Title: State v. Zimbal
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2015AP001293-CR, 2015AP001292-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 14, 2017

2017 WI 59 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1292-CR and 2015AP1293-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Edward J. Zimbal, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 371 Wis. 2d 564, 884 N.W.2d 535 
(2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 14, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 2, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Brown 
 
JUDGE: 
William M. Atkinson 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, C.J. concurs, joined by R.G. 
BRADLEY, J. and KELLY, J.(opinion  filed). 
ZIEGLER, J. concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by and oral argument by Jeremy A. Newman, assistant state 
public defender, with whom on the briefs was Tristan S. 
Breedlove, assistant state public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
and an oral argument by Nancy A. Noet, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney 
general. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
State Public Defender by Joseph N. Ehmann, regional attorney 
manager, and Kelli S. Thompson, state public defender. 
 
 
2017 WI 59
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.   2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
(L.C. Nos. 2010CF706 & 2011CF231) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Edward J. Zimbal, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
Jun 14, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of an opinion of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Petitioner, Edward J. Zimbal 
("Zimbal"), seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals 
opinion 
affirming 
a 
circuit 
court 
order 
denying 
his 
postconviction motion.1  The court of appeals determined that 
Zimbal did not timely invoke his right to substitution of a 
circuit court judge.  It reasoned that his request fell outside 
                                                 
1 State v. Zimbal, Nos. 2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR, 
unpublished slip op., (Wis. Ct. App. July 6, 2016) (affirming 
order entered by the circuit court for Brown County, William M. 
Atkinson, J., presiding). 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
2 
 
of the statutory 20 day time limit that begins to run on the 
date of the court of appeal's remittitur following a prior 
successful appeal in this case. 
¶2 
Zimbal asserts that the court of appeals erred, 
contending that his substitution request was timely because:  
(1) prior to having an attorney appointed he made an oral 
request for substitution in the circuit court and a written 
request in the court of appeals; (2) the circuit court 
instructed him that the filing of a motion for substitution 
should be deferred until after an attorney was appointed; and 
(3) his trial counsel formalized the substitution request 17 
days after being appointed. 
¶3 
We conclude that under the unique circumstances 
presented here, when a defendant follows a circuit court's 
instruction to defer filing a request for substitution of a 
judge until after counsel is appointed, that strict compliance 
with the 20 day deadline for filing a request for substitution 
after remittitur is not warranted.2  Although Zimbal's motion for 
                                                 
2 There is nothing wrong with this strict compliance 
substitution statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.20(7), and we should not 
rewrite it by adding such indefinite concepts as excusable 
delay, good faith and prejudice.  Establishing such a rule would 
tend to unravel what is meant to be a narrowly circumscribed 
statute.  See, e.g., State v. Austin, 171 Wis. 2d 251, 257, 490 
N.W.2d 780 (Ct. App. 1992).  Nevertheless, the concurrence of 
C.J. Roggensack would do just that. 
(continued) 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
3 
 
substitution of judge was not timely filed under the statute, it 
was timely filed in this case because the circuit court in 
essence extended the deadline until after his trial counsel was 
appointed.  Zimbal complied with the extended deadline when he 
filed a motion for substitution of judge within 20 days after 
                                                                                                                                                             
The concurrence would create a new——albeit amorphous——
category for the application of equitable tolling in this 
context.  Explaining that "[e]quitable tolling focuses on 
whether there was an excusable delay by the plaintiff," it 
reasons that "[t]he doctrine may be applied when a claimant has 
made a good faith error and there is an absence of prejudice to 
others 
if 
it 
is 
applied." 
 
Chief 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
concurrence, ¶12 (citation and quotation omitted). 
Under the approach of the concurrence, courts would have to 
determine when the delay is excusable.  What constitutes a good 
faith showing and will any level of prejudice suffice?  Is the 
new rule to be applied prospectively or retroactively?  Given 
that the rule of the concurrence pertains only to unrepresented 
defendants, are there equal protection considerations?  See 
concurrence, ¶19.  What happens when a represented defendant 
also can show excusable delay, good faith and no prejudice? 
In the past this court and the court of appeals have 
established categorical exceptions to the rule of strict 
adherence to Wis. Stat. § 971.20.  See, e.g., Baldwin v. State, 
62 Wis. 2d 521, 530, 215 N.W.2d 541 (1974) (an exception when a 
county's calendaring procedure prevents a defendant from timely 
knowing the assigned judge); State ex rel. Tessmer v. Cir. Ct. 
Branch III, In & For Racine Cty., 123 Wis. 2d 439, 443, 367 
N.W.2d 235 (Ct. App. 1985) (an exception when the traffic and 
misdemeanor court's procedures prevented a defendant from timely 
knowing the assigned judge); State ex rel. Tinti v. Cir. Ct. for 
Waukesha Cty., Branch 2, 159 Wis. 2d 783, 788, 464 N.W.2d 853 
(Ct. App. 1990) (an exception when an intake system does not 
provide adequate notice of the assigned judge). 
None of these cases has expanded the exception to invoke 
the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling and we 
likewise decline to do so here.  Instead, we limit our decision 
to the unique facts of this case. 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
4 
 
his trial counsel was appointed.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court 
to vacate the judgments of conviction and for a new trial. 
I 
¶4 
The underlying facts in this case are not in dispute.  
Zimbal's petition for review arises from two criminal cases.  In 
the first case, Zimbal was charged with stalking, disorderly 
conduct, and sending an obscene computer message.  He was 
charged with stalking and two counts of felony bail jumping in 
the second case. 
¶5 
Zimbal entered a no contest plea to one count of 
stalking in the former case and one count of bail jumping in the 
latter, with the remaining counts dismissed or dismissed and 
read-in at sentencing.  The circuit court sentenced Zimbal to 
consecutive maximum sentences, totaling nine years and six 
months with four years and six months of initial confinement and 
five years of extended supervision. 
¶6 
After sentencing, Zimbal filed a Bangert motion to 
withdraw his pleas and vacate his conviction, alleging that his 
pleas were not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered.3  
The circuit court denied the motion but the court of appeals 
reversed, determining that the "court did not utilize any of the 
methods 
identified 
in 
Bangert 
for 
establishing 
Zimbal's 
                                                 
3 See State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 275-76, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986). 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
5 
 
understanding of the nature of the offense."4  It remanded 
Zimbal's cases with directions to vacate the judgments of 
conviction and grant Zimbal's motion to withdraw his pleas.5 
¶7 
Although the merits of Zimbal's Bangert motion are not 
at issue here, its resolution on appeal is relevant to the 
procedural posture of this case.  At issue is whether Zimbal 
made a timely request for substitution of judge pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 971.20(7) (2013-14)6 after his cases were remitted to the 
circuit court following the successful appeal of the denial of 
his Bangert motion. 
¶8 
A request for substitution of judge following appeal 
may be filed within 20 days after the filing of the remittitur 
by the appellate court: 
If an appellate court orders a new trial or sentencing 
proceeding, a request under this section may be filed 
within 20 days after the filing of the remittitur by 
the appellate court, whether or not a request for 
substitution was made prior to the time the appeal was 
taken. 
Wis. Stat. § 971.20(7). 
¶9 
After Zimbal's appeal on the Bangert motion concluded, 
his cases were remitted to the circuit court on October 8, 2013.  
On October 7, 2013, the circuit court continued a status hearing 
                                                 
4 State v. Zimbal, Nos. 2012AP2234-CR & 2012AP2235-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶9 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2013). 
5 Id., ¶1. 
6 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statues are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
6 
 
that had been held over from October 4, 2013.  Zimbal appeared 
at the status conference by telephone from prison.  Attorney 
Jeff Cano, the Regional Attorney Manager for the State Public 
Defender ("SPD") in Green Bay, was present in the courtroom.  He 
advised the court that when the government returned Zimbal to 
the county, the SPD "would discuss with him the appointment of 
an attorney." 
¶10 At the October 7, 2013, status hearing, Zimbal made a 
request for recusal of the circuit court judge, which was denied 
"at this time."  The court allowed that it would give Zimbal's 
attorney an opportunity to do research on the recusal issue and 
address the request at the status conference: 
ZIMBAL:  I'm also asking that you recuse yourself 
because there is no way you can be impartial and/or 
[un]bias[ed]. 
THE COURT:  Since you probably haven't done any 
research, I'll let your attorney do research on that 
issue 
and 
you 
can 
address 
that 
at 
the 
status 
conference. I'll deny your request at this time. 
ZIMBAL:  I spoke to Attorney Hirsch this morning, and 
she said absolutely you can't do that. The Judge must 
recuse himself. 
THE COURT:  All right. He can provide his authority 
for that at the status conference, and he can send it 
by letter beforehand, by the way, if you want it 
addressed beforehand. 
¶11 That same day, Zimbal also wrote a letter to the court 
of appeals requesting assistance because the circuit court 
denied his oral request for recusal.  It provided in relevant 
part: 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
7 
 
I asked Attorney Hirsch if I could ask Judge Atkinson 
to recuse himself from my case based on him being 
biased and [not] impartial.  She said absolutely.  If 
you ask as the defendant he has to recuse himself 
especially after a[n] appeal from his Court. 
 . . .  
There is no way Judge Atkinson can be impartial and I 
know that since I asked him to recuse himself from 
this case.  He has to.  Can you please look into this 
for me as I feel you need to be aware of this. 
 . . .  
Yes I want him off my case and feel this is critical 
to me! 
¶12 The court of appeals replied to Zimbal's letter on 
October 17, 2013, copying Judge Atkinson and the Clerk of the 
Circuit Court.  It denominated his request as one for 
"substitution or recusal" of a judge and explained that it no 
longer had jurisdiction over his cases because the cases had 
been remitted to the circuit court.  The reply recommended that 
he consult with trial counsel about how to proceed: 
The court has asked me to respond to your October 7, 
2013 letter regarding substitution or recusal of Judge 
Atkinson.  The records in these cases ha[ve] been 
remitted to the circuit court and this court has no 
jurisdiction after remittitur.  Therefore, the court 
will take no action on your letter.  We suggest that 
you consult with your trial counsel about how to 
proceed. 
¶13 When the State failed to produce Zimbal for a 
scheduled status hearing on October 15, and counsel had not yet 
been appointed, the circuit court rescheduled the status hearing 
to October 29, 2013.  Zimbal appeared at that status conference 
but without counsel.  The circuit court acknowledged that Zimbal 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
8 
 
was unrepresented and adjourned the hearing until an attorney 
could be appointed to represent him. 
¶14 On November 1, 2013, the State Public Defender 
appointed Zimbal new trial counsel who subsequently filed a 
request for substitution of judge seventeen days later, on 
November 18, 2013.  It asserted: 
Zimbal made a written request for substitution before 
the statutory deadline, however he was not represented 
by counsel at the time and mistakenly sent the request 
to the Court of Appeals.  Undersigned counsel was 
appointed by the State Public Defender on November 1, 
2013. 
 . . .  
 
Zimbal requests that the Court deem this motion 
timely, because counsel was only appointed after the 
statutory deadline had elapsed. 
The circuit court denied Zimbal's November 18, 2013, request for 
substitution, concluding that the "[d]efendant did not comply 
with Wis. Stat[]. § 971.20(7)." 
¶15 After Zimbal's request for substitution was denied, he 
went to trial on the original charges.  A jury found Zimbal 
guilty of three counts in the first case, and three counts in 
the second case.  The circuit court again sentenced Zimbal to 
consecutive maximum sentences, this time totaling nineteen years 
and six months, with  nine and a half years of initial 
confinement and ten years of extended supervision. 
¶16 Zimbal filed a postconviction motion requesting a new 
trial in the interest of justice or, in the alternative, a new 
trial 
due 
to 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel. 
 
His 
postconviction motion did not include a claim that any of 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
9 
 
Zimbal's attorneys had been ineffective for failing to file a 
timely request for substitution of judge.  The circuit court 
denied Zimbal's postconviction motion. 
¶17 On appeal, Zimbal raised only one issue:  whether the 
circuit court erred in denying his request for substitution of 
judge.  In an unpublished per curium opinion, the court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court order denying Zimbal's motion 
for substitution of judge.  It concluded that because "Zimbal 
failed to comply with Wis. Stat. § 971.20(7), he did not 
properly invoke his right to substitution of a circuit court 
judge and his motion was properly denied."7 
II 
¶18 At issue is whether Zimbal made a timely request for 
substitution of judge.  We are called upon to interpret and 
apply relevant statutes.  The interpretation and application of 
a statute present questions of law that we decide independently 
of the decisions rendered by the circuit court and the court of 
appeals.  State v. Harrison, 2015 WI 5, ¶37, 360 Wis. 2d 246, 
858 N.W.2d 372. 
¶19 Statutory interpretation begins with examining the  
language of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for 
Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the 
                                                 
7 State v. Zimbal, Nos. 2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. July 6, 2016). 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
10 
 
statute means so that it may be given its "full, proper, and 
intended effect."  Id., ¶44. 
¶20 We give statutory language "its common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning."  Id., ¶45.  Statutory language is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used, in relation to 
the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes."  Id., 
¶46. 
III 
 
¶21 In 
determining 
whether 
Zimbal's 
request 
for 
substitution of judge was timely, we must consider both the 
plain meaning of the substitution statute and whether, under the 
circumstances, Zimbal was provided with an opportunity to 
exercise the statutory right to substitution.  Zimbal asserts 
that his request for substitution of judge was timely because:  
(1) prior to having an attorney appointed he made an oral 
request for substitution in the circuit court and a written 
request in the court of appeals; (2) the circuit court 
instructed him that the filing of a motion for substitution 
should be deferred until after an attorney was appointed; and 
(3) his trial counsel formalized the substitution request 17 
days after being appointed. 
 
¶22 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.20(7), a request for 
substitution of judge following appeal must be filed within 20 
days after remittitur: 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
11 
 
If an appellate court orders a new trial or sentencing 
proceeding, a request under this section may be filed 
within 20 days after the filing of the remittitur by 
the appellate court, whether or not a request for 
substitution was made prior to the time the appeal was 
taken. 
Zimbal argues first that he complied with the deadline set forth 
in the statute.  He asserts that his request for substitution of 
judge was timely because he requested substitution orally in the 
circuit court and in writing in the court of appeals before the 
20 day deadline had passed. 
¶23 We pause to briefly address Zimbal's use of the word 
"recuse," rather than "substitute" in his oral request to the 
circuit court and subsequent written request to the court of 
appeals.  The State asserts that Zimbal did not comply with Wis. 
Stat. § 971.20(7) because both his oral request and his letter 
to the court of appeals requested Judge Atkinson's recusal, 
rather than a substitution of judge. 
¶24 A motion for recusal is distinct from a request for 
substitution of judge.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.20, a 
criminal defendant has the right to substitute a judge without 
providing a reason for the requested substitution.  Harrison, 
360 Wis. 2d 246, ¶39.  Once a request for substitution is filed 
"in proper form and within the proper time, the judge whose 
substitution has been requested has no authority to act further 
in the action except to conduct the initial appearance, accept 
pleas and set bail."  Wis. Stat. § 971.20(9).  In contrast, a 
motion for recusal requires a defendant to overcome the 
presumption that a judge has acted fairly, impartially, and 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
12 
 
without bias.  See State v. Goodson, 2009 WI App 107, ¶8, 320 
Wis. 2d 166, 771 N.W.2d 385. 
¶25 Although a motion for recusal is distinct from a 
request for substitution of judge, this court has previously 
allowed a request for substitution when the defendant used the 
word "recuse" in his filings.  See Harrison, 360 Wis. 2d 246, 
¶26.  In Harrison, the defendant used phrases like "change of 
judge" and "recusal" in some of his filings, rather than 
"substitution."  Id.  Nevertheless, this court determined that 
"the defendant's goal was clear:  He did not want [the judge] on 
the instant case or the other criminal case in which he was 
being charged."  Id.  The same is true here. 
¶26 Zimbal used the word "recuse," but it was clear that 
he did not want the circuit court judge to preside over his 
criminal cases.  Before the circuit court, Zimbal orally stated 
that "[t]he Judge must recuse himself."  His written request to 
the court of appeals provided that "I want [the judge] off my 
case and feel this is critical to me!"  The court of appeals 
responded to Zimbal's letter by characterizing it as a letter 
"regarding substitution or recusal of Judge Atkinson." 
¶27 As Harrison indicates, Zimbal's request could be 
liberally construed as a request for substitution.  See 
Harrison, 360 Wis. 2d 246, ¶26.  Accordingly, we analyze 
Zimbal's oral request in the circuit court and written request 
to the court of appeals as a request for substitution of judge. 
¶28 We begin our statutory analysis with the language of 
the statute.  Kalal 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  Subsection (7) 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
13 
 
provides that a request for substitution of judge must be 
"filed."  Wis. Stat. § 971.20(7).  In this context, the common, 
ordinary and accepted meaning of the word filed is "to enter (a 
legal document) on public official record."  Am. Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 680 (3rd ed. 1992).  With 
this definition in mind, we look next to other sections of the 
statute to inform our analysis. 
¶29 Statutory language is interpreted in the context in 
which it is used, in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely-related statutes.  Kalal 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  Several 
other subsections of the same statute explicitly state that 
requests for substitution have to be "written."  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 971.20(3)(b), (4) and (5).  Likewise, § 971.20(10) sets forth 
the form for a substitution of judge request, which provides 
that a request be signed and dated by the defendant or his 
attorney: 
A request for substitution of a judge may be made in 
the following form: 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN 
CIRCUIT COURT 
... County 
 
State of Wisconsin 
vs. 
...(Defendant) 
 
Pursuant to s. 971.20 the defendant (or defendants) 
request (s) a substitution for the Hon. .... as judge 
in the above entitled action. 
 
Dated ..., ... (year). 
 
....(Signature of defendant or defendant's attorney) 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
14 
 
This proffered statutory form further supports our determination 
that a request for substitution must take the form of a written 
document, rather than an oral request. 
¶30 We consider next whether Zimbal's October 7, 2013, 
letter to the court of appeals complied with the statutory 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 971.20.  The plain language of the 
statute requires that a request for substitution of judge be 
filed with the circuit court.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 971.20(3), (4), 
(5), (8) and (10).  Additionally, as the court of appeals 
informed Zimbal, it did not have jurisdiction over his case 
after the remittitur was filed with the circuit court.  See 
State ex rel. Fuentes v. Wisconsin Ct. App., District IV, 225 
Wis. 2d 446, 452-53, 593 N.W.2d 48 (1999). 
¶31 Accordingly, neither Zimbal's oral request in the 
circuit court nor his written request to the court of appeals 
complied with the statutory requirements because a request for 
substitution of judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.20(7) must be 
filed in writing with the circuit court. 
¶32 Zimbal argues that even if his oral request in the 
circuit court and written request to the court of appeals are 
statutorily insufficient, his attorney's written request filed 
with the circuit court on November, 18, 2013, should be deemed 
timely.  He contends that because the circuit court told him 
that the issue of substitution would be deferred until counsel 
was appointed, he complied with the circuit court's instructions 
for filing a motion for substitution. 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
15 
 
¶33 After Zimbal made his oral request for recusal, the 
circuit court told Zimbal that "[s]ince you probably haven't 
done any research, I'll let your attorney do research on that 
issue and you can address that at the status conference.  I'll 
deny your request at this time."  Zimbal responded that he had 
spoken with his appellate counsel and she said "the Judge must 
recuse himself."  Again, the circuit court told Zimbal that his 
attorney could "provide his authority for that at the status 
conference, and he can send it by letter beforehand, by the way 
if you want it addressed beforehand."  Likewise, the court of 
appeals responded to Zimbal's letter by telling him to "consult 
with your trial counsel about how to proceed." 
¶34 Trial 
counsel's 
November 
18, 
2013, 
filing 
for 
substitution of judge requested that it be deemed timely because 
he was not appointed until after the statutory deadline had run. 
It provided in relevant part: 
Zimbal made a written request for substitution before 
the statutory deadline, however he was not represented 
by counsel at the time and mistakenly sent the request 
to the Court of Appeals.  Undersigned counsel was 
appointed by the State Public Defender on November 1, 
2013. 
 . . .  
Zimbal requests that the Court deem this motion 
timely, because counsel was only appointed after the 
statutory deadline had elapsed.  
¶35 The State responds that Zimbal could have filed a 
written motion for substitution because he had counsel prior to 
the appointment of his public defender on November 1, 2013.  
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
16 
 
According to the State, Zimbal was represented by Attorney Cano 
(the Regional Attorney Manager for the State Public Defender in 
Green Bay) who appeared in his administrative capacity at two 
status hearings on October 4, 2013, and October 7, 2013.  The 
State also emphasizes Zimbal indicated that before the hearing 
he spoke with Attorney Hirsch, his state appointed appellate 
counsel.  Additionally, the State asserts Attorney Hirsch should 
have filed the request for substitution of judge on Zimbal's 
behalf. 
¶36 The record indicates that after the remittitur was 
filed, Zimbal was not represented by trial counsel until 
November 1, 2013.  Attorney Hirsch was Zimbal's appointed 
appellate counsel and did not appear on his behalf after the 
appeal of his Bangert motion was concluded.  Although Attorney 
Cano appeared in the circuit court in his administrative 
capacity, he did not act as Zimbal's counsel.8  It was Zimbal, 
                                                 
8 The Office of the State Public Defender ("SPD") is a 
statutory creation and its attorneys and employees actions are 
governed by statute and administrative code rules.  See Wis. 
Stat. Ch. 977; Wis. Admin. Code Chs. PD 1-8. 
According to the amicus brief filed by the SPD, it has four 
separate divisions:  an Administrative Services Division, Trial 
Division, Appellate Division and an Assigned Counsel Division.  
It 
advises 
that 
"[r]esponsibility 
for 
determining 
client 
eligibility and appointing counsel in SPD staff and private bar 
cases is delegated to attorney managers and representatives in 
36 Trial Division offices and two Appellate Division offices." 
(continued) 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
17 
 
not Attorney Cano, who made the arguments before the circuit 
court at the October 7, 2013, status hearing. 
¶37 Additionally, the circuit court treated Zimbal as a 
pro se litigant until the newly appointed counsel, Attorney 
Hanes, appeared at the November 1, 2013, hearing.  It denied 
Zimbal's oral request for a new judge on October 7, 2013, 
stating "I'll let your attorney do research on that issue and 
you can address that at the status conference.  I'll deny your 
request at this time."  Zimbal was also unrepresented at an 
October 29, 2013, hearing during which the circuit court stated 
that "I think we've been able to determine there is no one 
appointed for you at this time." 
¶38 In the alternative, the State argues that even if 
Zimbal was unrepresented, he could have filed a written request 
for substitution despite the circuit court's instructions that 
he wait until counsel was appointed.  It relies on the court of 
appeals' reasoning that the circuit court's instructions did not 
make it "impossible" for Zimbal to comply with the statute: 
While Judge Atkinson's comments coupled with delays in 
the appointment of counsel for Zimbal may have lead 
Zimbal to conclude the court would not grant his 
request within twenty days of remittitur, nothing 
                                                                                                                                                             
Additionally, the SPD's amicus brief explains that within a 
single prosecution, appellate representation is considered a 
separate case from trial representation.  Wis. Admin. Code § PD 
2.11(1).  Separate fees are imposed for trial and appellate 
representation. 
 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§§ PD 
6.01 
and 
6.02.  
Likewise, certification and hiring requirements for trial and 
appellate cases are separate and distinct.  Wis. Admin. Code 
§ PD 1.04. 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
18 
 
prevented Zimbal from complying with the requirement 
for filing a written request within twenty days of 
remittitur.  Compliance with the statute was not 
impossible.9 
¶39 According to the State, the substitution statute 
demands strict adherence to its terms because Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.20(2) requires that the right to substitution "shall be 
exercised as provided in this section."  It further relies on 
the court of appeals decision in 
State v. Austin, 171 
Wis. 2d 251, 257, 490 N.W.2d 780 (Ct. App. 1992), which reasoned 
that 
"deviation 
from 
the 
requirements 
[of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.20(11)] would allow for substantial problems that are 
prevented by strict adherence to the statute." 
¶40 Here we make an exception to the rule of strict 
adherence 
because 
the 
circuit 
court 
directed 
that 
the 
substitution issue would again be addressed after trial counsel 
was appointed and  Zimbal followed that directive.  This limited 
exception comports with our prior case law allowing for an 
exception 
when 
a 
government-created 
obstacle 
prevents 
a 
defendant from complying with the statutory deadline. 
¶41 In 
the 
Baldwin-Tessmer-Tinti 
arraignment 
cases 
involving Wis. Stat. § 971.20(4), this court and the court of 
appeals allowed an exception to the rule of strict adherence to 
the statutory filing deadlines when a criminal defendant is 
arraigned before he receives notice of which judge will hear his 
                                                 
9 State v. Zimbal, Nos. 2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶8 (Wis. Ct. App. July 6, 2016). 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
19 
 
case.  See Baldwin v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 521, 530-532, 215 
N.W.2d 541 (1974); See also State ex rel. Tessmer v. Cir. Ct. 
Branch III, In & For Racine Cty., 123 Wis. 2d 439, 443, 367 
N.W.2d 235 (Ct. App. 1985); State ex rel. Tinti v. Cir. Ct. for 
Waukesha Cty., Branch 2, 159 Wis. 2d 783, 790, 464 N.W.2d 853 
(Ct. App. 1990). 
¶42 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.20(4), "[a] written 
request for the substitution of a different judge for the judge 
originally assigned to the trial of the action may be filed with 
the clerk before making any motions to the trial court and 
before arraignment."  In Baldwin, the defendant argued that when 
the circuit judge originally assigned to the case voluntarily 
disqualified himself after arraignment, Wis. Stat. § 970.20 
should 
have 
been 
construed 
to 
permit 
the 
defendant 
the 
opportunity to file a request for substitution of judge after 
the case was reassigned.  62 Wis. 2d at 529.  The Baldwin court 
agreed. 
¶43 The court observed that the requirement that a request 
for substitution be made prior to arraignment "works well in the 
majority of cases" because the defendant is normally arraigned 
before the judge who will hear the case.  Id.  However, it 
determined that in cases where the judge who handles the 
arraignment is not the judge who will preside over trial, strict 
compliance with Wis. Stat. § 971.20 is not mandated.  Id. at 
529-30. 
¶44 The reason for the defendant's inability to comply 
with the statutory deadline in Baldwin was a calendaring system 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
20 
 
utilized in Milwaukee County in which the judge assigned to 
handle the arraignment was not necessarily the same judge who 
would preside at trial.  Id. at 530.  However, Baldwin's 
rationale has been extended to other cases where a defendant has 
been unable to make a request for substitution due to a 
government-created obstacle. 
¶45 In Tessmer, the court of appeals explained that the 
"Baldwin rational is controlling" when a defendant does not know 
what judge will be assigned to try the case until after a plea 
is entered .  123 Wis. 2d at 443.  The Tessmer court explained 
that because a traffic citation does not inform a defendant of 
the judge assigned to trial, a defendant cannot exercise the 
statutory right to substitution prior to an initial court 
appearance.  Id.  Likewise, in Tinti, the court of appeals 
determined that because an intake system did not provide 
adequate notice in advance of arraignment of the assigned trial 
judge, an exception to the filing deadline should be made to 
allow for an opportunity to exercise the statutory right to 
substitution.  159 Wis. 2d at 790. 
¶46 This case is analogous to the arraignment cases 
because 
a 
government-created 
obstacle 
interfered 
with 
a 
defendant's opportunity to timely file for substitution.  When 
the circuit court instructed Zimbal to wait to file a request 
for substitution until trial counsel was appointed, this 
prevented Zimbal from complying with the statutory timeline.  In 
order to comply with the statutory deadline, Zimbal would have 
had to disregard the instructions of the circuit court.   
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
21 
 
¶47 Similar to the arraignment cases, a government-created 
obstacle prevented Zimbal from exercising the statutory right to 
substitution before the statutory deadline expired.  Zimbal 
followed the instructions of the circuit court when he waited 
until trial counsel was appointed to file a motion for 
substitution.  He was not able to exercise his statutory right 
to substitution when the circuit court instructed him to wait 
until counsel was appointed and then later denied the motion 
that counsel filed.   
¶48 Strict adherence to the 20 day filing deadline is 
problematic when, as here, a defendant follows a circuit court's 
instruction to defer filing a request for substitution of judge 
until after counsel is appointed.  A requirement that a 
defendant file a request for substitution within a 20 day time 
limit when a circuit court in essence extends the deadline until 
counsel is appointed is contrary to the goal of affording a 
defendant an opportunity to exercise the statutory right to 
substitution.  See Tessmer, 123 Wis. 2d at 443. 
¶49 Finally, we turn to the question of whether Zimbal's 
motion for substitution of judge filed on November 18, 2013, 
seventeen days after counsel was appointed, was timely under the 
circuit court's extended deadline. 
¶50 We again look to the arraignment cases, which have 
balanced the importance of giving effect to the legislative 
intent expressed in Wis. Stat. § 971.20 and preventing a 
defendant from using a request as a technique to disrupt 
scheduled calendaring or delay a scheduled trial.  See, e.g., 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
22 
 
Clark, 92 Wis. 2d at 628-29; see also Tessmer, 123 Wis. 2d at 
443-44.  As this court explained in Baldwin, "[o]ne thing which 
should not be allowed is the disruption of the orderly 
calendaring and trial of a case by a request on the day of trial 
or at a time which upsets a trial date."  62 Wis. 2d at 532. 
¶51 Accordingly, one of the considerations here is that 
there is no indication Zimbal intended to disrupt scheduled 
calendaring or delay a scheduled trial.  Just the opposite——he 
made an oral request as soon as possible and immediately 
followed-up with a written request to the court of appeals.  
There is also no evidence in the record that Zimbal had control 
over the timely appointment of trial counsel. 
¶52 Once counsel was appointed, he filed a motion for 
substitution of judge within 17 days.  Under the unique facts of 
this case, it is reasonable to restart the 20 day deadline once 
counsel had been appointed because the circuit court extended 
the deadline.  See Clark, 92 Wis. 2d at 627.  Accordingly, we 
also agree with Zimbal that the motion for substitution of judge 
filed by his trial counsel on November 18, 2013, although not 
timely under the statutory deadline, was timely here because the 
circuit court extended the deadline until after his trial 
counsel was appointed. 
IV 
¶53 In sum, we conclude that under the circumstances 
presented here, when a defendant follows a circuit court's 
instruction to defer filing a request for substitution of a 
judge until after counsel is appointed, that strict compliance 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR 
 
23 
 
with the 20 day deadline for filing a request for substitution 
after remittitur is not warranted.  Although Zimbal's motion for 
substitution of judge was not timely filed under the statute, it 
was timely filed in this case because the circuit court in 
essence extended the deadline until after his trial counsel was 
appointed.  Zimbal complied with the extended deadline when he 
filed a motion for substitution of judge within 20 days after 
his trial counsel was appointed.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court 
to vacate the judgments of conviction and for a new trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶54 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J.   (concurring).  
Although I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and remand for the assignment of a different circuit court judge 
to preside at Zimbal's trials, I respectfully concur in, but do 
not join, the majority opinion.  The majority opinion's 
standard, which cases have described as "relax[ing]" the rule of 
strict compliance with Wis. Stat. § 971.20(7),1 is too amorphous 
to provide guidance in future cases where a circuit court's 
interaction with an unrepresented defendant contributes to 
temporal problems with statutory compliance.   
¶55 Instead, I would apply the well-developed factors of 
the doctrine of equitable tolling and conclude that the circuit 
court herein tolled the statutory time limits of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.20(7) 
when 
it 
acknowledged 
Zimbal's 
request 
for 
substitution and told Zimbal that substitution would wait until 
counsel was appointed.  I would so conclude because Zimbal made 
a good faith error in relying on the circuit court's statement 
that his request for substitution on remand from his successful 
appeal would be taken up after counsel was appointed; he had no 
control over when counsel was appointed; and the State is not 
prejudiced by the application of equitable tolling.  Counsel 
                                                 
1 Majority Op. ¶41.  See State ex rel Tinti v. Circuit Court 
of Waukesha County, Branch II, 159 Wis. 2d 783, 788, 464 N.W.2d 
853 (Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that in "both Tessmer [v. 
Circuit Court Branch III, 123 Wis. 2d 439, 367 N.W.2d 235 (Ct. 
App. 1985)] and Baldwin v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 521, 215 N.W.2d 541 
(1974), the filing deadline of the substitution statute was 
relaxed where the judicial assignment system did not adequately 
advise, prior to arraignment, of the judge to whom the case was 
to be assigned for trial."). 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293.pdr 
 
2 
 
filed Zimbal's substitution request within 20 days of being 
appointed, which was timely due to the circuit court's tolling 
the temporal requirements of § 971.20(7) until counsel was 
appointed.  Therefore, the court of appeals erred when it 
affirmed the circuit court's denial of Zimbal's substitution 
request.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶56 This substitution issue arose shortly after Zimbal 
prevailed on appeal of the circuit court's denial of his Bangert 
motion to withdraw his pleas.2  Upon vacation of the judgments of 
conviction and his pleas, the court of appeals remanded Zimbal's 
cases to the circuit court on September 4, 2013.   
¶57 On October 7, 2013, when Zimbal appeared without 
counsel in circuit court, the following exchange took place: 
MR. ZIMBAL:  I'm also asking that you recuse 
yourself because there is no way you can be impartial. 
THE COURT:  Since you probably haven't done any 
research, I'll let your attorney do research on that 
issue 
and 
you 
can 
address 
that 
at 
the 
status 
conference.  I'll deny your request at this time. 
The circuit court then adjourned until an October 29 status 
conference to await appointment of counsel. 
¶58 On October 7, 2013, Zimbal also wrote to the court of 
appeals asking that the circuit court judge who presided at his 
convictions and sentencing be removed.  He said, "I feel I will 
                                                 
2 State v. Zimbal, Nos. 2012AP2234-CR & 2012AP2235-CR (Wis. 
Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2013); State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986).  
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293.pdr 
 
3 
 
never get any fair rulings in his courtroom due to his Bias to 
this case and his inability to be impartial and Fair."   
¶59 On October 11, 2013, remittitur occurred.  On October 
17, 2013, the clerk of the court of appeals replied to Zimbal, 
explaining that the records in his cases had been remitted to 
the circuit court.  On October 29, 2013, because counsel had not 
yet been appointed for Zimbal, the status conference was 
adjourned. 
¶60 On November 1, 2013, counsel was appointed.  On 
November 
18, 
2013, 
counsel 
filed 
a 
written 
request 
for 
substitution with the circuit court.  The circuit court denied 
the request as untimely under Wis. Stat. § 971.20(7) and 
proceeded to trial.   
¶61 A jury found Zimbal guilty of multiple counts in both 
pending cases.  The circuit court again sentenced Zimbal to 
consecutive, maximum sentences.  Zimbal filed a postconviction 
motion requesting a new trial in the interest of justice because 
his motion for substitution should have been granted but was 
not.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's denial 
of his postconviction motion.  We now reverse, vacate the 
judgments of conviction, and order the substitution of the 
circuit court judge and new trials on the pending charges. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶62 The State relies on Wis. Stat. § 971.20(7) to assert 
that Zimbal's requested substitution is not timely.  It 
provides: 
(7) SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGE FOLLOWING APPEAL.  If an 
appellate court orders a new trial or sentencing 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293.pdr 
 
4 
 
proceeding, a request under this section may be filed 
within 20 days after the filing of the remittitur by 
the appellate court, whether or not a request for 
substitution was made prior to the time the appeal was 
taken.  
Because remittitur occurred October 11, 2013 and Zimbal's 
counsel filed the substitution request on November 18, 2013, the 
State contends, and the circuit court and court of appeals 
concluded, the filing was not timely.   
¶63 Zimbal argues that the circuit court's statement that 
it would not address his request for substitution until after 
counsel was appointed tolled the filing requirements of Wis. 
Stat. § 971.20(7) until counsel was appointed.  He asserts that 
the doctrine of equitable tolling should be applied because he 
tried to bring his right of substitution to the circuit court's 
attention; he relied in good faith on the circuit court's 
statement; he had no control over when counsel would be 
appointed; and counsel filed a written request for substitution 
within 20 days of being appointed.  
A.  Standard of Review 
¶64 We have not set a clear standard of review that should 
be applied to a circuit court's decision in regard to equitable 
tolling.  However, when the material facts are not contested, we 
have reviewed whether temporal performance of an act has been 
equitably tolled independent of the decisions of the court of 
appeals and the circuit court, but benefitting from their 
discussions.  State v. Nichols, 2001 WI 119, 247 Wis. 2d 1013, 
635 N.W.2d 292.  Here, material facts are uncontested and 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293.pdr 
 
5 
 
therefore, we independently review whether the doctrine of 
equitable tolling is appropriate for us to apply. 
B.  Equitable Tolling 
¶65 "Equitable tolling is a remedy that permits a court to 
allow an action to proceed when justice requires it, even though 
a statutory time period has elapsed."  51 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Limitations of Actions § 153 (2017).  "Equitable tolling focuses 
on whether there was excusable delay by the plaintiff."  Id.  
The doctrine may be applied when a claimant has made a good 
faith error and there is an absence of prejudice to others if it 
is applied.  Id., § 154.  
¶66 We have employed equitable tolling when a required act 
is dependent on a prior necessary act of another over whom the 
person seeking equitable tolling has no control.  Nichols, 247 
Wis. 2d 1013, ¶26.  Wisconsin appellate courts have tolled 
statutory deadlines as an equitable solution for harsh results 
that would follow from a required action outside of defendant's 
control.  Walker v. McCaughtry, 2001 WI App 110, ¶13, 244 
Wis. 2d 177, 629 N.W.2d 17 (citing Steldt v. McCaughtry, 2000 WI 
App 176, ¶17, 238 Wis. 2d 393, 617 N.W.2d 201).   
¶67 In an equitable tolling defense, courts must determine 
the date on which tolling may have occurred.  This may be a 
factual or a legal question.  Griffin v. Smith, 2004 WI 36, ¶38, 
270 Wis. 2d 235, 677 N.W.2d 259.  If the question is factual, a 
remand is required.  At other times, as when material facts are 
uncontested, the date on which tolling may occur will be 
established as a matter of law.  Id.   
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293.pdr 
 
