Title: SHARDA GARG V MACOMB CO COMM MENTAL HEALTH
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 121361
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 11, 2005

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 11, 2005 
SHARDA GARG, 
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 
v 
No. 121361 
MACOMB COUNTY COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, 
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
MARKMAN, J.  
We granted leave to appeal to consider whether there 
was sufficient evidence to support plaintiff's claims of 
retaliatory discrimination and whether the "continuing 
violations" doctrine of Sumner v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 
427 Mich 505; 398 NW2d 368 (1986), should be preserved, 
modified, or abrogated in light of the language of the 
statute of limitations, MCL 600.5805(1). 
The jury found 
that plaintiff was not discriminated against on the basis 
of national origin, but was retaliated against on the basis 
of either her opposition to sexual harassment or because 
she 
filed 
a 
grievance 
claiming 
national-origin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
discrimination. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Because we 
conclude that, once evidence of acts that occurred outside 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations 
period 
is 
removed 
from 
consideration, 
there 
was 
insufficient 
evidence 
of 
retaliation based on either plaintiff's alleged opposition 
to sexual harassment or her filing of a grievance, we 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to 
the trial court for entry of a judgment in favor of 
defendant. 
In so holding, we overrule the "continuing 
violations" doctrine of Sumner, supra, as inconsistent with 
the language of the statute of limitations, MCL 600.5805(1) 
and (10). 
As a result, we do not reach the other issues 
raised on appeal or the issues raised in plaintiff's cross­
appeal. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
Plaintiff Sharda Garg is of Asian Indian ancestry. 
She began her employment as a staff psychologist with 
defendant Macomb County Community Mental Health Services in 
1978. 
Plaintiff testified that Donald Habkirk, the 
director of defendant's disability section, which included 
the facility where plaintiff worked, had during 1981 
engaged in what plaintiff characterized as "sexually 
harassing" behavior with female coworkers. 
Specifically, 
plaintiff observed Habkirk pull one coworker's bra strap 
and snap the elastic panties of another. 
Plaintiff 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
acknowledges that she herself was never treated in this 
manner or otherwise sexually harassed, and that she never 
reported to anyone the incidents she allegedly observed. 
Habkirk denied engaging in such conduct. 
At "around the same time," plaintiff, while walking 
down an office corridor, felt someone's hand touch her 
upper back, near her shoulder. 
Plaintiff reacted as 
follows: "I felt somebody touching me, and I just turned 
around and swung at him." 
She further observed, "it was a 
very automatic reaction on my part." It was only after she 
hit this person that she realized it was Habkirk whom she 
had hit. She and Habkirk stared at each other for a moment 
before she proceeded into her office. 
Plaintiff did not 
file a grievance, tell anyone about the incident, or offer 
any explanation to anyone regarding why she had struck 
Habkirk. 
In response to a question concerning whether the 
touching was "improper," plaintiff did not characterize it 
as such. 
While Habkirk never took any formal action against 
plaintiff for striking him, and indeed testified that he 
could not even remember the incident, plaintiff claims that 
her formerly cordial relationship with Habkirk deteriorated 
as he became increasingly cold and distant. 
While 
plaintiff generally enjoyed a good employment relationship 
with defendant and its management initially, she asserted 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
that she began to perceive changes in this relationship 
following the touching incident. 
After six years of being 
rated as either "outstanding" or "very good," plaintiff's 
1983 performance review was downgraded to "satisfactory." 
It was also at this point that plaintiff applied for 
several job promotions, in each case unsuccessfully. 
The 
first position she applied for in 1983 was given to someone 
from 
outside 
the 
organization, 
despite 
a 
general 
inclination by defendant in favor of internal promotions. 
Two 
other 
promotion 
applications 
in 
1983 
were 
also 
rejected. 
Over the next three years, plaintiff applied 
unsuccessfully for four more promotions. 
Plaintiff was 
denied 
a 
total 
of 
eighteen 
promotion 
opportunities, 
including eleven during the period of 1983 through 1987. 
During this period, Habkirk always served in plaintiff's 
chain of command. 
Once at a dinner party with plaintiff's 
immediate supervisor, Robert Slaine, plaintiff's husband 
asked why plaintiff had not been promoted. 
Slaine 
responded that, in his opinion, it was because Habkirk did 
not like plaintiff. 
Slaine denied making this statement, 
and 
Habkirk 
denied 
telling 
Slaine 
that 
he 
disliked 
plaintiff. 
In 1986, Kent Cathcart was chosen by Habkirk as the 
new program director in plaintiff's facility. 
However, 
little changed for plaintiff because she failed to receive 
4  
 
 
 
any of the next three promotions for which she applied. In 
December 1986, she was denied a promotion in favor of a 
contract employee with less seniority. 
Following this 
rejection in February 1987, plaintiff filed her first 
promotion-related grievance with the union representing 
defendant's employees. 
When plaintiff was again denied a 
promotion in early 1987, this time in favor of a person 
from outside the company, she filed a second promotion­
related grievance with the union in June 1987, alleging 
that the denial was due to discrimination based on her 
national origin and color. 
The grievance was forwarded to 
Cathcart, and was denied without investigation. 
Plaintiff 
next applied for a promotion in 1989, but was again denied. 
Plaintiff was denied seven promotions during the period of 
1989 through 1997. 
Plaintiff claims that the "retaliation" against her 
for filing these grievances also took the form of poor 
overall treatment by defendant. 
Specifically, she claims 
that Cathcart, and the two supervisors who succeeded 
Cathcart after plaintiff was transferred to defendant's 
First North facility in 1995, treated her "in a degrading 
and humiliating manner." 
Plaintiff claims that Cathcart 
would criticize her for not participating in agency 
activities, but would then deny her requests to participate 
in meetings, conferences, and committees. 
In addition, 
5  
 
 
 
plaintiff testified that Cathcart would reprimand her for 
being even two minutes late for work, but would let her 
coworkers "come and go as they pleased." 
Plaintiff also 
testified that Cathcart once chastised her for going 
outside to look at a rainbow, but that her coworkers were 
routinely allowed to go outside for cigarette breaks on 
company time. 
Cathcart also refused to give her keys to 
the facility. 
Finally, when she moved to First North, 
plaintiff was given an office that was formerly a storage 
closet. 
The office was uncarpeted and had no windows. 
In 
addition, it was located next to a bathroom, forcing 
plaintiff 
to 
hear 
"people 
defecating 
and 
urinating" 
throughout the day. 
Plaintiff was assigned to this office 
despite 
her 
seventeen 
years 
of 
seniority 
and 
the 
availability of more desirable office spaces. 
Plaintiff also claims that Cathcart demonstrated a 
predisposition against "people of color" during the period 
that she was employed by defendant under his supervision. 
Specifically, plaintiff testified regarding four separate 
displays of this predisposition. 
First, when Cathcart 
learned that plaintiff's son had been accepted to medical 
school, he allegedly stated that "there are enough Indian 
doctors already." 
Second, Cathcart allegedly complained 
about the accent of an Indian psychiatrist, stating that 
"these people have been here long enough, they ought to 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
speak good English." Third, Cathcart allegedly stated that 
he would not have hired an African-American nurse if a 
white candidate had been available. 
Finally, Cathcart 
allegedly used a racially derogatory term when referring to 
African-Americans. 
Cathcart denies making any of these 
statements. 
On July 21, 1995, plaintiff brought this action under 
the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., claiming that 
her promotion denials and poor treatment were due to 
national-origin discrimination and were in retaliation for 
engaging in activities protected by the act. 
Plaintiff 
originally claimed retaliatory discrimination based solely 
on 
the 
union 
grievance 
claiming 
national-origin 
discrimination. 
She later amended her complaint to allege 
that she was also retaliated against for opposing sexual 
harassment. 
Defendant denied the allegations and asserted 
that some of the allegations were barred by the three-year 
period 
of 
limitations. 
MCL 
600.5805(1) 
and 
(10). 
Defendant moved for partial summary disposition on that 
basis, but the trial court denied the motion, citing the 
"continuing violations" doctrine adopted in Sumner. 
Following a three-week trial, the jury found that 
plaintiff was not discriminated against because of national 
origin or color. 
However, the jury also found that 
defendant had retaliated against plaintiff because she 
7  
 
 
 
"opposed sexual harassment or because she filed a complaint 
or charge about being discriminated against." 
The jury 
awarded plaintiff $250,000 in damages. 
Defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict or a new trial. 
The trial court noted that 
"physical acts can convey a message better than words," and 
that plaintiff's physical response to the touching by 
Habkirk was sufficient to inform defendant that she opposed 
Habkirk's sexually harassing behavior. 
The trial court 
further held that sufficient evidence was presented to 
allow a reasonable juror to find a causal connection 
between plaintiff's striking Habkirk and her failure to be 
promoted. 
Because the evidence supported at least one of 
the retaliation theories, defendant's motion was denied. 
In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the jury's verdict. 
Unpublished opinion per curiam of the 
Court of Appeals, issued March 29, 2002 (Docket No. 
223829). 
The Court of Appeals held that the "continuing 
violations" doctrine allowed the introduction of factual 
allegations going back more than three years before 
plaintiff filed her lawsuit and thus the statute of 
limitations was not a bar to the facts plaintiff presented 
to the jury. 
With regard to the merits, the Court of 
Appeals 
held 
that 
when 
plaintiff 
struck 
Habkirk, 
a 
reasonable juror could have concluded that she "'raise[d] 
8  
 
 
 
 
the specter,'" quoting Mitan v Neiman Marcus, 240 Mich App 
679, 682; 613 NW2d 415 (2000), that she was opposing 
Habkirk's sexual harassment. 
The Court of Appeals also 
determined that there was sufficient evidence to allow a 
reasonable juror to conclude that plaintiff established 
both of her retaliation claims. 
After this Court directed the parties to present oral 
argument on whether to grant leave to appeal or take other 
action permitted by MCR 7.302(G)(1), 469 Mich 983 (2003), 
and having heard such argument, we granted defendant's 
application 
for 
leave 
to 
appeal, 
directing 
briefing 
regarding whether the "continuing violations" doctrine of 
Sumner was consistent with the statute of limitations, MCL 
600.5805(1). 469 Mich 1042 (2004). 
II. Standard of Review 
The denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict is subject to review de novo. 
Sniecinski v 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 469 Mich 124, 131; 
666 NW2d 186 (2003). 
Reversal is permitted only if the 
evidence, while viewed in a light most favorable to 
plaintiff, fails to establish a claim as a matter of law. 
Wilkinson v Lee, 463 Mich 388, 391; 617 NW2d 305 (2000). 
Whether the "continuing violations" doctrine is consistent 
with MCL 600.5805(1) and (10) is a question of law that we 
9  
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
review de novo. 
Jenkins v Patel, 471 Mich 158, 162; 684 
NW2d 346 (2004). 
III. Analysis 
The issue in this case is not whether plaintiff was 
treated poorly or insensitively by defendant. 
Nor is it 
whether defendant "retaliated" against plaintiff for her 
conduct in hitting Habkirk. 
Instead, the issue is whether 
defendant retaliated against plaintiff specifically for 
conduct on her part protected by the Civil Rights Act. MCL 
37.2701 provides, in pertinent part: 
Two or more persons shall not conspire to,
or a person shall not: 
(a) Retaliate or discriminate against a
person because the person has opposed a violation
of this act, or because the person has made a
charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted,
or participated in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under this act. 
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a 
plaintiff must show: 
(1) that he engaged in a protected activity;
(2) that this was known by the defendant; (3)
that the defendant took an employment action 
adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) that there was
a 
causal 
connection 
between 
the 
protected
activity 
and 
the 
adverse 
employment 
action. 
[DeFlaviis v Lord & Taylor, Inc, 223 Mich App
432, 436; 566 NW2d 661 (1997).] 
A. RETALIATION BASED ON OPPOSITION TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Plaintiff's first theory is that defendant retaliated 
against 
her 
because 
she 
opposed 
Habkirk's 
sexual 
10  
 
 
                                                 
harassment. 
At "around the same time" that plaintiff 
allegedly observed sexually harassing behavior by Habkirk 
toward female employees, she felt someone touch her on the 
back, near her shoulder, while she was walking near 
Habkirk's office.1
 Plaintiff testified that "I felt 
somebody's hand touching me, and I turned around and hit 
the person." 
She noted further that "it was a very 
automatic reaction on my part. 
I felt somebody touching 
me, and I just turned around and swung at him." 
We conclude there is insufficient evidence for a juror 
reasonably to conclude that by striking Habkirk under these 
circumstances plaintiff was opposing sexual harassment, 
i.e., engaging in a "protected activity" under the Civil 
Rights Act. First, plaintiff acknowledged that Habkirk was 
not sexually harassing her at the time she hit him so that 
it is difficult to view her conduct as responsive to 
"protected activity." 
This is underscored by plaintiff's 
acknowledgment that Habkirk had never sexually harassed 
her. 
Second, there is no evidence that, before this 
lawsuit, plaintiff ever sought to cast her conduct in 
1 Plaintiff argued at oral argument before this Court
that it was significant that she was passing a room Habkirk
had just occupied, because it demonstrates that she "knew"
it was Habkirk who touched her. 
However, she testified
several times that she felt "somebody" touch her back, that
she "didn't know who was in behind [her]," and that she
simply "swung at whoever it was behind [her]." 
(Emphasis
added.) 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
hitting Habkirk in terms of opposing sexual harassment at 
defendant's 
workplace. 
Such 
a 
message 
was 
never 
communicated to the alleged victims of Habkirk's sexual 
harassment or to fellow employees, much less to Habkirk, 
management, union representatives, or public agencies. 
Third, plaintiff testified that she did not even know it 
was Habkirk who touched her shoulder until after she struck 
him. 
That is, because plaintiff in her "automatic" 
response to the touching could just as likely have struck 
out at any one of her coworkers as at Habkirk, it is 
difficult to conclude that her action was somehow intended 
to communicate a principled opposition to prior incidents 
of supervisory misconduct. 
That is, there is simply no 
connection 
here 
between 
cause—the 
alleged 
sexual 
harassment—and effect—plaintiff's striking Habkirk.2 
Moreover, although it is not necessary to our analysis 
in 
this 
case, 
even 
if 
plaintiff 
were 
indisputably 
responding to past sexual harassment by hitting Habkirk, we 
are not prepared to conclude that any response to conduct 
2 This lack of connection is underscored by plaintiff's
own testimony that the incidents of sexual harassment that
allegedly prompted her opposition occurred only at "about
the same time" that she struck Habkirk. 
Although we
acknowledge that a reasonable juror would be entitled to
conclude that this characterization is compatible with 
incidents 
of 
sexual 
harassment 
preceding 
plaintiff's
hitting Habkirk, the lack of a clear temporal relationship
between the cause and the effect does not well serve 
plaintiff's argument. 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
prohibited by the Civil Rights Act, no matter how excessive 
or 
inappropriate 
the 
response, 
including 
assaultive 
behavior, falls within the act's protections. 
An employee 
is not immunized for any type of responsive conduct, no 
matter how outrageous or disproportionate, simply because 
it 
is 
connected 
with 
opposition 
to 
discrimination. 
Obviously, no employee would be protected under the act 
from all "retaliation" by an employer for criminal, or 
sabotaging, or destructive activities simply because these 
occurred in response to perceived employer discrimination. 
For purposes of analysis under § 701(a), consideration must 
be given to separating the motivation underlying an 
employee's conduct and the means by which such motivation 
is translated into conduct. 
Under these circumstances, we conclude that no juror 
could have reasonably concluded that defendant was engaged 
in a "protected activity" by opposing sexual harassment 
when she hit Habkirk. 
Even if the jury here were persuaded that plaintiff 
was engaged in a "protected activity" by striking Habkirk, 
she has failed to show that defendant knew that she was 
engaged in such activity. 
Absent such a showing, there 
could be no "retaliation" on the employer's part to 
anything within the protection of the Civil Rights Act. 
While 
Habkirk 
obviously 
would 
have 
been 
aware 
that 
13  
 
 
 
                                                 
plaintiff had struck him, there was nothing inherent in 
this conduct that would have apprised him that plaintiff 
was thereby opposing sexual harassment. 
There is no 
evidence that Habkirk touched plaintiff at that time (or 
any other time) in a way that was inappropriate; there is 
no evidence that plaintiff herself perceived that Habkirk 
touched her in a way that was inappropriate; there is no 
evidence that Habkirk reasonably could have discerned from 
the nature of plaintiff's response to his touching that she 
was communicating any message of opposition to sexual 
harassment; and there is no evidence that plaintiff at any 
time explained the "significance" of her behavior to 
Habkirk. 
Nor is there anything else on the part of plaintiff 
following this incident that would communicate to anyone 
how she had been opposing sexual harassment by striking 
Habkirk. To the extent that she failed to communicate this 
supposed purpose to alleged victims of Habkirk's previous 
conduct, 
to 
coemployees, 
to 
management, 
to 
union 
representatives, to public authorities, or to Habkirk 
himself,3 it is difficult to understand how defendant could 
have been sufficiently aware that plaintiff was engaged in 
3 
Nor 
did 
plaintiff 
discuss 
Habkirk's 
alleged
inappropriate behavior itself with any of these parties.
14 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
"protected" activity so as to be able to "retaliate" 
against her for such conduct. 
Under these circumstances, we conclude that no juror 
could reasonably have concluded that defendant was aware 
that plaintiff had been engaged in "protected activity" by 
opposing sexual harassment when she hit Habkirk. 
Therefore, 
on 
the 
basis 
either 
that 
there 
is 
insufficient 
evidence 
that 
plaintiff 
was 
engaged 
in 
protected activity4 or that defendant could have been aware 
of such activity, plaintiff has failed to establish a claim 
under the Civil Rights Act. 
To the extent that she has 
failed to present sufficient evidence that she was engaged 
in protected activity, she has failed to satisfy the 
threshold requirement for coverage under § 701(a); to the 
extent that she has failed to present sufficient evidence 
that defendant could have been aware of such activity, she 
could not have been the object of "retaliation" under 
§ 701(a).5 
4 We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that
plaintiff here has raised any specter that she was engaged
in opposition to sexual harassment by her conduct. 
5 Had plaintiff presented sufficient evidence with
regard to these matters, i.e., shown both that she had been
engaged in a protected activity and that defendant had been
aware of this, she would still have been required to
demonstrate that she suffered an adverse employment action
as a result of her engaging in the protected activity,
i.e., that there was some nexus or causal connection 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
B. RETALIATION BASED ON FILING A GRIEVANCE 
Plaintiff's second theory is that defendant retaliated 
against her after she filed a grievance claiming national­
origin discrimination. After being refused a promotion for 
the eleventh time, plaintiff filed a grievance with her 
union in June 1987, claiming that she was being denied 
promotions because of discrimination based on national 
origin and color. 
Plaintiff claims that, as a result of 
filing the grievance, she was denied subsequent promotion 
opportunities and was subjected to poor treatment in 
general by Cathcart and the First North supervisors. 
With 
regard to this claim, it is undisputed that plaintiff 
engaged in a protected activity, namely filing a grievance 
claiming a violation of the Civil Rights Act. In addition, 
it is undisputed that defendant was aware that plaintiff 
had 
engaged 
in 
this 
activity. 
Plaintiff 
presented 
testimony that defendant's retaliatory conduct took place 
over an eleven-year period, including acts that took place 
after she filed the instant action on July 21, 1995. 
between the adverse employment action and the protected
activity. 
See DeFlaviis, supra; West v Gen Motors Corp,
469 Mich 177, 186; 665 NW2d 468 (2003) (applying the
antiretaliation 
provisions 
of 
the 
Whistleblowers' 
Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq.). 
See also Shallal v 
Catholic Social Services of Wayne Co, 455 Mich 604, 617;
566 
NW2d 
571 
(1997) 
(noting 
that 
"'whistleblower 
statute[s][are] analogous to antiretaliation provisions of
other employment discrimination statutes . . .'" [citation
omitted]). 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Defendant argues that, pursuant to the three-year period of 
limitations, any claim based on acts occurring before July 
21, 1992, is barred. 
MCL 600.5805(10). 
Despite the 
statute of limitations, both the trial court and the Court 
of Appeals permitted plaintiff to recover on the basis of 
untimely acts, or acts occurring before July 21, 1992, 
under 
the 
so-called 
"continuing 
violations" 
doctrine 
adopted in Sumner. 
We conclude that, absent evidence of 
these acts, there is insufficient evidence to establish a 
causal link between the 1987 grievance and any retaliatory 
acts occurring within the limitations period. 
The 
"continuing 
violations" 
doctrine 
was 
first 
addressed by this Court in Sumner, supra at 510. 
We began 
our 
analysis 
in 
that 
case 
by 
stating 
that 
it 
is 
"appropriate . . . in discrimination cases [to] turn to 
federal precedent for guidance in reaching our decision." 
Id. 
at 
525. 
We 
found 
particularly 
helpful 
the 
considerations relied on by federal courts in nullifying 
the statute of limitations in Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. 42 USC 2000e et seq. We described these as 
follows: 
First, [the Civil Rights Act] is a remedial
statute 
whose 
purpose 
is 
to 
root 
out 
discrimination and make injured parties whole.
Second, employees are generally lay people, who
do not know that they must act quickly or risk
losing their cause of action. 
An employee may
fear reprisal by the employer, or may refer the 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
matter to a union, which may not take any action
within the limitation period. Employees may also
delay filing their complaints in the hope of
internal 
resolution 
or 
simply 
to 
give 
the 
employer a second chance. 
Third, and most 
importantly, many discriminatory acts occur in
such a manner that it is difficult to precisely
define when they took place. 
One might say that
they unfold rather than occur. [Sumner, supra at 
525-526].[6] 
Sumner also found persuasive the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in United Air Lines, Inc v Evans, 431 US 
553; 97 S Ct 1885; 52 L Ed 2d 571 (1977). 
In Evans, the 
United States Supreme Court for the first time addressed 
the "continuing violations" doctrine that had been created 
by the lower federal courts in order to overcome the 
statute of limitations.7
 The employee in Evans, a flight 
6 While it is not necessary to our analysis in this
case, we note that the operation of our statute of 
limitations at least partially undercuts the significance
of the factors cited by Sumner. 
In Michigan, an employee
does not have to "act quickly or risk losing their cause of
action" under the state Civil Rights Act but has up to
three years to assert a claim in contrast to the 180 days
allowed under Title VII. 
This extended period would also
presumably accord an employee sufficient time to seek 
"internal resolution or simply to give the employer a
second chance" without endangering her claim. 
Further, at
least some reasonable observers might presume the three­
year limitations period accords an employee sufficient time
to 
determine 
that 
a 
discriminatory 
act 
has 
truly
"unfolded." 
7 See, e.g., King v Georgia Power Co, 295 F Supp 943,
946 (ND Ga, 1968)(holding that "[t]he failure to allege
that 
the 
complaint 
was 
filed 
with 
the 
EEOC 
[Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission] within 90 days of the
alleged unfair employment practices is of no importance, 
for the violations of Title VII alleged in the complaint
18 
 
 
  
                                                 
attendant with United Air Lines, was fired in 1968 on the 
basis of a "no marriage" rule that was later found to 
violate Title VII. She was rehired by the airline in 1972, 
but was not credited for her pre-1968 service and, 
therefore, was treated as a new hire for seniority 
purposes. 
The employee argued that the airline's refusal 
to recognize her past service constituted a "present effect 
to the past illegal act and therefore perpetuates the 
consequences of forbidden discrimination." 
Id. at 557. 
Therefore, she alleged that the "continuing violations" 
doctrine should be applied to allow her to obtain relief 
for the now-untimely 1968 firing. 
However, the United 
States Supreme Court held that merely demonstrating a 
"present effect to a past act of discrimination" is 
insufficient to create a continuing violation. Id. at 558. 
"[T]he emphasis should not be placed on mere continuity; 
the critical question is whether any present violation 
exists." 
Id.
 
Therefore, 
in 
order 
to 
support 
a 
discrimination claim on a "continuing violations" theory, 
an employee must first demonstrate the existence of a 
present violation. 
Since the employee in Evans was unable 
may be construed as 'continuing' acts"); Bartmess v Drewrys 
USA, Inc, 444 F2d 1186, 1188 (CA 7, 1971) (holding that
"the ninety day limitation is no bar when a continuing
practice of discrimination is being challenged rather than
a single, isolated discriminatory act").
19 
 
 
 
 
 
