Title: Guinn v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 52, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 7, 2005

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
NATHAN GUINN, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 52, 2005 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below--Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware, in and 
v. 
§ 
for Kent County, in IK02-08- 
§ 
0082-R1, 0083-R1, 0085-R1. 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
Def. ID No. 0207018218 
 
Submitted: June 7, 2005 
Decided: 
September 7, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.  
 
Nathan Guinn, pro se, appellant. 
 
John Williams, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for 
the appellee, State of Delaware.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
The appellant, Nathan Guinn, has appealed from the Superior Court's 
denial of Guinn's motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61").  The appellee, State of Delaware, has moved 
to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest 
on the face of Guinn's opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We 
agree and affirm. 
Facts 
During the evening of July 27, 2002, police officer Paul D. Kuntzi and 
probation officer Douglas Watts were on patrol in the vicinity of Reed and 
South New Streets in Dover, Delaware, when they observed Guinn walking 
toward their car.  Guinn was in the company of his brother, Samuel Ingram.  
Kuntzi and Watts stopped Guinn, who was out past his probation curfew and 
was wanted for an outstanding capias.  The officers placed Guinn in 
handcuffs and searched him, seizing $424 cash, a piece of suspected crack 
cocaine and a small screwdriver.  Guinn was then placed under arrest and 
was later charged with Possession with Intent to Deliver, Possession within 
300 Feet of a Church, Possession of Cocaine, and Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia.  
                                                 
1 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
3
Robert A. Harpster, Esquire, assistant public defender,  represented 
Guinn at his December 2002 jury trial.  On the second day of trial, Harpster 
requested a mistrial.  That motion was granted and a new trial was scheduled 
for February 2003.   
Sandra W. Dean, Esquire, assistant public defender, represented 
Guinn at his second trial.  Guinn was convicted of Possession of Cocaine 
with Intent to Deliver, Delivery of Cocaine within 300 Feet of a Church, and 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.  He was sentenced to thirty-six years at 
Level V, suspended after sixteen years and nine months for probation. 
On direct appeal, Guinn alleged that the drug evidence was not 
properly authenticated, and that there was insufficient evidence to prove 
Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine.  This Court concluded that 
Guinn's arguments were without merit and affirmed the Superior Court's 
judgment.2 
Postconviction Motion 
Guinn filed a motion for postconviction relief in June 2004.  Guinn 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct, and related court error, and ineffective 
assistance of counsel.   On his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Guinn 
alleged that Dean had (a) refused to seek a mistrial, (b) refused to interview 
                                                 
2Guinn v. State, 841 A.2d 1239 (Del. 2004).   
 
4
and subpoena witnesses, including Ingram, and (c) failed to seek a 
continuance at a suppression hearing.  By "order of reference" dated June 
29, 2004, a Superior Court judge referred Guinn's postconviction motion to a 
Superior Court Commissioner, for proposed findings of fact and 
recommendations.3  In turn, the Commissioner issued an "order of briefing" 
directing that Dean file an affidavit in response to the allegations of 
ineffective assistance of counsel4 and that the Department of Justice file a 
response to the motion and to Dean's response.5   
In a report dated December 3, 2004, the Commissioner concluded that 
Guinn's ineffective assistance of counsel claims were without merit and 
recommended that the postconviction motion be dismissed as procedurally 
barred under Rule 61(i)(3) and 61(i)(4).  The Superior Court adopted the 
Commissioner's report and denied Guinn's motion for postconviction relief.  
This appeal followed. 
Issues on Appeal 
In his opening brief on appeal, Guinn does not address the 
prosecutorial misconduct and related court error claims that he raised in his 
postconviction motion.  Moreover, Guinn raises only two allegations of 
                                                 
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 512(b)(1)b; Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a)(5).   
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g)(2). 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(f)(1).  The "order of briefing" also provided a deadline for 
Guinn's reply, if any, to Dean’s affidavit and the State's response.  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 
61(f)(3). 
 
5
ineffective assistance of counsel, i.e., that Dean failed to seek a continuance 
at the suppression hearing,6 and that she failed to interview Ingram.7  To the 
extent Guinn has not raised his other postconviction claims, those claims are 
deemed abandoned and will not be addressed by this Court.8 
Ineffectiveness Claims First Postconviction Motion 
 
The Superior Court, in its discretion, may proceed in a number of 
different ways when considering a motion for postconviction relief.9  
Nonetheless, in a case such as Guinn's that involves a first postconviction 
motion containing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court has 
concluded that the Superior Court's preferable practice should include 
obtaining trial counsel's affidavit in response to the ineffectiveness claims.10  
That practice was followed in Guinn's case.   
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Guinn also raises a related claim that the trial court committed error when denying his 
motion to suppress.  
7 Guinn's postconviction motion alleged that Dean was ineffective when she failed to 
interview and/or subpoena three potential witnesses, including Ingram.  In his opening 
brief on appeal, Guinn limits his argument generally to Ingram. 
8 See Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997) (citing Murphy v. State, 632 
A.2d 1150, 1152-1153 (Del. 1993)). 
9 See Horne v. State, ___ A.2d ___, 2005 WL 1949967 (Del. Supr.) (discussing how the 
Superior Court may proceed upon the filing of a postconviction motion under Rule 61). 
10 Id. at *2. 
 
6
Standard of Review 
We review the Superior Court's denial of a postconviction motion for 
abuse of discretion.11  The Court first must consider the procedural 
requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any substantive issues.12  Under 
Rule 61(i)(3), any ground for relief not adjudicated in the proceedings 
leading to the judgment of conviction is barred unless the movant 
demonstrates cause for failure to assert the ground and prejudice stemming 
from the alleged grievance.  Under Rule 61(i)(5), this bar to relief is 
inapplicable to a jurisdictional challenge or to a colorable claim of a 
miscarriage of justice stemming from a constitutional violation.  To prevail 
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show that his 
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 
and that but for his counsel's errors, the outcome of the trial would have 
been different. 13 
Second Trial Preparation Reasonable 
Guinn has not demonstrated that Dean was unreasonable and 
unprofessional or that he was prejudiced as a result Dean's alleged 
ineffectiveness.  The record, specifically a file memorandum written by 
                                                 
11 Melendez v. State, 2004 WL 1965650 (Del. Supr.) (citing Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 
547, 551(Del. 1998)). 
12 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
13 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
 
7
Harpster that Dean attached to her affidavit, reflects that Ingram spoke to 
Harpster prior to Guinn's first trial and denied having any "knowledge of the 
cocaine found in the shorts Mr. Guinn was wearing."  Moreover, Harpster's 
memorandum reflects that Guinn "indicated he did not want Mr. Ingram to 
testify and wanted to proceed with the defense that the drugs found on his 
possession was consistent with simple possession."  Thus, we agree with the 
Superior Court that Guinn has not shown that Dean was ineffective when 
she did not interview or subpoena Ingram prior to Guinn's second trial.  
Continuance Unnecessary 
Next, Guinn alleges that Dean was ineffective when she failed to seek 
a continuance at a suppression hearing at which Kuntzi did not appear.  In 
his postconviction motion and now on appeal, Guinn contends that Kuntzi's 
testimony was essential to prove Guinn's claims that he was arrested in 
violation of Miranda v. Arizona.14  We have reviewed the record, including 
the transcript of the preliminary hearing that Guinn referred to in his opening 
brief.  We agree with the Superior Court that there is nothing in the record to 
                                                 
14 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966) (holding that statements obtained 
during custodial interrogation are inadmissible absent a prior warning advising a suspect 
of rights under Fifth Amendment). 
 
8
suggest that the outcome of Guinn's suppression hearing would have been 
different had Kuntzi testified.15 
Suppression Issue Barred 
In a related claim, Guinn contends that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion when denying the motion to suppress.  The claim is barred 
pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3), however, because the record reveals neither cause 
for Guinn's failure to raise the claim on direct appeal nor prejudice as a 
result of the alleged error.16  Moreover, Guinn has not made a colorable 
claim of a miscarriage of justice to warrant application of the exception to 
the procedural default.17  
Conclusion 
It is manifest on the face of Guinn's opening brief that the appeal is 
without merit.  The issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled 
Delaware law.  To the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, clearly 
there was no abuse of discretion.  Therefore, pursuant to Supreme Court 
                                                 
15 The preliminary hearing transcript reflects the following exchange: 
[Prosecutor]:  Did you question Guinn? 
[Kuntzi]:  Just asked him what he was doing out and what was going  
on.  I didn't interview him and read him his Miranda rights or anything like that. 
Hr'g Tr. at 5 (Aug. 2, 2002). 
16 When denying the motion to suppress, the Superior Court concluded that "the facts do 
not support the assertion that [Kuntzi]  should have known that his question or questions 
to [Watts] was likely to or reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response [from 
Guinn]."  Trial Tr. at 8 (May 12, 2003).  
17 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 
 
9
Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware's motion to affirm is granted.  The 
judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.