Title: Ritter v. Farrow
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018AP001518
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 23, 2021

2021 WI 14 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1518 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Ted Ritter and Carolyn Ritter d/b/a Ritter 
Enterprises, Inc., 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Tony Farrow and Arlyce Farrow d/b/a Farrow 
Enterprises, Inc., 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Bibs Resort Condominium, Inc., 
          Intervenor-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 388 Wis. 2d 421,933 N.W.2d 167 
PDC No:2019 WI App 46 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 23, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 8, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Vilas   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael H. Bloom   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion for the Court, in 
which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and ZIEGLER, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
defendants-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Jennifer L. Gregor, Allison W. Reimann, and 
Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison. There was an oral argument by 
Jennifer L. Gregor. 
 
 
 
2 
For the intervenor-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
John E. Danner and Harrold, Scrobell & Danner, S.C., Minocqua. 
There was an oral argument by John E. Danner. 
 
 
2021 WI 14 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP1518 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV212) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Ted Ritter and Carolyn Ritter d/b/a Ritter 
Enterprises, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Tony Farrow and Arlyce Farrow d/b/a Farrow 
Enterprises, Inc., 
 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Bibs Resort Condominium, Inc., 
 
          Intervenor-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
FEB 23, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and ZIEGLER, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   The subjects of this case are a 
logo depicting a pair of red bib overalls with a handkerchief 
hanging out of the back pocket and the names "Bibs Resort" and 
"Bibs."  These designations relate to a lakefront resort in St. 
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
2 
 
Germain, Wisconsin, and we are asked to determine their 
ownership.1 
¶2 
The three parties involved in this case are:  (1) Ted 
and Carolyn Ritter, original owners of Bibs Resort; (2) Tony and 
Arlyce Farrow, purchasers of the Ritters' resort management 
business; and (3) Bibs Resort Condominium, Inc., the condominium 
association at Bibs Resort ("Association").  The Farrows claim 
that they assumed ownership of the Bibs Resort marks when they 
purchased the Ritters' resort management business, and that the 
Ritters subsequently infringed on those marks.  The Ritters and 
the Association disagree with the Farrows.  
¶3 
The circuit court granted summary judgment to the 
Ritters and the Association and denied the Farrows' motion.2  The 
circuit court concluded that the Bibs Resort marks "became part 
of" the Association in 1998 when the resort was converted to a 
condominium form of ownership.  Finding that no one exclusively 
owned the Bibs Resort marks after that conversion, the circuit 
court ruled that the Farrows could not have become exclusive 
owners of the marks when they purchased the Ritters' resort 
                                                 
1 The court of appeals correctly noted that there are three 
designations at issue, but "the Farrows do not argue that any 
legal principle applies to only one particular designation, nor 
do they argue that any material facts exist that differentiate 
between the designations."  Ritter v. Farrow, 2019 WI App 46, ¶4 
n.2, 388 Wis. 2d 421, 933 N.W.2d 167.  We agree and will 
collectively refer to the designations at issue as the "Bibs 
Resort marks" unless otherwise noted. 
2 The Honorable Michael H. Bloom of the Vilas County Circuit 
Court presided. 
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
3 
 
management business in 2006.  The court of appeals affirmed on 
other grounds, ruling that the 1998 resort-to-condominium 
conversion resulted in the Ritters impliedly transferring the 
Bibs Resort marks to the Association.  The court of appeals 
reasoned that because of that transfer, the Ritters no longer 
owned the marks and, as a result, could not have sold them to 
the Farrows in 2006. 
¶4 
It is a well-settled legal principle that trademarks 
and their associated goodwill pass with the sale of a business.  
Therefore, we conclude as a matter of law that:  (1) the 
Association did not acquire the Bibs Resort marks in 1998; and 
(2) the Farrows became the exclusive owners of the Bibs Resort 
marks in 2006 when they purchased the resort management business 
from the Ritters.  Consequently, since the circuit court did not 
apply the well-settled principles surrounding trademarks and 
trade names, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to the 
Ritters and the Association and remand to the circuit court to 
reconsider the Farrows' summary judgment motion in light of our 
legal conclusions. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶5 
In the spring of 1986, the Ritters3 purchased a 
lakefront resort in St. Germain, Wisconsin and named it "Bibs 
Resort."  The property included a permanent residence, 11 rental 
units, and an on-site bar.  Ted and Carolyn Ritter lived in the 
                                                 
3 All references to "the Ritters" are to Ted and Carolyn 
Ritter doing business as Bibs Resort, Inc. or its subsequent 
name, Ritter Enterprises, Inc., unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
4 
 
permanent residence while renting the other units to the public 
and operating the bar.  To represent the resort, the Ritters 
created a logo depicting a pair of red bib overalls with a 
handkerchief hanging out of the back pocket.  The name "Bibs 
Resort" was incorporated into the logo.   
¶6 
Under the Bibs Resort marks, the Ritters provided 
resort management services to guests and patrons of the resort.  
These services included marketing rental units to the public, 
collecting payments, tracking expenses, maintaining the grounds, 
cleaning the units, operating the on-site bar, and organizing 
activities such as picnics, waterskiing lessons, volleyball 
tournaments, campfires, and fishing lessons for guests.   
¶7 
In 1998, the Ritters converted the resort to a 
condominium form of ownership.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 703 
(2017-18),4 the "Condominium Ownership Act," the Ritters recorded 
a condominium declaration5 and plat with the Vilas County 
Register 
of 
Deeds. 
 
The 
"Declaration 
of 
Condominium" 
("Declaration") specifically excluded any transfer of the resort 
management services the Ritters had provided since 1986, stating 
that "nothing in the paragraphs in these Declarations shall be 
construed to prohibit [the Ritters] from continuing to operate 
the property, or any part thereof, as a resort, or to prohibit 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated.  
5 A condominium declaration contains, among other things, a 
condominium's name and address and a description of the land, 
units, and common elements.  See Wis. Stat. § 703.09(1)(a)-(j).  
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
5 
 
any of the units [sic] owners from renting out the unit or 
units."  Said differently, the Ritters would continue to provide 
resort management services after the condominium conversion in 
the same manner as they had before the conversion. 
¶8 
The 
Declaration 
identified 
the 
newly 
established 
condominium's legal name as "Bibs Resort Condominium."  The 
Declaration referenced the transfer of the "real property" of 
Bibs Resort and described the condominium as consisting of 13 
units (12 dwellings and the on-site bar) and 15 garage units.  
It also established that each unit owner had exclusive rights to 
use certain limited common elements and owned a fractional 
interest in the condominium's common elements.  Included within 
the Declaration's description of the common elements was "[a]ll 
the tangible personal property required for the operation of the 
condominium."  (Emphasis added.)  The Declaration did not 
contain any reference to the conveyance of intangible personal 
property.6   
¶9 
The Declaration also recognized the Association as the 
entity responsible for the operation of the condominium, in 
compliance with the Condominium Ownership Act.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 703.15(1).7  At the time of the condominium conversion, the 
                                                 
6 Tangible property is "[p]roperty that has physical form 
and characteristics," whereas intangible property is "[p]roperty 
that lacks a physical existence."  Tangible property, Black's 
Law Dictionary 1412 (10th ed. 2014); Intangible property, id. at 
1411. 
7 The articles of incorporation and the bylaws for the 
Association were also filed in 1998.   
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
6 
 
Ritters were the sole members of the Association because they 
owned all 13 units of the condominium.  Additionally, they 
continued to rent out 11 units and, as noted above, provide 
resort management services to guests and patrons under the Bibs 
Resort marks.   
¶10 Between May 1998 and September 2005, the Ritters sold 
four of the condominium units.  The Ritters entered into rental 
management agreements with each of the new unit owners, renting 
and marketing these units on the new owners' behalf.  At the 
time of the sale of each unit, the Bibs logo, which prominently 
displayed the associated unit number, was affixed to the 
exterior wall of the unit. 
¶11 In April 2006, the Farrows8 sought to purchase the 
entirety 
of 
the 
Ritters' 
resort 
management 
business 
and 
presented them with an offer to purchase "the Business known as 
Bibs" and Unit 13, the on-site bar.  The offer to purchase 
stated that the sellers, the Ritters, "shall include in the 
purchase price and transfer . . . goodwill . . . and business 
personal property . . . ."  The offer defined "business personal 
property" as "all tangible and intangible personal property and 
rights in personal property owned by Seller and used in the 
business as of the date of [the] Offer, including . . . trade 
names . . . ."9  An "Amendment to Offer to Purchase" similarly 
                                                 
8 The Farrows operated under the corporate entity "Farrow 
Enterprises, Inc." 
9 While the offer was still pending, the Farrows also 
purchased unit 12, the permanent residence. 
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
7 
 
described 
the 
sale 
as 
including 
"Unit 
13 
Bibs 
Resort 
Condominiums and the business known as Bibs Resort."   
¶12 The Ritters accepted the Farrows' offer, and the sale 
closed on June 23, 2006.  The Ritters executed a document that 
"authorize[d] the sale of BIB's [sic] Resort, Inc. property 
management, its management contracts, listed inventory, all 
associated equipment and Unit #13."  The Ritters also signed a 
bill of sale that conveyed to the Farrows the personal property 
necessary for resort management, including fishing boats, 
canoes, paddle boats, a golf cart, bedding supplies, and 
cleaning supplies.  That bill of sale also conveyed to the 
Farrows the business equipment needed to manage the resort, 
including 
a 
computer, 
business 
records, 
business 
licenses/registration, the website, and office supplies.   
¶13 Additionally, the Ritters filed a "Report of Business 
Transfer" 
with 
the 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Workforce 
Development, as required by Wisconsin's unemployment insurance 
law.  This report indicated that there was a "total transfer" of 
the 
Ritters' 
business, 
which 
the 
Ritters 
described 
as 
"management of vacation resort."  Included within the list of 
"assets" transferred, the Ritters selected the box titled 
"Goodwill." 
 
This 
report 
also 
identified 
the 
former 
owner/operator's trade name as "Bibs Resort" and the new 
owner/operator's trade name as "Bibs Resort." 
¶14 In September 2006, the parties also sent a joint 
letter to the Wisconsin Department of Revenue ("DOR").  In that 
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
8 
 
letter, the Ritters and the Farrows explained the change in 
business names as follows: 
In June of this year, the management of the resort and 
some of the buildings were sold to Farrow Enterprises, 
Inc. . . . .  Anthony and Arlyce Farrow, corporate 
officers of Farrow Enterprises, Inc., would like to 
use the name BIBS Resort as a trade name since they 
are handling advertising, reservations and payments 
under that name.  Ted and Carolyn Ritter are amenable 
to that change. 
BIBS Resort, Inc. . . . still owns business property 
(some rental cottages) at the resort.  Corporate 
officers Ted and Carolyn Ritter wish to maintain the 
business corporate status but change the current name 
of 
BIBS 
Resort, 
Inc. 
to 
Ritter 
Enterprises, 
Inc. . . .  
Anthony 
and 
Arlyce 
Farrow 
wish 
to 
keep 
Farrow 
Enterprises, Inc. as their legal entity and use BIBS 
Resort as their trade name . . . . 
¶15 After the sale, the Farrows stepped into the role of 
resort managers and provided services to guests and patrons 
under the Bibs Resort marks.  The Farrows signed new rental 
agreements with each unit owner.  They also entered into an 
agreement with the Association's board of directors, pursuant to 
which the Farrows assumed responsibility for 
maintenance, 
repair, landscaping, and groundwork for the common elements.  
¶16 Not long after the sale, the relationship between the 
Ritters and the Farrows soured.  In February 2008, the Ritters 
terminated their rental management agreements with the Farrows 
for the seven units that the Ritters still owned.  Over the next 
two years, the four other condominium unit owners followed suit.  
After the rental agreements were terminated, the Ritters started 
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
9 
 
renting out their units and the units of the other owners.  The 
Ritters rented out the units and provided services under the 
name "The Cottages at Bibs Resort" and "Bibs Cottages" and also 
used the logo of a pair of red bib overalls. 
¶17 Meanwhile, the Farrows were taking steps to officially 
register the Bibs Resort marks with the State.  In November 
2008, unbeknownst to any of the other unit owners, the Farrows 
filed an "Application for Registration of Marks" with the Office 
of the Secretary of State of Wisconsin, seeking to register a 
"pair of red bibs with a kerchief sticking out of pocket" and 
the resort name of "Bibs."  In February 2010, the Farrows filed 
another application, seeking to register the mark "Bibs Resort."   
¶18 Several months later, the Ritters filed an action 
against the Farrows which set in motion the decade of litigation 
that preceded this appeal.  The Farrows counterclaimed with 
multiple causes of action, including trademark infringement.  
The circuit court eventually dismissed all of the Ritters' 
claims, and the case proceeded to trial on the Farrows' 
counterclaims. 
¶19 A month prior to trial, the Association filed a motion 
to intervene, which the circuit court denied.  At trial, the 
jury found in favor of the Farrows on three points:  (1) the 
Farrows had established use of the name "Bibs Resort" as a trade 
name; (2) the Ritters' use of the name "Bibs Cottages" and "The 
Cottages at Bibs Resort" infringed on that trade name; and 
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
10 
 
(3) the Ritters' infringement was a cause of damages to the 
Farrows.10 
¶20 The Association appealed the order denying its motion 
to intervene and the Ritters appealed the entry of judgment; 
these actions were consolidated on appeal.  The court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court's order denying the motion to 
intervene and remanded the case for further proceedings.  See 
Ritter v. Farrow, Nos. 2012AP781 & 2013AP927, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 24, 2014). 
¶21 On remand, the circuit court determined that "[t]he 
trial of this case on remand from the Court of Appeals shall 
include the common law and statutory trade name claims at issue 
in the first trial . . . ."  The Farrows and the Association 
filed competing motions for summary judgment "regarding trade 
name and trademark infringement."  The circuit court granted 
summary judgment to the Association and the Ritters and denied 
the Farrows' motion.11  The circuit court concluded that:  
(1) "Bibs Resort" was a trade name; (2) the name Bibs Resort 
"became part of" the Association at the time of the 1998 
conversion; (3) although there were disputed issues of fact as 
                                                 
10 The jury ruled on the Farrows' other counterclaims, but 
the disposition of those counterclaims is not relevant to this 
dispute.  
11 The Farrows raised federal trademark infringement claims 
for the first time on summary judgment.  The Association 
objected to the Farrows raising these claims.  The circuit court 
declined to reach the issue, concluding that the federal claims 
were moot in light of the court granting summary judgment to the 
Association.   
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
11 
 
to whether the marks were transferred to the Farrows as part of 
the 2006 sale, that dispute was immaterial because the Ritters 
did not have exclusive ownership of the marks in 2006; and 
(4) because each individual condominium owner held rights to 
"Bibs Resort," no one held exclusive ownership.  The Farrows 
appealed.  
¶22 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court on 
different grounds, concluding that, in 1998, the Ritters 
impliedly transferred the name "Bibs Resort" to the Association 
when they converted their resort to a condominium form of 
ownership; consequently, the Ritters could not have transferred 
ownership of the name "Bibs Resort" to the Farrows in 2006.  
Ritter v. Farrow, 2019 WI App 46, ¶5, 388 Wis. 2d 421, 933 
N.W.2d 167.  The Farrows petitioned this court for review, which 
we granted.12  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶23 "We review a grant of summary judgment independently, 
applying the same methodology as the circuit court."  Pinter v. 
Vill. of Stetsonville, 2019 WI 74, ¶26, 387 Wis. 2d 475, 929 
N.W.2d 547.  Summary judgment shall be granted where the record 
demonstrates "that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). 
                                                 
12 While the Ritters are still a party to this litigation, 
they did not file a brief with this court or the court of 
appeals.  Instead, by letter brief, the Ritters asserted that 
their interests were adequately represented by the Association's 
brief. 
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
12 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶24 In order to determine whether summary judgment was 
properly granted, we must ascertain whether the circuit court 
applied the well-settled principles of trademark and trade name 
law in determining exclusive ownership of the Bibs Resort marks.  
We begin with a brief primer on trademarks and trade names and 
then discuss the Bibs Resort marks at issue.  We then address 
the parties' arguments regarding how both the 1998 resort-to-
condominium 
conversion 
and 
the 
2006 
sale 
of 
the 
resort 
management business impacted the ownership of the Bibs Resort 
marks.  
A. Trademarks and Trade Names Generally 
¶25 This litigation involves both a trademark and trade 
names.  Wisconsin law recognizes a common law and statutory 
cause of action for infringement of trademarks and trade names.  
See First Wis. Nat'l Bank of Milwaukee v. Wichman, 85 
Wis. 2d 54, 63, 270 N.W.2d 168 (1978); Wis. Stat. ch. 132.  
Although Wisconsin has long recognized a cause of action for 
trademark infringement, Wisconsin courts have recognized that 
the state's jurisprudence on trademark law is "undeveloped."  
See Koepsell's Olde Popcorn Wagons, Inc. v. Koepsell's Festival 
Popcorn Wagons, Ltd., 2004 WI App 129, ¶34, 275 Wis. 2d 397, 685 
N.W.2d 853.  Therefore, we look to federal law for guidance and 
key principles, id., as well as to treatises. 
¶26 A trademark is "a word, name, symbol, device, or other 
designation, or a combination of such designations, that is 
distinctive of a person's goods or services and that is used in 
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
13 
 
a 
manner 
that 
identifies 
those 
goods 
or 
services 
and 
distinguishes them from the goods or services of others."  
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 9 (Am. L. Inst. 
1995); see 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining "trademark"); Wis. 
Stat. § 132.001(2) (defining "mark"); 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, 
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 3:1 (5th ed. 
2019).  "From an economic point of view, a trademark is a symbol 
that allows a purchaser to identify goods or services that have 
been satisfactory in the past and reject goods or services that 
have failed to give satisfaction."  1 McCarthy, supra, § 2:3.  
In other words, a trademark "helps consumers identify goods and 
services that they wish to purchase, as well as those they want 
to avoid."  Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 
(2017). 
¶27 A trademark is a form of intangible property that 
cannot exist "separate from the good will of the product or 
service it symbolizes."  1 McCarthy, supra, § 2:15.  "Good will 
is a business value that reflects the basic human propensity to 
continue doing business with a seller who has offered goods and 
services that the customer likes and has found adequate to 
fulfill [his or] her needs."  Id., § 2:17; see also Newark 
Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 555-56 (1993) 
("Although the definition of goodwill has taken different forms 
over the years, the shorthand description of good-will as 'the 
expectancy of continued patronage' . . . provides a useful label 
with which to identify the total of all the imponderable 
qualities that attract customers to the business." (quoted 
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
14 
 
source omitted)); Goodwill, Black's Law Dictionary 810 ("A 
business's reputation, patronage, and other intangible assets 
that are considered when appraising the business, esp. for 
purchase. . . . ").  Accordingly, a trademark cannot be sold or 
assigned unless the associated goodwill is also sold.  See 1 
McCarthy, supra, § 2:15. 
¶28 In contrast, a trade name is a "word, name, symbol, 
device 
or 
other 
designation, 
or 
a 
combination 
of 
such 
designations, that is distinctive of a person's business or 
other enterprise and that is used in a manner that identifies 
that business or enterprise and distinguishes it from the 
businesses or enterprises of others."  Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition § 12; see 1 McCarthy, supra, § 4:5 (defining 
"trade 
name"). 
 
In 
short, 
a 
trademark 
identifies 
and 
distinguishes goods and services, while a trade name denotes a 
business or association.  See 1 McCarthy, supra, § 4:5.  In both 
cases, the key is whether the designation serves as an indicator 
of 
the 
source; 
i.e., 
whether 
it 
distinguishes 
the 
goods/services/business from others so 
that consumers can 
identify the source that is connected to the designation.  See 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Bradley Corp., 2003 WI 33, 
¶28, 261 Wis. 2d 4, 660 N.W.2d 666. 
¶29 It is an "old and clear rule, universally followed" 
that when a business is sold, "trademarks and the good will of 
the business that the trademarks symbolize are presumed to pass 
with the sale of the business. . . . "  3 McCarthy, supra, 
§ 18:37.  "The rule of law is well recognized that in a 
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
15 
 
voluntary sale of a business as an entirety, trademarks and 
trade names, which have been lawfully established and identified 
with such business, will pass to one who purchases as a whole 
the physical assets or elements of the business."  Am. Dirigold 
Corp. v. Dirigold Metals Corp., 125 F.2d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 
1942) (citing Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v. Hall's Safe Co., 
208 U.S. 554, 558 (1908)); see Yellowbook Inc. v. Brandeberry, 
708 F.3d 837, 846 (6th Cir. 2013)("[W]hen a business sells the 
'entirety' of its assets, the trade name is presumably one of 
those assets.  A contract that sells 'as an entirety the 
property of a corporation, including good will, passes title to 
the business trademarks of the corporation.'" (quoted source 
omitted)).  Having outlined the relevant terms and legal 
principles, we apply those concepts to the facts of this case. 
B. The Bibs Resort Marks 
¶30 We begin by emphasizing that the Bibs Resort marks 
indicate the source of the provided goods or services.  That is, 
the Bibs Resort marks represent the resort management services 
that the Ritters' business continuously provided from Bibs 
Resort's founding in 1986 until 2006.  These services included 
marketing, 
maintenance, 
cleaning, 
and 
conducting 
social 
activities.  It is undisputed that the Ritters provided these 
services uninterrupted and in the same fashion even after the 
1998 resort-to-condominium conversion, a conclusion bolstered by 
the plain language of the Declaration.  The Declaration 
expressly permitted the Ritters' business to continue providing 
these resort management services:  "nothing in the paragraphs in 
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
16 
 
these Declarations shall be construed to prohibit [the Ritters] 
from continuing to operate the property, or any part thereof, as 
a resort or to prohibit any of the units [sic] owners from 
renting out the unit or units."   
¶31 During the 20 years that the Ritters provided the 
resort 
management 
services, 
the 
Bibs 
Resort 
marks 
were 
transformed into symbols of the resort management services, 
including the resort activities and their associated enjoyment.  
In other words, the Ritters' resort management business built up 
the goodwill of the resort through activities such as picnics, 
campfires, and other lakeside recreational events, as well as 
maintaining the grounds, cleaning the units, and operating an 
on-site bar, all while using the Bibs Resort marks.  See 1 
McCarthy, supra, § 3:2 (noting that a trademark "is the visual 
symbol of the good will and reputation that a business has built 
up in a product or service").  Because the Ritters provided 
ongoing and uninterrupted resort services, returning customers 
were able to identify their services, and the associated 
goodwill, with the Bibs Resort marks.  Having established this 
link between the Bibs Resort marks and the resort management 
services they symbolized, we turn to the Association's argument 
about the 1998 resort-to-condominium conversion. 
C. The Association's Claim of Ownership 
¶32 The Association contends, and the court of appeals 
agreed, 
that 
the 
1998 
resort-to-condominium 
conversion 
transferred to the Association the Bibs Resort marks.  The 
Association's argument fails for two reasons.  First, the 
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
17 
 
argument 
violates 
longstanding 
trademark 
and 
trade 
name 
principles.  Second, neither the Condominium Ownership Act nor 
the Declaration "mandate[d]" a transfer of the Bibs Resort marks 
from the Ritters to the Association in 1998. 
¶33 The Association asserts that the Bibs Resort marks 
were tied to the resort's real property and thus automatically 
transferred when the Ritters recorded the Declaration and 
converted the property to a condominium.  This argument violates 
the longstanding principle that marks cannot exist separate and 
apart from the goodwill of the product or service they 
symbolize:  the resort management services.  See 1 McCarthy, 
supra, § 2:15 ("A trademark has no existence separate from the 
good will of the product or service it symbolizes.  Good will 
and its tangible symbol, a trademark, are inseparable."); 
Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984) (reasoning 
that "[t]here are no rights in a trademark apart from the 
business with which the mark has been associated; they are 
inseparable").  Whether the lakefront property in and of itself 
drew and attracted guests is irrelevant to the analysis here 
because the Bibs Resort marks protect, and are associated with, 
the goods and services that the Ritters provided through their 
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
18 
 
business.13  By incorrectly linking the Bibs Resort marks to the 
real property rather than the resort management services, the 
Association misidentifies the source of the goodwill underlying 
the Bibs Resort marks.   
¶34 The Condominium Ownership Act lends no support to the 
Association's argument that there was an automatic transfer of 
the Bibs Resort marks to the Association in 1998.  The court of 
appeals concluded that the transfer "is mandated" by Wis. Stat. 
§ 703.15, which says that "[t]he affairs of every condominium 
shall be governed by an association" of unit owners.  Ritter, 
388 Wis. 2d 421, ¶25.  But, even putting aside (1) the fact that 
the Ritters continued to provide the resort management services 
that the marks symbolized; and (2) that those marks cannot exist 
separate and apart from the goodwill of the product or service 
they symbolize, the plain language of chapter 703 did not 
"mandate" the transfer of the Bibs Resort marks in 1998.  
Section 703.15(3) lists the powers of condominium associations, 
                                                 
13 The court of appeals relied upon ABKA for the proposition 
that "in the context of resort properties, the 'product' that 
attracts prospective renters is not the type of fungible 
services 
identified 
by 
the 
Farrows." 
 
