Title: STAPLETON v DEVRIES
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12849
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: May 27, 1975

No. 12849 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M O N T A N A 1975 LOUISE STAPLETON, e t a l . , P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, -vs- BEVERLY A. D E VRIES, e t a 1. , Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable C, B, Sande, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Hibbs, Sweeney and Colberg, B i l l i n g s , Montana Maurice Colberg argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondents: F i l l n e r , Snyder and Mudd, B i l l i n g s , Montana R u s s e l l F i l l n e r argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: January 24, 1975 !&RY 2 T 1975 Decided : ' F i l e d : M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendants Beverly A. DeVries, individually and a s executrix of t h e e s t a t e of Amanda DeVries, deceased; E m m a R. Storer; Herman DeVries, J r . ; Loretta M. Kilwein; Gladys J. Weimer; and Marcella K. Buckholz bring t h i s appeal from a judgment of the d i s t r i c t court, Carbon County, awarding plain- t i f f s Louise Stapleton; Dorothy Pihlaja; Ethel Cestnik; and Ruth Johnson, the children of Herman DeVries, deceased, from a p r i o r marriage, each an equal one-tenth share of t h e e s t a t e of Amanda D e V r i e s . Herman DeVries was married twice. As issue of t h e f i r s t marriage were born the p l a i n t i f f s . A s issue of the marriage between Herman and A.manda were born the defendants. Herman died June 14, 1951. In h i s w i l l , he stated: I t I give, devise and bequeath t o m y beloved wife, Amanda DeVries, a l l the balance, residue and re- mainder of m y property of whatever nature, kind o r character which I may own a t the time of m y death t o have and t o hold a s her sole and separate property. I do t h i s with the knowledge t h a t she w i l l be f a i r and equitable t o a l l of m y children, the issue of myself and m y former wife a s w e l l as the issue of herself and myself. I I O n July 15, 1953, i n i t s decree, the d i s t r i c t court dis- tributed ~ e r m a n ' s e s t a t e t o h i s widow Amanda "as her s o l e and separate property, i n accordance with t h e Last W i l l and Testament Amanda died on November 8, 1971, leaving a w i l l which was admitted t o probate. It l e f t a l l her property t o her children, making no mention of p l a i n t i f f s . They contested Amanda's w i l l . Their p e t i t i o n t o contest t h e w i l l was dismissed on the ground t h a t I I they were not interested persons" under the s t a t u t e . P l a i n t i f f s then f i l e d a complaint alleging, i n the alterna- t i v e , t h a t Herman created a t r u s t f o r t h e i r benefit, o r Amanda had contracted t o leave a portion of her property t o them. O n the b a s i s of depositions taken of the four contestants and t h e i r proposed witnesses, and on the basis of t h e e s t a t e f i l e s of Herman and Amanda, the d i s t r i c t court granted summary judgment finding a t r u s t created by Herman f o r the benefit of h i s children by previous marriage, the p l a i n t i f f s . Defendants present three issues f o r review: 1. Was a constructive t r u s t created f o r the benefit of p l a i n t i f f s i n the w i l l of Herman DeVries, deceased? 2. Was there a contract, promise of agreement, whereby Amanda DeVries agreed. t o w i l l a portion of her property t o p l a i n t i f f s ? 3. I f there was e i t h e r such t r u s t o r contract, a r e the claims of p l a i n t i f f s barred by s t a t u t e s of limitation o r laches? Defendants argue there was no constructive t r u s t created by Herman D e ~ r i e s ' w i l l i n favor of p l a i n t i f f s . P l a i n t i f f s argue t h a t such a t r u s t was created and t h a t the second a r t i c l e of ~ e r m a n ' s w i l l , when read i n l i g h t of section 91-201, R.C.M. 1947, which provides t h a t a w i l l is t o be construed according t o the i n t e n t of the t e s t a t o r , creates a constructive t r u s t i n favor of p l a i n t i f f s a s t o t h e i r share of the e s t a t e . The second a r t i c l e i n Herman D e ~ r i e s ' w i l l reads: I I I give, devise and bequeath t o m y beloved wife, Amanda DeVries, a l l the balance, residue and re- mainder of m y property * * * with the knowledge t h a t she w i l l be f a i r and equitable t o a l l of m y children, the issue of myself and m y former wife, a s well a s the issue of herself and myself." This Court construing t h e second a r t i c l e finds t h a t there was no t r u s t created f o r the benefit of the p l a i n t i f f s . The w i l l i s c l e a r on i t s face. It gives t o Amanda D e V r i e s , outright a l l of the property owned by Herman DeVries a t the time of h i s death. The remaining language "with the knowledge t h a t she w i l l be f a i r and equitable t o a l l of m y children, the issue of myself and m y former wife, a s well a s the issue of herself and myself." i s merely precatory language, and does not c r e a t e a t r u s t f o r the bene- f i t of p l a i n t i f f s . Both defendants and p l a i n t i f f s c i t e numerous cases t o support t h e i r arguments. W e find these cases of l i t t l e value. A s s t a t e d i n In r e Sowash's Estate, 62 Cal.App.512, 217 P. 123, "* * 9~ t h e construction t o be placed upon the instrument i s of l i t t l e value a s a precedent i n a i d of t h e construction of another. And t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true of cases involving the existence o r nonexistence of a precatory t r u s t ; f o r previous decisions only served t o i l l u s t r a t e the application of general r u l e s of construction of w i l l s , which, a f t e r a l l , is a matter of impression a s t o the maker's intention made upon the mind of a court considering the w i l l i t s e l f with the circumstances surrounding i t s execution. Each case must of necessity, therefore, depend more o r l e s s upon i t s own peculiar facts. ' 1 A Utah decision c i t e d by defendants, M i l l e r v. Walker 676, Bank & Trust Company, 17 Utah 2d 88, 404 P. 2d 675, /is very similar t o the f a c t s i t u a t i o n found here. The w i l l of the decedent i n t h a t case provided i n p a r t : 'I Second, I give, devise and bequeath t o m y beloved wife, Nettie Ihudsen Miller, a l l of m y property, whether the same be r e a l o r personal o r mixed, and I do t h i s acknowledging a l l m y children hereinafter named, and f o r the reason t h a t I know t h a t m y beloved wife w i l l , care f o r m y children from the remainder of m y e s t a t e , i f there be any, share a l i k e * * 9;. " The Utah court held t h a t there was no constructive t r u s t created by the quoted language, a s alleged by t h e children of the deceased. The court then s t a t e d : 1 l Further persuading us t o t h e conclusion we have reached i s the f a c t t h a t it i s extremely doubtful t h a t the language of the w i l l would j u s t i f y a con- clusion t h a t a t r u s t was intended. Rather the language seems t o indicate c l e a r l y an intention by the t e s t a t o r t o leave t o h i s wife a l l of h i s property t o be used i n accordance with her judgment. H e advisedly acknowledged h i s children and s t a t e d the reason f o r giving the property t o h i s wife, apparently reposing s u f f i c i e n t con- fidence i n her t h a t she would use it properly a s indicated by the language, 'I know t h a t m y beloved wife w i l l care f o r m y children from the remainder of m y e s t a t e , i f there be any, share and share a l i k e . ' Where there i s a c l e a r and unequivocal devise, the statement of t h e rea- sons f o r doing s o does not l i m i t or r e s t r i c t the t e s t a - mentary g i f t . " (Emphasis supplied. ) The f a c t s i t u a t i o n i n Miller i s very similar t o the f a c t s we have before us. Herman DeVries gave a l l the property owned by him t o h i s wife, Amanda, t o have and t o hold a s her s o l e and the separate property. The reason f o r doing so, i.e. ffwith/knowledge t h a t she w i l l be f a i r and equitable t o a l l of m y children" does not l i m i t or r e s t r i c t the testamentary g i f t . Depositions were taken of a l l of p l a i n t i f f s and a deposi- tion was taken of Herman ~ e ~ r i e s ' brother, Martin DeVries, who was 76 a t t h e time of the taking of t h e deposition. None of the children had ever talked t o t h e i r f a t h e r before h i s death o r t o Amanda, a s t o the testamentary d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e i r property. None of them knew anything of an agreement between Herman and Amanda concerning the d i s t r i b u t i o n of ~ e r m a n ' s property. Martin DeVries s t a t e d i n h i s deposition t h a t he discussed ~ e r m a n ' s w i l l with Herman on one of art in's v i s i t s t o Montana from h i s home i n California. Martin recalled t h i s conversation i n h i s testimony: "The only thing t h a t I advised Herman was when we s a t on the porch and I says, have you made a w i l l , because you know the importance of having a w i l l . H e says yes, and I says, have you taken care of a l l of your kids, both families, because you have two families, and he says, I have taken care of every- thing. That i s t h e substance of t h i s conversation and the only conversation t h a t I r e c a l l I ever had with Herman * * *,but never anything with reference t o t h a t , [advising Herman a s an attorney] t h a t I can r e c a l l about the w i l l . I f There i s no evidence i n the record t o support the contention t h a t Herman DeVries intended t o c r e a t e a t r u s t i n favor of plain- t i f f s . The language of t h e w i l l i s not s u f f i c i e n t . Therefore, t h i s Court finds no t r u s t created i n t h e i r favor. P l a i n t i f f s next contend there was an agreement between Amanda and Herman t h a t Amanda would leave her e s t a t e i n equal shares t o a l l of t h e children of Herman DeVries. P l a i n t i f f s reason: t h a t when Herman used the phrase, "with t h e knowledge1' t h a t he had t o obtain t h i s knowledge from h i s wife; t h a t when Amanda, a s executrix of ~ e r m a n ' s e s t a t e , signed t h e f i n a l account and p e t i t i o n f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n of ~ e r m a n ' s e s t a t e which s t a t e d I I t h a t i n pursuance of and according t o the terms and provisions of the Last W i l l and Testament of Herman DeVriesfl t h a t she knew part of t h e terms was t h a t t h e property would go t o her with the knowledge t h a t she would be f a i r and equitable t o a l l of h i s children, and t h a t she had some knowledge of an agreement which t h i s Court can imply was a promise t o equally d i s t r i b u t e the property upon her death. This Court does not agree with t h i s position of p l a i n t i f f s . Nowhere can we find any such knowledge o r implication, e i t h e r from the depositions o r from the w i l l i t s e l f . Amanda's signing of the f i n a l account and p e t i t i o n f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n merely acknowledged t h a t she was doing so under the authority of and i n conformity with the l a s t w i l l and testament of Herman DeVries, and no other implica tion nor knowledge can be alleged t o e x i s t because of the signing. Having found no t r u s t f o r t h e benefit of p l a i n t i f f s , and having found no agreement o r contract t o have existed between Amanda and Henry DeVries a s t o the equal d i s t r i b u t i o n of Amanda's e s t a t e , we do not find i t necessary t o discuss the l a s t question f o r review concerning laches mr t h e s t a t u t e of limitations. The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t court i s reversed and remanded with the instruction t h a t a new judgment be entered i n W e Concur: ----------------I-------------- Chief J u s t i c e ------------------------------= Justices.