Title: Sherry E. Phelps v. County of Mobile
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1190469
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 25, 2020

Rel: November 25, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
_________________________
1190468
_________________________
Lewis A. Richardson and Ellen G. Richardson
v.
County of Mobile
_________________________
1190469
_________________________
Sherry E. Phelps
v.
County of Mobile
Appeals from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-17-901056 and CV-16-902772)
1190468; 1190469
SELLERS, Justice.
In these consolidated appeals, Lewis A. Richardson and Ellen G.
Richardson (in case no. 1190468) and Sherry E. Phelps (in case no.
1190469) (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the landowners") contend
that the Mobile Circuit Court erred in entering summary judgments in
favor of Mobile County ("the County") in the landowners' respective
actions against the County.  The landowners assert that the County is
responsible for flooding that has damaged the landowners' personal
property, allegedly has decreased the value of their residential property,
and has made travel over the roads in their neighborhood unsafe and
inconvenient.  
The trial court concluded that the County owes no duty to remediate
the flooding.  We agree with the County that the landowners have not
demonstrated that the County owes them a duty to prevent the flooding
of their property.  However, we conclude that the County does owe a duty
to keep its roads safe and convenient for travel and that the landowners
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can seek to enforce that duty.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's
judgments in part and reverse them in part.
The landowners are neighbors in a subdivision called Cottage Park
Estates in an unincorporated area of Mobile County ("Cottage Park"). 
Cottage Park was constructed in 1977 by a private developer.  Phelps's
house and the Richardsons' house are located across the street from one
another in Cottage Park.
There is an open concrete drainage ditch in Cottage Park that is
located east and southeast of the landowners' houses.  When it rains,
storm water enters the concrete ditch and travels to an underground
concrete culvert.  After reaching the underground culvert, storm water
makes its way to a manhole under one of the streets in Cottage Park and
exits into an open ditch or creek to the north of the neighborhood.  If too
much water enters the concrete ditch, water overflows at various points
in the drainage system, flooding the roads in Cottage Park and the
landowners' property. 
The County had no input in designing, constructing, approving, or
permitting any part of the drainage system in Cottage Park.  In 1978,
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however, pursuant to a County resolution, the County accepted dedication
of the roads in Cottage Park, "together with the drainage system as it
affects said roads." 
Cottage Park has a history of flooding problems, which were
exacerbated by the construction of four subdivisions on land situated
uphill and to the east and southeast of Cottage Park.  The first two
subdivisions were constructed in 1989 and the third was constructed in
1992.  In 2015, the fourth subdivision, called the O'Fallon subdivision, was
constructed.  The construction of the O'Fallon subdivision made the
flooding problem worse and prompted the landowners to file their actions
against the County.  As it did with Cottage Park, the County accepted
dedication of the roads in the four referenced subdivisions, as well as
drainage systems to the extent they affect the roadways therein.1
The County approved the plans for the development of the four
upland subdivisions, including the O'Fallon subdivision.  The drainage
1It appears, however, that, of the four upland subdivisions, only the
O'Fallon subdivision has improvements aimed at storm-water drainage. 
It appears that the other three developments do not have drainage
systems.
4
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system constructed in the O'Fallon subdivision was designed by a licensed
engineer, and the plans for the subdivision were approved after review by
the County's own engineer, Bryan Kegley.  According to the landowners'
brief,2 the developer's engineer submitted "a certification regarding pre
and post construction stormwater and surface water drainage."  The
record suggests that the developer's engineer certified that, after
completion of the O'Fallon subdivision, the amount of storm-water runoff
in the area would be the same or less than it was before construction.
The O'Fallon developer's engineer was incorrect.  Shortly after
construction began on the O'Fallon subdivision, the flooding problem in
Cottage Park worsened significantly.  The evidence indicates that the
roads in Cottage Park frequently flood and become impassable.  There is
also evidence indicating that portions of the roads in the subdivision have
caved in multiple times, necessitating repairs.  Water also tends to escape
from the roads, flooding the residential lots.
Expert reports submitted to the trial court suggest that the recent
increase in the severity of flooding is largely the result of a decision by the
2The landowners filed the same joint brief in each appeal.
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O'Fallon developer's engineer not to route certain portions of the O'Fallon
subdivision's water runoff to the detention pond that is located in that
subdivision.  The water from the areas in question should have been
routed to the pond or, if that was not possible, the discharge rate of the
pond should have been set lower to account for the uncontrolled runoff
coming from those areas.  Design aspects of the Cottage Park drainage
system, built in the late 1970s, render it unable to accommodate the
increased storm water coming from the upland subdivisions.
The landowners sued the County and the developer of the O'Fallon
subdivision.  They eventually settled their claims against the developer
and proceeded against only the County.  Against the County, the
landowners asserted negligence, nuisance, and trespass.  They alleged
that the flooding has made the roads in Cottage Park unsafe and that
floodwater escapes from the roads and onto the landowners' property. 
They asserted that the County has a responsibility to ensure that the
drainage system in Cottage Park is sufficient to control flooding in that
subdivision.  They also criticized the County for approving the plans for
the upland subdivisions, primarily the plan proposed by the developer of
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the O'Fallon subdivision.  The landowners sought monetary awards and
an injunction requiring the County to alleviate the flooding.
The trial court granted the County's summary-judgment motions,
and the landowners filed two separate appeals.  Those appeals were
consolidated for the purpose of issuing one opinion.
" 'A summary judgment is proper when there
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P. The burden is on the
moving party to make a prima facie showing that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In
determining whether the movant has carried that
burden, the court is to view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and to draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. To
defeat a properly supported summary judgment
motion, the nonmoving party must present
"substantial evidence" creating a genuine issue of
material fact -- "evidence of such weight and
quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial judgment can reasonably infer the
existence of the fact sought to be proved." Ala. Code
1975, § 12–21–12; West v. Founders Life Assurance
Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).'
"Capital Alliance Ins. Co. v. Thorough–Clean, Inc., 639 So. 2d
1349, 1350 (Ala. 1994). Questions of law are reviewed de novo.
Alabama Republican Party v. McGinley, 893 So. 2d 337, 342
(Ala. 2004)."
7
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Pritchett v. ICN Med. All., Inc., 938 So. 2d 933, 935 (Ala. 2006).  As the
appellants, the landowners bear the burden of demonstrating that the
trial court erred in entering the summary judgments.  Johnson v. Life Ins.
Co. of Alabama, 581 So. 2d 438, 444 (Ala. 1991).
Flooding of Private Property
The landowners rely on Long v. Jefferson County, 623 So. 2d 1130
(Ala. 1993).  In that case, Jefferson County constructed an underground
sewer line within an easement it owned, which ran across a parcel of
private property.  A house was later constructed on top of the sewer line,
and the plaintiffs purchased the property.  Eventually, the sewer line
collapsed, causing structural damage to the house.  The plaintiffs sued
Jefferson County, and the trial court entered a summary judgment in
Jefferson County's favor.  
On appeal, this Court pointed to analogous cases involving
municipal drainage systems.  Once a municipality chooses to provide such
a system, " 'a duty of care arises and a municipality may be liable for
damages proximately caused by its negligence [in designing or
maintaining the drainage system].' "  623 So. 2d at 1136 (quoting City of
8
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Mobile v. Jackson, 474 So. 2d 644, 649 (Ala. 1985)).  According to Long,
"[a] county, like a city, is under a duty to exercise due care when it
constructs and operates a sewage or drainage system, and it may be liable
for damages proximately caused by its negligence."  623 So. 2d at 1137. 
Jefferson County was aware when it installed the sewer line that a house
likely would be built on top of the line, but the county failed to install a
line that could withstand the weight of a house.  It also failed to follow up
after the house was constructed to determine whether the sewer line
would hold up.
The landowners also point to Reichert v. City of Mobile, 776 So. 2d
761 (Ala. 2000).  Reichert indicates that municipalities can be held liable
if they are negligent in the design and construction of their drainage
systems, if they negligently fail to correct design or construction problems
in their drainage systems, or if they negligently fail to provide appropriate
upkeep of their drainage systems.
As the County points out, it did not design or construct the drainage
system in Cottage Park.  But the County acknowledges that it did accept
some responsibility over that system when it accepted dedication of the
9
1190468; 1190469
roads in Cottage Park.  The County's primary response to the landowners'
reliance on Long and other authorities is that the County accepted
dedication of the Cottage Park drainage system only "as it affects" the
roads in Cottage Park.  According to the County, unlike Jefferson County
in Long, the County "has never operated any [drainage] system for the
benefit of the surrounding landowners."  The County suggests that it has
responsibility for only those portions of the drainage system that are
physically located in the County's rights-of-way and only to the extent
those portions are aimed at preventing flooding of the roads.  The evidence
before the trial court indicates that the open concrete ditch and most of
the underground culvert are located outside the County's rights-of-way.
The landowners, who have the burden on appeal, have not offered
a convincing argument that the proviso in the resolution by which the
roads in Cottage Park were dedicated to the County was not effective in
limiting the County's responsibility over the drainage system in Cottage
Park.  They have not established that the County accepted responsibility
over the entire drainage system when the roads were dedicated to the
County.  See Chalkley v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Comm'n, 34 So. 3d 667, 675
10
1190468; 1190469
(Ala. 2009) (indicating that a county can limit the portions of a drainage
system for which it will be responsible when accepting dedication of
roads).  The landowners also have not established that the County's
responsibility over the Cottage Park drainage system to the extent "it
affects" the roads in Cottage Park exposes the County to liability for the
flooding of private property.
Notwithstanding the limiting language the County used when it
accepted dedication of the roads in Cottage Park, the landowners argue
that the County has since voluntarily assumed responsibility over the
entire drainage system.  The landowners point to evidence indicating that
the County has performed a significant amount of work in Cottage Park
during the 40 years since it accepted dedication of the roads therein.  It
appears, however, that the overwhelming majority of that work was
performed on portions of the drainage system located in the County's
rights-of-way, not on portions located on private property.
The landowners can identify only 4 specific instances during that 40-
year period when the County was involved in repairs or maintenance on
portions of the drainage system that are outside the County's rights-of-
11
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way.  During a significant rainfall in 1980, the concrete ditch was
destroyed.  According to an affidavit submitted by County Engineer
Kegley, "FEMA got involved with the repairs" and "provided all of the
funding and asked the County to help administer and coordinate the
project."  According to Kegley, however, "the work itself was done by a
private construction firm and not by the County."  Nevertheless, it is clear
that the County played a role in facilitating the rebuilding of the concrete
ditch.  In the mid 1980s, the County dug a swale on one of the lots in
Cottage Park to divert water to the concrete ditch.  In April 2009, the
County removed portions of the concrete ditch to determine if water was
flowing under the concrete and later replaced the concrete and filled the
area with soil.  Finally, in 2013, the County removed a fallen tree from the
concrete ditch.
