Title: Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. Douglas R. Stern
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP000622-J
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 2, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-0622-J 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against the Honorable Douglas R. 
Stern, Municipal Judge. 
 
Wisconsin Judicial Commission, 
 
Complainant, 
 
v. 
The Honorable Douglas R. Stern, 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST STERN 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 2, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
December 2, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the Honorable Douglas R. Stern, there were 
briefs by Phillip J. Ramthun and Stern & Ramthun, LLP, Milwaukee 
and oral argument by Phillip J. Ramthun. 
 
 
For the Wisconsin Judicial Commission there was a 
brief and oral argument by James C. Alexander, Madison. 
 
No. 
97-0622-J 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-0622-J 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against the Honorable Douglas 
R. Stern, Municipal Judge. 
Wisconsin Judicial Commission, 
 
 
Complainant, 
 
v.  
The Honorable Douglas R. Stern, 
 
 
Respondent. 
FILED 
 
MAR 2, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
JUDICIAL disciplinary proceeding.  Reprimand imposed. 
¶1 
PER CURIAM   This is a review, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.911, of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
recommendation for discipline of the judicial conduct panel 
concerning the conduct of the Hon. Douglas R. Stern, municipal 
judge for Western Waukesha county. The panel concluded that 
Judge Stern engaged in judicial misconduct by holding two 
                     
1  Wis. Stat. § 757.91 provides: Supreme court; disposition. 
The supreme court shall review the findings of fact, conclusions 
of law and recommendations under s. 757.89 and determine 
appropriate discipline in cases of misconduct and appropriate 
action in cases of permanent disability. The rules of the 
supreme court applicable to civil cases in the supreme court 
govern the review proceedings under this section.   
No. 
97-0622-J 
 
2 
offices of public trust -– municipal judge and school board 
member -– at the same time and recommended that Judge Stern be 
reprimanded for that judicial misconduct. Judge Stern contested 
the panel’s conclusion that he engaged in judicial misconduct 
and its recommendation that he be reprimanded. The Judicial 
Commission took the position that the seriousness of Judge 
Stern’s misconduct warrants his suspension from judicial office 
for a minimum of 15 days.  
¶2 
We determine that the panel properly concluded that 
Judge Stern violated the provision of the former Code of 
Judicial Ethics2 that prohibited a judge, including a municipal 
judge, from “hold[ing] any office of public trust except a 
judicial office during the term for which he or she is elected 
or appointed.” SCR 60.04.3 We also determine that the appropriate 
discipline to impose on Judge Stern for that misconduct is the 
reprimand recommended by the panel. Following his reelection as 
school board member and simultaneous election to the office of 
municipal judge, Judge Stern repeatedly sought an authoritative 
answer to the question of whether he could hold both offices at 
the same time, and he ultimately presented a good faith, albeit 
unsuccessful, argument that the prohibition did not apply to his 
                     
2  The Code of Judicial Ethics was replaced, effective 
January 1, 1997, by the Code of Judicial Conduct, SCR Chapter 
60. References in this opinion to chapter 60 of the Supreme 
Court Rules are to the Code of Judicial Ethics.  
3  The prohibition was applicable to “occupants of part-time 
judicial offices such as reserve judges and municipal judges.” 
SCR 60.39(2).  
No. 
97-0622-J 
 
3 
circumstances. Nonetheless, Judge Stern took office as municipal 
judge while continuing as a member of the school board without 
having his question answered, thereby accepting the risk that 
his doing so would violate the Code of Judicial Ethics. Yet, 
once he learned the Judicial Commission had found probable cause 
to believe that his conduct violated the Code of Judicial Ethics 
and would file a disciplinary complaint with this court, he 
resigned from the school board.  
¶3 
The judicial conduct panel, consisting of Court of 
Appeals Judges Ted E. Wedemeyer, Jr., Margaret J. Vergeront, and 
David G. Deininger, made findings of fact based on a stipulation 
of the parties and on testimony presented at a hearing. None of 
those facts is in dispute.  
¶4 
At the 1996 spring election, Douglas Stern was 
reelected member of a high school board of education and elected 
municipal judge for Western Waukesha county. He took office as 
municipal judge May 1, 1996, and continues to serve in that 
part-time position, spending from 12 to 15 hours per week on 
court business. He continued to serve as school board president 
until November 20, 1996, when he tendered his letter of 
resignation confirming the resignation he had announced at the 
Board’s 
November 
13, 
1996 
meeting. 
That 
resignation 
was 
effective December 11, 1996.  
¶5 
After becoming a candidate for both positions in 
January 1996 and while the Supreme Court had under consideration 
a proposed revision of the Code of Judicial Ethics, Attorney 
Stern wrote a member of this court questioning the wisdom of the 
No. 
97-0622-J 
 
4 
Code’s prohibition of a judge’s holding two offices of public 
trust when one of them is a part-time municipal judgeship. He 
did not cite any constitutional or statutory authority for the 
proposition that the rule did not or should not apply in such 
circumstance.  
¶6 
On March 12, 1996, Attorney Stern requested an 
Attorney General’s Opinion on the question of whether, under 
Wisconsin law, an attorney who already is a part-time elected 
official may be elected to a part-time municipal judgeship. 
Assistant Attorney General Alan Lee responded that the statutes 
do not authorize the attorney general to provide opinions to 
school boards or their members, but he noted that the Supreme 
Court Rules, particularly SCR 60.04, “seem to be quite clear,” 
including that the prohibition of a judge’s holding any office 
of public trust except a judicial office during the term for 
which elected or appointed applied to municipal judges.  
¶7 
Attorney Stern again wrote Assistant Attorney General 
Lee, citing a state constitutional provision and a statute4 
imposing a similar prohibition but limited to judges of a court 
of record and noting that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 755.01(1), a 
                     
4  Article VII, sec. 10(1), Wis. Const., provides, in 
pertinent part: “No justice of the supreme court or judge of any 
court of record shall hold any other office of public trust, 
except a judicial office, during the term for which elected.”  
 Wis. Stat. § 757.02(2) provides: “The judge of any court 
of record in this state shall be ineligible to hold any office 
of public trust, except a judicial office, during the term for 
which he or she was elected or appointed.”  
No. 
97-0622-J 
 
5 
municipal court is not a court of record. Responding to that 
communication, Assistant Attorney General Lee disagreed with 
Attorney Stern’s conclusion that the statute precluded the 
Supreme 
Court 
from 
acting 
independently 
in 
adopting 
the 
prohibition in SCR 60.04:  
The statute and the supreme court rule are not 
necessarily in conflict; since the statute is silent 
[in respect to judges of courts not of record], the 
supreme court’s rule could be viewed as supplementing 
the 
statute. 
There 
is 
only 
a 
conflict 
if 
the 
Legislature specifically spoke to the matter and 
stated that municipal judges could hold other offices 
and the supreme court’s rule said they could not.  
He also disagreed with Attorney Stern’s conclusion that the 
statute would “trump” the supreme court rule.  
¶8 
Following 
the 
spring 
election, 
Judge-elect 
Stern 
sought assistance in the matter from a state senator, who then 
wrote the chief justice of this court concerning what she 
perceived to be an apparent conflict between the Code of 
Judicial Conduct the court recently had promulgated and the 
Wisconsin Constitution in respect to a judge’s simultaneous 
holding of other offices of public trust. The chief justice 
declined comment on the matter because the issue had arisen in 
the context of a judicial disciplinary proceeding involving 
Judge Stern, which was pending before a judicial conduct panel. 
The chief justice invited the senator to bring her concern to 
No. 
97-0622-J 
 
6 
the 
court’s 
attention 
after 
the 
pending 
proceeding 
was 
concluded.  
¶9 
The Judicial Commission notified Judge Stern April 30, 
1996, that it was investigating his holding two offices. Prior 
to being informed of its investigation, Judge Stern never 
contacted anyone at the Judicial Commission to ask whether he 
could hold both offices. A few days after learning of the 
Judicial Commission’s investigation, Judge Stern asked the State 
Ethics Board for an opinion, and it responded that it did not 
interpret the Code of Judicial Ethics. He informed the Judicial 
Commission May 3, 1996, that he held both positions and believed 
the SCR 60.04 prohibition to be in conflict with state law.  
¶10 Judge Stern then filed a petition for writ of mandamus 
in this court May 13, 1996, asking that the Judicial Commission 
be ordered to respect the limited prohibition set forth in the 
constitution and the statute and that the court declare that the 
SCR 60.04 prohibition did not apply to the office of municipal 
judge. The court denied that petition ex parte June 11, 1996.  
¶11 Following a hearing held October 24, 1996, the 
Judicial Commission notified Judge Stern that it had found 
probable cause to believe he had engaged in a wilful violation 
of SCR 60.04 and that it intended to file a complaint with the 
Supreme Court seeking discipline. Judge Stern then resigned from 
the school board and by letter of November 22, 1996, informed 
the Judicial Commission of his resignation. The Judicial 
Commission filed a complaint in this matter three months later.  
No. 
97-0622-J 
 
7 
¶12 On the basis of those facts, the judicial conduct 
panel 
made 
the 
following 
conclusions 
of 
law. 
First, 
notwithstanding 
the 
state 
constitutional 
and 
statutory 
provisions prohibiting a judge of a court of record from holding 
more than one office of public trust, the Supreme Court is not 
precluded from extending that prohibition to municipal judges 
under its Code of Judicial Ethics. Second, as the school board 
membership and the municipal judgeship are offices of public 
trust, until his resignation from the school board, Judge Stern 
violated SCR 60.04. Third, Judge Stern’s violation of that rule 
was wilful and thus constituted judicial misconduct under Wis. 
Stat. § 757.81(4)(a).5  
¶13 In 
respect 
to 
its 
third 
conclusion, 
the 
panel 
determined that in the context of a judicial disciplinary 
proceeding, a judge’s conduct is “wilful” if it is the result of 
the judge’s “free will and not as a result of duress or 
coercion,” citing Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Pressentin, 139 Wis. 2d 150, 406 N.W.2d 779 (1987). There, a 
municipal judge ran for the office of county supervisor without 
first resigning his judgeship, contrary to the prohibition of 
SCR 60.05 that “a judge shall not become a candidate for a 
federal, state or local nonjudicial elective office without 
first resigning his or her judgeship.” This court rejected the 
judge’s contention that his violation of the rule was not wilful 
                     
5  Wis. Stat. § 757.81(4)(a) defines judicial misconduct to 
include “Wilful violation of a rule of the code of judicial 
ethics.”  
No. 
97-0622-J 
 
8 
because he did not know of the rule’s provisions, holding that 
the judge’s violation was wilful whether or not he had actual 
knowledge of the rule.  
¶14 The panel rejected Judge Stern’s contention that his 
conduct could not be considered wilful because he never received 
a “definitive answer” to the question of whether he could hold 
both offices until after the Judicial Commission hearing held 
October 24, 1996. Pointing out that a great deal of judicial 
conduct would escape scrutiny if wilfulness did not attach until 
after the judge had made a formal appearance before the Judicial 
Commission, the panel refused to adopt what it called “an 
unreasonable interpretation of the Code.” The panel also 
rejected Judge Stern’s other arguments: that he was entitled to 
a reasonable time to comply with the rule after his “challenge” 
to it was rejected, that there was no formal advice-giving body 
to consider the propriety of his conduct, and that, as he no 
longer held both elective offices, the disciplinary proceeding 
should be dismissed.  
¶15 In determining the discipline to recommend for Judge 
Stern’s misconduct, the panel acknowledged that in many respects 
the offices of part-time municipal judge and school board member 
are “community service” positions, with minimal compensation and 
a substantial time commitment, and that the discharge of the 
responsibilities of those positions is “laudatory.” Nonetheless, 
the panel understood the Supreme Court’s rule –- what it termed 
“a bright line prohibition” -– to be based on the concept of 
separation of powers and intended to protect the judiciary from 
No. 
97-0622-J 
 
9 
inevitable conflicts that would face a judge who holds another 
office of public trust.  
¶16 In the latter respect, Judge Stern testified that 
between May 1, 1996, and October 24, 1996, he had presided over 
from 10 to 20 ordinance violation cases, such as possession of 
tobacco and loitering on school grounds, that arose out of the 
school district he served. Noting there was no suggestion that 
Judge 
Stern 
had 
acted 
inappropriately 
in 
any 
municipal 
prosecution involving a student or a school policy, the panel 
deemed the absence of actual conflict or impropriety immaterial.  
¶17 The panel also noted that before taking office as 
municipal judge, Judge Stern inquired of several sources whether 
he could hold both offices. Yet, he did not contact the Judicial 
Commission –- the agency statutorily charged with investigating 
and, where it deems appropriate, prosecuting alleged violations 
of the Code of Judicial Ethics.  
¶18 The 
panel’s 
recommendation 
of 
a 
reprimand 
as 
appropriate 
discipline 
to 
be 
imposed 
for 
Judge 
Stern’s 
misconduct is based in part on its perception of the public’s 
need for protection from similar misconduct by other judges in 
the future. It is also based on the panel’s belief that similar 
misconduct by Judge Stern is unlikely.  
¶19 In this review, Judge Stern first argued that the 
judicial conduct panel improperly interpreted the term “wilful” 
to mean “the absence of duress or coercion.” He would have the 
court interpret it to mean “intentional” and “without excuse.” 
He averred that his running for municipal judge and for 
No. 
97-0622-J 
 
10
reelection as school board member and his subsequent holding of 
both offices were not done intentionally to flout the Supreme 
Court Rules. He contended that his attempts to obtain a ruling 
on the application of the prohibition by filing a writ of 
mandamus and by recourse to a state senator and to the attorney 
general distinguish his conduct from an intentional violation of 
a rule with the “evil purpose” he believes is required by the 
ordinary meaning of “wilful.”  
¶20 For its part, the Judicial Commission cited Judge 
Stern’s testimony that he first learned of the SCR 60.04 
prohibition in January 1996, shortly after he filed as a 
candidate for the office of municipal court judge, when a 
circuit judge told him of the rule’s prohibition and said she 
did not think he could serve as both a municipal judge and a 
school board member. Also in January 1996, the program attorney 
for municipal judge education in the Supreme Court’s Office of 
Judicial Education advised Judge Stern of the SCR 60.04 
prohibition. Thus, the Commission argued, it was clear to Judge 
Stern when he read the rule that, by its terms, it prohibited a 
municipal court judge from simultaneously serving as a school 
board member.  
¶21 The  panel’s conclusion that Judge Stern’s violation 
of SCR 60.04 was “wilful” was properly drawn from the undisputed 
facts. While that conclusion focused on the “free will -– duress 
-— coercion” aspects of the term, the panel’s findings support a 
determination of wilfulness from the aspect of knowledge -– 
actual or imputed. “Prior judicial disciplinary cases have 
No. 
97-0622-J 
 
11
established that ‘wilful’ means that the judge’s conduct was not 
the result of duress or coercion and that the judge knew or 
should have known that the conduct was prohibited by the Code of 
Judicial Ethics.” Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Tesmer, 219 Wis. 2d 709, 730, 580 N.W.2d 317, (1998).  
¶22 The element of knowledge in respect to Judge Stern’s 
conduct is established by the undisputed fact that Judge Stern 
was aware of the provisions of SCR 60.04 almost two months 
before the election and four months prior to being sworn in as 
municipal judge. The panel said, “The language of SCR 60.04 is 
unambiguous and Pressentin expressly held that municipal judges 
were subject to the Code of Judicial Ethics.” Thus, not only was 
Judge Stern chargeable with knowledge of the prohibitions set 
forth in the Code of Judicial Ethics, but he also had actual 
knowledge of the specific prohibition as early as January of 
1996 when a circuit judge advised him of the rule’s prohibition 
and of her belief that it prohibited him from serving as 
municipal judge and school board member.  
¶23 Judge Stern next argued that the application of SCR 
60.04 to him was vague for the reason that a provision of the 
Wisconsin Constitution and a statute set forth a similar 
prohibition against holding two offices of public trust but 
explicitly limit it to judges of courts of record. He took the 
position that it was reasonable for him to interpret the 
interplay between the constitutional and statutory prohibitions 
on the one hand and the Supreme Court Rule prohibition on the 
other so as to be in conformity, that is, that the Supreme 
No. 
97-0622-J 
 
12
Court’s rule would not conflict with the constitution and the 
statute. Judge Stern also contended that when the legislature 
created municipal courts, it was aware of the constitutional and 
statutory prohibitions and intentionally made municipal courts 
not courts of record so that municipal court judges would not be 
subject to the prohibition of holding two offices of public 
trust.  
¶24 In addition, Judge 
Stern 
suggested 
that because 
municipal courts are creatures of the legislature, this court 
should defer to the legislature in respect to determinations 
concerning those courts that do not impair their ability to 
function impartially or impugn their integrity. He urged that 
the “legislature’s determination” not to apply the statutory 
prohibition of a judge’s holding two offices of public trust to 
courts that are not courts of record should be respected, 
asserting that by extending the constitutional and statutory 
prohibitions to municipal judges in its own rule, this court 
effectively has amended the Wisconsin Constitution and state 
statutes.  
¶25 We find no merit to Judge Stern’s argument that a 
constitutional 
provision 
and 
a 
statute 
setting 
forth 
a 
prohibition limited to judges of courts of record similar to 
this court’s prohibition applicable to municipal court judges as 
well created either a conflict that he was entitled to presume 
the court’s rule could not countenance or an ambiguity regarding 
the rule’s application to him. This court has the authority to 
promulgate rules of conduct applicable to municipal court judges 
No. 
97-0622-J 
 
