Title: Attorney General Troy King, in his official capacity v. Harvey B. Campbell, Jr.; Chad Woodruff; and the Talladega County Judicial Commission
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1060804
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 30, 2007

REL: 11/30/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1060804
_________________________
Attorney General Troy King, in his official capacity
v.
Harvey B. Campbell, Jr.; Chad Woodruff; and the Talladega
County Judicial Commission
Appeal from Talladega Circuit Court
(CV-06-364)
LYONS, Justice.  
Attorney General Troy King appeals from a judgment
entered by the trial court declaring unconstitutional an act
of the legislature creating an additional circuit judgeship in
the 29th Judicial Circuit.  We reverse and remand.  
1060804
2
I. Factual Background
On five separate occasions the legislature has provided
for the creation of a third judgeship for the 29th Judicial
Circuit (Talladega County).  Each time, the legislature pushed
back the creation of the judgeship.  On the first four
occasions, the legislation contemplated filling the office by
an election to be held several years after the enactment of
the act establishing the judgeship for a term commencing in
the January following the election.  On the fifth occasion the
legislature opted for a different method of filling the
office--appointment by the governor.  
The third circuit judgeship was originally created by Act
No. 85-546, Ala. Acts 1985 ("the 1985 Act").  Section 9 of the
1985 Act provided:
"There is hereby created and shall be established
the office of circuit judgeship No. 3 in the 29th
Judicial Circuit, which shall be in addition to the
two circuit judgeships now existing.  Provided, the
additional circuit judgeship hereby created shall
first be filled at the general election to be held
in 1988, and the first judge so elected shall serve
a full term of office beginning on the first Monday
following the second Tuesday in January, 1989."
(Emphasis added.)  Section 11 of the 1985 Act appropriated
funding for the additional judgeship for fiscal year 1988-89.
1060804
3
Act No. 87-348, Ala. Acts 1987, amended Sections 9 and 11
of the 1985 Act.  Section 9, as amended, provided:
"There is hereby created and shall be established
the office of circuit judgeship No. 3 in the 29th
Judicial Circuit, which shall be in addition to the
two circuit judgeships now existing.  Provided, the
additional circuit judgeship hereby created shall
first be filled at the general election to be held
in 1994, and the first judge so elected shall serve
a full term of office beginning on the first Monday
following the second Tuesday in January, 1995."
(Emphasis added.)  The amendment to Section 11 appropriated
funding for the additional judgeship for fiscal year 1994-95.
Act No. 93-302, Ala. Acts 1993, further amended these two
sections.  Section 9, as amended, provided:
"There is hereby created and shall be established
the office of circuit judgeship No. 3 in the 29th
Judicial Circuit, which shall be in addition to the
two circuit judgeships now existing.  Provided, the
additional circuit judgeship hereby created shall
first be filled at the general election to be held
in 2000, and the first judge so elected shall serve
a full term of office beginning on the first Monday
following the second Tuesday in January, 2001."
(Emphasis added.)  The 1993 amendment to Section 11
appropriated funding for the additional judgeship for fiscal
year 2000-01.
Act No. 99-566, Ala. Acts 1999 ("the 1999 Act"), further
amended Sections 9 and 11.  Section 9, as amended, provided:
1060804
Amendment No. 615, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp., Local
1
Amendments, Talladega County, § 6), created the Talladega
County Judicial Commission "for the purpose of nominating to
the Governor persons for appointment to any vacancy in the
offices of judge of the circuit court, judge of the district
court, and district attorney."
4
"There is hereby created an additional judgeship in
the Twenty-ninth Judicial Circuit which shall be
Circuit Judgeship No. 3.  The additional judgeship
created by this act shall be filled at the general
election to be held in 2006 and the judge elected
shall serve a full term of office beginning on the
first Monday following the second Tuesday in January
2007."
(Emphasis added.)  The 1999 amendment to Section 11
appropriated funding for the additional judgeship for fiscal
year 2006-07.
Act No. 2006-355, Ala. Acts 2006 ("the 2006 Act"), the
subject of this litigation, again amended Sections 9 and 11.
Section 9, as amended, provided:
"There is hereby created an additional judgeship in
the Twenty-ninth Judicial Circuit which shall be
Circuit Judgeship No. 3.  The additional judgeship
created by this act shall be filled by appointment
of the Governor on or after October 1, 2009, from a
list of nominees by the Talladega County Judicial
Commission.[ ]  The judgeship shall be subject to
1
election at the general election to be held in 2010
and the judge elected shall serve a full term of
office beginning on the first Monday following the
second Tuesday in January 2011."
1060804
5
(Emphasis added.)  The 2006 amendment to Section 11
appropriated funding for the additional judgeship for fiscal
year 2009-10.  The 2006 Act was signed by the governor on
April 13, 2006.
On April 7, 2006, Chad Woodruff, acting pursuant to the
1999 
Act, 
filed 
a 
candidate-declaration 
form 
and 
a
qualification form with the Alabama Democratic Party, and paid
the filing fee to become a candidate for the newly created
third circuit judgeship.  On April 12, 2006, one day before
the 2006 Act was signed into law, the chair of the Alabama
Democratic Party certified to the secretary of state the names
of the Party's candidates for the June 2006 primary election.
The certification further provided that "[c]andidates who are
unopposed are nominated."  Woodruff's name appeared on page 8
of the list of candidates as the only Democratic candidate
seeking to be elected to the third circuit judgeship; thus, he
was certified as the Party's candidate. 
II. Course of Proceedings
On July 5, 2006, Harvey B. Campbell, Jr., a registered
voter in Talladega County, filed this declaratory-judgment
action, naming as defendants Attorney General Troy King
1060804
6
(hereinafter "the State") and the Talladega County Judicial
Commission.  Campbell alleged that the provision of the 2006
Act for initially filling the office by gubernatorial
appointment violated Art. VI, § 152, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off.
Recomp.) ("All judges shall be elected by vote of the electors
within the territorial jurisdiction of their respective
courts.").  Campbell further alleged that the provision of the
2006 Act for initially filling the office by appointment
impermissibly expanded the ways a vacancy can occur and be
filled by gubernatorial appointment as contemplated by Art.
VI, § 153, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.) ("The office of a
judge shall be vacant if he dies, resigns, retires, or is
removed.  Vacancies in any judicial office shall be filled by
the governor ....").  Campbell also contended that the 2006
Act, with its requirement that the Talladega County Judicial
Commission submit names to the governor from which the third
judgeship appointment would be made, violated §§ 152 and 153
for the reasons previously stated.  
Campbell requested a judgment declaring that the 2006 Act
was unconstitutional and that the third judgeship be filled in
the November 2006 election pursuant to the 1999 Act.  On
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7
August 14, 2006, Campbell filed an amended complaint, which
added the secretary of state, Nancy Worley, as a defendant and
requested a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction directing Secretary of State Worley to certify
Woodruff as the candidate for the third judgeship to the
Talladega County Probate Judge and requiring that his name
appear on the ballot in the general election to be held
November 7, 2006. 
The State and the secretary of state (hereinafter
referred to collectively as "the State defendants") filed an
opposition to the request for a preliminary injunction and a
motion for a judgment on the pleadings.  On August 31, 2006,
the trial court denied the motion of the State defendants for
a judgment on the pleadings and granted Campbell's motion for
a preliminary injunction directing Secretary of State Worley
to place Woodruff's name on the November 7, 2006, general-
election ballot as the Democratic candidate for the third
judgeship for the 29th Judicial Circuit.  
Woodruff had no Republican opposition in the general
election, and he received an overwhelming number of votes,
approximately 14,000.  On December 22, 2006, the Talladega
1060804
Apparently at some point during these proceedings the
2
Talladega County Judicial Commission was realigned as a
plaintiff.  
8
County Judicial Commission filed a cross-claim against the
State defendants, alleging essentially the same grounds as
Campbell's complaint as to the unconstitutionality of the 2006
Act.   On January 12, 2007, the State defendants filed a
2
motion to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party, or in
the alternative, a motion to join, Woodruff.  Upon Woodruff's
joinder as a coplaintiff, the trial court denied the State
defendants' motion.  Woodruff thereupon alleged that he had
properly qualified with the Alabama Democratic Party on April
7, 2006, for the third judgeship; that he had been duly
certified on April 12, 2006, as the Party nominee; that he had
been duly elected in the November 7, 2006, general election;
and that he had since then been certified by the secretary of
state as the elected candidate for the third judgeship.
Woodruff also adopted by reference all factual allegations and
pleadings of Campbell and the Talladega County Judicial
Commission.  Woodruff requested that the trial court declare
the 2006 Act unconstitutional and that he be allowed
immediately to commence his judicial term of office.  
1060804
The secretary of state did not appeal.  
3
9
The trial court held a hearing on February 2, 2007, at
which ore tenus evidence was presented, and heard testimony
from Campbell, Woodruff, Judge Julian M. King (place no. 1
circuit judge and ex officio chairman of the Talladega County
Judicial Commission), and Clarence Haynes (clerk of the
Talladega Circuit Court).  On February 21, 2007, the trial
court entered a detailed order concluding as follows:
"1. Chad Woodruff was the duly qualified,
nominated, and certified Democratic Party candidate
for the Talladega County Circuit Judge, Place No. 3,
and was the winner of the November 7, 2006 general
election for this office.
"2. Act No. 2006-355 is unconstitutional and is,
therefore, null and void.
"3. ... Act No. 2006-355 did not operate to
divest Mr. Woodruff of his right to be declared the
elected candidate for this office.
"4. ... Mr. Woodruff shall be sworn in without
further delay as the Talladega County Circuit Judge,
Place No. 3; and the Administrative Office of Courts
shall immediately compensate him and provide to him
all benefits to which he may be entitled as the
elected third judge for the 29th Judicial Circuit,
upon assuming duties as judge."
The State filed its notice of appeal on February 28,
2007.  
3
III. Standard of Review
1060804
10
"'[W]hen 
a 
trial 
court 
hears 
ore 
tenus
testimony, its findings on disputed facts are
presumed correct and its judgment based on those
findings will not be reversed unless the judgment is
palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust.'  Philpot
v. State, 843 So. 2d 122, 125 (Ala. 2002).
'However, where the facts before the trial court are
essentially undisputed and the controversy involves
questions of law for the court to consider, the
court's 
judgment 
carries 
no 
presumption 
of
correctness.'  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Skelton, 675 So.
2d 377, 379 (Ala. 1996).  Questions of law are
reviewed de novo. BT Sec. Corp. v. W.R. Huff Asset
Mgmt. Co., 891 So. 2d 310 (Ala. 2004)."  
Alabama Republican Party v. McGinley, 893 So. 2d 337, 342
(Ala. 2004).  
IV. Threshold Issues of Jurisdiction and Mootness
Campbell, Woodruff, and the Talladega County Judicial
Commission (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the
Talladega County parties") have filed a motion to dismiss the
State's appeal, arguing, in the alternative, that subject-
matter jurisdiction is lacking and that the issues made the
basis of the State's appeal are moot.  
The Talladega County parties contend that this Court
lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter in that this
proceeding 
constitutes 
an 
impermissible 
post-election
challenge to the legality of the election for the office of
circuit judge for the 29th Judicial Circuit, which they say is
1060804
11
precluded by § 17-16-44, Ala. Code 1975.  Section 17-16-44
provides:
"No jurisdiction exists in or shall be exercised
by any judge or court to entertain any proceeding
for ascertaining the legality, conduct, or results
of any election, except so far as authority to do so
shall be specially and specifically enumerated and
set down by statute; and any injunction, process, or
order from any judge or court, whereby the results
of any election are sought to be inquired into,
questioned, or affected, or whereby any certificate
of election is sought to be inquired into or
questioned, 
save 
as 
may 
be 
specially 
and
specifically enumerated and set down by statute,
shall be null and void and shall not be enforced by
any officer or obeyed by any person.  If any judge
or other officer hereafter undertakes to fine or in
any wise deal with any person for disobeying any
such prohibited injunction, process, or order, such
attempt shall be null and void, and an appeal shall
lie forthwith therefrom to the Supreme Court then
sitting, or next to sit, without bond, and such
proceedings shall be suspended by force of such
appeal; and the notice to be given of such appeal
shall be 14 days."
(Emphasis added.)
The Talladega County parties contend that the State
defendants' failure to seek appellate review of the trial
court's August 31, 2006, order placing Woodruff's name on the
November 2006 general-election ballot either deprives this
Court of subject-matter jurisdiction or moots this appeal.
The Talladega County parties rely upon Bell v. Eagerton, 908
1060804
As is discussed more fully below, the State contends that
4
§ 17-16-44 does not operate in the context of a challenge that
does not constitute a contest to an election.
12
So. 2d 204, 207 (Ala. 2002) ("Therefore, because Bell did not
seek and obtain an injunction to stop the November 7, 2000,
election for Lowndes County district court judge, and because
Bell did not contest the election of Terri Bozeman to that
office, this Court cannot nullify her election or order a new
election.");  and Buskey v. Amos, 294 Ala. 1, 2, 310 So. 2d
468, 469 (1975) ("In all cases involving election disputes,
time is of the essence.  It has been a policy of the courts of
this state to handle such cases speedily before issues become
moot, if requested to do so.").  
The State's response to the Talladega County parties'
motion to dismiss the appeal does not direct us to any statute
specifically authorizing this proceeding as an exception to
the general rule set forth in § 17-16-44.   Instead, the State
4
contends that an appeal from the preliminary injunction
entered on August 31, 2006, was unnecessary.  The State
contends 
that 
the 
confluence of several circumstances
justified its failure to appeal the order of August 31, 2006,
before the November 2006 general election.  First, the State
1060804
13
points out that the trial court's order did not declare the
2006 Act unconstitutional; instead, it found "that a
substantial controversy exists as to the constitutionality of
[the 2006 Act] that requires a further hearing or hearings."
The State then points to the fact that the secretary of state
complied with the injunction and certified Woodruff's name as
a candidate to the probate judge of Talladega County.  The
State thus concludes that on the day of the circuit court's
order, the secretary of state "took action that rendered any
subsequent appeal of the circuit court's order moot."
Attorney General's Opposition to Appellees' Joint Motion to
Dismiss Appeal, p. 4.  
The State relies on Morrison v. Mullins, 275 Ala. 258,
154 So. 2d 16 (1963), in which this Court dismissed as moot an
appeal from the denial of injunctive relief where, pending
appeal, the defendant-appellee rescinded the qualifications
for taking a test to determine eligibility to fill a position
and replaced them with new qualifications, and the plaintiff-
appellant had not attempted to establish his eligibility under
the new qualifications.  In dismissing the appeal, this Court
stated: 
1060804
14
"We have held that if an event happening after
hearing and decree in circuit court, but before
appeal 
is 
taken, 
or 
pending 
appeal, 
makes
determination of the appeal unnecessary or renders
it clearly impossible for the appellate court to
grant 
effectual 
relief, 
the 
appeal 
will 
be
dismissed."  
275 Ala. at 259, 154 So. 2d at 18.  Morrison is easily
distinguishable, however, because the event the State asserts
makes any appeal of the August 31, 2006, order moot is the
secretary of state's compliance with the order, an entirely
different circumstance than was presented in Morrison, where
the defendant-appellee, not subject to an injunction, merely
changed the qualifications applicable to the plaintiff-
appellant pending appeal.  In such instance it is not possible
for the appellate court to award meaningful relief.  See Mills
v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895):
"The duty of this court, as of every other
judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies
by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of
law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the
case before it.  It necessarily follows that when,
pending an appeal from a judgment of a lower court,
and without any fault of the defendant, an event
occurs which renders it impossible for this court,
if it should decide the case in favor of the
plaintiff, to grant him any effectual relief
whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal
judgment, but will dismiss the appeal."
1060804
See Rule 62(g), Ala. R. Civ. P., which states:
5
"(g) Power of Appellate Court Not Limited.  The
provisions in this rule do not limit any power of an
appellate court or of a judge or justice thereof to
stay proceedings during the pendency of an appeal or
to suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction
during the pendency of an appeal or to make any
order appropriate to preserve the status quo or the
effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be
entered."  
15
(Emphasis added.)  
We do not here deal with a changed circumstance that
"renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide the
case in favor of the plaintiff, to grant him any effectual
relief whatever."  159 U.S. at 653.  The State could have
immediately appealed the August 31, 2006, order, and sought a
mandatory 
injunction 
from this Court, pending appeal,
requiring the secretary of state to set aside the previous
certification.  If this Court had been so inclined on proper
motion by the State,  it would have been situated to grant the
5
State "effectual relief" on the merits.   
The State next contends that this proceeding is not an
election contest and therefore that this Court can ignore the
jurisdictional limitations of § 17-16-44.  Citing Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the State alludes to
1060804
16
this Court's "inherent authority to review the orders of
inferior courts," especially "where, as here, the inferior
court has used its authority to strike down an act of the
Alabama Legislature."  Attorney General's Opposition to
Appellees' Joint Motion to Dismiss Appeal, p. 6.  Noting the
presumption of constitutionality applicable to statutes, the
State argues that because the 2006 Act was presumed
constitutional on the day the November 2006 general election
was held, "there is substantial doubt as to whether there was
a valid, lawful election capable of supporting an election
contest."  Attorney General's Opposition to Appellees' Joint
Motion to Dismiss Appeal, p. 8.
Article VI, § 142(b), Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.),
provides:
"(b) The circuit court shall exercise general
jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be
provided by law.  The circuit court may be
authorized by law to review decisions of state
administrative agencies and decisions of inferior
courts.  It shall have authority to issue such writs
as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate its
powers, and shall have such other powers as may be
provided by law."
(Emphasis added.)  The legislature has restricted the
jurisdiction of the circuit courts by enacting § 17-16-44.
1060804
17
This Court has previously addressed the effect of this
jurisdictional limitation in several cases.  In Dennis v.
Prather, 212 Ala. 449, 103 So. 59 (1925), this Court construed
a predecessor statute to § 17-16-44.  This Court noted:
"The general rule without question is that courts of
equity will not interfere by injunction with the
holding of elections political in character, nor
take jurisdiction of a contest after the election is
held. 
 
But 
this 
court 
is 
committed 
to 
the
proposition that equity will interfere by injunction
to restrain elections not authorized by law.  It
will also restrain the usurpation of office, or the
assumption of functions of office where no lawful
office exists."
212 Ala. at 452, 103 So. at 61-62 (emphasis added).  Speaking
to the predecessor to § 17-16-44, the Dennis Court stated:
"Statutes restricting the jurisdiction of courts of
equity, as defined at common law, and reiterated by
statute in Alabama, should be strictly construed.
Construing this statute as a whole, it appears,
broadly speaking, to cover cases inquiring into the
validity of elections theretofore held--a proceeding
in the nature of a contest of an election, whether
the legality, conduct or results of the election be
the point of attack.  We doubt if it would include
a case of injunction against the exercise of any
form of official power, derived through or by virtue
of an election not authorized by law and therefore
wholly void.  The equity jurisdiction in such case
does not rest so much upon matters going to the
conduct of the election, but upon the usurpation or
abuse of official power under color of a void
election."
1060804
18
212 Ala. at 452-53, 103 So. at 62 (emphasis added).  This
Court then concluded: 
"Following our former decisions, and, we think, in
keeping with sound principles, we hold that the
court of equity has the power by injunction to
prevent the holding of such election as is here
involved [a referendum on moving the site of the
courthouse], in a case wholly unauthorized by law,
there appearing no adequate legal remedy." 
212 Ala. at 453, 103 So. at 62.  Based upon Dennis, we
conclude that litigation challenging the consequences of a
void election does not come within the sweep of the limitation
on subject-matter jurisdiction in  § 17-16-44. 
Against this backdrop, we turn to Bell v. Eagerton, in
which we held that a disqualified candidate's appeal was
rendered moot by his failure to seek and obtain an injunction
to stop the election before it took place and his failure to
contest the election.  However, Bell is distinguishable
because the issue in that case was whether the candidate met
the residency requirements.  We did not deal with that aspect
of equitable jurisdiction, "the usurpation or abuse of
official power under color of a void election," which we held
in Dennis was unaffected by the precursor to § 17-16-44.  212
Ala. at 453, 103 So. at 62.  Here, on the other hand, we deal
1060804
The Chief Justice, in her dissent, states:  "Further,
6
Bell, Harvey v. City of Oneonta, 715 So. 2d 779 (Ala. 1998),
and Etheridge v. State ex rel. Olson, 730 So. 2d 1179 (Ala.
1999), all applied the predecessor to § 17-16-44, Ala. Code
1975, § 17-15-6, to reject the sort of collateral challenges
to elections the State attempts in this case."  ___ So. 2d at
___.  As previously noted, Bell dealt with a candidate's
satisfaction of the residency requirements; Harvey dealt with
a candidate's compliance with the Fair Campaign Practices Act;
and Etheridge dealt with a candidate's failure to timely file
pre-election disclosure forms.  The foregoing cases do not
involve an allegation of a void election and cannot therefore
be categorized as "the sort of collateral challenges to
elections the State attempts in this case."  ___ So. 2d at
___.  Likewise, State ex rel. Norrell v. Key, 276 Ala. 524,
165 So. 2d 76 (1964), also relied upon by the Chief Justice,
is similarly distinguishable because it did not involve a
challenge to the statute under which the election was held;
instead, it dealt with the validity of a candidate's
nomination. 
The Chief Justice relegates the doubts emphatically
7
expressed in Dennis as to the validity of a limitation upon
the judicial power to annul the consequences of "an election
not authorized by law and therefore wholly void" (Dennis, 212
Ala. at 453, 103 So. at 62) as "speculation" and concludes
19
with the State's interest, through the attorney general, in
upholding the 2006 Act against constitutional challenge in
litigation that invokes equitable jurisdiction beyond the
context of matters dealing with the conduct of the election
such as the credentials of a candidate.   
6
Because we are not here dealing with a limitation on
subject-matter jurisdiction under the dichotomy recognized in
Dennis,  the remaining basis for dismissal of the appeal is
7
1060804
that "the plain language of § 17-16-44 may now be disregarded
at the convenience of the attorney general."  ___ So. 2d at
___.  Of course, only in the event of a challenge to the
validity of the law under which the election is held would the
jurisdiction of the courts be available, a limitation far more
stringent than "the convenience of the attorney general."
20
grounded upon estoppel by reason of delay in prosecuting the
appeal until after the election–-prudential limitations on the
exercise of judicial power not involving subject-matter
jurisdiction.  
Article V, § 137, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.),
authorizes the legislature to "require the attorney general to
defend any or all suits brought against the state."  Section
36-15-1(2), Ala. Code 1975, requires the attorney general to
attend to cases pending in the courts of the state "in which
the state may be in any manner concerned."  Assuming, without
deciding, that estoppel might apply under the circumstances
here 
presented 
in 
litigation 
between private parties,
dismissal of this appeal based upon the State's failure to
take steps necessary to enjoin the occurrence of the election
before it took place would impermissibly apply the bar of
estoppel to the State of Alabama arising from the attorney
general's delay in the discharge of duties owed to the public
pursuant to § 137 and § 36-15-1.  This we cannot do.  See
1060804
21
Greenwood v. State ex rel. Bailes,  230 Ala. 405, 407, 161 So.
498, 499 (1935):
"Reduced to the last analysis, the defense
sought to be interposed is in the nature of an
estoppel.  But this court in State ex rel. Lott v.
Brewer, 64 Ala. 287, [298 (1879),] declared that
estoppels against the state cannot be favored, and
that though they may arise in some instances, yet,
upon the broad ground of public policy, they cannot
arise, certainly as to the exercise of governmental
functions, 'from the laches of its officers.'" 
We therefore deny the motion to dismiss the appeal.
V. Validity of the 2006 Act
A. Woodruff's Status as a Quasi-Official
Woodruff and the Talladega County Judicial Commission
contend that Woodruff's status as the nominee of the Alabama
Democratic Party makes him a "quasi-incumbent."  They rely
upon State ex rel. Norrell v. Key, 276 Ala. 524, 526, 165 So.
2d 76, 78 (1964), in which this Court held, in the context of
measuring the timeliness of a quo warranto proceeding, that
the holder of a certificate of nomination has the status of a
"quasi-officer," thereby obliging the relator to initiate his
action prior to the election.  
Article VI, § 151, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.),
authorizes the legislature to increase or decrease the number
1060804
22
of circuit judges.  Section 151(c) provides: "An act
decreasing the number of circuit or district judges shall not
affect the right of any judge to hold his office for his full
term."  This limitation on legislative authority is confined
to officeholders and is silent as to nominees.  Woodruff and
the Talladega County Judicial Commission have not cited any
authority applying the concept of "quasi-officer" in the
context of a statutorily created office that has been
abolished whereby the quasi-officer was deemed a "quasi-
incumbent" and thereby insulated from the effects of the
abolition of the office.  We decline to rely upon the concept
of "quasi-officer," useful in settings not involving vested
rights to public offices of statutory creation, as the basis
to limit further the authority of the legislature provided in
§ 151.  
This result is consistent with the view that a public
office that is a creature of the legislature confers no vested
right.  See Lane v. Kolb, 92 Ala. 636, 640, 9 So. 873, 874
(1891):
"When an office is not provided for by the
Constitution, but is the creature of statute, there
is no element of contract between the officer chosen
and the public, or constituent body which confers
1060804
23
the office.  Being created, and its functions and
emoluments conferred, by the legislature, the same
body may abolish it, take away or reduce its
functions and emoluments, or make any change its
wisdom or caprice may suggest, not inhibited by the
organic law."  
Applying similar principles, other courts have rejected a
contention by a candidate that his status protects him from
the impact of legislation abolishing the office for which he
is a candidate.  See State ex rel. Weller v. Schirmer, 131
Ohio St. 455, 3 N.E.2d 352 (1936), in which an individual
filing a petition for nomination as a candidate for judge of
a court of common pleas before the repeal of a statute
providing for such office was held not entitled to have his
name placed on the ballot at an election held after the
repeal; State ex rel. Core v. Green, 160 Ohio St. 175, 181,
115 N.E.2d 157, 160-61 (1953) ("While the statute was in
effect, the petitioners had the privilege to demand an
election, but when the statute was repealed before the
election was held, such privilege was taken away without any
impairment of vested or contractual rights."); and Corn v.
City of Oakland City,  415 N.E.2d 129, 133 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981): 
1060804
A determination that the 2006 Act is unconstitutional in
8
its entirety would result in a reversion to the 1999 Act,
pursuant to which Woodruff now holds office.  See San Ann
24
"The question of whether or not an office holder
or candidate or officer-elect has any vested right
to an office has been clearly settled contrary to
Corn's position.  In State, ex rel. Yancey v. Hyde,
[129 Ind. 296, 28 N.E. 186 (1891)], our Supreme
Court, at 129 Ind. 302, 28 N.E. 186[,] said: 
"'Offices are neither grants nor contracts,
nor obligations which can not be changed or
impaired. 
 
They 
are 
subject 
to 
the
legislative will at all times, except so
far as the Constitution may protect them
from interference.  Offices created by the
Legislature 
may 
be 
abolished 
by 
the
Legislature.  The power that creates can
destroy.  The creator is greater than the
creature.  The term of an office may be
shortened, 
the 
duties 
of 
the 
office
increased, and the compensation lessened,
by the legislative will.  (Citations
omitted.)'"  
Woodruff's status as the nominee of the Democratic Party
does not insulate him from the effects of the 2006 Act in
amending the 1999 Act.  
B. Whether the Provision for Gubernatorial
Appointment in the 2006 Act is Unconstitutional
The Talladega County parties contend that the provision
in the 2006 Act allowing the governor to fill the office of
the third circuit judgeship by appointment violates §§ 152 and
153, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.).  
8
1060804
Tobacco Co. v. Hamm, 283 Ala. 397, 406, 217 So. 2d 803, 810
(1965) ("It appears to be uniformly held that where there is
a valid act and an attempted but unconstitutional amendment to
it, the original act is not affected, but remains in full
force and effect.").
25
An act of the legislature arrives with a presumption of
constitutionality; a party challenging that constitutionality
has the burden of overcoming that presumption.  State ex rel.
King v. Morton, 955 So. 2d 1012 (Ala. 2006).  We note at the
outset that the challenged provision of the 2006 Act ("The
additional judgeship created by this act shall be filled by
appointment of the Governor on or after October 1, 2009, from
a list of nominees by the Talladega County Judicial
Commission.") does not refer to a vacancy.  The 2006 Act
admits of only one rational construction--the governor shall
appoint the first holder of the office.  
The State relies upon Griggs v. Bennett, 710 So. 2d 411,
412 (Ala. 1998), in which this Court stated:  "Although § 6.14
[of Amendment No. 328, now § 153, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off.
Recomp.)] 
lists 
the 
usual 
causes 
of 
vacancy--death,
resignation, retirement, or removal of an incumbent judge--it
has long been recognized that vacancies may occur for reasons
other than the usual causes listed in an appointment
1060804
The State does not argue that Amendment No. 615, Ala.
9
Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp., Local Amendments, Talladega County,
§ 6), creating the Talladega County Judicial Commission "for
the purpose of nominating to the Governor persons for
appointment to any vacancy in the offices of judge of the
circuit court, judge of the district court, and district
attorney" (emphasis added) and applicable to "all vacancies in
the offices of judge of the circuit court" (emphasis added)
displaces the more restrictive description of circumstances
constituting a vacancy set forth in § 153.  Consequently, we
do not address that issue as a ground for reversing the trial
court's 
judgment 
holding 
that 
the 
2006 
Act 
is
unconstitutional.  See Bettis v. Thornton, 662 So. 2d 256, 257
(Ala. 1995) (an argument not made on appeal is considered
abandoned or waived).  In all events, the State's failure to
address this issue does not affect the ultimate disposition of
this appeal.  
26
provision."   In Griggs, a statute enacted in 1990 created a
9
judgeship; the initial officeholder was to be elected at the
general election to be held in 1992.  Litigation dealing with
clearance of the statute under the Voting Rights Act prevented
the election contemplated by the statute from taking place.
In 1996, the United States Department of Justice granted
preclearance for the new judgeship.  The attorney general
issued an opinion stating that under what is now § 153, the
governor could fill a vacancy by appointment.  
The plaintiffs in Griggs filed an action seeking an order
directing the secretary of state to place the judgeship on the
ballot for the primary and general elections in 1996, rather
1060804
The ratification of Amendment No. 328, the Judicial
10
Article, in 1973 repealed what was then Art. VI, § 159, Ala.
Const. 1901, allowing gubernatorial appointment of circuit
judges if a new circuit was created more than six months
before the next general election with the judge so appointed
serving until such election.
27
than filling the office by appointment.  The trial court
denied relief, holding that the judgeship should be slated for
election in 1998.  On appeal, this Court affirmed, noting
"that vacancies may occur for reasons other than the usual
causes listed in an appointment provision."  710 So. 2d at
412.  However, in no instance has this Court ever upheld the
authority of the governor to fill a "vacancy" pursuant to a
statute providing for appointment of the initial officeholder.
We decline to extend Griggs so as to permit the complete
disregard of § 153 and the emasculation of § 152, which
provides:  "All judges shall be elected by vote of the
electors 
within 
the 
territorial jurisdiction of their
respective courts."  We do not have the prerogative, by
judicial fiat, of reviving a practice once permitted by our
Constitution but subsequently repealed.
