Title: Michigan v. Warren (Opinion on Application)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 158065
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: April 29, 2020

PEOPLE v WARREN 
 
Docket No. 158065.  Argued on application for leave to appeal November 6, 2019.  
Decided April 29, 2020. 
 
 
Kelly Warren pleaded guilty in the Mecosta Circuit Court to two separate charges of 
operating a vehicle while intoxicated, third offense (OWI-3rd), MCL 257.625, in exchange for the 
dismissal of other criminal charges against him and of the sentence enhancement to which he was 
subject as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12(1)(b).  At the plea hearing, the trial 
court, Peter M. Jaklevic, J., noted on the record that each charge carried with it a maximum penalty 
of five years’ imprisonment, but the court did not inform defendant that it had the discretionary 
authority to sentence him to consecutive sentences under MCL 768.7b(2)(a) because he had 
committed the second OWI-3rd charge while the first OWI-3rd charge was pending.  The trial 
court ultimately sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of 2 to 5 years, which subjected 
defendant to a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment.  Defendant filed a timely motion to withdraw 
his plea on the basis of the court’s failure to advise him of the possibility of consecutive sentencing.  
The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals denied defendant’s delayed application 
for leave to appeal.  The Supreme Court then remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for 
consideration as on leave granted with directions to compare People v Johnson, 413 Mich 487 
(1982)—which held that the former court rule governing pleas, GCR 1963, 785.7, did not require 
the trial court to advise a defendant of potential sentence consequences such as consecutive 
sentencing—with People v Blanton, 317 Mich App 107 (2016), which held that the trial court was 
required to inform the defendant that he was subject to a two-year mandatory consecutive sentence 
for possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm).  500 Mich 1056 
(2017).  On remand, the Court of Appeals, M. J. KELLY and CAMERON, JJ. (GLEICHER, P.J., 
dissenting), affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences in an unpublished per curiam opinion 
issued May 17, 2018 (Docket No. 333997).  The majority concluded that Michigan caselaw, 
including Johnson and Blanton, was not dispositive of the issue and that neither the Michigan 
Court Rules nor due process required the court to inform defendant that it had the discretion to 
impose consecutive sentences.  Defendant sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which 
ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action.  503 
Mich 988 (2019). 
 
 
In an opinion by Justice MARKMAN, joined by Chief Justice MCCORMACK and Justices 
BERNSTEIN, CLEMENT, and CAVANAGH, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, 
held: 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Bridget M. McCormack 
Chief Justice Pro Tem: 
David F. Viviano 
 
 
 
Justices: 
Stephen J. Markman 
Brian K. Zahra 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
 
MCR 6.302(B)(2) requires a trial court, in cases in which such advice is relevant, to advise 
a defendant of its discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority and the possible consequences of 
that authority for the defendant’s sentence, because this authority clearly affects the defendant’s 
“maximum possible prison sentence for the offense.”  The trial court in this case erred when it 
denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea because the court failed to apprise defendant of 
this authority and its possible consequences for his sentence. 
 
 
1.  MCR 6.302(A) provides that a trial court may not accept a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere unless it is convinced that the plea is understanding, voluntary, and accurate.  To ensure 
that a defendant understands the consequences of his or her plea, MCR 6.302(B)(2) requires the 
trial court to advise the defendant of the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense and 
any mandatory minimum sentence required by law.   
 
 
2.  The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that no Michigan caselaw had resolved 
whether MCR 6.302(B)(2) requires courts to inform defendants of discretionary consecutive-
sentencing authority before accepting a guilty or no-contest plea.  Although Johnson observed that 
the prior version of MCR 6.302 did not require trial courts to inform defendants of potential 
sentence consequences such as consecutive sentencing, that statement was dictum.  And while 
Blanton held that trial courts must inform a defendant pleading guilty to felony-firearm that the 
sentence would include a mandatory two-year term of imprisonment that would be served before 
the sentences for the underlying substantive offenses, which would be served consecutively to the 
felony-firearm sentence, this holding was based on the “mandatory minimum sentence” language 
of MCR 6.302(B)(2) and not the “maximum possible prison sentence” language of the rule, and 
therefore it was also not dispositive of the issue in this case. 
 
 
3.  The phrase “maximum possible prison sentence” within MCR 6.302(B)(2) is not defined 
by the court rules.  Considering the dictionary definitions of “maximum” and “possible,” MCR 
6.302(B)(2) requires advising defendants of the maximum allowable prison sentence under the 
law, as well as under the particular circumstances of the case, whether that is the actual sentence 
that eventually transpires.  The modifying phrase “for the offense” does not indicate that a court 
must only advise defendants of the maximum possible prison sentence for each separate or discrete 
offense because the “maximum possible prison sentence for the offense” is additionally and 
materially affected by the possibility of consecutive sentencing; therefore, defendants must be 
facilitated in fully understanding the potential consequences of the trial court’s discretionary 
consecutive-sentencing authority.  In this case, the trial court’s authority to impose a consecutive 
sentence derived from MCL 768.7b, which effectively constitutes an enhanced punishment 
designed to deter persons from committing additional crimes while other charges are already 
pending by postponing the moment at which sentencing for one or more subsequent offenses will 
commence and thereby increasing the total duration of potential incarceration.  Thus, the fact of 
consecutive sentencing constitutes highly relevant information that directly implicates the 
“maximum possible prison sentence for the offense” under MCR 6.302(B)(2).  Further, MCR 
1.107 provides that words used in the singular also apply to the plural, where appropriate.  
Accordingly, MCR 6.302(B)(2) is reasonably read as requiring trial courts to inform defendants 
of “the maximum possible prison sentence for the offenses.”  Therefore, when a trial court advises 
a defendant of his or her “maximum possible prison sentence,” this must encompass not only the 
“maximum possible prison sentence” for each individual “offense,” but also the “maximum 
possible prison sentence” for the conviction of “offenses” specifically as to which the trial court 
possesses an authority to impose consecutive sentences.  Defendant was instructed that each OWI-
3rd conviction carried a five-year maximum term of imprisonment, which, if imposed 
concurrently, would amount to a maximum possible sentence of five years’ imprisonment.  
However, because of the trial court’s discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority, defendant 
actually faced, and received, a maximum possible sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.  This was 
the “maximum possible prison sentence for the offenses” under the most reasonable understanding 
of MCR 6.302(B)(2).  Reading the word “sentence” in the plural, as well as the word “offense,” 
would have led to the same conclusion, because where “sentences” are imposed, the possibility of 
a consecutive sentence becomes a possibility affecting the defendant’s “maximum possible prison 
sentence” on such multiple “sentences.”  The Court’s interpretation of MCR 6.302(B)(2) was also 
consistent with People v Brown, 492 Mich 684 (2012), which held that even though MCR 6.302(B) 
did not expressly require trial courts to advise defendants of habitual-offender enhancements, 
MCR 6.302(B)(2) nonetheless required courts to advise of the maximum possible prison sentence 
with the habitual-offender enhancement because the enhanced maximum became the maximum 
possible prison sentence for the principal offense. 
 
 
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
 
 
Justice ZAHRA, joined by Justice VIVIANO, dissenting, stated that the plain language of 
MCR 6.302(B) does not require trial courts to calculate a defendant’s potential aggregate 
maximum possible prison sentence resulting from the imposition of consecutive sentences and that 
there was nothing in the court rule to suggest that “sentence” should be read as “aggregate 
sentence.”  While he agreed that Michigan caselaw had not resolved this issue, he noted that 
persuasive federal caselaw interpreting the analogous federal rule, which is broader in scope than 
MCR 6.302(B), held that informing a defendant of mandatory consecutive sentencing was not 
required.  He also disagreed with the majority’s application of the number canon of construction 
to MCR 6.302(B), noting that a consistent application would have required only that defendant be 
advised of the maximum possible prison sentence for each of the two offenses to which he pleaded 
guilty, which the trial court did.  Justice ZAHRA further observed that the Supreme Court had 
previously considered and rejected proposals to expressly require by court rule that trial courts 
advise a defendant about the possibility of consecutive sentencing.  He would have held that the 
possibility of consecutive sentences pursuant to MCL 768.7b was a collateral rather than a direct 
consequence of defendant’s guilty pleas because the trial court had discretion whether to impose 
consecutive sentences and that due process therefore did not require that the trial court inform 
defendant that he was subject to consecutive sentencing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2020 State of Michigan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FILED  April 29, 2020 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 158065 
 
KELLY CHRISTOPHER WARREN, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
MARKMAN, J.  
At issue is whether, prior to accepting a guilty or no-contest plea, the trial court, in 
cases in which such advice is relevant, is required to advise a defendant that the court 
possesses discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority and to apprise the defendant as 
to the potential consequences of that authority for his or her sentence.  We conclude that 
the trial court is required to do so under MCR 6.302(B)(2).  As a result, the trial court here 
erred when it denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea because the court failed to 
apprise him of both this authority and its potential consequences.  We therefore reverse the 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Bridget M. McCormack  
 
Chief Justice Pro Tem: 
David F. Viviano 
 
 
Justices: 
Stephen J. Markman 
Brian K. Zahra 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
 
 
 
 
 
2
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court to allow defendant to either 
withdraw his guilty plea or to reaffirm this plea.  See People v Brown, 492 Mich 684, 702; 
822 NW2d 208 (2012). 
I.  FACTS & HISTORY 
In November 2014, defendant drove while intoxicated and then did so again the 
following summer while on bond for the first crime.  In each case, he was charged, among 
other crimes, with operating a vehicle while intoxicated, third offense (OWI-3rd), MCL 
257.625, and the prosecutor provided notice that defendant was subject to a sentence 
enhancement as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12(1)(b).  Defendant agreed 
to plead guilty to one count of OWI-3rd in each case in exchange for dismissal of the 
remaining charges and the habitual-offender enhancement.  At the plea hearing, after the 
prosecutor informed the trial court of the agreement, the court asked the following: 
The Court:  All right.  And each of the charges carries with it, absent 
the habitual, a five year maximum charge; is that correct, folks? 
[Prosecutor]:  Yes. 
[Defense Counsel]:  Yes. 
Thereafter, the court questioned defendant to ensure that his plea was understanding, 
voluntary, and accurate under MCR 6.302.  Yet at no point did the court inform defendant 
that it possessed the discretionary authority to sentence him to consecutive sentences 
because he had committed a felony (the second OWI-3rd charge) while disposition of 
another felony (the first OWI-3rd charge) had been pending.  MCL 768.7b(2)(a). 
The trial court ultimately sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of 2 to 5 
years.  Because these sentences were to be served consecutively, defendant was subject to 
 
 
 
3
a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment, twice the maximum of 5 years’ imprisonment had 
the sentences been imposed concurrently.  Defendant filed a timely motion to withdraw his 
plea based upon the court’s failure to have advised him of the possibility of consecutive 
sentencing.  The trial court denied this motion and the Court of Appeals denied leave to 
appeal.  This Court then remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave 
granted with directions to compare People v Johnson, 413 Mich 487, 490; 320 NW2d 876 
(1982) (holding that the former court rule governing pleas, GCR 1963, 785.7, did not 
“require advice as to other potential sentence consequences such as consecutive 
sentencing”) with People v Blanton, 317 Mich App 107, 119-120; 894 NW2d 613 (2016) 
(holding that the court was required to inform the defendant that he was subject to a two-
year mandatory consecutive sentence for possessing a firearm during the commission of a 
felony, or “felony-firearm”).  People v Warren, 500 Mich 1056 (2017). 
In a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s convictions and 
sentences.  People v Warren, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, 
issued May 17, 2018 (Docket No. 333997).  The majority concluded that Michigan 
caselaw, including Johnson and Blanton, was not dispositive of the issue and that neither 
the Michigan Court Rules nor due process required the court to inform defendant that it 
possessed the discretion to impose consecutive sentences.  Id. at 2-5.  The dissent would 
have held that “a possible consecutive sentence is a fact as important as the maximum 
penalty for each charge, and therefore an integral component of a voluntary and 
 
 
 
4
understanding plea.”  Id. at 1 (GLEICHER, J., dissenting).  Defendant sought leave to appeal 
in this Court and we heard oral argument on the application.1   
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 
withdraw a plea.”  Brown, 492 Mich at 688.  An abuse of discretion occurs when the 
decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes.  Woodard v Custer, 476 Mich 545, 
557; 719 NW2d 842 (2006).  The interpretation of court rules is reviewed de novo.  People 
v Lee, 489 Mich 289, 295; 803 NW2d 165 (2011). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A defendant has the “right to withdraw any plea until the court accepts it on the 
record.”  MCR 6.310(A).  Once the trial court has accepted the plea, there is no longer any 
absolute right to withdraw the plea.  People v Gomer, 206 Mich App 55, 56; 520 NW2d 
360 (1994).  Following sentencing, a trial court may withdraw a guilty plea if “there was 
an error in the plea proceeding that would entitle the defendant to have the plea set 
                                              
1 According to the Offender Tracking Information System maintained by the Michigan 
Department of Corrections (MDOC), defendant was paroled on January 7, 2020, after 
serving four years of his sentence.  However, because defendant is challenging his 
underlying conviction, his parole does not affect our ability to decide the merits of this case 
and afford a remedy for any alleged error.  Additionally, defendant is under the supervision 
of MDOC until January 2021 and any parole violation could result in the revocation of his 
parole, which would then subject him to the remainder of his term of imprisonment.  “An 
issue is moot when an event occurs that renders it impossible for the reviewing court to 
fashion a remedy to the controversy.”  People v Cathey, 261 Mich App 506, 510; 681 
NW2d 661 (2004).  But an issue is not moot “if it will continue to affect a party in some 
collateral way.”  Id.  Because defendant here is challenging his conviction and remains 
subject to the supervision of MDOC, the instant issue is not moot, and we will decide its 
merits despite the fact that defendant has recently been paroled.  
 
 
 
5
aside . . . .”  MCR 6.310(C)(4).  In other words, “[a] defendant seeking to withdraw his or 
her plea after sentencing must demonstrate a defect in the plea-taking process.”  Brown, 
492 Mich at 693.  Thus, the issue here is whether the trial court’s failure to inform 
defendant of the possibility of consecutive sentences constitutes a sufficient defect in the 
plea-taking process to require judicial relief.  To determine whether there is such a defect, 
we must first give meaning to the relevant court rule, MCR 6.302. 
“The court may not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless it is convinced 
that the plea is understanding, voluntary, and accurate.”  MCR 6.302(A).  “[T]his requires 
a defendant to be informed of the consequences of his or her plea and, necessarily, the 
resultant sentence.”  Brown, 492 Mich at 693 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  To 
ensure that a defendant’s plea satisfies these requirements, the trial court, before accepting 
such a plea, “must place the defendant or defendants under oath and personally carry out 
subrules (B)–(E).”  MCR 6.302(A).  Specifically relevant to the instant case are the 
requirements under Subrule (B), which addresses understanding pleas: 
 
(B) An Understanding Plea.  Speaking directly to the defendant or 
defendants, the court must advise the defendant or defendants of the 
following and determine that each defendant understands: 
*   *   * 
 
(2) the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense and any 
mandatory minimum sentence required by law, including a requirement for 
mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring under MCL 750.520b or 
750.520c[.]  [MCR 6.302(B)(2).] 
Defendant argues that a trial court must advise persons in his circumstances when 
the court possesses the discretion to impose consecutive sentences because such sentences 
 
 
 
6
affect the “maximum possible prison sentence.”  MCR 6.302(B)(2).  That is, if the trial 
court only advised the defendant that he or she faced a maximum penalty of five years’ 
imprisonment, when, in fact, he or she was facing a maximum penalty of 10 years’ 
imprisonment as a consequence of a consecutive sentence, the trial court would have failed 
to inform the defendant of the “maximum possible prison sentence” and thus the defendant 
would not have fully understood the consequences of the plea.2  Conversely, the prosecutor 
argues that the court rule does not explicitly require the trial court to inform defendants of 
discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority.  Rather, trial courts are only required to 
advise a defendant of the “maximum possible prison sentence for the offense,” meaning 
that they are only required to inform defendants of the maximum sentence for each separate 
or discrete conviction.  MCR 6.302(B)(2) (emphasis added).  And in the instant case, this 
was done: the trial court properly advised defendant that the maximum possible prison 
sentence for each of his OWI-3rd convictions was five years’ imprisonment.  To resolve 
this matter, we must undertake two related analyses: first, we must determine the extent to 
which prior caselaw governs the resolution of this issue and, second, if prior caselaw does 
not do so, we must determine in the first instance the proper understanding of MCR 
6.302(B)(2).   
                                              
2 We are cognizant that the trial court informed defendant that he faced a maximum of five 
years’ imprisonment on each of his OWI-3rd convictions and therefore that he could have 
assumed that he was subject to the sum total of 10 years’ imprisonment.  However, we are 
not prepared to operate upon the assumption that defendant was properly informed here on 
the basis that he believed, mistakenly, that as a general rule his sentences would be imposed 
consecutively.  See People v Ryan, 295 Mich App 388, 401; 819 NW2d 55 (2012) (“In 
Michigan, concurrent sentencing is the norm, and a consecutive sentence may be imposed 
only if specifically authorized by statute.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).   
 
 
 
7
A.  CASELAW 
We agree with the Court of Appeals majority that Michigan caselaw has not 
resolved the determinative question in this case: whether MCR 6.302(B)(2) requires courts 
to inform defendants of discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority before accepting a 
guilty or no-contest plea.  We first address this Court’s decision in Johnson and then the 
Court of Appeals’ decision in Blanton, because we specifically directed the Court of 
Appeals on remand to assess these specific decisions to determine what relevance, if any, 
these bear to the issue at hand.   
In Johnson, the issue concerned whether the former court rule regarding pleas, GCR 
1963, 785.7, required trial courts to inform defendants of the consequences of MCL 
791.233b, then known as “Proposal B.”  Johnson, 413 Mich at 488.  Under this law, a 
defendant was “not eligible for parole until he or she has served the minimum sentence 
imposed by the court, undiminished by allowance for good time, special good time, or 
special parole.”  Id. at 488 n 1.  We held that trial courts were not required to inform 
defendants of the consequences of Proposal B because the court rule did not expressly 
require trial courts to inform defendants of those consequences.  Id. at 490.  In so holding, 
we also observed that the prior version of MCR 6.302 had not required trial courts to inform 
defendants of “other potential sentence consequences such as consecutive sentencing.”  Id.  
However, the issue in dispute in Johnson did not generally involve the consequences of 
consecutive sentencing, but rather only the specific consequences of Proposal B; thus, its 
generalized statement on consecutive sentencing effectively constituted dictum because it 
was unnecessary to the resolution of the issue in Johnson.  See People v Peltola, 489 Mich 
 
 
 
8
174, 190 n 32; 803 NW2d 140 (2011).  For that reason, we do not find Johnson dispositive 
of the issue in the present case. 
And in Blanton, the Court of Appeals held that trial courts must inform a defendant 
pleading guilty to felony-firearm that “(1) he would be sentenced to a mandatory two-year 
term of imprisonment, (2) this term of imprisonment would be served first, and (3) the 
concurrent sentences for [the underlying substantive offenses] would be served 
consecutively to the felony-firearm sentence.”  Blanton, 317 Mich App at 120.  The 
rationale for this holding was that MCR 6.302(B)(2) required trial courts to advise 
defendants of “any mandatory minimum sentence required by law,” and that “when a 
defendant carries a firearm during the commission of a felony, he or she is subject to a 
mandatory two-year term of imprisonment to be served ‘consecutively with and preceding 
any term of imprisonment imposed’ for the underlying felony.”  Blanton, 317 Mich App at 
119-120 (citations and emphasis omitted).  Blanton thus relied upon the “mandatory 
minimum sentence” language of MCR 6.302(B)(2) and not the “maximum possible prison 
sentence” language of the rule, and therefore is also not dispositive of the issue in this case, 
which pertains only to whether discretionary consecutive sentencing implicates the 
“maximum possible prison sentence for the offense.”  MCR 6.302(B)(2).3   
                                              
3 We recognize that Blanton also asserts, “[A]lthough not explicitly required by MCR 
6.302(B), it is well settled that a trial court must inform the defendant of any ‘consecutive 
and/or mandatory sentencing’ requirements.”  Blanton, 317 Mich App at 119 (citation 
omitted).  However, because the issue in Blanton pertained to mandatory consecutive 
sentencing for a felony-firearm conviction, we do not believe it referred clearly to the 
matter of whether defendants must be advised as to discretionary consecutive-sentencing 
authority.  That said, Blanton is consistent with our ruling today that trial courts must advise 
defendants, when applicable, of even discretionary authority in this regard. 
 
 
 
9
Concluding that neither Johnson nor Blanton clearly resolves the issue in dispute, 
we turn to MCR 6.302(B)(2) to assess what course must be followed by the trial court 
concerning communications to a defendant regarding its discretionary consecutive-
sentencing authority and the consequences of that authority for defendant’s ultimate 
sentence.   
B.  MCR 6.302(B)(2) 
When interpreting a court rule, we begin, of course, with its text, reading the 
individual words and phrases in their context.  People v Traver, 502 Mich 23, 31; 917 
NW2d 260 (2018).  In doing so, this Court “must give effect to every word, phrase, and 
clause” in the court rule.  People v Comer, 500 Mich 278, 287; 901 NW2d 553 (2017).  We 
examine first the phrase “maximum possible prison sentence” within MCR 6.302(B)(2).  
The court rule does not specifically define this phrase or the individual words contained 
within it, but this Court gives undefined terms their plain and ordinary meanings and will 
often consult dictionary definitions in conferring such meaning.  People v Duncan, 494 
Mich 713, 723; 835 NW2d 399 (2013).  “Maximum” means “an upper limit allowed (as 
by a legal authority) or allowable (as by the circumstances of a particular case).”  Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed).  And “possible” describes “something that may 
or may not occur.”  Id.  Therefore, MCR 6.302(B)(2) requires advising defendants of the 
maximum allowable prison sentence under the law, as well as under the particular 
circumstances of the case, whether that is the actual sentence that eventually transpires.  
This phrase is further modified by the prepositional phrase “for the offense.”  MCR 
6.302(B)(2).  The prosecutor argues, and the dissent would conclude, that this qualifying 
 
 
 
10 
language indicates that a court must only advise defendants of the maximum possible 
prison sentence for each separate or discrete offense-- in this case, five years’ imprisonment 
for each of two OWI-3rd convictions.  Respectfully, we do not construe this language so 
narrowly, but in what we view to be a more reasonable fashion.  We believe that the 
“maximum possible prison sentence for the offense” is additionally and materially affected 
by the possibility of consecutive sentencing and therefore that defendants must be 
facilitated in fully understanding the potential consequences of the trial court’s 
discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority.  We believe so for the following reasons:  
First, in addition to understanding the possible duration of each sentence for 
multiple offenses, the defendant must also understand the possibility that the sentence for 
an offense may not commence until after the defendant has served one or more underlying 
sentences.  This comprehension is critical to a pleading individual fully understanding the 
“maximum possible prison sentence for the offense.”  MCR 6.302(B)(2).  Consecutive 
sentences are “served in sequence,” while concurrent sentences are “served 
simultaneously.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed) (emphasis added).  As a result, the fact 
of consecutive-sentencing authority is as integral to a fully understanding plea as the facts 
of the sheer duration of potential sentences for each offense viewed in splendid isolation.  
For when the trial court possesses such authority, the defendant’s sentences are neither 
viewed nor imposed in isolation, and for the defendant personally, understanding fully the 
consequences and implications of a plea is not some academic exercise but an intensely 
practical and life-altering exercise by which he or she might reasonably compare the 
wisdom of a guilty or no-contest plea with the merits of proceeding to trial.  Both of these 
considerations-- the possible duration of each sentence and the possibility that one or more 
 
 
 
11 
of these sentences will not commence immediately but only after another has been served-- 
will in the harshest reality determine the defendant’s “maximum possible prison sentence 
for the offense,” and defendants are entitled to be made fully aware of this reality so that 
they might enter into a genuinely “understanding, voluntary, and accurate” plea.   
In the instant case, the trial court’s authority to impose a consecutive sentence 
derives from MCL 768.7b, which states in relevant part: 
 
(2) Beginning January 1, 1992, if a person who has been charged with 
a felony, pending the disposition of the charge, commits a subsequent offense 
that is a felony, upon conviction of the subsequent offense or acceptance of 
a plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill, or nolo contendere to the subsequent 
offense, the following shall apply: 
 
(a) Unless the subsequent offense is a major controlled substance 
offense, the sentences imposed for the prior charged offense and the 
subsequent offense may run consecutively.  [MCL 768.7b(2)(a).] 
The effect of MCL 768.7b thus is to postpone the moment at which sentencing for one or 
more “subsequent offense[s]” will commence, and “[t]he purpose of the statute is to deter 
persons accused of one crime from committing others by removing the security of 
concurrent sentences should conviction result on any or all of the crimes so committed.”  
People v Bonner, 49 Mich App 153, 158; 211 NW2d 542 (1973).  Consequently, the statute 
differentiates between two classes of persons: “those who have committed subsequent 
felonies while on bond and those who have not . . . .”  Id.  And the Legislature has thereby 
provided “different punishments between those classes” wherein the defendant who has 
committed a felony while on bond is subject to a greater punishment than the defendant 
who has not.  Id. 
 
 
 
12 
Hence, while consecutive sentencing does not increase the maximum duration of a 
sentence for any single offense, the postponement of one or more of the sentences 
effectively constitutes an enhanced punishment designed to deter persons from committing 
additional crimes while other charges are already pending by increasing the total duration 
of potential incarceration.  In the fullest light of reality, defendant’s “maximum possible 
prison sentence” will be determined by both the durations of the sentences for each offense 
and their susceptibility to consecutive sentencing.  We find it critical then that a defendant, 
in order to fully understand the consequences of a plea, and to be fully cognizant of the 
“maximum possible prison sentence” on each offense, be apprised that a sentence for a 
subsequent offense to which he or she is pleading guilty may not proceed immediately but 
rather may be delayed-- this as a part of a purposeful legislative design to punish the 
defendant with greater severity.  In this manner, the fact of consecutive sentencing 
constitutes highly relevant information that directly implicates the “maximum possible 
prison sentence for the offense” under MCR 6.302(B)(2).4 
Second, our court rules require that “[w]ords used in the singular also apply to the 
plural, where appropriate.”  MCR 1.107.5  Accordingly, this Court must also reasonably 
read MCR 6.302(B)(2) as requiring trial courts to inform defendants of “the maximum 
                                              
4 This opinion should not be understood as requiring trial courts to advise defendants of 
precisely when a consecutive sentence will commence.  Rather, it is sufficient that 
defendants be reasonably informed that possible consecutive sentences will have to be 
served sequentially, i.e., that such sentences will not begin until after other sentences have 
been served. 
5 In a similar vein, MCL 8.3b states: “Every word importing the singular number only may 
extend to and embrace the plural number, and every word importing the plural number may 
be applied and limited to the singular number.”   
 
 
 
13 
possible prison sentence for the offenses.”  We believe it is “appropriate” to consider 
“offense” in both the singular and the plural because it is frequently the case that a criminal 
defendant will be convicted of more than a single crime and it is reasonable that MCR 
6.302(B)(2) would be understood as affording its myriad protections to all criminal 
defendants, not merely to those convicted of a single offense, for such a distinction would 
be odd (if not unprecedented) within our criminal rules and, specifically with regard to 
MCR 6.302(B)(2), lacking in any apparent purpose.  Thus, we conclude that when a trial 
court advises a defendant of his or her “maximum possible prison sentence,” this must 
encompass not only the “maximum possible prison sentence” for each individual 
“offense,” but also the “maximum possible prison sentence” for the conviction of 
“offenses” specifically as to which the trial court possesses an authority to impose 
consecutive sentences.6   
Defendant here was instructed that each OWI-3rd conviction carried a five-year 
maximum term of imprisonment, which, if imposed concurrently, would amount to a 
maximum possible sentence of five years’ imprisonment.  However, because of the trial 
court’s discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority, defendant actually faced, and 
received, a maximum possible sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.  This was, in fact, the 
“maximum possible prison sentence for the offenses.”  A trial court’s failure to advise a 
                                              
6 See e.g., Commonwealth v Persinger, 532 Pa 317, 323; 615 A2d 1305 (1992) (“In order 
to understand the consequences of his plea it is clear that a defendant must be informed of 
the maximum punishment that might be imposed for his conduct.  To hold that the term 
‘maximum’ does not include the total possible aggregate sentence is clearly incorrect.”) 
(citation omitted); State v Ricks, 53 Ohio App 2d 244, 246-247; 372 NE2d 1369 (1977) 
(holding that in order for a defendant to understand the maximum penalty, he or she must 
understand “whether defendant is eligible for consecutive or concurrent sentences”).  
 
 
 
14 
defendant of possible consecutive sentencing in the course of apprising him or her of a 
“maximum possible prison sentence” disregards the reality that the defendant may face a 
far-lengthier prison sentence-- a reality that we believe is anticipated, and accommodated, 
by the most reasonable understanding of MCR 6.302(B)(2). 
The dissent maintains that our use of this canon of interpretation is inconsistent 
because we read only “offense” in the plural while maintaining the singular use of the term 
“sentence.”  However, we see no such inconsistency, as certainly a defendant must not only 
understand the maximum possible “sentence” for each separate offense, but also that for 
the range of “offenses” of which he or she has been convicted, some of which may be 
viewed by the law as interconnected in a way that carries independent sentencing 
consequences.  Then, and only then, can a defendant fully apprehend the true maximum 
term of incarceration that he or she faces,7 i.e., the term of incarceration from its starting 
date to its release date, i.e., the period during which by force of law a person who has 
breached the strictures of that law will be segregated from free society and deprived of his 
or her God-given liberty.8  That said, our application of the singular/plural canon of 
                                              
7 A defendant’s maximum term of incarceration is, in other words, his or her “aggregate 
sentence,” which is defined as “[t]he total sentence imposed for multiple convictions, 
reflecting appropriate calculations for consecutive as opposed to cumulative periods . . . .”  
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed). 
8 The Attorney General, appearing as amicus curiae on behalf of defendant, asserted at oral 
argument that  
no single variable of a sentence [is] more important to a criminal defendant 
than how much time he will serve.  It’s more important than knowing if 
you’re going to be on a sex offenders’ registry or whether . . . you are 
pleading to a felony or a misdemeanor, or whether or not that crime may be 
expungable at some period; maybe later on those things will become 
 
 
 
15 
interpretation is not grounded on “advanc[ing] a policy goal,” as asserted by the dissent, 
but on the specific language of MCR 6.302(B)(2) requiring that a defendant understand the 
“maximum possible prison sentence for the offenses.”  The dissent avers that consistency 
and the use of “common sense” in applying this canon would require both “sentence” and 
“offense” to be read either in the plural or the singular; in other words, that these terms 
must travel together.  But that is not what is stated in the canon, and for good reason.  
Rather, the dissent’s understanding gives minimal consideration to the guidance of the 
canon that it should be applied “where appropriate.”  MCR 1.107.  We believe it is 
altogether “appropriate” here to read only “offense” in the plural under MCR 6.302(B)(2), 
as this optimally ensures that a defendant will come to understand the “maximum possible 
prison sentence” implicated by a guilty or no-contest plea.  This purpose, in our judgment, 
defines the obvious and fundamental purpose served by MCR 6.302(B)(2), and there is no 
obvious rationale for limiting the purview of this rule to circumstances in which a 
defendant has been convicted of only a single offense or even of multiple offenses for 
which there is no possibility of consecutive sentencing.  Thus, while professing to rely 
upon “common sense” in giving meaning to the court rule, the dissent not only errs in its 
                                              
significant.  But at the very moment that an individual is deciding whether or 
not to enter that plea, all they really care about is how much time am I going 
to do.   
And despite the dissent’s assertion that the Attorney General argues only that “due process 
requires us to amend our court rule,” her position at oral argument was to the contrary.  
Although she did urge the Court to amend its rule to clarify the trial court’s consecutive-
sentencing obligation, the Attorney General nonetheless adopted the position that MCR 
6.302(B)(2), as it currently reads, required the trial court here to advise defendant of the 
court’s discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority, apart from any “due process” 
requirement, precisely because the consequences of consecutive sentencing affect “the 
actual term of years [a defendant] receive[s].” 
 
 
 
16 
construction of the rule, but fails to account for the most fundamentally “common sense” 
aspect of the plea itself-- that the pleading party accurately comprehend the maximum 
possible prison sentence to which he or she is pleading.  In sum, we do not believe that the 
dissent’s interpretation of the singular and plural terms of MCR 6.302(B)(2) constitutes the 
most reasonable understanding of its language, the best discernment of the intentions of its 
framers, or the most appropriate application of the singular/plural canon, and therefore it 
is “appropriate” that we give the meaning to the rule that we do. 
Even, however, if we read “sentence” in the plural as the dissent would have us do, 
we reach the same conclusion.  That is, if a defendant must be apprised of the “maximum 
possible prison sentences for the offenses,” the trial court would still be required to inform 
the defendant of the court’s discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority because where 
“sentences” are imposed, and indeed only where “sentences” are imposed, the possibility 
of a consecutive sentence becomes a possibility affecting the defendant’s “maximum 
possible prison sentence” on such multiple “sentences.”  And thus to ensure the defendant’s 
full understanding of the plea, he or she must be apprised of the court’s discretionary 
consecutive-sentencing authority.9 
                                              
9 The dissent asserts that our “alternative analysis” concerning the singular/plural canon, 
i.e., where we read both “sentence” and “offense” in the plural, “fails to consider the entire 
context of MCR 6.302(B).”  Specifically, it asserts that the phrase “maximum possible 
prison sentence[s] for the offense[s]” does not stand alone and must be considered along 
with MCR 6.302(B)(1), a separate provision requiring trial courts to advise the defendant 
of “the name[s] of the offense[s] to which the defendant is pleading.”  And when these 
provisions are viewed together through the lens of the singular/plural canon, “just as 
Subsection (1) requires a trial court to inform a defendant of each name of each offense, so 
[too] Subsection (2) requires a trial court to inform a defendant of each maximum possible 
sentence, not the maximum possible aggregate sentence.”  However, we do not believe that 
(B)(1) has any particular effect on our application of the singular/plural canon to (B)(2).  
 
 
 
17 
Our interpretation of MCR 6.302(B)(2) is also consistent with this Court’s decision 
in Brown-- a decision the dissent does not address in any meaningful way.  There, we held 
that even though MCR 6.302(B) did not expressly require trial courts to advise defendants 
of habitual-offender enhancements, MCR 6.302(B)(2) nonetheless required courts to 
advise “of the maximum possible prison sentence with habitual-offender enhancement 
because the enhanced maximum becomes the ‘maximum possible prison sentence’ for the 
principal offense.”  Brown, 492 Mich at 693-694.10  We then opined:  
By not telling a defendant the potential maximum sentence because 
of his or her habitual-offender status, “a trial court is not advising of the ‘true’ 
potential maximum sentence.”  Today’s holding accurately reflects the intent 
of MCR 6.302(B)(2), which is that a defendant be informed beforehand of 
the maximum sentence that would follow his or her plea of guilty.  [Id. at 
694 (citation omitted).] 
                                              
Even under the dissent’s (correct) understanding of the contextual relationship between 
(B)(1) and (B)(2)-- that these provisions must be read together-- we are no less persuaded 
that defendants should be facilitated in their fullest understanding of the implications of 
the trial court’s discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority.  Even when reading each 
noun of these provisions in the plural, as the dissent would have us do, we remain persuaded 
that MCR 6.302(B) requires courts to advise defendants of their discretionary consecutive-
sentencing authority.  It truly seems of no consequence that a trial court be required to 
inform a defendant of the “maximum possible prison sentence[s] for the offense[s]” or 
where (B)(1) and (B)(2) are read together to inform a defendant of the “maximum possible 
prison sentence[s] for . . . the name[s] of the offense[s] to which the defendant is pleading.”  
In other words, our understanding of the court rule is not altered at all by consideration of 
(B)(1) and (B)(2) in tandem.  As stated earlier, consecutive sentencing only becomes a 
possibility affecting a defendant’s maximum possible term of incarceration when there are 
multiple “sentences” for the named “offenses,” and thus we believe our understanding of 
the rule to have no less force when (B)(1) and (B)(2) are considered together. 
10 “The habitual-offender statutes, MCL 769.10 et seq., provide enhancement of a 
defendant’s sentence on the basis of prior felony convictions,” which is intended to have 
“a deterrent and punitive purpose.”  Brown, 492 Mich at 689 (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 
 
 
18 
 
[A]n habitual offender supplement is not a separate offense, and thus 
it logically follows that it must be linked to, or considered one with, the 
underlying offense.  As such, to comply with MCR 6.302(B)(2), a defendant 
must be made aware of the consequences of “the offense” including any 
habitual offender enhancement.  [Id. at 694 n 35 (quotation marks and 
citation omitted).] 
Ultimately, we are persuaded that requiring the trial court to advise a defendant of 
the possibility of consecutive sentencing is consistent with “the intent of MCR 6.302(B)(2), 
which is that a defendant be informed beforehand of the maximum sentence that would 
follow his or her plea of guilty.”  Id. at 694.  When the court does not so inform the 
defendant, it is “not advising of the ‘true’ potential maximum sentence” as it pertains to 
the punishment on the multiple offenses.  Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Moreover, in order to comply with MCR 6.302(B)(2), “a defendant must be fully aware of 
the consequences” of the plea, Brown, 492 Mich at 694 n 35, which includes the fact that 
the second sentence could be served consecutively to the first sentence, resulting in a longer 
term of incarceration.  That is, as with the habitual-offender enhancement in Brown, 
consecutive sentencing does not give rise to a separate offense, but rather is, for all practical 
and legal purposes, “linked to,” or “considered one with,” or interconnected with, 
underlying “offenses,” and thus constitutes an irreducible aspect of sentencing for multiple 
“offenses” in specified circumstances-- that the punishment for one or more of these 
“offenses” will be postponed in order to lengthen the punishment.  Therefore, in accordance 
with our court rules, the trial court must disclose its consecutive-sentencing authority in 
order to ensure, as in Brown, that the defendant accurately understands his “true potential 
maximum sentence.”  Id. at 694.11 
                                              
11 Because we conclude that MCR 6.302(B)(2) requires trial courts to advise defendants of 
 
 
 
19 
IV.  CONCLUSION  
We conclude that MCR 6.302(B)(2) requires the trial court, in cases in which such 
advice is relevant, to advise a defendant of its discretionary consecutive-sentencing 
authority and the possible consequences of that authority for the defendant’s sentence.  This 
is because such authority clearly affects the defendant’s “maximum possible prison 
sentence for the offense.”  As a result, the trial court here erred when it denied defendant’s 
motion to withdraw his plea because the court failed to apprise defendant of this authority 
and its possible consequences for his sentence.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court to allow defendant the opportunity to either 
withdraw his guilty plea or to reaffirm this plea.   
 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
 
                                              
the court’s discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority and the reasonable implications 
of that authority, we do not address defendant’s “due process” argument.  See People v 
Riley, 465 Mich 442, 447; 636 NW2d 514 (2001) (noting that the Court generally will not 
address constitutional issues if it is unnecessary to resolve a case). 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 158065 
 
KELLY CHRISTOPHER WARREN, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
ZAHRA, J. (dissenting). 
MCR 6.302(B) requires trial courts to advise a defendant of “the name of the offense 
to which the defendant is pleading,” MCR 6.302(B)(1), and “the maximum possible prison 
sentence for the offense,” MCR 6.302(B)(2).  If, as in this case, a defendant pleads guilty 
or no contest to more than one offense, MCR 6.302(B) requires only that trial courts advise 
defendants of “the name[s] of the offense[s] to which the defendant is pleading” and “the 
maximum possible prison sentence[s] for the offense[s].”  The majority holds that MCR 
6.302(B) requires, in cases involving potential consecutive sentences, that trial courts 
“advise a defendant of its discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority and the possible 
consequences of that authority for the defendant’s sentence.”  The construction embraced 
by the majority opinion is overly broad and imposes on trial courts a requirement I do not 
find in MCR 6.302(B).  The language of MCR 6.302(B) simply does not require trial courts 
 
 
 
 
2
to calculate a defendant’s potential aggregate maximum possible prison sentence1 resulting 
from the imposition of consecutive sentences.  Further, this Court has at least twice 
previously declined to amend the court rules to expressly provide that trial courts advise 
defendants of a possible aggregate maximum sentence resulting from the imposition of 
consecutive sentences.  Because I do not agree with the majority’s decision to read into 
MCR 2.306(B) that which this Court has twice declined to expressly add to our court rules, 
I must respectfully dissent.2  I would affirm the lower courts. 
I.  BASIC FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
In late 2014, defendant was caught operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.  Six 
months later, while free on bond awaiting trial, he was again caught operating a motor 
vehicle while intoxicated.  In each case, the prosecution charged defendant with operating 
a vehicle while intoxicated, third offense,3 in addition to attendant misdemeanors related 
to the offense, and provided defendant notice that he was subject to sentence enhancement 
                                              
1 An “aggregate sentence” is defined as “[t]he total sentence imposed for multiple 
convictions, reflecting appropriate calculations for consecutive as opposed to cumulative 
periods, reductions for time already served, and statutory limitations.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary (11th ed). 
2 Because I conclude that MCR 6.302(B) provides no relief to defendant, I must also 
address defendant’s constitutional argument: whether his due-process rights were violated 
by the trial court’s failure to inform him of the possibility of consecutive sentences.  For 
reasons fully developed in this dissenting opinion, I conclude that defendant’s due-process 
rights were not violated by the trial court’s failure to inform defendant of the possibility he 
could be sentenced consecutively under MCL 768.7b. 
3 MCL 257.625. 
 
 
 
 
3
as a fourth-offense habitual offender.4  Defendant’s prior criminal record is extensive, 
including nine felony convictions and eleven misdemeanor convictions.  
Defendant agreed to plead guilty to both drunk-driving charges in exchange for the 
dismissal of the remaining charges and the habitual-offender enhancement.  At defendant’s 
plea hearing, the trial court informed him of the maximum sentence for each drunk-driving 
offense (five years).  Specifically, the court stated that “each of the charges carries with it, 
absent the habitual, . . . a five year maximum charge; is that correct, folks?”  Both the 
prosecution and counsel for defendant agreed.  After determining that defendant was 
voluntarily pleading guilty to the offenses, the court elicited from defendant a factual basis 
for the 2014 offense and accepted defendant’s plea to that offense.  The court then elicited 
a factual basis for the 2015 offense and accepted defendant’s plea to that offense.   
Before defendant’s sentencing hearing, the probation department prepared a 
presentence investigation report (PSIR).  In it, the probation department informed the trial 
court that it had the discretionary authority to impose consecutive sentences because 
defendant committed the second offense while on bond for the first.5  The PSIR provided 
the probation agent’s “Description of the Offense” in which each offense was separately 
delineated.  Within the PSIR, the agent included a “Sentencing Information Report” (SIR) 
for each offense and assessed defendant’s prior record variables and offense variables for 
each offense.  Each SIR scored defendant’s sentencing guidelines, and each recommended 
a minimum sentence of 12 to 24 months’ imprisonment.  The PSIR recommended that 
                                              
4 MCL 769.12(1)(b). 
5 See MCL 768.7b.   
 
 
 
 
4
“defendant be sentenced to the Michigan Department of Corrections for a period of 24 
months to 60 months for both Dockets, to run consecutively, with credit for 3 days served.”   
Following the probation department’s recommendation, the trial court exercised its 
discretion and imposed consecutive sentences of 24 to 60 months’ imprisonment, citing 
defendant’s lengthy criminal history, the fact that the offense committed on bond was the 
very same offense for which bond had been granted, and his proclivity for alcohol-related 
offenses as documented in his PSIR.  
Several months later, with the assistance of new counsel, defendant moved to 
withdraw his plea, arguing that the plea-taking process was constitutionally defective 
because he had not been specifically advised that the trial court had the discretionary 
authority to impose consecutive sentences.  The trial court denied the motion, and the Court 
of Appeals denied the ensuing application for leave to appeal for lack of merit in the 
grounds presented.6 
Defendant appealed in this Court, and in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we 
remanded the case for consideration as on leave granted.7  The Court of Appeals, in a split 
decision, rejected defendant’s claim that the trial court had a duty to inform him of the 
possibility of consecutive sentencing before accepting his plea.8  Defendant again applied 
                                              
6 People v Warren, unpublished order of the Michigan Court of Appeals, entered 
November 1, 2016 (Docket No. 333997). 
7 People v Warren, 500 Mich 1056 (2017). 
8 People v Warren, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 
17, 2018 (Docket No. 333997), unpub op at 1.  The majority held that the plain language 
of MCR 6.302 did not require advice about the possibility of discretionary consecutive 
sentencing.  The majority also concluded that due process did not require the trial court to 
 
 
 
 
5
for leave to appeal in this Court, and we ordered oral argument on the application, directing 
the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether, when a defendant’s plea of guilty 
or no contest will subject him to the court’s discretion to impose consecutive sentences, 
the court must advise the defendant of that possibility before the court may accept the plea.9   
II.  APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The interpretation of court rules presents a question of law that we review de novo.10  
Questions of constitutional law involving waiving constitutional rights by entering a guilty 
plea are reviewed de novo.11  Violations of the Michigan Rules of Court are 
nonconstitutional errors, and violations of due-process rights are constitutional errors, but 
when unpreserved, both are subject to plain-error review.12 
                                              
advise defendant that it had discretion to impose consecutive sentences because it was not 
a “direct consequence” of pleading guilty.  Id. at 5.  Judge GLEICHER dissented, contending 
that both MCR 6.302(B) and due process required trial courts to inform defendants about 
the possibility of consecutive sentences because, like habitual-offender enhancements, 
consecutive sentences affect a defendant’s “true potential maximum sentence.”  Id. at 3 
(GLEICHER, J., dissenting) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
9 People v Warren, 503 Mich 988 (2019). 
10 People v Lee, 489 Mich 289, 295; 803 NW2d 165 (2011). 
11 People v Cole, 491 Mich 325, 330; 817 NW2d 497 (2012). 
12 People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 767; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 
 
 
 
 
6
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF MCR 6.302(B) DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE 
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES 
MCR 6.302(B) concerns an “An Understanding Plea,” and it requires the trial court 
to “advise the defendant or defendants of the following and determine that each defendant 
understands:” 
(1) the name of the offense to which the defendant is pleading; the 
court is not obliged to explain the elements of the offense, or possible 
defenses; 
(2) the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense and any 
mandatory minimum sentence required by law, including a requirement for 
mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring under MCL 750.520b or 750.520c. 
MCR 6.302(B)(2) refers not just to any “maximum possible prison sentence,” but 
to “the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense.”  Reading (B)(1) and (B)(2) 
together, the court must advise a defendant as to the name of each discrete offense to which 
a defendant is pleading, as well as to each discrete corresponding maximum possible prison 
sentence.  There is nothing in the court rule suggesting that “sentence” should be read as 
“aggregate sentence.”13  The plain language of MCR 6.302(B) simply does not require a 
trial court to advise a defendant at the plea hearing of the maximum possible aggregate 
prison sentence for the offenses to which the defendant is pleading.  Therefore, it cannot 
be said, as the majority claims, that the phrase “maximum possible prison sentence for the 
offense” within MCR 6.302(B)(2) is “additionally and materially affected by the possibility 
of consecutive sentencing . . . .”  Of course the trial court, within its discretion, may offer 
                                              
13 See note 1 of this opinion.  If this Court had wanted to use the term “aggregate sentence” 
to clarify that a defendant must be informed of the maximum possible total sentence for 
multiple convictions, it could have done so.   
 
 
 
 
7
an opinion about a maximum possible aggregate prison sentence to assist the parties in 
facilitating a plea agreement, see, e.g., People v Cobbs,14 but neither our caselaw nor our 
court rules currently require the trial court to provide defendant with such assistance. 
I agree with the majority that “Michigan caselaw has not resolved the determinative 
question in this case: whether MCR 6.302(B)(2) requires courts to inform defendants of 
discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority before accepting a guilty or no-contest 
plea.”15  Nonetheless, there is persuasive federal authority interpreting the analogous 
federal rule, which is broader in scope than the Michigan rule.16  Specifically, FR Crim P 
11(b)(1)(H) requires a defendant pleading guilty to be informed of “any maximum possible 
                                              
14 People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276; 505 NW2d 208 (1993). 
15 As the majority points out, People v Johnson, 413 Mich 487, 490; 320 NW2d 876 (1982), 
stated that the former court rule did not require trial courts to inform a defendant of “other 
potential sentence consequences such as consecutive sentencing.”  I recognize, however, 
that this statement is dicta.  Further, in my view, Johnson is distinguishable because it did 
not address a defendant’s “maximum possible prison sentence” for any particular offense, 
but only a lack of parole eligibility for that offense.  Parole eligibility does not relate to a 
“maximum possible prison sentence”; indeed, a paroled prisoner has necessarily not served 
a “maximum possible prison sentence.”  I also agree with the majority that People v 
Blanton, 317 Mich App 107, 119; 894 NW2d 613 (2016), “relied upon the ‘mandatory 
minimum sentence’ language of MCR 6.302(B)(2) and not the ‘maximum possible prison 
sentence’ language of the rule” and is thus not on point.   
16 Though not binding, federal precedent may be persuasive when interpreting analogous 
text.  See, e.g., Tobin v Mich Civil Serv Comm, 416 Mich 661, 671; 331 NW2d 184 (1982) 
(reasoning that the Michigan Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 et seq., was 
patterned after the federal law and, thus, “decisions under the federal law are often 
instructive and, in this instance, persuasive”); Gumma v D & T Constr Co, 235 Mich App 
210, 223-224; 597 NW2d 207 (1999) (noting that, because the Natural Resources and 
Environmental Protection Act, MCL 324.101 et seq., and its federal counterpart are similar, 
“it is appropriate to examine federal case law interpreting similar issues”).    
 
 
 
 
8
penalty.”  In United States v General,17 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit held, “Rule 11 . . . does not require a district court to inform the defendant of 
mandatory consecutive sentencing.”  Other federal cases have concluded the same.18  
The majority supports its construction of MCR 6.302(B)(2) with an interpretive 
court rule commonly known as the “number canon” of construction, which provides that 
“[w]ords used in the singular also apply to the plural, where appropriate.”19  This principle 
is also codified in Michigan law20 and has common-law roots.21  But this canon of 
construction does not alter my understanding of this court rule. 
Applying the number canon to MCR 6.302(B), the rule would read: 
(1) the name[s] of the offense[s] to which the defendant is pleading; 
the court is not obliged to explain the elements of the offense[s], or possible 
defenses; 
(2) the maximum possible prison sentence[s] for the offense[s] and 
any mandatory minimum sentence[s] required by law, including a 
requirement for mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring under MCL 
750.520b or 750.520c[.] 
                                              
17 United States v General, 278 F3d 389, 395 (CA 4, 2002). 
18 See United States v Henry, 702 F3d 377, 381 (CA 7, 2012) (“[Th]e district court was not 
required to advise Henry that his federal sentence might be imposed to run consecutive to 
his undischarged state sentence.”); United States v Ospina, 18 F3d 1332, 1334 (CA 6, 
1994) (“[T]here is no requirement in [FR Crim P 11] that the court explicitly admonish a 
defendant that a sentence may be imposed consecutively.”).  
19 MCR 1.107.  The majority refers to this rule as the “singular/plural canon.” 
20 MCL 8.3b. 
21 See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (St. Paul: 
Thomson/West, 2012), pp 129-130. 
 
 
 
 
9
Consistent application of the number canon supports the conclusion that the trial 
court is not required to inform defendant of the possibility of consecutive sentences.  Here, 
defendant pleaded guilty to two offenses and, consistent with the number canon, was 
advised of the maximum possible prison sentences for each of those two offenses.  But the 
majority does not apply the number canon in a consistent manner throughout the court rule.  
Rather, the majority reaches its conclusion by using the number canon to make plural every 
term that is shown in brackets above, except the word “sentence” in the phrase “the 
maximum possible prison sentence.”  But the number canon should apply to each noun in 
MCR 6.302(B).  As stated, the canon dictates that singular nouns may be made plural 
“where appropriate,”22 and I see no textual reason why it is inappropriate to read “sentence” 
as “sentences” when applying the canon to read “offense” as “offenses.”  Instead of using 
“common sense and everyday linguistic experience”23 to apply the number canon, the 
majority’s usage drastically changes the meaning of the very object it purports to interpret.  
This application of the number canon introduces an entirely new concept—“the maximum 
possible [aggregate] prison sentence”—in order to advance a policy goal.     
The majority attempts to justify its application of the number canon on the basis that  
a defendant must not only understand the maximum possible “sentence” for 
each separate offense, but also that for the range of “offenses” of which he 
or she has been convicted, some of which may be viewed by the law as 
interconnected in a way that carries independent sentencing consequences.  
Then, and only then, can a defendant fully apprehend the true maximum term 
of incarceration that he or she faces . . . .   
                                              
22 MCR 1.107.   
23 Reading Law, p 130.  
 
 
 
 
10 
This may well be a laudable aim, but it is not a ground upon which to base the application 
of a canon of construction.   
The majority opinion also states:  
 
Even, however, if we read “sentence” in the plural as the dissent 
would have us do, we reach the same conclusion.  That is, if a defendant must 
be apprised of the “maximum possible prison sentences for the offenses,” the 
trial court would still be required to inform the defendant of the court’s 
discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority because where “sentences” 
are imposed, and indeed only where “sentences” are imposed, the possibility 
of a consecutive sentence becomes a possibility affecting the defendant’s 
“maximum possible prison sentence” on such multiple “sentences.”  And 
thus to ensure the defendant’s full understanding of the plea, he or she must 
be apprised of the court’s discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority. 
But this alternative construction of MCR 6.302 imposes on trial courts an obligation 
that is not expressed in the court rule: the extrapolation of a maximum possible aggregate 
prison sentence when a defendant pleads guilty or no contest to multiple offenses.  Further, 
in positing its alternative analysis, the majority fails to consider the entire context of MCR 
6.302(B).  The phrase—as construed using the number canon—“maximum possible prison 
sentence[s] for the offense[s]” within MCR 6.302(B)(2) does not stand alone and, in 
context, must be considered along with MCR 6.302(B)(1), which, when likewise construed 
using the number canon, speaks to “name[s] of the offense[s].”  As stated, just as 
Subsection (1) requires a trial court to inform a defendant of each name of each offense, so 
Subsection (2) requires a trial court to inform a defendant of each maximum possible 
sentence, not the maximum possible aggregate sentence. 
I will not dispute the notion that information in regard to consecutive sentences is 
“critical to a pleading individual” and “integral to a fully understanding plea.”  Nor do I 
dismiss the majority’s assertion that a “defendant’s [consecutive] sentences are neither 
 
 
 
 
11 
viewed nor imposed in isolation, and for the defendant personally, understanding fully the 
consequences and implications of a plea is not some academic exercise but an intensely 
practical and life-altering exercise by which he or she might reasonably compare the 
wisdom of a guilty or no-contest plea with the merits of proceeding to trial.”  These 
concerns may justify amending the court rules to require a trial court to advise a defendant 
under MCR 6.302(B) of: 
 
(2) the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense[, including, 
if applicable, whether the law permits or requires consecutive sentences,] and 
any mandatory minimum sentence required by law, including a requirement 
for mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring under MCL 750.520b or 
750.520c. 
But the current language of MCR 6.302(B) does not require that a trial court advise 
a defendant of the possibility that the sentence for the offense may be imposed 
consecutively to another sentence.  Defendant’s supplemental brief and the amicus briefs 
presented on defendant’s behalf all but concede the point.  Defendant’s supplemental brief 
does not rely on the actual text of MCR 6.302(B) to support his interpretation.  Rather, he 
only argues under caselaw that he was “not advised of [the] ‘true sentence’ he could 
receive.”24  The amicus brief of the Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan admits that 
“the Michigan Rules of Court do not require a warning on consecutive sentencing during 
the plea hearing . . . .”  Our Attorney General has taken the very unusual position of filing 
an amicus brief against the position of her office.  In so doing, she does not argue that MCR 
                                              
24 In support of this argument, defendant cites People v Brown, 492 Mich 684, 702; 822 
NW2d 208 (2012).  The majority opinion does not embrace defendant’s position, 
concluding instead that “[o]ur interpretation of MCR 6.302(B)(2) is . . . consistent with this 
Court’s decision in Brown[.]” 
 
 
 
 
12 
6.302(B) requires a trial court to extrapolate the maximum possible sentence that can be 
imposed when a defendant pleads guilty or no contest to multiple offenses.  Instead she 
argues that due process requires us to amend our court rule.    
Last, the language mentioned above as a suggestion to amending MCR 6.302(B) is 
the exact language that this Court declined to adopt in 1985.25  As the prosecution 
highlights, this Court has twice before considered amending the court rules to expressly 
provide that trial courts advise defendants of the possible effect on the maximum aggregate 
sentence resulting from the imposition of consecutive sentences, but the Court has declined 
to do so.  First, in the early 1970s this Court created the Supreme Court Guilty Plea 
Standards Committee.26  The Court offered Suggested Guilty Plea Taking Guidelines as a 
starting point for the committee’s work and suggested that the new rule require trial courts 
to “personally inform defendant of the maximum sentence prescribed by law and, if there 
is a mandatory minimum sentence, the minimum sentence prescribed by law . . . [.]”27  Yet, 
in a footnote attached to that suggested rule, this Court drew the committee’s attention to 
Section 1.4(c)(i) of the American Bar Association (ABA) Standards Relating to Pleas of 
Guilty, which provided that the trial court must inform the defendant “of the maximum 
possible sentence on the charge including that possible from consecutive sentences[.]”28 
                                              
25 Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure, 422A Mich 1, 113 (1985). 
26 People v Williams, 386 Mich 277, 293-295; 192 NW2d 466 (1971).   
27 Id. at 303. 
28 Id. at 303 n 9 (emphasis added). 
 
 
 
 
13 
Several months later, the committee proposed a rule that required the trial court to 
inform the defendant of “the maximum sentence and the mandatory minimum sentence, if 
any, for the offense to which the plea is offered[.]”29  Missing from the committee’s 
proposal was the ABA’s consecutive-sentence language that the Court highlighted for the 
committee.  The Court adopted the committee’s proposed rule without change.30 
Then, on November 4, 1981, the Court issued a proposed amendment to the court 
rules that would require that trial courts inform defendants of “the maximum possible 
prison sentence for the offense, including that possible from consecutive sentences[.]”31  
This Court never adopted the proposed additional language.   
In addition, as highlighted by amicus Prosecuting Attorneys Association of 
Michigan, a Criminal Procedure Rules Committee submitted Proposed Rules of Criminal 
Procedure on August 5, 1985, which were published for comment by the Court.32  The 
version of MCR 6.302(A)(2) drafted by the committee required that when taking a plea the 
trial court inform the defendant of “the mandatory minimum penalty, if any, and the 
maximum possible penalty for the offense, including, if applicable, whether the law 
permits or requires consecutive sentences or precludes probation or parole.”33  The Court, 
                                              
29 In the Matter of the Amendment of GCR 1963, 785, unpublished order of the Michigan 
Supreme Court, entered May 15, 1972, p 3 (publishing proposal for public comment). 
30 GCR 1963, 785, 389 Mich lv (promulgating revised court rule). 
31 Proposed amendment to GCR 1963, 785, unpublished order of the Michigan Supreme 
Court, entered November 4, 1981, p 1. 
32 422A Mich at 115. 
33 Id. (emphasis added).   
 
 
 
 
14 
however, in adopting and modifying the committee proposals, removed the provision that 
a defendant pleading guilty be advised of the consecutive-sentence ramifications of the 
plea.34  While the crux of my analysis is based on the text of the court rule, that these 
amendments were proposed and rejected provides further indication that the common 
understanding of the court rule was that it did not require defendants to be notified of the 
possibility of consecutive sentencing.   
B.  DUE PROCESS DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT TRIAL COURTS INFORM 
DEFENDANTS OF POTENTIAL CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES 
Both the Michigan Constitution and the United States Constitution preclude the 
government from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.35  Due process requires that a criminal defendant pleading guilty do so (1) 
competently, (2) voluntarily, (3) knowingly, and (4) with the benefit of effective assistance 
                                              
34 Perhaps one reason the Court declined to adopt these amendments is because it may be 
difficult, as a practical matter, for the trial court to know at the time of the plea hearing that 
a statute allowing for consecutive sentencing applies to the defendant.  As the prosecution 
explained in its brief, in some situations, such as if a second offense occurs in another 
county, the trial court may not be aware that consecutive sentencing is a possibility at the 
time the defendant pleads guilty.  The growing number of statutes allowing for consecutive 
sentences only makes it more difficult for a trial court to know at the plea hearing whether 
such a statute applies.  Yantus, Sentence Creep: Increasing Penalties in Michigan and the 
Need for Sentencing Reform, 47 U Mich J L Reform 645, 681 (2014) (“Before 1990, there 
were thirteen consecutive sentencing statutes in Michigan.  From 1990 to 2013, the 
Legislature added twenty-nine new consecutive sentencing provisions.”).  Nevertheless, as 
stated, I am open to considering amending the court rules to require that defendants be 
informed of the possibility of consecutive sentences, but I believe that the administrative 
process would be a better avenue through which to flesh out these kinds of practical 
concerns.  
35 US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. 
 
 
 
 
15 
of counsel.36  This Court has previously acknowledged that “the requirements of 
constitutional due process . . . might not be entirely satisfied by compliance with subrules 
(B) through (D) [of MCR 6.302].”37 
Here, only the third constitutional requirement is at issue.  To satisfy this 
requirement, a defendant must have sufficient information to ensure that his or her decision 
is an “intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.”38  
The defendant must also have some understanding of the option he or she is choosing.  That 
is, the defendant must be aware of “the true nature of the charge” against him or her39 as 
well as “the direct consequences” of entering a guilty plea.40 
Defendant first argues that the “possibility of consecutive sentencing violates Due 
Process because consecutive sentencing is ‘part of the sentence itself,’ and would be a 
‘direct’ rather than ‘collateral’ consequence.”  Defendant relies on this Court’s decision in 
People v Cole,41 which considered whether constitutional due process requires a trial court 
to inform a defendant pleading guilty or no contest to first-degree criminal sexual conduct 
                                              
36 See, e.g., Kercheval v United States, 274 US 220, 223; 47 S Ct 582; 71 L Ed 1009 (1927). 
37 People v Cole, 491 Mich 325, 332; 817 NW2d 497 (2012). 
38 North Carolina v Alford, 400 US 25, 31; 91 S Ct 160; 27 L Ed 2d 162 (1970). 
39 Smith v O’Grady, 312 US 329, 334; 61 S Ct 572; 85 L Ed 859 (1941). 
40 Brady v United States, 397 US 742, 755; 90 S Ct 146; 325 L Ed 2d 747 (1970) (quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
41 Cole, 491 Mich 325. 
 
 
 
 
16 
(CSC-I)42 or second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II)43 that he or she will be 
sentenced to mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM).44  When Cole was decided, 
MCR 6.302(B) did not explicitly mandate that the trial court notify a defendant that he or 
she would be subject to mandatory LEM under MCL 750.520c(2)(b).45  Central to Cole’s 
conclusion that due process required the trial court to inform a defendant of the LEM 
requirement is that the “Legislature chose to include the mandatory [LEM] requirement in 
the penalty sections of the CSC-I and CSC-II statutes, and that both statutes can be found 
in the Michigan Penal Code, which describes criminal offenses and prescribes penalties.”46  
Further, the Cole Court noted that “both [LEM] provisions provide that ‘the court shall 
sentence the defendant to [LEM] . . . .’ ” Last, the Cole Court observed that the CSC-II 
statute provides that the sentence of [LEM] is “[i]n addition to the penalty specified in 
subdivision (a),” MCL 750.520c(2)(b), and the CSC-I statute provides similarly that LEM 
is “[i]n addition to any other penalty imposed under subdivision (a) or (b),” MCL 
520b(2)(d).47  The Cole Court concluded that “the Legislature intended mandatory [LEM] 
                                              
42 MCL 750.520b(2)(d). 
43 MCL 750.520c(2)(b). 
44 Cole, 491 Mich at 327. 
45 See id. at 330 n 4. 
46 Id. at 335. 
47 Id. at 335-336. 
 
 
 
 
17 
to be an additional punishment and part of the sentence itself when required by the CSC-I 
or CSC-II statutes.”48 
Cole is simply inapplicable to the instant case because the provision allowing for 
the imposition of a consecutive sentence, MCL 768.7b, is not part of the sentence itself.  
Unlike the provision at issue in Cole, MCL 768.7b is not found in the statute setting forth 
the crimes and the applicable penalty, MCL 257.625, but is found in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure.  Further, and more substantively, MCL 768.7b is not potential punishment that 
relates to the offenses to which a defendant pleads guilty.  MCL 768.7b is offense-neutral, 
and it broadly applies “if a person who has been charged with a felony, pending the 
disposition of the charge, commits a subsequent offense that is a felony.”  In other words, 
MCL 768.7b does not authorize additional punishment for conduct that gave rise to 
offenses; it only authorizes punishment because a defendant brazenly committed a second 
felony in the relatively short period of time during which a previous felony charge against 
that defendant was pending.  In contrast, the LEM requirement considered in Cole was 
clearly intended by the Legislature to punish the defendant for the very offense to which 
he pleaded guilty.  In this sense, a potential consecutive sentence under MCL 768.7b is a 
“collateral” consequence of pleading guilty to the offenses.   
With that said, I will not dispute that the imposition of consecutive sentences is “a 
particularly severe ‘penalty.’ ”49  But due process does not require that trial courts advise 
                                              
48 Id. at 336. 
49 Padilla v Kentucky, 559 US 356, 365; 130 S Ct 147; 3176 L Ed 2d 28 (2010) (citation 
omitted). 
 
 
 
 
18 
defendants in regard to all severe penalties.50  Rather, this advisory responsibility lies 
primarily with defense counsel, whose effective assistance is guaranteed to all criminal 
defendants by the United States and Michigan Constitutions.51 
Defendant next argues that consecutive sentencing is a direct consequence because 
the Legislature intended to impose punishment.  Again, I will not dispute that the 
imposition of consecutive sentences is “a particularly severe ‘penalty.’ ”52  Nor will I 
dispute that the general purpose of consecutive sentencing is to “enhance the punishment 
imposed upon those who have been found guilty of more serious crimes and who 
repeatedly engage in criminal acts.”53  More specific to this case, I agree with defendant 
that 
[t]he intended effect of § 7b can best be seen by analyzing the deterrence 
situation that exists before and after a felony has been charged.  In general, 
once a criminal defendant has been charged with a felony, the level of 
deterrence against his commission of a second felony drops.  Section 7b 
restores the level of deterrence to its pre-charge plateau.[54] 
The fact nonetheless remains that consecutive sentencing was merely a possibility 
at the plea hearing.  The discretionary authority to impose consecutive sentences does not 
                                              
50 Id. 
51 5 LaFave, Criminal Procedure (4th ed), § 21.4(d) (noting that a common thread among 
the cases rejecting due-process challenges “is that defense counsel should be expected to 
discuss with his client the range of risks attendant his plea”). 
52 Padilla, 559 US at 365 (citation omitted). 
53 People v Smith, 423 Mich 427, 445; 378 NW2d 384 (1995). 
54 People v Williams, 89 Mich App 633, 637; 280 NW2d 617 (1979). 
 
 
 
 
19 
represent a definite, immediate, or automatic effect because it depends on the trial court’s 
later exercise of discretion.55  Only after the court considers the PSIR and the particular 
circumstances of a defendant’s personal and criminal history can the court fashion an 
individualized sentence that, in the court’s discretion, may merit consecutive sentences.   
This is not an unusual practice.  Many of the decisions a trial court makes following 
a defendant’s entry of a guilty plea have a substantial influence on a defendant’s ultimate 
sentence.  For instance, a court’s sentencing guidelines scoring decisions later inform a 
defendant’s ultimate sentence.  Likewise, the trial court may exercise discretion by 
sentencing a defendant within or perhaps outside the sentencing guidelines.  In my view, 
the possibility of consecutive sentences pursuant to MCL 768.7b is a “collateral” 
consequence of defendant’s guilty pleas, not a “direct result” of the guilty pleas, because 
the trial court had discretion whether to impose consecutive sentences.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The plain language of MCR 6.302(B) does not support the conclusion that trial 
courts must advise criminal defendants that sentences may potentially be imposed 
consecutively to one another.  Further, I disagree with the majority’s decision to add by 
judicial construction that which this Court has repeatedly declined to add in drafting MCR 
                                              
55 A solid majority of federal circuit courts agrees.  See, e.g., United States v Ocasio-
Cancel, 727 F3d 85, 90 (CA 1, 2013); Wilson v McGinnis, 413 F3d 196, 200 (CA 2, 2005); 
Paradiso v United States, 482 F2d 409, 415 (CA 3, 1973); United States v Fentress, 792 
F2d 461, 465 (CA 4, 1986); United States v Saldana, 505 F2d 628, 629 (CA 5, 1974); 
United States v Gaskin, 587 F Appx 290, 297-298 (CA 6, 2014); Faulisi v Daggett, 527 
F2d 305, 309 (CA 7, 1975); Clemmons v United States, 721 F2d 235, 238 (CA 8, 1983); 
United States v Rubalcaba, 811 F2d 491, 494 (CA 9, 1987); United States v Hurlich, 293 
F3d 1223, 1231 (CA 10, 2002); United States v Humphrey, 164 F3d 585, 587-588 (CA 11, 
1999). 
 
 
 
 
20 
6.302(B).  Lastly, the possibility of consecutive sentences pursuant to MCL 768.7b is a 
“collateral” consequence of defendant’s guilty pleas, not a “direct result” of the guilty 
pleas, because the trial court had discretion whether to impose consecutive sentences.  
Accordingly, due process did not require that the trial court inform defendant that he was 
subject to consecutive sentencing.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
David F. Viviano