Title: Commonwealth v. Brown
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12928
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 14, 2021

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SJC-12928 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  TYRIEK BROWN. 
 
 
April 14, 2021. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Evidence, Firearm. 
 
 
 
The defendant, Tyriek Brown, has been indicted for 
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and 
other offenses.  The defendant moved that the Commonwealth's 
test firing of the alleged firearm be observed by a defense 
expert.  A nonevidentiary hearing on the motion took place.  On 
March 27, 2019, a judge in the Superior Court denied the 
defendant's request to have his own expert be present at the 
test firing, but ordered that the test firing be audio-visually 
recorded and that the recording be provided to the defendant.  
Four months later, on August 2, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a 
motion for reconsideration.  That motion was denied on September 
3, 2019.  Another four months later, on January 15, 2020, the 
Commonwealth filed a petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking 
relief from the judge's order.  A single justice of this court 
denied relief without a hearing, and the Commonwealth appeals.  
We affirm. 
 
 
As we have explained, "[a] single justice considering a 
petition filed pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, performs a two-
step inquiry. . . .  The first step requires the single justice 
to decide 'whether to employ the court's power of general 
superintendence to become involved in the matter,' . . . or, 
stated differently, to 'decide, in his or her discretion, 
whether to review "the substantive merits of the . . . 
petition.'"  (Citations omitted.)  Commonwealth v. Dilworth, 485 
Mass. 1001, 1002 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 
Mass. 22, 24 (2019).  "The single justice need not take the 
2 
 
second step (which is to resolve the petition on its substantive 
merits) 'if the petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy or 
if the single justice determines, in his or her discretion, that 
the subject of the petition is not sufficiently important and 
extraordinary as to require general superintendence 
intervention.'"  Dilworth, supra, quoting Fontanez, supra at 24-
25.  See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 484 Mass. 1047, 1049 (2020).  
"Our role on appeal . . . is to determine whether [the single 
justice] abused [his] discretion by declining to intervene. 
. . .  We give considerable deference to the single justice's 
exercise of discretion, and it is not for us to substitute our 
judgment for that of the single justice."  Dilworth, supra.   
 
 
Here, the single justice denied relief without addressing 
the substantive merits of the Commonwealth's petition.  On 
appeal, it is incumbent on the Commonwealth to show that on the 
record before him, the single justice was required to exercise 
the court's superintendence power:  that is, that the 
Commonwealth had no adequate alternative remedy and that the 
single justice abused his discretion by failing to reach the 
merits of its petition in the circumstances of this case.  As to 
alternative remedies, we have repeatedly stated that, as a 
general rule, interlocutory orders pertaining to discovery are 
not immediately appealable, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ware, 471 
Mass. 85, 92 (2015), citing Cronin v. Strayer, 392 Mass. 525, 
528 (1984), and the Commonwealth has no right to appeal from a 
final judgment of acquittal.  Although appellate review of an 
interlocutory order can sometimes be had by disobeying the order 
and appealing from any judgment imposed as a sanction, we do not 
require the Commonwealth to take this approach.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bing Sial Liang, 434 Mass. 131, 133-134 (2001).1   
 
Regardless, the Commonwealth has not demonstrated that this 
case presented exceptional circumstances that required the 
single justice to reach the merits of its petition.  The 
Commonwealth argues that the Superior Court judge's order will 
 
1 The Commonwealth may have a means of obtaining review that 
would not require it to disobey the judge's order:  it could 
decline to conduct the testing and appeal from any resulting 
dismissal or required finding of not guilty based on 
insufficient evidence that the weapon was a "firearm" within the 
meaning of G. L. c. 140, § 121 (requiring, inter alia, that "a 
shot or bullet can be discharged").  The Commonwealth has not 
addressed in its brief the possibility of obtaining appellate 
review of the judge's order by this means. 
 
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effectively terminate the prosecution because State police 
policy prohibits recording the test firing of a weapon.  As a 
result, the Commonwealth argues, it faces an untenable choice:  
either forgo test firing the weapon, and thus be unable to prove 
that it is a "firearm"; or test fire the weapon without 
recording the process, violating the judge's order and risking 
exclusion of the weapon from the evidence at trial.  
Accordingly, the Commonwealth contends that the judge's order 
will leave it unable to prosecute the defendant for firearm 
offenses and that in these exceptional circumstances, the single 
justice was obligated to grant extraordinary relief. 
 
We disagree.  "While a single justice might be warranted in 
finding exceptional circumstances when, for example, the 
Commonwealth's petition . . . concerns a ruling that effectively 
forecloses the prosecution," Dilworth, 485 Mass. at 1003, citing 
Fontanez, 482 Mass. at 26, we do not agree that the judge's 
order in this case was such a ruling.  By its plain terms, the 
judge's order does not exclude any evidence; it merely imposes a 
requirement on the Commonwealth's ballistics testing.  Moreover, 
the Commonwealth has not shown that the State police 
department's policies have the force of law or supersede any 
court order.2  We see no reason why the Commonwealth could not 
carry out the test firing in compliance with the judge's order, 
or why the State police could not be ordered to permit recording 
of such testing should they refuse to do so.3   
 
 
Even apart from these considerations, the Commonwealth's 
unexplained delay in seeking relief provides a further reason 
not to disturb the single justice's decision.  Nearly ten months 
passed between the issuance of the judge's order and the filing 
of the Commonwealth's petition.  In the interim, the 
Commonwealth moved in the Superior Court for reconsideration.  
However, it took four months after the judge issued his order 
for it to do so, and after reconsideration was denied, it took 
another four months to seek extraordinary relief.  The 
Commonwealth has offered no reason for this delay.  The 
Commonwealth's failure to seek relief promptly undermines its 
 
2 According to the judge's order, the State police were 
given the opportunity to participate in the hearing on this 
matter and declined to do so.   
 
3 The parties disagree as to whether any alternate location 
is available to conduct the test firing, so as not to run afoul 
of the State police department's policy.  We need not resolve 
that dispute here.   
4 
 
claim that the circumstances here compelled the single justice 
to exercise the court's extraordinary superintendence power.  In 
these circumstances, the single justice was not required to 
reach the substantive merits of the Commonwealth's petition.  
There was no error or abuse of discretion in the denial of 
relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
Travis H. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Joseph N. Schneiderman for the defendant.