Title: Winkler v. N.C. State Board of Plumbing, Heating & Fire Sprinkler Contractors
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 319PA18
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 319PA18  
Filed 5 June 2020 
DALE THOMAS WINKLER, and DJ’S HEATING SERVICE 
 
 
v. 
NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF PLUMBING, HEATING & FIRE 
SPRINKLER CONTRACTORS 
 
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision 
of the Court of Appeals, 261 N.C. App, 106, 819 S.E.2d 105 (2018), reversing an order 
entered on 15 May 2017 by Judge Edwin G. Wilson in Superior Court, Watauga 
County. On 14 August 2019, the Supreme Court allowed defendant’s conditional 
petition for discretionary review as to additional issues. Heard in the Supreme Court 
on 6 January 2020. 
Bailey & Dixon, LLP, by Jeffrey P. Gray, for petitioner-appellants. 
Young Moore and Henderson P.A., by Angela Farag Craddock, John N. 
Fountain, and Reed N. Fountain, for respondent-appellee. 
 
Nichols, Choi & Lee, PLLC, by M. Jackson Nichols, Anna Baird Choi, and 
Christina D. Cress; and North Carolina Real Estate Commission, by Janet B. 
Thoren, for the North Carolina Board of Architecture, North Carolina Board of 
Barber Examiners, North Carolina Real Estate Commission, North Carolina 
State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, and State Licensing Board for General 
Contractors, amici curiae. 
 
 
BEASLEY, Chief Justice. 
 
 
WINKLER V. N.C. STATE BD. OF PLUMBING, HEATING & FIRE SPRINKLER CONTRACTORS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-2- 
In this case, the Court is asked to consider whether a trial court may award 
attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a disciplinary action by a licensing board. 
Because we conclude that N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1 does not preclude a trial court from 
awarding attorney’s fees in disciplinary actions by a licensing board, we modify and 
affirm the holding below. 
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
In April 2013, maintenance staff from the Best Western Hotel in Boone, North 
Carolina, contacted Dale Thomas Winkler f/k/a DJ’s Heating Service (Winkler) to 
examine the hotel’s pool heater. Winkler held a Heating Group 3 Class II (H-3-II) 
residential license that qualified him to work on detached residential HVAC units 
and, as such, he was not licensed to perform the work requested. Upon examining the 
heater, despite the fact that he was not equipped with the appropriate licensure, 
Winkler determined that the gas supply had been turned off. He located the fuel 
supply in the pool equipment room and turned on the gas.  
On 16 April 2013, several days after Winkler examined the pool heater, two 
guests died in Room 225 of the hotel, located above the pool equipment room. The 
hotel closed the room until it could be checked for gas leaks. At the time, the cause of 
death for both guests was undetermined.  
The hotel contacted Winkler, asking him to examine the ventilation system for 
the pool heater and the fireplace in Room 225. During his visit, Winkler performed a 
soap test to check for gas leaks and determined there were no leaks. Without checking 
WINKLER V. N.C. STATE BD. OF PLUMBING, HEATING & FIRE SPRINKLER CONTRACTORS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-3- 
for carbon monoxide, Winkler informed the hotel that the ventilation system 
appeared to be working.  
Following Winkler’s inspection, the hotel reopened Room 225 in late May 2013. 
On 8 June 2013, one guest died and another guest was injured while staying in Room 
225. Shortly after the third death, toxicology reports from the first two guests were 
performed and indicated that both individuals had a lethal concentration of carbon 
monoxide in their blood. Toxicology reports later performed on the third and fourth 
guests also indicated excessive levels of carbon monoxide in their blood.  
Following the issuance of the toxicology reports, the North Carolina State 
Board of Plumbing, Heating, & Fire Sprinkler Contractors (the Board) performed its 
own investigation and determined that carbon monoxide from the ventilation system 
for the pool heater had entered Room 225 through openings near the room’s fireplace 
and HVAC unit. After he admitted to the Board that he had performed work beyond 
his license qualification, the Board suspended Winkler’s license for one year and 
ordered him to complete multiple courses.  
Winkler appealed the Board’s decision to the Superior Court, Watauga County.  
The trial court entered an order on 22 June 2015 affirming the Board’s decision. On 
appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, Winkler challenged the Board’s 
jurisdiction to discipline him for working on the pool heater without proper licensure. 
On 20 September 2016, the Court of Appeals held that N.C.G.S. § 87-21 did not grant 
the Board jurisdiction to discipline Winkler for conducting the pool heater inspection. 
WINKLER V. N.C. STATE BD. OF PLUMBING, HEATING & FIRE SPRINKLER CONTRACTORS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-4- 
Winkler v. State Bd. of Exam’rs of Plumbing, Heating & Fire Sprinklers Contractors 
(Winkler I), 249 N.C. App. 578, 599, 790 S.E.2d 727, 739 (2016). The Court of Appeals 
vacated the portion of the Board’s order relating to Winkler’s inspection of the pool 
heater and remanded the case to the Board for entry of a new order based on other 
misconduct.  
On 24 October 2016, Winkler filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs in 
Superior Court, Watauga County, pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 6-19.1 and 6-20, arguing 
that the Board knew or should have known that it lacked authority to discipline him 
for the pool heater inspection. The trial court entered an order awarding Winkler 
$29,347.47 in attorney’s fees and costs. The Board appealed the order and moved to 
stay the order awarding attorney’s fees and costs pending appeal. 
The Court of Appeals ultimately held that the trial court erred in awarding 
Winkler attorney’s fees pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1 because, when read as a whole, 
the statute excludes cases arising out of the defense of a disciplinary action by a 
licensing board. Winkler v. N.C. State Bd. of Plumbing, Heating & Fire Sprinkler 
Contractors (Winkler II), 261 N.C. App. 106, 114, 819 S.E.2d 105, 110–11 (2018). We 
disagree.  
II. 
Discussion 
 
In North Carolina, a trial court may award attorney’s fees only as authorized 
by statute. City of Charlotte v. McNeely, 281 N.C. 684, 691, 190 S.E.2d 179, 185 
(1972). Section 6-19.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes governs a trial court’s 
WINKLER V. N.C. STATE BD. OF PLUMBING, HEATING & FIRE SPRINKLER CONTRACTORS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-5- 
ability to award attorney’s fees. The relevant portion of the statute provides the 
following:  
In any civil action, other than an adjudication for the 
purpose of establishing or fixing a rate, or a disciplinary 
action by a licensing board, brought by the State or brought 
by a party who is contesting State action pursuant to G.S. 
150B-43 or any other appropriate provisions of law, unless 
the prevailing party is the State, the court may, in its 
discretion, allow the prevailing party to recover reasonable 
attorney’s fees, including attorney’s fees applicable to the 
administrative review portion of the case, in contested 
cases arising under Article 3 of Chapter 150B, to be taxed 
as court costs against the appropriate agency if: 
 
(1) 
The court finds that the agency acted without 
substantial justification in pressing its claim against 
the party; and 
 
(2) 
The court finds that there are no special 
circumstances that would make the award of 
attorney’s fees unjust. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1(a) (2019).  
 
The Board contends that the phrase “or a disciplinary action by a licensing 
board” was intended to be an exclusion to the statute; Winkler, on the other hand, 
argues that rate-fixing cases are the only exclusion to the statute. Thus, this case 
presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Applewood 
Props., LLC v. New S. Props., LLC, 366 N.C. 518, 522, 742 S.E.2d 776, 779 (2013). 
 
 
WINKLER V. N.C. STATE BD. OF PLUMBING, HEATING & FIRE SPRINKLER CONTRACTORS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-6- 
 
1. Statutory Construction of N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1 
This Court has long recognized that, “[w]hen the language of a statute is clear 
and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning 
of the statute, and judicial construction of legislative intent is not required.” N.C. 
Dep’t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., 363 N.C. 189, 201, 675 S.E.2d 641, 649 (2009) (quoting 
Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006)). When the 
statutory language is ambiguous, however, the Court will ascertain legislative intent. 
Id.   
Furthermore, courts should construe the statute so that “none of its provisions 
shall be rendered useless or redundant.” Porsh Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-
Salem, 302 N.C. 550, 556, 276 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1981). Based on the Court’s review of 
the words and punctuation used in N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1, we conclude that the statute is 
ambiguous. 
The disputed language of N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1 is contained in the first half of the 
statute which reads that “[i]n any civil action, other than an adjudication for the 
purpose of establishing or fixing a rate, or a disciplinary action by a licensing board, 
brought by the State or brought by a party who is contesting State action . . . .” Both 
parties argue that the grammatical structure of the statute supports only their own 
interpretation of the statute and precludes that of their opponent, and the Court of 
Appeals relied heavily on the placement of commas and indefinite articles for its 
WINKLER V. N.C. STATE BD. OF PLUMBING, HEATING & FIRE SPRINKLER CONTRACTORS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-7- 
interpretation. 
Ordinarily, the placement and use of punctuation aids in the process of 
statutory interpretation. Stephens Co. v. Lisk, 240 N.C. 289, 293–94, 82 S.E.2d 99, 
102 (1954) (citing State v. Bell, 184 N.C. 701, 115 S.E. 190 (1922)). But while 
punctuation “is intended to and does assist in making clear and plain the meaning of 
all things else in the English language,” this Court has also recognized that 
punctuation “is not an infallible standard of construction,” Bell, 184 N.C. at 706, 115 
S.E. at 192. The statute at issue here demonstrates the fallibility of reliance on 
grammatical structure alone. Here each of the proposed constructions is marred by a 
punctuation or usage error. Thus, while we typically discuss statutory ambiguity in 
terms of the provision being equally susceptible of multiple interpretations, we see 
the opposite problem here—from a grammatical perspective, the provision at issue is 
equally unsusceptible of each proposed interpretation. 
It is undisputed that the introductory phrase of N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1(a) sets out a 
broad category of actions—“any civil action”—in which, upon proper findings, the 
trial court may award attorney’s fees. Likewise, everyone agrees that the clause 
immediately following the introductory phrase, which is set off by a pair of commas, 
delineates a subcategory of civil actions that are excluded from the provision—“an 
adjudication for the purpose of establishing or fixing a rate.” The dispute in the 
instant case arises over the function of the next clause, which is also set off by a pair 
of commas, and reads as follows: “or a disciplinary action by a licensing board.” There 
WINKLER V. N.C. STATE BD. OF PLUMBING, HEATING & FIRE SPRINKLER CONTRACTORS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-8- 
are two possible interpretations. Either the statute contains two broad categories of 
actions in which attorney’s fees may be awarded—civil actions and disciplinary 
actions by licensing boards—or it contains two subcategories of civil actions excluded 
from the provision allowing the trial court to award attorney’s fees—rate-fixing 
actions and disciplinary actions by licensing boards.  
The second interpretation—that disciplinary actions are a second subcategory 
of civil actions excepted from the broad category of civil actions and therefore are not 
eligible for an award of attorney’s fees—is the interpretation adopted by the Court of 
Appeals.  
As the Court of Appeals pointed out, this construction has the benefit of 
parallel structure. See Winkler II, 261 N.C. App. at 112, 819 S.E.2d at 109 (quoting 
Falin v. Roberts Co. Field Servs., 245 N.C. App. 144, 150, 782 S.E.2d 75, 79 (2016)). 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that, generally, “[e]very element of a parallel 
series must be a functional match of the others (word, phrase, clause, sentence) and 
serve the same grammatical function in the sentence (e.g., noun, verb, adjective, 
adverb). When linked items are not like items, the syntax of the sentence breaks 
down . . . .” Falin, 245 N.C. App. at 150, 782 S.E.2d at 79) (quoting The Chicago 
Manual of Style § 5.212 (16th ed. 2010)). In subsection 6-19.1(a) an adjective, “any,” 
modifies a phrase, “civil action,” while singular indefinite articles, “an” and “a,” 
modify the phrases “adjudication for the purpose of establishing or fixing a rate” and 
“disciplinary action by a licensing board.” This parallel use of singular indefinite 
WINKLER V. N.C. STATE BD. OF PLUMBING, HEATING & FIRE SPRINKLER CONTRACTORS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-9- 
articles ties together the phrases related to establishing and fixing a rate and 
disciplinary action by a licensing board and it differentiates those phrases from the 
phrase “civil action.” This common grammatical form implies a common function: to 
set out exceptions to the general provision that the trial court may award attorney’s 
fees in “any civil action.”  
This interpretation, however, fails to account for the excessive comma use 
throughout the relevant portion of the statute.  The following disputed portion of 
N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1(a) contains a series of three commas: “In any civil action, other than 
an adjudication for the purpose of establishing or fixing a rate, or a disciplinary action 
by a licensing board, brought by the State or brought by a party who is contesting 
State action . . . .” If the clauses related to establishing or fixing a rate and disciplinary 
actions are to be read as performing the same grammatical function within the 
sentence—i.e., modifying the phrase “any civil action”—the comma separating them 
is entirely superfluous.  
The fact that the rate-fixing clause is set off by a pair of commas arguably 
might indicate that the clause is intended as an interrupting modifier, altering the 
meaning of the noun phrase immediately preceding it. Generally, however, a pair of 
commas setting off a descriptive phrase denotes a nonrestrictive clause—one that 
describes, but is not necessary to preserve the meaning of the sentence. See The 
Chicago Manual of Style § 6.29 (17th ed. 2017); Bryan A. Garner, The Redbook: A 
Manual on Legal Style § 1.6 (4th ed. 2018). Here, the modifying phrase—whatever it 
WINKLER V. N.C. STATE BD. OF PLUMBING, HEATING & FIRE SPRINKLER CONTRACTORS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-10- 
includes—is necessary to the sentence because without it, “any civil action” could be 
eligible for an award of attorney’s fees without exception. It is clear that at least one—
and possibly all—of the first three commas in N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1(a) are misplaced.  
Because no interpretation of the statute is free from grammatical error, no 
plain meaning emerges from the language of N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1(a). Thus, we cannot 
rely on rules of grammar to guide us through our analysis. Typically, where the plain 
language of a statute is equally susceptible of multiple interpretations, we must 
attempt to discern the legislative intent behind the words in order to interpret the 
statute. Here, however, although the sentence is from a grammatical perspective 
equally incorrect in each interpretation, we nonetheless find the General Assembly 
could not have intended to except disciplinary actions by a licensing board from the 
category of civil actions because such disciplinary actions are not civil in nature.  
Chapter 1 of the North Carolina General Statutes, which governs civil 
procedure, defines a civil “action” as “an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice, by 
which a party prosecutes another party for the enforcement or protection of a right, 
the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment or prevention of a public 
offense.” N.C.G.S. § 1-2 (2019) (emphasis added). Disciplinary actions by licensing 
boards are administrative proceedings held before a board or commission, which 
creates its own regulations and enforces compliance upon certificate holders and 
licensees. Upon finding that there has been a violation, administrative agencies 
choose between several possible remedies, including suspension or revocation of the 
WINKLER V. N.C. STATE BD. OF PLUMBING, HEATING & FIRE SPRINKLER CONTRACTORS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-11- 
certificate or license. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 87-23 (2019). Neither the creation nor the 
initial enforcement of administrative regulations occurs before a “court of justice.” 
See Ocean Hill Joint Venture v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t, Health & Nat. Res., 333 N.C. 318, 
321, 426 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1993) (observing that although “[a]rticle IV, section 3 of the 
Constitution contemplates that discretionary judicial authority may be granted to an 
agency when reasonably necessary to accomplish the agency’s purposes[,]. . . . an 
agency so empowered is not a part of the ‘general court of justice’ ” (first quoting In 
the Matter of Appeal from the Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of the SPCA, 324 
N.C. 373, 379, 379 S.E.2d 30, 34 (1989); then quoting N.C. Const. art. IV § 2). Thus, 
proceedings before administrative agencies, including disciplinary actions by a 
licensing board, are not civil actions. 
Indeed, a disciplinary action does not become a civil action until either party 
petitions for judicial review of the decision of the board or commission, and the matter 
becomes a contested case before a judge. See Empire Power Co. v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t, 
Health & Nat. Res., 337 N.C. 569, 594, 447 S.E.2d 768, 783 (1994) (noting that judicial 
review “is generally available only to aggrieved persons who have exhausted all 
administrative remedies made available by statute or agency rule” (citing N.C.G.S. 
§ 150B-43 (1991))). 
Construing the statute to allow the trial court to award attorney’s fees for 
disciplinary actions by a licensing board is also consistent with the remainder of 
N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1(a), which contains an explicit exception to the statute. Specifically, 
WINKLER V. N.C. STATE BD. OF PLUMBING, HEATING & FIRE SPRINKLER CONTRACTORS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-12- 
the statute provides that “[n]othing in this section shall be deemed to authorize the 
assessment of attorney’s fees for the administrative review portion of the case in 
contested cases arising under Article 9 of Chapter 131E of the General Statutes.” Not 
only does this language convey an intent to allow the award of attorney’s fees for 
administrative hearings, but it also shows that, if it had intended to do so, the 
legislature could have explicitly excepted Article 3A from the provisions of N.C.G.S. 
§ 6-19.1.  
The statute also provides that “the court may, in its discretion, allow the 
prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, including attorney’s fees 
applicable to the administrative review portion of the case, in contested cases arising 
under Article 3 of Chapter 150B, to be taxed as court costs against the appropriate 
agency.” Appellee argued that because disciplinary actions by a licensing board are 
considered a “contested case” under Chapter 150B, it makes no sense to include “or  
a disciplinary action by a licensing board” in the statute unless it was intended to be 
an exclusion. This contention is incorrect. 
The Administrative Procedure Act contains multiple articles and covers 
different types of proceedings.  Administrative actions that become subject to judicial 
review have both administrative and judicial components. Disciplinary proceedings 
before licensing boards—like the one that is before us in this case—are covered by 
Article 3A of Chapter 150B of the North Carolina General Statutes. Under our 
interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1, the separate reference to disciplinary proceedings 
WINKLER V. N.C. STATE BD. OF PLUMBING, HEATING & FIRE SPRINKLER CONTRACTORS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-13- 
found in that statutory provision authorizes awards of attorney’s fees for both phases 
of such a proceeding. On the other hand, the provision authorizing attorney’s fee 
awards in administrative proceedings conducted pursuant to Article 3 of Chapter 
150B applies to a different set of cases, with the relevant language serving to 
authorize attorney’s fee awards in both the administrative and judicial components 
of such proceedings, given that the judicial review portion is covered by the statutory 
reference to “civil actions” and the administration portion is covered by the additional 
language expressly authorizing fee awards in the administrative portion of such 
proceedings.  For this reason, the interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1 that we deem 
appropriate in this case does not render the statutory reference to the administrative 
portion of cases arising under Article 3 of Chapter 150B “useless or redundant.”  
Porsh  Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. at 556, 276  S.E.2d at 447 
(stating that the court should construe the statute so that “none of its provisions shall 
be rendered useless or redundant”). 
Accordingly, we hold that the legislature intended to allow trial courts to award 
attorney’s fees in a disciplinary action by a licensing board. 
 
