Title: Progressive Northern Insurance Co. v. Mohr
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 243, 2011
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 21, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN 
§ 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
§ 
No. 243, 2011     
 
 
§ 
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of  
 
Appellant, 
§ 
the State of Delaware, in and for 
               
 
§ 
Kent County 
                 v. 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
WILLIAM J. MOHR, 
§ 
C. A. No. K10C-02-040 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: April 4, 2012 
 
 
Decided: 
June 21, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon Appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Daniel P. Bennett, Esquire (argued), of Mintzer, Sarowitz, Zeris, Ledva & 
Meyers, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; for Appellant. 
 
 
Keith E. Donovan, Esquire (argued), of Morris James LLP, Dover, 
Delaware; for Appellee. 
 
 
B. Wilson Redfearn and Nicholas M. Tyler, Esquires, of Tybout, Redfearn 
& Pell, Wilmington, Delaware; Amicus Curiae for Appellant. 
 
 
Richard A. Zappa and Erika R. Caesar, Esquires, of Young Conaway 
Stargatt & Taylor, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Amicus Curiae for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
JACOBS, Justice (for the majority): 
 
 
 
Delaware’s automobile insurance statute requires regulated insurers to offer 
a minimum amount of insurance on automobiles that are registered in the State.1  
On one subject, however, the statute is unclear: must an automobile insurer provide 
personal injury protection (“PIP”) coverage to an insured where that person is 
struck in Delaware, as a pedestrian, by a car (the “striking car”) that is insured in 
Delaware?2  This case presents that question of first impression. 
William Mohr, the plaintiff-below-appellee, was struck in Delaware by a car 
that was insured in Delaware.  Mohr recovered the minimum $15,000 coverage 
limit from the carrier that insured the striking car.  But, Mohr also sought to 
recover from Progressive Northern Insurance Company, the defendant-below-
appellant (“Progressive”), which had sold an automobile insurance policy to 
Mohr’s mother.  Under the Progressive policy, Mohr’s mother was the named 
insured, and Mohr was insured as a member of his mother’s household.  The 
Progressive policy, by its terms, did not cover Mohr as a pedestrian in the instant 
circumstances.  The Superior Court held, nonetheless, that Mohr was entitled to 
recover under the Progressive policy, because insofar as it denied PIP coverage, 
that policy conflicted with Delaware’s automobile insurance statute which—the 
Superior Court found—mandated such coverage.  The court ordered Progressive to 
                                                 
1 21 Del. C. § 2118. 
 
2 For ease of reference, we sometimes refer to that PIP coverage in this Opinion as “pedestrian 
PIP benefits.” 
 
2 
 
pay Mohr the $85,000 difference between the $15,000 he recovered from the 
insurer of the striking car and the $100,000 PIP coverage limit under his mother’s 
Progressive policy.  We find no error and affirm. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The pivotal facts are undisputed.  Mohr was struck by a car in Seaford, 
Delaware, while a pedestrian, on February 2, 2008.  The automobile that struck 
Mohr was registered and insured in Delaware.  Mohr was seriously injured, and 
was paid the statutory minimum $15,000 limit under the policy of the carrier that 
insured the striking car.  That amount, however, did not adequately compensate 
Mohr for his injuries.   
Mohr’s mother owned a Delaware-registered and insured automobile.  The 
mother’s automobile was insured under a Progressive policy that had a $100,000 
PIP benefits limit,3 and that relevantly provided pedestrian PIP benefits to 
“household members” of the “named insured.”4  Mohr, who was a “household 
member” of the “named insured” (his mother), sought to recover the $85,000 
difference between the amount he received from the insurer of the striking car, and 
the $100,000 limit under his mother’s policy.  Progressive denied the claim on the 
                                                 
3 That limit exceeded the required $15,000 statutory minimum.  21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)(b). 
 
4 Unless the context indicates otherwise, references to “insureds” in this Opinion include both 
named insureds and their household members. 
3 
 
ground that its policy did not provide pedestrian coverage to insureds who were 
struck in Delaware by a Delaware-insured automobile.   
It is undisputed that Mohr, even though an insured under his mother’s 
policy, was not covered.  We pause to explain why.  The Progressive policy 
insured Mohr’s mother and members of her household (including Mohr) as 
pedestrians, but only where the insured pedestrian is struck by a car that is not 
insured in Delaware.5  In this case, the striking car was insured in Delaware.  
Therefore, Progressive’s policy, by its terms, did not cover Mohr in the 
circumstances of this case.   
Mohr sued Progressive in the Superior Court for a determination that 
Progressive was required by statute to provide PIP coverage for his injuries, 
whether or not its insurance contract so provided.  Progressive defended on the 
basis that Delaware’s automobile insurance statute does not require an insurer to 
provide PIP benefits to an insured pedestrian who is struck in Delaware by a 
Delaware-insured car.    
                                                 
5 That provision in Progressive’s policy was based on subparagraph (d) of 21 Del. C. 
§ 2118(a)(2), which provides: 
 
d. The coverage required by this paragraph shall also be applicable to the named 
insureds and members of their households for accidents which occur through 
being injured by an accident with any motor vehicle other than a Delaware 
insured motor vehicle while a pedestrian or while occupying any registered motor 
vehicle other than a Delaware registered insured motor vehicle, in any state of the 
United States, its territories or possessions or Canada. 
 
4 
 
In an opinion issued on September 27, 2010, the Superior Court denied 
Progressive’s motion for summary judgment and awarded Mohr $85,000.  The 
court held that Delaware case law “support[s a finding] that Plaintiff may be 
entitled to the monetary difference in the two policies [the striking car’s and the 
pedestrian’s],” and that to “hold otherwise would limit no-fault coverage beyond 
what the legislature envisioned.”6  Under Progressive’s construction of the statute, 
a recovery of benefits would depend on whether the striking car is insured in 
Delaware, regardless of the amount of PIP coverage for which a premium was 
paid.  The Superior Court stated that if Progressive’s position were adopted, then 
“should [a pedestrian] have the misfortune of being struck by one of these ill-fated, 
lesser-insured Delaware vehicles, she must resign herself to that vehicle’s limited 
coverage.  [That] crapshoot cannot be what the legislature intended for Delaware 
residents.”7   
This appeal followed. 
ANALYSIS 
I. The Contentions and the Applicable Standard 
In this appeal, Progressive claims that the Superior Court reversibly erred, 
because by statute Progressive was not required to provide an insured pedestrian 
                                                 
6 Mohr v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 2010 WL 4061979 at *3 (Del. Super. Sept. 27, 2010). 
7 Id. 
 
5 
 
PIP benefits where, as here, the insured is struck in Delaware by a Delaware-
insured automobile.  All parties agree that the Progressive policy, by its terms, did 
not provide pedestrian PIP coverage in those circumstances.  The sole legal 
question presented is whether Progressive was statutorily mandated to provide 
such coverage.  That requires us to decide whether Delaware’s automobile 
insurance statute—in particular, subparagraph (e) of 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)—
requires an insurer to provide PIP coverage under a Delaware policy for an insured 
who is injured, as a pedestrian, in Delaware by a Delaware-insured car.  If the 
statute is found to so require, then the Superior Court’s judgment awarding Mohr 
$85,000 of PIP benefits under the Progressive policy must be upheld.8 
A trial court’s interpretation of a statute presents, on appellate review, a 
question of law that this Court reviews de novo.9  “The goal of statutory 
construction is to determine and give effect to [the] legislative intent.”10  When a 
statute is interpreted, “[u]ndefined words . . . must be given their ordinary, 
common meaning.”11  Those words “should not be construed as surplusage if there 
                                                 
8 Cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wagamon, 541 A.2d 557, 561 (Del. 1988) (refusing to 
reform statutorily-inconsistent exclusion, found contrary to public policy, solely to the minimum 
limit amount mandated by statute, due to absence of the “full agreement of the parties”). 
 
9 CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1040 (Del. 2011).  
 
10 LeVan v. Independence Mall, Inc., 940 A.2d 929, 932 (Del. 2007) (citation omitted). 
 
11 Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 900 (Del. 1994). 
 
6 
 
is a reasonable construction which will give them meaning.”12  Courts “must 
ascribe a purpose to the use of statutory language, if reasonably possible.”13  
Where the statutory language is clear on its face and is fairly susceptible to only 
one reading, the unambiguous text will be construed accordingly, unless the result 
is so absurd that it cannot be reasonably attributed to the legislature.14  Where, 
however, the statutory text is ambiguous, the court will resort to other sources, 
including relevant public policy, “for guidance [as] to [the statute’s] apparent 
purpose.”15  And, in carrying out its interpretive task, this Court will “read each 
section [of the statute] in light of all the others to produce a harmonious whole.”16 
The practical consequence of the issue presented is that if Progressive’s 
interpretation of 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)(e) is correct, then PIP coverage for a 
pedestrian injured in Delaware by a Delaware-insured striking car, will be 
recoverable only from the policy insuring the striking car.  To simplify the 
statutory analysis in this Opinion, we note—and the reader may assume—that this 
                                                 
12 Chase Alexa, LLC v. Kent County Levy Court, 991 A.2d 1148, 1152 (Del. 2010) (citing 
Oceanport Indus., Inc., 636 A.2d at 900). 
 
13 Chase Alexa, LLC, 991 A.2d 1152. 
 
14 CML V, 28 A.3d at 1041 (citing LeVan, 940 A.2d at 933). 
 
15 PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Ins. Trust, ex rel. Christiana Bank and Trust Co., 
28 A.3d 1059, 1070 (Del. 2011) (citation omitted). 
 
16 CML V, 28 A.3d at 1041 (citing Taylor v. Diamond State Port Corp., 14 A.3d 536, 538 (Del. 
2011)). 
 
7 
 
case is indistinguishable from the situation where Mohr himself purchases the 
Progressive policy in his own name, as opposed to being insured as a “household 
member” of the “named insured” (here, his mother).   
Underlying this dispute is the fact that an insured claimant will have paid a 
higher premium to purchase an insurance policy whose limits exceeds the $15,000 
statutory minimum.  To purchase only the minimum coverage, the premium would 
be less.  Where the policies insuring the injured pedestrian and the Delaware-
insured striking car, respectively, carry the same minimum coverage limit, no 
dispute arises, because the “no double recovery” principle may properly limit the 
injured pedestrian’s recovery to the limit under the policy insuring the striking 
car.17  Under Progressive’s reading of the statute, however, where an insured 
chooses to purchase additional, higher coverage and then is later struck and 
injured, as a pedestrian,  in Delaware by a Delaware insured automobile, the 
insured pedestrian cannot not receive the incremental benefit of the higher 
coverage under his own policy.  At stake, therefore, is the insured pedestrian’s 
ability to recover the difference between the minimum PIP coverage under the 
policy insuring the striking car (here, $15,000) and the higher PIP coverage 
                                                 
17 This Court has previously ruled that a policy exclusion for a “double recovery” under the 
insured’s policy—of the amount of coverage provided under the striking car’s policy—is 
permissible under the statute.  See generally, Gonzalez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 683 
A.2d 59 (Del. 1996). 
 
8 
 
afforded under the separate policy insuring the pedestrian (here, $100,000).  Here, 
that difference was $85,000.   
II. The Statutory Construction Issue 
The statutory construction issue presented requires us to decide whether: (1) 
subparagraph (e) of 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2) is plain on its face and susceptible only 
to the meaning Progressive ascribes to it—i.e., that coverage for pedestrians is 
mandated and available only from the striking car’s insurer—or (2) whether the 
statute is also reasonably susceptible to the opposite interpretation advocated by 
Mohr and adopted by the Superior Court.  If the statute is reasonably susceptible to 
both interpretations, then it must be deemed ambiguous.  In that case, the 
interpretation that best furthers the legislative purposes underlying the Delaware 
automobile insurance statutory scheme must prevail. 
A. The Coverage Mandate of 21 Del.  
C. § 2118(a)(2)(e) is Ambiguous 
 
Our analysis of the first issue, whether subparagraph (e) is ambiguous, starts 
with 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2).  That provision requires that automobiles registered 
in Delaware must carry insurance to compensate “injured persons for reasonable 
and necessary expenses” arising out of automobile accidents.18  Subparagraph (e) 
of Section 2118(a)(2) (“subparagraph (e)”) provides: 
                                                 
18 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)(a). 
 
9 
 
The coverage required in this paragraph shall apply to pedestrians 
only if they are injured by an accident with any motor vehicle within 
the State except as to named insureds or members of their households 
to the extent they must be covered pursuant to subparagraph d. of this 
paragraph. 
 
Unlike subparagraphs (c) and (d) of Section 2118(a)(2),19 subparagraph (e) 
does not specify whether its coverage mandate applies to an insured pedestrian’s 
insurance policy, or to the striking car’s insurance policy, or to both.  Progressive 
claims that subparagraph (e)’s coverage mandate can only be read (i) to regulate 
the insurance policy covering the striking car, and (ii) to limit geographically the 
pedestrian PIP benefits mandated by subparagraph (c)—by restricting 
subparagraph (c)’s coverage mandate to accidents that occur in Delaware.  And 
subparagraph (c), Progressive argues, applies by its terms only to the striking car.  
That interpretation, Progressive claims, is compelled when subparagraph (e) is read 
together with subparagraph (c).  Subparagraph (c) provides:  
The coverage required by this paragraph shall be applicable to each 
person occupying such [insured] motor vehicle and to any other 
person injured in an accident involving such [insured] motor vehicle, 
other than an occupant of another motor vehicle.20 
 
                                                 
19 As more fully discussed infra, subparagraph (c)’s coverage mandate applies only to the 
policies of striking cars (i.e., cars that are involved in the injury-causing accident).  
Subparagraph (d)’s coverage mandate applies to the policies covering “named insureds” and 
their household members, where they are injured in an accident involving a non-Delaware 
insured automobile either as pedestrians, or as occupants of a non-Delaware-insured automobile. 
 
20 Italics added. 
 
10 
 
We agree that Progressive’s interpretation is a reasonable construction of the 
statute.  Subparagraph (c) explicitly mandates coverage for injured pedestrians only 
from the policy that insures the striking car (i.e., “any other person injured in an 
accident involving such [insured] motor vehicle”).21  Subparagraph (c) contains no 
geographic limitations and subparagraph (e), which immediately follows 
subparagraph (d), imposes certain geographic limitations.  Progressive’s approach 
may be expressed syllogistically as follows: (i) Subparagraph (c)’s mandate is 
limited to the insurance policy covering the striking car; (ii) Subparagraph (e) is 
intended solely to limit geographically the coverage mandated by subparagraph (c); 
and (iii) therefore, subparagraph (e)’s coverage mandate is necessarily limited to 
the policy covering the striking car.   
But, Progressive’s construction is not the only reasonable interpretation, for 
three separate reasons.  First, subparagraph (e), which is claimed to modify 
subparagraph (c), makes no reference at all to subparagraph (c).22  The only even 
arguable textual link between the two subparagraphs is the word “only” in 
                                                 
21 Accord, Wisnewski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2005 WL 697945 at *1 (Del. Super. Feb. 
14, 2005) (“To constitute an ‘accident involving such motor vehicle,’ a casual connection is 
required between the use of the vehicle and the injury.”) (citing Gray v. Allstate Ins. Co., 668 
A.2d 778, 780 (Del. Super. 1995) (“On several occasions, this Court has discussed the causal 
nexus between an injury and an automobile accident which is required to trigger coverage under 
§ 2118(a)(2)(c).”)) (italics added). 
 
22 The legislature did choose to refer specifically to subparagraph (d) in the text of subparagraph 
(e).  
 
11 
 
subparagraph (e).  That word (Progressive argues) signals that subparagraph (e) 
operates solely to limit, rather than to expand, coverage.  That conclusion does not 
inexorably follow from the statutory text, however. 
Second, Progressive’s narrow focus on subparagraph (c) ignores and gives 
no effect to contrary language found in subparagraph (e)—specifically, that the 
“coverage required in this paragraph shall apply to pedestrians only if they are 
injured by an accident with any motor vehicle within the State. . . .”23  The quoted 
italicized language is substantively identical in both subparagraphs (c) and (d).24  
Progressive acknowledges that both provisions expand—rather than limit— 
coverage.25  
Third, subparagraph (c) expressly requires that the insured automobile be 
involved in striking the pedestrian.  Subparagraph (e) does not.  Subparagraph (c) 
mandates automobile insurance coverage for pedestrians injured in an accident 
“involving such motor vehicle.”  That language expressly requires that the insured 
                                                 
23 Italics added.  
 
24 Specifically, subparagraph (c) states “[t]he coverage required by this paragraph shall be 
applicable to. . . .” and subparagraph (d) states that the “coverage required by this paragraph shall 
also be applicable to. . . .”   
 
25 Progressive describes subparagraph (c) as where “the Delaware legislature sets forth the 
coverage applicable to occupants and others (including pedestrians) involved in an accident with 
an insured motor vehicle.” (italics added).  Moreover, the insurer states, “[subparagraph (d)] 
speaks to additional coverage provided to named insureds and members of their household,” 
whereas subparagraph (e) “limits those benefits that are required . . . in subparagraph [(c)].” 
(italics added). 
 
12 
 
automobile be involved in the accident.  That requirement necessarily excludes 
policies insuring automobiles that are not involved in the accident, even if the 
injured pedestrian is an insured under such a policy.26  Subparagraph (e), however, 
refers broadly to “any motor vehicle,” and nowhere limits the pedestrian’s right to 
recover under an automobile insurance policy insuring him, in cases where that 
insured automobile is not involved in the accident.    
The different language employed by these two subsections cannot be viewed 
as accidental or inconsequential.27  The legislative choice of the word “any” in 
subparagraph (e) reasonably could have been intended to expand the coverage 
mandate beyond that provided by subparagraph (c), which addresses only—and is 
limited to—the policy insuring the striking car.  That is, subparagraph (e) can 
reasonably be read to require that Delaware automobile insurance policies cover 
insured pedestrians who are injured in Delaware by “any motor vehicle.” 
Because subparagraph (e) is susceptible to two reasonable yet different 
interpretations, it is ambiguous. 
 
 
                                                 
26 See supra note 21. 
 
27 Dewey Beach Enter., Inc. v. Bd. of Adjust. of Tw. of Dewey Beach, 1 A.3d 305, 307-08 (Del. 
2010) (“[W]ords in a statute should not be construed as surplusage if there is a reasonable 
construction which will give them meaning, and courts must ascribe a purpose to the use of 
statutory language, if reasonably possible.”) (citation mitted). 
 
13 
 
B.  A Response to the Dissenting Opinion   
The Dissent forcefully and repeatedly argues that there can be but one 
reasonable reading of the statutory scheme: namely, that subparagraph (d) is 
unambiguously the only statutory provision that addresses PIP coverage for insured 
pedestrians; that subparagraph (d) does not mandate coverage for pedestrians 
struck by a Delaware-insured car; and by that omission, the General Assembly 
“explicitly eschew[ed]” mandating such coverage.28  The Dissent asserts that 
subparagraph (e) can only reasonably be read to impose a geographic restriction on 
the coverage mandate provided by subparagraph (c).    
The Dissent’s reasons only buttress a proposition that we readily concede—
that Progressive’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable.  The issue, however, is 
whether it is the only reasonable interpretation.  It cannot be.  That contention, no 
matter how often or how emphatically repeated by the Dissent, cannot obviate the 
existence of a reasonable, alternative reading of subparagraphs (d) and (e).  Under 
that alternative reading, subparagraph (d) is not the sole and exclusive source of 
coverage of insured pedestrians.  It may also reasonably be read to address a 
broader set of circumstances that involve non-Delaware insured cars, because 
subparagraph (d) mandates coverage for Delaware insureds—whether as occupants 
                                                 
28 Dissenting Op. at 38.  What is hard to square with this reasoning is the Dissent’s accusation 
that our interpretation “import[s] a new form of underinsured motorist coverage for personal 
injury protection.”  Dissenting Op. at 36.  That simply cannot be so, given the legislative 
decision to require the same form of coverage for accidents involving non-Delaware insured cars.  
 
14 
 
or as pedestrians—who are injured in accidents involving a non-Delaware insured 
car.  And, for the reasons stated supra, subparagraph (e) is also reasonably read to 
require coverage of insured pedestrians who are struck in Delaware by a Delaware-
insured automobile.29  That criticism erroneously presupposes that only 
subparagraph (d) “actually governs coverage for injuries to insured pedestrians.”30  
 
To summarize, the Dissent’s analysis does not come to grips with the 
reasoning that establishes that subparagraph (e) can reasonably be read in an 
alternative way that would mandate coverage in the circumstances at bar.  That 
interpretation conflicts with Progressive’s also-reasonable interpretation.  Being 
subject to two different reasonable yet inconsistent interpretations, subparagraph 
(e) is therefore ambiguous and requires a deeper analysis that includes resort to the 
tools of judicial construction.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Nor is it accurate for the Dissent to assert that our contrary view “fails to recognize” that 
“subparagraph (c) governs situations when the insured hits a pedestrian while subparagraph (d) 
governs situations when the insured is the injured pedestrian.”  Dissenting Op. at 27.  Also 
inaccurate is its characterization of our decision as “choos[ing] to recraft” the automobile 
insurance statute.   Dissenting Op. at 43.  That argument presupposes that the General Assembly 
has clearly formulated its intent.  It did not.  In defining the scope of no-fault coverage, the 
General Assembly instead chose to use language that lends itself to two opposite-yet-reasonable 
interpretations.  Accordingly, the result we reach represents our best effort to formulate, as an 
original matter, what the General Assembly intended despite its “careless[] draft[smanship]” of 
the statute (to use the Dissent’s words), Dissenting Op. at 28, not to “recraft”  an already-
existing construct whose meaning is clear beyond peradventure. 
 
30 Dissenting Op. at 25. 
15 
 
C. The Superior Court’s Interpretation  
Furthers the Underlying Statutory Purpose 
 
Because it is ambiguous, 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)(e) must be construed in a 
manner that best furthers the legislative purpose and public policy goals that 
underlie the enactment of Delaware’s automobile insurance statutory scheme.31  
The question thus becomes: which interpretation of subparagraph (e) best furthers 
the legislative purpose and policy goals—Progressive’s or Mohr’s?  
An important public policy goal of the automobile insurance statute is to 
promote “full compensation to all victims of automobile accidents.”32  A related 
goal is to “encourag[e] the Delaware driving public to purchase more than the 
statutory minimum amount [of coverage].”33  In furtherance of these purposes, this 
Court has held that, “[i]n the absence of express legislative authority, no policy 
exclusions affecting statutory minimum coverage will be recognized.”34  In our 
                                                 
31 LeVan v. Independence Mall, Inc., 940 A.2d 929, 932 (Del. 2007) (“The goal of statutory 
construction is to determine and give effect to legislative intent.”). 
 
32 Nationwide General Ins. Co. v. Seeman, 702 A.2d 915, 918 (Del. 1997) (declaring void, on 
public policy grounds, an exclusion limiting coverage to household members to statutory 
minimum rather than otherwise applicable policy limit). 
 
33 Id. 
 
34 Harris v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 632 A.2d 1380, 1381-82 (Del. 1993).   
 
16 
 
view, that principle also informs the proper construction of ambiguous automobile 
insurance statutory provisions that are claimed to deny coverage.35 
Progressive contends that “Delaware courts have regularly upheld policy 
provisions that deny ‘excess’ benefits as not being violative of public policy.”  For 
support, Progressive cites two Superior Court decisions, neither of which involved 
the construction of a statutory provision judicially determined to be ambiguous.36  
That Delaware courts have previously upheld specific policy exclusions that do not 
violate the automobile insurance statute does not advance the inquiry here, which 
is: what is the proper construction of provisions in that statute that are found to be 
ambiguous? 
In Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. v. Seeman,37 this Court held that the public 
policy underlying the statute “favors full compensation to all victims of automobile 
accidents” and encourages “the Delaware driving public to purchase more than the 
                                                 
35 See, 21 Del. C. § 2118(e) (requiring insurance policies “purporting to satisfy” the statute’s 
requirements to contain a provision “which states that, notwithstanding any of the other terms . . . 
of the policy, the coverage afforded shall be at least as extensive as the minimum coverage 
required by this section”).   
 
36 Mason v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1997 WL 524129, at *2-3 (Del. Super. July 21, 
1997) (upholding “regular use” exclusion under insured’s policy where “PIP coverage meeting 
the statutory requirements was . . . paid out to the limits of the coverage as required under section 
2118(a)) (italics added); Webb v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1993 WL 80634, at *4 (Del. 
Super. March 17, 1993) (“refus[ing] to extend coverage”—under a “convoluted reading” of 
subparagraph (d)—for injuries to the insured that she sustained while occupying her other, 
uninsured Delaware-registered automobile, because the insured “simply . . . decid[ed] to save the 
cost of purchasing insurance on [that] car”). 
 
37 702 A.2d 915 (1997). 
 
17 
 
statutory minimum amount [of coverage].”38  Progressive urges that Nationwide is 
distinguishable because the disputed policy provision in that case concerned 
“liability coverage, not PIP benefits,” and applied to household members of the 
named insureds, but not the named insureds themselves.  Those are distinctions 
without a difference. 
First, Nationwide establishes an important purpose of the automobile 
insurance statute, which informs our statutory construction analysis.  In 
Nationwide, the disputed policy carried a $100,000 limit of liability coverage “for 
property damage and bodily injury” arising from a car accident.  The insured’s 
teenage son, who was injured while riding as a passenger with his insured father, 
filed a claim against his father’s Nationwide policy.  That policy contained a 
“modified” household exclusion that limited coverage for the insured’s household 
members (the son) to the $15,000 statutory minimum.  That exclusion, we held, 
violated the public policy underlying 21 Del. C. ch. 29 and also Section 2118,39 
because it was inconsistent with the General Assembly’s “public policy [goal of] 
. . . affording opportunities for acquiring more than the statutorily mandated 
minimum amount [of coverage].”40   
                                                 
38 Id. at 918 (italics added). 
 
39 Id. at 915 (citing as “Delaware’s Financial Responsibility Laws” 21 Del. C. § 2118 and 21 
Del. C. Ch. 29). 
 
40 Id. at 918 (italics added). 
18 
 
Second, Progressive’s attempt to distinguish Nationwide on factual grounds 
is fatally undercut by Bass v. Horizon Assurance Co.,41 an earlier decision of this 
Court upon which the Nationwide court relied.  Bass involved PIP benefits, not 
liability coverage.  Nationwide cited Bass as support for its holding that 
Nationwide’s modified policy limiting the son’s benefits to the statutory 
minimum—as opposed to the higher limit of coverage purchased by the insured 
father—contravened public policy.42   
Nor are we persuaded by Progressive’s attempt to distinguish Nationwide on 
the basis that there the insurer (Nationwide) “was attempting to treat named 
insureds differently than other [household members]”—whereas here the insurer 
(Progressive) is treating them the same (i.e., denying additional coverage to both).  
As our case law makes clear, an important policy underlying Section 2118 is to 
encourage the purchase of “more than the statutorily mandated minimum amount” 
                                                 
41 562 A.2d 1194, 1196 (Del. 1989) (describing relevant exclusion as “incompatible with the no-
fault nature of PIP coverage”). 
 
42 Nationwide, 702 A.2d at 918, n. 4 (“This Court’s position that these exclusions violate public 
policy regardless of any modification for the statutory minimum [limit] was reiterated when we 
followed Wagamon in Bass v. Horizon Assurance Company.”). 
 
19 
 
of coverage.  That policy, we conclude, is best furthered by upholding the statutory 
interpretation endorsed by the Superior Court here.43   
Nationwide, Bass and other decisions of this Court44 establish that the 
“fundamental purpose” of 21 Del. C. § 2118(a), and of 21 Del. C. ch. 29 generally, 
is to compensate fully victims of car accidents.45   One way to achieve that purpose 
is to “encourag[e] the Delaware driving public to purchase more than the statutory 
minimum amount [of coverage].”46  Those related goals are particularly 
intertwined in a case such as this where, to obtain “full compensation,” a 
pedestrian victim of a car accident will need access to the higher limit of the 
insurance policy coverage that the pedestrian himself (or a relative) has purchased.  
                                                 
43 Nationwide, 702 A.2d at 918 (“The General Assembly intended [to] . . . afford[] opportunities 
for acquiring more than the statutorily mandated minimum amount of automobile insurance 
coverage.”) (citing 21 Del. C. § 2118(d) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit 
the issuance of policies providing coverage more extensive than the minimum coverages 
required by this section or to require the segregation of such minimum coverages from other 
coverages in the same policy.”)). 
 
44 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wagamon, 541 A.2d 557 (Del. 1988), for example, states 
that: 
 
The Delaware Financial Responsibility Law mandates a system of insurance 
intended to protect and compensate persons injured in automobile accidents.  This 
law requires motorists to purchase, and insurance carries to provide, both liability 
and no-fault compensation coverage.  
 
Id. at 560 (citing 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)) (italics added). 
 
45 Hudson v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 1168, 1171 (Del. 1990) (“[T]he fundamental 
purpose of Delaware’s financial responsibility laws is to protect and compensate all persons 
injured in automobile accidents.”) (italics added).  
 
46 Nationwide, 702 A.2d at 918. 
 
20 
 
The construction advocated by Mohr, and approved by the Superior Court, 
advances the related goals of full compensation of car accident victims and of 
encouraging policy holders to purchase that protection—in the form of higher 
coverage limits—for themselves and their household members.  The interpretation 
advocated by Progressive would have the opposite effect—of discouraging the 
insured from acquiring coverage needed to provide full protection for himself and 
his family. 
For these reasons, we hold that subparagraph (e) of 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2) 
must be construed to mandate PIP coverage of insured pedestrians in the 
circumstances presented here.47  To hold otherwise would deny Delaware 
residents, without any clear legislative basis,48 the “opportunit[y] for acquiring 
more than the statutorily mandated minimum amount”49 of pedestrian PIP coverage 
in the circumstance where they would most likely need it—being struck on a 
Delaware road by a Delaware-insured car.  Such a legislatively-unsanctioned 
                                                 
47 Cf., Selective Ins. Co. v. Lyons, 681 A.2d 1021, 1025 (Del. 1996) (“[A] liberal definition of 
occupant is applied [in subparagraph (c)] so that the injured insured will be compensated without 
strict scrutiny of the physical location of the insured.”). 
 
48 Compare Harris v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 632 A.2d 1380, 1381-82 (Del. 1993) 
(“In the absence of express legislative authority, no policy exclusions affecting statutory 
minimum coverage will be recognized.”) (italics added), with Selective Ins. Co., 681 A.2d at 
1025 (“An exclusion based on an explicit statutory allowance cannot be disfavored as contrary to 
the statute’s underlying purpose.”) (italics added) (citation omitted). 
 
49 Nationwide, 702 A.2d at 918. 
 
21 
 
benefits limitation would run counter to the fundamental purpose of Section 2118 
“to [fully] protect and compensate all persons injured in automobile accidents.”50 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. 
 
                                                 
50 Hudson v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 1168, 1171 (Del. 1990). 
 
22 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice dissenting: 
On February 8, 2008, William Mohr jumped out of a moving Jeep, which 
then ran over him.  Mohr attempted to recover no fault personal injury protection 
benefits under his mother’s insurance policy, but Progressive denied his claim.  
The trial judge held that Progressive’s policy violated 21 Del. C. § 2118 by failing 
to cover insured pedestrians struck by Delaware insured vehicles and ordered 
Progressive to pay $85,000 in benefits.  The Majority finds no error and affirms. 
I respectfully dissent because:  
(1) the General Assembly in subparagraph (d) of 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2) 
intentionally mandated no fault personal injury protection coverage for insured 
pedestrians struck by non-Delaware insured vehicles only — explicitly eschewing 
extending the mandate to Delaware insured vehicles;  
(2) this Court’s desired policy judgments cannot override the General 
Assembly’s intentional, rational, and unambiguous decision to distinguish between 
Delaware and non-Delaware insured vehicles when mandating limits on the scope 
of no fault coverage;  
(3) broad public policy statements in a statute’s preamble do not govern the 
specific and explicit text of an unambiguous statutory provision; and, 
(4) the Majority’s attempt to analogize mandated no fault coverage (personal 
injury 
protection) 
to 
mandated 
fault 
coverage 
(bodily 
injury 
and 
23 
 
underinsured/uninsured motorist coverage) ignores: (a) the interrelationship and 
distinction between fault and no fault mandated coverage; (b) the fact that 
Delaware is a hybrid no fault coverage state and that only the General Assembly 
through gathering and analyzing legislative facts can assess mandated coverages’ 
effect on the willingness of insurance carriers to offer insurance coverage in the 
state and the costs to consumers of mandated expansive coverage.  
I. 
Facts 
Around 10:25 p.m. on February 8, 2008, William Mohr and Courtney 
Brittingham were standing in a Seaford, Delaware parking lot arguing about who 
should drive.  According to the police report, Brittingham stated that they had been 
drinking since 6:00 p.m.  She recalled that Mohr had the keys to the Jeep and the 
two of them got in, but she continued insisting that Mohr not drive.  Brittingham 
repeatedly told Mohr to get out of the Jeep, but he instead left the parking space 
and turned left, flooring it while headed toward a fence.  The Jeep collided with a 
four foot metal chain link fence, dragging the fence for 15 feet.  Brittingham 
continued to tell Mohr to get out of the Jeep, so Mohr opened the door and jumped 
out.  Brittingham then attempted to stop the Jeep just before it struck a tree.  In the 
process, the Jeep’s left rear tire ran over Mohr.51   
                                                 
51 App. to Opening Br. A-8. 
24 
 
Mohr filed a personal injury protection benefits claim against Brittingham 
whose PIP no fault coverage had limits of $15,000.  On December 2, 2009, Mohr 
sent a letter to Progressive demanding “excess” personal injury protection benefits 
through his mother Maridebbie Mohr’s Progressive policy because he was living 
with his mother at the time of the accident and believed himself to be an insured 
under her policy.  Progressive rejected the claim.  There is no evidence in the 
record to show that Mohr sought to recover from Brittingham’s fault based bodily 
injury coverage or under his mother’s underinsured motorist coverage.   
II. 
Analysis 
Before proceeding to interpret 21 Del. C. § 2118, it is important to confront 
and appreciate intuitively the General Assembly’s construct of our vehicle 
insurance laws.   We must assume the obvious — the General Assembly is aware 
that its statutes require drivers to carry a variety of insurance coverages while 
operating vehicles on Delaware roadways, three of which are relevant to this case.  
The first is bodily injury insurance, which covers the insured for wrongfully 
causing injury to a third party after the third party proves duty, breach, causation 
and damages.  Second, underinsured motorist coverage may, under one’s own 
policy, indemnify a driver or pedestrian for losses caused by a driver who harms 
the insured but does not have sufficient bodily injury insurance to completely 
25 
 
indemnify the injured party.52  Underinsured motorist coverage may apply only 
after a tortfeasor’s liability coverage has been exhausted.53  Finally, personal injury 
protection is no fault coverage indemnifying an injured person for certain 
enumerated losses arising from the use of a vehicle, regardless of fault.  The 
Delaware personal injury protection scheme, as described by Couch on Insurance, 
is not a true form of no fault insurance “given that it does not affect the ability of 
the traffic accident victim to sue in tort, but merely provides benefits which are in 
addition to those afforded by the standard automobile coverage.”54 
The Majority’s concern that Mohr will be left with insufficient coverage if 
he cannot access his mother’s personal injury protection coverage misapprehends 
the General Assembly’s no fault/fault scheme of mandated coverage.  In reality, 
Mohr could access Brittingham’s bodily injury coverage and, to the extent 
necessary, his own underinsured motorist coverage if he can prove that 
Brittingham tortiously injured him.  The unique factual circumstances of this case 
and the difficulty Mohr might have proving Brittingham was at fault clearly 
underlie Mohr’s attempt to reformulate the General Assembly’s thoughtful, 
                                                 
52 For purposes of this dissent, the term underinsured motorist includes underinsured and 
uninsured motorists as the latter is a subset of the former. 
53 Eric M. Holmes, Appleman on Insurance § 150.2, at 202 (2d ed. 2004) (“UIM coverage 
typically would be triggered only when the victim’s underinsured coverage exceeded the 
tortfeasor’s liability coverage.  In this situation, the victim would then resort to his or her own 
underinsured coverage, minus the liability settlement from the tortfeasor’s carrier. . .”). 
54 Steven Plitt et al., Couch on Insurance § 125:5, at 125-16 (3d ed. 2008). 
26 
 
interrelated construct of no fault PIP and fault based bodily injury coverage.  
Because Mohr may find it difficult to prove Brittingham was at fault, and by doing 
so access her bodily injury liability coverage, he will also find it difficult to access 
his mother’s fault based underinsured motorist coverage.55   
Personal injury protection represents Mohr’s best chance to recover 
damages.  Brittingham’s carrier paid Mohr the maximum amount of $15,000 in 
personal injury protection benefits.  Therefore, the issue in this case is whether the 
General Assembly mandated that Mohr’s own insurance policy’s personal injury 
protection cover him if a Delaware insured vehicle struck him while he was a 
pedestrian, regardless of fault.  This question must be analyzed after appreciating 
that bodily injury coverage typically allows the pedestrian to recover damages 
when the driver of a vehicle wrongfully causes injury to the pedestrian. 
A. 
Subparagraph 
(d) 
only 
mandates 
coverage 
for 
insured 
pedestrians struck by non-Delaware insured motor vehicles. 
In the analysis section of the opinion, the Majority jumps headfirst into its 
interpretation of 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)(e) without first considering the threshold 
question of which subparagraph actually governs coverage for injuries to insured 
pedestrians.56  I find — after a comprehensive reading of the statute which takes 
                                                 
55 When making a claim for underinsured motorist coverage, the insurance company stands in 
the shoes of the other driver and the person making the claim must prove fault. 
56 In the first sentence under the “Statutory Construction Issue” heading, the Majority writes: 
“The statutory construction issue presented requires us to decide whether: (1) subparagraph (e) 
27 
 
into account the sequence of the provisions — that subparagraph (d) mandates the 
scope of coverage for pedestrian members of households while subparagraph (e) 
operates as a geographic limit on that scope. 
Under heading (a) of 21 Del. C. § 2118, no Delaware vehicle owner shall 
operate a vehicle on Delaware roadways unless the owner has the legally required 
minimum insurance.57  Heading (a) is divided into four paragraphs that describe 
the different areas of mandated insurance coverage: (1) indemnity from legal 
liability,58 (2) compensation to injured persons,59 (3) compensation for property 
damage,60 and (4) compensation for damage to the insured vehicle.61 
Paragraph (2) provides the relevant statutory text for mandated no fault 
personal injury protection coverage.  Subparagraph (a) states, inter alia, that a 
person’s insurance coverage must include compensation to injured persons for 
                                                                                                                                                             
of 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2) is plain on its face and susceptible only to the meaning Progressive 
ascribes to it . . . or (2) whether subparagraph (e) is also reasonably susceptible to the opposite 
interpretation advocated by Mohr and adopted by the Superior Court.”  Op. at 8. 
57 21 Del. C. § 2118(a) (“No owner of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this State, 
other than a self-insurer pursuant to § 2904 of this title, shall operate or authorize any other 
person to operate such vehicle unless the owner has insurance on such motor vehicle providing 
the following minimum insurance coverage:”). 
58 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(1). 
59 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2) (“Compensation to injured persons for reasonable and necessary 
expenses incurred within 2 years from the date of the accident”). 
60 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(3). 
61 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(4). 
28 
 
reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred within 2 years from the date 
of the accident.62  Subparagraph (b) establishes minimum limits of $15,000 for any 
one person and $30,000 for all persons injured in any one accident.63  More 
importantly, subparagraphs (c) through (e) define the scope of the term “injured 
person.” 
First, subparagraph (c) provides that the mandated coverage “shall be 
applicable to” each person occupying the vehicle and any other person injured in 
an accident with the vehicle.64  This subparagraph covers Mohr because a vehicle 
injured him in an accident, but the next subparagraph, which discusses pedestrian 
coverage in relation to members of the household, is more specific and therefore 
controls.  Critically, the Majority fails to recognize that subparagraph (c) governs 
situations when the insured hits a pedestrian while subparagraph (d) governs 
situations when the insured is the injured pedestrian.  Mohr is seeking coverage in 
the latter case as a member of the insured household injured as a pedestrian.  
                                                 
62 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)(a) (“Compensation to injured persons for reasonable and necessary 
expenses incurred within 2 years from the date of the accident for: 1. Medical, hospital, dental, 
surgical, medicine, x-ray, ambulance, prosthetic services, professional nursing and funeral 
services.”). 
63 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)(b) (“The minimum insurance coverage which will satisfy the 
requirements of subparagraph a. of this paragraph is a minimum limit for the total of all 
payments which must be made pursuant to that subparagraph of $15,000 for any 1 person and 
$30,000 for all persons injured in any 1 accident.”). 
64 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)(c) (“The coverage required by this paragraph shall be applicable to 
each person occupying such motor vehicle and to any other person injured in an accident 
involving such motor vehicle, other than an occupant of another motor vehicle.”). 
29 
 
Admittedly, subparagraph (c) is carelessly drafted, but because the specific 
controls the general, subparagraph (d) provides the relevant statutory rule.   
Under subparagraph (d), the mandated coverage “shall also be applicable”65 to 
named insureds and the members of their households:  
The coverage required by this paragraph shall also be applicable to the 
named insureds and members of their households for accidents which 
occur through being injured by an accident with any motor vehicle 
other than a Delaware insured motor vehicle while a pedestrian or 
while occupying any registered motor vehicle other than a Delaware 
registered insured motor vehicle, in any state of the United States, its 
territories or possessions or Canada.66 
In this subparagraph, the General Assembly divided the set of situations where an 
insured or household member can be injured into two scenarios: when the person is 
in the vehicle (“while occupying any registered motor vehicle”) and when the 
person is out of the vehicle (“while a pedestrian”).  For insured pedestrians, 
coverage is required if the striking vehicle is a non-Delaware insured vehicle but 
not required if the striking vehicle is insured in Delaware.  Similarly, for insured 
occupants, coverage is required if the occupied vehicle is a non-Delaware 
registered insured vehicle but not required if the occupied vehicle is a Delaware 
registered insured vehicle. 
                                                 
65 It is important to note that the drafters used the same “shall be applicable to” language to 
signify another area of coverage that must be provided by insurance companies like Progressive. 
66 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)(d) (emphasis added). 
30 
 
Unlike the previous two subparagraphs—which use the “shall be applicable” 
language—subparagraph (e) states that the coverage “shall apply to pedestrians 
only if” the accident occurs within Delaware.67  The insertion of the word “only” 
signifies an intention by the General Assembly not to extend the required coverage 
to a new group of persons but to limit the coverage which must be provided to 
pedestrians.  The General Assembly intended subparagraph (c) to control when an 
insured hits a pedestrian and subparagraph (d) to control when a third party hits the 
insured pedestrian.  Subparagraph (e) is designed to limit this coverage to accidents 
inside Delaware, with one exception; pedestrians who are named insureds and 
members of the household may have coverage outside Delaware to the extent they 
must be covered under subparagraph (d).  This morass of legal rules can be 
confusing, but if any one clear conclusion can be drawn, it is that subparagraph (e) 
is not the starting point of analysis for insured pedestrian coverage. 
Nevertheless, the Majority begins and ends its analysis with subparagraph 
(e).68  This error was certainly not induced by incorrect briefing: Progressive never 
made an argument based on subparagraph (e), which is cited only once in 
                                                 
67 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)(e). 
68 Op. at 5 (“That requires us to decide whether Delaware’s no-fault automobile insurance 
statute—in particular, subparagraph (e) of 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)—requires an insurer to 
provide PIP coverage under a Delaware policy for an insured who is injured, as a pedestrian, in 
Delaware by a Delaware-insured car.”). 
31 
 
Progressive’s Opening Brief.69  In fact, the second major heading under Merits of 
the Argument points to another statutory section: “Progressive’s policy language is 
consistent with the Delaware PIP statute, specifically 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)d.”70   
As described above, automobile insurance carriers writing insurance for 
vehicles in Delaware must provide coverage for named insureds or members of the 
household’s pedestrians injured by non-Delaware insured vehicles.  By itself, 
subparagraph (d) requires insurance companies to cover pedestrian accidents that 
occur in any state of the United States, its territories or possessions or Canada.  
Although subparagraph (e) creates a geographic limitation to coverage within the 
state, an exception referring to subparagraph (d) applies.71  A comprehensive 
examination of the statute—one which considers the sequence of the 
subparagraphs—reveals that subparagraph (d) mandates coverage for pedestrians 
who are named insureds or members of the household.   
Because the General Assembly specifically intends subparagraph (d) to 
provide the mandate for insured pedestrian PIP coverage, the next question is 
whether the Progressive insurance policy conforms to the statute.  Maridebbie 
Mohr’s policy for no fault personal injury protection provides that Progressive will 
                                                 
69 App. to Opening Br. 13. 
70 Id. at 10. 
71 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)(e) (emphasis added). 
32 
 
“pay for reasonable and necessary covered expenses: (1) incurred as a result of 
bodily injury sustained by an insured person in an accident; and (2) incurred within 
two (2) years of the date of the accident.”72  This broad coverage is limited by the 
definition of an insured person. 
The Progressive policy defines an insured person as a named insured or 
member of the household who is injured “(i) as a pedestrian in an accident with 
any land motor vehicle other than a motor vehicle insured under Delaware law; or 
(ii) while occupying any registered motor vehicle other than a Delaware registered 
insured motor vehicle.”73  Progressive’s insurance policy explicitly tracks the 
language of subparagraph (d). Therefore, Maridebbie Mohr’s Progressive policy 
conforms exactly to the statute and cannot be “reformed” in any principled way. 
B. 
This Court cannot override the General Assembly’s intentional,   
rational, and unambiguous decision to distinguish between 
Delaware and non-Delaware insured motor vehicles. 
The General Assembly intentionally, rationally, and unambiguously created a 
distinction between Delaware insured and non-Delaware insured vehicles.  The 
canon of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius supports this 
interpretation of subparagraph (d).74  “[W]here a form of conduct, the manner of its 
                                                 
72 App. to Opening Br. A-30 (emphasis added). 
73 Id. 
74 Leatherbury v. Greenspun, 939 A.2d 1284, 1291 (Del. 2007). 
33 
 
performance and operation, and the persons and things to which it refers are 
designated, there is an inference that all omissions should be understood as 
exclusions.”75  Because the General Assembly has mandated coverage when a non-
Delaware insured vehicle strikes a pedestrian, the only possible inference is that 
the General Assembly chose not to mandate coverage when a Delaware insured 
vehicle strikes a pedestrian. 
The trial judge maintained that the distinction between Delaware insured and 
non-Delaware insured vehicles is “illogical.”76  I disagree.  First, a rational basis 
for the distinction exists. The General Assembly mandated that Delaware insured 
vehicles must carry personal injury protection coverage from which an injured 
                                                 
75 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 47:23 (7th ed. 2011). 
76 The Majority claims that the Superior Court adopted Mohr’s interpretation of the statute.  Op. 
at 8 (“the statute is also reasonably susceptible to the opposite interpretation advocated by Mohr 
and adopted by the Superior Court.”).  The trial judge cites the statute once in the discussion 
section: “Neither 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)(d) nor 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(e) contains a prohibition 
against stacking or differential offsets.”  Mohr v. Progressive Northern Ins., 2010 WL 4061979, 
at *3 (Del. Super. Sept. 27, 2010).  No reasonable person could read this sentence as holding that 
the statute mandates coverage of any sort which Mohr argued and the Majority accepts.  
Furthermore, the next paragraph of the opinion below discusses the “illogical” crapshoot of a 
plaintiff being struck by a Delaware insured versus non-Delaware insured vehicle, which is a 
concept articulated in subparagraph (d).  The fact that the trial judge declined to discuss any 
affirmative interpretation of subparagraph (e) provides further support that subparagraph (d) 
contains the sole and exclusive mandate of PIP coverage for named insureds and members of the 
household who are injured pedestrians.  Finally, despite engaging in a limited statutory analysis, 
the trial judge simply disagreed with the General Assembly’s policy determination of 
differentiating between Delaware insured and non-Delaware insured vehicles.  The trial judge’s 
social policy view regarding the differentiation between Delaware and non-Delaware vehicles 
drove his conclusion that the General Assembly did not intend an illogical crapshoot rather than 
the Majority’s more elegant statutory analysis. 
 
 
34 
 
pedestrian can recover, but the General Assembly cannot mandate that non-
Delaware insured vehicles carry the same insurance.  To fill this gap, the General 
Assembly required coverage from the injured pedestrian’s own insurance policy to 
cover accidents with non-Delaware vehicles.   
In fact, a distinction between in state and out of state resident drivers is 
commonly created in this type of insurance.  According to Couch on Insurance, 
“the different interest that the state has in its own citizens’ compensation for 
injuries incurred on its own roads is generally accepted as sufficient to justify 
treating nonresidents differently.”77  Similarly, Delaware has an interest in 
mandating no fault PIP coverage when a non-Delaware insured vehicle strikes a 
pedestrian because it ensures that the pedestrian has some form of PIP coverage 
regardless of whether the non-Delaware insured vehicle has similar insurance 
coverage.  This mandate sensibly guarantees at least minimum no fault coverage 
comparable to that required for Delaware insured vehicles. 
Second, the General Assembly, and not this Court, is privy to legislative fact 
finding and information not in the record, including answers to the following 
questions: (1) how much more would it cost consumers were Delaware to mandate 
widening the scope of coverage to Delaware insured vehicles; (2) how many 
                                                 
77 Steven Plitt et al., Couch on Insurance § 125:12, at 125-131 (3d ed. 2008); see also Lee R. 
Russ & Thomas F. Segalia, Couch on Insurance § 169:94, at 169-173 (3d ed. 2008) (“Given that 
no-fault reigns in a minority of jurisdictions, these jurisdictions are understandably anxious to 
protect their residents against out-of-state vehicles.”). 
35 
 
insurance carriers would decide not to offer policies in Delaware if PIP stacking 
were mandated; (3) what actuarial statistics exist to determine whether carriers 
could afford to assume the risk of enlarging PIP coverage to gap fill in a no fault 
regime for underinsured PIP vehicles; (4) will some auto insurance carriers provide 
the coverage even if it is not mandated and, if so, at what costs; and (5) what is the 
actuarial risk of paying no fault based claims relative to fault based claims and the 
cost to consumers of an imbalance in pricing the alternatives?  When the General 
Assembly mandates coverage in no fault personal injury protection (a highly 
specific, limited range of damages), they know that there is a risk to legislating 
increased costs to insurance carriers and consumers.  The Majority has proceeded 
to effectively mandate increased coverage for personal injury protection without 
any information in the record to assess the unintended consequences. 
This brings me to a related but distinct third point.  Couch on Insurance 
describes no fault coverage as contractual in nature.78  The parties to this insurance 
contract knew or had the ability to know the exact scope of insurance at the time of 
purchase.  “The right to reject no-fault is also generally permitted with respect to 
all motorists under the type of plan known as an ‘Add-on’ or ‘Delaware’ plan.”79 
In this case, Maridebbie Mohr rejected no fault personal injury protection coverage 
                                                 
78 Id. at § 125:3, 125-11. 
79 Id.  
36 
 
for members of her household struck by Delaware vehicles when she agreed to 
purchase a Progressive policy with language conforming to the General 
Assembly’s statutory regime. 
In the Answering Brief, Mohr even concedes that the language of the policy 
unambiguously prevents him from recovering benefits.80  Progressive, in making 
its business decision to provide the coverage identical to the statutory mandate at a 
certain price, could not have anticipated that it would have to cover damages 
resulting from Delaware minimum PIP insured vehicles striking insured 
pedestrians.  Unless Maridebbie Mohr was supremely prescient, she could not have 
predicted that a Superior Court judge would require Progressive to provide the 
insurance, presumably under the guise of “reforming the policy.”  Neither of the 
parties to the contract could have expected the Majority’s preferred outcome when 
the parties exchanged consideration and signed the contract.81 
By requiring Mohr’s personal injury protection insurance to stack on top of 
Brittingham’s insurance, the Majority has altered the General Assembly’s no fault 
based personal injury protection and fault based underinsured motorist coverage.  
                                                 
80 Answering Br. at 8. 
81  The Majority makes much of the fact that Maridebbie Mohr paid a premium for her higher 
than the minimum PIP coverage.  We can intuit that she did.  However, no one can intuit that she 
did or would have paid a premium high enough to purchase the expanded coverage mandated by 
the Majority today.  The Majority’s expansion of coverage includes a risk never contemplated by 
Progressive’s policy or priced accordingly.  Maridebbie’s insured “pedestrian” receives a 
windfall as a result. 
 
37 
 
The Majority’s holding would import a new form of underinsured motorist 
coverage for personal injury protection that the General Assembly never intended 
and the contracting parties never expected.  Even the most imaginative General 
Assembly could not have contemplated this result when it drafted the unambiguous 
statutory language.  Stated in another way, the General Assembly is aware of how 
it has structured fault based bodily injury coverage and underinsured motorist 
coverage.  If the General Assembly intended the Majority’s result, it would have 
explicitly made it clear by removing the language limiting the scope of the 
mandated PIP coverage to non-Delaware insured vehicles.  Therefore, the Majority 
errs by eviscerating the General Assembly’s carefully crafted decision to 
distinguish between Delaware and non-Delaware insured vehicles and to recognize 
the distinction between no fault and fault based coverage. 
C. 
Broad public policy statements in a statute’s preamble do not 
govern the specific and explicit text of an unambiguous statutory 
provision. 
Public policy considerations only empower courts to construct gap fillers 
when the statute is ambiguous, and unambiguous statutory text trumps the statute’s 
purpose or broad public policy preamble.  Subparagraph (d) does not have an 
ambiguous gap; it has a mandatory designation and an intentional omission.  
Because the statute is rational and unambiguous, the public policy goals cited by 
the Majority do not inform a credible interpretation of the statute.  Moving from 
38 
 
the statute to the policy, Progressive patterned its policy language on the text of the 
statute—text that specifically did not require it to extend coverage to Delaware 
insured vehicles that injure insured pedestrians.  Because the Progressive policy 
conforms to subparagraph (d), there is no credible argument that the insurance 
policy violates the purpose of the statute. 
Assuming, arguendo, that an ambiguity exists in the statute, I contend that 
the twin public policy concerns of full compensation and encouraging more than 
minimum insurance do not control this case.  The Majority cites Bass v. Horizon 
Assurance Co.,82 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wagamon,83 and Nationwide 
General Ins. Co. v. Seeman84 for the proposition that the fundamental purpose of 
the statute is to fully compensate victims of car accidents.  Those cases, however, 
are all distinguishable for the same reasons; they involved insurance policies that 
created exclusions which were clearly in conflict with the statute.   
In Bass, the insurance carrier denied the claim because the policy had an 
exclusion which completely denied coverage when the insured was convicted of 
driving under the influence of alcohol.  We held that the insurance policy exclusion 
                                                 
82 Bass v. Horizon Assurance Co., 562 A.2d 1194 (Del. 1989). 
83 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wagamon, 541 A.2d 557 (Del. 1988). 
84 Nationwide General Ins. Co. v. Seeman, 702 A.2d 915 (Del. 1997). 
39 
 
“violated the language and legislative intent of the Delaware No-Fault statute.”85  
Bass reasoned that the “DUI exclusion in Horizon’s insurance policy conflicts with 
the basic statutory requirement of providing minimum legal coverage for claims by 
victims of an automobile accident.”86  In this case, however, the statute explicitly 
eschews mandating minimum PIP coverage for insured pedestrians injured by 
Delaware insured vehicles.  Thus, Progressive’s policy and its decision to deny 
coverage to an insured injured by a Delaware insured vehicle reflects specific 
statutory language narrowing the scope of coverage mandated.  The statutory 
language states the required ambit of coverage and the Progressive policy 
conforms to that language—neither “excludes” coverage. 
I take a moment to discuss the crucial difference between scope of coverage 
and an exclusion.  The Majority opinion quoted Harris v. Prudential Property & 
Cas. Ins. Co. for the proposition that “[i]n the absence of express legislative 
authority, no policy exclusions affecting statutory minimum coverage will be 
recognized.”87  By relying on Harris, the Majority analyzes a policy exclusion as if 
that term of art applies to scope of coverage.  According to Couch on Insurance, a 
policy exclusion occurs “[w]hen a type of insurance intended to cover a particular 
                                                 
85 Bass, 562 A.2d at 1196. 
86 Id. at 1197. 
87 Op. at 14 (citing Harris v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 632 A.2d 1380, 1382-83 (Del. 
1993)). 
40 
 
risk excludes a portion of that risk.”88  For example, an insurance policy for fire 
damage to a house could have a policy exclusion for arson committed by the 
named insured.  In this case, however, the General Assembly never required 
Progressive to provide coverage to insured pedestrians struck by Delaware insured 
vehicles in the first place.   The mandate expressly and clearly limited the scope of 
coverage.  Excluding a particular person otherwise covered, except under 
circumstances that would divest him of coverage, is fundamentally different from 
declining to write coverage the statute does not mandate.  Therefore, the Harris 
rule barring policy exclusions, except when expressly permitted by legislative 
authority, has no bearing here. 
In Wagamon, Lydia Wagamon and her mother were injured in a car 
accident, and the mother sued her daughter for her personal injuries.  State Farm 
denied coverage because the policy contained a household exclusion that precluded 
any claim for bodily injury brought by a member of an insured’s family residing 
with the insured.  Again, we held that “[t]he State Farm policy conflicts with the 
statutory scheme of sections 2118 and 2902.”89  Because I believe that the 
Progressive policy in this case is consistent with subparagraph (d), there can be no 
                                                 
88 Lee R. Russ et al., Couch on Insurance § 1:26 (3d ed. 2011) (“The various types of insurance 
are related in practical terms. When a type of insurance intended to cover a particular risk 
excludes a portion of that risk under a specific policy exclusion, for example, an additional rider 
or another policy might have to be purchased to cover that narrow, additional risk.”). 
89 Wagamon, 541 A.2d at 560. 
41 
 
plausible argument that the policy violates the purpose of the statute.  Furthermore, 
the distinction between bodily injury and personal injury protection is meaningful.  
Bodily injury insurance is based on fault; if this type of insurance is limited or 
excluded, then the third party has lost the primary source of recovery from the 
party at fault.  Personal injury protection, however, is a form of no fault insurance 
which is not the primary form of recovery for a plaintiff.  Therefore, choosing not 
to mandate no fault personal injury protection in this limited situation does not 
foreclose the primary source of compensation for the pedestrian—fault based 
bodily injury and underinsured motorist coverage.  
In Seeman, a father and his son were injured in a car accident.  The son sued 
his father for damages.  Nationwide denied the claim because the policy had a 
modified household exclusion which limited liability coverage for household 
members to the statutory minimum.  We held that the insurance policy “violated 
the statutory purpose of encouraging the Delaware driving public to purchase more 
than the statutory minimum amount of automobile insurance coverage.”90  As with 
the two previous cases, the type of insurance at issue was bodily injury.  When 
fault based insurance is the only type of insurance available, there is serious 
concern that taking away that coverage leaves the plaintiff with no alternative, but 
that concern is not present in this case because bodily injury and underinsured 
                                                 
90 Seeman, 701 A.2d at 918. 
42 
 
motorist coverages are fault based additions to no fault personal injury protection 
coverage.  Furthermore, Progressive’s insurance policy can be distinguished for the 
same reasons cited above—notably, that it does not contain an exclusion and it 
conforms to the statute.  Thus, in my view, it is not necessary to explore the nether 
regions of public policy. 
To the extent Wagamon, Bass, and Seeman can be read to find that Section 
2118 is illogical, the General Assembly is presumed to be aware of common law 
precedent’s effect on its statutes.  Makin v. Mack held that “it is an accepted 
principle of statutory construction that a legislature is presumed to know the 
common law before a statute is enacted.”91  Wagamon, Bass, and Seeman were 
decided in 1988, 1989, and 1997.  Section 2118 has been amended 18 times 
between 1990 and 2010.92  If the General Assembly believed the distinction 
between Delaware and non-Delaware insured motor vehicles to be illogical, it 
would have eliminated “other than a Delaware insured motor vehicle” in 
subparagraph (d), but it did not.  Therefore, one can infer that the General 
Assembly finds that the distinction between Delaware and non-Delaware insured 
                                                 
91 Makin v. Mack, 336 A.2d 230 (Del. Ch. 1975). 
92 67 Del. Laws ch. 177, §§ 1, 2 (1990); 68 Del. Laws ch. 331, §§ 1-4 (1992); 68 Del. Laws ch. 
336, § 1 (1992); 69 Del. Laws ch. 116, § 3 (1993); 69 Del. Laws ch. 155, §§ 1, 2 (1993); 69 Del. 
Laws ch. 197, § 1 (1994); 69 Del. Laws ch. 413, § 1 (1994); 70 Del. Laws ch. 186, § 1 (1995); 
70 Del. Laws ch. 247, §§ 1 to 3 (1995); 72 Del. Laws ch. 20, § 1 (1999); 72 Del. Laws ch. 58, §§ 
1, 2 (1999); 72 Del. Laws ch. 219, § 1 (1999); 72 Del. Laws ch. 380, §§ 1, 2 (2000); 74 Del. 
Laws ch. 110, § 139 (2003); 74 Del. Laws ch. 400, § 1 (2004); 75 Del. Laws ch. 59, § 1 (2005); 
76 Del. Laws ch. 128, § 1 (2007); 77 Del. Laws ch. 419, § 1 (2010). 
43 
 
motor vehicles and the distinction between fault and no fault based coverage to be 
logical and consistent with the public policy and purpose of the statute. 
III. 
Conclusion 
The General Assembly has spun an intricate web of insurance coverage that 
considers actuarial costs, availability of insurance, and consumer access to 
coverage at affordable rates.   The interrelationship between fault and no fault 
coverage creates a situation where Mohr has recourse beyond Brittingham’s PIP 
pedestrian coverage; even though the statute prevents Mohr from stacking no fault 
personal injury protection benefits, he nevertheless can exercise his right to sue the 
tortfeasor who wronged him and access either her bodily injury coverage, or, if that 
coverage is inadequate, his mother’s underinsurance coverage.  This Court should 
not frustrate the General Assembly’s carefully constructed interrelationship 
between mandated no fault and fault based coverage by reforming the policy or 
expanding the statutory mandates in order to help Mohr avoid this difficulty. 
Although the Majority opinion’s unflagging pursuit of full compensation to 
all persons injured in automobile accidents may be laudable—albeit not based on 
any facts relating to availability of or cost of insurance in the state—I do not accept 
the Majority’s underlying premise that the statute can be read to imply that the 
General Assembly intended automobile insurance policies to provide no fault 
personal injury protection coverage to insured pedestrians under their own policies 
44 
 
where Delaware insured vehicles injure those insured pedestrians.  Because the 
Majority chooses to recraft what I believe to be an unambiguous statutory 
provision with a result that extends insurance coverage in a way the General 
Assembly, Progressive, and Mohr never intended or expected, I respectfully 
dissent.