Title: ALBERTA STUDIER V MICHIGAN PUBLIC SCHL EMP RETIREMENT BD
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 125765
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 2005

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 28, 2005
ALBERTA STUDIER, PATRICIA M.
SANOCKI, MARY A. NICHOLS, LAVIVA
M. CABAY, MARY L. WOODRING, and
MILDRED E. WEDELL, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v 
 
No. 125765 
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES' 
RETIREMENT BOARD, MICHIGAN PUBLIC
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
and TREASURER OF MICHIGAN, 
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________/ 
ALBERTA STUDIER, PATRICIA M.
SANOCKI, MARY A. NICHOLS, LAVIVA
M. CABAY, MARY L. WOODRING, and
MILDRED E. WEDELL, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v 
 
No. 125766 
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SCHOOL EMLOYEES’ 
RETIREMENT BOARD, MICHIGAN PUBLIC
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
and TREASURER OF MICHIGAN, 
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________________/ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
TAYLOR, C.J. 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
We granted leave in this case to consider two issues. 
The first is whether health care benefits paid to public 
school retirees constitute “accrued financial benefits” 
subject to protection from diminishment or impairment by 
Const 1963, art 9, § 24. 
We hold that they do not and, 
accordingly, affirm the Court of Appeals determination on 
this issue.1
 The second issue is whether the statute 
establishing the health care benefits, MCL 38.1391(1), 
created a contract with the public school retirees that 
could not be changed by a later legislature because to do 
so would unconstitutionally impair an existing contractual 
obligation in violation of US Const, art I, § 10 and Const 
1963, art 1, § 10. 
The Court of Appeals determined that 
MCL 38.1391(1) established a contract, but that the 
Legislature’s subsequent changes were insubstantial and, 
thus, 
there 
was 
no 
constitutionally 
impermissible 
impairment of contract. The Court of Appeals erred on this 
issue because MCL 38.1391(1) did not create a contract. 
However, because the Court of Appeals reached the correct 
result, we affirm its determination that the circuit court 
properly entered summary disposition in defendants’ favor. 
1 260 Mich App 460; 679 NW2d 88 (2004). 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
I. 
FACTUAL HISTORY AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE  
The Michigan Public School Employees’ Retirement Board 
(board) began providing a health care plan for public 
school retirees in 1975 pursuant to amendments made by 1974 
PA 244 to the former Public School Employees Retirement 
Act, 1945 PA 136, which was the predecessor of the current 
Public School Employees Retirement Act, 1980 PA 300, MCL 
38.1301 et seq.  Since that time, participants in the plan 
have been required to pay deductibles and copays for 
prescription drugs, and the amounts of the deductibles and 
copays have gradually increased throughout the years 
because of numerous amendments the board has made to the 
plan to reflect the rising costs of health care and 
advances in medical technology. 
The present case arises 
from the two most recent amendments made to the plan by the 
board. 
The first amendment became effective on January 1, 
2000, and increased the amount of the deductibles that 
retirees are required to pay. 
The second amendment 
occurred on January 21, 2000, and increased the copays and 
out-of-pocket maximums that retirees are required to pay 
for prescription drugs. 
The Court of Appeals succinctly 
summarized those amendments as follows: 
The 
amendments 
modified 
the 
plan’s
prescription drug copayment structure and out-of­
pocket maximum for prescription drugs effective
April 1, 2000, and also implemented a formulary
effective January 1, 2001. A formulary is a 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
preferred list of drugs approved by the federal
Food and Drug Administration that is designed to
give preference to those competing drugs that
offer the greatest therapeutic benefit at the
most 
favorable 
cost. 
Existing 
maintenance 
prescriptions 
outside 
the 
formulary 
were 
grandfathered in and subject only to the standard
copayment of twenty percent of the drug's cost,
with a $ 4 minimum and a $ 20 maximum. 
The prescription drug copayment was changed
to a twenty percent copay, with a $4 minimum and
$20 maximum for up to a one-month supply. The
copay 
maximum 
for 
mail-order 
prescription
copayment was set at $50 for a three-month 
supply. 
A $750 maximum out-of-pocket copay for
each calendar year was also established. [The
plan did not previously contain an annual out-of­
pocket maximum.] 
Under the formulary, eligible
persons pay an additional twenty percent of a new
nonformulary drug’s approved cost only when use
of the nonformulary drug is not preapproved by
the drug plan administrator. 
The board also adopted a resolution to 
increase health insurance deductibles from $145 
for an individual to $165, and from $290 to $ 330
for a family, effective January 1, 2000. The
deductibles do not apply to prescription drugs.[2] 
Plaintiffs, six public school retirees, filed suit for 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the board, the 
Michigan 
Public 
School 
Employees’ 
Retirement 
System 
(MPSERS), the Michigan Department of Management and Budget, 
and the Treasurer of the state of Michigan. 
Although 
plaintiffs’ complaint contained three counts, only counts I 
and II remain for our consideration. 
Count I alleged that 
the copay and deductible increases violate Const 1963, art 
2 260 Mich App at 466-467. 
4  
 
 
 
 
9, § 24, which prohibits the state or a political 
subdivision from diminishing or impairing the “accrued 
financial benefits” of any pension plan or retirement 
system it offers. 
Count II alleged that the copay and 
deductible increases violate Const 1963, art 1, § 10 and US 
Const, art I, § 10, both of which prohibit the enactment of 
a law that impairs an existing contractual obligation. 
Both sides moved for summary disposition on these 
counts and the trial court granted defendants’ motion 
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). With respect to count I, the 
trial court rejected plaintiffs’ claim that health care 
benefits are “accrued financial benefits” under Const 1963, 
art 9, § 24, holding that the Court of Appeals and this 
Court “‘have been squarely faced with the opportunity to 
rule on this question and have declined to do so . . . .’” 
260 Mich App at 462. 
With respect to count II, the trial 
court, after noting the similarity between the MPSERS 
health care plan and those offered by other states, 
concluded that MCL 38.1391(1) does establish a contract 
with the plaintiffs but that, because the proportions of 
the total costs for deductibles and copays borne by the 
plaintiffs were essentially unchanged, the impairment was 
too insubstantial to create an impairment the law would 
recognize. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed the trial court’s ruling entirely. 
Thus, the 
panel held that health care benefits are not “accrued 
financial benefits” subject to protection by Const 1963, 
art 9, § 24, and that the Legislature’s enactment of MCL 
38.1391(1) created a contract, but the impairment was too 
de minimis to be recognized. 
Plaintiffs applied for leave to appeal to this Court, 
seeking to challenge the Court of Appeals determinations 
that health care benefits are not “accrued financial 
benefits” protected by Const 1963, art 9, § 24 and that the 
deductible and copay increases implemented by the health 
care plan amendments are not a substantial impairment of 
plaintiffs’ contractual right to receive health care 
benefits. 
Defendants filed an application for leave to 
appeal, 
seeking 
to 
challenge 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
conclusion that MCL 38.1391(1) vests plaintiffs with a 
contractual right. 
We granted both applications and 
ordered that they be submitted together.3 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision 
regarding a motion for summary disposition. 
Taxpayers of 
Michigan Against Casinos v Michigan, 471 Mich 306, 317; 685 
3 471 Mich 875 (2004). 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NW2d 221 (2004). 
This case also involves constitutional 
issues, as well as issues of statutory construction. These 
issues are reviewed de novo by this Court. 
Wayne Co v 
Hathcock, 471 Mich 445, 455; 684 NW2d 765 (2004). 
III. ANALYSIS OF CONST 1963, ART 9, § 24 
Const 1963, art 9, § 24 provides: 
The 
accrued 
financial 
benefits 
of 
each 
pension plan and retirement system of the state
and 
its 
political 
subdivisions 
shall 
be 
a 
contractual obligation thereof which shall not be
diminished or impaired thereby. 
Financial benefits arising on account of 
service rendered in each fiscal year shall be
funded during that year and such funding shall 
not be used for financing unfunded accrued 
liabilities. 
These two clauses unambiguously prohibit the state and 
its political subdivisions from diminishing or impairing 
“accrued financial benefits,” and require them to fund 
“accrued financial benefits” during the fiscal year for 
which corresponding services are rendered. 
To apply this, 
we are called upon to determine what is an “accrued 
financial benefit” and, in particular, whether health care 
benefits are such a benefit. 
This Court has twice considered the issue whether 
health care benefits fall within the ambit of “accrued 
financial benefits” protected by art 9, § 24. In the first 
instance, Musselman v Governor, 448 Mich 503; 533 NW2d 237 
7  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
(1995) (Musselman I), six members of this Court4 considered 
a constitutional challenge to the state’s failure to fund 
retirement health care benefits being earned by nonretired 
public school employees during the 1990-1991 school year. 
In determining whether the state’s failure to do so 
violated the “prefunding” requirement of the second clause 
of art 9, § 24, a four-member majority of this Court 
determined that health care benefits are, indeed, included 
within the term “accrued financial benefits.” 
Focusing 
primarily on statements by some of the constitutional 
delegates who supported art 9, § 24 that they were 
concerned about the future ability of governmental entities 
to pay retirement benefits if the entities did not set 
aside funding to do so during each year of a public 
employee’s service,5 the majority reasoned that “because the 
purpose of the provision is to prevent governmental units 
from amassing bills for pension payments that they do not 
have money to pay, we hold that the term ‘financial 
benefits’ must include retirement health care benefits.” 
Musselman I, supra at 513. 
Justice Riley, joined by 
4 Justice Weaver did not participate. 448 Mich at 503. 
5 Musselman I, supra at 512-513, quoting 1 Official
Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 772 (delegate
Stafseth); Musselman I, supra at 512 n 5, quoting 1 
Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 771 
(delegate Van Dusen). 
8  
 
 
 
 
Justice 
Levin, 
dissented 
from 
this 
portion 
of 
the 
majority’s 
analysis 
primarily 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
her 
conclusion that the term “financial” is commonly understood 
to connote monetary obligations and, thus, the term 
“financial 
benefits” 
does 
not 
encompass 
health 
care 
benefits. Id. at 525-532. 
This Court subsequently granted rehearing in Musselman 
v Governor (On Rehearing), 450 Mich 574; 545 NW2d 346 
(1996) (Musselman II), and the prior majority lost a vote 
because Justice Brickley stated that he no longer believed 
that interpretation of art 9, § 24 was necessary to resolve 
the case. Musselman II, supra at 576-577. Justice Weaver, 
now participating, joined Justice Riley’s dissent on the 
issue and also wrote separately, saying that the electorate 
could not have intended the phrase “accrued financial 
benefits” to include health care benefits because the 
pension and retirement systems in place at the time art 9, 
§ 24 was adopted consisted only of monthly stipends. 
Id. 
at 
579-580. 
Justice 
Weaver 
further 
concluded 
that 
statements by constitutional convention delegates show that 
they had employed the phrase “accrued financial benefits” 
for the specific purpose of limiting the contractual right 
of public school employees under art 9, § 24 to deferred 
compensation embodied in a pension plan. 
Musselman II, 
supra at 580, quoting 1 Official Record, Constitutional
9 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Convention 1961, pp 771, 773-774 (delegate Van Dusen). 
Thus, with six justices splitting three to three on the 
issue, the question whether health care benefits are 
included within the phrase “accrued financial benefits” 
remained unresolved by this Court. 
However, as did the 
Court of Appeals in the present case,6 we agree with 
Justices Riley, Weaver, and Levin that they are not. 
As Justice Riley correctly pointed out in her dissent 
in Musselman I, the majority “misse[d] the mark” by 
focusing on the history behind art 9, § 24 and the intent 
of the constitutional convention delegates in proposing it, 
rather than on the interpretation that the people would 
have given the provision when they adopted it. 
Musselman 
I, supra at 526. 
Indeed, we recently stated the correct 
standard to be applied when interpreting constitutional 
provisions in Hathcock, supra at 468: 
The 
primary 
objective 
in 
interpreting a 
constitutional provision is to determine the 
text’s original meaning to the ratifiers, the
people, at the time of ratification. [People v
Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 573; 677 NW2d 1 (2004).]
This rule of “common understanding” has been 
described by Justice COOLEY in this way: 
“A constitution is made for the people and
by the people. The interpretation that should be
given it is that which reasonable minds, the 
great mass of the people themselves, would give 
it. ‘For as the Constitution does not derive its 
6 260 Mich App at 473. 
10  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
force from the convention which framed, but from
the people who ratified it, the intent to be 
arrived at is that of the people, and it is not 
to be supposed that they have looked for any dark
or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but 
rather that they have accepted them in the sense
most obvious to the common understanding, and 
ratified the instrument in the belief that that 
was 
the 
sense 
designed 
to 
be 
conveyed.’”
[Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General,
384 Mich 390, 405; 185 NW2d 9 (1971) (emphasis in
original), 
quoting 
1 
Cooley, 
Constitutional 
Limitations (6th ed), p 81.] 
In short, the primary objective of constitutional
interpretation is to realize the intent of the
people by whom and for whom the constitution was
ratified. 
In order to reach the objective of discerning the 
intent of the people when ratifying a constitutional 
provision, we apply the plain meaning of each term used 
therein at the time of ratification unless technical, legal 
terms were employed. 
Phillips v Mirac, Inc, 470 Mich 415, 
422; 685 NW2d 174 (2004). 
In this case, the term 
“benefits” is modified by the words “financial” and 
“accrued.” 
Because these adjectives are not technical, 
legal terms that would have been ascribed a particular 
meaning by those learned in the law at the time the 
Constitution was ratified,7 we discern the intent of the 
people in ratifying art 9, § 24 by according the adjectives 
7 Id. at 425. 
11  
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
their 
plain 
and 
ordinary 
meanings 
at 
the 
time 
of 
ratification.8 
We first note that, despite specifically stating that 
the threshold issue in determining whether health care 
benefits were subject to the prefunding requirement of the 
second clause of art 9, § 24 is whether they constitute 
“accrued financial benefits” within the meaning of the 
first clause of art 9, § 24,9 the majority in Musselman I 
did not address the term “accrued.” 
At the time that our 
1963 Constitution was ratified, the term “accrue” was 
commonly defined as “to increase, grow,” “to come into 
existence as an enforceable claim; vest as a right,” “to 
come by way of increase or addition: arise as a growth or 
result,” “to be periodically accumulated in the process of 
time whether as an increase or a decrease,” “gather, 
collect, accumulate,” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 
(1961), p 13, or “to happen or result as a natural growth; 
arise in due course; come or fall as an addition or 
8 It seems apparent, but to foreclose confusion that
the dissent may engender, that the 2004 view of the 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) that the
dissent relies on to define terms is entirely irrelevant to
what ratifiers in 1963 would have understood. Furthermore,
the passage quoted from the GASB by the dissent does not
even purport to define any of these terms but merely
directs how to handle the accounting fringe benefits 
entail. 
9 Musselman I, supra at 510. 
12  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
increment,” “to become a present and enforceable right or 
demand,” Random House American College Dictionary (1964), p 
9. 
Thus, according to these definitions, the ratifiers of 
our Constitution would have commonly understood “accrued” 
benefits to be benefits of the type that increase or grow 
over time—such as a pension payment or retirement allowance 
that increases in amount along with the number of years of 
service a public school employee has completed.10
 Health 
care benefits, however, are not benefits of this sort. 
Simply 
stated, 
they 
are 
not 
accrued. 
Under 
MCL 
38.1390(1),11 which the plaintiffs in this case rely on, 
neither the amount of health care benefits a public school 
employee 
receives 
nor 
the 
amount 
of 
the 
premium, 
subscription, or membership fee that MPSERS pays increases 
in relation to the number of years of service the retiree 
has performed. 
That art 9, § 24 only protects those financial 
benefits that increase or grow over time is not only 
supported but, indeed, confirmed by the interaction between 
10 See, e.g., MCL 38.1384. 
11 MCL 38.1391(1) provides that “[t]he retirement system
shall pay the entire monthly premium or membership or
subscription fee for hospital, medical-surgical, and sick
care benefits for the benefit of a retirant or retirement 
allowance beneficiary who elects coverage in the plan
authorized by the retirement board and the department.” 
13  
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
the 
first 
and 
second 
clauses 
of 
that 
provision. 
Specifically, the first clause contractually binds the 
state and its political subdivisions to pay for retired 
public employees’ “accrued financial benefits . . . .” 
Thereafter, the second clause seeks to ensure that the 
state and its political subdivisions will be able to 
fulfill this contractual obligation by requiring them to 
set aside funding each year for those “[f]inancial benefits 
arising on account of service rendered in each fiscal year 
. . . .” Thus, because the second clause only requires the 
state and its political subdivision to set aside funding 
for “[f]inancial benefits arising on account of service 
rendered in each fiscal year” to fulfill their contractual 
obligation of paying for “accrued financial benefits,” it 
reasonably 
follows 
that 
“accrued” 
financial 
benefits 
consist only of those “[f]inancial benefits arising on 
account of service rendered in each fiscal year . . . .”12 
Moreover, health care benefits do not qualify as 
“financial” benefits. At the time Const 1963, art 9, § 24 
12 The dissent claims that we are not defining words
with any reference to context. 
This is not the case. 
Indeed, we are as committed to that interpretive tool as
the dissent claims to be, and this opinion bears witness to
that. 
The difference between us, however, is that we are
endeavoring to place words in the context of other words
while the dissent places words in the context of something
far more vague, apparently nothing more than its own sense
of the preferred result. 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
was ratified, the term “financial” was commonly defined as 
“pertaining 
to 
monetary 
receipts 
and 
expenditures; 
pertaining or relating to money matters; pecuniary,” Random 
House, supra, 
p 453, or “relating to finance or 
financiers,” Webster’s, supra, p 851, and “finance” was 
commonly defined as “pecuniary resources, as of . . . an 
individual; 
revenues,” 
Random 
House, 
supra; 
accord 
Webster’s, supra. 
“Pecuniary,” in turn, was commonly 
defined as “consisting of or given or extracted in money,” 
or “of or pertaining to money.” 
Random House, supra, p 
892; accord Webster’s, supra, p 1663. 
Accordingly, the 
ratifiers 
of 
our 
Constitution 
would 
have 
commonly 
understood 
“financial” benefits to include only those 
benefits that consist of monetary payments, and not 
benefits of a nonmonetary nature such as health care 
benefits. 
We further point out that, even if the phrase 
“accrued financial benefits” were ambiguous and, thus, it 
would 
be 
permissible 
or 
necessary 
to 
consult 
the 
statements 
of 
delegates 
during 
the 
constitutional 
convention debates, the majority’s approach in doing so 
in Musselman I was fundamentally flawed. 
Specifically, 
although this Court has continually recognized that 
constitutional 
convention 
debates 
are 
relevant 
to 
determining the meaning of a particular provision, Lapeer 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Co Clerk v Lapeer Circuit Court, 469 Mich 146, 156; 665 
NW2d 452 (2003); People v Nash, 418 Mich 196, 209; 341 
NW2d 439 (1983) (opinion by Brickley, J.), we take this 
opportunity to clarify that, when necessary, the proper 
objective in consulting constitutional convention debates 
is not to discern the intent of the framers in proposing 
or supporting a specific provision, but to determine the 
intent of the ratifiers in adopting the provision, Nutt, 
supra at 574.13  We highlighted this distinction in Univ 
of Michigan Regents v Michigan, 395 Mich 52, 59-60; 235 
NW2d 1 (1975), in which we stated: 
The debates must be placed in perspective.
They are individual expressions of concepts as
the speakers perceive them (or make an effort to
explain 
them). 
Although 
they 
are 
sometimes 
illuminating, affording a sense of direction,
they are not decisive as to the intent of the
general convention (or of the people) in adopting
the measures. 
Therefore, we will turn to the committee
debates only in the absence of guidance in the
constitutional language . . . or when we find in
the debates a recurring thread of explanation
binding together the whole of a constitutional
concept. 
Bearing this principle in mind, the primary focus of 
the majority in Musselman I should not have been on the 
intentions of the delegates in supporting art 9, § 24 but, 
13 “Constitutional Convention debates and the Address to 
the People are certainly relevant as aids in determining
the intent of the ratifiers.” (Emphasis added.) 
16  
 
 
                                                 
 
rather, on any statements they may have made that would 
have shed light on why they chose to employ the particular 
terms they used in drafting the provision to aid in 
discerning what the common understanding of those terms 
would have been when the provision was ratified by the 
people.14  In this regard, it is important to note that the 
majority in Musselman I did, in fact, locate such evidence 
but chose to disregard it, stating: 
The only explicit elaboration on the term
“accrued financial benefits” was this remark by
delegate Van Dusen: 
“The words ‘accrued financial benefits’ were 
used designedly, so that the contractual right of
the employee would be limited to the deferred
compensation embodied in any pension plan, and
that we hope to avoid thereby a proliferation of
litigation 
by 
individual 
participants 
in 
retirement systems talking about the general
benefits structure, or something other than his
specific right to receive benefits.” 
Unfortunately, he addresses which rights are 
contractual, and thus enforceable at law under
the first clause of Const 1963, art 9, § 24—a
question distinct from what must be prefunded 
14 See, generally, Beech Grove Investment Co v Civil 
Rights Comm, 380 Mich 405, 425-428; 157 NW2d 213 (1968), in
which 
this 
Court 
examined, 
among 
other 
things, 
the 
statements of delegates to the constitutional convention
and the Address to the People in order to discern the
meaning of the term “civil rights” as used in Const 1963,
art 5, § 29, but, in doing so, expressly recognized that
“it is the Constitution, not the debates, that was finally
submitted to the people. 
While the debates may assist in
an interpretation of the Constitution, neither they nor
even the Address to the People is controlling.” 
Beech 
Grove, supra at 427. 
17  
 
 
 
 
under the second clause. 
[Musselman I, supra at 
510 
n 
8, 
quoting 
1 
Official 
Record,
Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 773-774.] 
This statement by delegate Van Dusen is directly 
relevant to discerning the common understanding of the 
words “accrued” and “financial” at the time of the 
constitutional 
convention 
and, 
indeed, 
reinforces 
our 
conclusion 
that 
the 
ratifiers 
would 
have 
commonly 
understood the phrase “accrued financial benefits” to be 
one of limitation that would restrict the scope of 
protection provided by art 9, § 24 to monetary payments for 
past services. 
The Musselman I majority’s stated reason 
for disregarding this statement, that delegate Van Dusen 
was stating why that phrase was used in the first clause of 
art 9, § 24, and not why it was used in the second clause, 
is illogical. Stated simply, there is no reason to believe 
that the ratifiers would have interpreted the phrase 
“accrued financial benefits” any differently when reading 
the second clause than they would have when reading the 
first. 
Indeed, it would be unreasonable to assume, in the 
circumstance where they were drafted together and presented 
to the ratifiers at the same time, that there was any other 
intent. In discussing this concept, Justice Cooley stated, 
“[a]s a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same 
word is used in the same sense wherever it occurs in a 
18  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
constitution.” 
1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th 
ed), p 135.15 
Thus, in summary, we hold that health care benefits 
are not protected by Const 1963, art 9, § 24 because they 
neither qualify as “accrued” benefits nor “financial” 
benefits as those terms were commonly 
understood at the 
time of the Constitution’s ratification and, thus, are not 
“accrued financial benefits.” 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF CONST 1963, ART 1, § 10 AND US CONST,
ART I, § 10 
The plaintiffs here assert that, by enacting MCL 
38.1391(1), the Legislature created a contractual right by 
public school retirees to receive health care benefits and, 
further, that this contractual right could not be altered 
15 See, also, Lockwood v Comm’r of Revenue, 357 Mich 
517, 536-537; 98 NW2d 753 (1959) (Carr, J., dissenting): 
It is incredible that the legislature in
submitting to popular vote the proposed amendment
[of Const 1908, art 10, § 23] at the general
election in 1954, or that the people in voting
thereon, intended that the term “sales tax” as 
used in the clauses of said amendment providing
for the apportionment of sales tax funds in the
manner stated therein, and in inhibiting the 
legislature from increasing the sales tax above
3%, intended to use the term in question with
different meanings. In other words, it must be 
assumed that the designation was used in the 
proviso imposing limitation on the power of the
legislature with reference to the increase in the
sales tax with exactly the same meaning as 
clearly 
intended 
in 
the 
so-called 
diversion 
clauses. [Emphasis added.] 
19  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
or abolished by successive legislatures without violating 
Const 1963, art 1, § 1016 and US Const, art I, § 10,17 both 
of which prohibit the state from enacting any law that 
impairs existing contractual obligations. 
We disagree. 
MCL 38.1391(1) provides: 
The retirement system[18] shall pay the entire
monthly premium or membership or subscription fee
for hospital, medical-surgical, and sick care 
benefits for the benefit of a retirant or 
retirement 
allowance 
beneficiary 
who 
elects 
coverage in the plan authorized by the retirement
board and the department.[19] 
The Court of Appeals determined that this statute does 
create for plaintiffs a contractual right to receive health 
care benefits, but that the copay and deductible increases 
implemented by the board do not amount to a substantial 
impairment of that contractual right. However, we conclude 
that MCL 38.1391(1) does not create for retirees a 
contractual right to receive health care benefits and, 
16 “No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law
impairing the obligation of contract shall be enacted.” 
17 “No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex 
post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.” 
18 “Retirement system” refers to the MPSERS. 
MCL 
38.1307(8). 
19 “Department” refers to the Department of Management 
and Budget. MCL 38.1304(4). 
20  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals determination on 
that point. 
Of 
primary 
importance 
to 
the 
viability 
of 
our 
republican system of government is the ability of elected 
representatives to act on behalf of the people through the 
exercise of their power to enact, amend, or repeal 
legislation. 
Therefore, a fundamental principle of the 
jurisprudence of both the United States and this state is 
that one legislature cannot bind the power of a successive 
legislature.20
 We recently reiterated this principle at 
length in LeRoux v Secretary of State, 465 Mich 594, 615­
616; 640 NW2d 849 (2002), quoting Atlas v Wayne Co Bd of 
Auditors, 281 Mich 596, 599; 275 NW 507 (1937): 
“The act of one legislative body does not 
tie the hands of future legislatures. 
Cooper, 
Wells & Co v City of St Joseph, 232 Mich 255 [205
NW 86 (1925)]. 
The power to amend and repeal
legislation as well as to enact it is vested in
the 
legislature, 
and 
the 
legislature 
cannot 
restrict or limit its right to exercise the power
of legislation by prescribing modes of procedure 
for the repeal or amendment of statutes; nor may
one legislature restrict or limit the power of 
its successors . . . . [Additionally,] [o]ne
legislature cannot enact irrepealable legislation
or limit or restrict its own power, or the power
of its successors, as to the repeal of statutes; 
20 United States v Winstar Corp, 518 US 839, 873; 116 S
Ct 2432; 135 L Ed 2d 964 (1996) (opinion by Souter, J.);
Community-Service Broadcasting of Mid-America, Inc v Fed 
Communications Comm, 192 US App DC 448, 459; 593 F2d 1102
(1978); Mirac, supra at 430; Ballard v Ypsilanti Twp, 457 
Mich 564, 569; 577 NW2d 890 (1998). 
21  
 
 
 
 
and an act of one legislature is not binding on,
and 
does 
not 
tie 
the 
hands 
of, 
future 
legislatures.” 
Although this venerable principle that a legislative 
body may not bind its successors can be limited in some 
circumstances 
because 
of 
its 
tension 
with 
the 
constitutional 
prohibitions 
against 
the 
impairment 
of 
contracts, thus enabling one legislature to contractually 
bind another, Winstar, supra at 872-874, such surrenders of 
legislative power are subject to strict limitations that 
have 
developed 
in 
order 
to 
protect 
the 
sovereign 
prerogatives of state governments, id. at 874-875. 
A 
necessary corollary of these limitations that has been 
developed by the United States Supreme Court, and followed 
by this Court, is the strong presumption that statutes do 
not create contractual rights. 
Nat’l R Passenger Corp v 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R Co, 470 US 451, 465-466; 105 
S Ct 1441; 84 L Ed 2d 432 (1985); In re Certified Question 
(Fun ‘N Sun RV, Inc v Michigan), 
447 Mich 765, 777-778; 
527 NW2d 468 (1994). This presumption, and its relation to 
the protection of the sovereign powers of a legislature, 
was succinctly described by the United States Supreme Court 
in Nat’l R, supra at 465-466: 
For many decades, this Court has maintained
that absent some clear indication that the 
legislature intends to bind itself contractually,
the presumption is that “a law is not intended to
create private contractual or vested rights but 
22 
 
 
 
 
merely declares a policy to be pursued until the
legislature shall ordain otherwise.” Dodge v. 
Board of Education, 302 U.S. 74, 79 [58 S Ct 98;
82 L Ed 57] (1937). 
See also Rector of Christ 
Church v. County of Philadelphia, 24 How. 300,
302 [65 US 300; 16 L Ed 602] (1861) (“Such an 
interpretation is not to be favored”). This well­
established 
presumption 
is 
grounded 
in 
the 
elementary 
proposition 
that 
the 
principal
function 
of 
a 
legislature 
is 
not 
to 
make 
contracts, but to make laws that establish the 
policy of the state. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. 
Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 104-105 [58 S Ct 443; 82 L Ed
685] (1938). Policies, unlike contracts, are 
inherently subject to revision and repeal, and to
construe laws as contracts when the obligation is
not clearly and unequivocally expressed would be
to limit drastically the essential powers of a 
legislative 
body. 
Indeed, 
“‘[t]he 
continued 
existence of a government would be of no great
value, if by implications and presumptions, it
was 
disarmed 
of 
the 
powers 
necessary 
to 
accomplish the ends of its creation.’” 
Keefe v. 
Clark, 322 U.S. 393, 397 [64 S Ct 1072; 88 L Ed
1346] (1944) (quoting Charles River Bridge  v. 
Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 548 [36 US 420; 9 L
Ed 773] (1837)). Thus, the party asserting the 
creation of a contract must overcome this well­
founded presumption, Dodge, supra, at 79, and we
proceed cautiously both in identifying a contract
within the language of a regulatory statute and
in defining the contours of any contractual 
obligation. 
The first step in this cautious procession is to 
examine the statutory language itself. Nat’l R, supra at 
466. 
In order for a statute to form the basis of a 
contract, the statutory language “must be ‘plain and 
susceptible of no other reasonable construction’ than that 
the Legislature intended to be bound to a contract.” In re 
Certified Question, supra at 778, quoting Stanislaus Co v 
San Joaquin & King’s River Canal & Irrigation Co, 192 US 
23  
 
 
 
201, 208; 24 S Ct 241; 48 L Ed 406 (1904). 
If the 
statutory language “‘provides for the execution of a 
written contract on behalf of the state the case for an 
obligation binding upon the state is clear.’” 
Nat’l R, 
supra at 466, quoting Dodge, supra at 78 (emphasis supplied 
in Nat’l R). 
But, “absent ‘an adequate expression of an 
actual intent’ of the State to bind itself,” courts should 
not construe laws declaring a scheme of public regulation 
as also creating private contracts to which the state is a 
party. 
Nat’l R, supra at 466-467, quoting Wisconsin & 
Michigan R Co v Powers, 191 US 379, 386-387; 24 S Ct 107; 
48 L Ed 229(1903). 
In addition to the absence of 
contractual 
language, 
some 
federal 
courts, 
when 
interpreting statutes involving public-employee pension 
benefit plans, have expressed even greater reluctance to 
infer a contractual obligation where a legislature has not 
explicitly precluded amendment of a plan. 
Nat’l Ed Ass’n-
Rhode Island v Retirement Bd of the Rhode Island Employees’ 
Retirement System, 172 F3d 22, 27 (CA 1, 1999). 
This 
reluctance stems not only from the caution against finding 
an implied surrender of legislative power, but also from 
the realization that legislatures frequently need to 
utilize 
that 
power 
to 
modify 
benefit 
programs 
and 
compensation schedules. 
Id. 
Further, this reluctance is 
grounded in the realization that “it is easy enough for a
24 
 
 
 
statute explicitly to authorize a contract or to say 
explicitly that the benefits are contractual promises, or 
that any changes will not apply to a specific class of 
beneficiaries (e.g., those who have retired).” 
Id. at 27­
28 
(citations 
omitted). 
In 
the 
area 
of 
worker’s 
compensation, this Court has also followed this principle 
and stated that, as a general rule, a statute will not be 
held 
to 
have 
created 
contractual 
rights 
“if 
‘the 
Legislature 
did 
not 
covenant 
not 
to 
amend 
the 
legislation.’” 
In re Certified Question, supra at 778, 
quoting Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636, 654; 
375 NW2d 715 (1985). 
Finally, in addition to the absence 
of such clear and unequivocal statutory language, the 
circumstances of a statute’s passage may “belie an intent 
to contract away governmental powers.” 
Nat’l R, supra at 
468. 
The plaintiffs in this case have failed to overcome 
the strong presumption that the Legislature did not intend 
to surrender its legislative powers by entering into a 
contractual agreement to provide retirement health care 
benefits to public school employees when it enacted MCL 
38.1391(1). 
Nowhere in MCL 38.1391(1), or in the rest of 
the statute, did the Legislature provide for a written 
contract on behalf of the state of Michigan or even use 
25  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
terms typically associated with contractual relationships,21 
such as “contract,” “covenant,” or “vested rights.”22
 Had 
the Legislature intended to surrender its legislative 
powers through the creation of contractual rights, it would 
have expressly done so by employing such terms. Indeed, by 
its plain language, the statute merely shows a policy 
decision by the Legislature that the retirement system pay 
“the entire monthly premium or membership or subscription 
fee” for the listed health care benefits on behalf of a 
retired public school employee who chooses to participate 
in whatever plan the board and the Department of Management 
and Budget authorize. 
However, nowhere in the statute did 
21 Nat’l R, supra at 467. 
22It is clear that the Legislature can use such 
nomenclature when it wishes to. 
For instance, when 
enacting 1982 PA 259, which requires the state treasurer to
pay the principal of and interest on all state obligations,
the Legislature provided in MCL 12.64: “This act shall be 
deemed a contract with the holders from time to time of 
obligations of this state.” (Emphasis added.) 
Similarly,
when enacting the State Housing Development Authority Act,
1966 PA 346, the Legislature provided in MCL 125.1434: “The 
state pledges and agrees with the holders of any notes or
bonds issued under this act, that the state will not limit 
or alter the rights vested in the authority to fulfill the 
terms of any agreements made with the holders thereof, or
in any way impair the rights and remedies of the holders
until the notes or bonds, together with the interest 
thereon, with interest on any unpaid installments of 
interest, and all costs and expenses in connection with any
action or proceeding by or on behalf of such holders, are
fully met and discharged. The authority is authorized to
include this pledge and agreement of the state in any
agreement with the holders of such notes or bonds.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
26  
  
 
 
                                                 
 
  
 
 
the Legislature require the board and the department to 
authorize a particular plan containing a specific monthly 
premium, membership, or subscription fee or, alternatively, 
explicitly preclude the board and the department from 
amending whatever plan they authorize.23
 Additionally, 
nowhere in the statute did the Legislature require the 
board and the department to authorize a plan containing 
specified deductibles and copays. 
In fact, nowhere in the 
statute did the Legislature even mention deductibles and 
copays. 
Further, nowhere in the statute did the 
Legislature covenant that it would not amend the statute to 
remove or diminish the obligation of the MPSERS to pay the 
monthly premium, membership, or subscription fee; nor did 
it covenant that any changes to the plan by the board and 
the department, or amendments to the statute by the 
Legislature, would apply only to a specific class or group 
of public school retirees.24
 Again, had the Legislature 
intended to surrender its power to make such changes, it 
would have done so explicitly. 
Although we need not do so because of the absence of 
clear and unequivocal language showing an intent to 
23 Nat’l Ed Ass’n-Rhode Island, supra at 27.  
24 Id. at 27-28; In re Certified Question, supra at 778.  
27  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
contract, we note that the circumstances surrounding the 
Legislature’s enactment of MCL 38.1391(1) provide further 
evidence that the Legislature did not intend to contract 
away its legislative powers.25
 As was discussed by the 
Court of Appeals, initially the Legislature required the 
MPSERS to pay a portion of the premium for health care 
benefits for public school retirees through the enactment 
of the predecessor of MCL 38.1391, former MCL 38.325b of 
the Public School Employees Retirement Act, 1945 PA 136, 
and subsequent legislatures have exercised their powers to 
amend the statute many times throughout the years to change 
the type of plans that the board could authorize, the 
criteria for the beneficiaries on whose behalf the MPSERS 
could pay the premiums for various benefits, and the 
amounts of those premiums that the MPSERS was required to 
pay.26
 Thus, there is no indication that the Legislature 
that enacted MCL 38.1391(1) in 1980 intended to do anything 
beyond what its predecessors had done—set forth a policy to 
be pursued until one of its successor legislatures ordained 
a new policy.27  Additionally, as was also analyzed by the 
Court of Appeals, the health care plan itself has been 
25 Nat’l R, supra at 468. 
26 260 Mich App at 463-465. 
27 Nat’l R, supra at 466. 
28  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
amended and modified by the MPSERS numerous times since 
1975, not only to increase the benefits available but also 
to increase the amounts of the copays and deductibles that 
participants were required to pay.28
 In their appeal to 
this Court, plaintiffs have not only conceded that these 
statutory amendments and changes to the plan have occurred, 
but also expressly conceded during oral argument that the 
Legislature and the board have the authority to make such 
changes. 
Thus, plaintiffs themselves, by the positions 
they have taken, have effectively recognized that MCL 
38.1391(1) merely established a legislative policy that 
could be changed by a successor legislature rather than 
providing for a surrender of such legislative power through 
the creation of a contractual relationship. 
28 The Court of Appeals, 260 Mich App at 465-466,
stated: 
The MPSERS provides a health care plan for
retirees. Cost-sharing features have been a part
of the health plan since its inception in 1975.
The individual and family deductible component of
the health care plan has gradually increased from
1982 to 1999, beginning with a deductible of $50
for each person and $100 for each family in 1982,
and gradually rising to a deductible of $145 for
each person and $290 for each family in 1999.
Cost sharing for the prescription drug program
also had gradual increases, ranging from a copay
of ten percent in 1975 to a copay of $4 for
generic drugs and $8 for brand name drugs in 1997
through March 31, 2000. There is no dispute that
the MPSERS health care plan also gradually
increased the benefits available under the plan. 
29  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
We further note that, as part of the 1979 Public 
School Employees Retirement Act, in which MCL 38.1391(1) is 
included, the Legislature also enacted MCL 38.1303a(1), 
which defines “compensation” for public school employees as 
“the remuneration earned by a member for service performed 
as a public school employee.” 
Thus, by enacting this 
statute, the Legislature recognized that an implied-in-law 
contractual relationship can arise between the school 
system and public school employees. Specifically, a public 
school employee can become contractually entitled to 
“compensation” by first performing services. 
However, 
payment of health care premiums by the MPSERS under MCL 
38.1391(1) is not among the list of items that the 
Legislature specifically set forth as being part of an 
employee’s “compensation” in MCL 38.1303a(2)(a) through 
(h). 
Additionally, and more importantly, MCL 38.1303a(3) 
expressly lists items that are not included within the 
definition of compensation and includes, among other 
things, “[p]ayments for hospitalization insurance and life 
insurance premiums,”29 and “[o]ther fringe benefits paid by 
and 
from 
the 
funds 
of 
employers 
of 
public 
school 
employees.”30
 This causes us to conclude that surely the 
29 MCL 38.1303a(3)(c) (emphasis added). 
30 MCL 38.1303a(3)(d). 
30  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
Legislature would not specifically exclude the payment of 
health care benefits from the list of items that a public 
school employee could, potentially, become contractually 
entitled to by having performed services but, at the same 
time, intend to vest plaintiffs with a contractual right to 
receive such benefits through the simultaneous enactment of 
MCL 38.1391(1). Accordingly, it seems evident that the way 
to understand these enactments is that the Legislature 
intended for payment of health care benefits by the MPSERS 
under MCL 38.1391(1) to simply be a “fringe benefit” to 
which 
public 
school 
employees 
would 
never 
have 
a 
contractual entitlement.31 
Thus, because the plain language of MCL 38.1391(1) 
does not clearly indicate that the Legislature intended to 
surrender its legislative powers through the statute’s 
enactment, we hold that MCL 38.1391(1) does not create for 
public school employees a contractual right to health care 
31 This fact not only belies plaintiffs’ claim that MCL
38.1391(1) shows a legislative intent to vest public school
retirees with a contractual right to health care benefits,
but also renders erroneous the Court of Appeals statement
that “[h]ealth insurance is part of an employee’s benefit
package 
and 
the 
whole 
package 
is 
an 
element 
of 
consideration that the state contracts to tender in 
exchange for services rendered by the employee.” 
260 Mich 
App at 476. 
Indeed, MCL 38.1303a makes clear that payment
of health care benefits by the MPSERS is not an element of 
the consideration that the state contracts to tender as 
remuneration for a public school employee’s services. 
31  
 
 
 
     
                                                 
 
 
benefits. 
We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals 
conclusion to the contrary. 
However, because the Court of 
Appeals ultimately reached the correct result, we affirm 
its ultimate conclusion to uphold the circuit court’s entry 
of summary disposition in favor of defendants.32 
V. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT 
We would be remiss if we failed to point out that the 
ad hoc analysis employed by the dissent to determine that 
public school retirees possess a contractual right to 
health care benefits, rendering the Legislature powerless 
to alter or do away with them, is particularly disturbing 
and, taken to its logical conclusion, would undermine this 
state’s constitutionally guaranteed republican system of 
government. 
The most treasured civic possession of an American 
citizen is the right to self-government. It is the central 
pillar and animating force of our constitutions. 
Thus, US 
Const, art IV, § 4 provides that “[t]he United States shall 
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government . . . .” The Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, 
art 1, § 1 states similarly that “[a]ll political power is 
32 Having concluded that MCL 38.1391(1) does not create
a contract, we need not address plaintiffs’ argument 
challenging the Court of Appeals determination that the
copay and deductible increases do not operate as a 
substantial impairment of a contractual relationship. 
32  
 
 
inherent in the people,” and the importance the founding 
generation gave to this can be seen by its reiteration 
repeatedly in the documents preceding, coinciding with, and 
following the adoption of the United States Constitution in 
1789. 
Thus, Congress provided in the Northwest Ordinance 
that the constitutions and governments of the states to be 
formed in the territory, of which states Michigan is one, 
“shall be republican . . . .” Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 
art V. 
This requirement was carried forward by Congress 
when it severed Michigan from the Northwest Territory in 
1800 and made it part of the Indiana Territory, 2 US Stat, 
Ch XLI, § 2, and again in 1805 when it likewise severed 
Michigan from the Indiana Territory and established the 
Michigan Territory, 2 US Stat, Ch V, § 2, by requiring both 
times that the government established in those territories 
was to be “in all respects similar” to that provided in the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787. 
What 
this 
means 
concretely 
is 
that 
what 
one 
legislature has done, pursuant to the majority sentiment at 
that time, a later legislature responding to the then 
majority can modify or undo. Deprived of this right, self­
government is not just hollow, it is nonexistent. 
Yet, as the United States Supreme Court has held and 
we have discussed in this opinion, when the Legislature 
enters into a contract, a subsequent legislature cannot
33 
 
 
 
 
 
repudiate that contract. 
It seems obvious that to read 
what is a contract too broadly swallows the right of the 
people to change the course of their governance. 
This is 
the 
tension 
that 
we 
have 
attempted 
to 
address 
and 
thoroughly analyze, whereas the dissent has just blithely 
assumed that any benefit once conferred is a contract and 
cannot be altered. 
This is an ill-considered notion that 
in cases yet to be seen, but surely to be seen if this were 
to become the majority position, means that, for example, 
general assistance welfare benefits could not be altered, 
Medicaid would be frozen in its first enacted form, and, in 
short, any financial benefit would be unalterable. 
This is not and surely cannot be our law. 
Yet, the 
dissent claims that the recipients of the benefits will be 
surprised it is not. 
Will they? 
No one should be 
surprised that benefit battles are fought out in the 
Legislature. 
On the contrary, those who could claim 
legitimate surprise would be our citizens who, were there 
two more votes on this Court to join the dissent and make 
it a majority, would have lost, in the fog of a baffling 
contract analysis, the right to change the course of their 
government. Indeed, that would be more than surprising, it 
would be revolutionary. 
34  
 
 
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
We hold that health care benefits are not “accrued 
financial benefits” and, thus, are not protected by Const 
1963, art 9, § 24. 
Accordingly, we affirm the Court of 
Appeals on this issue. 
We further hold that the 
Legislature 
did 
not 
intend 
to 
create 
a 
contractual 
relationship with public school employees by enacting MCL 
38.1391(1) and, thus, payment of health care benefits by 
the MPSERS is not a contractual right subject to protection 
by Const 1963, art 1, § 10 and US Const, art I, § 10. 
We 
therefore reverse the Court of Appeals determination on 
this issue. 
However, because the Court of Appeals reached 
the correct result, we affirm its determination that the 
circuit court properly entered summary disposition in 
defendants’ favor. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
35  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ALBERTA STUDIER, PATRICIA M.
SANOCKI, MARY A. NICHOLS, LAVIVA
M. CABAY, MARY L. WOODRING, and
MILDRED E. WEDELL, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v 
No. 125765 
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES' 
RETIREMENT BOARD, MICHIGAN PUBLIC
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
and TREASURER OF MICHIGAN, 
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________/ 
ALBERTA STUDIER, PATRICIA M.
SANOCKI, MARY A. NICHOLS, LAVIVA
M. CABAY, MARY L. WOODRING, and
MILDRED E. WEDELL, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
V 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 125766 
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SCHOOL EMLOYEES’ 
RETIREMENT BOARD, MICHIGAN PUBLIC
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
and TREASURER OF MICHIGAN, 
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________________/ 
WEAVER, J. (concurring). 
I concur in the majority conclusion and reasoning that 
the Legislature did not intend to create a contractual 
 
 
  
right subject to Const 1963, art 1, § 10 and US Const, art 
I, § 10 when it provided for payment of health care 
benefits to public school employees through the enactment 
of MCL 38.1391(1). 
Regarding whether health care benefits paid to public 
school retirees are “accrued financial benefits” under 
Const 1963, art 9, § 24, I concur with the majority 
conclusion that they are not. 
I agree with the majority 
that “the ratifiers of our Constitution would have commonly 
understood ‘financial’ benefits to include only those 
benefits that consist of monetary payments, and not 
benefits of a nonmonetary nature such as health care 
benefits.” 
Ante at 15. 
As noted by Justice Riley in her 
partial concurrence and partial dissent regarding art 9, § 
24 in Musselman v Governor, 448 Mich 503, 526; 533 NW2d 237 
(1995) (Musselman I), “when interpreting the language of 
the constitution, unambiguous terms are given their plain 
meaning.” 
Justice Riley concluded that the “normal usage 
of the word ‘financial’ connotes money and ‘money’ connotes 
some form of hard currency that can be ‘spent.’” 
Id. at 
527. 
When the Court granted rehearing in Musselman, I 
concurred with Justice Riley’s Musselman I analysis of the 
common 
understanding 
of 
the 
term 
“accrued 
financial 
benefits” and I continue to agree with her analysis today. 
In Musselman v Governor (On Rehearing), 450 Mich 574; 545 
2  
 
 
 
 
NW2d 346 (1996)(Musselman II), I wrote further to note that 
Justice Riley’s conclusion was supported by the fact that 
health care benefits did not exist when the people ratified 
the 1963 Michigan Constitution. 
Because health care 
benefits did not exist at that time, the people would not 
have anticipated that the pension and retirement systems 
established by Const 1963, art 9, § 24 included health care 
benefits. Mussleman II at 579. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ALBERTA STUDIER, PATRICIA M.
SANOCKI, MARY A. NICHOLS, LAVIVA
M. CABAY, MARY L. WOODRING, and
MILDRED E. WEDELL, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v 
No. 125765 
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES' 
RETIREMENT BOARD, MICHIGAN PUBLIC
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
AND TREASURER OF MICHIGAN, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
_______________________________/ 
ALBERTA STUDIER, PATRICIA M.
SANOCKI, MARY A. NICHOLS, LAVIVA
M. CABAY, MARY L. WOODRING, and
MILDRED E. WEDELL, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v 
No. 125766 
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES' 
RETIREMENT BOARD, MICHIGAN PUBLIC
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
AND TREASURER OF MICHIGAN, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
_______________________________/ 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
I believe that retirement health care benefits earned 
by public school employees constitute “accrued financial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
benefits” that are protected by our Michigan Constitution 
from diminishment or impairment. 
I also believe that the 
statute that provides retirement health care benefits for 
public school employees, MCL 38.1391, creates a contract 
with public school employees and retirees that cannot be 
substantially impaired. 
Because there are significant 
questions about the accuracy of the record used by the 
lower courts to determine if a substantial impairment 
indeed occurred, I would remand for further review. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s 
position that public school employees and retirees are 
without protection from the prospect that their retirement 
health care benefits may be drastically decreased or even 
eliminated. 
I. HEALTH CARE BENEFITS ARE “ACCRUED FINANCIAL BENEFITS”  
WITHIN THE MEANING OF MICHIGAN’S CONSTITUTION  
Const 1963, art 9, § 24 provides the following: 
The 
accrued 
financial 
benefits 
of 
each 
pension plan and retirement system of the state
and 
its 
political 
subdivisions 
shall 
be 
a 
contractual obligation thereof which shall not be
diminished or impaired thereby. 
Financial benefits arising on account of 
service rendered in each fiscal year shall be
funded during that year and such funding shall 
not be used for financing unfunded accrued 
liabilities. 
2  
 
 
Whether health care benefits are “accrued financial 
benefits” has already been addressed by this Court in 
Musselman v Governor, 448 Mich 503, 510; 533 NW2d 237 
(1995) 
(Musselman 
I), 
and 
Musselman 
v 
Governor 
(On 
Rehearing), 450 Mich 574; 545 NW2d 346 (1996) (Musselman 
II). 
In Musselman I, this Court examined whether health 
care benefits are indeed “financial” benefits. 
We held 
that because the purpose of the constitutional provision is 
to prevent the state from amassing bills for pension 
payments, including health care benefits, for which the 
state does not have the money to pay, the term “financial 
benefits” includes retirement health care benefits. 
Reflecting on the analysis in Musselman I, I fail to 
see its flaws. 
This Court reasonably concluded that the 
goal of the constitutional provision is to ensure that the 
state can pay for the commitments it has made. 
Regardless 
of whether the commitment is for a straightforward monthly 
cash allowance to a retiree or for payment of health care 
benefits for a retiree, the state must still pay for its 
obligations. 
If the state has failed to set aside an 
appropriate amount of money, the situation is still the 
same, meaning the state still has a financial consequence. 
I believe this interpretation is the one that the 
people gave the constitutional provision when it was 
adopted because it best reflects the common understanding
3 
 
 
 
of the people. 
See Soap & Detergent Ass’n v Natural 
Resources Comm, 415 Mich 728, 745; 330 NW2d 346 (1982). 
The most reasonable interpretation of the phrase “accrued 
financial benefits” includes health care benefits. 
Health 
care benefits are given in lieu of additional compensation 
to public school employees. 
A health care benefit is a 
financial benefit because it clearly costs the state money 
and has an economic value to the employee. 
Notably, our 
Constitution was not written to include every conceivable 
aspect of a pension plan. 
It was certainly not beyond the 
understanding of the ratifiers that health care benefits, 
which cost the state money, would be offered as a 
retirement benefit. 
As such, these benefits would need to 
be protected, just as monthly cash allowances to retirees 
must be protected. 
As we stated in Musselman I, supra at 516 n 12, “Many 
delegates to the 1961 Constitutional Convention perceived 
as unfair the rule that pensions granted by public 
authorities were not contractual obligations, but rather 
gratuitous allowances that could be revoked at will.” See, 
e.g., 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 
770-774. 
It should not come as a surprise that the 
ratifiers would believe this to be true about health care 
benefits that mean as much, if not more, to many retirees. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
Moreover, even if the ratifiers did not imagine every 
conceivable pension plan benefit that would be offered, the 
“idea behind formulating a general rule, as opposed to a 
set 
of 
specific 
commands, 
is 
that 
a 
rule 
governs 
possibilities that could not have been anticipated at the 
time.” 
Musselman I, supra at 514.1
 The constitutional 
provision 
was 
meant 
to 
address 
all 
public 
employee 
retirement systems; it is entirely reasonable that the 
ratifiers would not be aware of every possible retirement 
benefit being offered to every public employee. See, e.g., 
1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 771. 
In response to a question whether the state could increase 
benefits and whether an increase in benefits would be a 
gratuity or an obligation that the state must fulfill, a 
constitutional convention delegate responded as follows: 
“Certainly there’s nothing here to prohibit the employer 
from increasing the benefit structure.” Id. at 774. “Once 
the employee, by working pursuant to an understanding that 
1 
We believe that this constitution must be a 
forward looking document; that it must take 
cognizance of the problem; that it must spell out
for the future the manner in which these funds 
should be managed, so that our children will not,
50 years hence, suffer from the fact that we
failed to put in enough money to take care of the
benefits attendant upon the service currently
performed by public employees. 
[1 Official 
Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 771.] 
5  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
this is the benefit structure presently provided, has 
worked in reliance thereon, he has the contractual right to 
those benefits which may not be diminished or impaired.” 
Id. 
The constitutional principle declared is that accrued 
financial benefits, including health care benefits, will be 
protected for retirees. 
Simply, “once an employee has 
performed the service in reliance upon the then prescribed 
level of benefits, the employee has the contractual right 
to receive those benefits under the terms of the statute or 
ordinance prescribing the plan.” Id. at 771. 
In attempting to define the term “accrued financial 
benefits,” the majority cites numerous definitions for the 
word “accrue,” and I do not quarrel with those definitions.2 
Indeed, 
as 
the 
majority 
states, 
“accrue” 
means 
“to 
increase, 
grow” 
and 
“to 
come 
into 
existence 
as 
an 
enforceable claim; vest as a right.” 
Ante at 12 (citation 
2 While I do not quarrel with the definitions used, I
must note that the majority yet again insists on relying
solely on dictionary definitions to the illogical exclusion
of context. 
“There is no more irritating fellow than the
man who tries to settle an argument about communism, or
justice, or liberty, by quoting from Webster.” 
Pflug, ed,
The Ways of Language (New York: 
The Odyssey Press, Inc,
1967), ch 4, How to Read a Dictionary, p 62. 
While 
dictionary definitions are certainly useful, they must be
examined in context. 
See also Hayakawa, Language in 
Thought and Action (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Co,
1949), 
ch 
4, 
p 
62 
(“Interpretation 
must 
be 
based,
therefore, on the totality of contexts.”). 
6  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
and internal quotation marks omitted). However, I disagree 
with the majority’s assertion that the ratifiers of our 
Constitution would have commonly understood “accrued” to 
mean that an individual’s benefits must increase or grow 
over time. 
The majority seems to believe that to be an 
accrued financial benefit, an employee’s retirement health 
care benefits must gradually increase on the basis of the 
number of years that the person is employed, yet this is 
not accurate. 
The term “accrued financial benefits” was 
used to denote benefits that were contractual obligations 
on the part of the state. 
The term “accrued financial 
benefits” was meant to include benefits that an employee 
had worked in reliance on and continued to work in reliance 
on. 
This is in contrast to the term “financial benefits,” 
which was used in the second clause of the constitutional 
provision to denote a system in which the benefits earned 
for the year were funded annually. 
Because the second 
clause only specifically dealt with how to fund benefits 
earned in a given year, retirement systems would eventually 
need to address the funding for benefits that had been 
earned in prior years but had not been properly funded. 
Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 773­
774.3 
3 The constitutional provision does two things:
(continued…)
7 
1 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
When a public school employee has fulfilled his 
commitment and is then entitled to receive health care 
benefits once he retires, the employee has an enforceable 
claim to receive the benefits upon retirement. 
“Accrued” 
does not mean that the amount of benefits the employee will 
receive during retirement must grow in conjunction with the 
employee’s years of service. 
For an employee to have an 
accrued financial benefit, he must fulfill the obligations 
set forth by the state. 
For plaintiffs, all the events 
that are necessary for them to receive their benefits have 
come into existence. 
Simply, plaintiffs went to work and 
did their jobs for the required number of years. 
As our 
Constitution states, accrued financial benefits “shall be a 
contractual 
obligation 
thereof 
which 
shall 
not 
be 
(…continued) 
[I]n the first paragraph, it provides that
the relationship between the employing unit and
the employee shall be a contractual relationship
so that the municipality may not change the 
relationship at its will. The benefits that have 
accrued up to a given time are contractual and
must be carried out by the municipality or by the
state. 
The second paragraph provides that each
year the system shall pay in enough money to fund
the liability arising in that year. 
It does not 
require that the system catch up with all of its
past liability, which would be an impossibility
in connection with some of the state systems, but
it does require that they shall not go any 
further 
behind. 
[2 
Official 
Record,
Constitutional Convention 1961, p 2659.] 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
diminished or impaired thereby.” 
Const 1963, art 9, § 24. 
Once an employee has fulfilled his obligation, the state 
must fulfill its obligation and be prepared to pay 
retirement health care benefits when necessary. 
Additionally, even if the term “accrued financial 
benefits” were viewed as a term more commonly used by 
accountants and actuaries than by laypersons, its meaning 
would still encompass retirement health care benefits. 
As 
stated by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board 
(GASB), cash payments and other retirement benefits, such 
as 
health 
care 
benefits, 
“are 
conceptually 
similar 
transactions-both involve deferred compensation offered in 
exchange for current services—and should be accounted for 
in a similar way.” 
Governmental Accounting Standards 
Board, Accounting and Financial Reporting by Employers for 
Postemployment Benefits Other Than Pensions, Statement No. 
45, June 2004, p 73 (emphasis added).4
 As noted by the 
majority, “‘“[t]he words ‘accrued financial benefits’ were 
used designedly, so that the contractual right of the 
employee would be limited to the deferred compensation 
4 The GASB also states that retirement health care 
benefits, like monthly cash allowances, arise “from an
exchange of salaries and benefits for employee services
rendered and constitute[] part of the compensation for
those services.” 
Id. at 1. 
Retirement benefits “are an 
exchange of promised benefits for employee services.” 
Id. 
at 77. 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
embodied in any pension plan . . . .”’” 
Ante at 17, 
quoting Musselman I, supra at 510 n 8, quoting 1 Official 
Record, 
Constitutional 
Convention 
1961, 
pp 
773-774 
(emphasis added). By any standard employed, the meaning of 
the 
term 
“accrued 
financial 
benefits” 
encompasses 
retirement 
health 
care 
benefits 
for 
public 
school 
employees. 
II. HEALTH CARE BENEFITS ARE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 
The United States Constitution provides in relevant 
part, “No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex 
post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts . . . .” 
US Const, art I, § 10, cl 1. 
Michigan’s Constitution provides, “No bill of attainder, ex 
post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contract 
shall be enacted.” Const 1963, art 1, § 10. 
Information about retirement health care benefits for 
Michigan’s public school employees is set forth in MCL 
38.1391. 
MCL 
38.1391(1) 
states 
that 
the 
state 
is 
responsible for paying the monthly premiums for plaintiffs’ 
health care benefits.5  In Musselman I, supra at 516, this 
Court stated that the obligation to pay retirement health 
5 MCL 38.1391(1) provides, “The retirement system shall
pay 
the 
entire 
monthly 
premium 
or 
membership 
or 
subscription fee for hospital, medical-surgical, and sick
care benefits for the benefit of a retirant or retirement 
allowance beneficiary who elects coverage in the plan
authorized by the retirement board and the department.” 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
care benefits “is a contractual right arising from the fact 
that employees have worked in reliance on the statutory 
promise that the board will pay earned health care benefits 
of any member receiving a retirement allowance.” 
In 
Musselman I, supra at 519 n 19, the defendants even 
conceded 
“that 
retirement 
health 
care 
benefits 
are 
contractual benefits subject to Const 1963, art 1, § 10.” 
Further, “the defendants conceded that these statutes 
create a right to receive health benefits that may not be 
impaired.” Musselman I, supra at 505 n 1. 
The 
statute’s 
intent 
is 
clear-in 
exchange 
for 
receiving years of an employee’s services, the state will 
pay 
for 
retirement 
health 
care 
benefits. 
This 
unconditional 
guarantee 
is 
what 
many 
public 
school 
employees and retirees have relied on throughout the years, 
and the state has benefited from that reliance. 
As stated 
at the constitutional convention, “[T]here is no question 
that when an employee today takes employment with a 
governmental unit, he does so with the idea that there is a 
pension plan or retirement system involved.” 
1 Official 
Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 773. 
The 
majority’s position now allows the state to choose, at its 
whim, not to fulfill its obligation under the contract even 
though 
employees 
have 
already 
performed 
the 
11  
 
 
 
responsibilities necessary to fulfill their obligations 
under the contract. 
The state did not offer retirement health care 
benefits to public school employees to be charitable; it 
did so to remain competitive in the marketplace. 
See 1 
Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 773. 
And public school employees do not “receive” these benefits 
for free. 
Because retirement health care benefits cost 
money, 
the 
monetary 
compensation 
for 
public 
school 
employees had to have been factored into the equation. 
It 
is unreasonable to now claim that public school employees, 
who received less compensation because of the benefits they 
believed they would receive when they retired, are now no 
longer entitled to the health care benefits they worked to 
receive. 
Stability in retirement benefits is likely at 
least part of the reasons why many people chose to accept a 
position with the public schools or stay in that position, 
and it is untenable to tell these employees and retirees 
that it was for naught. 
The majority attempts to buttress its argument by 
noting the definition for “compensation” provided by MCL 
38.1303a(1). 
However, the definition of “compensation” in 
MCL 38.1303a does not indicate that retirement health care 
benefits are not to be considered “accrued financial 
benefits” or are not contractual obligations that the state
12 
 
 
must fulfill. The items listed in MCL 38.1303a are used to 
determine a retiree’s monthly cash allowance. 
See, e.g., 
MCL 38.1309; MCL 38.1379; MCL 38.1384. 
However, this does 
not mean that the state is absolved of its responsibility 
to fulfill its obligations. 
The majority even states the 
fundamental concept that is critical to the analysis of 
this issue: 
“Specifically, a public school employee can 
become contractually entitled to ‘compensation’ by first 
performing services.” 
Ante at 30. 
Because retirement 
health care benefits for public school employees are 
deferred compensation, see ante at 17, I fail to comprehend 
how the majority can justify its misapplication of a basic 
contract principle. I am quite certain that it comes as a 
surprise to the over 140,000 public school employees that 
their retirement health care benefits are nothing more than 
a “policy decision” that the Legislature can choose to 
alter or eliminate at its whim. 
To many retirees, the 
health care benefits they receive through their pension 
plan are every bit as important, if not more so, than the 
monthly cash allowance they receive through their pension 
plan. Public school employees surely did not envision that 
they were afforded no protection against their retirement 
health care benefits being capriciously eliminated.  The 
13  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  
provision of health care benefits for retirees is not a 
gratuitous undertaking by defendants.6  It is a benefit that 
is provided to plaintiffs in exchange for years of service. 
Defendants are not altruistically giving plaintiffs these 
benefits, plaintiffs earned them through years of hard work 
and dedication. 
Plaintiffs fulfilled their obligations, 
and the state should fulfill its obligation. 
Finally, contrary to the majority’s panic-stricken 
response to the dissent, the Constitution and our system of 
government are not under attack merely because I disagree 
with the majority over the interpretation of the words of 
the Constitution and the applicable statute. Regardless of 
the majority’s attempt to distract the reader from the 
issues at hand, reading the plain words of the statute to 
indicate that a contract was made with public school 
employees and retirees does not mean that no legislative 
action can ever be amended or repealed. 
It does not mean 
that welfare benefits could never be altered, as the 
majority’s rhetoric proclaims. 
It merely means that when 
6 In Ramey v Pub Service Comm, 296 Mich 449, 462; 296
NW 323 (1941), this Court held that vacation with pay is
not a gratuity—it is compensation for services rendered. 
If paid vacation time is not considered a gratuity, then I
cannot fathom how retirement health care benefits can be 
considered 
a 
gratuity 
when 
they 
are 
part 
of 
the 
consideration that was exchanged for the years of service
provided by public school employees. 
14  
 
 
 
reading this statute, it is clear that the words chosen by 
the Legislature were meant to oblige the state to provide 
the retirement health care benefits that were promised to 
public school employees. 
While the majority accurately states that benefit 
battles are fought in the Legislature, it inaccurately 
states that benefits “won” can then be changed at the whim 
of a subsequent legislature. 
Once benefits have been 
guaranteed to workers and the workers have served the state 
in 
reliance 
on 
them, 
it 
is 
unconstitutional 
to 
substantially impair the receipt of these earned benefits. 
The dissent states a concept that is really quite 
unremarkable. The government, just like any other party to 
a contract, must fulfill its obligation. 
When a public 
school employee has worked for years in reliance on a 
promise of retirement health care benefits, our system of 
government is not challenged by the simple notion that the 
state must provide these benefits. 
III. ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY IS NECESSARY TO PROPERLY ASSESS 
WHETHER DEFENDANTS’ ACTIONS CREATE A SUBSTANTIAL IMPAIRMENT 
OF PLAINTIFFS’ CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS 
Because plaintiffs’ retirement health care benefits 
are a contractual right, the next step is to determine 
whether 
the 
increases 
in 
plaintiffs’ 
copayments 
and 
deductibles substantially impaired plaintiffs’ contractual 
rights.  Romein v Gen Motors Corp, 436 Mich 515, 534; 462 
15 
 
 
NW2d 555 (1990). 
If plaintiffs’ contractual rights are 
impaired, the impairment must be the result of a legitimate 
public purpose. 
Id. at 535. 
Finally, the means chosen to 
carry out the public purpose must be reasonable. 
I must first address defendants’ argument that the 
legitimate public purpose of the increases is to ensure 
that there are sufficient school funds available for 
children. 
I believe that ensuring high quality education 
for our children is a valuable and worthwhile public 
purpose 
that 
should 
be 
one 
of 
our 
state’s 
highest 
priorities. However, defendants’ argument essentially pits 
the quality of education for school children against 
providing adequate health care benefits for retirees. 
Yet 
meeting the needs of school children and meeting the needs 
of retirees are not mutually exclusive. 
While it may be 
challenging, to say the least, to determine the best way to 
meet the needs of children and retirees, it does not mean 
that the commitment made to our state’s retirees can be 
ignored. 
Merely because meeting our responsibilities is 
difficult does not mean that our responsibilities can be 
abandoned. 
Plaintiffs’ 
legitimate 
expectations 
are 
that 
retirement health care benefits will be continued and 
plaintiffs’ portion of the costs for these benefits will 
not be significantly altered. 
It is not sufficient for 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
defendants 
to 
pay 
the 
“entire 
monthly 
premium” 
if 
defendants disproportionately increase the amount that 
plaintiffs must pay for their deductibles and copayments. 
Moreover, increasing the amount that plaintiffs must pay 
over time can certainly amount to a substantial impairment 
if defendants do in increments what they would not be 
allowed to do in one large adjustment. 
The amount of copayments and deductibles is linked to 
the amount of the monthly premiums. 
By increasing 
copayments and deductibles to extremely high proportions, 
the defendants could essentially avoid paying any monthly 
premium. That would not fulfill the terms of the contract. 
While the statute does not specifically state the amount 
that the state must pay, like any contract, the words used 
by the Legislature must be construed to ascertain the 
intent of the parties. 
See Sobczak v Kotwicki, 347 Mich 
242, 249; 79 NW2d 471 (1956). 
Whether there has been a substantial impairment is 
largely a factual question that is better resolved after 
additional discovery, especially because there have been 
claimed inaccuracies in some of the documents submitted by 
defendants. 
It is reasonable that the amount that 
plaintiffs must pay will increase in logical proportion to 
the amount they have historically paid. 
However, because 
plaintiffs raise valid concerns about the accuracy of 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reports submitted by defendants, I believe it is imprudent 
to determine on the basis of what may amount to be an 
inadequate record whether the increases pose a substantial 
impairment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The years of dedication that public school employees 
and retirees have committed to educating and caring for the 
children of our state are worth more than empty promises 
provided to them by the majority’s approach. 
I believe 
that retirement health care benefits earned by public 
school employees constitute “accrued financial benefits” 
that are protected by our Michigan Constitution from 
diminishment or impairment. 
I further believe that 
retirement health care benefits earned by public school 
employees are a contractual right created by statute, and 
whether this contractual right was substantially impaired 
cannot be determined without further review by the lower 
courts. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
18