Title: Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GMBH
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 200, 2020
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: February 8, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
MESO SCALE DIAGNOSTICS,  
§ 
LLC., et al.,  
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 200, 2020 
 
Plaintiffs Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellants,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Court of Chancery 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
ROCHE DIAGNOSTICS GMBH, 
 
§ 
et al.,  
 
 
 
 
§ 
C.A. No. 2019-0167 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Defendants Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellees. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted: 
December 9, 2020 
Decided: 
February 8, 2021 
 
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, TRAYNOR, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justices 
and RANJI, Judge,* constituting the Court en Banc. 
   
Upon appeal from the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware.  AFFIRMED.   
David L. Finger, Esquire, Finger & Slanina, Wilmington, Delaware, William S. Consovoy, 
Esquire, J. Michael Connolly, Esquire (argued), Consovoy McCarthy PLLC, Arlington, 
Virginia, Patrick Strawbridge, Esquire, Consovoy McCarthy PLLC, Boston, 
Massachusetts for Appellants.  
 
Matthew E. Fischer, Esquire, Timothy R. Dudderar, Esquire, J. Matthew Belger, Esquire, 
Andrew H. Sauder, Esquire, Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Of 
Counsel Thomas L. Shriner, Jr., Esquire (argued), James T. McKeown, Esquire, Foley & 
Lardner LLP, Milwaukee, Wisconsin for Appellees.   
 
* Sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. Art. IV, § 12 and Supreme Court Rules 2(a) and 
4(a) to complete the quorum.  
2 
 
PER CURIAM:  
In 2010, Appellants Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC and Meso Scale Technologies, 
LLC (collectively “Meso”) filed suit in the Court of Chancery against Appellee entities 
Roche Diagnostics GmbH, Roche Diagnostics Corp., Roche Holding Ltd., IGEN LS LLC, 
Lilli Acquisition Corp., IGEN International, Inc., and Bioveris Corp. (collectively 
“Roche”), all of which are or were affiliates or subsidiaries of the F. Hoffmann -- La Roche, 
Ltd. family of pharmaceutical and diagnostics companies.  Meso alleged two counts of 
breach of contract.   Roche prevailed at trial, and this Court affirmed the judgment in 2014.  
On February 28, 2019, Meso brought a new action asking the court to reopen the 
case, vacate the judgment entered after trial, and order a new trial.  Meso alleged that the 
Vice Chancellor who decided its case four years earlier had an undisclosed disabling 
conflict, namely, that Roche’s counsel had been simultaneously representing him in an 
unrelated federal suit challenging the constitutionality of Delaware’s law providing for 
confidential business arbitration in the Court of Chancery, 10 Del. C. § 349 (“Section 
349”).  In that federal litigation, which ended in 2014, the Chancellor and Vice Chancellors 
of the Court of Chancery, as the parties responsible for implementing the challenged 
statute, were nominal defendants (hereinafter, the “Judicial Officers”). 
The Court of Chancery denied relief and dismissed the action.  Meso appeals.  
For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the Court of Chancery.  
3 
 
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
Though this case reaches us as an appeal from the dismissal of Meso’s complaint 
granting Roche’s motion pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), Meso’s “complaint” 
is, in effect, substantively a motion for relief from a judgment under Court of Chancery 
Rule 60(b), and in particular, under subparagraphs (b)(4) and (b)(6).  Meso’s request for 
relief was restyled as a separate action for the convenience and at the request of the trial 
court.  Roche’s corresponding dismissal motion likewise presents, in effect, its opposition 
to the Rule 60(b) arguments raised by Meso.  The Court of Chancery treated the motion 
substantially as one seeking Rule 60(b) relief.1  
We take the facts as pled by Meso.2  In so doing, we defer only to those facts Meso 
alleged in its pleading and the reasonable inferences therefrom.3  We otherwise rely on the 
trial court’s recitation of the facts. 
 
1 Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GMBH et al., Del. Ch. C.A. No. 2019-0167, 
at 19 (May 18, 2020) (Telephone Rulings of the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss) [Notice 
of Appeal Ex. A, hereinafter, “Order”] (stating that “this isn’t a vanilla 12(b)(6) motion.  Rather, 
it is a motion that challenges a claim for extraordinary relief under Rule 60(b), that happens to 
have been sought by complaint rather than by motion.”). 
2 See generally App. to Op. Br. at A017–28 (Complaint). 
3 This accords with the deference given to well-pleaded facts under Rule 12(b)(6): 
Our review is limited to the well-pleaded allegations contained in the complaint.  
We accept all well-pleaded allegations as true, but we ignore conclusory allegations 
that lack specific supporting factual allegations.  Finally, throughout our 
examination of dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6), we remain heedful of our duty to 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. . . . 
Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1034 (Del. 1998) (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 
4 
 
Meso sued Roche on June 22, 2010 alleging two counts of breach of contract (“Meso 
Litigation”).4  Then-Attorney Andre Bouchard represented Roche in that action, while Vice 
Chancellor Parsons presided over the case.  On April 8, 2011, the Vice Chancellor denied 
Roche’s motion to dismiss the Meso Litigation.5 
On October 25, 2011 the Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Inc. (the 
“Coalition”) filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware 
against the State of Delaware, as well as the Court of Chancery and the Judicial Officers, 
including Vice Chancellor Parsons (“DelCOG Litigation”).6     
The Coalition asserted a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil 
rights statute.  It alleged no specific misconduct by Vice Chancellor Parsons.  Rather, it 
alleged that Section 349 deprived the Coalition of its right to public access to judicial 
proceedings under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.  The Coalition 
sought a declaration to that effect, as well as injunctive relief barring further arbitrations 
under the statute and rules.  It also sought to unseal the records of prior arbitrations 
conducted pursuant to Section 349.   
The Coalition’s complaint included a prayer for attorney’s fees and a residual prayer 
for “such other and further relief as the Court deems fair and just.”7  Aside from this 
 
4 App. to Op. Br. at A018 (Complaint). 
5 Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GMBH, 2011 WL 1348438, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 8, 2011). 
6 See generally App. to Op. Br. at A030–34 (DelCOG Complaint).  
7 Id. at A34. 
5 
 
mention of attorney’s fees, there is no other indication in the record that the Coalition 
sought to recover damages, and Meso made clear that Vice Chancellor Parsons did not face 
the prospect of money damages or other personal liability beyond the declaratory and 
injunctive relief sought in his capacity as a judicial officer charged with implementing 
Section 349. 
The State retained then-Attorney Bouchard to represent it in the DelCOG Litigation 
some time before November 29, 2011.8  At that time, then-Attorney Bouchard sent a letter 
to the Court on behalf of all parties coordinating a briefing and oral argument schedule for 
the cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.  As the letter indicates, the parties agreed 
to stay discovery pending a ruling on those motions.  Also copied on the letter were the 
Coalition’s counsel and the counsel for the Judicial Officers, Professor Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh of the Widener University - Delaware Law School. 
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware held oral argument on 
February 9, 2012.9  Then-Attorney Bouchard and other attorneys at his firm continued to 
represent the State and the Court of Chancery.  Professor Hamermesh continued to 
represent the Judicial Officers.  During that argument, the parties confirmed a prior 
agreement that the State and the Court of Chancery should be dismissed.10  Then-Attorney 
 
8 Id. at A036–37 (Letter from Counsel). 
9 Id. at A048 (DelCOG Oral Argument Transcript). 
10 Id. at A053. 
6 
 
Bouchard presented oral argument on behalf of all defendants, including Vice Chancellor 
Parsons. 
The District Court granted judgment in the Coalition’s favor on the cross-motions 
on August 30, 2012.11  Consistent with the parties’ stipulation, the District Court dismissed 
the State and Court of Chancery on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds.12  
Then-Attorney Bouchard remained counsel of record in the case, and on October 12, 2012, 
he entered his appearance for the Judicial Officers, including Vice Chancellor Parsons.13 
While that matter was on appeal, Vice Chancellor Parsons granted Roche summary 
judgment on the first of the two breach of contract counts in the Meso Litigation on 
February 22, 2013.14  He presided over a trial on the remaining count three days later, from 
February 25 through March 1, 2013. 15 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court 
in the DelCOG Litigation on October 23, 2013.16  Then-Attorney Bouchard was still one 
of several attorneys representing the Judicial Officers at that time.17 
 
11 Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 504 (D. Del. 2012). 
12 Id. at 494 n.1.   
13 App. to Op. Br. at A135 (Entry of Appearance); see also id. at A141–94 (Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari) (application for United States Supreme Court review in the DelCOG litigation). 
14 Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 62 A.3d 62, 94 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
15 Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 2014 WL 2919333, at *12 (Del. Ch. 
June 25, 2014). 
16 Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 521 (3d Cir. 2013). 
17 Id. at 511. 
7 
 
Thereafter, Vice Chancellor Parsons heard post-trial argument in the Meso 
Litigation on November 8, 2013.18   
On January 21, 2014, then-Attorney Bouchard, Professor Hamermesh, and the rest 
of the defense team in the DelCOG Litigation submitted a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Supreme Court.19  The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on 
March 24, 2014.20  The parties allege no further involvement by then-Attorney Bouchard 
in the DelCOG Litigation.   
On April 16, 2014, then-Attorney Bouchard sought to withdraw from representing 
Meso in anticipation of his elevation to the position of Chancellor of the Court of Chancery, 
while his firm continued the representation.21  The trial court approved that request, and he 
withdrew on April 29, 2014.22  On June 25, 2014, Vice Chancellor Parsons issued a 
decision in Roche’s favor on the remaining breach of contract count.23  This Court affirmed 
the judgment on the basis of the trial court’s opinion on June 18, 2015.24  The United States 
Supreme Court denied certiorari on November 16, 2015.25 
The foregoing facts are undisputed.   
 
