Title: P. v. Nakahara
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S018292
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: May 22, 2003

1
Filed 5/22/03 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S018292 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
EVAN TEEK NAKAHARA, 
) 
Super. Ct. No. NA000163 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Defendant Evan Teek Nakahara appeals from a judgment of the Los 
Angeles County Superior Court imposing the death penalty following his 
conviction of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187),1 burglary (§ 459), and 
robbery (§ 211), accompanied by special circumstance findings that he committed 
the murder while lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)), and while engaged in the 
commission of burglary (id., former subd. (a)(17)(i)) and robbery (id., former 
subd. (a)(17)(vii)).  The jury also found defendant used a firearm (§§ 1203.06, 
12022.5) but was not personally armed (§ 12022) during these crimes.  
Defendant’s appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  As will appear, we will 
affirm the judgment in its entirety.   
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
2
I.  FACTS 
Defendant and Michael Rojas were jointly charged with murdering Beatrice 
Viveiros on July 11, 1989.  The trial court ordered the cases severed for trial.  The 
evidence in the present case showed that defendant had been dating Viveiros for 
several years, and had admired a gun collection owned by her father.  Defendant 
had earlier joked with his friend Edwin Skinner about planning to steal the guns 
and “doing away” with Viveiros after the theft.  On the day of the murder, 
defendant and Rojas visited Viveiros’s house around 1:15 p.m. and defendant 
asked her to help him back his car into the garage and empty his car trunk.  After 
the job was done, Viveiros closed the garage door on his car, angering him.   
According to Viveiros’s friend Kim Austin, when Austin left at 2:45 p.m., 
Viveiros was alive and in the company of defendant and Rojas.  Viveiros’s father 
arrived at the house around 4:30 p.m. and found his daughter’s lifeless body on a 
hallway floor.  His guns were missing, along with various war memorabilia such 
as pins, certificates and war ration cards.  Viveiros had been shot three times in the 
back and once beneath her left ear; each wound probably would have been fatal.   
On the same day, around 3:34 p.m., defendant asked a friend’s sister, Debra 
Helm, if her brother would be interested in buying some guns, and she said “no.”  
Later, between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m., defendant called his friend Steven Jurich and 
asked if he knew anyone who wanted to buy a gold-plated Winchester rifle.  
Jurich, not knowing of Viveiros’s death, told defendant he knew no one who 
might be interested.  Around the same time, John Calvert arrived at defendant’s 
house.  Defendant showed him the guns and admitted shooting a girl three times at 
point-blank range.  Defendant also told Calvert that Rojas shot her one time.  
Thereafter, defendant approached his uncle, Todd Kawabata and sold him some of 
the war memorabilia he had taken.  Defendant also visited his friend Mitch 
Zankich and offered to sell him some guns, but Zankich declined the offer.   
 
3
Investigating officers went to defendant’s apartment and discovered a large 
collection of weapons later identified as belonging to Viveiros’s father.  Defendant 
and Calvert were arrested and placed in custody.  Defendant, after first denying 
involvement, eventually told interrogating officers that he shot Viveiros following 
a quarrel over some bad checks she had deposited to his account.   Defendant 
admitted taking the guns to make the shooting appear to be motivated by robbery.  
At the penalty phase, the prosecution introduced evidence that in October 
1989, prison guards found a 12-inch metal shank concealed in defendant’s cell.  
The defense offered various background and character witnesses including a 
cultural anthropologist, defendant’s parents, and his uncle.  This evidence tended 
to show that defendant had a difficult childhood, and was raised by a passive, 
nonnurturing father and an overly strict mother, resulting in defendant’s 
depression and aggressive personality.  Defendant himself testified (against advice 
of his counsel), cautioning the jury that persons serving life terms often get into 
more trouble, and telling them he would choose the death penalty if the decision 
were up to him.  He explained on cross-examination that he sought a death penalty 
because he was “worn out” with the court proceedings.  
II.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Murder Instructions  
The information charged defendant with premeditated and deliberate 
murder under section 187, subdivision (a).  At the close of the guilt phase, the jury 
was instructed on premeditated murder, felony murder, and murder by lying in 
wait.  Defendant faults the instructions for their failure to require unanimous 
agreement, beyond a reasonable doubt, as to which of these theories the jury 
accepted.  According to defendant, the omission denied him due process, a verdict 
 
4
rendered beyond a reasonable doubt, and a reliable guilt determination under the 
state and federal Constitutions.  We discern no error. 
Defendant, citing language in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 479, 
footnote 26 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.), finds “confusing” our prior decisions 
regarding the relationship between premeditated murder and felony murder.  But 
our recent cases have clarified any confusion, holding that although the two forms 
of murder have different elements, only a single statutory offense of murder exists.  
Felony murder and premeditated murder are not distinct crimes, and need not be 
separately pleaded.  (E.g., People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 369; People v. 
Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1131; People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 367; 
People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 394-395.)  As for defendant’s claim 
that a unanimity instruction should have been given, our cases have repeatedly 
rejected this contention, holding that the jurors need not unanimously agree on a 
theory of first degree murder as either felony murder or murder with premeditation 
and deliberation.  (E.g., Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1132; People v. Lewis (2001) 
25 Cal.4th 610, 654; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1212; People v. Riel 
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1200.)   
We are not persuaded otherwise by Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 
U.S. 466.  There, the United States Supreme Court found a constitutional 
requirement that any fact that increases the maximum penalty for a crime, other 
than a prior conviction, must be formally charged, submitted to the fact finder, 
treated as a criminal element, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Id. at pp. 
476-490.)  We see nothing in Apprendi that would require a unanimous jury 
verdict as to the particular theory justifying a finding of first degree murder.  (See 
also Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 610 [requiring jury finding beyond 
reasonable doubt as to facts essential to punishment].)   
 
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B.  Consciousness of Guilt Instruction  
Evidence at trial showed that during his interrogation defendant initially 
denied complicity in the Viveiros offenses.  The court instructed the jury that it 
could consider any false statements made by defendant as evidence of his 
consciousness of his guilt of the charged offenses, although such conduct alone is 
insufficient to prove guilt, and its weight and significance, if any, are matters for 
the jury.  (See CALJIC No. 2.03.)  Defendant now contends the instruction was 
impermissibly argumentative and improperly allowed the jury to make irrational 
inferences regarding his mental state during the commission of the offenses.   
As defendant acknowledges, we have rejected similar arguments in prior 
cases. (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 375, and cases cited; People v. 
Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1223-1224; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 
1060, 1140-1141; People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 128.)  We see no 
reason to reconsider the soundness of these decisions.  Defendant relies on People 
v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, but that case is inapposite for it involved no 
consciousness of guilt instruction but merely deemed improper and unduly 
argumentative a proposed defense instruction that would have invited the jury to 
“infer the existence of [the defendant’s] version of the facts, rather than his theory 
of defense.”  (Id. at p. 437.) 
C.  Reasonable Doubt and Related Instructions  
Defendant finds asserted defects in various instructions outlining the 
People’s burden of proof.  These claims lack merit.   
The court gave several related instructions (CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.02, and 
8.83) essentially telling the jurors they had a duty to accept the reasonable 
interpretation of evidence and reject the unreasonable interpretation.  Defendant 
asserts that these instructions were contrary to the basic “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” principle and enabled the jurors to find him guilty “if he reasonably 
 
6
appeared guilty,” regardless of any reasonable doubt they might entertain.  
Defendant characterizes these instructions as creating “an impermissible 
mandatory conclusive presumption of guilt,” in cases in which a reasonable 
interpretation of evidence points toward guilt.  Defendant believes these 
instructions “had the effect of reversing the burden of proof,” requiring the jury to 
find him guilty unless he came forward with reasonable evidence of his innocence.   
As the Attorney General correctly observes, we have recently rejected these 
contentions, and we see no reason to reconsider them.  (People v. Riel, supra, 22 
Cal.4th at p. 1200; People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 160; People v. 
Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 144.)    
Defendant also suggests that other instructions (CALJIC Nos. 1.00 
[defendant’s arrest and prosecution not used to infer he is “more likely to be guilty 
than not guilty”] and 2.51 [presence of motive may establish guilt]) misled the jury 
by failing to reiterate that the central issue in the case was not simply guilt or 
innocence, but whether guilt had been demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Again, we have recently rejected the argument.  (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 
894, 957-958.) 
Defendant argues that another instruction (CALJIC No. 2.21.2) 
“impermissibly lightened” the People’s proof burden by telling the jury it should 
distrust, and could reject, the entire testimony of a witness who has given willfully 
false material testimony, unless the jury believes that “the probability of truth” 
favors the testimony.  Defendant contends this instruction “allowed the jury to 
assess prosecution witnesses by seeking only a probability of truth in their 
testimony.”  But as we have held, the targeted instruction says no such thing.  
(People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 493; People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th 
at p. 1200.) 
 
7
Defendant complains of an instruction (CALJIC No. 2.22) advising the 
jurors to evaluate the evidence by looking at its “convincing force” rather than the 
“relative number” of testifying witnesses.  Defendant argues that the instruction 
improperly “replaced” the beyond reasonable doubt standard with a standard akin 
to a preponderance of evidence standard.  Although we have not considered the 
point, we adopt the reasoning of Court of Appeal cases holding that CALJIC No. 
2.22 is appropriate and unobjectionable when, as here, it is accompanied by the 
usual instructions on reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence, and the 
People’s burden of proof (see CALJIC No. 2.90).  (People v. Clay (1984) 153 
Cal.App.3d 433, 461-462; People v. Salas (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 151, 155-157.) 
Finally, defendant challenges an instruction (CALJIC No. 8.20) advising 
the jury that premeditation and deliberation “must have been formed upon pre-
existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other condition 
precluding the idea of deliberation . . . .”  (Italics added.)  Defendant suggests that 
the word “precluding” is too strong and could be interpreted as requiring him to 
absolutely preclude the possibility of deliberation, as opposed to merely raising a 
reasonable doubt on that issue.  We have recently approved the foregoing 
instruction without specifically considering defendant’s point.  (See People v. 
Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 148, 151.)  We think that, like CALJIC No. 2.22, this 
instruction is unobjectionable when, as here, it is accompanied by the usual 
instructions on reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence, and the People’s 
burden of proof.  These instructions make it clear that a defendant is not required 
to absolutely preclude the element of deliberation. 
We conclude that defendant’s multifaceted challenge to the court’s 
reasonable doubt and related instructions lacks merit.   
 
8
D.  “Acquittal First” Instructions  
The court instructed the jury on first and second degree murder and 
manslaughter, explaining that the court could not accept a guilty verdict on second 
degree murder unless the jury first unanimously found defendant not guilty of first 
degree murder, and similarly could not accept a manslaughter verdict without an 
initial unanimous finding that he was not guilty of first or second degree murder.  
(CALJIC Nos. 8.75, 17.10.)  Defendant now argues these instructions violated his 
constitutional right to full consideration of all lesser offenses, because “[a] jury 
which is deadlocked on the charged offense must be permitted to render a verdict 
(either conviction or acquittal) on a lesser offense, if they are able to do so.”   
As the Attorney General correctly observes, we have frequently rejected 
this and similar contentions.  (People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1200-1201; 
see People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 308-311; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 
Cal.3d 612, 672-673.)  We see no reason for reconsidering these decisions. 
III.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Voluntariness of Defendant’s Narrative Testimony and Supposed 
“Waiver” of Counsel  
As previously noted, defendant testified at the penalty phase, against the 
advice of his counsel.  He cautioned the jurors that persons serving life terms often 
get into more trouble, and told them he would choose the death penalty if the 
decision were up to him.  Defendant now complains that the trial court failed to 
determine whether he made a knowing and voluntary decision to waive counsel 
and testify against counsel’s advice.  He also argues the trial court failed 
adequately to caution him against giving narrative testimony.  These contentions 
lack merit.   
The record shows that, once defense counsel indicated that defendant 
intended to testify against his advice, the court held a brief hearing to discuss the 
 
9
matter with defendant.  The court first explained to him that although he had the 
right to testify, he might want to reconsider rejecting his counsel’s advice.  The 
court explained that defendant would be subject to cross-examination and limited 
as to the scope of his testimony.  The court then gave him four hours to reconsider 
his position.   
At the close of presentation of other defense witnesses, the court revisited 
the issue, observed again that defendant’s counsel advised him against testifying, 
and explained that he would be subject to cross-examination.  Defendant remained 
adamant that he wished to testify.  The prosecutor, evidently concerned about 
possible appellate claims of incompetent counsel, suggested the court hold a 
“Marsden-type hearing” outside his presence.  (See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 
Cal.3d 118, 123-124.)   
Thereafter, outside the prosecutor’s presence, defense counsel explained to 
the court that his client had not indicated what he intended to say, and that counsel 
was “concerned” defendant might say something “negative” that could be 
exploited on cross-examination.  Counsel, although not agreeing to defendant’s 
tactic, advised him to testify in narrative form, without any questioning from 
defense counsel, as counsel had no idea what the testimony would be.  The court 
asked defendant if he wished to comment regarding his proposed testimony, and 
he replied “[n]ot personally.”  The court asked defendant whether he believed he 
needed the court’s or counsel’s assistance to help him make his statement, or 
whether he could present it without such assistance.  He replied, “Yeah.”  
Following some inaudible whispered conversation between defendant and 
the court, the prosecutor returned to the courtroom and defendant made his 
narrative statement as described above.  
As noted, defendant now contends the court failed to determine whether he 
made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel.  Of course, any such 
 
10
“waiver,” and the consequent absence of counsel, was limited to defendant’s 
narrative statement itself, as his counsel was fully available before and after the 
statement was given, including cross-examination.  Defendant also complains of 
the court’s failure specifically to advise him of his right to counsel’s assistance 
during his testimony, of the dangers of narrative testimony, and of counsel’s 
ability to conduct the direct examination himself, rather than permitting defendant 
to make a narrative statement.   
Our review of the proceedings leads us to conclude that the trial court 
adequately and repeatedly admonished defendant regarding his refusal to follow 
counsel’s advice and the dangers of taking the stand and testifying, and that the 
court committed no error in allowing defendant to exercise his right to address the 
jury.  Defendant had “a fundamental right to testify in his own behalf, even if 
contrary to the advice of counsel.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Guzman (1988) 45 
Cal.3d 915, 962 (Guzman); accord, Rock v. Arkansas (1987) 483 U.S. 44, 49-53; 
People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 534-535.)  Seen in this light, defendant at no 
time before, after, or during his narrative testimony “waived” his right to counsel’s 
assistancehe merely exercised his fundamental right to testify.   
Defendant observes that in Guzman, the trial court gave the defendant a 
panoply of additional warnings prior to his narrative testimony, advising him that 
his testimony would be subject to evidentiary objections, impeachment through 
prior convictions, and possible adverse inferences if he failed to explain or deny 
negative evidence.  The court also explained to the defendant that he had a 
constitutional right not to testify and that no adverse inferences could be drawn 
from his silence.  (Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 941-942.)  We note, however, 
that nowhere in our Guzman opinion did we suggest that such an array of 
admonishments was a necessary or constitutional prerequisite to receiving a 
defendant’s testimony against advice of counsel.   
 
11
We explained in Guzman that because counsel’s assistance was, as here, 
available during all other stages of trial, “it was not necessary that the trial court’s 
warnings about the dangers of self-representation be as complete as would be 
necessary for a defendant who sought to conduct his entire defense.”  (Guzman, 
supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 946.)  Here, as previously observed, defendant’s counsel 
understandably suggested that defendant testify in narrative form without defense 
questioning, because counsel lacked any knowledge of what his client planned to 
say.   
We conclude the trial court did not err in failing more extensively to warn 
defendant regarding the various rights he would forgo in testifying in narrative 
form, or to secure an express waiver of those rights.   
B.  Failure to Conduct Extensive Marsden Hearing 
In a related argument, defendant contends the court erred in failing to hold 
a more extensive Marsden hearing to inquire regarding a possible breakdown in 
defendant’s relationship with his counsel resulting from counsel’s advice not to 
testify at the penalty phase.  In Marsden, we held that a criminal defendant has a 
right to substitute counsel on a proper showing that his constitutional right to 
counsel would otherwise be substantially impaired.  (People v. Marsden, supra, 2 
Cal.3d at p. 123.)  We also held that the defendant is entitled to present evidence 
or argument on the matter of substitute counsel, assuming he has clearly indicated 
that he wants a substitute.  (Id. at pp. 123-124; see People v. Mendosa (2000) 24 
Cal.4th 130, 157; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 281, fn. 8.)   
The Attorney General correctly observes that defendant failed to question 
his counsel’s competence or to request a hearing on the matter.  Our review of the 
record shows only that before testifying, defendant was adamant about doing so, 
contrary to his counsel’s advice, without explaining why, and without requesting 
 
12
new counsel or a hearing on the matter.  Only after testifying, and after all penalty 
phase evidence had been presented, did defendant write a letter to the court 
complaining of a “conflict of interest” with his counsel arising from some phone 
calls defendant claimed he never made, and accusing counsel of not providing him 
with “paperwork” involving some witnesses, matters not shown to be critical to 
the defense.  In this letter, defendant also indicated that counsel seemed 
“uninterested” in reading defendant’s own notes taken from the preliminary 
hearing transcript, that counsel conferred with defendant only “at court,” and that 
defendant was “extremely exhausted both mentally and physically” and unable to 
follow all of the trial testimony.   
The trial court responded to the foregoing letter by telling defendant that 
disagreements with counsel over trial tactics often occur, and that nothing in 
defendant’s letter afforded a ground for relief, although he could raise such 
matters in a motion for new trial at the conclusion of the case.  No such motion 
was filed.   
Defendant now asserts that the trial court erred in failing to hold an 
additional hearing to explore whether to order a substitution of counsel prior to 
presentation of closing arguments.  He relies primarily on the fact that defense 
counsel indicated he opposed defendant’s decision to testify, having no knowledge 
of the nature of his proposed testimony, but we have held that such a “conflict” 
regarding tactical matters neither justifies substitution of counsel nor signals a 
fundamental breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.  (People v. Welch 
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 728-729; People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 282.)  As 
for the vague allegations in defendant’s letter, at most they reflect a difference of 
opinion over trial tactics and some generalized complaints regarding counsel’s 
performance, rather than a request for new counsel based on specific facts 
showing a deterioration of the attorney-client relationship.  (See People v. Padilla 
 
13
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 926-927; People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 281-
283.)  We conclude the court did not err in failing to hold a more extensive 
Marsden hearing at close of trial.   
C.  Effect of Defendant’s Testimony on the Jury’s Verdict  
Defendant next argues that his own testimony (“if it was my choice, not the 
jurors, I would have picked the death penalty”) rendered the ensuing death 
judgment constitutionally unreliable.  As previously noted, however, every 
defendant in a death case has the right to testify, even if contrary to counsel’s 
advice, and even if that testimony indicates a preference for the death penalty.  
(People v. Webb, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 534-535; Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 
961-963.)  Defendant gives us no reason to reconsider those decisions.  The jurors 
in this case were properly instructed that their duty was to decide the appropriate 
penalty, based on the law and the evidence, and defense counsel’s closing 
arguments confirmed that principle and expressed skepticism about defendant’s 
asserted preference for death.  We find no error in permitting defendant to testify 
as to his preference for the death penalty.   
D.  Instructions Concerning Deadly Weapon in Jail Cell  
The prosecutor introduced evidence that defendant hid a metal “shank” in 
the corner of his jail cell.  Accordingly, the trial court instructed the jury at the 
penalty phase that evidence had been introduced to show defendant committed a 
crime by bringing a deadly weapon into the county jail, conduct that “involves the 
implied use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence.”  The instruction 
further stated that before a juror could consider such activity as an aggravating 
circumstance (see § 190.3, factor (b)), that juror must find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that defendant did in fact commit the crime.  (See CALJIC No. 8.87.)  
Although defendant now argues that possession of a weapon in his cell does not 
 
