Title: Commonwealth v. Peno
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12464
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 10, 2020

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12464 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KIMBERLY PENO. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     April 10, 2020. - August 10, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Prior misconduct, Relevancy and 
materiality, Inflammatory evidence.  Practice, Criminal, 
Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 21, 2010. 
 
 
The case was tried before Renee P. Dupuis, J. 
 
 
Robert F. Shaw, Jr., for the defendant. 
Erica G. Sylvia, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In the early morning hours of March 18, 2010, 
Joseph Peno and his wife rushed their two year old child, 
Timothy, to the fire and rescue center in Seekonk.  He had 
visible facial injuries and was not moving.  Doctors at the 
hospital where Timothy was transported discovered that he had 
been severely beaten and had suffered a traumatic brain injury.  
2 
 
He died two days later.  Timothy's mother, the defendant, was 
charged with murder in the first degree in his death.  His 
father pleaded guilty to child endangerment, under an agreement 
to receive a term of probation in exchange for his testimony at 
the defendant's trial.  After an eight-day trial, the defendant 
was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, and now appeals from her 
conviction. 
 
The defendant argues that the Commonwealth secured the 
conviction by improperly portraying her as a bad mother.  She 
maintains that much of the Commonwealth's evidence served only 
to inflame the jury's emotions and to turn them against her, and 
that the Commonwealth misused this evidence to argue that she, 
and not her husband, was the kind of person who could kill her 
own child.  In the alternative, in the interests of justice, the 
defendant asks us to use our authority under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to reduce the verdict or to order a new trial. 
 
We agree that some of the evidence of the defendant's prior 
conduct, and of Timothy's struggles early in life, should not 
have been admitted, and that the prosecutor's closing at times 
crossed the line into impermissible argument.  These errors, 
however, when weighed against the otherwise strong evidence of 
the defendant's guilt, do not require a new trial.  Nor do we 
3 
 
conclude that we should use our extraordinary powers to reduce 
the degree of guilt.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have 
found, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
reserving a more detailed recitation of the challenged evidence 
for further discussion. 
 
a.  Relationship between the defendant and Timothy.  
Timothy was born to the defendant and Joseph Peno1 in October of 
2007.  At birth, he was diagnosed with fetal alcohol syndrome 
and addiction to cocaine.  Accordingly, the Department of 
Children and Families (department) took temporary custody.  For 
the first eighteen months of his life, Timothy lived with a 
foster mother.  To address certain developmental issues 
associated with fetal alcohol syndrome, he received physical, 
social, and speech therapy.  The department also assigned 
Timothy an early intervention social worker to provide him with 
additional support. 
Approximately one month after Timothy was born, the 
defendant learned that she was pregnant again.  During this 
pregnancy, she was monitored by the department and was required 
to undergo addiction counselling.  At some point during this 
                                                 
 
1 Because the defendant and Joseph Peno share a last name, 
we refer to him by his first name. 
 
4 
 
pregnancy with their second son, Collin,2 Joseph and the 
defendant were married. 
Joseph and the defendant had multiple supervised visits 
with Timothy while he was in the foster mother's custody.  The 
social worker who observed the visits noted that the defendant 
struggled to soothe Timothy, became frustrated quickly, and then 
would hand Timothy to Joseph. 
The Penos began the process of reunification with Timothy 
during the summer of 2009.  At the same time, in August of 2009, 
the social worker noted that Timothy was beginning to regress 
from spoken words to gestures.  Shortly thereafter, the 
defendant asked that the social worker stop visiting.  The 
defendant terminated departmental services because she no longer 
wanted outsiders in her home.  Joseph also did not feel that 
Timothy had the developmental issues that the department 
reported and did not want the department involved any further in 
his family's life.  The Penos were granted full custody of 
Timothy in October of 2009.  Early in March of 2010, the 
defendant learned that she was pregnant again.  She was torn 
between raising the child herself and giving it up for adoption. 
b.  Timothy's death.  Approximately one week before 
Timothy's death, to make it easier to clean and maintain the 
                                                 
2 A pseudonym. 
5 
 
household, the Peno family began sleeping together in their 
finished basement.  On March 17, 2010, the family drove to 
multiple locations so that the defendant could purchase alcohol 
and cocaine.  When the family returned home, the defendant went 
to the basement with Timothy, while Joseph stayed upstairs with 
Collin to cook dinner. 
 
At approximately 10 P.M., the defendant asked Joseph to go 
out for more alcohol.  He responded that the liquor stores would 
be closed.  Nonetheless, around 11 P.M., the defendant put 
Timothy and Collin in the family vehicle, roused Joseph from a 
nap, and told him to drive her to a store.  When they got to the 
corner, she changed her mind and asked Joseph to drive them 
home.  Timothy and the defendant went upstairs and headed toward 
the master bedroom, while Joseph returned to the couch, with 
Collin lying on the floor next to him; Collin was "doing fine 
where he was," and Joseph did not think to put him in his crib 
upstairs.  Joseph heard the defendant tell Timothy to "go to 
bed," and then quickly fell asleep. 
A short time later, Joseph woke to what sounded like "a 
muffler," or like Timothy's muffled voice coming from the 
basement.  Joseph ran downstairs to the playroom door, where he 
was met by the defendant, who had blood on her mouth.  Joseph 
asked her what had happened, and she replied that Timothy had 
bitten her.  Joseph returned upstairs to get Collin, who was 
6 
 
sleeping, and headed downstairs again.  He encountered the 
defendant, who was coming up the stairs carrying Timothy.  He 
again asked her what had happened, and the defendant said that 
she would "take care of it."  Joseph continued into the basement 
to "check[] out the room," and saw spots of blood on the floor.  
He put Collin down on the floor near a couch and began to clean 
up the blood. 
A few minutes later, Joseph heard the defendant yelling 
from upstairs.  He went upstairs, carrying Collin, and found the 
defendant in the hallway attempting to give Timothy mouth-to-
mouth resuscitation.  Both Timothy and the defendant had blood 
on their shirts.  The defendant asked Joseph several times to 
telephone 911.  Instead, Joseph decided that she should change 
Timothy's clothes and then he would drive them to the Seekonk 
fire and rescue center.  Joseph thought this would be faster, 
because he was not sure where to find the handset to the 
landline telephone and the fire and rescue center was "just down 
the street" from the Penos' house.  After placing Timothy on the 
bed, Joseph noticed that Timothy's face was red and his nose was 
bleeding; Timothy then threw up on the bed.  Joseph decided not 
to attempt to change Timothy's clothes, and instead grabbed a 
blanket to wrap around him.  Joseph then put Timothy in the 
front seat of his vehicle; Timothy whimpered as he was put down.  
The defendant was at the top of the stairs, acting upset, while 
7 
 
Collin had somehow gone downstairs.  The defendant commented, 
"I'm going to do a lot of time for this."  The defendant put 
Collin in the rear of the vehicle, and then sat in the front 
with Timothy in the middle between her and Joseph.  During the 
three-minute drive, she picked him up and held him. 
Shortly after 12:15 A.M. on March 18, 2010, the family 
arrived at the Seekonk fire and rescue center.  The defendant 
banged on the front door and yelled that they needed assistance.  
She asked the officer at the front desk to come outside, without 
explaining the problem.  Joseph carried Timothy into the center 
wrapped in a blanket.  Timothy's face was visibly red, and his 
eyes were swollen shut.  One of the police officers there 
telephoned 911 in order to alert paramedics.  When asked what 
happened, Joseph said, "My wife had a breakdown."3 
 
Paramedics were summoned to assess Timothy.  Joseph seemed 
anxious, and said, "My wife, his mother . . . can you help him?"  
A paramedic determined that Timothy had no pulse and was not 
breathing, and began performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation.  
Within minutes, Timothy was placed in an ambulance and driven to 
the hospital; Joseph accompanied him in the front of the 
ambulance. 
                                                 
 
3 The Penos' arrival at the Seekonk fire and rescue center 
and the defendant's interview with Seekonk police officers were 
captured on video recordings, without audio. 
8 
 
 
When he arrived at the hospital, pediatricians observed 
that Timothy had serious injuries to his face, head, neck, chest 
and arms.  Due to a lack of brain activity, the family 
ultimately decided to remove Timothy from life support, and he 
was pronounced dead.  The cause of death was a traumatic brain 
injury.  An autopsy later revealed lacerations that were 
consistent with Timothy having been punched in the face.  He 
also had multiple skull fractures caused by blows to or 
compression of his head.  The autopsy indicated that there had 
been at least five distinct traumatic injuries inflicted during 
a single event. 
 
c.  Investigation.  While Timothy was en route to the 
hospital with Joseph, officers at the Seekonk fire and rescue 
center secured the Penos' vehicle and contacted the East 
Providence fire department to take charge of Collin.  The 
defendant was escorted into the interview area.  She appeared 
disheveled and "out of sorts."  Her shirt had a brownish stain 
on the left shoulder, and her right hand was visibly swollen. 
 
A detective and another officer interviewed the defendant.  
From the outset, the detective could detect an odor of alcohol 
coming from the defendant, who confirmed that she had drunk beer 
earlier that day.  The defendant remarked that she did not want 
any more children.  She also said that Timothy cried a lot, 
9 
 
whereas Collin did not.  She said that Joseph had been sleeping 
at the time of the incident, and that he was "always" sleeping. 
 
Eventually, the defendant became incoherent and appeared to 
be "crashing"; she was transported to a hospital for treatment.  
While en route, she said aloud, "The answer to every question is 
I don't know."  Blood drawn at the hospital showed that her 
serum alcohol level at that time was .09.  A department worker 
spoke to the defendant at the hospital.  During this 
conversation, the defendant alternated between being agitated 
and unresponsive to his questions.  When asked how Timothy was 
hurt, she said, "I don't remember what happened to the boy." 
 
A Rehoboth police officer obtained a statement from Joseph 
at the hospital where Timothy was being treated.4  According to 
the officer, Joseph appeared to be in a state of "stoic shock."  
Joseph then was transported back to the Seekonk fire and rescue 
center for an additional interview.  He was not physically 
examined or photographed, and his clothing was not analyzed for 
evidence.  After this second interview, Joseph returned to the 
hospital. 
 
Rehoboth police officers obtained a search warrant for the 
Penos' house and found the house in a state of disarray.  They 
                                                 
 
4 Although the Rehoboth police officer testified as to 
Joseph's demeanor during this conversation, the substance of 
Joseph's statement at the hospital was not before the jury. 
10 
 
observed several bloody pieces of children's clothing, as well 
as blood on the carpet, a child's chair and another chair in the 
basement, the mattresses in the upstairs bedrooms, a towel and 
blanket on the floor of the upstairs master bedroom, and a 
child's crib.  In addition, the wooden paneling in an area above 
the bed in the basement, approximately one foot in diameter and 
sixteen inches above the bed, was damaged. 
 
The defendant's hands were swabbed for evidence.  These 
swabs showed two deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profiles:  one 
matched the defendant, and one was consistent with Timothy, 
Collin, or Joseph.  Chemists also found human blood on several 
pieces of clothing taken from the defendant at the hospital.  
DNA tests indicated that the blood found on items from the home 
matched Timothy.  Joseph's hands were not swabbed, and his 
clothing was not tested for blood. 
 
d.  Procedural background.  The defendant was indicted on a 
charge of murder in the first degree.  Joseph was charged with 
child endangerment and entered into a plea agreement under which 
he agreed to testify at the defendant's trial in exchange for a 
sentence of three years' probation. 
 
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress statements 
she made to police at the Seekonk fire and rescue center, as 
well as her statements to police at the hospital where she was 
taken in the early morning hours of March 18, 2010.  A Superior 
11 
 
Court judge, who was not the trial judge, agreed that the 
statements at the hospital, where the defendant had been taken 
after she appeared to be "crashing," were involuntary, and 
allowed her motion with respect to those statements.  He denied 
the motion as to the statements at the fire and rescue center. 
The Commonwealth proceeded against the defendant under 
theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and deliberate 
premeditation.  Following over five days of testimony, and jury 
deliberations extending over two days, the defendant was found 
guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  She timely appealed. 
 
2.  Discussion.  There was no dispute at trial that 
Timothy's irreversible brain injuries were the result of a 
beating by an adult, and that only the defendant and her husband 
had been in the house on the night Timothy was fatally injured.  
Moreover, the only direct evidence as to which of them was 
responsible for what happened in the house that night was 
through testimony by the defendant's husband, pursuant to a plea 
agreement under which he received no jail time. 
 
The Commonwealth introduced detailed evidence of the 
defendant's use of drugs and alcohol while pregnant, her lack of 
prenatal care, and Timothy's medical difficulties at birth and 
while in his foster mother's care, as well as various aspects of 
the defendant's parenting, to show the defendant's attitude 
12 
 
toward her son and to argue that the beating evinced a 
deliberate plan to kill him because of long-standing resentment. 
 
The theory of the defense was that Joseph, and not the 
defendant, was responsible for Timothy's death, and that he had 
killed Timothy while the defendant, who was severely intoxicated 
due to binging on "crack" cocaine and alcohol, was on another 
floor of the house.  In support of this argument, defense 
counsel sought to challenge Joseph's credibility by extensive 
cross-examination and by eliciting prior inconsistent statements 
that he made to other family members about the night of the 
beating.  Counsel also called witnesses to paint a more positive 
picture of the defendant's relationship with Timothy, and to 
describe her demeanor hours before he was beaten. 
 
On appeal, the defendant asserts two sets of errors 
relating to the Commonwealth's use of prior bad act evidence.  
She contends that the evidence pertaining to her prenatal 
conduct, Timothy's resulting developmental complications, and 
her relationship with Timothy served merely as impermissible 
propensity evidence, and thus was admitted improperly.  This 
evidence, the defendant argues, was at best of minimal 
relevance, and was calculated to arouse the jury's emotions and 
to invite them to convict her out of anger or sympathy or based 
on the view that she was unfit to be a parent.  Moreover, it 
struck at the core of her defense and created an intolerable 
13 
 
risk that the jury impermissibly would conclude that, by virtue 
of her character and her prior conduct, she was more likely than 
Joseph to have killed their child.  The defendant maintains as 
well that the prosecutor's reliance on this evidence in her 
closing argument was improper, and was so inflammatory as to 
constitute a separate ground for a new trial. 
 
The asserted errors all relate to a single issue, i.e., the 
potential prejudice from the use of prior bad act evidence.  
Accordingly, we first address each of the defendant's claims to 
determine whether any error occurred, and then consider whether, 
if there were errors, their cumulative effect so prejudiced the 
defendant as to require a new trial.  See Commonwealth. v. 
Maynard, 436 Mass. 558, 570 (2002).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 
448 Mass. 122, 138–139 (2006); Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 
514, 523 (1987). 
 
We agree that some of the challenged evidence, specifically 
evidence pertaining to the defendant's prenatal care, and 
Timothy's developmental complications at birth and while in 
foster care, should not have been admitted.  We also agree that 
the prosecutor's reliance on this evidence in closing was 
improper, as was the use of properly admitted prior bad act 
evidence to advance an argument grounded in propensity-based 
reasoning.  While these errors are troubling, and the question 
14 
 
is a close one, ultimately we discern no reason to disturb the 
verdict. 
 
a.  Prior bad act evidence.  "Evidence of a crime, wrong, 
or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in 
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 
accordance with the character."  Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(1) 
(2020).  Such evidence may, however, "be admissible for another 
purpose," such as to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or 
lack of accident."  Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(2).  Even where 
evidence is relevant to a permissible purpose, it "will not be 
admitted if its probative value is outweighed by the risk of 
unfair prejudice to the defendant."  See Commonwealth v. 
Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014).  A determination whether 
evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts is admissible at trial 
requires a two-part inquiry.  First, the evidence must be 
relevant to something other than the defendant's propensity to 
commit the charged offense.  See, e.g., id. at 249-251 (evidence 
of prior bad act was inadmissible because its relevance to case 
rested on propensity reasoning).  Second, if the evidence is 
relevant, its prejudicial effect must not outweigh its probative 
value.  Id. 
 
"To be sufficiently probative the evidence must be 
connected with the facts of the case [and] not be too remote in 
15 
 
time" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Butler, 445 Mass. 
568, 574 (2005).  Temporal remoteness is not an exercise in line 
drawing; rather, a reviewing court focuses on the "'logical 
relationship'" between the [prior bad act] evidence and the 
crime charged" (citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Facella, 
478 Mass. 393, 405 (2017). 
 
We review a judge's decision to allow the introduction of 
prior bad act evidence for abuse of discretion.  Facella, 478 
Mass. at 407.  The decision will stand unless we conclude that 
the judge "made a clear error of judgment in weighing the 
factors relevant to the decision, such that the decision falls 
outside the range of reasonable alternatives."  See id., citing 
L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
 
When assessing whether the risk of unfair prejudice 
outweighs the probative value of the challenged evidence, the 
factors a reviewing court considers may include (1) whether the 
trial judge carefully weighed the probative value and 
prejudicial effect of the evidence introduced at trial, see 
Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 229 n.14 (1986); 
(2) whether the judge mitigated the prejudicial effect through 
proper limiting instructions, see Commonwealth v. Bryant, 482 
Mass. 731, 735 (2019); (3) whether the challenged evidence was 
cumulative of other admissible evidence, thereby reducing the 
risk of any additional prejudicial effect, cf. Commonwealth v. 
16 
 
Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 348 (1998); and (4) whether the 
challenged evidence was so similar to the charged offense as to 
increase the risk of propensity reasoning by the jury, see 
Crayton, 470 Mass. at 251. 
 
The evidence at issue falls into four categories:  (i) the 
defendant's alcohol and drug use while pregnant with Timothy; 
(ii) the adequacy of the defendant's medical care while she was 
pregnant with Timothy; (iii) the developmental complications 
Timothy faced at birth and while in foster care as a result of 
the defendant's alcohol and drug use; and (iv) the defendant's 
relationship with Timothy.5 
 
The Commonwealth argues that this evidence was indicative 
of the defendant's indifference or hostility towards Timothy, 
                                                 
 
5 Although she objected to the introduction of the 
challenged testimony prior to trial, the defendant did not 
object separately to each piece of prior bad act testimony at 
trial.  The defendant did, however, object to the entirety of 
the testimony of Timothy's foster mother and to that of multiple 
department workers, and the judge noted that the defendant's 
objections were saved.  These witnesses' testimony included 
(1) the fact that Timothy had been exposed to drugs in utero, 
(2) details of Timothy's complications at and after birth, and 
(3) the witnesses' observations of the defendant's interactions 
with Timothy.  Because, as discussed supra, we review the 
cumulative prejudicial effect of the errors, at least some of 
which specifically were objected to at trial, we need not 
determine whether objections were preserved to each individual 
piece of prior bad act testimony.  We note, however, that the 
better practice is for a defendant to raise specific objections 
at trial to ensure that his or her objections are considered and 
preserved for appeal.  See Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass. 715, 
721 (2016). 
17 
 
and thus relevant to her motive or intent to kill him.  Evidence 
of the relationship between a defendant and a victim indeed may 
be relevant to establish motive or intent.  This is a fact-
dependent inquiry.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carlson, 448 
Mass. 501, 507-508 (2007) (evidence of prior arguments between 
defendant and victim, where defendant had threatened to hit 
victim, "tended to show that the defendant intentionally beat 
the victim as inducement to comply with his request to get some 
money").  See also Commonwealth v. Dung Van Tran, 463 Mass. 8, 
15 (2012) (evidence of defendant's past abusive behavior toward 
his children and family was relevant to defendant's ongoing 
hostility toward his family, and to suggest revenge for 
perceived betrayal as possible motive for defendant setting 
himself on fire inside family apartment); Commonwealth v. 
Gallison, 383 Mass. 659, 672-673 (1981) (evidence that defendant 
abused one child during same time frame as other child's death 
was probative of defendant's "reckless and wanton state of mind 
as to the physical well-being of both children"). 
 
We therefore turn to examine the specific evidence at issue 
to determine whether its admission was proper in this case. 
 
i.  The defendant's prenatal use of drugs and alcohol.  The 
Commonwealth introduced evidence that, while she was pregnant 
with Timothy, the defendant continued to use drugs and alcohol 
on at least a weekly basis, and also smoked a pack of cigarettes 
18 
 
every day.  Indeed, Joseph testified that he was unable to 
control the defendant's alcohol and drug use.  Timothy was born 
with cocaine in his system and suffering from fetal alcohol 
syndrome.  The judge agreed with the Commonwealth's argument 
that the defendant's prenatal use of drugs and alcohol was 
indicative of her indifference towards Timothy, and thus 
relevant to her motive or intent to harm Timothy. 
 
Absent evidence that a mother ingested harmful substances 
with the intent to harm her fetus, evidence of prenatal use of 
drugs or alcohol generally is inadmissible to establish the 
nature of the relationship between a mother and her unborn 
child, or an intent to harm that child years later.  See 
Commonwealth v. Podkowka, 445 Mass. 692, 695-697 (2006) (where 
defendant father sought to introduce evidence of mother's 
prenatal drug and alcohol use to suggest that mother was 
responsible for child's death, it was proper to exclude such 
evidence because it "amounted to nothing more than improper 
evidence of bad character . . . [and] did not consist of 
'acts . . . so closely connected in point of time and method of 
operation as to cast doubt upon the identification of [the] 
defendant as the person who committed the crime'" [citation 
omitted]). 
 
