Title: Halterman v. Radisson Hotel Corp.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 990311
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 14, 2000

Present:  All the Justices 
 
JOHN D. HALTERMAN, JR. 
 
v.  Record No. 990311   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
January 14, 2000 
RADISSON HOTEL CORPORATION, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
John E. Kloch, Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in striking the plaintiff's evidence on a claim of negligence 
per se. 
 
John D. Halterman, Jr., filed an amended motion for 
judgment against Radisson Hotel Corporation, Mark Center Hotel 
Limited Partnership, and Radisson Mark Plaza Joint Venture 
(collectively, Radisson), the owners and operators of the 
Radisson Plaza Hotel at Mark Center (the hotel) in Alexandria.  
He alleged that he was injured when he was exposed to hazardous 
chemicals while repairing washing machines in the hotel's 
laundry room. 
 
In Count I, Halterman alleged that Radisson was guilty of 
negligence per se because it violated a federal regulation 
promulgated under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 
29 U.S.C. §§ 651 through -678.  The regulation, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1910.1200(e), known as the Hazard Communication Standard (HCS 
regulation), requires, among other things, that employers 
implement a written hazard communication program to provide 
specified information to certain employees concerning hazardous 
chemicals used at the employer's work sites.  This regulation 
provides, in material part: 
(e) Written hazard communication program.  (1) 
Employers shall develop, implement, and maintain at 
each workplace, a written hazard communication program 
which . . . includes the following: 
 
(i) A list of the hazardous chemicals known to be 
present using an identity that is referenced on the 
appropriate material safety data sheet (the list may 
be compiled for the workplace as a whole or for 
individual work areas); . . . 
 
(ii) The methods the employer will use to inform 
employees of the hazards of non-routine tasks . . . 
   (2) Multi-employer workplaces.  Employers who 
produce, use, or store hazardous chemicals at a 
workplace in such a way that the employees of other 
employer(s) may be exposed (for example, employees of 
a construction contractor working on-site) shall 
additionally ensure that the hazard communications 
programs developed and implemented under this 
paragraph (e) include the following: 
 
(i) The methods the employer will use to provide 
the other employer(s) on-site access to material 
safety data sheets for each hazardous chemical the 
other employer(s)' employees may be exposed to while 
working; 
 
(ii) The methods the employer will use to inform 
the other employer(s) of any precautionary measures 
that need to be taken to protect employees during the 
workplace's normal operating conditions and in 
foreseeable emergencies; and 
 
(iii) The methods the employer will use to inform 
the other employer(s) of the labeling system used in 
the workplace. 
   (3) The employer may rely on an existing hazard 
communication program to comply with these 
requirements, provided that it meets the criteria 
established in this paragraph (e). 
 
 
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Halterman asserted that Radisson violated the HCS regulation "by 
failing in all respects to provide information to him about any 
chemicals known to be present in the laundry room in such a 
manner that he may be exposed to them while doing the repair 
work or in a foreseeable emergency." 
 
In Count II, Halterman asserted a simple negligence claim.  
He alleged that Radisson failed to maintain the hotel laundry 
room in a reasonably safe condition and failed to warn him of 
the hazards posed by chemicals contained in laundry products 
used in the laundry room. 
 
The following evidence was presented in a jury trial.  In 
March 1995, John Hieatt, the hotel's chief engineer, contacted 
H & H Machine Company (H & H) to arrange for the repair of a 
washing machine in the hotel's laundry room that had developed 
cracks around its stainless steel door hinges.  H & H sent 
Halterman, a certified welder, and Robert Lankford, another 
employee, to the hotel to perform the work.  After Halterman 
arrived at the work site, Hieatt directed him to repair an 
additional washing machine that had similar cracks. 
 
Halterman employed a welding process using tungsten inert 
gas to repair the cracks.  During this welding process, heat is 
generated by electricity and conducted through a noncombustible 
tungsten electrode to melt stainless steel filler rods and form 
a weld.  The repair work took several hours to complete, and 
 
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Halterman spent about 30 to 45 minutes of that time welding the 
cracks in the doors of the machines. 
 
