Title: Lopez v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 234, 2006
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 22, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
CARLOS J. LOPEZ, 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 234, 2006 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   I.D. No. 05-06-007270 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  December 6, 2006 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  December 22, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 22nd day of December 2006, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1) 
The defendant-appellant, Carlos Lopez (“Lopez”), appeals from his 
conviction by a Superior Court jury of Rape in the Second Degree.  On appeal, 
Lopez contends that the Superior Court deprived him of a fair trial by denying his 
two continuance requests and by declining to instruct the jury on a lesser-included 
offense.   
2) 
In June 2004, the victim, Andrea Dawson (“Dawson”), spent the night 
at the house of her school friend, Sandra Smith (“Smith”).  At the time, Dawson 
 
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and Smith were both twelve years old.1  Also present in the house were Smith’s 
parents; her brother, Joey, who was thirteen or fourteen years old; and Smith’s 
uncle, defendant Lopez. 
  3) 
On the night of the incident, Smith and Dawson watched television in 
the living room.  Joey and Lopez were also in this room.  Joey asked Dawson to 
give Lopez “a blowjob” several times.  Dawson repeatedly refused.  Lopez  then 
made the request and threatened Dawson that “if [Dawson] didn’t do anything, that 
he would throw [her] outside with [her] clothes.”  Dawson testified that because 
she felt “pushed into a corner,” she “gave in” and put her “mouth around [Lopez’s] 
penis.”  Smith also testified that she saw Dawson put her mouth on Lopez’s penis.   
4) 
Nearly one year later, Dawson went to the A. I. duPont Children’s 
Hospital, where she spoke with Ms. Kolar, a registered medical assistant.  When 
Ms. Kolar asked whether she was sexually active, Dawson disclosed the June 2004 
incident.  The police were called and, following an investigation, Lopez was 
arrested for rape in June 2005. 
5) 
Trial was set for February 2, 2006.  On January 12, 2006, the 
prosecutor and defense counsel filed a joint continuance request.  The prosecutor 
requested a continuance to accommodate the investigating police officer, who was 
                                                 
1 The Court has designated pseudonyms for the victim and her friend, who were minors.  Supr. 
Ct. R. 7(d).  
 
 
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scheduled for training the week of trial.  Defense counsel wanted a continuance to 
“investigate a possible alibi.”  The joint request was denied the following day.   
6) 
Thereafter, defense counsel filed two additional continuance motions.  
On January 27, 2006, counsel requested more time to locate a witness with whom 
Lopez said he was working “every day that summer and drove to his home in 
Dover area each night.”  The motion was denied.  On February 1, 2006, the day 
before trial, defense counsel renewed his application for a continuance and 
informed the trial court that he had identified the alibi witness, Mark Feliciano 
(“Feliciano”).  Feliciano was impossible to find, however, because he was “now on 
the run as his probation officer, Dean Mills, f[ro]m the Kent County Probation 
Office was looking for him for a probation violation charge.”  This application was 
denied and the trial went forward the next day as scheduled.   
7) 
Lopez was charged with Rape in the Second Degree.  Lopez asked the 
judge to instruct the jury on the elements of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the 
Second Degree as a lesser-included offense of Rape in the Second Degree.  The 
trial judge denied Lopez’s application.       
8) 
At trial, the jury found Lopez guilty as charged.  Lopez was sentenced 
as an habitual offender to life imprisonment.  Lopez appeals from that conviction, 
presenting two issues on appeal:  whether the Superior Court correctly denied his 
 
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two continuance requests; and properly declined to instruct the jury on a lesser 
included charge. 
 
9) 
“Requests for continuances ‘are left to the discretion of a trial judge 
whose ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling is clearly 
unreasonable or capricious.’”2  In Secrest v. State,3 this Court set forth a two-
pronged standard for deciding a claim alleging the erroneous denial of a motion for 
continuance:  
First, the party seeking the continuance has the burden of establishing 
a clear record of the relevant facts relating to the criteria for a 
continuance, including the length of the requested continuance.   
 
Second, the party seeking the continuance must show: 
 
(a) that it was diligent in preparing for the presentation of the 
testimony; 
(b) that the continuance will be likely to satisfy the need to present the 
testimony; and 
(c) that the inconvenience to the Court, opposing parties, witnesses 
and jurors is insubstantial in relation to the likely prejudice which 
would result from the denial of the continuance.4 
 
10) 
Lopez failed to meet either prong of this test.  First, Lopez did not 
provide a time frame for the continuance.  Under Secrest, the moving party must 
“establish a clear record of the facts relevant to the criteria for a continuance, 
                                                 
2 Secrest v. State, 679 A.2d 58, 64 (Del. 1996), citing Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1088 (Del. 
1987). 
3 Secrest v. State, 679 A.2d 58, 66 (Del. 1996). 
4 Id. at 66.  
 
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including the length of the continuance.”5  “For purposes of case management and 
efficiency, it is essential for a judge to know how long a continuance will last.”6  In 
neither request did Lopez indicate the length of time he would need to obtain the 
presence of the alibi witness.  Defense counsel informed the trial judge that the 
witness was a fugitive from justice, but the length of the requested continuance 
was never specified.   
11) 
Second, the record does not reflect that Lopez was diligent in 
preparing for the presentation of defense testimony.  The trial was scheduled for 
February 2, 2006, a date that had been set in August 2005.  As late as January 12, 
2006, three weeks before the trial date, defense counsel was still only 
“investigat[ing] a possible alibi.”  Moreover, Lopez’s continuance requests 
suggested that he was not actively searching for the alibi witness.7  These facts 
support the conclusion that defense counsel was not being diligent in ascertaining 
the whereabouts of the witnesses. 
                                                 
 
5 Smith v. State, 2005 Del. LEXIS 322, at *4-5 (Del. Supr.). 
6 Id. at *5. 
7 On January 30, 2006, defense counsel stated in his renewed continuance request:  . . . . 
[Defendant’s “adopted” father] was interviewed on October 27th.  I have spoken to him since 
last week and have directed my investigator to follow up with him.   
My client had tried to contact me in January and I was not able to visit him until the 24th 
whereupon I notified the State and the court. . . .  I was still pursing possible alibi witnesses at 
that time. 
I have subsequently learned of the possible witness’ mother’s address but have not been able to 
get hold of her. . . .    
 
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12) 
Third, Lopez did not show that the denial of a continuance was likely 
to prejudice his case.  The State presented a strong case against Lopez.  Lopez’s 
niece, Smith, testified for the prosecution that Lopez was at Smith’s house on the 
night of the crime and she observed Lopez engaging in oral sexual intercourse with 
Dawson.  The only demonstrated relevance of the unavailable witness, Feliciano, 
to this charge was that “[Feliciano] lived and worked with Lopez and transported 
[Lopez] from the Dover area to work. . . .”  All that Lopez and Feliciano’s mother 
could offer was the conjecture that “[Feliciano] would likely have testified that 
Lopez did not leave his presence on the approximate dates in question nor have the 
opportunity to do so.”  Therefore, Lopez did not show that the denial of his 
continuance requests prejudiced him sufficiently to warrant reversal.    
13) 
Because his requests for a continuance did not satisfy the Secrest 
standards, the trial judge properly denied Lopez’s continuance requests. 
 
14) 
Lopez’s second argument on appeal is that the Superior Court erred in 
declining to instruct the jury on a lesser-included charge.  Lopez requested that the 
jury be instructed on the elements of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Second 
Degree as a lesser-included crime of Rape in the Second Degree.   The trial judge 
denied Lopez’s application, ruling that “it would be inconsistent for the jury to find 
not guilty on Rape Second and guilty on Unlawful Sexual Contact.”   
 
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15) 
A trial court is obligated to charge a jury with respect to a lesser-
included offense instruction where two conditions are satisfied.  First, the lesser-
included offense must be included in the greater-charged offense.8  Second, there 
must be “a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting the defendant of 
the offense charged and convicting the defendant of the included offense.”9  In 
particular: 
A claim that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury as to 
lesser included offenses presents a mixed question of law and fact.  
Such a claim requires the appellate court to review the entire record to 
determine if the crimes for which instructions to the jury were 
requested were, in fact, lesser included offenses; and, if so, whether 
there was rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the charged offense and convicting him of the included 
offense.10   
 
At issue on this appeal is the second condition, i.e., the trial judge’s “rational-
basis” determination.  
16) 
Lopez was charged with Rape in the Second Degree.  A person is 
guilty of rape in the second degree when that person “[i]ntentionally engages in 
sexual intercourse with another person, and the intercourse occurs without the 
victim's consent.”11  “Sexual intercourse” is defined as “[a]ny act of cunnilingus or 
                                                 
8 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 206(b) (2001). 
9 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 206(c) (2001).  
10 Harding v. State, 1991 Del. LEXIS 445, at *9 (Del. Dec. 11, 1991). 
11 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 772(a)(1) (2004). 
 
 
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fellatio regardless of whether penetration occurs. Ejaculation is not required.”12  
Fellatio includes any oral contact with the male genitalia.13  “A child who has not 
reached his or her sixteenth (16th) birthday is deemed unable to consent to a sexual 
act with a person more than four (4) years older than said child.”14   
17) 
A person “is guilty of unlawful sexual contact in the second degree 
when the person intentionally has sexual contact with another person who is less 
than 16 years of age or causes the victim to have sexual contact with the person or 
a third person.”15  “Sexual contact” is defined as international touching another’s 
“anus, breast, buttocks or genitalia,” or intentionally touching another “with the 
defendant’s anus, breast, buttocks or genitalia” where the touching is intended to 
be sexual in nature.16 
18) 
Dawson testified because of Lopez’s continued pressure and threats, 
she put her mouth “around” Lopez’s penis until Smith pulled her off.  Smith also 
testified unequivocally that Dawson placed her mouth on Lopez’s penis.  Under the 
above statutory definitions, that contact between Dawson’s mouth and Lopez’s 
penis constituted fellatio, and, hence, sexual intercourse, regardless of whether 
there was penetration or ejaculation.  At the time of the crime, Lopez was forty-
                                                 
12 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 761(e)(2) (2001). 
13 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 761(b) (2001). 
14 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 761(j) (2001). 
15 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 768 (2001). 
16 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 761(f)(1)(2) (2001). 
 
 
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two years old and Dawson was twelve years old.  Therefore, the evidence was 
sufficient to support Lopez’s conviction of Rape in the Second Degree.   
19) 
Lopez has not shown a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict 
acquitting him of Rape in the Second Degree, yet convicting him of Unlawful 
Sexual Contact in the Second Degree.  Therefore, the trial judge was not required 
under the lesser-included offense statute17 to instruct the jury with respect to an 
Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Second Degree.  The trial judge also correctly 
ruled that the evidence provided a rational basis to instruct the jury on Rape in the 
Second Degree. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ordered that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
17 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 206 (2001).