Title: People v. Wilson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S087533
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: April 12, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
BYRON WILSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S087533 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BA164899 
 
 
April 12, 2021 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, Groban, and Krause* concurred. 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
*  Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
S087533 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 This automatic appeal follows from defendants Byron 
Wilson’s and Aswad Pops’s1 2000 convictions and death 
sentences for the murders of four men during the robbery of a 
Compton car wash.  Wilson was found guilty of four counts of 
murder in violation of Penal Code2 section 187, subdivision (a), 
four counts of second degree robbery in violation of section 211, 
and second degree commercial burglary in violation of section 
459.  The jury found true that Wilson was armed with, and 
personally and intentionally discharged, a firearm causing great 
bodily injury with regard to three of the murders in violation of 
sections 12022, subdivision (a)(1) and 12022.53, subdivisions 
(b)–(d).  The jury also found true the robbery-murder, burglary-
murder, and multiple-murder special circumstances in violation 
of section 190.2, subdivisions (a)(3) and (a)(17).  The jury found 
Wilson had suffered a prior serious or violent felony conviction 
 
1  
Aswad Pops was pronounced dead at San Quentin State 
Prison on August 29, 2019.  (California Department of 
Corrections 
and 
Rehabilitation, 
News 
Releases 
<https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/news/2019/08/30/condemned-inmates-
death-investigated-as-a-suicide-2/> [as of Apr. 9, 2021].  All 
Internet citations in this opinion will be archived by year, docket 
number, and case name at <http://www.courts.ca.gov/ 
38324.htm>.)  The appeal was permanently abated as to Pops 
on February 11, 2020.   
2  
All further unspecified statutory references are to the 
Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
under section 667, subdivisions (a)(1) and (b) through (i).  After 
a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death.   
Wilson contends that several errors occurred during the 
guilt and penalty phases of his trial.  Because we see no merit 
to any of his claims, we affirm the judgment. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase 
1. Prosecution Case 
a. Wheels ’N Stuff 
On January 25, 1998, Super Bowl Sunday, Byron Wilson 
and Aswad Pops parked outside of the Wheels ’N Stuff car wash 
on Sportsman Drive in Compton.  Christopher Williams and 
Charles “Spanky” Hurd operated the car wash, which had been 
open for several months.   
Williams, Hurd, and other employees dealt marijuana 
from the car wash, a fact about which Wilson was aware.  
Williams testified that he and his coworkers “tend[ed] to smoke 
a lot of weed,” and the car wash customers “would want us to 
sell [them] some of the weed we were smoking and from time to 
time we would.”  A soda vending machine was located inside the 
car wash, and sometimes marijuana was stored inside of it.  The 
patrons and workers of the car wash, by and large, knew one 
another.  Williams saw both patrons and workers of the car 
wash with large amounts of cash in their pockets.  Williams 
testified that the car wash had no official employees, and 
Williams did not keep financial records.  Williams explained 
that anyone who washed cars did so on a volunteer basis, and 
Williams made no money from car washing as Wheels ’N Stuff 
did not charge for washes, although donations were permitted.  
The business sporadically paid its workers, but they generally 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
earned money in tips.3  The $1,500 rent for the Wheels ’N Stuff 
location was paid from marijuana proceeds.   
b. Williams 
Williams arrived at the car wash the morning of January 
25, 1998, intending to invite his friends to his home for a Super 
Bowl party, and to obtain marijuana to smoke.  When he got out 
of his truck, he noticed a car parked directly beside the car wash 
with two people sitting low in the car’s front seats.  Williams 
went into the car wash, where he saw Michael Hoard working 
behind the counter, from whom he obtained a small bag of 
marijuana.  He also saw two acquaintances, Shawn Potter and 
E.T., arriving as he was leaving.    
As Williams was leaving he noticed the two people, both 
Black men, were still sitting in a car — “probably an eighty 
something Honda” — parked beside the car wash.  Because he 
routinely sold marijuana from the car wash, he assumed the two 
men were interested in buying some and asked them what they 
needed.  The passenger — who Williams later identified as Pops 
— replied they were interested in “sounds,” which the driver — 
later identified as Wilson — confirmed; Williams directed them 
to a nearby store that sold car stereos.     
Williams then left the Wheels ’N Stuff parking lot.  Later 
that day he received a call at his home from a friend who told 
him, “[H]ey man, as soon as you left the people you talked to 
went straight in there and killed everybody.”  Williams returned 
to the car wash, which had already been cordoned off with police 
 
3  
The Wheels ’N Stuff owners permitted workers to retain 
tips for car washes, but asked that tips for larger services be 
shared with them.   
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
tape.  From there, he was taken to the Compton Police 
Department and interviewed.  He described the men he had seen 
sitting in the Honda earlier, explaining that the driver had a 
lighter complexion than the passenger, and appeared to be a 
little older.  He believed both men had short hair, although he 
described the driver as having worn a cap.   
c. Bowie 
Randy Bowie, who washed cars at the Wheels ’N Stuff 
from time to time, walked to work the day of the shooting, 
arriving just as Williams was leaving.  Bowie stopped to use the 
payphone right outside of the car wash, which was where he first 
saw the car parked next to the car wash.  The driver was about 
six feet from where Bowie stood.  Bowie identified the driver at 
trial as Wilson.  While on the payphone, the passenger of the car 
— who Bowie identified at trial as Pops — raised what Bowie 
believed was a TEC-9 semiautomatic handgun, pointed it at 
him, and told him not to warn anyone.  Pops then got out of the 
car, grabbed Bowie’s collar, thrust the gun beneath Bowie’s arm, 
and used him as a shield.  The driver got out of the car while 
brandishing a gun, which Bowie believed was a nine-millimeter 
or Glock and held it to Bowie’s back.  The two men then marched 
Bowie into the car wash.   
While Bowie was held at gunpoint by the payphone, Hurd 
drove up to the car wash.  At the same time, Jessie Dunn arrived 
in his own car, an El Camino with chrome IROC rims.  The 
custom 3-bar chrome IROC rims originally belonged to Hurd, 
who had them specially retrofitted for his El Camino.  Because 
the rims were manufactured for use with a Camaro, Hurd had 
new holes drilled into them and added distinctive hardware.  
Dunn bought the El Camino from Hurd.  Following the sale, 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
Dunn’s girlfriend, Kimberly Thomas, noticed an oxidation spot 
on one of the rims, and Dunn planned to have the rim re-dipped 
in chrome to fix the imperfection.    
Hurd and Dunn both entered the car wash building after 
Pops and Wilson marched Bowie inside.  Once in the building, 
Pops and Wilson ordered everyone to get on the ground and not 
move.  The men inside the building after Bowie and his 
assailants entered included Hurd and Dunn (who had walked in 
after Bowie), Potter and E.T. (who entered as Williams was 
leaving), and Hoard (who had been inside all along).  Bowie was 
afraid that if he alerted Hurd and Dunn to Pops and Wilson’s 
presence, he would be shot.   
Pops and Wilson asked those inside the car wash where 
the money and “shit” were kept.  They searched inside of the 
building, walking to the opposite side of the building away from 
where Bowie lay on the ground.  Hurd was the only other person 
Bowie could see.  Bowie heard a commotion, after which a room 
divider slid between him and the area where Wilson and Pops 
were searching.  Seizing the opportunity, Bowie got up and ran 
from the building; as he ran, he heard a number of gunshots.   
Bowie hid for some time not knowing whether he was 
being pursued, and ultimately ran into a storage facility where 
he asked an employee to call the police.  He said his shop had 
been robbed and his friends may have been shot.  Bowie, shaken 
by the events, asked an employee of the storage facility to drive 
him to his brother’s house.  The employee agreed, and as they 
drove they passed the car wash, where Bowie saw police 
arriving.   
While heading toward his brother’s house, Bowie saw his 
brother’s car turn into a parking lot, and Bowie asked the driver 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
to go there instead.  Bowie, shaking so badly he could hardly 
stand, got into his brother’s car.  Now a passenger in his 
brother’s car, Bowie again drove past the Wheels ’N Stuff where 
he saw the car wash taped off and a large crowd gathered.  Bowie 
was still very frightened, and he did not want to stop or speak 
with police.  He did not report that he witnessed the crime until 
the next day.   
Bowie was interviewed by Detective Cat Chavers of the 
Compton Police Department.  He told Detective Chavers about 
what he had witnessed and gave descriptions of the Honda’s 
driver and passenger.  He described the passenger as darker 
skinned than the driver, with braided hair curled up at the ends.  
He believed the passenger was between 25 and 30 years old and 
described him as wearing dark clothing and having a TEC-9 gun 
with a long clip.  Bowie described the driver as lighter skinned 
and smaller than the passenger.  Bowie “guess[ed]” the driver’s 
age to be between 25 and 30; in fact, Wilson was 20 years old at 
the time of the shooting.  Bowie told Detective Chavers he 
thought Wilson had a uniquely shaped mouth, and was able to 
identify Wilson on February 23, 1998, from a photographic 
lineup based on what he described to be “the smirky grin on his 
face.”4   
d. Brown 
Anthony Brown’s testimony from the preliminary hearing 
was read to the jury as Brown was unavailable for trial.  
Anthony Brown was a Wheels ’N Stuff employee since its 
 
4  
Bowie testified that he told Detective Chavers that Wilson 
had a “funny shaped mouth,” but admitted on cross-examination 
that he did not recall whether he described Wilson’s mouth 
when giving his first statement, or only later.      
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
opening in 1997.  The morning of January 25, 1998, Brown 
arrived at the car wash in the late morning.  Brown planned to 
attend a Super Bowl ’98 party with his friends and coworkers 
that day and planned to sell T-shirts and wash cars to make 
money before going to the party.  As he was arriving to the car 
wash, Brown saw a man driving Jessie Dunn’s El Camino 
abruptly out of the parking lot, moving forward and backward, 
skidding the tires, and ultimately knocking over a gate on his 
way off of the property.  The El Camino sported IROC rims.  
Brown did not know the man driving the El Camino but testified 
that Wilson resembled the driver.  Brown was ultimately unable 
to positively identify the driver of the El Camino as Wilson.   
As he saw the El Camino driving out of the parking lot, 
Brown was also grabbing the T-shirts he’d planned to sell from 
his own car.  When he did so, he saw Pops walk out of the car 
wash office through the front doors.  Brown gestured to Pops as 
if to remark upon the absurdity of the driver who had just 
knocked over the car wash gate.  Pops walked to the Honda that 
had been parked by the payphone, got in, pointed a TEC-9 at 
Brown, and fumbled with the weapon like he was trying to clear 
a jam.  Brown tried to evade the weapon pointed at him by 
crawling through his own car and exiting from the passenger 
door.  Pops then drove out of the Wheels ’N Stuff parking lot in 
the Honda, traveling in the same direction the El Camino had 
gone.   
Brown went toward the car wash office and yelled into the 
building but did not enter.  A man wearing a yellow shirt, who 
Brown identified as E.T., got up and ran toward him.  E.T. told 
Brown that the men “shot everybody.”  The four remaining men 
in the car wash, all of whom had been shot and killed, included 
Hoard, Hurd, Potter, and Dunn.  From his vantage point at the 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
door, Brown could see Hurd’s body on the floor, and E.T. told 
Brown that Hurd had been shot.  E.T. went on, “I don’t know 
why they didn’t kill me.”  E.T. looked for his car keys inside the 
building, but was unable to find them and asked Brown for a 
ride because he did “not want to be around this kind [of] mess 
when the police c[a]me.”   
While E.T. was inside the building searching for his keys, 
Potter’s mother, Georgetta Hoard,5 along with a friend, stopped 
by the car wash.  Brown told Georgetta she should not go into 
the building, and that E.T. told him it was “a terrible sight” 
inside.  Brown and E.T. then left in Brown’s car.   
Brown called his brother from the car to tell him what had 
happened, and Brown’s brother advised Brown and E.T. to 
return to the car wash.  They did, and both men spoke with the 
police already on the scene.  Police officers then took Brown and 
E.T. to the station to be interviewed, where Brown described 
Pops’s height, age, and hairstyle.  Officers observed that motor 
oil and dirt stains covered E.T.’s yellow shirt.   
e. Investigation 
Compton police officer Bettye Jones was one of the first 
responders to the Wheels ’N Stuff scene, where she saw two 
women standing outside — Georgetta and her friend — and 
observed that one was crying hysterically.  Jones looked through 
the front doors into the car wash, and saw a body lying on the 
floor.  Unsure if suspects remained in the building, she placed 
Georgetta and her companion in a patrol car and entered the car 
wash with Officer Larry Urrutia.  Initially, Jones and Urrutia 
 
5  
Georgetta Hoard will be referred to by first name to avoid 
confusion with victim Michael Hoard. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
saw three men — Hurd, Potter, and Hoard, lying in the building, 
“obviously dead.”  They inspected the building further and found 
one additional victim — Dunn — behind a car near the back of 
the building.  After the officers secured the building, paramedics 
came in, checked the pulse of the men on the floor, and 
determined that all of them were deceased.   
Jones noted there were blood puddles and a bloody 
footprint on the floor and was careful to ensure that officers and 
paramedics did not step in the blood.  A shelf had fallen inside 
the car wash, and the contents were strewn on the floor.  Jones 
also observed that, in the car wash parking lot, broken headlight 
fragments were on the ground near the gate.  The gate appeared 
scratched and had paint transfer damage, suggesting it had 
been hit by a car.   
Deputy Jeff Walley, a ballistics expert, collected evidence 
at the scene.  He recovered nine-millimeter and .40 caliber 
bullets, bullet fragments, casings, and one live round.  
Specifically, he found nine .40 caliber Smith and Wesson 
cartridge casings, along with 10 expended .40 caliber bullets or 
bullet fragments.  Walley determined, based on unique gun 
barrel and firing pin manufacturing processes, that a Glock 
semiautomatic pistol fired the .40 caliber bullets found at the 
scene.   
Walley also recovered five nine-millimeter expended 
casings and one live nine-millimeter round.  He determined 
these rounds could have been fired from one of several weapons, 
but the only weapon with both a barrel extension and 
appearance different than other types of pistols, including the 
Glock used to fire the .40 caliber bullets, was an Intratec TEC-
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
9.6  A nine-millimeter casing found at the scene was dented, 
suggesting the weapon jammed, a malfunction in which the 
ammunition does not work as expected and no bullet is fired.  
Intratec firearms are not known to be high quality weapons and 
are known to jam on occasion.  No ballistics evidence other than 
from a nine-millimeter and .40 caliber was found at the scene; 
Walley concluded only two weapons were used at the scene:  a 
Glock that fired .40 caliber bullets, and likely an Intratec TEC-
9 with a barrel extension that fired the nine-millimeter bullets.   
The Office of the Medical Examiner performed autopsies 
on the four victims two days after the shootings.  Deputy medical 
examiner Christopher Rogers testified that each of the four 
victims were shot in their heads.  Hurd suffered one fatal 
gunshot wound to the back of his head, fired from a distance of 
at least two feet.  Potter suffered three gunshot wounds to the 
back of his head, all of which were fatal.  Potter was shot from a 
distance of at least two feet.  Hoard suffered three gunshot 
wounds to the back of his head, all of which were fatal.  These 
wounds were inflicted from a distance of at least two feet.  Hoard 
also suffered two nonfatal wounds to his hands from bullet 
fragments.  Dunn was shot five times, twice in his head, once 
under his arm, once in his shoulder, and once to his forearm.  
The shots he suffered to his head were both fatal.  The shot to 
the area beneath his arm was fatal, as the bullet traveled 
through a vein next to his heart.  The shot he suffered to his 
shoulder was likely fatal.  The shot to his forearm was 
potentially fatal.  The shots to Dunn’s head were fired from a 
range of less than two feet.  The shots to Dunn’s shoulder, 
 
6  
Bowie believed the weapon pointed at him was a TEC-9 
with a long clip, and Brown saw a TEC-9 pointed at him. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
forearm, and arm were each fired from a distance of at least two 
feet.   
f. After the shooting 
On the evening of the shooting one of Pops’s relatives 
hosted a barbeque.  Larry Barnes — a friend of Pops and Wilson 
— attended the barbeque, along with Wilson.  While there, 
Pops’s brother, Aziz Harris, asked Barnes for assistance burning 
a stolen car.  Barnes, Harris, and Pops’s girlfriend drove in a 
Honda to an alley where they burned Dunn’s stolen El Camino.  
A nine-millimeter Lorcin pistol was in the filter, in an area 
located beneath the car’s carburetor lid.  The tires were in poor 
condition and the El Camino had no radio.   
On February 12, 1998, Detective Richard Conant of the 
Long Beach Police Department stopped Pops, who was driving 
a Camaro with chrome rims.  Detective Conant conducted the 
stop because he believed the rims matched the description of 
those stolen from a car owned by one of the victims of the car 
wash murders.  Pops’s Camaro was painted a light color.  Three 
weeks before the stop, Barnes had joined Pops, Wilson, and 
others at a local bowling alley, where Barnes noted that Pops’s 
Camaro had been fitted with rims that matched the car’s light 
paint color.  The Camaro had different rims at the time of the 
February 12, 1998 stop.   
Wilson, Harris, and Barnes were passengers in Pops’s car 
when it was stopped.  Wilson became verbally combative with 
detectives during the stop, angry that officers were conducting 
safety pat downs.  Officers arrested Barnes based upon an 
outstanding warrant, but did not arrest Pops, Wilson, or Harris 
at that time.   
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
On February 22, 1998, Bowie saw Pops at a gas station in 
Long Beach.  Pops was driving a Camaro with IROC rims, and 
Bowie believed the rims were the same as those that had been 
on Dunn’s car.  As Pops left the gas station, Bowie paged 
Detective Reynolds, and when they spoke Bowie urgently and 
fearfully and described what he had seen.   
i. The lineups 
On February 11, 1998, Detective Reynolds showed 
Williams a mug book consisting of 20 photographs spread across 
five pages, none of which depicted Pops or Wilson, and Williams 
was unable to identify anyone.  Reynolds showed the same mug 
book to Brown, who was also unable to identify anyone.  On 
February 12, Reynolds showed Williams a single sheet 
containing six images — a “six-pack” — with none of the images 
depicting Pops or Wilson.  Williams was unable to identify 
anyone, but he noted that the individual depicted in the number 
one position “almost” looked like one of the men who 
participated in the shooting.  Reynolds showed that same six-
pack to Brown, who similarly noted that the person in the 
number one position looked closest to the driver.   
Eight days later, Bowie participated in a photo lineup.  
Reynolds showed Bowie a mug book consisting of 20 
photographs spread across five pages, as well as a single six-
pack, none of which depicted Pops or Wilson.  Bowie was unable 
to identify any of the individuals pictured as those involved with 
the murders.  Reynolds next showed two photographs to Bowie, 
who, upon seeing them, became angry and began crying.  
Pointing to one of the photographs, which depicted Pops, Bowie 
said, “That’s the motherfucker right there.”  Reynolds did not 
show any photographs of Wilson to Bowie during this lineup.   
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
On February 23, 1998, Reynolds prepared a second six-
pack, this time containing a photograph of Wilson.  Bowie looked 
at the images and identified the person in the number two 
position — Wilson — as the Honda’s driver.  Bowie stated, “I 
know for sure that’s him, I know the shape of his mouth.”  That 
same day, Reynolds showed Williams two different six-packs, 
one of which contained a photo of Pops and the other a photo of 
Wilson.  Williams was unable to identify anyone.   
On February 24, Brown participated in a photo lineup, 
viewing a six-pack containing an image of Wilson.  Brown was 
unable to identify Wilson, although he told Detective Reynolds 
that the person in the number two position — Wilson — looked 
like he had the same complexion as the man he saw driving 
Dunn’s El Camino.  Brown was also unable to identify Pops from 
the six-pack containing his photo, and although Brown indicated 
that the photo of Pops was similar in appearance to one of the 
assailants, he said that the man he saw had a darker complexion 
than the individual depicted.   
Several months later, on June 9, 1998, a live lineup was 
conducted at the Los Angeles County Jail.  Reynolds testified 
that Bowie, Brown, and Williams attended the witness lineup, 
and that they did not communicate with one another during the 
process.  All three witnesses identified Pops.  Bowie and 
Williams identified Wilson as the driver.  Brown could not 
positively identify Wilson although he believed Wilson was the 
person closest in appearance to the man he saw driving Dunn’s 
El Camino.  Brown wrote on his identification card that he “only 
viewed [the suspect] from behind and [got] a quick view of [his] 
face but [Wilson] fits best . . . .”   
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
14 
ii. The searches and arrests 
 
On March 5, 1998, Reynolds obtained warrants to search 
and arrest Pops and Wilson.  Wilson was arrested in his home, 
where he was found lying on his couch with a shotgun.  Officers 
carried out the search warrants simultaneously, and during 
their search of Wilson’s home — where they found and arrested 
Harris7 — they discovered a live round of nine-millimeter 
ammunition, a man’s wallet, a loaded .12 gauge shotgun, a 
three-ring binder, and a blue pad of paper.       
Officers found the bullet beneath a couch cushion in 
Wilson’s home, where they also located Wilson’s wallet.8  The 
wallet held, among other contents, a business card from a gun 
store, which listed prices for .26 and .30 caliber Glock firearms, 
but not a .40 caliber Glock, the type used in the Wheels ’N Stuff 
shooting.  Walley, the ballistics expert, identified the bullet as 
one ejected from the same nine-millimeter weapon that was 
used in the shooting.  He testified the bullet could have been 
dropped in the home before or after the shooting.   
The binder found in Wilson’s home contained a single 
newspaper clipping about the car wash murders.  Officers found 
no other newspapers or clippings in Wilson’s home.  The blue 
pad of paper found on Wilson’s table contained pages depicting 
various drawings and a list of names.  According to Barnes’s 
testimony, one of the drawings was of Pops’s car with the 
addition of IROC rims, and it was labeled “the Monster Beefy.”  
There was also a drawing of street signs labeled “55th” and 
 
7  
Warrants for Harris’s and Barnes’s arrests were issued at 
the same time as the warrants for Pops and Wilson.   
8  
The wallet was identified as Wilson’s because it contained 
a video rental card and calling card in Wilson’s name.   
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
15 
“Lime,” which was an intersection near Pops’s and Wilson’s 
homes.  Another drawing was a caricature of Pops labeled with 
his moniker, “Nut,” and with the word “Loco.”  Another drawing 
showed a tattooed arm firing a semiautomatic weapon; the 
tattoo said “Y.M.O.,” which stands for “Young Mafia 
Organization,” a group to which Wilson, Pops, Harris, and 
Barnes belonged.  Pops was tattooed on his left and right 
forearms with the letters, “Y.M.O.”  The pad of paper also held 
a page listing the various monikers of the individuals who spent 
time with Pops and Wilson.9   
During the search of Pops’s home — where Pops was 
arrested — a Camaro fitted with IROC rims was seized and 
taken to a tow yard.  The IROC rims on the car were the same 
as those that had been fitted on Dunn’s El Camino.  Anthony 
Boochee, who originally fit the rims on the El Camino, testified 
that the IROC rims had been modified to fit that car by drilling 
larger holes to accommodate the necessary screws and Cragar 
lugs.  Boochee testified that the rims had been modified a second 
time to fit a smaller wheel, but still utilized the Cragar lugs 
originally placed on Dunn’s El Camino.  Kimberly Thomas, 
Dunn’s girlfriend, testified she recognized the rims as having 
originally been placed on Dunn’s El Camino because there was 
an oxidation spot she recognized on one of them.   
2. Defense Case and Rebuttal Evidence 
Although Williams initially told the prosecution he was 
“positive” “from a glance” and had “no doubt” regarding his 
 
9  
Pops’s moniker was listed as “Nut.”  Wilson’s moniker was 
listed as “Bird.”  Harris’s moniker was listed as “Scrap.”  
Barnes’s moniker was listed as “Smerf,” which he had tattooed 
across his stomach.   
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
16 
preliminary hearing identification of Pops and Wilson, he later 
admitted he “really did not get a good look at” one of the men.  
Williams explained that he has “a habit of not staring at people 
I don’t know so, yeah, I looked over towards them and mind my 
own business, then I would maybe look again.”   
Williams had a conversation with the driver of the vehicle, 
who he described as having a lighter complexion than the 
passenger.  At one point, Williams conceded during questioning 
that he became “confused about who was in the passenger seat 
and the driver’s seat.  It’s the only thing — a small thing to be 
confused about; otherwise, those are the two people in the car.  
[¶]  Now, right now, they almost look similar so for me to know 
which one was driving and which one was in the passenger seat 
is hard for me but I do know those are the two people in the car, 
yes.”  Williams also acknowledged that he lied several times 
while giving testimony during the preliminary hearing, 
although this dishonesty related to what he knew about the sale 
of marijuana from the car wash.  Selling marijuana from Wheels 
’N Stuff violated the terms of his probation.10    
Bowie’s testimony suffered from credibility concerns.  
Bowie had numerous prior felony convictions, including battery 
against the mother of his child, robbery, and burglary.  Bowie 
denied on direct examination that he had suffered an armed 
robbery conviction, although he acknowledged on cross-
examination that he suffered a robbery conviction as a juvenile 
in which a firearm was involved.  Bowie maintained that Wheels 
’N Stuff was a legitimate car wash business of which he was an 
 
10  
Williams was on probation at the time of the shooting, 
having suffered felony convictions for possession of marijuana 
with intent to sell and possession of stolen property.   
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
17 
employee, and he was paid up to $300 per week, “assuming that 
[he] made that much,” to wash cars.  Williams denied paying 
Bowie regularly for his work, testifying he sporadically paid 
Bowie in small amounts if he was asked, and Bowie paid no 
income tax.  Bowie claimed never to have seen marijuana being 
sold from the Wheels ’N Stuff.  His claim was undermined by 
Williams’s testimony that the building’s rent was paid from 
marijuana sale proceeds, and by the crime scene photographs, 
which showed marijuana and related drug paraphernalia visible 
in open locations.  Bowie also claimed he had never testified at 
a trial; this statement was impeached by a minute order from 
his own trial showing he testified, but he maintained he had not 
recalled doing so as his trial had occurred fifteen years prior to 
Wilson’s trial.     
When Bowie identified Wilson, he told Chavers he recalled 
what the driver looked like because of “the smirky grin on his 
face.”  Police graphic artist John Shannon testified Bowie’s 
description of the driver was not sufficiently specific to permit 
him to create a sketch.  He testified that Bowie did not say 
anything about Wilson’s mouth shape or a smirk, only 
describing that the driver had a receding hairline, tight eyes, or 
“something like that.”  Shannon explained that when a suspect 
possessed some unusual feature, witnesses were usually able to 
describe that detail to him.  Williams and Brown believed the 
driver wore a cap with writing on it, while Bowie described the 
driver’s hairline.  Wilson argued he did not have a receding 
hairline in 1998, nor did his eyes appear “tight.”   
Brown had testified that he saw the El Camino and the 
Honda leaving Wheels ’N Stuff the morning of the shooting.  He 
began his employment with the car wash weeks after his release 
from county jail, where he was incarcerated after suffering 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
18 
felony convictions for conspiracy and telephone fraud in 1993.  
Brown was unable to identify Wilson as the driver during the 
February 24, 1998 photographic lineup, and Wilson argues he 
erroneously identified another man as someone who resembled 
the driver.   
Wilson presented evidence that he was not involved with 
burning the El Camino.  Joseph Black, a defense expert 
employed by one of the manufacturers of IROC rims, testified 
that the rims on Dunn’s El Camino appeared consistent with a 
1984 rim style, and were not the same style as the rims sold with 
the 1988 Camaro.  He testified that he did not believe IROC rims 
required modification to be fit on an El Camino.   
With regard to the binder found in Wilson’s home, no 
evidence suggested that Wilson made any of the drawings or 
that he composed the list of Y.M.O. members.  No drawings of 
Wilson appeared in the binder.   
None of the fingerprints collected from the car wash could 
be traced to Pops or Wilson.    
Deputy Public Defender Jeanmarie Klingenbeck, a close 
friend of Deputy Public Defender Cheryl Jones (Pops’s attorney) 
attended the live lineup in June 1998.  She sat a few rows behind 
the three witnesses — Bowie, Williams, and Brown — who each 
sat about six feet away from one another in a row of school desks 
with empty desks between them.  Klingenbeck noticed the 
witnesses motioning toward each other, “like kids would do 
when they were copying off papers.”  Klingenbeck took notes 
once she noticed what she perceived as “unusual activity,” but 
she did not inform the officers at the lineup about her 
observations.  Klingenbeck told Jones, her friend and fellow 
public defender, about what she saw, and she provided a 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
19 
statement to Jones a few months before trial.  Klingenbeck 
testified at trial as to her observations.   
Deputy Sheriff William Gilbert of the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff’s Department supervised the June 9, 1998 live lineup, 
and he testified regarding the procedures and safeguards in 
place.  Gilbert described how witnesses are generally seated at 
a lineup, explaining that because there are seven seats in a row, 
three witnesses would be seated with two chairs between each 
person.  Witnesses are reminded “that there is no talking, 
communicating or looking around in any way, shape or form, 
[and they are instructed] to look straight ahead.”  Gilbert 
testified that he monitored the lineup from a window in front of 
the stage, where he could see the lineup participants and the 
witnesses in the gallery.  If any witness communication had 
been observed, the lineup would have been cancelled.  The 
witnesses are illuminated by the light behind a two-way mirror, 
and the area where witnesses are seated is too dim to read a 
newspaper.   
Attorneys attending the lineup are seated between six and 
eight rows behind the witnesses, and they are required to 
identify themselves, and to state why they’re attending the 
lineup, before it begins.  Klingenbeck intimated she was an 
attorney related to the case, and Gilbert testified that if she had 
indicated that she was merely accompanying attorney Jones she 
would have been asked to wait outside.  The paperwork Gilbert 
completed in conjunction with the lineup notes no objections or 
incidents related to improper witness communication.   
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
20 
B. Penalty Phase 
1. Prosecution Case 
Hurd’s sister, Charmaine Hurd, testified about the toll his 
death took on his family, including his five children.   
Wilson’s prior robbery conviction was admitted via 
stipulation.  Wilson pleaded guilty to a robbery in which he 
drove the getaway car while his accomplice robbed a 53-year-old 
woman of cash from her Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (“AFDC”) check by threatening to kill her companion.  
Wilson was 18 years old at the time of that offense and was 
ordered to serve 120 days in county jail.   
2. Defense Case 
Marcellette James, an old family friend, began writing to 
Wilson following his incarceration.  As a child, James found 
Wilson to be happy, smart, and perceptive.  She believed he was 
fairly well supported by his family, particularly his dad, during 
the years of his childhood during which the two were 
acquainted.  During the first year of Wilson’s incarceration, 
James sent him dozens of letters, cards, and Christian 
pamphlets.  The two spoke frequently on the telephone.  James 
and Wilson fell in love through their correspondence and 
continued writing letters even after Wilson’s telephone 
privileges were revoked.  James testified that Wilson’s being 
charged with murdering four people did not change her feelings 
for him.  James and Wilson did not speak about the murders, 
but James believed Wilson to be innocent and considered him a 
“very mature man.”  James testified she “matured spiritually” 
because of her relationship with Wilson and were he to receive 
the death penalty “it could be killing a part of” her.   
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
21 
Wilson also presented evidence of his childhood and 
upbringing.  Byron Paul Wilson, Sr., Wilson’s father, testified 
the family lived in Long Beach when Wilson was born, and 
Byron worked in housekeeping at Fairview State Hospital at 
that time.  Byron was educated at a local community college and 
trade college, after which he gained employment at Univox 
doing technical troubleshooting work from 1983–1987.  Byron 
used alcohol and cocaine during this period.  Wilson’s mother, 
Tonya Wilson, worked as a secretary in a school district around 
this time, from 1982–1990.  Byron testified that during the 
period he was employed by Univox, Tonya also casually drank 
alcohol and used drugs, mainly marijuana.   
Byron and Tonya’s marriage was initially “okay,” despite 
periods of infidelity.  They moved to Avenal for Byron’s work in 
1987, and to Novato in 1989 when he became employed by San 
Quentin State Prison.  Their drug use consistently increased as 
the years passed.  Following another move for Byron’s job when 
Wilson was about 11, he began socializing with Byron’s and 
Tonya’s friends, all of whom used drugs together.  Tonya 
described their family as dysfunctional.  When Tonya was under 
the influence of drugs “she became a changed person,” 
sometimes physically attacking Wilson and Byron.   
Tonya oversaw Wilson’s education and spoke with his 
teachers when necessary.  She testified that in elementary 
school Wilson was a “class clown,” and he was placed in special 
education classes.  Wilson kept to himself with friends and 
peers, and when he tried to have friends over to his home Wilson 
would become so withdrawn Tonya asked the child’s parent to 
come and retrieve their child.   
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
22 
The family moved to Los Angeles, and although Wilson 
preferred living in small towns he eventually adjusted and grew 
to like it.  Byron’s drug abuse worsened, and he resigned from 
his job due to his drug use and a back injury.  He and Tonya 
separated, and the two divorced in 1997.  Tonya’s mother died 
in 1997, and following that loss and a drug relapse, she was 
arrested and convicted of a felony.  Byron and Tonya both lost 
contact with Wilson while they lived in Los Angeles.   
Tonya testified about an incident in Wilson’s childhood 
when he called 911 after she collapsed due to an ectopic 
pregnancy.  Byron testified that Wilson — then aged seven or 
eight — helped care for his mother when she was ill with cancer 
and when she was injured in a car accident after having taken 
PCP.   
Despite their lack of contact, Byron testified that he did 
not want Wilson to be executed because Wilson was his only 
child.  Tonya testified that she loved Wilson and did not want 
him to receive the death penalty.   
Wilson’s elementary school special education teacher, 
Barry Carlson, testified that Wilson suffered from attention 
deficit disorder as a child.  Wilson was capable of learning well 
when given individual attention and appeared happy in grade 
school — particularly when his teacher worked with him.  He 
was easily distracted when left alone, and more hyperactive 
than other children with the same diagnosis.   
Dr. Efrain Beliz, a clinical psychologist providing expert 
testimony for Wilson, opined that it was likely he suffered from 
attention deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD) in elementary 
and high school.  Over the course of two days, Dr. Beliz 
interviewed Wilson for 13 hours.  Dr. Beliz explained that 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
23 
ADHD sufferers are impulsive and disruptive, and that children 
with ADHD face an increased risk of developing substance 
abuse issues.  Because those suffering from ADHD possess poor 
social skills, Dr. Beliz opined they are vulnerable to social 
manipulation and gang involvement.   
II. GUILT PHASE 
A. Identification of Wilson Was Proper  
Wilson argues the trial court erred by denying a motion to 
suppress Bowie’s and Brown’s identifications of him.11  He 
alleges the identification procedures were unduly suggestive 
and the resulting identifications unreliable, rendering their 
admissions violative of his rights under the Due Process Clause 
to the United States Constitution.  For the reasons that follow, 
we conclude his claim lacks merit. 
1. Background 
a. Bowie’s Identification 
While Bowie was using the payphone outside the Wheels 
’N Stuff on January 25, 1998, he saw two men parked outside 
the car wash.  The passenger, Pops, pointed a semiautomatic 
handgun at Bowie, then got out of the car and held the gun 
against Bowie’s body.  Bowie also saw the driver, whom he later 
identified as Wilson, get out of the car and hold a gun against 
Bowie’s back.  Pops and Wilson marched Bowie into the car 
wash, and the events of the shooting transpired.   
 
11  
Bowie’s and Brown’s identifications, made in 1998, 
predate the enactment of section 859.7, which now mandates 
that law enforcement agencies adopt regulations for the 
administration of identification processes.  
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
24 
Bowie went to the police station the day after the 
shootings, and although he was unable to describe his assailants 
clearly enough for a sketch artist to produce a composite 
drawing, he told Chavers that the driver had a “funny shaped 
mouth.”  Bowie also said that he would be able to identify his 
assailants if he saw them again.  Bowie participated in a 
photographic lineup on February 19, 1998 — less than one 
month after the shooting — but was shown no photos of Wilson 
and did not identify any of the photos he was shown as being of 
Wilson.12  On February 23, 1998, Bowie returned to the police 
station to view a different photo lineup that did include a photo 
of Wilson and of five other men.  Bowie identified Wilson as the 
Honda’s driver, saying, “I know for sure that’s him, I know the 
shape of his mouth.”   
At a subsequent live lineup on June 9, 1998, and at the 
preliminary hearing, Bowie had no difficulty identifying Wilson, 
highlighting the distinctive shape of Wilson’s mouth.  Bowie 
testified at the preliminary hearing that he had described 
Wilson’s smirk to police officers when he first spoke with them 
the day after the shooting.  Later, he was unable to recall 
whether he had told Chavers that Wilson had a unique mouth 
shape when he first gave a statement to her or only sometime 
later.   
 
12  
Bowie was able to identify Pops.  Although Bowie was 
shown several photo arrays — four pages with five images each, 
one six-pack, and two individual photographs, in that order — 
he did not recall the order in which officers showed the photos 
to him.  The photo of Pops was shown to Bowie last; it was one 
of the two photographs shown.  We need not decide whether this 
procedure was suggestive to address Wilson’s claim of error. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
25 
b. Brown’s Identification 
Brown arrived at the car wash right after the shooting as 
Wilson and Pops were fleeing the scene.  He saw a person he 
described as a light-skinned Black man driving Dunn’s El 
Camino out of the parking lot.  Pops got into his car to leave the 
scene, fleeing when the gun he fired at Brown jammed.   
Brown participated in a photo lineup on February 11, 
1998, but none of the photos he was shown depicted Wilson, and 
he was not able to identify anyone.  The next day he was shown 
a different six-pack, which also did not contain an image of 
Wilson, but he pointed to a picture, noting the person looked 
closest to the El Camino driver.  On February 24, 1998, he 
participated in a third photo lineup — this time including a 
photo of Wilson — and although he did not identify Wilson, he 
noted Wilson had the same complexion as the man he saw 
driving the El Camino.  At the live lineup on June 9, 1998, 
Brown was unable to identify Wilson with certainty, writing on 
his identification card that he “only viewed [the suspect] from 
behind and [got] a quick view of [his] face but [Wilson] fits 
best . . . .”  Brown did not positively identify Wilson at the 
preliminary hearing, but testified that “[t]he light complected 
guy” — Wilson — “would probably best fit the description but I 
only seen [sic] him from the rear view and glanced at the front 
view.”   
Wilson sought to exclude evidence of Bowie’s and Brown’s 
pretrial identifications of him under Evidence Code section 402, 
arguing the procedures used by the police were unduly 
suggestive and the identifications tainted.  The trial court heard 
the motion to exclude on March 19, 1999; Bowie appeared at the 
hearing, but Brown did not.  The trial court ruled the procedures 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
26 
employed in connection with Bowie’s identification were not 
suggestive and it permitted the introduction of Bowie’s 
identification.  The trial court deferred ruling on the 
suggestiveness of Brown’s identification pending his appearance 
at the Evidence Code section 402 hearing.  Brown’s appearance 
was never secured, and he did not testify at trial; the trial court 
instead declared him unavailable and counsel read his 
preliminary hearing testimony to the jury.   
2. Discussion  
Wilson claims his right to due process was violated by the 
introduction of Brown’s and Bowie’s identifications.  A violation 
occurs “ ‘only if the identification procedure is “so impermissibly 
suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification.” ’ ”  (People v. Sanchez (2019) 7 
Cal.5th 14, 35.)  If we determine the procedure was suggestive, 
no due process violation arises if “ ‘ “the identification itself was 
nevertheless 
reliable 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the  
circumstances.” ’ ”  (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 556 
(Clark), quoting People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 608 
(Kennedy).)  In assessing the totality of the circumstances, we 
consider “ ‘such factors as the opportunity of the witness to view 
the suspect at the time of the offense, the witness’s degree of 
attention at the time of the offense, the accuracy of his or her 
prior description of the suspect, the level of certainty 
demonstrated at the time of the identification, and the lapse of 
time between the offense and the identification.’  [Citations.]  
‘Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of 
the suggestive identification itself.’  [Citation.]”  (Sanchez, at pp. 
35–36.)   
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
27 
A defendant’s claim that an identification procedure was 
unduly suggestive is a “mixed question of law and fact.”  (Clark, 
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 557; see also Kennedy, supra, 36 Cal.4th 
at p. 609.)  This standard of review applies because “the facts 
are established, the law is undisputed, and the issue” we must 
resolve “is whether the law as applied to the established facts is 
violated.”  (Kennedy, supra, at p. 608.)  We review the so-called 
“historical 
facts,” 
those 
factual 
determinations 
that 
underpinned the trial court’s conclusion that the identification 
procedure was or was not suggestive, “under a deferential 
standard.” (Clark, supra, at p. 557.)  This standard 
acknowledges that the trial court may have made “credibility 
determinations,” that “contribute[d] to deciding the facts of 
what had already happened, [but] were not dispositive of the 
inquiry because the trial court did not have a ‘first-person 
vantage’ ” to whatever “facts occurred outside of court.”  
(Kennedy, supra, at p. 609.) 
What Wilson argues is that Bowie’s identification of his 
photograph was unduly suggestive because the six-pack array 
shown to Bowie made Wilson appear distinct from the other five 
individuals depicted.  As a result, Wilson claims, the lineup was 
suggestive because his image stood out to Bowie.  In particular, 
Wilson contends Bowie found the shape of his mouth 
remarkable, and he argues no other person had a similar mouth 
shape.  Wilson argues there should have been “fillers” in the 
photo array; that is, he claims the array should have included 
photographs of other individuals who shared the characteristic 
mouth shape Bowie found unique.  Because Bowie believed 
Wilson to be the only individual in the array with the uniquely 
shaped mouth, he argues, the procedure was impermissibly 
suggestive.   
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
28 
Wilson did not object on this basis before the trial court, 
but claims he has not forfeited the argument because he joined 
Pops’s motion to exclude and the motion “cited the correct 
objection.”13  Even if the argument is not forfeited (People v. 
 
13  
The forfeiture issue in this case is somewhat tangled.  
Wilson joined Pops’s motion for an Evidence Code section 402 
hearing.  In that motion, Pops argued that the way Bowie was 
shown his photograph was unduly suggestive because law 
enforcement officials presented several photographic arrays to 
Bowie, and then showed him just two pictures, one of which was 
of Pops.  Wilson joined Pops’s motion, and the prosecution’s 
response to Pops’s motion included an argument about the 
propriety of Bowie’s photographic identification of Wilson.  At 
the hearing, immediately before Wilson examined Bowie, the 
prosecution informed the court it assumed Wilson was joining 
Pops’s motion.  The trial court agreed, noting that the 
prosecution argued Bowie’s identification of Wilson was proper 
in its opposition.  Wilson then briefly questioned Bowie about 
that identification.  Pops made further argument to the court to 
exclude Bowie’s identification, and Wilson “submitted.”   
Wilson claims the issue is not forfeited because the “ ‘court 
understood the issue presented.’ ”  (People v. Clark (2011) 52 
Cal.4th 856, 966.)  In People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
926, 989, we held a suggestiveness claim was forfeited because 
defendant failed to object, but the first time suggestiveness was 
raised was in connection with a motion for judgment of 
acquittal.  In finding the suggestiveness claim forfeited in 
Cunningham, we cited Evidence Code section 353, which 
permits a court’s reversal based on erroneously admitted 
evidence only if the defendant moved to exclude the evidence or 
objected to its admission, and the reviewing court found the 
evidence should have been excluded on the grounds stated in the 
objection, or admission constituted a miscarriage of justice.  The 
only ground for exclusion of Bowie’s identification raised in 
Pops’s motion was based on the suggestiveness of Bowie being 
shown two photos, one of which depicted Pops, after he was 
shown several multiple-photo arrays.  Arguably, no motion to 
 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
29 
Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 989), we conclude it lacks 
merit.  In evaluating the suggestiveness of a photo array, we 
consider “whether anything caused defendant to ‘stand out’ from 
the others in a way that would suggest the witness should select 
him.”  (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 367.)  
Standing out requires more than the defendant potentially 
being a different race than others pictured or having a photo 
background slightly different than other images in the array.  
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 556–558.)  We have noted that 
identifying “apparent racial or ethnic identity is something that 
is harder to quantify and agree on.”  (Id. at p. 557.)  In Clark, 
the defendant was a light-skinned Black man with a 
distinctively large mustache, and the other images in the six-
pack showed men of a similar complexion but a potentially 
different race, all with similar facial hair.  (Ibid.)  We concluded 
in that case that nothing in the identification procedure made 
the witness select the defendant’s photograph from among the 
others, even accounting for the background tone and the 
potentially distinct races of those pictured.  (Id. at p. 557.)  We 
acknowledged law enforcement faced a challenge in finding 
images similar to the defendant’s and met it as best they could.   
Like the six-pack shown to the witness in Clark, the 
images shown to Bowie all depicted men with similar 
complexions.  (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 557.)  Wilson’s 
 
exclude Bowie’s identification based on the suggestiveness of 
Wilson’s mouth shape was made, although the issue was 
addressed at the Evidence Code section 402 hearing.  Whether 
Wilson forfeited this issue is a close question, but even if his 
suggestiveness claim is forfeited, nothing prohibits us from 
considering the merits of the issue, and we elect to do so here.  
(See ibid.; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 753.)   
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
30 
concern is not primarily with the race of the men depicted, but 
with their facial expression; Wilson claims he was the only 
person smirking, and Bowie testified he knew Wilson by his 
smirky grin.  Our review of the images does not reveal anything 
unique about the mouth shape in Wilson’s photo, nor does the 
shape of his mouth appear distinctive compared to the other 
photographs.  Even if it had, the identification was not unduly 
suggestive because nothing made defendant “ ‘stand out’ ” from 
the other men depicted.  (People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th 
at p. 367.)  As in Carpenter, Wilson “was neither the oldest nor 
the youngest of the [six-pack] participants, neither the tallest 
nor the shortest, neither the heaviest nor the lightest.”  (Ibid.)   
All of the men in defendant’s six-pack were distinct in 
some respect from one another, with varying hairstyles and 
clothing, and each of the image backgrounds was somewhat 
different.  But “nothing in the lineup suggested that the witness 
should select defendant.”  (People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 
932, 943.)  In Gonzalez, the defendant claimed his identification 
from a photo array in which he was the only person with a  
“ ‘droopy’ ” eye, and whose photo had a discolored background, 
was improper.  (Ibid.)  Witnesses had not previously described 
the defendant as having a distinctive eye, nor did we find 
anything particularly unique about the defendant’s eye in the 
image.  (Ibid.)  We held the identification was not unduly 
suggestive.  Likewise, here, although Bowie testified he was able 
to recognize Wilson by his smirk, there was nothing unique 
about Wilson’s mouth readily visible in the image.  (Ibid.)  To 
the extent Wilson’s mouth shape was distinct from the other 
individuals depicted, we have acknowledged all humans appear 
somewhat different from one another.  (People v. Lucas (2014) 
60 Cal.4th 153, 237; see also People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
31 
Cal.4th at p. 367 [“Because human beings do not look exactly 
alike, differences are inevitable”].)  Because nothing made 
Wilson’s image stand out, we conclude the identification was not 
impermissibly suggestive.  (Gonzalez, at p. 943; Carpenter, at p. 
367.)   
Wilson also argues Brown’s identification was unreliable.  
To evaluate this argument, “we consider (1) whether the 
identification 
procedure 
was 
unduly 
suggestive 
and 
unnecessary, and, if so, (2) whether the identification itself was 
nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances.”  
(People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 989.)  Because 
we did not find the identification procedure unduly suggestive, 
we turn next to whether the identification itself was reliable 
under a totality of the circumstances.  We conclude that it was.   
Brown did not positively identify Wilson during the photo 
lineup that contained his image, but said the image of Wilson 
most closely resembled the skin tone of the man who drove away 
in Dunn’s El Camino.  Brown acknowledged at that time he did 
not get a good look at the driver.  Brown had selected an image 
at a prior photo lineup, but the person selected was not Wilson.  
Following his tepid identification of a person who resembled the 
driver, Wilson, in a photographic lineup, Brown briefly saw 
Wilson and Pops when he appeared for a continuance hearing in 
May.  A month later, Brown participated in a live lineup.  He 
did not positively identify Wilson, but indicated he most closely 
resembled the person Brown saw driving the El Camino, 
acknowledging he did not get a good look at the driver and saw 
him from the back.  At the preliminary hearing, Brown again 
noted that — of the two defendants — Wilson most closely 
resembled the El Camino driver, although he was unable to view 
that person from the front. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
32 
Wilson argues that Brown’s photo identification was 
unreliable because, after failing to select an image of Wilson 
during two photo lineups, his participation in a subsequent 
photo lineup implied to Brown that he failed to identify the 
proper suspect initially.  We have previously concluded a 
witness viewing multiple photo lineups and making an 
identification each time was not the product of unduly 
suggestive procedure and conclude that is true here.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1213–1218.)  Brown 
viewed several photographic lineups, did not positively identify 
Wilson in any of them — although he twice noted images 
resembled the person he saw, one of which depicted Wilson — 
and was given no indication that he failed select the correct 
image.  We conclude the procedure used in the photographic 
lineup was not unduly suggestive and unnecessary.  
Wilson also contends that the passage of time between the 
crime and his participation in the live lineup rendered it 
unreliable.  The Attorney General assumes for the sake of 
argument, as do we, that Brown’s brief sighting of Wilson at the 
continuance hearing rendered the subsequent live lineup 
“suggestive to some degree.”  Even where an identification 
procedure is suggestive, we will find no due process violation if 
it was reliable under a totality of the circumstances, as Brown’s 
hesitant identification of Wilson was.  (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 
at p. 556.)  The circumstances we evaluate include how well and 
attentively the witness viewed the suspect, the accuracy of any 
prior description, how much time passed between the offense 
and identification, and the witness’s degree of certainty — all 
weighed against the “corrupting effect” of the identification.  
(People v. Sanchez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 36.)   
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
33 
Wilson argues that the passage of several months between 
the crime and the live lineup rendered the identification 
unreliable.  Brown’s  identifications at the live lineup and 
preliminary hearing were uncertain; in both instances he 
indicated that, of the choices available, Wilson most closely 
resembled the man he saw because his complexion was closest.  
Brown acknowledged he was unable to carefully observe the El 
Camino’s driver, and he provided no contemporaneous 
description of that person.  Brown’s failure to definitively 
identify Wilson at the live lineup, even after seeing Wilson in 
person and in a photograph, indicates the procedure was not 
unduly suggestive.  The reliability of Brown’s identification was 
not undermined.  (See People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 873, 
902 [witness’s failure to make in-court identification of the 
defendant suggests that showing the witness photographs of the 
defendant the night before trial was not unduly suggestive].)   
The passage of time between crime and identification, like 
the other circumstances, must be weighed against the damaging 
nature of the identification.  (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 556; 
People v. Sanchez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 35–36.)  Here, the 
“corrupting effect” of the identification was minimal.  (Sanchez, 
at p. 36.)  Identifying Wilson as the driver was not reliant on 
Brown’s testimony.  His identifications were consistently 
uncertain.  If useful to any degree they bolstered the more 
definitive identifications provided by Bowie, and of Williams — 
who also positively identified Wilson as the driver during the 
live lineup.  Moreover, Brown’s identifications — at the live 
lineup months after the crime, but also at the photographic 
lineup just weeks after it — were consistently uncertain and 
equivocal.  Considering the totality of circumstances, we 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
34 
conclude Brown’s uncertain identification was reliable, and no 
violation of Wilson’s right to due process occurred.  
B. Wilson’s Confrontation Right Was Not Violated 
by the Trial  Court’s Admission of Brown’s 
Testimony  
Wilson argues his Sixth Amendment confrontation right 
was violated by the admission of Brown’s preliminary hearing 
testimony.  Wilson acknowledges he was able to cross-examine 
Brown’s testimonial statements at the preliminary hearing, but 
argues Brown was not “unavailable” to testify at his trial as that 
term was understood by the framers of the federal Constitution.  
Wilson further argues admission of Brown’s preliminary 
hearing testimony constituted error because the prosecution 
failed to exercise diligence in attempting to secure his testimony 
at trial.  We conclude that Brown was “unavailable,” the 
prosecution exercised diligence in attempting to secure his 
testimony, and introduction of Brown’s preliminary hearing 
testimony did not violate Wilson’s confrontation right.  
1. Background 
Brown was initially a cooperative witness.  He returned to 
the scene of the shooting, spoke with police on several occasions, 
and participated in a live lineup.  He was subpoenaed to, and 
did, testify at the preliminary hearing on June 24, 1998.  Nearly 
a year later, in March 1999, the prosecution alerted the court to 
a potential problem with securing Brown’s testimony at trial.  
Brown had received a phone call from Tracy Batts, a man 
incarcerated on charges unrelated to this case, who warned 
Brown against testifying at trial.  The prosecution subsequently 
learned that Batts orchestrated a witness killing in his own 
case.  The prosecution understood Brown took the threat 
seriously.  Brown told prosecutors he would testify if he was 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
35 
“dragged into court,” but the prosecution believed it would be 
able to secure his testimony with sufficient time to work with 
him. 
The prosecution requested that Brown attend a hearing in 
March 1999 but did not believe his attendance could be secured 
so quickly.  That proved prescient, and despite the prosecution’s 
efforts to secure his appearance, Brown did not attend the 
hearing.  The prosecution then subpoenaed Brown to appear for 
a hearing in May 1999.  Brown signed the subpoena but did not 
appear, although he indicated he would meet with Detective 
Frederick Reynolds — a law enforcement contact with whom he 
had been in touch throughout the investigation — shortly 
thereafter.  Brown did not attend that meeting.   
Trial began on May 26, 1999, and on June 7, 1999, the 
prosecution sought — and the court ordered — a body 
attachment for Brown with bail set at $50,000.  The prosecution 
noted that if it could not secure Brown’s presence at trial it 
would seek to introduce his preliminary hearing testimony.  The 
prosecution made efforts — detailed below — to secure Brown’s 
testimony, and although Brown agreed to come to court he again 
failed to appear.   
On June 17, 1999, the court held a hearing to address 
whether the prosecution had exercised due diligence in seeking 
Brown’s appearance at trial.  Detective Reynolds testified about 
his efforts to secure Brown’s testimony, which included serving 
Brown with a subpoena at his workplace, Melvin Hoard’s 
autobody shop, on May 20, 1999.  Detective Reynolds returned 
to Melvin’s  autobody shop the next day, and Brown was not 
there.  Melvin did not know where he was.  Over the next few 
weeks, Detective Reynolds attempted to contact Brown at his 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
36 
last known address multiple times.  He also sought to contact 
Brown at the home of his ex-girlfriend, Nicole Washington.  
Detective Reynolds spoke with Washington in June 1999, and 
she claimed Brown had not been to her home for months, that 
Brown would not tell Washington his address, noting he was 
afraid to appear in court.  
During this period of time, Brown and Detective Reynolds 
spoke frequently by telephone, and despite Brown making plans 
to meet Detective Reynolds on several occasions, he consistently 
failed to keep their appointments.  Detective Reynolds searched 
for arrest records for Brown and confirmed he had not been 
arrested.  Neither Detective Reynolds nor the prosecution team 
checked local hospital records, voter registration, or the post 
office.  While Detective Reynolds investigated Brown’s last 
known address, employer, and frequent hangouts, he and the 
prosecution team did not try to find Brown via public assistance 
rosters. 
  Defense counsel urged the trial court to conclude the 
prosecution had not exercised due diligence in seeking Brown’s 
appearance at trial.  The trial court ruled otherwise, concluding 
that Brown made “active efforts to avoid” Detective Reynolds.  
The court ruled that had the prosecution team been able to make 
contact with Brown on or after May 20, 1999, efforts to secure a 
bond or to arrest Brown would have occurred at that time.  The 
trial court declared Brown unavailable and permitted his 
preliminary hearing testimony to be read to the jury. 
Brown was not the only reluctant witness in this case.  The 
prosecution believed that Barnes, a juvenile probationer, would 
be hesitant to testify and sought a bond to secure his 
appearance, arguing to the court it was likely Barnes would 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
37 
make himself scarce during the pendency of the trial.  The court 
ordered the bond, Barnes failed to post it, and he was remanded 
to custody.  Barnes did not testify at the preliminary hearing.  
The prosecution also sought to secure the appearance of a third 
reluctant witness who was subpoenaed and failed to appear at 
the preliminary hearing.  As with Brown, the prosecution 
engaged in a multitude of efforts to secure the witness’s 
appearance, speaking to the witness’s family, associates, and 
generally saturating the area over a “considerable” period of 
time.  The prosecutor ultimately released the witness without 
bond, having decided not to use the witness’s testimony at trial.    
2. Discussion 
The Confrontation Clauses of the state and federal 
Constitutions guarantee defendants the right to confront the 
witnesses against them.  (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., 
art. 1, § 15.)  “The right of confrontation ‘seeks “to ensure that 
the defendant is able to conduct a ‘personal examination and 
cross-examination of the witness.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Herrera (2010) 
49 Cal.4th 613, 620–621.)  Via the confrontation right, a 
defendant is able to compel prosecution witnesses to appear 
before the jury so their credibility may be assessed.  (Id. at p. 
621.)   
Although the constitutional right of confrontation is 
important, it is not absolute.  (People v. Herrera, supra, 49 
Cal.4th at p. 621.)  If a witness is unavailable but had previously 
testified against the defendant and was subject to cross-
examination at that time, that prior testimony may be admitted.  
(Ibid., citing Barber v. Page (1968) 390 U.S. 719, 722; People v. 
Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 897.)  Evidence Code section 1291 
codifies this exception to the Confrontation Clauses, stating, 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
38 
“Evidence of former testimony is not made inadmissible by the 
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and: [¶] 
. . . [¶] (2) The party against whom the former testimony is 
offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the 
testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to 
that which he has at the hearing.”  (Evid. Code, § 1291, subds. 
(a), (a)(2).)  We have held this exception permits an unavailable 
witness’s preliminary hearing testimony to be admitted at trial. 
(Herrera, supra, at p. 621; People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 
303.)   
Wilson argues the trial court erred by admitting Brown’s 
preliminary hearing testimony because he was not unavailable 
to testify at trial as that term was understood when the federal 
Confrontation Clause was drafted, and even under a modern 
interpretation of unavailability the prosecution did not exercise 
diligence in attempting to secure Brown’s presence at trial.  
Wilson argues that because Brown was not “dead, in extremis, 
[] detained by the defendant,” or outside the trial court’s 
jurisdiction, Brown’s preliminary hearing testimony should not 
have been introduced.  Wilson urges us to adopt the originalist 
interpretation of “unavailability” because the high court’s 
decision in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 68 
(Crawford) commands conformity with the common law at the 
time of this nation’s founding.   
In Crawford, the court underscored that “reliability of 
evidence” is a goal embodied in the Confrontation Clause.  
(Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 61.)  One way reliability is 
tested is “in the crucible of cross-examination.”  (Ibid.)  In 
acknowledging that “[r]eliability is an amorphous, if not entirely 
subjective, concept” (id. at p. 63), the court held that “[w]here 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
39 
testimonial evidence is at issue” — as it is here — “the Sixth 
Amendment demands what the common law required:  
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination” 
(id. at p. 68).  Crawford did not define unavailability, but in a 
pre-Crawford decision, the court explained the “basic litmus of 
Sixth Amendment unavailability” as follows:  “ ‘[A] witness is 
not “unavailable” for purposes of the . . . exception to the 
confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities 
have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.’ ”  
(Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 74.)14  California law is in 
accord.  Evidence Code section 240 includes in its definition of 
unavailability a witness who is “[a]bsent from the hearing and 
the proponent of his or her statement has exercised reasonable 
diligence but has been unable to procure his or her attendance 
by the court’s process.”  (Evid. Code, § 240, subd. (a)(5).) 
We recently explained that prior testimony of an 
unavailable witness may be admitted if, at that prior hearing, 
“the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness . . . .”  (People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 440 
(Sánchez).)  The prosecution must demonstrate that “the 
witness is unavailable and, additionally, that it made a ‘good-
faith effort’ [citation] or, equivalently, exercised reasonable or 
due diligence to obtain the witness’s presence at trial.”  (Ibid.)  
 
14  
This aspect of the analysis in Ohio v. Roberts survived 
Crawford.  (See, e.g., People v. Herrera, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 
622 [implicitly acknowledging, in a post-Crawford decision, that 
although Ohio v. Roberts was disapproved on other grounds by 
Crawford, its analysis concerning “[t]he ultimate question [of] 
whether [a] witness is unavailable despite good-faith efforts 
undertaken prior to trial to locate and present that witness” 
remained viable].) 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
40 
While due diligence lacks a precise definition, we have explained 
that it “ ‘ “connotes persevering application, untiring efforts in 
good earnest, [and] efforts of a substantial character.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  
We evaluate whether the prosecution timely searched for the 
unavailable witness, whether the prosecution “competently 
explored” leads on the witness’s location, and the overall import 
of the unavailable witness’s testimony.  (Ibid.)  We review de 
novo the trial court’s unavailability determination, although we 
defer to the trial court’s determination of historical facts 
supported by substantial evidence.  (Ibid.)   
Wilson argues the trial court erred by finding Brown 
unavailable because the prosecution did not exercise good faith 
or reasonable diligence in attempting to secure his trial 
testimony.  We’re not persuaded.  The prosecution initially had 
no reason to suspect Brown would be a reluctant or unavailable 
witness — he willingly participated in identification and 
preliminary hearing proceedings in June 1998.  It was not until 
March 1999 that the prosecution understood Brown was 
apprehensive, and not until May 1999 that serious concerns 
began to arise about his participation in proceedings.  On May 
20, 1999, Brown was subpoenaed to appear at trial, but failed to 
do so.  Detective Reynolds tried to contact Brown at Melvin 
Hoard’s body shop, where Brown worked, but failed in his 
efforts.  Brown and Detective Reynolds spoke several times by 
telephone in May and June 1999, and although Brown promised 
he would meet with Detective Reynolds those meetings did not 
occur.  During these calls, Brown consistently refused to reveal 
his address or permanent phone number.  Detective Reynolds 
visited Brown’s last known address three times, but a neighbor 
told Detective Reynolds that Brown had not been seen there for 
about two months, and Brown’s ex-girlfriend confirmed he had 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
41 
moved away to an unknown location after the shootings due to 
fear of testifying.  Brown’s ex-girlfriend had received collect calls 
from people looking for Brown.   
Detective Reynolds visited Melvin Hoard’s shop a few 
more times in June 1999 — once after Brown told him the two 
could meet there — but Brown was never there.  Detective 
Reynolds visited another location where Brown was said to 
frequent, but he did not see Brown there.  In mid-June 1999, 
after Brown failed to make it to a scheduled meeting with 
Detective Reynolds at the police station, Detective Reynolds 
confirmed Brown was not in custody.  These many efforts 
undertaken by Detective Reynolds on behalf of the prosecution 
are the very definition of “ ‘ “persevering application, untiring 
efforts in good earnest, [and] efforts of a substantial 
character.” ’ ”  (Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 440.)   
Wilson contends the prosecution could, and should, have 
done more to find Brown, and suggests several avenues of 
inquiry about his whereabouts that were not pursued.  He 
argues, for example, that the prosecution could have checked 
with Brown’s relatives, assigned multiple investigators to the 
task of locating Brown, or sought records from the Department 
of Motor Vehicles.  Notwithstanding these possibilities, the 
prosecution can be said to have “competently explored” 
numerous leads, in a manner consistent with its responsibility 
under the Confrontation Clause.  (Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 
p. 440.)  Wilson argues that the prosecution should have done 
more to secure Brown’s testimony.  He cites the prosecution’s 
efforts in People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836 (Bunyard) as 
an example of what should have been done here, including:  
repeatedly seeking the witness out at his last known address, 
asking for information on his whereabouts from acquaintances 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
42 
and relatives, and returning to locations the witness was known 
to frequent.  (Id. at p. 855.)  We held those efforts demonstrated 
diligence, and conclude here that the prosecution engaged in 
equivalently diligent efforts.  (Ibid.)   
What the prosecution did here contrasts with cases where 
courts have found deficiencies — cases where review did not 
reveal “adequate diligence, [and where] the efforts of the 
prosecutor or defense counsel have been perfunctory or 
obviously negligent.”  (Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 855.)  In 
contrast, “diligence has been found when the prosecution’s 
efforts are timely, reasonably extensive and carried out over a 
reasonable period.”  (Id. at p. 856.)  Detective Reynolds’s efforts 
to secure Brown’s testimony once it became clear he would no 
longer cooperate spanned a month and included pursuit of 
multiple avenues of inquiry.  The efforts were far from 
perfunctory or negligent.  Simply because Wilson suggests 
Detective Reynolds could have taken different steps does not 
mean those he did take lacked diligence.  
Wilson correctly notes we consider the import of Brown’s 
testimony in evaluating the reasonableness of the prosecution’s 
efforts.  (Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 440.)  While Brown’s 
testimony was helpful to the prosecution’s case, it was not 
critical.  Brown witnessed his coworker Dunn’s El Camino being 
hastily driven out of the Wheels ’N Stuff parking lot the morning 
of the shooting, but he was not able to positively identify Wilson 
as the driver of that car.  Brown noted that Wilson looked like 
the driver but acknowledged his uncertainty.  In contrast, Bowie 
unequivocally identified Wilson as one of the two assailants.   
Wilson argues we must also consider the fact that this is a 
capital case in our evaluation of the prosecution’s diligence.  We 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
43 
have not previously held the nature of the charged offense is a 
factor in assessing diligence, but nevertheless conclude the 
prosecution’s efforts to secure Brown’s testimony were diligent 
despite the nature of the charged offenses.  (See Cook v. McCune 
(10th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3d 825, 835 [“[T]he more serious the crime 
for which the defendant is being tried, the greater the effort the 
government should put forth to produce the witness at trial”]; 
McCandless v. Vaughn (10th Cir. 1999) 172 F.3d 255, 266 
[same].) 
Federal authority also suggests that “a good measure of 
reasonableness is to require the State to make the same sort of 
effort to locate and secure the witness for trial that it would have 
made if it did not have the prior testimony available.”  (Cook v. 
McCune, supra, 323 F.3d at p. 836.)  In McCandless v. Vaughn, 
supra, 172 F.3d at page 269, the court concluded a Confrontation 
Clause violation arose when unduly minimal efforts were used 
to secure the presence of a witness at trial who had provided 
prior testimony when compared against what efforts would have 
been undertaken to secure attendance by a witness who had not.  
Here, the efforts to secure Brown’s testimony are not directly 
comparable to the efforts undertaken with the two other 
reluctant witnesses.  But they were sufficient.  The prosecution 
believed Barnes would be reluctant at the outset of proceedings 
and promptly sought a bond; Barnes was placed in custody after 
failing to post the bond, and he did not testify at the preliminary 
hearing.  A third witness failed to appear at the preliminary 
hearing after being subpoenaed, and the prosecution visited the 
area where the witness was known to spend time, talking to the 
witness’s friends and family members on multiple occasions.    
Ultimately, the prosecution elected to proceed without that 
witness’s testimony.  Compared against this third witness, the 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
44 
prosecution expended greater efforts to locate Brown — talking 
to friends and family, visiting his last known addresses and 
workplace on multiple occasions, and searching arrest records 
— and Brown had provided prior testimony.  It is harder to 
compare the prosecution’s efforts to secure Brown’s testimony 
against the effort undertaken with Barnes, because the latter 
was reluctant from the outset and a bond was immediately 
issued.  This difference reflects Brown’s initial willingness to 
work with the prosecution, not that he provided prior testimony.  
In any event, we conclude the prosecution was reasonably 
diligent in its efforts to secure Brown’s testimony.  
C.  Second Degree Murder Instructional Error 
Allegation  
Wilson contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct 
the jury, sua sponte, on the lesser included offense of 
unpremeditated second degree murder.  Because there was 
insufficient evidence to support that instruction, we conclude no 
error occurred. 
1. Background 
On the morning of the shooting, Wilson and Pops waited 
in a car outside Wheels ’N Stuff.  Williams approached the car 
and asked them what they needed.  They told Williams they 
were looking for some “sounds,” but after being told they should 
go look elsewhere they remained in the car for some time.  Bowie 
arrived at the car wash, and as he stopped to talk on a payphone 
before going inside Wilson and Pops forced him into the car wash 
at gunpoint, and ordered everyone inside to lay on the ground.  
Wilson was heard asking for money and “shit,” presumably 
meaning drugs, and both he and Pops rummaged through the 
car wash before shooting and killing four of the men inside.  
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
45 
Wilson fled the scene in Dunn’s El Camino and Pops left in the 
Honda in which the two men had arrived.  When police arrived 
at the car wash they found the victims’ pockets had been 
searched, and saw that empty boxes were scattered across the 
floor.  Williams testified that from the pictures taken at the 
scene, there appeared to be far less marijuana in the shop 
following the shooting than there had been that morning.   
 
The information charged Wilson with four counts of 
murder “with malice aforethought” in violation of section 187, 
subdivision (a).  He was also charged with, and the jury found 
true, multiple-murder, burglary-murder, and robbery-murder 
special circumstances.  Despite the charging language, the 
prosecutor only pursued a felony-murder theory at trial, and the 
jury was only instructed on that theory.   
2. Discussion 
Wilson claims the trial court erred by failing to instruct 
the jury on nonpremeditated second degree murder.  We review 
such claims of error de novo.  (People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 
90, 113; People v. Licas (2007) 41 Cal.4th 362, 366.)  “ ‘ “ ‘[I]t is 
settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, 
the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law 
relevant to the issues raised by the evidence.’  [Citation.]  That 
obligation has been held to include giving instructions on lesser 
included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to 
whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present 
[citation], but not when there is no evidence that the offense was 
less than that charged.  [Citations.]” ’ ”  (People v. Valdez (2004) 
32 Cal.4th 73, 115.)    
To determine if a lesser offense is included in a greater 
offense, we consider whether the pleading charging the 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
46 
defendant described the offense in such a manner that the 
offender, if guilty, must necessarily have also committed the 
lesser crime.  (People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 240.)  
There must be, at a minimum, substantial evidence 
demonstrating the lesser offense was committed.  (People v. 
Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 718 (Westerfield).)  In general, 
“a trial court errs if it fails to instruct, sua sponte, on all theories 
of a lesser included offense which finds substantial support in 
the evidence.”  (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162.)  
Substantial support requires introduction of “ ‘ “ ‘ “evidence 
sufficient to ‘deserve consideration by the jury,’ that is, evidence 
that a reasonable jury could find persuasive.” ’ ” ’  [Citation.]”  
(Westerfield, at p. 718, quoting People v. Valdez, supra, 32 
Cal.4th at p. 116.)   
Here, although Wilson was charged with four counts of 
murder “with malice aforethought,” the prosecutor exclusively 
pursued a felony-murder theory, and the jury was only 
instructed on that theory.  “[W]e have previously declined to 
address the question of whether second degree murder is a 
lesser included offense of first degree felony murder.”  
(Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 717.)  Wilson argues that, 
because he was charged with first degree premeditated murder, 
second degree nonpremeditated murder — i.e., “ ‘ “the unlawful 
killing of a human being with malice, but without the additional 
elements . . . that would support a conviction of first degree 
murder” ’ ” — is necessarily a lesser included offense.  (People v. 
Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1160 (Banks).)  In Banks, the 
defendant was charged with “willfully killing [the victim] with 
malice aforethought.”  What we concluded is that “second degree 
murder was plainly a lesser included offense of felony murder as 
charged . . . .”  (Ibid.)   
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
47 
As in Banks, second degree murder was “plainly” a lesser 
included offense of the murder “as charged.”  (Banks, supra, 59 
Cal.4th at p. 1160.)  Nevertheless, we conclude the trial court’s 
decision to forgo a nonpremeditated second-degree murder 
instruction was proper.  “ ‘ “[T]here is no evidence that the 
offense was less than that charged.  [Citations.]” ’ ”  (People v. 
Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th 73, 115.)  Wilson posits a version of 
events in which he and Pops went to the car wash to buy 
marijuana and an unexpected confrontation inside the building 
occurred, culminating in the shooting and deaths of four 
individuals.  That version is unsupported.   
What the evidence demonstrated is that each of the 
murders occurred during a burglary or robbery; indeed Wilson 
was convicted of both offenses.  There was scant evidence from 
which a reasonable jury could have concluded Wilson committed 
second degree murder, but not first degree murder.  Wilson and 
Pops were armed.  They waited in their car for between 15 and 
20 minutes, with Williams first spotting them when he arrived 
at the car wash, spending 15 minutes inside, then approaching 
them to ask what they needed.   After Williams spoke with Pops 
and Wilson, he put water in his radiator and left the car wash; 
they were still in their car at this point, suggesting they were 
outside of the car wash for at least 15 to 20 minutes.  During 
their conversation with Williams, they declined his overture to 
sell them marijuana.  They then led Bowie into the car wash at 
gunpoint demanding to know “where . . . the money and where 
 . . . the shit” were kept.  Finally, once inside, Wilson and Pops 
forced those in the car wash to lie on the ground while Wilson 
and Pops searched through the building before shooting the four 
victims.  In light of these facts, including the methodical, 
execution-style killings of the four victims, Wilson’s theory does 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
48 
not “support a second degree murder instruction, but merely 
points to evidence that there may have been a struggle,” a fact 
not in dispute here.  (People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 
116.)  Indeed, Bowie testified there was “a lot of ruckus,” 
“struggling or something,” and “a bunch of commotion.”  
Williams testified that there appeared to be far less marijuana 
in the shop following the shootings than what was present when 
he had been there earlier that morning.  Boxes were found 
strewn about the car wash following the shooting, and Pops and 
Wilson had searched the victims’ pockets.  Wilson’s theory that 
the struggle resulted from a drug purchase gone wrong is purely 
speculative, which we have held “ ‘is an insufficient basis upon 
which to require the giving of an instruction on a lesser 
offense.’ ”  (Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 718.) 
Both first and second degree murder require proof of an 
unlawful killing committed with malice aforethought, but only 
the former requires evidence of willfulness, premeditation, and 
deliberation.15  (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 325.)  
Wilson and Pops brought weapons to the car wash, watched and 
waited, and eventually entered, stole marijuana and cash, and 
shot four people.  Such evidence demonstrates deliberation and 
premeditation.  (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1081–
1082.)  On these facts, no reasonable jury could have concluded 
that Wilson acted without willfulness, premeditation, and 
deliberation.  To the extent some evidence may exist to dispel a 
finding of premeditation and deliberation — and there is none 
 
15  
“ ‘ “Deliberation” 
refers 
to 
careful 
weighing 
of 
considerations in forming a course of action; “premeditation” 
means thought over in advance.’ ”  (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 
Cal.5th 1, 58.)   
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
49 
here — we note the “ ‘substantial evidence requirement is not 
satisfied by “ ‘any evidence . . . no matter how weak,’ ” but rather 
by evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude “that 
the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.” ’ ”  
(Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 1160–1161, italics added.)  On 
this evidence the jury could only conclude that first degree 
murder was committed, whether under a premeditation or 
felony murder theory.  Because no reasonable jury would have 
been able to conclude that Wilson committed only the lesser 
offense of nonpremeditated second degree murder, the trial 
court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on that offense.  
(Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 717.)     
Wilson claims the trial court’s failure to provide a second 
degree murder instruction runs afoul of the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 
625, 638 (Beck).  A trial court satisfies Beck when the jury is 
provided a noncapital third option beyond the “ ‘all-or-nothing 
choice between capital murder and innocence.’ ”  (Schad v. 
Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624, 647.)  Where substantial evidence 
does not support an instruction on the lesser offense, Beck is not 
implicated.  (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1167.)  We 
have previously concluded no error under Beck flows from a trial 
court’s failure to provide a sua sponte second degree murder 
instruction where substantial evidence would not support such 
an instruction and we affirm that holding here.  (Westerfield, 
supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 717–718.) 
D.  Theft as Lesser Included Offense of Dunn 
Robbery 
Wilson argues the trial court erred by failing to instruct 
the jury, sua sponte, on the lesser included offense of theft.  
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
50 
Although the issue is close, we conclude no instruction on theft 
was warranted. 
Wilson was found guilty of robbing Dunn of his El Camino 
car.  He claims the intent to steal could have been formed after 
force was used in this case, warranting an instruction on the 
lesser included theft offense.  (See People v. Powell (2018) 6 
Cal.5th 136, 165; People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 
162.)  As Wilson notes, theft is a lesser included offense of 
robbery if the intent to steal is formed “after force was used.”  
(People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 688.)  The Attorney 
General may be understood to argue that no instruction is 
warranted if the intent to steal preceded the use of force.  But 
this is not the correct standard.  The obligation to instruct on a 
lesser included offense arises whenever the evidence “ ‘ “raises a 
question as to whether all the elements of the [greater] offense 
were present.” ’ ”  (People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 115.)  
“This substantial evidence requirement is not satisfied by ‘ “any 
evidence . . . no matter how weak,” ’ but rather by evidence from 
which a jury composed of reasonable persons could conclude 
‘that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.’ ”  
(People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 705, emphasis added.)  
Here, the obligation to instruct on theft would have arisen if a 
reasonable jury could have concluded that Wilson committed 
theft, but not robbery when he took the El Camino, i.e., if there 
were evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that 
Wilson formed the intent to steal the El Camino after force was 
used.  
Wilson claims Brown saw someone driving the El Camino 
only after the car wash assault had concluded.  From this 
evidence, he argues it is reasonable to surmise the intent to steal 
the El Camino was formulated only after the assault, as he 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
51 
wished to use the car as a getaway vehicle.  He argues this 
inference is particularly reasonable in light of the large number 
of shots fired and the presence of witnesses.  Wilson argues he 
could have anticipated a significant police response, and Bowie’s 
testimony that he heard sirens and saw police at the car wash 
quickly following the shooting confirms that Wilson’s concern 
was well founded.  Wilson further argues that the decision to 
burn the car immediately following its use also suggests no 
intent could have been formed prior to the violent act because 
there was no intent to sell it or its component parts.   
Wilson’s claim lacks merit.  Here, little if any evidence 
suggests Wilson “formed the intent to steal only after shooting” 
the victims.  (People v. Powell, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 165; see 
also People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 115 [“ ‘ “giving 
instructions on lesser included offenses [is warranted] when the 
evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of 
the charged offense were present [citation], but not when there 
is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged.  
[Citations.]” ’ ”].)  Overwhelming evidence supports the 
conclusion that Wilson and his accomplice formed the intent to 
steal the El Camino prior to entering the car wash.  Wilson 
waited in his car, armed, for some time before entering the 
building.  The El Camino pulled into the Wheels ’N Stuff parking 
lot, at which point Wilson and Pops forced Bowie into the 
building at gunpoint.  Once inside, they ensured Bowie’s silence 
until Dunn had entered the building, then demanded the 
building’s occupants — including Dunn — lay on the ground.  At 
this point they asked where the money and “shit” were kept, 
shot the victims, took money and marijuana, and — although it 
is not clear whether or how the keys to the El Camino were 
obtained — Wilson then stole the El Camino.  After the robbery, 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
52 
Pops retained the El Camino’s rims, and installed them on his 
Camaro.   
Wilson argues there was no evidence that Pops knew 
about the El Camino or its rims prior to the incident at the car 
wash, and merely stole the car as a convenient getaway vehicle.  
While it’s conceivable that Wilson and Pops decided to flee the 
scene in different cars and the El Camino’s theft was merely 
opportunistic, at least two points undermine this theory.   
First, even if Wilson and Pops did not know about the El 
Camino and its specialized rims before they drove to Wheels ’N 
Stuff, a jury could easily conclude the intent to steal the car — 
once they were aware of it — was formed prior to the murders.  
A jury could so infer from how Pops used the rims after the 
shooting.  The El Camino’s rims would not have fit most tires, 
having been manufactured for use with a Camaro, and requiring 
special modification to be placed on an El Camino, as Dunn had 
done.  The evidence suggested Pops was interested in obtaining 
the rims, as he immediately added them to his car, the only 
other make of car on which the rims would have fit.  Moreover, 
Pops’s Camaro already had custom rims that matched the car’s 
exterior paint color, suggesting he valued the IROC rims above 
those already on his car.  A drawing of Pops’s Camaro sporting 
the prized IROC rims was found in Wilson’s home after the 
crime.  This evidence suggests the car was taken not simply as 
a convenient getaway, but because Pops and Wilson valued it.   
Second, Wilson’s theory that the El Camino was stolen 
only after the shootings for use as a getaway car also seems 
unlikely because Pops and Wilson arrived at the car wash in 
their own car, obviating the need for a getaway vehicle.  Further, 
we note the El Camino was not the only vehicle at the car wash; 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
53 
Pops and Wilson rummaged through a car parked inside the car 
wash building but did not take that car — for reasons the record 
does not reflect.  E.T., one of the men inside the car wash who 
was not shot, was unable to find his car keys after the violence 
concluded and left the scene with Brown.  Even if he possessed 
keys or access to multiple vehicles parked at the car wash, Pops 
did not take leave the scene using one of those cars.  Instead, he 
drove away in the same vehicle he brought to the car wash.  
Surely Wilson could have done likewise.  Accordingly, we 
conclude the trial court properly did not provide an instruction 
on the lesser included offense of theft.  (People v. Friend (2009) 
47 Cal.4th 1, 52 [“There was no substantial evidence that 
defendant formed an intent to steal only after he . . . fatally 
[injured] the victim, and thus no factual predicate for 
instructing the jury on theft as a lesser included offense”].) 
E.  Guilt Phase Instructional Error Claims  
 
Wilson contends the related jury instructions, CALJIC 
Nos. 2.01 and 8.83, undermined the requirement of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt because they “informed the jurors that if 
Wilson reasonably appeared to be guilty, they could find him 
guilty — even if they entertained a reasonable doubt as to guilt.”  
We have previously rejected similar challenges to these 
instructions, and Wilson presents no persuasive reason to do 
otherwise here.  (People v. Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 
1019.) 
 
Wilson also posits that four other instructions the jury 
received, CALJIC Nos. 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, and 2.51, “magnified 
the harm” caused by instructing the jury with CALJIC Nos. 2.01 
and 8.83 because “the instructions implicitly replaced the 
‘reasonable doubt’ standard with the ‘preponderance of evidence’ 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
54 
test, and violated the constitutional prohibition against 
convicting a capital defendant on any lesser standard of proof.”  
As Wilson acknowledges, we have previously rejected this 
argument, and he advances no persuasive reason to reconsider 
our prior rejection of substantially similar challenges to these 
instructions.  Accordingly, we again conclude that CALJIC Nos. 
2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, and 2.51 do not undermine or dilute the 
reasonable doubt standard.  (People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 
Cal.5th 548, 653–654.)   
F. Sufficiency of Evidence of Hurd Robbery  
Wilson contends the trial court erred by failing to enter 
judgment of acquittal of the Hurd robbery because insufficient 
evidence supported his conviction for that offense.  Following 
our independent review of the evidence, we agree with the trial 
court’s ruling. 
1. Background  
Williams and Hurd, lifelong friends, co-owned the Wheels 
’N Stuff car wash.  They had both suffered prior convictions of 
marijuana possession for sale.  While washing cars was part of 
the business conducted at Wheels ’N Stuff, a major part of the 
business activities included selling marijuana.  The building’s 
rent was paid from marijuana sale proceeds.  Williams testified 
that marijuana was present at the business on a daily basis.  
The individuals who frequented the shop, both customers and 
employees, tended to carry large amounts of money — upwards 
of $10,000.  When Wilson entered the Wheels ’N Stuff on the day 
of the shooting, he demanded to know the location of money and 
“shit,” by which he presumably meant drugs.     
 
Following presentation of the foregoing evidence during 
the prosecution’s case-in-chief, Wilson unsuccessfully moved for 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
55 
acquittal of the Hurd robbery charge under section 1118.1, 
arguing the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction.   
2. Discussion 
 
When a trial court rules on a motion for a judgment of 
acquittal under section 1118.1, the standard the trial court must 
apply is the same as what the appellate court applies when 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting conviction.  
A section 1118.1 motion is used to cull the “ ‘ “few instances in 
which the prosecution fails to make even a prima facie case.” ’ ”  
(People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 249.)  A court resolves a 
section 1118.1 motion by determining whether the prosecution 
presented sufficient evidence, measured from the moment the 
section 1118.1 motion is made, to permit the jury to resolve the 
issue.  (Ibid.)  We review the trial court’s determination de novo.  
(Ibid.)  
Here is how robbery — the charged offense — is defined:  
“the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of 
another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his 
will, accomplished by means of force or fear.”  (§ 211.)  Robbery 
requires the “specific intent to permanently deprive” the victim 
of his or her property.  (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 
1176.) 
 
Wilson contends insufficient evidence supported the Hurd 
robbery charge because, while true that Hurd was a co-owner of 
the car wash business, there was no evidence that he was 
involved in the marijuana business.  Wilson argues, in essence, 
that the marijuana enterprise was Williams’s business alone.  
This interpretation is not supported by the evidence.  Williams 
testified that he and Hurd were lifelong friends who owned the 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
56 
Wheels ’N Stuff together and paid rent on the building from 
proceeds of marijuana sales.  Both had been arrested for 
possession of marijuana for sale.  It was well known that car 
wash employees — including Hurd — sold marijuana and 
tended to carry large amounts of cash.  Wilson likely knew this, 
as he and Pops sought the location of money and “shit” 
immediately upon entering.   
 
Wilson argues that this evidence was insufficient to 
support a robbery charge because Hurd was not part of the 
marijuana business, no money or drugs were stolen from him 
directly, and he suffered no deprivation sufficient to constitute 
robbery.  He also claims his motion for acquittal should have 
been granted because Hurd lacked constructive possession of 
the property — that is, the money and drugs — alleged to have 
been taken from Wheels ’N Stuff.  We are unpersuaded. 
The element of possession under the robbery statute can 
be established in multiple ways.  Possession or direct physical 
control over an object will suffice but neither is essential.  
(People v. Scott (2009) 45 Cal.4th 743, 749–750.)  Constructive 
possession by an employee is also sufficient to establish the 
element.  (Ibid.)  In Scott, we explained that because anyone 
committing robbery in a business establishment would perceive 
an employee as capable of resisting, “all on-duty employees have 
constructive possession of their employer’s property during a 
robbery.”  (Id. at p. 755.)  A wrongdoer’s decision to threaten or 
use force against an employee “is not likely to turn on fine 
distinctions regarding a particular employee’s actual or implied 
authority.”  (Ibid.)   
Whether the evidence supported Hurd’s constructive or 
actual possession, it was sufficient for a jury to have concluded 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
57 
Wilson intended to permanently deprive Hurd of money, 
marijuana, or both.  (§ 211; People v. Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 249.)  The trial court concluded as much, stating the jury 
“could find a robbery of the people connected to the business 
based on the narcotics.”  Our independent review leads us to the 
same conclusion.  (Dalton, at p. 249.)  That a different trier of 
fact could have concluded otherwise does not mean the verdict 
is not supported by the evidence.  (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 107, 143.)  We are not free to reform the verdict simply 
because another theory is plausible.  (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 
Cal.5th 269, 345 [“ ‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the 
trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted 
simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be 
reconciled with a contrary finding’ ”].) 
A reasonable jury could have inferred from the evidence 
presented — and this jury did — that Wilson intended to 
permanently deprive Hurd of his money, belongings, and 
marijuana.  Because it appears the evidence was sufficient to 
substantiate a robbery conviction, we conclude the trial court 
committed no error in denying Wilson’s motion for acquittal 
under section 1118.1.     
G. Prejudicial Hearsay Admission Allegation  
Wilson argues the trial court erred in admitting the pages 
of the writing tablet containing drawings and a list of names.  
He claims the documents were improperly authenticated and 
constituted 
hearsay, 
and 
their 
admission 
violated 
his 
confrontation rights.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude 
Wilson’s claims lack merit. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
58 
1. Background 
Following execution of a search warrant at Wilson’s home, 
officers seized — among other items — a writing tablet 
containing several drawings and a list of names.  The 
prosecution sought to introduce some of the documents, 
including:  (1) a depiction of a firearm being fired; (2) a drawing 
of a man holding a firearm with the words “Nut LOCO” at the 
top of the page; (3) a caricature-style drawing of a muscled male 
standing at a street corner with street signs reading “55th” and 
“Lime,” the corner near Wilson’s home, the moniker “Nut” at the 
top of the page, and a drawing of a car with what appeared to be 
IROC rims labeled “THE MONSTER BEEFY”; (4) a drawing of 
a figure’s chest, right forearm tattooed with the letters “Y.M.O.,” 
and hand holding a firearm being fired; and (5) a list of 22 
nicknames, including Pops, Wilson, and people who spent time 
with them.   
At a pretrial hearing held under Evidence Code section 
402, the prosecutor presented evidence that the home from 
which the tablet was seized was Wilson’s residence.  He argued 
that the drawings and list were admissible as circumstantial 
evidence demonstrating that the drawings were prepared close 
in time to the shootings, that they were found on Wilson’s 
kitchen table in plain view, and that they demonstrated a 
relationship between Pops and Wilson.  Wilson argued the 
drawings and list constituted inadmissible hearsay, that they 
were incapable of authentication because they were found in a 
common area of his residence, and that there was no evidence 
he personally created the documents.  The trial court tentatively 
ruled the evidence was admissible as “relevant circumstantial 
evidence on motive — the connection between the defendants 
and circumstantial evidence of the possession of the guns by the 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
59 
defendants . . . .”  The court affirmed its tentative ruling on June 
7, 1999, clarifying the drawings and list would be admitted for 
the limited purposes of connecting Pops to Wilson’s residence 
where the items were seized, and to confirm the association 
between Pops and Wilson.   
2. Discussion 
Wilson argues the trial court erred by admitting the 
drawings and list of names because they constituted improperly 
authenticated writings under Evidence Code sections 250 and 
1401, and because they constituted inadmissible hearsay with 
no applicable exception justifying their admission.  We conclude 
Wilson’s arguments lack merit. 
Evidence Code section 250 defines a “ ‘writing’ ” to include 
“every . . . means of recording upon any tangible thing, any form 
of communication or representation, including letters, words, 
pictures, . . . or combinations thereof, and any record thereby 
created, regardless of the manner in which the record has been 
stored.”  “Authentication of a writing is required before it may 
be received in evidence.”  (Evid. Code, § 1401, subd. (a).)  
“Authentication . . . means . . . the introduction of evidence 
sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the 
proponent of the evidence claims it is . . . .”  (Evid. Code, § 1400.) 
Wilson argues that the list and drawings were writings 
within the meaning of Evidence Code section 250 but were 
inadmissible because they were not properly authenticated.  He 
argues there was no direct evidence the documents were 
authored by him, and neither the location in which they were 
found nor their accessibility was sufficient to prove ownership.  
We review a trial court’s determination that a document 
constitutes a writing and that it is properly authenticated under 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
60 
the abuse of discretion standard.  (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 
Cal.4th 415, 466; see People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 
1113 [“The abuse of discretion standard of review applies to any 
ruling by a trial court on the admissibility of evidence”].)  Under 
this standard, a trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed, and 
reversal of the judgment is not required, unless the trial court 
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently 
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of 
justice.  (People v. Guerra, supra, at p. 1113, citing People v. 
Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9–10.)  
A writing can be authenticated by circumstantial evidence 
and by its contents.  (People v. Skiles (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1178, 
1187.)  Wilson argues proof of authentication was flawed 
because no evidence demonstrated that he brought the tablet 
into the residence or that it belonged to him, and nothing 
suggested that he authored the writings. 
As Wilson concedes, however, authentication of a writing 
can occur via numerous methods, including presentation of 
circumstantial evidence, and by introducing evidence showing 
where documents were found or by whom they were authored.  
Here, the trial court concluded that the list of names and 
drawings were properly authenticated by location, content, and 
circumstantial evidence.  The writing tablet was found in 
Wilson’s residence.  The prosecution had two witnesses testify 
as to the contents of the drawings and the list.  Tanesha Martin 
testified that she believed Pops was the man depicted in the 
drawing entitled “Nut LOCO” who was holding a gun.  Martin 
testified that the drawing entitled “Nut and the Monster Beefy” 
looked a bit like Pops and his Camaro.  Barnes also identified 
Pops as the male figure in the drawing entitled “Nut and the 
Monster Beefy.”  Barnes additionally identified the car in the 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
61 
drawing as Pops’s Camaro with the IROC rims. Barnes 
identified the letters “Y.M.O.” on the drawing of the forearm 
shooting a gun to mean “Young Mafia Organization,” a group to 
which Barnes, Pops, Wilson, and Harris belonged.  The parties 
stipulated that Pops had the letters “Y M O” tattooed on both of 
his forearms.  As to the list of monikers, Barnes testified that 
the nickname “Nut” on the list was Pops, the nickname “Scrap” 
was Pops’s brother Harris, the nickname “Bird” was Wilson, and 
the nickname “Smerf” was Barnes’s own nickname.    
 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding 
the writings were adequately authenticated.  The purpose for 
which any writing is admitted “will determine what must be 
shown for authentication.”  (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 
Cal.4th 258, 267.)  A trier of fact must be able to determine that 
a writing is what it appears to be.  (Ibid.)  “ ‘As long as the 
evidence would support a finding of authenticity, the writing is 
admissible.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Here, the location of the documents 
supported authentication:  law enforcement officials found them 
in Wilson’s residence.  The content of the documents also 
supported authentication:  they referenced Wilson, Pops, and 
other witnesses.  Finally, Pops and Wilson were connected by 
circumstantial evidence.  In addition to the documents’ contents, 
Martin’s and Barnes’s testimony confirmed that the drawings 
depicted Pops, and the list referred to Pops, Wilson, Barnes, and 
Harris.  (Evid. Code, §§ 1400, 1410, 1421.)  Accordingly, we 
conclude the trial court did not err in finding the documents 
were properly authenticated.  
Wilson next argues that the list of monikers and drawings 
constituted inadmissible hearsay because they were admitted 
for, and the prosecution sought to rely on, the truth of their 
implied incriminatory propositions.  Our review “focuses on 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
62 
whether the documents supported the nonhearsay purposes 
identified by the court and whether those purposes were 
relevant to an actual issue in dispute.”  (People v. Bunyard 
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1204, quoting People v. Armendariz 
(1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 585.)  
When an out-of-court statement is offered for any relevant 
purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter stated, the 
statement is not hearsay.  (People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 
735, 786.)  Evidence is generally relevant if it “ ‘tends “logically, 
naturally, and by reasonable inference” to establish material 
facts such as identity, intent, or motive.’ ”  (People v. Riccardi 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 815, quoting People v. Garceau (1993) 6 
Cal.4th 140, 177.)  Because otherwise relevant evidence not 
offered for its truth falls outside the hearsay rule entirely, the 
party offering that evidence is not required to demonstrate an 
exception to the hearsay rule to justify its admission.  (People v. 
Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 232.)    
 
Here, the court initially identified the nonhearsay 
purposes for admitting the writings as connecting Pops to 
Wilson’s residence, associating Pops with Wilson, and 
associating both Pops and Wilson with Barnes and Harris to 
corroborate Barnes’s testimony regarding his relationships with 
Pops, Wilson, and Harris.  The court later confirmed the 
drawings and list were admissible for the limited purposes of 
connecting Pops to Wilson’s home and to confirm their 
association.  These nonhearsay purposes were relevant to 
establish identity — that is, that the alleged shooters, Pops and 
Wilson, had a relationship to each other.  The existence of this 
relationship aided in demonstrating that the two men could 
have committed the crime together.  What’s more, the 
documents were relevant to establish a connection between Pops 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
63 
and Wilson’s residence because a nine-millimeter cartridge 
expended from the same firearm used in the murders was found 
at Wilson’s residence.  Barnes’s testimony identifying Pops and 
his car in the drawings, as well as his testimony about the 
monikers of all four men, further corroborated these various 
connections and relationships.  Thus, the trial court did not err 
by concluding the evidence supported the nonhearsay purposes 
for which it was admitted and those purposes were relevant to 
issues in dispute.16  (People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 
1204.) 
Wilson argues that our decision in People v. Lewis (2008) 
43 Cal.4th 415 (Lewis) renders the evidence inadmissible.  In 
Lewis, we held that caricature drawings found in the 
defendant’s residence depicting a sawed-off shotgun were 
hearsay because they were offered for the truth of the assertion 
that the defendant committed robberies with a sawed-off 
shotgun.  (Id. at p. 498.)  We concluded that because no exception 
to the hearsay rule justified their introduction, the court erred 
by admitting them.  (Ibid.)  The erroneous admissions, 
 
16  
Because the evidence was admitted for nonhearsay 
purposes, defendant’s argument that its admission constituted 
a violation of his confrontation rights is unavailing.  “Whether a 
challenged statement is hearsay is always the threshold 
question.”  (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 820, fn. 19.)  
“[T]he confrontation clause is concerned solely with hearsay 
statements that are testimonial, in that they are out-of-court 
analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by 
witnesses at trial.”  (People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 984.)  
The evidence was neither hearsay nor testimonial; accordingly, 
no violation of defendant’s confrontation rights could have 
occurred.  
 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
64 
however, did not prejudice the defendant because the drawings 
added “next to nothing to the evidence of defendant’s guilt of the 
crimes . . . .”  (Id. at p. 499.)  Lewis does not inform our analysis 
here because the list of names and the drawings found in 
Wilson’s home, unlike the drawing found in Lewis, were not 
offered for their truth.  Had these names been offered to 
demonstrate that Pops possessed the weapon he was depicted 
holding, our analysis might be different.  But that is simply not 
the case; the list and drawings were instead offered for the 
nonhearsay purpose of identity, that is, establishing a 
relationship between Pops and Wilson, and connecting Pops to 
Wilson’s residence.   
In any event, were we to have found error in the trial 
court’s admission of the list and drawings, it would have been 
harmless under any standard.  (Chapman v. California (1967) 
386 U.S. 18, 24; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)  
Substantial evidence of Wilson’s guilt and the connection 
between Wilson and Pops was introduced, including the nine-
millimeter round found in Wilson’s home that matched the 
expended casings found at the scene, evidence that Pops placed 
onto his car the IROC rims from the El Camino Wilson stole, 
Barnes’s testimony that he was friendly with Pops and Wilson, 
and his testimony that he assisted with burning the El Camino 
following the murders.  Like the drawing in Lewis, the writings 
introduced here added “next to nothing to the evidence of 
[Wilson’s] guilt of the crimes.”  (Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 
499.)  Any error in their admission would have been harmless. 
III.  JURY MISCONDUCT 
 
Wilson asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion 
for new trial based on alleged juror misconduct.  He claims that 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
65 
Juror No. 9 committed misconduct by failing to disclose her prior 
jury service, and the court’s denial of his new trial motion based 
on that misconduct was error.  Wilson further alleges the trial 
court abused its discretion by failing to adequately investigate 
claims of juror misconduct he raised in his new trial motion, 
despite holding an evidentiary hearing to address those claims, 
by not calling more jurors to testify, not sufficiently questioning 
those who did, and not permitting defense counsel to examine 
the jurors.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude these claims 
lack merit. 
A. Juror No. 9’s Recollection of Prior Death 
Penalty Jury Experience  
1. Background 
Juror No. 9, a 35-year-old law firm docket clerk, stated in 
her jury questionnaire that she had served as a juror in a civil 
matter in 1992.  She failed, inadvertently, to note her earlier 
experience as an alternate on a murder trial.  Question 40A 
asked prospective jurors to identify whether they had “been a 
juror in the past,” and, if so, to list the year the trial occurred, 
whether it was civil or criminal, the nature of the charge, and 
whether a verdict had been reached.  Juror No. 9 listed a 1992 
personal injury trial on which she had served as a juror but 
listed no other cases.   
During voir dire, Juror No. 9 was questioned exclusively 
about her views on, and ability to impose, the death penalty.  
She indicated she could impose the death penalty if appropriate 
and would evaluate the evidence — even if emotional — before 
deciding upon the appropriate penalty.  The prospective juror in 
the number 12 position, who was examined shortly before Juror 
No. 9, responded to questions about her prior service as an 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
66 
alternate juror on a death penalty case.  Later that afternoon, 
following a break and additional questioning, Pops and Wilson 
utilized a joint peremptory strike to excuse the prospective juror 
in the number 12 position, which occurred in front of Juror No. 
9.  Juror No. 9 was empaneled and served on Wilson’s jury.   
Following the death verdict, defense counsel conducted 
interviews with jurors.  In her interview, Juror No. 9 told 
counsel she wanted to put the experience of serving as a juror 
on Wilson’s case behind her “because it seemed to be lingering 
on and on, and she had been through this experience before,” 
having served on a death penalty case many years earlier.  This 
conversation marked the first time she alerted anyone involved 
with this case to the fact that she newly recalled her prior jury 
service.  In a phone call with defense counsel a few days later, 
Juror No. 9 clarified she was as an alternate juror on a murder 
trial, and that it may have been a juvenile, not capital, case.  
Juror No. 9 said it was difficult to remember the details of the 
case because it had occurred some 15 years prior to Wilson’s 
trial.   
Defense counsel sought a court order of Juror No. 9’s jury 
service records.  The records indicated that between 1985 and 
1999, Juror No. 9 had served on two trials, a 1993 matter and 
Wilson’s trial — consistent with her questionnaire responses.  
No records were maintained regarding jury service predating 
1985; the murder trial on which Juror No. 9 served as an 
alternate took place in 1984.   
Wilson moved for a new trial, arguing Juror No. 9 
committed misconduct by intentionally concealing her prior 
service on a murder case.  On March 24, 2000, the court 
conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding the alleged juror 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
67 
misconduct.17  Juror No. 9 testified that she had told defense 
counsel, during their post-trial interview, that she had served 
on a prior death penalty case as an alternate juror.  She did not 
list her prior service in her juror questionnaire because she “had 
just forgotten about it.”  She said the questionnaire was 
“lengthy” and she “was trying to get through it,” noting she 
simply did not recall her prior service when filling it out.  She 
also did not mention her prior service during voir dire, although 
she was not asked about it, despite another prospective juror 
discussing their prior service as an alternate on a capital trial, 
who was subsequently peremptorily excused.  Juror No. 9 
testified that she had 
remembered her prior service 
“months . . . or weeks into” Wilson’s trial, and certainly after the 
jury began hearing evidence.  When the court asked her why she 
did not report her prior service once she remembered it, she 
explained she “just really honestly didn’t think about it.”   
Wilson’s attorney argued at the evidentiary hearing that 
Juror No. 9’s failure to disclose her prior service at any point 
during the trial constituted “a concealment of a very material 
fact.”  When the court pressed counsel on whether he was 
asserting Juror No. 9 had lied when she gave testimony before 
the court, Wilson’s counsel clarified that he did not believe Juror 
No. 9 was being untruthful, and his use of the word 
“concealment” was a “term of art.”  The court found Juror No. 9 
“very credible” and did not believe she “intentionally concealed 
anything.”  The questionnaire’s phrasing regarding prior 
 
17  
Wilson’s counsel unsuccessfully sought the court’s 
permission to examine jurors, including Juror No. 9, at the 
hearings related to the alleged misconduct.  The trial court ruled 
it would be the exclusive questioning body, but requested 
“counsel . . . make any suggestions for the scope of the inquiry.”    
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
68 
service, the court noted, was not altogether clear as to whether 
service as an alternate should have been included.18   
The court continued the matter to conduct further 
research and heard argument again on April 7, 2000.  Following 
that second hearing, the court denied the new trial motion, 
reiterating its finding that Juror No. 9 was “credible.”  The court 
explained that Juror No. 9’s prior service was 15 or 16 years 
before Wilson’s trial, it was unclear whether that service was on 
a juvenile matter or a death penalty matter, and in any event 
the fact she was an alternate made her service “a lot easier to 
forget” because she was not involved in rendering a verdict.  
Although Juror No. 9 recalled at some point during the trial that 
she had this prior experience, the court concluded nothing in the 
questionnaire or the jury’s instructions would have alerted her 
that she was obliged to bring it up.  Finally, the court concluded 
that Juror No. 9’s inadvertent omission did not constitute actual 
bias under In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273.19   
2. Discussion 
Wilson argues Juror No. 9 committed misconduct by 
intentionally concealing her prior service on a murder trial’s 
 
18  
Specifically, the questionnaire stated:  “If you have been a 
juror in the past, please provide the following information,” and 
listed categories including year of the case, whether it was civil 
or criminal, the charges (if criminal), the type of case (if civil), 
and whether a verdict was reached.   
19  
In In re Hamilton, we explained “that an honest mistake 
on voir dire cannot disturb a judgment in the absence of proof 
that the juror’s wrong or incomplete answer hid the juror’s 
actual bias.  Moreover, the juror’s good faith when answering 
voir dire questions is the most significant indicator that there 
was no bias.”  (In re Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 300.)  
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
69 
jury once she remembered it during his trial.  “The law 
concerning juror concealment is settled. . . . ‘[An] accused . . . has 
a constitutional right to a trial by impartial jurors.  [Citations.]  
“ ‘ “The right to unbiased and unprejudiced jurors is an 
inseparable and inalienable part of the right to trial by jury 
guaranteed by the Constitution.” ’ ” ’ ”  (In re Manriquez (2018) 
5 Cal.5th 785, 797 (Manriquez).)  If a juror actively conceals 
factual information or falsifies voir dire responses, the process 
of selecting jurors is undermined.  (Ibid.)  Wilson argues Juror 
No. 9’s failure to list her prior jury service in the questionnaire, 
disclose it during voir dire, or — in particular — bring it to the 
court’s attention once she remembered it — constituted 
intentional concealment.   
While intentionally concealing juror information may be 
sufficient to demonstrate bias warranting disqualification, a 
juror’s “ ‘inadvertent or unintentional failure[] to disclose’ ” 
information is treated differently.  (People v. San Nicolas (2004) 
34 Cal.4th 614, 644 (San Nicolas).)  In the case of unintentional 
failure to disclose, the trial court evaluates whether a juror is so 
biased that they cannot perform the duties required of them.  
(Ibid.)  We accord deference to any credibility determination 
made by the trial court in its evaluation of concealment.  (Id. at 
p. 646.) 
Wilson suggests that because Juror No. 9 executed her 
questionnaire under penalty of perjury — which attaches 
serious consequences to lies and omissions, and because the 
questionnaire asked about her prior jury service, her failure to 
disclose that prior service at any point in the trial constituted 
concealment demonstrating bias.  The trial court found Juror 
No. 9 credible when she testified that she did not remember her 
prior jury service when completing her questionnaire or 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
70 
responding during voir dire.  It also found credible that she was 
not aware she should alert the court when she recalled her prior 
service mid-trial.  Wilson argues these credibility findings 
should be discounted because the conclusion was made with 
respect to whether she recalled her prior service at the time she 
completed the questionnaire, not as to whether she was credible 
about why she failed to disclose it later.  The record does not 
support this assertion. 
A trial court has the discretion to determine whether a 
juror’s “ ‘failure to disclose is intentional or unintentional’ ” and 
whether the juror is biased.  (San Nicolas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at 
p. 644.)  Unless the record clearly demonstrates a juror’s bias, 
the trial judge is best situated to evaluate a juror’s intentions 
through the voir dire process.  (Ibid.)  The court expressly asked 
why Juror No. 9 did not report her prior service to the court once 
she remembered it, and she responded that she simply did not 
think to do so.  The court found this testimony “very credible,” 
and noted she was never instructed to bring to the court’s 
attention something she remembered after completing her 
questionnaire or responding to voir dire.  We accord this 
credibility finding deference, as well.  (Ibid.) 
Wilson argues that because Juror No. 9 failed to disclose 
her prior jury service, her inherently biased presence on the jury 
constituted a structural defect warranting reversal.  He further 
contends that even if her failure to disclose her prior jury service 
only raised a presumption of prejudice, that presumption was 
not rebutted.  Neither of these arguments is meritorious.  While 
we have acknowledged that, “in a rare case, a court ultimately 
may determine that a juror’s innocent concealment masked a 
substantial likelihood of actual bias,” Juror No. 9’s failure to 
disclose her prior service does not demonstrate such bias.  
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
71 
(Manriquez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 798.)  In Manriquez, a juror 
failed to disclose in her questionnaire the fact that she suffered 
physical and sexual abuse as a child, despite the questionnaire 
inquiring about whether prospective jurors had been the victims 
of crimes.  (Manriquez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 793–794.)  After 
the trial, the juror voluntarily responded to a questionnaire, and 
in it she disclosed her childhood abuse to explain why she found 
the petitioner’s mitigating evidence of abuse unpersuasive.  
(Ibid.)  She later attested that she did not conceal her abuse in 
filling out her jury questionnaire, but did not believe it was 
responsive to questions because she thought the questionnaire 
pertained exclusively to her experiences as an adult.  (Id. at pp. 
794–795.) 
Following our order to show cause, the juror testified at a 
reference hearing that she had not thought the abuse or violence 
she suffered as a child was responsive to the questionnaire’s 
inquiries about suffering violence or past criminal activity 
because she was a child when it occurred and such abuse was 
relatively normalized during the era in which she was raised.  
(Manriquez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 796, 801.)  We concluded 
substantial evidence supported the referee’s findings that the 
juror’s nondisclosure was not intentional and did not indicate 
bias (id. at pp. 809–810), and independently concluded that 
although it constituted misconduct to fail to complete the 
questionnaire accurately, the juror was not actually biased (id. 
at p. 819).   
In San Nicolas, a juror failed to disclose in his 
questionnaire and during voir dire that he had suffered prior 
arrests, had been falsely arrested, and had been the victim of a 
violent crime as a child.  (San Nicolas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 
644–646.)  The defendant moved for new trial on the grounds of 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
72 
juror misconduct, an evidentiary hearing followed, and the trial 
court concluded the juror’s failures to disclose the prior arrests 
and false arrest were “inadvertent or unintentional, and there 
was no resulting bias.”  (Id. at p. 645.)  This conclusion was 
supported by substantial evidence, as was the court’s conclusion 
that the juror’s failure to disclose his status as victim of a violent 
crime was not deliberate and he was not biased.  (Id. at pp. 645, 
648.) 
We likewise conclude here that Juror No. 9’s failure to 
disclose her prior jury service on a murder trial, even if capital, 
did not demonstrate bias, and no misconduct occurred.  Juror 
No. 3 had prior experience as a juror on a murder trial and Juror 
No. 2 had previously served on a jury in a drive-by shooting case 
with three victims.  Wilson contends all jurors who had prior 
capital experience were excused from service via peremptory 
challenge.  Whether Juror No. 9’s undisclosed prior service was 
on a capital trial or a murder trial is beside the point; when 
assessing whether it is substantially likely a juror was actually 
biased, our inquiry is “ ‘not whether the juror would have been 
stricken by one of the parties, but whether the juror’s 
concealment (or nondisclosure) evidences bias.’ ”  (Manriquez, 
supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 798.)  Juror No. 9’s inadvertent 
nondisclosure of her prior jury service did not evidence bias, and 
the trial court’s denial of Wilson’s new trial motion was not 
error. 
B. Trial Court’s Alleged Failure to Investigate 
Juror Misconduct  
In addition to the misconduct alleged regarding Juror No. 
9’s prior service, Wilson claims the trial court failed to conduct 
an adequate inquiry of alleged misconduct involving Juror Nos. 
1, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12, and remand is warranted to determine 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
73 
the extent of the possible misconduct.  We conclude the court’s 
inquiry was adequate, and that the court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying the motion for new trial based on alleged 
misconduct. 
1. Background 
Following the death verdict, Pops’s attorney, Jones, 
contacted jurors.  One of the jurors complained, and the court 
ordered counsel to stop contacting jurors.  Before the no contact 
order was issued, defense counsel’s conversations with some 
jurors revealed a juror had discussed a publicized murder case 
during deliberations, which counsel contended constituted 
misconduct.  Defense counsel asked the court to lift the no-
contact order, and the People opposed their motion but urged 
the court to question jurors under oath to bring swift resolution 
to the misconduct allegation.  The court did not lift the order, 
but it called Juror Nos. 6 and 7 to provide sworn testimony 
regarding attorney Jones’s assertion.   
Juror No. 7 testified that the penalty vote for Wilson had 
been split nine to three, with nine jurors voting for death and 
three for life.  The court dismissed the jurors for a weekend, and 
upon returning they took an informal vote, revealing unanimity 
in favor of death.  Those who had voted for life shared why their 
votes had shifted, and Juror No. 7 testified that Juror No. 6 told 
the others she had seen a news story over the weekend about a 
shooting in Atlanta that made her “take a closer look at the case 
that she was on,” and “honestly in her mind” Wilson “deserved 
the death penalty.”  She had indicated when she voted for life 
the week before that her vote had been wavering.   
Juror No. 7 testified that he thought the jurors followed 
the instructions at all times, and that the discussion regarding 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
74 
the Atlanta crime occurred only after the poll indicating the 
verdict was unanimous had occurred.  Juror No. 7 recalled that 
Juror No. 12 had also voted for life the week before, believing it 
to be a harsh enough form of punishment, but Juror No. 7 also 
thought Juror No. 12 would vote with the majority.  Juror No. 7 
testified that all of the jurors, including Juror No. 12, exercised 
independent judgment in voting, rather than blindly following 
the majority; Juror No. 12 actively deliberated and analyzed the 
issues.  
Juror No. 6 also testified.  She confirmed a unanimous poll 
was taken after jurors returned from the weekend, and that 
some of the jurors who formerly voted for life discussed why 
their votes had changed.  She remembered addressing her 
changed vote, but she did not recall exactly what she said, and 
did not remember mentioning the Atlanta crime that day.  She 
testified that she had read an Internet article and watched a 
news program about the Atlanta shootings, and remembered 
that the jurors had a discussion about that crime generally, but 
she did not know precisely when that conversation occurred.  
When asked whether she was emotionally affected by the 
Atlanta shootings, Juror No. 6 testified that she was an 
emotional person and tended to dwell on things like the Atlanta 
shooting “every time something like that happens,” but that the 
emotional impact of that crime had dissipated for her before 
jurors completed the poll and reached the ensuing penalty 
verdict.   
After it heard testimony from Juror Nos. 6 and 7 and 
argument from the parties, the court sought testimony from 
Juror No. 12, as well.  Juror No. 12 confirmed that before the 
jurors departed for the weekend the vote had been nine to three, 
and he was one of the three jurors who had voted for life.  He 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
75 
believed the poll taken when jurors returned after the weekend 
was still nine to three, and he said he would vote with the 
majority if 11 jurors voted for death.  Juror No. 12 eventually 
changed his vote, but did so not simply to go along with the 
majority; he testified that the heinous nature of the crime and 
his own “scrupulous[]” evaluation of witness testimony 
ultimately changed his mind.  He did not recall which other 
jurors initially voted for life, except that they were both female.  
He did not recall a discussion regarding the Atlanta crimes and 
testified that it was not a factor affecting his deliberative 
process.   
After Juror No. 12 testified, defense counsel persisted in 
requesting the court grant the parties permission to contact 
jurors.  The court ultimately agreed to send a letter to jurors 
asking if they would consent to contact, and following receipt of 
consent from several jurors, the court continued the new trial 
motion to provide defense counsel an opportunity to contact 
those jurors who had responded.20    
Pops’s attorney, Jones, contacted Juror No. 1, who told her 
that Juror Nos. 6 and 12 had initially voted for life but their 
votes changed in the poll immediately following the jurors’ 
return from the weekend.  Juror No. 1 told Jones that there was 
a conversation amongst jurors following the poll during which 
jurors discussed the Atlanta crimes.  Juror No. 6 purportedly 
said she believed she needed to put her sympathy for Wilson’s 
family aside after hearing news about the Atlanta crimes; Juror 
No. 10 purportedly said his country of origin taught that “[i]f you 
 
20  
It was at this juncture that defense counsel spoke with 
Juror No. 9 and learned of her prior jury service, as previously 
addressed.   
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
76 
kill someone, then you are killed”; Juror Nos. 10 and/or 11 
purportedly asked the jurors why Pops and Wilson should sit in 
prison while they — the citizens — paid for it; and, Juror No. 12 
said he was “comfortable” with voting for life or for death.  Jones 
reported that Juror No. 1 initially agreed to sign a declaration 
attesting to these impressions, but after relations between Jones 
and Juror No. 1 soured, Juror No. 1 ultimately indicated she did 
not want to be contacted again, and she did not sign a 
declaration.  Jones submitted a declaration attesting to her 
conversation with Juror No. 1 regarding the juror’s conversation 
with fellow jurors.  The trial court declined to obtain Juror No. 
1’s testimony, because “this juror . . . is, obviously, very 
reluctant.”  The trial court also declined to call Juror Nos. 10 or 
11 to testify because there was no evidence their alleged 
statements “were anything other than transitory comments in 
passing, provoking no discussion by other jurors.”   
Pops’s motion for new trial, joined by Wilson, argued that 
Juror No. 12 committed misconduct by siding with the majority 
instead of weighing the evidence.  In the alternative, they 
argued Juror No. 12 relied on evidence outside of the case, 
namely Juror No. 6’s statements concerning the Atlanta crime 
— which constituted misconduct because it violated his oath as 
a juror.  They argued Juror No. 6 likewise committed 
misconduct by relying on information about the Atlanta crime 
to reach a verdict.  Defense counsel objected to the court’s refusal 
to allow them to question the jurors, claiming the court’s 
questioning was leading and permitted the jurors to deny 
misconduct.   
The court concluded Juror No. 6 had not deliberated over 
the weekend before her vote changed, and noted jurors 
necessarily thought about the case during their non-deliberative 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
77 
time.  Wilson claims — incorrectly — that the court did not 
expressly rule on his motion for new trial, but at a hearing on 
April 7, 2000 — during which Juror No. 9’s alleged misconduct 
was addressed — the court stated it was “prepared to deny all 
the motions.”  On that same day, the trial court denied the 
outstanding motions for new trial, including those related to 
Juror Nos. 6, 9, and 12.   
2. Discussion 
Wilson contends the trial court failed to adequately 
investigate his allegations of juror misconduct by not exercising 
its discretion to permit the parties to call and question jurors at 
the hearings on his motions for new trial.  We conclude this 
claim lacks merit.  A trial court has broad discretion to resolve 
a motion for new trial.  (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 
40, 52 (Manibusan).)  While “a new trial may be warranted if a 
jury 
engages 
in 
misconduct 
that 
prevents 
impartial 
consideration of the case,” the trial court is obliged only “to 
‘ “ ‘make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary’ ” to resolve 
the matter.’ ”  (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 
517 (Mora and Rangel).)  When the allegations of misconduct 
are based on the hearsay assertions of counsel — as with Jones’s 
declaration pertaining to Juror No. 1’s alleged statements — we 
have held that evidence “ ‘insufficient to establish an abuse of 
discretion in either denying the motion or declining to conduct 
an evidentiary hearing.’ ”  (Ibid.)   
The trial court fulfilled its obligation in this case by 
conducting several hearings to determine whether misconduct 
occurred.  After hearing testimony from Juror Nos. 6, 7, and 12, 
the trial court found no misconduct.  It was under no obligation 
to obtain testimony from every juror, and no error resulted from 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
78 
its decision not to obtain testimony from Juror Nos. 1, 10, or 11.  
As to Juror No. 1, the only basis to conduct a further inquiry was 
Jones’s statement regarding their phone conversation.  This 
evidence was hearsay; accordingly, no error followed from the 
trial court’s decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing or by 
denying the new trial motion.  (Mora and Rangel, supra, 5 
Cal.5th at p. 517.)  We might likewise conclude no abuse of 
discretion resulted from the trial court’s conclusion that Juror 
No. 6 did not commit misconduct (see ibid.), although that is not 
Wilson’s assertion. 
Instead, Wilson claims the court erred by not adequately 
investigating the alleged misconduct.  This assertion is both 
unfounded — the court conducted multiple evidentiary hearings 
— and unavailing; the basis for the alleged misconduct related 
to Juror No. 6 was a hearsay statement made by defense 
counsel.  We have made clear that “[a] court must hold an 
evidentiary hearing on alleged jury misconduct only when the 
defendant 
shows 
‘a 
strong 
possibility 
that 
prejudicial 
misconduct has occurred.  Even upon such a showing, an 
evidentiary hearing will generally be unnecessary unless the 
parties’ evidence presents a material conflict that can only be 
resolved at such a hearing.’ ”  (Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at 
p. 55.)  No such conflict existed here.  To the extent Wilson 
presented evidence intimating jurors were influenced by 
matters outside the record, the court’s evidentiary hearing 
resolved that concern.  “As we have explained, deliberating 
jurors ‘may be particularly reluctant to express themselves 
freely in the jury room if their mental processes are subject to 
immediate judicial scrutiny.’ ”  (Id. at p. 53.)  Once the trial 
“court is satisfied that the juror in question ‘is participating in 
deliberations and has not expressed an intention to disregard 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
79 
the court’s instructions or otherwise committed misconduct,’ ” 
the court is not obliged to conduct further inquiry.  (Ibid.)  After 
conducting multiple hearings, the trial court was satisfied that 
the deliberations were not tainted by misconduct, and its denial 
of Wilson’s new trial motion did not constitute an abuse of 
discretion.  (Ibid.) 
In an effort to avoid this conclusion, Wilson’s argument is 
not that the denial of the new trial motion or failure to hold a 
hearing constituted an abuse of discretion, but rather that the 
court erred by failing to permit him to interview jurors.  Wilson 
asserts that “[t]he testimony of the jurors was a poor substitute 
for the interviews the attorneys were asking to do” because the 
court’s hearings did not “clear up the facts” to his satisfaction.  
This argument lacks merit.  Trial courts are under no obligation 
to conduct evidentiary hearings at all when the allegations of 
misconduct are based on hearsay, as was the case here, and are 
certainly not required to permit the parties — rather than the 
court — to examine witnesses.  (Mora and Rangel, supra, 5 
Cal.5th at p. 517.)   
To the extent Wilson is claiming error arose from the 
court’s refusal to grant him access to jurors outside of the 
courtroom, the argument is even less persuasive; such 
interviews would have, at best, resulted in unsworn hearsay 
statements alleging misconduct occurred.  Even if those 
statements had been obtained, the court would have committed 
no error in declining to do the very act that occurred here — 
conduct an evidentiary hearing.  (See Mora and Rangel, supra, 
5 Cal.5th at p. 517.)  The court did conduct a hearing, and 
determined no misconduct occurred.  This decision was “ ‘within 
the sound discretion of the trial court,’ ” and the trial “ ‘court 
d[id] not abuse its discretion  simply because it fail[ed] to 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
80 
investigate any and all new information . . .’ ” or allegations 
raised by Wilson.  (Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 52.)   
IV.  PENALTY PHASE 
A. Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty 
Statutory Scheme  
Wilson raises several objections to the constitutionality of 
California’s death penalty scheme.  We decline to reconsider our 
existing precedent and reject these objections, on the merits, as 
follows: 
The special circumstances qualifying a defendant for the 
death penalty, as set out in section 190.2, are not 
unconstitutionally overbroad, nor are they so numerous that the 
constitutionally 
required 
narrowing 
function 
cannot 
be 
performed.  (People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 130; People v. 
Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 469.)   
There is no basis in our precedent to conclude that a trier 
of fact imposes the death penalty in an arbitrary or capricious 
manner when the trier of fact considers the circumstances of the 
crime under section 190.3, factor (a).  (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 
Cal.5th 147, 213.)   
We have previously held that the death penalty is not 
unconstitutional “ ‘ “for failing to require proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that aggravating factors exist, outweigh the 
mitigating 
factors, 
and 
render 
death 
the 
appropriate 
punishment.”  [Citation.]’ ”  (People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 
Cal.5th 1, 45.)  We also have consistently held the death penalty 
does not constitute an increased sentence.  (People v. Scott 
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 407.)  And we have determined that these 
conclusions are unaltered by Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 
U.S. 466, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, Blakely v. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
81 
Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, or Cunningham v. California 
(2007) 549 U.S. 270.  (People v. Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 
407.)   
Defendant does not give us any reason to revisit these 
issues or to find that California’s capital punishment scheme 
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 
unusual 
punishment, 
or 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment’s 
guarantee of due process does not require the jury find 
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating 
factors outweigh mitigating factors.  (People v. Jones (2017) 3 
Cal.5th 583, 618–619.)  Nor does defendant give us any reason 
to depart from our precedent holding that the death penalty 
statutory scheme is not rendered infirm under the federal 
Constitution by failing to demand written findings or unanimity 
as to the existence of particular aggravating factors.  (People v. 
Lopez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 339, 370; People v. Silveria and Travis 
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 326.) 
There is no requirement that the jury be instructed 
concerning burden of proof at the penalty phase, nor must it be 
instructed on a “ ‘ “ ‘presumption of life’ ” ’ ” to satisfy a 
defendant’s constitutional rights to due process, equal 
protection, a reliable determination of sentence, or freedom from 
cruel and unusual punishment.  (People v. Fayed, supra, 9 
Cal.5th at p. 213.)  
Nor does the use of unadjudicated offenses under section 
190.3, factor (b) constitute a violation of due process principles.  
(People v. Fayed, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 214.)  Section 190.3’s use 
of the word “ ‘extreme’ . . . in the list of mitigating factors . . . 
does not act as a barrier to the jury’s consideration of mitigating 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
82 
evidence in violation of the federal Constitution.”  (People v. 
Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 588.) 
The phrase “ ‘ “ ‘so substantial’ ” ’ ” — when used to 
compare mitigating and aggravating factors — does not render 
CALJIC No. 8.88 unconstitutional.  (People v. Landry (2016) 2 
Cal.5th 52, 123.)  Nor is the instruction “ ‘ “unconstitutional for 
failing to inform the jury that: . . . death must be the appropriate 
penalty, not just a warranted penalty.” ’ ”  (People v. Mitchell, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 589.)  Error does not “flow[] from a failure 
to instruct the jury that if mitigating factors outweigh 
aggravating factors, life is the appropriate sentence.”  (Mora and 
Rangel, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 519.) 
The trial court was not obliged to provide a jury 
instruction indicating it was a defendant’s burden to 
demonstrate factors in mitigation were present, nor did the 
court need to instruct the jury it was required to unanimously 
find any mitigating factor was present.  (People v. Jones, supra, 
3 Cal.5th at p. 620.)   
“The trial court has no obligation to delete from CALJIC 
No. 8.85 inapplicable mitigating factors.”  (People v. Mitchell, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 589.)  There is likewise no requirement 
“that the court designate which factors are aggravating or 
mitigating or instruct the jury that certain factors are relevant 
only in mitigation.”  (People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 
490.) 
The federal Constitution does not require intercase 
proportionality review, assessing the relative culpability of a 
defendant’s case compared to other murders.  (People v. Bell, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 131.)  “ ‘The capital sentencing scheme 
does not violate equal protection by denying to capital 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
83 
defendants procedural safeguards that are available to 
noncapital defendants.’ ”  (People v. Frederickson, supra, 8 
Cal.5th at p. 1027.)  Defendant does not present a persuasive 
argument that international law prohibits application of the 
death penalty in this case, or in the United States.  This country 
reserved the right to impose the death penalty when it signed 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
(People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1017.) 
B.  Cumulative Error  
Wilson contends the combined guilt and penalty phase 
errors require reversal of his conviction and death sentence, 
even if the errors are not prejudicial when considered 
individually.  We have found no error, so no prejudice can 
accumulate. 
V.  DISPOSITION 
 
We affirm the judgment. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J.  
KRAUSE, J.* 
 
________________________ 
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Wilson   
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Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
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Opinion No. S087533 
Date Filed:  April 12, 2021 
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Court:  Superior    
County:  Los Angeles    
Judge:  Curtis B. Rappe    
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Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek and Mary K. McComb, State Public Defenders, 
under appointments by the Supreme Court, Joseph E. Chabot, Ryan R. 
Davis and Elias Batchelder, Deputy State Public Defenders, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. 
Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and 
James William Bilderback II, Assistant Attorneys General, Jaime L. 
Fuster and Douglas L. Wilson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Ryan R. Davis 
Deputy State Public Defender 
770 L St., Suite 1000 
Sacramento, CA 95814-3362 
(916) 322-2676 
 
Douglas L. Wilson 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6184