Title: Ex parte The Poarch Band of Creek Indians and PCI Gaming Authority d/b/a Creek Casino Montgomery. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Adrianne Kelly and Edward Gilbert v. The Poarch Band of Creek Indians et al.) (Montgomery Circuit Court: CV-13-900487). Petition Denied. No Opinion.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1121411
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 23, 2014

Rel: 5/23/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1121411
____________________
Ex parte Poarch Band of Creek Indians and PCI Gaming
Authority d/b/a Creek Casino Montgomery
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Adrianne Kelly and Edward Gilbert
v.
Poarch Band of Creek Indians et al.)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-13-900487)
BRYAN, Justice.
PETITION DENIED; NO OPINION.
Bolin, Murdock, and Main, JJ., concur.
Moore, C.J., concurs specially.
1121411
MOORE, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
Because the Poarch Band of Creek Indians and PCI Gaming
Authority d/b/a Creek Casino Montgomery (hereinafter referred
to collectively as "PBCI") do not have a clear legal right to
sovereign immunity in an Alabama state court from a dram-shop
action, I concur in denying their petition for a writ of
mandamus. I write separately to examine the law on this
question of first impression.
I. Facts and Procedural History  
 On August 8, 2011, shortly after leaving Creek Casino
Montgomery, a casino operated on land owned by the Poarch Band
of Creek Indians, Elfago Ramirez crossed the centerline on
Wares Ferry Road and collided head-on with a vehicle traveling
in the opposite lane. The collision caused injuries to
Adrianne Kelly and Edward Gilbert ("the plaintiffs"), the
occupants of the other vehicle. On March 21, 2013, in the
Montgomery Circuit Court, the plaintiffs sued PBCI and other
defendants 
alleging 
that 
PBCI 
furnished 
alcoholic 
beverages 
to
Ramirez knowing that he was visibly intoxicated.
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Citing 
tribal 
immunity, 
PBCI 
moved 
to 
dismiss 
the 
action.1
The trial court denied the motion, finding that PBCI's
agreement to maintain dram-shop insurance as a condition of
receiving a liquor license for Creek Casino Montgomery
constituted an express waiver of any immunity from suit based
on a violation of Alabama's Dram Shop Act. § 6-5-71, Ala. Code
1975. PBCI then petitioned for a writ of mandamus on the
ground of immunity.
II. Standard of Review
 "[A] petition for a writ of mandamus is an appropriate
means for seeking review of an order denying a claim of
immunity." Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 176 (Ala. 2000).
"Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ that will be
issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in the
petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3)
the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court." Ex parte United Serv. Stations,
Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (1993).
PCI Gaming Authority, wholly owned by the Poarch Band and
1
chartered under its tribal laws, shares the tribe's immunity.
Freemanville Water Sys. Inc. v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians,
563 F.3d 1205, 1207 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009). 
3
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III. Analysis
A. Tribal Sovereign Immunity
"Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing
the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by
sovereign powers." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S.
49, 58 (1978). Thus, "an Indian tribe is subject to suit only
where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived
its immunity." Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Techs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998). Because the plaintiffs do not
contend that dram-shop actions by private parties against
Indian tribes have been authorized by Congress, the only issue
before the Court is whether PBCI has waived its immunity from
such actions.
"It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity
'"cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed."'"
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58 (quoting United States v.
Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976), quoting in turn United
States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)). Such a waiver must be
"clear." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi
Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991). "Absent an
effective waiver or consent, it is settled that a state court
4
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may not exercise jurisdiction over a recognized 
Indian 
tribe."
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of Wash., 433 U.S.
165, 172 (1977).
B. Dram Shop Act and Sovereign Immunity
A person injured by someone who is intoxicated may sue
for damages anyone who caused the intoxication of the party
causing the injury by furnishing "liquor or beverages"
contrary to law. § 6-5-71, Ala. Code 1975. Regulations of the
Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board ("the ABC Board")
"have the full force and effect of law." § 28-3-49(a), Ala.
Code 1975. "No ABC Board on-premises licensee, employee or
agent thereof shall serve any person alcoholic beverages if
such person appears, considering the totality of the
circumstances, to be intoxicated." Reg. 20-X-6-.02(4), Ala.
Admin. Code (ABC Board).
Although the complaint states a cause of action against
PBCI under the Dram Shop Act and certain ABC Board
regulations, PBCI argues that the defense of sovereign
immunity based on its tribal status requires dismissal of this
action. Although the United States Supreme Court has
questioned "the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine" of 
tribal
5
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immunity, Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758, the plaintiffs do not
attack immunity per se. They argue, instead, that PBCI waived
its immunity by subjecting itself to licensing by the ABC
Board. 
They 
point 
in 
particular 
to 
the 
financial-
responsibility provision in the ABC Board regulations that is
reprinted in substantial part in the pre-application packet
for an ABC Board license: 
"(1) All retail licensees of the ABC Board shall
maintain, at all times, liquor liability (dram shop)
insurance described below and shall comply with the
following conditions of requirements of Financial
Responsibility.
"(a) Prior to the issuance or renewal of any
retail alcoholic beverage license, each applicant
must 
provide 
the 
ABC 
Board 
with 
sufficient
information that it has liquor liability (dram shop)
insurance coverage in the amount of at least one
hundred 
thousand 
dollars 
($100,000.00) 
per
occurrence, exclusive of, and separate from, any
attorney fees or other costs incurred in the defense
of any claim asserted against the insured."
Reg. 20-X-5-.14, Ala. Admin. Code (ABC Board) ("Requirements
Of Financial Responsibility By Licensees") (emphasis added).
See PBCI's brief, Exhibit 1. The first question on the formal
application for a retail liquor license asks in oversize
letters: "Has applicant complied with ABC Regulation 
# 
20-X-5-
6
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.14 regarding financial responsibility?" PBCI circled "Y" on
its application. Plaintiffs' brief, Exhibit 5.
The plaintiffs question how PBCI can be required to
maintain dram-shop insurance for "the defense of any claim
asserted against the insured" and yet claim immunity in a
civil action that implicates the protection provided by that
insurance. The plaintiffs contend that allowing tribal
immunity to shield PBCI from a dram-shop action would nullify
the insurance provision of the state liquor law that PBCI
agreed to observe as a condition for licensing. In short, the
plaintiffs argue that PBCI's acceptance of the financial-
responsibility provision as a condition for obtaining an
alcoholic-beverage license operates as an express waiver of
the defense of sovereign immunity in a dram-shop action. 
C. The No-Forum Conundrum2
Although PBCI stated in its motion to dismiss that the
"[p]laintiffs' remedy, if any, lies in the tribal court
established by the Defendant sovereign, [the Poarch Band of
Creek Indians]," the Poarch Band Tribal Code indicates that a
See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, (Re)Solving the Tribal
2
No-Forum Conundrum: Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community,
123 Yale L.J. Online 311 (2013). 
7
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dram-shop action against PBCI in the tribal court would be
ineffectual. Section 11-1-1(a), Poarch Band Tribal Code,
empowers the Poarch Band Tribal Court to try "all civil causes
of action and defenses thereto which are cognizable in the
trial courts of the State of Alabama." However, the
immediately following section states: "The recognition of
causes of action and defenses thereto which are cognizable in
the trial courts of the State of Alabama is not and shall not
be deemed a waiver of tribal sovereignty or jurisdiction with
respect to the Tribe or Tribal Courts." Section 11-1-1(b),
Poarch Band Tribal Code. Thus, although the plaintiffs could
formally file a dram-shop action in Poarch Band tribal court,
PBCI would instantly have recourse to the defense of sovereign
immunity. The Poarch Band Tort Claims Act, § 29-1-1 et seq.,
Poarch Band Tribal Code, does provide for a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity, but it applies only to "an individual
Gaming Facility patron," § 29-1-3(e), 
Poarch Band Tribal 
Code,
and excludes third-party claims such as the injuries suffered
by plaintiffs on a state highway. § 29-2-3(f), Poarch Band
Tribal Code. Thus, if the plaintiffs have no remedy against
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PBCI in a state court, they likely have no remedy against PBCI
anywhere.