13
and to other persons or matters under its jurisdiction where the 
legislature has not acted. The legislature and the Constitution 
are silent in respect to the simultaneous holding of two offices 
of public trust by a judge of a court not of record. The 
prohibition of SCR 60.04 was clear and unambiguous, as was its 
application to part-time municipal judges, not only by virtue of 
the rule itself but also by the court’s decision in Pressentin.  
¶26 Having determined that Judge Stern engaged in judicial 
misconduct by simultaneously holding two offices of public 
trust, we turn to the issue of the discipline to be imposed for 
that misconduct. The Judicial Commission took the position that 
the seriousness of that misconduct, in terms of the adverse 
effect it had on the public’s perception of the integrity of the 
judiciary, and the need to protect the public from any 
recurrence of similar misconduct warrant his suspension from 
office for at least 15 days. The Judicial Commission expressed 
particular concern with the fact that Judge Stern’s violation of 
the Code of Judicial Ethics was open and notorious, as the issue 
of his eligibility to hold both offices was a matter of public 
knowledge raised and discussed during the election.  
¶27 In support of its position, the Judicial Commission 
cites Pressentin, Id., in which we suspended a municipal judge 
from office for six months as discipline for having sought 
election 
to 
a 
nonjudicial 
elective 
office 
without 
first 
resigning his judicial office, in violation of the Code of 
Judicial Ethics. However, Judge Stern’s case is distinguishable 
from Judge Pressentin’s in several respects. First, Judge 
No. 
97-0622-J 
 
14
Pressentin, who had been a municipal judge for more than 17 
years, chose to violate the Code by pursuing election to a 
nonjudicial elective position. Judge Stern’s violation occurred 
not during the simultaneous election campaigns but only upon his 
swearings in to both offices. Thus, Judge Pressentin was in a 
position to use his judicial office as an advantage during the 
election; Judge Stern was not. Moreover, until he was sworn in 
to both offices, Judge Stern retained the option of declining 
either of them and not violating the Code.  
¶28 Second, unlike the several attempts Judge Stern made 
to obtain an opinion or ruling that the Code prohibition did not 
apply to him, Judge Pressentin merely relied on his continuing 
campaign for the office of county supervisor as constituting a 
legitimate challenge to the Code prohibition. In that respect, 
we stated in Pressentin that the judge had means other than a 
campaign for election to nonjudicial office available to 
challenge the rule prohibiting his conduct, “ . . .  [f]or 
example, by seeking an injunction against enforcement of the 
rule or declaratory judgment with respect to the rule’s validity 
or applicability.” Pressentin, Id., 156. Here, unlike Judge 
Pressentin, Judge Stern pursued those means, albeit after he 
chose to violate the rule he was challenging. Also, once the 
Judicial Commission found probable cause to believe he had 
engaged in a wilful violation of the Code and announced that it 
would file a complaint with this court seeking discipline, Judge 
Stern brought his misconduct to an end by resigning from the 
nonjudicial office.  
No. 
97-0622-J 
 
15
¶29 Nonetheless, we are concerned that Judge Stern, after 
being made aware of the clear, unambiguous prohibition of his 
holding two offices of public trust simultaneously, chose to 
take both offices and continued to occupy them without having 
obtained an authoritative affirmation of his good faith legal 
argument that the rule did not apply to him. Indeed, he never 
posed his question to the Judicial Commission, even if its 
answer would not have been “definitive,” and he did not seek the 
injunction or declaratory judgment we suggested in Pressentin 
until after he had assumed both offices.  
¶30 Under 
the 
circumstances, 
we 
determine 
that 
the 
appropriate discipline for Judge Stern’s judicial misconduct is 
a reprimand. The likelihood of similar misconduct by Judge Stern 
is minimal, and the reprimand we impose on him should provide 
adequate protection to the public from any further judicial 
misconduct of this kind by others.  
¶31 IT IS ORDERED that the Hon. Douglas R. Stern is 
reprimanded 
for 
judicial 
misconduct 
established 
in 
this 
proceeding.  
 
 
1