Title: Anker v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 552, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 31, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DANIEL J. ANKER, 
 
 
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No. 552, 2005 
 
Defendant Below-   
 
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Appellant,  
 
 
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Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
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of the State of Delaware in and 
 
 
 
 
 
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for New Castle County 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
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§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
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ID # 0402010394 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
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Appellee. 
 
 
 
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Submitted:  August 21, 2006 
   Decided:  October 31, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
(1)  
Defendant-Appellant Daniel J. Anker appeals his convictions in 
Superior Court of nine counts of Felony Theft and one count of Conspiracy Second 
Degree.  At the time of the alleged crimes, Anker was an attorney who conducted 
residential real estate closings, including refinancing of mortgages.  The charges 
concerned his alleged misappropriation of funds from his client escrow account.   
(2)  
In this appeal, Anker claims that the Superior Court committed 
reversible error in four ways.  First, Anker contends that the Superior Court should 
not have admitted evidence that the victims’ mortgages were “paid off” by the 
Delaware Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection.  Second, Anker claims that 
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evidence of prior wrongs or acts was admitted in contravention of D.R.E. 404(b).  
Third, he claims that evidence relating to the impact of the crime on the victims 
should have been excluded.  Finally, Anker claims that the exclusion of the two 
defense expert witnesses constitutes reversible error.  We find no merit to his 
arguments and affirm. 
 
(3)  
Anker was a real estate lawyer practicing in Delaware as a solo 
practitioner.  During the relevant times in this case, his daughter, Laura Larks, was 
his sole employee.  Each of the alleged nine acts of theft was similar.  Anker would 
represent the individual at the real estate closing.1  In the refinancing closings, 
Anker did not apply the money deposited into his escrow account by the new 
mortgagee to satisfy the existing mortgages.  In the two situations where Anker 
represented the seller, he did not apply the money deposited by the buyer to pay off 
the seller’s mortgage.  In the one situation where Anker represented the buyer, 
Anker did not pay the money to the seller’s mortgagee.  
 
(4)  
When the clients realized that the money was not paid to satisfy the 
mortgages, they contacted Anker’s office.  Although slightly different events 
transpired for each client, generally, Larks would tell them that it was the bank’s 
fault.  In some situations, Larks and/or Anker told the client that the bank offered 
                                          
 
1 Six of the real estate closings involved refinancing.  In two of the closings, Anker represented 
the seller and in one closing Anker represented the buyer. 
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the client a settlement for the mix up.  In one case, the settlement was as high as 
$700,000.  After the jury convicted Anker of the nine counts of Felony Theft and 
Conspiracy, he was sentenced to five years in jail and ordered to pay $554,046 in 
restitution.  This appeal followed. 
(5)  
We review all the evidentiary claims for plain error.  We review the 
trial judge’s exclusion of the defense experts for abuse of discretion.2 
(6)  
Anker’s first claim of error stems from testimony from five of the nine 
victims that the Lawyer’s Fund for Client Protection (“Lawyer’s Fund”) “paid off” 
their unpaid mortgages.  Anker did not object to these statements when they were 
made at trial.  Anker now argues that the testimony confused the jury into 
believing that Anker was previously adjudged guilty from another tribunal, namely 
the Lawyer’s Fund.  He argues that the evidence should have been excluded as 
unduly prejudicial under D.R.E. 403. 
(7)  
This Court will generally decline to review issues that are not raised 
below and preserved for appeal.3  “Failure to make an objection at trial constitutes 
a waiver of the defendant’s right to raise that issue on appeal, unless the error is 
                                          
 
2 M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 522 (Del. 1999) (“[A]n appellate court 
must apply an abuse of discretion standard when ‘it reviews a trial court’s decision to admit or 
exclude expert testimony.’” (citing General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997))).  
3 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
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plain.”4  Plain error exists when the error is “so clearly prejudicial to substantial 
rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”5  Such errors 
must be apparent on the face of the record and be “so basic, serious and 
fundamental in their character that they clearly deprive an accused of a substantial 
right or show manifest injustice.”6  Moreover, “it is difficult to conclude that the 
judge committed plain error by refusing to bar the admission of the evidence under 
D.R.E. 403.”7   
(8)  
Anker has not shown that the admission of evidence that the Lawyer’s 
Fund paid the mortgages was plain error.  The Lawyer’s Fund is not a tribunal.  
Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to support Anker’s argument that the 
jury equated the payments by the Lawyer’s Fund with his being found guilty of 
any crime.  Rather, evidence that the Lawyer’s Fund paid the mortgages was 
relevant to show that Anker did not pay them with the money entrusted to him. 
(9)  
Anker’s second claim of error is the admission of “bad act” evidence 
in contravention of D.R.E. 404(b).  He claims that three different pieces of 
evidence should have been excluded because of the prohibition of bad act 
evidence.  The first is Anker’s own testimony that he falsely certified to the 
                                          
 
4 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
5 Id. 
6 Hunter v. State, 788 A.2d 131 (Del. 2001) (TABLE). 
7 Id. 
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Delaware Supreme Court that his escrow account was in compliance with the 
Court’s requirements.  The second is testimony that Anker failed to pay his federal 
taxes for several years.  Finally, a defense witness testified that Anker failed to pay 
$211,000 in insurance settlements to his client.   
(10)  Rule 404(b) is not a complete bar to the admission of prior bad acts, 
“so long as [the] evidence has relevance beyond merely showing a character trait.”8  
Each piece of evidence that Anker complains of was relevant.  The evidence 
concerning the certification of his escrow account directly contradicts Anker’s 
defense that his daughter tricked him and stole the money.  The state of Anker’s 
escrow account was directly related to the theft charges.  Evidence that Anker 
wrote two escrow checks to the United States Internal Revenue Service satisfies 
the motive exception to Rule 404(b).  Finally, as the trial judge explained during 
the trial, evidence of the misappropriation of settlement funds was relevant to show 
intent, knowledge or absence of mistake.  Further, the trial judge’s limiting 
instruction with respect to this evidence was consistent with Getz v. State.9  We 
find no merit to his second claim of error. 
(11)  Anker’s third evidentiary claim is that the victims were allowed to 
testify that Anker’s failure to pay off their mortgages damaged their credit.  He 
                                          
 
8 Baumann v. State, 891 A.2d 146, 149 (Del. 2005).    
9 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988). 
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argues that a jury may not consider evidence of the impact of the defendant’s 
conduct on the victim.10  Like the other types of evidence complained of, Anker 
did not object to these statements made during the trial.  Anker has not shown that 
the admission of the evidence affected the outcome of the trial.  The consequence 
of nonpayment of a mortgage on a mortgagor’s credit standing is obvious.  Only 
four of the nine victims testified concerning the effect on their credit.  A less 
favorable credit rating due to the failure to satisfy a mortgage is not the type of 
impact evidence that would infuriate a jury to the point of “manifest injustice.”11  
We find no plain error. 
(12)  Anker’s final claim of error is the exclusion of testimony from two 
psychiatrists about his relationship with Larks, his own personality traits and his 
feelings of guilt about the effect of his separation from his wife and their divorce 
on Larks.  Anker argues that such exclusion denied his constitutional right to 
present a defense to a charge.12  Anker acknowledges that Rule 702 of the 
Delaware Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of expert testimony.13  
                                          
 
10 Appellant’s Opening Br. at 26.  “In a time where the public is exposed, nearly every day, to 
media accounts of the often irreparable harm caused to the credit ratings of victims of economic 
crimes, this evidence, which had no relevance to the issue of guilt, no doubt influenced the jury 
to be prejudiced towards Anker.” 
11 Hunter, 788 A.2d 131. 
12 Appellant’s Opening Br. at 29 
13 D.R.E. 702 provides: 
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
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Under this rule, the trial court has the role of a gatekeeper and must determine if 
the evidence is relevant and reliable.14      
(13)  Anker first offered testimony from Dr. Neil S. Kaye, a forensic 
psychiatrist.  Dr. Kaye was retained specifically for trial as an expert.  He was 
neither Anker’s nor Larks’ treating physician.  Anker’s purpose for calling Dr. 
Kaye as a witness was two-fold.  First, Dr. Kaye would have testified that Anker 
was vulnerable and susceptible to Larks and thus, was unable to see or believe the 
events as they transpired.  Second, Dr. Kay would have testified that Larks’ actions 
were done “out of her anger at her father for the perceived abandonment, and 
would have the added attraction of taking advantage of people who would be most 
malleable because they were friends and family.”  
(14)  The Superior Court, determined that Dr. Kaye’s testimony was not 
admissible under D.R.E. 702 because it did not “assist the jury to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”  The trial judge determined that “[i]t is 
within the common experience of the jury to know motive, hate and the 
vulnerability of a father who, from love or easy understood emotion, may be blind 
                                                                                                                                        
by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has 
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
14 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993); M.G. Bancroporation v. Le 
Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 521-522 (Del. 1999). 
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to what his daughter was about.”15  Additionally, Dr. Kaye did not interview Larks.  
The only information Dr. Kaye had concerning Larks was a prescription found at 
Larks’s home and information he received from Anker.  The proffer also did not 
reveal any diagnosis of Anker.  In the words of the trial judge, the proffer leaves 
one “to guess what the disorder is, [and] how that may relate to the times of the 
charged offenses.”  On the record before us, we find no abuse of discretion in the 
Superior Court’s exclusion of Dr. Kaye’s proffered testimony. 
(15)  Dr. Neal A. Shore treated Anker after the charges were brought 
against him.  The records of his treatment relate to the hospital admissions, an 
adult disorder and depression that resulted from the loss of Anker’s legal practice 
long after the offenses occurred.  The trial judge refused to allow this expert 
testimony of Dr. Shore’s because it was not relevant and because it was 
inadmissible under D.R.E. 403.  The trial judge found that the basic purpose of Dr. 
Shore’s testimony was to say that Anker is credible and Larks is not credible.   The 
trial judge further found that it would be “unfairly prejudicial to put an expert label 
or veneer on evidence which is commonly understood.  A jury would be confused 
by the labeling.”  Based upon the record before us, we find that the Superior Court 
did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered testimony of Dr. Shore.   
                                          
 
15 See U.S. v. Dupre, 339 F.Supp. 2d 534, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“courts should not admit expert 
testimony that is ‘directed solely to lay matters which a jury is capable of understanding and 
deciding without the expert’s help’”). 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice