Title: Joy v. Chessie Employees Federal Credit Union
Citation: 186 W. Va. 118, 411 S.E.2d 261
Docket Number: 20121
State: west-virginia
Issuer: west-virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 1, 1991

Joy v. Chessie Employees Federal Credit Union, 186 W. Va. 118, 411 S.E.2d 261 (1991) NEELY, Judge: In this case, the Circuit Court of Mineral County has certified the following questions to us: We answer the certified questions as follows: I. Terrence L. Joy and Sheila Ray Joy owned some land in Mineral County, West Virginia which they used as security for a $46,500 loan from the Chessie Employees Federal Credit Union. Mr. and Mrs. Joy, along with Brooks A. Joy, Terrence Joy’s father, as co-signer, entered into the loan agreement and executed the deed of trust at a Chessie office in Maryland on 8 January 1987. By 1989, the Joys fell behind on their payments, and Chessie began foreclosure proceedings. Mr. and Mrs. Joy claim that they notified Chessie their payments would be late and that Chessie assured them it would accept the late payments. Chessie, on the other hand, claims that the Joys were regularly late in making payments and that it told them continued late payments would lead to foreclosure. Beginning 26 July 1989, the trustee under the deed of trust published a notice of trustee’s sale in the Mineral County Tribune for three weeks. The trustee also mailed (by certified mail, return receipt requested) notice to the Joys on 24 July 1989, which notice the Joys received on 27 July 1989. On 11 August 1989, the Joys’ home was sold for $46,500, an amount that both parties agree was significantly below the property’s appraised value. The circuit court found that the 1985 version of W.Va.Code, 38-1-4 applied to the deed of trust, but that if the 1987 version applied, the statute did not require 20 days notice to the Joys. The court also found that W.Va.Code, Chapter 46A, the Consumer Credit and Protection Act, did not apply to the loan between the Joys and Chessie and that Maryland law controlled the interpretation of the note and loan. The circuit court, thereafter, certified the four questions stated above. II. The legislature amended W.Va.Code, 38-1-4 in 1987.1 Chessie claims that the 1987 version of the statute cannot be applied to *120a deed of trust executed before the effective date of the statute even if the foreclosure proceeding takes place after the effective date of the statute. *121Although the retroactive application of some laws would violate due process, we have consistently held that statutory changes that are purely procedural in nature will be applied retroactively. Pnakovich v. SWCC, 163 W.Va. 583, 259 S.E.2d 127 (1979). Purely procedural changes do not impair the reliance interests of the parties. As we stated in Pnakovich: Pnakovich, 163 W.Va. at 589, 259 S.E.2d at 130. For some statutes, distinguishing between substantive changes and procedural changes is difficult. However, this case involves a statutory amendment that merely changed the procedure by which a creditor can foreclose on a deed of trust. The procedures effected are a part of the foreclosure process — which in this case took place after the effective date of the 1987 amendments. Chessie certainly did not modify its position in reliance on the statutory amendments, nor did the amendments affect the initial reasonable expectations of the parties. Because the amendments to W.Va.Code, 38-1-4 were procedural, the 1987 version of the statute applies in this case. III. The Joys contend that the 1987 amendments do not affect the required 20 day statutory notice. They claim that the legislature intended to make foreclosure more difficult and, therefore, would not have removed the 20 day requirement. The plain language of the statute is at odds with the Joys’ contention. W.Va. Code, 38-1-4 [1985] provided: The same portion of W.Va.Code, 38-1-4 [1987] provides: As part of the 1987 amendment, the legislature removed the 20 day requirement for notice to the grantor. Removal of the 20 day requirement, however, does not allow the trustee to mail notice to the grantor whenever he chooses. When a contract sets no firm time for its completion, a reasonable time is implied. Maze v. Bennett, 114 W.Va. 169, 171 S.E. 249 (1933). Similarly, when a statute mandates that something be done, but sets no firm time requirement, we will imply a reasonable time. Notice must be given a reasonable amount of time prior to the sale, and, in this case, 18 days was reasonable notice. Notwithstanding the fact that the legislature removed the 20 day requirement, it did strengthen W.Va.Code, 38-1-4. Grantors may no longer waive notice. Previously, grantors could waive notice altogether; and it does not take a great deal of knowledge about the credit industry to understand that if grantors can waive notice, *122creditors will make such waiver a standard part of their form agreements. IV. The Joys present several reasons for this Court to apply West Virginia law to the loan agreement. They contend that because this loan was associated with a deed of trust on property located in West Virginia, the loan agreement must be judged by West Virginia law. The Joys also contend that we must apply West Virginia law in order to further the legislature’s intent to protect consumers. Finally, they contend that general choice of law analysis favors the application of West Virginia law. The court below found, and no one disputes, that West Virginia law applies to the deed of trust in question. The loan agreement, however, was separate from the deed of trust and the money from the loan was used to finance a business — not to improve the real property. Therefore, the circuit court’s decision properly protects our jurisdiction over issues involving property located in West Virginia. The Joys’ second argument seems to imply that this Court should always apply West Virginia law whenever a West Virginia consumer is involved. This application of West Virginia law would exceed the U.S. Supreme Court’s “significant relationship” test (see, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 101 S. Ct. 633, 66 L. Ed. 2d 521 (1981)), and it also implies that our sister states are not willing to protect consumers. We do not share this belief and will apply our general choice of law principles to this case. Conflicts of law is often a confusing subject, and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hague offers few real guidelines. Most often in close or reasonably close cases, state courts choose to apply their own law, citing the “significant relationship” test from Hague. This case, however, is not a close one. The Joys went to Maryland and contracted for a loan with a credit union located in Maryland, the payments on which were to be made in Maryland. As we stated in Lee v. Saliga, 179 W.Va. 762, 373 S.E.2d 345, 351 (1988): The trial court was correct in determining that the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (W.Va.Code, Ch. 46A) does not apply in this case because choice of law principles dictate that the law of Maryland control the loan agreement. Because it is unnecessary, we do not address here the jurisdictional exceptions found in W.Va.Code, 46A-1-104 [1979]. V. For the foregoing reasons, the certified questions are answered. Certified questions answered. . W.Va.Code, 38-1-4 [1987] provides: W.Va.Code, 38-1-4 [1985] provides: