Title: Food Lion Inc. v. Melton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 941224
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 9, 1995

Present:  All the Justices 
 
FOOD LION, INC. 
 
v.  Record No. 941224 
 
CHRISTINE F. MELTON 
 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
                                       June 9, 1995 
CHRISTINE F. MELTON 
 
v.  Record No. 941230 
 
FOOD LION, INC. 
 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 
 
George F. Tidey, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal from a judgment in a tort action, we consider 
whether the trial court erred:  1) in striking the plaintiff's 
evidence of defamation; and 2) in barring the plaintiff from 
introducing in her case in chief the defendant's original 
responses to the plaintiff's request for admissions, which had 
been amended prior to trial. 
 
Christine F. Melton filed a motion for judgment against Food 
Lion, Inc., alleging intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, defamation, insulting words, false imprisonment, and 
negligence.  Melton alleged that, upon leaving the Food Lion 
store located at Route 1 and Parham Road in Henrico County, she 
was "accosted by a security guard" employed by Food Lion, who 
accused her "repeatedly and in a belligerent accusatory voice" of 
leaving the store with meat in her purse.  Melton alleged that, 
as a result of this encounter, she suffered "great humiliation, 
embarrassment, pain, suffering, anxiety, stress, severe distress, 
nervousness and damage to her reputation," which caused her to 
 
 
 
 
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require medical attention. 
 
In response to Melton's requests for admission, Food Lion 
made the following relevant admissions: 
 
 
3.  Admit that during his encounter with the 
plaintiff on April 19, 1991, the security guard 
referred to in the plaintiff's Motion for Judgment was 
employed by the defendant. 
 
 
 
Response:  Food Lion admits that the loss 
prevention agent referred to in the motion for judgment 
was employed by Food Lion. 
 
 
 
. . . 
 
 
 
5.  Admit that at the time of the plaintiff's 
encounter with the security guard referred to in the 
plaintiff's motion for judgment, the security guard was 
acting within the scope of his employment with the 
defendant. 
 
 
 
Response:  Food Lion admits that during all times 
relevant to this action, the loss prevention agent was 
acting within the scope of his employment with Food 
Lion. 
 
 
Shortly before trial, Food Lion moved to amend these 
responses to deny that Melton's accuser was a Food Lion employee 
acting within the scope of his employment.  At a hearing, Food 
Lion proffered testimony that its manager and loss prevention 
agent had made these admissions based on their belief that 
Melton's lawsuit arose out of an incident they recalled, but they 
later realized that Melton was not the woman involved in that 
other incident. 
 
The trial court permitted Food Lion to file amended 
responses.  At the trial, the court granted Food Lion's motion in 
limine prohibiting Melton from introducing the original 
 
 
 
 
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admissions into evidence as part of her case, but ruled that she 
could use them for impeachment purposes. 
 
Melton, who was 68 years old at the time of the incident, 
testified that on the day in question, after purchasing meat at 
the Food Lion store, she left the store and walked out into the 
parking lot.  She had almost reached her car, which was parked 
"directly in front of the store in the regular parking lot," when 
a man approached her and accused her of leaving the store with 
meat belonging to Food Lion in her purse. 
 
According to Melton, the man said, "[D]on't you have some 
meat that belongs to us?"  Melton told the man she had purchased 
some meat and had a receipt to prove this fact.  The man then 
said, "I'm not talking about that, I'm talking about the meat 
that you have in your purse."  Although Melton denied having any 
meat in her purse, the man repeatedly questioned her in an 
accusatory manner, using a "very loud tone," and stood close to 
her so that she understood she was not free to leave.  He then 
showed her an object that appeared to be a badge and stated, 
"What if I called the police?"  After Melton allowed him to 
search her purse and no merchandise was found, the man terminated 
the encounter and left. 
 
Melton further testified that the incident occurred on a 
Friday afternoon, that people were nearby during this 
confrontation, and that there were "people going in and out of 
the store and there were people stopping to listen and see what 
 
 
 
 
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was going on."  Melton did not know the names of any of these 
people.  She also stated that the entire incident lasted about 
ten minutes. 
 
Melton stated that, after arriving home, she telephoned the 
store and asked to speak to the manager.  Her call was 
transferred and was answered by an unidentified man.  When Melton 
related the details of the incident to him, the man replied:  
"[T]his is the second time he has done this.  He's not under my 
jurisdiction.  He works from one store to the other but I will 
report him."  Melton described her accuser as being a large, 
African-American man. 
 
At the conclusion of Melton's evidence, the trial court 
granted Food Lion's motion to strike her claims of defamation and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Food Lion then 
presented its case, which included the testimony of Derrick 
Slater, a loss prevention agent for Food Lion. 
 
Slater testified that he was one of the two African-American 
loss prevention agents employed by Food Lion on the date of the 
incident in the region in which the Route 1 store is located.  
Slater stated that he had not worked at the Route 1 store on the 
date in question, and that the other African-American loss 
prevention agent, Duane Knight, had never worked at the Route 1 
store. 
 
The evidence further showed that Melton was unable to 
identify Slater as the man who accosted her.  She testified that 
 
 
 
 
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her accuser was heavier than Slater and had a lighter complexion. 
 
Food Lion also presented evidence concerning its established 
procedures for confronting a suspected shoplifter, as well as 
evidence indicating that Melton's accuser did not follow these 
procedures.  Finally, Food Lion called as witnesses the two male 
managers working at the store on that day.  Both denied having 
received a telephone call from a customer relating the details of 
this incident. 
 
The jury returned a verdict for Melton on the negligence 
count, but found in favor of Food Lion on the counts of false 
imprisonment and insulting words.  The trial court denied 
Melton's motion for a new trial and entered judgment on the 
verdict.  This appeal followed. 
 
Melton first argues that the trial court erred in striking 
her evidence of defamation.  Specifically, she asserts that she 
presented prima facie evidence of publication of the defamatory 
remarks, by her testimony that a number of people stopped to 
listen to the security guard's accusations. 
 
In response, Food Lion contends that the trial court 
properly struck the defamation count because Melton presented no 
evidence that any of the bystanders in the parking lot actually 
heard or understood the man's verbal accusations.  Food Lion 
asserts that Melton was required to identify the persons to whom 
the statements were published in order to prove the essential 
element of publication.  We disagree with Food Lion. 
 
 
 
 
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First, in reviewing a trial court's decision to strike a 
plaintiff's evidence, we consider the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.  Any reasonable doubt regarding the sufficiency of the 
evidence must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor.  Waters v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 246 Va. 269, 270, 435 S.E.2d 380, 380 
(1993). 
 
Second, we set forth the principles of law applicable to our 
consideration of this defamation claim.  Since the trial court 
did not state its basis for striking the evidence of this claim, 
we do not limit our consideration to the issue of publication but 
examine the evidence as a whole to determine whether it was 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 
 
As pertinent here, a published statement is defamatory and 
is actionable per se when it imputes to a person the commission 
of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude, for which the 
party, if the charge is true, may be indicted and punished.  
Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 146, 334 
S.E.2d 846, 849 (1985); Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 196 
Va. 1, 7, 82 S.E.2d 588, 591 (1954).  A statement imputes the 
commission of a crime when it refers to matters that would 
naturally and presumably be understood by those hearing them as 
charging a crime.  Moss v. Harwood, 102 Va. 386, 388, 46 S.E. 
385, 386 (1904); see also Schnupp v. Smith, 249 Va. 353, 360-61, 
___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (1995). 
 
 
 
 
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In the circumstances presented here, involving a plaintiff 
who is not a public official or public figure, and an alleged 
defamatory statement that imputes commission of a crime and thus 
makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, a negligence 
standard applies.  See Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 15, 
22-23, 325 S.E.2d 713, 724-25, 729, cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 
(1985).  The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the statement was false and that the defendant 
either knew the statement was false or, believing it to be true, 
lacked reasonable grounds for such belief or acted negligently in 
failing to ascertain the truth.  Ingles v. Dively, 246 Va. 244, 
251, 435 S.E.2d 641, 645 (1993); Gazette, 229 Va. at 15, 325 
S.E.2d at 724-25. 
 
The plaintiff further must prove that there was publication 
of the defamatory words.  Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Nance, 165 Va. 
363, 378, 182 S.E. 264, 269 (1935).  It is sufficient to show 
that, when the defendant addressed the defamatory words to the 
plaintiff, another person was present, heard the words spoken, 
and understood the statement as referring to the plaintiff.  See 
Snyder v. Fatherly, 158 Va. 335, 350, 163 S.E. 358, 364 (1932); 
Powell v. Young, 151 Va. 985, 997-98, 144 S.E. 624, 627, rev'd on 
other grounds, 151 Va. 1002, 145 S.E. 731 (1928); see also 
Gazette, 229 Va. at 37, 325 S.E.2d at 738.  However, this Court 
has not addressed specifically the issue raised by the parties 
here, namely, whether proof of publication under facts such as 
 
 
 
 
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these requires direct evidence from a third party who actually 
heard and understood the defamatory remarks as referring to the 
plaintiff. 
 
In considering this issue, courts of other jurisdictions 
have held that circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to 
prove publication of the defamatory remarks.  See, e.g., Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dolph, 825 S.W.2d 810, 811-12 (Ark. 1992); 
Lombardi v. Flaming Fountain, Inc., 327 So. 2d 39, 40-41 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cliser, 298 A.2d 
16, 22-23 (Md. 1972); Southwest Drug Stores of Mississippi, Inc. 
v. Garner, 195 So. 2d 837, 841 (Miss. 1967); Harris v. Temple, 
392 S.E.2d 752, 753-54 (N.C. Ct. App.), review denied, 395 S.E.2d 
678 (N.C. 1990); Gaudette v. Carter, 214 A.2d 197, 200 (R.I. 
1965); Duckworth v. First Nat'l Bank, 176 S.E.2d 297, 301 (S.C. 
1970). 
 
We agree with this principle and hold that, in order to 
establish prima facie evidence of publication, a plaintiff is not 
required to present testimony from a third party regarding what 
that person heard and understood, or to identify the person to 
whom the defamatory words were published.  Instead, a plaintiff 
may prove publication of defamatory remarks by either direct or 
circumstantial evidence that the remarks were heard by a third 
party who understood these remarks as referring to the plaintiff 
in a defamatory sense. 
 
In the present case, it is undisputed that Melton's accuser 
 
 
 
 
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made statements imputing to her the commission of the crime of 
larceny.  Further, as stated above, Melton testified that the 
security guard stood very close to her and made his accusations 
in a "very loud tone" of voice during an encounter that lasted 
approximately ten minutes.  She also testified that, during this 
time, people were close by, and they stopped "to listen and see 
what was going on."  We hold that, when considered in the light 
most favorable to Melton, this evidence was sufficient to permit 
a reasonable inference that the accuser's words were heard and 
understood by a third party as referring to Melton and as 
imputing the commission of a crime. 
 
In addition, we conclude that Melton's testimony provided 
evidence from which a jury reasonably could infer that her 
accuser lacked reasonable grounds for his belief that she had 
committed larceny or acted negligently in failing to ascertain 
the truth, and that her accuser was a Food Lion employee acting 
within the scope of his employment.  We also note that, since an 
award of general damages for defamation is based on a concept of 
per se injury, Melton was not required to present further proof 
of injury or loss.  See Snead v. Harbaugh, 241 Va. 524, 528, 404 
S.E.2d 53, 55 (1991).  Based on this record, we hold that Melton 
presented prima facie evidence of defamation, and that the trial 
court erred in striking her claim.
1
                     
     
1We reject Food Lion's claim that the trial court's ruling 
was harmless error since the jury failed to return a verdict for 
 
 
 
 
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Melton next argues that the trial court erred in excluding 
evidence, as part of her case in chief, of Food Lion's original 
admissions that the man who accosted her was a Food Lion employee 
acting within the scope of his employment.  Melton contends that, 
although the trial court later permitted Food Lion to amend these 
responses, the original responses nevertheless retained their 
character as admissions in the case. 
 
In response, Food Lion asserts that, even if the trial court 
erred in refusing to allow Melton to introduce these admissions 
into evidence, any such error was harmless, because the jury 
learned the substance of these admissions during Melton's 
cross-examination of Derrick Slater.  Further, since the trial 
 
Melton on her claim for insulting words.  Food Lion contends that 
the jury necessarily would have returned a similar verdict 
against Melton had they considered the claim of defamation, 
because an action for insulting words differs from an action for 
defamation only in that no proof of publication is necessary to 
support a claim for insulting words.  Tweedy v. J.C. Penney Co., 
216 Va. 596, 601 n.6, 221 S.E.2d 152, 156 n.6 (1976).  However, 
this issue is rendered moot by the conclusion, reached in our 
determination of the second issue in this case, that other 
reversible error requires a new trial of this case on all claims 
that are the subject of this appeal, including the claim of 
insulting words. 
 
 
 
 
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court did not instruct the jury that this information could be 
considered only for impeachment purposes, Food Lion argues that 
Melton was not prejudiced by the trial court's ruling.  We 
disagree with Food Lion. 
 
We have not been called upon previously to address the issue 
whether admissions made by written answer to a request under Rule 
4:11, which are thereafter amended under Rule 4:11(b), may be 
introduced as substantive evidence in the trial of the pending 
action.  The effect of these admissions is governed by Rule 
4:11(b), which provides in relevant part: 
 
Any matter admitted under this Rule is conclusively 
established unless the court on motion permits 
withdrawal or amendment of the admission. . . . [T]he 
court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the 
presentation of the merits of the action will be 
subserved thereby and the party who obtained the 
admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or 
amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action 
or defense on the merits. 
 
 
In this case, since Food Lion was permitted to amend its 
initial responses, the original admissions could not be used to 
establish conclusively that Melton was accosted by a Food Lion 
employee acting within the scope of his employment.  Cf. State 
Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haines, 250 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 
___ (1995) (decided this day).  Thus, the matters addressed in 
those admissions were returned to the case as issues Melton was 
required to prove.  However, we hold that Melton was entitled to 
introduce as substantive evidence Food Lion's original responses, 
since Rule 4:11 contains no provision prohibiting such a use of 
 
 
 
 
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admissions that have been amended with leave of court.  
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in barring 
Melton from introducing those admissions into evidence as part of 
her case in chief. 
 
We reject Food Lion's contention that the exclusion of this 
evidence from Melton's case in chief was harmless error.  
Although these written admissions were not conclusive of the 
matters that were addressed, they were deliberately made and thus 
provided evidence of a persuasive nature that may have furnished 
the strongest and most convincing evidence of truth.  See Tyree 
v. Lariew, 208 Va. 382, 385, 158 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1967); Watson 
v. Coles, 170 Va. 141, 150, 195 S.E. 506, 509 (1938).  The weight 
to be given such admissions was an issue for the jury's 
determination.  Tyree, 208 Va. at 385, 158 S.E.2d at 143.  
Therefore, we hold that Melton was prejudiced by the trial 
court's ruling.  Further, since this error affected the 
presentation of evidence on the four counts that are the subject 
of this appeal, Melton is entitled to a new trial on all these 
counts.
2
                     
     
2Melton does not challenge in this appeal the trial court's 
ruling striking her evidence of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  Thus, Melton is not entitled to a new trial 
on this count.  See Rule 5:17(c).  Further, in view of our ruling 
that Melton is entitled to a new trial on the other counts, we do 
not reach Melton's assignment of error regarding the trial 
 
 
 
 
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For these reasons, we will reverse the trial court's 
judgment and remand the case for a new trial on the counts of 
defamation, insulting words, false imprisonment, and negligence.
3
 
Reversed and remanded. 
                                                                  
court's denial of her motion for a new trial. 
     
3Based on our disposition of Melton's appeal, we also do not 
reach Food Lion's assignments of error, which challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict and the 
jury's award of damages.