Title: Warner v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 35, 2001
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 21, 2001

* As required by Supr. Ct. Rule 7(d), we have assigned a pseudonym to the appellant
whose appeal arose from a juvenile delinquency proceeding.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JOSEPH WARNER, 
§
§
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§ No. 35, 2001
§
v.
§ Court Below: Family Court 
§ of the State of Delaware in and
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§ for New Castle County 
§ Case No. 9910024290
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Submitted: August 28, 2001
Decided:
November 21, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices.
O R D E R
This 21st day of November 2001, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal
and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The respondent-appellant, Joseph Warner* (“Warner”), was adjudged
delinquent on one count of assault in the second degree by the Family Court on April
24, 2001.  This is Warner’s direct appeal. 
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(2)
On February 17, 1999, John Wray (“Wray”) was assaulted by several
youths outside his home after attempting to break up a fight involving his teenage
son.  Both Wray and a neighbor testified that Warner was one of the perpetrators of
the assault.  Although Wray was not visibly injured in the assault, shortly thereafter
he suffered a massive heart attack, arguably triggered by the melee.  Warner’s sole
defense at trial was one of mistaken identity.  After hearing testimony from witnesses
for both the State and Warner, the Family Court found Warner delinquent of the
charge against him.
(3)
In this appeal, Warner argues, for the first time, that the State did not
prove that the victim sustained “serious physical injury,” a material element of the
charge of assault in the second degree.  11 Del. C. § 612.  Although defense counsel
moved for a judgment of acquittal twice in the court below, the basis for both
motions was that the State had failed to prove that Warner was the perpetrator of the
assault.  The “serious injury” issue was never presented to the trial court.
(4)
This Court will not consider questions which have not been presented
to the court below, absent a showing of plain error.  See Supr. Ct. R. 8, Super. Ct.
Crim. R. 52(b).  Plain error exists when there is a material defect, apparent on the
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record, which deprives an accused of a substantial right or which clearly shows
manifest injustice.  Gregory v. State, Del. Supr., 616 A.2d 1198, 1203 (1992).
(5)
Plain error review is not available to Warner, however, because he
waived his claim that serious physical injury had not been proven when he conceded
that the victim indeed sustained a serious injury that was causally related to the
assault.  At the conclusion of all evidence, defense counsel made a motion for
judgment of acquittal in which he stated: “So I – I certainly concur that the injuries
are serious, that there are injuries to Mr. Ray, it occurred in connection with this,
I don’t think that my client had anything to do with these injuries approximately, and
I think the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in fact the
perpetrator of the injuries that he did sustain.”  Transcript of Family Court Hearing
at 80 (April 24, 2000).  
(6)
Plain error review extends to claims that are forfeited because they were
not raised at trial.  U.S. v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-733 (1993).  But certain errors
may be denied review if they have been waived.    Whereas forfeiture is the failure
to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right.  U.S. v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (citations
omitted).  Decisions following Olano have made clear that only forfeited errors are
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reviewable for plain error.  U.S. v. Dispoz-O-Plastics, Inc., 3d Cir., 172 F.3d 275,
282 (1999); U.S. v. Meade, 1st Cir., 175 F.3d 215, 222 (1999). 
(7)
“As a general matter, a criminal defendant who stipulates to an element
of an offense relinquishes his right to test the government's case with respect to the
existence of the facts underlying that particular.”  Meade, 175 F.3d at 223.  Thus,
Warner cannot now challenge the fact that his victim sustained a serious physical
injury.
(8)
Warner’s further attacks on the sufficiency of evidence to sustain his
adjudication of delinquency are without merit.  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family Court
be, and the same hereby is, 
AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT:
   s/Joseph T. Walsh                            
                   Justice