Title: Minton v. Leonard
Citation: 412 S.W.2d 886
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 1967

412 S.W.2d 886 (1967) James M. MINTON, dba Minton Fence Sales, Plaintiff in Error, v. Douglas Steve LEONARD, Defendant in Error. Supreme Court of Tennessee. February 17, 1967. Gore, Gore &amp; Ladd, Bristol, for plaintiff in error. Slaughter &amp; Jackson, Bristol, for defendant in error. CRESON, Justice. This appeal comes from the Chancery Court of Sullivan County, Tennessee. The parties will be referred to herein as they appeared in the trial court; that is, plaintiff in error James M. Minton, dba Minton Fence Sales, as defendant and defendant in error, Douglas Steve Leonard, as petitioner. On November 3, 1965, the petitioner filed his petition for workmen's compensation. In the petition it was alleged that on May 1, 1965, while in the course and scope of his employment, the petitioner was injured when a section of pipe fell upon his back while he was engaged in the erection of a backstop at an athletic field. It was further alleged that this injury permanently affected his ability to follow gainful employment. The petitioner prayed for an award of permanent partial disability under this State's Workmen's Compensation law. The defendant's answer, filed on November 23, 1965, admitted that the petitioner *887 received the injury alleged in his petition in the course and scope of his employment, but denied that, as a result thereof, he suffered any permanent partial disability. On February 2, 1966, after the taking of the deposition of Dr. E.T. Pearson, the petitioner amended his petition, by adding the following: The trial court, on February 8, 1966, allowed the amendment. It was further ordered by the Court, upon motion of defendant, that a psychiatrist be appointed to examine the petitioner and to file report with the attorneys for both sides. The testimony of such psychiatrist was never made a part of the record by either side. The case was heard on June 20, 1966. The trial court found that the petitioner had suffered a fifty per cent permanent partial disability, and entered judgment that he recover for same from the defendant. Appeal has been timely perfected to this Court. The assignments of error of defendant are as follows: Defendant's first assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. E.T. Pearson to testify as to the employability of the petitioner on January 31, 1966. It is contended that no medical findings were given to support Dr. Pearson's conclusion. It appears from the record that Dr. Pearson had been treating the petitioner with some regularity from May 6, 1965, immediately after the accident occurred, until January 31, 1966. It appears that Dr. Pearson's conclusion as to petitioner's disability was based upon this entire series of examinations and treatment. No authority is cited by defendant to support this contention, and it is the opinion of this Court that the same is without merit. The defendant's second assignment of error urges that Dr. E.T. Pearson, a general practitioner, was unqualified to testify as an expert in the field of nervous overlay or traumatic neurosis. It appears from the record in this case that Dr. Pearson was treating the petitioner for this condition, and was thoroughly familiar with the entire history of petitioner's nervous condition. This testimony, as to the existence of this condition, was entirely competent. *888 Defendant's third assignment of error makes the point that no material evidence was presented to show that the injury suffered by the petitioner resulted in a permanent disability. This is the serious question presented. The evidence adduced by the petitioner reveals that prior to his injury, on or about May 6, 1965, he was suffering from a nervous disorder. It appears that this nervous disorder was precipitated by his having learned that his wife was some three months pregnant before he married her, he having known her for less than two weeks before their marriage. Dr. Pearson testified that the subsequent injury on May 6, 1965 aggravated this pre-existing nervous condition. Dr. Pearson's testimony is as follows: The only other medical testimony contained in the record is that of Dr. Bachman, which is well summarized in the following quotation from his testimony: It is the opinion of this Court that the previously quoted testimony of Dr. Pearson is some material evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that there was a causal connection between the injury suffered by petitioner on May 6, 1965, and his presently aggravated nervous condition. However, we further hold the view that the trial court's finding that this condition is permanent is not supported by any material evidence. It might be noted that Dr. Pearson was very careful to say that, at the "present time" the petitioner was disabled; that is, at the time his testimony was given. No opinion was expressed by him as to the permanency of this condition. Rather, it is inferable from his testimony that the complainant's disability was not rightly to be considered as permanent. This is not to say that in every case there must be expert medical testimony as to the permanency of the injury. In some cases, it may be completely obvious that the injury is permanent, as where the Court is dealing with loss of a hand, or there may be cases where lay testimony would establish the permanency of the injury. However, in the case at bar, we are dealing with a most complex disability, concerning which this Court is not competent to infer permanency. *890 The trial judge has found the petitioner's condition to be permanent, without expert opinion to that effect. In this we must conclude there is error. However, it seems apparent that petitioner has not been paid all that to which the trial court, having found causal connection between the injury and the condition of traumatic neurosis, might justifiably award him. Thus, in the plight of this record it would not be proper, as contended by counsel for defendant, to dismiss this cause. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for new trial. The costs of this appeal are to be equally divided between the parties. BURNETT, C. J., DYER and CHATTIN, JJ., and HARBISON, Special Justice, concur.