Title: Moore v. Adams
Citation: 542 P.2d 490
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: November 20, 1975

542 P.2d 490 (1975)
Pearl MOORE, Appellant,
v.
Richard ADAMS and Donna Adams, Respondents.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted September 10, 1975.
Decided November 20, 1975.
*491 Michael E. Clift, Portland, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.
Raymond J. Conboy, Portland, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Donald N. Atchison, and Pozzi, Wilson &amp; Atchison, Portland.
Before O'CONNELL, C.J., and McALLISTER, HOLMAN, TONGUE, HOWELL, and BRYSON JJ.
BRYSON, Justice.
In this action for battery the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. Seven days later plaintiff moved for a new trial on the ground that "[o]ne of defendants' witnesses communicated with members of the jury concerning the merits of the case."[1]
Plaintiff's affidavit in support of her motion states:
The affidavit of Anna Straughn, one of plaintiff's witnesses, was to the same effect.
The trial court received testimony on plaintiff's motion. Nothing was elicited from that testimony that did not appear in plaintiff's affidavit except the testimony of defendants' witness. One of defendants' witnesses controverted the statement of plaintiff by stating no jurors were present when Mr. Reid allegedly made his statement.
The trial court denied plaintiff's motion, and plaintiff appeals.
In denying plaintiff's motion after having heard testimony thereon, the trial court stated:
As stated by the trial judge, the conduct which plaintiff complains of occurred during the noon recess, and plaintiff did not inform either the trial court or her attorney of this matter until several days after the jury had returned a verdict against plaintiff. We have frequently stated that a party who learns the facts regarding the misconduct of a juror or party or any other irregularity which occurred during trial should promptly inform the trial court of such facts. One cannot suppress those facts, in hope of a favorable verdict, and then rely upon the same facts after an adverse verdict has been returned. Cheyne v. Deike, 270 Or. 58, 526 P.2d 557 (1974); Wulff v. Sprouse-Reitz Co., Inc., 262 Or. 293, 315-16, 498 P.2d 766 (1972); Raymond v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 Or. 629, 637-38, 488 P.2d 460 (1971); Transamerica Title Ins. v. Millar, 258 Or. 258, 262-64, 482 P.2d 163 (1971). Cf. Niemela v. Collings, 267 Or. 369, 517 P.2d 268 (1973).
In appeals from the denial of a motion for a new trial, we generally defer to the discretion of the trial court. Beglau v. Albertus, 75 Or.Adv.Sh. 2025, 2033, 536 P.2d 1251 (1975); Snyder v. Hunter Room, Inc., 269 Or. 536, 525 P.2d 1293 (1974). This is because the trial judge is usually in a better position to evaluate the circumstances of each case and the prejudicial effect, if any, of any claimed irregularity. Schmitz v. Yant, 242 Or. 308, 313, 409 P.2d 346 (1965); Johnson v. Kolovos, 224 Or. 266, 275, 355 P.2d 1115 (1960).
In support of her motion plaintiff testified, "there were jurors and a lot of people in the hall" when Mr. Reid made his alleged statement. She further testified, "I don't see how they couldn't hear what he said, because I heard it."
Mrs. Straughn, plaintiff's witness, testified on behalf of the motion as follows:
In her affidavit in support of the motion, Mrs. Straughn states:
Both defendant Richard Adams and defendants' witness, Reid, denied that there were jurors within hearing range of their conversation although they admitted that they did have a conversation. However, it was not in the language related by the plaintiff.
This is the extent of the record. There is no substantial evidence that witness Reid actually conversed with a juror or jurors or prejudicially influenced a juror by his statements. Whether any juror heard Reid's statement or was influenced thereby is a matter of mere speculation because the trial judge did not have the opportunity to interrogate the jurors prior to *493 their deliberation or subsequent discharge. Under these facts we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
Affirmed.
[1]  ORS 17.610:

"A former judgment may be set aside and a new trial granted on the motion of the party aggrieved for any of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of such party:
"* * *.
"(2) Misconduct of the jury or prevailing party.
"* * *."