The landowners point to Lott v. City of Daphne, 539 So. 2d 241 (Ala.
1989).  In that case, the plaintiff sued the City of Daphne after his
property began eroding because of increased runoff caused by a new
upland development.  There was a gully running across the plaintiff's
property, referred to as "Mazie's Gulch."  Daphne's drainage system
12
1190468; 1190469
consisted of underground pipes and junction boxes that discharged water
from the area near Mazie's Gulch into the head of the gulch.  When the
new development was proposed, Daphne required the developer to build
a drainage system that emptied into Daphne's existing system and
required the developer to build an "energy suppressor" at the head of
Mazie's Gulch.  After the development was finished, Daphne maintained
the drainage system and the energy suppressor.  The additional runoff
from the new development increased the water running through the gulch,
which caused the plaintiff's property to erode.  After a jury trial, the trial
court in Lott directed a verdict3 in favor of the City of Daphne. 
On appeal, this Court held that there was sufficient evidence to
support a conclusion that Daphne had undertaken responsibility to control
the amount of storm water running into Mazie's Gulch.  Specifically, the
Court noted:
"The mayor of Daphne, Victor Guarisco, and Daphne's former
city engineer, Arthur Rigas, both testified that the City had
constructed various pipes and junction boxes leading from the
areas surrounding Mazie's Gulch to carry storm water that
3Effective October 1, 1995, a directed verdict is called a judgment as
a matter of law.  See Rule 50(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.
13
1190468; 1190469
eventually emptied into Mazie's Gulch. Prior to the
construction of the [new] Subdivision, the City required the
developers to construct a drainage system that fed into the
City's system, and to construct an energy suppressor at the
head of Mazie's Gulch where the City's system emptied.
Moreover, both witnesses testified that the City had
continually maintained the drainage system. These facts
clearly show that the City had undertaken the responsibility
for insuring the proper drainage of storm water from the areas
surrounding Mazie's Gulch. However, the City contends that
although it has maintained the drainage system surrounding
Mazie's Gulch, it has never undertaken to maintain the gully
itself and, therefore, is under no duty to maintain it. We
cannot agree with such reasoning.
"First, the facts show that the City has undertaken to
maintain Mazie's Gulch itself. Arthur Rigas testified that the
City repaired the energy suppressor, located at the head of
Mazie's Gulch, at least once to protect the gully from erosion.
More important, however, is the testimony of Mayor Guarisco
that the City had been using Mazie's Gulch as an important
part of the City's drainage system for the surrounding area. As
noted above, once a municipality undertakes to maintain a
'drainage system,' a duty of care attaches in the maintenance
thereof.  Kennedy [v. City of Montgomery, 423 So. 2d 187 (Ala.
1982)].  Consequently, Mazie's Gulch being an integral part of
the City's drainage system, it is subject to the same standards
of due care to be exercised by the City in preventing harm to
adjoining property owners. The fact that the City has failed or
refused to maintain the gully is some evidence of the City's
negligence. To hold otherwise would permit the City to channel
any volume of water into Mazie's Gulch without taking any
responsibility for its consequences to the landowners below."
539 So. 2d at 244.  
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For its part, the County relies on Royal Automotive, Inc. v. City of
Vestavia Hills, 995 So. 2d 154 (Ala. 2008).  In that case, four businesses
sued Vestavia Hills and Hoover after the businesses incurred property
damage when a creek flooded.  According to the businesses, the cities had
assumed a duty to maintain the creek and keep it from flooding.  This
Court disagreed:
"Three dredgings of [the creek] by Vestavia over a
23–year period and the removal of debris in ditches and
channels of the creek to prevent the flooding of public roads do
not constitute undertaking maintenance of the creek. Such
occasional activity constitutes the sporadic exercise of
discretion to meet exigent circumstances. 'Sporadic' is defined
as 'occurring occasionally, singly, or in irregular or random
instances.' Merriam–Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1207
(11th ed. 2003). The fact that Vestavia spent more than
$100,000 per dredging on 3 occasions over a 23–year period
does not serve to bring such intermittent activity above the
level of sporadic activity. Further, we decline to hold that
evidence indicating that Vestavia monitored the effects of
storm-water runoff from some residential and commercial
developments is sufficient evidence of the assumption of a duty
to maintain the creek.
"Hoover's occasional cleaning of [the creek] in response
to requests from residents of adjoining property and one
public-works project to remove silt and debris from the creek
is also insufficient to support a finding that Hoover undertook
maintenance of [the creek]."
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995 So. 2d at 160 (citations omitted).  The Court in Royal Automotive
distinguished Lott on the following grounds:
"Surface water has flowed down adjoining mountainous
terrain into and through [the creek] for hundreds of years.
There is no evidence indicating that Vestavia or Hoover has
constructed devices to direct water that would not otherwise
naturally flow through or into [the creek]. In Lott, this Court
held that 'in order for the City to be held liable for any
damages caused by its failure to act, it must also be shown
that the water from the City's drainage system, rather than
the natural drainage of surface water, caused the damage
complained of by the plaintiff.' 539 So. 2d at 244. Unlike Lott,
in which Daphne purposefully constructed 'a series of
underground pipes and junction boxes' to redirect surface
water through one area of Mazie's Gulch, there is no evidence
here indicating that Vestavia or Hoover constructed a drainage
system that directed surface water, other than by natural
drainage, into [the creek].  We conclude that neither Vestavia
nor Hoover has undertaken a duty to maintain [the creek]
because the cities have not purposefully directed into [the
creek] water that would not otherwise naturally flow through
the creek."
995 So. 2d at 159–60 (emphasis omitted).  See also City of Dothan v. Sego,
646 So. 2d 1363, 1364 (Ala. 1994) (holding that a city's occasional clearing
of a drainage ditch on private property did not amount to the assumption
of a duty to maintain the ditch).
16
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The present case is more like Royal Automotive and Sego than it is
Lott.  The County's acts of maintenance on the private portions of the
drainage system in Cottage Park were "sporadic" and not sufficient to
justify a conclusion that the County assumed responsibility over the entire
drainage system.  Moreover, like Vestavia Hills and Hoover in Royal
Automotive, the County did not purposefully construct a drainage system
in the O'Fallon subdivision to redirect water into the Cottage Park
drainage system.  Further, the landowners have not demonstrated that,
like the City of Daphne in Lott, the County uses the Cottage Park
drainage system as "an integral part" of its own drainage system.4
The landowners also criticize the County for approving the plans for
the O'Fallon subdivision, which was constructed in 2015.5  The landowners
suggest that, by undertaking to review and approve development plans,
4The landowners have not established that the County's acceptance
of the drainage system in the O'Fallon subdivision to the extent that
system "affects" the roads therein puts the County in the same position as
the City of Daphne in Lott. 
5Although the landowners make passing reference to the County's
approval of the plans for the other three subdivisions that lie uphill from
Cottage Park, they concentrate on the O'Fallon subdivision.
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the County assumes a duty to the owners of downhill property to ensure
that the plans include adequate drainage systems.  According to the
landowners, if the County approves a plan for an upland subdivision that
lacks a sufficient drainage system, the County can be held liable for the
flooding of downhill private property.
The landowners rely primarily on Havard v. Palmer & Baker
Engineers, Inc., 293 Ala. 301, 302 So. 2d 228 (1974), overruled on other
grounds in Ex parte Insurance Co. of North America, 523 So. 2d 1064 (Ala.
1988).  In Havard, the plaintiff's decedent was killed in a fire in the
Bankhead Tunnel in the City of Mobile.  Thereafter, the plaintiff sued an
engineering firm that had contracted with Mobile to inspect the tunnel,
including the fire-suppression equipment kept in the tunnel.  The plaintiff
alleged that the engineering firm had failed to identify faulty fire-fighting
equipment in the tunnel.  In considering whether the engineering firm
owed a duty to the decedent, with whom the firm was not in contractual
privity, this Court stated:
"[T]he test [for whether a duty existed] here is, would an
ordinary man in defendant's position, knowing what they knew
or should have known, anticipate that injury of the nature of
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that suffered was likely to result. Applying this test, the
complaint ... alleges a duty. It could be foreseen or anticipated
by [the engineering firm] that a fire could break out in the
Tunnel and when it did break out, good and workable
fire-fighting equipment would be needed to fight the fire."
293 Ala. at 307, 302 So. 2d at 232.  
The landowners assert that the County should be held liable
because, they say, it was foreseeable that flooding could occur as a result
of the County's approval of the plans for the O'Fallon subdivision.  They
analogize the County's role in approving those plans to the role the
engineering firm played in inspecting the Bankhead Tunnel in Havard.
Pursuant to its contract with the City of Mobile, the engineering
firm in Havard specifically assumed a duty to ensure that the fire-
suppression equipment in the tunnel worked properly, and it was clearly
foreseeable to the firm that people could be injured or killed if the firm
was negligent in doing so.  In the present case, the County asserts that it
simply undertakes to ensure that a licensed engineer has designed a
drainage system for a private developer and that that engineer has
concluded that the development will not increase the amount of storm-
water runoff.  According to the County, it does not make engineering
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calculations itself or check the private engineer's work.  As the County
points out, the landowners "offer this Court no caselaw transforming the
permitting process into an engineering study of drainage."  
In Brickman v. Walter Schoel Engineering Co., 630 So. 2d 424 (Ala.
1993), the plaintiffs, who owned homes in a new subdivision in Vestavia
Hills, sued the city's engineer after their homes were damaged by water
runoff.  They claimed that the drainage system built by the developer of
the subdivision was insufficient and that the city's engineer should have
discovered the problem.  This Court held that the city engineer had no
duty to inspect portions of the drainage system that were located on
private property.  In reaching that conclusion, the Court consulted the
city's regulations setting forth the engineer's responsibilities and the
engineer's own testimony as to what his duties were.
In the present case, the County points to § 11-24-2(b), Ala. Code
1975, which provides, in part:
"No proposed plat shall be approved or disapproved by the
county commission without first being reviewed by the county
engineer or his or her designee. Following the review, the
county engineer or his or her designee shall certify to the
commission whether the proposed plat meets the county's
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regulations. If the proposed plat meets the regulations, it shall
be approved by the commission. Should the proposed plat be
determined by the county engineer to be deficient in any
regard, the county engineer shall detail the deficiency to the
county commission along with a recommendation that it be
disapproved."
 
Although § 11-24-2(b) states that county engineers are to "certify to the
[county] commission whether [a] proposed plat meets the county's
regulations," as the County points out nothing in § 11-24-2(b) requires a
county engineer to determine whether the calculations of a private
developer's engineer regarding a proposed drainage system are correct. 
Regarding the requirements of its regulations, the County points to
an affidavit submitted by County Engineer Kegley.  Kegley testified as
follows:
"The County process [for approving proposed subdivision
plats] is governed by ... laws from the Alabama Code and
County regulations adopted by the County Commission.
"The County requires an owner and developer to submit
the proposed plat to the county commission for approval and
obtain a permit to develop. The County Engineer, or one of
his/her delegates, checks to see if the plan meets County
regulations to ensure it has been prepared by a licensed
professional engineer, and that the plans show the proposed
drainage route and drainage calculations, such that they are
sufficient to show the subdivision's storm water runoff flows
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meet a minimum of a 10-year storm level. The subdivisions are
required to release storm water at a rate that is equal to or
less than what would be released prior to development, and
the engineer's calculations are meant to attest to that
requirement being met by ensuring that the sizing of the
improvements inside the roadways and the drainage
easements can handle the anticipated flows. The specific
numerical guidelines for detention and dispersal of storm
water that the County distributes to developers are broadly
accepted standards, and to my knowledge are in use all over
the country.
"The rationale behind this County procedure is simple:
by requiring developers to use licensed professional engineers,
the County is able to feel certain that the design and
construction of buildings, drains, streets, and other items are
done competently while providing any aggrieved person with
an avenue for redress against the designing entity.
"The O'Fallon subdivision plans were submitted by a
licensed professional engineer. They show calculations that
indicate that the project will actually release less water than
what was being released by the natural slope of the land.
These calculations appear mathematically correct, using the
traditional method of engineering formulas, as is used by other
counties throughout the United States. The County has not
inspected or measured the outfall flow, and it is my
understanding that the County is not obligated to do so by
law."
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The only specific portion of the County's regulations the landowners cite
to this Court is a requirement that proposed subdivisions "shall have an
adequate storm water collection system."6
The County construes its regulations as requiring only that the
County engineer ensure that a developer's licensed engineer has
concluded that a new development will not result in increased storm-
6Another County regulation provides:
"Street, utility, and other improvements shall be installed in
each new subdivision in accordance with the standards and
requirements of these Regulations and the detailed
construction specifications and engineering requirements.
Approval of the Final Plat shall be subject to the proper
installation of such improvements, as determined by the
County Engineer, or the posting of a surety or irrevocable
letter of credit in such form and amount as approved by the
County Engineer, such amount not to exceed 125% of the
estimated cost of completion, to secure the actual construction
of such improvements." 
Although this regulation seems to require the County engineer to verify
that a new subdivision has been constructed according to approved plans,
there apparently was no final inspection performed with respect to the
O'Fallon subdivision. Even though this regulation calls for the County
engineer to perform an inspection prior to "approval of the Final Plat," 
the landowners do not link this regulatory process to the flooding in
Cottage Park and fail to show how it imposes any duty on the County for
their benefit.
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water runoff.  The County asserts that nothing in the regulations requires
the County engineer to perform the same work of the developer's engineer
to ensure that his or her conclusions are correct.  In any event, to the
extent the regulations can be construed to impose such a duty, the County
suggests that that duty runs to the public in general, not to individual
citizens, and therefore cannot support a cause of action against the County
for the flooding of private property.  In support, the County points to Rich
v. City of Mobile, 410 So. 2d 385 (Ala. 1982).  
In Rich, this Court held that a city could not be held liable for the
negligent inspection of a faulty connection between the plaintiff's house
and the city's sewer system.  The city's plumbing inspectors were tasked,
presumably pursuant to municipal ordinances, with ensuring that proper
materials were used in residential plumbing lines and connections, that
no leaks existed, and that lines and connections were installed in
compliance with the city's plumbing code.  This Court held that there is
no "legal duty, the breach of which imposes liability, in those narrow areas
of governmental activities essential to the well-being of the governed,
where the imposition of liability can be reasonably calculated to
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materially thwart the City's legitimate efforts to provide such public
services."  410 So. 2d at 387.  The Court suggested that the duty of the city
plumbing inspectors in Rich was owed "to the public generally" and not "to
individual homeowners."  Id. at 385.  In the present case, the County
analogizes the inspection of sewer connections in Rich to the County's
consideration of development plans.  The County also cites Hilliard v. City
of Huntsville, 585 So. 2d 889 (Ala. 1991), in which this Court held that
municipal electrical inspections benefit the general public and that any
benefit to an individual is merely incidental and not a guarantee of safety.
It is the landowners' burden to show that the trial court erred in
entering the summary judgments in favor of the County.  Considering the
appellate record and the arguments before this Court, we simply cannot
conclude that the landowners have met that burden with respect to their
claims based on the County's approval of the O'Fallon subdivision.7
7The landowners suggest that Reichert, supra, supports their claim
that the County can be held liable for approving the plans for the O'Fallon
subdivision.  Although the Court in Reichert noted that the City of Mobile
had "issued additional permits for development to the north and to the
west of the plaintiffs' subdivision, causing an increased discharge of
surface water to be directed to the area of the plaintiffs' property,"  776 So.
2d at 766, the gist of the plaintiffs' claims was that the City of Mobile had
25
1190468; 1190469
The landowners also appear to suggest that, simply because water
enters the County's rights-of-way in Cottage Park, the County
automatically becomes responsible to stop the water from entering
surrounding private property.  In support, they refer to testimony given
by County Engineer Kegley indicating that, once water reaches the
County's roadway, the county "maintains" the water:
"Q. The stormwater system where the underground culvert ...
that goes under your road, that's not the County's system?
"A. Once it gets to our right-of-way, it becomes County
maintained, yes, sir.
"....
"A. And that inlet pipe flows downstream a little bit further
until it gets to the County right-of-way. And then just inside
the County right-of-way there's a manhole. Once it reaches the
County right-of-way, it becomes our maintenance.
"Q. You're saying that the inlet pipe is not within the County's
right-of-way?
"A. That's  correct."
been negligent in designing, constructing, or maintaining its own drainage
system.  Reichert does not establish that the County is liable in the
present case for approving upland-development plans.
26
1190468; 1190469
As the County asserts, Kegley was simply testifying to "the boundaries or
limits of what physical part of the [drainage] system was
County-maintained and within the County right-of-way."  He did not
concede that the County owes a duty to "maintain" floodwater by keeping
it off private property simply because it enters the County's rights-of-way. 
The landowners also rely on the foreseeability test in support of their
theory that the County has a duty to stop storm water once it enters the
County's rights-of-way.  See Smitherman v. McCafferty, 622 So. 2d 322,
324 (Ala. 1993) ("The key factor [in determining whether a duty exists] is
whether the injury was foreseeable by the defendant.").  They claim it is
foreseeable to the County that, if it does not stop water once it enters the
County's roads, the water will "escape" onto private property.  But
foreseeability is not the only factor courts consider in determining
whether a duty exists.  See DiBiasi v. Joe Wheeler Elec. Membership
Corp., 988 So. 2d 454, 461 (Ala. 2008) (identifying foreseeability, public
policy, social considerations, the nature of the defendant's activity, the
relationship between the parties, and the type of injury or harm
threatened as factors to be considered when determining whether a duty
27
1190468; 1190469
exists).  The landowners have not convincingly argued that foreseeability
alone creates an affirmative duty to stop water from flowing onto adjacent
property simply because it enters a roadway.
Finally, at various points in their brief, the landowners point to
Mitchell v. Mackin, 376 So. 2d 684 (Ala. 1979), in which the Court
discussed principles relating to a landowner's altering of property and
interference with the natural flow of surface water to the detriment of
downhill neighbors.  The landowners, however, have not demonstrated
that, for purposes of the rules discussed in Mitchell, the County is an
owner of property lying uphill from the landowners' property and has
interfered with the natural flow of surface water to the detriment of the
landowners.
With respect to their claim that the County is liable for negligence
in connection with the flooding of private property in Cottage Park, the
landowners have not demonstrated that the trial court erred in entering
summary judgments in favor of the County.  Regarding the landowners'
nuisance and trespass theories, the trial court concluded that those claims
fail for the same reason their negligence claim fails.  See generally Royal
28
1190468; 1190469
Automotive, 995 So. 2d at 160 ("The trial court correctly found that
because the [plaintiffs'] negligent-maintenance claims fail, their nuisance
and trespass claims must also fail.").  The landowners do not point to any
authority supporting the proposition that, even if the County does not owe
them a duty that would support a negligence claim in connection with the
flooding of private property, the landowners can still succeed under a
nuisance or trespass theory as to such flooding.
The County's Responsibility to Keep its Roads Safe and Convenient
The landowners argue that the County has a duty to alleviate the
flooding on the roads in Cottage Park to make the roads safe and
convenient to use.  The landowners submitted evidence to the trial court
indicating that the flooding of the roads makes them impassable at times
and that residents have had to park their vehicles uphill and walk
barefoot to their homes.  There are photographs and videos in the record
showing the roads in Cottage Park completely covered by swiftly flowing,
muddy water.
In its brief to this Court, the County does not address the
landowners' argument that the County has a duty to keep its roads safe
29
1190468; 1190469
and convenient.  During oral argument, counsel for the County suggested
that the landowners had not argued to the trial court that the County has
such a duty.  Although the landowners' complaint concentrates primarily
on the flooding of their private property, it does assert that the flooded
roadways in Cottage Park create a dangerous condition and requests an
injunction directing the County to alleviate the flooding in the
neighborhood.  Moreover, in response to the County's summary-judgment
motions, the landowners pointed to statutory law and caselaw that, they
asserted, made the County responsible for alleviating the flooding on the
roads in Cottage Park to make them safe and convenient.  We conclude
that the landowners sufficiently raised this theory in the trial court.
The landowners cite § 23-1-80, Ala. Code 1975, which provides:
"The county commissions of the several counties of this
state have general superintendence of the public roads,
bridges, and ferries within their respective counties so as to
render travel over the same as safe and convenient as
practicable. To this end, they have legislative and executive
powers, except as limited in this chapter. They may establish,
promulgate, and enforce rules and regulations, make and enter
into such contracts as may be necessary or as may be deemed
necessary or advisable by such commissions to build, construct,
make, improve and maintain a good system of public roads,
bridges, and ferries in their respective counties, and regulate
30
1190468; 1190469
the use thereof; but no contract for the construction or repair
of any public roads, bridge, or bridges shall be made where the
payment of the contract price for such work shall extend over
a period of more than 20 years."
(Emphasis added.)  In Macon County Commission v. Sanders, 555 So. 2d
1054 (Ala. 1990), upon which the landowners rely, the plaintiff sued
Macon County and the Macon County Commission in tort after the
plaintiff's decedent was killed in a car accident on a county road.  The trial
court entered a judgment on a jury verdict against the defendants.  On
appeal, this Court, citing § 23-1-80, noted that "[a] county has the duty to
keep its roads in a reasonably safe condition for travel and to remedy
defects in the roadway on receipt of notice of those defects."  555 So. 2d at
1057.  See also Jefferson Cnty. v. Sulzby, 468 So. 2d 112, 114 (Ala. 1985)
("[G]overnmental entities, by virtue of their exclusive authority to
maintain and control the roadways[,] are under a common law duty to
keep the streets in repair and in a reasonably safe condition for their
intended use.").  The Court in Sanders affirmed the trial court's judgment,
noting that the road on which the decedent was killed was overgrown with
vegetation, had ruts and washouts, was too narrow, had insufficient sight
31
1190468; 1190469
distances, and lacked warning signs.  Although Sanders involved a
monetary award based on a wrongful death and not a claim seeking an
injunction, as noted the Court in Sanders did state that counties have a
duty "to remedy defects in the roadway on receipt of notice of those
defects."  555 So. 2d at 1057.
