Title: Sheboygan County DSS v. Matthew S.
Citation: 2005 WI 84
Docket Number: 2004AP000901
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 22, 2005

2005 WI 84 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP901 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Joshua S., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Sheboygan County Department of Social  
Services,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Matthew S.,  
          Respondent-Co-Appellant, 
Rachel B.,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  276 Wis. 2d 572, 687 N.W.2d 550 
(Ct. App. 2004-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 22, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 29, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan   
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas S. Williams   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER and ROGGENSACK, J.J., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by John J. Grau and Grau Law Office, Waukesha, and oral argument 
by John J. Grau. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by Mary 
T. Wagner, assistant district attorney, with whom on the brief 
was Joseph DeCecco, district attorney. 
 
 
2005 WI 84
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP901  
(L.C. No. 
03 TP 009) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights to 
 
Joshua S., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
 
 
Sheboygan County Department of Social Services, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Matthew S., 
 
          Respondent-Co-Appellant, 
 
Rachel B., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 22, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Petitioner Rachel B. seeks 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals 
affirming an order of the Sheboygan County Circuit Court for the 
termination of her parental rights to Joshua S.  Rachel B. 
No. 
2004AP901   
 
2 
 
argues on appeal that the circuit court lost competency to 
terminate her parental rights, because it violated the mandatory 
statutory time limitation set forth in Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2) 
(2003-04).1  The issue before this court is whether a competency 
challenge 
based 
on 
the 
violation 
of 
the 
statutory 
time 
limitation is waived if not first made before the circuit court.     
 
¶2 
We conclude such a competency challenge based on the 
violation 
of 
the 
statutory 
time 
limitation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2) cannot be waived, even though it was not 
raised in the circuit court.  The court of appeals erred in 
extending the holding in Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 
WI 79, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190, to violations of such a 
mandatory statutory time limitation under Wis. Stat. ch. 48.    
The circuit court did not hold the fact-finding hearing within 
the time limits established by § 48.422(2), and never granted a 
proper 
extension 
or 
continuance 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 48.315(1)(a) and (2),2 and thus it lost competency 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated all references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2003-04 edition. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.422(2) states: "If the petition is 
contested the court shall set a date for a fact-finding hearing 
to be held within 45 days of the hearing on the petition, unless 
all of the necessary parties agree to commence with the hearing 
on the merits immediately."   
2 "The general requirements of § 48.315(2) control all 
extensions of time deadlines under the Children's Code."  State 
v. April O., 2000 WI App 70, ¶5, 233 Wis. 2d 663, 607 
N.W.2d 927.   
No. 
2004AP901   
 
3 
 
to proceed before it ordered the termination of Rachel B.'s 
parental rights.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals, which had affirmed the order of the circuit 
court.  
I 
 
¶3 
Rachel B. gave birth to Joshua S. on October 10, 2001.  
On November 30, 2001, the circuit court determined that Joshua 
S. was at risk of physical abuse and in need of protection or 
services, pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 48.13(3m) and (10).  The 
court ordered that Joshua S. be placed in a licensed foster home 
and imposed Children in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS) 
conditions on Rachel B. and her husband, Ronald B.  Ronald B. 
was presumed to be Joshua S.'s father, as he and Rachel B. were 
married at the time of conception.  However, in January 2002, 
the Sheboygan County Circuit Court adjudicated Matthew S. as 
Joshua S.'s biological father.3  On January 8, 2002, Matthew S. 
began serving a ten-year prison sentence for the child abuse of 
Joshua S.'s half-brother.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.315(2) states: "A continuance shall be 
granted by the court only upon a showing of good cause in open 
court or during a telephone conference under s. 807.13 on the 
record and only for so long as is necessary, taking into account 
the request or consent of the district attorney or the parties 
and the interest of the public in the prompt disposition of 
cases."      
3 On September 5, 2002, the circuit court granted the 
Sheboygan County's Department of Social Services petition to 
amend the CHIPS order to reflect the change in paternity. 
No. 
2004AP901   
 
4 
 
 
¶4 
On March 7, 2003, the social worker in Joshua S.'s 
case filed a Termination of Parental Rights (TPR) petition in 
regard 
to 
Rachel 
B. 
and 
Matthew 
S., 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2).4  The petition stated the following:  
Because of Matthew [S.'s] long-term incarceration and 
his previous violent behavior towards Joshua's half-
brother, and because of [Rachel B.'s] inability to 
meet the conditions of the court order for well over a 
year and her lack of progress, it appears unlikely 
that either parent will be able to meet the conditions 
for the safe return of [Joshua S.] to their home 
within a one year period of any fact-finding hearing 
in this matter.   
 
¶5 
The circuit court appointed an attorney for Rachel B. 
and then conducted the initial hearing on the petition on March 
27, 2003.  The attorney for Rachel B. denied the grounds for 
termination of her parental rights.  At this hearing, Matthew 
S.'s attorney denied the grounds for termination, discussed the 
possibility of a separate trial, indicated that he was planning 
to file a motion for severance, and stated that he would waive 
the time limits if the motion was granted.   
 
¶6 
Since the TPR petition was contested, there was a need 
to 
set 
a 
fact-finding 
hearing, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2).  The circuit court originally scheduled 
this hearing before a jury for April 29 and 30, 2003, which fell 
                                                 
4 The social worker first filed a petition to terminate 
Matthew S.'s parental rights on March 20, 2002, pursuant to the 
child 
abuse 
section 
of 
the 
Children's 
Code, 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(5)(a).  This petition was dismissed on April 
2, 2002, because Matthew S. still had appeals pending for his 
child abuse conviction.   
No. 
2004AP901   
 
5 
 
well within the 45-day time period required by § 48.422(2).  In 
a letter dated April 3, 2003, the deputy district attorney 
requested that the hearing be rescheduled, as he had a TPR trial 
scheduled for April 30 in another branch of the court.  Matthew 
S.'s attorney also sent a letter to the court asking it to 
adjourn the hearing, as he would not be able to obtain a hearing 
date on a motion for severance before April 29 and 30.  He also 
stated that he had scheduling conflicts on April 29. 
 
¶7 
Pursuant to these requests, the court notified the 
parties on April 4, 2003, that the fact-finding hearing was 
rescheduled for June 17 and 18, 2003.  None of these actions 
occurred in open court or during a telephone conference on the 
record.  On April 15, 2003, Matthew S. moved for severance of 
respondents, and thus for separate trials.  The court scheduled 
a hearing for this motion on May 19, 2003.  After these hearings 
were scheduled, Rachel B.'s attorney indicated that he had a 
conflict with the case and could no longer continue as her 
attorney.  On April 23, 2003, a new attorney was appointed to 
represent Rachel B.  Soon after his appointment, Rachel B.'s new 
attorney indicated that he had a scheduling conflict with the 
motion for severance hearing on May 19, and also asked for a 
rescheduling of the June 17 and 18 fact-finding hearing.  With 
the court's permission, Rachel B.'s attorney participated in the 
May 19 motion hearing via telephone.  At that hearing, the 
circuit court, John D. Murphy, Judge, denied Matthew S.'s motion 
for severance.  The court referred counsel to the court clerk to 
schedule the fact-finding hearing before a jury.  On June 4, 
No. 
2004AP901   
 
6 
 
2003, the court notified the parties that the fact-finding 
hearing was rescheduled for November 18 and 19, 2003.            
 
¶8 
On June 12, 2003, the deputy district attorney moved 
the court for a new hearing date, expressing concern about the 
45-day constraints set forth in Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2).  The 
circuit court heard and granted this motion on June 27, 2003, 
and moved the dates for the fact-finding hearing to August 7 and 
8, 2003.  Rachel B.'s attorney informed the court that he would 
be unavailable to represent her on those dates, and was later 
unsuccessful in finding a replacement.  As a result, the court 
apparently took the fact-finding hearing off the calendar and 
scheduled a status conference for July 30, 2003. 
 
¶9 
While no record was made of that status conference, it 
appears that the court held another status conference on August 
7, 2003, and rescheduled the fact-finding hearing for September 
17, 2003.  Prior to that hearing date, Judge Thomas S. Williams 
was substituted in place of Judge Terence J. Bourke, and a new 
attorney was appointed for Rachel B.   
¶10 In accord with a conference call on August 28, 2003, 
the court held a motion hearing on September 12, 2003, to 
address various motions.  The court granted severance of Matthew 
S.'s fact-finding hearing from Rachel B.'s.  Although another 
formal motion was not made to that effect, all of the parties 
agreed to severance, and the circuit court accepted the 
stipulation.   
¶11 Matthew S.'s fact-finding hearing was then scheduled 
for September 17, 2003.  At his hearing, all four special 
No. 
2004AP901   
 
7 
 
verdict questions were answered in the affirmative, thus 
indicating, among other things, that he would not be able to 
meet the CHIPS conditions within the 12-month period after the 
hearing.  Rachel B.'s fact-finding hearing was postponed until 
October 15, 16, and 17, 2003.  At her hearing, all four special 
verdict questions were also answered in the affirmative.5   
 
¶12 On October 30, 2003, the circuit court entered a 
dispositional order terminating the parental rights of both 
Matthew S. and Rachel B., pursuant to these jury verdicts.  The 
record does not indicate that either the parents or Sheboygan 
County or the guardian ad litem raised the issue regarding the 
circuit court's competency to hear the cases.  Both Matthew S. 
and Rachel B. timely appealed.   
 
¶13 On 
appeal, 
Rachel 
B. 
argued 
that, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2), the circuit court lost competency to 
                                                 
5 The four special verdict questions were as follows:  
1. Has [Joshua S.] been adjudged to be in need of protection 
or services and placed outside the home for a cumulative 
total period of six months or longer pursuant to one or 
more court orders containing the termination of parental 
rights notice required by law?  
2. Did the Sheboygan County Department of Social Services 
make a reasonable effort to provide the services to assist 
[Rachel B.] in meeting the conditions for the return of 
the child?  
3. Has [Rachel B.] failed to meet the conditions for the safe 
return of [Joshua S.] to her home?  
4. Is there a substantial likelihood that [Rachel B.]  will 
not meet these conditions within the twelve-month period 
following the conclusion of this hearing? 
No. 
2004AP901   
 
8 
 
proceed with her case on May 12, 2003, 45 days after the initial 
hearing on the termination petition.  Because her fact-finding 
hearing did not occur until October 15, 16, and 17, 2003, she 
claimed that the court did not have competency to order the 
termination of her parental rights.  In an unpublished opinion, 
the court of appeals affirmed the termination of her parental 
rights on August 25, 2004.  Court of appeals Judge Richard S. 
Brown, relying on Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, held that 
Rachel waived her claim by not raising it before the circuit 
court.  The court extended the holding in Mikrut to competency 
challenges based on the violation of the statutory time 
constraints at issue.  As a result, the court of appeals 
affirmed the order of the circuit court terminating Rachel B.'s 
parental rights to Joshua S.       
 
¶14 Rachel petitioned this court to review the decision of 
the court of appeals, and we granted her petition and now 
reverse.     
II 
 
¶15 The issue we address is whether a competency challenge 
based on the violation of the statutory time limitation of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2) of the Children's Code is waived, even 
though it was not raised in circuit court.  This presents a 
question of law.  We therefore review this question de novo, 
benefiting from the analyses of the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  See Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶7; State v. Kywanda F., 
200 Wis. 2d 26, 32-33, 546 N.W.2d 440 (1996).     
No. 
2004AP901   
 
9 
 
¶16 Competency has been defined as the court's power to 
exercise subject matter jurisdiction.  Kohler Co. v. Wixen, 204 
Wis. 2d 327, 337, 555 N.W.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1996).  The concept 
of 
competency 
is 
narrower 
than 
that 
of 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction, because while the constitution confers subject 
matter jurisdiction on the courts, the state legislature may 
limit the ability of the courts to exercise that power by 
statute.  See Wis. Const. art. VII, § 8; Wis. Stat. § 801.04.  
"Such a legislative enactment affects that court's competency to 
proceed rather than its subject matter jurisdiction."  Cepukenas 
v. Cepukenas, 221 Wis. 2d 166, 170, 584 N.W.2d 227 (Ct. App. 
1998).  Competency is of central importance in this case, since 
the "failure to comply with mandatory time limits under the 
Children's Code may result in the loss of the circuit court's 
competency to proceed."  State v. April O., 2000 WI App 70, ¶5, 
233 Wis. 2d 663, 607 N.W.2d 927.     
¶17 The legislative history of the Children's Code has 
been summarized previously by Wisconsin courts, so it is 
unnecessary that we provide great detail here.  In re B.J.N., 
162 Wis. 2d 635, 645, 469 N.W.2d 845 (1991); see also In re 
R.H., 147 Wis. 2d 22, 433 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1988).  However, 
we do highlight some important revisions, in order to clarify 
the legislative intent behind the statutory time limits at 
issue.  When the Children's Code was first enacted, "there were 
'no statutorily authorized time limits for the processing of 
cases in the juvenile court,' the lack of which often resulted 
in an abuse of detention."  B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 646 (citing 
No. 
2004AP901   
 
10 
 
Wisconsin 
Council 
on 
Criminal 
Justice, 
Juvenile 
Justice 
Standards and Goals 81 (Dec. 1975)).  In 1977 and 1979, however, 
the Code was substantially revised to include numerous time 
limitations, which were established to protect constitutional 
due process rights.  B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 646; R.H., 147 
Wis. 2d at 27-31.  "The legislative history of the Children's 
Code shows that the legislature considers that strict time 
limits between critical stages within the adjudication process 
are necessary to protect the due process rights of children and 
parents."  R.H., 147 Wis. 2d at 33.         
¶18 As stated above, the time limit in this case requires 
that a fact-finding hearing be held within 45 days of a party 
contesting the petition for termination of parental rights.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2).  While all time limits set forth in the 
Children's Code are intended to be mandatory, the legislature 
provided that noncompliance with the time limits may not always 
result in the loss of competency.  See April O., 233 
Wis. 2d 663, ¶5.  Time limits under Wis. Stat. ch. 48 may be 
delayed, 
continued, 
or 
extended, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.315.   
¶19 Sheboygan County argues that here the application of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.315 extended the circuit court's competency to 
terminate Rachel B.'s parental rights.  Specifically, it argues 
that the 45-day time limit mandated by Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2) 
was tolled by Matthew S.'s motion for severance, pursuant to 
§ 48.315(1)(a).  This statute reads:  
No. 
2004AP901   
 
11 
 
(1) The following time periods shall be excluded in 
computing time requirements within this chapter:                      
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other 
legal actions concerning the child or the unborn child 
and the unborn child's expectant mother, including an 
examination under s. 48.295 or a hearing related to 
the mental condition of the child, the child's parent, 
guardian or legal custodian or the expectant mother, 
prehearing motions, waiver motions and hearings on 
other matters.  
According to Sheboygan County, the effect of Matthew S.'s motion 
for severance, in light of this statute, was to toll the 45-day 
time limit for an additional 34 days, expanding the statutory 
deadline to June 13, 2003.   
¶20 Sheboygan County also argues that the circuit court 
properly continued the case for good cause, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2).  It contends that at the hearing on the 
motion for severance on May 19, 2003, the court noted on the 
record that there were scheduling conflicts and that the fact-
finding hearing would need to be postponed.  Sheboygan County 
argues that these scheduling conflicts constituted good cause, 
thus triggering a permitted continuance under § 48.315(2).         
¶21 In opposition to this argument, Rachel B. claims that 
the court lost competency when it violated the time limitation 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2), and that this deadline was 
never properly continued nor the time period tolled.   In 
response to Sheboygan County's first argument, that Matthew S.'s 
motion for severance tolled the statute, Rachel B. contends that 
the filing of this motion had no effect on the violation of the 
mandatory time limit.  In Wis. Stat. § 48.315(1)(a), the statute 
No. 
2004AP901   
 
12 
 
excludes "any period of delay resulting from other legal actions 
concerning the child" when computing time requirements within 
the Children's Code.  Rachel B. argues that because the motion 
for severance was not filed until after the court had already 
extended the time for the fact-finding hearing, the period of 
delay could not be "resulting from" Matthew S.'s motion.   
¶22 We agree with Rachel B. that Matthew S.'s motion for 
severance did not toll the statutory time limit set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2).  Because the initial appearance was held 
for both Rachel B. and Matthew S. on March 27, 2003, and the 
petition was contested at that time, the statutory deadline for 
the fact-finding hearing was May 12, 2003.  However, on April 3, 
2003, the court rescheduled the fact-finding hearing to June 18, 
2003.  Matthew S. did not file his motion for severance until 
April 15, 2003, after the fact-finding hearing had already been 
rescheduled.  As a result, the delay in the fact-finding hearing 
did not result from the filing of the severance motion.6  Because 
the motion for severance was filed after the fact-finding 
hearing was already rescheduled, Sheboygan County's argument is 
not persuasive.7   
                                                 
6 It should also be noted that the attorney for Matthew S. 
was directed at the March 27 hearing to make his motion for 
severance within the 45-day time limit.  Judge Murphy stated: 
"We have 45 days to do this.  Make your motion."   
7 Even if we agreed with Sheboygan County that the statute 
was properly tolled, the statutory time limit was still 
violated, and the court lost competency to proceed.  Matthew 
S.'s motion for severance, if it tolled the statute, would have 
extended the time to hold the fact-finding hearing by 34 days, 
to June 13, 2003.  Thirty-four days was the amount of time that 
No. 
2004AP901   
 
13 
 
¶23 In response to Sheboygan County's second argument, 
Rachel B. contends that there never was a continuance of the 
fact-finding hearing, in accord with Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2).  
She argues that the circuit court failed to acknowledge in open 
court or in a telephone conference on the record that the 
hearing was continued for good cause, as is required by the 
statute.  She also relies on the court of appeals’ decision in 
April O.  In April O., the parents argued on appeal that the 
circuit court did not have competency to terminate their 
parental rights, since the circuit court failed to hold their 
initial and dispositional hearings within the mandatory time 
limits set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 48.422 and 48.424(4) (1997-
98).  April O., 233 Wis. 2d 663, ¶5.  In that case, the circuit 
court determined on the record that good cause existed to extend 
the time limits, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2), but it did 
so only after the time limits had already expired.  The court of 
appeals therefore concluded that "[o]nce a court has lost 
competency it cannot, in a later proceeding, find good cause for 
a 
delay 
and 
thereby 
restore 
competency." 
 
Id., 
¶10.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals determined that the circuit 
court had lost competency to proceed and vacated the termination 
order of the circuit court.               
                                                                                                                                                             
elapsed between the filing of the motion on April 15, 2003, and 
the date of the motion hearing, May 19, 2003.  Regardless, the 
record indicates that Rachel B.'s fact-finding hearing did not 
commence until October 15, 2003.  This date falls well outside 
the 45-day time limit mandated by Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2).   
 
No. 
2004AP901   
 
14 
 
¶24 We agree with Rachel B. that the there was no 
determination of good cause in open court or during a telephone 
conference on the record.  In this case, similar to April O., 
the circuit court did not make a finding of good cause during 
the March 27, 2003 hearing.  When the fact-finding hearing was 
rescheduled for the first time on April 4, 2003, and set for 
June 17, 2003, that date was outside of the statutorily required 
45 days.  The court notified the parties by letter, without a 
showing of good cause in open court or during a phone conference 
on the record.  On March 27, 2003, the only mention of a 
potential scheduling problem was when Matthew S.’s attorney 
raised the possibility of severance, and the circuit court noted 
that the fact-finding hearing had to be held within 45 days.  
Therefore, when the time limit expired without a continuance in 
accord with Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2), the circuit court lost 
competency to proceed.  In other words, "the circuit court never 
granted a continuance at any proceeding before the time limits 
expired and therefore did not do so in open court and in a 
'timely manner.'"  April O., 233 Wis. 2d 663, ¶10.8  Accordingly, 
                                                 
8 We do not decide whether the scheduling conflicts, noted 
on the record at later hearings, would have constituted good 
cause for a continuance.  Such a determination distinguishes 
this case from State v. Quinsanna D., 2002 WI App 318, 259 
Wis. 2d 429, 655 N.W.2d 752, and other cases where scheduling 
conflicts were discussed on the record, within the statutory 
time limit.   
No. 
2004AP901   
 
15 
 
Sheboygan County's arguments to extend the competency of the 
court, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2), fails.     
¶25 Sheboygan County next argues that the court of appeals 
correctly 
applied 
Village 
of 
Trempealeau 
v. 
Mikrut 
in 
determining that a challenge to a circuit court's competency is 
waived if not raised in the circuit court.  In Mikrut, the 
defendant was adjudged guilty of 21 violations of local 
ordinances.  On appeal, he argued that defects in the issuance 
of these citations caused the circuit court to lack competency, 
and that the judgments against him thus were void.  Mikrut, 273 
Wis. 2d 76, ¶6.  This court held that competency does not equate 
to subject matter jurisdiction, and that such a challenge to the 
circuit court's competency is waived if not raised in the 
circuit court.  Id., ¶3.  "The Mikrut court, however, backed off 
from adopting a categorical rule that all competency objections 
must be made at circuit court or be waived."  State v. Michael 
S., 2005 WI 82, ¶71, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (citing 
Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶30).         
 
¶26 Rachel B., on the other hand, argues that the court of 
appeals misinterpreted the holding in Mikrut and improperly 
extended the waiver rule.  She contends that this issue should 
be controlled by our decision in B.J.N.  In that case, a 
                                                                                                                                                             
We also recognize that on February 9, 2005, this court 
granted a petition for review in State v. Robert K., 2004AP2330 
consolidated with 2004AP2331.  That case similarly involved a 
competency 
challenge 
based 
on 
a 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2).  That case is somewhat different than 
the one at issue here.    
No. 
2004AP901   
 
16 
 
petition was filed to extend a dispositional order beyond the 
30-day extension allowed by Wis. Stat. § 48.365(6) (1987-88).       
B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 643.  This court held that such an 
extension was not proper and, with regard to the issue of 
waiver, concluded that "a party cannot waive the right to object 
to a court's loss of competence once the 30-day extension has 
passed without a hearing."  Id. at 658.  In so holding, the 
court emphasized that "[a]n objecting party's failure to 
expressly raise the loss of competence at the earliest available 
moment cannot revive an order which has expired and no longer 
carries any force of law."  Id.  Rachel B. argues that this 
reasoning should be applied to similar mandatory statutory time 
limits within the Children's Code, such as the 45-day deadline 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2). 
¶27 In our analysis of the waiver rule, we recognize that 
the Mikrut court did not address whether mandatory statutory 
time limitations can be waived.  In that case, this court 
stated:  
[T]here is an established line of cases holding, in 
conclusory 
fashion, 
that 
competency 
challenges 
premised upon noncompliance with mandatory statutory 
time limitations cannot be waived.  Because the 
competency challenge in this case is not premised upon 
noncompliance with statutory time limitations, we do 
not address the issue of waiver in this context except 
to note that these cases appear to simply perpetuate 
by rote the rule in older case law that statutory time 
limitations are "jurisdictional" and therefore cannot 
be waived. 
Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶3 n.1 (citation omitted).   
No. 
2004AP901   
 
17 
 
¶28 Although we acknowledged in Mikrut that there was case 
law holding that mandatory statutory time limitations under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 48 cannot be waived, we noted some concern with 
the continued viability of such case law.  Mikrut, 273 
Wis. 2d 76, ¶12 n.4.  Pursuant to this concern, the Mikrut court 
highlighted 
recent 
legislation, 
particularly 
Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2m)(b). 
 
