Title: People v. Carrera
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 91465
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 2002

Docket No. 91465-Agenda 16-January 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
								RUDOLFO CARRERA, Appellee.
Opinion filed December 19, 2002.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a stipulated bench trial, the circuit court of Cook
County convicted defendant of three counts of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS
570/401(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D) (West 1996)) and sentenced
him to concurrent terms of 15 years of imprisonment. The
appellate court found that the police did not have authority to
arrest defendant. Consequently, the court reversed the circuit
court's denial of defendant's second motion to quash arrest and
suppress evidence and remanded for further proceedings. 321 Ill.
App. 3d 582. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal
(177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	On August 26, 1997, Chicago police officers conducted
surveillance of defendant's home in Franklin Park, Illinois. The
officers observed defendant leave his home and drive to a storage
facility in Schiller Park, Illinois. Defendant entered the storage
facility and returned to his car carrying a bag. Upon his return
home, the officers confronted defendant and learned that the bag
contained a controlled substance. The officers arrested defendant.
Subsequently, defendant signed consent forms for the search of his
home and a locker at the storage facility in Schiller Park. The
officers recovered controlled substances from defendant's garage
and storage locker.
	The State charged defendant with three counts of possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Following his
indictment, defendant moved to quash his arrest and to suppress
the evidence recovered by the police officers. Defendant argued
that the officers did not have probable cause to effectuate his
arrest. Consequently, defendant maintained, the contents of the
bag, as well as certain evidence recovered from his home, garage,
and storage locker, should be suppressed.
	The circuit court held a hearing on defendant's motion to
quash arrest and suppress evidence. At the hearing, defendant
testified that on August 26, 1997, he retrieved a brown paper bag
from his storage locker in Schiller Park and placed the bag in the
trunk of his car. Upon his return home, he exited the car and
opened the trunk, intending to remove the bag. However, before
he could do so, he saw the police approaching. One police officer
told him to put his hands on top of the car. The officers then
grabbed the bag and the car keys and handcuffed him. They asked
him whether he lived at the Franklin Park residence and who was
inside the house. Upon being told that defendant's wife and three
children were inside the house, the officers entered the house with
defendant. Once inside the house, the officers had defendant,
defendant's wife and their children sit in the living room. The
officers threatened that defendant and his wife would be sent to
jail and the children removed from their care. The officers asked
defendant if he had anything in the house. Defendant replied that
he had a scale in the basement, whereupon three officers took
defendant to the basement to look for the scale. The officers
recovered the scale. They then told defendant that the law required
that he sign consent forms for the search of the house and things
would be hard for him if he did not. Defendant signed the forms.
Back upstairs, the officers searched the house. The officers
transported defendant to a Chicago police station.
	Rosa Elaina Carrera, defendant's wife, also testified at the
hearing. She stated that defendant left the house at 12 p.m. on
August 26, 1997. At 12:30 p.m., the door opened and four police
officers entered, along with defendant. One officer asked her to
bring the children to the living room and sit next to them. He told
her that there were some problems and he was going to arrest her.
The officers sat defendant in the living room as well. In
defendant's presence, the officers told Mrs. Carrera that they were
going to arrest her. They also added that they would take her
daughters away and she would not see defendant again. The
officers then asked defendant what else he had in the house.
Defendant replied that he had a scale in the basement. Three
officers accompanied defendant to the basement. One officer
stayed to watch Mrs. Carrera and the children. While the other
officers were in the basement with defendant, the police officer
continued to threaten her. Approximately 20 minutes later, the
officers and defendant returned from the basement. The officers
proceeded to search the house. Eventually, two other officers
arrived at the house. These officers told Mrs. Carrera that they
would not take her or the children. Yet later, as the police officers
were about to leave the house with defendant, a police officer from
Franklin Park arrived at the house.
	Officer Joseph DiGiacomo testified next. On August 26,
1997, he was employed by the Chicago police department. He
received information that a Hispanic male named Rudolfo, who
drove a gray Mercury Marquis, was dealing drugs from his
residence at 3112 N. Emerson in Franklin Park. Officer
DiGiacomo testified that he, along with Sergeant DeAntonio,
Officer Cane, Officer Herrera, Officer Horton, and Officer Rowan,
all of the Chicago police department, proceeded to Franklin Park.
The officers drove separate cars. Each officer carried a gun, a
badge, and a pair of binoculars. The officers communicated via
walkie-talkie. In Franklin Park, the officers set up surveillance at
defendant's home. At 12:30 p.m., defendant left his home and
drove away in a car matching the description provided by the
informant. The officers followed defendant to the storage facility
in Schiller Park. Shortly after defendant entered the facility, he
returned to his car carrying a brown paper bag, which he placed in
the trunk of the car. The officers followed defendant back to
Franklin Park. The officers had not observed defendant commit
any crimes up to this point. Also, the officers had not received any
information regarding defendant's use of a storage locker in
connection with the alleged sale of drugs at the Franklin Park
residence.
	Once home, defendant exited the car, opened the trunk and
pulled the bag from the trunk. Acting on a "hunch," Officer
DiGiacomo and the other officers "converged" on defendant.
Officer DiGiacomo explained that, as he exited his vehicle, he
confronted defendant, stating: "Police officer. What do you have
in the bag." Defendant replied that he had drugs in the bag and
handed the bag to Officer DiGiacomo. Officer DiGiacomo opened
the bag and saw what he suspected to be cocaine.(1) Officer
DiGiacomo placed defendant under arrest.
	Officer DiGiacomo further testified that Officer Herrera
advised defendant of his rights in Spanish. Officer DiGiacomo
then asked defendant how much more cocaine he had in the
storage locker. Defendant replied that he had two kilos of cocaine
in the locker. Next, defendant asked to go inside the house.(2) Once
inside, defendant signed consent forms in Spanish for the search
of the house and storage locker. Officer DiGiacomo recovered
suspected cocaine from defendant's garage and storage locker.
	Officer Herrera was the last witness at the hearing. He
testified that he participated in the surveillance of defendant's
home. Upon defendant's return home, the police officers,
including Officer Herrera, approached defendant. As he moved
towards defendant, Officer Herrera surveyed the area to make sure
that everything was secure. Officer Herrera saw defendant hand a
brown paper bag to Officer DiGiacomo. The officers then placed
defendant under arrest.
	Defendant spoke Spanish and only a little English. Officer
Herrera, a native Spanish speaker, communicated with defendant
in Spanish. Officer Herrera gave defendant the Miranda warnings
in Spanish. Also in Spanish, defendant indicated that he wanted to
get off the street and go inside the house. Once inside the house,
defendant spoke to his wife, who gathered the children into the
living room. Officer Herrera communicated with defendant's wife
in Spanish and stayed with her and the children while the other
officers searched the house. Officer Herrera denied ever
threatening defendant, defendant's wife or their children.
	At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that the
information that the officers had was sufficient to sustain the
encounter. The court also found that, upon being approached,
defendant volunteered he had drugs in his hands and gave those to
Officer DiGiacomo. Lastly, the court found that defendant
willingly entered the house in an attempt to remove a potentially
embarrassing situation from the street and signed the consent-to-search forms for the premises.
	Subsequently, defendant filed a second motion to quash arrest
and suppress evidence in which he maintained that the Chicago
police officers did not have authority to arrest him outside the
territorial limits of the City of Chicago. The State rejoined that the
police officers effectuated a valid citizen's arrest. The State
maintained that, even though the police officers possessed
reasonable suspicion to effectuate a Terry stop prior to defendant's
actual arrest, defendant did not submit to the officers' authority.
Without actual submission to the officers' authority, "no police
action occurred until the facts justified a valid 'citizen's arrest.' "
The State claimed that "[d]espite defendant's assertions, [the
circuit] Court never found any submission by the defendant to
police authority prior to his incriminating admissions, nor did [the
circuit] Court ever rule that the officer's initial approach
constituted a Terry stop." In the alternative, the State argued that
the circuit court should not suppress the evidence recovered by the
police officers because the officers acted in good-faith reliance
upon an amendment to the extraterritorial arrest statute, section
7-4-8 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/7-4-8 (West
1996)), as amended by Public Act 89-404, effective August 20,
1995. The amendment was declared unconstitutional several
months after defendant's arrest.
	The circuit court denied defendant's second motion to quash
arrest and suppress evidence. The court found that the police
officers acted in good faith in effectuating defendant's arrest. The
court explained:
			"THE COURT: *** It appears to me that when you
describe what happened in this case as you counsel
described the police, they were not fortuitously in Schiller
Park, Franklin Park. They launched an investigation based
on some information that they had, and they went out
there and they did this surveillance. But at the time that
they did that, everyone agrees that that was within their
statutory authority as it existed at the time.
			Now, because of this single subject problem that the
State is currently going through, it turns out that that
statute was invalid. But at the time that the police-if you
look into the police minds, for example at the time that
the police decided okay, we are going to go out to Schiller
Park and do this investigation, and in their mind they were
of a belief they were not committing misconduct because
it was statutorily authorized. So obviously what I am
talking about is good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule."
The court concluded that the purpose of the exclusionary rule
would not be served by suppressing the evidence recovered.
	The matter proceeded to a stipulated bench trial. At the
conclusion of the trial, the circuit court convicted defendant of
three counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver and sentenced him to concurrent terms of 15 years of
imprisonment.
	Defendant appealed the denial of his second motion to quash
arrest and suppress evidence. He maintained that the police
officers did not have authority to arrest him in Franklin Park and
did not effectuate a valid citizen's arrest. Defendant also
contended that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
should not apply because the amendment to the extraterritorial
arrest statute, upon which the officers relied, was void ab initio.
	The State argued that the police officers effectuated a proper
citizen's arrest. The State claimed that defendant voluntarily gave
Officer DiGiacomo the bag containing the cocaine. Once
DiGiacomo examined the bag, he had reasonable grounds to
believe that defendant was committing a crime, as required by the
private citizen's arrest statute (725 ILCS 5/107-3 (West 1996)).
The State also argued that the officers did not use the power of
their office to gather evidence against defendant that would not
have been available to private citizens.
	The appellate court considered first whether the actions of the
police officers constituted a seizure of defendant. The court noted
that if a seizure did not occur, the protections of the fourth
amendment would not be invoked. Based on the totality of the
circumstances, the court found that "there was a sufficient show of
authority by the threatening presence of several officers at the time
of the encounter to constitute a seizure." 321 Ill. App. 3d at 590.
The court also found that the seizure could not be justified as a
valid citizen's arrest because Officer DiGiacomo "used the power
of his office to collect the evidence necessary to give him
reasonable grounds to arrest defendant." 321 Ill. App. 3d at 593.
Lastly, the court refused to apply the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. The court noted that the amendment to the
extraterritorial arrest statute was found to be unconstitutional.
Because a statute which is unconstitutional is void ab initio, the
court stated that it would view the facts of the case as though the
statute never existed. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 599. The court suppressed
the contents of the bag recovered from defendant and defendant's
statement to Officer DiGiacomo that the bag contained drugs. 321
Ill. App. 3d at 599-600. The court remanded the cause to the trial
court for a determination as to whether the illegal arrest tainted the
subsequent evidence recovered by the police from defendant's
home, garage and storage locker. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 600.
	As noted above, this court granted the State's petition for
leave to appeal.

ANALYSIS
	In its petition for leave to appeal, the State advanced two
arguments for reversal of the appellate court's judgment. First, the
State argued that a private citizen, or a police officer who acts
outside his territorial jurisdiction and is therefore considered a
private citizen, can conduct an investigatory stop based on a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Second, the State argued
that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply
where the legislature enacts a statute in violation of the single
subject rule and police officers conduct a seizure pursuant to the
statute. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal to
consider the arguments presented.
	In its brief on appeal, the State abandons its claim that the
police officers effectuated a valid citizen's arrest. The State
repeats its argument that the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule is applicable where the police officers rely upon
a statute later declared unconstitutional. In addition, the State
argues that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable because the police
officers did not conduct a constitutionally unreasonable search or
seizure, but simply acted outside the territorial limits of the City
of Chicago without valid statutory authority to so.
	Noting that the State failed to argue in its petition for leave to
appeal that the exclusionary rule does not apply under the
circumstances at bar, defendant maintains the State has waived
this contention. Pursuant to Rule 315(b) (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(b)), a
petition for leave to appeal must contain "a statement of the points
relied upon for reversal of the judgment of the Appellate Court"
and "a short argument (including appropriate authorities) stating
why review by the Supreme Court is warranted and why the
decision of the Appellate Court should be reversed or modified."
This court has previously declined to consider points that a party
relied upon for reversal in its brief on appeal but failed to include
in its petition for leave to appeal. City of Naperville v. Watson, 175 Ill. 2d 399, 406 (1997); People v. Clark, 119 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (1987);
People v. Anderson, 112 Ill. 2d 39, 44 (1986).
	The State acknowledges that a point not raised in the petition
for leave to appeal is waived. However, the State urges this court,
in the exercise of its discretion, to consider the argument in
question. The State claims this court must first determine whether
the exclusionary rule applies before this court can determine
whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.
The State concludes that because consideration of it's argument
regarding the exclusionary rule is necessary to consideration of
whether the good-faith exception applies, this court should
exercise its authority to override application of the rule of waiver.
	It is not necessary for us to determine whether the State has
waived the argument at issue, as defendant maintains. Nor need
we consider whether the alleged waiver must be excused under the
circumstances at bar. As discussed below, Illinois law is settled
that the exclusionary rule is applicable where the police effectuate
an extraterritorial arrest without appropriate statutory authority.
Thus, full consideration of the State's argument is not a necessary
first step to a determination of whether the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule is applicable.
	In People v. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d 379 (1992), this court affirmed
the judgments of the lower courts suppressing evidence the police
obtained during the course of an extraterritorial arrest. The
defendant was driving in unincorporated Kane County,
approximately seven-tenths of one mile outside the Village of
Sleepy Hollow. At the time, Officer Beyer of the Sleepy Hollow
police department was conducting stationary radar surveillance
near that location. Based on a radar reading of the defendant's car,
Officer Beyer stopped defendant and issued a traffic citation for
speeding. At the time of the arrest, Officer Beyer was in uniform,
was driving an official police vehicle, and held himself out to the
defendant as a police officer.
	Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
charges against him, predicated on the fact that the defendant was
arrested by Officer Beyer of the Sleepy Hollow police department
on a road located outside that municipality's boundaries. The
circuit court construed the defendant's motion as a motion to
quash arrest and suppress evidence. The court granted the motion,
finding that Officer Beyer lacked official police authority to arrest
the defendant and that the arrest could not be legitimized as a
private citizen's arrest. The appellate court affirmed. The court
held that the officer used the power of his office to gain access to
evidence not available to private citizens. The officer's use of the
radar equipment tainted the gathering of the information and its
later use against the defendant. People v. Lahr, 207 Ill. App. 3d
419, 421 (1991). This court granted the State's petition for leave
to appeal.
	Initially, this court observed that a police officer acting
outside his jurisdiction retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen,
including the right to effect a citizen's arrest. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d  at
382. This court recognized, however, that, outside his jurisdiction,
a police officer's right to arrest is no greater than that of a private
citizen. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d  at 382-83. Thus, this court stated that an
extraterritorial arrest will not be upheld if in making the arrest the
officer uses the powers of his office to obtain evidence not
available to private citizens. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d  at 383.
	This court next considered whether Officer Beyer used the
powers of his office in making the arrest. This court rejected the
State's argument that because the defendant was driving on an
open roadway and because the radar equipment was available to
the general public, Officer Beyer did not use the powers of his
office to obtain evidence not available to a private citizen. In
rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that the use of radar
guns for monitoring the speed of traffic is limited to police
officers. Therefore, despite the fact that this type of radar
equipment was not strictly limited to police officers, its use in this
case was an assertion of the officer's police authority. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d  at 383-84. The court concluded that the evidence should be
suppressed since Officer Beyer was not investigating any
particular individual or suspected crime; there was no evidence
except the radar which indicated that Officer Beyer had reasonable
grounds to believe a crime had been committed; and Officer Beyer
did not effectuate a valid citizen's arrest. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d  at 386-87.
	We note that in Lahr we did not have occasion to consider
whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is
applicable where police officers effectuate an extraterritorial arrest
pursuant to a statute that is later found to be unconstitutional.
Citing People v. Carlson, 185 Ill. 2d 546 (1999), the State argues
that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies
because the police officers did not violate defendant's substantive
constitutional rights in effectuating the extraterritorial arrest.
While we acknowledge the State's argument on this issue, we
choose to resolve this cause on narrower grounds. In our
estimation, the result that we reach is dictated by application of the
void ab initio doctrine.
	Prior to 1995, section 7-4-8 of the Illinois Municipal Code
(65 ILCS 5/7-4-8 (West 1994)) authorized the police of any
municipality in a police district, defined as the territory embraced
within the corporate limits of adjoining municipalities within any
county of the state, to go into any part of the district to suppress a
riot, to preserve the peace, and to protect the lives, rights, and
property of citizens. As amended by Public Act 89-404, effective
August 20, 1995, section 7-4-8 of the Code (65 ILCS 5/7-4-8
(West 1996)) gave police officers from any municipality in a
police district full authority and power as peace officers and
authorized the officers to go into any part of the district to exercise
that authority and power. Thus, the amended statute purported to
give Chicago police officers authority to go into Franklin Park to
effectuate defendant's arrest. In People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1, 12
(1999), this court held that Public Act 89-404 was adopted in
violation of the single subject rule. Subsequently, in People v.
Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d 154, 156 (2000), this court stated that Public
Act 89-404 is void ab initio.
	This court has previously explained that a statute which is
facially invalid and thus unconstitutional in its entirety is void ab
initio. See Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d  at 156; In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 43
(2000) (noting that when an act is held unconstitutional in its
entirety it is void ab initio); People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d 80, 94
(1999); People v. Tellez-Valencia, 188 Ill. 2d 523, 526 (1999);
People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384 (1990). An unconstitutional law
confers no right, imposes no duty and affords no protection.
Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d  at 399, citing People v. Schraeberg, 347 Ill. 392 (1932). It is as though no such law had ever been passed.
Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d  at 156; Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d  at 399. The void ab
initio doctrine applies equally to legislative acts which are
unconstitutional because they violate substantive constitutional
guarantees (Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d at 399) and those that are
unconstitutional because they are adopted in violation of the single
subject clause of our constitution (In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 43).
The single subject clause of our constitution regulates the process
by which legislation is enacted. Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d  at 83;
Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 8. In Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 13, this court
stressed the importance of the single subject clause and the
seriousness with which this court regards single subject clause
violations. The court reviewed the dual purposes of the single
subject clause:
		"On one hand, the clause serves to prevent the enactment
of legislation that, standing on its own, could not garner
the votes necessary for passage. Johnson [v. Edgar], 176
Ill. 2d [499,] 514 [(1997)]; Geja's Cafe v. Metropolitan
Pier &amp; Exposition Authority, 153 Ill. 2d 239, 258 (1992).
Indeed, in upholding the mandate of the Illinois
Constitution, this court is duty-bound to ensure that the
legislature refrains from the ' "practice of bringing
together into one bill subjects diverse in their nature, and
having no necessary connection, with a view to combine
in their favor the advocates of all ***." ' Fuehrmeyer [v.
City of Chicago], 57 Ill. 2d [193,] 202 [(1974)], quoting
People ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 494-95
(1865).
			A second and equally important purpose of the single
subject clause is to facilitate the enactment of bills
through a legislative process that is orderly and informed.
See Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d  at 514. By limiting each bill to a
single subject, each legislator can better understand and
more intelligently debate the issues presented by a bill.
Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d  at 514-15. These dual purposes of the
single subject clause, therefore, promote direct
confrontation and informed discussion of legislative
issues submitted for enactment." Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 13-14.
In light of the serious nature of single subject clause violations, the
court concluded these violations are not subject to a harmless error
analysis. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 16.
	As noted above, in People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 12, this
court held that Public Act 89-404 is unconstitutional because it
was adopted in violation of the single subject rule. Further, in
People v. Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d  at 156, this court stated that Public
Act 89-404 is void ab initio. As of the date of defendant's arrest,
the amendment to section 7-4-8 had not been declared
unconstitutional. Thus, the State urges application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. However, to apply the
good-faith exception would run counter to our single subject
clause and void ab initio jurisprudence-specifically, that once a
statute is declared facially unconstitutional, it is as if it had never
been enacted. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at 43; Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d  at
390.
	The State argues that this court should give legal effect to the
historical fact that Public Act 89-404 existed and that the police
officers acted pursuant to the amendment to section 7-4-8. We
decline to do so. In our estimation, to give effect to the historical
fact that the amendment existed at the time of defendant's arrest
would effectively resurrect the amendment and provide a grace
period (in this case four years between the effective date of the
amendment and the date of our opinion in Reedy finding Public
Act 89-404 unconstitutional) during which our citizens would
have been subject to extraterritorial arrests without proper
authorization. Our decision not to recognize an exception to the
exclusionary rule where a statute is adopted in violation of the
single subject clause comports with our jurisprudence that a statute
which is facially invalid, and thus unconstitutional in its entirety,
is void ab initio.
CONCLUSION
	The State has abandoned its position that the police
effectuated a valid citizen's arrest. Further, the State acknowledges
that the police effectuated an extraterritorial arrest pursuant to an
amendment to section 7-4-8 of the Code later held to be
unconstitutional. We conclude that the amendment is void ab
initio and the police officers effectuated an unlawful arrest.
Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.
	The majority concludes that the extraterritorial arrest of
defendant by Chicago police officers was unlawful because the
statute authorizing the arrest was enacted in violation of the single
subject requirement of the Illinois constitution. Slip op. at 10-11.
However, the State, as appellant, has not asked this court to
answer the question addressed by the majority. Indeed, the State
acknowledges that the arrest was unlawful. The narrow question
posed by the State as appellant before this court is whether the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when officers
relied on an apparently valid statute when they made an arrest that,
while unlawful, did not violate the individual's state or federal
constitutional rights. I write separately to clarify a distinction that
the majority obscures-the difference between quashing an arrest
because it was not authorized by a valid statute and applying the
exclusionary rule to suppress evidence that was obtained in
violation of a defendant's right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure.
	As a threshold matter, the majority does not identify the
standard of review it applies. Although a trial court's ruling on a
motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence is generally
reviewed for manifest error, the parties agree that the issue
presented is purely a question of law, subject to de novo review.
People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 64 (1996). As such, defendant
has not disputed the facts presented in the State's brief, nor has
defendant questioned the credibility of the officers. Nevertheless,
the majority recounts in detail the conflicting testimony before the
trial court during the hearing on defendant's first motion to quash
his arrest, at which he argued that the officers lacked probable
cause. The trial court denied that motion and defendant did not
raise this issue on appeal. It serves no purpose at this stage of the
proceedings to recount accusations made by defendant and his
wife against the police officers when the accusations were found
not credible by the trial court, and particularly when they have
absolutely no bearing on the issue we have been asked to decide.
	I agree with the majority that the statute upon which the
officers relied is void ab initio and that the legislative enactment
of which this statute was a part is void in its entirety as a result of
the single subject violation (slip op. at 11). The majority then
notes that harmless error analysis is inappropriate, given the
serious nature of single subject clause violations. Slip op. at 12.
	However, if we were to consider whether or not it is necessary
to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, we would not be
engaging in harmless error analysis. The effect of declaring the
statute unconstitutional on single subject grounds is to return the
law to the status quo ante. People v. Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d 154, 156
(2000). Thus, the resolution of the question posed by the State is
governed by the law that existed prior to the enactment of the
flawed statute. As such, we must apply the earlier version of
section 7-4-8 (65 ILCS 5/7-4-8 (West 1994)) and the common
law of extraterritorial arrests. This does not constitute harmless
error analysis; it is simply a matter of determining what remedy,
if any, defendant would have been entitled to under previously
applicable law.
	Defendant suggests that the State has waived its argument
regarding the application of the exclusionary rule. Although the
State did not include this threshold question in its petition for
leave to appeal, I agree with the State that it is necessary to address
the applicability of the rule itself before addressing any exceptions
to the rule.
	The majority disposes of the exclusionary rule issue by citing
this court's decision in People v. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d 379 (1992), for
the proposition that "Illinois law is settled that the exclusionary
rule is applicable where the police effectuate an extraterritorial
arrest without appropriate statutory authority." Slip op. at 8-9.
Lahr, however, contained no discussion of the exclusionary rule.
In fact, the terms "exclusionary rule," "constitution," and "fourth
amendment" do not appear in the Lahr opinion at all. Lahr
involved only common law analysis, not the application of state or
federal constitutional principles. The sole issue in Lahr was not
whether evidence should be suppressed but, rather, whether the
extraterritorial arrest of defendant was valid. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d  at
383.
	In Lahr, this court acknowledged the general rule that
"municipal and county police officers [have] no authority to arrest
a defendant outside the territorial limits of the political entity
which appointed them to their office." Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d  at 382.
The sole exception to the rule, at common law, was for the fresh
pursuit of a suspected felon fleeing the jurisdiction of the arresting
officer. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d  at 382. Based on section 107-3 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38,
par. 107-3), which permits citizen's arrests, the Lahr court created
a second exception to the general rule of invalidity of
extraterritorial arrests. Lahr merely established that when outside
his jurisdiction, a police officer has the same ability to make a
valid arrest as any citizen, no more and no less. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d 
at 382-83. If an officer making an extraterritorial arrest uses the
powers of his office to obtain the evidence justifying the arrest, the
arrest cannot be justified as a citizen's arrest. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d  at
383.
	In the present case, the appellate court concluded, based on
Lahr and its progeny, that Officer DiGiacomo did use the powers
of his office to obtain the evidence that gave him probable cause
to arrest defendant and, thus, did not make a valid citizen's arrest.
321 Ill. App. 3d 582, 593-94. Because the State has abandoned its
argument that the arrest was valid as a citizen's arrest (slip op. at
8), Lahr is irrelevant to the issue raised by the State in this appeal.
In any event, Lahr tells us nothing about the application of the
exclusionary rule or any of its exceptions to evidence gathered by
a police officer acting outside his jurisdiction.
	The majority did not consider the history of the exclusionary
rule and the function it serves before concluding that Lahr settled
this issue. The exclusionary rule is a judicially created device
designed to protect fourth amendment rights in general. The rule
itself is not a constitutional right, and it is not intended to redress
the injury to the privacy of the defendant who has been the subject
of the illegal search or seizure, for any "[r]eparation comes too
late." Linkletter v. Walker 381 U.S. 618, 637, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601,
613, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 1742 (1965). As the Supreme Court noted in
Mapp v. Ohio, the rule safeguards fourth amendment rights by
deterring police misconduct. It " 'compel[s] respect for the
constitutional guaranty' " of freedom from unreasonable search
and seizure " 'in the only effectively available way-by removing
the incentive to disregard it.' " Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656,
6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1090, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1692 (1961), quoting
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 1677,
80 S. Ct. 1437, 1444 (1960).
	In Illinois, however, this judicially created remedy has been
in existence since 1923, when this court declared in People v.
Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448 (1923), that "there must, of necessity, be a
remedy" when the individual's "constitutional rights were
ruthlessly and unlawfully violated" by a warrantless search of his
home. Brocamp, 307 Ill.  at 453-55.
	The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule was first
articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Leon in the
context of an officer's good-faith reliance on a search warrant that
was later determined to be unsupported by probable cause. United
States v. Leon, 486 U.S. 897, 919-22, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 696-98,
104 S. Ct. 3405, 3418-20 (1984). Because the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, and because
application of the rule will not serve to deter a police officer who
is acting in good faith when he conducts a search pursuant to such
a warrant, the Court determined that an exception to the rule was
warranted. Leon, 486 U.S.  at 916-21, 82 L. Ed. 2d  at 694-97, 104 S. Ct.  at 3417-19 (noting that the exclusionary rule "cannot be
expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively
reasonable law enforcement activity").
 	This court adopted the Leon good-faith exception in People
v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 477 (1984). However, when the
Supreme Court later extended the Leon good-faith exception, this
court declined to follow. In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 94 L. Ed. 2d 364, 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987), the Court held that the
exclusionary rule does not bar evidence seized by a police officer
who reasonably relied, in objective good faith, on a statute
authorizing a warrantless administrative search, although the
statute was subsequently held unconstitutional on fourth
amendment grounds. Krull, 480 U.S.  at 349-50, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at
375, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 1167. In Krueger, this court declared a statute
allowing police executing a search warrant to make "no-knock"
entries under certain circumstances unconstitutional on fourth
amendment grounds. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 70. Relying on our
own state constitution and the long-standing history of the
exclusionary rule in this state, beginning with Brocamp, this court
found that the exclusionary rule arising from article I, section 6, of
the Illinois constitution provides greater protection than the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule:
		"We are not willing to recognize an exception to our state
exclusionary rule that will provide a grace period for
unconstitutional search and seizure legislation, during
which time our citizens' prized constitutional rights can
be violated with impunity. We are particularly disturbed
by the fact that such a grace period could last for several
years and affect large numbers of people. This is simply
too high a price for our citizens to pay. We therefore
conclude that article I, section 6, of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970 prohibits the application of Krull's
extended good-faith exception to our state exclusionary
rule." Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 75-76.
	However, the question of whether a search or arrest is legal is
entirely separate from the question of whether evidence derived
from that search or arrest should be excluded. People v. Turnage,
162 Ill. 2d 299, 307 (1994). The exclusionary rule is applicable
when suppression of the evidence would further its purpose of
deterring further police misconduct (Leon, 468 U.S.  at 917, 82 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 3417; Turnage, 162 Ill. 2d at 307) or,
as this court noted in Krueger, when the giving effect to search
and seizure legislation that violates the fourth amendment or the
state constitution would permit "our citizens' prized constitutional
rights" to be violated with impunity (Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d at 75).
	In the present case, however, the constitutional infirmity in the
statute did not spring from any violation of the fourth amendment
of the United States Constitution or article I, section 6, of the state
constitution. The appellate court concluded that the actions of the
Chicago police officers when they approached defendant outside
his home constituted a seizure. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 590. I agree.
However, the seizure itself did not violate defendant's rights under
the state or federal constitutions. Rather, the officers' actions
violated the preexisting statute governing the power of police
officers to act outside their assigned district. Unless such a
statutory violation is per se unconstitutional, or the exclusionary
rule is applicable to a statutory, as opposed to a constitutional,
violation, any evidence obtained as a result of the seizure need not
be suppressed.
	The Supreme Court of Colorado addressed this issue in
People v. Vigil, 729 P.2d 360 (Colo. 1986), where the defendant
argued that evidence should be excluded because the Denver
police officers who arrested her outside of their jurisdiction
violated the state statute governing extraterritorial arrests (8A
Colo. Rev. Stat. §16-3-106 (1986)). The court found "implicit" in
the statute "the premise that peace officers may not go outside the
territorial boundaries of their authority to arrest suspects except in
the limited circumstances described." Vigil, 729 P.2d  at 365. The
intent of the legislature in enacting the statute was to limit police
officers "from exercising their arrest powers and their law
enforcement efforts" outside their jurisdiction and to "require that
local peace officers be advised and participate in the
extraterritorial law enforcement activities of other police officers."
Vigil, 729 P.2d  at 365. The Colorado court rejected the idea that
violations of the law governing extraterritorial arrests are per se
unconstitutional. Vigil, 729 P.2d  at 366. The State, as appellant,
argued that the exclusionary rule should apply only when evidence
is obtained as a result of a violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights and, further, that exclusion should never be
available as a remedy for the mere violation of statutory limits on
the authority of police officers. Vigil, 729 P.2d  at 366. After first
acknowledging that when the statute governing extraterritorial
arrests has been violated by the police, "evidence obtained as a
result of the violation should be suppressed if the violation also
infringes a constitutional right of the defendant, such as the right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures," the court
reasoned that willful disobedience of the statute could also be a
basis for the exclusion of evidence. Vigil, 729 P.2d  at 366. A two-step analysis is required. First, if officers have exceeded their
statutory arrest authority, the court must determine whether the
unauthorized arrest is unconstitutional and, as a result, suppression
of any illegally seized evidence is warranted on that basis alone.
Vigil, 729 P.2d  at 366. Second, if there is no constitutional
violation, the court must still consider whether the police officers
exhibited both a knowing disregard of the territorial boundaries of
their authority and a failure to avail themselves of readily available
means of legitimizing the extraterritorial arrest, such as seeking
the assistance of the local police. Vigil, 729 P.2d  at 366.
"[S]uppression is not foreclosed as a possible remedy for willful
violations" of the statute; such violations "will trigger suppression
if they are so egregious as to violate the protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures." Vigil, 729 P.2d  at 366-67.
	In my opinion, this approach guards against violations of a
defendant's rights under the fourth amendment and the Illinois
constitution and against overreaching by the police that falls short
of a constitutional violation but is so willful or recurrent that a
sanction is required. Applying this approach in the present case, I
conclude that the seizure of defendant, while unlawful, did not
violate constitutional protections and that there was no willful
violation of the governing statute. Indeed, the officers acted
entirely in accord with the statute that they reasonably believed to
be in effect at the time. Their failure to adhere to an earlier version
of the statute that was only later determined to still be in effect
cannot, in any sense of the word, be deemed willful.
	Such a result is consistent with our prior decisions. Under our
case law, the violation of a statute by the police does not
necessarily require that any evidence acquired as a result of the
violation be excluded. In People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 148-49
(1998), the defendant claimed that he was transferred from the
Cook County jail to the custody of the Chicago police department
in violation of the Illinois Habeas Corpus Act (735 ILCS 5/10-131
(West 1994)) and the County Jail Act (730 ILCS 125/4 (West
1994)). As a remedy for these violations, he sought suppression of
statements he made while in the custody of the Chicago police
department, although he did not claim that the questioning by the
Chicago police itself violated any constitutional right. We
concluded that even if the transfer of custody was unlawful,
suppression was not the appropriate remedy because neither of the
statutes was "aimed at the sort of police misconduct that would
warrant suppression of the defendant's statements." Harris, 182 Ill. 2d  at 150. In the present case, as in Harris, the violation of
existing statutory and common law by the police did not violate
defendant's constitutional rights and, therefore, the resulting
evidence is not tainted. See, e.g., People v. Burnidge, 178 Ill. 2d 429, 440-42 (1997) (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by
Bilandic, J.) (noting that because no fourth amendment violation
occurred, there is no need to apply the exclusionary rule or any of
its exceptions in a case involving a question of evidentiary
privilege).
	Because I conclude that the exclusionary rule does not apply
in this situation in the first place, I would not reach the issue of the
good-faith exception. However, even if the exclusionary rule were
to apply to evidence obtained following an arrest that is
constitutionally valid but statutorily unlawful, the officers' good-faith reliance on the then-applicable statute should permit the
evidence to be admitted. Krueger does not require otherwise. Our
concern in Krueger was with a statute authorizing police conduct
that was, in itself, unconstitutional. This case does not pose the
same threat to liberty as the statute at issue in Krueger, which
purported to authorize unconstitutional no-knock entries by the
police when executing a search warrant. Recognizing a good-faith
exception for action taken by the police pursuant to a statute
authorizing certain extraterritorial arrests, but enacted in violation
of the single subject rule, would not subject the citizens of Illinois
to "a grace period *** during which time *** constitutional rights
can be violated with impunity." Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 75-76.
	In sum, I would hold that although the seizure of defendant
was unlawful, the exclusionary rule does not apply to the bag
containing drugs because the seizure did not violate defendant's
state or federal constitutional rights and because the police did not
act in willful disregard of the applicable statute. Even if the
exclusionary rule were to apply in this case, I would admit the
evidence under the good-faith exception. Therefore, I respectfully
dissent.
	JUSTICES FITZGERALD and THOMAS join in this dissent.
	 
	 
1.      1As inventoried, the brown paper bag contained a large zip-lock
freezer bag with a half-brick of compressed white powder wrapped in
silver tape.

2.      2Officer DiGiacomo did not so indicate in his written report.