Title: Schall v. Burks
Citation: 396 P.2d 192, 74 N.M. 583
Docket Number: 7700
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: October 19, 1964

396 P.2d 192 (1964) 74 N.M. 583 Thomas G. SCHALL, Administrator of the Estate of Charlie M. Guynn, Deceased, Petitioner, v. Hon. Garnett R. BURKS, Judge of the Seventh Judicial District comprising the Counties of Torrance, Socorro, Sierra and Catron, Respondent. No. 7700. Supreme Court of New Mexico. October 19, 1964. Keleher &amp; McLeod, Russell Moore, Albuquerque, for petitioner. Matteucci, Gutierrez, Franchini &amp; Calkins, Albuquerque, for respondent. CHAVEZ, Justice. Petitioner Thomas G. Schall, administrator of the estate of Charlie M. Guynn, deceased, by original action in mandamus, seeks the dismissal of a damage action pursuant to Rule 41(e) (§ 21-1-1 (41) (e), N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp.). The trial court, respondent herein, by order denied the administrator's motion to dismiss the cause. *193 Petitioner then filed his petition for an alternative writ of mandamus which was granted by this court. The record shows the following: As set out above, plaintiffs' complaint was filed on August 3, 1960. Thereafter, the only action taken by plaintiffs, prior to defendant's motion to dismiss, was the notice filed on December 23, 1960, that the case would be heard on the merits on January 31, 1961. Defendant repeatedly filed notices to take plaintiffs' depositions in Albuquerque and in Kansas City, and was met by plaintiffs' motions for a protective order to extend the time of taking plaintiffs' depositions and that the depositions be taken in Kansas City instead of Albuquerque and, in the alternative, that they be taken about a week prior to trial. Plaintiffs also filed a motion to obtain certain statements and the trial court, on February 20, 1961, directed that defendant deliver said statements to plaintiffs. It was not until January 18, 1963, a period of more than two years and four months after the filing of the complaint, and more than two years after plaintiffs filed their notice of trial on December 23, 1960, that plaintiffs filed a notice requesting that the trial court set a date for hearing on defendant's motion for summary judgment, and that a date be set down for trial. As early as Ringle Development Corporation v. Chavez, 51 N.M. 156, 180 P.2d 790, we held that, subject to the exceptions therein stated, Rule 41 (e) is mandatory. This rule has been followed in Pettine v. Rogers, 63 N.M. 457, 321 P.2d 638; Featherstone v. Hanson, 65 N.M. 398, 338 P.2d 298; Western Timber Products Company v. W.S. Ranch Company, 69 N.M. 108, 364 P.2d 361; Morris v. Fitzgerald, 73 N.M. 56, 385 P.2d 574; Sender v. Montoya, 73 N.M. 287, 387 P.2d 860; Marley v. City of Truth or Consequences, 73 N.M. 484, 389 P.2d 603. In Featherstone v. Hanson, supra, we stated: In Western Timber Products Company v. W.S. Ranch Company, supra, we said: The question before us is simply whether the court file discloses that the plaintiff was diligent in his efforts to bring the case to trial and final determination within two years after it was filed on August 3, 1960. We hold that nothing that the plaintiff did in the instant case can be considered as establishing the diligence required under the decisions cited above. If the mere filing of a notice of hearing were considered as having the effect of stopping the running of the two-year period fixed by the rule, there would be every reason to anticipate that plaintiff's counsel would file such a motion in every case at the earliest possible time, even though he had no intention of doing anything further. The result would be to effectively nullify the rule and avoid its salutary purposes. What we are saying, and what we thought we had said in our previous cases, is simply that to avoid the running of the two-year statute for any reason not specifically provided for therein, the court record must disclose actual and bona fide efforts on the part of the plaintiff to have the case finally determined *195 within the two-year period. Nothing less will suffice. We are not prepared to state what will or what will not be considered diligence in any given case. However, we will say that we are satisfied that the showing made in this record does not meet the test. We are cognizant of the fact that, in many counties, jury sessions are infrequently held; but that of itself does not excuse a plaintiff from taking affirmative action showing diligence in bringing the case to trial within the two-year period. It may be that the two-year period within which a case must be brought to trial is too short, and that perhaps a three-year period would be more appropriate to meet the circumstances confronting a litigant in the courts today. This, however, is a matter which should be brought to the attention of the legislature. In view of our holding, the alternative writ of mandamus will be made permanent. It is so ordered. CARMODY and MOISE, JJ., concur.