Title: STATE v. POWELL
Citation: 2010 OK 40
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: May 11, 2010

STATE v. POWELL Annotate this Case STATE v. POWELL 2010 OK 40 Case Number: 106175 Decided: 05/11/2010 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Petitioner, v. CLYDE POWELL, Respondent. ATTEMPTED APPEAL FROM ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT OF CRAIG COUNTY GRANTING HABEAS CORPUS ¶0 Respondent, committed to state psychiatric hospital after being found not guilty of murder by reason of insanity, successfully sought release from confinement by original proceeding in habeas corpus before the District Court of Craig County, Hon. James D. Goodpaster, District Judge. Upon State's request, the District Court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and State sought certiorari for its attempted appeal under ATTEMPTED APPEAL DISMISSED. Gene Haynes, District Attorney, James W. Ely, Jr. Assistant District Attorney, Vinita, Oklahoma, Attorneys for Petitioner, Cathy Stocker, District Attorney, John L. Scott, Assistant District Attorney, Enid, Oklahoma, Attorneys for Petitioner. Winston H. Connor, II, Stockwell and Connor, Miami, Oklahoma, Attorney for Respondent. EDMONDSON, C.J. ¶1 This is an attempted appeal by the State of Oklahoma from the judgment of the District Court of Craig County allowing a writ of habeas corpus. In 1990, Mr. Powell was committed by the District Court of Garfield County to the hospital for psychiatric treatment after he was found not guilty by reason of insanity of the murder of his mother. The writ ordered the release of Clyde Powell from the Oklahoma Forensic Center, formerly Eastern State Hospital, based on evidence that Mr. Powell is now sane. Because there is no appeal from an order granting habeas corpus, we dismiss it. ¶2 Under the Constitution and statutes of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court, Court of Criminal Appeals, all other appellate courts and the District Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction to hear and determine habeas corpus. Art. 7, §§ 4,7, Oklahoma Constitution; ¶3 The state's arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, there is no question that Mr. Powell had a right to bring this action in habeas corpus to seek his release from confinement. Title ¶4 It is well-settled in Oklahoma that the order of the district court in a habeas corpus proceeding is not subject to review on appeal. Since the beginning of the last century, this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have held that no appeal can be taken from a decision in habeas corpus discharging a petitioner restrained of his liberty. Wisener v. Burrell, ¶5 In Wisener, this court dismissed the appeal brought by a county sheriff from an order of the district court in habeas corpus discharging a prisoner held in custody for extradition. The court recognized that statutory authority and court decisions varied among the states, but held appeals from a decision in habeas corpus discharging a person from restraint do not lie in Oklahoma. The Wisener court cited Judge Doyle's discussion in Ex parte Johnson explaining that habeas corpus decisions were held not reviewable under general laws for appeal from all final judgments and noting that Oklahoma has no specific statutory provision for appeals in this class of cases. Judge Doyle concluded that if the legislature had intended to provide for appeals in habeas corpus, an appropriate provision would have been made in our statutes: "Its omission affords the best evidence to the contrary, and, if anything is wanting to remove all doubt, it will be found in the nature and object of this great writ as a constitutional right; its purpose being to afford a speedy remedy to a party . . . without obstructing or delaying public justice, both of which objects would be defeated by the delays consequent upon an appeal. Any other rule would operate practically to subvert the constitutional safeguards and the fundamental rights of the citizen." Wisener, 118 P. at 1000. ¶6 Wisener [I]f the discharge of the applicant upon a writ of habeas corpus, before a court or judge having jurisdiction, is an order or judgment from which a appeal can be taken to this court, necessarily attended with unavoidable delay, the value of the great writ as a safeguard of person liberty is, at least, greatly impaired, if it is not changed into a means of oppression. ¶7 The Wisener court emphasized that Article II, Section 10 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended by the authorities of this State," stating: [O]ur Constitution on this subject is as broad as it may well be. Section 10 of article 2, commonly known as the "Bill of Rights," provides in broad and comprehensive terms that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended by the authorities of this state." It is to be noted that the language of the Constitution is not merely that the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended, but it is the privilege of the writ which is never to be suspended. "Privilege," according to Webster (Webster's New International Dictionary), means "special enjoyment of a good, or exemption from an evil or burden," etc. "Suspended" is defined as "temporarily inactive or inoperative; held in abeyance." Undoubtedly courts, sheriffs, and other public officers of the state are authorities thereof, and if a party invoking the privilege of this writ may be reincarcerated by a sheriff, or other officer, on the order of a court or judge of the state, pending an appeal, then unquestionably his privilege under the operation of the writ would not only be suspended, but virtually destroyed and denied. So jealous have the people been of an opportunity being afforded every citizen for a speedy determination of the righteousness of his incarceration, that they have placed the power to adjudicate that question in every court of record and judge thereof in the state. Id., at 1001. ¶8 In Ex parte Logan, ¶9 The district court's order in habeas corpus releasing Mr. Powell is not capable of invoking our appellate cognizance and we dismiss this appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction. In view of our decision, we do not address the other questions raised by the state. ¶10 EDMONDSON, C.J., HARGRAVE, WATT, COLBERT, REIF, JJ. - Concur ¶11 TAYLOR, V.C.J., OPALA, KAUGER, WINCHESTER, JJ. - Dissent TAYLOR, V.C.J., with whom OPALA and WINCHESTER, JJ. join, dissenting. I dissent. The issue of the release of this criminal defendant should be fully reviewed and determined by the original sentencing court in Garfield County pursuant to Title 22, Oklahoma Statutes, Section 1161. I would grant the relief requested by the State of Oklahoma. FOOT