Title: George v. George
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12059
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 23, 2016

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SJC-12059 
 
CLIFFORD E. GEORGE  vs.  JACQUELYN A. GEORGE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 6, 2016. - November 23, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Divorce and Separation, Alimony, Modification of judgment. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint for divorce filed in the Suffolk Division of the 
Probate and Family Court Department on May 29, 2001. 
 
 
A complaint for modification, filed on August 26, 2013, was 
heard by Jeremy A. Stahlin, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Brian J. Kelly for Clifford E. George. 
 
Matthew P. Barach (Alessandra Petrucelli with him) for 
Jacquelyn A. George. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  Clifford E. George and Jacquelyn A. George 
married in 1989 and divorced in 2002.1  Their separation 
agreement, and the judgment that followed, provided that 
                                                          
 
 
1 Because they share a last name, we refer to the parties by 
their first names. 
2 
 
Clifford would pay Jacquelyn monthly alimony.  In 2013, Clifford 
filed a complaint for modification of the divorce judgment that 
sought, among other things, to modify his alimony obligation 
based on G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b), part of the Alimony Reform Act, 
St. 2011, c. 124 (act), which became effective on March 1, 2012, 
nearly ten years after the parties' divorce.  Section 49 (b) 
provides that general term alimony for marriages lasting more 
than ten years but fewer than fifteen years shall not continue 
for "longer than [seventy] per cent of the number of months of 
the marriage,"  G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b) (3), a process by which a 
judge can deviate from the durational limit, where doing so is 
"required in the interests of justice."  G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b).  
The act also provided a phase-in schedule for when complaints 
for modification based on the new durational limits could be 
brought for alimony obligations that predated the effective date 
of the act.  St. 2011, c. 124, §§ 4, 5. 
 
In his memorandum of decision, the Probate and Family Court 
judge denied Clifford's complaint for modification because he 
found that deviation beyond the durational limits of the act was 
warranted.  Clifford appealed from this judgment to the Appeals 
Court, and we transferred the case to this court on our own 
motion. 
 
We affirm the judge's denial of relief but on the ground 
that Clifford's complaint was filed prematurely.  However, we 
3 
 
utilize this opportunity to set forth guidance for how the 
"interests of justice" standard of § 49 (b) should be applied 
when determining whether deviating beyond the durational limits 
of the act is warranted. 
 
Background.  Clifford and Jacquelyn married in 
Massachusetts in June, 1989.  The parties were divorced in 
November, 2002.  Their separation agreement merged into the 
divorce judgment, except for the division of property 
provisions.  According to one of the merged portions, Clifford 
was to pay Jacquelyn $1,800 per month in alimony, subject to 
termination "upon the earliest to occur of [Clifford's] death, 
[Jacquelyn's] death, [Jacquelyn's] remarriage or July 30, 2026."  
The unmerged portion of the separation agreement and the divorce 
judgment gave Jacquelyn the former marital home and required 
Clifford to pay for her health insurance. 
 
On August 26, 2013, Clifford filed a complaint for 
modification, requesting that the  divorce judgment be modified 
in several ways:  to allow Clifford to cease paying for 
Jacquelyn's health insurance; to order Jacquelyn to refinance 
and remove Clifford's name from the mortgage on the former 
marital home; and to terminate alimony payments.  Clifford 
asserted that changed circumstances warranted such modification.  
Specifically, he claimed that the cost of health insurance had 
more than doubled since the time of divorce, his ability to 
4 
 
secure credit for his business had been harmed by Jacquelyn's 
refusal to refinance the mortgage, and the durational limits of 
the act called for the termination of alimony payments based on 
the length of the parties' marriage. 
 
Following a pretrial conference in May, 2014, the judge 
issued temporary orders, ruling that there were no remaining 
issues relating to the health insurance or mortgage, and 
requested that the parties submit briefs and an agreed statement 
of facts as to the alimony issue.  After reviewing the materials 
submitted by the parties, the judge issued a "modification 
judgment" and memorandum of decision denying termination of 
alimony payments. 
 
The judge found, and the parties do not contest, that the 
parties' marriage lasted 143.97 months (approximately twelve 
years) and that based upon the act's durational limits, 
Clifford's alimony payments presumptively should have ended 
after 100.78 months, or on April 23, 2011.2  G. L. c. 208, § 49 
(b) (3).  The judge noted that for divorce judgments predating 
the act arising from marriages that lasted as long as the 
Georges', uncodified § 5 of the act  requires complaints for 
modification based solely on durational limits to be filed no 
earlier than March 1, 2015, which was more than one year later 
                                                          
 
 
2 The judge measured the length of marriage from the date of 
marriage to the date of service of the divorce papers. 
5 
 
than the date that Clifford's complaint for modification was 
filed.  St. 2011, c. 124, § 5 (3).  Nonetheless, the judge went 
on to evaluate whether deviation from the durational limits was 
warranted, stating that he was obligated to do so.  The judge 
concluded that deviation was warranted because, he theorized, 
Jacquelyn "bargained for" a specific alimony termination date in 
exchange for a certain division of property and, had Jacquelyn 
known that alimony would terminate before the date contained in 
the agreement, she would "likely have insisted on different 
property division terms."  As mentioned, Clifford appealed from 
the judge's decision to the Appeals Court, and we transferred 
the case to this court on our own motion.3  In his brief, 
Clifford makes clear that his appeal focuses only on the judge's 
decision that deviation from the durational limits was 
warranted, and on how such deviation issues should be analyzed. 
 
Discussion.  a.  The Alimony Reform Act.  The act became 
effective on March 1, 2012, and deemed all alimony awards that 
predated it to be general term alimony.  St. 2011, c. 124, 
§§ 4 (b), 7.  Under the act, general term alimony may be 
                                                          
 
 
3 After the modification judgment was issued, Jacquelyn 
filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs.  A motion hearing 
was held in December, 2014.  In a memorandum of decision 
following the hearing, as well as in a supplemental modification 
judgment, the judge awarded her certain attorney's fees and 
costs.  Although Clifford appealed from some of the award, he 
stated in his brief that he is no longer appealing any issue 
involving attorney's fees.  The issue is therefore waived.  
Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975). 
6 
 
modified in amount and duration upon a material change of 
circumstance.  G. L. c. 208, § 49 (e).  The act also provides 
presumptive termination dates for general term alimony 
obligations for marriages lasting fewer than twenty years.4  
G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b).  A judge may deviate beyond these 
termination dates if the judge makes a written finding that 
doing so is in the "interests of justice."  G. L. c. 208, 
§ 49 (b). 
 
Uncodified § 4 (b) of the act states:  "Existing alimony 
awards which exceed the durational limits established in said 
[§] 49 of said [G. L. c.] 208 shall be modified upon a complaint 
for modification without additional material change of 
                                                          
 
 
4 The presumptive termination dates -- which are expressed 
as percentages of the length of the marriage -- for payment of 
general term alimony are set forth in G. L. c. 208, 
§ 49 (b) (1)-(4): 
 
"(1) If the length of the marriage is [five] years or less, 
general term alimony shall continue for not longer than 
one-half the number of months of the marriage. 
 
"(2) If the length of the marriage is [ten] years or less, 
but more than [five] years, general term alimony shall 
continue for not longer than [sixty] per cent of the number 
of months of the marriage. 
 
"(3) If the length of the marriage is [fifteen] years or 
less, but more than [ten] years, general term alimony shall 
continue for not longer than [seventy] per cent of the 
number of months of the marriage. 
 
"(4) If the length of the marriage is [twenty] years or 
less, but more than [fifteen] years, general term alimony 
shall continue for not longer than [eighty] per cent of the 
number of months of the marriage." 
7 
 
circumstance, unless the court finds that deviation from the 
durational limits is warranted."  St. 2011, c. 124, § 4 (b).  
Thus, the durational limits are retroactive and apply to alimony 
awards that predate the act.  Rodman v. Rodman, 470 Mass. 539, 
544 (2015); Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 536 (2015); Holmes 
v. Holmes, 467 Mass. 653, 661 n.9 (2014).  Pursuant to 
uncodified § 4, a payor spouse with an alimony obligation that 
existed before March 1, 2012, and that exceeds the act's 
durational limits, need only file a complaint for modification 
to demonstrate a material change in circumstances.  St. 2011, 
c. 124, § 4 (b).  Nonetheless, a judge may order alimony to 
continue beyond the durational limit if the judge finds that 
deviation is "required in the interests of justice."  Id. 
 
Uncodified § 5 provides a phase-in period for when 
complaints for modification of existing alimony awards may be 
filed by payor spouses "solely because the existing alimony 
judgment exceeds the durational limits."  St. 2011, c. 124, § 5.5  
This phase-in period was created to avoid a rush to the 
                                                          
 
 
5 Statute 2011, c. 124, § 5 provides: "Any complaint for 
modification filed by a payor under [§] 4 of this act solely 
because the existing alimony judgment exceeds the durational 
limits of [G. L. c. 208, § 49,] may only be filed under the 
following time limits: 
 
 
". . .  
 
"(3) Payors who were married to the alimony recipient 
[fifteen] years or less, but more than [ten] years, may 
file a modification action on or after March 1, 2015." 
8 
 
courthouse by payor spouses upon passage of the act.  See Doktor 
v. Doktor, 470 Mass. 547, 551 n.6 (2015).  For marriages lasting 
fewer than fifteen years but more than ten years -- as is the 
case here -- that date is March 1, 2015.  St. 2011, c. 124, 
§ 5 (3). 
 
As Clifford admits, his complaint for modification was 
filed before the permissible filing date set out in uncodified 
§ 5 of the act.  In light of the premature filing, dismissal of 
Clifford's complaint was appropriate, and we affirm the judge's 
denial of relief on that ground.  See Holmes, 467 Mass. at 661 
n.9.6 
 
b.  Deviation standard.  We now set forth guidelines for 
how a judge of the Probate and Family Court should apply the 
G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b) "interests of justice" standard.  The 
identity of the moving party will depend on whether the marriage 
ended before the act's effective date.  For marriages that ended 
before that date, the payor spouse will be the moving party, and 
for marriages that ended after that date, the recipient spouse 
                                                          
 
 
6 Clifford brought two additional claims with his complaint 
for alimony modification.  The judge ruled that these claims 
were frivolous and without merit, and they were no longer part 
of the case when he considered and decided Clifford's request to 
terminate the alimony obligation.  Still, the judge, recognizing 
our statement in Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass. 653, 661 n.9 
(2014), that claims not filed "solely because" the existing 
alimony judgment exceeded the act's durational limits may be 
considered by a probate judge, went on to address the issue 
whether deviation was warranted.  See St. 2011, c. 124, § 5. 
9 
 
will be the moving party.  See G. L. c. 208, § 53 (e) ("In 
setting an initial alimony order, or in modifying an existing 
order, the court may deviate from duration and amount limits for 
general term alimony . . . upon written findings that deviation 
is necessary."); St. 2011, c. 124, § 4 (b) (durational limits 
apply to alimony awards that predate act). 
 
In either case, we conclude that when disputes of fact 
arise the judge must make written findings based on evidence to 
determine whether the "interests of justice" require alimony 
payments to continue beyond the durational limits of the act.  
The recipient spouse bears the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that deviation beyond the 
presumptive termination date is "required in the interests of 
justice."  G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b).  See St. 2011, c. 124, § 4 
(existing alimony award exceeding durational limits is material 
change of circumstance).  Further, a judge should evaluate the 
circumstances of the parties in the here and now; that is, as 
they exist at the time the deviation is sought, rather than the 
situation as it existed at the time of divorce.  See Schuler v. 
Schuler, 382 Mass. 366, 377-378 (1981) (affirming denial of 
alimony modification where judge found "at the time of the 
modification hearing [payor spouse] had the ability to make the 
payments"); Katz v. Katz, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 472, 483 (2002) 
(reversing judge's decision to terminate alimony where payor 
10 
 
spouse had income-generating assets "at the time of the hearing 
on the complaint for modification").  If relevant factors that 
existed at the time of the divorce persist when the complaint 
for modification is filed, a judge may properly consider them.  
For example, if at the time of divorce a spouse was disabled and 
that disability was taken into consideration in setting the 
initial alimony award, and if that disability persists when the 
payor spouse files a complaint for modification, the judge may 
properly consider the impact the disability continues to have on 
the recipient spouse in determining whether deviation beyond the 
act's durational limits is "required in the interests of 
justice."  G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b). 
 
The importance of this temporal focus is shown in the 
instant case.  The judge concluded that had Jacquelyn known that 
her alimony would terminate prior to the date in the merged 
portion of the separation agreement, she would likely have 
"bargained for" a different division of property.  This analysis 
was flawed in two respects.  First, there was nothing in the 
agreed statement of facts to support this finding.  Second, this 
logic might well prevent nearly all payor spouses with alimony 
obligations predating the act from ever gaining the benefit of 
the act's durational limits, because recipient spouses could 
argue that, had they known that their alimony payments would be 
affected by the act, they would have negotiated their separation 
11 
 
agreement differently.  This is in direct contravention of the 
Legislature's intent that the durational limits apply to 
preexisting alimony awards.  See St. 2011, c. 124, § 4 (b); 
Rodman, 470 Mass. at 544; Chin, 470 Mass. at 536; Holmes, 467 
Mass. at 661 n.9. 
 
"Although a 'judge has broad discretion when awarding 
alimony under the [act],' . . . the judge must consider all 
relevant, statutorily specified factors . . . ."  Duff-Kareores 
v. Kareores, 474 Mass. 528, 535 (2016), quoting Zaleski v. 
Zaleski, 469 Mass. 230, 235 (2014).  Here, the appropriate 
statutory factors to be considered are set forth in G. L. 
c. 208, § 53 (e): 
"(1) advanced age; chronic illness; or unusual health 
circumstances of either party; (2) tax considerations 
applicable to the parties; (3) whether the payor spouse is 
providing health insurance and the cost of health insurance 
for the recipient spouse; (4) whether the payor spouse has 
been ordered to secure life insurance for the benefit of 
the recipient spouse and the cost of such insurance; (5) 
sources and amounts of unearned income, including capital 
gains, interest and dividends, annuity and investment 
income from assets that were not allocated in the 
parties['] divorce; (6) significant premarital cohabitation 
that included economic partnership or marital separation of 
significant duration, each of which the court may consider 
in determining the length of the marriage; (7) a party's 
inability to provide for that party's own support by reason 
of physical or mental abuse by the payor; (8) a party's 
inability to provide for that party's own support by reason 
of that party's deficiency of property, maintenance or 
employment opportunity; and (9) upon written findings, any 
other factor that the court deems relevant and material." 
 
12 
 
 
Conclusion.  We affirm the denial of relief to the 
plaintiff on the grounds that his complaint was premature.  See 
G. L. c. 208, § 49; St. 2011, c. 124, § 5.  The plaintiff may 
refile his complaint for modification, and it should be 
considered under the standard articulated today.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
                                                          
 
 
7 We deny Jacquelyn's request for appellate attorney's fees, 
as she has not provided a legal basis for such an award.  See 
Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10-11 (2004).