Title: State v. Wantland
Citation: 2014 WI 58
Docket Number: 2011AP003007-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2014

2014 WI 58 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP3007-CR  
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Derik J. Wantland, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
346 Wis. 2d 680, 828 N.W.2d 885 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No: 2013 WI App 36  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 20, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit  
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan 
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy Van Akkeren 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.) 
PROSSER, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., 
dissent. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendant-appellant-petitioner, 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Tristan S. Breedlove, assistant state public defender, 
with whom on the briefs was Susan E. Alesia, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Sarah 
K. Larson, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 58
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP3007-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2011CF56) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Derik J. Wantland, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Wantland, 2013 WI App 
36, 346 Wis. 2d 680, 828 N.W.2d 885, that affirmed the judgment 
and order of the Sheboygan County Circuit Court,1 which convicted 
Derik J. Wantland ("Wantland") of possession of a narcotic and 
denied his motion to suppress evidence. 
¶2 
Both the State and Wantland concede that the driver 
consented to the search of the vehicle in which the briefcase 
was located, and concede that the driver's consent was not 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Timothy M. Van Akkeren presided. 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
2 
 
limited in a way that would have excluded the briefcase from the 
search.2  Wantland's petition for review and argument assume that 
the driver's general consent to search was not limited until 
Wantland, the passenger, asked the officer whether he had a 
warrant for the briefcase.   Thus, this opinion addresses not 
whether the officer had the driver's general consent in the 
first instance, but rather, we address whether Wantland's 
question limited that consent.3 
¶3 
Wantland argues that the warrantless search of his 
briefcase, which led to the discovery of the narcotics, was 
unreasonable and therefore violated his rights under the Fourth 
                                                 
2 Indeed, Wantland's petition for review framed the issue as 
whether "[w]hen the passenger asks 'got a warrant for that?' 
before the officer opens a briefcase found in the hatchback of 
the car, has the driver's general consent to search the car been 
limited?"  This statement of the issue clearly assumes that the 
driver's initial consent to search was valid and extended to the 
briefcase.  Wantland framed his argument almost identically in 
his brief, arguing that his question "effectively limited the 
driver's general consent to search the car."  The State noted 
the concession, stating "[t]his case is not about the validity 
of the original consent to search the entire vehicle . . . [a]s 
Wantland 
concedes . . . the 
valid, 
unambiguous, 
unlimited, 
general consent to search the vehicle was given by someone with 
authority to consent——the brother."  Wantland did not object to 
this characterization of his position in his reply brief or at 
oral argument. 
3 Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent chooses to address an 
issue that is not relevant to why we accepted the petition for 
review.  In fact, the issue of whether the driver's initial 
consent to search was valid is the subject of long settled law, 
see State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, ¶19, 241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 
N.W.2d 891, and therefore would constitute mere error correction 
inappropriate for our review.  See Wis. Stat. § 809.62(1r)(a) 
(2013-14). 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
3 
 
Amendment.  Wantland contends that he asserted ownership of the 
briefcase and withdrew the driver's consent by asking "Got a 
warrant for that?" of the police officer who was conducting the 
search.  He further argues that the police officer had a duty to 
ask follow-up questions to clarify any ambiguity once Wantland 
asked his question. 
¶4 
The State argues that Wantland's question "Got a 
warrant for that? was too ambiguous to constitute a withdrawal 
of the driver's consent.  The State further contends that the 
officer was under no duty to clarify Wantland's question. 
¶5 
We conclude that Wantland did not effectively withdraw 
the driver's consent when he asked "Got a warrant for that?"   
Further, we conclude that police officers confronted with 
ambiguous statements, such as Wantland's, are not under a duty 
to ask follow-up questions to clarify the ambiguity.  As a 
result, we conclude that the search of the briefcase was 
reasonable under the circumstances, and we affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
On August 26, 2010, Sheboygan County Sheriff's Deputy 
Jason Brockway ("Deputy Brockway") stopped a vehicle in Random 
Lake, Wisconsin, for driving with a cracked windshield and a 
defective brake light.  The vehicle was being driven by 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
4 
 
Wantland's brother, Dennis Wantland ("the driver").4  Wantland 
was riding in the front passenger seat of the vehicle. 
¶7 
After issuing a written warning, Deputy Brockway asked 
the driver to step out of the car so that he could show him the 
brake light and explain why driving with a cracked windshield 
was dangerous.  Deputy Brockway then informed the driver that he 
was free to leave.  After walking back to his squad car, Deputy 
Brockway turned and asked the driver if there was "anything in 
the vehicle that wasn't supposed to be in the vehicle."5  When 
the driver responded that he did not believe there was, Deputy 
Brockway asked if he could search the car.6  The driver responded 
"Um, I don't see why not. We gotta get our tools and stuff out 
anyway."  Deputy Brockway then asked both men to step out of the 
vehicle and wait by the curb while he performed the search. 
                                                 
4 During the course of the search, Dennis Wantland informed 
Deputy Brockway that the vehicle was actually registered to his 
sister-in-law. 
5 An officer making this this type of statement is seeking 
general consent to search, rather than requesting permission to 
search for a certain item or items.  United States v. Canipe, 
569 F.3d 597, 605 (6th Cir. 2009). 
6 The police procedure whereby "a police officer attempts to 
obtain a person's consent to a search even though the officer 
has no legal basis to further detain the person" has been deemed 
acceptable.  State v. Kolk, 2006 WI App 261, ¶23 n.7, 298 
Wis. 2d 99, 726 N.W.2d 337.  This court has held that, so long 
as "a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the 
officer's questions and leave the scene, or otherwise terminate 
the encounter," such consent is a valid exception to the warrant 
requirement.  State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶35, 255 Wis. 2d 1, 
646 N.W.2d 834; see also State v. Jones, 2005 WI App 26, ¶¶9-10, 
278 Wis. 2d 774, 693 N.W.2d 104. 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
5 
 
¶8 
During Deputy Brockway's search of the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle, he noted some razor blades and asked 
what they were for.  The driver replied, "we got these little, 
um, utility knives that we use they're for-- painting the 
windows and stuff, [it's] easier to just paint over the trim 
then come back." 
¶9 
After searching the passenger compartment, Deputy 
Brockway opened the back hatch of the vehicle and observed a 
variety of tools and toolboxes, along with a briefcase.  Deputy 
Brockway asked what was in the briefcase.  Wantland responded, 
"A laptop. Uh. Got a warrant for that?"  Deputy Brockway 
responded, "I can open up the, uh, laptop" and proceeded to 
remove the briefcase from the vehicle.  Wantland then recounted 
the contents of the briefcase, stating "Yeah, it's uh, laptop, 
Visine, acid reflux." 
¶10 During his search of the briefcase, Deputy Brockway 
discovered pills that appeared to be inconsistent with the 
bottle in which they were found.7  A second officer, called in by 
Deputy Brockway for his expertise in identifying narcotics, 
verified that the pills were morphine.  The briefcase also 
contained letters and personal papers with Wantland's name on 
them.  At that point, Deputy Brockway arrested Wantland and 
informed him of his Miranda rights.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966).  A search incident to Wantland's arrest 
                                                 
7 The label indicated that the pill bottle should contain 
40mg antacid pills, but the pills Deputy Brockway discovered 
were marked "30mg." 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
6 
 
revealed two additional morphine pills concealed in some loose 
tobacco in Wantland's pocket. 
II. 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶11 On January 27, 2011, the State filed a complaint 
charging Wantland with possession of narcotic drugs without a 
prescription, 
as 
a 
repeater, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 961.41(3g)(am) and 939.62(1)(b) (2011-12).8  On February 14, 
2011, Wantland made his initial appearance, waived a reading of 
the complaint, and requested a preliminary hearing.  The court 
set Wantland's signature bond at $5,000.  On February 23, 2011, 
the court held a preliminary hearing, found probable cause to 
bind Wantland over for trial, and the State filed an information 
which alleged the same charge against Wantland.  On March 25, 
2011, Wantland was arraigned on the information and pled not 
guilty. 
¶12 On April 5, 2011, Wantland filed a motion to suppress 
the evidence uncovered during Deputy Brockway's search of the 
briefcase.9  On April 12, 2011, the circuit court held a hearing 
                                                 
8 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
9 Wantland also filed motions to suppress the fruits of his 
detention and to suppress any statements he made following his 
arrest.  Wantland admitted before the circuit court that these 
additional motions were "all connected to the search of the 
vehicle."  Because we conclude that the search in this case was 
reasonable, and because Wantland did not raise these issues in 
his petition for review, we need not address these arguments. 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
7 
 
on Wantland's motion.10  At the hearing, Wantland argued that 
there was no valid consent to search the vehicle because the 
circumstances of the stop were coercive.  Alternatively, 
Wantland argued that his question "Got a warrant for that?" was 
sufficient to withdraw any consent that may have been given.  
The State argued that the driver's consent to search the vehicle 
was valid and was not limited in any way, and that Wantland's 
question was not sufficient to withdraw the original consent. 
¶13 On May 2, 2011, the circuit court denied Wantland's 
motion to suppress.  The court concluded that the initial 
consent was voluntary and was not the result of any coercion or 
show of force on the part of Deputy Brockway.  The court further 
concluded Wantland's question did not withdraw the driver's 
original consent. 
¶14 On May 3, 2011, Wantland pled no contest to the charge 
pursuant to a plea agreement.  In exchange for his plea, the 
State agreed to recommend 18 months probation.  The circuit 
court accepted Wantland's plea, found him guilty, and accepted 
the State's recommendation with regard to sentencing. 
¶15 On December 21, 2011, Wantland appealed.  Before the 
court of appeals, Wantland narrowed the issue and argued that 
the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
because his question "Got a warrant for that?" effectively 
                                                 
10 Due to scheduling conflicts, the motion hearing had to be 
continued twice.  Additional testimony was taken on April 20, 
2011, and counsel presented brief arguments before the court's 
ruling on May 2, 2011. 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
8 
 
withdrew the general consent his brother had given Deputy 
Brockway.  The State again contended that, as the driver of the 
vehicle, the driver had apparent authority to consent to a 
search, and that Wantland's subsequent question did not withdraw 
that consent. 
¶16 On February 20, 2013, the court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court.  Wantland, 346 Wis. 2d 680, ¶1.  The court of 
appeals 
determined 
that, 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, a reasonable person would not have understood 
Wantland's question to be a withdrawal of his brother's general 
consent to search the vehicle.  Id., ¶¶8-9.  As a result, the 
court of appeals concluded that the search was legal and upheld 
the circuit court's denial of Wantland's motion to suppress.  
Id., ¶12. 
¶17 On March 22, 2013, Wantland petitioned this court for 
review, which we granted on November 21, 2013. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 "Our review of an order granting or denying a motion 
to suppress evidence presents a question of constitutional 
fact."  State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 
N.W.2d 463 (citing State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶15, 233 
Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621). 
¶19 "When presented with a question of constitutional 
fact, this court engages in a two-step inquiry."  Id. (citations 
omitted); see also State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶10, 317 
Wis. 2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569.  "First, we review the circuit 
court's 
findings 
of 
historical 
fact 
under 
a 
deferential 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
9 
 
standard, upholding them unless they are clearly erroneous.  
Second, we independently apply constitutional principles to 
those facts."  Id. (citations omitted).11 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
¶20 "The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-
initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those 
which are unreasonable."  Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 
(1991) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990)).  The 
United States Supreme Court has "long approved consensual 
searches because it is no doubt reasonable for the police to 
conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so."  Id. 
at 250-51 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 
(1973)).  Thus, "a search conducted pursuant to a valid consent 
is constitutionally permissible."  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222; 
see also Wis. Stat. § 968.10(2). 
¶21 "The scope of a search is generally defined by its 
expressed object."  Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 (citing United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)).  "One who consents to a 
search 'may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the 
search to which he consents.'"  State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, 
¶37, 241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891 (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 
252).  "But if his consent would reasonably be understood to 
extend to a particular container, the Fourth Amendment provides 
                                                 
11 In the case at issue the historical facts are undisputed.  
Therefore, this opinion focuses on the second step of the 
analysis: applying the undisputed facts to the constitutional 
standard. 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
10 
 
no grounds for requiring a more explicit authorization."  
Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252. 
¶22 Further, "[t]he Supreme Court long ago held that 
officers may conduct warrantless searches based upon a third-
party's consent, where the third party has common authority over 
the premises to be searched."  Matejka, 241 Wis. 2d 52, ¶19 
(citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-71 (1974)). 
¶23 Before consent may operate as a valid exception to the 
warrant requirement, two conditions must be met.  First, the 
consent must have been "freely and voluntarily given."  Bumper 
v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).  Second, the 
consent must be given by an individual having either actual or 
apparent authority over the place to be searched.  See 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171). 
¶24 In the case at issue, the parties agree that the 
driver voluntarily consented to a search of the vehicle.  It is 
thus undisputed that the consent was neither mere acquiescence 
to a claim of lawful authority nor obtained through coercion.  
See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 
(1980); State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶17, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 
N.W.2d 182.  The parties also agree that the driver had actual 
authority over the vehicle, and thus his consent to search the 
vehicle was valid.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222.  Further, 
Wantland concedes that the driver did not limit the scope of the 
initial consent.  In other words, he concedes that a reasonable 
person would have understood the initial consent given by the 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
11 
 
driver to extend to all containers within the vehicle, including 
the briefcase. 
¶25 In sum, Wantland and the State agree that, absent 
Wantland's question, Deputy Brockway's search of the briefcase 
would have been constitutionally permissible.  Thus, the focus 
of our attention rests upon whether Wantland's question "Got a 
warrant for that?" effectively withdrew the driver's consent. 
¶26 Wantland argues that once he asked his question "Got a 
warrant for that?" the officer's search of his briefcase was 
unreasonable.  Wantland contends that his question undermined 
the driver's apparent authority and constituted a withdrawal of 
the 
driver's 
original 
consent 
to 
search 
the 
briefcase.  
Alternatively, Wantland argues that Deputy Brockway had a duty 
to ask follow-up questions to resolve any ambiguity.  We reject 
these arguments and affirm the court of appeals. 
A. Wantland Did Not Withdraw Consent 
¶27 Third-party consent to a search may be valid, so long 
as "'permission to search was obtained from a third party who 
possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship 
to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.'"  Matejka, 
241 Wis. 2d 52, ¶32 (emphasis in Matejka) (quoting Matlock, 415 
U.S. at 171).  In the context of an automobile, this court has 
held that the common authority inquiry "focuses not necessarily 
on the third-party's authority over the specific object in 
question, but the third-party's authority over the premises in 
which that object is located."  Id., ¶36. 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
12 
 
¶28 The driver of a vehicle has "obvious possessory 
authority over the vehicle and therefore the capacity to consent 
to its search."  Id., ¶35.  Further, "by virtue of the joint 
access and mutual use of the interior" of the vehicle, the 
driver has apparent authority to consent to a search of the 
belongings of any passengers in the vehicle.  Id.  This accords 
with the general proposition that "consent to search a space 
includes consent to search containers within that space where a 
reasonable officer would construe the consent to extend to the 
container."  United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251). 
¶29 In the case at issue, it is undisputed that Deputy 
Brockway obtained consent to search for "anything in the vehicle 
that wasn't supposed to be in the vehicle."  A reasonable 
officer would construe this as a general consent that extends to 
containers.  See, e.g., United States v. Canipe, 569 F.3d 597, 
600 (6th Cir. 2009) (determining that a request to look for 
"'anything' in [a] vehicle that might be unlawful or about which 
[the officer] needed to know" was a request for general consent 
to search); United States v. Crain, 33 F.3d 480, 483-84 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (determining that a request to "look inside" a 
vehicle, without any further explanation, was a request for 
general consent to search).  "It is self-evident that a police 
officer seeking general permission to search a vehicle is 
looking for evidence of illegal activity.  It is just as obvious 
that such evidence might be hidden in closed containers."  
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
13 
 
Canipe, 569 F.3d at 605 (quoting United States v. Snow, 44 F.3d 
133, 135 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also Crain, 33 F.3d at 484. 
¶30 The driver gave Deputy Brockway valid consent to 
search containers in the vehicle, and the driver had apparent 
authority over those containers at the time consent was given.12 
¶31 Wantland argues, however, that his question "Got a 
warrant for that?" undermined the driver's apparent authority 
over the briefcase, and should have led Deputy Brockway to 
conclude that he had withdrawn the driver's consent to its 
search. 
¶32 Wantland points to a number of cases where the 
apparent authority of a driver did not extend to items in the 
vehicle that belonged to passengers.  See United States v. 
Munoz, 590 F.3d 916, 922-23 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 765 (9th Cir. 1993) modified, United States 
v. Kim, 105 F.3d 1579, 1580-81 (9th Cir. 1997); State v. Suazo, 
627 A.2d 1074 (N.J. 1993); State v. Williams, 616 P.2d 1178 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1980).  Munoz, Welch, and Williams, however, address 
whether initial consent was valid, not whether consent was later 
withdrawn.  These cases do not support Wantland's claim that the 
officer, who had consent to search, should have known that 
Wantland's later question, "Got a warrant for that?" was a 
sufficiently clear assertion of ownership so to inform Deputy 
                                                 
12 The parties do not dispute that the briefcase was not 
locked or otherwise secured.  As we noted in State v. Matejka, 
another fact scenario "might give rise to a different focus for 
the common authority analysis."  241 Wis. 2d 52, ¶36. 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
14 
 
Brockway 
that 
the 
consent 
to 
search 
the 
briefcase 
was 
withdrawn.13  In addition, Suazo is factually distinct from the 
case at issue because in that case the passenger unequivocally 
stated that the item at issue belonged to him and not the 
driver.14  In fact, mere assertion of ownership of an item may be 
insufficient to constitute withdrawal of consent.  See, e.g., 
United States v. West, 321 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that the lawfulness of the search turned not on whether 
the defendant owned the item searched, but rather turned on 
whether he withdrew consent).  Because Wantland concedes that 
the initial consent was valid, the issue before this court turns 
on whether Wantland's question "Got a warrant for that?" served 
to unequivocally withdraw that consent. 
                                                 
13 For example, in United States v. Welch officers obtained 
consent from a male suspect to search a rental vehicle he shared 
with a female suspect but did not obtain consent to search the 
female suspect's purse.  4 F.3d 761, 762 (9th Cir. 1993).  On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, while the suspect had 
authority to consent to the search of the car, "there is simply 
nothing in the record demonstrating that [the male suspect] had 
use of, let alone joint access to or shared control over, [the 
defendant's] purse."  Id. at 764.  By contrast, in the case at 
issue, Deputy Brockway's belief that the briefcase was at least 
subject to joint access or shared control is amply supported by 
the record. 
14 The driver of the vehicle in State v. Suazo consented to 
the initial search, but when the non-consenting passenger's bag 
was removed from the trunk, the passenger clearly stated that it 
belonged to him and not the driver.  627 A.2d 1074, 1075.  Such 
a clear statement of ownership is lacking in the case at issue.  
A reasonable person would not understand the statement "Got a 
warrant for that?" to mean "that belongs to me." 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
15 
 
¶33 "'Withdrawal of consent need not be effectuated 
through particular "magic words," but an intent to withdraw 
consent must be made by unequivocal act or statement.'"  United 
States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting 
United States v. Gray, 369 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 2004)); see 
also United States v. Alfaro, 935 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1991); 
Payton v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 468, 478 (Ky. 2010).  "The 
standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under 
the Fourth Amendment is that of 'objective' reasonableness——what 
would the typical reasonable person have understood by the 
exchange between the officer and the suspect?"  Jimeno, 500 U.S. 
at 251 (citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 183-89; Florida v. Royer, 
460 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1983)). 
¶34 Unequivocal 
acts 
or 
statements 
sufficient 
to 
constitute withdrawal of consent may include slamming shut the 
trunk of a car during a search, see United States v. Flores, 48 
F.3d 467, 468 (10th Cir. 1995), grabbing back the item to be 
searched from the officer, see United States v. Ho, 94 F.3d 932, 
934 (5th Cir. 1996), and shouting "No wait" before a search 
could be completed, see United States v. Fuentes, 105 F.3d 487, 
489 (9th Cir. 1997). 
¶35 By contrast, Wantland's inquiry "Got a warrant for 
that?" was equivocal, such that it did not clearly withdraw the 
otherwise valid consent of his brother, the driver.  Wantland 
did not ask the officer to stop the search as the vehicle owner 
did in Fuentes.  He did not take action to prevent the officer 
from accessing the briefcase, as the item's owners did in Flores 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
16 
 
and Ho.  Rather, Wantland did little to indicate that he owned 
the briefcase and that the officer was not free to search the 
briefcase.  In fact, case law does not support the notion that 
Wantland's question, "Got a warrant for that?" was sufficient to 
constitute a withdrawal of consent. 
¶36 Payton v. Commonwealth illustrates why Wantland's 
question did not constitute a withdrawal of consent.  In Payton 
police officers received valid consent to search a residence 
from the suspect's wife.  327 S.W.3d at 470.  When officers 
entered the bedroom in which the defendant was sitting, Payton 
immediately asked, "where's your warrant?"  Id. at 476.  When 
the officers informed the defendant that his wife had consented 
to the search, he responded, "'Fine' or 'Well, okay.'"  Id. at 
470.  The officers subsequently discovered methamphetamine 
hidden in the bedroom.  Id. at 471. 
¶37 At 
trial 
Payton 
sought 
to 
suppress 
the 
methamphetamine, arguing that when he asked "where's your 
warrant?" he withdrew his wife's consent to search the house.  
Id.  The court denied his motion and the defendant appealed.  
Id. 
¶38 The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the trial 
court's denial of the motion to suppress.  Id. at 470.  The 
Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that the defendant "cannot be 
said to have 'unequivocally refused' consent by his asking 
'where's your warrant' and then saying 'fine' or 'well, okay' 
after being told his wife had already consented to a search."  
Id. at 478.  The court distinguished the facts before it from 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
17 
 
other cases in which a defendant "unequivocally refuse[s]" to 
consent to a search.  Id. (citing Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 
103, 107 (2006)). 
¶39 Notably, 
Wantland's 
warrant 
question 
was 
almost 
identical to the question asked by the suspect in Payton.  Also 
similar to the conversation in Payton, Wantland's question was 
immediately followed by statements that were conversational 
rather than an unequivocal indication that the officer should 
cease the search.  Instead of denying access to the briefcase, 
Wantland explained what the officer would find inside the 
briefcase.  Additionally, unlike the defendant in Payton, who 
responded as soon as he became aware of the consent to search, 
Wantland was present at the time the original consent was given 
and did not object to that consent.  Instead, Wantland stayed 
quiet throughout the search of the passenger compartment of the 
vehicle and did not ask any question or make any comment until 
Deputy Brockway reached for the briefcase.  Even then it was far 
from clear that Wantland was telling the officer that he could 
no longer search the briefcase.  Given these facts, under the 
totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would not 
understand Wantland's question to be an unequivocal withdrawal 
of an otherwise valid consent to search the briefcase. 
¶40 Similarly, in United States v. Gray, the Eighth 
Circuit concluded that a defendant's expression of frustration 
with the length of time the search was taking and a stated 
desire to leave was not sufficient to constitute a withdrawal of 
his previous consent to search.  369 F.3d at 1026.  The court 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
18 
 
held that that "intent to withdraw consent must be made by 
unequivocal act or statement."  Gray's statement that the length 
of the search was "ridiculous" and that he and his companion 
were "ready to go now" "amounted to an expression of impatience, 
which is not sufficient to terminate consent."  Id. (citing 
United States v. Ross, 263 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 2001)).  
Wantland's remarks were even more equivocal than those made by 
Gray, in that Gray at least referenced a desire to depart the 
scene. 
¶41 Similar ambiguous statements were deemed insufficient 
to constitute a withdrawal of a previous consent to search in 
United States v. Gregoire, 425 F.3d 872, 881 (10th Cir. 2005).  
In Gregoire the driver had consented to a search of his vehicle 
but later stated, "I [was] planning to be home" and "[i]sn't 
that illegal" as the search progressed.  Id.  The Tenth Circuit 
concluded that these statements were too ambiguous to constitute 
withdrawal of the driver's original consent to search.  Id.  
Unlike Gregoire Wantland did not imply that he wanted to leave, 
and he did not clearly indicate that he believed the search was 
illegal. 
¶42 Under the analysis of these cases, Wantland's question 
"Got a warrant for that?" must be deemed ambiguous.  Such a 
question may constitute an inquiry regarding the officer's 
lawful authority to search the briefcase, but it is far from an 
unequivocal withdrawal of consent.  Deputy Brockway's response, 
"I can, uh, open the laptop," was responsive to Wantland as 
Deputy Brockway already had legal authority for the search from 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
19 
 
the driver.  Moreover, Wantland's listing out the contents of 
the briefcase failed to clearly indicate that Deputy Brockway no 
longer had consent to search the briefcase. 
¶43 Further, the driver initially made numerous statements 
to Deputy Brockway clarifying which items in the vehicle 
belonged to the occupants jointly.  For example, the driver 
stated, "We gotta get our tools and stuff out anyway" in 
responding to the initial request for consent. (Emphasis added).  
Further, in response to a question from Deputy Brockway about 
the razor blades in the vehicle, the driver replied, "we got 
these little, um, utility knives that we use."  (Emphasis 
added).  Wantland said nothing to indicate that other items may 
belong to him alone.  Thus, to the extent that a reasonable 
officer would conclude that some of the items in the vehicle did 
not belong solely to the driver, that indication related, at 
most, to the tools and knives and not the briefcase.15  Notably, 
Wantland never made any statement to the effect that the 
briefcase was not to be searched.  In fact, prior to asking "Got 
a warrant for that?" Wantland had said nothing at all about the 
briefcase or any other item in the vehicle.  Nothing in the 
plain 
question 
"Got 
a 
warrant 
for 
that?" 
would 
have 
                                                 
15 We are not confronted with whether the officer's search 
of the tools or knives was inappropriate.  Thus, we need not 
address whether the driver's consent was somehow limited with 
respect to these items.  In addition, we do not conclude that an 
officer has a duty to put items such as these, which are 
potential weapons, into the hands of the requester, especially 
while the officer is conducting a search and such items could be 
used to harm the officer. 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
20 
 
unequivocally indicated to a reasonable person that consent to 
search the briefcase had been withdrawn. 
¶44 Hence, a reasonable person considering the totality of 
the circumstances would not understand Wantland's inquiry to be 
an unequivocal withdrawal of consent.  See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 
251; Sanders, 424 F.3d at 774.  Thus, Deputy Brockway's search 
of the briefcase was reasonable. 
B. Officer's Duty To Inquire 
¶45 Finally, Wantland argues that where ownership or 
authority over a closed container is unclear, police officers 
are under a duty to make further inquiry to resolve the 
ambiguity before proceeding with a search.  We conclude that law 
enforcement is not under such a duty to further inquire. 
¶46 The Seventh Circuit has held that once police have 
received consent to search the premises from a person with 
apparent authority, they may rely on that authority to search 
closed containers without further inquiry, unless they encounter 
an item which they "have reliable information . . . is not under 
the authorizer's control."  United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 
1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original).  The court 
noted that "[a] contrary rule would impose an impossible burden 
on the police."  Id. at 1042. 
¶47 We agree.  Once valid consent for a search has been 
secured, law enforcement officers are not required to halt their 
search and question whether consent is still valid every time a 
person makes an ambiguous statement regarding the ownership of 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
21 
 
an item that is otherwise within the scope of that consent.16  
See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (holding that the 
court 
would 
not 
engage 
in 
"metaphysical 
subtleties" 
in 
determining the efficacy of a third party's consent).  Such a 
rule would place an onerous and unreasonable burden on law 
enforcement, particularly given that the true owner of the 
property may or may not be present.  See, e.g., Matlock, 415 
U.S. at 166-67.  Thus, an officer need not clarify whether an 
ambiguous statement is meant to withdraw otherwise valid consent 
to search.  Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041; see also Matejka, 241 
Wis. 2d 52, ¶32 (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171). 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
¶48 We conclude that Wantland did not effectively withdraw 
the driver's consent when he asked, "Got a warrant for that?"  
Further, we conclude that police officers confronted with 
ambiguous statements, such as Wantland's, are not under a duty 
to ask follow-up questions to clarify the ambiguity.  As a 
result, we conclude that the search of the briefcase was 
reasonable under the circumstances, and we affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
                                                 
16 In fact, this court has declined the opportunity to 
require law enforcement to inquire further in other settings.  
See, e.g., State v. Edler, 2013 WI 73, ¶¶86-87, 350 Wis. 2d 1, 
833 N.W.2d 564 (Ziegler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part); State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶¶31-36, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 
647 N.W.2d 142 (indicating that while clarifying questions are 
"good police practice," such questions are not required). 
No. 
2011AP3007-CR   
 
22 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶49 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority opinion repeatedly proclaims that the driver of the car 
(the 
defendant's 
brother) 
validly 
consented 
to 
the 
law 
enforcement officer's search of the motor vehicle and all 
containers in the vehicle, including the defendant's briefcase.1  
 
¶49 The majority opinion maintains that the instant case is 
not 
one 
addressing 
"whether 
initial 
consent 
was 
valid."  
Majority op., ¶32.  Rather, the majority opinion addresses 
whether the defendant effectively revoked the driver's valid 
consent to search the briefcase.2 
¶50 The State, the defendant, Justice Prosser, and I 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
view 
of 
the 
issue 
presented.  I join Justice Prosser's dissent. 
¶51 We understand the issue to be whether the driver's 
consent to the search of the vehicle, including a consent to 
search the containers and briefcase therein, was valid after it 
became clear to law enforcement that the driver did not own the 
briefcase.  The driver's initial consent to search the vehicle 
may have appeared as valid consent to search any container or 
briefcase in the vehicle.  But the issue in the instant case is 
whether facts coming to light during the search should have 
caused a reasonable person to doubt the validity of the consent 
to a search of the briefcase, that is, should have caused a 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶¶24, 30, 33, 35-36, 39, 47. 
2 See majority op., ¶25. 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
reasonable person to have doubted the authority of the driver to 
consent to a search of the briefcase.3 
¶52 The warrant requirement of the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions does not apply when a party consents to 
a search,4 when a third party with common control over the 
searched premises consents,5 or when an individual with apparent 
authority to consent does so.6 
¶53 "When police are relying upon consent as the basis for 
their warrantless search, they have no more authority than they 
have apparently been given by the consent. . . . But, the 
question is not to be determined on the basis of the subjective 
intentions 
of 
the 
consenting 
party 
or 
the 
subjective 
interpretation of the searching officer. . . . [T]he standard is 
'that of "objective" reasonableness . . . .'"7 
¶54 Although the driver in the present case appeared to 
have the authority to consent to a search of the vehicle and its 
contents, the defendant's claim of ownership of the briefcase 
put the officer on notice that someone other than the driver 
might have authority over the briefcase.  When circumstances 
suggest that the property to be searched belongs to someone 
                                                 
3 See 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure:  A Treatise on 
the Fourth Amendment § 8.3(g), at 245 (5th ed. 2012). 
4 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
5 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991). 
6 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). 
7 4 LaFave, supra note 3, § 8.1(c), at 22-23 (quoted source 
omitted, emphasis in original). 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
other than the consenting person, the validity of the consenting 
person's consent becomes questionable, even if the consent was 
voluntarily given. 
¶55 As the State's brief correctly explains, "it is the 
sufficiency of the consenting individual's relationship to the 
premises to be searched[ ] that the State must establish."8  The 
test is whether a reasonable officer would believe under the 
totality of the circumstances that the consenter had authority 
to consent to the search: 
The crux of this case is what a reasonable [law 
enforcement officer] would believe, under the totality 
of the circumstances, about who had apparent authority 
over the briefcase at the time [the defendant] made 
his warrant remark.  Consent (and by extension, 
revocation or limitation of that consent) requires 
authority to consent in the first instance.9 
¶56 The State has the burden in the present case to prove 
by 
clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
a 
reasonable 
law 
enforcement officer would believe, under the totality of the 
circumstances, that the driver had authority to consent to the 
search of the briefcase.10  
¶57 I address three issues:  
                                                 
8 State v. Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, 542, 577 N.W.2d 352 
(1998). 
9 Brief of the Plaintiff-Respondent at 5 (second emphasis 
added).  See also Justice Prosser's dissent, ¶114 ("The question 
is whether his consent to search the vehicle not only covered a 
closed container within the vehicle, but also remained valid 
after 
his 
non-ownership 
of 
the 
closed 
container 
became 
clear . . . ."). 
10 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990). 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
• First, whether a reasonable law enforcement officer 
would 
believe, 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, that the driver had authority to 
consent to the search of the briefcase; 
• Second, 
whether 
the 
law 
enforcement 
officer's 
erroneous assertion of authority to search the laptop 
in the briefcase undermined the defendant's authority 
to withdraw or limit the driver's consent;  
• Third, what the standard is for determining whether a 
person withdraws, limits, or revokes consent. 
¶58 I conclude that the State did not meet its burden to 
prove that a reasonable law enforcement officer would believe, 
under the totality of the circumstances of the instant case, 
that the driver had authority to consent to the search of the 
briefcase.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
¶59 The validity of the driver's consent to the law 
enforcement officer's search of the briefcase turns on whether 
the driver had apparent authority to consent to the search of 
the briefcase, as I have previously stated.  Neither party 
claims that the driver had actual authority to consent to the 
search of the briefcase.   
¶60 I 
conclude 
that 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances in the present case, a law enforcement officer 
could not reasonably believe that the driver had apparent 
authority to consent to a search of the briefcase.  Gauging the 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
objective reasonableness of a law enforcement officer's actions 
is a particularly fact-sensitive inquiry.11    
¶61 The majority opinion limits its inquiry to the 
statement, "Got a warrant for that?" but the totality of the 
circumstances is more than this statement   
¶62 The defendant asserted his claim of ownership over the 
briefcase as follows: 
DEPUTY: What's in the briefcase? 
DEFENDANT:  A laptop.  Uh, got a warrant for that?   
[At this point, the deputy has unlatched and begun 
opening the briefcase.] 
DEPUTY: I can open up the, uh, laptop. 
DEFENDANT: 
Yeah, 
it's 
a 
laptop, 
Visine, 
acid 
reflux . . . . 
 
¶63 The facts available to the officer at the time of the 
search of the briefcase include the following: 
• The consenting driver did not own the vehicle; 
• The consenting driver advised the officer that some 
property in the vehicle (such as tools) belonged to 
the defendant; 
• When the officer asked what was in the briefcase, the 
defendant answered, not the driver; 
• When the officer asked what was in the briefcase, the 
defendant correctly identified the contents, while the 
driver was silent about the contents of the briefcase; 
                                                 
11 See Missouri v. McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 
1564 (2013) (describing "totality of the circumstances" tests as 
"fact-intensive"). 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
• When the officer asked what was in the briefcase, the 
defendant asked if the officer had a warrant; 
• The officer cut off any further inquiry by opening the 
briefcase and erroneously declared: "I can open the 
laptop." 
¶64 The communications between the law enforcement officer 
and 
the 
defendant 
revealed 
that 
the 
briefcase 
was 
the 
defendant's, 
not 
the 
driver's. 
 
The 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances demonstrates that the defendant signaled his 
ownership of the briefcase.  Consequently, the validity of the 
driver's authority to consent to the search of the defendant's 
briefcase was questionable.  The officer's reliance on the 
driver's authority over the briefcase was not objectively 
reasonable.   
¶65 A law enforcement officer can assume that an officer 
has authority to perform a search only if "the facts available 
to the officer . . . warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in 
the belief that the consenting party had authority over the 
premises."12  If a reasonable person would doubt that the 
consenting person had authority over the property, the officer 
must make further inquiry to determine whether the person has 
authority to consent to the search.13  The officer "may not 
always take [a person's] consent to a search at face value, but 
                                                 
12 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
13 See Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d at 548. 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
must consider the surrounding circumstances.  That consideration 
often demands further inquiry."14 
¶66 Professor LaFave explains that a contrary rule would 
undermine the purposes of the objective test of the totality of 
the circumstances to determine authority.  It would, according 
to Professor LaFave, "make no sense whatsoever" to ignore facts 
discovered during a search to affect the authority of a 
consenter; doing so would "permit police simply to ignore all 
facts coming to light during the search that should cause a 
reasonable person to doubt the soundness of the previous 
conclusion that the consenting person has authority to allow the 
ongoing search."15   
¶67 We have explicitly adopted this approach in State v. 
Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, 577 N.W.2d 352 (1998).  In Kieffer, 
law enforcement officers obtained the consent of a homeowner who 
appeared 
to 
have 
shared 
authority 
over 
a 
lofted 
garage 
apartment.  During their investigation, however, the officers 
learned facts that led them to doubt that the homeowner had 
authority to consent to a search of the lofted garage space.   
¶68 The Kieffer court held that once a reasonable person 
would have reason to doubt the authority of the consenting 
party, the officers could not rely on the consenting party's 
                                                 
14 Id. at 549. 
15 4 LaFave, supra note 3, § 8.3(g), at 245. 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
apparent 
authority; 
the 
officers 
were 
obligated 
to 
ask 
additional clarifying questions.16  
¶69 The majority opinion does not cite Kieffer.  Instead, 
the majority opinion relies on United States v. Melgar, 227 
F.3d 1038 (7th Cir. 2000), to support its assertion that law 
enforcement officers need not ask any clarifying questions when 
confronted with a non-consenting defendant claiming ownership or 
asking for a warrant.     
¶70 Melgar is inapposite.  Unlike the defendant in Melgar, 
the defendant in the instant case demonstrated his ownership of 
the property contemporaneously with the search and challenged 
the officer's search.   
¶71 In Melgar, law enforcement officers had consent to 
search a hotel room from the renter of the room and all the 
occupants of the room.  After all of the people had left the 
hotel room, the officers searched the room and found a purse in 
the bed, between the mattress and box spring.  The purse had no 
personalized markings on the outside.  The officers had no 
explicit permission from anyone to search the purse.  They had 
no clue about who owned the purse.17   
¶72 In Melgar, the police lacked "reliable information 
that the container [was] not under the authorizer's control."  
                                                 
16 "[T]he surrounding circumstances could conceivably be 
such that a reasonable person would doubt [the] truth [of the 
consent] 
and 
not 
act 
upon 
it 
without 
further 
inquiry."  
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188. 
17 United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1039-40 (7th Cir. 
2000). 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041 (cited by majority op., ¶46).  The 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned in Melgar that "if the 
police do not have reliable information that the container is 
not under the authorizer's control," the police do not need to 
ascertain the identity of a container's owner prior to searching 
it.18 
¶73 In the instant case, unlike in Melgar, the totality of 
the 
circumstances 
exposed 
reliable 
information 
that 
the 
briefcase 
was 
not 
under 
the 
consenting 
driver's 
(the 
authorizer's) control.  
¶74 According to the majority opinion, however, "[o]nce 
valid consent for a search has been secured, law enforcement 
officers are not required to halt their search and question 
whether consent is still valid every time a person makes an 
ambiguous statement regarding the ownership of an item that is 
otherwise within the scope of that consent."  Majority op., ¶47.   
¶75 The majority opinion asserts that requiring inquiry 
into the scope of the consenter's authority "would place an 
onerous and unreasonable burden on law enforcement, particularly 
given that the true owner of the property may or may not be 
present."  Majority op., ¶47.   
¶76 That is not what our court stated in Kieffer.  Indeed, 
requiring 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
to 
evaluate 
evolving 
circumstances is inherent in many search and seizure contexts.   
¶77 As part of the objective analysis of a consenter's 
authority, courts regularly require law enforcement to evaluate 
                                                 
18 Id. at 1041 (emphasis added). 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
and inquire into the consenter's authority in kaleidoscopic 
circumstances.  For example, the court asks that officers 
determine whether a minor answering a door has authority under 
the circumstances to consent to a search of a house when the 
owner is not present;19 whether a houseguest has authority under 
the circumstances to consent to a search of the contents of a 
computer without the owner being present;20 and whether a 
landlord has authority under the circumstances to consent to a 
search of a tenant's bedroom.21 
¶78 The totality of the circumstances in the present case 
should have indicated to an objective police officer that the 
driver did not have authority to consent to the search of the 
defendant's briefcase.  Thus, the officer could not rely on the 
driver's consent to the search of the car or containers therein 
to be a valid consent to the search of the briefcase. 
II 
¶79 The majority opinion ignores the officer's erroneous 
assertion of authority that he could "open up the laptop," 
meaning he could open the briefcase including the laptop.  Yet 
"one 
factor 
very 
likely 
to 
produce 
a 
finding 
of 
no 
consent . . . is an express or implied false claim by the police 
                                                 
19 State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 648 
N.W.2d 367. 
20 State v. Sobczak, 2013 WI 52, 347 Wis. 2d 724, 833 
N.W.2d 59. 
21 State v. St. Germaine, 2007 WI App 214, 305 Wis. 2d 511, 
740 N.W.2d 148. 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
that they can immediately proceed to make the search in any 
event."22 
¶80 The officer, upon being confronted by the defendant's 
challenge, "Got a warrant for that?" falsely invoked the power 
of the law to justify opening of the briefcase.  See Justice 
Prosser's dissent, ¶¶120-121.  
¶81 By asserting his authority during the defendant's 
objection to the search, the officer made the driver's consent 
appear irrevocable.  The officer cut off the defendant's 
opportunity to refuse to give his consent.  "When a law 
enforcement officer claims authority to search . . . , he 
announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the 
search."23  The officer undermined the principle that a person 
can refuse, revoke, withdraw, or limit consent. 
¶82 The majority opinion ignores the officer's false claim 
of legal authority entirely and permits the law enforcement 
officer under false claim of legal authority to cut off any 
possibility of the defendant's objection to a search.  This 
result cannot be correct when the law requires consent to be 
freely and voluntarily given to a warrantless search.  State v. 
Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶32, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430.  
III 
¶83 Because the totality of the circumstances is such that 
a reasonable officer was not entitled to believe that the driver 
                                                 
22 4 LaFave, supra note 3, § 8.2(a), at 71 (citations and 
footnotes omitted). 
23 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968). 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
had authority to consent to the search of the briefcase, the 
question of how consent is to be revoked, withdrawn, or limited 
need not be addressed.  
¶84 I write on this issue, however, to make clear that I 
do not agree with the majority opinion's requirement that a 
defendant must make an "unequivocal" statement to revoke, 
withdraw, or limit consent.   
¶85 As the majority opinion rightly notes, "[w]ithdrawal 
of consent need not be effectuated through particular 'magic 
words, . . . ."24     
¶86 Nevertheless, the majority opinion adopts a rule 
similar to that used in determining an accused's invocation 
during interrogation of the right to an attorney or the right to 
remain silent.  See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994).   
¶87 The Davis "unequivocal" or "unambiguous" rule has been 
heavily criticized on a number of grounds, including that the 
"unequivocal" test invites equivocation on the part of courts——
identical statements may appear "unequivocal" to one court may 
be "equivocal" to another.25 
                                                 
24 Majority op., ¶33 (quoting United States v. Sanders, 424 
F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2005)).   
25 Compare United States v. Martin, 664 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 
2011) (invocation was unequivocal when defendant said "I'd 
rather talk to an attorney first before I do that") with 
Delashmit v. State, 991 So. 2d 1215 (Miss. 2008) (invocation was 
equivocal when defendant said "I prefer a lawyer").  Compare 
also Wood v. Ercole, 644 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2011) (invocation was 
unequivocal when defendant said "I think I should get a lawyer") 
with Commonwealth v. Morganti, 917 N.E.2d 191 (Mass. 2009) 
(invocation was equivocal when defendant said he was "thinking I 
might need a lawyer and want to talk to him before talking to 
you"). 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶88 As Justice Sotomayor noted in her dissent in Berghuis 
v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 408-12 (2010), the "unequivocal" or 
"unambiguous" test has limited practical value and erodes the 
protections that defendants receive under Miranda.  The dissent 
explains that "ample evidence has accrued that criminal suspects 
often use equivocal or colloquial language in attempting to 
invoke their right to silence" and that courts imposing a clear-
statement requirement "have rejected as ambiguous an array of 
statements whose meaning might otherwise be thought plain."26 
¶89 I acknowledge that courts in other jurisdictions have 
adopted this "unequivocal" test in the context of revocation, 
withdrawal, or limitation of consent.27  I am not persuaded that 
different tests should be applied to whether consent was granted 
and whether consent was revoked, withdrawn, or limited.  I 
conclude that the same test should apply to both instances.  
¶90 The "unequivocal" test results in an additional and 
unnecessary layer of complexity to an area of law requiring 
clarity.28   
 
¶91 By using its flawed "unequivocal" test, the majority 
opinion bends a defendant's statement that a reasonable person 
would construe as an objection into mere equivocation and 
                                                 
26 Thompkins, 
560 
U.S. 
at 
410-11 
(Sotomayor, 
J., 
dissenting). 
27 See, e.g., United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219 (3d 
Cir. 2011); United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 
2005); State v. Smith, 782 N.W.2d 913 (Neb. 2010); State v. 
Watson, 864 A.2d 1095 (N.H. 2004).  
28 State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶25, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 
N.W.2d 460. 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
erroneously places the burden on the defendant to prove the 
unreasonableness of the search. 
¶92 For the reasons set forth, I would reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and hold that the circuit court 
erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress. 
¶93 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶94 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  Several of the 
techniques employed by the law enforcement officer in this case 
are common in Wisconsin.  The officer stopped a vehicle for 
minor traffic violations.  He quickly learned that a passenger 
in the vehicle was a convicted felon with a history of drug 
abuse.  With consummate skill, the officer embarked on a plan to 
elicit consent to search the vehicle so that he could determine 
whether it contained controlled substances.  Most of the 
techniques the officer employed have been approved by this and 
other courts.  The question presented here is whether the 
officer crossed the line of reasonableness by disregarding an 
apparent objection to a consent search and thereby violated the 
Fourth Amendment.  I believe he did.  Because the majority 
concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 
FACTS SURROUNDING THE SEARCH 
¶95 On August 26, 2010, a Sheboygan County deputy sheriff 
stopped a vehicle driven by Dennis Wantland (the driver) on 
Butler Street in Random Lake.  The vehicle had a cracked 
windshield and a defective brake light.  The officer asked the 
driver for his license.  He also asked the passenger, the 
driver's brother, for his license.  The officer then took the 
licenses and returned to his squad car, with its red and blue 
lights flashing, to run an identity check on the two men.  
Before he returned to the vehicle, the officer knew the driver 
had a minor record but that the passenger, Derik Wantland 
("Wantland" or "the defendant"), was a repeat offender who had 
used drugs. 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
¶96 When he returned to the vehicle with a warning 
citation, the officer asked the driver to step out of the car 
and accompany him behind the vehicle to examine the defective 
"third brake lamp." 
¶97 The officer later explained to the court that he made 
it a practice to ask a driver to leave his vehicle to show him 
"exactly what I'm talking about." 
Some people don't know what I mean by "third brake 
lamp," so I'll take them out of the vehicle, point out 
the brake lamp.  And I've had the experience myself of 
trying to replace things, so I'll try to explain to 
them,  you know, where you can get a light bulb, or 
how much, roughly, it would cost to get it fixed, and 
I kind of explain it to them, and then explain the 
written 
warning 
to 
them, 
tell 
them 
about 
the 
windshield, the safety of it, you know, that it's 
there to prevent anything from coming through the 
windshield, and if they would hit something that would 
hit the windshield, with it already being cracked, 
it's not as safe as it would be, you know, completely 
basically not broken, and kind of explain to them the 
reason for it. 
¶98 The officer described his "conversational tone, trying 
to explain to [the driver] the reason for the stop and why he 
should get the things fixed."  Then he went on: 
 
At that point, I asked if [the driver] had any 
questions, which I do on every traffic stop.  If they 
have any questions, I'll be more than happy to answer 
them.  He advised no, and I advised him he was free to 
leave, at which point I started walking back to my 
car, and he was walking back to the driver's door.1 
(Emphasis added.) 
                                                 
1 The officer advised the driver that he was free to leave.  
It is not clear whether the driver had someplace else to go.  
Wantland was on Butler Street in front of his house. 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
¶99 The officer walked toward the door of his squad car.  
Then, in a tactic reminiscent of Lieutenant Columbo, he suddenly 
turned around and asked the driver if there was anything in the 
vehicle that wasn't supposed to be there.  When the driver 
answered no, the officer immediately asked him "if he would mind 
if I did a consent search of the vehicle."  "The driver said 
'yes, go ahead,'" the officer testified.  On this point, the 
majority quotes the driver as saying: "Um, I don't see why not.  
We gotta get our tools and stuff out anyway."  Majority op., ¶7. 
¶100 In his police report, the officer wrote: "They asked 
if they could remove their items out of the rear of the vehicle 
and put them in the house at which point, I asked them to stand 
alongside the roadway and when I was done searching the car, 
they could remove their items."2 
¶101 The officer obtained the driver's consent to search 
the vehicle, but the above-quoted passage from the police report 
reveals tension between the driver's consent and the brothers' 
expressed desire to remove their property from the vehicle. 
¶102 Given the driver's consent to search, the officer 
asked Wantland to get out of the car and directed him to join 
his brother at the curb.  For the next six and a half minutes, 
                                                 
2 The following exchange took place at the suppression 
hearing: 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: 
And at one point, Derik Wantland 
actually asked if he could obtain his items out of the 
vehicle. 
OFFICER: Yes, they'd asked if they could get their 
tools out of the vehicle.  This was after the search 
had begun on the vehicle.  And again I told them no. 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
the officer conducted a very thorough search of the interior of 
the vehicle using a flashlight and his hands.  The officer 
opened both the driver's door and the passenger's door.  He 
climbed into the vehicle from each side, opened the glove 
compartment, looked under the seats, checked the shelf near the 
back window, and ran his fingers through tight, concealed areas 
next to the seats.  Finding nothing but some razor blades, which 
the driver explained were used in painting, the officer moved to 
the trunk area. 
¶103 After searching the passenger compartment, the officer 
"opened the back hatch of the vehicle and observed a variety of 
tools and toolboxes, along with a briefcase."  Majority op., ¶9.  
With his back to the squad car camera, the officer asked: 
"What's in the briefcase?"   
¶104 For the first time, Derik Wantland spoke up: "A 
laptop.  Uh.  Got a warrant for that?"3   
¶105 The officer replied, "I can open up the, uh, laptop," 
and he proceeded to remove the briefcase from the vehicle and 
                                                 
3 The transcript of the suppression hearing reads in part as 
follows: 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: 
And as you were searching the back 
portion of the vehicle, you asked a question of, I 
guess, Derik Wantland and Dennis Wantland about what 
was in the briefcase; is that correct? 
OFFICER: I may have asked what was inside the 
briefcase, yes. 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: 
And at that point, Derik Wantland 
asked you if you had a search warrant. 
OFFICER: Yes, he did. 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.dtp 
 
