Title: Kean Federation of Teachers v. Morell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 21, 2018

Kean Federation of Teachers v. Morell Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary At issue in this case were: (1) the extent of Kean University’s (Kean) notice obligations as a public body under the Open Public Meetings Act (the OPMA or the Act), and whether the notice for the personnel exception established in Rice v. Union County Regional High School Board of Education, 155 N.J. Super. 64, 73 (App. Div. 1977) (the Rice notice) applied here; (2) timing parameters for the release of minutes of meetings; and (3) the appropriate remedy if the OPMA was violated in the latter respect in this matter. Kean’s Board of Trustees (the Board), as a public body, is required to annually establish and publish a schedule of its regular meetings. Plaintiff Valera Hascup received a letter from the University President informing her that he would not nominate her for reappointment at the Board’s meeting scheduled for December 6, 2014. On November 29, 2014, the Board published a tentative agenda for the December meeting on the Kean University website, indicating that the Board intended to discuss faculty reappointments during the public meeting. It did not send a Rice notice. On December 18, 2014, co-plaintiff James Castiglione, a Kean professor and President of the Kean Federation of Teachers (KFT), filed an Open Public Records Act request seeking the minutes from the closed sessions of the September 15 and December 6, 2014 meetings. The Appellate Division affirmed the determination that the Board did not make the meeting minutes promptly available, but reversed and vacated a permanent injunction. The New Jersey Supreme Court found there was no obligation to send Rice notices here, where the Board determined from the start to conduct its discussion about faculty reappointments in public session. With respect to the release of meeting minutes, the delay that occurred was unreasonable no matter the excuses advanced by the Board, but the Court modified the Appellate Division’s holding requiring the Board to set a regular meeting schedule. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) Kean Federation of Teachers v. Ada Morell (A-84-16) (078926)Argued January 17, 2018 -- Decided June 21, 2018LaVECCHIA, J., writing for the Court. At issue in this case are (1) the extent of Kean University’s (Kean) notice obligations as a public body under the Open Public Meetings Act (the OPMA or the Act), N.J.S.A. 10:4- 6 to -21, and whether the notice for the personnel exception established in Rice v. Union County Regional High School Board of Education, 155 N.J. Super. 64, 73 (App. Div. 1977) (the Rice notice) applied here; (2) timing parameters for the release of minutes of meetings; and (3) the appropriate remedy if the OPMA was violated in the latter respect in this matter. The OPMA requires the meetings of public bodies to be conducted in open session and in view of the public. N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(a). In relevant part for purposes of this appeal, the Act provides that “[a] public body may exclude the public only from that portion of a meeting at which the public body discusses” a “matter involving the . . . termination of employment . . . of any . . . current . . . employee . . . unless all the individual employees or appointees whose rights could be adversely affected request in writing that the matter or matters be discussed at a public meeting.” N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8). Employees whose employment interests could be adversely affected have the right to waive the protection of having their matter discussed in closed session. The ability to make that request is of little import, however, if affected employees are not aware that their employment may be discussed. Thus, employees must be given “reasonable notice” when a public entity intends to take adverse employment action related to them in private session. Rice, 155 N.J. Super. at 74. Finally, the OPMA requires public bodies to make their meeting minutes “promptly available to the public to the extent that making such matters public shall not be inconsistent with [N.J.S.A. 10:4-12],” N.J.S.A. 10:4-14, but does not define “promptly available.” Kean’s Board of Trustees (the Board), as a public body, is required to annually establish and publish a schedule of its regular meetings. See N.J.S.A. 10:4-18. The Board’s policy has been to hold five regularly scheduled meetings each year. Further, it is the Board’s practice to approve a prior session’s minutes at the next scheduled meeting. One of the Board’s duties is to vote on the reappointment or non-appointment of faculty members. The President of the University provides a recommendation to the Board about whether to reappoint each individual. Before the Board holds its meeting at which the reappointment of faculty will be on the agenda, a Board subcommittee reviews the President’s recommendations and then provides its own recommendation to the Board. 1 Plaintiff Valera Hascup received a letter from the University President informing her that he would not nominate her for reappointment at the Board’s meeting scheduled for December 6, 2014. On November 29, 2014, the Board published a tentative agenda for the December meeting on the Kean University website, indicating that the Board intended to discuss faculty reappointments during the public meeting. It did not send a Rice notice. The Board held its December 6, 2014 meeting as scheduled. The Board voted in public session to accept the President’s recommendations -- reviewed by the subcommittee -- as to the reappointment and non-reappointment of faculty members. At that meeting, the Board also approved the minutes of its prior meeting held on September 15, 2014. Minutes from both the public and closed sessions were approved, but the closed session minutes were to be redacted by legal counsel. On December 18, 2014, co-plaintiff James Castiglione, a Kean professor and President of the Kean Federation of Teachers (KFT), filed an Open Public Records Act request seeking the minutes from the closed sessions of the September 15 and December 6, 2014 meetings. The minutes for the closed session from the September 15 meeting were made available on February 2, 2015. The minutes for the December 6 meeting were approved at the March 2 meeting and were released on March 4, 2015. The KFT, Castiglione, and Hascup filed the instant complaint in lieu of prerogative writs in the Law Division, naming as defendants Kean, the Board, and Board Chairperson Ada Morell. The complaint alleged that defendants violated the OPMA by failing to issue Rice notices prior to the December 6, 2014 meeting and by failing to make the Board’s minutes for the September 15 and December 6, 2014 meetings “promptly available” to the public. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to each party. The court held that the Board was not required to issue Rice notices but that the Board had violated the “promptly available” requirement of N.J.S.A. 10:4-14. The court issued a permanent injunction requiring the Board to make minutes available to the public within forty-five days. The Appellate Division affirmed the determination that the Board did not make the meeting minutes promptly available, but reversed and vacated the permanent injunction. 448 N.J. Super. 520, 526 (App. Div. 2017). The panel ordered the Board to adopt a meeting schedule for the 2017-18 academic year that would promote the release of meeting minutes within thirty to forty-five days of the last meeting, except in “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 545. Turning to the Rice issue, the panel held that Rice notices are required “in advance of any meeting at which a personnel decision may occur.” Id. at 544. The panel declared void all personnel-related actions taken by the Board at the December 6 meeting. Id. at 546. The Court granted defendants’ petition for certification. 230 N.J. 524 (2017).HELD: There is no obligation to send Rice notices here, where the Board determined from the start to conduct its discussion about faculty reappointments in public session. Turning to the release of meeting minutes, the delay that occurred is unreasonable no matter the excuses advanced by the Board, but the Court modifies the Appellate Division’s holding requiring the Board to set a regular meeting schedule. 2 1. “A public body may exclude the public only from that portion of a meeting at which the public body discusses any” of the enumerated topics. N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b) (emphasis added). Although N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8) adds personnel matters to the enumerated topics that a governing body may consider privately, it also authorizes an exception to that personnel exception -- when “all individual employees . . . whose rights could be adversely affected request in writing that the matter or matters be discussed at a public meeting,” the governing body may not opt to shut its doors. (emphasis added). Two principles thus emerge: the public entity may elect to discuss a topic listed in subsection (b) in closed session, and the choice to have that discussion in private may be overridden if all employees whose rights could be adversely affected request in writing that the discussion occur at a public session. The statute provides employees with the right to move a private discussion into the sunshine of a public discussion. The personnel exception’s language is not applicable when a public entity already intends to take public action. That conclusion is not undermined by a public body’s use of a subcommittee of the whole to examine a topic in advance of a public meeting. Forcing public bodies to issue Rice notices and robustly discuss all personnel matters, as the Appellate Division intimated, would intrude on a public body’s prerogative as to how to conduct its meetings. The OPMA does not contain a requirement about the robustness of the discussion that must take place on a topic. The Court reverses on this issue and also reverses the voiding of the personnel actions taken by the Board. (pp. 23-30)2. The Court has not specifically addressed the meaning of the “promptly available” requirement but has made clear that minutes from a closed session are still subject to the promptly available requirement. Even so, a public entity is permitted to take steps to modify the disclosure where personal privacy interests are implicated. The OPMA’s legislative history recognizes that closed-session minutes may need to be shielded from the public for a longer period due to the sensitive nature of the material. The delay that occurred here -- the release of minutes for the September 2014 meeting in February 2015 -- is unreasonable no matter the individual or combination of excuses advanced by the Board. The Court affirms the judgment of the panel as to the failure to make minutes promptly available. (pp. 31-34)3. The Court, however, modifies the remedy the panel imposed for that failure. A public entity must establish its meeting schedule to suit the managerial obligations of its public responsibilities while also acting responsibly concerning its obligation to make minutes promptly available to the public. The OPMA’s requirements apply to a diverse range of public entities, so no one set amount of time for the release of minutes should be mandated. Reasonableness must remain the touchstone when assessing promptness. The Court modifies the panel’s holding requiring the Board to set a schedule that would allow for the approval of minutes within forty-five days but cautions that, if a public entity were to continue to limit its meetings to five per year, the Court might see the issue again. (pp. 35-37) REVERSED in part and AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED in part.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICES PATTERSON and TIMPONE did not participate. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 84 September Term 2016 078926KEAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, JAMES CASTIGLIONE, and VALERA HASCUP, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v.ADA MORELL, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF KEAN UNIVERSITY, and KEAN UNIVERSITY, a body Corporate and Politic, Defendants-Appellants. Argued January 17, 2018 – Decided June 21, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 448 N.J. Super. 520 (App. Div. 2017). James P. Lidon argued the cause for appellants (McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, attorneys; James P. Lidon, of counsel and on the briefs, and John J. Peirano, on the briefs). Robert A. Fagella argued the cause for respondents (Zazzali, Fagella, Nowak, Kleinbaum and Friedman, attorneys; Robert A. Fagella, of counsel and on the briefs, and Genevieve M. Murphy-Bradacs, on the briefs). Michael O’B. Boldt argued the cause for amicus curiae Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, attorneys; John J. Peirano, on the brief). 1 Arnold H. Chait argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Council of County Colleges (Vogel, Chait, Collins & Schneider, attorneys; Arnold H. Chait, of counsel and on the brief, and Craig A. Long, on the brief).John C. Gillespie argued the cause for amici curiae New Jersey State League of Municipalities and New Jersey Institute of Local Government Attorneys (Parker McCay, attorneys; John C. Gillespie, on the brief).Alexi M. Velez argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal Director, attorney; Alexi M. Velez, Edward L. Barocas, and Jeanne M. LoCicero, on the brief).Louis P. Bucceri argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Education Association (Bucceri & Pincus, attorneys; Louis P. Bucceri, of counsel and on the brief, and Albert J. Leonardo, on the brief).Cherie L. Adams submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae State-Operated School District of the City of Camden and the Trenton Board of Education (Adams Gutierrez & Lattiboudere, attorneys; Cherie L. Adams, of counsel and on the brief, and Daniel A. Schlein, on the brief).Cynthia J. Jahn submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey School Boards Association (Cynthia Jahn, General Counsel, attorney; Cynthia J. Jahn and John J. Burns, on the brief).CJ Griffin submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Libertarians for Transparent Government (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; CJ Griffin, of counsel and on the brief, and Michael J. Zoller, on the brief).Kevin P. McGovern submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Council of New 2 Jersey State College Locals AFT, AFL-CIO (Mets Schiro McGovern & Paris, attorneys; Kevin P. McGovern, of counsel and on the brief, and David M. Bander, on the brief). Maria M. Lepore submitted a letter brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey Association of School Administrators (Maria M. Lepore, Chief Counsel, attorney; Maria M. Lepore, of counsel and on the brief, and Andrew Babiak, on the brief). JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. With the enactment of the Open Public Meetings Act (theOPMA or the Act), L. 1975, c. 231 (codified at N.J.S.A. 10:4-6to -21), the Legislature established procedures governing theconduct of meetings of public bodies. The Act makes explicitthe legislative intent to ensure the public’s right to bepresent at public meetings and to witness government in action.N.J.S.A. 10:4-7. That legislative intent is balanced by anexpress recognition that public bodies must be allowed toexercise discretion in determining how to perform their tasks,see N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(a), and whether to engage in privatediscussion and voting under certain identified circumstances,N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b). In this appeal, we consider whether the Appellate Divisionerred in its application of the OPMA and relevant interpretivecase law to a specific public institution of higher education,thereby burdening that entity and, by implication, other public 3 bodies in the exercise of their discretion in how to conducttheir meetings. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the AppellateDivision’s judgment as to notice requirements under the OPMA,and we affirm the judgment as to the Board’s failure to makeminutes promptly available but modify the remedy the panelimposed for that failure. I. Before reciting the details of the dispute that generatedthis appeal, it is helpful to review the OPMA’s basic provisionsas well as a key case on which the parties base their clashingviews of the Act’s requirements. A. The OPMA establishes requirements for notice of meetings,N.J.S.A. 10:4-9, publication of an annual schedule of regularmeetings, N.J.S.A. 10:4-18, and the keeping and public releaseof minutes, N.J.S.A. 10:4-14, as well as definitions of basicconcepts of “public business” and “adequate notice,” N.J.S.A.10:4-8(c), (d). The requirements are generic even though thedefinition of “public body” encompasses various types of publicinstitutions of diverse membership size, obligations, meetingneeds, and other practicalities. See N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(a). The Act’s declared goal is to ensure “the right of thepublic to be present for all meetings of public bodies, and to 4 witness in full detail all phases of the deliberation, policyformulation, and decision making of public bodies.” N.J.S.A.10:4-7. As a general rule, no meeting may occur withoutadherence to the Act’s requirements as to adequacy of notice tothe public. N.J.S.A. 10:4-9. Except as identified, the OPMA requires the meetings ofpublic bodies to be conducted in open session and in view of thepublic. N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(a). That said, public bodies aregiven discretion in how to conduct their meetings. Ibid.(“Nothing in this act shall be construed to limit the discretionof a public body to permit, prohibit, or regulate the activeparticipation of the public at any meeting, except that”municipal governing bodies and local boards of education arerequired to set aside time for public comment). The samesection acknowledges circumstances under which a public body mayenter into a closed session, for example, to address mattersrequired by federal or state law to be confidential; matters ofindividual privacy; matters pertaining to collective bargainingor the purchase, lease, or acquisition of real property; andpending or anticipated litigation or contract negotiation inwhich the public body is, or may become, a party. N.J.S.A.10:4-12(b). In relevant part for purposes of this appeal, theAct provides: 5 A public body may exclude the public only from that portion of a meeting at which the public body discusses any: . . . . matter involving the employment, appointment, [or] termination of employment . . . of any specific prospective public officer or employee or current public officer or employee employed or appointed by the public body, unless all the individual employees or appointees whose rights could be adversely affected request in writing that the matter or matters be discussed at a public meeting . . . . [N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8).]That exception concerning personnel matters is a focal point ofthis appeal. B. Notably, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8), employeeswhose employment interests could be adversely affected have theright to waive the protection of having their matter discussedin closed session. The subsection provides for such individualsto choose that the public body have the discussion in public.Ibid. The ability to make that request is of little import,however, if affected employees are not aware that theiremployment may be discussed at a future meeting -- an issueaddressed soon after the OPMA’s adoption by the Appellate 6 Division in Rice v. Union County Regional High School Board ofEducation, 155 N.J. Super. 64, 73 (App. Div. 1977). In that case, the Appellate Division considered whether aschool board violated N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8) by entering intoclosed session and discussing whether to reduce staff byterminating seventeen school employees at the end of the schoolyear for budgetary purposes. Id. at 68-69. The employees werenot given advance notice that their termination would bediscussed in a closed session. See id. at 73-74. In finding the board’s failure of notice violative of theOPMA, the Rice appellate panel noted that the OPMA providesaffected employees with the right “to have a public discussionof his or her personnel matter.” Id. at 72. Tying thepersonnel exception of N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8) to the employees’privacy interests, the panel stated that the right to compelpublic action on the personnel topic would be rendered “uselessand inoperative” if affected personnel are not given some formof notice that action affecting their employment status is onthe agenda. Ibid. Continuing, the panel stated: The plain implication of the personnel exception to the [OPMA] is that if all employees whose rights could be adversely affected decide to request a public hearing, they can only exercise that statutory right and request a public hearing if they have reasonable advance notice so as to enable them to (1) make a decision on whether they desire 7 a public discussion and (2) prepare and present an appropriate request in writing. [Id. at 73.] The panel held that employees must be given “reasonablenotice” when a public entity intends to consider taking adverseemployment action related to them. Id. at 74. The details ofthat notice, as described above, have become commonly known as aRice notice. C. Finally, also at issue in this appeal is the timeliness ofthe release of the minutes from meetings. The OPMA requirespublic bodies to make their meeting minutes “promptly availableto the public to the extent that making such matters publicshall not be inconsistent with [N.J.S.A. 10:4-12].” N.J.S.A.10:4-14. The Act does not define what it means to make meetingminutes “promptly available.” See N.J.S.A. 10:4-8 (providingdefinitions for OPMA terms). II. A. The matter before us is one of a number of proceedingsconcerning certain public meetings of a New Jersey higher-education institution. There is no dispute as to the salientfacts. The parties’ disagreement is over the OPMA’srequirements under the circumstances that occurred here. 8 Specifically at issue are (1) the extent of the public body’snotice obligations under the OPMA and whether the Rice noticefor the personnel exception applied; (2) timing parameters forthe release of minutes of meetings; and (3) the appropriateremedy if the OPMA was violated in the latter respect in thismatter. We draw the facts from the record created in the LawDivision. Kean University (Kean) is a public institution of highereducation operating campuses in Union and Ocean Counties. As apublic university, Kean’s Board of Trustees (the Board) hasstatutory authority, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:64-6, to directand control Kean’s general operations, curriculum, and policy.The Board is required to “meet and organize annually at aregular meeting held during the second week of September, by theelection of a chairman, vice chairman and such other officers asthe board shall determine.” N.J.S.A. 18A:64-4. Aside from that mandatory annual meeting, “[t]he board maymeet at such other times and at such places as it maydesignate.” Ibid. The OPMA requires the Board, as a publicbody, to annually establish, post, and otherwise publish aschedule of its regular meetings. See N.J.S.A. 10:4-18. Theschedule can be revised and republished thereafter. Ibid. Over the last several years, the Board’s policy has been tohold five regularly scheduled meetings each year. Thus, for the 9 2014-15 academic year the Board held meetings on September 15,2014; December 6, 2014; March 2, 2015; May 11, 2015; and June29, 2015. Further, it is the Board’s practice to approve aprior session’s minutes at the next scheduled meeting.Consistent with that, the minutes for the September 15, 2014meeting, for example, were approved at the December 6, 2014meeting. One of the Board’s duties is to vote on the reappointmentor non-appointment of faculty members. That procedure occurs inaccordance with a set protocol. As described in swornstatements provided to the Law Division, faculty applicantswhose appointments are expiring and who must be reappointed tocontinue on the faculty are considered first by the President ofthe University, who is the academic head of the institution.The President then provides a recommendation to the Board aboutwhether to reappoint each individual. Prior to notifying theBoard about a recommendation either for or againstreappointment, the President notifies each affected facultymember regarding the recommendation and the date of the Boardmeeting at which the Board will consider the nominations forreappointment.1 Before the Board holds its meeting at which the1 At oral argument we were informed that faculty who are not recommended for reappointment have grievance rights under the existing collective bargaining agreement. 10 reappointment of faculty will be on the agenda for action, aBoard subcommittee -- known as the Academic Policy and ProgramsCommittee -- reviews the President’s recommendations and thenprovides its own recommendation to the Board in the form of apersonnel report entitled “Faculty Reappointments and FacultyNon-Reappointments.” B. Prior to the commencement of this action, the KeanFederation of Teachers (the KFT) -- a union representing theKean faculty -- and two individual professors sued the Board.The complaint alleged that the Board violated the OPMA byfailing to make “promptly available,” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:4-14, minutes from a December 7, 2013 meeting at which the Boardvoted not to reappoint the two professors. The complaint alsoalleged that the Board was required to and failed to issue Ricenotices to the individual professors in advance of closedsession discussions followed by a public vote at that meeting. The Law Division issued an opinion, dated June 17, 2014,holding that the Board’s failure to issue Rice notices toaffected faculty violated the OPMA. However, the courtdeclined, under the circumstances, to void the Board’s action.The court issued a second opinion on September 18, 2014, holdingthat the Board had failed to meet the “promptly available”requirement of N.J.S.A. 10:4-14 with respect to the release of 11 minutes from the closed session of the Board. The court“suggest[ed]” a guideline of between thirty to forty-five daysfor release of minutes, indicating that the “promptly available”requirement would be satisfied if the Board made the minutesavailable within that timeframe. Those two Law Division decisions are backdrop to thepresent matter. C. On November 14, 2014, plaintiff Valera Hascup, an untenuredAssistant Professor of Nursing employed by Kean since 2011,received a letter from the University President informing herthat he would not nominate her for reappointment at the Board’smeeting scheduled for December 6, 2014. Before that meetingoccurred, counsel for the KFT wrote to the Board’s attorney.The letter set forth the KFT’s position that, to comply with theLaw Division’s June 2014 order, the Board should send Ricenotices at least two weeks before the December 6 meeting tofaculty affected by the reappointment decisions to be made bythe Board at that meeting. On November 29, 2014, the Boardpublished a tentative agenda for the December meeting on theKean University website, indicating that the Board intended todiscuss faculty reappointments during the public meeting.Specifically, the agenda listed the Subcommittee’s report on thePresident’s recommendations on faculty retention among the items 12 to be discussed in public session. The Board also issued acampus announcement regarding the meeting, as well as an e-mailto impacted groups. It did not send a Rice notice to Hascup orto the other affected faculty members. The Board held its December 6, 2014 meeting as scheduled.The Board voted in public session to accept the President’srecommendations -- reviewed by the Subcommittee -- as to thereappointment and non-reappointment of faculty members,including the President’s recommendation against thereappointment of Hascup. At that meeting, the Board also approved the minutes of itsprior meeting held on September 15, 2014. Minutes from both thepublic and closed sessions were approved, but the closed sessionminutes were to be redacted by legal counsel. On December 18, 2014, co-plaintiff James Castiglione, aKean professor and President of the KFT, filed an Open PublicRecords Act (OPRA)2 request seeking the minutes from the closedsessions of the September 15 and December 6, 2014 meetings.Audrey Kelly, the Board’s Executive Director who was responsiblefor OPRA requests, was on leave until mid-January and did notlearn of the request until her return. Apparently, in her2 N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13. 13 absence, no one assumed responsibility for her duties withrespect to that OPRA request. The minutes for the closed session from the September 15meeting were made available on February 2, 2015. With regard tothe December meeting minutes, the record reveals that Kellyacknowledged she was aware of the prior trial court decisionthat recommended release of minutes from closed sessions of theBoard within forty-five days. She believed she could not complywith that timeframe because the Board must approve the minutesbefore they can be released, which requires a formal publicmeeting conducted in conformity with the OPMA. Kelly concluded,with the advice of Board counsel, that she therefore could notrelease the minutes for the December 6, 2014 meeting prior tothe Board’s next scheduled meeting on March 2, 2015.Accordingly, the minutes for the December 6 meeting wereapproved at the March 2 meeting and were released on March 4,2015. D. The KFT, Castiglione, and Hascup filed the instantcomplaint in lieu of prerogative writs in the Law Division onFebruary 11, 2015, naming as defendants Kean, the Board, andBoard Chairperson Ada Morell. The complaint alleged thatdefendants violated the OPMA by failing to issue Rice noticesprior to the December 6, 2014 meeting and by failing to make the 14 Board’s minutes for the September 15 and December 6, 2014meetings “promptly available” to the public. The matter proceeded on cross-motions for summary judgment.In an opinion dated May 21, 2015, the trial court grantedpartial summary judgment to each party. On the notice issue,the court held that the Board was not required to issue Ricenotices prior to the December meeting because the personnelactions occurred during the public session. The court explainedthat Rice provides an employee the right to advance notice andto demand a public discussion of matters relating to thatemployee and, thus, is implicated “[o]nly when a public entityintends to exclude the public and discuss in executive session apersonnel matter.” On the timing of the release of the minutes from theSeptember 2014 and December 2014 meetings, the court relied onMatawan Regional Teachers Ass’n v. Matawan-Aberdeen RegionalBoard of Education, 212 N.J. Super. 328 (Law Div. 1986), to holdthat the Board had violated the “promptly available” requirementof N.J.S.A. 10:4-14. The court also noted that defendants haddisregarded its prior order regarding prompt release of minutes.The court issued a permanent injunction requiring the Board tomake the minutes of all future meetings available to the publicwithin forty-five days. 15 Defendants appealed the order establishing the forty-fiveday deadline for issuance of the minutes. Plaintiffs filed across-appeal challenging the trial court’s determination on theissue of Rice notice. In a published opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed thedetermination that the Board did not make the meeting minutespromptly available, but reversed and vacated the permanentinjunction requiring release of minutes from all future sessionsof the Board within forty-five days of each meeting. Kean Fed’nof Teachers v. Morell, 448 N.J. Super. 520, 526 (App. Div.2017). The panel also reversed the trial court’s holding thatno Rice violation had occurred. Id. at 527. With regard to the release of meeting minutes, the paneldeclined to adopt the analysis from Matawan Regional and insteadrelied on “well-settled principles of statutory construction” tointerpret the Legislature’s intent concerning the “promptlyavailable” requirement. Id. at 531. To the panel, “[t]he words'promptly available’ in N.J.S.A. 10:4-14 require public bodiesto approve and make their meeting minutes available to thepublic in a manner that fulfills the Legislature’s commitment totransparency in public affairs.” Ibid. The panel thusinterpreted that language as requiring a public body to make it“a priority” to issue its minutes, and to develop a protocol toachieve that goal. Ibid. If the only way to make minutes 16 “promptly available” would be “to meet ten times per year,”then, the panel concluded, the public body would be obliged todo so. Id. at 533. That said, the panel viewed a permanent injunction with aset timeframe for release of minutes to be problematic. Thepanel found that the injunction “undermines the Board’s autonomyby usurping a quintessential managerial prerogative” and “ismanagerially, logistically, and legally unsound because itleaves the door ajar to permanent judicial entanglement.” Id.at 535. Noting that courts “are ill suited to micromanage theinternal affairs” of a public body that the Legislatureentrusted with managing a public university, the panelnonetheless viewed five meetings per year as inadequate tocomply with the “promptly available” requirement for minutes’release and “urge[d]” the Board to “seriously consider”increasing the frequency of its meetings. Ibid. With respect to a remedy for the OPMA violation found tohave occurred here, taking into consideration the underlyingcircumstances the panel ordered the Board to adopt a meetingschedule for the 2017-18 academic year that would promote therelease of meeting minutes within thirty to forty-five days ofthe last meeting, except in “extraordinary circumstances.” Id.at 545. 17 Turning to the Rice issue, the panel expressed the viewthat the Board was utilizing the subcommittee process to avoidsending Rice notices, which, the panel concluded, violated thepolicy of public participation advanced by the OPMA. Id. at540. According to the panel, “a public body is required to sendout a Rice notice any time it has placed on its agenda anymatters” that involve employment, termination, discipline, orany other items described in N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8). Id. at543. Thus, the panel held that Rice notices are required “inadvance of any meeting at which a personnel decision may occur.”Id. at 544. The panel declared void all personnel-relatedactions taken by the Board at the December 6 meeting. Id. at546 (citing N.J.S.A. 10:4-16). We granted defendants’ petition for certification. 230 N.J. 524 (2017). In addition, numerous parties were grantedamicus status. Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey (Rutgers); theNew Jersey Council of County Colleges (NJCCC); the State-Operated School District of the City of Camden and the TrentonBoard of Education (the School Districts); the New Jersey StateLeague of Municipalities and the New Jersey Institute of LocalGovernment Attorneys (the League); the New Jersey School BoardsAssociation (NJSBA); and the New Jersey Association of SchoolAdministrators (NJASA), filed briefs supportive of defendants. 18 The American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU-NJ);the Council of New Jersey State College Locals, AFT, AFL-CIO(the Council); the New Jersey Education Association (NJEA); andLibertarians for Transparent Government (LTG), filed briefs insupport of plaintiffs. III. A. Defendants argue that the Appellate Division incorrectlyexpanded the reach of Rice and N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8) toencompass all discussions regarding personnel matters, whichplaces a heavy burden on public bodies and renders the noticerequirement effectively useless in light of the large volume ofnotices that personnel will receive. According to defendants,Rice’s holding was narrow and designed to effectuate notice onlyto personnel who will be negatively impacted by discussions oractions conducted in a closed session, giving such personnel theopportunity to demand that the discussion take place in public.Defendants argue that the Appellate Division’s holding expandsthe rule beyond its intended purpose, applying it to cases inwhich personnel are not adversely affected and where the meetingtakes place in public. Defendants further contend that nothing in Rice or the OPMAprovides employees the right to demand a robust discussion on anemployment issue and that the Appellate Division holding will 19 effectively require detailed discussions of perfunctoryemployment decisions. Consequently, public bodies will beforced to deliberate on employment decisions as a whole bodyrather than delegate that authority to a committee. Regarding whether meeting minutes were made promptlyavailable and the appropriate remedy if they were not,defendants argue that the Appellate Division’s holdinginappropriately and arbitrarily requires them effectively todouble the frequency of their board meetings for the solepurpose of approving minutes of previous meetings. According todefendants, that holding will create a logistical hardship andinappropriately interferes with the discretion that theLegislature gave to the Board, as a public body, to determinethe most advantageous and efficacious manner of proceeding withits business. Moreover, defendants argue that the AppellateDivision pointed to nothing in either the OPMA or theestablished case law on which it based the thirty-to-forty-fiveday timeline. B. In response, plaintiffs assert that personnel have a rightto determine whether discussions or actions pertaining to theiremployment should take place in an open or closed session.According to plaintiffs, employees must be given notice ofpending action or discussion concerning their employment status 20 in order to decide for themselves whether they want the meetingto proceed in a closed or open session. The entire purpose ofthe notice requirement, plaintiffs argue, is to give employeesthe power to demand a public discussion or to agree that anydiscussion regarding their employment take place behind closeddoors. Plaintiffs contend that the OPMA intended to protectemployees’ privacy rights and that the Appellate Division did nomore than allow the affected employees an opportunity toexercise those rights here. On the availability of meeting minutes, plaintiffs contendthat the Appellate Division properly emphasized publicdisclosure by requiring that meeting minutes be available withinforty-five days. Plaintiffs note that under defendants’ releasetimeline, as practiced here, minutes of prior meetings were notavailable to the public for review and inspection until afterthe next meeting, which forced interested parties to wait up tofive months (September to February) to address issues taken upby the Board in closed session. Plaintiffs argue that the desire to protect board membersfrom inconvenience is not a consideration sufficient to outweighthe public’s interest in transparency, and that courts haveregularly held that prompt disclosure must be prioritized overadministrative convenience. Plaintiffs further contend thatimposing a deadline to disclose meeting minutes is a permissible 21 remedy under the OPMA. Lastly, plaintiffs fault defendants fornot utilizing technology to facilitate the process of makingmeeting minutes available in a more timely fashion. IV. A. This appeal comes before us on a record created throughcross-motions for summary judgment. The essential facts areundisputed and the issues we face concern questions of law. Wereview such questions de novo. Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC,226 N.J. 370, 386 (2016). Specifically, we are addressing conflicting views as to astatute’s requirements. See Cashin v. Bello, 223 N.J. 328, 335(2015) (noting that appellate courts apply de novo standard inconstruing statutory language). When we interpret a statute,our goal is to “ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’sintent.” Ibid. To do that, we look first to the statute’sactual language and ascribe to its words their ordinary meaning.Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 68 (2008) (citingDiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). Where thestatutory language is ambiguous, we may consider extrinsicmaterials such as legislative history, committee reports, andother relevant sources. Cashin, 223 N.J. at 335-36 (relying onState v. Fleischman, 189 N.J. 539, 548 (2007)). Thoseprinciples of statutory construction guide us in this matter. 22 B. We begin with the failure to give Rice notices in the casebefore us. The trial court concluded that such notices were notrequired, relying on the express language of the OPMA. TheAppellate Division concluded the opposite, based on its view ofthe OPMA’s aim and how that aim was advanced through Rice. We look first to the OPMA. If its language is clear andunambiguous, revealing the Legislature’s intent, ourinterpretative task is concluded. Mason, 196 N.J. at 68(stating that courts “need look no further” where meaning ofstatutory words is “clear”). Our duty is to enforce the wordsof the Legislature. The relevant OPMA section uses plain language to expresswhat a public body may do with respect to conducting closedsessions. N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b) clearly permits the public bodyto determine to enter into closed session for any one of theidentified circumstances approved by the Legislature. Thatsection of the Act states that “[a] public body may exclude thepublic only from that portion of a meeting at which the publicbody discusses any” of the enumerated topics. N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b) (emphasis added). The choice is that of the public body.It determines whether to have the private discussion of thelisted topics, as evidenced by the Legislature’s use of the word 23 “may.” The Board and many of the amici correctly emphasize thatpoint. The so-called “personnel exception” also has specificlanguage that cannot be ignored or treated as surplusage. SeeIn re Attorney Gen.’s “Directive on Exit Polling: Media & Non-Partisan Pub. Interest Grps.”, 200 N.J. 283, 297-98 (2009) (“Wemust presume that every word in a statute has meaning and is notmere surplusage, and therefore we must give those words effectand not render them a nullity.”). Although N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8) adds personnel matters to the enumerated topics that agoverning body may consider privately, it also authorizes anexception to that personnel exception -- when “all individualemployees . . . whose rights could be adversely affected requestin writing that the matter or matters be discussed at a publicmeeting,” the governing body may not opt to shut its doors.(emphasis added). Two principles thus emerge from the legislative language:the public entity may elect to discuss a topic listed insubsection (b) in closed session, and the choice to have thatdiscussion in private may be overridden if all employees whoserights could be adversely affected request in writing that thediscussion occur at a public session. The Appellate Division decision in Rice dealt with afactual setting that squarely fit within both of those 24 principles. The public body had determined to proceed with itsposition reduction and employee termination plan in closedsession, and the individual employees whose rights wereadversely affected never had the opportunity to exercise theright under N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b) to request in writing that thediscussion occur in public session. Rice thus developed aprocedural requirement designed to promote the opportunity foradversely affected individuals to exercise the specific rightthat the Legislature conferred on them. Defendants and amici curiae Rutgers, NJCCC, the SchoolDistricts, the League, NJSBA, and NJASA describe the AppellateDivision’s holding in this case as expanding the Rice noticerequirement by mandating a Rice notice even when the matter isintended to be discussed in public, as opposed to in closedsession, and even when the public entity’s actions do not“adversely affect” an employee’s rights. Relatedly, they arguethat the Appellate Division’s decision invades as well asburdens the discretion granted to public entities to conducttheir meetings efficiently and without unwarranted interference. Plaintiffs and the amici supporting them acknowledge thatthe holding under review is an expansion of Rice. However, theyperceive that expansion as furthering the animating principle ofthe OPMA. 25 We find that the procedural notice created in Rice shouldnot be stretched beyond its factual setting. To do so wouldresult in adding to the OPMA requirements that the Legislaturedid not impose. Moreover, it would risk throwing off thecareful balance that the Legislature struck between a publicbody’s need to control its own proceedings and at the same timedetermine when and how to protect confidential interests of thepublic body or others. Neither N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8) nor Rice supports theinterpretation that notice must be given to all potentiallyaffected employees, regardless of whether the employee isadversely affected, whenever a personnel matter appears on agoverning body’s public meeting agenda. First, N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8) applies only to adversely affected employees. Second,it speaks only to an employee’s right to make a privatediscussion public. The Appellate Division’s extension of Riceas applied here is not logical in light of the express languageof N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8), and it intrudes upon the discretionrecognized for the Board in the legislative language. SeeMcGovern v. Rutgers, 211 N.J. 94, 111 (2012) (declining, incontext of OPMA, “to impose a greater burden on public bodiesthan what the Legislature has required”). The statute does not provide employees with a right to“select the forum of the discussion,” as has been argued to us. 26 Rather, it provides employees with the right to move a privatediscussion into the sunshine of a public discussion. Thepersonnel exception’s language is not applicable when a publicentity already intends to take public action on a personnelmatter implicating employees whose rights could be adverselyaffected by that action. Requiring Rice notices to employeeswhen a public discussion is already planned so that theemployees, if all agreed, could, in turn, insist that thediscussion be public, at once defies logic and, as pointed outby amici supporting the Board, imposes a greater burden onpublic entities than the Legislature envisioned under N.J.S.A.10:4-12(b)(8). We note that the purpose underlying the originalrequirement of a Rice notice is not advanced when a public bodyvotes on a summary resolution of personnel matters in a publicsession. That conclusion is not undermined by a public body’suse of a subcommittee of the whole to examine a topic in advanceof a public meeting. As pointed out by the League as amicus,public bodies routinely approve recommendations in publicmeetings without discussion and must rely on advice fromprofessional staff to make decisions. A public body’s use ofthe subcommittee process is common and is not fairly viewed asan inherent subterfuge to eschew public discussion. Nor isthere evidence in this case to support a finding that the desire 27 to avoid sending Rice notices motivated the Board to act on theadvice of its subcommittee to adopt the recommendations of theUniversity President. The record before us simply does notsupport the arguments of plaintiffs and amici curiae the ACLU-NJ, the Council, and the NJEA that the Board purposefullyavoided compliance with the OPMA and Rice by undergoing a proforma process that attempted to technically comply with the lawwhile blatantly violating its spirit.3 Forcing public bodies to issue Rice notices and robustlydiscuss all personnel matters, as the Appellate Divisionintimated, would intrude on a public body’s prerogative as tohow to conduct its meetings. The Appellate Division’s holdingon the Rice requirement takes that salutary notice procedure outof its context and places on public bodies an intrusive,expansive, and confusing notice requirement that extends beyondthe plain language of the right of employees under N.J.S.A.10:4-12(b)(8). See DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492 (“It is not thefunction of this Court to 'rewrite a plainly-written enactmentof the Legislature []or presume that the Legislature intendedsomething other than that expressed by way of the plainlanguage.’” (alteration in original) (quoting O’Connell v.State, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002))).3 We do not encourage a process that would have the effect of stifling discussion on important personnel matters. 28 The OPMA does not contain a requirement about therobustness of the discussion that must take place on a topic.Here, members of the public were able to witness the Board’spublic vote on faculty reappointments and thus have a base ofinformation on which they can express views to the Legislatureand others responsible for appointments to the Board regardingthe adequacy, or inadequacy, of the discussion of Boardbusiness. But the robustness of a debate on a particular itemdiscussed in public session is not a topic addressed in theOPMA. It is beyond the existing requirements of the OPMA. If adiscussion of a certain length or quality is to be mandated, theOPMA requires amendment by the Legislature, not by the courts. C. Here, Hascup, as an affected employee, knew that theUniversity President was not recommending her for reappointmentand knew that the President’s recommendation would go before theBoard at the December 6 meeting. She had no right to demand aclosed session under the OPMA personnel exception. She had theright only, if all other affected employees agreed, to demand apublic setting for discussion. She received a public settingfor the discussion and vote on the recommendations aboutreappointment. It may not have been much of a discussion, butit was done in public view, as was the vote. There is no Riceobligation in that setting unless we were to read the opening 29 language of N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b) that says “may” to mean “must,”triggering all personnel actions to be presumptively andmandatorily private unless all affected employees request thatthe public body hold its discussion in public. We cannotrewrite a clearly written statute to achieve that forplaintiffs. See DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492. We hold that the Appellate Division erred in reversing thetrial court’s judgment on this issue. There is no obligation tosend Rice notices in a setting such as the one presented here,where the Board determined from the start to conduct itsdiscussion about faculty reappointments in public session.Accordingly, we also reverse the voiding of the personnelactions taken by the Board at its December 6, 2014 meeting. We add only that once a public entity has committed to apublic discussion on a topic tangential to the personnelexception, if a Board member sought during that public sessionto raise questions or provoke a discussion that implicated aneed to adjourn to private session, then the discussion wouldhave to halt. The Rice notice practice would have to beemployed for the employees whose rights could be adverselyaffected. We express no opinion on whether any or all questionsabout reappointment would implicate either a privacy concernunder N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(3) or a risk of litigation for theBoard over reputational harm to the employee. 30 V. A. Turning to the release of meeting minutes, the OPMArequires that public bodies make their meeting minutes “promptlyavailable to the public to the extent that making such matterspublic shall not be inconsistent with [N.J.S.A. 10:4-12].”N.J.S.A. 10:4-14. There is no definition of the term “promptlyavailable” in the Act. See N.J.S.A. 10:4-8. The only published decision to provide a thoroughconsideration of the question is a Law Division decision from1986, Matawan Regional Teachers Ass’n v. Matawan-AberdeenRegional Board of Education, 212 N.J. Super. 328. In that case,a local teachers’ association asserted that the Matawan-AberdeenBoard of Education failed to make minutes of certain meetings“promptly available to the public.” Id. at 329. Endeavoring toascertain the proper interpretation of “promptly” under theOPMA, the court looked to an ordinary definition of “prompt,”but found the definition ill-suited for purposes of the OPMA.See id. at 331. Instead, the court adopted a fact-sensitiveapproach, identifying the following factors as relevant in thecourt’s consideration of the matter at hand: 1. Prior experience in the publication of board minutes. 31 2. The subject matter of the minutes and its importance to the association and others directly affected by board action. 3. The subject matter of the minutes and its importance to the public, in general. 4. The intervals at which regular meetings were scheduled. 