Title: VIRGIL NOLAN BRUMFIELD, JR . HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON V COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2001-SC-000851-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: October 10, 2003

IMPORTANTNOTICE NOT TO BEPUBLISHED_ OPINION THIS OPINIONISDESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THERULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BYTHE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDAND SHALL NOTBE CITED OR USED ASAUTHORITYINANYOTHER CASE INANYCOURT OF THIS STATE. ,Supxmur (gourf of VIRGIL NOLAN BRUMFIELD, JR . V 2001-SC-0851-MR RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 18, 2003 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON CRIMINAL NO . 9-CR-1456 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE Appellant, Virgil Nolan Brumfield, Jr., was convicted in the Jefferson Circuit Court of manslaughter in the first-degree and of being a persistent felony offender in the second-degree . He was sentenced to a total of thirty (30) years imprisonment and appeals to this Court as a matter of right . I . FACTS On June 7, 1999, Kim Wegrzyn, and her boyfriend Virgil Nolan Brumfield, Jr., ('`Appellant"), went to visit Wegrzyn's mother, Renee Griffin, and her live-in boyfriend, Gilbert Stivers, at their house on 122 North 19th Street in Louisville, Kentucky . Griffin told Wegrzyn that she could come over in spite of the fact that Griffin had taken out an emergency protective order against her . Wegrzyn's behavior toward her mother caused her to experience problems with Stivers . Although they managed to get along most of the time, Wegrzyn and Stivers became involved in a physical confrontation on one occasion with Stivers getting the better of Wegrzyn . In fact, Griffin had to intervene in that altercation to pull Stivers off of Wegrzyn . Despite their turbulent past, Wegrzyn went to her mother's home accompanied by Appellant, who she introduced as "David ." At first, Wegrzyn's visit seemed to be going well, everyone talked, drank beer, and played cards . However, the evening quickly took a fatal turn when Appellant apparently confronted Stivers about the altercation that had occurred between him and Wegrzyn in the previous months . There was evidence that Appellant repeatedly kicked Stivers and told him not to get up after he had knocked him to the ground . Following the beating, both Wegrzyn and Appellant took showers at Griffin's house . When Wegrzyn got out of the shower, Stivers was still laying on the floor . Wegrzyn kicked him twice in the leg, calling him a "mother f----r" because she was still angry about what he had done to her months earlier . After Wegrzyn and Appellant left the house, Griffin went to bed . The following morning when Griffin attempted to wake Stivers, who was still lying on the floor in between the bed and the dresser, she discovered he was dead . When the EMS arrived, Stivers was not breathing and did not have a pulse . An EKG was performed at the scene which indicated that there was no electrical activity in the heart and it was determined that Stivers had been dead too long to be revived . At the scene, EMT Paul Wren took a statement from Griffin indicating that Appellant had beaten Stivers, taken a shower to wash off the blood, and then administered a second beating . Once the police arrived, both Griffin and Wegrzyn were taken in for questioning . Despite the differences in their stories, both women maintained at trial that they never heard Stivers say anything to provoke Appellant . In addition, both women contended that they never saw Stivers even attempt to defend himself from the beating that was inflicted upon him by Appellant . Appellant was indicted for murder, first-degree assault, and for being a second- degree persistent felony offender . Appellant's case was initially treated as a capital case, but during a pre-trial conference, the Commonwealth stated that it no longer intended to pursue the death penalty . Also prior to trial, the indictment was amended to include complicity . Following a trial in August 2001, a jury convicted Appellant of first- degree manslaughter and recommended an enhanced sentence of thirty (30) years imprisonment by virtue of the PFO charge . Judgment was entered accordingly . II . THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S NUMEROUS REQUESTS FOR RELIEF FROM THE ALLEGED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT Appellant claims that the trial court erred in failing to grant relief following the Commonwealth's late disclosure of two video-taped statements . Specifically, Appellant argues that the trial court should have granted one or more of the following motions : motion to dismiss his indictment, motion to suppress his statement, motion to release him from custody, motion to disqualify the prosecutor, and a motion to hold the prosecutor in contempt . Although the trial court denied the motions, it granted a continuance and undertook several significant steps to ensure that the Commonwealth adequately complied with its discovery orders, including the prompt production of the two late-discovered video-taped statements . Pursuant to RCr . 7 .24(9), If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule or an order issued pursuant thereto, the court may direct such party to permit the 3 discovery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as may be just under the circumstances . The question of what sanction, if any, to be applied for discovery abuses under RCr 7 .24 is within the trial court's discretion . Stallard v. Mc Donald , Ky. App ., 826 S.W.2d 840 (1992) . Appellant has not established irreparable harm and the question he raises is within the trial court's discretion . Therefore, the trial court's grant of a continuance and its significant efforts to ensure that the Commonwealth adequately complied with the trial court's discovery orders were sufficient to cure any possible prejudice caused by the Commonwealth's late disclosure of the two taped statements . III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS TAPED STATEMENTS Appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the taped statement he gave to Detective Alpiger . Specifically, Appellant claims that his statement was taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel and that the Commonwealth failed to prove that Appellant's statement was voluntary . In order for the trial court to accurately determine whether a subsequent waiver of asserted Fifth Amendment rights is valid, a court must determine : (a) whether the accused clearly invoked his right to counsel, and (b) whether the accused voluntarily initiated further discussions with police, and knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked . Smith v . Commonwealth , Ky., 920 S .W.2d 514, 517 (1995) . In this case, Appellant invoked his right to counsel after being read his Miranda rights by immediately requesting an attorney and refusing to sign the waiver form . At that point, Detective Alpiger ceased questioning . Appellant thereafter reinitiated contact with Detective Alpiger by asking him if he was going to be charged, to which the 4 Detective responded by stating that Appellant was, in fact, going to be charged . After a brief period of silence, Appellant grabbed the waiver form, acknowledged that he knew what it was, and signed his name on the bottom . Appellant then stated, "I didn't do nothing . Man jumped in my face and I whooped him. He was still breathing when I left ." Appellant also admitted that he hit Stivers with his fist, but denied ever kicking him . In Oregon v . Bradshaw , 462 U .S 1039, 103 S .Ct . 2830, 77 L .Ed .2d 405 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that the word "initiated" must be construed in its ordinary meaning when determining whether an accused reinitiated contact with the police . Further, the Court held that, "[t]here can be no doubt in this case that in asking, `Well what is going to happen to me now?', respondent `initiated' further conversation in the ordinary dictionary sense of that word ." Id . at 1045, 103 S.Ct at 2835 . Appellant in this case initiated further conversation with Detective Alpiger when he asked what he was going to be charged with . Appellant then knowingly and intelligently waived his previous invocation of his right to counsel by acknowledging and signing the waiver form that had previously been read and explained to him . In addition, Appellant claims that he could not have knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel due to his intoxication . However, the trial court found that there was no factual basis to believe Appellant was intoxicated to the point that he was incapable of waiving his rights . In Halvorson v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 730 S.W.2d 921, 927 (1987), cert . denied , 484 U .S . 970 (1987), this Court held that, "a confession otherwise voluntary is not to be excluded by reason of self-induced intoxication unless `the accused was intoxicated to the degree of mania, or of being unable to understand the meaning of his statements . "'(uotin Britt v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 512 S .W .2d 469, 499 (1974)) . In this case, the trial court found that Appellant appeared to know exactly what he was doing and was cognizant of his statements . Further, the trial court found no evidence of mania . The record of the hearing clearly indicates that Appellant was properly informed of his Miranda rights and that he voluntarily waived those rights and gave a taped statement . Thus, the trial court properly denied Appellant's motion to suppress . The trial court's decision on a suppression motion is conclusive and will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence and is correct as a matter of law . RCr . 9.78 . In the present case, the trial court properly found that Appellant reinitiated contact with Detective Alpiger after asserting his right to counsel . In addition, the trial court found that Appellant affirmatively waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel by signing the waiver form and making statements to Detective Alpiger . Furthermore, the trial court properly found that there was no factual basis on which to believe that Appellant was intoxicated to the point that he was incapable of validly waiving his rights . IV . THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION TO INTRODUCE THE CO-DEFENDANT'S INDICTMENT AS A PARTY ADMISSION Appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to introduce his co-defendant's indictment as a party admission . Specifically, Appellant argues that count two of Wegrzyn's indictment charges her as a principal in the assault, which is at odds with the Commonwealth's position at Appellant's trial . However, Appellant fails to cite any authority from this jurisdiction or any other jurisdiction in which a co-defendant's indictment may be used as a party admission . Thus, the trial court properly denied Appellant's request to introduce Wegrzyn's indictment as a party admission . V. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE REGARDING THE VICTIM'S MISDEMEANOR CONVICTION FOR SECOND DEGREE WANTON ENDANGERMENT Appellant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to permit him to introduce a certified copy of the victim's prior conviction for second-degree wanton endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor . Specifically, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth opened the door to this type of normally-excluded character evidence when its witness, Renee Griffin testified on redirect, "Gilbert wasn't a violent person, as far as getting into fights especially at home . He was in a good mood ." KRE 404 provides, in pertinent part : (a) Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except : (2) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, other than the prosecution for criminal sexual conduct, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor . There was absolutely no evidence that Stivers was the initial aggressor, and, as such, Appellant was not entitled to offer negative character evidence . Once Griffin testified that Stivers was not a violent person, defense counsel could have impeached her testimony by inquiring whether she was aware of Stivers' prior conviction . Robert G . Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook , § 4.25, at 206-207 (3rd ed ., Michie 1993) . Under no circumstances, however, could the defense have admitted a certified copy of Stivers' prior conviction . The trial court properly excluded the evidence . A. Self-Protection . VI . THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY DURING THE GUILT-INNOCENT PHASE The trial court properly found that there was no evidence offered at trial that would warrant the giving of a self-protection instruction . KRS 503.050 (1) and (2) provide : (1) The use of physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable when the defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by the other person . (2) The use of deadly physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable under subsection (1) only when the defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious physical injury, kidnapping, or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat . The only evidence even remotely related to self-protection was Appellant's own statement, in which he stated that "man jumped in my face, and I whooped him ." However, this statement is not sufficient to justify the self-protection instruction in a homicide case . This case is analogous to Cecil v . Commonwealth , Ky., 888 S.W 2d 669, 674 (1995), wherein we stated that, "there was no evidence that the appellant acted out of any need for self-protection ; at most was her testimony that the victim might have `jumped' at her or `verbally abused her."' Therefore, this Court concluded that the appellant's use of deadly force was unnecessary at the time to protect her against death or serious physical injury. Id . Here, the trial court properly found that there was no evidence of any kind of aggression on the part of the victim and that self-protection was not warranted . B . Reckless Homicide . The trial court properly ruled that the evidence did not support a reckless homicide instruction . KRS 501 .020 (4) provides : (4) "Recklessly"--A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists . The risk must be of such nature and degree that failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation . The examination of the victim's body revealed that he suffered numerous serious injuries including bruises, abrasions, multiple facial fractures, facial swelling, a black eye, a broken jaw in two places, hemorrhaging, multiple rib fractures, and internal bleeding . Therefore, it is unreasonable to believe that Appellant failed to perceive that the severe beating he inflicted on the victim would result in serious physical injury and or death . C . Wanton Fourth-Degree Assault . Appellant concedes that he neither tendered nor requested a fourth-degree wanton assault instruction . RCr 9 .22 requires a party to render a timely and appropriate objection in order to preserve an issue for review . Since Appellant failed to object in a timely manner to the trial court's failure to include such an instruction, we need not review the claim . D . Reckless Fourth-Degree Assault . Since the trial court specifically found that there was no evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that Appellant acted recklessly, a reckless fourth-degree assault instruction was not warranted . Further, we held in Hager v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 41 S .W.3d 828 (2001), that it is improper to give an instruction on fourth-degree assault as a lesser-included offense of homicide E . Fourth-Degree Assault Under Extreme Emotional_ Disturbance . Contrary to the Commonwealth's position, Appellant did preserve this issue by tendering an instruction on fourth-degree assault under extreme emotional disturbance, although he did not object when such instruction was not given . Notwithstanding, the jury specifically found Appellant guilty under a first-degree manslaughter instruction that provided, in pertinent part A . That in this county on or about the 8th day of June, 1999, acting alone or in complicity, he killed Gilbert Stivers by beating him ; AND B . That in doing so, he did not intend to kill 'Gilbert Stivers, but intended to cause serious physical injury to Gilbert Stivers . The jury rejected a finding of manslaughter based on extreme emotional disturbance . Further, the jury was instructed on first-degree assault, second-degree assault, assault under extreme emotional disturbance, and fourth-degree assault . By finding that Appellant intended to cause serious physical injury to Stivers, it necessarily did not believe that Appellant intended to only inflict serious injury as set forth in fourth-degree assault . Further, no reasonable juror could have concluded that the deceased victim was only subjected to fourth-degree assault . Further, as previously stated, Hager , supra, precludes an instruction on fourth-degree assault as a lesser-included offense of homicide . No error occurred . The judgment and conviction of the Jefferson Circuit Court are affirmed . Lambert, C .J., Graves, Johnstone, Stumbo, and Wintersheimer, J .J . concur. Cooper, J ., concurs in result only . 10 Keller, J ., dissents and would reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial because the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury regarding the lesser- included offense of Reckless Homicide . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT Elizabeth B. McMahon 200 Advocacy Plaza 719 West Jefferson Street Louisville, KY 40202 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE A.B . Chandler III Attorney General William Robert Long Assistant Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601