Title: Barber v. State
Citation: 703 So. 2d 314
Docket Number: 1952062, 1952094
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 1997

703 So. 2d 314 (1997)
Norman BARBER, et al.
v.
STATE of Alabama, et al.
Ben JERNIGAN
v.
STATE of Alabama, et al.
1952062, 1952094.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 27, 1997.
Rehearing Denied August 22, 1997.
*316 John W. Parker and Herndon Inge III, Mobile, for appellants.
Jerry L. Weidler and R. Mitchell Alton III, Counsel, State of Alabama Highway Department, for State.
Carroll H. Sullivan and Jannea S. Rogers of Clark, Scott &amp; Sullivan, P.C., Mobile, for P &amp; H Construction Company.
Tabor R. Novak, Jr. and E. Hamilton Wilson, Jr. of Ball, Ball, Matthews &amp; Novak, P.A., Montgomery, for appellees.
HOUSTON, Justice.
The plaintiffs, Norman Barber, Brenda Barber, Wharfhouse Restaurant and Oyster Bar, Inc., and Ben Jernigan, appeal from a summary judgment for the defendants, the Alabama Department of Transportation ("the State") and McInnis Corporation ("McInnis"), in two consolidated actions for damages brought pursuant to Article I, § 23, and Article III, § 235, of the Alabama Constitution for a taking of, injury to, or destruction of private property for public use and for damages for tortious conduct. (One action was filed by Norman Barber, Brenda Barber, and Wharfhouse Restaurant and Oyster Bar, Inc.; the other action was filed by Ben Jernigan.) We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
On a motion for a summary judgment, the burden is initially on the movant to make a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In order to defeat a movant's properly supported summary judgment motion, the nonmovant must present sufficient evidence to create a factual issue for resolution by the factfinder. On review of a summary judgment, this Court reviews the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolves all reasonable doubts against the movant. Blackburn v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 652 So. 2d 1140 (Ala.1994).
On February 27, 1987, Brenda Barber purchased the Wharfhouse Restaurant and Oyster Bar ("the restaurant") and the land on which it is located. This waterfront restaurant, located in Mobile County, is primarily a wooden structure, supported by piles driven deep into the sandy soil. Brenda Barber's husband, Norman Barber, contributed funds toward the purchase of the property, and he joined his wife as a plaintiff; however, the record indicates that Brenda Barber was the sole purchaser.
On August 4, 1987, Brenda Barber transferred her ownership interest in the property to Wharfhouse Restaurant and Oyster Bar, Inc. ("the corporation"), which had been formed to assume the liabilities and operation of the restaurant. In March 1992, after Brenda Barber had learned that the State was planning to build a bridge on property adjacent to the restaurant property, the corporation leased the property to Ben Jernigan. Jernigan, who was also given an option to purchase the property, was aware when he entered into the lease that the construction of a bridge nearby was a possibility, although he believed, based on erroneous information he had received from a representative of the State, that construction would not begin soon. In fact, plans for construction were underway. The State ultimately contracted *317 with McInnis to build the bridge. McInnis contracted with P &amp; H Construction Company, Inc. ("the subcontractor"), to perform the initial pile-driving operations to form the footings for the placement of the bridge structure. The State required that the piledriving operations conform to the project's plans and specifications. Construction of the bridge, including the installation of test piles, got underway in late 1992. The pile-driving operations subjected the restaurant to extensive vibration. Other construction activities also significantly hindered Jernigan's ability to operate the restaurant. By September 1994, Jernigan was forced to close the restaurant, and it has been vacant since.
The construction of the bridge, according to the plaintiffs, caused physical damage to the restaurant, the destruction of the restaurant as a viable business, and the diminution of the value of the property as a whole. The plaintiffs' claims against the State were based in part on allegations that the State had to compensate them under § 23 and § 235 of the Alabama Constitution for the "taking" of their respective property interests, and in part on allegations that the State was liable in damages for negligence or wantonness in connection with the construction of the bridge and on allegations that the State was liable for willful injury to their property interests.[1] The plaintiffs' claims against McInnis were based on allegations of negligent, wanton, or willful injury to the property. The plaintiffs requested a jury trial on each of their claims. The dispositive issue is whether there are any factual questions that must be resolved by a jury.
Initially, we note that the summary judgment for the State was proper as to the claims of Brenda and Norman Barber. An inverse condemnation action must be brought by the owner of the property affected or by someone with a property interest; in this case, that would have been the corporation (Wharfhouse Restaurant and Oyster Bar, Inc.) or Ben Jernigan. See State v. Woodham, 288 Ala. 608, 614, 264 So. 2d 166, 171 (1972) ("The basic constitutional principle is that there must be an actual taking of property or property rights before compensation is required."); see, also, Ala.Code 1975, § 18-1A-3(6), part of the Alabama Eminent Domain Code (defining "condemnee" as "[a] person who has or claims an interest in property that is the subject of a prospective or pending condemnation action"). We also note that § 235 of the Alabama Constitution requires municipalities and other corporations "invested with the privilege of taking property for public use" to make "just compensation" for "property taken, injured, or destroyed by the construction or enlargement of its works, highways, or improvements," where there is evidence of some direct physical damage to the property. Jefferson County v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 621 So. 2d 1282 (Ala.1993). Section 235 does not apply to the State. Finnell v. Pitts, 222 Ala. 290, 132 So. 2 (1930). The summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' § 235 claims was, therefore, proper, and, in fact, the plaintiffs concede this in their briefs. Finally, it is well established that tort claims against the State, such as those made here (based on allegations of negligence, wantonness, and willfulness), are barred by the sovereign immunity granted under Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution. See Hutchinson v. Board of Trustees of University of Alabama, 288 Ala. 20, 23, 256 So. 2d 281, 283 (1971) (noting that "[t]his Court, construing Section 14, has held almost every conceivable type of suit to be within the constitutional prohibition"). For exceptions to the sovereign immunity doctrine, including the exception made for inverse condemnation actions against the State, see Williams v. Hank's Ambulance Service, Inc., 699 So. 2d 1230 (Ala.1997).
The principal argument of the plaintiffs (the corporation and Jernigan) is that they have valid claims against the State under § 23 of the Alabama Constitution. Section 23 provides in pertinent part that *318 "private property shall not be taken for, or applied to public use, unless just compensation be first made therefor." In Foreman v. State, 676 So. 2d 303 (Ala.1995), this Court rejected the State's argument that there can be no "taking" within the meaning of § 23 unless the State actually occupies or engages in construction activities on the affected property. This Court, quoting Jefferson County v. Southern Natural Gas, supra, at 1287, stated: "[I]n inverse condemnation actions, a governmental authority need only occupy or injure the property in question." 676 So. 2d  at 305. (Emphasis in Foreman.) The State contends that there is insufficient evidence in the record from which a jury could reasonably find that the construction of the bridge caused compensable damage to the plaintiffs' property interests. After reviewing the record, we must disagree.
Ben Jernigan testified by deposition as follows:
Joe Lamar, a retired employee of the Mobile District of the Corps of Engineers, who had experience in determining the effect of vibrations on soil, testified by deposition:
Although he expressed no opinion as to whether the pile-driving operations had actually damaged the restaurant, Bill Phillips, an architect, stated in his deposition that it was his opinion that the damage to the restaurant could have been caused by the kind of piledriving operations that were conducted by the State:
The record also contains two reports and an internal memorandum prepared by Clark, Geer, Latham, &amp; Associates, Inc., an engineering firm that Jernigan hired to conduct a structural investigation of the restaurant. These documents indicate that the restaurant began to show signs of structural stress (cracks, leaks) after the construction on the bridge was commenced. One report, dated August 16, 1993, states: "Based on our new survey, the restaurant has experienced differential movements varying from 1/2" to 3/4" which appears to have primarily occurred in the south portion of the structure."
Based on the above, we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to create factual questions for a jury as to whether the restaurant was physically damaged as a result of the construction of the bridge, and, if so, to what extent, and as to whether the bridge construction caused the restaurant to go out of business. Compensation in a condemnation proceeding, where, as here, only a part of the property is "taken" (damaged) for a public purpose, is computed by taking the difference between the fair market value of the entire parcel immediately before the "taking" (damage) and the value of the part remaining after the "taking" (damage). State v. Woodham, supra. It is the generally accepted rule that insofar as a building adds to the fair market value of the land, it must be considered in determining the amount of compensation owed. State v. Woodham. This Court has held that unless otherwise provided by statute, the loss of a business, as such, is not compensable in condemnation proceedings[3]; however, the existence of a business is a factor to be considered in determining the highest and best use of the land upon which it is conducted. State v. Woodham, 288 Ala. at 610-11, 264 So. 2d  at 168; Harco Drug, Inc. v. Notsla, Inc., 382 So. 2d 1 (Ala.1980) (noting that although loss of a business is not compensable, income derived from a business on the condemned property is nonetheless a factor that may be considered in arriving at the fair market value of the land). In State v. Atkins, 439 So. 2d 128, 131 (Ala.1983), this Court noted that "[i]n determining the fair market value of a parcel taken by eminent domain, consideration should be given to any factors which a reasonably prudent buyer would consider before purchasing the property."
Based on the above, we conclude that the summary judgment was improper with respect to the plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claims against the State under § 23 of the Alabama Constitution. Sufficient evidence was presented to allow a jury to determine whether the construction of the bridge damaged the restaurant and otherwise diminished the fair market value of the property and, if so, to determine the amount of "just compensation" due for that damage. The compensation, if any, awarded by the jury should be allocated between the owner *323 (the corporation) and the lessee (Jernigan) in accordance with the "undivided fee rule," which was discussed in Harco Drug, Inc. v. Notsla, Inc., supra, 382 So.2d at 5:
The plaintiffs' claims against McInnis were based on allegations that McInnis had acted negligently or wantonly in certain aspects of its construction activities, that those activities had proximately caused damage to the property, and that McInnis had willfully damaged the property. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that because Brenda Barber and Norman Barber owned no interest in the property, the summary judgment was proper with respect to their tort claims against McInnis. We also conclude that there was insufficient evidence to submit the corporation and Jernigan's willfulness claims to a jury and, therefore, that the summary judgment was proper as to those claims. We further conclude that there was insufficient evidence to submit the negligence and wantonness claims to a jury, to the extent that those claims were based on damage that may have been done to the property by the pile-driving operations performed by the subcontractor. The undisputed evidence indicates that the pile-driving conformed to generally accepted pile-driving practices. Even the plaintiffs' soil expert, Joe Lamar, agreed that the pile-driving was not negligently performed:
Accordingly, the summary judgment was also proper with respect to the claims based on allegations of negligence or wantonness in connection with the pile-driving.
However, we cannot say that there was insufficient evidence of negligence or wantonness on McInnis's part with respect to other construction activities. As noted above, Jernigan testified in his affidavit *324 that McInnis had periodically cut off utility service to his restaurant (i.e., electric, water, and telephone service); that water and mud had been diverted from the construction site onto the restaurant's parking area; that McInnis's employees had repeatedly parked their vehicles in the restaurant parking area, using valuable customer parking space; that McInnis had deposited construction materials, garbage, and other debris onto the restaurant property; that McInnis had repeatedly blocked access to the restaurant during the restaurant's business hours; and that McInnis had dug up the only driveway providing access to the restaurant and had diverted customer traffic onto a newly built service road that provided only limited access from the main road, Dauphin Island Parkway. We consider this evidence sufficient to present a jury question as to whether McInnis acted with reasonable care in its construction of the bridge and, if not, whether the failure to do so proximately caused damage to the plaintiffs. Furthermore, we view Jernigan's testimony that he had repeatedly called McInnis's attention to many of these problems to be sufficient to allow a jury to consider the plaintiffs' wantonness claims.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment for the State and McInnis is affirmed in part and reversed in part and the cause is remanded.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
HOOPER, C.J., and KENNEDY, COOK, and SEE, JJ., concur.
[1]  We note that the plaintiffs did not sue the subcontractor. McInnis filed a third-party complaint against the subcontractor, seeking indemnification in the event it was held liable to the plaintiffs for damage caused by the pile-driving operations. The trial court also entered a summary judgment for the subcontractor.
[2]  As previously noted, other evidence indicates that installation of test piles began in late 1992.
[3]  Section 18-1A-32(b), provides:

"The judgment and any settlement in an inverse condemnation action awarding or allowing compensation to the plaintiff for the taking or damaging of property by a condemnor shall include the plaintiffs' litigation expenses."
Contrary to the plaintiffs' assertions, we do not view this provision as a clear legislative authorization for the direct recovery of damages for the loss of a business.