Title: State of Missouri, Respondent vs. Jacob Waldrup, Jr., Appellant.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC90978
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: March 1, 2011

Supreme Court of Missouri 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Respondent,     
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC90978 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
JACOB WALDRUP, JR.,   
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CLAY COUNTY 
The Honorable David Paul Chamberlain, Judge 
 
Opinion issued March 1, 2011 
 
I. 
Introduction 
Mr. Jacob Waldrup, Jr., appeals his conviction of possessing a controlled 
substance (section 195.202).1  Mr. Waldrup’s sole point on appeal claims the trial 
court erred in overruling his motion to suppress and overruling objections to 
admission of evidence and its accompanying testimony. 
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.  
 
II. Facts and Procedural History 
In the light most favorable to the ruling, State v. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d 437, 
442 (Mo. banc 2009), the facts are as follows.  On November 9, 2006, Troopers 
Seth Isringhausen and Gregory Primm were engaged in a driver’s license 
                                                 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise indicated. 
checkpoint, located at the northbound exit ramp of I-35 to Parvin Road, in Clay 
County, Missouri.  At approximately 3:45 p.m.,2 their attention was drawn to a 
1988 blue Chevy Camaro approaching the checkpoint.  Specifically, the moment 
the passenger of the car, Mr. Waldrup, took notice of the troopers his “eyes 
opened wide, [and] his mouth kind of hung open, as if…concerned with [the 
troopers’] presence.”  Both troopers then clearly observed Mr. Waldrup duck 
“very far” into the floorboard, “reaching for something or stuffing something 
down around his feet.”  The troopers noted the behavior as “a very unusual 
action,” confirming with one another that it was a “higher risk” contact. 
As the Camaro approached the checkpoint, the troopers’ primary concerns 
were that of their own safety and the safety of others within the vicinity.  Trooper 
Primm testified that Mr. Waldrup’s actions raised some alarm, because a person 
approaching a checkpoint in that manner “could either be trying to retrieve a 
weapon, hide a weapon or any type of contraband a person may not want a law 
enforcement officer to see.”  
Trooper Isringhausen approached the driver of the vehicle, Gerald L. 
Shields, as Trooper Primm approached the passenger side, in case Mr. Waldrup 
had “bad intentions.”  Pursuant to Trooper Isringhausen’s request, Mr. Shields 
presented him with a Kansas driver’s license.  A standard “radio check” revealed 
that Mr. Shield’s license was suspended.  Trooper Isringhausen issued a citation to 
that effect and released Mr. Shields after a “minute or two.”   
                                                 
2 Officers’ testimony put the time anywhere from 3:30-4:00 p.m. 
Simultaneously, Trooper Primm investigated Mr. Waldrup’s abnormal 
behavior.  Mr. Waldrup was asked to exit the Camaro, while Trooper Primm 
performed a cursory plain-view scan of the vehicle for weapons.  Trooper Primm 
testified that the motivation behind having Mr. Waldrup exit the vehicle was “to 
ensure that he didn’t, in fact, intend to retrieve any weapons or anything that might 
pose a danger to [the troopers] or anybody else.”   Trooper Primm then performed 
a Terry frisk on Mr. Waldrup, patting-down his outer clothing for weapons.   As 
he was conducting the pat-down search, he explained to Mr. Waldrup what he was 
doing, asked a few investigatory questions and attempted to elicit Mr. Waldrup’s 
identity.  Mr. Waldrup did not have identification, but he provided Trooper Primm 
with his name, date of birth, and social security number.  
At this point in the investigation, Trooper Isringhausen finished with Mr. 
Shields.  Trooper Primm relayed the identifying information provided by Mr. 
Waldrup to Trooper Isringhausen, so a “radio check” could be performed.  While 
Trooper Isringhausen did so, Trooper Primm felt it necessary to remain with Mr. 
Waldrup, “because [he] wasn’t certain at that point that he was no longer a 
threat....”   The troopers noted that throughout their encounter with Mr. Waldrup 
he was “acting differently,” as if he were under the influence of some substance or 
suffered from a mental or physical disability.  The “radio check” revealed that Mr. 
Waldrup had several outstanding warrants for his arrest.   
Once the troopers were informed of the warrants, Mr. Waldrup was 
immediately arrested, handcuffed, and given a full-body search.  The search 
 
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revealed $365 tucked into Mr. Waldrup’s right sock and a cocaine-base “white 
rock” stuffed between the cushion and sole of Mr. Waldrup’s right shoe.  In 
addition to the search of Mr. Waldrup’s person, the troopers felt it prudent to 
perform a more thorough search of the vehicle Mr. Waldrup arrived in.  
Approximately “ten to fifteen” minutes after the troopers first took notice 
of the Camaro, Mr. Waldrup was transported to the Clay County detention center.  
On the way to the detention center, Mr. Waldrup “passed out” in the patrol car.   
He was awakened at the detention center at 4:24 p.m. and, after being read his 
Miranda rights, stated that he thought the drug in his shoe was cocaine and 
indicated that he had consumed cocaine, PCP, and insulin earlier in the day.  
Mr. Waldrup was charged with possession of a controlled substance, 
pursuant to section 195.202.   Prior to trial, defense counsel entered a motion to 
suppress the “white rock” found in Mr. Waldrup’s shoe, arguing that once Trooper 
Isringhausen issued a ticket to Mr. Shields and released him, the purpose of the 
checkpoint stop had been fulfilled and therefore Mr. Waldrup’s continued 
detention, and the subsequent computer check of his identification, was not 
justified.  Thus, he argued, the evidence seized should be excluded as the product 
of an unlawful search and seizure.  At the suppression hearing, the motion was 
overruled. 
Trial was held in the circuit court of Clay County, where the “white rock” 
found in Mr. Waldrup’s shoe was entered into evidence over defense counsel’s 
objection.  Trooper Isringhausen and Trooper Primm testified as to discovering 
 
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and seizing the crack cocaine, while criminalist James Burgio confirmed the 
cocaine base of the “white rock.”   Counsel objected to the testimonial evidence 
concerning the cocaine, but was again overruled and granted a continuing 
objection.    
A jury found Mr. Waldrup guilty of the charged offense.  At sentencing, the 
court found Mr. Waldrup to be a prior and persistent drug offender, pursuant to 
sections 195.275 and 195.285.2, and sentenced him to 12 years imprisonment in 
the department of corrections. 
III.  The Trial Court Did Not Err in Overruling Mr. Waldrup’s Motion to 
Suppress and Overruling His Objections at Trial  
 
Mr. Waldrup claims the trial court clearly erred and abused its discretion in 
overruling his motion to suppress and in overruling his objections to admission of 
the “white rock” and testimony of Trooper Isringhausen, Trooper Primm, and 
criminalist James Bugio, regarding the discovery, seizure, and testing of the 
“white rock,” because the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the 
Missouri Constitution.  
Standard of Review 
This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress in the light 
most favorable to the ruling, disregarding any contrary evidence or adverse 
inferences.  Oliver, 293 S.W.3d at 442.  The inquiry is limited to determining if 
the decision is supported by substantial evidence, whether that evidence is 
 
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presented at the suppression hearing itself or during trial.  Id.; State v. Edwards, 
116 S.W.3d 511, 530 (Mo. banc 2003).   While “a trial court’s ruling on a motion 
to suppress will be reversed only if it is clearly erroneous,” a determination as to 
whether conduct violates the Fourth Amendment is an issue of law that this Court 
reviews de novo.  State v. Sund, 215 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Mo. banc 2007). 
Analysis 
A.  Mr. Waldrup’s Detention Was Lawful 
 
A lawful search or seizure must not impinge upon the rights guaranteed by 
the Fourth Amendment,3 namely the right of citizens “to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 
Oliver, 293 S.W.3d at 442; U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Reasonableness, therefore, is 
the “touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment.  Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 
855 n.4 (2006).  Generally, “warrantless seizures are unreasonable and, thus, 
unconstitutional.”  State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d 464, 472 (Mo. banc. 2005).  The 
Supreme Court of the United States, however, found exception to this general rule 
in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), permitting officers to make a brief, 
investigatory stop if they are able to point to “specific articulable facts” that, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, supports a “reasonable 
suspicion” that illegal activity has occurred or is occurring.  Pike, 162 S.W.3d at 
                                                 
3 The constitutional protections afforded citizens under article I, section 15 of the 
Missouri Constitution are parallel to, and coextensive with, those of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and are to be interpreted in such a 
manner. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d at 442; see Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 15. 
 
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473 (Mo. banc. 2005) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).  Even if such a reasonable 
suspicion exists, the stop still must “be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies 
which justify its initiation.”  Terry, 392 U.S. at 25.  The exception’s analysis is 
twofold: 1) whether the circumstances support a finding of reasonable suspicion 
justifying the initial stop and 2) whether the officer’s actions were “reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place.” Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added).  
1.  Reasonable Suspicion Justified the Stop  
The existence of “reasonable suspicion” is determined objectively by 
asking “whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure 
warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was 
appropriate.”  Pike, 162 S.W.3d at 473 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22).   While 
this standard does not rise to that of the traditionally required probable cause, a 
proper Terry stop must be supported by “some minimal level of objective 
justification.” State v. Johnson, 316 S.W.3d 390, 395 (Mo. App. 2010) (quoting 
State v. Lanear, 805 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Mo. App. 1991)).  “The [reasonable 
suspicion] that will justify the minimally intrusive ‘Terry’ stop is present when ‘a 
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude 
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.’” State v. Mack, 66 
S.W.3d 706, 709 (Mo. banc 2002) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30) (emphasis 
added).  Furthermore, while displays of nervousness are to be considered as a 
contributing factor, a court must examine the totality of the circumstances in order 
 
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to evaluate whether the standard for “reasonable suspicion” has been met. State v. 
Johnson, 316 S.W.3d 390, 395 (Mo. App. 2010); State v. Bizovi, 129 S.W.3d 429, 
432 (Mo. App. 2004); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).  
In the instant case, both troopers testified to “specific articulable facts,” 
having seen Mr. Waldrup’s “eyes opened wide, [and] his mouth kind of hung 
open, as if…concerned with [the troopers’] presence.”  Even more telling, both 
officers observed Mr. Waldrup reach “very far” into the floorboard “reaching for 
something or stuffing something down around his feet.”  Drawing from the 
officers’ previous experience, they testified that Mr. Waldrup’s actions were “very 
unusual” and raised safety concerns because actions of that type suggested he 
“could either be trying to retrieve a weapon, hide a weapon or any type of 
contraband a person may not want a law enforcement officer to see.”  This Court 
and the court of appeals have held on multiple occasions that similar actions 
provide an officer with “reasonable suspicion.” See State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 
527, 535-36 (Mo. banc 1999) (officer possessed reasonable suspicion where driver 
of vehicle turned away from officer and reached toward passenger side of vehicle 
“as if he was reaching for something or attempting to conceal something”);  
Lanear, 805 S.W.2d at 717 (officer possessed reasonable suspicion for Terry stop 
where defendants exhibited nervous behavior and two men in front of the car 
leaned forward “as if they were hiding something or going to get something”); 
State v. Hunter, 783 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Mo. App. 1990) (officer possessed 
reasonable suspicion for Terry stop where passenger in car reacted to his “take-
 
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down” lights by ducking out of view and appearing to stuff something under the 
seat).   
 Based on the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for the 
troopers to assume criminal activity was afoot in that Mr. Waldrup was attempting 
to retrieve a weapon or hide a weapon or other contraband, either on his person or 
in the car.  Accordingly, reasonable suspicion supported an investigatory stop of 
Mr. Waldrup. 
It is necessary to highlight that the reasonable suspicion possessed by the 
troopers was not limited to a belief that Mr. Waldrup may be armed, but also that 
his furtive movements supported the reasonable suspicion that he may have 
concealed a weapon in the car.  The troopers’ testified that when they saw Mr. 
Waldrup reach down “into the floorboard,” they suspected he was trying to 
retrieve or conceal a weapon or other contraband. (emphasis added).  Trooper 
Primm testified that he performed a plain-view scan of the car for weapons, asking 
Mr. Waldrup to exit the car because he wanted to ensure he did not “retrieve any 
weapons or anything that might pose a danger to [the troopers] or anybody else.” 
(emphasis added).  Trooper Primm also felt it necessary to remain with Mr. 
Waldrup, even after he had performed a pat-down, because he was not convinced 
Mr. Waldrup was “no longer a threat….” (emphasis added).  The fact that the 
troopers felt it prudent to search the car after Mr. Waldrup’s arrest further supports 
the existence of their suspicion.  The troopers’ testimony clearly indicates their 
suspicion included the belief that Mr. Waldrup may have concealed a weapon or 
 
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other contraband in the car and that he might gain access to such items if 
permitted.   
2. Troopers Investigated Within the Requisite Scope    
“Having established the validity of the stop, the propriety of the ensuing 
search must next be addressed.” Hunter, 783 S.W.2d at 495.  A Terry stop must be 
“carefully tailored to its underlying justification.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 
500 (1983); State v. Maginnis, 150 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Mo. App. 2004).   
Under the Terry principle, officers may detain travelers involved in a 
routine traffic stop for “matters unrelated to the traffic violation” if they have 
reasonable and articulable grounds for suspicion of illegal activity.  Maginnis, 150 
S.W.3d at 120-21.  In their efforts to dispel their suspicions, officers are well 
within their authority to ask occupants to exit a vehicle during a traffic stop and 
may frisk those persons for weapons if they possess a reasonable suspicion that 
they may be armed. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam); 
State v. Rushing, 935 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1996); Lanear, 805 S.W.2d at 716.  
Generally, the frisk involves a pat-down of the suspect’s outer clothing, but 
“…where the officer sincerely fears a hidden weapon might be concealed,” a more 
extensive search may be appropriate in particular circumstances. Compare M. 
Stone v. State, 671 N.E.2d 499, 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), and State v. Mitchell, 
622 N.E.2d 680 (1993).  
A Terry stop is more than just a frisk for weapons.  It is an investigation 
hinged upon an officer’s reasonable suspicion and, consequently, a Terry stop 
 
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detainee may be asked “a moderate number of questions to determine his identity 
and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicion.” 
Berkemer v. McCarty,  468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).  To that end, in Hiibel v. Sixth 
Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004), the Supreme Court 
ruled that “questions concerning a suspect's identity are a routine and accepted part 
of many Terry stops.” See also section 84.710 (if he possesses reasonable 
suspicion, an officer may demand a suspect’s “name, address, business abroad and 
whither he is going.”).  “In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the Terry 
principle was extended to the search of the interior of the vehicle ‘if the police 
officer possesses a reasonable belief…the suspect is dangerous and the suspect 
may gain immediate control of weapons.’” State v. Lanear, 805 S.W.2d 713, 
716 (Mo. App. 1991) (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1049).   
Though factually linked, the investigations of Mr. Shields and Mr. Waldrup 
were distinctly separate. See State v. Woods, 284 S.W.3d 630, 638 (Mo. App. 
2009) (officer was not limited to investigating traffic violations of driver, because 
he “initially was suspicious of criminal activity beyond traffic violations, and as 
the investigation proceeded, his suspicions only mounted, justifying at each step 
the actions he took” with respect to the passenger).   Troopers Isringhausen and 
Primm reasonably believed Mr. Waldrup might be armed, justifying his removal 
from the vehicle and subsequent pat-down for weapons.   
During and immediately after the frisk, Trooper Primm was entitled to ask 
Mr. Waldrup the series of investigatory questions pertaining to his identity and the 
 
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circumstances surrounding his arrival at the checkpoint.  As Mr. Waldrup did not 
possess identification, Trooper Primm properly requested and received his name, 
date of birth and social security number.  Although Trooper Primm had dispelled 
his suspicion that Mr. Waldrup concealed a weapon on his person, via the pat-
down frisk, the troopers had not dispelled their suspicions that Mr. Waldrup may 
have concealed a weapon in the vehicle.   
Pursuant to Michigan v. Long, it was lawful for the troopers, as part of the 
investigatory stop, to search the Camaro for weapons, given their suspicions.  See 
Deck, 994 S.W.2d at 535-36 (reasonable suspicion deduced from defendant 
turning away from officer and reaching towards passenger side of vehicle “as if he 
was reaching for something or attempting to conceal something” justified seizure 
of defendant, subsequent order for defendant to exit vehicle, pat-down search of 
defendant, protective sweep of passenger compartment of vehicle, and seizure of 
pistol from beneath passenger seat). The investigation simply did not progress to 
that point because, rather than search the car, the troopers chose to perform a 
“radio check” of Mr. Waldrup’s identifying information, thereby using a less 
intrusive means to dispel their suspicions. Where, as here, an officer possesses 
reasonable suspicion that an individual not possessing identification has 
immediate access to a weapon, he may perform a warrant check of that person’s 
information, in furtherance of his efforts to dispel his reasonable suspicion.  See 
Klaucke v. Daly, 595 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2010) (“most circuits have held that an 
officer does not impermissibly expand the scope of a Terry stop by performing a 
 
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background and warrant check, even where that search is unrelated to the 
circumstances that initially drew the officer’s attention.”). 
Ten to fifteen minutes elapsed from the point at which the troopers first 
noticed the car to when Mr. Waldrup departed for the detention center.  Given the 
officers suspicions that Mr. Waldrup may be armed or may have hidden a weapon 
in the vehicle and the fact that Mr. Waldrup did not possess identification, this did 
not exceed Terry.  Cf.  Woods, 284 S.W.3d 630 (citing numerous cases where 
detentions lasting 15 minutes to one hour were reasonable while officers waited 
for canine); State v. Peterson, 964 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Mo. App.1998) (15 minute 
investigation before receiving consent to search was reasonable); United States v. 
Payne, 534 F.3d 948, 951-52 (8th Cir. 2008) (traffic stop of 39 minutes was 
reasonable where officers saw weapon when suspect exited car). 
Every step the troopers took leading up to the discovery of Mr. Waldrup’s 
outstanding warrants was “carefully tailored” to their reasonable suspicion that he 
may be armed or may have hidden weapons or other contraband in the car.  They 
implemented the least intrusive means available to them without unnecessarily 
prolonging their investigation.   At no point were their suspicions sufficiently 
dispelled to warrant release of Mr. Waldrup.  Mr. Waldrup was properly detained 
within the confines of the Fourth Amendment.  
B. The Evidence Was Seized Incident to a Lawful Arrest 
An officer may arrest a lawfully detained suspect upon receiving radio 
confirmation that the suspect is wanted on an outstanding warrant.  State v. Craig, 
 
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759 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Mo. App. 1988).  Pursuant to a lawful arrest, a search may 
be performed of the “arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’ 
–construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain 
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”  United States v. Gant, 129 S. 
Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). 
Upon Trooper Isringhausen receiving radio confirmation that several arrest 
warrants were outstanding for Mr. Waldrup, he lawfully effectuated the arrest, 
placing Mr. Waldrup in handcuffs.  He performed a permissible search incident to 
arrest of Mr. Waldrup’s person, discovering $365 and a “white rock,” which was 
later found to possess a cocaine base.  Substantial evidence supports the trial 
courts ruling that the evidence in question was obtained lawfully, and no clear 
error exists in ruling in such a manner.  
IV.  Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
        
______________________________________ 
                                    WILLIAM RAY PRICE, JR., CHIEF JUSTICE 
All concur. 
 
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