Title: People v. Becerra
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S065573
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 2016

1 
Filed 6/27/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S065573 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
   
FRANK KALIL BECERRA, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Sup. Ct. No. BA 106878 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Defendant Frank Kalil Becerra was convicted by jury of the first degree 
murders of James Harding and Herman Jackson,1 with the special circumstance of 
multiple murders.2  He was also convicted of first degree burglary with use of a 
knife3 and assault causing great bodily injury on George McPherson.4  The jury 
returned a verdict of death, which the court imposed,5 along with seven years in 
                                              
1  
Penal Code sections 187, subdivision (a), and 189.  All further statutory 
references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise noted. 
 
2  
Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3).                                                                                                
 
3  
Sections 459 and 12022.5, subdivision (a). 
 
4  
Section 245, subdivision (a)(1). 
 
5  
Section 190.4, subdivision (e). 
2 
prison for the first degree burglary and enhancement.  The assault sentence was 
stayed.6   
In this automatic appeal, defendant contends the trial court erroneously 
terminated his right to self-representation in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the federal Constitution.  (See Faretta v. California (1975) 422 
U.S. 806, 807, 835 (Faretta).)  We agree.  The court‟s rationale, that defendant 
had been “dilatory” and had been “stalling,” is not supported by the record.  
Faretta and its progeny require reversal of the judgment in its entirety. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On December 28, 1994, Harding and Jackson were found bound to each 
other and strangled to death with electrical cords in Harding‟s room at the Pacific 
Grand Hotel, a residential hotel in downtown Los Angeles where drugs were 
routinely bought and sold.  Defendant, an admitted drug dealer and gang member, 
had repeatedly threatened to kill Harding in a dispute over a bag of missing 
cocaine.  A few days before the murders, defendant forced his way into 
McPherson‟s room and held a knife to McPherson‟s neck while demanding to 
know where his “stuff” was.  Because resolution of defendant‟s appeal turns 
exclusively on his Faretta claim, we focus solely on facts germane to that 
contention. 
In April 1995, before his preliminary hearing, defendant moved 
unsuccessfully to replace his public defender, Gregory Fisher.  In May, still 
awaiting his preliminary hearing, defendant asked to represent himself, adding that 
he was acting as his own counsel in another, unrelated criminal case.  The court 
granted his Faretta request.  It directed the public defender to turn over his 
                                              
6  
Section 654. 
 
3 
records, approved funds for an investigator7 and supplies, and set a June date for 
defendant‟s discovery motion.  Fisher informed the court he had already given 
defendant copies of all reports except the victims‟ rap sheets and would turn over 
any additional discovery.     
At the June discovery hearing, defendant requested a postponement, 
claiming he had not yet received a complete copy of the prosecution‟s murder 
book8 from his investigator.  The court concluded defendant could proceed with 
an additional 73 discovery requests.  On the record but outside the court‟s 
presence, the prosecutor and defendant discussed each request.  In most instances, 
the prosecutor explained the items were either contained in the murder book, had 
been given to defendant‟s previous counsel, or did not exist.  As to many requests, 
the prosecutor told defendant just where the information could be found in the 
murder book.  With consent of the parties, the court continued the matter to July to 
set a preliminary hearing.   
In July, the prosecutor declared he was “available any day” for the 
preliminary hearing.  Defendant, however, requested additional discovery, 
claiming an inventory of the material he had been given revealed “a lot” of items 
were missing, as detailed in his compliance motion.  The prosecutor responded he 
had turned over “a complete and true copy of the murder book” to defendant‟s 
previous counsel.  He did not otherwise speak to the contention that “a lot” of 
defendant‟s requested discovery items had not been turned over.  The court 
                                              
7  
Defendant specifically requested that John Jensen be appointed as his case 
investigator; the court acceded to this request.   
 
8  
A “ „murder book‟ ” typically “is a notebook or file compiled by law 
enforcement and the prosecution that contains investigative reports, witness 
statements, photographs, audio and videotape recordings, and other material 
related to the case.”  (People v. Carson (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1, 12, fn. 3 (Carson).) 
4 
directed defendant‟s investigator to ascertain “all the matters” that defendant was 
seeking, meet with the prosecutor to secure them, and then deliver them to 
defendant.  If problems arose, they were to notify the clerk so the court could 
intervene.  The court also directed the parties to cooperate so the preliminary 
hearing could be set in August.     
At the August hearing, the prosecutor reported that he and defendant‟s 
investigator had gone through the murder book “page by page by page, literally 
through the entire murder book.  [¶]  There were some documents Mr. Jensen did 
not have that I copied and gave to him.  He gave me the further request for 
discovery; one being request for receipt by fax [of] rap sheets for approximately 
25 witnesses.”  (Italics added.)  The process of checking those records had not 
been completed.  “Other than that, I believe that all the discovery Mr. Jensen asked 
of me has been provided” except for the audio tapes, which were in the process of 
being reproduced.  The prosecutor said he would notify Jensen in three or four 
days when the tapes were ready.  After addressing several subpoena issues with 
the court, defendant identified additional discovery items he claimed were still 
missing.  The prosecutor did not object to the requests, nor did the court rule that 
defendant was not entitled to the items mentioned.  Instead, the court set an 
additional hearing date, explaining, “I want to make sure that you have all those 
things before we go ahead with the prelim.  [¶]  Approximately 30 days from 
today‟s date?  Will that be enough time, or do you need more time?”  (Italics 
added.)  Defendant responded, “Yeah, that is fine,” and the parties agreed to meet 
on September 28 to set the preliminary hearing.   
At the September hearing, however, the court opened the proceedings by 
terminating defendant‟s self-representation during the following exchange, 
without any record of prior warning or discussion: 
5 
“The Court:  I gave you pro per privileges a little over four months ago and 
you continued this case on at least six occasions.  The Court finds that everything 
you‟ve done is dilatory; that this case is never going to get off the ground; that the 
prelim will never occur; and that all you‟re doing is stalling.  Eventually it‟s going 
to have to happen.  [¶]  I don‟t want to hear from you anymore.   
“[Defendant]:  Your Honor? 
“The Court:  I‟m telling you to be quiet.  I‟m releaving [sic] you.  I‟m 
reappointing the public defender‟s office and you can talk to —  
“[Defendant]:  Well, your Honor — I would like to say one thing for the 
record. 
“The Court:  Say it. 
“[Defendant]:  Okay.  First of all, your Honor, this is a capit[a]l case one.  I 
been appointed since May 19 of 1995.  I don‟t have, since May till now, enough 
time to have enough season [sic] of the law to present my preliminary hearing in 
front of this Court.  [¶]  As you can see from the advisory counsel motion that I 
submitted to this Court on my last court appearance, it states a lot of the material 
that‟s missing from the law library.  There‟s no Evidence Code books, Jeffersons, 
talks about the law.  [¶]  This is a capit[a]l case and you‟re dealing with my life.  
I‟ve dealt with Mr. Fisher prior to this.  Me and Mr. Fisher do not get along, and 
this is one of the reasons I took charge of my case is so I can do my investigation 
because ever since Mr. Fisher was appointed — since December, he hasn‟t done 
nothing.  And since I been working from the — with the Jensens, I done a lot of 
investigations and ready to do my prelim, but I need time to understand the law.  
As to the admissibility of hearsay evidence, the admissibility of — of evidence 
that‟s going to be introduced by the district attorney.  This is a capit[a]l case, your 
Honor.  This is not a petty theft with a prior.  This is a double murder case.  [¶]  
6 
. . .   [¶]  . . .   [¶]  . . .   [¶]  I have the constitutional right to represent myself . . .  
I‟m entitled to an advisory counsel, your Honor.  
“The Court:  You made your record.  I made my ruling. 
“[Defendant]:  I haven‟t done nothing to take this privilege away from me.  
You‟re taking my constitutional rights from me and that is a reversible error 
in [sic] your part.  And I‟m going to take this on a writ.  And if this is all you have 
to say, this is all I have to say.  I‟ll take this . . . up on a writ.  You‟re not going to 
take my constitutional rights when I have the rights to represent myself.  This is 
my life, your Honor.  You‟re dealing with my life. 
“The Court:  That will be all.  [¶]  . . .   [¶]   
“[Defendant]:  I hope Mr. Fisher doesn‟t come to the jail and visit me.  
That, hopefully, is for the record.  I do not get along with him.”   
Defendant ended by telling the court:  “You want to fuck with me, I‟ll fuck 
with you.”  After a short pause in the record, the prosecutor described how an 
enraged defendant had thrown four or five sharpened pencils at Fisher before 
being removed from the courtroom.  The prosecutor indicated an intention to file 
an assault charge based on that behavior.  In defendant‟s absence, the court set the 
next hearing for November, stating, “[b]ecause of . . . what the defendant 
displayed about five minutes ago . . . I simply do not feel that this court would be a 
safe place and have him out here at the same time.” 
Fisher was reinstated as defendant‟s counsel.  At a hearing two weeks later, 
defendant requested to resume self-representation and asserted there was still 
outstanding discovery that he needed.  Even so, he argued that, rather than 
terminating his Faretta status, the court should have denied his request for a 
continuance and proceeded with the preliminary hearing.  The court affirmed its 
ruling, stating, “When I granted you pro per status, I did it with the understanding 
that you act as any other attorney would act, and that this Court would give you no 
7 
special indulgences, and that you would follow the rules and substantive law.  [¶]  
The case was put over an incredible amount of times. The Court felt that you were 
dilatory.”  A few days later, defendant renewed the request for self-representation, 
stating he would be ready to proceed with the preliminary hearing in 30 days.  The 
renewed request was denied.   
II. DISCUSSION 
The United States Supreme Court has held the Sixth Amendment to the 
federal Constitution gives a defendant the right to self-representation.  (Faretta, 
supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 807, 819.)  That right is not without limits, however.  
(Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164, 171.)  “ „[The] government‟s interest in 
ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant‟s 
interest in acting as his own lawyer.‟ ”  (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 
253; see also Faretta, at pp. 834-835, fn. 46.)  In Carson, we held that a trial court 
may terminate the pro per status of a defendant who engages in “ „deliberate 
dilatory or obstructive behavior‟ ” that “threatens to subvert „the core concept of a 
trial‟ [citation] or to compromise the court‟s ability to conduct a fair trial,” 
(Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 10), but added that “[t]ermination of the right of 
self-representation is a severe sanction and must not be imposed lightly” (id. at 
p. 7).   
“When determining whether termination is necessary and appropriate, the 
trial court should consider several factors in addition to the nature of the 
misconduct and its impact on the trial proceedings,” including:  (1) “the 
availability and suitability of alternative sanctions,” (2) “whether the defendant 
has been warned that particular misconduct will result in termination of in propria 
persona status,” and (3) “whether the defendant has „intentionally sought to disrupt 
and delay his trial.‟ ”  (Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 10.)  A record of the basis 
for terminating a defendant‟s Faretta rights should include “the precise 
8 
misconduct on which the trial court based the decision to terminate.  [Citation.]  
The court should also explain how the misconduct threatened to impair the core 
integrity of the trial.  Did the court also rely on antecedent misconduct and, if so, 
what and why?  Did any of the misconduct occur while the defendant was 
represented by counsel?  If so, what is the relation to the defendant‟s self-
representation?  Additionally, was the defendant warned such misconduct might 
forfeit his Faretta rights?  Were other sanctions available?  If so, why were they 
inadequate?”  (Id. at pp. 11-12, fn. omitted.) 
On review, we accord “due deference to the trial court‟s assessment of the 
defendant‟s motives and sincerity as well as the nature and context of his 
misconduct and its impact on the integrity of the trial in determining whether 
termination of Faretta rights is necessary to maintain the fairness of the 
proceedings.”  (Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 12.)  The court exercises 
considerable discretion in this regard and “the exercise of that discretion „will not 
be disturbed in the absence of a strong showing of clear abuse.‟ ”  (People v. 
Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 735.) 
In Carson we emphasized the necessity of providing an adequate record to 
justify terminating a defendant‟s self-representation status.  (Carson, supra, 35 
Cal.4th at pp. 11-12.)  We do so again here.  Ruling on a Faretta motion and 
deciding whether to terminate a defendant‟s pro per status present a trial court 
with particular complexities.  A defendant‟s request to proceed pro per must be 
unequivocal, voluntary, and intelligent.  Often, defendants make a self-
representation motion in the heat of the moment, after a different motion has been 
denied.  No matter how extensive the court‟s explanation of a defendant‟s options 
and responsibilities, a defendant may not have a clear picture of how challenging 
self-representation can be.  Once a defendant has had a reasonable opportunity to 
prepare, a mere desire for more time, a need to study the law in detail, or alleged 
9 
inadequacies in the jail library will seldom be sufficient to entitle him to a 
continuance.9  Incomplete discovery, however, is a different matter.  
While we review a Faretta revocation order for abuse of discretion, it is 
incumbent upon the court to create a record that permits meaningful review of the 
basis for its rulings.  As we explained in Carson, when terminating self-
representation, the trial court must “preserve a chronology of relevant events for 
possible appellate review” and “document its decision . . . with some evidence 
reasonably supporting a finding that the defendant‟s obstructive behavior seriously 
threatens the core integrity of the trial.”  (Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 11.) 
Here, although the court said defendant had been dilatory, the record does 
not contain factual support for this finding.  There is no evidence before us to 
demonstrate defendant‟s discovery requests were made in bad faith or intended to 
cause delay.  The court did not otherwise make clear how defendant‟s behavior 
threatened to compromise its ability to conduct a fair trial.  The prosecution did 
not complain about the pace of the proceedings, nor does the record reflect any 
warning to defendant about his conduct or the court‟s consideration of alternate 
sanctions.  It appears some of defendant‟s discovery requests were extensive, but 
the prosecutor never objected that any of the items defendant requested were not 
properly discoverable.  Indeed, the prosecutor repeatedly acknowledged that items 
remained outstanding and that discovery had yet to be fully completed by the 
August hearing.   
The most challenging aspects of the case on review, however, are the 
abruptness of the trial court‟s action, its initial ruling without giving defendant an 
                                              
9  
Even if a continuance is unwarranted, however, the question of whether to 
revoke a defendant‟s Faretta status must be separately evaluated, applying the 
standards set out here. 
10 
opportunity to be heard, and the failure to explain how it concluded defendant had 
been dilatory.  Terminating a defendant‟s self-representation status should be 
considered a last resort, not a first impulse.  If the court thought enough time had 
been spent sorting out discovery, that the outstanding items were unnecessary for 
the preliminary hearing, that defendant was stalling for tactical advantage, or that 
defendant needed to work with his investigator and be ready for the hearing by a 
date certain, the court should have said so on the record before taking dispositive 
action.  Instead, the court took a hands-off approach to discovery.  It did not make 
any ruling on the propriety of defendant‟s discovery requests.  It granted several 
continuances, asking defendant if he needed more time and continuing the matter 
for setting dates “to make sure [he] had all those things before we go ahead with 
the prelim.”  It then abruptly terminated defendant‟s pro per status without ever 
expressing a concern that defendant was “stalling” or warning of potential adverse 
consequences.  The stated reason for this action, defendant‟s dilatoriness, is not 
manifest in the record. 
It is possible something occurred before the final hearing that tried the 
court‟s patience.  But if so, an adequate record is required to facilitate meaningful 
review.  This is no mere technicality but an important mechanism to protect 
defendant‟s constitutional guarantee.  To be sure, defendant‟s subsequent threats 
to the court and his assault on counsel were most inappropriate.  The court, 
however, had already made up its mind and issued its termination ruling.  This 
subsequent misconduct, no matter how serious, cannot shore up an unsupported 
ruling that had already taken place.  (See, e.g., Moon v. Superior Court (2005) 134 
Cal.App.4th 1521, 1530-1531 [rejecting argument that the defendant‟s disruptive 
behavior, prompted by anger when he was not allowed to represent himself, could 
be used to justify denying his request for self-representation in the first place].)  
11 
Even after its ruling the court did not refer to defendant‟s outburst as indicative of 
other behavior that the court had failed to mention earlier.       
“Erroneous denial of a Faretta motion is reversible per se.  [Citations.]  The 
same standard applies to erroneous revocation of pro. per. status.”  (People v. 
Butler (2009) 47 Cal.4th 814, 824-825.)  As in Butler, “[w]e decide this case under 
compulsion of United States Supreme Court precedent” and “prevailing 
constitutional standards.”  (Id. at p. 829.)  The record before us is bereft of 
information to support the trial court‟s revocation of defendant‟s pro per status.  In 
such a circumstance, controlling precedent compels this result.   
III. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Becerra 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S065573 
Date Filed: June 27, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: J. D. Smith 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Alison Bernstein, 
Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Sharlene A. Honnaka and Susan S. 
Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Alison Bernstein 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, 10th Floor 
Oakland, CA  94607 
(510) 267-3300 
 
Susan S. Kim 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 620-6449