Title: Reese v. Ross & Ross Auctioneers, Inc.
Citation: 149 N.W.2d 16
Docket Number: 39990
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 1967

149 N.W.2d 16 (1967) Herbert REESE, Sr., Respondent, v. ROSS &amp; ROSS AUCTIONEERS, INC., et al., Appellants. No. 39990. Supreme Court of Minnesota. February 17, 1967. Rehearing Denied March 21, 1967. *17 Neville, Johnson &amp; Thompson, Minneapolis, for appellants on appeal only. Cummins, Cummins &amp; Gislason, St. Paul, Brink &amp; Sobolik, Hallock, for respondent. SHERAN, Justice. Appeal from an order of the district court denying defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. A Hennepin County jury awarded approximately $21,000 to Herbert Reese, Sr., of Greenbush, Minnesota, to be paid by Ross &amp; Ross Auctioneers, Inc., a corporation, and its employees, Don Marsolais and Percy N. Ross, as damages for a fraud perpetrated in connection with an auction sale held at Thief River Falls, Minnesota, on October 13, 1960. Defendants, acknowledging that the evidence is adequate to sustain the verdict, urge that a new trial should be ordered because: We have examined the record with care and feel that the trial judge would surely have been justified in ordering a new trial and would have done so had he not been satisfied that the admitted and clearly established facts were such as to dilute the impact of the improprieties in the context of this unique case. In his memorandum made a part of the order denying the post-trial motion, the trial judge states: A detailed recitation of the facts of the case would be of little value as precedent. We do not find in the decisions cited by defendants[7] any case which, in our judgment, takes the present situation out of this applicable general rule: Although we accept the judgment of the trial court that the claimed misconduct did not affect the result and therefore was not prejudicial, we do not want to be understood as condoning the asserted improprieties. What appears from the cold record to be completely unjustified excursion from the relevant facts may have appeared justified at trial time to plaintiff's attorneys because of confusing and seemingly, at least, evasive responses from defendants' witnesses upon being questioned concerning the affairs of numerous corporate entities of which defendant Ross and his wife were the principal stockholders. But, whatever the provocation may have been, the integrity of jury trials must not be jeopardized by questions which embrace testimonial assertions by counsel, intimations of guilt by association, and disparagement of counsel for the adverse party. Trial lawyers have the right and obligation to object to such tactics and to suggest to the court the measures to be taken to offset any prejudicial effect. Trial judges have the clear duty to take whatever action may be necessary to meet the situation and to counteract any attempted appeal to prejudice by clear, specific, and *20 unequivocal admonition. Of necessity, the trial judge, aided by the expressed views of trial counsel, must appraise the effect of misconduct on the fairness of the trial and must decide whether the situation at hand can be corrected without the declaration of a mistrial. Because we feel that the trial judge in this case was aware of this responsibility and took corrective action when and as urged by defendants' attorney, we are affirming the order from which the appeal has been taken. Affirmed. PETERSON, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. [1] Defense counsel did not object to the elicitation of testimony as to plaintiff's financial status, but did make timely objection to plaintiff's closing argument in which reference was made to plaintiff having been talked out of his life's savings. The evidence with respect to the salary, the real estate, and the rings was legitimate in that pursuant to an alternative contract claim plaintiff was endeavoring to pierce the corporate veil of Ross &amp; Ross Auctioneers, Inc., and the residential real estate and rings had been that defendant's only tangible assets and had been transferred to Mr. Ross and to Mrs. Ross' father prior to this suit. [2] Counsel referred to plaintiff's physical condition on four separate occasions during his questioning of witnesses and three times during final argument. Defense counsel objected only to the final argument. Although the references obstensibly related to plaintiff's reasons for allowing defendants to conduct an auction sale for him, the unnecessary repetition bespeaks a motive to prejudice the jury. [3] Defense counsel, probably because of an aversion to appearing opposed to religion or law enforcement, did not object at the time these matters were evoked, but later raised these matters in chambers in unsuccessfully moving for a mistrial. [4] Plaintiff's counsel was properly inquiring as to a garnishment arising out of a Le Mars auction, and moved into a prohibited area by asking about the lawsuit. An immediate objection was sustained. [5] Defendants supported this claim through affidavits accompanying their post-trial motion. Although the ground for the trial court's ruling was lack of prejudice, it should be noted that plaintiff also presented an affidavit tending to show he made no deliberate misstatement. [6] Plaintiff's counsel inquired as to this matter knowing what the answer would be. A belated objection was sustained and the judge instructed the jury to disregard the testimony. Plaintiff's attempted explanations as to how this matter could have been thought relevant are not satisfactory. [7] See, Hoye v. Chicago, M. &amp; St. P. Ry. Co., 46 Minn. 269, 48 N.W. 1117; Wells v. Moses, 87 Minn. 432, 92 N.W. 334; Fisher v. Weinholzer, 91 Minn. 22, 97 N.W. 426; Bremer v. Minneapolis, St. P. &amp; S. S. M. Ry. Co., 96 Minn. 469, 105 N.W. 494; Bahr v. Northern P. Ry. Co., 101 Minn. 314, 112 N.W. 267; Bjoraker v. Chicago, M. &amp; St. P. Ry. Co., 103 Minn. 400, 115 N.W. 202; Gutmann v. Klimek, 116 Minn. 110, 133 N.W. 475; Smith v. Great N. Ry. Co., 133 Minn. 192, 158 N.W. 46; Westwell v. Oleson, 174 Minn. 151, 218 N.W. 548; Romann v. Bender, 184 Minn. 586, 239 N.W. 596; Burmeister v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 185 Minn. 167, 240 N.W. 359; Campbell v. Sargent, 186 Minn. 293, 243 N.W. 142; Swanson v. Swanson, 196 Minn. 298, 265 N.W. 39; Ferraro v. Taylor, 197 Minn. 5, 265 N.W. 829; Krenik v. Westerman, 201 Minn. 255, 275 N.W. 849; Anderson v. Hawthorn Fuel Co., 201 Minn. 580, 277 N.W. 259; Rian v. Hegnauer, 210 Minn. 607, 299 N.W. 673; Rom v. Calhoun, 227 Minn. 143, 34 N.W.2d 359; Magistad v. Potter, 227 Minn. 570, 36 N.W.2d 400; Strand v. Great N. Ry. Co., 233 Minn. 93, 546, 46 N.W.2d 266; Harris v. Breezy Point Lodge, Inc., 238 Minn. 322, 56 N.W.2d 655; Maher v. Roisner, 239 Minn. 115, 57 N.W.2d 810, 37 A.L.R.2d 658; Pelzer v. Lange, 254 Minn. 46, 93 N.W.2d 666; State v. Currie, 267 Minn. 294, 126 N.W.2d 389; New York Cent R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 40 S. Ct. 300, 73 L. Ed. 706; Chicago &amp; N.W. Ry. Co. v. Kelly (8 Cir.), 74 F.2d 31; Bulleri v. Chicago Transit Authority, 41 Ill.App.2d 95, 190 N.E.2d 476.