Title: Hopkins v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC10-2483
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 13, 2012

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-2483 
____________ 
 
LAVERESS HOPKINS, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[September 13, 2012] 
 
QUINCE, J. 
 
Laveress Hopkins seeks review of the decision of the Fourth District Court 
of Appeal in State v. Hopkins, 47 So. 3d 974 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), on the ground 
that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of the First District Court 
of Appeal in T.C. v. State, 852 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), on a question of 
law.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  The question before 
us is whether the battery by detainee charge pursuant to section 784.082, Florida 
Statutes (2007), applies to juvenile detention centers.  We answer that question in 
the affirmative, and find that a juvenile detention center qualifies as a “detention 
 
 
- 2 - 
facility” for purposes of section 784.082.  Therefore, we approve the Fourth 
District’s decision in Hopkins and disapprove the First District’s decision in T.C. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The State charged Hopkins with one count of battery by detainee in violation 
of sections 784.03 and 784.082, Florida Statutes (2007).  At the time of the alleged 
offense, Hopkins was detained at the St. Lucie Regional Juvenile Detention Center.  
By invoking section 784.082, the battery offense was reclassified from a first-
degree misdemeanor, see § 784.03(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007), to a third-degree 
felony.1    Hopkins moved to dismiss the battery by detainee charge, contending 
that a juvenile could not be lawfully charged with battery by detainee while 
detained in a juvenile detention facility.  
A hearing was held on the motion to dismiss.  While Hopkins relied on the 
First District’s decision in T.C., which held that the battery by detainee offense 
under section 784.082 was inapplicable to juveniles held in juvenile facilities, the 
State did not rely on any case law in support of the charge.  Finding section 
784.082 “clear and unambiguous,” the trial court maintained that a “juvenile 
detention facility” was an “other detention facility” under the statute.  The trial 
                                         
1.  Section 784.082 provides:  “Whenever a person who is being detained in 
a prison, jail, or other detention facility is charged with committing . . . a battery . . 
. upon any visitor to the detention facility or upon any other detainee in the 
detention facility,” such offense shall be reclassified as a third-degree felony.  § 
784.082, Fla. Stat. (2007).   
 
 
- 3 - 
court reached this same conclusion when it read section 784.082 in pari materia 
with “detention center or facility,” as defined in chapters 984 and 985, to mean:  “a 
facility used pending court adjudication or disposition or execution of court order 
for the temporary care of a child alleged or found to have committed a violation of 
law.”  §§ 984.03(19), 985.03(19), Fla. Stat. (2007).  In addition, the trial court 
found significant the language used in the preamble to chapter 96-293, which 
enacted section 784.082:  “Whereas, with the rising incidence of crime, especially 
juvenile crime . . . .”  Ch. 96-293, preamble, § 4, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added).  
As noted by the trial judge, section 784.081, Florida Statutes (2007), was also 
created by chapter 96-293.  Section 784.081 also reclassifies assaults and batteries 
committed against school district employees and officials, among others.  § 
784.081, Fla. Stat. (2007).     
Notwithstanding its findings, the trial court dismissed the battery by detainee 
charge based on its belief that it was bound to follow T.C.2  The trial court urged 
the State to appeal its decision.  In its written order, the trial court noted the Fourth 
District’s decision in J.A. v. State, 743 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), which 
affirmed the trial court’s order adjudicating a juvenile guilty of battery upon a 
fellow detainee in violation of sections 784.03 and 784.082, and the Fifth District’s 
                                         
2.  The trial judge found that there were no other district court decisions on 
point other than T.C.  See Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992) (“[I]n the 
absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial 
courts.”).  
 
 
- 4 - 
decision in J.A.D. v. State, 855 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), which affirmed 
the trial court’s adjudication of delinquency of battery by detainee pursuant to 
section 784.082.3  However, the trial court declined to follow J.A. and J.A.D. 
because T.C. “seem[ed] to be on point and controlling.”     
The State appealed the trial court’s order granting Hopkins’ motion to 
dismiss.  State v. Hopkins, 47 So. 3d 974 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).  The Fourth 
District reversed and remanded the case for reinstatement of the battery by 
detainee charge, noting that in the past it, in J.A., as well as the Fifth District in 
J.A.D, had “affirmed a trial court order adjudicating a juvenile guilty of battery 
upon a fellow detainee.”  Id. at 975.   
ANALYSIS 
The question before this Court is whether the language “detention facility” 
as used in section 784.082 includes juvenile detention centers.  As the issue 
presented is one of statutory interpretation, the standard of review is de novo.  
Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 194 (Fla. 2007).  Hopkins argues 
                                         
3.  The Fourth District in J.A. remanded the case so that the disposition order 
could properly state that the adjudication of delinquency occurred after a hearing, 
instead of a guilty plea.  743 So. 2d at 601.  Because there was a scrivener’s error 
contained in the disposition order in J.A.D., the district court remanded the case for 
correction thereof.  855 So. 2d at 1199. 
 
 
 
- 5 - 
that the trial court below properly dismissed the charge in reliance on T.C.,4 which 
according to Hopkins, was a decision grounded on the rule of lenity.  See § 
775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2007).  On the other hand, the State contends that a juvenile 
who commits a battery while detained in a juvenile detention facility may be 
properly charged with battery by detainee under section 784.082.   
Juvenile detention centers are facilities used “pending court adjudication or 
disposition or execution of court order for the temporary care of a child alleged or 
found to have committed a violation of law.”  See § 985.03(19), Fla. Stat. (2007); 
see also § 985.03(46), Fla. Stat. (2007) (defining “[s]ecure detention center or 
facility” as a “physically restricting facility for the temporary care of children, 
pending adjudication, disposition, or placement”).  On October 1, 1996, the Florida 
Legislature enacted section 784.082, which provides as follows: 
Whenever a person who is being detained in a prison, jail, or other 
detention facility is charged with committing an assault or aggravated 
assault or a battery or aggravated battery upon any visitor to the 
detention facility or upon any other detainee in the detention facility, 
the offense for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as 
follows: 
 
(1) In the case of aggravated battery, from a felony of the 
second degree to a felony of the first degree. 
 
                                         
4.  In T.C., the First District reversed a juvenile’s adjudication of 
delinquency for battery by detainee which occurred while the juvenile was 
detained in a juvenile detention center.  852 So. 2d at 276.  The First District found 
that “[n]othing in section 784.082 indicate[d] that the statute applie[d] to juveniles 
held in juvenile facilities.”  Id.  
 
 
- 6 - 
(2) In the case of aggravated assault, from a felony of the third 
degree to a felony of the second degree. 
 
(3) In the case of battery, from a misdemeanor of the first 
degree to a felony of the third degree. 
 
(4) In the case of assault, from a misdemeanor of the second 
degree to a misdemeanor of the first degree. 
 
§ 784.082, Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added); see also ch. 96-293, §§ 4, 8, Laws 
of Fla.   
Although the term “detention facility” is undefined in chapter 784, 
“detention center or facility,” is defined in chapter 985, which is titled “Juvenile 
Justice; Interstate Compact on Juveniles,” to mean: 
a facility used pending court adjudication or disposition or execution 
of court order for the temporary care of a child alleged or found to 
have committed a violation of law.  A detention center or facility may 
provide secure or nonsecure custody.  A facility used for the 
commitment of adjudicated delinquents shall not be considered a 
detention center or facility. 
 
§ 985.03(19), Fla. Stat. (2007); see also § 984.03(19), Fla. Stat. (2007) (supplying 
the same definition for “detention center or facility”).  By its own terms, the 
“detention center or facility” definition appearing in both chapters 984 and 985 is 
limited to each respective chapter.  See § 984.03, Fla. Stat. (2007) (“When used in 
this chapter . . . .”); § 985.03, Fla. Stat. (2007) (“As used in this chapter . . . .”).5 
                                         
5.  Unlike in section 784.082, the Legislature opted to include the specific 
references to sections 984.03 and 985.03 in section 784.075:  
 
 
- 7 - 
In construing section 784.082, we begin with the actual language in the 
statute because “legislative intent is determined primarily from the statute’s text.”  
See Heart of Adoptions, Inc., 963 So. 2d at 198.  In Koile v. State, 934 So. 2d 1226 
(Fla. 2006), we explained: 
When the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look 
behind the statute’s plain language for legislative intent or resort to 
rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent.  In such instance, the 
statute’s plain and ordinary meaning must control, unless this leads to 
an unreasonable result or a result clearly contrary to legislative intent. 
 
Id. at 1230-31 (quoting Daniels v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 64-65 (Fla. 
2005) (internal citation omitted)).  Courts are “without power to construe an 
unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express 
terms or its reasonable and obvious implications.  To do so would be an abrogation 
of legislative power.”  Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting 
                                                                                                                                   
A person who commits a battery on a juvenile probation officer, 
as defined in s. 984.03 or s. 985.03, on other staff of a detention center 
or facility as defined in s. 984.03(19) or s. 985.03, or on a staff 
member of a commitment facility as defined in s. 985.03, commits a 
felony of the third degree . . . .  For purposes of this section, a staff 
member of the facilities listed includes persons employed by the 
Department of Juvenile Justice, persons employed at facilities 
licensed by the Department of Juvenile Justice, and persons employed 
at facilities operated under a contract with the Department of Juvenile 
Justice. 
 
§ 784.075, Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added).  Notably, section 784.075 went into 
effect on May 15, 1993, and therefore, prior to the Legislature’s enactment of 
section 784.082.  See ch. 93-230, § 13, Laws of Fla. 
 
 
- 8 - 
Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1968)). 
Section 784.082 applies to a “person,” i.e., adults as well as juveniles.  § 
784.082, Fla. Stat. (2007).  Further, the detainee must be detained in a “prison, jail, 
or other detention facility.”  § 784.082, Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added).  We 
find the statute clear and unambiguous, and thus, the statute’s plain and ordinary 
meaning controls.  The plain and ordinary meaning of “detention facility” must 
undoubtedly include the temporary detention of juveniles in juvenile detention 
centers “pending court adjudication or disposition or execution of court order for 
the temporary care of a child alleged or found to have committed a violation of 
law.”  See § 985.03(19), Fla. Stat. (2007).  This construction is also in keeping 
with the Legislature’s use of the term “jail.”  A “jail” is a detention center used by 
local governments for persons who are awaiting trial or have been convicted of 
misdemeanors.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 910 (9th. ed. 2009). 
This interpretation does not lead to an unreasonable result or a result clearly 
contrary to legislative intent where the Legislature intended to make penalties more 
severe when assaults and batteries are committed in jails, prisons, or other 
detention facilities.  Conversely, construing the statute as to exclude juvenile 
detention centers would clearly limit its “reasonable and obvious implications.”  
See Holly, 450 So. 2d at 219.  By not limiting section 784.082 to only jails and 
 
 
- 9 - 
prisons, the Legislature intended to expand the facilities subject to the statute.  Had 
the Legislature intended to exclude juvenile detention centers from the scope of 
section 784.082, it would have said so.  See Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co., 212 
So. 2d at 778 (“Had the legislature intended the statute to import a more specific 
and definite meaning, it could easily have chosen words to express any limitation it 
wished to impose.”). 
Furthermore, the trial judge recognized that chapter 96-293, which created 
section 784.082, included “juvenile crime” in the preamble.  Ch. 96-293, preamble, 
§ 4, Laws of Fla.  This legislative statement to address juvenile crime supports our 
conclusion that the plain and ordinary meaning of “detention facility” encompasses 
juvenile detention centers.  See Holly, 450 So. 2d at 219 (“The preamble and 
language of [an] enactment readily reveal[s] the legislature’s intent and its policy 
reasons.”). 
Related Statutory Provisions 
Even assuming arguendo that we were required to resort to rules of statutory 
construction to ascertain the legislative intent, our conclusion—that section 
784.082 applies to juvenile detention centers—remains the same.  “The doctrine of 
in pari materia is a principle of statutory construction that requires that statutes 
relating to the same subject or object be construed together to harmonize the 
statutes and to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.”  Fla. Dep’t of State v. 
 
 
- 10 - 
Martin, 916 So. 2d 763, 768 (Fla. 2005).  For this analysis, we discuss three other 
battery statutes contained in chapter 784.  See §§ 784.076, 784.085, 784.078, Fla. 
Stat. (2007). 
Pursuant to section 784.076, “A juvenile who has been committed to or 
detained by the Department of Juvenile Justice pursuant to a court order, who 
commits battery upon a person who provides health services commits a felony of 
the third degree . . . .”  § 784.076, Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added).6  Exactly one 
year after the enactment of section 784.076—which was expressly restricted to 
juveniles—the Legislature, in enacting section 784.082, decided against being so 
restrictive by using the word “person.”  See ch. 95-267, § 57, Laws of Fla.  In 
addition, the Legislature excepted children from being prosecuted under section 
784.085, which states that “any person, except a child . . . [who] knowingly 
cause[s] or attempt[s] to cause a child to come into contact with” certain fluids or 
materials thereby commits a battery of a child, a third-degree felony.  § 
784.085(1),(2), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added).   
Under section 784.078, Florida Statutes (2007), the battery of a facility 
employee, a third-degree felony, occurs when  
any person, while being detained in a facility and with intent to harass, 
annoy, threaten, or alarm a person in a facility whom he or she knows 
                                         
6.  “Health services” under section 784.076 is defined as “preventive, 
diagnostic, curative, or rehabilitative services and includes alcohol treatment, drug 
abuse treatment, and mental health services.”  Id. 
 
 
- 11 - 
or reasonably should know to be an employee of such facility . . . 
cause[s] or attempt[s] to cause such employee to come into contact 
with [specified fluids or materials].   
 
§ 784.078(3)(a), (b), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added).  In the same statute, the 
Legislature defined the type of facilities as:  
a state correctional institution defined in s. 944.02(6); a private 
correctional facility defined in s. 944.710 or under chapter 957; a 
county, municipal, or regional jail or other detention facility of local 
government under chapter 950 or chapter 951; or a secure facility 
operated and maintained by the Department of Corrections or the 
Department of Juvenile Justice.   
 
§ 784.078(1), Fla. Stat.  In section 784.082, the Legislature did not find it 
necessary to define “other detention facility.”  Unlike the statutes referred to 
above, the Legislature did not indicate in section 784.082 that it should have 
limited application.  Our conclusion that the Legislature intended for section 
784.082 to apply to juvenile detention centers is confirmed when reading section 
784.082 in pari materia with other battery statutes found in chapter 784. 
Rule of Lenity 
Hopkins relies on the rule of lenity in support of his position that section 
784.082 does not include juvenile detention centers.  The rule of lenity, codified in 
section 775.021(1), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that, “[t]he provisions of this 
code and offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed; when the 
language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most 
favorably to the accused.”  § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2007).  Because section 
 
 
- 12 - 
784.082 is unambiguous and not subject to differing reasonable constructions, we 
conclude that the rule of lenity is inapplicable.  See Nettles v. State, 850 So. 2d 
487, 494 (Fla. 2003).  
CONCLUSION 
We therefore approve the Fourth District’s decision in Hopkins, and 
disapprove the First District’s decision in T.C.   
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D09-1152 
 
 
(St. Lucie County) 
 
Carol Stafford Haughwout, Public Defender, and Tom William Odom, Assistant 
Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Consiglia Terenzio, 
Bureau Chief, and Katherine Yzquierdo McIntire, Assistant Attorney General, 
West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent