Title: Brennan v. Bergen County Prosecutor's Office
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: May 23, 2018

Brennan v. Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) required disclosure of the names and addresses of successful bidders at a public auction of government property. An auction was held at the Bergen County Law and Public Safety Institute to sell sports memorabilia seized by the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office. There were thirty-nine successful bidders. Plaintiff William Brennan submitted a request to the Prosecutor’s Office, based on OPRA and the common law, for “[r]ecords of payment received from all winning bidders” and “[c]ontact information for each winning bidder.” The Prosecutor’s Office offered redacted copies of receipts that did not include the buyers’ names or addresses. The Office explained that it had sent the buyers letters to ask if they would consent to disclosure of their personal information. For buyers who consented, the Office represented it would provide unredacted receipts. The trial court directed defendants to release the requested information under OPRA. The Supreme Court determined courts were not required to analyze the "Doe" factors each time a party asserts that a privacy interest exists. "A party must first present a colorable claim that public access to records would invade a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy." Here, defendants could not make that threshold showing. "It is not reasonable to expect that details about a public auction of government property -- including the names and addresses of people who bought the seized property -- will remain private. Without a review of the Doe factors, we find that OPRA calls for disclosure of records relating to the auction." The Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) William J. Brennan v. Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office (A-62-16) (078074)Argued January 17, 2018 -- Decided May 23, 2018RABNER, C.J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, requires disclosure of the names and addresses of successful bidders at a public auction of government property. An auction was held at the Bergen County Law and Public Safety Institute to sell sports memorabilia seized by the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office. There were thirty-nine successful bidders. Plaintiff William Brennan submitted a request to the Prosecutor’s Office, based on OPRA and the common law, for “[r]ecords of payment received from all winning bidders” and “[c]ontact information for each winning bidder.” The Prosecutor’s Office offered redacted copies of receipts that did not include the buyers’ names or addresses. The Office explained that it had sent the buyers letters to ask if they would consent to disclosure of their personal information. For buyers who consented, the Office represented it would provide unredacted receipts. Days later, plaintiff filed a complaint that asserted he was entitled to the requested records under OPRA and the common law right of access. The Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office and its custodian of records filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion but declined to order immediate disclosure. The court found that the winning bidders did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal information under OPRA. However, the court granted defendants ten more days to contact the winning bidders and advise them either to object to the release of their personal information or to move to intervene. The Prosecutor’s Office sent a letter to the successful bidders. Based on the responses, the Prosecutor’s Office declined to provide plaintiff the unredacted records. The trial court directed defendants to release the requested information under OPRA. The court analyzed defendants’ privacy argument under the factors outlined in Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 88 (1995), and found that the buyers’ privacy interest was “limited,” in that most names and addresses are already publicly available from various sources. Likewise, because the information was not “private,” the court found that the potential for harm was “relatively miniscule.” The court noted that plaintiff sought names and addresses, not social security numbers. As a result, any concern that disclosure would create a security risk for the buyers was “only speculative.” The Appellate Division reversed. The panel weighed the Doe factors and concluded that the buyers had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their names and addresses because the purchase of sports memorabilia could reveal that an individual is a collector and “could make the bidders targets of theft.” Finally, the panel observed that the interest in government accountability would not be served by disclosure. For similar reasons, the Appellate Division found that plaintiff was not entitled to disclosure under the common law. The Court granted plaintiff’s petition for certification. 230 N.J. 357 (2017).HELD: Courts are not required to analyze the Doe factors each time a party asserts that a privacy interest exists. A party must first present a colorable claim that public access to records would invade a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. It is not reasonable to expect that details about a public auction of government property will remain private. OPRA calls for disclosure of records relating to the auction.1. OPRA provides that “all government records shall be subject to public access unless exempt,” and “any limitations on the right of access . . . shall be construed in favor of the public’s right of access.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. 1 The law also places the burden on the public agency to prove that it appropriately denied a request. N.J.S.A. 47:1A- 6. At the same time, the statute declares that a public agency must “safeguard from public access a citizen’s personal information with which it has been entrusted when disclosure thereof would violate the citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 (emphasis added). (pp. 8-9)2. The statute lists twenty-three exemptions. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. Several exemptions encompass names and home addresses but prevent their release only in limited situations. Aside from those particular exemptions, however, OPRA does not contain a broad-based exception for the disclosure of names and home addresses that appear in government records. That issue has been debated before, and a report issued in 2004 recommended certain limits on disclosure. Neither the legislative nor the executive branch, by law or executive order, has adopted the recommendations. (pp. 9-12)3. In Burnett v. County of Bergen, the Court considered “a single request for eight million pages of land title records of all types, . . . which contain[ed] names, addresses, social security numbers, and signatures of countless citizens.” 198 N.J. 408, 414 (2009). To balance the statute’s competing aims—ready access to government records while safeguarding a citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy—the Court looked to the factors identified in Doe, 142 N.J. at 88. Id. at 428-37. The Court considered and balanced the factors and concluded that they weighed in favor of redacting social security numbers—not home addresses—from the requested records. Id. at 437-38. In Carter v. Doe (In re N.J. Firemen’s Ass’n Obligation), the Court once again turned to the Doe factors to analyze a privacy claim. 230 N.J. 258, 279-80 (2017). The plaintiff sought copies of financial assistance applications and hardship payments made to firefighters through the Firemen’s Association. Id. at 267-68. The Association noted that the records sought contained “the complete personal financial history of individual applicants.” Id. at 280. After a review of the Doe factors, the Court declined to order disclosure of the records. Ibid. (pp. 12-14)4. Neither Burnett nor Carter, however, requires courts to analyze the Doe factors every time a party asserts that a privacy interest exists. In Asbury Park Press v. County of Monmouth, for example, the Court saw “no reason to analyze the Doe factors” when disclosure “would not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy.” 201 N.J. 5, 7 (2010). As OPRA states, it is only “when disclosure . . . would violate the citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy” that a public agency must safeguard records from public access. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 (emphasis added). Before an extended analysis of the Doe factors is required, a custodian must present a colorable claim that public access to the records requested would invade a person’s objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. The custodians in Burnett and Carter raised serious privacy concerns that established far more than a colorable claim. The threshold showing they presented justified a searching analysis of the Doe factors. By contrast, the custodian in Asbury Park Press did not present a colorable privacy claim at the outset. When a claim of privacy falls short in that way, there is no need to resort to the Doe factors. (pp. 14-16)5. In this case, defendants did not present a colorable claim in support of their privacy argument. Forfeiture proceedings and public auctions of forfeited property are not conducted in private. Before the State can subject property to forfeiture, it must file a complaint and give notice to “any person known to have a property interest in the article.” N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3(a) to (c). If contested, the matter is then aired in court. N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3(f). In addition, the Legislature generally requires government entities to provide public notice in advance of a public auction. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 40A:14-157(a); N.J.S.A. 52:27B-68; N.J.S.A. 39:3-40.3(b)(1). Viewed objectively, it was unreasonable for a buyer to expect that the information requested would remain private. If anything, the sale of government property at a public auction is a quintessential public event that calls for transparency. To guard against possible abuses, the public has a right to know what property was sold, at what price, and to whom. OPRA’s plain terms call for disclosure of that type of recorded information, including the names and addresses of successful bidders. To hold otherwise would jeopardize OPRA’s purpose: to maximize public knowledge about public affairs in order to ensure an informed citizenry and to minimize the evils inherent in a secluded process. The privacy interest asserted in this case was limited, and the risk of harm was speculative. Because disclosure is required under OPRA, the Court does not reach plaintiff’s claim under the common law. (pp. 16-18) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the requested records are ordered disclosed. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 62 September Term 2016 078074WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.BERGEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE; FRANK PUCCIO, CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS FOR THE BERGEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, Defendants-Respondents. Argued January 17, 2018 – Decided May 23, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Donald F. Burke, Jr., argued the cause for appellant (Law Office of Donald F. Burke, attorney; Donald F. Burke, on the brief). Craig P. Bossong argued the cause for respondents (Florio Perrucci Steinhardt & Fader, attorneys; John M. Carbone, of Carbone and Faasse, on the brief). CJ Griffin argued the cause for amicus curiae Libertarians for Transparent Government (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; CJ Griffin, of counsel and on the brief). CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 In this appeal, we consider whether the Open Public RecordsAct (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, requires disclosure of thenames and addresses of successful bidders at a public auction ofgovernment property. The Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office seized sportsmemorabilia and later auctioned it off to the public. Plaintiffmade an OPRA request for the names and addresses of thesuccessful bidders. Citing privacy concerns, the Prosecutor’sOffice declined to produce that information. Plaintiff thenfiled a lawsuit to obtain the records under OPRA and the commonlaw, and the trial court ordered the records disclosed. TheAppellate Division looked to various factors outlined in Doe v.Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 88 (1995), to evaluate the request andassess defendants’ privacy argument. The panel concluded thatthe bidders had a reasonable expectation of privacy in theinformation sought and reversed. OPRA favors broad public access to government records. Atthe same time, it directs agencies to safeguard “a citizen’spersonal information . . . when disclosure . . . would violatethe citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy.” N.J.S.A.47:1A-1. In light of that language, courts are not required toanalyze the Doe factors each time a party asserts that a privacyinterest exists. A party must first present a colorable claim 2 that public access to records would invade a person’s reasonableexpectation of privacy. See ibid. Here, defendants could not make that threshold showing. Itis not reasonable to expect that details about a public auctionof government property -- including the names and addresses ofpeople who bought the seized property -- will remain private.Without a review of the Doe factors, we find that OPRA calls fordisclosure of records relating to the auction. We thereforereverse the judgment of the Appellate Division. I. On May 3, 2014, an auction was held at the Bergen CountyLaw and Public Safety Institute to sell sports memorabiliaseized by the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office. TheProsecutor’s Office hired Caspert Management Company, a privateauctioneer, to conduct the auction. Bidders could participate in the auction either in personor online. All live bidders completed a registration form thatasked them to list their names, addresses, telephone numbers,and e-mail addresses. They were assigned a paddle number to useat the auction. Online bidders were also assigned a paddlenumber. At oral argument, counsel for the Prosecutor’s Officerepresented that online bidders had to present the same personalinformation to participate. 3 There were thirty-nine successful bidders. Successful livebidders received receipts that listed only their paddle numbers;no personal information appeared on the receipts. Successfulonline bidders got receipts that listed their paddle numbers,names, and addresses. After a news report raised questionsabout whether the auctioned items were authentic, theProsecutor’s Office offered the buyers refunds. On December 9, 2014, plaintiff William Brennan submitted arequest to the Prosecutor’s Office, based on OPRA and the commonlaw, for “[r]ecords of payment received from all winningbidders,” “[c]ontact information for each winning bidder,” andother records relating to the contract with Caspert. (Thelatter category of records is not part of this appeal.) Inresponse, the Prosecutor’s Office offered redacted copies ofreceipts that did not include the buyers’ names or addresses.The Office explained that it had sent the buyers letters to askif they would consent to disclosure of their personalinformation. For buyers who consented, the Office representedit would provide unredacted receipts. Plaintiff did not pick upthe compact disc of redacted receipts that was prepared. Days later, plaintiff filed a complaint that asserted hewas entitled to the requested records under OPRA and the commonlaw right of access. Plaintiff also alleged violations of theState Constitution and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act but later 4 withdrew those claims before the trial court. The complaintnamed as defendants the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office andits custodian of records, who filed an answer and a motion todismiss. In a written decision dated February 25, 2015, theHonorable Peter E. Doyne, then Assignment Judge for the BergenVicinage, denied the motion to dismiss but declined to orderimmediate disclosure. The court found that the winning biddersdid not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in theirpersonal information under OPRA. “[I]n light of defendants’good faith attempt to comply with the request and the state’sobligation to safeguard personal information,” however, thecourt granted defendants ten more days to contact the winningbidders and advise them either to object to the release of theirpersonal information or to move to intervene. The Prosecutor’s Office, in turn, informed the court thatit sent a letter to the thirty-nine successful bidders; thatnineteen responded; and that all but three objected to therelease of their personal information. Based on the responses,the Prosecutor’s Office declined to provide plaintiff theunredacted records. On June 12, 2015, the Honorable Bonnie J. Mizdol, theVicinage’s new Assignment Judge, issued a written opinion thatdirected defendants to release the requested information under 5 OPRA. The trial court analyzed defendants’ privacy argumentunder the Doe factors. The court found that the buyers’ privacyinterest was “limited,” in that most names and addresses arealready publicly available from various sources. Likewise,because the information was not “private,” the court found thatthe potential for harm was “relatively miniscule.” The courtnoted that plaintiff sought names and addresses, not socialsecurity numbers. As a result, any concern that disclosurewould create a security risk for the buyers was “onlyspeculative.” The Appellate Division reversed. To determine whether therecords were shielded under OPRA’s privacy clause, the panelweighed the Doe factors. The panel concluded that the buyershad a reasonable expectation of privacy in their names andaddresses -- the same level of confidentiality they could expectat an auction of private property. The panel disagreed with thetrial court that “the privacy interest in one’s name and addressis 'very limited.’” Because the purchase of sports memorabiliacould reveal that an individual is a collector, the panel foundthat the buyers’ privacy interests were heightened. The panelalso disagreed with the conclusion that the buyers’ concernswere too speculative because disclosure of the receipts andregistration forms “could make the bidders targets of theft.”Finally, the panel observed that the interest in government 6 accountability would not be served by disclosure because the“bidders were not responsible for any government actions inconnection with the auction.” For similar reasons, theAppellate Division found that plaintiff was not entitled todisclosure under the common law. We granted plaintiff’s petition for certification. 230 N.J. 357 (2017). We also granted leave to appear as amicuscuriae to Libertarians for Transparent Government. II. Plaintiff argues that the Appellate Division erred inallowing the Prosecutor’s Office to withhold the names andaddresses of the bidders. Plaintiff contends that the rulingfailed to adhere to OPRA’s presumption of openness; that namesand addresses are not exempt under OPRA; that prior ExecutiveOrders and legislative history support that conclusion; that theruling starkly contrasts with precedent; and that the Doefactors favor disclosure here. Defendants argue that the Appellate Division appropriatelyanalyzed the Doe factors and correctly denied disclosure.Defendants agree with the panel’s findings that the buyers had areasonable expectation that their personal information wouldremain private; that disclosure would place the buyers at riskby linking them to the ownership of valuable sports memorabilia;and that the release of information would serve no public 7 purpose. Defendants also maintain that the records should notbe released under the common law. Amicus Libertarians for Transparent Government argues thatthe names and addresses of purchasers of government propertymust be disclosed in order to guard against corruption andwrongdoing. Amicus also contends that courts have “over-applied” Burnett v. County of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408 (2009), whichadopted the Doe factors for OPRA cases. According to amicus,this Court has previously rejected attempts to “over-apply” theDoe factors and should do so again. In addition, amicus submitsthat an analysis of the Doe factors is not warranted in casesthat involve home addresses alone. III. OPRA calls for “ready access to government records” by thepublic. Burnett, 198 N.J. at 421. The statute provides that“all government records shall be subject to public access unlessexempt,” and “any limitations on the right of access . . . shallbe construed in favor of the public’s right of access.”N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. The law also places the burden on the publicagency to prove that it appropriately denied a request.N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. OPRA broadly defines the term “government record.” Thephrase includes any documents “made, maintained or kept on filein the course of . . . official business.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. 8 At the same time, the statute declares that a public agency must“safeguard from public access a citizen’s personal informationwith which it has been entrusted when disclosure thereof wouldviolate the citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 (emphasis added). The meaning of that privacyclause is central to this appeal. The statute lists twenty-three exemptions. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. None, however, provide an overarching exception for thedisclosure of names or home addresses. One exceptionspecifically prevents public access to the following personalinformation: “that portion of any document which discloses thesocial security number, credit card number, unlisted telephonenumber or driver license number of any person.” Ibid. UnderN.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(a), custodians must redact that informationfrom government records before allowing access to them. Theexemption, however, does not mention or protect names or homeaddresses. Several other exemptions encompass names and home addressesbut prevent their release only in limited situations. Personalidentifying information -- including a person’s name and address-- is exempt from disclosure when received “in connection withthe issuance of any license authorizing hunting with a firearm.”N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. “Personal firearms records” -- including aperson’s name and address -- which are “contained in a 9 background investigation . . . of any applicant for a permit topurchase a handgun, firearms identification card license, orfirearms registration” are also exempt. Ibid. In addition, OPRA protects crime victims whose personalinformation appears in government records. A defendantconvicted of a crime may not gain access to the victim’s homeaddress or various other personal identifiers. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-2.2(a). OPRA also exempts from disclosure any information thatis protected by any other state or federal statute, regulation,or executive order. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(a). As a result, the homeaddress of a victim of domestic violence cannot be obtainedthrough OPRA. See N.J.S.A. 47:4-2 to -4. As the above examples reveal, the Legislature has chosen toprevent disclosure of home addresses in select situations.Aside from those particular exemptions, however, OPRA does notcontain a broad-based exception for the disclosure of names andhome addresses that appear in government records. That issue has been debated before. On July 5, 2002, justdays before OPRA went into effect, Governor McGreevey issuedExecutive Order 21. To give effect to “the legislativedirective that a public” agency must “safeguard from publicaccess a citizen’s personal information with which it has beenentrusted,” the Executive Order declared that “an individual’shome address and home telephone number, as well as his or her 10 social security number, shall not be disclosed,” except underlimited circumstances. Exec. Order No. 21 ¶ 3, 34 N.J.R. 2487(a) (July 5, 2002). One month later, the Governor rescinded the above provisionof Executive Order 21 and asked the Privacy Study Commission “topromptly study the issue of whether and to what extent the homeaddress and home telephone number of citizens should be madepublicly available by public agencies.” Exec. Order No. 26 ¶ 5,34 N.J.R. 3043(b) (Aug. 13, 2002). The Commission held hearings and issued a final report in2004. It recommended, among other things, that (a) “[h]ometelephone numbers . . . should not be disclosed”; (b) “[p]ublicagencies should notify individuals that their home addresses maybe disclosed pursuant to OPRA requests”; (c) “[i]ndividualsshould be permitted to provide an address of record fordisclosure purposes . . . when interacting with publicagencies”; (d) “[t]he Governor or Legislature should establishobjective guidelines defining when and from which governmentrecords home addresses should be redacted”; (e) “[i]ndividualsshould be permitted to opt out of disclosure of their homeaddresses”; and (f) “computer systems and applications should beprogrammed to collect but not disclose home addresses andtelephone numbers.” Final Report: Privacy Study Commission 16(Dec. 2004), https://dspace.njstatelib.org/xmlui/bitstream/ 11 handle/10929/22262/c58152004.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y(emphasis added). The Legislature has amended OPRA multiple times since thereport was issued. See L. 2005, c. 170, § 1; L. 2010, c. 75, §5; L. 2013, c. 112, § 1; L. 2013, c. 116, § 1; L. 2014, c. 19,§§ 2, 3; L. 2015, c. 59, § 1; L. 2017, c. 266, § 4. But neitherthe legislative nor the executive branch, by law or executiveorder, has adopted the recommendations. IV. We review the interpretation of a statute de novo. Verryv. Franklin Fire Dist. No. 1, 230 N.J. 285, 294 (2017); Carterv. Doe (In re N.J. Firemen’s Ass’n Obligation), 230 N.J. 258,273-74 (2017). As a threshold matter, the documents sought in this casequalify as government records under OPRA. Records of publicauctions of forfeited government property are plainly“government records” under the law, and no specific exemptionapplies. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. We turn next to the statute’s privacy provision. Theprovision, once again, directs agencies to safeguard personalinformation that, if disclosed, “would violate [a] citizen’sreasonable expectation of privacy.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. Thetrial court considered the Doe factors, found only a limitedprivacy interest under the circumstances, and ordered 12 disclosure. The Appellate Division thoroughly examineddefendants’ privacy claim under Burnett and Doe and foundotherwise. Burnett involved “a single request for eight million pagesof land title records of all types, extending over a period oftwenty-two years, which contain[ed] names, addresses, socialsecurity numbers, and signatures of countless citizens.” 198 N.J. at 414. That information provided a potential roadmap toidentity fraud. Ibid. The Court found that the broad requestfor detailed personal information implicated OPRA’s privacyprovision, particularly because the records contained socialsecurity numbers. Id. at 428. To balance the statute’s competing aims -- ready access togovernment records while safeguarding a citizen’s reasonableexpectation of privacy -- the Court looked to the factorsidentified in Doe, 142 N.J. at 88. Id. at 428-37. The Doefactors call for an examination of (1) the type of record requested; (2) the information it does or might contain; (3) the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure; (4) the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated; (5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure; (6) the degree of need for access; and (7) whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognized public interest militating toward access. 13 [Id. at 427 (quoting Doe, 142 N.J. at 88).] The Court considered and balanced the factors and concludedthat they weighed in favor of redacting social security numbers-- not home addresses -- from the requested records, with thecosts passed on to the requestor. Id. at 437-38. The Courtlimited its holding to the facts of the case: a bulk request for millions of realty records, spanning decades, which contain a substantial number of [social security numbers] the requestor does not need, whose dissemination via a centralized computer database would pose an increased risk of identity theft to countless individuals, with no possibility of advance notice to those individuals, where the request does not further OPRA’s core aim of transparency in government. [Id. at 437.] More recently in Carter, the Court once again turned to theDoe factors to analyze a privacy claim. 230 N.J. at 279-80.The plaintiff sought copies of financial assistance applicationsand hardship payments made to firefighters through the Firemen’sAssociation. Id. at 267-68. The Association noted that therecords sought contained “the complete personal financialhistory of individual applicants.” Id. at 280. After a reviewof the Doe factors, the Court declined to order disclosure ofthe records. Ibid. Neither Burnett nor Carter, however, requires courts toanalyze the Doe factors every time a party asserts that a 14 privacy interest exists. In Asbury Park Press v. County ofMonmouth, for example, the Court ordered disclosure of asettlement agreement between the County of Monmouth and anemployee. 201 N.J. 5, 6 (2010). The employee had filed alawsuit claiming sex discrimination, harassment, retaliation,and a hostile work environment. Id. at 6. The County relied onOPRA’s privacy clause to try to prevent disclosure of theagreement. Id. at 6-7. Noting that the case was “a far cry from Burnett,” theCourt quickly dispensed with the argument. Ibid. The Courtexplained that “OPRA’s privacy clause has no application herebecause this case does not implicate the concerns raised inBurnett.” Id. at 7. The Court also saw “no reason to analyzethe Doe factors” when “a former county employee chose to file apublic action -- a complaint against the County which wasavailable to the public” -- and the matter would have unfoldedin open court had the case not settled. Ibid. Disclosure ofthe settlement, the Court observed, “would not violate anyreasonable expectation of privacy.” Ibid. As OPRA states, it is only “when disclosure . . . wouldviolate the citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy” that apublic agency must safeguard records from public access.N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 (emphasis added). When courts interpret astatute, they strive to give meaning to the Legislature’s intent 15 by following the statute’s plain language if it is clear.Carter, 230 N.J. at 274; State v. Morrison, 227 N.J. 295, 308(2016). We therefore find that, before an extended analysis ofthe Doe factors is required, a custodian must present acolorable claim that public access to the records requestedwould invade a person’s objectively reasonable expectation ofprivacy. The custodians in Burnett and Carter raised serious privacyconcerns that established far more than a colorable claim. Thethreshold showing they presented justified a searching analysisof the Doe factors. By contrast, the custodian in Asbury ParkPress did not present a colorable privacy claim at the outset.When a claim of privacy falls short in that way, there is noneed to resort to the Doe factors. V. In this case, defendants did not present a colorable claimin support of their privacy argument. Consider the context ofthis appeal. The bidders knew that they were participating in apublic auction. The use of paddles, a common practice atauctions, did not suggest otherwise. And the participants knewthat they were bidding on seized property forfeited to thegovernment. Forfeiture proceedings and public auctions of forfeitedproperty are not conducted in private. Before the State can 16 subject property to forfeiture, it must file a complaint andgive notice to “any person known to have a property interest inthe article.” N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3(a) to (c). If contested, thematter is then aired in court. N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3(f). Inaddition, the Legislature generally requires government entitiesto provide public notice in advance of a public auction. See,e.g., N.J.S.A. 40A:14-157(a); N.J.S.A. 52:27B-68; N.J.S.A. 39:3-40.3(b)(1). All of those circumstances undermine the notion that abidder could reasonably expect the auction in this case would becloaked in privacy. Viewed objectively, it was unreasonable fora buyer to expect that the information requested would remainprivate. If anything, the sale of government property at apublic auction is a quintessential public event that calls fortransparency. To guard against possible abuses, the public hasa right to know what property was sold, at what price, and towhom. OPRA’s plain terms call for disclosure of that type ofrecorded information, including the names and addresses ofsuccessful bidders. To hold otherwise would jeopardize OPRA’spurpose: “to maximize public knowledge about public affairs inorder to ensure an informed citizenry and to minimize the evilsinherent in a secluded process.” See Mason v. City of Hoboken,196 N.J. 51, 64 (2008) (quoting Asbury Park Press v. Ocean Cty.Prosecutor’s Office, 374 N.J. Super 312, 329 (Law Div. 2004)). 17 In any event, we agree with Judge Mizdol that the privacyinterest asserted in this case was limited. We agree as wellthat the risk of harm was speculative. Because we conclude thatdisclosure is required under OPRA, we do not reach plaintiff’sclaim under the common law. VI. For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment ofthe Appellate Division and direct that the records plaintiffrequested be disclosed under OPRA. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. 18