Title: Johnson v. Bondurant
Citation: 187 Kan. 637, 359 P.2d 861
Docket Number: 42,002
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 1961

187 Kan. 637 (1961)
359 P.2d 861
CARLYS H. JOHNSON, Appellant,
v.
ERNEST E. BONDURANT, Appellee.
No. 42,002

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 4, 1961.
Jacob F. May, of Kansas City, argued the cause, and Joseph Cohen, Charles S. Schnider, John E. Shamberg, Joseph P. Jenkins, Barton P. Cohen, Norma Braly and Frederick K. Cross, all of Kansas City, were with him on the brief for the appellant.
W.C. Jones, of Olathe, argued the cause, and John W. Breyfogle, Jr., of Olathe, was with him on the brief for the appellee.
*638 The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
This case presents a rather novel and unusual question. The action was brought to recover for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff as a result of the alleged negligent operation of defendant's truck while being used on a construction project. During the pendency of the action defendant, who was covered by a liability policy of insurance, was adjudged a bankrupt and received his discharge.
Involved in the case is the question whether defendant's discharge in bankruptcy constitutes a complete defense to plaintiff's action  all as hereafter set forth.
The personal injuries were sustained on August 28, 1955, and plaintiff's petition, which is not abstracted, was filed on August 17, 1957.
An amended petition was filed December 11, 1958. It set out the alleged grounds of negligence on the part of defendant and the injuries sustained, with which, for present purposes, we are not concerned.
On December 29, 1958, defendant filed an answer to the amended petition denying generally plaintiff's allegations and alleging contributory negligence and assumption of risk on the part of plaintiff.
On February 16, 1959, defendant filed an amended answer, and on February 19, 1959, plaintiff filed a reply.
The case was set for trial for April 7, 1959, but, not being tried on that date, was reset for October 5, 1959.
On September 29, 1959, defendant, by leave of court, filed his second amended answer which denied generally the allegations of the amended petition and alleged contributory negligence and assumption of risk on the part of plaintiff. As a further and separate defense, the second amended answer contained the following:
On October 12, 1959, plaintiff filed a reply to the second amended answer. The first paragraph thereof denied all allegations contained in the second amended answer except admissions of allegations in plaintiff's petitions  and then continued:
On November 13, 1959, defendant filed a demurrer to the above-quoted portion of plaintiff's reply on the grounds the allegations therein contained (1) do not constitute a denial of the new matter set out in the second amended answer; (2) are insufficient in that they do not set up a defense to the allegations of new matter pleaded in the second amended answer; (3) that the court no longer had jurisdiction of the subject of the action, and (4) that in such reply plaintiff had departed from the cause of action set forth in his amended petition.
*640 On January 19, 1960, the demurrer, as to the first three grounds thereof, was sustained. At the time of making this order the court granted plaintiff twenty-one days in which to reply further to the second amended answer, and defendant was allowed ten days thereafter in which to plead to any further reply that may be filed by plaintiff.
Plaintiff has appealed from the order sustaining the demurrer to the quoted portion of his reply to the second amended answer.
Despite the apparent "inconsistency" in the trial court's order to the effect "it no longer had jurisdiction of the subject of the action," and its further order granting the parties additional time to plead  from the briefs and arguments made it seems clear that the question presented is whether, under all of the facts and circumstances pleaded, defendant's adjudication and discharge in bankruptcy constitutes a complete defense to plaintiff's action.
Section 34 of the Bankruptcy Act (Title 11, U.S.C.A.) provides:
In Butler Bros. v. Twineham, 134 Kan. 547, 7 P.2d 531, a judgment was rendered against a debtor from which he appealed and gave an appeal bond signed by a surety prior to a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding which resulted in the discharge of the bankrupt debtor. In a later trial of the appeal from the judgment it was held that the creditor was entitled to a special judgment against the principal and surety, but the court granted a perpetual stay of execution or other enforcement of the judgment as against the bankrupt and adjudged the surety to be liable on the appeal bond. On appeal to this court it was held that such judgment was not erroneous, and in paragraphs one and two of the syllabus it was held:
In Flowers v. Terry, 170 Kan. 266, 225 P.2d 94, it was held:
*641 and in the course of the opinion (p. 270) it was said that a discharge of a bankrupt does not affect secondary liability.
A situation somewhat analogous to the one here was present in Miller v. Collins, 328 Mo. 313, 40 S.W.2d 1062, in which it was held:
In the course of the opinion it was said:
In the case before us the provisions of the liability policy of insurance are not abstracted, but in that portion of the reply to which the demurrer was sustained it is alleged that under the terms and provisions of the policy the insurer obligated itself to pay any judgment that plaintiff might recover against defendant in the action to the extent of the policy limits of coverage. It is true that in the Missouri case, above, the judgment was obtained prior to the adjudication and discharge in bankruptcy, but we believe the reasoning of that case is applicable to the question here presented.
It seems only logical to conclude that section 34 of the Bankruptcy Act, above, which provides that liability of a person who is a co-debtor with, or guarantor or in any manner a surety for, a bankrupt, shall not be altered by the bankrupt's discharge, evidences a legislative intent to confine operation of the act to a bankrupt's assets at the time of adjudication, and does not operate to release claims against parties liable with the bankrupt, whether liquidated, *642 as in the case of debts, or unliquidated, as in the case of claims based on torts.
All of defendant's contentions have been examined and considered, but it appears that his arguments with respect to the provability of the right to recover damages in a negligence action instituted prior to and pending at the time of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, overlook the fact that here it is conceded plaintiff cannot look to defendant personally for payment of any judgment that may be rendered  but, rather, to the insurer under the liability policy of insurance.
In the event this action comes to trial, all matters pertaining to the bankruptcy proceeding and the liability insurance policy in question have no place in the evidence or instructions by the court.
The order sustaining the demurrer to the quoted portion of the reply to the second amended answer was erroneous and is therefore reversed.