Title: Terry Summerlin v. Sharon Summerlin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1051470
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2007

REL:01/12/2007 Summerlin v. Summerlin
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1051470
_________________________
Terry Summerlin
v.
Sharon Summerlin
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-05-3893)
SMITH, Justice.
Terry Summerlin appeals from a partial summary judgment
entered in favor of Sharon Summerlin by the Mobile Circuit
Court.  We set aside the trial court's certification of the
1051470
2
summary judgment as final under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
On July 23, 2005, Thomas R. Summerlin, 38, and his 7-
year-old stepson, Noah C. Butler, were on the beach in Gulf
Shores when they were struck by lightning and killed.  Thomas
was buried in a plot owned by his father, Terry Summerlin, at
Serenity Memorial Gardens Cemetery; Noah was buried in a plot
owned by Sharon Summerlin, Noah's mother and Thomas's widow,
at Mobile Memorial Gardens. 
On September 28, 2005, Sharon informed a representative
of Serenity Memorial that she wanted to have Thomas's remains
disinterred and reinterred at Mobile Memorial Gardens.  The
representative stated that Serenity Memorial would not permit
the disinterment without a court order requiring Serenity
Memorial to comply with Sharon's request.
Sharon then filed in the Mobile Circuit Court a "petition
for injunctive relief," naming as defendants SLG Group, Inc.,
1051470
Neither SLG Group nor Serenity Memorial is a party to
1
this appeal.
Thomas and Sharon's daughter was also named as a
2
plaintiff to the action.  As a minor, the daughter sued by and
through her mother, Sharon.
3
d/b/a Serenity Memorial Gardens,  and Terry Summerlin.   Sharon
1
2
alleged that Terry had "unduly pressured" her into agreeing to
bury Thomas at Serenity Memorial rather than at Mobile
Memorial.  Sharon's petition requested the court to 
"issue 
all 
such 
orders 
necessary 
to 
require
[Serenity Memorial] to allow the disinterment of the
remains of Thomas R. Summerlin from Serenity
Memorial Gardens;  [to] issue all necessary orders
allowing the remains of Thomas R. Summerlin to be
reinterred at Mobile Memorial Gardens; and ... [to
order] such other, further, and different relief
[that the plaintiffs] may be entitled to receive."
Terry filed an answer to the petition.  Among other
things, Terry denied having "unduly pressured" Sharon into
agreeing to Thomas's burial at Serenity Memorial, and Terry
requested that the court deny Sharon's petition to disinter
Thomas's remains.
On March 13, 2006, Sharon moved for a summary judgment.
Sharon contended that she had initially planned to bury Thomas
at Mobile Memorial Gardens but that "she was then persuaded by
[Terry] to have [Thomas] buried at Serenity [Memorial]."
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Sharon asserted that Terry "used economic duress by demanding
[that Thomas] be buried in Serenity Memorial Gardens at
[Terry's] expense," and that she "reluctantly ... acquiesced
to [Terry's] demand." 
On April 5, 2006, Terry filed a breach-of-contract
counterclaim against Sharon.  Terry contended that after
Thomas's death Sharon told him "she did not know how she was
going to pay for [Thomas's] funeral and burial expenses."
Terry alleged that he and Sharon then "entered into a verbal
contract in which [Terry] agreed to pay for [Thomas's] burial"
in exchange for Sharon's agreement to have Thomas "interred at
Serenity Memorial Gardens."  Terry's counterclaim asserts, and
Sharon does not dispute, that Sharon and Terry signed a card
entitled "Interment Record," which authorized Thomas's burial
in Serenity Memorial Gardens.
Terry's counterclaim also alleges that a few days after
Thomas's funeral, when Sharon mentioned to Terry that she
wanted to move Thomas's remains from Serenity Memorial to
Mobile Memorial, Terry and Sharon entered into a second
contract.  The terms of that contract, Terry contends, "were
that, in consideration for allowing [Sharon] to retain a truck
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and furniture [for] which [Thomas] owed [Terry] at least
$5,700, 
[Sharon 
agreed] 
to 
leave 
[Thomas's] 
remains
undisturbed."  Terry claimed Sharon had breached that
agreement by filing the present action seeking to disinter
Thomas's remains.  Sharon later filed an answer to Terry's
breach-of-contract counterclaim.
On the same date he filed his counterclaim, Terry also
filed materials in opposition to Sharon's summary-judgment
motion.  Among other things, Terry included an affidavit from
James Baldwin, the manager of the funeral home at Serenity
Memorial.  In his affidavit, Baldwin asserts that he witnessed
Sharon's agreement to bury Thomas at Serenity Memorial; that
he witnessed her signing of an "interment card" authorizing
Thomas's burial at Serenity Memorial; and that he witnessed
her agreement that Terry would pay Thomas's funeral expenses.
Baldwin also stated in his affidavit that "[a]t no time did
[he] witness [Sharon's] being pressured or coerced into
agreeing to permit [Thomas] to be buried at Serenity
Memorial."  
On June 26, 2006, the trial court entered the following
written order:
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"On the 28th day of April, 2006, [the attorneys
for Sharon and Terry] in open court submitted oral
argument and written caselaw concerning the issues
of relief prayed for by [Sharon].  After careful
consideration it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and
DECREED that a final judgment in favor of [Sharon]
for the relief requested in [her] motion for a
summary judgment is hereby granted.  Said order is
hereby made final under [Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ.
P.].  It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and  DECREED
that [Sharon] may disinter the remains of [Thomas]
from Serenity Memorial Gardens and reinter the
remains in Mobile Memorial Gardens.
"It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED
that the defendant, SLG Group, Inc., shall comply
with the request of [Sharon] to disinter the remains
of [Thomas] from Serenity Memorial Gardens and
reinter the remains in Mobile Memorial Gardens."
Terry filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.
Discussion
Terry contends that the summary judgment in favor of
Sharon was inappropriate.  He argues that there is a genuine
issue of material fact because, he says, there is substantial
evidence indicating that Sharon consented, without coercion or
duress, 
to 
Thomas's 
interment 
at 
Serenity 
Memorial.
Conversely, Sharon argues that her consent to Thomas's burial
at Serenity Memorial was the result of coercion by Terry or
duress.  Moreover, she asserts that her consent to Thomas's
interment at Serenity Memorial is irrelevant because, she
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says, as the surviving spouse she has the exclusive right to
decide whether Thomas's remains should be disinterred from
Serenity Memorial and reinterred at Mobile Memorial Gardens.
However, there is a fundamental issue in this appeal not
addressed by the parties--namely, the appropriateness of the
trial court's certification, under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ.
P., of its June 26, 2006, order entering a summary judgment in
favor of Sharon.  
Rule 54(b) states, in pertinent part:
"When more than one claim for relief is presented in
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry
of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than
all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment." 
This Court, in Branch v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514
So. 2d 1373 (Ala. 1987), noted:
"Rule 54(b), A.R. Civ. P., provides a means of
making final 'an order which does not adjudicate the
entire case but as to which there is no just reason
for delay in the attachment of finality.'  Foster v.
Greer & Sons, Inc., 446 So. 2d 605, 609 (Ala. 1984).
'Rule 54(b) certifications should be granted only in
exceptional cases and "should not be entered
routinely or as a courtesy or accommodation to
counsel." Page v. Preisser, 585 F.2d 336, 339 (8th
Cir. 1978).'  Foster, 446 So. 2d at 610.
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"Rule 54(b) is properly applied in a situation
where the claim and the counterclaim present more
than one claim for relief, either of which could
have been separately enforced. Cates v. Bush, 293
Ala. 535, 307 So. 2d 6 (1975).  Under 'appropriate
facts,' a partial summary judgment on an original
claim may be finally adjudicated pursuant to Rule
54(b), leaving a counterclaim undecided so that the
parties can further litigate the issues presented by
the counterclaim."
514 So. 2d at 1374.  
In Branch, the trial court certified as a final judgment,
under Rule 54(b), its summary judgment in favor of SouthTrust
Bank on its claim that Branch had defaulted on a promissory
note.  514 So. 2d at 1373.  However, at the time of the Rule
54(b) certification, the trial court had not ruled on Branch's
counterclaim, which was "based upon an alleged fraudulent
representation by an agent of SouthTrust upon which Branch
claim[ed] he relied in executing the promissory note."  514
So. 2d at 1374.  This Court set aside the Rule 54(b)
certification and remanded the case to the trial court, noting
that because the issues in SouthTrust's claim and Branch's
counterclaim were "so closely intertwined that separate
adjudication would pose an unreasonable risk of inconsistent
1051470
9
results," it would not be "in the interest of justice" to
adjudicate the claims separately.  514 So. 2d at 1374.  
In this case, the trial court purported to enter a
summary judgment as to Sharon's entire claim--namely, her
petition for injunctive relief.  In form, Sharon's "claim"
appears to be separate and distinct from Terry's  breach-of-
contract counterclaim.  If one looks beyond form, however,
Terry's breach-of-contract counterclaim is, in substance, a
defense to Sharon's petition for injunctive relief.
For Sharon to be entitled to an injunction requiring
Serenity Memorial to permit her to have Thomas's remains
disinterred, she must show that she has a clear, specific,
legal right to disinter Thomas's remains.  See Gulf House
Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Gulf Shores, 484 So. 2d 1061, 1064
(Ala. 1985) ("A permanent injunction will be granted when
there exists a clear, specific, legal right requiring
protection and the injunction is necessary to prevent
irreparable injury and there is no adequate remedy at law.").
The essence of Terry's breach-of-contract counterclaim--as
well as his arguments and materials in opposition to Sharon's
summary-judgment motion--is that Sharon does not have "a
1051470
10
clear, specific, legal right" to the injunctive relief she is
seeking.  Although the trial court's June 26 order purports to
rule only on the claim presented in Sharon's petition and not
on Terry's counterclaim, the trial court's summary judgment
granting Sharon the relief she requested in her petition
amounts to a denial of the relief Terry seeks to obtain by
pursuing his counterclaim.
In short, the issues presented in Terry's counterclaim
and those in Sharon's petition for injunctive relief "are so
closely intertwined that separate adjudication would pose an
unreasonable risk of inconsistent results."  Branch, 514 So.
2d at 1374.  "We must conclude, therefore, that in the
interest of justice, the claims should not be adjudicated
separately."  514 So. 2d at 1374.  Consequently, the trial
court erred in certifying its summary judgment in favor of
Sharon as final under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Branch, 514
So. 2d at 1374.  Cf. Automatic Liquid Packaging, Inc. v.
Dominik, 852 F.2d 1036, 1038 (7th Cir. 1988) (describing a
claim presented in the plaintiff's complaint and one presented
in the defendant's counterclaim as "the same claim, expressing
the parties' opposed interpretations of [the agreement at
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issue], though configured as a plaintiff's claim in the
complaint and as a defense masquerading as a positive claim
for relief in the counterclaim").
Conclusion
The trial court's certification of finality under Rule
54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., is set aside, and the case is remanded
to the trial court.
CERTIFICATION SET ASIDE; REMANDED.
Nabers, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, and Parker, JJ.,
concur.