See 
Ritter, 
388 
Wis. 2d 421, ¶35 (citing ABKA Ltd. P'ship v. Bd. of Rev. of 
Vill. of Fontana-On-Geneva Lake, 231 Wis. 2d 328, 342, 603 
N.W.2d 217 (1999)).  However, ABKA is inapposite because it is a 
property tax decision in which this court held that management 
income that is "inextricably intertwined with" the resort 
property may be included in a tax assessment, even if the 
services are provided offsite.  ABKA, 231 Wis. 2d at 331.  ABKA 
has no bearing on this case and the bedrock principles of 
trademark and trade name law that dictate that marks indicate 
the source of goods or services. 
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
19 
 
including the conditional power of an association to "[a]cquire, 
hold, encumber and convey any right, title or interest in or to 
real property."  (Emphasis added.)  The Bibs Resort marks are 
intangible property, the ownership of which is not enumerated 
among the powers granted by the Condominium Ownership Act.  It 
is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that 
"the express mention of one matter excludes other similar 
matters [that are] not mentioned."  FAS, LLC v. Town of Bass 
Lake, 2007 WI 73, ¶27, 301 Wis. 2d 321, 733 N.W.2d 287 (quoting 
Perra v. Menomonee Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI App 215, ¶12, 239 
Wis. 2d 26, 619 N.W.2d 123).  The legislature, in drafting the 
Condominium Ownership Act, was fully capable of granting 
condominium associations the power to own intangible property 
such as trademarks and trade names.  It did not do so.  
¶35 To be sure, Wis. Stat. § 703.15(3)(a)4. grants to 
associations broad authority to "[e]xercise any other power 
conferred 
by 
the 
condominium 
instruments[14] 
or 
bylaws."  
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Despite 
this 
open-ended 
grant 
to 
a 
condominium association to construct its bylaws as it sees fit, 
the statute explicitly states that any non-enumerated powers 
held by an association must be expressly conferred in either the 
condominium instruments or bylaws.  Here, even assuming, 
incorrectly, that the Bibs Resort marks can be separated from 
the resort management services they represent, there is no 
                                                 
14 Pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 703.02(5), 
condominium 
instruments include "the declaration, plats and plans of a 
condominium together with any attached exhibits or schedules."   
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
20 
 
evidence that the Bibs Resort condominium's bylaws conferred on 
the Association the ability to own any items of intangible 
property and it is undisputed that the Association never 
provided goods or services in the resort management service 
industry.15   
¶36 Additionally, the Declaration does not contain any 
references to the transfer of intangible property to the 
Association.  Nor does it evince any transfer of the Bibs Resort 
marks or any part of the business and associated goodwill that 
those marks represent.  To the contrary, the Declaration 
specifically and unambiguously excludes that business from the 
Association's authority, reserving it for the Ritters.  And the 
Ritters continued to provide those resort management services to 
guests and patrons under the Bibs Resorts marks for years 
following the resort-to-condominium conversion.   
¶37 In sum, both the Association's argument that there was 
a transfer of the Bibs Resort marks to the Association in 1998 
and the circuit court's conclusion that the Bibs Resort marks 
"became part of" the Association violate basic principles of 
trademark and trade name law.  Additionally, there is no reading 
                                                 
15 The Farrows have consistently reiterated that they do not 
dispute the Association's use of the marks in a non-business 
context, such as affixing the logo to the exterior wall of each 
unit, since these uses are not uses in the marketplace and do 
not indicate a source of goods or services.   
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
21 
 
of 
the 
Condominium 
Association 
Act 
or 
the 
condominium 
instruments that supports such a "mandated" transfer.16 
D. The Farrows' Claim of Ownership 
¶38 Having determined that there is no support for the 
proposition that the Bibs Resort marks transferred to the 
Association in 1998, we turn next to the 2006 sale.  In 2006, 
the Ritters sold the on-site bar and "the Business known as 
Bibs" to the Farrows.  Included in the offer to purchase were 
the "goodwill" and "business personal property," defined as "all 
tangible and intangible personal property and rights in personal 
property owned by Seller and used in the business as of the date 
of [the] Offer, including . . . trade names. . . . "  (Emphasis 
added.)  The Ritters also signed a bill of sale that transferred 
the personal property and business equipment necessary to 
operate the resort management business to the Farrows.  The 
parties confirmed the sale of the entirety of the Ritters' 
resort 
management 
business 
to 
the 
Farrows 
in 
subsequent 
                                                 
16 We also note that the court of appeals relied in part 
upon Carolyn Ritter's affidavit, in which she averred that she 
and her husband did not sell the trademark rights at issue to 
the Farrows in 2006 because the "name and logo [of Bibs Resort] 
was and is the property of the [Association.]"  Likewise, the 
dissent exclusively relies upon Carolyn Ritter's unsupported 
averment that "Each unit [the Ritters] sold included the right 
to use the name as well as the logo."  See, e.g., Dissent, ¶¶61, 
72, 73.  We decline to rely upon this self-serving affidavit 
since the averments violate longstanding trademark and trade 
name law and her averments find no independent support in the 
Declaration or the Condominium Ownership Act.  See TMT N. Am., 
Inc. v. Magic Touch GmbH, 124 F.3d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(recognizing the danger of allowing parties to "us[e] self-
serving testimony to gain ownership of trademarks").  
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
22 
 
documentary filings with the State.  Indicative of selling their 
business to the Farrows, Ted and Carolyn Ritter changed their 
business name from "Bibs Resort, Inc." to "Ritter Enterprises, 
Inc." 
¶39 Following 
the 
"old 
and 
clear 
rule, 
universally 
followed," the Bibs Resort marks and their associated goodwill 
passed from the Ritters to the Farrows in 2006 with the sale of 
the resort management business.  See 3 McCarthy, supra, § 18:37 
("When a business is sold . . . trademarks and the good will of 
the business that the trademarks symbolize are presumed to pass 
with the sale of the business."); Am. Dirigold Corp., 125 F.2d 
at 453 ("The rule of law is well recognized that in a voluntary 
sale of a business as an entirety, trademarks and trade names, 
which have been lawfully established and identified with such 
business, will pass to one who purchases as a whole the physical 
assets or elements of the business . . . ."). 
¶40 To summarize, the language in the 2006 documents 
clearly shows that the Ritters sold the Farrows the entirety of 
their resort management business, which included the associated 
goodwill and exclusive ownership of and rights to the Bibs 
Resort marks.  The offer to purchase made explicit the Farrows' 
intention to purchase the goodwill that was inextricably 
associated with the resort management services.  The bill of 
sale signed by the Ritters further indicates that the resort 
management business and related goodwill were transferred 
together in accordance with longstanding practice.  The Report 
of Business Transfer filed by the Ritters and the joint letter 
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
23 
 
the parties sent to the DOR subsequent to the sale provide even 
more evidence demonstrating the parties' intent to transfer the 
goodwill and trade names from the Ritters to the Farrows.  Based 
on the ample evidence in the record and well-settled trademark 
and trade name law, the ownership of the Bibs Resort marks 
passed with the sale of the Ritters' resort management business 
in 2006.17  
¶41 Having determined that the Ritters and the Association 
were not entitled to summary judgment because:  (1) applying 
well-settled principles of trademark and trade name law, the 
Bibs Resort marks did not transfer to the Association in 1998; 
and (2) the Farrows owned the Bibs Resort marks as of 2006 when 
they purchased the Ritters' business, we reverse the circuit 
court's grant of summary judgment.  This case must be remanded 
                                                 
17 The Association also asserts that the Bibs Resort marks 
are a collective mark of the Association.  We need not address 
this argument based on the foregoing analysis and our conclusion 
that the Farrows were the exclusive owners of the Bibs Resort 
marks as of 2006. 
No. 
2018AP1518   
 
24 
 
to the circuit court to reconsider the Farrows' summary judgment 
motion in light of our legal conclusions.18 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶42 Because it is a well-settled principle that trademarks 
and their associated goodwill pass with the sale of a business, 
we conclude as a matter of law that the Farrows became the 
exclusive owner of the Bibs Resort marks in 2006 when they 
purchased the resort management business from the Ritters.  We 
reverse the grant of summary judgment to the Ritters and the 
Association and remand the case to the circuit court to 
reconsider the Farrows' summary judgment motion in light of our 
legal conclusions. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded. 
 
                                                 
18 The dissent claims that this opinion "gets all tangled up 
in asserted connections between goodwill and tradenames, which 
issues are not relevant to the dispute before us."  Dissent, 
¶91.  Yet, the connection between goodwill and the Bibs Resort 
marks is the crux of this case, as it is determinative of the 
trademark ownership issues before us.  The dissent erroneously 
conflates trademark use with trademark ownership.  Instead of 
grappling with either of the ownership issues the parties 
presented to this court, the dissent concludes that the Ritters 
did not have "exclusive use" of the marks when they sold the 
resort management business in 2006 because they had "dispersed 
the right to use Bibs Resort and its logo to others long before 
their 2006 transaction with the Farrows."  Id., ¶87.  But in 
reaching this determination, the dissent glosses over the key 
fact that although the Association and the individual unit 
owners used the name and logo for non-commercial purposes, 
nowhere does the record demonstrate that they used the marks to 
provide resort management services. 
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶43 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (dissenting).  The 
majority opinion errs when it fails to apply summary judgment 
methodology, which is the same for us as it is for the circuit 
court, and thereby ignores uncontested material facts developed 
during summary judgment.  Those uncontested facts preclude 
Anthony and Arlyce Farrows' (the Farrows) claim for tradename or 
trademark infringement.  The majority opinion compounds its 
error when it ignores the common law of Wisconsin in regard to 
what must be shown at summary judgment to make or defeat a prima 
facie claim of infringement of tradename or trademark and relies 
instead on federal case law that is grounded in the Lanham Act.   
¶44 I conclude that application of Wisconsin common law to 
the questions presented requires affirming the court of appeals' 
decision that a claim for tradename or trademark infringement 
sufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion to dismiss 
has not been made here.  I employ the rationale on which the 
circuit court granted summary judgment, which also was presented 
to us.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶45 On December 6, 1985, Ted and Carolyn Ritter (the 
Ritters) formed a Wisconsin corporation, Bibs Resort, Inc.  In 
early 1986, the corporation purchased resort property on Little 
St. Germain Lake.  They improved the resort property and gave 
the resort a new name, Bibs Resort.  They also created a logo, 
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
2 
 
which included "BIBS Resort" with a pair of bibbed overalls that 
have a handkerchief hanging out of the back pocket.   
¶46 Bibs Resort consisted of 11 cottages, a bar and game 
room and the Ritters' residence.  The Ritters managed the resort 
property, rented the cottages and operated the bar.  The name, 
Bibs Resort, and the logo have been associated with this resort 
on Little St. Germain Lake since 1986.   
¶47 On May 19, 1998, Bibs Resort, Inc., as the Declarant, 
formed Bibs Resort Condominium and transferred all real property 
and improvements thereon into the condominium form of use and 
ownership pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes.1  That same day, the 
Bibs Resort Declaration of Condominium was recorded at the 
Office of the Register of Deeds for Vilas County, Wisconsin.2   
¶48 The Declaration of Condominium named Bibs Resort 
Condominium, Inc., a nonstock corporation, as the managing 
entity of Bibs Resort Condominium.3  The bylaws of the 
association were designated as the bylaws of Bibs Resort 
Condominium.4  The Board of Directors of Bibs Resort Condominium 
                                                 
1 "A condominium is a form of ownership of real property 
that combines two separate forms of ownership interest:  the 
individual ownership of the dwelling unit and the undivided 
common ownership, with other unit owners, of the common elements 
of the condominium parcel."  Solowicz v. Forward Geneva Nat'l 
LLC, 2010 WI 20, ¶19, 323 Wis. 2d 556, 780 N.W.2d 111 (citing 
Joseph W. Boucher et al., Wisconsin Condominium Law Handbook 
§ 1.17 (3rd ed. 2006)).   
2 R. 36 at 8. 
3 R. 36 at 10, 20. 
4 R. 36 at 20-21.  The bylaws of the condominium association 
are not part of the record before us.   
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
3 
 
Association had the right to contract with any firm, person or 
corporation for the maintenance and repair of the condominium 
common area and properties.5   
¶49 The Ritters continued to operate Bibs Resort as they 
had in the past, by maintaining the grounds, renting cottages 
and operating the bar.  They did so through written contracts 
with Bibs Resort Condominium, Inc. that could be cancelled with 
90 days written notice by either party. 
¶50 On May 24, 1998, Unit 10 of Bibs Resort Condominium 
was sold to the Sorensens, and on June 30, 1998, Unit 9 was sold 
to the Sorensens.  The Sorensens' purchases included the right 
to use the name Bibs Resort and the logo when they rented their 
cottages, which name and logo were affixed to their individual 
cottages.   
¶51 On April 8, 2002, Unit 1 was sold to the McGinns, with 
Bibs Resort and logo attached to their individual cottage.  They 
too obtained the right to use the name and logo.  On September 
16, 2005, Unit 6 was sold to the Abrahams, again with Bibs 
Resort name and logo affixed to their cottage.  They too had the 
right to use the name and logo of Bibs Resort when they marketed 
their cottage.   
¶52 On May 27, 2006, unit number 12 was sold to the 
Farrows, again with the Bibs Resort logo affixed to cottage 12 
and the right to use the name, Bibs Resort.  At that time, the 
Farrows were given copies of all Bibs Resort Condominium 
documents, 
including 
the 
Declaration 
of 
Condominium, 
the 
                                                 
5 R. 36 at 30. 
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
4 
 
Condominium Plat, By-laws and Rules and Regulations.6  The 
Farrows knew that the rental agreements the Ritters had in place 
could be terminated by either party with 90 days written notice.7  
The Farrows' attorney insisted that new rental agreements be 
prepared.8  Those new rental agreements also contained the right 
of either party to terminate the agreement with 90 days written 
notice.9  On June 23, 2006, Unit 13 (Northwoods Pub and Grill) 
was sold to the Farrows, once again with the Bibs Resort name 
and logo affixed.  The Ritters continued to own seven units in 
the condominium, which cottages were available for rental.    
¶53 On June 23, 2006, the Farrows also purchased the 
opportunity to enter into contracts with Bibs Resort Condominium 
to manage the common areas and with owners of individual 
condominium units to manage their individual cottages.  
¶54 That same day, the Farrows reported a business 
transfer for the "management of vacation resort" between Bibs 
Resort, Inc. and Farrow Enterprises, Inc. to the Wisconsin 
Division of Unemployment Insurance.10  BIBS Resort was stated as 
the "tradename."  On September 7, 2006, the Ritters and the 
Farrows sent the Wisconsin Department of Revenue a letter 
stating:  "Anthony and Arlyce Farrow, corporate officers of 
                                                 
6 R. 77 at 3, 4. 
7 R. 77 at 4. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 R. 36 at 50. 
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
5 
 
Farrow Enterprises, Inc., would like to use the name BIBS Resort 
as 
a 
trade 
name 
since 
they 
are 
handling 
advertising, 
reservations and payments under that name.  Ted and Carolyn 
Ritter are amenable to that change."11    
¶55 In 2006, the Bibs Resort Condominium Association and 
the owners of cottages 10, 9, 6 and 1 entered into management 
agreements with Farrow Enterprises, Inc., which included the 
option for either party to terminate the agreement with 90 days 
written notice, just as the management contracts had when the 
Ritters were providing management services.   
¶56 Several years later, problems developed with the 
Farrows' management of the resort, although there are no 
findings in the record as to what they were.  In September and 
October of 2009 and in March of 2010, the Farrows' contracts 
with the condominium association and the individual cottage 
owners were terminated with the required 90-day written notices.   
¶57 On November 19, 2008, Farrow Enterprises, Inc., 
applied to the Wisconsin Secretary of State to register Bibs 
Resort logo as a trademark.  In her application, Arlyce Farrow 
represented that the date of first use of the Bibs Resort logo 
was "June 1, 2006."  After being duly sworn, she averred that: 
[T]he registrant has the right to the use of the 
subject of the registration applied for, and that no 
other 
person 
or 
persons, 
firm, 
partnership, 
corporation, association or union of workers has such 
right either in the identical form or in any such near 
resemblance 
thereto 
as 
may 
be 
calculated 
to 
deceive.[12] 
                                                 
11 R. 36 at 58. 
12 R. 77 at 15-17. 
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
6 
 
¶58 On February 17, 2010, Farrow Enterprises, Inc. applied 
to the Wisconsin Secretary of State to register "Bibs Resort" as 
a tradename.  On her application, Arlyce Farrow represented that 
the date of first use of the Bibs Resort name was "June 23, 
2006."  After being duly sworn, she again averred that in regard 
to Farrow Enterprises right to use the name Bibs Resort, "no 
other 
person 
or 
persons, 
firm, 
partnership, 
corporation, 
association or union of workers has such right either in the 
identical form or in any such near resemblance thereto as may be 
calculated to deceive."13   
¶59 In her affidavit supporting summary judgment of 
dismissal 
of 
the 
Farrows' 
claim 
of 
tradename/trademark 
infringement and based on personal knowledge, Carolyn Ritter 
averred that the right to use the name Bibs Resort was given to 
Bibs Resort Condominium when that form of ownership was created 
in 1998 by Bibs Resort, Inc., the corporation of which she and 
her husband, Ted, were the sole shareholders.   
¶60 She averred that individual cottages were rented using 
Bibs Resort as their name, and she attached a Vilas County 
Public Health Department license permitting rentals of units of 
"Bibs Resort Condominium."14  She also attached pictures of 
signage that gave directions to the location of "BIBS Resort" 
and employed the Bibs logo, which signs were created, paid for 
and maintained by Bibs Resort Condominium Association.15 
                                                 
13 R. 77 at 18, 19. 
14 R. 77 at 11. 
15 R. 77 at 23. 
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
7 
 
¶61 Carolyn Ritter further averred that the Town of 
St. Germain's real estate tax bills for individual units at Bibs 
Resort Condominium used the name "Bibs Resort Condominium" as 
identification. 
 
She 
attached 
examples 
of 
the 
Town 
of 
St. Germain's tax bills.16  She said that every person who 
purchased a unit in Bibs Resort Condominium had the right to use 
the name Bibs Resort and the logo in marketing their cottages.  
During the summary judgment proceedings before the circuit 
court, the Farrows did not offer any evidence to dispute Carolyn 
Ritters' statement that owners of individual units and the Bibs 
Resort Condominium association had been given rights to use the 
Bibs Resort name and logo.   
¶62 In its summary judgment decision, the circuit court 
concluded that, based on uncontested material facts, in 2006 the 
Farrows could not have received the right to exclusive use of 
the name, Bibs Resort, or the logo from either the Ritters or 
the Bibs Resort Condominium because neither the Ritters nor the 
Bibs Resort Condominium had the right to exclusive use to impart 
to anyone.  The court further explained: 
Prior to the 2006 transaction between the Ritters 
and the Farrows the Ritters had already granted the 
other unit owners -– the Sorensens, the McGinns, and 
the Abrahams -– the right to use the Bibs name and 
logo in marketing the cabins.  Those unit owners 
already had a vested interest in the use of those 
trademarks, and the interests of those third parties 
cannot be extinguished by an agreement between the 
Farrows and the Ritters alone.   
. . . .   
                                                 
16 R. 77 at 13, 14.  
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
8 
 
 
The individual unit owners had the right to use 
the Bibs name and logo, the logo was posted on each 
unit, just as the Farrows had been given that right 
when they bought their units.[17]   
¶63 The Farrows appealed, and the court of appeals 
affirmed.  The court of appeals concluded that based on 
undisputed material facts when the Farrows purchased two units 
in the condominium and the opportunity to manage Bibs Resort 
Condominium, others already had obtained the right to use the 
Bibs Resort name and logo; therefore, the Farrows did not obtain 
the right to exclusive use of the Bibs Resort name or logo when 
they purchased the business opportunity.  See Ritter v. Farrow, 
2019 WI App 46, ¶36, ¶38 n.12, 388 Wis. 2d 421, 933 N.W.2d 167.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶64 This case presents as a review of the decision of the 
court of appeals that affirmed the summary judgment decision of 
the Vilas County Circuit Court18 dismissing the Farrows' claim 
that the Ritters infringed their tradename/trademark.  Whether 
summary judgment was properly granted is a question of law that 
we review independently, while applying the same methodology as 
the circuit court and the court of appeals.  Hoida, Inc. v. M&I 
Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶15, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17 
(citing Cole v. Hubanks, 2004 WI 74, ¶5, 272 Wis. 2d 539, 681 
N.W.2d 147); see also Sands v. Menard, 2017 WI 110, ¶28, 379 
Wis. 2d 1, 904 N.W.2d 789.  In our review, we benefit from the 
                                                 
17 R. 335 at 8. 
18 The Honorable Michael H. Bloom presided.  
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
9 
 
previous courts' discussions.  Showers Appraisals, LLC v. Musson 
Bros. Inc., 2013 WI 79, ¶21, 350 Wis. 2d 509, 835 N.W.2d 226.   
B.  Summary Judgment Principles 
¶65 Every decision on a motion for summary judgment begins 
with a review of the complaint (here, a counterclaim) to 
determine whether, on its face, it states a claim for relief.  
Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶16.  If it does, then we examine the 
answer to see if issues of fact or law have been joined.  Id.  
After determining that the complaint and answer are sufficient 
to join issue, we examine the moving party's affidavits to 
determine whether they establish a prima facie case for summary 
judgment in the movant's favor.19  Id.  When they do, we review 
the opposing party's affidavits to determine whether those 
affidavits establish that there are material facts in dispute, 
                                                 
19 A moving party's affidavits based on personal knowledge 
and submitted during a summary judgment proceeding should not be 
discarded as "self-serving," and "unsupported" which is how the 
majority opinion discounts them.  Majority op., ¶37 n.16.  
Affidavits given under oath and based on personal knowledge are 
an evidentiary portion of the statutory process that is employed 
when a court is deciding a summary judgment motion.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(3).  
The majority opinion's disregard for established rules of 
summary judgment will cause confusion in circuit courts who are 
expected to follow Wis. Stat. § 802.08(3) and case law in regard 
to summary judgment motions.  Augustine v. Anti-Defamation 
League of B'Nai B'Rith, 75 Wis. 2d 207, 221, 249 N.W.2d 547 
(1977) (explaining that when affidavits based on personal 
knowledge present material facts they may make a prima facie 
case for summary judgment); Physicians Plus Ins. Corp. v. 
Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 80, ¶18, 254 Wis. 2d 77, 646 
N.W.2d 777 (concluding that to defeat summary judgment there 
must be a genuine issue of material fact apparent in the 
affidavits submitted). 
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
10 
 
or inferences from undisputed material facts, that would entitle 
the opposing party to a trial to determine those facts.  Id.  We 
affirm a grant of summary judgment when this process shows that 
there are no disputes of material fact.  Id.  "'[T]he mere 
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties 
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for 
summary judgment,' so long as there is no disputed fact that is 
material to the claim or defense made."  Id. (quoting City of 
Elkhorn v. 211 Centralia St. Corp., 2004 WI App 139, ¶18, 275 
Wis. 2d 584, 685 N.W.2d 874).   
C.  Infringement Principles 
¶66 The 
sole 
remaining 
claim 
from 
the 
Farrows' 
counterclaims 
is 
whether 
the 
Ritters 
infringed 
their 
tradename/trademark.20  Wisconsin recognizes a claim for relief 
at 
common 
law 
for 
tradename 
or 
trademark 
infringement.  
"Infringement actions, even against a non-competitor, protect 
the reputation and goodwill exclusively appropriated to the 
trademark holder."  Spheeris Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Spheeris on 
Capitol, 157 Wis. 2d 298, 312, 459 N.W.2d 581 (1990).  As 
claimed in First Wis. Nat. Bank of Milwaukee v. Wichman, 85 
Wis. 2d 54, 270 N.W.2d 168 (1978), the plaintiff must allege 
infringement of its common law rights to the exclusive use of 
certain words, there, "First Wisconsin."  Id. at 60.   
                                                 
20 Notably, there can be no claim for the violation of a 
non-compete agreement in the case before us.  A non-compete 
agreement was not alleged to have been agreed to or breached.  
However, to me, the Farrows really are complaining that they are 
injured because the Ritters competed with them.  
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
11 
 
¶67 Without the right to exclusive use, an action for 
tradename or trademark infringement cannot be maintained.  
Marshall v. Pinkham, 52 Wis. 572, 590, 9 N.W. 615 (1881).  
Marshall involved a liniment that the father, Samuel Marshall, 
first prepared and sold under his name, with a label that 
contained a particular vignette of a horse's head.  Id. at 574-
75.  Over the course of several years he gave his seven children 
the formula for the liniment, which they manufactured and sold 
on their own.  Samuel generally provided the labels for them to 
use.  Id. at 575.  After Samuel died, his widow, Mary, continued 
to manufacture and sell the liniment, as did a number of their 
children.  Id.   
¶68 Some years later, one son, Charles H., bought out the 
liniment business his mother had operated.  Id.  He then brought 
a suit for trademark infringement to enjoin the manufacture and 
sale of the liniment by others.  He claimed that his father had 
left the rights for the liniment to Mary and that he had 
purchased those rights from her.  The trial court dismissed the 
suit after determining that plaintiff did not have the right to 
exclusive use of the name or label.  Id. at 577.  We agreed 
stating:  
[I]t would seem to be very certain that Charles H. 
never acquired an exclusive right to the use of the 
word "Marshall's" or "Old Dr. S. Marshall's" upon the 
liniment put up by him, as against his father, mother, 
brothers or sisters.  If the plaintiff Charles H. 
never acquired any such exclusive right as against 
them, it would seem quite doubtful whether he ever 
acquired it as against any one. . . .  The question 
occurs, [w]hom does the word "Marshall's" point out as 
the true source, origin, or owner of the original 
genuine mixture, or what particular place of business 
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
12 
 
or sale has it designated during these many years?  If 
it never in fact truly so pointed out or designated, 
or if by its distributive use, . . . it ceased to 
perform that function, then it can no longer be 
protected as a trade-mark. 
Id. at 582-83.  We explained that "[a]s no exclusive right of 
either of the plaintiffs was invaded, they were not entitled to 
an injunction by reason of any mere absence of such right on the 
part of the defendant."  Id. at 590. 
D.  Farrows' Infringement Claim 
¶69 The Farrows would like to return to the circuit court 
to pursue a claim for infringement of tradename/trademark based 
on their purchase of a business opportunity from the Ritters.  
In order to do so, they must allege material facts sufficient to 
prove that they have the right to exclusive use of the name, 
Bibs Resort, and its overalls logo.  First Wisconsin, 85 Wis. 2d 
at 60; Marshall, 52 Wis. at 582; Spheeris, 157 Wis. 2d at 312.   
¶70 As I begin the required summary judgment methodology, 
I 
examine 
the 
Farrows' 
counterclaim 
allegations 
and 
the 
responses that are asserted by the Ritters relative to the 
Farrows' infringement claim.  The Farrows' alleged that they 
"own the common law and state-registered trademark, 'BIBS 
Resort.'"21  The Ritters respond that "Defendants do not have an 
exclusive propriety interest in the [logo], 'BIBS Resort,' as 
said [logo] is part of the name and legal description of the 
condominium in which all unit owners have an interest, including 
the right to use the same."22  They further contend that 
                                                 
