Title: Ronald Cote v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-1327
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: August 30, 2001

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-1327
____________
RONALD COTE,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[August 30, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Cote v. State, 760 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000),
which expressly and directly conflicts with N.T. v. State, 682 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1996).  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  We quash Cote,
approve N.T., and hold that a juvenile may not be punished by both criminal
contempt and for a violation of community control based upon the same underlying
conduct.  
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THE CASE BELOW
The Second District in Cote reflects the proceedings to date:
While a juvenile, Mr. Cote entered a plea to a felony in case
number 97-670, a case in which he was exposed to adult sanctions. 
Rather than imposing adult penalties, the trial court opted for the
juvenile sanction of commitment to a Level 8 facility to be followed by
community control that was not to extend beyond his 19th birthday. 
After Mr. Cote's sentencing hearing on August 26, 1997, a written
order of commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice (to be
followed by aftercare probation) was entered in the felony case on
September 18, 1997.  Erroneously, the juvenile commitment order
indicated that it was entered in the juvenile division and reflected that
Mr. Cote had entered a plea to a juvenile petition rather than to a
felony information in felony division.
Subsequently, Mr. Cote was brought before the juvenile court
judge for a contempt citation arising out of violations of his
community control order.  The juvenile judge indicated that the
enforcement of Mr. Cote's juvenile sentence had been referred to the
juvenile division of circuit court.  Thus, upon a plea to the violations,
Mr. Cote was held in indirect criminal contempt and was sentenced to
serve a period of time in juvenile detention.  Later, in this unique
factual scenario, Mr. Cote was brought before the original felony
division sentencing judge for violations of his community control
order.  The violations cited by the State were identical to those
considered by the juvenile court judge.  Mr. Cote argued that the
violation hearing was prohibited by double jeopardy.  The motion was
denied and, upon plea, the court revoked the juvenile community
control, withheld adjudication of guilt, and imposed a downward
departure sentence of six years in prison, which was suspended on the
condition that he successfully complete two years of community
control followed by five years on probation.
Cote, 760 So. 2d at 163.  On appeal, Cote renewed his contention that the
subsequent proceeding in the felony division violated double jeopardy principles. 
1See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
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The Second District rejected his appeal and concluded that the juvenile division of
the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to invoke contempt sanctions, and hence
its prosecution for criminal contempt was void.  Judge Fulmer disagreed with this
analysis and dissented.
N.T. v. State
In N.T., the child was placed on community control for the commission of
grand theft.  When N.T. violated the conditions of a second community control
order, he was successfully prosecuted both for a violation of community control
and for indirect criminal contempt.  
On appeal, the issue was framed as “whether N.T.’s prosecution for both
violation of community control and indirect criminal contempt violated his
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.”  N.T., 682 So. 2d at 689.  The
Fifth District agreed with N.T. and, applying the “same elements” test,1 the court
explained that where two prosecutions are based on the same conduct and the
prosecutions contain the same elements, double jeopardy bars the successive
prosecution.  Citing State v. Woodland, 602 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), and
other cases, the Fifth District found the contempt charge to have been subsumed
within the violation of community control, thus precluding an additional prosecution
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for criminal contempt.  See id. at 689-90. 
ANALYSIS
The State contends that the holding in N.T. should be distinguished from the
circumstances presented in Cote because only one division of the circuit court was
involved in N.T. whereas in Cote two distinct divisions prosecuted the juvenile for
his conduct, and the juvenile division lacked jurisdiction when it punished him for
criminal contempt.  We disagree.  Rather, we agree with the analysis set out in
Judge Fulmer’s dissent explaining that in both instances the court was operating
with circuit court jurisdiction.  
As analyzed in the dissenting opinion below, this Court has decided related
cases involving similar circumstances.  See State v. Griffith, 675 So. 2d 911 (Fla.
1996); King v. State, 426 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1982).  In those cases we held a
proceeding in the juvenile division is merely voidable, not void, for purposes of
adjudication of a juvenile who was direct-filed but upon whom juvenile sanctions
were imposed.  Judge Fulmer explained the effect of those decisions:
In Griffith, the district court reversed the conviction of a
defendant who was prosecuted in the criminal division of the circuit
court for offenses that occurred when the defendant was under the age
of sixteen.  The district court's reversal was based on a finding that the
criminal division lacked jurisdiction.  The supreme court reversed the
district court and began its discussion by acknowledging that the
Juvenile Justice Act vests the juvenile division with exclusive
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jurisdiction over all proceedings in which a child allegedly violates the
law unless juvenile jurisdiction is waived or a statutory exception
applies.  However, the court concluded that there was "no
jurisdictional problem" that required reversal because "the juvenile
court and the criminal court are both divisions of the circuit court."
675 So. 2d at 913.  It cited to State v. King, 426 So. 2d 12 (Fla.
1982), as a case directly on point.
In King, a juvenile was indicted, tried as an adult, and convicted
for crimes that were not punishable by death or life imprisonment. 
The juvenile appealed his conviction, asserting that he could not be
charged by indictment and tried as an adult under the provisions of
chapter 39, Florida Statutes (1981).  The district court of appeal
agreed and reversed.  The supreme court held that a juvenile charged
with an offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment has a
right not to be charged by indictment under Article I, § 15(b) of the
Florida Constitution.  Nevertheless, the supreme court reversed the
decision of the district court because the juvenile failed to object in the
trial court and, the supreme court concluded, thereby waived his right
not to be charged and tried by indictment.
The supreme court then addressed another question in King that
has particular significance to this case and which underscores my
dissent.  Because the juvenile in King asserted his right not to be tried
by indictment for the first time on appeal, the supreme court had to
consider whether the error was a fundamental error affecting the
court's jurisdiction and thereby rendering the judgment void.  The
court answered this question by first noting the distinction between
judgments that are void and those that are voidable, pointing out that
"[o]bjections to a void judgment can be raised at any time, whereas
objections to a voidable judgment must be timely made . . .  If a court
has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, the proceeding
is not a nullity and the judgment is not void."  426 So. 2d at 14.  The
court then concluded that, in the case before it, the trial court had
jurisdiction of the subject matter because it was a circuit court which
has jurisdiction of all felonies and that any objection King had to
jurisdiction over his person was waived by his personal appearance.
The case before us is the reverse of the scenarios in Griffith and
King, but the same rules should apply.  When Mr. Cote was
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prosecuted for violating his juvenile sanctions, the proceeding,
arguably, should have been conducted in the felony division, not the
juvenile division.  However, both the juvenile division judge and the
felony division judge are circuit judges, and it is the circuit court that
has subject matter jurisdiction over felony proceedings.  Therefore, I
conclude that the juvenile court judgment of contempt and sentence
are not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  They may very
well be voidable, in which case a timely objection is required.  But,
unlike Griffith and King, in this case, the State, not the defendant,
seeks to set aside the voidable judgment. In Griffith and King, there
was a single prosecution and conviction and it was the defendant who
was seeking to overturn the conviction.  That is not the case before us. 
What Mr. Cote seeks to set aside here is the second prosecution and
second sanction imposed on him for a single offense, which are both
contrary to the protections promised by the Double Jeopardy Clause,
under which Mr. Cote timely asserted his right in the trial court.
Cote, 760 So. 2d at 166-67 (Fulmer, Acting C. J., dissenting).  We agree with and
adopt as our own Judge Fulmer’s analysis.
The circuit court has jurisdiction to hear both juvenile and felony cases. 
Therefore, it is a party’s responsibility, whether it be the State or a child, to object
to a proceeding which the contestant asserts should occur in a different division
(i.e., juvenile or felony).  As shown in King, we have held that a juvenile who failed
to object to being tried as an adult in the felony division could not complain on
appeal about the impropriety of the felony division.  Likewise, as a matter of
fairness, as well as adherence to double jeopardy principles, we hold that the State
may not participate in a proceeding in one division of court without protesting its
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impropriety and then later complain that the proceeding should not have taken place
in that division.  Here the State did exactly that when it participated in the juvenile
proceeding without objection, and then subsequently contended, in the felony
division, that the juvenile proceedings were actually void.  In the meantime, of
course, Cote had already been adjudicated and punished for criminal contempt. 
Having been once punished for his misconduct, Cote could not be punished again
without violating the constitutional bar against double jeopardy.
We find the juvenile contempt proceeding to have been at most voidable, not
void.  As such, jeopardy attached once the State participated without objection to
the criminal contempt proceeding against Cote, and the court adjudicated Cote in
criminal contempt and imposed sanctions.  Consistent with the Fifth District’s
analysis and holding in N.T., which we approve, Cote could not be punished for
violation of community control on the exact same facts. 
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we approve N.T., quash the Second
District’s decision below and remand the case for proceedings consistent herewith. 
 
It is so ordered.
SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which HARDING, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
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WELLS, C.J., dissenting.
I dissent because I conclude that there is no conflict jurisdiction between this
case and N.T. v. State, 682 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).  As stated by the
Second District Court of Appeal’s majority, this case arises out of a unique factual
situation, which is not the same as the situation presented to the Fifth District in
N.T..  In view of there being no conflict, I would discharge this case.
HARDING, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Second District - Case No. 2D98-4438 
(Manatee County)
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Richard P. Albertine, Jr., Assistant
Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Robert J. Krauss, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Chief of Criminal Law, and Timothy A. Freeland, Assistant
Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Respondent