Title: Commonwealth v. Cadet
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-10505
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 18, 2015

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SJC-10505 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PIERRE P. CADET. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     April 10, 2015. - November 18, 2015. 
 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Public trial, Assistance of 
counsel.  Practice, Criminal, New trial, Public trial, 
Assistance of counsel, Argument by prosecutor, Hearsay, 
Instructions to jury, Capital case.  Evidence, Hearsay, 
State of mind.  Protective Order.  Self-Defense. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 17, 2004. 
 
 
The case was tried before by Frank M. Gaziano, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on March 28, 2013, was heard by 
him. 
 
 
 
James M. Doyle for the defendant. 
 
Mary Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  In May, 2007, the defendant was convicted by a 
Superior Court jury of murder in the first degree on the theory 
of extreme atrocity or cruelty in the stabbing death of his girl 
friend, Betina Francois.  At trial, the defendant did not contest 
2 
 
that he had stabbed the victim, but argued that he had done so in 
self-defense, after she became enraged and attacked him with two 
knives.  In March, 2013, while his appeal from his conviction was 
pending, the defendant filed in this court a motion for a new 
trial; the appeal was stayed, and the motion was remanded to the 
Superior Court.  The defendant's appeal from the denial of that 
motion was consolidated with his direct appeal. 
We conclude that, although there were improprieties in the 
prosecutor's conduct at trial, including in his cross-examination 
of the defendant and in his closing argument, they did not create 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's conviction and the denial 
of his motion for a new trial.  Having conducted a thorough 
review pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we discern 
no reason to reduce the verdict or to order a new trial. 
Background.  We recite some of the facts that the jury could 
have found, reserving additional facts for discussion of the 
issues raised.   
1.  Commonwealth's case.  At the time of the victim's death 
in late September, 2004, she and the defendant had been involved 
in a romantic relationship for three years.  They had purchased a 
triple-decker house in Brockton in 2002, and lived there in the 
first-floor apartment.  The relationship changed notably in 
January, 2004, after an argument during which the defendant hit 
3 
 
and shoved the victim.  The victim obtained an abuse prevention 
order against the defendant, but the relationship, although 
volatile, continued.  Notwithstanding the abuse prevention order, 
the victim and the defendant generally lived together in the same 
apartment, while sometimes living apart for a few weeks at a 
time.1  They had numerous arguments, but still socialized 
together.  After the victim was involved in an automobile 
accident in April, 2004, the victim and the defendant shared the 
use of his automobile until September, when the victim purchased 
another vehicle.  They drove each other to and from work and 
school, and brought each other lunch.  The victim invited the 
defendant to events at her workplace, and, in the spring and 
summer of 2004, they went on various trips out of State and to 
Canada, including trips to visit relatives in New York.    
In July, 2004, the victim's family, friends, and coworkers 
began noticing injuries on her body and on her face, including 
bruises, black eyes, and bite marks.  They also noticed that the 
defendant often telephoned the victim many times a day, and that 
at times she appeared upset after his calls.2  In late July or 
                     
1 The defendant's name remained on the mailbox in the front 
hallway, his automobile routinely was parked near the house, and 
neighbors reported seeing him regularly.  He also performed 
maintenance work on the neighbors' apartments. 
 
2 Some of the victim's relatives testified that the victim 
rarely telephoned the defendant, and many testified that she 
never telephoned the defendant.  However, telephone records from 
4 
 
early August, 2004, the victim's family helped her remove the 
defendant's belongings from the apartment, and change the locks.  
The defendant was angry at the way he felt the victim's relatives 
were treating him as a result of her statements to them about the 
relationship.  Twice thereafter, the defendant attempted to break 
into the apartment.  In August, 2004, he was charged with 
violating the abuse prevention order, but the victim resumed 
allowing him to stay in the apartment, and went on several more 
trips with him, to Florida and New York.  Sometime that month, 
the victim's sister's husband had an encounter with the defendant 
during which the defendant said that he planned to teach the 
victim "a lesson."  In late August, 2004, one of the victim's 
friends stayed with her for five days; during that time, the 
defendant made "innumerable" calls to the victim and, on two 
nights, came to the victim's house unexpectedly in the middle of 
the night, banging on the door and fleeing when police were 
called.  The defendant then resumed spending nights in the 
apartment, and socializing with the victim. 
On Sunday morning, September 26, 2004, neighbors saw the 
defendant and the victim, who were "dressed for church," leave 
                                                                  
 
the victim's cellular telephone showed that she often called the 
defendant many times per day, at some points more than fifteen 
times in a day; in his decision on the defendant's motion for a 
new trial, the judge noted that the telephone records introduced 
at trial "demonstrated continuous incoming and outgoing telephone 
calls between the defendant and the victim." 
 
5 
 
the apartment.  Their vehicles, which had been parked side by 
side in front of the house at 7 A.M., were gone for much of the 
day, and returned at approximately 5 P.M. in the afternoon.  
Later, one neighbor saw the defendant, still dressed in a suit, 
carrying out trash; another neighbor noticed that the defendant's 
vehicle was parked one-half block away from the house, in a 
location where she had never before seen him park.  Around 
7:30 P.M. that evening, the defendant and the victim were both in 
the apartment.  As the neighbors who lived in the apartment above 
were walking up the back stairs to their apartment and passing 
the victim's kitchen door, they heard the victim say, in an 
"irritated" voice, "What the fuck is this?  I'm not going to take 
this bullshit anymore."  She then said, "I swear to God, I swear 
to God," and then, "Leave me alone" three times.  Approximately 
ten minutes later, loud music began playing inside the apartment.  
Shortly after the music started playing, a neighbor saw the 
victim's automobile backing out of the driveway "very fast," and 
being driven away.  When one of the neighbors noticed the 
victim's automobile leaving, she called the victim's cellular 
telephone to complain about the loud music, thinking that the 
victim had forgotten to turn it off, but there was no answer.  
The music played until at least 11 P.M., but the victim did not 
answer repeated calls to her cellular telephone. 
6 
 
At approximately 9 P.M., the defendant, driving the victim's 
sport utility vehicle (SUV) was involved in a single-vehicle 
roll-over accident in Exeter, Rhode Island.  The SUV had been 
traveling at over one hundred miles per hour when it left the 
highway, traveled through a wooded median, and flipped over, 
landing on its roof and throwing the defendant onto the shoulder 
of the road.3  Rhode Island State police officers responding to 
reports of the accident found the defendant, unresponsive and 
bleeding, lying face down in the breakdown lane; there was blood 
nearby.  The defendant was identified by documents in his pocket.  
Emergency room staff determined that the defendant had at 
least two injuries to his neck, including a "tracheal laceration 
between the first and second tracheal ring . . . under the voice 
box" and a "right internal jugular vein laceration."  The 
defendant also had a wound in his stomach, and a knife wound on 
his left palm.  The wounds were not consistent with having been 
obtained as a result of the motor vehicle accident.4  The 
                     
3 A Rhode Island State police trooper testified that the 
absence of skid marks on the highway where the vehicle left the 
road was inconsistent with the driver having lost control of the 
vehicle while attempting to avoid an obstacle in the road. 
 
4 Later investigation of the sport utility vehicle (SUV) 
showed no blood on the steering wheel, the gear shift, or the 
inside or outside of the driver's door handle; there was blood on 
the defendant's cellular telephone, found in the vehicle, and on 
the driver's side headliner attached to the inside roof of the 
vehicle.  A Brockton police detective testified that the 
detectives had expected a great deal more blood in the SUV, 
7 
 
defendant underwent two surgeries that night to repair damage 
from the injuries.  Telephone records showed that during the 
course of his drive from Brockton to Rhode Island, the defendant 
made at least twenty-one calls from his cellular telephone in an 
attempt to reach his brother, including numerous calls to his 
brother's friend's cellular telephone, as well as calls to the 
friend's land-line and to a cellular telephone belonging to the 
friend's wife.  
Hospital staff contacted Rhode Island State police about the 
defendant's injuries, which they believed were knife wounds, and 
Rhode Island troopers notified the Brockton police.  On the 
morning of September 27, 2004, after learning that the victim had 
an active restraining order against the defendant, Brockton 
police went to the victim's house to perform a well-being check.  
They found the victim's body on the couch in the living room.  
She had been stabbed nine times, in the chest, neck, and upper 
left arm.  At least four of the wounds could have been fatal.  
The wound to the arm could have been consistent with being a 
defensive wound that the victim sustained while attempting to 
block a blow.  Police found a bloody knife blade on the floor 
                                                                  
 
because it appeared to have been a "major accident," and the 
absence of a large amount of blood was not consistent with what 
they had learned about the nature of the defendant's injuries 
from Rhode Island State police troopers and hospital staff.  
Troopers searched the area of the crash for evidence of a weapon, 
but no knife or other weapon was found. 
 
8 
 
near the couch, a knife handle on the couch near the victim, and 
an unbroken knife in a crevice in the couch.  Later testing 
showed that blood on the knives and elsewhere in the living room, 
including the victim's jeans, contained deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) from both the victim and the defendant.  The defendant's 
DNA was also present in small bloodstains on the kitchen floor 
and the dining room table.  
Police found a note written by the defendant on a coffee 
table near the victim's body.  The note began, "To everyone who 
does not know the life that I've been living with [the victim] 
for [three] years.  I've had enough."  It stated that the victim 
had called the defendant as he was driving home from church and 
asked him to come to the apartment as soon as possible, but when 
he arrived, the victim started arguing with him and threatened to 
call the police.  The note also said that the victim and her 
family were trying to destroy the defendant's life, that he did 
not deserve to be in prison, and that his life was "already 
over."  
2.  Defendant's case.  The defendant testified in his own 
defense.  He said that when he arrived at the apartment, the 
victim wanted to discuss their relationship but he wanted to work 
on a paper for one of his college courses.  The victim became 
angry and threatened to call police, saying that she would 
"destroy his life."  He piled his clothes and books near the back 
9 
 
door, preparing to leave, but she would not let him leave the 
apartment.  As he passed by her to return from the kitchen to the 
living room, she swung a knife with one hand, cutting his neck.  
Moments later, in the living room, the victim "came at him" 
swinging two knives, saying, "Am I going to do it?"  The 
defendant pushed her down onto the couch and was able to grab one 
of the knives the victim had been using to stab him.  He then 
kept stabbing her until she stopped stabbing him.  
The defendant attempted to clean up the blood on the living 
room carpet, realized it would be futile, wrote the note, and, 
approximately fifteen minutes after the stabbing, left the 
apartment and took the victim's SUV.  Unsure where to go, he 
decided to go to New York to see friends.  He drove from Brockton 
to Rhode Island, where he crashed the vehicle. 
3.  Motion for new trial.  The defendant's motion for a new 
trial raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
including a claim that the court room was closed during jury 
selection and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
have objected to the closure. In December, 2013, the trial judge 
conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion, limited to the 
claim concerning court room closure.  The judge thereafter denied 
the motion for a new trial in its entirety.  The defendant raises 
the same arguments in his direct appeal as he did in his motion 
for a new trial.    
10 
 
Discussion.  1.  Public trial right.  The defendant claims 
that a new trial is required because his right to a public trial 
was violated when the court room was closed throughout the 
process of jury empanelment.  See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 
209, 215 (2010); Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 106 
(2010).  A decision whether to allow a new trial "is addressed to 
the sound discretion of the [motion] judge."  Commonwealth v. 
Perkins, 450 Mass. 834, 845 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Moore, 408 Mass. 117, 125 (1990).  A reviewing court accepts the 
motion judge's findings of fact, made after an evidentiary 
hearing, if they are supported by the record, Commonwealth v. 
Walker, 443 Mass. 213, 224 (2005), and defers to the judge's 
assessments of credibility, Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 
307 (1986), extending "special deference to the action of a 
motion judge who [as here] was also the trial judge."  
Commonwealth v. Rosario, 460 Mass. 181, 195 (2011), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Grace, supra.  
In his motion for a new trial, the defendant asserted that 
although he had requested that members of his family be present 
during jury selection, they were not permitted to enter the court 
room because it was closed to the public throughout the process 
of empanelment; the defendant asserted also that his attorney had 
indicated he had had no strategic reason not to have objected to 
11 
 
the court room closure.5  Three witnesses -- the defendant, his 
brother, and his cousin -- testified at the evidentiary hearing 
on the motion.  The defendant's trial counsel did not testify, 
and did not file an affidavit as to any strategic reason he might 
have had for not objecting to the asserted closure.   
A defendant asserting a claim of violation of the right to a 
public trial bears the burden of showing that the court room was 
closed to the public during the trial.  Commonwealth v. Lennon, 
463 Mass. 520, 527 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 
supra at 107-108, and Commonwealth v. Williams, 379 Mass. 874, 
875 (1980); Commonwealth v. Buckman, 461 Mass. 24, 28-29 (2011), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2781 (2012).  In his written findings, 
the judge stated that he discredited the testimony of all of the 
witnesses.  He remembered clearly how he had conducted jury 
selection in this case; he had not ordered the court room to be 
closed, to his knowledge the court officers had not closed the 
court room, and no sign had been posted on the door prohibiting 
                     
5 The trial transcripts show no objection from trial counsel 
concerning the exclusion of the defendant's family from the court 
room at any point during the trial proceedings.  Trial counsel 
did file a motion seeking individual voir dire, based on concerns 
of racial bias and media attention that focused on the issue of 
domestic violence; the judge conducted individual voir dire 
solely on the issue of domestic violence.  At the end of the 
selection process, the judge inquired whether counsel had any 
objections, and he had none.  See Commonwealth v. Lavoie, 464 
Mass. 83, 89-90 & n.12 (2013), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 2356 
(2013), and cases cited. 
 
12 
 
the public from entering.  See Commonwealth v. Garuti, 454 Mass. 
48, 56-57 (2009) (judge who was trial judge permissibly may 
consider his or her knowledge of conduct of trial in reaching 
decision on motion for new trial).  Commenting that, at the time 
of empanelment in this case, he had been well aware of the 
decision of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit in Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 66 (1st 
Cir. 2007) (holding that public trial right extends to jury 
empanelment),6 the judge denied the defendant's motion to take 
judicial notice of the past practices of other judges in that 
particular court house.  See Commonwealth v. Morganti, 467 Mass. 
96, 97-98, cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 356 (2014) (discussing "the 
legal culture and practice in the Superior Court in 
Brockton . . . of acquiescence to the closure of the court room 
to facilitate jury empanelment" prior to 2007).  The transcript 
of the hearing supports the judge's factual findings and provides 
ample support for his determination that the witnesses were not 
credible.7  
                     
6 The decision in Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 66 
(1st Cir. 2007), was issued on April 12, 2007; trial in this case 
began April 30, 2007, and empanelment commenced on May 1. 
 
7 The judge commented particularly that the court room door 
had not been locked, as one affidavit stated; it was not his 
practice to have court officers stand in the doorway, barring 
access to the court room, as an affidavit maintained had 
occurred; and court officers did not repeatedly leave the court 
room and go out into the hallway while court was in session to 
13 
 
Because the defendant has not met his burden of establishing 
that the court room was closed, there was no abuse of discretion 
in the motion judge's denial of the motion for a new trial on the 
ground of a violation of the public trial right.  See 
Commonwealth v. Buckman, 461 Mass. at 29.  Nor was the defendant 
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.  Whatever his 
reasoning, trial counsel cannot have been ineffective for failing 
to object to a closure that the motion judge, who had been the 
trial judge, found after an evidentiary hearing did not take 
place.  
2.  Use of word "victim."  The defendant objects to the 
prosecutor's references to the "victim" throughout the trial and 
in his closing argument.8  Before jury empanelment, the defendant 
filed a motion seeking to preclude any references to the term 
"victim."  The judge denied the motion; the defendant did not 
                                                                  
 
talk to family members waiting there, as one of the defendants' 
relatives stated had happened.  In addition, because the 
defendant had exercised his right to be present at sidebar, at 
least two court officers had been required to be stationed near 
the bench during questioning of the venire, leaving fewer 
officers available for other duties. 
 
8 The defendant also challenges the prosecutor's repeated 
use of the word "monster" in his closing argument, and counsel's 
failure to object, as well as the prosecutor's use of other 
similar language, that the defendant asserts were impermissible 
attacks on his character.  We consider these claims in 
conjunction with our discussion of other issues in the 
prosecutor's closing, as part of the defendant's claim of 
ineffective assistance, infra. 
 
14 
 
seek a continuing objection, and did not object to the use of the 
word "victim" during the trial.  The defendant maintains on 
appeal that the use of this term "prejudged" the questions of 
self-defense and mitigation, which were the heart of the defense, 
and "injected the prosecutor's personal opinion into the trial," 
depriving the defendant of the presumption of innocence and 
violating his right to a fair trial. 
In the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the use 
of the word "victim" did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Rosario, 460 Mass. 
181, 190 (2011).  Here, there was no dispute that the defendant's 
girl friend had been killed by being stabbed.  We assume "a 
certain degree of jury sophistication," Commonwealth v. Kozec, 
399 Mass. 514, 517 (1987), and do not think it likely that the 
jury were swayed by the repeated references to the "victim."  
Nonetheless, we emphasize that the better practice is for the 
prosecutor, defense counsel, the judge, and all of the witnesses 
to refrain from describing the person killed as the "victim."  
See Commonwealth v. Krepon, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 945, 947 (1992) 
(term "victim" may not be used in sexual assault cases, where 
complaining witness should be referred to as "alleged victim").  
3.  Exclusion of "hearsay" testimony by the defendant.  The 
defendant argues that the judge's allowance of the Commonwealth's 
objection to certain portions of the defendant's testimony 
15 
 
violated his rights to present a defense and to testify on his 
own behalf, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
pursue any objection to the judge's ruling.  The defendant 
contends that he sought to testify concerning statements that he 
now asserts the victim made to him on the night of her death, 
immediately before the final confrontation, in which the victim 
expressed anger at having just learned that the defendant had 
cheated on her and had also revealed to members of the victim's 
family statements she had made to the defendant in confidence, 
including that she had in the past been raped by a cousin. 
The defendant argues that his purpose in seeking to testify 
about the victim's statements was not to have them admitted for 
their truth, but, rather, to explain the victim's state of mind 
(her rage).  See Commonwealth v. Qualls, 425 Mass. 163, 167 
(1997), S.C., 440 Mass. 576 (2003) (although broad rule on 
hearsay evidence prohibits admission of out-of-court statement 
offered to prove truth of matter asserted, "the state of mind or 
intent of a person, whenever material, may be shown by his 
declarations out of court" [citation omitted]).  See also Mass. 
G. Evid. § 801(c) comment (2015).  According to the defendant, 
this evidence would have provided material support for his 
contention that the victim had violently attacked him, causing 
him to stab the victim in self-defense, and without such an 
16 
 
explanation, his description of the victim's sudden rage would 
have appeared far less comprehensible to the jury.   
In evaluating the defendant's claim, we have considered the 
context in which issues relating to statements of the victim were 
raised and considered prior to and during the trial.  Before 
trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine to prevent the 
introduction of evidence concerning the restraining order the 
victim had obtained against him, including prior alleged conduct 
by the defendant that defense counsel characterized as prior bad 
acts, and statements the victim was asserted to have made to two 
friends and a family member:  that the defendant had beaten her 
and then threatened to kill himself, and that he had said if she 
tried to leave him he would kill her and then himself.  The 
Commonwealth sought to introduce evidence of the restraining 
order, the affidavit in support of the order, and statements by 
the victim's friends, family, and coworkers concerning prior 
conduct by the defendant.  
After a hearing on both motions, the judge ruled that the 
restraining order itself could be admitted, but the victim's 
application and affidavit were inadmissible.  He also allowed 
introduction of testimony by percipient witnesses concerning 
conduct of the defendant toward the victim, to be admitted on the 
issue of the defendant's and the victim's hostile relationship.  
Statements of the victim concerning the defendant, including any 
17 
 
fear of him, were not to be admitted.  The defendant did not 
object to these rulings, before or during trial.9   
At trial, when the judge sustained the prosecutor's 
objection to the defendant's incipient testimony about what he 
said to the victim shortly before the stabbing, or she to him, 
defense counsel did not challenge the ruling.  Instead, he 
cautioned the defendant to respond "without getting into any 
conversation."  Counsel thereafter included this warning in each 
question, telling the defendant that he was not to describe any 
statements, and was to answer only in terms of his or the 
victim's actions.10  At no point did counsel make any proffer 
regarding the introduction of statements by the victim to reflect 
her angry state of mind; indeed, on two occasions when the 
defendant said the victim had been "upset" or "mad," counsel 
interrupted him to explain that he was not to tell the jury what 
anyone had said.    
In his motion for a new trial, appellate counsel argued, as 
he does on appeal, that the defendant had been seeking to testify 
                     
9 The defendant also does not challenge the rulings on 
appeal, and we discern no abuse of discretion in them.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 470-472 (2004); 
Commonwealth v. Stroyny, 435 Mass. 635, 642-643 (2002).  
 
10 In response to at least seven of the defendant's answers, 
counsel interjected some caution such as "don't tell me what she 
said," "don't tell us what anybody said," or "you're not allowed 
to say what she said." 
 
18 
 
about the victim's statements for the purpose of showing her 
enraged state of mind, and that trial counsel's failure to object 
deprived him of the ability to present a full defense.  Counsel 
argued that those statements would have included that the victim 
said she wanted to discuss their relationship, or that she had 
just learned of the defendant's infidelity and his disclosure to 
other family members of statements she made to him in confidence.  
In support of this argument, the defendant attached his own 
affidavit describing the evidence regarding state of mind he 
contends he wanted to introduce; he did not submit an affidavit 
from trial counsel concerning the out-of-court statements, 
counsel's reasons for not objecting to their exclusion, and 
whether such a decision had been strategic.  
In his ruling on the defendant's motion for a new trial, the 
judge discredited as self-serving the portion of the defendant's 
affidavit in which the defendant set forth the evidence he argues 
he was prevented from introducing.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Rebello, 450 Mass. 118, 130 (2007) (where motion judge was also 
trial judge, judge was entitled to discredit defendant's 
statement in affidavit as self-serving).  The defendant has not 
established that the judge erred in sustaining the Commonwealth's 
objection, or that defense counsel's decision not to object to 
the exclusion of whatever hearsay statements the defendant 
intended to offer was manifestly unreasonable. 
19 
 
4.  Jury instructions.  The defendant argues that errors in 
the judge's instructions on self-defense and the excessive use of 
force in self-defense impermissibly shifted the burden of proof 
from the Commonwealth to the defendant.  The instruction given 
was based on the language of the model jury instruction on 
homicide that was in effect at the time of the defendant's trial 
in 2007.  See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 30 (1999).  The 
defendant points to other circumstances in which an instruction 
has been deemed inadequate to instruct the jury on the 
Commonwealth's burden of proof where a defendant presents a 
defense of self-defense or excessive use of force in self-
defense.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Santos, 454 Mass. 770, 774-
775 (2009).  The defendant complains that where the judge 
inserted an extensive discussion of self-defense between his 
presentation of reasonable provocation and sudden combat as 
mitigating factors and his subsequent discussion of excessive use 
of force in self-defense, which did not explicitly repeat that 
excessive use of self-defense was a mitigating factor, the jury 
may have been led to believe that excessive use of force in self-
defense was not a mitigating factor.  The defendant also may be 
suggesting that the judge's instruction on excessive use of force 
in self-defense improperly placed on the defendant the burden of 
proving the excessive use of force. 
20 
 
There was no error.  The judge explicitly told the jury that 
the defendant could be convicted of murder only if the 
Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of 
three mitigating circumstances, and then listed the three, 
including the excessive use of force in self-defense.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bolling, 462 Mass. 440, 448-449 (2012) 
(discussing essentially identical instruction to that given here, 
and distinguishing it from improper instruction in Commonwealth 
v. Santos, supra).  The judge's instruction did group together 
the mitigating circumstances of heat of passion on reasonable 
provocation and heat of passion induced by sudden combat, and 
then separately discussed the excessive use of force in self-
defense.  Nonetheless, the judge properly explained that the jury 
must find the defendant not guilty of any crime if the 
Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt the absence of self-defense, and that if the 
Commonwealth proved the excessive use of force by the defendant 
in self-defense, the appropriate verdict would be manslaughter.11  
5.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
maintains, as he did in his motion for a new trial, that his 
                     
11 The revisions to the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 
that this court approved in 2013, and on which the defendant 
relies, offer a revised explanation of these concepts that may be 
more clear than the 1999 model instructions in effect at the time 
of the defendant's trial, but the substance of both versions is 
the same. 
 
21 
 
trial counsel's performance denied him constitutionally effective 
assistance of counsel, and accordingly, that a new trial is 
required.  He argues that counsel failed to marshal the evidence 
persuasively to show that he stabbed the victim in self-defense 
or at least on account of one of the reasons that mitigate murder 
to voluntary manslaughter; failed to object to certain portions 
of the medical examiner's testimony; failed to obtain an 
independent forensic analysis of the crime scene that would have 
supported the defendant's theory of self-defense or excessive use 
of force in self-defense; failed to object to leading questions 
by the prosecutor; and failed to object to a number of 
improprieties by the prosecutor, particularly with regard to the 
prosecutor's closing argument.     
Our review of the record indicates that, although some of 
the conduct complained of was not ineffective, in other respects, 
the performance of the defendant's trial counsel fell below the 
standard we would expect of an ordinary fallible lawyer.  For 
instance, counsel's description of the defendant's neck wounds in 
his opening statement -- that the defendant had been cut 
"completely across the neck" -- was not supported by the medical 
evidence.  Rather, the evidence showed that the defendant 
suffered an internal laceration to his jugular vein, a laceration 
to his trachea, a stab wound to his stomach, and another to his 
left palm; the large cut across the defendant's neck shown in 
22 
 
photographs introduced in evidence was the result of surgery 
conducted to explore and repair the two neck wounds.  Counsel's 
inaccurate characterization of the neck injuries permitted the 
prosecutor to pursue quite extensively with the medical examiner 
a discussion of the defendant's actual neck injuries, as well as 
to argue to the jury the implausibility of the defense counsel's 
description of the defendant's neck injuries.  
Defense counsel's reasons in deciding to pursue this 
implausible argument are unclear.  We note, however, that the 
defendant himself testified that the victim had "slashed" and 
"sliced" his throat and that he was bleeding from his throat 
while still in the victim's apartment and while driving away from 
the apartment to Rhode Island.  Additionally, the defendant's 
affidavit filed in support of his motion for a new trial mentions 
his wounds and discusses the importance of presenting the jury 
with accurate information about the nature of those wounds, which 
he asserts counsel failed to do by not calling as a witness a 
physician who had treated him in the hospital in Rhode Island.12  
It is also the case that, in some respects, the prosecutor=s 
cross-examination of the defendant was improper and the 
defendant's counsel was deficient in failing to object.  The 
prosecutor took a highly aggressive approach in his cross-
                     
12 The affidavit does not reference the defendant's 
characterization of his wounds during his trial testimony. 
 
23 
 
examination of the defendant.  He was entitled to do so, but in a 
number of instances he crossed the line of appropriateness and 
the questioning bordered on the abusive.  The prosecutor, for 
example, repeatedly asked sarcastic, gender-stereotyped questions 
of the defendant as to whether he was too "weak" or "frail" to 
fend off a woman, particularly one who was smaller than he.13  See 
Mass. G. Evid. § 1113(b)(3)(c) note (2015) ("Both prosecutors and 
defense counsel should refrain from what is termed 'broad 
brushing' or arguments based on racial, ethnic, or gender 
stereotypes").  The prosecutor also asked several times whether, 
while the victim was "bleeding to death," the defendant had heard 
her blood "gurgling" in her throat, although there was no 
evidence of "gurgling"; and he displayed photographs of the 
victim's wounds to the defendant, commenting, "go on, you can 
look at it, you did it," followed by additional similar 
commentary.14  These questions and comments were wholly 
unnecessary and improper. 
                     
13 In the same vein, the prosecutor asked, "Well, again, do 
you have anything wrong with you that makes you less of a man 
that you don't have that much strength that this woman could 
overpower you?  Anything we should know about?"  Defense 
counsel's objection to that particular question was sustained. 
 
14 Soon thereafter, the prosecutor displayed another 
photograph of the victim to the defendant, saying, "Why don't you 
take a look at your handiwork here . . . . Do you remember making 
these stab wounds?  Look at it."  When the defendant did not 
respond, the prosecutor said, "All right. You want to be a 
24 
 
The defendant challenges a number of asserted improprieties 
in the prosecutor's closing argument.  Here, as in his cross-
examination of the defendant, certain forceful and aggressive 
statements by the prosecutor permissibly attacked the credibility 
of the defendant's version of events and offered reasonable 
explanations of the evidence, such as the inferences that could 
be drawn from the nature of the victim's wounds.  But the 
prosecutor also came close to, and at times crossed over, the 
line of propriety and what is expected from a prosecutor.  
In his closing, the prosecutor repeatedly referred to the 
defendant as a "monster," and a "controlling, jealous, angry, 
violent man."  The defendant contends that these references were 
improper in part because they were premised on, and exploited, 
prior bad act evidence relating to the defendant's conduct toward 
the victim that the judge had permitted to be introduced solely 
on the issue of the defendant's relationship with the victim 
leading up to the stabbing incident.  The Commonwealth maintains 
that the prosecutor was responding appropriately to the 
defendant's closing, in which defense counsel had argued that 
friends and family of the victim who testified at trial had 
                                                                  
 
coward, be a coward."  On defense counsel's objection, the judge 
ordered the jury to disregard the comment. 
 
25 
 
presented a biased view of the victim, in essence painting her as 
an "angel" and the defendant as a "monster."15   
The prosecutor was permitted to respond by urging the jury 
to pay attention to the testimony of those witnesses who had 
portrayed the defendant in a light different from that in which 
he sought to portray himself.  The prosecutor fully exploited the 
defendant's rhetorical use of this angel/monster dichotomy, and 
his use of defense counsel's term "monster" in this context was 
not, standing alone, improper.  Cf. Commonwealth v. McColl, 375 
Mass. 316, 325 (1978) (prosecutor's improper comments were 
"facetious response" to "similar references . . . made . . . by 
the defense counsel is his argument").  
The prosecutor's closing, however, went beyond the bounds of 
permissible response to the defendant's argument, and came close 
to an invitation to the jury that they convict the defendant 
because of his bad character.  At one point, the prosecutor 
argued: 
                     
15 Defense counsel stated: 
 
"We heard from [the victim's] family and friends.  We 
heard about their perceptions of the history of the 
relationship. . . . These people who described their 
relationship . . . were all biased.  They were all family 
and friends of her[s].  They all had a view of the 
relationship where she was . . . the angel.  He was the 
monster, he was the stalker, . . . the abuser.  That's how 
we'd all like our family and friends, I'm sure, and we can 
see that, they can remember us in a good light." 
26 
 
"[R]emember what [two friends of the victim] said to 
you, and more importantly remember their body language.  
These are two women that both saw the defendant a little 
different than he appeared [when he testified at trial].  I 
suggest to you that these two women saw what's under the 
façade.  They saw that monster lurking below the surface.  
Katherine . . . was on the stand trembling, crying, because 
she'd seen this man so enraged and out of control at a club 
that she feared for the safety of [the victim].  Elsa . . . 
was so scared when she stayed at [the victim's apartment] 
that she slept in the bedroom with the victim with the door 
locked.  They saw the monster below the surface, and the 
last person to see that monster was [the victim]. 
 
 
". . . .  
 
"And there's nothing [i.e., no sound coming from the 
victim's apartment] because [the victim] is looking into that 
monster's eyes as he puts that knife to her throat and she 
knows if she makes any noise it might be her life." 
 
Defense counsel made no objection to any of the prosecutor's 
closing remarks, even when the judge at one point sua sponte 
interrupted the prosecutor.  The judge properly instructed the 
jury that they could consider evidence regarding the relationship 
between the defendant and the victim only as it bore on the 
defendant's motive and intent, the limited purpose for which it 
had been introduced.  Considered in the context of the 
prosecutor's entire closing, we think the jury would have been 
capable of taking with a "grain of salt" his references to the 
defendant as a monster.  See Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 
244, 277 (1982).  
The prosecutor also came close to, and at times crossed 
over, the line of propriety with respect to other of his 
27 
 
arguments.  In addition to excesses previously noted, the 
prosecutor described the defendant's account of the stabbing four 
separate times as "crap, pure and simple," or simply "crap," and 
another time as "a line of bull."  It is permissible for a 
prosecutor to argue that a defendant's testimony is not credible, 
see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Espada, 450 Mass. 687, 699 (2008); 
Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 431 Mass. 609, 613 (2000), but repeated 
use of crude slang to describe the defendant's version of the 
critical events, as the prosecutor did here, is offensive and 
demeaning, and runs the risk of transforming criticism of the 
defendant's testimony into an attack on the defendant's 
character.  See Commonwealth v. Daley, 439 Mass. 558, 563 (2003) 
(improper for prosecutor to argue that jury should consider 
evidence of defendant's bad character as proof that he or she 
committed crime).  Further, the prosecutor's persistent and 
graphic references to the victim's injuries appeared designed 
improperly to appeal to the jurors' sympathies and emotions.16  
                     
16 In a number of recent cases, this court has been 
confronted with closing arguments by prosecutors who crossed the 
line between permissible advocacy and improper rhetoric.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Niemic, 472 Mass. 665, 673-677 (2015); 
Commonwealth v. Scesny, 472 Mass. 185, 200-206 (2015).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 128-133 (2013).  We again 
refer counsel to the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence, 
§ 1113 (2015).  See Commonwealth v. Scesny, supra at 203 n.29.  
In addition, we commend to trial judges the suggestion that, 
immediately before counsel make their closing arguments, jurors 
be provided with a brief instruction about the purposes and 
limitations of closing arguments.  See Commonwealth v. Olmande, 
28 
 
See Mass. G. Evid. § 1113(b)(3)(C) (impermissible to appeal to 
jurors= emotions, passions, prejudices, or sympathies).  
Notwithstanding these improper aspects of the prosecutor's 
cross-examination and closing, and the failures of defense 
counsel in not objecting to them, we conclude that the errors did 
not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014).   
During the prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant, 
defense counsel objected repeatedly to the prosecutor's 
overreaching questions and comments, and the judge sustained a 
number of them.  With respect to the closing, the judge told the 
jury -- albeit only in general terms -- immediately before 
closing arguments and again in his charge, that such arguments 
are not evidence.  Most importantly, the evidence against the 
defendant was overwhelming, and we cannot conclude that the 
prosecutorial excesses were likely to have influenced the 
verdict.  See Commonwealth v. Scesny, 472 Mass. 185, 203-206 
(2015); Commonwealth v. Wright, supra.  See also Commonwealth v. 
Dagley, 442 Mass. 713, 725-726 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 930 
(2005).  The number, nature, and severity of the victim's stab 
wounds; the relative sizes of the victim and the defendant; the 
                                                                  
 
84 Mass. App. Ct. 231, 241-243 (2013) (Agnes, J., concurring in 
result). 
29 
 
blood evidence relating to the location, amount, and identity of 
blood within the victim's apartment and in the SUV the defendant 
drove after the stabbing; the defendant's own testimony 
describing what happened; and the defendant's note, found on a 
table in the living room, together made the defendant's theory of 
self-defense or even excessive use of force in self-defense 
implausible, particularly in light of the evidence concerning the 
nature of the relationship between the victim and the defendant 
from January, 2004, until her death in September, 2004. 
We conclude that there is no reason to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict or to 
order a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for a new 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  trial affirmed.