Title: MATTER OF SECRET GRAND JURY INQUIRY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13437
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 18, 1976

No. 13437 I N T H E SUPREME COIRT O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1976 I N T H E M A T T E R O F SECRET GRAND JURY INQUIRY, J O H N AND JANE D O E S THIRTY T H R O U G H THIRTY -NINE ORIGINAL PROCEEDING : Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Howard M. G i l b e r t , Special Prosecutor argued and Thomas Budewitz, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Hon. Gordon R. Bennett, D i s t r i c t Judge,argued, Helena, Montana Dexter T 2 . Delaney, affirmative p o s i t i o n argued, Missnula, Montana For Respondent : Robert Emmons, negative position, argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Filed : Submitted : J u l y 7, 1976 Clerk Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is a petition of Hon. Gordon R. Bennett, presiding district judge in charge of the Lewis and Clark County grand jury, requesting in effect a declaratory judgment from this Court on certain issues raised in the grand jury proceedings of the Workmen's Compensation Division, Department of Labor and Industry, State of Montana. Three issues are presented: 1 ) What authority does the district court have over grand jury subpoenas ? 2) What authority has the district court to examine the proceedings of the grand jury to determine if its instructions, given upon empanelment are being adhered to? 3 ) What authority has the district court to determine whether agents of the grand jury, such as investigators, are ad- hering to the law or conducting themselves appropriately as attaches of the court? The petition was set for oral argument before this Court on July 7, 1976, together with several other matters arising out of the grand jury investigation. Several counsel argued for this Court to accept the district court's petition, while others argued this Court had no authority to issue an advisory opinion, and there was nothing before the Court upon which to make a determination, either by appeal or by supervisory control. With the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction, we cannot agree. In the first instance, the petition of Judge Bennett is not one for an advisory opinion. Advisory opinions are those opinions issued by a court in response to a request from some other branch of government,such as the legislative or executive, asking for information concerning matters of law. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law 5 150. We are here involved with justiciable issues. ar'ising 6rom bana ride c6ntroverk.l-es En the dbstr'ict .court. We consider Judge Bennett's questions as justiciable controversies contempLaed by Rule 57, Montana Rules Civil Procedure. First, a justiciable controversy requires that parties have existing and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, rights or interests. Second, the controversy must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate, as distinguished from a debate or argument invoking a purely political, administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion. Third, it must be a contro- versy the judicial determination of which will have the effect final j udgmen t in law or decree in equity upon the rights, status or legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in interest, or lacking these qualities be of such an overriding public moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of them. The decisions of this Court recognize and support this definition, See: The Forty-Second Legislative Assembly v. Lennon, 156 Mont. 330; Conrad et al. v. Managhan et al., 157 Mont. 335, 485 P.2d 948; State ex rel. Kvaalen v. Graybill, 159 Mont. 190, 496 P.2d 1127; Woodahl v. Montana. Board Natural Re- sources and Conservation, 163 Mont. 193, 516 P.2d 383; State ex rel. Irvin v. Anderson, 164 Mont. 513, 525 P.2d 564. As this Court stated in Lennon, in taking jurisdiction under the Montana Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Title 93, Chap. 89, R.C.M. 1947: "A declaratory judgment action i s a proper proceeding i n which t o reach and answer the l e g a l issues raised i n t h i s proceeding. A court of record i n Montana i s s p e c i f i c a l l y granted the power ' t o declare r i g h t s , s t a t u s , and other l e g a l r e l a t i o n s ' of a party (section 93-8901, R.C.M. 1947) which ' a r e affected by a s t a t u t e ' (section 93-8902, R.C.M. 1947) and i n which a declaratory judgment ' w i l l terminate the controversy o r remove an uncertainty' (section 93- 8905, R.C.M. 1947). This is prescisely the s i t u a t i o n t h a t e x i s t s i n the present case. * *I1 F i r s t , we outline a b r i e f factual s e t t i n g of the grand jury cases. I n 1974, t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e enacted section 79-2315, R.C.M. 1947, which provides i n pertinent part: "The attorney general s h a l l conduct on behalf of the s t a t e , a l l prosecutions f o r public offenses disclosed by an audit of a s t a t e agency performed by the l e g i s l a t i v e auditor. I f the attorney general s h a l l decline such prosecution o r s h a l l f a i l t o commence action on a public offense within a reasonable time the county attorney of the appropriate county s h a l l conduct on behalf of t h e s t a t e such prosecution .'I Pursuant t o the direction of section 79-2315, the attorney general began an investigation arising out of an audit of the Workmen's Compensation Division and requested the two judges of the f i r s t j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t t o c a l l a grand jury. This request was denied and the attorney general applied t o t h i s Court f o r a w r i t of supervisory control, directing the two judges t o empanel a grand jury. In S t a t e ex r e l . Woodahl v. D i s t r i c t Court, 166 Mont. 31, 530 P.2d 780, 32 St.Rep. 11, t h i s Court ordered the empanelment of a grand jury and since t h a t time the grand jury has been func- tioning, r e s d t i n g in a number of lndiccmentsc . Due t o numerous delays i n g e t t i n g cases t o t r i a l , t h i s Court issued t h i s order dated June 15, 1976, e n t i t l e d "In the Matter of the Workmen' s Compensation Litiga.tionl', t h i s Court' s No. 13410 : "It appearing in the light of recent events that the rights of the public, the state, the defendants and the judiciary are being subordinated to personal and extraneous ends and purposes, "And it appearing that the Montana Supreme Court should act under its general supervisory powers pursuant to Art.VIS, Sec. 2 of the Montana Constitution, in order to remedy and mitigate the effects of the foregoing situa- tion, "IT IS ORDERED: " ( 1 ) public p r district That the attorney general of Montana and other bosecutors, all defense counsel, and the presiding judges in all pending criminal cases involving the Workmen's Compensation investigations and prosecutions are directed to appear at a Conference to be held in the Court- room of this Supreme Court on the 21st day of June, 1976, at 2:00 p.m. " ( 2 ) That the Commission on Practice is directed to investigate the conduct of all public prosecutors and de- fense attorneys in pending Workmen's Compensation litiga- tion, determine whether there are any violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility and transmit the Commis- sion recommendations, including disciplinary action, if indicated, to this Court in the usual manner. " ( 3 ) That in order to prevent further injury to the rights of the public, the state, the defendants and the judiciary pending the Conference herein provided, all counsel, their staffs, clerks, stenographers and attaches are ordered and directed to refrain directly or indirectly from public comment in any way relating to the litigation heretofore des- cribed. . I ' ( 4 ) Any violation of this order shall subject the offender to proceedings for contempt of court. " ( 5 ) The Clerk of this Court is directed to cause notice to be given by mailing a true copy hereof forthwith to all public prosecutors, defense counsel, and presiding district judges in all pending Workmen's Compensation cases. District judges shall bring the district court file to the Conference herein provided. " ( 6 ) No excuses will be accepted for nonattendance at said Conference . ' I Following the hearing on June 21St, 1976, Judge Bennett petitioned this Court for a declaratory judgment, this Court's No. 13437, as to the heretbfore enumerated three questions. Underlying the questions is a basic question as to the nature of a grand jury proceeding, which must be answered before giving specific answers to Judge Bennett's questions. The Supreme Court of the United States discussed the nature of grand jury proceedings i n United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, "Traditionally the grand jury has been accorded wide l a t i t u d e t o inquire i n t o violations of criminal law. N o judge presides t o monitor i t s proceedings. I t deliberates i n s e c r e t and may determine alone the course of i t s inquiry. The grand jury may compel the production of evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate, and i t s operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal t r i a l s . 'It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not t o be limited narrowly by questions of propriety o r forecasts of the probable r e s u l t of the investigation, o r by doubts whether any p a r t i c u l a r individual w i l l be found properly subject t o an accusation of crime.' B l a i r v. United S t a t e s , 250 US 273, 282, 63 L Ed 979, 39 S.Ct. 468 (1919). "The scope of the grand jury's powers r e f l e c t s i t s special r o l e i n insuring f a i r and e f f e c t i v e law enforce- ment. A grand jury proceeding i s not an adversary hearing i n which g u i l t o r innocence of the accused is adjudicated. Rather, it is an ex parte investigation t o determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings should be i n s t i t u t e d against any person. The grand j u r y ' s investigative power must be broad i f i t s public responsibility i s adequately t o be discharged. * 9; *I' There is a grave public need f o r a grand jury which may conduct an unfettered and uninterrupted investigation. The grand iury has a responsibility t o the public t o thoroughly investigate 2 the matters before it. The public must know t h a t no lead went unin- vestigated, t h a t the public may have confidence i n the f u l l and f a i r adrriinistration of j u s t i c e . Measuring the public need f o r a f u l l , broad grand jury invescigation against any potential harm t o a witness who has been subpoenaed, it i s c l e a r the need f o r an unfettered grand jury is much greater. What, i f anything, i s l o s t by anyone i f the grand jury hears evidence from a witness a second time, even if that evidence was conceded to be irrelevant to the grand jury's basic investigation. The grand jury conducts its investigation in secret, and its investigation is not adversarial. The grand jury does not determine guilt or innocence, it only determines if criminal pro- ceedings should be begun. Most of the witnesses that appear before the grand jury will never be indicted, but the grand jury needs their testimony simply to continue its investigation. The witnesses lose nothing by testifying. The grand jury has a right to every man's evidence, even if it would be embarrassing to him personally. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L ed 2d 626. If a witness should be later indicted, he would be accorded the full range of rights granted to him as a defendant in a criminal case. If, at that time, evidence is offered that is irrelevant an objection would lie, and the legal question can be determined in a court of law. The constant interruption of the grand jury by witnesses who wish to litigate the validity of the subpoenas which call them before the grand jury, could easily result in the investigation coming to a grinding halt. The logic of the United States Supreme Court in Calandra explaining why the exclusionary rule should not apply to grand jury proceedings applies with equal force to the questions now before this Court: "* * Because the grand jury does not finally adjudicate guilt or innocence, it has traditionally been allowed to pursue its investigative and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evidentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal trial. Permitting witnesses to invoke the exclusionary rule before a grand jury would precipitate adjudication of issues hitherto reserved for the trial on the merits and would delay and disrupt grand jury proceedings. Suppression hearings would halt the orderly progress of an,investigation and might necessitate extended litigation of issues only tangentially related to the grand jury's primary objective. The probable result would be 'protracted interruption of grand jury proceedings, t * 9~ * effectively transforming them into preliminary trials on the merits. In some cases the delay might be fatal to the enforcement of the criminal law. Just last Term we reaffirmed our disinclination to allow litigious interference with grand jury proceedings: "'Any holding that would saddle a grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings would assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the public's interest in the fair and expeditious administration of the criminal laws.' United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17, 35 L Ed 2d 67, 93 S.Ct. 764 (1973) . I ' The questions posed by Judge Bennett must be answered against the backdrop of this strong policy against saddling the grand jury investigation with delays for preliminary hearings that would frustrate the public need for an unfettered grand jury investigation. This Court will not tolerate "litigious interference with grand jury proceedings". We now consider Judge Bennett's concern as to the authority of a district judge over grand jury subpoenas in the instant case. The statutory section in the Code of Criminal Procedure which applies to grand jury subpoena power is section 95-1407, R.C.M. 1947, which provides: "A subpoena requiring the attendance of a witness before the grand jury may be signed and issued by the county attorney, by the grand jury or by the judge of the district court, for witnesses in the state, in support of the pro- secution, for those witnesses whose testimony, in his opinion is material in an investigation before the grand jury, and for such other witnesses as the grand jury upon investigation pending before them may direct." (Emphasis added. ) The statute allows the court, the county: attorney, or the grand jury to issue subpoenas. It allows any one of the three to subpoena witnesses whose testimony is, in the caller's opinion, material. However, i n the instant case, the judge's charge i s Che limiting feature t o the scope of the grand jury. The general r u l e i s t h a t a grand jury i s e n t i t l e d t o obtain testimony o r subpoena a l l evidence necessary f o r its deliberations. However, i n c e r t a i n circumstances, exceptions t o the general r u l e are made. For example, there i s the necessity for conformity with the reasonableness requirements of the Fourth and F i f t h Amendments to the United States Constitution. The court may quash a subpoena duces tecum which i s consti- tutionally overbroad. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S. C t . 370, 50 L ed 652. The court may quash a subpoena duces tecum which violates the F i f t h Amendment's r i g h t against self-incrimination. ,3,g!!/ Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct.-$&3f 29 L ed 746; Losavio v. D i s t r i c t Court In & For Tenth Jud. D i s t . , (Colo. 1975), 533 P.2d 32. A grand jury may subpoena a witness even though i t i s powerless t o force him t o t e s t i f y over a v a l i d claim of self-incrimin- ation absent a grant of immunity. United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204. Quashing a subpoena because there i s no showing of the materiality of the testimony sought i s c l e a r l y erroneous. United States v. United States D i s t r i c t Court, 238 F.2d 713. This does not mean t h a t the d i s t r i c t court may never quash a grand jury sub- poena no matter how f a r a f i e l d the grand jury may go from the area of i t s o r i g i n a l investigation, only t h a t t h i s power i s limited t o the most extreme cases where the court, by not quashing the subpoena, would be permitting a gross abuse of process. I n United States v. United States D i s t r i c t Court, 238 F. 2d 713, 722, the Court said: IT* * * While the judge has the supervisory duty t o see t h a t i t s process i s not abused o r used f o r purposes of oppression o r i n j u s t i c e * * * there should be no cur- tailment of i t s i n q u i s i t o r i a l power except i n the c l e a r e s t cases of abuse ." Applying t h a t t e s t , the c l e a r e s t case of abuse requires something more than recalling witnesses whose testimony is relevant t o the original inquiry. Oppression i s something substantially more than t e l l i n g a witness t h a t i f he l i e s before the grand jury he w i l l be charged with perjury. Only i n a much stronger case, where there was gross misconduct associated with the use of process, would the court be j u s t i f i e d i n interfering with the grand j u r y ' s investi- gation by quashing the grand jury's subpoena. From the foregoing discussion it i s apparent and we hold, t h a t the d i s t r i c t court may not i n t e r f e r e with the grand jury's subpoena power except (a) where the subpoena duces tecum is over- broad; (b) where the subpoena requires self-incrimination; (c) i n the c l e a r e s t case of grossly abusive conduct; (d) where the grand j u r y ' s investigation goes beyond the scope s e t f o r t h above; or (e) where, i f the court did not i n t e r f e r e , the r e s u l t would be an abuse of process. Judge Bennett's second issue revolves around the authority of the d i s t r i c t court t o inquire i n t o the grand jury proceedings t o determine i f the l i m i t s of the charge a r e being violated. It is c l e a r the d i s t r i c t court may inquire i n t o the grand jury proceedings only t o see t h a t it stays within the s t a t u t o r y provisions of section 79-2315, R.C.M. 1947. The Code of Criminal Procedure d i r e c t s the grand jury t o r e t i r e t o a "private roomf' and look i n t o the offenses cognizable by it, section 95-1404(b), R.C.M. 1947. Section 95-1406, R.C.M. 1947, allows the grand jury t o ask advice of the d i s t r i c t court judge, but it requires, absent a request f o r such advice, t h a t the d i s t r i c t judge not be present during the sessions of the grand jury. The d i s t r i c t court i s not t o monitor the grand jury proceedings. The United States Supreme Court i n Calandra a t 38 L ed 2d 561, 568, said: I I N o judge presides t o monitor i t s proceedings. It deliberates i n secret and may determine a-lone the course of i t s inquiry." In r e K i t t l e , 180 F. 946, 947, where Felix Frankfurter was the Assistant United States D i s t r i c t Attorney, Federal D i s t r i c t Judge Learned Hand refused t o r e l i e v e a witness from examination by a grand jury, s t a t i n g : "* * They a r e the voice of the community accusing i t s members, and the only protection from such accusation i s i n the conscience of t h a t tribunal. Therefore, except i n sporadic and ill-considered instances, the courts have never taken supervision over what evidence s h a l l come before them * * *." To summarize the second matter of concern t o Judge Bennett, the d i s t r i c t court has authority t o l i m i t the area of a grand jury investigation by i t s charge given a t empanelment and the d i s t r i c t caurt may inquire i n t o the grand jury proceedings t o ascertain i f any instructions which were given are not being followed. However, such authority is r e s t r i c t e d t o the l i m i t s previously referred t o i n t h i s opinion as s e t f o r t h i n section 79-2315, R.C.M. Judge Bennett's t h i r d matter of concern i s the extent of the authority of the d i s t r i c t court over the agents of the grand jury t o ascertain i f these agents are obeying the law o r conducting them- selves appropriately while the grand jury is conducting i t s i n v e s t i gation. W e noted i n t h i s Court's order s e t t i n g a hearing on t h i s matter, t h a t one of the matters of concern i s a p e t i t i o n f i l e d b y counsel for John Boyer, William F. Pellegrini, John C. Drescher and Wade J. Dahood to have certain subpoenas quashed. To summarize the affidavits and their allegations, we note that the fact an in- dictment came down, partially from their testimony on their first appearance before the grand jury, does not close off further inquiry. Each of the first three named witnesses later signed affidavits which reflect upon the accuracy, veracity and completeness of their prior grand jury testimony. Since an indictment against Dahood was partially based on their testimony, it would appear to this Court that it is not only relevant but absolutely necessary for the grand jury to ascertain whether or not the allegations are correct. The very integrity of the entire investigation leading to the Dahood indictment may depend upon the veracity and accuracy of the testimony given by the three witnesses, The petition of Wade J. Dahood, filed earlier, related to testimony of another witness, Henry T. Laughlin. The filing of that affidavit resulted in an unusual closed hearing before Judge Bennett at which Laughlin's testimony was taken, a transcript of which was submitted and considered by this Court in State ex rel. Woodahl v. District Court, Mont . , P.2d 9 33 St.Rep. 537, (June 1976). That transcript has possible dis- crepancies between Dahood's affidavit and Laughlin's subsequent testimony respecting the events described in the affidavit. To not have called Laughlin back to the grand jury for more testimony, as was done, would have interfered with the grand jury's full investigation of the Dahood case. The Dahood petition contains only speculation and its conclusions, that the witnesses are being recalled for harassment and intimidation, are without grounds either in law or fact. A legitimate and lawful purpose for the subpoenas exists; they should issue. See: In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed t o Certain Executive Officers of the M.G. Allen & Associates, Inc., 391 Fed. Supp. 991 (1975). In B l a i r v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 39 S. C t . 468, 63 L ed 979, 982, it was noted: "'It i s c l e a r l y recognized t h a t the giving of testimony and the attendance upon court o r grand jury i n order t o t e s t i f y a r e public duties which every person within the jurisdiction of the govern- ment i s bound t o perform upon being properly summoned * * * The personal s a c r i f i c e involved i s a p a r t of the necessary contribution of the individual t o the welfare of the public. The duty, so onerous a t times, yet so necessary t o the administration of j u s t i c e according t o the forms and modes established i n our system of government * * * i s subject t o mitigation i n exceptional circumstances; there i s a constitu- t i o n a l exemption from being compelled i n any criminal case t o be a witness against oneself, e n t i t l i n g the witness t o be excused from answering anything t h a t w i l l tend t o incriminate him * * * some confidential matters are shielded, from considerations of policy, and per- haps i n other cases f o r special reasons a witness may be excused from t e l l i n g a l l t h a t he knows. 11 1 But, aside from exceptions and qualifications-- and none such i s asserted i n the present case--- the witness i s bound not only t o attend, but t o t e l l what he knows i n answer t o questions framed for the purpose of bringing out the t r u t h of the matter under inquiry. " (Emphasis supplied.) The d i s t r i c t court judge has limited power over a grand jury. Once it i s called, the grand jury i s not subject t o control except as heretofore s e t out and discussed i n t h i s opinion. I n United States v. Doe (Ellsberg), 455 F.2d 1270, 1274, the Court said: 11 W e recognize * * * t h a t grand jury proceedings cannot be policed i n any d e t a i l . It i s a price we pay f o r grand jury independence * * *.I1 In t h a t same case, i n a memorandum attached a t the end of the opinion, appears a statement which we think applies i n the i n s t a n t case: If* * *defendants seek t o break up the play before it has s t a r t e d , and then claim the government was offside." This Opinion s h a l l constitute declaratory judgment. a\ @ Chief Justiceu .................................. Justices M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d i s s e n t i n g I d i s s e n t . Judge Bennett received a p e t i t i o n i n h i s c o u r t June 22, 1976 requesting an order t o show cause t o suspend o r cancel subpoenas d i r e c t e d t o one P e l l e g r i n i , Boyer and Drescher, persons who had previously t e s t i f i e d before t h e grand jury. The p e t i t i o n a l l e g e s c e r t a i n a c t s of harassment, intimidation and improper conduct on t h e p a r t of t h e o f f i c e r s i n charge of t h e grand jury function. The pleading a f f i r m a t i v e l y a l l e g e s t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n is one and t h e same t h a t was previously presented t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t and brought t o t h e Supreme Court on supervisory c o n t r o l . This Court heard t h e matter on June 7, 1976, and on June 18, 1976, and ordered t h e order t o show cause and s t a y s e t a s i d e as t o t h e p e t i t i o n e r s because no sworn statements by applicants accompanied t h e p e t i t i o n t h a t would allow t h e Court t o proceed. The sworn support now has been f i l e d with t h e present p e t i t i o n together with memorandum of a u t h o r i t y . Judge Bennett attached a copy of t h i s p e t i t i o n and support- ing documents t o a communication addressed t o t h e Chief J u s t i c e of t h i s Court a l l e g i n g t h a t it appears t o be t h e same p e t i t i o n previously presented t o h i s c o u r t and t h e subject of our order of June 18, 1976, supra, and a l l e g i n g c e r t i f i c a t i o n o r documen- t a t i o n held lacking before has now been added. Judge Bennett advises t h a t he has not acted on t h e p e t i - t i o n and forwarded same t o t h e Supreme Court because t h e Supreme Court has suggested " t h a t t h e p i t h and moment of these workmen's compensation proceedings j u s t i f y s p e c i a l procedures. This Court [Judge Bennett's] has learned by experience t h a t any a c t i o n taken i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e grand jury, other than approving of expense vouchers and ordering t h e f i l i n g of indictments, w i l l be m e t by an application f o r a w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l , which w i l l be heard by t h e Supreme Court. I t i s then, t h e i n t e n t of t h i s pe- t i t i o n [ B e n n e t t ' s ] t o e l i m i n a t e t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y expenses and delay occasioned by such proceedings." Judge Bennett f u r t h e r r e q u e s t s : " * * * t h a t t h e Supreme Court i s s u e i t s o ~ i n i o n on t h e following q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d by t h e a i o r e - s a i d p e t i t i o n " [The p e t i t i o n f i l e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t Judge Bennett lists t h e t h r e e q u e s t i o n s set o u t above i n t h e m a j o r i t y opinion and concludes: "You a r e r e s p e c t f u l l y requested t o review t h e m a t t e r s set f o r t h h e r e i n and t o t a k e a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n o r a d v i s e t h i s c o u r t thereon." ( ~ m p h a s i s supplied.) W e have h e r e a p e t i t i o n properly f i l e d w i t h t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o g e t h e r w i t h sworn a l l e g a t i o n s t o move t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o g r a n t a f a c t hearing t o determine i f t h e p e t i t i o n e r s a r e e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f . Instead it i s h e r e on a r e q u e s t t h a t t h i s Court s i t a s a d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o save e x t r a o r d i n a r y expense and d e l a y and t o " a c t " on t h e p e t i t i o n o r i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e "advise" t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . F i r s t t h e m a j o r i t y through some kind of reasoning, n o t a t a l l c l e a r t o m e , determines t h a t t h e r e q u e s t of Judge Bennett is n o t one f o r "advisory opinion" o r "advice" a s set f o r t h above b u t t h i s becomes, a s I understand it, a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a c t i o n . They cite Rule 57, M.R.Civ.P., and v a r i o u s p a s t d e c l a r a - t o r y judgment c a s e s heard by t h i s Court, none of which a r e i n p o i n t i n t h i s m a t t e r . Rule 57 r e q u i r e s t h a t s e c t i o n 93-8901- 93-8916, R.C.M. 1947, must be observed. The f i r s t obvious problem i s how do w e s i t a s a d i s t r i c t c o u r t on t h i s p e t i t i o n a n d ' d e c i d e i s s u e s of f a c t without a n e v i d e n t i a r y hearing? The f a c t s a l l e g e d i n t h e p e t i t i o n a r e n o t agreed f a c t s by any means. Section 93-8911, R.C.M. 1947, seems t o i n d i c a t e t h a t i f f a c t s a r e t o be resolved a l l p a r t i e s must be heard o r else they would n o t be bound. Some of t h e f a c t s t h e m a j o r i t y has decided without a e v i d e n t i a r y hearing a r e t h a t t h e oppression pleaded i n t h e p e t i t i o n i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant r e l i e f ; t h a t c e r t a i n indictments f i l e d w e r e based on t h e testimony of p e t i t i o n e r s ; t h a t f u r t h e r testimony of p e t i t i o n e r s i s r e l e v a n t and necessary; t h a t t h e Dahood p e t i t i o n c o n t a i n s o n l y s p e c u l a t i o n and conclusions; t h a t t h e r e a r e no grounds i n law o r f a c t t o support harassment; t h e subpoenas a r e grounded on l e g i t i m a t e and lawful purpose t h a t t h e defendants "seek t o break up t h e p l a y b e f o r e it has s t a r t e d , and then claim t h e government was o f f s i d e " ; t h a t , "Most w i t n e s s e s t h a t appear before a grand jury w i l l never be i n d i c t e d * * * T.he witnesses l o s e nothing by t e s t i f y i n g * * *. I f a witness should l a t e r be i n d i c t e d , he would be accorded t h e f u l l range of r i g h t s granted t o him a s a defendant i n a c r i m i n a l case. I f , a t t h a t t i m e , evidence i s o f f e r e d t h a t i s i r r e l e v a n t an o b j e c t i o n would l i e , and t h e l e g a l q u e s t i o n can be determined c o n s t a n t by a c o u r t of law * * * The/interruption of t h e grand. jury by witnesses who wish t o l i t i g a t e t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e subpoenas * * * could e a s i l y r e s u l t i n t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n coming t o a g r i n d i n g h a l t . " , and s o on. Even i f t h i s procedure could be c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a c t i o n it has gone f a r beyond t h e o r i g - i n a l scope of i n q u i r y . See National S u r e t y Corp. v. Kruse, 121 Mont. 202, 192 P.2d 317, 319. It i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t t h i s Court i n 1962 seemed t o hold t h a t " P e t i t i o n e r f a i l s t o understand t h e purpose of t h e Declaratory Judgment S t a t u t e s which a r e c i v i l and n o t c r i m i n a l remedies". Harold Goff v. S t a t e of Montana and Ed Ellsworth, Jr., 1 4 1 Mont. 605, 374 P.2d 862. See a l s o I n t h e Matter of Charges Against Robert D e W a r , P o l i c e O f f i c e r , Mont . , 548 P.2d 149, 33 St.Rep. 353 (1976) and S t a t e ex rel. Forsythe v. Coate, Mont . , 546 P.2d 1060, 33 St.Rep. 310, (1976) . - 16 - It i s m y p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e questions by Judge Bennett have already been g e n e r a l l y decided by t h i s Court. There i s no law t h a t permits t h i s Court t o decide f a c t s i n a vacuum which w i l l o p e r a t e d i r e c t l y on individual p e t i t i o n e r s i n a d i s t r i c t c o u r t cause. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t should f i r s t determine t h e f a c t s and make i t s r u l i n g and u n t i l a n order is entered by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t h e r e i s no proper a p p l i c a t i o n before t h i s Court on which t h e majority can render its opinion. There are no circumstances presented t h a t would i n law permit t h i s Court t o e n t e r a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment which would be binding on t h e p e t i t i o n e r s i n t h e d i s t r i c t court. The request by Judge Bennett should be dismissed and t h e matter returned t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s o t h a t t h e foundation p e t i t i o n preceding a l l of t h i s o r d e r l y j u d i c i a l proceeding. J u s t i c e M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l d i s s e n t i n g : I d i s s e n t . I n m y view, t h e majority opinion i s n o t a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment, binds no one, and it furnishes no precedent i n f u t u r e cases. There a r e no pleadings a s required by Montana's Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Section 93-8901 et seq.; National Surety Corp. v. Kruse, 1 2 1 Mont. 202, 192 P.2d 317. A l l persons who have o r claim an i n t e r e s t which would be a f f e c t e d by t h e d e c l a r a t i o n have n o t been made p a r t i e s a s required by s e c t i o n 93-8911, R.C.M. 1947. The i s s u e s i n t h i s matter have not been framed i n a f a c t u a l s e t t i n g permitting e n t r y of a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment. National Surety Corp. v. Kruse, supra. Instead of a bona f i d e s u b s t a n t i a l controversy between i d e n t i f i a b l e p a r t i e s seeking s p e c i f i c r e l i e f through a decree of conclusive c h a r a c t e r as required t o v e s t t h i s Court with j u r i s - d i c t i o n (Chovanak v. Matthews, 120 Mont. 520, 188 P.2d 582), w e simply have a request f o r answers t o t h r e e broad, t h e o r e t i c a l and a b s t r a c t questions. I n s h o r t , t h e m a j o r i t y has rendered an advisory opinion without l e g a l a u t h o r i t y t o do so. The majority opinion i s n o t a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment but simply a g r a t u i t o u s opinion, furnishing n e i t h e r guidance nor precedent, and binding no one, n o t even i t s author. I f o r e s e e s u b s t a n t i a l mischief i n t h e broad, sweeping language employed. I would remand t h i s matter t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r s u f f i c i e n t p a r t i c u l a r i z a t i o n t o bring it within t h e provisions of t h e Uniform Declaratory Judgments A c t before accepting j u r i s - d i c t i o n . J u s t i c e