Title: Big Sky Excavating, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 99380
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 1, 2005

Docket No. 99380-Agenda 24-September 2005.
BIG SKY EXCAVATING, INC., et al., Appellees, v. ILLINOIS 							

BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed December 1, 2005.
	JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiffs brought an action in the circuit court of Madison
County challenging the constitutionality of section 13-502.5 of the
Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/13-502.5 (West 2002)), which
abated proceedings then pending before the Illinois Commerce
Commission and mandated that $90 million be refunded to certain
customers of telecommunication services. On plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment, the circuit court declared section 13-502.5 invalid
on the grounds that it violated the prohibition against special
legislation set forth in article IV, section 13, of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §13) and denied the
Illinois Constitution's guarantees of due process and equal protection
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Because the circuit court's judgment
declared a statute of this state invalid, the appeal was taken directly to
our court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a). For the reasons that follow, we now
reverse.
	Telephone companies in Illinois have long been regulated as
public utilities. As such, their rates were determined by administrative
agencies. Before a telephone company could alter the price of its
services, it was required to give 45 days notice to the Illinois
Commerce Commission (Commission) and the public. 220 ILCS
5/9-201(a), 13-504(a) (West 2002). The Commission could then
suspend the effectiveness of the price change for up to 11 months
while deciding whether to approve it. 220 ILCS 5/9-201(b),
13-504(a) (West 2002).
	In 1985, the General Assembly enacted the Universal Telephone
Service Protection Law of 1985 (220 ILCS 5/13-100 et seq. (West
2002)), which created two classifications of telephone services:
"competitive" and "noncompetitive" (220 ILCS 5/13-502 (West
2002)). Generally speaking, noncompetitive services remain subject
to the requirements discussed above. See 220 ILCS 5/13-504(a)
(West 2002). Under section 13-502(b) of the Universal Telephone
Service Protection Law (220 ILCS 5/13-502(b) (West 2002)),
however, an incumbent provider is now allowed to declare a service
competitive with respect to an identifiable class of customers (such as
business customers in a certain geographic area) if "such service, or
its functional equivalent, or a substitute service" is "reasonably
available from more than one provider." This categorization is
significant because once a service has been declared competitive,
prices can be changed immediately simply by filing a new tariff and, in
the case of an increase, providing notice to customers. 220 ILCS
5/13-505(a) (West 2002).
	The power of telecommunications providers to declare a service
competitive is not unrestricted. Section 13-502(b) of the Universal
Telephone Service Protection Law confers on the Commission the
authority "to investigate the propriety of any classification of a
telecommunications service on its own motion" and requires it to
investigate the propriety of any classification where a complaint has
been filed. 220 ILCS 5/13-502(b) (West 2002). The statute sets forth
standards for evaluating whether a service should be reclassified as
competitive (see 220 ILCS 5/13-502(c) (West 2002)) and provides
that "[i]n any hearing or investigation, the burden of proof as to the
proper classification of any service shall rest upon the
telecommunications carrier providing the service" (220 ILCS
5/13-502(b) (West 2002)). Where the reclassification of service as
competitive is successfully challenged, the Commission has the power
to order the carrier to refund any overcharges that may have resulted
from the improper classification. It may also order other remedies as
authorized by the statute or seek appropriate relief in a court of
competent jurisdiction. 220 ILCS 5/13-502(e) (West 2002).
	On February 6, 1998, Illinois Bell Telephone Company, doing
business as SBC Illinois, filed a tariff with the Commission
reclassifying many of the business services it provided to small
business customers as competitive. After Illinois Bell reclassified its
services, it raised rates for many of those services. Pursuant to the
authority conferred on it by section 13-502(b) of the Universal
Telephone Service Protection Law (220 ILCS 5/13-502(b) (West
2002)), the Commission initiated an investigation of Illinois Bell's
actions. Hearings were conducted during which a substantial
evidentiary record was compiled. The Commission hearing examiners
assigned to the matter ultimately submitted a proposed order to the
Commission finding that Illinois Bell had wrongfully reclassified many
of its small business services as competitive and that such
reclassification resulted in unwarranted and significant rate increases.
The proposed order, dated March 30, 2001, concluded that Illinois
Bell should refund the price increases it had charged affected
customers.
	In accordance with section 200.830 of title 83 of the
Administrative Code (83 Ill. Adm. Code §200.830 (2005) (as
amended by 20 Ill. Reg. 10607, eff. August 15, 1996)), the parties
were permitted to file exceptions to the proposed order and replies to
the exceptions. While the matter was still pending, and before the
Commission issued a final order in the case, the General Assembly
enacted Public Act 92-22. That legislation made numerous changes
to various statutes concerning telecommunications. It repealed section
13-803 of the Universal Telephone Service Protection Law (220
ILCS 5/13-803 (West 2000)), which would have repealed the entire
Universal Telephone Service Protection Law as of July 1, 2001, and
extended the life of the statute, as amended, until June 30, 2005 (220
ILCS 5/13-803 (West 2002)).(1) At the same time, it added an entirely
new section to the law, section 13-502.5 (220 ILCS 5/13-502.5
(West 2002)), which declared:
			"(a) Any action or proceeding pending before the
Commission upon the effective date of this amendatory Act
of the 92nd General Assembly [Public Act 92-22] in which
it is alleged that a telecommunications carrier has improperly
classified services as competitive, other than a case pertaining
to Section 13-506.1, shall be abated and shall not be
maintained or continued.
			(b) All retail telecommunications services provided to
business end users by any telecommunications carrier subject,
as of May 1, 2001, to alternative regulation under an
alternative regulation plan pursuant to Section 13-506.1 of
this Act shall be classified as competitive as of the effective
date of this amendatory Act of the 92nd General Assembly
[Public Act 92-22] without further Commission review.
Rates for retail telecommunications services provided to
business end users with 4 or fewer access lines shall not
exceed the rates the carrier charged for those services on
May 1, 2001. This restriction upon the rates of retail
telecommunications services provided to business end users
shall remain in force and effect through July 1, 2005;
provided, however, that nothing in this Section shall be
construed to prohibit reduction of those rates. Rates for retail
telecommunications services provided to business end users
with 5 or more access lines shall not be subject to the
restrictions set forth in this subsection.
			(c) All retail vertical services, as defined herein, that are
provided by a telecommunications carrier subject, as of May
1, 2001, to alternative regulation under an alternative
regulation plan pursuant to Section 13-506.1 of this Act shall
be classified as competitive as of June 1, 2003 without further
Commission review. Retail vertical services shall include, for
purposes of this Section, services available on a subscriber's
telephone line that the subscriber pays for on a periodic or
per use basis, but shall not include caller identification and
call waiting.
			(d) Any action or proceeding before the Commission upon
the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 92nd General
Assembly [Public Act 92-22], in which it is alleged that a
telecommunications carrier has improperly classified services
as competitive, other than a case pertaining to Section
13-506.1, shall be abated and the services the classification
of which is at issue shall be deemed either competitive or
noncompetitive as set forth in this Section. Any
telecommunications carrier subject to an action or proceeding
in which it is alleged that the telecommunications carrier has
improperly classified services as competitive shall be deemed
liable to refund, and shall refund, the sum of $90,000,000 to
that class or those classes of its customers that were alleged
to have paid rates in excess of noncompetitive rates as the
result of the alleged improper classification. ***
			(e) Any telecommunications carrier subject to an action or
proceeding in which it is alleged that the telecommunications
carrier has improperly classified services as competitive shall
also pay the sum of $15,000,000 to the Digital Divide
Elimination Fund established pursuant to Section 5-20 of the
Eliminate the Digital Divide Law, and shall further pay the
sum of $15,000,000 to the Digital Divide Elimination
Infrastructure Fund established pursuant to Section 13-301.3
of this Act."
	The effect of the foregoing legislation was to abate the
Commission case against Illinois Bell, render all Illinois Bell business
services "competitive" within the meaning of the Universal Telephone
Service Protection Law without future review, require Illinois Bell to
make $90 million in refunds to the customers who would have been
affected by the now abated Commission proceedings against it, and
obligate the company to deposit $15 million into the Digital Divide
Elimination Fund and an additional $15 million into the Digital Divide
Elimination Infrastructure Fund.
