Title: STATE v BREITENSTEIN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14417
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 2, 1979

N o . 14417 IN THE supm COUHT OF THE STATE O F rnNTANA 1978 THE STATE O F JONTANA, Plaintiff a n d Respondent, -VS- KENNETH BREmSTEIN', S R . Defendant and Appellant. Appeal f r o a n : District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District, Honorable Ibbert M . Holter, Judge presiding. Counsel of m r d : For Appellant: Frank B . bbrrison, S r . , Whitefish, Mntana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Mntana William A . Douglas, County Attorney, Libby, Mntana Submitted on briefs: N o - 8, 1978 MAR 2 - ! 9 7 9 Decided. M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant Kenneth Breitenstein, Sr., appeals from a judgment convicting him of t h e crime of aggravated a s s a u l t following a jury t r i a l i n t h e District Court of Lincoln County. O n J u l y 4 , 1977, appellant Kenneth B r e i t e n s t e i n , S r . , w a s a r r e s t e d i n Lincoln County, Montana, on t h e charge of aggravated a s s a u l t under s e c t i o n 94-5-202, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 45-5-202 MCA. An information was f i l e d charging t h a t t h e defendant had purposely and knowingly placed W i l l i a m H. Heika i n reasonable apprehension of s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y by use of a weapon, s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t he had pointed a p i s t o l a t W i l l i a m Heika and threatened t o shoot him i f he moved. Defendant pleaded "not g u i l t y " . Later defendant f i l e d n o t i c e of h i s i n t e n t i o n t o r e l y on t h e defenses of i n s a n i t y , self-defense and a l i b i . Jury t r i a l w a s held March 1 4 and 15, 1978, and appel- l a n t w a s found g u i l t y of t h e crime of aggravated a s s a u l t . H e w a s sentenced t o four years i n t h e Montana S t a t e Prison. The sentence w a s suspended. On J u l y 4 , 1977, W i l l i a m Heika, E a r l Ballenger and J i m Tompkins w e r e on a spur road a s h o r t d i s t a n c e off t h e Long Meadow Road i n t h e Yaak Valley of Lincoln County, Montana, on t h e i r way t o c u t firewood a t Roderick Butte nearby. Heika held a Forest Service permit t o c u t firewood i n t h e a r e a . On t h e spur road they came upon a number of trees f e l l e d across t h e road blocking f u r t h e r progress. They proceeded t o c u t t h e trees i n t o blocks, loading them i n t o Heika's pickup t o clear passage f o r t h e i r t h r e e pickups. Appellant was d r i v i n g down Long Meadow Road on h i s way home from work. H e saw t h e t h r e e pickups on the spur road and recognized Heika's. Appellant t e s t i f i e d he proceeded t o h i s ranch nearby and washed up. H e then strapped on h i s . 2 2 c a l i b e r p i s t o l , t i e d a block of s a l t on h i s t r a i l bike and proceeded t o take t h e s a l t t o h i s c a t t l e . H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had f e l l e d t h e trees a c r o s s t h e spur road where Heika and h i s two companions w e r e sawing i n order t o contain h i s cows within a F o r e s t Service Grazing Permit located adjacent t o h i s ranch and upon which t h e i n c i d e n t occurred. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r s a l t i n g h i s c a t t l e , he decided t o i n v e s t i g a t e t o see i f t h e trees had been removed, which would allow h i s cows t o walk away. Appellant t e s t i f i e d he was somewhat upset when he a r r i v e d a t t h e scene of t h e incident. H e apparently addressed himself t o Heika almost exclusively although Heika w a s t h e f u r t h e s t from him a s he a r r i v e d on t h e scene. H e t e s t i f i e d he inquired ". . . what t h e h e l l they w e r e doing t h e r e , c u t t i n g those t r e e s . " Heika's version w a s a p p e l l a n t ". . . came charging o u t of t h e woods . . . [ y e l l i n g a t us] 'What i n t h e h e l l are you doing on m y property'. That he had c u t down those t r e e s f o r a reason . . ." Appellant c a l l e d Heika some very profane and i n s u l t i n g names and ordered a l l of them o f f " h i s property". Heika w a s from 10 t o 25 f e e t from appellant. Appellant was standing about a t t h e rear of Heika' s pickup. Both agree Heika took several s t e p s forward i n appel- l a n t ' s d i r e c t i o n . Appellant a t t h i s p o i n t drew h i s auto- m a t i c p i s t o l and pointed it a t Heika. Heika t e s t i f i e d he had been ordered t o leave and was t r y i n g t o g e t t o h i s pickup t o do so. Appellant's version i s t h e s t e p s w e r e threatening, a s Heika had a beer can i n h i s hand and ~ e i k a "had a weird look on h i s face", " a twisted look l i k e he Was r e a l l y mad and going t o g e t revenge". Appellant t e s t i f i e d he s a i d , "Stop B i l l t t and B i l l stopped. Heika t e s t i f i e d he stopped b u t t h a t again appellant ordered him t o leave and again he took a s t e p toward h i s pickup whereupon a p p e l l a n t pulled t h e s l i d e t o cock t h e automatic p i s t o l and s a i d "All r i g h t you f a t son-of-a-bitch, another s t e p and I w i l l blow you f u l l of holes l i k e a s,i.eve." Heika turned away, walked t o t h e f a r t h e s t pickup, Tompkins', and l e f t . Appellant holstered t h e p i s t o l and allowed Tompkins t o take Heika's pickup. Heika made a complaint t o t h e s h e r i f f and a p p e l l a n t w a s a r r e s t e d . Some background i s necessary. Appellant Kenneth B r e i t e n s t e i n owned t h e family ranch of 150 acres along t h e South Fork of t h e Yaak River and had l i v e d t h e r e h i s whole l i f e , 44 years. H e worked i n t h e woods f e l l i n g trees and had some c a t t l e on h i s ranch. H e a l s o had, a s h i s family before him, a U. S. Forest Service Grazing Permit on some 70 odd a c r e s adjacent t o t h e ranch. The complaining witness, W i l l i a m Heika, had l i v e d i n t h e Yaak community f o r two o r two and one-half years before t h e incident. H e "thinned i n the woods" and ran a b a r c a l l e d The Cherokee S t r i p , located about two o r two and one-half m i l e s from t h e scene of t h e incident. Appellant and Heika had met four o r f i v e t i m e s i n t h e t i m e Heika had l i v e d i n t h e community. I n 1976 Heika owned t h r e e I r i s h S e t t e r s and intended t o raise s e t t e r s a t t h e Cherokee S t r i p . I n August 1976 appel- l a n t ' s son, Ken, Jr., s h o t two of Heika's dogs k i l l i n g one and wounding another. One dog, "Big M e l t ' , w a s r e g i s t e r e d and a champion, worth $350 according t o Heika. ~ c c o r d i n g t o appellant, t h e dogs were shot because they were chasing a p p e l l a n t ' s c a t t l e . I n e a r l y 1977 Heika discovered who had s h o t h i s dogs and f i l e d a lawsuit a g a i n s t appellant. Appellant a l s o t e s t i f i e d Heika had threatened him over t h e C i t i z e n Band r a d i o threatening t o g e t a p p e l l a n t and h i s son i f he could ever c a t c h them "alone o u t on t h e road". The i s s u e on appeal i s framed by a p p e l l a n t a s follows: Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n excluding evidence of s p e c i f i c instances of p r i o r t h r e a t s made by t h e victim of t h e alleged a s s a u l t a g a i n s t appellant/defendant which w e r e known by a p p e l l a n t and which engendered i n him a reasonable b e l i e f t h a t he w a s i n danger of imminent bodily injury? It i s w e l l t o note t h a t the D i s t r i c t Court d i d allow defendant t o t e s t i f y f u l l y a s t o t h r e a t s made by Heika a g a i n s t himself and h i s son. Two s e p a r a t e o f f e r s of proof w e r e made by appellant. The f i r s t w a s when a p p e l l a n t ' s son w a s c a l l e d a s t h e f i r s t defense witness and before a p p e l l a n t had t e s t i f i e d . The o f f e r was t h a t t h e witness, Ken, Jr., would t e s t i f y t h a t Heika's mother-in-law s a i d she would blow Ken, Jr.'s head o f f with a shotgun and t h i s t h r e a t was r e l a t e d t o appellant. Further, he would t e s t i f y t h a t i n March 1977 t h e r e was a confrontation