This 
amendment 
to 
§ 48.315, 
discussed in Mikrut, specifies that "failure to comply with time 
limits specified in par. (a) does not deprive the court of 
personal or subject matter jurisdiction or of competency to 
exercise that jurisdiction."  Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2m)(b).                
¶29 The court of appeals interpreted Mikrut as controlling 
the case before us.  Relying on Mikrut, the court of appeals 
held that Rachel B.'s competency challenge came too late, 
because it was not raised in the circuit court.  Sheboygan 
County v. Matthew S., No. 2004AP901, unpublished slip op., ¶25 
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2004).  The court's rationale for 
extending Mikrut was as follows:  
Mikrut 
purported 
not 
to 
extend 
its 
holding 
to 
competency challenges based on violations of mandatory 
statutory time limitations, which were not at issue in 
that case.  However, the sweeping language of that 
holding convinces us that the court would do so in a 
case where the issue was properly raised.  Because we 
therefore conclude that it meant to sub silentio 
overrule all cases necessitating a contrary result, 
this court cannot in good conscience decline to follow 
Mikrut in this case.     
Id., ¶25 (footnotes omitted).   
No. 
2004AP901   
 
18 
 
¶30 We agree with Rachel B. that the waiver rule adopted 
in Mikrut does not extend to this case.  In Mikrut, we declined 
to overrule B.J.N. or its progeny, and specifically refrained 
from extending our holding to cases involving competency 
challenges based on violations of statutory time limitations.  
See Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶3 n.1.  "Thus, the waiver rule of 
Mikrut does not, according to Mikrut, control the outcome of 
this case.  The present case involves a statutory time period 
that Mikrut left undisturbed."  Michael S., ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
¶73.  We therefore conclude, consistent with Michael S., Mikrut, 
and B.J.N., that a competency challenge such as the one here, 
based on the court's failure to act within the statutory time 
periods listed within Wis. Stat. ch. 48, cannot be waived, even 
though it was not raised in the circuit court.      
¶31 We also conclude that recent changes to the Children's 
Code do not affect our decision in this case, nor did the 
changes overrule B.J.N. and April O. sub silentio.  Both the 
court of appeals and Sheboygan County noted that since those 
cases were decided, the Wisconsin Legislature has amended 
Wis. Stat. § 48.315 to specify that the "failure to comply with 
time limitations for continuances, extensions of time or periods 
of delay in Ch. 48 'does not deprive the court of personal or 
subject matter jurisdiction or of competency to exercise that 
jurisdiction. . . .'"  See Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶12 n.4; 
Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2m)(b).  In doing so, Sheboygan County 
contends that the legislature clearly intended to afford 
No. 
2004AP901   
 
19 
 
competency to courts after violations of any time limit within 
Wis. Stat. ch. 48.       
¶32 Rachel B., on the other hand, argues that the court of 
appeals did not properly interpret and apply the recent 
amendment to Wis. Stat. § 48.315 and its effect on competency.  
She contends that because Mikrut omitted language from the 
statutory text, that the court of appeals inappropriately 
broadened the scope of the statute.  We agree.  The Mikrut court 
left out the first line of § 48.315(2m)(b) when it discussed the 
new legislation and its effect on competency.  The first line of 
the statutory language in subsection (2m)(b) is as follows: 
"Failure to comply with any time limit specified in par. 
(a). . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2m)(a) (emphasis added).  Thus, 
only a failure to comply with the time limits in subsection 
(2m)(a)1. and 2. will trigger the application of subsection 
(2m)(b), and thus save the court's personal or subject matter 
jurisdiction or competency to exercise that jurisdiction.   
¶33 The 
text 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2m)(a) 
does 
not 
mention the mandatory statutory time limit presented in this 
case.  Here, the time limit in question is the 45-day period 
between the March 27 date, where the petition for termination of 
parental rights was contested, and the date that the fact-
finding 
hearing 
was 
to 
be 
held. 
 
In 
contrast, 
Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2m)(a) only applies to the following:  
No continuance or extension of a time limit specified 
in this chapter may be granted and no period of delay 
specified in sub. (1) may be excluded in computing a 
time 
requirement 
under 
this 
chapter 
if 
the 
No. 
2004AP901   
 
20 
 
continuance, extension, or exclusion would result in 
any of the following:  
 
1. The court making an initial finding under s. 
48.21(5)(b)1., 
48.355(2)(b)(6)., or 
48.357(2v)(a)1. 
that reasonable efforts have been made to prevent the 
removal of the child from the home, while assuring 
that the child's health and safety are the paramount 
concerns, 
or 
an 
initial 
finding 
under 
s. 
48.21(5)(b)3., 
48.355(2)(b)6r., 
or 
48.357(2v)(a)3. 
that those efforts were not required to be made 
because a circumstance specified in s. 48.355(2d)(b)1. 
to 5. applies, more than 60 days after the date on 
which the child was removed from the home. 
 
