Title: The Florida Bar v. Bruce Edward Committee
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC03-1203
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 12, 2005

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC03-1203 
_____________ 
 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant/Cross-Respondent, 
 
vs. 
 
BRUCE EDWARD COMMITTE, 
Respondent/ Cross-Complainant. 
 
[October 12, 2005] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report regarding alleged ethical breaches by 
Bruce Edward Committe.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. 
I.  FACTS 
On July 8, 2003, The Florida Bar filed a one-count complaint against Bruce 
Edward Committe, alleging that he knowingly failed to comply with legally proper 
discovery requests, filed two frivolous federal lawsuits, and abused the legal 
process.  The referee’s findings follow. 
On July 16, 1993, attorney William E. Gardner obtained a money judgment 
against Committe in Arlington, Virginia, in the amount of $4,527.21 plus interest.  
 
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The judgment was domesticated and recorded in Pensacola, Florida, where it was 
referred to a local collection agency, Collection Services, Inc. (CSI).  CSI, in turn, 
referred the case to attorney Stephen M. Guttmann, who appeared in the debt 
collection suit against Committe on June 11, 1998.  Guttmann issued a notice of 
taking deposition with a subpoena duces tecum to Committe to appear on June 24, 
1998.  Within days, Committe moved for a protective order, claiming that the 
deposition was “burdensome” because he had prior plans to be out of state.  
Committe’s motion included alternative dates when he was available.  Relying on 
these alternative dates, Guttmann filed an amended notice of taking deposition and 
subpoena, rescheduling the deposition for June 18, 1998. 
The day before the deposition was to be taken, Committe filed a second 
motion for a protective order based on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA).  In his motion, he claimed that Guttmann was a “debt collector” under 
the statute, and the FDCPA prohibited Guttmann from taking his deposition since 
he had been notified in the motion to “cease communication” with Committe.  
Committe, believing that his motion acted as a stay, did not appear at the 
deposition pursuant to the subpoena duces tecum.  Guttmann set Committe’s 
motion for a hearing before Judge G.J. Roark, III, who denied it.  Specifically, 
Judge Roark found that, although Guttmann was a “debt collector” under the 
statute, the FDCPA did not prohibit him from engaging in the litigation activity of 
 
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a deposition in aid of execution on a money judgment.  On August 22, 1998, 
Committe filed a motion for rehearing, citing to Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 
(1995), as grounds for reversing Judge Roark’s prior ruling.  Guttmann set the 
motion for rehearing before Judge Roark, who denied the motion. 
Guttmann filed a third notice of taking deposition and subpoena duces 
tecum, setting Committe’s deposition for August 2, 1999.  Committe failed to 
appear, but instead, on the day of the deposition, he filed a third motion for 
protective order, alleging that he needed to appeal Judge Roark’s decision to deny 
his motion for rehearing.  Guttmann then filed a motion for contempt for failure to 
appear pursuant to the notice of taking deposition and subpoena.  On October 22, 
1999, Judge Roark held Committe in contempt of court for failure to comply and 
sentenced Committe to sixty days in jail for contempt.  Committe, however, was 
given thirty-five days to purge the contempt by complying with the terms of the 
order, including appearing for a deposition on November 22, 1999. 
On October 15, 1999, while the motion for contempt in the county court 
action was pending, Committe filed a federal court action against Guttmann and 
Gardner, claiming over $3 million in damages based on alleged violations of the 
FDCPA and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA).  On October 
20, 2000, while the first federal case was still pending, Committe filed a second 
complaint against Guttmann, with similar allegations but adding another allegation 
 
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regarding substitute service of process.  Committe filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
petition, in which he stated that his federal lawsuit against Guttmann had a market 
value of $1000, despite the fact that his federal suit claimed over $3 million in 
damages.  On November 16, 1999, Committe proposed to settle his federal lawsuit 
against Guttmann for a total of $4500.  On June 15, 2001, Judge Roger Vinson 
granted summary judgment to Guttmann in the first federal lawsuit, finding that 
Committe’s action amounted to “an abuse of legal process.”  He noted that in light 
of Committe’s conduct in the state court proceedings and the fact that his two 
federal actions raised the same frivolous claims, Committe’s intent was to harass 
Guttmann.  Further, Judge Vinson held that Committe’s case was “brought in bad 
faith” and sua sponte ordered Committe to show cause why rule 11 sanctions1 
should not be imposed.  In a separate order, dated December 18, 2001, Judge 
Vinson found that rule 11 sanctions were warranted and ordered Committe to pay 
Guttmann his “reasonable fees and costs as a sanction for his bad faith in filing this 
frivolous action.”2  Committe appealed Judge Vinson’s order, but the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision granting summary 
judgment and imposing rule 11 sanctions. 
                                          
 
 
1.  See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 
 
2.  The federal court later determined this amount to be $15,382.50 for 
attorney fees and $649.50 for costs. 
 
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During the proceedings before the referee, Committe testified that he had 
substantial experience in filing claims under the FDCPA and FCCPA and that he 
had almost five years of prior legal experience in this particular field before he 
filed the two federal lawsuits against Guttmann.  After listening to all of the 
testimony and reviewing the evidence, the referee found that Committe’s two 
federal lawsuits were frivolous and that he lacked a statutory basis or prevailing 
case law to support his claims.  The referee also found that Committe “knowingly 
and intentionally failed to comply with a legally proper discovery request by Mr. 
Guttmann by failing to appear for his deposition” and had no reasonable grounds 
for failing to appear.  The referee explicitly found that Committe abused the legal 
process by filing two federal actions in order to harass Guttmann for his attempts 
to collect a money judgment.  The referee concluded that Committe violated Rules 
Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions), 4-3.4(c) 
(knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 4-3.4(d) (failure to 
comply with a legally proper discovery request), 4-8.4(a) (violation of bar rules), 
and 4-8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
In assessing his recommended discipline, the referee found that three 
aggravating circumstances applied:  Committe engaged in a pattern of misconduct; 
he committed multiple offenses; and he had substantial experience in the law.  He 
also noted in mitigation that Committe had no prior disciplinary record, made a full 
 
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disclosure, and was cooperative in the disciplinary proceedings.  After balancing 
these factors, the referee recommended that Committe receive a private reprimand.  
Committe filed a petition for review in this Court, arguing among other things that 
there was no competent and substantial evidence that he violated any Bar rule.  The 
Florida Bar filed its answer and cross-petition, contending that the referee’s 
recommended discipline was insufficient and that the Bar should be entitled to its 
costs. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Preliminary Motions 
Committe first claims that the grievance committee meeting of The Florida 
Bar violated section 286.011, Florida Statutes (2003), because Committe was not 
allowed to attend the meeting, no public notice was given, and no transcript of the 
meeting was recorded.  The grievance committee meetings of the Bar are private, 
and therefore the Bar is justified in prohibiting Committe from attendance.  See R. 
Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.1(a)(1).  Given that The Florida Bar is “an official arm of 
the court,” see R. Regulating Fla. Bar, Introduction, this Court has previously 
rejected the Legislature’s power to regulate which Florida Bar files were subject to 
public records law, holding that “[n]either the legislature nor the governor can 
control what is purely a judicial function.”  Fla. Bar re Advisory Opinion, 398 So. 
2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1981) (holding that public records law did not apply to 
 
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unauthorized practice of law investigative files maintained by The Florida Bar); 
see also Locke v. Hawkes, 595 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1992).  Moreover, the Bar rules 
regarding confidentiality are protected by the constitution.  Article I, section 24(d), 
of the Florida Constitution, which grants access to public records and meetings, 
specifically provides that “[r]ules of court that are in effect on the date of adoption 
of this section that limit access to records shall remain in effect until they are 
repealed.”  In this case, rule 3-7.1 was in effect years prior to the constitutional 
right to access public records and meetings.  Hence, we reject Committe’s 
argument that the Bar rules regarding confidentiality violated section 286.011(1), 
Florida Statutes (2003). 
In this same argument, Committe claims that two members of the grievance 
committee were “commanded” to discuss the investigation with him, which they 
failed to do.  To the extent that Committe alleges that this denied him due process, 
his argument must fail.  Due process was met because Committe was served with 
notice of the Bar’s charges and was afforded an opportunity in the disciplinary 
hearing to be heard and defend himself.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Rubin, 709 So. 2d 
1361, 1363 (Fla. 1998) (“Prior to being found guilty of the charges at issue here, 
Rubin was afforded appropriate notice and a full opportunity to be heard during the 
final hearing before the referee.  This was sufficient to satisfy the demands of due 
process.”). 
 
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Sufficiency of the Referee’s Report 
In his second claim, Committe contends that the Bar’s complaint was 
insufficient because the complaint failed to connect each allegation to a specific 
rule, and this failure prevented him from preparing an effective defense.  We 
disagree and find that the Bar complied with rule 3-7.6(h)(1)(B), which requires 
only that the Bar “set forth the particular act or acts of conduct for which the 
attorney is sought to be disciplined.”  There is no requirement for the Bar to 
connect every alleged item of misconduct to a specific rule violation.  The Bar’s 
complaint specifically addressed what conduct it relied upon to show Committe 
violated his professional obligations.  It is the combination of these acts that led to 
the conclusion that Committe violated the rules.  As addressed above, due process 
is satisfied where the attorney has notice and an opportunity to be heard.  See, e.g., 
Fla. Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1254 (Fla. 1999) (“Accordingly, because 
Fredericks was made aware of the conduct alleged by the Bar to be unethical and 
had the opportunity to be heard as to this conduct, there was no violation of due 
process.”).  In fact, Committe’s very response demonstrates that he was adequately 
informed and had an opportunity to be heard, given the strenuous arguments he 
presented to both the referee and this Court as to why he believed his acts did not 
violate any ethical rules. 
Findings of Fact 
 
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Committe claims that there is no competent, substantial evidence to support 
the referee’s findings that he violated the Bar rules, making a repetitive argument 
that his conduct was legal.  In reviewing this type of claim, the Court has set forth 
the appropriate standard of review as follows: 
A referee’s findings of fact regarding guilt carry a presumption of 
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without 
support in the record.  Florida Bar v. Vannier, 498 So. 2d 896, 898 
(Fla. 1986).  Absent a showing that the referee’s findings are clearly 
erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support, this Court is precluded 
from reweighing the evidence and substituting its judgment for that of 
the referee.  Florida Bar v. MacMillan, 600 So. 2d 457, 459 (Fla. 
1992).  The party contending that the referee’s findings of fact and 
conclusions as to guilt are erroneous carries the burden of 
demonstrating that there is no evidence in the record to support those 
findings or that the record evidence clearly contradicts the 
conclusions. 
Fla. Bar v. Spann, 682 So. 2d 1070, 1073 (Fla. 1996).  Committe cannot meet this 
burden by simply pointing to contradictory evidence when there is also competent, 
substantial evidence in the record to support the referee’s findings.  Fla. Bar v. 
Nowacki, 697 So. 2d 828, 832 (Fla. 1997).  Committe has not met this burden. 
As found by the referee, after Guttmann attempted to depose Committe, 
Committe filed a motion for protective order raising his FDCPA claim in state 
court, which was denied.  He then filed a motion for rehearing, which was also 
denied.  Guttmann attempted to take Committe’s deposition for a third time and set 
the date for August 2, 1999.  On the date the deposition was scheduled to be taken, 
Committe failed to appear and filed his third motion for protective order, relying 
 
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only on his claim that this was necessary because he needed to appeal the decision 
relating to the rehearing.  When this course of action was not successful, Committe 
filed two successive claims in the federal district court, again raising the same 
claim which was already unsuccessful in state court.  In the federal action, 
Committe sought over $3 million; however, when he filed bankruptcy, he admitted 
that his claim had no such value by stating this lawsuit had a market value of only 
$1000.  United States District Judge Vinson denied all of Committe’s claims in an 
order granting summary judgment to Guttmann, explicitly finding that Committe 
filed the federal action in order to harass Guttmann and that his action amounted to 
“an abuse of the legal process.”  Committe was experienced in this area of the law 
and should have been aware that his claims lacked a good-faith basis in law.  
Committe does not address the successive nature of his actions but instead reargues 
the merits of his claims, asserting that he had a proper legal foundation for all of 
his claims because he was merely trying to develop the law in this area. 
Committe’s claims revolve around his often-repeated contention that the 
FDCPA “stop communication” clause allows him to stop all communications with 
an attorney debt collector, including attending a deposition.  This is contrary to the 
record evidence and the holding of Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995), of 
which Committe was aware before he filed his federal suits.  Specifically, in 
Heintz, an attorney debt-collector argued that the term “debt collector” in the 
 
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FDCPA does not apply to attorneys, in part because if it did, it would create an 
anomaly in the law since an attorney would never be able to file a lawsuit against a 
nonconsenting consumer in light of the fact that 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) (1988) 
requires a “‘debt collector’ not to ‘communicate further’ with a consumer who 
‘notifies’ the ‘debt collector’ that he or she ‘refuses to pay’ or wishes the debt 
collector to ‘cease further communication.’”  Heintz, 514 U.S. at 296.  The United 
States Supreme Court rejected this argument as follows: 
 
We agree with Heintz that it would be odd if the Act 
empowered a debt-owing consumer to stop the “communications” 
inherent in an ordinary lawsuit and thereby cause an ordinary debt-
collecting lawsuit to grind to a halt.  But, it is not necessary to read § 
1692c(c) in that way—if only because that provision has exceptions 
that permit communications “to notify the consumer that the debt 
collector or creditor may invoke” or “intends to invoke” a “specified 
remedy” (of a kind “ordinarily invoked by [the] debt collector or 
creditor”).  §§ 1692c(c)(2), (3).  Courts can read these exceptions, 
plausibly, to imply that they authorize the actual invocation of the 
remedy that the collector “intends to invoke.”  The language permits 
such a reading, for an ordinary court-related document does, in fact, 
“notify” its recipient that the creditor may “invoke” a judicial remedy.  
Moreover, the interpretation is consistent with the statute’s apparent 
objective of preserving creditors’ judicial remedies.  We need not 
authoritatively interpret the Act’s conduct-regulating provisions now, 
however. Rather, we rest our conclusions upon the fact that it is easier 
to read § 1692c(c) as containing some such additional, implicit, 
exception than to believe that Congress intended, silently and 
implicitly, to create a far broader exception, for all litigating attorneys, 
from the Act itself. 
Heintz, 514 U.S. at 296-97.  The referee was clearly bothered by this same 
problem, questioning Committe on the record as to why Committe believed that 
 
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there was a justiciable issue of fact or law for the federal lawsuits based on the 
plain holding in Heintz.  Committe responded by asserting that the above reasoning 
stated in Heintz was merely dicta and thus had no authoritative value.  Again, 
Committe misses the point.  Presenting such an argument once or moving for a 
rehearing is one thing.  In this case, Committe argued the same ground numerous 
times, and when he was not successful in state court, he filed two federal suits 
raising the same previously denied claims.  Moreover, his actions in filing a claim 
for $3 million in damages against Guttmann and then admitting his claim was 
worth only about $1000 further supports the referee’s finding that Committe’s 
intention in filing the federal claims was merely to harass Guttmann. 
Committe claims that prosecuting him for the filing of these FDCPA 
lawsuits would have a chilling effect on other attorneys.  This claim is without 
merit.  This Court denied a similar claim in Florida Bar v. Richardson, 591 So. 2d 
908 (Fla. 1991): 
 
Neither the Bar nor this Court wishes to stifle innovative claims 
by attorneys.  Nevertheless, under the rules of professional conduct, 
the pursuit of imaginative claims is not without limit.  The standard 
embodied in rule 4-3.1, requiring a good-faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, is broad enough 
to encompass those cases where the claims are the result of innovative 
theories rather than, as here, an obsessive attempt to relitigate an issue 
that has failed decisively numerous times.  The federal court in this 
case specifically found this claim to be frivolous and malicious. 
Id. at 910-11. 
 
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In the case at hand, the referee found that these multiple attempts to 
relitigate this same nonmeritorious and frivolous issue were without a good-faith 
basis in the law.  Moreover, the referee found these pleadings were filed for the 
purpose of harassing Guttmann.  Although Committe attempts to show that the 
referee’s findings were unsupported by the record, mostly relying on his testimony 
before the referee and his argument that some court could find his arguments 
plausible, he has failed to meet his burden in showing that the findings are “clearly 
erroneous.”  See, e.g., Spann, 682 So. 2d at 1073.  The record is full of competent 
and substantial evidence to support this finding, including Committe’s own 
pleadings and the federal judge’s written findings which reached the same 
conclusion and even imposed rule 11 sanctions sua sponte.  Accordingly, we adopt 
the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt. 
Cross-Appeal 
 
The Bar filed a cross-appeal, contending that the referee’s recommended 
discipline was too lenient and that a ninety-one-day suspension is the appropriate 
level of discipline.  In reviewing the referee’s recommendation as to discipline, this 
Court’s scope of review is somewhat broader because this Court has the ultimate 
responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  Fla. Bar v. Lawless, 640 So. 2d 
1098, 1100 (Fla. 1994).  The sanction resulting from a Bar disciplinary proceeding 
must be fair to society, fair to the attorney, and severe enough to deter other 
 
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attorneys from similar misconduct.  Id.  As a general rule, when evaluating a 
referee’s recommended discipline, the Court will not second-guess a referee’s 
recommended discipline as long as that discipline (1) is authorized under the 
Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (Standards), and (2) has a 
reasonable basis in existing case law.  Fla. Bar v. McFall, 863 So. 2d 303, 307 (Fla. 
2003).  For the following reasons, we agree that the referee’s recommendation for 
a private reprimand is too lenient3 but decline to impose a ninety-one-day 
suspension. 
First, the referee’s recommended discipline is contrary to the standards.  
Specifically, standard 6.2 sets forth the appropriate standards for abuse of the legal 
process: 
6.22 Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
violates a court order or rule, and causes injury or potential injury to a 
client or a party, or causes interference or potential interference with a 
legal proceeding. 
6.23 Public reprimand is appropriate when a lawyer 
negligently fails to comply with a court order or rule, and causes 
injury or potential injury to a client or other party, or causes 
interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding. 
6.24 Admonishment is appropriate when a lawyer negligently 
fails to comply with a court order or rule, and causes little or no injury 
to a party, or causes little or no actual or potential interference with a 
legal proceeding. 
 
                                          
 
 
3.  A private reprimand is now termed an admonishment and is only 
appropriate where this Court finds an attorney’s misconduct to be “minor.”  R. 
Regulating Fla. Bar 3-5.1(b); Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 2.6; Fla. Bar v. 
Kramer, 593 So. 2d 1040, 1041 (Fla. 1992). 
 
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In this case, the referee did not find that the abuse of legal process was based on a 
negligent act.  Instead, the referee explicitly found Committe “knowingly and 
intentionally failed to comply with a legally proper discovery request” and 
“knowingly failed to obey the rules of civil procedure by failing to appear at his 
third scheduled deposition.”  He also found that Committe abused the legal process 
by filing “two nonmeritorious and frivolous federal lawsuits for the purpose of 
harassing Mr. Guttmann” and by “failing to appear and filing motions for 
protective orders on what he should have known were frivolous grounds.”  The 
two federal lawsuits clearly harmed Guttmann because they were filed for the 
purpose of harassment and further caused Guttmann to hire an attorney to defend 
the suits.  Since Committe’s acts were intentional and knowing and, further, since 
he caused injury or potential injury to a party, suspension is the presumed 
discipline. 
A suspension is likewise supported by prior case law.  In Florida Bar v. 
Richardson, 591 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1991), which consisted of two different Bar 
proceedings both arising from the same facts, an attorney was suspended after 
engaging in similar misconduct.  In the first proceeding, while Richardson 
represented the personal representative in a probate proceeding, the judge 
determined that Richardson’s fee was excessive.  Richardson appealed that 
decision, arguing that the judge lacked jurisdiction because the payment was made 
 
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by the personal representative and not the estate.  The district court found the 
argument to be without merit and ordered a calculation of the reimbursement of the 
excessive fee to the estate.  Id. at 909.  After the calculation by the trial court, 
Richardson appealed again.  The second appeal was dismissed as untimely, and 
Richardson was suspended for ninety-one days in a Bar proceeding for his 
excessive fee charge.  Id.  After Richardson unsuccessfully sought two writs of 
mandamus from this Court, he then filed a federal complaint in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia, stating that his civil rights were 
violated because the trial judge ruled without jurisdiction.  The federal court 
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and imposed rule 11 sanctions on 
Richardson, finding that the “complaint [was] both manifestly frivolous and 
malicious.”  Id. at 910.  This Court held that a private reprimand was insufficient 
and instead imposed a sixty-day suspension for his frivolous filings. 
Similarly, Committe attempted to relitigate an issue that failed numerous 
times for the purpose of harassment.  Both Richardson and Committe filed 
frivolous federal lawsuits claiming absurd damage amounts and were sanctioned 
under rule 11.  The decisions are factually similar with the one exception being that 
Richardson was previously disciplined for acts stemming from the same isolated 
incident, while Committe was disciplined for the entirety of his actions in one 
proceeding. 
 
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Committe repeatedly attempted to relitigate the same nonmeritorious issue in 
an attempt to frustrate the legal process and to harass a attorney debt-collector who 
had every legal right to depose him.  All during this time, Committe offered to 
settle these frivolous claims for pennies on the dollar and valued these claims at 
next to nothing in his own bankruptcy proceeding.  His knowledge of the frivolous 
nature of his lawsuits makes his conduct even more unprofessional.  Perhaps even 
more troubling to this Court is that even now, Committe appears to not understand 
the basic obligations imposed on attorneys.  Upon review of all of the facts, the 
standards, and prior case law, we find a ninety-day suspension to be the 
appropriate level of discipline, to be followed by a one-year probation.  See 
Richardson, 591 So. 2d at 911.  Prior to the expiration of his probation, Committe 
must complete The Florida Bar’s practice and professionalism enhancement 
program entitled, “Professionalism Workshop.” 
Costs 
In the final claim of the cross-petition, the Bar contends that the referee 
should have awarded it costs since it prevailed.  The Bar failed to file an affidavit 
of costs with the referee, and hence the report failed to include any findings or 
recommendations as to costs, contrary to rule 3-7.6(k)(1)(E).  Accordingly, this 
Court remanded this portion of the report to the referee.  The referee has now 
submitted a supplemental report stating that respondent has stipulated that the Bar 
 
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reasonably incurred costs of $4,252.55, as set forth in the Bar’s affidavit filed with 
the Court on April 14, 2004. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and 
recommendations as to guilt but reject the recommended discipline and instead 
impose a suspension.  Bruce Edward Committe is hereby suspended from the 
practice of law for ninety days, to be followed by a one-year probation.  Further, 
during this time, Committe shall complete The Florida Bar’s practice and 
professionalism enhancement program, “Professionalism Workshop.”  The 
suspension will become effective thirty days from the date of this opinion so that 
Committe can close out his practice and protect the interests of existing clients.  If 
Committe notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing and does not 
need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an order 
making the suspension effective immediately.  Committe shall accept no new 
business from the date this opinion is filed until the suspension is completed. 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Bruce Edward 
Committe in the amount of $4,252.55, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, John Anthony Boggs, Staff Counsel and 
Olivia Paiva Klein, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant/Cross-Respondent 
 
Bruce Committee, Pro se, Pensacola, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent/Cross-Complainant