Title: Bryant v. Carpenter
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1180843
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 18, 2020

REL: September 18, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2020
____________________
1180843
____________________
Frankie Bryant, administrator of the Estate of Deitrick
Bryant, deceased
v.
Elston Carpenter and Athelyn Jordan, individually and in
their official capacities as officers of the Greene County
Sheriff's Office
Appeal from Greene Circuit Court
(CV-14-900060)
MITCHELL, Justice.
Deitrick Bryant ("Deitrick") committed suicide in his
cell while he was an inmate at the Greene County jail. 
1180843
Deitrick's mother, as the administrator of his estate, sued
two jail employees, alleging that their negligence allowed
Deitrick's suicide to happen.  The trial court entered a
summary judgment in favor of the jail employees, and
Deitrick's mother appeals.  We affirm the judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
On April 3, 2012, an investigator from the Greene County
Sheriff's Office attempted to arrest Deitrick on an
outstanding warrant.  While he was being handcuffed, Deitrick
knocked the investigator down and fled the premises.  Later
that evening, Greene County Sheriff Joe Benison and several
deputies went to Deitrick's last known address and found him
hiding in a freezer.  After he was handcuffed, Deitrick
knocked down a deputy, again broke away, and began to run. 
Deputy Jeremy Rancher pursued him and ultimately used a stun
gun to subdue him and take him into custody.  Deitrick was
then transported to the Greene County jail.  
It is undisputed that Deitrick was compliant while being
booked into the jail.  As part of the intake process, Deitrick
was asked about his health and medical history and he gave no
indication that he was in pain or had any injuries, nor did he
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express any suicidal ideations.  Jail employee Elston
Carpenter assisted in the intake process by 
searching Deitrick
and supervising him while he changed into jail clothes. 
According to Carpenter, Deitrick never complained that he was
in pain, expressed suicidal ideations, or indicated that "he
was even depressed." 
Based on the aggressive behavior Deitrick exhibited both
times the sheriff's office attempted to take him into custody,
he was placed in an isolation cell in the booking area.  That
cell was visible to staff in the booking area and monitored
remotely by staff in the security-control room, where 36
monitors showed live feeds of various areas throughout the
jail.  No camera was dedicated exclusively to Deitrick's cell,
but his cell door and window were within the area monitored by
a camera located in the booking area.
The next day, April 4, Deitrick's mother, Frankie Bryant,
visited the Greene County courthouse to inquire about having
Deitrick released on bond.  She states that she spoke with a
district court judge and Sheriff Benison and that she told
Sheriff Benison that Deitrick did not need to be in jail
because "he [was] not well."  Nevertheless, Deitrick was not
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released on bond, and he remained in jail.  Carpenter states
that his interactions with Deitrick in jail that day were
normal, that they talked while Deitrick was eating his food,
and that Deitrick said he wanted to talk to his grandmother.
On April 5, at 4:00 P.M., Carpenter reported to work.  He
states that, as he came in, he asked Deitrick how he was doing
and that Deitrick replied that he was fine.  
About an hour later, jail employee Athelyn Jordan, who
also began her shift at 4:00 P.M., had her first and only
interaction with Deitrick when they spoke while she was
passing through the booking area.1  Jordan states that
Deitrick told her that he had been sexually assaulted sometime
before he was jailed and that he needed to see a doctor. 
Jordan testified that Deitrick "did not seem alarmed,
distressed, or emotional" when he told her about the sexual
assault and that she told him she would pass that information
along.
1At various places in the record, Jordan is referred to
as "Jones."  During a deposition, however, Jordan stated that
she has never used the name Jones and did not know why she had
repeatedly been referred to as Jones during the course of this
litigation.
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A video recorded by the camera in the booking area shows
that approximately an hour later, at 6:11 P.M., Deitrick
committed suicide by hanging himself with his bed sheet.  At
6:39 P.M., another inmate who was passing through the booking
area saw Deitrick's body and used a call box to contact
Carpenter in the security-control room.  Carpenter and the
inmate got Deitrick down and telephoned emergency medical
personnel, but Deitrick was pronounced dead on the scene.
Bryant sued various entities and individuals associated
with Greene County and the Greene County Sheriff's Office,
including Carpenter and Jordan, in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama, alleging that
excessive force had been used during Deitrick's arrest, that
he had not been provided with proper medical care, and that
the defendants' negligence had proximately caused Deitrick's
death.  The federal district court dismissed Bryant's lawsuit
after concluding that none of her federal claims were viable. 
But the court noted in its order of dismissal that Bryant
could refile some of her claims in state court if she
concluded that those claims were "appropriate and 
supported by
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law."  Bryant v. Greene Cnty., No. 7:14-CV-519-LSC, July 23,
2014 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (not reported in F.Supp.).
One week later, Bryant did precisely that, filing a
wrongful-death action 
against 
Greene 
County; 
the 
Greene 
County
commissioners, in their official capacities; and Carpenter,
Jordan, and Barbara Collins, the administrator of the Greene
County jail, in their individual and official capacities, in
the Greene Circuit Court.  Bryant eventually withdrew her
claims against all defendants except Carpenter and Jordan.  
Bryant's complaint alleged that Carpenter and Jordan
failed to follow proper procedures for monitoring Deitrick and
that they failed to provide him with necessary medical care. 
Carpenter and Jordan denied Bryant's allegations and 
moved for
summary judgment, arguing (1) that Bryant's claims against
them were barred by § 14-6-1, Ala. Code 1975, which extends
the State immunity held by sheriffs to individuals employed by
a sheriff "to carry out [the sheriff's] duty to operate the
jail and supervise the inmates housed therein" provided that
those employees "are acting within the line and scope of their
duties and are acting in compliance with the law," and (2)
that Deitrick's death was unforeseeable.  The trial court
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granted Carpenter and Jordan's motion and entered a summary
judgment in their favor.  Bryant appealed.
Standard of Review
When a party "appeals from a summary judgment, our review
is de novo."  Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. DPF
Architects, P.C., 792 So. 2d 369, 372 (Ala. 2000).  We
therefore apply the same standard of review the trial court
used to determine whether the trial court had before it
substantial evidence establishing the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact that must be resolved by the
factfinder.  Id.  "Substantial evidence" is "evidence of such
weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the
fact sought to be proved."  West v. Founders Life Assurance
Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).  We further
note that, in reviewing a summary judgment, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and
entertain such reasonable inferences as the jury would have
been free to draw.  Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n v. ECO Pres.
Servs., L.L.C., 788 So. 2d 121, 127 (Ala. 2000).
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Analysis
Bryant's brief is largely devoted to arguing that
Carpenter and Jordan are not entitled to immunity.  Bryant
references § 14-6-1 –– the statute that is the basis of
Carpenter and Jordan's claim of immunity –– but the vast
majority of her argument focuses on the doctrine of State-
agent immunity.  This Court has yet to definitively articulate
how § 14-6-1 should be interpreted.  And while we might
interpret § 14-6-1 in a manner that would dispose of this
case, it would not be prudent for us to make an interpretation
of that statute here, when one party's arguments are largely
directed to other issues, unless the posture of the case
requires us to do so.2  See Cook Transps., Inc. v. Beavers,
528 So. 2d 875, 878 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988) (explaining that an
issue of first impression regarding the proper application of
a statute "must await a better vehicle for interpretation"). 
Ultimately, however, we do not have to interpret § 14-6-1 or
decide whether it applies because the trial court's judgment
2We note that one federal court to consider § 14-6-1 has
concluded that it should be interpreted "in a manner that
would render it more effective than a discretionary-driven
defense already available under state-agent immunity."  Young
v. Myhrer, 243 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1261 (N.D. Ala. 2017).
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is due to be affirmed on the other basis of Carpenter and
Jordan's summary-judgment motion –– that Deitrick's suicide
was not foreseeable.
This Court has previously decided appeals involving
wrongful-death 
claims 
stemming 
from 
the 
suicides 
of
individuals being kept in law-enforcement or mental-health
facilities.  In Popham v. City of Talladega, 582 So. 2d 541,
543 (Ala. 1991), the Court explained the circumstances under
which a party might bear liability for such a suicide:
"The controlling factor in determining whether there
may be a recovery for a failure to prevent a suicide
is whether the defendants reasonably should have
anticipated that the deceased would attempt to harm
himself.  Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 751, 782–92 (1950). 
In Keebler v. Winfield Carraway Hospital, 531 So. 2d
841 
(Ala. 
1988), 
this 
Court 
held 
'that
foreseeability of a decedent's suicide is legally
sufficient only if the deceased had a history of
suicidal 
proclivities, 
or 
manifested 
suicidal
proclivities in the presence of the defendant, or
was admitted to the facility of the defendant
because of a suicide attempt.'  Keeton v. Fayette
County, 558 So. 2d 884, 887 (Ala. 1989)."
See also City of Crossville v. Haynes, 925 So. 2d 944, 951
(Ala. 2005) ("Th[e] test of foreseeability [set forth in
Popham] remains the law applicable today in determining
whether a duty to prevent a suicide exists.").  Applying this
test to the facts of Bryant's case, a factfinder could not
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conclude that Carpenter and Jordan reasonably should have
anticipated that Deitrick would attempt to harm himself while
he was incarcerated in the Greene County jail.  
A. Deitrick had no history of suicidal proclivities
First, there is no allegation, much less evidence, that
Deitrick had a history of suicidal proclivities.  Bryant has
acknowledged that, 
although 
she 
was 
concerned 
about 
Deitrick's
mental health, he never expressly indicated to her that he was
suicidal and she was unaware of any previous suicide attempts. 
Bryant nonetheless emphasizes that she had concerns about
Deitrick's mental health and says that she shared those
concerns with Sheriff Benison.  But  Bryant's own description
of her conversation with Sheriff Benison reveals that her
stated concerns were vague and that suicide was never
mentioned:
"Q.
[By the attorney for Carpenter and Jordan:] 
Tell me about that conversation [with Sheriff
Benison].
"A.
He was passing through [the courthouse], and I
asked him, you know, what was going on, why
didn't my son have a bond, and he said, well,
it's not up to him for him to have a bond.  I
said, 'Well, he don't need to be in jail
because, you know, he's not well.'  And he told
me that, you know, like he say, he got other
charges pending.  And I'm like, 'What?'  And he
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was like, 'Well, like I say, you need to speak
to the judge.'  I said, 'Okay, I plan on doing
that.'
"Q.
That was the conversation?
"A.
That was the conversation.
"Q.
And you said that he was not well?
"A.
Yes.
"Q.  And what did you mean that he was not well?
"A.
I mean that he was depressed and just the vibe. 
Like I said, the vibe I got from him he wasn't
well.
"Q.
And the words that you used to the sheriff was
that he was not well?
"A.
Pretty much I think so that's the word I used."
This conversation was insufficient to put Sheriff Benison on
notice that Deitrick might harm himself.  Moreover, there is
no evidence indicating that Carpenter and Jordan were ever
told of this conversation or that anybody expressed concerns
to them about Deitrick's mental health.  To the contrary, both
Carpenter and Jordan have testified that they were never given
any information indicating that Deitrick might be suicidal or
that he had expressed suicidal ideations.
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B. Deitrick did not manifest suicidal proclivities in the
presence of Carpenter or Jordan
Second, there is no evidence indicating that Deitrick
manifested suicidal proclivities in the presence of Carpenter
or Jordan.  The employee who initially booked Deitrick into
jail stated that Deitrick did not express suicidal ideations
when he was asked whether he had such ideations while being
booked on April 3.  Carpenter confirmed that point in his own
testimony.  Carpenter further stated that there was nothing
remarkable about his interactions with Deitrick on April 4 and
that, when he spoke with Deitrick on April 5, approximately
two hours before his death, Deitrick told him he was doing
fine. 
The only time Jordan interacted with Deitrick was on
April 5, about an hour before he committed suicide, when they
spoke while she was passing through the booking area.  Jordan
states that Deitrick told her at that time that he had been
sexually assaulted sometime before coming to jail and that he
needed to see a doctor.  She further explained that "he did
not seem alarmed, distressed, or emotional" and that she told
him she would pass along that information, but she never got
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the chance to do so because he committed suicide shortly
thereafter.  
Bryant argues that Jordan should have foreseen that
Deitrick might harm himself based on that conversation.  We
disagree.  Deitrick's disclosure of a past sexual assault and
his request for medical attention –– unaccompanied by any
indication that he was suicidal –– cannot be considered a
"manifest[ation of] suicidal proclivities."  Popham, 582 So.
2d at 544.  Bryant has cited no caselaw to support her
argument, and as the federal district court succinctly
explained in its order dismissing Bryant's federal lawsuit: 
"The fact that [Deitrick] hanged himself shortly thereafter
does not retrospectively give [Jordan] knowledge that suicide
was likely."  Bryant, supra.
Bryant makes additional arguments, all of which are
unpersuasive.  She argues that Carpenter and Jordan should
have anticipated that Deitrick might harm himself because, she
says, Deitrick had recently experienced "excessive" pain when
a stun gun was used on him, he was not eating, he had been
exhibiting irrational, impulsive, and aggressive behavior
before he was arrested, and he was facing multiple felony
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charges.  But Bryant has failed to support the stun-gun
allegation with citations to evidence in the record.  Bryant
cites her complaint and other filings in which she previously
made that allegation, but allegations are not evidence.  This
Court has no duty to search the record to determine whether it
contains evidence to support a party's allegation.  Chestang
v. IPSCO Steel (Alabama), Inc., 50 So. 3d 418, 430 (Ala.
2010).
Moreover, the record contains evidence to the contrary. 
See Maxwell v. Dawkins, 974 So. 2d 282, 287 (Ala. 2006)
(affirming a summary judgment when the appellant "identified
no evidence in the record" to support his allegations and
"there [was] evidence to the contrary").  
Specifically, Deputy
Rancher, who used the stun gun on Deitrick, testified that the
prongs did not break Deitrick's skin and that Deitrick never
complained that he was in pain as a result of being stunned. 
And Carpenter and Jordan reinforced in their testimony that
Deitrick never told either of them that he was in pain.  
Bryant has similarly failed to support, with record
evidence, her allegation that Bryant was not eating.  In fact,
the record refutes this allegation, because Carpenter
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testified that Deitrick was eating when he talked to him on
April 4.
Bryant next emphasizes that Carpenter and Jordan, in
their summary-judgment motion, acknowledged that Deitrick was
exhibiting "escalated and aggressive behavior" before he was
taken into custody.  Thus, she argues, they should have been
aware that he might harm himself.  But as Popham and other
cases make clear, it is manifested suicidal proclivities, not
just erratic behavior, that potentially gives rise to a duty
to prevent a suicide.  The evidence in the record indicates
that the sheriff's office was concerned about Deitrick's
resistance before he was taken into custody and that his
behavior was the reason he was placed in the cell in the
booking area, instead of another cell where he would be in
close proximity to other prisoners with whom he might get into
an altercation.  But Sheriff Benison and Deputy Rancher also
testified that Deitrick had not voiced any suicidal thoughts
or exhibited suicidal signs.  In sum, Deitrick's pre-arrest
behavior, while concerning, was not the type of behavior that
would impose a duty upon a party to prevent his suicide.  See
also Smith v. King, 615 So. 2d 69, 73 (Ala. 1993) (concluding
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that staff at a mental-health facility could not have
reasonably foreseen an admitted patient's suicide); Williams
v. Lee Cnty., Alabama, 78 F.3d 491, 493-94 (11th Cir. 1996)
(holding that there was insufficient evidence to permit a jury
to find that a prisoner's suicide was foreseeable even though
the prisoner was being held on an order of the probate court
pending his transfer to a mental-health facility).
The final argument made by Bryant fails as well. 
Carpenter and Jordan could not have reasonably foreseen that
Deitrick might harm himself simply because he was facing
multiple felony charges.  It is not uncommon for county jails
to house prisoners facing multiple felony charges, and the
vast majority of those prisoners do not attempt suicide.
C. Deitrick was not being held in the Greene County jail
because of a suicide attempt
Finally, the undisputed evidence indicates that Deitrick
was not taken into custody and held in the Greene County jail
because of a suicide attempt.  Thus, none of the circumstances
described in Popham would permit a finding that Deitrick's
suicide could have been foreseen –– Deitrick did not have a
history of suicidal proclivities, Deitrick did not manifest
suicidal proclivities in the presence of Carpenter or Jordan,
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and Deitrick was not being held in the Greene County jail
because of a suicide attempt.  582 So. 2d at 544.  
Conclusion
Bryant sued Carpenter and Jordan alleging that they had
negligently performed their duties as employees at the Greene
County jail and that their negligence allowed her son Deitrick
to commit suicide while he was being held in the jail.  But
"[t]he controlling factor in determining whether there may be
a recovery for a failure to prevent a suicide is whether the
defendants reasonably should have anticipated that the
deceased would attempt to harm himself," Popham, 582 So. 2d at
543.  Bryant has failed to put forth evidence that would allow
a factfinder to conclude that Carpenter or Jordan could have
anticipated Deitrick's suicide.  Accordingly, the summary
judgment entered by the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., and Bryan, J., concur.
Shaw and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.
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