Title: State v. Jones
Citation: 238 N.W.2d 790
Docket Number: 58007
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: February 18, 1976

238 N.W.2d 790 (1976) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Martin R. JONES, Appellant. No. 58007. Supreme Court of Iowa. February 18, 1976. Camp &amp; Harsh and Paul J. Boysen, Jr., Creston, for appellant. Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Raymond W. Sullins, Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, and Robert A. Rolfe, County Atty., Creston, for appellant. Submitted to MOORE, C. J., and MASON, LeGRAND, REES and HARRIS, JJ. REES, Justice. On November 22, 1974, defendant was charged in four separate true informations with the crimes of (1) possession of a controlled substance, namely tetrahydrocannabinol, (2) possession of a controlled substance, namely, lysergic acid diethylamide, (3) possession, with intent to deliver, of a controlled substance, namely, methamphetamine, and (4) resisting execution of process. Defendant was arraigned, and entered not guilty pleas on all charges on the same date. On December 13, 1974, defendant *791 appeared with his then counsel, Mr. Harold DeKay, withdrew his not guilty plea to the first charge, possession of tetrahydrocannabinol, and pleaded guilty thereto. As the result of a plea bargaining arrangement the three remaining informations were dismissed. The record abundantly satisfies us the proceedings on November 22, 1974, before Judge Thomas S. Bown, comported with the guidelines laid down by us in State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969), and in Brainard v. State, 222 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa 1974). After an extended colloquy between Judge Bown, the defendant and defendant's counsel we find the following occurred: On January 17, 1975, defendant appeared in open court, unaccompanied by counsel, before Judge James E. Hughes. We excerpt the following from the record: "* * * Thereupon the court sentenced defendant to imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more than six months, and ordered that 60 days of the sentence be suspended during defendant's good behavior, and further, that defendant be given credit for 46 days he had been incarcerated prior to the sentencing procedure. Here again the Sisco and Brainard guidelines were adequately complied with. Defendant now asserts in this appeal trial court erred in sentencing him in absence of his counsel without first determining whether defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. He contends a defendant in a criminal proceeding is entitled to the "guiding hand of counsel" at every critical stage thereof, that sentencing is a "critical stage" of a criminal proceedings where substantial rights of a criminal defendant may be affected and that a defendant may waive his right to counsel only if the waiver is knowingly and intelligently made. I. We have no quarrel with the abstract propositions of law advanced by defendant, nor with the many citations of authority he cites to support such propositions. We must conclude, however, they are without merit when applied to the facts in this case. We have said a defendant's right to counsel, afforded him constitutionally under Amendment 6 of the Constitution of the United States and Article I, section 10, of the Constitution of Iowa, and statutorily under section 775.4, The Code, extends to the sentencing proceeding. State v. Cole, 168 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Iowa 1969). See also Losieau v. Sigler, Warden, 406 F.2d 795, 8 Cir. 1969, and citations. Such right to counsel is, however, subject to waiver. A waiver of either a statutory or constitutional right must be a voluntary, intentional act done with actual knowledge of the existence and meaning of the rights involved and with full understanding of the direct consequences of the waiver. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (and annotation appearing in 25 L.Ed.2d 1021-1060). See also State v. Quinn, 197 N.W.2d 624 (Iowa 1972); Carpentier v. Lainson, 248 Iowa 1275, 84 N.W.2d 32. We conclude the record in this case shows a valid, unequivocal and binding waiver by defendant of his right to representation by counsel at the sentencing proceeding. His waiver was clearly made with actual knowledge of the existence and meaning of his rights and with a full understanding *793 of the direct consequences of the waiver. We find no reversible error, and affirm. Affirmed.