Title: Commonwealth v. Gebo
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13203
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 2, 2022

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SJC-13203 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ELIZABETH GEBO. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     January 5, 2022. - June 2, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.  
Constitutional Law, Waiver of constitutional rights, Trial 
by jury, Trial jury-waived.  Waiver.  Practice, Criminal, 
Trial jury-waived, Waiver of trial by jury. 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Springfield Division 
of the District Court Department on July 26, 2017. 
 
The case was tried before William P. Hadley, J. 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
Chrisoula I. Roumeliotis for the defendant. 
John A. Wendel, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a trial by 
2 
 
jury.  In a noncapital case, a defendant may waive this 
constitutional right, so long as jurors have yet to be 
empanelled.  See G. L. c. 263, § 6.  Where a defendant requests 
a waiver, trial will proceed jury-waived "[i]f the court 
consents," id.; a "judge may refuse to approve such a waiver for 
any good and sufficient reason provided that such refusal is 
given in open court and on the record," Mass. R. Crim. P. 
19 (a), 378 Mass. 888 (1979). 
 
We have yet to clarify the appropriate standard of review 
of a judge's denial of a motion for jury waiver.  Nor have we 
explained the contours of "good and sufficient reason," within 
the meaning of Mass. R. Crim. P. 19 (a), for a judge to deny the 
waiver.  Judges presented with motions for jury waiver therefore 
have had little guidance in addressing a defendant's request for 
a waiver. 
 
The defendant in this case sought to waive her right to a 
jury trial on the day of trial, after previously having elected 
a jury trial at a trial readiness conference twelve days 
earlier.  The judge denied the request for a waiver, reasoning 
that the request gave "the appearance or the inkling of judge 
shopping."  The defendant challenges this denial and maintains 
that she was not "judge shopping."  The defendant also 
challenges her conviction of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon on a person aged sixty or older, on the ground 
3 
 
that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the chair the defendant used to strike the 
victim was a dangerous weapon within the meaning of G. L. 
c. 265, § 15A (a). 
 
We conclude that the appropriate standard of review of a 
judge's decision on a request for a jury waiver is an abuse of 
discretion.  Here, there was no abuse of discretion in the 
judge's determination to deny the request on the ground that it 
gave the appearance of "judge shopping."  We conclude as well 
that the evidence was sufficient to support the single 
conviction of assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon, because the evidence would have allowed the jury to 
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the chair, as used, was a 
dangerous weapon. 
 
1.  Background.  The jury could have found the following.  
At the time of the altercation that led to the defendant's 
conviction, in April of 2017, the victim and the defendant had 
been married for fifty-five years.  The victim, who was seventy-
six years old at the time of trial, was in the family home, 
watching television and drinking coffee, when his wife walked 
through the kitchen and out into the breezeway.  He heard a loud 
noise, and when he went out to investigate, found that his wife 
had thrown one of his shoes onto the deck.  An argument ensued, 
which the victim characterized as the defendant "hollering" at 
4 
 
him.  The argument involved the cleanliness of the deck and the 
shoe, which the defendant maintained smelled of dog feces.  As 
the victim bent down to pick up his shoe, the defendant grabbed 
a plastic chair and swung it at him, hitting him near the left 
wrist.  When the victim again bent to pick up the shoe, the 
defendant again swung the chair, but the victim was able to grab 
it and push it away from himself. 
 
The victim returned to the house, and the defendant 
followed him into the kitchen, where she picked up a ladle and 
hit him in the back of the head.  The victim briefly lost 
consciousness and awoke on the kitchen floor.  The defendant 
told him that he had had a heart attack.  The victim was treated 
at a hospital emergency room for a one inch by two and one-half 
inch gash on his wrist, and an injury to the back of his head 
that required staples to close.  Because the victim was taking 
anticoagulants, both injuries bled profusely, but the victim was 
able to be released after the injuries were treated. 
 
