Title: Nieves v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 352, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: February 11, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MANUEL NIEVES, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 352, 2002 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  ID No. 0107022700 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  January 14, 2003 
Decided:  February 11, 2003 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 11th day of February 2003, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1. 
In March 2002, a Superior Court jury convicted appellant Manuel 
Nieves of numerous counts of rape and related crimes.  In this appeal, Nieves 
asserts two grounds of error: (i) the trial judge failed to maintain impartiality 
before the jury thus denying him a fair trial and (ii) the trial judge’s decision to 
reject the defendant’s attempts to place before the jury his lack of a criminal record 
denied him a fair trial.  We find no merit in either argument and conclude the 
conviction should be affirmed.   
 
2. 
The victim of alleged child molestation testified as a prosecution 
witness.  She was eight years old at the time of trial.  After she finished her 
 
2
testimony, the trial judge excused her with the following words: “Jocelyn, you’ve 
done a great job.  You can be excused now.  Go outside and join your Mommy.  
Thank you very much.”  There was no objection to the trial judge’s choice of 
words or a request for a curative instruction.  Now, for the first time on appeal, 
Nieves claims the trial judge’s choice of words amounted to commentary 
approving the substance of the victim’s testimony, thus violating the Delaware 
Constitution’s prohibition against judicial comment on the evidence.  Since Nieves 
failed to object at trial, we review for plain error.1  Plain error exists when the error 
was so clearly prejudicial to a defendant's substantial rights that it jeopardizes the 
very fairness and integrity of the trial process.2 
 
3. 
The Delaware Constitution prohibits trial judges from commenting 
upon evidence offered at trial.3   Article IV, section 19 specifically provides that 
“judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the 
questions of fact in issue and declare the law.”  “The purpose of the provision in 
the Delaware Constitution is to protect the province of the jury on factual issues.”4  
Here, the trial judge’s comment should be read as an attempt to calm an 
apprehensive witness rather than an overt expression evidencing bias.  In any 
event, the trial judge’s comment hardly rises to the level of jeopardizing the 
                                                 
1 Bullock v. State, 775 A.2d 1043, 1046 (Del. 2001). 
2 Id. 
3 Feleke v. State, 620 A.2d 222, 228 (Del. 1993); Wright v. State, 405 A.2d 685, 689 (Del. 1979). 
4 Randy J. Holland, The Delaware State Constitution: A Reference Guide 150 (G. Alan Tarr, ed., 
2002). 
 
3
fairness and integrity of the trial process given the circumstances surrounding the 
statement and the text of the commonly given final instructions reminding the jury 
that they are the sole determiners of the facts.   
 
4. 
Nieves also claims that the trial judge’s decision to reject the 
defendant’s attempts to place before the jury his lack of a criminal record denied 
him the right to a fair trial.  Twice during trial, defense counsel tried to place the 
fact that Nieves had no criminal record before the jury.  Defense counsel asked the 
chief investigating officer during cross-examination whether the defendant had a 
criminal record.  The prosecution objected on relevancy and the trial judge 
sustained the objection, finding the question “totally improper.”  The trial judge 
also instructed the jury to disregard defense counsel’s question.  Defense counsel 
also asked Nieves on direct examination whether he had ever been convicted of a 
serious crime.  The prosecutor again objected on relevancy grounds and the trial 
judge sustained the objection.  Nieves asserts that pursuant to D.R.E. 404(a)(1),5 he 
was entitled to place his criminal record before the jury as character evidence. 
                                                 
5 D.R.E. 404(a)(1) provides: 
 
(a) Character evidence generally.  Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith 
on a particular occasion, except: 
(1)  Character of the accused.  Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same.  
 
 
4
 
5. 
Nieves misreads Delaware Rule of Evidence 404(a).  “Neither the 
defendant nor the prosecution may offer evidence of ‘general’ good or bad 
character.  To be relevant, it is necessary that the evidence, good or bad, be 
confined to a particular trait or character the existence or nonexistence of which 
would be relevant to the crime charged or the credibility of a witness.”6  The 
defendant’s lack of a criminal record does not correlate with any character trait in 
issue.  The trial judge appropriately recognized that the defense could have asked 
the questions with the sole purpose of suggesting that no criminal record would be 
inconsistent with the crimes for which the defendant faced trial.  Even if the trial 
judge had determined the questions to be relevant, the trial judge has general 
discretionary authority to exclude the evidence if he determines that its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by practical considerations such as unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, waste of time or danger of misleading the jury.7  
At a minimum here, allowing the jury to hear that the defendant had no criminal 
record would clearly run the risk of misleading the jury into the improper inference 
that the lack of a criminal record would be inconsistent with guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he stood trial.  Just as a criminal record 
can not be allowed to infer guilt, lack of a criminal record may not be allowed to 
                                                 
6 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, § 4:22, p. 359. 
7 For a general discussion of character evidence and its admissibility, see Graham C. Lilly, An 
Introduction to the Law of Evidence 130 (West Publishing, 3rd ed. 1996). 
 
5
stand for inconsistence with guilt.  Accordingly, the trial judge did not err by 
sustaining the State’s objections.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_/s/ Myron T. Steele__________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice