Title: Taylor v. Tinsley
Citation: 330 P.2d 954
Docket Number: 18615
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: October 27, 1958

330 P.2d 954 (1958) Arthur J. TAYLOR, Plaintiff in Error, v. Harry C. TINSLEY, Warden of the Colorado State Penitentiary, Defendant in Error. No. 18615. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. October 27, 1958. H. R. Harward, Canon City, for plaintiff in error. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Patterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error. DAY, Justice. The parties will be referred to herein as they appeared in the trial court where plaintiff in error was plaintiff and defendant in error defendant. Plaintiff filed in the court below a complaint for declaratory judgment, R.C.P. Colo. 57. In it he alleged that he was confined in the state penitentiary pursuant to mittimus issued by the district court in and for the county of Rio Blanco, State of Colorado, and that the defendant is the authorized warden of the penitentiary where he is confined. He alleges that the warden failed to give him certain credits to which he believed he is entitled under various statutes, to wit: C.R.S. '53, 105-4-4, 5, 6 and 10. In his complaint he prays for *955 a determination of his status under the various statutes cited and for an order of court directing the defendant warden to make certain corrections in the prison records and to give him certain credits which he claims under C.R.S. '53, 105-4-4 and 5. The court, after hearing, dismissed the complaint, giving as a reason that it "fails to state a judiciable issue." The question to be determined is: Did the court err in dismissing the complaint and in holding that it did not state a justiciable issue? This question is answered in the negative. There is no allegation in plaintiff's complaint and there was no showing at the hearing that the change requested by him in the penitentiary records was necessary or in any manner would change his then present rights or status. He does not claim that an alteration of the record, if made at the time of his complaint, would entitle him to discharge or even consideration for parole. It is not the function of the courts, even by way of declaration, to adjudicate with respect to administrative orders in the absence of a showing that a judgment, if entered, would afford the plaintiff present relief. Declaratory judgment proceedings may not be invoked to resolve a question which is non-existent, even though it can be assumed that at some future time such question may arise. As was stated by this court in Gabriel v. Board of Regents, 83 Colo. 582, 267 P. 407, 408: See also City and County of Denver v. Lynch, 92 Colo. 102, 18 P.2d 907, 86 A.L. R. 907, and Mulcahy v. Johnson, 80 Colo. 499, 252 P. 816. It seems patent that the complaint in this case falls clearly within the prohibitions of these cases. Plaintiff asks the court to advise him of the meaning of the statutes and to order changes in the records concerning his incarceration without establishing that his rights or status would be affected by such adjudication. The only relief that could be granted to plaintiff would be some change on a record card. Because construction of the statute by the court would not change his status or entitle him to immediate discharge or parole from prison, the court was right in dismissing the action. It is apropos to comment here that even though a change in the record, under such interpretation of the statute as is sought by the plaintiff, might entitle him on some future day to a release from prison in advance of the time calculated by the prison records, declaratory relief is improper. He has a remedy in habeas corpus in which a coercive judgment could be entered. There can be no coercive judgment in a proceeding under the declaratory judgment rule. The Supreme Court of Indiana had occassion to discuss under similar facts the impropriety of declaratory relief in Hinkle v. Howard, 225 Ind. 176, 73 N.E.2d 674, 675. The facts in that case as stated by the court were as follows: "Appellant filed his petition for a declaratory judgment in the LaPorte Circuit Court. It alleged in substance that he was convicted of forgery in the Grant Circuit Court on May 4, 1934, and sentenced to the state prison for an indeterminate term of not less than two nor more than fourteen years. He avers that he was thereafter released on parole but was returned to prison for violation, and was then, by the prison authorities, given the remainder of his fourteen *956 year term, because of the violation. Appellant contends that this action of the prison authorities made his sentence a determinate sentence of fourteen years, and that he is entitled to the good time allowance on a determinate sentence of fourteen years, which would be five years, and reduce his determinate sentence to nine years. On this theory he should have been released on May 4, 1943." The court then held: Enunciating the same general principles is Clark v. Memolo, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 65, 174 F.2d 978, 981, where the court stated: "The Declaratory Judgment Act [28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201, 2202], was designed to provide a remedy in a case or controversy while there is still opportunity for peaceable judicial settlement. It was the primary purpose of the act to have a declaration of rights not theretofore determined, and not to determine whether rights therefore adjudicated have been properly adjudicated. To permit every person convicted in any United States District Court who claimed that his sentence was void because of a violation of his constitutional rights, such as double jeopardy, appointment of counsel, and the like, to maintain an action in the District of Columbia to set such sentence aside, would create a conflict of jurisdictions which was not *957 contemplated or intended by the Declaratory Judgment Act. Di Benedetto v. Morgenthau, supra [80 U.S.App.D. C. 34, 148 F.2d 223]; Valenti v. Clark, D.C., 83 F. Supp. 167; United States v. Rollnick, D.C.M.D.Pa., 33 F. Supp. 863; Avery Freight Lines v. White, 245 Ala. 618, 18 So. 2d 394, 154 A.L.R. 740. The action for declaratory judgment is not suitable and does not lie in the District of Columbia in such cases as a substitute for a motion to vacate or to correct the sentence in the court where it was imposed, or as a substitute for habeas corpus in the district where the unlawful detention occurs, or as a substitute for a new trial or appeal. Unless so restricted there would be no end to that kind of litigation." (Emphasis supplied.) For the reasons herein set forth, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.