Title: Dane County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Mable K.
Citation: 2013 WI 28
Docket Number: 2011AP000826
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 29, 2013

2013 WI 28 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
Isaiah H., a person under the age of 18: 
 
Dane County Department of Human Services, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Mable K., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner, 
Lee H., 
          Respondent. 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to May 
K., a person under the age of 18: 
 
Dane County Department of Human Services, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Mable K., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner, 
Wesley J., 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
(No Cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 29, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 7, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Amy R. Smith 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
Ziegler, Roggensack, Gableman, JJJ., dissent. 
(Opinion filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Brian C. Findley, Darlington, and oral argument by 
Brian C. Findley.     
 
 
2
 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Gary Rehfeldt, assistant Dane County corporation counsel, and 
oral argument by Gary Rehfeldt. 
A guardian ad litem brief was filed by Ginger L. Murray and 
Lawton & Cates, S.C., Madison. 
 
 
 
 
2013 WI 28
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP825 & 2011AP826 
(L.C. No. 
2010TP32 & 2010TP33) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
Isaiah H., a person under the age of 18: 
 
 
 
Dane County Department of Human Services, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Mable K., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Lee H., 
 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
MAR 29, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to May 
K., a person under the age of 18: 
 
 
 
Dane County Department of Human Services, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Mable K., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
2
 
Wesley J., 
 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Mable K., 
seeks review of an order of the court of appeals dismissing her 
appeals in two consolidated termination of parental rights 
proceedings.1  She contends that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion when it granted a default judgment 
finding that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights, 
after barring her attorney from offering further evidence 
tending 
to 
refute 
the 
grounds 
for 
the 
termination.  
Additionally, she argues that the circuit court erred when it 
granted the default judgment prematurely.  
¶2 
Mable K. further argues that the remedy provided by 
the circuit court to address its errors is fundamentally unfair.  
The circuit court's remedy was to return Mable K. to the 
procedural posture when the error occurred and conduct the 
                                                 
1 Dane Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Mable K., Case Nos. 
2011AP825, 2011AP826, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App., Jan. 
11, 2012), dismissing Mable K.'s appeals after an order of the 
circuit court for Dane County, Amy Smith, J. presiding, vacated 
its previous order terminating her parental rights. 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
3 
 
remainder of the fact-finding hearing before the circuit court, 
not before a jury. 
¶3 
We conclude, and the circuit court has acknowledged, 
that it erroneously exercised its discretion when it entered a 
default judgment finding that grounds existed to terminate Mable 
K.'s parental rights after barring her attorney from offering 
additional evidence.  It also erred when it granted the default 
judgment before taking evidence sufficient to establish the 
grounds alleged in the amended petitions.  We further conclude 
that the circuit court's remedy for correcting the errors is 
fundamentally unfair under the facts of this case.   
¶4 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the circuit 
court for a new fact-finding hearing to be heard by a jury if 
Mable K. timely demands one.  On remand, the new fact-finding 
hearing is to be held at the earliest reasonable opportunity.   
I 
¶5 
Dane 
County 
filed 
amended 
petitions 
for 
the 
termination of Mable K.'s parental rights of her children, 
Isaiah H. and May K.  Dane County also sought to terminate the 
parental rights of the fathers of the children in the amended 
petitions.  The amended petitions allege as grounds for 
termination of Mable K.'s parental rights a continuing need of 
protection or services under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2) (2009-10)2 
and abandonment under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1).    
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
4 
 
¶6 
Before the fact-finding hearing, the circuit court 
ordered Mable K. to appear in person at all proceedings.3  She 
was represented by an attorney, Yolanda Lehner, at the fact-
finding hearing which was being tried by a jury.  On September 
14, 2010, the second day of the fact-finding hearing, Mable K. 
failed to personally appear at 9:00 a.m. when the hearing was 
set to resume.4  However, Attorney Lehner was present and 
appeared on her behalf.   
¶7 
When Mable K. failed to personally appear at the 
appointed time, the circuit court asked Attorney Lehner about 
Mable K.'s absence.  Attorney Lehner stated that Mable K. had 
called as Attorney Lehner was arriving at the courthouse that 
morning.  Mable K. told Attorney Lehner that she "wasn't feeling 
good" and that the hearing was extremely stressful.  She also 
told Attorney Lehner that she didn't think she could come to 
court.   
                                                 
3 Termination of parental rights proceedings involve a two-
step procedure.  State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, ¶26, 298 Wis. 
2d 1, 724 N.W.2d 623.  The first step is the fact-finding phase, 
which consists of an evidentiary hearing to determine whether 
adequate grounds exist for the termination of parental rights.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.424; Shirley E., 298 Wis. 2d 1, ¶27.  The second 
step 
is 
the 
dispositional 
phase, 
which 
consists 
of 
an 
evidentiary hearing in which the circuit court determines 
whether termination of parental rights is in the child's best 
interests.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.427; Shirley E., 298 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶28. 
4 Mable K. was present for the first day of the fact-finding 
hearing.  Additionally, there were eight pre-trial proceedings 
held by the circuit court prior to the fact-finding hearing and 
there is no indication that Mable K. failed to appear on time 
for any of those proceedings.  
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
5 
 
¶8 
Dane County moved for a default judgment.  Attorney 
Lehner requested another opportunity to speak with Mable K. 
about coming to court.  Instead of granting a default judgment 
at that time, the circuit court recessed for five minutes in 
order to allow Attorney Lehner an opportunity to again contact 
Mable K.  
¶9 
When Attorney Lehner returned to court, she explained 
that she had spoken with Mable K. via telephone.  Mable K. told 
Attorney Lehner that she was going to ride her bicycle to court 
and that she would be there in "about half an hour."   
¶10 Attorney Lehner asked the circuit court to wait until 
"10 to 10," or 9:50 a.m., to see if Mable K. arrived.  The 
circuit court agreed and took Dane County's motion under 
advisement to see whether Mable K. arrived in court later in the 
day.  The hearing before the jury resumed, and testimony was 
presented addressing the petitions against the fathers.   
¶11 At approximately 10:20 a.m., outside the presence of 
the jury, the circuit court again took up the matter of Mable K. 
being absent from court.  Dane County renewed its motion for a 
default judgment.  However, the attorney for Dane County noted 
that more evidence would be required to support the abandonment 
ground regarding both children before a default judgment could 
be entered.  He expected a witness who could testify about that 
issue to arrive at 10:30 a.m.  The circuit court acknowledged 
that it needed to hear additional testimony from Dane County's 
witness to establish the ground of abandonment before granting 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
6 
 
the motion for a default judgment finding that grounds existed 
to terminate Mable K.'s parental rights.5 
¶12 In opposition to the renewed motion, Attorney Lehner 
argued that on the abandonment issue, she had "a lot of 
evidence."  The evidence was, in Attorney Lehner's estimation, 
enough 
to 
make 
it 
"difficult 
for 
the 
County 
to 
prove 
abandonment."     
¶13 Attorney Lehner asked whether she would be allowed to 
adduce that evidence, but the circuit court determined that she 
would not be allowed to do so.  Instead she would be allowed 
only to cross-examine Dane County's sole witness in response to 
the direct evidence introduced by Dane County.  The circuit 
court then heard testimony from the witness and Attorney Lehner 
cross-examined him.   
¶14 Following the testimony from Dane County's witness, 
the 
circuit 
court 
"found 
by 
default" 
both 
grounds 
for 
termination.  After making that determination, the circuit court 
found Mable K. unfit.  There was no reference at the hearing to 
Wis. Stat. § 805.03, a statute that allows the circuit court to 
enter a sanction for the violation of a court order.  In fact, 
                                                 
5 This court determined in Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 
110, ¶¶16-19, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768, that a circuit 
court must first take evidence sufficient to support a finding 
by clear and convincing evidence that the ground or grounds 
alleged in the petition were proven before granting a default 
judgment on the grounds at issue.  The circuit court did not 
reference Evelyn C.R. directly, but in acknowledging that it 
needed to hear additional testimony, it appears to have been 
aware of that requirement.   
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
7 
 
the words "sanction" or "forfeiture" were not employed as part 
of the analysis (for further discussion, see infra ¶¶67-71). 
¶15 Mable K. arrived in court approximately ten minutes 
later at 10:45 a.m.  Outside the presence of the jury Attorney 
Lehner requested that the circuit court reconsider its previous 
entry of a default judgment finding that grounds existed to 
terminate Mable K.'s parental rights.  The circuit court invited 
Mable K. to testify about why the circuit court should 
reconsider the default judgment.     
¶16 Mable K. testified that she was "real kind of sick" 
from the previous day's "procedure."  The proceedings from the 
previous day "really kind of hurt" her and she testified that 
she arrived late because "[she] was just tired."  On cross-
examination, 
Dane 
County 
introduced 
deposition 
testimony 
regarding inconsistent statements made by Mable K. about her 
marital status in previous termination proceedings.  On further 
questioning from the circuit court, Mable K. testified that 
after the second phone call, she said she "had to get me some 
breakfast then I will be coming."   
¶17 After Mable K. finished testifying, the circuit court 
considered whether it should vacate the default judgment.  The 
circuit court questioned Mable K.'s credibility, citing the 
inconsistent statements Mable K. had made in prior depositions 
that were introduced during cross-examination by Dane County.  
The circuit court also discussed the morning's events and Mable 
K.'s 
testimony, 
where 
Mable 
K. 
had 
offered 
several 
"inconsistent" 
reasons 
for 
not 
appearing 
in 
person.  
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
8 
 
Accordingly, the circuit court determined that Mable K. had 
introduced insufficient proof to support a finding that the 
default 
judgment 
should 
be 
vacated 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.07(1)(a), which allows relief from a judgment on grounds 
of mistake or excusable neglect.6   
¶18 The circuit court then dismissed Mable K. and Attorney 
Lehner from the remainder of the fact-finding hearing.  When the 
jury was brought back into court, it was instructed that Mable 
K. was no longer involved in the cases and that the claims 
against her had been resolved.  The hearing before the jury 
continued, addressing the petitions against the fathers. 
                                                 
6 The record from the hearing on the motion to vacate the 
default judgment reflects that the motion was advanced and 
decided pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a).  The record 
reflects the following: 
I infer from the information that [Mable K.] has 
provided and the comments made by Ms. Lehner that we 
are, that [Mable K.] is seeking the Court to vacate 
the default judgment based on mistake or excusable 
neglect or something of that nature. . . . 
I also would note that I do not believe that the 
testimony of [Mable K.], even taken in the light most 
favorable 
to 
[her], 
could 
possibly 
constitute 
excusable neglect.  [Mable K.] has indicated that for 
–- on the record as to a number of different possible 
excuses for her failure to appear here today.  I do 
not believe that any of them constitute mistake or 
excusable neglect as those terms are defined in 
Section 806.07(1)(a). . . . 
I also will find that the information that I have is 
insufficient to make a finding that judgment or order 
of default should be relieved under 806.07 and I, 
therefore, deny the motion to relieve [Mable K.] from 
default judgment.  I've ruled in that regard. 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
9 
 
¶19 Before the dispositional hearing, Joyce Brown, a 
social worker with the Dane County Department of Human Services, 
filed a court report that recommended terminating Mable K.'s 
parental rights.  According to the psychiatric evaluations 
referenced in that court report, Mable K. has "intellectual 
deficits" with a performance IQ of 60, and a full scale IQ of 
54.  The court report indicates that an IQ of 54 is "considered 
in the extremely low range."    
¶20 The circuit court held a dispositional hearing on 
January 3, 2011.  Mable K. personally appeared along with 
Attorney Lehner.  The circuit court heard testimony from Joyce 
Brown regarding the best interests of the children.  At the 
conclusion of the dispositional hearing, the circuit court 
entered an order terminating Mable K.'s parental rights.   
¶21 Mable K. appealed following the dispositional hearing.  
Retaining jurisdiction, the court of appeals remanded the cases 
back to the circuit court and ordered the circuit court to hear 
and decide postdisposition motions.   
¶22 At a postdisposition motion hearing on remand, Mable 
K. argued that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by granting and refusing to vacate the default 
judgment finding that grounds existed to terminate her parental 
rights.  She contended that the appropriate remedy for the 
erroneous exercise of discretion was a new fact-finding hearing.   
¶23 Attorney Lehner offered testimony about the evidence 
she had intended to introduce at the fact-finding hearing.  She 
testified that she did not think that Dane County could prove 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
10 
 
the abandonment ground.  The amended petitions relating to both 
children alleged that Mable K. failed to visit or communicate 
with the children during a five-month period between December 
17, 2009 and May 27, 2010.  The amended petitions further 
alleged that there were two e-mail communications from Mable K. 
to 
the 
children's 
foster 
parent, 
but 
that 
both 
e-mail 
communications occurred more than three months after Mable K.'s 
last visit with the children on December 17, 2009.   
¶24 To rebut the abandonment ground, Attorney Lehner 
intended to introduce e-mail correspondence and records of 
contacts between Mable K., the social workers involved in her 
case, and the children's foster parent.  Contrary to the 
allegations in the amended petitions, these contacts suggest 
that Mable K. contacted the children's foster parent and social 
workers on a number of occasions during the period of the 
alleged abandonment.   
¶25 The e-mail communications that Mable K. sent directly 
to the children's foster parent during the period of alleged 
abandonment were not two in number as stated in the amended 
petitions, but rather there were seven.  Also contrary to the 
allegations of the amended petitions, the record indicates that 
there were e-mails sent during——not after——the three-month 
period following Mable K.'s last visit with the children.  The 
e-mails which Attorney Lehner intended to introduce were sent on 
January 21, 2010, March 1, 2010, March 31, 2010, April 22, 2010, 
April 29, 2010, May 5, 2010, and May 13, 2010.  In those e-mail 
communications, Mable K. asked on several occasions about the 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
11 
 
children's lives, their experiences in school, how big the 
children were getting, and whether the foster parent could share 
any pictures of the children.   
¶26  To further rebut the abandonment ground, Attorney 
Lehner intended to introduce e-mail correspondence and records 
of contacts between Mable K. and social workers involved in her 
case during the alleged period of abandonment.  One such record 
notes that Mable K. left a voice message with a social worker on 
January 7, 2010, cancelling a contact scheduled for that date.  
Mable K. sent an e-mail to the same social worker on March 1, 
2010 saying she no longer had a telephone and apologizing for 
her lack of response.  Another record from March 10, 2010 notes 
that Mable K. called a social worker and asked whether she could 
"see her kids," but there is no indication such a visit 
occurred.  An additional e-mail from a social worker sent on 
March 16, 2010 indicates that the social worker spoke on the 
telephone with Mable K. the previous day and that Mable K. said 
she "expect[ed] to get the kids back as she will have housing on 
the South side next month."   
¶27 Attorney Lehner stated she intended to introduce the 
evidence 
to 
rebut 
the 
abandonment 
ground 
through 
cross-
examination of "the social workers" or through Mable K.'s 
testimony directly.  Nearly all of the e-mails were either 
directed to or copied to the social worker, Joyce Brown.  
Attorney Lehner had previously listed Joyce Brown on her amended 
witness list before the fact-finding hearing. 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
12 
 
¶28 Attorney 
Lehner 
further 
testified 
that 
she 
had 
intended to introduce evidence contesting the continuing need of 
protection or services ground.  She thought that she could "make 
a case that [Mable K.] would meet the conditions [of the child 
in need of protection or services order] in the next nine 
months."  Attorney Lehner testified that Mable K. "had an 
apartment lined up" and that the apartment evidence would make 
it likely that Mable K. would meet the conditions.  In Attorney 
Lehner's opinion, the fact that Mable K. did not have a place to 
live "seemed to be the mainstay with getting her kids back."   
¶29 Attorney Lehner thought that she had an additional 
defense to this ground, that is a "strong argument that the 
Department had not made reasonable efforts."  She had intended 
to develop the argument that "it was almost set up so that 
[Mable K.] would fail...to meet the conditions she needed for 
return" by cross-examining Joyce Brown.  Additionally, Attorney 
Lehner intended for Mable K. to testify regarding both of the 
anticipated defenses to the continuing need of protection or 
services ground.  
¶30 In 
a 
later 
oral 
decision 
following 
the 
post-
disposition motion hearing, the circuit court determined that it 
erroneously deprived Mable K. of her statutory right to an 
attorney provided under Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2).  Citing State v. 
Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, 298 Wis. 2d 1, 724 N.W.2d 623, the 
circuit court acknowledged that it had erred when it barred 
Attorney Lehner from adducing evidence tending to refute the 
grounds alleged in the amended petitions.  Dane County argued 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
13 
 
that there were no witnesses to present when Mable K. was late 
on the second day of the fact-finding hearing, but the circuit 
court rejected that argument.7  It concluded that Attorney Lehner 
"had evidence beyond [Mable K.]" and had "other witnesses on her 
witnesses list," stating: 
I really think that [Mable K.] should have had that 
opportunity to bring in these witnesses and, frankly, 
I don't know exactly what they would say but she had a 
right to at least present it. 
Accordingly, the circuit court vacated its previous orders 
terminating Mable K.'s parental rights. 
¶31 The circuit court determined that the appropriate 
remedy for the erroneous exercise of discretion was to return 
Mable K. to the procedural posture when the error occurred. That 
procedural posture was after Dane County had moved for a default 
judgment and its abandonment witness had testified outside the 
presence of the jury, but before the circuit court actually 
found by default that grounds existed to terminate Mable K.'s 
                                                 
7 The dissent makes the same argument that there were no 
witnesses to present but ignores that the circuit court soundly 
rejected that argument.  Dissent, ¶110 n.11. 
Additionally, Attorney Lehner acknowledged that although 
she could not call Mable K. if Mable K. was not present for the 
second day of the fact-finding hearing, she "wouldn't have put 
[her] case on probably until the next day anyway."  Contrary to 
the arguments of the dissent, the record indicates that not only 
were there witnesses to present, but that the parties had 
already scheduled them to testify.    
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
14 
 
parental rights and found Mable K. unfit.8  Under the circuit 
court's remedy, any additional evidence Mable K. could offer 
would be to the court, not to a jury. 
¶32 The cases returned to the court of appeals after the 
postdisposition motion hearing.  While the cases were pending 
before the court of appeals, Dane County filed a motion for 
reconsideration with the circuit court concerning its findings 
at the postdisposition motion hearing. 
¶33 The circuit court issued a written "response" to the 
motion for reconsideration, indicating that it would be inclined 
to amend portions of its oral decision on remand if the court of 
appeals allowed it to do so.  However, the circuit court 
concluded that it lacked the authority to act while the cases 
were pending before the court of appeals. 
¶34 After the circuit court issued its written "response," 
the court of appeals issued an order remanding the cases to the 
circuit court in order to address Dane County's motion.  The 
court of appeals reasoned that there was little point in 
reviewing a circuit court order that the circuit court itself no 
longer believed was the correct outcome. 
                                                 
8 This case presents legal questions for our determination.  
In an apparent attempt to obfuscate the legal issues, much of 
the 
dissent's 
"family background" discussion seemingly is 
designed to malign Mable K.'s fitness as a parent——which is not 
an issue before us.  The dissent seems to be advancing that we 
should somehow evaluate the law differently because of Mable 
K.'s family background. 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
15 
 
¶35 On remand to address Dane County's reconsideration 
motion, the circuit court reaffirmed its earlier oral findings 
in a written decision.  The circuit court concluded that the 
order terminating Mable K.'s parental rights would remain 
vacated, "with the expectation that this court will decide at an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
whether 
grounds 
exist 
to 
establish 
termination of [Mable K.'s] parental rights," at which time 
Mable K. could present evidence "contrary to default."   
¶36 Following the circuit court's written decision, the 
cases returned to the court of appeals.  In an order issued on 
December 21, 2011, the court of appeals sua sponte questioned 
what to do with the appeals, tentatively concluding that no 
appeal existed as of right and that it would not be inclined to 
take up the appeals on a discretionary basis.  However, the 
court of appeals invited additional briefing on the matter. 
¶37 After additional briefing, the court of appeals issued 
an order on January 11, 2012 dismissing the appeals.  The court 
of appeals relied on the analysis contained in its December 21, 
2011 order.  
II 
¶38 In these cases, we are called upon to examine whether 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
16 
 
entering a default judgment against Mable K.9  We are asked to 
first determine whether it was an erroneous exercise of 
discretion to grant a default judgment finding that grounds 
existed to terminate Mable K.'s parental rights after the 
circuit court barred Attorney Lehner from adducing evidence 
tending to refute the allegations in the amended petitions.  We 
are further called to determine whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in granting the default 
judgment before establishing the grounds alleged in the amended 
petitions.   
¶39 A circuit court properly exercises its discretion when 
it examines the relevant facts, applies a proper standard of 
law, and using a demonstrated rational process reaches a 
conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.  Schneller v. 
                                                 
9 Mable K. additionally argues that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in granting a default 
judgment because her conduct was not egregious or in bad faith 
and because Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h), which allows relief from 
a judgment for "[a]ny other reasons justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment," required the circuit court to vacate 
the default judgment.  Because we conclude that entering a 
default judgment was an erroneous exercise of discretion on 
other grounds, we need not address whether granting a default 
judgment was an erroneous exercise of discretion for those 
reasons.    
In accepting the petition for review, we ordered the 
parties to brief the issue of whether the circuit court's 
decision to vacate its previous order terminating Mable K.'s 
parental rights constitutes a final order for the purposes of 
appeal.  However, we likewise need not decide that issue.  
Having accepted the petition for review, determining the exact 
implications of the circuit court's actions on the status of 
these appeals is not necessary to the resolution of this case. 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
17 
 
St. Mary's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 162 Wis. 2d 296, 306, 470 N.W.2d 873 
(1991). 
 
Ultimately 
our 
determination 
rests 
here 
on 
an 
examination 
of 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
applied 
proper 
standards of law when it granted the default judgment.  We 
review questions of law independent of the determinations 
rendered by the circuit court and the court of appeals. 
¶40 If we determine that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in granting a default judgment finding 
that grounds existed to terminate Mable K.'s parental rights, we 
must then examine whether the circuit court's remedy is 
fundamentally fair under these facts.  See Sheboygan Cnty. Dep't 
of Health & Human Servs. v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶22, 255 
Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402.  Whether a circuit court has 
provided a parent in a termination of parental rights proceeding 
fundamentally fair procedures also presents a question of law 
that we review independent of the determinations of the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  See Monroe Cnty. Dep't of Human 
Servs. v. Kelli B., 2004 WI 48, ¶¶16, 27, 271 Wis. 2d 51, 678 
N.W.2d 831. 
¶41 We address each issue in turn. 
III 
¶42 We 
first 
consider 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it entered a default 
judgment finding that grounds existed to terminate Mable K.'s 
parental rights.  Specifically, Mable K. contends that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in granting 
the default judgment after it deprived her of her statutory 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
18 
 
right to an attorney under Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2).10  She further 
contends that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion when it granted the default judgment before taking 
evidence sufficient to establish the grounds alleged in the 
amended petitions. 
¶43 The circuit court acknowledged that it erred when it 
barred Mable K. from presenting further evidence.  Citing 
Shirley E., the circuit court determined that Attorney Lehner 
should have been allowed to present evidence tending to refute 
the allegations in the amended petitions to terminate Mable K.'s 
parental rights.  Likewise, Dane County agreed at oral argument 
before this court that the circuit court committed error in not 
allowing Attorney Lehner to adduce additional evidence.  We 
begin our analysis by examining Shirley E. 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.23(2) provides the following: 
(2) Whenever a child is the subject of a proceeding 
involving a contested adoption or the involuntary 
termination of parental rights, any parent under 18 
years of age who appears before the court shall be 
represented by counsel; but no such parent may waive 
counsel. Except as provided in sub. (2g), a minor 
parent petitioning for the voluntary termination of 
parental rights shall be represented by a guardian ad 
litem. If a proceeding involves a contested adoption 
or the involuntary termination of parental rights, any 
parent 18 years old or older who appears before the 
court shall be represented by counsel; but the parent 
may waive counsel provided the court is satisfied such 
waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. 
 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
19 
 
¶44 The Shirley E. court addressed the question of whether 
a circuit court may deny a parent the statutory right to an 
attorney when the parent appeared in the proceeding but failed 
to personally attend the hearing in contravention of a court 
order.  298 Wis. 2d 1, ¶2.  Shirley E., a parent, failed to 
personally attend an initial plea hearing in a termination of 
parental rights proceeding.  Id., ¶11.  The circuit court 
rescheduled the hearing so the State could obtain service on 
Shirley E. and arrange for the appointment of an attorney.  Id.   
¶45 At the rescheduled hearing, Shirley E.'s recently-
appointed attorney appeared in person, but Shirley E. did not.  
Id., ¶12.  The circuit court allowed Shirley E. to appear by 
telephone at her attorney's request.  Id.  The State asked the 
circuit court to enter a default judgment against Shirley E., 
but the circuit court instead ordered Shirley E. to appear in 
person at the next hearing and warned her that if she did not 
appear personally, the circuit court would enter a default 
judgment against her.  Id.  The hearing was adjourned and 
rescheduled again.  Id. 
¶46 Shirley 
E. 
failed 
to 
personally 
appear 
at 
the 
rescheduled hearing.  Id., ¶13.  The circuit court entered a 
default judgment as a sanction for her failure to obey the court 
order that Shirley E. appear in person.  Id.  However, the 
circuit court indicated that it would entertain a motion to 
vacate the default judgment if Shirley E. appeared in person, 
and again adjourned the matter.  Id., ¶15.   
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
20 
 
¶47 When Shirley E. failed to appear personally at the 
next hearing, the circuit court dismissed her attorney from the 
proceeding.  Id., ¶16.  The circuit court proceeded to hold 
hearings in both phases of the proceeding without Shirley E. or 
her attorney present and terminated Shirley E.'s parental 
rights.  Id., ¶18. 
¶48 Parents have a statutory right to representation by an 
attorney under Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2).  The Shirley E. court 
concluded that the statutory right to an attorney is not limited 
to parents who appear in person at court proceedings.  298 Wis. 
2d 1, ¶43.  A parent's attorney may act on behalf of a parent 
who does not appear in person.  Id., ¶46.   
¶49 The Shirley E. court further concluded that a parent's 
statutory right to an attorney is preserved even after the entry 
of a default judgment.  Id., ¶56.  Parents in termination of 
parental rights proceedings have a statutory right to be heard 
through an attorney in "a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner."11  Id., ¶52. 
                                                 
11 The dissent appears to conclude that a parent cannot be 
denied her statutory right to an attorney unless the court bars 
the 
parent 
from 
participating 
"before 
any 
evidence 
[is] 
presented" and remains barred throughout an entire trial.  
Dissent, ¶127.  It seems to ignore entirely the actual reasoning 
of this opinion and that of the circuit court, which is that the 
circuit court erroneously cut off Attorney Lehner before she 
could put in her case. 
The 
dissent's 
analysis would unreasonably expand the 
holding of Shirley E. by implying that a parent's participation 
is meaningful except when the parent is entirely barred from 
participating at trial.  See id. 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
21 
 
¶50 Accordingly, Mable K.'s statutory right to an attorney 
did not expire when she did not arrive in court on time.  
Attorney Lehner could act on her behalf at the fact-finding 
hearing whether or not Mable K. personally appeared. 
¶51  We agree with the parties and the circuit court that 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it 
entered a default judgment against Mable K. finding that grounds 
existed to terminate her parental rights after depriving her of 
her statutory right to an attorney under Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2).  
In these cases, Attorney Lehner requested an opportunity to be 
heard and told the circuit court that she possessed "a lot of 
evidence" on the issue of abandonment, which she thought would 
make it "difficult for [Dane County] to prove abandonment" if 
she were allowed to enter it into the record.  She later 
testified that she had intended to introduce additional evidence 
tending to refute the allegations of continuing need of 
protection or services.  However, the circuit court refused to 
allow Attorney Lehner any opportunity to adduce that evidence.12   
                                                 
12 Dane County cites to an unpublished court of appeals 
opinion, State v. Laura M., Nos. 2011AP2825, 2011AP2828, 
2011AP2826, 2011AP2827, unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. March 27, 
2012), in support of the argument that because Mable K. was not 
present to testify, Attorney Lehner could not adduce any other 
evidence.  However, Dane County ignores that in Laura M., the 
circuit court specifically asked whether the parent's attorney 
wished to call any witnesses and the attorney declined the 
opportunity.  Id., ¶42.  In these cases, Attorney Lehner was 
never asked if she had any other evidence, and when she asked 
for an opportunity to present additional evidence, the circuit 
court denied her request. 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
22 
 
¶52 We turn next to address whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in entering the default 
judgment finding that grounds existed to terminate Mable K.'s 
parental rights before taking evidence sufficient to establish 
the grounds alleged in the amended petitions.  We look to Evelyn 
C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768 
for guidance.    
¶53 In Evelyn C.R., a child's biological mother failed to 
appear in person at a fact-finding hearing.  246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶8.  
Because the issue was to be tried before a jury, the circuit 
court expressed apprehension about holding the hearing without 
the mother's physical presence.  Id.  The parties rescheduled 
the fact-finding hearing for a later date.  Id.   
¶54 There is no indication that the fact-finding hearing 
before a jury ever commenced.  Instead, when the mother failed 
to appear in person a second time, the petitioner moved for a 
default judgment at the rescheduled hearing.  Id., ¶9.  The 
circuit court granted the petitioner's motion, found the mother 
unfit based on the allegations in the petition, and scheduled 
the case for a dispositional hearing.  Id.   
¶55 The Evelyn C.R. court concluded that circuit courts 
have a duty at the fact-finding hearing to find, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that all of the elements of the allegations 
in the petition have been met before granting a default judgment 
against a parent.  Id., ¶24.  The duty to establish grounds is 
"independent" of the circuit court's authority to grant a 
default judgment.  Id., ¶¶25-26.   
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
23 
 
