Title: Ex parte Shana M. Flynn. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Shana M. Flynn v. Michael Patrick Flynn)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1070109
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 11, 2008

REL: 04/11/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1070109
____________________
Ex parte Shana M. Flynn
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Shana M. Flynn
v.
Michael Patrick Flynn)
(Autauga Circuit Court, DR-05-166.02)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Shana M. Flynn ("the mother") seeks a writ of mandamus
directing the Autauga Circuit Court to vacate its existing
1070109
2
order, entered in September 2007, denying her motion for a
protective order to prevent the taking of her deposition.
Among other things, the mother also requests in her petition
that this Court order the trial court to refrain from
requiring her to testify at any future hearing in the present
case until the resolution of a criminal case that is pending
against her.  We grant the petition to the extent it seeks the
vacation of the trial court's existing order.
In March 2006, the Autauga Circuit Court entered a
judgment divorcing the mother and Michael Patrick Flynn ("the
father").  Pursuant to the judgment, which was based on a
settlement agreement between the parties, the Autauga Circuit
Court awarded the parties joint legal custody of their two
minor children.  The trial court awarded the mother primary
physical custody of the children, and it awarded the father
visitation.
The case-action-summary sheet from the parties' divorce
proceeding reflects that after the trial court entered the
judgment of divorce a dispute arose concerning visitation and
certain other matters.  The father filed at least two motions
requesting that the trial court hold the mother in contempt.
1070109
The criminal matter was submitted to a grand jury in
1
August 2007; the grand jury issued an indictment against the
mother in November 2007. 
3
At a hearing in May 2007, the parties apparently reached an
agreement concerning some of their disputes, and the trial
court entered an order directing the mother to acquire life
insurance as required by the divorce judgment, directing her
to return $370 that she had withdrawn from the father's bank
account, and directing her to pay $750 of the father's
attorney fees.
In June 2007, as a result of an undercover sting
operation, the mother was arrested and charged with conspiracy
to solicit the murder of the father.   
1
In early July 2007, the father filed a petition to modify
custody; he sought sole legal custody and sole physical
custody of the children.  Also, the father requested that the
trial court enter an emergency order awarding him pendente
lite custody of the children.  The father based his petition
on the recent criminal charge against the mother and on her
alleged "extreme" instability "with possible psychological
issues rendering her completely unfit/unstable and unable to
care for the ... children."  In his petition, the father also
1070109
In his appellate brief, the father argues that the
2
mother's alleged failure to comply with prior "orders" of the
trial court constituted one of the grounds for his petition to
modify custody.  The only prior order discussed in the
father's petition for modification of custody is the May 2007
order.  The prayer for relief in the father's petition
requests that the trial court hold the mother in contempt for
failing to satisfy her obligations under the May 2007 order.
The father does not appear to assert in his petition that the
mother's alleged failure to comply with the May 2007 order was
grounds 
for 
modification 
of 
custody, 
nor 
are 
there 
allegations
concerning how her failure to comply with the order might
relate to the care or welfare of the children.  Even assuming
that the mother failed to comply with the obligations imposed
by the May 2007 order and that the father had properly raised
the issue in support of his custody-modification request, it
is unclear how the mother's conduct in that regard might
constitute grounds for modifying custody.  
4
requested that the trial court enter an order holding the
mother in contempt of court for failing to satisfy her
financial obligations to him under the May 2007 order and for
failing to provide him with documentation that she had
procured life insurance.  
2
A few days after the father filed his petition for
modification of custody, the trial court entered an order
awarding the father sole pendente lite custody (both legal and
physical) of the children.
The mother filed an answer denying most of the material
allegations in the father's petition for modification but
1070109
5
admitting that she had been charged with attempt to solicit
the father's murder.  The mother issued notices of deposition
to the father and Agent Scott Donovan, the undercover agent
with the Alabama Bureau of Investigation whom she allegedly
solicited to murder the father.  
The father filed a motion seeking a psychological
evaluation of the mother to determine whether she posed any
danger to the children.  The mother objected to the
psychological evaluation to the extent it might require her to
discuss any matters regarding the pending criminal charge
against her.  Also, in late July 2007, the father filed a
motion to quash the mother's deposition subpoenas.  The father
argued in part that it would "be inherently unfair and
substantially prejudic[ial] ... to require him to give a
deposition ... knowing that the [mother] has no intention of
making herself available for the same, without restrictions or
asserting [her] Fifth Amendment [p]rivilege [against self-
incrimination]."  The father requested that the trial court
enter an order staying all depositions pending a hearing. 
In August 2007, after conducting a pendente lite hearing,
the 
trial 
court 
instructed 
the 
parties 
to 
schedule
1070109
Based on copies of correspondence submitted by the father
3
as an exhibit to his appellate brief, on September 12, 2007,
counsel for the father wrote a letter to counsel for the
mother suggesting several possible deposition dates in
September 2007 and one in early October 2007.  Counsel for the
mother responded in a letter stating, in part:
"Of the dates you propose, I have selected the dates
of September 18 & 19, 2007, beginning at 2:15 p.m.
on each date, in which to depose the [father] and
Agent Donovan.  It is my understanding that you will
depose my client after the conclusion of these
depositions on September 19. ...  I will need to
hear from you promptly on this matter as I intend on
issuing Donovan's deposition subpoena this morning.
Deposition notices will follow shortly." 
In her reply brief, the mother does not deny the existence of
the above-described correspondence or the accuracy of the
content.  However, there is nothing in the materials before us
to reflect that the trial court was presented with the details
of the parties' September 12 and September 13 correspondence
6
depositions, and it set another pendente lite hearing for
September 13, 2007.  A few days before the September 13
hearing, the father filed a motion alleging that the parties
had been unable to arrange for depositions because of
scheduling conflicts.  The father requested that the trial
court reschedule the September 13 hearing for a later date and
that it order the parties to make themselves available for
deposition on September 13.  The trial court rescheduled the
review hearing, but it apparently did not order the parties to
make themselves available for deposition on September 13.   
3
1070109
or that that correspondence was made part of the record in the
present case.  Thus, we will not consider the content of the
letters in determining whether the trial court exceeded its
discretion in denying the mother's motion for a protective
order, filed on September 19, 2007, and discussed infra.  See
Ex parte Turner,  840 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 2002)(stating the
well-settled 
rule 
that "the appellate court will consider only
that factual material available of record to the trial court
for its consideration in deciding the motion").  
Although the materials before us do not include either
4
a copy of the motion to quash or a transcript of the September
18, 2007, conference call, the information in the text
concerning the motion to quash and the granting of that motion
7
On September 13, 2007, the mother issued a notice of
deposition to the father; the father's deposition was to occur
on September 18, 2007, immediately after Agent Donovan's
deposition, which was also noticed for September 18, 2007.
Subsequently, the father issued a notice of deposition to the
mother; the mother's deposition was to occur on September 19,
2007.
 Agent Donovan did not appear for his scheduled
deposition, and, as a result, the parties' counsel held a
conference call with the trial court on September 18, 2007.
During the conference call, the trial court informed counsel
for the parties that a motion to quash had been filed as to
Agent Donovan's deposition subpoena and that it was granting
the  motion.   Following the conference call, the mother took
4
1070109
is undisputed.  Further, it is clear from the transcript of a
September 19, 2007, conference call between the parties'
counsel and the trial court, see discussion, infra, that the
mother was not permitted to take Agent Donovan's deposition on
September 18.
The father asserts in his brief to this Court that,
during the September 18 conference call, after the trial court
granted the motion to quash Agent Donovan's deposition
subpoena:
"Counsel for the [mother] ... argued with the
Court's 
ruling 
concerning 
[Agent] 
Donovan's
deposition and suggested that his client may no
longer be in a position to offer any testimony in
the case if she were not permitted to take the
deposition 
of 
[Agent] 
Donovan. 
 
Upon 
this
development, Counselor for the [father] ... again
renewed and raised the issue already addressed with
the Court that it would be inherently unfair and
prejudicial to the [father] to be required to give
deposition testimony if, in fact, the [mother] was
changing her position and refusing to give any
testimony at all by way of deposition.  Furthermore,
in presenting said argument, Counsel for the
[father] explained to the Court that there were
other necessary issues of discovery including the
[mother]'s work history, medical/physical issues
concerning the children, changes of residences and
other relevant issues as to 'fitness' not related in
any way to the pending criminal charge; and, that
this discovery was necessary for the development of
the [father]'s case in chief to modify custody.  At
the conclusion of the legal argument, the Court
recognized the need for discovery on these issues
and ordered the parties to proceed with the
deposition of the [father] on September 18th at 2:15
p.m. and to proceed with the deposition of the
[mother] 
on 
September 
19th 
at 
2:15 
p.m.,
specifically instructing counselors that if any
8
1070109
questions to the [mother] were in any way related to
the pending criminal charge, that counsel for the
[mother] should 'certify the question' on the record
and have the questions presented to the Trial Court
for ruling the following day." 
(Emphasis omitted.)  The foregoing factual statements are not
supported by the materials before us, however, and we will
therefore not consider them.  See Ex parte Turner, 840 So. 2d
at 135. 
9
the father's deposition.   
On September 19, 2007, the mother filed a motion for a
protective order.  Relying on this Court's holding in Ex parte
Dinkel, 956 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 2006), the mother sought to
prevent "the taking of her deposition until such time as the
criminal charge against her [was] resolved."  In Dinkel, this
Court stated, in part:
"This Court consider[s] three issues when deciding
whether to issue the writ of mandamus and stay the
[civil] 
proceeding [pending resolution of the
criminal proceeding]: (1) whether the civil and
criminal proceedings [are] parallel; (2) whether
[the movant]'s Fifth Amendment protection against
self-incrimination [is] threatened by his testifying
in the [civil] proceeding; and (3) whether the
requirements of the balancing test established in Ex
parte Baugh, 530 So. 2d 238, 244 (Ala. 1988), [are]
met. ...
"... [T]he same concerns apply to a party
seeking a protective order."
1070109
10
956 So. 2d at 1133 (relying on  Ex parte Rawls, 953 So. 2d 374
(Ala. 2006)). 
After filing her motion for a protective order, the
mother appeared for her deposition, but she refused to
testify.  The parties' counsel then participated in a
conference call with the trial court concerning the mother's
motion for a protective order.  The transcript of the
conference call reveals the following discussion:
"THE COURT:  I thought y'all had agreed
yesterday that there was going –- that you were
going to take the parties' depositions.
"[FATHER'S COUNSEL]:  Well, not only that,
Judge, but through my argument at our last two
hearings and in conversations with [the mother's
counsel], I have consistently refused to put [the
father] up if I wasn't going to be able to at least
put ... [the mother] under oath and either get her
to plead the Fifth or give me a deposition or
partial deposition.  And after putting my client up,
then I get this motion for a protective order filed
on the eve of our turn, for lack of a better phrase.
But that having been said Judge, I want to address
the issue and the case cited in the [mother's]
motion. [In Dinkel,] there is a distinction, a clear
distinction, that I want to make in my –- since I
haven't had a chance to file a written response to
this motion, I'm reduced to making it verbally.
"THE COURT:  Well, I think I –- I think I know
what your argument is.  And that is that [Dinkel] is
a –- ... was apparently an automobile accident where
there's a suit about the automobile accident and a
1070109
In her motion for a protective order, the mother did not
5
assert Agent Donovan's failure to appear for his deposition or
the trial court's granting of the motion to quash Agent
Donovan's deposition subpoena as a basis for her motion. 
11
criminal action concerning the automobile accident
as well.
"[FATHER'S COUNSEL]:  Exactly.
"THE 
COURT: 
 
Which 
made 
it 
a 
parallel
proceeding.
"[FATHER'S COUNSEL]:  Right.  And any testimony
that that deponent would have given about that
incident regarding wantonness or negligence could
have implicated him or waived his Fifth Amendment
privilege in any criminal proceeding for the same
thing.
"What I want to do is take at least a partial
deposition of [the mother] on other issues, such as
where she's resided, her income, other issues of
fitness.  And then once I get to anything remotely
related to her pending criminal proceedings, if she
asserts her Fifth Amendment privilege, I think she's
well within her rights.  And that is in the spirit
of the case that's been cited.
"THE COURT:  Okay.  [Counsel for the mother.]
"[MOTHER'S COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, the first
thing I would note is as of yesterday, we had all
agreed I would depose Agent Donovan as well
yesterday; and that did not happen.
  Secondly, the
[5]
Dinkel case makes clear that it is inappropriate to
require 
a 
defendant 
in 
a 
parallel 
criminal
proceeding 
to 
selectively 
invoke 
the 
Fifth
Amendment.
"THE COURT:  This is not a –- is this a parallel
proceeding?
1070109
The 
colloquy 
from 
the 
September 
19, 
2007, 
conference 
call
6
reflects that the trial court understood that the parties had
previously reached some agreement concerning the taking of
their 
respective 
depositions. 
 
The 
colloquy, 
however, 
suggests
that the trial court did not rely on the parties' agreement as
the basis for denying the mother's motion for a protective
order.  Instead, the colloquy suggests that the trial court
relied on its conclusion that the custody-modification case
was not a civil proceeding that was "parallel" to the
criminal proceeding pending against the mother.
The father urges this Court to conclude that the mother
is "estopped" from refusing to submit to deposition because of
the parties' "agreement" concerning the depositions and his
alleged reliance on that agreement as the basis for his
submitting to deposition on September 18.  Any such estoppel,
however, would have had to be based on findings of fact (1)
regarding the terms of the parties' "agreement," the mother's
conduct, and the father's "reliance," as to each of which the
materials before us in varying degrees are unclear or
12
"[MOTHER'S COUNSEL]:  It is.  It pertains
exactly to the –-
"THE COURT:  No.  This proceeding pertains to
the change of custody of children.
"[MOTHER'S COUNSEL]:  Right.  Based on the
allegation of criminal activity, which is the
solicitation to commit murder.
 
"THE COURT:  Not –- is it so –- is that solely
the grounds?
"[FATHER'S COUNSEL]:  No, sir.
"[MOTHER'S COUNSEL]:  Well, that is the –-
"THE COURT:  All right.  Here we go.  Motion for
protective order denied.  Thank you, gentlemen."6
1070109
omissive, see generally notes 3 and 4, supra, and (2) which
the trial court did not explicitly make.  Further, as noted,
the colloquy does not suggest that the trial court's decision
depended on an estoppel theory; rather, it suggests that the
decision was based on the trial court's view as to whether the
present case involved a "parallel" proceeding.  Thus we
decline to address here whether estoppel might be a proper
ground to support the  denial of the mother's motion.  See,
e.g., Hinds v. Hinds, 887 So. 2d 267, 272 n.2 (Ala. Civ. App.
2003). 
As part of the father's motion to compel he also
7
requested that the trial court sanction the mother for failing
to honor her agreement to "present[] herself for deposition
... and give testimony as to issues not related to the pending
criminal matter ... while reserving the right to assert her
Fifth Amendment privilege on any matters or questions related
to the pending criminal matter."  The trial court was unable
to rule on the father's motion because of stays subsequently
entered by this Court and by the Court of Civil Appeals before
the denial of the mother's petition for the writ of mandamus
on October 16, 2007, Ex parte Flynn (No. 207006, Oct. 16,
2007), __ So. 2d __ (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)(table). 
13
After the conference call, the mother refused to testify
at her deposition, and the father filed a motion to compel the
mother to submit to deposition.   The mother filed a petition
7
for writ of mandamus with the Court of Civil Appeals and an
emergency motion to stay further proceedings in the trial
court.  The Court of Civil Appeals granted the motion to stay
but subsequently denied the mother's petition without an
opinion and lifted the stay.  Ex parte Flynn (No. 207006, Oct.
16, 2007), __ So. 2d __ (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)(table).  The
1070109
14
mother filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with this
Court, as well as a motion requesting that we stay further
proceedings in the trial court pending our resolution of her
petition.  We granted the motion to stay but left undisturbed
the trial court's award of pendente lite custody to the
father.
The mother asks this Court to direct the trial court to
vacate its order denying her motion for a protective order.
We grant the mother's petition in part.
The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary writ by which "a
party seeks emergency and immediate appellate review of an
order that is otherwise interlocutory and not appealable."
Rule 21(e)(4), Ala. R. App. P.  Mandamus is appropriate 
"only where there is (1) a clear legal right in the
petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative
duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by
a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate
remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the
court."  
Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc., 882 So. 2d 307, 309-10 (Ala.
2003) (quoting  Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499
(Ala. 1995)).  This Court may grant a writ of mandamus "to
prevent an abuse of discretion, or to correct an arbitrary
action outside of the exercise of a reasonable discretion."
1070109
The "balancing test" is the subject of extensive
8
exposition by this Court in Ex parte Ebbers, 871 So. 2d 776,
787-88 (Ala. 2003).
15
Foshee v. State, 210 Ala. 155, 157, 97 So. 565, 566 (1923).
A petition for a writ of mandamus is the appropriate means for
challenging the denial of a motion to stay discovery or of a
motion for a protective order under circumstances such as
those in the present case.  See Ex parte Weems, 711 So. 2d
1011 (Ala. 1998); see also Dinkel, supra.
As noted above, in Dinkel this Court stated that we 
"consider[] three issues when deciding whether to
issue the writ of mandamus and stay the [civil]
proceeding: (1) whether the civil and criminal
proceedings 
[are] 
parallel; 
(2) 
whether 
[the
movant]'s 
Fifth 
Amendment 
protection 
against
self-incrimination [is] threatened by his testifying
in the [civil] proceeding; and (3) whether the
requirements of the balancing test
 established in
[8]
Ex parte Baugh, 530 So. 2d 238, 244 (Ala. 1988),
[are] met. ...
956 So. 2d at 1133 (emphasis added).  
The trial court's apparent conclusion that the present
case did not involve a civil proceeding "parallel" to the
pending criminal case against the mother is incorrect for two
reasons.  First, to the extent the concept of a "parallel"
proceeding relates to the time of the proceeding, there is
clearly a parallel proceeding in the present case because
1070109
16
criminal charges against the mother were pending at all times
pertinent to the present case.  Second, as hereinafter
discussed, to the extent the concept of a "parallel"
proceeding relates to the nature of the claims and charges at
issue, the present case includes sufficient "overlap" of
issues and "implication" of the mother's Fifth Amendment
rights to constitute a parallel proceeding.  See, e.g., Ex
parte Baugh, 530 So. 2d 238, 239 (Ala. 1988)(civil claim
alleging slander filed while there was a pending grand-jury
investigation of, and eventual indictment for, the charge of
theft of property); Rawls, 953 So. 2d at 380 ("Because th[e]
criminal proceeding [relating to a charge of stalking the
former wife] and the divorce proceeding have some overlapping
acts, 
they 
must 
be 
considered 
parallel 
proceedings.
Therefore, Bryan [Rawls]'s motion for a stay cannot be denied
on the grounds that these are not parallel proceedings."
(emphasis added)).
The criminal proceeding at issue here involves a charge
that the mother attempted to hire Agent Donovan to murder the
father.  The present case involves the father's attempt to
prove that a material change of circumstances has occurred
1070109
17
since the entry of the divorce judgment so that it is in the
best interests of the parties' children for physical custody
to be changed from the mother to him and for him to have sole
legal custody.  The pertinent alleged changes of circumstance
described in the father's petition are (1) that the mother
attempted to hire Agent Donovan to murder the father, (2)
"[t]hat the [mother] is extremely unstable with possible
psychological issues rendering her completely unfit/unstable
and unable to care for the parties' minor children," and (3)
"[t]hat the [mother] told the parties' minor children that the
[father] 'caused her to get arrested' and that all of this is
his fault."
The father's petition to modify custody was filed soon
after the mother was arrested and charged with attempting to
solicit his murder.  Two of the alleged changes of
circumstances specifically relate to the mother's arrest, and
the third alleged change generically states that the mother is
unfit and unstable, with no indication that her unfitness and
instability are unrelated to the mother's alleged criminal
activity.   The father alleged in his July 2007 motion to
quash the mother's deposition subpoenas that he had "concerns
1070109
In his subsequent motion to compel, the 
father
9
acknowledged that in the August 2007 pendente lite hearing "it
was discussed [with the trial court] that if the [mother]
asserted her Fifth Amendment Privilege at her deposition that
the Court may infer that the allegations against her were true
in the civil" proceeding, i.e., that the trial court might
infer that she had in fact engaged in some criminal wrongdoing
that would support the father's petition for modification of
custody. 
18
about the [mother]'s mental state considering that fact that
she allegedly tried to hire a hit man to kill him."   Thus,
9
even the "unfitness and instability" allegations appear to
relate to the mother's alleged crime. 
Based on the foregoing, the mother's petition is due to
be granted in part.  The trial court is instructed to vacate
its September 2007 order denying the mother's motion for a
protective order and to proceed in a manner consistent with
this opinion. 
PETITION GRANTED IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, and Bolin, JJ., concur.