Title: Doell v. Myers
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S46311
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 1999

Filed: June 11, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STEVE DOELL,

				Petitioner,

	v.

HARDY MYERS, Attorney General

for the State of Oregon,

	Respondent.

CATHI LAWLER,

Petitioner,

     v.

HARDY MYERS, Attorney General

for the State of Oregon,

Respondent.

(SC S46311, S46312)

(Consolidated for argument and opinon)

	En Banc

	Argued and submitted May 10, 1999.

	John A. Bennett, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
petition for petitioner Steve Doell.

	Emily Simon, Portland, argued the cause and filed the petition
for petitioner Cathi Lawler.

	John T. Bagg, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent.  With him on the answering memoranda were
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General.  

	LEESON, J.

	Ballot title certified as modified.  This decision shall
become effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).

	LEESON, J.

	In these consolidated ballot title review proceedings,
petitioner Lawler, a chief sponsor of a proposed initiative
measure, and petitioner Doell, an elector, seek review of a ballot
title certified by the Attorney General for that proposed measure. 
Because both petitioners submitted timely written comments on the
draft ballot title as provided by ORS 250.067(1), they are entitled
to seek this court's review of the certified ballot title.  ORS
250.085(2).  Our task is to determine whether the Attorney
General's certified ballot title complies substantially with the
statutory requirements.  See ORS 250.035(2) (prescribing content of
ballot title for statewide measure); ORS 250.085(5) (prescribing
standard of review).  We conclude that the caption and result
statements substantially comply with the statutory requirements but
that the summary is insufficient.  Accordingly, we modify the
summary and certify the ballot title as modified.

	In 1994, the voters approved Ballot Measure 11, codified
at ORS 137.700 to 137.707.  Those statutes impose mandatory minimum
sentences for 21 different felony offenses committed by persons 15
years of age or older.  The proposed initiative measure at issue
here would repeal Measure 11.  The proposed initiative measure
provides:

		"Section 1:  This Act shall be known as the
'Judicial Discretion Act of 2000.'

		"Section 2:  ORS 135.240(4) and (5), 137.700,
137.705, 137.707, 137.712, 138.222(4)(c) and 419C.067 are
repealed.

		"Section 3:  (a) Any person sentenced under any
repealed provision of law listed in Section 2 above,
shall be resentenced by the Court of conviction in
accordance with the Oregon Revised Statutes and the rules
of the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission that were in
effect on March 31, 1995, unless the person requests not
to be resentenced.  The Court shall hold the resentencing
hearing as soon as practicable after the effective date
of this Act, but not later than 90 days, with priority
given to those persons who have been incarcerated the
longest pursuant to any repealed statute.  Any person
resentenced under this subsection shall receive credit
for any time served.

		"(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any
person sentenced under any repealed provision of law
listed in Section 2 above, who would have otherwise been
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and who did
not receive a waiver hearing shall be subject to juvenile
court jurisdiction, unless waived to a circuit, justice
or municipal court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to
ORS 419C.340 et seq., and unless the person requests not
to be resentenced.

		"(c) Any person charged or convicted of an offense,
the sentence for which is dictated by any repealed
provision of law listed in Section 2 above, who has not
been sentenced as of the effective date of this Act,
shall be sentenced in accordance with the Oregon Revised
Statutes and the rules of the Oregon Criminal Justice
Commission that were in effect on March 31, 1995.  Any
such person who would have otherwise been within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court, but for a repealed
provision of law listed in Section 2 above, shall be
subject to juvenile court jurisdiction, unless waived to
a circuit, justice or municipal court of competent
jurisdiction pursuant to ORS 419C.340 et seq.

		"Section 4:  Notwithstanding the repeal of [ORS]
137.707, any person who was entitled to a hearing
pursuant to [ORS] 420 A. 200 et seq. 'second look' shall
retain the right to such a hearing."

	The Attorney General certified the following ballot title for the proposed initiative measure:

		"REPEALS MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES FOR CERTAIN FELONIES,
REQUIRES RESENTENCING

		"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote repeals mandatory
minimum sentences for certain violent and other felonies,
requires resentencing.

		"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote retains mandatory
minimum sentences for certain violent and other felonies,
maintains existing sentences.

		"SUMMARY: Laws approved in 1994 as 'Measure 11'
require minimum sentences for certain violent felonies,
conspiracy and attempt to commit certain felonies,
committed after April 1, 1995.  With limited exceptions,
statutes require persons convicted serve full minimum
sentence, with no reduction for post-prison supervision,
temporary leave.  Statutes require persons charged with
specified crimes aged 15 to 17 when crime committed be
prosecuted as adults.  Measure repeals these statutes,
requires persons sentenced under them be resentenced
under existing sentencing guidelines which provide
possibility of shorter sentences." 

	Petitioners' challenges require us to examine all three
parts of the Attorney General's ballot title -- the caption, the
"yes" and "no" result statements, and the summary.

CAPTION

	The caption reasonably must identify the subject matter
of the proposed initiative measure in not more than 10 words, ORS
250.035(2)(a), and it must not give "undue attention to one aspect
of the proposed measure at the expense of a full description of the
general subject of the measure."  Phillips v. Myers, 325 Or 221,
226, 936 P2d 964 (1997).  If a proposed initiative measure contains
more than one subject, all should be reflected in the caption if
possible.  See Witt v. Kulongoski, 319 Or 7, 10 n 3, 872 P2d 14
(1994) (so stating).

	Petitioner Doell contends that the Attorney General's
caption fails to comply substantially with ORS 250.035(2)(a)
because it "does not accurately inform the voters that the chief
thrust of this measure is to eliminate mandatory minimum sentences
for violent offenders."  (Emphasis in original.)  We reject
petitioner Doell's argument for two reasons.

	First, the text of the proposed initiative measure makes
clear that it has two subjects:  eliminating statutory mandatory
minimum sentences for specified crimes and resentencing persons who
have received mandatory minimum sentences in accordance with the
sentencing guidelines promulgated by the Oregon Criminal Justice
Commission.  Both of those subjects, if possible, should be
reflected in the caption.  The Attorney General's caption does so. 
Petitioner Doell would add the word "violent" to the caption and
eliminate reference to the requirement for resentencing, thereby
stating only one of the subjects of the proposed initiative.

	Second, and as we discuss in greater detail below, the
proposed initiative measure would repeal mandatory minimum
sentences for 21 felonies, only some of which properly can be
characterized as violent felonies.  It would be inaccurate to state
in the caption that the proposed initiative measure would repeal
mandatory minimum sentences only for violent felonies.  

	 We turn to petitioner Lawler's challenges to the
caption.  Her first objection is that it excludes the phrase
"judicial discretion," relying instead on the phrase "repeals
mandatory minimum sentences."  She contends that, because the title
of the proposed initiative measure is the "Judicial Discretion Act
of 2000," the caption must contain the phrase "judicial
discretion."  Her second objection is to the statement that the
proposed initiative measure "requires" resentencing.  In her view,
the proposed measure merely permits resentencing.  

	In determining whether a caption accurately states the
subject matter of a proposed initiative measure, we examine the
text of the measure itself, not simply the title that its
proponents have put on it.  See Peppers v. Myers, 325 Or 611, 614,
942 P2d 273 (1997) (scope of wording determines subject matter of
proposed measure).  If the proposed initiative measure at issue in
this case were to be approved by the voters, a person who has been
sentenced in accordance with Measure 11 would be resentenced in
accordance with the Oregon sentencing-guidelines statutes in effect
on March 31, 1995, unless that person requests not to be
resentenced.  The sentencing guidelines would permit the exercise
of a limited but greater range of judicial discretion under
prescribed circumstances than would the minimum sentences enacted
by Measure 11.  However, it would be inaccurate for the caption to
state, as petitioner Lawler advocates, that, if the voters repealed
Measure 11, then judicial discretion would determine criminal
sentences.  The Attorney General's caption is not inadequate for
the first reason asserted by petitioner Lawler.

	  We turn to petitioner Lawler's contention that the
proposed initiative measure merely permits resentencing.  By its
terms, the proposed measure requires resentencing unless the person
declines to be resentenced.  It thus would be misleading for the
caption to state that the proposed initiative measure permits
resentencing.

	For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that neither
petitioner Doell nor petitioner Lawler has shown that the Attorney
General's certified caption fails to comply substantially with the
requirements of ORS 250.035(2)(a).

RESULT STATEMENTS

	The result statements in a ballot title must be simple
and understandable statements of not more than 15 words that
describe the result if the proposed initiative measure is approved
or rejected.  ORS 250.035(2)(b) and (c).  Only petitioner Lawler
challenges the result statements in the Attorney General's ballot
title.  She contends that the word "violent" in both the "yes" and
"no" result statements is inaccurate and inflammatory and that use
of that word "adds a value laden term that is not conducive to a
reasoned and fair debate."  

	This court has held that a ballot title should not use
words that "obviously" are argumentative, Burbidge v. Paulus, 289
Or 35, 42, 609 P2d 815 (1980), or that would influence the vote by
characterizing the proposed measure in a way that essentially takes
sides with respect to the measure.  Hamilton v. Myers, 326 Or 44,
54, 943 P2d 214 (1997).  In our view, the word "violent" in this
context is used appropriately.  

	Measure 11 imposes mandatory minimum sentences for 21
crimes, ranging from murder to first-degree sexual abuse.  Many of
those felonies unquestionably are crimes of violence, such as
murder, robbery, rape, kidnaping, and assault.  Other felonies for
which Measure 11 mandatory minimum sentences are required, such as
consensual sexual touching, are not crimes of violence.  The
proposed initiative measure would repeal Measure 11 sentences for
both kinds of felonies.  The Attorney General's result statements
accurately state that, if the proposed initiative measure is
approved by the voters, then mandatory minimum sentences for
"certain violent and other felonies" would be repealed and that, if
the proposed initiative measure is rejected, then mandatory minimum
sentences for "certain violent and other felonies" would be
retained.  Those statements are both accurate and reasonably
neutral in this context.  We conclude that the Attorney General's
result statements comply substantially with ORS 250.035(2)(b) and
(c).

SUMMARY

	The summary is "[a] concise and impartial statement of
not more than 85 words summarizing the measure and its major
effect."  ORS 250.035(2)(d).  Petitioner Doell contends that the
Attorney General's summary is inadequate for four reasons.  First,
he contends that the summary fails to convey the seriousness of the
crimes involved, a defect that he contends would be cured by
listing some of the crimes for which the proposed initiative
measure would repeal mandatory minimum sentences.  Second, he
contends that the summary fails to inform the voters that the
resentencing required by the proposed initiative measure would
shorten, substantially, sentences that have been imposed under
Measure 11.  Third, he argues that the summary fails to inform the
voters that crimes of violence committed by juveniles would be
returned to juvenile court for adjudication.  Finally, he maintains
that the structure of the summary is confusing, because its
references to "statutes" fail to make clear that the "statutes"
referred to are those enacted by Measure 11.  

	As to petitioner Doell's first argument, providing
examples of the felonies for which mandatory minimum sentences
would be repealed if the proposed initiative measure were approved
by the voters, would have the effect of providing the voters with
less information about the result of the proposed initiative
measure than the Attorney General's summary provides.  The Attorney
General's summary explains that, under Measure 11, mandatory
minimum sentences are required for "certain violent felonies,
conspiracy and attempt to commit certain felonies."  The Attorney
General's summary explains other aspects of Measure 11, all of
which would be repealed if the proposed initiative measure is
approved by the voters.  We cannot fault the Attorney General for
choosing to provide the more comprehensive explanation.  The
failure to list examples of particular crimes for which mandatory
minimum sentences would be repealed is even less significant
because of the statement in the summary that the proposed
initiative measure would repeal the imposition of mandatory minimum
sentences for "certain violent felonies." 

	We turn to petitioner Doell's other three arguments
regarding the Attorney General's summary.  The first three
sentences of the summary describe sentencing requirements under
Measure 11 and explain that persons 15 to 17 years old, who are
charged with specified crimes, must be prosecuted as adults.  The
last sentence explains that the proposed initiative measure would
repeal Measure 11 and require resentencing under the sentencing
guidelines.  In our view, the Attorney General's summary adequately
informs the voters that, if they approve the proposed initiative
measure, then persons 15 to 17 years old, who are charged with
specified crimes, no longer would be prosecuted as adults.  We also
conclude that the word "statutes" and the phrase "these statutes"
in the Attorney General's summary unambiguously refer to the laws
that came into effect under Measure 11.  Finally, it would not be
accurate to state that passage of the proposed initiative measure
would "substantially shorten" sentences that have been imposed
under Measure 11.  As the Attorney General notes, shorter, longer,
or identical sentences are possible if persons are resentenced
under the sentencing guidelines.

	We turn to petitioner Lawler's challenges to the summary. 
First, she argues that the summary should include the clause,
"Measure repeals automatic waiver to adult court," and that,
without that clause, "the voters will not be apprised of one of the
primary effects of the Measure."   Second, she maintains that the
last phrase of the summary -- "possibility of shorter sentences" ­-
is misleading, because it does not disclose other possibilities,
namely, imposition of identical or longer sentences.  

	Petitioner Lawler's first argument is not well taken.  As
explained above, the Attorney General's summary states that, under
Measure 11, persons charged with specified crimes who were 15 to 17
years old when the crimes were committed are prosecuted as adults. 
The last sentence of the Attorney General's summary states that the
proposed initiative measure would repeal the statutes enacted by
Measure 11.  That is sufficient to explain to the voters that the
proposed initiative measure would repeal automatic waiver to adult
court of persons who were 15 to 17 years old when the crimes were
committed.

	Petitioner Lawler's other argument, however, is well
taken.  The last phrase of the last sentence in the Attorney
General's summary ­- "which provide possibility of shorter
sentences" -­ is misleading.  As explained above, identical,
longer, or shorter sentences are possible if persons who were
sentenced under Measure 11 are resentenced under the sentencing
guidelines.  In context, the phrase improperly appears to take
sides by alerting the voters to only one of several potential
consequences if the proposed measure were to become law.  Because
the last phrase does not disclose the effect of the proposed
measure in neutral terms, we conclude that it should be stricken
from the Attorney General's summary.

	We certify the following ballot title to the Secretary of
State:

		REPEALS MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES FOR CERTAIN FELONIES,
REQUIRES RESENTENCING

		RESULT OF "YES" VOTE: "Yes" vote repeals mandatory
minimum sentences for certain violent and other felonies,
requires resentencing.

		RESULT OF "NO" VOTE: "No" vote retains mandatory
minimum sentences for certain violent and other felonies,
maintains existing sentences.

		SUMMARY: Laws approved in 1994 as "Measure 11"
require minimum sentences for certain violent felonies,
conspiracy and attempt to commit certain felonies,
committed after April 1, 1995.  With limited exceptions,
statutes require persons convicted serve full minimum
sentence, with no reduction for post-prison supervision,
temporary leave.  Statutes require persons charged with
specified crimes aged 15 to 17 when crime committed be
prosecuted as adults.  Measure repeals these statutes,
requires persons sentenced under them be resentenced
under existing sentencing guidelines.

	Ballot title certified as modified.  This decision shall
become effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).