Title: SCHOOL DIST NO 1 v DRISCOLL
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13604
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 17, 1977

No. 1 3 6 0 4 I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1977 SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 1 o f S i l v e r Bow County, a P o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n o f t h e S t a t e o f Montana e t a l . , P l j i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , MAURICE DRISCOLL, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable James D. Freebourn, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For A p p e l l a n t : John G. Winston, County A t t o r n e y , B u t t e , PTontana C r a i g P h i l l i p s a r g u e d , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , B u t t e , Montana For Respondent: Robert Holland argued, B u t t e , Montana For Amicus C u r i a e : McKittrick and Duffy, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana Joseph W. Duffy argued, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana James D r i s c o l l argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: June 7 , 1977 P . i Decided: "2+1G , i : *.. 4. F i l e d : C l e r k M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a judgment of the d i s t r i c t court, Silver B o w County, awarding defendant school supervisor accrued sick and annual leave, and h i s contractual salary f o r the months of May and June, 1975. A t the outset we note i n view of the f a i l u r e of appellant School D i s t r i c t t o s e t f o r t h the issues of i t s case a s provided by Rule 23, M.R.App,Civ.P., we w i l l discuss t h i s matter on the issues a s delineated and s e t f o r t h by respondent. Issues I and 11 ask t h i s Court t o determine whether the d i s t r i c t court properly interpreted the clauses of the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining contract concerning wages, hours and working condi- tions entered into by and between Butte Teamsters Union, Local No. 2 and the School D i s t r i c t . Issue I11 is directed a t the c o u r t ' s finding t h a t respondent was e n t i t l e d t o h i s contract pay f o r the months of May and June, 1975. The t r i a l court found respondent Maurice Driscoll was a party t o three contracts with School D i s t r i c t No. 1, not two a s alleged by the School D i s t r i c t . The f i r s t contract was a collec- t i v e bargaining agreement executed by and between the School D i s t r i c t and Butte Teamsters Union, Local No. 2 a s the sole bar- gaining representative f o r a l l administrative personnel i n the school system. The second contract was an individual contract executed on July 1, 1974, between Driscoll and the School D i s t r i c t providing f o r an annual salary of $24,217.40. The t h i r d contract was the contract of employment of Driscoll, a s a consultant t o the a s s i s t a n t director of the Vo-Tech Center, and the Vo-Tech Center. I t became e f f e c t i v e on February 28, 1975, t o run through t h e months of March, April, May and June, 1975. The employment f a c t s a r e not i n dispute. Driscoll had been Director of the Vo-Tech Center f o r several years. O n January 25, 1975, he n o t i f i e d the School D i s t r i c t t h a t he in- tended t o r e t i r e on June 30, 1975. He requested a temporary director be appointed e f f e c t i v e February 28, 1975 and t h a t he would remain a s a consultant through June 30, 1975. O n February 18, 1975, Dave Keltz was appointed a s s i s t a n t director i n charge of operations e f f e c t i v e February 28, 1975. Driscoll was paid as a consultant through April 1975. He was informed on April 29, 1975 t h a t the Board of Trustees had rescinded i t s motion of January 20, 1975 and he was dismissed from a l l duties e f f e c t i v e M a y 5, 1975. Driscoll performed services i n May and June, but was not paid f o r them. Issue I. The d i s t r i c t court did not e r r i n finding t h a t Driscoll was e n t i t l e d t o receive 71 days s i c k leave multiplied by h i s d a i l y r a t e of pay which i s determined by dividing h i s annual salary by 190 a s s e t f o r t h i n Article XXIV of the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement entered i n t o by and between Butte Teamsters Union, Local No. 2 and School D i s t r i c t No. 1. The relevant p a r t of the collective bargaining agreement, A r t i c l e XXIV, Sick Leave, reads: "Every administrator of School D i s t r i c t No. 1 s h a l l be allowed an annual f i f t e e n (15) days s i c k leave with f u l l salary cumulative f o r one hundred f i f t y (150) days. Retirement pay w i l l be 50% of accumulated sick leave and s h a l l be included a s p a r t of the administrator's yearly salary f o r the year i n which he r e t i r e s . * * * Said d a i l y r a t e of pay s h a l l be deter- mined by dividing h i s annual salary o r wage-:by 190." It was stipula tEd between the parties that Driscoll had accumulated 142 days of annual sick leave. The School District contends that in determining how much accumulated sick leave should be paid to Driscoll as retirement pay, h i s yearly salary of $24,000 should be divided by 260, and then, that figure should be multiplied by 7 1 days (50% of the accumulated sick leave -- Article XXIV, Sick Leave). Driscoll contends, and dt:was.+found by the d i s t r i c t court, that he should be paid sick leave pay in terms of retirement a t the rate of $127.46 by dividing h i s annual salary of $24,000 by 190 x 7 1 days, as i s clearly s e t forth in Article XXIV of the contract. W e note the quoted portion of Article XXIV of the contract relates t o benefits and coverage for every administrator. The School District concedes that the contract generally, and that clause particularly,covers Driscoll. There i s nothing whatsoever i n t h i s particular clause indicating the parties should use the figure "260" i n the formula for determining how much accumulated sick leave w i l l be received a s retirement pay by the adminis- trator. The chairman of the Board of Trustees admitted that the figure "260" was picked out of the a i r ; while the school clerk asserted that the figure "260" should be used because it has reference t o the number of days Driscoll was employed under h i s contract. That is not part of the contract agreed upon by the parties; rather, the parties agreed t o use the figure "190". It i s clear the language of the particular contract clause was what was contracted for. J i m Roberts, secretary-treasurer of the Teamsters Union, who negotiated the contract testified: YOU "Q. w i l l / relate to the Court, i f you can remember that, particularly in the 1974 negotiations the meetins cumerning t h i s particular provision? A. During the course of a l l collective bargaining processes with the administrators w e have submitted demands to the Board t o improve sick leave as it i s spelled out in the current contract and during a l l of the collective bargaining negotiations you reach a point where some of the things have to go by the wayside and during the '74 and '75 negotiations w e reached that point and we went into caucus without committees and it was decided that based on the, as our understanding of the negotiated provisions as it exists, that w e were adequately protected and t o back off on our proposals and i n doing so w e tried to make it known to the school board that we f e l t , with the fact that the 190 days was a formula used that we were adequately protected on our sick leave. "Q. It was your interpretation that the 190 figure divided into t h e i r annual salary applied t o every administrator i n the d i s t r i c t ? A. Without question. "Q. And the Board, to your understanding, fully understood that? A. Yes, definitely. "Q. I n regard to that, what have they done as f a r as the negotiations that are presently involved i n t h i s regard to that a r t i c l e ? A. A t the l a s t bar- gaining session w e had with the Board of trustees on February 24, I believe that's when it was, the Board submitted a proposal t o us even though it may have been untimely t o modify the current sick leave provisions t o spell out that the 190 days be changed t o read the actual number of days that each adminis- t r a t o r has worked, h i s work year schedule." Again, there i s nothing i n the contract as it pertains t o sick leave wherein 260 is interjected into the formula t o establish the sick leave. While the sick leave provision clearly contemplates having every administrator of the School District come under i t s coverage, a casual look a t the clause pertaining to vacations, Article XXVII, specifies that it only applies t o administrators employed on a twelve-month basis. I f the School Board desired t o have the formula for twelve- month employees based on 260 rather than 190, obviously the place to bring t h i s up was a t the bargaining table. The School District wants t h i s Court t o interpret the sick leave clause i n such a way as t o give effect t o i t s posi- tion which, up to the time i n question, it has been unsuccessful in accomplishing through the collective bargaining process. The courts have no power t o make contracts for parties. Horst v. Staley, 101Mont. 543, 54 P.2d 876; Reeves v. L i t t l e f i e l d , 101 Mont. 482, 54 P.2d 879. The language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, and the courts have no authority t o change the contract or disregard the express language used. Williams v. Insurance Co. of North America, 150 Mont. 292, 434 P. 2d 395. This Court i s not a t liberty under the guise of construction t o a l t e r the contract of the parties. Ryan Mer- cantile Co. v. Great Northern Railway Co., 186 F.Supp. 660, affirmed 294 F.2d 629. In the interpretation of contracts, the language employed must be given i t s ordinary meaning. Quirk v. Rich, 40 Mont. 552, 107 P. 821, There are no incon- sistencies in the contract clause i n question. There are no ambiguities i n question. The clause is clear, Driscoll was t o receive retirement pay a s decreed by the d i s t r i c t court. The School District attempted t o justify its rationale by premising i t s argument on a survey of Montana administrative salaries. The court properly sustained the objection of Driscoll that t h i s exhibit was not relevant t o the issues here. The School District erroneously reldes upon Zderick v. Silver B o w County, 154 Mont. 118, 460 P.2d 749, for the proposition that it had no authority t o enter into a contract for sick leave or severance pay. That case involved a county, not a school d i s t r i c t , and held that because, i n 1969, the l e g i s l a t u r e had not yet granted t o county commissioners the authority t o contract over the subject matter, to-wit: the accumulation of unused sick leave t o be used a s severance pay, the p a r t i c u l a r clause was t o be stricken. I n 1973 the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e enacted i n t o law T i t l e 59, Chapter 16, R.C.M. 1947, granting a l l public employers the r i g h t t o bargain collec-- t i v e l y with t h e i r employees over r a t e s of pay, hours, fringe benefits and other conditions of employment. Sections 59- 1601 through 59-1617, R.C.M. 1947. However, since 1971 school d i s t r i c t s have had the authority t o enter i n t o binding c o l l e c t i v e bargaining contracts over such matters. Sections 75-6115 through 75-6128, R.C.M. 1947 (repealed 1975). Zderick man- dated the l e g i s l a t u r e must a c t i n t h i s area before such a clause could be enforced, and t h a t is p r e c i d y what the l e g i s l a t u r e has done. A d d i t h a l l y , i n 1974 the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e enacted Chapter 374, Montana Session Laws, which amended section 68- 1602, R.C.M. 1947. That p a r t i c u l a r law concerns the propo- s i t i o n t h a t a public employee who i s a member of a retirement system funded through monies established under a c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement a l s o remains e l i g i b l e a s a member of a public employment retirement system. By enacting t h a t p a r t i - cular provision i n t o law, it is c l e a r the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e reaffirmed its policy t h a t the p a r t i e s could collectively bar- gain f o r such things a s retirement pay. The School D i s t r i c t c i t e s Bitney v. School D i s t r i c t No. 44, 167 Mont. 129, 135, 535 P.2d 1273, which d e a l t i n p a r t with the amount of unused sick leave pay a superintendent of schools was t o receive when h i s contract was terminated. Here, Bitney does l i t t l e t o support the School D i s t r i c t ' s position; rather it supports the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s decision. I n Bitney there was no c o l l e c t i v e bargaining contract covering the issue, and the School D i s t r i c t policy was s i l e n t on the matter. This Court held t h a t the terms of the contract entered i n t o by and between the superintendent and the school d i s t r i c t should be enforced and said: "Therefore, we find p l a i n t i f f contracted f o r the regular sick leave granted t o a l l teachers of the school d i s t r i c t . " (Emphasis added.) 167 Mont. 135. Similarly, in the i n s t a n t case, it is contended the contract r i g h t s , a s the d i s t r i c t court held, should be enforced. W e agree. Issue 11. The court did not e r r i n finding t h a t Driscoll was e n t i t l e d t o receive additional s i c k leave a t the r a t e of 17.5 days multiplied by $109.46 which is determined pursuant t o Article XXIV of the collective bargaining agreement. The relevant p a r t of t h e collective bargaining agreement, Article XXIV, Sick Leave, reads: "* * * I n addition, f i v e (5) days per year cumulative t o t h i r t y - f i v e (35) days s h a l l be allowed a t the difference between $18 per day and the administrator's d a i l y r a t e of pay. Said daily r a t e of pay s h a l l be determined by dividing h i s annual salary o r wage by . 190." Pursuant t o the quoted language, t h e d i s t r i c t court found and decreed t h a t Driscoll was t o receive the additional sick leave pay of 17.5 days i n the amount of $1,915.53. The School D i s t r i c t a s s e r t s t h i s Court should Fgnore the language "In sddi- tion" found i n the language contracted f o r by the p a r t i e s o r , t h a t the Court should give it some type of abortive meaning t o deny Driscoll the benefits t o which he has a l e g a l r i g h t . The words "In addition" a r e not ambiguous and should be interpreted i n t h e i r usual sense. Section 13-710, R.C.M. 1947. Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, contains these definitions: "Add. To unite, attach; annex; join." "Addition. Extension; increase, augmentation. 11 The d i s t r i c t court did i n t e r p r e t these words i n t h e i r usual sense denoting t h a t something is added t o what preceded it. Clearly, the ruling of the d i s t r i c t court is supported by substantial evidence. Roberts' testimony is d i r e c t l y on t h i s point. Even Grant, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, ad- mitted the School D i s t r i c t was "remiss" i n not getting other language i n the contract i f it intended something d i f f e r e n t by the p a r t i c u l a r clause. The contract clause i t s e l f , a s well a s the applicable case law c i t e d heretofore, demonstrates without a doubt t h a t the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s finding, conclusions and judg- ment should not be disturbed. Issue 111. The court did not e r r i n finding the School D i s t r i c t owed t o Driscoll $4,036 pursuant t o the consultant contract entered i n t o by and between the p a r t i e s . Maurice Driscoll was a teacher and administrator i n School D i s t r i c t No. 1 f o r approximately 35 years. I n February 1975, he advised the School Board he wished t o r e t i r e on June 30, 1975. H i s retirement was approved by the School Board which indicated t h a t f o r the months of March, April, May, June 1975, Driscoll would serve a s a consultant t o Dave Keltz, who was named acting director i n ~ r i s c o l l ' s stead. Driscoll's pay f o r these four months was t o be $2,018 per month. The only termination notice Driscoll received was a l e t t e r written pursuant t o action of the Educational Committee indicating h i s contract had been rescinded. Driscoll then n o t i f i e d the Teamsters Union,Local No. 2 of the l e t t e r he received concerning the rescission of the contract, and the Teamsters Union immediately protested the action pursuant t o terms of the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement. Driscoll continued t o serve a s a consultant from March u n t i l June 30, 1975, advising Keltz, the acting d i r e c t o r , and insuring t h a t the orderly t r a n s i t i o n was accomplished. He received h i s monthly salary f o r April, but not f o r May o r June, 1975. Throughout t h i s period (1) Driscoll worked and made himself available on a bonsulting basis a s per h i s contract, and (2) he maintained h i s o f f i c e i n the vocational educational building. Further, no one i n an o f f i c i a l capacity advised him throughout the period of May and June t h a t he should not perform h i s duties. This was substantiated by Keltz who t e s t i f i e d t h a t Driscoll, f o r the months of May and June 1975, did advise and consult with him and maintained h i s o f f i c e u n t i l June 30, 1975. O n t h a t p a r t i c u l a r date, the School Board cleared out ~ r i s c o l l ' s f i l e s , a s it was the l a s t day of the contract. During t h i s e n t i r e period Keltz was never o f f i c i a l l y o r otherwise n o t i f i e d by the School Board, the Superintendent of Schools, o r the Clerk of the School D i s t r i c t t h a t Driscoll had been f i r e d o r t h a t h i s contract had been rescinded. Again, the only indication t h a t he had i n t h i s regard was seeing t h e l e t t e r Driscoll received on the matter, written pursuant t o the action of the Education Committee. W e note here t h a t the Board of Trustees, s i t t i n g a s a School Board, did not take any action a t a public regular meeting o r a properly called special meeting o r a t a l l , r e l a t i v e t o the rescission of Driscoll's contract o r h i s f i r i n g . I n f a c t , the chairman of the board, J i m Grant, admitted the manner of the attempted discharge did not conform even t o the policy of the - 10 - School Board i t s e l f , and t h a t , i n f a c t , it was not normal action to attempt t o cancel a contract in t h i s fashion. Even though the Teamsters Union protested the discharge, there was never a hearing s e t up pursuant t o the terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the attorney for Driscoll, i n Driscoll' s presence, requested from the School D i s t r i c t notice of when the e n t i r e Board of Trustees was going to a c t on the discharge. However, no meeting o r hearing was ever set pursuant t o contract o r law. The record is c l e a r the l e t t e r attempting t o rescind ~ r i s c o l l ' s contract was not a r e s u l t of any meeting whatsoever of the School Board, rather it was a product of the Education Committee, meeting a s a committee. Thus, t h e attempted rescis- sion o r f i r i n g was void since it was i n v i o l a t i o n of section 75-5930, R.C.M. 1947, which provides i n pertinent part: "No business s h a l l be transacted by the t r u s t e e s of a d i s t r i c t unless it is transacted a t a regular meeting o r a properly called special meeting. * * *" See: Wyatt v. School D i s t r i c t No. 104, 148 Mont. 83, 417 P.2d 221. Consequently, the attempt t o rescind the contract and t o f i r e Driscoll a r e both void. I n Lowery v. Garfield County, 122 Mont. 571, 584, 208 P.2d 478, the Court said: "A 'void thing' is no thing; it has no l e g a l e f f e c t whatsoever and no r i g h t whatever can be obtained under it o r grow out of it. I n law it is the same thing a s i f the 'void thing' had never existed." Thus, i n Lowery, even a subsequent a c t of the l e g i s l a t u r e could not cure something t h a t was void. I n the probate case of S t a t e v. McCracken, 91 Mont. 157, 163, 6 P.2d 869, the Court said: "If the order of July 1, is void, a l l proceedings founded upon it a r e ineffective f o r any purpose. It was open t o c o l l a t e r a l attack, and may be s e t aside a t any time. f 1 See also: In re Takahashi's Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 129 P.2d A s i n Wyatt, here there was no regularly scheduled or special meeting held by the School Board of Trustees i n rescinding Driscoll' s contract o r discharging him. I n Wyatt, the teacher a l s o was dismissed without a meeting. The Court in t h a t case found t h a t since the School Board had f a i l e d t o follow the law i n the dismissal of Wyatt: "* * * the very dismissal was void f o r want of jurisdiction. N o proceedings on appeal could have validated the dismissal t h a t o r i g i n a l l y was void f o r want of jurisdiction." 148 Mont. 83, 91. The School D i s t r i c t c i t e s School D i s t r i c t No. 4 , Lincoln County v. Colburg, Mont . , 547 P.2d 84, 33 St. Rep. 296. W e find t h a t case not i n point since the decision of the School Board was i n question there. I n the i n s t a n t case, the School Board did not meet and did not rescind D r i s c o l l ' s contract. Further,Driscoll continued t o perform and did perform h i s duties pursuant t o contract i n the months of May and June, 1975, and was not thwarted i n any way whatsoever by the School Board i n performing i n h i s o f f i c i a l capacity and pursuant t o h i s con- t r a c t . W e find Driscoll i s e n t i t l e d t o h i s contractual salary f o r the months May and June, 1975, i n the t o t a l amount of $4,036. Wyatt v. School D i s t r i c t No. 104, supra; Lindgren v. Board of Trustees, Mont . , 558 P.2d 468, 33 St. Rep. 1226. There i s substantial credible evidence t o support the rulings of the d i s t r i c t court and its judgment is affirmed. We Concur: Chief Justice \ I\