Title: Mann v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 190, 2000
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 7, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
EDWARD N. MANN, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
No. 190, 2000 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Court Below:  Superior Court 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
of the State of Delaware in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
and for Sussex County 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Cr. A. No. 93-09-0578 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
Cr. ID No. 93S04867DI 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  December 12, 2000 
Decided:  March 7, 2001 
 
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 7th day of March, 2001, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
Edward Mann appeals the Superior Court’s judgment that he had 
violated his probation.  That Court sentenced him to time at Level V.  Mann argues 
that the trial court abused its discretion because the trial judge improperly 
considered the events surrounding a rape charge on which a jury had found him not 
guilty.  Mann argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the trial 
judge from considering these events because a jury had acquitted him of that 
crime.  Mann also contends that the trial judge’s comments at the violation of 
probation hearing demonstrated that he was neither “neutral” nor “detached.”  
Mann’s arguments ignore the fact that the trial judge also found that Mann had 
 
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violated his probation because he had failed to appear at two scheduled office visits 
with his probation officer, he had tested positive for cocaine and he had admitted to 
using cocaine on the night of the alleged rape.  We find no merit to Mann’s claims 
of error and find that the record establishes Mann’s clear violations of his 
probation.  Therefore, we AFFIRM. 
 
2. 
On October 30, 1999, police charged Mann with first degree rape, 
second degree burglary, third degree assault and two counts of endangering the 
welfare of a child.  On November 19, 1999, Mann’s probation officer filed a 
violation of probation report alleging that Mann failed to report for two scheduled 
office visits1 and that Mann tested positive for cocaine in July and August 1999.2  
Because Mann faced new charges at that time, a violation of probation hearing was 
scheduled for a time after the disposition of the new charges.   
3. 
On March 1, 2000, a jury found Mann not guilty of first degree rape, 
second degree burglary and third degree assault. The endangering charges had 
been previously dismissed.  Approximately two days later, Mann appeared in the 
Superior Court for the violation of probation charges before the very same trial 
judge who had presided over Mann’s rape trial.  During the violation of probation 
                                                          
 
1 These office visits were scheduled for September 21, 1999 and October 5, 1999. 
2 Mann’s probation contained nine conditions.  Condition #3 stated: “You must report to your 
Supervising Officer at such times and places as directed, and permit the Probation/Parole Officer 
to enter your home and/or visit places of employment.”  Condition #7 stated: “You are not to 
possess or consume a controlled substance or other dangerous drugs unless prescribed lawfully.  
You are subject to random testing as directed by your Supervising Officer.” 
 
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hearing, the trial judge referred to the rape charges, stating “I don’t buy into the 
grounds that he went to the lady who he was breaking up with at 4:30 in the 
morning for the purposes of her desire to make love one more time before they 
broke up.”3  Mann then requested a continuance to present an argument that it 
would be improper to adopt findings of fact contradicted by a jury’s evident 
finding at a trial to support a conclusion that a defendant violated his probation.   
4. 
When the violation of probation hearing continued, the trial judge 
rejected Mann’s argument that collateral estoppel precluded him from considering 
the events surrounding the rape charge.  When finding that Mann violated his 
probation, the trial judge considered all of Mann’s conditions of probation, the 
events surrounding the rape charge and Mann’s admission that he used cocaine on 
the night of the alleged rape.  The trial judge sentenced him to four years at Level 
V, suspended after two years for Level IV, suspended after nine months for Level 
III.  
5. 
In the present matter, this Court reviews the trial court’s judgment to 
revoke probation for an abuse of discretion.4  Mann argues that the trial court 
abused its discretion when it revoked his probation because the trial judge 
improperly considered the events surrounding the rape charge.  Mann argues that 
                                                          
 
3 App. To Appellant’s Op. Br. at A-9. 
4 See Stewart v. State, Del. Supr., No. 144, 1997 Hartnett, J. (Sep. 17, 1997) (ORDER); Brown 
v. State, Del. Supr., 249 A.2d 269, 271 (1968). 
 
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the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the trial judge from considering the 
events surrounding the rape charge because a jury found him not guilty of that 
crime.  Mann urges us to conclude that the jury’s finding of not guilty is an 
inescapable conclusion that the facts alleged by the State never occurred.   
6. 
The burden of proof to sustain a finding of a violation of probation is 
preponderance of the evidence.5  The burden of proof to sustain a guilty verdict for 
rape is beyond a reasonable doubt.  Mann incorrectly argues that a finding of not 
guilty equates to a conclusion that he did not commit all of the acts that the State 
argued constituted rape.  To the contrary, an acquittal merely means that the State 
failed to convince a jury empanelled for his trial that Mann committed rape beyond 
a reasonable doubt.6  Because the burden of proof at a violation of probation 
hearing is different than the burden of proof at a trial for rape, the trial judge 
correctly found that collateral estoppel did not preclude him from considering the 
facts surrounding the alleged rape.7    
7. 
Mann argues that at his violation of probation hearing, the trial 
judge’s comments demonstrated the he was neither “neutral” nor “detached.”  In 
other words, Mann argues that the trial judge lacked objectivity.  Because Mann 
                                                          
 
5 See Cooper v. State, Del. Supr., No. 119, 1999, Veasey, C.J. (Dec. 8, 1999) (ORDER) (citing 
Brown v. State, Del. Supr., 249 A.2d 269 (1968)). 
6 See, e.g., Gibson v. State, Md. Ct. App., 616 A.2d 877, 881 (1992). 
7 See Gibbs v. State, Del. Supr., 760 A.2d 541, 544 (2000); Standlee v. Rhay, 9th Cir., 557 F.2d 
1303 (1977).  In fact the State notes that only two jurisdictions, Pennsylvania and Illinois, follow 
 
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did not request that the trial judge recuse himself from presiding over the violation 
of probation hearing, we review this issue for plain error.8 
8. 
Mann presents no more than the trial judge’s comments at the hearing 
to suggest that the trial judge lacked objectivity.  There is no evidence in the record 
to raise any reasonable question about the impartiality of the judge who presided 
over the violation of probation hearing.  The trial judge knew Mann admitted to 
using cocaine while on probation because Mann admitted to using cocaine on the 
night of the alleged rape during his rape trial.  The trial judge’s comments, no 
matter how colorful, simply reflected his knowledge of Mann’s actions as he heard 
them as he presided over a trial in his courtroom.  There is no evidence of bias or 
prejudice from an extrajudicial source that would have required recusal or 
disqualification.9 
 
9. 
Mann fails to show either that the trial judge abused his discretion in 
reaching his findings at the violation of probation hearing or that the trial judge’s 
comments at the violation of probation hearing demonstrated that he lacked 
objectivity when he considered Mann’s actions.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the rule that an acquittal in a criminal trial collaterally estops the revocation of probation on the 
same offense.  
8 See Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
9 See Stevenson v. State, Del. Supr., 709 A.2d 619, 635 (1998); Weber v. State, Del. Supr., 547 
A.2d 948, 951-52 (1988). 
 
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10. 
Mann’s arguments above overlook the fact that the trial judge found 
that Mann had violated his probation because he missed two scheduled office visits 
with his probation officer, he had tested positive for cocaine while on probation 
and admitted to using cocaine on the night of the alleged rape.  These facts alone 
constituted sufficient grounds to revoke Mann’s probation.  Further, the sentence 
actually imposed would have been well within the discretion of the Court even if 
the Court’s conclusion had been based upon these three grounds alone. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, the judgment of the Superior Court 
is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
Myron T. Steele_____________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice