Title: John T. Morris v. Juneau County
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP002507
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2507 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
John T. Morris and Jeanne Morris,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
Juneau County, a municipal corporation and 
Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance Corporation,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  211 Wis. 2d 887, 568 N.W.2d 652 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-UNPUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 30, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 28, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Juneau 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick Taggart 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by Bradley D. Armstrong, Paul Voelker, Christopher P. 
Koback and Axley Brynelson, Madison and oral argument by 
Christopher R. Koback. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief 
and oral argument by William H. Rudolph, Hillsboro. 
 
 
 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by John J. Prentice, 
Andrew T. Phillips and Prentice & Phillips, Milwaukee for the 
Wisconsin Counties Association. 
 
 
Amcus curiae was filed by Michael Riley and 
Atterbury, Riley & Luebke, S.C., Madison for the Wisconsin 
Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
No.  96-2507 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2507 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John T. Morris and Jeanne Morris,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Juneau County, a municipal corporation  
and Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance  
Corporation,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners.  
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Juneau County (County) seeks 
review of a decision of the court of appeals which held that the 
County was not immune from suit for alleged negligence in 
repairing the shoulder of a highway.  John T. Morris (Morris) 
was injured when another vehicle traveling towards him hit a rut 
on the shoulder of the road, lost control, and came back over 
the center line striking his vehicle.  Because we conclude that 
the general immunity given counties under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) 
is not applicable when the conditions of Wis. Stat. § 81.15 are 
met, as they are here, and because we conclude that the shoulder 
is part of the highway, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.  In addition, because we conclude that the Morrises 
sufficiently stated a claim in their pleadings, we need not 
determine whether Ms. Morris’ affidavit, filed after the 
No.  96-2507 
 
2 
County’s motion for summary judgment and alleging that there was 
also a pothole in the highway, was inconsistent with her prior 
deposition testimony and filed only to create a genuine issue of 
material fact.   
¶2 
The following facts are relevant to this appeal.  On 
February 23, 1994, the plaintiff, Morris, was driving his 
vehicle westbound on State Highway 82 when a vehicle driven 
eastbound by Jean Williams (Williams) went out of control, 
crossed the center line, and hit the Morris vehicle.  Mr. Morris 
suffered severe injuries as a result of the accident.   
¶3 
Mr. Morris and his wife, Jeanne Morris, filed a Notice 
of Claim with Juneau County, a municipal corporation, pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) (1991-92),1 alleging that Williams 
lost control of her car due to a drop-off (also referred to as a 
rut) between the blacktop and the aggregate gravel shoulder of 
the road.  The claim was based on this highway defect and the 
County’s want of maintenance or repair.  The County denied the 
claim and served a notice of disallowance on the plaintiffs.   
¶4 
The Morrises then filed a Summons and Complaint 
against the County and its insurance company, alleging that the 
collision between Morris and Williams occurred in part due to a 
highway defect resulting from a want of maintenance or repair by 
Juneau County.  Because the dispute with Williams was settled 
out-of-court, the subject of the action against the County was 
                     
1 All references to Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1991-92 
version unless otherwise noted.  
No.  96-2507 
 
3 
the apportionment of the County’s negligence contributing to 
Morris’ injury.  Mr. Morris requested damages for his medical 
expenses, pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, 
permanent disability, loss of wages, and loss of future earning 
capacity.  Ms. Morris requested damages for her medical 
expenses, loss of society and companionship, and loss of 
consortium. 
¶5 
Among other affirmative defenses, the County answered 
that it was immune from the plaintiffs’ claims because they were 
based on acts that the County performed in the exercise of its 
discretionary 
powers. 
 
The 
County 
also 
answered, 
as 
an 
affirmative defense, that no damages sustained by the Morrises 
happened because of the insufficiency or want of repairs of the 
highway. 
 
