Title: Middlebrook v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 273, 2000
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
NIKERRAY MIDDLEBROOK,
§
No. 273, 2000
§
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§
Court Below:  Superior Court of
§
the State of Delaware in and for
              v.
§
New Castle County
§
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
Cr.A. Nos: IN96-09-2018
§
through
Plaintiff Below,
§
IN96-09-2027
Appellee.
§
§
Submitted: April 23, 2002
Decided: July 15, 2002
 Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and HOLLAND, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED.
Jerome M. Capone, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for the Appellant.
William M. Kelleher, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington,
Delaware, for the Appellee.
VEASEY, Chief Justice:
In this appeal we consider whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a
speedy trial was violated by a delay of almost four years between indictment and
trial.  Such an egregious delay is presumptively prejudicial.  In this case, the
defendant  asserted his right to a speedy trial and demonstrated actual prejudice
from the delay in the form of oppressive pretrial incarceration and the
impairment of his defense.  Contributing to the delay was a lengthy period for
deciding a suppression motion, transfer of case assignment among several judges
and the granting of eleven continuances, sometimes at the request of the
prosecution, sometimes at the request of defense counsel, and sometimes by the
trial court sua sponte.
2
The right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution
protects not only the defendant’s interests but those of the public, which “is
entitled to no less than such steady efforts to see that criminal justice should be
swift and certain as may be consistent with the demands of fair and orderly
procedure.”1  The egregious delay and the circumstances surrounding it in this
case establish a violation of the right to a speedy trial under both the United
States Constitution and the Delaware Constitution, either of which independently
supports our conclusion.2  It is well established that the only remedy for violation
of the right to a speedy trial is dismissal of the indictment.3  Consequently, we
reverse the sentence for these convictions and remand for dismissal of the
indictment.4
Facts
                                                          
1  United States v. Mann, 291 F.Supp. 298, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (cited with approval in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 533 n.36 (1972) (“For an example of how the speedy trial issue should be approached, see Judge Frankel’s
excellent opinion in United States v. Mann, . . . .”).
2 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (recognizing that state law, if separate and independent from
federal law, may provide an adequate and independent ground for a state court’s decision and that “[i]f the state
court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and
independent [state law] grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision”).
3Barker, 407 U.S. at 522.
4We note that the defendant in this case is serving jail sentences for other convictions.  While those sentences are
also on appeal to this Court, the appeal is pending and those sentences continue until that appeal is resolved.
3
On September 11, 1996, Derrick Homer was shot in the shoulder.  Homer
called the police and later identified Nikerray Middlebrook as his assailant.
Homer testified that Middlebrook attempted to rob him at gunpoint, and that he
grabbed Middlebrook’s wrist and struggled with him over the gun.  Middlebrook
then broke free, according to Homer, and shot him in the shoulder before
running away.  Middlebrook disputed Homer’s account of the shooting.5
Middlebrook testified that he was attempting to purchase drugs from Homer, and
they quarreled over the quality of the drugs and the fact that Homer believed
Middlebrook was responsible for the shooting of Homer’s friend some weeks
earlier.  Middlebrook claimed that both he and Homer pulled out guns, a struggle
ensued, and one of the guns accidentally fired, wounding Homer in the shoulder.
Middlebrook was indicted on September 30, 1996 for second degree
assault, first degree attempted robbery, two counts of possession of a weapon
during the commission of a felony, and various other crimes stemming from the
shooting.  Almost four years passed before Middlebrook was tried for these
charges.6  The first three trial dates were continued at the State’s request on
January 27, March 24, and May 5, 1997.  In response to the very first
continuance, Middlebrook wrote a letter to the trial court protesting the
postponement as a violation of his right to a speedy trial.
                                                          
5
  Middlebrook’s recounting of events is taken from his testimony at trial.
6 Clearly this lapse of time is inconsistent with well established speedy trial guidelines.  The Chief Justice, with
unanimous approval of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article IV, Section 13 of the Delaware Constitution, has
issued Administrative Directives directing the Superior Court to dispose of all criminal cases generally within one
year.  See Administrative Directive Number 82 (May 16, 1990) (implementing recommendations of the Speedy Trial
Goal Committee dated April 18, 1990 and directing the Superior Court that “[a]t least 90% of all criminal cases be
adjudicated as to guilt or innocence or otherwise disposed of short of sentencing for those to be sentenced after a
presentence investigation within 120 days from the date of arrest, 98% within 180 days, and 100% within one
year”), superseded and repealed by Administrative Directive 130 (July 11, 2001) (implementing recommendations
contained in the Final Report of the Committee on Speedy Trial Guidelines dated November 1, 2000 and directing
the Superior Court that “[a]t least 90% of all criminal cases shall be adjudicated as to guilt or innocence or otherwise
disposed of within 120 days from the date of indictment/information, 98% within 180 days, and 100% within one
year”).
4
The next trial date of May 19, 1997, was continued at defense counsel’s
request because he had a vacation scheduled.  On July 10, 1997, Middlebrook
wrote another letter to the trial court claiming that the continued postponements
violated his right to a speedy trial.
On February 5, 1998, before another trial date was set, Middlebrook,
represented by new counsel, filed a motion to suppress Homer’s identification of
him.  The trial court did not decide this motion until May 4, 1999, more than six
months after the parties completed their briefing.7
On June 11, 1999, trial was set again for August 3, 1999.  The docket
entry states that, absent exceptional circumstances, the trial court would deny
rescheduling or continuance requests.  Nevertheless, the trial court shortly
thereafter set a new trial date for September 14, 1999 at defense counsel’s
request because he had a vacation scheduled, despite the fact that his client had
been facing criminal charges for over two years.
The September 14, 1999 trial date was continued three times.  The first
continuance was due to Hurricane Floyd; the second was at the trial court’s
initiative; and the third was because of the unavailability of a State witness.  Trial
was then set for October 4, 1999.  The docket entry again stated that, absent
exceptional circumstances, the trial court would deny rescheduling or continuance
requests.  Yet, less than a week later, the trial court canceled that trial date
because both the prosecutor and defense counsel had to be in federal court.
                                                          
7  Clearly this delay is inconsistent with directives requiring early disposition of pending decisions.  The Chief
Justice, with unanimous approval of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article IV, Section 13 of the Delaware
Constitution, has issued Administrative Directives directing the Court of Chancery, the Superior Court and the
Family Court to report to the Chief Justice all matters held under advisement for more than 90 days from submission
to decision, to set forth reasons for the delay, and to present a specific plan to decide the matter promptly.  See
Administrative Directive Number 13 (Dec. 31, 1974, Revised March 16, 1981and Nov. 6, 1987), superseded by
Administrative Directive Number 94 (Feb. 1, 1994) (also requiring similar reporting of delays more than 30 days by
the Court of Common Pleas and the Justice of the Peace Courts).
5
The next trial was set for January 4, 2000, but it was canceled at defense
counsel’s request because he had a vacation scheduled, even though
Middlebrook’s criminal charges now had been outstanding for more than three
years.  Yet another trial date was set for February 23, 2000, but it was canceled
at the prosecutor’s request because he was scheduled to be on his honeymoon.
As of March 31, 2000, this case was the second oldest in the Superior
Court, and Middlebrook had been in jail awaiting trial for 1,297 days.  By this
time Middlebrook’s case had been set for trial and postponed eleven times by five
different judges.8
Finally, trial was set for May 11, 2000.  After being continued briefly at
the State’s request because of witness unavailability due to a death in the family,
a four-day jury trial began May 16, 2000, almost four years after Middlebrook’s
indictment.  The jury found him guilty of second degree assault, attempted first
degree robbery, and two counts of possession of a weapon during the commission
of a felony.  The Superior Court sentenced Middlebrook to 38 consecutive years
in prison.  This is Middlebrook’s direct appeal of these sentences.9Analysis
                                                          
8  Why five different judges were involved is unclear.  We expect in the future that individual case assignments or
other improved case assignment and case management procedures will be implemented by the Superior Court to
attempt to obviate these problems.
9  Middlebrook initially attempted to proceed pro se through the post-conviction and appellate process.  After
receiving his opening brief and the State’s answering brief, this Court remanded for the appointment of counsel by
the Superior Court to assist Middlebrook in his direct appeal.  Counsel on appeal was not trial counsel.  Appellate
counsel  has been of significant assistance to this Court, for which we are very grateful.  Middlebrook also is serving
other sentences that are on appeal to this Court.
6
Middlebrook claims that the three year and eight month delay between his
indictment and trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial as provided
by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution10 and Article I, Section
7 of the Delaware Constitution.11
As far back as the Magna Carta in 1215, a defendant’s right to swift justice
was fundamental to the concept of fairness in the English legal system.12  Early in
our nation’s history, a number of the original states, such as Delaware, Virginia,
Maryland, and Pennsylvania, guaranteed the right to a speedy trial in their
constitutions.13  The federal government also recognized the right to a speedy trial
in the Bill of Rights through the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.  The United States Supreme Court subsequently held that the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial is “fundamental and is imposed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the States.”14
                                                          
10  The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in relevant part:  “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, . . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.
11  Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution provides:  "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a right
to . . . a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury; . . . ."  Del. Const. art. I, § 7.
12  Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-24 (1967) (describing the historical English and state antecedents
to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
13
  Id. at 225.
14
  Barker, 407 U.S. at  516 (citing Klopfer, 386 U.S. at  223).
7
The right to a speedy trial not only helps ensure “that all accused persons
[will] be treated according to decent and fair procedures,” but also protects
society’s interest “in providing a speedy trial.”15  “The interests in maximum
speed consistent with fairness, in fresh memories likely to approach full accounts
of the facts, in prompt vindication and relief of the innocent, and in swift
punishment of the guilty . . . are matters of broad public moment.”16
                                                          
15
  Barker, 407 U.S. at 519.
16  Mann, 291 F.Supp. at 274.  See also Key v. State, 463 A.2d 633, 637 (Del. 1983) (stating that “the public has an
interest in prompt and certain punishment, . . . as part of the fair and expeditious administration of justice”).
8
In the seminal case Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court
adopted a balancing test to determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial
has been violated.17  The Barker test weighs both the conduct of the prosecution
and the defendant and “compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad
hoc basis.”18  The Barker Court held that courts should assess four factors in
determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of the right to a
speedy trial:  (1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the
defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the
defendant.19  None of the four factors is “either a necessary or sufficient
condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.”  Rather they
“are related factors and must be considered together with such other
circumstances as may be relevant.”20  Because “these factors have no talismanic
qualities, courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.”21
Consequently, we will examine each factor in turn.
Length of Delay
                                                          
17  Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.  See also Fensterer v. State, 493 A.2d 959, 965 (Del. 1985) (marking this Court’s first
application of the Barker test), rev’d on other grounds, 474 U.S. 15 (1985).
18Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.  See also Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1079 (Del. 1987) (“What constitutes a speedy
trial varies depending upon the facts of the individual case.  To determine whether a speedy trial violation has
occurred, a court must use a balancing test in which the conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are
weighed.”).
19
 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
20
  Id. at 533.  See also Key, 463 A.2d at 636 (“Individually, none of these factors is conclusive; they are
related . . . .”).
21
 Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
9
The right to a speedy trial attaches as soon as the defendant is accused of a
crime through arrest or indictment, whichever occurs first.22  “The length of
delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism [because u]ntil there is some
delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the
other factors that go into the balance.”23  The length of delay that “will provoke
such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the
case.”24
The State concedes that the length of delay in this case between the
indictment and start of Middlebrook’s trial raises the presumption of prejudice to
Middlebrook.  Indeed, the egregious delay of almost four years between
Middlebrook’s indictment and trial is, on its face, a cause for considerable
concern.25  Consequently, we find that the first Barker factor, length of delay,
weighs in favor of Middlebrook.
Reason for the Delay
                                                          
22  United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (“[I]t is readily understandable that it is either a formal
indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that
engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.”).
23Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.  See also Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Del. 1990) (“The threshold question is
the length of the delay.  Unless there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no reason to review
the other factors.”).
24
 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31.
25  Cf. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992) (noting that lower courts have generally found
postaccusation delay presumptively prejudicial as it approaches at least one year).
10
“The flag all litigants seek to capture is the second factor, the reason for
delay.”26  Different weights are assigned to different reasons for the delay.27
Thus,  a “deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense
should be weighted heavily against the [State],” while a “more neutral reason
such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily”
against the State.28  Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, may justify
appropriate delay and will not weigh against the State.29
                                                          
26  United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316 (1986).
27  Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
28  Id.
29  Id.  See also Key, 463 A.2d at 636 (stating that “an event over which the prosecution has no control, e.g.,
 the disappearance or illness of an important witness, supports an appropriate rescheduling of the proceedings”).
11
In this case, the State asserts that the prosecution is directly responsible for
only six and a half months of unjustifiable delay, which resulted from the first
three continuances and the prosecutor’s honeymoon.  The State also contends that
the prosecution clearly did not intend to hamper the defense through deliberate
delay.  Nevertheless, most of the delay in this case weighs against the State,
including the prosecution and the trial court, because “the ultimate
responsibility” for delay caused by overloaded trial courts “must rest with the
government rather than with the defendant.”30  Although negligence resulting
from overcrowded courts “is obviously to be weighed more lightly than a
deliberate intent to harm the accused’s defense, it still falls on the wrong side of
the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal
prosecution once it has begun.”31
                                                          
30  Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.  See also Key, 463 A.2d at 636 (“Yet the responsibility for delays resulting from
[negligence, overcrowded courts, or excessive caseloads on prosecutors] properly lies with the State if only because
the defendant has no influence over the decisions necessary to reduce a backlog in the courts or the caseloads of
individual prosecutors.”).
31  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657.
12
The trial court in this case is responsible for most of a twenty-one month
delay.  First, the trial court took more than a year to hear and decide
Middlebrook’s motion to suppress.  This is inexcusable.  We reject the State's
response that the trial court’s delay in deciding the motion to suppress should be
attributed to Middlebrook because the court was considering a pretrial motion by
the defense not the State.  The State cites Bailey v. State in which this Court
stated that the period of time required for the trial court to hear argument and
decide the defendant’s motion to suppress “cannot be weighed against the
State.”32  But, in that case, we considered a total delay of only three months, not
a delay of more than a year.  While we recognize that swift justice must also be
deliberate, we find that six and a half months between final briefing by the
parties and a decision by the trial court on a pretrial motion to suppress is too
long, particularly given the relatively uncomplicated facts and settled law of the
contested identification in this case.33  Moreover, it is inconsistent with the
Administrative Directives of the Chief Justice, unanimously approved by the
Supreme Court, setting a goal that matters such as the motion to suppress in this
case should be decided within 90 days from submission to decision.34
                                                          
32  Bailey, 521 A.2d at 1080.
33Unless the suppression motion presents a novel question of law or the underlying facts are complex, we strongly
urge trial judges to dispose of suppression motions through bench rulings which fully explain the factual and legal
basis for the ruling.
34  See supra note 7.
13
Second, the trial court granted three continuances so that defense counsel
could take vacations.  This resulted in nine and a half months of delay.  While
the State, of course, did not ask for these continuances, the State and the trial
court did not oppose the delay despite the prolonged pendency of Middlebrook’s
charges.  The “unquestioned duty to implement the right to a speedy trial” should
be felt by the prosecutor’s office and “no less lightly by the judges.”35  “[S]ociety
has a particular interest in bringing swift prosecutions, and society’s
representatives are the ones who should protect that interest.”36
As the United States Supreme Court has noted, the Barker test “places the
primary burden on the courts and the prosecutors to assure that cases are brought
to trial.”37  Most of the egregious delay in this case was caused, not by the
defendant, but by the prosecution and the trial court, and consequently the State
must be held accountable for it.  Therefore, we find that the second Barker
factor, reason for the delay, also weighs in favor of Middlebrook.
Defendant’s Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial
“If and when a defendant asserts his rights are factors of considerable
significance in determining whether there has been a speedy trial violation.”38
Furthermore, the “failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant
to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.”39
                                                          
35  Mann, 291 F.Supp. at 275.
36  Barker, 407 U.S. at 527.
37  Id. at 529.
38  Bailey, 521 A.2d at 1082.
39  Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
14
Middlebrook asserted at the first opportunity his right to a speedy trial.
After his very first trial date was continued at the request of the State,
Middlebrook wrote a letter to the trial court protesting the continuance as a
violation of his right to a speedy trial.  After two more continuances at the State’s
request and a third continuance at the request of defense counsel so that he could
take a vacation, Middlebrook again asserted his right to a speedy trial through a
letter to the trial court.
Although the second letter was Middlebrook’s final assertion of the right to
a speedy trial until this appeal, we find that his protest letter after the first
continuance combined with his second protest letter fulfilled the defendant’s
“responsibility to call attention to what he views as an unfair postponement.”40
Trial judges must be sensitive to the need for our courts to provide swift and fair
justice.  Therefore, we find that the third Barker factor, defendant’s assertion of
the right to a speedy trial, weighs in favor of Middlebrook.
Prejudice to the Defendant from the Delay
                                                          
40  Key, 463 A.2d at 637.
15
As “everyone knows . . . memories fade, evidence is lost, and the burden
of anxiety upon any criminal defendant increases with the passing months and
years.”41 Thus, the prejudice prong should be considered in light of three of
defendants’ interests that the speedy trial right was designed to protect: (1)
preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and
concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be
impaired.42  Although Middlebrook raised only the third interest, impairment of
his defense, as a claim of prejudice, we shall address all three.43
First, lengthy pretrial incarceration “has a destructive effect on human
character and makes the rehabilitation of the individual offender much more
difficult.”44  In addition, time spent in jail awaiting trial by one presumed
innocent until proven guilty often means loss of a job, disrupts family life, and
enforces idleness.45 “Imposing these consequences on anyone who has not yet
been convicted is serious.”46
                                                          
41  Mann, 291 F.Supp. at 271 (citing United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)).
42  Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
43  Bailey, 521 A.2d at 1082 (“The defendant did not raise any arguments under the first two interests[, but w]e shall
address all three.”).
44  Barker, 407 U.S. at 520 (internal quotation omitted).
45  Id. at 532.
46  Id. at 533.  We note also the public interest not only in the trust and confidence in our courts' duty to provide
swift and fair justice, but also in the cost to the taxpayers of pretrial detention.  The courts are addressing this issue.
See Administrative Directive Number 118 (Dec. 1, 1999) (creating the Committee on Speedy Trial Guidelines
chaired by Justice Walsh to recommend new guidelines to accelerate the adjudication of criminal cases in the
Delaware court system); Administrative Directive Number 128 (April 10, 2001) (creating the Delivery of Criminal
Justice Policy Committee chaired by Justice Walsh to formulate statewide criminal justice policy facilitating the
adjudication of all criminal cases at the earliest feasible stage); Final Report of the Committee on Speedy Trial
Guidelines (Nov. 1, 2000) (stating that “it is essential to the administration of justice and public confidence that
criminal cases move through the system as expeditiously as possible”); Final Report of the Delivery of Criminal
Justice Policy Committee (Dec. 28, 2001) (detailing recommendations implemented by the Committee to accelerate
case processing and to enhance individual court and agency responsibility for detentioners).
16
Second, “even if an accused is not incarcerated prior to trial, he is still
disadvantaged . . . by living under a cloud of anxiety.”47  Although there is no
clear record or finding on this issue, Middlebrook was presumptively prejudiced
to at least some extent by anxiety and concern regarding the delay of his trial.
Finally, we review whether Middlebrook’s defense at trial was impaired by
the delay.  This type of prejudice, while not the only type recognized by the Sixth
Amendment, is “the most serious . . . because the inability of a defendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.”48  Not
only is impairment of a defendant’s defense the most serious type of prejudice,
but also it is “the most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because
time’s erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony ‘can rarely be shown.’”49
Furthermore, “whether the delay has hurt the defense, . . . is not a point to be
resolved with mathematical certainty.”50
                                                          
47  Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
48  Id. at 532.
49  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).
50  Mann, 291 F.Supp. at 273.
17
The State claims that Middlebrook’s defense was not prejudiced by the
delay of almost four years because he has not demonstrated that the delay
weakened his ability to raise specific defenses, elicit specific testimony, or
produce specific items of evidence.  But, the State ignores the fact that, during
the inordinate delay, witnesses’ memories presumptively faded, and Middlebrook
lost contact with an alleged exculpatory witness who moved out-of-state.  During
this delay, Middlebrook also was convicted and sentenced to prison on a set of
unrelated charges stemming from another shooting.  Those sentences have been
appealed on other grounds and are now pending review by this Court.
Nevertheless, the conviction on those other charges was used against
Middlebrook when he testified at trial in this case.  Consequently, we find that
Middlebrook’s defense in this case was compromised by the egregious pretrial
delay.
Thus, the fourth factor of the Barker test, prejudice to the defendant, also
weighs in favor of Middlebrook because of his disturbingly long pretrial
incarceration, the attendant anxiety and concern, and the unrebutted presumption
that his defense was impaired by the egregious pretrial delay of 1,312 days.
Having found that each of the four Barker test factors weighs in favor of
Middlebrook, we hold that the egregious pretrial delay of almost four years
violated Middlebrook’s right to a speedy trial guaranteed both by the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the
Delaware Constitution.
Conclusion
18
The only remedy for violation of the right to a speedy trial is dismissal of
the indictment.51  Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is
REVERSED and REMANDED for dismissal of Middlebrook’s indictment in
this case.52
                                                          
51  Barker, 407 U.S. at 522.  Because Middlebrook’s speedy trial claim alone merits and requires dismissal of his
indictment, we need not address Middlebrook’s other claims regarding trial error raised on appeal.
52  As we have noted several times throughout this opinion, Middlebrook will remain incarcerated despite our
decision in this case.  Middlebrook has an outstanding thirty-seven-year sentence for a set of unrelated convictions.
State v. Middlebrook, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN96-09-1119 through 1122 and 1795 (June 12, 1998).  Middlebrook
formally noticed an appeal of the Superior Court’s judgment in that case.  This Court scheduled that appeal for
decision on briefs on January 29, 2002, but stayed its decision on February 4, 2002 pending disposition of the case at
bar.