Title: Commonwealth v. Shaffer
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 010480
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 1, 2002

PRESENT: Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, JJ., 
and Compton, S.J. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 010480 
 
March 1, 2002 
 
MICHAEL BRIAN SHAFFER 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
At issue in this appeal is the nature of the right to 
operate a motor vehicle in the Commonwealth and the extent of 
the right to obtain judicial review of a determination by the 
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) that a person qualifies as an 
habitual offender. 
 
The facts are undisputed.  In July 1997, the DMV, in an ex 
parte proceeding relying on records of criminal convictions, 
determined Michael Brian Shaffer to be an habitual offender 
pursuant to former Code § 46.2-352(A) (Repl. Vol. 1998), and 
revoked his operator's license effective in August 1997.  In 
July 1997, Shaffer received the notice of revocation. 
 
In 1997, former Code § 46.2-352(B) provided that, "[a]t any 
time after receipt of the revocation notice," a person who had 
been determined to be an habitual offender may file in the 
appropriate circuit court a petition for a hearing and 
determination by the court that the person is not an habitual 
offender. 
 
Effective July 1, 1999, the General Assembly repealed Code 
§§ 46.2-351 through -355, which, of course, included § 46.2-352.  
Acts 1999, chs. 945, 987. 
 
In September 1999, Shaffer filed in the Circuit Court of 
Stafford County the present petition for review of the DMV 
determination.  He alleged that the petition was filed pursuant 
to the provisions of former Code § 46.2-352(B).  The 
Commonwealth objected, asserting that the court lacked 
jurisdiction to entertain the petition because the statute had 
been repealed at the time the petition was filed. 
 
Upon consideration of argument of counsel, the trial court 
dismissed the petition in a November 1999 order, ruling that it 
lacked jurisdiction to review the DMV determination because the 
statute invoked by Shaffer was no longer in force at the time he 
filed his petition. 
 
Shaffer appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia.  That 
court reversed the judgment of the trial court, and ruled that 
Shaffer's right to appeal the DMV's "order determining him to be 
an habitual offender remained extant notwithstanding the repeal 
of Code § 46.2-352."  Shaffer v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 36, 
41, 537 S.E.2d 613, 616 (2000). 
 
The Court of Appeals based its decision upon the following 
statement:  "The right to operate a motor vehicle is a property 
right that cannot be taken away without due process of law."  
 
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Id. at 39, 537 S.E.2d at 615.  Continuing, the court said that 
"[a]t a minimum, a person whose license to drive has been 
rescinded is entitled to a post-deprivation review."  Id.
 
Tracing the evolution of the habitual offender statutes, 
the Court of Appeals pointed out that former Code § 46.2-352(B) 
"did not specify a time period within which a petition for 
review had to be filed."  Id.  The court also noted that in the 
1999 repeal of Code §§ 46.2-351 through -355, "the General 
Assembly did not state that the statute was repealed 
retroactively.  Thus, it did not explicitly eliminate the right 
of those individuals found to be habitual offenders under former 
Code § 46.2-352 to petition for judicial review."  Id. at 40, 
537 S.E.2d at 615. 
 
Concluding, the Court of Appeals stated:  "We decline to 
apply the statutory repeal retroactively absent an expressed 
intent by the legislature to deprive the formerly adjudicated 
habitual offenders of their right to obtain judicial review, 
particularly when the right in question is a property right, 
entitled to due process protection."  Id. at 41, 537 S.E.2d at 
616. 
 
In this appeal, the Attorney General criticizes as "simply 
wrong" the Court of Appeals' statement that "[t]he right to 
operate a motor vehicle is a property right."  On brief, Shaffer 
 
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says he "has never argued that the right to operate a motor 
vehicle is a property right per se." 
 
We agree with the Attorney General.  Neither of the cases 
cited by the Court of Appeals as authority for the erroneous 
proposition supports the idea.  In Walton v. Commonwealth, 255 
Va. 422, 428, 497 S.E.2d 869, 873 (1998), we stated:  "The right 
to operate a motor vehicle is a conditional privilege, which may 
be suspended or revoked in the interest of public safety under 
the police power of the Commonwealth."  We also said:  "It is 
not a fundamental constitutional right; however, the right may 
not be revoked or suspended without due process of law."  Id.
 
In Walton, we relied upon Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 
(1971), also cited by the Court of Appeals.  There, the Supreme 
Court said that once licenses to operate motor vehicles are 
issued, "their continued possession may become essential in the 
pursuit of a livelihood."  Id. at 539.  Continuing, the Supreme 
Court stated:  "Suspension of issued licenses thus involves 
state action that adjudicates important interests of the 
licensees.  In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away 
without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment."  Id.  According to the Supreme Court, "This is but 
an application of the general proposition that relevant 
constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an 
 
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entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a 'right' or 
a 'privilege.'"  Id.
 
It is true that some cases dealing with deprivation of an 
operator's license have labeled a person's interest in the 
continued possession of such a conditional privilege as a 
"property interest," Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 (1979), 
or a "private interest," Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113 
(1977).  However, use of those terms does not mean that the 
right to drive is "a property right" in the sense that it is "a 
fundamental constitutional right."  Walton, 255 Va. at 428, 497 
S.E.2d at 873. 
 
Shaffer argues, however, that the Court of Appeals' 
inaccurate statement is not "central" to its holding that the 
trial court erred.  According to Shaffer, "once the conditional 
privilege to operate a motor vehicle is afforded a citizen by 
licensing," the state cannot "revoke that privilege in an ex 
parte proceeding without affording the citizen any right to be 
heard or to challenge its action."  Shaffer contends the Court 
of Appeals correctly held "that due process prohibits revoking a 
citizen's privilege to operate a motor vehicle without, at a 
minimum, affording the citizen a post-deprivation review." 
 
Shaffer also asserts that the right to petition for 
judicial review set forth in former Code § 46.2-352(B) was "a 
substantive right," and that such right "accrued and vested when 
 
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DMV acted to revoke his license."  He says that the repeal of 
the statute in question "cannot be applied retroactively to 
divest the appeal rights of those whose right to appeal had 
previously vested."  We do not agree with Shaffer's contentions. 
 
Our analysis begins with a restatement of the Walton 
principle that the right to operate a motor vehicle is a 
conditional privilege, which may not be suspended or revoked 
without due process of law.  Therefore, in this case the 
question becomes how much process was due Shaffer. 
 
Initially, we observe, contrary to Shaffer's contentions, 
that the entitlement to judicial review in former Code § 46.2-
352(B) was not a substantive right; it was purely a procedural 
remedy in which Shaffer had no vested interest when the DMV 
revoked his license. 
 
As relevant here, the rule is settled:  Mere matters of 
procedure may be altered, curtailed, or repealed at the will of 
the legislature.  Phipps v. Sutherland, 201 Va. 448, 452, 111 
S.E.2d 422, 425 (1959); Duffy v. Hartsock, 187 Va. 406, 416, 46 
S.E.2d 570, 574 (1948).  Persons are given no "right," in the 
strict sense, to a particular mode of procedure, unless they 
avail themselves of it while the statute is in force.  Phipps, 
201 Va. at 453, 111 S.E.2d at 426. 
 
Addressing the subject of retroactive legislation, we note 
that when Shaffer filed his petition for judicial review, there 
 
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had been a total repeal of the statute giving circuit courts 
authority to review the DMV's determinations.  Contrary to 
Shaffer's argument, a ruling that no statute existed giving the 
courts jurisdiction does not amount to retroactive application 
of the repeal.  Rather, there is a prospective application, 
because the application relates to any petitions for review 
filed subsequent to the effective date of the repeal.  See Code 
§ 1-16 (proceedings had after repeal of former law "shall 
conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the time 
of such proceedings"). 
 
This brings us to consideration of whether, without the 
benefit of the repealed statute, Shaffer's due process rights 
were violated, under Virginia's habitual offender statutory 
scheme, because he failed to receive a post-deprivation remedy.  
To state, in the words of the Court of Appeals, that Shaffer was 
"entitled to a post-deprivation review," Shaffer, 34 Va. App. at 
39, 537 S.E.2d at 615, is not entirely accurate, and is 
misleading in the context of this case.  Assuming he was 
entitled to a post-deprivation review, he failed to resort to 
the adequate due process opportunities that were available. 
 
Code § 46.2-410 was in effect at all times pertinent to 
this case.  It provides for judicial review "in accordance with 
the provisions of the Administrative Process Act (§ 9-6.14:1 et 
seq.)" (APA) of DMV orders suspending or revoking licenses or 
 
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registrations.  The statute provides, however, that "[n]o appeal 
shall lie in any case in which suspension or revocation of the 
license or registration was mandatory except to determine the 
identity of the person concerned when the question of identity 
is in dispute." 
 
Here, revocation of Shaffer's license was mandatory.  
Former Code § 46.2-352(A) provided that the Commissioner of the 
DMV "shall determine, from the Department's records, whether a 
person named therein qualifies as an habitual offender, as 
defined in § 46.2-351 . . . and shall revoke the person's 
driver's license."  Former Code § 46.2-351 provided that "[a]n 
habitual offender shall be any . . . person whose record, as 
maintained in the office of the [DMV], shows that he has 
accumulated the convictions . . . as follows." 
 
However, Shaffer did not avail himself after deprivation of 
the opportunity to dispute his identity by employing the 
provisions of the APA, which permits review by a "timely court 
action," Code § 9-6.14:16(A), subject to a 30-day notice of 
appeal requirement.  Rule 2A:2.  See Tomai-Minogue v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 1228, 1233-36 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(provisions of predecessor to Code § 46.2-410 afforded 
sufficient review of driver's license revocation to satisfy due 
process when revocation mandatory and based on DMV records of 
court judgments). 
 
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Additionally, Shaffer had two years from the July 1997 
revocation until the July 1999 repeal of former § 46.2-352(B) to 
seek judicial review under that statute, but failed to avail 
himself of that post-deprivation opportunity either. 
 
Thus, we hold that, given the foregoing opportunities and 
under these facts, Shaffer was not entitled, after repeal of 
§ 46.2-352(B), to any other post-deprivation review in order to 
satisfy his due process rights. 
 
Consequently, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will be 
reversed and final judgment will be entered here dismissing 
Shaffer's petition for review. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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