Title: Commonwealth v. Vaughn
Citation: 326 A.2d 393, 459 Pa. 35
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: October 16, 1974

459 Pa. 35 (1974) 326 A.2d 393 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Charles VAUGHN, Jr., Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted November 8, 1973. Decided October 16, 1974. *36 *37 Harry J. Greenstein, Philadelphia, for appellant. Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., Richard A. Sprague, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Milton M. Stein, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., James Garrett, Asst. Dist. Atty., David Richman, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., Philadelphia, for appellee. Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ. MANDERINO, Justice. The appellant, Charles Vaughn, Jr., pleaded guilty to murder subsequent to a plea bargain in which it was agreed that the crime would rise no higher than murder of the second degree and that the prosecution would recommend a maximum sentence, for whatever verdict, of not less than four nor more than twelve years imprisonment. Following a degree of guilt hearing, the trial court found the appellant guilty of murder in the second degree and imposed the recommended sentence. This appeal followed in which the only issue raised is whether the trial court erred in accepting appellant's guilty plea. The appellant concedes that the trial court "engaged in an extensive formal colloquy with the [appellant] as to his understanding of his plea of guilty and as to whether it was being made voluntarily and intelligently." That colloquy is a matter of record. Three questions, however, are raised about the acceptance of the guilty plea. Appellant first argues that his guilty plea to murder was inconsistent with the established facts. It is true that a guilty plea should not be accepted if the facts do not support the plea. In this case, the appellant argues that his plea was inconsistent with the fact that he did not inflict the fatal stab wound. One need not, however, inflict the fatal blow, to be guilty of murder. See Commonwealth v. Rife, 454 Pa. 506, 312 A.2d 406 (1973); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 449 Pa. 235, 296 A.2d 719 (1972); Commonwealth v. Lowry, 374 Pa. 594, 98 A.2d 733 (1953). Appellant's participation in the events immediately preceding the stabbing was sufficient to establish his guilt even if he did not inflict the fatal blow. The testimony at the trial, as summarized by the appellant, is as follows: The above evidence and the reasonable inferences arising therefrom were sufficient to establish that the appellant was guilty of murder even though another struck the fatal blow. When there is evidence that one, who has not struck the fatal blow, has, nonetheless, shared in the criminal intent and the criminal activity, that person has aided and abetted in the commission of *40 the crime and, thus, may be held responsible as an accomplice to another's acts and the consequences of those acts. Commonwealth v. Rife, 454 Pa. 506, 312 A.2d 406 (1973); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 449 Pa. 235, 296 A.2d 719 (1972); Commonwealth v. Lowry, 374 Pa. 594, 98 A.2d 733 (1953). "The least degree of concert or collusion between parties to an illegal transaction makes the act of one the act of all." Commonwealth v. Strantz, 328 Pa. 33, 40, 195 A. 75, 79 (1937). We thus, cannot agree with the appellant's contention that facts were asserted at the time of the guilty plea which were inconsistent with that plea. Commonwealth v. Roundtree, 440 Pa. 199, 269 A.2d 709 (1970), cited by appellant, is therefore not applicable to this case. Appellant next argues he was not properly advised by his attorney. This claim is based on the following portion of the record colloquy: *41 The above portion of the colloquy, which is quoted by the appellant, however, must be viewed in the context of that which immediately follows: Moreover, a reading of the entire colloquy, which appellant has correctly described as extensive, leaves no doubt that the appellant was properly and fully advised. The last issue raised is whether the appellant was "intellectually capable of comprehending the significance of his plea of guilty." A plea of guilty must be made with an understanding of the nature of the *42 charges, the rights to which one is entitled, and the consequences of waiving those rights by the entering of a guilty plea. Commonwealth v. Enty, 442 Pa. 39, 271 A.2d 926, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 913, 91 S. Ct. 1396, 28 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1971). Although there is evidence in the record that the appellant, who went to the eighth grade, was poorly educated and was described in a pre-sentence psychiatric evaluation report as "a schizoid personality disorder with a dissocial life style," a review of the extensive colloquy conducted at the time of the plea satisfies us that the trial court properly concluded that the appellant understood the nature of the charges, the plea proceedings being conducted, his rights and the consequences of waiving his rights by entering the guilty plea. The appellant's answers during the colloquy were responsive and intelligent. The trial court, after observing the appellant's demeanor, disposition, and ability to respond to questions, specifically concluded that the appellant was knowingly and intelligently entering his plea of guilty. We find no error in that conclusion. Judgment of sentence affirmed.