The defendant testified in her own defense that she had 
walked into the breezeway, smelled a foul odor coming from the 
victim's shoe, and threw it onto the deck.  The victim then ran 
toward her with his arms raised, and she picked up a deck chair 
to protect herself.  The victim wrestled the chair out of her 
hands, cutting her arm in the process.  The victim returned to 
the house, and the defendant went to the kitchen to treat her 
5 
 
arm.  At that moment, she heard a sound and saw the victim on 
the floor, with a cut on his head.  The victim called 911 and 
was taken to the hospital, where he was treated and released. 
 
The defendant was charged with two counts of assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon (a chair and a blunt 
object) on a person aged sixty or older, in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 15A (a), and one count of violating an abuse 
prevention order, in violation of G. L. c. 209A, § 7.1 
 
On January 17, 2018, a hearing judge held a trial readiness 
conference to assess whether the case would proceed to trial.  
When the judge asked, "This is going to be a jury trial?" 
defense counsel responded, "As of this point, yes, Your Honor."  
The judge replied, "Okay.  Be subject to a motion when it's 
called for trial next week or in the future."  The case was 
scheduled for trial on January 29, 2018. 
 
On January 29, 2018, the day of trial, the parties appeared 
before the trial judge, a different judge from the one who had 
presided over the readiness conference.  The defendant completed 
the form titled "Motion Pursuant to Rule 19 (a) for Relief from 
Election of Jury or Jury-Waived Trial" and requested a jury-
waived trial.  The form required the defendant to select the 
 
 
1 On the first day of trial, before the jury were 
empanelled, the Commonwealth entered a nolle prosequi on the 
charge of violating an abuse prevention order. 
6 
 
reasons for her request from a list of options.2  The defendant 
selected the option, "Specific characteristics of this case have 
caused me to reconsider my original election (Specify below)," 
but did not specify anything further in the allotted space on 
the form. 
 
In open court, the trial judge discussed the defendant's 
motion with defense counsel: 
The judge:  "Okay, and [the defendant] elected a jury trial 
previously?" 
 
Defense counsel:  "She had previously, Judge." 
 
The judge:  "So what's the basis for waiving that at this 
point?" 
 
Defense counsel:  "Judge, we have consulted extensively 
today about the different options, and I understand we did 
not elect a jury waived trial on the 15th, or when is it 
the trial I guess." 
 
The judge:  "Uh huh." 
 
Defense counsel:  "We did have high hopes coming into 
today, given my client's lack of criminal history . . . 
that the case be resolved.  I did speak with my client 
today again about what the different options were.  I think 
given the facts of this case, given the time, context of 
this case, a jury waived trial is appropriate.  I did go 
over the difference with my client and she believed given 
 
2 The waiver form enumerates the following options:  
(1) "I/my attorney have recently become aware of additional 
evidence that could not have been discovered earlier and that 
bears on my decision whether to proceed with a trial by jury or 
a bench trial (Specify below)"; (2) "Specific characteristics of 
this case have caused me to reconsider my original election 
(Specify below)"; (3) "Specific characteristics about myself, as 
the Defendant, have caused me to reconsider my original election 
(Specify below)"; (4) "I have retained new counsel"; and 
(5) "Other (Specify below)." 
7 
 
all the circumstances that she wanted a jury waived trial 
today." 
 
The judge:  "Okay, well that really isn't a legitimate 
reason.  I mean it's a legitimate reason as far as you're 
concerned, but lawfully under the current rules in 
Massachusetts there has to be a good cause and that does 
not amount to good cause." 
 
Defense counsel:  "I can only tell the court that I have 
attempted or on other occasions I have gone down to 
courtroom nine or courtroom [ten] and have been able to 
elect a jury waiving of trial, given different 
circumstances so --" 
 
The judge:  "Okay." 
 
Defense counsel:  "With that understanding --" 
 
The judge:  "Well, good for you." 
 
Defense counsel:  "Yeah." 
 
The judge:  "My ruling is that's, that's not good cause 
under the standards for waiving a once elected jury trial.  
So that motion is denied.  We have jurors and we will use 
them." 
 
Defense counsel:  "Judge, I would just say the Commonwealth 
does not object to a jury waived trial." 
 