2. Substantial Justification and Special Circumstances 
Section 6-19.1 provides that a judge may award attorney’s fees in eligible 
matters only upon a finding that the agency acted without substantial justification 
and that there are no special circumstances that would make the award of attorney’s 
WINKLER V. N.C. STATE BD. OF PLUMBING, HEATING & FIRE SPRINKLER CONTRACTORS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-14- 
fees unjust. Because substantial justification existed to support the Board’s claim in 
this case, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s 
fees for both the administrative and judicial review proceedings. 
We review a trial court’s decision to award attorney’s fees under N.C.G.S. 
§ 6-19.1 for abuse of discretion. See High Rock Lake Partners, LLC v. N.C. Dep’t of 
Transp., 234 N.C. App. 336, 338, 760 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2014) (“By the clear language 
of the statute, once the trial court makes the appropriate findings required in 
subsections (1) and (2) of N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1(a), its decision on whether or not to award 
attorney’s fees is discretionary.”). “To show an abuse of discretion and reverse the 
trial court’s order[, the] appellant has the burden to show the trial court’s rulings are 
‘manifestly unsupported by reason,’ or ‘could not be the product of a reasoned 
decision.’ ” Id. at 340, 760 S.E.2d at 753 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Bourlon, 172 N.C. App. 595, 610, 617 S.E.2d 40, 50 (2005)).  
The purpose of N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1 is to “curb unwarranted, ill supported suits 
initiated by State agencies,” by requiring that the State’s action be substantially 
justified. Crowell Constructors v. State ex rel. Cobey, 342 N.C. 838, 844, 467 S.E.2d 
675, 679 (1996). This standard is not so stringent that the agency must “demonstrate 
the infallibility of each suit it initiates” or even prevail in the action. Id. Nor is the 
standard so lax that the State may avoid liability for attorney’s fees by demonstrating 
merely that its suit is not frivolous. Id. (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 
566, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (1988)). Rather, this Court has adopted “a middle-ground 
WINKLER V. N.C. STATE BD. OF PLUMBING, HEATING & FIRE SPRINKLER CONTRACTORS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-15- 
objective standard to require the agency to demonstrate that its position, at and from 
the time of its initial action, was rational and legitimate to such degree that a 
reasonable person could find it satisfactory or justifiable in light of the circumstances 
then known to the agency.” Id. 
Throughout the proceedings in the instant case, the Board has contended that 
the deaths and injuries at the center of this controversy are “the precise kind of harm 
the legislature intended to bring under the authority of the Board ‘in order to protect 
the public health, comfort and safety.’ ” Winkler I, 249 N.C. App. at 591, 790 S.E.2d 
at 735.  
Specifically, N.C.G.S. § 87-23(a) grants the Board authority to do the following:  
[R]evoke or suspend the license of or order the reprimand 
or probation of any plumbing, heating, or fire sprinkler 
contractor, or any combination thereof . . . who fails to 
comply with any provision or requirement of this Article 
[2], or the rules adopted by the Board, or for gross 
negligence, incompetency, or misconduct, in the practice of 
or in carrying on the business of a plumbing, heating, or fire 
sprinkler contractor, or any combination thereof, as 
defined in this Article.  
 
N.C.G.S. § 87-23(a) (2019) (emphasis added).  
Subsection 87-21(a)(5)1 of the North Carolina General Statutes, at the time of 
the events, defined “engaged in the business” as the act of or offer to perform 
                                            
1 Following the events giving rise to this case, the statute was amended to include any 
person who “verifies, inspects, evaluates, tests, installs, alters or restores” plumbing or 
heating devices or offers to perform those services. N.C.G.S. § 87-21(a)(5) (2019).  
WINKLER V. N.C. STATE BD. OF PLUMBING, HEATING & FIRE SPRINKLER CONTRACTORS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-16- 
installations, alterations, or restorations. N.C.G.S. § 87-21(a)(5) (2017). The terms 
“install,” “alter” and “restore” were not defined in the statute. The term “restore” can 
mean a number of things, including “to put or bring back into existence or use” or “to 
bring back to or to put back into a former or original state.” Restore, Merriam-
Webster’s Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/restore 
(last visited May 26, 2020). The Board argued that Winkler’s actions with regard to 
the pool heater were consistent with this definition.  
According to the Board’s unchallenged findings of fact, Winkler was asked to 
“examine the pool heater and get it running.” Winkler then examined the heater and, 
“[a]long with the Best Western [H]otel maintenance staff,” turned on the pool heater. 
Winkler’s services were again requested following the death of two occupants, and he 
concluded that there was no gas leak, despite obvious signs of a leak. As a result of 
the gas leak, three people died and one person was seriously injured. 
The Board argued that Winkler’s actions “put [the pool heating system] back 
into use.” That is, he restored the system. The Court of Appeals ultimately concluded 
that Winkler’s actions in turning on the pool heating system did not rise to the level 
of a restoration. That decision is not before this Court, and we express no opinion on 
it. Even assuming that the Court of Appeals’ decision in Winkler I was correct, we 
cannot agree, however, that the Board’s arguments were irrational or illegitimate in 
light of the facts. Despite failing to prevail on the merits of its claim, the Board was 
substantially justified in contending that Winkler engaged in the type of conduct the 
WINKLER V. N.C. STATE BD. OF PLUMBING, HEATING & FIRE SPRINKLER CONTRACTORS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-17- 
Board was authorized to discipline.2 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court erred in awarding 
Winkler attorney’s fees, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 6-19.1, because there was substantial 
justification for the Board’s claims.  
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED. 
                                            
2 Because the Board acted with substantial justification, we need not consider whether 
special circumstances existed that would make the award of attorney’s fees unjust.