Title: MICHAEL GRIMES V DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 127901
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 31, 2006

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 31, 2006 
MICHAEL GRIMES and TAMARA GRIMES, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v 
No. 127901 
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
YOUNG, J.  
We granted leave to appeal to consider whether the shoulder is part of the 
“improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel” for the purpose of 
the highway exception to governmental immunity.  We conclude that a shoulder is 
not within the exception because it is not “designed for vehicular travel.” 
In reaching this conclusion, we overrule the holding in our earlier decision 
in Gregg v State Hwy Dep't that a shoulder is “designed for vehicular travel.”1 
Gregg subsequently has been relied on by lower courts for the proposition that 
1 435 Mich 307; 458 NW2d 619 (1990). 
 
 
                                                 
 
every shoulder is “designed for vehicular travel.”  As we will discuss, we find no 
support within Gregg, considering its internal inconsistencies, to give it this broad 
reading. Moreover, judging from the plain meaning of the statutory language and 
the context thereof enacted by the Legislature, we conclude that a shoulder, unlike 
a travel lane, is not the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular 
travel. 
Accordingly, the order of the Court of Claims denying summary 
disposition on the basis of Gregg is reversed, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals affirming that order is reversed, and this case is remanded to the Court of 
Claims for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
On the morning of March 24, 2000, Alan Thisse traveled north on I-75 in 
the far left lane of the three-lane highway. Thisse testified in his deposition that as 
he passed an entrance ramp he ran over a mound of dirt that forced his vehicle 
onto the left shoulder of the highway.  The left shoulder consisted of a three-foot­
wide strip of asphalt with an adjoining two-foot-wide gravel strip.  The asphalt 
portion of the shoulder shared the same grade as the travel lanes.  The gravel 
portion, however, was lower.2  Thisse’s two left tires dropped onto the gravel 
surface. As Thisse left the highway travel lane, plaintiff Michael Grimes had just 
entered onto northbound I-75.  It is alleged that when Thisse recovered and 
reentered the highway, the grade differential between the gravel and the asphalt 
2 The parties dispute the severity of the grade differential. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
surfaces caused Thisse to lose control of his vehicle, veer into the far right lane, 
and crash into Grimes’s vehicle. As a result of the accident, plaintiff Michael 
Grimes suffered permanent quadriplegia. 
Plaintiffs Michael Grimes and his wife Tamara filed actions against Alan 
and Douglas Thisse and defendant Michigan Department of Transportation 
(MDOT).3  Plaintiffs brought negligence and nuisance claims against MDOT, 
claiming that MDOT negligently maintained the gravel portion of the shoulder 
where Thisse left the roadway.  They argued that MDOT designed the shoulder 
intending that the gravel portion would gradually slope away from the asphalt 
portion. 
However, plaintiffs allege that MDOT failed to maintain that gradual 
slope, resulting in the drop-off that proximately caused plaintiffs’ injuries. 
MDOT moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), 
asserting governmental immunity as a defense.  It argued that the shoulder fell 
outside the scope of the highway exception because it was not an improved 
portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.  Relying on Gregg, the Court 
of Claims denied MDOT’s motion for summary disposition.4 
3 Plaintiff Tamara Grimes sued derivatively for loss of consortium. 
Plaintiffs’ claims against Alan Thisse, the driver, and Douglas Thisse, the owner 
of the vehicle, are not part of this appeal. 
4 The parties stipulated in the order of denial to dismiss all other allegations 
and agreed that plaintiffs could “only proceed on their claim regarding an alleged 
defective shoulder as it relates to the failure of MDOT to repair and maintain the 
shoulder.” 
3  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Claims.5  In a 
short unpublished per curiam decision, the panel relied on Gregg as well as 
subsequent Court of Appeals cases following Gregg in holding that a shoulder is 
part of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.6  The 
panel also held that this Court’s subsequent decision in Nawrocki v Macomb Co 
Rd Comm7 had not affected the jurisprudential validity of Gregg. 
MDOT filed an application for leave to appeal, which this Court granted.8 
II. Standard Of Review 
This Court reviews motions for summary disposition under MCR 
2.116(C)(7) de novo.9  Questions of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de 
novo.10  When this Court interprets statutory language, our primary goal is to 
discern the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the text of the statute.11  Where 
5 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued December 16, 2004 (Docket No. 
249558). 
6 Meek v Dep’t of Transportation, 240 Mich App 105, 114; 610 NW2d 250 
(2000); Soule v Macomb Co Bd of Rd Comm’rs, 196 Mich App 235, 237; 492 
NW2d 783 (1992). 
7 463 Mich 143; 615 NW2d 702 (2000). 
8 474 Mich 877 (2005). 
9 Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). 
10 Mitan v Campbell, 474 Mich 21, 23; 706 NW2d 420 (2005). 
11 Dibenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 300 
(2000). 
4  
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ends and we apply the statute 
as written.12 
III. Analysis 
a. Governmental Immunity and the Highway Exception 
The governmental tort liability act (GTLA)13 broadly shields a 
governmental agency14 from tort liability “if the governmental agency is engaged 
in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.”15  The act enumerates 
several exceptions to governmental immunity that permit a plaintiff to pursue a 
claim against a governmental agency.16  This case concerns what is known 
colloquially as the “highway exception.”  That provision states, in pertinent part: 
[E]ach governmental agency having jurisdiction over a 
highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is 
reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.  A person who 
12 Huggett v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 464 Mich 711, 717; 629 NW2d 
915 (2001). 
13 MCL 691.1401 et seq. 
14 A governmental agency is “the state or a political subdivision.”  MCL 
691.1401(d). The state, in turn, includes “the state of Michigan and its agencies, 
departments [and] commissions . . . .”  MCL 691.1401(c). Defendant, as a 
department of the state, is protected by the provisions of this act. 
15 MCL 691.1407(1). 
16 The Legislature codified the following exceptions: the highway 
exception, MCL 691.1402; the motor vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405; the 
public building exception, MCL 691.1406; the proprietary function exception, 
MCL 691.1413; the governmental hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4); and the 
sewage disposal system exception, MCL 691.1417. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
sustains bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of 
failure of a governmental agency to keep a highway under its 
jurisdiction in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe 
and fit for travel may recover the damages suffered by him or her 
from the governmental agency . . . . The duty of the state and the 
county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the 
liability for that duty, extends only to the improved portion of the 
highway designed for vehicular travel and does not include 
sidewalks, trailways, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of 
the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. 
[17] 
The GTLA provides its own definition of “highway,” which is “a public 
highway, road, or street that is open for public travel and includes bridges, 
sidewalks, trailways, crosswalks, and culverts on the highway.”18  This definition 
of a highway excludes “alleys, trees, and utility poles.”19  Beyond defining the 
term “highway,” the GTLA does not define these additional terms.  It also does 
not define “shoulder” or include shoulder among the list of features such as 
bridges and sidewalks that are deemed to be part of a highway. 
The scope of the highway exception is narrowly drawn.  Under its plain 
language, every governmental agency with jurisdiction over a highway owes a 
duty to “maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and 
convenient for public travel.”  However, when the governmental agency is the 
state or a county road commission, as is the case here, the Legislature constricted 
17 MCL 691.1402(1) (emphasis added).  
18 MCL 691.1401(e).  
19 Id.  
6  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
  
 
the scope of the highway exception by limiting the portion of the highway covered 
by that exception.  For these agencies, the highway exception does not extend to 
an installation “outside” the improved portion of the highway such as a sidewalk, 
trailway, or crosswalk, although these features are included in the general 
definition of a “highway.” The duty of these agencies to repair and maintain does 
not extend to every “improved portion of highway.”  It attaches only “to the 
improved portion of the highway” that is also “designed for vehicular travel.”  As 
we discuss later in this opinion, such narrowing of the duty supplies important 
textual clues regarding the Legislature’s intent concerning whether a shoulder falls 
within or without the protection afforded by the GTLA. 
Although the specific issues considered in Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd 
Comm,20 are not before us today, that case is particularly instructive in this case.21 
In Nawrocki, this Court reconciled several of our previous inconsistent highway 
exception cases, and clarified the scope of the governmental agency’s duty under 
the highway exception.  We held in Nawrocki that “if the condition is not located 
in the actual roadbed designed for vehicular travel, the narrowly drawn highway 
20 463 Mich 143; 615 NW2d 702 (2000). 
21 In Nawrocki, this Court decided two issues. First, the highway exception 
protects pedestrians who are injured by the defendant state or county road 
commission’s failure to repair and maintain the improved portion of the highway 
designed for vehicular travel.  Id. at 184. Second, the highway exception does not 
permit “signage” claims. That is, the state and country road commissions owed no 
duty to install, maintain, repair, and improve traffic control devices.  Id. 
7  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
exception is inapplicable . . . .”22  Put differently, the highway exception creates a 
duty to maintain only the “‘traveled portion, paved or unpaved, of the roadbed 
actually designed for public vehicular travel.’”23  Our focus, then, consistent with 
Nawrocki, is determining whether a shoulder is actually designed for public 
vehicular travel. 
b. Gregg v State Hwy Dep’t 
Plaintiffs urge this Court to affirm the judgments of the lower courts on the 
basis of our decision in Gregg v State Hwy Dep’t,24 which we decided before 
Nawrocki. In Gregg, this Court considered whether the highway exception was 
available to a bicyclist injured by a defect in “a designated bicycle path on the 
inner portion of the paved shoulder of a state highway.”25  The plaintiff suffered 
extensive injuries when he struck a pothole on the bicycle path and overturned his 
22 Id. at 162. 
23 Id. at 180 (citation omitted). 
24 435 Mich 307; 458 NW2d 619 (1990).   
25 Id. at 309. The defendant in Gregg raised a second argument that 
bicyclists could not bring suit under the highway exception.  We rejected that 
claim by resorting to the plain language of the highway exception, which permits 
“a person who sustains bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of 
failure of a governmental agency to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in 
reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel” to recover 
damages for injuries suffered in the improved portion of the roadway designed for 
vehicular travel. MCL 691.1402(1).  This separate holding in Gregg is consistent 
with our decision in Nawrocki that a pedestrian may sue for an injury occurring in 
the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.  See Nawrocki, 
supra at 184. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
bicycle. For purposes of deciding whether the trial court had properly granted the 
defendant’s motion for summary disposition, this Court relied on a photograph of 
the accident scene, which pictured a bicycle path situated between the “traveled 
portion of the highway and its paved shoulder.”26  The majority in Gregg reversed 
the judgment granting summary disposition that had been entered in favor of the 
defendant, concluding that the shoulder was designed for vehicular travel. 
Gregg’s first task was to distinguish the bicycle path in that case from the 
bicycle path at issue in Roy v Dep’t of Transportation. 
27 Roy also involved an 
injury sustained on a bicycle path, and we concluded there that the plaintiff’s 
claim was barred by governmental immunity.  In distinguishing the two cases, the 
Gregg majority placed a great deal of reliance on where the bicycle path in that 
case was located in relationship to the roadbed.28  Whereas the bicycle path in 
Gregg “comprised part of the inner portion of the shoulder,” the bicycle path in 
Roy ran “parallel to” and was “detached from” the highway.  As a result, Gregg 
26 Gregg, supra at 310. 
27 428 Mich 330; 408 NW2d 783 (1987). 
28 The Gregg majority also made a superficial attempt to square its holding 
with an earlier decision from this Court, Goodrich v Kalamazoo Co, 304 Mich 
442; 8 NW2d 130 (1943). Goodrich had held that a shoulder next to the roadway 
that was a three-foot-wide dirt and gravel shoulder with a tree planted 
“approximately 30 inches” from the pavement was not part of the traveled portion 
of the road. The Gregg majority recognized but made little effort to differentiate 
Goodrich, acknowledging that it “would probably conclude” that such a shoulder 
was not an “improved portion” of a highway if the factual situation in Goodrich 
had been before the Gregg Court.  Gregg, supra at 313. 
9  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expressly rested its holding “on the assumption that the bicycle path at issue 
comprised part of the inner portion of the shoulder closest to the roadway,”29 later 
conceding that it would have been a closer question “if the bike path had been on 
the outer fringes of the shoulder . . . .”30 
After distinguishing Roy, the Gregg majority offered several reasons to 
support its conclusion that the shoulder encompassing the bicycle path fell within 
the highway exception. It noted the uninterrupted line of cases from the Court of 
Appeals beginning in 1971 holding that a shoulder was designed for vehicular 
travel.31  Because the Legislature did not overrule that line of cases when it 
amended the GTLA over the years, this served as proof to the Gregg majority that 
the Legislature approved of this line of cases construing the highway exception. 
The Gregg majority also held that it “flies in the face of common 
experience” to say that a shoulder is not designed for vehicular travel.  It opined: 
Any motorist who has ever experienced a highway 
emergency understands that shoulders are essential to a safe modern 
highway. To get on or off a shoulder to stop, park, or leave standing 
a vehicle, motorists must travel on the shoulder.   
29 Id. at 310. 
30 Id. at 317 n 5. 
31 See, e.g., Johnson v Michigan, 32 Mich App 37, 39; 188 NW2d 33 
(1971); Van Liere v State Hwy Dep’t, 59 Mich App 133, 136; 229 NW2d 369 
(1975); Hall v Dep’t of State Hwys, 109 Mich App 592, 602 n 4; 311 NW2d 813 
(1981); McKee v Dep’t of Transportation, 132 Mich App 714, 721; 349 NW2d 
798 (1984); Roux v Dep’t of Transportation, 169 Mich App 582, 586; 426 NW2d 
714 (1988). 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
At the high speeds of modern vehicles, such an endeavor 
often results in significant travel, “in the ordinary sense,” on the 
shoulder of a highway.  Indeed, it seems quite extraordinary, if not 
fictional, to assume that vehicles do not travel on shoulders or that 
shoulders are not designed for vehicular travel, albeit of a temporary 
sort.[32] 
In further support of its holding, the Gregg majority cited what it believed 
to be apposite definitions from the Michigan Vehicle Code (MVC).33  It noted that 
the MVC defines “highway” more broadly than “roadway.”  Whereas in the MVC 
a highway encompasses “the entire width between the boundary lines,”34 a 
roadway is only that portion of the highway “improved, designed, or ordinarily 
used for vehicular travel.”35  According to the Gregg majority, the Legislature’s 
use of the broader term “highway” in the highway exception of the GTLA evinced 
its intent to sweep the shoulder into that exception.  Otherwise, it reasoned, the 
Legislature would have used the more narrowly defined term “roadway” to cabin 
the scope of the highway exception. 
Justice Griffin dissented from the Gregg majority opinion, arguing, among 
other things, that the plain language of the highway exception excluded the 
32 Gregg, supra at 315.  
33 MCL 257.1 et seq.  
34 MCL 257.20.  
35 MCL 257.55.  
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
shoulder.36  He emphasized that the highway exception extends only to a portion 
of the highway, that is, the portion “designed for vehicular travel.”  37
 c. Gregg was Wrongly Decided and Poorly Reasoned 
Although the Court of Claims and the Court of Appeals relied on Gregg to 
deny defendant summary disposition, we overrule Gregg’s conclusion that a 
shoulder is “designed for vehicular travel.”  That conclusion rested heavily on the 
fact that the inner portion of the shoulder included a designated bicycle path.  The 
Gregg majority expressed doubt that it would have reached the same conclusion 
had the designated bicycle path been located further from the edge of the travel 
lane of the highway.38  This unusual factual premise—an integrated, dedicated 
bicycle path—from the standpoint of statutory construction is irrelevant.  We 
36 Chief Justice Riley wrote a separate dissent concurring in Justice 
Griffin’s analysis. 
37 Justice Griffin also discussed at length the importance of the MVC 
definitions and their applicability to the GTLA.  While we agree with much of 
Justice Griffin’s dissent, we do not rely on the MVC to reach our decision.  See 
the discussion later in this opinion. 
38 See n 28 of this opinion and the accompanying text. In this case, the 
shoulder was immediately adjacent to I-75, a well-traveled interstate highway, and 
contained no designated bicycle path. 
We see no principled basis for the distinction Gregg drew between a 
bicycle path located near to or farther from the travel lanes of a highway.  A 
bicycle path included anywhere within the shoulder of a road would not otherwise 
be an “installation outside the improved portion of the highway” if, as Gregg 
arguably concluded, a shoulder itself constitutes an improved portion of the 
highway designed for vehicular travel. 
12  
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
 
believe Gregg is consequently so internally inconsistent that it does not yield a 
meaningful rule applicable to all shoulders on Michigan’s highways.  Frankly, 
upon close inspection, Gregg is an enigma. Its core assumption is that the location 
of the integrated bicycle path determined the outcome of that case.  We cannot 
ascertain why the location of the integrated bicycle path—whether it was located 
on the inner portion or the outer fringe of the shoulder—bore so heavily or at all 
on the question whether the shoulder was designed for vehicular travel.39 
Furthermore, the Gregg majority’s analysis, as we will show, is not based on the 
text of the GTLA and is seriously flawed.  Therefore, we overrule Gregg and its 
progeny to the extent that they can be read to suggest that a shoulder is “designed 
for vehicular travel.” 
d. Gregg’s Reasoning is Erroneous 
In our view, there are several fatal flaws in the analysis offered by Gregg. 
It failed to pay serious attention to the plain meaning of the text of the highway 
exception and it made other unpersuasive arguments. 
First, the Gregg majority inappropriately relied on the doctrine of 
legislative acquiescence for the proposition that prior Court of Appeals decisions 
that had broadly construed the highway exception to encompass all shoulders were 
consistent with the Legislature’s intent. This doctrine of legislative acquiescence 
is founded on the notion that decisions that have not been legislatively overturned 
39 See n 38 of this opinion. 
13  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
are tacitly approved by the Legislature.  The doctrine is “highly disfavored” in this 
Court’s jurisprudence, which prescribes that courts are to discern the Legislature’s 
intent “‘from its words, not from its silence.’”40  That the Legislature did not 
amend the existing language of the highway exception in response to earlier Court 
of Appeals cases does not suggest that the Legislature believed those cases were 
rightly decided. 
Moreover, unlike the Gregg majority, we decline to rely on the Court’s 
conception of motorists’ “common experience” with road shoulders as a proper 
canon of statutory construction.  Were this Court competent to make such a 
normative judgment about motorists’ common experience, it would be particularly 
inappropriate to apply that judgment here where it departs from the plain statutory 
language used by the Legislature.  This subtle appeal to common experience 
arguably substituted the Gregg majority’s policy preference for the policy 
preference of the Legislature. In analyzing the highway exception, we must be 
governed by the statutory language.41 
Unlike the Gregg Court, we also decline to consult the definitions 
contained in the MVC to inform our construction regarding the scope of the 
highway exception.  Closer inspection of the MVC reveals why Gregg’s reliance 
40 Nawrocki, supra at 177 n 33, quoting Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 
460 Mich 243, 261; 596 NW2d 574 (1999) (emphasis omitted). 
41 We expect jurors to apply their “common experience” in assessing facts. 
Judges should apply law in interpreting statutes. 
14  
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
on an unrelated statute to construe another is a perilous endeavor to be avoided by 
our courts. The GTLA expressly incorporates only one definition from the MVC. 
Section 5, also known as the  motor vehicle exception, refers the reader to the 
definition of “owner” in the MVC.42  The absence of any other reference to the 
MVC in the GTLA, coupled with the explicit incorporation of “owner” in the 
motor vehicle exception indicates that the Legislature intended to limit the 
applicability of the MVC in the GTLA.43 
Even more troubling than the Gregg majority’s frank violation of the rules 
of statutory construction was the fact that it used provisions of the MVC in a 
highly selective manner. One of the “crucial” questions before the Gregg Court 
was “whether the paved shoulder is ‘designed for vehicular travel.’”44 Gregg 
preferentially selected and relied on only some of the MVC defined terms to 
answer that question. 
The Gregg majority cited the MVC definitions of 
“roadway” and “highway” to support its conclusion that a shoulder was part of the 
42 MCL 691.1405; see also Stanton v Battle Creek, 466 Mich 611; 647 
NW2d 508 (2002). 
43 See Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 210; 501 NW2d 
76 (1993) (“Courts cannot assume that the Legislature inadvertently omitted from 
one statute the language that it placed in another statute, and then, on the basis of 
that assumption, apply what is not there.”); Detroit v Redford Twp, 253 Mich 453, 
456; 235 NW 217 (1931) (“Courts cannot attach provisions not found therein to an 
act of the legislature because they have been incorporated in other similar acts.”), 
citing Michigan v Sparrow, 89 Mich 263, 269; 50 NW 1088 (1891). 
44 Gregg, supra at 313. 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel, but curiously failed 
to rely on the most relevant term defined in the MVC— “shoulder.”  One can only 
speculate why the Gregg majority brushed aside this term, which the MVC 
actually defines as “that portion of the highway contiguous to the roadway 
generally extending the contour of the roadway, not designed for vehicular travel 
but maintained for the temporary accommodation of disabled or stopped vehicles 
otherwise permitted on the roadway.”45 
Justice Griffin’s dissent reminded the majority of this fact, to which the 
majority unconvincingly responded that what it termed “another section” of the 
MVC stated, “‘“Shoulder” means that portion of a highway or street on either side 
of the roadway which is normally snowplowed for the safety and convenience of 
vehicular traffic.’”46  It is not clear why the Gregg majority believed this 
provision negated the MVC’s specific definition of “shoulder,” particularly 
because this provision does not support the conclusion that a shoulder is designed 
for vehicular travel, whereas the MVC’s definition of a shoulder specifically states 
that a shoulder is not so designed.  Had the Gregg majority relied on the most 
relevant definition, the one found in the MVC, it could not have reached the result 
45 MCL 257.59a (emphasis added). 
46 Gregg, supra at 315, quoting former MCL 257.1501(k) (emphasis in 
Gregg). 
In actuality, the quoted section was part of the former Michigan 
Snowmobile Act, not the MVC.  The former provision is now found at MCL 
324.82101(p). 
16  
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
   
 
 
 
it did.47  Once the Gregg majority inappropriately committed itself to using the 
language of the MVC rather than construing the actual words of the highway 
exception, the MVC should have pressed the Court to reach the opposite 
conclusion. 
More important, the GTLA provides its own definition of “highway.”48 
There is no apparent ambiguity in the GTLA’s definition of “highway” that would 
warrant resort to another statute’s definition of the same term.  Hence, the Gregg 
majority’s use of the MVC definition was inconsistent with our canons of statutory 
construction. 
In sum, the Gregg majority’s conclusion that a shoulder is designed for 
vehicular travel and the reasons supporting that conclusion are entirely 
unpersuasive and must be abandoned.49 
47 If the Gregg majority had examined faithfully the entire MVC, it would 
have found additional support to conclude that a shoulder is not designed for 
vehicular travel. The MVC requires a person to drive within the travel lanes or 
risk a civil infraction. For example, the driver of a vehicle may not “overtake and 
pass another vehicle upon the right by driving off the pavement or main-traveled 
portion of the roadway.” MCL 257.637(2).  Thus the organic traffic laws of this 
state, as provided in the MVC, limit vehicular travel to the travel lanes. 
48 MCL 691.1401(e). 
49 Although this Court respects and gives considerable weight to the 
doctrine of stare decisis, we are “not constrained to follow precedent when 
governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned.”  Robinson v Detroit, 
462 Mich 439, 464; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).  For the reasons stated earlier in this 
opinion, we believe Gregg was a badly reasoned decision.  However, we must 
move beyond those considerations under a stare decisis analysis and examine the 
effects of overruling Gregg. Id. at 466. 
(continued . . .) 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
 
e. A Shoulder is not “Designed for Vehicular Travel” 
Turning from Gregg to the text of the highway exception itself, we hold 
that the shoulder is not “designed for vehicular travel.” Plaintiffs’ theory, boiled 
down to its core, is that a shoulder is meant to be a travel lane.  Guided by the 
statutory language chosen by the Legislature, we reject plaintiffs’ contention.  A 
shoulder may be capable of supporting some form of vehicular traffic, but it is not 
a travel lane and it is not “designed for vehicular travel.” 
The GTLA does not expressly define “shoulder” or the phrase “designed 
for vehicular travel.” Nor does the highway exception explicitly indicate whether 
a shoulder is “designed for vehicular travel.”  Consequently, to aid our inquiry, we 
must consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “the improved portion 
(. . . continued) 
One of the most significant considerations is “the effect on reliance 
interests and whether overruling would work an undue hardship because of that 
reliance.” Id. We find no reliance interests at work that support the continuation 
of Gregg’s erroneous interpretation of the highway exception.  Motorists traverse 
shoulders because of the exigencies of highway travel.  They do not traverse 
shoulders because our case law might permit them to recover against the 
governmental agency in the event of an accident.  Indeed, to do so would be a 
violation of the MVC.  MCL 257.637.  Gregg is not the sort of case that fosters a 
reliance interest or shapes future individual conduct.  Therefore, we do not believe 
we work an undue hardship in overruling Gregg. Further, by correcting Gregg’s 
erroneous construction of the highway exception, we restore “legitimate citizen 
expectations” that the Court will not arrogate to itself the legislative power to 
make public policy.  Robinson, supra at 467. 
18  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
  
 
of the highway designed for vehicular travel” and the context in which the 
Legislature employed this phrase.50 
MDOT does not contest that road shoulders are “designed” with the 
intention that they be used by vehicles. It contests that shoulders are designed as 
travel lanes. This is a distinction that turns on the meaning of “travel.”  Taken in 
its broadest and most literal sense, “travel” in the highway exception could include 
the shortest incremental movement by a vehicle on an improved surface.51 
Therefore, in an emergency, when a motorist momentarily swerves onto the 
shoulder, the motorist can be said to have traveled on the shoulder.  Were this 
broadly inclusive definition of “travel” appropriate, we might be persuaded by 
plaintiffs’ argument that a shoulder is designed for vehicular travel.  However, we 
reject this broad definition proposed by plaintiffs. 
Adopting a broad definition of “travel” would read any meaning out of the 
phrase “designed for vehicular travel.”  When interpreting statutes, we “must give 
effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that 
would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.”52  The Legislature 
50 MCL 8.3a; Horace v City of Pontiac, 456 Mich 744, 755-756; 575 
NW2d 762 (1998). 
51 See Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1995), defining 
“travel” as “to go from one place to another . . . .” 
52 State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Old Republic Ins Co, 466 Mich 142, 146; 
644 NW2d 715 (2002). 
19  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
modified the phrase “the improved portion of the highway” with the phrase 
“designed for vehicular travel.”  It did not intend to extend the highway exception 
indiscriminately to every “improved portion of the highway.”  Otherwise, it would 
not have qualified the phrase.  Rather, it limited the exception to the segment of 
the “improved portion of highway” that is “designed for vehicular travel.” 
Because the Legislature created this distinction, it believed there are improved 
portions of highway that are not designed for vehicular travel.  Hence, this Court 
ought to respect this distinction as we parse the statutory language. 
Plaintiffs in effect urge this Court to adopt the expansive definition of 
“travel.” If “travel” is broadly construed to include traversing even the smallest 
distance, then it must follow that every area surrounding the highway that has been 
improved for highway purposes is “designed for vehicular travel” since such 
improved portions could support even momentary vehicular “travel.”53  Under 
53 The only conceivable limitation of the highway exception under this 
expansive view is that the duty does not extend to an “installation outside of the 
improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.”  MCL 
691.1402(1) (emphasis added).  However, it is not clear, if every improved portion 
of highway is designed for vehicular travel, where the improved portion of the 
highway designed for vehicular travel ceases. 
For example, on the motion for summary disposition, the parties submitted 
photos that depict the area of I-75 around the accident scene.  Clearly, much of 
this area is an “improved portion of the highway.”  That is, most of the area 
surrounding the actual roadbed bears the mark of human improvement for 
highway purposes. For example, separating the northbound and southbound lanes 
of I-75 is an intentionally sloped grassy median shaped in that fashion for any 
number of highway-related purposes.  Plaintiffs’ theory would require that we 
conclude that this entire swath of land, which looks dramatically different from the 
(continued . . .) 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
plaintiffs’ interpretation, then, every “improved portion of the highway” is also 
“designed for vehicular travel.”  This interpretation renders these phrases 
redundant and contravenes a settled rule of statutory interpretation.  It also 
conflates two disparate concepts:  design and contemplated use.  That vehicular 
traffic might use an improved portion of the highway does not mean that that 
portion was “designed for vehicular travel.”  Therefore, in an effort to give 
meaning to every word of the highway exception and to honor the Legislature’s 
expressed intent, we reject plaintiffs’ construction of the highway exception. 
We believe that, taken as a whole, the language of the highway exception 
supports the view that a shoulder, unlike a travel lane, is not designed for vehicular 
travel. Consequently, we adopt a view of “travel” that excludes the shoulder from 
the scope of the highway exception.  Thus, we hold that only the travel lanes of a 
highway are subject to the duty of repair and maintenance specified in MCL 
691.1402(1).54 
(. . . continued)  
wood and shrubbery lines on either side of I-75, was an improved portion of  
highway designed for vehicular travel.  
54 In construing the GTLA, this Court has often relied on the principle set 
forth in Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 618; 363 
NW2d 641 (1984), that exceptions to governmental immunity are construed 
narrowly and the grant of immunity is construed broadly.  It is unnecessary to rely 
on this Ross principle to decide this case.  We reject plaintiffs’ argument that the 
shoulder is designed for vehicular travel, and we overrule Gregg in order to 
construe the statutory language reasonably and give effect to every word and 
phrase in the highway exception. 
21  
 
 
 
   
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
Also, our decision is consistent with Nawrocki. We had no opportunity in 
Nawrocki to consider the validity of Gregg as it relates to the question presented in 
this case. However, our determination that the shoulder is not designed for 
vehicular travel reinforces Nawrocki’s reading of the highway exception that it 
encompassed only the “‘traveled portion, paved or unpaved, of the roadbed 
actually designed for public vehicular travel.’”55 
IV. Response to the Dissent 
Although the dissent would reaffirm Gregg, it fails to rebut the peculiarities 
and flaws in Gregg’s reasoning highlighted above and rests heavily on the doctrine 
of legislative acquiescence, which this Court has clearly discredited and rejected.56 
Furthermore, the dissent offers no serious rebuttal to our construction of the 
highway exception. We do not harbor, as the dissent accuses, a “subjective fear” 
that Gregg exposes the governmental agency to “unlimited liability.”57  Rather, 
this Court simply seeks to give effect to each word and phrase employed by the 
Legislature. A shoulder may be capable of supporting vehicular traffic, but this 
fact does not answer the legal question whether the Legislature intended to 
designate shoulders as an “improved portion of the highway designed for 
vehicular travel” and thereby expose a governmental agency to tort liability for 
55 Nawrocki, supra at 180 (citation omitted). 
56 See Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 258-262; 596 
NW2d 574 (1999). 
57 Post at 8. 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
defects in a shoulder.  If plaintiffs’ definition of “travel” were to prevail, then a 
key phrase in the highway exception is rendered surplusage.  This is inconsistent 
with our settled rules of statutory construction. 
V. Conclusion 
We overrule Gregg because it was internally inconsistent and it appealed to 
inappropriate methods of statutory construction.  Consistent with the language of 
the highway exception, we conclude that the shoulder is not designed for vehicular 
travel. As this Court previously held in Nawrocki, the focus of the highway 
exception is the actual physical roadbed.  Moreover, by concluding that the 
shoulder is not “designed for vehicular travel,” we fulfill our obligation to give 
effect to every word of the highway exception.   
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Court of Claims and the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Claims for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Clifford W. Taylor 
 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Stephen J. Markman 
23  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
V 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
MICHAEL GRIMES and TAMARA 
GRIMES, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
No. 127901 
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION,
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
The issue presented is whether the shoulder of the road is part of the 
“improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel” for purposes of 
the highway exception to governmental immunity.  MCL 691.1402(1).  Unlike 
the majority, I would reaffirm this Court’s holding in Gregg v State Hwy Dep’t,1 
and hold that a shoulder is “designed for vehicular travel.”  Therefore, I would 
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition.  We 
review such rulings de novo.  Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 
817 (1999). 
1 435 Mich 307; 458 NW2d 619 (1990). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In making our de novo review, we are called on to determine an issue 
involving statutory construction.  Such matters are questions of law that also are 
reviewed de novo. Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 62; 642 NW2d 
663 (2002). 
Our primary goal in construing the meaning of statutes is to 
determine the intent of the Legislature.  Everyone on the Court is in accord that, if 
a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, it must be enforced as written. 
People v Laney, 470 Mich 267, 271; 680 NW2d 888 (2004).  Also, it is generally 
agreed that the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning expressed in 
the words it wrote. Roberts, supra at 63. All words and phrases are “construed 
and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language . . . 
.” MCL 8.3a. 
ANALYSIS 
The immunity of government from suit is made possible by the 
governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq. It sets forth the 
basic tenets of governmental immunity: “Except as otherwise provided in this act, 
a governmental agency is immune from tort liability if the governmental agency is 
engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.”  MCL 
691.1407(1). There are a few exceptions.  One is contained in MCL 691.1402(1), 
which is commonly referred to as the “highway exception.”  It provides, in 
relevant part: 
[E]ach governmental agency having jurisdiction over a 
highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is 
reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. A person who 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
sustains bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of 
failure of a governmental agency to keep a highway under its 
jurisdiction in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and 
fit for travel may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the 
governmental agency . . . The duty of the state and the county road 
commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability for 
that duty, extends only to the improved portion of the highway 
designed for vehicular travel and does not include sidewalks, 
trailways, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved 
portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.  [Emphasis 
added.] 
“Highway” is defined by the GTLA as “a public highway, road, or street 
that is open for public travel and includes bridges, sidewalks, trailways, 
crosswalks, and culverts on the highway.”  MCL 691.1401(e). “Shoulder” is not 
defined in the GTLA. 
I believe that this Court’s decision in Gregg correctly interpreted these 
statutory provisions.  It recognized that, for purposes of the highway exception to 
governmental immunity, a shoulder is part of the highway “designed for vehicular 
travel.” Gregg, supra at 317. The Gregg Court reached its decision for three 
reasons. 
First, the Court noted that, beginning in 1971, the Court of Appeals has 
consistently held that the shoulder of a highway is designed for vehicular travel. 
Id. at 314.2  In making this ruling, the Court applied the concept of legislative 
2 See, e.g., Johnson v Michigan, 32 Mich App 37, 39; 188 NW2d 33 
(1971); Van Liere v State Hwy Dep’t, 59 Mich App 133, 136; 229 NW2d 369 
(1975); Hall v Dep’t of State Hwys, 109 Mich App 592, 602 n 4; 311 NW2d 813 
(1981); McKee v Dep’t of Transportation, 132 Mich App 714, 721; 349 NW2d 
(continued . . .) 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
acquiescence. Since the Legislature chose not to amend the GTLA in the face of 
numerous holdings of the Court of Appeals, it acquiesced in the Court of Appeals 
interpretation of the law. Id. 
Second, the Court held that it would fly in the face of “common 
experience” to hold that a highway shoulder is not designed for vehicular travel. 
Id. at 315.  The Court reasoned that all motorists understand that, because a 
shoulder is an essential safety feature of a highway, it is part of the highway. 
Specifically, the Court stated that 
[t]o get on or off a shoulder to stop, park, or leave standing a vehicle, 
motorists must travel on the shoulder.   
At the high speeds of modern vehicles, such an endeavor 
often results in significant travel, “in the ordinary sense,” on the 
shoulder of a highway.  Indeed, it seems quite extraordinary, if not 
fictional, to assume that vehicles do not travel on shoulders or that 
shoulders are not designed for vehicular travel, albeit of a temporary 
sort. [Id.] 
Third, the Court considered relevant definitions found in the Michigan 
Vehicle Code (MVC). MCL 257.1 et seq. Id.  Specifically, it considered the MVC 
definitions of “highway” and “roadway.” It noted that the MVC definition of 
“highway”3 is broader than the definition of “roadway.”4  It then concluded that 
(. . . continued)  
798 (1984); Roux v Dep’t of Transportation, 169 Mich App 582, 586; 426 NW2d  
714 (1988).  
3 MCL 257.20 defines “highway” to include “the entire width between the 
boundary lines.” 
4 MCL 257.55 defines “roadway” to include only the portion of a highway 
“improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel.”   
4  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
the Legislature’s use of the word “highway” rather than “roadway” in the highway 
exception statute showed that it intended that shoulders be considered as designed 
for vehicular travel. Id. at 315-316. 
The majority concludes that the rationale presented in Gregg is 
unpersuasive. 
It states that Gregg should be overruled because, under the 
majority’s “strict construction” approach, a shoulder is not “designed for vehicular 
travel.” 
MCL 8.3a and numerous recent decisions from this Court emphasize that 
we should give words their ordinary meanings in construing statutes.5  In fact, this 
Court often refers to dictionary definitions to interpret the meanings of words.  A 
dictionary is a codification of the “common experience” meanings of words.  
believe that the Gregg Court properly emphasized the mandate of MCL 8.3a when 
it held that “it seems quite extraordinary, if not fictional, to assume that vehicles 
do not travel on shoulders or that shoulders are not designed for vehicular travel, 
albeit of a temporary sort.” Gregg, supra at 315. 
Moreover, Gregg’s holding is consistent with dictionary definitions for 
“design” and “travel.” 
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1995) 
5 See, e.g., People v Monaco, 474 Mich 48; 710 NW2d 46 (2006); Griffith v 
State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 472 Mich 521, 526; 697 NW2d 895 (2005); 
Halloran v Bhan, 470 Mich 572, 578; 683 NW2d 129 (2004); Gilbert v 
DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749, 763; 685 NW2d 391 (2004); Koontz v 
Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). 
5  
I 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
defines “design” as “to intend for a definite purpose[.]”  It defines “travel” as “to 
move or pass from one place or point to another.” 
Defense counsel’s admission at oral argument comported with the Gregg 
Court’s “common experience” reasoning. Counsel conceded that shoulders are 
designed for vehicular travel “of a sort.”  Emergency vehicles travel on the 
shoulder, and the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) typically 
diverts vehicular traffic onto shoulders during construction.  Given these facts, 
defense counsel admitted that shoulders are designed for travel “of a sort.”6 
Certainly, MDOT would not permit motorists to drive their vehicles from 
one place to another on a portion of the highway that is not designed for vehicular 
travel. These facts, together with traditional notions of statutory construction, 
strongly support Gregg’s reasoning. The majority’s conclusion that the “common 
experience” approach is inconsistent with the statutory language is flawed in light 
of this Court’s current practices and MCL 8.3a. 
The majority also takes issue with Gregg’s use of legislative acquiescence. 
This issue has arisen numerous times in the last several years.  I continue to 
believe that we should consider legislative acquiescence when construing statutes. 
See Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 270-273; 596 NW2d 574 
(1999) (Kelly, J., dissenting).  Since 1971, when appellate cases began defining 
“designed for vehicular travel,” the Legislature has amended the highway 
6 The majority does not even attempt to contradict this admission.   
6  
 
    
 
                                                 
 
 
 
exception three times. But it did not see fit to alter the judicial interpretation of 
those words.7  The Legislature’s acceptance of Gregg is highly persuasive.8 
In summary, I believe that Gregg was correctly decided. I would affirm it 
on the basis of (1) basic accepted principles of statutory interpretation, (2) defense 
counsel’s unrebutted admission that a shoulder is designed for vehicular travel “of 
a sort,” (3) MDOT’s use of shoulders for diversion of vehicular traffic during 
construction, and (4) the fact that the law in question has remained unaltered since 
1971. 
In holding that shoulders are not “designed for vehicular travel,” the 
majority admits that several interpretations are available but chooses the narrowest 
one possible.9  Essentially, it argues that giving the words “designed for vehicular 
travel” their plain ordinary meaning swallows the exception, because a vehicle 
could travel on every improved part of a highway.  This argument has three flaws:   
First, the majority fails to remember that, although drivers rarely travel on 
medians or embankments, they do routinely travel short distances on shoulders. 
7 The Legislature amended the statute in 1990, 1996, and 1999. 
8 The majority asserts that the Court’s ruling in Gregg was based on the 
assumption that the Legislature had acquiesced in the Court’s earlier decisions. 
This ignores the fact that the Gregg Court went further. It based its holding 
primarily on an interpretation of the language of MCL 691.1402(1) that gave an 
ordinary meaning to the word “travel.” 
9 The majority suggests that it does not need to apply Ross v Consumers 
Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984) to this case.  In 
actuality, the majority does apply Ross and reads the statute narrowly. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Moreover, MDOT specifically requires vehicles to travel on shoulders for long 
distances. The same cannot be said for other highway improvements. 
Second, as explained in Wexford Med Group v City of Cadillac,10 a court 
should not make an interpretation not intended by the Legislature because it fears 
what will develop if it interprets the language as written.   Id. at 220 n 10. The 
majority suggests that giving the statute’s language a meaning other than the 
narrowest possible meaning would create the risk of unlimited liability, which is 
something it must avoid.  Its conclusion contradicts Wexford, apparently out of a 
subjective fear. 
Third, the only issue before the Court is whether a shoulder is designed for 
vehicular travel. Whether other improved portions of the highway are designed 
for vehicular travel is a question best left to cases that raise and explore that 
possibility. 
Ultimately, the majority’s reasoning fails because of the language of the 
statute and because of the fact that vehicles do indeed travel on shoulders that 
were designed for travel. 
By contrast, the reasoning in Gregg is soundly 
supported by the meaning of the words in the statute and by common practice. 
Moreover, Gregg is properly in line with the majority’s rules of statutory 
interpretation. 
10 474 Mich 192; ___ NW2d ___ (2006). 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
I would reaffirm this Court’s decision in Gregg  and hold that the shoulder 
of a highway is “designed for vehicular travel” within the meaning of the highway 
exception to governmental immunity.  I base this position on (1) time-honored 
principles of statutory interpretation, (2) defense counsel’s unrebutted admission 
that a shoulder is designed for vehicular travel, (3) MDOT’s actions of actually 
diverting traffic onto the shoulders of highways, and (4) the fact that Michigan 
courts have followed this interpretation since 1971.  Therefore, I would affirm the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
Cavanagh, J., concurred only in the result proposed by Kelly, J. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
9