Title: People v. Woolley
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 88210
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: February 22, 2002

Docket No. 88210-Agenda 2-November 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								MARTIN M. WOOLLEY, Appellant.
Opinion filed February 22, 2002.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Martin M. Woolley, was convicted in Henry
County of six counts of murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2),
(a)(3) (West 1994)), one count of armed violence (720 ILCS
5/33A-2 (West 1994)), one count of armed robbery (720 ILCS
5/18-2(a) (West 1994)), one count of robbery (720 ILCS
5/18-1(a) (West 1994)), and one count of unlawful possession of
a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 1994)).
Defendant was sentenced to death. On his direct appeal, this court
vacated defendant's conviction for armed violence and vacated
defendant's death sentence. People v. Woolley, 178 Ill. 2d 175
(1997). The cause was remanded to the circuit court for a new
capital sentencing hearing. Woolley, 178 Ill. 2d  at 215. On remand,
defendant was again sentenced to death and appealed directly to
this court.
	Defendant raises 13 issues on appeal. Because we agree with
defendant that the trial court erred in informing a panel of
prospective jurors that defendant had previously been sentenced to
death in this case and in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial,
we need not address defendant's remaining issues. We vacate
defendant's death sentence and remand this cause for a new
sentencing hearing.
BACKGROUND
	Defendant was charged with the shooting deaths of Rane
Baldwin and Diana Turley. The evidence presented at defendant's
trial is fully set forth in our first opinion in this case. See Woolley,
178 Ill. 2d 175. We will discuss only those facts necessary to the
disposition of this appeal.
	On direct appeal to this court, we affirmed defendant's
convictions for murder, armed robbery, and unlawful possession
of a weapon by a felon, but vacated defendant's death sentence
and remanded for a new capital sentencing hearing. On remand,
the trial court conducted a second sentencing hearing. The first
panel of jurors was brought into the courtroom to hear
introductory remarks by the trial court. During introductory
remarks, the trial court informed the prospective jurors that
defendant previously had been convicted by a jury of the murder
charges. The trial court further told the panel:
			"[A]s the trial was pending, the State gave notice to the
defense that they would be seeking the death penalty from
the jury should the jury return any verdicts of guilty on
one or more of these first-degree murder counts. The jury
came back with a return of, of the death penalty on these
counts."
Further, the trial court informed these jurors that the murder
convictions were appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court and that
the court affirmed the first degree murder convictions, but vacated
the jury's imposition of death. The trial court stated:
			"They vacated the jury's imposition of the death penalty
and gave reasons that they concluded as to why the death
penalty should be vacated. They remanded the case back
to Henry County for a new trial on the sentencing aspect
of the case. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions
of first degree murder, [and] reversed the death penalty
with instructions for it to remand it back to this court for
*** a new penalty phase. *** [T]he errors that the
Supreme Court ascribed to [sic] reversal of the death
penalty [sic] will not be repeated before this jury."
	The trial court admonished the jurors not to consider the result
from the first jury with the following statement:
			"I admonish you at this time that you are to disregard
the result that was rendered by the first jury. You may,
after your consideration of this case, return the same
verdict. You may return a different verdict. That is
entirely up to you. All I'm saying is do not be influenced
by the mere conclusion of the first jury. You decide the
case on the merits of the evidence that you hear in this
court room. The result, of course, will be up to you as a
group of twelve jurors. This jury was held in this county
and I don't know to what extent some of you present have
recollections of that trial here first hand or from reading
newspapers or hearing media accounts."
	Defense counsel did not object during the trial court's
introductory remarks. However, the next day, defense counsel
moved for a mistrial and stated:
			"[Y]esterday when the court spoke to the jury pool as a
group, which I do not object to, and did not object to, I
think there may have inadvertently been a statement made
to the jury pool that may be in error. I think that the court
in the explanation of what led us to this stage of the
proceeding mentioned to the jury pool that the original
jury had sentenced Mr. Woolley to death and the Illinois
Supreme Court vacated the death."
	Defense counsel based his argument on two cases, People v.
Hope, 116 Ill. 2d 265 (1986), and People v. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d 1
(1983), in which this court held that the jury should not have any
knowledge of what a prior jury had done in a particular case
because such knowledge could influence the jury. The trial court
denied the motion for a mistrial, stating that a double homicide in
such a small county, such as Henry County, would be remembered
and that it would be more intellectually honest to tell the jurors the
case history. The trial court concluded,
			"I think the distinction between our case and Hope and
Davis are obvious. I recognize the procedural safeguards
in Hope and Davis, but they don't exist here. There is no
way in our situation the juror is not going to figure this
out, and I think the procedural high road here is disclose
and admonish and follow up with a written instruction."
The trial court, pursuant to defense counsel's request, issued an
additional cautionary instruction at the conclusion of the
sentencing hearing.
	On March 23, 1999, jury selection continued and a second
panel of jurors was brought to the courtroom and issued
introductory remarks by the trial judge. The trial court advised the
second panel that defendant had been found guilty and eligible to
receive the death penalty. However, the trial court changed his
remarks concerning the prior sentencing history:
			"You are specifically admonished not to concern
yourself with the prior activity of the jury that held the
original sentencing hearing. We are not to speculate in our
thought processes because that has been vacated. This is
a brand new proceeding and the jurors who ultimately will
be a part of this proceeding are required to listen to all of
the evidence and make their own independent assessment
and conclusion of this case as to whether or not the death
penalty should be imposed without any speculation or
referral at all to the earlier procedures of the jury of ninety
five or ninety six."
	At the conclusion of the jury selection, 10 jurors were selected
from the first panel and 2 jurors and 6 alternates where selected
from the second panel to participate in the case.
	The trial court gave the following cautionary instruction at the
conclusion of the sentencing hearing:
			"You may not consider for any reason the verdict of the
jury at the Defendant's first sentencing hearing. The
original jury sentence verdict is null and void and should
not be considered by you for any reason during this
sentencing hearing."
	Following deliberations, the jury returned a sentence of death
and defendant directly appealed to this court.

ANALYSIS
	Defendant maintains that the trial court erred in informing the
first panel of jurors that he had been sentenced to death at a
previous sentencing hearing. The State counters that no error
occurred because the court's remarks were merely a recitation of
the history of the case. We disagree with the State.
	At the outset, we address the State's argument that defendant
has waived the issue by failing to contemporaneously object.
Defendant argues that pursuant to People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398 (1963), and People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592 (2000), he was not
required to make a contemporaneous objection.
	In Sprinkle, we noted that where the alleged error is an act of
the trial judge, the making of a contemporaneous objection to
questions or comments by the judge poses a practical problem for
the trial lawyer. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d  at 400. In Sprinkle, the trial
judge, during the trial, asked questions and made comments to the
State's witness and to the defendant's father. Defense counsel did
not object to the judge's comments during either the trial or in a
post-trial motion. This court stated that "a fair trial, in all its
stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and
when such requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due
process of law." Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d  at 400. Therefore, we
concluded "less rigid application of the rule requiring timely and
proper objection and preservation of rulings thereon should prevail
where the basis for the objection is the conduct of the trial judge
than is otherwise required." Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d  at 401.
	Likewise, in Sims, during the aggravation-mitigation stage of
the sentencing hearing, the trial judge made a comment to the
grandmother of the victim that he was sorry for her loss. Defense
counsel did not object. Citing to Spritz, we concluded that the
waiver rule is not rigidly applied where the basis for the objection
is the conduct of the trial judge. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d  at 636, citing 
People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d 423, 455 (1990), citing Sprinkle, 27
Ill. 2d at 400-01; People v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217 (1997); People
v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 343 (1998); People v. Dameron, 196 Ill. 2d 156 (2001). Based upon Spritz and its progeny, we will not
rigidly apply the waiver rule.
	We now turn to defendant's claim that the trial court erred in
refusing to proceed with a venire that was untainted by actual and
specific knowledge of defendant's prior death penalty sentence
and that the trial court should have granted defendant's mistrial
motion. We review these claims under an abuse of discretion
standard. People v. Seuffer, 144 Ill. 2d 482, 500 (1991); People v.
Hryciuk, 5 Ill. 2d 176, 182 (1954).
	The day after the trial court informed the jury of defendant's
previous death sentence, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The
trial court denied the motion, maintaining that, unlike a large
metropolitan area, a double homicide in Henry County would be
remembered and that probably every panel member was aware of
the prior death sentence. The trial court concluded that the
precedent set out in People v. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d 265 (1986), and
People v. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d 1 (1983), addressed a factually different
scenario from the one in this case. The trial judge stated,
			"They didn't intellectually address what I have
addressed. [H]ow do you remand a double murder to the
local area of the state and expect under any circumstances
to get a complete jury where nobody has ever heard of this
at all? What are we supposed to do? *** It's an
impossibility to expect that somebody on that jury isn't
going to ultimately know there was a prior death sentence.
I believe that it's the procedurally intellectual high road to
disclose and admonish rather than naively expect that
nobody on this Henry County jury has ever heard of this.
*** [T]he extension from Hope and Davis to the facts of
our case, I believe is a disservice to the juris prudence
[sic] of Illinois."
	After extensively discussing possible options with both
defense counsel and with the State, the trial court denied the
motion for a mistrial and gave a cautionary instruction to the jury.
	In resolving the issue before us, we turn first to this court's
holding in People v. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d 1 (1983). In Davis, during
the eligibility phase of the sentencing hearing, the jury was
informed that the defendant had previously received the death
penalty for the unrelated murder of another person. In determining
whether such information was in error, we noted that at the first
stage of the sentencing hearing, a jury determines whether a
defendant is eligible to receive the death sentence; not whether he
should receive this penalty. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d  at 26. We concluded
that defendant's death sentence for a prior murder had "absolutely
no relevance" at the defendant's eligibility phase of the sentencing
hearing. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d  at 26. We noted that the introduction of
such evidence may improperly influence a jury's decision. Davis,
97 Ill. 2d  at 26. In addition, we found that the jury's sense of
responsibility would diminish with its awareness that another
panel of jurors already sentenced defendant to death. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d  at 26. We concluded:
			"The possibility that the jury may have found defendant
eligible for [the death penalty] on the basis of an
irrelevant and prejudicial nonstatutory aggravating factor
should not be tolerated." Davis, 97 Ill. 2d  at 27.
	Subsequently, in People v. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d 265 (1986), we
stated that although the Davis court was specifically concerned
about the impact of the defendant's previous death sentence on the
first stage of the sentencing hearing, a complete reading of Davis
indicates that such evidence is never admissible. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d 
at 274. In Hope, the defendant argued that he was denied a fair
sentencing hearing because two or three jurors had either seen or
heard television news reports regarding his conviction and death
sentence in a different case. The State argued that evidence of
defendant's prior conviction and death sentence was admissible in
the second stage of the sentencing hearing where the focus is on
the defendant's character and prior record. We stated:
		"The possibility that the jury, even one member, may have
sentenced the defendant to death on the basis of an
irrelevant, highly prejudicial and nonstatutory aggravating
factor constitutes reversible error." Hope, 116 Ill. 2d  at
274.
	With these principles in mind, we look at the specific facts in
this case. Here, there is no dispute that 10 of the jurors were
advised that defendant was previously sentenced to death in the
original sentencing hearing. This admonishment was improper
under both Davis and Hope and was not relevant to the jury's
deliberations at the second stage of the sentencing hearing.
Although a brief history of the case was necessary to explain to the
jurors their role at the sentencing hearing, it was not necessary to
inform the jurors of defendant's previous death sentence.
	Contrary to the State's argument, common sense does not
dictate that the jurors would have known that defendant had been
sentenced to death at a previous sentencing hearing without the
trial judge's comments. The murders occurred nearly five years
earlier, and the trial and first sentencing hearing occurred nearly
four years earlier. Even though some jurors may have heard or
remembered the double homicide, it is not a forgone conclusion
that the jurors would have been aware of the sentence imposed.
Further, even if the jurors remembered the case and the previous
sentence, their decision at the resentencing hearing would not have
been aided by additional reference to the fact that a prior jury had
sentenced defendant to death. Such information was not necessary
in presenting the case history. We find that informing the panel of
jurors of defendant's original sentence was both prejudicial and
inflammatory.
	Furthermore, as we previously noted in Davis, information
regarding a previous death sentence may diminish a jury's sense
of responsibility. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d  at 26. The fact that the jurors
heard that another jury sentenced defendant to death could have
mitigated the serious consequences of their decision. The State,
following the reasoning of the trial court, maintains that this was
not the case because defendant was not under sentence of death at
the time of the resentencing hearing. This reason, however, is
unpersuasive. Despite the fact that defendant was not under
sentence of death, merely hearing that another jury not only found
him eligible for death but also imposed the death penalty may have
diminished the jury's sense of responsibility in determining
whether defendant should be sentenced to death.
	In denying defendant's motion for a mistrial, the trial court
distinguished Davis and Hope on the basis that both cases
involved a second, unrelated offense for which the previous death
penalty had been imposed. This case was different, according to
the trial court, because the previous death sentence was imposed
in the same case and had been reversed on appeal. Thus, reasoned
the trial court, because the jurors would have likely known about
the previous death sentence, disclosure, coupled with a cautionary
instruction, was the most intellectually honest approach.
	Although we recognize the difficult task that faced the trial
court in conducting a second stage resentencing hearing and
determining which information to impart to the jury panel, we
decline to depart from the principles set out in Hope and Davis.
With regards to this case, information regarding defendant's
previous death sentence was unwarranted. While it may have
appeared reasonable at the time to inform the jury of the entire
case history, including the previous death sentence, a cautionary
instruction could have been given to the jury without explicitly
mentioning the fact that defendant had been sentenced to death by
a prior jury. This option was clearly illustrated by the trial court's
actions in making introductory remarks to the second panel of
jurors. In admonishing the second panel, the trial court told the
jurors "not to concern [themselves] with the prior activity of the
jury that held the original sentencing hearing." The trial court did
not, however, inform the jury that defendant had previously been
sentenced to death. This option sufficiently informed the jurors of
the case's prior history without causing prejudice to defendant.
	We conclude, therefore, that defendant has demonstrated
circumstances reasonably justifying a conclusion that a juror was
improperly prejudiced against him. See People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65 (1990). We find that the trial court's comments to the first
panel of jurors was an abuse of discretion and constitutes
reversible error.
	Our disposition of this appeal obviates the need to address
other issues raised by the parties. We do, however, caution the
State with reference to its comments during closing arguments.
Specifically, we find troubling the State's comment: "When Christ
was on the cross there were two thieves with him, and he forgave
the good thief and he promised him salvation in the next life, but
he did not stay the execution." Although the character and scope
of argument is left largely to the trial court (People v. Tenner, 157 Ill. 2d 341 (1993)), argument designed solely to inflame the
passions of the jury is prohibited (People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119 (1987)). On resentencing, the State should refrain from
making any such emotional religious appeal for the death penalty.
	For the forgoing reasons, we reverse defendant's death
sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
	I agree that this matter should be remanded to the circuit court
for further proceedings. In my view, however, the remand should
not be limited to a new sentencing hearing. Woolley should be
granted a new trial on the underlying offenses. He is entitled to
that retrial because the original proceedings in this case did not
comport with the requirements promulgated by our court for the
conduct of cases in which the State is seeking the death penalty.
Those requirements are indispensable for achieving an accurate
determination of innocence or guilt and are applicable to all capital
cases now coming before us on review, including cases
commenced before the rules were enacted. People v. Hickey, No.
87286, slip op. at 38 (September 27, 2001) (Harrison, C.J.,
dissenting); see also People ex rel. Birkett v. Bakalis, 196 Ill. 2d 510, 513 (2001).
	Even if Woolley were not entitled to a new trial, I would
regard the majority's disposition as inadequate. In remanding for
resentencing, this court should impose a restriction its present
opinion lacks. It should bar the State from seeking the death
penalty. As set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent
in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty
law is void and unenforceable because it violates the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Absent a new trial
conducted in accordance with the new rules, there is no basis for
altering that conclusion.
	I agree in part with the majority that this cause must at a
minimum be remanded for a new sentencing hearing, and I concur
in that narrow portion of the majority's judgment. Nonetheless, I
also dissent in part and I urge that defendant should receive a new
trial. For the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey,
No. 87286, slip op. at 39 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J.,
dissenting), and People v. Simpson, No. 85084, slip op. at 35
(September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I believe
defendant's convictions and sentence should also be set aside
because the trial proceedings were conducted without the
minimum constitutional assurances established by the new
supreme court rules governing capital cases. As I stated in my
dissents in Hickey and Simpson, I believe that the new rules should
be applied retroactively. See People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205,
220-21 (1997). Thus, this cause should be remanded for a new
trial conducted in compliance with the new rules.