Title: State v. William G. Johnson
Citation: 2001 WI 52
Docket Number: 1999AP002968-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 30, 2001

2001 WI 52 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-2968-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
William G. Johnson,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 30, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
February 5, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael S. Fisher 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BABLITCH, J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and 
oral argument by Martha K. Askins, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2001 WI 52 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-2968-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
William G. Johnson,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Kenosha 
County, Michael S. Fisher, Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DIANE 
S. 
SYKES, 
J. 
 
This 
case 
presents 
a 
constitutional challenge to the statute making it a crime to 
engage in repeated acts of sexual assault of the same child, 
Wis. Stat. § 948.025 (1997-98).1  The defendant challenges the 
provision in the statute that relieves the jury of any 
requirement of unanimity as to the specific individual acts of 
sexual assault that combine to constitute the crime, as long as 
it unanimously agrees that the defendant committed the minimum 
number required, to wit, at least three. 
                     
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-
98 version unless otherwise noted. 
FILED 
 
MAY 30, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-2968-CR 
 
 
2 
¶2 
The statute previously survived a unanimity challenge 
under the state constitution in State v. Molitor, 210 Wis. 2d 
415, 565 N.W.2d 248 (Ct. App. 1997).  In Molitor, the court of 
appeals concluded that the statute's requirement of jury 
unanimity on the existence of a continuing course of sexually 
assaultive 
conduct 
satisfied 
the 
defendant's 
right 
to 
a 
unanimous verdict, even though unanimity is not required as to 
each discrete act of sexual assault comprising the course of 
conduct.  Then came Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 
(1999), in which the United States Supreme Court held that to 
convict a defendant under the federal "continuing criminal 
enterprise" drug statute, the jury must unanimously agree on the 
specific underlying drug code violations that comprise the 
"continuing criminal enterprise".  Id. at 815.   
¶3 
After Molitor but before Richardson, the defendant in 
this case, William G. Johnson, was convicted under Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.025 for repeated sexual assault of the same child, after a 
trial in which the state introduced evidence of more than three 
separate acts of sexual assault against the same victim.  On 
postconviction motion and appeal, Johnson argued that Molitor 
cannot survive Richardson, and since the jury in his case had 
not been instructed that it must be unanimous on the specific 
predicate acts of sexual assault that comprised the crime, his 
right to a unanimous verdict had been violated.  The court of 
appeals certified the case to us.2  We conclude that Molitor 
                     
2 The court of appeals stated the question on certification 
as follows:   
No. 
99-2968-CR 
 
 
3 
survives 
Richardson, 
and 
under 
the 
state 
and 
federal 
constitutional 
analyses 
in 
both 
cases, 
the 
statute 
is 
constitutional.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's 
denial of the motion for a new trial. 
I 
¶4 
Johnson was charged with repeated sexual assault of 
the same child in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.025 arising out 
of a series of incidents involving Roshunda R., who was 14 years 
old when the incidents occurred.3  At trial, Roshunda testified 
that she used to live across the street from Johnson's 
girlfriend 
and 
that 
she 
would 
sometimes 
play 
with 
his 
girlfriend's children.  Roshunda testified that during the 
summer of 1997, Johnson touched her sexually a number of times. 
 The first of these sexual contacts occurred on a day in July 
1997, when a person Roshunda knew as "Marianne" got in trouble 
with the police; a detective's testimony determined this date to 
be July 8, 1997.  Roshunda was on Johnson's porch that evening 
with a number of other people, and Johnson touched her chest 
                                                                  
Does State v. Molitor, 210 Wis. 2d 415, 421-23, 565 
N.W.2d 248 (Ct. App. 1997), holding that a jury need 
only unanimously agree that three or more sexual 
assaults constitute a "continuing course of conduct" 
to support a conviction of repeated sexual assault of 
a child contrary to WIS. STAT. §  948.025 (1997-98), 
survive Richardson v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1707 
(1999), holding that a jury must also unanimously 
agree on the specific violations included in the 
"continuing course of conduct?" 
 
3 Johnson was also charged with second-degree sexual assault 
for conduct relating to Andrea V.  The jury acquitted him on 
this count.  
No. 
99-2968-CR 
 
 
4 
over her clothes.  When she moved to a different spot on the 
porch, Johnson followed her and touched her again on her chest 
and "butt."   
¶5 
Roshunda also testified about a separate incident that 
occurred later that summer, on a day when her family returned to 
Kenosha from Waukegan, Illinois, where they were living at the 
time.  Roshunda's mother established this date as August 21, 
1997.  Roshunda testified that while she and her sister were 
visiting at Johnson's house on that day, Johnson touched her on 
her breast and "bottom."  When she tried to leave the house, 
Johnson asked her for a hug and a kiss and then hit her "bottom" 
as she was going out the door.   
¶6 
Roshunda also testified about a game of tag that 
occurred sometime in July 1997.  She said that during the game 
of tag, Johnson caught her from behind and touched her chest, 
"butt," and vagina.     
¶7 
At the conclusion of the trial, the Kenosha County 
Circuit Court, the Honorable Michael S. Fisher, instructed the 
jury on the elements of the crime of repeated sexual assault of 
the same child:  
 
Before you may find the defendant guilty of this 
offense, the State must prove by evidence which 
satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
following three elements were present. 
 
The first element requires that the defendant 
committed three or more sexual assaults of Roshunda.  
In this case, the sexual assaults are alleged to have 
involved sexual contact. 
 
... 
No. 
99-2968-CR 
 
 
5 
 
The second element requires that Roshunda had not 
attained the age of 16 years at the time of each act 
of sexual contact. 
 
... 
 
The third element requires that at least three of 
the alleged sexual assaults took place from a specific 
period of time.  The specific period of time is from 
July 1, 1997 through August 21, 1997. 
¶8 
This 
instruction 
derives 
from 
the 
pattern 
jury 
instruction applicable to this crime.  See Wis JI——Criminal 
2107.  However, the circuit court did not read the entire 
instruction to the jury, but, rather, omitted the part of the 
instruction recommended for use in cases in which evidence of 
more than three acts of sexual assault has been admitted.  That 
section of the pattern instruction paraphrases Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.025(2) and tells the jury: "Before you may find the 
defendant guilty, you must unanimously agree that at least three 
sexual assaults occurred . . . but you need not agree on which 
acts constitute the required three."  Johnson was convicted and 
sentenced to ten years in prison. 
¶9  Johnson moved for a new trial, arguing that his right 
to a unanimous verdict had been violated because the State 
introduced evidence of more than the minimum number of sexual 
assaults required to constitute the crime, but the jury was not 
instructed that it had to agree unanimously on the specific acts 
of sexual assault before convicting him.  Johnson argued that 
Richardson, decided after his trial, called into question the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 948.025 because the statute 
No. 
99-2968-CR 
 
 
6 
specifically allows conviction in the absence of jury unanimity 
on the individual acts of sexual assault that make up the crime. 
 The circuit court denied the postconviction motion, concluding 
that 
Richardson was distinguishable 
from Molitor. Johnson 
appealed, and the court of appeals certified the case to us.   
II 
 
¶10 The constitutionality of a statute is a question of 
law that this court reviews without deference to the lower 
courts. State v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 824, 532 N.W.2d 94 
(1995).  Statutes are presumed to be constitutional. Gloria A. 
v. State, 195 Wis. 2d 268, 276, 536 N.W.2d 396 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 A statute will not be invalidated unless it has been proven 
unconstitutional 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt. 
Bachowski 
v. 
Salamone, 139 Wis. 2d 397, 404, 407 N.W.2d 533 (1987).  The 
party challenging a statute's constitutionality bears the burden 
of overcoming the strong presumption in favor of the statute's 
validity.  State v. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 762, 482 N.W.2d 
883, 887 (1992).   
 
¶11 The Wisconsin Constitution's guarantee of the right to 
trial by jury includes the right to a unanimous verdict with 
respect to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence.  Wis. 
Const., art. I, §§ 54 and 75; State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶13, 
                     
4 Article I, Section 5, Trial by jury; verdict in civil 
cases, states:  
Section 5. The right of trial by jury shall 
remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law 
without regard to the amount in controversy; but a 
jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases 
No. 
99-2968-CR 
 
 
7 
236 Wis. 2d 721, 731, 613 N.W.2d 833.  To say that the jury must 
be unanimous, however, does not explain what the jury must be 
unanimous about.  For this we look to the statutory language 
defining 
the 
crime 
and 
its 
elements. 
 
"The 
principal 
justification for the unanimity requirement is that it ensures 
that each juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
prosecution has proved each essential element of the offense." 
Derango at ¶13 (quoting State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis. 2d 582, 591, 
335 N.W.2d 583 (1983)).  Thus, while jury unanimity is required 
on the essential elements of the offense, when the statute in 
question establishes different modes or means by which the 
offense may be committed, unanimity is generally not required on 
the alternate modes or means of commission.  Derango, 2000 WI at 
¶¶13-14. 
                                                                  
in the manner prescribed by law.  Provided, however, 
that the legislature may, from time to time, by 
statute provide that a valid verdict, in civil cases, 
may be based on the votes of a specified number of the 
jury, not less than five-sixths thereof. 
 
5 Article I, Section 7, Rights of accused, states: 
Section 7.  In all criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself 
and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him; to meet the witnesses face to 
face; to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses 
in 
his 
behalf; 
and 
in 
prosecutions by indictment, or information, to a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county 
or district wherein the offense shall have been 
committed; which county or district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law.  
No. 
99-2968-CR 
 
 
8 
¶12 Ordinarily, then, the first step in a unanimity 
challenge is an examination of the language of the statute in 
order to determine the elements of the crime and whether the 
legislature has created a single offense with multiple or 
alternate modes of commission.  Derango, 2000 WI at ¶14.  "The 
point is to determine legislative intent: did the legislature 
intend to create multiple, separate offenses, or a single 
offense capable of being committed in several different ways?"  
Id. at ¶15.  For example, where the legislature has specified 
that any of several different mental states will satisfy the 
intent or mens rea element of a particular crime, unanimity is 
not required on the specific alternate mental state as long as 
the jury unanimously agrees that the state has proven the intent 
element beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at ¶¶23-25. 
¶13 Federal constitutional due process considerations, 
however, limit the state's ability to define a crime so as to 
dispense with the requirement of jury unanimity on the alternate 
means or modes of committing it.  Richardson, 526 U.S. at 820 
(citing Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1991) (plurality 
opinion) and Id. at 651 (Scalia, J., concurring); Derango, 2000 
WI at ¶22 (citing Schad, 501 U.S. at 635).  So the second step 
in the analysis is an evaluation of whether the lack of jury 
unanimity on the alternate means or modes of commission violates 
due process.  Derango, 2000 WI at ¶22.  This involves an inquiry 
into the fundamental fairness and rationality of the legislative 
choice, 
starting, 
however, 
with 
a 
presumption 
that 
the 
legislature has made its determination fairly and rationally.  
No. 
99-2968-CR 
 
 
9 
Id.  As we noted in Derango, the due process fundamental 
fairness and rationality test for unanimity challenges was 
established by the Supreme Court in Schad and focuses on 
historical practice and the relative moral and conceptual 
equivalence of the alternate modes or means of committing the 
crime.  Id. 
¶14 The statute in question here does not present a 
difficult issue of statutory interpretation.  The language of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.025 is unambiguous as to the elements of the 
offense and the question of what the jury must be unanimous 
about before convicting a defendant of repeated sexual assault 
of the same child: 
 
948.025  Engaging in repeated acts of sexual assault 
of the same child.  (1)  Whoever commits 3 or more 
violations under s. 948.02(1) or (2) [first and second 
degree sexual assault of a child] within a specified 
period of time involving the same child is guilty of a 
Class B felony. 
 
 
(2)  If an action under sub. (1) is tried to a 
jury, in order to find the defendant guilty the 
members of the jury must unanimously agree that at 
least 3 violations occurred within the time period 
applicable under sub. (1) but need not agree on which 
acts constitute the requisite number.  
¶15 It is clear from this language that the predicate acts 
of sexual assault are not themselves elements of the offense, 
about which the jury must be unanimous before convicting the 
defendant.  Rather, to convict under this statute, the jury need 
only unanimously agree that the defendant committed at least 
three acts of sexual assault of the same child within the 
specified time period.  Where evidence of more than three acts 
No. 
99-2968-CR 
 
 
10
is admitted, the jury need not unanimously agree about the 
underlying acts as long as it unanimously agrees that the 
defendant committed at least three. 
¶16 In 
other 
words, 
it 
is 
the 
course 
of 
sexually 
assaultive conduct that constitutes the primary element of this 
offense, about which the jury must be unanimous (the second and 
third elements are the age of the victim and the timing of the 
acts).  See Wis JI——Criminal 2107.  Unanimity is explicitly not 
required regarding the individual acts of sexual assault. 
¶17 This brings us to the question of whether dispensing 
with unanimity on the predicate acts that comprise the course of 
conduct element of this offense is consistent with federal due 
process under Derango and Schad.  This also is not a difficult 
question.  This statute was enacted in 1993, and, therefore, 
like the statute at issue in Derango, "does not have a lengthy 
history to look to as an indicia of what is acceptable as 
fundamentally fair; but Schad recognized that this might often 
be the case with modern criminal statutes."  Derango, 236 Wis. 
2d at 738 (citing Schad, 501 U.S. at 640, n. 7).  Nevertheless, 
Wisconsin has historically held that in "continuing course of 
conduct" crimes, the requirement of jury unanimity is satisfied 
even where the jury is not required to be unanimous about which 
specific underlying act or acts constitute the crime.  See 
Lomagro, 113 Wis. 2d at 589; State v. Giwosky, 109 Wis. 2d 446, 
451, 326 N.W.2d 232 (1982). 
¶18 Furthermore, the predicate acts of first- and second-
degree sexual assault that combine to establish the required 
No. 
99-2968-CR 
 
 
11
course of conduct under Wis. Stat. § 948.025 are basically 
morally and conceptually equivalent.  There is, of course, a 
distinction in victim age and maximum penalty as between first- 
and second-degree sexual assault of a child: the former involves 
victims under age 13 and carries a 40-year confinement maximum; 
the latter involves victims under age 16 and carries a 20-year 
confinement maximum.  See Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) and (2).  And 
different types of sexual conduct——from sexual intercourse to 
various forms of sexual contact——can be implicated in either 
offense.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(1) and (2), 948.01(5) and 
(6).  But these variations are not of such a degree or nature as 
to call into question the basic moral and conceptual equivalence 
of first- and second-degree sexual assault of a child.  Lack of 
jury unanimity regarding the specific acts constituting the 
required minimum of three raises no concern about fundamental 
fairness under these circumstances. 
¶19 After all, the violations of the law about which the 
jury need not be unanimous under this statutory scheme all 
involve the sexual abuse of children, crimes of the same or 
similar nature and level of culpability.  It is therefore not 
unfair or irrational to lift the requirement of jury unanimity 
as to the specific underlying acts as long as unanimity is 
required regarding the existence of the course of conduct, 
defined as at least three acts of sexual assault of the same 
child. 
 ¶20 This is essentially the same conclusion the court of 
appeals reached in Molitor, although it did not engage in the 
No. 
99-2968-CR 
 
 
12
Schad due process analysis as we have just done.  In Molitor, 
the defendant was charged under Wis. Stat. § 948.025 with 
engaging in sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old girl "on more 
than three occasions between April 1 and May 21, 1995."  
Molitor, 210 Wis. 2d at 418.  Molitor pleaded no contest to the 
charge and was sentenced to a 20-year prison term.   
¶21 On appeal, Molitor attacked the constitutionality of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.025 on unanimity grounds.  The court of appeals 
rejected the defendant's argument and upheld the statute, citing 
our "continuing course of conduct" cases, Giwosky and Lomagro:   
 
The supreme court in State v. Giwosky concluded 
that 
when 
the charged 
behavior 
constitutes 
"one 
continuous course of conduct," the requirement of jury 
unanimity is satisfied regardless of whether there is 
agreement among jurors as to "which act" constituted 
the crime charged.  (Emphasis omitted).  While the 
course of conduct in Giwosky was a "short continuous 
incident that can not be factually separated," the 
court later clarified in State v. Lomagro that the 
duration of the course of conduct was not "legally 
significant."  The unanimity requirement is met where 
multiple 
acts 
can 
be 
said 
to 
constitute 
"one 
continuous, unlawful event and chargeable as one 
count." 
 
The 
question 
in 
Lomagro 
was 
whether 
the 
aggregation of multiple, conceptually similar acts in 
a 
single 
charged 
crime 
was 
constitutionally 
permissible as an act of prosecutorial discretion.  
The language of § 948.025, Stats., plainly shows that 
the legislature intended to create a single crime, the 
repeated sexual assault of the same child within a 
specified time period.  The question before us, then, 
is whether the legislature may, like prosecutors, 
aggregate 
conceptually 
similar acts in 
a 
single 
"course of conduct" crime, albeit for acts committed 
over an indefinite, and presumably longer, period of 
time.  We conclude that it may.   
No. 
99-2968-CR 
 
 
13
Molitor, 210 Wis. 2d at 420-421 (citations omitted). 
¶22 Johnson argues that the Supreme Court's decision in 
Richardson abrogates Molitor on due process grounds.  We 
disagree.  In Richardson, the Supreme Court evaluated a 
unanimity 
challenge 
to 
the 
federal 
"continuing 
criminal 
enterprise" statute6 in light of the statute's language and the 
due process considerations articulated in its decision in Schad. 
The statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1994), defines a "continuing 
criminal 
enterprise" 
(CCE) 
as 
a 
"continuing 
series 
of 
violations" of federal drug laws undertaken by an "organizer" or 
"supervisor" of the enterprise, in concert with at least five 
other persons, and from which the defendant derives substantial 
income. See 21 U.S.C § 848(c) (1994).  The district court 
instructed the jury that it must "unanimously agree that the 
                     
6 21 U.S.C § 848(c) (1994) says, in pertinent part:  
[A] person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise  
  if— 
(1) he violates any provision of [the federal drug laws, 
i.e.,] this subchapter or subchapter II of this 
chapter the punishment for which is a felony, and 
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of 
violations of [the federal drug laws, i.e.,] this 
subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter— 
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert 
with five or more other persons with respect to 
whom such person occupies a position of organizer 
[or supervisor or manager] and 
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income 
or resources. 
No. 
99-2968-CR 
 
 
14
defendant committed at least three federal narcotics offenses," 
adding that "[y]ou do not . . . have to agree as to the 
particular three or more federal narcotics offenses committed by 
the defendant."  The defendant was convicted.   
¶23 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that to convict 
under the CCE, the jury must be unanimous not only on the 
question of whether the defendant committed a "continuous series 
of violations" of the federal drug laws, but also on the 
specific "violations" that make up the continuing series.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on the language of 
the statute, historical tradition, and the potential for 
unfairness.  Richardson, 526 U.S. at 818-20.  That is, the Court 
initially engaged in an exercise of statutory interpretation, 
and then applied the due process test articulated in Schad.   
¶24 The Court concluded that the CCE statute's use of the 
word "violation" to describe the constituent parts of the course 
of conduct required to comprise the "continuing series" was a 
legal term of art, and meant that Congress intended each 
violation 
to 
be treated 
as 
an element of 
the offense.  
Richardson, 526 U.S. at 818-19.  Furthermore, the Court 
concluded that the breadth of the violations that could 
potentially qualify as part of the series under the statute——
ranging from civil penalties for removing drug labels, to simple 
criminal 
possession, 
to 
endangering 
human 
life 
while 
manufacturing a controlled substance and possession with intent 
to deliver large quantities of drugs——raised due process 
concerns. 
 The Court 
noted 
that 
the 
federal 
drug 
code 
No. 
99-2968-CR 
 
 
15
encompassed "many different kinds of behavior of varying degrees 
of seriousness," and that this breadth would aggravate the 
danger of unfairness if the jury were not required to be 
unanimous about the predicate acts making up the continuing 
criminal enterprise. Id. at 819.  The Court identified two 
principal concerns: first, by treating predicate violations 
simply as alternate means of committing the crime, jurors could 
avoid the specific factual details of each violation and thus 
cover up potential disagreements about what the defendant did or 
did not do; second, unless jurors were required to focus on 
specific factual detail, they might conclude "that where there 
is smoke there is fire."  Id  
¶25 Applying the Supreme Court's analysis in Richardson to 
Wis. Stat. § 948.025 does not require us to overrule Molitor or 
invalidate the statute.  To the contrary, as we have set forth 
above, 
an 
examination 
of 
the 
statute's 
language 
and 
an 
application of the Schad due process test for fundamental 
fairness and rationality yields the same conclusion as that 
reached in Molitor.  Unlike the federal CCE statute at issue in 
Richardson, Wis. Stat. § 948.025 plainly does not designate the 
predicate acts of sexual assault as elements of the offense of 
repeated sexual assault of a child, about which the jury must be 
unanimous. 
 
Rather, 
the 
statute 
explicitly 
excludes 
the 
predicate acts from any unanimity requirement.  As such, and in 
contrast to Richardson, no exercise in statutory interpretation 
is necessary here. 
No. 
99-2968-CR 
 
 
16
¶26 Furthermore, as we have discussed at length above, the 
risk of unfairness in dispensing with unanimity on the predicate 
acts under this statute is not present as it was in Richardson. 
 The range of crimes included as predicate acts under the CCE, 
totaling approximately 90 numbered sections of the federal 
criminal code and covering minor civil drug offenses as well as 
major drug felonies, is far greater than the two types of sexual 
assault of a child included as predicate acts under Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.025. 
In 
Richardson 
there 
was 
insufficient 
moral 
equivalence and conceptual similarity in the 90 or so predicate 
drug crimes included within the ambit of the CCE to sustain an 
interpretation of the statute that would permit nonunanimity on 
the predicate acts.  Here, the predicate acts of first- and 
second- degree sexual assault of a child are sufficiently 
equivalent to justify the legislature's decision to dispense 
with unanimity on the predicate acts.     
¶27 Finally, the Supreme Court in Richardson specifically 
noted that state statutes pertaining to child sexual assault are 
distinguishable under its analysis: 
 
The closest analogies [the federal government] cites 
consist of state statutes making criminal such crimes 
as sexual abuse of a minor.  State courts interpreting 
such 
statutes 
have 
sometimes 
permitted 
jury 
disagreement about a "specific" underlying criminal 
"incident" insisting only upon proof of a "continuous 
course of conduct" in violation of the law. . . . The 
state 
practice 
may 
well 
respond 
to 
special 
difficulties of proving individual underlying criminal 
acts, which difficulties are absent here. . . . The 
cases are not federal but state, where this Court has 
not 
held 
that 
the 
Constitution 
imposes 
a 
jury 
unanimity requirement.  And their special subject 
No. 
99-2968-CR 
 
 
17
matter indicates that they represent an exception; 
they do not represent a general tradition or a rule. 
 
Richardson, 526 U.S. at 821-22 (citations omitted).  That the 
Supreme Court excluded this type of state statute from its 
analysis in Richardson supports our conclusion that Molitor has 
not 
been 
abrogated, 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.025 
is 
not 
unconstitutional on unanimous verdict or due process grounds.   
¶28 Accordingly, we conclude that Johnson has not overcome 
the 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality 
that 
attends 
the 
legislative 
determination 
to 
dispense 
with 
a 
unanimity 
requirement for the individual acts of child sexual assault that 
comprise the crime of repeated sexual assault of the same child. 
 Under the state and federal constitutional analyses of Molitor, 
Richardson, and Schad, Wis. Stat. § 948.025 does not violate due 
process or the right to a unanimous verdict.  We affirm the 
order of the circuit court denying Johnson's motion for a new 
trial.     
 
By the Court.-The order of the circuit court for Kenosha 
County is affirmed. 
 
No. 99-2968-CR.awb 
 
1 
¶29 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting).  The case before 
us 
presents 
two 
constitutional 
challenges 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.025(2).  The defendant's challenges are grounded in 
different constitutions and implicate different bodies of law.  
I believe a properly conceived and applied Fourteenth Amendment 
due process inquiry, guided by the principles enunciated in 
United States v. Richardson, 526 U.S. 813 (1999), requires that 
§ 948.025(2) be declared unconstitutional.  I also believe that 
by undermining established Wisconsin precedent, the majority 
obfuscates the guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict provided by 
Article I, Sections 5 and 7 of our state constitution.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
¶30 Under § 948.025(2), a jury need not agree on the 
individual offenses that comprise the crime of repeated acts of 
sexual assault of a child.  Our court of appeals previously 
addressed this statute in State v. Molitor, 210 Wis. 2d 415, 565 
N.W.2d 248 (Ct. App. 1997).  In certifying this case for our 
review, 
however, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
acknowledged 
the 
deficiencies of its analysis in Molitor, in particular its 
failure to take into account the considerations of fairness 
required by due process under Richardson: 
 
We did not conduct such a detailed analysis [as 
presented 
by 
Richardson] 
in 
Molitor. . . . [O]ur 
analysis of the language was cursory at best and was 
done 
without 
the 
benefit 
of 
the 
reasoning 
in 
Richardson . . . .  In addition, we did not consider 
the potential for unfairness, particularly whether 
treating the violations as a "series" would permit 
widespread 
disagreement 
among 
the 
jurors 
to 
go 
No. 99-2968-CR.awb 
 
2 
unnoticed or permit jurors to simply conclude from the 
testimony that where there is smoke there is fire.   
Despite these recognized deficiencies, the majority reaffirms 
the Molitor analysis.  
In 
the process, it 
rejects the 
controlling authority of Richardson and the considerations of 
fairness necessitated by due process.  The majority, in 
addressing both constitutional challenges, endorses the Molitor 
analysis and thus succumbs to the same shortcomings.   
¶31 I turn first to the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
challenge.  The majority concludes that § 948.025(2) clears the 
hurdle of the due process limitation on the legislature's power 
to define crimes in a manner that allows the jury to disagree as 
to means in which the crime was committed.  It hinges its 
conclusion on an analysis into history and the relative "moral 
and conceptual equivalence" of the predicate offenses that 
constitute a violation of § 948.025.  However, even the most 
cursory review of the relevant United States Supreme Court 
precedent reveals that the due process analysis required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment cannot be collapsed into the two-part 
inquiry advanced by the majority.   
¶32 In clinging to its formulaic two-part test, the 
majority has abandoned the Supreme Court's guidance in defining 
the limits of due process and ignores the critical inquiries 
required 
by Schad 
v. Arizona, 501 
U.S. 
624 
(1991) and 
Richardson.  In Schad, the Supreme Court first scrutinized a 
statutory definition of an offense that allows jury disagreement 
and concluded that such a statute is subject to the due process 
No. 99-2968-CR.awb 
 
3 
demands of fundamental fairness and rationality.  501 U.S. at 
637.  A plurality of the Court offered guideposts that 
emphasized the demands for fairness and rationality, advancing 
an inquiry into the "history and wide practice as guides to 
fundamental values" as well as the "moral and practical 
equivalence" of the alternative means of committing the crime.  
Id. at 637-38.  Justice Scalia, who provided the fifth vote on 
the due process question in Schad, offered an analysis that 
focused on historical practice, criticizing the plurality's 
creation of a moral equivalence requirement.  Id. at 651 
(Scalia, J., concurring).   
¶33 In 
construing 
the 
federal 
statute 
at 
issue 
in 
Richardson, the Supreme Court explained that it was guided by 
the constitutional limits on a state's "power to define crimes 
in ways that would permit juries to convict while disagreeing 
about means."  526 U.S. at 820.  Harmonizing the plurality and 
concurring opinions of Schad for the first time, the Court 
explained that the state exceeds the limitations imposed by due 
process when its definition of a crime "risks serious unfairness 
and lacks support in history or tradition."  Id.   
¶34 A proper consideration of the risk of unfairness, 
history, and tradition must lead to the conclusion that 
§ 948.025(2) exceeds the limits of due process.  Because 
Richardson represents the analysis approved by a majority of the 
United States Supreme Court in an analogous case, today's 
majority is remiss in not adhering to that analysis.  Instead, 
it dismisses Richardson and concludes that "the risk of 
No. 99-2968-CR.awb 
 
4 
unfairness in dispensing with unanimity . . . is not present as 
it was in Richardson."  Majority op. at ¶26.   
¶35 There is no doubt that removal of the requirement of 
jury unanimity as to the predicate offenses that comprise the 
crime of repeated sexual assaults of the same child risks 
serious unfairness.  The risk of unfairness, as identified by 
the Richardson Court, is twofold.  First, there is the risk that 
absence of a requirement that the jury agree on the particular 
acts committed "will cover up wide disagreement among the jurors 
about just what the defendant did, or did not, do."  Richardson, 
526 U.S. at 819.   
¶36 Section 948.025(2) epitomizes this risk.  In a case 
where a sufficiently high number of sexual assaults are alleged, 
a jury could conceivably convict a defendant without any two 
jurors agreeing as to the predicate violations of § 948.02(1) or 
(2) that they believe the defendant committed.  Even in the 
ordinary case, § 948.025(2) will mask juror disagreement as to 
which offenses the defendant actually committed.   
¶37 As 
a 
practical 
matter, 
allowing 
such 
juror 
disagreement amounts to little more than an abrogation of the 
State's burden of proof for each individual predicate offense 
through the creation of a "continuous course of conduct crime." 
 The State is no longer required to convince all twelve jurors 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a 
specific act of sexual assault.  Rather, the State need only 
convince some jurors that the defendant committed acts A, B, and 
C; other jurors may find that the defendant committed acts D, E, 
No. 99-2968-CR.awb 
 
5 
and F.  Where no valid conviction for a single individual act 
could otherwise stand because of the lack of jury agreement, the 
defendant may nonetheless be convicted under § 948.025.  
¶38 Ironically, the State itself provides the strongest 
argument illustrating the unfairness posed by § 948.025(2).  The 
state candidly advances in its brief that the prosecution in 
this case pursued a conviction under § 948.025 because of the 
difficulties of proving the individual instances of assault: 
 
[T]he prosecutor must have believed there would be 
problems proving up the individual sexual assaults or 
else there would have been no reason to charge Johnson 
with a single violation of § 948.025 rather than with 
multiple violations of § 948.02(2). 
The state's position leads me to ask, much like the Richardson 
Court asked when presented with a similar argument premised on 
the alleged difficulty in establishing the predicate offenses: 
Does the difficulty in proving the individual specific offenses 
not tend to cast doubt upon the very existence of the requisite 
"course of conduct"?  See Richardson, 526 U.S. at 823.   
¶39 The second risk of unfairness posed by the abrogation 
of the requirement of unanimity is that by not requiring the 
jurors to focus upon specific factual details the jury may 
conclude that "where there is smoke there is fire."  Richardson, 
526 U.S. at 819.  In other words, when presented with numerous 
allegations of sexual assault, but relieved of the obligation of 
finding that three particular assaults occurred beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the jury will convict out of a belief that 
there must have been at least three sexual assaults.   
No. 99-2968-CR.awb 
 
6 
¶40 While both of these risks of unfairness, which were 
set forth by the Supreme Court in Richardson, are present under 
§ 948.025(2), the majority brushes them aside.  The majority 
instead rests on its inquiry into "moral and conceptual 
equivalence" of the predicate offenses about which the jurors 
are permitted to disagree.  Unfortunately, the majority's 
analysis, which concludes that similar crimes may be grouped 
together as a "continuous course of conduct" crime under which 
the requirement of jury unanimity may be eliminated, misses the 
mark.  The inquiry does little to reflect on the overall 
unfairness of allowing a jury to disagree entirely on which 
criminal acts serve as the basis for conviction.  The similarity 
of the underlying offenses is no substitute for the requisite 
proof and agreement that the offenses were actually committed by 
the defendant.   
¶41 While I would conclude that the risk of serious 
unfairness alone defeats the constitutionality of § 948.025(2), 
I note that the statute lacks support in both tradition and 
history.  There is no tradition in the law supporting the 
constitutionality of a statute that defines an offense in a 
manner which allows jurors to wholly disagree as to the acts 
comprising the offense.  Indeed, the Richardson Court noted that 
the law reflects a competing tradition: the "tradition of 
requiring juror unanimity where the issue is whether a defendant 
has engaged in conduct that violates the law."  526 U.S. at 819.  
¶42 Additionally, there is no historical support for an 
offense that allows juror disagreement in the manner of 
No. 99-2968-CR.awb 
 
7 
§ 948.025(2).  The majority gives this inquiry short shrift, 
concluding that because the statute is a recent creation, 
history is not a relevant inquiry into its constitutionality.  
The Schad plurality noted the "obvious proposition" that modern 
statutory offenses lacking support in the common law may not 
necessarily be tested by the "yardstick" of history.  501 U.S. 
at 640 n.7.  However, this should not end the inquiry.  The 
majority could, but does not, acknowledge that there is no 
analog in American legal history to the statutory abrogation of 
the requirement of jury unanimity presented in this case.   
¶43 The lack of a historical antecedent invites an inquiry 
into the widespread contemporary acceptance of a particular 
practice.7  Indeed, the plurality opinion in Schad, to which the 
majority clings, featured an inquiry into the widespread use as 
an indicator of fundamental fairness and rationality.  501 U.S. 
at 640-643.  Had the majority conducted an inquiry into the 
practices of other states, it would have been forced to 
acknowledge that only five other states have such statutory 
provisions.8  Moreover, it would have noted that Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.025 is perhaps the most expansive of the few state 
                     
7 "[F]or those portions of the process that were added in 
more 
recent 
times, 
and 
therefore 
lack 
strong 
historical 
traditions, widespread acceptance of a particular practice 
speaks strongly in favor of its constitutionality."  1 Wayne R. 
LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 2.7(b) (2d ed. 1999). 
8  See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1417 (West 2000); Cal. 
Penal Code § 288.5 (West 2000); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 778 
(2000); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 707-733.5 (Michie 1999); N.D. 
Cent. Code § 12.1-20-03.1 (1999). 
No. 99-2968-CR.awb 
 
8 
statutes that relieve the requirement of jury unanimity in this 
context.  Unlike Wisconsin, the few other states that do provide 
for such a statute limit the statute's breadth, through 
limitations on the circumstances of the assaults and on the 
timeframe during which the offenses must occur.  Thus comparing 
§ 948.025(2) to the practice of other states, it cannot be said 
that the removal of jury unanimity as to the predicate offenses 
under § 948.025(2) is supported by widespread practice.9  
¶44 All tolled, I believe that § 948.025(2) cannot pass 
constitutional 
muster 
in 
light 
of 
Richardson. 
 
Section 
948.025(2) poses substantial risks of unfairness to the criminal 
defendant and also lacks support in history and tradition.  
                     
9 As the majority notes, the Richardson Court cited state 
case law and statutes regarding sexual assault of a child 
represented as the only area where jury unanimity is avoided by 
treating individual offenses as a course of conduct crime.  
However, contrary to the majority's conclusions, that discussion 
should 
not 
be 
read 
to 
support 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
§ 948.025(2).  526 U.S. 83, 821 (1999).  The Court noted several 
mitigating factors that are not applicable to § 948.025(2).  
First, the Court noted that the federal Constitution does not 
impose a unanimous jury requirement upon the states.  Id.  When 
subject to scrutiny by this court, however, this distinguishing 
factor is inapplicable.  Our state constitution does establish 
the right to a unanimous jury verdict. 
Second, among the state laws reviewed by the Richardson 
Court, California's counterpart to § 948.025 was noted as truly 
exceptional on the ground that it defines the statutory offense 
in terms of other predicate offenses.  Id. (discussing Cal. 
Penal Code Ann. § 288.5 (West Supp. 1998)).  Because § 948.025 
also defines the statutory offense with reference to other 
predicate offenses, it must be viewed in the same light as the 
California statute: a unique statute singled out by the Supreme 
Court and on which the Court has not placed its imprimatur. 
No. 99-2968-CR.awb 
 
9 
Accordingly, it exceeds the state's ability to define crimes in 
a manner that allows jury disagreement as to the modes of 
commission and violates due process.   
¶45 Although I would rest the fate of § 948.025(2) on the 
due process afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment, I also address 
the majority's treatment of the state constitutional guarantee 
of a unanimous jury verdict under Article I, Sections 5 and 7.  
I am concerned about the untold consequences of the majority's 
acceptance of State v. Molitor.10   
¶46 By accepting the court of appeals' analysis in 
Molitor, the majority seems to have expanded the principles of 
State v. Giwosky, 109 Wis. 2d 446, 326 N.W.2d 232 (1982), and 
State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis. 2d 582, 335 N.W.2d 583 (1983), to an 
irrational degree.  The potential result is that Giwosky and 
Lomagro and the accepted delineation of the jury unanimity 
requirement 
expressed 
in 
those 
cases 
have 
been 
wholly 
undermined.   
¶47 Giwosky and Lomagro provide that a continuous criminal 
episode, although consisting of numerous criminal acts, may be 
treated as a single offense and that a jury need not be 
                     
10 Not only do I disagree with the analysis of the Molitor 
court, but I note that the discussion of the constitutionality 
of § 948.025(2) was unnecessary to the court of appeals decision 
in that case.  In State v. Molitor, 210 Wis. 2d 415, 565 N.W.2d 
248 (Ct. 
App. 1997), 
the 
defendant 
pled 
no 
contest to 
§ 948.025(1).  Section 948.025(2), which applies only to cases 
tried to a jury, was not implicated.  Nevertheless, the court of 
appeals reached out and ruled on the constitutionality of 
§ 948.025(2).  Today the majority opinion adopts the analysis of 
the court of appeals' advisory opinion in Molitor.   
No. 99-2968-CR.awb 
 
10
unanimous as to which specific act serves as the basis for 
conviction.  In Giwosky, the requirement of jury unanimity was 
not violated when jurors were able to conclude that either of 
two assaultive acts committed within minutes in the same fight 
supported the defendant's battery conviction.  We reasoned that 
"[t]he evidence introduced at trial established that the 
encounter was a short continuous incident that cannot be 
factually separated."  109 Wis. 2d at 456.  In Lomagro, the 
guarantee of jury unanimity was not violated where numerous acts 
of sexual violence occurring over a two-hour period were 
presented to the jury as one count of sexual assault.  We 
explained that, as in Giwosky, the encounter was "one continuing 
criminal episode and properly chargeable as one offense."  113 
Wis. 2d at 598.   
¶48 By adopting the Molitor rationale, the majority takes 
the Giwosky/Lomagro concept of a continuous criminal episode, 
limited in time and circumstance, and extrapolates it to include 
a series of non-continuous, separate and distinct criminal 
episodes.  In doing so the majority seemingly defeats the 
concept of continuity that was the backbone of the Giwosky and 
Lomagro analysis.   
¶49 Although the majority dons § 948.025 with the title of 
a "continuous course of conduct" crime, there is nothing 
continuous about the predicate offenses that comprise the 
violation of § 948.025 in this case.  These crimes may involve 
the same victim and offender and they may be related offenses.  
They may also be part of a recurring pattern of conduct on the 
No. 99-2968-CR.awb 
 
11
part of the defendant.  However, unlike Giwosky, which involved 
offenses separated by a few minutes or Lomagro where the time 
span was around two hours, the offenses here are interrupted 
significantly by time and space.  They occurred on different 
days, in different months, and in different places.  They do not 
represent a single episode, but multiple episodes.  As such, 
they must be viewed as multiple offenses, not a single 
"continuous" offense. 
¶50 If the concept of continuity expressed in Giwosky and 
Lomagro can be read to satisfy the unanimity requirement in the 
case at hand, I, for one, no longer have any sense of the limits 
of the state constitution's unanimity protection.  Could the 
state have pursued all of the sexual assaults in this case as 
one count of sexual assault under § 948.02, leaving the jury 
free to disagree as to whether an assault that occurred in July 
or one in committed in August is the basis for conviction?  
Because the individual assaults may be viewed together as a 
"continuous course of conduct crime" under the reasoning of the 
majority and Molitor, the State apparently could have pursued 
such a charge.  Did the majority intend such a result?  I do not 
think so.  Can the majority reason its way out of those 
potential consequences?  Not without rejecting the rationale of 
Molitor.   
¶51 Finally, I note that in lieu of Giwosky and Lomagro to 
further guide us in defining the limits of the unanimity 
protection, the majority seems to have also left us with the 
most curious of constitutional standards.  It has seemingly 
No. 99-2968-CR.awb 
 
12
transformed the constitutional inquiry under Article I, Sections 
5 and 7 into little more than a circuitous inquiry into 
legislative intent.  Majority op. at ¶¶ 11-12 & ¶14.  Under the 
majority's analysis legislative intent is apparently now the be 
all and end all of the Wisconsin constitution's guarantee of a 
unanimous jury verdict.  Simply put, the majority's analysis 
directs that if the legislature intended to abrogate jury 
unanimity, then the state constitution presents no bar to the 
statutory definition. 
¶52 In sum, the court of appeals asked us to render a 
decision in this case to reconcile its prior decision under the 
state constitution in Molitor with the due process formulation 
of the Supreme Court in Richardson.  My response to the court of 
appeals is that there can be no reconciliation.  The demands of 
due 
process, 
and 
in 
particular 
the 
risks 
of 
unfairness 
enunciated by the Richardson Court, defeat the constitutionality 
of 
§ 948.025(2). 
 
By 
engaging 
in 
its 
own 
due 
process 
formulation, however, the majority fails to acknowledge that 
Richardson is controlling authority and that it requires this 
result.  Not only does the majority depart from the United 
States Supreme Court to reach an incorrect result, but because 
it endorses the reasoning of Molitor, the majority leaves our 
state constitutional unanimity protection in a confused and 
troublesome condition.   
¶53 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice WILLIAM A. BABLITCH join this dissenting 
opinion.   
No. 99-2968-CR.awb 
 
13
 
No. 99-2968-CR.awb 
 
1