¶56 In refusing to hear Attorney Lehner's additional 
evidence before entering a default judgment finding that grounds 
existed to terminate Mable K.'s parental rights, the circuit 
court put the cart before the horse.  The circuit court could 
not make a decision based on clear and convincing evidence 
having heard only one side's version of the facts when the other 
side was requesting an opportunity to offer evidence that could 
defeat the allegations in the amended petitions.  See Evelyn 
C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶26. 
¶57 Accordingly, we also conclude that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it entered the default 
judgment finding that grounds existed to terminate Mable K.'s 
parental rights before establishing the grounds alleged in the 
amended petitions by clear and convincing evidence. 
IV 
¶58 We turn now to examine the remedy for the errors.  The 
circuit court concluded that the appropriate remedy would be to 
return Mable K. procedurally to the time of the error.  The 
circuit court's remedy would place Mable K. after the testimony 
from Dane County's abandonment witness had been taken outside 
the presence of the jury, just before the circuit court entered 
the default judgment finding that grounds existed to terminate 
Mable 
K.'s 
parental 
rights. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
further 
determined that Mable K. would be permitted to adduce additional 
evidence, but before the circuit court, not before a jury.  
¶59 Terminating parental rights works a "unique kind of 
deprivation."  M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 118 (1996).  A 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
24 
 
parent's 
interest 
in 
the 
"accuracy 
and 
justice 
of 
the 
decision . . . is . . . a commanding one."  M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 
118 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., 
452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).  Although "the best interests of the 
child" standard set forth in Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1) is a matter 
of paramount consideration in a termination proceeding, it does 
not dominate every stage of the proceeding.  The statutes 
carefully balance the interests of all participants including 
those of the parents.  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1).  The "best 
interests of the child" standard does not dominate until the 
parent has been found unfit.  As this court stated in Julie 
A.B.: 
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.01(1) provides in part: "In 
construing this chapter, the best interests of the 
child...shall always be of paramount consideration." 
(citations omitted.) 
Notwithstanding 
this 
broad 
language, 
the 
"best 
interests of the child" standard does not dominate 
every step of every proceeding, because other vital 
interests must be accommodated.  When the government 
seeks to terminate parental rights, the best interests 
of the child standard does not "prevail" until the 
affected parent has been found unfit pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 48.424(4). 
255 Wis. 2d 170, ¶¶21-22. 
¶60 During the fact-finding phase, "the parent's rights 
are paramount."  Id., ¶24 (quoting Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶22).  Thus, parents in the fact-finding phase of termination of 
parental rights proceedings require heightened legal safeguards 
to prevent erroneous decisions.  Shirley E., 298 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24.   
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
25 
 
¶61 One of the purposes of Chapter 48, the Children's 
Code, is to provide for procedures through which all interested 
parties are assured fair hearings that enforce their legal 
rights.  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(ad).  The legislature intended to 
be expansive in its according of legal rights to parents.  
Shirley E., 298 Wis. 2d 1, ¶43.  Therefore, parents must be 
provided with fundamentally fair procedures.  See Julie A.B., 
255 Wis. 2d 170, ¶22 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 
753 (1982)).   
¶62 There are problems inherent in restarting the half-
completed hearing that render the circuit court's remedy 
fundamentally unfair.  To begin, the jury is gone and a new one 
cannot be empaneled halfway through the fact-finding hearing, 
years after the first portion of the fact-finding hearing 
occurred.   
¶63 Another problem with restarting the half-completed 
fact-finding hearing is that Mable K. will require another 
appointed attorney on remand.  The new attorney will be stuck 
defending Mable K. on a record where the circuit court has twice 
found her not to be a credible witness.  The circuit court's 
remedy sets the newly appointed attorney, and by extension Mable 
K., up to fail because the attorney would be restricted to 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
26 
 
arguing against a default judgment that the circuit court has 
previously granted.13 
¶64 In essence, restarting the half-completed fact-finding 
hearing shifts the burden to Mable K. to prove that she is not 
an unfit parent.  Under the circuit court's remedy, Mable K. 
would be forced to rebut Dane County's case from a hearing that 
is now approximately two years old.  The circuit court's remedy 
conflicts with the requirement that the government bears the 
burden to show that grounds exist for the termination of 
parental rights, and that the parent should have a "full 
complement of procedural rights."  Julie A.B., 255 Wis. 2d 170, 
¶24. 
¶65 Holding the remainder of the fact-finding hearing 
before the circuit court also appears contrary to the heightened 
safeguards envisioned by the legislature for termination of 
parental rights proceedings.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 48.31(2) and 
48.424(2) provide Mable K. with a statutory right to a jury 
trial if she properly demands one.14  None of the parties dispute 
                                                 
13 By setting any new attorney up to fail, the circuit 
court's remedy defies the principle that the statutory right to 
counsel includes the right to effective counsel.  See Shirley 
E., 298 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶36-39 (quoting A.S. v. State, 168 Wis. 2d 
995, 1003, 485 N.W.2d 52 (1992)).   
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.31(2) provides that a fact-finding 
hearing shall be to the court "unless the . . . child's 
parent . . . exercises the right to a jury trial by demanding a 
jury trial at any time before or during the plea hearing."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.424(2) additionally provides that fact-
finding hearings in termination of parental rights proceedings 
"shall be conducted according to the procedure specified in s. 
48.31 . . . ." 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
27 
 
that Mable K. properly demanded a jury for the fact-finding 
hearing addressing the grounds for termination.  Yet the circuit 
court's remedy would take away that right. 
¶66 The record is unclear as to what authority the circuit 
court employed in denying the statutory right to a jury.  There 
is nothing in the record to suggest that Mable K. waived her 
right to a jury.  The circuit court's grant of a default 
judgment cannot be a default judgment entered under Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.02(5), which allows for a default judgment for non-
appearance at trial.  Mable K. appeared personally at the first 
day of the fact-finding hearing and Attorney Lehner appeared on 
her behalf on the day she was late for court.  Furthermore, no 
other provisions of the default judgment statute apply because 
Mable K. appeared in the action and fully participated until she 
was late on the second day of the fact-finding hearing. 
¶67 Arguably, the circuit court could have determined that 
the statutory right to a jury was forfeited and granted a 
default judgment as a sanction for violation of a court order 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.03.15  The record, however, is 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.03 states the following: 
For failure of any claimant to prosecute or for 
failure of any party to comply with the statutes 
governing procedure in civil actions or to obey any 
order of court, the court in which the action is 
pending may make such orders in regard to the failure 
as are just, including but not limited to orders 
authorized under s. 804.12(2)(a). Any dismissal under 
this section operates as an adjudication on the merits 
unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies for good cause shown recited in the order. A 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
28 
 
unclear.  That statute was never cited by the circuit court or 
any attorney.   
¶68 In fact, the words "sanction" or "forfeiture" are 
nowhere to be found in the transcripts of the fact-finding 
hearing or postdisposition motion hearing as they relate to 
Mable K.  When asked at oral argument whether the record shines 
any light on our inquiry into the procedures employed by the 
circuit court when it entered the default judgment finding that 
grounds existed to terminate Mable K.'s parental rights, Dane 
County admitted that the record was "murky," despite the fact 
that the attorney for Dane County had "read [the transcript] 
over twenty times."   
¶69 Even if the circuit court determined that Mable K. 
forfeited her right to a jury and granted a default judgment as 
a sanction, Wis. Stat. § 805.03 limits the sanctions that a 
circuit court may impose for failure to comply with court orders 
to those that are "just."  See also Indus. Roofing Servs., Inc. 
v. Marquardt, 2007 WI 19, ¶43, 299 Wis. 2d 81, 726 N.W.2d 898.  
In order for a sanction dismissing a civil case to be "just," 
the non-complying party must act "egregiously or in bad faith."  
Id.; Schneller v. St. Mary's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 162 Wis. 2d 296, 
311-12, 470 N.W.2d 873 (1991).  The Shirley E. court applied 
                                                                                                                                                             
dismissal on the merits may be set aside by the court 
on the grounds specified in and in accordance with s. 
806.07. A dismissal not on the merits may be set aside 
by the court for good cause shown and within a 
reasonable time. 
 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
29 
 
that requirement to default judgments at fact-finding hearings 
in termination of parental rights proceedings.  298 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶13 n.3.   
¶70 Where a circuit court concludes that a party's failure 
to follow court orders, though unintentional, is "so extreme, 
substantial and persistent" that the conduct may be considered 
egregious, 
the 
circuit 
court 
may 
make 
a 
finding 
of 
egregiousness.  Hudson Diesel, Inc. v. Kenall, 194 Wis. 2d 531, 
543, 535 N.W.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1995).  Conversely, a party may 
also act in bad faith, which by its nature cannot be 
unintentional conduct.  Id.  To find that a party acts in bad 
faith, the circuit court must find that the noncomplying party 
"intentionally or deliberately" delayed, obstructed, or refused 
to comply with the court order.  Id.     
¶71 Although the circuit court at the postdisposition 
motion hearing described Mable K.'s conduct as egregious and in 
bad faith in retrospect, it made no reference to egregiousness 
or bad faith when the default judgment finding that grounds 
existed to terminate Mable K.'s parental rights was granted.  
Likewise, there was no analysis as to whether Mable K.'s conduct 
was "extreme, substantial and persistent."  Hudson Diesel, 194 
Wis. 2d at 543.  Any analysis of whether Mable K.'s conduct 
"intentionally or deliberately" delayed, obstructed, or refused 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
30 
 
to obey the court order is also absent from the record.16  Id.  
Had the record clearly indicated that the default was imposed as 
a sanction, then our analysis would be different. 
¶72 Under these facts, the only fundamentally fair remedy 
is a new fact-finding hearing.  A new fact-finding hearing 
honors the intent of the legislature by providing Mable K. with 
heightened legal safeguards.  Shirley E., 298 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24.  
It provides Mable K. with the only remedy that can assure a fair 
hearing that recognizes and enforces Mable K.'s statutory rights 
to an attorney and to a jury.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(ad).   
¶73 Additionally, a new fact-finding hearing avoids the 
problems discussed above that are inherent in trying to renew 
the fact-finding hearing in mid-stream.  A new jury may be 
empaneled if Mable K. chooses to demand one.  Her new attorney 
may act on her behalf unfettered by the events of the first part 
of the fact-finding hearing that occurred approximately two 
years in the past.  Unlike the circuit court's remedy, a new 
fact-finding hearing places the burden on Dane County to prove 
the allegations in the amended petitions.  We therefore conclude 
that the circuit court's remedy is fundamentally unfair here.   
V 
¶74 In sum, we reverse and remand for a new fact-finding 
hearing.  We conclude, and the circuit court has acknowledged, 
                                                 
16 The dissent appears to conclude that Mable K.'s conduct 
was "egregious" in failing to timely appear in court on the 
second day of the fact-finding hearing.  Dissent, ¶1.  As we 
previously stated, we need not and do not address the egregious 
conduct argument.  See supra note 8. 
No. 
2011AP825 & 2011AP826   
 
31 
 
that it erroneously exercised its discretion when it entered a 
default judgment finding that grounds existed to terminate Mable 
K.'s parental rights after barring her attorney from offering 
additional evidence.  It also erred when it granted the default 
judgment before taking evidence sufficient to establish the 
grounds alleged in the amended petitions.  We further conclude 
that the circuit court's remedy for correcting the errors is 
fundamentally unfair under the facts of this case.17   
¶75 Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the circuit 
court for a new fact-finding hearing to be heard by a jury if 
Mable K. timely demands one.  On remand, the new fact-finding 
hearing is to be held at the earliest reasonable opportunity.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for a 
new fact-finding hearing. 
 
                                                 
17 If grounds for termination are found and Mable K. is 
determined to be unfit at the fact-finding hearing, the matter 
will then proceed to a dispositional hearing. 
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
1 
 
¶76 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
I 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, which concludes 
that the circuit court must hold an entirely new jury trial on 
all of the issues in this case when it is Mable K. who is solely 
responsible for her own egregious and volitional failure to 
appear in court.  Because of the majority's conclusion, a 
circuit court's authority to enforce its orders is diminished, a 
non-appearing party's behavior is rewarded, and at least two 
children's lives continue to hang in the balance.  Our system of 
justice is designed to do better.   
¶77 Mable K. chose not to come to court on the second day 
of a fact-finding hearing in front of a jury.  She knew when she 
was to appear, but she chose not to follow the circuit court's 
order.  Accordingly, I conclude that the trial court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion when it vacated the default 
judgment and instead, sanctioned Mable K. for her egregious 
behavior by ordering that the remainder of the evidence would be 
heard as a court trial.  The circuit court was not unreasonable 
in concluding that Mable K. relinquished the right to a jury 
trial when she chose not to appear before the jury that had been 
impanelled. 
¶78 Curiously, the majority opinion rests its conclusions 
on the hypothetical scenario of default judgment remaining in 
place against Mable K.  However, the default judgment was 
vacated.  It is not before this court.  Nonetheless, the 
majority opinion concludes that because default judgment once 
was granted, the rules of State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, 298 
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
2 
 
Wis. 2d 1, 724 N.W.2d 623, and Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 
110, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768, have been irreparably 
violated.  The majority opinion errs: first, by ducking the 
issue this case actually presents, i.e., whether the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion by sanctioning Mable 
K.'s egregious conduct by ordering that the trial be continued 
as a bench trial; and second, by misapplying the opinions it 
cites, given the facts of this case.   
¶79 In short, the majority opinion is based on a factual 
fiction that leaves a circuit court no ability to sanction a 
party who egregiously disobeys a court order to appear for the 
second day of a jury trial at which grounds for termination are 
being adjudicated.  Instead, the majority rewards such a party.  
The majority's analysis leaves the tail wagging the dog. 
¶80 I conclude that the circuit court reasonably exercised 
its discretion when it vacated the default judgment and 
sanctioned Mable K. for her egregious conduct by reconvening the 
termination of parental rights (TPR) proceeding as a trial to 
the court, rather than selecting a second jury to replace the 
jury that would have heard the termination proceeding if Mable 
K. had appeared.   
¶81 I also conclude that under Evelyn C.R., when a default 
judgment is reviewed, we are to determine whether the circuit 
court heard sufficient evidence on the grounds in the petitions 
before it granted default.  Unlike Evelyn C.R., Dane County had 
presented nearly all of the evidence in its case-in-chief before 
the court sanctioned Mable K. by granting a default judgment due 
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
3 
 
to her failure to appear before the jury.  I further conclude 
that under Shirley E., Mable K.'s right to counsel was not 
violated because her attorney substantively participated in the 
proceedings.     
¶82 There are and should be consequences for a party who, 
without excuse, fails to appear for trial.  Mable K. deserves a 
fair trial, but these children deserve stability and security.  
Isaiah H. and May K. remain innocent victims who now must wait 
even longer for a conclusion in this matter.  Instead of 
considering that this case also involves two young children, the 
majority accepts review of a non-final order and sends this case 
back for the selection of a second jury to hear the TPR 
proceeding.  In so doing, the majority sends a message to 
parties who do not like the way a trial is going: do not show up 
for the second part of the trial.  You get a "do over."  The 
manner in which the majority reaches this determination is 
unprecedented and, for these reasons, I respectfully dissent.   
I. THERE IS NO DEFAULT JUDGMENT TO REVIEW  
¶83 Procedurally, Mable K.'s appeal is an attack on a non-
final order, and we should not have accepted review.   The 
majority opinion grants an entirely new jury trial when there 
has been no final order in the case below.   
¶84 The sanction currently before the court is the 
continuation of the fact finding as a bench trial.  This 
sanction arose out of a fact-finding hearing that commenced on 
September 13, 2010.  Mable K. appeared for the first day of the 
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
4 
 
hearing.1  However, she chose not to appear at the time set for 
the second day of the hearing, despite being court ordered to do 
so and being verbally reminded when to appear.  Because of her 
choice, the circuit court initially entered default judgment 
against Mable K., finding that there were grounds to terminate 
her parental rights.  The circuit court then scheduled a 
dispositional hearing for January 3, 2011.  At the dispositional 
hearing, the circuit court terminated the parental rights of 
Mable K., Wesley J., and Lee H. 
¶85 After the dispositional hearing on January 3, 2011, 
Lee H. and Mable K. both appealed; Wesley J. did not.  The court 
of appeals issued a decision upholding the termination of 
parental rights for Lee H.  The court of appeals remanded the 
case to the circuit court to determine whether the circuit court 
had erroneously entered default judgment against Mable K.   
¶86 On remand, the circuit court (1) vacated the orders 
terminating her parental rights,2 and (2) returned Mable K. back 
to the fact-finding hearing, before default was granted.  Mable 
K. is currently in a position to have counsel represent her and 
present evidence, testimony, and witnesses.  No final fact 
                                                 
1 There are two parts to a TPR case.  The first part is the 
fact-finding hearing, where the jury or the court determines 
whether there are grounds to terminate the parental rights.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.424.  The second part is a dispositional 
hearing, where the court determines whether TPR is in the 
child's best interest.  Wis. Stat. § 48.427.   
2 We do not pass judgment today on whether the trial court 
was correct in its vacation of the order terminating Mable K.'s 
parental rights.   
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
5 
 
finding has been completed, and no final order or judgment 
exists because the circuit court vacated the default judgment.   
¶87 Appeals in TPR cases, under Wis. Stat. § 809.107, can 
be taken from "an order or judgment" under Wis. Stat. § 48.43.  
Because there was no final order in place, the court of appeals 
concluded that neither party could appeal as a matter of right, 
and it was not "inclined to grant leave" to appeal.  Cf. Wis. 
Stat. § 808.03(1); Wick v. Mueller, 105 Wis. 2d 191, 195-98, 313 
N.W.2d 799 (1982) (concluding that an order for a new trial in a 
civil case is not appealable as a matter of right because it 
does not dispose of the entire matter).   
¶88 It is quite unusual, if not unprecedented, for this 
court to take such an appeal in a TPR case, where there is no 
order or judgment to review.  Nonetheless, despite there being 
no final order in place, the majority determines that Mable K. 
is entitled to the extraordinary relief of a second jury to 
replace the previous jury that Mable K. chose not to appear 
before beyond the first day of testimony.  Curiously, the 
majority concludes that the circuit court "erroneously exercised 
its discretion when it entered a default judgment" because the 
default "depriv[ed] her of her statutory right to an attorney," 
and 
because 
the 
default 
was 
granted 
before 
Dane 
County 
"establish[ed] the grounds alleged in the amended petitions."  
See majority op., ¶¶51, 57.   
¶89 By repeatedly discussing a default judgment that does 
not exist, the majority opinion ducks the actual issue this case 
presents, i.e., whether the circuit court erroneously exercised 
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
6 
 
its discretion in sanctioning Mable K.'s egregious conduct by 
ordering that the trial will be continued as a bench trial.   
II. FAMILY BACKGROUND  
¶90 Notably absent from the majority opinion is any 
meaningful discussion of the court record concerning the family 
background, repeated attempts to reunite the children with their 
mother, and failure of Mable K. to actively engage in the 
children's upbringing.  The majority opinion leaves Isaiah H. 
and May K. to continue hanging in the balance, neglecting 
appropriate consideration of the children's interests, and 
instead, affords considerable accommodation to a parent who has 
not engaged in her children's lives for years and who, without 
any reasonable excuse, did not timely attend the second day of 
the jury trial at which grounds to terminate her parental rights 
were being adjudicated.  According to the record before this 
court, the lives of these children have hung in the balance for 
far too long.  
¶91 The majority opinion almost portrays Mable K. to be an 
innocent victim of circumstance.  A review of the record 
reflects that she has had opportunity after opportunity to 
parent these children.  The record reflects that in January 
2007, both of Mable K.'s sons, Samuel C.,3 age three, and Isaiah 
H., age five and one-half at the time, were determined to need 
                                                 
3 Mable K.'s parental rights to Samuel C. were terminated in 
a prior TPR case.  The transcript in this case indicates that 
Mable K. arrived three hours late to that proceeding.   
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
7 
 
care that no one could provide.4  The government placed both boys 
in out-of-home care.  May K., Mable K.'s third child, was placed 
at her current foster home shortly after May K. was born in 
November 2008, because Mable K. was allegedly not able to meet 
her daughter's needs consistently or keep her safe.  At the 
hospital, staff members raised concerns about Mable K.'s ability 
to care for a newborn.5  The social worker opined that Mable K. 
would not be able to meet the demands of a newborn baby.  May 
K., now over four years old, has lived outside of her parental 
home consistently since she was born.   
¶92 All of the biological parents in this case have 
significant criminal histories, which, in and of itself, is not 
grounds for termination.  However, the current record is replete 
with allegations of their impaired ability to be available for 
their children, and to provide for the children's basic needs, 
stable housing, medical needs, and personal needs.  Lee H., the 
adjudicated father of Isaiah H., was incarcerated at the time 
Isaiah H. was placed in foster care, and he was again 
incarcerated in January 2010.  He has six criminal convictions.  
Mable K. has at least two previous convictions for forgery, and 
                                                 
4 Isaiah H.'s father, Lee H., has had very little direct 
contact with Isaiah H., has been unavailable, and has been on 
the run or incarcerated.  After he was rearrested in January 
2010, and placed in Dodge Correctional Institution, he had a 
couple of phone contacts with a social worker in March and April 
2010.  His parental rights have been terminated and are not the 
subject of this appeal. 
5 The hospital staff observed Mable K. talking on the phone 
and ignoring the baby.  On one occasion, Mable K. left the 
hospital room while the baby was in Mable K.'s hospital bed.  It 
seemed as if Mable K. forgot that the baby was there.   
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
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was on probation at the time her sons were placed in foster 
care.  Initially, Mable K. did not disclose the name of May K.'s 
father, Wesley J., purportedly because she was concerned that 
Dane County would judge him by his previous criminal record.  
Wesley J. was convicted of second-degree sexual assault of a 
child and several other violent crimes.6   
¶93 The record before us reflects that Mable K. and her 
family have had many contacts with the Dane County Department of 
Human Services (Dane County) and have been the subject of 
approximately 16 referrals to Dane County.  In short, the 
referrals alleged that the children were in need of protection 
or services, that they had unaddressed health problems, and that 
they were neglected. 
¶94 As part of the services provided by Dane County, Mable 
K. completed a psychological evaluation in 2007, and Dane County 
attempted to provide her with mental health treatment.  Mable K. 
remains the only biological parent available to take care of the 
two children at issue, as the parental rights of both biological 
fathers have been terminated.  The record indicates that on 
numerous occasions, Mable K. would fail to show up for a 
confirmed family contact or would simply cancel the family 
contact.  According to the court record, before the start of 
this case on March 24, 2010, Mable K.'s last contact with her 
children was on December 17, 2009.  Following that date, she 
purportedly missed three weekly, scheduled family contacts 
                                                 
6 Wesley J.'s parental rights have been terminated and are 
not the subject of this appeal. 
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
9 
 
despite being told that she needed to have a meeting to discuss 
the missed family contacts.  Nonetheless, the record indicates 
that she failed to request or arrange such a meeting, and her 
excuse for not making the scheduled contacts was that she had 
many appointments and that it was none of Dane County's business 
what she was doing.  At best, Mable K. has had sporadic contact 
with her children. 
¶95 According to Dane County, Mable K. did not make 
consistent progress in meeting the specified court ordered 
conditions for the return of her children.  She did not make 
appropriate planning for the children or work closely towards 
permanent placement with the assigned Dane County social worker 
or social service specialist.  The reunification team was 
involved with Mable K. and her children from mid-January 2009, 
until April 23, 2009, at which time it was clear that Mable K. 
was not ready for the children's transition to her full-time 
care.  Mable K. was unable to consistently and appropriately 
address the children's emotional needs and challenging behavior.  
During her time with her children, Mable K. appeared to be more 
focused on meeting her own personal needs rather than those of 
her children.  Dane County explained that it attempted to avoid 
terminating Mable K.'s parental rights.  She was provided with 
the opportunity to utilize a variety of resources, attend 
meetings, participate in evaluations, attend court hearings, and 
work 
with 
specialists 
to 
improve 
her 
parenting 
skills.  
Nonetheless, the record reflects that Dane County filed two TPR 
petitions on March 24, 2010, which alleged that both Isaiah H. 
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
10 
 
and May K. were children in need of protection or services 
(CHIPS).  An amended petition was filed on June 1, 2010, which 
also alleged that both children had been abandoned.  
¶96 Despite her repeated contact with the system and the 
gravitas of the subject matter, on the second day of the jury 
trial, Mable K. found it more important to "get me some 
breakfast" because she was "real kind of sick" from the 
proceedings and she "was just tired."   
III. THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ERR 
A. The Conduct Was Egregious 
¶97 The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in concluding that Mable K. demonstrated egregious 
conduct by failing to appear at the second day of the fact-
finding hearing.  A sanction was warranted.     
¶98 Notwithstanding that there is no default judgment to 
review in this case, the majority relies on Evelyn C.R. to 
support its conclusion that the default judgment was an improper 
remedy.  However, unlike the majority, I undertake an analysis 
of whether a sanction was justified by Mable K.'s failure to 
appear, 
and 
then 
I 
determine 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it sanctioned Mable K. 
by continuing the TPR proceeding as a bench trial rather than 
impanelling a second jury.  This analysis leads me to conclude 
that Mable K.'s conduct was egregious and that the circuit court 
did not erroneously exercise its discretion in sanctioning Mable 
K. by reconvening the TPR proceeding as a trial to the court, 
rather than selecting a new jury to replace the jury that would 
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
11 
 
have heard the termination proceeding if Mable K. had timely 
appeared.   
¶99 A circuit court has inherent and statutory power to 
sanction parties who fail to obey court orders.  Evelyn C.R., 
246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶17.  Under this authority, a circuit court may 
sanction a party who fails to comply with a court order.7  Id.  
The decision to sanction a party is within the sound discretion 
of the circuit court.  Id., ¶18; Oostburg State Bank v. United 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 130 Wis. 2d 4, 11, 386 N.W.2d 53 (1986).  An 
appellate 
court 
reviews 
a 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary 
determination for an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Evelyn 
C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶18.  A reviewing court will affirm the 
circuit court's exercise of discretion if the circuit court has 
examined the relevant facts, has applied a proper standard of 
law, and has used a demonstrated, rational process to reach a 
conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.  Loy v. 
Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982). 
¶100 Before a circuit court may sanction a party who failed 
to comply with a court order, the party's conduct must be 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.10(7), "Sanctions," provides that 
"[v]iolations of a scheduling or pretrial order are subject to 
ss. 802.05, 804.12 and 805.03."  Wisconsin Stat. § 805.03, 
"Failure to prosecute or comply with procedure statutes," 
provides in part: "[F]or failure of any party to . . . obey any 
order of court, the court in which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, including 
but not limited to orders authorized under s. 804.12(2)(a)."  
Wisconsin 
Stat. § 804.12(2)(a)3., "Failure to comply with 
order," gives the court the power to provide "just" sanctions 
for failure to obey an order, including "rendering a judgment by 
default against the disobedient party."   
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
12 
 
egregious or in bad faith.  Shirley E., 298 Wis. 2d 1, ¶13 n.3.  
Failure to comply with a circuit court scheduling order without 
a clear and justifiable excuse is egregious conduct.  Indus. 
Roofing Servs., Inc. v. Marquardt, 2007 WI 19, ¶43, 299 
Wis. 2d 81, 726 N.W.2d 898.  "Egregious" conduct has been 
defined as "extreme, substantial, and persistent."  Id.  While 
the record on appeal must reflect the circuit court's reasoned 
application of the appropriate legal standard to the relevant 
facts, 
an 
appellate 
court 
need 
not 
remand 
for 
such 
a 
determination if the circuit court's finding was implicit.  
Englewood Cmty. Apartments Ltd. P'ship v. Alexander Grant & Co., 
119 Wis. 2d 34, 39 n.3, 349 N.W.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1984) ("[A] 
remand directing the trial court to make an explicit finding 
where it has already made unmistakable but implicit findings to 
the same effect would be both superfluous and a waste of 
judicial resources.").   
¶101 After Dane County filed the petition to terminate her 
parental rights, Mable K. was ordered to appear personally at 
all proceedings in this case by a court order dated May 24, 
2010.  Nearly six months later, a fact-finding hearing before a 
jury commenced on September 13, 2010.  Mable K. appeared for the 
first day of the jury trial, but chose not to appear for the 
second day of trial at the time when she was instructed to 
appear.  
¶102 Mable K. is not an innocent victim of circumstance who 
was unfairly sanctioned.  The circuit court entered an order 
requiring that Mable K. personally appear at all hearings.  The 
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
13 
 
circuit court took extra effort to remind her at the conclusion 
of the first day of trial to be in court the next day before 9 
a.m.  Mable K. ignored the circuit court's directive and did not 
come to court at 9 a.m. to defend herself in a matter where her 
children could be taken away forever.     
¶103 The circuit court and counsel undertook efforts to get 
her to court.  She did not come to court when she was instructed 
to be there or even when she said that she would be there.  When 
she did not show, the circuit court, the jury, and counsel 
waited for her.   
¶104 Specifically, her attorney (Attorney Lehner), who had 
talked with Mable K. earlier that morning, later called her to 
persuade her to come to court.  Mable K. told Attorney Lehner 
that she would ride her bike to court and be there within a 
half-hour, by 9:45 a.m.  By 10:35 a.m., she still had not 
arrived.  At that point, the circuit court concluded that a 
sanction was warranted, and it found Mable K. in default on both 
of the allegations, CHIPS and abandonment.8   
                                                 
8 This court has previously rejected the argument that a 
parent has an absolute right to a jury trial under the TPR 
statutes.  Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶33, 271 
Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856.  A parent's right to a jury trial in 
TPR proceedings is statutory, not constitutional.  Id., ¶4.  
Because TPR proceedings are civil in nature, the general rules 
of civil procedure are applicable unless Chapter 48 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes provides a more specific rule.  See id., ¶32.  
The court in Steven V. concluded: 
The circuit court, however, is always responsible for 
conclusions of law, as is specifically recognized in 
the TPR statutes.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.31(4).  If a 
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 802.08, the circuit court 
may properly conclude at the fact-finding hearing that 
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
14 
 
¶105 At approximately 10:45 a.m., nearly two hours late, 
Mable K. finally arrived and counsel moved for relief from the 
default judgment.  The circuit court allowed Mable K. to testify 
about why she did not appear, and she stated that she was "real 
kind of sick" from the proceedings, she "was just tired," and 
she wanted to "get me some breakfast."  She acknowledged that 
Attorney Lehner warned her of the consequences of failing to 
appear.  Mable K. said that she did not sleep well and had just 
woken up around 9 a.m.  She testified that she knew she needed 
to be at the court by 9 a.m. 
¶106 In its initial decision, the circuit court did not 
explicitly use the word "egregious," but a review of the record 
                                                                                                                                                             
there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute 
and the moving party is entitled to partial summary 
judgment on parental unfitness as a matter of law.  
See Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). 
Id., ¶34.  Further, several cases have concluded that a directed 
verdict pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.14(4) applies to TPR 
proceedings.  Id., ¶32 (citing Door Cnty. DHFS v. Scott S., 230 
Wis. 2d 460, 465, 602 N.W.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1999); J.A.B. v. 
Waukesha Cnty. Human Servs. Dep't, 153 Wis. 2d 761, 765, 451 
N.W.2d 799 (Ct. App. 1989)).  See also Wis. Stat. § 971.04(3) 
(stating that if defendant is present at beginning of criminal 
jury trial, then voluntarily absents himself, the trial may 
proceed without the defendant). 
It is also interesting to note that only five states 
currently allow jury trials in TPR cases.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.31(2); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 105.002 (West 2012); Okla. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 10A, § 1-4-502 (West 2012); Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-2-312 (West 2012); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-296 (West 2012); 
Linda Szymanski, Is a Jury Trial Ever Available in a Termination 
of Parental Rights Case?, National Center for Juvenile Justice 
Snapshot, March 2011, Vol. 16, No. 3; James L. Buchwalter, 
Annotation, Right to Jury Trial in Child Neglect, Child Abuse, 
or Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 102 A.L.R. 5th 
227 (2002).   
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
15 
 
makes clear that the court did find her conduct to be egregious.  
Our court does not require a circuit court to use "magic words" 
when undertaking a legal analysis and in making findings.  
Englewood, 119 Wis. 2d at 39 n.3.  Furthermore, the court did 
find that Mable K. was not credible.  The court considered her 
excuses but also noted that Mable K. previously arrived three 
hours late in the TPR proceeding for her son Samuel C.  Indeed, 
at a hearing on August 26, 2011, the circuit court judge stated: 
It was and, frankly, still is evident to this 
Court on this record in this Court's view that it is 
an egregious violation of the Court order given the 
fact that it was orally issued to Ms. K., it was given 
to 
her 
in 
written 
form, 
she 
is 
in 
a 
jury 
trial, . . . the fact that she was reminded when the 
Court concluded its proceedings the first day of trial 
on the 13th that she needed to be here a little bit 
before 9:00, this is egregious to the Court and it is 
without justifiable basis.  It's either egregious or 
in bad faith . . . but definitely I don't think you 
even need to use those magic words for those things to 
in fact be true. 
¶107 I agree with the circuit court that Mable K.'s conduct 
was deserving of a sanction.  Although the court did not use the 
word "egregious" initially, the record reflects that the court 
found her conduct to be egregious.  The circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion when it sanctioned Mable K. 
for her failure to appear.   
¶108 The record reflects that the circuit court made 
several findings to support the sanction for her egregious 
behavior.  The court cited to the following facts: that the 
order dated May 24, 2010, required Mable K. to appear personally 
at all hearings; that at the end of the first day of the fact-
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
16 
 
finding hearing, the court informed all parties that they needed 
to be in court shortly before 9 a.m. on the next day; that she 
had shown up late to a previous TPR proceeding; and that the 
court did not find her explanation about why she could not have 
followed the court order credible.  In short, Mable K. failed to 
demonstrate any credible reason for her failure to appear at the 
time set by the court.   
¶109 I conclude that Mable K.'s actions were especially 
egregious in the context of a TPR trial.9  It took nearly six 
months from the time the TPR petition was filed until the time 
of the trial.  The circuit court held eight hearings before the 
first day of trial, including several hearings based on the 
petitions, two pretrial conferences, and two motion hearings.  
The circuit court and the parties all completed substantial 
pretrial work, much of which is now rendered void by the 
majority opinion.  In addition to the large amount of pretrial 
work, there was a full day of the fact-finding hearing before 
Mable K. failed to follow the court's order.10   
¶110 Mable K. was the witness her attorney would have 
called, but her failure to appear precluded her attorney from 
presenting her testimony in an attempt to rebut evidence 
                                                 
9 A circuit court may grant a default judgment in a TPR 
proceeding for a non-appearing party if, inter alia, there is 
sufficient evidence to support the grounds for the petition and 
the default does not violate the party's statutory right to 
counsel.  See infra, parts III.B. and III.C. 
10 The transcripts in this case total 587 pages from the 
time the petition was filed though the first day of the fact-
finding hearing. 
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
17 
 
presented in support of the petitions to terminate her parental 
rights.11  The court and the jury were not required to wait until 
Mable K. chose to arrive.  Mable K.'s conduct was egregious, and 
a sanction was appropriate.  If Mable K. valued a jury trial, 
she should have appeared for the second day of the trial.  That 
the court chose not to put Dane County to the expense of 
impanelling a second jury, and instead chose to conclude the 
fact-finding hearing as a bench trial, is within the circuit 
court's discretion.   
B. Majority Opinion Errs In Its Analysis Of Evelyn C.R.  
¶111 The majority claims to rely on Evelyn C.R. to support 
its determination that a second jury must be impanelled and the 
trial to begin anew.  In my view, because the circuit court had 
a significant evidentiary record before it, the court did not 
violate the rule of Evelyn C.R.   
¶112 In Evelyn C.R., we held that "the circuit court had 
the duty at the fact-finding hearing to find by clear and 
convincing evidence that all of the elements" of the allegations 
                                                 
11 At the postconviction motion hearing on August 16, 2011, 
Attorney Lehner testified that she intended to call Mable K. to 
rebut both grounds for termination of her rights that were set 
out in the petition.  Attorney Lehner also testified that she 
intended to cross-examine Joyce Brown to rebut the CHIPS claim, 
but Brown was never called as a witness in the fact-finding 
hearing.  The petitioners rested the case as to Mable K. after 
the testimony of Brenda Blank and Mike Boehm, and Attorney 
Lehner was allowed to cross-examine both of these witnesses.  
Further, Dane County asked Attorney Lehner if she would have 
called any other witnesses on her witness list during the fact-
finding hearing, and she stated that she would have called the 
social workers if the other parties had not already called them.  
She did not name any other witnesses that she was prevented from 
calling to testify. 
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
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in the petition are met.  246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24.  In Evelyn C.R., 
the court did not hold a fact-finding hearing.  Id., ¶9.  
Instead, the court granted default against the mother, Tykila 
S., for failure to appear personally, finding her unfit based 
solely upon allegations in the petition.  Id.  In Evelyn C.R., 
the circuit court "had no evidentiary basis to support its 
finding of abandonment."  Id., ¶24.   
¶113 By contrast, in Mable K.'s case, the circuit court 
heard evidence supporting the CHIPS and abandonment claims 
before it decided to sanction Mable K.  Dane County had 
presented evidence at trial, which was tested by Attorney 
Lehner's cross-examination.  The circuit court made explicit 
findings that Mable K. was unfit on both grounds.  If no further 
testimony was taken, it is because Mable K. did not come to 
court to be her own witness.  The procedural posture of Evelyn 
C.R. is clearly distinguishable from the posture of this case at 
the time that Mable K. was sanctioned by the circuit court.   
¶114 For example, unlike Evelyn C.R., the circuit court 
heard substantial testimony against Mable K., nearly all of Dane 
County's case-in-chief.12  On the first day of the fact-finding 
                                                 
12 To 
establish 
a 
CHIPS 
claim 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(2)(a) "Continuing need of protection or services," the 
petitioner must prove the following: 
1. That 
the 
child 
has 
been 
adjudged 
to 
be 
a 
child . . . in need of protection or services and 
placed, or continued in a placement, outside his or 
her home pursuant to one or more court orders under s. 
48.345 . . . containing the notice required by s. 
48.356(2);   
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
19 
 
hearing, before default was an issue, the circuit court heard 
testimony from Brenda Blank (Blank), Mable K.'s case worker.  
First, during Blank's testimony, Dane County introduced orders 
adjudging both Isaiah H. and May K. as children in need of 
protection or services and placing them outside of Mable K.'s 
home.  The orders, which were entered as exhibits, contained the 
notice required by Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2).  Second, Blank 
testified that Dane County "definitely did" make a reasonable 
effort to provide the services ordered by the court.  For 
example, Mable K. received one-on-one parent education and 
support, was assigned a social service specialist, worked with a 
family reunification team, and worked with Blank on specific 
tasks she could complete to meet the conditions of return.  
Third, Blank testified that both children had spent more than 
six months outside of Mable K.'s home.  May K. has been 
continuously outside of the home since she was born, in November 
of 2008.  Isaiah H. has been continuously outside of the home 
since 2007.  Finally, Blank testified that Mable K. "will 
                                                                                                                                                             
2. That the agency responsible for the care of the child 
and the family . . . has made a reasonable effort to 
provide the services ordered by the court; 
3. That the child has been outside the home for a 
cumulative total period of 6 months or longer pursuant 
to such orders; and 
4. That the parent has failed to meet the conditions 
established for the safe return of the child to the 
home and there is a substantial likelihood that the 
parent will not meet these conditions within the 9-
month period following the fact-finding hearing under 
s. 48.424.  
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
20 
 
absolutely not" meet the conditions for return within nine 
months of the fact-finding hearing.  Blank testified that Mable 
K. failed to meet a majority of the conditions of return, 
including maintaining housing, showing interest in the children, 
maintaining regular visits without canceling, showing that she 
could properly care for the children, and staying in touch and 
cooperating with the social worker.  Mable K.'s counsel cross-
examined Blank. 
¶115 The circuit court also heard evidence of the grounds 
of abandonment13 before it decided to sanction Mable K.  The 
CHIPS orders introduced during Blank's testimony satisfy the 
first element of abandonment.  Further, it is notable that after 
Dane County moved for a default against Mable K., the court 
stated, "I need to have Mr. Boehm on the stand . . . to make the 
findings related to default on Ms. K. on the abandonment 
ground."  Dane County then called Michael Boehm to testify on 
the abandonment ground.  Boehm testified that Mable K. had 
failed to communicate with her children for more than three 
months before the petitions to terminate her parental rights 
were filed, which satisfies the second element of abandonment.  
Boehm was also subject to cross-examination by Mable K.'s 
counsel. 
                                                 
13 One way to establish an abandonment claim under Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(1), is for the petitioner to prove: 
1. That the child has been placed, or continued in a 
placement, outside the parent's home by a court order 
containing the notice required by s. 48.356(2)..., 
and 
2. [That] the parent has failed to visit or communicate 
with the child for a period of 3 months or longer.   
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
21 
 
¶116 Unlike Evelyn C.R., wherein the court heard no 
evidence, the circuit court here heard nearly all of Dane 
County's 
evidence——evidence 
that 
was 
subject 
to 
cross-
examination——on both grounds before it found Mable K. unfit and 
sanctioned her.  Indeed, "[i]f grounds for the termination of 
parental rights are found by the court or jury, the court shall 
find the parent unfit."  Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4) (emphasis 
added).  
¶117 The majority opinion unnecessarily extends the rule in 
Evelyn C.R. such that it undermines the role of a circuit court 
in TPR proceedings.  The majority opinion does not evaluate the 
evidence, does not give proper deference to the circuit court's 
exercise of its discretion, and ultimately does not evaluate 
whether grounds were established.  
¶118 According to the record, Mable K., the absent parent, 
had the opportunity to present testimony to rebut the evidence 
that was presented on the grounds alleged as the basis for 
finding her unfit.  She chose not to come to court where a jury 
had been impanelled, and it is not her attorney's fault that no 
other witnesses testified that day.   
¶119 The majority opinion unnecessarily undercuts a circuit 
court's authority to sanction a non-appearing parent by trying 
the case to the court rather than impanelling a second jury.  
The majority opinion does so because it never analyzes whether 
the sanction the circuit court chose was within its discretion.  
Cf. Shirley E., 298 Wis. 2d 1, ¶70 (Prosser, J., concurring) 
("[T]his court's decision to protect a parent who did not care 
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
22 
 
enough to appear and defend herself, seriously undercuts the 
authority 
of 
circuit 
judges 
to 
enforce 
their 
orders.").  
Instead, the majority opinion pretends that the default judgment 
that has been vacated still exists.  
¶120 Not only is giving Mable K. a second jury trial 
unjustified, but it fails to consider the children's interests.  
The negative impact the majority opinion has on May K. and 
Isaiah H. adds insult to injury.  After all, these children have 
not lived with their biological mother for years.  This petition 
was filed nearly three years ago, on March 24, 2010, and was 
filed based on allegations that these children are in need of 
protection or services and that they have been abandoned by 
Mable K. and the biological fathers.  The children must now wait 
even longer to resolve their family status.  It is not Mable K. 
who was treated unfairly in these proceedings, it is her 
children.  
C. Majority Opinion Errs In Its Analysis Of Shirley E. 
¶121 The majority opinion also concludes that Mable K. was 
deprived on her statutory right to counsel under the rule of 
Shirley E.  See majority op., ¶51.  However, unlike Shirley E., 
Mable K. had a lawyer and still has a lawyer.  It is clear from 
the record that counsel was a zealous advocate for Mable K. 
throughout the pretrial proceedings and at trial.  Counsel 
vigorously advocated for Mable K. even after she did not appear.  
Even now, Mable K. and her lawyer can mount a defense at the 
unfinished trial.  Because the circuit court vacated the default 
judgment, the case awaits conclusion at the continued trial.   
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
23 
 
¶122 The majority relies on Shirley E. to conclude that 
Mable K. was wrongfully deprived of counsel and a second jury 
trial is required.  Notably, however, the procedural posture in 
Shirley E. and the procedural posture of the case today are 
quite different.  In Shirley E., the court granted a default 
against Shirley E. because she violated a court order personally 
to appear.  298 Wis. 2d 1, ¶13.  However, unlike counsel for 
Mable K., counsel for Shirley E. was not allowed to participate 
in any way at the hearings.  Id., ¶18.  This court held that the 
circuit court violated Shirley E.'s statutory right to counsel 
because it granted a default judgment against her and also 
dismissed Shirley E.'s counsel from the fact-finding and 
dispositional hearing before any evidence was taken.  Id., ¶56.  
Without counsel or Shirley E. present, the court found that 
Shirley E. was unfit, and it terminated her parental rights.  
¶123 Simply stated, Shirley E. involved a total denial of 
counsel at the fact-finding and dispositional phases, which is 
not even remotely similar to the facts presented in this case.  
To be clear, Mable K. chose not to follow the court's order that 
she appear by 9 a.m.  Instead, she slept late, stayed home, and 
ate breakfast, all the time knowing that she was required to be 
in court for the continuation of her trial where she was to be 
her own witness.  Mable K. should be required to live with the 
consequences of the choices she made that morning.  Mable K. 
absented herself from the trial, and because counsel had no 
other scheduled witnesses until the third day of trial, 
anticipating that Mable K.'s testimony would fill the second day 
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
24 
 
of trial, Mable K. created the problem of counsel having no one 
to call on the second day of trial.  See supra note 11.   
¶124 Moreover, unlike Shirley E., Mable K.'s attorney did 
participate substantively in pretrial matters and at the 
hearings.  On the first day of the fact-finding hearing, counsel 
gave an opening statement that summarized why Mable K. should 
not be found unfit.  Also on the first day of the hearing, Dane 
County presented testimony of Brenda Blank, one of Mable K.'s 
case workers.  During that testimony, Attorney Lehner objected 
to hearsay at least five times and her objections were sustained 
several times.  On the second day of the hearing, even though 
Mable K. was not present, the trial continued.  Attorney Lehner 
cross-examined Blank, who testified regarding the CHIPS claim.  
Later in the hearing, Attorney Lehner cross-examined Dane 
County's witness Michael Boehm, a social service specialist, who 
testified regarding the abandonment claim.   
¶125 After Mable K. arrived, the circuit court allowed her 
to testify as to why she was late, and Attorney Lehner argued on 
Mable K.'s behalf that the circuit court should vacate the 
default judgment.  Counsel was present and vigorously defended 
Mable K. with respect to the sanction imposed.  After Mable K.'s 
testimony, the circuit court asked Attorney Lehner whether she 
had any further evidence or witnesses to present.  Attorney 
Lehner responded that she did not.  The circuit court did not 
take further evidence against Mable K.; Dane County and the 
guardian ad litem rested immediately after Mable K. testified.   
No.  2011AP825 & 2011AP826.akz 
 
25 
 
¶126 Mable 
K. 
and 
Attorney 
Lehner 
appeared 
at 
the 
dispositional hearing on January 3, 2011, where Attorney Lehner 
once again cross-examined Dane County's witnesses.  At the end 
of one witness's testimony, the circuit court asked Attorney 
Lehner if she had further questions, and she responded that she 
did not.  The circuit court then asked all of the parties if 
they had any further evidence that they would like to produce, 
and Attorney Lehner responded "No, Your Honor."   
¶127 Unlike 
in 
Shirley 
E., 
where 
the 
circuit 
court 
dismissed Shirley E.'s attorney from the courtroom before any 
evidence was presented, Attorney Lehner actively participated in 
the trial and vigorously defended Mable K.'s actions.  Based on 
the extensive participation of Attorney Lehner in this case, I 
would conclude that Mable K.'s right to counsel was not violated 
under the standards this court set in Shirley E.14 
¶128 For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the circuit 
court did not err; accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
¶129 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this dissent. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 At the Machner hearing, Attorney Lehner testified that 
she did not have witnesses available and that Mable K.'s absence 
left her without any viable witnesses through which she could 
present evidence.  Counsel testified that she did not have 
advanced notice that Mable K. would not appear.  If trial 
counsel was left with no option, that was Mable K.'s own doing.  
Mable K. testified that Attorney Lehner had explained the 
effects of a default judgment.  In other words, Mable K. created 
her own prejudice by failing to appear.