Title: People v. Thomas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 88126
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: January 19, 2001

Docket No. 88126-Agenda 3-November 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								WALTER L. THOMAS, Appellant.
Opinion filed January 19, 2001.
	JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
	The defendant, Walter L. Thomas, brings this appeal from an
order of the circuit court of Du Page County dismissing, without
an evidentiary hearing, his petition for post-conviction relief.
Because the defendant received the death penalty for the
underlying murder conviction, the defendant's appeal lies directly
to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). For the reasons that follow, we
reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the cause to
that court for further proceedings.
	The defendant was convicted of murder and other offenses
and was sentenced to death following a jury trial in the circuit
court of Du Page County. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the
defendant's convictions and death sentence. People v. Thomas,
137 Ill. 2d 500 (1990). The United States Supreme Court denied
the defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Thomas v. Illinois,
498 U.S. 1127, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1196, 111 S. Ct. 1092 (1991). The
defendant then sought post-conviction relief in the circuit court of
Du Page County. The circuit court dismissed the petition, and this
court affirmed the dismissal. People v. Thomas, 164 Ill. 2d 410
(1995). The defendant later initiated habeas corpus proceedings in
federal court. The district court denied the defendant's petition,
and the court of appeals affirmed that order. Thomas v. Gilmore,
144 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 1998). The United States Supreme Court
later denied the defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari.
Thomas v. Gilmore, 525 U.S. 1123, 142 L. Ed. 2d 905, 119 S. Ct. 907 (1999).
	The defendant then brought the present action for post-conviction relief, filing another petition in the circuit court of
Du Page County in April 1999. Appearing pro se, the defendant
filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and submitted an
affidavit of indigence. Without appointing counsel, and in the
absence of any responsive pleading by the State, the circuit judge
summarily dismissed the defendant's petition. The defendant
brings this appeal. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a).
	The defendant first argues that the circuit court erred in failing
to inquire whether he wanted counsel appointed to represent him
in this matter. The State has confessed error on this issue, and we
agree that the circuit court erred in failing to determine whether
the defendant wished to be represented by counsel and, if he did,
in failing to make the appointment. The Post-Conviction Hearing
Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 through 122-7 (West 1998)) contains
special procedures that are applicable in capital cases. Section
122-2.1(a)(1) of the Act provides:
			"If the petitioner is under sentence of death and is
without counsel and alleges that he is without means to
procure counsel, he shall state whether or not he wishes
counsel to be appointed to represent him. If appointment
of counsel is so requested, the court shall appoint counsel
if satisfied that the petitioner has no means to procure
counsel." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(1) (West 1998).
For noncapital defendants, in contrast, the Act requires the
appointment of counsel only if the court first determines that the
petition is not "frivolous or *** patently without merit." 725 ILCS
5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1998).
	In the present case, the defendant is under sentence of death.
Although the defendant was appearing pro se and was seeking to
proceed in forma pauperis, the circuit judge did not determine
whether the defendant wanted to be represented by counsel, as the
judge was required to do in capital cases under section
122-2.1(a)(1) of the Act. Accordingly, the cause must be
remanded to the circuit court so that the defendant may be
provided with appointed counsel, if that is his choice. See People
v. Dye, 50 Ill. 2d 49 (1971).
	The defendant also contends that the post-conviction court
erred in summarily dismissing his petition without first receiving
a responsive pleading from the State. The State has correctly
confessed error on this issue also. Again, the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act contains different procedures for capital petitioners
and noncapital petitioners. In a noncapital case, the post-conviction court may summarily dismiss the petition if the court
judge decides that it is "frivolous or *** patently without merit."
If the judge does not dismiss the petition, then the matter will be
docketed for further consideration in accordance with other
provisions of the Act.
	Post-conviction petitions filed by capital defendants are
handled differently. There is no provision authorizing the circuit
court to dismiss the petition of a capital defendant if it is
"frivolous or *** patently without merit." As noted above, the
court must first determine whether the petitioner, if indigent,
wants to be represented by counsel. After the petitioner makes that
choice, the matter is then docketed for further proceedings. 725
ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West 1998). At that juncture the State may
either answer the petition or move to dismiss it. 725 ILCS 5/122-5
(West 1998).
	The circuit judge in the present case did not follow the
procedure applicable to capital cases. Instead, she examined the
contents of the petition and determined on her own that the matters
raised by the defendant were without merit. That inquiry is
appropriate only when the post-conviction petitioner has been
sentenced to imprisonment. This was a capital case, however, and
the judge could not rule on the defendant's petition without first
receiving a responsive pleading from the State. Cf. People v.
Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236 (1995) (responsive pleading not required
when State had previously moved to dismiss earlier post-conviction petition).
	The defendant raises two other issues in this appeal. He
argues that the post-conviction judge erred in dismissing the
petition without first providing notice to the defendant that she
was going to enter a dispositive ruling on that date, which she had
earlier said would be for a status hearing. The defendant also
argues that, before dismissing the petition, the judge failed to
consider the defendant's request for forensic testing of certain
evidence, as authorized by section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 1998)). Given our
resolution of the first two issues in this appeal, it is not necessary
for us to address these additional questions at this time. It appears
that these matters grew out of the judge's treatment of the case as
a noncapital matter and summary disposition of the petition, and
thus are unlikely to recur on remand. Finally, we note that this is
the defendant's second post-conviction action. We express no
view here regarding the propriety of a successive post-conviction
petition in these circumstances.
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of
Du Page County is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that
court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.