21 R. 2 at 12, ¶44. 
22 R. 30 at 9, ¶26. 
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
13 
 
"Defendants have no exclusive proprietary interest in the name 
of 'BIBS Resort.'"23  The Ritters further contend, as an 
affirmative defense, that the Farrows pleadings fail to state a 
claim.24 
¶71 In determining whether pleadings state a claim for 
relief, we liberally construe what has been alleged.  John Doe 1 
v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, ¶12, 303 Wis. 2d 34, 
734 N.W.2d 827.  The word, "own," which the Farrows used to 
describe their interest in the Bibs Resort logo, is an undefined 
term that could convey a number of properties.  Therefore, I 
conclude that their complaint could state a claim for trademark 
infringement.  The Ritters deny the Farrows' allegations and 
affirmatively allege that in order to proceed with a claim of 
infringement, the Farrows must have the right to exclusive use 
of the name, Bibs Resort, and its logo, which they do not have.  
Accordingly, at that stage of the summary judgment methodology, 
I conclude that issue has been joined on whether the Farrows 
have a claim for tradename/trademark infringement.   
¶72 The Ritters moved for summary judgment dismissing the 
Farrows' infringement claim.  They provided the affidavit of 
Carolyn Ritter, which is based on her personal knowledge.  To 
her affidavit, they attached documents showing that since at 
least 1998, when Bibs Resort Condominium was formed, others in 
                                                 
23 R. 30 at 10, ¶28. 
24 R. 30 at 15, ¶41, H. 
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
14 
 
addition to the Ritters have had the right to use the name, Bibs 
Resort, and its logo.25   
¶73 Her affidavit averred that when individual units in 
Bibs Resort Condominium were sold in 1998, 2002 and 2006, the 
unit owners were given the right to use the name, Bibs Resort, 
and its logo to advertise rentals of their individual cottages.  
The documents attached to the affidavit showed that the Town of 
St. Germain also used the name, Bibs Resort Condominium, when it 
taxed individual unit owners, and the Vilas County Department of 
Health issued rental permits to unit owners for property known 
as Bibs Resort.26  The affidavit also attached pictures of signs 
showing directions to the location of "Bibs Resort"; the signs 
used the BIBS Resort logo too.27  Those advertisements were 
created, maintained and paid for by the condominium association 
for Bibs Resort Condominium.28   
¶74 These 
submissions 
made 
a 
prima 
facie 
case 
for 
dismissal of the Farrows' infringement claim because the 
undisputed, material facts demonstrated that in 2006 the Ritters 
no longer had the right to exclusive use of the name, Bibs 
Resort, or its logo; and therefore, the Ritters could not 
transfer the right to exclusive use of the name or logo to the 
Farrows.  First Wisconsin, 85 Wis. 2d at 60; Marshall, 52 Wis. 
                                                 
25 R. 77 at 11. 
26 R. 77 at 13, 14. 
27 R. 77 at 23. 
28 R. 77 at 23. 
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
15 
 
at 582; Spheeris, 157 Wis. 2d at 312.  The Farrows submitted 
nothing in opposition to the Ritters' submissions in support of 
their motion for summary judgment dismissing the Farrows' 
infringement claim.     
¶75 Although Farrow Enterprises, Inc. twice attempted to 
register Bibs Resort and its logo with the Wisconsin Secretary 
of State pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes, and they alleged 
infringement of a "registered mark" in their counterclaim, the 
Farrows did not continue with the contention that they had a 
registered 
mark 
during 
the 
summary 
judgment 
proceedings.  
However, if they had, they would have had to prove that they 
have the right to exclusive use of the name, Bibs Resort, and 
its logo, because exclusivity of use is a requirement for 
registering a trademark in Wisconsin.   
¶76 The requirement of exclusivity of use is apparent from 
the statement that the Secretary of State requires be given 
under oath on the registration form and also from the plain 
meaning of Wis. Stat. §§ 132.01(1) and (7)(a).  The Secretary of 
State's form provides:   
[T]he registrant has the right to the use of the 
subject of the registration applied for, and that no 
other 
person 
or 
persons, 
firm, 
partnership, 
corporation, association or union of workers has such 
right either in the identical form or in any such near 
resemblance 
thereto 
as 
may 
be 
calculated 
to 
deceive.[29] 
The plain meaning of §§ 132.01(1) and (7)(a) is consistent with 
the Secretary of State's form.  They provide a protectable mark 
                                                 
29 R. 77 at 15-17 (emphasis added). 
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
16 
 
if the registrant has the right to exclusive use of the mark.  
The plain meaning of those statutes are consistent with 
Wisconsin common law, as related in my discussion above.  
Section 132.01 provides in relevant part: 
(1) 
[Registration requires] . . . that the party, on 
whose behalf such mark is to be filed, has the 
right to the use of the same, and that no other 
person, 
or 
persons, 
firm, 
partnership, 
corporation, association, or union of workingmen 
has such right  . . . . 
. . . .  
(7)  The 
department 
shall 
do 
all 
of 
the 
following: 
(a)  Cancel 
from 
his 
or 
her 
register 
any 
registration . . . if a final judgment in any court of 
competent jurisdiction finds that . . . the registrant 
does not have the right to the exclusive use of the 
registration. 
(Emphasis 
added). 
 
Accordingly, 
if 
a 
registrant 
obtains 
Wisconsin registration by representing registrant has the right 
to exclusive use of a trademark and a court determines that the 
registrant does not have the right to exclusive use, the 
registration will be cancelled.  Therefore, the right to 
exclusive use is critical to a claim of infringement, whether 
under statutory or common law.    
¶77 Few cases employ Wisconsin's trademark statutes, and 
those that I found are not on-point with the dispute before us.  
For example, Mil-Mar Shoe Co., Inc. v. Shonac Corp., 75 F.3d 
1153 (7th Cir. 1996), which relied on Wis. Stat. ch. 132, turns 
on whether an alleged trademark is generic or descriptive, an 
issue not present in the dispute before us.   
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
17 
 
¶78 D.L. 
Anderson's 
Lakeside 
Leisure 
Co., 
Inc. 
v. 
Anderson, 2008 WI 126, 314 Wis. 2d 560, 757 N.W.2d 803 is 
somewhat helpful in regard to common law.  Over the years, D.L. 
Anderson developed a business of selling marine services and 
products.  In 2000, Scott Statz and Steven Statz (the Statzes) 
purchased 
that 
business 
for 
$891,000. 
 
Under 
the 
sales 
agreement, the Statzes purchased "restrictions on competition," 
for which they paid $400,000, and the right of the "use" of the 
tradename, D.L. Anderson Co., for which they paid $200,000.  
Id., ¶7. 
¶79 About two years after the Statzes' purchase, Anderson 
began working in areas that the Statzes believed violated the 
noncompetition provision of their asset purchase agreement.  
Id., ¶¶10-13.  In 2004, the Statzes filed suit against Anderson, 
alleging breach of the noncompetition provisions of the purchase 
agreement, infringement of tradename, unfair competition and 
breach of contract.  Id., ¶14.  The jury found in favor of the 
Statzes.  Id., ¶15. 
¶80 On review, Anderson claimed that the jury instructions 
were erroneous.  The Statzes said that Anderson waived the error 
because he did not raise it before the circuit court.  We agreed 
Anderson did not raise it, however, we exercised our discretion 
and reviewed the instructions given.  Id., ¶41.   
¶81 While there are parts of D.L. Anderson's Lakeside 
Leisure that address infringement issues not present in the case 
before us, D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure confirms that an 
infringement claim must be grounded in the right to exclusive 
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
18 
 
use of the tradename.  Id., ¶42.  We cited First Wisconsin, 
which concluded that infringement claims require exclusivity of 
use of a trademark, and Spheeris, which, again, relied on 
exclusivity of use as a requirement for an infringement claim.  
Id.  
¶82 Because 
there 
is 
little 
state 
law 
on 
tradename/trademark 
infringement, 
courts 
sometimes 
look 
to 
federal law.  While such consideration may be helpful, it can 
lead a court to err if the court does not recognize significant 
differences 
in 
state 
and 
federal 
law 
relative 
to 
tradenames/trademarks.   
¶83 One significant difference is the effect of federal 
registration under the Lanham Act.  Such registration "shift[s] 
the burden of proof from the plaintiff, who in a common law 
infringement [claim] would have to establish his right to 
exclusive use, to the defendant, who must introduce sufficient 
evidence to rebut the presumption of plaintiff's right to such 
use."  Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 373 
(1st Cir. 1980), repudiated on other grounds by Miller Brewing 
Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981).  
"Under the Lanham Act, registration of a mark is prima facie 
evidence of the 'the registrant's exclusive right to use the 
registered mark in commerce [] or in connection with the goods 
or services specified in the registration.'"  Black Dog Tavern 
Co., Inc. v. Hall, 823 F. Supp. 48, 53 (D. Mass. 1993) (quoting 
15 U.S.C. § 1115(a)).   
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
19 
 
¶84 Therefore, relying on federal cases with underlying 
Lanham Act registration can be troublesome if a question 
presented is whether the claimant has the right to exclusive use 
of the tradename/trademark because federal cases with underlying 
Lanham Act registration will presume that claimant has such a 
right.  Under Wisconsin common law, a claimant is required to 
prove possession of the right to exclusive use of the 
tradename/trademark.  Marshall, 52 Wis. at 582.   
¶85 Stated otherwise, relying on federal case law for a 
Wisconsin common law claim can cause a court to fail to analyze 
what state common law requires as the foundation for an 
infringement claim, i.e., the possession of the right to 
exclusive use of the tradename or trademark.  Missing that 
foundation can cause a court to get tangled in other issues that 
may 
be 
presented 
but 
are 
not 
relevant 
to 
deciding 
an 
infringement action where the right to exclusive use has not 
been 
proved. 
 
As 
basic 
tradename/trademark 
hornbook 
law 
provides, "[i]n a trade name infringement action, the plaintiff 
is required to establish a right to exclusive use of the name."  
Robin Cheryl Miller, 17 Causes of Action 579 § 5 Cumulative 
Supp. (updated Nov. 2020). 
¶86 Simply stated, because a tradename or trademark is 
often employed to identify the source of goods or services, if 
others have the right to use the same name or mark, the name or 
mark does not identify the source of goods or services.30  
                                                 
30 One can license a tradename so that others can use it.  
McDonald's is an example of such licensing, but licensing has no 
relevance to the case before us. 
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
20 
 
Accordingly, a seller who no longer has the right to exclusive 
use of a tradename/trademark cannot sell it to someone else.  
¶87 The case now before us was properly dismissed by the 
circuit court in a well-reasoned opinion.31  At summary judgment, 
it became apparent that based on uncontroverted material facts, 
the Farrows' counterclaim for infringement failed.  It failed 
because the Farrows never provided any evidentiary proof that 
the Ritters had the right to exclusive use of the name and logo 
for Bibs Resort at the time of the Farrows' 2006 purchase.  The 
right to exclusive use of a tradename/trademark is required to 
sue for infringement.  First Wisconsin, 85 Wis. 2d at 60; 
Marshall, 52 Wis. at 582; Spheeris, 157 Wis. 2d at 312.  The 
only proof on the right to exclusive use was uncontroverted.  
Carolyn Ritter averred, based on personal knowledge, that she 
and her husband had dispersed the right to use Bibs Resort and 
its logo to others long before their 2006 transaction with the 
Farrows.  
E.  Majority Opinion 
¶88 The majority opinion leads itself into error because 
it misstates the dispositive issue in the case, saying:  "These 
designations relate to a lakefront resort in St. Germain, 
                                                 
31 Because I employ the same rationale as the circuit court 
(that the Farrows did not establish the right to exclusive use 
of the Bibs' Resort name and logo), I need not address another 
rationale utilized by the court of appeals.  I observe, however, 
that renters likely chose to visit Bibs Resort in part because 
of its location rather than due to fungible management services.  
See ABKA Ltd. P'Ship v. Bd. of Review of the Vill. of Fontana-
on-Geneva Lake, 231 Wis. 2d 328, 342, 603 N.W.2d 217 (1999).  
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
21 
 
Wisconsin, and we are asked to determine their ownership."32  And 
it repeats this concept frequently, "we must ascertain whether 
the circuit court applied the well-settled principles of 
trademark and trade name law in determining the exclusive owner 
of the Bibs Resort marks."33  And further, "the Farrows owned the 
Bibs Resort marks as of 2006 when they purchased the Ritters' 
business."34    
¶89 The word "ownership" creates a foundational problem in 
the majority's analysis because the analysis does not recognize 
that for ownership to matter in an infringement claim, it must 
include ownership of the right to exclusive use of the name and 
logo.35  First Wisconsin, 85 Wis. 2d at 60; Marshall, 52 Wis. at 
582; Spheeris, 157 Wis. 2d at 312; see also Wis. Stat. 
§§ 132.01(1) and (7)(a).   
                                                 
32 Majority op., ¶1.  
33 Id., ¶24.  
34 Id., ¶41. 
35 In 
addition 
to 
missing 
the 
issue 
on 
which 
this 
infringement 
claim 
turns, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
also 
is 
internally inconsistent such that it will be difficult for 
circuit courts to apply.  To explain further, the majority's 
holding rests upon its statement that "[i]t is a well-settled 
legal principle that trademarks and their associated goodwill 
pass with the sale of a business."  Majority op., ¶4.  However, 
later in the opinion when hornbook and federal case law are 
cited, 
this 
"well-settled 
principle" 
becomes 
a 
bit 
more 
tentative.  It morphs into only a presumption that trademarks 
pass with the sale of a business.  See id., ¶¶29, 40.  So which 
is it?  Is it a well-settled principle or merely a rebuttable 
presumption, i.e., a well-settled principle that absent contrary 
evidence it is presumed to pass?  This inconsistency may 
undermine the ability of future courts to apply the majority 
opinion.  
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
22 
 
¶90 The majority opinion also ignores summary judgment 
methodology even though it acknowledges it is to apply the same 
methodology as the circuit court applied.36  If the majority 
opinion had not skipped this critical step, it may have avoided 
error. 
¶91 However, the majority also relies on federal case law 
when a tradename or trademark has been registered under the 
Lanham Act, where the right to exclusive use is presumed once 
registration has occurred.37  Keebler, 624 F.2d at 373.  The 
common law of Wisconsin requires the claimant in an infringement 
action to prove it has the right to exclusive use.  First 
Wisconsin, 85 Wis. 2d at 60; Marshall, 52 Wis. at 582; Spheeris, 
157 Wis. 2d at 312.  The opinion also gets all tangled up in 
asserted connections between goodwill and tradenames, which 
issues are not relevant to the dispute before us.38  
¶92 The majority opinion says that the dissent "conflates 
trademark use with trademark ownership."39  That statement shows 
a basic misunderstanding of the law.  To explain, if the Farrows 
"ownership" includes the right to exclusive use of the name, 
Bibs Resort, and its logo, they can maintain a claim for 
tradename/trademark infringement.  If their ownership is a right 
to shared use of the name and logo with others who were given 
                                                 
36 Majority op., ¶24 
37 Id., e.g., ¶29.  
38 Id., e.g., ¶34.  
39 Majority op., ¶41 n.18.   
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
23 
 
the right to use the name and logo when marketing their 
cottages, 
then 
the 
Farrows 
cannot 
maintain 
a 
claim 
of 
tradename/trademark infringement.  The right to exclusive use is 
required to be proved as a fact in order to maintain a claim for 
tradename/trademark infringement.  First Wisconsin, 85 Wis. 2d 
at 60; Marshall, 52 Wis. at 582.  When this matter returns to 
the circuit court, the Farrows must prove that their "ownership" 
includes the right to exclusive use of the name and logo; 
otherwise, 
they 
cannot 
maintain 
a 
tradename/trademark 
infringement action.  Id. 
¶93 At its core, this case is about whether the Ritters 
had dispersed the right to use Bibs Resort and its logo to 
others before the sale to the Farrows.  The undisputed record 
shows that they did.  Individual condominium owners were given  
the right to use the name and logo when they purchased their 
individual 
cottages; 
the 
operating 
company, 
Bibs 
Resort 
Condominium, Inc., also was given the right to use the name and 
logo, which it did, as shown by the pictures in the record of 
the signs that the association created and maintained.   
¶94 Certainly, the Farrows had a right to use the Bibs 
Resort name and logo; however, it was not the right to exclusive 
use.  And therein lies the problem.  The right to exclusive use 
of a tradename or trademark is required to maintain an 
infringement action under Wisconsin law.  Id. 
 
 
 
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
24 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶95 I conclude that application of Wisconsin common law to 
the questions presented requires affirming the court of appeals 
decision that a claim for tradename or trademark infringement 
sufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion to dismiss 
has not been made here.  I employ the rationale on which the 
circuit court granted summary judgment, which also was presented 
to us.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion. 
¶96 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER join this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2018AP1518.pdr 
 
 
 
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