Title: Carter v. Carter
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 333, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 9, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TROY J. CARTER,  
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
PAMELA J. CARTER,  
 
Respondent Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 333, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  File No. CS96-03382 
§  Petition No. 04-29487 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: November 4, 2005 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: March 9, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en banc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R1  
 
 
This 9th day of March 2006, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The petitioner-appellant, Troy J. Carter (“Father”), filed an 
appeal from the Family Court’s July 7, 2005 order, which modified a Family 
Court commissioner’s order that established the child support obligation of 
respondent-appellee, Pamela J. Carter (“Mother”).  Because the Family 
Court committed legal error, we REVERSE and REMAND this matter to the 
Family Court for further proceedings in accordance with this Order. 
                                                 
1 The Court has sua sponte assigned pseudonyms to the parties and their minor children.  
Supr. Ct. R. 7(d). 
 
2
 
(2) 
 Father and Mother are the parents of two daughters, Hannah, 
age 16, and Leslie, age 13.  In October 2002, pursuant to a consent custody 
order, Father was given primary residential custody of Hannah.  In 
December 2002, a Family Court commissioner entered an order setting 
Mother’s support obligation at $93 per month,2 which was made retroactive 
to the date of mediation. 
 
(3) 
In August 2004, again pursuant to a consent custody order, 
Father also was given primary residential custody of Leslie.  In September 
2004, Father filed a petition for support, which the parties agree was served 
on Mother by regular mail.3  Following mediation in November 2004, the 
parties entered into a consent order providing that Mother would pay $896 
per month in current support on behalf of both children.    
 
(4) 
A hearing was held before a Family Court commissioner in 
January 2005.  The commissioner determined that Mother should pay a total 
of $996 per month in child support, representing $896 in current support and 
$100 in arrears.  The commissioner also determined that Father was entitled 
to retroactive support, but only as of the date of the mediation.    
                                                 
2 This amount reflected support arrears owed by Father during the time Hannah’s primary 
residence was with Mother. 
3 While the petition was filed in the interest of both children, it was characterized as a 
petition for “support” rather than a petition for “modification of support.”  In addition, 
Father’s counsel had checked the box that requested support “. . . up to a maximum of 
two years prior to the date of filing . . . .” 
 
3
 
(5) 
Father appealed the commissioner’s order to a judge of the 
Family Court on the ground that Mother should be required to pay 
retroactive support beginning at the time of Leslie’s change of residence in 
May 2004.4  In its order dated July 7, 2005, the Family Court held that 
Father was not entitled to any retroactive support under this Court’s decision 
in Taylor v. Taylor, 672 A.2d 44, 50 (Del. 1996).5  The Family Court 
modified the commissioner’s determination of Mother’s child support 
obligation and gave her a credit for her overpayment of child support 
between the date of the mediation and the date of the commissioner’s order.6            
 
(6) 
In this appeal, Father claims that the Family Court’s order was 
based on an error of law and constituted an abuse of discretion.  According 
to Father, the Family Court should have ordered Mother to pay child support 
retroactive to the date Leslie came to live with him because Mother, who 
had consented to Leslie’s change of residence, was on notice that she would 
be obligated to pay additional child support for Leslie as of that date.     
                                                 
4 Father also claimed that the commissioner erred by ordering him to provide Mother, as 
the “support recipient,” with all documentation concerning the children’s health 
insurance coverage. 
5 In Taylor, this Court held that, under Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 513(d) (2), service by 
regular mail of a petition for prospective modification of support is sufficient notice to a 
support obligor, but that a petition for retrospective modification of support requires 
service by certified or registered mail.  
6 The judge also agreed with Father that the commissioner had incorrectly referred to 
Mother as the “support recipient.”     
 
4
 
(7) 
The Family Court reviews de novo those portions of a 
commissioner’s order to which objection is made and may accept, reject or 
modify the order in whole or in part, and may receive further evidence or 
remand the matter to the commissioner with instructions.7  This Court’s 
review of appeals from the Family Court extends to review of the facts and 
the law.8  If the Family Court has applied the law correctly and has made no 
factual finding that is clearly wrong, the standard of review is abuse of 
discretion.9 
 
(8) 
Following a careful review of the record, we conclude that the 
Family Court erroneously applied this Court’s ruling in Taylor to the facts of 
this case.  The record reflects that the purpose of Father’s support petition, 
which followed Mother’s consent to Leslie’s change of residence, was to 
request additional support from Mother on behalf of Leslie.  The petition did 
not request a modification of the support that Mother already was providing 
for Hannah, rendering the Taylor case inapposite.  Under the relevant 
Delaware case law, it is within the discretion of the Family Court to award 
support retroactively for up to two years prior to the date on which the 
                                                 
7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 915(d) (1); Fam. Ct. Civ. Proc. R. 53.1(e). 
8 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
9 Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185, 186 (Del. 1991). 
 
5
petition for support was filed.10  In this case, the Family Court had discretion 
to award Father retroactive support on behalf of Leslie for up to two years 
prior to September 2004, when Father filed his support petition.11  
 
(9) 
Because the Family Court relied on an inapposite Delaware 
case in modifying the commissioner’s order, the matter must be remanded to 
the Family Court for reconsideration of the commissioner’s order in light of 
the appropriate legal authority.12 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that this matter is hereby 
REVERSED and REMANDED to the Family Court for further proceedings 
in accordance with this Order.  Jurisdiction is not retained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
                                                 
10 Snader v. Dudley, Del. Supr., No. 73, 1999, Berger, J. (Sept. 29, 1999) (citing Patricia 
M.D. v. Alexis I.D., 442 A.2d 952, 955-56 (Del. 1982)). 
11 Moreover, we find no impropriety in Father serving Mother with the support petition by 
mail, given that the Family Court already had exercised its jurisdiction over a number of 
ancillary matters stemming from Mother’s and Father’s divorce. 
12 We find no error with respect to the Family Court’s determination that the 
commissioner incorrectly referred to Mother as the “support recipient.”