6 
 
¶68 Here, Zimbal requested counsel; however, he had no 
control over when counsel would be appointed.  On October 7, 
while Zimbal was unrepresented, the circuit court said that 
Zimbal's substitution request would wait until counsel was 
appointed.  On October 7, 2013, Zimbal also brought his 
substitution request to the clerk of the court of appeals, and 
he continued to wait for the appointment of counsel.   
¶69 In regard to Zimbal's equitable tolling argument, the 
State does not assert that it would be prejudiced by granting 
Zimbal's substitution request.  The State merely asserts that 
the cases Zimbal cites deal with prisoners and should not excuse 
Zimbal's failure to file a written substitution request.   
¶70 I agree with Zimbal.  He relied on the circuit court's 
directive that his substitution request would wait until after 
counsel was appointed.  He made a good faith error in waiting 
for the appointment of counsel, and the State is not prejudiced 
by the application of equitable tolling to his request for 
substitution under Wis. Stat. § 971.20(7).  Accordingly, I 
conclude that the circuit court's October 7, 2013 decision 
tolled 
the 
temporal 
requirements 
for 
substitution 
under 
§ 971.20(7) until after counsel was appointed.   
¶71 Counsel was appointed for Zimbal on November 1, 2013.  
Because Zimbal's counsel had 20 days after appointment to file a 
substitution request, his filing was due on or before November 
21.  He filed for substitution on November 18, 2013.  Zimbal's 
substitution request was timely. 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293.pdr 
 
7 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶72 In conclusion, I would apply the well-developed 
factors of the doctrine of equitable tolling and conclude that 
the circuit court herein tolled the statutory time limits of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.20(7) when it acknowledged Zimbal's request for 
substitution and told Zimbal that substitution would wait until 
counsel was appointed.  I would so conclude because Zimbal made 
a good faith error in relying on the circuit court's statement 
that his request for substitution on remand from his successful 
appeal would be taken up after counsel was appointed; he had no 
control over when counsel was appointed; and the State is not 
prejudiced by the application of equitable tolling.  Counsel 
filed Zimbal's substitution request within 20 days of being 
appointed, which was timely due to the circuit court's tolling 
the temporal requirements of § 971.20(7) until counsel was 
appointed.  Therefore, the court of appeals erred when it 
affirmed the circuit court's denial of Zimbal's substitution 
request.  Having so stated, I respectfully concur in the 
majority opinion.   
¶73 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY and DANIEL KELLY join this concurrence. 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶74 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the opinion of the court because it is written narrowly and tied 
to the unique circumstances present in this case.  However, I 
write separately to emphasize that a defendant's right to the 
substitution of his judge under Wis. Stat. § 971.20 "is a matter 
of legislative grace, not constitutional mandate."  State ex 
rel. Garibay v. Circuit Court for Kenosha Cty., 2002 WI App 164, 
¶9, 256 Wis. 2d 438, 647 N.W.2d 455.  Therefore, the legislature 
could eliminate § 971.20 entirely if it wished to do so.  
Although one does have a statutory right to substitution, that 
right is far from a constitutional right. 
¶75 While I join the court's opinion, I do not endorse all 
of the reasoning present in the cases the court cites.  Many of 
these cases refer to a defendant's "ability to exercise his 
right of substitution intelligently."  Clark v. State, 92 
Wis. 2d 617, 628, 286 N.W.2d 344 (1979).  When words like 
"intelligently" exercise are used, that cannot be read to mean 
that somehow a person needs to affirmatively waive the right to 
substitution, which is just not the case.  In fact, missing the 
statutory deadline in and of itself results in a relinquishment 
of the right.  There need not be anything particularly 
"intelligent" about missing that deadline.  See, e.g., State v. 
Naydihor, 2004 WI 43, ¶55 n.11, 270 Wis. 2d 585, 678 N.W.2d 220 
("Naydihor . . . attempted to exercise his statutory right to 
automatic substitution, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.20(5).  The 
motion was denied because it was untimely."); State v. Beaty, 57 
Wis. 2d 531, 542, 205 N.W.2d 11 (1973) ("Defendant claims error 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
on the part of the trial court in refusing to grant a motion for 
substitution of judges. . . . The motion was not timely, and was 
properly denied.").  I would therefore take this opportunity to 
modify the case law language that could be read to suggest that 
somehow waiver must be intelligently done and that seems to 
bestow upon this statutory right a prominence and protections it 
does not merit.  I am nevertheless able to join the court's 
opinion because it does not weigh in on the correctness of that 
language.   
¶76 Ultimately, I agree that under the unusual facts 
presented, Zimbal is entitled to relief.  While Zimbal's later 
request, in and of itself, would otherwise have been properly 
denied under the plain terms of Wis. Stat. § 971.20(7), the 
circuit court had previously directly assured the defendant that 
it would allow the defendant additional time to request 
substitution and in fact, specifically denied the defendant's 
ability to timely file under the statute.  The defendant was not 
allowed to timely file pursuant to the statute because the 
circuit court postponed addressing that request.  But then the 
circuit court, after the statutory deadline had passed, but 
still timely under the circuit court's order, then denied the 
defendant's request citing the statute and concluding that it 
was untimely.  Clearly, these are unique facts. Indeed, 
litigants should be hesitant to cite this case as authority in 
the future in circumstances not identical to what occurred here.  
Absent these unique facts, an untimely filing would be just 
that.  It need not be intelligently waived. 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
¶77 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.  
 
 
Nos.  2015AP1292-CR & 2015AP1293-CR.akz 
 
1