Title: State Bank of Burden v. Augusta State Bank
Citation: 207 Kan. 116, 483 P.2d 1068
Docket Number: 45,938
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 10, 1971

207 Kan. 116 (1971)
483 P.2d 1068
STATE BANK OF BURDEN, Appellant,
v.
AUGUSTA STATE BANK and PAUL MANN, Appellees.
No. 45,938

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 10, 1971.
Stan E. Wisdom, of Jochems, Sargent and Blaes, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Grant H. Cole, of Cole and Camp, of Winfield, was with him on the brief for the appellant.
Robert L. Bishop, of Janicke, Herlocker and Bishop, of Winfield, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This is an appeal from a summary judgment in a replevin action.
Summary judgment was rendered against the plaintiff, the State Bank of Burden, and on a motion to amend the judgment it submitted numerous affidavits which are in the record on appeal. The appellees object to the use of these affidavits in determining the propriety of the summary judgment. The appellees suggest that in determining the validity of the summary judgment this court should limit its consideration to the matters which were before the trial court when it entered the judgment in the first instance. We are inclined to agree. The affidavits submitted on the motion to amend the judgment should be considered only on the contention *117 that the court abused its discretion in not amending the judgment, if we should reach such a question.
It would appear to be conceded on appeal that one of the defendants, Harold A. Krug, was engaged in the welding business and in connection therewith made and sold farm and stock trailers. All other facts must be gleaned from the amended petition, the motion and the affidavit accompanying the motion for judgment. Unfortunately it is necessary that we present the instruments in some detail.
On January 22, 1969, the plaintiff filed its petition in replevin and on January 30, filed an amended petition. It is the allegations of this petition that we are to consider here.
The amended petition may be summarized in part:
On December 20, 1966, defendant Harold A. Krug and Deloris V. Krug executed a security agreement and financing statement along with notes. The financing statement was duly recorded in the office of the Secretary of State of Kansas on December 27, 1966. The notes have been renewed and the security indicated in said financing statement is still in full force and effect. The plaintiff has a valid lien on all the security given therein.
On or about November 16, 1967, the Augusta State Bank filed a financing statement listing merely the inventory of defendant Harold A. Krug in the office of the Secretary of State at Topeka, Kansas, and later, on the 28th day of March, 1968, again filed a financing statement listing equipment; that both the items indicated in the financing statements are inferior to the lien of plaintiff and plaintiff's lien on said property is prior to any lien of the defendant, Augusta State Bank.
It was alleged:
1  1968 four horse trailer, ID#113169;
1  1968 nine foot trailer;
Attached to plaintiff's petition as exhibits were the security agreement and the financing statement presented to the Secretary of State for filing pursuant to the provisions of the Commercial Code. Both the security agreement and the financing statement described the property covered as follows:
"(e) Proceeds and products of the foregoing."
The defendants filed an entry of appearance and redelivery bond. These items are not material here.
The defendants then moved the court for an order dismissing the action because plaintiff's petition fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The grounds of said motion were as follows:
Attached to the motion to dismiss was an affidavit which read:
As disclosed by the record, the foregoing is all that the trial court had before it except the motion of Mrs. Harold A. Krug to intervene. The motion was not passed on by the trial court and is not before us for consideration.
The trial court considered the motion to dismiss and the affidavit as a motion for summary judgment and concluded:
*120 The plaintiff has appealed.
The appellant makes two principal contentions which we summarize:
(1) It was error for the court to award summary judgment when the amended petition shows on its face that the trailers involved were inventory, a material issue of fact in the case, and specifically exempted from the requirement that liens on vehicles must be included on the title certificates (K.S.A. 1968 Supp. 84-9-302 [3] [c]).
(2) It was error for the court to dismiss plaintiff's petition with prejudice as to the second trailer because of an inadequate description.
We are forced to agree with appellant.
The appellant proceeded upon the single theory that the trailers were inventory of the manufacturer and not required to be registered under the Motor Vehicle Registration Act (K.S.A. 8-126), and the lien was perfected by filing under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. It relies on K.S.A. 1970 Supp. 84-9-302 which provides insofar as material here:
"(3) A security interest in
It would not be well for us to speculate on the statutes or legal principles applicable until the factual issues are determined.
The amended petition specially alleged "that the above described property [the two trailers] was and is a part of the inventory of Harold A. Krug." The affidavit filed by appellees in no way refutes this allegation.
It would appear that all of the issues of fact raised by appellant's petition were left in dispute. It is not definite whether defendant Krug was a manufacturer of trailers or seller or both. These facts would reflect on the question of the necessity for registration. *121 Certainly there were no facts before the trial court from which it could determine whether the trailers were inventory in the possession of Krug at the time the security agreement was entered into or any time. This question was a material issue. A summary judgment is not proper where material factual issues remain. One of our later pronouncements of this question will be found in Lawrence v. Deemy, 204 Kan. 299, 461 P.2d 770, where we stated:
We are, also, forced to disagree with the trial court's conclusion that the petition does not sufficiently describe the property claimed, i.e., one 1968 nine-foot trailer.
The property to be replevied must be so sufficiently described to enable the officer serving the process to identify it. The description must also be sufficient to enable the defendant to know with what property he is charged with detaining. (77 C.J.S., Replevin, § 149, p. 103.) The amount of detail in the description depends on the nature of the property. Cattle being numerous, a cow would require a more detailed description than a farm trailer. Circumstances might also make a difference, such as whether the property was standing alone or commingled with other property of the same character.
In the case before us two trailers were taken from Harold Krug by the Augusta State Bank. It is not to be assumed that the bank was in the trailer sales business or operating trailers. We will not assume that the bank had in its possession more than one 1968 nine-foot trailer.
We must conclude that the description was sufficient, under the circumstances, to enable the officer serving the process to identify it and the defendants must have known with what property they were charged with detaining. If the defendants were not so informed, a motion for a definite statement would have been the better practice.
The judgment is reversed with instructions to the trial court to set *122 aside the summary judgment and proceed with the trial of the issues raised by plaintiff's petition.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.