Title: Estate of Brandon Narleski v. Gomes
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: September 17, 2020

Estate of Brandon Narleski v. Gomes Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Nineteen-year-old Mark Zwierzynski permitted underage adult friends to consume alcoholic beverages in his home. Nineteen-year-old Brandon Narleski and twenty-year-old Nicholas Gomes left the home severely intoxicated. Shortly afterwards, Gomes lost control of his vehicle and crashed. Narleski died at the scene. Gomes’s blood alcohol concentration was twice the legal limit. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review was whether the common law imposed a duty on underage adults -- over the age of eighteen but under twenty-one -- to refrain from making their homes a safe haven for underage guests to consume alcoholic beverages and, if so, what the standard for liability would be if an underage guest, who becomes intoxicated, afterwards drives a motor vehicle and injures or kills a third party. The Court held an underage adult defendant may be held civilly liable to a third-party drunk driving victim if the defendant facilitated the use of alcohol by making his home available as a venue for underage drinking, regardless of whether he was a leaseholder or titleholder of the property; if the guest causing the crash became visibly intoxicated in the defendant’s home; and if it was reasonably foreseeable that the visibly intoxicated guest would leave the residence to operate a motor vehicle and cause injury to another. The Appellate Division was reversed, the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Zwierzynski was vacated, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here .This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. Estate of Brandon Tyler Narleski v. Nicholas Gomes (A-9/10-19) (083169)Argued March 30, 2020 -- Decided September 17, 2020ALBIN, J., writing for the Court. The issue before the Court is whether the common law imposes a duty on underage adults -- over the age of eighteen but under twenty-one -- to refrain from making their homes a safe haven for underage guests to consume alcoholic beverages and, if so, the standard for liability if an underage guest, who becomes intoxicated, afterwards drives a motor vehicle and injures or kills a third party. Nineteen-year-old Mark Zwierzynski permitted underage adult friends to consume alcoholic beverages in his home. Nineteen-year-old Brandon Tyler Narleski and twenty-year-old Nicholas Gomes left the home severely intoxicated. Shortly afterwards, Gomes lost control of his vehicle and crashed. Narleski died at the scene. Gomes’s blood alcohol concentration was twice the legal limit. Narleski’s parents filed a wrongful death action against Gomes, Gomes’s parents, and Amboy Food Liquor and News (Amboy), where the underage Narleski purchased the alcohol. In turn, Amboy filed a third-party complaint against Zwierzynski. The trial court granted Zwierzynski’s motion for summary judgment, finding that he did not have a duty to supervise his friends. The Appellate Division affirmed, 459 N.J. Super. 377, 399 (App. Div. 2019), but set forth a new rule of law to apply purely prospectively that an underage adult “shall owe a common law duty to injured parties to desist from facilitating the drinking of alcohol by underage adults in his place of residence, regardless of whether he owns, rents, or manages the premises.” Id. at 398. The Court granted Zwierzynski’s petition for certification and Amboy’s cross-petition. 239 N.J. 493-94 (2019).HELD: An underage adult defendant may be held civilly liable to a third-party drunk driving victim if the defendant facilitated the use of alcohol by making his home available as a venue for underage drinking, regardless of whether he is a leaseholder or titleholder of the property; if the guest causing the crash became visibly intoxicated in the defendant’s home; and if it was reasonably foreseeable that the visibly intoxicated guest would leave the residence to operate a motor vehicle 1 and cause injury to another. The duty the Court recognizes today was foreshadowed by precedent and therefore will apply in the case of Zwierzynski.1. Six decades ago, in Rappaport v. Nichols, the Court recognized a common law cause of action against licensed tavern owners who knowingly serve alcohol to minors or intoxicated patrons who then negligently drive vehicles causing injury to third-party victims. 31 N.J. 188, 202-05 (1959). The Appellate Division in Linn v. Rand extended the rationale of Rappaport to homeowner social hosts. 140 N.J. Super. 212 (App. Div. 1976). The Linn court held that the social host could be held liable in negligence for the injuries suffered by a third-party victim if the host served alcohol to a visibly intoxicated underage guest, knowing that the guest was unfit and about to drive and that an accident was reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 217, 219. In the seminal case of Kelly v. Gwinnell, this Court expressly approved of Linn and expanded the doctrine of social host liability to a private residence where an adult host “serves liquor to an adult social guest, knowing both that the guest is intoxicated and will thereafter be operating a motor vehicle.” 96 N.J. 538, 547-48 (1984). In that circumstance, the Court held, the social host will be “liable for injuries inflicted on a third party as a result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the adult guest when such negligence is caused by the intoxication.” Id. at 548. (pp. 17-21)2. The Legislature largely codified Kelly in enacting the Social Host Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.5 to -5.8. The Act’s text and legislative history refute any argument that the Act was intended to replace or stunt the development of the common law of social host liability in cases where alcohol is provided to intoxicated minors and underage adults. The Court rejects any interpretation of the Act that would lead to the absurd conclusion that the Legislature intended to create a liability-free zone for underage social hosts who knowingly provide alcohol to visibly intoxicated minors and underage adults who negligently cause injury to third parties as a result of their intoxication. (pp. 21-24)3. The Legislature has expressed the State’s strong public policy against underage drinking by adding to the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice a law punishing those who supply alcohol to minors and those who make property available for underage consumption of alcohol. Although N.J.S.A. 2C:33-17(a) and (b) create penal sanctions, not tort liability standards, those statutes underscore the policy steps the State has taken to deter those who might be tempted to accommodate or supply alcoholic beverages for underage drinking. The Court reviews cases in which the Appellate Division touched on the potential relevance of criminal statutes in setting the standard of care for an underage social host who serves alcohol to underage social guests and the continuing development of social host liability law. The Court also notes that statistics show drunk driving remains a significant public health threat. (pp. 25-32) 2 4. In determining whether to recognize a duty to refrain from conduct that poses an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm to others, the Court considers four factors: “the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution.” Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993). Weighing those factors, the Court concludes that an underage social host, who makes his residence available and facilitates underage drinking, has a duty not to knowingly provide or allow self- service of alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest and, if a guest becomes visibly intoxicated, to take reasonable steps to prevent the guest from operating a motor vehicle. (pp. 32-39)5. The Court accordingly establishes the following rule. A plaintiff injured by an intoxicated underage social guest may succeed in a cause of action against an underage social host if the plaintiff can prove by a preponderance of the evidence the following: (1) The social host knowingly permitted and facilitated the consumption of alcoholic beverages to underage guests in a residence under his control. This element does not require that the social host be a leaseholder or titleholder to the property. It is enough that the social host has the ability and apparent authority to give others access to the property; (2) The social host knowingly provided alcohol to a visibly intoxicated underage guest or knowingly permitted the visibly intoxicated underage guest to serve himself or be served by others. It is no defense that the underage guests bought and brought the alcoholic beverages that they or others consumed; (3) The social host knew or reasonably should have known that the visibly intoxicated social guest would leave the premises and operate a motor vehicle and therefore would foreseeably endanger the lives and property of others; (4) The social host did not take any reasonable steps to prevent the intoxicated guest from getting behind the wheel of the vehicle; and (5) The social guest, as a result of intoxication facilitated by the social host, negligently operated a vehicle and proximately caused injury to a third party. (pp. 39-40)6. That rule was foreshadowed and is the logical extension of the Court’s common law jurisprudence and legislative enactments aimed at combatting drunk driving and providing fair compensation for its victims. Applying the duty here is also consistent with the usual rule that the prevailing party who brings a claim that advances the common law should receive the benefit of his efforts. Based on the record before the Court, Zwierzynski is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. There are material issues of disputed fact that can be resolved only by a jury. (pp. 40-41) REVERSED and REMANDED to the trial court.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-9/ 10 September Term 2019 083169 Estate of Brandon Tyler Narleski, deceased by Administrator ad Prosequendum, John A. Narleski and Lori Anniello-Narleski, and John A. Narleski, individually, Plaintiffs, v. Nicholas Gomes, Orquivanes Gomes, and Sergio Gomes, Defendants, and Amboy Food Liquor and News Inc., a/k/a Krauszers, and Krauszers Food and Liquor, Inc., a/k/a Krauszers Food & Liquor, Inc., Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs/Respondents/Cross-Appellants, v. Mercedes Apraez and Zdzislaw Zwierzynski, Third-Party Defendants, and Mark Zwierzynski,Third-Party Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Respondent. 1 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 459 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2019). Argued Decided March 30, 2020 September 17, 2020 Russell Macnow argued the cause for appellant/cross- respondent (Russell Macnow, on the briefs). Mark R. Scirocco argued the cause for respondents/cross- appellants (Law Offices of Robert A. Scirocco, attorneys; Mark R. Scirocco and Robert A. Scirocco, on the briefs). Jeffrey S. Jacobson argued the cause for amici curiae New Jersey Civil Justice Institute and American Property Casualty Insurance Association (Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath, attorneys; Jeffrey S. Jacobson on the brief). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. The deterrence of drunk driving has been a preeminent policy goal oflegislative enactments and our common law for many decades. Nonetheless,drunk driving remains one of the major causes of carnage on our highways androadways. To address this seemingly intractable societal problem, statutoryschemes and the common law generally impose civil liability on taverns andsocial hosts who serve or facilitate the service of alcohol to visibly intoxicatedcustomers and guests who then get into their vehicles and maim or kill others. 2 Under our statutes and case law, a social host over the age of twenty-onehas a duty not to serve alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest, either an adult ora minor, if it is reasonably foreseeable the guest is about to drive. This casepresents a variation on that theme. Does a young adult, over the age ofeighteen but under the age of twenty-one -- an adult under the lawful drinkingage -- have a duty not to facilitate the service of alcohol to a visiblyintoxicated underage guest in his home if the guest is expected to operate amotor vehicle? In this wrongful death case, nineteen-year-old Mark Zwierzynski -- athird-party defendant -- permitted underage adult friends to bring into hishome alcoholic beverages, which they consumed while his parents were notthere. Based on the summary judgment record before us, two of Zwierzynski’sfriends, nineteen-year-old Brandon Tyler Narleski and twenty-year-oldNicholas Gomes, left the home severely intoxicated and got into Gomes’s car.Gomes drove away and, shortly afterwards, lost control of the vehicle andcrashed into a concrete road divider. Narleski was ejected from the vehicleand died at the scene. The trial court determined that Zwierzynski -- despite providing hishome as a drinking venue and arguably facilitating the excessive use of alcohol-- owed no legal duty to Narleski because of Gomes’s intoxication. 3 Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the third-party action againstZwierzynski. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the complaint againstZwierzynski. Estate of Narleski v. Gomes, 459 N.J. Super. 377, 399 (App.Div. 2019). It nevertheless declared that, going forward, an underage adult“shall owe a common law duty to injured parties to desist from facilitating thedrinking of alcohol by underage adults in his place of residence, regardless ofwhether he owns, rents, or manages the premises.” Id. at 398. We now hold that an underage adult defendant may be held civilly liableto a third-party drunk driving victim if the defendant facilitated the use ofalcohol by making his home available as a venue for underage drinking,regardless of whether he is a leaseholder or titleholder of the property; if theguest causing the crash became visibly intoxicated in the defendant’s home;and if it was reasonably foreseeable that the visibly intoxicated guest wouldleave the residence to operate a motor vehicle and cause injury to another. Anunderage adult, by law, may sue and be sued, may drive a motor vehicle, andhas the same civil obligations as any other citizen. He too is bound by thesocial compact. His age does not make him immune from legal responsibilityfor the violation of an established duty that is intended to protect others fromforeseeable harm. 4 The duty we recognize today was foreshadowed by our precedents andtherefore will apply in the case of Zwierzynski. Applying the duty here is alsoconsistent with the usual rule that the prevailing party who brings a claim thatadvances the common law should receive the benefit of his efforts. We therefore reverse the Appellate Division, vacate the order ofsummary judgment dismissing the third-party claim against Zwierzynski, andremand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. A. Narleski’s parents, individually and on behalf of his estate, filed awrongful death action in the Superior Court, Law Division. They named asdefendants Nicholas Gomes, Gomes’s parents, and Amboy Food Liquor andNews (Amboy), also known as Krauszers Food & Liquor Store, where theunderage Narleski purchased the alcohol consumed in Zwierzynski’s home. Inturn, Amboy filed a third-party complaint against Zwierzynski and his parentsseeking contribution pursuant to the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Act. Thethird-party complaint alleged that Zwierzynski and his parents, as social hosts,negligently supervised their guests, particularly Narleski and Gomes. 5 Narleski’s parents settled their claims against Gomes, his parents, andAmboy. Third-party defendants Zwierzynski and his parents moved forsummary judgment against third-party plaintiff Amboy. This appeal comes to us from a grant of summary judgment in favor ofZwierzynski and his parents. When reviewing a motion for summaryjudgment, we apply the same standard as the trial court: we view the evidencein the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Harz v. Borough ofSpring Lake, 234 N.J. 317, 329 (2018). In reviewing the summary judgmentrecord, we must give Amboy “the benefit of the most favorable evidence andmost favorable inferences drawn from that evidence.” Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 86 (2014); see also R. 4:46-2(c). In that light, we present the relevant portions of the summary judgmentrecord -- deposition testimony and police reports generated during the criminalinvestigation of the crash. B. In the late afternoon of November 9, 2014, Zwierzynski, Narleski,nineteen-year-old Xavier Pinto, and twenty-year-old Zachary Johnson drove inJohnson’s car to Krauszers Food & Liquor Store in South Amboy to purchasealcoholic beverages. Zwierzynski and Narleski left the car and entered thestore, where Narleski -- who sported a beard and looked older than his friends 6 -- paid for three twenty-four-ounce cans of beer, a 1.75-liter bottle of vodka,and a two-liter bottle of Sprite. The store clerk did not ask Narleski foridentification. 1 The sale of alcohol to underage adults is prohibited by law, N.J.S.A. 33:1-77; N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.1(a), and the consumption of alcohol byunderage adults is prohibited as well, N.J.S.A. 9:17B-1(b); N.J.S.A. 2C:33-15. The four underage friends then travelled to Zwierzynski’s house inSayreville, arriving at approximately 7:00 p.m. Zwierzynski lived there withhis mother, but she was not home at the time, and his father lived elsewhere.The home was jointly owned by Zwierzynski’s father and mother, who wereseparated. Zwierzynski brought his friends to his upstairs bedroom, where theybegan drinking, playing video games, and watching television. Pinto andNarleski each drank two to three cups of vodka. Pinto became tired , wentdownstairs, and fell asleep on a couch. That evening, Narleski texted hisfriend Gomes and told him to come over to Zwierzynski’s house, where theywere drinking. Gomes arrived in his 1997 Mercedes-Benz at approximately9:00 p.m. Pinto was already laid out on the downstairs couch when Gomesentered the house.1 Zwierzynski and Narleski had successfully purchased liquor at that store a number of times before. 7 In the upstairs bedroom, Zwierzynski handed Gomes a cup. Gomespoured himself approximately two inches of vodka and orange juice anddowned the cup. Then, Gomes poured himself another two inches of vodkaand orange juice and downed that cup. 2 The drinking occurred in the presenceof Zwierzynski.3 At some point, Narleski and Gomes decided to leave and goto the home of a mutual friend. By the time they left, Gomes had spent aboutfifty minutes at Zwierzynski’s home. According to Gomes’s testimony, at thatpoint, he had a “buzz” and Narleski was “fairly drunk” and “slurring hiswords.”4 Narleski got into the passenger seat of Gomes’s Mercedes withoutstrapping on his seat belt, and Gomes drove away. En route to their friend’shome, Gomes sped past a vehicle on U.S. Route 9 and lost control of hisMercedes. The car crossed multiple lanes of traffic, crashed into the2 Gomes also admitted to smoking marijuana earlier in the evening. 3 Zachary Johnson told the police that he left Zwierzynski’s home about fifteen minutes after Gomes’s arrival and did not observe Gomes consume alcohol. 4 Zwierzynski’s mother arrived home around 10:00 p.m. with Zwierzynski’s infant daughter. The daughter, who lived with her mother, apparently was staying over that evening. Zwierzynski’s mother stated in her deposition that she did not see anyone in the house or know that Zwierzynski’s friends had been in his room. Pinto, however, according to his deposition testimony, was still sprawled out on the couch downstairs and did not awake until 2:00 a.m. 8 roadway’s concrete center divider, and went airborne. Narleski was ejectedfrom the vehicle, which flipped over several times and landed on top of him.Paramedics pronounced Narleski dead at the scene. A responding police officer detected the odor of alcohol emanating fromGomes. A blood sample was taken from Gomes pursuant to a search warrant . The records of the Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office indicate thatGomes’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was approximately .16% at thetime of the crash -- a point that Gomes conceded. That BAC is twice thepermissible legal limit for an adult of legal drinking age. See N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a) (making it unlawful to operate a motor vehicle “with a blood alcoholconcentration of 0.08% or more”). According to the report of John Brick,PhD, an expert in neuropharmacology, at a .15% BAC, “[m]ost drinkersdisplay classic signs of visible intoxication”; at .10% BAC, “the relative riskfor a fatal motor vehicle accident is 82 times greater than compared with sobercontrols; and at .17% [BAC], that risk is increased to 1,772 times greater ascompared with controls.” (emphasis added). Gomes pled guilty to second-degree vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5. At his plea hearing, Gomes admitted that he drove under the influence ofalcohol and that his intoxicated state, along with his speeding and weaving in 9 and out of traffic, caused the deadly crash. Gomes was sentenced to a seven-year term in state prison. C. In granting summary judgment in favor of Zwierzynski’s parents, thetrial court explained that any duty that “parents [have] to supervise the conductof their children ends when” they become adults and therefore Zwierzynski’sparents had no duty to supervise Zwierzynski.5 In the case of Zwierzynski’sfather, the court also noted that he was estranged from his wife, did not live inthe Sayreville residence, and “was not in any tangible form related with thepresent action.” In finding that Zwierzynski also was entitled to summaryjudgment, the court looked to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-17(b), which states that a personcommits a disorderly persons offense if he “makes real property owned, leasedor managed by him available to” underage adults or minors for the purpose ofconsuming alcoholic beverages. The court reasoned that Zwierzynski did notown, lease, or manage the property and that, although he “provided his friendswith a place to consume alcohol, he did not have a duty to supervise his adultfriends during their consumption.”5 The trial court gave its reasons for granting summary judgment, first orally on the record and again in a written opinion when denying a motion for reconsideration. The recitation and quotations here are from the written opinion. 10 The court denied Amboy’s motion for reconsideration and entered finaljudgment, dismissing both the settled claims and Amboy’s third-party claimsagainst Zwierzynski and his parents. D. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s summary judgmentdismissal of Amboy’s third-party complaint. Narleski, 459 N.J. Super. at 399.The Appellate Division held that, given the lack of evidence thatZwierzynski’s parents knew of or consented to their son’s activities on theevening in question, they “had no statutory or common law duty to preventtheir adult underage son from allowing his adult underage friends to drinkalcohol in their home.” Id. at 382. It also held that “no established precedentin New Jersey” imposed on Zwierzynski a duty to prevent his underage friends-- the ones he invited into his home -- from drinking or drinking excessivelywhile in his parents’ house. Id. at 382, 397. Thus, under current law, theAppellate Division exonerated Zwierzynski from civil liability for the death ofNarleski. Ibid. The court, nevertheless, determined that exposing a young adult, such asZwierzynski, to civil liability in the circumstances of this case “would be alogical extension of case law” and “consistent with sound public policy.” Id.at 397-98. It refrained from doing so in this case, however, because “imposing 11 upon [Zwierzynski] a novel rule of liability that he might not have reasonablyanticipated” would not be equitable. Id. at 398. The Appellate Division concluded by setting forth a new rule of law toapply purely prospectively -- a new rule that was “a logical extension” ofcommon law precedents on social host liability and “consistent with the policyobjectives of related statutes.” Ibid. The Appellate Division held that, goingforward, “an adult such as Mark Zwierzynski who is under the legal drinkingage shall owe a common law duty to injured parties to desist from facilitatingthe drinking of alcohol by underage adults in his place of residence, regardlessof whether he owns, rents, or manages the premises.” Ibid. The court deferredthe effective date of its “prospective holding for 180 days to enable possiblefurther judicial review or responsive legislation.” Id. at 398-99. We granted Zwierzynski’s petition for certification and Amboy’s cross-petition. 239 N.J. 493-94 (2019). We also granted the motion of the NewJersey Civil Justice Institute and American Property Casualty InsuranceAssociation to appear as amici curiae. 12 II. A. 1. Zwierzynski argues that the Appellate Division erred in imposing a newcommon law duty on underage adults to refrain from facilitating theconsumption of alcoholic beverages in their homes by other underage adultswho may foreseeably operate motor vehicles and injure third parties.6 Thatnew rule, he maintains, does not advance public policy and “effectivelyimposes strict liability [on the underage facilitator] if a third party is injured asthe result of” alcohol consumption by an underage adult in the home.Zwierzynski challenges the assumption that a new common law duty will deteralcohol consumption by underage adults. Instead, he posits that such a rulewill have the untoward effect of driving underage alcoholic “get-togethers”from a secure residence to less desirable environments, such as parks andabandoned buildings.6 It may seem odd that Zwierzynski appeals from a decision that dismissed the action against him. Nevertheless, because of his status as a party in this case, he is the only person in a position to challenge what he claims is the erroneous imposition of a duty on similarly situated future litigants. Zwierzynski’s challenge is permissible because “[u]nlike the Federal Constitution, there is no express language in New Jersey’s Constitution which confines the exercise of our judicial power to actual cases and controversies.” Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n v. Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y., 58 N.J. 98, 107 (1971). 13 Zwierzynski asserts that nothing in the penal statute referred to by theAppellate Division, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-17, which makes it unlawful to providealcohol to underage drinkers under defined circumstances, suggests that theLegislature intended to create a tort duty. He claims, moreover, that theappellate court’s reliance on Thomas v. Romeis is misplaced because that caseupheld the principle that social host liability will attach when alcoholicbeverages are provided to a visibly intoxicated minor who injures a third party,citing 234 N.J. Super. 364, 365-66 (App. Div. 1989), whereas here theAppellate Division’s tort duty is triggered by the service of any alcohol to anunderage adult. Following the approach in Thomas, Zwierzynski alternatively arguesthat if a new duty is to be imposed on underage adults, it should be limited tobarring the service of alcohol to visibly intoxicated individuals. Finally, he submits that the Appellate Division correctly determined thatany new legal duty imposed on underage adults should be applied purelyprospectively. 2. Amici Curiae New Jersey Civil Justice Institute and American PropertyCasualty Insurance Association filed a joint brief that echoes many of thethemes in Zwierzynski’s arguments. Amici principally argue that the 14 Appellate Division fashioned a new legal duty by imposing liability on anunderage adult social host where the host does not serve alcohol but makes hishome available for underage drinking and where an underage intoxicated adultguest ultimately drives drunk and causes injuries. According to amici, “[t]heLegislature indisputably has not imposed liability” on underage adults incircumstances as presented in this case, and “the judiciary should respect theLegislature’s policy choices.” B. Amboy argues that the Appellate Division erred by not applying to thiscase the new duty -- the duty that an underage adult not facilitate alcoholconsumption by other underage adults by making his residence a venue fordrinking. Amboy claims that the Appellate Division’s failure to give Amboythe benefit of that ruling is inconsistent with the court’s “clear articulation ofthe duty” and its finding that the source of the duty is rooted in the commonlaw, legislative enactments, and public policy. Amboy further contends thatthe purely prospective application of the new rule “was made without citationto any legal authority” and conflicts with this Court’s imposition of the socialhost liability rule established in Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 548 (1984),which was applied to the parties in that case on the basis that to “deprive theplaintiff of any benefit resulting from her own efforts” would discourage other 15 individuals from seeking to establish new common law rights that are just,quoting id. at 551. According to Amboy, Zwierzynski’s conduct falls squarely within theproscribed ambit of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-17 and within the reasoning of Dower v.Gamba, 276 N.J. Super. 319, 326-28 (App. Div. 1994), which held that underthe Social Host Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.6(b), liability may attach to asocial host who throws a party and allows guests to serve themselves and drinkto the point of visible intoxication. In addition, Amboy asserts that theLegislature has not fully occupied the field of social host liability and th atcourts still play a vital role in recognizing the existence of a duty in commonlaw negligence cases. Finally, Amboy argues that if the common law duty to refrain frommaking one’s home available and facilitating the excessive use of alcohol doesnot apply here, then the law has carved out a liability-free zone for underageadult hosts who throw parties, permit their underage adult friends to becomeintoxicated, and allow them to drive and negligently injure and kill thirdparties. 16 III. A. The primary issue before the Court is whether the common law imposesa duty on underage adults to refrain from making their homes a safe haven forunderage guests to consume alcoholic beverages and, if so, the standard forliability if an underage guest, who becomes intoxicated, afterwards drives amotor vehicle and injures or kills a third party. See Acuna v. Turkish, 192 N.J. 399, 413 (2007) (“The recognition or establishment of a legal duty in tort lawis generally a matter for a court to decide.”). In construing the common law,our standard of review is de novo. Qian v. Toll Bros. Inc., 223 N.J. 124, 135(2015). We therefore owe no deference to the interpretative analysis of eitherthe trial court or Appellate Division, unless we are persuaded by the reasoningof those courts. See ibid. B. Any common law duty imposed by this Court must “satisf[y] an abidingsense of basic fairness under all of the circumstances in light of considerationsof public policy.” Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993).In addressing whether a new duty meets the basic fairness test and advances anenlightened public policy, Justice Holmes’s reminder that “a page of history is 17 worth a volume of logic,” N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 , 349 (1921),directs us to look to the historical antecedents for such a duty in this case. Intoxicated driving remains one of the preeminent public safety threatsin New Jersey, as evidenced by the mayhem caused on our highways by drunkdrivers to this day. N.J. Office of the Att’y Gen., Div. of Highway TrafficSafety, State of New Jersey Highway Safety Plan 25 (2018),https://www.state.nj.us/lps/hts/downloads/HSP_2018_web.pdf (“Driving whileintoxicated remains a major factor in contributing to fatalities, crashes andinjuries on the State’s roadways.”). This State’s public policy of imposingsevere sanctions on drunk drivers and of prohibiting the service of alcohol tominors and visibly intoxicated adults has deep roots in our law. The commonlaw has been in the vanguard in addressing the acute problem of underagedrinking and drunk driving. Six decades ago, in Rappaport v. Nichols, this Court recognized acommon law cause of action against licensed tavern owners who knowinglyserve alcohol to minors or intoxicated patrons who then negligently drivevehicles causing injury to third-party victims. 31 N.J. 188, 202-05 (1959). Inthat case, several licensed taverns served alcohol to a young adult, justeighteen years old, who left the last tavern intoxicated, drove negligently, andkilled another driver. Id. at 192-93. 18 New Jersey’s statutory and regulatory scheme barred taverns fromserving alcohol to minors and those “apparently” intoxicated. Id. at 201-02.We imposed a common law duty on taverns to refrain from serving alcohol tominors and intoxicated patrons and allowed innocent third-party victims to suetaverns breaching that duty to “afford a fairer measure of justice” and to“strengthen and give greater force to the enlightened statutory and regulatoryprecautions.” Id. at 205. We concluded that placing on taverns the burden ofexercising due care was justifiable given the “frightening consequences” ofdrunk driving. Ibid. The Appellate Division in Linn v. Rand extended the rationale ofRappaport to homeowner social hosts. 140 N.J. Super. 212 (App. Div. 1976).In that case, the homeowner allegedly served alcohol to an underage guest andpermitted her to drive home intoxicated. Id. at 214. The intoxicated underageguest negligently drove her vehicle, striking and seriously injuring a pedestrianchild. Ibid. In reversing the summary judgment order, which dismissed thecase against the homeowner, the Appellate Division stated that it would makelittle sense to impose a duty to exercise care on the licensee in Rappaport butnot the “social host who may be guilty of the same wrongful conduct.” Id. at217. The Linn court held that the social host could be held liable in negligencefor the injuries suffered by the child if the host served alcohol to a visibly 19 intoxicated underage guest, knowing that the guest was unfit and about todrive and that an accident was reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 217, 219. Theneed to impose that new duty, according to the court, was “devastatinglyapparent in view of the ever-increasing incidence of serious automobileaccidents resulting from drunken driving.” Id. at 219. In the seminal case of Kelly v. Gwinnell, this Court expressly approvedof Linn and expanded the doctrine of social host liability to a private residencewhere an adult host “serves liquor to an adult social guest, knowing both thatthe guest is intoxicated and will thereafter be operating a motor vehicle.” 96 N.J. at 547-48. In that circumstance, the Court held, the social host will be“liable for injuries inflicted on a third party as a result of the negligentoperation of a motor vehicle by the adult guest when such negligence is causedby the intoxication.” Id. at 548. In writing for the Court, Chief JusticeWilentz stated that “[i]n a society where thousands of deaths are caused eachyear by drunken drivers, [and] where the damage caused by such deaths isregarded increasingly as intolerable, . . . the imposition of such a duty by thejudiciary seems both fair and fully in accord with the State’s policy.” Id. at544-45 (footnote omitted). The Court articulated two primary goals inimposing social host liability -- the “fair compensation of victims who areinjured as a result of drunken driving” and the deterrence of social hosts from 20 serving alcohol to their visibly intoxicated guests who will later drive. Id. at548, 551-52. The Court rejected the argument that its decision -- a significant but“fairly predictable expansion of liability in this area” -- treaded on mattersfalling within the legislative domain. Id. at 552, 555-56. It reached thatconclusion because “[d]efining the scope of tort liability has traditionally been. . . the responsibility of the courts” and the Legislature had not occupied thefield. Id. at 553-56. The Court did “not perceive the potential revision ofcocktail-party customs as constituting a sufficient threat to social well-being towarrant staying [its] hand.” Id. at 555. Nevertheless, in light of “the lack of precedent anywhere else in thecountry” for this form of social host liability, the Court determined that “itwould be unfair to impose this liability retroactively.” Id. at 551. The Court,however, applied the new doctrine to the parties in that case because “to dootherwise would not only deprive the plaintiff of any benefit resulting from herown efforts but would also make it less likely that, in the future, individualswill be willing to claim rights, not yet established, that they believe are just.”Ibid. With amendments recommended by the Governor, the Legislaturelargely codified Kelly in enacting the Social Host Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 21 2A:15-5.5 to -5.8. The Act affords a third party injured by a social host’sintoxicated guest -- “a person who has attained the legal age to purchase andconsume alcoholic beverages” -- a cause of action against the social host if: (1) The social host willfully and knowingly provided alcoholic beverages either: (a) To a person who was visibly intoxicated in the social host’s presence; or (b) To a person who was visibly intoxicated under circumstances manifesting reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another; and (2) The social host provided alcoholic beverages to the visibly intoxicated person under circumstances which created an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm to the life or property of another, and the social host failed to exercise reasonable care and diligence to avoid the foreseeable risk; and (3) The injury arose out of an accident caused by the negligent operation of a vehicle by the visibly intoxicated person who was provided alcoholic beverages by a social host. [N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.6(b).] By design, the Social Host Liability Act did not address the service ofalcohol to visibly intoxicated underage guests or in any way disapprove of 22 Linn 7 The Act defines “social host,” in relevant part, as a person “who legallyprovides alcoholic beverages to another person who has attained the legal ageto purchase and consume alcoholic beverages.” N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.5. Notably,only a person over the age of twenty-one may “legally” provide alcoholicbeverages to another. The Act’s definition of social host also removesunderage drinkers from the reach of the Act. See Morella v. Machu, 235 N.J.Super. 604, 609 (App. Div. 1989) (noting that the Act “only sets the standardsfor the liability of social hosts 'to a person who has attained the legal age’”(quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.5 to -5.8)). Indeed, the Governor’s Reconsideration and Recommendation Statementattached to the bill -- which, with the Governor’s revisions, became the SocialHost Liability Act -- noted that the bill’s legislative history indicated that itwas “not intended to affect the current law regarding social hosts who serveindividuals under the legal age,” Governor’s Reconsideration andRecommendation Statement to S. Comm. Sub. S. 1152 & 545 (Nov. 9, 1987)(emphasis added), thus leaving Linn intact. The Act’s text and legislative7 The Act includes this significant qualifying language: “No social host shall be held liable to a person who has attained the legal age to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages for damages suffered as a result of the social host’s negligent provision of alcoholic beverages to that person.” N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.7. Thus, the intoxicated social guest who causes injury to himself has no recourse against the social host. 23 history refute any argument that the Act was intended to replace or stunt thedevelopment of the common law of social host liability in cases where alcoholis provided to intoxicated minors and underage adults. See Morella, 235 N.J.Super. at 609 (“Recently enacted 'social host’ legislation strongly suggests thatprinciples of liability for permitting minors to obtain alcoholic beverages is asubject for common-law development by the courts.”).8 Last, the Act is the “exclusive civil remedy” for accident victims injuredby the negligent provision of alcohol “to a person who has attained the legalage to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages.” N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.6(a)(emphasis added). We reject any interpretation of the Social Host LiabilityAct that would lead to the absurd conclusion that the Legislature intended tocreate a liability-free zone for underage social hosts who knowingly providealcohol to visibly intoxicated minors and underage adults who negligentlycause injury to third parties as a result of their intoxication. 8 In 1987, the Legislature effectively codified Rappaport by enacting the Licensed Alcoholic Beverage Server Fair Liability Act (the Dram Shop Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:22A-1 to -7. See L. 1987, c. 152; Steele v. Kerrigan, 148 N.J. 1, 15 (1997) (“The Licensed Server Liability Act is a codification of the common-law 'dram shop’ doctrine that evolved in a series of cases beginning with Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188 (1959).”). That Act imposes liability on an alcoholic beverage licensee who serves alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person, or to a minor “under circumstances where the server knew, or reasonably should have known, that the person served was a minor.” N.J.S.A. 2A:22A-5(b). 24 C. The Legislature has expressed the State’s strong public policy againstunderage drinking by adding to the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice a lawpunishing those who supply alcohol to minors and those who make propertyavailable for underage consumption of alcohol. Statement to S. 2312 2 (L.1985, c. 311); Sponsor’s Statement to S. 1234 (L. 1995, c. 31). N.J.S.A.2C:33-17(a) states that it is a disorderly persons offense if an individual“purposely or knowingly offers or serves or makes available an alcoholicbeverage to a person under the legal age for consuming alcoholic beverages orentices or encourages that person to drink an alcoholic beverage.” N.J.S.A.2C:33-17(b) states that it is a disorderly persons offense if an individual“makes real property owned, leased or managed by him available to . . .another person with the purpose that alcoholic beverages will be madeavailable for consumption by . . . persons who are under the legal age forconsuming alcoholic beverages.”9 A violation of either statute occurs if an underage person is suppliedwith or consumes any amount of alcohol. Importantly, the statutes createpenal sanctions, not tort liability standards. The Legislature knows how to 9 N.J.S.A. 2C:33-17(a) and (b) are subject to parental and religious observance and ceremony exceptions. 25 construct tort liability schemes, as evidenced by both the Social Host Liabili tyAct and the Dram Shop Act. 10 We need not determine whether the conduct in this case fits within thefour corners of either statute. Those statutes, however, underscore the policysteps the State has taken to deter those who might be tempted to accommodateor supply alcoholic beverages for underage drinking. D. After passage of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-17(a), the Appellate Division touchedon the potential relevance of that disorderly persons statute in setting thestandard of care for an underage social host who serves alcohol to underagesocial guests, see Thomas, 234 N.J. Super. at 365, 374, and the importance ofthat statute in the continuing development of social host liability law, seeMorella, 235 N.J. Super. at 609-10. In Thomas, the underage social host allegedly provided alcohol to hisintoxicated minor guest, who drove and got into an accident, injuring herintoxicated passenger. 234 N.J. Super. at 366-68. The Appellate Divisionpointedly observed that although the twenty-year-old social host “was a minorfor the purpose of purchasing alcoholic beverages, he was, nonetheless, an10 The violation of a criminal statute, however, may be “evidence” of the breach of a duty of care. See Alloway v. Bradlees, Inc., 157 N.J. 221, 236 (1999). 26 adult with respect to 'basic civil and contractual rights and obligations,’including the right to 'sue, be sued and defend civil actions.’” Id. at 370(quoting N.J.S.A. 9:17B-1(a)). The plaintiff passenger sued the social host, contending on appeal “thatservice of alcohol to a minor leading to the minor’s intoxication is all that isnecessary to establish liability against a social host.” Id. at 369. The trialjudge declined to charge that proposition of law, as reflected in N.J.S.A.2C:33-17(a), and instead instructed the jury, consistent with Kelly, that thesocial host’s liability depended on whether he knew his minor guest wasvisibly intoxicated when he served her alcohol. Id. at 368-69, 374-75. In view of the effective date of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-17(a), one week after theaccident, the Thomas court discerned no intent in that “legislation to justifyusing the conduct it proscribes as a tort standard.” Id. at 374. On that basis,the Appellate Division agreed that the trial judge properly charged the jury.Id. at 374-75. In Morella, eighteen-year-old Joseph Machu became intoxicated at ahouse party thrown by at least one of the teenage children of Mr. and Mrs.Kamatoy, who were away on vacation and who left a twenty-year-oldsupervisor in charge of their three teenage children. 235 N.J. Super. at 606-08.The intoxicated Machu drove and got into an accident, injuring the plaintiff, 27 who was a passenger in another vehicle. Ibid. The plaintiff sued, amongothers, the Kamatoy parents for negligent supervision, as well as theirseventeen-year-old son and the twenty-year-old supervisor, on the basis ofsocial host liability. Id. at 606-07, 611 n.3. The Appellate Division reversedthe grant of summary judgment in favor of those defendants. Id. at 606-07. Itconcluded that in light of the legislative policy expressed in the Social HostLiability Act, the Dram Shop Act, and N.J.S.A. 2C:33-17, “the Kamatoys asparents or their agents had a duty to the public to exercise reasonable care toarrange for competent supervision of their teenagers while they were . . . onvacation.” Id. at 611. The Appellate Division also made clear that theKamatoys’ seventeen-year-old son and the twenty-year-old supervisor werenot immune from potential civil liability as social hosts. Id. at 611 n.3. Another informative case is Dower v. Gamba, in which the AppellateDivision determined that, in a party setting, a host does not have to directlyserve alcohol to a guest for the purpose of providing alcohol within themeaning of the Social Host Liability Act. 276 N.J. Super. at 322, 327-28. Inthat case, based on the summary judgment record, twenty to thirty-five personsattended a party thrown by the four Gamba brothers. Id. at 322-23. Some ofthe persons attending the party brought beer to the Gamba house and placedthe beer in a “kiddie pool,” which the Gambas stocked with ice. Id. at 323. 28 Sheila Dower stated that one of the Gamba brothers provided “a good amountof the beer” at the party. Ibid. Guests helped themselves to beer from thekiddie pool. Ibid. Mathew Kohaut, who was of age to drink, arrived with twosix-packs of beer, which he put in the kiddie pool. Id. at 322-23. He remainedat the party for six hours. Id. at 323. According to Theresa Dower, Kohautwas “chugging entire cans of beer” and “was obviously and visiblyintoxicated.” Ibid. Shortly before 1:00 a.m., the underage Dower sisters were passengers inKohaut’s car when he crashed into a tree, injuring the sisters. Id. at 322.Kohaut’s BAC was .17%. Ibid. Based on the summary judgment record, thetrial judge dismissed the Dower sisters’ social host liability lawsuit against theGamba brothers because they failed to prove that the brothers “actually servedbeer to Kohaut.” Id. at 324. In the trial judge’s view, “[i]f the beer is on thetable, there is no service” and no “social guest problem.” Id. at 327. The Appellate Division reversed the grant of summary judgment,concluding that “the Legislature did not require that a plaintiff show that thesocial host directly served the visibly intoxicated driver who negligent lyinjures another.” Ibid. According to the Appellate Division, “[t]he focus of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.6(b) is not on the means used to provide the alcoholicbeverage to the potential operator of a vehicle.” Ibid. It rejected “[t]he 29 proposition that the Legislature intended that a social host may escaperesponsibility for the negligent provision of alcoholic beverages to anobviously intoxicated person merely by 'placing the booze on a table’ andwalking away.” Ibid. The Appellate Division held that it was for the jury todetermine “whether the Gambas willfully and knowingly provided alcoholicbeverages to Kohaut, while he was visibly intoxicated, under circumstanceswhich created an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm to the life or propertyof another.” Id. at 328 (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.6). IV. Drunk driving remains a significant public health threat, althoughvarious initiatives have likely contributed to the reduction of drunk drivingdeaths on our highways. Those initiatives include the strengthening of drunkdriving laws by increasing penalties and including rehabilitative andpreventative measures, see, e.g., L. 2019, c. 248; L. 2000, c. 83; L. 1982, c. 53;L. 1977, c. 29; the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-17, which prohibits makingalcohol available to minors; common law decisions, such as Rappaport, Linn,and Kelly, which imposed duties on licensed bars and social hosts not to serveintoxicated adults or underage adults; the passage of the Social Host LiabilityAct and the Dram Shop Act; and an increased public consciousness about thedangers of drinking and driving. Since 1982, drunk driving fatalities on our 30 nation’s roadways have decreased by fifty percent, 11 and from 2009 to 2018,alcohol-impaired driving fatalities in New Jersey have decreased overall bynearly sixteen percent and for those under the age of twenty-one by overtwenty-three percent.12 Despite those significant strides, the number of crashes, injuries, anddeaths caused by drunk drivers, including underage adults, is still terrifyinglyhigh. In 2018, there were 564 traffic fatalities in New Jersey: 159 werealcohol related, 125 involved drivers with a BAC of .08% or higher,13 and, ofthat number, 13 involved drivers under the age of twenty-one.14 But fatalitiesare but one measure of the grave harm caused by drinking and driving. In2000, approximately 32,940 crashes in New Jersey involved alcohol, injuring11 Found. for Advancing Alcohol Responsibility, Drunk Driving Fatality Statistics, https://www.responsibility.org/alcohol-statistics/drunk-driving- statistics/drunk-driving-fatality-statistics (last visited Aug. 14, 2020). 12 Found. for Advancing Alcohol Responsibility, State Map: New Jersey, https://www.responsibility.org/alcohol-statistics/state-map/state/new-jersey (last visited Aug. 14, 2020). 13 Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Nat’l Ctr. for Statistics & Analysis, Traffic Safety Facts: 2 018 Data 6 (June 2020), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/ Api/Public/ViewPublication/812917. 14 Found. for Advancing Alcohol Responsibility, 2018 State of Drunk Driving Fatalities in America 6, https://www.responsibility.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2020/02/2018_Drunk-Driving-Stats-Book.pdf. 31 an estimated 11,200 people and killing 319 people.15 Drivers between the agesof sixteen and twenty are seventeen times more likely to die in a crash whenthey have a BAC of .08% or higher.16 Those grim statistics raise important public policy concerns as we decidewhether to impose a duty on an underage adult not to make his residence aforum where guests can get drunk, drive, and then wreak havoc on ourroadways. V. The assessment of whether a person has a duty to refrain from conductthat poses an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm to others is a “valuejudgment” based on public policy and notions of basic fairness -- did theperson owe the injured party a duty of reasonable care? See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 543-44. In determining whether to recognize a duty, we ordinarily considerfour factors: “the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk,the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in theproposed solution.” Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 439; see also Kelly, 96 N.J. at 544.15 Am. Safety Council, Impaired Driving, https://www.safemotorist.com/ NewJersey/Driving/impaired_driving (last visited Aug. 14, 2020). 16 Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Teen Drinking and Driving: A Dangerous Mix (Oct. 2012), https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/ teendrinkinganddriving/index.html. 32 The relationship of the parties. In this case, Zwierzynski was a social host who controlled access to hishouse, even though his name was not on the deed to the home. He invited hisunderage friends into his residence so that, within its secure confines, he a ndthey could consume alcohol -- an activity forbidden under the law, N.J.S.A.9:17B-1, and an activity they could not engage in publicly, see N.J.S.A. 2C:33-15(a) (making it a disorderly persons offense for an underage person toconsume alcohol in public). Although Zwierzynski may not have been hisbrother’s keeper, he did have a responsibility not to lend his home for an illicitpurpose -- underage drinking -- even if his conduct did not squarely constitutea violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-17 of the Criminal Code. For purposes of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-17, Zwierzynski may not have directly served or madeavailable alcohol to underage guests or owned, leased, or managed propertyused for underage drinking. But tort liability does not depend on whether aperson’s conduct is proscribed by a penal statute. A person who drivesnegligently while intoxicated and causes death is subject to a civil wrongfuldeath suit, see Lee v. Kiku Rest., 127 N.J. 170, 185-86 (1992), but only if hedrives recklessly while intoxicated is he answerable for vehicular homicide,see N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5. Tort standards and criminal statutes are not necessarily 33 co-extensive and sometimes advance similar yet different goals. See State v.Burkert, 231 N.J. 257, 286-87 (2017). That a guest bought and brought the alcohol into Zwierzynski’s room islittle different from the guests who put the beer in the kiddie pool in Dower forothers to consume. See 276 N.J. Super. at 323. Zwierzynski supplied the cupsjust as the Gambas in Dower supplied the ice for the kiddie pool. See ibid.Unlike in Dower, where twenty to thirty-five guests were roaming about in abackyard, Zwierzynski had a few guests in close quarters and could reasonablyobserve the consumption of alcohol in his room and its effects on his friends.See ibid. Like the Appellate Division in Dower, we reject the notion that “[i]fthe beer is on the table, there is no service” or “social guest problem.” See id.at 327. Under the law, moreover, Zwierzynski was “an adult with respect to'basic civil and contractual rights and obligations,’ including the right to 'sue,be sued and defend civil actions.’” See Thomas, 234 N.J. Super. at 370(quoting N.J.S.A. 9:17B-1(a)). All in all, the relationship betweenZwierzynski and his guests is indistinguishable from the relationship betweenthe host and guest in Kelly. See 96 N.J. at 547-48. 34 The nature of the attendant risk. The statistical evidence reveals the scope of the public-health threatpresented by drunk drivers in general and underage drunk drivers in particular.Thousands of crashes -- many fatal -- involve drivers who had been drinking,and too many of those crashes and fatalities involve intoxicated underagedrivers. Gomes -- the operator of the car that crashed and killed Narleski-- was driving with a BAC of .16%, which made him somewhere between 82to 1772 times more likely to be involved in a fatal crash than had he beensober. See supra ___ (slip op. at 9). When a visibly intoxicated guest walksout of a party to drive home or to some other location, the tragic consequencesthat follow are reasonably foreseeable. The grave risk that drunk drivers poseto unsuspecting and innocent pedestrians and motorists is common knowledge.See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 544-45 (noting that the “social goal” of reducing drunkdriving “is practically unanimously accepted by society”). The opportunity and ability to exercise care. Even at a party attended by adults, the host has a duty not to providealcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest who is expected to operate a motorvehicle. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.6(b). At a party attended by only underage guests,the person who makes his residence available for the gathering is on noticethat the service of alcohol is unlawful per se. See N.J.S.A. 2C:33-17. 