The landowners also rely on a nuisance theory not discussed in
Sanders.  According to the landowners, the frequent flooding of the roads
in Cottage Park is a nuisance.  The landowners acknowledge hurdles for
individuals attempting to remedy a "public" nuisance as opposed to a
"private" nuisance.  Specifically, they note that § 6-5-121, Ala. Code 1975,
provides:
"Nuisances are either public or private. A public nuisance
is one which damages all persons who come within the sphere
of its operation, though it may vary in its effects on
individuals. A private nuisance is one limited in its injurious
effects to one or a few individuals. Generally, a public nuisance
gives no right of action to any individual, but must be abated
by a process instituted in the name of the state. A private
nuisance gives a right of action to the person injured."
But, as the landowners point out, "a public nuisance may ... give an
individual a cause of action for abatement when he has suffered damages
32
1190468; 1190469
different in degree and kind from those suffered by the general public." 
City of Birmingham v. City of Fairfield, 375 So. 2d 438, 441 (Ala. 1979). 
See also § 6-5-123, Ala. Code 1975 ("If a public nuisance causes a special
damage to an individual in which the public does not participate, such
special damage gives a right of action.").
Hall v. North Montgomery Materials, LLC, 39 So. 3d 159 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2008), a per curiam opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals joined by
two judges, with three judges concurring in the result, concluded that
individuals could maintain an action to abate a public nuisance in the
form of a proposed gravel quarry, which would have increased the use of
heavy trucks in a residential area.  The use of the trucks would have
caused the roads to deteriorate, making it difficult and unsafe for the
plaintiffs to use the roads to reach their houses.  The opinion in Hall
states:
"An individual who cannot reach his home (or any other
destination, such as a family cemetery, that holds a
significance that society is prepared to recognize as
compelling) without having to take a circuitous alternate route
in order to avoid a public nuisance has established special
injury different in kind as well as degree from the injury
suffered by the public at large. A fortiori, an individual who
33
1190468; 1190469
cannot avoid a public nuisance by taking an alternate route to
his home -- because there is no alternate route -- has
established a special injury.
"Applying those principles to the facts of the present case
leads to the following conclusion: The local residents, who
cannot travel to or from their homes without encountering the
inherent danger of driving on [the roads in question] because
those roads provide the only means of ingress and egress to
their homes, established special injury different in kind as well
as degree from the injury suffered by the public at large.
Accordingly, they had a right of action, pursuant to § 6–5–123,
to abate a public nuisance."
39 So. 3d at 178–79.  The opinion in Hall references three decisions by this
Court holding that individuals could seek to abate nuisances that blocked
access to public roads.  See  Barnes v. Kent, 292 Ala. 508, 296 So. 2d 881
(1974) (noting that nuisance blocked plaintiff's access to public road
leading to his property and required him to take circuitous route that
added "two or three extra miles"); Scruggs v. Beason, 246 Ala. 405, 20 So.
2d 774 (1945) (noting that nuisance blocked access to public road leading
to 
cemetery 
where 
plaintiffs' 
family 
members 
were 
buried);
Sloss–Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Johnson, 147 Ala. 384, 41 So. 907
(1906) (noting that nuisance blocked public road and required plaintiff to
take a circuitous route to his property).  See also McIntosh v. Moody, 228
34
1190468; 1190469
Ala. 165, 167, 153 So. 182, 184 (1934) (holding that a nuisance in the form
of a building that had been erected on a public road could be abated in an
action brought by the owners of another building "at the point where the
alleged obstruction [was] maintained").  
In the present case, the County has taken the position that it does
not cause the flooding of the roads in Cottage Park.  But it has not been
disputed that the County has responsibility over those roads and a duty
to maintain their safety and convenience.  A county can be held liable for
injuries suffered by people using roads that are in an unsafe condition. 
Sanders.  We have not been presented with a persuasive argument that
a county cannot be enjoined from refusing to remediate the unsafe
condition of a road.
We reverse the summary judgments to the extent they are based on
the proposition that the County simply has no duty to maintain the roads
in Cottage Park so that they are safe and convenient by taking steps to
alleviate flooding on those roads and remand the cases for further
proceedings.  We express no opinion as to whether the landowners will
ultimately succeed based on that theory.
35
1190468; 1190469
1190468 -- AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND
REMANDED.
1190469 -- AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND
REMANDED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Wise, Mendheim, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ.,
concur.
Sellers, J., concurs specially.
Shaw and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result in part and dissent in
part.
36
1190468; 1190469
SELLERS, Justice (concurring specially). 
I authored the main opinion.  I write specially to address one aspect
of Justice Shaw's opinion dissenting in part.  That opinion appears to
conclude that the County of Mobile does not have a responsibility to take
reasonable steps to alleviate flooding on its roads, when those roads
become dangerous or impassable, because the County itself did not cause
the flooding by, for example, altering uphill land to the detriment of
downhill land.  But counties have a statutory and common-law duty to
keep their roads as safe and convenient as practicable, and they must take
reasonable steps to remedy unsafe or inconvenient conditions once notified
of their existence.  § 23-1-80, Ala. Code 1975; Macon Cnty. Comm'n v.