5 
 
open it up.  The sound track of the video records nervous 
laughter from Wantland who says, in response to the officer, 
"Yeah, it's uh, laptop, Visine, acid reflux."   
¶106 According to the record, there were documents in the 
briefcase with Wantland's name.  There was also a pair of 
scissors, a jackknife, coins, a bottle of Visine, and two opaque 
plastic pill bottles, at least one of which was for Benicar 40 
mg. 
¶107 The officer opened one of the plastic bottles and 
found two purple capsule-type pills that turned out to be 
morphine, a controlled substance.  Later, at the Sheboygan 
County Jail, officers discovered two more pills in Wantland's 
pocket.  These four pills constitute the evidence that the 
defendant sought to suppress. 
DISCUSSION 
¶108 The majority opinion takes the view that the driver of 
the car gave the officer consent to search the vehicle.  Consent 
to search the vehicle included consent to search containers in 
the vehicle.  The majority concludes that neither the driver nor 
the passenger ever effectively withdrew the driver's consent, 
and that the officer had no duty to ask any follow-up questions 
when Derik Wantland asked, "Got a warrant for that?"  See 
majority op., ¶5 
¶109 We are concerned here with application of the Fourth 
Amendment, which provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.dtp 
 
6 
 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
¶110 Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution is 
nearly identical, and historically, it has been interpreted to 
be consistent with United States Supreme Court interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment.  See State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶14, 
327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97. 
¶111 In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 
(1971), the Supreme Court summarized the law on warrantless 
searches: 
[T]he most basic constitutional rule . . . is that 
"searches conducted outside the judicial process, 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per 
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment——subject 
only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions."  The exceptions are "jealously 
and carefully drawn," and there must be "a showing by 
those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of 
the situation made that course imperative."  "[T]he 
burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the 
need for it."   
Id. (second ellipsis and second brackets in original) (footnotes 
omitted).  These passages have been repeatedly quoted or 
paraphrased in Wisconsin decisions.4   
                                                 
4 State v. Sobczak, 2013 WI 52, ¶11, 347 Wis. 2d 724, 833 
N.W.2d 59, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 626 (2013); State v. Artic, 
2010 WI 83, ¶29, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430; State v. 
Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶13, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592; State 
v. Faust, 2004 WI 99, ¶11, 274 Wis. 2d 183, 682 N.W.2d 371; 
State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶18, 255 Wis. 2d 1, 646 
N.W.2d 834; State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, ¶17, 241 Wis. 2d 52, 
621 N.W.2d 891; State v. Pallone, 2000 WI 77, ¶29, 236 
Wis. 2d 162, 613 N.W.2d 568; State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 
196, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998). 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.dtp 
 
7 
 
¶112 One 
well-established 
exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement is consent.  State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 
196, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998); State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶29, 327 
Wis. 2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430; State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶18, 
255 Wis. 2d 1, 646 N.W.2d 834; State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, ¶17, 
241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891.  Voluntary third-party consent 
is an established form of consent.  Matejka, 241 Wis. 2d 52, 
¶17. 
¶113 The fact that "consent" is an established exception 
and that third-party consent can be acceptable does not mean 
that the consent exception does not present issues such as 
authority to give consent, scope of the consent, and the 
voluntariness of the consent. 
¶114 There is no dispute here that the driver voluntarily 
consented to the officer's search of the vehicle.  He was surely 
authorized to consent to the search of anything in the vehicle 
that he owned or lawfully controlled or shared with his brother.  
The question is whether his consent to search the vehicle not 
only covered a closed container within the vehicle, but also 
remained valid after his non-ownership of the closed container 
became clear by virtue of the fact that Wantland answered the 
officer's question with intimate knowledge of the contents of 
the briefcase and Wantland appeared to object to the search. 
¶115 In Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991), the 
Supreme Court was asked to decide "whether a criminal suspect's 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches is 
violated when, after he gives a police officer permission to 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.dtp 
 
8 
 
search his automobile, the officer opens a closed container 
found within the car that might reasonably hold the object of 
the search."  The Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment was 
not violated: "The Fourth Amendment is satisfied when, under the 
circumstances, it is objectively reasonable for the officer to 
believe that the scope of the suspect's consent permitted him to 
open a particular container within the automobile."  Id. 
¶116 The facts in Jimeno are materially different from the 
facts in this case.  First, in Jimeno, the defendant was the 
person who gave consent to search the vehicle.  Id. at 249-50.  
Second, the arresting police officer told the defendant before 
he gave consent that the officer "had reason to believe that 
Jimeno was carrying narcotics in his car."  Id. at 249.  Third, 
the officer "explained that Jimeno did not have to consent to a 
search of the car."  Id.  Fourth, the officer saw and then 
opened a brown paper bag on the floor of the car and found a 
kilogram of cocaine inside.  Id. at 250.  Fifth, the defendant 
never said anything that limited or withdrew his consent. 
¶117 Here, the defendant's brother, whose guard was down 
and who presumably had nothing in the vehicle to be concerned 
about, was the person who gave consent——not the defendant.  The 
officer gave the defendant no warning about his search objective 
and no counsel that the defendant could refuse consent to a 
search of his property.  The officer's search went into an 
opaque closed bottle in a closed briefcase in a closed trunk, 
and 
the 
defendant, 
after 
demonstrating 
ownership 
of 
the 
briefcase, asked the officer: "Got a warrant for that?" 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.dtp 
 
9 
 
¶118 Was it objectively reasonable for the officer to 
believe that the driver had given him consent to open up a pill 
bottle in his brother's briefcase?  If so, was it still 
objectively reasonable for the officer to continue the search of 
the briefcase after Wantland asked his question?   
¶119 The defendant's question may not have been perfect but 
it should have alerted the officer that the defendant was 
challenging a "consent" search of his briefcase.  It would be 
difficult to articulate what other objective the defendant might 
have had when he asked about a warrant.  The defendant had just 
witnessed the officer dig through the car like a police dog on 
assignment.  He knew that his briefcase was the next target.  
"Got a warrant for that?" he asked. 
¶120 The 
officer 
did 
not 
ask 
a 
follow-up 
question.  
Instead, his answer was an assertion of authority that shut down 
discussion.  It effectively precluded dialogue.  "I can open up 
the, uh, laptop" is not a responsive answer to the question. 
¶121 The officer's "conversational tone" was now gone.  His 
professed willingness to answer "any questions" had ended.  His 
helpful hints on where to buy brake lights evolved into a series 
of orders.  The officer was on a mission.  If there were any 
doubt about the officer's new persona, it was put to rest when 
Derik Wantland walked to his house to go to the bathroom.  The 
officer quickly pursued him, following him to the bathroom, 
ordering him not to flush the toilet, and threatening that if he 
did, the officer "could shut the water off and take the toilet 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.dtp 
 
10 
 
off and go into the trap and find anything that had been stuck 
in the trap." 
¶122 This is a consent case.  The officer had no probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion to conduct a search.  The 
continuing validity of the consent to search must be assessed in 
light of the totality of the circumstances, which moved from the 
broad consent given by one brother to the pointed question posed 
by the other brother as the officer began to handle the property 
of the other brother. 
¶123 I acknowledge that conscientious judges may assess 
these circumstances differently.  In my view, the defendant 
withdrew any "consent" to search his briefcase, and the officer 
simply disregarded him.  Because the majority's assessment is 
different from mine, I respectfully dissent. 
¶124 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
No.  2011AP3007-CR.dtp 
 
 
 
1