Title: Heyne v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC14-1800
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 2017

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-1800 
____________ 
 
JUSTIN CURTIS HEYNE,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[April 6, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Justin Curtis Heyne filed an initial motion for postconviction relief under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, which the trial court denied after 
holding an evidentiary hearing.  For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the 
denial of the guilt phase claims but remand for a new penalty phase pursuant to 
Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) petition for cert. filed, No. 16-998 (U.S. 
Feb. 13, 2017).1 
                                          
 
 
1.  This Court has jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  Because we 
are remanding for a new penalty phase, we do not address the penalty phase claim 
that Heyne raised in the appeal of the denial of his postconviction motion. 
 
 
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BACKGROUND 
Heyne was convicted for the 2006 murders of Sarah Buckoski, Benjamin 
Hamilton, and five-year-old Ivory Hamilton.  Heyne v. State, 88 So. 3d 113, 117 
(Fla. 2012).  He was sentenced to death for Ivory’s murder.  Id.  When affirming 
the convictions and death sentence on direct appeal, this Court described the 
background as follows: 
On March 30, 2006, Sarah Buckoski returned to her home with 
her five-year-old daughter, Ivory Hamilton, to find Heyne and Ivory’s 
father, Benjamin Hamilton, engaged in a verbal dispute.  The dispute 
centered on money Heyne owed to Benjamin and took place in the 
master bedroom, a 12–by 13–foot room in which law enforcement 
later discovered drug paraphernalia and several pounds of marijuana.  
Heyne worked with Benjamin and was temporarily residing with 
Benjamin, Sarah, and Ivory in Titusville, Florida.  Heyne was 24 
years old.  Benjamin and Sarah were 26 and 24, respectively. 
As the argument escalated, Heyne began to feel disrespected.  
He started to walk away when he heard Benjamin cock a 9–mm gun.  
Heyne left, retrieved a .38 Special from his room, and then returned to 
the master bedroom to continue the argument with Benjamin.  The 
two argued while holding their respective guns but did not point them 
at one another while arguing.  Heyne pushed Benjamin onto the bed. 
At some point during the dispute, Ivory entered the room, prompting 
Benjamin to drop the 9–mm.  Heyne picked up Benjamin’s 9–mm.  
Benjamin told Ivory to leave the room, and she turned to walk out.  
 
In its sentencing order, the trial court detailed the shootings as 
follows: 
 
Benjamin Hamilton was shot at a distance of no more 
than four or five feet.  At that point, Sarah Buckoski dove 
to the floor on the far side of the bed near the wall and 
started screaming.  The defendant shot her next.  She was 
shot one time, but the bullet passed through her arm 
before it entered the center of the back of the head.  At 
 
 
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that point, Ivory began to pull on the defendant’s shorts 
and the defendant shot her one time in the head at point 
blank range.  
When law enforcement arrived on the scene, Benjamin was 
struggling for air on the bed, Sarah was on the floor next to the bed in 
a fetal position screaming, and Ivory was lying on the floor without a 
pulse.  An autopsy revealed that just prior her death, Ivory was 
slapped in the face in a manner violent enough to cause a rupture of 
the blood vessel beneath the skin.  A bullet fired from Heyne’s .38 
Special was found in her skull. 
After the shooting, Heyne ran out of the back door with his gun 
in a pillowcase and with marijuana and cocaine he took from the 
master bedroom.  Heyne called a friend, Roxanne Larabie, and asked 
her to pick him up.  Larabie testified that Heyne admitted to shooting 
Benjamin and Sarah and that when she asked about Ivory, Heyne “just 
looked at me and said she was gone.”  Larabie helped Heyne obtain 
new clothes identical to the ones he was wearing.  When they arrived 
at Larabie’s house, Heyne washed the new clothes in an effort to 
make them appear worn.  He removed his old shoes and clothes, 
wrapped up his gun in the pillowcase, and put all of the items in a box 
in Larabie’s attic.  Law enforcement retrieved the items and 
discovered bloodstains matching Benjamin’s DNA profile on Heyne’s 
pants and the pillowcase. 
Heyne was apprehended and questioned regarding the murder, 
and a videotape of the interrogation was played for the jury at trial.  
Initially, Heyne denied that he was at the house at the time of the 
murder.  But when an investigating officer interrupted the 
interrogation with news that Heyne’s gun, bloodied clothing, and 
pillowcase were discovered in a box in Larabie’s attic, Heyne 
confessed to shooting Benjamin and Sarah and acknowledged seeing 
Ivory “go down.”  At the time, Heyne could not remember shooting 
Ivory and repeatedly denied that he would have shot her on purpose.  
However, he acknowledged shooting both the 9–mm and the .38 
Special and directed the interrogating officer as the officer drew a 
diagram of the room depicting the placement of Heyne and all three 
victims during the shootings.  Heyne said that his argument with 
Benjamin began as a non-violent confrontation in which Benjamin 
never threatened him or pointed his gun in Heyne’s direction. 
At trial, Heyne advanced the theory that he shot Benjamin and 
Sarah in self-defense, specifically suggesting in closing arguments 
 
 
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that Sarah may have been trying to access a shotgun under the bed.  
As for Ivory, Heyne argued that the evidence supported an accidental 
shooting.  The prosecution attempted to foreclose the possibility of 
self-defense and accident, relying heavily on the diagram drawn 
during Heyne’s interrogation to show that the relative positioning of 
Heyne and the victims precluded either scenario.  Ultimately, the jury 
found Heyne guilty of first-degree premeditated murder of all three 
victims. 
At the penalty phase, Heyne presented mitigation testimony 
from former educators, family members, and evaluating 
psychologists.  His former educators attested to Heyne’s status as a 
special education student, and his family members testified that he 
was a caring but difficult child.  Dr. Joseph Wu testified that imaging 
from a PET scan showed damage to Heyne’s temporal and parietal 
lobes, evidencing learning difficulties, causing problems regulating 
aggression and impulse, and making addiction to alcohol and drugs 
more likely.  Dr. Wu also testified that imaging was consistent with a 
history of traumatic brain injuries and specifically noted two 
concussions Heyne suffered as a child, another head injury when 
Heyne was incarcerated in 2004, and a slow processing speed relative 
to his IQ score of 88.  Dr. William Riebsame diagnosed Heyne with 
ADHD and possible bipolar disorder—one or both of which caused 
Heyne to have impulse control disorder—as well as cocaine and 
alcohol use and dependence at the time of the offense.  Dr. Riebsame 
also discussed Heyne’s history of impulsivity, including two 
documented suicide attempts.  Dr. Riebsame revealed that Heyne had 
confessed to shooting Ivory, whom Heyne said was crying and pulling 
on his shorts after he shot Benjamin. 
The jury recommended life imprisonment for the murder of 
Benjamin, the death penalty for the murder of Sarah by a vote of eight 
to four, and the death penalty for the murder of Ivory by a vote of ten 
to two. 
The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation of death for 
the murder of Ivory but sentenced Heyne to life imprisonment for the 
murders of Benjamin and Sarah.  For the murder of Ivory, the trial 
court found three aggravators:  (1) Heyne was previously convicted of 
a felony involving the use or threat of violence (great weight); (2) the 
murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (great 
weight); and (3) the victim was less than twelve years of age (great 
weight).  The trial court found the following mitigators:  (1) Heyne 
 
 
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suffers from a mental illness (great weight); (2) Heyne has brain 
damage and brain deficits (great weight); (3) Heyne had a problem 
with substance abuse and dependence (moderate weight); (4) Heyne 
had an impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct 
or conform it to the requirements of law (moderate weight); (5) Heyne 
was under the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance (little 
weight); (6) Heyne was a good, caring father to a handicapped son 
(very little weight); (7) Heyne cared for and helped elderly neighbors 
when he was a child (very little weight); (8) Heyne gave his flannel 
jacket to a homeless person (very little weight); (9) Heyne protected 
younger, weaker children when he was a child (very little weight); 
(10) Heyne played football and other sports as a child and was 
devastated when he could no longer play (very little weight); (11) 
Heyne was recommended to receive in-patient psychiatric treatment at 
age five but did not receive treatment (moderate weight); (12) Heyne 
has a history of suicide attempts and self-destructive behavior 
(moderate weight); and (13) Heyne exhibited good behavior during 
trial (some weight). 
 
Id. at 117-19. 
 
On direct appeal, this Court rejected a Ring claim as well as four other 
claims:  “(A) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; 
(B) the trial court erred in finding the HAC aggravator for the murder of Ivory; (C) 
the trial court erred in assessing the mental health mitigating evidence; and (D) the 
death sentence is not proportionate.”  Id. at 119-20. 
 
In October 2013, Heyne filed an initial motion for postconviction relief, 
which the trial court denied after holding an evidentiary hearing.  
 
 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
I. 
 
First, Heyne claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 
motion to suppress his confession based upon a violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 486 (1966).  Specifically, Heyne claims that trial counsel should have 
alleged that Heyne invoked his rights to counsel and silence after initially waiving 
his Miranda rights.  However, this Court affirms the trial court’s denial of relief. 
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has explained that for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied: 
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  
Bolin v. State, 41 So. 3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 
490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)).   
Regarding the deficiency prong of Strickland, there is a strong presumption 
that trial counsel’s performance was not ineffective.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  
Moreover, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort 
be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
 
 
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counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Id. at 689.  Further, counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective for failing to make a meritless argument.  Melendez v. State, 612 So. 2d 
1366, 1369 (Fla. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Deren v. State, 985 So. 2d 
1087 (Fla. 2008).  “Regarding the prejudice prong of Strickland, the defendant 
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, ‘absent the [deficient 
performance], the factfinder would have [had] a reasonable doubt respecting  
guilt.’ ”  Dennis v. State, 109 So. 3d 680, 690 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 695).  “A reasonable probability is a ‘probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.’ ”  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  
“Because both prongs of Strickland present mixed questions of law and fact, 
this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the trial court’s factual 
findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the 
trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.”  Id.   
 
“[T]he United States Supreme Court announced in Davis v. United States, 
512 U.S. 452 (1994), that neither Miranda nor its progeny require police officers to 
stop interrogation when a suspect in custody, who has made a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of his or her Miranda rights, thereafter makes an equivocal or 
ambiguous request for counsel.”  State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 717 (Fla. 1997).  
In fact, “under Davis police are under no obligation to clarify a suspect’s equivocal 
or ambiguous request and may continue the interrogation until the suspect makes a 
 
 
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clear assertion of the right to counsel.”  Id.  And this Court has explained that “the 
reasoning of Davis applies when a defendant makes an equivocal assertion of any 
right under Miranda.”  Id. at 717-18.  Accordingly, this Court has held that “police 
in Florida need not ask clarifying questions if a defendant who has received proper 
Miranda warnings makes only an equivocal or ambiguous request to terminate an 
interrogation after having validly waived his or her Miranda rights.”  Id. at 719. 
 
Here, after Heyne waived his rights, the interrogating officer discussed 
possible scenarios or mental health issues that might mitigate Heyne’s involvement 
in the murders.  However, Heyne initially denied any involvement.  Thereafter, the 
following questioning took place between the officer and Heyne: 
Q:  So how are we going to handle this now - - 
A:  I don’t know.  Put me in a jail cell. 
Q:  - - after you being accused? 
A:  I’ll get a lawyer and we’ll go through the court.  And spend 
thousands and thousands of dollars on an innocent man.  So that’s 
how we’re going to handle it.  And if I’m convicted, and they convict 
me, then I do time and sit and let them fry me. 
 
Heyne’s statements were not “sufficiently clear[] that a reasonable police officer in 
the circumstances would understand the statement[s] to be a request for an 
attorney” or an assertion of the right to remain silent.  Davis, 512 U.S. at 459.  
Instead, a reasonable officer could have concluded, as the trial court found, that 
Heyne “was merely predicting what would happen in the future if he were arrested 
for the murders.”  Therefore, because Heyne’s statements were not unambiguous 
 
 
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and unequivocal assertions of his rights to counsel and silence, the officer was 
under no obligation to terminate questioning.  See Walker v. State, 957 So. 2d 560, 
574 (Fla. 2007) (holding that “I think I might want to talk to an attorney” as well as 
additional questions about an attorney were not an unequivocal request for counsel 
and did not require termination of questioning); Spivey v. State, 45 So. 3d 51, 54-
55 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (holding that “I mean if I am being held and I’m being 
charged with something I need to be on the phone calling my lawyer” was at most 
a conditional request for counsel and not an unequivocal request requiring 
termination of interrogation). 
 
Accordingly, because this Miranda claim is without merit, trial counsel 
cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise it. 
II. 
 
Second, Heyne alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move 
to suppress the admission of the shoebox retrieved from Roxanne Larabie’s attic as 
well as the box’s contents.  However, we affirm the denial of relief. 
 
In Twiligar v. State, 42 So. 3d 177, 193 (Fla. 2010) (quoting State v. 
Milligan, 411 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)), this Court explained that, 
under Fourth Amendment law, “[n]o search occurs when police retrieve property 
voluntarily abandoned by a suspect in an area where the latter has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”  “The test for abandonment is whether a defendant 
 
 
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voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the 
property in question so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of 
privacy with regard to it at the time of the search.”  Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
14A Fla. Jur. 2d Abandoned Property § 633 (2001)). 
 
Here, Heyne was not an occupant of, or even an invited guest in, Ms. 
Larabie’s residence.  Heyne had informed Ms. Larabie that he shot Ben and Sarah, 
that Ivory was gone, and that he had a gun with him in her residence.  In response, 
Ms. Larabie told Heyne that he and his gun were unwelcome in her house.  
Knowing this, Heyne placed the gun in a shoebox (along with clothing that he 
wore during the crime) and voluntarily left the box behind in Ms. Larabie’s attic.  
After Heyne departed, Ms. Larabie called the police and told them what had 
transpired.  The officer obtained Ms. Larabie’s consent to search her attic.   
Under these circumstances, there was no illegal search and seizure of the 
box.  Heyne relinquished his interest in the box by abandoning it in an area where 
he had no reasonable expectation of privacy.  Heyne did not maintain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy with regard to the property left in the attic since Ms. Larabie 
specifically told him that she did not want the gun to remain at her residence.  As 
the postconviction court explained, Heyne “would have known that there was a 
good chance that [Ms.] Larabie would try to get the box, or at least the gun which 
was inside the box, out of her house.”          
 
 
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Accordingly, had trial counsel moved to suppress the box and its contents by 
alleging that the search was illegal, the request would have been denied as 
meritless.  See Fotopoulos v. State, 838 So. 2d 1122, 1131-32 (Fla. 2002) 
(affirming denial of claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to 
suppress two bags that were discovered during a search of the house of the 
defendant’s mother-in-law that was conducted with the mother-in-law’s consent 
even though the defendant was living in the home); see also State v. Kennon, 652 
So. 2d 396, 399 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (holding that defendant abandoned any 
interest in pouch when she voluntarily chose to hide it under the tire of a vehicle in 
a vacant lot and walk away); State v. Daniels, 576 So. 2d 819, 824 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1991) (holding that defendant abandoned her interest in the luggage when she 
voluntarily left “the suitcase in an area where she had no Fourth Amendment 
protection, the train station”).  Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to 
raise a meritless argument.   
III. 
 
Third, we consider whether Heyne is entitled to relief after the United States 
Supreme Court issued its decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).  
Because the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of ten to two, we 
conclude that Heyne’s death sentence violates Hurst.  See Kopsho v. State, 209 So. 
 
 
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3d 568, 570 (Fla. 2017).  We must then consider whether the Hurst error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: 
The harmless error test, as set forth in Chapman[v. California, 386 
U.S. 18 (1967),] and progeny, places the burden on the state, as the 
beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively 
stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed 
to the conviction. 
Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 68 (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 
1986)). 
 
Because the jury in this case recommended death by a vote of ten to two, 
“we cannot determine that the jury unanimously found that the aggravators 
outweighed the mitigation.”  Kopsho, 209 So. 3d at 570.  “We can only determine 
that the jury did not unanimously recommend a sentence of death.”  Id.  Therefore, 
because we cannot say that there is no possibility that the error did not contribute 
to the sentence, the error in Heyne’s sentencing was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
Accordingly, we vacate the death sentence and remand for a new penalty 
phase.  See Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 69.   
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, this Court affirms the denial of the guilt phase 
claims raised in the initial postconviction motion filed pursuant to rule 3.851, but  
 
 
 
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we remand for a new penalty phase pursuant to Hurst. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the majority’s decision except its vacating of the death 
sentence pursuant to Hurst. 
CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur.  
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County,  
William David Dugan, Judge - Case No. 052006CF019237AXXXXX 
 
James V. Viggiano, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Chelsea Rae Shirley, 
Maria E. DeLiberato, and Julissa Fontán, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional 
Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Stacey E. Kircher, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee