Title: State v. Lindsey A.F.
Citation: 2003 WI 63
Docket Number: 2001AP000082
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2003

2003 WI 63 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0081 & 01-0082 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Interest of Lindsey A.F., a Person Under 
the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Lindsey A.F.,  
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 223 
Reported at:  257 Wis. 2d 650, 653 N.W.2d 116 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 20, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 4, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael N. Nowakowski   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Susan M. Crawford, assistant attorney general, and James E. 
Doyle, attorney general, and oral argument by Sally L. Wellman, 
assistant attorney general. 
 
For the respondent-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Eileen A. Hirsch, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
2003 WI 63 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-0081 & 01-0082  
(L.C. No. 
00 JV 617) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Interest of Lindsey A.F., a  
person Under the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Lindsey A.F.,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.    The 
petitioner, 
State 
of 
Wisconsin, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision 
that affirmed two orders of the circuit court, dismissing 
delinquency petitions against Lindsey A.F.1  The State asserts 
that because the juvenile was not in custody, the circuit court 
lacked authority to dismiss the first petition and refer the 
matter for deferred prosecution.  Further, the State argues that 
                                                 
1 State v. Lindsey A.F., 2002 WI App 223, 257 Wis. 2d 650, 
653 N.W.2d 116 (affirming orders of the circuit court for Dane 
County, Michael N. Nowakowski, Judge). 
No. 
01-0081 & 01-0082   
 
2 
 
even if the circuit court had such authority, it erred when it 
concluded that the district attorney could not terminate the 
court ordered deferred prosecution by the filing of a second 
petition. 
¶2 
We 
determine 
that 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 938.21(7) 
(1999-2000),2 a circuit court has authority to dismiss a juvenile 
delinquency 
petition 
and 
refer 
the 
matter 
for 
deferred 
prosecution regardless of whether the juvenile is in custody.  
Additionally, we conclude that a district attorney cannot 
terminate a court ordered deferred prosecution by filing a 
second delinquency petition containing the same charge and 
factual basis.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶3 
Lindsey A.F., age 13, sold marijuana while in a middle 
school.  Her case was referred to an intake worker, who 
subsequently referred the case to the district attorney with a 
recommendation that the district attorney file a delinquency 
petition and enter into a consent decree.  The district attorney 
filed a delinquency petition but did not pursue a consent 
decree. 
¶4 
Apparently dissatisfied with the district attorney's 
failure to request a consent decree, Lindsey filed a motion to 
dismiss the petition.  She requested that the court refer her 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
 
No. 
01-0081 & 01-0082   
 
3 
 
case back to the intake worker for deferred prosecution.  Over 
the State's objection, the circuit court granted the motion, 
dismissed the petition, and referred the matter for deferred 
prosecution.  Lindsey, her mother, and the intake worker then 
entered into a deferred prosecution agreement. 
¶5 
In an effort to terminate the deferred prosecution 
agreement, the State filed a second delinquency petition 
containing the same charge and factual allegations as set forth 
in the first petition.  Lindsey again filed a motion to dismiss, 
arguing that the second petition was the same as the first 
petition and that no new information existed to justify the 
re-filing of an already dismissed petition.  The court agreed 
and concluded that the district attorney did not have the 
authority to terminate the deferred prosecution agreement by 
filing another petition.  Accordingly, it dismissed the second 
petition. 
¶6 
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the two 
petitions.  It examined the relevant statutes and determined 
that the district attorney's consent was not required for the 
circuit court to dismiss the delinquency petitions and refer the 
No. 
01-0081 & 01-0082   
 
4 
 
matter for deferred prosecution.3  State v. Lindsey A.F., 2002 WI 
App 223, ¶13, 257 Wis. 2d 650, 653 N.W.2d 116.  It further 
concluded that the district attorney did not have the authority 
to terminate the resulting deferred prosecution agreement by 
filing a new petition with the same charges and facts.  Id. 
II 
¶7 
This case provides us with an opportunity to review 
the authority of the circuit court and the district attorney 
under Wisconsin's Juvenile Justice Code.4  Specifically, we 
examine whether a juvenile must first be in custody in order for 
the circuit court to have authority under Wis. Stat. § 938.21(7) 
to dismiss a delinquency petition and refer the matter to the 
intake worker for deferred prosecution.  If it has such 
authority, we must then consider whether the district attorney 
has the authority under § 938.245(6) to terminate the resulting 
deferred prosecution agreement by filing a second delinquency 
                                                 
3 Although we are affirming the court of appeals decision, 
we note that there is a difference in rationale.  This 
difference occurs because in the court of appeals the State 
argued 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
lacked 
authority 
to 
dismiss-and-refer under Wis. Stat. § 938.21(7) without the 
district attorney's consent.  However, before this court, the 
State changed its argument and primarily asserts that the 
circuit court's authority to dismiss-and-refer under Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.21(7) applies only to petitions filed against juveniles in 
custody and only at the time of the custody review hearing. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 938. 
No. 
01-0081 & 01-0082   
 
5 
 
petition which contains the same charge and factual allegations 
as the first petition.5 
¶8 
The resolution of each of these issues is a matter of 
statutory interpretation which presents a question of law 
subject to independent appellate review.  State v. Setagord, 211 
Wis. 2d 397, 405-06, 565 N.W.2d 506 (1997).  The goal of 
statutory interpretation is to discern the intent of the 
legislature.  Id. at 406.  Here, in examining the intent of the 
legislature, we look first to the language of the statute, and 
then consider other aids such as the legislative history, 
context, and purpose to assist in ascertaining the legislature's 
intent. 
III 
¶9 
We begin by examining Wis. Stat. § 938.21(7), which 
the circuit court cited as the basis for its authority to 
                                                 
5  We decide the issues presented even though the case is 
moot.  While the appeal was pending in the court of appeals, 
Lindsey A.F. violated the terms of the deferred prosecution 
agreement and the case was returned to court for prosecution.  
Thus, this decision will have no practical effect on Lindsey 
A.F.'s case.  As a general rule, this court will not consider an 
issue which will not have any practical effect upon an existing 
controversy.  State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶13, 253 Wis. 2d 
449, 646 N.W.2d 341 (citing State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. 
Circuit Court for La Crosse Co., 15 Wis. 2d 220, 228, 340 N.W.2d 
460 (1983)).  However, moot cases may be decided in a variety of 
circumstances, including where the issues are of great public 
importance or should be resolved to avoid future uncertainty. 
Leitner, 253 Wis. 2d 449, ¶14.  This case falls within these 
exceptions to the general mootness rule, and thus, we reach the 
merits of the present case. 
No. 
01-0081 & 01-0082   
 
6 
 
dismiss the delinquency petitions and refer the matter for 
deferred prosecution.6  Wisconsin Stat. § 938.21(7) provides: 
(7)  Deferred prosecution.  If the judge or juvenile 
court commissioner determines that the best interests 
of the juvenile and the public are served, he or she 
may enter a consent decree under s. 938.32 or order 
the petition dismissed and refer the matter to the 
intake worker for deferred prosecution in accordance 
with s. 938.245. 
¶10 The State argues that this provision could not serve 
as the basis for dismissing the petitions because it applies 
only to petitions filed against juveniles in custody and only at 
the time of the custody review hearing under Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.21(1), which describes the hearing required for a juvenile 
held in custody.  Lindsey was not in custody at the time the 
petitions were filed and the judicial proceedings that resulted 
in the dismissals were not custody review hearings under 
§ 938.21(1).  Therefore, according to the State, § 938.21(7) 
could not be relied upon as the source of authority in 
dismissing the petitions. 
¶11 We 
disagree 
with 
the 
State's 
interpretation 
of 
§ 938.21(7) as limited to petitions filed while the juvenile is 
in custody and then only at the time of the custody review 
hearing.  The statutory language in the subsection and the 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.21(7) refers to the ability of a 
court to order a "petition" dismissed. The present case arises 
in the context of a delinquency petition. Thus, the holding is 
confined to the applicability of § 938.21(7) to delinquency 
petitions. 
 
No. 
01-0081 & 01-0082   
 
7 
 
legislative 
history 
do 
not 
support 
this 
interpretation.  
Further, the existence of such a limitation would lead to an 
anomalous result. 
¶12 Nothing in the language of § 938.21(7) indicates that 
it is limited to situations in which the child is in custody.  
It simply states that if the judge determines that the best 
interests of the juvenile and the public are served, the judge 
may order the petition dismissed and refer the matter to the 
intake worker for deferred prosecution.  Nowhere in this 
subsection is there a statement that the judge may do this only 
if the child is in custody and only at the time of the custody 
review hearing. 
¶13 The State emphasizes the placement of § 938.21(7) as 
supporting its interpretation.  The State notes that § 938.21(7) 
is within a section titled "Hearing for juvenile in custody" and 
that the remainder of the section deals exclusively with 
hearings and other procedures for juveniles who are held in 
custody.  The State argues that, when viewed in this context, 
the authority to dismiss and refer should apply only to 
juveniles in custody. 
¶14 A section title is not part of the statute.  Wis. 
Stat. § 990.001.  While titles may be considered in resolving 
doubt as to a statute's meaning, they should not be used to 
create a doubt where none would otherwise exist.  Wisconsin 
Valley Imp. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 9 Wis. 2d 606, 618, 101 
N.W.2d 798 (1960); Brennan v. WERC, 112 Wis. 2d 38, 41, 331 
N.W.2d 667 (Ct. App. 1983).  Nevertheless, the placement of 
No. 
01-0081 & 01-0082   
 
8 
 
§ 938.21(7) within a section that primarily deals with hearings 
and other procedures for juveniles who are held in custody 
raises a question regarding whether it was intended to be 
similarly limited.  Thus, § 938.21(7) is rendered ambiguous as 
to whether it is limited to custody situations. 
¶15 We conclude, however, that the legislature did not 
intend such a limitation, which is a position that the State did 
not dispute in its court of appeals brief.  In that brief, the 
State acknowledged that the placement of § 938.21(7) and its 
interaction with other statutes did not necessarily mean that 
the court's authority is limited: 
[T]he 
State 
is 
not 
necessarily 
arguing 
that 
Sec. 938.21(7) is meant to apply only to juveniles 
held in custody.  Rather, the State maintains that the 
legislature placed this particular subsection where it 
did for a specific reason, i.e. to authorize and 
promote the prompt resolution of juvenile cases at the 
earliest opportunity. 
¶16 A review of the legislative history indicates that the 
State had it right in its court of appeals brief.  The current 
language in § 938.21(7) can be traced back to language that 
existed in the 1975 version of the Children's Code, Chapter 48 
of the Wisconsin Statutes.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.19 (1975) 
provided: 
48.19.  Informal Disposition.  . . . if [the court] 
determines that neither the interests of the child nor 
of the public require that a petition be filed, [the 
court] may defer further proceedings on the condition 
that the child appear with his parent, guardian or 
legal custodian for counseling and advice or that the 
child abide by such obligations imposed upon him with 
respect to his future conduct as the court deems 
No. 
01-0081 & 01-0082   
 
9 
 
necessary 
or 
advisable 
to 
insure 
the 
child's 
protection, correction or rehabilitation. . . . 
This provision gave the judge clear authority to order the 
informal disposition of a juvenile's case as an alternative to 
adjudication of a delinquency petition. 
¶17 As part of revisions made in 1977, the authority to 
initiate a petition in delinquency cases was assigned to the 
district attorney.  However, the court's authority to order an 
informal disposition was not repealed.  Rather, it was moved 
from Wis. Stat. § 48.19 (1975) to Wis. Stat. § 48.21(7) (1977): 
(7)  Informal disposition.  If the judge or juvenile 
court commissioner determines that the best interests 
of the child and the public are served, he or she may 
enter a consent decree under s. 48.32 or order the 
petition dismissed and refer the matter to the intake 
worker for informal disposition in accordance with s. 
48.245. 
¶18 Although the language had been modified, Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.21(7) (1977) clearly had its roots in Wis. Stat. § 48.19 
(1975).  Both are entitled "Informal Disposition."  Both use the 
same criteria.  Under Wis. Stat. § 48.19 (1975), the criteria is 
whether the court "determines that neither the interests of the 
child nor of the public require that a petition be filed."  The 
criteria in Wis. Stat. § 48.21(7) (1977) is whether the court 
"determines that the best interests of the child and the public 
are served."  Finally, both address the same issue, whether a 
juvenile's case should be handled informally rather than 
requiring an adjudication on the petition. 
¶19 We note that Wis. Stat. § 48.21(7) (1977) was placed 
within a section, Wis. Stat. § 48.21 (1977), titled "Hearing for 
No. 
01-0081 & 01-0082   
 
10 
 
child in custody," similar to the placement of the current Wis. 
Stat. § 938.21(7).  Lindsey advances an explanation for this 
placement of the informal disposition provision:  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.21 (1977) was the first place where the judge made any 
decisions in the process.  Accordingly, it made sense to have 
the dispositional options described in Wis. Stat. § 48.21(7) 
placed there, even though they would be applicable throughout 
the process.  The State acknowledged as much in its court of 
appeals brief when it stated that "the State maintains that the 
legislature placed this particular subsection where it did for a 
specific reason, i.e. to authorize and promote the prompt 
resolution of juvenile cases at the earliest opportunity." 
¶20 We also note that the State's interpretation would 
generate an anomalous result.  A juvenile that is held in 
custody usually poses a more serious threat to public safety 
than a juvenile who has not been placed in custody.  Presumably, 
dismissal and referral for deferred prosecution is more likely 
to be appropriate in those cases in which the juvenile is not a 
serious threat to public safety.  However, under the State's 
interpretation, the court has authority to dismiss-and-refer in 
the serious cases where dismissal and referral is less likely to 
be appropriate, but the circuit court does not have authority to 
dismiss-and-refer in the less serious cases where it is more 
likely to be appropriate. 
¶21 The State argues that this anomalous result can be 
explained.  It notes that the time frame for filing a petition 
is significantly shorter when a juvenile is held in custody.  
No. 
01-0081 & 01-0082   
 
11 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 938.21(1) generally requires that a petition 
be filed and a hearing held within 24 hours after the end of the 
day that the decision to hold the juvenile in custody was made, 
excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.7  As a result, 
the intake worker and the district attorney operate under 
significant time constraints in conducting an inquiry prior to 
the filing of a petition.  In such cases, according to the 
State, 
it 
makes 
sense 
to 
permit 
the 
circuit 
court 
to 
dismiss-and-refer in order to allow the intake worker to conduct 
a more thorough inquiry. 
¶22 However, given that the hearing is held within 
24 hours of the custody decision, it is unlikely that the court 
will have any information that the intake worker and the 
district attorney did not have when the petition was drafted.  
Accordingly, 
it 
seems 
odd 
that 
the 
authorization 
to 
dismiss-and-refer would apply only to situations in which the 
circuit court has limited information.  It seems more logical to 
permit 
a 
circuit 
court 
to 
delay 
its 
decision 
to 
dismiss-and-refer until after a further investigation takes 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.21 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) Hearing; when held. 
(a)  If a juvenile who has been taken into custody is 
not released under s. 938.20, a hearing to determine 
whether the juvenile shall continue to be held in 
custody under the criteria of ss. 938.205 to 938.209 
(1) shall be conducted by the judge or juvenile court 
commissioner within 24 hours after the end of the day 
that the decision to hold the juvenile was made, 
excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays.   
No. 
01-0081 & 01-0082   
 
12 
 
place.  However, under the State's interpretation, the court may 
exercise the authority to dismiss-and-refer only at the custody 
hearing and may not delay its decision until it has the results 
of a further investigation. 
¶23 Finally, we observe that an enumerated purpose of the 
Juvenile Justice Code is to provide an individualized assessment 
of each alleged delinquent juvenile "in order to prevent further 
delinquent behavior through the development of competency in the 
juvenile offender so that he or she is more capable of living 
productively 
and 
responsibly 
in 
the 
community." 
 
Our 
interpretation of § 938.21(7) ensures that the circuit judge has 
adequate authority to advance this purpose.  The importance of 
this purpose is reflected in the criteria set forth in 
§ 938.21(7) which directs the judge to consider the "best 
interests of the juvenile and the public" in determining whether 
to dismiss-and-refer. 
¶24 In State v. Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 873, 580 
N.W.2d 660 (1998), we explained that "the legislature did not 
lose sight of the fact that the [Juvenile Justice Code] 
provisions are distinct from the criminal code provisions, and 
that the rehabilitation of juveniles is a primary objective."  
In 
describing 
the 
substantive 
provisions 
that 
show 
the 
differences between the criminal code and the Juvenile Justice 
Code, the court noted that one of these differences is the 
circuit court's ability to dismiss-and-refer when it is in the 
best interests of the juvenile and the public: 
No. 
01-0081 & 01-0082   
 
13 
 
[I]n accord with Wis. Stat. § 938.21(7), a judge or 
juvenile court commissioner has the discretion to 
dismiss a petition and refer a juvenile's case to a 
social worker for deferred prosecution, if it is "in 
the best interests of the juvenile and the public." 
Id. at 874. 
¶25 Therefore, based on our examination of the statutory 
language, the legislative history, context, and purpose, we 
determine that the legislature did not intend the interpretation 
advanced by the State.  Rather, we conclude that the legislature 
intended 
that 
a 
court 
would 
have 
the 
authority 
to 
dismiss-and-refer under § 938.21(7) even when the juvenile is 
not in custody. 
IV 
¶26 We turn now to the district attorney's authority under 
Wis. Stat. § 938.245(6) to terminate the deferred prosecution 
agreement by filing the second delinquency petition.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 938.245(6) provides in relevant part: 
(6)  A deferred prosecution agreement arising out of 
an alleged delinquent act is terminated if the 
district attorney files a delinquency petition within 
20 days after receipt of notice of the deferred 
prosecution agreement under s. 938.24(5). . . . 
The State argues that the circuit court's dismissal of a 
delinquency petition under § 938.21(7) does not preclude the 
district attorney from terminating the subsequent deferred 
prosecution agreement by filing another delinquency petition 
pursuant to § 938.245(6). 
¶27 We 
disagree 
with 
the 
State's 
interpretation 
of 
§ 938.245(6) as allowing the district attorney to terminate the 
No. 
01-0081 & 01-0082   
 
14 
 
deferred 
prosecution 
agreement 
in 
this 
case. 
 
Such 
an 
interpretation misreads the scope of the notice requirement in 
Wis. Stat. § 938.24(5) and eviscerates the authority explicitly 
granted to the court by § 938.21(7). 
¶28 As highlighted by the particular facts of this case, 
the State's interpretation creates an odd framework in which the 
district attorney can nullify a decision of the circuit court to 
exercise its authority under § 938.21(7) to dismiss a petition 
and refer the matter for deferred prosecution.  In this case, 
the circuit court, over the State's objection, dismissed the 
initial delinquency petition that the State filed against 
Lindsey and referred the matter to the intake worker for 
deferred prosecution.  Lindsey, her mother, and the intake 
worker then entered into a deferred prosecution agreement.  
Dissatisfied with this result, the district attorney attempted 
to terminate the deferred prosecution agreement and continue to 
seek a delinquency adjudication.  It did so by filing a second 
petition containing the same charge and factual basis. 
¶29 This result is seemingly at odds with the dismissal 
authority granted to the court in § 938.21(7).  Nevertheless, 
the State argues that the interaction of the relevant statutes 
supports this result.  In particular, the State argues that, 
after a court exercises its authority under § 938.21(7) to 
dismiss-and-refer, § 938.24(5) requires that the intake worker 
provide written notice to the district attorney when the parties 
enter into the deferred prosecution agreement.  According to the 
State, this notice in turn triggers the authority of the 
No. 
01-0081 & 01-0082   
 
15 
 
district 
attorney 
to 
terminate 
the 
deferred 
prosecution 
agreement under § 938.245(6). 
¶30 However, the process leading to the notice required by 
§ 938.24(5) is the initial intake procedures governed by Wis. 
Stat. § 938.24.  A brief discussion of the underlying statutory 
framework 
for 
intake 
and 
referral 
provides 
context 
for 
evaluating the State's argument. 
¶31 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.24 sets forth the process by 
which a district attorney receives notice of the juvenile's 
case.  Pursuant to this process, the intake worker performs an 
inquiry after which the intake worker may request that a 
petition be filed, enter into a deferred prosecution agreement, 
or close the case.  If the intake worker enters into a deferred 
prosecution agreement, § 938.24(5) requires that notification be 
sent to the district attorney.  A district attorney then has 
20 days from the receipt of such notice to exercise its 
authority 
under 
§ 938.245(6) 
to 
terminate 
the 
deferred 
prosecution agreement. 
¶32 Section 938.245(6) is not a blanket grant of authority 
empowering 
a 
district 
authority 
to 
terminate 
a 
deferred 
prosecution agreement.  Rather, the authority is triggered by 
receipt of the § 938.24(5) notice.  However, as noted above, a 
§ 938.24(5) notice is a part of the initial intake procedures, 
not a part of a court ordered deferred prosecution.   
¶33 When 
a 
court 
orders 
deferred 
prosecution 
under 
§ 938.21(7), there is no statutory notice requirement.  Unlike 
the notice requirement set forth in § 938.24(5) which triggers 
No. 
01-0081 & 01-0082   
 
16 
 
termination authority under § 938.245(6), here there is no 
required notice to provide the necessary triggering event.  The 
fact that the termination authority under § 938.245(6) is tied 
to and triggered by an intake worker notice is not unique.  An 
intake worker notice is also required to trigger the district 
attorney's 
termination 
authority 
under 
§ 938.245(7) 
which 
addresses noncompliance with a deferred prosecution agreement.8 
¶34 Accordingly, we agree with the court of appeals that 
while § 938.245(6) authorizes a district attorney to override a 
determination made by an intake worker within 20 days after 
receipt of notice, it does not authorize a district attorney to 
override a determination made by the circuit court.  Lindsey 
A.F., 257 Wis. 2d 650, ¶¶13, 16.  Based on a proper reading of 
the notice requirement of § 938.24(5), the scope of the district 
attorney's ability to terminate a deferred prosecution agreement 
under § 938.245(6), and the authority granted to judges under 
§ 938.21(7), we conclude that the district attorney did not have 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.245(7)(a) provides in relevant part: 
(a) If at any time during the period of a deferred 
prosecution agreement the intake worker determines 
that the obligations imposed under it are not being 
met, the intake worker may cancel the deferred 
prosecution agreement.  Within 10 days after the 
cancellation of the deferred prosecution agreement, 
the intake worker shall notify the district attorney, 
corporation counsel or other official under s. 938.09 
of the cancellation and request that a petition be 
filed.  In delinquency cases, the district attorney 
may initiate a petition within 20 days after the date 
of the notice regardless of whether the intake worker 
has requested that a petition be filed. 
No. 
01-0081 & 01-0082   
 
17 
 
the authority to terminate the deferred prosecution agreement in 
this case. 
¶35 In 
sum, 
we 
determine 
that 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.21(7), the circuit court had the authority to dismiss the 
delinquency 
petitions 
and 
refer 
the 
matter 
for 
deferred 
prosecution.  We further conclude that the district attorney 
cannot terminate the resulting deferred prosecution agreement by 
filing a second delinquency petition containing the same charge 
and factual basis.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
01-0081 & 01-0082   
 
 
 
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