Title: State v. McDaniel
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 101634
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 2011

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 101,634 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
DAVID MCDANIEL, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
K.S.A. 22-3424(d) does not require that a hearing on restitution occur before 
sentencing when no restitution amount has been requested by the victim or the victim's 
family.  In addition, its use of the word "shall" is directory rather than mandatory. 
 
2. 
 
On the record before the court, the district judge did not change the defendant's 
sentence after pronouncement. The court had jurisdiction to complete sentencing by 
adding a restitution amount at a continued hearing set by the agreement of the parties. 
 
3. 
 
Sentencing to the highest term in an applicable Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act 
grid box without proof of aggravating facts to a jury does not violate Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed October 2, 2009. 
Appeal from Seward District Court; KIM R. SCHROEDER, judge. Opinion filed July 15, 2011. Judgment of 
the Court of Appeals affirming the district court in part and dismissing in part is affirmed. Judgment of 
the district court is affirmed.   
 
2 
 
Patrick H. Dunn, of the Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the 
briefs for appellant.   
 
Don L. Scott, county attorney, argued the cause, and Steve Six, attorney general, was with him on 
the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BEIER, J.:  David McDaniel asks this court to reverse the Court of Appeals' 
decision affirming the sentence and restitution order imposed by the district court for his 
conviction of aggravated battery. McDaniel contends that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to order restitution and violated his constitutional rights by imposing the 
highest sentence in the grid box assigned to his offense without the aggravating facts 
being proved to a jury. 
 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The factual background and procedural history of this case are straightforward.   
 
McDaniel entered a guilty plea to one count of aggravated battery arising from his 
involvement in a fight that ended with McDaniel stabbing the victim. McDaniel's 
presentence investigation report, submitted 9 days before the sentencing hearing, 
included a restitution amount of $21,269.06, payable to Medicaid for the victim's medical 
expenses. The record on appeal reflects no request from the victim or the victim's family 
for restitution.   
 
 
At the sentencing hearing, the district judge denied McDaniel's request for a 
nonprison sentence and imposed 34 months' incarceration, the highest presumptive 
sentence in the grid box corresponding to a severity level 5 felony committed by an 
individual with a criminal history score of I. When the judge then mentioned the PSI 
3 
 
restitution amount, McDaniel objected. The judge then asked if the issue needed to be set 
for hearing, and counsel for McDaniel and the State agreed to a hearing date 
approximately 3 weeks in the future. The judge then proceeded with remaining elements 
of a typical plea colloquy, including recitation of a notice of appeal deadline 10 days after 
the sentencing hearing. 
 
 
McDaniel filed his notice of appeal within 10 days of the sentencing hearing.  
 
 
At the later hearing on the restitution amount, counsel for the State opened his 
remarks by referring to the proceeding as a "continued" sentencing. There was no 
contrary statement by McDaniel's counsel or the judge. McDaniel stipulated to a reduced 
restitution amount of $7,744.26, and the judge entered an order consistent with that 
stipulation.   
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Jurisdiction to Set Restitution Amount 
 
Jurisdiction is a question of law over which this court exercises unlimited review. 
State v. Jackson, 291 Kan. 34, 35, 238 P.3d 246 (2010) (citing State v. Denney, 283 Kan. 
781, 787, 156 P.3d 1275 [2007]). In addition, this case requires the court to interpret 
provisions of the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA). Statutory interpretation is a 
question of law, and this court's review is unlimited. State v. Miller, 260 Kan. 892, 895, 
926 P.2d 652 (1996).   
 
"When courts are called upon to interpret statutes, the fundamental rule 
governing our interpretation is that 'the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can 
be ascertained. The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the 
language of the statutory scheme it enacted.' State ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 271 Kan. 
4 
 
355, 378, 22 P.3d 124 (2001). For this reason, when the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, courts 'need not resort to statutory construction.' In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 
53, 79, 169 P.3d 1025 (2007). Instead, '[w]hen the language is plain and unambiguous, an 
appellate court is bound to implement the expressed intent.' State v. Manbeck, 277 Kan. 
224, Syl. ¶ 3, 83 P.3d 190 (2004). 
 
"Where a statute's language is subject to multiple interpretations, however, a 
reviewing court 'may look to the historical background of the enactment, the 
circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the 
statute may have under the various constructions suggested. [Citation omitted.]' Robinett 
v. The Haskell Co., 270 Kan. 95, 100-01, 12 P.3d 411 (2000). Generally, courts should 
construe statutes to avoid unreasonable results and should presume that the legislature 
does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation. Hawley v. Kansas Dept. of 
Agriculture, 281 Kan. 603, 631, 132 P.3d 870 (2006). We ascertain the legislature's intent 
behind a particular statutory provision 'from a general consideration of the entire act. 
Effect must be given, if possible, to the entire act and every part thereof. To this end, it is 
the duty of the court, as far as practicable, to reconcile the different provisions so as to 
make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible. [Citation omitted.]' In re Marriage of 
Ross, 245 Kan. 591, 594, 783 P.2d 331 (1989); see also State ex rel. Morrison v. Oshman 
Sporting Goods Co. Kansas, 275 Kan. 763, Syl. ¶ 2, 69 P.3d 1087 (2003). Thus, in cases 
that require statutory construction, 'courts are not permitted to consider only a certain 
isolated part or parts of an act but are required to consider and construe together all parts 
thereof in pari materia.' Kansas Commission on Civil Rights v. Howard, 218 Kan. 248, 
Syl. ¶ 2, 544 P.2d 791 (1975)." Board of  Sumner County Comm'rs v. Bremby, 286 Kan. 
745, 754-55, 189 P.3d 494 (2008). 
 
 
"Sentencing in a criminal proceeding takes place when the trial court pronounces 
the sentence from the bench." Jackson, 291 Kan. at 35 (citing State v. Garcia, 288 Kan. 
761, 765, 207 P.3d 251 [2009]; Abasolo v. State, 284 Kan. 299, 304, 160 P.3d 471 
[2007]; State v. Moses, 227 Kan. 400, 402, 607 P.2d 477 [1980]). A district judge has no 
jurisdiction to change a sentence once it is pronounced. Jackson, 291 Kan. at 35. An 
exception exists under the KSGA for modification to correct arithmetic or clerical errors. 
See K.S.A. 21-4721(i); State v. Miller, 260 Kan. 892, 900, 926 P.2d 652 (1996); see also 
5 
 
State v. Anthony, 274 Kan. 998, 1002, 58 P.3d 742 (2002) ("Without the authority 
granted by statute, the court has no ability to modify."). Restitution is one of the 
dispositions authorized by K.S.A. 21-4603d, and it therefore constitutes part of a criminal 
defendant's sentence. K.S.A. 21-4603d(b)(1). 
 
The first question before us is whether the procedure followed by the district judge 
in this case ran afoul of these rules governing sentencing jurisdiction.   
 
 
McDaniel advances two arguments on this question. First, he invokes K.S.A. 22-
3424(d) to contend that any hearing on restitution must take place before sentencing. 
Second, he argues that what occurred in his case was an impermissible change in his 
sentence after pronouncement from the bench.   
 
K.S.A. 22-3424(d) provides:  
 
 
"If the verdict or finding is guilty, upon request of the victim or the victim's 
family and before imposing sentence, the court shall hold a hearing to establish 
restitution. The defendant may waive the right to the hearing and accept the amount of 
restitution as established by the court. If the court orders restitution to be paid to the 
victim or the victim's family, the order shall be enforced as a judgment of restitution 
pursuant to K.S.A. . . . 60-4301 through 60-4304." (Emphasis added.) 
 
 
McDaniel is correct that the plain language of K.S.A. 22-3424(d) clearly states 
that a court "shall" hold a hearing to establish restitution before imposing sentence, but 
this language is limited to situations in which the crime victim or the victim's family 
requested restitution. We do not have that situation here.  
 
 
In addition, we agree with the Court of Appeals panel that decided State v. Bryant, 
37 Kan. App. 2d 924, 163 P.3d 325, rev. denied 285 Kan. 1175 (2007), which held that 
6 
 
the "shall" used in K.S.A. 22-3424(d) is directory rather than mandatory. Bryant, 37 Kan. 
App. 2d at 930. 
 
 
As we set forth in State v. Raschke, 289 Kan. 911, Syl. ¶ 4, 219 P.3d 481 (2009), 
the factors that bear on the directory/mandatory question include:  (1) legislative context 
and history; (2) substantive effect on a party's rights versus merely form or procedural 
effect; (3) existence or nonexistence of consequences for noncompliance; and (4) the 
subject matter of the statutory provision. See State v. Copes, 290 Kan. 209, 220, 224 P.3d 
571 (2010).   
 
Regarding the first factor, there is little legislative history available regarding 
K.S.A. 22-3424(d). The language at issue was added in 1995 by conference committee 
amendment. House J. 1995, p. 676. No committee minutes or supplemental notes address 
the language or its underlying intention. 
 
On the second and fourth factors, we view the language of K.S.A. 22-3424(d) as 
fixing a mode of procedure rather than affecting the substantial rights of any party. 
Indeed, each subsection of K.S.A. 22-3424 addresses the process by which the district 
court shall render judgment and impose sentence. This procedure "secure[s] order, 
system, and dispatch of the public business." See Raschke, 289 Kan. at 922. 
 
Subsection (d) of K.S.A. 22-3424 also does not impose any consequences for a 
sentencing judge's failure to determine restitution before imposing sentence.  
 
Examination of all of these factors leads us to conclude that K.S.A. 22-3424 is 
directory, not mandatory. The district judge's failure to require that any hearing on the 
amount of restitution occur before sentencing in this case did not deprive the district court 
of jurisdiction.  
 
7 
 
We now turn to McDaniel's second argument—that the setting of restitution in the 
second hearing was an impermissible change in his sentence. In McDaniel's view, the 
restitution ordered at the sentencing hearing was zero, and that amount was later changed 
to $7,744.26. He relies on the general rule stated in State v. Trostle, 41 Kan. App. 2d 98, 
201 P.3d 724 (2009), and State v. Anthony, 274 Kan. at 1002,  i.e., that a court may not 
alter a sentence after pronouncement. He acknowledges our earlier decision in State v. 
Cooper, 267 Kan. 15, 18-19, 977 P.2d 960 (1999), in which we held that a district judge 
has discretion to extend the time to set an amount, once restitution was ordered at 
sentencing; but he asserts that Trostle and Anthony call Cooper into question.  
 
We leave consideration of the substance of McDaniel's criticism and synthesis of 
Trostle, Anthony, and Cooper for another day, because the facts before us simply do not 
support an argument that any change in sentence took place. The district judge's 
restitution order altered nothing about McDaniel's sentence; it merely completed it. Both 
sides demonstrated that they understood exactly this fact when they agreed to the timing 
and subject matter of the later hearing. Functionally, McDaniel got precisely what he now 
claims to want:  a continuation of his sentencing to fill in the only blank left in the court's 
pronouncement. Although it may have been better practice for the district judge to wait 
until the later hearing to conclude his usual sentencing colloquy, and he erred in reciting a 
deadline for notice of appeal that fell between the first and second hearings, we see no 
prejudice to McDaniel's rights. Indeed, McDaniel got the reward he sought when his 
counsel lodged the objection to the PSI restitution amount at the sentencing hearing. The 
functional continuance led to a 2/3 reduction in the amount McDaniel would be expected 
to pay to reimburse Medicaid.    
 
 
Given all of the above discussion, we affirm the order of restitution.  
 
 
8 
 
 
Sentencing to Highest Grid Term 
 
McDaniel also invokes Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 
147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), to argue that he could not be sentenced to the highest 
presumptive term in the grid box applicable to his offense severity of 5 and criminal 
history of I without aggravating facts first being proved to a jury. We rejected this 
argument in State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 849-51, 190 P.3d 207 (2008) (discussing 
prior Kansas cases, United States Supreme Court decision in Cunningham v. California, 
549 U.S. 270, 127 S. Ct. 856, 166 L. Ed. 2d 856 [2007]). We decline McDaniel's request 
to reconsider Johnson here, meaning his 34-month prison sentence also is affirmed.   
 
 
The district court is affirmed. The Court of Appeals is affirmed.