to demonstrate any violation within the time limitations of 
Title VII, her claim was barred as untimely. 
Sumner found the federal precedent persuasive and held 
that the "continuing violations" doctrine applied to claims 
under both the Civil Rights Act and the Handicappers' Civil 
Rights Act, MCL 37.1101 et seq. 
This Court adopted the 
Evans requirement that an employee must first demonstrate 
that a violation has taken place within the limitations 
period. 
Sumner, supra at 536. 
Once an employee has 
demonstrated this, he or she must then demonstrate either 
that his or her employer has engaged in a "policy of 
discrimination" or has engaged in "a series of allegedly 
discriminatory acts which are sufficiently related so as to 
constitute a pattern . . . ."  Id. at 528. There are three 
factors to consider in determining whether an employer has 
been engaged in a series of allegedly discriminatory acts: 
"The first is subject matter. 
Do the 
alleged 
acts 
involve 
the 
same 
type 
of 
discrimination, tending to connect them in a 
continuing violation? 
The second is frequency.
Are the alleged acts recurring (e.g., a biweekly
paycheck) or more in the nature of an isolated
work assignment or employment decision? 
The 
third factor, perhaps of most importance, is 
degree of permanence. 
Does the act have the 
degree of permanence which should trigger an 
employee's awareness of and duty to assert his or
her rights, or which should indicate to the 
employee that the continued existence of the 
adverse consequences of the act is to be expected
without being dependent on a continuing intent to
discriminate?" 
[Sumner, supra at 538, quoting 
20  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Berry v LSU Bd of Supervisors, 715 F2d 971, 981
(CA 5, 1983).] 
Whatever the merits of the policy crafted by Sumner, 
it bears little relationship to the actual language of the 
relevant statue of limitations, MCL 600.5805, and MCL 
600.5827. 
Fundamental canons of statutory interpretation 
require us to discern and give effect to the Legislature's 
intent as expressed by the language of its statutes. 
DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 
300 (2000). 
If such language is unambiguous, as most such 
language is, Klapp v United Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 
459; 663 NW2d 447 (2003), "we presume that the Legislature 
intended the meaning clearly expressed—no further judicial 
construction is required or permitted, and the statute must 
be enforced as written." DiBenedetto, supra at 402. 
MCL 600.5805 provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) A person shall not bring or maintain an
action to recover damages for injuries to persons
or property unless, after the claim first accrued
to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the
plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within
the periods of time prescribed by this section. 
* * * 
(10) The period of limitations is 3 years
after the time of the death or injury for all
other actions to recover damages for the death of
a person, or for injury to a person or property. 
MCL 600.5827 provides that a "claim accrues at the 
time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done 
21  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
regardless of the time when damage results." 
Thus, § 5805 
requires a plaintiff to commence an action within three 
years of each adverse employment act by a defendant. 
Section 5805 does not say that a claim outside this three­
year period can be revived if it is somehow "sufficiently 
related" to injuries occurring within the limitations 
period. Rather, the statute simply states that a plaintiff 
"shall not" bring a claim for injuries outside the 
limitations period. 
Nothing in these provisions permits a 
plaintiff to recover for injuries outside the limitations 
period when they are susceptible to being characterized as 
"continuing violations." To allow recovery for such claims 
is simply to extend the limitations period beyond that 
which was expressly established by the Legislature.8 
8 The dissent is utterly deconstructionist in its 
attitude toward statutes of limitations, which is its right
but which attitude nonetheless bears no relationship to
that of the Legislature. 
We are told by the dissent, for
example, that we often cannot determine when discriminatory
acts have taken place, when civil rights claims have 
accrued or manifested themselves, whether an act of 
discrimination is "discrete or nondiscrete," and that even
discrete 
acts 
of 
discrimination 
may 
not 
be 
readily
identifiable. 
Post at 12. 
Doubtless, there are difficult
evidentiary issues in the realm of civil rights as in most
other realms of the law. 
Such difficulties, however, do
not constitute authorization for ignoring the express
direction of the Legislature that violations of the Civil
Rights Act are to be subject to a period of limitations,
one that is 2 1/2 years longer than the federal period of
limitations. 
The dissent is obviously correct that the
cost of a statute of limitations is that some acts of 
discrimination will go unredressed. 
This is the cost of 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
An additional flaw in Sumner's reasoning is its unduly 
heavy reliance on federal case law, particularly Evans. 
While federal precedent may often be useful as guidance in 
this Court's interpretation of laws with federal analogues, 
such precedent cannot be allowed to rewrite Michigan law. 
The persuasiveness of federal precedent can only be 
considered after the statutory differences between Michigan 
and federal law have been fully assessed, and, of course, 
even when this has been done and language in state statutes 
is compared to similar language in federal statutes, 
federal precedent remains only as persuasive as the quality 
of its analysis. 
Here, not only does the "continuing 
violations" 
doctrine 
in 
Michigan 
conflict 
with 
the 
requirements of §§ 5805 and 5827, but, at least arguably, 
the federal doctrine is given affirmative support by 
language in Title VII that is absent from the Civil Rights 
Act. 
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to extend the 
period within which an employee must file a complaint with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from 90 days to 
180 days. 
At the same time, Congress imposed a two-year 
any statute of limitations, but nonetheless a cost that the
Legislature apparently believes is outweighed by the 
benefits of setting a deadline on stale claims. 
While the 
dissent may be correct that the "continuing violations"
doctrine "better protects" the victims of discrimination,
post at 13, and that it is a "highly workable and 
preferable" doctrine, post at 14, it is not the doctrine
chosen by the Legislature. 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
limit on backpay awards. 
Thus, Congress implicitly 
recognized an employee's right to recover damages for 
discriminatory acts beyond those that occurred within the 
180-day 
period. 
Sumner 
noted 
that 
such 
amendment 
constituted an "implicit endorsement of the continuing 
violation theory," because Congress allowed employees to 
recover damages for discriminatory acts beyond those that 
occurred within the 180-day period. 
Sumner, supra at 526. 
However, 
Sumner 
failed 
to 
note 
that 
there 
is 
no 
corresponding 
provision 
in 
Michigan 
law 
that 
even 
implicitly endorses the "continuing violations" doctrine. 
Thus, 
rather 
than 
supporting 
Sumner's 
holding, 
the 
existence of the federal statute leads to the opposite 
conclusion—that the "continuing violations" doctrine is 
contrary to Michigan law and, therefore, that federal 
precedent should not have been imported into Michigan law.9 
Therefore, we overrule Sumner and hold that a person 
must file a claim under the Civil Rights Act within three 
years of the date his or her cause of action accrues, as 
9 We note that the United States Supreme Court recently
rejected the "continuing violations" doctrine for Title VII
claims with regard to discrete acts because it is contrary
to the statute of limitations. 
Nat'l R Passenger Corp v
Morgan, 536 US 101; 122 S Ct 2061; 153 L Ed 2d 106 (2002).
24 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
required by § 5805(10).10
 That is, "three years" means 
three years. 
An employee is not permitted to bring a 
lawsuit for employment acts that accrue beyond this period, 
because the Legislature has determined that such claims 
should not be permitted.11  Whether or not the "continuing 
10 Although we concur with the dissent that the 
doctrine of stare decisis constitutes the "'preferred
course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and
consistent 
development 
of 
legal 
principles, 
fosters 
reliance on judicial decisions and contributes to the 
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process,'"
post at 10-11, quoting Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 
439,463; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), so also are these values
promoted by the separation of powers doctrine, which holds
that it is the responsibility of the judiciary to respect
the intentions of the Legislature by giving faithful 
meaning to the words of the law. In this case, we conclude
that the values identified in Robinson, and invoked by the
dissent, are substantially better served by restoring the
law to its written meaning rather than maintaining the
judicial amendments of Sumner. 
Not only, in our judgment,
are laws generally made more "evenhanded, predictable and
consistent" when their words mean what they plainly say,
and when all litigants are subject to the equal application
of such words, but laws are also made more accessible to
the people when each of them is able to read the law and
thereby understand his or her rights and responsibilities.
When the words of the law bear little or no relationship to
what courts say the law means (as in Sumner), then the law
increasingly becomes the exclusive province of lawyers and
judges. 
11 The principal difference between the majority and
the dissent in approaching the interpretative process is 
that the majority is content to rely on the actual words
used by the Legislature while the dissent insists on 
ascribing its own "purpose" to the act, post at 17 n 6, and
interpreting the act consistent with this statement of
purpose, no matter what barriers to this end have been
inconveniently created by the Legislature in failing to use
words that serve the dissent's self-stated "purpose."
While it can scarcely be gainsaid that the purpose of the
25 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
violations" exception of 
Sumner constitutes a useful 
improvement in the law, there is no basis for this Court to 
construct such an amendment.12 
Accordingly, 
plaintiff's 
claims 
of 
retaliatory 
discrimination arising from acts occurring before June 21, 
Civil Rights Act is to "root out discrimination and make 
injured 
parties 
whole," 
id., 
that 
purpose 
must 
be 
understood in the context of a competing "purpose" to
ensure that relief under the act be subject to a statute of
limitations. 
While the dissent apparently views a statute
of limitations as compromising the act's "purpose," i.e.,
its own characterization of such purpose, we believe that
it is better understood as requiring a more precise and
fine-tuned statement of the act's purpose, one predicated
on the intentions of the Legislature rather than on the
preferences of the dissent. 
The words of any statute can
be effectively undermined by a sufficiently generalized
statement of "purpose" that is unmoored in the actual
language of the law. 
12 This Court has rejected similar attempts to modify
statutes of limitations. 
See Boyle v Gen Motors Corp, 468
Mich 
226, 
231-232; 
661 
NW2d 
557 
(2003) 
(rejecting
application of the discovery rule to extend the statute of
limitations in fraud cases); Secura Ins Co v Auto-Owners 
Ins Co, 461 Mich 382, 387-388; 605 NW2d 308 (2000) (holding
that the doctrine of judicial tolling cannot be applied in
the absence of statutory language permitting such tolling);
Magee v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 472 Mich 108, 113; 693 NW2d
166 
(2005) 
(noting 
that 
the 
"continuing 
violations" 
doctrine "renders nugatory the period of limitations 
established by the Legislature in MCL 600.5805[10]").
While the judicial temptation to relax a statute of 
limitations may be understandable in the context of a
lawsuit in which a plaintiff, alleging that he or she has
suffered a serious wrong, has been denied his or her day in
court, the costs involved in terms of undermining the
clarity and predictability of the law, allowing stale 
complaints to proceed, and injecting uncertainty into a
myriad of legal relationships, are considerable, not to
mention that a court that does so would be exercising
"legislative," not "judicial," power. 
See Const 1963, art
3, § 2; art 4, § 1; art 6, § 1.
26 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
1992, are untimely and cannot be maintained. Without these 
untimely acts, plaintiff's claim is limited to acts 
occurring five to eleven years13 after she filed her 
grievance. 
In light of this gap, there is insufficient 
evidence to allow a reasonable juror to find a causal link 
between the 1987 grievance and the discriminatory acts 
falling within the limitations period.14 
13 The first actionable claim in 1992 is five years
after 
plaintiff's 
1987 
national-origin 
grievance 
and 
plaintiff claims that she was treated poorly up to the date
of the 1998 trial, which was eleven years after the 
grievance was filed. 
14 Notwithstanding our overruling of Sumner, the 
dissent, unlike the majority, would still allow acts 
falling outside the period of limitations to be admissible
"'as background evidence in support of a timely claim.'"
Post at 19, quoting Morgan, supra at 113. 
The dissent 
would 
enable 
a 
plaintiff 
to 
claim 
that 
an 
adverse 
employment action occurring outside the limitations period
constituted evidence that the employer is committing
current 
violations. 
Such 
an 
understanding 
would 
essentially resurrect the "continuing violations" doctrine
of Sumner through the back door. 
It would bar an employee
from 
directly 
recovering 
for 
untimely 
acts 
of 
discrimination, but allow the employee to 
indirectly
recover for the same acts. 
What practical difference is
there between the Sumner rule, which states that acts of
discrimination that might otherwise be viewed as stale are
cognizable under the act if they are part of a "continuing
violation," and the dissent's rule that would allow stale
violations to be considered "as evidence" of the actionable 
violation? 
The premises of the dissent and of Sumner are 
indistinguishable in that there can be no "discrete" acts
of discrimination, but that such acts must always be 
assessed in a continuing context so that we can never know
when an "injury" for statute of limitations purposes has
occurred. 
The dissent's rule is as inconsistent with the 
Civil Rights Act as the "continuing violations" doctrine of
Sumner, and equally incompatible with the rationale for a
27 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Furthermore, 
in 
order 
to 
show 
causation 
in 
a 
retaliatory discrimination case, "[p]laintiff must show 
something more than merely a coincidence in time between 
protected activity and adverse employment action." 
West v 
Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 186; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). 
There is no evidence to suggest any distinction between the 
promotion denial that occurred while plaintiff was in 
Cathcart's chain of command and those denials involving 
supervisors who had no knowledge of plaintiff's grievance. 
Five 
supervisors, 
including 
four 
who 
were 
directly 
responsible for postgrievance promotion decisions involving 
plaintiff, testified that they were unaware that plaintiff 
had filed any grievance. Plaintiff failed to introduce any 
evidence to contradict that testimony. 
However, despite 
the First North supervisors' lack of knowledge about the 
grievance, they treated her requests for promotions in the 
same manner that Cathcart did, i.e., they denied them. 
Because these supervisors were not aware of the grievance, 
they could not have "retaliated" against plaintiff for its 
filing. Further, there is no evidence that plaintiff's job 
qualifications changed in any meaningful way in the time 
statute of limitations. See Nielsen v Barnett, 440 Mich 1,
8-9; 485 NW2d 666 (1992). 
It would allow the plaintiff to
resuscitate stale claims—in this case claims more than a 
decade old—and require a defendant to defend against such
claims in the face of the passage of time, fading memories,
and the loss of witnesses and evidence. 
28  
 