	 After section 13-502.5 took effect, the Commission complied
with the new law's requirements and dismissed the proceedings it had
initiated to challenge Illinois Bell's reclassification of its small business
services as "competitive." Shortly thereafter, a lawsuit was filed in the
circuit court of Sangamon County on behalf of a purported class of
Illinois Bell's small business customers, seeking to overturn section
13-502.5 on the grounds that it constituted impermissible special
legislation and denied the plaintiffs' due process and equal protection
rights in violation of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. The circuit
court denied plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, rejected
plaintiffs' request for class certification, and granted Illinois Bell's
motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs did not appeal.
	Almost one year later, a similar action was filed in the circuit
court of Madison County. The plaintiffs in that action, which is the
one before us today, are two Illinois businesses that sought to
represent a class of all Illinois Bell business customers who used
between 1 and 11 telephone lines. As grounds for their complaint, the
Madison County plaintiffs alleged that they were harmed by enactment
of section 13-502.5 of the Universal Telephone Service Protection
Law because the regulatory proceedings abated by the new law would
have enabled them to recover substantially larger refunds than the
statute mandates. They further asserted that by declaring Illinois Bell's
services to be competitive, section 13-502.5 will permit the company
to collect excessive and noncompetitive rates from them in the future
without review by the Commission or the courts.
	As amended, the Madison County complaint contained six
counts. Counts I, III and V each sought the same relief: (1) a
declaration that section 13-502.5 violates the special legislation, due
process and equal protection provisions of the Illinois Constitution of
1970 and (2) an order requiring the Commission to reinstate the
regulatory proceedings abated by section 13-502.5's enactment.(2) The
only difference between counts I, III and V was the composition of
the purported class on whose behalf the respective counts were
asserted. Count I dealt with the entire class of Illinois Bell business
customers with between 1 and 11 telephone lines. Counts III and V
each dealt with subsets of that class. Count III was brought on behalf
of business customers with between 1 and 4 lines, while count V
sought relief on behalf of business customers with between 5 and 11
lines.
	Counts II, IV and VI paralleled counts I, III and V, but sought
alternative relief in the event plaintiffs' constitutional challenges were
rejected. Specifically, they prayed for: (1) an accounting to determine
how much of the statutorily mandated refunds should properly be paid
to the class of business customers plaintiffs represented, and (2)
creation of an interest-bearing account to hold the refund money until
the appropriate allocation is determined and the refunds are made. By
order of the circuit court, these alternative counts were held in
abeyance pending resolution of plaintiffs' constitutional challenge.
	Because plaintiffs' complaint challenged the constitutionality of
a state statute, and because the state was not already a party to the
proceedings, plaintiffs were required to notify the Attorney General
that they were raising the constitutional issue. 134 Ill. 2d R. 19(a).
The requisite notice was given. The Attorney General did not elect to
participate in the case and filed no petition to intervene. See 134 Ill.
2d R. 19(c).
	In August of 2004, the circuit court ruled that this proceeding
could be maintained as a class action. The following month, the court
entered an order: (1) denying a motion filed by Illinois Bell to dismiss
counts I, III and V of plaintiffs' complaint and (2) granting partial
summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against Illinois Bell on
those three counts. In its order, the court declared section 13-502.5
of the Universal Telephone Service Protection Law invalid on the
grounds that it violated the prohibition against special legislation set
forth in article IV, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. IV, §13) and denied the Illinois Constitution's
guarantees of due process and equal protection (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, §2). Because the court believed that section 13-502.5 was severable
from the remainder of the legislation enacted by Public Act 92-22, the
court further ruled that its ruling did not affect the balance of the new
law. The question of whether the court should order reinstatement of
the administrative proceedings abated by section 13-502.5's
enactment was not reached. The court's determination that the statute
was invalid obviated the need to address the alternative relief
requested in counts II, IV and VI of plaintiffs' complaint.
	Illinois Bell promptly appealed the circuit court's judgment. As
noted at the outset of this opinion, because the judgment declared a
statute of this state invalid, the appeal was taken directly to our court
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)).
	Before we reach the merits of Illinois Bell's appeal, a threshold
jurisdictional issue must be addressed. The record shows that Illinois
Bell filed its notice of appeal before the circuit court had the
opportunity to consider plaintiffs' request that the Commission be
ordered to reinstate the proceedings abated by section 13-502.5.
There is no indication that plaintiffs intended to abandon that request.
It therefore appears to remain pending and unresolved.
	The existence of that unresolved claim is problematic because to
trigger direct review under Rule 302(a), it is not enough that the
circuit court declared a statute invalid. The court must also have
entered final judgment in the case. A final judgment is a determination
by the court on the issues presented by the pleadings which ascertains
and fixes absolutely and finally the rights of the parties in the lawsuit.
A judgment is final if it determines the litigation on the merits so that,
if affirmed, nothing remains for the trial court to do but to proceed
with its execution. Flores v. Dugan, 91 Ill. 2d 108, 112 (1982).
	The judgment here does not satisfy that test. The court's order
did not terminate the litigation. As just indicated, the question of
whether the Commission should be ordered to reinstate the abated
administrative proceedings remains pending. Resolution of that
question involves substantive legal and factual issues beyond those
attendant to plaintiffs' claim for declaratory relief. If we were to
affirm, the circuit court would therefore have more to do than simply
undertake the administrative and ministerial responsibilities associated
with execution of a judgment.
	Having said that, we also note that plaintiffs' unresolved claim for
affirmative relief against the Commission has little, if any, practical
significance. For reasons plaintiffs have not addressed, they did not
name and have never attempted to make the Commission a defendant
in these proceedings, nor have they joined any agents, employees or
anyone else in active concert or participation with the Commission. As
a result, no injunction or restraining order issued by the circuit court
in this case would be binding on the Commission. See 735 ILCS
5/11-101 (West 2002). Any attempt to compel the Commission to
take particular action with respect to administrative proceedings
involving Illinois Bell would have to come in a separate action.
Accordingly, the ultimate disposition of this particular case is unlikely
to be any different even if we were to affirm.
	Under these circumstances, dismissing Illinois Bell's appeal for
failure to comply with Rule 302(a) would serve no purpose other than
to delay resolution of the pivotal issue in this case, namely, whether
the circuit court erred in declaring section 13-502.5 unconstitutional.
Our court has jurisdiction to permit direct appeals from other than
final judgments, and where the order appealed from rests on a finding
of a statute's unconstitutionality, we have assumed jurisdiction under
Rule 302(a), notwithstanding the finality requirement. Desnick v.
Department of Professional Regulation, 171 Ill. 2d 510, 516 (1996).
Based on these considerations, we shall proceed with our review of
this case.
	Because Illinois Bell's appeal arises from an order granting
summary judgment, our review is de novo. Progressive Universal
Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 2d 121, 128 (2005). De novo review is also appropriate because
the order from which the appeal is taken declared a statute
unconstitutional. See Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill. 2d 520, 536 (2004).
	In undertaking our review, we begin with the well-settled
principle that all statutes are presumed to be constitutional. The party
challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of
rebutting the presumption of validity and clearly establishing a
constitutional violation. Village of Chatham v. County of Sangamon,
216 Ill. 2d 402, 417 (2005). Our court has a duty to uphold the
constitutionality of a statute if it is reasonably possible to do so.
Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d 106, 122 (2004).
	On this appeal Illinois Bell first takes issue with the circuit court's
determination that section 13-502.5 of the Universal Telephone
Service Protection Law violates the special legislation clause of the
Illinois Constitution. That provision states:
			"The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law
when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a
general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for
judicial determination." Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §13.
	The meaning of this provision was recently taken up by our court
in Crusius v. Illinois Gaming Board, 216 Ill. 2d 315 (2005). We held
in that case that the special legislation clause prohibits the General
Assembly from conferring a special benefit or privilege upon one
person or group and excluding others that are similarly situated. While
the legislature has broad discretion to make statutory classifications,
the special legislation clause prevents it from making classifications
that arbitrarily discriminate in favor of a select group. Our inquiry into
special legislation issues is therefore twofold. First, we must determine
whether the statutory classification at issue discriminates in favor of
a select group. If it does, we must then consider whether the
classification is arbitrary. Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d  at 325.
	In support of the circuit court's judgment, plaintiffs argue here,
as they did in the court below, that section 13-502.5 cannot pass
special legislation scrutiny because Illinois Bell is the only entity to
benefit from its provisions. This argument is without merit. It is true
that Illinois Bell was the only telecommunications carrier involved in
the type of Commission proceedings mentioned in subsections (a), (d)
and (e) of the legislation (220 ILCS 5/13-502.5(a), (d), (e) (West
2002)) at the time the legislation was enacted as well as being the only
telecommunications carrier then subject to so-called "alternative
regulation" within the meaning of sections 13-502.5 (b) and (c) of the
statute (220 ILCS 5/13-502.5(b), (c) (West 2002)). The mere fact
that a law may affect only a single entity does not, however, render
the law invalid under the special legislation clause. See, e.g., Crusius,
216 Ill. 2d 315 (statute affecting single river boat gambling licensee
upheld against special legislation challenge); Chicago National
League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357 (1985) (rejecting
constitutional challenge to validity of statutes that applied only to
Wrigley Field). Likewise, laws will not be regarded as improper
special legislation merely because they affect only one class of entities
and not another. See Kaufman, Litwin &amp; Feinstein v. Edgar, 301 Ill.
App. 3d 826, 838 (1998). To contravene article IV, section 13, of our
constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §13), the statute must confer on
a person, entity, or class of persons or entities a special benefit or
exclusive privilege that is denied to others who are similarly situated.
See In re Marriage of Blaisdell, 142 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1043 (1986).
	Section 13-502.5 terminated administrative proceedings pending
against Illinois Bell and declared that certain of its services would be
classified as competitive, enabling Illinois Bell to increase rates for
those services. At the same time, however, the statute required the
company to refund $90 million to certain of its customers and to pay
an additional $30 million into "digital divide elimination" funds
established by statute. Whether this action can be construed as
conferring a benefit or privilege on Illinois Bell is vigorously contested
by the parties. We need not resolve that question, for even if Illinois
Bell's position improved as a result of the legislation, the advantages
received by Illinois Bell were not denied to others who were similarly
situated. They could not have been, for there were no other
telecommunications carriers whose situation was similar to Illinois
Bell's. As we have just observed, Illinois Bell was the only
telecommunications carrier involved in the type of Commission
proceedings mentioned in subsections (a), (d) and (e) of the legislation
(220 ILCS 5/13-502.5(a), (d), (e) (West 2002)) at the time the
legislation was enacted and was the only telecommunications carrier
then subject to so-called "alternative regulation" within the meaning
of subsections (b) and (c) of the statute (220 ILCS 5/13-502.5(b), (c)
(West 2002)).
	If any telecommunications carrier believed that section 13-502.5
afforded Illinois Bell an advantage it was denied, there is no evidence
of it in the record before us. Plaintiffs' arguments focus instead on the
harm consumers would suffer under the new law. Consumers,
however, are not similarly situated to the telecommunications carriers
from which they purchase services. Accordingly, their harm is not
relevant to the question of the law's discriminatory effect.
	By its terms, article IV, section 13, of our constitution (Ill. Const.
1970, art. IV, §13) only prohibits passage of a special law when "a
general law is or can be made applicable." Where, as here, an entity is
uniquely situated, nothing in article IV, section 13, or any other part
of our constitution bars the General Assembly from enacting a law
tailored to address the conditions presented by that unique situation.
See County of Bureau v. Thompson, 139 Ill. 2d 323, 345-46 (1990).
Because no other carrier was shown to be similarly situated to Illinois
Bell, section 13-502.5 cannot be said to have discriminated in favor
of a select group. 
	Even if that were not the case and section 13-502.5 did
discriminate in favor of Illinois Bell, plaintiffs' special legislation
challenge could not succeed. The special legislation clause does not
prohibit all classifications. As already discussed, it only forbids
legislative classifications that are arbitrary. In re Petition of the
Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d 117, 122 (1995). In determining
whether a statute violates this standard, courts generally apply the
same standards applicable to challenges brought under the equal
protection clause of our constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2).
Where, as here, the statute under consideration does not affect a
fundamental right or involve a suspect classification, we review it
under the deferential rational basis test. Under this test, the statute is
constitutional if the classification it establishes is rationally related to
a legitimate state interest. Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d  at 325. If any set of
facts can be reasonably conceived that justify distinguishing the class
to which the statute applies from the class to which the statute is
inapplicable, then the General Assembly may constitutionally classify
persons and objects for the purpose of legislative regulation or
control, and may enact laws applicable only to those persons or
objects. In re Petition of the Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d  at
122.
	The Universal Telephone Service Protection Law is premised on
a recognition by the General Assembly of the changing nature of the
telecommunications industry (220 ILCS 5/13-103(e) (West 2002))
and a legislative determination that
			"consistent with the protection of consumers of
telecommunications services and the furtherance of other
public interest goals, competition in all telecommunications
service markets should be pursued as a substitute for
regulation in determining the variety, quality and price of
telecommunications services and that the economic burdens
of regulation should be reduced to the extent possible
consistent with the furtherance of market competition and
protection of the public interest[.]" 220 ILCS 5/13-103(b)
(West 2002).
	A fundamental problem in attaining these objectives is that the
telephone industry in Illinois has long been dominated by Illinois Bell.
Illinois Bell owned much of the state's telecommunications
infrastructure and operated what was essentially a regulated monopoly
of the telephone business. In this regard Illinois Bell stands alone from
all other telecommunications providers operating here.
	Under the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 (47 U.S.C.
§251 (2000)), telecommunications carriers that provide local
telephone exchange services, as Illinois Bell does, are required to
provide access to their networks on rates, terms and conditions that
are just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory. Promulgation of this law
and other factors have placed enormous pressure on Illinois Bell from
other carriers anxious to compete against it. In response, Illinois Bell
has been engaged in an ongoing effort to sustain its operations by
securing the highest rates for its services that state regulations and the
market place would permit.
	By the time the General Assembly amended the Universal
Telephone Service Protection Law to include section 13-502.5,
Illinois Bell had been trying for more than five years to successfully
reclassify certain services it provided to business customers from
noncompetitive to competitive in order to facilitate price changes for
those services. One effort, begun in 1995, was rejected by the
Commission in a decision subsequently upheld on administrative
review. See Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n, 282 Ill. App. 3d 672 (1996). Another effort, initiated in
1998, culminated in the Commission proceedings that were ultimately
abated by section 13-502.5.
	Through section 13-502.5, the General Assembly was able to
resolve the reclassification dispute in a way that permits Illinois Bell
to increase the rates it charges, helping to ensure the viability of its
networks and their continued availability to its competitors, while at
the same time reducing future economic burdens of regulation and
providing monetary relief to the company's business customers. This
solution was the product of 18 months of bipartisan cooperation and
was supported, according to the materials before us, by groups as
diverse as the Illinois Manufacturers Association and the Citizens
Utility Board. In purpose and design, it appears fully consistent with
the objectives of the Universal Telephone Service Protection Law.
	Plaintiffs protest that section 13-502.5 is ill-conceived and will
ultimately undermine the goals of the Universal Telephone Service
Protection Law by forcing consumers to pay higher rates and
perpetuating Illinois Bell's advantages in the marketplace to the
detriment of its competitors. Competition is not instantly created by
legislative fiat, they argue, and a monopoly must be dismantled
systematically as part of a continuous and monitored process. Such
determinations, however, are not for us to make. Whether a statute is
wise or whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result are
matters left to the legislature, not the courts. Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d  at
332, quoting Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003).
The judgments made by the legislature in crafting a statute are not
subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. People ex rel.
Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d 117, 124 (1998). The legislature has
broad latitude and discretion in drawing statutory classifications to
benefit the general welfare. A statute will be held unconstitutional as
special legislation only if it was enacted for reasons totally unrelated
to the pursuit of a legitimate state goal. Bilyk v. Chicago Transit
Authority, 125 Ill. 2d 230, 236 (1988). That is not the case here. The
classification established by section 13-502.5 is rationally related to
a legitimate state interest. Plaintiffs have therefore failed to meet their
burden of clearly establishing that the statute violated the prohibition
against special legislation.
	In addition to raising a special legislation challenge to section
13-502.5, plaintiffs contend, and the trial court held, that the statute
denied them equal protection of the law in violation of article I,
section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). The
equal protection guarantee and the special legislation proscription of
our constitution are generally judged by the same standard. Nevitt v.
Langfelder, 157 Ill. 2d 116, 125 (1993), quoting Chicago National
League Ball Club, Inc., 108 Ill. 2d  at 368. Plaintiffs have advanced no
separate or additional arguments that would warrant treating their
equal protection and special legislation claims differently in this case.
Our determination that section 13-502.5 is not unconstitutional under
the special legislation provision therefore requires us to likewise
conclude that the statute did not violate plaintiffs' right to equal
protection.
	The sole remaining basis for the circuit court's judgment is that
section 13-502.5 denied plaintiffs due process of law under article I,
section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). The
gravamen of plaintiffs' claim is that due process considerations
entitled them to have the Commission resolve the questions of
whether Illinois Bell acted improperly when it reclassified its services
as competitive and, if so, whether the company should be required to
issue refunds to the affected customers. In plaintiffs' view, the
legislature had no right to abate the Commission proceedings and
settle the question of refunds through statutory enactment.
	As Illinois Bell has correctly observed, there is no due process
right to due process in the abstract. In undertaking any due process
analysis, one must first ascertain that a protected interest has been
interfered with by the state. Then and only then does one consider
what process is due. If no protected interest is present, due process
protections are not triggered. See Cathedral Rock of Granite City,
Inc. v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board, 308 Ill. App. 3d
529, 539 (1999).
	The due process protections of our constitution pertain to
deprivations of life, liberty or property. No deprivation of life or
liberty is involved in this case. Accordingly, plaintiffs may prevail only
if they can establish that enactment of section 13-502.5 deprived them
of some property right. No such showing has been made.
	The power to regulate rates of a public utility is fixed in the
General Assembly. When exercised, it is as an act of sovereignty
performed in the interest of protecting the lives, health, comfort and
general welfare of the public. Sprague v. Biggs, 390 Ill. 537, 549
(1945). Through the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq.
(West 2002)), the legislature has established a comprehensive
mechanism for undertaking that regulation. As with any statutory
scheme, the legislature has an ongoing right to amend the Act when
it sees fit to do so. Because of this power to amend, plaintiffs can
claim no right in the mere continuance of the law. Dardeen v.
Heartland Manor, Inc., 186 Ill. 2d 291, 300 (1999).
	The presumption is that laws do not create vested rights, but
merely declare a policy to be pursued until the law ordains otherwise.
The party asserting that a statute creates a vested right bears the
burden of overcoming this presumption. See People ex rel.
Sklodowski v. State of Illinois, 182 Ill. 2d 220, 231-32 (1998). To
satisfy that burden, a plaintiff must show more than a unilateral
expectation that he or she will receive benefits under the law. A
legitimate claim of entitlement to those benefits must be demonstrated.
Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius, 77 Ill. 2d 287, 294 (1979).
	The case before us does not involve a statutorily created private
right of action. See, e.g., Bradford v. Soto, 159 Ill. App. 3d 668, 672-73 (1987). The proceeding abated by section 13-502.5 was a
regulatory enforcement matter. Plaintiffs were not parties to that
proceeding and had no established, definite or ascertainable right to
any monetary relief from Illinois Bell. They merely hoped to get back
some of the money they had paid for telephone service in the event the
Commission ultimately agreed with the hearing examiners, determined
that Illinois Bell had acted improperly, and ordered it to make refunds
to its customers. Such expectations clearly do not rise to the level of
a legitimate claim of entitlement to benefits under the prior law.
Plaintiffs therefore failed to establish that they had a vested property
right necessary to support their due process claim.
	For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against Illinois Bell. The
judgment of the circuit court is therefore reversed, and this cause is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with
our opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
1.  ï»¿ 1 Public Act 9476, effective June 24, 2005, 
subsequently extended the
statute's life an additional two years. It is now scheduled to be repealed
effective July 1, 2007.
2.    ï»¿ 2The complaint's 
prayer for relief asked that action be taken against
Public Act 9222 generally, but it is clear from the pleadings and subsequent
litigation that plaintiffs' grievance concerns only that portion of Public Act
9222 which added section 13502.5 to the Universal Telephone Service
Protection Law. Plaintiffs' complaint also included a request that a prior
administrative proceeding be "remanded" to the Commission. As Illinois Bell
correctly pointed out in the trial court, however, there were no proceedings
then before the court subject to remand.