5. Whether meetings complained of were regularly scheduled or were, because of some exigency, held so close together that the board could not reasonably be expected to abide by the act’s requirement. [Id. at 333.] Our Court has not specifically addressed the meaning of the“promptly available” requirement; however, we have made clearthat when a public body meets in closed session, minutes fromthat session are still subject to the promptly availablerequirement. S. Jersey Publ’g Co. v. Expressway Auth., 124 N.J. 478, 493-95 (1991). Even so, a public entity is permitted totake steps to modify the disclosure where personal privacyinterests are implicated, “provided the public interest is notsubverted.” Id. at 494. The release of closed session minutesmust balance the interests of personal privacy and the public’sright to information: [I]f a public body legitimately conducts a meeting in closed session under any of the exceptions enumerated in N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b), it nevertheless must make the minutes of that meeting “promptly available to the public” unless full disclosure would subvert the purpose of the particular exception. If 32 disclosure would subvert the purpose of an exception, then the subversion must be balanced against the applicant’s interest in disclosure. [Payton v. Tpk. Auth., 148 N.J. 524, 556-57 (1997).] Thus, although we have made clear that minutes from aclosed session meeting must be made “promptly available,”because closed session meetings involve matters that generallyare of a sensitive nature, the development of releasable minutesof closed sessions must be approached more cautiously thanmeetings carried out in public. See ibid.; S. Jersey Publ’gCo., 124 N.J. at 494 (“To the extent a cognizable privacyinterest may be compromised by the required disclosure, theextent of disclosure may be modified appropriately, provided thepublic interest is not subverted.” (citation omitted)). The OPMA is not crystal clear on the “promptly available”requirement generally, or as it pertains to the more subtleconsiderations involved with minutes of closed sessions. Hence,a resort to legislative history is appropriate. DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492-93 (“[I]f there is ambiguity in the statutorylanguage that leads to more than one plausible interpretation,we may turn to extrinsic evidence, 'including legislativehistory . . . .’” (quoting Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno,182 N.J. 64, 75 (2004))). The legislative history is sparseabout a generic meaning for “promptly available,” but that 33 history does illuminate that the Legislature anticipated theneed for extra flexibility when it comes to closed-sessionportions of public meetings. The OPMA’s legislative history qualifies the requirement ofprompt disclosure of meeting minutes in recognition of the factthat closed-session minutes may need to be shielded from thepublic for a longer period due to the sensitive nature of thematerial under discussion. Statement to Third Official CopyReprint of A. 1030 12 (L. 1975, c. 231) (“Minutes must bepromptly available to the public, except for material coveringmeetings or portions of meetings closed to the public.”(emphasis added)); see also N.J.S.A. 10:4-14 (minutes must bemade “promptly available to the public to the extent that makingsuch matters public shall not be inconsistent with [N.J.S.A.10:4-12]”). Indeed, the Legislature was aware that certainsensitive material must be carefully reviewed and anticipatedthat some of the information under review may never reach thepublic’s eyes. Statement to Third Official Copy Reprint of A.1030 12 (“[N.J.S.A. 10:4-13] requires that whenever a publicbody seeks to meet in private it must first pass a resolution .. . [that] must also state the general nature of the matters tobe discussed and approximately when, if ever, the mattersdiscussed can be made public.” (emphasis added)). 34 B. The parties and amici generally agree that the AppellateDivision correctly took an essentially fact-sensitive, case-by-case approach to the requirement that minutes be “promptlyavailable” to the public. We agree. The term’s application requires context. The Legislature’schoice of the phrase implicitly requires individual assessmentsas specific facts unfold in matters, while at the same timesignaling to public bodies the legislative expectation that therelease of minutes must be considered a priority, an obligation,and not a nuisance to be addressed when convenient. TheAppellate Division sought to thoughtfully balance the OPMA’slanguage and underlying legislative goals and to create a fairbalance between the public’s need for information and a publicentity’s autonomy and need for logistical flexibility. The delay that occurred here -- the release of minutes forthe September 2014 meeting in February 2015 -- is unreasonableno matter the individual or combination of excuses advanced bythe Board. Our concern is with the remedy selected by theAppellate Division. A public entity must establish its meetingschedule to suit the managerial obligations of its publicresponsibilities while also acting responsibly concerning itsobligation to make minutes promptly available to the public.The OPMA’s requirements apply to a diverse range of public 35 entities, so no one set amount of time for the release ofminutes should be mandated. Reasonableness must remain thetouchstone when assessing the promptness of a public entity’sactions in this area. We are reluctant to set a specifictimeframe for the calling of meetings, which should remain theprerogative of the body entrusted with running the publicentity. See McGovern, 211 N.J. at 115 (noting that “public bodymust be afforded discretion in determining” most effective wayof conducting its proceedings). Hence, although the 2017-18 academic year is nearing itsend, we modify the Appellate Division’s holding requiring theBoard to set a regular meeting schedule that would allow for theapproval of minutes within a forty-five-day time period. Thathaving been said, if a public entity, like the Board, were tocontinue to limit its meetings to five per year, significantlyimpeding its ability to approve meeting minutes promptly, wemight see the issue again. At argument, we were informed that, with the availabilityof technology, entities are developing ways to speed thepreparation of minutes of public sessions. Indeed, some publicbodies are able to release minutes on the very day of themeeting through the contemporaneous electronic production ofminutes as the meeting unfolds followed by a vote on the minutesbefore the meeting is adjourned. We commend such action. Also, 36 some public entities are using separately noticed additionalpublic meetings, with telephonically enhanced access formembers, to expedite the approval of minutes. Again, weencourage such ingenuity, which furthers the OPMA’s aims. Asfor minutes of closed sessions, which may require sensitiveconsiderations and even consultation with counsel, we expectpublic bodies will similarly develop ways to speed the processwithout shortchanging their decisions as to what may be includedfor release to the public in such minutes. Cf. Atl. CityConvention Ctr. Auth. v. S. Jersey Publ’g Co., 135 N.J. 53, 67-69 (1994) (recognizing that public release of executive sessionminutes requires careful balancing of competing interests);O’Shea v. W. Milford Bd. of Educ., 391 N.J. Super. 534, 539-41(App. Div. 2007) (same). Finally, we add what should be obvious: minutes should bereleased within days of their approval, unless trulyextraordinary circumstances prevent their availability to thepublic. VI. The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed in part,and affirmed, as modified, in part. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICES PATTERSON and TIMPONE did not participate. 37