We do not believe that, standing alone, the fact that a 
mother ingested harmful substances while pregnant is indicative 
19 
 
of an intent to harm her child before or after birth, or of her 
future relationship with that child.  See Weisberg & Vandervort, 
A Liberal Dilemma:  Respecting Autonomy While Also Protecting 
Inchoate Children from Prenatal Substance Abuse, 24 Wm. & Mary 
Bill Rts. J. 659, 703 (2016) ("many pregnant women who abuse 
substances do so because they are addicted"). 
 
Nonetheless, the specific facts of this case afford this 
evidence a more nuanced relevance.  The jury heard testimony by 
Joseph, officers at the Seekonk fire and rescue center, and 
several department staff, from which the jury reasonably could 
have inferred that the defendant resented Timothy for his 
imposition on her life, namely, his interference with her 
ability to consume drugs and alcohol as she wished.  The 
properly admitted evidence established that, as a result of her 
use of drugs and alcohol while pregnant, and Timothy's ensuing 
developmental complications, the department took custody of her 
child and became involved in her life.  Joseph and a department 
worker also testified that, even after Timothy was returned to 
the Penos' care, the defendant was frustrated by the 
department's continued involvement in their lives.  When the 
defendant became pregnant again shortly after giving birth to 
Timothy, the department monitored the pregnancy, thereby 
restricting the defendant's ability to continue to use drugs and 
alcohol. 
20 
 
 
In the days prior to Timothy's death, the defendant learned 
that she was again pregnant.  According to Joseph, the defendant 
was anxious about this pregnancy; the defendant herself told 
police that she did not want any more children.  After she had 
regained custody of Timothy, the defendant also explicitly 
stated that she did not want further involvement by the 
department in her life and demonstrated this implicitly by not 
responding to any of the department's efforts at outreach after 
she terminated home visits by an early intervention social 
worker.  From this evidence, the jury reasonably might have 
inferred that the defendant's anxiety about being pregnant again 
could have rekindled her feelings of resentment toward Timothy, 
given that his complications at birth had led to the 
department's intrusion in her life and had interfered with her 
ability to consume drugs and alcohol throughout her subsequent 
pregnancy with Collin.  While the defendant's use of drugs and 
alcohol did not, by itself, establish anything about her 
feelings toward Timothy, it did provide some context for a 
particular facet of their later relationship and some 
explanation, albeit attenuated, of her subsequent feelings of 
resentment toward him. 
 
Accordingly, the evidence was probative of a material fact 
concerning the defendant's motive.  Cf. Dung Van Tran, 463 Mass. 
at 14-15 (prior bad act evidence had greater probative value 
21 
 
than prejudicial effect "in light of 'the seemingly inexplicable 
nature of the assault'"); Commonwealth v. Guy, 454 Mass. 440, 
443-444 (2009) (evidence that defendant had spoken to coworkers 
about serial killings and often read books about serial killings 
and murder was relevant to establish defendant's fascination 
with murder to explain "what otherwise might be seen as an 
inexplicable act of violence"); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 427 
Mass. 65, 68 (1998) (detailed evidence regarding defendant's 
prior drug dealing was admissible in light of fact that 
Commonwealth's theory of case was that defendant killed victim 
because he owed defendant money for drugs or had stolen 
defendant's drugs, and evidence supplied context for 
Commonwealth's theory); Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 
269-270 (1982) (evidence of defendant's activities prior to 
killing was "relevant to show intent or motive" where evidence 
was "inextricably intertwined with the description of events on 
the [day] of the killing" [citation omitted]). 
 
The evidence of the defendant's prenatal use of drugs and 
alcohol also was not so similar to the fatal beating that the 
jury would have inferred from this evidence a propensity to 
commit murder.  Compare Commonwealth v. Veiovis, 477 Mass. 472, 
486 (2017) (abuse of discretion to allow evidence that defendant 
possessed spiked baseball bat, where weapon could not have been 
used in crimes, because evidence that defendant possessed this 
22 
 
type of weapon "posed a needless risk of unfair prejudice"); 
Crayton, 470 Mass. at 251 (evidence that defendant possessed 
hand-drawn sketches of nude or partially nude young girls gave 
rise to risk of unfair prejudice where defendant was charged 
with viewing child pornography).  Moreover, in light of the 
extensive testimony pertaining to the impact of the defendant's 
use of drugs and alcohol on her relationship with Timothy, any 
additional prejudicial effect was likely to have been minimal.  
See Wilson, 427 Mass. at 348. 
 
In addition, while her instructions were generic, the judge 
undertook some effort to mitigate the risk by instructing the 
jury during her final charge that they were not to consider 
evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts as evidence that she 
committed the crime charged.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Anestal, 
463 Mass. 655, 673 (2012) (absence of any limiting instruction 
permitted jury to consider evidence for improper purpose).  
Accordingly, despite our significant reservations about the 
reliance on evidence of the prenatal use of drugs and alcohol to 
establish the nature of the subsequent relationship between a 
mother and her child, we cannot conclude that the judge abused 
her discretion in allowing the introduction of such evidence in 
these particular circumstances. 
 
ii.  Adequacy of the defendant's prenatal medical care.  
The Commonwealth also introduced evidence that the defendant had 
23 
 
not sought adequate prenatal medical care while she was pregnant 
with Timothy.  The evidence on this point was vague and mixed:  
Joseph testified that he remembered driving the defendant to a 
location where she could have received prenatal medical care, 
and that the defendant "could have gone" to seek such care; he 
also testified, however, that he never attended a doctor's visit 
while the defendant was pregnant with Timothy.  Medical records 
introduced in evidence from the time of Timothy's birth include 
notes indicating that the defendant had received almost no 
prenatal care. 
 
The Commonwealth argued -- and the trial judge agreed -- 
that the defendant's inadequate prenatal medical care showed her 
indifference toward Timothy.  Even if we accept that such 
evidence could have some probative value in some circumstances, 
we nonetheless conclude that any probative value here was at 
best marginal and unquestionably outweighed by the risk of 
unfair prejudice to the defendant. 
 
This court has urged caution when relying upon evidence of 
a defendant's poor parenting to establish a parent's intent to 
harm his or her child.  See, e.g., Podkowka, 445 Mass. at 696 
(while "[p]oor parenting may provide a basis for the State to 
intervene in the parent-child relationship, . . . standing 
alone, it does not tend to show that a parent had the motive 
seriously to injure or kill [his or] her child").  Our 
24 
 
misgivings about such evidence grow greater still where the 
evidence seeks to draw an inference about the relationship 
between a mother and her child based on the mother's conduct 
while pregnant, and even more so two and one-half years after 
the child's birth.  See Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482, 
484, 495 n.21 (2012) (where mother was on trial for involuntary 
manslaughter after child died during unassisted childbirth, 
evidence that defendant smoked or drank while pregnant was of 
"minimal probative value but potentially high prejudicial 
effect"). 
 
Nearly all aspects of a woman's conduct while pregnant have 
the potential to affect her unborn child.  See Remy v. 
MacDonald, 440 Mass. 675, 677-678 (2004) (discussing "unique 
symbiotic relationship" between mother and unborn child, where 
"almost all aspects of a woman's life may have an impact, for 
better or for worse, on her developing fetus").  Hence, absent 
clear evidence indicating that a defendant's decision not to 
seek adequate prenatal medical care was motivated by specific 
feelings toward her unborn child, there is a strong possibility 
that the defendant's conduct had nothing whatsoever to do with 
any feelings toward her unborn child.  In this case, for 
example, Joseph testified that, while she was pregnant, the 
25 
 
defendant was unable to curb her use of drugs and alcohol.6  See 
Mohapatra, Unshackling Addiction:  A Public Health Approach to 
Drug Use During Pregnancy, 26 Wis. J.L. Gender & Soc'y 241, 264–
265 (2011) (explaining that women who use drugs while pregnant 
often are reluctant to seek prenatal care for fear of criminal 
repercussions).  Because there was no indication that the 
defendant's decision not to seek adequate prenatal care was 
motivated by her attitude toward Timothy, the evidence lacked a 
sufficient "logical relationship" to the issues in the case, see 
Facella, 478 Mass. at 405, and it should not have been 
introduced. 
 
iii.  Timothy's postbirth complications.  Beyond 
establishing that Timothy was born drug-addicted and with fetal 
alcohol syndrome, the Commonwealth presented detailed evidence, 
over the defendant's repeated objections, pertaining to 
Timothy's developmental complications early in life.  For 
example, his foster mother, who cared for Timothy for the first 
eighteen months of his life, described her difficulties feeding 
                                                 
 
6 As stated, evidence was introduced at trial that the 
defendant suffered from substance use disorder and other mental 
health issues.  There also was evidence, from Joseph and the 
defendant's sister, concerning the defendant's pattern of binge 
drinking with her sister.  In his closing argument, defense 
counsel reminded the jury of the evidence of the defendant's 
substance use disorder and suggested that she had been binging 
on drugs and alcohol on the evening that Timothy was fatally 
injured. 
26 
 
Timothy and his disturbed sleep patterns until he was six to 
eight weeks old.  The foster mother and a caseworker from the 
department both testified that Timothy's condition improved 
under the foster mother's care, but that, when he was returned 
to the defendant's custody, he continued to require physical 
therapy and speech therapy. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the detailed evidence was 
relevant to show that the defendant could have grown frustrated 
with Timothy's deficits, and this in turn could have increased 
her resentment toward Timothy.  We do not share the 
Commonwealth's view that this and other evidence of Timothy's 
developmental complications was admissible for this purpose.  It 
is unclear how the foster mother's difficulties feeding Timothy, 
or his initially disturbed sleep while in the foster mother's 
care, would have increased the defendant's frustration with or 
resentment toward Timothy. 
 
We agree with the defendant that this piled-on evidence 
instead served to invoke juror sympathy for Timothy and to 
besmirch the defendant's character by implying that Timothy's 
foster mother was a far better parent.  Cf. Podkowka, 445 Mass. 
at 695-697.  Because this evidence of Timothy's developmental 
complications while in the care of his foster mother was not 
probative of a material fact, see Crayton, 470 Mass. at 249, its 
introduction was error. 
27 
 
 
iv.  The defendant's relationship with Timothy.  The 
defendant challenges the introduction of extensive evidence 
pertaining to her interactions with Timothy well before the 
fatal incident.  This evidence included, inter alia, the 
defendant's struggles to bond with Timothy, her indifference to 
his ongoing developmental needs, and her approach to parenting. 
 
Timothy's foster mother testified, for example, that the 
defendant struggled to bond with Timothy while he remained in 
her care and after visitation had begun; the foster mother 
pointed to a six-month progress meeting with the department 
where Timothy was present and the defendant did not appear to 
interact much with Timothy.  In addition, the foster mother 
testified that multiple one-hour visits between the Penos and 
Timothy ended early, with Timothy being returned to her crying.  
In a similar vein, multiple witnesses described the defendant's 
dismissive attitude toward Timothy as compared to her attitude 
toward her younger son Collin. 
 
There was also evidence to suggest that the defendant was 
indifferent to Timothy's ongoing developmental needs once he was 
returned to the Penos' custody.  The jury heard that the 
defendant terminated early intervention services for Timothy 
because she "didn't want people in [her] home anymore,"7 and both 
                                                 
 
7 The same department worker also testified on cross-
examination, however, that she had made three home visits after 
28 
 
the defendant and Joseph seemed to minimize Timothy's 
developmental challenges. 
 
The defendant's approach to parenting also featured 
prominently throughout the trial.  One conspicuous example was 
the defendant's draconian approach to "potty training" Timothy 
beginning shortly after his second birthday.  If Timothy soiled 
himself, which he did apparently on a daily basis, the defendant 
would punish him by making him stand in a corner for twenty 
minutes.  On one occasion the defendant forcibly grasped 
Timothy's arm and placed him on a toilet seat.  At times the 
defendant handled Timothy roughly in other contexts as well.  
For instance, a department worker reported that she once saw the 
defendant place Timothy -- who was secured in a child safety car 
seat -- on the ground with "excessive force," and the 
defendant's sister described an instance where the defendant 
grabbed Timothy by the arm and pulled him onto a rug in front of 
the television. 
 
The relevance of this evidence, which was probative of the 
defendant's relationship with Timothy, and thus of motive or 
                                                 
Timothy was returned to the Penos' custody, and that everything 
went well at those visits, the children seemed "happy," and she 
had no issues or concerns about either of the children at that 
time.  Moreover, an early intervention counsellor also explained 
that, after she started working with Collin, the defendant 
requested similar services for Timothy, and the counsellor 
provided both boys services once a week for approximately one 
year. 
29 
 
intent, is not in dispute.  See, e.g., Dung Van Tran, 463 Mass. 
at 15.  The question remains, however, whether the probative 
value of this evidence was outweighed by a risk of unfair 
prejudice.  See Crayton, 470 Mass. at 249.  This decision is 
left to the discretion of the trial judge and will be disturbed 
only where there is "a clear error of judgment . . . such that 
the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives."  Facella, 478 Mass. at 407. 
 
"[T]rial judges must take care to avoid exposing the jury 
unnecessarily to inflammatory material that might inflame the 
jurors' emotions and possibly deprive the defendant of an 
impartial jury" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Carey, 463 
Mass. 378, 390 (2012).  As stated, see part 2.a, supra, in 
deciding whether challenged evidence was more prejudicial than 
probative, a number of factors may be relevant.  See 
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 500 (1997), S.C., 427 
Mass. 298 and 428 Mass. 39 (1998).  To determine whether the 
evidence of the defendant's relationship with Timothy after he 
was returned to her custody was more prejudicial than probative, 
two of these factors are relevant:  (1) whether the judge 
thoughtfully weighed the risks of unfair prejudice, and 
(2) whether she gave limiting instructions adequate to mitigate 
any additional prejudice from the introduction of this evidence. 
30 
 
 
v.  Weighing risk of unfair prejudice.  Only after "careful 
and reasoned" scrutiny of the contested evidence "will the judge 
truly appreciate the substance and purpose of the evidence, thus 
enabling him [or her] fairly to balance the submission's 
prejudicial impact against its probative value."  See Carey, 463 
Mass. at 390.  A record of the thoughtful weighing of the risks 
of unfair prejudice, and the weight of the contested evidence, 
as well as steps the judge took to limit its quantity, may 
indicate a reasonable exercise of discretion.  See Facella, 478 
Mass. at 407. 
 
As discussed, see note 5, supra, defense counsel often did 
not object to individual pieces of prior bad act testimony as it 
was introduced.  Instead, counsel routinely objected to a 
particular witness's testimony in a blanket fashion:  for 
example, counsel objected to the testimony of Timothy's foster 
mother, and of the department workers, in their entirety; these 
global objections were overruled.  Because defense counsel did 
not consistently later raise more tailored objections to 
specific portions of testimony, the judge rarely was called upon 
to weigh the probative value and prejudicial effect of 
individual portions of prior bad act testimony. 
 
This is not, however, a case where the judge failed to 
exercise any discretion by making no effort at all to scrutinize 
the contested evidence.  Contrast Carey, 463 Mass. at 391-392 
31 
 
(error where judge did not review video recording of victim 
being strangled to death and simply accepted Commonwealth's 
description of recording); Commonwealth v. Manning, 47 Mass. 
App. Ct. 923, 923 (1999) (error where judge did not weigh 
evidence based on mistaken belief that judge was required to 
allow evidence to be introduced).  Both before and during trial, 
for example, the judge expressed misgivings about the volume of 
prior bad act evidence the Commonwealth sought to introduce, the 
distance in time of the evidence from the crime at issue, and 
the basis of knowledge of some of the challenged evidence. 
 
The judge also struck some testimony on the defendant's 
objection and excluded certain portions of the Commonwealth's 
proffered testimony.  For example, the judge struck the 
testimony by a department worker regarding a visit between the 
defendant and Timothy where the defendant apparently put 
Timothy's snowsuit on too early before the end of the visit.  
The judge also excluded testimony pertaining to an incident in 
which the defendant left Timothy with Joseph in a vehicle for an 
extended period of time while she and Collin visited a relative. 
 
At a particularly regrettable juncture of the trial, when 
Joseph's daughter referred to the defendant as "the uterus," the 
judge sua sponte intervened.  She first excused the jury, and 
then warned the daughter that she would be held in contempt if 
she continued to testify in that manner, and that such testimony 
32 
 
would risk a mistrial.  When the jury returned, the judge 
instructed them that they should disregard the testimony, and 
that they could consider evidence of a witness's bias when 
assessing that witness's credibility. 
 
vi.  Limiting instructions.  We next consider whether the 
judge's use of limiting instructions was sufficient to mitigate 
any risk that the jury might misuse the prior bad act evidence.  
Despite his evident focus on excluding the prior bad act 
evidence, and his objections to its introduction, defense 
counsel did not request that contemporaneous limiting 
instructions be given regarding evidence of the defendant's 
relationship with Timothy as it was introduced at trial, and 
none was given.  The judge instead instructed the jury as to the 
permissible uses of prior bad act evidence in her final charge. 
 
To be sure, we have not said that a judge is required to 
give contemporaneous limiting instructions if a defendant does 
not request them.  See Commonwealth v. Leonardi, 413 Mass. 757, 
764 (1992).  Where, however, the risk of unfair prejudice is 
apparent, as it was here, contemporaneous limiting instructions 
are much to be preferred; such instructions would have mitigated 
further any prejudicial effect of the prior bad act evidence.  
See Bryant, 482 Mass. at 737 (although contemporaneous limiting 
instructions were not requested, "[b]est practice would 
certainly have been to give a limiting instruction at the time 
33 
 
the evidence of the defendant's drug dealing history was 
admitted"); Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 551 n.12 
(noting that limiting instructions should be given at time 
testimony is introduced in order to better mitigate risk of 
prejudice).  "The timing of a limiting instruction is, however, 
ultimately in the discretion of the trial judge."  Bryant, supra 
at 737-738. 
 
Moreover, in her final charge, the judge properly 
instructed the jury that they were to consider the prior bad act 
evidence only for permitted purposes such as motive or intent.  
She also instructed them that "emotion or sympathy, passion or 
prejudice [had] no place in [their] deliberations."  We presume 
that the jury followed these instructions.  See Commonwealth v. 
Bois, 476 Mass. 15, 35–36, (2016). 
 
In sum, evidence pertaining to the defendant's prior 
interactions with Timothy was clearly relevant to the question 
of motive.  It is apparent that the judge understood the risks 
of this prior bad act evidence and took steps to exclude unduly 
prejudicial evidence.  Although contemporaneous limiting 
instructions would have been a more effective way to mitigate 
the risk of prejudice, defense counsel did not request such 
instructions, and the judge gave clear and proper instructions 
regarding this type of evidence during her final charge.  
Ultimately, we discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's 
34 
 
conclusion that the probative value of this evidence was not 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
 
b.  Improprieties in prosecutor's closing argument.  The 
defendant also asserts error in the prosecutor's closing 
argument with respect to the prior bad act evidence, both with 
regard to the discussion of evidence that should not have been 
admitted, and the improper propensity arguments made concerning 
properly admitted evidence.  The defendant argues that the 
prosecutor's statements compounded the prejudicial effect of the 
evidence introduced; the Commonwealth maintains that the 
prosecutor simply marshalled the evidence that had been 
introduced.  We agree with the defendant that certain statements 
were improper. 
 
The prosecutor began and ended her closing by commenting on 
Timothy's developmental complications stemming from the 
defendant's prenatal use of drugs and alcohol.  Early in her 
argument, the prosecutor said: 
"Because [Timothy] was drug dependent, he had tremors.  He 
shook all the time.  He couldn't sleep.  He cried all the 
time.  He was born with developmental delays, and one of 
the issues he had was he couldn't suck properly; and as a 
result, it would take hours and hours [to feed him]." 
 
Later, the prosecutor argued that Timothy "came into this world 
suffering from crack," and "left the world the same way."  At 
the end of the prosecutor's closing, defense counsel objected to 
these statements. 
35 
 
 
While trial counsel did not make this argument, the 
defendant also asserts on appeal that the prosecutor used the 
prior bad act evidence to invite the jury to engage in 
propensity-based reasoning.  In particular, the defendant 
challenges the following statement by the prosecutor: 
"Now, you may ask yourself what kind of mother would do 
this to her own child?  The same mother who would abuse 
alcohol throughout her pregnancy, the same mother who would 
smoke crack throughout her pregnancy, the same mother who 
never sought any prenatal treatment during her pregnancy, 
the same mother who when giving birth to a child who's 
drug-dependent refuses to tell doctors what drug she had 
taken so they could treat her sick child who was suffering 
from withdrawal." 
 
 
"A prosecutor is entitled to argue forcefully for the 
defendant's conviction"; "[e]nthusiastic rhetoric, strong 
advocacy, and excusable hyperbole are not grounds for reversal" 
(quotation and citations omitted).  See Wilson, 427 Mass. at 
350.  At the same time, prosecutors have "a particular 
obligation" to argue in a manner that "inspires confidence that 
the verdict was reached based on the evidence rather than 
sympathy for the victim."  See Santiago, 425 Mass. at 494. 
 
