Title: State ex rel. Woodco, Inc. v. Honorable Jennifer Phillips
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC98227
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: July 28, 2020

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. 
     ) 
WOODCO, INC., 
 
        ) 
     ) 
Relator, 
     ) 
     ) 
v. 
     ) 
No. SC98227 
     ) 
THE HONORABLE JENNIFER 
     ) 
PHILLIPS, 
  
        ) 
     ) 
Respondent. 
     ) 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION 
Woodco Inc. seeks a writ of prohibition prohibiting the circuit court from ordering 
certain defendants to be joined as “necessary” parties.  Because Rule 52.04(a) does not 
mandate the added defendants be joined, the circuit court’s action in sustaining motions 
seeking their joinder constituted an abuse of discretion, and the circuit court did not have 
the authority to require joinder.  This Court makes permanent its preliminary writ of 
prohibition. 
Background 
This case concerns contracts among multiple parties involved in the design and 
construction of the Gardens at Jackson Creek (“Project”), an independent senior living 
Opinion issued July 28, 2020
2 
 
facility.  The owner of the Project contracted with Williams Spurgeon Kuhl & Freshnock 
Architects (“architect”).  The architect entered into a contract with Bob D. Campbell & 
Co. (“structural engineer”).  The owner of the Project also entered into a contract with 
Woodco to serve as the general contractor for construction of the Project.  As the general 
contractor, Woodco then entered into various contracts, including one with Haren & 
Laughlin Construction Co. Inc. (“construction company”) to provide quality control for 
the Project and another with RCC Framing, LLC (“framer”) to perform framing and to 
install windows, which were provided by Associated Materials LLC d/b/a Alside Supply 
Center (“supplier”).  Woodco also contracted with BSP Masonry LLC (“masonry 
company”) to perform brick masonry work. 
After deficiencies in the construction of the Project emerged, Woodco and the 
owner of the Project entered into a settlement agreement in which the owner of the 
Project assigned to Woodco any and all rights, claims, and interest against third parties 
arising from or relating to the Project’s defects.  Woodco filed a lawsuit, asserting 
contract and tort claims, against the architect, the structural engineer, the construction 
company, the framer, and the supplier.  Although the suit involved allegations of 
construction defects, the masonry company was not included as a defendant.   
 
The structural engineer, the construction company, and the architect (collectively, 
“Movants”) filed motions to add the masonry company, as well as its managers, Moses 
Davila and Elisa Judith Saenz (collectively, “masonry company”), arguing the masonry 
company must be added pursuant to Rule 52.04.  Woodco opposed these motions.  Aside 
from the general allegation that the masonry company was partially responsible for the 
3 
 
construction defects, the Movants specifically argued the defendants, in particular the 
construction company, were sued on claims derivative of the masonry company’s failure 
to perform its contractual obligations to Woodco.  The circuit court ordered the masonry 
company be joined. 
Woodco filed a petition for a writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, a writ of 
mandamus in the court of appeals, seeking to direct the circuit court to dismiss and 
remove the masonry company.  The court of appeals denied the petition.  After a petition 
for a writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus was filed with this 
Court, a preliminary writ of prohibition was issued.  Woodco now seeks a permanent 
writ. 
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
This Court has the authority to issue and determine original remedial writs.  Mo.  
Const. art. V, sec. 4.1.  A writ of prohibition may issue to: (1) “prevent the usurpation of 
judicial power when a lower court lacks authority or jurisdiction;” (2) “remedy an excess 
of authority, jurisdiction or abuse of discretion where the lower court lacks the power to 
act as intended;” or when (3) “a party may suffer irreparable harm if relief is not 
granted.”  State ex rel. Strauser v. Martinez, 416 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Mo. banc 2014). 
Analysis 
This case requires a determination of whether the circuit court improperly joined 
the masonry company.  Woodco argues the masonry company was improperly joined 
under Rule 52.04(a) because (1) the masonry company was not a party to any of the 
contracts upon which Woodco was suing and (2) the masonry company’s joinder was not 
4 
 
required to resolve any of the tort claims in the action because the masonry company was, 
at best, a joint tortfeasor.1 
The parties agree the issue before this Court is whether the masonry company 
must be joined if feasible; in other words, the analysis here is limited to Rule 52.04(a).  
Rule 52.04 governs the joinder of persons needed for a just adjudication.  Rule 52.04(a), 
which outlines when persons are to be joined if feasible, is comprised of two prongs.  The 
first prong requires joinder on the basis that complete relief should result from the action.  
Rule 52.04(a)(1).  The second prong requires joinder in circumstances when either the 
absent party’s interest would be prejudiced or when those before the court would be 
subject to an inconsistent obligation due to the absent party’s claimed interest.  Rule 
52.04(a)(2).  If either prong of Rule 52.04(a) has been satisfied, courts have traditionally 
labeled such party “necessary.”  See, e.g., State ex rel. Twenty-Second Jud. Cir. v. Jones, 
823 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Mo. banc 1992). 
I. 
The Masonry Company Is Not Required to Accord Complete Relief 
The construction company argues that, without the masonry company, it cannot be 
accorded complete relief.  This argument implicates Rule 52.04(a)(1).  Rule 52.04(a)(1) 
requires joinder when “in the person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among 
those already parties.” 
                                              
1 If Woodco’s argument – that the criteria set forth in Rule 52.04(a) have not been met – is 
correct, the order sustaining the motion to add the masonry company would constitute an abuse 
of discretion, and the circuit court would lack the authority to order the masonry company be 
made a party.  A writ of prohibition is appropriate when a party joined pursuant to Rule 52.04 is 
not needed for just adjudication. 
5 
 
Joinder of the masonry company is not required for the asserted contract claims.  
In Bunting v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., this Court reaffirmed the rule that, in a suit on a 
contract by one of the parties to that contract, the only defendants required are (1) “the 
other parties to the contract sued on” and (2) “those who have an interest in the dispute 
which will be affected by the action.”  522 S.W.2d 161, 169 (Mo. banc 1975).  That 
“interest in the dispute” must be “such a direct claim upon the subject matter of the action 
that the [absent party] will either gain or lose by direct operation of the judgment to be 
rendered.”  Id.  The masonry company is not a party to any of the contracts upon which 
Woodco is suing.  Although resolution of the contractual disputes among Woodco and 
the existing defendants may concern work performed by the masonry company and 
reference to the contract between Woodco and the masonry company, the masonry 
company will be left unaffected by the outcome, and the discrete contract claims among 
Woodco and the existing defendants can be resolved. 
Joinder of the masonry company is also not required for the asserted tort claims.  
Assuming the masonry company is a joint tortfeasor, its liability to Woodco is 
insufficient to require its presence in the action.  See, e.g., Temple v. Synthes Corp., 498 
U.S. 5, 7 (1990) (“It has long been the rule that it is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors 
to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit.”); Gramex Corp. v. Green Supply, Inc., 89 
S.W.3d 432, 439-40 (Mo. banc 2002) (“Joint or concurrent tort-feasors are severally, as 
well as jointly, answerable to the injured party for the full amount of the injuries.  The 
injured party may sue all or any of the joint or concurrent tort-feasors and obtain a 
judgment against all or any of them.”).  Woodco’s tort claims against particular 
6 
 
defendants does not require the assertion of claims against the masonry company, even 
though the masonry company may be responsible for some of the damages.  Complete 
relief can be accorded among the existing parties.  Even assuming Woodco’s claims 
against the construction company are derivative of work performed by the masonry 
company, the masonry company is not required as a party to make a full determination of 
Woodco’s asserted contract or tort claims. 
II. 
The Masonry Company’s Absence Would Not Result in 
Inconsistent Obligations to Existing Parties 
 
The construction company argues it would be exposed to inconsistent obligations 
without the joinder of the masonry company.  Rule 52.04(a)(2)(ii) requires joinder when 
the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so 
situated that the disposition of the action in the person’s absence may . . . 
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason 
of the claimed interest. 
 
The construction company proposes that a verdict that holds it responsible for the 
masonry company’s alleged negligence would result in an inconsistent obligation, 
reasoning a verdict against it would likely encompass damages attributable to the 
masonry company.  As related to the asserted contract claims, the construction company 
does not put forth a colorable theory to support its notion that a nonparty to a contract 
would be required to prevent an inconsistent obligation on a breach of contract claim 
between two parties to a contract.  As to the tort claims, if a successive action could occur 
to allow a party to seek contribution against a nonparty in the first action, a court should 
not consider the possibility of this subsequent action to require the presence of that 
7 
 
nonparty in the initial lawsuit.  A contrary position would violate the long-held rule that a 
plaintiff need not sue all joint tortfeasors.  See Gramex Corp., 89 S.W.3d at 439-40.2  
There is no risk of inconsistent obligations. 
Although third-party practice may not be a desired alternative for the existing 
defendants, it is the option available if they desire the presence of the masonry company 
in the current action because of alleged shared fault.3  Rule 52.11(a), governing when a 
defendant may bring in a third party, provides: 
At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a third-
party plaintiff, may cause a summons and petition to be served upon a person 
not a party to the action who is or may be liable to the defending party for all 
or part of the plaintiff’s claim against the defending party. 
 
The construction company posits that Woodco’s resistance to joinder of the masonry 
company through Rule 52.04 results in Woodco being shielded from its own negligence 
and puts forth argument grounded in equity requesting that the defendants not be required 
to join the masonry company through third-party practice, especially given the likelihood 
the masonry company is judgment-proof.  Because the claims asserted by Woodco do not 
require the masonry company be joined under Rule 52.04(a) and an equitable analysis is 
not part of determining when a person is to be joined if feasible,4 the construction 
                                              
2 A potentially judgment-proof nonparty does not result in a different analysis. 
3 And without joining the masonry company, the defendants have the option of arguing the 
masonry company is the negligent party.  See Oldaker v. Peters, 817 S.W.2d 245, 252 (Mo. banc 
1991) (noting a defendant is free to introduce evidence that a nonparty is responsible instead of 
the defendant). 
4 Compare Rule 52.04(a) (containing the two prongs requiring joinder if feasible) with Rule 
52.04(b) (requiring a court to “determine whether in equity and good conscience the action 
should proceed among the parties before it or should be dismissed” if a party described in Rule 
52.04(a) cannot be made a party). 
8 
 
company’s argument fails. 
Conclusion 
Because Rule 52.04(a) does not mandate the masonry company be joined, the 
circuit court’s action in sustaining motions seeking its joinder constituted an abuse of 
discretion, and the circuit court did not have the authority to require joinder.  This Court 
makes permanent its preliminary writ of prohibition. 
 
______________________________ 
Mary R. Russell, Judge 
 
Draper, C.J., Wilson, Breckenridge, Stith,  
Fischer, JJ., and Francis, Sp.J., concur. 
 
Powell, J., not participating.