Title: State v. Dragon
Citation: 310 A.2d 24
Docket Number: 36-72
State: Vermont
Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court
Date: October 2, 1973

310 A.2d 24 (1973) STATE of Vermont v. Robert E. DRAGON, Jr. No. 36-72. Supreme Court of Vermont, Windsor. October 2, 1973. Paul F. Hudson, State's Atty., for the State. Glover &amp; Fink, Ludlow, for defendant. *25 Before SHANGRAW, C. J., and BARNEY, SMITH, KEYSER and DALEY, JJ. SMITH, Justice. During the course of a jury trial of the defendant in the District Court of Vermont, Unit No. 6, Windsor Circuit, on January 26, 1971, the lower court found the defendant in contempt of court, after dismissing the jury. The defendant was sentenced from 0 to 3 months in the Vermont State Prison, this sentence to run consecutive to any sentences the defendant was serving: (1) a sentence of from 2 to 7 years, consecutive to sentences imposed prior to its imposition on May 29, 1971; (2) a sentence of from 0 to 10 years concurrent to any sentences existing at the time of imposition in June, 1971; and (3) a sentence of from 6 to 24 months, which sentence expired May 29, 1972. Defendant, pursuant to the then existing statutes (13 V.S.A., Chapter 221, subchapter 2) would necessarily have to serve the maximum amount of his previous sentences before the sentence of from 0 to 3 months for contempt would commence to run. The sole question presented is the claimed error on the part of the lower court in denying the defendant the right to trial by jury for the contempt. During the course of the opening statement of the States Attorney to the jury, and at a time when both the States Attorney and the counsel for the defendant were conferring at the bench, the defendant started to talk. Mr. Dragon stated: These remarks were apparently directed toward the States Attorney. The lower court then stated to the defendant: To this the defendant replied: The lower court then asked the defendant: The defendant replied: The court then declared a recess, dismissed the jury and granted the motion of the State for a mistrial, and found the defendant in contempt and imposed the sentence appealed from. The defendant relies upon both State and Federal precedent in maintaining a right to jury trial for contempt of court. The precedent upon the state level is based on the interpretation of Chapter 1, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution, as interpreted by this Court in State v. Becker, 130 Vt. 153, 156, 287 A.2d 580, 582 (1972), in which we stated: The question presented in Becker was whether the Vermont Constitution made a distinction between felonies and misdemeanors *26 in guaranteeing the right of trial by jury. However, in State Ex inf. The Atty. Gen. v. Hildreth, 82 Vt. 382, 384, 74 A. 71, 72 (1909), the Court made clear that it was the common law which governs contempt proceedings in this state. In the words of then Chief Justice Rowell: What the Court then said is equally applicable today, except that 12 V.S.A. § 123 provides: The defendant contends also that under Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S. Ct. 1477, 20 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1968), the Supreme Court of the United States has held that prosecution for serious criminal contempts are subject to the jury trial provisions of Article 3, Section 2 of the United States Constitution and of the Sixth Amendment. Such Sixth Amendment's right of trial by jury was made binding upon the States by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1968). Defendant admits that the United States Supreme Court, in Bloom, as a guideline for determining serious crimes used the standard prescribed in Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 86 S. Ct. 1523, 16 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1966), holding that incarceration for less than six months is a petty offense. It will be recalled that the longest period of incarceration the defendant could serve under the appealed sentence for contempt was three months, which would be a petty offense under the Federal guidelines. The United States Supreme Court in Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S. Ct. 499 92 L. Ed. 682 (1948), in commenting upon the due process requirement in regard to proceeding for criminal contempt, made the following statement: The facts of the instant case fit such requirements. Affirmed.