  
10
C. Severability
The remaining issue is whether the offending portion of
the 2006 Act can be severed, thereby allowing the remainder of
1060804
28
the 2006 Act, including the provision deferring the election
until 2010, to remain in place.  This Court is required to
sever and save what can be saved in a statute in the event a
portion of the statute is determined to be unconstitutional.
See § 1-1-16, Ala. Code 1975:  
"If any provision of this Code or any amendment
hereto, or any other statute, or the application
thereof to any person, thing or circumstances, is
held invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction,
such invalidity shall not affect the provisions or
application of this Code or such amendment or
statute that can be given effect without the invalid
provisions or application, and to this end, the
provisions of this Code and such amendments and
statutes are declared to be severable."  
The absence of a severability provision is not determinative.
See State ex rel. Jeffers v. Martin, 735 So. 2d 1156, 1158
(Ala. 1999): 
"To be sure, '[t]he inclusion of a severability
clause is a clear statement of legislative intent to
that effect, but the absence of such a clause does
not necessarily indicate the lack of such an intent
or require a holding of inseverability.'  [City of
Birmingham v. Smith, 507 So. 2d 1312, 1315 (Ala.
1987)] 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
Nevertheless, 
'the
authority of a court to eliminate invalid elements
of an act and yet sustain the valid elements is not
derived from the legislature, but rather flows from
powers inherent in the judiciary.'  2 Norman J.
Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 44.08
(5th ed. 1992)."  
1060804
29
Here we have a severability clause within the original act--
the 1985 Act--creating the additional judgeship for the 29th
Judicial Circuit, thereby justifying the conclusion that there
exists a "clear statement" of legislative intent in favor of
severability.  See § 15 of the 1985 Act, which was left
unchanged by the amendment in the 2006 Act ("The provisions of
this Act are severable.  If any part of the Act is declared
invalid or unconstitutional, such declaration shall not affect
the part which remains.").
This Court addressed the standard for ascertaining
severability in Newton v. City of Tuscaloosa, 251 Ala. 209,
217, 36 So. 2d 487, 493 (1948):
"A criterion to ascertain whether or not a
statute is severable so that by rejecting the bad
the valid may remain intact is:  The act 'ought not
to be held wholly void unless the invalid portion is
so important to the general plan and operation of
the law in its entirety as reasonably to lead to the
conclusion that it would not have been adopted if
the legislature had perceived the invalidity of the
part so held to be unconstitutional.'  A. Bertolla
& Sons v. State, 247 Ala. 269, 271, 24 So. 2d 23, 25
[(1945)]; Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Blan, 229 Ala.
180, 155 So. 612 [(1934)]; 6 R.C.L. 125, § 123."
Also further guiding our analysis is State ex rel.
Jeffers v. Martin:
1060804
30
"Under these well-established principles, the
judiciary's severability power extends only to those
cases in which the invalid portions are '"not so
intertwined with the remaining portions that such
remaining portions are rendered meaningless by the
extirpation."'  Hamilton v. Autauga County, 289 Ala.
419, 426, 268 So. 2d 30, 36 (1972) (quoting Allen v.
Walker County, 281 Ala. 156, 162, 199 So. 2d 854,
860 (1967)).  If they are so intertwined, it must
'"be assumed that the legislature would not have
passed the enactment thus rendered meaningless."'
Id.  In such a case, the entire act must fall.  2
[Norman 
J.] 
Singer, 
[Sutherland 
Statutory
Construction] § 44.04, at 502 [(5th ed. 1992)].
Nevertheless, 'if the remaining portions of an Act
are complete within themselves, sensible and capable
of execution, the Act will stand.'  Mitchell v.
Mobile County, 294 Ala. 130, 134, 313 So. 2d 172,
174 (1975)."
735 So. 2d at 1159 (emphasis added). 
See also City of Mobile v. Salter,  287 Ala. 660, 666-67,
255 So. 2d 5, 10 (1971), in which this Court quoted from Allen
v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 83 (1880), as follows:
"'It is an elementary principle that the same
statute may be in part constitutional and in part
unconstitutional, and that if the parts are wholly
independent 
of 
each 
other, 
that 
which 
is
constitutional may stand while that which is
unconstitutional will be rejected.  "But," ... "if
they are so mutually connected with and dependent on
each 
other, 
as 
conditions, considerations, or
compensations for each other as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, and
that, if all could not be carried into effect, the
legislature 
would 
not 
pass 
the 
residue
independently, and some parts are unconstitutional,
1060804
31
all the provisions which are thus dependent,
conditional, or connected must fall with them."'"
In Springer v. State ex rel. Williams, 229 Ala. 339, 157
So. 219 (1934), the county school board had had the authority
to appoint a superintendent of education until a statute
enacted in 1931 called for the election in 1932 of a county
superintendent of education for a four-year term commencing in
1933.  The incumbent superintendent had been appointed in 1930
to a term of four years.  The election took place in 1932, and
a candidate qualified and was elected.  In 1934 the school
board reappointed the incumbent for a term of two years.  The
winner of the election in 1932, after  waiting until the
conclusion of the four-year appointive term,  instituted a quo
warranto proceeding seeking the ouster of the incumbent.  This
Court struck down as unconstitutional the provision calling
for the ouster of the incumbent during his four-year term that
had commenced in 1930.  However, the Court upheld the portion
of the act calling for election in 1932 for  a term that
exceeded the period of the incumbent's initial appointment.
In upholding a portion of the act, the Court in  Springer
stated:
1060804
32
"In the case of State ex rel. Crumpton v.
Montgomery et al., Excise Commissioners, 177 Ala.
212, 59 So. 294, 302 [(1912)], this court, speaking
through Mr. Justice McClellan, held: 'An enactment
may be valid in part and invalid in part, and the
general rule is that, if the valid and invalid parts
are independent of each other, separable, and the
valid competent to stand without the invalid,
leaving an enactment sensible and capable of being
executed, the valid parts will survive and the
invalid will be stricken.  Powell v. State, 69 Ala.
10 [(1881)]; Doe ex dem. Davis v. Minge, 56 Ala. 121
[(1876)]; State v. Davis, 130 Ala. 148, 30 So. 344,
89 Am. St. Rep. 23 [(1901)]; 36 Cyc. pp. 976-978.
It is also to be said, in the nature of limitation
of the rule stated, that the whole statute will be
stricken if the valid and invalid parts are so
connected and interdependent in subject-matter,
meaning, and purpose that it cannot be presumed that
the Legislature would have passed the one without
the other, or where the striking of the invalid
would cause results not contemplated or intended by
the lawmakers, or where that invalid is the
consideration or inducement of the whole act, or
where 
the 
valid 
parts 
are 
ineffective 
and
unenforceable 
in themselves, according to the
legislative intent.'"  
229 Ala. at 342-43, 157 So. at 222.  See also City of
Birmingham v. Smith, 507 So. 2d 1312, 1317 (Ala. 1987),
describing the test as whether the legislature would have
enacted the statute without the void provision.  
Addressing severability in its February 21, 2007, order,
the trial court held:
"The general purpose and intent of Act No. 2006-355
was to change the manner of filling the judgeship
1060804
33
from an elective position to an appointed position.
To accomplish this radical change after 20 years of
the position being subject to an election, the
legislature had to delay the judgeship.  The delay
was only the means to accomplish the filling of the
judgeship by an appointment as opposed to an
election."
The trial court further found that the language in the 2006
Act 
dealing 
with 
the 
election 
following 
the 
initial
appointment was "merely surplusage because our constitution
schedules elections subsequent to appointment."  The trial
court thus concluded:
"An appointment and subsequent election of the
judgeship as provided in Act No. 2006-355 are so
connected and interdependent in subject matter that
the whole must be stricken.  The appointment was a
consideration 
and 
inducement 
to 
a 
subsequent
election.  The election language was surplusage
because Constitutional Amendment 615 [now, Local
Amendments, Talladega County, § 6 (Off. Recomp.)]
provides for elections after valid and legal
appointments.  The two (appointment and election)
are intertwined in a manner that one logically
cannot fall without the other.  Therefore the whole
act must fail."
The 2006 Act unquestionably accomplished three departures
from what was then the existing law, i.e., the 1999 Act:
1. It postponed the time for the commencement of
service on the part of a third judge in the 29th
Judicial Circuit from the second Tuesday in January
2007 to October 1, 2009;
1060804
34
2. It provided for filling the office by
appointment, rather than by election; and  
3. It provided for filling the office at the
general election to be held in 2010 with the judge
so elected serving a full term of office beginning
on the first Monday following the second Tuesday in
January 2011.
We must determine whether we agree with the trial court's
ultimate conclusion that "the appointment was a consideration
and inducement to a subsequent election."  Our review of an
issue concerning the intent of the legislature is confined to
the terms of the legislative act itself, unaided by the views
of observers of or participants in the legislative process.
City of Daphne v. City of Spanish Fort, 853 So. 2d 933, 945
(Ala. 2003).  We can look to "'the history of the times, the
existing order of things, the state of the law when the
instrument was adopted, and the conditions necessitating such
adoption.'"  City of Birmingham v. Hendrix, 257 Ala. 300, 307,
58 So. 2d 626, 633 (1952) (quoting In re Upshaw, 247 Ala. 221,
223, 23 So. 2d 861, 863 (1945)).  We can also look to an act's
"'relation to other statutory and constitutional provisions,
view its history and the purposes sought to be accomplished
and look to the previous state of law and to the defects
intended to be remedied.'"  Hendrix, 257 Ala. at 307, 58 So.
1060804
The Chief Justice, in her dissent, concludes that the
11
appointment provision is not severable from the 2006 Act and
that the trial court correctly determined that the entire 2006
Act is unconstitutional.  The question that begs answering in
this analysis is why, if "the general purpose of the 2006 Act
was to fill the new judgeship in Talladega County by
appointment," ___ So. 2d at ___, did the legislature not
provide that the appointment take place immediately, rather
than more than three years after the 2006 Act was enacted.
35
2d at 633 (quoting Birmingham Paper Co. v. Curry, 238 Ala.
138, 140, 190 So. 86, 88 (1939)).    
The Talladega County parties call our attention to the
provision of the 2006 Act requiring that the inaugural term of
the third judge should commence on or after October 1, 2009,
significantly before the second Tuesday in January 2011.
Striking only that portion of the 2006 Act while maintaining
the balance of the act, they argue, would result in a delay
not intended by the legislature.  So, although it is
irrefutable that the 2006 Act contemplated delay, by severing
only the portion providing for the appointment of the new
judge and leaving in place the portion providing for the
election, we will have effectuated a further delay.  If the
legislature had intended that the judgeship not be filled into
2011, it would not have set a date as early as 2009 for the
appointment.11
1060804
36
On the other hand, if we do not sever the provision for
appointment and save the portion deferring filling the office
until January 2011, the election of 2006 and the commencement
of a term in January 2007 is a fait accompli.  Of course, this
circumstance is flatly contrary to the timetable clearly
contemplated by the 2006 Act with its deferral to a date no
earlier than October 1, 2009, for the commencement of service
by the third circuit judge.  If we decline to sever and save,
thereby striking down the 2006 Act in its entirety, the
legislature could not restore the timetable contemplated by
the 2006 Act by subsequent legislation because § 151 preserves
from legislative action the right of a judge to hold office
for the full term.  
The legislature has not shown any reluctance to defer the
filling of this seat, as evidenced by three previous
postponements of the time for creation of the office.  If we
sever and save, we preserve the status quo contemplated by the
2006 Act--no immediate occupant of the office.  Under this
alternative, if it comports with legislative will to have an
occupant in place earlier than January 2011, the legislature
could act early in the 2008 regular legislative session so as
1060804
37
to permit filling the seat in the 2008 election or provide for
a special election at some time before the 2010 election.
When we reject severability and strike down in its
entirety an act that contains an invalid provision, we must be
comfortable with the conclusion that a majority of the
legislators voting in favor of the bill that became the act
would prefer no statute at all to the alternative of
eliminating only the provision that violates the constitution.
In this context, the question posed would be:
"If the provision in the 2006 Act allowing the
governor to appoint at some time after October 1,
2009, is struck down, are you content to allow that
circumstance to nullify the separate provision of
the 2006 Act repealing the election this year (2006)
and replacing it with an election in 2010?" 
Section 1 of the 2006 Act, in the first sentence, creates
an additional judgeship.  There follows two separate
sentences.  The first of these two sentences calls for filling
the office by appointment "on or after October 1, 2009."  The
second of these two sentences subjects the judgeship to
election at the general election in 2010.  The record of three
previous postponements (1987, 1993, and 1999) of the time for
filling the additional judgeship for the 29th Judicial Circuit
is convincing evidence that the deferral of the commencement
1060804
38
of the term from 2006 to a later date was not a secondary
consideration 
wholly 
subordinate to the 
provision for
commencement of the term by gubernatorial appointment.  The
answer to the hypothetical question whether the legislature
would have been satisfied by the result of striking down the
entire 2006 Act would therefore have to be an emphatic no.  A
legislator so polled would be cognizant of the fact that
saving that part that is constitutional would permit
subsequent enactment of a statute that passed constitutional
muster while continuing to provide for a term beginning at a
date other than in 2006, as was clearly intended by the 2006
Act, consistent with the will of three preceding legislatures.
On the other hand, if we conclude that the will of the
legislature would have been to see the entire 2006 Act fail by
reason of constitutional infirmity as to only a portion of it
and thus to allow an election to take place in 2006, we will
have ignored the clearly expressed will of the legislature in
that portion of the 2006 Act unaffected by constitutional
infirmity.  Such aggressive exercise of the power of judicial
review is inconsistent with our obligations under the
constitutional mandate for separation of powers.
1060804
39
As this Court stated in Springer, "If the act thus
deleted of the invalid part is competent to stand without the
invalid part, and leaves an enactment complete within itself,
sensible, and capable of being executed, it will stand, unless
the two parts--the valid and invalid--are so inseparable as to
raise the presumption that the Legislature would not have
enacted the one without the other."  229 Ala. at 343, 157 So.
at 223.  Applying that standard to this case, the portion of
Section 1 of the 2006 Act amending the provision in the 1985
Act, as last amended, which called for an election in 2006,
and providing instead for an election in 2010 for a term of
office to begin in 2011, clearly constitutes an enactment
"complete within itself, sensible, and capable of being
executed."  
In summary, we conclude that it is more logical to
presume that the legislature did not contemplate election of
a third circuit judge in the 2006 election than it is to
assume that, if the legislature knew that the office could not
be filled by gubernatorial appointment on or after October 1,
2009, it would prefer the status quo before the 2006 Act of an
election in 2006.  This is especially so in light of the
1060804
40
legislature's previous disposition to postpone repeatedly the
effective date and of the availability to the legislature of
the means to adjust further the effective date by subsequent
legislation if we decline to sever and save.  
We therefore cannot conclude that the primary intent of
the legislature was to change the method of filling the
judgeship from that of an election to appointment.  The
unconstitutional provision of the 2006 Act is not "'so
important to the general plan and operation of the law in its
entirety as reasonably to lead to the conclusion that it would
not have been adopted if the legislature had perceived the
invalidity of the part so held to be unconstitutional.'"
Newton v. City of Tuscaloosa, 251 Ala. at 217, 36 So. 2d at
493 (quoting A. Bertolla & Sons v. State, 247 Ala. 269, 271,
24 So. 2d 23, 25 (1945)).  Nor can we find that the
appointment clause and the deferral of the election to 2010
are "so intertwined" that it must be assumed that the
legislature would not have passed an act that, shorn of the
offending provision, has become "meaningless," where, as here,
the remaining portions of the 2006 Act are "complete within
[themselves], sensible, and capable of execution."  State ex
1060804
41
rel. Jeffers v. Martin, 735 So. 2d at 1159.  That aspect of
the 2006 Act deferring the onset of the term until January
2011 remains in effect, thereby amending the provision for an
election in 2006 in the 1999 Act.
VI. Conclusion
This 
Court's 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction 
is 
not
eliminated by § 17-16-44.  Neither does the State's failure to
appeal the trial court's order of August 31, 2006, preclude
judicial review subsequent to Woodruff's election.  Woodruff's
status as the nominee of the Democratic Party did not insulate
him from the authority of the legislature to abolish the
office for which he was a candidate.  Although the provision
in the 2006 Act for filling the office of circuit judge
initially by gubernatorial appointment violates §§ 152 and
153, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.), that provision is
severable.  That aspect of the 2006 Act deferring the onset of
the term until January 2011 remains in effect, thereby
amending the provision for an election in 2006 in the 1999
Act.  We reverse the judgment of the trial court declaring the
2006 Act unconstitutional in its entirety, and we remand the
cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1060804
42
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL DENIED; REVERSED AND REMANDED.
See, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ.,
concur.
Cobb, C.J., and Parker, J., dissent.
1060804
43
COBB, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.  This case presents a question of
first impression in this State, and, in answering it, a
majority of this Court has chosen to remove a judge from the
office in which he has been faithfully and effectively serving
the citizens of Talladega County since his election by an
overwhelming majority of those citizens.  I believe that the
correct legal analysis of this question shows that the
majority incorrectly decides two issues, either of which is
sufficient to uphold the election in this case.  First, I am
of the opinion that the State's failure to timely seek review
of the trial court's order placing Chad Woodruff's name on the
ballot for the November 2006 election deprived the courts of
this State of jurisdiction to address the validity of the
election at issue in this case.  Second, even if I agreed that
this Court has jurisdiction, I believe that the majority errs
in holding that the offending portion of Act No. 2006-355,
Ala. Acts 2006 ("the 2006 Act"), is severable.  I agree with
the 
trial 
court 
that 
the 
constitutionally 
defective
"appointment" language in the 2006 Act is not severable from
the remainder of the statute, so that the entire 2006 Act is
1060804
44
unconstitutional 
and 
cannot 
be 
read 
piecemeal 
to
disenfranchise the voters of Talladega County.
I.  State's Failure to Timely Seek Review
The State's failure in this case to seek review of the
trial court's order of August 31, 2006, which placed
Woodruff's name on the November 2006 ballot for the general
election, effectively deprived this Court of jurisdiction over
this appeal.  The majority's citation to Ala. Code 1975, § 17-
16-44, is apt, and that statute emphatically provides that our
courts are without jurisdiction to address the proceedings in
this case absent some specific statutory authority.  The
majority then notes that the State has supplied us with no
such authority.  Moreover, the majority notes that "[t]he
State could have immediately appealed the August 31, 2006,
order, and sought a mandatory injunction from this Court,
pending appeal, requiring the secretary of state to set aside
the previous certification.  If this Court had been so
inclined on proper motion by the State, it would have been
situated to grant the State 'effectual relief' on the merits."
___ So. 2d at ___ (footnote omitted).  Thus, the State could
have presented a timely challenge to the August 31, 2006,
1060804
45
order in which it raised its concerns about the effect of
placing  Woodruff's name on the ballot for the November 2006
election.  However, the State chose not to make such a
challenge, even in the context of § 17-16-44, which plainly
states: "No jurisdiction exists in or shall be exercised by
any judge or court to entertain any proceeding for
ascertaining the legality ... of any election, except so far
as authority to do so shall be specially and specifically
enumerated and set down by statute ...."  Further, the State
pursued this course in the face of the precedent in Bell v.
Eagerton, 908 So. 2d 204 (Ala. 2005), and Buskey v. Amos, 294
Ala. 1, 310 So. 2d 468 (1975), both of which make clear that
a timely challenge to an election is a critical prerequisite
for a court's  jurisdiction to entertain the challenge.
Further, Bell,  Harvey v. City of Oneonta, 715 So. 2d 779
(Ala. 1998), and Etheridge v. State ex rel. Olson, 730 So. 2d
1179 (Ala. 1999), all applied the predecessor to § 17-16-44,
Ala. Code 1975, § 17-15-6, to reject the sort of collateral
challenges to elections the State attempts in this case.  
For all that, the State opted not to pursue a timely
appeal of the trial court's August 31, 2006, order; neither
1060804
46
did it seek injunctive relief challenging the trial court's
action.  Further, it is settled law that the State could have
brought a quo warranto proceeding to challenge Woodruff's
status on the ballot, see Corpew v. Tallapoosa County, 241
Ala. 492, 3 So. 2d 53 (1941)(discussing the availability of
the quo warranto proceeding to determine the validity of an
office).  Instead, the State seeks to invalidate Judge
Woodruff's election, 
by 
the overwhelming majority 
of 
the votes
cast in Talladega County, long after that election was a fact
and Judge Woodruff had entered into the office.  I believe
that this situation is exactly the sort of situation § 17-16-
44 and its predecessor, § 17-15-6, sought to avoid.  Moreover,
I believe that the majority's reliance upon Dennis v. Prather,
212 Ala. 449, 103 So. 2d 59 (1925), and the speculation in
that opinion that § 17-15-6 should be strictly construed,
results in a holding by this Court that the plain language of
§ 17-16-44 may now be disregarded at the convenience of the
attorney general.  
I believe that State ex rel. Norrell v. Key, 276 Ala.
524, 165 So. 2d 76 (1964), presents a more applicable
rationale for a holding in this case.  In Norrell, this Court
1060804
47
considered the plaintiff's claim that a county commissioner,
Fred Key, should be ousted from his office because he had not
been properly nominated by the Democratic Party and his name
had been improperly placed on the ballot.  Key had been
nominated in May 1962 and elected on November 6, 1962.  The
plaintiff brought the quo warranto action challenging Key's
right to office in August 1963.  The trial court entered a
judgment in favor of Key, and the plaintiff appealed.  The
Court stated:
"In this state quo warranto is a statutory
proceeding and to be maintained it must meet the
requirements of the statute as to parties and
procedure. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. State, 154 Ala.
156, 45 So. 296 [(1907)].  As for public officers,
the proceeding may be brought to oust from office
any person who 'usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully
holds or exercises any public office,' or does an
act which 'forfeits his office.' Title 7, § 1136,
Code of Ala. 1940 [now § 6-6-591, Ala. Code 1975].
In State ex rel. McIntyre v. McEachern, 231 Ala.
609, 166 So. 36 [(1936)], we said: 'It will lie to
test the qualifications of one to hold an office
when they are sufficient to make it unlawful for him
[sic] with them to hold the office.  Those
qualifications must go to his eligibility to hold
the office or sufficient to cause its forfeiture.'
Here there is no question as to appellee's
forfeiture of the office.  The substance of
appellant's complaint is that the appellee holds the
office unlawfully, such being an attack on the
appellee's qualifications as a nominee.
1060804
48
"We find appropriate to a decision of this case
the statement in 29 C.J.S. Elections § 141, p. 211:
'Objections relating to nominations must be timely
made.  It is too late to make them after the
nominee's name has been placed on the ballot and he
has been elected to office; his election cannot be
impeached on the ground that statutory requirements
regarding nominations were not complied with in his
case ....'  At 18 Am.Jur., Elections, § 131, p. 263,
it is said:
"'It is a firmly established general
rule that objections to irregularities in
the nomination of a candidate should be
taken prior to election.  Voters finding a
ticket or the names of candidates on the
official ballot are not required to
determine whether they are entitled to a
place thereon, but may safely rely on the
action of the officers of the law and on
the presumption that they have performed
their duty.  Thus, an election in which the
voters have fully, fairly, and honestly
expressed their 
will is 
not invalid because
the certificate of nomination of the
successful candidate is defective through
the omission of some detail; nor is the
title of the successful candidate affected
by a subsequent decision holding the law
under which the nominations were made
invalid. ... Some decisions have gone so
far as to hold that in the absence of a
statutory provision to the contrary, an
election is not invalidated by the fact
that the nomination of the successful
candidate was fraudulent and not made in
the manner prescribed by statute, unless
the noncompliance with the law had the
effect of preventing a fair vote.'"
1060804
49
276 Ala. at 525-26, 165 So. 2d at 77-78 (emphasis added).  The
Court in Key affirmed the judgment of the trial court
rejecting the plaintiff's challenge to Key's election.
Moreover, although I agree that an action by the State is
not normally subject to estoppel, see, e.g., Greenwood v.
State ex rel. Bailes,  230 Ala. 405, 161 So. 498 (1935), I do
not believe that this general policy should be subject to the
application of an explicit legislative pronouncement, as in §
17-16-44, nor do I believe that this policy should apply when
the State, in a dilatory action, seeks to invalidate a
fundamental constitutional right, in this case the right of
the citizens of Talladega County to exercise their right to
vote.  In large part, our country was founded on this right:
"A share in the sovereignty of the State, which is
exercised by the citizens at large in voting at the
elections, is one of the most important rights of
the subject, and in a republic ought to stand
foremost in the estimation of the law.  It is that
right by which we exist, as a free people, and it
will certainly therefore never be admitted that less
ceremony ought to be used in divesting any citizen
of that right than in depriving him of his property.
Such a doctrine would ill suit the principles of the
Revolution which taught the inhabitants of this
country to risk their lives and fortunes in
asserting their liberty, or, in other words, their
right to share in the government.  Let me caution
against precedents which may in their consequences
1060804
50
render 
out 
title 
to 
this 
great 
privilege
precarious."
3 Papers of Alexander Hamilton 544-45 (Harold C. Syrett, ed.,
Columbia University Press 1962).  The United States Supreme
Court is in accord: "It is beyond cavil that 'voting is of the
most fundamental significance under out constitutional
structure.'  Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers
Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979)."  Burdick v. Takushi, 504
U.S. 428, 433 (1992); so are the courts of this State:
Hutchins v. DCH Reg'l Med. Ctr., 770 So. 2d 49 (Ala. 2000);
Gideon v. Alabama State Ethics Comm'n, 379 So. 2d 570 (Ala.
1980)(both acknowledging the United States Supreme Court's
holding in  Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), that the
right to vote is a fundamental constitutional right).  See
also Amend. XV, U.S. Const., and Art. I, § 33, Ala. Const.
1901.
Given the significance of the right to vote here at
issue, I cannot accept a rule that estoppel never applies to
the State and that the State need not timely prosecute any
action it may have to challenge the exercise of that right.
Moreover, I believe that the majority's holding on this point
unwisely 
vests 
in 
the attorney 
general 
an 
unrestricted ability
1060804
51
to challenge elections otherwise long settled.  Surely even
the State is at some point subject to a requirement that it
timely assert a claim or be silent, and I believe that that
point is shown in this case.  I would hold that the State can
be estopped to challenge the result of the exercise by
citizens of this State of their fundamental constitutional
right to vote in the event it fails to assert that challenge
in a reasonably timely manner as determined by the applicable
statutes and case authority.  Thus, I would conclude that the
plain language of § 17-16-44, particularly when read in the
context of our settled law that requires a challenge to an
elected office to be timely made, does not permit the courts
to exercise jurisdiction over the State's untimely challenge
to Judge Woodruff's election in this case.  Even if I could
reasonably conclude that § 17-16–44 is inapplicable under
these circumstances, I would hold that the State's action to
invalidate the fundamental rights of the voters of Talladega
County is barred by its failure to timely assert that action.
I therefore dissent from this Court's denial of the Talladega
County parties' motion to dismiss the appeal.
II.  Severability
1060804
52
Further, even if I were to agree that this Court had
jurisdiction in this case, I believe that the majority's
application of the doctrine of severability to the 2006 Act is
incorrect.  I do agree with the Court's conclusion that the
trial court correctly determined that the 2006 Act is
constitutionally invalid; however, I must dissent from the
majority's rationale that the three sentences that constitute
that potion of the 2006 Act before us are not so "closely
intertwined" as to be severable.  State ex rel. Jeffers v.
Martin, 735 So. 2d 1156 (Ala. 1999).  The result of the
majority's rationale is to find the 2006 Act  unconstitutional
while still invalidating Judge Woodruff's election.  
I agree with the majority that a critical  consideration
on the issue of severability is the legislature's intent.
Newton v. City of Tuscaloosa, 251 Ala. 209, 36 So. 2d 487
(1948).  Further, our settled law regarding the determination
of legislative intent in this context requires a reference to
the language in the enacting portion and the preamble of the
act.  Ball v. Jones, 272 Ala. 305, 315-16, 132 So. 2d 120, 129
(1961)("In case of doubt or inconsistency between language in
the enacting part of a statute and language in the preamble,
1060804
53
the preamble controls because it expresses in the most
satisfactory manner ... the purpose of the act.  Sutherland
Statutes and Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, p. 342, §
4801(3).").  See also City of Bessemer v. McLain, 957 So. 2d
1061 (Ala. 2006).  The preamble to the 2006 Act states that it
is being enacted "to provide for the appointment and
subsequent election ... of Circuit Judgeship No. 3."  That is,
the very existence of the office of circuit judgeship no. 3 is
first contingent upon appointment.  Unlike each of the
preceding legislative attempts to fill this office that
specified election, the legislature's intent in enacting the
2006 Act was clearly that no election could take place if the
office was not first filled by appointment.  
Moreover, 
the 
record 
contains 
evidence 
of 
the
circumstances surrounding the enactment of the 2006 Act that
includes 
the testimony of Clarence Haynes, 
a 
former legislator
and sponsor of one of the prior bills creating the new
judgeship, that the purpose of the 2006 Act was to delay the
filling of the new judgeship by three years and then to fill
it by appointment.  In light of these circumstances, I agree
with the trial court's determination, quoted in the majority
1060804
54
opinion, that the general purpose of the 2006 Act was to fill
the new judgeship in Talladega County by appointment.  Only
when the judgeship existed as a result of that appointment
could an election take place.  I conclude that this is exactly
the sort of intertwining that supports the trial court's
determination that the entire 2006 Act is constitutionally
invalid.  
State ex rel. Jeffers provides a good example of a
situation in which  a provision in an act was severable
because it was not so intertwined.  The Court in State ex rel.
Jeffers addressed a challenge to a provision of the
legislature's statutory plan creating and regulating city
school boards.  At issue in State ex rel. Jeffers was a
portion of 
the 
general provision 
regulating the 
composition 
of
the school boards and providing that teachers would not be
eligible to serve as members of a school board.  The Court
applied the principles already noted by the majority to
conclude that the constitutionally infirm language could be
properly severed from the many provisions of the statute
providing for the type and composition of school boards.  The
Court stated that because the offending language was only an
1060804
55
exception to the general rule and because the rule was fully
applicable without the exception, severability was warranted.
735 So. 2d at 1159-60.  
This case is entirely distinct from State ex rel.
Jeffers.  Unlike the statutory plan in State ex rel. Jeffers,
the 2006 Act has only one purpose -- the filling of the newly
created judgeship.  That purpose was to be accomplished by an
appointment.  The fact that it was subsequently to be filled
by election was wholly contingent upon that initial
establishment.  I do not believe that the majority's parsing
of the three sentences in the 2006 Act, no matter how careful,
can overcome this fact.  Accordingly, even in the event that
this Court could find an appropriate basis on which to
exercise jurisdiction over this case, I would conclude that
the trial court correctly determined that the 2006 Act was
constitutionally invalid in its entirety and that Judge
Woodruff was properly elected to office under the revived act
-- Act No. 99-566, Ala. Acts 1999.
Parker, J., concurs.