Title: Larry Raifsnider v. State of Arkansas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: CR07-488
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: November 29, 2007

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 07­488 LARRY RAIFSNIDER Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee Opinion Delivered November 29, 2007 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BENTON COUNTY, CR 2004­1324, HON. TOM KEITH, JUDGE AFFIRMED. PER CURIAM An amended judgment and commitment order entered July 18, 2006, reflects that appellant Larry Raifsnider entered pleas of guilty to two counts of kidnapping, two counts of robbery, terroristic threatening, and theft ofproperty, and was sentenced asa habitualoffender to anaggregate term of sixty years’ imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Appellant timely filed in the trial court a pro se petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, which was denied. Appellant now brings this appeal of the order denying postconviction relief. This court does not reverse a denial of postconviction relief unless the trial court’s findings are clearlyerroneous or clearlyagainst the preponderance ofthe evidence. Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 146 S.W.3d 871 (2004). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court after reviewing the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Flores v. State, 350 Ark. 198, 85 S.W.3d 896 (2002). On appeal, appellant submitted his brief, the State filed its response, and appellant filed a reply ­2­ brief. In his brief, appellant identifies eighteen “questions presented.” One of those eighteen points raises seven allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Many of the claims appellant lists to argue were not raised in the petition before the trial court, and we do not address those issues. This court has repeatedlystated that we willnot address arguments, even constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal. Dowty v. State, 363 Ark. 1, 210 S.W.3d 850 (2005); see also, Standridge v. State, 357 Ark. 105, 161 S.W.3d 815 (2004). Nor will we address issues raised in the petition, but not raised in appellant’s brief­in­chief. Issues raised below but not argued on appeal are considered abandoned. Jordan v. State, 356 Ark. 248, 147 S.W.3d 691 (2004); see also Echols v. State, 344 Ark. 513, 42 S.W.3d 467 (2001). We do not address the merits of a question where the argument is raised for the first time in a reply brief. State v. McCormack, 343 Ark. 285, 34 S.W.3d 735 (2000). Of the remaining points appellant raises in his brief, a number argue error by the trial court as to claims that were not cognizable in a Rule 37.1 petition on a guilty plea. When a defendant pleads guilty, the only claims cognizable in a proceeding pursuant to a Rule 37.1 petition are those which allege that the plea was not made voluntarily and intelligently or was entered without effective assistance of counsel. State v. Herred, 332 Ark. 241, 964 S.W.2d 391 (1998). Appellant’s claims concerning counsel’s efforts to prepare for trial, failure to file motions, and other defects do not demonstrate that those defects had a direct bearing on his abilityto make a voluntarydecision to enter a guiltyplea. Under the analysis in Herred, appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Id. at 251, 964 S.W.2d at 397. Appellant’s claims did not allege facts to support such a showing and were therefore not appropriate for a Rule 37.1 petition. 1 Appellant also raises this issue as a claim of ineffective assistance in his brief, but that argument was not presented in his petition and we do not address it. ­3­ Appellant raises only two issues in the points that are listed in his brief that were also raised in his petition and that pertain to the voluntary nature of his plea. Two points on appeal present arguments that concern appellant’s claim of coercion and one point alleges ineffective assistance for failure to request a competency evaluation. In addition to these two issues, there are additional arguments that concern a direct challenge to the plea for what appellant contended was a lack of jurisdiction by the trial court to accept his plea. 1 We limit our review to these three issues. Appellant argues that his attorney coerced him into entering a plea. However, as the trial court correctly found, the claim as presented in appellant’s petition was limited to conclusory allegations. Conclusory statements cannot be the basis of postconviction relief. Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d 352 (2003). The petition alleged counsel used threats and “forcible isolation in the county jail” to force appellant to accept the plea agreement. No threat was identified. Appellant offered nothing to show that the conditions of appellant’s confinement were within counsel’s control to use for coercion. Moreover, appellant had been incarcerated on other charges prior to his plea and would continue to be incarcerated on those other charges after his plea. Appellant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a hearing on appellant’s competency. In his petition, appellant alleged that counsel knew appellant “was not in his right state of mind,” as a result of “isolation and psychological hardship caused by the sheriff’s department.” Once again, the trial court correctly determined that these allegations were conclusory. Appellant provided no factual support for his claim that counsel would have had a basis to have challenged his competency, failing to include any specific, apparent effects on his mental state, or ­4­ otherwise show how counsel would have had a meritorious basis for a motion to have appellant’s competency evaluated. Counsel is presumed effective and allegations without factual substantiation are insufficient to overcome that presumption. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791 (2001) (per curiam); see also State v. Barrett, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Sept. 27, 2007). Appellant’s last argument challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction to accept his plea on the basis that he was not properly extradited from a federal penitentiary. A petitioner carries the burden to prove his allegations for postconviction relief. Cranford v. State, 303 Ark. 393, 797 S.W.2d 442 (1990); Porter v. State, 264 Ark. 272, 570 S.W.2d 615 (1978) (holding under prior law). Once again, appellant failed to include sufficient allegations of fact to support the claim in his petition. Appellant contends in his brief to this court that no detainer was filed, despite having alleged in the petition that a writ was issued. The record indicates that an order granting writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum or prosequendum was filed in Benton County Circuit Court on October 25, 2005, along with other documents directed to the warden of the federal penitentiary then holding appellant and concerning appellant’s release for prosecution in Benton County. That order was issued well prior to appellant’s plea. In the petition, appellant argued that the writ was never sent to the prison holding him. Appellant did not, however, allege facts in the petition to substantiate his claimthat the federalprison never received the detainer, once againproviding onlya conclusorystatement without substantiation. On May 26, 2006, trial counsel filed in this court a petition for temporary and permanent writs of prohibition in relation to appellant’s claim of a speedy trial violation. We take judicial notice of the record inthat proceeding under Drymon v. State, 327 Ark. 375, 938 S.W.2d 825 (1997) (per curiam), and note that the record that was before the trial court in the postconviction proceeding included ­5­ testimony that the writ and other documents had been sent to the penitentiary holding appellant on the day filed. The trial court’s finding that a detainer was properly filed with the federal prison was not clearly erroneous. As to the issues properly before us on this appeal, the trialcourt correctlydetermined that the petition contained only conclusory allegations that would not support postconviction relief. We accordingly affirm the denial of appellant’s Rule 37.1 petition. Affirmed.