Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Scott F. Anderson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018AP001837-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: October 28, 2020

2020 WI 82 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1837-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Scott F. Anderson, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Scott F. Anderson, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ANDERSON 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
October 28, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Per Curiam.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 82
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2018AP1837-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Scott F. Anderson, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Scott F. Anderson, 
 
          Respondent. 
FILED 
 
OCT 28, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report of Referee Kim 
Peterson in which she found that Attorney Scott F. Anderson had 
committed six counts of professional misconduct with respect to 
his handling of two client matters.  The referee recommended 
that Attorney Anderson's license to practice law in this state 
be suspended for a period of 30 days.  Upon careful review of 
the matter, we uphold the referee's findings and fact and 
conclusions of law.  Rather than a 30-day suspension, we 
conclude that a 60-day license suspension is an appropriate 
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
2 
 
sanction for Attorney Anderson's misconduct.  We further agree 
that Attorney Anderson should be required to pay the costs of 
this proceeding, which are $19,339.98 as of June 11, 2020. 
¶2 
Attorney Anderson was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1985 and practices in Milwaukee.  In 1991 he 
received a consensual private reprimand.  Private reprimand No. 
1991-13 
(electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium. 
wicourts.gov/app/raw/000038.html).  In 2004, he received a 
consensual public reprimand for misconduct arising out of three 
cases.  Public Reprimand of Scott F. Anderson, No. 2004-05  
(electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts. 
gov/app/raw/002075.html).  In 2005, he received a second 
consensual public reprimand.  Public Reprimand of Scott F. 
Anderson, 
No. 
2005-06 
(electronic 
copy 
available 
at  
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/001776.html).   In 2010, 
Attorney Anderson's license to practice law was suspended for 60 
days as a sanction for professional misconduct that included 
failing to file claims timely and failing to take action on his 
client's behalf; failing to respond to his client's reasonable 
requests for information and failing to communicate case 
developments to his client in a timely manner.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Anderson, 2010 WI 39, 324 
Wis. 2d 627, 782 N.W.2d 100. 
¶3 
On September 26, 2018, the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) filed a complaint alleging ten counts of misconduct 
arising out of two client matters.  The first client matter 
detailed in the complaint arose out of Attorney Anderson's 
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
3 
 
representation of D.J., who faced felony charges in two separate 
Racine County cases.  On March 11, 2016, the State Public 
Defender's Office (SPD) appointed Attorney Anderson to represent 
D.J. in both cases.  At that time, a status conference in one 
case and a preliminary hearing in the second case had been 
scheduled for March 24, 2016. 
¶4 
On or about March 15, 2016, Attorney Anderson filed a 
Demand For Discovery and Inspection with the district attorney.  
Attorney Anderson did not send a copy of the discovery demand to 
D.J.  On March 18, 2016, the SPD informed Attorney Anderson that 
D.J. requested to see him prior to the March 24, 2016 status 
conference and preliminary hearing.  Attorney Anderson did not 
meet with D.J.  D.J. was in court on March 24, 2016.  The court 
held the scheduled hearings in both cases and set a pretrial 
conference for May 6, 2016.  The pretrial conference was later 
rescheduled to June 10, 2016.   
¶5 
Attorney Anderson met with D.J. on April 25, 2016, for 
about 1 1/2 hours.  On May 17 and June 3, 2016, the SPD informed 
Attorney Anderson about D.J.'s growing concern with the lack of 
communication from Attorney Anderson.  Attorney Anderson was 
informed by the SPD that D.J. wanted to see him prior to the 
June 10, 2016, pretrial conference.  Attorney Anderson had no 
communication with D.J. between his April 25, 2016 visit and the 
June 10, 2016 pretrial conference.  D.J. was not produced for 
the June 10, 2016 pretrial, and Attorney Anderson did not inform 
him what occurred at the pretrial conference. 
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
4 
 
¶6 
D.J. contacted the SPD to learn what had happened at 
the June 10, 2016 pretrial conference, to express his continued 
dissatisfaction with the lack of communication from Attorney 
Anderson, and to raise the possibility of Attorney Anderson's 
replacement due to his failure to timely inform D.J. about the 
status of his case.  On June 13, 2016, the SPD emailed Attorney 
Anderson about D.J.'s concerns and asked Attorney Anderson to 
meet with D.J. 
¶7 
On June 17, 2016, Attorney Anderson advised D.J. of 
his status conference scheduled for August 9, 2016.  Attorney 
Anderson did not communicate or meet with D.J. between June 17 
and August 8, 2016.  In a July 27, 2016 letter to Attorney 
Anderson, D.J. expressed his frustration with the lack of 
communication, asked about the status of the discovery demand, 
requested an in-person meeting, and again raised the possibility 
of Attorney Anderson's withdrawal.   
¶8 
On August 8, 2016, Attorney Anderson met with D.J. for 
an hour.  D.J. requested that Attorney Anderson file three 
separate motions, and he requested that Attorney Anderson file a 
Miranda-Goodchild 
motion 
or 
otherwise 
challenge, 
via 
interlocutory 
appeal, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
earlier 
ruling 
permitting the use of D.J.'s statements at trial.  Finally, D.J. 
requested Attorney Anderson have an investigator interview two 
witnesses 
and 
obtain 
the 
co-defendant's 
plea/cooperation 
agreement. 
¶9 
Other than the demand for discovery filed on March 15, 
2016, Attorney Anderson never filed any motions or appeals on 
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
5 
 
D.J.'s behalf.  Until October 11, 2016, Attorney Anderson did 
not explain to D.J. why he had not filed any motions or appeals.  
Attorney Anderson never had witnesses interviewed and never 
obtained 
a 
copy 
of 
the 
co-defendant's 
plea/cooperation 
agreement. 
¶10 At the August 9, 2016 status conference, the circuit 
court set a final pretrial date for October 17, 2016, and it 
scheduled the jury trial for November 1, 2016.  Between August 
9, 2016, and October 4, 2016, Attorney Anderson had no 
communication with D.J. and took no action to prepare the case. 
¶11 In August 2016, D.J. requested Attorney Anderson to 
timely respond as to whether he had filed the requested motions 
concerning discovery, the suppression of evidence, and the 
Miranda-Goodchild motion.  D.J. inquired whether an investigator 
had interviewed witnesses or if the co-defendant's video 
statement had been reviewed.  Attorney Anderson did not respond. 
¶12 On September 18, 2016, D.J. filed his own motion 
requesting that the court "withdraw legal counsel."   
¶13 On October 11, 2016, Attorney Anderson informed D.J. 
he would not file any of the motions.  Previously, Attorney 
Anderson had never discussed with D.J. why he did not file any 
of the motions D.J. had requested. 
¶14 At the October 17, 2016 final pretrial conference, 
D.J.'s request to have Attorney Anderson removed was denied.  On 
October 18, 2016, Attorney Anderson forwarded D.J. a plea offer 
which expired on October 28, 2016.  Attorney Anderson promised 
to meet with D.J. "to discuss it and all other matters."  
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
6 
 
Attorney Anderson did not communicate or meet with D.J. between 
October 18 and October 28, 2016. 
¶15 On October 20, 2016, due to Attorney Anderson's lack 
of communication and diligence, D.J. attempted to negotiate a 
plea directly with the district attorney.  On October 28, 2016, 
D.J. again unsuccessfully requested the circuit court to appoint 
a new attorney.   
¶16 On October 30, 2016, Attorney Anderson reviewed the 
transcript from D.J.'s Miranda-Goodchild hearing.  On October 
31, 2016, the day before trial, Attorney Anderson finally 
requested from the district attorney any plea/cooperation 
agreement of the co-defendant, asked to compare discovery, and 
informed the district attorney he would be filing a motion to 
withdraw.   
¶17 On November 1, 2016, D.J. entered a no contest plea in 
one of the Racine County cases.  Attorney Anderson withdrew as 
D.J.'s counsel prior to sentencing. 
¶18 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Anderson's representation of 
D.J.: 
Count 1:  By failing to timely consult with D.J. about 
the Miranda-Goodchild motion or interlocutory appeal, 
by failing to timely advise D.J. he would not file the 
requested motions or interview witnesses, and by 
failing to timely consult with D.J. about additional 
discovery D.J. believed to be outstanding, Attorney 
Anderson violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(2).1 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) provides:  "A lawyer shall reasonably 
consult with the client about the means by which the client's 
objectives are to be accomplished." 
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
7 
 
Count 2:  By failing to timely communicate with D.J. 
on defense strategy and the status of D.J.'s case, 
Attorney Anderson violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(3).2 
Count 3:  By failing to timely respond to D.J.'s 
reasonable requests for information, Attorney Anderson 
violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).3 
Count 4:  By failing to diligently follow up with the 
district attorney regarding his discovery demand, by 
failing to timely review the transcript from D.J.'s 
Miranda-Goodchild hearing so as to provide D.J. an 
informed opinion on the merits of refiling the 
Miranda-Goodchild motion or pursuing an interlocutory 
appeal, and by failing to timely request the co-
defendant's 
plea/cooperation 
agreement, 
Attorney 
Anderson violated SCR 20:1.3.4 
¶19 The remaining counts of misconduct detailed in the 
OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney Anderson's representation 
of J.H., who had been charged with first-degree reckless injury 
and attempted first-degree intentional homicide.  Although 
represented by the SPD, J.H. requested to proceed pro se.  The 
request was granted, and Attorney Anderson was appointed as 
standby counsel to assist J.H. in his defense. 
¶20 J.H. was also awaiting sentencing in another case in 
which he had been charged with being a felon in possession of a 
firearm, among other charges.  Attorney Anderson was also 
appointed as standby counsel in that case. 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) provides:  "A lawyer shall keep the 
client reasonably informed about the status of the matter." 
3 SCR 20:1.4(a)(4) provides:  "A lawyer shall promptly 
comply with reasonable requests by the client for information." 
4 SCR 20:1.3 provides:  "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
8 
 
¶21 At the March 10, 2016 pretrial conference in the 
homicide case, J.H. informed the court he had a handwritten 
witness list, a discovery motion, a motion in limine, and one 
other partially drafted motion he wanted to file that day.  The 
court specifically ordered Attorney Anderson to get J.H. the 
discovery and assist him in filing "the motions and everything 
that [J.H. needed] to get filed here."  The court instructed 
Attorney Anderson to get copies of the various motions to 
everyone promptly. 
¶22 Hearings for J.H.'s motions in the homicide case and 
his sentencing in the firearm case were scheduled for April 15, 
2016.  On that date, J.H. was sentenced in the firearm case. 
¶23 In the homicide case, between March 10 and April 15, 
2016, Attorney Anderson did not prepare, file, or distribute 
J.H.'s motions and witness list.  Attorney Anderson acknowledged 
on the record that he had received J.H.'s motions, and he said 
he would have the documents prepared and filed within 10 days.  
On April 22 and April 27, 2016, Attorney Anderson billed for 
reviewing "Client Prepared Docs" and "Prep of Discovery Demand."  
No motions were filed or ever prepared and given to J.H. for 
review. 
¶24 At the April 28, 2016 status conference in the 
homicide case, a pretrial conference was scheduled for August 1, 
and a jury trial was scheduled for August 29, 2016.  On April 
28, 2016, Attorney Anderson told J.H. he would visit him the 
following week, but did not do so. 
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
9 
 
¶25 On May 5, 2016, the district attorney sent Attorney 
Anderson six pages of additional discovery.  Between May 5 and 
August 1, 2016, Attorney Anderson did not provide J.H. with the 
additional discovery, nor did he advise J.H. he had received it. 
¶26 On May 17, 2016, J.H. informed Attorney Anderson he 
had the ability to prepare the motions and witness list himself, 
and he asked Attorney Anderson to return his handwritten 
documents.  J.H. also requested "a letter stating that I am on a 
deadline for any motions that I will file."  J.H. said he needed 
the deadline letter "as soon as possible" to acquire time in the 
prison's law library to prepare his various motions.  J.H. also 
asked Attorney Anderson to prepare a "petition" permitting him 
to "colloquy" with all witnesses, which witnesses J.H. believed 
would be subpoenaed by the court.  Attorney Anderson did not 
respond to J.H.'s letter, did not prepare the motions, did not 
return the handwritten documents, and did not provide J.H. with 
the deadline letter.  Attorney Anderson took no action on J.H.'s 
case between May 25 and August 1, 2016.  On June 2, 2016, J.H. 
again requested return of the handwritten documents and the 
deadline letter, and he requested that Attorney Anderson visit 
him.  Attorney Anderson did not respond. 
¶27 On June 12, 2016, J.H. contacted the Milwaukee County 
Clerk of Court requesting information about the deadline for 
filing his motions, and he was told to contact his standby 
counsel.  On June 17, 2016, J.H. contacted Attorney Anderson for 
the filing deadline letter so he could prepare his motions.  
Attorney Anderson did not respond. 
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
10 
 
¶28 On June 21, 2016, J.H. provided Attorney Anderson with 
drafts of several motions and an alibi statement.  J.H. wanted 
Attorney Anderson to file the motions because his access to the 
law library had been denied due to his not receiving the 
deadline letter.   Attorney Anderson did not respond to J.H. and 
did not file the motions.    
¶29 On July 11, 2016, J.H. filed a second request for 
discovery, seeking the same documents Attorney Anderson had 
received from the district attorney on May 5, 2016.   
¶30 At the August 1, 2016 pretrial conference, J.H. 
informed the court he still had not received all of the 
discovery and requested the dismissal of Attorney Anderson.  The 
assistant district attorney informed the court the discovery had 
been given to Attorney Anderson on May 5, 2016.  The OLR alleged 
that Attorney Anderson falsely represented to the court the 
discovery had been sent to J.H.  J.H.'s request to dismiss 
Attorney Anderson was denied, and a final pretrial conference 
was scheduled for August 25, 2016. 
¶31 On or about August 14, 2016, J.H. requested that 
Attorney Anderson draft and file a motion regarding witness 
identification.  Attorney Anderson did not respond to the 
letter, take the requested action, or advise J.H. why the action 
might be unwarranted. 
¶32 Attorney Anderson never issued subpoenas for J.H.'s 
witnesses, nor did he advise J.H. how to subpoena the witnesses 
himself.   
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
11 
 
¶33 J.H. was not produced for the August 25, 2016 final 
pretrial conference.  J.H. filed five motions on the morning of 
the trial.  The circuit court commented that J.H. had had since 
May 2016 to file the motions.  Attorney Anderson failed to 
disclose to the court that his lack of diligence prevented 
J.H.'s motions and witness list from being timely filed.   The 
court denied J.H.'s motion to subpoena his witnesses as 
untimely.  Attorney Anderson denied he ever received J.H.'s 
witness list. 
¶34 On 
September 
1, 
2016, 
J.H. 
was 
convicted, 
and 
sentencing was scheduled for September 27, 2016.  At the 
sentencing hearing, Attorney Anderson requested to withdraw.  
J.H. asserted Attorney Anderson misrepresented information to 
the court and said that on March 10, 2016 he had given Attorney 
Anderson numerous motions and a witness list to file.  Attorney 
Anderson denied he was " . . . even on the case" at that time, 
even though he had been appointed on March 10, 2016. 
¶35 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Anderson's representation of 
J.H.: 
Count 5:  As standby counsel, by failing to advance 
J.H.'s interests in timely preparing and filing J.H.'s 
motions, by failing to file J.H.'s witness list, by 
failing to provide J.H. with the motion deadline 
letter to facilitate J.H.'s use of the prison library, 
and by failing to timely provide J.H. with the 
discovery documents he received in May 2016, Attorney 
Anderson violated SCR 20:1.3. 
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
12 
 
Count 6:  By failing to inform J.H. that he had 
received additional discovery documents in May 2016, 
Attorney Anderson violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(3). 
Count 7:  By failing to timely respond to J.H.'s 
reasonable requests for information regarding this 
case, Attorney Anderson violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4). 
Count 8:  By failing to advise J.H. he did not intend 
to file any motions, failing to advise J.H. on the 
legitimacy of any of the requested motions and failing 
to advise J.H. on the defense's obligations and the 
procedures to subpoena a witness for trial, so as to 
allow J.H., in each instance, to make informed 
decisions about the defense of his case, Attorney 
Anderson violated SCR 20:1.4(b).5 
Count 9:  By making false and misleading statements to 
the 
court 
about 
having 
provided 
all 
discovery 
materials to J.H., about draft filings J.H. had given 
to him and by stating to the court he wasn't on the 
case on March 10, 2016, Attorney Anderson violated 
SCR 20:3.3(a)(1).6 
Count 10:  By making false and misleading statements 
to the OLR about his receipt of discovery materials, 
about having provided all discovery materials to J.H., 
and about his receipt of motions from J.H., Attorney 
                                                 
5 SCR 20:1.4(b) provides:  "A lawyer shall explain a matter 
to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make 
informed decisions regarding the representation." 
6 SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) provides:  "A lawyer shall not knowingly 
make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously 
made to the tribunal by the lawyer." 
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
13 
 
Anderson 
violated 
SCR 22.03(6),7, 
enforceable 
via 
SCR 20:8.4(h).8 
¶36 The referee was appointed on December 7, 2018.  
Attorney Anderson filed an answer to the OLR's complaint on 
December 18, 2018.  A three-day evidentiary hearing was held in 
December 2019.   
¶37 In her report, the referee found that the OLR had met 
its burden of proof as to counts 1 through 3 and 5 through 7.  
The referee found that the OLR did not prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that Attorney Anderson failed to diligently 
follow up with the assistant district attorney about the 
discovery demand in D.J.'s case, failed to timely review the 
transcript of the Miranda-Goodchild hearing or pursue an 
interlocutory appeal on that matter, or failed to timely request 
the co-defendant's plea/cooperation agreement.  The referee 
found that prior to trial, Attorney Anderson had continued 
negotiations 
and 
discussions 
with 
the 
assistant 
district 
attorney on D.J.'s case and had reviewed the transcript from the 
                                                 
7 SCR 
22.03(6) 
provides: 
 
"In 
the 
course 
of 
the 
investigation, the respondent's willful failure to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance." 
8 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 
or SCR 22.04(1)." 
 
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
14 
 
earlier Miranda-Goodchild hearing.  The referee noted that 
Attorney Anderson asserted the motions requested by D.J. were 
not necessary or appropriate. 
¶38 With respect to Attorney Anderson's representation of 
J.H., the referee noted that Attorney Anderson was appointed 
standby counsel only, and she pointed out Wisconsin has not 
specifically addressed the issue of whether standby counsel owes 
an ethical obligation to the defendant he or she is assisting.  
The referee said it seems logical that a limited attorney-client 
relationship was formed when J.H. asked Attorney Anderson to 
perform certain tasks and when the circuit court asked Attorney 
Anderson to be prepared to take over J.H.'s defense at trial if 
requested to do so.  The referee reasoned that in order to 
accomplish those tasks, Attorney Anderson would have to act with 
diligence so that he could be informed about the case prior to 
trial and communicate with J.H. about the tasks that were 
requested.   
¶39 The referee found that Attorney Anderson did not 
violate Supreme Court Rules when he failed to inform J.H. about 
how to subpoena witnesses or when he failed to send additional 
discovery documents to J.H. since those discovery documents were 
already in J.H.'s possession and there was no evidence presented 
indicating the documents were important to help J.H. prepare his 
case for trial.  The referee said that J.H. had already received 
discovery from prior counsel, who had prepared the case for 
trial before having to withdraw.  The referee also noted that 
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
15 
 
J.H. had received a complete set of discovery at the pretrial 
conference. 
¶40 The referee agreed with the OLR that Attorney Anderson 
failed to communicate with both of his clients.  The referee 
said the record was replete with letters that both D.J. and J.H. 
sent to Attorney Anderson desperately seeking information about 
their cases.  Both clients wrote to Attorney Anderson and asked 
to meet with him on several occasions.  They wrote asking about 
specific motions they wanted filed, and Attorney Anderson 
ignored most of those letters and requests for information.  
While Attorney Anderson acknowledged he could have been better 
at communicating, he said that often the information sought by 
the clients was not particularly important.  The referee said, 
"by failing to report to his clients the status of their cases, 
even to simply to report that there was no new information, his 
clients were left to wonder what was happening in their cases, 
often resulting in even more questions and correspondence." 
¶41 The referee said even when Attorney Anderson did 
communicate with his clients about trial and defense strategies, 
the communication was often not effective.  The referee said the 
lack of communication was especially harmful to J.H. because he 
was trying to represent himself and needed Attorney Anderson's 
assistance.  The referee said both clients had significant 
interests at stake in their cases, and J.H. was facing life in 
prison, so the clients understandably wanted a lawyer who would 
help them, fight for them, and take their cases seriously, which 
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
16 
 
required an attorney who would listen and respond to them.  
Attorney Anderson failed to do so. 
¶42 The referee found that the OLR did not meet its burden 
of proving that Attorney Anderson made misrepresentations to the 
circuit court in J.H.'s case.  While the OLR asserted that 
Attorney Anderson falsely informed the circuit court he had 
given all the discovery to J.H. when in fact he did not send 
J.H. the inventory control sheets he had received from the  
assistant district attorney, the referee said that Attorney 
Anderson testified that J.H. had already received all of the 
discovery in the case from prior counsel including the inventory 
control sheets.  The referee said there was no evidence that 
Attorney Anderson was knowingly trying to mislead the circuit 
court, and although he arguably could have been clearer in 
explaining the specifics of the discovery J.H. had received, 
that alone did not demonstrate a violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
¶43 With respect to the appropriate sanction, the referee 
noted that the OLR sought a 120-day license suspension, while 
Attorney Anderson argued for a public reprimand.  The referee 
concluded that a 30-day license suspension was an appropriate 
sanction. 
 
She 
said 
Attorney 
Anderson's 
conduct 
was 
disrespectful 
and 
unprofessional, 
causing 
his 
clients 
unnecessary concern and distress.  The referee also said 
Attorney Anderson exhibited a pattern of failing to communicate 
with clients, and a license suspension was appropriate to 
impress upon him that his conduct is unacceptable and needs to 
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
17 
 
be corrected.  The referee found as a mitigating factor that 
Attorney Anderson has accepted responsibility for his conduct.  
The referee also noted that Attorney Anderson works in a 
difficult environment representing indigent defendants in high 
stakes criminal cases.  She said she was confident that a 30-day 
suspension would give Attorney Anderson time to reflect and 
adjust his practice to ensure he will better respond to his 
clients' needs in the future. 
¶44 We 
adopt 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law as to Attorney Anderson's professional 
misconduct.  As to the appropriate sanction, we conclude that a 
60-day suspension, rather than the 30-day suspension recommended 
by the referee, is an appropriate sanction. 
¶45 With rare exceptions, this court has adhered to a 
policy of imposing a minimum license suspension of 60 days.  See 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka, 2009 WI 38, ¶38, 
317 Wis. 2d 135, 765 N.W.2d 775; In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Grady, 188 Wis. 2d 98, 108-09, 523 N.W.2d 564 (1994); In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schnitzler, 140 Wis. 2d 574, 
577-78, 412 N.W.2d 124 (1987).  ("We conclude that a minimum 60-
day period of suspension serves the needs of the public and of 
the legal system when a lawyer's license is suspended for 
disciplinary reasons.")  We see no reason to depart from that 
general policy here, particularly since this is the fifth 
occasion on which Attorney Anderson is being sanctioned for 
professional misconduct, and he has already received one 60-day 
suspension. 
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
18 
 
¶46 Wisconsin generally adheres to the idea of progressive 
discipline.  As the referee appropriately noted, it has been 10 
years since Attorney Anderson's previous 60-day suspension; 
however, the 2010 suspension involved misconduct that was 
similar in many respects to the misconduct at issue here:  
failure to respond to his client's reasonable requests for 
information and to communicate case developments to his client 
in a timely manner.  Although the referee found that Attorney 
Anderson has expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for 
his conduct, it does not appear that he took the lessons of the 
2010 suspension to heart.  If the previous suspension were not a 
decade old, we may well have considered a suspension longer than 
60 days.  Under the circumstances, we conclude that a suspension 
shorter than 60 days would unduly depreciate the nature of the 
misconduct. 
¶47 Finally, as is our normal practice, we find it 
appropriate to assess the full costs of the proceeding against 
Attorney Anderson.  The OLR does not seek restitution and we 
impose none. 
¶48 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Scott F. Anderson to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60 days, 
effective December 9, 2020. 
¶49 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Scott F. Anderson pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $19,339.98 as 
of June 11, 2020. 
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
19 
 
¶50 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Scott F. Anderson shall 
comply with SCR 22.26 regarding the duties of a person whose 
license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended. 
 
No. 
2018AP1837-D   
 
 
 
1