Title: Inquiry Concerning A Judge, No. 02-466, Re: Judge John Renke, III
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC03-1846
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2006

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-1846 
____________ 
 
 
 
INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NO. 02-466, 
 
RE:  JUDGE JOHN RENKE III.  
 
[May 25, 2006] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review the recommendation of the Judicial Qualifications 
Commission (JQC) that Circuit Judge John Renke III be disciplined for numerous 
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 12, 
Fla. Const.  As we explain below, given the flagrant misrepresentations made to 
the voting public during Judge Renke’s judicial campaign, coupled with the serious 
campaign financial misconduct and violations of law found by the JQC, we 
conclude that he is presently unfit to hold office and that removal from the bench is 
the only appropriate sanction in this case. 
CHARGES 
 
 
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This case arose out of a series of charges filed against Judge John Renke by 
the JQC alleging that during his 2002 election campaign for the office of Circuit 
Court Judge for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, he committed certain acts in violation of 
Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  The original Notice of Formal Charges 
was filed in October of 2003, and in April of 2004, the JQC entered its findings 
and recommendations of discipline.  The JQC and Judge Renke presented a 
stipulation to this Court pursuant to article V, section 12 of the Florida Constitution 
and rule 6(j) of the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission Rules, in which 
Judge Renke admitted to the conduct alleged and did not contest either the findings 
of guilt or the recommendation of discipline.  At that time, he also waived a 
plenary hearing before the Hearing Panel of the JQC and oral argument before this 
Court. 
In July of 2004, we determined that the JQC’s recommended disposition 
should be rejected as too lenient and directed the JQC to conduct further 
proceedings on the merits of the case.  The JQC then amended the charges, adding 
an additional count concerning an alleged improper $95,800 contribution to the 
Renke campaign from Judge Renke’s father in violation of sections 106.08(1)(a), 
106.08(5) and 106.19(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (2002).  This campaign financial 
charge became count 8 of the Second Amended Notice of Formal Charges of 
August 24, 2005.  Before trial, the JQC’s charging document asserted: 
 
 
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1.  During the campaign, in violation of Canon 7A(3)(a) and 
Canon 7A(3)(d)(iii) you knowingly and purposefully misrepresented 
in a campaign brochure . . . that you were an incumbent judge by 
describing yourself as AJohn Renke, a Judge With Our Values@ when 
in fact you were not at that time a sitting or incumbent judge. 
 
2.  During the campaign, in violation of Canon 7A(3)(a) and 
Canon 7A(3)(d)(iii), you knowingly and purposefully misrepresented 
in the same brochure . . . your holding of an office in the Southwest 
Florida Water Management District by running a picture of you with a 
nameplate that says “John K. Renke, III Chair” beneath a Southwest 
Florida Water Management District banner, when you were not in fact 
the Chairman of the Southwest Florida Water Management District. 
 
3.  During the campaign, in violation of Canon 7A(3)(a) and 
Canon 7A(3)(d)(iii), you knowingly and purposefully misrepresented 
in the same brochure . . . your endorsement by the Clearwater 
firefighters by asserting that you were “supported by our areas 
bravest: John with Kevin Bowler and the Clearwater firefighters” 
when you did not then have an endorsement from any group of or any 
group representing the Clearwater firefighters. 
 
 
4.  During the campaign, in violation of Canon 7A(3)(a) and 
Canon 7A(3)(d)(iii), you knowingly and purposefully misrepresented 
in the same brochure . . . your judicial experience when you described 
yourself as having “real judicial experience as a hearing officer in 
hearing appeals from administrative law judges,” when your actual 
participation was limited to one instance where you acted as a hearing 
officer and to other instances where you were sitting as a board 
member of an administrative agency.   
 
5.  During the campaign, in violation of Canon 7A(3)(a) and 
Canon 7A(3)(d)(iii), you knowingly and purposefully misrepresented 
your endorsement by Pinellas County public officials in a campaign 
flyer . . . when you listed a number of persons, including Paul 
Bedinghaus, Gail Hebert, John Milford, George Jirotka and Nancy 
Riley as such, when they in fact were not Pinellas County public 
officials but instead officials of a private, partisan political 
organization to wit, the Pinellas County Republican Party. 
 
6.  During the campaign in violation of Canon 7A(3)(a) and 
Canon 7A(3)(d)(iii), you knowingly and purposefully misrepresented 
your experience as a practicing lawyer and thus your qualifications to 
be a circuit court judge.  In the Candidate Reply you authored which 
was published by and in the St. Petersburg Times, you represented 
 
 
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that you had “almost eight years of experience handling complex civil 
trials in many areas.”  This was knowingly false and misleading 
because in fact you had little or no actual trial or courtroom 
experience. 
 
7.  During the campaign in violation of Canon 7A(3)(a) and 
Canon 7(A)(3)(d)(iii), you knowingly and purposefully 
misrepresented your experience as a practicing lawyer and thus your 
qualifications to be a circuit court judge, as well as your opponent=s 
experience, by asserting in a piece of campaign literature that your 
opponent lacked “the kind of broad experience that best prepares 
someone to serve as a Circuit Court Judge” and represented to the 
voting public that the voters would be “better served by an attorney 
[like you] who has many years of broad civil trial experience.”  This 
was knowingly false because your opponent had far more experience 
as a lawyer and in the courtroom and in fact you had little or no actual 
trial or courtroom experience. 
 
