Title: Slavenburg v. Bautts
Citation: 221 Kan. 590, 561 P.2d 423
Docket Number: 48,129
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: March 5, 1977

221 Kan. 590 (1977)
561 P.2d 423
DIRK W. SLAVENBURG, Appellee,
v.
DONALD R. BAUTTS, Appellant.
No. 48,129

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 5, 1977.
Christopher A. Randall, of Turner and Hensley, Chartered, of Great Bend, argued the cause, and Lee Turner and Raymond L. Dahlberg, of the same firm, were on the brief for the appellant.
Jerry K. Levy, of Michaud and Cranmer, Chartered, of Wichita, argued the cause, and M. William Syrios, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
OWSLEY, J.:
This action arose out of an automobile accident in Hutchinson, Kansas. Plaintiff recovered a jury verdict and defendant appeals raising one point. He claims the trial court erred in refusing to continue the trial to afford defendant an opportunity to present his medical expert. We agree with defendant and grant a new trial, but limit the new trial to the issue of damages.
Plaintiff was driving a pickup truck north and defendant was driving an automobile south on Monroe Street. As the two parties approached one another at the intersection of Monroe and 56th Streets, defendant apparently attempted to turn left and pulled into the left lane of traffic directly in front of plaintiff. Plaintiff applied his brakes but could not stop before striking defendant *591 nearly head-on. On impact plaintiff was thrown about in his vehicle and sustained injuries.
Damages were hotly contested. Plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that prior to the accident he had been a healthy, hard-working, injury-free man; that as a result of the accident he sustained temporary and permanent injury to his chest, hip, leg, knees, upper back and head; that despite extensive medical treatment he still had considerable pain and disability; and that since the time of the accident he was unable to work regularly.
Defendant proceeded on the theory that plaintiff was not injured in the accident, and if disability did exist it was due to prior job-related injuries as a construction worker. Both defendant and a sheriff's officer testified that at the scene of the accident they inquired if plaintiff was injured and received a negative reply, and plaintiff appeared to them to be uninjured. During cross-examination plaintiff admitted he had been treated for various back, neck and other body discomforts prior to the accident.
On the first day of the three-day trial plaintiff called two witnesses  the sheriff's officer and plaintiff; whereupon, the court was forced to recess because other plaintiff witnesses were not available. The next morning defendant introduced two witnesses out of order to accommodate a lack of plaintiff witnesses. Plaintiff then presented four other witnesses. Defendant took the stand. At the end of the second day of trial plaintiff announced he had no further witnesses until 1:30 p.m. on the following day when he would call Dr. John Lance of Wichita, Kansas. The following transpired:
"THE COURT: Anything else?
"MR. LEVY: Not at this time.
(The jury left the courtroom)
"THE COURT: Did you take his deposition?
"THE COURT: Was Doctor Lance's deposition taken?
"MR. LEVY: I understand.
"MR. TURNER: I have one more, Doctor Lichtor.
"THE COURT: He's not here?
..............
..............
"MR. TURNER: Okay. I'll be here.
The following morning plaintiff announced Dr. Lance could not appear until 1:30 p.m. At that point the trial court announced that plaintiff had rested his case. The court then instructed defendant to proceed. Defense counsel told the court his only remaining witness was Dr. Lichtor, of Kansas City, who had not yet arrived. Upon request of defense counsel the court granted a ten-minute recess. When court reconvened defense counsel told the court the doctor was on his way. The court proceeded to give jury instructions. Dr. Lichtor arrived in the courtroom as the court concluded instructions. The court did not allow the doctor to testify.
A trial court has the inherent authority to control its docket to eliminate procrastination and delay in order to expedite the orderly flow of business, but the power is not absolute and should be exercised with sound discretion. (Carter v. State Department of Social Welfare, 186 Kan. 187, 348 P.2d 609; City of Wichita v. Houchens, 184 Kan. 297, 335 P.2d 1117; 88 C.J.S., Trial, § 18, p. 49.)
In Bane v. Cox, 75 Kan. 184, 88 Pac. 1083, this court stated:
Several cases have held it to be an abuse of discretion to refuse a recess to permit the reception of a physician's testimony. In Logan v. McPhail, 208 Kan. 770, 494 P.2d 1191, the trial court dismissed an automobile negligence case when the plaintiff's expert medical witness was five minutes late in arriving. This court held the action was an abuse of discretion and reversed. In O'Malley v. City of New York, 16 App.Div.2d 942, 229 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1962), the court held exclusion of a medical examiner's testimony error when the evidence showed he was on his way to the courthouse. In Simon v. Goldberg, 39 App.Div.2d 758, 332 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1972), a similar ruling was made in an automobile negligence case where two physicians needed two hours to get to the court and one physician would testify that the injured plaintiff had a previous back injury and laminectomy five years earlier. The supreme court in Herbert v. Garner, 78 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1955), reversed the trial court's decision in another automobile negligence case because the trial court refused to grant an overnight delay when the physician, who lived thirty miles away, would have been present except for the existence of a medical emergency. Finally, in Pepe v. Urban, 11 N.J. Super. 385, 78 A.2d 406 (1951), the trial court was reversed for refusing an overnight delay when a physician, who would testify on damages, could not appear because he was performing an operation. See also, Matter of Bluttal, 37 App.Div.2d 530, 322 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1971); Jarvis v. Stoddart, 215 App.Div. 523, 213 N.Y.S. 829 (1926).
The problem before this court is a troublesome one. On one hand the trial court is charged with the responsibility of moving cases and promoting the orderly dispatch of judicial business. The expert medical witness, on the other hand, is often engulfed in a demanding professional practice which, because of tight schedules and unforeseeable emergencies, makes it difficult to appear at a time convenient to court and counsel.
*595 The power to grant a recess is inherent within the trial court's power to control the orderly movement of cases within sound judicial discretion. (Mooney v. Olsen, 22 Kan. 69, 80, 81; 88 C.J.S., Trial, § 45, pp. 113-15.) This includes the right to deny or grant a recess due to the absence of a witness. Exercise of this discretion, however, demands consideration of many factors. In ruling on a motion to recess because a witness is unavailable the court must consider and balance factors including counsel's diligence and effort to gain attendance of the witness, the reason the witness is not present, the nature of the witness's expected testimony, whether the testimony is critical evidence or merely cumulative, the amount of the delay expected, the effect of the delay on the docket of the court, and the overall injustice which might result if the delay were denied.
Our decision is based on the circumstances existing at the time the trial court refused to delay the trial. At that time the trial court knew (1) that Dr. Lichtor was on his way from Wichita to Hutchinson by auto; (2) that his testimony would contradict plaintiff's evidence as to plaintiff's injuries; (3) that his testimony was important to the defense and was not cumulative; (4) that when plaintiff had no available witnesses, defendant accommodated plaintiff by using defendant's witnesses out of time; (5) that defendant had the right to assume he could use Dr. Lichtor after Dr. Lance testified and he was not aware the court would refuse to permit Dr. Lance to testify at 1:30 p.m. on Thursday until the afternoon before; (6) that even if the court permitted Dr. Lichtor's testimony it was not likely the court's schedule of cases for Monday would be affected; and (7) that without the testimony of Dr. Lichtor an injustice might result.
Having objectively considered the foregoing balancing factors, we believe a new trial should be granted. Since the issue of liability has been litigated and decided by the jury the new trial should be limited to the issue of damages. (Carlgren v. Saindon, 129 Kan. 475, 283 Pac. 620.)
Reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages.