Title: STATE v FRATES
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12136
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: November 15, 1972

No. 12136 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1972 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - L A R R Y FRATES , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Towe, Neely and Ball, Billings, Montana. Gerald J. Neely argued, Billings, Montana. For Respondent: Honorable Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana. J. C. Weingartner, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana. Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, argued, Billings, Montana. Submitted: May 16, 1972 M r . Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendant, Larry Frates, appeals from a judgment of convic- tion of the crime of criminal sale of dangerous drugs entered on June 10, 1971, following jury t r i a l and verdict of guilty i n the d i s t r i c t court of the thirteenth judicial d i s t r i c t , county of Yellowstone, the Hon. Charles Luedke, d i s t r i c t judge presiding. Following denial of h i s motion for a new t r i a l , defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction. Defendant was arrested on the night of March 17, 1971, i n Room 105 of the Imperial 400 Motel i n Billings by officers of the Billings police department following a sale by defendant of 900 L S D tablets t o an undercover police officer, Richard Stelzer. Two officers of the Billings police department, Sgt. Jack Samson and Detective Pat Hagel, occupied the adjoining motel room and heard the entire conversation between defendant and Officer Stelzer by means of an electronic "bug" planted i n the telephone i n Room 105, which transmitted the conversation through the telephone i n the room they occupied. A t t r i a l , defendant admitted h i s actions of March 17, 1971, but offered testimony and evidence t o support h i s defense of entrapment by the Billings police and the Yellowstone County sheriff's departments. During t r i a l it developed that a police informer, Dale Anderson, a bartender a t the Midway Bar i n Billings, had purchased 100 L S D tablets from defendant on two separate occasions within days of the crime charged, and played a significant role i n arranging the meeting a t the Imperial 400 Motel between Officer Stelzer and defendant culminating i n the sale of 900 L S D tablets with which defendant was charged. Defendant was duly charged with the l a t t e r sale, t r i e d by jury, convicted, and sentenced t o twenty years i n the s t a t e prison. Following denial of his motion for a new trial, de- fendant appeals from his conviction. Defendant raises seven issues on appeal: 1 . The court erred in refusing to give defendant's offered instruction No. 7 . 2, The court abused its discretion in admitting evidence where there was an incomplete chain of possession. 3 . The court abused its discretion in allowing informant to testify to alleged prior sales. 4 . Entrapment having been shown as a matter of law, the court erred in not granting a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case. 5. The court erred in not striking all testimony relating to conversations taking place in the motel room in question. 6, The court erred in not granting a new trial or directing a verdict of acquittal at the close of defendant's case. 7 . The court erred in overruling defendant's objection to plaintiff's offered instruction No. 4 . Directing our attention to Issue 1, we observe that de- fendant's offered instruction No, 7 is covered by the court's instruction No. 2, which is the cautionary instruction taken verbatim from Instruction No. 1, M . J . I . G . Accordingly there is no error in the court's refusal of defendant's offered instruction No. 7 covering the same point in slightly different language. State v. Lagge, 143 Mont. 289, 388 P.2d 792; State v, Logan, 156 Mont. 48, 473 P,2d 833. In Issue No. 2, defendant argues the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of dangerous drugs where there was an incomplete chain of possession. The evidence establishes a chain of possession of the LSD tablets from de- fendant to the arresting officers; from there to tagging, marking and storing in the evidence vault at the Billings police de- partment; the packaging and addressing of four of the tablets to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in San Francisco; the receipt of the four p i l l s by t h i s agency; their examination, testing, and identification by chemist Chan of that agency; and, the return of the plastic container, the mailing box, and the mailing wrapper,bearing the handwriting of one of the Billings officers, to the Billings police department. Under such circumstances, the absence of the direct testimony of the person who actually mailed them t o San Francisco is immaterial and i n no sense breaks the chain of possession, precluding t h e i r ad- missibility in evidence. Issue No. 3 concerns the admission of testimony by informant Anderson of alleged prior sales of dangerous drugs by defendant. The s t a t e ' s evidence disclosed that Dale Anderson was re- quested by the Billings police department t o a s s i s t i t i n curbing the drug t r a f f i c i n Billings and t o relay information on drug t r a f f i c as a paid informer, Anderson was given the names of two suspects of particular interest t o the Billings police de- partment, one of whom was Ron Novasio and the second, the de- fendant. In l a t e February or early March 1971, defendant came t o the Midway Bar i n Billings where Anderson was employed as a bartender. Anderson told defendant that he wanted t o go i n t o a "partnership" with defendant i n the i l l e g a l drug field. Anderson informed defendant he was not getting supplied l i k e he should, and asked i f defendant could a s s i s t him. Defendant replied that he was not sure a t that time, but he would l e t Anderson know. Again, about a week l a t e r , defendant and Anderson came into contact and discussed their possible agreement. On March 9, 1971, approximately a week and a half a f t e r their l a s t meeting, defendant came t o the Midway Bar and handed Anderson a sack containing 100 capsules of LSD. Defendant told Anderson the capsules were LSD, which could be sold for double the amount of money needed t o purchase them. Anderson turned the capsules over t o Detective Hagel, who gave Anderson $150 so that he could pay defendant. About a week l a t e r , on March 14, 1971, defendant returned to the Midway Bar and handed Anderson another sack containing 100 LSD capsules which were again turned over to Detective Hagel. It is the evidence of these prior transactionq admitted at the trial over the objection of defendant, that is one of the principal assignments of error. The general rule in regard to the admissibility of evidence of other crimes is stated in 29 Am,Jur.2d, Evidence, 5320,p.366: "It is a well-established common-law rule that in a criminal prosecution proof which shows or tends to show that the accused is guilty of the commission of other crimes and offenses at other times, even though they are of the same nature as the one charged, is in- competent and inadmissible for the purpose of showing the commission of the particular crime charged * * * . " ~ontana's adherence to the above quoted general rule is recited in State v . Jensen, 153 Mont. 233, 238, 455 P.2d 631, which states: "* * * Montana recognizes the general rule " ' t h a t when a defendant is put upon trial fox one offense, he should be convicted, if at all, by evidence which shows that he is guilty of that offense alone; and evidence which in any manner shows, or tends to show, that he has committed another crime wholly independent. even though it be a crime of the same sort, is irrele-• vant and inadmissible." Williams v . State, 68 Ok1,Cr. 348, 352, 98 P,2d 937, 939.' State v. Tiedemann, 139 Mont. 237, 362 P.2d 529 ( 1 9 6 1 ) . The reason for this rule is---the defendant is entitled to be informed of the crime charged so as to prepare his defense and proof of other crimes subjects him to surprise and defense of multiple collateral or unrelated issues, State v. Nicks, 134 Mont. 341, 332 P.2d 904, ( 1 9 5 8 ) . 1 1 (Emphasis added) Jensen, then goes on to state a recognized exception to this general rule: 11 There are recognized exceptions to this general rule: similar acts with the same prosecuting witness, State vs. Sauter, 125 Mont. 109, 232 P.2d 731 ( 1 9 5 1 ) ; similar acts not too remote in time, State vs. Nicks, supra; and 'where the evidence of other crimes tends to establish a common scheme, plan or system and where such other crimes are similar to, closely connected with and not too remote from the one charged, and also where they are so that proof of one tends to establish the other.' State v. Merritt, Mont , 5'/ P. State v, Gran~berr:?~140 Mo~:~~?O: 367 $ ! 2 ! 8 : 6 d 1 ; ? % $ ) . " (Emphasis added) The weight of authority, although not pursued in Jensen, is favorable to this exception to the general rule. State v, Mc- Daniel, 80 Ariz. 381, 298 P.2d 798; Warren v . State, 95 Ga.App. 79, 97 S.E.2d 194; State v, Whiting, 173 Kan. 711, 252 P.2d 884; Commonwealth v. Kline , 361 Pa. 434, 65 A.2d 348. W e recognize that the admission of such evidence i s an exception t o the general rule and accordingly we are obligated to look very carefully a t the relative probative value of such evidence, i f any, and weigh i t against the prejudice inherent i n t h i s type of evidence in the light of the actual need t o introduce such evidence by the state. The evidence of the two prior sales of LSD to the informer i n the instant case i s part of the corpus d e l i c t i of the crime with which the defendant i s charged. It is a part of the t o t a l i t y of events and occurrences leading t o and culminating i n the sale of the 900 LSD tablets t o the undercover police officer of which defendant was convicted. It tends t o explain the circumstances leading t o the commission of the crime charged, establishes defendant's intent t o commit the crime charged, and negatives the defense of entrapment. As such, it i s clearly relevant, probative and competent evidence tending t o prove the crime charged. The fact that it i s inherently prejudicial t o defendant does not detract from i t s admissibility under such circumstances, particularly where, as here, no element of surprise i s involved. Defendant argues that such evidence i s not admissible i n the s t a t e ' s case-in-chief as the defense of entrapment had not been raised by defendant a t t h i s juncture. The record belies t h i s claim. Defendant had made h i s opening statement immediately following that of the s t a t e before the introduction of any evi- dence and although such opening statement i s not transcribed i n the record on appeal, the record indicates the defense of entrap- ment had been raised therein by the following remark of the t r i a l judge i n response t o defendant's objection t o the admissibility of evidence of the two prior sales of LSD: "THE COURT: Well, it seems t o m e that the die is pretty well cast by virtue of the opening statements made on both sides, to which neither made any objection. And the rule i n Montana i s that provided by State v. Jensen, 153 Mont. 233, and under the circumstances 1 ' m going t o over- rule the objection. 11 Issue No. 4 i s whether entrapment was established a s a matter of law e n t i t l i n g defendant t o a directed verdict of acquittal, The law of entrapment i s s e t forth i n our recent decision i n State v. Karathanos, M o n t . 9 493 P.2d 326, 330, 29 St.Rep. 81, 88, which we quote i n pertinent part: "Defendant now contends that he was entrapped i n t o commitllng the offense charged. With t h i s contention, we cannot agree. Entrapment occurs only when the criminal intent or design originates i n the mind of the police officer or informer and not with the accused, and the accused i s lured or induced i n t o committing a crime he had no intention of committing. Only when the criminal design originates, not with the accused, but i n the mind of government officers and the accused i s by persuasion, deceitful representa- tions, o r inducement, lured into the commission of a criminal a c t , can a case of entrapment be made out. In short, there i s a controlling distinction between inducing a person t o do an unlawful a c t and setting a trap t o catch him i n the execution of a criminal design of h i s own conception. The f a c t that the Yellowstone County sheriff's office afforded the op- portunity or f a c i l i t y for the commission of the offense, does not come within the entrapment rule. In t h i s class of offenses, usually committed secretly, it i s d i f f i c u l t i f not almost impossible t o secure the evidence necessary t o convict by any other means than by the use of decoys, Certainly, there can be no objection t o their use i f the officers do not by persuasion, deceitful representations o r inducement, lure a person who otherwise would not be likely t o break the law, into a criminal act. State v. Wong Hip Chung, 74 Mont. 523, 241 P, 620; State v. Parr, 129 Mont. 175, 283 P.2d 1086; 22 C,J.S. Criminal-Law 5 5 45(1), 45(2), 45(4), p. 137," Here, the evidence i s conflicting precluding entrapment a s a matter of law, and the jury resolved t h i s conflict against the defendant. There i s no merit i n defendant's issue No. 5. It i s based on the failure of the s t a t e t o permit inspection and copying of the tape recording of the conversation between defendant and the undercover police officer i n the motel room a t the time of sale. The uncontradicted evidence shows that the tape was unintelligible, inaudible, not available, and not used prior t o or a t the t r i a l . Under such circumstances the claimed error i s without substance, Defendant's issue No. 6 i s encompassed i n the other errors claimed and need not be separately discussed, In issue No. 7 , the f i n a l issue, defendant claims that the word "suspect" as used i n court's instruction No. 1 1 was error. Instruction No. 1 1 reads i n pertinent part: "On the other hand, where a person already has the readiness and willingness t o break the law, the mere fact that law enforcement officers o r their agents provide what appears t o be a favorable oppor- tunity i s not entrapment. For example, when law enforcement officers or their agents suspect that a person i s engaged i n the i l l i c i t sale of dangerous drugs, i t i s not entrapment for law enforcement o f f i - cers or t h e i r agents t o pretend t o be someone else and t o offer, either directly or through an informer or other decoy, t o purchase narcotics from such suspected person." (Emphasis supplied) I I Defendant contends the term suspect" was error and the words "has reasonable grounds for believing" should have been substi- tuted. The use of the word "suspect" i s entirely proper where, as here, the balance of the instruction clearly indicates that the impetus for commission of the crime must emanate from de- fendant and that the law enforcement officers can do no more than create the opportunity for i t s commission by posing a s prospective purchasers of contraband. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t Associate Justice / M : , f Justice r