Title: Nordelo v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC11-23
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 2012

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-23 
____________ 
 
MARCO NORDELO,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[June 7, 2012] 
 
LABARGA, J. 
We have for review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in 
Nordelo v. State, 47 So. 3d 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), on the ground that it 
misapplies our precedent concerning summary denial of an evidentiary hearing in 
postconviction proceedings under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  We 
have jurisdiction under article V, § 3(b)(3), of the Florida Constitution.  See Jaimes 
v. State, 51 So. 3d 445, 446 (Fla. 2010) (identifying misapplication of decisions as 
a basis for express and direct conflict jurisdiction under article V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. 
Const.).  As explained below, we conclude that the district court misapplied our 
precedent and in so doing erred in affirming the summary denial of Nordelo‟s 
 
 
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successive motion for postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence.  
Accordingly, we quash the decision below and remand for an evidentiary hearing 
on the newly discovered evidence claim involving only the affidavit of 
codefendant Angel Lopez.      
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The decision of the district court which is now before the Court sets forth the 
basic facts pertinent to this case as follows: 
Nineteen years ago, a jury found Marco Nordelo guilty of 
armed robbery of a convenience store and sentenced him to life in 
prison as a habitually violent offender.  Before Nordelo‟s trial began, 
his codefendant entered a plea of no contest and was sentenced to 
twenty-five years in state prison. 
Two years ago, Nordelo filed a Motion for New Trial Based on 
Newly Discovered Evidence and Prosecutorial Misconduct Pursuant 
to Rule 3.850.  Attached to the motion was an affidavit from 
Nordelo‟s codefendant, a nineteen-time convicted felon, alleging that 
Nordelo had not participated in the robbery and naming a different co-
perpetrator.  The codefendant claimed that he did not come forward 
with this information sooner because he was afraid that the State 
would take away his plea offer. 
 
Nordelo, 47 So. 3d at 856.1  The postconviction motion for new trial alleged two 
claims.  First, based on the Lopez affidavit, Nordelo alleged that a new trial is 
required based on newly discovered evidence that he was not involved in the 
crime.  Second, he alleged that the prosecutor knowingly presented false or 
                                         
 
1.  Nordelo‟s conviction was affirmed in Nordelo v. State, 603 So. 2d 36 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1992).   
 
 
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misleading evidence that Nordelo was driving a white car when he was arrested the 
day after the robbery although the prosecutor knew at the time that the white car 
seen during the robbery and the white car Nordelo was driving were not the same 
car.2   
The sworn affidavit of codefendant Angel Lopez, which was the basis of the 
postconviction motion for new trial, states: 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANGEL LOPEZ 
 
I, Angel Lopez, do swear under penalty of perjury, that the 
following statements are true and correct: 
I was involved in the armed robbery of the Circle-K convenience 
store on May 29, 1990, at approximately 6:45 am, located at 595 SE 
Okeechobee Road.  I entered this convenience store with an 
accomplice named Jose Sanchez, not Mr. Marco Nordelo. 
Mr. Nordelo was not present at the time of the robbery, and was 
not involved in any way. 
I was then involved in the Grand Theft of a Ford Taurus on the 
next day, May 30, 1990.  I was driving this stolen car when I came 
into contact with Mr. Nordelo. 
Mr. Nordelo was the passenger in this car when we were both 
arrested on May 31, 1990.  Any items from the robbery that were in 
the car were placed there by me. 
I did not come forward with this information sooner, as I was 
afraid that the Office of the State Attorney would take away my plea 
offer.  I took the plea and then refused to testify.  I was ignorant of the 
                                         
 
2.  On direct appeal, the Third District held that although the store clerk 
testified that he saw a white car leaving the scene of the robbery, an officer‟s 
testimony that on a separate occasion he arrested Nordelo for a traffic incident, 
during which Nordelo was driving a white car, was irrelevant.  The court held that 
the testimony “does not tend to prove that defendant was the assailant.”  Nordelo, 
603 So. 2d at 38.  The court further held that even though the testimony was 
erroneously admitted, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.  
 
 
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law and was afraid that if I had not cooperated with the State 
Attorney, then my plea would have been refused. 
Marco Nordelo was mis-identified by Mr. Benavides, the victim 
in the robbery.  He should have never been convicted because he is 
innocent of this crime. 
I feel it is now time to come forward with the truth. 
 
The circuit court held a hearing to determine if an evidentiary hearing would be 
required on the motion.  After hearing argument of counsel, the circuit court denied 
the evidentiary hearing and issued an order summarily denying postconviction 
relief, concluding that the evidence was not newly discovered in that it could have 
been obtained earlier by due diligence and that the claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct was barred as successive.  The order further directed the clerk “to 
attach all necessary record excerpts from the court file that support the Court‟s 
ruling in this matter,” although the record in this case shows no attachments to the 
order.  
Nordelo took a timely appeal to the Third District Court of Appeal.  On 
appeal, although the majority concluded that the motion was “legally insufficient,” 
47 So. 2d at 858, it also concurred with the postconviction court on its factual 
conclusions.  The district court stated: 
The codefendant‟s affidavit cannot be deemed newly 
discovered evidence because it was either known to or easily 
discoverable by Nordelo and his counsel: the court allowed them both 
to speak with the codefendant after his plea was accepted and before 
Nordelo‟s trial began.  Put in the context of due diligence, if Nordelo 
had believed that he was innocent, then he would have had a 
reasonable basis for believing that his codefendant would provide 
 
 
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exculpatory testimony and would have sought to elicit such testimony.  
Indeed, the record is clear that neither side called the codefendant as a 
witness. 
 
 
. . . Nordelo failed to allege in his motion that he ever, in 
seventeen years, asked his codefendant to testify. 
The codefendant now claims in his affidavit that the reason he 
did not come forward with this information sooner is because he “was 
afraid that the Office of the State Attorney would take away [his] plea 
offer.”  This is nonsensical: as the court had already accepted his plea, 
which required him neither to testify for the State nor to refrain from 
testifying for Nordelo, he could have come forward with this 
supposed information at any time, and the State would have had no 
discretion or authority to withdraw the plea offer or vacate the plea.  
Furthermore, the codefendant does not state in his affidavit, nor does 
Nordelo allege, that he was coerced or threatened by anyone, 
including the State. 
 
. . . . 
 
In order for an appellate court “[t]o uphold the trial court‟s 
summary denial of claims raised in a 3.850 motion, the claims must be 
either facially invalid or conclusively refuted by the record.”  Peede v. 
State, 748 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla.1999) (citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.850(d)).  Nordelo‟s claims are both.  First, his claim that his 
codefendant‟s affidavit is newly discovered evidence is invalid on its 
face: as explained above, the affidavit provides no information that 
neither Nordelo nor his counsel could have discovered at the time of 
trial through the exercise of due diligence.  Second, his claim is 
conclusively refuted by the record: the State presented overwhelming 
evidence of Nordelo‟s guilt during the trial, including the victim‟s 
identification of both defendants from photo lineups with one hundred 
percent certainty.  Furthermore, under Taylor v. State, 877 So. 2d 842, 
843 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), “the trial court could properly reject the 
affidavit, for it is „inherently incredible‟ ”: therein, the codefendant 
claims he was the driver of the white car, while the record shows that 
the arresting officer testified—and Nordelo never disputed—that 
Nordelo was driving at the time of his arrest. 
We agree that this alleged evidence cannot meet the first prong 
of the newly discovered evidence test.  We therefore affirm the trial 
court‟s summary denial of the newly discovered evidence claim.  We 
 
 
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find that the record shows conclusively that Nordelo is entitled to no 
postconviction relief, and we affirm the trial court's order. 
 
Affirmed. 
 
Nordelo, 47 So. 3d at 856-58.   
Judge Cope dissented in Nordelo, concluding that the motion was in fact 
sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing, and opined that where the new 
evidence suggests that the defendant is actually innocent, the court should err on 
the side of granting a hearing.  Id. at 858 (Cope, J., dissenting).  Citing this Court‟s 
decision in Davis v. State, 26 So. 3d 519, 526 (Fla. 2009), Judge Cope further 
noted: 
The Davis court explained that there is an important distinction 
between the requirements (a) to plead the existence of newly 
discovered evidence, versus (b) the heightened requirements to 
establish due diligence during an evidentiary hearing.  The pleading 
requirement is lower; the proof requirement is higher.  The Davis 
Court said: 
 
The postconviction trial court appears to have 
incorrectly applied the heightened requirements to 
establish due diligence during an evidentiary hearing to 
evaluate the allegations at a pleading stage.  However, 
permitting a newly discovered evidence claim to proceed 
to an evidentiary hearing does not establish that the 
recanted testimony qualifies as newly discovered 
evidence as a matter of law.  See Swafford, 679 So. 2d at 
739.  The newly discovered evidence claim remains to be 
factually tested in an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether the defendant has demonstrated that the 
successive motion has been filed within the time limit for 
when the statement was or could have been discovered 
through the exercise of due diligence.  See id.  The 
 
 
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motion here was sufficiently pled to allow the 
opportunity to prove through the testimony of witnesses 
that the threshold requirement of due diligence was 
satisfied.  Accordingly, the postconviction trial court 
erred in summarily denying this claim on the basis that 
the pleading failed to sufficiently satisfy the due 
diligence requirement at that stage of the proceeding. 
 
26 So. 3d at 528-29. 
 
Codefendant Lopez‟s affidavit states that he “did not come 
forward with this information [exonerating the defendant] sooner, as I 
was afraid that the Office of the State Attorney would take away my 
plea offer.  I took the plea and then refused to testify.  I was ignorant 
of the law and was afraid that if I had not cooperated with the State 
Attorney, then my plea would have been refused.”  For pleading 
purposes, we are required to accept that statement as true.  The 
majority opinion says that this statement is nonsensical, majority op. 
at 857, by which the majority opinion means that codefendant Lopez 
was wrong about the law.  For present purposes, however, we are 
required to accept the proposition that the [co]defendant [Lopez] did 
not know the law—which is what his affidavit says—and believed 
that any cooperation would jeopardize his plea.  He states that he 
refused to testify. 
 
Nordelo, 47 So. 3d at 861 (Cope, J., dissenting).  We turn next to the pertinent 
provisions of rule 3.850, the rule under which Nordelo filed his motion.    
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 
 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
Rule 3.850. Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct 
Sentence 
(a) . . . . 
(b) Time Limitations.  A motion to vacate a sentence that 
exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time.  No other 
 
 
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motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more 
than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final unless it 
alleges that 
(1) the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to 
the movant or the movant‟s attorney and could not have been 
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, and the claim is made 
within 2 years of the time the new facts were or could have been 
discovered with the exercise of due diligence, or 
(2) . . . .  
(3) . . . . 
(d) Procedure; Evidentiary Hearing; Disposition.  On filing 
of a rule 3.850 motion, the clerk shall forward the motion and file to 
the court.  If the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively 
show that the movant is entitled to no relief, the motion shall be 
denied without a hearing.  In those instances when the denial is not 
predicated on the legal insufficiency of the motion on its face, a copy 
of that portion of the files and records that conclusively shows that the 
movant is entitled to no relief shall be attached to the order. . . .  If the 
court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, that 
the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or is otherwise open 
to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or 
infringement of the constitutional rights of the movant as to render the 
judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set 
aside the judgment and shall discharge or resentence the movant, 
grant a new trial, or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate. 
 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b), (d) (emphasis added).  Nordelo contends that both the 
trial court and the district court failed to apply binding precedent of this Court in 
evaluating his motion for a new trial by not taking as true the facts set forth in the 
motion for purposes of evaluating its sufficiency.  We agree, and for the reasons 
set forth below, we quash the decision of the district court. 
 
 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 “A postconviction court‟s decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing 
on a rule 3.850 motion is ultimately based on written materials before the court.  
Thus, its ruling is tantamount to a pure question of law, subject to de novo review.”  
Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d 82, 95 (Fla. 2011) (footnote omitted).  To prevail on a 
claim of newly discovered evidence, a movant must show the following: (1) the 
evidence was unknown to the movant or his counsel and could not have been 
uncovered by due diligence at the time of trial; and (2) the evidence is such that it 
would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  See Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 
915 (Fla. 1991) (Jones I).   
In evaluating the legal sufficiency of a motion based on newly discovered 
evidence, the court must accept the allegations as true for the purpose of 
determining whether the alleged facts, if true, would “render the judgment 
vulnerable to collateral attack.”  Arbelaez v. State, 775 So. 2d 909, 915 (Fla. 2000) 
(citing Ragsdale v. State, 720 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1998)).  In Steinhorst v. State, 498 
So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1986), we explained the process as follows: 
Where a motion for post-conviction relief under rule 3.850 
lacks any substantial factual allegations, or where the facts alleged, 
even if true, would not render the judgment vulnerable to collateral 
attack, the motion may be summarily denied without examination of 
the record.  But where the motion contains allegations of substantial 
material facts stating a claim cognizable in post-conviction 
proceedings, the motion must be evaluated in light of the trial record. 
 
 
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Steinhorst‟s allegations were sufficiently adequate to at least require 
an examination of the record. 
It appears in this case that the circuit court judge did not 
examine the trial record and did not have the record before him when 
ruling on appellant‟s rule 3.850 motion. 
Id. at 414-15.  We reiterated in Hamilton v. State, 875 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 2004): 
Where the motion lacks sufficient factual allegations, or where alleged 
facts do not render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the 
motion may be summarily denied.  Ragsdale v. State, 720 So. 2d 203, 
207 (Fla. 1998).  However, in cases where there has been no 
evidentiary hearing, this Court must accept the defendant‟s factual 
allegations to the extent the record does not refute them.  See Peede v. 
State, 748 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999).  In other words, this Court 
must examine each claim to determine if it is legally sufficient, and if 
so, determine whether or not the claim is refuted by the record. 
Atwater v. State, 788 So. 2d 223, 229 (Fla. 2001). 
 
Id. at 591; see also Foster v. State, 810 So. 2d 910, 914 (Fla. 2002).   
Thus, “[u]pon receiving a motion filed under rule 3.850, the court must first 
„determine whether the motion is facially sufficient, i.e., whether it sets out a 
cognizable claim for relief based upon the legal and factual grounds asserted.‟ 
Only after the trial court deems the motion (or the particular claims within it) 
facially sufficient does it review the record for evidence refuting the claim.”  Spera 
v. State, 971 So. 2d 754, 758 (Fla. 2007) (citations omitted) (quoting Jacobs v. 
State, 880 So. 2d 548, 550 (Fla. 2004)).  We have explained this distinction 
between the tasks undertaken in the evaluation of the sufficiency of a 3.850 motion 
as follows: 
 
 
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[R]ule 3.850 distinguishes between claims that are facially insufficient 
and those that are facially sufficient but are also conclusively refuted 
by the record.  A determination of facial sufficiency will rest upon an 
examination of the face, or contents, of the postconviction motion.  
Because the determination of facial sufficiency under rule 3.850 is 
one of law and involves an evaluation of the legal sufficiency of the 
claim alleged, the evidence in the record will ordinarily be irrelevant 
to such an evaluation. 
 
Spera, 971 So. 2d at 758 (quoting Jacobs, 880 So. 2d at 551).  Both the circuit 
court and the district court muddied the distinction between evaluation of the facial 
sufficiency of the motion and the subsequent task of determining if a facially 
sufficient motion is conclusively refuted by the record.  In the lower courts‟ 
consideration and review of Nordelo‟s motion, both courts made factual 
determinations based solely on the face of the motion.   
In Jones I, we recognized the practical difficulty in attempting to evaluate a 
newly discovered evidence claim solely on the face of the pleading, stating: 
On the face of the pleadings, we cannot determine whether some of 
the evidence can properly be said to be newly discovered.  Moreover, 
we cannot fully evaluate the quality of the evidence which 
demonstrably meets the definition of newly discovered evidence. 
Therefore, we believe it necessary to have an evidentiary hearing on 
the claims that are based upon newly discovered evidence.  At the 
hearing, the trial judge should consider all newly discovered evidence 
which would be admissible and determine whether such evidence, had 
it been introduced at the trial, would have probably resulted in an 
acquittal.  In reaching this conclusion, the judge will necessarily have 
to evaluate the weight of both the newly discovered evidence and the 
evidence which was introduced at the trial. 
 
 
 
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Jones, 591 So. 2d at 916.  These types of factual matters generally require an 
evidentiary hearing to resolve.  The determination of whether the statements in an 
affidavit provided as newly discovered evidence are true and meet the due 
diligence and probability prongs of Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998) 
(Jones II), “usually requires an evidentiary hearing to evaluate credibility unless 
the affidavit is inherently incredible or obviously immaterial to the verdict and 
sentence.”  Davis, 26 So. 3d at 526; see also McLin v. State, 827 So. 2d 948, 955 
(Fla. 2002) (requiring an evidentiary hearing to test the credibility of the 
codefendant‟s recantation that served as the basis for a newly discovered evidence 
claim).  Similarly, where the codefendant‟s statement in the affidavit is not a 
recantation, but is clearly exculpatory of the movant, an evidentiary hearing will 
allow the court to determine if due diligence was exercised by the movant, and will 
also test the credibility of the codefendant‟s statements. 
After an evidentiary hearing, “[i]n determining whether the [newly 
discovered] evidence compels a new trial under [Jones I], the trial court must 
„consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible,‟ and must 
„evaluate the weight of both the newly discovered evidence and the evidence 
which was introduced at the trial.‟ ”  Rutherford v. State, 926 So. 2d 1100, 1108 
(Fla. 2006) (bracketed material added) (quoting Jones I, 591 So. 2d at 916).  This 
determination includes 
 
 
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whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or whether it 
constitutes impeachment evidence.  The trial court should also 
determine whether the evidence is cumulative to other evidence in the 
case.  The trial court should further consider the materiality and 
relevance of the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly 
discovered evidence. 
 
Tompkins v. State, 980 So. 2d 451, 457 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 
521). 
The circuit court summarily denied Nordelo‟s claims, finding as a matter of 
fact in its order that the evidence was not newly discovered and that it could have 
been obtained earlier by due diligence.  The order, on its face, did not hold that the 
motion was legally insufficient; and because the order directed the clerk “to attach 
all necessary record excerpts from the court file that support the Court‟s ruling in 
this matter,” it is apparent that the ruling was more in the nature of a finding that 
the claims were conclusively refuted by the record.  However, the record in this 
case shows no record attachments to the order.   
When the district court affirmed the summary denial of Nordelo‟s motion on 
appeal, it concluded that the motion was “legally insufficient.”  Nordelo, 47 So. 3d 
at 858.  Notwithstanding that declaration, the district court proceeded to make its 
own assessment of the facts.  For example, the district court stated:   
 
The codefendant now claims in his affidavit that the reason he 
did not come forward with this information sooner is because he “was 
afraid that the Office of the State Attorney would take away [his] plea 
offer.”  This is nonsensical: as the court had already accepted his plea, 
which required him neither to testify for the State nor to refrain from 
 
 
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testifying for Nordelo, he could have come forward with this 
supposed information at any time, and the State would have had no 
discretion or authority to withdraw the plea offer or vacate the plea.  
 
Id. at 857.  The district court further concluded: 
 
The codefendant‟s affidavit cannot be deemed newly discovered 
evidence because it was either known to or easily discoverable by 
Nordelo and his counsel: the court allowed them both to speak with 
the codefendant after his plea was accepted and before Nordelo‟s trial 
began.  Put in the context of due diligence, if Nordelo had believed 
that he was innocent, then he would have had a reasonable basis for 
believing that his codefendant would provide exculpatory testimony 
and would have sought to elicit such testimony.  Indeed, the record is 
clear that neither side called the codefendant as a witness. 
 
Id. at 856-57.   
We have repeatedly held that “where no evidentiary hearing is held below, 
[the appellate court] must accept the defendant‟s factual allegations to the extent 
they are not refuted by the record.”  Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999) 
(emphasis added).  The district court misapplied this precedent when it failed to 
accept the factual allegations of the motion, including the affidavit, in determining 
if the motion was legally sufficient.  In spite of the fact that the record was not 
before either court, both courts proceeded to make factual determinations as a basis 
for summary denial of the motion.  The district court‟s ruling is based in part on a 
factual finding that the affidavit was known to or easily discoverable by Nordelo‟s 
counsel because he was allowed to speak with Lopez after the plea but prior to 
Nordelo‟s trial.  Nordelo, 47 So. 3d at 856.  The postconviction motion, however, 
 
 
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alleges that Lopez did not admit that Nordelo was not involved in the crime until 
2007.  And Lopez states in his affidavit, “I did not come forward with this 
information sooner . . . .  I took the plea and then refused to testify.”  Further, the 
State conceded in its brief in this Court and in its written response in the circuit 
court that “the content of any conversation that may have taken place prior to trial 
between the defendant‟s counsel and Mr. Lopez would not be included in the 
record.”  Thus, even if the record had been before the lower courts when they 
ruled, the record could not conclusively refute the claim that a meeting between 
Nordelo‟s counsel and Lopez did not disclose his potential exculpatory testimony.  
Without an evidentiary hearing, the lower courts‟ conclusions that Nordelo‟s 
counsel was allowed to speak with Lopez prior to trial and therefore could have 
learned of this exculpatory testimony are simply speculation.   
The district court also found it significant that neither side called Lopez to 
testify at trial, but the motion and affidavit clearly alleged that Lopez refused to 
testify.  The district court further made credibility determinations concerning 
Lopez‟s fear of losing his plea deal by noting that the State could not have reneged 
on the deal even if Lopez had testified for Nordelo.  Nordelo, 47 So. 3d at 857.  
However, the terms of conversations between Nordelo‟s counsel and Lopez and 
the details of Lopez‟s plea negotiations are not before the Court.  Whether Lopez 
 
 
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truly believed that he would lose his plea deal or was legally justified in that belief 
are not factual matters that can be determined from the affidavit alone.   
In the instant case, the facts set forth in the motion and affidavit—that 
Nordelo did not participate in the crime with Lopez and that Lopez was afraid to 
come forward with the exculpatory testimony and refused to testify—are the type 
of facts which, if true, would subject the judgment to a legitimate collateral 
challenge.  See Arbelaez, 775 So. 2d at 915.  Such evidence, if presented at trial, 
would have been important evidence for consideration by the jury, in part because 
the postconviction motion also alleged that the victim was knocked out at the time 
of the crime and was not asked to identify Nordelo as the perpetrator until a month 
after the crime.  When taken as true for purposes of evaluating the legal sufficiency 
of the motion, the factual allegations and Lopez‟s proposed exculpatory testimony 
present a legally sufficient claim triggering an evidentiary hearing and were not 
conclusively refuted by the record.  Only after holding an evidentiary hearing can 
the circuit court determine if the evidence is credible and newly discovered, and 
whether it would probably produce a different result on retrial—a separate issue 
requiring the circuit court to review the new evidence and the evidence that was 
presented at the original trial.   
Accordingly, we agree with Nordelo that an evidentiary hearing was 
required on his claim of newly discovered evidence.  The factual allegations in the 
 
 
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Lopez affidavit that exculpate Nordelo must be tried and tested in an evidentiary 
hearing where they are subject to credibility determinations.  Further, as part of the 
evidentiary hearing, “the trial judge should consider all newly discovered evidence 
which would be admissible and determine whether such evidence, had it been 
introduced at the trial, would have probably resulted in an acquittal.  In reaching 
this conclusion, the judge will necessarily have to evaluate the weight of both the 
newly discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the trial.”  
Jones I, 591 So. 2d at 916.  For all the reasons set forth above, we must quash the 
decision of the district court and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the claims 
associated with the Angel Lopez affidavit.   
CONCLUSION 
 
Because the district court misapplied our precedent in affirming the trial 
court‟s summary denial of an evidentiary hearing, we quash the decision of the 
Third District in Nordelo v. State, 47 So. 3d 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
 
 
 
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D09-1269 
 
 
(Miami-Dade County) 
 
Gary L. Sasso, Adam S. Tanenbaum and Allison L. Kirkwood of Carlton Fields, 
P.A., Tampa, Florida,  
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Nicholas A. Merlin 
and Richard L. Polin, Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, Florida,  
 
 
for Respondent