Title: Shipps v. District Attorney for the Norfolk District
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11733
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 2015

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SJC-11733 
 
WILLIAM M. SHIPPS, JR.  vs.  DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE NORFOLK 
DISTRICT. 
 
 
July 6, 2015. 
 
 
Declaratory Relief.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Sentence. 
 
 
 
William M. Shipps, Jr., filed a complaint in the county 
court in 2014, pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, seeking a declaration 
that his sentences for murder in the first degree under G. L. 
c. 265, § 2, as amended by St. 1979, c. 488, § 2, which were 
imposed thirty years earlier, are unconstitutional.  A single 
justice of this court dismissed the complaint.  We affirm. 
 
 
In 1984, Shipps was convicted of two indictments charging 
murder in the first degree and other crimes.  He was sentenced 
on the murder convictions to two consecutive life terms in State 
prison without the possibility of parole, and to four concurrent 
life terms on the remaining convictions.  Commonwealth 
v. Shipps, 399 Mass. 820 (1987).  Thereafter, Shipps filed three 
motions seeking a new trial in the Superior Court, all of which 
were denied.  Commonwealth v. Shipps, 440 Mass. 1018, 1019 
(2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 910 (2004).  A single justice of 
this court denied leave to appeal from the ruling on the third 
motion, pursuant to the "gatekeeper" provision of G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, and we dismissed Shipps's appeal from that ruling.  Id. 
 
 
1.  In 2014, Shipps filed a complaint for declaratory 
relief in the county court, seeking a determination that the 
imposition of his sentence (indeed, any sentence at all) for his 
convictions of murder in the first degree violated the ex post 
facto and due process clauses of the United States Constitution 
because the sentencing statute applicable at the time of his 
offenses, G. L. c. 265, § 2, as amended by St. 1979, c. 488, 
2 
 
§ 2, provided for no penalty other than death, which by the time 
of his offenses had been ruled unconstitutional.  See District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648 (1980).  
It is well established that declaratory relief ordinarily is not 
available in the context of pending criminal cases.  Id. at 659.  
Similarly, a complaint seeking declaratory relief may not be 
used postconviction to avoid the gatekeeper provision of G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, or to challenge the legality of a sentence by 
contesting the constitutionality of the statute under which the 
plaintiff (the defendant in the underlying criminal case) was 
sentenced.  Napolitano v. Attorney Gen., 432 Mass. 240, 242-243 
(2000).  "[T]he proper way for [the plaintiff] to challenge the 
legality of his sentences was by way of a postconviction motion 
in the trial court."  Id. at 243 n.5.  See Commonwealth 
v. Ambers, 397 Mass. 705, 710 n.6 (1986).  "[N]o matter how a 
defendant chooses to label his claim," Commonwealth v. Shipps, 
440 Mass. at 1019, and regardless of the procedural route 
employed, he may not "circumvent the gatekeeper provision by 
filing [an action] in the county court in the first 
instance."  Tyree v. Commonwealth, 449 Mass. 1034, 1034 (2007), 
cert. denied, 554 U.S. 926 (2008) (petition for writ of habeas 
corpus), citing Napolitano v. Attorney Gen., supra (declaratory 
judgment action).  This appeal does not present an extraordinary 
circumstance "justifying declaratory relief to prevent 
disruption of the orderly administration of criminal 
justice."  District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 
381 Mass. at 660.  Contrast Diatchenko v. District Attorney for 
the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 657 n.5 (2013), S.C., 471 
Mass. 12 (2015) (on reservation and report court considered 
constitutionality of sentence, noting constitutional 
significance and impact of case for administration of justice, 
in light of number of past, present, and future defendants whose 
sentences would be affected). 
 
 
2.  The plaintiff would fare no better even if we were to 
consider his claims on the substantive merits, as did the single 
justice.  The single justice's memorandum of decision, which we 
accept, adequately and concisely addressed and rejected the 
plaintiff's meritless contention that persons, like him, who 
committed murder in the first degree between October 28, 1980 -- 
the date of our decision in District Attorney for the Suffolk 
Dist. v. Watson, supra -- and January 1, 1983 -- the effective 
date of G. L. c. 265, § 2, as amended by St. 1982, c. 544, § 3  
-- are subject to no punishment at all for their offenses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
3 
 
 
 
 
William M. Shipps Jr., pro se. 
 
Marguerite T. Grant, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth.