Title: FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE 108 v. CITY OF ARDMORE
Citation: 2002 OK 19, 44 P.3d 569, 73OBJ903
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: March 19, 2002

FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE 108 v. CITY OF ARDMORE Annotate this Case FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE 108 v. CITY OF ARDMORE 2002 OK 19 44 P.3d 569 73 OBJ 903 Case Number: 95131 Decided: 03/19/2002 Mandate Issued: 04/18/2002 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE 108, KENNETH BRIDGEMAN, and NATHAN FOUNTAIN, Plaintiffs/Appellants v. CITY OF ARDMORE and the PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD, An agency of the State of Oklahoma, Defendants/Appellees ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. 1 ¶0 Defendant-city terminated the employment of two police officers during their initial probationary period. The officers filed grievances with the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 108 [FOP], but the city refused to arbitrate the grievances because the termination occurred during the affected employees' probationary period. FOP instituted administrative proceedings against the city before the Public Employees Relations Board (PERB) to secure a cease-and-desist order based on the alleged unfair labor practice. The PERB declined to issue the order. FOP appealed from the administrative decision to the District Court, Carter County, Thomas S. Walker, Judge, in accordance with the provisions of the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act. The district court sustained the PERB decision, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the nisi prius ruling. On certiorari granted on FOP's petition, THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS IS VACATED; THE NISI PRIUS DECISION, INSOFAR AS IT IS CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT, IS AFFIRMED. James R. Moore, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Appellants [44 P.3d 570] Ted J. Pasley, Ardmore, Oklahoma for Appellee City of Ardmore Gretchen Zumwalt, Asst. Atty. General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Appellee Public Employees Relations Board. ¶1 Two dispositive issues are presented on certiorari: [1] Are probationary police officers to be considered "permanent members" of the police department for invocation of grievance arbitration rights under the terms of the Fire and Police Arbitration Act (FPAA)2? and [2] Does the PERB have statutory authority to determine the membership status of a collective bargaining unit? We answer the first question in the negative and the second in the affirmative. I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 All the facts in this controversy were submitted to the PERB and to the district court by stipulation. FOP and the city entered into a collective bargaining agreement effective 1 July 1997 through 30 June 1998. The agreement contained, in Article II, the following provision: The City recognizes Lodge #108 of the Fraternal Order of Police as the exclusive bargaining agent for all permanent, full-time, commissioned police officers of the City of Ardmore, excluding: (a) The Chief of Police. (b) The Deputy Chief/Administrative Assistant. (c) Employees who have not successfully completed one (1) year probationary period from initial date of employment, except as provided for by the Oklahoma state law.3 ¶4 In May of 1999 FOP brought a complaint before the PERB alleging an unfair labor practice in the city's refusal to arbitrate the officers' grievance. II STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶5 This case calls for statutory interpretation and presents two legal questions. Questions of law stand before us for de novo review. In its reexamination of a trial court's legal rulings, an appellate court exercises plenary, independent, and non-deferential authority. III PROBATIONARY POLICE OFFICERS ARE NOT PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT FOR INVOCATION OF GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION RIGHTS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE FIRE AND POLICE ARBITRATION ACT ¶6 In articulating public policy for the Fire and Police Arbitration Act (FPAA), the legislature provides that the FPAA applies to the "permanent members" of a municipal police department. ¶7 The city claims that "permanent," as used in the FPAA, means "not probationary" while FOP insists the adjective means "not temporary." The latter party points to a definition of permanent employment pronounced by this court's 1915 opinion in McKelvy v. Choctaw Cotton Oil Co. ¶9 Also cited by the FOP is the decision by the Court of Civil Appeals in City of Oklahoma City v. Public Employees Relations Bd. ¶10 The mere fact that a probationary police officer may for some purposes be considered a permanent employee of the city (because the employee's appointment has no specific termination date), does not confer on that employee the status of "permanent member" of the police department for invoking the benefit of grievance arbitration rights under the FPAA. We agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that recognition of probationary officers as voting union employees does not ipso facto entitle them to the right of grievance arbitration under the FPAA. ¶11 By the provision of the FPAA that defines the Act's relevant terms, police officers are described as "the permanent paid members of any . . . police department in any municipality." ¶13 When the police pension statute was first enacted in 1977, it included no definition of the term "member." ¶14 When the provisions of a statute assign one meaning to a term, its definition will apply in every other instance in which the same term is found anywhere else in the compilation. ¶15 Today's declaration of legislative intent also finds support in ¶16 Although not dispositive of today's inquiry into legislative intent, we find added support for today's pronouncement in the holdings of other jurisdictions that have addressed the same question. Both in our sister states IV THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD IS THE ENTITY STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED TO DETERMINE, IN AN INDIVIDUAL PROCEEDING, THE MEMBERSHIP STATUS OF A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNIT ¶17 The second issue raised on certiorari is whether the PERB has the authority to determine the membership status of a collective bargaining unit. FOP insists this court has held on two previous occasions that the bargaining unit's membership is strictly defined by statute and cannot be subject to PERB's redetermination. ¶18 The legislature created the PERB to "accomplish the objectives and to perform the duties prescribed by" the FPAA. ¶19 In Stone, the city and the firefighters' union were negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement. The city insisted that certain high-ranking supervisory members of that department be excluded from the bargaining unit. This court held the city's position was not consistent with good-faith negotiation because the legislature specifically included those individuals in the bargaining unit. ¶20 The difference between Stone and the present case is that in order to bargain one out of the unit, one must first be included in that unit. Because probationary police officers are not permanent members of the police department with regard to grievance arbitration rights, it necessarily follows that they also are excluded from the bargaining unit for that purpose. As probationary officers are not pro tanto in the unit, they cannot be bargained out of it. In short, Stone does not apply. ¶21 In Bethany, the firefighters' union and the city were negotiating for renewal of a collective bargaining agreement. The city insisted that certain issues be exempt from arbitration under the new agreement. The union presented its case to the PERB, which issued a cease-and-desist order. This court held the FPAA does not allow the parties to enact a regime in which some aspects of the collective bargaining agreement are exempt from arbitration. V SUMMARY ¶23 The probationary period is a vital tool which allows municipal authorities to ensure [ 44 P.3d 575 ] only fit individuals serve as police officers. The legislature has recognized a distinction between a probationary police officer and one who is permanent. That distinction withholds from the probationary police officer the benefit of grievance arbitration until such time as one in that position completes the required probationary service. When breathing life into the Fire and Police Arbitration Act, the legislature also created the Public Employees Relations Board and charged that agency with the case-by-case administration of the Act. So long as the legislative mandate remains in force, the Board must continue to exercise its authority (when invoked) to determine for each case which persons make up the unit appropriate for collective bargaining. ¶24 THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS IS VACATED; THE NISI PRIUS DECISION, INSOFAR AS IT IS CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT, IS AFFIRMED. ¶25 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR. FOOT