Title: State v. Thornton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 120028
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: March 5, 2021

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 120,028 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JAMES L. THORNTON, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
An error admitting evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights is a constitutional error that can be declared harmless only when the 
party benefitting from the error proves beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not affect 
the trial's outcome in light of the entire record, i.e., when there is no reasonable 
possibility the error contributed to the verdict. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed May 15, 2020. 
Appeal from Douglas District Court; SALLY D. POKORNY, judge. Opinion filed March 5, 2021. Judgment 
of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the briefs for appellant.  
 
Kate Duncan Butler, assistant district attorney, and Charles E. Branson, district attorney, and 
Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  James L. Thornton seeks our review of a Court of Appeals decision 
affirming his convictions for possession of marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug 
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paraphernalia. Our concern is the prejudicial impact of the trial court admitting evidence 
that a syringe was found by police during a search that all agree violated Thornton's 
Fourth Amendment rights. The panel upheld the convictions. State v. Thornton, No. 
120,028, 2020 WL 2503480, at *5 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion). We affirm 
that result, even though the panel failed to consider whether this constitutional error was 
harmless. We hold the remaining evidence leaves no reasonable possibility the syringe 
affected the trial's outcome.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Late one night, a Lawrence police officer saw Thornton ride away on a bicycle 
from a house "well known" for criminal behavior. The bicycle had no lights, which the 
officer believed was a city ordinance violation, so the officer activated his emergency 
lights and attempted a stop. But Thornton continued on for another block and a half with 
the officer twice trying to force him off the road. When the pursuit ended, the officer 
handcuffed Thornton, who carried a machete on his belt and wore a backpack. The 
officer removed the backpack, placed it on the patrol vehicle, and did a pat-down search. 
 
After another officer arrived, the two did a "more thorough check" because 
Thornton was wearing multiple layers of clothing. Thornton told the officers he had a 
marijuana glass pipe on him, which they found. They also learned he had an active arrest 
warrant on a marijuana charge in Franklin County. They searched the backpack and 
found the syringe. It was photographed later and then disposed of according to standard 
practice. 
 
After putting Thornton into a patrol car, an officer retraced the path Thornton had 
taken on the bicycle and found a plastic bag containing drugs. The State charged 
Thornton with possession of marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia. 
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Thornton moved to suppress the glass pipe, his statements to officers, and the bag of 
drugs. 
 
At the suppression hearing, Thornton's counsel conceded the search that produced 
the pipe was "clearly" incident to arrest. He did not argue about the syringe and 
concluded his arguments by saying, "I guess the only issue that comes here would be 
[his] statement that he made to [the officer], and I ask that be suppressed." The district 
court ruled the statement was admissible and remarked it was "not even sure the [arrest] 
affidavit even mentions the syringe and the backpack, so I don't know where that even 
plays into this." 
 
A jury convicted Thornton on all charges. The district court sentenced him to 18 
months' imprisonment for methamphetamine possession and to concurrent terms of 6 
months in jail for marijuana possession and 12 months in jail for paraphernalia 
possession. 
 
Thornton appealed, raising two issues. First, he argued the backpack was illegally 
searched and this required his convictions be reversed. Failing that, he claimed the two 
drug possession convictions should be reversed because the prosecutor "repeatedly" 
linked the syringe's discovery with the circumstantial claim that the drugs found along 
Thornton's path belonged to him. Second, he argued the drug paraphernalia conviction 
should be reversed because the district court did not instruct the jury to agree 
unanimously whether the syringe or the pipe was the contraband on which its verdict 
should be based, noting the State did not elect which it relied on to support a conviction. 
 
The State conceded on appeal the district court should have granted the 
suppression motion on the syringe, agreeing the search incident to arrest exception for a 
warrantless search did not apply to the backpack search that produced it. But the State 
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argued the bag of drugs was not discovered because of any information collected from 
the backpack, so the panel was "justified in not considering [Thornton's] reversibility 
argument." 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Thornton, 2020 WL 2503480, at *5, 7. The panel 
accepted the State's concession that the syringe's discovery was the product of an illegal 
search and that the district court erred admitting evidence of it. The panel also held the 
pipe was not tainted by an illegal search. 2020 WL 2503480, at *4-5. The panel then 
concluded: 
 
"Thornton also makes a cursory argument that reversal is necessary because the 
State 'repeatedly linked the discovery of the syringe with its circumstantial claim that the 
drugs found on the ground were [his].' But he cites no authority in support of this 
conclusory spillover effect argument. We deem it abandoned. See State v. Sprague, 303 
Kan. 418, 425, 362 P.3d 828 (2015) ('When a litigant fails to adequately brief an issue it 
is deemed abandoned.')." Thornton, 2020 WL 2503480, at *5. 
 
Finally, the panel held it was unnecessary to instruct the jury to agree unanimously 
whether the pipe or syringe constituted the contraband underlying the drug paraphernalia 
conviction because simultaneously possessing the two items would constitute drug 
paraphernalia and would "not include multiple acts because they are not factually distinct 
. . . ." 2020 WL 2503480, at *7. 
 
We granted Thornton's petition for review to consider whether the panel erred by 
affirming these convictions without determining if the syringe evidence was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (providing for 
petitions for review of Court of Appeals decisions); K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (Supreme Court 
has jurisdiction to review Court of Appeals decisions upon petition for review). 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
When an appellate court concludes suppression should have been granted, it must 
"consider whether the error in admitting the evidence was harmless." State v. Porting, 
281 Kan. 320, 328-29, 130 P.3d 1173 (2006) (holding error admitting evidence found in 
search of the defendants' residence in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights was not 
harmless, when the evidence obtained was the only evidence against the defendants). In 
Thornton's case, the panel reasoned suppression was required under a "judicially created 
. . . exclusionary rule." Thornton, 2020 WL 2503480, at *2; see also State v. Daniel, 291 
Kan. 490, 496, 242 P.3d 1186 (2010) ("Th[e] exclusionary rule operates to protect Fourth 
Amendment rights through deterrence, and it is not the defendant's personal 
constitutional right."). 
 
But an error admitting evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights is a constitutional error that "may only be declared harmless when the 
party benefitting from the error proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 
affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record." State v. James, 301 Kan. 898, 
910, 349 P.3d 457 (2015) (holding reversibility for erroneous admission of evidence from 
defendant's cell phone in violation of the Fourth Amendment turned on the harmless-
error test applicable to constitutional errors, not the more lenient test for non-
constitutional errors). The so-called, Chapman formula for harmlessness of constitutional 
error requires reversal unless an appellate court is willing to declare it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 
17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967) ("[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the 
court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."); 
State v. Johnson, 310 Kan. 835, 843, 450 P.3d 790 (2019) ("A constitutional error is 
harmless if the State can show 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of 
will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where 
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there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.'"); State v. 
Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 560-61, 256 P.3d 801 (2011) (noting Chapman places burden on 
beneficiary of constitutional error to prove harmlessness). 
 
The panel affirmed Thornton's convictions without assessing the error's prejudicial 
impact despite concluding the district court erred in admitting evidence about the syringe. 
This was plainly wrong. Instead, the panel simply characterized Thornton's argument 
about the syringe's prejudicial effect as "cursory" and "conclusory." Thornton, 2020 WL 
2503480, at *5. It referenced no harmless error caselaw and said nothing in its analysis to 
show it satisfied itself the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, 
the panel missed a necessary step. 
  
Thornton asks us to remand the case so the panel can perform the harmless error 
analysis. Alternatively, he asks us to do it and conclude the State failed to carry its burden 
to prove the trial error was harmless. 
 
We have decided in this instance to address the question ourselves. We hold the 
remaining evidence was strong enough that there is no reasonable possibility the syringe 
evidence affected the jury's decisions to convict. 
 
On the paraphernalia count, the State argued at trial that either the syringe or the 
glass pipe constituted drug paraphernalia. Yet an arresting officer admitted the syringe 
was dry, admitted he did not test it, and agreed it could have legitimate medical uses. 
These admissions dilute the officer's testimony that the syringe was consistent with others 
he had seen used for methamphetamine. Even so, the evidence about the syringe contrasts 
with the much stronger evidence connecting the glass pipe to Thornton's drug use and 
paraphernalia possession. As to that, the officer testified the pipe's purpose was for 
smoking marijuana and the bag with the pipe had an odor resembling burnt marijuana. 
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Adding to this, the discovery of the marijuana and methamphetamine along Thornton's 
path of travel during the bicycle pursuit reinforces the State's claim that both the pipe and 
syringe were drug paraphernalia Thornton "use[d] or possess[ed] with intent to use . . . to 
. . . inject . . . inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body." 
See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5709(b)(2) (defining crime of drug paraphernalia possession). 
We hold there is no reasonable possibility the syringe evidence's admission contributed to 
the paraphernalia conviction given the evidence about the glass pipe. 
 
On the two drug possession counts, the State characterized the syringe at trial 
simply as circumstantial evidence linking Thornton to the bag of drugs found along his 
path before the stop. But that inference was overshadowed by the other evidence because 
Thornton's refusal to stop when the officer was in pursuit, the condition of the bag of 
drugs, and other admissible drug-related evidence in Thornton's possession strongly 
support an inferential link to him. After all, the ground was damp but the bag was dry, 
which suggests the bag was dropped very recently. And Thornton had on his person a 
pipe inside a bag that emitted a burnt marijuana odor. Based on the evidence, we hold 
there is no reasonable possibility the syringe evidence contributed to the jury's decision 
that the drugs found along Thornton's path belonged to him. 
 
We affirm Thornton's convictions by applying the appropriate constitutional 
harmless error test. See State v. Williams, 311 Kan. 88, 91, 456 P.3d 540 (2020) 
(affirming Court of Appeals as right for the wrong reason). 
 
Affirmed.