18 Meso Scale Diagnostics, 2014 WL 2919333, at *12. 
19 App. to Op. Br. at A141 (Petition for Writ of Certiorari). 
20 Strine v. Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Inc., 572 U.S. 1029 (2014). 
21 App. to Ans. Br. at B48–49 (Motion to Withdraw Appearance).   
22 App. to Op. Br. at A20 (Complaint). 
23 Meso Scale Diagnostics, 2014 WL 2919333, at *29. 
24 116 A.3d 1244, 2015 WL 3824809 (Del. June 18, 2015).  
25 136 S. Ct. 524 (2015). 
8 
 
Meso asserts, and in this procedural posture we assume to be true, certain key 
subsequent developments: 
15. In early 2018, Jacob Wohlstadter, the President and Chief Executive 
Officer of Meso, was conducting Internet research and discovered for the 
first time that Mr. Bouchard had represented Vice Chancellor Parsons in the 
DelCOG Litigation during his representation of Roche in the Meso 
Litigation. 
 
16. Mr. Wohlstadter immediately notified Jonathan Klein-Evans, the Vice 
President and General Counsel of Meso, and Meso’s Chief Legal Officer of 
this revelation, about which all were previously unaware.  They were all 
shocked that Vice Chancellor Parsons had never disclosed this fact or recused 
himself from the Meso Litigation.   
 
17. After Meso learned of this conflict of interest, and despite its involvement 
in another trial at the time, Mr. Klein-Evans led a careful investigation of the 
issue.  The investigation confirmed that no one at Meso was aware of Mr. 
Bouchard’s representation of Vice Chancellor Parsons.  Nor were there any 
indications that it had been disclosed.26 
 
Thereafter, Meso sought to retain counsel to collaterally challenge the judgment.  
Meso secured its current firm in July 2018 after six other firms declined to represent it.  
That firm lacked a Delaware office, and Meso was able to retain local counsel on January 
24, 2019 only after five other firms declined representation.  Meso sought to file the instant 
matter as a Rule 60(b) motion under the Meso Litigation’s docket on February 22, 2019.  
At the direction of the clerk’s office, Meso refashioned the motion as a separate complaint 
and filed it on February 28, 2019, stipulating that “the Court may elect to treat this 
complaint as a motion under subsections (4) and (6) of [Court of Chancery Rule 60(b)].”27 
 
26 App. to Op. Br. at A20–21 (Complaint). 
27 Id. at A17 (alteration added). 
9 
 
Roche moved to dismiss.  The Court of Chancery heard argument on May 6, 2020.28  
On May 18, 2020, the trial court ruled that Meso was not entitled to relief under either Rule 
60(b)(4) or 60(b)(6), and it granted Roche’s dismissal motion.   
II. 
The Court of Chancery’s Ruling 
Meso argued that the court’s judgment in the Meso Litigation was “void” under 
Rule 60(b)(4) because Vice Chancellor Parsons’s failure to recuse himself violated Meso’s 
due process rights.  The Court of Chancery disagreed.   
Surveying federal case law, the Court of Chancery determined that a due process 
violation renders a judgment void only when the violation involves “a failure to give notice, 
reasonably calculated to afford the parties an opportunity to be heard,” or when the 
judgment is premised on a certain type of jurisdictional error.29  According to the Vice 
Chancellor, failure to recuse results in a judgment that “was, at best [for Meso], voidable.”30  
Because voidable judgments are not subject to vacatur under Rule 60(b)(4), the Vice 
Chancellor found that subsection inapplicable. 
The Court of Chancery also rejected Meso’s claim that it was entitled to relief under 
Rule 60(b)(6), which provides for relief from a final judgment for “any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.”31  The court relied on Liljeberg v. 
 
28 App. to Ans. Br. at B319–79 (Motion to Dismiss Oral Argument Transcript). 
29 Order at 11–12. 
30 Id. at 16.  Because of this finding, the court determined that it did not need to resolve the question 
of whether the alleged failure to recuse would ever constitute a violation of due process. 
31 Del. Ct. Ch. R. 60(b)(6). 
10 
 
Health Services Acquisition Corp.32 as the key case for analyzing undisclosed conflicts of 
interest under Rule 60(b)(6).  The trial court reasoned, based on Liljeberg, that in order to 
obtain vacatur, Meso had to show that (1) it acted within a reasonable time, and (2) the 
failure to recuse constituted “extraordinary circumstances,” considering three factors set 
forth in Liljeberg.  As the United States Supreme Court explained in Liljeberg: 
Rule 60(b)(6) relief is accordingly neither categorically available nor 
categorically unavailable for all [judicial disqualification] violations.  We 
conclude that in determining whether a judgment should be vacated for a 
violation of [the federal judicial disqualification statute], it is appropriate to 
consider the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, the risk that 
the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of 
undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process. We must 
continuously bear in mind that “to perform its high function in the best way 
‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’”33 
 
Applying that standard, the Court of Chancery determined that Meso had neither 
acted within a reasonable time nor had it identified extraordinary circumstances. 
As to the first step of the test, the court found that “conspicuously absent from 
Meso’s pleading is an averment that its attorneys did not know of now-Chancellor 
Bouchard’s representation.”34  Although when pressed at oral argument Meso asserted that 
it had reached out to its former counsel’s firms to investigate their awareness of the 
representation issue, the trial court refused to consider facts not pled.  Because Meso’s 
attorney’s knowledge was imputable to it, the Vice Chancellor found that Meso’s lack of 
 
32 486 U.S. 847, 108 S. Ct. 2194, 100 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1988) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 455, the statute for 
federal judicial disqualification).  
33 Id. at 864 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). 
34 Order at 17. 
11 
 
awareness of the highly-publicized DelCOG Litigation could not be inferred reasonably 
from the averments in the complaint.   
The trial court then found that even if Meso had pled that neither it nor its attorneys 
knew of the DelCOG Litigation and representation at any time prior to early 2018, the full 
year delay in securing counsel was unreasonable.  The court also took judicial notice that, 
while “not ultimately dispositive,” Meso’s eventual local counsel was the Coalition’s 
counsel from the DelCOG Litigation.35 
As to extraordinary circumstances, the trial court found that granting relief would 
severely prejudice Roche by negating a long-settled judgment obtained after trial, while 
Meso had failed to allege any injustice that it would suffer.  Likewise, the trial court found 
that “the ostensible judicial ethics violation Meso has identified is not remotely, much less 
conceivably, serious under the Rule 60(b) rubric.”36  The trial court noted that the lawsuit 
named all of the Judicial Officers; that its allegations were directed to them solely in their 
official capacity; and that it “merely sought to prevent confidential arbitrations, a process 
from which the judges would reap no personal benefit.”37  Given those facts, the trial court 
concluded that even if the representation were deemed to violate judicial ethics rules, it 
could not have “caused any reasonably conceivable harm, much less serious harm.”38 
 
35 Id. at 19. 
36 Id. at 22. 
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 23.     
12 
 
III. 
Contentions on Appeal 
On appeal, Meso argues that the Court of Chancery erred in denying relief under 
both Rule 60(b)(4) and Rule 60(b)(6).   
Meso argues that Rule 60(b)(4) applies because any judgment issued in violation of 
“procedural due process” is void.  It also argues that even if only a narrower subset of due 
process violations satisfy Rule 60(b)(4), the judgment is void in this case because a hearing 
before a conflicted judicial officer deprived Meso of the “opportunity to be heard.” 
Therefore, Meso urges us to examine the constitutional due process issue and hold that 
Vice Chancellor Parsons violated Meso’s due process rights by failing to recuse. 
As to Rule 60(b)(6), Meso asserts that it was not aware of the DelCOG Litigation 
and potential conflict until Mr. Wohlstadter’s internet search in 2018.  Acknowledging that 
attorney knowledge is imputed to the client, Meso argues that it nevertheless properly pled 
a lack of awareness of the conflict at the time of the trial and appeal.  It urges the Court to 
consider the year-long gap between Mr. Wohlstadter’s search and its filing justified in light 
of the difficulty it experienced in retaining a firm willing to represent it in a suit alleging 
“serious ethics violations” by a Vice Chancellor.    
Roche believes that both of Meso’s arguments are misguided.  It argues that we and 
many other jurisdictions have found that recusal violations render a judgment merely 
voidable, not void, and hence ineligible for vacatur under Rule 60(b)(4).  It argues that 
Meso’s efforts to distinguish these authorities by claiming that the threat of impartiality 
13 
 
constructively denied them an opportunity to be heard cannot survive its concession that 
the Vice Chancellor was not in fact actually biased.  
Roche further contends that the trial court’s Rule 60(b)(6) ruling is correct.   It 
asserts that the judicial ethics rules did not require recusal since Vice Chancellor Parsons 
was clearly a nominal party in the DelCOG Litigation and that no objective observer would 
harbor doubts as to his impartiality.  In any case, because all members of the Court of 
Chancery had the same potential conflict as the nominal defendants in the DelCOG 
Litigation, Roche argues that the rule of necessity would militate against recusal even if it 
were otherwise warranted.  
IV. 
The Relevant Ethical Framework 
We first explain the ethical framework in which Meso’s Rule 60(b) challenge arises, 
as the parties have devoted much attention to the ethical rules pertaining to judicial 
conflicts.  Although Rule 60(b) is the basis upon which this dispute is resolved, the 
underlying ethical framework is important to our system of justice and in promoting public 
confidence in the integrity of our judicial system.  We start with the basic rules governing 
judicial disqualification and recusal and then consider other ethical considerations relevant 
to the unique circumstances presented here.  We then address the Rule 60(b) issues Meso 
has raised on appeal.    
A. The Delaware Judicial Code 
This Court is the entity ultimately responsible for promulgating the rules and 
14 
 
practices governing both bench and bar in Delaware.39  We promulgated the Delaware 
Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct (“Judicial Code”) in fulfillment of that duty.40     
The Judicial Code provides that a “judge should uphold the integrity, independence 
and impartiality of the judiciary”41 and to that end “should avoid impropriety and the 
appearance of impropriety in all activities.”42  According to the Judicial Code, 
“impartiality” is the “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties 
or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may 
 
39 See Del. Const. art. IV, § 37 (“A judicial officer may be censured or removed by virtue of this 
section for. . . persistent misconduct in violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics as adopted by the 
Delaware Supreme Court from time to time.”); see In re Appeal of Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 
215, 216–17 (Del. 1990) (“Unless the challenged conduct prejudices the fairness of the 
proceedings, such that it adversely affects the fair and efficient administration of justice, only this 
Court has the power and responsibility to govern the Bar, and in pursuance of that authority to 
enforce the Rules for disciplinary purposes.”); see also In re Green, 464 A.2d 881, 885 (Del. 1983) 
(internal citations omitted): 
This Court, alone, has the responsibility for licensing and disciplining persons 
admitted to practice in Delaware.  This tenet is of historic proportions, having been 
transplanted to Delaware by the colonists.  It is based on the concept, taken from 
England, that the courts possess the exclusive right to govern the practice of law. 
Moreover, the interest of this State in matters pertaining to the admission and 
regulation of lawyers practicing before our courts is essential to the primary 
governmental function of administering justice, and in meeting our obligation to 
protect the public by assuring and maintaining high standards of conduct of persons 
admitted to this Bar. 
40 See Del. Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct [Hereinafter “Judicial Code”] Preamble (“This Code 
shall constitute the ‘Canons of Judicial Ethics’ referenced in the Delaware Constitution, Article 
IV, Section 37.”). 
41 Id. Canon 1.  See also id. Canon 2 (“A judge should perform the duties of judicial office 
impartially, competently and diligently.”). 
42 Id. R. 1.2(A).  See also id. R. 2.3(B) (“A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety in all activities.”); R. 2.5(A) (“A judge should perform the duties of the office 
impartially and diligently.”). 
15 
 
come before a judge.”43  The Judicial Code provides that “[t]he test for appearance of 
impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds, with knowledge of 
all the relevant circumstances that a reasonable inquiry would disclose, a perception that 
the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and 
competence is impaired.”44 
Judicial Code Rule 2.11 governs disqualification.  That Rule states that “[a] judge 
should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to” a set of enumerated examples.45  
Those examples, contained in Rule 2.11(A), include situations where the judge is biased; 
has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; where the 
judge, the judge’s relative to within the third degree or the judge’s spouse or domestic 
partner has or is likely to have some involvement in the case at bar; where some member 
of the judge’s household, directly or as a fiduciary, has an economic interest in the subject 
matter, or in a party, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the 
outcome of the proceeding; or where the judge “served as a lawyer in the matter in 
 
43 Id. Terminology.  See also ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Terminology (defining 
“impartiality” as the “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or 
classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may come 
before a judge”). 
44 Judicial Code R. 1.2(A) cmt. 
45 See also Stevenson v. State, 782 A.2d 249, 255 (Del. 2001) (regarding the predecessor provision 
to Rule 2.11, this Court observed that “[t]he specific instances prompting disqualification that are 
set forth in the Code do not exhaust all situations in which a judge’s impartiality may be reasonably 
questioned.”).   
16 
 
controversy, or a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served during such 
association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a 
material witness concerning it, or the judge was associated in the practice of law within the 
preceding year with a law firm or lawyer acting as counsel in the proceeding.”46   
In furtherance of these requirements, Rule 2.11(B) obligates the judge to make 
reasonable efforts to keep informed of his or her own economic and fiduciary interests, and 
those of the judge’s immediate family and household members.47   
With certain enumerated exceptions listed in the rule, Rule 2.11(C) provides that as 
an alternative to disqualification, the judge “may, instead of withdrawing from the 
proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of the judge’s disqualification,” and “if the 
parties and their lawyers, after such disclosure and an opportunity to confer outside of the 
presence of the judge, all agree in writing or on the record that the judge should not be 
disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate, the judge may participate in the 
proceeding.”48   
Disclosure and waiver pursuant to Rule 2.11(C) is available for all situations in 
which a judge is disqualified by the terms of Rule 2.11,  except two from the enumerated 
list, namely, Rule 2.11(A)(1) and 2.11(A)(4).49  Those are, respectively, conflicts due to 
 
46 Judicial Code R. 2.11(A)(4)(a). 
47 Id. R. 2.11(B). 
48 Judicial Code R. 2.11(C). 
49 Id. 
17 
 
actual personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed 
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding, and certain enumerated matters related to the 
judge’s or the judge’s previous law practice’s current or prior involvement in the case.50 
B. Conflicts Arising from the Judge as Party in Other Litigation 
The cases addressing judicial disqualification and recusal invariably involve an 
analysis of the unique facts and circumstances giving rise to the challenge.  The leading 
Delaware case on judicial disqualification arising from the judge’s participation as a party 
in other litigation is Los v. Los.51   
Los involved parties in acrimonious and lengthy Family Court litigation.  Mr. Los 
petitioned for review of a child support order.  Two weeks before the hearing, he filed suit 
in federal court against Ms. Los, her counsel, the Delaware Attorney General, and the 
Family Court judge, seeking to invalidate as unconstitutional Delaware’s child support 
formula and Family Court Rule 26, requiring court approval before initiating discovery.52  
Though it recited a prayer for damages, the federal suit’s claims against the Family Court 
 
50 In other words, if the lawyer’s participation in the matter before the judge gives rise to an actual 
bias or prejudice, the judge is disqualified under Rule 2.11(A)(1), and the disqualification is not 
waivable.  Assuming the judge “reasonably concludes” that he or she does not have an actual bias 
or prejudice, the judge “may continue to preside over the matter as long as [the judge] complies 
with the remaining requirements” of Rule 2.11(C).”  Lawyer Concurrently Representing Judge 
and Litigant Before the Judge in Unrelated Matters, ABA Standing Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l 
Resp., Formal Op. 07-449 (Aug. 9, 2007). 
51 595 A.2d 381 (Del. 1991). 
52 Id. at 383. 
18 
 
judge were solely that he discharged his official duties in accordance with court rules and 
state law.   
At the hearing, Mr. Los sought the judge’s recusal.  He asserted that the federal case 
rendered the judge conflicted, and also that the judge was biased against him, but presented 
no specific basis for his claim.  The Family Court judge determined first that he harbored 
no subjective bias against Mr. Los, and second that the federal litigation did not present a 
disabling conflict, and so he refused to disqualify himself.  As Mr. Los refused to 
participate in the hearing, the judge dismissed the petition and Mr. Los appealed.   
This Court affirmed the Family Court’s decision.  In our view, “as a matter of due 
process, a litigant is entitled to neutrality on the part of the presiding judge but the standards 
governing disqualification also require the appearance of impartiality.”53  We noted that 
the judicial ethics rules we had promulgated codified both of these requirements.54   
We determined that “[w]here the basis for the alleged disqualification is a claim, 
under Canon 3(C)(1) [the predecessor to Rule 2.11(A)], that the judge ‘has a personal bias 
or prejudice concerning a party,’ no per se automatic disqualification is required.”55  
 
53 Id. 
54 At the time of Los, the operative ethical rule was Canon 3(C)(1) of the 1987 predecessor to the 
current Judicial Code.  Id. (citing Weber v. State, 547 A.2d 948, 951–52 (Del. 1988)).  Canon 
3(C)(1) corresponds to Rule 2.11(A)(1) of the current Delaware Judicial Code.  The modest 
differences between Canon 3(C)(1) in the 1987 Judicial Code and Rule 2.11(A) in the current one, 
including use of masculine language to refer to the judge in the 1987 version, are immaterial to the 
present case.  As we note in the Preamble, we adopted the current Judicial Code in 2008, 
reformatting and renumbering its provisions to conform to the order and numbering of the ABA 
2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct.   
55 Los, 595 A.2d at 384.     
19 
 
Instead, we held that when “faced with a claim of personal bias or prejudice” under Canon 
3(C)(1),  the judge must engage in a two-part analysis to determine if recusal is warranted.  
First, the judge must determine whether she is subjectively satisfied that she can hear the 
case free of bias or prejudice concerning the party seeking recusal.  Second, “even if the 
judge believes that he or she is free of bias or prejudice, the judge must objectively examine 
whether the circumstances require recusal because ‘there is an appearance of bias sufficient 
to cause doubt as to the judge’s impartiality.’”56  When the trial judge performs those two 
inquiries, we review each under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.   
As this Court further explained, “[t]he mere fact that a judge is an adverse party in 
another proceeding will not, by itself, result in automatic disqualification.”57  We noted a 
“compelling” policy reason for a judge not to disqualify herself at the behest of a party who 
initiates litigation against a judge -- in “the absence of genuine bias, a litigant should not 
be permitted to ‘judge-shop’ through the disqualification process.”58  Permitting a litigant 
 
56 Stevenson v. State, 782 A.2d at 255 (citation omitted); see also Layton v. Layton, 211 A.3d 136, 
2019 WL 2078346, at *2 (Del. May 10, 2019) (TABLE) (“the judge must determine whether there 
is the appearance of bias sufficient to cause objective doubt as to the judge's impartiality”); Turner 
v. State, 162 A.3d 102, 2017 WL 1954944, at *1 (Del. May 10, 2017) (TABLE) (“even if the judge 
subjectively believes she does not have bias, she must determine that there is not an ‘appearance 
of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to the judge's impartiality.’”) (quoting Los, 595 A.2d at 385).  
As the United States Supreme Court stated in In re Murchison, “to perform its high function in the 
best way, ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’”  349 U.S. at 136 (quoting Offutt v. 
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).  
57 Los, 595 A.2d at 385.  
58 Id.   
20 
 
to exert control over which judge presides over a case by provoking a conflict by filing 
another action would hamper the orderly administration of justice.59   
That policy concern, so compelling in Los, is inapplicable here.  Though we stated 
in Los that “there was no requirement that [a judge] disqualify himself where he was sued 
in his judicial capacity in an action instituted during the course of the proceedings before 
him,” we were addressing a circumstance where the litigant seeking disqualification 
provoked the conflict.  Meso did not.  Though the DelCOG Litigation was later-filed, the 
alleged conflict arose because of the involvement of Roche’s counsel.  Meso and its agents 
neither created nor controlled the circumstances of which it now complains.  That 
dissimilarity distinguishes Los from the present case and necessitates further examination.   
C. Other Jurisdictions’ Treatment of Judge-as-Litigant Conflicts  
Because this Court has not previously examined cases where counsel represented a 
judge in a different case, we examine the treatment of this issue in other jurisdictions.  Our 
Delaware Judicial Code is derived in substantial part from the American Bar Association’s 
(“ABA”) Model Code of Judicial Conduct.  Many other states have similarly modeled their 
own rules of judicial ethics on the ABA Model Code and have considered the effect of an 
attorney’s representation of the judge in an unrelated suit.60   
 
59 Id. (citing Smith v. Smith, 564 P.2d 1266 (Ariz. 1977)). 
60 Delaware courts have examined this issue in cases involving other types of adjudicators.  
Although the standards applied in these situations are not the same as those applied in the judicial 
context, they offer some insight into the concerns posed by such dual representations.  In Beebe 
Med. Ctr., Inc. v. InSight Health Servs. Corp., a party sought vacatur of an arbitration award after 
learning that adverse counsel represented the arbitrator (who sat as one member of a three-lawyer 
arbitration panel) in an unrelated suit for money damages against the arbitrator’s former employer.  
21 
 
Considering the dual representation issue, the ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics 
and Professional Responsibility (“ABA Committee”) issued Informal Opinion 147761 in 
1981, primarily directed to the judge’s obligations, and Formal Ethics Opinion 07-44962 in 
2007, addressing both the attorney’s and judge’s obligations.   
In its earlier Informal Opinion 1477, the ABA Committee stated that in the absence 
of applicability of the rule of necessity, “when a private lawyer is currently representing a 
judge, even in a matter involving the judge’s official position or conduct, the judge should 
not sit in a case in which a litigant is represented by the lawyer or by the lawyer’s partner 
 
751 A.2d 426, 427 (Del. Ch. 1999).  The Court of Chancery determined that the “evident partiality” 
standard under 10 Del. C. § 5714(a)(2) was satisfied and vacatur was the necessary remedy “where 
an arbitrator does not disclose a relationship with a party that creates a reasonable impression of 
bias.”  Beebe, 751 A.2d at 427.  See also Del. Transit Corp. v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 
842, 34 A.3d 1064, 1072 (Del. 2011) (holding that to demonstrate “evident partiality,” the record 
“must reflect that an arbitrator failed to disclose a substantial personal or financial relationship 
with a party, a party’s agent, or a party’s attorney that a reasonable person would conclude was 
powerfully suggestive of bias.”).  In Home Paramount Pest Control v. Gibbs, 953 A.2d 219 (Del. 
2008), an employer sought to vacate an administrative decision awarding workers’ compensation 
benefits to an employee for carpal tunnel syndrome.  The employer’s basis for vacatur was a 
constellation of similarities between the employee’s claim and an earlier claim that the hearing 
officer herself had filed.  We determined that the two-part Los test applied to an Industrial Accident 
Board hearing officer.  Id. at 221.  Applying it, this Court found no abuse of discretion in the 
hearing officer’s determination that she was not subjectively biased.  But we concluded that “a 
person knowing this unusual overlap in both the claim and the participants” in the hearing officer’s 
past case and the case before her “would have a reasonable basis to question her impartiality.”  Id. 
at 222.  Thus, we held that “in order to promote public trust and confidence in our judicial system, 
the hearing officer should have recused herself,” and we reversed.  Id.   
61 Requirement of Judicial Recusal When a Litigant is Represented by Judge’s Lawyers, ABA 
Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof. Resp., Informal Op. 1477 (Aug. 12, 1981) [Hereinafter 
“Opinion 1477”].  Like Los, Opinion 1477 was decided under the prior numbering system, wherein 
Rule 2.11(A)’s provisions were embodied by Canon 3(C)(1). 
62 Lawyer Concurrently Representing Judge and Litigant Before the Judge in Unrelated Matters, 
ABA Standing Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l Resp., Formal Op. 07-449 (Aug. 9, 2007) [Hereinafter 
“Opinion 07-449”].   
22 
 
or associate.”63  Thus, the ABA Committee drew no distinction between lawyers 
“representing the judge in a personal matter or in a matter pertaining to the judge’s official 
position or conduct.”64   
In its 2007 Formal Opinion 07-499, the ABA Committee later stated that:   
The Committee does not assume that, whenever a judge finds herself 
presiding over a matter in which a lawyer for one of the parties is 
concurrently representing her in an unrelated matter, she inevitably develops 
a personal bias or prejudice for or against her lawyer thus triggering the 
mandatory and nonwaivable disqualification under Judicial Code Rule 
2.11(A)(1).  The existence or nonexistence of such bias or prejudice depends 
on the facts of any particular situation.  When a judge reasonably concludes 
that she is not personally biased or prejudiced towards her lawyer, she may 
continue to preside over the matter as long as she complies with the 
remaining requirements of Judicial Code Rule 2.11(C).65 
 
Thus, in the ABA Committee’s view, such a conflict can be waived when a judge 
reasonably concludes that she is not personally biased or prejudiced towards her lawyer.66  
 
63 Opinion 1477 at 2.  In Opinion 1477, the ABA expressly did not address a situation in which a 
judge, in her official capacity, is represented by “a state attorney general in discharge of the 
attorney general’s legal duty to represent judicial officers in matters pertaining to their judicial 
office  or duty.”  Id.  It expressly stated that it did not reach “the view that such a situation would 
require recusal in all cases in which the attorney general, or other public attorney, or their assistants 
represent the state or its agencies before the court.”  Id.   
64 Opinion 1477 at 1. 
65 Opinion 07-449 at 2.   
66 See Opinion 07-449 at 1.  (“[A]bsent such a bias or prejudice for or against her lawyer, under 
Judicial Code Rule 2.11(C), the judge may continue to participate in the proceeding if the judge 
discloses on the record that she is being represented in the other matter by one of the lawyers, and 
the parties and their lawyers all consider such disclosure, out of the presence of the judge and court 
personnel, and unanimously agree to waive the judge’s disqualification.”); Opinion 1477 at 2 
(noting that the ABA’s Model Code “permits remittal of disqualification in specified 
circumstances (financial interest and family relationship) upon agreement of their parties and their 
lawyers that the judge's interest is insubstantial or his relationship is immaterial.”). 
23 
 
Waiver under Rule 2.11(C) requires that a willing judge disclose the representation on the 
record, and then: 
ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, outside the presence of the judge 
and court personnel, whether to waive disqualification.  If, following the 
disclosure, the parties and lawyers agree, without participation by the judge 
or court personnel, that the judge should not be disqualified, the judge may 
participate in the proceeding.  The agreement shall be incorporated into the 
record of the proceeding.67 
 
The ABA Committee regards the judge’s ethical obligation to disclose the 
representation issue as unequivocal, and states that the absence of such disclosure “cannot 
be cured by reliance on the fact that all parties to the matter already might be aware of the 
lawyer’s representation of the judge in another matter.”68   
Various state supreme courts have addressed this dual representation issue.  The 
Supreme Court of Iowa also construes its version of Rule 2.11(A) as being the relevant 
inquiry in cases where a judge is represented by a party’s counsel.69  In In re Howes, an 
Iowa judge was represented by an attorney in the judge’s divorce.70  While that 
representation was ongoing, the attorney sought an ex parte temporary injunction on behalf 
of another client in a custody matter from the judge, who granted it.71  The Iowa Supreme 
 
67 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.11(C).  Opinion 07-449 cites Rule 2.11(C) by name 
as the appropriate procedure, while Opinion 1477 cites its predecessor extant at the time, Canon 
3(D). 
68 Opinion 07-449 at 3.   
69 In re Howes, 880 N.W.2d 184, 193 (Iowa 2016). 
70 Id. at 189. 
71 Id. at 190–91. 
24 
 
Court stated that its version of Rule 2.11 “does not presume actual personal bias or 
prejudice on the part of a judge merely because a party’s lawyer currently represents or 
previously represented the judge in an unrelated matter.”  Rather, “disqualification is 
required based on an existing or former attorney-client relationship between the judge and 
a party’s lawyer only when ‘the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned’ due 
to that relationship.”72  The Court then found that “[w]hen an attorney who 
contemporaneously represents or recently represented a judge in a personal matter appears 
before the judge in another case and the judge does not disclose that fact to the parties, the 
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”73  Because the judge did not disclose 
the representation to the parties and obtain a waiver, she was required to disqualify herself 
from the injunction proceeding.74     
The Supreme Court of North Dakota dealt with the issue of a judge’s representation 
by a party’s law firm in Sargent County Bank v. Wentworth.75  In that case, a disbarred 
attorney, William Williams, had commenced a “frivolous” “nuisance lawsuit” against a 
judge, the state attorney general, the state bar association, the attorney disciplinary 
authority, and others.  The lawyer who represented the judge in that suit was part of a firm, 
another member of which represented a bank in a foreclosure proceeding before the judge.  
 
72 880 N.W.2d at 194–95 (citing Iowa R. 51:2.11). 
73 Id. at 195.     
74 Id. at 204. 
75 500 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1993). 
25 
 
The bank’s firm had represented the judge in the Williams suit; the bank’s original attorney 
had been one of the judge’s co-defendants; and that same attorney was a fact witness in the 
foreclosure action.  The court held that “a reasonable person could, on the basis of these 
objective facts, reasonably question [the judge’s] impartiality,” and that the judge therefore 
was required to disqualify himself in the foreclosure action.76 
The Ohio Supreme Court, in In re Disqualification of Reinbold, stated that “[a] trial 
judge’s impartiality may reasonably be questioned if he or she presides over a case in which 
a litigant is represented by the judge’s own lawyer” and that the Ohio “chief justice and the 
Board of Professional Conduct have long advised that a judge should recuse himself or 
herself—or be disqualified—from actions in which an attorney in the case is representing 
the judge in another proceeding.”77   
Wright & Miller also observes a similar rule under the applicable federal statute, 
which requires judicial disqualification “in any proceeding in which [a judge’s] impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned.”78  That treatise states that a situation in which “an 
attorney in the case is currently representing the judge in a suit for damages . . . seems 
appropriate for disqualification under § 455(a).”79 
 
76 Id. at 879–80.  The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the judgment in favor of the bank 
and remanded for a new trial before a different judge.  Id. at 880.   
77 94 N.E.3d 570, 570 (Ohio 2017). 
78 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). 
79 13D Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3549, at text 
accompanying note 28 (3d ed. Oct. 2020 update) (citing cases). 
26 
 
But the existence of bias or prejudice depends on the unique facts in each case.  In 
their briefing, the parties recognize this and address a number of factors such as whether 
the judicial officer has been sued in her official capacity, whether the judicial officer is a 
nominal party, and whether all judicial officers who might normally preside over the matter 
have also been sued.80  Because the litigation was brought against Vice Chancellor Parsons 
in his official capacity and as a nominal party, and against all of the other members of the 
Court of Chancery, and because the Vice Chancellor had no financial or other personal 
interest in the outcome of that lawsuit, we next consider how certain jurisdictions have 
weighed these factors. 
D. Representation in an Official Capacity Suit 
In analyzing disqualification when counsel appearing before a judge represents that 
judge in another matter, various courts have distinguished between suits where the judge 
is sued in her personal capacity versus suits asserting claims arising from her official 
conduct and position. 
The Iowa Supreme Court limited its decision In re Howes (discussed above) to cases 
where judges were represented in “personal matters.”  That court expressly noted that it 
“need not decide whether or under what circumstances disqualification is required under 
 
80 For example, Meso acknowledges in its opening brief that there are “a host of other factors that 
could distinguish this case from others” including the level of counsel’s “involvement” in the 
underlying litigation.  Op. Br. at 17.   
27 
 
rule [2.11(A)] based on an attorney’s representation of a judge in a matter concerning the 
judge's official acts.”81   
Conversely, in In re Disqualification of Badger, the Ohio Supreme Court required 
disqualification where nothing suggested that the judge was biased or prejudiced, where 
the unrelated case in which the judge was concurrently represented by counsel pertained to 
the judge’s official position, and where the judge had no involvement in the selection of 
counsel.82  The Ohio Supreme Court later observed that this rule had been modified as it 
applies to prosecuting attorneys and the Attorney General, who are statutorily required to 
represent judges in their official capacity, and to judges who are named as nominal parties 
and who are represented by the Attorney General’s office.  Thus, in In re Disqualification 
of Whitmore, the Ohio Supreme Court held that disqualification was not required where 
the prosecuting attorney representing the judge was not the same prosecutor appearing 
before the judge in another case.83  More recently the Ohio Supreme Court noted a number 
of “recognized exceptions” to the rule that “[a] trial judge’s impartiality may reasonably 
be questioned if he or she presides over a case in which a litigant is represented by the 
judge’s own lawyer.”84  Included among the exceptions is that “disqualification may not 
be necessary if the judge is merely a nominal party in the case represented by the 
 
81 See In re Howes, 800 N.W.2d at 195 n.3 (alteration added). 
82 546 N.E.2d 929, 929 (Ohio 1989) (“when a private lawyer is currently representing a judge, 
even in a matter involving the judge’s official position or conduct, the judge should not sit in a 
case in which a litigant is represented by the lawyer.”) (quoting and following Opinion 1477). 
83 704 N.E.2d 1235, 1235 (Ohio 1998).   
84 In re Disqualification of Reinbold, 94 N.E.3d at 570.   
28 
 
prosecuting attorney or attorney general or if the judge is not personally or substantively 
involved in that litigation.”85  
The United States Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct has opined 
that disqualification is not always required when the unrelated suit is against the judge in 
his or her official capacity.86  In the Committee’s view, “a judge’s impartiality cannot 
reasonably be questioned in unrelated matters handled by the DOJ simply because the 
Department provides representation in a lawsuit naming the judge in an official capacity,”87 
and “[w]hen accepting representation by the Department, a judge is not choosing a personal 
attorney, and the DOJ is not the same as a private law firm.”88  More broadly, the 
Committee stated, “[n]or is disqualification always required in unrelated matters handled 
by the individual attorney assigned to represent the judge.”89   As it explained, “[n]umerous 
lawsuits against judges are filed by disgruntled litigants and are patently frivolous; they are 
often dismissed promptly and without any discovery on the basis of the judge’s absolute 
judicial immunity,” and “[i]n these instances, a judge often will have little personal contact 
with the government attorney providing representation.”90  Thus, disqualification “is not 
 
85 Id. at at 571. 
86 U.S. Jud. Conf. Comm. Code Cond., Disqualification Issues Relating to Judge Being Sued in 
Official Capacity, Including Representation by Department of Justice, Adv. Op. No. 102, 2009 
WL 8484596 (June 2009). 
87 Id. at *1.   
88 Id.   
89 Id.   
90 Id.   
29 
 
always required, but instead depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the case,” 
including the nature of the claims and the judge’s relationship with the attorney.91 
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in Alred v. Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission, 
relying on a Kentucky Judicial Ethics Opinion, has recognized that “where a judge is sued 
in his official capacity and the Attorney General’s office represents him, the judge need 
not automatically disqualify himself from cases in which the Attorney General 
participates.”92  That court has held that the same rule applies where “a judge is sued in his 
official capacity . . . and he hires outside counsel to represent him,” but has distinguished 
that situation from a situation in which the judge “hires an outside attorney to represent 
him in personal litigation.”93  
As these cases illustrate, the capacity in which a judicial officer is sued is an 
important factor to consider.  On one end of that continuum is a lawyer representing a judge 
in highly personal litigation such as a divorce or personal injury case (as in In re Howes).  
On the other end might be, for example, a situation where a member of the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”), pursuant to state statute,94 represents a judicial officer sued in her official 
capacity.  Even when judges are sued in their official capacity, there are often other nuances 
 
91 Id. at *1–2.  
92 395 S.W. 3d 417, 431–32 (Ky. 2012). 
93 Id. at 431. 
94 See 29 Del. C. § 2504(3) (“The State Department of Justice and the Attorney General shall have 
the following powers, duties and authority. . . [n]otwithstanding any other laws, to represent as 
counsel in all proceedings or actions which may be brought on behalf of or against them in their 
official capacity in any court, except in actions in which the State has a conflicting interest, all 
officers, agencies, departments, boards, commissions and instrumentalities of state government”). 
30 
 
that affect the analysis, as the Alred case illustrates.  Such other factors may include 
whether the judge is a mere nominal party, and whether and the extent to which the judge 
has direct contact with the DOJ attorneys.   
In this case, the DelCOG Litigation asserted a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.95  The record overwhelmingly shows that Vice Chancellor Parsons was named as a 
defendant in his official capacity as a Vice Chancellor of the Court of Chancery and was 
merely a nominal party in the DelCOG Litigation.96  He had no financial, reputational, or 
other personal stake in the suit at any time.97     
E. The Rule of Necessity 
Other rules may come into play when all of the members of a court are named as 
defendants in a lawsuit.  The “rule of necessity” is the principle of common law that “a 
judge is not disqualified to [sit in] a case because of his personal interest in the matter at 
 
95 App. to Op. Br. at A033 (DelCOG Complaint).  Under Section 1983, “[a]n action for money 
damages may not be maintained against a state or its agencies.”  Delaware Dept. of Health & Soc. 
Servs. v. Sheppard, 864 A.2d 929, 2004 WL 2850086, at *2 (Del. Dec. 10, 2004) (TABLE) (citing 
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617, 122 S. Ct. 1640, 152 L. Ed. 2d 806 (2002)).  
96 As the Court of Chancery observed, “[i]n the federal action, Vice Chancellor Parsons and the 
other members of the Court of Chancery were named as defendants because the coalition could 
not sue the State of Delaware or the Court of Chancery directly since they were protected from 
suit by sovereign immunity.”  Order at 5–6.   
97 Further, judges are absolutely immune from money damages resulting from their judicial 
actions.  Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 1104, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978).  
Judicial immunity is overcome only if the action complained of was taken outside “the judge’s 
judicial capacity,” or if the action was “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”  Mireles 
v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12, 112 S. Ct. 286, 288, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991). 
31 
 
issue if there is no other judge available to hear and decide the case.”98  This rule “reflects 
the longstanding principle that to deny an individual access to courts for the vindication of 
his or her rights constitutes a far more egregious wrong than to permit a judge to hear a 
matter in which he or she has some interest.”99  The rule has been applied to allow judges 
to decide cases that would affect judicial retirement benefits or compensation for all of the 
judges in a jurisdiction,100 resolve a challenge to a rule requiring all federal judges to file 
annual personal financial statements,101 or decide the validity of a statute that would 
compromise the independence of the state judiciary.102  It has been applied where the case 
 
98 Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1036 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (alteration added).  The court in 
Atkins observed that, “[t]he rule of necessity was a part of the English common law and has been 
traced back to 1430 and the Year Books.”  Id .   
99 In re Howes, 880 N.W.2d at 201 (citing Weinstock v. Holden, 995 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Mo. 1999)).  
Under the rule of necessity, our own procedures provide that “[r]ather than deny a party access to 
court, judicial disqualification yields to the demands of necessity.”  Supr. Ct. Internal Op. Proc. 
XIX(2).  See also id. (“The rule of necessity has been invoked where disqualifications exist as to 
all members of the state judiciary who would normally hear a matter.”). 
100 See Fields v. Elected Officials’ Ret. Plan, 320 P.3d 1160, 1164 (Ariz. 2014) (invoking the rule 
of necessity where the Justices were all members of the plan at issue); Bd. of Trs. of Pub. Emps.’ 
Ret. Fund v. Hill, 472 N.E.2d 204, 206 (Ind. 1985) (applying the rule of necessity in a case 
involving calculation of judicial retirement benefits); Weinstock, 995 S.W.2d at 410 (stating that 
“[w]hile this particular case involves judicial review of a ‘concurrent resolution’ relating to judicial 
pay rather than a statute, no doubt exists that all judges of the state, whether active or senior, have 
a potential stake in the outcome of the case,” and “[u]nless the rule of necessity is applied, the 
parties can have no judicial resolution of their rights”).   
101 See Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654, 662 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that rule of 
necessity applied where all federal judges would have an interest in a case challenging a statute 
that required federal judges to file annual personal financial statements.). 
102 See In re P.L. 2001, Chapter 362, 895 A.2d 1128, 1131, 1143 (N.J. 2006) (invoking rule of 
necessity in a case challenging a statute that would “fatally compromise[] the independence of the 
judiciary” by creating in the administrative office of the courts “a law enforcement unit comprised 
of no less than two hundred probation officers” and directing the New Jersey Supreme Court to 
promulgate rules for the new unit).  
32 
 
involves a legal issue that was within the special province of the members of the allegedly 
disqualified court to decide,103 or where an issue of disqualification involved all of the 
members of an appellate court, which made designation more problematic.104  Similarly, 
courts frequently hold that the rule of necessity allows judges to hear a case involving an 
“indiscriminate[]” litigant who has filed an action that names all of the judges in a particular 
jurisdiction as defendants.105  Application of the rule in such instances responds to those 
who filed litigation as a tactical effort to “manipulate the random assignment of judges.”106  
The rule of necessity exists in Delaware and requires conflicted judges to hear cases 
if there is no other judge able to do so.  As we said in Nellius v. Stiftel: 
The members of this Court would prefer not to sit in this appeal.  But this 
Court must recognize its responsibility to keep the doors of the Court open 
to every litigant.  The law is clear.  When the right of a litigant to be heard 
conflicts with the policy against decisions by interested judges, the former 
prevails.  The Court is the guardian of that right and we will not avoid our 
 
103 See, e.g., N.Y. State Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers v. Kaye, 744 N.E.2d 123, 126–27 (N.Y. 
2000)  (holding that the rule of necessity compelled the participation of the members of the New 
York Court of Appeals in a case challenging an administrative directive of that court, because that 
court “has primary responsibility for the administration of the judicial branch of government, and 
some administrative rule-making powers are vested exclusively in the Court of Appeals.”).   
104 Id.; see also Ignacio v. Judges of U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 453 F.3d 1160, 1165 
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the rule of necessity “should be extended to circumstances like this 
where a litigant has named uncritically all the judges of this circuit,” and rejecting “the contention 
that the ability to bring in judges from other circuits to hear the case precludes the application of 
the rule of necessity as this would be the pragmatic equivalent of having the case transferred out 
of circuit.”).   
105 See Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Construction and Application of Rule of Necessity in 
Judicial Actions, Providing that a Judge Is Not Disqualified to Try a Case Because of Personal 
Interest If Case Cannot Be Heard Otherwise, 27 A.L.R. 6th 403 §§ 14–15 (2007) (collecting 
federal and state cases, including those where plaintiff had sued all of the judges in a jurisdiction 
or would likely sue any judge assigned). 
106 In re BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d 941, 956–59, n.7 (11th Cir. 2003). 
33 
 
responsibility.107 
 
In Nellius, an action related to judicial compensation, the rule of necessity required the 
conflicted members of this Court to hear the case only so long as the Governor declined to 
exercise his power to appoint unconflicted Justices ad litem to sit in their stead.108   
Later, in Crosse v. BCBSD, Inc., citing the rule of necessity, this Court heard a case 
involving the health insurer with whom every Justice had coverage without resort to 
gubernatorial ad litem appointments.109  We observed that under those circumstances, 
recusal would have been an impracticable result.110    
All of the Judicial Officers of the Court of Chancery were named as defendants in 
 
107 402 A.2d 359, 361–62 (Del. 1978). 
108 See id. at 362 (“If the matter is not resolved and if the Governor elects not to commission judges 
Ad litem before argument day, the members of this Court, under the rule of necessity, will grant 
plaintiffs’ application and, notwithstanding their declared interest, will hear and decide this 
appeal.”); see also Del. Const. art IV, § 15 (“The Governor shall have power to commission a 
judge or judges ad litem to sit in any cause in any of said Courts when by reason of legal exception 
to the Judges authorized to sit therein, or for other cause, there are not a sufficient number of 
Judges available to hold such Court.”). 
109 836 A.2d 492, 493 n.1 (Del. 2003). 
110 Id.  But see Dacey v. Conn. Bar Ass’n, 441 A.2d 49, 51 (Conn. 1981) (indicating that the rule 
of necessity would not require a trial court judge, who was disqualified because he was a member 
of the bar association that was a party in the case, to sit in a case if other judges who were not 
members of the bar association could be reassigned); Lorenz v. N.H. Admin. Office of the Courts, 
858 A.2d 546, 549 (N.H. 2004) (recusing the entire New Hampshire Supreme Court in a case 
challenging an administrative directive of the court, conditioned “upon there being substitute 
judges available to sit on this case” by designation); State ex rel. Bardacke v. Welsh, 698 P.2d 462, 
475 (N.M. 1985) (declining to apply the rule of necessity when a judge from another court could 
be designated to hear a case); Hooker v. Haslam, 393 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tenn. 2012) (stating that 
even if all the judges in Tennessee would be disqualified because the case implicated an economic 
interest for all of them (because, for example, the outcome might affect their salaries), the rule of 
necessity would not apply because Tennessee law contained provisions that would allow the 
governor to appoint “special judges” with no economic interest in the litigation).     
34 
 
the DelCOG Litigation.  Thus, Roche contends that the rule of necessity permitted Vice 
Chancellor Parsons to preside in the Meso Litigation because all of the other members of 
the court would face the same alleged disqualifying interest—representation by then-
Attorney Bouchard in the DelCOG Litigation.  Meso counters that the rule of necessity did 
not apply because Delaware law authorizes the Chief Justice to designate a judge of another 
court to sit in the Court of Chancery.   
The trial court did not address this point,111 and we think it would be unwise for us 
to do so in the first instance and on a purely advisory basis.  We recognize that litigants file 
in the Court of Chancery based upon its well-deserved reputation of excellence and 
expertise in deciding certain types of matters.  A party’s choice of forum is an important 
aspect of a party’s litigation strategy.  We also emphasize the paramount importance of 
avoiding situations where a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned as judicial 
impartiality is fundamental to the administration of justice and the rule of law.  Meso is 
correct that mechanisms exist in Delaware for designating judges from another trial court 
to handle a matter if all judges on a court are unable to sit on a case.112  Such a decision to 
 
111 See Order at 7–8 (discussing defendants’ arguments relating to “official capacity” suits and the 
rule of necessity, and stating that “[w]hile defendants have raised persuasive arguments on these 
fronts, I don’t reach these questions because I don’t have to.”).   
112 Del. Const. art IV, § 13(2) empowers the Chief Justice, upon written request from the 
Chancellor or President Judge of one of the trial courts, or the next most senior Vice-Chancellor 
or Judge should that position be empty, to assign a Judge or Justice from another court to sit on 
the requesting court by designation for a specified case and period of time in order to hear and 
decide the matter.  See, e.g. Humanigen, Inc. v. Savant Neglected Diseases, LLC, 238 A.3d 194, 
198 n.10 (Del. Super. 2020) (appointing a judge of the Superior Court to sit as a Vice Chancellor 
over a case consolidated from complaints filed in both courts) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG 
Ins. Co., 2006 WL 3742596, at *4 n.27 (Del. Ch. Dec. 12, 2006)). 
35 
 
apply the rule of necessity and to designate a judge from another trial court to hear the case 
obviously can potentially affect not only the parties’ litigation strategy, but also both 
courts’ resources, particularly in highly complex cases that involve extensive pre-trial, trial 
and post-trial proceedings.  The complications posed by and arising from such dual 
representations are obvious.113       
The Vice Chancellor did not decide whether recusal was required in this case, and 
he concluded that he did not need to reach the constitutional questions “because, even if 
Meso has identified a due process violation, Meso very clearly has not satisfied the 
requirement of Court of Chancery Rule 60(b) to obtain relief from a final judgment.”114  
We agree.115  We nevertheless have discussed the ethical principles at some length to 
reinforce that such dual representation situations should be avoided and that the need for 
vigilance at the outset of a case is imperative.  A judge who finds herself in such a situation 
should follow the procedure set forth in Los — assuming the judge has no actual bias or 
prejudice, the judge must examine the facts and circumstances of the particular case to 
determine whether the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.  We 
acknowledge Meso’s concerns, and we agree with Meso that even though it asserts no 
 
113 Complicating this matter further is the fact that then-Attorney Bouchard was not counsel of 
record for the Judicial Officers until after the matter was appealed to the Third Circuit. 
114 Order at 9.   
115 See Downs v. Jacobs, 272 A.2d 706, 708 (Del. 1970) (“[i]t is the settled policy of this Court 
that a constitutional question will not be decided unless its determination is essential to the 
disposition of a case.”).  As we said in Downs, “[w]e consider that policy of judicial restraint to be 
an important element in the orderly administration of justice.”  Id.   
36 
 
claim of any actual bias or prejudice on his part, the Vice Chancellor, at a minimum, should 
have disclosed the representation on the record.116  Meso then would have had the option 
of waiving the conflict,117 or formally seeking the Vice Chancellor’s recusal thereby 
allowing the recusal issues to be addressed in the proceeding directly instead of years later 
in a collateral challenge to a final judgment after trial where additional issues come into 
play.118   
 
116 See, e.g. Stevenson v. State, 782 A.2d at 257 (“When a judge knows, or as soon as a judge 
discovers, facts that would lead a reasonable person to question his or her impartiality in a 
particular matter, it is essential that he or she promptly disclose that information.  Following the 
prompt disclosure of such information, a judge should engage in the two-part inquiry under Los.  
In addition, prompt disclosure of such information permits the timely filing of a motion for recusal, 
which would require the trial judge to engage in the objective analysis of the appearance of 
impropriety mandated by Los.”).   
117 See Oral Argument video at 6:30 – 8:39 https://livestream.com/accounts/5969852/events/ 
9376922/videos/214637158/player: 
Meso’s Counsel: “[I]t is correct that if he had, if Vice Chancellor Parsons had 
disclosed this, that the parties could have waived the recusal violation, but he never 
did.” 
118 For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that “where the challenge is made for 
the first time after verdict, in post-trial motions or in arguments and briefs before the appellate 
courts, different considerations come into play.”  Reilly v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 489 A.2d 1291, 
1301 (Pa. 1985).  It stated in Reilly that: 
Charges of prejudice or unfairness made after trial expose the trial bench to ridicule 
and litigants to the uncertain collateral attack of adjudications upon which they have 
placed their reliance.  One of the strengths of our system of justice is that once 
decisions are made by our tribunals, they are left undisturbed.  Litigants are given 
their opportunity to present their cause and once that opportunity has passed, we 
are loathe to reopen the controversy for another airing, save for the greatest of need.  
This must be so for the security of the bench and the successful administration of 
justice.  Accordingly, rules have developed for the overturning of verdicts and 
judgments for after-acquired evidence.  In our view, recusal motions raised after 
verdict should be treated no differently than other after-acquired evidence situations 
which compel the proponent to show that:  1) the evidence could not have been 
brought to the attention of the trial court in the exercise of due diligence, and 2) the 
existence of the evidence would have compelled a different result in the case.  
37 
 
With that backdrop, we turn to the Rule 60(b) analysis.   
V. 
Rule 60(b) Analysis 
Questions concerning the impartiality of a trial court potentially affect the 
administration of justice in a fundamental way.  It is important that our courts maintain the 
trust and confidence of the public.  Where such a challenge arises in the context of a 
collateral attack, and in this case, five years after a full trial on the merits (and before a trial 
judge who all agree harbored no actual bias), additional public policy considerations must 
be considered.119  Court of Chancery Rule 60(b) is designed to address collateral challenges 
generally.  Various courts have considered additional factors when the collateral challenges 
arise in the recusal/disqualification setting as explained next.     
“Court of Chancery Rule 60(b) permits a party to seek relief from a final judgment 
or order.”120  It recognizes six categories of justification for such relief.  Rule 60(b)(4) 
applies when “the judgment is void,” whereas Rule 60(b)(6) is the residual catchall, 
applying to “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.”121  
Relief under this residual category requires a showing of an “extraordinary situation or 
 
Id.  Applying this test, the court dismissed the attempt “to force the recusal of the trial judge in 
post-trial fashion” since there was no showing that the evidence relied on for recusal was 
unavailable during trial in the exercise of due diligence or that the existence of the evidence would 
have compelled a different outcome in the case.  Id. at 1302. 
119 Vice Chancellor Parsons entered final judgment in Meso v. Roche on June 25, 2014.  Meso 
filed its complaint seeking vacatur on February 28, 2019.   
120 MCA, Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 785 A.2d 625, 634 (Del. 2001); see also 
Chaverri v. Dole Food Co., -- A.3d ---, 2021 WL 99505, at *6 (Del. Jan. 21, 2021) (“Superior 
Court Rule 60 controls motions to vacate a judgment.”). 
121 Del. Ct. Ch. R. 60(b)(6). 
38 
 
circumstances.”122  Even on such a showing, the movant is “obliged to act without 
unreasonable delay” in making a Rule 60(b)(6) motion or relief will be denied.123     
The decision whether to grant vacatur under Rule 60(b)(6) lies in the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will be disturbed only for an abuse of that discretion.124  In 
exercising its discretion, the trial court must consider two significant public policy 
objectives, which may be in tension in the particular case before it: “[t]he first is ensuring 
the integrity of the judicial process and the second, countervailing consideration is the 
finality of judgments.”125  However, under Rule 60(b)(4), that discretion is extremely 
limited, since “either a judgment is void or it is valid.”126 
A. Rule 60(b)(4): The Underlying Judgment is Not Void 
Meso contends that the Court of Chancery erred in dismissing its claim for relief 
under Rule 60(b)(4).  Rule 60(b)(4) allows a judgment to be vacated if the judgment is 
“void.”  Roche contends that the Vice Chancellor correctly held that recusal violations 
render a judgment voidable, as opposed to void.  We agree with Roche.   
 
122 Jewell v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 401 A.2d 88, 90 (Del 1979).  Recently we reiterated that, “[r]elief 
under Rule 60(b)(6) is an extraordinary remedy which requires a showing of ‘extraordinary 
circumstances.’”  Chaverri, -- A.3d ---, 2021 WL 99505, at *6. 
123 Schremp v. Marvel, 405 A.2d 119, 120 (Del. 1979) (per curiam). 
124 Cox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 239 A.2d 706, 707 (Del. 1967). 
125 MCA, Inc., 785 A.2d at 634.      
126 Id. at 634, n.8 (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 2862 (1995)); see also Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir. 
1998) (“When, however, the motion is based on a void judgment under rule 60(b)(4), the [trial 
court] has no discretion, the judgment is either void or it is not.”) (quoting Recreational Props., 
Inc. v. Sw. Mortg. Serv. Corp., 804 F.2d 311, 313–14 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
39 
 
Our decision in Copeland v. Manuel127 virtually controls Meso’s first issue on 
appeal.  Except for the most extreme cases, as discussed below, a challenge to the judge’s 
impartiality sounds in voidability, not voidness, and is outside the bounds of Rule 60(b)(4).  
In Copeland, two judges recused themselves during the conduct of a civil suit involving a 
dentist, resulting in the case’s transfer to a third judge.  The dentist ceased attending pretrial 
conferences thereafter, and failed to attend the trial, resulting in a judgment against him.  
After the plaintiff executed judgment and the scheduling of a sheriff sale of the dentist’s 
property, the dentist belatedly moved under Rule 60(b) to vacate on the grounds that the 
judgment impermissibly relied on pretrial orders from the recused judges.128 
In denying relief, this Court reiterated the common law rule that “the judgments of 
disqualified judges were deemed as voidable but not void.”129  We determined that a Rule 
60(b) attack on the judge’s impartiality requires a showing of “extraordinary 
circumstances,” suggesting that Rule 60(b)(6) applies and not Rule 60(b)(4).   
Meso, citing Copeland, acknowledges in its opening brief that “mere recusal 
violations do not create ‘void’ judgments under Rule 60(b)(4),”130 but argues that the 
United States Supreme Court in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. modified and 
superseded this rule, rendering the judgment void “if the failure to recuse is so severe that 
 
127 653 A.2d 304, 1994 WL 665257 (Del. Nov. 22, 1994) (TABLE).   
128 Id. at *1. 
129 Id. at *2. 
130 See Op. Br. at 16 (“To be sure, mere recusal violations do not create ‘void’ judgments under 
Rule 60(b)(4)”) (citing Copeland, 1994 WL 665257, at *2). 
40 
 
it deprives a litigant of due process.”131  But Caperton was a case on direct appeal from an 
appellate court decision in which the allegedly conflicted jurist participated.132  The 
Caperton Court made no mention of Rule 60(b) at all, and made no comment on when a 
judgment is void.133   
Moreover, Meso’s claim presents none of the factual scenarios that Caperton 
identified as sufficiently extreme to presume a violation of due process.  First, as Caperton 
acknowledges, actual bias is disqualifying.134  Here, Meso does not argue that Vice 
Chancellor Parsons was actually biased.  In fact, it affirmatively agrees that he was not.  
Other scenarios identified  in Caperton that could constitute a violation of due process are 
when “a judge ha[s] a financial interest in the outcome of a case,”135 or when a judge 
“participat[es] in an earlier proceeding” in the case in the effective capacity as a 
 
131 Id. (citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 877 (2009)). 
132 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 875–76.     
133 Accordingly, the Court of Chancery concluded that neither Caperton nor Williams v. 
Pennsylvania, 136 S.Ct. 1899 (2016) changed the “traditional” view that failures to recuse fall 
outside Rule 60(b)(4).  Order at 12–13. 
134 See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881, 883 (although proof of actual bias is not required, “actual bias, 
if disclosed, no doubt would be grounds for appropriate relief.”).   
135 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 877–78 (discussing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (holding that 
the defendant was deprived of due process where judge’s compensation was derived from fines 
assessed in cases over which he presided)).   
41 
 
prosecutor.136  Another is when a judge “becomes embroiled in a running, bitter 
controversy” with a litigant.137  None of those apply here.    
The Supreme Court in Caperton also made clear that a failure to comply with a 
state’s judicial conduct rules does not necessarily translate into a due process violation.   
Constitutional principles operate on matters of recusal as well, since due process 
“guarantees ‘an absence of actual bias’ on the part of a judge.”138  As the Supreme Court 
explained, the Due Process Clause “demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial 
disqualifications.”139  States remain free to impose more rigorous recusal standards than 
what the Due Process Clause requires.140  Consequently, as the Supreme Court recognized, 
 
136 Id. at 880–81 (discussing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 133 (1955) (holding that the judge 
could not preside over the defendant’s trial for contempt when he had acted as a ‘one-man grand 
jury’ in bringing the contempt charges.)).  
137 Id. at 881 (discussing Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971) (judge ‘vilified’ by 
defendant could not preside over defendant’s criminal contempt proceedings as “[n]o one so 
cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that calm detachment necessary for fair adjudication.”)).   
138 Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (2016).  See also Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876 
(“It is axiomatic that a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”) (internal 
quotation and alteration omitted)); Los, 595 A.2d at 383 (“The requirement that judges be impartial 
is a fundamental principle of the administration of justice.  To that end, rules of disqualification 
have evolved to ensure that no judge shall preside in a case in which he is not disinterested and 
impartial.  As a matter of due process, a litigant is entitled to neutrality on the part of the presiding 
judge but the standards governing disqualification also require the appearance of impartiality.”). 
139 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889.   
140 Id.  See also Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291, 296 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating that “[a] litigant is 
denied the fundamental fairness to which he is constitutionally entitled if the judge of his case is 
unfairly biased against him.  However, a litigant is not denied due process by either the 
‘appearance’ of partiality or by circumstances which might lead one to speculate as to a judge’s 
impartiality.  A litigant is denied due process if he is in fact treated unfairly.”).  Thus, the Seventh 
Circuit found the standards set forth by the federal recusal statute to be “largely irrelevant” and the 
cases based on it “not particularly helpful” to resolving the Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate the 
42 
 
most disputes over disqualification will be resolved without resort to the Constitution.141 
Following Caperton, in United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, the United 
States Supreme Court emphasized that “Rule 60(b)(4) applies only in the rare instance 
where a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a 
violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.”142  
Thus, the courts have declined to find an unconstitutional risk of bias except in a few 
extreme circumstances.143  Meso acknowledged throughout these proceedings that it has 
no case supporting its view that a failure to recuse would fall within Rule 60(b)(4).144 
 
judgment based on an alleged violation of due process because the federal recusal statute “goes 
beyond ‘due process.’”  Id. 
141 Id. at 890.   
142 559 U.S. 260, 271, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1377, 176 L. Ed. 2d 158 (2010); see also id. at 270 (“[t]he 
list of . . . infirmities” that will render a judgment void is “exceedingly short; otherwise, Rule 
60(b)(4)’s exception to finality would swallow the rule.”).   
143 See, e.g., Johnson v. Morales, 946 F.3d 911, 918 n.3 (6th Cir. 2020) (the Supreme Court “has 
declined to find an unconstitutional risk of bias in all but a few narrow circumstances”); United 
States v. Williams, 949 F.3d 1056, 1061–62 (7th Cir. 2020) (discussing the “limited set of 
circumstances” where due process requires recusal); United States v. Richardson, 796 F. App’x 
795, 799–800 (4th Cir. 2019) (unpublished decision) (rejecting due process claim that did not 
involve any of the “extraordinary situation[s]” in which the Supreme Court has held that “the 
Constitution  requires recusal”) cert. denied 140 S. Ct. 2750 (2020).   
144 See Oral Argument video at 17:58 – 18:15 https://livestream.com/accounts/5969852/events/ 
9376922/videos/214637158/player: 
Meso’s Counsel: “To your first question, that is correct, we do not have a case 
where there is a due process violation for an appearance of impartiality, of bias 
under Caperton and Williams that rendered the judgment void.” 
See also Order at 12 (observing that “Meso has not cited a single case where the Court vacated a 
judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) for a judge’s alleged unconstitutional failure to recuse.”).   
43 
 
As a matter of pleading, Meso’s complaint falls well short of alleging any such 
extreme circumstance.  The Court of Chancery found that even though Meso had access to 
the records in both the Meso v. Roche case as well as the DelCOG litigation, “the best the 
complaint can muster is that Vice Chancellor Parsons ‘may’ have felt a ‘debt of gratitude’ 
to then-attorney Bouchard.”145  The court also concluded that “Meso’s vague and 
conclusory allegations in paragraph 33 of the complaint that Vice Chancellor Parsons 
‘may’ have had communications with then-attorney Bouchard concerning the federal 
litigation that ‘touch[ed] [up]on’ Meso’s ‘case’ is not even close to being well-pled.”146  
We agree with the trial court that Meso’s allegations, which are merely speculative and 
conclusory, do not rise to the level of alleging unconstitutional bias that would render the 
judgment void under Rule 60(b)(4).   
B. Meso Fails to Plead Extraordinary Circumstances 
Meso’s Rule 60(b)(6) argument fares no better.  Where a litigant seeks Rule 60(b)(6) 
relief based on a failure to recuse, we endorse and adopt the two-part test used by the Court 
of Chancery.  A litigant must show that she acted promptly and without delay to seek relief 
upon learning of the alleged conflict, and that the alleged conflict was of an extraordinary 
character as analyzed under the three Liljeberg factors.  The Court of Chancery correctly 
determined that Meso has done neither.   
At the outset, the Court of Chancery examined the careful language in Meso’s 
 
145 Id. at 7.   
146 Id. at 22. 
44 
 
pleading as to its lack of knowledge of the dual representation.  The relevant language in 
Meso’s complaint is that “[t]he investigation confirmed that no one at Meso was aware of 
Mr. Bouchard’s representation of Vice Chancellor Parsons.”147  The court found that Meso 
had not pled that its agents, including its former counsel, were unaware of the 
representation and, therefore, “Meso is not entitled to reasonable inferences flowing from 
facts it has not pled.”148  We agree with the Court of Chancery’s decision not to infer facts 
that were not pled.   
But even setting aside that aspect of the delay analysis, the Court of Chancery found 
Meso’s delay in seeking Rule 60(b)(6) relief unreasonable and incompatible with the 
timeliness requirement.  A party seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is “obliged to act 
without unreasonable delay.”149  Whether a delay is reasonable or not is a matter committed 
to the sound discretion of the trial judge.150  To find an abuse of that discretion, “there must 
be a showing that the trial court acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”151   
 
147 App. to Op. Br. at A021 (Complaint).   
148 Order at 18 (“With no allegation that its attorneys were ignorant of the unrelated and highly 
publicized federal litigation, and now-Chancellor Bouchard’s representation of the members of the 
Court of Chancery in that case, it is not reasonable to infer Meso has exercised diligence as is 
required under Rule 60(b)(6) and our Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Shipley vs. New Castle 
County.”); see also Copeland, 1994 WL 665257, at *2 (“A party who fails to raise a 
disqualification issue may not seek to set aside the results of a trial when knowledge of the 
disqualification was known to the party during trial.”).   
149 Schremp, 405 A.2d at 120. 
150 Brown v. Comegys, 567 A.2d 34, 1989 WL 90728, at *1 (Del. July 31, 1989) (TABLE). 
151 Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 81 A.3d 1264, 1268 (Del. 2013) (quoting Spencer 
v. Wal–Mart Stores E., LP, 930 A.2d 881, 887 (Del.2007)). 
45 
 
Meso makes no such showing.  To the contrary, the record supports the court’s 
decision not to credit Meso’s justification that its delay was founded on difficulties in 
obtaining counsel.  Of the year-long delay, Meso explains that it took half that time to 
obtain lead counsel, and the other half to obtain local Delaware counsel.  The trial court 
was justifiably troubled by “Meso’s alleged wandering from firm to firm over the course 
of a year -- particularly when it knew that the judgment it would seek to vacate was already 
three years old.”152  Further, the trial court specifically noted that Meso’s eventually-
obtained local Delaware counsel was plaintiff’s counsel in the DelCOG Litigation.153  We 
conclude that the Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion in determining that, under 
the particular circumstances of this case, Meso’s delay was unreasonable. 
Where a Rule 60(b)(6) application is untimely, we need not reach the merits of the 
underlying claim for relief,154 which in the case of an alleged failure to recuse is whether 
the conflict was of an “extraordinary character,” considering the Liljeberg factors.  But, for 
the sake of completeness, we also find no error with that aspect of the Court of Chancery’s 
analysis.   
 
152 Order at 19.  As we recently decided, a trial court is within its discretion to find a seven month 
wait unreasonable if it finds the litigant’s justification for delay inadequate.  Chaverri, -- A.3d ---
, 2021 WL 99505, at *9. 
153 Order at 19 (“Although not ultimately dispositive, I take judicial notice of the fact that [Meso’s] 
search coincidently led it to the same Delaware firm that represented the coalition in the federal 
litigation.”).   
154 Schremp, 405 A.2d at 120. 
46 
 
The three Liljeberg factors relevant in Rule 60(b)(6) motions for undisclosed 
conflicts are (1) the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, (2) the risk that the 
denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and (3) the risk of undermining the 
public’s confidence in the judicial process.155   
As to the first factor, Meso readily concedes that Vice Chancellor Parsons was 
unbiased as to them.156  Absent Rule 60(b)(6) relief, Meso remains bound by an adverse 
judgment entered against it but that judgment occurred following trial before a judge who 
Meso admits harbored no actual bias.  By contrast, the Court of Chancery noted that 
granting relief inflicts on Roche the reopening of a case long-since completed, with the 
attendant expense and difficulty of re-litigating that which was already litigated to 
completion.157  The court found that Meso had failed to allege anything other than vague 
and conclusory allegations relating to a risk of injustice.  We agree with the Court of 
Chancery’s assessment of the complaint and the conclusion that “[t]o support that serious 
charge [of injustice] under Rule 8 and the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, Meso would need to 
 
155 486 U.S. at 864.  The United States Supreme Court’s analysis is fact-specific and allows room 
for some element of harmless error.  See id. at 862 (“As in other areas of the law, there is surely 
room for harmless error committed by busy judges who inadvertently overlook a disqualifying 
circumstance.”).  Here, the trial court found that “Meso has not overcome the Liljeberg harmless 
error admonition.”  Order at 21.   
156 E.g. App. to Ans. Br. at B349 (Motion to Dismiss Oral Argument Transcript) (“We [Meso] are 
in no way impugning the motives, intentions, actions other than the failure to observe the rules by 
Vice Chancellor Parsons.  We have tried to make that clear in our papers.  If we haven’t, I’d like 
to make it clear this morning.  We hold him in the highest possible regard.”). 
157 Order at 21 (finding that, “[v]acatur would severely prejudice defendants who prevailed after 
a five-day trial in Meso’s unsuccessful appeal to our Supreme Court,” and that, “on the other hand, 
Meso has not well-pled that it will suffer an injustice if it is denied relief.”). 
47 
 
muster well-pled factual allegations, not mere speculation.”158  We agree that the first 
Liljeberg factor thus weighs strongly against relief. 
As to the second factor — the risk that denial of relief will produce injustice in other 
cases — Meso concedes that other litigants are unlikely to suffer injustice absent relief.  
Before the trial court, Meso stated its belief that, had Vice Chancellor Parsons disclosed 
the conflict in every case for which then-Attorney Bouchard appeared before him, parties 
in many cases would have waived the conflict and in the remaining cases presumed they 
would have been satisfied by having other attorneys at his firm handle the case instead.159  
This concession weighs against a finding of extraordinary circumstances. 
As for the third factor of undermining public confidence in the judicial process, for 
judges’ “own” counsel in an unrelated matter to appear before them does have the potential 
to create the appearance of bias before the public against which all authorities caution.  We 
agree with Meso that Vice Chancellor Parsons should have disclosed Mr. Bouchard’s 
representation of him on the record.  Our discussion above discusses generally other factors 
that a court would consider in any recusal analysis if the parties, following disclosure on 
the record, had chosen not to waive the conflict.  We emphasize the importance of 
maintaining the public’s confidence in the judicial system and of guarding against 
situations where a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.  But ultimately, in 
 
158 Order at 22.   
159 See id. at 349–50 (“Had notice been given, in many of these cases, I’m quite confident, parties 
would have waived their rights.  It wouldn’t have been all 25 cases.  Other attorneys at then-
Attorney Bouchard’s firm could have handled them.”). 
48 
 
considering all three factors, we agree with the Vice Chancellor that “[o]n this complaint, 
it is not reasonable to infer Vice Chancellor Parsons’ alleged judicial ethics violation -- 
even assuming it occurred -- caused any reasonably conceivable harm, much less serious 
harm.”160 
Accordingly, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that these circumstances do 
not give rise to relief under Rule 60(b)(4) or Rule 60(b)(6).   
VI. 
Conclusion 
   
For the forgoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the Court of Chancery. 
 
160 Order at 23.