Title: Johnson v. State
Citation: 712 So. 2d 380
Docket Number: 90494
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 7, 1998

712 So. 2d 380 (1998)
Tommie V. JOHNSON, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 90494.

Supreme Court of Florida.
May 7, 1998.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Susan D. Cline, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, for Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Belle B. Turner, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
SHAW, Justice.
We have for review Johnson v. State, 689 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), based on conflict with Gibbs v. State, 698 So. 2d 1206 (Fla.1997), and Paccione v. State, 698 So. 2d 252 (Fla.1997). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We quash Johnson.
*381 On September 6, 1995, Deputy Moore stopped Tommie Johnson for speeding on Interstate 95. When Moore looked under the spare tire in Johnson's trunk, he found two plastic bags of cocaine, one weighing 69 grams, the other 41 grams. Based on this evidence, Johnson was charged with trafficking in cocaine[1] and possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell.[2] He was convicted as charged and the district court affirmed.
Johnson contends that his dual convictions based on the same quantity of cocaine violate double jeopardy. We agree. After the district court rendered its decision in Johnson, we decided both Gibbs v. State, 698 So. 2d 1206 (Fla.1997),[3] and Paccione v. State, 698 So. 2d 252 (Fla.1997).[4] We find these cases dispositive.
When conducting double jeopardy analysis under an "alternative conduct statute," such as the trafficking statute, the court must focus on the particular component of the statute that is in issue, as we explained in Gibbs:
Gibbs, 698 So. 2d  at 1209-10.
In the present case, when we compare the possession component of the trafficking statute to the companion crime of possession with intent to sell, we find that while the latter offense contains a statutory element not found in the former, i.e., intent to sell, the reverse is not true.[5] "Thus, the court exceeded its statutory authority by convicting and sentencing [the defendant] for both of these crimes, which arose out of a single criminal episode." Paccione, 698 So. 2d  at 254.
We quash Johnson.
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
*382 WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.
PARIENTE, J., recused.
WELLS, Justice, dissenting.
Petitioner was arrested for possessing more than twenty-eight grams of cocaine and ultimately convicted of violating sections 893.135(1)(b)1 and 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1995). Petitioner appealed, contending that the dual convictions violated double jeopardy principles. The district court affirmed the convictions. Johnson v. State, 689 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). The majority of this Court quashes the district court decision holding that our decisions in Gibbs v. State, 698 So. 2d 1206 (Fla.1997), and Paccione v. State, 698 So. 2d 252 (Fla.1997), are dispositive. I dissent.
Neither Gibbs nor Paccione control here. The instant case deals with two alternative conduct statutes, whereas in both Gibbs and Paccione one of the statutes for which the defendant was convicted was section 893.13(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), a statute which only punishes simple possession of a controlled substance.
In Gibbs, the district court certified the following question:
Gibbs, 698 So. 2d  at 1206 (emphasis added).[6] Applying the test set out by the legislature in section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), we answered that question in the negative because the elements of trafficking possession were no different from the elements of simple possession. In addition, we reasoned that the legislature clearly intended to punish more harshly those convicted of possessing more than twenty-eight grams of cocaine. In essence, we found that trafficking possession was a heightened form of possession that could not be punished along with simple possession.
This Court has repeatedly stated that legislative intent is dispositive in determining whether double jeopardy bars separate convictions and sentences for offenses arising from the same criminal episode. Boler v. State, 678 So. 2d 319, 321 (Fla.1996); State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613, 614 (Fla.1989). "[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended." Smith, 547 So. 2d  at 614 (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S. Ct. 673, 74 L. Ed. 2d 535 (1983)). I continue to believe that our decisions in Gibbs and Paccione represent a reasoned assessment of legislative intent and make good sense in respect to simple possession cases. As we stated in Gibbs:
Id. at 1209.
In Gibbs we also answered the following question raised by Judge Gross in his concurring opinion to the district court's decision: How is the comparative elements analysis made when a statute prohibits alternative types of conduct? We stated:
Id. at 1209-10. The answer to that question was unnecessary to the resolution of the Gibbs case because of the certified question. I believe that this case points out why we should not have answered that unnecessary question. We should recede from that portion of Gibbs.
Rather, I believe that the analysis of Justice Pariente (then a judge for the Fourth District) is better reasoned. As Justice Pariente points out, finding that the dual convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession with intent to sell/deliver in this case do not violate double jeopardy principles conforms with our decision in State v. McCloud, 577 So. 2d 939 (Fla.1991). I would adopt the following portion of Justice Pariente's decision:
Johnson, 689 So. 2d  at 1125-26. In Gibbs we specifically adhered to our decision in McCloud. I would continue this adherence.
In sum, I conclude that Gibbs and Paccione have limited application to the simple possession statutes. In respect to the statutes under consideration in this case, as Justice Pariente's opinion illustrates, the traditional Blockburger[7] analysis of comparing the elements of the statutes leads to the conclusion that there is no double jeopardy violation. Moreover, there is no indication that the legislature intended anything other than dual convictions in a situation such as the one before us.
Accordingly, I would affirm.
[1]  Section 893.135 prohibits the possession of 28 grams or more of cocaine and provides in relevant part:

Any person who knowingly sells, purchases, manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, 28 grams or more of cocaine ... but less than 150 kilograms of cocaine ... commits a felony of the first degree, which felony shall be known as "trafficking in cocaine."
§ 893.135(1)(b)(1), Fla. Stat. (1995).
[2]  Section 893.13 prohibits the possession of a controlled substance for specific purposes and provides in relevant part:

Except as authorized by this chapter and chapter 499, it is unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance.
§ 893.13(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995).
[3]  In Gibbs v. State, 698 So. 2d 1206 (Fla.1997), we held that dual convictions for trafficking possession of cocaine and possession of a controlled substance violate double jeopardy when based on the same quantity of cocaine.
[4]  In Paccione v. State, 698 So. 2d 252 (Fla.1997), we held that dual convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to sell and simple possession of marijuana violate double jeopardy when based on the same quantity of marijuana.
[5]  Cf. Paccione, 698 So. 2d  at 254 ("While possession with the intent to sell contains an element that possession does not, the converse is not true. Simple possession contains no element not found in possession with the intent to sell."); see also Gibbs, 698 So. 2d  at 1209 ("We do not find that the quantity requirement of trafficking possession is a separate element which allows the dual prosecution of both trafficking possession and simple possession arising out of the possession of the same cocaine.").
[6]  Similarly, in Paccione, the certified question read:

MAY A PERSON BE SEPARATELY CONVICTED AND PUNISHED FOR POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA WITH INTENT TO SELL AND SIMPLE POSSESSION OF THE SAME QUANTITY OF MARIJUANA?
Paccione, 698 So. 2d  at 252 (emphasis added).
[7]  Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932) (codified at section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1995)).