Title: Marvel v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 19, 2014
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 13, 2014

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LARRY D. MARVEL,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 19, 2014 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and  
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0510007925 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: January 21, 2014 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
March 13, 2014 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
 
This 13th day of March 2014, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief as amended and the appellee’s motion to affirm, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
In 2006, the appellant, Larry D. Marvel, was found guilty by a 
Superior Court jury of Criminal Solicitation in the Second Degree and Conspiracy 
in the Second Degree.  Marvel was sentenced as a habitual offender to life in 
prison plus two years at Level V.  This Court affirmed Marvel’s convictions on 
direct appeal.1 
                                          
 
1 Marvel v. State, 2007 WL 2713271 (Del. Sept. 18, 2007).    
2 
 
(2) 
This appeal is from the Superior Court’s denial of Marvel’s third 
motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 
(“Rule 61”).  It is well-settled that when reviewing a denial of postconviction 
relief, this Court will address any procedural bars before considering the merits of 
any claim for relief.2 
(3) 
Having considered the Rule 61(i) procedural bars in this case, the 
Court has determined, as did the Superior Court, that Marvel’s third postconviction 
motion is procedurally barred as untimely,3 repetitive4 and formerly adjudicated.5  
In the absence of a constitutional violation,6 a newly recognized retroactively 
applicable right,7 or any indication that reconsideration of Marvel’s claims is 
warranted in the interest of justice,8 we conclude that the Superior Court did not err 
when denying Marvel’s third motion for postconviction relief.   
                                          
 
2 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
3 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (barring claim filed more than one year after judgment is 
final). 
4 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) (barring any ground for relief not asserted in a prior 
postconviction proceeding). 
5 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) (barring formerly adjudicated claim). 
6 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing in pertinent part that the procedural bar of 
(i)(1) and (2) shall not apply to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because 
of a constitutional violation). 
7 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (providing that an untimely motion may be considered 
when the movant asserts a retroactively applicable right that has been newly recognized). 
8 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2), (4) (barring claim unless consideration is warranted in the 
interest of justice). 
3 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice