Title: Stephens v. Rose
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 131780
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 12, 2014

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
JEFFREY STEPHENS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 131780 
          JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    September 12, 2014 
SHELLIE RAE ROSE 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Lorraine Nordlund, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County erred in issuing a protective order pursuant to 
Code § 19.2-152.10. 
Background 
Shellie Rae Rose (Rose) filed a petition in the General 
District Court of Fairfax County for a protective order 
against her former boyfriend Jeffrey Paul Stephens (Stephens).  
The general district court granted her petition, and Stephens 
appealed to the Circuit Court of Fairfax County. 
The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing and 
found “that [Rose had] been reasonably placed in apprehension 
of bodily injury” by Stephens’ actions, which constituted 
stalking.  It granted Rose’s petition.  Stephens appeals, 
claiming that the circuit court erred in issuing the 
protective order because Rose failed to show that he directed 
an act of violence, force or threat toward her. 
 
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Facts 
In 2007, Stephens and Rose were engaged to be married and 
had dated for approximately four years when they decided to 
end their relationship.  According to Rose, the couple 
separated because Stephens had “become somewhat moody” and had 
“problems with anger management.”  At the hearing in circuit 
court, she said, “It felt like I was walking on eggshells all 
the time.  I didn’t know what triggers would cause him to get 
angry.” 
In 2008, Rose and Stephens communicated infrequently.  
On one occasion, they briefly chatted through online instant 
messaging.  Rose also forwarded two emails to Stephens 
pertaining to doctoral programs in which he might be 
interested.  Soon thereafter Rose emailed Stephens and asked 
that he not call her anymore. 
From 2009 through 2012, Stephens periodically tried to 
contact Rose through email, instant messaging and social 
media.  During this period, he emailed her numerous times, 
sent her seven online instant messages, and tried to contact 
her several times through two social media sites.  However, 
Rose did not respond.  In two of his 2010 emails, Stephens 
acknowledged Rose’s desire not to communicate with him, 
professed his love for her, begged Rose to talk to him and 
expressed sorrow at her refusal to communicate with him. 
 
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Beginning in January 2013, Stephens’ efforts to contact 
Rose escalated suddenly.  On January 2, 2013, Stephens 
unexpectedly visited the home of Rose’s parents in Canton, 
Ohio.  As Rose’s father Gary Rose (Gary) was about to leave 
for work at 6:20 a.m., Stephens approached him in his 
driveway.  Stephens asked where Rose was currently living; 
Gary told Stephens not to contact Rose anymore.  After 
speaking with Stephens, Gary went inside his home and called 
911.  In response, the police stopped Stephens and informed 
him that Gary had complained about his trespassing. 
Upon learning that Stephens had visited her parents’ 
home, Rose became emotionally disturbed and started crying 
because she was afraid.  She asked her current boyfriend to 
start staying with her because she was afraid to be home 
alone. 
Stephens began repeatedly calling Rose at her home and 
leaving voice messages.  Between January 2 and January 9, he 
called forty times.  Stephens blocked his phone number, but 
Rose recognized his voice in the voice messages.  According to 
her boyfriend, Rose became “very upset, visibly upset, 
emotionally upset over the phone calls” from Stephens. 
Rose’s boyfriend twice answered Stephens’ phone calls on 
January 6 and pretended to be Rose’s husband.  He told 
Stephens that Stephens had called the wrong number, that “his 
 
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wife” was not the same Shellie Rose whom Stephens was trying 
to locate.  He also told Stephens if the calls did not stop, 
he would contact the police. 
Stephens also tried to contact Rose at work.  He called 
Rose’s work number and was told she did not work there.  
Undeterred, he sent flowers to Rose’s workplace on January 8; 
Rose returned them. 
On January 9, Stephens called Rose several times between 
2:00 and 3:00 a.m. and appeared at the door to her home around 
7:00 a.m. with flowers.  Rose’s boyfriend called 911.  When 
police arrived, Stephens was not there, but they observed him 
in the parking lot and arrested him.  After Stephens was 
arrested, Rose moved from her home because she was afraid. 
 
At the circuit court hearing on the protective order, 
Rose admitted that she “never directly told [Stephens] to stop 
contacting [her].”  She also testified that Stephens had never 
physically abused or threatened to physically abuse her, her 
family members, or her boyfriend. 
Analysis 
Code § 19.2-152.10 authorizes a court to issue a 
protective order if the petitioner proves by a preponderance 
of the evidence “that [he or she] is or has been, within a 
reasonable period of time, subjected to an act of violence, 
force, or threat.”  Code §§ 19.2-152.9(D) and -152.10(A)(ii). 
 
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Stephens argues that Rose’s “articulated reasons for 
being scared” are not the result of any act of violence, force 
or threat and that the circuit court erred in issuing a 
protective order because he did not commit an act of violence, 
force or threat.  Stephens maintains that both Gary and Rose 
confirmed at the hearing that he has neither physically harmed 
Rose nor threatened to do so. 
An “[a]ct of violence, force, or threat” is defined by 
Code § 19.2-152.7:1 as “any act involving violence, force, or 
threat that results in bodily injury or places one in 
reasonable apprehension of death, sexual assault, or bodily 
injury.”  The statute explicitly states, “Such act includes 
. . . stalking.”  Id. 
The criminal offense of stalking is described in Code § 
18.2-60.3(A): 
Any person . . . who on more than one occasion 
engages in conduct directed at another person with 
the intent to place, or when he knows or reasonably 
should know that the conduct places that other 
person in reasonable fear of death, criminal sexual 
assault, or bodily injury to that other person or to 
that other person's family or household member is 
guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. 
This Court has not had an occasion to address Code 
§ 18.2-60.3(A), but the Court of Appeals has correctly 
identified three elements necessary to prove stalking under 
this statute: (1) the defendant directed his or her conduct 
 
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toward the victim on at least two occasions; (2) the defendant 
intended to cause fear or knew or should have known that his 
or her conduct would cause fear; and (3) the defendant’s 
conduct caused the victim “to experience reasonable fear of 
death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily injury.”  See Parker 
v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 681, 685, 485 S.E.2d 150, 152 
(1997) (decided under a former version of Code § 18.2-60.3). 
Physical harm or threatened physical harm to a victim is 
not a necessary prerequisite to the granting of a protective 
order under Code § 19.2-152.10, because Code §§ 19.2-152.7:1 
and -152.9(D) provide that such an order may be premised upon 
other acts, “includ[ing], but . . . not limited to . . . 
stalking.”  Rose argued at trial, and the circuit court found, 
that she was entitled to a protective order in this case 
because Stephens had stalked her.  Therefore, if Rose proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence that Stephens stalked her, 
the circuit court did not err in issuing the protective order. 
Stephens argues that the evidence does not establish the 
elements of stalking because Rose’s “fear of some 
unarticulated subjective potential harm” is not sufficient to 
do so.  He insists that only “serious, violent and hostile 
conduct . . . is proscribed, not conduct that makes one 
uncomfortable or is annoying.” 
 
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When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence, this Court views the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party below.  Viney v. 
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299, 609 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2005).  We 
presume the circuit court’s decision is correct unless it is 
“plainly wrong” or unsupported by the evidence.  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Our review of the evidence presented to the circuit court 
indicates that it was sufficient to support the issuance of 
the protective order.  There is no question that Stephens 
directed his conduct at Rose.  Over a period of several years, 
Stephens persistently tried to contact Rose online through 
social media and email.  In January 2013, Stephens contacted 
her parents to inquire of her whereabouts, called her at home, 
called her workplace, sent her flowers at work, and visited 
her home.  Thus, Rose’s evidence was sufficient to establish 
the first element of stalking. 
The evidence also established that Stephens should have 
known his actions caused Rose to fear him.  Stephens claimed 
before the circuit court that he did not intend to cause fear 
and that he did not know his actions caused fear, but Code 
§ 18.2-60.3(A) does not require intent to cause fear or even 
actual knowledge.  The mens rea element is satisfied if the 
evidence shows the defendant should have known his conduct 
 
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would cause fear.  See Code § 18.2-60.3(A) (“when he knows or 
reasonably should know that the conduct places that other 
person in reasonable fear of death, criminal sexual assault, 
or bodily injury”) (emphasis added). 
Evidence that the defendant received notice that his 
contacts were unwelcome may be sufficient to support a trial 
court’s finding that the defendant should have known his 
continued contacts would cause fear.  See Parker, 24 Va. App. 
at 685-86, 485 S.E.2d at 152-53 (reasoning that the victim’s 
silence informed the defendant that his contacts were 
unwelcome). 
In this case, the evidence amply supports that finding.  
Soon after they stopped dating, Rose asked Stephens not to 
call her.  For the next four years, Stephens tried 
unsuccessfully to contact Rose through instant messaging, 
email and social media.  Stephens acknowledged in his 2010 
emails that Rose no longer wished to associate with him and 
told her he did not wish to “upset” her.  Cf. id. at 686, 485 
S.E.2d at 153 (“Appellant acknowledged that he was causing the 
victim to experience fear . . . when he said, ‘Don’t be 
afraid.’”).  Additionally, in 2013, Gary told Stephens to 
leave Rose alone and move on with his life.  This should have 
been additional indicia to Stephens that Rose had already done 
the same.  Shortly thereafter, Stephens received a similar 
 
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message from Rose’s boyfriend over the phone.  Moreover, Rose 
returned the flowers Stephens sent to her workplace. 
After several years of seeking a response from Rose to no 
avail, Stephens should have known that his suddenly renewed 
and abnormally persistent efforts to contact Rose were 
unwelcomed and would cause fear.  The evidence is sufficient 
to satisfy the second element of stalking. 
The third element of stalking requires that the 
defendant’s conduct cause the victim to experience “reasonable 
fear of death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily injury.”  
Code § 18.2-60.3(A).  The standard is an objective one.  See 
Parker, 24 Va. App. at 688, 485 S.E.2d at 153 (“By qualifying 
the word fear with the word ‘reasonable,’ the General Assembly 
intended to limit the reach of Code § 18.2-60.3 to conduct 
that would render an ordinary, reasonable person in the 
victim’s circumstances in fear for his or her physical well-
being.”). 
From 2009 until 2012, Rose did not respond to Stephens’ 
efforts to communicate with her over the internet.  In January 
2013, without warning, Stephens reinitiated and dramatically 
escalated his efforts to contact Rose.  He unexpectedly 
appeared at her parents’ home in Ohio early in the morning.  
Shortly after, Rose began receiving an excessive number of 
telephone calls from Stephens, some between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m.  
 
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He sent flowers to her at work and called her office telephone 
number.  Despite Rose’s failure to respond and warnings from 
third parties to leave her alone, Stephens appeared uninvited 
at her home in northern Virginia one week after appearing at 
her parents’ home in Ohio. 
When asked why the police were called, Rose responded, 
“Because I was scared.”  She explained, 
Because I thought this was over.  I thought Mr. 
Stephens had moved on, and I didn’t know what else 
to expect of him. . . .  I’m scared because I don’t 
know how he’s going to react in the future.  I don’t 
know if this is going to happen again.  I need some 
sort of documentation that it has happened to 
protect me in an event that harm should occur. 
A victim need not specify what particular harm she fears to 
satisfy the third element of stalking.  See Parker, 24 Va. 
App. at 685-86, 485 S.E.2d at 152 (upholding the trial court’s 
finding of sufficient evidence of reasonable fear of bodily 
harm, “[a]lthough the victim did not specify that she was 
afraid for her physical well-being”). 
Other evidence corroborated Rose’s claim of being afraid 
of bodily harm.  Rose became emotionally upset and cried when 
she learned that Stephens had visited her parents’ home.  In 
fact, she was so afraid that she asked her boyfriend to stay 
with her at her home.  When presented with this evidence, we 
cannot say the circuit court was plainly wrong in determining 
 
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that Rose was reasonably afraid of criminal sexual assault or 
bodily injury. 
Conclusion 
Code § 19.2-152.7:1 expressly includes stalking as an act 
of violence, force or threat.  There is sufficient evidence to 
support the circuit court’s finding of stalking on the part of 
Stephens under Code § 18.2-60.3(A).  Therefore, we hold that 
the circuit court did not err in granting Rose’s petition for 
a protective order under Code § 19.2-152.10.  The judgment of 
the circuit court will be affirmed. 
Affirmed.