Sanders, 555 So. 2d 1054 (Ala. 1990); Jefferson Cnty. v. Sulzby, 468 So. 2d
112 (Ala. 1985).  I do not view the existence of that duty as contingent
upon the counties themselves having affirmatively caused the unsafe or
inconvenient condition.
37
1190468; 1190469
SHAW, Justice (concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part).
I agree with the conclusion of the main opinion insofar as it affirms
the summary judgments entered by the trial court on the basis that
Mobile County ("the County") owes no duty to alleviate flooding on
privately owned property; therefore, I concur in the result reached in that
portion of the opinion.  However, I am unable to agree with the opinion's
second conclusion that the summary judgments for the County were
inappropriate to the extent that they were allegedly based on the
proposition that the County has no duty to maintain its roads so that they
are safe and convenient. 
In their original complaints, as to the County, in addition to
damages for the alleged devaluation of and interference with privately
owned real property, Lewis A. Richardson and Ellen G. Richardson and
Sherry E. Phelps ("the landowners") sought "a permanent mandatory
injunction ... against the ... County ... that the [County] be required to
provide adequate stormwater and surface water drainage systems so as
to alleviate the continued flooding or possibility of flooding on [the
landowners'] property."  I see nothing in those pleadings referencing
38
1190468; 1190469
public roads or any duty of the County with respect to public roads. 
Thereafter, the landowners amended their complaints to add allegations
connected to new flooding events.  However, as reflected in the County's
summarization of the landowners' claims in its brief in support of the
summary judgments, at no time did their requests for injunctive relief
against the County appear to change.  During the proceedings on the
County's summary-judgment motions, as observed in the main opinion,
the landowners' evidentiary submissions did include reference to and
evidence of corresponding flooding of the roads in the subdivision;
however, it appears clear that the emphasis of the landowners' arguments
was the effect of the alleged flooding on their privately owned real
property. 
Following the filing of the County's summary-judgment motions and
after the trial court had taken the matter under advisement, the
landowners filed amended complaints in each case, alleging for the first
time that the County "allowed storm water and surface water from its
right of way to flood private property and to damage private property."
Nonetheless, the landowners' request for injunctive relief as to the County
39
1190468; 1190469
was not amended and remained the same.  In addition, the record
indicates that the landowners expressly conceded that, "in the event the
[trial] Court grants [the County's] summary judgment ..., [the landowners] 
agreed that the amended complaint would be moot and of no effect ."
The trial court's subsequent orders entering summary judgments for
the County on the landowners' negligence claims reflects that it concluded
as a matter of law "that the County had no duty to maintain the drainage
ditch/system in question."  In reaching that conclusion, the trial court
specifically noted that the "primary criticism" of the landowners' expert
"focuses on the initial design of the drainage system and the failure to
upgrade that original design."  As the trial court correctly pointed out, the
landowners' complaint thus "points to an issue of design of the drainage
system of the subdivision and not a lack of maintenance by the County." 
Similarly, as to its subsequent orders entering summary judgments for
the County on the landowners' nuisance and trespass claims, the trial
court found that "the nuisance, if any, arose out of a breach of a duty to
provide " 'appropriate up-keep,' a duty which does not belong to the
County" and that the landowners' trespass claims also failed because "[a]t
40
1190468; 1190469
best [they] demonstrate a failure to act or take actions which the county
had no legal duty to take, i.e., redesign or provide appropriate upkeep of
the private drainage system. "  Thus, I see nothing to suggest that the
trial court's summary judgments were based, to  any extent, on its
rejection of the notion that the County has a legal duty to maintain its
roads.  To the contrary, the landowners specifically argued in
postjudgment proceedings that the trial court's summary-judgment orders
"do not address the flooding from the County’s right-of-way." 
In any event, and assuming that the landowners' road-based claims
were properly presented below, I see nothing to suggest that ordering the
County to perform its statutory responsibility to maintain its roads will
afford the landowners relief:  the landowners' evidence does not
demonstrate that the rights-of-way -- or any other aspect of the roads
under the County's responsibility -- were improperly designed,
constructed, or maintained.  Moreover, it appears that the primary source
of the flooding is not runoff from the County's roads.  
Like the trial court, the main opinion in its initial holding appears
to accept the County's conclusion that it is responsible only for portions of
41
1190468; 1190469
the drainage system located in the County's rights-of-way and only to the
extent necessary to prevent flooding of the roads.  However, not only are
the portions of the affected drainage ditch, according to the main opinion,
located "outside the County's rights-of-way," ___ So. 3d at ___, but the
record suggests alternate sources of flooding and, as the main opinion also
concludes, the recent increase in flooding within Cottage Park is largely
attributable to the detention pond located in the O'Fallon subdivision.  See
___ So. 3d at ___.  That being the case, it appears to me that the second
holding of the opinion not only places the trial court in error on grounds
that the trial court did not consider, but also awards to the landowners
relief that they never actually requested and, to the extent that it does so,
relies on a conflicting analysis.  If the flooding in Cottage Park -- both on
private property and the roads -- is caused by the improperly designed
drainage system in a neighboring subdivision over which the County has
no duty or responsibility, then I see no causation demonstrated on the
County's part in relation to the flooding on the roads. Thus, as to that
portion of the main opinion, I respectfully dissent.
Bryan, J., concurs.
42