Title: YOUNG v CITY OF GREAT FALLS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-367
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 20, 1981

No. 8 0 - 3 6 7 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA I N THE MATTER OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE: BRUCE YOUNG BY CONSTRUCTION AND GENERAL LABORERS' LOCAL NO. 1 3 3 4 AFL-CIO, R e s p o n d e n t and C o m p l a i n a n t , vs. C I T Y OF GREAT FALLS, P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t . A p p e a l f r o m : D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and for t h e C o u n t y of C a s c a d e . H o n o r a b l e Joel G. R o t h , Judge presiding. C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For A p p e l l a n t : D a v i d V. G l i k o , C i t y A t t o r n e y , argued, G r e a t F a l l s , M a n t h n a F o r R e s p o n d e n t : Hon. M i k e G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , M o n t a n a - J a r n e r - - & ? l s , Z ~ ~ S I ~ F X , -Ye-n+a* D. P a t r i c k M c K i t t r i c k argued, G r e a t Falls, M o n t a n a --- S u b m i t t e d : June 18, 1 9 8 1 D e c i d e d : A u g u s t 2 0 , 1 9 8 1 A!!G 2 9 1981 Filed: Y d C l e r k M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., d e l i v e r e d the opinion of t h e Court. This appeal follows an order and judgment of the Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Cascade County, denying a motion t o amend and dismissing a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l review of a d e c i s i o n and order of t h e S t a t e Board of Personnel Appeals. On January 1 0 , 1979, respondent, Construction and General Laborers' Union Local No. 1334, AFL-CIO, f i l e d an u n f a i r labor p r a c t i c e charge with the Montana S t a t e Board of Personnel Appeals. This charge was f i l e d on behalf of Bruce Young a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t , C i t y of Great F a l l s . Appellant answered and denied the charge, whereupon a hearing was held by an examiner f o r the Board. Following t h e hearing, the examiner on October 1 2 , 1979, issued f i n d i n g s of f a c t , conclusions of law and a recommended o r d e r , confirming i n p a r t the u n f a i r labor p r a c t i c e charge. Appellant f i l e d exceptions and o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e d e c i s i o n rendered by the hearings examiner. A review hearing w a s then held and t h e Board of Personnel Appeals confirmed the recommended order. A f i n a l order w a s issued by the Board on February 2 1 , 1980. On March 21, 1980, a p p e l l a n t p e t i t i o n e d the D i s t r i c t Court f o r j u d i c i a l review of the f i n a l order. Service of t h e p e t i t i o n and a summons was acknowledged by Young, t h e a t t o r n e y general of the S t a t e of Montana and the Board of Personnel Appeals. Appellant, however, d i d n o t include the Board a s a named p a r t y on the p e t i t i o n . Respondent, on A p r i l 2 1 , 1980, moved t o dismiss t h e p e t i t i o n f o r t h e reason t h a t a p p e l l a n t f a i l e d t o name the Board a s a p a r t y within the 30-day l i m i t a t i o n provided f o r i n s e c t i o n 2-4-702, MCA. On April 30, 1980, a p p e l l a n t moved t o amend i t s p e t i t i o n t o add the Board a s a party. A hearing on the matter w a s held i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court on J u l y 2 4 , 1980. On J u l y 29, 1980, the c o u r t issued a memorandum d e c i s i o n and order, denying a p p e l l a n t ' s motion t o amend the p e t i t i o n and granting respondent's motion t o dismiss. Judgment was s o entered, and t h e C i t y of Great F a l l s now appeals. The s o l e i s s u e on appeal i s whether t h e S t a t e Board of Personnel Appeals i s required t o be designated a s a p a r t y on a p e t i t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l review. W e hold t h a t the S t a t e Board of Personnel Appeals i s not required t o be made a p a r t y . Section 2-4-702, MCA, governs j u d i c i a l review proceedings under the Administrative Procedure A c t , including review of decisions by the Board of Personnel Appeals. That s t a t u t e , i n p a r t , provides a s follows: " ( 2 ) (a) Proceedings f o r review s h a l l be i n s t i t u t e d by f i l i n g a p e t i t i o n i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t within 30 days a f t e r s e r v i c e of the f i n a l d e c i s i o n of the agency o r , i f a hearing i s requested, within 30 days a f t e r t h e d e c i s i o n thereon. Except a s other- w i s e provided by s t a t u t e , t h e p e t i t i o n s h a l l be f i l e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r the county where the p e t i t i o n e r r e s i d e s o r has h i s p r i n c i p a l place of business o r where t h e agency maintains i t s p r i n c i - p a l o f f i c e . Copies of the p e t i t i o n s h a l l be promptly served upon the agency and a l l p a r t i e s of record. " The only b a s i s f o r dismissing t h i s p e t i t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l review i s t h e claim by respondent t h a t t h e Board i s an indispensable p a r t y within t h e purview of Rule 19, M.R.Civ.P. I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , Rule 19 provides: "A person who i s s u b j e c t t o s e r v i c e of process s h a l l be joined a s a p a r t y i n t h e a c t i o n i f (1) i n h i s absence complete r e l i e f cannot be accorded among those already p a r t i e s , o r ( 2 ) he claims an i n t e r e s t r e l a t i n g t o t h e s u b j e c t of the a c t i o n and i s s o s i t u a t e d t h a t the d i s p o s i t i o n of the a c t i o n i n h i s absence may (i) a s a p r a c t i c a l matter i m - p a i r o r impede h i s a b i l i t y t o p r o t e c t t h a t i n t e r - e s t o r (ii) leave any of the persons already p a r t i e s s u b j e c t t o a s u b s t a n t i a l r i s k of i n c u r r i n g double, m u l t i p l e , o r otherwise i n c o n s i s t e n t o b l i g a t i o n s by reason of h i s claimed i n t e r e s t : . . ." There i s some support f o r the proposition t h a t an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e agency must be joined under Rule 19, M.R.Civ.P. See Smith v. County of E l Paso (1979), 4 2 Colo.App. 316, 593 P.2d 979; C i v i l Serv. Com'n of C. & C. of Denver v. D i s t r i c t Court (1974), 186 Colo. 308, 527 P.2d 531. W e believe t h a t Rule 19, M.R.Civ.P., does n o t , by i t s terms, contemplate i n c l u s i o n of an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e board a s an indispensable p a r t y f o r purposes of j u d i c i a l review. Where t h e l e g i s l a t u r e has intended f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e bodies t o be made p a r t i e s , they have s p e c i f i c a l l y so provided. For example, s e c t i o n 39-51-2410, MCA, providing f o r j u d i c i a l review of a d e c i s i o n by the Board of Labor Appeals, provides t h a t t h e Employment Security Division s h a l l be deemed t o be a p a r t y i n any a c t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l review. Yet when t h e l e g i s l a t u r e enacted 2-4-702, MCA, no provision was made f o r naming t h e "board" a s a p a r t y f o r purposes of review. Our c o u r t encourages a l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of procedural r u l e s governing j u d i c i a l review of an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e board. F.W. Woolworth Co., Inc. v. Employment Sec. Div. (1981), - Mont. , 627 P.2d 851, 38 St.Rep. 694. J u s t i c e i s b e s t served by avoiding an over-technical approach and allowing t h e p a r t i e s t o have t h e i r day i n court. W e hold t h a t the Board of Personnel Appeals need n o t be a p a r t y t o proceedings f o r j u d i c i a l review. Accordingly, t h e D i s t r i c t Court order and judgment i s reversed, and the c a s e remanded f o r proceedings i n accordance with t h i s opinion. W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e J u s t i c e s Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d i s s e n t i n g : W e d i s s e n t . I t is t r u e t h e s t a t u t e does n o t s p e c i f y whether t h e agency is r e q u i r e d t o be named a s a p a r t y i n t h e p e t i t i o n f o r review and does n o t appear t o make t h e a g e n c y ' s j o i n d e r m a n d a t o r y o r j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i n n a t u r e . A t h i r t y - d a y l i m i t a t i o n on f i l i n g a p e t i t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w , however, has been i n t e r p r e t e d t o mean t h a t any c h a l l e n g e t o t h e agency a c t i o n must be p e r f e c t e d w i t h i n t h e r e q u i r e d t h i r t y days. P e r f e c t i o n i n t h i s r e g a r d must i n c l u d e t h e c o r r e c t j o i n d e r of a l l p a r t i e s r e q u i r e d t o be joined under Rule 19, M.R.Civ.P. See Smith v. County of E l Paso ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 42 Colo.App. 316, 593 P.2d 979; C i v i l S e r v i c e Commission v. D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 186 Colo. 308, 527 P.2d 531. ( I t should be p o i n t e d o u t t h a t Colorado h a s n o t adopted t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Procedure Act b u t provided f o r a j u d i c i a l review of agency a c t i o n i n its r u l e s of c i v i l p r o c e d u r e , Rule 106, C.R.C.P., under which t h e above-cited c a s e s were decided. ) I f t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is accepted by t h e Court, t h e n a proper j o i n d e r of t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l s o r a g e n c i e s deemed t o be e s s e n t i a l or i n d i s p e n s a b l e p a r t i e s t o t h e p e t i t i o n , under Rule 1 9 , R.R.Civ.P., must be c o n s i d e r e d a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l requirement t o be s a t i s f i e d i f d i s m i s s a l is t o be avoided. Rule 1 9 , M.R.Civ.P., p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "A p e r s o n who is s u b j e c t t o s e r v i c e o f p r o c e s s s h a l l be joined a s a p a r t y i n t h e a c t i o n i f (1) i n h i s absence complete r e l i e f c a n n o t b e a c c o r d e d among t h o s e a l r e a d y p a r t i e s , o r ( 2 ) h e c l a i m s a n i n t e r e s t r e l a t i n g t o t h e s u b j e c t of t h e a c t i o n and is s o s i t u a t e d t h a t t h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n i n h i s absence may ( i ) a s a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r i m p a i r o r impede h i s a b i l i t y t o p r o t e c t t h a t i n t e r e s t . . ." Here, a p p e l l a n t is a t t e m p t i n g t o c h a l l e n g e a d e c i s i o n and o r d e r of t h e Board of Personnel Appeals, i s s u e d i n f u r - t h e r a n c e of its d u t y a s a q u a s i - j u d i c i a l body t o a d m i n i s t e r t h e p u b l i c p o l i c y of t h i s S t a t e a s set f o r t h i n T i t l e 3 9 , Chap. 31, MCA ( C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining f o r P u b l i c Employees). I n f u n c t i o n i n g t o promote and advance t h i s p u b l i c p o l i c y , t h e Board h a s a d e f i n i t e i n t e r e s t i n t h e p e t i t i o n t o review and, a s a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r , must be joined t o i n s u r e a complete and j u s t a d j u d i c a t i o n of t h a t i n t e r e s t . The m a j o r i t y , o f c o u r s e , d i s a g r e e s w i t h t h i s c o n c l u s i o n and a s s e r t s t h a t t h e Board is, by some l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , excluded from t h e i r review h e a r i n g i n c o u r t and t h a t " j u s t i c e is b e s t s e r v e d by avoiding an over- t e c h n i c a l approach and a l l o w i n g t h e p a r t i e s t o have t h e i r day i n c o u r t . " W e do n o t understand how you g i v e p a r t i e s t h e i r day i n c o u r t by e x c l u d i n g them. I suppose it depends on whose ox is being gored. What t h e m a j o r i t y f a i l s t o r e a l i z e , however, is t h a t i n t h i s c a s e a j o i n d e r of a l l e s s e n t i a l p a r t i e s w i t h i n t h e t h i r t y - d a y l i m i t a t i o n p e r i o d i s a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l ------ requirement. A s a consequence of its j u r i d i c t i o n a l n a t u r e , i f a p a r t y is deemed e s s e n t i a l o r n e c e s s a r y t o t h e proceeding, t h a t p a r t y a u t o m a t i c a l l y becomes i n d i s p e n s a b l e . T h i s i n no way depends on a l i b e r a l c o n s t r u c t i o n or o t h e r s e l f - s e r v i n g jingoisms r e l i e d upon by t h e m a j o r i t y . Those e s s e n t i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n a l requirements n e c e s s a r y t o p e r f e c t a p e t i t i o n f o r review must be s a t i s f i e d t o v e s t a u t h o r i t y i n t h e reviewing o r a p p e l l a t e t r i b u n a l . A f a i l u r e t o s a t i s f y t h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s t h u s l e a v e s t h e c o u r t w i t h no a d j u d i c a t o r y or reviewing power; no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o a c t ; and no discretion to remedy or waive the jurisdictional defects. Here, appellant appears to have failed to vest the District Court with jurisdiction to consider the petition for review. If this is the case, then the court was unable to entertain appellant's motion to amend and was left with no alternative but to dismiss the action. We would affirm the We concur in the foregoing dissent: VL-Q-J, Chief Justice