Title: Citation Partners, LLC v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2020AP001683
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 1, 2023

2023 WI 16 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP1683 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Citation Partners, LLC, 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 400 Wis. 2d 260, 968 N.W.2d 734 
PDC No: 2021 WI App 86 - Published  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 1, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 17, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Dodge   
 
JUDGE: 
Martin J. De Vries   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER, 
C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Frederic J. Brounder, J. Wesley Webendorfer, and DeWitt 
LLP, Madison. There was an oral argument by 
J. Wesley 
Webendorfer. 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Anthony D. Russomanno, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
 
 
2 
oral argument by Anthony D. Russomanno, assistant attorney 
general.  
 
 
 
 
     2023 WI 16 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP1683 
(L.C. No. 
2019CV612) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Citation Partners, LLC, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
MAR 1, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER, 
C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.    
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   Wisconsin imposes a five 
percent tax on the sale or lease of tangible personal property, 
including aircraft, as well as on select services.  The tax 
applies to the "sales price"——that is, "the total amount of 
consideration" paid for a sale, lease, or service, with no 
deductions for the seller's or lessor's costs.  See Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2020AP1683   
 
2 
 
§§ 77.52(1)(a), 77.51(15b)(a) (2013-14).1  The sale of aircraft 
parts and maintenance, however, are exempt from sales tax.  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 77.52(2)(a)10., 77.54(5)(a)3.  
¶2 
Citation Partners, LLC owns an aircraft which it 
leases to third parties, the Lessees.  As part of the total 
amount the Lessees pay to lease the aircraft, Citation Partners 
charges per-flight-hour rates for aircraft repairs and engine 
maintenance.  Those rates correspond to the amount Citation 
Partners spends on aircraft repairs and engine maintenance.  
Citation Partners argues that this portion of the lease payment 
is tax exempt because it is a sale of aircraft parts or 
maintenance.  We disagree.  The per-flight-hour charges for 
aircraft repairs and engine maintenance are taxable because they 
are part of the total amount of consideration the Lessees pay to 
lease Citation Partners' aircraft.  We therefore affirm the 
court of appeals' decision.  
I 
¶3 
Citation Partners owns an aircraft that it leases to 
the Lessees.  The Lessees signed a contract called the Aircraft 
Dry Lease, defining the responsibilities they and Citation 
Partners have with regard to the lease of the aircraft.  The Dry 
Lease requires the Lessees to notify Citation Partners if the 
aircraft needs repairs or maintenance.  If so, Citation Partners 
is responsible for scheduling and paying for all repairs or 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version. 
No. 
2020AP1683   
 
3 
 
maintenance.2  It does not perform any of the repairs or 
maintenance itself.  
¶4 
In addition to the Dry Lease, the Lessees entered into 
a Side Agreement with Citation Partners that sets forth the 
financial terms for the lease of the aircraft.  The Side 
Agreement includes costs-per-flight-hour that Citation Partners 
charges the Lessees for aircraft repairs and engine maintenance.  
Those charges are substantially similar to the amount Citation 
Partners spends when it purchases aircraft repairs and engine 
maintenance directly from vendors.  
¶5 
In 2013, the Legislature passed Wisconsin Act 185, 
which expanded an existing sales tax exemption to include the 
sale of aircraft parts or maintenance.  See 2013 Wis. Act 185.  
After the Act took effect, Citation Partners stopped collecting 
sales tax on the amounts it charged Lessees for aircraft repairs 
and engine maintenance.  In 2017, the Wisconsin Department of 
Revenue notified Citation Partners that unpaid sales taxes were 
due on those amounts.  
¶6 
Citation Partners appealed, claiming that the Act 185 
sales tax exemption applied to the Lessees' payments for 
aircraft repairs and engine maintenance because they were a 
dollar-for-dollar "reimbursement" to Citation Partners for those 
costs.  The Tax Appeals Commission disagreed, concluding that 
                                                 
2 The Lessees have limited authority to incur up to $5,000 
of necessary maintenance and repair work for the aircraft 
without the prior written approval from Citation Partners.  The 
Lessees will be reimbursed by Citation Partners upon receipt of 
proof of payment. 
No. 
2020AP1683   
 
4 
 
the payments were not reimbursements and that Act 185 did not 
apply to any portion of the payments Citation Partners received 
from the Lessees.  The circuit court3 reversed the Commission's 
decision on the grounds that an agency relationship existed 
between Citation Partners and the Lessees.  According to the 
circuit court, this relationship meant that the payments for 
aircraft repairs and engine maintenance were tax exempt, since 
those payments would be tax-free if they were made directly by 
the Lessees to the vendors.   
¶7 
The court of appeals reversed.  Citation Partners, LLC 
v. DOR, 2021 WI App 86, ¶35, 400 Wis. 2d 260, 968 N.W.2d 734.  
In its view, the existence of an agency relationship was 
irrelevant.  Id., ¶32.  Instead, it held that the payments were 
not exempt from sales tax under the plain language of the 
statutes, which apply sales tax to "the total amount paid on an 
aircraft lease," without "any deduction for the portions of a 
lease attributed to aircraft maintenance or engine maintenance, 
which are the costs and expenses of running an aircraft leasing 
business."  Id., ¶24.   
II 
¶8 
We review the Commission's decision rather than the 
circuit court's.  See Friendly Vill. Nursing & Rehab, LLC v. 
DWD, 2022 WI 4, ¶13, 400 Wis. 2d 277, 969 N.W.2d 245.  In doing 
so, we defer to the Commission's findings of fact so long as 
                                                 
3 The Honorable Martin J. De Vries of the Dodge County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2020AP1683   
 
5 
 
they are supported by substantial evidence, but we review its 
legal conclusions de novo.  Id.   
III 
¶9 
In order to determine whether the Lessees' cost-per-
flight-hour payments to Citation Partners for aircraft repairs 
and engine maintenance are taxable, we analyze the tax statutes.  
"When interpreting statutes, we start with the text, and if its 
meaning is plain on its face, we stop there."  Clean Wis., Inc. 
v. DNR, 2021 WI 72, ¶10, 398 Wis. 2d 433, 961 N.W.2d 611.  In 
assessing the plain meaning of the text, "[w]e also consider the 
broader statutory context, interpreting language consistently 
with how it is used in closely related statutes."  Duncan v. 
Asset Recovery Specialists, Inc., 2022 WI 1, ¶9, 400 Wis. 2d 1, 
968 N.W.2d 661.  After analyzing the relevant statutes, we then 
consider what effect, if any, Citation Partners' arguments about 
the law of agency has on our interpretation.   
A 
¶10 Wisconsin imposes a five percent tax on the "sales 
price" for tangible personal property like aircraft that is sold 
or leased.  § 77.52(1)(a).  "[S]ales price" is defined broadly 
as "the total amount of consideration, . . . for which tangible 
personal 
property . . . [is] 
sold, 
licensed, 
[or] 
leased."  
§ 77.51(15b)(a).  The "total amount of consideration," and 
therefore 
the 
"sales 
price," 
is 
calculated 
"without 
any 
deduction for" "[t]he seller's cost of the property or items, 
No. 
2020AP1683   
 
6 
 
property, or goods . . . sold," or "[t]he cost of materials 
used, labor or service cost, . . . and any other expense of the 
seller."  Id. (a)1.-2.  Thus, §§ 77.52(1)(a) and § 77.51(15b)(a) 
together state that the total amount of consideration paid for a 
lease——the "sales price"——is taxable, with no deduction for the 
lessor's costs.  See § 77.51(15b)(a)1.-2.   
¶11 To calculate the total "sales price" that the Lessees 
pay Citation Partners to lease the Aircraft, we simply multiply 
the number of flight hours by the total of all the costs-per-
flight-hour.4  The Side Agreement breaks the total costs-per-
flight-hour down into different hourly rates, including a base 
rate ($724.50/hour), Airplane Repairs ($488/hour), and Engine 
TAP Costs ($292.26/hour).5  The Lessees have to pay all of these 
costs in order to lease the aircraft.  The sum of those costs——
including for aircraft repair and engine maintenance——is thus 
"the total amount of consideration . . . for which [the aircraft 
is] 
. 
. 
. 
leased" 
and 
is 
therefore 
taxable. 
 
See 
§ 77.51(15b)(a).  If there were any doubt remaining as to 
whether Citation Partners' costs for aircraft repairs and engine 
maintenance 
can 
be 
deducted 
from 
the 
sales 
price, 
§ 77.51(15b)(a) 
confirms 
that 
the 
"total 
amount 
of 
consideration" must be calculated "without any deduction" for 
Citation Partners' costs.  Id. (emphasis added). 
                                                 
4 In addition, the Lessees also pay $1.00 per rental period 
to lease the aircraft. 
5 These hourly rates reflect those in the Side Agreement as 
of January 1, 2015. 
No. 
2020AP1683   
 
7 
 
¶12 Citation Partners argues that the payments are not 
taxable because they are not consideration at all.  That is 
because, in its view, Citation Partners simply hands the money 
the Lessees pay for repairs and maintenance over to the vendors 
that provide those services.  But consideration is "any act of 
the plaintiff from which the defendant . . . derives a benefit 
or advantage."  Consideration, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 
2019); see also DOR v. River City Refuse Removal, Inc., 2007 WI 
27, ¶50, 299 Wis. 2d 561, 729 N.W.2d 396 (explaining that 
consideration "may arise when there is a benefit to the promisor 
or a detriment to the promisee").  And Citation Partners clearly 
benefits from these payments by passing along to its Lessees the 
costs of maintaining its aircraft.  For that reason, these 
payments are——by definition——consideration.  See River City, 299 
Wis. 2d 561, ¶50 (consideration includes "a change in financial 
position").  Additionally, accepting Citation Partners' argument 
that it receives no consideration from the Lessees' payments for 
aircraft repairs and engine maintenance simply because that 
payment corresponds to anticipated repair costs would render 
part of § 77.51(15b)(a) meaningless.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 ("Statutory language is read where possible to give 
reasonable 
effect 
to 
every 
word, 
in 
order 
to 
avoid 
surplusage.").  After all, if Citation Partners is right, it is 
not clear what § 77.51(15b)(a) means when it says that the 
"sales 
price"——the 
"total 
amount 
of 
consideration"——is 
No. 
2020AP1683   
 
8 
 
calculated "without any deduction" for Citation Partners' costs.  
§ 77.51(15b)(a)  (emphasis added). 
¶13 Citation Partners claims that the costs-per-flight-
hour that it receives for aircraft parts and engine maintenance 
are nevertheless tax exempt.  It points to two statutory 
exemptions related to aircraft: Wis. Stat. § 77.54(5)(a)3., 
which exempts the sale of "parts used to modify or repair 
aircraft," and Wis. Stat. § 77.52(2)(a)10., which exempts the 
sale of "repair, service, . . . and maintenance of any aircraft 
or aircraft parts."  Citation Partners argues that since the 
plain language of both exemptions covers the costs of aircraft 
repairs and engine maintenance, then "the reimbursement payments 
that Citation Partners receives from the Lessees are exempt from 
sales tax."   
¶14 We 
disagree 
because 
neither 
of 
these 
statutory 
exemptions applies to the payments Citation Partners receives 
from the Lessees.  Simply put, Citation Partners does not sell 
its Lessees "parts used to modify or repair aircraft," or 
"repair, service, . . . and maintenance of any aircraft."  See 
§§ 77.54(5)(a)3., 77.52(2)(a)10.  It leases its aircraft to the 
Lessees.  And as explained previously, the statutes already make 
clear that the total amount of consideration paid on an aircraft 
lease is taxable without any deduction for the Lessor's costs.  
See §§ 77.51(15b)(a), 77.52(1)(a).  When Citation Partners (or 
the Lessees for that matter) buy aircraft repairs or engine 
maintenance directly, those transactions are tax-exempt.  But 
when Citation Partners passes those costs along to its customers 
No. 
2020AP1683   
 
9 
 
as part of the total amount of consideration in a lease, that 
transaction is taxable.   
 
¶15 For example, if the plane's landing gear breaks and 
Citation Partners purchases parts from a business in Wisconsin, 
that transaction is exempt under § 77.54(5)(a)3.  That is 
because the business sold Citation Partners "parts used to 
modify or repair [the] aircraft."  See id.  Thus, the seller 
would not have to charge the usual five percent sales tax.  
Likewise, when Citation Partners pays a maintenance company to 
service the aircraft's engine, that transaction is exempt from 
the sales tax under § 77.52(2)(a)10.  That is because the 
maintenance 
company 
sold 
Citation 
Partners 
"repair, 
service, . . . and maintenance of . . . an[] aircraft part[]."  
See id.   
¶16 Under Act 185 then, sales of aircraft repairs or 
engine maintenance are tax-exempt.  But when Citation Partners 
turns around and leases its aircraft, it is not selling aircraft 
repairs or engine maintenance.  It is leasing an aircraft.6  
Thus, because Citation Partners' activities fall outside the 
text of the exemptions, the total lease price is taxable. 
                                                 
6 For this reason, the general rule in § 77.51(15b)(a) and 
the specific exemptions in §§ 77.54(5)(a)3. and 77.52(2)(a)10. 
relate to different subject matters and are not in conflict.  These 
statutes simply apply to different types of transactions.  And 
because there is no conflict, the general-specific canon is 
inapposite.  See Kramer v. City of Hayward, 57 Wis. 2d 302, 310-
11, 203 N.W.2d 871 (1973); see also Townsend v. ChartSwap, LLC, 
2021 WI 86, ¶39, 399 Wis. 2d 599, 967 N.W.2d 21 (Dallet, J., 
concurring) 
("The 
general-specific 
canon 
applies 
only 
to 
statutes that both address the same subject matter and conflict 
with one another such that harmonizing them is impossible.").    
No. 
2020AP1683   
 
10 
 
B 
¶17 Citation Partners tries to circumvent the plain 
language of the statutes by arguing that it is the Lessees' 
agent when it purchases aircraft repairs and engine maintenance.  
And for that reason, the per-flight-hour reimbursements for 
aircraft repairs and engine maintenance are akin to the Lessees 
purchasing those repairs and maintenance directly.   
¶18 An agency relationship is a "fiduciary relation which 
results from the manifestation of consent by one person to 
another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to 
his control."  James W. Thomas Constr. Co. v. City of Madison, 
79 Wis. 2d 345, 352, 255 N.W.2d 551 (1977).  Thus, in order for 
an 
agency 
relationship 
to 
exist, 
Citation 
Partners 
must 
demonstrate that (1) the Lessees manifested consent to have 
Citation Partners act on their behalf with respect to aircraft 
repairs and engine maintenance and (2) the Lessees had the right 
to control Citation Partners' conduct in that regard.  See id. 
¶19 Citation Partners relies on the lease documents as 
"provid[ing] the framework for the agency relationship."  It 
points out that the Dry Lease makes the Lessees responsible for 
"inspect[ing] the Aircraft" and notifying Citation Partners if 
"any repair or maintenance should be completed."  Additionally, 
the Dry Lease contains an indemnification provision under which 
the Lessees are "ultimately responsible for all obligations, 
expenses and disbursements asserted against Citation Partners 
arising out of the operation of the Aircraft."   
No. 
2020AP1683   
 
11 
 
¶20 Rather than prove an agency relationship exists, the 
lease documents reveal the opposite.  The Dry Lease states that 
Citation Partners——not the Lessees——"shall schedule and pay for 
all repairs and maintenance."  And that decision is not 
"directed" by the Lessees just because they must notify Citation 
Partners of necessary maintenance upon inspection of the 
aircraft.  Rather, the Lessees' inspection obligation is limited 
to confirming that the aircraft is flightworthy before using it.  
Likewise, under the Dry Lease, the Lessees have only limited 
authority to purchase repairs and maintenance up to $5,000, and 
are 
reimbursed 
by 
Citation 
Partners 
if 
they 
do 
so.  
Additionally, although the parties entered into a new Side 
Agreement in 2015 which states that the Lessees are "responsible 
for 
fixed 
and 
indirect 
operating 
expenses 
and 
charges 
attributable to the operation and maintenance of the Aircraft," 
including "[s]cheduled and unscheduled maintenance," nothing in 
that Agreement or the Dry Lease suggests that the Lessees 
control Citation Partners' aircraft-maintenance activities.   
¶21 The indemnification provision does not demonstrate 
otherwise.  In that provision, the Lessees agree to indemnify 
Citation Partners "from and against any and all claims, 
liabilities, demands, obligations, losses, damages,  . . . which 
may be imposed on, incurred by or asserted against [Citation 
Partners], in any way relating to or arising out of this Lease, 
and/or the operation of the Aircraft, . . . ."  But standing 
alone, standard indemnification language like this does not 
create an agency relationship.  To reiterate, an agency 
No. 
2020AP1683   
 
12 
 
relationship requires that one party have the right to control 
the other's conduct.  See James W. Thomas Constr. Co., 79 Wis. 
2d 345, at 352.  And nothing in this indemnification provision 
grants the Lessees the right to control Citation Partners.  
Instead, the Dry Lease and the Side Agreement demonstrate that 
Citation Partners, the owner of the aircraft, is the one in 
charge of repairs and engine maintenance, and that the Lessees 
do 
not 
control 
how 
Citation 
Partners 
fulfills 
that 
responsibility.    
IV 
¶22 Wisconsin imposes a five percent sales tax on the sale 
or lease of tangible personal property like Citation Partners' 
aircraft.  The tax applies to the total "sales price" of the 
lease unless there is an applicable exemption.  Two such 
exemptions exist for the sale of aircraft parts and maintenance, 
but neither apply to the Lessees' payments to Citation Partners 
for aircraft repairs and engine maintenance.  Accordingly, we 
hold that the total amount of consideration the Lessees pay to 
lease Citation Partners' aircraft is taxable, and affirm the 
court of appeals' decision.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2020AP1683.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶23 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   (dissenting).  In 2013 
Wis. 
Act 
185, 
the 
legislature 
enacted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 77.52(2)(a)10. 
to 
exempt 
the 
"repair, 
service, 
alteration . . . of any aircraft or aircraft parts" and Wis. 
Stat. § 77.54(5)(a)3. to exempt the "[p]arts used to modify or 
repair aircraft" from state sales taxes.  This case involves a 
claimed 
exemption 
from 
state 
sales 
taxes 
for 
aircraft 
maintenance services and aircraft parts.  The majority opinion 
never 
interprets 
§§ 77.52(2)(a)10. 
or 
77.54(5)(a)3, 
which 
address aircraft repairs and aircraft parts.  It skips over the 
plain meaning of those two statutes, and instead, it interprets 
Wis. Stat. §§ 77.51(15b)(a) and 77.52(1)(a), neither of which 
contains the word, "aircraft," nor does either statute mention 
aircraft parts or aircraft maintenance.   
¶24 I 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 77.52(2)(a)10. 
and 
77.54(5)(a)3., the statutes relevant to Citation Partners, LLC's 
claim.  The plain meaning of those statutes grants Citation 
Partners the sales tax exemption it seeks.  Because the majority 
opinion chooses to follow the error-strewn path of the Tax 
Appeals Commission (TAC), which contravenes the clear statutory 
direction to exempt the sales price of aircraft parts and 
aircraft maintenance from state sales taxes, I respectfully 
dissent.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶25 Citation Partners, LLC owns a Cessna Citation C12 
aircraft that it leases to parties related to the limited 
No.  2020AP1683.pdr 
 
2 
 
liability company and to one unrelated party.  The parties 
operate under two documents:  the Aircraft Dry Lease and 
individual Side Agreements that each lessee signs.  
¶26 Section One of the Dry Lease describes the structure 
of a "Rental Period" for the aircraft's use and return to 
Citation Partners.  It sets one dollar "and other good and 
valuable consideration" as a lessee's initial payment to 
Citation Partners.  Section Two provides that the lease term is 
one year, unless terminated earlier by either party with ten 
days notice.  Section Four talks about scheduling use of the 
aircraft and what is required to do so.  Section Five requires 
Citation Partners to insure the aircraft.   
¶27 Section Six places certain geographic and other 
restrictions on aircraft use and creates obligations for the 
lessees.  Section Nine requires lessees to inspect the aircraft 
and maintenance records prior to each rental period and to 
notify Citation Partners and not to operate the aircraft until 
all repairs and maintenance are completed.  Citation Partners 
schedules 
and 
initially 
pays 
vendors 
for 
repairs 
and 
maintenance.  Section Nineteen requires that the lease be 
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of 
Wisconsin.   
¶28 The 
Side 
Agreements 
are 
individual 
memoranda 
concerning the financial commitments of lessees to Citation 
Partners.  Each Side Agreement states the hourly charge for 
flight time, the lessee's obligation to pay a stated amount for 
aircraft repairs and for engine maintenance and a listing of 
No.  2020AP1683.pdr 
 
3 
 
expenses specific to flights that are allocated only to the 
lessee who was using the aircraft when the charges were 
incurred.  Accordingly, Citation Partners charges each lessee 
its 
proportionate 
share 
of 
aircraft 
repairs 
and 
engine 
maintenance that Citation Partners initially pays to vendors. 
However, the Side Agreements contain more components than those 
two charges.     
¶29 Prior to 2015, Citation Partners charged state sales 
taxes on all components of the Dry Lease and Side Agreements and 
remitted the collections to Department of Revenue (DOR).  
Because the effective date of 2013 Wis. Act 185 was July 2014, 
Citation Partners filed for a refund of taxes collected for 
periods of time after the effective date of Act 185.  DOR 
granted the refund.  Subsequently, however, DOR demanded 
repayment.   
¶30 Citation Partners appealed DOR's decision to the TAC, 
which agreed with DOR.  Citation Partners then sought review in 
circuit court, which reversed the TAC.  The TAC sought review in 
the court of appeals, which reversed the circuit court.  
Citation Partners petitioned for review here, which petition we 
granted.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶31 We review the TAC's decision, not that of the circuit 
court or the court of appeals.  MercyCare Ins. Co. v. Wis. 
Comm'r of Ins., 2010 WI 87, ¶25, 328 Wis. 2d 110, 786 N.W.2d 
785.   
No.  2020AP1683.pdr 
 
4 
 
¶32 This dispute requires us to interpret and apply 
statutes.  The interpretation and application of statutes 
present questions of law requiring our independent review.  
Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 86, ¶17, 
383 Wis. 2d 247, 914 N.W.2d 597; Solowicz v. Forward Geneva 
Nat'l, LLC, 2010 WI 20, ¶13, 323 Wis. 2d 556, 780 N.W.2d 111.  
However, as we do so, we benefit from the discussions of the 
circuit court and court of appeals.  Id.  We owe no deference to 
TAC on questions of law.  Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 
75, ¶84, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21; see also Patience Drake 
Roggensack, 
Elected 
to 
Decide:  Is 
the 
Decision-Avoidance 
Doctrine of Great Weight Deference Appropriate in This Court of 
Last Resort?, 89 Marq. L. Rev. 541 (2006).   
B.  Statutory Interpretation 
1.  Principles of Statutory Interpretation 
¶33 We begin statutory interpretation with examination of 
the words the legislature chose to use in statutory enactments 
that are under review here.  When we do so, "statutory language 
is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in 
isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Teigen v. Wis. Elections 
Comm'n, 2022 WI 64, ¶50, 403 Wis. 2d 607, 976 N.W.2d 519 
(quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 
58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110); Antonin Scalia & 
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts, 180, 183 (2012) (explaining that the general-specific 
No.  2020AP1683.pdr 
 
5 
 
canon applies 
to statutory construction "when conflicting 
provisions simply cannot be reconciled").  
¶34 Statutory history is central to a plain meaning 
analysis.  As we have explained, a "review of statutory history 
is part of a plain meaning analysis" because it is part of the 
context in which we interpret statutory terms.  Richards v. 
Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 
N.W.2d 581; see also Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶52 n.9 (citing 
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 
103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 430 (1989)). 
2.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 77.52(2)(a)10. and 77.54(5)(a)3. 
¶35 2013 Wis. Act 185 enacted two statutes that are 
relevant here:  Wis. Stat. §§ 77.52(2)(a)10. and 77.54(5)(a)3.  
As enacted, § 77.52(2)(a)10. provides in relevant part:   
For the privilege of selling, licensing, performing or 
furnishing 
the 
services 
described 
under 
par. 
(a) . . . . 
(a)  The tax imposed herein applies to the 
following types of services: 
. . . .   
10.  Except for the repair, service, alteration, 
fitting, 
cleaning, 
painting, 
coating, 
towing, 
inspection, 
and 
maintenance 
of 
any 
aircraft 
or 
aircraft parts; 
Section 77.52(2)(a)10. is broadly stated.  The statute applies 
to "any aircraft or aircraft parts."  (Emphasis added.)  There 
is no statutory limitation on the statute's use that refers to 
whether the "selling, licensing, performing or furnishing" of 
aircraft parts or services are set out in a written agreement or 
performed without a written agreement.  There is no limitation 
No.  2020AP1683.pdr 
 
6 
 
on whether the person responsible for that financial obligation 
pays the vendor directly or pays another who has paid the vendor 
on that person's behalf.   
¶36 Wisconsin Stat. § 77.54 is not a newcomer to Wisconsin 
statutes.  It sets out "General exemptions" from state sales 
tax.  Section 77.54's exemptions are many and diverse, ranging 
from tractors and machines, § 77.54(3)(a), to the sales price 
for tickets to elementary and secondary school activities, 
§ 77.54(9), to the sales price of ballet and tap shoes, 
§ 77.54(67)(a)12.a.  
¶37 2013 Wis. Act 185 added a relevant exemption to the 
many-faceted exemptions of Wis. Stat. § 77.54 with the enactment 
of 
§ 77.54(5)(a)3. 
 
The 
amended 
statute 
provides 
a 
new 
exemption: 
The sales price from the sale of and the storage, use 
or other consumption of; 
. . . . 
3.  Parts used to modify or repair aircraft. 
It exempts the "sales price" of aircraft parts from sales taxes, 
just as § 77.54(67)(a)12.a. exempts the sales price of ballet 
and tap shoes from sales taxes.  Nothing in § 77.54(5)(a)3. 
limits its exemption when the obligation to pay for aircraft 
parts is set out in written agreements.  Once again, just as the 
legislature has done for the myriad of exemptions contained 
within § 77.54, the legislature granted a broad exemption for 
the sales price of aircraft parts.   
¶38 In the dispute before us, the plain meaning of the 
words 
the 
legislature 
chose 
when 
it 
enacted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
No.  2020AP1683.pdr 
 
7 
 
§§ 77.52(2)(a)10. 
and 
77.54(5)(a)3. 
describe 
both 
specific 
exemptions from sales taxes for the repair and maintenance of 
aircraft and general exemptions from sales tax for the "sales 
price" of aircraft parts used to modify or repair an aircraft.   
¶39 Prior 
to 
the 
above-described 
statutory 
changes, 
aircraft parts and maintenance were not exempt from state sales 
tax, unless the aircraft was used by "certified or licensed 
carriers of persons or property in interstate or foreign 
commerce," Wis. Stat. § 77.54(5)(a)1., or the aircraft and 
attachments to aircraft were "sold to persons who are not 
residents of this state and who will not use such aircraft in 
this state," § 77.54(5)(a)2.1  Clearly, the legislature knew how 
to limit exemptions from sales tax for aircraft if it chose to 
do 
so. 
 
However, 
in 
the 
enactment 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 77.52(2)(a)10. and 77.54(5)(a)3., the legislature chose to 
provide the exemption for the "sales price" of "any aircraft or 
aircraft parts."  (Emphasis added.)  Accordingly, applying the 
plain meaning of the words the legislature chose, I conclude 
§§ 77.52(2)(a)10. 
and 
77.54(5)(a)3. 
grant 
exemptions 
that 
Citation Partners seeks.   
                                                 
1 2013 Wis. Act 185 repealed Wis. Stat. § 77.54(5)(a) and 
renumbered the statute as Wis. Stat. §§ 77.54(5)(a)1. and 
77.54(5)(a)2.  Act 185 did not change the quoted language. 
No.  2020AP1683.pdr 
 
8 
 
3.  TAC Decision 
¶40 As required, I review the TAC decision, beginning with 
its factual statements.  In reviewing TAC findings of fact, we 
apply the "'substantial evidence' standard."  Hilton ex rel. 
Pages Homeowners' Ass'n v. DNR, 2006 WI 84, ¶16, 293 Wis. 2d 1, 
717 N.W.2d 166 (citations omitted).  Wisconsin Stat. § 227.57(6) 
requires us to set aside or remand an agency action "if the 
agency's decision depends on any finding of fact not supported 
by substantial evidence in the record."2  Id.   
¶41 The test is based on the evidence of record, and 
whether reasonable minds would conclude that there are material 
factual 
findings 
that 
underlie 
TAC's 
erroneous 
legal 
conclusions.  Id.  In this matter, we are concerned about how 
TAC's factual findings affected its decision not to apply Wis. 
Stat. §§ 77.52(2)(a)10. and 77.54(5)(a)3. to the transaction 
under review here.  As explained below, I conclude that the 
TAC's 
material 
factual 
findings 
that 
underlie 
its 
legal 
conclusion are not supported by substantial evidence, and 
therefore, TAC's decision must be set aside.   
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.57(6) provides:  "The court shall, 
however, set aside agency action or remand the case to the 
agency if it finds that the agency's action depends on any 
finding of fact that is not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record."   
Wisconsin Stat. § 73.015(2) provides that "[a]ny adverse 
determination of the tax appeals commission is subject to review 
in the manner provided in [Wis. Stat.] ch. 227."   
No.  2020AP1683.pdr 
 
9 
 
a.  Factual Errors 
¶42 TAC appears to misread the relevant Side Agreements 
that are in the record.  In one of TAC's errors, it says:  
Below the hourly fee descriptions, the Side 
Agreement clarifies the parties' responsibilities for 
expenses.  The Lessor's list includes scheduled and 
unscheduled maintenance.  The Lessee's list does not 
include any maintenance related expenses.[3]   
This TAC statement is completely incorrect. 
¶43 The relevant Side Agreement, dated January 1, 2015, 
says the opposite of what TAC finds.  The Side Agreement 
actually provides:   
Lessee will be responsible for fixed and indirect 
operating expenses and charges attributable to the 
operation and maintenance of the Aircraft.  These 
expenses and costs include, but are not limited 
to: . . . Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance.[4]  
¶44 The TAC's factual inaccuracy leads it to incorrect 
legal conclusions.  TAC errs when it ignores the plain 
statements in the Side Agreement and says: 
The Dry Lease, with its Side Agreement, does not 
confer a responsibility for maintenance on the Lessee.  
To the contrary, it is the Lessor who is expressly 
responsible for the repairs and maintenance.  Because 
the 
Lessees 
are 
not 
obligated 
to 
maintain 
the 
aircraft, they are not reimbursing the Lessor for 
something paid on their behalf.[5]   
As the quote above from Record 6-35 shows, under the Side 
Agreement, the lessees are obligated to pay for repairs and 
                                                 
3 TAC decision, R. 22-13 (emphasis added). 
4 R. 6-35 (P. App 0053) (emphasis added). 
5 R. 22-15. 
No.  2020AP1683.pdr 
 
10 
 
maintenance of the aircraft.  Therefore, Citation Partners is 
being reimbursed under the Side Agreement for obligations of the 
lessees that it paid on their behalves.   
¶45 In addition to its misreading of record exhibits, the 
TAC ignores the Stipulation of Facts that the parties jointly 
submitted.6  That stipulation in paragraph 3 states, "the Side 
Agreements and invoices to lessees expressly provided for dollar 
for dollar reimbursement by each of the lessees of the Aircraft 
of both engine maintenance cost and Aircraft maintenance cost."7  
Notwithstanding that factual stipulation the TAC says, 
That starting point, reimbursement, presupposes 
that each Lessee was obligated to pay for repair and 
maintenance such that the Lessor, in effect, paid the 
expenses on behalf of the Lessees.  That is not what 
happens under these Agreements.[8] 
However, reimbursement from the lessees for expenses that 
Citation Partners paid for the lessees is exactly what the 
parties represented in the Factual Stipulation that they 
provided to TAC, as well as under other record exhibits.   
¶46 Accordingly, TAC's material factual findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence, and they must be set aside 
based on documents in the record and the Stipulation of Facts 
                                                 
6 The majority opinion also ignores the parties' Stipulation 
of Facts that was submitted to and accepted by TAC and is part 
of the record before us.  That Stipulation is critical to 
understanding the facts that drive the matter that is now before 
the court.   
7 R. 9-4 (P. App 0061). 
8 R. 22-14. 
No.  2020AP1683.pdr 
 
11 
 
that the parties provided to the TAC.  Pages Homeowners' Ass'n, 
293 Wis. 2d 1, ¶16. 
b.  Legal Conclusions 
¶47 TAC's legal conclusions are grounded in its erroneous 
factual findings.  As with the majority opinion, the TAC does 
not interpret the statutes that are at issue here.  Instead, it 
interprets Wis. Stat. § 77.51(15b)(a), which does not mention 
aircraft maintenance, aircraft parts or aircraft in any regard.9  
Nevertheless, TAC concludes that "expenditures for those repairs 
and maintenance parts and services are not separately exempt 
when incorporated into the lease payments of a subsequent lease 
of the entire Aircraft."10   
¶48 Rather, it is Wis. Stat. § 77.54(5)(a)3. that creates 
an "exemption" for the "sales price" of "[p]arts used to modify 
or repair aircraft," and Wis. Stat. § 77.52(2)(a)10. that sets 
sales of "repair, service, alteration, fitting, cleaning, 
painting, coating, towing, inspection and maintenance of any 
aircraft or aircraft parts" outside the scope of state sales 
taxes.  Nothing in either statute changes those exemptions when 
an aircraft is leased.  Stated otherwise, there is nothing in 
either statute that limits its use when obligations to pay for 
aircraft maintenance and parts are incurred pursuant to written 
documents rather than directly to the vendors.   
                                                 
9 The word "aircraft" also does not appear in Wis. Stat. 
§ 77.52(1)(a), which is relied on by the majority opinion.  
Majority op., ¶10. 
10 TAC decision, R. 22-16 (P. App 0038). 
No.  2020AP1683.pdr 
 
12 
 
¶49 In 
addition, 
a 
plain 
reading 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 77.52(2)(a)10. and 77.54(5)(a)3. cannot be reconciled with 
the 
TAC's 
use 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 77.51(15b)(a). 
 
Sections 
77.52(2)(a)10. and 77.54(5)(a)3. are more specific to the 
dispute before the court than are § 77.51(15b)(a)'s general 
terms.  Therefore, §§ 77.54(5)(a)3. and 77.52(2)(a)10., which 
are more specific in addressing sales taxes on the sales price 
of aircraft services and aircraft parts, control the outcome of 
Citation Partners' claim for state sales tax exemption.  RadLAX 
Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) 
(explaining "it is a commonplace of statutory construction that 
the specific governs the general.").  Furthermore, this canon is 
most 
frequently 
applied 
to 
statutes 
in 
which 
a 
general 
prohibition is contradicted by a specific permission, just as we 
have here.  Id.; see also Scalia, Reading Law, at 183.  TAC's 
legal conclusion is based on its interpretation of a broad sales 
tax statute and is contrary to the plain meaning of Act 185's 
amendments to sales taxes owed on the sales price for any 
aircraft parts and services that were granted by Act 185.  
Accordingly, TAC's decision must be set aside.11  
¶50 Furthermore, although the plain meaning of the words 
chosen by the legislature for Act 185's enactments clearly grant 
the 
exemption 
Citation 
Partners 
seeks, 
I 
note 
that 
the 
Legislative Council Act Memo describes comprehensive use of Act 
185's provisions: 
                                                 
11 The majority opinion does not review TAC's decision, 
either as to the facts TAC found or the reasoning underlying 
TAC's legal conclusion.   
No.  2020AP1683.pdr 
 
13 
 
2013 Wisconsin Act 185 adds a comprehensive exemption 
for aircraft parts to the list of aviation-related 
sales and use tax exemptions under existing law, 
described above.  Under the Act, sales of aircraft 
parts are exempt from sales and use tax regardless of 
how the aircraft is used.  The Act also creates a 
sales and use tax exemption for the repair and 
maintenance of any aircraft and aircraft parts. 
Although legislative history is not part of a plain meaning 
statutory analysis, we have used it to confirm a plain meaning 
interpretation, as I do here.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶51 I 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 77.52(2)(a)10. 
and 
77.54(5)(a)3., the statutes relevant to Citation Partners' 
claim.  The plain meaning of those statutes grants Citation 
Partners the sales tax exemption it seeks.  Because the majority 
opinion chooses to follow the error-strewn path of the TAC, 
which contravenes clear statutory direction to exempt the sales 
price of aircraft parts and aircraft maintenance from state 
sales taxes, I respectfully dissent. 
¶52 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this 
dissent. 
 
No.  2020AP1683.pdr 
 
 
 
1