2. The court making an initial finding under s. 
48.38(5m) that the agency primarily responsible for 
providing services to the child has made reasonable 
efforts to achieve the goals of the child's permanency 
plan more than 12 months after the date on which the 
child was removed from the home or making any 
subsequent findings under s. 48.38(5m) as to those 
reasonable efforts more than 12 months after the date 
of a previous finding as to those reasonable efforts. 
Therefore, 
without 
any 
express 
language 
incorporating 
Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2) 
into 
subsection 
(a) 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2m), subsection (b) of the same statute is 
not triggered, and thus it is inapplicable to the competency 
challenge in this case.  Moreover, this recent amendment to the 
Children's Code does not affect our reliance on either B.J.N. or 
April O.  Neither of those cases involved circumstances that 
would trigger § 48.315(2m)(b).  Section 48.315(2) was correctly 
applied in those cases, and the decisions finding a loss of 
competency would not have been changed even if this amendment 
had been in effect.           
 
¶34 We are convinced by the plain reading of the statute  
that the legislature did not intend to extend competency for all 
No. 
2004AP901   
 
21 
 
violations of time deadlines outlined in the Children's Code.  
If this were truly its intent, it would have said as much in the 
statute.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, 
¶¶45-46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Although we interpret 
the statute as unambiguous, our conclusion is bolstered when we 
contrast the language of Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2m) with that of 
Wis. Stat. § 938.315(3) of the Juvenile Justice Code.9  In the 
latter statute, the legislature stated: "Failure to comply with 
any time limit specified in this chapter does not deprive the 
court 
of 
personal 
or 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction 
or 
of 
competency 
to 
exercise 
that 
jurisdiction."  
Wis. Stat. § 938.315(3) (emphasis added).   
¶35 While Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2m)(b) uses much of the same 
language as Wis. Stat. § 938.315(3), it did not save competency 
for 
a 
violation 
of 
"any 
time 
limit 
specified 
in 
this 
chapter. . . ." Wis. Stat. § 938.315(3).10  Instead, it limited 
                                                 
9 The original Children's Code encompassed a broad array of 
juvenile 
matters, 
including 
TPR petitions, 
adoptions, and 
delinquency petitions.  However, "[i]n 1995, the legislature 
created chapter 938, the Juvenile Justice Code, which governs 
delinquent juveniles; CHIPS cases remain in chapter 48."  State 
v. Michael S., 2005 WI 82, ¶57, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ 
(interpreting time limits under Wis. Stat. § 938.315). 
10 While we acknowledge that the Mikrut court held that 
Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2m) 
was 
amended 
"to 
like 
effect" 
as 
Wis. Stat. § 938.315, we clarify now that the two statutes are 
not identical in effect.  In § 938.315, the statute saves court 
competency for the failure to comply with any time limit 
specified in that entire chapter.  In § 48.315(2), however, 
court competency is only saved for the failure to comply with 
any time limit specified in paragraph (a) of that statute, not 
the entire chapter.     
No. 
2004AP901   
 
22 
 
the statute's scope to "any time limit specified in par. (a)."  
It is also important to note that § 48.315(2m)(b) became 
effective several years after the legislature adopted the 
Juvenile Justice Code in 1995.  Therefore, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the legislature considered, and then rejected, the 
adoption of the exact language that was used in § 938.315(3).   
¶36 Because 
of 
the 
clear 
statutory 
language 
and 
legislative intent behind these statutes, we must emphasize the 
importance 
of 
strictly 
following 
the 
provisions 
of 
Wis. Stat. ch. 48.  While we recognize the need for flexibility 
in the Children's Code, we believe the legislature addressed 
this problem with the enactment of Wis. Stat. § 48.315.  In this 
case, for example, the court perhaps could have granted a 
continuance if it had recognized good cause for the delay in 
open court or during a telephone conference on the record.    
Without such action, however, there is no choice for us but to 
follow the plain language of the statutes,  and to hold that the 
court 
lost 
competency 
to 
proceed 
before 
it 
ordered 
the 
termination of Rachel B.'s parental rights.  In a similar 
situation in April O., the court of appeals understandingly 
lamented: 
(Statutory language) compels us to reach a result 
in this case that is, to say the least, unfortunate.  
. . . [T]he object of the Children's Code is to 
protect the best interests of the children.  . . . We 
empathize with the circuit court that this is not a 
good result for the children.  However, we may not 
rewrite clear statutory language. . . .  
No. 
2004AP901   
 
23 
 
April O., 233 Wis. 2d 663, ¶12.  We are satisfied, however, that 
children such as Joshua S., and their parents, clearly have a 
due process right to have these decisions determined within the 
time limits set by the legislature, unless statutory provisions 
for a continuance are followed.  See B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 649; 
R.H., 147 Wis. 2d at 33. 
III 
¶37 In sum, we conclude that a competency challenge based 
on 
the 
violation 
of 
the 
statutory 
time 
limitation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2) cannot be waived, even though it was not 
raised in the circuit court.  The court of appeals erred in 
extending the holding in Mikrut to violations of such a 
mandatory statutory time limitation under Wis. Stat. ch. 48.  
The circuit court did not hold the fact-finding hearing within 
the time limits established by § 48.422(2), and never granted a 
proper 
extension 
or 
continuance 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 48.315(1)(a) and (2), and thus it lost competency 
to proceed before it ordered the termination of Rachel B.'s 
parental rights. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals, which had affirmed the order of the circuit 
court.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.    
 
 
No.  2004AP901.jpw 
 
1 
 
 
¶38 JON 
P. 
WILCOX, 
J.   (dissenting).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.01(1) (2003-04)11 provides:  "In construing 
this chapter, the best interests of the child or unborn child 
shall always be of paramount consideration."  Because the 
majority adopts an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2m)(b) 
that is inconsistent with the text of the statute and in 
contravention of the best interests of children, I dissent.   
¶39 Section 48.315(2m)(b) provides, in pertinent part:  
"Failure to comply with any time limit specified in par. (a) 
does not deprive the court of personal or subject matter 
jurisdiction or of competency to exercise that jurisdiction."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.315(2m)(a) 
governs 
the 
granting 
of 
a 
continuance or extension "of a time limit specified in this 
chapter . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)   
¶40 Thus, this court was correct in Village of Trempealeau 
v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶12 n.4, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190, 
when we stated that § 48.315(2m)(b) "specif[ies] that failure to 
comply with time limitations for continuances, extensions of 
time or periods of delay in Ch. 48 'does not deprive the court 
of personal or subject matter jurisdiction or of competency to 
exercise 
that 
jurisdiction.'" 
 Given 
that 
§ 48.315(2m)(a) 
applies to granting continuances or extensions "of a time limit 
specified in this chapter," Mikrut was correct in stating that 
                                                 
11 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No.  2004AP901.jpw 
 
2 
 
§ 48.315(2m)(b) is similar to Wis. Stat. § 938.315(3), in that 
both apply to any time period in the respective chapter.  Id.  
¶41 The majority erroneously concludes that the operation 
of § 48.315(2m)(b) is limited to those time periods specified in 
subdivisions 1.-2. of § 48.315(2m)(a).  Majority op., ¶32.  
Contrary to the assertion of the majority, the statute says no 
such thing.  While § 48.315(2m)(a) provides that a court may not 
grant a continuance or extension if the continuance or extension 
would 
result 
in 
certain 
other 
time 
limits 
specified 
in 
subdivisions 
1.-2. 
being 
violated, 
the 
application 
of 
§ 48.315(2m)(b) is not limited to those time periods enumerated 
in subdivisions 1.-2. of § 48.315(2m)(a).  Rather, the text of 
§ 48.315(2m)(b) expressly applies to "any time limit specified 
in par. (a)."  As paragraph (a) governs the granting of 
continuances and extensions "of a time limit specified in this 
chapter[,]" it is of no consequence that paragraph (a) "does not 
mention the mandatory time limit presented in this case."  
Majority op., ¶33.   
¶42 In addition to being inconsistent with the text of the 
statute, the majority's interpretation of § 48.315(2m)(b) fails 
to adhere to the legislative mandate that in construing all 
provisions of chapter 48, "the best interests of the child or 
unborn child shall always be of paramount consideration."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.01(1).  The time period at issue in this 
case, Wis. Stat. § 48.222(2), was not met in large part due to 
scheduling conflicts between the parties' attorneys.  See 
majority op., ¶¶6-7.  The majority fails to explain how 
No.  2004AP901.jpw 
 
3 
 
interpreting § 48.315(2m)(b) in such a manner so as to deprive a 
circuit court of its competency to adjudicate the termination of 
parental rights (TPR) petition under these circumstances is in 
the best interests of Joshua S.  The interests of children, such 
as Joshua S., are best protected by interpreting § 48.315(2m)(a) 
& (b) in conformity with their plain language so as to allow a 
circuit court to retain competency over the TPR petition if a 
time period within chapter 48 has not been met.   
¶43 Accordingly, 
I 
would 
hold 
that 
pursuant 
to 
§ 48.315(2m)(a) & (b), a circuit court does not lose competency 
when it fails to comply with the time period set forth in 
§ 48.222(2). 
 
This 
interpretation 
conforms 
to 
the 
plain 
statutory language and the best interests of the child sought to 
be protected by the TPR petition.  Therefore, I would affirm the 
order of the circuit court.   
¶44 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join in this dissent. 
 
No.  2004AP901.jpw 
 
 
 
1