Title: Walker v. Associates Loan Company
Citation: 385 P.2d 421
Docket Number: 20353
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: September 30, 1963

385 P.2d 421 (1963) Clifford G. WALKER, Plaintiff in Error, v. ASSOCIATES LOAN COMPANY, Defendant in Error. No. 20353. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. September 30, 1963. Elias J. Candell, Lakewood, for plaintiff in error. James R. Horton, Denver, for defendant in error. MOORE, Justice. Associates Loan Company filed this action to secure judgment on a promissory note executed by plaintiff in error Clifford G. Walker, his wife Sally Walker and her mother Maude F. Stephens. All three signers of the note were named defendants. A default judgment was entered against Clifford G. Walker in the sum of $357.52 and costs. Shortly thereafter he filed his "Motion for Relief from Judgment" as follows: Attached to the motion was a tendered answer in which it was alleged that: The motion for relief from the judgment was set for hearing at which time counsel for Walker offered to prove that the first knowledge he had of the action was when his wages were garnisheed at his place of employment. He further offered to prove facts which, if true, would raise a question as to whether there had ever been a valid service of summons upon him. He offered to prove The court refused to hear any of this evidence and ruled as follows: The trial court permitted Walker's attorney to place in the record a certified copy of the discharge in bankruptcy, and another instrument in the bankruptcy proceeding which clearly showed knowledge thereof on the part of Associates Loan Company. The trial court erred in refusing to set the judgment aside. Motion to vacate a default judgment taken against a defendant should be considered by the trial court in a manner calculated to promote substantial justice. Burlington Ditch, Reservoir &amp; Land Company et al. v. Fort Morgan Reservoir &amp; Irrigation Company et al., 59 Colo. 571, 151 P. 432. Where a default judgment has been entered and it is made to appear that in justice to a defendant he is entitled to be heard, and that the tendered defense, if established, would defeat the action, the trial court should vacate the judgment. Gumaer et al. v. Bell, 51 Colo. 473, 119 P. 681. The generally accepted rule is that, "where application to vacate default judgment is made promptly, a defense on the merits should be permitted." Drinkard et al. v. Spencer, 72 Colo. 396, 211 P. 379. Numerous opinions of this court announce the rule that the granting or denial of an application to vacate a default rests in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and to warrant a reversal it must appear that there was an abuse of that discretion. See Ehrlinger v. Parker, 137 Colo. 514, 327 P.2d 267, and cases there cited. It is stated in that case, in which personal service was had upon the defendant, that: *423 In the instant case the defendant made a very strong showing that the facts relied upon as a defense "would result in a judgment materially different than the judgment entered." The record before us is heavily weighted in support of the motion to vacate the judgment and in the language of this court in Calkins v. Smalley, 88 Colo. 227, 294 P. 534, The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to set aside the order denying the Motion for Relief from Judgment, and for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed.