Title: Clean Wisconsin, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP001688
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 2021

2021 WI 71 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP1688 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Clean Wisconsin, Inc., Lynda Cochart, Amy 
Cochart, Roger DeJardin, Sandra Winnemueller and 
Chad Cochart, 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 
          Respondent-Appellant, 
Kinnard Farms, Inc., 
          Intervenor-Co-Appellant, 
Wisconsin Legislature, 
          Intervenor. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 12, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
John W. Markson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. ROGGENSACK, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
HAGGEDORN, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the intervenor-co-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Jordan J. Hemaidan, Nancy Cruz, and Michael Best & Friedrich 
LLP, Madison. There was an oral argument by Jordan J. Hemaidan. 
 
For the intervenor, there were briefs filed by Eric M. 
McLeod, Kirsten A. Atanasoff, Lisa M Lawless, and Husch 
 
 
 
Blackwell LLP, Madison and Milwaukee. There was an oral argument 
by Eric M. McLeod. 
 
For the petitioners-respondents, there was a brief filed by 
Andrea Gelatt, Rob Lee, and Midwest Environmental Advocates, 
Madison; with whom on the brief was Evan Feinauer and Clean 
Wisconsin, Inc., Madison. There was an oral argument by Andrea 
Gelatt. 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Jennifer 
L. 
Vandermeuse 
and 
Gabe 
Johnson-Karp 
assistant 
attorneys general; with whom on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, 
attorney general, Madison. There was an oral argument by 
Jennifer L. Vandermeuse. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Ryan J. Owens, Verona. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Environmental Health Network by John S. Greene, Madison.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Manufacturers and Commerce, Midwest Food Products Association, 
Wisconsin Cheese Makers Association, Dairy Business Association, 
Wisconsin Potato and Vegetable Growers Association, Wisconsin 
Farm Bureau Federation, Wisconsin Paper Council, Wisconsin Corn 
Growers Association, Wisconsin Dairy Alliance, and Venture Dairy 
Cooperative by Robert I. Fassbender and Great Lakes Legal 
Foundation, Madison; with whom on the brief was Luca T. Vebber, 
Corydon J. Fish, and Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, 
Madison.  
 
 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Food & Water 
Watch, Family Farm Defenders, and Sustain Rural Wisconsin 
Network by Zach Corrigan, Madison. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2021 WI 71 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP1688 
(L.C. No. 
2015CV2633) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Clean Wisconsin, Inc., Lynda Cochart, Amy 
Cochart, Roger DeJardin, Sandra Winnemueller 
and Chad Cochart, 
 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant, 
 
Kinnard Farms, Inc., 
 
          Intervenor-Co-Appellant, 
 
Wisconsin Legislature, 
 
          Intervenor. 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. ROGGENSACK, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.  
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.   
 
HAGEDORN, J., did not participate. 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, 
John W. Markson, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
2 
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   This case is about whether the 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) had the explicit 
authority to impose an animal unit maximum condition and an off-
site groundwater monitoring condition upon a Wisconsin Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (WPDES) permit it reissued to 
Kinnard Farms, Inc. (Kinnard) for its concentrated animal 
feeding operation (CAFO).  The circuit court decided that the 
DNR had the explicit authority to do so, and the court of 
appeals certified this appeal to us, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.61 (2017-18).1   
¶2 
We conclude that the DNR had the explicit authority to 
impose both the animal unit maximum and off-site groundwater 
monitoring conditions upon Kinnard's reissued WPDES permit 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 283.31(3)-(5) and related regulations.  
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court. 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶3 
Kinnard operates a large CAFO2 in the Town of Lincoln.  
In 2012, Kinnard wanted to expand its dairy operation by 
                     
1 The Honorable John W. Markson of the Dane County Circuit 
Court presided. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 See Wis. Admin. Code § NR 243.03(12)(a)(defining a CAFO, 
as 
relevant 
here, 
as 
"an 
animal 
feeding 
operation 
[with] . . . 1,000 animal units or more at any time [that] 
stores manure or process wastewater in a below or at grade level 
storage 
structure 
or 
land 
applies 
manure 
or 
process 
wastewater").   
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
3 
 
building a second site and adding 3,000 dairy cows.  The 
expansion required Kinnard to apply to the DNR for reissuance of 
its WPDES permit to include both the original site and the 
proposed expansion.3  Wis. Stat. § 283.59(1).  The DNR approved 
Kinnard's application and reissued Kinnard's WPDES permit with 
effective dates of September 1, 2012-August 31, 2017.4   
¶4 
The five named petitioners in this appeal sought 
review of the reissued WPDES permit because they lived near 
Kinnard's CAFO, had private drinking wells, and were concerned 
that Kinnard's proposed expansion would exacerbate current 
groundwater contamination issues.  The petitioners alleged that 
the reissued WPDES permit was inadequate because, among other 
failings, it did not set a "maximum number of animal units" or 
"require 
monitoring 
to 
evaluate 
impacts 
to 
groundwater."  
Accordingly, they petitioned for a contested case hearing to 
review the DNR's decision, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 283.63(1).  
¶5 
The DNR granted the petition and referred the matter 
to an administrative law judge (ALJ), pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 227.43(1)(b), 283.63.  Kinnard filed for summary judgment, 
alleging that the DNR lacked statutory authority to impose an 
                     
3 The second site, a quarter-mile away from the original 
facility, is also a CAFO, and therefore a "point source" subject 
to the WPDES permit program, as outlined in ch. 283.  All owners 
and operators of point sources in Wisconsin must obtain a WPDES 
permit in order to discharge pollutants into the waters of the 
State.  Wis. Stat. §§ 283.31(1), 283.37. 
4 See Wis. Stat. § 283.53(1)(establishing a 5-year maximum 
term for WPDES permits). 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
4 
 
animal unit maximum, citing 2011 Wis. Act 21, specifically Wis. 
Stat. § 227.10(2m).5  The ALJ denied the motion, concluding there 
were genuine issues of material fact, and set the matter for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
¶6 
The ALJ conducted a four-day evidentiary hearing 
during which Town of Lincoln community members who lived and 
worked near Kinnard's CAFO testified about the contamination of 
their well water and the impact of that contamination on their 
businesses, homes, and daily lives.  The community members 
conveyed their belief that Kinnard's CAFO was the source of the 
well water contamination.  The ALJ also heard testimony from a 
number of experts who established that up to 50 percent of 
private wells in the Town of Lincoln were contaminated and that 
30 percent of wells tested positive for E. coli bacteria.6  
Additionally, an expert testified about the particular features 
of the land underlying Kinnard's CAFO which made that land 
extremely susceptible to groundwater contamination.  According 
                     
5 The only provision of 2011 Wis. Act 21 at issue in this 
case is Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m). 
6 As the ALJ noted, "No witness for the dairy or the DNR 
disputed these numbers."  
"The presence of large volumes of feces in and around 
animals 
in 
CAFO[s] 
provides 
a 
breeding 
ground 
for 
many 
bacteria," including E. coli.  The bacteria can cause disease 
outbreaks through "contact with these organisms via swimming, 
eating 
shellfish, 
eating 
contaminated 
food, 
or 
drinking 
contaminated water."  United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, Risk Assessment Evaluation for Concentrated Animal Feed 
Operations, 1, 29-30 (May 2004). 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
5 
 
to the testimony, pollution could travel over half a mile 
through groundwater into wells in 24 hours.7  
¶7 
Based on the evidence presented, the ALJ concluded 
that the "level of groundwater contamination including E. coli 
bacteria in the area at or near the [second] site is [] very 
unusual."  Additionally, the ALJ identified "what could fairly 
be called a groundwater contamination crisis in areas near the 
site."  The ALJ further found that "[t]he proliferation of 
contaminated wells represents a massive regulatory failure to 
protect groundwater in the Town of Lincoln."  Of import to this 
appeal, the ALJ determined that, based on the facts presented, 
the DNR had "clear regulatory authority" to impose the two 
conditions disputed in this action upon Kinnard's reissued WPDES 
permit.   
                     
7 The groundwater beneath Kinnard's CAFO is in a featured 
carbonated bedrock aquifer; this type of bedrock is referred to 
as "karst."  The Iowa Department of Natural Resources explains 
karst geology as such:  
Karst bedrock is characterized as bedrock that is 
close to the land's surface and contains a vast 
network of underground drainage systems that have 
direct connections to the land's surface.  In areas of 
Karst . . . [s]ome of the water that originates at the 
surface——possibly near sources of contamination——flows 
undetected into the ground.  This water can contain 
contaminants that are found on the land's surface and 
those not bound or utilized by the area[']s soils and 
land cover.  Once in the ground, this water that was 
once on the surface becomes part of the groundwater 
supply. 
iowadnr.gov/environmental-protection/water-quality/private-well-
program/private-well-testing/contamination-in-karst 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
6 
 
¶8 
The first condition was an animal unit maximum.  The 
ALJ ordered the DNR to modify Kinnard's reissued WPDES permit to 
"articulate the maximum number of animal units allowed at the 
facility."  The ALJ reasoned that "[e]stablishing a cap on the 
maximum number of animal units will provide clarity and 
transparency for all sides as to the limits that are necessary 
to protect groundwater and surface waters."  Additionally, the 
ALJ noted that the condition would assure compliance with the 
statutory requirement that CAFOs have and maintain 180 days' 
worth of properly designed manure storage.8  This was especially 
important due to Kinnard's recent history of noncompliance with 
this storage requirement.  The ALJ also reasoned that "[i]t is 
not a question of either/or——the 180 day storage requirement 
represents a good short term measure to detect an impending 
problem, but the maximum animal unit number represents a useful 
longer-term management tool."  
¶9 
The 
second 
condition 
was 
off-site 
groundwater 
monitoring.  The ALJ determined that "a groundwater monitoring 
plan is essential given that the area is 'susceptible to 
groundwater contamination' within the meaning of Wis. Admin. 
Code § NR 243.15(3)(2)(a)."  According to the ALJ, "it is 
essential 
that 
the 
[DNR] 
utilize 
its 
clear 
regulatory 
                     
8 Pursuant to Wis. Admin. Code § NR 243.15(3)(i-k)(March 
2019), CAFOs must have and maintain 180 days' worth of properly 
designed manure storage to ensure sufficient storage capacity 
during the winter months when spreading of manure is limited to 
emergencies.  See § NR 243.14(7)(a). 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
7 
 
authority . . . to ensure that Kinnard Farms meet its legal 
obligation under Wis. Admin. Code § NR 243.14(2)(b)(3)[9] not to 
contaminate well water with fecal bacteria from manure or [from] 
process wastewater."  The ALJ ordered the DNR to modify the 
permit "to include a groundwater monitoring plan which includes 
no less than six monitoring wells.  If practicable, the permit-
holder shall include at least two monitoring wells which are 
located off-site on voluntarily willing neighboring properties 
with water contamination issues or risks."  The ALJ justified 
the off-site monitoring as "better and more likely to yield 
results that identified problem areas" and acknowledged that 
"[o]bviously, this would require the voluntary participation of 
off-site property owners."10 
¶10 Kinnard appealed the ALJ's decision to the DNR 
Secretary, pursuant to Wis. Admin. Code § NR 2.20(1) (February 
2019).11  The DNR Secretary denied review, reasoning that the 
issue "would most appropriately [be] decided by the courts of 
this state."  Kinnard then filed a petition for judicial review 
                     
9 This 
and 
all 
subsequent 
references 
to 
the Wis. Admin. Code ch. NR 243 are to the March 2019 register 
date unless otherwise indicated. 
10 The DNR's authority to require on-site groundwater 
monitoring is not at issue in this case, as Wis. Admin. Code 
§ NR 243.15(3)(c)2.a. fully supports the "on-site" groundwater 
monitoring that the ALJ imposed in its decision. 
11 All subsequent references to the Wis. Admin. Code ch. 
NR 2 are to the February 2019 register date unless otherwise 
indicated. 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
8 
 
in the Kewaunee County Circuit Court.  The circuit court 
determined that the petition for judicial review was premature 
and was not "final" for purposes of appeal until the DNR imposed 
the conditions ordered by the ALJ.   
¶11 At this point, the DNR began implementing the two 
conditions.  Shortly thereafter, in August 2015, the DNR sought 
review from the Wisconsin Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding 
its ability to impose the conditions upon Kinnard's reissued 
WPDES permit in light of Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m).  DOJ opined 
that 
§ 227.10(2m) 
precluded 
the 
DNR 
from 
imposing 
the 
conditions, which prompted the DNR Secretary to reconsider her 
decision denying review of the ALJ's decision.  The DNR 
Secretary concluded that such a review was appropriate and 
quickly issued an order reversing the portion of the ALJ's 
decision that imposed the animal unit maximum and off-site 
groundwater monitoring conditions. 
¶12 The five named petitioners filed a petition for 
judicial review in the Kewaunee County Circuit Court, and Clean 
Wisconsin filed a petition for judicial review in the Dane 
County 
Circuit 
Court. 
 
The 
Dane 
County 
Circuit 
Court 
consolidated the two cases and reversed the DNR Secretary's 
decision, concluding that the DNR had the explicit authority to 
impose 
the 
animal 
unit 
maximum 
and 
off-site 
groundwater 
monitoring 
conditions 
on 
Kinnard's 
reissued 
WPDES 
permit 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
9 
 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 283.31(3)-(5) and related regulations.12  
The circuit court remanded the case with instructions for the 
DNR to implement the ALJ's order as to those conditions.  
¶13 The DNR and Kinnard appealed the circuit court's 
decision.13  The court of appeals certified the case to this 
court and we accepted certification in April 2019.14  Shortly 
thereafter, we granted the DNR's motion to modify the briefing 
schedule since it was no longer advocating the same positions as 
                     
12 At the outset, the circuit court determined that the 
ALJ's decision became a final decision of the DNR when the DNR 
Secretary denied Kinnard's petition for review and the DNR did 
not petition for review itself under Wis. Admin. Code § NR 2.20, 
pursuant to §§ NR 2.155(1), 2.20(3).  Additionally, the circuit 
court concluded that the DNR Secretary's attempt to reverse her 
denial of Kinnard's petition was untimely and exceeded her 
authority. 
13 The circuit court granted the petitioners their fees and 
costs under Wis. Stat. § 814.245.  The DNR appealed that 
judgment and moved the court of appeals to consolidate the two 
appeals, which it did.  The DNR voluntarily dismissed the appeal 
regarding fees and costs, Case No. 2016AP2502, in May 2019, so 
the issue is no longer before the court. 
14 While the appeals were pending, Kinnard's 2012 permit 
expired and the DNR issued a subsequent permit that did not 
contain either an animal unit maximum or an off-site groundwater 
monitoring condition.  A group of citizens petitioned for a 
contested case hearing regarding the new permit, but the parties 
agreed to put that dispute on hold until the resolution of this 
appeal. 
The court of appeals also certified another consolidated 
"companion" case, Clean Wisconsin, Inc. v. DNR, No. 2018AP59.  
Although 
both 
cases 
address 
the 
effect 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.10(2m) on the scope of the DNR's authority, each deals 
with a different authorizing statute, thus presenting different 
legal issues.  See Clean Wis., Inc. v. DNR, No. 2018AP59, slip 
op. (Wis. S. Ct. July 8, 2021). 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
10 
 
it did in the circuit court.  The Joint Committee on Legislative 
Organization 
(the 
Legislature) 
also 
moved 
the 
court 
to 
intervene.  We granted that motion in January 2021.15 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 "When an appeal is taken from a circuit court order 
reviewing an agency decision, we review the decision of the 
agency, not the circuit court."  Hilton ex rel. 
Pages 
Homeowners' Ass'n v. DNR, 2006 WI 84, ¶15, 293 Wis. 2d 1, 
717 N.W.2d 166.  We review questions of agency authority de 
novo.  Andersen v. DNR, 2011 WI 19, ¶¶25-26, 332 Wis. 2d 41, 
796 N.W.2d 1.  
¶15 This case also requires us to interpret several 
statutory provisions, which we review de novo.  Noffke ex rel. 
Swenson 
v. 
Bakke, 
2009 
WI 
10, 
¶9, 
315 Wis. 2d 
350, 
760 N.W.2d 156.  The purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
"determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.   
III. ANALYSIS 
¶16 We are tasked with determining whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 283.31(3)-(5), and related regulations, grant the DNR explicit 
authority to impose the two conditions at issue upon Kinnard's 
                     
15 Although the caption of this case is Clean Wisconsin v. 
DNR, that is a misnomer.  Clean Wisconsin and the DNR are now 
aligned in view, and the Legislature and Kinnard are likewise 
aligned. 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
11 
 
reissued WPDES permit.  We first provide some background 
regarding the WPDES permit program and its significance as it 
relates to:  (1) CAFOs; (2) restricting the amount of pollutants 
discharged into waters of the state ("effluent limitations"16); 
and (3) groundwater protection standards.  We then interpret the 
"explicit authority" requirement of Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m).  
Next, we examine the text of § 283.31(3)-(4), paying special 
attention to the terms "effluent limitations" and "groundwater 
protection standards."  We conclude by determining whether 
§ 283.31(3)-(5), and relevant regulations, explicitly authorized 
the DNR to impose both the animal unit maximum and off-site 
groundwater monitoring conditions upon Kinnard's reissued WPDES 
permit.   
A. Relevant Background 
¶17 We begin with a discussion of the WPDES permit program 
and its impact on CAFOs, effluent limitations, and groundwater 
protection standards to provide context for our statutory 
analysis.  The WPDES permit program is outlined in ch. 283 of 
the Wisconsin Statutes, wherein the DNR is granted "all 
authority necessary to establish, administer and maintain a 
state pollutant discharge elimination system" in order to 
protect the "waters of this state," including groundwater and 
                     
16 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 283.01(6) 
defines 
an 
"effluent 
limitation" as "any restriction established by [DNR] . . . on 
quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, 
biological, and other constituents which are discharged from 
point sources into waters of this state."   
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
12 
 
surface water, from pollution.  Wis. Stat. § 283.001(1)-(2).17  
Chapter 283 prohibits the discharge of any pollutant into the 
waters of the state unless the DNR authorizes the discharge in a 
permit.  Wis. Stat. § 283.31(1); 283.37.  The DNR may issue a 
WPDES permit "for the discharge of any pollutant, or combination 
of pollutants . . . upon condition that such discharges will 
meet" the requirements outlined in § 283.31(3).  Additionally, 
§ 283.31(4) 
mandates 
that 
the 
DNR 
prescribe 
"additional 
conditions" 
necessary 
to 
"assure 
compliance" 
with 
the 
requirements listed in § 283.31(3).   
¶18 CAFOs are statutorily required to apply to the DNR for 
a WPDES permit because they are "point sources" as defined in 
Wis. Stat. § 283.01(12).  Generally speaking, a CAFO is "a 
specific type of large-scale industrial agricultural facility 
that 
raises 
animals, 
usually 
at 
high-density, 
for 
the 
[production] of meat, eggs, or milk."  National Association of 
Local Boards of Health, 
Understanding Concentrated Animal 
Feeding Operations and Their Impact on Communities (2010).  Due 
to their size, CAFOs produce as much manure——waste——as do small 
and medium-size cities.  For example, "[a] farm with 2,500 dairy 
cattle is similar in waste load to a city of 411,000 people."  
                     
17 The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
is authorized to allow States to administer their own permit 
programs, 
in 
lieu 
of 
the 
National 
Pollution 
Discharge 
Elimination System, so long as those States meet certain federal 
requirements.  33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)-(c) (2019).  The EPA approved 
the WPDES permit program in 1974.  Andersen v. DNR, 2011 WI 19, 
¶37, 332 Wis. 2d 41, 796 N.W.2d 1. 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
13 
 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Risk Assessment 
Evaluation for Concentrated Animal Feed Operations, 7 (May 
2004).   
¶19 CAFOs' agricultural waste, including manure and water 
that comes into contact with animal feed and manure (also 
referred to as "process wastewater"18), is defined as a 
"pollutant" and subject to regulation.  Wis. Stat. § 283.01(13).  
WPDES 
permits 
establish 
effluent 
limitations, 
which 
are 
restrictions on the amount of pollutants a point source like a 
CAFO may release into the waters of the state.  This includes 
discharges both from the production area (on-site) and onto the 
fields where manure is land-applied (off-site).19  "Because large 
numbers of animals are confined in relatively small areas at 
CAFOs, a very large volume of manure is produced and must be 
kept in a correspondingly small area until disposed of."  United 
States Environmental Protection Agency, supra at 1.  While 
manure is useful to the farming industry as fertilizer, in large 
quantities it has the potential to become hazardous because 
                     
18 See Wis. Admin. Code § NR 243.03(53) (defining "process 
wastewater" as "wastewater from the production area directly or 
indirectly used in the operation of animal feeding operation 
that results from," among other things, "[w]ater that comes into 
contact with any raw materials or animal byproducts including 
manure [or] feed"). 
19 Wisconsin 
Admin. 
Code 
§ NR 
243.03(54) 
defines 
the 
"production area," in part, as "that part of an animal feeding 
operation that includes the animal confinement area, the manure 
storage area, the raw materials storage area, and the waste 
containment areas but not CAFO outdoor vegetated areas." 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
14 
 
"[t]raditional means of using manure are not adequate to contend 
with the large volumes present at CAFOs."  Id. at 2.   
¶20 Long-term manure storage requirements are common in 
states like Wisconsin where long, cold winters prevent liquid 
manure-spreading for several months each year.  See Wis. Admin. 
Code § NR 243.14(9) (requiring CAFOs to have "a minimum of 180 
days of storage designed and maintained in accordance with ss. 
NR 243.15(3)(i) to (k)").  The number of animals at a CAFO 
corresponds to the amount of animal-generated waste that the 
CAFO must store.  See § NR 243.15(3)(k).  If a CAFO fails to 
properly manage its manure storage, it presents a higher risk of 
storage overflow and groundwater contamination.  
National 
Association of Local Boards of Health, supra at 3.  Such 
failures are hazardous because manure is a breeding ground for 
many pathogens, including E. coli, and as a result creates a 
serious risk for disease outbreak if it enters the groundwater.  
Id. at 8-10.  To 
protect against this risk, 
Wisconsin 
regulations require CAFOs to comply with certain regulations 
such as:  (1) effluent limitations, promulgated in Wis. Admin. 
Code ch. NR 243; and (2) groundwater quality standards.  See NR 
§ 243.13(5)(a).  With this general background in mind, we 
proceed to the statutory analysis. 
B. Wisconsin Stat. § 227.10(2m) 
¶21 The core issue in this case involves Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.10(2m), which dictates that "[n]o agency may implement or 
enforce any standard, requirement, or threshold . . . unless 
that standard, requirement, or threshold is explicitly required 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
15 
 
or explicitly permitted by statute or by a rule that has been 
promulgated in accordance with this subchapter." (emphasis 
added).  The parties dispute the meaning of "explicitly required 
or explicitly permitted" in the context of the DNR imposing 
conditions upon Kinnard's reissued WPDES permit.   
¶22 Kinnard and the Legislature assert that explicit means 
specific, and that in order for the DNR to impose a condition 
upon a WPDES permit, without promulgating a rule, that condition 
must be listed verbatim in a statute or the administrative code.  
According to Kinnard and the Legislature, because there is no 
literal enumeration or verbatim mention of an animal unit 
maximum or off-site groundwater monitoring condition in the 
statutes 
or 
administrative 
code, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.10(2m) 
precludes the DNR from imposing such conditions upon Kinnard's 
reissued WPDES permit.  Kinnard and the Legislature assert that 
in the absence of such statutory or administrative authority, 
the DNR must promulgate a rule in order to impose these 
conditions upon Kinnard's reissued WPDES permit. 
¶23 The DNR and Clean Wisconsin counter that such a 
reading of "explicitly required or explicitly permitted" is too 
narrow, and that Kinnard and the Legislature overlook the 
explicit, but broad, authority given to the DNR in Wis. Stat. 
§ 283.31(3)-(5) to prescribe such conditions.  The DNR and Clean 
Wisconsin assert that explicit means expressly conferred and 
clear; and an explicit grant, like that given in § 283.31(3)-
(5), can be general and broad in nature.  Said differently, 
according to the DNR and Clean Wisconsin, an explicit grant of 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
16 
 
authority does not necessarily have to be circumscribed or 
exhaustively detailed.   
¶24 To resolve this issue of interpreting the term 
explicit, we examine its dictionary definition and Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.10(2m) in context.  Explicit and specific are not 
synonymous.  Black's Law Dictionary defines "explicit" as 
"clear, open, direct, or exact" and "expressed without ambiguity 
or vagueness."  Explicit, Black's Law Dictionary 725 (11th ed. 
2019). Similarly, the American Heritage Dictionary defines 
explicit as "fully and clearly expressed; leaving nothing 
implied" and "fully developed or formulated."  Explicit, 
American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2011).  
¶25 Additionally, when we review Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) 
in context, we note that in Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a)3., the 
legislature 
used 
the 
word 
"specific." 
 
See 
Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("[S]tatutory language is interpreted in 
the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of 
a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related statutes . . . .").  This context shows us that the 
legislature knew how to use the word "specific," but did not do 
so in § 227.10(2m).  As a result, we must presume the two words, 
explicit and specific, mean different things.  Because neither 
the dictionary definition nor an examination of the statute in 
context supports the premise that the terms explicit and 
specific are synonyms, we conclude that an agency may rely upon 
a grant of authority that is explicit but broad when undertaking 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
17 
 
agency action, and such an explicit but broad grant of authority 
complies with § 227.10(2m). 
C. Wisconsin Stat. § 283.31(3)-(4) 
¶26 Having clarified that explicit authority can be broad 
in scope, we next examine Wis. Stat. § 283.31(3) and (4), and 
related regulations, as the parties dispute whether these 
provisions granted the DNR the explicit authority to impose the 
animal 
unit 
maximum 
and 
off-site 
groundwater 
monitoring 
conditions upon Kinnard's reissued WPDES permit. 
¶27 Wisconsin Stat. § 283.31(3) allows the DNR to issue a 
permit "for the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of 
pollutants . . . upon condition that such discharges will meet 
all the following, whenever applicable:" 
(a) 
Effluent limitations. 
(b) 
Standards of performance for new sources. 
(c) 
Effluent standards, effluents prohibitions and 
pretreatment standards. 
(d) 
Any more stringent limitations, including those: 
. . .  
2. 
Necessary to comply with any applicable 
federal law or regulation[.] 
 . . .  
(e) Any more stringent legally applicable requirements 
necessary to comply with an approved areawide waste 
treatment management plan. 
(f) Groundwater protection standards established under 
ch. 160. 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
18 
 
§ 283.31(3).  In this case we are focused on para. a (effluent 
limitations) and para. f (groundwater protection standards).   
¶28 Wisconsin Stat. § 283.31(4) mandates that the DNR 
"shall prescribe conditions for permits issued under this 
section to assure compliance with the requirements of sub. (3)."  
A non-exhaustive list of examples, beginning with the phrase 
"shall 
include 
at 
least 
the 
following," 
is 
outlined 
at 
§ 283.31(4)(a-f).  Therefore, § 283.31(4) requires the DNR to 
prescribe conditions in a WPDES permit to assure compliance with 
§ 283.31(3); in this case, the parties dispute the imposition of 
conditions to enforce effluent limitations and groundwater 
protection standards.  Notably and of import, § 283.31(4) does 
not say "promulgate rules to assure compliance with the 
requirements of sub. (3)."  Maple Leaf Farms, Inc. v. DNR, 
2001 WI App 170, ¶30, 247 Wis. 2d 96, 633 N.W.2d 720 (stating 
that "while [] § 283.31(4) directs the DNR to prescribe 
conditions for permits to assure compliance with water quality 
standards, the statute does not require the DNR to promulgate 
such 
conditions 
by 
rule"). 
 
Additionally, 
the 
text 
of 
§ 283.31(4) 
explicitly 
contemplates 
the 
DNR's 
ability 
to 
prescribe conditions for permits that are not enumerated in 
subs. (a-f) by prefacing that list with the phrase "at least the 
following."  (emphasis added). 
¶29 Before we continue, we must briefly discuss two terms:  
first, "effluent limitations," Wis. Stat. § 283.31(3)(a); and 
second, "groundwater protection standards," § 283.31(3)(f).  An 
effluent limitation is a restriction established by the DNR "on 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
19 
 
quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, 
biological, and other constituents which are discharged from 
point sources into waters of this state."  
Wis. Stat. 
§ 283.01(6); see also Wis. Stat. § 283.13.  In other words, 
effluent limitations are restrictions on the amount of pollutant 
a point source may release into bodies of water.20  As we 
mentioned above, effluent limitations have been promulgated for 
CAFOs in Wis. Admin. Code ch. NR 243.  For example, and of 
significance 
here: 
 
(1) CAFOs 
may 
not 
cause 
the 
fecal 
contamination of water in a well, § NR 243.14(2)(b)3; and 
(2) CAFOs must have 180 days of properly-designed manure 
storage, § NR 243.15(3)(i-k), to be prepared for long winters 
when spreading of manure is limited to emergencies. 
¶30 The second term we must address is "groundwater 
protection standards established under ch. 160," as set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 283.31(3)(f).  The Legislature gave the DNR broad 
authority to establish, monitor, and enforce health-based 
groundwater standards in Wis. Stat. ch. 160, which resulted in 
the promulgation of Wis. Admin. Code ch. NR 140 (February 
2021).21  Chapter 140 contains the State's groundwater standards 
and provides that the DNR "may take any actions within the 
context of regulatory programs established in statutes or rules 
                     
20 Effluent limitations for CAFOs are based on proper manure 
and process wastewater storage and land application practices. 
21 All subsequent references to the Wis. Admin. Code ch. 
NR 140 are to the February 2021 register date unless otherwise 
indicated. 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
20 
 
outside of this chapter, if those actions are necessary to 
protect public health and welfare or prevent a significant 
damaging effect on groundwater or surface water quality."  § NR 
140.02(4).  Chapter 140 applies to all facilities regulated by 
Wis. Stat. ch. 283, including Kinnard's CAFO.  § NR 140.03.  As 
discussed above, ch. NR 243 requires CAFOs to comply with 
groundwater quality standards.  See § NR 243.13(5)(a).  Having 
provided some background to § 283.31(3)(a) and (f), we turn to 
the two permit conditions at issue. 
D. Whether Wis. Stat. § 283.31(3)-(5) Grants the DNR Explicit 
Authority to Impose The Disputed Conditions 
¶31 Having provided background regarding the WPDES permit 
program, interpreted the "explicit authority" requirement of 
Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m), and examined the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 283.31(3)-(4), we next look at the animal unit maximum and 
off-site groundwater monitoring conditions to determine whether 
the DNR had explicit authority to impose these conditions upon 
Kinnard's reissued WPDES permit. 
¶32 We begin by noting that the ALJ imposed both of these 
conditions after hearing four days of testimony specific to this 
case and reviewing pre-filed reports.  Examining the specific 
facts surrounding a particular permit application is consistent 
with how the DNR has historically imposed conditions upon WPDES 
permits.  This case-by-case analysis allows the DNR to use its 
expertise to make fact-specific determinations and gives it the 
flexibility to 
prescribe conditions that are specifically 
tailored to a particular applicant.  See Maple Leaf Farms, 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
21 
 
247 Wis. 2d 96, ¶31 (noting that the DNR "closely balance[s] the 
specific needs of the permit holder with public environmental 
concerns."); Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. DNR, 2011 WI 54, ¶43, 
335 Wis. 2d 47, 799 N.W.2d 73 (reasoning that "[a]s with many [] 
environmental statutes," the DNR "utilizes its expertise and 
exercises its discretion to make what, by necessity, are fact-
specific determinations.").   
1. Animal Unit Maximum Condition 
¶33 The ALJ concluded that the animal unit maximum 
condition was necessary to assure Kinnard's compliance with 
effluent 
limitations, 
as 
enumerated 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 283.31(3)(a).  We agree.   
¶34 The DNR customarily monitors 180-day manure storage 
requirements through the use of permanent markers.  Wis. Admin. 
Code § NR 243.15(3)(e).  However, as the ALJ found, Kinnard had 
a history of failing to install those markers in 2009 and 2010.  
The ALJ concluded that without permanent markers, Kinnard had 
not established an effective means by which to measure the 180-
day manure storage requirement.  We agree with the ALJ's 
conclusions on this point.  The animal unit maximum condition 
was a practical means of assuring compliance with the 180-day 
manure storage requirement——especially in light of Kinnard's 
failure to effectively measure its manure in the past——and of 
avoiding 
the 
potential 
hazardous 
consequences 
of 
storage 
overflow.   
¶35 Additionally, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 283.31(5) 
explicitly 
requires that the DNR issue permits that "specify maximum levels 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
22 
 
of discharges."22  Limiting the number of animal units at a CAFO 
is a practical way to quantify and limit the amount of 
agricultural waste produced and discharged from that CAFO both 
on-site 
and 
off-site, 
since 
the 
number 
of 
animal 
units 
correlates to the amount of manure and process wastewater 
produced.   
¶36 Accordingly, the DNR had the explicit authority to 
prescribe the animal unit maximum condition, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 283.31(4), in order to assure compliance with effluent 
limitations, as specified in § 283.31(3)(a), and pursuant to 
§ 283.31(5). 
2. Off-site Groundwater Monitoring Condition 
¶37 The ALJ concluded that the installation of two off-
site monitoring wells, if practicable, was necessary to assure 
Kinnard's compliance with effluent limitations and groundwater 
protection standards pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 283.31(3).  The 
ALJ further determined that the legislature gave the DNR 
explicit authority in § 283.31(4) to prescribe permit conditions 
to assure compliance with these standards.  We agree for two 
reasons.  
¶38 First, the off-site groundwater monitoring condition 
assures 
Kinnard's 
compliance 
with 
effluent 
limitations, 
primarily Wis. Admin. Code § NR 243.14(2)(b)3, which prohibits 
                     
22 We note that Wis. Stat. § 283.31(5), while not mentioned 
in the ALJ's decision, was cited by the circuit court as a 
reason for its ruling.  
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
23 
 
fecal contamination of a well by the landspreading of manure or 
process wastewater.  Given the overwhelming testimony regarding 
contaminated wells near Kinnard's CAFO, this condition was 
essential to ensure that Kinnard did not further contaminate the 
well water of residents in the vicinity.  Additionally, the 
susceptibility of this area to groundwater contamination, as 
defined by § NR 243.15(3)(c)2.a., further supports the ALJ's 
imposition of this condition in accordance with the DNR's 
explicit authority.23   
¶39 Second, the off-site groundwater monitoring condition 
was necessary to assure Kinnard's compliance with groundwater 
protection standards.  See Wis. Admin. Code § NR 243.13(5)(a) 
(requiring 
that 
CAFOs 
comply 
with 
groundwater 
quality 
standards); § NR 
243.13(1) ("The department shall include 
conditions in a WPDES permit for the production area and 
ancillary service and storage areas . . . that are necessary to 
achieve compliance with surface water and groundwater quality 
standards contained in chs. NR 102 to 105, 140 and 207.").  The 
record in this case established that as many as 50 percent of 
private wells in the Town of Lincoln were contaminated, 30 
percent of wells had tested positive for E. coli bacteria, and 
                     
23 It is also notable that Wis. Admin. Code ch. NR 140 
establishes a public health standard for E. coli at zero.  When 
a preventative action limit for a substance of health or welfare 
concern, like E. coli, is attained or exceeded ch. NR 140 
provides for, among other responses, "the installation and 
sampling of groundwater monitoring wells."  See § NR 140.24(4). 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
24 
 
manure had caused that contamination.  Additionally, if the DNR 
did not have the ability to impose a groundwater monitoring 
requirement, then the groundwater protection standards would be 
essentially unenforceable.  For these reasons, we conclude that 
the DNR had the explicit authority to prescribe the off-site 
groundwater 
monitoring 
condition, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 283.31(4), in order to assure Kinnard's compliance with 
effluent limitations and groundwater protection standards, as 
enumerated in § 283.31(3)(a) and (f).24   
                     
24 The parties dispute whether the former DNR Secretary had 
the authority to:  (1) "reconsider" her initial denial of 
Kinnard's petition for review under Wis. Admin Code § NR 2.20; 
and (2) reverse the agency's final decision.  We conclude that 
the issue is moot. 
"An issue is moot when its resolution will have no 
practical effect on the underlying controversy."  PRN Assocs., 
LLC, 2009 WI 53, ¶25, 317 Wis. 2d 656, 766 N.W.2d 559.  We 
generally decline to reach moot issues.  Portage County v. 
J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶12, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509.  
However, there are several well-established exceptions where we 
may elect to address moot issues:  (1) "the issues are of great 
public importance;" (2) "the constitutionality of a statute is 
involved;" (3) the situation arises so often "a definitive 
decision is essential to guide the trial courts;" (4) "the issue 
is likely to arise again and should be resolved by the court to 
avoid uncertainty;" or (5) the issue is "capable and likely of 
repetition and yet evades review."  Id. (quoted source omitted).  
Whether the DNR Secretary complied with the administrative 
code in "reconsidering" her initial denial of Kinnard's petition 
is purely academic, and therefore moot.  Any resolution will 
have no practical effect on the underlying controversy since 
Kinnard's 2012 permit expired and, as of February 1, 2018, it 
operates under a new WPDES permit and this procedural question 
is no longer at issue. 
No. 
2016AP1688   
 
25 
 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶40 We conclude that the DNR had the explicit authority to 
impose both the animal unit maximum and off-site groundwater 
monitoring conditions upon Kinnard's reissued WPDES permit, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 283.31(3)-(5) and related regulations.  
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
No.  2016AP1688.rfd 
1 
 
¶41 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority in full.  I write separately to make two points 
regarding the dissent's1 use of extrinsic sources in its 
statutory analysis.  First, while I welcome what appears to be a 
return to a more holistic statutory-interpretation approach, I 
would dispense with the formalistic requirement that we must 
first label a statutory term "ambiguous" before we consult 
extrinsic sources to determine its meaning.  Second, not all 
extrinsic sources are created equal, and the materials the 
dissent uses——a governor's press release and one legislator's 
floor statement——are generally unreliable indicators of a 
statute's meaning. 
¶42 To fit its analysis within our current approach to 
statutory interpretation, the dissent had no choice but to label 
Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) "ambiguous" before it could look to 
extrinsic sources to analyze the statute's meaning.  But as the 
dissent frames it, a statutory term is ambiguous so long as it 
is defined differently in multiple dictionaries.  Under that 
framework, it is likely that all statutory terms can be labeled 
ambiguous 
and 
therefore 
extrinsic 
sources 
can 
always 
be 
consulted.  I agree with this end result but not the process. 
¶43 Instead of requiring that we first label a statute 
"ambiguous," the better approach is to dispense with the 
pretext.  We should of course start with the text of the 
                     
1 In this opinion, "the dissent" refers to Justice Patience 
Drake Roggensack's dissenting opinion. 
No.  2016AP1688.rfd 
2 
 
statute, but our general approach to statutory interpretation 
should be more comprehensive.  Such a holistic methodology would 
lead to more transparent analyses in which the court is upfront 
and honest about considering relevant extrinsic sources to 
interpret a statute's meaning.  That includes being transparent 
about those sources' actual analytical value when they support 
more than one reasonable inference.  See James v. Heinrich, 2021 
WI 58, ¶68 n.3, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Dallet, J., 
dissenting).  Indeed, the court "must engage in an analysis of 
both the evidence that supports a given interpretation as well 
as the evidence that contradicts a given interpretation."  Fox 
v. 
Catholic 
Knights 
Ins. 
Soc'y, 
2003 
WI 87, 
¶44, 
263 
Wis. 2d 207, 
665 
N.W.2d 181 
(Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring).  
Ultimately, carefully weighed, relevant legislative history can 
be an indicator of a statute's meaning and thus an important 
tool in statutory interpretation.  See United Am., LLC v. DOT, 
2021 WI 44, ¶¶18-19, 397 Wis. 2d 42, 959 N.W.2d 317; State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶66, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
¶44 Of course, the same extrinsic sources will not be 
helpful in every case, and some sources are more reliable than 
others. 
 
The 
extrinsic 
materials 
the 
dissent 
uses 
are 
uninformative and unreliable and therefore have minimal value.  
There is little to be gleaned about a statute's meaning from a 
governor's press release and one legislator's floor statement.  
Then-Governor Walker's press release about what he hoped an 
initial legislative proposal would achieve says nothing about 
No.  2016AP1688.rfd 
3 
 
what the legislature's final enacted text means.  Cf., e.g., 
Landwehr v. Landwehr, 2006 WI 64, ¶25, 291 Wis. 2d 49, 715 
N.W.2d 180.  As for Representative Tiffany's statement during a 
floor debate, courts have long recognized that "debates in [the 
legislature] are not appropriate sources of information from 
which to discover the meaning of the language of a statute 
passed by that body."  See United States v. Trans-Missouri 
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897); United States v. 
O'Brien, 
391 
U.S. 367, 
384 
(1968) 
("What 
motivates 
one 
legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily 
what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are 
sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.").  Such cherry 
picking is why even those who embrace a more holistic approach 
to statutory interpretation have little use for a single 
legislator's statement.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶64-72 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
¶45 Nevertheless, I support the dissent's use of extrinsic 
sources to inform its statutory analysis.  When clear and 
reliable, such sources can provide valuable context, regardless 
of whether a statute is ambiguous.  The dissent, however, 
oversells the analytical value of two isolated and unreliable 
statements, thus leading it astray from the majority opinion's 
more 
reasoned 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.10(2m).  
Accordingly, I join the majority opinion. 
¶46 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this opinion. 
 
No.  2016AP1688.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶47 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.  (dissenting).  It is 
the legislative branch of government that enacts statutory laws 
for Wisconsin.  Whether we agree with the policy set forth in 
those statutes, the words chosen by the legislature control.  
This 
case 
turns 
on 
the 
phrase, 
"explicitly 
required 
or 
explicitly permitted by statute or by a rule" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.10(2m), which statute was enacted as part of 2011 Wis. Act 
21. 
 
We 
previously 
described 
§ 227.10(2m) 
in 
Wisconsin 
Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, ¶52, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 
N.W.2d 900.    
¶48 In 
this 
case, 
which 
appears 
before 
us 
on 
certification, Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) is argued to preclude 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) from requiring a 
maximum 
number 
of 
animal 
units 
and 
off-site 
groundwater 
monitoring as conditions of a Wisconsin Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (WPDES) permit for Kinnard Farms, Inc.'s 
concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO) because no statute 
or rule explicitly requires or permits that.  The majority 
opinion claims the DNR has the "explicit authority" to condition 
the WPDES permit because it has broad authority pursuant to 
"Wis. Stat. § 283.31(3)–(5) and related regulations."1  In so 
doing, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
restores 
court 
deference 
to 
administrative agency assertions of power that the legislature 
explicitly limited in Act 21.    
                     
1 Majority op., ¶2.   
No.  2016AP1688.pdr 
 
2 
 
¶49 I conclude that there is no explicit textual authority 
in either statute or rule that grants the DNR power to set a 
maximum number of animals that Kinnard's CAFO may contain or to 
require off-site groundwater monitoring wells.  Furthermore, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.11(2)(a)1.–3. 
preclude 
agencies 
from 
circumventing the "explicitly permitted or explicitly required" 
directive of Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) through the use of broad 
policy statements from other statutes.  Accordingly, the WPDES 
permit requirements that cap the number of animal units and 
require groundwater monitoring through off-site wells are 
unlawful, and should be vacated.  Because the majority opinion 
nullifies § 227.10(2m)'s plainly stated directive that, "No 
agency may implement or enforce any standard, requirement, or 
threshold . . . unless that standard, requirement, or threshold 
is explicitly required or explicitly permitted by statute or by 
a rule," and in so doing it overturns Act 21's legislative 
command, I respectfully dissent.    
I.  BACKGROUND2 
¶50 Kinnard operates a large dairy farm in Kewaunee 
County, which it sought permission to expand.  Expansion 
required DNR approval and securing another WPDES permit for the 
expanded CAFO.     
                     
2 The majority opinion ably sets out the factual background; 
therefore, I shall narrate only that which is necessary to 
understand the discussion that follows.    
No.  2016AP1688.pdr 
 
3 
 
¶51 The requested permit was contested by Clean Wisconsin, 
Inc. and others (hereinafter Clean Wisconsin) during a lengthy 
administrative proceeding.  The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
determined that the permit should have specified the maximum 
number of animals allowed at the new facility and that a 
groundwater monitoring plan was needed in order to assure 
compliance with effluent limitations and groundwater protection 
standards.  He recommended two or three off-site groundwater 
monitoring wells.   
¶52 Kinnard 
sought 
review 
of 
the 
ALJ 
decision 
and 
ultimately the DNR approved a groundwater monitoring plan, 
without any off-site wells, and granted the WPDES permit without 
a cap on the number of animal units.  The former DNR Secretary, 
citing Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m), concluded that the DNR did not 
have explicit authority to place those restrictions on the WPDES 
permit.   
¶53 Clean Wisconsin and others sought circuit court review 
of the DNR decision, in both Kewaunee County and Dane County.  
The Dane County Circuit Court, upon Clean Wisconsin's motion, 
consolidated the reviews in Dane County.   
¶54 The circuit court vacated the WPDES permit.  It 
concluded that the DNR had authority to impose off-site 
groundwater monitoring wells and an animal unit maximum cap on 
the WPDES permit, and the DNR should have complied with the 
ALJ's recommendation.  Kinnard appealed, and the court of 
appeals certified the appeal to us.   
No.  2016AP1688.pdr 
 
4 
 
¶55 After the matter was certified to us, Governor Evers 
appointed 
a 
new 
DNR 
Secretary, 
who 
reversed 
the 
prior 
Secretary's position.  He embraced the ALJ's requirements of 
animal unit caps and off-site groundwater monitoring wells for 
Kinnard's WPDES permit.  He relied on Wis. Stat. § 283.31(3) and 
(4), and did not mention Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m).  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶56 This is a review of an administrative agency's 
decision; here, arising from an ALJ decision that the current 
DNR Secretary has endorsed.  On appeal, we review the decision 
of the DNR, not the decision of the circuit court.  Wis. Indus. 
Energy Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 2012 WI 89, ¶14, 342 
Wis. 2d 576, 819 N.W.2d 240.   
¶57 Statutory interpretation and application drive our 
decision.  We independently review questions of statutory 
interpretation and application.  State v. Mercado, 2021 WI 2, 
¶32, 395 Wis. 2d 296, 953 N.W.2d 337.   
B.  General Principles 
¶58 The 
purpose 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
is 
to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be applied 
correctly.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Statutory 
interpretation begins with the words chosen by the legislature, 
i.e., the text of the statute.  Id., ¶45.  
¶59 "If the words chosen for the statute exhibit a 'plain, 
clear statutory meaning,' without ambiguity, the statute is 
No.  2016AP1688.pdr 
 
5 
 
applied according to the plain meaning of the statutory terms."  
State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ¶22, 311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 N.W.2d 
769 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46).  However, if the 
statute is "capable of being understood by reasonably well-
informed persons in two or more senses[,]" the statute is 
ambiguous.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47.    
¶60 When a statute is ambiguous we often consult extrinsic 
sources such as legislative history.  Id., ¶46.  However, we 
also have consulted legislative history to confirm or verify a 
plain-meaning interpretation.  Id., ¶51.   
C.  Wisconsin Stat. § 227.10(2m) 
¶61 The outcome of this case turns on the interpretation 
and application of Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) to undisputed facts.  
Section 227.10(2m) provides in relevant part: 
No agency may implement or enforce any standard, 
requirement, or threshold, including as a term or 
condition of any license issued by the agency, unless 
that standard, requirement, or threshold is explicitly 
required or explicitly permitted by statute or by a 
rule that has been promulgated in accordance with this 
subchapter.    
The specific questions that we must address are whether the 
agency requirements on the WPDES permit that caps the number of 
animals in the CAFO and requires off-site groundwater monitoring 
wells are "explicitly required or explicitly permitted by 
statute or by a rule."   
¶62 "Explicitly" is not a statutorily defined term.  
Therefore, we employ common, ordinary definitions for that term.  
Pulera v. Town of Richmond, 2017 WI 61, ¶13, 375 Wis. 2d 676, 
No.  2016AP1688.pdr 
 
6 
 
896 N.W.2d 342.  We often use a dictionary to find such 
definitions.  State v. Guarnero, 2015 WI 72, ¶16, 363 Wis. 2d 
857, 867 N.W.2d 400.  As the majority opinion points out, there 
are many dictionary definitions for "explicit."3  Reasonably 
well-informed persons could disagree about which definition best 
defines explicitly.  Accordingly, "explicitly," as employed in 
Wis. Stat. § 227.20(2m), is ambiguous.  Richards v. Badger Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶21, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581.   
¶63 Context also is important to meaning.  Id., ¶14.  In 
that regard, we interpret "explicitly required or permitted" in 
Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) in relation to closely-related statutes.  
Id.  Both § 227.10(2m) and Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a)1.-3. were 
enacted as part of 2011 Wisconsin Act 21; therefore, they are 
closely related.  Their connection is helpful in understanding 
the meaning of "explicitly," as is the legislative history 
underlying their enactments.   
¶64 For example, what became Act 21 was introduced as 
Assembly Bill 8 at the request of then-Governor Walker and then-
Representative-Tom Tiffany.4  As A.B. 8 was introduced, then-
Governor Walker said that the "legislation will take a multi-
pronged approach to improve Wisconsin's regulatory climate 
                     
3 Majority op., ¶24, noting that Black's Law Dictionary 
defines "explicit" as "expressed without ambiguity or vagueness" 
and American Heritage Dictionary defines "explicit" as "leaving 
nothing implied."    
4 2011-2012 Wisconsin Legislature, January 2011 Special 
Session, Assembly Bill 8, History. 
No.  2016AP1688.pdr 
 
7 
 
[including prohibiting agencies from] creat[ing] rules more 
restrictive than the regulatory standards or thresholds provided 
by the Legislature."5  His statement evidences that Act 21 was 
anticipated 
to 
cabin 
administrative 
authority 
so 
that 
administrative agencies did not exceed the textual directives 
from the legislature.   
¶65 The 
importance 
of 
the 
executive's 
statement 
as 
interpretative of an enacted statute is confirmed by United 
States Supreme Court precedent where recognition of public 
statements of past presidents have been employed in statutory 
interpretation.  For example, President Harrison is said to have 
voiced concerns about the coupling of train cars, when a statute 
addressing that issue was reviewed.  Johnson v. S. Pac. Co., 196 
U.S. 1, 19 (1904) (explaining that "President Harrison, in his 
annual messages of 1889, 1890, 1891, and 1892, earnestly urged 
upon Congress the necessity of legislation to obviate and reduce 
the loss of life and the injuries due to the prevailing method 
of coupling and braking.").  See also Kathryn Marie Dessayer, 
Note, The First Word:  The President's Place in "Legislative 
History", 89 Mich. L. Rev. 399, 413-420 (1990) (collecting 
federal and state cases that have utilized executive branch 
statements as legislative history).    
¶66 Furthermore, the cabining of administrative authority 
was a definitive change from past practice where administrative 
                     
5 Press Release, Scott Walker, Governor of Wisconsin, 
Special Session Part 2:  Regulatory Reform (Dec. 21, 2010). 
No.  2016AP1688.pdr 
 
8 
 
agencies ordered what they decided was helpful to furthering 
their administrative concerns and courts upheld such agency 
actions.6  See e.g., Maple Leaf Farms, Inc. v. DNR, 2001 WI App 
170, ¶13, 247 Wis. 2d 96, 633 N.W.2d 720 (examining DNR 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 283.31 to regulate off-site manure 
application because it was related to effluent regulation).   
¶67 In Maple Leaf, the court of appeals reasoned that an 
administrative 
agency 
has 
only 
those 
powers 
"expressly 
conferred" or that can be "fairly implied" from statutes.  Id.  
The court acknowledged that authority to regulate off-site 
manure application was not expressly conferred on the DNR by 
statute.  Id.  However, because the DNR asserted regulation of 
off-site application of manure was necessary to furthering its 
administrative regulation of effluents, the court concluded that 
it was implied by Wis. Stat. § 283.31's general terms and the 
DNR prevailed.  Id., ¶27.  The court explained that "the 
legislature has conferred authority on the DNR to regulate 
discharges, in the form of overapplication of manure, by CAFOs, 
regardless of whether the discharge occurs on land owned by the 
CAFO."  Id.   
¶68 Broad grants of administrative power to agencies were 
regular court practices prior to Act 21.7  The legislative 
                     
6 Prior to Act 21, "[a] mere statement of policy or an 
interpretation of a statute made in an agency decision in a 
particular matter with a specific set of facts did not make the 
statement or interpretation a 'rule' and did not require rule 
promulgation."  Wis. Leg. Council IM-2011-15, 2. 
7 See e.g., State ex rel. Farrell v. Schubert, 52 Wis. 2d 
(continued) 
No.  2016AP1688.pdr 
 
9 
 
history of Act 21 shows that the legislature was cabining 
administrative regulatory authority as it revised the Wisconsin 
Administrative 
Procedure 
Act. 
 
The 
legislative 
history 
underlying 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.10(2m) 
is 
helpful 
to 
its 
interpretation.  Initially, § 227.10(2m) was written, "No agency 
may implement or enforce any standard, requirement, or threshold 
as a term or condition of any license issued by the agency 
unless such implementation or enforcement is expressly required 
or permitted by statute or by a rule."  2011 Spec. Sess. A.B. 8 
(emphasis added).  Senate Amendment 1 changed "expressly" to 
"explicitly" because, as a sponsoring legislator explained, 
"courts 
have 
interpreted 
expressly 
very 
broadly" 
and 
"explicitly" was seen as a stronger limitation on agency 
authority.8   
                                                                  
351, 358, 190 N.W.2d 529 (1971) (concluding that the special 
review board had the "implied power to hold hearings and make 
investigations"); Racine Fire & Police Comm'n v. Stanfield, 70 
Wis. 2d 395, 399, 234 N.W.2d 307 (1975) ("It is the general rule 
that an agency or board created by the legislature has only 
those powers which are either expressly conferred or which are, 
by necessity, to be implied from the four corners of the statute 
under which it operates."); DOA v. DIHLR, 77 Wis. 2d 126, 136, 
252 N.W.2d 353 (1977) (same); Peterson v. Nat. Res. Bd., 94 
Wis. 2d 587, 592, 288 N.W.2d 845 (1980) (same); Kimberly-Clark 
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 110 Wis. 2d 455, 461-62, 329 N.W.2d 
143 (1983) (same); Watkins v. LIRC, 117 Wis. 2d 753, 761, 345 
N.W.2d 482 (1984) (same); Tatum v. LIRC, 132 Wis. 2d 411, 421, 
392 N.W.2d 840 (1986) (same and also noting that any reasonable 
doubt regarding the existence of an implied power of an 
administrative agency should be resolved in the agency's favor); 
Oneida Cnty. v. Converse, 180 Wis. 2d 120, 125, 508 N.W.2d 416 
(1993) (same). 
8 Representative Tom Tiffany, co-sponsor of A.B. 8, floor 
debate on Senate Amendment 1.  We have utilized floor debates as 
(continued) 
No.  2016AP1688.pdr 
 
10 
 
¶69 When interpreting federal statutes, the United States 
Supreme Court also has relied on statements from legislators as 
part of legislative history.  For example, in Sturgeon v. Frost, 
139 S. Ct. 1066, 1085 (2019), the Court reviewed a statutory 
provision regarding whether the National Park Service (NPS) had 
the power to regulate the use of hovercraft on the Nation River, 
which is within ANILCA.9  In its discussion, the Court reasoned 
that the legislative sponsor of ANILCA in the House of 
Representatives 
"described 
that 
provision's 
effect" 
as 
"designed . . . to ensure that ANILCA's new boundary lines would 
'not in any way change the status' of the state, Native, and 
private lands placed within them."  Id. (citing 125 Cong. Rec. 
11158 (1979)).  Therefore, because the use of hovercraft on the 
Nation River was permitted before the enactment of ANILCA, it 
continued after enactment, and the NPS could not prohibit such 
use.    
¶70 We employed both Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) and Wis. 
Stat. § 227.11(2)(a)1.-3. in Palm.  In doing so, we explained 
that the "explicit authority requirement is, in effect, a 
legislatively-imposed canon of construction that requires us to 
                                                                  
assists in statutory interpretation in the past.  See Strenke v. 
Hogner, 2005 WI 25, ¶¶23-25, 279 Wis. 2d 52, 694 N.W.2d 296 
(relating that in "the floor debate on Senate Bill 11, which 
later evolved into Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3)," Rep. Green responded 
to Rep. Robson's question about the effect of the bill then 
under consideration that we employed in our review). 
9 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA).   
No.  2016AP1688.pdr 
 
11 
 
narrowly 
construe 
imprecise 
delegations 
of 
power 
to 
administrative agencies."  Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶52.  We also 
noted with approval, a recent law review comment that summarized 
the interactions among the paragraphs of § 227.11(2)(a)1.-3. as 
"'prevent[ing] agencies from circumventing this new "explicit 
authority" requirement by simply utilizing broad statutes 
describing the agency's general duties or legislative purpose as 
a blank check for regulatory authority.'"  Id. (quoting Kirsten 
Koschnick, 
Comment, 
Making 
"Explicit 
Authority" 
Explicit:  Deciphering Wis. Act 21's Prescriptions for Agency 
Rulemaking Authority, 2019 Wis. L. Rev. 993, 996 (2019)).   
¶71 It is critical to note that because we are addressing 
statutes or rules, i.e., written communications, the explicit 
requirement or permission that is necessary to satisfy Wis. 
Stat. § 227.10(2m) must be expressed within the text of the 
statute or rule from which the agency asserts it was granted the 
power that it is exercising.  Here, the agency has identified no 
statute or rule wherein the text of the statute or rule even 
mentions that an agency may establish either a cap on the number 
of animal units in a CAFO or the requirement for off-site 
groundwater 
monitoring 
wells. 
 
Therefore, 
pursuant 
to 
§ 227.10(2m), the DNR has no authority to add those requirements 
to a WPDES permit. 
¶72 The DNR relies on statutes that describe the agency's 
general powers or duties, such as Wis. Stat. § 283.31, a 
practice 
that 
Act 
21, 
through 
creation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
No.  2016AP1688.pdr 
 
12 
 
§ 227.10(2m) and Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a)1.-3., prevents.  The 
majority opinion follows the lead of the DNR.    
D.  Majority Opinion 
¶73 The majority opinion concludes first, that "explicit" 
and "specific" are not synonymous.10  The majority then cites 
Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a)3. as support for that distinction 
because the legislature used "specific" in § 227.11(2)(a)3., but 
did not use it in Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m).11   
¶74 In order to understand Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a)3., it 
must be read in context, which includes (2)(a)'s directive that 
"[a]ll of the following apply to the promulgation of a rule 
interpreting 
the 
provisions 
of 
a 
statute 
enforced 
or 
administered by an agency:" 
1.  A 
statutory 
or 
nonstatutory 
provision 
containing a statement or declaration of legislative 
intent, purpose, findings, or policy does not confer 
rule-making authority on the agency or augment the 
agency's rule-making authority beyond the rule-making 
authority that is explicitly conferred on the agency 
by the legislature.   
2.  A statutory provision describing the agency's 
general powers or duties does not confer rule-making 
authority on the agency or augment the agency's rule-
making authority beyond the rule-making authority that 
is 
explicitly 
conferred 
on 
the 
agency 
by 
the 
legislature. 
3.  A statutory provision containing a specific 
standard, requirement, or threshold does not confer on 
the agency the authority to promulgate, enforce, or 
                     
10 Majority op., ¶24.   
11 Id., ¶25.   
No.  2016AP1688.pdr 
 
13 
 
administer 
a 
rule 
that 
contains 
a 
standard, 
requirement, or threshold that is more restrictive 
than the standard, requirement, or threshold contained 
in the statutory provision. 
§ 227.11(2)(a)1.-3. 
¶75 As is apparent from Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a)1.-3., 
that in § 227.11(2)(a)3., the legislature employed "a specific 
standard, requirement, or threshold" as a means of describing a 
statute that "explicitly conferred" legislative authority on an 
administrative agency within the text of the statute, and that 
such authority was not to be expanded beyond the text the 
legislature chose.12   
¶76 The 
legislature 
also 
prohibited 
the 
use 
of 
declarations of purpose or policy to expand authority delegated 
to an agency beyond that which was "explicitly conferred" by the 
text of the statute upon which the agency relies.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.11(2)(a)1.  And further, the legislature prohibited an 
agency from relying on the agency's general powers or duties to 
go beyond authority that was conferred on the agency by the 
explicit text of a statute.  § 227.11(2)(a)2.  As a recent law 
review comment pointed out, § 227.11(2)(a)1.-3. keep agency 
action in check so that it does not supersede statutory textual 
delegations.13   
                     
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.11(2)(a)1.-3., applies only to 
agency rulemaking, and there is no rulemaking that underlies 
this case.  However, since it was enacted as part of Act 21, the 
choice of words the legislature employed is revealing. 
13 Kirsten Koschnick, Comment, Making "Explicit Authority" 
Explicit:  Deciphering Wis. Act 21's Prescriptions for Agency 
Rulemaking Authority, 2019 Wis. L. Rev. 993, 996 (2019).   
No.  2016AP1688.pdr 
 
14 
 
¶77 As explained above, the majority opinion's reliance on 
Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a)3. is misplaced because that statute 
limits agency authority; it does not expand it.  In addition, 
the majority opinion relies on Wis. Stat. § 283.31(3)-(5)'s 
general statements of purpose to permit agency regulation of the 
number 
of 
animal 
units 
on 
Kinnard's 
CAFO 
and 
off-site 
groundwater monitoring wells.14  Section 227.11(2)(a)2. prohibits 
such an expansion.15  The majority opinion disregards Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.10(2m)'s requirement that an agency must have explicit 
textual authority before it may act.  In so doing, the majority 
opinion 
resurrects 
an 
administrative 
practice 
that 
the 
legislature explicitly prohibited in Act 21.   
¶78 First, although Wis. Stat. § 281.31(3) and (4) address 
water pollutant discharge permits, neither subsection mentions 
regulating the number of animal units or requiring off-site 
groundwater monitoring wells.  The text of both subsections are 
general purpose provisions.  For example, § 281.31(3) provides 
that a WPDES permit may be issued subject to effluent 
limitations.   
¶79 Second, DNR rules discuss effluent limitations, but 
there is no text that mentions animal unit limitations or off-
site groundwater monitoring wells for CAFOs.  Rather, the cited 
                     
14 Majority op., ¶¶2, 16, et seq.   
15 A statute that describes the agency's general powers or 
duties does not grant authority beyond that which "is explicitly 
conferred on the agency by the legislature."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.11(2)(a)2.   
No.  2016AP1688.pdr 
 
15 
 
rules are general requirements that are based on structural 
requirements and calculations of various volumes of effluents.16     
¶80 In regard to groundwater protection, which Wis. Stat. 
§ 283.31(3)(f) references, no statute or rule mentions off-site 
groundwater monitoring wells.  Wisconsin Admin. Code § NR 140.01 
states the chapter's purpose "is to establish groundwater 
quality standards for substances detected in or having a 
reasonable probability of entering the groundwater resources of 
the state."  Wisconsin Admin. Code § NR 214.21 addresses 
groundwater monitoring requirements, but contains no mention of 
off-site monitoring wells or caps on the number of animals 
permitted in a CAFO.  Rather, the monitoring wells all are tied 
to the treatment area and the grade of the site.  § NR 214.21(3) 
and (4).  
¶81 Simply stated, the majority opinion takes apart what 
the legislature enacted in Act 21, and it reinstates control by 
agency regulation, as was the circumstance in Wisconsin before 
Act 21.  In so doing, a majority of the court steps out of the 
judicial lane as an interpreter of the law and becomes a maker 
of law, contrary to the clear directive of the legislature in 
Act 21.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶82 I conclude that there is no explicit textual authority 
in either statute or rule that grants the DNR power to set a 
                     
16 See e.g., Wis. Admin. Code § NR 243.13(2)(a) and (b).   
No.  2016AP1688.pdr 
 
16 
 
maximum number of animals that Kinnard's CAFO may contain or to 
require off-site groundwater monitoring wells.  Furthermore, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.11(2)(a)1.–3. 
preclude 
agencies 
from 
circumventing the "explicitly permitted or explicitly required" 
directive of Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) through the use of broad 
policy statements from other statutes.  Accordingly, the WPDES 
permit requirements that cap the number of animal units and 
require groundwater monitoring through off-site wells are 
unlawful, and should be vacated.  Because the majority opinion 
nullifies § 227.10(2m)'s plainly stated directive that, "No 
agency may implement or enforce any standard, requirement, or 
threshold . . . unless that standard, requirement, or threshold 
is explicitly required or explicitly permitted by statute or by 
a rule," and in so doing it overturns Act 21's legislative 
command, I respectfully dissent. 
¶83 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2016AP1688.rgb 
 
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¶84 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I join the 
textual analysis of the operative statutes in Justice Patience 
Drake Roggensack's dissent, which definitively resolves the 
questions presented.  I write separately to refute Justice 
Rebecca Frank Dallet's mischaracterization of that writing.  
Justice Dallet attempts to signal a change in the dissent's 
approach to statutory interpretation.  There is no deviation 
from our seminal case on statutory interpretation, which 
expounds textualism.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  The dissent 
simply 
applies 
Kalal, 
which 
says 
"as 
a 
general 
matter, 
legislative history need not be and is not consulted except to 
resolve an ambiguity in the statutory language, although 
legislative history is sometimes consulted to confirm or verify 
a plain-meaning interpretation."  Id., ¶51. 
¶85 Although Justice Dallet would prefer that Justice 
Shirley Abrahamson's concurrence in Kalal govern statutory 
interpretation 
in 
Wisconsin, 
the 
method 
it 
espoused 
was 
affirmatively rejected 17 years ago and this court continues to 
disavow the sort of results-oriented analysis Justice Dallet now 
embraces.  "We do not . . . endorse the methodology advanced by 
the[n] chief justice [Shirley Abrahamson] in her concurrence 
that calls for consultation of extrinsic, non-textual sources of 
interpretation in every case, regardless of whether the language 
of the statute is clear.  Such an approach subordinates the 
statutory text and renders the analysis more vulnerable to 
subjectivity."  Id., ¶49 n.8. 
No.  2016AP1688.rgb 
 
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¶86 Kalal was a "watershed decision in the modern history 
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court" and is Wisconsin's "most cited 
case of modern times."  Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin 
Statutes, 100 Marq. L. Rev. 969, 969-70 (2017).  "Kalal 
transformed 
statutory 
interpretation 
in 
Wisconsin" 
and 
"shift[ed] 
state 
courts 
from 
a 
vaguely 
intentionalist 
interpretive method" to a "uniform method" focusing upon the 
plain meaning of the words actually enacted into law.  Id. at 
970.  Justice Dallet seems determined to do away with this 
mainstream textual method of interpreting statutes, which would 
usher 
in 
an 
"unusual, 
freewheeling 
method 
of 
statutory 
interpretation" that prioritizes results over text.  See State 
v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶102, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203 
(Sykes, J., concurring). 
¶87 While Justice Dallet "would dispense with" what she 
describes as "the formalistic requirement that we must first 
label a statutory term 'ambiguous' before we consult extrinsic 
sources to determine its meaning," it is no mere formality for 
judges who faithfully interpret statutory text.  Concurrence, 
¶41.  "[T]he rule prevents the use of extrinsic sources of 
interpretation to vary or contradict the plain meaning of a 
statute[.]"  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51.  Because it would 
interfere with the type of results-oriented decision-making the 
majority employs in this case, Justice Dallet maligns the rule 
as mere "pretext" and accuses the judges who follow it of being 
something other than "upfront and honest about considering 
relevant extrinsic sources to interpret a statute's meaning."  
No.  2016AP1688.rgb 
 
3 
 
Concurrence, ¶43.  In doing so, Justice Dallet, once again, 
simply "misunderstands how to interpret legal texts."  James v. 
Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, ¶23 n.12, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __.  
Absent ambiguity, we do not consult any "extrinsic sources to 
interpret a statute's meaning" because it is a cardinal rule of 
statutory interpretation that "[t]he words of a governing text 
are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their 
context, is what the text means."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 
(2012); Milwaukee District Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2019 
WI 24, ¶21, 385 Wis. 2d 748, 924 N.W.2d 153. 
¶88 Although 
Justice 
Dallet 
would 
abandon 
it, 
the 
textualist method of statutory interpretation is "rooted in and 
fundamental to the rule of law.  Ours is 'a government of laws 
not men,' and 'it is simply incompatible with democratic 
government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the 
meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather 
than by what the lawgiver promulgated.  It is the law that 
governs, not the intent of the lawgiver . . . .  Men may intend 
what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which 
bind us.'"  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶52 (quoting Antonin Scalia, 
A Matter of Interpretation:  Federal Courts and the Law 17 
(1997)). 
¶89 Justice Dallet misconstrues the dissent to say "a 
statutory term is ambiguous so long as it is defined differently 
in multiple dictionaries."  Concurrence, ¶42.  Obviously, words 
often bear different meanings in different contexts.  The 
No.  2016AP1688.rgb 
 
4 
 
existence of varying definitions does not give judges a license 
to declare a statute ambiguous and then rely on extrinsic 
sources to give a statute a meaning it does not have.  "[A] 
statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by 
reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses.  It is 
not enough that there is a disagreement about the statutory 
meaning; the test for ambiguity examines the language of the 
statute to determine whether well-informed persons should have 
become confused, that is, whether the statutory . . . language 
reasonably gives rise to different meanings."  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶47 (quoted source omitted). 
¶90 While it is debatable whether reasonable minds may 
differ on the meaning of "explicit,"1 there is nothing wrong with 
consulting the history of a statute to confirm its plain 
meaning; doing so does not treat such extrinsic sources as 
authoritative on the meaning of the text.  Contrary to Justice 
Dallet's proffered method of interpretation, legislative history 
                     
1 Compare Clean Wisconsin, Inc. v. DNR, 2021 WI __, ¶51, __ 
Wis. 2d __, 
__ 
N.W.2d __ 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting) (defining "explicit" as "something expressed without 
ambiguity or vagueness" and "leaving no doubt") with Justice 
Roggensack's dissent, ¶62. 
No.  2016AP1688.rgb 
 
5 
 
is not "an important tool in statutory interpretation"2 but a 
thoroughly discredited one: 
The notion that you can pluck statements from a couple 
of legislators or even from a committee report, which 
is usually written by some teenagers, and . . . very 
often not even read by the committee, much less read 
by the whole House, much less less read by the other 
House, . . . [and 
presume 
the 
statements] 
somehow 
[are] reflective of the intent of the whole Congress 
and of the President . . . it truly is the last 
surviving fiction in American law.[3] 
¶91 Justice Dallet's approach would allow judges to misuse 
legislative history in order to give an unambiguous statute a 
meaning it does not bear.  Adopting her approach would make the 
law's history superior to the law itself:  "The more [you] use[] 
[legislative history], the more unreliable it's likely to become 
and the less incentive legislators will have to legislate.  
After all, canny politicians will have every reason to try to 
achieve their lawmaking dreams through ever more enterprising 
                     
2 Although Justice Dallet cites United America for this 
proposition, 
that 
case 
actually 
says 
the 
"plain-meaning 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.18 fully 
resolves 
[the 
court's] interpretative inquiry," and quotes Kalal's limited 
allowance for its use:  "legislative history is sometimes 
consulted to confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation."  
United Am., LLC v. DOT, 2021 WI 44, ¶18, 397 Wis. 2d 42, 959 
N.W.2d 317 (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶51, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110) 
(emphasis added). 
3 Hoover Inst., Uncommon Knowledge with Justice Antonin 
Scalia, YouTube, at 17:40 (Oct. 30, 2012), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=DaoLMW5AF4Y. 
No.  2016AP1688.rgb 
 
6 
 
uses of legislative history[.]"  Neil Gorsuch, A Republic, If 
You Can Keep It 141 (2019). 
¶92 On a final note, Justice Dallet claims the dissent 
uses "extrinsic sources to inform its statutory analysis."  It 
doesn't.  But Justice Dallet persists in promoting, as she has 
done in multiple cases this term,4 a results-oriented approach to 
statutory interpretation to replace the neutral, text-based 
methodology 
this 
court 
adopted 
in 
Kalal——in 
this 
case 
encouraging "ever more enterprising uses of legislative history" 
to achieve desired outcomes.  As it did 17 years ago, this court 
should resist any impulse to stray from the text in order to 
shape the law as it may have preferred it to be written.  
Preservation of the rule of law depends on it. 
 
                     
4 See, e.g., James v. Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, __ Wis. 2d __, 
__ N.W.2d __ (Dallet, J., dissenting) (advocating to jettison 
well-established canons of statutory construction in order to 
reach a desired meaning of Wis. Stat. § 252.03); Schwab v. 
Schwab, 2021 WI 67, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (declining to 
interpret and follow the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 893.40, 
as it in part "would produce an unreasonable result that would 
not advance the statute's purpose"). 
No.  2016AP1688.rgb 
 
1