Title: Commonwealth v. Carrillo
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12617
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 3, 2019

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SJC-12617 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JESSE CARRILLO. 
 
 
 
Hampshire.     February 4, 2019. - October 3, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Controlled Substances.  Wanton or Reckless Conduct.  
Practice, Criminal, Request for jury instructions. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 28, 2015. 
 
 
The cases were tried before John A. Agostini, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
J.W. Carney, Jr. (Reyna Ramirez also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Cynthia M. Von Flatern, Assistant District Attorney (Jeremy 
C. Bucci, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Leo Beletsky, of New York, & Lisa Newman-Polk, for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Randall E. Ravitz, 
Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In October 2013, Eric Sinacori, a twenty year 
old junior at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst, died 
from a heroin overdose.  His death was yet another tragic loss 
of a promising young adult whose life was cut short by the 
proliferation of heroin and other opioids that have ravaged 
communities across the Commonwealth.  The defendant, a graduate 
student at the university, had provided him with the heroin that 
caused his death.  Following a jury trial, the defendant was 
convicted of involuntary manslaughter and distribution of 
heroin.  We granted the defendant's application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
On appeal, the defendant raises two arguments.  First, he 
contends that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence 
to support the involuntary manslaughter conviction.  Second, he 
claims that he is entitled to a new trial on the indictment 
charging distribution of heroin because the judge erred in 
denying his request to instruct the jury on the lesser included 
offense of possession of heroin for personal use. 
 
To find a defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter 
caused by wanton or reckless conduct, our case law requires 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in 
conduct that creates "a high degree of likelihood that 
substantial harm will result to another."  Commonwealth v. 
Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 399 (1944).  Selling or giving heroin 
3 
 
 
to another person may be wanton or reckless conduct where, under 
the circumstances, there is a high degree of likelihood that the 
person will suffer substantial harm, such as an overdose or 
death, from the use of those drugs.  And in many cases the 
circumstances surrounding the distribution of heroin will permit 
a rational finder of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the transfer of heroin created a high degree of likelihood of 
substantial harm, such as an overdose or death.  But not every 
case will present circumstances that make such conduct "wanton 
or reckless."  This is one such case. 
 
We conclude that the mere possibility that the transfer of 
heroin will result in an overdose does not suffice to meet the 
standard of wanton or reckless conduct under our law.  The 
Commonwealth must introduce evidence showing that, considering 
the totality of the particular circumstances, the defendant knew 
or should have known that his or her conduct created a high 
degree of likelihood of substantial harm, such as an overdose or 
death. 
 
Here, no evidence was presented during the Commonwealth's 
case-in-chief that would permit a reasonable jury to conclude 
that the inherent possibility of substantial harm arising from 
the use of heroin -- which is present in any distribution of 
heroin -- had been increased by specific circumstances to create 
a high degree of likelihood of substantial harm.  For instance, 
4 
 
 
the Commonwealth did not present evidence that the defendant 
knew or should have known that the heroin was unusually potent 
or laced with fentanyl; evidence that Sinacori was particularly 
vulnerable to an overdose because of his age, use of other 
drugs, or prior overdoses; or evidence that the defendant knew 
or should have known that Sinacori had overdosed but failed to 
seek help.  In the absence of any such evidence, we conclude 
that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of producing 
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the 
defendant's conduct in this case created a high degree of 
likelihood that Sinacori would suffer substantial harm, such as 
an overdose or death, from his use of the heroin.  The 
defendant's conviction of involuntary manslaughter must 
therefore be vacated, and a required finding of not guilty 
entered. 
 
We affirm the defendant's conviction of distribution of 
heroin.  We conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, 
the judge did not err in denying the defendant's request for a 
lesser included jury instruction on simple possession, even 
though Sinacori asked the defendant to purchase heroin for him 
and the defendant did not profit from the sale.  Where the 
defendant traveled alone to New York to obtain the heroin that 
he later sold to Sinacori, and where Sinacori played no active 
role in the purchase of those drugs, no reasonable jury could 
5 
 
 
conclude that the defendant was anything other than a "link in 
the chain" of distribution of the heroin, rather than merely a 
joint possessor of the heroin for personal use.1 
 
Discussion.  1.  Involuntary manslaughter.  We consider 
first whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding 
of involuntary manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt by a 
reasonable trier of fact.  Because the defendant moved for a 
required finding of not guilty at the close of the 
Commonwealth's case, we review the sufficiency of only the 
evidence presented at the time the Commonwealth rested after its 
case-in-chief, viewing that evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth.  Commonwealth v. Berry, 431 Mass. 326, 330, 
332 (2000) (sufficiency of evidence determined "by an 
examination of the evidence at the close of the Commonwealth's 
case-in-chief").  We reserve discussion of the evidence offered 
by the defendant after the Commonwealth rested for our analysis 
of his challenge to the judge's denial of his request for a jury 
instruction on the lesser included offense of possession of 
heroin for personal use. 
                                                          
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Attorney 
General and by the Committee for Public Counsel Services, The 
Health in Justice Action Lab at Northeastern University School 
of Law, and Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers. 
6 
 
 
 
a.  The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  In the fall of 2013, the defendant and Sinacori 
lived in the same neighborhood in Amherst.  Both were heroin 
users.  Based on the text messages presented in evidence, a 
reasonable fact finder could have inferred that the defendant 
met Sinacori shortly before September 30, 2013, and Sinacori 
learned that the defendant periodically traveled to purchase 
heroin.  In a text message sent on September 30, Sinacori asked 
the defendant when he was making "the next run."  Sinacori 
indicated he would be willing to purchase "another bun" of 
heroin2 when the defendant made that "run."  The defendant said 
he could provide two "buns" for $180, but if Sinacori wanted 
only one "bun," it would cost one hundred dollars.  The 
defendant also sent a text message to Sinacori that he would 
have to pay in advance. 
 
They arranged to meet on October 1, when the defendant left 
Massachusetts to travel to the Bronx borough of New York to pick 
up the "buns."  During the defendant's trip, the defendant told 
Sinacori that he was also going to a drug store to purchase a 
                                                          
 
 
2 The jury could infer through the totality of the evidence 
presented by the Commonwealth in its case-in-chief that a "bun" 
referred to a ten-bag "bundle" of heroin that cost one hundred 
dollars.  This was later confirmed by the defendant in his 
testimony. 
 
7 
 
 
"new rig";3 Sinacori sent a text message that he would like to 
split a "10 pack" with the defendant, unless the defendant 
needed them all. The defendant, upon his return, invited 
Sinacori to his apartment to "[d]o some." 
 
