Title: Industrial Commission v. Johnson Pontiac, Inc.
Citation: 344 P.2d 186
Docket Number: 18984
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: August 17, 1959

344 P.2d 186 (1959) INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Colorado and Monty E. Lasher, Plaintiffs in Error, v. JOHNSON PONTIAC, INC., and Royal Indemnity Company, Defendants in Error. No. 18984. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. August 17, 1959. Rehearing Denied October 5, 1959. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Peter L. Dye, *187 Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff in error Industrial Commission. Eugene O. Perkins, Colorado Springs, for plaintiff in error Monty E. Lasher. Darwin D. Coit, John E. Walberg, Denver, for defendants in error. MOORE, Justice. This cause originated before the Industrial Commission of Colorado upon the claim of Monty E. Lasher for benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, C.R.S. '53, § 81-1-1 et seq. On August 12, 1955, claimant was an employee of Johnson Pontiac, Inc. The claim for benefits was filed following an injury allegedly suffered on that date, and thereafter, on October 17, 1955, the insuror filed a General Admission of Liability. Hearings were had on the question of the extent and nature of the disability suffered by claimant, which were concluded November 7, 1957. At the conclusion of these hearings the insuror moved for permission to withdraw the General Admission of Liability. The findings of the Industrial Commission contained, inter alia, the following pertinent provision: Benefits, as provided by the Workmen's Compensation law, were ordered paid to claimant. On review the district court reversed the award and directed dismissal of the claim. Findings of Fact were entered in the district court, which included the following: First: Did the trial court err in holding that the Industrial Commission erroneously refused to permit withdrawal by the insurance carrier of the General Admission of Liability? This question is answered in the affirmative. The date of the accident was August 12, 1955; September 1, 1955, the employer made full report concerning the circumstances connected therewith, and the insurance carrier received a copy of this report. August 16, 1955, after treatment by a commission doctor and after his first report was filed with the commission, the insurance carrier filed its General Admission of Liability which obligated it, inter alia, to pay benefits, "* * * for such permanent disability as may hereafter be determined to exist." For over *188 two years compensation was paid, during all of which time the insurance company knew all the facts pertinent to the case. There is no suggestion of fraud. The conclusion of the district court that, "The General Admission of Liability * * * is patently based on a misapprehension and mistake of fact," has no support in the record. This more fully appears in the discussion of the second question. We hold that the Industrial Commission, under all the facts involved in this case, did not exceed its authority or abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the withdrawal of the General Admission of Liability, and the district court erred in reaching a contrary conclusion. Neal v. Stuart Foundry Co., 250 Mich. 46, 229 N.W. 595; Mitchell v. Littlejohn Transportation Co., La.App., 10 So. 2d 651. Second: Did the trial court err in holding, as a matter of law, that there was no evidence before the Industrial Commission supporting the conclusion that the claimant suffered permanent partial disability as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and "that the medical evidence is undisputed in showing that there is no medically provable connection between the `strain' and the commencement of the occlusive process which resulted in the myocardial infarction"? This question is answered in the affirmative. Even though it be assumed, for the purpose of argument, that the insurance carrier, under the facts in this case, is not bound by its admission of liability, there was ample evidence to support the award of the commission. We direct attention to the following language taken from the report of Dr. J. L. McDonald in his report of November 29, 1955: The employer in its report to the commission stated that the claimant "strained or pulled his heart muscle when attempting to lift a transmission into an automobile." This was a declaration against the interest of the employer, having probative value the weight of which was for the consideration of the commission. Johnson v. Industrial Commission, 137 Colo. 591, 328 P.2d 384. In Bennett's Claimants v. Durango Furniture Mart, 136 Colo. 529, 319 P.2d 494, 496, this court stated, inter alia: To like effect is Industrial Commission v. Royal Indemnity Co., 124 Colo. 210, 236 P.2d 293, 295, where we find the following pertinent language: "* * * All that is necessary, to warrant the finding of causal connection between the accident and the disability, is to show facts and circumstances which would indicate with *189 reasonable probability that the detached retina resulted from, or was precipitated by, the accident." See also Industrial Commission v. Corwin Hospital, 126 Colo. 358, 250 P.2d 135; and Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 314 P.2d 698. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment affirming the award of the Industrial Commission. HALL, J., dissents.