Title: State v. T.D.R
Citation: 347 N.C. 489
Docket Number: 172PA97
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: February 6, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 172PA97
FILED: 6 FEBRUARY 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
T.D.R.
On appeal of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(1) of
an unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, vacating an order
entered on 7 February 1997 by LaBarre, J., in Superior Court,
Durham County.  On 8 May 1997, the Supreme Court allowed
discretionary review of additional issues.  Heard in the Supreme
Court 14 October 1997.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Gail E. Weis,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Kevin P. Bradley for defendant-appellant.
American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal
Foundation, by Sandy S. Ma and Deborah K. Ross,
Children’s Law Center, by Phillip H. Redmond, Jr.,
amici curiae.
MITCHELL, Chief Justice.
By juvenile petitions filed 22 August 1996, defendant,
then fifteen years old, was alleged to be delinquent by reason of
his having committed first-degree rape and first-degree burglary. 
A hearing was held pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-608 and -609 in
District Court, Durham County, on 3 December 1996 before the
Honorable Carolyn D. Johnson, District Court Judge.  Defendant
waived his right to present evidence and stipulated that probable
cause did exist.  Defendant then requested a two-week continuance
-2-
in order that independent psychological evaluations could be
performed and offered as evidence concerning the issue of whether
his case should be transferred to Superior Court for his trial as
an adult.  The District Court denied the continuance and then
proceeded to take evidence on the question of transfer.  At the
conclusion of the hearing, the District Court entered an order
finding probable cause as to both rape and burglary and
transferring jurisdiction over defendant to Superior Court for
defendant’s trial as an adult.
On 16 December 1996, defendant was indicted by the
grand jury of Durham County for first-degree rape and first-
degree burglary.  Subsequently, on 21 January 1997, defendant was
indicted for first-degree kidnapping.
On 15 January 1997, defendant filed a motion in
Superior Court, Durham County, to dismiss the indictments against
him and to remand jurisdiction of his case to the Juvenile
District Court.  On 24 January 1997, a hearing on defendant’s
motion to dismiss was held in the Superior Court, Durham County,
before the Honorable David Q. LaBarre.  On 29 January 1997,
defendant filed an amended motion to dismiss.  On 7 February
1997, the Superior Court entered an order making findings and
concluding inter alia that “[t]he District Court . . . [had]
denied the Juvenile-Defendant Due Process of law and fundamental
fairness by its refusal to hear or consider the juvenile’s
evidence with regard to the appropriateness of retaining
jurisdiction in the District Court Division.”  The order went on
to vacate and dismiss the indictments against defendant and to
-3-
remand jurisdiction to the District Court for a new hearing as to
whether the District Court should retain jurisdiction or transfer
jurisdiction over the juvenile to the Superior Court.
On 10 February 1997, the State filed a petition in the
Superior Court, Durham County, for a temporary stay of its
7 February 1997 order.  On 13 February 1997, the State filed a
notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals.  On 19 February 1997,
the State filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for writ of
supersedeas and motion for temporary stay.  A temporary stay was
entered by the Court of Appeals on 27 February 1997.  On
28 February 1997, the Superior Court entered an order concluding
that it lacked jurisdiction because of the filing of the notice
of appeal with the Court of Appeals and denying the State’s
motion for reconsideration.
On 10 March 1997, the State filed a petition for writ
of certiorari with the Court of Appeals.  On 26 March 1997, the
Court of Appeals entered an order as follows:
Because orders of the district court
transferring the jurisdiction over a juvenile
to superior court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
7A-608 (1995) are subject to review only by
[the Court of Appeals] after entry of a final
judgment by the superior court, the superior
court is without authority to review transfer
orders.  The order entered 7 February 1997 by
Judge David Q. LaBarre, reviewing the
district court’s order transferring
jurisdiction over the juvenile to the
superior court, is hereby vacated.  The
matter is remanded to Superior Court, Durham
County, for reinstatement of the indictments
dismissed in that order and for further
proceedings.
(Citation omitted.)
-4-
Defendant filed a notice of appeal of right with this
Court asserting that this case directly involves a substantial
constitutional question.  His petition for discretionary review
as to additional issues was allowed by this Court on 8 May 1997.
Defendant contends on this appeal that the Superior
Court had authority under N.C.G.S. § 15A-954 to review the
indictments against him and to dismiss them if it found that
defendant’s constitutional rights had been “flagrantly violated
and there is such irreparable prejudice to the defendant’s
preparation of his case that there is no remedy but to dismiss
the prosecution.”  Before we can address this argument directly,
however, it is necessary that we first address the order of the
Court of Appeals which is before us.
Defendant expressly based his motion in the Superior
Court to dismiss the criminal charges against him upon the
authority of N.C.G.S. § 15A-954, and the Superior Court entered
its order dismissing the indictments on the authority of this
statute.  Nevertheless, the order of the Court of Appeals
vacating the order of the Superior Court did not address the
issue of the Superior Court’s authority to review indictments. 
Instead, the Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether
the Superior Court had authority to directly review District
Court orders transferring jurisdiction over juveniles pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 7A-608.  The Court of Appeals held that such orders
are subject to review only by the Court of Appeals and only after
entry of a final judgment by the Superior Court on the criminal
charges against the defendant who is to be tried as an adult. 
-5-
This issue was not before the Court of Appeals and is before this
Court only by virtue of the appeal from the order of the Court of
Appeals addressing the issue.  Nevertheless, we must first
address this issue before reaching the issues addressed by the
parties.
Although the Court of Appeals followed its own
precedents, it erred in holding that it is only after the entry
of a final judgment by the Superior Court in a criminal case
against a juvenile that the juvenile may appeal the earlier order
of the District Court transferring jurisdiction.  We conclude
that N.C.G.S. § 7A-666 authorizes an immediate direct appeal to
the Court of Appeals of a juvenile transfer order.  The statute
expressly provides:
Upon motion of a proper party as defined
in G.S. 7A-667, review of any final order of
the court in a juvenile matter under this
Article shall be before the Court of
Appeals. . . .  A final order shall include:
. . . .
(2)
Any order which in effect
determines the action and prevents
a judgment from which appeal might
be taken[.]
N.C.G.S. § 7A-666(2) (1995).  Because the juvenile transfer order
terminates the jurisdiction of the District Court by transferring
jurisdiction to the Superior Court, a juvenile transfer order
entered by the District Court is a final order within the meaning
of the statute.  The transfer order in effect “determines” the
District Court juvenile proceeding and prevents any further
judgment of the District Court from which appeal might be taken. 
-6-
Although upon entry of a transfer order the Superior Court
obtains jurisdiction over the case for trial and related matters,
it does not have authority to conduct an appellate review of the
District Court transfer order.  Proper appellate jurisdiction
lies with the Court of Appeals--not with the Superior Court--for
direct appellate review of District Court orders transferring
jurisdiction over juveniles to the Superior Court.
That part of the order of the Court of Appeals
concluding that appellate jurisdiction to directly review
juvenile transfers lies only with the Court of Appeals was
correct.  However, we find no authority for the Court of Appeals’
conclusion in its order that juvenile transfer petitions entered
by the District Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-608 are subject
to appellate review by the Court of Appeals only “after entry of
a final judgment by the superior court.”  As we have concluded
that juvenile transfer orders entered by the District Court are
“final” orders of the court in the juvenile matter within the
meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7A-666(2), we further conclude that such
orders are immediately appealable to the Court of Appeals.  To
the extent that it may be read as holding to the contrary, In re
Green, 118 N.C. App. 336, 453 S.E.2d 191 (1995), is overruled. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion in the
present case that the juvenile transfer order was not immediately
appealable to the Court of Appeals.
We next turn to the issue raised on appeal by
defendant, which was before the Court of Appeals but was not
addressed in its order in the present case.  The juvenile
-7-
defendant argues that the Superior Court had the authority under
N.C.G.S. § 15A-954 to review and dismiss the criminal indictments
against him and to remand his case to the District Court for a
new hearing on the issue of whether jurisdiction over his case
should be transferred to the Superior Court.  Although we have
concluded that the Superior Court did not have appellate
jurisdiction to directly review the District Court’s transfer
order, we nevertheless conclude that the Superior Court had
authority, on motion of defendant, to review the indictments
against defendant and to dismiss those charging instruments if
defendant’s rights were “flagrantly violated and there is such
irreparable prejudice to the defendant’s preparation of his case
that there is no remedy but to dismiss the prosecution.” 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-954(a)(4) (1997).  To the extent the Court of
Appeals’ order in the present case may be read to imply that the
Superior Court may not review criminal pleadings filed against a
juvenile in Superior Court, that order is in error.  Criminal
pleadings against a juvenile in such situations are neither more
nor less subject to review by the Superior Court than criminal
pleadings against an adult.
By another argument, defendant contends that the
Superior Court’s order vacating the indictments against him and
remanding his case to District Court was correct.  He contends
that this is so because the District Court violated his rights to
due process of law and to the law of the land by transferring
jurisdiction over him to the Superior Court without granting him
an opportunity to present evidence.  The Court of Appeals appears
-8-
to have vacated the order of the Superior Court on the mistaken
assumption that the Superior Court had conducted direct appellate
review of the District Court’s transfer order.  Instead, we
conclude that the Superior Court conducted an appropriate review
of the proceedings in District Court that ultimately resulted in
the indictments against defendant, which review was authorized by
N.C.G.S. § 15A-954.  The Court of Appeals did not address the
issue raised by defendant in this argument.  Accordingly, it
would be proper for this Court to remand this case to the Court
of Appeals for it to consider and decide whether the Superior
Court erred in its exercise of the jurisdiction granted it under
N.C.G.S. § 15A-954.  Nevertheless, in the interest of judicial
economy, we now address that issue which was properly before the
Court of Appeals and is properly before this Court.
The procedure for finding probable cause and
transferring a juvenile to Superior Court for trial as an adult
is governed by three provisions of the Juvenile Code.  N.C.G.S.
§§ 7A-608 to -610 (1995).  The authority of the District Court to
transfer jurisdiction over a juvenile to Superior Court for trial
as in the case of an adult is provided by N.C.G.S. § 7A-608 as
follows:
The court after notice, hearing, and a
finding of probable cause may transfer
jurisdiction over a juvenile to superior
court if the juvenile was 13 years of age or
older at the time the juvenile allegedly
committed an offense that would be a felony
if committed by an adult.  If the alleged
felony constitutes a Class A felony and the
court finds probable cause, the court shall
transfer the case to the superior court for
trial as in the case of adults.
-9-
Further, N.C.G.S. § 7A-609 provides that the District Court
“shall conduct a hearing to determine probable cause in all
felony cases in which a juvenile was 13 years of age or older
when the offense was allegedly committed.”  N.C.G.S. § 7A-609(a). 
However, “[c]ounsel for the juvenile may waive in writing the
right to the hearing and stipulate to a finding of probable
cause.”  Id.  At the probable cause hearing, the juvenile must be
represented by counsel in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 7A-584 and
may testify as a witness in his own behalf, call and examine
other witnesses, and produce other evidence in his behalf. 
N.C.G.S. § 7A-609(b).
Although the State argues that the rights accorded a
juvenile by N.C.G.S. § 7A-609 apply only to the District Court’s
determination of probable cause, we conclude that the legislature
intended that such rights also be accorded the juvenile with
regard to the District Court’s consideration and decision as to
whether to transfer jurisdiction over the juvenile to Superior
Court for trial as an adult.  N.C.G.S. § 7A-610 appears clearly
to contemplate that the decision as to whether to transfer
jurisdiction ordinarily will be made as a part of the same
hearing at which probable cause is determined.  Under N.C.G.S. §
7A-608, if the alleged felony constitutes a Class A felony and
the District Court finds probable cause, the District Court is
required to transfer the case to Superior Court for trial and
would do so automatically as part of the order finding probable
cause.  Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-610, if probable cause is found and a
transfer of jurisdiction to Superior Court is not required by
-10-
reason of the alleged crime being a Class A felony, the
prosecutor or the juvenile may immediately move that the case be
transferred to Superior Court for trial as in the case of an
adult.  N.C.G.S. § 7A-610(a).  The District Court may then
immediately proceed to determine whether the needs of the
juvenile or the best interest of the State will be served by
transfer of the case to Superior Court.  Id.  We simply do not
believe that the legislature intended that the rights accorded
the juvenile by N.C.G.S. § 7A-609 would apply only with regard to
the District Court’s determination of probable cause and not to
its decision to transfer the case, since the District Court is
authorized to make both those determinations in a single hearing
and, in the great run of cases, does so.
Additionally, to hold that a juvenile did not have the
right to a hearing and to produce evidence in his own behalf on
the issue of transfer of jurisdiction to the Superior Court for
his trial as an adult would unnecessarily raise substantial
questions as to the constitutionality of our procedures for
conducting the transfer hearing contemplated by the statutes
under consideration here.  See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,
528-29, 44 L. Ed. 2d 346, 355 (1975) (noting that the Supreme
Court’s response to the gap between the originally benign
conception of the juvenile court system and its realities “has
been to make applicable in juvenile proceedings constitutional
guarantees associated with traditional criminal prosecutions”);
see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970); In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967).  Where one of two
-11-
reasonable constructions of a statute will raise a serious
constitutional question, it is well settled that our courts
should adopt the construction that avoids the constitutional
question.  In re Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 642, 231 S.E.2d 614, 616
(1977); In re Appeal of Arcadia Dairy Farms, Inc., 289 N.C. 456,
465-66, 223 S.E.2d 323, 328-29 (1976); cf. Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 557, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84, 95 (1966) (statutory
construction “in the context of constitutional principles
relating to due process and the assistance of counsel”). 
Accordingly, we conclude that when read in pari materia, N.C.G.S.
§§ 7A-608, -609, and -610 were intended by our legislature to
provide a juvenile the right to a hearing on the issue of whether
his case should be transferred to the Superior Court for his
trial as in the case of an adult and the rights, among others, to
be represented by counsel in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 7A-584,
to testify as a witness in his own behalf, to call and examine
witnesses, and to produce other evidence in his own behalf.
We next turn to the application of the foregoing
principles to the facts presented by the record in this case.  In
the present case, the juvenile petitions were filed against the
juvenile defendant, T.D.R., on 22 August 1996.  Thereafter,
continuances resulting from no fault on the part of the juvenile
or the State prevented the holding of the probable cause hearing
required by N.C.G.S. § 7A-609 until 3 December 1996--more than
three months after the juvenile petitions had been filed.  At the
hearing, counsel for the juvenile waived the right to a hearing
on the issue of probable cause and stipulated to a finding of
-12-
probable cause.  Counsel for defendant then requested a
continuance of the hearing until 17 December 1996 in order to
obtain forensic psychological evaluations of defendant and to
gather evidence concerning treatment alternatives if the District
Court retained jurisdiction over the juvenile.  The State
objected to the motion for continuance, and the District Court
proceeded to take evidence on the issue of transfer.  The
district attorney put on evidence concerning the manner in which
the victim alleged that the juvenile defendant had forcibly
broken into her home, armed with a knife.  The district attorney
also presented evidence that defendant forced the victim to enter
the bedroom of the home at knifepoint and take off her clothes
and that defendant attempted to have sex with her.  The district
attorney then stated, “Your Honor, that would be all for the
foundation of evidence for the Court.”
Counsel for defendant renewed defendant’s motion for a
continuance to be allowed to gather evidence to present at a
later time as to whether the District Court should retain
jurisdiction.  The district attorney then called Carolyn
Cordasco, a coordinator of the Adolescent Sex Offender Program
for Durham County Mental Health.  She testified that she had
worked exclusively with adolescent sex offenders for three years. 
She further testified:
I’ve spent approximately twelve years with
sex offenders and I spent five years in the
prison system in Kansas, starting sex
offender programs and working there, and then
five years here in North Carolina.  And I
started the adult sex offender program and
then went to Central Prison for the last
-13-
couple of years to work with violent
offenders and rapists in a combination
program.
[DISTRICT ATTORNEY:]  Okay.  So you would say
over the last twelve years this has been your
specialty?
[MS. CORDASCO:]  Absolutely.
The district attorney then asked if Ms. Cordasco had
heard the evidence presented at the hearing concerning the
factual basis of the charges against the juvenile defendant.  She
indicated that she had.  The following colloquy then occurred
between the district attorney and the witness:
[DISTRICT ATTORNEY:]  And in the
consideration, this juvenile was fifteen
years old.  What would your opinion or could
you give one -- do you have enough
information to give an opinion regarding the
nature of this act and the feasibility of
this juvenile being treated as a juvenile or
by the nature of this act, in your opinion,
do you believe he would -- is a threat to the
community and should be transferred as an
adult and treated as an adult?  If you can
answer that.
[MS. CORDASCO:]  I listened to the facts that
the detective presented and based on my
experience, working with both adults and
juveniles and working in North Carolina’s
juvenile and adult system, it’s, you know, my
opinion that this young man committed a very
sophisticated sexual crime based on the use
of a weapon.  It was obviously planned.  I
mean, he had a bandana.  He was out there. 
He also interjected putting his arm around
her neck, which at any time, I don’t know if
he actually cut her air off, but that
certainly is very frightening because the
victim would not know would he [sic] do that. 
And then putting her in a closet -- in a dark
closet.  All these things are very, very
sophisticated for someone so young.
In the juvenile system they do not have
the capacity to treat this serious an
-14-
offense.  The adult system does. 
Unfortunately he would go into the youth
system first and he would have to wait until
he was twenty-two to get sex offender
treatment.  However, I do think the crime, in
and of itself, puts him at extremely high
risk to re-offend.  There’s usually a time
thing.  He apparently, from what I hear, has
done fairly good in the community.  But I
think he’s a very high risk for re-offending
and I don’t think the juvenile system -- not
my program, nor the one at Dillon or at
Swannanoa -- would be equipped to handle this
serious of a crime.
He also needs some time within -- away
from the community, within the system, to be
seasoned enough to even be amenable to this
kind of treatment.
Counsel for defendant then cross-examined the witness. 
During cross-examination, Ms. Cordasco testified that based on
her twelve years’ experience working with men who rape, such men
were usually given standard psychological tests to reveal
depression or psychosis, but that she did not know of any test
that would assist in predicting the possibility of such a
person’s reentry into the community or the risks he posed to the
community.
Counsel for defendant offered no evidence at the
conclusion of the evidence for the State.  The District Court
then ruled as follows:
On what I’ve already heard, I have to
consider that if T.D.R. were to remain in the
Juvenile Court jurisdiction and [be] sent to
C.A. Dillon or some other training school, I
believe that at age eighteen he would be
released, whether he had improved or he had
not improved, whether he had been treated or
not.
And with the -- just with the evidence
that I have now, I feel that we have been
-15-
about as thorough and lenient as we can be on
him.  I’m going to have him transferred to
Superior Court.
The District Court denied the motion and entered an
order finding probable cause and transferring jurisdiction over
the juvenile defendant to the Superior Court and giving the
reasons for the transfer.  In its order, the District Court
stated that the needs of the juvenile, or the best interests of
the State, or both, would be served by transfer of the case to
Superior Court.  The order also stated as reasons for the
transfer that
[t]he attorney for the juvenile waived
probable cause after having received
laboratory results which the juvenile’s
attorney had processed.  The Court finds that
juvenile services would not be adequate to
rehabilitate the juvenile and/or protect the
community.  The fact that this juvenile would
automatically be released from Division of
Youth Services at age 18 weighs heavily on
the Court & would be inappropriate in this
case to retain at the juvenile level.
Thereafter, the grand jury of Durham County indicted
defendant for the crimes charged.  The juvenile defendant then
moved under N.C.G.S. § 15A-954(a) that the Superior Court dismiss
the indictments and remand the case against him to the District
Court “for a full and meaningful transfer hearing.”  After
reviewing the transcript of the hearing before the District Court
and other documents in the District and Superior Court files, the
Superior Court made findings and conclusions and ordered that the
indictments against defendant be vacated.  Defendant contends
that the Superior Court properly entered this order.  For the
following reasons, we disagree.
-16-
In one of its conclusions of law in support of its
order, the Superior Court concluded that “[t]he District Court in
this case denied the Juvenile-Defendant Due Process of law and
fundamental fairness by its refusal to hear or consider the
juvenile’s evidence with regard to the appropriateness of
retaining jurisdiction in the District Court Division.”  This
conclusion by the Superior Court does not find support either in
the Superior Court’s findings of fact or in the transcript of the
hearing held by the District Court on the issue of transfer.  The
only finding by the Superior Court related to this issue was that
the juvenile defendant had been denied the opportunity to present
evidence contradicting the expert testimony of the State’s
witness, Ms. Cordasco.  Specifically, the Superior Court found
that “[c]ounsel was denied an opportunity to do so by [the denial
of] a two-week continuance.”  This finding was in response to the
only argument made by defendant before the Superior Court and
before this Court as to why his constitutional rights were
violated.
Defendant did not contend before the Superior Court,
and does not argue before this Court, that the District Court
refused to hear or consider any evidence he sought to introduce. 
The transcript of the District Court hearing does not reflect
that defendant was ever prevented from introducing evidence. 
Instead, the transcript reveals that at each point at which
defendant could have offered any evidence he had on the issue of
transfer, defendant, through counsel, renewed his motion for a
continuance to gather such evidence.  The argument defendant made
-17-
before the Superior Court and here is that the District Court’s
order violated his constitutional rights by denying his motion
for a continuance of the hearing to gather evidence.
Whether to allow or deny a motion to continue any legal
proceeding is a matter ordinarily addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and its ruling is not reversible
on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.  State v. Jones, 342
N.C. 523, 530, 467 S.E.2d 12, 17 (1996).  We recognize that
numerous decisions of the appellate courts of this state have
indicated that, in such situations, the appealing party must
demonstrate a “gross abuse” or “manifest abuse” of discretion. 
We further recognize that our use of such phrases has created
some confusion as to whether there is more than one standard for,
or type of, abuse of discretion; there is not.  Our use of
phrases such as “gross abuse” and “manifest abuse” of discretion
originated in earlier cases, before the term “abuse of
discretion” had been given any definitive meaning.  E.g., State
v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497, 50 S.E.2d 520 (1948); State v. Farrell,
223 N.C. 321, 26 S.E.2d 322 (1943).  More recently, however, we
have given a more complete and definite meaning to the legal term
“abuse of discretion” by holding that an abuse of discretion is
established only upon a showing that a court’s actions “are
manifestly unsupported by reason.”  White v. White, 312 N.C. 770,
777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985).  Further, we have emphasized
that any “ruling committed to a trial court’s discretion is to be
accorded great deference and will be upset only upon a showing
that it was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result
-18-
of a reasoned decision.”  Id.  Any such abuse of discretion is
a fortiori “gross” or “manifest” as those terms have been used in
prior cases of the appellate courts of this state.  There is but
one type of abuse of discretion.
For clarity, we reemphasize that a motion for
continuance is ordinarily addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court.  In such cases, the trial court’s ruling will
not be disturbed unless it is manifestly unsupported by reason,
which is to say it is so arbitrary that it could not have been
the result of a reasoned decision.  Id.; State v. Wooten, 344
N.C. 316, 337, 474 S.E.2d 360, 372 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___, 137 L. Ed. 2d 348 (1997); State v. Mutakbbic, 317 N.C. 264,
273, 345 S.E.2d 154, 158 (1986).  However, if the motion to
continue is based on a constitutional right, the trial court’s
ruling thereon presents a question of law that is fully
reviewable on appeal.  Jones, 342 N.C. at 530, 467 S.E.2d at 17;
State v. Smith, 310 N.C. 108, 112, 310 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1984). 
Here, defendant has argued, as he argued in the Superior Court,
that the District Court’s denial of his motion for a continuance
to gather evidence on the issue of whether jurisdiction over him
should have been transferred to the Superior Court denied him the
constitutional right of presenting evidence on his own behalf.
Defendant contends that the denial of his motion for a
continuance prevented his introducing evidence in his own behalf
because he simply did not have adequate time to gather such
evidence.  The record indicates that defendant gave no reason at
the hearing before the District Court as to why the time he had
-19-
been allowed to gather evidence and prepare for its presentation
had not been sufficient.  The record indicates that defendant was
on notice of the allegations against him from the date of the
filing of the juvenile petitions on 22 August 1996.  The holding
of a probable cause hearing was delayed in part because of the
District Court’s accommodation of defendant’s request that his
own experts be permitted to conduct DNA testing on the State’s
evidence prior to a determination of probable cause.  The State
relinquished custody of its as-yet-unanalyzed evidence for such
testing by defendant’s experts in response to a court order.  A
probable cause hearing was set for 18 November 1996.  On
4 November 1996, defendant moved for a continuance of that
hearing.  The District Court granted his motion and continued the
probable cause hearing until 3 December 1996.
Defendant made no further motion for a continuance
until after he had appeared at the 3 December 1996 hearing and
stipulated that probable cause existed.  His motion to continue
was made orally at that time.  Defendant offered no explanation
as to why the more than three months from 22 August 1996 until
3 December 1996 had not been a sufficient time for him to secure
any necessary evidence.  Further, defendant submitted no
affidavits to the District Court indicating any fact that might
be proved by any witness if the continuance were granted.
This Court has stated that “before ruling on a motion
to continue the judge should hear the evidence pro and con,
consider it judicially and then rule with a view to promoting
substantial justice.”  Shankle v. Shankle, 289 N.C. 473, 483, 223
-20-
S.E.2d 380, 386 (1976).  Here, the District Court allowed both
defendant and the State to be heard on the motion to continue
before ruling.  No evidence was offered with regard to the
motion.  In light of the fact that defendant had more than three
months to prepare and that the District Court continued the
hearing date more than once and entered orders assisting
defendant in gathering evidence when requested, we conclude that
the District Court did not abuse its discretion or commit any
constitutional error in denying defendant’s motion for a further
continuance.  See Jones, 342 N.C. at 531, 467 S.E.2d at 18
(denial of continuance not error or abuse of discretion where
defendant’s oral motion to continue to secure psychiatric
evaluation was made on the date set for trial, was not supported
by affidavit, and did not set forth detailed proof to establish
grounds for further delay); State v. McCullers, 341 N.C. 19,
32-33, 460 S.E.2d 163, 171 (1995) (same); State v. Branch, 306
N.C. 101, 105, 291 S.E.2d 653, 657 (1982) (same); State v.
Searles, 304 N.C. 149, 155, 282 S.E.2d 430, 434 (1981) (same);
State v. Cradle, 281 N.C. 198, 208, 188 S.E.2d 296, 303 (same),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047, 34 L. Ed. 2d 499 (1972).
Defendant further argues that the District Court erred
in denying a continuance because he did not have notice that the
issue of transfer of jurisdiction to Superior Court would be
considered at the probable cause hearing.  We disagree.  The
applicable statutes themselves give notice that upon a finding of
probable cause, either the juvenile or the prosecutor may make a
motion for transfer of jurisdiction to the Superior Court and
-21-
that the District Court may immediately proceed to a ruling on
such motion.  N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-608, -610(a).  Further, the
transcript of the hearing reveals that defendant had notice in
fact that the hearing on the issue of transfer of jurisdiction
would or might be held immediately upon a finding of probable
cause.  Counsel for defendant implicitly acknowledged being on
such notice when she stated during the hearing, “[W]e are waiving
probable cause at this time and we’re going to ask, Judge, that
we have a continuance of the transfer hearing until
December 17th.”  Additionally, after the District Court had
announced that it would enter an order transferring defendant to
the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, counsel for defendant
indicated actual prior notice that the issue of transfer would be
considered by stating:
Your Honor, I know you’ve made your
ruling on this and I would ask you to
reconsider for this one reason.  Ms. Cordasco
testified that one of the things they look
for when they have people coming to their
program is an MMPI and some of the same
testing that he’s going through right now. 
We don’t have -- we’ve not had an opportunity
to present any evidence to show whether or
not there is anything in the juvenile system
that could help him and we would have
recommendations from our forensic
psychologist that could tell the Court and
give the Court more of a basis in which
whether or not this thing should be
transferred to adult court.
We understand this is a serious crime
and we understand we have waived probable
cause and that’s one of the things we took a
chance on when we waived it . . . .
(Emphasis added.)  This argument by defendant is without merit.
-22-
The Superior Court also based its order vacating the
indictments against defendant and purporting to remand
jurisdiction to the District Court upon another ground.  The
Superior Court concluded as a matter of law that the District
Court order transferring jurisdiction “was not supported by
competent evidence” to the extent that it was based upon the
reason that there was “a lack of rehabilitative services for this
juvenile in the Juvenile Court Division.”  This conclusion by the
Superior Court is not supported by the transcript of the District
Court hearing or by any other document that was before the
Superior Court.  Instead, it seems that the Superior Court’s
conclusion was based on its disagreement with the testimony of
the State’s expert and with the District Court’s action based on
that evidence.  Therefore, the Superior Court erred in this
conclusion.
The State’s expert, Ms. Cordasco, testified in detail
as to her lengthy experience and qualifications.  Defendant never
objected to her testimony and never requested that the court make
any findings of fact.  Cf. State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 322
S.E.2d 370 (1984) (trial court did not err in permitting witness
to testify as an expert without making findings of fact as to her
qualifications where defendant did not specifically request that
the court make such findings).  In the absence of a request by
defendant for the trial court to make a finding concerning the
qualifications of a witness as an expert, it is not necessary
that the record show an express finding on this issue--the
finding being deemed implicit in the ruling admitting or
-23-
rejecting the opinion testimony of the witness.  State v. Perry,
275 N.C. 565, 169 S.E.2d 839 (1969).  This is particularly true
where, as here, there is ample evidence to support a finding that
the witness is an expert or where, as here, defendant does not
object to the witness’ being found to be an expert.  State v.
Mitchell, 283 N.C. 462, 196 S.E.2d 736 (1973) (evidence to
support a finding that the witness was an expert); Perry, 275
N.C. 565, 169 S.E.2d 839 (no objection to witness’ being treated
as an expert).  Where, as here, there was sufficient evidence to
support a finding that the witness was an expert, it is presumed
that the court found the witness to be an expert before admitting
the testimony, notwithstanding the absence of a specific finding
to this effect.  Olan Mills, Inc. v. Cannon Aircraft Executive
Terminal, Inc., 273 N.C. 519, 160 S.E.2d 735 (1968).  Therefore,
the Superior Court erred in its findings and conclusion to the
effect that there was no competent expert evidence before the
District Court on the issue of the availability of rehabilitative
services for defendant as a juvenile and that the order of the
District Court must be vacated for that reason.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Superior
Court vacating and dismissing the indictments against defendant
and purporting to remand jurisdiction to the District Court was
in error and must be reversed.  However, the order of the Court
of Appeals did not reverse the order of the Superior Court. 
Instead, the Court of Appeals, proceeding on the mistaken
assumption that the Superior Court acted without jurisdiction,
vacated the order of the Superior Court.  The Court of Appeals
-24-
erred in vacating the order of the Superior Court rather than
reversing that order.
As previously explained in this opinion, once the
District Court has transferred jurisdiction over a juvenile to
the Superior Court, the Superior Court has complete jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction and authority to hear and dispose of
motions to dismiss the charges stated in the criminal pleadings
against the defendant in the Superior Court.  N.C.G.S. §
15A-954(a).  Here, the Superior Court had jurisdiction; it simply
committed reversible error.  Therefore, the order of the Court of
Appeals also must be reversed.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Court of
Appeals vacating the order of the Superior Court is reversed. 
The order of the Superior Court vacating and dismissing the
indictments against defendant and purporting to remand
jurisdiction over the juvenile defendant to the District Court is
also reversed.  This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for
its further remand to the Superior Court, Durham County, for
reinstatement of the indictments against defendant and for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:  REVERSED;
ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT:  REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR
REINSTATEMENT OF INDICTMENTS AND FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.