Courts in many jurisdictions have remarked on the
unsettling fact that recognition of tribal immunity can leave
accident victims without a remedy against tribal defendants.
"[I]mmunity can harm those who are unaware that they are
dealing with a tribe, who do not know of tribal immunity, or
who have no choice in the matter, as in the case of tort
victims." Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758. See also Three
Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g,
P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 893 (1986) (noting "[t]he perceived
inequity of permitting the Tribe to recover from a non-Indian
for civil wrongs in instances where a non-Indian allegedly may
not recover against the Tribe"); Cook v. Avi Casino Enters.,
Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 727 (9th Cir. 2008) (lamenting that "an
unjust result is reached that our law might better preclude")
(Gould, J., concurring); Filer v. Tahono O'Odham Nation
Gaming, 212 Ariz. 167, 173, 129 P.3d 78, 84 (Ct. App. 2006)
(noting that tribal immunity from dram-shop actions "may be
unsatisfactory to some and arguably is divorced from the
realities of the modern world"); Foxworthy v. Puyallup Tribe
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1121411
of Indians Ass'n, 141 Wash. App. 221, 234, 169 P.3d 53, 59
(2007) (noting that "the current state of dram shop case law"
involving tribal defendants may "tolerate inequities").
D. Effect of Purchase of Insurance on Immunity
The mere acquisition of insurance by an entity having
sovereign immunity does not constitute an express consent to
be sued in a state court for policy benefits. The Poarch Band
Tribal Code, for example, delineates a workers' compensation
plan of coverage for Poarch Band employees but allows
enforcement only in tribal courts. §§ 35-4-1 & -4, Poarch Band
Tribal Code. An employee "seeking any remedy in any Non-Tribal
forum" forfeits coverage. § 35-1-6(d), Poarch Band Tribal
Code. The workers' compensation title of the Poarch Band
Tribal  Code states that the Poarch Band "does not hereby
waive its immunity from suit in state or federal court, or any
other state or federal forum, for any purpose." § 35-1-6(b),
Poarch Band Tribal  Code. See Sanderford v. Creek Casino
Montgomery, (No. 2:12-CV-455-WKW, Jan. 10, 2013) (M.D. Ala.
2013) 
(dismissing 
on 
sovereign-immunity 
grounds 
action 
brought
in federal court by Creek Casino Montgomery employee for
workers' compensation benefits). See also White Mountain
10
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Apache Tribe v. Industrial Comm'n of Ariz., 144 Ariz. 129, 696
P.2d 223 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a tribe's purchase of
workers' 
compensation 
insurance 
does 
not 
constitute 
an 
express
waiver of sovereign immunity from a worker's compensation
action).
Similarly, the purchase of liability insurance by an
agency of the Alabama state government does not of itself
waive state immunity. "'[A] governmental unit's immunity from
tort liability is unaffected by its procurement of insurance
which purports to protect it from such liability.'" Thompson
v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 279 Ala. 314, 315, 184 So. 2d 825,
826 (1966) (quoting 68 A.L.R.2d 1437 (1959)). See also Alabama
State Docks v. Saxon, 631 So. 2d 943, 946 (1994) (noting that
"an intent to waive governmental immunity should not be
presumed from the purchase of liability insurance"); 
Graves 
v.
White Mountain Apache Tribe, 117 Ariz. 32, 570 P.2d 803 (Ct.
App. 1977) (holding that purchase of liability insurance by an
Apache tribe did not waive the tribe's 
governmental 
immunity).
E. Countervailing Factors
Courts that have addressed the issue uniformly hold that 
sovereign immunity protects Indian tribes from private dram-
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shop actions. See Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of
Fla., 685 F.3d 1224, 1233 (11th Cir. 2012); Filer, 212 Ariz.
at 173, 129 P.3d at 84; Foxworthy, 141 Wash. App. at 234, 169
P.3d at 58; Holguin v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo, 954 S.W.2d 843,
854, (Tex. App. 1997). Recently Oklahoma reversed 
its 
contrary
precedent. See Sheffer v. Buffalo Run Casino, PTE, Inc., 315
P.3d 359, 372 (Okla. 2013) (rev'g Bittle v. Bahe, 192 P.3d 810
(Okla. 2008)). Nevertheless, certain countervailing factors
argue for denying PBCI's petition for a writ of mandamus. 
1. Immunity is Minimal in the Area of Alcohol Regulation
Although "[t]he policy of leaving Indians free from state
jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's
history," Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945), and "tribal
immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to
diminution by the States," Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 756,
tribal immunity is at its weakest in the context of alcohol
regulation. Although at one time federal law prohibited the
possession or sale of alcoholic beverages in 
Indian 
territory,
Congress in 1953 abrogated those provisions and instead gave
the states authority to regulate and control the use of
alcohol on tribal lands. 18 U.S.C. § 1161. Construing § 1161,
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the United States Supreme Court noted that "Congress has
divested the Indians of any inherent power to regulate in this
area." Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 724 (1983). "With respect
to the regulation of liquor transactions, ... Indians cannot
be said to 'possess the usual accoutrements of tribal self-
government.'" Id. (quoting McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 167-68 (1973)).
"Because we find that there is no tradition of
sovereign immunity that favors the Indians in this
respect, and because we must consider that the
activity in which Rehner seeks to engage potentially
has a substantial impact beyond the reservation, we
may accord little if any weight to any asserted
interest in tribal sovereignty in this case."
Rehner, 463 U.S. at 725. Because tribal immunity derives from
tribal sovereignty, PBCI's assertion of immunity to thwart
state law in the area of alcohol regulation has "little if any
weight," especially when the activity whose regulation PBCI
seeks to evade -- overserving gaming customers -- "has a
substantial impact beyond the reservation." 463 U.S. at 725.
2. The Covenant of Financial Responsibility
Even if, as other courts have held, the state's power to
regulate alcohol usage on tribal lands does not of itself
authorize private dram-shop actions, the nature of the
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agreement PBCI made with the ABC Board constitutes a waiver of
any residual immunity from such lawsuits. By purchasing dram-
shop insurance as a condition for obtaining a liquor license,
PBCI expressly agreed in writing to be "financially
responsible" in damages for serving alcohol to any apparently
intoxicated person. PBCI cannot both assume financial
responsibility for compensating victims of its own wrongdoing
and at the same time disclaim its responsibility for providing
such compensation. An agreement to be financially responsible
is an express declaration that excludes, i.e., waives, the
alternative 
of 
being 
financially 
irresponsible. 
Otherwise, 
the
assumption of financial responsibility would be meaningless.
Compare C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe
of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 422 (2001) (noting that an arbitration
clause in a contract "'would be meaningless if it did not
constitute a waiver of whatever immunity [the Tribe]
possessed'") 
(quoting 
Native 
Village 
of 
Eyak 
v. 
GC
Contractors, 658 P.2d 756, 760 (Alaska 1983)).3
No "magic words" are needed to waive sovereign immunity.
A waiver that has "the requisite clarity," C & L Enterprises,
Oklahoma 
statutes 
allow 
for 
the 
enforcement 
of 
predispute
3
arbitration agreements. See Okla. Stat. 12, § 1851 et seq.
14
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532 U.S. at 418, need not, "to be deemed explicit ... use the
words 'sovereign immunity.'" Id. at 420-21 (quoting Sokaogon
Gaming Enter. Corp. 
v. Tushie-Montgomery Assocs., 86 
F.3d 656,
660 (7th Cir. 1996)). See also Rosebud Sioux v. Val-U Constr.
Co. of S. Dakota, 50 F.3d 560, 563 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[W]hile
the Supreme Court has expressed its protectiveness of tribal
sovereign immunity by requiring that any waiver be explicit,
it has never required the invocation of 'magic words' stating
that the tribe hereby waives its sovereign immunity.");
Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F. 3d 16, 25
(1st Cir. 2006) (citing C & L Enterprises for the proposition
that a court need not employ "talismanic phrases"). 
In rejecting the assertion that a tribe may employ the
doctrine of sovereign immunity to nullify an arbitration
clause under Oklahoma law, the United States Supreme Court
stated that "[the contract's dispute resolution] regime has a
real world objective; it is not designed for a game lacking
practical consequences." C & L Enterprises, 532 U.S. at 422.
Likewise, in this case the financial-responsibility covenant
PBCI made with the ABC Board as a condition for obtaining a
liquor license had "a real world objective": the protection of
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the 
general 
public 
from 
drunk 
drivers 
improvidently 
overserved
in the casino. This agreement "was not designed for a game
lacking 
practical 
consequences," 
as 
PBCI 
implausibly 
contends.
Just as "[t]o agree to be sued is to waive any immunity
one might have from being sued," Sokaogon, 86 F.3d at 659, so
to agree to be financially responsible is to waive any
immunity one might have to be financially irresponsible. To
claim immunity in this context is to assert in "the real
world" that PBCI has no coverage for dram-shop incidents. See
Koscielak v. Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty., 340 Wis. 2d 409, 422,
811 N.W.2d 451, 458 (Ct. App. 2012) ("[A]n insurer is not
liable unless its insured is."). But such an assertion
functions as a repudiation of the legal requirement -- to
which PBCI has assented –- that "current insurance coverage
exists" that has not "been cancelled or otherwise is not in
force for any reason." Reg. 20-X-5-.14(2), Ala. Admin. Code
(ABC Board). Again, the requirement of dram-shop coverage is
not a mere paper formality with no effect in the real world,
a meaningless arrangement "lacking practical consequences."
"It is ludicrous to contend that anyone can enter into an
indemnifying contract and then refuse to fulfill the contract
16
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against the injured party, contending in substance that there
is no basis for the suit for there was no risk to be insured."
Beach v. City of Springfield, 32 Ill. App. 2d 256, 261, 177
N.E.2d 436, 439 (1961).
3. The No-Forum Conundrum Revisited
The absence of a tribal forum to hear dram-shop actions
weighs against a finding of immunity. In refusing to infer a
private cause of action for enforcement of the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1304, the United States Supreme
Court reasoned that such a remedy was not necessary because
"[t]ribal forums are available to vindicate rights." Santa
Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 65. The Court forthrightly asserted:
"Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate
forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting
important personal and property interests of both Indians and
non-Indians." Id. Because the Poarch Band has structured its
Tribal Code to prevent dram-shop claims from being heard in
the tribal court, its claim of immunity from a state-court
action is accordingly diminished. See Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v.
Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980)
(reversing a trial court's order that dismissed a case on
17
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immunity grounds because no tribal or other forum existed to
settle the dispute).
IV. Conclusion
The doctrine of tribal immunity, intended in part to
shield Indian tribes from exploitation by outsiders, is not
also a sword tribes may wield to victimize outsiders. Pushing
the doctrine to illogical extremes and employing it after the
fact to repudiate freely assumed legal obligations must
ultimately 
result 
in 
discrediting 
the 
doctrine 
itself. 
"Indian
scholars ... have been warning tribal leaders and counsel for
decades that if they do not solve the no-forum conundrum,
someone else will –- either Congress or the federal courts."
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, (Re)Solving the Tribal No-Forum
Conundrum: Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 123 Yale
L.J. Online 311, 314 (2013). 
Because PBCI's formal covenant to assume financial
responsibility in dram-shop actions constitutes an explicit
waiver of its sovereign immunity from liability for such
actions, I concur in denying PBCI's petition for a writ of
mandamus ordering the trial court to dismiss this action on
the ground of tribal immunity.
18