Title: State v. Goudy
Citation: 479 P.2d 800
Docket Number: 4933
State: Hawaii
Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 1971

479 P.2d 800 (1971) STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Rollin GOUDY, II, Defendant-Appellant. No. 4933. Supreme Court of Hawaii. January 13, 1971. *801 Thomas P. Huber, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant (Cades, Schutte, Fleming &amp; Wright, Honolulu, of counsel). Douglas L. Halsted, Deputy Pros. Atty., City and County of Honolulu (Barry Chung, Pros. Atty., with him on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee. Before RICHARDSON, C.J., and MARUMOTO, ABE, LEVINSON and KOBAYASHI, JJ. MARUMOTO, Justice. This is an appeal by defendant William Rollin Goudy II from a circuit court judgment convicting him of possession of firearms by a person convicted of a crime of violence, in violation of HRS § 134-7(b). Defendant had previously been convicted of burglary, which, under the definition in HRS § 134-1, is a crime of violence. The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court properly denied the defense motion for suppression of evidence. The items of evidence sought to be suppressed were one .22 caliber Marlin rifle, one 9 mm. Luger pistol, and one .32 caliber Walther pistol. The police obtained these items under the circumstances described below. At 10 o'clock in the morning of June 23, 1969, Sergeant Carl Ledward of the Honolulu police department received an anonymous telephone call at the Kaneohe police station informing him that within an hour there would be a transaction in guns, diamond ring, and diamond watch, which the informant thought was illegal; that the transaction would take place at 127 Oneawa Street, Kailua; that the buyer would be driving a black Barracuda automobile; and that the passenger in the automobile would be the contact man to obtain the articles. Upon receiving the telephone call, Ledward went to Kailua to check the address, but there was no house on Oneawa Street with the given number. However, together with Detective Donald Kamakea, whom he met at the Kailua police station, he kept a watch for an automobile fitting the informant's description at Andy's Drive-Inn on Oneawa Street. At 11:10 o'clock, Ledward and Kamakea saw a black Barracuda, with driver and a passenger, proceed on Oneawa Street in the Kaneohe direction. The driver was later identified as James Kaaku. Defendant was the passenger. Ledward and Kamakea followed the Barracuda in Kamakea's automobile, with Kamakea driving. Kamakea's automobile was used because it had no police insignia. The Barracuda stopped in front of a house at 728 Oneawa Street. Kamakea drove past the Barracuda for about a block to the intersection of Oneawa Street and Oneawa Place, where he turned his automobile around and backed into Oneawa Place. Ledward and Kamakea set up a surveillance of the Barracuda behind a growth of pine trees at the intersection. Ledward watched with his naked eyes. Kamakea used binoculars in making his observation. On the surveillance, both Ledward and Kamakea saw defendant make the following movements: He got off the Barracuda, entered a nearby lane, and returned within a few minutes with a beige-colored case which appeared to contain a rifle. He placed the case in the back of the automobile, then went into the house at 728 Oneawa Street, returned with a brown paper sack, and got back into the automobile. *802 When defendant got back into the Barracuda, Kaaku turned the automobile around, and drove it back in the direction of Kailua town at a speed of about 20 miles, well within the legal speed limit. Ledward and Kamakea again followed the Barracuda. Just before reaching the intersection of Oneawa Street with Kailua Road, Kamakea tooted his horn, and Ledward motioned to Kaaku to pull over. Instead of pulling over, Kaaku made an abrupt stop. The stop took place in front of the City Bank Building at 43 Oneawa Street. Ledward and Kamakea decided to stop the Barracuda at that location lest there might be a getaway if it was permitted to go beyond the intersection. Up to this point, there was nothing furtive in the actions of Kaaku and defendant, and nothing to arouse any suspicion of criminal activity, except for substantial dovetailing of police observations with the information given in the anonymous telephone call. Neither Ledward nor Kamakea knew defendant. Ledward did not know Kaaku. Kamakea knew Kaaku as a musician, had heard that he was "a member of the criminal world," but was not sure that he was. When the Barracuda stopped, Ledward and Kamakea approached it from different sides with drawn pistols. Ledward approached Kaaku from the left side of that automobile, and told him to get out. Kaaku did so with his hands up. Kamakea approached defendant from the right side, and opened the door to have him come out. While making the approaches, both Ledward and Kamakea saw the butt end of a rifle sticking out from a case on the back seat of the Barracuda. In addition, when he opened the door to have defendant come out, Kamakea noticed the butt end of a pistol exposed from a package on the floor. Upon seeing the rifle and the pistol in the Barracuda, Kamakea placed Kaaku and defendant under arrest for being offensively armed, and took them to the Kailua police station for booking.[1] Defendant was formally charged on the day after the arrest with violation of HRS § 134-7(b), instead of for being offensively armed, which is a violation of HRS § 727-25.[2] The rifle Ledward and Kamakea saw on the back seat of the Barracuda was the .22 caliber Marlin rifle. The pistol Kamakea noticed on the floor was the 9 mm. Luger pistol. After the arrest, Kamakea found the .32 caliber Walther pistol between the bucket seats of the automobile. That pistol was fully loaded with one round in the chamber, and cocked. In deciding the issue raised on this appeal, we must first inquire whether the stopping of the Barracuda by Ledward and Kamakea was a constitutionally permissible action. On this point, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), is apposite. That was a stop and frisk case. The case at hand involved stop only, and not a frisk. But the discussion there of considerations involved in constitutionally permissible street stops is pertinent. *803 Terry states that a police officer may "in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest"; that this is warranted by the general governmental interest in effective crime prevention and detection; and that, given a state of facts, which separately may appear innocent but which taken together would warrant investigation, it would be poor police work to fail to make further investigation. However, it cautions that such an intrusion upon personal liberty must be reasonable and be based on something more substantial than inarticulate hunches, and that reasonableness is to be judged by an objective standard, namely, whether the facts known by the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate. Here, circumstances were appropriate for Ledward and Kamakea to approach Kaaku and defendant to question them about possible criminal conduct. The anonymous telephone call to Ledward did not justify arrest or search. But the call was a factor in the totality of circumstances which made the decision of Ledward and Kamakea to stop the Barracuda and approach its occupants for questioning reasonable. Where, as here, the telephone call related to possible traffic in firearms, it would have been poor police work on the part of Ledward not to have followed up the given information. Dealings in firearms, and possession thereof, are very strictly regulated in HRS c. 134. Also, it would have been poor police work on the part of Ledward and Kamakea not to have stopped the Barracuda and questioned its occupants when, upon surveillance, they observed facts which substantially corroborated the information in the telephone call. The observed facts might have been consistent with lawful activity. But they were also consistent with possible criminal activity. Under such circumstances, a stop for brief inquiry, without more, does not constitute an arrest. It is stated in Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir.1966): Also, under similar circumstances, the mere approach with drawn pistols upon persons stopped for questioning is not an arrest. In Wartson v. United States, 400 F.2d 25, 28 (9th Cir.1968), the court stated, citing Terry: *804 There is a cautionary statement in Terry that an investigative action which is reasonable at its inception may violate the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope. In this connection, questions may possibly be raised as to the reasonableness of the actions of Ledward and Kamakea, first, in ordering Kaaku and defendant out of the Barracuda instead of questioning them while they were seated in the automobile, and, second, in approaching them with drawn pistols. On the first point, Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 169 (8th Cir.1970), supports the actions of Ledward and Kamakea. In that case, two police officers stopped a suspicious automobile after a period of surveillance. After holding that the stop was reasonable under Terry, the court considered the question as to whether under the Terry analysis, "the scope of the `seizure' was reasonably related to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." The court stated: The stop in this case was made in broad daylight, instead of in darkness as in Carpenter. Nevertheless, we think that the ordering out was justified by the same circumstances which made the stop reasonable. On the second point also, we think that the same circumstances support the actions taken by Ledward and Kamakea as reasonable self-protective measures. It is stated in Terry: The stop of the Barracuda being reasonable, and the subsequent actions of Ledward and Kamakea in approaching Kaaku and defendant with drawn pistols and ordering them out of the automobile not being an arrest, State v. Hanawahine, 50 Haw. 461, 443 P.2d 149 (1968), applies. We need not decide whether the sighting of the butt end of the Marlin rifle in the back seat of the Barracuda by Ledward and Kamakea while they were approaching Kaaku and defendant provided probable cause for their arrest. When the door of the Barracuda was opened to let defendant out and the butt end of the Luger pistol was seen in open view on the floor, that certainly provided sufficient probable cause for arrest under HRS § 727-25. The fact that Kamakea opened the door does not matter. He opened the door not to pry into the automobile but to let defendant out. Kamakea arrested Kaaku and defendant only after he saw the butt end of the Luger pistol. Kamakea later found the Walther pistol between the bucket seats of the Barracuda. That discovery *805 was made upon a search incident to lawful arrest. Affirmed. ABE, Justice (dissenting). It appears that the decision of the majority of this court concedes that the officers did not have probable cause to effectuate an arrest at the time they stopped the automobile. I agree. But this court then holds that the officers did not arrest the defendant but, in accordance with the rule of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), only stopped and detained him for investigatory purposes. I do not agree because the record indicates the officers stopped the automobile to arrest the defendant, not to investigate. Officer Ledward testified as follows: Further, Officer Ledward on cross examination stated: *806 The other officer, Detective Kamakea testified as follows: In my opinion the foregoing testimony of the officers definitely indicates that at the outset, with no probable cause, they had intended to arrest the occupants of the black Barracuda, including the defendant, when the driver was ordered to pull over. Otherwise, why were the three other officers on their automobiles directed to converge to the area where the defendant was stopped? And I would hold that as soon as the driver was ordered to pull over the defendant was under arrest. The situation here is very similar to Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1959), where federal agents waved a suspect's automobile to a stop. The Supreme *807 Court held that the arrest took place when the agents stopped the car. As noted above, this court conceded that until "the door of the Barracuda was opened to let defendant out and the butt end of the Luger pistol was seen in open view on the floor" there was no probable cause for an arrest. Thus, as the United States Supreme Court has held time and time again such an arrest was illegal and unconstitutional, therefore, the pistol was illegally seized and such evidence should have been suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1959); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925). It should be emphasized here that Terry makes clear that temporary detention for investigatory purposes comes within the purview of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the United States Supreme Court at page 16, 88 S.Ct. at page 1877, said: Also the Court in Terry carefully emphasized at page 30, 88 S.Ct. at page 1884: It should be noted that the Court at page 19, in its footnote 16, 88 S.Ct. at page 1879, stated: In the light of the foregoing statements by the United States Supreme Court, it appears to me that in the absence of probable cause Terry cannot and should not be used by this court to support the proposition that under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Art. I, § 4 of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii the defendant here was legally "seized" for investigatory purposes. However, if Terry stands for the proposition that an officer may seize a person for investigatory purposes on evidence insufficient to effectuate an arrest, I believe Justice Douglas' dissent in Terry is very apropos, where at page 35, 88 S.Ct. at page 1887, he said: I believe Justice Douglas correctly states the law because the United States Supreme Court has explicitly and clearly stated repeatedly that an officer may not act upon less evidence in making an arrest merely by avoiding making an application to a judge for the issuance of a warrant.[1] Thus, it should be emphatically stated that the officers' actions here should be sustained only if their actions would have been permissible had there been a judge at their elbow to issue a warrant. I think that I am for "law and order," as are all of the other members of this court; however, I do not believe that the pressure of the moment, as may be evidenced by this case, is reason enough for this court to water down a person's fundamental rights under our Constitutions. It is to be noted that the United States Supreme Court stated that Terry involved the issue of protective search for weapons and 392 U.S. at page 29, 88 S.Ct. at page 1884, said: Thus, I believe Terry does not set up guidelines to determine the reasonableness of a temporary detention because as specifically stated the United States Supreme Court did not intend to cover that point and the decision was strictly on the issue of protective search as noted above. Therefore, in my opinion, this court errs in using the guidelines set up in Terry to justify protective search to justify temporary detention for investigatory purposes here. Also, may I ask, what is the guideline which states "an intrusion upon personal liberty must be reasonable and based on something more substantial than inarticulate hunches, and that reasonableness is to be judged by an objective standard, namely, whether the facts known by the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate"? Yes, it may sound good and legalistic but it sets up no definite standard.[2] To me, under such a guideline an officer may justify any action he takes if he is a good talker. Further, I do not believe Terry is applicable here. What was the "criminal activity of a violent nature" involved here? The tip to the police was that there might be illegal traffic in guns or jewelry. This information does not in any way denote a "criminal activity of a violent nature." Of course, the guns may later be used in commission of a crime; however, from the information available to the officers, how can this court say that the State was able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts that a crime involving violence was being or to be committed? The crime suspected was the illegal possession of firearms. I do not believe that such offense involves a high degree of potential violence. In my opinion Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917 (1968), decided on the same day as Terry, is closer to the facts of this case. There, the Brooklyn police observed Sibron conversing with six or eight known narcotics addicts. He observed Sibron enter a restaurant and talk to three more known addicts. At this point, the police approached Sibron, told him to come out of the restaurant and upon searching him on the sidewalk found narcotics. The United States Supreme Court held that the search was unlawful because the officer was seeking narcotics rather than acting from fear of his own safety. I believe Sibron v. New York, supra, provides a clear factual contrast to Terry v. Ohio. In both Terry and Sibron the court emphasizes the reasonableness of a police officer searching a suspect when he is justified in believing the person whom he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others.[3] While Terry did not address itself to the "stop" or "seizure"[4]Sibron did *810 mention that "If [the officer] lacked probable cause for an arrest, however, his seizure and search of Sibron might still have been justified at the outset if he had reasonable grounds to believe that Sibron was armed and dangerous."[5] Of course, Sibron, also focused on the search because no incriminating evidence arose to justify the stopping of the suspect. But assuming that for a stop to be "reasonable"[6] there must be the same grounds as for a protective "pat down" then in deciding this case a comparison of Sibron and Terry should be made. In Terry the Court felt that the reasonable suspicion that the suspects were about to commit a daylight robbery was enough to "make it quite reasonable to fear that they were armed."[7] However, in Sibron, the Court felt it abundantly clear that the officer was only searching for narcotics and those circumstances did not give rise to a "reasonable fear of life or limb."[8] The Court also noted that the officer never even contended that he acted to protect himself.[9] Therefore, the court felt that there was not available "particular facts from which [the officer] reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous."[10] The record in this case does not support the inference that Goudy was armed and dangerous within the meaning of Terry and Sibron. In the first place the investigation involved a transaction in contraband goods (Tr. p. 5). This brings it within the Sibron situation of possession of narcotics and not within the Terry situation where an imminent armed robbery was suspected. The police stated they saw the rifle. This is the only possible link with Terry but is very weak because unlike Terry there was no indication that the suspect was presently dangerous to the officer or others. There is no indication in the record the police stopped the car to prevent a violent crime from occurring. It should be also noted that Justice Harlan concurred in both Terry and Sibron on the grounds similar to those expounded by this court, i.e., that the short investigatory detentions without probable cause may be constitutionally permissible. But unlike in Terry, where he felt such a stop was justified, 392 U.S. at 34, 88 S. Ct. 1868, in Sibron he felt the stop of Sibron was not permissible, 392 U.S. at 73, 74, 88 S. Ct. 1912, even though New York Code Criminal Procedure, § 180-a, authorized an officer to stop a person short of an arrest where the officer "reasonably" suspected that the person stopped "is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony." Thus, under Sibron, the evidence should have been suppressed. I would reverse. [1] Kamakea testified as follows regarding the arrest he made: "When I approached the car I noticed the butt end of the rifle sticking out of the case which was on the back seat. I also noticed a package on the floor with some papers in it and the butt end of a pistol sticking out. I then placed both occupants of the car under arrest." [2] HRS § 727-25 reads as follows: "§ 727-25. Carrying deadly weapons; penalty. Any person not authorized by law, who carries concealed upon his person or within any vehicle used or occupied by him, or who is found armed with any dirk, dagger, blackjack, slug shot, billy, metal knuckles, pistol, or other deadly or dangerous weapon, shall be fined not more than $250, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. Any such person may be immediately arrested without warrant by any sheriff, policeman, or other officer or person. Any weapon, above enumerated, shall, upon conviction of the one carrying or possessing same under this section, be summarily destroyed by the chief of police or sheriff." [1] E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S. Ct. 191, 93 L. Ed. 153 (1948); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1959); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). [2] It is to be noted that in "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 Mich.L. Rev. 40, 64, Professor of Law Wayne R. LaFave, University of Illinois, stated: "There is to be sure, some dictum in Terry which lends support to the proposition that stops for investigation are permissible on evidence insufficient for arrest, but the language affords few hints as to what the proper standards are. It is said, for example, that the officer's conduct should be judged by this `objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief," that the action taken was appropriate?' It would be hard to quarrel with this generality, although it is unclear what help it offers in the development of police guidelines." [3] Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 at 24, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889; Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 at 63, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917. [4] "The crux of this case * * * is not the propriety of [the officer] taking steps to investigate * * * but rather, [the search]." Id. at 23, 88 S. Ct. at 1881. See also footnote 16 at p. 19, 88 S.Ct. at p. 1879, and Harlan J. concurring opinion at 32, 88 S. Ct. at 1885. [5] Id. at 63, 88 S. Ct. at 1903 (emphasis supplied). [6] Aside from there being a "reasonable suspicion." [7] Id. at 28, 88 S. Ct. at 1883. [8] Id. at 64, 88 S. Ct. at 1903. [9] Id. at 64, 88 S. Ct. at 1903. [10] Id. at 64, 88 S. Ct. at 1903.