8.  During the campaign, in violation of Canon 2, Canon 2A 
and Canon 7A(3)(a) and §§ 106.08(1)(a), 106.08(5) and 106.19(a) and 
(b), Florida Statutes, your campaign knowingly and purposefully 
accepted a series of “loans” totaling $95,800 purportedly made by you 
to the campaign which were reported as such, but in fact these monies, 
in whole or in substantial part, were not your own legitimately earned 
funds but were in truth contributions to your campaign from John 
Renke II (or his law firm) far in excess of the $500 per person 
limitation on such contributions imposed by controlling law. 
 
9.  During the campaign, in violation of Canon 7A(3)(a) and 
Canon 7A(3)(d)(iii), you made a deliberate effort to misrepresent your 
qualifications for office and those of your opponent as detailed in 
Charges 1 through 7, supra, which cumulative misconduct constitutes 
a pattern and practice unbecoming a candidate for and lacking the 
dignity appropriate to judicial office, which had the effect of bringing 
the judiciary into disrepute. 
 
Subsequently, after a final hearing before an adjudicatory panel, the JQC found 
Judge Renke guilty on counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9; however, the JQC did not find 
Judge Renke guilty of counts 4 or 5.  Based on these findings, the JQC 
 
 
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recommended a $40,000 fine, a public reprimand by this Court, and that Judge 
Renke be responsible for the costs of these proceedings.    
FINDINGS OF FACT 
 
In judicial disciplinary proceedings, this Court reviews the findings of the 
JQC to determine if they are supported by clear and convincing evidence and 
reviews the recommendation of discipline to determine whether it should be 
approved or whether other discipline is appropriate.  In re Andrews, 875 So. 2d 
441, 442 (Fla. 2004).  As we have noted before, the clear and convincing evidence 
standard   
requires more proof than a “preponderance of the evidence” but less 
than “beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.”   If the 
findings meet this intermediate standard, then they are of persuasive 
force and are given great weight by this Court.  This is so because the 
JQC is in a position to evaluate the testimony and evidence first-hand.  
However, the ultimate power and responsibility in making a 
determination rests with this Court. 
 
In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744, 753 (Fla. 1997) (citations omitted) (quoting In re 
Davey, 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994)).  After extensive review of the record and 
the evidence submitted by both sides, we find an abundance of competent evidence 
to support the JQC’s conclusions that the charges found proven were established 
by clear and convincing evidence. 
Counts 1, 2 and 3 
 
 
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The basis of these charges is founded upon various statements made in one 
of Judge Renke’s campaign brochures, and all involve violations of Canon 
7A(3)(a) and Canon 7A(3)(d)(iii).  The Code of Judicial Conduct was recently 
amended by this Court, effective January 2006; while the text of the particular 
Canon subsection has not changed, Canon 7(A)(3)(d)(iii) is now Canon 
7(A)(3)(d)(ii).  It reads, as it did at the time that Judge Renke was charged, that a 
candidate for judicial office shall not “knowingly misrepresent the identity, 
qualifications, present position or other fact concerning the candidate or an 
opponent.”1 
 
The record reflects that Judge Renke arranged for the Mallard Group, a 
political campaign company headed by John Herbert, to do all of the direct mail 
campaign work; however, the judge reviewed and approved all of the campaign 
materials designed by Herbert.  Regarding the first charge, the JQC concluded that 
the phrase “a judge with our values,” written in large yellow print, surrounding a 
photo of the Renke family, and coupled with other text from the brochure stating 
                                          
 
 
1.  The text of Canon 7A(3)(a) has been changed since the beginning of 
these proceedings against Judge Renke, but the modification does not affect this 
case, since Judge Renke was not accused of committing himself to a particular 
stance on an issue during his campaign.  Canon 7(A)(3)(a) now provides that a 
candidate for judicial office “shall maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial 
office and act in a manner consistent with the impartiality, integrity, and 
independence of the judiciary, and shall encourage members of the candidate’s 
family to adhere to the same standards of political conduct in support of the 
candidate as apply to the candidate.” (Emphasis added.)  
 
 
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that Renke had “real judicial experience as a hearing officer and in hearing appeals 
from administrative law judges,” knowingly and purposefully created the 
impression that Judge Renke was running as an incumbent judge when he was not.   
 
Count 2 concerned a picture, prominently displayed in the same brochure, of 
Judge Renke sitting just beneath a large banner stating “Southwest Florida Water 
Management District” in front of a nameplate reading, “John K. Renke Chair.”  
The JQC concluded that this was a deliberate attempt to convey to the public that 
he was the chairman of the Southwest Florida Water Management District 
(SWFWMD), a public body of considerable importance and responsibility in the 
area, when actually he was only chair of the Coastal River Basin Board.  In fact, 
the parties agree no such position as chairman of the SWFWMD even exists.   
 
Finally, with regards to the third charge, the JQC concluded that a picture of 
Judge Renke, surrounded by firefighters with the caption “Supported by our area’s 
bravest:  John with Kevin Bowler and the Clearwater firefighters,” was an attempt 
to wrongfully convince the public that he had the official support of the Clearwater 
firefighters.  The panel found that the use of the photograph with the 
accompanying caption was an intentional misrepresentation of Judge Renke’s 
campaign endorsements.   
 
We conclude that the JQC’s findings that these three charges have been 
established by clear and convincing evidence are supported by the evidence 
 
 
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received at the hearing.  In In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003), this Court 
concluded that “a voter should not be required to read the fine print in an election 
campaign flyer to correct a misrepresentation contained in large, bold letters.”  Id. 
at 90.  This admonition has special meaning to the misconduct established here. 
 
As to the first charge, Judge Renke himself testified that the statement, “a 
judge with our values,” could be misleading to the voting public.  As to count 2, 
Judge Renke admitted that the photograph was also inaccurate.  While he points to 
other text in the same pamphlet indicating that Judge Renke was only “awarded an 
appointment by the Governor to the Governing Board of the Southwest Florida 
Water Management District,” In re Kinsey provides that smaller or other text 
elsewhere in a brochure does not serve to rectify bold misstatements made in the 
same document.  842 So. 2d at 90.  In reference to the third charge, again, Judge 
Renke testified at his hearing that he did not have the support of the Clearwater 
firefighters union or any actual Clearwater firefighters group or organization.  
While Judge Renke stated that he did have the support of the particular firefighters 
posing with him in the campaign brochure photograph, he conceded that he was 
aware that the firefighters were represented by a union and that he had never asked 
for their endorsement.   
 
The record provides abundant evidentiary support for the JQC’s findings and 
its conclusion that there was a clear pattern of intentional misrepresentation with 
 
 
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regard to the three charges concerning this particular brochure, specifically that 
Judge Renke was attempting to convey to the voters that he was running as an 
incumbent judge, was the chair of the SWFWMD, and finally that he was endorsed 
by the local firefighters.  These findings establish clear violations of the judicial 
canon’s prohibition on knowing misrepresentations of a candidate’s experience and 
qualifications for judicial office.  Accordingly, we uphold the JQC’s findings of 
guilt on counts 1, 2 and 3.   
Counts 6 and 7 
 
Counts 6 and 7 are similar to counts 1-3 but are even more serious, as they 
involve substantial misrepresentations as to the relevant qualifications for judicial 
office.  These two charges are related to statements Judge Renke made prior to the 
election, by which the JQC concludes he vastly overstated his relevant legal 
experience and qualifications for the bench.  Count 6 concerned a “Candidate 
Reply” authored by Judge Renke and submitted to the St. Petersburg Times, in 
which he claimed he had “almost eight years of experience handling complex civil 
trials in many areas.”  The JQC, rejecting Judge Renke’s explanation that he did 
not grasp the difference between handling a complex “trial” versus mere “litigation 
experience,” concluded that this was a false statement.  Count 7 concerned a piece 
of campaign literature in which Judge Renke stated that his opponent in the judicial 
election did not have the kind of broad experience necessary to be a circuit judge 
 
 
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and that the public would instead be “better served by an attorney [like you] who 
has many years of broad civil trial experience.”  The JQC, concluding that this was 
a clear misrepresentation regarding his qualifications, disregarded Renke’s claim 
that the statement regarding his years of “broad civil trial experience” was 
accurate, since his opponent’s experience was primarily in the area of criminal law.   
 
As with the first set of charges, we also find that the findings of misconduct 
on counts 6 and 7 are supported by clear and convincing evidence.  Among other 
testimony given at the hearing below, Judge Renke testified that he had never acted 
as lead counsel in a jury trial and that the only trial he tried on his own was a small 
claims case.  He also testified that the claim regarding his eight years of “broad 
civil trial experience”  “may not be the best and most accurate way to depict what 
[he] had done over eight years.”  He went on to confirm that he had no criminal 
law experience, had never examined a witness outside of the above-mentioned 
small claims court case, and that he was never “on his feet” in a courtroom in a 
case in which his father was lead counsel.   
 
Furthermore, while Judge Renke disputed that he was “called out” by the 
newspaper’s editorial board regarding his claim that he had eight years of trial 
experience in the courtroom prior to his publishing the “Candidate’s Reply” at 
issue in count 6, the testimony makes clear that he was asked by the editorial board 
how many times he had, in fact, served as first chair.  Although he replied that he 
 
 
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had never served as first chair, he nevertheless still included the claim regarding 
his broad trial experience in his “Candidate’s Reply.”   
 
As the JQC found, in reality Judge Renke had virtually no trial experience at 
all, and his explicit campaign statements to the contrary constitute blatant 
misrepresentations as to his qualifications.  We find abundant evidence to support 
the JQC’s conclusion that throughout his campaign he knowingly misrepresented 
his experience and qualifications for judicial office in direct violation of the 
judicial canons of ethics.   
Count 9 
 
Because we find support for the JQC’s findings of guilt on counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 
and 7 as outlined above, we also conclude that its finding of guilt on count 9 is 
supported by clear and convincing evidence.  This charge concerns a deliberate and 
calculated effort on the part of Judge Renke to misrepresent his experience and 
qualifications for judicial office.  We agree, based on the charges specified in 
counts 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7, that Judge Renke engaged in cumulative misconduct 
constituting a pattern unbecoming a candidate and lacking in the dignity 
appropriate to judicial office which has brought the judiciary into disrepute.   
Count 8 
 
This charge, added after our rejection of the previously recommended 
discipline based on the charges set out above, involves a series of campaign 
 
 
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“loans” from Judge Renke’s father to his campaign in 2002.  The JQC found that 
the father provided substantial campaign funds to Judge Renke in 2002 and that 
Renke disguised these funds as earned income from which he made loans to his 
campaign fund.  Judge Renke contended that it was mere coincidence that his 
income dramatically rose in 2002.   
 
The record reflects that until his election to the bench, Judge Renke was 
employed in his father’s law firm, where he had worked since his graduation from 
law school.  The firm consisted of John Renke, II, Judge Renke, and a third 
attorney, Thomas Gurran.  John Renke, II’s wife Margaret worked at the firm for 
over twenty years as a secretary, receiving no salary; Judge Renke’s wife also 
occasionally performed clerical duties at the firm.   
 
Judge Renke was paid on an hourly basis, earning between $9.00 and $11.00 
an hour with no benefits.  Judge Renke’s tax records show the following net 
income after taxes for the eight years he worked for his father’s firm: 
 
1995: 
 
$10,941 
 
1996: 
 
$16,020 
 
1997: 
 
$18,600 
 
1998: 
 
$15,325 
 
1999: 
 
$11,480 
 
2000: 
 
$12,682 
 
2001: 
 
$35,987 
 
                    2002:                                                    $140,116 
 
There was nothing in writing between father and son regarding Judge Renke’s 
compensation, and the evidence shows that there were many disputes between 
 
 
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Judge Renke and his father regarding his pay.  While John Renke continually 
claimed that he would retire soon and leave the firm to his son, Judge Renke 
testified that he ultimately decided to run for the judgeship due to his financial 
concerns.  As the JQC concluded, the evidence overwhelmingly indicated that 
Judge Renke was underpaid throughout these years and he and his family 
functioned very close to a financial survival line.2 
 
The evidence indicates that there was a verbal agreement between Judge 
Renke and his father that he would be paid twenty percent of the recovery in the 
firm’s larger cases, but there was disputed evidence as to whether this percentage 
fee was always paid.  This fee arrangement is at the heart of count 8, specifically 
regarding a series of cases known collectively as the “Driftwood litigation” and 
involving various claims connected with a homeowner’s association.  The firm had 
handled the cases since 1995, resulting in significant settlements and attorney’s 
fees.  The primary dispute on review between Judge Renke and the JQC involves 
when the Renkes actually earned the fees generated by these cases.  Judge Renke 
argues that the 2002 payments from his father were his share of the Driftwood 
settlement, to which he was rightfully entitled.  He asserts that it was mere 
coincidence that he received these substantial increases in income at a time when 
he was in need of campaign funds.   
                                          
 
 
2.  This evidence would also appear to support the JQC findings as to Judge 
Renke’s misrepresentations regarding his legal experience. 
 
 
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The JQC rejected this explanation and concluded that while the Driftwood 
cases had been preliminarily settled in 2001, and a fee of $123,553 had been paid 
to the senior Renke, this fee was to be held in escrow pending the court’s approval 
of the final settlement.  The insurance company for the defendant in the Driftwood 
cases made the payment to stop the accrual of further fees and interest, making the 
check payable to “John K. Renke, II Trust Account.”  The agreement provided that 
if the court did not approve the settlement, John Renke was to return the funds.  
The JQC noted that a real question existed as to whether the final settlement would 
be approved or not, with the Renkes arguing that they technically “earned” the 
money when the check arrived from the insurance company in 2001.  However, the 
JQC found that the Driftwood Homeowner’s Association and Board of Directors 
still had to approve various changes in the settlement agreement.  Furthermore, 
there was a thirty-day “safeguard period” included after final court approval of the 
settlement before the funds could become available to ensure that an appeal had 
not been taken.  Court approval of the settlement and a vested right to the fee did 
not occur until 2003.   
 
Regarding his campaign financing, the JQC found that Judge Renke spent a 
total of $105,800 on his campaign.  The official election filings showed he 
received approximately $10,000 in public contributions and that he loaned his own 
campaign $95,800.  These monies came in the form of three different loans in the 
 
 
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amounts of $6,000, $40,000 and $49,800, which matched incremental 
compensation installments paid to Judge Renke by his firm.  In 2002, the year of 
the campaign, his final reported salary totaled $140,116, a sum far in excess of any 
sums previously received.  Out of his total net income of $140,116, the sum of 
$101,800 was attributed directly to the Driftwood fees.  Thus the cost of the 
campaign was $105,800, and the Driftwood fees were supposedly the basis for 
$101,800 of Judge Renke’s compensation that year, out of which he loaned his 
campaign $95,800. 
 
The JQC concluded that the firm was not yet entitled to the Driftwood fees 
since final court approval of the settlement did not happen until August of 2003, 
and, even though the firm was already holding $123,553 of this money, it was 
being held in a form of trust and had not yet been earned because the final 
settlement in the case had not been approved.  It should also be noted that Thomas 
Gurran, the second attorney working for the senior Renke, was likewise entitled to 
a share of the Driftwood fees; however, he was not paid until October of 2003, 
after the final court approval of the settlement in August 2003.  Thus, the JQC 
concluded Judge Renke had not actually earned these fees at the time of the 
payment to him by his father.  While it appears that a dispute existed as to the 
exact fee arrangement between Judge Renke and his father, the JQC concluded that 
such a dispute was irrelevant, since the compensation he was paid in 2002 was 
 
 
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allegedly based solely on the pending Driftwood litigation fees.  The JQC, 
therefore, found Judge Renke guilty of count 8, since he knowingly accepted the 
unearned fee amounts from his father and then directly loaned them to his own 
campaign.  The JQC concluded that the 2002 payments were actually campaign 
contributions from his father. 
 
Once again, we find adequate evidentiary support for the JQC’s conclusion 
that these fees were not actually earned until the firm had the completely vested 
right to them upon final court approval and the expiration of the time for an appeal.  
We agree that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the JQC’s 
conclusion that the payments to Judge Renke were intended to be campaign 
contributions rather than earned income.  Judge Renke does not contest any of the 
actual evidence used by the JQC in reaching its conclusions, nor does he argue that 
any of the evidence is “indecisive, confused and contradictory,” as was the case 
when this Court overturned some of the JQC’s findings in In re Davey, 645 So. 2d 
398, 405 (Fla. 1994).  Instead, he relies on bits and pieces of the total evidentiary 
picture in an attempt to paint the circumstances in a manner to fit his explanations.  
A thorough review of the trial record, some of which we have outlined above, 
reveals that the JQC’s finding of guilt on this charge is warranted. 
 
Of particular note is the testimony of  Steven Mezer, an attorney who 
represented the Timber Oaks Community Services Association (TOSCA) as part of 
 
 
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the Driftwood litigation.  He testified that the insurance check was to be held in 
trust until the court approved the final settlement and that it was his understanding 
that John Renke was not entitled to the money before such court approval.  Mezer 
also testified that there were many contingencies that could affect the final 
approval of the settlement, since they were dealing with a large community 
membership that needed to be educated regarding all amendments, and also 
because there was infighting among the board members regarding the final deal.  
He stated that, as of 2002, there were indications that some board members were 
very much opposed to the settlement agreement and that there were also some 
changes in the constituency of the board.  Furthermore, Mezer testified that none of 
these issues were a secret and he had ongoing discussions with John Renke 
regarding these problems throughout 2002. 
 
The testimony of Margaret Renke further demonstrates the discrepancies 
surrounding both the purpose and the timing of the payments made to Judge Renke 
in 2002.  On the one hand, she testified that Judge Renke was paid his portion of 
the Driftwood fees in a piecemeal fashion because John Renke was concerned that 
the settlement might not go through; however, she also testified that the fee was 
split up to cover campaign expenses as they arose, “when [Judge Renke] needed 
it.”  Then again, however, she also stated that Judge Renke could have wanted the 
sum split up for tax purposes.  Her testimony was also inconsistent with regard to 
 
 
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the purpose of the payment and whether it was to remedy years of general 
underpayment or was due Judge Renke as payment for his specific work on the 
Driftwood cases.   
 
John Renke’s testimony also reveals inconsistencies in Judge Renke’s 
version of events and furthermore raises questions as to the credibility of his 
testimony.  For example, concerning the fee-sharing arrangement between the two, 
John Renke testified that the original plan was for Judge Renke to get twenty 
percent of settlements over $10,000 and that this was not up to his own personal 
discretion.  He then testified that, in 2000, he changed his mind and told his son 
that he would give him half of the fees from the Driftwood settlement.  However, 
one of the JQC prosecutors noted that in John Renke’s prior three depositions, he 
had never once mentioned this supposed adjustment in the Driftwood fee-sharing 
arrangement.  An additional discrepancy arose regarding the reason he paid his son 
the money when he did; during one of his previous depositions, he stated that the 
money was for Judge Renke’s work solely on Driftwood, but at the hearing, John 
Renke testified to a whole list of other cases that Judge Renke worked on as 
reasons to compensate him in 2002.  The senior Renke also testified he understood 
the insurance check to be his money at the time it was delivered to him, and that he 
was entitled to put it in any account of his choosing, spend it or do with it what he 
 
 
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wanted.3  However, he eventually conceded that the attorney’s fees in Driftwood 
were contingent on court approval of the settlement and that while he received the 
Driftwood check in 2001, he did not begin to disburse any payments to Judge 
Renke until 2002, after his son had decided to run for the judgeship.  According to 
John Renke, the reason that he paid Judge Renke the compensation in piecemeal 
fashion was to minimize his own risk in case the settlement did not go through.  
Contradictions in John Renke’s testimony, as well as the discrepancies between his 
statements at his deposition and then later at trial, bear on his credibility as a 
witness and the veracity of his explanation for the payments to his son. 
 
Based upon our review of the record, we find ample support for the JQC’s 
conclusion that both the timing of the payments from John Renke to his son and 
their prompt deposit into Judge Renke’s campaign account indicate that these 
funds were not the product of mere coincidence in the payment of earned legal 
fees, but rather were meant to be campaign contributions.  Given the many 
discrepancies in the testimony of both John and Margaret Renke concerning the 
purpose and timing of the payments to their son, as well as uncontroverted 
                                          
 
 
3.  To defend his belief that he could place the money in an account of his 
choosing, John Renke read aloud a provision from the settlement agreement’s 
“Post-Signing Procedure,” which stated: “TOSCA’s Insurer will, within 10 days 
after this agreement is signed by the attorneys, deposit in an interest-bearing 
account at a place and of a type to be designated by John K. Renke, II: (a) $98,000 
for plaintiffs’ attorneys fees incurred through the December 1998 mediation.”   
 
 
 
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testimony by an opposing attorney in the Driftwood litigation that the settlement 
agreement was not final when the payments were made to Judge Renke in 2002 
and other evidence in the record, we find that the JQC’s conclusion on this charge 
is supported by clear and convincing evidence.   
DISCIPLINE 
 
According to article V, section 12(c)(1) of the Florida Constitution, this 
Court has discretion to either accept, reject, or modify the commission’s findings 
and recommendation of discipline.  In re Alley, 699 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1997) 
(noting that in 1996, article V, section 12 of the Florida Constitution was amended 
to allow the Supreme Court to modify the recommendations of the JQC).  
Although this Court gives the findings and recommendations of the JQC great 
weight, the ultimate power and responsibility in making a determination to 
discipline a judge rests with this Court.  In re Angel, 867 So. 2d 379, 382 (Fla. 
2004).    
 
As mentioned above, this case originally came before us in July of 2004, 
when the JQC charged Judge Renke only with the campaign literature violations 
that form the bases of counts 1 through 7 and count 9 of the current proceedings.  
However, we remanded the case back to the JQC to conduct additional 
proceedings, having determined that the recommended penalty of a $20,000 fine, a 
 
 
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thirty-day suspension, and a public reprimand was not severe enough for the 
violations presented at that time.   
 
After our rejection and remand, the JQC then added count 8, ultimately 
concluding that in addition to the serious campaign violations, Judge Renke also 
violated state campaign finance laws by accepting an illegal campaign contribution 
from his father.  However, despite the addition of this substantial charge, the JQC’s 
recommended penalty now is barely any different than it was two years ago, with 
the fine increasing only $20,000, to a total of $40,000.  Given our original 
reservations with the discipline originally recommended by the JQC, we are 
satisfied that the addition of such egregious campaign finance violations merits a 
more substantial sanction, lest our warnings of more serious consequences go 
unheeded.    
 
Given the history of this case before this Court, coupled with the previous 
warnings we have issued in published opinions regarding misconduct during 
judicial elections, the deliberate misrepresentations made by Judge Renke during 
his campaign, and the substantial violation of campaign finance laws, we find that 
removing Judge Renke from the bench is the only sanction appropriate for the 
serious misconduct established here. 
 
Importantly, our previous opinions have cautioned against the exact type of 
misconduct that is before us in this case.  Almost ten years ago, in In re Alley, 699 
 
 
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So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1997), we faced similar alleged violations on behalf of a 
candidate for judicial office; in that case, Judge Alley was charged with knowingly 
misrepresenting her qualifications and those of her opponent in her campaign 
literature, including mailers and newspaper advertisements.  Id. at 1369.  Among 
other violations, she claimed to have circuit court judicial experience, when in fact 
she had only served as a general master.  Id.  She also argued that her opponent had 
no circuit court judicial experience, when actually the opponent did have extensive 
experience serving in that capacity.  Id.  Finally, Judge Alley was charged with 
fostering an overly partisan tone in her election and creating false impressions as to 
her campaign endorsements.  Id.   
 
At the time we reviewed that case, we were constrained by the language of 
article V regarding our ability to modify the JQC’s proposed discipline.  Id. at 
1370.  However, we expressed our frustration with the recommended discipline in 
that case, regarding violations similar to the ones we face today, stating, “we find it 
difficult to allow one guilty of such egregious conduct to retain the benefits of 
those violations and remain in office.”  Id.  Thus, we are especially troubled by 
Judge Renke’s conduct, given the explicit warnings regarding similar misconduct 
and the potential consequences we issued in In re Alley.  
 
This Court continued to send loud and clear warnings concerning judicial 
election misconduct in In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 2001).  In that case, 
 
 
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Judge McMillan, while a candidate for office, clearly indicated during his 
campaign that he would favor both the State and the police in court proceedings 
and also that he would side against the defense; he was further charged with 
making unfounded attacks on an incumbent judge and the local court system.  Id. 
at 562.  As did Judge Renke, Judge McMillan initially made a stipulation regarding 
these charges.  The JQC then recommended a penalty of a public reprimand and 
six months’ suspension without pay; again, as in the instant case, we rejected this 
recommendation, remanding the case back to the JQC for further proceedings.  Id. 
at 564.  The JQC then amended the charges to add additional allegations, as it did 
with Judge Renke; in the case of Judge McMillan, this included charges of 
improper conduct once he was on the bench, including presiding over proceedings 
in a case in which he had a conflict of interest.  Id.   
 
On review, we agreed with the JQC’s findings of guilt on all charges, 
concluding that they were supported by clear and convincing evidence.  Id. at 566.  
We also agreed with the JQC’s ultimate determination to remove Judge McMillan 
from the bench, especially in light of the additional charges concerning improper 
conduct once he became a judge.  In our opinion we concluded:  
This Court has emphasized that the object of disciplinary 
proceedings is not for the purpose of inflicting punishment, but rather 
to gauge a judge’s fitness to serve as an impartial judicial officer.  See 
In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565, 569 (Fla. 1970).  In making that 
determination, the Court has often pointed out that judges should be 
held to higher ethical standards than lawyers by virtue of their 
 
 
- 24 -
position in the judiciary and the impact of their conduct on public 
confidence in an impartial justice system.  See In re Boyd, 308 So. 2d 
13, 21 (Fla. 1975).  At the same time, the Court has recognized that 
the discipline of removal should not be imposed upon a judge unless 
the Court concludes that “the judge’s conduct is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office.”  In re 
Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744, 753 (Fla. 1997).  
 
In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d at 571.  In removing a judge from the bench and 
sounding this warning before Judge Renke’s campaign in 2002, we again were 
hoping to deter the kind of conduct we are faced with here, and putting all judicial 
candidates on notice that we would no longer tolerate such serious misconduct.  
 
Unfortunately, we are compelled to repeat and emphasize the same warning 
we did ten years ago in In re Alley and more recently in In re McMillan: 
[A]s we attempted to make clear in In re Alley, to allow someone who 
has committed such misconduct during a campaign to attain office to 
then serve the term of the judgeship obtained by such means clearly 
sends the wrong message to future candidates; that is, the end justifies 
the means and, thus, all is fair so long as the candidate wins. 
 
In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d at 573.  Today we make clear that those warnings 
cannot be ignored by those who seek the trust of the public to place them in 
judicial office. 
 
In our decision to remove Judge Renke, we have concluded that the series of 
blatant, knowing misrepresentations found in Judge Renke’s campaign literature 
and in his statements to the press amount to nothing short of fraud on the electorate 
in an effort to secure a seat on the bench.  Furthermore, as found by the JQC, the 
 
 
- 25 -
payments from Judge Renke’s father, though disguised as compensation, were 
clearly illegal donations to a judicial campaign in obvious violation of our state 
campaign finance laws.  In essence, Judge Renke and his cohorts created a 
fictitious candidate, funded his candidacy in violation of Florida’s election laws, 
and successfully perpetrated a fraud on the electorate in securing the candidate’s 
election.  Unlike the situation in In re Alley, we no longer feel restrained to permit 
someone who has successfully achieved judicial office by such blatant misconduct 
to hold onto this office. 
 
Neither are we swayed by the mitigation proffered in this case.  It is not 
enough to point to Judge Renke’s successes as a judge if he only attained that 
position through his own fraudulent and illegal campaign misconduct.  It appears 
that the JQC may have decided that, as a matter of law, if a judge who has 
committed serious misconduct is serving adequately as a judge, he is presently fit 
to hold office.  However, even accepting the JQC’s findings of fact on this issue, 
we hold that regardless of Judge Renke’s present abilities and reputation as a 
judge, one who obtains a position by fraud and other serious misconduct, as we 
have found Judge Renke did, is by definition unfit to hold that office.    
 
In determining the discipline appropriate in cases of judicial wrongdoing, 
our obligation is first and foremost to the public and to our state’s justice system.  
Florida has chosen a nonpartisan election process for selecting judges, and conduct 
 
 
- 26 -
that substantially misleads the voting public and interferes with its right to make a 
knowing and intelligent decision as to a judicial candidate’s qualifications will 
simply not be tolerated in selecting members of the judiciary.  Those who seek to 
assume the mantle of administrators of justice cannot be seen to attain such a 
position of trust through such unjust means.  The JQC’s finding of guilt on the 
severe campaign finance improprieties evidenced here, when coupled with Judge 
Renke’s efforts to mislead the voting public as to his experience and qualifications 
to serve as judge, lead us to conclude that his conduct during his judicial campaign 
was “fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office.”  In re 
Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744, 753 (Fla. 1997).  Accordingly, we conclude that Judge 
Renke is presently unfit to hold judicial office and removal is warranted.   
CONCLUSION 
 
We conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence in support of the 
findings of fact of the JQC on all charges.  For the reasons stated above, John 
Renke III is hereby removed as a judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, effective upon 
this opinion becoming final.  We direct that Renke pay the costs of these 
proceedings.  See In re Hapner, 737 So. 2d 1075, 1077 (Fla. 1999).  We remand 
this case to the JQC for a determination of the amount of such costs.   
 
It is so ordered. 
 
 
 
- 27 -
PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANTERO, JJ., 
concur. 
WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which BELL, 
J., concurs. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
WELLS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur in the approval of the findings and conclusions of the Judicial 
Qualifications Commission (JQC) as to the charges against Judge Renke. 
 
I dissent from the majority’s decision to remove Judge Renke from office.  
While I agree that the violations committed by Judge Renke are serious—
warranting serious discipline—I do not concur with the Court’s removal of Judge 
Renke when the hearing panel of the Judicial Qualifications Commission has not 
recommended removal.  To the contrary, the hearing panel stated in its findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations that “after thorough deliberation, the Panel 
unanimously rejected removal from office.”  I know of no precedent in which this 
Court has removed a judge when there has not been a recommendation by the JQC 
to do so.  Here, the Court is not only doing so without a JQC recommendation, the 
Court is rejecting the JQC’s recommendation that the judge not be removed from 
office. 
 
 
- 28 -
 
I do not conclude that the Court could never remove a judge from office 
without a recommendation to do so from the hearing panel of the JQC, but I do 
conclude that this Court can only do so when adhering strictly to the constitution 
and upon specifically stated standards.  The constitutional provision upon which 
the Court is authorized to act is article V, section 12(c)(1), which states: 
 
(c) 
SUPREME COURT.—The supreme court shall receive 
recommendations from the judicial qualifications commission’s 
hearing panel. 
 
(1) 
The supreme court may accept, reject, or modify in 
whole or in part the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of 
the commission and it may order that the justice or judge be subjected 
to appropriate discipline, or be removed from office with termination 
of compensation for willful or persistent failure to perform judicial 
duties or for other conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary 
demonstrating a present unfitness to hold office, or be involuntarily 
retired for any permanent disability that seriously interferes with the 
performance of judicial duties.  Malafides, scienter or moral turpitude 
on the part of a justice or judge shall not be required for removal from 
office of a justice or judge whose conduct demonstrates a present 
unfitness to hold office.  After the filing of a formal proceeding and 
upon request of the investigative panel, the supreme court may 
suspend the justice or judge from office, with or without 
compensation, pending final determination of the inquiry. 
I read this section to authorize this Court to remove a judge from office only for 
conduct “demonstrating a present unfitness to hold office.” 
 
In this case, the hearing panel of the JQC specifically found that there had 
not been demonstrated a present unfitness to hold office.  The hearing panel stated: 
The Panel believes that Judge Renke has been a very good judge for 
three years and the Panel thus strongly holds that he is not presently 
unfit to serve as a judge. 
 
 
- 29 -
The hearing panel, of course, heard live evidence and had the power to evaluate the 
credibility of witnesses.  The Court did not.  I do not believe that the constitution 
allows this Court’s majority to simply substitute its judgment for that of the 
hearing panel which heard and evaluated the evidence. 
 
I cannot agree with the majority that this specific finding by the JQC can be 
avoided by this Court’s finding that Judge Renke obtained his position by fraud.  
The JQC did not charge Judge Renke with obtaining his position by fraud.  Rather, 
the JQC charged Judge Renke with making a series of misrepresentations during 
the election campaign.  I am uncertain what the standards are by which campaign 
misrepresentations rise to the level of fraud. 
 
Neither did the JQC panel find Judge Renke guilty of having obtained his 
position by fraud.  In the thirty-three pages of the JQC’s “Findings, Conclusions 
and Recommendations” I do not find the word “fraud.” 
 
Whether there was fraud would properly be decided as an issue of fact.  This 
has always been the law of this State.  See Gibson v. Love, 4 Fla. 217 (1851); Lab. 
Corp. of Am. v. Prof’l Recovery Network, 813 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).  I 
know of no precedent for the Court to make a finding of fraud as the Court does 
here. 
 
The JQC is a constitutionally authorized entity which is constitutionally 
independent from this Court.  Art. V, § 12(a)-(b), Fla. Const.  I believe this Court 
 
 
- 30 -
should give the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the JQC not only 
the deference given by an appellate court to the findings of fact of any lower 
tribunal, but enhanced deference by reason of the JQC’s constitutional 
empowerment.  In its brief and argument before this Court, the JQC contended that 
the discipline in this case should be as recommended by the hearing panel.  There 
has been no brief or argument contending that Judge Renke should be removed. 
 
This Court removed judges from office in In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560 
(Fla. 2001); In re Shea, 759 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 2000); and In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 
744 (Fla. 1997).  Each time, we did so upon the recommendation of the JQC.  In 
doing so, we recognized that removal is the ultimate sanction: 
 
Removal is the ultimate sanction in judicial disciplinary 
proceedings.  This Court will approve a recommendation that a judge 
be removed from the bench when we conclude that the judge’s 
conduct is fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of 
judicial office. 
Shea, 759 So. 2d at 638-39 (citation omitted).  With a directly contrary 
recommendation from the JQC, I cannot join in the majority’s use of this ultimate 
sanction.  A finding by this Court of fraud cannot be a proper basis since fraud was 
not found by the JQC in this case.  What is the standard that we will apply in future 
cases?  What is the role of the hearing panel of the JQC? 
 
It is my view that since the majority does not conclude that it can approve 
the discipline recommended by the hearing panel, the proper course would be to 
 
 
- 31 -
again remand to the hearing panel for further consideration of a more severe 
sanction that is short of removal from office.  I would join in that remand. 
BELL, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
Original Proceeding – Judicial Qualifications Commission 
 
Honorable James R. Wolf, Chair, Tallahassee, Florida, Thomas C. MacDonald, Jr., 
General Counsel, Tampa, Florida, Brooke S. Kennerly, Executive Director, 
Tallahassee, Florida, Marvin E. Barkin, Marie Tomassi, and Michael K. Green of 
Trenam, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye, O’Neill and Mullis, P.A., Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, Petitioner 
 
Scott K. Tozian and Gwendolyn H. Hinkle of Smith, Tozian and Hinkle, P.A., 
Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Judge Renke, Respondent