Title: Johnson v. Johnson
Citation: 105 Ariz. 233, 462 P.2d 782
Docket Number: 9745-PR
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 1969

105 Ariz. 233 (1969) 462 P.2d 782 Charlotte M. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. Robert J. JOHNSON, Appellee. No. 9745-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Banc. December 19, 1969. Rehearing Denied January 13, 1970. *234 James H. Garcia and Raymond Huffsteter, Phoenix, for appellant. Price, Tinney &amp; Lindberg, by John Price, Tucson, for appellee. McFARLAND, Justice: This case is before us on a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, 10 Ariz. App. 14, 455 P.2d 463, affirming the judgment of the trial court. The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed in part and modified in part. The Superior Court of Pima County, Arizona, on November 4, 1963, having jurisdiction over all the parties, decreed that the marriage relationship existing at that time between plaintiff Charlotte M. Johnson (Mrs. Johnson) and defendant Robert J. Johnson (Mr. Johnson) be dissolved. By the original decree Mrs. Johnson was awarded the custody of the minor child, Alan Johnson, now seventeen years of age, with visitation rights for Mr. Johnson. The decree also provided for payment of alimony and child support by Mr. Johnson. *235 On November 16, 1965, the decree was amended retaining the custody of Alan with Mrs. Johnson, but permitting her to remove Alan "from the State of Arizona, at any time, either permanently or temporarily"; also that in the event Mrs. Johnson moved her residence and that of Alan from Pima County she keep Mr. Johnson informed of her residence, Alan's activities and schooling, and permit Mr. Johnson to correspond with Alan without delay or hindrance. The court further ordered that defendant (Mr. Johnson) might relieve himself from paying alimony by filing an affidavit in non-compliance with these provisions until such time as plaintiff (Mrs. Johnson) would appear before the court and show cause. Under this authority Mrs. Johnson subsequently, together with Alan, changed her residence, first to Tennessee, thence to Utah, and, finally, about August 1967, she established her domicile in California and continues to reside there to this date. On March 17, 1966, Mr. Johnson filed an affidavit of non-compliance with the court, and ceased making alimony payments. Further affidavits of non-compliance were filed by Mr. Johnson on the following dates: July 11, 1966; February 2, 1967; and September 14, 1967. He asserted in the affidavits that he was not receiving information regarding progress, activities and report cards of Alan that he was not being furnished with the requested necessary information pertaining to Alan's vacations and that Alan was not sent to him for a scheduled visitation. On May 16, 1968, Mr. Johnson filed with the court a petition for an order to show cause and to amend the decree of divorce. On the date set for hearing on Mr. Johnson's petition, the trial court specifically stated in the record that Mrs. Johnson was served with notice of the hearing by having been mailed copies of the appropriate documents to her last-known address of record (in California), and further stated that receipt of the documents by her was evidenced by a return receipt bearing her signature. The trial judge, after stating in the record that neither Mrs. Johnson nor her attorney was present, proceeded with the hearing on Mr. Johnson's petition. After hearing, the trial court ordered as follows: The record shows that Mr. Johnson received some letters from Mrs. Johnson and *236 her attorney advising him of Alan's health, progress in school, and the new address, when Mrs. Johnson and Alan left Utah for California. In fact, Mr. Johnson testified that: Regarding Mrs. Johnson's failure to send Alan to Arizona for visitation purposes, he testified: Mr. Johnson did not testify as to the reason given him by the attorney as to why Alan was not sent to Arizona, and there is nothing in the record to show that Mrs. Johnson wilfully did not send the boy, or if there was a good reason for not sending him. Apparently at the time of the present hearing Alan had become involved with the juvenile authorities in California, as was stated by Mr. Johnson: Mr. Johnson did not testify of any effort he had made to assist his son in his present difficulty, nor does he definitely state he will do so if the decree is modified, as indicated by the following testimony: "A Yes, I believe I will. The facts in the instant case show that Mrs. Johnson, under authority of the modified decree of the Superior Court of Pima County, legally changed her domicile and that of the minor child, Alan, to the State of California; that neither the mother nor Alan were physically present in the State of Arizona nor personally served with process in the State of Arizona; that their domicile is in the State of California, and that Alan was at the time of the hearing under the jurisdiction of the juvenile authorities of that state. The questions presented by the mother are: (1) Whether under these facts the court had jurisdiction to change the custody of the minor child to Mr. Johnson; (2) Does the court have jurisdiction to cancel alimony accrued before petition is made to modify the decree? (3) Does the court, under the facts set forth in Question No. 1, have jurisdiction to find plaintiff in contempt of court for failure to comply with a writ of habeas corpus where the plaintiff is not personally served with the writ in the State of Arizona? The answer to the first question requires a determination as to whether the jurisdiction of a court having original jurisdiction to award the custody of a child continues after the domicile of the child and the party given custody thereof has been changed to another state. The question is similar to that posed by Professor Ehrenzweig: The courts of the several states have followed different rules in answering questions of the jurisdiction of the court where the domicile of the child is in another state. Some have held that, once obtained, the jurisdiction is a continuing one, subject to modification regardless of the domicile of the parties, including that of the child. Others have adopted the theory of continuing jurisdiction in the state which issued the original decree with concurrent jurisdiction in the state of the child's domicile. Corkill v. Cloninger (Mont.) 454 P.2d 911. Still others hold that jurisdiction lies in the state where the child is legally domiciled and physically present. In re Guardianship of Fox, 212 Or. 80, 318 P.2d 933; 4 A.L.R. 2d 7, § 17. A development of the latter rule is that a state obtains jurisdiction of a nondomiciliary child and may alter a foreign custody decree if the child is physically present in the state of the forum, even though temporarily. Wicks v. Cox, 146 Tex. 489, 208 S.W.2d 876, 4 A.L.R.2d 1. Some of those states which reject jurisdiction if the child is not a domiciliary, and those which accept jurisdiction despite the state of domicile, declaim that this is not a hard and fast rule. The Texas court, in Wicks v. Cox, supra, referring to it as a "rather unusual child custody case," assumed the child to be domiciled in Virginia, but upheld the jurisdiction of the Dallas District Court because the child and its *238 mother were physically present in the forum. But the court hastened to add: On the other hand the Oregon court, in Application of Lorenz, 194 Or. 355, 241 P.2d 142, rehearing denied, sub nom. Ex parte Lorenz, 242 P.2d 200, after affirming that jurisdiction is lost after the child becomes legally domiciled in another state, added: Implicit in all the foregoing decisions is the overriding consideration for the welfare of the child of the broken marriage. This Court has emphasized that the primary, paramount, and controlling consideration is the welfare of the child. The courts of the state of domicile are in a much better position to inquire into a change of circumstances surrounding children, and, under the doctrine of parens patriae, they have the primary obligation to care for the general welfare of their own citizens. We have adopted this principle in making our determinations of the jurisdiction of the court in regard to cases where one of the parents has been given legal custody of a child, and has, with permission of the court, established a domicile in another state. In order to determine the best interest of the child there must be evidence of the conditions under which the child *239 lives. In a case involving custody this would be very difficult, and, in some instances impossible, to present properly to a court of a state other than of the domicile of the child and the parent. For example the child might be in the custody of a devoted mother who is not making any more money than is necessary for the support of herself and the education and support of the child. She would be unable to pay the expenses of witnesses, even if they would take the time to go to a far-away state to testify, or even pay the expense of taking depositions. This Court, in In re Hughes, 73 Ariz. 97, 237 P.2d 1009, followed this principle. In that case the mother and father were divorced in California. The care and custody of the child was awarded the father. The father thereafter obtained a modification of the divorce decree permitting him to remove the child to Arizona. He thereafter moved to Phoenix, Arizona, and the mother became a resident of the State of Texas. The mother went back to California, and secured a modification of the decree giving her the custody of the child. Neither the father nor the child were in the State of California, nor were they present at the hearing at which the decree was modified. We held jurisdiction was in the State of Arizona. In holding that California did not have jurisdiction, we said: In that decision we recognized the rule that full faith and credit should be given to a decree of a court of another state at the time that it had jurisdiction of the minor and the parents. However, the paramount concern of the court in custody proceedings is the welfare of the child, so where change in circumstances has occurred since that decree which shows the welfare of the child would be better served by a change of custody such change could be made by the court having jurisdiction (in that instance, the Arizona court) by showing such a change in *240 conditions. This we made plain when we further said, in In re Hughes, supra: We cited with approval Griffin v. Griffin, 95 Or. 78, 187 P. 598, where that court said: In Ex Parte Lorenz, supra, the Oregon Court reaffirmed its stand, as follows: In Byers v. Superior Court, 61 Ariz. 284, 148 P.2d 999, we stated: However, we wish to make it indelibly clear that our holdings do not countenance the "stealing" of a child and taking it to another state for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction there. That would not change *241 the legal domicile of the child.[1] This was clearly expressed in Ex parte Lorenz, supra: This is called the doctrine of unclean hands. See Ehrenzweig, supra, § 88, p. 293. Under the state of facts in the instant case we hold that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in changing the custody of Alan from Mrs. Johnson to Mr. Johnson. It would seem that if the appellee feels that he has a well-founded case he should not hesitate to bring it before the proper California court where all the evidence relative to the welfare of the child is readily available. The second question is whether the trial court erred in cancelling accrued payments for alimony and child support. The court's order, filed on June 7, 1968, relieved the appellee from further payments as of March 1, 1966. The appellee had already ceased making these payments, relying on his affidavit filed on March 17, 1966, and the amended order, dated November 16, 1966. That order said, in part: There is no provision in the law, nor could there be, that a party himself may decide to stop alimony and support payments by *242 the mere filing of an affidavit. That part of the November 16th order that purported to give Mr. Johnson this privilege is a nullity in that it constitutes an unlawful delegation of the court's authority to determine facts which justify a modification of payments. Under this provision of the decree the father makes an ex parte determination that the mother has not complied with the order of the court, and by filing an affidavit of such determination setting forth the facts upon which he made such a finding of non-compliance stops the payment to an indefinite date. For them to be re-instated the mother must file a petition showing cause why payments should be resumed on a current or retroactive basis. The courts have held that such power is vested only in the court and may not be delegated to any one else. Washburn v. Washburn, 49 Cal. App. 2d 581, 122 P.2d 96. In the case of Washburn v. Washburn, supra, in passing upon the authority of the court to delegate its power of decision in regard to custody of children, it was held: See also Rea v. Rea, 195 Or. 252, 245 P.2d 884, 35 A.L.R.2d 612; Hosford v. Henry, 107 Cal. App. 2d 765, 238 P.2d 91; Nelson v. Nelson, 180 Or. 275, 176 P.2d 648. We accordingly hold that the order of the court terminating alimony could be retro-active only to the date of the filing of the petition on May 16, 1968. McClanahan v. Hawkins, 90 Ariz. 139, 367 P.2d 196; Johnson v. Johnson, 46 Ariz. 535, 52 P.2d 1162. Our holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to change custody of Alan Johnson disposes of the issue of Mrs. Johnson's alleged contempt. Therefore, the contempt judgment is of no force or effect. The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated; the judgment of the Superior Court relating to custody and contempt is vacated; the judgment regarding payments of alimony and child support is reversed, and the matter remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. UDALL, C.J., LOCKWOOD, V.C.J., and STRUCKMEYER and HAYS, JJ., concur. [1] The cases following this theory hold that the domicile must be in a state to give the court jurisdiction to change custody. Serving a parent where the parent and child are temporarily in a state does not give the court of the state of temporary residence jurisdiction, or deprive the state of domicile of its jurisdiction The violation of orders of the court where jurisdiction is based on temporary residence is not always such that it offends the doctrine of unclean hands. While other matters were discussed, and the ruling based primarily on the change of circumstances, this was in effect the holding in In re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 413 P.2d 744.