Title: Coast Business Brokers, Inc. v. Hickman
Citation: 239 Or. 121, 396 P.2d 756
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: November 18, 1964

Affirmed November 18, 1964.
Darst B. Atherly, Eugene, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.
Lewis Hoffman, Eugene, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Bailey, Hoffman, Spencer &amp; Morris, Eugene.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, SLOAN and GOODWIN, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
*122 SLOAN, J.
Plaintiff, a real estate broker, brought this action to recover a broker's commission. Plaintiff's claim to a commission was based upon an earnest money receipt that had been signed by defendant. Defendant signed the receipt as a prospective buyer. The earnest money receipt was made a part of plaintiff's complaint. At the beginning of the trial, the trial court sustained an objection to the admission of any evidence in support of the complaint. The objection was actually in the nature of a demurrer for the reason that the complaint did not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. The trial court held the receipt did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, particularly, ORS 41.580(5) and (7). Plaintiff elected to stand on the complaint. Judgment was entered for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
The earnest money receipt contained several conditions. The conditions imposed, the description of the property involved and the form of the execution of the receipt were all challenged by the demurrer. It was also contended that the receipt did not express a consideration. We need not decide this last issue. The purported description of the property involved and the other conditions of the proposed purchase, as set forth in the receipt, did not satisfy the Statute.
The specific language of ORS 41.580 as it applies to this case, reads:
We mentioned that the conditions of the purchase did not meet the test of the Statute. For the purpose of this opinion, however, we will only refer to the description which attempted to identify the property involved. It read:
In Hertel v. Woodard, 1948, 183 Or 99, at 102, 191 P2d 400, the requirements of the Oregon Statute, in respect to the problem at hand, were set forth in language which requires no explanation:
In The Oregon Home Builders v. Crowley, 1918, 87 Or 517, at 536, 170 P 718, 171 P 214, a case involving a real estate broker's action for a commission, the opinion of Mr. Justice HARRIS also expressed the basic requirements of the statute:
The description of the 5 and 7 acre tracts contained in the earnest money receipt was not just patently ambiguous, it was devoid of any identification. The description did not "intelligently identify the subject matter." It could have referred to any tract of the approximate size adjoining the Honeyman park, regardless of ownership or location. The other conditions of purchase were, as stated, also ambiguous. Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that since the writing before him contained the only evidence that *125 could be considered, the contract was not enforceable. Hertel v. Woodard, supra, 183 Or at 103.
We think it clear that the earnest money receipt did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds and the judgment is affirmed.