Sinacori went to the defendant's apartment that evening and 
used heroin with the defendant.  Later that night, Sinacori 
asked the defendant in a text message if he "could get another 
bun tomorrow."  The defendant replied that if he were to "let go 
one from [his] headstash," he would charge "mad dollar" for it.  
Sinacori agreed to wait for the defendant's next trip; the 
defendant replied by text that he would be leaving at 5 P.M. on 
October 3.  Sinacori gave the defendant seventy dollars before 
the defendant left on his trip, and asked the defendant to 
"spot" him thirty dollars.  The defendant drove to the Bronx to 
buy heroin.  At 8:44 P.M. that evening, the defendant sent 
Sinacori a text message stating, "Candy acquired," and added 
that he was on his way back.  Later, the defendant sent a text 
message that he was delayed because of traffic in Hartford, 
Connecticut.  Sinacori replied that his "veins are crying" and 
that he was hurting.  At 11:40 P.M., the defendant sent a text 
message that he knew that Sinacori was "hurtin but u will very 
                                                          
 
 
3 Although the Commonwealth did not explain or introduce 
evidence as to what a "rig" is in this context, it refers to 
"slang for a hypodermic needle and syringe used to inject 
heroin."  State v. Ferrell, 2017-Ohio-9341 ¶16 (Ohio Ct. App.). 
8 
 
 
soon be in the loving comforting arms of Miss H."  The defendant 
said he would drive to Sinacori's home so that Sinacori would 
not "have to go far in hurt mode."  As he approached, the 
defendant asked Sinacori whether he had the balance of thirty 
dollars; Sinacori sent a text message that he only had twenty 
dollars.  They agreed that either the defendant would give him 
"nine," inferably referring to nine out of ten bags of heroin, 
or Sinacori would get the remaining ten dollars the next day.  
The defendant arrived at Sinacori's home just before midnight, 
and at 12:20 A.M sent a text message to Sinacori to ask, "Ehh??? 
;)" and "How much tropicana did u drink?," which inferably was 
asking him how much heroin he had used.4  Sinacori did not reply 
to either text. 
 
On the afternoon of October 4, Sinacori's father entered 
his son's apartment and found his son dead, with a used needle 
nearby.  The police found three waxed bags with a Tropicana 
stamp that had been torn open, and six more bags that had not 
been opened.  The analyst at the drug laboratory found that the 
bags contained heroin with a purity range of "roughly from 
[fifty-eight] to [sixty-nine] percent."  The autopsy conducted 
by the medical examiner revealed that the cause of death was 
"acute heroin intoxication."  A toxicology specialist testified 
                                                          
 
 
4 The brand of heroin purchased by the defendant bore the 
mark "Tropicana" on its packaging. 
9 
 
 
that the opiate found in Sinacori's blood was heroin and that no 
fentanyl was present in the blood. 
 
From this evidence, a reasonable jury could have inferred 
that the defendant and Sinacori on October 1 together used the 
heroin the defendant had procured earlier that day from the 
Bronx.  Two days later, the defendant traveled again to the 
Bronx to obtain a "bun" of heroin for Sinacori, and more heroin 
for himself.  When the defendant was traveling through Hartford 
on his way back to Amherst, Sinacori was suffering from 
withdrawal pain.  The defendant delivered nine bags of heroin to 
Sinacori that night, omitting one bag because Sinacori had 
apparently not paid the remaining ten dollars he owed to the 
defendant.  Sinacori used three of those bags and this time 
overdosed, causing his death. 
 
The Commonwealth contends that this evidence reveals at 
least two circumstances showing that the defendant knew or 
should have known that his conduct was wanton or reckless.   
First, there was evidence from the text messages that Sinacori 
was suffering from withdrawal symptoms ("my veins are crying") 
before he used the heroin, and the Commonwealth argues that the 
defendant should have known that an addicted person in 
withdrawal is more likely to overdose.  But there was no expert 
evidence -- or even lay testimony -- that a heroin user is more 
likely to overdose when he or she is suffering from withdrawal.  
10 
 
 
We cannot reasonably take judicial notice that this is true, or 
that the defendant or a reasonable person would know it to be 
true. 
 
Second, the Commonwealth claims that when his text to 
Sinacori at 12:20 A.M. asking, "How much tropicana did u drink?" 
went unanswered, the defendant should have recognized that 
Sinacori had overdosed and immediately sought help.  We decline 
to give so much inferential weight to the failure of a person to 
respond to such a text message. 
 
In sum, there was no evidence that the defendant knew or 
should have known that the transfer of heroin to Sinacori 
created a high degree of likelihood of substantial harm, such as 
an overdose or death.  As discussed in greater detail infra, 
where courts in drug-induced homicide cases have found the 
evidence sufficient to support a conviction of involuntary 
manslaughter, there generally has been evidence of specific 
circumstances that a reasonable person would understand to 
heighten the risk of harm, such as where the drugs were 
unusually potent, the user was particularly vulnerable to an 
overdose, or the defendant failed to seek help after the user 
became unconscious or unresponsive.  Of course, this list is not 
exhaustive of all the circumstances that may increase the risk 
of serious harm. 
11 
 
 
 
In this case, however, the Commonwealth proved little more 
than the fact that heroin was transferred from one person to 
another.  Here, the heroin in question was not laced or tainted 
with fentanyl; the defendant purchased the same brand of heroin 
for his own personal use; the defendant observed Sinacori use 
the same brand of heroin two days earlier without apparent 
problem; the defendant did not personally inject Sinacori with 
heroin or any other drugs; there is no evidence that the 
defendant had any knowledge of any other drug or alcohol use by 
Sinacori that could have increased the likelihood of an 
overdose; and the defendant did not observe Sinacori overdose 
and fail to call for help.  Nor was there any expert testimony 
regarding the relative potency of heroin of the purity that the 
drug laboratory analyst found, or regarding the likelihood that 
heroin of that purity would result in an overdose. 
 
The issue we confront, then, is whether evidence of heroin 
distribution alone is sufficient to support a conviction of 
involuntary manslaughter where the heroin caused a tragic death. 
 
b.  Wanton or reckless conduct in the context of a transfer 
of heroin.  "Involuntary manslaughter is 'an unlawful homicide 
unintentionally caused by an act which constitutes such a 
disregard of probable harmful consequences to another as to 
amount to wanton or reckless conduct.'"  Commonwealth v. Life 
Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 456 Mass. 826, 832 (2010), quoting 
12 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 443 Mass. 799, 808 (2005).  Our model 
homicide instructions, adopting language from Commonwealth v. 
Welansky, 316 Mass. at 399, provide that "[w]anton or reckless 
conduct is conduct that creates a high degree of likelihood that 
substantial harm will result to another."  Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 88 (2018) (involuntary manslaughter).  
See Welansky, supra ("The essence of wanton or reckless conduct 
is intentional conduct, by way either of commission or of 
omission where there is a duty to act, which conduct involves a 
high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to 
another").  In determining what actions are wanton or reckless, 
we focus on "the conduct that caused the result, . . . not the 
resultant harm" (emphasis added).  Commonwealth v. Hardy, 482 
Mass. 416, 424 (2019). 
 
The phrase -- "a high degree of likelihood that substantial 
harm will result to another" -- separates wanton or reckless 
conduct from the unreasonable risk of harm that constitutes 
negligence or gross negligence.  As this court declared in 
Welansky, 316 Mass. at 399:  "The words 'wanton' and 'reckless' 
are thus not merely rhetorical or vituperative expressions used 
instead of negligent or grossly negligent.  They express a 
difference in the degree of risk and in the voluntary taking of 
risk so marked, as compared with negligence, as to amount 
substantially and in the eyes of the law to a difference in 
13 
 
 
kind."  The risk of harm must be more than a possible or 
unreasonable risk; it must reach a "high degree of likelihood."  
See id.  See also id. at 397 ("Usually wanton or reckless 
conduct consists of an affirmative act, like driving an 
automobile or discharging a firearm, in disregard of probable 
harmful consequences to another" [emphasis added]).  And the 
harm to another person must be substantial, involving death or 
grave bodily injury.  See Sandler v. Commonwealth, 419 Mass. 
334, 336 (1995) ("The risk of death or grave bodily injury must 
be known or reasonably apparent, and the harm must be a probable 
consequence of the defendant's election to run that risk"). 
 
Where the Commonwealth alleges that a defendant committed 
involuntary manslaughter by selling or giving heroin to another 
person, who died from its use, the distribution of that heroin 
must be proven to be wanton or reckless conduct, which means 
that the distribution must have created a high degree of 
likelihood of death or grave bodily injury.  The most common 
risk of death or grave bodily injury from the distribution of 
heroin arises from the risk of an overdose.  See National 
Institutes of Health:  National Institute on Drug Abuse, Drug 
Facts:  Heroin (revised June, 2019), https://www.drugabuse 
.gov/publications/drugfacts/heroin [https://perma.cc/G43Q-6R6W] 
(noting that heroin overdose results in "breathing [that] slows 
or stops, . . . decreas[ing] the amount of oxygen that reaches 
14 
 
 
the brain, a condition called hypoxia[,] [which] can have short- 
and long-term effects and effects on the nervous system, 
including coma and permanent brain damage").  We recognize that 
every use of heroin presents the possibility of an overdose 
causing death or grave bodily injury, but "a high degree of 
likelihood" of death or grave bodily injury requires more than 
the mere possibility of an overdose; it requires proof of a high 
degree of likelihood of an overdose.  See Lofthouse v. 
Commonwealth, 13 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Ky. 2000) (conviction of 
reckless homicide based on transfer of illegal drugs "required 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that [the victim] would die if he ingested 
the cocaine and heroin furnished to him by [the defendant]"); 
State v. Shell, 501 S.W.3d 22, 32-33 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (to 
prove involuntary manslaughter based on transfer of heroin, "it 
was incumbent upon the State to prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that [d]efendant was aware of the risk that [d]ecedent's 
death was probable as a result of injecting heroin").5 
                                                          
 
 
5 We recognize that, in some circumstances, such as where 
the health of the user is already fragile, or the user employs 
contaminated needles, the use of heroin might pose a risk of 
death or grave bodily injury even without an overdose.  We need 
not address that possibility here, where there was no evidence 
that Eric Sinacori's health was impaired or that any equipment 
he used to inject heroin was contaminated. 
 
 
Similarly, we also recognize that there may be 
circumstances where a defendant provides heroin to a user who 
15 
 
 
 
Our model jury instructions also provide: 
"If the defendant realized the grave risk created by his 
conduct, his subsequent act amounts to wanton or reckless 
conduct whether or not a reasonable person would have 
realized the risk of grave danger.  Even if the defendant 
himself did not realize the grave risk of harm to another, 
the act would constitute wanton or reckless conduct if a 
reasonable person, knowing what the defendant knew, would 
have realized the act posed a risk of grave danger to 
another." 
 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide, supra at 89-90.  Therefore, 
to prove a defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter in these 
circumstances, the Commonwealth must prove not only that the 
defendant's conduct created a high degree of likelihood that the 
user would overdose from the heroin, but also that the defendant 
knew of this high degree of likelihood or should have known of 
it, given his own personal knowledge and experience. 
 
c.  Massachusetts case law.  "Perhaps it is a testament to 
prosecutorial discretion, trial judges properly dismissing cases 
based on insufficient evidence, and juries conscientiously 
performing their function that we have had few occasions to 
                                                          
 
overdoses in the presence of the defendant, and the defendant 
fails to seek medical attention or other help to the overdose 
victim, who dies.  In these circumstances, even if there was not 
a high degree of likelihood of an overdose, the failure of the 
person who provided the heroin that caused the overdose to 
exercise reasonable care to prevent the overdose victim from 
dying may be sufficient to support a conviction of voluntary 
manslaughter.  See Commonwealth v. Levesque, 436 Mass. 443, 450 
(2002) ("Where a defendant's failure to exercise reasonable care 
to prevent the risk he created is reckless and results in death, 
the defendant can be convicted of involuntary manslaughter"). 
16 
 
 
review convictions on the basis that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove 'wanton or reckless' conduct."  Hardy, 482 
Mass. at 423.  We have decided three cases where a defendant was 
prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter after providing heroin 
to a person who died from an overdose.  Two were full opinions:  
Commonwealth v. Catalina, 407 Mass. 779 (1990), and Commonwealth 
v. Auditore, 407 Mass. 793 (1990).  The other, Commonwealth v. 
Perry, 416 Mass. 1003 (1993), was a short rescript opinion in 
which we adopted the analysis of the Appeals Court from the same 
case. 
 
In each of these cases, the issue before the court was 
whether the evidence before the grand jury was sufficient to 
support the probable cause needed for an indictment, not whether 
the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of 
involuntary manslaughter.  See Auditore, 407 Mass. at 796 
("Emphasizing that we are dealing only with the standard of 
probable cause"); Catalina, 407 Mass. at 789-790 ("The defendant 
has not yet been tried on this charge, so we are not concerned 
with whether sufficient evidence exists to warrant a finding of 
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Rather, we consider only 
whether the information before the grand jury was adequate to 
establish his identity and probable cause to arrest him for the 
crime charged").  See also Perry, 416 Mass. at 1003-1004.  This 
is the first case of involuntary manslaughter based on the 
17 
 
 
transfer of drugs where we address the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a finding of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, rather than probable cause. 
 
The standard for probable cause "is a relatively low 
threshold, requiring only sufficiently trustworthy information 
to instill in a reasonable person the requisite belief of 
criminality" (quotations and citation omitted).  Paquette v. 
Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 121, 132 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 
1150 (2004).  Yet in finding probable cause in Catalina, 407 
Mass. at 790 n.12, we noted that "there was evidence that the 
defendant knew he was distributing a highly potent brand of 
heroin, that [the deceased] had a low tolerance for the drug and 
had overdosed in the past, that she could not handle a whole bag 
of this type of heroin, and that she needed to be warned not to 
'do a whole one.'"  In finding probable cause in Auditore, 407 
Mass. at 796, we noted that the brand of heroin sold by the 
defendant "was twice as strong as the average dose," that he had 
a supply of this brand of heroin in his apartment in Gloucester, 
and that this brand of heroin "had caused at least two deaths by 
overdose in the Gloucester area."  And in finding probable cause 
in the rescript opinion in Perry, 416 Mass. at 1004, we simply 
adopted the reasons advanced by the Appeals Court.  In the 
Appeals Court opinion, it was noted that there was evidence that 
the defendant knew that the heroin she had obtained for the 
18 
 
 
deceased was unusually dangerous; the defendant, after she 
learned that the deceased had collapsed after injecting himself, 
commented, "That's what happens when you get good stuff."  
Commonwealth v. Perry, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 127, 130 (1993).  
Consequently, even though the court in these cases was 
determining only whether there was probable cause to support an 
indictment for involuntary manslaughter, the court noted 
circumstances in each of those cases that are not present here -
- facts that a reasonable person would understand to increase 
the risk of substantial harm. 
 