 
 
 
 
between the denial by Cathcart and the denials by the other 
supervisors at First North. 
Thus, a juror could not 
reasonably conclude that the reasons behind the denials 
within First North were related to the grievance. 
Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence affirmatively 
showing, as is her burden, that the reasons underlying the 
promotion denial involving Cathcart were any different from 
the denials involving supervisors who were unaware that 
plaintiff had filed a grievance. 
West, supra at 183-184; 
DeFlaviis, supra. It appears that both the trial court and 
the Court of Appeals identified a "causal connection" 
between the grievance and the promotion denials simply on 
the basis of timing—that is, because the denials occurred 
after 
the 
grievance, 
there 
must 
be 
a 
functional 
relationship. 
This is the kind of post hoc, ergo propter 
hoc reasoning rejected in West. 
We reject such reasoning 
in this case as well. 
Similarly, plaintiff failed to establish that she was 
treated poorly by Cathcart and the First North supervisors 
as a result of the grievance. 
Plaintiff was unable to 
establish that Cathcart's treatment of plaintiff was 
29  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
distinguishable 
in 
any 
way 
from 
her 
treatment 
by 
supervisors who were unaware of the grievance.15 
First, plaintiff claimed that Cathcart treated her 
differently from other employees by refusing to give her a 
key to the facility. 
However, her supervisor at First 
North, who denied any knowledge of the grievance, similarly 
refused to give plaintiff a key. Second, plaintiff claimed 
that her work was subjected to greater scrutiny by Cathcart 
than that of her coworkers. However, she also claimed that 
another First North supervisor, who is no longer an 
employee of defendant and did not testify, wrote her 
several memos a day "unfairly attacking" her performance. 
Finally, both plaintiff and the Court of Appeals found it 
noteworthy that she was moved to a "disgusting" office 
after the transfer to First North. However, the supervisor 
who assigned her that office testified that he was unaware 
of the grievance and had informed her that it was only a 
temporary 
situation. 
Under 
these 
circumstances, 
we 
conclude that no juror could have reasonably concluded that 
plaintiff was subjected to poor treatment because she had 
15 In fact, Cathcart testified that he did not 
remember, and would not have been troubled by, the 
grievance. 
Further, plaintiff admitted that, during the 
period of alleged poor treatment, Cathcart intervened on 
her behalf when another supervisor sought to change her
work hours. 
30  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
been engaged in "protected activity" by filing a grievance 
claiming national-origin discrimination. 
Finally, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that 
Cathcart's alleged derogatory comments based on national 
origin 
establish 
any 
causal 
connection 
between 
the 
grievance and the adverse employment action. 
In order to 
establish such a connection, plaintiff needed to show that 
the comments demonstrated Cathcart's discriminatory animus 
toward her and that, as a result of such animus, Cathcart 
retaliated against her for filing the grievance. 
Plaintiff 
claims 
that 
Cathcart 
made 
a 
racially 
derogatory 
statement 
regarding 
Indians.16
 
Plaintiff 
testified that Cathcart responded to the news that her son 
had been admitted to a medical program by stating, "I don't 
know how many Indian doctors we need."17 This statement does 
not pertain in any way to the promotion process; neither is 
it directed toward plaintiff in terms of evaluating her 
16 Cathcart allegedly made another racially derogatory
statement regarding Indians in 1989; however, it is outside
the limitations period. 
We also note that Cathcart 
allegedly made two statements concerning African-Americans.
These seem to have little bearing in this case because
plaintiff is not African-American. 
Further, one of these
statements occurred at least two years before plaintiff's
grievance regarding national-origin discrimination and the
other occurred approximately nine years afterward. 
17 While plaintiff did not indicate when this statement
was made, a juror could infer that it was made sometime
between 1992 and 1995. 
31  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
                                                 
work performance or threatening any future treatment of 
her. 
See Sniecinski, supra at 136 n 8. 
However 
inappropriate or ill-informed this statement, it is better 
characterized, in our judgment, as a "stray comment" than 
as reflective of any "pattern of biased comments . . . ."18 
Id. 
More to the point, for the same reason that plaintiff 
here has failed to demonstrate that Cathcart's treatment of 
her did not vary in any appreciable way from her treatment 
by other supervisors—concerning whom there is no evidence 
of even such "stray comments"—we do not believe that 
plaintiff has demonstrated that she was subjected to 
denials of promotions or otherwise poor treatment by 
defendant on the basis of her grievance. 
Again, we 
reiterate that the question is not the propriety or 
seemliness of Cathcart's statements, but merely whether 
such statements establish a causal link between plaintiff's 
grievance and her subsequent treatment by defendant. 
In light of insufficient evidence that plaintiff was 
not promoted or otherwise treated poorly because she 
engaged in a "protected activity," i.e., having filed a 
grievance 
against 
defendant 
alleging 
national-origin 
18 This conclusion is underscored by the fact that the
jury, after learning of all these statements, concluded
that plaintiff had not been discriminated against on the
basis of national origin. 
32 
 
 
 
 
discrimination, 
plaintiff 
has 
failed 
to 
establish 
a 
retaliation claim under the Civil Rights Act. 
IV. Conclusion 
We conclude that the "continuing violations" doctrine 
is contrary to the language of § 5805 and hold, therefore, 
that 
the 
doctrine 
has 
no 
continued 
place 
in 
the 
jurisprudence of this state. 
Accordingly, Sumner is 
overruled. Further, we conclude that there is insufficient 
evidence to support plaintiff's claims of retaliation based 
on her opposition to sexual harassment and those acts by 
her employer following the grievance that were within the 
statutory limitations period. 
Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the matter to 
Maura D. Corrigan 
the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of 
defendant. 
Stephen J. Markman
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
33  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
SHARDA GARG, 
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 
No. 121361 
MACOMB COUNTY COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, 
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that there was 
insufficient evidence of retaliation based on plaintiff’s 
alleged opposition to the sexual harassment of her co­
workers. 
I 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority’s 
conclusion 
that 
plaintiff presented insufficient evidence that she was 
retaliated against for filing a grievance. 
Moreover, I 
disagree with the majority’s decision to overrule Sumner v 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 427 Mich 505; 398 NW2d 368 
(1986), and abolish the continuing violations doctrine. 
Finally, I disagree with the majority’s rationale that 
because the continuing violations doctrine no longer 
applies, evidence of prior acts must necessarily be 
excluded 
from 
consideration. 
Accordingly, 
I 
must 
respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Plaintiff Presented Sufficient Evidence of Retaliation 
for Filing a Grievance 
The Michigan Civil Rights Act “is aimed at ‘the 
prejudices and biases’ borne against persons because of 
their membership in a certain class, and seeks to eliminate 
the 
effects 
of 
offensive 
or 
demeaning 
stereotypes, 
prejudices, and biases.” 
Miller v C A Muer Corp, 420 Mich 
355, 363; 362 NW2d 650 (1984) (citations omitted). To this 
end, the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2701, provides in 
pertinent part: 
Two or more persons shall not conspire to,
or a person shall not: 
(a) Retaliate or discriminate against a 
person because the person has opposed a violation
of this act, or because the person has made a
charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted,
or participated in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under this act. 
The Court of Appeals has observed that the purposes of the 
retaliation provisions of the act are “to protect access to 
the machinery available to seek redress for civil rights 
violations and to protect operation of that machinery once 
it has been engaged.” 
DeFlaviis v Lord & Taylor, Inc, 223 
Mich App 432, 440; 566 NW2d 661 (1997) (citation omitted). 
This Court has yet to formally delineate the prima 
facie elements of a retaliation claim under the Michigan 
Civil Rights Act. 
The Court of Appeals, however, has 
2  
 
 
 
 
relied on federal precedent to formulate its own test. 
Today, the majority adopts the Court of Appeals test as its 
own. See ante at 10-11. Thus, to establish a prima facie 
case of unlawful retaliation under the Civil Rights Act, a 
plaintiff must show: “(1) that he engaged in a protected 
activity; (2) that this was known by the defendant; (3) 
that the defendant took an employment action adverse to the 
plaintiff; and (4) that there was a causal connection 
between the protected activity and the adverse employment 
action.” 
DeFlaviis, supra at 436, citing Polk v Yellow 
Freight Sys, Inc, 876 F2d 527, 531 (CA 6, 1989), Booker v 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co, Inc, 879 F2d 1304, 1310 (CA 
6, 1989), and Kroll v Disney Store, Inc, 899 F Supp 344, 
348 (ED Mich, 1995). 
Using these elements, I would 
conclude that the trial court properly denied defendant’s 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on 
plaintiff’s claim that she was retaliated against for 
filing a grievance against her supervisor. 
As noted by the majority, the first two elements of 
the test are satisfied because plaintiff engaged in 
protected activity and defendant was aware that plaintiff 
had engaged in this activity. See ante at 17. Moreover, I 
would conclude that sufficient evidence was presented on 
the third and fourth elements; namely, there was sufficient 
3  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
evidence that defendant took adverse employment action 
against plaintiff and there was a causal connection between 
the filing of the grievance and the adverse employment 
action. With regard to these elements, I find the Court of 
Appeals characterization of the evidence persuasive. 
The 
Court of Appeals noted: 
[P]laintiff 
sufficiently 
established 
the 
elements of a retaliation claim by way of her
evidence that (1) plaintiff filed a grievance
alleging racial discrimination in June 1987; (2)
Cathcart, a supervisor, knew about the grievance;
(3) after filing the grievance, plaintiff failed
to receive the next promotion that she sought, 
posted in December 1988, despite being qualified
for the position; (4) plaintiff failed to receive
seven total promotions between 1989 and 1997,
despite being qualified for the positions; (5)
individuals 
less 
qualified 
than 
plaintiff
received promotions while plaintiff did not; (6)
in 
1994, 
plaintiff 
was 
transferred 
to 
a 
windowless office from which she could hear 
noises emanating from the adjacent bathroom,
while persons more senior [sic] to plaintiff
received better offices; (7) in 1996, Cathcart
made a statement disparaging to blacks; (8) 
Cathcart made another comment disparaging to 
Indians; (9) Cathcart reprimanded plaintiff but
not others for minor infractions; (10) Cathcart
ignored plaintiff in staff meetings and treated
her poorly in the hallways; (11) in 1984 or 1985,
Cathcart used the word “n-----” in referring to
blacks; and (12) Cathcart remained in plaintiff’s
chain 
of 
command 
throughout 
the 
years.
[Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued March 29, 2002 (Docket No. 
223829).][1] 
1 I disagree with the majority’s contention that these
statements 
should 
be 
considered 
mere 
stray 
remarks. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
A motion for JNOV should be granted only if the 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, fails to establish a claim as a matter of 
law. 
Orzel v Scott Drug Co, 449 Mich 550, 557-558; 537 
NW2d 208 (1995). 
This Court reviews de novo a trial 
court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for JNOV, and 
likewise reviews the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
Craig 
v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 77; 684 NW2d 296 (2004). 
Under this standard, I cannot say that the evidence 
detailed by the Court of Appeals fails to establish a claim 
of retaliation as a matter of law. 
Moreover, while 
reasonable jurors could reach different conclusions, I 
cannot say that no reasonable juror could conclude that 
plaintiff was retaliated against for filing a grievance. 
Thus, I would hold that the trial court properly denied 
defendant’s motion for JNOV on the retaliation theory.2 
Moreover, I find wholly unpersuasive the majority’s logic
that the derogatory statements concerning African-Americans
are irrelevant because plaintiff is Indian. 
2 As noted previously, I tend to agree with the
majority that plaintiff presented insufficient evidence 
that she was retaliated against for her alleged opposition
to the sexual harassment of her coworkers. 
However, I
disagree with the majority’s election to decide, in dictum,
whether responsive physical behavior constitutes protected
activity. 
Given the majority’s ultimate conclusion, this
portion 
of 
the 
majority’s 
opinion 
is 
unnecessary. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
II. Sumner and the Continuing Violations Doctrine 
The Michigan Civil Rights Act contains no internal 
statute of limitations. 
Nonetheless, this Court has 
applied the general three-year limitations period set forth 
in MCL 600.5805 to claims brought under the act. 
See, 
e.g., Mair v Consumers Power Co, 419 Mich 74; 348 NW2d 256 
(1984). 
However, in recognition that such claims tend to 
“unfold rather than occur,” this Court unanimously adopted 
a narrow exception to the statute of limitations—the 
continuing violations doctrine. Sumner, supra at 526. The 
continuing violations doctrine dictates that unlawful acts 
that occur beyond the period of limitations are actionable, 
as long as the acts are sufficiently related to constitute 
a pattern and one of the acts occurred within the period of 
limitations. 
As noted by the Sumner Court, the federal courts 
developed the continuing violations doctrine as a narrow 
exception to Title VII’s short limitations period. 
This 
Court detailed the reasons for the exception, reasons that 
still ring true today: 
These courts expressed concern with a number
of factors which they felt militated against a 
strict application of the limitation requirement. 
Moreover, although this issue was raised by the Attorney
General as amicus curiae, this issue was neither raised
below nor specifically briefed by the parties. 
6  
 
 
 
 
First, Title VII is a remedial statute whose
purpose is to root out discrimination and make
injured parties whole. 
Second, employees are
generally lay people, who do not know that they
must act quickly or risk losing their cause of
action. 
An employee may fear reprisal by the
employer, or may refer the matter to a union,
which 
may 
not 
take 
any 
action 
within 
the 
limitation period. 
Employees may also delay
filing their complaints in the hope of internal
resolution or simply to give the employer a 
second chance. Third, and most importantly, many
discriminatory acts occur in such a manner that
it is difficult to precisely define when they
took place. 
One might say that they unfold
rather than occur. [Id. at 525-526.] 
In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision 
in United Air Lines, Inc v Evans, 431 US 553; 97 S Ct 1885; 
52 L Ed 2d 571 (1977), this Court observed that the 
continuing violations doctrine generally consists of two 
subtheories: 
The first subtheory involves allegations
that an employer has engaged in a continuous
policy of discrimination. 
In such a case, the
plaintiff is alleging that “he is challenging not
just discriminatory conduct which has affected
him, but also, or alternatively, the underlying
employment system which has harmed or which 
threatens to harm him and other members of his 
class.” 
The second subtheory, the “continuing course
of conduct” or “series of events” situation is 
relevant where an employee challenges a series of
allegedly 
discriminatory 
acts 
which 
are 
sufficiently related so as to constitute a 
pattern, only one of which occurred within the 
limitation 
period. 
[Sumner, 
supra 
at 
528 
(citations omitted).] 
7  
 
 
 
 
Here, plaintiff is alleging that defendant retaliated 
against her through a continuing course of conduct. 
Thus, 
the second subtheory applies to this case. 
In determining whether a continuing course of conduct 
exists under the second subtheory, this Court adopted the 
approach set forth by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals: 
“The first is subject matter. Do the alleged
acts involve the same type of discrimination,
tending 
to 
connect 
them 
in 
a 
continuing
violation? 
The second is frequency. Are the
alleged 
acts 
recurring 
(e.g., 
a 
biweekly
paycheck) or more in the nature of an isolated
work assignment or employment decision? 
The 
third factor, perhaps of most importance, is 
degree of permanence. 
Does the act have the 
degree of permanence which should trigger an 
employee’s awareness of and duty to assert his or
her rights, or which should indicate to the 
employee that the continued existence of the 
adverse consequences of the act is to be expected
without being dependent on a continuing intent to
discriminate?” 
[Sumner, supra at 538, quoting
Berry v LSU Bd of Supervisors, 715 F2d 971, 981
(CA 5, 1983).] 
Under these circumstances, I would conclude that the 
continuing 
violations 
doctrine 
applies 
to 
plaintiff’s 
retaliation claim. 
First, the acts involve the same type 
of continuing violation: repeated denials of promotions and 
disparate 
treatment 
in 
retaliation 
for 
engaging 
in 
protected activity. Second, defendant’s acts occurred with 
frequency: 
plaintiff 
was 
consistently 
denied 
every 
promotion she applied for from the date the grievance was 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
filed. 
Finally, on these facts, the consistent denials of 
promotions and disparate treatment did not have the degree 
of permanence that would necessarily preclude application 
of the continuing violations doctrine. 
Plaintiff did not 
suspect that the impetus for the adverse actions was the 
filing 
of 
the 
grievance 
until 
much 
later. 
While 
retaliatory conduct may be considered a discrete act under 
some circumstances, the facts of this case demonstrate that 
retaliation is often just as subtle and hard to detect as 
discrimination. 
Thus, I would apply the continuing 
violations doctrine and conclude that all the adverse 
employment actions taken by defendant against plaintiff are 
actionable. 
III. The Majority’s Decision to Overrule Sumner 
The majority reasons that Sumner and the continuing 
violations doctrine have no place in Michigan law because 
they bear little relationship to the actual language of MCL 
600.5805 and 600.5827. 
Rather, MCL 600.5805 “requires a 
plaintiff to commence an action within three years of each 
adverse employment act by a defendant. . . . Nothing in 
these provisions permits a plaintiff to recover for 
injuries outside the limitations period when they are 
susceptible 
to 
being 
characterized 
as 
‘continuing 
violations.’” 
Ante at 22-23. 
Moreover, the majority 
9  
 
 
 
 
concludes that Sumner “unduly” relied on federal case law. 
Id. at 23. 
According to the majority, the continuing 
violations doctrine is arguably given support by the 
language of Title VII, unlike the language of Michigan’s 
statutory provisions. Additionally, Congress amended Title 
VII to impose a two-year limit on recovering back pay and, 
thus, implicitly endorsed the doctrine. 
The majority 
posits that there is no corresponding provision in Michigan 
law that even implicitly endorses the continuing violations 
doctrine. 
Accordingly, the majority overrules Sumner and 
holds that a person must file a claim under the Civil 
Rights Act within three years of the date his or her cause 
of action accrues. 
“[T]his Court has consistently opined that, absent the 
rarest 
circumstances, 
we 
should 
remain 
faithful 
to 
established precedent.” 
Brown v Manistee Co Rd Comm, 452 
Mich 354, 365; 550 NW2d 215 (1996). 
The doctrine of stare 
decisis is “‘the preferred course because it promotes the 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of 
legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, 
and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of 
the judicial process.’” 
Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 
463; 613 NW2d 307 (2000) (citation omitted). 
The current 
Court has detailed four principles to consider before 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
established precedent is overruled: “(1) whether the 
earlier case was wrongly decided,[3] (2) whether the 
decision 
defies 
‘practical 
workability,’ 
(3) 
whether 
reliance interests would work an undue hardship, and (4) 
whether changes in the law or facts no longer justify the 
questioned decision.” 
Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 
Mich 675, 694; 641 NW2d 219 (2002). 
In my view, none of 
these factors weighs in favor of overruling Sumner and 
abolishing the continuing violations doctrine. 
First, I cannot say that Sumner was wrongly decided. 
Like its federal counterpart, the Civil Rights Act “is a 
remedial 
statute 
whose 
purpose 
is 
to 
root 
out 
discrimination and make injured parties whole.”  Sumner, 
supra at 525. 
Because the Civil Rights Act is remedial in 
nature, it should be liberally construed. 
Kassab v 
Michigan Basic Prop Ins Ass’n, 441 Mich 433, 467; 491 NW2d 
545 (1992) (Cavanagh, C.J., dissenting); see also Kassab, 
supra at 451 (Mallett, J., dissenting). 
In Sumner, supra at 526, this Court astutely observed 
that “many discriminatory acts occur in such a manner that 
it is difficult to precisely define when they took place.” 
3 Is not this “principle” a given? 
As I have noted 
previously, it would seem strange indeed for a “correctly
decided” decision to be trashed. 
11  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
Indeed, determining when a claim accrues or occurs is 
surprisingly difficult because violations of the act may 
not manifest themselves except at the end of a lengthy 
period. 
Whether 
a 
particular 
act 
is 
discrete 
or 
nondiscrete often depends on the circumstances of the 
individual case. 
And even so-called discrete acts may not 
always be readily identifiable. In fact, the United States 
Supreme Court recently left open the question whether 
discriminatory employment actions are subject to some sort 
of discovery rule. The Court noted that 
[t]here may be circumstances where it will be
difficult to determine when the time period
should begin to run. One issue that may arise in
such circumstances is whether the time begins to
run when the injury occurs as opposed to when the
injury reasonably should have been discovered.
But this case presents no occasion to resolve
that issue. 
[Nat’l R Passenger Corp v Morgan,
536 US 101, 114 n 7; 122 S Ct 2061; 153 L Ed 2d
106 (2002).] 
The continuing violations doctrine remains a salutary 
tool because, as a practical matter, it may be difficult to 
determine when a violation of the act was committed or when 
a civil rights claim accrues for purposes of MCL 600.5827.4 
4 MCL 600.5827 provides: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided, the period of
limitations runs from the time the claim accrues. 
The 
claim accrues at the time provided in sections 5829 to
5838, and in cases not covered by these sections the claim 
12  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Simply stated, a victim of discrimination may not be aware 
that he or she is being or has been discriminated against 
until after the period of limitations has expired. 
The 
continuing violations doctrine better protects the victim 
and does not reflexively give the discriminating party the 
benefit of judicial hindsight. 
However, the Sumner Court 
was careful to explain that not every prior act will be 
actionable under the continuing violations doctrine. 
Even 
though discriminatory acts may be difficult to ascertain, 
the continuing violations doctrine will not apply if there 
is not a pattern, the acts do not involve the same subject 
matter, the acts do not occur with frequency, or the 
plaintiff should have been aware that his or her rights 
under the act were being violated. 
In my view, Sumner 
remains a sound decision because it seeks to ameliorate the 
effects of strictly applying the limitations period where 
it is difficult to ascertain exactly when a civil rights 
claim accrues. 
Second, Sumner does not defy practical workability. 
As noted above, just the opposite is true. 
Because it is 
often extremely difficult to ascertain when a claim 
accrues, application of the continuing violations doctrine 
accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based
was done regardless of the time when damage results. 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
proceeds on a case-by-case basis. 
The doctrine is 
generally analyzed under two distinct subtheories and this 
Court has set forth a clear three-factor test to assist 
courts in determining whether a continuing course of 
discriminatory conduct exists. 
Sumner, supra at 538. 
In 
my view, Sumner remains a highly workable and preferable 
decision. 
Third, overruling Sumner would work an undue hardship 
because of the reliance interests placed on that decision. 
Sumner has been entrenched in this state’s jurisprudence 
for nearly twenty years. 
Further, as a practical matter, 
the 
continuing 
violations 
doctrine 
encourages 
lay 
employees, who may not be supremely confident that their 
rights are being violated, to seek internal resolution of 
their suspected complaints. Needless to say, such a course 
of action is advantageous to all persons involved. 
In 
reliance on Sumner, an employee could rest assured that 
possible violations of the Civil Rights Act would not 
become stale while attempting to resolve the complaint 
internally. 
Moreover, employees’ fear of reprisals by 
employers was greatly diminished because of 
Sumner’s 
safeguards. 
Because 
of 
Sumner, 
both 
employees 
and 
employers 
were 
relieved 
of 
the 
burden 
of 
being 
on 
“litigation watch” at the first sign of trouble. Employees 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
and employers have relied on Sumner for quite some time and 
conducted their affairs and operations accordingly. 
In my view, affirming the principles announced in 
Sumner would work far less of a hardship than overruling 
that decision. 
Indeed, opponents of the continuing 
violations doctrine should be careful what they wish for. 
Overruling Sumner may actually encourage employees to run 
to court at the first sign of trouble. 
This will put a 
strain on everyone involved in the process—the employee, 
the employer, and the courts. 
Such inherent tension was 
alleviated 
by 
Sumner 
and 
the 
continuing 
violations 
doctrine. 
Thus, because the citizens of this state have 
justifiably relied on Sumner for nearly two decades and 
overruling that decision would unnecessarily disrupt these 
reliance interests, I would refrain from overruling Sumner. 
Fourth and finally, there has been no change in the 
law or facts that has cast doubt on the wisdom of Sumner. 
Indeed, this Court has consistently cited and suggested 
that Sumner’s reliance on federal precedent was warranted. 
See, e.g., Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297, 313; 614 
NW2d 910 (2000) (“We are many times guided in our 
interpretation of the Michigan Civil Rights Act by federal 
interpretations of its counterpart federal statute. 
See, 
e.g., Sumner v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 427 Mich 505, 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
525; 398 NW2d 368 (1986).”)5
 Thus, there has been no 
seismic shift, except for the makeup of this Court, that 
would 
warrant 
overruling 
Sumner 
and 
abolishing 
the 
continuing violations doctrine. 
In sum, I disagree with the majority’s decision to 
overrule Sumner. 
I believe that the continuing violations 
doctrine remains a venerable approach to analyzing claims 
brought under the Michigan Civil Rights Act.6 
5 See also Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 381-382; 501
NW2d 155 (1993) (“While this Court is not compelled to
follow federal precedent or guidelines in interpreting
Michigan law, this Court may, ‘as we have done in the past
in discrimination cases, turn to federal precedent for
guidance in reaching our decision.’ Sumner v Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co, 427 Mich 505, 525; 398 NW2d 368 (1986).”);
Stevens v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 433 Mich 365, 375;
446 NW2d 95 (1989) (“This Court has frequently drawn from
federal court precedent in interpreting other aspects of
the Civil Rights Act. 
See, e.g., Sumner v Goodyear Tire &
Rubber 
Co, 
427 
Mich 
505, 
525; 
398 
NW2d 
368 
(1986) . . . .”). 
6 The majority posits that my conclusion to reaffirm
the principles announced in Sumner stems from my preference
to interpret the Civil Rights Act in harmony with my “own,”
“self-stated” “characterization” of the purpose of the act.
Ante at 26-27 n 11. 
As detailed in Sumner, supra at 525,
the purpose of the act is “to root out discrimination and
make injured parties whole.” 
In the same footnote,
however, the majority acknowledges that Sumner’s stated 
purpose of the act is undeniable. 
Nonetheless, the 
majority concludes that this undeniable purpose must heed
another “competing” purpose–“to ensure that relief under
the act be subject to a statute of limitations.” 
Ante at 
27 n 11. 
Accordingly, the majority would “fine-tune” the
act’s undeniable purpose and restate the “precise” purpose
of the Civil Rights Act as follows: to intermittently root 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
IV. The Majority’s Application of its New Rule is 
Fundamentally Flawed  
Even assuming the continuing violations doctrine no 
longer pertains, the majority’s additional reasoning cannot 
withstand scrutiny. 
Under the continuing violations 
doctrine, unlawful acts that occur beyond the period of 
limitations are actionable, as long as the acts are 
sufficiently related to constitute a pattern and one of the 
acts occurred within the period of limitations. 
The 
majority properly acknowledges this point of law.7
 Thus, 
the natural consequence of overruling Sumner and abolishing 
the continuing violations doctrine is that acts occurring 
beyond the period of limitations are no longer actionable. 
out discrimination and make injured parties somewhat whole.
I prefer the undeniable purpose previously articulated by
this 
Court 
because 
it 
is 
more 
consistent 
with 
the 
Legislature’s intent. 
While the majority claims that the
words of any statute can be undermined by considering the
statute’s purpose, today’s decision demonstrates that the
opposite proposition is equally true. 
Namely, a remedial
statute can be tortured by a preference to ignore, not
effectuate, the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the 
statute. 
7 “Nothing in these provisions permits a plaintiff to 
recover for injuries outside the limitations period when
they are susceptible to being characterized as ‘continuing
violations.’ 
To allow recovery for such claims is simply
to extend the limitations period beyond that which was
expressly established by the Legislature.” 
Ante at 23 
(emphasis added). “An employee is not permitted to bring a
lawsuit for employment acts that accrue beyond this period,
because the Legislature has determined that such claims
should not be permitted.” Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
17  
 
 
                                                 
Yet the majority goes even further and reasons that 
evidence 
of 
acts 
occurring 
outside 
the 
period 
of 
limitations must be excluded.8
 Such a conclusion is 
fundamentally flawed. 
For example, in Morgan, supra at 105, the United 
Stated Supreme Court held that Title VII “precludes 
recovery for discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation 
that occur outside the statutory time period.”9
 While I 
disagree with the Morgan Court’s holding, it is important 
to observe the Court’s subsequent rationale. 
In light of 
8 “[W]e conclude that, once evidence of acts that 
occurred outside the statute of limitations period is 
removed from consideration, there was insufficient evidence
of 
retaliation 
based 
on 
either 
plaintiff’s 
alleged
opposition to sexual harassment or her filing of a 
grievance . . . .” 
Ante at 1-2 (emphasis added). 
“We 
conclude that, absent evidence of these acts, there is
insufficient evidence to establish a causal link between 
the 1987 grievance and any retaliatory acts occurring
within the limitations period.” 
Id. at 18 (emphasis
added). 
9 However, I must note that the Morgan Court held that 
the continuing violations doctrine still applies to hostile
work environment claims. 
“We also hold that consideration 
of the entire scope of a hostile work environment claim,
including behavior alleged outside the statutory time 
period, is permissible for the purposes of assessing 
liability, so long as any act contributing to that hostile
work environment takes place within the statutory time
period.” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Here, the majority does
not attempt to exercise the same degree of prudence and
reason. 
Rather, the majority simply concludes that all
claims brought under the Civil Rights Act, whether premised
on discrete or nondiscrete acts, are subject to the statute
of limitations. 
18  
 
 
its holding, the Morgan Court noted, “As we have held, 
however, this time period for filing a charge is subject to 
equitable doctrines such as tolling or estoppel.” 
Id. at 
113. 
Importantly, the Court also reasoned, “Nor does the 
statute bar an employee from using the prior acts as 
background evidence in support of a timely claim.” 
Id. 
(emphasis added). This rationale comports with the natural 
consequences 
of 
abolishing 
the 
continuing 
violations 
doctrine: prior acts outside the period of limitations are 
not actionable (i.e., cannot serve as the basis for 
imposing liability), but these acts may still be used as 
background evidence to support a timely claim. 
Thus, the 
majority’s conclusion that acts occurring outside the 
limitations period must be “removed from consideration” is 
unacceptable. Ante at 2. 
I disagree with the majority’s stated conclusion that 
evidence of acts occurring outside the limitations period 
must 
be 
“removed 
from 
consideration” 
because, 
as 
a 
practical matter, such evidence often must be considered, 
as the majority’s rationale confirms. 
While certainly not 
a novel approach, I believe that it is entirely proper to 
examine relevant evidence even though such evidence may 
itself not be actionable. Stated differently, the decision 
whether to admit certain evidence is within the trial 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
court's sound discretion and will not be disturbed absent 
an abuse of discretion. 
See, e.g., People v McDaniel, 469 
Mich 409, 412; 670 NW2d 659 (2003). Therefore, even though 
so-called untimely acts may not be actionable under the 
majority’s approach, such acts may be considered as 
relevant background evidence in most instances. 
In my 
view, the majority misunderstands the consequences of 
overruling Sumner. 
In response, the majority claims that the United 
States Supreme Court’s rationale in Morgan “essentially 
resurrect[s] the ‘continuing violations’ doctrine through 
the back door.” Ante at 28 n 14. The majority moans that 
consideration 
of 
background 
evidence 
would 
allow 
an 
employee to indirectly recover for past acts. 
The 
majority, transfixed with destroying every shred of the 
additional 
protections 
afforded 
by 
the 
continuing 
violations doctrine, has lost sight of the bigger picture. 
The 
majority 
admittedly 
fails 
to 
see 
the 
practical 
difference between the Sumner rule and the logic employed 
by the Morgan Court. 
I would simply urge reexamination of 
these opinions because the differences are quite clear. 
The United States Supreme Court concluded that the 
result of abolishing the continuing violations doctrine is 
that 
untimely 
claims 
are 
not 
actionable, 
period. 
20  
 
 
Inexplicably, however, the majority feels compelled to 
conclude that any evidence that may have once constituted a 
claim under the Civil Rights Act, but is now barred by the 
statute of limitations, may never be admitted. But, again, 
this is not the majority’s decision to make. 
If the trial 
court determines that evidence of the now time-barred claim 
is relevant to the timely claim, such evidence may be 
admitted as background evidence, but may not serve as the 
basis for any damage award. 
Sometimes the time-barred 
claim will not be relevant and the trial court may conclude 
that such background evidence is unnecessary. 
In other 
instances, 
the 
trial 
court 
may 
exercise 
its 
sound 
discretion and admit such evidence. The majority, however, 
oversteps its bounds when it concludes that such evidence 
may never be relevant and, therefore, may never be 
considered. 
I do not know how the Morgan decision could 
make this point of law any clearer. 
In sum, I believe that the majority’s resolve to 
dismantle the continuing violations doctrine has led it to 
an illogical result. 
The majority is essentially arguing 
that, in Morgan, the United States Supreme Court attempted 
to resurrect the continuing violations doctrine after 
having overruled the doctrine. 
This argument makes no 
sense. 
Rather, I believe that the Morgan Court properly 
21  
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
acknowledged that overruling the continuing violations 
doctrine means that untimely claims are not actionable, 
but, in some instances, the trial court may determine that 
evidence of these untimely claims may be admissible to 
provide necessary context. 
V. Conclusion 
I would hold that plaintiff presented sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that she was 
retaliated against for filing her grievance. 
Moreover, I 
would affirm the principles announced in Sumner, and apply 
the continuing violations doctrine to plaintiff’s claim of 
retaliation based on the grievance theory. 
Finally, even 
if I were to agree with the majority that the continuing 
violations doctrine is no longer viable, the natural 
consequence of abolishing that doctrine is not to exclude 
untimely acts from consideration. 
Rather, abolishing the 
continuing violations doctrine simply means that untimely 
acts are not actionable.10 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
10 In light of the majority’s resolution of this case,
I too do not reach the other issues raised on appeal or in
plaintiff’s cross-appeal. 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
  
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
SHARDA GARG, 
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 
No. 121361 
MACOMB COUNTY COMMUNITY HEALTH SERVICES, 
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
and 
LIFE CONSULTATION CENTER, 
Defendant. 
WEAVER, J. (dissenting). 
I agree with the reasoning and conclusions of Justice 
Cavanagh’s dissenting opinion. 
This Court unanimously 
adopted the continuing violations doctrine in Sumner v 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 427 Mich 505; 398 NW2d 368 
(1986). Justice Brickley authored Sumner, and was joined by 
Justices Cavanagh, Levin, and Archer. 
Justice Riley, 
joined by Justice Boyle, concurred in the adoption of the 
doctrine, but disagreed with the majority’s application of 
it to the facts of the case. Chief Justice Williams, in a 
separate opinion, also concurred in the adoption of the 
doctrine. 
I am not persuaded that the adoption of the 
 
 
 
doctrine was unwarranted or that, after nineteen years, the 
doctrine should be abandoned. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
2