Title: Lang v. Cruz
Citation: 394 P.2d 988, 74 N.M. 473
Docket Number: 7402
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: August 24, 1964

394 P.2d 988 (1964) 74 N.M. 473 William H. LANG and Francis X. Murphy, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Alfonso Martinez CRUZ and Clancy Gomez, Defendants-Appellees. No. 7402. Supreme Court of New Mexico. August 24, 1964. *989 J. Lee Cathey, Carlsbad, Bean &amp; Snead, Roswell, for appellants. Brown &amp; Brainerd, Roswell, for appellees. CHAVEZ, Justice. Appellants, William H. Lang and Francis X. Murphy, plaintiffs in the court below, appeal from a summary judgment in favor of appellee Clancy Gomez. Appellants amended complaint, which is in two counts, alleged that on July 23, 1962, at about 8:55 p.m., appellants were riding in a pickup truck driven by Zackay T. Robinson in a northerly direction on U.S. Highway 285 at a point about 3.3 miles south of Dexter, New Mexico; that appellee Alfonso Martinez Cruz was driving a farm tractor owned by appellee Gomez and so negligently operated the tractor as to cause a head-on collision between the vehicle driven by Robinson and a vehicle driven by one Francisco Chaves Solis; that at the time of the accident, appellee Cruz was employed by appellee Gomez and was driving the tractor in the course and scope of his employment; that as a proximate result of the negligence of appellee Cruz, appellants received severe and permanent injuries. Each appellant also alleged that the manner of operation of the tractor by appellee Cruz, at the time and place and under the circumstances, was unlawful, reckless and grossly negligent. In separate answers, appellees Cruz and Gomez admitted the residence of the parties, the time and place of the accident and that appellee Cruz was employed by appellee Gomez, but denied all other allegations contained in appellants' complaint. Appellee Gomez then filed a motion for summary judgment, stating as grounds: That appellants seek recovery against him as the employer of appellee Cruz; that on the day of the accident and at all times material, appellee Cruz was employed as a farm laborer for the purposes of irrigating, chopping and picking cotton; that appellee Cruz was expressly instructed by appellee Gomez not to operate farm machinery of any type, including tractors, at any time; that on the date of the accident and at all times material, appellee Cruz was acting outside the scope of his employment in operating any tractor belonging to appellee Gomez; that, as shown by the depositions on file and affidavits attached, appellee Cruz was operating appellee Gomez' tractor without the knowledge or consent of Gomez, either express or implied, and in direct violation of express instructions by Gomez; that the pleadings on file show the injuries and damages complained of occurred at a point some distance from the place of employment of Cruz, said point being well outside the area of employment. Attached to the motion for summary judgment were affidavits by appellees Cruz and Gomez relating the following: Alfonso Martinez Cruz is a Mexican National who *990 was employed by Clancy Gomez as an agricultural worker, whose duties consisted of irrigation of alfalfa, chopping and picking cotton, and stacking bales of hay; that in November or December, 1961, all Mexican Nationals in the employ of appellee Gomez were instructed by Gomez that they were prohibited from operating any farm machinery, including tractors; that these instructions were repeated by the Chaves County Farm and Livestock Bureau, Inc., who, in January 1962, asked all Mexican Nationals who worked for Gomez to sign a form, printed in both English and Spanish, stating that they understood that they were not to drive any farm machinery, tractors or other equipment of a related nature. On July 23, 1962, the date of the accident, appellee Cruz and another Mexican National, Jose Cardona Gallegos, were taken to the alfalfa field at about 6:00 p.m. and instructed to irrigate until about 11:00 p.m., when appellee Gomez would return and they would assist Gomez in baling hay. While irrigating, Cruz found that one of his boots had developed a rip in the heel causing a leak. Gallegos told Cruz that there was another pair of boots at the "bracero" headquarters, about a mile and a half distant. Appellee Cruz, in his affidavit, states: On January 8, 1963, appellants filed a response to the motion for summary judgment, in which they reiterated their position that appellee Cruz was acting within the scope of his employment, even though it may have been in disobedience of express instructions of appellee Gomez. On January 11, 1963, a hearing was held on this motion, in which appellants introduced the transcript of an inquest held over the bodies of Francisco Chaves Solis and Erminda Salazar; and the depositions of appellees Cruz and Gomez which had been taken in cause No. 26026 in the district court of Chaves County, entitled Enadine Romero, Administratrix et al v. Zackay T. Robinson, et al. The transcript of the inquest held July 24, 1962, reveals that appellee Cruz was called as a witness and testified as follows: In his deposition, appellee Cruz, after testifying as to his job experience and ability as a driver of motor vehicles, stated: On cross-examination, appellee Cruz further testified: Based upon these affidavits, depositions and transcript of the inquest, the trial court granted summary judgment to appellee Gomez and made the following finding of fact: Appeal timely followed with appellants relying on one point for reversal, to-wit: Appellants rely principally upon White Auto Stores, Inc. v. Reyes, (10 CCA 1955), 223 F.2d 298, which, they contend, stands for the proposition that a servant, even though he commits an act specifically forbidden by his master, may be acting within the scope of his employment. In White Auto Stores, Inc. v. Reyes, supra, the court, relying upon Childers v. Southern Pacific Company, 20 N.M. 366, 149 P. 307, said: Thus appellants argue that, although appellee Cruz took the tractor in violation of his orders, he took it to get hay hooks, and that this, under the White Auto Stores definition, raises an inference that the intent of appellee Cruz was to further his master's interest. They assert, as stated in White Auto Stores, Inc. v. Reyes, supra, that the question of whether a servant was acting within the scope of his employment when an accident occurs as a result of his negligence is a question of fact. Therefore, they say that, under our rule for summary judgment, as set out in Hewitt-Robins, Inc., Robins Conveyors Division v. Lea County Sand and Gravel, Inc., 70 N.M. 144, 371 P.2d 795, the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment. However, even under the rule as announced in that case, where, as here, there is no dispute concerning the facts, it is not error for the trial court, in passing on a motion for summary judgment, to determine whether a finding based thereon, that the conduct was within the scope of employment, could be supported in law. If the answer is in the negative, the trial court's action in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee Gomez must be affirmed. In the Childers case, appellant railroad company employed a watchman whose duties were to watch and guard the yards, prevent trespasses, and prevent trespassers from boarding trains. Plaintiff-appellee started to go from the business district of Deming across the railroad yards to the *993 depot to see his landlord. Appellee was accosted in the yards by the watchman, who accused him of being a trespasser. Upon appellee's denial, the watchman knocked him to the ground, severely beat him, and procured appellee's arrest. The question was raised as to whether or not the watchman was acting within the scope of his employment and, in affirming the district court, Chief Justice Roberts stated the following definition of "course of employment," as taken from Vol. 2, Mechem on Agency, 2d Ed., § 1960: We again refer to the above authority and note that § 1960 of Mechem on Agency is a subsection under the following classifications: The Childers' definition has been applied in its entirety only where there has been a wilful or malicious act by the servant. In Archuleta v. Floersheim Mercantile Co., 25 N.M. 632, 187 P. 272, 40 A.L.R. 199, it was contended that the servant intentionally started a fire; in Gutierrez v. Montosa Sheep Co., 25 N.M. 540, 185 P. 273, the tortious act was a trespass and a conversion; in Miera v. George, 55 N.M. 535, 237 P.2d 102, the tortious act was an assault and battery; and in McFatridge v. Harlem Globe Trotters, 69 N.M. 271, 365 P.2d 918, 89 A.L.R.2d 1154, plaintiff contended that defendant negligently failed to protect him from the intentional throw of a basketball by one of defendant's employees. In Massey v. Beacon Supply Company, 70 N.M. 149, 371 P.2d 798, we noted the close similarity between the test for re-entry into employment and the Childers test, both tests requiring the common element of intention to serve the master's business. See also, Restatement of the Law, 2d Ed., Agency, § 237. In Mechem on Agency, Ch. V, supra, "3. Liability for Negligent Act of Servant or Agent, § 1879," we note the following quotation: Restatement of the Law, 2d Ed., Agency, § 229, gives the following test in determining what conduct is within the scope of employment: See also, Silva v. Haake, 56 N.M. 497, 245 P.2d 835. The question before us, however, is not a question of the liability of a master for his servant's wilful or malicious acts; nor is it a question of the master's liability for a servant who has deviated and now seeks to re-enter his scope of employment; nor is it even a question of applying a test for determining what conduct comes within the scope of employment. We have here before us the question of the scope of employment of appellee Cruz, who disobeyed his master's instructions as to the operation of farm machinery. In 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 570d(9), p. 312, the rule is stated as follows: In Stone v. Commonwealth Coal Co., 259 Mass. 360, 156 N.E. 737, plaintiffs were injured by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle driven by one McDonnell, who was employed as a nightwatchman, in cleaning up the yard, and whatever odd jobs he was asked to do by his superior. He had no duty to drive cars outside defendant's coal yard. On the day of the accident: Trial was held and a verdict rendered for plaintiffs, which was set aside and verdicts entered for defendants. In affirming the trial court's action, the supreme court of Massachusetts said: In Rose v. Gisi, 139 Neb. 593, 298 N.W. 333, the employer Gisi ordered his truck driver Carter not to permit one Wascher to drive the employer's truck on a trip. Carter disobeyed his employer and permitted Wascher, who had been employed as a loader, to drive. An accident resulted and suit was brought against Gisi, Carter and Wascher. Judgment was for plaintiff and, on appeal, the employer and the truck driver Carter won a reversal, while the judgment as to Wascher was affirmed. The court said: Accord, Nelson v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 154 Neb. 199, 47 N.W.2d 432; Anno. 166 A.L.R. 877. The evidence clearly shows, and there is no dispute, that all Mexican Nationals were forbidden by law to operate farm machinery after January 1962, and appellee Gomez had given orders accordingly; that appellee Cruz was aware of these orders and knowingly violated them; and that this was the first time he had disobeyed this particular order. We, therefore, hold that the driving of a tractor by appellee Cruz was clearly outside those classes of service for which appellee Cruz was employed to perform and, even though by the testimony an inference could be raised that appellee Cruz was attempting to further his master's business by going for hay hooks, unquestionably such actions were outside the scope of employment and the master could not be held liable. Appellants, in their brief, contend there is a split of authority in this jurisdiction regarding the scope of employment; however, the cases cited by appellants for a contrary view all depend upon the master furnishing his servant a dangerous instrumentality and are not applicable in the instant case. There being no error, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. It is so ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and MOISE, J., concur.