Two reported decisions by the Appeals Court have upheld 
convictions of involuntary manslaughter where the defendant 
provided illegal drugs to another person who overdosed and died.  
In both cases, there was specific evidence that the defendant 
knew or should have known that his or her conduct created a high 
degree of likelihood of substantial harm to another. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Osachuk, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 71, 72 
(1997), the Appeals Court affirmed an involuntary manslaughter 
conviction where the defendant, having earlier provided the 
victim with methadone and having loaned her money to purchase 
cocaine, provided the victim with heroin, knowing that she 
intended to mix it with cocaine to produce a "speed ball," and 
then after she became unconscious, personally injected her with 
more cocaine to try to wake her up.  "[E]xperts for both the 
19 
 
 
Commonwealth and the defense agreed that the results of blood 
tests were consistent with death caused by cocaine, heroin and 
methadone intoxication."  Id. at 73.  Perhaps because of the 
weight of the evidence, the defendant on appeal challenged only 
the sufficiency of the evidence as to causation, and did not 
challenge whether the defendant's conduct was wanton or 
reckless.6  Id. at 71. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 818, 819-820 
(1997), the defendant injected the victim with heroin and, after 
she passed out and became unresponsive, left her alone "for some 
time," returned and slapped her in an effort to rouse her, and 
when that failed, he "went back downstairs and watched 
television."  See id. at 825-826 (jury could infer defendant's 
subjective awareness of risks of injecting heroin from his 
conduct after victim passed out). 
 
Another case, Commonwealth v. Walker, 442 Mass. 185 (2004), 
merits attention, although it did not concern the transfer of 
heroin.  In Walker, the defendant repeatedly mixed a high dose 
of sleeping medication -- which contained a benzodiazepine 
called temazepam -- into drinks that he prepared for various 
women.  Id. at 187-189 & n.3.  Eventually, one woman died from a 
combination of temazepam and alcohol.  Id. at 189.  We affirmed 
                                                          
 
 
6 The defendant here does not challenge the causal link 
between his conduct and Sinacori's death.  
20 
 
 
the jury's conviction of involuntary manslaughter.  Id. at 204.  
In so doing, we identified the specific evidence that proved 
that the defendant knew or should have known that his conduct 
created a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm would 
result.  We noted first that the defendant used a particularly 
high dose, and that the Commonwealth introduced testimony from 
an expert who testified as to the toxicity of the dose the 
defendant administered.  Id. at 189, 192.  Importantly, we also 
noted that the defendant had engaged in such conduct on previous 
occasions and "watched [the] injurious effects take hold," and 
that he thus should have understood that his actions would 
likely "be toxic, if not lethal."  Id. at 193. 
 
The case now before us is unique, not only because it is 
the first time we have addressed the sufficiency of the evidence 
for an involuntary manslaughter conviction based on the 
distribution of heroin, but also because it is the first time we 
have confronted such a case where there was no evidence, for 
example, of the unusual potency of the heroin, of the 
vulnerability of the user to an overdose, or of the defendant's 
failure to seek help when the user appeared to overdose. 
 
The Commonwealth contends that we have already decided that 
the distribution of heroin of unknown strength alone, without 
more, is sufficient to support a conviction of involuntary 
21 
 
 
manslaughter.  In making this argument, the Commonwealth relies 
upon our statement in Perry: 
"In Commonwealth v. Catalina, 407 Mass. 779, 790-791 
(1990), . . . we held that the distributing of a 
particularly potent form of heroin to one who injected it 
and died as a result constituted evidence sufficient for an 
indictment by a grand jury of manslaughter.  See [id.] at 
790 n.12.  However, we did not limit the effect of this 
rule to that specific form of heroin because all heroin of 
unknown strength is inherently dangerous and carries a 
'high probability that death will occur.'  Id. at 791, 
quoting with approval People v. Cruciani, 70 Misc. 2d 528, 
536 (N.Y. [Suffolk Co. Ct.] 1972)." 
 
Perry, 416 Mass. at 1004. 
 
The last sentence of this statement is dictum; in Catalina, 
as earlier noted, we identified considerable evidence that the 
defendant should have recognized would result in substantial 
harm, and therefore did not need to address whether the 
indictment could survive without any such evidence.  But it is 
admittedly powerful dictum because, if it is true that the use 
of "all heroin of unknown strength . . . carries 'a high 
probability that death will occur,'" then the distribution of 
heroin alone would suffice to support a finding of wanton or 
reckless conduct because it would always create "a high degree 
of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another."  
And we note that at least one other State court has relied on 
this language from our Catalina and Perry opinions for the 
proposition that, in Massachusetts, the distribution of heroin 
alone is sufficient to support a guilty finding of involuntary 
22 
 
 
manslaughter where the heroin causes the user's death.  See 
State v. Miller, 874 N.W.2d 659, 664 (Iowa App. 2015).  We now 
reject that proposition. 
 
The Commonwealth put forth no evidence at trial that the 
use of heroin generally carries a "high probability" of death or 
even overdose.  In the absence of such evidence, if the 
assertion that "all heroin of unknown strength . . . carries 'a 
high probability that death will occur'" is to be used to 
support the sufficiency of evidence at trial, a reasonable 
person must know this to be true.  But we cannot infer that a 
reasonable person would know this to be true unless it indeed is 
true.  Neither this court in Perry or Catalina, nor the New York 
trial court in Cruciani, where the statement originated, 
provided any empirical factual support for that statement.7 
                                                          
 
 
7 In the New York case cited by the court, People v. 
Cruciani, 70 Misc. 2d 528, 529, 537 (N.Y. Suffolk Co. Ct. 1972), 
the trial judge denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the 
counts in the indictment charging reckless manslaughter in the 
second degree and criminally negligent homicide.  It is 
noteworthy that, after the defendant was convicted of reckless 
manslaughter, the Court of Appeals of New York, in affirming the 
conviction, rejected the defendant's claim that the evidence of 
recklessness was insufficient by noting that "the proof 
show[ed], among other things, that defendant Cruciani injected 
[the victim] with heroin (1) when, in his own words, she was 
already 'completely bombed out on downs' (depressants like 
morphine into which heroin is rapidly converted by the body's 
metabolic processes), (2) at a time when she had lost the 
capacity to 'walk or talk straight', and (3) despite his 
admission of awareness that there was a substantial possibility 
that a further injection in her then drug-saturated state would 
cause her to 'fall out' (in modern vernacular of drug users, 
23 
 
 
 
Heroin is undoubtedly an inherently dangerous drug, and 
heroin overdoses have undoubtedly caused a tragic number of 
deaths.  See Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Data 
Brief:  Opioid-Related Overdose Deaths among Massachusetts 
Residents, at 2 (Feb. 2019), https://www.mass.gov/files 
/documents/2019/02/12/Opioid-related-Overdose-Deaths-among-MA-
Residents-February-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Z2Z-RN2W] (over 
1,000 Massachusetts residents died from opioid-related overdoses 
each year between 2014 and 2018).  But we can find no evidence -
- nor has the Commonwealth pointed us to any -- proving that any 
use of heroin of unknown strength carries a "high probability" 
of substantial harm, such as an overdose or death.  According to 
recent data gathered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration, in 2017 approximately 652,000 Americans 
suffered from "heroin use disorder," which is defined as 
"clinically significant impairment caused by the recurrent use 
of heroin."  Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, Key Substance Use and Mental Health Indicators 
in the United States:  Results from the 2017 National Survey on 
Drug Use and Health 33 (2017), https://www.samhsa.gov 
/data/sites/default/files/cbhsq-reports/NSDUHFFR2017 
/NSDUHFFR2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/V92Q-2DJ8].  And 886,000 
                                                          
 
that she would die)."  People v. Cruciani, 36 N.Y.2d 304, 305 
(1975). 
24 
 
 
Americans used heroin that year.  Id. at 19.  Among those 
individuals, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
reported 15,482 drug overdose deaths involving heroin.  National 
Institutes of Health:  National Institute on Drug Abuse, 
Overdose Death Rates (revised Jan. 2019), https://www.drugabuse 
.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates 
[https://perma.cc/2ZC8-X7NN].  This is, of course, a national 
tragedy.  But as devastating as the heroin epidemic has been, we 
cannot rationally conclude from this data that every single 
instance of heroin distribution carries a "high probability" 
that the user will die. 
 
The rate of overdose, of course, is higher than the rate of 
death.  Reliable data regarding the incidence of overdoses (or 
the ratio of overdoses to deaths) is more difficult to obtain 
than data regarding the incidence of death, because so many 
overdoses are unreported.  The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention has estimated that in 2015, 81,326 emergency 
department visits occurred for "heroin-related poisonings" in 
the United States, a year in which 12,989 individuals were 
reported to have died from drug overdoses involving heroin.  See 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018 Annual 
Surveillance Report of Drug-Related Risks and Outcomes 19, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pubs/2018-cdc-drug-
surveillance-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/23PU-QN3B]; Rudd, 
25 
 
 
Seth, David, & Scholl, Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved 
Deaths -- United States, 2010-2015, 65 MMRW 1445, 1450 (Dec. 30, 
2016).  But even if we recognize that the rate of overdose 
substantially exceeds the rate of death, we still could not 
reasonably assume that all heroin of unknown strength carries a 
high probability that overdose will occur, or that a reasonable 
person would know that to be true.  It is fair to assume that a 
reasonable person would know that the use of heroin of unknown 
strength is inherently dangerous and carries a significant 
possibility of overdose or death.  But to suggest that a 
reasonable person would know that any use of heroin carries a 
high probability or a substantial likelihood of overdose or 
death is a bridge too far.8 
                                                          
 
 
8 It is worthy of note that the dramatic increase in the 
overdose death rate over the past decade is mainly attributable 
to the widespread introduction of synthetic fentanyl.  See 
National Institutes of Health:  National Institute on Drug 
Abuse, Overdose Death Rates (revised Jan. 2019), https: 
//www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-
death-rates [https://perma.cc/2ZC8-X7NN].  According to the 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health, "[a]mong the 1,902 
[Massachusetts] opioid-related overdose deaths in 2018 where a 
toxicology screen was also available, 1,695 of them (89%) had a 
positive screen result for fentanyl.  In the fourth quarter of 
2018, heroin or likely heroin was present in approximately 32% 
of opioid-related overdose deaths that had a toxicology screen."  
Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Data Brief:  Opioid-
Related Overdose Deaths among Massachusetts Residents 2(May 
2019), https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2019/05/15/Opioid-
related-Overdose-Deaths-among-MA-Residents-May-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2BSH-YY8T].  As discussed supra, the 
toxicology results of Sinacori's blood revealed heroin, not 
fentanyl. 
26 
 
 
 
The creation of a per se rule -- that the transfer of 
heroin to a person addicted to heroin, without more, is 
sufficient to support a finding of the required element of 
wanton or reckless conduct -- is inconsistent, both 
jurisprudentially and empirically, with the requirement that 
conduct, to be found wanton or reckless, must create a high 
degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to 
another.  For all practical purposes, an indictment for 
involuntary manslaughter premised on the transfer of heroin 
revises the definition of wanton or reckless.  We decline to 
carve out a heroin exception to our law of involuntary 
manslaughter.  Nor need we do so where the distribution of 
heroin alone carries severe penalties and where, when specific 
evidence of circumstances increasing the risk of harm is proven, 
a distribution of heroin resulting in death may be punished as 
involuntary manslaughter. 
 
d.  Approach of other State courts.  Although the 
definition of "wanton or reckless" as applied to involuntary 
manslaughter is not uniform among the fifty States, we think it 
worthy of note that numerous State appellate courts that have 
recently considered the issue have declined to adopt a per se 
rule that the distribution of heroin alone, without more, 
suffices to support a verdict of involuntary manslaughter. 
27 
 
 
 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky in Lofthouse, 13 S.W.3d at 
241, in vacating a conviction of reckless homicide, rejected 
both the defendant's "proposition that furnishing controlled 
substances to one who subsequently dies from their ingestion can 
never support a conviction of criminal homicide and the 
Commonwealth's proposition that such will always support a 
conviction" (emphasis in original).  Id.  The court highlighted 
the importance of additional evidence: 
"[G]uilt of criminal homicide, like any other offense, 
depends upon proof. . . .  For example, in the Tennessee 
case of State v. Randolph, [676 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. 1984)], 
there was evidence that another of one defendant's 
customers had died the same way two weeks earlier, and that 
another defendant knew that the heroin sold to the victim 
was 'uncut' and dangerous because it had not been diluted.  
And in the New York case of People v. Cruciani, [36 N.Y.2d 
304 (1975)], there was evidence that the defendant injected 
the victim with heroin after she was already 'bombed out' 
on depressants and that the defendant was aware of the 
substantial possibility that the injection would cause the 
victim's death."  
  
Lofthouse, supra. 
 
The Missouri Court of Appeals in Shell, 501 S.W.3d at 32, 
vacated a defendant's conviction of involuntary manslaughter 
where the "[d]efendant's [only] affirmative act was delivering 
heroin to" the victim. The court concluded that, despite State 
testimony by a forensic pathologist of the inherent risk of 
heroin overdose, the State did not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant acted recklessly, because it did not 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim's death was 
28 
 
 
probable under the circumstances.  Id. at 33.  It further noted 
that "[w]hile we recognize the concern of the heroin epidemic 
and the rise in deaths as a result of heroin use . . . [t]o rule 
as the State suggests and hold that [the d]efendant acted 
recklessly simply by providing [the victim] with heroin would 
create a per se involuntary manslaughter rule, which we are 
unwilling [to] impose upon criminal defendants absent clear 
legislative intent."  Id. 
 
The Court of Appeals of Iowa came to a similar conclusion, 
also vacating a conviction of involuntary manslaughter arising 
out of an overdose death.  See Miller, 874 N.W.2d at 667.  The 
court determined that, without circumstances increasing the risk 
of harm, there was insufficient evidence to establish that the 
defendant acted recklessly.  Id. at 666 (there must be "evidence 
establishing an increased risk of death and the defendant's 
awareness of an elevated risk of overdose and death beyond mere 
delivery of the controlled substance").  As to the State's 
suggestion "that the delivery of heroin, without more, is always 
substantial evidence of recklessness," the court rejected "this 
per se or categorical approach," id. at 664, for three reasons: 
"First, such an approach is inconsistent with our case law 
regarding criminal recklessness.  The mere delivery of 
heroin, without more, does not necessarily establish a 
sufficiently material increase in the probability of the 
proscribed harm.  More important, the per se approach is 
inconsistent with the culpability aspect of recklessness, 
in which the jury must determine whether the defendant had 
29 
 
 
or should have had a 'subjective awareness of the risk' 
such that his disregard of the increased risk warrants 
criminal sanction. . . . Second, the per se approach is 
inconsistent with our general approach to criminal 
proceedings, which requires the State to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and every element of the 
offense. . . .  Third, adopting a rule of strict liability 
for death resulting from delivery of a controlled substance 
is a policy decision best addressed by the legislature 
rather than the judiciary."9 
                                                          
 
 
9 As to this third point, at least eighteen States have 
enacted laws providing for strict liability homicide where a 
person transfers heroin to another who later overdoses and dies.  
See Alaska Stat. § 11.41.120(a)(3) (manslaughter); Colo. Rev. 
Stat. § 18-3-102(1)(e) (murder in first degree only as to 
distribution to minor on school grounds); Fla. Stat. 
§ 782.04(1)(a)(3) (murder in first degree); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
5/9-3.3 ("drug-induced homicide" with minimum sentence of 
fifteen years); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1(A)(3) (second 
degree murder); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.317a (drug-induced 
homicide with sentence up to life); Minn. Stat. § 609.195(b) 
(murder in third degree); N.H. Rev. Stat. § 318-B:26(IX) (strict 
liability homicide with sentence up to life); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:35-9 (strict liability homicide); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
17(b)(2) (second degree murder); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.7(B) 
(murder in first degree); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2506 ("drug 
dealing resulting in death" as homicide offense); R.I. Gen. Laws 
§ 11-23-6 (drug-induced homicide only as to distribution to 
minor, carrying life sentence); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-
210(a)(2) (second degree murder); Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.415 
("controlled substances homicide"); W. Va. Code § 61-2-1 (murder 
in first degree); Wis. Stat. § 940.02(2)(a), (b) (first degree 
reckless homicide); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-108 (drug induced 
homicide). 
 
 
Three other States ratchet up the permissible sentencing 
range for drug distribution where it results in death from an 
overdose.  See Del. Code Ann. tit 16, § 4752B; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 
21-5430; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4250. 
 
 
The Massachusetts Legislature has considered strict 
liability homicide legislation but did not enact it.  See 2017 
Senate Doc. No. 2158 at 7 ("Any person who . . . distributes[ ] 
or dispenses heroin . . . is strictly liable for a death which 
results from the injection, inhalation or ingestion of that 
substance, and shall be punished by imprisonment for life or for 
30 
 
 
 
Id. at 664-665. 
 
Most recently, in State v. Thomas, 464 Md. 133, 140 (2019), 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland -- Maryland's highest court -- 
affirmed the defendant's conviction of involuntary manslaughter 
on the theory of gross negligence but declared that "a per se 
rule providing that all heroin distribution resulting in death 
constitutes gross negligence involuntary manslaughter is unwise 
and not in keeping with our precedent."  Id. at 167.  "Instead," 
the court stated, "we must consider the inherent dangerousness 
of distributing heroin with the attendant environmental risk 
factors presented by each case."  Id.10  That conclusion is 
consistent with our holding here. 
                                                          
 
any term of years as the court may order, and by a fine or not 
more than $25,000; provided, however, that the sentence of 
imprisonment . . . shall not be reduced to less than 5 years, 
nor suspended, nor shall any such person be eligible for 
probation, parole or furlough or receive a deduction from his or 
her sentence for good conduct until such person shall have 
served 5 years of such sentence"). 
 
A bill with the same text as the 2017 bill was reintroduced 
in 2019.  See 2019 House Doc. No. 1411. 
 
 
10 We recognize that the court in State v. Thomas, 464 Md. 
133, 145, 147-150, 180 (2019), found the evidence sufficient to 
establish gross negligence involuntary manslaughter based on 
facts comparable to those in the instant case:  the victim was 
known to be drug addicted, the defendant had sold four bags of 
heroin to the nineteen year old victim on the night he died from 
an overdose, the defendant himself had regularly used four bags 
of the same heroin product and had not overdosed, there was no 
evidence of the unusual potency of the heroin, and, when 
confronted with the victim's death, the defendant told the 
31 
 
 
 
Today we simply reaffirm that "guilt of criminal homicide, 
like any other offense, depends upon proof."  Lofthouse, 13 
S.W.3d at 241.  Where there is specific evidence that the 
defendant knew or should have known that his or her conduct 
created "a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will 
result," Welansky, 316 Mass. at 399, the Commonwealth may indeed 
convict the person who sold or gave the heroin to the decedent 
of involuntary manslaughter.  But here, the Commonwealth in its 
                                                          
 
police lieutenant, "He couldn't have overdosed off what I sold 
him; I only sold him four bags." 
 
 
But we also recognize that the legal standard in Maryland 
for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter differs from our 
legal standard for involuntary manslaughter, even though 
Maryland law equates "'gross negligence' with a 'wanton or 
reckless disregard for human life'" (citation omitted).  Id. at 
153.  Although the common law of Massachusetts defines wanton or 
reckless conduct as conduct that creates a high degree of 
likelihood that substantial harm will result to another, under 
the common law of Maryland, "'gross negligence' mens rea is 
established by asking whether the accused's conduct, under the 
circumstances, amounted to a disregard of the consequences which 
might ensue and indifference to the rights of others" 
(quotations omitted). Id., quoting State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 
475, 500 (1994).  The Thomas court added that, for criminal 
gross negligence, "the inherent dangerousness of the act engaged 
in, as judged by a reasonable person, . . . is combined with 
environmental risk factors which, together, make the particular 
activity more or less 'likely at any moment to bring harm to 
another'" (emphasis added).  Thomas, supra at 159, quoting 
Johnson v. State, 213 Md. 527, 533 (1957).  Indeed, the court 
noted that the holdings of the Kentucky court in Lofthouse, 13 
S.W.3d at 241, and the Iowa court in Miller, 874 N.W.2d at 663, 
were "inapt" because the standard for criminal gross negligence 
in those States "requires the State to demonstrate a higher 
'probability of harm' than the one borne out by our cases."  
Thomas, supra at 166. 
32 
 
 
case-in-chief proved little more than that Sinacori overdosed 
and died after using heroin given to him by the defendant; it 
proved no additional facts that transformed the inherent 
possibility of an overdose arising from any use of heroin into a 
high degree of likelihood of an overdose.  As a result, the 
evidence was insufficient to support a finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant knew, or that a reasonable 
person would have known, that there was a high degree of 
likelihood that Sinacori would overdose from the use of that 
heroin.  Consequently, the conviction cannot stand.  We remand 
the case to the Superior Court for entry of a required finding 
of not guilty on the involuntary manslaughter indictment. 
 
2.  Failure to give instruction on the lesser included 
offense of simple possession of heroin.  As another consequence 
of his transfer of heroin to Sinacori, the defendant was 
convicted of distribution of heroin in violation of G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32.11  The second issue on appeal is whether the judge 
erred by declining to instruct the jury on the lesser included 
offense of simple possession of heroin.  The defendant argues 
that the jury should have been given the opportunity to convict 
                                                          
 
 
11 The defendant was sentenced on the heroin distribution 
conviction to two years and six months in a house of correction, 
with one year to serve and the balance suspended and five years' 
probation.  He was sentenced to a concurrent probation term of 
five years on the involuntary manslaughter conviction. 
33 
 
 
him only of possession, not distribution, because he and 
Sinacori were engaged in a "joint venture" to possess heroin 
when the defendant purchased it in New York.  The defendant 
twice requested this instruction -- before trial and after the 
close of all the evidence -- and objected to the judge's refusal 
to give it.  Accordingly, we review the judge's decision for 
prejudicial error.  Commonwealth v. Henderson, 434 Mass. 155, 
158 (2001). 
 
In contrast with our evaluation of the sufficiency of the 
evidence of involuntary manslaughter, where we considered only 
the evidence that was presented before the defendant moved for a 
required finding of not guilty after the Commonwealth rested its 
case-in-chief, here we review all the evidence presented at 
trial to determine whether it would permit the jury to find the 
defendant guilty only of simple possession.  See id.  "In 
determining whether any view of the evidence would support a 
conviction on a lesser included offense, 'all reasonable 
inferences must be resolved in favor of the defendant,' 
Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 367 Mass. 743, 746 (1975)." 
Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 399 Mass. 741, 746 (1987), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Egerton, 396 Mass. 499, 503 (1986).  If the 
evidence would so permit, "a judge must, upon request, instruct 
the jury on the possibility of conviction of the lesser crime" 
34 
 
 
(citation and emphasis omitted).  Commonwealth v. Roberts, 407 
Mass. 731, 737 (1990). 
 
a.  The defendant's testimony.  The defendant testified in 
his own defense and admitted that he possessed heroin on the 
evening in question and gave some of that heroin to Sinacori.  
The defendant testified that he frequently drove from Amherst to 
the Bronx -- up to four times per week -- to purchase heroin for 
his own personal use.  After Sinacori asked the defendant to 
purchase some heroin for him, the defendant on October 1, 2013, 
collected one hundred dollars from Sinacori and drove to New 
York to purchase heroin both for himself and for Sinacori.  Upon 
his return, he and Sinacori each used some of their own heroin 
in the defendant's apartment.  Sinacori sent him a text message 
on October 3 to ask if he was "making another run," which the 
defendant understood to mean that Sinacori wanted more heroin.  
Sinacori provided the defendant with seventy dollars to purchase 
seven bags of heroin, and promised to give the defendant another 
thirty dollars later that evening in exchange for a total of ten 
bags.  As he had done when he previously went to New York to buy 
heroin for himself and Sinacori, the defendant put Sinacori's 
money -- and then the heroin once it was purchased -- in a 
different pocket to keep their respective shares separated.  
Sinacori was ultimately only able to produce another twenty 
dollars, so the defendant gave Sinacori nine bags and kept the 
35 
 
 
remaining one out of the ten-pack for himself, in addition to 
the other heroin that he had bought for himself. 
 
Sinacori did not accompany the defendant to New York in 
either instance.  There was no evidence that Sinacori himself 
had any interaction with the defendant's supplier in New York or 
had any role in negotiating prices.  In contrast, the defendant 
frequently purchased his own heroin from the same supplier, 
sometimes negotiating for discounts.  On September 30, for 
example, before the October 1 "run" to buy heroin for himself 
and Sinacori, the defendant sent Sinacori a text message 
indicating that he would try to get a "deal" on twenty bags. 
 
b.  Discussion.  The statutory scheme governing 
distribution of controlled substances defines "[d]istribute" as 
"to deliver other than by administering or dispensing a 
controlled substance."  G. L. c. 94C, § 1.  "Deliver" is defined 
as "to transfer, whether by actual or constructive transfer, a 
controlled substance from one person to another, whether or not 
there is an agency relationship."  Id.  The defendant contends 
that, although he literally delivered heroin to Sinacori, he did 
not deliver the heroin within the meaning of G. L. c. 94C, § 1, 
because Sinacori jointly and constructively possessed his share 
of the heroin at the same time that the defendant purchased it 
in New York, and the defendant thus could not "deliver" or 
"distribute" heroin that Sinacori already possessed.  See State 
36 
 
 
v. Morrison, 188 N.J. 2, 14 (2006) ("It hardly requires stating 
that the 'transfer' of a controlled dangerous substance cannot 
occur . . . if the intended recipient already [legally] 
possesses that substance").  In view of the relevant case law 
and the factual circumstances in this case, however, we are not 
persuaded that a reasonable jury could have found that Sinacori 
jointly possessed his share of the heroin when the defendant 
purchased it for him in New York. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 413 Mass. 598, 605 (1992), we 
held that "to purchase [narcotics], even with friends' money, 
intending to transfer it to them, constitutes distribution," in 
violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32.  While we recognized an 
exception "[w]here two or more persons simultaneously and 
jointly acquire possession of a drug for their own use intending 
only to share it together," which would constitute joint 
possession, this is "limited to the situation when the persons 
. . . are there at the acquisition together and simultaneously 
acquire."  Id. at 604.  Of course, "[n]o cases require literal 
simultaneous possession" or acquisition, Weldon v. United 
States, 840 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2016), but Johnson suggests 
that all parties engaged in joint possession must at least be 
physically present at the time the drugs are acquired.  We 
further held in Commonwealth v. Fluellen, 456 Mass. 517, 525 
(2010), that a joint possession theory is "inapplicable to 
37 
 
 
circumstances where a defendant facilitates a transfer of drugs 
from a seller to a buyer."  See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 464 
Mass. 758, 763 (2013) (facilitating transfer of drugs "can 
constitute the crime of distribution even if the defendant 
intends to share some of the drug with the buyer"); Commonwealth 
v. Rodriguez, 456 Mass. 578, 584 n.8 (2010) (distinguishing 
"defendant's transfer of cocaine he had just purchased, which 
would constitute distribution, [and] his division of the cocaine 
that [he and another] had simultaneously and jointly acquired, 
which would constitute joint possession").  In short, the crime 
of distribution occurs "whenever the defendant serves as 'a link 
in the chain' between supplier and consumer."  Jackson, supra at 
764, quoting Fluellen, supra. 
 
Here, the defendant argues that we should revisit our rule 
that drugs are jointly possessed only where both persons were 
present when the drugs were acquired.  First, he contends, in 
essence, that Johnson and its progeny are no longer good law in 
light of our holding in Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 
462 (2009), where we held that a defendant need not be 
physically present at the crime scene to be found guilty as a 
joint venturer.  Second, he argues that, in spite of Johnson, 
physical presence at the time of acquisition is not required 
where "the absent [party] was then entitled to exercise joint 
physical possession" of the illicit drugs (emphasis in 
38 
 
 
original).  State v. Carithers, 490 N.W.2d 620, 622 (Minn. 
1992).  We address these arguments in turn. 
 
In Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 463, we amended the formulation 
for joint venture liability that was articulated in Commonwealth 
v. Bianco, 388 Mass. 358, 366, S.C., 390 Mass. 254 (1983), which 
provided that "[t]he test [for joint venture] is whether each 
defendant was (1) present at the scene of the crime, (2) with 
knowledge that another intends to commit the crime or with 
intent to commit a crime, and (3) by agreement is willing and 
available to help the other if necessary."  Concluding that this 
framework was confusing and failed to respect "the spirit behind 
the common law as now reflected in the aiding and abetting 
statute, G. L. c. 274, § 2," we instead adopted the formulation 
of aiding and abetting in cases where there was evidence "that 
more than one person may have participated in the commission of 
the crime."  Zanetti, supra at 467.  In so doing, we clarified 
that an accomplice who knowingly participated in the offense 
with the intent required for that offense may be convicted of 
the offense as a joint venturer even if not physically present 
at the scene of the crime.  Id. at 462, 467.  See Commonwealth 
v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 813 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 
(2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 433 Mass. 678, 690 
n.13 (2001) ("A defendant may be convicted as a coventurer when 
he or she is not present at the scene of the crime 'so long as 
39 
 
 
the jury [find] [that the defendant] had actually associated 
[himself or herself] with the criminal venture and assisted in 
making it a success'"). 
 
The flaw in the defendant's argument is that, since the 
time we decided the Zanetti case, we have repeatedly reaffirmed 
the requirement that both persons be physically present at the 
time of acquisition in order to show joint possession of 
narcotics under G. L. c. 94C.  See Jackson, 464 Mass. at 763; 
Fluellen, 456 Mass. at 524-525.  And, as we made clear in 
Zanetti, our "shift from the language of joint venture to the 
language of aiding and abetting does not enlarge or diminish the 
scope of existing joint venture liability."  Zanetti, 454 Mass. 
at 468.  Nor does it change our definition of joint possession. 
 
Second, the defendant suggests, essentially, that our 
holding in Johnson requiring physical presence at the time of 
acquisition should be reexamined in light of our legal 
principles of constructive possession.  Certainly, the 
possession of heroin "need not be exclusive," but "may be joint 
and constructive."  Commonwealth v. Beverly, 389 Mass. 866, 870 
(1983).  See Instruction 3.220 of the Criminal Model Jury 
Instructions for Use in the District Court (2009) (possession) 
("A person can also 'possess' something even if he is not its 
sole owner or holder.  For example, a person is considered to 
40 
 
 
'possess' something which he owns or holds jointly with another 
person, who is keeping it for both of them"). 
 
And, to be sure, various courts have concluded that "[a] 
buyer could have 'constructive possession' before actual 
delivery," United States v. Palacios-Quinonez, 431 F.3d 471, 475 
(5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1035 (2006), such as 
where a defendant so directly orders the "disposition or 
movement of the drug as to warrant the inference he possesses 
it."  Id., quoting Armstrong v. Superior Court, 217 Cal. App. 3d 
535, 539 (1990).  See United States v. Pelusio, 725 F.2d 161, 
167 (2d Cir. 1983), quoting United States v. Craven, 478 F.2d 
1329, 1333 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973) 
("Constructive possession exists when a person . . . knowingly 
has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise 
dominion and control over an object, either directly or through 
others").  Consequently, a defendant who directs a courier to 
pick up a substantial quantity of heroin on his or her behalf 
may be found to have possessed the drugs once the courier 
obtained the drugs, even where the defendant is not present at 
the pick-up, and therefore may be found guilty of possession 
with intent to distribute if the drugs are seized when they are 
still in the courier's possession.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1986) ("doctrine of 
constructive possession . . . creates a legal fiction to take 
41 
 
 
care of such cases as that of a drug dealer who operates through 
hirelings who have physical possession of the drugs.  It would 
be odd if a dealer could not be guilty of possession, merely 
because he had the resources to hire a flunky to have custody of 
the drugs"); United States v. Felts, 497 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1051 (1974) ("a party who 
instigated the sale, negotiated the price, and caused the drug 
to be produced for the customer had constructive possession of 
it," which is sufficient to support conviction of possession 
with intent to distribute). 
 
But here, the issue is whether a reasonable jury could 
conclude that the delivery the defendant made to Sinacori was 
not a "distribution" of drugs, but was instead a joint 
possession of drugs for personal use.  In Commonwealth v. 
Blevins, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 206, 209 (2002), the Appeals Court 
identified circumstances where a defendant charged with 
distribution was entitled to a requested instruction on simple 
possession: 
"The evidence -- that the defendant and his two companions 
were friends who on occasion shared drugs; that the three 
had pooled their money to purchase drugs they intended to 
share; that they each participated in the negotiation for 
the purchase of drugs; and that all were present when the 
drugs were paid for and received -- was, if believed, 
sufficient to support a finding that the drugs were 
simultaneously and jointly acquired and intended to be 
shared only by the three purchasers." 
 
42 
 
 
 
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit in Weldon, 840 F.3d at 867, concluded that a 
defendant may be guilty only of drug possession rather than of 
drug distribution where three friends "agreed to get high 
together, they shared the expense, they all went together to the 
drug dealer, and they shared the drug they bought from him."  
The fact that the defendant was the one who got out of the 
vehicle, paid the pooled money to the drug dealer, and carried 
the drugs back to the vehicle for the three of them to share did 
not necessarily mean that he was guilty of drug distribution.  
Id. at 866.12 
 
If we were faced with facts comparable to those in Weldon, 
where equal partners participated in a drug purchase but only 
one partner walked to the supplier's vehicle to receive the 
drugs, we might need to revisit the rule in Johnson that drugs 
can be jointly possessed for personal use only where all persons 
were present when the drugs were acquired.  But we need not 
                                                          
 
 
12 The court reasoned: 
 
"Suppose you have lunch with a friend, order two 
hamburgers, and when your hamburgers are ready you pick 
them up at the food counter and bring them back to the 
table and he eats one and you eat the other.  It would be 
very odd to describe what you had done as 'distributing' 
the food to him.  It is similarly odd to describe what [the 
defendant] did as distribution." 
 
Weldon v. United States, 840 F.3d 865, 866 (7th Cir. 2016). 
43 
 
 
revisit that rule here, because we do not have facts comparable 
to those in Weldon.  In this case, the defendant traveled 
several hours across State lines to purchase the heroin while 
Sinacori remained in Amherst.  There was no evidence that 
Sinacori had any involvement in negotiating the transaction.  In 
contrast, the defendant explained to Sinacori the prices that 
were available, and the defendant alone had a role in trying to 
bargain for discounts.  Moreover, the record reveals no evidence 
that Sinacori knew who the defendant's supplier was, or that he 
even knew precisely where the defendant was going.  And when 
Sinacori was unable to pay the defendant for all the heroin that 
he purchased, the defendant kept a bag for himself, exercising a 
certain level of control over the drugs that he obtained from 
his supplier. 
 
Here, unlike in Weldon, the defendant giving the drugs to 
Sinacori -- rather than vice-versa -- was not the result of a 
mere fortuity or convenience.  The defendant was the "middle 
man," the link in the chain between supplier and buyer, who 
facilitated the sale of drugs to the buyer -- Sinacori.  The 
fact that the defendant made no profit from the transaction is 
not dispositive as to whether he distributed the drugs rather 
than jointly possessed them for personal use.  See Johnson, 413 
Mass. at 605.  What is dispositive is that the defendant's 
active role in this transaction differed substantially from 
44 
 
 
Sinacori's passive role -- the defendant knew the supplier, 
negotiated prices, traveled alone to obtain the heroin, and 
determined whether he would share the heroin with Sinacori.  See 
People v. Edwards, 39 Cal.3d 107, 114 (1985) (distinguishing 
scenario with "equal partners" in consummation of drug purchase, 
which would be joint possession, from scenario where one person 
"instigated the purchase and was actively involved in arranging 
and consummating the deal, while [the other] was wholly passive 
and merely accepted the heroin," which would be distribution).  
On the facts of this case, viewed in the light most favorable to 
the defendant, we conclude that no reasonable jury could have 
concluded that the defendant was guilty only of the simple 
possession of heroin.  The judge therefore did not err in 
denying the defendant's request for the lesser included 
instruction. 
 
Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's request to 
instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple 
possession of heroin is affirmed, as is the judgment of 
conviction of distribution of heroin.  As to the defendant's 
conviction of involuntary manslaughter, the judgment is vacated, 
the verdict is set aside, and the case is remanded to the 
Superior Court for entry of a required finding of not guilty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.