35 Therefore, the first caution in exercising care is to bar the flow of alcohol tounderage drinkers. But even if that threshold is crossed, and alcohol isconsumed, the social host has the ability to ensure that a guest does notcontinue to drink to a point of visible intoxication. Last, if a guest is visiblyintoxicated, the host has the opportunity to take steps to have the impairedguest driven home or to keep him on the premises. The social host is notpowerless to deny his residence as a venue for uncontrolled drinking or to takemeasures to safeguard an impaired guest from the danger he presents tohimself and others. The public interest in the proposed solution. An underage adult has all the civil rights and obligations of any otheradult -- other than the privilege to consume alcohol. Therefore, imposing aduty on underage adults not to provide alcohol to visibly intoxicated underageguests, who are likely to drive, directly flows from sixty years of decisionallaw and legislative enactments -- Rappaport, Linn, Kelly, the Social HostLiability Act, and additions to the Code of Criminal Justice. When anunderage adult controls a residence or premises where he lives -- if only byhaving a key to the door -- he has sway over who enters and who remainsinside, regardless of whether he is a leaseholder or titleholder to the property.When the same underage adult permits underage guests to bring beer, vodka, 36 or other intoxicating beverages into his home for the purpose of drinking-- conduct forbidden under the law -- then he should have some concomitantresponsibility to monitor his guests’ activities. Should the line drawn for the imposition of a duty on the host depend onwhether he poured the drink for his visibly intoxicated guest as opposed towhether he is a mute observer of his intoxicated guest’s continuedconsumption of beer or vodka left on a table and swigged in cups provided bythe host? The Dower court rejected that artificial distinction, and we do sohere as well. See 276 N.J. Super. at 327. In either scenario, the social host hasfacilitated reckless or negligent conduct if the guest is expected to operate avehicle. We cannot condone or encourage clever evasions of a duty that mayhave life-threatening or even deadly consequences. The public clearly has an interest in deterring the unnecessarydestruction and maiming of lives on our roadways and highways. Imposing aduty of care on an underage social host who controls his residence places astrong incentive on the host to exercise due care -- or suffer the consequences.As stated in Kelly, immunizing a social host is not consistent with thetraditional law of negligence, which tests “whether the reasonably prudentperson at the time and place should recognize and foresee an unreasonable riskor likelihood of harm or danger to others” by his conduct. 96 N.J. at 543 37 (quoting Rappaport, 31 N.J. at 201). Subjecting Zwierzynski to potentialsocial host liability advances the underlying rationales of the tort ofnegligence. One of the principal purposes of tort law is deterrence. Imposing a dutyof care that encourages responsible conduct holds out the promise of reducingthe number of preventable crashes, injuries, and deaths on our roadways. Overthe years, the number of drunk driving crashes has declined because our lawshave responded in various ways to the needless carnage caused by intoxicateddrivers. Nevertheless, we cannot take too much comfort in that progress.Statistics show that drunk driving remains one of the leading causes of seriousinjuries and deaths on our highways. Another principal purpose of tort law is to provide compensation to theinnocent victim of another person’s negligence. “[T]he fair compensation ofvictims who are injured as a result of drunken driving” -- in addition todeterring drunk driving -- is a central aim of the law of social host liability. Id.at 551. In balancing the equities, sound public policy dictates that the victimshould not have to bear the costs of the injuries he suffers because of atortfeasor’s negligent conduct. That equation is not altered if homeownersinsurance is implicated. Imposing a duty, in circumstances such as in thiscase, is no less sensible merely because we cannot determine how many lives 38 may be saved or how many victims will receive compensation from a negligentsocial host. See id. at 558. Weighing the Hopkins factors, we conclude that an underage social host,who makes his residence available and facilitates underage drinking, has aduty not to knowingly provide or allow self-service of alcohol to a visiblyintoxicated guest and, if a guest becomes visibly intoxicated, to takereasonable steps to prevent the guest from operating a motor vehicle. Theimposition of such a duty is consonant with basic notions of fairness and soundpublic policy. See Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 439.17 VI. A. Accordingly, a plaintiff injured by an intoxicated underage social guestmay succeed in a cause of action against an underage social host if the plaintiffcan prove by a preponderance of the evidence the following: (1) The social host knowingly permitted and facilitated the consumption of alcoholic beverages to underage17 We do not adopt the Appellate Division’s threshold for social host liability as the service of any alcohol to an underage adult in the present setting. First, the Appellate Division threshold may not be an easily workable standard for proving foreseeability and proximate cause. Second, that standard is not consistent with our established social host liability jurisprudence in Linn and Thomas and, to some extent, Kelly and the Social Host Liability Act. We recognize that the Dram Shop Act, which applies to licensed establishments, creates potential tort liability for the service of any alcohol to a minor or underage adult. See N.J.S.A. 2A:22A-5. 39 guests in a residence under his control. This element does not require that the social host be a leaseholder or titleholder to the property. It is enough that the social host has the ability and apparent authority to give others access to the property; (2) The social host knowingly provided alcohol to a visibly intoxicated underage guest or knowingly permitted the visibly intoxicated underage guest to serve himself or be served by others. It is no defense that the underage guests bought and brought the alcoholic beverages that they or others consumed; (3) The social host knew or reasonably should have known that the visibly intoxicated social guest would leave the premises and operate a motor vehicle and therefore would foreseeably endanger the lives and property of others; (4) The social host did not take any reasonable steps to prevent the intoxicated guest from getting behind the wheel of the vehicle; and (5) The social guest, as a result of intoxication facilitated by the social host, negligently operated a vehicle and proximately caused injury to a third party. B. The rule we establish today was foreshadowed by the case law discussedearlier and is the logical extension of our common law jurisprudence andlegislative enactments aimed at combatting drunk driving and providing faircompensation for its victims. In providing justification for the application ofthis new social host liability rule to the parties in this case, we need only turn 40 to our words in Kelly -- “to do otherwise would not only deprive the plaintiffof any benefit resulting from her own efforts but would also make it less likelythat, in the future, individuals will be willing to claim rights, not yetestablished, that they believe are just.” 96 N.J. at 551. C. Because this appeal comes before us on a motion for summary judgmentfiled by Zwierzynski, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorableto Amboy -- the same standard that would govern a review by the trial court.See Harz, 234 N.J. at 329. Based on that standard and the record before us,Zwierzynski is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. There are materialissues of disputed fact that can be resolved only by a jury. VII. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division, whichaffirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Zwierzynski. We remandto the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. 41