Title: J. Marshall Osborn v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System
Citation: 2002 WI 83
Docket Number: 2000AP002861
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2002

2002 WI 83 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-2861 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
J. Marshall Osborn and Center for Equal  
Opportunity,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross-Appellants- 
 
Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin 
System,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 209 
Reported at:  247 Wis. 2d 957, 634 N.W.2d 563 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 30, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Stuart A. Schwartz   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents-cross appellants-petitioners 
there were briefs by Daniel Kelly and Reinhart Boerner Van 
Deuren S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Daniel Kelly. 
 
For the defendant-appellant-cross respondent the cause was 
argued by Alan Lee, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Michael D. Dean and 
Dean & McKoy, S.C., Waukesha, and Lucy A. Dalglish, Gregg P. 
Leslie, and Youngmee Moon, Arlington, Virginia, on behalf of the 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and Student Press 
Law Center. 
 
 
2
 
 
2002 WI 83 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-2861  
(L.C. No. 
99-CV-2958) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
J. Marshall Osborn and Center for Equal  
Opportunity,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Board of Regents of the University of  
Wisconsin System,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   In this case, we review a 
court of appeals' decision, Osborn v. Board of Regents of the 
University 
of 
Wisconsin 
System, 
2001 
WI 
App 
209, 
247 
Wis. 2d 957, 634 N.W.2d 563, regarding whether the Board of 
Regents of the University of Wisconsin System (hereinafter the 
University) must provide documents in response to open records 
requests by J. Marshall Osborn and the Center for Equal 
Opportunity (hereinafter referred to collectively as Osborn).  
In 1998 and 1999, Osborn made several open record requests to 
No. 
00-2861   
 
2 
 
the University, seeking records of applicants to its campuses, 
as well as the University of Wisconsin Law School (Law School) 
and the University of Wisconsin Medical School (Medical School).  
The University responded by producing some of the requested 
records, but largely denied Osborn's requests relating to 
information in student application records.  In an effort to 
compel the University to provide the requested records, Osborn 
filed a mandamus action.  The circuit court concluded that the 
University was required to grant the requests relating to 
applicants who had not enrolled at the University, but denied 
Osborn's requests relating to those who matriculated, regardless 
of Osborn's request that personally identifiable information be 
redacted.  The court also concluded, however, that even for 
those applicants who did not matriculate, the University was not 
required to create new records in order to comply with Osborn's 
request. 
¶2 
Both parties appealed and the court of appeals 
affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The court of appeals 
concluded that all records sought——including records of both 
those who matriculated and those who did not——were prohibited 
from disclosure under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000), as amended (hereinafter 
FERPA or the Act)1.  In addition, the court affirmed the circuit 
court's decision refusing to require the University to create 
new records to comply with the open records request. 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise noted, subsequent references to 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g are to the 2000 version. 
No. 
00-2861   
 
3 
 
¶3 
On review, we reverse the court of appeals' decision.  
We 
conclude 
that 
Osborn 
is 
not 
requesting 
personally 
identifiable information; therefore, FERPA does not prohibit 
disclosure of the requested information in this case.  We then 
balance the public policy interests involved and conclude that 
because the request does not seek personally identifiable 
information, there is no overriding public policy interest in 
keeping the requested records confidential.  Further, we 
conclude that based on the statutory requirement to provide 
information subject to disclosure and delete information not 
subject to disclosure as stated in Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6) (1999-
2000),2 the University must redact records, where necessary, in 
order to comply with Osborn's open records requests.  We also 
note that the University is entitled to charge a fee for the 
actual, necessary, and direct cost of complying with these open 
record requests. 
I 
¶4 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  In 1998 and 
1999, Osborn requested public records from the University in 
order to analyze and compare data regarding the admissions 
policies and practices of public institutions of professional 
education.  On April 2, 1998, in nearly identical letters, 
Osborn first requested public records from several of the 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
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4 
 
University's campuses3 relating to applications for undergraduate 
admission for the years 1993 through 1997.  The letter 
enumerated 27 public records requests seeking information in 
student applications, including, for example, high school grade 
point averages, SAT scores, race, socio-economic background, and 
class rank.  Osborn later made virtually the same public records 
request for the same years to the Law School on October 19, 
1999, and to the Medical School on November 10, 1999.4 
¶5 
On June 15, 1998, in response to the original requests 
to the University's undergraduate campuses, the University 
provided several hundred pages of documents in response to 
requests numbered 1 through 5 and 16 through 27.  The University 
also responded to some of those requests by claiming that it 
does not maintain records of the type requested.  With regard to 
Osborn's requests numbered 6 through 15,5 focusing largely on 
                                                 
3 Specifically, Osborn sent the open records request to the 
following:  UW LaCrosse, UW Madison, UW Milwaukee, UW Oshkosh, 
UW Parkside, UW Platteville, UW River Falls, UW Stevens Point, 
UW Stout, UW Superior, UW Whitewater, and UW Law School Madison. 
4 Osborn's records request to the Law School enumerated 28 
requests and the request to the Medical School enumerated 31 
requests.  Again, the open records requests focused on student 
applications, including, for example, information regarding 
race, LSAT (Law School Admissions Test) or MCAT (Medical College 
Admissions Test) scores, undergraduate class rank, undergraduate 
grade point average, and socio-economic background.  The 
requests to the Law School and Medical School were subsequently 
clarified by letters dated January 3, 2000. 
5 Osborn's requests numbered 6 through 15 asked for the 
following information: 
6. 
The math and verbal scores achieved on the 
Scholastic 
Aptitude 
Test 
("SAT") 
and 
the 
No. 
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5 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
composite scores achieved on the American College 
Testing 
Assessment 
("ACT") 
by 
each 
American 
Indian, Asian, black, Hispanic, and white, male 
freshman. 
7. 
The math and verbal scores achieved on the SAT, 
and the composite scores achieved on the ACT, by 
each American Indian, Asian, black, Hispanic, and 
white, male applicant who was denied admission. 
8. 
The math and verbal scores achieved on the SAT, 
and the composite scores achieved on the ACT, by 
each American Indian, Asian, black, Hispanic, and 
white, male applicant who was accepted, but who 
did not enroll. 
9. 
The math and verbal scores achieved on the SAT, 
and the composite scores achieved on the ACT, by 
each American Indian, Asian, black, Hispanic, and 
white, female freshman. 
10. The math and verbal scores achieved on the SAT, 
and the composite scores achieved on the ACT, by 
each American Indian, Asian, black, Hispanic, and 
white, female applicant who was denied admission. 
11. The math and verbal scores achieved on the SAT, 
and the composite scores achieved on the ACT, by 
each American Indian, Asian, black, Hispanic, and 
white, female applicant who was accepted, but who 
did not enroll. 
12. The high-school rank for each American Indian, 
Asian, black, Hispanic, and white, male freshman, 
rejected 
male 
applicant, 
and 
accepted 
male 
applicant who did not enroll. 
13. The high-school rank for each American Indian, 
Asian, 
black, 
Hispanic, 
and 
white, 
female 
freshman, rejected female applicant, and accepted 
female applicant who did not enroll. 
14. The high-school grade point average ("GPA") for 
each American Indian, Asian, black, Hispanic, and 
white, male freshman, rejected male applicant, 
and accepted male applicant who did not enroll. 
No. 
00-2861   
 
6 
 
test scores, grade point averages, and class rank by race and 
sex, the University denied the requests, claiming that such 
personally 
identifiable 
information 
is 
prohibited 
from 
disclosure under FERPA, and because the public interest in 
disclosure is outweighed by the public interest in non-
disclosure. 
 
Moreover, 
the 
University 
claimed 
that 
the 
information sought by those requests is only maintained in 
individual student education records and that extracting the 
information requested would amount to creating a new record, 
which, it argued, is not required under the open records law.   
¶6 
After 
receiving 
the 
University's 
denial, 
Osborn 
attempted to clarify the requests and asked the University to 
reconsider its decision in a subsequent letter, dated June 22, 
1998.  Specifically, Osborn stated in part: 
[I]t was my expectation and intention in requesting 
this information that the various institutions would 
comply 
fully 
with 
the 
provisions 
of . . . Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act . . . by redacting 
"private information."  I did not explicitly specify 
that personally identifiable information should be in 
all cases redacted because this is unquestionably 
required by that provision. 
The University responded to Osborn's letter by maintaining its 
position that education records are not subject to open records 
requests and that the University has no duty to redact or create 
new records. 
                                                                                                                                                             
15. The GPA for each American Indian, Asian, black, 
Hispanic, and white, female freshman, rejected 
female applicant, and accepted female applicant 
who did not enroll. 
No. 
00-2861   
 
7 
 
¶7 
In response to Osborn's requests to the Law School and 
the Medical School, the University similarly provided some 
records, but denied several of the requests, including those for 
test scores, grade point averages, and class rank by race or 
sex.6  Again, the University claimed that the requests asked for 
                                                 
6 Osborn's requests to the Law School numbered 8 through 19 
stated: 
8. 
(a) Whether the applicant is male or female. 
(b) Whether 
the 
applicant 
was 
accepted 
and 
subsequently enrolled; was accepted but did 
not subsequently enroll; or was rejected or 
deferred. 
9. 
Whether the applicant is resident or non-resident 
of the State. 
10. Whether the applicant is American Indian, Asian, 
Non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, or Non-Hispanic 
white. 
11.  (a) The 
first-year 
law 
school 
grade 
point 
average for the enrolled applicant. 
(b) Whether the applicant is classified as a 
remedial student. 
(c) Whether the applicant was eligible to return 
to the law school for a second year of study 
or was placed on academic probation for the 
second year or any part thereof. 
12. The geographical origin within the State of the 
applicant. 
13.  (a) The particular area of academic interest or 
undergraduate major of the applicant. 
(b) The 
extracurricular 
activity 
of 
the 
applicant. 
No. 
00-2861   
 
8 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
14. The scores achieved on the Law School Scholastic 
Aptitude Test ("LSAT") by each applicant and 
dates taken. 
15. The undergraduate rank for each applicant. 
16. The undergraduate grade point average ("GPA") 
used by the Law School for each applicant. 
17. If the Law School adjusts or weighs the GPA of 
any applicant to take into account:  (a) the 
quality of the undergraduate institution and/or 
the quality of the undergraduate courses; (b) the 
professional-school 
level 
of 
undergraduate 
courses 
taken 
through 
any 
form 
of 
dual 
enrollment; 
(c) 
the 
most 
recent 
academic 
performance; (d) performance in specific law 
school preparatory course work; or (e) any other 
factor, then with respect to each such applicant 
-- 
(i) The un-weighted, unadjusted GPA; 
(ii) The form and amount of the adjustment 
factor; and 
(iii)The basis for the form and amount of 
the adjustment factor. 
18. The native language of the applicant, if other 
than English. 
19. If the Law School weighed the socio-economic, 
racial, 
ethnic, 
or 
similar 
background 
of 
applicants to the first-year class as a factor in 
the admission process, please provide the records 
containing any discussion of how these factors 
are considered and any information which might 
thereby affect the admission of the applicant, 
including the family income for each applicant. 
Osborn's requests to the Medical School numbered 9 through 
17, and 22, stated: 
9. 
(a) Whether the applicant is male or female. 
No. 
00-2861   
 
9 
 
personally identifiable information from education records that 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) Whether 
the 
applicant 
was 
accepted 
and 
subsequently enrolled; was accepted but did 
not subsequently enroll; was rejected, or 
was deferred. 
10. Whether the applicant is resident or non-resident 
of the state. 
11. Whether the applicant is American Indian, Asian, 
black, Hispanic, or white. 
12.  (a) The first-year medical school grade point 
average for the enrolled applicant. 
(b) The results of the United States Medical 
Licensing 
Examination 
Step 
1, 
for 
the 
enrolled applicant. 
(c) Whether the applicant is classified as a 
remedial student. 
13. The geographical origin within the state of the 
applicant. 
14.  (a) The 
particular 
areas 
of 
undergraduate 
academic interest or major of the applicant. 
(b) The 
extracurricular 
activity 
of 
the 
applicant. 
15. The 
scores 
achieved 
on 
the 
MCAT 
by 
each 
applicant. 
16. The undergraduate rank for each applicant. 
17. The undergraduate GPA used by the Medical School 
for each applicant. 
22. If the Medical School weighed the socio-economic, 
or other background of applicants to the first-
year class as a factor in the admission process, 
the records containing any information which 
might 
thereby 
affect 
the 
admission 
of 
the 
applicant, including the family income for each 
applicant. 
No. 
00-2861   
 
10 
 
are protected from disclosure by FERPA and public policy.  The 
University also repeated its argument that it is not required to 
create new records by extracting or redacting information. 
¶8 
On April 4, 2000,7 Osborn filed a complaint in Dane 
County Circuit Court, seeking a writ of mandamus8 to compel the 
University to produce the requested documents under Wisconsin's 
Open Records Law, Wis. Stat. § 19.35.9  The University responded 
by filing a motion to dismiss.  On July 19, 2000, the circuit 
court, the Honorable Stuart A. Schwartz, presiding, granted in 
part and denied in part the University's motion.  With regard to 
information relating to applicants who matriculated, the court 
                                                 
7 Osborn originally filed the complaint on December 17, 
1999, but later filed an amended complaint on April 4, 2000.  
The amended complaint substituted the Board of Regents as 
defendant, removing the previously named defendant, Elizabeth 
Rindskopf Parker, General Counsel of the University of Wisconsin 
System, and added allegations.   
8 Osborn filed the writ of mandamus as provided in 
Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1)(a), which states in relevant part: 
If an authority withholds a record or part of a record 
or delays granting access to a record or part of a 
record after a written request for disclosure is made, 
the requester may pursue either, or both, of the 
alternatives under pars. (a) and (b). 
(a) The requester may bring an action for mandamus 
asking a court to order release of the record. 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.35(1) 
is 
the 
statutory 
section 
granting a requester the right to inspect and copy public 
records.  "Except as otherwise provided by law, any requester 
has a right to inspect any record."  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a).  
Moreover, "Except as otherwise provided by law, any requester 
has a right to inspect a record and to make or receive a copy of 
a 
record 
which 
appears 
in 
written 
form."  
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(b). 
No. 
00-2861   
 
11 
 
denied the requests by concluding that the records were 
prohibited from disclosure by FERPA.  In contrast, the court 
granted Osborn's request for records of applicants who had not 
enrolled at the University because such records are not 
protected as education records.  The court also concluded, 
however, that the requested information was found only in the 
individual files of applicants and thus, would require the 
University to create a new record, which is not required under 
the open records law.  The court concluded that in order to 
obtain information regarding applicants who did not matriculate, 
it was Osborn's responsibility to compile the desired data by 
viewing each individual file. 
¶9 
The University appealed and Osborn cross-appealed.  In 
a published decision, the Court of Appeals, District IV, 
affirmed in part and reversed in part.  Osborn, 2001 WI App 209, 
¶25.  First, the court concluded that the University's objection 
based on FERPA is an objection with the requisite degree of 
specificity.  Id. at ¶10.  Then, after looking at the 
definitions of "education records" and "student" in the Code of 
Federal Regulations, the court concluded that all records 
requested by Osborn are specifically exempted from disclosure 
under FERPA.  Id. at ¶15.  The court also concluded that even if 
records of the non-enrollees were not specifically protected by 
FERPA, disclosure was properly denied based on the public policy 
interest in preserving the privacy of student records.  Id. at 
¶19. 
 
The 
court 
declined 
to 
address 
the 
impact 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 118.125 because the case was resolved under federal 
No. 
00-2861   
 
12 
 
law.  Id. at ¶21.  Finally, with regard to the University's 
obligation to redact, the court concluded that § 19.36(6) does 
not require the University to produce the records after 
redacting personally identifiable information.  The court held 
that nothing in FERPA suggests that education records are 
subject to release, even if a student's name is redacted.  The 
court further concluded that because the records are not subject 
to disclosure under § 19.35, "the University is not required to 
review each education record and remove part of it."  Id. at 
¶24. 
¶10 Judge 
Dykman 
dissented. 
 
He 
noted 
the 
strong 
presumption of disclosure of public records in Wisconsin and 
concluded 
that 
public 
policy 
favors 
disclosure 
of 
the 
information Osborn requested.  He indicated that it is the 
University's burden to show that the records should not be 
disclosed and that it has failed to do so in this case.  Id. at 
¶30.  Judge Dykman then rejected the majority opinion's broad 
definition of "student" and concluded that Congress intended a 
limited exception for the records of non-students.  Id. at ¶35.  
Finally, he disagreed with the majority opinion's decision 
regarding the University's obligation to redact.   
Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6) requires the Board of Regents to 
separate 
information 
subject 
to 
disclosure 
from 
information not subject to disclosure, and to then 
disclose the former.  I need not consider whether 
Osborn is entitled to what he describes as "personally 
identifiable information" because he does not seek 
that information. 
Id. at ¶37. 
No. 
00-2861   
 
13 
 
¶11 We subsequently granted Osborn's petition for review. 
II 
¶12 In this case we examine the custodian's reasons for 
denying the open records requests and determine the scope of 
protection from disclosure for education records under FERPA and 
the 
open 
records 
law, 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35. 
 
Statutory 
interpretation and application of the open records law to 
undisputed facts present questions of law that we review de 
novo, benefiting, however, from the analyses of the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  Nichols v. Bennett, 199 
Wis. 2d 268, 273, 544 N.W.2d 428 (1996); Rathie v. N.E. Wis. 
Tech. Inst., 142 Wis. 2d 685, 687, 419 N.W.2d 296 (Ct. App. 
1987). 
¶13 In Wisconsin, we have a presumption of open access to 
public records, which is reflected in both our statutes and our 
case law. 
[I]t is declared to be the public policy of this state 
that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
information regarding the affairs of government and 
the official acts of those officers and employees who 
represent them. . . . The denial of public access 
generally is contrary to the public interest, and only 
in an exceptional case may access be denied. 
Wis. Stat. § 19.31;  see also Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, 
¶15, 
___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 
___ 
N.W.2d ___ 
(recognizing 
the 
presumption that all public records should be open to the 
public); 
Mayfair 
Chrysler-Plymouth 
v. 
Baldarotta 
162 
Wis. 2d 142, 155, 469 N.W.2d 638 (1991) (discussing presumption 
of open access to public records as having been long recognized 
No. 
00-2861   
 
14 
 
in 
Wisconsin); 
Hathaway 
v. 
Green 
Bay 
Sch. 
Dist., 
116 
Wis. 2d 388, 392, 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984) ("Public policy and 
public interest favor the public's right to inspect public 
records."); Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 426-427, 
279 N.W.2d 179 (1979) (recognizing the legislative presumption 
that "where a public record is involved, the denial of 
inspection is contrary to the public policy and the public 
interest").  The open records law, Wis. Stat. § 19.35, provides 
a requester with the procedure to exercise the right to inspect 
a public record and/or to make or receive a copy of a public 
record that appears in written form.  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) 
and (b). 
¶14 The right to inspect public records, however, is not 
absolute.  In certain circumstances, a custodian should deny a 
request to inspect public records.  Access should be denied 
where the legislature or the court has predetermined that the 
public 
interest 
in 
keeping 
a 
public 
record 
confidential 
outweighs the public's right to have access to the documents.  
"Thus, the general presumption of our law is that public records 
shall be open to the public unless there is a clear statutory 
exception, unless there exists a limitation under the common 
law, or unless there is an overriding public interest in keeping 
the public record confidential."  Hathaway, 116 Wis. 2d at 397. 
¶15 After receiving an open records request, a custodian 
should turn to the statutes and to this court's established 
procedural standards to determine whether disclosure of the 
requested public records is proper.  First, the custodian must 
No. 
00-2861   
 
15 
 
determine whether any of the exceptions to open access apply, 
and then "weigh the competing interests involved and determine 
whether permitting inspection would result in harm to the public 
interest which outweighs the legislative policy recognizing the 
public interest in allowing inspection."  Breier, 89 Wis. 2d at 
427.  If the custodian decides that the open records request 
should be denied, then the custodian must state the specific 
policy reasons relied on to make that determination.  Mayfair, 
162 Wis. 2d at 157; Breier, 89 Wis. 2d at 427; see also 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4). 
 
Further, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.35(4)(b), if the custodian "denies a written request in 
whole or in part, the requester shall receive from the authority 
a written statement of the reasons for denying the written 
request." 
¶16 In reviewing a mandamus action seeking to compel the 
custodian to disclose the requested public records, we first 
examine the sufficiency of the custodian's stated reasons for 
denying the request.  Rathie, 142 Wis. 2d at 687.  The threshold 
question is whether the custodian stated legally specific 
reasons for denying the open records request.  Mayfair, 162 
Wis. 2d at 158.  It is not this court's role to hypothesize or 
consider reasons to deny the request that were not asserted by 
the custodian.  Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417.  If the custodian states 
insufficient reasons for denying access, then the writ of 
mandamus compelling disclosure must issue.  Oshkosh Northwestern 
Co. v. Oshkosh Library Bd., 125 Wis. 2d 480, 486, 373 N.W.2d 459 
(Ct. App. 1985). 
No. 
00-2861   
 
16 
 
¶17 Here, the University denied Osborn's open records 
requests by stating: (1) disclosure of the requested information 
would violate FERPA, (2) the public interest in the disclosure 
of the requested records is outweighed by the public interest in 
non-disclosure, and (3) complying with the request would 
essentially require the University to create a new record, which 
is not required under the open records law.  The parties here do 
not dispute that the University's reasons for denying Osborn's 
requests satisfy the custodian's duty to state specifically the 
policy reasons for 
denial. 
 
See 
Chvala 
v. 
Bubolz, 204 
Wis. 2d 82, 87-88, 552 N.W.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1996) (concluding 
that there are some statutes, including FERPA, "that leave no 
room for explanation or discretion when applied to an open 
records case").  We conclude that the University stated legally 
specific reasons for denying Osborn's requests, thus, we review 
each of the University's stated reasons in turn.  
III 
¶18 We begin by examining the scope of FERPA and whether 
the University correctly relied on the Act as a basis for 
denying Osborn's requests.  FERPA conditions the availability of 
funds to educational agencies and institutions based on their 
policies and practices regarding open access to education 
records.  Specifically, the Act provides in relevant part: 
No funds shall be made available under any applicable 
program to any educational agency or institution which 
has a policy or practice of permitting the release of 
education 
records 
(or 
personally 
identifiable 
information contained therein other than directory 
information . . . ) of students without the written 
No. 
00-2861   
 
17 
 
consent of their parents to any individual, agency, or 
organization. . . .  
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (emphasis added).10  Before discussing 
the applicability of FERPA to the open records requests at issue 
here, we note that, on its face, the Act does not prohibit 
disclosure of the records Osborn has requested from the 
University.  In fact, FERPA does not prohibit disclosure of any 
documents.  Rather, FERPA operates to deprive an educational 
agency or institution of funds if "education records (or 
personally identifiable information contained therein . . . )" 
are disclosed without consent.  20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1).  We do 
not question the importance of, and the University's interest 
in, receiving funding; therefore, we interpret FERPA here 
according to what records or information the University can 
disclose without jeopardizing its eligibility for funding. 
¶19 The dispute here is to what extent, if any, FERPA 
protects from disclosure the records Osborn has requested from 
the University.  We note that this issue, the scope of 
protection for records under FERPA, is one of first impression 
in Wisconsin. 
¶20 In 
denying 
Osborn's 
open 
records 
requests, 
the 
University relied on FERPA, claiming  that the requested records 
are "education records" which, under FERPA and Wisconsin's open 
                                                 
10 The United States Supreme Court recently addressed FERPA 
and held that the Act's nondisclosure provisions fail to confer 
individual enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Gonzaga 
University v. Doe, 536 U.S. ___, 122 S. Ct. 628 (June 20, 2002).  
We have reviewed the Court's decision and it has no effect on 
our ruling here. 
No. 
00-2861   
 
18 
 
records law, are excepted from the general rule of inspection.  
The University interprets FERPA to protect all information 
contained 
in 
education records, including 
the 
information 
requested here.  Specifically, the University argues that 
student records include records of applicants who subsequently 
attend the University, as well as records of applicants who do 
not matriculate.  The University seems to contend that all 
student records contain only personal information, and not any 
information that is subject to disclosure because of an open 
records request.  According to the University, because Osborn's 
requests are for information regarding each applicant for 
enrollment, on their face, the requests are for personally 
identifiable information protected from disclosure by FERPA. 
¶21 In contrast, Osborn 
argues 
that 
FERPA 
prohibits 
disclosure of information contained in education records in only 
two situations, neither of which is present here.  First, he 
argues that FERPA prohibits disclosure of an entire education 
record.  Second, FERPA prohibits disclosure of personally 
identifiable information in an education record.  Osborn claims 
that because the open records requests here do not ask for 
entire education records, nor do the requests ask for personally 
identifiable 
information, 
the 
Act 
does 
not 
prohibit 
the 
University from complying with his open records requests.  
Specifically, Osborn looks to the language of FERPA and argues 
that the parenthetical portion of the Act, "(or personally 
identifiable information contained therein other than directory 
information . . . )," demonstrates that some of the information 
No. 
00-2861   
 
19 
 
in an education record may be released.  Osborn claims that the 
purpose of the parenthetical is to explain to educational 
agencies and institutions that the information they release must 
not be capable of identifying a particular student.  According 
to Osborn, therefore, FERPA does not prohibit the release of all 
information in an education record and, furthermore, does not 
prohibit the release of the information requested here. 
¶22 We conclude, based on the plain language of FERPA, 
that the Act prohibits non-consensual disclosure of personally 
identifiable information contained within education records.11  
The plain language of FERPA protects from disclosure "education 
records 
(or 
personally 
identifiable 
information 
contained 
therein other than directory information . . . )."  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g(b)(1).  Based on this unambiguous language, it is clear 
that FERPA protects the disclosure of education records.  It is 
also clear, however, that FERPA does not prohibit disclosure of 
all information contained in such records.  The Act itself 
indicates that directory information, which is part of an 
education record, is subject to release.  Furthermore, as Osborn 
notes, the parenthetical referring to personally identifiable 
                                                 
11 We do not address Osborn's interpretation of FERPA as 
prohibiting disclosure of education records "in their entirety" 
because it is unnecessary to do so.  We focus on the scope of 
FERPA regarding personally identifiable information because once 
personally identifiable information is deleted, by definition, a 
record is no longer an education record since it is no longer 
directly related to a student.  See 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(A) 
(defining education records in part as a records which "contain 
information directly related to a student"). 
No. 
00-2861   
 
20 
 
information would be meaningless if FERPA prohibited disclosure 
of all information in education records.  When interpreting a 
statute, we attempt to give effect to every word, so as not to 
render any portion of the statute superfluous.  Landis v. 
Physicians Ins. Co., 2001 WI 86, ¶16, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 
N.W.2d 893.  We, therefore, interpret FERPA by giving effect to 
the 
parenthetical 
reference 
to 
personally 
identifiable 
information.  Accordingly, we conclude that FERPA prohibits non-
consensual disclosure of personally identifiable information 
contained in education records. 
¶23 In order to determine if the requested information is 
personally 
identifiable 
and 
subject 
to 
protection 
from 
disclosure, we look to the regulations adopted to implement 
FERPA.  Specifically, 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (2000) defines personally 
identifiable information as follows: 
Personally identifiable information includes, but is 
not limited to: 
(a) The student's name; 
(b) The name of the student's parent or other 
family member; 
(c) The address of the student or student's 
family; 
(d) A personal identifier, such as the student's 
social security number or student number; 
(e) A list of personal characteristics that 
would make the student's identity easily 
traceable; or 
(f) Other 
information 
that 
would 
make 
the 
student's identity easily traceable. 
No. 
00-2861   
 
21 
 
Based on this definition, we conclude that only if the open 
records request seeks information that would make a student's 
identity traceable, may a custodian rely on FERPA to deny the 
request on the basis that it seeks personally identifiable 
information. 
¶24 While we base our interpretation of FERPA on the plain 
language of the Act itself, we note that our interpretation of 
FERPA here is consistent with Wisconsin's prior interpretation 
of 
FERPA 
in 
Rathie 
v. 
Northeastern 
Wisconsin 
Technical 
Institute, 142 Wis. 2d 685, 419 N.W.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1987).12  
Although Rathie did not address, directly, the scope of 
protection under FERPA, we note that our interpretation of FERPA 
                                                 
12 Our interpretation of FERPA is also consistent with 
interpretations of the Act in other jurisdictions.  See Tarka v. 
Franklin, 891 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1989) ("A student's or 
parent's consent is required where personally identifiable 
information from the educational records of a student is to be 
disclosed."); Doe v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 918 F. Supp. 181, 
184 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (applying FERPA by focusing on whether the 
information disclosed was personally identifiable); Norwood v. 
Slammons, 788 F. Supp. 1020, 1026 (W.D. Ark. 1991) ("Before 
personally identifiable information from the education records 
of a student may be disclosed, the consent of the student or 
parent must be obtained."); Mattie T. v. Johnston, 74 F.R.D. 
498, 501 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (holding that FERPA does not apply 
when a subpoena allows the custodian to delete or cover up 
personally identifiable information in the requested documents); 
Human Rights Auth. of the State of Ill. Guardianship & Advocacy 
Comm'n v. Miller, 464 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) 
(comparing Illinois Student Records Act to FERPA as "affect[ing] 
only records containing personally identifiable information"); 
Kryston v. Bd. of Educ. of the E. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 77 
A.D. 2d 896, 897 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (holding that release of 
"scrambled" test scores would not constitute disclosure of 
personally identifiable information under FERPA). 
No. 
00-2861   
 
22 
 
here is consistent with that opinion.  In Rathie, the court of 
appeals addressed FERPA in the context of an open records 
request for attendance and grade forms, including the name, 
social security number, telephone number, class attendance 
record, and final grade of each student enrolled in courses at 
the Northeastern Wisconsin Technical Institute (NWTI) (now 
Northeastern Wisconsin Technical College (NWTC)).  Based on the 
language and purpose of FERPA, the court held that the custodian 
of the requested attendance and grade records properly denied 
the open records request.  Id. at 695. 
¶25 The court first examined the language of FERPA itself, 
and also looked at regulations adopted to protect and enforce 
students' 
right 
to 
privacy, 
including 
the 
definition 
of 
personally identifiable information in 34 C.F.R. § 99.3.  Id. at 
690-691.  The court did not interpret FERPA as prohibiting 
disclosure of all information in education records.  To the 
contrary, the court relied on the same personally identifiable 
information distinction we rely on here. 
The 
Act 
does 
provide 
that 
certain 
personally 
identifiable 
information 
may 
be 
released 
without 
written consent under certain conditions.  Specific 
categories of personally identifiable information may 
be 
designated 
as 
"directory 
information," 
for 
example . . . . 
Id. at 692.  The court concluded, however, that NWTI had not 
designated categories of personally identifiable information as 
directory information, and that the requested information was 
personally identifiable information which is protected by FERPA.  
Id. at 691, 692.   
No. 
00-2861   
 
23 
 
¶26 Next, the court in Rathie examined the purpose of 
FERPA.  Looking to the congressional record, the court quoted 
the purpose of the Act as asserted by its sponsors. 
The purpose of the Act is two-fold——to assure parents 
of students, and students themselves if they are over 
the 
age 
of 
18 
or 
attending 
an 
institution 
or 
postsecondary education, access to their education 
records and to protect such individuals' rights to 
privacy by limiting the transferability of their 
records without their consent. 
Id. at 693 (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 39862 (Dec. 13, 1974) (Joint 
Statement in Explanation of Buckley/Pell Amendment) (emphasis 
supplied)).  The court noted that the privacy protection is 
"secured 
by 
the 
regulations 
adopted . . . allowing 
the 
institution to release personally identifiable student records 
'only upon written consent.'"  Id. at 694 (quoting S. Rep. No. 
93-1026, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 186, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Admin. News 4250).  Finally, the court concluded that 
because the requested information was personally identifiable, 
the public policy basis for nondisclosure outweighs the interest 
in disclosure.  Id. 
¶27 Our interpretation of FERPA here is consistent with 
Rathie and the stated purpose of the Act itself.  Similar to 
Rathie, we conclude that non-consensual access to information in 
education records is not wholly forbidden.  Rather, access is 
limited only to disclosure of information that is not personally 
identifiable.  We agree that an institution may release 
personally identifiable information contained in an education 
No. 
00-2861   
 
24 
 
record, but only upon written consent, unless it is directory 
information. 
¶28 We now turn to Osborn's open records requests and 
apply our interpretation of FERPA here.  We focus on whether 
Osborn's requests seek personally identifiable information as 
defined in 34 C.F.R. § 99.3.  Osborn is not requesting the 
student's name, the name of the student's parent or other family 
member, the address of the student or student's family, or a 
personal identifier such as the student's social security 
number.  We, therefore, must determine whether the requested 
information is a list of personal characteristics or other 
information that would make the student's identity easily 
traceable. 
¶29 The disputed open records requests here focus largely 
on test scores, class rank, grade point average, race, gender, 
ethnicity, and socio-economic background.  At oral argument, 
Osborn's counsel clarified that at a minimum, Osborn needs the 
following information to accomplish stated research goals:  test 
scores, grade point average, race, gender, and ethnicity.  
Furthermore, Osborn has maintained that the University should 
comply with FERPA by redacting all personally identifiable 
information.  In fact, as early as June 22, 1998, Osborn wrote 
the University: 
[I]t was my expectation and intention in requesting 
this information that the various institutions would 
comply fully with the provisions of the Buckley 
Amendment, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. 1232g, as amended, by redacting 
"private information."  I did not explicitly specify 
No. 
00-2861   
 
25 
 
that personally identifiable information should be in 
all cases redacted because this is unquestionably 
required by that provision. 
 . . . . 
In compliance with the Buckley Amendment, the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. 
1232g, as 
amended, 
please redact 
all 
personally 
identifiable information. . . .  
¶30 Based on the written requests and his counsel's 
statements at oral argument, we conclude that Osborn is not 
requesting personally identifiable information.  The list of 
somewhat 
minimal 
information 
Osborn 
requests——grade 
point 
average, test scores, race, gender, and ethnicity (if recorded)—
— is not sufficient, by itself, to trace the identity of an 
applicant.  Although we recognize that in a small number of 
situations the requested information could possibly create a 
list of characteristics that would make an individual personally 
identifiable, we conclude that under the circumstances here, the 
information is not personally identifiable.  Specifically, we 
find it significant that the name of the high school or 
undergraduate institution is not included in Osborn's list of 
necessary information.  With the name of the institution 
excluded, we conclude that it becomes significantly more 
difficult, if not impossible, to identify an individual based 
only on the data Osborn has requested.  For example, by 
redacting 
or 
deleting 
the 
name 
of 
the 
high 
school 
or 
undergraduate institution, the University no longer faces a 
situation where only one minority student from a named high 
school 
applies 
to 
one 
of 
the 
University's 
campuses 
and 
No. 
00-2861   
 
26 
 
therefore, even though the student's name is not disclosed, the 
data could be personally identifiable.  By complying with 
Osborn's requests and only disclosing the requested information, 
however, we conclude that the public records requests here do 
not seek personally identifiable information. 
¶31 Furthermore, we find it significant that Osborn is 
asking the University to comply with FERPA and provide only the 
requested information that is not personally identifiable.  As 
previously noted, at oral argument Osborn's counsel provided a 
list of minimal information needed to accomplish the desired 
research objectives.  Osborn's counsel also indicated, however, 
that to the extent this requested information is personally 
identifiable, the University should state it as such and refuse 
disclosure.  We conclude that Osborn's list of minimal necessary 
information is not a list of personal characteristics that would 
make a student's identity easily traceable.  We do not intend, 
however, to deprive the University of a discretionary decision, 
in an individual case, to conclude that providing Osborn's list 
of minimal necessary information would involve disclosure of 
personally identifiable characteristics.  The University should 
comply with FERPA and, in those few situations, refuse to 
disclose the information if it would indeed involve the release 
of personally identifiable information.  We are satisfied that 
as long as the University complies with Osborn's requests and 
provides the somewhat minimal information necessary for Osborn's 
research, in all but a very few situations the disclosed data 
would be about the applicant, but not traceable to the 
No. 
00-2861   
 
27 
 
applicant's identity.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
University inappropriately relied on FERPA in denying Osborn's 
open records request, because FERPA does not prohibit disclosure 
of records where personally identifiable information is not 
included. 
¶32 Finally, we note that because we conclude that Osborn 
is not requesting personally identifiable information, we do not 
reach the issue of whether application records of those persons 
who did not matriculate are education records protected under 
FERPA.  It is unnecessary, here, to decide that question.  Since 
we conclude that none of Osborn's open records requests seek 
personally identifiable information, and thus, do not violate 
FERPA, it is unnecessary to distinguish between requests 
relating to applicants who subsequently enrolled and requests 
relating to applicants who did not matriculate. 
IV 
¶33 The University's second stated reason for denying 
Osborn's open records requests was based on public policy.  The 
University claimed that the requested information "implicates 
the personal privacy and reputational interests of individual 
students and applications for admission."  Accordingly, the 
University balanced the interests involved and concluded that 
"[t]he public interest in the disclosure of these records is 
outweighed by the public interest in nondisclosure."   
¶34 The University argues that Wisconsin's public records 
law exempts application records of students from disclosure.  
According to the University, the records of applicants contain 
No. 
00-2861   
 
28 
 
only 
personal 
information, 
not 
information 
subject 
to 
disclosure, so none of the information Osborn requests from the 
application records is accessible under the open records law.  
The 
University 
argues 
here, 
by 
analogy, 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 118.12513 is Wisconsin's equivalent to FERPA and 
that by following the analysis in State ex rel. Blum v. Board of 
Education, 209 Wis. 2d 377, 385, 565 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1997), 
it is clear that the public policy reflected by § 118.125 
                                                 
13 We decline to address specifically the parties' arguments 
here 
regarding 
whether 
Wis. Stat. § 118.125 
protects 
the 
requested documents from disclosure, because the University did 
not use this statute, originally, as a reason for denying access 
to the records.  See Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 
427, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979) (It is not the court's role to 
consider reasons for not allowing inspection that were not 
asserted by the custodian.).  We, therefore, consider and 
address § 118.125 only in the context of the University's public 
policy argument. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 118.125(1)(d) defines pupil records as 
follows: 
"Pupil 
records" 
means 
all 
records 
relating 
to 
individual pupils maintained by a school but does not 
include notes or records maintained for personal use 
by a teacher or other person who is required by the 
state superintendent under s. 115.28(7) to hold a 
certificate, license or permit if such records and 
notes are not available to others, nor does it include 
records necessary for, and available only to persons 
involved in, the psychological treatment of a pupil. 
With 
regard 
to 
the 
confidentiality 
of 
pupil 
records, 
§ 118.125(2) states in relevant part:  "All pupil records 
maintained by a public school shall be confidential . . . ." 
No. 
00-2861   
 
29 
 
provides an exception to the presumption of access to records 
under the open records law.14 
¶35 In Blum, the court of appeals concluded that an open 
records request by a student seeking interim grades for herself 
and another student, required disclosure of pupil records exempt 
from access under the open records law by the statutory 
exception set forth in Wis. Stat. § 118.125.  Id. at 385.  The 
court concluded that the grades were a "record" for the purposes 
of the open records law, but that they were also pupil records 
that 
must 
be 
kept 
confidential 
under 
§ 118.125(2).  
Significantly, the court noted that the identity of the other 
student, even if not stated, would be easily identifiable.  The 
court then stated, "nothing in § 118.125 suggests that 'pupil 
records' are exempted from the confidentiality requirement if 
released under a guise of anonymity."  Id. at 384-385.  The 
University argues that Blum, in combination with Rathie, which 
we discussed earlier, establishes that federal and state 
policies require that the application records requested here 
should not be released.   
¶36 In contrast, Osborn and Amicus Curiae, The Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press and Student Press Law Center 
                                                 
14 We 
note 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 118.125(2) 
addresses 
the 
confidentiality of "[a]ll pupil records maintained by a public 
school."  For the purposes of that statute, public schools are 
defined in § 115.01(1) as "the elementary and high schools 
supported by public taxation."  Accordingly, we emphasize that 
to the extent we examine § 118.125, we do so only in the context 
of public policy considerations. 
No. 
00-2861   
 
30 
 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Amicus"), argue that 
Wisconsin's public policy favors openness of records and that 
public access should be denied only in exceptional cases.  In 
support of its position, Osborn cites the declaration of policy 
in the open records law, Wis. Stat. § 19.31, indicating that 
Wisconsin prefers open government and public accountability 
unless 
there 
is 
an 
exceptionally 
good 
reason 
for 
confidentiality.  Osborn also cites this court's precedent 
expressing a presumption of open access.  See ¶13, supra. 
¶37 Applied here, Osborn and Amicus argue that there are 
important policy reasons for making the requested information 
available.  Disclosing data from student applications allows the 
public 
to 
research 
and 
conduct 
studies 
to 
gauge 
the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of the University's admissions 
practices and policies.  Specifically, Osborn and Amicus argue 
that open access to application records keeps the actions of 
public universities accountable.  Furthermore, with regard to 
Wisconsin's public policy as applied in Blum, Osborn and Amicus 
argue that it does not apply here because the "guise of 
anonymity" is not penetrable.  In Blum, the records of the two 
students would be clearly traceable to the students' identities.  
Here, however, the requested information is not personally 
identifiable.  According to Osborn, therefore, there is no 
justification to prohibit disclosure of the requested records 
based on Blum. 
¶38 Finally, Osborn and Amicus argue that when balancing 
the public policy interests here, we should conclude that the 
No. 
00-2861   
 
31 
 
presumption of openness prevails.  Public policies favoring 
disclosure, including the presumption of openness, are to be 
weighed against the harm to the public interest in disclosing 
the requested information.  See Milwaukee Teachers' Ed. Ass'n v. 
Milwaukee 
Bd. 
of 
Sch. 
Dirs., 
227 
Wis. 2d 779, 
786, 
596 
N.W.2d 403 (1999); Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 183, 
549 N.W.2d 699 (1996); Wis. Newspress v. Sheboygan Falls Sch. 
Dist., 199 Wis. 2d 768, 781, 546 N.W.2d 143 (1996); Breier, 89 
Wis. 2d at 437; Kraemer Brothers, Inc. v. Dane County, 229 
Wis. 2d 86, 101, 599 N.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1999); Rathie, 142 
Wis. 2d at 694.  Osborn and Amicus argue that unlike Rathie, 
where the student records involved were personally identifiable, 
when applying the balancing test here the court should conclude 
that the public's interest in inspection and openness outweighs 
any potential detriment to the public interest in disclosure.  
The requested 
information 
is not 
personally 
identifiable.  
According to Osborn and Amicus, therefore, this is not an 
exceptional case where, contrary to the presumption of openness, 
access should be denied. 
¶39 We agree.  We begin by applying the presumption of 
openness in Wisconsin, and pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.31, 
access should be denied only in an exceptional case.  We have 
already concluded that the specific statutory exception of FERPA 
does not preclude disclosure of the requested records, and we 
now conclude that there is no overriding public interest in 
keeping the requested records confidential.  See Hathaway, 116 
Wis. 2d at 397. 
No. 
00-2861   
 
32 
 
¶40 We conclude that applying the balancing test here 
produces a different result than Blum and Rathie.  In both of 
those cases, either because they were small in number or because 
they 
included 
specific 
information, 
the requested records 
contained personally identifiable information.  We have already 
concluded 
here 
that 
Osborn 
is 
not 
requesting 
personally 
identifiable information.  Any detriment to the public interest, 
such as a privacy or reputational interest, therefore, is not 
present.  In contrast, the public interest in open access and 
the 
ability 
to 
analyze 
data 
regarding 
the 
University's 
admissions policies and procedures remains.  After weighing 
these competing public policy interests, we conclude that the 
presumption of openness and access to public records prevails; 
public policy favors disclosure in this case.  We reiterate that 
Wisconsin prefers open government and public accountability, and 
"only in an exceptional case may access be denied."  § 19.31.  
This is not an exceptional case.  We conclude, therefore, that 
the University inappropriately relied on public policy to deny 
Osborn's open records requests. 
V 
¶41 The University's final reason for denying Osborn's 
open records request was that in order to comply with the 
request, the University would have to essentially create a new 
record, which is not required under the open records law.  
Specifically, 
the 
University 
noted 
that 
the 
requested 
information regarding test scores, grade point averages, race, 
etc., 
is 
maintained 
only 
in 
the 
individual 
records 
of 
No. 
00-2861   
 
33 
 
applicants.  The University then cited Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(L) 
and stated, "Custodians of public records are not required to 
create new records by extracting information from existing 
records and compiling it in a new format.  For this additional 
reason, disclosure of the records requested must be denied." 
¶42 We begin by examining the statutes regarding a 
custodian's duty to redact.  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(L) states:  
"Except as necessary to comply with pars. (c) to (e) or s. 
19.36(6), this subsection does not require an authority to 
create a new record by extracting information from existing 
records and compiling the information in a new format."  As 
noted, § 19.35 must be read in conjunction with § 19.36(6), 
which relates to the separation of information for access under 
the open records law.   
If a record contains information that is subject to 
disclosure 
under 
s. 
19.35(1)(a) 
or 
(am) 
and 
information that is not subject to such disclosure, 
the authority having custody of the record shall 
provide the information that is subject to disclosure 
and delete the information that is not subject to 
disclosure from the record before release. 
§ 19.36(6) (emphasis added).   
¶43 The University argues that compliance with Osborn's 
requests would require the University to redact information from 
thousands of documents and that, under the circumstances, 
redacting 
the 
personally 
identifiable 
information 
would 
No. 
00-2861   
 
34 
 
essentially require the University to create a new record.15  The 
University recognizes that redaction, by itself, does not result 
in creation of a new record.  In this case, however, the 
University contends that the burden to redact is much larger 
than that required by the open records law.  In support of this 
position, the University relies on Schopper v. Gehring, 210 
Wis. 2d 208, 213, 565 N.W.2d 187 (1997), where the court of 
appeals concluded that an open records request that would 
require a custodian to copy 180 hours of tape is an insufficient 
request under § 19.35(1)(h)16 because it is not reasonably 
limited by subject matter or length of time.  The University 
analogizes this case to the burden in Schopper of transcribing 
180 hours of tape and concludes that the public records law does 
                                                 
15 We 
recognize 
that 
the 
University 
makes 
two 
other 
arguments regarding redaction.  First, the University argues 
that Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6) does not apply here because the 
application records do not contain any information that is 
subject to disclosure.  Second, the University argues that even 
if obvious identifiers have been redacted, the redaction might 
not be sufficient to protect the confidentiality of personally 
identifiable information.  Both of these arguments relate to our 
conclusions in Section III of this opinion, mainly, that Osborn 
is not requesting personally identifiable information and that 
the information requested does not result in a list of 
characteristics or other information making the identity of the 
applicant traceable.  Since we have already addressed these 
issues, we decline to address them again in the context of the 
University's arguments regarding redaction. 
16 Wisconsin  Stat. § 19.35(1)(h) states in relevant part:  
"A request under pars. (a) to (f) is deemed sufficient if it 
reasonably describes the requested record or the information 
requested.  However, a request for a record without a reasonable 
limitation as to subject matter or length of time represented by 
the record does not constitute a sufficient request." 
No. 
00-2861   
 
35 
 
not require it to expend numerous hours and dollars redacting 
records to comply with Osborn's request. 
¶44 In contrast to the University's position, Osborn and 
Amicus argue that the University has a statutory duty to redact 
information that is not subject to disclosure, and then disclose 
the remaining requested information.  Osborn looks directly to 
the language in Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6) and argues that the 
legislature enacted the statute exactly for the circumstances 
present in this case——where some information is subject to 
disclosure and some is not.  The legislature instructed that in 
this 
type 
of 
situation 
a 
custodian 
"shall 
provide 
the 
information that is subject to disclosure and delete the 
information that is not subject to disclosure from the record 
before release."  § 19.36(6) (emphasis added).  By using the 
word "shall," Osborn and Amicus argue that a custodian may not 
refuse to redact.  Rather, the custodian has a duty to comply 
with the statute and separate information subject to disclosure 
from information that is not. 
¶45 We agree with Osborn and conclude that the University 
must comply with the statutory duty to delete or redact 
information not subject to disclosure.  Section 19.36(6) 
specifically 
addresses 
this 
situation 
where 
some 
of 
the 
information in the applicants' records is subject to disclosure, 
but some is not.  We have concluded that the University must 
comply with Osborn's open records requests regarding the minimal 
information Osborn needs to fulfill research goals.  The 
applicants' 
records, 
however, 
also 
contain 
personally 
No. 
00-2861   
 
36 
 
identifiable information that Osborn is not requesting and that 
we are not ordering the University to disclose.  The information 
in the applicants' records, therefore, must be separated as 
instructed in § 19.36(6).  The unambiguous and instructive word 
"shall" does not give a custodian, under these circumstances, 
the option of separating the information or simply denying the 
open records request.  Rather, we conclude that the statute 
requires the custodian to provide the information subject to 
disclosure and delete or redact the information that is not.  
Applied here, the University must comply with § 19.36(6) by 
providing the information subject to Osborn's open records 
requests and delete or redact the information that is not. 
¶46 Furthermore, we reject the University's reliance on 
Schopper because that argument is misplaced.  The University is 
not relieved of its duty to redact under Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6) 
simply because the University believes it is burdensome.17  
Schopper was decided under § 19.35(1)(h) as an insufficient 
request as to subject matter or length of time.  The University 
does not raise the same argument here.  Instead, the University 
                                                 
17 In a motion to strike portions of the University's brief 
and at oral argument, Osborn's counsel noted, in response to the 
University's burdensome argument, that if the University had 
argued its burdensome position in the circuit court and if given 
the opportunity to respond to that argument, Osborn would 
provide evidence that 16 other Universities have complied with 
similar public records requests.  We deny Osborn's motion to 
strike portions of the University's brief, since we have 
considered and rejected the arguments to which counsel objected.  
We note, however, that although it is not controlling, the fact 
that 16 other Universities have complied with similar requests 
is certainly of some persuasive value. 
No. 
00-2861   
 
37 
 
attempts 
to 
use 
language 
in 
Schopper 
relating 
to 
"an 
unreasonable burden" on the custodian, and apply it here to 
excuse it from the statutory duty to redact.  We reject the 
University's argument.  It uses the language in Schopper out of 
context.  In addition, we note that under the open records law, 
the University is not required, by itself, to bear the cost of 
producing documents in response to Osborn's request.  Under 
§ 19.35(3)18, the University may impose a fee on Osborn for the 
                                                 
18 Wisconsin  Stat. § 19.35(3) states: 
(3) FEES.  (a)  An authority may impose a fee upon the 
requester of a copy of a record which may not exceed the actual, 
necessary and direct cost of reproduction and transcription of 
the record, unless a fee is otherwise specifically established 
or authorized to be established by law. 
(b) Except as otherwise provided by law or as authorized 
to be prescribed by law an authority may impose a fee upon the 
requester of a copy of a record that does not exceed the actual, 
necessary and direct cost of photographing and photographic 
processing if the authority provides a photograph of a record, 
the form of which does not permit copying. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided by law or as authorized 
to be prescribed by law, an authority may impose a fee upon a 
requester for locating a record, not exceeding the actual, 
necessary and direct cost of location, if the cost is $50 or 
more. 
(d) An authority may impose a fee upon a requester for the 
actual, necessary and direct cost of mailing or shipping of any 
copy or photograph of a record which is mailed or shipped to the 
requester. 
(e) An authority may provide copies of a record without 
charge or at a reduced charge where the authority determines 
that waiver or reduction of the fee is in the public interest. 
No. 
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38 
 
location, 
reproduction 
or 
photographic 
processing 
of 
the 
requested records, but the fee may not exceed the actual, 
necessary and direct cost of complying with the open records 
requests. 
¶47 Based 
on 
the 
unambiguous 
language 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6), we conclude that the University has a 
duty to comply with Osborn's open records requests by redacting 
or deleting the information that is not subject to disclosure.  
We previously concluded that Osborn is not requesting personally 
identifiable information that is protected from disclosure 
either by FERPA or by public policy considerations.  Consistent 
with Osborn's open records requests, therefore, the University 
must comply with § 19.36 by redacting or deleting personally 
identifiable information in the application records, before 
releasing the information subject to disclosure. 
VI 
¶48 In summary, we reverse the court of appeals' decision.  
We have concluded that Osborn is not requesting personally 
identifiable information.  Consequently, the University cannot 
rely on FERPA to prohibit the disclosure of the requested 
                                                                                                                                                             
(f) An authority may require prepayment by a requester of 
any fee or fees imposed under this subsection if the total 
amount exceeds $5.  If the requester is a prisoner, as defined 
in s. 301.01(2), or is a person confined in a federal 
correctional institution located in this state, and he or she 
has failed to pay any fee that was imposed by the authority for 
a request made previously by that requester, the authority may 
require prepayment both of the amount owed for the previous 
request and the amount owed for the current request. 
No. 
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39 
 
information found in student application records.  We have 
balanced 
the 
public 
policy 
interests 
involved, 
and 
have 
concluded 
that 
because 
the 
requested 
information 
is 
not 
personally identifiable, there is no overriding public policy 
interest 
in 
keeping 
the 
requested 
records 
confidential.  
Finally, we have addressed the University's duty to redact under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6) and have concluded that the unambiguous 
language of the statute requires the University to provide the 
information that is subject to disclosure, and to redact or 
delete the information that is not.  Consistent with Osborn's 
open records requests and FERPA, therefore, the University must 
redact or delete personally identifiable information in the 
application records before releasing the information subject to 
disclosure.  We have also noted that the University is entitled 
to charge a fee for the actual, necessary and direct cost of 
complying with these open records requests. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
¶49 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate. 
 
 
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