The 
County 
demanded 
judgment 
dismissing 
the 
plaintiffs’ complaint on its merits, with prejudice.  The County 
later filed a motion for summary judgment. 
¶6 
In response to the County’s motion for summary 
judgment, plaintiffs’ counsel deposed several persons including 
William Anderson (Anderson), the Department of Transportation 
Area Highway Maintenance Supervisor.  During his deposition, 
Anderson presented photographs of the accident site that he had 
taken in July 1994, five months after Morris’ accident.  The 
photographs showed that in the approximate area where Williams 
lost control of her vehicle, there was a pothole on the edge of 
the pavement.  Although Anderson did not know whether the 
pothole was present on the date of the accident, he testified 
that such a pothole could take a year to develop.  Following 
No.  96-2507 
 
4 
Anderson’s deposition, Ms. Morris filed an affidavit in which 
she stated for the first time that two days after the accident, 
she noticed a “big chunk of pavement broken off at the beginning 
of the rut.” 
¶7 
The Juneau County Circuit Court, Patrick J. Taggart, 
Judge, granted the County’s motion for summary judgment.  The 
court determined that the County was immune from suit under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(4) because repairing the rut was a discretionary 
act.  The court further determined that the Morrises did not 
have a cause of action under Wis. Stat. § 81.15 because that 
statute only imposes an obligation on the County to keep the 
traveled surface of the road in a reasonably safe condition.  
The circuit court stated that the shoulder of the road is not 
part of the traveled surface of the highway and the road was in 
a reasonably safe condition given the winter weather conditions. 
 The court did not address Ms. Morris’ affidavit regarding the 
pothole.  
¶8 
The Morrises appealed and in an unpublished decision,2 
the court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s judgment 
granting the County’s motion for summary judgment.  The court of 
appeals determined that if Wis. Stat. § 81.15 is otherwise 
applicable the County is liable under § 81.15 for insufficiency 
or want of repairs of a highway, regardless of whether the acts 
were discretionary under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  The court of 
                     
2 Morris v. Juneau County, No. 96-2507, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 1, 1997). 
No.  96-2507 
 
5 
appeals further concluded that the shoulder of the highway is 
within the meaning of the term “highway” used in § 81.15.  
Finally, the court of appeals determined that there was no basis 
for the County’s assertion that Ms. Morris submitted her 
affidavit, which stated that there was a pothole in the highway, 
in bad faith.  The court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s 
judgment because it concluded that the case presented disputed 
issues of material fact, thus making a grant of summary judgment 
inappropriate.   
¶9 
This court granted the County’s petition for review, 
and we address the two primary issues presented by this case: 1) 
whether governmental immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) 
applies to an actionable claim under Wis. Stat. § 81.15; and 2) 
whether the term “highway” includes the shoulder adjacent to the 
paved portion of the highway as the term “highway” is used in 
§ 81.15.  We hold that if a plaintiff states an actionable claim 
under 
§ 81.15, 
the 
governmental 
immunity 
provisions 
of 
§ 893.80(4) do not apply.  Therefore, because the Morrises 
stated an actionable claim under § 81.15, we need not determine 
whether the County’s duties were discretionary or ministerial 
under § 893.80(4).  We also hold that the definition of 
“highway” includes the shoulder of the highway.  Because we 
conclude that the plaintiffs sufficiently stated a claim in 
their pleadings, we need not determine whether Ms. Morris’ 
affidavit, alleging that there was also a pothole in the 
highway, was inconsistent with her prior deposition testimony 
No.  96-2507 
 
6 
and filed only to create a genuine issue of material fact.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals’ decision. 
¶10 On appeal, this court applies the same summary 
judgment methodology as applied by the circuit court.  See Green 
Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816 
(1987).  A circuit court properly grants summary judgment “if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 
 Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  The party moving for summary judgment 
has the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact.  See Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338, 294 
N.W.2d 473 (1980).  Inferences should be drawn in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party.  See id. at 339.  Whether the 
moving party in this case, the County, is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law depends on our interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 81.15 and 893.80(4).   
¶11 The first issue presented by this case, whether 
governmental immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) applies to an 
actionable claim under Wis. Stat. § 81.15, requires that we 
interpret both statutes and their relationship.  A question of 
statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de 
novo.  See Colby v. Columbia County 202 Wis. 2d 342, 349, 550 
N.W.2d 124 (1996) (citing Pufahl v. Williams, 179 Wis. 2d 104, 
107, 506 N.W.2d 747 (1993)).  The main goal of statutory 
interpretation is to discern the intent of the legislature.  See 
No.  96-2507 
 
7 
State v. Rosenburg, 208 Wis. 2d 191, 194, 560 N.W.2d 266 (1997) 
(citing Scott v. First State Ins. Co., 155 Wis. 2d 608, 612, 456 
N.W.2d 152 (1990)).  “We ascertain legislative intent by 
examining the language of the statute, as well as its scope, 
history, context, subject matter, and purpose.”  Rosenburg, 208 
Wis. 2d at 194 (citing Scott, 155 Wis. 2d at 612).  When there 
is an inconsistency between statutes, we must reconcile them 
without nullifying either statute and in a way which gives 
effect to legislative intent.  See Colby, 202 Wis. 2d at 349 
(citing Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm’n, 167 Wis. 2d 205, 
217, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Ct. App. 1992)). 
¶12 The language of Wis. Stat. § 81.15 (reprinted in full 
below)3 provides in pertinent part that the “claim for damages 
                     
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 81.15 provides: 
81.15 Damages caused by highway defects; liability 
of town and county.  If damages happen to any 
person or his or her property by reason of the 
insufficiency or want of repairs of any highway 
which any town, city or village is bound to keep 
in repair, the person sustaining the damages has 
a right to recover the damages from the town, 
city or village.  If the damages happen by reason 
of the insufficiency or want of repairs of a 
highway which any county by law or by agreement 
with any town, city or village is bound to keep 
in repair, or which occupies any land owned and 
controlled by the county, the county is liable 
for the damages and the claim for damages shall 
be against the county.  . . .  The amount 
recoverable by any person for any damages so 
sustained 
shall 
not 
exceed 
$50,000. 
 
The 
procedures under s. 893.80 shall apply to the 
commencement 
of 
actions 
brought 
under 
this 
section.  No action may be maintained to recover 
damages for injuries sustained by reason of an 
No.  96-2507 
 
8 
shall be against the county” for “damages [that] happen by 
reason of the insufficiency or want of repairs of a highway 
which any county . . . is bound to keep in repair . . . .”  
Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(4) (reprinted in full below)4 provides 
in pertinent part that “[n]o suit may be brought against any . . 
. political corporation . . . for the intentional torts of its 
officers, officials, agents or employes nor may any suit be 
brought against such corporation . . . for acts done in the 
exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.”   
¶13 The County argues that the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) 
confers 
governmental 
immunity 
for 
discretionary acts in all suits and that nothing precludes 
application of immunity for alleged violations of Wis. Stat. 
§ 81.15.  We disagree.  The plain language of these statutes is 
seemingly in conflict.  On one hand, if a plaintiff alleges 
insufficiency or want of repairs of a highway, § 81.15 provides 
                                                                  
accumulation of snow or ice upon any bridge or 
highway, unless the accumulation existed for 3 
weeks.  
81.16  
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(4) provides: 
(4) No suit may be brought against any volunteer fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employes nor may any suit be 
brought 
against 
such 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
agency or volunteer fire company or against its 
officers, officials, agents or employes for acts done 
in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 
No.  96-2507 
 
9 
that a claim for damages shall be against the County.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 81.15.  On the other hand, § 893.80(4) provides that the 
governmental entity is immune from suit if the acts of the 
governmental entity 
are 
within the 
entity’s 
discretionary 
functions.  See Lifer v. Raymond 80 Wis. 2d 503, 511-12, 259 
N.W.2d 537 (1977).   
¶14 Our task is to harmonize these statutes, giving effect 
to both, if possible.  We do so by concluding that Wis. Stat. 
§ 81.15 provides an exception to the general grant of immunity 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  Accordingly, if a plaintiff’s 
injuries occurred by reason of insufficiency or want of repairs 
of 
any 
highway, 
a 
governmental 
entity 
is 
not 
afforded 
governmental 
immunity 
under 
§ 893.80(4). 
 
We 
reach 
this 
conclusion by examining legislative history and case law 
interpreting these statutes. 
¶15 Wisconsin Stat. § 81.15 was included in the first 
publication of Wisconsin statutes as R.S. 1849, ch. 16, § 103.  
At the time, common law governmental immunity was the rule, and 
§ 81.15 was the legislative exception, imposing liability for 
damages caused by insufficiency or want of repairs of any 
highway.  See Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 36, 40, 115 
N.W.2d 618 (1962).   
¶16 In 
1962 
with 
the 
Holytz 
decision, 
this 
court 
completely abrogated common law governmental immunity, applying 
the abrogation broadly to torts, whether by commission or 
omission.  See id. at 39.  “[T]he rule is liabilitythe 
exception is immunity.”  Id.  However, “[t]his decision is not 
No.  96-2507 
 
10
to be interpreted as imposing liability on a governmental body 
in the exercise of its legislative or judicial or quasi-
legislative or quasi-judicial functions.”  Id. at 40 (citing 
Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1957)). 
¶17 The legislature was quick to respond to the abrogation 
of governmental immunity in Holytz by creating Wis. Stat. 
§ 331.43 (1963) (now Wis. Stat. § 893.80).5  See ch. 198, Laws of 
1963.  The statute included a subsection regarding governmental 
immunity: “No suit shall be brought against any political 
corporation . . . for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employes nor shall any suit be brought 
against such . . . corporation . . . for acts done in the 
exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.”  § 331.43(3) (1963).  Acts done in the 
exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-
judicial functions refer to discretionary acts.  See Lifer, 80 
Wis. 2d at 512.   
¶18 In the same year that the legislature created Wis. 
Stat. § 331.43 (1963), the legislature also amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 81.15.  The amendments to § 81.15 provided that a plaintiff 
had to provide notice to a governmental entity within 120 days 
of the event causing injury and increased the damage limit to 
$25,000.  See ch. 435, Laws of 1963.  The time frame for notice 
                     
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 331.43 (1963) was renumbered as Wis. 
Stat. § 895.43, see § 2, ch. 66, Laws of 1965, and was again 
renumbered to its present location at Wis. Stat. § 893.80, see 
§ 29, ch. 323, Laws of 1979.   
No.  96-2507 
 
11
and damage limit amount mirrored the provisions in the newly 
created § 331.43 (1963).  Significantly, the legislature did not 
abolish the exception to governmental immunity provided by 
§ 81.15. 
¶19 In discussing the relationship between Wis. Stat. 
§§ 81.15 and 895.43 (previously Wis. Stat. § 331.43 and now Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80), this court called for the legislature to repeal 
§ 81.15.   
 
Neither sec. 81.15 nor sec. 895.43 create liability 
but rather provide the procedure to prosecute a claim 
for negligence.  If the city is negligent, one or the 
other of the sections must be followed depending upon 
the type of negligence involved.  . . .   Apparently a 
material difference in these sections is the fact that 
sec. 895.43 makes provision for actual notice while 
sec. 81.15 does not.  . . . .  A lot of confusion in 
the practice would be avoided if the legislature would 
repeal sec. 81.15, which is no longer needed since our 
decision in Holytz v. Milwaukee, (1962), 17 Wis. 2d 
26, 115 N.W.2d 618, and the amendment to sec. 895.43. 
Schwartz v. Milwaukee, 43 Wis. 2d 119, 123, 168 N.W.2d 107 
(1969) (Schwartz I).  See also Schwartz v. Milwaukee, 54 Wis. 2d 
286, 288-89, 195 N.W.2d 480 (1972) (Schwartz II) (“Sec. 895.43 
covers some of the same ground covered by sec. 81.15, and we 
pointed out in Schwartz v. Milwaukee, supra, sec. 81.15 might as 
well be repealed by the legislature since its purported language 
creating a cause of action has been supplanted by Holytz v. 
Milwaukee, (1962), 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618.”). 
¶20 Despite this court’s repeated clear suggestion to the 
legislature to repeal Wis. Stat. § 81.15, the legislature 
declined to do so.  Rather, in 1977, the legislature made 
No.  96-2507 
 
12
sweeping 
changes 
to 
the 
notice 
provisions 
for 
various 
governmental entities by combining the notice requirements into 
Wis. Stat. § 895.43 (1978) (now Wis. Stat. § 893.80).  See ch. 
285, Laws of 1977.  The act, published on May 8, 1978 and 
effective on November 8, 1978, deleted all notice requirements 
from Wis. Stat. § 81.15 but added the following sentence to that 
statute: “The procedures under s. 895.43 shall apply to the 
commencement of actions brought under this section.”  § 5, ch. 
285, Laws of 1977.  The act also repealed and recreated § 895.43 
(now § 893.80).  See § 11, ch. 285, Laws of 1977.  The Prefatory 
Note to the statute recognized that several statutes at the time 
contained “a variety of procedural steps to follow when bringing 
a claim against a county, town, city, school district or other 
municipality.  This bill consolidates these procedures . . . and 
makes them uniform . . . .”  Prefatory Note, ch. 285, Laws of 
1977.  In the recreation of Wis. Stat. § 895.43 (1978), the 
legislature continued the governmental immunity provision for 
discretionary acts first enacted as part of Wis. Stat. § 331.43 
(1963).  However, and again significantly, the legislature did 
not abolish the exception to governmental immunity provided by 
§ 81.15. 
¶21 When discerning legislative intent, we assume that the 
legislature knew the law in effect at the time it enacted the 
statute in question.  See Rosenburg, 208 Wis. 2d at 194-95 
(citing Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 193 Wis. 2d 168, 183, 532 N.W.2d 
690 (1995)).  We need not depend on an assumption in this 
instance, 
however, 
because 
here 
we 
know 
that 
when 
the 
No.  96-2507 
 
13
legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 331.43 (1963), the predecessor 
to Wis. Stat. § 893.80, it was aware of Wis. Stat. § 81.15.  The 
legislature amended the two statutes in the same year, see ch. 
198 and ch. 435, Laws of 1963, and in the same act.  See §§ 5 
and 11, ch. 285, Laws of 1977; and ch. 63, Laws of 1981.  
Despite a seeming inconsistency between §§ 81.15 and 893.80, the 
legislature continued to keep them both on the books. 
¶22 We also presume that when the legislature repealed and 
recreated Wis. Stat. § 895.43 (now Wis. Stat. § 893.80) in ch. 
285, Laws of 1977 to consolidate the notice provisions of 
several statutes, including Wis. Stat. § 81.15, the legislature 
was aware of our prior decisions regarding these two statutes 
and our suggestion that § 81.15 be repealed.  See Schwartz I, 43 
Wis. 2d at 123; Schwartz II, 54 Wis. 2d at 288-89.  Because the 
legislature clearly had several opportunities to respond to this 
court’s suggestions but nonetheless acquiesced in our decisions 
or refused to amend or repeal § 81.15, we conclude that the 
legislature 
intended 
to 
keep 
in 
force 
the 
exception 
to 
governmental immunity provided by § 81.15.  We can derive no 
other conclusion for the legislature’s failure to abolish 
§ 81.15.  Were we to reach the opposite conclusion we would make 
a nullity of § 81.15.  By the legislative action outlined above, 
the legislature did not intend that § 81.15 be a nullity. 
¶23 Because the legislature continued to breathe life into 
a statute which this court stated was “no longer needed,” we 
must now give the statute effect.  We do so by turning to the 
rule of statutory interpretation that a specific statute takes 
No.  96-2507 
 
14
precedence over a general statute.  See Kilgore, 193 Wis. 2d at 
185.  “[Section] 81.15, Stats., only applies to a small area of 
negligent conduct by a municipality and in this area does not 
necessarily cover all the negligence which might relate to 
highways.”  Schwartz I, 43 Wis. 2d at 122-23.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 81.15 
specifically 
applies 
to 
damages 
caused 
by 
the 
insufficiency or want of repairs of any highway.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 893.80(4) generally grants immunity for the intentional 
acts of its officers, officials, agents or employees or for the 
exercise of its discretionary functions.  Therefore, since 
§ 81.15 is specific and § 893.80(4) is general, § 81.15 takes 
precedence over § 893.80(4).  To reconcile these statutes and 
give them both effect, we conclude that § 81.15 provides an 
exception to the general grant of immunity found in § 893.80(4). 
  
¶24 To support its argument that it is immune from suit, 
the County argues that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), providing 
governmental immunity, must be read in conjunction with Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(5) (reprinted below)6 which provides that § 893.80 
is exclusive and applies to all claims unless rights or remedies 
                     
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(5) provides in pertinent part: 
(5) Except as provided in this subsection, the 
provisions and limitations of this section shall be 
exclusive and shall apply to all claims against . . . 
political corporation, governmental subdivision . . . 
.  When rights or remedies are provided by any other 
statute 
against 
any 
political 
corporation, 
governmental subdivision or agency . . . for injury, 
damage or death, such statute shall apply and the 
limitations in sub. (3) shall be inapplicable. 
No.  96-2507 
 
15
are provided by another statute.  The County asserts that case 
law provides that no rights or remedies are provided under Wis. 
Stat. § 81.15.  See, e.g., Schwartz II, 54 Wis. 2d at 289. 
¶25 We are not persuaded by the County’s interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80.  First, the language of Wis. Stat. § 81.15 
does provide rights or remedies for parties injured “by reason 
of the insufficiency or want of repairs of any highway . . . .” 
 § 81.15.  The statute provides that “the claim for damages 
shall be against the county.”  § 81.15.  We recognize that in 
both Schwartz I and Schwartz II, this court stated that § 81.15 
does not create liability but only provides “the procedure to 
prosecute a claim for negligence . . . .”  Schwartz II, 54 
Wis. 2d at 289.  At the time of these cases, however, liability 
for highway defects existed in the absence of § 81.15 because of 
the abrogation of common law immunity in Holytz.  See Dunwiddie 
v. Rock County, 28 Wis. 2d 568, 573, 137 N.W.2d 388 (1965).  As 
we noted in Schwartz II, the language of § 81.15 “purported[ly] 
. . . creating a cause of action has been supplanted by Holytz . 
. . .”  Schwartz II, 54 Wis. 2d at 288-89.   
¶26 However, when the legislature stripped Wis. Stat. 
§ 81.15 of all procedures, it left the rights and remedies for 
injuries caused by the insufficiency or want of repairs of any 
highway.  See ch. 285, Laws of 1977.  The legislature specified 
that parties must follow the procedures in Wis. Stat. § 893.80 
to commence an action under § 81.15 but did not abolish the 
rights and remedies of § 81.15.  Accordingly, we must conclude 
from the above that § 81.15 does create rights or remediesthe 
No.  96-2507 
 
16
right to recover damages from a county negligent in its 
insufficiency or want of repairs of any highway. 
¶27 In sum, we conclude that if a plaintiff’s injuries 
occurred by reason of insufficiency or want of repairs of any 
highway, that is, the plaintiff states an actionable claim under 
Wis. Stat. § 81.15, a governmental entity is not afforded 
immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4). 
¶28 We now turn to the second issue presented by this 
case: whether the term “highway” includes the shoulder adjacent 
to the paved portion of the highway as the term “highway” is 
used in Wis. Stat. § 81.15.  The County argues that the shoulder 
is not part of the highway by relying on this court’s statement 
in Weiss v. Milwaukee, 79 Wis. 2d 213, 255 N.W.2d 496 (1977) 
that § 81.15 “has been interpreted to refer to physical defects 
existing on the traveled surface of the highway . . . .”  Weiss, 
79 Wis. 2d at 225 (emphasis added).  However, later in the Weiss 
decision this court, like the court of appeals in this case, 
correctly relied on the statutory definition of “highway” found 
in Wisconsin’s Vehicle Code at Wis. Stat. § 340.01(22) to 
conclude that “highway” as used in § 81.15 includes the 
shoulder.   
¶29 This court has previously relied on Wis. Stat. 
§ 340.01 (22) for the statutory definition of “highway.”  See 
Weiss, 79 Wis. 2d at 232.  The court distinguished “highway” 
from “roadway:” “West Mill Road and the two closely proximated 
frontage roads comprised a highway (footnote quoting the 
definition of highway in § 340.01(22)) consisting of three 
No.  96-2507 
 
17
separate and parallel roadways (footnote quoting the definition 
of roadway in Wis. Stat. § 340.01(54).”  Id.  The term “highway” 
“includes the entire width between the boundary lines of every 
way open to the use of the public as a matter of right for the 
purposes of vehicular travel.”  § 340.01(22).  In contrast, 
“roadway” is defined as “that portion of a highway between the 
regularly established curb lines or that portion which is 
improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, 
excluding the berm or shoulder.”  § 340.01(54).  The distinction 
between the definition of “highway” and “roadway” emphasizes 
that “highway” includes the shoulder of the highway. 
¶30 Neither the court in Weiss nor the court of appeals in 
this case was embarking on new territory by using the definition 
of “highway” in Wis. Stat. § 340.01(22) to interpret a statute 
in another chapter of the statutes.  For example, in Weiss v. 
Holman, 58 Wis. 2d 608, 619, 207 N.W.2d 660 (1973), the court 
used the definition of “highway” in § 340.01(22) to interpret 
Wis. Stat. § 182.017(2) (1973) regarding the duties of public 
utilities in placing power poles.  See Holman, 58 Wis. 2d at 
618-19.  Relying on the doctrine of in pari materia, the court 
reasoned that it could rely on § 340.01(22) because both the 
Vehicle Code and § 182.017(2) are concerned with public safety. 
 See also In Interest of E.J.H., 112 Wis. 2d 439, 442, 334 
N.W.2d 77 (1983) (relying on § 340.01(22) to determine that the 
grassy portion next to the shoulder of the pavement is part of 
the highway, thereby concluding that a juvenile was properly 
adjudged delinquent for driving without a license when she drove 
No.  96-2507 
 
18
on this grassy area.); Panzer v. Hesse, 249 Wis. 340, 346, 24 
N.W.2d 613 (1946) (concluding that the term “highway” as used in 
Wis. Stat. § 85.44(6) (1946) which required pedestrians to walk 
on the left side of the highway when there is no sidewalk, 
refers to the portions of the highway open to use by vehicular 
traffic including the gravel shoulder.); and Poyer v. State, 240 
Wis. 337, 340, 3 N.W.2d 369 (1942) (relying on § 340.01(22) in a 
dispute regarding the public or private nature of an alley and 
concluding that the area adjacent to the paved roadway is part 
of the highway because “[v]ehicles may use this for the purpose 
of making turns and other maneuvers incident to the use of the 
roadway . . . .”). 
¶31 The County argues that by relying on the definition of 
“highway” in Wis. Stat. § 340.01(22) the court of appeals 
ignored decades of decisions by this court which defined 
“highway” as the traveled surface of the road.  We disagree.  As 
early as 1872, this court determined that Wis. Stat. § 81.15 
applied not only to the traveled part of the highway but also to 
the area “so connected with [the highway] as to affect the 
safety or convenience of those using the traveled path . . . .” 
 Wheeler v. Town of Westport, 30 Wis. 392, 403 (1872) (citations 
omitted).  In Wheeler, boulders next to the traveled path "were 
connected with it, and so closely as to make it almost true that 
they formed a part of it."  Id.  See also McChesney v. Dane 
County, 171 Wis. 234, 237, 177 N.W. 12 (1920); Meidenbauer v. 
Pewaukee, 162 Wis. 326, 331-332, 156 N.W. 144 (1916).  Reliance 
on the definition of highway in § 340.01(22) is consistent with 
No.  96-2507 
 
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the construction of the term “highway” as used in § 81.15 for 
over 120 years. 
¶32 We conclude that the area adjacent to the paved 
portion of the highway, commonly known as the shoulder, is part 
of the highway as that term is used in Wis. Stat. § 81.15.  
Because the County does not dispute that the rut is an 
insufficiency or want of repair and because the rut is in part 
of the highway, we conclude that the plaintiffs have stated an 
actionable claim under § 81.15.  Accordingly, governmental 
immunity is not available to the County.   
¶33 In sum, we conclude that if a plaintiff states an 
actionable claim under Wis. Stat. § 81.15, the governmental 
immunity provisions of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) do not apply.  
Therefore, because the Morrises stated an actionable claim under 
§ 81.15, we need not determine whether the County’s duties were 
discretionary or ministerial.  We also hold that the definition 
of “highway” in Wis. Stat. § 340.01(22) appropriately applies to 
§ 81.15 and includes the shoulder of the highway.  Accordingly, 
we conclude that the Morrises did state an actionable claim 
under § 81.15 and therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate.  
¶34 Regarding Ms. Morris’s affidavit, filed several months 
after the County moved for summary judgment, we need not 
determine whether such affidavit should be permitted to preclude 
summary judgment.  Because we conclude that the Morrises stated 
an 
actionable 
claim 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 81.15 
without 
consideration of Ms. Morris’ affidavit, we need not determine 
this issue.   
No.  96-2507 
 
20
¶35 Several months after the County filed its motion for 
summary judgment, Ms. Morris filed an affidavit in which she 
stated for the first time that she saw a chunk of broken-off 
pavement at the scene of the accident two days after the 
accident.  The County argues that by filing this late affidavit 
Ms. Morris was only attempting to create a genuine issue of 
material fact and thereby survive the County’s summary judgment 
motion.  The County asserts that her affidavit was inconsistent 
with her prior deposition testimony in which the only highway 
defect she mentioned was the rut in the shoulder.  The County 
urges this court to adopt the position of the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals that “[p]arties cannot thwart the purpose of 
[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 56 [similar to Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2)] by creating issues of fact through affidavits that 
contradict their own depositions.”  Miller v. A.H. Robins Co., 
Inc., 766 F.2d 1102, 1104 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Perma Research 
and Development v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 577-78 (2nd Cir. 
1969)).  
¶36 This court is, of course, the proper forum for 
determining the issue of whether a party can submit an affidavit 
that is inconsistent with prior deposition testimony in response 
to a motion for summary judgment.  Cf. Wolski v. Wilson, 174 
Wis. 2d 533, 540-41, 497 N.W.2d 794 (Ct. App. 1993).  However, 
this case does not require that we decide this issue.  The 
plaintiff’s 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
and 
answers 
to 
interrogatories create a genuine issue of material fact even 
without considering Ms. Morris’ affidavit submitted after the 
No.  96-2507 
 
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County’s motion for summary judgment.  Therefore, we need not 
decide whether her affidavit and deposition testimony are 
contradictory.  The Morrises’ claims survive the County’s motion 
for summary judgment without consideration of Ms. Morris’s later 
affidavit. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
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