Title: New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. M.M.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-115-05
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: February 8, 2007

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). M.M. is the biological father of M.A.M., the child at issue. M.M. resides in Dover, New Jersey with C.B., M.A.M. s biological mother. The mother is thirty-two years old and the father is sixty-years old. They have one other biological child together, a daughter born in 1993, who also lives in the home. The father s parental rights concerning the daughter are not at issue in this appeal. Within days of the son s birth in 2003, DYFS became involved. The initial DYFS referral noted that the mother had poor hygiene, appeared overwhelmed caring for the newborn, and needed constant direction. The son was hypoglycemic at birth and has a variety of developmental disorders that were likely caused by overexposure to alcohol in utero and that require special therapy. The Division filed a verified complaint in January 2003 requesting custody of the son. The trial court awarded guardianship to DYFS and the son was placed directly in foster care on January 23, 2003, when he was released from the hospital at sixteen days-old. In February 2004, the mother missed her scheduled visitation because she had run away from home. Consequently, the Division filed a complaint in April 2004, requesting guardianship of the son for purposes of adoption. At trial, a court-appointed Law Guardian appeared on the son s behalf. In May 2005, the trial court rendered an oral decision terminating the parental rights of both the mother and the father. The court concluded that it was in the son s best interests to remain with the foster family because of the bonds that he had developed with his foster parents and because of the repeated destabilizing elements created by the mother. Both the mother and father appealed the termination of their parental rights. The Appellate Division upheld the trial court s termination of the mother s rights but reinstated the father s rights, disagreeing with the trial court s judgment as a matter of law because one parent cannot be held responsible for the shortcomings of the other. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. M.M., 382 N.J. Super. 264, 282-84. The mother petitioned this Court for certification. DYFS and the Law Guardian filed a petition for cross-certification, contending that termination of the father s rights is in the son s best interests. We granted certification as to the father s rights only. 186 N.J. 606 (2006). We also permitted Legal Services of New Jersey to file a brief as amicus curiae. HELD: The standard for the determination of this appeal is the best-interests-of-the-child. The record demonstrates that the separation of the son from his foster parents, who have comprehensively cared for his special needs almost since birth, combined with his return to the unstable and at times dangerous home of his severely-limited biological parents, is not in the son s best interests. 1. Review of a trial court s termination of parental rights is limited. A reviewing court should uphold the factual findings undergirding the trial court s decision if they are supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence on the record. In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993). Additionally, as a general rule we must grant deference to the trial court s credibility determinations. (Pp. 19-20) 2. Parents have a constitutionally protected right to maintain a relationship with their children. Parental rights are not absolute, however. The State has responsibility to protect the welfare of children and may terminate parental rights if the child is at risk of serious physical or emotional harm. The statutory best-interests-of-the-child standard aims to achieve the appropriate balance between parental rights and the State s parens patriae responsibility. Parental rights may be terminated only when: (1) The child s safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship; (2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm; (3) The Division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child s placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and (4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good. The Division bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the four statutory criteria are satisfied. (Pp. 20-24) 3. We find that the record is replete with evidence that justifies the trial court s conclusion that the father failed to provide a home in which the son was not in constant danger. The mother s presence in the home creates an unstable environment and poses a serious risk to the son because of her substance abuse problems, habitual running away from home, and history of falsely alleging domestic violence. In short, the evidence demonstrates that the mother is a danger to the son both when she remains at home and when she runs away from home. Although it was imperative that the father provide a daycare plan that could guarantee that the son would not be left alone with the mother, he did not provide a suitable plan under the circumstances. Stated simply, the father s daycare plan could not protect the son from the harmful home environment that he maintained. (Pp. 24-26) 4. Although the father appears to have overcome his troubled past, he does not appreciate the extraordinary difficulties of raising the son in the same home as the mother. The father s contentions highlight his questionable judgment and reveal his inability to exercise the prudence necessary to protect the son from the mother s harmful presence. In addition, the daughter s apparent healthy development is distinguishable from the son s circumstances and the caseworkers expressed concern that the father would be unable to sustain multiple jobs, stabilize the mother, parent the daughter, and care for the son. The daughter s development, therefore, is not an accurate barometer of the potential harm to the son and the trial court properly concluded that the father could not provide a suitable home for the son. Furthermore, the trial court properly considered the harm caused by removing the son from his foster parents. Removing the son from his foster family would destroy any sense of permanency and further harm him. (Pp. 27-30) 5. The trial court found that DYFS provided an array of services aimed at family reunification. Although not a perfect model, the record demonstrates that DYFS met the third prong. The Division thoroughly investigated each person suggested by the father as a viable daycare provider. All of those individuals were either unable to provide daycare or were unfit because they had a history of involvement with the Division. Additionally, DYFS independently investigated a homemaker service but found that it was unavailable in the county where the father resided. Although parents always can argue that DYFS should have done more, the third prong is satisfied in this appeal, and the Division s assistance passes muster. (Pp. 30-31) 6. In respect of the fourth prong, it is undisputed that the foster parents have provided a stable, loving environment for almost the son s entire life. They intend to adopt the son if given the opportunity, resulting in a secure and permanent placement for the son. Separating the son from his foster parents would expose the son to the dangers and instability of the biological parents home, subject him to the loss of the many services provided by the foster parents, and disrupt any permanency in his life. Integral to our analysis under the fourth prong is the foster parents willingness, as promised, to permit continued visitation by the father and the daughter. (Pp. 31-33) 7. Termination of one parent s rights is not appropriate merely because the other parent is unfit or has surrendered his or her rights. Parental rights are individual in nature and due process requires that fitness be evaluated on an individual basis. That said, the conduct of one parent can be relevant to an evaluation of the parental fitness of another parent. The harm caused by circumstances attendant to the parent-child relationship is as pertinent as any harm caused directly by a parent. That is, the harms need not be inflicted by the parent personally. The crucial inquiries are whether the parent s association with others causes harm to the child and whether the parent is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home. That the threat to the child is created by the presence of another parent is irrelevant to the determination of whether the child is at risk. Accordingly, the trial court was correct when it evaluated the father s parental rights in light of his cohabitation with the mother. (Pp. 34-37) 8. Although we do not consider the father s belated parenting plan in reaching our decision, we note that the plan s only reference to the son s special needs is a brief statement that the proposed daycare center would make arrangements for speech therapy. The plan does not acknowledge the various home physical therapies required to help the son overcome his developmental disabilities. Because it does not accommodate the son s special needs, the plan is simply too little too late. This appeal demonstrates that reunification becomes increasingly difficult with the passage of time because a child may develop bonds with his or her foster family and gain a sense of permanency. For the guidance of DYFS and parties in the future, therefore, DYFS should communicate a sense of urgency to parents who are attempting to regain custody of their children and that they should present relevant evidence as soon as possible. (Pp. 37-39) 9. We recognize the predicament of the father who is seeking to accommodate all of his loved ones. However, the best interests of the son must take precedence. The record demonstrates that the separation of the son from his foster parents, who have comprehensively cared for his special needs almost since birth, combined with his return to the unstable and at times dangerous home of his severely-limited biological parents, is not in the son s best interests. We cannot gamble on the present welfare and future well-being of this four-year-old special needs child. We emphasize that our conclusion is premised, in part, on the foster parents willingness to allow continued visitation by the father and the daughter. (Pp. 39-42) The judgment of the Appellate Division in respect of the father s parental rights is REVERSED and the trial court s award of guardianship to the Division of Youth and Family Services for purposes of adoption is REINSTATED. JUSTICE WALLACE filed a separate, DISSENTING opinion, in which JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO joins, stating that, based on the facts as found by the trial court, he is compelled to conclude that clear and convincing evidence does not exist to establish the four statutory factors that must be found prior to termination of parental rights, and in particular that there was little or no evidence that the father was unable to protect his son. JUSTICES LONG, La V ECCHIA, and ALBIN join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI S opinion. JUSTICE WALLACE filed a separate, dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO joins. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-115/ 116 September Term 2005 NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M.M., Defendant-Respondent. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF M.A.M. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff, v. C.B., Defendant. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF M.A.M. Argued October 11, 2006 Decided February 8, 2007 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 382 N.J. Super. 264 (2006). Lauren F. Carlton, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (Stuart J. Rabner, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Carlton and Patricia J. O'Dowd, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs). Jane M. Personette, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant Law Guardian for M.A.M. (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). Beatrix W. Shear, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney; Ms. Shear, Ted Gary Mitchell, Deputy Public Defender and Alison S. Perrone, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). Mary M. McManus, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Legal Services of New Jersey (Melville D. Miller, Jr., President, attorney; Ms. McManus and Mr. Miller, on the brief). JUSTICE ZAZZALI delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, we must decide whether the trial court properly terminated a father s parental rights in respect of his son. The son is now four years old and has been in his foster parents custody since a few days after his birth. The trial court terminated the parental rights of the mother and the father and awarded guardianship to the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS or Division). Among other findings, the court concluded that the son was at risk because of the mother s destabilizing influence on the home, a negative influence that must be considered when evaluating the father s rights. The Appellate Division reinstated the father s parental rights but affirmed the termination of the mother s rights. Div. of Youth &amp; Family Servs. v. M.M., 382 N.J. Super. 264, 283-84 (App. Div. 2006). We granted certification to review the termination of the father s rights only. 186 N.J. 606 (2006). The record contains clear and convincing evidence that the father did not establish a safe and stable environment for his son. Although the father does not pose a direct threat to his son, the evidence demonstrates that he did not provide for the son s special needs or mitigate the effects of the harmful environment in which he intends to raise the son. Additionally, since the son s placement in foster care a few days after his birth, he has developed strong emotional bonds with his foster parents and, with their assistance, is overcoming various muscular and neurological disorders. Conversely, the father has had ample opportunity to improve the circumstances, but his efforts are both untimely and inadequate. The standard for the determination of this appeal is the best-interests-of-the-child. In the tapestry of facts that we now detail, one common thread emerges -- it is not in the son s best interests to remove him from a home where he has flourished and place him in an environment that is, at best, destabilizing. Because we defer to, and agree with, the trial court s holding that termination of the father s rights is in the son s best interests in this unique case, we reverse. (2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child; (3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and (4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good. [N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).] Those four elements of the best interests test overlap and provide a comprehensive standard for deciding what is in a child s best interest. N.J. Div. of Youth &amp; Family Servs. v. S.V., 362 N.J. Super. 76, 84 (App. Div. 2003). They are neither discrete nor separate. They overlap to provide a composite picture of what may be necessary to advance the best interests of the children. N.J. Div. of Youth &amp; Family Servs. v. F.M., 375 N.J. Super. 235, 259 (App. Div. 2005) (emphasis added). [T]hey are designed to identify and assess what may be necessary to promote and protect the best interests of the child. N.J. Div. of Youth &amp; Family Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81, 88 (App. Div. 2006). The considerations involved are extremely fact sensitive and require particularized evidence that address the specific circumstance in the given case. Id. at 348 (quoting In re Adoption of Children by L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 139 (1993)). The Division bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the four statutory criteria are satisfied. See N.J. Div. of Youth &amp; Fam. Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 511 (2004). Under the first prong of the best-interests standard, the harm shown . . . must be one that threatens the child s health and will likely have continuing deleterious effects on the child. In re K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 352. The State can satisfy the second prong if it can show that the child will suffer substantially from a lack of stability and a permanent placement and from the disruption of [his or] her bond with foster parents. In re K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 363. Under the third prong, DYFS must make reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parents correct the circumstances that led to the child s placement outside the home. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). Reasonable efforts may include consultation with the parent, developing a plan for reunification, providing services essential to the realization of the reunification plan, informing the family of the child s progress, and facilitating visitation. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(c). Finally, to satisfy the fourth prong, the State should offer testimony of a well qualified expert who has had full opportunity to make a comprehensive, objective, and informed evaluation of the child s relationship with both the natural parents and the foster parents. In re J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 19. A child s need for permanency is an important consideration under the fourth prong. See In re K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 357-58. B. Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M.M., Defendant-Respondent. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF M.A.M. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff, v. C.B., Defendant. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF M.A.M. JUSTICE WALLACE, JR., dissenting. I respectfully dissent. I agree with the Appellate Division s analysis that the father was a capable and competent parent, but he was unable to remedy the pernicious effects of [the mother s] irresponsible conduct on the children. Div. of Youth &amp; Family Servs. v. M.M., 382 N.J. Super. 264, 282 (App. Div. 2006). I also agree with the panel s conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to terminate the father s parental rights. Ibid. The father was obliged only to exert reasonably successful efforts to protect the child from the harm inflicted by [the mother], and the trial court found that the father had done that. Ibid. The standards for termination of parental rights were articulated by this Court in Division of Youth &amp; Family Services v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591 (1986). The Legislature subsequently adopted those standards in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1. In order to terminate an individual s parental rights, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1 requires that the trial court make specific findings that (1) The child s safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship; (2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child . . . and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm . . .; (3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child s placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and (4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good. [N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a.] Parents have a constitutionally protected right to raise their biological children, even if those children have been placed in foster care. In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 9 (1992) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982)). Nevertheless, those constitutionally protected rights must be balanced against the State s parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare of children. Id. at 10. Importantly, [b]ecause that power involves the State acting in the place of parents, it is limited to situations in which the [S]tate has demonstrated that the child s parent or custodian is unfit. Ibid. We emphasized in J.C. that [f]ew forms of state action are both so severe and so irreversible. Ibid. (citations omitted). In expressing that the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unable or unwilling to eliminate the initial harm and will continue to cause serious and lasting harm to the child, we declared that [w]hen the child s biological parents resist the termination of their parental rights, the court s function will ordinarily be to decide whether the parents can raise their children without causing them further harm. In most cases proofs will focus on past abuse and neglect and on the likelihood of it continuing. However, the cornerstone of the inquiry is not whether the biological parents are fit but whether they can cease causing their child harm. The analysis of harm entails strict standards to protect the statutory and constitutional rights of the natural parents. [Ibid. (internal citations omitted).] In the present case, the trial court was faced with the difficult and unusual circumstance of a mother who was unfit due to her sporadic leaving of the home, but a father who was capable of protecting his son from future harm. The trial court found that the evidence demonstrated that the father was a responsible parent and that he adequately provided for the thirteen-year-old daughter who continued to live in the home. See footnote 4 Further, there was no question that the father had exercised the visitation allowed and completed the recommended parenting classes. Regarding the father s ability to parent his son, the trial court found that all the experts, certainly Dr. Fulford and Dr. Dyer and . . . Dr. Silikovitz all agreed that [the father] is a competent parent and [a] dedicated parent. Prior to that finding, the trial court read from portions of the Division s expert s report concerning the bonding assessment between the father and his son, in which Dr. Dyer expressed the following: [The father] behaved in an entirely appropriate fashion towards his son, [M.A.M.], during the bonding assessment. [The father] was appropriately nurturing and involved with the child in constructive play activities. He related to [his son] on the child s level and was able to offer him adequate cognitive and language stimulation during the session. It is obvious that [the father] loves this child and that he genuinely desires to have [his son] placed in his care even if it means that he has to shoulder the entire burden with [the mother] completely excluded as a caretaker. Based on the facts as found by the trial court, I am compelled to conclude that clear and convincing evidence does not exist to establish the four statutory factors that must be found prior to termination of parental rights. The trial court essentially acknowledged that conclusion when it stated that it s not a clear case and not an easy case, and admitted that maybe [the court] got it wrong. The majority opinion disregards the strict standards we impose for termination of parental rights, see J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 9, and focuses on the bonding between the foster parents and the child. However, bonding should not be used to determine only which set of parents is optimum or even better in some vague social sense, rather than [whether the natural parents are] capable of rearing the child without serious harm. Id. at 21 (citing In re Baby M., 109 N.J. 396, 445 (1988) ( the mere fact that a child would be better off with one set of parents than with another is an insufficient basis for terminating the natural parent s rights. )). In regard to the daughter, the majority opinion states that no matter how well-intentioned, [the father] left the daughter in the sole care of the mother on at least five occasions notwithstanding the DYFS case plan to the contrary. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 26). However, the trial court never made that factual finding, but rather, the court praised the father s parenting of his daughter. Furthermore, the record reveals that alleged conduct occurred prior to the Title 9 abuse and neglect action in which the trial court found, in its June 25, 2003 order, that the Division had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the father had abused or neglected his daughter. In short, I am in accord with the argument advanced by Legal Services of New Jersey that because the daughter was not abused or neglected, there is no basis upon which to impute such to her brother. In any event, there was little or no evidence that the father was unable to protect his son. The majority opinion relies on the rejection by the Division of the father s parenting plan to place the child in daycare because the daycare facility could not hold a space open as the facility did not know when the father would be able to enroll his son. The testimony in this regard is noteworthy. One caseworker testified that she did not recall contacting the daycare provider and a second caseworker testified that when she contacted the daycare provider, she was informed that it had been holding a space open for the father s child for quite some time, but that it was not able to hold it open anymore. Surely, that evidence is insufficient to support the conclusion that the father was unable to find a person or daycare facility to care for his son when he was at work. Tellingly, the record fails to disclose any attempt by the Division to coordinate with the father and the daycare facility to return the child to the father at the time an opening was available. Essentially, the majority approves the termination of the father s parental rights to one of his children because the Division was not satisfied that an opening in the daycare facility would be available whenever the Division decided to return the child to his father, and as a result, the child bonded with his foster parents. I cannot approve such a result. Unfortunately, the Division never gave the father the opportunity to be a parent to his son, which would have included enrollment in daycare. I agree with the Appellate Division s reasoning that the child -- almost two-and-one-half years old at the time of trial, and now barely three years old -- has bonded with the foster parents, who have done admirably fine work in providing for him and meeting his special needs. But the fact of bonding between foster parents and subject child --even with a proper focus on the best interests of the child -- cannot be a surrogate for the showings and proof standard mandated by statute, without some special showing of substantial and particularized evidence that serious psychological or emotional harm will be inflicted on the child by separating him from the foster parents. See J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 17-26, 608 A.2d 1312. Here, from the expert opinions in the case, we discern no such harm that will come to this child from careful and sensitive efforts to reunite him with his father. [M.M., supra, 382 N.J. Super. at 282-83.] I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division reversing the trial court s order terminating the parental rights of the father substantially for the reasons expressed in the Appellate Division s thoughtful opinion. Justice Rivera-Soto joins in this opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-115/116 SEPTEMBER TERM 2005 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M.M., Defendant-Respondent. ______________________________ IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF M.A.M. DECIDED February 8, 2007 Justice Long PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Zazzali CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Wallace However, although the trial court did comment regarding the testimony of the various experts, the court articulated its own factual finding in respect of the father. The trial court stated: I do not find that the [father] is disqualified as a parent by any current active elements of his personality. The court nonetheless found that termination was appropriate because the father could not provide a safe and stable home for the son. In certain circumstances, although a parent may not be incompetent because of any elements of his [or her] personality, as the trial court concluded in this appeal, that parent may nonetheless be unfit because he or she cannot provide a safe environment for the child. See e.g., S.V., supra, 362 N.J. Super. at 80, 84-85 (finding termination appropriate despite no evidence of psychiatric illness or substance abuse that would prevent [the parent] from caring for her children ). In the unusual circumstances of this appeal, we recognize that the father does not suffer from any threatening intellectual or psychological limitations. However, we find that the father is unfit because, among other considerations, he cannot provide a safe and stable home for his son.