The hotel maintained a display unit on the wall of the 
laundry room, which contained material safety data sheets for 
all the laundry products used by the hotel.  These sheets 
contained information about hazardous components in the products 
and included warnings and instructions about the proper use of 
the products, protective measures to follow, and first aid 
procedures to employ in the event of improper exposure. 
 
One of the products that the hotel used in the laundry room 
was a laundry sour known as Liquid Lusterfixe.  A material 
safety data sheet in the display unit noted that Liquid 
Lusterfixe contained a 15% to 40% concentration of 
hydrofluosilicic acid, and that this acid was a "hazardous 
component." 
 
The display unit for the material safety data sheets was 
located ten feet to the left of the door through which Halterman 
entered the laundry room.  To reach the washing machines, 
Halterman was required to turn to his right after passing 
through the door.  Hieatt did not point out the display unit to 
Halterman or otherwise advise him about hazardous chemicals used 
in the laundry room. 
 
Halterman testified that he was in good health when he 
arrived at the hotel but, before leaving the premises, he had 
 
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developed a cough.  During the remainder of the day and the 
following night, Halterman's cough worsened and he developed 
shortness of breath. 
 
Dr. Mohammad Taleghani, a pulmonary disease specialist who 
treated Halterman, testified that Halterman contracted acute 
chemical pneumonitis as a result of being exposed to Liquid 
Lusterfixe.  Dr. Taleghani explained that Halterman's 
pneumonitis eventually "resolved itself" into a condition known 
as interstitial fibrosis, or scarring of the lung tissue.  Dr. 
Taleghani further stated that, as a result of the fibrosis, 
Halterman lost about one-third of his vital lung capacity. 
 
Dr. Laura Welch, an occupational medicine specialist, 
testified that in her opinion, Halterman's lungs were injured 
when the welding process heated the hydrofluosilicic acid 
contained in the Liquid Lusterfixe residue that had accumulated 
in the cracks around the washing machines' hinges.  She stated 
that this heat "acted on" the hydrofluosilicic acid "to create" 
a gas of hydrogen fluoride or another fluorine-based compound, 
which are toxins known to cause pneumonitis. 
 
At the conclusion of Halterman's evidence, the trial court 
granted Radisson's motion to strike Halterman's evidence on 
Count I, the claim of negligence per se.  The court ruled that 
Halterman was not within the class of persons that the HCS 
regulation was intended to protect.  The court then denied 
 
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Radisson's motion to strike Halterman's evidence on Count II, 
the simple negligence claim. 
 
After Radisson presented testimony and rested its case, the 
trial court denied Radisson's renewed motion to strike 
Halterman's evidence on the simple negligence claim.  The court 
also refused Halterman's proposed jury instruction no. 14, which 
contained the definition of the term "hazardous chemical" used 
in the HCS regulation, and proposed instruction no. 15, which 
stated the duties imposed by the HCS regulation on an employer 
at a "multi-employer workplace."  The jury returned a verdict in 
favor of Radisson on the simple negligence claim and the trial 
court entered final judgment in accordance with the jury 
verdict. 
 
On appeal, Halterman contends, among other things, that 
Radisson violated the HCS regulation by failing "to ensure that 
the hazards of Liquid Lusterfixe, plainly set out in its 
material safety data sheet, were communicated to [him]."  He 
asserts that the "multi-employer workplaces" provision of the 
HCS regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(e)(2), imposed this duty 
on Radisson, and that Radisson's violation of that provision 
entitled him to assert a claim of negligence per se against 
Radisson for the injuries he sustained.  We disagree with 
Halterman's arguments. 
 
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The requirements for proving a claim of negligence per se 
are well established.  First, a plaintiff must establish that 
the defendant violated a statute that was enacted for public 
safety.1  MacCoy v. Colony House Builders, Inc., 239 Va. 64, 69, 
387 S.E.2d 760, 763 (1990); Virginia Elec. and Power Co. v. 
Savoy Const. Co., 224 Va. 36, 45, 294 S.E.2d 811, 817 (1982).  
Second, the plaintiff must prove that he belongs to the class of 
persons for whose benefit the statute was enacted, and that the 
harm that occurred was of the type against which the statute was 
designed to protect.  Williamson v. The Old Brogue, Inc., 232 
Va. 350, 355, 350 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1986); Pearson v. Canada 
Contracting Co., 232 Va. 177, 186, 349 S.E.2d 106, 112 (1986); 
Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 224 Va. at 45, 294 S.E.2d at 817.  
Third, the plaintiff must prove that the statutory violation was 
a proximate cause of his injury.  Thomas v. Settle, 247 Va. 15, 
20, 439 S.E.2d 360, 363 (1994); Hack v. Nester, 241 Va. 499, 
503-04, 404 S.E.2d 42, 43 (1990); Pullen v. Nickens, 226 Va. 
342, 349, 310 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1983). 
 
We first consider whether Halterman proved that Radisson 
violated the HCS regulation.  Since the trial court struck 
                     
 
1We note that Radisson does not argue that an OSHA 
regulation is not the equivalent of a statute enacted for public 
safety for purposes of establishing a claim of negligence per 
se.  Thus, in resolving the issues raised in this appeal we will 
assume, without deciding, that the violation of an OSHA 
 
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Halterman's evidence, we will review the evidence and the 
inferences reasonably raised by the evidence in the light most 
favorable to him.  Claycomb v. Didawick, 256 Va. 332, 335, 505 
S.E.2d 202, 204 (1998); A.H. v. Rockingham Pub. Co., 255 Va. 
216, 219, 495 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1998). 
 
In deciding this issue, we need not determine whether 
Halterman, a repairman sent to the workplace by his employer, 
was within the class of persons that the "multi-employer 
workplaces" provision of the regulation was intended to protect.  
Even if Halterman was within this class of persons, his evidence 
failed to show that Radisson violated any requirements imposed 
by that provision. 
 
At trial, Halterman did not present any evidence that the 
material safety data sheets Radisson maintained at its workplace 
lacked sufficient warnings about the hazardous chemicals 
contained in Liquid Lusterfixe or the potential consequences of 
exposure to those chemicals.  Instead, he based his claim of 
negligence per se solely on Radisson's violation of an alleged 
requirement in the "multi-employer workplaces" provision to 
provide this information about the chemicals directly to him, or 
to show him the location of the material safety data sheets in 
the laundry room. 
                                                                  
regulation is the equivalent of such a statutory violation in 
asserting this type of claim. 
 
8
 
The provisions of the HCS regulation apply to "any chemical 
which is known to be present in the workplace in such a manner 
that employees may be exposed under normal conditions of use or 
in a foreseeable emergency."  29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(b)(2).  The 
HCS regulation required Radisson, among other things, to provide 
the required information at its workplace to its own employees.  
See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(e)(1).  Under the "multi-employer 
workplaces" provision of the HCS regulation, Radisson also was 
responsible for providing information about its hazard 
communications program to the employer(s) of other employees 
working at the same work site.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(e)(2). 
The required information included, among other things, the 
"methods the employer will use to provide the other employer(s) 
on-site access to material safety data sheets for each hazardous 
chemical the other employer(s)' employees may be exposed to 
while working."  29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(e)(2)(i)(emphasis added). 
 
The plain language of this provision did not obligate 
Radisson to communicate information about the chemicals in use 
in the laundry room directly to Halterman, the employee of 
another employer, but only obligated Radisson to communicate or 
to make available any required information to Halterman's 
employer, H & H. 
 
The record contains no evidence that Radisson failed to 
provide to H & H any information required under the HCS 
 
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regulation.  Thus, we hold that Halterman failed to prove that 
Radisson violated the HCS regulation, and we conclude that the 
trial court did not err in striking Count I of the amended 
motion for judgment.  Since the trial court reached the correct 
result for reasons not stated in its ruling, we will uphold that 
result.2  First Sec. Federal Sav. Bank, Inc. v. McQuilken, 253 
Va. 110, 115, 480 S.E.2d 485, 488 (1997); see Robbins v. Grimes, 
211 Va. 97, 100, 175 S.E.2d 246, 248 (1970). 
 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we will affirm the 
trial court's judgment. 
Affirmed.
                     
 
2Because the trial court properly struck the evidence on 
Count I, we also conclude that the court did not err in refusing 
proposed jury instructions nos. 14 and 15, which were based on 
the HCS regulation. 
 
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