Title: DunbarHomes, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Franklin Township
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2018

DunbarHomes, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Franklin Township Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Plaintiff Dunbar Homes, Inc., (Dunbar) owns a 276-unit garden apartment complex in the General Business Zone (GB-Zone) of Franklin Township (Township). Dunbar sought approval to develop an additional fifty-five garden apartments, which at that time were a permitted conditional use in the GB-Zone. As such, construction of the additional apartments required submission of an application for site plan approval and a “conditional use special reasons” variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3) ((d)(3) variance). On May 28, 2013, the Township introduced and scheduled a public hearing for an ordinance that eliminated garden apartments as a permitted conditional use in the GB-Zone. The Township adopted the new ordinance on July 16, 2013, and it became effective on August 5, 2013. Eighteen days before it adopted its new ordinance, the Township advised Dunbar of the potential GB-Zone change. The day before the Township adopted its new ordinance, Dunbar submitted an application to the Planning Board for site plan approval and a (d)(3) variance. Two days after the Township’s new zoning ordinance eliminated garden apartments as a conditional use in the GB-Zone, a Township zoning officer emailed Dunbar to indicate that its application was incomplete under the Township’s Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance (Ordinance). The zoning officer provided a list of items “needed for completeness” and instructed Dunbar it would need to apply for a “restricted use special reasons” variance under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1) ((d)(1) variance) Since a (d)(3) variance need not meet the stringent standards required for a (d)(1) variance, approval of a (d)(1) variance was less likely. Dunbar appealed the Township’s decision to the Zoning Board of Adjustment (Board), arguing that the application was “complete” upon submission and was therefore protected by the TOA Rule. Dunbar filed a complaint, asserting that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious or unreasonable. The trial court agreed and reversed the Board, concluding that “there was enough submitted to functionally begin a review” of Dunbar’s application. Thus, the court found that Dunbar was protected by the TOA Rule and could therefore pursue a (d)(3) variance. The Township appealed the trial court’s decision and the Appellate Division reversed. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court: "the plain language of the MLUL defines an 'application for development' as 'the application form and all accompanying documents required by ordinance.' Because Dunbar’s application lacked many of the documents required by the Ordinance, the application was not complete upon submission and does not benefit from the TOA Rule." Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.) Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Franklin Township (A-89-16) (079076)Argued April 9, 2018 -- Decided June 20, 2018SOLOMON, J., writing for the Court.N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5, a section of the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -136, provides that “development regulations which are in effect on the date of submission of an application for development shall govern the review of that application for development.” That rule is known as the Time of Application Rule (TOA Rule), and this appeal turns on whether an incomplete application triggers the TOA Rule’s protections. Plaintiff Dunbar Homes, Inc., (Dunbar) owns a 276-unit garden apartment complex in the General Business Zone (GB-Zone) of Franklin Township (Township). Dunbar sought approval to develop an additional fifty-five garden apartments, which at that time were a permitted conditional use in the GB-Zone. As such, construction of the additional apartments required submission of an application for site plan approval and a “conditional use special reasons” variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3) ((d)(3) variance). On May 28, 2013, the Township introduced and scheduled a public hearing for an ordinance that eliminated garden apartments as a permitted conditional use in the GB-Zone. The Township adopted the new ordinance on July 16, 2013, and it became effective on August 5, 2013. On June 28, 2013, eighteen days before it adopted its new ordinance, the Township advised Dunbar of the potential GB-Zone change. The day before the Township adopted its new ordinance, Dunbar submitted an application to the Planning Board for site plan approval and a (d)(3) variance. On August 7, 2013, two days after the Township’s new zoning ordinance eliminated garden apartments as a conditional use in the GB-Zone, a Township zoning officer emailed Dunbar to indicate that its application was incomplete under the Township’s Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance (Ordinance). The zoning officer provided a list of items “needed for completeness” and instructed Dunbar it would need to apply for a “restricted use special reasons” variance under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1) ((d)(1) variance) instead of a (d)(3) variance because “garden apartments are not permitted in the GB Zone.” Since a (d)(3) variance need not meet the stringent standards required for a (d)(1) variance, approval of a (d)(1) variance was less likely. Dunbar appealed the Township’s decision to the Zoning Board of Adjustment (Board), arguing that the application was “complete” upon submission and was therefore protected by the TOA Rule. Dunbar presented the testimony of two experts. A professional 1 planner conceded that Dunbar’s application lacked items required by the Ordinance for site plan or variance approval but opined that despite those deficiencies Dunbar’s application was sufficient. Second, an expert in New Jersey land use law stated that a completeness requirement would frustrate the purpose of the MLUL. The Board denied the appeal. Dunbar filed a complaint, asserting that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious or unreasonable. The trial court agreed and reversed the Board, concluding that “there was enough submitted to functionally begin a review” of Dunbar’s application. Thus, the court found that Dunbar was protected by the TOA Rule and could therefore pursue a variance for the additional apartments under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3). The Township appealed the trial court’s decision and the Appellate Division reversed. 448 N.J. Super. 583 (App. Div. 2017). The Court granted certification. 233 N.J. 127 (2017).HELD: The plain language of the MLUL defines an “application for development” as “the application form and all accompanying documents required by ordinance.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D- 3. Because Dunbar’s application lacked many of the documents required by the Ordinance, the application was not complete upon submission and does not benefit from the TOA Rule.1. The MLUL is a comprehensive statute that allows municipalities to adopt ordinances to regulate land development in a manner which will promote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare using uniform and efficient procedures. The TOA Rule, which took effect in May 2011, replaced the former “time of decision rule,” which required that zoning boards and reviewing courts apply the statute in effect at the time of the land-use application decision. The time of decision rule allowed municipalities to change land-use ordinances after an application had been filed, even in direct response to the application. The Legislature acknowledged that the time of decision rule had produced “inequitable results.” A. Housing & Local Gov’t Comm. Statement to A. 437 (2010). In order to “effectively prohibit[] municipalities from responding to an application for development by changing the law to frustrate that application,” ibid., the Legislature adopted the TOA Rule, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5. The terms used in the TOA Rule are to be construed in accordance with any definitions set forth in the MLUL. Thus, the term “application for development” must be interpreted to mean “the application form and all accompanying documents required by ordinance for approval of a subdivision plat, site plan, planned development, cluster development, conditional use, zoning variance or direction of the issuance of a permit.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3 (emphasis added). (pp. 16-18)2. Determinations as to the precise contents of an application for development are thus left to municipalities. Pursuant to its delegated power, the Township incorporated into its Ordinance a detailed checklist and description of each application requirement for agency review. For the purposes of the legal question posed by Dunbar, it is sufficient that a checklist of application components are provided by the Ordinance. That list is anticipated in, and incorporated by, the MLUL definition of “application for development” in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3 and, by extension, the TOA Rule of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5. Thus, to benefit from the protections of the TOA Rule, an application for development in Franklin Township must contain the required information and documents listed in the Ordinance. That clear, easily applied, and objective standard advances the MLUL’s goal of statewide consistency and uniformity in land use decisions. (pp. 18-20) 2 3. The Court notes some important practical limits to Board determinations based on an application’s failure to include all required materials. First, an application is not “incomplete” simply because a municipality requires “correction of any information found to be in error and submission of additional information.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.3. Further, in the event information required by ordinance is not pertinent, the applicant may request a waiver.N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.3. The applicant’s submission will provisionally trigger the TOA Rule if a waiver request for one or more items accompanies all other required materials; if the Board grants the waiver, then the application will be deemed complete. If the Board denies the waiver, its decision will be subject to review. (p. 20)4. Although the TOA Rule does not use the word “complete,” it explicitly cross-references the local ordinance provisions that list application requirements. The MLUL’s “completeness provision,” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.3, has no bearing on whether an application receives the protection of the TOA Rule. (p. 21)5. The Township’s relevant Ordinance provisions list the information and materials required for site plan and variance applications. Dunbar argues that the Township has conflicting application requirements because, in addition to the Ordinance requirements for site plan and variance applications, it lists requirements for a bifurcated submission. It is undisputed that, whether Dunbar submitted a single application for site plan approval with a use variance or separate applications for site plan approval and for a use variance, Dunbar failed to include materials required by the Ordinance. It is inconceivable that Dunbar’s confusion about which Ordinance provision applied resulted in its failure to comply with either. The Township’s zoning officer properly determined that Dunbar’s application did not include “all accompanying documents required by ordinance” and was, therefore, “incomplete.” Because the application was incomplete and no waiver was sought, Dunbar’s application could not benefit from the TOA Rule. Rather, Dunbar’s application was properly subjected to the (d)(1) variance requirement. Hence, the decision of the Board was not arbitrary and capricious or unreasonable, and the judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed. (pp. 21-24) AFFIRMED.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 89 September Term 2016 079076 DUNBAR HOMES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v.ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF FRANKLIN, Defendant-Respondent, andTOWNSHIP OF FRANKLIN, Defendant-Respondent. Argued April 9, 2018 – Decided June 20, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 448 N.J. Super. 583 (App. Div. 2017). Ronald L. Shimanowitz argued the cause for appellant (Hutt & Shimanowitz, attorneys; Ronald L. Shimanowitz and Bryan D. Plocker, of counsel and on the briefs). Louis N. Rainone argued the cause for respondent Township of Franklin (Rainone Coughlin Minchello, attorneys; Louis N. Rainone, of counsel and on the briefs, and Carol A. Berlen, on the briefs). James J. Kinneally, III, argued the cause for respondent The Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Township of Franklin (Marriott Callahan & Blair, attorneys; 1 respondent joins in the brief of respondent Township of Franklin). Meryl A.G. Gonchar argued the cause for amici curiae New Jersey Builders Association, NAIOP New Jersey Chapter, Inc., and International Council of Shopping Centers (Sills Cummis & Gross and Flaster Greenberg, attorneys; Meryl A.G. Gonchar, Robert M. Washburn, and Melissa Hazell Davis, on the brief). Howard D. Geneslaw argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association (New Jersey State Bar Association, attorneys; Robert B. Hille, President, of counsel and on the brief, and Michael D. DeLoreto, Howard D. Geneslaw, and Cameron W. MacLeod, on the brief). F. Clifford Gibbons argued the cause for amici curiae New Jersey State League of Municipalities and New Jersey Institute of Local Government Attorneys (F. Clifford Gibbons, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court.N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5, a section of the Municipal Land UseLaw, provides that “development regulations which are in effecton the date of submission of an application for developmentshall govern the review of that application for development.”That rule is known as the Time of Application Rule (TOA Rule),and this appeal turns on whether an incomplete applicationtriggers the TOA Rule’s protections. Plaintiff Dunbar Homes, Inc., (Dunbar) sought to buildgarden apartments in Franklin Township (Township), and applied 2 for site plan approval and a “conditional use special reasons”variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3) ((d)(3) variance).1Dunbar’s application lacked a number of documents required underthe Township’s Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance (Ordinance). One day after Dunbar submitted its application for siteplan approval and a (d)(3) variance, the Township formallyadopted an ordinance that, as Dunbar knew, had been introducedweeks earlier. That ordinance eliminated garden apartments as apermitted use. Thereafter, the Township notified Dunbar that itwould have to apply for a “restricted use special reasons”variance under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1) ((d)(1) variance).2 Dunbar appealed the Township’s decision to the Zoning Boardof Adjustment (Board), arguing that the application was“complete” upon submission and was therefore protected by theTOA Rule. The Board denied the appeal. The trial courtreversed the Board, finding that the TOA Rule applied becausethe contents of the application permitted the Township toconduct a “meaningful review.”1 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3) allows a Zoning Board of Adjustment to permit a “deviation from a specification or standard . . . pertaining solely to a conditional use” for “special reasons.”2 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1) allows a Zoning Board of Adjustment to permit “a use or principal structure in a district restricted against such use or principal structure” for “special reasons.” 3 The Township appealed the trial court’s decision and theAppellate Division reversed. We now affirm the AppellateDivision’s determination. The plain language of the MunicipalLand Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -136, defines an“application for development” as “the application form and allaccompanying documents required by ordinance.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3. Because Dunbar’s application lacked many of the documentsrequired by the Ordinance, the application was not complete uponsubmission and does not benefit from the TOA Rule. I. A. Dunbar is a land developer and residential builder thatowns a 276-unit garden apartment complex in the Township’sGeneral Business Zone (GB-Zone). Dunbar also owns 6.93 acresadjacent to the complex. Over the summer of 2013, Dunbar soughtapproval to develop an additional fifty-five garden apartments,which at that time were a permitted conditional use in the GB-Zone. As such, construction of the additional apartmentsrequired a (d)(3) variance, and submission of an application forsite plan approval and a (d)(3) variance. On May 28, 2013, the Township introduced and scheduled apublic hearing for an ordinance that eliminated gardenapartments as a permitted conditional use in the GB-Zone. The 4 Township adopted the new ordinance on July 16, 2013, and itbecame effective on August 5, 2013. On June 28, 2013, eighteen days before it adopted its newzoning ordinance, the Township advised Dunbar of the potentialGB-Zone change. On July 15, 2013 -- the day before the Townshipadopted its new ordinance -- Dunbar submitted an application tothe Planning Board for site plan approval and a (d)(3) varianceto build the additional apartments in the GB-Zone. On August 7, 2013, two days after the Township’s new zoningordinance eliminated garden apartments as a conditional use inthe GB-Zone, a Township zoning officer emailed Dunbar toindicate that its application was incomplete. The zoningofficer provided a list of items “needed for completeness” andinstructed Dunbar that it would need to apply for a (d)(1)variance instead of a (d)(3) variance because “garden apartmentsare not permitted in the GB Zone.” Since a (d)(3) variance neednot meet the stringent standards required for a (d)(1) variance,33 To justify a (d)(1) variance, an applicant must fit within at least one of the three “special reasons” categories set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d): (1) where the proposed use inherently serves the public good, such as a school, hospital or public housing facility; (2) where the property owner would suffer undue hardship if compelled to use the property in conformity with the permitted uses in the zone; and (3) where the use would serve the general welfare 5 approval of Dunbar’s application for a (d)(1) variance was lesslikely. See Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, 9-18 (1987). Dunbarlater submitted the additional materials, and on October 29,2013, its application for site plan approval and (d)(1) variancewas certified as “complete.” B. Dunbar filed a notice of appeal to the Board claiming thatthe TOA Rule preserved, for the purpose of its site planapplication, the zoning ordinance in place at the time Dunbarsubmitted the application. In its appeal to the Board, Dunbardid not dispute the zoning officer’s deficiency findings. At a public hearing on the application, Dunbar presentedthe testimony of two experts. First, John Chadwick, aprofessional planner, conceded that Dunbar’s application lackeditems required by the Ordinance for site plan or varianceapproval but opined that despite those deficiencies Dunbar’sapplication was sufficient. Second, Dunbar presented thetestimony of Robert Washburn, an expert in New Jersey land use because the proposed site is particularly suitable for the proposed use. [Nuckel v. Borough of Little Ferry Planning Bd., 208 N.J. 95, 102 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Saddle Brook Realty, LLC v. Twp. of Saddle Brook Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 388 N.J. Super. 67, 76 (App. Div. 2006)).] 6 law. Washburn stated that a completeness requirement wouldfrustrate the purpose of the MLUL, and that the Ordinance wasinvalid because it required a “complete application.” Washburnasserted that the MLUL required an “application for development”rather than a “complete application for development” to triggerthe protections of the TOA Rule. The Township argued that, pursuant to Section 112-4 of theOrdinance, an application for development had to be “complete”for the TOA Rule to apply. The Board agreed with the Township’sview and unanimously denied Dunbar’s appeal. The Boarddetermined that Dunbar’s initial application was not an“application for development” as defined by the Ordinancebecause it did not include the materials required by theOrdinance. Thus, because the application was not deemed“complete” until after the effective date of the ordinanceprohibiting garden apartments in the GB-Zone, the TOA Rule didnot shield Dunbar from Franklin’s new zoning ordinance, andDunbar was required to obtain a (d)(1) variance. C. Dunbar filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writsagainst the Board and the Township, asserting that the Board’sdecision was arbitrary and capricious or unreasonable. Dunbaralso claimed that the Township’s denial of the application was 7 invalid and ultra vires because it conflicted with the MLUL’sTOA Rule. The trial court agreed and reversed the Board. In an oral opinion, the trial court considered thelegislative history of the TOA Rule, determining that theLegislature’s omission of the word “complete,” which wasincluded in a proposed 2004 version of the statute, revealed theLegislature’s intent not to require a “complete” application totrigger the TOA Rule. Thus, the court reasoned, the TOA Rule’suse of the word “application” without reference to“completeness” suggests the need for a “determination of what’san application independent as to whether there was a formaldeclaration of completeness.” The court read the TOA Rule in conjunction with N.J.S.A.40:55D-10.3 to find that a municipal land use ordinance must setforth a checklist to provide a “clear understanding[] of what isrequired” for submission. It ruled that absent such achecklist, the TOA Rule should apply “if the applicantprovide[s] enough information . . . so that a meaningful reviewof the application can commence.” The trial court then reviewedDunbar’s original submission under this standard, concludingthat “there was enough submitted to functionally begin a review”of Dunbar’s application. Thus, the court found that Dunbar wasprotected by the TOA Rule and could therefore pursue a variancefor the additional apartments under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3). 8 The Township appealed the ruling to the Appellate Division,which reversed the trial court. The panel rejected the trialcourt’s “enough information for meaningful review” standard,holding that courts must instead apply the definition of“application for development” adopted by the Legislature in thedefinitions section of the MLUL. Thus, the panel held that“[t]he benchmark for determining whether documents required forthe submission to constitute an application for development. . . is whether they are specifically required by ordinance.”Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Franklin, 448 N.J. Super. 583, 602-03 (App. Div. 2017) (citing N.J.S.A.40:55D-10.3). Applying that standard, the panel ruled thatDunbar’s application failed to include documents required by theOrdinance. Therefore, because Dunbar’s submission did notconstitute an “application for development” within the meaningof the MLUL, the panel concluded that the Board’s decision notto extend the protection of the TOA Rule to Dunbar’s submissionwas not arbitrary and capricious or unreasonable. Dunbar petitioned for certification, which this Courtgranted. 233 N.J. 127 (2017). We also granted the followingmotions for leave to appear as amicus curiae: a joint motion bythe New Jersey Builders Association, NAIOP New Jersey Chapter,Inc., and the International Council of Shopping Centers(collectively, NAIOP); a joint motion by the New Jersey State 9 League of Municipalities and the New Jersey Institute of LocalGovernment Attorneys (collectively, NJLM); and an individualmotion by the New Jersey State Bar Association (NJSBA). II. A. Dunbar claims that the appellate panel acknowledged thatthe MLUL does not require completeness to apply the TOA Rule,yet created a standard that essentially mandates “the submissionof a 100% complete application.” Dunbar also argues that theappellate panel’s standard would foster the very “municipalmischief” the TOA Rule sought to eradicate because it allows amunicipal officer to review and thereby delay an application,which is not authorized under the MLUL. Dunbar cites as anexample the fact that, here, the Board had Dunbar’s applicationfor “several weeks,” yet waited until two days after the newzoning ordinance became effective to advise Dunbar that it hadnot submitted a complete application. Dunbar warns that applying the Appellate Division’sstandard would effectively make any applicant that submittedmaterial with a request to waive submission of a documentineligible for the TOA Rule’s protection even though thesubmission would be retroactively rendered “complete” if theBoard granted a waiver at the public hearing. Although Dunbaragrees that applicants rely on zoning board checklists under10 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.3, it contends that the Appellate Divisionerred in conflating Section 10.3’s completeness review and theTOA Rule. That decision, according to Dunbar, frustrates theTOA Rule’s purpose to remove uncertainty regarding futuremunicipal zoning changes by encouraging municipalities to “lookfor even the most minor and technical 'deficiencies’ [in anapplication] to effectuate a zoning change.” B. The Township relies on the TOA Rule and N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3-- the MLUL’s definition of “application for development.”According to the Township, those provisions specify that the TOARule is triggered only upon submission of an “application fordevelopment,” defined as “all documents required by theordinance for the approval sought by the applicant.” TheTownship argues that if the Legislature intended “applicationfor development” to mean something other than what is alreadyprovided by the statute, it would have said so when it passedthe TOA Rule. The Township stresses that the MLUL’s application fordevelopment definition “provides a bright-line inquiry” thatadvances the overarching “goal of providing certainty to theland development process.” The Township asserts that itconsidered the GB-Zone change as part of a “comprehensive,Township-wide revision to the Ordinance,” not as a means to 11 frustrate land use applications or harass applicants. TheTownship highlights that the Board’s decision to change theOrdinance to preclude garden apartments in the GB-Zone predatedDunbar’s submission “as far back as March of 2012,” and that thedrafted ordinance implementing the change was introduced on May28, 2013 -- six weeks before Dunbar’s submission. C. 1. Amicus NAIOP argues that the Appellate Division’s decisioncreated a new, non-prescribed procedure whereby municipalitiesdetermine what constitutes an “application for development.”NAIOP contends that Dunbar’s “minor, non-substantivedeficiencies” should not preclude protection under the TOA Rulebecause the Legislature did not intend for an applicant to bedenied due to inconsequential deficiencies. Finally, NAIOPwarns that the Appellate Division’s opinion creates “a [new]nonsensical second step” to the MLUL’s application process thatplaces into the municipalities’ hands whether an applicant isafforded protection under the TOA Rule. NAIOP claims that suchauthority is “the very evil the TOA Rule was enacted to protect”against, and undermines the MLUL goals of consistency, statewideuniformity, and predictability in land use decisions. 12 2. Amicus NJLM urges this Court to affirm the AppellateDivision’s decision. NJLM asserts that the zoning officerproperly relied upon the MLUL and the Township’s relevantordinance provisions to make his determination that Dunbar hadfailed to submit documents required for an application fordevelopment. NJLM reasons that sections 112-192 and 112-300 ofthe Township’s Ordinance serve as checklists under N.J.S.A.40:55D-10.3 because they list the requirements for developmentapplications. According to NJLM, the Appellate Division’sdecision “restored order to the application review process” byfollowing the MLUL’s express language and sustaining theTownship zoning officer’s role in evaluating land useapplications against ordinance requirements. 3. The NJSBA contends that the Appellate Division reached aself-contradictory result by ruling that an application need notbe “complete” yet requiring that “all the application forms andaccompanying documents be submitted” before a completenessdetermination is rendered. Drawing attention to common land useapplication processes, the NJSBA claims that the appellatepanel’s opinion “fails to recognize that most developmentapplications are not complete when filed.” In light of thisstandard practice, the NJSBA asserts that the panel’s decision 13 will operate to prevent many applications from receiving TOARule protection. III. “[Z]oning boards, 'because of their peculiar knowledge oflocal conditions[,] must be allowed wide latitude in theexercise of delegated discretion.’” Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 284 (2013) (quoting Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment of SeaGirt, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965)). A zoning board’s land usedecisions thus “enjoy a presumption of validity.” Ibid. “[T]heaction of a board will not be overturned unless it is found tobe arbitrary and capricious or unreasonable, with the burden ofproof placed on the plaintiff challenging the action.”Grabowsky v. Township of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536, 551 (2015). “On the other hand, however, a board’s decision regarding aquestion of law . . . is subject to a de novo review by thecourts, and is entitled to no deference since a zoning board has'no peculiar skill superior to the courts’ regarding purelylegal matters.” Chicalese v. Monroe Twp. Planning Bd., 334 N.J.Super. 413, 419 (Law Div. 2000) (citations omitted) (quotingJantausch v. Borough of Verona, 41 N.J. Super. 89, 96 (Law Div.1956)); see also 388 Route 22 Readington Realty Holdings, LLC v.Township of Readington, 221 N.J. 318, 338 (2015) (“In construingthe meaning of a statute, an ordinance, or our case law, ourreview is de novo.”). 14 This case poses such a question of law: whether anapplication for development that does not include all requiredmaterials should be considered “an application for development”for purposes of the TOA Rule, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5. Inanswering that question, we strive to effectuate theLegislature’s intent in enacting the TOA Rule; as we havestressed, “[l]egislative intent 'is the paramount goal wheninterpreting a statute and, generally, the best indicator ofthat intent is the statutory language.’” State v. Marquez, 202 N.J. 485, 499 (2010) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477,492 (2005)). “When there is a conflict in interpretation,” we turn tothe “well-established canon of construction that 'a legislativeprovision should not be read in isolation or in a way whichsacrifices what appears to be the scheme of the statute as awhole.’” Koch v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 157 N.J. 1, 7 (1999)(quoting Zimmerman v. Mun. Clerk of Berkeley, 201 N.J. Super. 363, 368 (App. Div. 1985)). We therefore “read the statutes intheir entirety and construe 'each part or section . . . inconnection with every other part or section to provide aharmonious whole.’” Marquez, 202 N.J. at 499 (ellipsis inoriginal) (quoting Bedford v. Riello, 195 N.J. 210, 224 (2008)).Here, we consider the TOA Rule in the context of the MLUL. IV. 15 A. The MLUL is “a comprehensive statute that allowsmunicipalities to adopt ordinances to regulate land development'in a manner which will promote the public health, safety,morals and general welfare’ using uniform and efficientprocedures.” Rumson Estates, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of FairHaven, 177 N.J. 338, 349 (2003) (quoting Levin v. Township ofParsippany-Troy Hills, 82 N.J. 174, 178-79 (1980)). Theprovisions of the MLUL pertinent to this appeal are the TOA Ruleand the definitions section. The TOA Rule, which took effect in May 2011, L. 2010, c. 9,replaced the former “time of decision rule.” See A. Housing &Local Gov’t Comm. Statement to A. 437 (2010). The time ofdecision rule required that zoning boards and reviewing courts“apply the statute in effect at the time of the [land-useapplication] decision.” Pizzo Mantin Grp. v. Township ofRandolph, 137 N.J. 216, 235 (1994). The time of decision ruleallowed municipalities to “change . . . land-use ordinancesafter an application ha[d] been filed, even 'in direct responseto the application.’” Ibid. (quoting Burcam Corp. v. PlanningBd. of Medford, 168 N.J. Super. 508, 521 (App. Div. 1979)). TheLegislature acknowledged that the time of decision rule hadproduced “inequitable results, such as when an applicant hasexpended considerable amounts of money for professional services 16 and documentation that becomes unusable after [an] ordinance hasbeen amended.” A. Housing & Local Gov’t Comm. Statement to A.437 (2010). In order to “effectively prohibit[] municipalitiesfrom responding to an application for development by changingthe law to frustrate that application,” ibid., the Legislatureadopted the TOA Rule: Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, those development regulations which are in effect on the date of submission of an application for development shall govern the review of that application for development and any decision made with regard to that application for development. Any provisions of an ordinance, except those relating to health and public safety, that are adopted subsequent to the date of submission of an application for development, shall not be applicable to that application for development. [ N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5 (emphases added).] The terms used in the TOA Rule are to be construed inaccordance with any definitions set forth in the MLUL. SeeNorman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, 1A Sutherland StatutoryConstruction § 20:8 (7th ed. 2008) (“The definition of a term inthe definitional section of a statute controls the constructionof that term wherever it appears throughout the statute.”).Thus, the term “application for development” must be interpretedto mean “the application form and all accompanying documentsrequired by ordinance for approval of a subdivision plat, siteplan, planned development, cluster development, conditional use, 17 zoning variance or direction of the issuance of a permit.”N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3 (emphasis added). Determinations as to the precise contents of an“application for development” are thus left to municipalities,in accordance with the Legislature’s general exercise of its“constitutional authority to delegate to municipalities the'police power’ to enact ordinances governing” land use “throughthe passage of the [MLUL].” 388 Route 22 Readington RealtyHoldings, LLC, 221 N.J. at 339. Significantly, “[b]ecause theplanning and zoning power stems from legislative allowance, itmust be exercised in strict conformity with the delegatingenactment -- the MLUL.” Nuckel v. Borough of Little FerryPlanning Bd., 208 N.J. 95, 101 (2011). Pursuant to its delegated power, the Township incorporatedinto its Ordinance a set of requirements for developmentapplications in Chapter 112, Article XXIII, Section 192. Thatsection contains a detailed checklist and description of eachapplication requirement for agency review. We will review thoserequirements later. For the purposes of the legal question posed by Dunbar,however, it is sufficient that a checklist of applicationcomponents are provided by the Ordinance. That list isanticipated in, and incorporated by, the MLUL definition of“application for development” in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3 and, by 18 extension, the TOA Rule of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5. Thus, tobenefit from the protections of the TOA Rule, an application fordevelopment in Franklin Township must contain the requiredinformation and documents listed in Chapter 112, Article XXIII,Section 192 of the Township Ordinance. That clear, easily applied, and objective standard advancesthe MLUL’s goal of statewide consistency and uniformity in landuse decisions. See Amerada Hess Corp. v. Burlington Cty.Planning Bd., 195 N.J. 616, 630 (2008); Rumson Estates, 177 N.J.at 349. The standard requires that the zoning officer comparethe contents of a submission to the requirements of themunicipal ordinance; it does not require review of eachsubmission to determine whether a “meaningful review” can beundertaken. The trial court outlined a standard for requiring“enough information . . . so that at least the [T]ownship canget . . . started on engaging a meaningful review” and concludedthat the Board’s rejection of the application was arbitrary andcapricious because the Township was able to “functionally begina review” on the date of the application’s submission. We agreewith the Appellate Division that the trial court’s standard is“fatally imprecise” and inconsistent with “the Legislature’sintent that the MLUL 'bring consistency, statewide uniformity,and predictability to the approval process.’” Dunbar Homes,Inc., 448 N.J. Super. at 602 (quoting N.Y. SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. 19 Twp. Council of Edison, 382 N.J. Super. 541, 550 (App. Div.2006)). Nonetheless, we note some important practical limits toBoard determinations based on an application’s failure toinclude all required materials. First, an application is notrendered “incomplete” simply because a municipality requires“correction of any information found to be in error andsubmission of additional information not specified in theordinance or any revisions in the accompanying documents.”N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.3. Further, in the event informationrequired by local ordinance is not pertinent, the applicant mayrequest a waiver as to that information or those documents itfinds extraneous. Ibid. The applicant’s submission willprovisionally trigger the TOA Rule if a waiver request for oneor more items accompanies all other required materials; if theBoard grants the waiver, then the application will be deemedcomplete. If the Board denies the waiver, its decision will besubject to review under the customary “arbitrary and capriciousor unreasonable” standard. Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 551. Dunbar argues that an application for development shouldnot need to contain all of the materials identified in Chapter112, Article XXIII, Section 192, because those are the materialsthat comprise a “complete application for development,” asindicated in Chapter 112, Article I, Section 4 of the Ordinance, 20 and the TOA Rule does not require that the application be“complete.” That argument is not persuasive.N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3 does not distinguish between an“application for development” and a “complete application fordevelopment.” The MLUL does contain a “completeness provision,”N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.3, which provides that an application shallbe deemed complete forty-five days from its submission unlessany required items are missing. The fact that the completenessprovision contemplates the submission of an incompleteapplication that would not start the clock on the forty-five-dayperiod does not mean that the initial, incomplete applicationcan trigger the TOA Rule. Although the TOA Rule does not usethe word “complete,” it explicitly cross-references the localordinance provisions that list application requirements. Inshort, the completeness provision has no bearing on whether anapplication receives the protection of the TOA Rule. B. Having determined that, to be protected by the TOA Rule,applicants must submit precisely what N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3 requires-- “the application form and all accompanying documents requiredby ordinance for approval of a . . . site plan, . . .conditional use, zoning variance or direction of the issuance ofa permit” -- we now consider whether the Board’s decision thatDunbar’s application was not entitled to the protection of the 21 TOA Rule and that Dunbar would have to complete a more stringent(d)(1) variance application was “arbitrary and capricious orunreasonable.” Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 551. The Township’s relevant Ordinance provisions list theinformation and materials required for site plan and varianceapplications. Franklin Township, N.J., Code c. 112, art. XXIII,§ 192 (2016). The materials required for use varianceapplications are set forth in Franklin Township, N.J., Code c.112, art. XXXVI, § 300 (2016). Applicants are also required tosubmit an application fee. Franklin Township, N.J., Code c.112, schedule 7 (2013). It is undisputed that Dunbar’s submission lacked thefollowing items mandated by the Ordinance for site planapproval: (1) a sealed survey of the subject property; (2) akey map showing all zoning boundaries; (3) a location mapshowing the zoning of all properties within 200 feet of thesubject property; (4) a site plan showing existing and proposedtopography; (5) a site plan providing datum to which contourelevations refer; (6) a site plan indicating methods andplacement of solid waste disposal facilities; and (7) fouradditional copies of the site plan application. It is also undisputed that Dunbar’s submission lacked thefollowing Ordinance requirements for a use variance application:(1) drainage calculations; (2) a site plan indicating domestic 22 water demand and the amount of effluent; (3) a submittal letterto the Department of Transportation; and (4) four additionalcopies of site plan and architectural documents. Schedule 7 ofthe Ordinance also requires payment of additional fees with ause variance application. Dunbar argues that the Township has conflicting applicationrequirements because, in addition to the Ordinance requirementsfor site plan and variance applications, it lists requirementsfor a bifurcated submission, or “an application . . . where theapplicant has elected to submit a separate application for anyrequired approval of subdivision, site plan or condition use.”Franklin Township, N.J., Code c. 112, art. XXXVI, § 300 (2016).The record suggests, however, that Dunbar submitted a singlesite plan and use variance application. Further, it isundisputed that, whether Dunbar submitted a single applicationfor site plan approval with a use variance or separateapplications for site plan approval and for a use variance,Dunbar failed to include materials required by the Ordinance.It is inconceivable that Dunbar’s confusion about whichOrdinance provision applied resulted in its failure to complywith either.N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3 calls for submission of “the applicationform and all accompanying documents required by ordinance.” TheTownship’s zoning officer properly determined that Dunbar’s 23 application did not include “all accompanying documents requiredby ordinance” and was, therefore, “incomplete.” Because theapplication was incomplete and no waiver was sought, Dunbar’sapplication could not benefit from the TOA Rule. Rather,Dunbar’s application was properly subjected to the (d)(1)variance requirement. Hence, the decision of the Board touphold the Township zoning officer’s determination was not“arbitrary and capricious or unreasonable.” V. For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment ofthe Appellate Division. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. 24