, 698 So. 2d 260, 263 (Fla. 1997).   
Sexual orientation has not been determined to constitute a protected class 
and therefore sexual orientation does not provide an independent basis for using 
heightened scrutiny to review State action that results in unequal treatment to 
homosexuals.  See Romer, 517 U.S. at 630-32 (applying rational basis review to a 
 
 
 
- 34 - 
state constitutional amendment banning state or local governments from providing 
minority protections based on sexual orientation).  Further, even though our state 
constitution recognizes gender as a specific class, see art. I, § 2, Fla. Const., it does 
not separately recognize sexual orientation as a protected class, and thus we do not 
rely on our state’s Equal Protection Clause to apply a heightened scrutiny 
examination to statutes discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.  See Fla. 
Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 81, 83 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2010) (applying rational basis review to a statute prohibiting homosexuals 
from adopting).   
Accordingly, we apply a rational basis analysis to our review of this claim.  
The specific question we confront is whether the classification between 
heterosexual and same-sex couples drawn by the assisted reproductive technology 
statute bears some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.   
D.M.T. argues that defining the term “commissioning couple” in section 
742.13(2), as applied in section 742.14, to include only one male and one female is 
related to the State’s legitimate interest in not extending rights to same-sex 
couples.  Specifically, she cites to Florida law that declines to recognize same-sex 
marriages and prohibits homosexuals from adopting children.  We reject this 
argument as unavailing for several reasons. 
 
 
 
- 35 - 
First, section 742.14 does not operate to grant parental rights to biological 
parents, but only to provide for the relinquishment of those rights in the case of the 
typical egg or sperm donor.  In other words, section 742.14 allows a member of a 
“commissioning couple” to preserve his or her interest in the child conceived 
through assisted reproductive technology; however, that individual becomes a 
parent only if he or she has some legal basis to be recognized as a parent.  This 
could be due to a biological connection plus the assumption of parental 
responsibilities, as we have demonstrated applies in this case, or through 
application of another statute.  See, e.g., § 63.032(12), Fla. Stat. (2008) (defining 
the term “parent” to mean “a woman who gives birth to a child or a man whose 
consent to the adoption of the child would be required”); § 742.11, Fla. Stat. 
(2008) (defining the parental status of birth mothers and non-genetic, legal fathers).  
That is, sections 742.13 and 742.14 do not create a statutory basis for an individual 
who would not otherwise have parental rights to claim those rights.  Therefore, 
because section 742.14 does not operate to grant rights, but only to eliminate rights 
that are already held or that may develop, any State interest that could potentially 
exist in not extending rights to same-sex couples is not implicated. 
Second, there is no indication that the exception provided in section 742.14 
for a “commissioning couple” extends only to married couples, so the state 
constitutional provision against same-sex marriage is also not implicated.  See art. 
 
 
 
- 36 - 
I, § 27, Fla. Const. (defining marriage as “the legal union of only one man and one 
woman as husband and wife” and stating that “no other legal union that is treated 
as marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof shall be valid or recognized”).  By 
contrast, in the next statutory provisions, sections 742.15-16, Florida Statutes, 
which relate to gestational surrogacy, the Legislature has specifically provided that 
the “commissioning couple” must be “legally married” in order to claim protection 
under the statutes.  See § 742.15(1), Fla. Stat. (2008).  In the assisted reproductive 
technology statute, however, the Legislature did not include an additional marriage 
requirement regarding an exemption from the relinquishment of parental rights 
with respect to the donation of eggs, sperm, or preembryos. 
Third, we reject D.M.T.’s contention that recognizing T.M.H.’s parental 
rights in this case would undermine the State interest in providing certainty to 
couples using assisted reproductive technology to become parents because it would 
increase litigation regarding the intentions of individuals providing genetic 
material for use in assisted reproductive technology.  No one disputes that the State 
has an interest in ensuring that the parental rights of children conceived through the 
use of assisted reproductive technology are defined by law, in making sure children 
have parents to care for them, and in preventing litigation that disrupts families.  
See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766 (“Two state interests are at stake in parental 
rights termination proceedings—a parens patriae interest in preserving and 
 
 
 
- 37 - 
promoting the welfare of the child and a fiscal and administrative interest in 
reducing the cost and burden of such proceedings.”).   
In reality, however, the issue of an unmarried mother and father’s intent 
under the statute, including whether they qualify as a “commissioning couple,” has 
been the subject of prior litigation in the courts of this state.  See Janssen v. Alicea, 
30 So. 3d 680, 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (reversing the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment because a material fact existed as to whether the father of the 
child, who was a “close friend” of the mother, was simply a sperm donor or 
whether the mother and father were a “commissioning couple” who intended to 
jointly parent the child conceived through assisted reproductive technology); 
Lamaritata, 823 So. 2d at 319 (rejecting a sperm donor’s claim to parental rights 
because the mother and father “did not commission or contract to jointly raise the 
children as mother and father” but instead “joined forces solely for the purpose of 
artificially inseminating” the mother); L.A.L. v. D.A.L., 714 So. 2d 595, 596-97 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (granting a petition for writ of certiorari and directing the trial 
court to determine the applicability of section 742.14 where the mother and father 
had entered into an agreement regarding the use of assisted reproductive 
technology).   
Since intent, pursuant to the definition of “commissioning couple” found in 
section 742.13(2) and used in section 742.14, is the determinative element 
 
 
 
- 38 - 
regarding whether two individuals seeking the assistance of reproductive 
technology to conceive qualify as a “commissioning couple,” it is of course 
relevant to the inquiry.  We conclude, though, that the State does not have a 
legitimate interest in precluding same-sex couples from being given the same 
opportunity as heterosexual couples to demonstrate that intent.  Consistent with 
equal protection, a same-sex couple must be afforded the equivalent chance as a 
heterosexual couple to establish their intentions in using assisted reproductive 
technology to conceive a child. 
Finally, we note that the Third District has held Florida law prohibiting 
same-sex couples from adopting as unconstitutional.  See Adoption of X.X.G., 45 
So. 3d at 92.  In finding the legislative prohibition against a homosexual adopting a 
child to be unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection lacking a rational basis, 
the Third District in Adoption of X.X.G. noted that the parties in that case agreed 
“that gay people and heterosexuals make equally good parents,” and that no party 
offered a justification for the prohibition on homosexual adoption based “on any 
theory that homosexual persons are unfit to be parents.”  Id. at 85.   
Likewise, in this case, no party and no amicus curiae has advanced the 
argument that either T.M.H. or, for that matter, D.M.T., is unfit to be a parent.  
Further, no party or amicus curiae has advanced the argument that the child’s best 
 
 
 
- 39 - 
interests would be better served by having only one loving parent rather than two.8
We conclude that the State would be hard pressed to find a reason why a 
child would not be better off having two loving parents in her life, regardless of 
whether those parents are of the same sex, than she would by having only one 
  
To the contrary, the very statute that bars T.M.H. from being considered part of a 
“commissioning couple” fully contemplates that D.M.T., as the birth mother, 
would be recognized as the mother of the child born from the couple’s use of 
assisted reproductive technology, even though D.M.T. has no genetic connection to 
the child.   
                                         
 
8.  The opposite argument has in fact been advanced by the amici for the 
University of Florida Levin College of Law Center on Children and Families, 
University of Miami School of Law Children and Youth Law Clinic, Nova 
Southeastern University Law Center Children and Families Clinic, and Barry 
University School of Law Children and Families Clinic, as well as the National 
Association of Social Workers and National Association of Social Workers, 
Florida Chapter.  These amici have observed that peer-reviewed social science 
research demonstrates the developmental and psychological importance for 
children in maintaining a relationship with both of their parents when those parents 
become separated.  See, e.g., Joseph S. Jackson & Lauren G. Fasig, The Parentless 
Child’s Right to a Permanent Family, 46 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1, 27-28 (2011); 
James G. Byrne, et al., The Contribution of Attachment Theory to Child Custody 
Assessments, 46 J. of Child Psychol. & Psychiatry 115, 118 (2005); Frank J. Dyer, 
Termination of Parental Rights in Light of Attachment Theory, 10 Psychol. Pub. 
Pol’y & L. 5, 11 (2004); see also Nat’l Scientific Council on the Developing Child 
Working Paper 1, Young Children Develop in an Environment of Relationships 1-
2 (2004); Am. Acad. of Pediatrics: Committee on Early Childhood, Adoption, & 
Dependent Care, Developmental Issues for Young Children in Foster Care, 106 
Pediatrics 1145, 1146 (2000). 
 
 
 
- 40 - 
parent.9
 
We further conclude that this distinction is unconstitutional as applied 
because it lacks a rational basis.  Regardless of whether the individual’s parental 
rights have developed into a fundamental right, as T.M.H.’s have, the distinction is 
unconstitutional as applied to same-sex couples because the statute does not permit 
same-sex couples—and only same-sex couples—to qualify as a “commissioning 
couple.”  Accordingly, based on the reasons we have set forth, we conclude that 
section 742.14, in conjunction with the restrictive definition of “commissioning 
couple” in section 742.13(2), violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Florida 
and United States Constitutions as applied in this case because it prohibited 
T.M.H., as part of a same-sex couple, from qualifying as a “commissioning 
couple.”   
  This, once again, is particularly true given that in this statute the 
Legislature did not limit the definition of “commissioning couple” to married 
individuals.  Thus, as we have observed, an unmarried heterosexual couple would 
have the same rights to parent the resulting child, under this statute, as a married 
couple.  Critically, the only excluded category is for individuals of the same sex. 
III.  Waiver of Rights 
                                         
 
9.  There is no dispute that the sperm donor in this case has relinquished any 
interest he has in the child.  The statute clearly applies to him.  Therefore, if 
T.M.H. is denied parental rights, this child will have only one legal parent. 
 
 
 
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Lastly, we address the birth mother’s contention that, regardless of the 
application of section 742.14 in this case, the biological mother waived any 
parental rights to this child by signing a standard informed consent form during the 
couple’s process of seeking medical assistance to conceive.  The undisputed facts 
of this case clearly refute this argument and demonstrate that the biological mother 
did not expressly waive her parental rights.  Instead, it is clear that the very 
purpose of the biological mother’s provision of the egg to her partner was to enable 
each party to become parents of the child they wished to conceive.  This 
conclusion is supported by several facts, including a careful review of the informed 
consent form this Court has in its record, as well as the affidavit of the doctor who 
operated the reproductive center the couple attended. 
While it is uncontroverted that the biological mother signed a standard 
“Informed Consent Oocyte Recipient” form for the Fertility and Reproductive 
Medicine Center for Women with the birth mother listed as the recipient, the 
biological mother signed this form as the birth mother’s partner and not as the 
individual providing the egg for the couple.  Clearly, then, this informed consent 
does not on its face apply to waive the biological mother’s rights to the child, even 
though this is the document that the birth mother relied on in her initial motion to 
dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
 
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The Fifth District addressed and rejected the birth mother’s argument that 
the biological mother had waived her parental rights, although the district court 
referenced a different preprinted form, an exact copy of which is not in this Court’s 
record.  See T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 801.  If there is another preprinted form, this 
form does not appear in our record, and the birth mother, as the appellant, bears the 
burden of producing a complete record on appeal.  Significantly, the birth mother 
does not base her argument in this Court on the existence of this specific form and 
neither cites to nor quotes from this form in her brief.   
In fact, the birth mother does not clearly identify the document the biological 
mother signed, discuss the circumstances under which this particular form was 
signed, or explain why the Fifth District, which specifically found this form to be 
inapplicable to the facts of this case, erred in concluding that the informed consent 
form did not waive the biological mother’s rights.  Moreover, in asserting that the 
biological mother expressly waived her parental rights, the dissent relies on this 
form, an exact copy of which we do not have in the record, and on the “Informed 
Consent Oocyte Recipient” form, which the biological mother signed as the birth 
mother’s partner and not as the egg donor—neither of which can even remotely be 
considered conclusive. 
In any event, courts that have considered similar standard informed consents 
used in reproductive technology have held that waiver provisions like the one 
 
 
 
- 43 - 
referenced by the Fifth District are inapplicable in circumstances like those in this 
case.  This is because it is uncontested that the biological mother was not an 
anonymous donor, but rather, that the parties were in a committed relationship 
where reproductive technology was used—with one woman providing her egg and 
the other partner bearing the child—so that both women became the child’s 
parents.  See Matter of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 689 n.44 (N.Y. Sur. 2009) 
(holding that a standard egg donor waiver signed at the reproductive clinic did not 
apply where the biological mother had a relationship with the birth mother and 
only signed the waiver because there was no other way to accomplish the assisted 
reproductive technology procedure); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 682 (Cal. 2005) 
(holding that an almost identical informed consent form did not waive the 
biological mother’s rights because a “woman who supplies ova to be used to 
impregnate her lesbian partner, with the understanding that the resulting child will 
be raised in their joint home, cannot waive her responsibility to support that child.  
Nor can such a purported waiver effectively cause that woman to relinquish her 
parental rights.”). 
We reject the dissent’s reliance on Lamaritata, 823 So. 2d 316, to argue that 
the biological mother waived her parental rights.  Lamaritata is completely 
distinguishable from this case.  As the dissent acknowledges, the parties in 
Lamaritata specifically entered into a contract whereby they agreed that the donor 
 
