Title: Ragan v. State
Citation: 318 So. 2d 879
Docket Number: 48628
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: September 22, 1975

318 So. 2d 879 (1975) Bobby RAGAN v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 48628. Supreme Court of Mississippi. September 22, 1975. *880 Farese, Farese, Jones &amp; Farese, Ashland, for appellant. A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by John C. Ellis, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before RODGERS, SUGG and BROOM, JJ. RODGERS, Presiding Justice. The appellant Bobby Ragan was indicated, tried, convicted and sentenced by the Circuit Court of Tippah County, Mississippi, to serve a term of seven (7) years in the state penitentiary on a charge of having burglarized a drugstore in Tippah County, Mississippi. The state offered testimony to show that the town marshal of Walnut, Mississippi, at approximately 12:40 A.M. on September 19, 1972, discovered a drugstore had been broken into. He saw a man running away from the building toward an automobile parked on the other side of the street. He also saw the defendant in the store and saw him run out the back door. This automobile was discovered to be an automobile belonging to the defendant's father. Two sets of footprints led away from the back door of the drugstore. The officers obtained bloodhounds and used them to follow the footprints. The dogs led them to the defendant's father's home, where the defendant was found hiding in the attic. The father of the defendant used a shotgun to prevent the officers from entering the house until a warrant was obtained. In rebuttal to the evidence offered by the state, the defendant introduced one James Bartlett, Chief Deputy Sheriff of Hardeman County, Tennessee, who testified that he had known the defendant all of his life and that on the 19th day of September at 12:30 A.M. he saw the defendant at Buster's Place in Hardeman County, Tennessee, twelve (12) miles from Walnut, Mississippi. At that time this officer was in the company of another officer. He testified that he saw "Bobby Ragan and another fellow and two women sitting there talking." None of these witnesses were introduced, nor did the defendant testify. After the state and the defendant had rested their respective testimony, the defendant offered the following instructions: The trial judge modified Instruction No. 12, so as to strike out the clause "nor does this fact arouse even a suspicion that he is guilty." The defendant requested the following two instructions: The trial judge refused Instruction No. 11 upon the ground that this instruction was a comment upon the weight of the evidence. He also refused Instruction No. 18 upon the ground that the instruction limited the jury to determining the guilt of the defendants to the testimony of the officer's identification of the defendant. We are of the opinion that the acts of the trial judge complained of by the defendant as to the instructions were not reversible errors. In the first place, Instruction No. 12, as modified, is sufficient to meet the test required by Funches v. State, 125 Miss. 140, 87 So. 487 (1921), cited by the appellant. The court pointed out in Funches that no instruction was given to the jury advising the jury that the defendant did not have to testify. The Court then said: This type of instruction is, of course, based upon the following language of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 13-1-9 (1972): In the case of Wood v. State, 221 Miss. 901, 74 So. 2d 851 (1954), a similar instruction was refused the defendant, and the court said that the refusal of the instruction was error, but harmless in that case, because the defendant was positively identified by Mrs. Hendrix. The defendant was positively identified in the instant case by the town marshal. Moreover, the trial court permitted a good instruction to be *882 given to the jury on the subject in the present case. Compare Rose v. State, 222 Miss. 699, 76 So. 2d 835 (1955). Instruction No. 13 was on the same legal proposition granted in Instruction No. 12. The trial court is not required to grant several instructions on the same question in a different verbiage. McMillan v. State, 198 Miss. 179, 21 So. 2d 586 (1945); Barnes v. State, 164 Miss. 126, 143 So. 475 (1932); Taylor v. State, 158 Miss. 505, 130 So. 502 (1930); Smith v. State, 128 Miss. 258, 90 So. 883 (1922). We hold that the trial judge committed no error in refusing Instruction No. 13. The appellant also complains that the trial court refused to grant requested Instructions No. 11 and 18, as set out above. Instruction No. 11 was refused by the court upon the ground that it was a "comment upon the weight of the evidence." We think that the trial judge was correct in so holding, since this instruction violates the terms of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-17-35 (1972), wherein it is said: "The judge in any criminal cause, shall not sum up or comment on the testimony, or charge the jury as to the weight of the evidence; ..." There is another reason, however, why the refusal to grant a cautionary instruction is not reversible error. This Court is committed to the rule that the refusal to grant a cautionary instruction as to the testimony of an accomplice cannot be assigned as an error, since it may be offered within the discretion of the trial judge. Wellborn v. State, 140 Miss. 640, 105 So. 769 (1925). Instruction No. 18 is clearly erroneous. It predicates the entire case of guilty or innocence of the defendant upon whether or not there could be a reasonable doubt that the officer actually identified the defendant as the man he saw in the drugstore. Reasonable doubt of the guilt or innocence of an accused in a criminal case is not based on just a part of the testimony, but, rather, upon the entire case including the circumstances surrounding the alleged crime. It is also contended that the district attorney commented on the fact that the defendant did not testify in violation of accused's constitutional right to stay silent. The record shows the following colloquy: There is no bill of exceptions to this statement, and no motion for a new trial on the grounds now advanced is shown in the record. The appellant argues that this is an ill-disguised comment intended and calculated to draw the jury's attention to the fact that the defendant did not testify and cause the jury to query why Bobby did not answer the district attorney. The statement of the district attorney is based upon the testimony of the city marshal that he saw the defendant in the drugstore: "Somewhere around halfway of the building, facing the front door." The officer then said: "He broke and run, run out the back door." A district attorney has the right to comment on the evidence and may analyze and deduce inferences from the testimony and may even call witnesses by their names, so long as he does not violate proper decorum of the court or infringe upon the defendant's right not to testify. Stewart *883 v. State, 170 Miss. 540, 155 So. 347 (1934); Blackwell v. State, 161 Miss. 487, 135 So. 192, 137 So. 189 (1931); Callas v. State, 151 Miss. 617, 118 So. 447 (1928). We cannot agree with the contention of the defendant that the statement made by the district attorney was in fact a comment intended to call attention to the fact that the defendant did not testify in his own defense. The district attorney had the right to comment on the fact that the man identified as the defendant ran away and did not stop and talk to the officer. We have found no reversible error in the record of this case, and we are of the opinion that there is ample testimony on which to base a conviction. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court. Affirmed. GILLESPIE, C.J., and PATTERSON, INZER, SMITH, ROBERTSON and WALKER, JJ., concur.