between Heika and Ken, Jr., a t t h e D i r t y Shame Saloon when Heika s a i d he was going t o knock t h e h e l l o u t of Ken, Jr. This t h r e a t was a l s o relayed t o appellant. The o f f e r of proof w a s r e j e c t e d by t h e c o u r t f o r lack of foundation. Appellant cites Rules 404- (a) ( 2 ) and 405 (b) , Mont.R.Evid., a s t o when s p e c i f i c instances of conduct may be used t o show character where character i s an e s s e n t i a l element of t h e defense. W e hold t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t w a s c o r r e c t i n i t s r u l i n g a t t h i s t i m e . The Commission Comment t o Rules 404 (a) (2) and 405 (b) s t a t e s i n e f f e c t t h a t t h e Montana r u l e s were modified from t h e Federal Rules s p e c i f i c a l l y t o be restatements of e x i s t - i n g Montana c a s e l a w . Appellant's argument recognizes t h e Montana r u l e i s t h a t " a f t e r t h e accused has l a i d h i s foundation f o r self-defense", such evidence m a y be admissible." H e argues t h a t by appel- l a n t giving n o t i c e of h i s i n t e n t i o n t o r e l y on self-defense t h a t no f u r t h e r foundation w a s necessary. This Court i n S t a t e v. Logan (1970), 156 Mont. 48, 64- 65, 473 P.2d 833, 842, s p e c i f i c a l l y r e j e c t e d t h i s argument: ". . . The existence of t h e i s s u e of self-defense and an i s s u e as t o t h e agressor i n t h e a l t e r c a t i o n i s necessary before corroboration by evidence of t h e deceased's reputation f o r turbulence and vio- lence i s admissible. "The n o t i c e of i n t e n t i o n t o r e l y on self-defense served by defendant on t h e s t a t e p r i o r t o t r i a l i s immaterial and does n o t place t h i s matter i n i s s u e a t t h e t r i a l . Defendant i s n o t bound t o r e l y on t h i s defense a t t h e t r i a l notwithstanding s e r v i c e of t h i s notice. Until such t i m e a s de- fendant took t h e stand and admitted t h e k i l l i n g , t h e i s s u e of self-defense w a s n o t joined a t t h e t r i a l . Thus no foundation e x i s t e d f o r t h e admis- s i o n of the testimony." (Emphasis added.) The Court then allowed a p p e l l a n t t o t e s t i f y t o h i s knowledge of p r i o r t h r e a t s Heika had made. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n t h e middle of April, he, a p p e l l a n t , w a s t a l k i n g t o a neighbor on h i s C i t i z e n Band radio when Heika broke i n and s a i d " I ' l l g e t even with you and your son" i f he could ever c a t c h them alone somewhere on t h e road. H e a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n A p r i l o r May h i s daughter had t o l d him t h a t Heika had stopped where she w a s l i v i n g and made her go f o r a r i d e with Heika i n h i s pickup. Heika wanted a p p e l l a n t ' s daughter t o t e s t i f y a g a i n s t her f a t h e r i n t h e lawsuit over t h e dogs. Further, Heika had threatened t o c a t c h a p p e l l a n t o u t on t h e road and even things up. H e f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n t h e spring of 1977 h i s son, Ken, Jr., came home and t o l d him he had had an encounter with Heika a t t h e D i r t y Shame Saloon where Heika had t h r e a t - ened t o g e t him f o r shooting t h e dogs. Under cross-examination Heika admitted t h e two i n c i d e n t s dealing with a p p e l l a n t ' s son and daughter. H e denied t h e C. B. t h r e a t . However, a l l t h e t h r e a t s w e r e t h e same, he would g e t a p p e l l a n t and h i s son o u t on t h e road alone and even things up. A second o f f e r of proof was made t o prove by t h e testi- mony of one David Lawson t h a t t h e C.B. t h r e a t was made. The testimony of Elizabeth Breitenstein, now Elizabeth J e t t o n , would provide corroboration of Heika's v i s i t t o her and h i s t h r e a t s t o her f a t h e r and brother. Further, Ken, Jr., would t e s t i f y a s t o t h r e a t s made by Heika a t t h e Dirty Shame Saloon. This o f f e r was r e j e c t e d by t h e c o u r t a f t e r s t a t i n g he had allowed a p p e l l a n t t o t e s t i f y concerning t h e t h r e a t s on h i s own s t a t e of mind, b u t found "under t h e Rules of Evi- dence t h a t it would exclude it because i t s probative value i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y outweighed by t h e danger of u n f a i r preju- d i c e , confusion of t h e i s s u e and r e s u l t i n g i n misleading t h e jury . " The c o u r t a l s o refused t h e S t a t e through William Heika t o r e b u t t h e t h r e a t s t e s t i f i e d t o by appellant. The t r i a l judge made h i s assessment of t h e probative value of t h e t h r e a t evidence and h i s reasoning a s follows: "The very most that can be said is that with the beer can in his hand, if you take the Defendant's view of him moving toward his agressor, if you take the complaining witness's statement of standing there and I started to go to my car and a guy whipped out a pistol and then said I am going to blow you out of existence, or something to that effect, then it might have been admitted solely for the state of mind of the Defendant. I don't believe its of any great value to the Jury." Judge Brantly in State v. Hanlon (1909), 38 Mont. 557, 574, 580, 100 P. 1035, addressed the admissibility of such evidence as follows: ". . . But no hard-and-fast rule of exclusion may be laid down. A wise discretion should be the guide, and in all cases where the specific act, by reason of its proximity in time and place, would legitimately reflect upon the conduct or motives of the parties at the time of the affray . . . it should be admitted." Did the trial judge abuse his discretion? "As the admissibility of the evidence itself must rest largely in the sound discretion of the trial court, so must the extent to which the investigation of collateral issues arising thereon may so be lodged in its discretion, and its action will not be reviewed except where its discretionary power has been manifestly abused." Hanlon, 38 Mont. at 580. The trial judge stated that in his opinion, further testimony as to the threats would be excluded because its "probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue and result in misleading the jury. " Rule 403, Mont.R.Evid., states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury . . . or needless presenta- tion of cumulative evidence." The Commission Comment reads: "A key element of this rule is the discretion of the judge in deciding whether otherwise relevant evidence is to be excluded because of the factors listed in the rule." I n S t a t e v. Jennings (1934), 96 Mont. 80, 89, 28 P.2d 448, t h i s Court s t a t e d : "Such evidence i s admissible only when t h e defen- d a n t has interposed a p l e a of self-defense ( c i t i n g cases) and when a proper foundation i s l a i d by proof of some o v e r t a c t j u s t i f y i n g such defense. ( C i t i n g cases.) The t r i a l c o u r t should e x e r c i s e a sound l e g a l d i s c r e t i o n i n determining whether o r n o t t h e proper foundation has been l a i d f o r t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e o f f e r e d testimony. . . "'The t r u e s o l u t i o n i s t o e x e r c i s e a d i s c r e t i o n and t o admit such f a c t s when common sense tells t h a t they could l e g i t i m a t e l y a f f e c t a defendant's apprehension.' (1 Wigmore on Evidence, 2nd ed., 521.)" I n t h i s case t h e jury was informed of t h e t h r e a t s . From t h e t o t a l record of t h e case, t h e long-standing contro- versy between Heika and a p p e l l a n t and h i s family i s c l e a r and uncontradicted. The evidence by t h e witnesses t o t h e i n c i d e n t s u b s t a n t i a t e s t h a t even during t h e confrontation, t h e dog problem w a s argued. Under t h e s e ciroumstances w e hold t h a t t h e t r i a l judge d i d n o t abuse h i s d i s c r e t i o n by r u l i n g t h a t r e p e t i t i o u s testimony a s t o p r i o r t h r e a t s should be excluded a s l i k e l y t o d i s t r a c t and mislead t h e jury from t h e i s s u e s a c t u a l l y i n controversy. See S t a t e v. Heaston (1939), 1 0 9 Mont. 303, The judgment of conviction i s affirmed. - . - Chief J u s t i c e