We need not dwell at length on the Commonwealth's reference 
to the details of Timothy's developmental complications at and 
after birth.  As discussed, this evidence should not have been 
36 
 
introduced; the references to the evidence at closing only 
served to compound the effect of that error.8 
 
With respect to the improper propensity arguments, we also 
agree with the defendant that the prosecutor's suggestion that 
the defendant was the "kind of mother" who would harm her child 
was blatant propensity reasoning.  The meaning of the 
prosecutor's statement was clear:  because the defendant had 
used drugs and alcohol during her pregnancy and had not sought 
adequate prenatal care, she was more likely to have killed her 
child.  This line of argument was out of bounds.  See 
Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass. 721, 744 (2014), S.C., 479 
Mass. 52 (2018) ("using [evidence of] bad acts directly as 
propensity evidence [in closing argument] . . . is forbidden"). 
 
c.  Prejudicial error.  Having determined that there were 
several errors in the admission of the disputed evidence, as 
well as in aspects of the prosecutor's closing argument, we turn 
to consider whether the cumulative effect of the identified 
errors -- the introduction of evidence pertaining to prenatal 
                                                 
 
8 The prosecutor's statement that Timothy "came into this 
world suffering from crack," and "left the world the same way," 
was not improper, although "close to the line" of impropriety, 
and in context was essentially a dramatic flourish.  See 
Commonwealth v. Vuthy Seng, 436 Mass. 537, 555-556, cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 942 (2002).  Evidence that Timothy had been 
exposed to drugs in utero, and that the defendant's use of drugs 
and alcohol was ongoing at the time of Timothy's death, was 
properly before the jury. 
37 
 
medical care and to Timothy's medical complications at and after 
birth, and the prosecutor's improper statements at closing -- 
warrants a new trial.  While a close call, we conclude that it 
does not. 
 
Where, as here, the errors concern the improper 
introduction of, and reference to, prior bad act evidence, a 
fundamental concern is that the jury impermissibly will conclude 
that the defendant had a propensity to commit the charged 
offense, and will render a guilty verdict on the basis of that 
conclusion without carefully scrutinizing all of the evidence 
before them.  See Crayton, 470 Mass. at 250-251, 254.  More 
specifically, a concern in these circumstances is that the jury 
unfairly would be inclined to believe Joseph's testimony 
implicating the defendant, and to disbelieve the defendant's 
contention that Joseph was responsible for Timothy's death.  See 
Commonwealth v. Santos, 460 Mass. 128, 137-138 (2011). 
 
A second and equally fundamental concern resulting from the 
piling on of impermissible prior bad act evidence, particularly 
involving a young child and a brutal crime, is that the 
erroneously admitted evidence, highlighted by the prosecutor's 
improper closing argument, could so inflame the jury's passion 
or sympathy that they would be unable to remain impartial.  
Thus, they might reach a verdict based on passion and a need to 
avenge the victim, rather than on having scrutinized the 
38 
 
evidence thoroughly and rationally to determine whether the 
Commonwealth has met its burden as to each element of the 
charged offense.  See Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 
645 (2017), quoting Bois, 476 Mass. at 34 ("Prosecutorial 
'appeals to sympathy . . . obscure the clarity with which the 
jury would look at the evidence and encourage the jury to find 
guilt even if the evidence does not reach the level of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt'"). 
 
Where the nature of the properly admitted evidence itself 
is highly inflammatory, the dangers from throwing improper 
propensity arguments on an already smoldering flame are 
exacerbated.  See Carey, 463 Mass. at 391-392.  Here, 
specifically, the risk is that the improperly admitted evidence, 
viewed, as the prosecutor urged, as propensity evidence, could 
arouse the jury's emotions such that they could reach a 
conviction even if the evidence actually were insufficient to 
determine beyond a reasonable doubt which of two individuals was 
responsible for Timothy's death.  See id. 
 
Where, as here, an objection was preserved and the question 
is not a constitutional one, "[t]he standard for determining 
whether a conviction must be reversed" is whether the 
improprieties at trial constituted prejudicial error.  Santiago, 
425 Mass. at 500.  See Commonwealth v. Daggett, 416 Mass. 347, 
352 n.5 (1993).  "An error is nonprejudicial only" if we are 
39 
 
convinced "that the error did not influence the jury, or had but 
very slight effect."  Commonwealth v. Vinnie, 428 Mass. 161, 
163, cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1007 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994). 
 
To decide whether the errors at trial amounted to 
prejudicial error, "we must determine, 'after pondering all that 
happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, 
[whether] the judgment was not substantially swayed by the 
error'" (citation omitted).  See Anestal, 463 Mass. at 672.  
Numerous aspects of a proceeding may be relevant to a 
determination whether the errors were likely to have 
"substantially swayed" the jury.  These include, inter alia, the 
strength of the Commonwealth's case, Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 
Mass. 583, 590-591 (1983); the jury's ability to distinguish 
between permissible and excessive lines of argument in the 
attorneys' closings, Bradshaw, 385 Mass. at 277; whether 
"defense counsel seasonably objected," Santiago, 425 Mass. 
at 500; whether "the errors . . . went to the heart of the 
issues at trial or concerned collateral matters," id.; and 
whether the judge adequately mitigated the errors with proper 
limiting instructions, id. 
 
Where otherwise strong evidence links a defendant to a 
crime, the impact on the jury from the introduction of improper 
evidence is significantly lessened.  See Commonwealth v. 
40 
 
Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 728-729 (2010) (due to strength of 
Commonwealth's case, improper evidence had but "slight effect" 
on jury's deliberations [citation omitted]). 
 
Here, only two people -- the defendant and Joseph -- could 
have been responsible for Timothy's death.  Some of the 
strongest evidence at trial supporting an inference that the 
defendant, and not Joseph, was responsible came from the 
defendant's own statements.  Joseph's testimony that the 
defendant had been with Timothy at the time of his injuries, and 
then told Joseph that she was "going to do a lot of time," was 
particularly damning.  To some extent the defendant later seemed 
to adopt this statement in speaking to police.  When she was 
interviewed by police after Timothy had been taken to the 
hospital, the defendant, who smelled of alcohol and said that 
she had been drinking earlier,9 told police that Joseph had been 
sleeping at the time of the incident.  Thus, by her own words, 
in her first interview with police, the defendant implicated 
herself, and not her husband, in the fatal beating.  The 
defendant also told police that Timothy cried a lot, that her 
other son did not cry as often, that Joseph was "always 
sleeping," and that she did not want any more children. 
                                                 
 
9 The defendant's blood alcohol level was tested at the 
hospital several hours later and found to be elevated at that 
point. 
41 
 
 
The jury also could have viewed the defendant's actions at 
the police station that night as additionally compelling.  A 
police officer on duty testified that while the defendant was 
sitting in an interview room at the fire and rescue center, he 
noticed that her right hand was red and visibly swollen, and 
when she saw him looking at it resting on her leg, she 
immediately covered it with her left hand.  Another officer 
testified that, while she was being interviewed, the defendant 
kept her left hand clasped around her right hand, and both hands 
held between her legs.10  The jury also saw a video recording of 
the defendant in the interview room doing as the officer 
described.  Joseph's hands showed no visible injuries.  In light 
of testimony from the medical examiner that Timothy's injuries 
were consistent, at least in part, with being punched, the jury 
reasonably could have concluded that the defendant's hand was 
swollen from repeatedly punching him.  Moreover, while in the 
ambulance on the way to the hospital after her collapse, the 
defendant recited aloud, "The answer to every question is I 
don't know." 
 
The properly admitted evidence of the defendant's 
indifference or hostility toward Timothy, proffered through her 
                                                 
 
10 The judge properly denied the Commonwealth's motion to 
introduce a comment purportedly made by the defendant to one of 
the officers when he asked if he could take a photograph of her 
hand, "Fuck that.  I want a lawyer." 
42 
 
own statements and actions toward him on the night of the 
incident, as well as from the time Timothy first was returned to 
the Penos' care, undoubtedly was powerful, and oft repeated 
throughout the trial.  In other ways, many of the most 
compelling of the defendant's statements were introduced only in 
testimony by Joseph, whose behavior was far from that of a model 
father, who at best enabled the defendant's drug and alcohol 
use, and whose vagueness about the events of the evening, among 
other things, would have allowed the jury reasonably to question 
his credibility.  It is particularly concerning in this regard 
that the prosecutor structured her entire closing, from the 
first word to the last, around exhorting the jury impermissibly 
to infer that the defendant was a failure at that most 
fundamental role -- motherhood -- and thus necessarily the 
killer.  The jury were told, "Now, you may ask yourself what 
kind of mother would do this to her own child?  The same mother 
who would abuse alcohol throughout her pregnancy, the same 
mother who would smoke crack throughout her pregnancy . . . ."  
See United States v. Richards, 719 F.3d 746, 766 (7th Cir. 2013) 
("Although the prosecution did not misstate the evidence, it 
'invited the jury to make an improper inference from the 
evidence, an action with a similar effect'" [citation omitted]). 
 
Ultimately, however, we are persuaded that the jury were 
not so unduly swayed by the inadmissible evidence or the 
43 
 
prosecutor's repeated urging in closing that they, too, engage 
in an impermissible, propensity-based calculus so as to require 
a new trial.  While they were generic, the judge's instructions 
accurately explained, inter alia, (1) the permissible uses of 
prior bad act evidence, (2) that closing arguments are not 
evidence, and (3) the jury's obligation not to decide the case 
based on emotion, passion, prejudice, or sympathy. 
 
We presume that the jury were capable of following these 
instructions.  See Bois, 476 Mass. at 35-36.  The verdict 
suggests that they did just that and did not rely upon these 
prohibited propensity arguments.  See Bradshaw, 385 Mass. at 277 
("The jury could be expected to take both arguments with a grain 
of salt").  The jury were instructed on murder in the first 
degree as to both the theory of deliberate premeditation and the 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  They convicted the 
defendant on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, as to 
which the evidence was ample,11 and did not convict on the theory 
                                                 
 
11 "To convict a defendant of murder in the first degree on 
a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, the Commonwealth must 
prove that the defendant committed an unlawful killing with 
malice aforethought and with extreme atrocity or cruelty."  See 
Commonwealth v. Szlachta, 463 Mass. 37, 45 (2012).  "Malice is 
defined in these circumstances as an intent to cause death, to 
cause grievous bodily harm, or to do an act which, in the 
circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable person would 
have known created a plain and strong likelihood that death 
would follow" (citation omitted).  Id. at 45-46.  A jury can 
consider "a number of factors . . . in determining whether a 
murder was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty," 
44 
 
of deliberate premeditation.  This also suggests that the jury 
carefully considered the evidence, without passion, and did not 
fully adopt the Commonwealth's narrative that the defendant 
plotted to kill Timothy out of deep-seated resentment.  See 
Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 506, 510-512 (2000) (no 
prejudicial error where, although "prosecutor erred 
egregiously," verdicts "show[ed] that the jury were able to 
distinguish wheat from chaff"). 
 
Taken as a whole, we conclude that "neither the 
introduction of the challenged evidence," nor the prosecutor's 
exhortations that the evidence be used for improper propensity 
purposes, "so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny due 
process of law" (citation omitted).  Estelle v. McGuire, 502 
U.S. 62, 75 (1991). 
 
d.  Review under G. L. 278, § 33E.  The defendant urges us 
to exercise our extraordinary power under G. L. 278, § 33E, 
either to grant her a new trial or to reduce the verdict to a 
lesser degree of guilt.  In addition to her other arguments, the 
defendant contends that her struggles early in life and her 
history of "mental illness, hospitalizations, and lifelong 
                                                 
including "indifference to or taking pleasure in the victim's 
suffering, consciousness and degree of suffering of the victim, 
extent of physical injuries, number of blows, manner and force 
with which delivered, instrument employed, and disproportion 
between the means needed to cause death and those employed" 
(citation omitted).  See id. at 47-48. 
45 
 
addiction" make a verdict of murder in the first degree not 
consonant with justice. 
"Our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is to consider broadly 
the whole case on the law and the facts to determine whether the 
verdict is 'consonant with justice.'"  Commonwealth v. Imbert, 
479 Mass. 575, 587 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 
Mass. 672, 680 (1980).  "If upon our examination of the facts, 
we should, in our discretion, be of [the] opinion that there was 
a miscarriage of justice in convicting the defendant of murder 
in the first degree, and that a verdict of guilty of murder in 
the second degree or of manslaughter would have been more 
consonant with justice, it is now our power and duty so to 
declare."  Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 823–824 (2017), 
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Baker, 346 Mass. 107, 109 (1963). 
Even so, "our power under [G. L. c. 278, § 33E,] is to be 
used with restraint," and "[w]e do not sit as a second jury to 
pass anew on the question of the defendant's guilt."  
Commonwealth v. Schnopps, 390 Mass. 722, 726 (1984), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Reddick, 372 Mass. 460, 464 (1977).  The 
properly admitted evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain 
the verdict, and the errors were not so egregious that they 
called into question the fundamental fairness of the trial.  
46 
 
After carefully reviewing the entire record, we also are not 
convinced that a reduction in the verdict would be appropriate. 
The defendant also asks us to take account of more than 
1,000 pages of additional documents, consisting largely of 
mental health records, dating from approximately 1986 through 
2012, that were submitted with her appeal but were not before 
the jury.  The documents appear to describe the defendant's 
struggles early in life, her serious mental health illnesses, 
and a long-standing substance use disorder.  While these 
documents well could have been relevant to her capacity to 
commit the offense, or to a defense of diminished capacity, they 
were not part of the record of the trial that is the subject of 
our review.  As the trial judge commented on at least one 
occasion, defense counsel made a clear strategic decision to 
pursue a defense that her husband, and not the defendant, was 
the one responsible for Timothy's death.  The proper method by 
which to seek consideration of these records, or to challenge 
trial counsel's decision not to pursue what might have been a 
powerful defense, is through a motion for a new trial in the 
Superior Court.  Accordingly, we are not persuaded that a 
reduction in the verdict would serve the interests of justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.