Title: State v. Hollin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 69S05-1201-PC-6
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2012

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
 
 
 
 
 
Stephen T. Owens 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
State Public Defender 
 
Cynthia L. Ploughe 
 
 
 
 
 
J. Michael Sauer 
Deputy Attorney General  
 
 
 
 
Deputy Public Defender 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 69S05-1201-PC-6 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Respondent below), 
 
v. 
 
STEVEN RAY HOLLIN, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Petitioner below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Ripley Circuit Court, No. 69C01-0802-PC-001 
The Honorable Carl H. Taul, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 69A05-1101-PC-113 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
July 12, 2012 
 
 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jul 12 2012, 8:57 am
 
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Steven Ray Hollin filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging prosecutorial 
misconduct and ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  The post-conviction court granted relief 
and the State of Indiana appealed.  The Court of Appeals reversed.  We granted transfer.  
 
Facts and Procedural History1 
 
 
A recitation of the essential facts in this case was set forth in our opinion on direct appeal 
as follows:  
 
 
Eighteen-year-old Steven R. Hollin was released from jail 
on November 1, 2005.  Less than a week later, he and Nathan 
Vogel (“Vogel”) devised a plan to burglarize homes in a rural 
portion of Ripley County, Indiana.  They planned to knock upon 
doors to locate unoccupied homes, from which they would steal 
money.  On the morning of November 8, 2005, the two men 
ventured out by foot along a road in Ripley County.  The first 
residence they approached was occupied.  A woman answered the 
door, and to avoid suspicion Hollin and Vogel asked for directions 
to Greensburg, Indiana.  They then left and continued their search 
for an unoccupied house.  The next home they reached appeared to 
be empty.  To be certain, Hollin and Vogel knocked upon both the 
front and back doors before entering the garage and proceeding 
into the kitchen.  While Hollin remained in the kitchen, Vogel 
entered a bedroom.  Vogel took a camera bag containing 
approximately six hundred dollars.  The two then left the home, 
walking back toward town.  At this point, the woman who had 
provided directions to Greensburg noticed them and called police 
to report this suspicious activity. 
 
 
Batesville Police Department Lieutenant Jeff Thielking 
responded to the call and recognized Hollin.  He became 
suspicious about the possibility of criminal activity because, 
although it was approximately sixty-six degrees outside, Vogel 
wore a heavy winter coat and appeared to be hiding something 
inside of it.  Vogel asserted that their car had broken down along 
the road, but Lieutenant Thielking had not seen any disabled 
vehicles in the vicinity.  Lieutenant Thielking also knew of several 
recent burglaries in the area.  Noting the name of Al Wuestefeld on 
the camera bag Vogel was carrying, Lieutenant Thielking arrested 
both men.  A telephone call to the Wuestefeld residence confirmed 
                                                 
1 “Tr.” refers to the trial transcript. “PC-Tr.” refers to the transcript of the post-conviction proceedings.  
“PC-Ex.” refers to the exhibits entered into the post-conviction proceedings. 
 
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that it had been burgled.  Hollin and Vogel subsequently 
confessed.2 
 
Hollin v. State, 877 N.E.2d 462, 463-64 (Ind. 2007).  
 
 
On November 10, 2005, the State initially charged both Hollin and Vogel with burglary 
as a Class B felony and theft as a Class D felony.  Hollin was also charged as a habitual offender.  
On July 11, 2006, the State amended Hollin’s theft charge to conspiracy to commit burglary as a 
Class B felony.  A jury trial began August 8, 2006.  The jury convicted Hollin of conspiracy to 
commit burglary and adjudged him a habitual offender.  After conducting a sentencing hearing, 
Judge Carl H. Taul found one aggravating factor – Hollin’s criminal history – and one mitigating 
factor – his young age.  The trial judge then sentenced Hollin to the maximum term of twenty 
years for the conspiracy conviction, enhanced by twenty years for the habitual offender 
adjudication, for a total term of forty years. 
 
 
On direct appeal Hollin raised two issues, one of which was whether the trial court 
properly sentenced him.  In an unpublished memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals rejected 
Hollin’s arguments and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  Hollin v. State, No. 69A01-
0609-CR-401 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2007).  We granted transfer and affirmed Hollin’s 
convictions, but finding his forty-year sentence inappropriate we revised his sentence to ten years 
for conspiracy to commit burglary enhanced by an additional ten years as a habitual offender, for 
a total executed term of twenty years.  See Hollin, 877 N.E.2d at 465-66.  
 
 
Hollin filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on February 25, 2008.  Amended 
by counsel on August 16, 2010, the petition alleged prosecutorial misconduct and a number of 
claims alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  Judge Carl H. Taul, the same trial judge 
that presided over Hollin’s jury trial, presided over the post-conviction proceedings. The trial 
judge granted Hollin’s petition, reversed his conviction, and ordered a new trial.  The State 
                                                 
2 Although the record shows that both Hollin and Vogel gave statements to an Officer of the Batesville 
Police Department that could reasonably be interpreted as implicating themselves in a burglary, it is 
incorrect to say that either man actually “confessed” to the offense.  This inaccurate characterization of 
the record was raised for the first time at the hearing on Hollin’s petition for post-conviction relief.  As 
will become apparent later in this opinion it has some bearing on the outcome of this appeal.  
 
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appealed.  In an unpublished memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment 
of the post-conviction court.  State v. Hollin, No. 69A05-1101-PC-113 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 
2011).  Having previously granted transfer we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.  
Additional facts are set forth below.  
 
Standard of Review for Post-Conviction Proceedings 
 
 
Post-conviction proceedings do not provide criminal defendants with a “super-appeal.”  
State v. Holmes, 728 N.E.2d 164, 168 (Ind. 2000).  Rather, they provide a narrow remedy to 
raise issues that were not known at the time of the original trial or were unavailable on direct 
appeal.  Id.  “The petitioner has the burden of establishing his grounds for relief by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”  Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5).  When the State appeals a 
judgment granting post-conviction relief, we review using the standard in Indiana Trial Rule 
52(A): 
 
On appeal of claims tried by the court without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, at law or in equity, the court on appeal shall not set 
aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge 
the credibility of witnesses. 
 
State v. Cooper, 935 N.E.2d 146, 149 (Ind. 2010).  The clearly erroneous standard of review is a 
review for sufficiency of the evidence, and we neither reweigh that evidence nor determine the 
credibility of witnesses.  Instead, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable 
inferences supporting the trial court’s judgment.  State v. Dye, 784 N.E.2d 469, 471 (Ind. 2003).  
Further, the post-conviction court in this case entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). Although we do not defer to the post-
conviction court’s legal conclusions, “a post conviction court’s findings and judgment will be 
reversed only upon a showing of clear error – that which leaves us with a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made.”  Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 714 (Ind. 2007) 
(quoting Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 830 
(2001) (table)).  
 
 
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Standard of Review for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
 
To establish a post-conviction claim alleging a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish the two components set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  First, the defendant must show that counsel’s 
performance was deficient, that is, falling below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
denying defendant the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  Timberlake v. 
State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001).  Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense by establishing a reasonable probability that but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different.  Id.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  Id.  
We afford counsel considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and “[i]solated 
mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render 
representation ineffective.”  Id.   
 
Discussion 
 
 
The evidence before the post-conviction court reveals the following.  After being arrested 
Hollin was transported to the Batesville Police Department by Officer Stanley Holt, who read 
Hollin his Miranda rights and asked Hollin questions about the alleged burglary.  Hollin stated he 
didn’t have any knowledge about a house being broken into and denied any involvement.  Vogel 
and Hollin both gave tape recorded statements.  Vogel told Officer Holt that he entered the 
Wuestefeld house intending to use the telephone, but then went into the master bedroom and 
emptied a big jar of change into a camera bag he found.  PC-Tr. at 43.  He did not implicate 
Hollin in a plan to burglarize the home.  Hollin told Officer Holt that Vogel needed to find a 
telephone and suggested they go to the Wuestefeld residence, but no one answered the door.  
Noting the door was unlocked, Vogel entered the residence and Hollin followed him inside.  
When Vogel left the room, Hollin said he waited in the kitchen for approximately two minutes 
until Vogel returned with a pack.  Then they left the residence.  PC-Ex. at 233-34.  Notably, 
Hollin neither declared that he entered the residence intending to take property therefrom nor that 
he knew Vogel intended to do so.  
 
6 
 
On November 10, 2005, the State initially charged both Hollin and Vogel with burglary 
as a Class B felony and theft as a Class D felony.  Hollin was also charged as a habitual offender.  
On July 11, 2006, the State amended Hollin’s theft charge to conspiracy to commit burglary as a 
Class B felony.  Thereafter Vogel entered an agreement with the State in which he pleaded guilty 
to theft as a Class D felony and the burglary charge was dismissed.  On February 21, 2006, the 
trial court sentenced Vogel under the terms of the plea agreement to 545 days imprisonment, 
with all time not already served suspended to probation.  If Vogel successfully completed his 
probation, then his felony theft conviction would be reduced to a Class A misdemeanor.  
 
At the time he was charged in this cause, Vogel had a pending theft charge in 
neighboring Decatur County.  On March 1, 2006, Vogel pleaded guilty to the theft charge and 
was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment, with all but sixty days suspended to probation.  
On May 16, 2006, Vogel was charged with battery as a Class C felony in Decatur County.  On 
May 25, 2006, petitions to revoke Vogel’s suspended sentences were filed in both Ripley and 
Decatur Counties. 
 
 
Shortly after the State amended Hollin’s theft charge to conspiracy to commit burglary 
Officer Holt and Ripley County Chief Deputy Prosecutor Ryan King met with Vogel in the 
Ripley County Jail.  Vogel had originally contended that Hollin was unaware of Vogel’s theft 
until after they had left the burglarized home.  In jail, however, for the first time Vogel declared 
he and Hollin had agreed in advance to look for houses to break into and burglarize.  Officer 
Holt and Deputy Prosecutor King met again with Vogel on August 2, 2006.  At the time of these 
meetings, Deputy Prosecutor King knew there was a petition in Ripley County to revoke Vogel’s 
probation, and that the reason for the petition was the pending Class C felony battery charge in 
Decatur County.  On August 8, the first day of trial, the trial court granted the State’s motion to 
dismiss the charge of Burglary against Hollin, leaving only the charge of conspiracy to commit 
burglary.  
 
 
During opening statement Hollin’s trial counsel declared if Vogel testified that “this was 
some kind of a plan, this will be the first time he’s come up with that story,” suggesting that 
counsel was unaware of Vogel’s jailhouse statement to Holt and King.  Tr. at 74.  Vogel 
 
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proceeded to testify that he and Hollin had agreed the night before the burglary to find a home to 
burglarize.  Vogel acknowledged that he had been convicted of theft in Decatur County after he 
and Hollin had been arrested in the present case.  However, trial counsel did not inquire into 
Vogel’s pending Class C felony battery charge or the pending petitions to revoke Vogel’s 
probation in both Ripley and Decatur counties.  
 
 
The statement Hollin gave to Officer Holt on the day of his arrest was played to the jury.  
Hollin’s trial testimony was consistent with his statement.  He testified that he thought Vogel 
knew the residents of the home, and that Vogel did not respond when he asked Vogel what was 
going on.  According to Hollin, he only realized the full extent of what had happened when 
Vogel showed him the items he had taken from the house.  Hollin specifically denied having any 
plan to break into the house with Vogel.  
 
 
At his hearing for post-conviction relief Hollin made a number of claims alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel, one of which we find particularly compelling, namely, counsel 
failed to present evidence that would have impeached Vogel’s credibility.  Specifically, Hollin 
alleges that trial counsel should have elicited the details of Vogel’s plea agreement and 
sentencing during cross-examination.  The post-conviction court found that trial counsel knew, 
or should have known by reasonable diligence, that Vogel was originally charged with burglary 
and theft felonies that, but for a plea agreement that eliminated jail time, would have subjected 
Vogel to a maximum sentence of twenty-three years.  Additionally, Vogel’s plea agreement 
provided that his felony was to be reduced to a misdemeanor upon successful completion of 
probation.  However, trial counsel did not employ this information to impeach Vogel.  Instead, 
the jury was only aware that Vogel had pled guilty and was in jail.  “Thus,” the post-conviction 
court noted, “the jury likely presumed that Vogel pled guilty to the same charge for which Hollin 
was being tried, Conspiracy to Commit Burglary, a class B felony, and was serving a lengthy 
sentence for that offense.”  Appellant’s App. at 128.  “The jury had no idea that Vogel, the only 
person who took any property from the Wuestefeld residence, avoided a potential 23-year 
sentence by pleading guilty and was given probation.”  Appellant’s App. at 128.   
 
 
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Trial counsel testified that he did not question Vogel about his plea agreement because he 
didn’t want to “make the trial about somebody else rather than about [my] own client.”  PC-Tr. 
at 68.  Further, he didn’t want to take the “risk of giving the prosecutor even more opportunities 
to talk about Mr. Hollin’s past record even, even by comparing him in some way with Mr. 
Vogel.”  PC-Tr. at 68.  Trial counsel elaborated that he did not want to “open the door” to 
Hollin’s criminal history by asking questions about Vogel’s criminal history.  PC-Tr. at 69.  The 
post-conviction court was not persuaded that this was sound reasoning.  See Roche v. State, 690 
N.E.2d 1115, 1126 (Ind. 1997) (noting that a matter of trial strategy “cannot form the basis for 
establishing ineffective assistance of trial counsel unless there was no sound basis for not 
pursuing the strategy” (emphasis added)).  Instead, the court found that the case against Hollin 
was “essentially a credibility contest” that relied upon one question:  Was there an agreement?  
Appellant’s App. at 137.  “Thus, any evidence bearing on the respective credibility of Vogel and 
Hollin was critical to the outcome of this jury trial.”  Appellant’s App. at 137.  We agree with 
this assessment.  More importantly, the State has not demonstrated that the post-conviction 
court’s finding in this regard is clearly erroneous.  
 
 
In addition to concluding Hollin was entitled to a new trial because of the ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, the post-conviction court also concluded Hollin was entitled to a new 
trial because of prosecutorial misconduct.  In particular the trial court found that the jury did not 
know:  there was a pending petition to revoke Vogel’s Ripley County probation; Vogel’s Decatur 
County theft conviction was also a Class C felony that would be reduced to a misdemeanor if he 
completed probation successfully; there was a pending petition to revoke Vogel’s Decatur 
County probation; there was a pending charge against Vogel in Decatur County for battery with 
a deadly weapon, a Class C felony; and that Vogel did not implicate Hollin in the burglary until 
after he was charged with battery with a deadly weapon and two petitions to revoke his probation 
were filed.  According to the post-conviction court “the State never disclosed this information” 
in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  Appellant’s App. at 131.  
 
Under Brady, the State has an affirmative duty to disclose material evidence favorable to 
the defendant.  “To prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must establish: (1) that the prosecution 
suppressed evidence; (2) that the evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) that the evidence 
 
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was material to an issue at trial.”  Minnick v. State, 698 N.E.2d 745, 755 (Ind. 1998) (citing 
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).  Evidence is material when there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  
Id. 
 
Under the first prong of the Brady analysis, the post-conviction court found that trial 
counsel was not aware of Vogel’s pending criminal matters or Vogel’s pretrial statement and 
change of story.  See Appellant’s App. at 121 (citing Tr. at 74 (“Nobody can control what [Vogel 
is going to] say today, but if he tries to say today that this was some kind of a plan, this will be 
the first time he’s come up with that story.”)).  Under the second prong, we agree with the post-
conviction court that the undisclosed evidence “was favorable to Hollin because it was 
impeaching – it showed a motivating factor for Vogel to cooperate with the State that would 
have affected the jury’s assessment of his credibility.”  Appellant’s App. at 132.  Further, 
Vogel’s testimony provided the only evidence that he and Hollin agreed to commit the charged 
offense.  Appellant’s App. at 139.  Of particular note, Vogel did not implicate Hollin in an 
agreement to burglarize homes until after Vogel was charged with a new felony and proceedings 
to revoke his probation had begun – approximately eight months after the crime took place.  
Under the third prong, given the importance of credibility in this case as discussed above, we 
conclude there was sufficient evidence for the post-conviction court’s conclusion that there was a 
reasonable probability that had this information been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
trial would have been different. 
 
 
Applying our standard of review to the State’s appeal in this case, we conclude that the 
post-conviction court’s judgment is not clearly erroneous and the State has not shown the 
existence of clear error – that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made.  We therefore affirm the post-conviction court’s grant of Hollin’s petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
 
 
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Conclusion 
 
 
The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.  We remand this cause for a new 
trial. 
 
Dickson, C.J., and Sullivan, David and Massa, JJ., concur.