 
 
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would have no parental rights and obligations associated with any child conceived 
from the use of assisted reproductive technology.  Id. at 318.  This contract and the 
parties’ intentions in entering into it were never in dispute.  See L.A.L., 714 So. 2d 
at 596-97 (setting forth the specific language of the parties’ agreement in a prior 
decision involving the same parties).  As the Second District explained, there were 
“no facts to show that [the parties] ha[d] any type of relationship that would fall 
under the rubric of ‘couple.’  Further, they did not commission or contract to 
jointly raise the children as mother and father.”  Lamaritata, 823 So. 2d at 319.  
Instead, according to the Second District, the parties in Lamaritata “joined forces 
solely for the purpose of artificially inseminating Ms. Lamaritata, an intent clearly 
set forth in the parties’ contract.”  Id.        
Despite the dissent’s view to the contrary, the facts of this case clearly 
demonstrate that exactly the opposite of the facts in Lamaritata are true here.  Not 
only did the biological mother assume parental obligations, but the couple’s 
actions before and after the child’s birth—including their use of funds from their 
joint bank account, their statements to the reproductive doctor that they intended to 
raise the child as a couple, the counseling they underwent to prepare themselves 
for parenthood, the use of a hyphenated last name for the child, and the joint birth 
announcement—reveal that the couple’s agreement in actuality was to both parent 
the child they intended to conceive.  Further, there was no issue as to the validity 
 
 
 
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of the contract entered into by the parties in Lamaritata, whereas the whole point in 
this case is that the couple never intended for the biological mother to give up 
parental rights by signing a standard informed consent form in the reproductive 
doctor’s office.     
We also reject the dissent’s reliance on Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2006).  Like the Fifth District, we conclude that Wakeman “is 
clearly distinguishable from the instant case because there, one lesbian partner was 
the birth mother and the partner claiming parental rights was not the biological 
mother.”  T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 794 n.6.  As the Fifth District correctly observed, 
the First District in Wakeman held that the individual seeking parental rights was 
neither a “biological” nor a “natural” parent, whereas in this case, T.M.H. “would 
fall into both categories under the Wakeman rationale.”  T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 794 
n.6.  Further, Wakeman specifically relied on cases involving nonparents, see 
Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 671 (citing Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271), which we have 
explained are inapplicable in this case.         
Finally, in addition to the uncontroverted fact that both women in this 
relationship were intending to, and did, jointly raise the child as their own from the 
time of birth until their acrimonious separation, it is clear from the affidavit 
submitted by the doctor who operated the reproductive center the couple attended 
that any waiver of rights language in the standard forms signed as part of the 
 
 
 
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couple’s process of using assisted reproductive technology would be inapplicable 
to this situation.  The Fifth District described the doctor’s affidavit as follows: 
[The biological mother] submitted at the summary judgment hearing 
an affidavit from the doctor who operated the reproductive center that 
[the parties] attended and who had personal knowledge of the services 
provided to both women.  The testimony of the doctor reveals that the 
waiver provisions were simply part of a standard form he has all 
patients sign and that those provisions were inapplicable to [the 
parties].  In the affidavit, the doctor stated that the two women 
presented themselves as a couple seeking reproductive therapy, 
represented that they intended to raise a child together, and acted 
consistently with their desire to raise a child together.  He further 
explained that the sole purpose of the form was to “inform [the 
biological mother] of the procedures that would be undertaken, the 
goals of the procedures and the risks related thereto,” and that the 
form was not tailored to characterize the relationship of either [party] 
beyond that purpose
T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 801-02 (emphasis added). 
.  Finally, the doctor explained that the [waiver 
language] “is used in situations where the donor is anonymous.” 
Accordingly, the informed consent form signed by the biological mother has 
nothing to do with a release of parental rights where she was not an anonymous 
donor, but rather, was a full-fledged partner in the conception and raising of the 
child. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that application of section 742.14 as a bar 
to T.M.H.’s assertion of parental rights is unconstitutional.  The due process 
guarantees in the Florida and United States Constitutions and the privacy provision 
of the Florida Constitution do not permit the State to deprive this biological mother 
 
 
 
- 47 - 
of parental rights where she was an intended parent and actually established a 
parental relationship with the child.  We further hold that sections 742.13(2) and 
742.14, in providing an exception to the statutory relinquishment of parental rights 
for egg and sperm donors who are part of a heterosexual “commissioning couple,” 
but not those who are part of a same-sex couple, violate the Florida and federal 
Equal Protection Clauses.  We therefore hold that T.M.H.’s parental rights have 
not been terminated by law. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the Fifth District’s determination of statutory 
unconstitutionality, answer the certified question in the affirmative, and determine 
that T.M.H. has a constitutionally protected interest to parent the child under the 
United States Constitution and separately under the Florida Constitution.  
However, we disapprove the Fifth District’s decision to the extent that the district 
court alternatively determined that the statute did not apply because the definition 
of “donor” in section 742.14 allows for an inquiry of subjective intent.  Consistent 
with this opinion, we direct that this case be remanded to the trial court to 
determine, based on the best interests of the child, issues such as parental time-
sharing and child support.   
It is so ordered. 
 
QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, C.J., dissents with an opinion in which LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., 
concur. 
 
 
 
 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
POLSTON, C.J., dissenting. 
Unlike the majority, I do not believe that sections 742.14 and 742.13(2), 
Florida Statutes, violate T.M.H.’s constitutional rights to due process, privacy, and 
equal protection.  Instead, contract law, common law, Florida statutory law, and 
the United States and Florida Constitutions all provide that T.M.H. does not have 
parental rights with respect to the child born to D.M.T.  Therefore, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
I refer to the parties in this case using the birth mother’s initials, D.M.T., and 
the egg donor’s initials, T.M.H.  The majority refers to T.M.H. as the biological 
mother, but the term might appear to answer the very question addressed by this 
Court, namely whether T.M.H. is a legal parent.  Furthermore, the terms the 
majority uses to distinguish the parties (birth mother and biological mother) are 
confusing because “both the genetic and gestational roles in bringing this child into 
the world are ‘biological’ processes.”  T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 807 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2011) (Lawson, J., dissenting). 
I.  Background 
 
D.M.T. and T.M.H. were involved in relationship from 1995 until 2006.  In 
January 2004, D.M.T. gave birth to a child who was conceived through assisted 
 
 
 
- 49 - 
reproductive technology.  T.M.H. had donated the egg.  At the time of donation, 
T.M.H. signed two informed consent forms relinquishing any rights or claims to 
her eggs and to any resulting child.   
Both women lived together with the child until May 2006, at which time the 
child began living solely with D.M.T.  Initially after their separation, T.M.H. 
provided support payments and continued her relationship with the child.  
However, D.M.T. and T.M.H.’s relationship further deteriorated, and D.M.T. 
terminated T.M.H.’s contact with the child in December 2007.     
 
In April 2008, T.M.H. filed a petition to establish parental rights and for 
declaratory relief.  She later filed an amended petition and a second amended 
petition.  In her second amended petition, T.M.H. requested the following relief:  
(1) an adjudication of parentage pursuant to chapter 742, Florida Statutes; (2) a 
declaration that chapter 742 provides a mechanism for determining maternity or, 
alternatively, if it just provides a mechanism for determining paternity, a 
declaration that it violates her constitutional rights to equal protection and due 
process under the Florida and United States Constitutions; (3) a declaration that 
chapter 382, Florida Statutes, regarding birth certificates, unconstitutionally 
infringes her rights to due process and equal protection under the Florida and 
United States Constitutions; and (4) a declaration that section 742.14 violates her 
right to privacy under the Florida Constitution and her right to equal protection 
 
 
 
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under the Florida and United States Constitutions.  T.M.H.’s petition 
acknowledged that she had signed an informed consent form waiving her rights to 
any offspring created, but she argued that the form was inconsistent with her and 
D.M.T.’s true intent.   
 
After first moving to quash service of process and moving to dismiss, 
D.M.T. answered T.M.H’s complaint and moved for summary judgment.  D.M.T. 
conceded that she and T.M.H. had raised the child together for a period of time; 
however, D.M.T. did not concede that at the time of T.M.H.’s egg donation the two 
had intended to co-parent any resulting child.  In fact, her answer expressly denied 
that allegation.  Instead, D.M.T. argued that summary judgment was proper, 
despite this disputed factual issue, because T.M.H. lacked parental rights to the 
child born to D.M.T. as a matter of law.  In addition, D.M.T. asserted multiple 
affirmative defenses:  (1) T.M.H. voluntarily executed a waiver of all her rights 
and claims; (2) section 742.14 provides that a donor of any biological material 
relinquishes all rights; and (3) the United States and Florida Constitutions provide 
D.M.T. with an absolute right to privacy to parent the child without any 
interference from T.M.H. 
 
During the summary judgment hearing, T.M.H. did not elaborate on the 
cursory constitutional claims she set forth in her petition.  Instead, T.M.H.’s 
counsel obliquely stated that D.M.T. was asking the trial court “to interpret these 
 
 
 
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statutes and to erase the blood lineage that exists between T.M.H. and the child” 
and that “to apply [Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002),] to 
the instant situation would in my opinion be unconstitutional because [T.M.H.] is 
the biological parent and because this is really the only way that they could have a 
child.”  Then, after referencing Florida’s gestational surrogacy statute (which is not 
at issue in this case), T.M.H.’s counsel vaguely mentioned equal protection in 
connection with a constitutional right to procreate:   
 
Florida law clearly recognizes that most everybody has a 
constitutional right to procreate and raise a child.  It doesn’t 
distinguish between same-sex couples or heterosexual couples.  It just 
says that everybody has the right to procreate. 
 
Now, if a same-sex couple wants to have a child, they can [sic] 
adopt a child under the existing State of Florida law.  But there is 
nothing that prevents them from going to a fertility specialist and 
asking that a child, not be engineered but a procedure be undertaken 
so that a child can be born.  If you consider every single one of those 
situations, as one in which one parent is a donor and the other is not, 
and you then interpret the statute to say that the donor loses all rights 
to that child when the parties break up and the birth parent decides 
that they don’t want to be involved in the situation anymore, then 
what you are doing is you’re depriving one of those parties of equal 
protection under the law because you have a situation where people 
have a constitutional right to procreate.   
 
 
After the hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
D.M.T.  The trial court’s order explained that “[t]he law does not recognize the 
rights of a biological mother versus a birth mother.” Additionally, the trial court 
stated that “[s]ame sex partners do not meet the definition of ‘commissioning 
couples’ as defined in [c]hapter 742,” and that “[a]n agreement or contract between 
 
 
 
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the parties, and/or previous course of conduct, does not create any rights in 
[T.M.H.] to the minor child.”  Therefore, the trial court ruled that, “under the 
current state of the law, the Court cannot find any rights that [T.M.H.] would have 
with regard to the minor child herein.”   
 
On appeal to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, T.M.H. contended that 
D.M.T.’s statutory right to parent is not a superior interest over T.M.H.’s 
fundamental right to parent.  And “[t]o apply Florida Statutes in such a manner as 
to deprive [T.M.H.] of those fundamental rights deprives her of equal protection 
under the law and the right to due process.”  Moreover, T.M.H. claimed that, 
despite the existence of the informed consent form waiving her parental rights, 
sufficient conflict in the record exists to merit an evidentiary hearing.  D.M.T. 
responded that T.M.H., as an egg donor, statutorily relinquished any claim to the 
resulting child and that T.M.H. also voluntarily signed a contractual waiver of 
parental rights at the time of donation.  Furthermore, D.M.T. argued that she has a 
fundamental right to the love and companionship of her child under both the 
United States and Florida Constitutions. 
 
The Fifth District reversed the trial court, holding that section 742.14 is 
inapplicable because T.M.H. did not fall within the statutory definition of “donor” 
since she and D.M.T. intended to co-parent the resulting child.  T.M.H., 79 So. 3d 
at 792.  The Fifth District further held that the trial court’s interpretation and 
 
 
 
- 53 - 
application of section 742.14 infringed upon T.M.H.’s parental rights and her right 
to procreate in violation of both the United States and Florida Constitutions.  Id. at 
793-94, 798.  Finally, the Fifth District concluded that T.M.H.’s contractual waiver 
was ineffective because T.M.H. was not a donor but was instead D.M.T.’s partner.  
Id. at 801-02. 
Based on the above procedural history, two things are abundantly clear.  
First, the constitutional claims that the majority analyzes are not actually before 
this Court because they were not properly raised and preserved below.  Although 
in her complaint T.M.H. alleged that section 742.14 violated her rights to equal 
protection under the United States and Florida Constitutions and her right to 
privacy under the Florida Constitution, “the record does not reflect that [T.M.H.] 
ever advanced any coherent legal theory, analysis or argument in support of these 
constitutional claims.”  Id. at 815 (Lawson, J., dissenting).  Additionally, despite 
the majority’s discussion of the federal and Florida substantive due process 
clauses, T.M.H.’s complaint never alleged a violation of her rights under those 
clauses.  Accordingly, the constitutional challenges to sections 742.14 and 
742.13(2) that the majority discusses were not preserved, and this Court has no 
ability to reverse the trial court’s ruling in favor of D.M.T. on that basis.  See 
Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985) (“In order to be preserved for 
further review by a higher court, an issue must be presented to the lower court and 
 
 
 
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the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal or review must be 
part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved.”).  
 
Second, contrary to the majority’s (and the Fifth District’s) repeated 
statements that it is undisputed that T.M.H. and D.M.T. intended to co-parent any 
child resulting from T.M.H.’s egg donation, the record indicates that the parties’ 
intentions are very much in dispute in this case.  As explained above, D.M.T. never 
conceded that she and T.M.H. had jointly agreed to co-parent, and the trial court 
decided this case on a motion for summary judgment without an evidentiary 
hearing.  In fact, T.M.H. argued before the trial court as well as the Fifth District 
that a factual dispute exists as to her intentions regarding her egg donation and that 
an evidentiary hearing should be required to resolve the factual dispute.  Therefore, 
the majority misstates the undisputed nature of the parties’ intentions in this case, 
and any of the majority’s reasoning based upon that misstatement is inappropriate.           
II.  Contractual Waiver 
As explained above, T.M.H. signed at the time of her egg donation two 
waivers of all claims and rights she might have regarding any resulting child.  
Specifically, the informed consent donor form that T.M.H. signed at the time she 
donated her eggs includes the following language: 
I, the undersigned, [T.M.H.,] forever hereafter relinquish any claims 
to jurisdiction over the offspring that might result from this donation 
and waive any and all rights to future consent, notice, or consultation 
regarding the donation.  I agree that the recipient may regard the 
 
 
 
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donated eggs as her own and any offspring resulted there from as her 
own children. 
 In addition to this informed consent donor form, T.M.H. also signed an “Informed 
Consent Oocyte Recipient” form on the line reserved for the recipient’s partner.  
And, very similar to the donor form, the recipient form provides as follows:  
I/We understand that the egg donor has relinquished any claim to, or 
jurisdiction over the offspring that might result from this donation and 
waive any and all rights to future consent, notice, or consultation 
regarding such donation.  The donor understands that the recipient 
may regard the donated eggs as her own and any offspring resulting 
there from as her own children. 
Therefore, T.M.H. signed two contracts that expressly waived any rights she might 
have with respect to any child resulting from her egg donation.   
 
A person may waive fully vested, fundamental parental rights by completing 
a form.  See, e.g., § 39.806(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (providing that grounds for the 
termination of parental rights may be established “[w]hen the parent or parents 
have voluntarily executed a written surrender of the child and consented to the 
entry of an order giving custody of the child to the department for subsequent 
adoption”); Matter of Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 744 (Fla. 1989) (“Absent a 
finding of fraud, duress, or undue influence, a natural parent’s consent to an 
adoption is valid and irrevocable upon execution of the written consent.”) (quoting 
Matter of Adoption of Doe, 524 So. 2d 1037, 1041 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)); Hall v. 
Hall, 672 So. 2d 60, 62 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“Under Florida law, the birth 
 
 
 
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mother’s written consent to the wife’s adoption of the child is valid and 
irrevocable.”).  In fact, a genetic father’s execution of a written waiver of his 
parental rights was found to be enforceable as freely and voluntarily executed even 
though it was presented to him without his counsel present.  In the Interest of 
D.M.W., 623 So. 2d 634, 635-36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).  Further, as recognized by 
this Court in Chames v. DeMayo, 972 So. 2d 850, 860-61 (Fla. 2007), individuals 
may waive various constitutional rights, including the right to counsel, the right to 
remain silent, and the right to a jury.   
If one can waive fully vested parental rights and various constitutional rights 
by signing a written form, an egg donor can certainly waive any potential interest 
in a possible future child by completing a form.  Consequently, I would give effect 
to the plain language of the two forms that T.M.H. signed and conclude that 
T.M.H. contractually waived any claim of parental rights.  See State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Menendez, 70 So. 3d 566, 569 (Fla. 2011) (“[W]e are bound by 
the plain meaning of the contract’s text.”).    
The majority dismisses the contracts that T.M.H. signed, stating that an 
exact copy of one of the two forms, specifically the donor form, is not present in 
our record.  However, T.M.H. readily acknowledged in her complaint and 
elsewhere that she signed a waiver as part of her informed consent as an egg donor.  
Furthermore, the relevant language from the donor form was quoted in the Fifth 
 
 
 
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District’s opinion and exists in our record as well because it was read by D.M.T.’s 
attorney during the hearing on the motion for summary judgment and is included in 
the transcript of that proceeding.  Additionally, exact copies of the “Informed 
Consent Oocyte Recipient” form are repeatedly present in our record.   
The majority also states that it would ignore any contractual waivers signed 
by T.M.H. anyway, even if an exact copy of the donor form was in our record.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the majority relies on one case from New York and one 
from California.  The majority fails to cite any Florida law for its proposition, 
either cases involving the enforcement of contracts in general or cases involving 
the contractual waiver of rights in circumstances similar to this one.  Notably, the 
Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in Lamaritata, 823 So. 2d 316, is very 
persuasively on point.   
In Lamaritata, a donor and recipient “entered into a contract whereby the 
donor would provide sperm to [the] recipient with the expectation that she would 
become pregnant through artificial insemination and deliver offspring.”  823 So. 2d 
at 318 (quoting L.A.L. v. D.A.L., 714 So. 2d 595, 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), an 
earlier decision involving the same parties).  Further, their “agreement provided 
that if childbirth resulted, the donor would have no parental rights and 
obligations.”  Id.  The Second District held that “[b]oth the contract between the 
parties and the Florida statute controlling these arrangements provide that there are 
 
 
 
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no parental rights or responsibilities resulting to the donor of sperm.”  Id. at 319 
(citing § 742.14, Fla. Stat.).  As a result, “the sperm donor is a nonparent, a 
statutory stranger to the children.”  Id.  The donor’s status as a nonparent continued 
to be true, even though the donor and recipient “entered into subsequent 
stipulations, purportedly to give visitation rights to this [donor.]”  Id.  The Second 
District explained that the subsequent visitation rights agreement between the 
parties was not enforceable because “[t]here are numerous Florida cases holding 
that nonparents are not entitled to visitation rights.”  Id.  
 
In this case, like the donor in Lamaritata, T.M.H. signed a contract at the 
time of donation waiving any claims or rights to any potential child.  And similar 
to the parties in Lamaritata, T.M.H. and D.M.T. agreed at some point to co-parent 
the child as evidenced by T.M.H. participating in parenting decisions for a period 
of time after the child’s birth, although the parenting agreement in this case 
appears to have been oral and not formally executed.  However, just as the Second 
District concluded in Lamaritata, I would hold that the donor in this case is a 
nonparent by operation of the waivers of rights she signed (as well as by operation 
of section 742.14).  Because T.M.H. is not a legal parent, any agreement, oral or 
otherwise, that may have existed between the parties for T.M.H. to co-parent is 
unenforceable under Florida law.  See Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2006) (holding that written agreement between same-sex couple providing 
 
 
 
- 59 - 
parental rights to non-birth mother was unenforceable even though the non-birth 
mother had provided support and had been a de facto parent for years); 
Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (concluding that 
“psychological parent” was not entitled to visitation or custody); Taylor v. 
Kennedy, 649 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (holding that visitation and support 
agreement between man who formerly lived with mother of a child was 
unenforceable because “Florida courts do not recognize a claim for specific 
performance of a contract for visitation in favor of a non-parent”); O’Dell v. 
O’Dell, 629 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (reversing visitation for a divorced 
man and former stepson and explaining that the Second District “has repeatedly 
reversed orders giving visitation rights to nonparents”). 
Accordingly, I would give effect to the plain language of the two waivers 
that T.M.H. signed at the time of donation, two contracts that expressly state that 
T.M.H. “relinquish[es] any claims to jurisdiction over the offspring that might 
result” and that D.M.T. “may regard the donated eggs as her own and any offspring 
resulted there from as her own children.” 
III.  Florida’s Assisted Reproductive Technology Statute 
Similar to the contractual waivers that T.M.H. signed, section 742.14, 
entitled “Donation of eggs, sperm, or preembryos,” provides the following: 
The donor of any egg, sperm, or preembryo, other than the 
commissioning couple or a father who has executed a preplanned 
 
 
 
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adoption agreement under s. 63.212, shall relinquish all maternal or 
paternal rights and obligations with respect to the donation or the 
resulting children.  Only reasonable compensation directly related to 
the donation of eggs, sperm, and preembryos shall be permitted. 
Section 742.13(2), Florida Statutes, defines “[c]ommissioning couple” as “the 
intended mother and father of a child who will be conceived by means of assisted 
reproductive technology using the eggs or sperm of at least one of the intended 
parents.”   
The purpose of this statute is to define the rights of parties who use assisted 
reproductive technology to conceive and to thereby provide certainty and stability 
for parents and children.  “When construing a statute, this Court attempts to give 
effect to the Legislature’s intent, looking first to the actual language used in the 
statute and its plain meaning.”  Trinidad v. Fla. Peninsula Ins. Co., 121 So. 3d 433, 
439 (Fla. 2013). 
Here, the plain language of section 742.14 applies to T.M.H. as “[t]he donor 
of any egg.”  As the majority accurately explains, “[t]he plain language of section 
742.14 does not provide for the subjective intentions of someone in T.M.H.’s 
position to be taken into consideration in determining whether he or she is a 
‘donor’ under the terms of the statute.”  Majority op. at 15.  And T.M.H. does not 
fall within the definition of a “commissioning couple” delineated in section 
742.13(2) as she cannot be considered “the intended mother and father.”  
Therefore, pursuant to the plain language of section 742.14, T.M.H. has no “rights 
 
 
 
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and obligations with respect to the donation or the resulting child[.]”  T.M.H. “is a 
nonparent, a statutory stranger to the child[.]”  Lamaritata, 823 So. 2d at 319.  The 
operation of this statute is in addition to and duplicative of T.M.H.’s contractual 
waiver of any rights or claims to the child.   
Accordingly, under both Florida contract law and Florida statutory law, the 
trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of D.M.T. 
IV.  D.M.T.’s Constitutional Rights 
D.M.T. has consistently argued throughout this case that her constitutional 
rights as the child’s legal parent bar T.M.H’s claims for visitation and parental 
rights, and I agree.   
“Both the United States and Florida Constitutions protect individuals from 
arbitrary and unreasonable governmental interference with a person’s right to life, 
liberty, and property.”  State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1212 (Fla. 2004) 
(citing U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.).   
“[A]s the natural and legal mother of the child, D.M.T. enjoys protection 
under both the United States Constitution and the Florida Constitution against 
interference with her parental rights.”  T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 807 (Lawson, J., 
dissenting).  In fact, D.M.T.’s “liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of 
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of 
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”  Troxel v. Granville, 
 
 
 
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530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).  And “[t]he interest of a parent in the upbringing of his or 
her children has been acknowledged by this Court as a fundamental liberty interest 
under the Florida right to privacy.”  Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 
189, 206 (Fla. 2007) (Lewis, C.J., concurring in result only) (citing Beagle v. 
Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1275 (Fla. 1996)).   
Providing T.M.H. access to visitation and other incidents of a parental 
relationship over D.M.T.’s objection would violate D.M.T.’s due process and 
privacy rights as the child’s legal parent.  See Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 671 
(holding that co-parenting agreement between same-sex couple was unenforceable 
and explaining that a non-legal parent “cannot be granted by statute the right to 
visitation with minor children, because, absent evidence of a demonstrable harm to 
the child, such a grant unconstitutionally interferes with a natural parent’s privacy 
right to rear his or her child”); see also Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 
1998) (holding that grandparent visitation statute unconstitutionally interfered with 
the legal parent’s fundamental right to rear a child).     
V.  The Majority’s Substantive Due Process & Privacy Analysis 
The majority skips any analysis of D.M.T.’s constitutional rights as the legal 
parent.  Instead, the majority concludes as a matter of substantive due process and 
privacy that, because T.M.H. at some point established a relationship with the 
child, the promotion of stability and certainty in families employing assisted 
 
 
 
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reproductive technology is an insufficient state interest to support the termination 
of that relationship.  The majority’s conclusion is based upon its argument that 
T.M.H. has a fundamental interest in her relationship with the child that is 
protected by the due process clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions 
and the privacy clause of the Florida Constitution.   
But contrary to the majority’s description of the asserted interest as the 
elimination of an already established parental relationship, section 742.14 operates 
at the time of donation to eliminate any interests or obligations a sperm donor or 
egg donor may have with regard to a future, potential child.  At the time of the 
donation of biological material, any interest in a potential parental relationship 
would have to be deemed an inchoate interest and not even possibly a fundamental 
interest protected by the due process and privacy clauses as there is indisputably no 
child or parental relationship with a child at that point.  See Adoption of Doe, 543 
So. 2d at 748 (explaining that “it is the assumption of the parental responsibilities 
which is of constitutional significance”); G.F.C. v. S.G., 686 So. 2d 1382, 1385-86 
(Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (holding that a genetic father who has not acted as a parent 
does not have any protected liberty interest in the child under the Florida or federal 
constitutions); § 63.022(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (“An unmarried biological father has an 
inchoate interest that acquires constitutional protection only when he demonstrates 
a timely and full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood[.]”). 
 
 
 
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Moreover, the majority’s analysis ignores a vital aspect of substantive due 
process jurisprudence.  The United States Supreme Court has recognized the 
temptation for members of a court to improperly constitutionalize their own 
preferences and thereby impose them upon the rest of the citizenry in perpetuity 
and, therefore, has “insisted not merely that the interest denominated as a ‘liberty’ 
be ‘fundamental’ (a concept that, in isolation, is hard to objectify), but also that it 
be an interest traditionally protected by our society.”  Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 
U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (footnote omitted).  In other words, due process only affords 
protections to rights “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to 
be ranked as fundamental.”  Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).  
“This insistence that the asserted liberty interest be rooted in history and tradition 
is evident, as elsewhere, in [United States Supreme Court] cases according 
constitutional protection to certain parental rights.”  Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123; 
see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) (“It is self-evident that [the 
connections between parents and children] are sufficiently vital to merit 
constitutional protection in appropriate cases.  In deciding whether this is such a 
case, however, we must consider the broad framework that has traditionally been 
used to resolve the legal problems arising from the parent-child relationship.”) 
(emphasis added).  
 
 
 
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Without discussing, as required by Snyder, whether the asserted interest is 
rooted in history and tradition, the majority concludes that T.M.H. has a 
fundamental right to parent the child in this case by reading Lehr as establishing 
that a fundamental right is created when genetic parenthood is combined with the 
establishment of a parental relationship.  However, a plurality of the United States 
Supreme Court has emphatically stated that this reading of Lehr (as well as this 
reading of its other parental rights cases) “distorts the rationale of those cases.”  
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123.  According to the United States Supreme Court, Lehr 
and its other parental rights cases “rest not upon such isolated factors but upon the 
historic respect—indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term—traditionally 
accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary family.”  Id.  (footnote 
omitted).  
Therefore, based upon the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of its 
own precedent, the substantive due process issue in the present case really comes 
down to whether relationships like the one between T.M.H. and the child born to 
D.M.T. “ha[ve] been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices 
of our society, or whether on any other basis [they have] been accorded special 
protection.”  Id. at 124.  Of course, it is impossible to conclude that such 
relationships have been treated in this manner.  In fact, our history indicates that 
 
 
 
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quite the opposite is true as our society has historically protected the legal rights of 
birth mothers and the traditional family.   
Historically, the birth mother was the only legal mother of a child.  As a New 
York court has explained, “[a]t common law, parentage derived from two events, a 
child’s birth to its ‘mother,’ and the mother’s marriage to a man.  Children born 
out-of-wedlock had only one legal parent, their birth mother.”  In re Matter of 
Sebastian,  879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (N.Y. Sur. 2009); see also Gossett v. 
Ullendorff, 154 So. 177, 181 (Fla. 1934) (explaining that a “wife is not permitted 
to deny the parentage of children born during wedlock” because “maternity is 
never uncertain”).  Later, legislatures provided for paternity proceedings to legally 
establish the parental rights and obligations of unwed, genetic fathers in certain 
circumstances as well as for adoption.  See, e.g., § 742.10, Fla. Stat; ch. 63, Fla. 
Stat.  But “[Florida] law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual 
[mother]hood,” either historically or presently.  Michael H., 491 U.S. at 118; cf. 
art. I, § 27, Fla. Const. (defining marriage in Florida as “the legal union of only one 
man and one woman”).10
                                         
 
10.  Florida’s constitutional definition of marriage remains valid.  It and this 
case are not affected by the United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions in 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (holding that the provision 
of the Defense of Marriage Act that defines marriage for federal law purposes 
“violates basic due process and equal protection principles” as it deviates “from the 
usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage”), and 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013)  (holding that the proponents 
  For example, section 39.01(49), Florida Statutes, defines 
 
 
 
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“[p]arent” as “a woman who gives birth to a child and a man whose consent to the 
adoption of the child would be required under s. 63.062(1),” and section 
63.032(12), Florida Statutes, similarly defines “[p]arent” as “a woman who gives 
birth to a child and who is not a gestational surrogate as defined in s. 742.13 or a 
man whose consent to the adoption of the child would be required under s. 
63.062(1).”  See also § 382.002(11), Fla. Stat. (“ ‘Live birth’ means the complete 
expulsion or extraction of a product of human conception from its mother[.]”); § 
382.013(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (requiring the listing of the child’s birth mother on the 
birth certificate as a legal parent).   
Accordingly, “the claim that a State must recognize multiple [mother]hood 
has no support in the history or traditions of this country.”  Michael H., 491 U.S. at 
131.  And because it lacks this support, any substantive due process claim raised 
by T.M.H. (if one, in fact, had been properly raised and preserved) must fail.  See 
Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105 (explaining that due process only affords protections to 
liberty interests “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental”).   
 
But not only does the majority’s analysis skip the vital question of whether 
the alleged right is “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to 
                                                                                                                                   
of California’s constitutional provision defining marriage did not have standing to 
appeal district court’s order declaring that definition unconstitutional). 
 
 
 
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be ranked as fundamental,”11
Based upon the above, it is clear that the majority’s substantive due process 
analysis is flawed and lacks an obvious stopping point even though the majority 
repeatedly states that its holding only extends to the particular circumstances of 
this case.   
 it also suffers from the problem of having no seeming 
or logical end point.  Does the majority’s analysis now mean that section 742.14 is 
unconstitutional as applied to all sperm and egg donors since they are also denied 
the opportunity to develop parental relationships with children resulting from their 
biological material?  Or perhaps the majority would limit its holding to those 
sperm and egg donors who may later develop relationships with resulting children 
despite the operation of the statute?  However, does this mean that a child could 
have a constitutional right to two mothers and a father (or two fathers), perhaps 
where a married, heterosexual couple agrees to and then subsequently raises a child 
with the egg donor, an egg donor who is in a committed relationship with a man 
other than the genetic father?  Or perhaps this new constitutional right to employ 
assisted reproductive technology without the relinquishment of any donor rights 
and obligations only applies to those in same-sex relationships?  Additionally, does 
this newly created constitutional right now override all waivers of parental rights, 
including voluntary waivers leading to adoption? 
                                         
 
11.  Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105. 
 
 
 
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VI.  Equal Protection   
The majority also concludes that sections 742.14 and 742.13(2) violate the 
equal protection clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions by 
“exempting heterosexual couples, but not same-sex couples, from the automatic 
relinquishment of parental rights when seeking the assistance of reproductive 
technology to conceive a child with the intent to become the child’s parents.”  
Majority op. at 32.  It reaches this conclusion by applying a rational basis analysis 
and assuming that there is no legitimate state purpose behind these statutes.  
However, the Legislature had a legitimate state purpose in enacting these statutes.   
“Under a ‘rational basis’ standard of review a court should inquire only 
whether it is conceivable that the regulatory classification bears some rational 
relationship to a legitimate state purpose[:]” 
The burden is upon the party challenging the statute or regulation to 
show that there is no
Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass’n v. Thomas, 434 So. 2d 306, 308 (Fla. 1983); see 
also Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 112 (Fla. 2002).  It is not the judiciary’s 
task under the rational basis standard “to determine whether the legislation 
achieves its intended goal in the best manner possible, but only whether the goal is 
legitimate and the means to achieve it are rationally related to the goal.”  
 conceivable factual predicate which would 
rationally support the classification under attack.  Where the 
challenging party fails to meet this difficult burden, the statute or 
regulation must be sustained. 
 
 
 
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Loxahatchee River Envtl. Control Dist. v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty., 496 So. 
2d 930, 938 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).  “Some inequality or imprecision will not render 
a statute invalid.”  Acton v. Ft. Lauderdale Hosp., 440 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 
1983).   
The rationale underlying sections 742.14 and 742.13(2) is the promotion of 
stability, certainty, and permanence in families employing assisted reproductive 
technology.  And the State has a legitimate interest in regulating assisted 
reproductive technology and its social and economic effects.  See § 63.022(1)(a), 
Fla. Stat. (“The state has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent 
homes for adoptive children[.]”); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1989) 
(“[W]here parental rights over a minor child are concerned, society has recognized 
additional state interests—protection of the immature minor and preservation of 
the family unit.”); Griffin v. State, 396 So. 2d 152, 155 (Fla. 1981) (“The well-
being of children is a subject within the state’s constitutional power to regulate.”).  
The statutes are rationally related to this legitimate interest since allowing claims 
of parentage by egg and sperm donors could disrupt the certainty, stability, and 
permanence that generally proves beneficial to families employing assisted 
reproductive technology, including the constitutionally protected parental rights of 
legal birth mothers “to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of 
their children.”  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.  Accordingly, because it pursues a 
 
 
 
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legitimate purpose by rational means, Florida’s decision to treat T.M.H. differently 
from a commissioning couple cannot be deemed a denial of equal protection. 
Furthermore, as Judge Lawson aptly noted,  
the statute in question here is not directed just at men or women, 
heterosexuals or homosexuals, or any other narrow class.  It places 
broad limits on the right of all citizens to make a parentage claim after 
donating genetic material to another.  And . . . the statute does not bar 
[T.M.H.] (or any women, irrespective of sexual preference) from 
using assisted reproductive technology to conceive, bear and give 
birth to a child of her own, using her own body.  This appears, at least 
on its face, to be a rational way to address this difficult social policy 
issue, irrespective of whether it reflects a policy choice that the 
majority or I would prefer. 
T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 823 (Lawson, J., dissenting).  Simply put, T.M.H. did not 
have to choose this way.  The statute does not prohibit T.M.H. from engaging in 
any sexual activity, using assisted reproductive technology to pass along her genes 
to a child gestated by another, or parenting a child that she personally gave birth to 
or legally adopted.  The statute does not stand in the way of T.M.H. having 
children.     
VII.  Conclusion 
 
As explained above, T.M.H. contractually waived all of her rights and 
claims to any resulting child at the time of her egg donation.  Furthermore, the 
plain language of Florida’s assisted reproductive technology statute provides that 
T.M.H. has no parental rights or obligations with respect to the child born to 
D.M.T.  And, contrary to the majority’s decision otherwise, Florida’s assisted 
 
 
 
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reproductive technology statute does not violate T.M.H.’s rights to due process, 
privacy, and equal protection under the United States and Florida Constitutions.   
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
 
LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur. 
 
 
An Appeal from the District Court of Appeal – Statutory or Constitutional 
Invalidity 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D09-3559 
 
(Brevard County) 
 
Michael B. Jones of The Wheelock Law Firm, LLC, Orlando, Florida,  
 
for Appellant 
 
Christopher V. Carlyle and Shannon McLin Carlyle of The Carlyle Appellate 
Law Firm, The Villages, Florida; Robert A. Segal of Law Offices of Robert A. 
Segal, P.A., Melbourne, Florida,  
 
for Appellee  
 
Randall C. Marshall, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida,  
 
Inc. 
 
Leslie Cooper, New York, New York,  
 
 
for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberty Union Foundation 
 
Beth Littrell, Atlanta, Georgia, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Lambda Legal 
 
Joseph S. Jackson, Gainesville, Florida, 
 
 
 
- 73 - 
 
for Amici Curiae University of Florida Frederic G. Levin College of Law 
Center on Children and Families, University of Miami School of Law 
Children and Youth Law Clinic, Nova Southeastern University Law Center 
Children and Families Clinic, and Barry University School of Law Children 
and Families Clinic  
 
Shannon P. Minter of the National Center for Lesbian Rights, San Francisco, 
California; Cristina Alonso and Christopher B. Corts of Carlton Fields, P.A., 
Miami, Florida, 
 
for Amicus Curiae American Academy of Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Attorneys 
 
Reginald Brown, Daniel S. Volchok, and Daniel Aguilar of Wilmer Cutler 
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, D.C. 
 
for Amici Curiae The National Association of Social Workers and National 
Association of Social Workers, Florida Chapter