14
constitute an implied threat of violence under section 190.3, we have held 
otherwise.  (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1002; People v. Tuilaepa 
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 589; People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1186-1187.)  
Defendant offers no reason for reconsidering these decisions.   
Defendant also complains that the court took the issue of implied threat out 
of the jury’s hands, and created an improper “mandatory presumption” by 
instructing that evidence had been introduced that the shank incident “involv[ed] 
the implied use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence.”  As 
defendant observes, this instruction left it to the jurors to decide only whether, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the incident in fact occurred.   
We recently held that CALJIC No. 8.87 is not invalid for failing to submit 
to the jury the issue whether the defendant’s acts involved the use, attempted use, 
or threat of force or violence.  (People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 453.)  The 
question whether the acts occurred is certainly a factual matter for the jury, but the 
characterization of those acts as involving an express or implied use of force or 
violence, or the threat thereof, would be a legal matter properly decided by the 
court.   
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the instruction given here did not advise 
the jury that defendant’s conduct amounted to an actual or express threat of 
violence, and no danger existed the jury would assume that an actual threat was 
made in this case.  As the evidence made clear, defendant’s illegal conduct 
amounted to possessing a shank in his cell, conduct that is properly deemed an 
implied threat of violence.  (See People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1002.) 
As noted, the court’s instruction left it to the jury to decide whether, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, defendant possessed a shank in his cell.  The court declined to 
reread the definition of “reasonable doubt,” but did instruct that all relevant guilt 
phase instructions still applied, and that the jury could have copies of those 
 
15
instructions for its use on request.  Defendant argues that the court erred in failing 
to reinstruct on the definition and concept of reasonable doubt (see CALJIC No. 
2.90), for purposes of considering the “other crimes” evidence.  Our cases have 
rejected this argument.  (See People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 342, and cases 
cited; People v. Payton (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1050, 1068-1069.)   
E.  Validity of Lying-in-Wait Special Circumstance  
Defendant next argues that the lying-in-wait special circumstance (§ 190.2, 
subd. (a)(15)) is invalid for failure to sufficiently narrow the class of persons 
eligible for death and to provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing the few 
cases in which death is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.  (See 
Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238, 313 (conc. opn. of White, J.).)  We have 
repeatedly rejected this contention, and defendant fails to convince us the matter 
warrants our reconsideration.  (See People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 
510; People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1029; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 
Cal.4th at pp. 154-156; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557-558.)   
Defendant’s challenge is addressed to the statute on its face and he does not 
argue that the facts of the present case failed to support a lying-in-wait special 
circumstance.  Nonetheless, we note the record amply demonstrates the 
applicability of the special circumstance.  Defendant, after seemingly joking with 
his friend Edwin Skinner about stealing Joseph Viveiros’s gun collection and 
“doing away” with Bernice Viveiros, went to their house, engaged Bernice in 
emptying his car trunk until her friend Kim Austin departed, and then ambushed 
her by shooting her in the back to facilitate stealing Joseph’s gun collection.   
F.  Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute and Procedures  
Defendant asserts a variety of supposed flaws in California’s death penalty 
statutes and procedures, including failing to designate the aggravating and 
 
16
mitigating factors, limiting the jury’s consideration of defendant’s mental 
disorders or duress exerted on him, failing to delete inapplicable sentencing 
factors, failing adequately to define mitigation, failing to advise the jury of its 
ability to vote for life imprisonment without parole despite the weight of 
aggravating circumstances, failing to require written findings, allowing multiple 
use and counting of aggravating evidence, failing to require a finding that death is 
appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt, and failing to require unanimity as to the 
truth of aggravating factors.  We have recently and repeatedly rejected these 
contentions.  (See, e.g., People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 404-406; 
People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 991-993; People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 
Cal.4th at pp. 417-418, 421; People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1057-
1059.)  We see no reason to reexamine those cases. 
Defendant cites Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466, and Ring v. 
Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 584, as justifying reconsideration of the foregoing 
decisions.  These cases, however, have no application to the penalty phase 
procedures of this state.  (People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 262-264, 271-
272, 275; see People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43; People v. Smith (May 8, 2003, 
S028339) ___ Cal.4th ___ [p. 65].)   
G.  Prosecutor’s Discretion to Seek Death Penalty 
Defendant argues this state’s death penalty law confers unguided discretion 
to prosecutors to charge the death penalty, resulting in arbitrary and irrational 
decisions.  Again, we have often rejected the point and decline to reconsider it 
here.  (See People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 992; People v. Kirkpatrick 
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1024; People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 505.) 
 
17
H.  Disproportionate Penalty  
Defendant argues that imposing death on “a 19-year-old offender, with no 
previous criminal record, and with a history of emotional and family problems” 
would be a grossly disproportionate penalty.  (See People v. Dillon, supra, 34 
Cal.3d at p. 478.)  As the Attorney General observes, however, at the time of the 
charged offenses, defendant had “suffered a sustained petition for arson, and was 
facing two additional charges, including a weapon-related offense.”  Defendant 
formulated a plan to commit robbery and murder, and to blame the crimes on his 
former roommate.  After convincing his victim to open the safe containing the 
guns he coveted, defendant executed her by shooting her several times at close 
range while her back was turned.  The murder was premeditated and deliberate, 
carried out after a period of watchful waiting until his victim turned her back on 
him.  Defendant’s possession of a shank in his prison cell casts doubt on his 
suitability for life imprisonment.  Nothing in the record regarding defendant’s 
background and supposed troubled state of mind compels a finding that death 
would be a grossly disproportionate punishment for his crimes.   
I.  Denial of Automatic Modification of Sentence Motion 
Defendant contends the trial court improperly (1) based its decision 
denying modification of sentence on his probation report, (2) ignored relevant 
mitigating evidence, and (3) treated certain mitigating evidence as aggravating.  
We find no basis for reversing the judgment.   
a.  Probation report  
The court, in the course of ruling on defendant’s request for modification of 
sentence and sentencing him for the noncapital offenses, began by stating that 
“Based on what I’ve heard of the recommendations from outside parties, including 
the victim’s family, members of Mr. Nakahara’s and the probation 
departmentand I have done that and reviewed this case under [section] 190.3 of 
 
18
the Penal Codeand going back through the factors in aggravation and 
mitigation.”  (Italics added.)  The court proceeded to summarize the various 
factors in aggravation and mitigation, including the circumstances of the crime, 
the presence of criminal activity involving the use or attempted use of force or 
violence, the absence of prior convictions, the lack of evidence of extreme mental 
or emotional distress, and the like.   
The court concluded that “[o]n balance, and weighing the aggravation and 
mitigating circumstances, the court believes the factors in aggravation outweigh 
the factors in mitigation, particularly as to the crime itself.”  The court indicated 
that the strongest aggravating evidence was defendant’s advance announcement of 
his intention to rob and kill Viveiros, and his statement to police to the effect that 
he put two bullets into his victim’s back, and when she went to her knees and 
looked back at him, he shot her again in the head.   
In summarizing its specific reasons for denying modification of the death 
verdict, the court made no mention whatever of the probation report or its 
contents.  Immediately thereafter, the court turned to defendant’s noncapital 
crimes, robbery and burglary, announcing that, before imposing sentence on those 
counts, “[I]t is now my function to read and review the probation report in this 
matter before I impose sentence as to the other counts.”  (Italics added.)  The court 
proceeded to sentence defendant to an additional term of 16 years for his 
noncapital offenses.   
Defendant assumes that the court, in denying modification of sentence, was 
influenced by the information or recommendations in defendant’s probation 
report, including the writer’s opinion that defendant had an “uncooperative” and 
“evasive” attitude, was a “cold blooded killer with the object of killing to steal a 
valuable gun collection,” and had “no place in society.”  We have repeatedly 
stated that “[a] trial court should not read or consider a presentence report before 
 
19
ruling on an automatic motion to modify penalty.  [Citation.]  If the court has done 
so, we examine the record to determine whether the court may have been 
improperly influenced by material in the report.  [Citation.]  If the court does not 
mention any material in the report when giving its reasons for denying the 
modification motion, we conclude there was no improper influence.  [Citations.]  
Here, the trial court’s statement of reasons cited only the evidence presented at 
trial, not extraneous information in the presentence report.”  (People v. Kipp, 
supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 383.) 
Likewise, in the present case we find no indication the trial court 
improperly relied on the opinions expressed in the probation report in ruling on 
the automatic motion to modify.  Accordingly, we find no reversible error in its 
consideration of that report.  Absent contrary indication in the record, we must 
assume the trial court was not influenced by the probation report in ruling on the 
automatic motion to modify.  (See People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 526 
[court considered modification motion on same day as sentencing hearing on 
noncapital crimes; nothing in record suggests court considered or relied on 
probation report when ruling on application for modification]; People v. Seaton 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 694; People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1221-1222.)   
b.  Disregarding mitigating evidence 
Defendant also contends the court, in denying the modification motion, 
erred in “disregarding” evidence of defendant’s mental disturbance, including 
expert testimony that defendant suffered from attention deficit disorder and a 
passive-aggressive personality disorder.  The record shows that in reviewing the 
list of statutory factors under section 190.3, the court made this comment 
regarding factor (d):  “ ‘D,’ whether or not he was under extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance at the time of the offense.  That may have some merit, but 
 
20
there was no evidence of extreme mental duress [sic].  There was certainly 
evidence of some emotional disturbance during the time of this rather bizarre 
behavior and some statements that were a close enough call where I couldn’t put 
that in any particular category.”   
Later, in evaluating factor (k) of section 190.3, the court commented that 
“Factor ‘K,’ any other circumstance, I found that to be a mitigating circumstance 
based on his childhood and what some of the things he went through as he was 
being raised.”  The court concluded, however, that “On balance, and weighing the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the court believes the factors in 
aggravation outweigh the factors in mitigation, particularly as to the crime itself.”   
Defendant contends the court erred in failing to mention or consider the 
evidence of his “nonextreme” mental disorder under section 190.3, factor (k), as a 
circumstance that would extenuate the gravity of his crime.  It is true that factor 
(k) does allow consideration of nonextreme mental or emotional conditions.  
(People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 208, and cases cited.)  It is also true that 
the trial court, in the present case, did not include defendant’s mental disorder 
evidence in its discussion of the mitigating evidence.  But we have held that the 
court, in reciting its reasons for denying the modification motion, need not discuss 
all evidence the defendant submitted as supposedly mitigating.  (People v. Seaton, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 694; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 192.)  In any 
event, assuming the court erred in not considering defendant’s expert evidence as 
potentially mitigating, no reasonable possibility exists that the error affected the 
court’s ruling.  (See People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 660-661; People v. 
Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 192.)  The court had heard, and certainly was aware 
of, defendant’s evidence, yet it ultimately believed the aggravating evidence 
justified the jury’s death verdict.   
 
21
c.  Davenport error   
Defendant contends the trial court erred in characterizing as “aggravating” 
defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.  In People v. 
Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290, we explained that the failure to show 
the defendant’s mental impairment is not an aggravating circumstance, but simply 
the absence of a mitigating one.  Accordingly, the court may have erred in 
concluding that defendant’s capacity to know right from wrong aggravated his 
offense.  (People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 717; People v. Marshall (1990) 
50 Cal.3d 907, 944.)  But the error was undoubtedly harmless in light of the other 
aggravating circumstances in the case, and no reasonable possibility exists that the 
error affected the court’s ruling.  (People v. Whitt, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 660-
661; Kaurish, supra, at p. 718; Marshall, supra, at pp. 944-945.)  Certainly, the 
court was entitled to consider defendant’s ability to appreciate the criminality of 
his conduct as yet another circumstance of his crime.  (§ 190.3.)   
d.  Cumulative errors  
Defendant asserts the combined effect of the trial court’s errors in denying 
defendant’s modification request requires reversal.  As we have seen, no serious 
errors were committed here.  Whether viewed separately or in the aggregate, no 
reasonable possibility exists that these errors affected the court’s decision to deny 
the request. 
 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment of death in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
1
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Nakahara 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S018292 
Date Filed: May 22, 2003 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Michael G. Nott 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Lynne S. Coffin, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Peter R. Silten and 
Arnold Erickson, Deputy State Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Carol Wendelin Pollack and Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorneys General, Donald 
Denicola, Robert S. Henry, Keith H. Borjon, John R. Gorey and Shawn McGahey Webb, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Arnold Erickson 
Deputy State Public Defender 
221 Main Street, 10th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 904-5600 
 
Donald Denicola 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2276