Title: Rash v. Wilkins
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 136, 2007
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 1, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TH STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KEVIN RASH, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 136, 2007 
 
 
Petitioner Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Family Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
JULIA CARTER WILKINS, 
 
)  File No. CN02-10069 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent Below, 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  September 5, 2007 
Decided:  October 1, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices constituting the court en banc. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 1st day of October 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
Appellant Kevin Rash (“Rash”) appeals from a Family Court 
judgment denying his Motion for Reargument and Motion to Reopen ancillary 
proceedings.  Rash contends that the trial judge abused his discretion and that the 
trial judge’s decision was not the product of an orderly and logical deductive 
process.  Because Rash failed to include any new evidence at the hearing in Family 
Court on his Motion for Reargument and Motion to Reopen ancillary proceedings, 
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying the motion.  Therefore, we 
AFFIRM.  
 
2
(2) 
Rash married Julia Carter Wilkins in December 2000.  The two 
divorced in August 2006.  In November 2006, Wilkins filed a Petition for Interim 
Alimony.  In her petition, Wilkins alleged that she was disabled and unable to 
work.  She also informed the court that Rash was recently employed full-time with 
the United States Postal Service.  In his response, Rash indicated that he was 
presently unemployed.   He made no reference to any physical inability to work.  
The Family Court granted the petition on December 11, 2007, explaining that Rash 
“provided no evidence indicating he is unable to obtain comparable employment to 
that which he held previously. . . . [T]he Court attributes him with the amount of 
income he earned at his last position.”1  
(3) 
While preparing for trial, Wilkins requested that Rash produce any 
and all documents that he intended to introduce at trial.  Rash failed to respond, 
prompting Wilkins to file a Motion to Compel.  Family Court granted Wilkins’ 
Motion to Compel on December 28, 2006.   Rash did not respond.  Rash also failed 
to file a Family Court Rule 52(d) mandated pre-trial stipulation.2  Meanwhile, 
                                                 
1  
Rash v. Wilkins, Del. Fam., File No. CN02-10069, at 6 (Dec. 11, 2006). 
 
2  
Family Court Rule 52(d) provides: 
(d) Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions. At least 7 days prior to trial in 
any ancillary action, each party, or counsel, shall submit to the Court proposed 
findings and conclusions, including supporting reasons therefor concerning all 
material elements of the case. Each proposed finding of fact shall contain a brief 
reference to the evidence to be offered in support of that finding. The submission 
shall include a proposed form of order. 
 
 
3
Rash’s counsel moved to withdraw on December 13, 2006, apparently at Rash’s 
request. 
(4) 
The trial judge held a hearing on January 10, 2007.  Rash arrived 
approximately 20 minutes late.  The trial judge and Rash engaged in a discussion 
about Rash’s employment.  Rash told the trial judge that no one would hire him 
because of his “disabilities.”  Rash then explained his disabilities and told the 
judge that he had documentation supporting his alleged inability to work.  Later, 
when asked to produce those documents, however, Rash told the judge that he did 
not have the documents in his possession.3   The trial judge also inquired into an 
                                                 
3 The trial judge asked the following questions regarding Rash’s employment status: 
 
Court:  [A]re you currently employed, Mr. Reese? 
Rash:   No, Sir. 
Court: And, according to our records, you were last employed by the postal 
authority, and your last day - - you were discharged on April 21, 2006. 
Rash:   Yes, sir. 
Court:  For excessive absenteeism? 
Rash:   Yes, sir. 
Court:  Okay.  And, what efforts are you making to work - - what efforts have you 
made to find work after April 21? 
Rash:   Nobody would hire me; I’m going on disability. 
Court:  What - - what do you mean nobody would hire you? 
Rash:   I don’t know, because of my illness. 
Court:  And, what’s your illness? 
Rash:   I have several disabilities - - illness. 
Court:  How old are you? 
Rash:   I’m 47. 
Court: You’re 47 years old? 
Rash:   Yes. 
Court: Okay.  And, what - - what - - what disabilities do you have that would 
enable [sic] you to work at age 47? 
 
4
unemployment claim Rash recently filed in Pennsylvania.4   In a written order, the 
Family Court ultimately rejected Rash’s claim that he was physically unable to 
work and divided the property accordingly.5   
                                                                                                                                                             
Rash: Well, I have fibromalger [sic] and rheumatoid osteoarthritis.  And, I just 
got an operation on my foot, left foot, and they hit a nerve and they damaged my 
nerve, and I have no feeling in my left foot; and asthma and panic depression. 
Court: Well, do you have any - - any doctor’s records or statements that - - 
Rash:   Yes, I do, sir. 
Court:  - - you’re unable to work.  Have you been determined to be unable to 
work by the disability - - by social security? 
Rash:   Yes, sir.  But, I’m a disabled vet. 
Court:  What - - what do you mean you’re a disabled vet? 
Rash:   Well, my illness happened when I was in the service. 
Court: Yeah, well then - - but you were working at the post office until April.  
The fact that you were getting benefits from the VA is one thing, but you were 
working up until April. 
Rash:   Yes. 
Court:  And, now you’re saying - - then you get fired for not - - for taking too 
much - - missing too much time, and you say now I’m not able to work. 
Rash:   I’m not saying that; the doctor said that. 
Court:  Okay, well that’s what I’m asking. 
Rash:   You, I have - - I have documentation 
Court:  You - - you got that with you? 
Rash:  I don’t have it with me, no, sir. 
Court:  Well, why wouldn’t you have it with you?  That’s a key part of your - - 
your case, whether you’re able to work or not. 
Rash:   That’s true too, but all my documentations are going from the  
administrative office to the social security [sic].  They have my records right now.  
And, when I went to the VA to request my records, they told me they can’t give 
me a copy because they send it [sic] to the administrative building, which is social 
security. 
 
4  
The trial judge questioned Rash regarding his unemployment claim as follows: 
 
Court:  Now, you filed for unemployment benefits up in Pennsylvania, and the 
referee in the unemployment department said this in June:  The burden of proof is 
on the claimant to show that he is able and available for suitable employment.  In 
this case, the claimant has sustained his burden of proof, and is able and available 
for suitable work.  And, he’s there for [sic] eligible - - he’s there fore [sic] eligible 
for unemployment benefits.  Now, you - - you went up in June and told the 
unemployment department that you were able to work.  And, you come in, you 
 
5
(5) 
Acting pro se, Rash filed a Motion for Reargument on January 24, 
2007.  On February 5, 2007, counsel entered an appearance on Rash’s behalf and 
filed a Motion to Amend Motion for Reargument and to Reopen and an Amended 
Motion for Reargument and to Reopen.  With his amended motions, Rash included 
a letter from his psychiatrist explaining that Rash suffered an attack on January 10, 
2007 that “impaired his abilities to concentrate and to think clearly.  In addition, 
the sedative effects of the medication, [sic] further compromised his cognition.”  
When the trial judge asked Rash to present evidence of his disability to the court, 
he produced no new evidence to the trial judge.  The motions were summarily 
denied on February 15, 2007.6  
(6) 
Rash argues that the Family Court judge committed an abuse of 
discretion when he denied his Amended Motion for Reargument and to Reopen.  
                                                                                                                                                             
know, later and tell me I’m not able to work, when you have no doctor’s evidence 
or no statement to sustain that.  So, right now, based upon your previous 
statements under oath an in unemployment benefit claim, we have to assume that 
you’re able to work.  I guess, so - - we - - we would have to continue the alimony 
award, and I guess sometime you can apply to modify that if you get social 
security disability, and prove that you are truly disabled. 
Rash:  Okay. 
Court:  You can’t tell one Court one thing - - one administrative board one thing 
back in June, and tell us one thing a few months later something different - - 
totally different . . . . 
 
5  
Rash v. Wilkins, Del. Fam., File No. CN02-10069, at 16 (Jan. 17, 2007). 
 
6  
The trial judge denied the motions, explaining that the “Motion to Amend the Motion 
originally filed on 1/24/07 does not contain any facts referred to in the 1/24/07 Motion.  New 
Material is untimely raised.”  Id. 
 
 
6
Rule 60(b)(1) grants the Family Court broad discretion to relieve a party from a 
judgment upon a showing of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect 
. . . .”7   Although the rule should be liberally construed, the moving party must 
meet the following three factors to be entitled to relief: 
(1) excusable neglect in the conduct that resulted in the default 
judgment (or order of dismissal) being taken, (2) the outcome of the 
action may be different, if relief is granted, from what it will be if the 
judgment is permitted to stand and (3) substantial prejudice will not 
be suffered by the nonmoving party if the motion is granted.8  
 
(7) 
Assuming that Rash could satisfy the second and third elements of 
Donohue, he cannot demonstrate excusable neglect.  “Excusable neglect” is the 
conduct of a reasonably prudent person.9   In this case, Rash contends that his 
failure to produce documentary evidence at trial to support his claim that he is 
physically unable to work was the product of excusable neglect.  Rash, however, 
had ample opportunity, other than at trial, to present documentary evidence to 
support his argument but failed to do so.  He could have produced those documents 
in response to: Wilkins’ Motion for Interim Alimony; Wilkins’ document requests; 
                                                 
7  
Family Court Rule 60(b) provides: 
 
(b) Mistake; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; 
Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the Court may relieve a 
party or legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) . . . . 
 
8  
Donohue v. Donohue, 2005 Del. LEXIS 224, at *4–5. 
 
9  
Morrow v. Morrow, 2006 Del. LEXIS 109, at *5–6. 
 
7
Wilkins’ Motion to Compel; or by filing the required Rule 52(d) pre-trial 
stipulation and including or attaching the information.  Rash posits no explanation 
for his failure to comply with his discovery obligations during the length of the 
proceeding.  A reasonably prudent person would have produced this information at 
an appropriate time or requested an extension of time to do so.  Accordingly, the 
trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied Rash’s motions for post-
trial relief. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice