Title: Camacho v. Superior Court
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S273391
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 31, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
CIRO CAMACHO, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MERCED COUNTY, 
Respondent; 
THE PEOPLE, 
Real Party in Interest. 
 
S273391 
 
Fifth Appellate District 
F082798 
 
Merced County Superior Court 
146207 
 
 
August 31, 2023 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred. 
 
1 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
S273391 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
The Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVP Act; Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 6600 et seq.) authorizes the involuntary commitment of 
certain convicted sex offenders — termed “sexually violent 
predators,” or SVPs — who are found to have mental disorders 
that make them likely to reoffend after release from prison.  This 
case concerns delays in holding trial on a petition for SVP 
commitment.  
Petitioner Ciro Camacho was first determined to be an 
SVP at a 2005 trial and was committed to the state hospital for 
a two-year term under the version of the statute then in force.  
The next year, the statute was amended to provide for indefinite 
commitment instead of renewable two-year terms.  In 2007, 
before Camacho’s two-year term ended, the state filed a 
recommitment petition seeking indefinite commitment under 
the new version of the statute.  Since then, the defense has 
repeatedly requested or agreed to continuances of the trial date, 
with the result that the trial on the recommitment petition has 
yet to occur.  Camacho now argues that the extended pretrial 
delay violates his constitutional rights.   
Although the Courts of Appeal have previously addressed 
similar claims, this case marks the first time this court has 
considered the constitutional framework for evaluating the 
timeliness of SVP trials.  We now hold that persons facing SVP 
commitment have a due process right to a timely trial.  But as 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
is true in other contexts, whether pretrial delay violates that 
right depends in the first instance on the reasons for the delay.  
(Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 531.)  Here, while the 
decade-plus delay in holding Camacho’s recommitment trial is 
extraordinarily lengthy, the available record shows that 
responsibility for the delay lies primarily with the defense, 
which either sought or agreed to the continuances that led to the 
delay.  While many of the continuance requests were made by 
Camacho’s counsel when Camacho was not personally present 
in court, the ordinary rule is that delays sought by counsel are 
attributable to their clients (Vermont v. Brillon (2009) 556 U.S. 
81, 85), and the record reveals no basis to depart from that rule 
in this case.  Camacho therefore has not established that the 
pretrial delay in this case resulted in a violation of his due 
process rights. 
Although we find no due process violation in the case 
before us, we underscore the vital role of trial courts in 
safeguarding the timely trial right of alleged SVPs.  Involuntary 
commitment entails “a massive curtailment of liberty.”  
(Humphrey v. Cady (1972) 405 U.S. 504, 509.)  In the context of 
SVP proceedings, the deprivation of liberty begins when a court 
finds probable cause to hold an alleged SVP in state custody 
pending trial.  In making determinations that will affect when 
trial is held, the trial court must take due account of the 
individual’s interests in prompt adjudication and take decisive 
steps to guard against unjustified delay. 
I. 
A. 
The Legislature first enacted the SVP Act in 1995, 
expressing concerns about “a select group of criminal offenders 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
who are extremely dangerous as the result of mental 
impairment, and who are likely to continue committing acts of 
sexual violence even after they have been punished for such 
crimes.”  (Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 
1144 (Hubbart).)  In its findings and declarations for the SVP 
Act, the Legislature described its intent to “identify these 
individuals prior to the expiration of their terms of 
imprisonment” and, if they are “found to be likely to commit acts 
of sexually violent criminal behavior beyond a reasonable 
doubt,” to ensure that they “be confined and treated until such 
time that it can be determined that they no longer present a 
threat to society.”  (Stats. 1995, ch. 763, § 1, p. 5921.)  
To be committed as an SVP, an individual must meet the 
SVP Act’s definition of the term “ ‘[s]exually violent predator’ ”:  
“[A] person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense 
against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental 
disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety 
of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually 
violent criminal behavior.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. 
(a)(1); see id., subd. (b) [defining “ ‘[s]exually violent offense’ ” to 
include certain enumerated crimes “when committed by force, 
violence, duress, menace, fear of immediate and unlawful bodily 
injury on the victim or another person, or threatening to 
retaliate in the future against the victim or any other person”].)1 
The statute sets forth extensive administrative and 
judicial procedures for determining whether an individual is 
properly classified as an SVP.  The process typically begins 
 
1 
The SVP Act has been amended several times since it was 
first enacted in 1995.  Unless otherwise indicated, statutory 
references are to the version of the SVP Act currently in force. 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
while the individual is still serving a prison sentence for a 
sexually violent offense.  At least six months before the 
individual’s scheduled release date, the Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation conducts an initial screening of 
individuals who have committed a qualifying offense, using a 
standardized screening instrument to review the individual’s 
“social, criminal, and institutional history.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 6601, subd. (b).)  If the initial screening indicates that the 
person is likely to be an SVP, the individual is referred to the 
California Department of State Hospitals (Department) for a 
full evaluation.  (Id., subds. (a)(1), (2), (b).)  The Department 
designates two mental health evaluators, who must be 
practicing psychiatrists or psychologists and must use the 
Department’s standardized assessment protocol.  (Id., subds. (c), 
(d).)  If both mental health evaluators agree the person meets 
the statutory definition of an SVP, then the Director of State 
Hospitals asks the state to file a petition for commitment.  (Id., 
subd. (d).)  If the evaluators reach different conclusions, then 
two new evaluations are performed by independent mental 
health professionals.  (Id., subd. (e).)  A petition for commitment 
may be filed only if the two new evaluators concur that the 
person meets the criteria for commitment.  (Id., subd. (f).)  
Once the Director of State Hospitals has forwarded the 
evaluators’ reports to the appropriate district attorney, the 
district attorney may file a petition for commitment.  (Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 6601, subd. (h)(1).)  The trial court then reviews 
the petition to determine whether it “contains sufficient facts 
that, if true, would constitute probable cause” that the person 
meets the definition of an SVP.  (Id., § 6601.5.)  If the court 
answers that question in the affirmative, the court then must 
hold a probable cause hearing within 10 days, absent good cause 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
for extending the time period.  (Id., §§ 6601.5, 6602, subd. (b).)  
In the meantime, the person must be detained in a secure 
facility.  (Id., § 6601.5.)  If, after a hearing, the court finds 
probable cause to believe the individual is an SVP, the person is 
detained at the state hospital pending trial.  (Id., § 6602.5, subd. 
(a).) 
The statute does not specify a fixed deadline by which trial 
must occur.  It does, however, lay out a number of procedural 
protections for the conduct of trial, including the right to a jury 
and to the assistance of counsel and relevant experts.  (Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 6603, subd. (a).)  At trial, the state bears the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is 
an SVP.  (Id., § 6604.)  Specifically, the state must prove four 
conditions are met:  “(1) the person has previously been 
convicted of at least one qualifying ‘sexually violent offense’ 
listed in [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 6600, 
subdivision (b) [citation]; (2) the person has ‘a diagnosed mental 
disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety 
of others’ [citation]; (3) the mental disorder makes it likely the 
person will engage in future acts of sexually violent criminal 
behavior if released from custody [citation]; and (4) those acts 
will be predatory in nature.”  (Walker v. Superior Court (2021) 
12 Cal.5th 177, 190 (Walker).)  The state must prove these 
conditions exist at the time of trial:  A person is subject to SVP 
commitment only if the person is found to have a current 
diagnosed mental disorder and to pose a current risk to public 
safety.  (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1162.) 
 
If the individual is found at trial to be an SVP, the court 
then issues an order of commitment.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6604; 
id., § 6604.1, subd. (a).)  As initially enacted, the SVP Act 
provided for renewable two-year commitment terms.  (People v. 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1183 (McKee), citing former Welf. 
& Inst. Code, § 6604.)  In 2006, however, voters passed 
Proposition 83 (Gen. Elec., Nov. 7, 2006), which replaced these 
renewable two-year terms with an indefinite commitment from 
which the individual can be released if it is shown that the 
individual no longer qualifies as an SVP.  (See McKee, at p. 1184; 
see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6604.1, subd. (a).)  Under this 
system, a person who is committed as an SVP must be 
reexamined annually by a qualified mental health professional 
to determine whether commitment is still appropriate.  (Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 6604.9, subds. (a), (b), added by Stats. 2013, ch. 
182, § 1, p. 2256.)  Depending on the results of the evaluation, 
the report may recommend unconditional discharge, conditional 
release with outpatient supervision and treatment in the 
community, or continued commitment at the state hospital.  The 
person then may file a petition for release and, depending on the 
circumstances, may be entitled to a hearing at which the person 
has a right to appointed counsel and experts.  (Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 6605, subd. (a)(3); id., § 6608, subds. (a), (g).)   
 
If the annual report concludes the person is no longer an 
SVP, the Director of State Hospitals must authorize the 
committed person to petition for unconditional discharge.  (Welf. 
& Inst. Code, § 6604.9, subd. (d).)  After making an initial 
probable cause determination on the petition, the court holds a 
hearing — or, at the individual’s request, a jury trial — at which 
the state bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the individual continues to meet the criteria for 
commitment as an SVP.  (Id., § 6605, subd. (a)(2), (3).)   
 
A person may petition for conditional release whether or 
not the annual report recommends that course (Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 6608, subd. (a)), but the recommendation determines 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
how the petition will be handled.  If the annual report 
recommends conditional release, then the state must show by a 
preponderance of the evidence at a release hearing that the 
individual is not, in fact, suitable for release.  (Id., § 6604.9, 
subd. (d); see id., § 6608, subd. (k).)  If, on the other hand, the 
annual report recommends continued commitment, the court 
screens the petition for frivolousness before holding a hearing 
(id., § 6608, subd. (a)), and at that hearing the individual bears 
the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that 
conditional release is appropriate.  (Id., subd. (k).)  After one 
year on conditional release, the individual may petition for 
unconditional discharge from SVP commitment.  (Id., subd. (m).) 
B. 
 
In 1993, Ciro Camacho pleaded guilty to one count of 
continuous sexual abuse of a child in violation of Penal Code 
section 288.5 and two counts of lewd acts on a child under 14 
years old in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a).  
He was sentenced to 14 years in prison.   
 
In August 2002, while Camacho was still serving his 
sentence, the state filed a petition to commit him as an SVP.  
Two doctors had evaluated Camacho and concluded he met the 
statutory criteria for SVP commitment.  Camacho waived his 
right to a jury trial, and the trial court held a bench trial in 
January 2005.  The court ordered Camacho committed to the 
state hospital for a two-year term under the version of the SVP 
Act then in effect.   
 
The following year, Proposition 83 replaced the system of 
renewable two-year terms with the current system of indefinite 
commitments subject to annual reevaluations.  (See McKee, 
supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1183–1184.)  On December 18, 2006, 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
before Camacho’s two-year term expired, the state filed a 
petition to recommit Camacho to an indefinite term.  On 
February 8, 2007, Camacho waived the probable cause hearing 
on the recommitment petition.  The trial on that petition has yet 
to occur.  Camacho now challenges that delay as violating his 
due process right to a timely trial. 
 
In the years since 2007, Camacho’s case has appeared on 
the trial court docket and been continued more than 200 times 
without trial.  Although the record of the proceedings is limited, 
the parties have stipulated to the relevant procedural history 
and the accuracy of the available record.  Because Camacho’s 
due process claim requires careful review of the relevant facts, 
we discuss this history in some detail below.   
After waiving the probable cause hearing on the 2006 
petition for recommitment, Camacho entered a general time 
waiver on March 29, 2007, when he was personally present in 
court.  He was then transported from the county jail to the state 
hospital. 
On July 25, 2008, the Public Defender declared a conflict.  
The court assigned Attorney William Davis as replacement 
defense counsel.  Davis would serve as Camacho’s defense 
counsel for the next decade, until 2018.    
Two updated doctors’ reports became available in August 
2008, both concluding that Camacho met the criteria for 
commitment.  The court held 16 additional hearings in 2008, but 
the court did not set a trial date. 
In 2009, Camacho’s case appeared on the court docket 16 
times.  Camacho was present for 10 of these hearings.  That 
year, two trial dates were set and later continued, with no record 
of the reason for these continuances.  Camacho appeared in 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
court for another trial setting conference on March 11, 2010.  No 
trial date was set.  
Between March 11, 2010, and July 5, 2018, Camacho’s 
case appeared on the trial court docket 102 times.  Camacho was 
not personally present at any of the hearings held during that 
eight-year period. 
In 2010, doctors again concluded that Camacho met the 
criteria for commitment as an SVP.  The court did not set any 
additional trial dates in 2010.  The minute orders from 2010 
generally state “time waived.”   
In 2011, the court held 15 hearings.  On April 14, 2011, 
the court noted that Davis was “still [a]waiting confirmation of 
experts” and a general time waiver was in effect.  No trial date 
was set in 2011.  From 2012 to 2015, the court regularly called 
Camacho’s case and set hearings, but the record shows no 
reason for the repeated continuances.  
In 2015, four new doctors’ reports were prepared.  One of 
these reports concluded — for the first time — that Camacho no 
longer met the criteria for commitment.  The other three reports, 
by contrast, concluded that Camacho continued to meet the SVP 
criteria. 
Despite this development, 2016 continued in much the 
same vein as the preceding five years.  The court held eight 
hearings that year without setting a trial date.  
In 2017, Camacho’s case appeared on the court docket 10 
times, again with no trial date set and multiple continuances 
granted at Davis’s request.  On March 22, 2018, the court called 
the case for a regular hearing.  According to the reporter’s 
transcript (one of the few available in this case), Davis informed 
the court Camacho was “at the hospital at Coalinga by his own 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
choice.”  The District Attorney and Davis told the court they 
were mutually requesting a continuance, with Davis explaining 
“[t]here have been some statewide developments in these kinds 
of cases that [the prosecutor] and I have looked at.”   
The court held an in camera hearing on May 17, 2018.  
Davis waived Camacho’s presence for that hearing and the court 
continued the case to June 21 to allow counsel to secure 
Camacho’s appearance by video conference.  Camacho did not 
appear on June 21, however, and Davis waived his presence “for 
today’s hearing.”   
On July 5, 2018, the court held another in camera hearing.  
This time, Camacho was present by video.  The prosecutor did 
not appear.  At the hearing, Davis told Camacho that he had 
“placed calls” to three “psychologists or psychiatrists . . . well 
qualified to assist us in this case.”  Camacho responded, “All 
right.”  Camacho then asked if he should send Davis letters that 
staff members at the hospital wanted to write “in [his] behalf.”  
Davis said to “[g]o ahead” and asked if Camacho had his 
address.  Camacho confirmed he did.  The court then concluded, 
“All right.  I’ll find good cause to continue this to the 16th?”  And 
Davis confirmed, “Yes.”  
On September 20, 2018, the court held another hearing.  
Camacho was not present.  Davis made “an oral motion to 
continue the matter” and the prosecutor objected — the first 
recorded objection to a continuance in the history of the case.  
The court overruled the objection and scheduled a trial setting 
conference in October. 
The parties met again on October 4, 2018, with Camacho 
present by video conference.  The parties discussed setting a 
trial date.  Davis noted that Camacho “need[ed] to have 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
additional evaluations” because the last doctors’ reports were 
from 2015.  Davis suggested March 5 for a jury trial.  The 
prosecutor noted he had another trial on that date, but stated 
he was “available several weeks before that.  And we are looking 
forward to moving this case forward to conclusion.”  Davis then 
suggested April for trial, and the prosecutor stated, “just for the 
record, I can do this significantly earlier,” and “I’m not trying to 
delay the trial.”  Davis said he understood but that because of 
his preparation, April was best.  The court set a trial date for 
April 2 and ordered monthly pretrial hearings.   
After the date was set, the prosecutor said that since 
Camacho was present, he wanted to “clear up a few things.”  The 
prosecutor continued, “First off, the [d]efendant does have a 
right to a speedy trial in this matter within a reasonable time 
period.  [¶] . . . [¶]  . . .  However, my understanding is the 
[d]efendant, having these rights in mind, is consenting to this 
date in April because he feels it’s in his best interests.”  Davis 
responded that he had not “had a chance to discuss all of the 
things that [he] need[ed] to discuss with [Camacho]” and asked 
the court to order that Camacho be permitted to give Davis a 
phone call the next week to “go over all the issues necessary.”  
The court asked if Camacho had heard everything and 
addressed Camacho directly as he summarized that the parties 
would reconvene two weeks later, so that “Mr. Davis can talk to 
you in more detail about what he’s planning to do regarding your 
defense.  And at that time you can decide if you want to ask for 
a speedy trial or if you’re agreeable to putting it out longer, 
which is what has happened so far.  [¶]  But so far you’re okay 
with everything?”  Camacho replied, “Yes.” 
The court called Camacho’s case again two weeks later, on 
October 18, 2018.  Davis began the hearing by stating that 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
Camacho “doesn’t want to waive any more time.”  Davis referred 
to the Court of Appeal’s then-recent decision in People v. 
Superior Court (Vasquez) (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 36 (Vasquez), 
which upheld the trial court’s determination that a 17-year 
delay in holding an SVP trial violated due process because the 
delay had been caused by a “ ‘ “breakdown in the public defender 
system.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 41.)  The prosecutor responded he would 
not object to “resetting the trial within 60 days of today.”  
Camacho reiterated that he wanted “to apply this Vasquez 
case.”  Davis stated he was “assuming that means he wants 
another attorney,” and Camacho confirmed.  Davis noted, 
“Vasquez does create some interesting issues . . . part of the 
problem is that there is a systemic logistical problem . . . 
everybody that has one of these petitions pending is held at 
Coalinga, which is a hundred miles from anywhere.  Literally, 
anywhere else in the state.”  
Davis stated that “another issue” was that Camacho was 
“not sure that he wants to be brought to the county jail.”  The 
prosecutor again suggested that they set trial within 60 days.  
The court said it sounded like it was Camacho’s “desire to have 
a speedy trial in the matter” and they could set trial within 60 
days and “come back in two weeks for a readiness conference.”  
Davis asked Camacho, “Do you want to be here in Merced 
County?”  Camacho responded, “No.  No.  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  I want to 
stay here in Coalinga.  [¶] . . .  [¶]  . . .  I mean, how long is the 
trial going to be?  If it’s gonna be a while, then, yeah, I’ll go to 
the county [jail].  But if it’s just gonna be a ready conference, 
then send me back.”  Davis and Camacho ultimately agreed to 
decide about transportation later and keep the April trial date.  
The prosecutor then reiterated that since “the defendant is 
requesting a speedy trial” he had no objection to “advancing 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
[trial] to December 11th which is within 60 days of today.”  The 
court set trial for December 11.  
On November 6, 2018, the court held a readiness 
conference that began with Davis informing the court that 
Camacho wanted to “go ahead and make an oral motion . . . to 
dismiss for a lack of prosecution.”  The court agreed with Davis’s 
recommendation to refer the motion to a different law firm, 
Fitzgerald, Alvarez & Ciummo, in order “to look into 
Mr. Camacho’s claims pursuant to the Vasquez case.”   
On November 29, 2018, Davis declared a conflict and was 
relieved by the court.  Fitzgerald, Alvarez & Ciummo became 
Camacho’s defense counsel for all purposes.   
On March 11, 2021, Camacho filed a motion to dismiss the 
2006 petition to extend commitment, claiming his right to due 
process had been violated “due to the excessive delay in bringing 
his matter to trial.”  The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, 
describing the pretrial delay as “troubling,” but finding that 
“most of that [delay] is attributable to Mr. Camacho or his 
counsel.”  Camacho then filed an original petition for a writ of 
mandate in the Court of Appeal.   
The Court of Appeal denied Camacho’s writ petition in an 
unpublished opinion, finding that although “ ‘substantial delays 
weigh in [Camacho]’s favor’ . . .  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  . . . the record shows 
the delay was at Camacho’s request or agreement,” such that his 
right to due process was not violated.  The court explained that 
“[u]p to October 18, 2018, Camacho waived time repeatedly and 
requested or acquiesced to the numerous continuances, either in 
person or through his attorney.”  Although the continuance 
requests were made by counsel without Camacho present, the 
court cited the “ ‘general rule’ ” that “ ‘ “delays caused by defense 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
counsel are properly attributed to the defendant, even where 
counsel is assigned.” ’ ”  The court further opined that while the 
length of Camacho’s pretrial incarceration “ ‘constitutes some 
degree of prejudice,’ ” the delay had not prejudiced Camacho’s 
defense, reasoning that “the passage of time improved 
Camacho’s prospects:  the first medical evaluation opining that 
he no longer satisfied [the criteria for commitment] was 
prepared” in 2015.   
II. 
The issue of SVP trial delays is not new.  Nearly 20 years 
ago, courts began to raise concerns that significant pretrial 
delays in SVP cases “can and do occur.”  (Litmon v. Superior 
Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1170 (Litmon); see Orozco v. 
Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 170, 179 (Orozco).)  At 
the time, the courts’ concern was that delays in holding trials to 
recommit SVPs sometimes matched or even exceeded the two-
year commitment period prescribed by the law then in force.  
(Ibid.)  Since the SVP Act was amended to provide for indefinite 
commitment terms, the issue of pretrial delay has not abated.  
Extended delays — in some cases upwards of a decade — have 
not been uncommon.2   
 
2  
(See, e.g., In re Kerins (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1084 [14-year 
delay], review granted June 14, 2023, S279933; People v. Hubbs 
(Jan. 19, 2023, D077636) [nonpub. opn.] 2023 WL 311941 [15-
year delay]; People v. Carter (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 739 [14-year 
delay]; People v. Lozano (Aug. 10, 2022, C094245) [nonpub. opn.] 
2022 WL 3224388 [11-year delay]; People v. Ballardo (Mar. 29, 
2022, B290567) [nonpub. opn.] 2022 WL 906421 [13-year delay]; 
Camacho v. Superior Court of Merced County (Jan. 21, 2022, 
F082798) [nonpub. opn.] 2022 WL 189070 [15-year delay]; 
 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
 
The reasons for delay in a given case vary, but certain 
features of the SVP Act help to explain why, in general, 
extended pretrial delays may be more likely to occur in SVP 
cases than in other cases.  As an initial matter, SVP trials, 
unlike criminal trials and most types of civil trials, are not 
subject to statutory time limits.  (See Litmon, supra, 123 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1170–1171; cf. Pen. Code, § 1382, subd. (a)(2) 
[setting presumptive 60-day limit for trial in a criminal case]; 
Code Civ. Proc., § 583.310 [setting presumptive five-year limit 
for trial in a civil case].)  This is not because the Legislature has 
been inattentive to questions of timing in SVP cases:  In 1998, it 
set a 10-day limit for holding a pretrial probable cause hearing 
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6601.5, as added by Stats. 1998, ch. 19, 
§ 2, p. 145); more recently, it set limits on granting continuances 
and required that continuance requests be made in writing and 
supported by good cause.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6603, subd. (c), 
 
People v. Eden (Jan. 21, 2022, A162818) [nonpub. opn.] 2022 WL 
188679 [5-year delay]; People v. Tran (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 330 
[11-year delay]; People v. Orey (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 529 [8-year 
delay]; People v. Sims (Feb. 24, 2021, C088029) [nonpub. opn.] 
2021 WL 717063 [9-year delay]; People v. Taylor (Jan. 28, 2021, 
B303044) [nonpub. opn.] 2021 WL 281796 [9-year delay]; People 
v. Allen (Jan. 27, 2021, B288740) [nonpub. opn.] 2021 WL 
268353 [15-year delay]; In re Butler (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 614 
[13-year delay]; People v. DeCasas (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 785 
[13-year delay]; People v. Bradley (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 32 [3-
year delay]; People v. Teluci (Nov. 4, 2020, A155206) [nonpub. 
opn.] 2020 WL 6482396 [11-year delay]; People v. Raker (Aug. 
20, 2020, B299718) [nonpub. opn.] 2020 WL 4877437 [11-year 
delay]; People v. Barrcena (Aug. 3, 2020, B289917) [nonpub. 
opn.] 2020 WL 4435548 [11-year delay]; People v. Burns (May 
21, 2020, B296809) [nonpub. opn.] 2020 WL 2570173 [13-year 
delay]; People v. Strahan (Feb. 5, 2020, B295295) [nonpub. opn.] 
2020 WL 563906 [22-year delay].) 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
as amended by Stats. 2019, ch. 606, § 1.)  But despite various 
calls to set firm limits on the scheduling of trial, the Legislature 
has thus far declined to do so, instead choosing to give courts 
and parties greater flexibility in matters of trial timing.  (See, 
e.g., Litmon, at p. 1172.)   
 
More fundamentally, SVP trials are unlike criminal trials 
in that they are not aimed primarily at establishing an 
individual’s liability for past events, but instead at establishing 
the individual’s present need for mental health treatment.  
Although an SVP proceeding may involve inquiry into certain 
facts about an individual’s criminal history (see, e.g., Walker, 
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 185), the central focus of an SVP trial is 
whether the individual currently has a mental disorder that 
poses a danger to the public and thus requires hospitalization 
(Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1162).  Once a judge has found 
probable cause to believe an individual is an SVP, that 
individual is held in a state hospital and begins to receive 
mental health treatment — even before trial is ever held.  For 
this reason, both sides may have a common interest in delaying 
trial.  From the individual’s perspective, allowing more time for 
treatment may ultimately improve the chance of success at trial, 
insofar as treatment may help address a mental disorder that a 
jury might otherwise find poses a risk to the public.  (See, e.g., 
In re Butler, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 635 (Butler).)  While 
individuals committed as SVPs after trial may later petition for 
release, conditions are generally more favorable at the initial 
trial, where the state always bears the burden of proving beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the individual qualifies as an SVP.  
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6604; cf. id., §§ 6605, 6608 [describing 
procedures for postcommitment release].)  For the state’s part, 
there are limited incentives to expend the resources necessary 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
to push the case toward trial when, following a finding of 
probable cause, the individual is already being hospitalized and 
receiving treatment. 
 
Understanding why parties may have incentives to delay 
SVP trials in general does not, of course, tell us the reasons for 
delay in any particular case.  Nor does the Legislature’s choice 
to avoid imposing statutory time limits justify prolonged delay 
or tell us whether the delay is consistent with an individual’s 
constitutional rights.  In recent years, the Courts of Appeal have 
confronted a number of cases calling for consideration of these 
questions.  (See, e.g., In re Kerins, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 1084 
[14-year pretrial delay and extended absence from court did not 
violate due process], review granted; People v. Tran, supra, 62 
Cal.App.5th 
330 
[11-year 
delay 
between 
petition 
for 
commitment and SVP retrial did not violate due process]; People 
v. Landau (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 (Landau) [seven-year 
delay did not violate due process].)  In three cases, courts found 
that extended delays violated the due process rights of alleged 
SVPs. 
 
In the first of these cases, Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th 
36, the Court of Appeal reviewed the record of the 17-year delay 
in that case and affirmed the superior court’s finding that delays 
sought by defense counsel could not be attributed to Vasquez 
himself, but instead resulted from an institutional breakdown 
related to budget cuts and understaffing in the public defender’s 
office that handled his case.  (Id. at pp. 54, 66, citing Vermont v. 
Brillon, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 94 (Brillon).)  Concluding the delay 
violated Vasquez’s due process right to a timely SVP trial, the 
court dismissed the petition for commitment.   
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
 
Two years later, the appellate court in People v. DeCasas, 
supra, 54 Cal.App.5th 785 (DeCasas) confronted a 13-year delay 
caused by “the same reduction of the SVP unit staff” at the same 
public defender’s office as in Vasquez.  (DeCasas, at p. 809.)  
Following the logic of Vasquez, the court found a due process 
violation and dismissed the petition for commitment.  (Id. at 
p. 813.) 
 
Finally, the court in Butler, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th 614 
dismissed a petition for commitment after finding a due process 
violation based on pretrial delay.  Though there were “several 
factors 
. . . 
suggesting 
that 
the 
public 
defender’s 
mismanagement of this case went beyond any particular 
attorney’s performance,” the court found that even if those 
circumstances did not constitute systemic breakdown in the 
public defender’s office, it would be “fundamentally unfair to 
hold Butler personally and solely accountable for delays caused 
by his counsel” where the record showed that counsel refused to 
convey Butler’s explicit demands for trial, failed to demand a 
probable cause hearing or consult with a defense expert, and did 
not ever “come close to being ready for trial.”  (Id. at p. 658.)   
 
In response to Vasquez and cases that followed, the 
Legislature amended the SVP Act to prescribe more demanding 
requirements for seeking and granting trial continuances.  The 
statute now requires that motions for trial continuances be in 
writing, supported by good cause, and resolved in a timely 
manner.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6603, subd. (c), as amended by 
Stats. 2019, ch. 606, § 1.)  While these amendments provide 
procedural safeguards against unwarranted delays, they do not 
address whether or when an SVP commitment trial may become 
untimely as a result of previously granted continuances.   
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
III. 
 
We turn, then, to the question before us, which concerns 
the constitutional principles governing the timeliness of SVP 
trials.  The due process clauses of both the federal and state 
Constitutions forbid the state from depriving individuals of their 
liberty without due process of law.  (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, 
§ 1; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).)3  Civil commitment under 
the SVP Act undoubtedly involves “a significant deprivation of 
liberty.”  (People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200, 209; see Kansas 
v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 356–357.)  “The fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ”  (Mathews v. 
Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333 (Mathews).)  Thus, as every 
Court of Appeal to address the issue has agreed, individuals 
facing commitment under the SVP Act have a due process right 
to a timely trial.  (See, e.g., Orozco, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 179–180; People v. Litmon (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 383, 395–
399 (Litmon II); Landau, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 27; 
Butler, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 637.) 
 
Although the appellate courts have agreed on this 
threshold point, they have expressed uncertainty about the 
appropriate framework for evaluating claims of excessive 
pretrial delay under the due process clause.  (See, e.g., Litmon 
 
3  
Although Camacho brings a claim under both the federal 
and state Constitutions, he focuses exclusively on federal 
authorities.  While we reaffirm that we have the “power and 
authority to construe the state Constitution independently” 
(Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1152, fn. 19), Camacho has 
offered no arguments specific to the California Constitution.  
Our analysis, like the parties’, therefore centers on the federal 
Constitution.    
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
II, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 399 [noting the United States 
Supreme Court has not addressed the issue].)  In the absence of 
more specific guidance, the Courts of Appeal have uniformly 
borrowed the Barker framework used to adjudicate claims of 
speedy trial violations in criminal cases.  (Barker v. Wingo, 
supra, 407 U.S. 514 (Barker); People v. Williams (2013) 58 
Cal.4th 197 (Williams).)  But several courts, including the Court 
of Appeal in this case, have also applied the Mathews general 
balancing test used to evaluate the adequacy of governmental 
process under the federal due process clause.  (Mathews, supra, 
424 U.S. 319.)  We now clarify that this general balancing under 
Mathews is unnecessary; it suffices to consider the factors laid 
out in Barker in deciding whether an alleged SVP has been 
deprived of the constitutional right to a timely trial. 
 
In Barker, the United States Supreme Court considered 
the scope of the right to a speedy criminal trial secured by the 
Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution.  The speedy trial 
right, the court observed, is a “slippery” one, “generically 
different from any of the other rights enshrined in the 
Constitution for the protection of the accused.”  (Barker, supra, 
407 U.S. at pp. 522, 519.)  For one thing, the accused may not 
actually want a speedy trial and may perceive a tactical 
advantage in delay; in particular, the accused may believe that 
the passage of time will hurt the prosecution’s ability to prove 
guilt more than it hurts the accused’s ability to defend.  (Id. at 
pp. 519–521.)  In this respect, the interests of the accused may 
not align with broader societal interests in the prompt 
resolution of criminal charges.  (Id. at p. 519; see id. at pp. 519–
521.)  And “perhaps most importantly,” the court explained, “the 
right to speedy trial is a more vague concept than other 
procedural rights.”  (Id. at p. 521.)  “We cannot definitely say 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be 
swift but deliberate.  As a consequence, there is no fixed point 
in the criminal process when the State can put the defendant to 
the choice of either exercising or waiving the right to a speedy 
trial. . . .  [A]ny inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a 
functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the 
case.”  (Id. at pp. 521–522, fn. omitted.) 
 
In keeping with these observations about the slippery 
nature of the speedy trial right, the Barker court declined to 
adopt any bright-line rules for determining when the right has 
been violated.  The court instead identified four factors for 
courts to examine:  the length of the pretrial delay, the reason 
for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and 
prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay.  (Barker, supra, 
407 U.S. at p. 530.)  The defendant carries the “burden of 
demonstrating a speedy trial violation under Barker’s 
multifactor test.”  (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 233.)  
Because none of these factors is dispositive, “courts must still 
engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process” to 
determine whether trial has been unconstitutionally delayed.  
(Barker, at p. 533.)   
 
Although Barker concerned the constitutional right to a 
speedy trial in a criminal case, courts have employed Barker’s 
flexible, 
four-factor 
inquiry 
to 
evaluate 
claims 
of 
unconstitutional delay in other contexts.  (See, e.g., United 
States v. $8,850 (1983) 461 U.S. 555, 564 [applying Barker test 
to evaluate pretrial delay in civil forfeiture case]; DeLancy v. 
Caldwell (10th Cir. 1984) 741 F.2d 1246, 1247–1248 (per 
curiam) [applying Barker factors to review delay in furnishing 
trial transcript to be used by incarcerated criminal defendant on 
appeal]; see also U.S. v. Sanders (6th Cir. 2006) 452 F.3d 572, 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
577 [holding that Barker applies to due process claims based on 
postsentencing delays, and citing similar cases from other 
circuits]; cf. Betterman v. Montana (2016) 578 U.S. 437, 448, fn. 
12 (Betterman) [reserving the question of how the due process 
clause applies to claims based on postsentencing delays, but 
noting that “[r]elevant considerations may include the length of 
and reasons for delay, the defendant’s diligence in requesting 
expeditious sentencing, and prejudice”].) 
The Barker factors are likewise appropriate for use in 
evaluating due process claims based on delays in holding SVP 
trials.  The timing of SVP trials is not in all respects comparable 
to the timing of criminal trials, but many of the same general 
principles translate.  Once a court has found probable cause to 
support an SVP commitment petition, an individual is 
committed to a state hospital for treatment while awaiting trial.  
But as is true in criminal cases, an individual’s interests in a 
timely trial do not run in just one direction; one individual facing 
SVP commitment may wish for a prompt trial, while another 
may perceive a tactical advantage in delay.  (See Barker, supra, 
407 U.S. at pp. 519–521.)  And, more fundamentally, as is true 
in criminal cases, it is impossible to define with any precision a 
fixed point at which trial must occur — “how long is too long in 
a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate.”  
(Id. at p. 521.)  The Barker test outlines a broadly relevant set 
of functional, case-dependent factors to consider in analyzing 
questions of trial timing.  To the extent the SVP context differs 
from the criminal context in which Barker was decided, the 
flexibility of the test allows courts to account for those 
differences. 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
 
Indeed, every Court of Appeal to address the issue to date 
has done so by employing the Barker factors.4  But in an 
abundance of caution, some have also employed the Mathews 
test to evaluate claims of SVP trial delay. 
 
The issue in Mathews was whether due process required 
an evidentiary hearing before the termination of Social Security 
disability payments.  (Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 323.)  The 
United States Supreme Court set out a three-factor framework 
to decide the question:  (1) “the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and 
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.”  (Id. at p. 335.)  With its focus on evaluating the value of 
additional procedural safeguards for the sake of reducing error, 
this test is more clearly suited to questions about the adequacy 
 
4  
So have other state high courts.  (See Matter of Ellison 
(2016) 305 Kan. 519, 531–532, 535 [adopting Barker test to 
evaluate delay of 1,705 days between probable cause hearing 
and trial under Kansas’s SVP Act]; Morel v. Wilkins (Fla. 2012) 
84 So.3d 226, 246 [applying Barker to evaluate 10-year pretrial 
delay under Florida’s SVP Act]; cf. In re Commitment of Beyer 
(2006) 287 Wis.2d 1, 25–31 [implicitly adopting Barker in 
evaluating due process violation for 22-month delay between 
filing of annual examination and probable cause hearing]; Com. 
v. Blake (2009) 454 Mass. 267, 279–280 (conc. opn. of Ireland, J.) 
[discussing relevance of Barker to evaluation of 13-month delay 
between bench trial for adjudication of sexual dangerousness 
and issuance of decision].) 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
of procedures used in government decisionmaking than to 
questions about the timing of those decisions.   
 
To be sure, the United States Supreme Court has invoked 
Mathews in evaluating certain timing-related claims.  In FDIC 
v. Mallen (1988) 486 U.S. 230, 231–232, 242, for instance, the 
high court employed a modified version of the Mathews test in 
considering, and rejecting, a claim that a statute allowing the 
government to suspend indicted bank officials facially violated 
due process because the statute did not guarantee that 
suspended officials would receive sufficiently prompt decisions 
on their appeals.  (See Litmon II, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 396–397 [discussing Mallen].)   
 
But the trial timing question here bears far greater 
resemblance to the trial timing question in Barker than to the 
question in Mallen about the adequacy of postsuspension review 
procedures.  And it serves no meaningful purpose to analyze 
pretrial delays under both Mathews and Barker, as some Courts 
of Appeal have done.  None of these courts has ever found that 
the Mathews inquiry yields a different result from Barker.  This 
is unsurprising, since the questions the courts have asked under 
Mathews — adapting the three-part test for the context of a 
challenge to trial timing — are all matters already addressed, 
with somewhat greater specificity, by the Barker factors.  We 
thus clarify that courts need not apply Mathews in this context; 
it suffices to apply the Barker factors in considering whether 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
25 
pretrial delay in an SVP case has resulted in a denial of due 
process.5 
 
 
 
5 
It is a separate question whether Barker dictates the 
remedy when a violation is found.  In the criminal context, 
Barker instructs that the sole remedy for a Sixth Amendment 
speedy trial violation is dismissal of the prosecution — an 
“unsatisfactorily severe remedy,” but, in the high court’s view, 
the “only possible” one.  (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 522; 
accord, Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 233.)  The Courts of 
Appeal have generally assumed the same must be true in 
evaluating claims of due process violations in the SVP context.  
(Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at pp. 82–83 [holding that 
dismissal is the only possible remedy for a timely trial violation 
and affirming the trial court’s order of dismissal]; DeCasas, 
supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 813 [same]; see also Butler, supra, 
55 Cal.App.5th at pp. 637, 664 [affirming order of dismissal 
without discussing the question of appropriate remedies].)   
Other courts have, however, suggested that there may be 
other possible remedies for unreasonable delays in this context.  
(U.S. v. Timms (4th Cir. 2012) 664 F.3d 436, 455, fn. 19 [“[E]ven 
if Timms’ case constituted a due process violation, the proper 
remedy would not be release, but to conduct the hearing and 
adjudicate whether he is a ‘sexually dangerous person’ under 
the statute.”]; see Orozco, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 179 
[finding no due process violation, but noting that when trial had 
not occurred within a reasonable time after the probable cause 
hearing, the remedy was to order that trial be held “forthwith”]; 
cf. Betterman, supra, 578 U.S. at pp. 445, 444 [discussing 
remedy for unconstitutional postconviction delay in sentencing 
and noting that “a dismissal remedy ordinarily would not be in 
order” and would provide “an unjustified windfall” to the 
defendant].)  The parties before us have not addressed the 
question of possible alternative remedies in this case and we 
have no occasion to decide it. 
  
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
26 
IV. 
With this background in mind, we turn to Camacho’s due 
process claim.  The Court of Appeal in this case reviewed the 
trial court’s denial of relief for abuse of discretion.  Under that 
standard, “[t]he trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for 
substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de 
novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only 
if arbitrary and capricious.”  (Haraguchi v. Superior Court 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712, fns. omitted.)  Neither party 
here contends we should employ a different standard of review.  
Ultimately, however, the standard of review is not dispositive, 
because Camacho fails to establish a due process violation under 
any possible standard. 
A. 
We begin with the first Barker factor, the length of the 
pretrial delay.  This factor operates as a threshold hurdle; 
“[u]ntil there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, 
there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go 
into the balance.”  (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 530.)  “If the 
accused makes this showing, the court must then consider . . . 
the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare 
minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.”  
(Doggett v. United States (1992) 505 U.S. 647, 652 (Doggett).)   
 
Here, 
Camacho 
awaits 
trial 
on 
a 
petition 
for 
recommitment that was filed in 2006.  Although this delay is not 
entirely out of line with delays seen in other SVP cases, it is an 
exceedingly lengthy delay all the same.  The Attorney General 
contends that our inquiry should focus more narrowly on the 
eight-year period from 2010 to 2018, when Camacho did not 
personally appear in court.  The Attorney General notes that 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
27 
Camacho “makes no real effort to establish that he was denied 
his speedy trial right between 2006 and 2010,” when Camacho 
frequently appeared personally in court and had entered a 
general time waiver.  The Attorney General concedes, however, 
that an eight-year delay is “significant” in its own right, and so 
“the length of the delay weighs in Camacho’s favor.”  We agree; 
the first Barker factor unquestionably supports Camacho’s 
claim of a constitutional timely trial violation. 
B. 
We next turn to the second Barker factor, the reasons for 
the delay.  This is the “flag all litigants seek to capture” (United 
States v. Loud Hawk (1986) 474 U.S. 302, 315) because the 
permissibility of pretrial delay depends to a great extent on who 
bears responsibility for it and why.   
In analyzing the second factor, courts examine “whether the 
government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for th[e] 
delay.”  (Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 651; Barker, supra, 407 
U.S. at p. 530.)  Courts also examine why the delay occurred, for 
“different weights should be assigned to different reasons.”  
(Barker, at p. 531.)  If the government deliberately delays trial 
to hamper the defense, for instance, that effort at manipulation 
“should be weighted heavily against the government.”  (Ibid.)  “A 
more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts 
should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be 
considered 
since 
the 
ultimate 
responsibility 
for 
such 
circumstances must rest with the government rather than with 
the defendant.  Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing 
witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.”  (Ibid.)  By 
contrast, “if delay is attributable to the defendant, then his 
waiver [of his right to a speedy trial] may be given effect under 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
28 
standard waiver doctrine.”  (Id. at p. 529; accord, Brillon, supra, 
556 U.S. at p. 90.) 
 
Our analysis of the reasons for delay in this case is 
hampered to some extent by the limited record before us.  We 
emphasize that trial courts have a responsibility to maintain an 
adequate record for review.  The parties have, however, 
stipulated to an undisputed record that forms a sufficient basis 
for our opinion today.  In the majority of the hearings at which 
delays were sought and granted, the record does not identify the 
party that requested the continuance.  But in every instance 
where the available record identifies the party moving for a 
continuance, the record shows that it was defense counsel — 
either alone, or jointly with the People.  The record also does not 
show a single instance of the defense objecting to a continuance.  
In other words, as far as the record shows, virtually all the 
delays in this case were either sought by the defense or agreed 
to by the defense, and no continuances were requested solely by 
the People.  Camacho does not contend otherwise.  Against that 
backdrop, we assess the conduct of the defense, the prosecution, 
and the trial court in turn.  
1. 
 
It is undisputed that Camacho — either personally or 
through counsel — either sought or agreed to most of the delay 
in this case.  The central point of dispute between the parties is 
whether we should distinguish between those delays Camacho 
personally agreed to and those to which his counsel assented on 
his behalf, particularly during the eight-year period when 
Camacho did not personally appear in court. 
 
In general, delays sought by the defendant’s counsel weigh 
against the defendant’s claim of a speedy trial violation.  
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
29 
(Brillon, supra, 556 U.S. at pp. 90–91.)  This rule flows from the 
ordinary principle that an “ ‘attorney is the [defendant’s] agent 
when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation,’ ” 
such that the client must assume the consequences of the 
attorney’s delay.  (Ibid., quoting Coleman v. Thompson (1991) 
501 U.S. 722, 753 (Coleman).)   
 
Applying this principle in Brillon, supra, 556 U.S. 81, the 
United States Supreme Court reversed a state court’s decision 
that pretrial delay should be charged against the state when the 
blame for the delay lay with court-appointed counsel for an 
indigent criminal defendant.  (Id. at p. 92.)  The high court 
explained that “assigned counsel generally are not state actors 
for purposes of a speedy-trial claim. . . .  [¶]  . . .  Their ‘inability 
or unwillingness . . . to move the case forward,’ [citation], may 
not be attributed to the State simply because they are assigned 
counsel.”  (Id. at pp. 92–93, fn. omitted.)  The court noted that 
the analysis might be different if, as Brillon had argued, the 
delay was shown to result from “a systemic ‘breakdown in the 
public defender system.’ ”  (Id. at p. 94.)  But, the court observed, 
the Vermont Supreme Court had “made no determination, and 
nothing in the record suggest[ed], that institutional problems 
caused any part of the delay in Brillon’s case.”  (Ibid.)   
 
In Camacho’s case, the Court of Appeal concluded that 
“the record contains substantial evidence that the delay was ‘the 
result of defense counsel’s agreement or . . . explicit request.’ ”  
The court cited Brillon’s holding that delays caused by defense 
counsel are ordinarily charged to the defendant.  The court 
acknowledged the high court’s suggestion that delay caused by 
appointed counsel could be charged to the state if there was a 
systemic breakdown in the public defender system, citing 
Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th 36 and DeCasas, supra, 54 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
30 
Cal.App.5th 785.  But the court noted that in Camacho’s case 
“the record does not support such a finding.” 
 
Camacho argues the Court of Appeal mistakenly 
construed Brillon to mean that delay caused by defense counsel 
may be charged against the state only when there is a systemic 
breakdown of the public defender system and under no other 
circumstances.  It is unclear whether the appellate court so held 
or was simply responding to what it understood as Camacho’s 
argument that there had been an “institutional breakdown.”  In 
any event, like Camacho, we do not read Brillon as standing for 
any such broad proposition; Brillon addressed a hypothetical 
systemic breakdown of the public defender system because that 
was the argument presented in the case.   The Attorney General, 
for his part, acknowledges that a constitutional problem might 
arise if Camacho had shown “that, during the eight years at 
issue, his absence from the courtroom had been unknowing or 
involuntary, or if Camacho had demonstrated that his attorney 
had waived time against Camacho’s wishes.”  In those 
circumstances, “the People would likely agree that Camacho 
suffered a due process violation.”  (Cf. Butler, supra, 55 
Cal.App.5th at p. 658 [finding due process violation where 
alleged SVP explicitly demanded trial and defense counsel failed 
to convey those demands to the court or make progress towards 
trial].)  We, too, agree that Brillon does not prevent a court from 
taking such matters into account. 
 
Still, Camacho provides no sufficient reason for us to 
depart from the ordinary rule that delays sought by counsel are 
attributed to their client.  (Brillon, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 90.)  
Camacho does not allege that his eight-year absence from court 
was involuntary.  Nor does he allege that his attorney waived 
time against his express wishes.  His argument is, instead, that 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
31 
delays sought by defense counsel during a period when he did 
not personally appear in court should not count against him, 
solely by virtue of his absence.  We reject this broad argument.  
(See People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 799 [finding the 
defendant’s absence from 17 pretrial proceedings did not violate 
constitutional right to be present and noting that most of the 
proceedings “concerned routine legal and procedural matters”].)   
 
There is no reason why, standing alone, absence from 
court would relieve an individual of responsibility for delays 
sought by counsel who was acting as the individual’s agent.  
(Coleman, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 753.)  Of course, an individual’s 
extended absence from court may raise concerns about whether 
the individual’s wishes about timing have been adequately 
considered; when an individual is absent from court, it becomes 
more difficult to evaluate whether the individual has been 
adequately informed about and agrees with counsel’s proposed 
approach to trial timing.  Here, however, the record contains no 
indication that Camacho was inadequately informed of — much 
less disagreed with — counsel’s approach to trial timing during 
his eight-year absence from court.   
 
Although Davis at one point referenced Camacho’s remote 
location as an obstacle to trial preparation, there is nothing in 
the record to indicate Davis and Camacho faced substantial 
obstacles in communicating in general.6  The continuances and 
 
6  
The transcript of the hearing from October 18, 2018 
reflects one relevant exchange between Camacho and Davis.  
Davis stated, “The Vasquez case has raised some issues that are 
certainly parallel to Mr. Camacho’s situation.”  The prosecutor 
responded that he would not object to “resetting the trial within 
60 days of today.”  Davis reminded the judge that Camacho did 
 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
32 
time waivers during the period when Camacho was absent from 
court were consistent with continuances and waivers that had 
been entered before 2010, when Camacho did regularly appear 
in court.  And Camacho’s first reappearance in court after eight 
years was uneventful.  On that date, Camacho did not assert his 
timely trial rights, complain about his absence from court, or 
otherwise express dissatisfaction with the progress of his case.  
He also confirmed that he had Davis’s mailing address, which, 
if nothing else, suggests he had an available method of 
communicating with Davis about any concerns he may have 
had. 
 
In sum, we agree with Camacho that an extended absence 
from court could raise concerns about an SVP’s opportunity to 
complain about attorney-sought delay, but we conclude that 
absence alone does not provide a sufficient basis to depart from 
the ordinary rule that delays sought by attorneys are properly 
attributed to the clients they represent.  On the available record, 
Camacho bears most of the responsibility for the delay he now 
challenges. 
 
not have any updated evaluations, and Camacho added, “[a]nd 
this is why I wanted to not waive any more time because they 
have never come to see me at any time after nine years.  [¶]  . . . 
[¶]  I’ve been waiting and waiting for, you know, for somebody 
to come and talk to me about anything.  [¶]  And I was looking 
at this Vasquez case, and it kind of like — it does apply to 
myself.  [¶]  Seventeen years of not having a representative to 
get me ready for trial.” 
 
We note, however, that Camacho does not assert here that 
he was unable to speak with Davis or an expert for nine years, 
or that he was unrepresented for 17 years.  Both claims are, 
moreover, unsupported by the record the parties stipulated to 
here. 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
33 
2. 
While the People were not primarily responsible for the 
delay in the case, the record also shows the People made little  
effort to move the case toward trial.  The Attorney General 
acknowledges as much, explaining that “[a]t least until the 
September 2018 decision in Vasquez, the People were amenable 
in many cases — including Camacho’s — to the defendant’s 
desire to delay trial for the purpose of progressing in treatment.  
If, before the case went to trial, the individual progressed in 
treatment to the point where he was no longer a danger to public 
safety, the People could simply dismiss the case.”  
 
Although 
this 
policy 
of 
acquiescence 
is 
perhaps 
understandable, it also carries important risks and drawbacks.  
For one thing, it invites reliance on the assumption that when 
the defense repeatedly requests continuances, it is because the 
alleged SVP has decided to indefinitely delay trial for the 
purpose of progressing in treatment.  Though this may be true 
of some alleged SVPs, it may not be true of other individuals, 
and individual preferences may change over time.  (See, e.g., 
Butler, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at pp. 635, 636 [noting alleged 
SVP “made sincere and repeated demands for a speedy trial . . . 
throughout his 12-year period of detention awaiting trial” and 
his “public defenders essentially ignored and disregarded his 
demands for a timely trial” by never communicating those 
demands in court].)  For another, permitting the alleged SVP to 
indefinitely delay trial discounts the broader societal interest in 
timely, definitive decisions about whether individuals satisfy 
the criteria for involuntary commitment — where commitment 
necessarily comes at taxpayer expense and carries personal 
costs for families and communities from whom the individual 
will remain indefinitely separated. 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
34 
 
Because alleged SVPs have no duty to bring themselves to 
trial, the government has a responsibility to ensure the case is 
moving forward in a manner that is consistent with due process.  
When faced with unwarranted delays or repeated continuances, 
“diligent prosecution of an SVP petition may necessitate 
objecting to the delays, insisting upon trial deadlines, and 
making the trial court aware of the length of time since the filing 
of the SVP petition or other pertinent details from the record.”  
(Butler, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 655.) 
 
In this case, the Court of Appeal observed that “[n]othing 
in the record suggests that the prosecution engaged in 
deliberate delay tactics or acted in bad faith.”  We agree with 
the court’s conclusion in this regard, and Camacho does not 
dispute that reading of the record.  He argues, however, that the 
Court of Appeal erred in implicitly requiring a showing of bad 
faith to prevail on a timely trial claim.  To the extent that the 
Court of Appeal’s opinion may be construed as applying such a 
rule, we agree with Camacho that bad faith on the part of the 
prosecution is not necessary to establish a constitutional 
violation.  As the United States Supreme Court recognized in 
Doggett, “Between diligent prosecution and bad-faith delay, 
official negligence in bringing an accused to trial occupies the 
middle ground.  While not compelling relief in every case where 
bad-faith delay would make relief virtually automatic, neither 
is negligence automatically tolerable.”  (Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. 
at pp. 656–657.)   
 
Ultimately, though the People should have exhibited 
greater diligence in ensuring Camacho was timely brought to 
trial, the record shows that the People do not bear most of the 
responsibility for the delays; as discussed above, the 
responsibility falls primarily with the defense. 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
35 
3. 
 
We now assess the trial court’s responsibility for the delay.  
In the criminal context, this court has recognized that the trial 
court “ ‘has an affirmative constitutional obligation to bring the 
defendant to trial in a timely manner.  [Citation.]  And to that 
end, it is entirely appropriate for the court to set deadlines and 
to hold the parties strictly to those deadlines unless a 
continuance is justified by a concrete showing of good cause for 
the delay.  [Citation.]  The trial judge is the captain of the ship; 
and it goes without saying that the ship will go in circles if the 
crew is running around the deck with no firm marching 
orders.’ ”  (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 251, quoting State 
v. Couture (2010) 357 Mont. 398, 427.) 
 
Camacho’s case did indeed go in circles, and the trial court 
appears to bear some responsibility.  From the limited available 
record, it appears the trial court allowed long periods of time to 
elapse without setting a trial date at all; if the trial court made 
efforts to move the case along, they are not apparent.   
 
The Attorney General argues that the trial court’s conduct 
is “more properly characterized as acceding in Camacho’s desire 
to delay trial rather than as negligence.”  But what we have said 
of the People is equally true of the trial court:  There are risks 
and drawbacks to a policy of readily acceding to an alleged SVP’s 
perceived wishes to delay trial.  Because trial courts ultimately 
control when trial will be held, they bear particular 
responsibility for preserving an alleged SVP’s constitutional 
right to a timely trial. 
 
Trial courts have a number of tools available to fulfill their 
responsibility to advance a case to trial in a timely manner.  
Courts should make affirmative inquiries about the procedural 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
36 
posture of a case and the status of counsel’s trial preparation; 
ask alleged SVPs about their wishes for the timing of trial (or, if 
the alleged SVP is not present, ask counsel whether there is 
ongoing communication with the alleged SVP about their wishes 
regarding trial timing); set a date for trial within a reasonable 
time from the probable cause hearing; and carefully examine the 
propriety of continuing that date once it has been set.  As in the 
criminal context, it is “ ‘entirely appropriate for the court to set 
deadlines and to hold the parties strictly to those deadlines.’ ”  
(Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 251.)   
 
Indeed, the recent amendments to the SVP Act now 
require the court to proceed with a trial date, once set, unless a 
continuance is justified by good cause.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 6603, subd. (c).)  To show good cause, the parties must provide 
written materials that detail “specific facts showing that a 
continuance is necessary.”  (Ibid.)  What constitutes good cause 
will vary from case to case, but a party’s showing of good cause 
should generally demonstrate due diligence in preparing for 
trial.  Any continuance shall last “only for the period of time 
shown to be necessary” by the specific factual circumstances 
justifying the continuance.  (Id., subd. (c)(7).)  Even when an 
alleged SVP has entered a time waiver, courts should remind 
the parties that a trial cannot be delayed indefinitely and must 
still be held within a reasonable timeframe. 
 
Trial courts also bear the critical duty of creating an 
adequate record to enable review of any claims that trial has 
been unconstitutionally delayed.  The limitations in the record 
of this case make our review challenging; such record 
deficiencies are to be avoided in future cases, and should be 
helped through careful adherence to the requirements of written 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
37 
justification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6603, 
subdivision (c).7  
 
Limited though the record may be in this case, however, 
both parties have stipulated to a joint version of events and the 
available record supplies a sufficient basis for our decision 
today.  On this record, while the court certainly could have done 
more to urge the case to trial and enforce deadlines, the 
responsibility for the delay rests primarily with the defense.  
The second Barker factor thus weighs against finding a violation 
of his constitutional right to a timely trial. 
C. 
Analysis of the third Barker factor, the petitioner’s 
assertion of his right to a timely trial, does not hinge on “ ‘the 
number of times the accused acquiesced or objected; rather, the 
focus is on the surrounding circumstances, such as the 
timeliness, persistence, and sincerity of the objections, the 
reasons for the acquiescence, whether the accused was 
represented by counsel, the accused’s pretrial conduct (as that 
conduct bears on the speedy trial right), and so forth.  [Citation.]  
The totality of the accused’s responses to the delay is indicative 
of whether he or she actually wanted a speedy trial.’ ”  
(Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 238, quoting State v. Couture, 
supra, 357 Mont. at p. 417.)  Viewing the complete picture 
matters because “[t]he more serious the deprivation [of the right 
 
7  
We additionally note that, as is typically true, a more 
complete record of proceedings may be developed by way of a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus.  In this case, Camacho has 
had the opportunity to present evidence that Davis acted 
against his wishes in requesting trial continuances and entering 
time waivers on his behalf.  He has not, however, presented any 
such evidence.   
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
38 
to a speedy trial], the more likely a defendant is to complain.”  
(Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 531.) 
It bears some emphasis that assertion of the right is only 
one factor in the analysis, and not a dispositive one; in Barker, 
the court explicitly rejected the argument that a defendant must 
expressly demand a speedy trial or else be deemed to have 
waived the right.  (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 528.)  Instead, 
the court instructed that “the defendant’s assertion of or failure 
to assert his right to a speedy trial” is just one factor to balance 
against the others and must be evaluated in a holistic manner.  
(Ibid.)  This flexibility allows courts “to attach a different weight 
to a situation in which the defendant knowingly fails to object 
from a situation in which his attorney acquiesces in long delay 
without adequately informing his client, or from a situation in 
which no counsel is appointed.”  (Id. at p. 529.)  The high court 
emphasized, however, that “failure to assert the right will make 
it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy 
trial.”  (Id. at p. 532.) 
According to the available record, Camacho first 
demanded trial in October 2018.  Camacho did not demand trial 
at any point over the previous decade, including in July 2018, 
when he made his first court appearance in eight years.  There 
is no evidence that he previously asked Davis to go to trial and 
was ignored; nor does he allege an inability to communicate with 
Davis during his eight-year absence from court.  Camacho was 
free to offer evidence that defense counsel acted against his 
wishes in delaying trial when he filed his motion to dismiss, but 
he did not do so.  In sum, there is no evidence that Camacho 
sought to go to trial before October 2018 and was prevented from 
exercising his right to do so.  On this record, we are not 
persuaded that Camacho desired trial before October 2018 and 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
39 
we conclude this Barker factor weighs against his claim of a due 
process violation.   
D. 
The final Barker factor is the prejudice to the defendant 
caused by the delay in bringing the case to trial.  “Prejudice, of 
course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of 
defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to 
protect.”  (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 532.)  In the criminal 
context, the court has identified “three such interests:  (i) to 
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize 
anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the 
possibility that the defense will be impaired.”  (Ibid.)  In the SVP 
context, we consider the same interests, but acknowledge 
differences in how the interests arise.   
We begin with the “most serious” interest:  the “possibility 
that the defense will be impaired.”  (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at 
p. 532.)  The Barker court identified this as the most important 
interest covered by the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, 
since impairment to an individual’s ability to present a defense 
“skews the fairness of the entire system.”  (Barker, at p. 532.)  
Of course, not every case raises such concerns; indeed, a 
criminal defendant may affirmatively deploy delay as a “defense 
tactic.”  (Id. at p. 521.)  “[U]nlike the right to counsel or the right 
to be free from compelled self-incrimination, deprivation of the 
right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused’s 
ability to defend himself.”  (Ibid.)  But in many criminal cases, 
a period of lengthy pretrial delay may impose real detriment to 
an individual’s ability to mount a defense; defense witnesses 
may die, disappear, or lose their memory of the relevant events.  
(Id. at p. 532.)  Because “time’s erosion of exculpatory evidence 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
40 
and testimony ‘can rarely be shown’ . . . we generally have to 
recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises the 
reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for 
that matter, identify.”  (Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 655, 
quoting Barker, at p. 532.)  Accordingly, in the criminal context, 
“ ‘[a]ffirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential 
to every speedy trial claim’ . . . ‘[w]hile such presumptive 
prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim . . . it is 
part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases 
with the length of delay.’ ”  (People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 
871, 892, quoting Doggett, at pp. 655–656.)   
There is little reason, however, to apply a presumption of 
trial prejudice in the SVP context.  As previously noted, trial on 
a petition for commitment under the SVP Act aims to establish 
whether a person meets the definition of an SVP at the time of 
trial.  This inquiry is categorically different from that of a 
criminal trial, where the issue is whether the defendant’s past 
conduct constitutes guilt of a particular offense.  In the SVP 
context, then, time ordinarily will not erase critical evidence for 
the defense, since the jury relies on recent expert evaluations to 
evaluate whether the individual qualifies as an SVP at the time 
of trial.  In Camacho’s case, for example, though his defense may 
suffer if the author of the favorable 2015 report recommending 
release became unavailable to testify, that evidence is unlikely 
to be dispositive.  Camacho will still need updated evaluations 
by mental health experts before he can proceed to trial.  Mental 
status may fluctuate over time, and the jury will focus on the 
most recent evidence to determine whether the alleged SVP 
meets the commitment criteria at the time of trial.  Severe 
prejudice to the alleged SVP’s defense is less likely to result 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
41 
purely as a function of the passage of time; as a result, no 
presumption of prejudice applies in this context.8 
In addition to prejudice at trial, the Barker court identified 
“oppressive pretrial incarceration” and the “anxiety and concern 
of the accused” as two other threats the speedy trial right was 
designed to ward against.  (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 532.)  
The court observed that “time spent in jail awaiting trial has a 
detrimental impact on the individual.  It often means loss of a 
job; it disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness.  Most jails 
offer little or no recreational or rehabilitative programs.”  (Ibid.)   
Being held in anticipation of an SVP trial, like pretrial 
detention in a jail, unquestionably entails a severe and 
oppressive restriction on liberty that may give rise to feelings of 
anxiety and concern.  (Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 
425–426 
[noting 
it 
is 
“indisputable 
that 
involuntary 
commitment to a mental hospital . . . can engender adverse 
social consequences to the individual”].)  But pretrial SVP 
custody does differ from pretrial criminal detention in certain 
pertinent respects.  After the trial court holds a probable cause 
hearing, alleged SVPs are confined at a state hospital, not jail, 
and begin receiving mental health treatment while they await 
trial.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600.05, subd. (a); id., §§ 6602, subd. 
(a), 6604.)  Pretrial treatment of the underlying mental disorder 
 
8  
We disapprove the following cases to the extent they apply 
a presumption of prejudice when evaluating a claimed violation 
of the due process right to a timely SVP trial:  People v. Tran, 
supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 354; In re Butler, supra, 55 
Cal.App.5th at p. 662; People v. Bradley, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 41; People v. DeCasas, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 808; 
People v. Superior Court (Vasquez), supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 74. 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
42 
that caused the state to seek commitment in the first place may 
ultimately facilitate the individual’s release before trial.  This 
observation does not, of course, minimize the oppressive nature 
of involuntary detention awaiting an SVP trial.  But it does to 
some extent distinguish pretrial incarceration at a state 
hospital from pretrial detention at a jail, which has few 
rehabilitative resources.  
Determining how heavily to weigh the prejudice resulting 
from pretrial custody therefore requires a sensitive inquiry into 
the circumstances of the case.  For individuals who have never 
received a favorable expert evaluation, delay in holding trial will 
generally entail less prejudice than for individuals who have a 
more substantial basis for arguing they do not satisfy the 
criteria for SVP commitment.  Where an individual makes such 
a showing, the amount of prejudice may increase as the length 
of the delay increases.  For example, in the case of an individual 
who has expert reports recommending release, a four-year delay 
in going to trial will generally be significantly more prejudicial 
than a one-year delay.   
Applying these general principles to Camacho’s case, the 
delay here had no appreciable impact on Camacho’s ability to 
present his defense.  In 2015, one out of four expert reports 
concluded — for the first time ever — that Camacho no longer 
met the criteria for commitment, and two of the other reports 
seemed to suggest he might qualify for conditional release in the 
future.  The length of delay since that point — approximately 
seven years — is significant, and Camacho has been 
involuntarily committed throughout that period.  We therefore 
find some amount of prejudice in Camacho’s case, but no 
indication that the delay has undermined the fairness of the 
proceedings.  Any prejudice is, moreover, extenuated by the fact 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
43 
that Camacho has not shown he in fact wanted a timely trial.  
(See Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 534 [“More important than 
the absence of serious prejudice, is the fact that Barker did not 
want a speedy trial”].)   
E. 
Balancing the Barker factors, we conclude that Camacho 
fails to demonstrate a violation of his due process right to a 
timely trial.  Only one factor — the length of the delay — 
strongly supports Camacho’s claim of a due process violation.  
Though the trial court and the state seemingly neglected their 
responsibility to bring the case to trial in a timely manner, we 
agree with the Court of Appeal that the defense, rather than the 
state, bears more responsibility for the delay.  Camacho did not 
demonstrate a desire to go to trial before 2018, nor did he suffer 
significant prejudice to his case as a result of the delay.  We find 
no violation of Camacho’s due process right to a timely trial. 
V. 
Camacho raises an alternative due process argument:  
that the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to 
“enact any procedural safeguards to ensure that [he] consented 
to the repeated delays in his case” during the eight-year period 
when he did not personally appear.  In Camacho’s view, if, at 
any given hearing, an alleged SVP is not “present in court with 
the opportunity to be heard,” due process mandates that “an 
appropriate written waiver” of personal appearance must be 
filed.   
We decline to hold that due process requires the 
defendant’s personal presence at every hearing, regardless of 
the substance of the hearing.  As a general rule, a criminal 
defendant has no due process right to be present at hearings 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
44 
unless “his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to 
the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.”  
(Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 105–106; id. at 
pp. 107–108 [“[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due 
process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be 
thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.”].)  There is no 
reason to believe a different rule should apply in the SVP 
context.  To require personal presence at every hearing would, 
moreover, entail transportation and other logistical costs not 
justified by any substantial benefit.  If an individual objects to 
delays and wishes to assert the right to a speedy or timely trial, 
he or she may communicate as much through counsel or 
communicate directly with the court; and courts may consider 
any difficulties in that communication when determining 
whether an individual’s timely trial right has been violated.  
(See Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 529.) 
 
As discussed above, Camacho fails to show that his 
prolonged absence from court was involuntary.  Camacho does 
not attempt to demonstrate that his presence at any of the 
hearings held in his absence would have had a “reasonable, 
substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges 
against him.”  (People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 861.)  Nor 
does Camacho allege, much less demonstrate, that his counsel 
acted against his wishes in seeking trial continuances during 
periods 
when 
Camacho 
was 
not 
personally 
present.  
Accordingly, we find no due process violation.  
VI. 
Although Camacho fails to establish a violation of his due 
process rights, the Attorney General concedes that the People 
and the trial court both could have done more to move the case 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
45 
along.  We agree.  It bears emphasis that an individual faced 
with potential SVP commitment has a due process right to trial 
at a reasonable time, and the People and trial court both bear 
responsibility for ensuring that right is respected.  The trial 
court, in particular, has responsibility to exercise its power over 
trial timing in a manner that takes account of the individual’s 
interests and that adequately guards against unjustified delays. 
We have already described what this responsibility 
entails, including careful compliance with new statutory 
procedures 
designed 
to 
safeguard 
against 
unjustified 
continuances of previously set trial dates.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 6603, subd. (c).)  In view of the vital importance of ensuring 
adequate procedures are in place to protect the interests of the 
defendant, the state, and the public, we further call on the 
Judicial Council to examine the issue.  As the policy and 
rulemaking body of the courts, the Judicial Council is in the best 
position to study the issue of pretrial delays in SVP cases with 
the input of interested persons and consider what, if any, 
additional safeguards would facilitate timely adjudication of 
petitions for commitment under the SVP Act.   
Here, however, although the trial court and the People 
should have taken more affirmative steps to bring Camacho to 
trial, Camacho fails to demonstrate a violation of his due process 
right to a timely trial on the petition for recommitment under  
 
 
CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
46 
the SVP Act.  Because the Court of Appeal reached the same 
conclusion, we affirm its judgment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     KRUGER, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Camacho v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 1/21/22 – 5th Dist. 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S273391 
Date Filed:  August 31, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Merced 
Judge:  Ronald W. Hansen 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Fitzgerald, Alvarez & Ciummo and Douglas C. Foster for Petitioner. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric 
L. Christoffersen, Julie A. Hokans, Rachelle A. Newcomb and Sally 
Espinoza, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Douglas C. Foster 
Fitzgerald, Alvarez & Ciummo 
3185 M Street, Suite 200 
Merced, CA 95348 
(209) 691-7280 
 
Sally Espinoza 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 210-6282