Title: MICHIGAN OPEN CARRY INC V CLIO AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT (Opinion on Application)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 155204
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 27, 2018

MICHIGAN GUN OWNERS, INC v ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
MICHIGAN OPEN CARRY INC v CLIO AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT 
 
Docket Nos. 155196 and 155204.  Argued on application for leave to appeal April 11, 
2018.  Decided July 27, 2018. 
 
 
In Docket No. 155196, Michigan Gun Owners, Inc., and Ulysses Wong brought an action 
in the Washtenaw Circuit Court against the Ann Arbor Public Schools (AAPS), challenging three 
AAPS policies that banned the possession of firearms in schools and at school-sponsored events.  
Plaintiffs asserted that AAPS was a local unit of government under MCL 123.1101 and that, as 
such, they were preempted by state law from regulating the possession of firearms.  The parties 
filed cross-motions for summary disposition.  The court, Carol A. Kuhnke, J., granted AAPS’s 
motion for summary disposition and dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice, ruling that 
AAPS was not a local unit of government under MCL 123.1101 and that state law did not 
preempt AAPS’s policies under the four-factor analysis set forth in People v Llewellyn, 401 
Mich 314, 323-324 (1977).  The Court of Appeals, K. F. KELLY, P.J., and GLEICHER and 
SHAPIRO, JJ., affirmed, 318 Mich App 338 (2016), and plaintiffs sought leave to appeal.  The 
Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other 
peremptory action.  501 Mich 941 (2017). 
 
 
In Docket No. 155204, Michigan Open Carry Inc. and Kenneth Herman brought an 
action in the Genesee Circuit Court against the Clio Area School District (CASD), Fletcher 
Spears III, and Katrina Mitchell, alleging that defendants had improperly denied Herman access 
to his child’s elementary school while he was openly carrying a pistol under a CASD policy that 
banned the possession of firearms in CASD schools and at public events.  The court, Archie L. 
Hayman, J., granted summary disposition and entered a declaratory judgment in plaintiffs’ favor, 
ruling that, under Capital Area Dist Library v Mich Open Carry, Inc, 298 Mich App 220 (2012) 
(CADL), CASD was a quasi-municipal corporation that was preempted from attempting to 
regulate in the field of firearm regulation.  The Court of Appeals, K. F. KELLY, P.J., and 
GLEICHER and SHAPIRO, JJ., reversed, 318 Mich App 356 (2016), and defendants sought leave to 
appeal.  The Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application 
or take other peremptory action.  501 Mich 941 (2017). 
 
 
In an opinion by Justice MCCORMACK, joined by Justices VIVIANO, BERNSTEIN, and 
CLEMENT, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held: 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
 
The Legislature has the authority to preempt school districts from adopting policies like 
the ones at issue that regulate firearms on school property; however, not only has the Legislature 
not done so, it has expressed its intent not to preempt such regulation.  Because an unambiguous 
statute showed a legislative intent not to occupy the field of firearms regulation, the districts’ 
policies were not impliedly field-preempted.  And given the procedural history of the case and 
the arguments presented to the Court, it was unnecessary to determine whether the policies were 
conflict-preempted.  The Court of Appeals judgments were affirmed.  To the extent that Mich 
Coalition for Responsible Gun Owners v City of Ferndale, 256 Mich App 401 (2003), cited 
MCL 123.1102 as supporting the proposition that state law completely occupied the field of 
firearms regulation, it was overruled. 
 
 
1.  Under Llewellyn, a court begins the preemption analysis by determining whether state 
law expressly provides that the state’s authority to regulate in a specified area of the law is to be 
exclusive.  It was undisputed in these cases that state law does not expressly preempt school 
districts’ authority to regulate guns.  While MCL 123.1102 prohibits a local unit of government 
from regulating firearms except as otherwise provided by federal law or a law of this state, MCL 
123.1101(b) then defines “local unit of government” to mean “a city, village, township, or 
county.”  In other words, while MCL 123.1102 expressly preempts regulation of firearms by a 
city, village, township, or county; it does not apply to school districts. 
 
 
2.  In determining under Llewellyn whether the Legislature has impliedly occupied the 
field and thereby precluded local regulation in a certain area, courts are to consider legislative 
history, the pervasiveness of a state regulatory scheme, and whether the nature of the regulated 
subject matter demands exclusive state regulation to achieve the uniformity necessary to serve 
the state’s purpose or interest.  The Court of Appeals analyzed these factors and determined that 
the Legislature had not impliedly occupied the field of firearms regulation.  However, this 
analysis of the Llewellyn factors to consider field preemption was unnecessary in light of the fact 
that an unambiguous statute established legislative intent to regulate the subject matter only 
partially.  Under the doctrine expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the expression of one thing 
suggests the exclusion of all others—the enactment of an express preemption statute limited to 
specific local units of government implies that entities not included are not preempted.  In this 
case, because MCL 123.1102 and MCL 123.1101 exclude school districts from an otherwise 
precise list of local units of government prohibited from regulating firearms, the districts’ 
policies are not field-preempted.  To the extent that Mich Coalition for Responsible Gun Owners, 
256 Mich App 401, cited MCL 123.1102 as supporting the proposition that state law completely 
occupied the field of firearms regulation, it was overruled. 
 
 
3.  Plaintiffs’ argument that the districts’ policies conflict with various statutes—
particularly MCL 28.425o and MCL 750.237a, which they read as implying a state law right to 
openly carry firearms on school property—was abandoned because plaintiffs failed to assert it in 
their applications for leave to appeal and also made clear at oral argument that they were not 
advancing a conflict-preemption argument.   
 
 
Court of Appeals judgments affirmed. 
 
 
Justice VIVIANO, joined by Justice BERNSTEIN, concurring, wrote separately to explain 
his reasons for disagreeing with the dissenting opinion.  He noted that the dissent raised only a 
narrow issue, specifically, whether the school policies directly conflicted with state law and were 
therefore preempted by it.  He disagreed with the dissent’s position that MCL 750.237a(5)(c) and 
MCL 28.425o(1)(a), when read together, give concealed pistol license (CPL) holders the right to 
openly carry a firearm on school property, thereby permitting what the policies prohibit.  He 
stated that MCL 28.421 et seq. only addresses the open carrying of a pistol in limited 
circumstances not applicable in this case, MCL 28.425c(3)(b), and that MCL 750.237a also does 
not provide an express right to openly carry a firearm on school property.  He further stated that 
even if these statutes could be read as expressly exempting the open carrying of firearms by CPL 
holders from the criminal prohibition in MCL 750.237a, the Court had previously rejected the 
dissent’s theory that that which the Legislature has not prohibited it has impliedly permitted.  
Instead, the Court had established that in order for a state law to conflict with and preempt a 
local regulation, the state law must expressly permit something the local regulation prohibits.  
Justice VIVIANO concluded that because no state statute could be read to expressly permit the 
open carrying of firearms on school property, the school policies at issue did not conflict with 
any state law and were therefore not preempted.   
 
 
Justice CLEMENT, concurring, wrote separately to note that, despite the number of 
opinions in these cases, no member of the Court expressed any disagreement as to the holding 
that the field of firearms regulation was not preempted either expressly, by MCL 123.1102, or 
impliedly under Llewellyn.  She stated that what divided the Court was the Chief Justice’s 
assertion that it was necessary to perform a threshold inquiry of whether the school districts had 
the authority to adopt the policies in the first place and his conclusion that they did not have this 
authority.  Justice CLEMENT expressed no opinion on the merits of this argument, but rather 
agreed with the majority that the Court should decline to advance this argument for the parties 
when the parties not only did not make it for themselves but instead ceded the issue during oral 
argument, thereby abandoning it.  She stated that declining to reach this argument was consistent 
with the Court’s concern for judicial modesty and the admonition that appellate courts do not sit 
as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, and she noted that declining to reach the 
argument in these cases did nothing to prejudice the Court’s ability to take it up in a future case 
in which it was properly presented. 
 
 
Justice WILDER, joined by Justice ZAHRA, concurred with the majority opinion insofar as 
it concluded that the Legislature has not occupied the entire field of firearm regulation for 
preemption purposes, but he respectfully dissented from the majority’s decision not to reach the 
issue of conflict preemption, noting that the decision not to address an abandoned issue was a 
prudential matter rather than an inflexible rule and that the equities favored waiving the rules 
regarding issue preservation and abandonment under these circumstances.  Justice WILDER 
would have granted the application in this case and directed the parties to brief the issue of 
conflict preemption in light of the fact that the issue presented a matter of pure statutory 
interpretation, the issue was likely to be relitigated, and the parties appeared motivated to brief 
and argue the issue of conflict preemption in greater depth. 
 
 
Chief Justice MARKMAN, dissenting, stated that while he did not necessarily disagree 
with the majority’s conclusions regarding express preemption and field preemption, he disagreed 
with the majority’s failure to address the threshold inquiry of whether the school districts had the 
authority to adopt these policies in the first place.  He stated that although MCL 380.11a(3) gives 
school districts the authority to enact policies that provide for the safety and welfare of pupils 
while at school “except as otherwise provided by law,” state law does “otherwise provide,” by 
generally prohibiting the possession of firearms on school property in MCL 750.237a(4) but then 
by expressly exempting individuals licensed by this state to carry a concealed pistol from this 
prohibition in MCL 750.237a(5), thereby permitting licensed individuals to possess firearms on 
school property.  He concluded that because the school districts have attempted to prohibit what 
state law permits, the school districts’ policies are void.  He stated that when there is an 
enactment of the Legislature that provides that a person “may” do something and a subordinate 
public body provides that he or she “may not” do that same thing, there is a textual, a logical, a 
legal, and a practical conflict, and the former provision of law prevails.  Chief Justice MARKMAN 
would have reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in both cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2018 State of Michigan 
FILED  July 27, 2018 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
MICHIGAN GUN OWNERS, INC. and 
ULYSSES WONG, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v 
No. 155196 
 
ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS and 
JEANICE K. SWIFT, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees. 
 
 
 
 
MICHIGAN OPEN CARRY INC. and 
KENNETH HERMAN, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v 
No. 155204 
 
CLIO AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
FLETCHER SPEARS III, and KATRINA 
MITCHELL, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees. 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
 
 
 
 
2
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
MCCORMACK, J.  
The defendants, the Ann Arbor and Clio school districts, each have a policy 
banning firearms on school property.  The plaintiffs, advocacy organizations supporting 
gun ownership and certain parents of children who attend school in the defendant 
districts, believe state law preempts these policies by implication.  While the Legislature 
plainly can preempt school districts from adopting policies like the ones at issue if it 
chooses to, it has not done so here: not only has our Legislature not preempted school 
districts’ regulation of guns by implication, it has expressed its intent not to preempt such 
regulation.  We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The defendant school districts adopted policies prohibiting firearms on school 
property.  Each policy contains an exception for individuals with a concealed pistol 
license (CPL).  To be clear, in practice this means CPL holders can carry a concealed 
weapon on school property under certain limited conditions, but they cannot openly carry 
one.1 
The plaintiffs filed these lawsuits, seeking a determination that state law preempts 
by implication the school districts’ policies limiting firearms on school grounds.  Each 
district moved for summary disposition.  The plaintiffs filed cross-motions for summary 
disposition or for declaratory relief.   
                                              
1 The exception to the districts’ policies for concealed carry under those limited 
conditions is to ensure alignment with state law, specifically MCL 28.425o. 
 
 
 
3
In the Ann Arbor case, the Washtenaw Circuit Court granted the defendants’ 
motion for summary disposition and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
disposition.  In the Clio case, the Genesee Circuit Court denied the defendants’ motion 
for summary disposition and granted declaratory relief to the plaintiffs.  In published 
opinions issued the same day and by the same panel, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
Washtenaw Circuit Court and reversed the Genesee Circuit Court.  The Court of Appeals 
held that the districts’ policies are not field-preempted, applying the analysis from our 
decision in People v Llewellyn, 401 Mich 314; 257 NW2d 902 (1977), and that the 
policies are not conflict-preempted because they do not conflict with any statute. 
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the school districts are prohibited from 
adopting policies banning firearms (beyond those permitted by the concealed-weapon 
licensing exception) because the state has occupied the field of firearms regulation and 
that the Court of Appeals’ decisions in these cases conflict with its opinion in Capital 
Area Dist Library v Mich Open Carry, Inc, 298 Mich App 220; 826 NW2d 736 (2012) 
(CADL).  We directed oral argument on the application in each case and ordered that they 
be argued and submitted together and directed the parties to brief: 
(1) whether, in light of MCL 123.1102, it is necessary to consider the 
factors set forth in People v Llewellyn, 401 Mich 314 (1977), in order to 
determine whether the school district’s policies are preempted; (2) if so, 
whether the Court of Appeals properly analyzed the Llewellyn factors; and 
(3) whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the school district’s 
policies are not preempted.  [501 Mich 941 (2017).]  
II.  ANALYSIS 
Whether the state has preempted a local regulation, which the state can do 
expressly or by implication—and in that latter case either because the local regulation 
 
 
 
4
directly conflicts with state law or because the state has occupied the entire field of 
regulation in a certain area—is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de 
novo.  Detroit v Ambassador Bridge Co, 481 Mich 29, 35; 748 NW2d 221 (2008); Ter 
Beek v City of Wyoming, 495 Mich 1, 8; 846 NW2d 531 (2014).  That means that we 
review it independently, with no required deference to the trial court.  Millar v Constr 
Code Auth, 501 Mich 233, 237; 912 NW2d 521 (2018).   
The plaintiffs argue that the school districts’ policies are preempted by 
implication.  For good reason: There is no indication that any statute preempts the 
policies expressly.  Accordingly, the sole argument in the plaintiffs’ applications for 
leave to appeal in this Court, and their primary argument in their supplemental briefing, is 
that the districts’ policies are field-preempted under our decision in Llewellyn.  Field 
preemption applies if “the state statutory scheme pre-empts the ordinance by occupying 
the field of regulation which the municipality seeks to enter, to the exclusion of the 
ordinance, even where there is no direct conflict between the two schemes of regulation.”  
Llewellyn, 401 Mich at 322.  Conflict preemption, by contrast, applies instead if “the 
ordinance is in direct conflict with the state statutory scheme,” id., such that conformity 
with both is not possible.  The plaintiffs did not advance a conflict-preemption argument 
in their applications or at oral argument.  
A.  EXPRESS PREEMPTION 
Under Llewellyn, a court begins the preemption analysis by determining whether 
state law “expressly provides that the state’s authority to regulate in a specified area of 
the law is to be exclusive . . . .”  Id. at 323.  As noted, there is no dispute that state law 
 
 
 
5
does not expressly preempt school districts’ authority to regulate guns.  Under MCL 
123.1102, “[a] local unit of government shall not . . . enact or enforce any ordinance or 
regulation pertaining to, or regulate in any other manner the ownership, registration, 
purchase, sale, transfer, transportation, or possession of pistols [or] other 
firearms . . . except as otherwise provided by federal law or a law of this state.”  MCL 
123.1101(b) then defines “local unit of government” in the act to mean “a city, village, 
township, or county.”  In other words, while MCL 123.1102 expressly preempts 
regulation of firearms by a city, village, township, or county, it does not apply to school 
districts, which are left out of the Legislature’s list.2 
                                              
2 To the extent that the plaintiffs suggest that the Legislature made a mistake in omitting 
school districts from MCL 123.1101 and that allowing a school district (but not a 
statutorily defined local unit of government) to impose firearm restrictions would lead to 
absurd results and defeat the stated intent of the Legislature, we note that when statutory 
language is unambiguous, the Court presumes that the Legislature “intended the meaning 
clearly expressed—no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the 
statute must be enforced as written.”  DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 
402; 605 NW2d 300 (2000).  And we see nothing absurd in the Legislature choosing to 
allow local school districts to make decisions that best suit their localities, leaving the 
door open to local prohibitions of firearms in schools in particular.  Schools are distinct in 
many ways.  What is more, what’s good policy for Ann Arbor and Clio might not be 
good policy for Cadillac and Escanaba.  We see nothing absurd about letting each school 
district, through its elected representatives, determine its own policy.  And the plaintiffs’ 
argument that the Legislature simply made a mistake is also not compelling given that the 
Legislature has shown that it is perfectly capable of defining “local unit of government” 
broadly and to include school districts when it wants to do so.  See, e.g., MCL 15.501(d). 
 
 
 
6
B.  IMPLIED PREEMPTION 
1.  FIELD PREEMPTION 
The schools districts’ policies are also not impliedly field-preempted.  Courts are 
to consider these factors in determining whether the Legislature has impliedly occupied 
the field so as to preclude local regulation in a certain area: 
[P]reemption of a field of regulation may be implied upon an 
examination of legislative history.  Walsh v River Rouge, 385 Mich 623; 
189 NW2d 318 (1971). 
[T]he pervasiveness of the state regulatory scheme may support a 
finding of preemption.  Grand Haven v Grocer’s Cooperative Dairy Co, 
330 Mich 694, 702; 48 NW2d 362 (1951); In re Lane, 58 Cal 2d 99; 22 Cal 
Rptr 857; 372 P2d 897 (1962); Montgomery County Council v Montgomery 
Ass’n, Inc, 274 Md 52; 325 A2d 112, 333 A2d 596 (1975).  While the 
pervasiveness of the state regulatory scheme is not generally sufficient by 
itself to infer pre-emption, it is a factor which should be considered as 
evidence of pre-emption. 
[T]he nature of the regulated subject matter may demand exclusive 
state regulation to achieve the uniformity necessary to serve the state’s 
purpose or interest.  [Llewellyn, 401 Mich at 323-324.] 
The Court of Appeals analyzed these factors and determined that the policies were 
not field-preempted.  But the school districts believe this step isn’t needed.  They contend 
that we should consider the exclusion of school districts from MCL 123.1101(b) as a 
definitive expression of the Legislature’s intent not to occupy the field.  They cite Judge 
GLEICHER’s partial dissenting opinion in CADL, 298 Mich App at 241-251 (advocating 
this approach).  We agree.   
In Llewellyn, no statute expressly stated the Legislature’s intent to preempt local 
obscenity regulation, but we found that the state’s comprehensive coverage of the field 
impliedly revealed the Legislature’s intent to occupy the field.  Llewellyn therefore 
 
 
 
7
addressed a different question than the one presented here.  Here, an unambiguous statute 
shows a legislative intent not to occupy the field.  
Requiring courts to turn to the Llewellyn factors to consider field preemption even 
when an unambiguous statute establishes legislative intent to regulate the subject matter 
only partially would be an internally contradictory exercise and contrary to this Court’s 
general rules of statutory interpretation.3  The Legislature’s partial list of local units of 
government that may not regulate firearms answers, definitively, the field-preemption 
question.  “Where the language of the statute is unambiguous, the plain meaning reflects 
the Legislature’s intent and this Court applies the statute as written. . . .  Only where the 
statutory language is ambiguous may a court properly go beyond the words of the statute 
to determine legislative intent.”  People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 284; 597 
NW2d 1 (1999).4  These principles apply with equal force to preemption questions.  
                                              
3 While of course not binding on this Court, the Court of Appeals has also held that resort 
to the remaining Llewellyn factors is unnecessary when a statute shows the Legislature’s 
intent not to occupy the field.  See, e.g., Gmoser’s Septic Serv, LLC v East Bay Charter 
Twp, 299 Mich App 504, 513; 831 NW2d 881 (2013) (concluding that although the 
Llewellyn factors favored a finding that the Legislature preempted the field, “this is not a 
typical case” because the Legislature by statute had “specifically limited the preemptive 
effect of its statutory scheme” and finding no field preemption); Granger Land Dev Co v 
Clinton Co Bd of Zoning Appeals, 135 Mich App 154, 159; 351 NW2d 908 (1984) 
(“Where a statute contains a provision for limited pre-emption (as in the present case), a 
court may not imply total pre-emption from the statutory history, the pervasiveness of the 
regulatory scheme, or the need for uniformity arising from the nature of the regulated 
subject matter.  Section 30(4) provides for limited pre-emption; it also implicitly 
precludes a holding of total pre-emption.”).  
4 See also CADL, 298 Mich App at 251 n 5 (GLEICHER, J., dissenting) (stating that 
“[w]hen a statute explicitly defines the field of its reach, use of the implied field-
preemption doctrine described in Llewellyn violates the canons of statutory construction 
and any application of Llewellyn is unjustified”). 
 
 
 
8
Morales v Trans World Airlines, Inc, 504 US 374, 383; 112 S Ct 2031; 119 L Ed 2d 157 
(1992) (“The question [of preemption], at bottom, is one of statutory intent, and we 
accordingly ‘ “begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that 
the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” ’ ”) 
(citations omitted).   
A reasonable application of the expressio unius est exclusio alterius doctrine gets 
to the same answer: “ ‘the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of all others.’ ”  
People v Wilson, 500 Mich 521, 526; 902 NW2d 378 (2017).  Enactment of an express-
preemption statute limited to specific local units of government implies that entities not 
included are not preempted.  Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc, 505 US 504, 517; 112 S Ct 
2608; 120 L Ed 2d 407 (1992) (“Congress’ enactment of a provision defining the pre-
emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.”); 
id. at 547 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Once there is an express 
pre-emption provision, in other words, all doctrines of implied pre-emption are 
eliminated. . . .  The existence of an express pre-emption provision tends to contradict 
any inference that Congress intended to occupy a field broader than the statute’s express 
language defines.”).  
Thus, when a statute expressly states the Legislature’s desire to preempt or not 
preempt a field, the statute controls and resort to the remaining Llewellyn factors is 
unnecessary.  In this case, because MCL 123.1102 and MCL 123.1101 show the 
Legislature’s intent to preempt some local units of government from regulation but not 
 
 
 
9
others, that intent controls.5  Because those statutes exclude school districts from an 
otherwise precise list of local units of government prohibited from regulating firearms, 
the districts’ policies are not field-preempted.  To the extent that Mich Coalition for 
Responsible Gun Owners v City of Ferndale, 256 Mich App 401, 414; 662 NW2d 864 
(2003), cited MCL 123.1102 as supporting the proposition that “state law completely 
occupies the field of [firearms] regulation,” we overrule it. 
2.  IMPLIED CONFLICT PREEMPTION6 
In a secondary argument advanced only in their supplemental briefs, the plaintiffs 
and their supporting amicus contend that the districts’ policies conflict with various 
                                              
5 We therefore need not reach the question whether the Court of Appeals in CADL or this 
case properly analyzed the remaining Llewellyn factors or whether those decisions are 
inconsistent in their analysis of those factors.  Nor need we address the holding in CADL 
that MCL 123.1102 preempted the library’s policy in that case because two entities 
covered by the statute created the district library that promulgated the policy.  
6 The dissent reframes this argument as a “threshold” issue of whether the school districts 
have the authority to adopt the policies at issue in the first place.  But there is no such 
animal as “threshold preemption”—under the dissent’s analysis, the districts lack that 
authority only if their policies conflict with state law, i.e. if they are conflict-preempted.  
And field preemption precludes all local regulation of a subject matter, while conflict 
preemption only precludes local regulation to the extent it conflicts with state law.  Thus, 
it is difficult to understand the basis for the dissent’s conclusion that its analysis involves 
“a question that must be addressed by the courts before the issue of field preemption can 
even be considered.”  See, e.g., Rental Prop Owners Ass’n of Kent Co v Grand Rapids, 
455 Mich 246, 256-263; 566 NW2d 514 (1997) (resolving first whether a local ordinance 
was field-preempted before analyzing whether it was conflict-preempted by a state 
statute).  In other words, this Court’s typical analysis of such issues proceeds exactly as 
we have done here.  It is therefore telling that however “logical” the dissent calls its 
order-of-operations approach, it has no basis in our law.  And as correctly framed, the 
urgency of the dissent’s plea that we must reach the conflict-preemption issue 
notwithstanding plaintiffs’ abandonment of it loses much of its force. 
 
 
 
10 
statutes, particularly MCL 28.425o and MCL 750.237a, which they read as implying a 
state-law right to openly carry firearms on school property.7  We decline to reach this 
argument because we conclude that the plaintiffs abandoned it by failing to assert it in 
their applications for leave to appeal.  Michigan Gun Owners’ Application for Leave to 
Appeal, p 7 (stating the sole question presented as “whether a school district is 
impliedly/field preempted from promulgating firearm rules or regulations”); Michigan 
Open Carry’s Application for Leave to Appeal, p vi (same); Michigan Gun Owners’ 
Application, p 20 (asserting that “[a]ppellants acknowledge that the [Ann Arbor Public 
Schools] policy does not directly contradict with the state statutory scheme”); Michigan 
Open Carry’s Application, p 12 (stating that “Michigan Open Carry, Inc. does not claim 
that the school’s firearm regulation is statutorily preempted”).  See Mitcham v Detroit, 
355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959) (stating that “[f]ailure to brief a question on 
appeal is tantamount to abandoning it”).   
And the plaintiffs were perfectly clear at oral argument that they were not 
advancing a conflict-preemption argument.  When asked to elaborate on this separate 
preemption theory, counsel for both of the plaintiffs balked except to offer a belated 
attempt to brief the issue.8  “In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in 
                                              
7 This argument is perfunctory and interwoven with the plaintiffs’ argument that the 
districts’ policies are field-preempted.  See, e.g., Michigan Gun Owners’ Supplemental 
Brief at 17 (asserting that Ann Arbor’s policy is “expressly and impliedly preempted by 
Michigan firearms regulations” just after citing the Llewellyn test for field preemption 
and as part of its discussion of the first Llewellyn factor). 
8 See Michigan Supreme Court, Oral Arguments in Michigan Gun Owners, Inc v Ann 
Arbor Public Schools  at 6:12 to 
6:29 (accessed July 10, 2018): 
 
 
 
 
11 
the first instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of party presentation.  That is, we 
rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral 
arbiter of matters the parties present.”  Greenlaw v United States, 554 US 237, 243; 128 S 
Ct 2559; 171 L Ed 2d 399 (2008).  The plaintiffs decided not to present this issue, and so 
we decline to reach it.9  
                                              
Justice MCCORMACK:  But that’s a—that’s a different kind of 
preemption, that’s conflict preemption, not field preemption. 
Mr. Makowski:  Right.  And we’ve not briefed that issue.  If the 
Court would like me to brief the issue of conflict preemption, I certainly 
can as a supplement. 
Justice MCCORMACK:  Well that—I mean, is it an issue you’ve raised 
and pleaded throughout your litigation? 
Mr. Makowski:  I have not.  [Emphasis added.] 
Indeed, if anything, the plaintiffs specifically disclaimed such an argument even when 
presented with the opportunity to embrace it.  See id. at 5:15 to 5:29; see also Michigan 
Supreme Court, Oral Arguments in Michigan Open Carry, Inc v Clio Area School 
District  at 14:36 to 14:49 (accessed 
July 10, 2018).  
9 Perhaps if the plaintiffs had articulated the dissent’s theory, we would have found it 
appropriate to resolve it.  But they didn’t.  (Maybe they didn’t for the reasons in Justice 
VIVIANO’s concurring opinion.)  And whatever the propriety of the Court’s decision in 
Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186; 649 NW2d 47 (2002), to resolve that case on an issue not 
raised in the defendant’s briefing, at least it was raised at oral argument and not expressly 
disclaimed.  That significantly distinguishes this case from Mack and exposes the 
dissent’s judicial overreach: The dissent is ready to say point, game, match for the 
plaintiffs on an argument almost entirely of its own construction.  There are plenty of 
considerations counseling against the dissent’s position that it is “of no consequence” that 
the plaintiffs have not made the dissent’s argument.  If it is truly “of no consequence,” 
best we ditch the adversarial system of law today, as under the dissent’s approach we the 
Court will always know not only the better answer than any supplied by the parties but 
even the better questions than those asked by the parties. 
 
 
 
 
12 
III.  CONCLUSION 
These are straightforward cases.  The Legislature has, expressly, restricted some 
but not all local governments from regulating firearms.  Schools in particular are not on 
the preempted list, quite possibly for reasons not difficult to imagine.  In any case, the 
clarity of the statute that we are bound to respect is entirely inconsistent with the notion 
that the Legislature plainly intended to occupy the field here.  Of course, if the 
Legislature in its wisdom sees fit to allow open firearms on all school grounds, no matter 
what local school districts may variously desire, it can say so.  
 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
                                              
Finally, the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part would grant leave to 
appeal and direct the parties to brief this issue.  It is difficult to take that suggestion very 
seriously.  The concurrence/dissent wants to have it both ways: we should grant leave 
because these cases “present an important set of legal issues” while purporting to “take 
rules regarding issue preservation and abandonment very seriously . . . .”  If ever we 
“take rules regarding issue preservation and abandonment very seriously,” it should be 
here.  Granting leave to appeal under the circumstances presented would send a message 
that we should and do decline to send: Abandon an issue in your application for leave to 
appeal?  And definitively distance yourself from that legal theory at oral argument?  
Worry not!  The Court will revive the theory for you and give you free rein to try again 
after hearing oral argument on that application. 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
MICHIGAN GUN OWNERS, INC. and 
ULYSSES WONG, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v 
No. 155196 
 
ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS and 
JEANICE K. SWIFT, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees. 
 
 
 
 
MICHIGAN OPEN CARRY INC. and 
KENNETH HERMAN, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v 
No. 155204 
 
CLIO AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
FLETCHER SPEARS III, and KATRINA 
MITCHELL, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees. 
 
 
 
VIVIANO, J. (concurring).  
I concur fully in the majority opinion.  I write, however, to explain why I disagree 
with the dissent, which concludes that the defendant schools lacked authority to issue the 
policies here because of a purported conflict with state law.  The dissent’s reasoning is 
 
 
 
2
flawed—its conclusion is premised on a misreading of our statutes and a 
misunderstanding of our conflict-preemption doctrine.1    
Before addressing the precise issue at the heart of the dissent’s analysis, it is well 
to remember what this case is not about.  No party has raised a constitutional challenge to 
the school policies at issue.  And no justice believes that the Legislature has expressly 
preempted the school districts’ policies or impliedly occupied the field of firearms 
regulation.2  The issue raised by the dissent is a narrow one:  whether the school policies 
directly conflict with a state law and are therefore preempted by it. 
In order for a state law to conflict with and preempt a local regulation, the state 
law must expressly permit something the local regulation prohibits: 
It has been held that in determining whether the provisions of a 
municipal ordinance conflict with a statute covering the same subject, the 
test is whether the ordinance prohibits an act which the statute permits, or 
permits an act which the statute prohibits.  Accordingly, it has often been 
held that a municipality cannot lawfully forbid what the legislature has 
expressly licensed, authorized, permitted, or required, or authorize what the 
legislature has expressly forbidden. 
*   *   * 
The mere fact that the state, in the exercise of the police power, has 
made certain regulations does not prohibit a municipality from exacting 
additional requirements.  So long as there is no conflict between the two . . . 
both will stand.  The fact that an ordinance enlarges upon the provisions of 
a statute by requiring more than the statute requires creates no conflict 
                                                 
1 I agree with the majority’s decision not to reach this issue, since the parties chose not to 
pursue this theory in our Court even when given the opportunity to do so.  I write simply 
to point out some of the inherent flaws in the dissent’s reasoning, and also to explain why 
I disagree with the partial concurrence that we should grant leave to address the issue. 
2 Indeed, the majority and concurring justices hold to the contrary, and the dissenting 
justice states that he “do[es] not necessarily disagree with” this conclusion. 
 
 
 
3
therewith unless the statute limits the requirement for all cases to its own 
prescription.  Thus, where both an ordinance and a statute are prohibitory, 
and the only difference between them is that the ordinance goes further in 
its prohibition but not counter to the prohibition under the statute, and the 
municipality does not attempt to authorize by the ordinance what the 
legislature has forbidden or forbid what the legislature has expressly 
licensed, authorized, or required, there is nothing contradictory between the 
provisions of the statute and the ordinance because of which they cannot 
coexist and be effective.  Unless legislative provisions are contradictory in 
the sense that they cannot coexist, they are not deemed inconsistent because 
of mere lack of uniformity in detail.[3] 
Our caselaw thus stands for the proposition that “what the State law expressly permits an 
ordinance may not prohibit.”4   
The dissent posits that two statutory provisions, MCL 750.237a(5)(c) and 
28.425o(1)(a), when read together, give concealed pistol license (CPL) holders the right 
to openly carry a firearm on school property.  Because a school’s power to provide for 
the safety of its students is subject to state law,5 including these provisions, the dissent 
concludes that the schools have no authority to ban the open carrying of firearms by CPL 
holders.  Under this reasoning, state law permits what the policies prohibit, and thus it 
preempts those policies.  
                                                 
3 Rental Prop Owners Ass’n of Kent Co v Grand Rapids, 455 Mich 246, 262; 566 NW2d 
514 (1997) (emphasis altered), quoting 56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations, § 374, 
pp 408-409; see also Detroit v Qualls, 434 Mich 340, 362; 454 NW2d 374 (1990); Miller 
v Fabius Twp Bd, 366 Mich 250, 256-257; 114 NW2d 205 (1962). 
4 Miller, 366 Mich at 258, citing City of Howell v Kaal, 341 Mich 585, 590-591; 67 
NW2d 704 (1954). 
5 MCL 380.11a(3)(b) (permitting the schools to regulate for the safety of pupils “except 
as otherwise provided by law”).  
 
 
 
4
The dissent misreads our statutes.  In order to determine what rights a person has 
by virtue of holding a CPL, the appropriate place to begin our analysis is the act that was 
intended to, among other things, “prescribe the rights and responsibilities of individuals 
who have obtained a license to carry a concealed pistol.”  MCL 28.421a.  A few sections 
later, in MCL 28.425c(3), the Legislature describes the conduct authorized by a CPL, 
stating as follows: 
Subject to [MCL 28.425o] and except as otherwise provided by law, 
a license to carry a concealed pistol issued by the county clerk authorizes 
the licensee to do all of the following: 
(a) Carry a pistol concealed on or about his or her person anywhere 
in this state. 
(b) Carry a pistol in a vehicle, whether concealed or not concealed, 
anywhere in this state.  
This provision, by itself, opens a gaping hole in the dissent’s theory that, by virtue 
of their status as licensees, CPL holders have the right to openly carry a firearm on school 
property.  Leaving aside, for the moment, its limiting language, this section authorizes a 
CPL holder to carry a concealed pistol on or about her person anywhere in the state; but it 
only authorizes the open carrying of a pistol (i.e., “whether concealed or not concealed”) 
if it is done in a vehicle.  Under well-established interpretative principles, by expressly 
authorizing a licensee to openly carry a pistol in a vehicle, the statute cannot be read as 
authorizing a right to openly carry a pistol more broadly.6 
                                                 
6 See Bradley v Saranac Community Schs Bd of Ed, 455 Mich 285, 298; 565 NW2d 650 
(1997) (“This Court recognizes the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius; that the 
express mention in a statute of one thing implies the exclusion of other similar things.”).  
This is not to say, of course, that the statute prohibits the open carrying of pistols except 
as provided in MCL 28.425c(3)(b).  Instead, my point is more modest—it is only that, for 
purposes of conflict-preemption analysis, this particular statutory provision cannot be 
 
 
 
5
Not finding such a right in the place where one might expect it to be (at least, if 
one accepts the dissent’s theory that the right to openly carry a firearm on school property 
is somehow connected to a person’s status as a CPL holder), the dissent looks instead to 
the Michigan Penal Code as the source of a CPL holder’s rights in this regard.  In 
particular, the dissent places great emphasis on MCL 750.237a, which makes it a crime 
for a person to possess a weapon in a weapon-free school zone unless that person is a 
                                                 
 
read as expressing a lawful right for CPL holders to openly carry firearms anywhere in 
the state.  Nor could I locate any other statute regulating the open carrying of a firearm in 
our state.  This is not surprising, however, since the “vast majority of . . . [state] statutes 
deal with concealed carry; while open carry is sometimes permitted in these states, nearly 
all of the laws focus on the right to carry a concealed weapon.”  Note, Open Carry For 
All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 123 Yale L J 1486, 1497 
(2014).  The focus on concealed carrying stems from the fact that concealed carrying was 
long viewed with greater suspicion than the open carrying of weapons and thus as being 
in more need of regulation; accordingly, courts have struck down open-carry bans on 
constitutional grounds.  Rosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment Originalism and the 
Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 92 Wash U L Rev 1187, 1210 (2015) (noting that 
in the nineteenth century, “[a]lthough laws prohibiting open-carry were more often than 
not invalidated, concealed-carry bans were generally upheld against constitutional 
challenge under the Second Amendment or state-law analogues”); Open Carry for All, 
123 Yale L J at 1500 (“[A] clear pattern emerges from [nineteenth-century caselaw in 
which] . . . states were allowed to ban the concealed carry of weapons but not their open 
carry.  This was not an arbitrary choice—instead, the dichotomy between open and 
concealed carry underscored antebellum understandings of permissible self-defense and 
public safety.”).   
In any event, I certainly do not mean to suggest that our citizens only have a right 
to openly carry a firearm if a statute expressly authorizes them to do so.  Instead, our 
citizens have broad rights to bear firearms that are protected by the Second Amendment.  
US Const, Am II; see also Dist of Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570, 610-614; 128 S Ct 
2783; 171 L Ed 2d 637 (2008) (noting caselaw upholding a constitutional right to openly 
carry firearms).  As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, however, those 
rights are subject to certain restrictions.  See Heller, 554 US at 626 (recognizing a broad 
right to bear firearms while noting that the Court was not “cast[ing] doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms . . . in sensitive places such as 
schools and government buildings”). 
 
 
 
6
CPL holder.7  However, despite the dissent’s protestations, an express right to openly 
carry a firearm on school property cannot be found in this criminal statute, either. 
MCL 750.237a must be read in pari materia with MCL 28.425o(1)(a),8 which 
provides that, except in narrow circumstances, a CPL holder may not carry a concealed 
pistol on school property.  By its terms, MCL 28.425o(1)(a) pertains only to CPL holders 
and provides limitations on where they may carry a concealed pistol unless an exemption 
applies.9  Unlike MCL 28.425c, MCL 28.425o does not authorize any conduct and makes 
                                                 
7 The relevant subsections of MCL 750.237a state, in relevant part:  
(4) Except as provided in subsection (5), an individual who 
possesses a weapon in a weapon free school zone is guilty of a 
misdemeanor . . . . 
*   *   * 
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to any of the following: 
*   *   * 
(c) An individual licensed by this state or another state to carry a 
concealed weapon. 
8 See Int’l Business Machines Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 496 Mich 642, 652; 852 NW2d 
865 (2014) (opinion by VIVIANO, J.) (“[I]n the construction of a particular statute, or in 
the interpretation of its provisions, all statutes relating to the same subject, or having the 
same general purpose, should be read in connection with it, as together constituting one 
law, although they were enacted at different times, and contain no reference to one 
another.”).  Notably, MCL 28.425o(1)(a) makes explicit reference to MCL 750.237a.  
See MCL 28.425o(1)(a) (“As used in this section, ‘school’ and ‘school property’ mean 
those terms as defined in . . . MCL 750.237a.”). 
9 MCL 28.425o provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) Subject to subsection (5), an individual licensed under this act to 
carry a concealed pistol, or who is exempt from licensure under section 
12a(h), shall not carry a concealed pistol on the premises of any of the 
following: 
 
 
 
7
no reference to unconcealed or open carrying of pistols or any other type of weapon.  
Thus, it is rather unremarkable that MCL 28.425o does “not prohibit[] [a CPL holder] 
from possessing an openly carried firearm on school property.”10  This omission can 
hardly be viewed as “expressly permitting” a CPL holder to carry a firearm on school 
property, for purposes of a conflict-preemption analysis.11  
The most reasonable way to interpret these provisions is that the exemption from 
criminal liability in MCL 750.237a(5)(c) only applies to the extent that a CPL holder 
complies with MCL 28.425c(3) and MCL 28.425o(1)(a).12  In other words, the exemption 
is subject to the statutes that govern CPL holders and does not extend to conduct not 
authorized by the CPL statutes, such as openly carrying firearms on school property.  
MCL 750.237a proscribes conduct—it does not provide any affirmative rights 
                                                 
 
(a) A school or school property except that a parent or legal guardian 
of a student of the school is not precluded from carrying a concealed pistol 
while in a vehicle on school property, if he or she is dropping the student 
off at the school or picking up the student from the school. 
10 Post at 5 (MARKMAN, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).   
11 At various points and in various ways, the dissent asserts that “if something is explicitly 
not prohibited, it is permitted.”  Post at 22.  There is a sense in which this is true, 
although the dissent’s resort to principles of logic is open to some question.  See, e.g., 
Aldisert, Logic For Lawyers: A Guide to Clear Legal Thinking (South Bend: National 
Institute for Trial Advocacy, 1997), pp 158-163.  But the sense in which it is not true is 
the sense that matters for purposes of a conflict-preemption analysis, and that analysis is 
dictated by our precedents, not by a middle-school primer. 
12 As noted above, the conduct authorized by MCL 28.425c(3) is expressly limited by 
MCL 28.425o.  See MCL 28.425c(3). 
 
 
 
8
whatsoever to CPL holders or anyone else.  And it certainly does not grant broader rights 
to a CPL holder than the CPL statutes themselves.13   
Even if, despite the foregoing, these statutes could somehow be read as expressly 
exempting the open carrying of firearms by CPL holders from the criminal prohibition in 
MCL 750.237a, the dissent’s theory has already been rejected by our Court in Detroit v 
Qualls.  In that case, we addressed a criminal statute that prohibited the storage of 
fireworks in certain places and amounts, but expressly exempted certain retailers from the 
limitations.14  The municipality, however, promulgated an ordinance preventing all 
retailers from storing more than 100 pounds of fireworks.15  In this Court, the dissent 
concluded that the statute, by exempting retailers from the storage limitations, permitted 
the defendant retailer to store fireworks in excess of the limitations—thus, the 
                                                 
13 The dissent believes that the Legislature has “clearly and straightforwardly denied 
school districts the authority to prohibit CPL holders from openly carrying firearms on 
school property,” post at 3, and indeed cannot even conceive of “how the Legislature 
could have communicated its intentions any more clearly,” post at 16.  One obvious way 
would be for the Legislature to add school districts to the list of local government entities 
covered by the express preemption statute, see MCL 123.1101 and MCL 123.1102, 
something it is already considering.  See 2017 SB 586.  Alternatively, the Legislature 
could pass a regulatory law that expressly permits the open carrying of a firearm on 
school property. 
14 Qualls, 434 Mich at 361; see also former MCL 750.243d (“The storage of fireworks at 
the site of a wholesaler, dealer, or jobber, except for a retailer who has goods on hand for 
sale to the public in a supervised display area, shall be as follows . . . .”), 1968 PA 358, as 
amended by 1980 PA 422; repealed by 2011 PA 256. 
15 Qualls, 434 Mich at 369 n 1 (LEVIN, J., dissenting) (“ ‘Retail sales.  The storage of 
fireworks in a place of retail sales shall be limited to a gross weight of less than one 
hundred (100) pounds . . . .’ ”), quoting Detroit Municipal Code, § 19-3-70 (emphasis 
omitted). 
 
 
 
9
ordinance’s imposition of a storage limitation was preempted and invalid.16  The majority 
disagreed with the conclusion “that the state [statute] impliedly permits what it does not 
prohibit,”17 or, put differently, we “reject[ed] the rationale . . . that that which the 
Legislature does not prohibit, it impliedly permits . . . .”18  Instead, we found no conflict 
between the statute and the ordinance.19  Thus, despite an express exemption from 
criminal liability under a state statute, we found no conflict between that statute and a 
local ordinance prohibiting the exempted conduct.20 
                                                 
16 Qualls, 434 Mich at 376 (LEVIN, J., dissenting). 
17 Id. at 361 (opinion of the Court). 
18 Id. at 363-364. 
19 Id. at 364.  The dissent does not know quite how to get around the holding in Qualls.  It 
first tries to ignore Qualls.  Post at 15 (“I am unaware of even a single case in Michigan 
that has ever held that a municipality or other subdivision of the state can forbid what the 
Legislature has permitted (either expressly or by implication).”).  Then, in a footnote, the 
dissent attempts to distinguish it with the bewildering assertion that since “this Court 
concluded that the Legislature did not permit the conduct in dispute,” Qualls “thus does 
not stand for the proposition that a municipality can forbid what the Legislature has 
permitted.”  Post at 15 n 2.  Of course, this Court concluded that the Legislature did not 
permit the conduct in dispute precisely because it rejected the dissent’s major premise in 
this case, i.e., that an express exemption in a criminal statute is an implied grant of 
permission for an individual to engage in the exempted activity that is not subject to local 
regulation.  Qualls, 434 Mich at 363-364 (opinion of the Court) (“Therefore, we reject 
the rationale employed by the dissent that that which the Legislature does not prohibit, it 
impliedly permits . . . .”).  Finally, the dissent disparages Qualls and is apparently of the 
belief that it should be overruled.  See post at 21 (“[T]he [Qualls] majority did not even 
quote, let alone analyze, the actual language of the statute. . . .  In other words, in a case 
in which the heart of the issue was one of statutory interpretation, the majority failed to 
interpret the actual words of the statute in dispute.”).  I take no position on whether 
Qualls was correctly decided because no party has asked us to overrule it.  Instead, at this 
juncture, I would simply treat it as a binding and controlling precedent of our Court. 
20 In the analogous context of federal preemption law, “[i]t is the rule that exceptions to 
broad prohibitory statutes generally have no preemptive effect. . . .  The Supreme Court 
has reasoned that a finding of preemption in this context is not only ‘inappropriate,’ but 
 
 
 
10
We also rejected the dissent’s reasoning in Miller v Fabius Twp.  In that case, a 
state statute banned boats pulling water-skiers during the period of “1 hour after sunset to 
1 hour prior to sunrise.”21  A local ordinance went further than the statute, banning 
waterskiing from 4:00 p.m. until 10:00 a.m. the following day.22  The dissent, employing 
the same reasoning as the dissent here, read the statute to permit waterskiing during the 
hours that it was not prohibited, and thus believed the ordinance conflicted with the 
statute.23  In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the ordinance was void because it 
exceeded the powers granted by the act, we held that the dissent’s position was “based on 
the erroneous assumption that the legislature, in making it unlawful to water ski from 1 
hour after sundown to 1 hour before sunrise, was expressing a lawful right to water ski 
without regulation during the other hours of the day.”24  We could discern no such intent 
from our review of the statute, and consequently we concluded that the ordinance and the 
statute did not conflict.25  In other words, the statute’s failure to prohibit conduct did not 
mean that the conduct was expressly permitted for purposes of a conflict-preemption 
analysis. 
                                                 
 
‘illogical.’ ”  Malabed v North Slope Borough, 335 F3d 864, 872 (CA 9, 2003), quoting 
Exxon Corp v Governor of Maryland, 437 US 117, 132; 98 S Ct 2207; 57 L Ed 2d 91 
(1978).  
21 Miller, 366 Mich at 255 (quotation marks omitted). 
22 Id. at 252. 
23 Id. at 260 (SOURIS, J., dissenting). 
24 Id. at 259 (opinion of the Court). 
25 Id. 
 
 
 
11
The dissent relies on Builders Ass’n v Detroit26 to suggest that our conflict-
preemption jurisprudence is broader than it truly is.  In that case, the Legislature had 
made it unlawful to conduct business on Sunday but had provided various express 
exceptions.27  The ordinance also made the same conduct unlawful but did not allow any 
of the statutory exceptions.28  Consequently, it sought to prohibit by criminal sanction 
what the Legislature had exempted from criminal sanction.  We held that the statute and 
ordinance conflicted.29  But that is not the case here.  The school policies do not 
criminalize anything, and the Legislature has not expressly exempted open carrying on 
school property by CPL holders.  In any event, we have more recently held that even 
express exemptions are not enough to create a conflict.30   
The dissent also cites Nat’l Amusement Co v Johnson for support.  In that case, the 
Legislature had enacted a statute regulating “endurance contests,” making it unlawful to 
hold such contests “ ‘except in accordance with the provisions of this act.’ ”31  A local 
ordinance purported to ban all such endurance contests.32  We held that the ordinance was 
preempted.33  The dissent reads this case to mean that “where the Legislature makes 
                                                 
26 Builders Ass’n v Detroit, 295 Mich 272; 294 NW 677 (1940). 
27 Id. at 275.   
28 Id. at 273-274.   
29 Id. at 276-277.   
30 See Qualls, 434 Mich at 364, discussed above.  
31 Nat’l Amusement, 270 Mich at 614-615, quoting 1933 PA 65. 
32 Id. at 614.   
33 Id. at 617.   
 
 
 
12
conduct unlawful unless certain conditions are satisfied, the Legislature has logically 
made the conduct lawful when those conditions have been satisfied.”34   
But the statutory scheme in Nat’l Amusement was materially different from the 
one at issue here.  In Nat’l Amusement, the statute explicitly stated that it was “ ‘[a]n act 
to regulate endurance contests,’ ” and it expressly provided that the contests could occur 
if certain conditions were met.35  In other words, unlike the statutes in this case, the 
legislation in that case provided an affirmative right to engage in the conduct at issue and 
established the circumstances under which the conduct could be carried out.  We called 
the legislation “regulatory, not prohibitory,” and stated that “it would seem clear that the 
legislature intended to permit continuance of the amusement, subject to statutory 
conditions.”36  That is not the case here.  No one would say that either of the statutes cited 
by the dissent is designed to provide a framework to enable the open carrying of firearms 
on school property.  The CPL statute makes absolutely no provision for such conduct,37 
and the criminal statute is “prohibitory,” proscribing conduct rather than enabling it; 
moreover, even if the criminal statute affirmatively permits some form of carrying by 
CPL holders, it is concealed carrying, not open carrying.38  Because no statute can be 
                                                 
34 Post at 6.   
35 Nat’l Amusement, 270 Mich at 614-615, quoting 1933 PA 65. 
36 Id. at 617.   
37 MCL 28.425c(3)(a); MCL 28.425o. 
38 MCL 750.237a.   
 
 
 
13
read to expressly permit the open carrying of firearms on school property, the policies 
here do not “attempt[] to prohibit what [a] statute permits.”39   
In sum, there is no conflict between the school policies and the relevant statutes 
because those statutes do not address the open carrying of firearms, much less afford an 
express right to do so; and the policies merely bar individuals from carrying firearms on 
school property.  Consequently, there is no conflict between the statutes and the policies. 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
 
                                                 
39 Nat’l Amusement, 270 Mich at 617; see also Qualls, 434 Mich at 364.  
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
MICHIGAN GUN OWNERS, INC. and 
ULYSSES WONG, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v 
No. 155196 
 
ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS and 
JEANICE K. SWIFT, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees. 
 
 
 
 
MICHIGAN OPEN CARRY INC. and 
KENNETH HERMAN, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v 
No. 155204 
 
CLIO AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
FLETCHER SPEARS III, and KATRINA 
MITCHELL, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees. 
 
 
 
CLEMENT, J. (concurring).  
I concur in full with the majority opinion.  I write separately, however, to note that 
there is more agreement on this Court than may be apparent from the multitude of 
opinions in these cases.  The majority opinion I join holds that the field of firearms 
regulation is not expressly preempted by MCL 123.1102 and that the field is not 
 
 
 
2
impliedly preempted under our test from People v Llewellyn, 401 Mich 314; 257 NW2d 
902 (1977).  The partial dissent concurs with the majority “insofar as it concludes that the 
Legislature has not occupied the entire field of firearm regulation for preemption 
purposes.”  And the Chief Justice, in dissent, “do[es] not necessarily disagree with either 
of these specific conclusions . . . .”  Consequently, as to the Court’s holding that the field 
of firearms regulation here is not preempted—either expressly, by MCL 123.1102, or 
impliedly under our Llewellyn test—no member of the Court has expressed any 
disagreement. 
What actually divides the Court, then, is the Chief Justice’s assertion that we must 
perform a “threshold inquiry of whether the school districts possessed the authority to 
adopt these policies in the first place”; in essence, that there is a conflict between the 
scope of the school districts’ regulatory authority and the policies at issue.  The Chief 
Justice concludes that school districts do not possess this authority.  But he is the only 
member of the Court to express that opinion; the partial dissenters express no opinion on 
the matter, but would simply grant leave to appeal “so that we can further explore this 
important issue.”  I, too, express no opinion on the merits of the Chief Justice’s argument 
in dissent; where I part ways with the remaining dissenting justices is that I agree with the 
majority that we should decline to advance this argument for the parties when they have 
not only not made it for themselves, but instead—in the words of the partial dissent—
“improvidently ceded” this issue during oral argument.  I agree with the majority that 
because plaintiffs expressly and unambiguously abandoned any argument that there is a 
conflict between the regulations at issue and the scope of the school districts’ statutory 
authority, we should decline to reach that argument now.  I believe this is consistent with 
 
 
 
3
our concern for “judicial modesty” recently articulated in People v Arnold, ___ Mich 
___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2018) (Docket No. 154764), slip op at 37, and the admonition 
that “appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but 
essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them,” 
Jefferson v Upton, 560 US 284, 301; 130 S Ct 2217; 176 L Ed 2d 1032 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  Declining to reach an argument the 
parties themselves have not raised does nothing to prejudice our ability to take it up in the 
future, in a case in which the issue is properly presented. 
 
 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
MICHIGAN GUN OWNERS, INC. and 
ULYSSES WONG, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v 
No. 155196 
 
ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS and 
JEANICE K. SWIFT, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees. 
 
 
 
 
MICHIGAN OPEN CARRY INC. and 
KENNETH HERMAN, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v 
No. 155204 
 
CLIO AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
FLETCHER SPEARS III, and KATRINA 
MITCHELL, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees. 
 
 
 
WILDER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it concludes that the Legislature has 
not occupied the entire field of firearm regulation for preemption purposes.  However, I 
respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision not to reach the issue of conflict 
 
 
 
2
preemption.  Even assuming arguendo that plaintiffs abandoned this claim,1 I would grant 
full leave so that we can further explore this important issue. 
Like issue preservation, abandonment has always presented a prudential concern, 
not an inflexible rule.  See Wortman v R L Coolsaet Constr Co, 305 Mich 176, 179; 
9 NW2d 50 (1943) (“The right to amend a declaration after all proofs have been taken is 
a matter that rests in the sound discretion of the court.”); MCR 7.305(H)(4) (“Unless 
otherwise ordered by the Court, an appeal shall be limited to the issues raised in the 
application for leave to appeal.”) (emphasis added); see also MCR 7.316(A)(3) (stating 
that the Supreme Court can permit the grounds of an appeal to be amended).2  Thus, 
rather than flat-out refusing to rule on the issue of conflict preemption, this Court should 
weigh the extent to which the issue is necessary to a full and proper determination of the 
applicable law, see Klooster v City of Charlevoix, 488 Mich 289, 310; 795 NW2d 578 
                                              
1 It is very common, if not routine, for one or more members of this Court to inform 
counsel during oral argument that the outcome of the specific case being argued by 
counsel is less important to the Court than the next hundred cases raising related issues 
that will be governed by the outcome of this case.  Because it is imperative that we, as the 
Court of last resort for Michigan, timely and clearly expound on the significant 
jurisprudential issues of our state, we should fully resolve this case, which presents issues 
of vital importance to the people.  Notwithstanding counsel’s exchange with Justice 
MCCORMACK during oral argument in which he improvidently ceded the conflict-
preemption issue, the importance of the next hundred cases counsels that this Court 
should exercise its discretion to grant leave to appeal and direct the parties to specifically 
brief the conflict-preemption question. 
2 This much is also clear from our recent practice.  See, e.g., People v Cowan, 501 Mich 
900 (2017) (remanding to the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing into the 
defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel despite the defendant’s not clearly 
raising the issue below); People v Temelkoski, 498 Mich 942 (2015) (requesting that the 
parties address additional issues not initially raised in the application). 
 
 
 
3
(2011), against the risk that the parties involved will not provide the sort of adversarial 
tenacity that this Court relies on to adjudicate matters effectively.  Cf. Castro v United 
States, 540 US 375, 386; 124 S Ct 786; 157 L Ed 2d 778 (2003) (“Our adversary system 
is designed around the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are 
responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief.”) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part). 
In this case, prudence counsels in favor of granting leave on the issue of conflict 
preemption.  Plaintiffs claim that they have a statutory right to carry firearms on school 
property under certain circumstances, while defendants seek to prevent that from 
happening.  By narrowly addressing only the issue of field preemption, the majority has 
not settled this statutory dispute.  That is, in order to fully resolve the ultimate issue 
before us—whether state law preempts the respective school policies—it is necessary to 
determine whether those policies are in conflict with one or more statutes enacted by the 
Legislature.  The majority has provided only partial guidance and left lingering doubts.  
A full grant with specific instructions to the parties that they address the issue of conflict 
preemption would resolve this uncertainty.  There is also little chance that the parties will 
not give it their all if asked to brief and argue the issue of conflict preemption in greater 
depth.  Having zealously advocated in the lower courts, both plaintiffs and defendants in 
these cases are clearly motivated to prevail.   
Nor can I find any other concern counseling against a grant.  There is no need for 
further factual development, because the issue of conflict preemption presents a matter of 
pure statutory interpretation.  See Packowski v United Food & Commercial Workers 
Local 951, 289 Mich App 132, 138; 796 NW2d 94 (2010).  In other words, it is a 
 
 
 
4
question of law firmly within our wheelhouse and ripe to resolve.  Cf. McNeil v 
Charlevoix Co, 484 Mich 69, 81 n 8; 772 NW2d 18 (2009) (noting that preservation 
requirements can be ignored if the issue presents a purely legal question and no further 
fact-finding is necessary).  We should not shy away from tackling it, even if it presents a 
difficult question. 
The conflict-preemption issue presented by these cases is one that will surely be 
relitigated; it is just a question of when.  While I take rules regarding issue preservation 
and abandonment very seriously, believing them to be essential to the functioning of our 
adversarial system, see Greenlaw v United States, 554 US 237, 243; 128 S Ct 2559; 171 
L Ed 2d 399 (2008), on balance the equities favor waiving such requirements under these 
circumstances.   
These cases present an important set of legal issues.  And yet we have only heard 
them through arguments on the applications.  In my view, that is insufficient.  
Accordingly, because I believe that this Court should grant the applications in these cases 
and direct the parties to brief the issue of conflict preemption, I respectfully dissent from 
the majority’s decision to dismiss the issue as abandoned. 
 
 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
MICHIGAN GUN OWNERS, INC. and 
ULYSSES WONG, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v 
No. 155196 
 
ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS and 
JEANICE K. SWIFT, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees. 
 
 
 
MICHIGAN OPEN CARRY INC. and 
KENNETH HERMAN, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v 
No. 155204 
 
CLIO AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
FLETCHER SPEARS III, and KATRINA 
MITCHELL, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees. 
 
 
 
MARKMAN, C.J. (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent from this Court’s affirmance of the judgments of the Court of 
Appeals.  The majority concludes that MCL 123.1102 does not expressly preempt the 
school districts’ policies and that the school districts’ policies are not field-preempted.  
While I do not necessarily disagree with either of these specific conclusions, I do 
disagree with the majority’s failure to address the threshold inquiry of whether the school 
 
 
 
2
districts possessed the authority to adopt these policies in the first place.  Because MCL 
380.11a(3) provides that school districts have the authority to enact school policies 
“except as otherwise provided” and because MCL 750.237a “otherwise provide[s],” I 
respectfully dissent.  MCL 750.237a permits individuals licensed by this state to carry a 
concealed pistol (CPL holders) to openly carry firearms on school property while the 
school policies at issue here prohibit such conduct.  Because school districts do not 
possess the authority to adopt policies that conflict with state law and the policies at issue 
here clearly conflict with state law, these policies are plainly invalid.  Accordingly, I 
would reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals.  
NOTE TO THE READER 
I do not raise any novel theories in this opinion.  Instead, I rely on the clear 
language and logic of the laws at issue.  The School Code provides that school districts 
have the authority to enact policies that “provid[e] for the safety and welfare of pupils 
while at school . . . except as otherwise provided by law . . . .”  MCL 380.11a(3)(b).  And 
state law does “otherwise provide”: first, by generally prohibiting the possession of 
firearms on school property, MCL 750.237a(4), and, second, by then expressly exempting 
CPL holders from this prohibition, MCL 750.237a(5)(c).  That is, the second of these 
provisions necessarily permits CPL holders to possess firearms on school property.  Yet 
the school districts here have attempted to prohibit this.  Because they attempt to prohibit 
what state law permits, their policies are void.  It is that simple, and the opinion could end 
here.  However, my position has not prevailed, and therefore I have written considerably 
more to explain my argument in greater detail and to respond to the majority and 
 
 
 
3
concurring opinions.  But I do not want the reader to lose sight of the fact that my 
position is as direct and as uncomplicated as this note suggests. 
ARGUMENT 
The present issue, of course, is not whether CPL holders ought to be allowed to 
openly carry firearms on school property, but rather what is required by the laws of this 
state.  Thus, it is the exercise of this Court’s judgment, not its will, that is required.  The 
Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton) (Rossiter ed, 1961), at 469.  For the following reasons, I 
conclude that the representatives of the people-- those who serve in our Legislature-- 
have clearly and straightforwardly denied school districts the authority to prohibit CPL 
holders from openly carrying firearms on school property, and this Court lacks the 
authority to second-guess the wisdom of that decision. 
(1) “School districts, like townships and counties, are subdivisions of the 
State . . . .”  Van Wert v Sch Dist No 8, 100 Mich 332, 333; 58 NW 1119 (1894).  
“[S]chool districts possess such power as the statutes expressly or by reasonably 
necessary implication grant to them.”  Senghas v L’Anse Creuse Pub Sch, 368 Mich 557, 
560; 118 NW2d 975 (1962) (emphasis omitted).   
(2) The Revised School Code, MCL 380.1 et seq., which is the only statute that 
defendants cite in support of their authority to enact the school policies at issue, provides, 
in pertinent part: 
A general powers school district has all of the rights, powers, and 
duties expressly stated in this act; may exercise a power implied or incident 
to a power expressly stated in this act; and, except as otherwise provided by 
law, may exercise a power incidental or appropriate to the performance of a 
function related to operation of a public school and the provision of public 
education services in the interests of public elementary and secondary 
 
 
 
4
education in the school district, including, but not limited to, all of the 
following: 
*   *   * 
(b) Providing for the safety and welfare of pupils while at school or a 
school sponsored activity or while en route to or from school or a school 
sponsored activity.  [MCL 380.11a(3) (emphasis added).] 
Accordingly, general powers school districts, such as defendants, may enact policies 
“providing for the safety and welfare of pupils while at school” “except as otherwise 
provided by law.”  Id.   
(3) The school policies at issue purport to “provid[e] for the safety and welfare of 
pupils while at school” by prohibiting even CPL holders from openly carrying firearms 
on school property.  However, the school districts’ authority to enact such policies is 
limited by the “except as otherwise provided by law” language of the Revised School 
Code.  Therefore, the issue is whether a CPL holder’s right to openly carry firearms on 
school property is “otherwise provided by law,” and I conclude that it clearly is.  
(4) Specifically, it is “otherwise provided by law” by MCL 750.237a, which first 
states that “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (5), an individual who possesses a weapon 
in a weapon free school zone is guilty of a misdemeanor,” MCL 750.237a(4), and then 
sets forth an exception in MCL 750.237a(5)(c) that “[s]ubsection (4) does not apply 
to . . . [a]n individual licensed by this state or another state to carry a concealed weapon.”  
Thus, MCL 750.237a permits an individual licensed to carry a concealed weapon to 
possess a firearm on school property.   
(5) However, MCL 28.425o(1)(a) states that “an individual licensed under this act 
to carry a concealed pistol . . . shall not carry a concealed pistol on the premises of . . . [a] 
 
 
 
5
school or school property except that a parent or legal guardian of a student of the school 
is not precluded from carrying a concealed pistol while in a vehicle on school property, if 
he or she is dropping the student off at the school or picking up the student from the 
school.”  (Emphasis added.)  As a result, when MCL 750.237a and MCL 28.425o are 
read together, it is clear that while a CPL holder is generally prohibited from possessing a 
concealed pistol on school property, he or she is not prohibited from possessing an 
openly carried firearm on school property.  Indeed, a CPL license expressly states, “This 
license allows the licensee to carry a pistol on or about his person anywhere in state, 
except a licensee shall not carry a concealed pistol [on] . . . school property . . . .”  
(Emphasis added.)  See also Michigan State Police, Legal Update No. 86 (2010) 
, 
at 2-3 (accessed July 9, 2018) [https://perma.cc/5VLA-CUSR] (“[MCL 28.425o] applies 
to CPL holders carrying a concealed pistol.  If the CPL holder is carrying a non-
concealed pistol, the statute does not apply. . . .  Therefore, a person with a valid CPL 
may carry a non-concealed pistol in the areas described in MCL 28.425o . . . .”). 
(6) Thus, MCL 750.237a(5)(c) permits the open carry of firearms on school 
property by CPL holders.  Because the Legislature has permitted by statute the open carry 
of firearms on school property by CPL holders, school districts cannot enact policies that 
conflict with that statute.  Such policies fall within the “except as otherwise provided by 
law” qualification of MCL 380.11a(3).  This reasoning is straightforward and requires 
nothing more than a traditional construction of two legal provisions, MCL 380.11a(3) and 
MCL 750.237a.   
 
 
 
6
(7) Moreover, this reasoning is also consistent with that in cases such as Builders 
Ass’n v Detroit, 295 Mich 272; 294 NW 677 (1940), in which this Court held that when a 
criminal statute creates an exception to a penalty, this logically permits an individual to 
engage in the conduct that is the subject of the exception.  In that case, the Legislature 
prohibited certain activity (conducting business on Sunday), but provided an exception to 
that prohibition (for those who observed the Sabbath on Saturday).  A Detroit ordinance, 
however, prohibited even those who observed the Sabbath on Saturday from conducting 
real estate business on Sunday.  This Court held that the ordinance “attempts to prohibit 
that which the statute permits and is, therefore, void.”  Id. at 276 (emphasis added).   
(8) In MCL 750.237a, by the same token, the Legislature has carved out an 
express exception (open carry of firearms on school property by CPL holders) from an 
express prohibition (no firearms on school property).  By doing so, the Legislature has 
permitted the open carry of firearms on school property by CPL holders while the school 
policies prohibit such activity.  Thus, these policies “attempt[] to prohibit that which the 
statute permits and [are], therefore, void.”  Builders Ass’n, 295 Mich at 276. 
(9) This reasoning is also consistent with that in cases such as Nat’l Amusement 
Co v Johnson, 270 Mich 613; 259 NW 342 (1935), in which this Court held that where 
the Legislature makes conduct unlawful unless certain conditions are satisfied, the 
Legislature has logically made the conduct lawful when those conditions have been 
satisfied.  In that case, the Legislature made it unlawful to conduct walkathons unless 
certain conditions, such as physical examinations of the participants, were conducted.  
The Grand Rapids ordinance, however, made all walkathons unlawful.  This Court held 
that the Grand Rapids ordinance “attempts to prohibit what the statute permits. . . .  
 
 
 
7
Therefore, the ordinance is void.”  Id. at 617 (emphasis added).  See also id. (“[It is] clear 
that the legislature intended to permit continuance of [walkathons], subject to statutory 
conditions,” because “[t]he statute makes it unlawful to conduct a walkathon only in 
violation of certain conditions” and “[t]his is merely a common legislative manner of 
saying that it is lawful to conduct it if the regulations are observed.”) (emphasis added).   
(10) In MCL 750.237a, the Legislature has made it unlawful to openly carry 
firearms on school property unless certain conditions are satisfied, e.g., those set forth in 
MCL 750.237a(5)(c), namely, being “licensed by this state or another state to carry a 
concealed weapon.”  By doing so, the Legislature has permitted the open carry of 
firearms on school property by CPL holders.  Yet, the school policies prohibit CPL 
holders from openly carrying firearms on school property.  That is, the school policies 
“attempt[] to prohibit what the statute permits,” and therefore, the school policies are 
void.  Nat’l Amusement Co, 270 Mich at 617. 
(11) That CPL holders are permitted to openly carry firearms on school property 
under MCL 750.237a(5)(c) is further reinforced by consideration of MCL 750.237a(5)(f).  
As with MCL 750.237a(5)(c), MCL 750.237a(5)(f) exempts certain conduct from the 
general prohibition of the possession of firearms on school property.  Specifically, MCL 
750.237a(5) provides: 
Subsection (4) does not apply to any of the following: 
*   *   * 
(c) An individual licensed by this state or another state to carry a 
concealed weapon. 
*   *   * 
 
 
 
8
(f) An individual who is 18 years of age or older who is not a student 
at the school and who possesses a firearm on school property while 
transporting a student to or from the school if any of the following apply: 
(i) The individual is carrying an antique firearm, completely 
unloaded, in a wrapper or container in the trunk of a vehicle while en route 
to or from a hunting or target shooting area or function involving the 
exhibition, demonstration or sale of antique firearms. 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that a person who engages in the conduct identified 
in MCL 750.237a(5)(f)(i), such as a parent who has an unloaded antique shotgun locked 
in the trunk and is picking up his or her child from school after an antique gun show, 
simply cannot be excluded from school property.  The Legislature could not have been 
more clear in providing that such conduct is permitted.  Indeed, an amicus brief filed in 
support of the school district by the Negligence Section of the State Bar of Michigan 
acknowledges that a school district cannot exclude from school property those who fall 
within this protection.  However, if a school cannot exclude persons who fall within the 
protections of MCL 750.237a(5)(f), there are no conceivable grounds for excluding 
persons who fall within the protections of MCL 750.237a(5)(c).  The first principle of 
statutory interpretation establishes that subsections (5)(a), (5)(b), (5)(c), (5)(d), (5)(e), 
and (5)(f) each set forth conduct protected by the Legislature that cannot be prohibited by 
school districts.  If any one of these legislative exceptions, including (5)(c) (the CPL 
holders exception), can be nullified by schools, then any or all of the other exceptions can 
also be nullified.  
(12) Furthermore, MCL 750.237a is more specific to the possession of weapons on 
school property by CPL holders than MCL 380.11a (or any other statute in the Revised 
School Code), so MCL 750.237a controls over MCL 380.11a for that reason as well.  
 
 
 
9
Ligons v Crittenton Hosp, 490 Mich 61, 83-84; 803 NW2d 271 (2011) (“These specific 
statutes governing medical malpractice actions, which apply to the more narrow realm of 
circumstances, prevail over the more general rules applicable to all civil actions.”) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted). 
For these reasons, I believe that Michigan law clearly permits the open carry of 
firearms on school property by CPL holders and that school districts cannot enact policies 
that conflict with that law.  This is because school districts can only enact security 
policies “except as otherwise provided by law,” and MCL 750.237a(5)(c) “otherwise 
provide[s] by law.”  Therefore, I would reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals. 
RESPONSE TO MAJORITY 
(1) The majority fails to address whether the school policies at issue here conflict 
with MCL 750.237a because this was a “secondary argument advanced only in 
[plaintiffs’] supplemental briefs[.]”  Although plaintiffs may not have principally relied 
on this particular argument throughout these proceedings, all parties agree that the 
dispositive issue is whether the school district’s policy is valid or void, i.e., whether 
schools can prohibit CPL holders from openly carrying firearms on school property.  See, 
e.g., Michigan Gun Owners’ Application for Leave to Appeal, p 10 (“On April 27, 
2015 . . . Plaintiffs filed suit seeking a Declaratory Judgment in an effort to establish 
conclusively that the AAPS policy implementation was unlawful as it affects lawful 
firearm possession.”); Michigan Open Carry’s Application for Leave to Appeal, p 3 (“On 
March 5, MOC and Mr. Herman brought their suit in the Genesee County Circuit Court 
for declaratory relief in an effort to conclusively establish that the CASD policy was 
 
 
 
10 
unlawful as it interferes with lawful firearm possession.”); Ann Arbor Public Schools’ 
Answer, p 4 (“The District’s policies prohibiting the possession of firearms on school 
property are permissible . . . because the District has the authority to enact such 
policies . . . .”); Clio Area Schools’ Answer, p v (“Plaintiffs—open carry gun 
advocates—filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that would allow them to 
openly carry guns in schools operated by the Clio Area School District.”)  See also, as an 
illustrative reportorial description of the case, Gershman, Michigan High Court Takes Up 
School 
Gun 
Ban, 
Wall 
Street 
Journal 
(April 
11, 
2018) 
 
(accessed July 9, 2018) [https://perma.cc/EXY3-F678] (“Michigan’s highest court on 
Wednesday heard arguments on whether the right to openly carry firearms extends to 
school grounds.”).   
(2) Plaintiffs predominantly argue that the school districts’ policies are void 
because they are preempted by state law via field preemption.  I would instead hold that 
the school districts’ policies are void because the districts do not have the authority to 
adopt a policy when a contrary policy is “otherwise provided by law,” MCL 380.11a(3), 
and MCL 750.237a(5)(c) “otherwise provide[s] by law.”  In other words, plaintiffs argue 
in support of the right result but predominantly rely on the wrong reasoning.  This Court 
frequently affirms lower court decisions on exactly that basis, that they have “reached the 
right result for the wrong reason.”  See, e.g., People v Brownridge, 459 Mich 456, 462; 
591 NW2d 26 (1999).  Similarly, nothing precludes this Court from concluding that 
although plaintiffs predominantly relied on the wrong reasons, they consistently argued in 
support of the right result.  It is of no consequence that plaintiffs have not consistently 
 
 
 
11 
argued in support of any particular reasoning.  We resolve cases and controversies; we do 
not sit in judgment of the work of attorneys. 
(3) Plaintiffs have cited and called to the attention of this Court and the lower 
courts the two statutes I view as dispositive: MCL 380.11a(3) and MCL 750.237a.  Given 
that I conclude it is unnecessary to look beyond these statutes, this opinion does nothing 
out of the ordinary in relying upon these statutes and reaching the conclusion, exclusively 
on the basis of these statutes, that the school districts’ policies are clearly void.   
(4) Moreover, even if the issue articulated here had been unpreserved (and it was 
not; it was only the precise argument that was purportedly unpreserved), it is well 
established that “this Court may review an unpreserved issue if it is one of law and the 
facts necessary for resolution of the issue have been presented[.]”  McNeil v Charlevoix 
Co, 484 Mich 69, 81 n 8; 772 NW2d 18 (2009).  The question whether the school 
districts possess the authority to adopt the policies at issue “presents an issue of statutory 
interpretation, which is a question of law for which the facts necessary for its resolution 
are sufficiently present to permit this Court’s review.”  Id.  See also People v Temelkoski, 
501 Mich 960 (2018), decided earlier this year on the basis of what was an entirely 
unpreserved argument. 
(5) That is, even if the precise issue had been unpreserved (and once again it was 
only the precise argument that was purportedly unpreserved), “the preservation 
requirement is not an inflexible rule; it yields to the necessity of considering additional 
issues when ‘ “necessary to a proper determination of a case . . . .” ’ ”  Klooster v City of 
Charlevoix, 488 Mich 289, 310; 795 NW2d 578 (2011) (citations omitted).  See also 
People v Rao, 491 Mich 271, 289 n 4; 815 NW2d 105 (2012) (“[W]hile an appellate 
 
 
 
12 
court will not ordinarily review an issue that has been abandoned or waived, such review 
is allowed when it is ‘necessary to a proper determination of a case . . . .’ ”) (citation 
omitted); Walters v Nadell, 481 Mich 377, 387; 751 NW2d 431 (2008) (“[T]his Court has 
[the] inherent power to review an issue not raised in the trial court to prevent a 
miscarriage of justice . . . .”).  And here, consideration of the school districts’ authority 
under the Revised School Code to adopt the policies in dispute is indeed “necessary to a 
proper determination” of this case.  It is a serious “miscarriage of justice” for this Court 
to hold that the school districts’ policies are valid, and allow that opinion to inform the 
rights of nearly 600 school districts and more than 600,000 CPL holders throughout this 
state, as well as to have that opinion define the law for the 10 million people of Michigan, 
when the majority opinion does not even consider the dispositive statutes.  Even more 
fundamentally, it is a serious “miscarriage of justice” to fail to consider a supposedly 
“unpreserved” argument when that argument implicates the threshold inquiry in this case: 
whether the school districts possess the authority under the Revised School Code to adopt 
their policies in the first place.  It is a question that must be addressed by the courts 
before the issue of field preemption can even be considered.1 
                                              
1 Contrary to the majority’s assertion, whether a school district possesses the authority to 
adopt a particular policy is properly described as a “threshold” inquiry.  If the district 
lacks such authority in the first place, there is no need to address further whether the state 
has or has not occupied the field of regulation in a particular realm.  A district only 
possesses authority granted by statute, and in order to determine whether it possesses a 
particular authority, we must first look to the statute that purports to grant that authority, 
in this case the Revised School Code.  If the authority is lacking, that is the end of the 
analysis.  Yet, the majority concludes that the school district policies at issue are valid 
without any reference to the code.  How can the majority possibly know whether these 
policies are valid without first assessing whether the code grants a district the authority to 
enact them?  Because the code provides that a district may enact policies “providing for 
 
 
 
 
13 
(6) The decision of an individual litigant not to pursue an available line of 
argument, or even to relinquish an available issue, cannot impose on this Court an 
obligation to operate upon erroneous premises or to fail to take into account relevant 
statutes.  MCL 380.11a(3) and MCL 750.237a have been called to the attention of this 
Court by the parties and they are controlling: the school districts have no authority to 
adopt the policies that have exclusively defined the present controversy at every stage of 
this litigation. 
(7) Indeed, in Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 206-207; 649 NW2d 47 (2002), this 
Court was in a similar situation to the present one, and we correctly held that “[w]e 
absolutely oppose the dissenters’ apparent position that although a controlling legal issue 
is squarely before this Court, in this case preemption by state law, the parties’ failure or 
refusal to offer correct solutions to the issue limits this Court’s ability to probe for and 
provide the correct solution.”  As we further explained, “addressing a controlling legal 
issue despite the failure of the parties to properly frame the issue is a well understood 
judicial principle” because “no one can seriously question the right of this Court to set 
forth the law as clearly as it can, irrespective whether the parties assist the Court in 
fulfilling its constitutional function.”  Id. at 207, 209.  “The jurisprudence of Michigan 
                                              
the safety and welfare” of students “except as otherwise provided by law,” MCL 
380.11a(3), an altogether logical continuation of the “threshold” inquiry is whether there 
is any law that “otherwise provides.”  And this is where MCL 750.237a comes into play; 
it is exactly a law that “otherwise provides.”  Thus, the present inquiry does not constitute 
a “threshold” inquiry only if, as the majority has done, it is assumed entirely without 
analysis that school districts possess the legal authority to enact the policies in dispute in 
the first place. 
 
 
 
14 
cannot be, and is not, dependent upon whether individual parties accurately identify and 
elucidate controlling legal questions.”  Id. at 209.  
RESPONSE TO JUSTICE VIVIANO’S CONCURRENCE 
(1) The concurrence asserts that pursuant to the “conflict preemption” doctrine, 
“[i]n order for a state law to conflict with and preempt a local regulation, the state law 
must expressly permit something the local regulation prohibits.”  To begin with, the 
question at issue here is not exactly one of conflict preemption.  Instead, the more precise 
question is whether the school districts’ policies are void because they exceed the powers 
granted to school districts by the Revised School Code.  It is a question of governmental 
authority.  As discussed earlier, the Code provides that school districts may enact policies 
“[p]roviding for the safety and welfare of pupils while at school” “except as otherwise 
provided by law . . . .”  MCL 380.11a(3)(b).  The Revised School Code does not say 
“except as otherwise expressly provided by law,” but simply “except as otherwise 
provided by law.”  Therefore, the precise question is whether there is state law that 
provides for something other than what the school districts’ policies provide for-- 
whether state law and the school district policies are in conflict.  As I have explained at 
length, they are in conflict and state law prevails.  
(2) Furthermore, I am not at all convinced that “conflict preemption” somehow 
obligates state law to expressly permit what school district policies prohibit and why it is 
not enough that a reasonable reading of the law identifies a conflict.  Nonetheless, it is 
well established that there are two types of preemption, express and implied, and there 
are two types of implied preemption, conflict and field.  That is, conflict preemption is a 
 
 
 
15 
form of implied preemption; indeed, even the majority refers to conflict preemption as 
“implied conflict preemption.”  Given this, it would be extremely odd if implied conflict 
preemption somehow required an express conflict, and it does not.   
(3) Moreover, although the concurrence is correct that there are cases that cite 56 
Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations, § 374, p 408, as stating that “a municipality cannot 
lawfully forbid what the legislature has expressly licensed, authorized, permitted, or 
required” (emphasis added), I am unaware of even a single case in Michigan that has ever 
held that a municipality or other subdivision of the state can forbid what the Legislature 
has permitted (either expressly or by implication).2  Instead, it is remarkably well 
established that “ ‘in determining whether the provisions of a municipal ordinance 
conflict with a statute covering the same subject, the test is whether the ordinance 
prohibits an act which the statute permits, or permits an act which the statute prohibits.’ ”  
Rental Prop Owners Ass’n of Kent Co v Grand Rapids, 455 Mich 246, 262; 566 NW2d 
514 (1997), despite quoting 56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations, § 374, p 408 
(emphasis omitted); see also Detroit v Qualls, 434 Mich 340, 362; 454 NW2d 374 
(1990); Ter Beek v City of Wyoming, 495 Mich 1, 20; 846 NW2d 531 (2014); People v 
Llewellyn, 401 Mich 314, 322 n 4; 257 NW2d 902 (1977); Walsh v River Rouge, 385 
Mich 623, 637; 189 NW2d 318 (1971); Miller v Fabius Twp Bd, 366 Mich 250, 256; 114 
NW2d 205 (1962); Grand Haven v Grocer’s Coop Dairy Co, 330 Mich 694, 698; 48 
                                              
2 The concurring justice might believe that Qualls stands for this proposition, but in that 
case, as discussed later, this Court concluded that the Legislature did not permit the 
conduct in dispute and thus does not stand for the proposition that a municipality can 
forbid what the Legislature has permitted. 
 
 
 
16 
NW2d 362 (1951); People v McDaniel, 303 Mich 90, 93; 5 NW2d 667 (1942); Builders 
Ass’n, 295 Mich at 277; Nat’l Amusement Co, 270 Mich at 617.  
(4) Furthermore, even assuming that an express conflict is required-- a proposition 
nowhere evident in actual Michigan judicial decisions-- there is an even clearer 
demonstration of a conflict in the instant case between the school districts’ policies and 
MCL 750.237a(5)(c) than an express conflict: a logical conflict.  As discussed earlier, 
MCL 750.237a(4) states, “Except as provided in subsection (5), an individual who 
possesses a weapon in a weapon free school zone is guilty of a misdemeanor,” and MCL 
750.237a(5)(c) states, “Subsection (4) does not apply to . . . [a]n individual licensed by 
this state or another state to carry a concealed weapon.”  In other words, as a general 
proposition, people cannot possess a firearm on school property; however, CPL holders 
are excepted from this prohibition.  I really am not sure how the Legislature could have 
communicated its intentions any more clearly.  Yet the school districts’ policies here 
prohibit CPL holders from possessing firearms on school property.  In other words, the 
school districts seek to prohibit what the state through MCL 750.237a(5)(c) permits.   
(5) I agree with the concurrence to the extent that it asserts: (a) “MCL 750.237a 
must be read in pari materia with MCL 28.425o(1)(a),” (b) MCL 28.425o(1)(a) 
“provides that, except in narrow circumstances, a CPL holder may not carry a concealed 
pistol on school property,” (c) MCL 28.425o “makes no reference to unconcealed or open 
carrying of pistols,” and (d) “the exemption from criminal liability in MCL 
750.237a(5)(c) only applies to the extent that a CPL holder complies with . . . MCL 
28.425o(1)(a).”  However, I disagree with what the concurrence apparently believes 
follows from these propositions, to wit, that MCL 750.237a(5)(c) does not permit a CPL 
 
 
 
17 
holder to possess an openly carried firearm on school property.  As discussed earlier, 
MCL 750.237a(5)(c) permits a CPL holder to possess a firearm on school property, while 
MCL 28.425o(1)(a) prohibits a CPL holder from possessing a concealed firearm on 
school property.  Reading these two statutes together in altogether conventional ways, it 
is clear that while a CPL holder cannot possess a concealed firearm on school property, 
he or she can possess an openly carried firearm on school property.3  Contrary to the 
concurrence’s implication, I do not rely upon the Legislature’s silence in any way to 
justify this conclusion, but rather on the explicit language of MCL 750.237a(5)(c) and 
MCL 28.425o(1)(a).4 
                                              
3 The concurrence asserts that MCL 28.425c(3) “opens a gaping hole in [my] 
theory . . . .”  MCL 28.425c(3) provides generally that a CPL holder can “carry a pistol 
concealed on or about his or her person anywhere in this state” and can “carry a pistol in 
a vehicle, whether concealed or not concealed, anywhere in this state.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  However, the issue in this case pertains specifically to the possession of firearms 
on school property; MCL 750.237a and MCL 28.425o(1)(a) pertain specifically to the 
possession of firearms on school property; and it is well established that “a specific 
statutory provision controls over a related but more general statutory provision,” DeFrain 
v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 367 n 22; 817 NW2d 504 (2012)-- hence 
my reliance on the two statutes that specifically pertain to the possession of firearms on 
school property rather than the more general statute that does not specifically pertain to 
the possession of firearms on school property and indeed notes that its general terms are 
“subject to” other provisions of the law, including explicitly MCL 28.425o.  The 
concurrence concludes that “by expressly authorizing a licensee to openly carry a pistol 
in a vehicle, [MCL 28.425c(3)] cannot be read as authorizing a right to openly carry a 
pistol more broadly.”  I agree and that is exactly why I do not rely on MCL 28.425c(3) as 
authorizing such a right.  Rather, I rely on MCL 750.237a(5)(c) as authorizing such a 
right, at least on school property, and, as recognized even by the concurrence, MCL 
28.425c(3) does not “prohibit[] the open carrying of pistols . . . .”   
4 That is, I do not conclude that the Legislature, by failing to prohibit the open carrying of 
a firearm on school property in MCL 28.425o(1)(a), was expressly establishing a right to 
openly carry a firearm on school property.  Instead, I conclude that MCL 750.237a(5)(c) 
establishes the right of a CPL holder to possess an openly carried firearm on school 
 
 
 
 
18 
(6) The concurrence asserts that “MCL 750.237a proscribes conduct—it does not 
provide any affirmative rights whatsoever to CPL holders . . . .”  This is really the heart 
of the disagreement between myself and the concurrence.  By this assertion, the 
concurrence seeks to transform the statutory conflict here into a metaphysical question.  
That is, notwithstanding that state law is explicit in excepting a class of persons from 
statutory prohibitions concerning the possession of firearms on school property, the 
concurrence asserts that this merely serves to relieve such persons of criminal sanctions 
for carrying firearms on school property rather than actually permitting them to carry 
firearms.  This is a wonderfully fine distinction, but one that is unsupported by the 
language of the law (the subject of state law is the actual “possession” and “carrying” of 
firearms in particular venues), unsupported by the logic of the law (MCL 750.237a(5)(c) 
serves to nullify the prohibitions of MCL 750.237a(4)), unsupported by ordinary 
understandings of the people (that someone is exempt from a prohibition is the equivalent 
of stating that he or she has a right to do what would otherwise be prohibited),5 and 
                                              
property and that MCL 28.425o(1)(a) does not compromise that authority.  Thus, again, it 
is not the silence of MCL 28.425o(1)(a) that creates the right, but the authorization of 
MCL 750.237a(5)(c) that does so.  
5 Indeed, if MCL 750.237a(5)(c) does not mean that CPL holders can possess openly 
carried firearms on school property, I am unsure what it does mean.  Indeed, I am unsure 
what practical meaning, if any, the concurrence itself ascribes to MCL 750.237a(5)(c).  
Given that MCL 28.425o(1)(a) indisputably controls under what circumstances a CPL 
holder can possess a concealed firearm on school property, the concurrence obviously 
does not believe that MCL 750.237a(5)(c) controls in this regard.  Therefore, if, as the 
concurrence asserts, MCL 750.237a(5)(c) also does not control in regard to whether a 
CPL holder can possess an openly carried firearm on school property, when does it 
control?  It seems that MCL 750.237a(5)(c) is rendered superfluous under the reasoning 
of the concurrence, contrary to the well-established rule that “[w]hen interpreting a 
statute, we must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause and avoid an interpretation 
 
 
 
 
19 
unsupported by common understandings of legislative intentions (what conceivable 
purpose is served by large numbers of state laws whose only apparent consequence from 
the viewpoint of the concurrence is to render conduct lawful while not actually permitting 
that conduct?).6  As discussed earlier, this straightforward proposition is also supported 
by our caselaw.  Builders Ass’n, 295 Mich at 276;7 Nat’l Amusement Co, 270 Mich at 
                                              
that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.”  People v Rea, 500 
Mich 422, 427-428; 902 NW2d 362 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
6 Many examples of this type of legislation can be found in the Penal Code.  For example, 
MCL 750.234e(1) provides that “a person shall not willfully and knowingly brandish a 
firearm in public,” but MCL 750.234e(2)(a) provides that “[s]ubsection (1) does not 
apply to . . . [a] peace officer lawfully performing his or her duties as a peace officer.”  I 
would imagine that everybody would agree that MCL 750.234e works to permit a peace 
officer, lawfully performing his or her duties as a peace officer, to brandish a firearm in 
public.  In addition, MCL 750.449a provides that “a person who engages or offers to 
engage the services of another person, not his or her spouse, for the purpose of 
prostitution, lewdness, or assignation, by the payment in money or other forms of 
consideration, is guilty of a misdemeanor,” but MCL 750.451a provides that MCL 
750.449a does “not apply to a law enforcement officer while in the performance of the 
officer’s duties as a law enforcement officer.”  Again, I would imagine that everybody 
would agree that MCL 750.451a works to permit a law enforcement officer, while in the 
performance of the officer’s duties as a law enforcement officer, to solicit a prostitute.  
Indeed, this understanding is clearly supported by MCL 750.451b, which provides that 
“[s]ection 451a does not apply to a law enforcement officer if the officer engages in 
sexual penetration . . . while in the course of his or her duties.”  In other words, if MCL 
750.451a did not permit a police officer to engage in the solicitation of a prostitute, there 
would have been no need for the Legislature to enact MCL 750.451b as an exception to 
that otherwise permitted conduct.  See also MCL 750.33; MCL 750.45; MCL 750.141a; 
MCL 750.160a; MCL 750.195; MCL 750.197; MCL 750.200; MCL 750.224; MCL 
750.224b; MCL 750.224c; MCL 750.224e; MCL 750.224f; MCL 750.227b; MCL 
750.227f; MCL 750.227(2) and MCL 750.231a; MCL 750.233; MCL 750.234; MCL 
750.234a; MCL 750.234d; MCL 750.235; MCL 750.282(1)(c); MCL 750.329; MCL 
750.410b(1); MCL 750.411w; MCL 750.415(6); MCL 750.473; MCL 750.508; MCL 
750.539k; MCL 750.539l; MCL 750.552. 
7 The concurrence purports to distinguish Builders Ass’n on the basis that the “school 
policies do not criminalize anything,” whereas the ordinance at issue in Builders Ass’n 
 
 
 
 
20 
617.8  The law is designed to communicate in a reasonably clear and practical manner the 
day-to-day rights and responsibilities of the people, and the Legislature has done exactly 
that in this instance, which ought not to be obscured or confused.  
(7) The concurrence relies on Qualls, 434 Mich at 363-364, because it “ ‘reject[ed] 
the rationale . . . that that which the Legislature does not prohibit, it impliedly 
permits[.]’ ”  The statute in that case stated that “ ‘[t]he storage of fireworks at the site of 
a wholesaler, dealer, or jobber, except for a retailer who has goods on hand for sale to the 
public in a supervised display area, shall be as follows . . . .’ ”  Qualls, 434 Mich at 370 
n 3 (LEVIN, J., dissenting), quoting former MCL 750.243d, repealed by 2011 PA 256 
(emphasis omitted).  The statute then set forth several requirements regarding the storage 
of fireworks, including weight restrictions.  The ordinance at issue stated that “ ‘[t]he 
                                              
did attempt to criminalize conduct the Legislature expressly exempted from criminal 
penalty.  However, this is a distinction without significance.  It is well established that “in 
determining whether the provisions of a municipal ordinance conflict with a statute 
covering the same subject, the test is whether the ordinance prohibits an act which the 
statute permits, or permits an act which the statute prohibits.”  Rental Prop Owners Ass’n 
of Kent Co, 455 Mich at 262, quoting 56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations, § 374, 
p 408 (emphasis omitted).  Because the school districts’ policies attempt to prohibit an 
act that the statute permits, the school policies are void.  It does not matter that the 
schools are not attempting to criminalize the conduct; all that matters is that the schools 
are attempting to prohibit the conduct.  
8 The concurrence purports to distinguish Nat’l Amusement Co on the basis that the 
statute at issue here prohibits conduct, whereas the statute at issue in Nat’l Amusement Co 
“provided an affirmative right to engage in the conduct at issue and established the 
circumstances under which the conduct could be carried out.”  However, this is also a 
distinction without significance.  Although the statute at issue here is generally 
prohibitory, by creating an exception to a prohibition, it also “provided an affirmative 
right to engage in the conduct at issue and established the circumstances under which the 
conduct could be carried out.”  That is, it provides that a person can possess an openly 
carried firearm on school property as long as that person is a CPL holder.  
 
 
 
21 
storage of fireworks in a place of retail sales shall be limited to a gross weight of less than 
one hundred (100) pounds . . . .’ ”  Id. at 369 n 1 (emphasis omitted).  This Court held 
that the ordinance did not conflict with the statute because the statute was silent regarding 
how many pounds of fireworks a retailer could store.  However, the majority did not even 
quote, let alone analyze, the actual language of the statute.  That is, the majority 
concluded that the statute and the ordinance did not conflict, but it did so without 
examining the actual language of the statute.  The issue was whether the statute and the 
ordinance could be harmonized, and the majority somehow concluded that those 
provisions could be harmonized without even bothering to examine the actual language 
of one of those provisions, indeed, the controlling provision.  In other words, in a case in 
which the heart of the issue was one of statutory interpretation, the majority failed to 
interpret the actual words of the statute in dispute.  Instead, it appears that the majority 
simply relied on an Attorney General opinion that concluded that a previous version of 
the statute allowed a retailer to maintain on the premises a “reasonable amount” of 
fireworks.  Id. at 363; OAG, 1979-1980, No. 5536, p 335, at 337 (August 9, 1979).  From 
this the majority concluded that the statute did not conflict with the ordinance.  The 
majority also did not cite, let alone discuss, Home Builders Ass’n, 295 Mich at 276, or 
Nat’l Amusement Co, 270 Mich at 617, two cases that, as discussed earlier, stand for the 
opposite proposition: that which the Legislature explicitly excludes from prohibition, it 
impliedly permits.9   
                                              
9 The concurrence also cites Miller, 366 Mich 250, in support of its position.  However, 
Miller is significantly distinguishable.  Miller involved a state statute that prohibited 
waterskiing from one hour after sundown to one hour before sunrise and an ordinance 
 
 
 
 
22 
(8) Far more importantly, however, than either Qualls, Home Builders, or Nat’l 
Amusement is that the analysis of the concurrence is simply incompatible with first 
principles of logic.  When a statute prohibits conduct and then excludes some class of 
persons from that prohibition, the only logical conclusion is that such class of persons is 
permitted to engage in the otherwise prohibited conduct.  This is not an issue in which we 
look to precedent, but to the premises by which reasonable meaning is given to the law, 
to the premises by which the people are communicated their rights and responsibilities.  
As a matter of rudimentary logic, if something is explicitly not prohibited, it is permitted.  
I can imagine the question on a middle-school worksheet: the opposite of “not 
prohibited” is ______?  Answer: permitted.  It is quite that simple.  The law is binary in 
this regard; conduct is either prohibited or it is not; there is not some Alice-in-
Wonderland third realm of the law in which conduct is neither prohibited nor permitted.  
That is what not what legislatures intend by their enactments, and it is not what the 
people comprehend in these enactments; not one Michigan citizen in a hundred would 
look to the relevant statutes in this case, read the prohibition on firearms in school zones 
and then read of the exception for CPL holders, and not conclude-- altogether reasonably-- 
that if he or she is a CPL holder, he or she is permitted to do what is prohibited to others.  
There are countless laws of this state predicated on exactly this same logic and this same 
                                              
that prohibited waterskiing on a specific lake after 4:00 p.m. until the following day at 
10:00 a.m.  In short, the ordinance did not conflict with the statute because the ordinance 
simply broadened the prohibition contained in the statute; there was no direct conflict 
between the two.  Miller did not involve a statute such as the one at issue here that 
includes an express exception to a prohibition.  While an ordinance may broaden 
prohibitions contained in a statute, an ordinance cannot prohibit what a statute permits. 
 
 
 
23 
commonsense understanding of language.  See note 6 of this opinion.  To adopt the 
position of the concurrence-- “that that which the Legislature does not prohibit, it [also 
does not] impliedly permit”-- is to engage in gamesmanship with the citizenry, to mislead 
them in the exercise of their rights and responsibilities, to play “gotcha” by holding 
people accountable to the law in indeterminate ways when they “confuse” relief from 
prohibition as the equivalent of permission.  If an explicit legal exemption from a general 
prohibition does not mean that the otherwise prohibited conduct is permitted, what does it 
mean?  What legal consequences are faced by persons who assume that such conduct is 
permitted and who engage in that conduct?  The approach advocated by the concurrence 
would lead to misunderstanding and uncertainty on the part of a law-abiding people 
seeking to discern from the prescriptions, and proscriptions, of their law what they can 
and cannot do.10 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, MCL 380.11a(3) authorizes school districts to enact school policies 
“except as otherwise provided by law,” and MCL 750.237a “otherwise provide[s] by 
law.”  That is, MCL 750.237a authorizes CPL holders to openly carry firearms on school 
property while the school policies at issue here prohibit this conduct.  Because school 
districts do not have the authority to enact school policies that conflict with state law, the 
school policies at issue here are invalid.  When there is an enactment of the Legislature 
                                              
10 Furthermore, matters of logic, as with a judge’s personal sense of judicial philosophy 
or jurisprudence, such as his or her view of appropriate tools of statutory and 
constitutional interpretation, are not binding in the same sense as legal holdings.  
 
 
 
24 
that provides that a person “may” do something and a subordinate public body provides 
that he or she “may not” do that same thing, there is a textual, a logical, a legal, and a 
practical conflict, and the former provision of law prevails; it is that simple.  Therefore, I 
would reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals. 
 
 
Stephen J. Markman