Title: State v. Fanus
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S46472
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: October 23, 2003

FILED: October 23, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
								 	         Respondent,
	v.
JESSE STUART FANUS,
									          Appellant.
(C98CR1510FE; SC S46472)
	On automatic and direct review of the judgment of conviction
and sentence of death imposed by the Douglas County Circuit
Court.
	Robert C. Millikan, Judge.
	Argued and submitted January 6, 2003.
	Dan Maloney, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause
and submitted the brief for appellant.  With him on the brief was
David E. Groom, State Public Defender.
	Kaye E. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent.  With her on the
brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General, and Christina M. Hutchins, Assistant Attorney
General. 
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.*
	CARSON, C.J.
	The judgment of conviction and the sentence of death are
affirmed.
	*Leeson, J., resigned January 31, 2003, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.  Kistler, J., did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
		CARSON, C.J.
This case is before the court on automatic and direct
review of a judgment of conviction and sentence of death
following defendant's convictions for two counts of aggravated
murder involving a single victim and 11 additional felony
convictions.  Former ORS 163.150(1)(g) (1997), repealed by Or
Laws 1999, ch 1055, § 1; (1) ORAP 12.10.  On review, defendant asks
this court to reverse his convictions or, alternatively, to
vacate his sentence of death and remand for resentencing.  For
the reasons set out below, we affirm defendant's convictions and
the sentence of death.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
		On the night of June 28, 1998, defendant broke into the
home of the victim, Major General Marion Carl, and his wife, Edna
Carl, in Douglas County, Oregon.  Defendant was armed with a
shotgun that he had stolen from D &amp; D Towing, a Roseburg vehicle
towing business, on or around June 17, 1998.  Defendant shot and
killed Marion Carl, and shot and wounded Edna Carl.  Defendant
then forced Edna Carl at gunpoint to give him several hundred
dollars and the keys to the Carls' vehicle. 
On July 5, 1998, defendant was arrested in Pasadena,
California and, subsequently, was extradited to Oregon.  For his
crimes on June 28, 1998, the state charged defendant with two
counts of aggravated murder, ORS 163.095; two counts of felony
murder, ORS 163.115 (1997); (2) one count of murder, ORS 163.115
(1997); two counts of attempted aggravated murder, ORS 161.405
and ORS 163.095; one count of attempted murder, ORS 161.405 and
ORS 163.115 (1997); one count of first-degree robbery with a
firearm, ORS 164.415 and ORS 161.610 (1997); (3) one count of
second-degree assault with a firearm, ORS 163.175 and ORS 161.610
(1997); and one count of first-degree burglary with a firearm,
ORS 164.225 and ORS 161.610 (1997).  For his burglary of D &amp; D
Towing on or around June 17, 1998, the state charged defendant
with one count of second-degree burglary, ORS 164.215; and one
count of first-degree theft, ORS 164.055.  At trial in April
1999, a Douglas County jury convicted defendant of all 13 counts. 
After a separate penalty-phase proceeding on the two counts of
aggravated murder, in which the jury unanimously answered yes to
the four questions set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b), (4) the trial court
entered a sentence of death.
 		On review, defendant raises 19 assignments of error. A number of those assignments were not preserved for review or
otherwise are not well taken.  We discuss defendant's remaining
arguments as he presents them:  pretrial-phase issues, guilt-
phase issues, and penalty-phase issues.
II.  PRETRIAL-PHASE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
		Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by
overruling his pretrial demurrer to the indictment, in which,
among other things, he raised a number of constitutional
challenges to Oregon's death-penalty statutes.  The trial court
denied defendant's demurrer because it concluded that none of his
arguments was well taken.  
Defendant first contends that the trial court should
have sustained his demurrer because, according to defendant, ORS
163.150(1)(a) and its related jury instruction set out in ORS
163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) (5) violate the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. (6)  That is so, defendant argues,
because neither ORS 163.150(1)(a) nor the jury instruction set
out in ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) sufficiently limit the
aggravating evidence that the state may introduce or that a jury
may consider in relation to the question set out in ORS
163.150(1)(b)(D), that is, "[w]hether the defendant should
receive a death sentence."
Before addressing the merits, we consider the state's
argument that this court should not consider defendant's
constitutional claims because those challenges were not raised
properly by a demurrer.  According to the state, because
defendant challenges the constitutionality of only the sentencing
statute for aggravated murder, his claims do not relate to a
defect appearing on the face of the indictment and are not among
the grounds for a pretrial demurrer under ORS 135.630. (7)   
For that proposition, the state relies upon this
court's decision in State v. Pinnell, 319 Or 438, 877 P2d 635
(1994).  In that case, the defendant had demurred to the possible
application of the "true-life" sentencing option (8) to his
particular case upon the ground that such an application would
amount to an unconstitutional imposition of an ex post facto law. 
Id. at 443-44.  This court held that the trial court had not
erred in overruling the defendant's demurrer because this court
concluded that the possibility of an unconstitutional application
of that sentencing option to the defendant's case was not a
defect appearing on the face of the accusatory instrument or
otherwise grounds for demurrer under ORS 135.630.  Id. at 444. 
By contrast to the defendant in Pinnell, however,
defendant here raises facial challenges to the constitutionality
of Oregon's sentencing statute for aggravated murder.  In City of
Portland v. Dollarhide, 300 Or 490, 495-96, 714 P2d 220 (1986),
this court explained that, when a defendant is charged under a
criminal law for which only an allegedly invalid penalty is
provided, the defendant may challenge that penalty provision by a
pretrial demurrer because, without a valid penalty, the charge
cannot stand. (9)  See also ORS 135.630(4) ("The defendant may demur
to the accusatory instrument when it appears upon the face
thereof * * * [t]hat the facts stated do not constitute an
offense[.]").  That reasoning applies here.  
Under ORS 163.105(1)(a), (10) when a defendant is
convicted of aggravated murder, the trial court must sentence the
defendant according to the statutory sentencing provisions set
out in ORS 163.150.  The parts of ORS 163.150 that defendant
challenged here apply only when the trial court submits to a jury
the sentencing option of death.  ORS 163.150(1)(a); (11) ORS
163.150(3)(a) (1997). (12)  However, when, as in this case, the
defendant is eligible for the death sentence, and the state
elects to present evidence for the purpose of sentencing the
defendant to death, then the trial court must submit to the jury
that sentencing option, and it must apply those parts of ORS
163.150 that defendant challenged as unconstitutional to
determine the defendant's penalty.  See ORS 163.150(1).  Thus,
because, as in Dollarhide, defendant's constitutional challenges
related to the only penalty provision that applied to the charges
of aggravated murder against defendant here, defendant properly
raised those challenges by a pretrial demurrer.  See, e.g., State
v. Moore, 324 Or 396, 429-34, 927 P2d 1073 (1996) (considering
defendant's constitutional challenges to Oregon's death-penalty
statutes raised by demurrer).
		We turn to the merits of defendant's first
constitutional claim.  As noted, defendant argues that ORS
163.150(1)(a) and its related jury instruction set out in ORS
163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) violate the Eighth Amendment because
those statutes do not limit sufficiently the aggravating evidence
that the state may introduce or that the jury may consider in
relation to the question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D), that
is, "[w]hether the defendant should receive a death sentence." 
Defendant essentially argues that, because ORS 163.150(1)(a) and
ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) allow the state to introduce, and the
jury to consider, "aggravating evidence" in relation to the
question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D), but do not provide
guidance as to the meaning of that term, the statutes do not
prevent the state from introducing, or the jury from relying
upon, factors that are irrelevant or constitutionally
impermissible in deciding whether to impose a death sentence
under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D).  We disagree.
		We begin by providing background to place defendant's
argument in context.  As noted, in addition to the three other
statutory questions that a jury must answer before a defendant
may be sentenced to death, ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) requires a jury
to decide "[w]hether the defendant should receive a death
sentence."  This court previously has explained that the question
set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) frames a discretionary
determination for the jury and, therefore, does not carry a
burden of proof.  See Moore, 324 Or at 432 (so stating).  
		In 1995, the legislature amended ORS 163.150(1)(a) to
provide explicitly that, in addition to mitigating evidence that
the defendant may offer, a trial court also may admit victim
impact evidence, as well as aggravating evidence that is
specifically relevant to a jury's determination under ORS
163.150(1)(b)(D).  That statute provides, in part:
	"In the [sentencing proceeding], evidence may be
presented as to any matter that the court deems
relevant to sentence including, but not limited to,
victim impact evidence relating to the personal
characteristics of the victim or the impact of the
crime on the victim's family and any aggravating or
mitigating evidence relevant to the [question set out
in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D)]." 
ORS 163.150(1)(a) (emphasis added).		Subsequently, in 1997, the legislature also amended ORS
163.150(1)(c)(B), the statutory jury instruction that a trial
court must give to guide a jury's determination of the question
under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D).  ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997)
provided:
		"The court shall instruct the jury to answer the
question in paragraph (b)(D) of this subsection 'no'
if, after considering any aggravating evidence and any
mitigating evidence concerning any aspect of the
defendant's character or background, or any
circumstances of the offense and any victim impact
evidence as described in subsection (1)(a) of this
section, one or more of the jurors believe that the
defendant should not receive a death sentence."
Defendant in this case was sentenced under the
1997 version of ORS 163.150.	

With that context in mind, we consider defendant's
first constitutional claim.  As this court observed in State v.
Compton, 333 Or 274, 283-84, 39 P3d 833 (2002), the United States
Supreme Court has explained that, in the selection phase of a
death-penalty proceeding, (13) "[w]hat is important * * * is an
individualized determination on the basis of the character of the
individual and the circumstances of the crime."  Zant v.
Stephens, 462 US 862, 879, 103 S Ct 2733, 77 L Ed 2d 235 (1983)
(emphasis in original).  In providing such an individualized
determination, the Court has stated that "the States may adopt
capital sentencing processes that rely upon the jury, in its
sound judgment, to exercise wide discretion."  Tuilaepa v.
California, 512 US 967, 974, 114 S Ct 2630, 129 L Ed 2d 750
(1994).  The Court has cautioned that a state may not attach an
aggravating label to, or allow a jury to draw adverse inferences
from, constitutionally protected conduct or factors that are
irrelevant or constitutionally impermissible, such as the race or
the religion of the defendant.  See, e.g., Dawson v. Delaware,
503 US 159, 166-68, 112 S Ct 1093, 117 L Ed 2d 309 (1992) (state
may not introduce evidence of defendant's membership in "Aryan
Brotherhood" as "bad character" evidence); Zant, 462 US at 885
(state may not attach "aggravating" label to factors that are
constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to
sentencing process, such as defendant's race, religion, or
political affiliation).  However, subject to that constitutional
limitation, the Court has stated that, under the Eighth
Amendment, a jury is "free to consider a myriad of factors to
determine whether death is the appropriate punishment." 
California v. Ramos, 463 US 992, 1008, 103 S Ct 3446, 77 L Ed 2d
1171 (1983).
		In providing that a jury may have wide discretion under
the Eighth Amendment in determining whether to impose a death
sentence, the Supreme Court also has rejected the notion that a
trial court must guide a jury's discretion by prescribing
standards for the jury's evaluation of aggravating or mitigating
facts and circumstances that either the state or the defendant
might have introduced.  Zant, 462 US at 875 (so stating).  To
that end, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US 153, 161, 203-04, 96 S Ct
2909, 49 L Ed 2d 859 (1976), the Court found no constitutional
difficulty when the trial judge had instructed the jury that, "in
determining what sentence was appropriate[,] the jury was free to
consider the facts and circumstances, if any, presented by the
parties in mitigation or aggravation."  Similarly, in Zant, the
Court approved a jury instruction that, under the same state
statute at issue in Gregg, informed the jury to consider "all
facts and circumstances presented in [extenuation], mitigation[,]
and aggravation of punishment as well as such arguments as have
been presented for the State and for the Defense[.]"  462 US at
878-80, 889 n 25.  See also Tuilaepa, 512 US at 978 (noting
approval of jury instructions in Zant and Gregg).  
		As the foregoing cases illustrate, the Eighth Amendment
does not prohibit the state from introducing a wide range of
evidence for the jury's consideration in determining whether to
impose a death sentence.  Those cases also make clear that a jury
instruction that directs a jury to consider both aggravating and
mitigating facts and circumstances that either the state or the
defendant might have introduced at trial does not offend the
Eighth Amendment by providing insufficient guidance as to the
evidence that a jury properly may consider as either aggravating
or mitigating in determining the appropriate sentence. 
Applying those standards here, we conclude that ORS
163.150(1)(a) and the jury instruction set out in ORS
163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) do not violate the Eighth Amendment in
the manner that defendant contends.  As noted, ORS
163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) requires a trial court to instruct a jury
that, in deciding whether the defendant should receive the death
sentence, the jury must consider "any aggravating evidence and
any mitigating evidence concerning any aspect of the defendant's
character or background, or any circumstances of the offense" (as
well as any relevant victim impact evidence).  That instruction
informs the jury that the jury may base its discretionary
decision to impose the death sentence upon only evidence that has
been presented at trial.  In addition, ORS 163.150(1)(a) limits
the evidence that may be admitted in a death-penalty sentencing
proceeding to "evidence * * * that the court deems relevant to
sentence."  Under those statutes, then, a defendant may prevent a
jury from considering evidence that is irrelevant or
constitutionally impermissible by objecting to the admission of
that evidence at trial.  In addition, if a defendant is concerned
that the jury might draw an improper inference from evidence
introduced in relation to another issue at trial, nothing in ORS
163.150 prohibits a defendant from seeking a jury instruction
that cautions against the jury's improper consideration of that
evidence in determining whether to impose a death sentence.  We
conclude that the trial court did not err in rejecting
defendant's facial constitutional challenge to ORS 163.150(1)(a)
and ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997). (14)
In addition to the argument set out above, defendant
also argues that the trial court erred in overruling his demurrer
because, defendant contends, ORS 163.150 does not allow
meaningful judicial review of the jury's decision to impose the
death sentence and because the statute does not provide
comparative sentencing review.  This court previously has
considered and rejected those same challenges.  See Moore, 324 Or
at 429-34 (concluding that ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) allows for
meaningful judicial review of jury's decision to impose death
sentence and rejecting defendant's argument that Due Process
Clause requires "excessiveness" review in death-penalty cases);
State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 67-68, 880 P2d 431 (1994)
(rejecting defendant's argument that comparative sentencing
review of death sentences required under Eighth Amendment). 
Because we adhere to those prior rulings, and because further
discussion would not benefit the public, the bench, or the bar,
we decline to discuss defendant's claims. (15)
B.	Venue
		In three assignments of error, defendant next argues
that the trial court erred when it denied his pretrial motions
for change of venue.  Defendant first moved for change of venue
in February 1999 before the start of jury selection.  At a
hearing before the trial court on that motion, defendant argued
that there was at least a reasonable likelihood that he could not
obtain a fair and impartial jury in Douglas County because of
prejudicial pretrial publicity concerning the case and,
particularly, concerning the victim Marion Carl.  In support of
that argument, defendant submitted copies of television news
reports and newspaper articles about the case, including 41
articles from the local newspaper.  The news director for the
dominant local television station testified that approximately 70
percent of the local television news reports about the case
primarily focused upon Marion Carl.  Fourteen of the local
newspaper articles also primarily focused upon facts about Marion
Carl's life, his career as a celebrated Marine Corps Major
General, and the local and national tributes that were being
offered in his honor.  The other local newspaper articles
included 15 reports about the crime and the court proceedings;
nine letters to the editor; two editorials; and Marion Carl's
obituary.  Some of the newspaper articles reported facts about
defendant's criminal history.  One article described Marion
Carl's murder as the top local news story in 1998.  
		Defendant also provided the court with a survey of
voters in Douglas and Multnomah counties that he had caused to be
conducted approximately two months after the victim's murder. 
The survey purported to show that 94 percent of the polled
Douglas County voters and 83 percent of the polled Multnomah
County voters had recognized defendant's case; 71 percent of the
polled Douglas County voters and 57 percent of the polled
Multnomah County voters had believed that defendant was guilty;
and 58 percent of the polled Douglas County voters and 43 percent
of the polled Multnomah County voters had believed that, if found
guilty, defendant should receive the death penalty.
		Finally, defendant offered the testimony of an expert
witness who opined that, based upon his analysis of the pretrial
publicity and survey results, at least a reasonable likelihood
existed that defendant could not obtain a fair trial in Douglas
County.  The expert testified that several factors created
heightened prejudice against defendant in that venue, including
the county's population size and Marion Carl's stature in that
community.
		The trial court denied defendant's motion, concluding
that defendant had failed to show that he could not obtain a fair
and impartial jury in Douglas County.  The court agreed that the
case had generated extensive publicity, particularly in that
venue.  The court also agreed that some of that publicity had
been "problematic," and the court speculated that "the nature of
[the] status of the victim and the tremendous amount of publicity
about that could well result in dislike or unfavorable prejudice
toward the accused."  The court, however, was not persuaded that
defendant could not obtain a fair trial in Douglas County,
because it also found that most of the publicity had occurred
more than six months earlier, that defendant's survey was flawed,
and that fewer potential jurors were likely to remember facts
about the case than defendant's survey suggested.
		Defendant moved for change of venue again on the fifth
day of voir dire.  In support of his renewed motion, defendant
proffered additional local newspaper articles about the case and
argued that a high percentage of prospective jurors had been
disqualified based upon their exposure to pretrial publicity. 
The trial court denied defendant's motion.
		Finally, defendant renewed his motion for change of
venue near the close of voir dire.  The trial court again denied
that motion, stating:
"* * * I'm convinced that we have a jury or we
have a pool from which we can get a fair jury and I'm
convinced of that.  I'm as convinced of that as I have
been in any murder case I've tried and perhaps that is
somewhat surprising looking back on the amount of
publicity in this case but again I think that that
publicity, even though as I mentioned in my memorandum
I found some of it to be -- well, I'm not going to look
back and recount what I said in my memorandum.  I just
think that we have enough jurors from here from which
we could find twelve impartial, fair people to try this
case." (16)		

Defendant argues that, under ORS 131.355, a trial court
must grant a motion for change of venue when there is a
reasonable likelihood that prejudicial pretrial publicity will
prevent the defendant from obtaining a fair and impartial trial
in the county in which the trial is set.  Defendant contends that
he made such a showing in this case and that, therefore, the
trial court erred by denying a change of venue.  Defendant
further asserts that, in deciding his motions, the trial court
erred by applying an improper standard and by failing to apply
"separate considerations" as to the fairness of the penalty-phase
proceeding if defendant were convicted. (17)  He argues that the
trial court's denial of his motions for change of venue violated
his right to an impartial jury under Article I, section 11, of
the Oregon Constitution, (18) his right to a fair trial under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, (19) and his
right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. (20)
		We first note that we assume, without deciding, that
the analysis for a motion for change of venue is the same under
ORS 131.355 as it is under the state and federal constitutions,
because defendant did not argue to the trial court that a
different analysis was required and because, although his brief
on review presents his arguments under separate headings as to
state and federal law, defendant also does not suggest to this
court how that analysis might differ.  See State v. Langley, 314
Or 247, 259, 839 P2d 692 (1992) (assuming same analysis under
statute as under state and federal constitutions for motion for
change of venue).  We also do not address defendant's argument
that a motion for change of venue in a death-penalty case
requires "separate considerations" as to the penalty-phase
proceeding as opposed to the guilt-phase proceeding, because
defendant did not present that argument to the trial court.  See
State v. Montez, 324 Or 343, 356, 927 P2d 64 (1996) (declining to
consider defendant's unpreserved claim of error). 
		ORS 131.355 governs the standard for a motion for
change of venue.  That statute provides:
		"The court, upon motion of the defendant, shall
order the place of trial to be changed to another
county if the court is satisfied that there exists in
the county where the action is commenced so great a
prejudice against the defendant that the defendant
cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial."
Under the wording of ORS 131.355 and the decisional law of this
court, a motion for change of venue is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court.  See State v. Little, 249 Or 297,
312, 431 P2d 810 (1968) (stating principle); State v. Jensen, 209
Or 239, 253, 289 P2d 687, 296 P2d 618 (1957) (same).  The trial
court's discretion on such a motion, however, is not unlimited. 
Little, 249 Or at 312.  When a defendant establishes that there
exists such a level of prejudice against the defendant as to
preclude a fair and impartial trial, then the defendant is
entitled to a change of venue.  See id. (no abuse of discretion
in denying motion for change of venue when record of trial
publicity did not compel conclusion that defendant could not
receive fair and impartial trial); see also Murphy v. Florida,
421 US 794, 803, 95 S Ct 2031, 44 L Ed 2d 589 (1975) (defendant
not denied fair trial when defendant failed to show that setting
of trial inherently prejudicial or that jury-selection process
permitted inference of actual prejudice); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 US
717, 728, 81 S Ct 1639, 6 L Ed 2d 751 (1961) (prejudice presumed
when extremely inflammatory publicity pervaded trial and two-thirds of jurors believed defendant guilty before trial).  
		In exercising its discretion to determine whether
prejudice against a defendant necessitates a change of venue, a
trial court must evaluate the likelihood of such prejudice from
both the character and the extent of any pretrial publicity about
the case; from the degree of any difficulty in obtaining
impartial jurors; and from any other factor that might be
indicative of prejudice against the defendant.  Langley, 314 Or
at 260-61 (considering media publicity about case and ability to
obtain impartial jurors); State v. Rogers, 313 Or 356, 364-65,
836 P2d 1308 (1992) (same); Jensen, 209 Or at 254 (in determining
whether trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for
change of venue, this court considers any unusual difficulty in
obtaining fair and impartial jury); see also Murphy, 421 US at
802-03 (difficulty in obtaining jurors who appear impartial
relevant in evaluating those jurors' assurances of impartiality);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 US 723, 727, 83 S Ct 1417, 10 L Ed 2d
663 (1963) (prejudice presumed when community where trial took
place repeatedly exposed to televised "confession" by defendant). 
This court places great weight upon a trial court's determination
that pretrial publicity was not prejudicial and that the
empaneled jurors would be impartial.  Langley, 314 Or at 261. 
Therefore, we will not disturb a trial court's denial of a motion
for change of venue absent a determination of an abuse of
discretion.  Id. at 260.
		Defendant contends that the record of prejudice in his
case is comparable to that described in Irvin, 366 US 717.  In
Irvin, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the
defendant had been denied a fair trial when the defendant's trial
took place in a community that had been saturated with extremely
inflammatory pretrial publicity and that had exhibited a "pattern
of deep and bitter prejudice" against the defendant.  Id. at 725-28.  The publicity in that case had included news stories that
the defendant had confessed to six murders and 24 burglaries, as
well as stories that had detailed the defendant's background and
criminal history.  Id. at 725-26.  The local news stations also
had broadcasted the results of interviews with different
community members as to their opinions about the defendant's
guilt and the punishment that he should receive.  Id. at 725.  In
addition, two-thirds of the jurors who actually had served in the
defendant's case professed to having formed opinions as to the
defendant's guilt before the start of the trial.  Id. at 728.
		Our review of the record here reveals a sharp contrast
to the above described record of prejudice against the defendant
in Irvin.  It is clear from the publicity that surrounded
defendant's case, and particularly from the publicity that took
place in Douglas County, that the murder of Marion Carl was
widely publicized and that his death was a source of sorrow and
profound loss for many.  However, although that publicity
certainly included some expressions of anger at Marion Carl's
murder, the record of publicity does not disclose a community
sentiment of "deep and bitter prejudice" against defendant.  
		In addition, we observe that the trial court here
considered the possibility of prejudice against defendant based
upon pretrial publicity concerning the case and the life of
Marion Carl.  The court presided over a lengthy jury selection
process that included both an extensive juror questionnaire and
seven days of voir dire questioning.  In addition, as described
more fully in the discussion of the next assignment of error,
near the close of voir dire, the trial court also provided
defendant with a second opportunity to challenge any of the
prospective jurors who already had been passed for cause. 
Defendant took that opportunity, but challenged only one
prospective juror, and the trial court allowed that challenge. 
Of the 12 jurors who actually served in defendant's trial, 10
disclosed that they had seen some form of pretrial media
publicity concerning the case.  However, none of the jurors had
followed that publicity with much interest, and all the jurors
stated that they could decide the case based solely upon the
evidence presented at trial.
		Based upon that record, we cannot say that the trial
court erred in concluding that there did not exist such a level
of prejudice against defendant so as to preclude a fair and
impartial trial.  We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the
trial court's decision to deny defendant's motions for change of
venue.
		Defendant also assigns error to the trial court's
denial of his challenge for cause against juror Ocumpaugh.  In
response to questions on the juror questionnaire and to defense
counsel's initial questions during voir dire, Ocumpaugh disclosed
that she was familiar with defendant's case from pretrial
publicity in the media.  She stated that she believed that
defendant probably was guilty, that she would require defendant
to prove his innocence, and that she believed that the death
penalty was appropriate for murder.  Based upon her statements,
defendant challenged her for cause.  
		The prosecutor then asked permission to inquire.  He
explained to Ocumpaugh that, as a juror, she would be required to
take an oath to base her decision as to defendant's guilt upon
only the evidence presented at the trial and to require the state
to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.  Ocumpaugh
replied that she was willing to and would be able to comply with
that oath.
		The trial court questioned Ocumpaugh further. 
Ocumpaugh confirmed that she understood that defendant was
presumed innocent, that the state had the burden to prove the
charges beyond a reasonable doubt, and that, as a juror, she
would be required to base her decision as to defendant's guilt
upon only the evidence presented at trial.  She also volunteered
that she knew from her own personal experience that facts
reported in the media were not always accurate.  The trial court
then asked Ocumpaugh to assess honestly whether she had formed
such a fixed opinion as to defendant's guilt that she would not
be able to judge defendant fairly.  Ocumpaugh denied that she had
formed such an opinion, and the trial court overruled defendant's
challenge.  
		After that exchange, defense counsel resumed his
questioning of Ocumpaugh.  In response to his questions,
Ocumpaugh initially stated that she believed that defendant had
the burden to show that he should receive a life sentence rather
than the death penalty, but then she professed that she did not
understand defense counsel's questions.  After defense counsel
clarified that he was asking if Ocumpaugh would require defendant
to produce evidence to "get a favorable result," Ocumpaugh stated
that she would require defendant to produce such evidence only if
the state had met its burden.  Defendant renewed his challenge to
Ocumpaugh for cause, but the trial court overruled that
challenge.  
		Subsequently, on the sixth day of voir dire, the trial
court announced that he would entertain any challenges that the
parties wished to raise to prospective jurors who already had
been passed for cause.  The next day, defense counsel raised the
trial judge's invitation to renew challenges, and he asked the
court to reconsider his challenge for cause to prospective juror
Cole.  The trial judge asked defense counsel if he had any other
challenges that he wished the court to reconsider, and defense
counsel responded that "[t]hat's the only one that comes strongly
to mind."  The trial court allowed defendant's challenge for
cause to prospective juror Cole.  Juror Ocumpaugh was not
excused.
On review, defendant contends that Ocumpaugh's answers
on the juror questionnaire and during voir dire reveal that she
was "both guilt biased and death biased."  He further asserts
that the trial court should have excused Ocumpaugh based upon a
statement that she believed that defendant was involved with
illegal drugs.  Defendant argues that the trial court's failure
to excuse Ocumpaugh violated his right to an impartial jury under
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (21)  
		The state responds that defendant waived his challenge
to Ocumpaugh because he did not renew that challenge after the
trial court allowed the parties to renew challenges to
prospective jurors who had been passed for cause.  On the merits,
the state argues that, as a whole, Ocumpaugh's statements
demonstrated that she would be a fair and impartial juror. 
		At the outset, we reject the state's contention that,
because he did not renew his challenge to juror Ocumpaugh,
defendant waived that challenge.  Waiver is the "intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 
State v. Meyrick, 313 Or 125, 132, 831 P2d 666 (1992).  In this
case, although the trial court offered to consider renewed
challenges to prospective jurors who had been passed for cause,
the trial court did not suggest that defendant was required to
take advantage of that offer to avoid abandonment of his
previously denied challenges.  Further, in declining the trial
court's offer to consider other renewed challenges, defense
counsel did not indicate that he had abandoned his previously
denied challenges, but only that he most strongly objected to
prospective juror Cole.  That record does not demonstrate that
defendant's decision not to renew his challenge to Ocumpaugh
evidenced an intent to abandon that challenge.  Defendant
preserved his objection to Ocumpaugh by challenging her twice
during voir dire, and his decision not to repeat his objection
did not constitute a waiver of those challenges. 
		 We turn to the merits of defendant's claim that the
trial court should have excused juror Ocumpaugh for actual bias. 
ORCP 57 D(1)(g) governs challenges for cause to prospective
jurors for actual bias.  See ORS 136.210(1); see also State v.
Barone, 328 Or 68, 74, 969 P2d 1013 (1998) (so stating).  Under
ORCP 57 D(1)(g), the fact that a prospective juror has formed
opinions about matters relevant to the case is not itself cause
to exclude that juror based upon actual bias.  See also Barone,
328 Or at 74 (so stating).  Instead, in determining whether a
prospective juror should be excused for actual bias, "the test is
whether the prospective juror's ideas or opinions would impair
substantially his or her performance of the duties of a juror to
decide the case fairly and impartially on the evidence presented
in court."  Barone, 328 Or at 74.  Whether a prospective juror is
actually biased is a factual question to be determined by the
trial court as an exercise of its discretion.  ORCP 57 D(1)(g);
see State v. Lotches, 331 Or 455, 473, 17 P3d 1045 (2000) (so
stating).  Because the trial court has the advantage of observing
the demeanor, apparent intelligence, and candor of a challenged
prospective juror, a trial court's discretionary decision on such
a challenge is entitled to deference and will not be disturbed
absent a manifest abuse of discretion.  Compton, 333 Or at 285.
		As noted, the challenged juror here, Ocumpaugh,
initially stated that she had formed opinions relating to
defendant and to defendant's guilt from pretrial publicity about
the case.  She also initially stated that she would require
defendant to prove his innocence.  However, after the prosecutor
explained the legal duties of a juror to her, Ocumpaugh was
unequivocal that she was willing and would be able to require the
state to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to
base her decision upon only the evidence presented at trial.  In
addition, although she expressed support for the death penalty in
general, Ocumpaugh consistently denied that she automatically
would vote for the death penalty in all circumstances or in this
particular case.  She also assured the trial court that she had
not formed strong opinions about the case, and the court, which
had the opportunity to observe her demeanor, was persuaded that
she would be able to perform her duties as a juror fairly and
impartially.  Because evidence in the record supports that
determination, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's refusal to excuse juror Ocumpaugh for cause. 
III. GUILT-PHASE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
		Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by
failing to issue a curative instruction or to declare a mistrial
sua sponte because of statements that the prosecutor made during
his closing argument.
		The prosecutor began his closing argument by outlining
facts incorporated in defendant's version of events that, if
true, would have tended to show that defendant had not shot
Marion Carl or Edna Carl intentionally or with the intent to
kill.  The prosecutor then stated:
		"So if the defense were able to persuade you of
all of these things, all we'd be left with is robbery
and burglary, not any murder charges, no attempted
murder charges, zilch.  He's off the hook.  If he's
unable to establish any of those things and I am able
to prove what I'm about to prove to you, then he's
stuck with all of them and you'll find him guilty of
all of them." 	
(Emphasis added.)
		Defendant made no objection to the prosecutor's
arguments at trial.  Instead, in his closing argument, defense
counsel responded:
	"Well, ladies and gentlemen, I hate to disappoint [the
prosecutor] but his attempt to co-op my argument was a
little off the mark.  I'm going to tell you exactly
what Jesse Fanus is guilty of and why.
		"He's guilty of count four, felony murder.
		"He's guilty of count nine, robbery in the first
degree.
		"He's guilty of count ten, assault in the second
degree.
		"He's guilty of count eleven, burglary in the
first degree.
		"And counts twelve and thirteen, D &amp; D Towing.
		"Those are what he's guilty of.  You heard
evidence that would lead you to believe that.
		"What he's not guilty of is aggravated murder or
attempted aggravated murder, either one." 
		On review, defendant contends that the prosecutor's
arguments denied him a fair trial because the prosecutor
improperly suggested that the jury faced an all-or-nothing choice
between guilt or acquittal as to all the murder counts. 
Defendant concedes that, because he took no action in response to
the prosecutor's statements at trial, he did not preserve this
assignment of error.  He urges, however, that this court consider
this claim of error as "error apparent on the face of the
record[.]"  ORAP 5.45(6); see State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or
431, 435-36, 7 P3d 522 (2000) (explaining and applying plain
error doctrine).  
		The state responds that, viewed in context, the
prosecutor's statements were neither misleading nor improper
because those statements in fact referred to only the intentional
murder counts.  The state also argues that, even if improper, the
prosecutor's statements could not have misled the jury in this
case because both the prosecutor and defense counsel subsequently
argued to the jury that felony murder did not require a finding
of intent, and because the trial court instructed the jury on the
elements of each crime that the state had charged, including the
elements of felony murder.  
		It is not apparent from our review of the record that,
as the state contends, the prosecutor's statements referred to
only the intentional murder counts.  Even assuming that the
prosecutor's arguments misstated the law, however, we
nevertheless conclude that the trial court's failure to issue a
curative instruction or to declare a mistrial sua sponte on the
basis of those arguments does not amount to an "error apparent on
the face of the record." 
		This court consistently has held that a motion for a
mistrial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court
because the trial court is in the best position to assess and
rectify any potential prejudice to the defendant.  State v.
Farrar, 309 Or 132, 164, 786 P2d 161 (1990) (so stating); see
also State v. Simonsen, 329 Or 288, 300, 986 P2d 566 (1999)
(same).  Thus, even if the court finds that a prosecutor's
statements were improper, this court will not find that a trial
court's failure to grant a mistrial sua sponte constituted error
apparent on the face of the record unless it was "beyond dispute
that the prosecutor's comments were so prejudicial as to have
denied defendant a fair trial."  Montez, 324 Or at 357 (so
stating); see also State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 24, 791 P2d 836
(1990) (even if this court finds prosecutor's remarks "improper,
tasteless, or inappropriate," no abuse of discretion in trial
court's denial of motion for mistrial unless effect of remarks
was to deny defendant fair trial).  
		In the present case, the prosecutor's alleged
misstatement was isolated and later was corrected by the
prosecutor's closing argument, the defense counsel's closing
argument, and the trial court's jury instructions defining the
elements of each crime charged.  Viewed in that context, the
prosecutor's argument was not so prejudicial that the trial
court's failure to issue a curative instruction or to declare a
mistrial sua sponte can be said to have denied defendant a fair
trial.  We find no error.
IV. PENALTY-PHASE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
A.	Failure to Exclude Evidence of Defendant's Nazi Beliefs
		Defendant assigns error to the trial court's ruling that permitted the state to introduce certain evidence
that related to defendant's beliefs in white supremacy and Nazi
ideology.  Before the penalty-phase proceeding began, defense
counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude "any evidence
relating to defendant's belief or expressions of belief in racist
ideals, white supremacy or other matters of similar nature or
defendant's use or display of symbols of such belief."  In
response to defendant's motion, the state submitted a list of the
evidence that it sought to introduce during the penalty-phase
proceeding that related to defendant's racist beliefs.  The state
asserted that its proffered evidence was relevant to the jury's
determination of defendant's future dangerousness, ORS
163.150(1)(b)(B), as well as to the jury's determination whether
defendant should receive the death sentence, ORS
163.150(1)(b)(D).  The trial court ruled that some of the state's
evidence was relevant to the issue of defendant's future
dangerousness, but that the admissibility of other items of
evidence would depend upon the context in which the state offered
it. 
During the penalty-phase proceeding, the state
introduced the testimony of Goodman and Flory, both employees of
MacLaren Youth Correctional Facility, that defendant had
contributed to racial tensions, had made racist remarks to and
provoked a fight with a minority youth, and had committed acts of
racist graffiti while defendant had been in custody at MacLaren
in 1995 and 1996.  The state also offered the testimony of
Douglas County Detective Perkins that defendant had confessed to
spray-painting swastikas, the letters "SS," and the words "Juden
Frei" (22) on a shack on the night of Marion Carl's murder.  The
state later introduced photographs of that shack as exhibits,
showing graffiti that included a swastika, the letters "SS," and
the words "Death to All Jews" and "Fuck Niggers and Jews."  In
addition, the state introduced testimony that defendant had
scratched graffiti, including a swastika symbol and the letters
"SS," in his jail cell after his arrest for the crimes in this
case. 
Over defendant's objection, the state also introduced
five exhibits that consisted of writings by defendant.  In the
disputed exhibits, defendant had expressed a hatred of
minorities, as well as beliefs in white supremacy and Nazi
ideology. (23)  
In this court, defendant challenges only the
admissibility of the five disputed exhibits consisting of
defendant's writings.  He argues that those exhibits were
irrelevant under OEC 401 (24) as to any of the four statutory
questions set out in ORS 136.150(1)(b) and were unfairly
prejudicial under OEC 403. (25)  Citing Dawson, 503 US 159,
defendant also asserts that the introduction of the challenged
exhibits violated his right to free speech under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. (26)  We address
defendant's subconstitutional arguments before addressing his
federal constitutional claim. (27)  
		This court reviews a trial court's determination of
relevance for errors of law.  State v. Titus, 328 Or 475, 481,
982 P2d 1133 (1999).  To be relevant to the issue of a
defendant's future dangerousness under ORS 136.150(1)(b)(B), "the
proffered evidence must have a tendency to show that a
probability either does or does not exist that the defendant will
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society."  Moore, 324 Or at 417.  This court
repeatedly has held that a broad range of evidence is admissible
to make that showing, including a defendant's entire prior
criminal history, unadjudicated bad acts by a defendant, and
evidence of a defendant's previous bad character.  Id. at 416;
see also State v. Moen, 309 Or 45, 73, 786 P2d 111 (1990)
(evidence of defendant's prior conduct, good and bad, is relevant
to question of defendant's future dangerousness).
		In Moore, this court considered whether evidence of the
defendant's beliefs in white supremacy was relevant to the
question of the defendant's future dangerousness.  The court
concluded that, although evidence of a defendant's abstract
beliefs or expression of beliefs generally is irrelevant to the
issue of future dangerousness, such evidence is relevant when the
state also introduces evidence of past dangerous conduct by the
defendant that was predicated upon those beliefs.  Moore, 324 Or
at 418-19.  The court reasoned that, in such circumstances,
evidence relating to the defendant's beliefs is probative of the
defendant's propensity to act dangerously in the future because
it demonstrates the depth of the defendant's adherence to beliefs
that drove the defendant to act dangerously in the past.  Id. at
419.
That same reasoning applies here.  As in Moore, the
state did not introduce only evidence that defendant previously
had expressed feelings of racial hatred and beliefs in Nazi
ideology; rather, the state also introduced evidence, which
defendant does not challenge on review, that demonstrated that
defendant previously had engaged in criminal conduct -- including
assaultive conduct and acts of graffiti -- related to those
beliefs.  Under those circumstances, defendant's expressions of
his racist beliefs were probative of his propensity to act
dangerously in the future and, thus, were relevant to the jury's
determination under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B). (28)
		In this case, we also fail to see any danger of unfair
prejudice to defendant from the admission of the disputed
exhibits.  See OEC 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded if
probative value substantially outweighed by danger of unfair
prejudice).  As noted, in addition to those exhibits, the jury
also heard substantial evidence of defendant's racist beliefs
from other testimony and exhibits that the state presented during
the penalty-phase proceeding that defendant does not challenge on
review.  We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's
decision that the disputed exhibits were not prejudicial and,
therefore, no error.  See State v. Rose, 311 Or 274, 290-91, 810
P2d 839 (1991) (court reviews trial court's ruling under OEC 403
for abuse of discretion).	
		Finally, we reject defendant's assertion that the
admission of the disputed exhibits violated his right to free
speech under the First Amendment.  As this court explained in
Moore, the admission of evidence relating to a defendant's
beliefs or expression of beliefs does not violate the First
Amendment when that evidence is relevant to the jury's
determination of an issue in the proceeding.  Moore, 324 Or at
422; see also Dawson, 503 US at 166-68 (evidence of defendant's
membership in Aryan Brotherhood violated defendant's First
Amendment rights, because evidence not relevant to any issue
being decided in proceeding).  Because, as we determined above,
the evidence at issue here was relevant to the jury's
determination under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B), the admission of that
evidence did not violate defendant's First Amendment rights. 
		In two assignments of error, defendant contends that
the trial court's imposition of the death sentence was
unconstitutional because, according to defendant, the indictment
did not allege an offense that made him eligible for the death
penalty.  Defendant's arguments are not preserved and, in any
event, were resolved against him in State v. Oatney, 335 Or 276,
292-97, 66 P3d 475 (2003).
V.  CONCLUSION
		In summary, we conclude that none of defendant's
assignments of error is well taken, and, consequently, we affirm
defendant's convictions and the sentence of death.
		The judgment of conviction and the sentence of death
are affirmed.



1. 	This court's automatic and direct review of a judgment
of conviction and sentence of death now is provided under ORS
138.012.

2. 	In 1999, the legislature amended ORS 163.115 in a way
that is not relevant to our discussion.  Or Laws 1999, ch 782, § 4.
3. 	In 1999, the legislature amended ORS 161.610 in a way
that is not relevant to our discussion.  Or Laws 1999, ch 951, § 3. 
4. 	In a death-penalty sentencing proceeding, ORS
163.150(1)(b) requires that the jury affirmatively answer the
following four questions:
		"(A) Whether the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
death of the deceased or another would result;
		"(B) Whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society;
		"(C) If raised by the evidence, whether the
conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was
unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased; and
		"(D) Whether the defendant should receive a death
sentence." 
		The jury considers the third question set out in ORS
163.150(1)(b)(C), regarding provocation by the victim, only when
that question is relevant under the facts of the case.  See,
e.g., State v. Terry, 333 Or 163, 182-83 n 12, 37 P3d 157 (2001)
(question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(C) not submitted to jury). 
As noted above, in this case, the jury considered all four
statutory questions.

5. 	In 2001, the legislature amended ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B)
in a way that is not relevant to our discussion.  Or Laws 2001,
ch 306, § 1.

6. 	The Eighth Amendment provides, in part, that "cruel and
unusual punishments [shall not be] inflicted."  The Eighth
Amendment is made applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Furman v. Georgia,
408 US 238, 239-40, 92 S Ct 2726, 33 L Ed 2d 346 (1972). 	

7. 	ORS 135.630 provides:
		"The defendant may demur to the accusatory
instrument when it appears upon the face thereof:
		"(1) If the accusatory instrument is an
indictment, that the grand jury by which it was found
had no legal authority to inquire into the crime
charged because the same is not triable within the
county;
		"(2) If the accusatory instrument is an
indictment, that it does not substantially conform to
the requirements of ORS 132.510 to 132.560, 135.713,
135.715, 135.717 to 135.737, 135.740 and 135.743;
		"(3) That the accusatory instrument charges more
than one offense not separately stated;
		"(4) That the facts stated do not constitute an
offense;
		"(5) That the accusatory instrument contains
matter which, if true, would constitute a legal
justification or excuse of the offense charged or other
legal bar to the action; or
		"(6) That the accusatory instrument is not
definite and certain."

8. 	See ORS 163.105(1)(a) (providing for sentencing option
of "life imprisonment without possibility of release or parole");
ORS 163.150(2)(a) (providing that, if penalty-phase jury does not
impose death sentence, trial court shall sentence defendant to
"life imprisonment without possibility of release or parole,"
unless 10 or more jurors find sufficient mitigating evidence to
warrant sentence of life imprisonment for minimum of 30 years).

9. 	We note, as did the court in Dollarhide, that the
determination that the penalty provision of a statute is invalid
does not require necessarily the dismissal of the complaint.  See
Dollarhide, 300 Or at 503-05 (trial court erred in dismissing
complaint after finding penalty provision invalid, because
invalid penalty provision was severable and, upon conviction,
defendant could be sentenced to penalty provided in general
penalty provision); see also ORS 174.040 (providing that, if any
part of statute held unconstitutional, remaining parts remain in
force unless statute provides otherwise or unconstitutional part
of statute is inseverable).  Nevertheless, when a defendant
alleges that only an invalid penalty is applicable to a charged
offense, the defendant's challenge relates to whether the facts
stated constitute an offense and is grounds for a pretrial
demurrer under ORS 135.630(4).

10. 	ORS 163.105(1)(a) provides: 
		"Except as otherwise provided in ORS 137.700, when
a defendant is convicted of aggravated murder as
defined by ORS 163.095, the defendant shall be
sentenced, pursuant to ORS 163.150, to death, life
imprisonment without the possibility of release or
parole or life imprisonment." 

11. 	ORS 163.150(1)(a) provides, in part:
		"Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of
aggravated murder, the court, except as otherwise
provided in subsection (3) of this section, shall
conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine
whether the defendant shall be sentenced to life
imprisonment, as described in ORS 163.105(1)(c), life
imprisonment without the possibility of release or
parole, as described in ORS 163.105(1)(b), or death."

12. 	ORS 163.150(3)(a) (1997) provided, in part:
		"When the defendant is found guilty of aggravated
murder upon a plea of guilty or no contest prior to the
introduction of evidence before the trier of fact, and
the state advises the court on the record that the
state declines to present evidence for purposes of
sentencing the defendant to death, the court:
		"(A) Shall not conduct a sentencing proceeding as
described in subsection (1) of this section, and a
sentence of death shall not be ordered.
		"(B) Shall conduct a sentencing proceeding to
determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to
life imprisonment without the possibility of release or
parole as described in ORS 163.150(1)(b) or life
imprisonment as described in ORS 163.150(1)(c). * * *
The procedure for the sentencing proceeding, whether
before a court or a jury, shall follow the procedure of
subsection (1)(a) and subsection (2) of this section,
as modified by this subsection which prohibits a
sentence of death when the state declines to present
evidence."
In 1999 and 2001, the legislature amended ORS 163.150(3)(a) in
ways not relevant to our discussion.  Or Laws 1999, ch 1055, § 1; Or Laws 2001, ch 306, § 1.

13. 	The Supreme Court characterizes the two phases of a
death-penalty sentencing process as "the eligibility phase" and
"the selection phase."  Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 US 269, 275,
118 S Ct 757, 139 L Ed 2d 702 (1998).  In the eligibility phase,
the jury "narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death
penalty[.]"  Id. at 275.  In the selection phase, the jury
determines whether a defendant who is eligible to receive a death
sentence in fact should receive that sentence.  Id.  See also
Compton, 333 Or at 283 (explaining federal constitutional
requirements for eligibility phase and selection phase of death-penalty proceedings).

14. 	We also have considered other arguments that defendant
raised in this and a related assignment of error respecting the
constitutionality of ORS 163.150(1)(a) and ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B)
(1997).  Because we conclude that those arguments are not
preserved or are not well taken, we reject them without further
discussion.

15. 	In another assignment of error, defendant argues that
the trial court erred by rejecting the other constitutional
challenges to Oregon's death-penalty statute that defendant
raised in his demurrer.  Defendant concedes that this court
previously has rejected those same challenges in other death-
penalty cases.  That concession is well taken, and we also
decline to discuss further the challenges raised in that
assignment of error.  See State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or 431,
443, 7 P3d 522 (2000) (declining to discuss such challenges
because it would not benefit bench or bar in light of previous
holdings); Moore, 324 Or at 429 n 19 (same).    

16. 	In March 1999, before trial, defendant also filed a
petition for an alternative writ of mandamus in this court,
asking the court to require the trial judge to grant his motion
for change of venue.  This court denied defendant's petition.

17. 	Defendant appears to argue that, even if he could have
obtained a fair and impartial jury in the guilt phase of his
trial, he could not have obtained a fair and impartial jury in
the penalty phase.  We agree with defendant that, in a death-penalty case, the jury's ability to be fair and impartial
in any penalty-phase proceeding is an integral part of a trial
court's consideration as to whether a change of venue is
required.  We, however, do not understand what "separate
considerations" defendant thinks that a trial court must apply in
making that determination.

18. 	Article I, section 11, provides, in part, that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to
public trial by an impartial jury * * *."    

19. 	The Sixth Amendment provides, in part:
		"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation * * *."
The Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 US 145, 88 S Ct 1444, 20 L Ed 2d 491
(1968).

20. 	The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part, that "[no
state shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law[.]"

21. 	Defendant does not contend that, in this context, the
Oregon constitutional guarantee to an impartial jury differs from
that of the United States Constitution.  See Compton, 333 Or at
285 n 6 (considering state and federal constitutional claims
together in context of motion to exclude jurors for cause in
absence of argument to contrary); State v. Barone, 328 Or 68, 71
n 2, 969 P2d 1031 (1998) (same).

22. 	Detective Perkins testified that defendant had told him
that defendant understood "Juden Frei" to mean "cleanse the Jews"
in German.

23. 	The challenged exhibits included: (1) a drawing of a
swastika with the words "Aryan Pride" and "Third Reich" written
around it, and, among other things, various racial epithets
followed by the words "live in fear cause the end is near"; (2) a
writing titled "Pink Floyd" that referred to homosexuals, a
Jewish person, and "rif raf," and ended with the statement,
apparently a lyric from a song by the band Pink Floyd, "if I had
my way, I'd have them all shot"; (3) a poem titled "Juden Frei"
that included lines such as "I wish I could kill a Jew" and "If I
had my way I would have there [sic] bodies laying everywhere";
(4) another writing titled "Juden Frei"; and (5) a copy of a
"Pee-Chee" folder with the words "ouch," "rape," "let's hurry up
and catch that Jew," and "help" written on it.    

24. 	OEC 401 provides:
		"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."

25. 	OEC 403 provides:
		"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
		The state argues that defendant did not preserve
adequately his argument that the disputed exhibits were unfairly
prejudicial under OEC 403.  After reviewing the record, we
conclude that defendant adequately preserved that claim of error.

26. 	The First Amendment provides, in part, that "Congress
shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech * * *."  
The First Amendment is made applicable to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 264 n 4, 84 S Ct 710, 11 L Ed 2d 686
(1964).

27. 	On review, defendant also contends that the admission
of the disputed evidence violated his right to due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment.  However, although defendant cited the
Fourteenth Amendment in his motion in limine, defendant made no
objection to the trial court upon due process grounds.  Thus,
defendant failed to preserve his due process argument, and we do
not address it.  See State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 343, 15 P3d 22
(2000) (to preserve issue for appellate consideration, party must
object with sufficient clarity to allow trial court to consider
alleged error).

28. 	Because we determine that the disputed exhibits were
relevant to the jury's determination under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B),
we do not need to address the state's contention that those
exhibits were relevant under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D).  See Moore,
324 Or at 414 (declining to consider whether disputed evidence
would be admissible under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) in light of
determination that evidence was relevant under ORS
163.150(1)(b)(B)).