The judge:  "I don't care.  All right.  I have to apply the 
law equally and that is not good cause.  So the parties 
want a trial, you get a trial.  It's going to be a trial in 
front of the jury.  That is what was elected and to waive 
that on the day of trial, part of the issue and I don't 
think it's me, but the issue of avoiding the appearance or 
the inkling of judge shopping, et cetera --" 
 
Defense counsel:  "And, and there's no judge shopping 
here --" 
 
The judge:  "It's done, it's done.  I'll note your 
objection.  I'll note the Commonwealth's objection if you 
want to, but we have jurors here today, it's a jury trial." 
 
8 
 
 
The members of the venire then were called in, and the 
Commonwealth moved for trial.  Defense counsel requested a 
sidebar conference, at which he told the judge that the "onus is 
actually on the Court" and "not defense counsel."  The judge 
reiterated his denial of the request for jury waiver.  
Empanelment proceeded, and trial ensued.  Both the victim and 
the defendant testified as the only witnesses.  The jury found 
the defendant guilty of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon, a chair, on a person aged sixty or older; the 
defendant was acquitted of the second count, involving the 
ladle.  On the defendant's appeal, the Appeals Court concluded 
that the judge erred in denying the defendant's request for a 
jury-waived trial, and we granted the Commonwealth's petition 
for further appellate review. 
 
2.  Statute and court rules governing jury waiver.  A 
criminal defendant's request for waiver of the constitutional 
right to a jury trial is governed by G. L. c. 263, § 6, and the 
Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure.  See Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 11 (b) (2) (iii), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1509 (2004); 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 19 (a).  The District Court and Municipal 
Court Rules of Criminal Procedure also regulate the request for 
a jury waiver.  See Dist./Mun. Cts. R. Crim. P. 4(e). 
 
The basic framework for requesting a jury waiver is set 
forth in G. L. c. 263, § 6, which provides, in relevant part, 
9 
 
"Any defendant in a criminal case other than a capital 
case . . . may, if he [or she] shall so elect, when called 
upon to plead, or later and before a jury has been 
impanelled . . . , waive his [or her] right to trial by 
jury by signing a written waiver thereof and filing the 
same with the clerk of the court.  If the court consents to 
the waiver, [the defendant] shall be tried by the court 
instead of by a jury, but not, however, unless all the 
defendants, if there are two or more charged with related 
offenses, . . . shall have exercised such election before a 
jury has been impanelled to try any of the 
defendants . . . .  Except where there is more than one 
defendant involved as aforesaid, consent to said waiver 
shall not be denied in the district court or the Boston 
municipal court if the waiver is filed before the case is 
transferred for jury trial to the appropriate jury session, 
as provided in [G. L. c. 218, § 27A]." 
 
 
The rules of criminal procedure similarly provide that a 
defendant may waive the right to a jury and that a judge may 
refuse to allow such a waiver, but contain much more specificity 
than does G. L. c. 263, § 6.  Rule 19 (a) of the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure provides, 
"Where the defendant has the right to be tried by a jury, 
the defendant may waive the right to be tried by a jury, 
provided that the judge determines after a colloquy that 
such waiver is knowing and voluntary, and the defendant 
signs a written waiver, which shall be filed with the 
court. . . .  The judge may refuse to approve such a waiver 
for any good and sufficient reason provided that such 
refusal is given in open court and on the record." 
 
Other rules requires a defendant to make an initial election 
before the day of trial.  For instance, pursuant to Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 11 (b) (2) (iii), once a judge has determined that "the 
pretrial conference report is complete, all discovery matters 
have been resolved, and compliance with all discovery orders has 
10 
 
been accomplished," "the court shall obtain the defendant's 
decision on waiver of the right to a jury trial, and assign a 
trial date or trial assignment date." 
 
The District and Municipal Court Rules of Criminal 
Procedure also set requirements beyond the provisions of G. L. 
c. 263, § 6.  Rule 4(e) of the District/Municipal Courts Rules 
of Criminal Procedure states, 
"When the pretrial conference report is submitted, the 
court shall examine it for completeness, shall rule on any 
disputed discovery issues, and, unless discovery compliance 
is still pending, shall inquire if the defendant waives the 
right to jury trial. 
 
"The court shall not compel the defendant's decision on 
waiver of jury trial until all discovery issues have been 
resolved and compliance with any discovery orders has been 
completed.  Compliance with discovery orders may require 
the scheduling of a 'compliance/election hearing' as 
provided in Rule 5.  However, the defendant may proceed to 
enter the decision on jury waiver and a trial date may be 
set prior to compliance with discovery orders, at the 
defendant's option." 
 
In addition, Rule 10(b) of the District/Municipal Courts 
Supplemental Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, 
"In the primary court the defendant shall decide whether or 
not he or she will waive the right to jury trial after 
completion of the pretrial conference and the hearing on 
the pretrial conference report, and after completion of the 
guilty plea or admission of procedure, if any . . . .  In 
the jury session, the defendant shall decide whether or not 
he or she will waive the right to jury trial no later than 
the commencement of trial.  The defendant shall not be 
required to decide on waiver of the right to jury trial in 
either the primary court or jury session until disposition 
or withdrawal of any pretrial discovery motion filed in 
accordance with the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
11 
 
Procedure and compliance with any court order issued in 
conjunction therewith." 
 
 
3.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that the trial judge 
erred in denying her motion to waive her right to a jury trial, 
after previously having elected a jury trial at the trial 
readiness conference.  The defendant contends that, because 
G. L. c. 263, § 6, allows her to request a jury trial before 
jury empanelment and jurors had not yet been empanelled, the 
judge lacked "good and sufficient reason," Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 19 (a), to deny her request.  The defendant maintains that 
the judge's reasoning concerning the appearance of judge 
shopping was faulty because, by her request for a waiver, she 
was not attempting to steer the case away from a jury and toward 
the assigned judge.  In addition, the defendant argues that the 
evidence was insufficient to support a finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the chair was a dangerous weapon within 
the meaning of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (a). 
 
a.  Denial of request for jury waiver.  While a criminal 
defendant has a constitutional right to a jury trial, see 
Commonwealth v. Dietrich, 381 Mass. 458, 460 (1980), "neither 
the Federal nor the State Constitution provides the right to 
waive a jury trial,"3 Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 134 
 
 
3 By contrast, the constitutions of some States, including 
New York and Oregon, provide that a criminal defendant may waive 
12 
 
(2007), S.C., 477 Mass. 582 (2017).  Trial by jury is the 
"normal . . . and preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact 
in criminal cases" (citation omitted).  Singer v. United States, 
380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965).  See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 
368, 383 (1979) (there is "great public interest in jury trials 
as the preferred mode of fact-finding in criminal cases"). 
 
While G. L. c. 263, § 6, affords defendants the right to 
seek a waiver, it provides no certainty that a request for a 
waiver will be allowed.  We review a question of statutory 
interpretation de novo.  Commonwealth v. Montarvo, 486 Mass. 
535, 536 (2020).  "Our analysis begins with the plain language 
of the statute, which is the principal source of insight into 
legislative intent" (quotation and citation omitted).  Tze-Kit 
Mui v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 478 Mass. 710, 712 (2018). 
 
After stating that a criminal defendant may waive the right 
to be tried by a jury, G. L. c. 263, § 6, provides that only 
"[i]f the court consents" shall a defendant "be tried by the 
court instead of by a jury" (emphasis added).  A defendant may 
waive this right "provided that a judge determines after a 
colloquy that such waiver is knowing and voluntary."  Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 19 (a).  We previously have determined "that G. L. 
c. 263, § 6, and rule 19 (a) merely prescribe procedures to be 
 
the right to a jury trial.  See People v. Duchin, 12 N.Y.2d 351, 
352-353 (1963); State v. Harrell, 353 Or. 247, 252 (2013). 
13 
 
followed if a defendant or a codefendant wishes to waive the 
right to a jury trial," and do not "vest any personal right in 
criminal defendants," nor do they "limit the court's power to 
hear the case."  See Commonwealth v. Collado, 426 Mass. 675, 678 
(1998).  Thus, the plain statutory language alone does not 
explain when a judge may withhold consent, i.e., may deny a 
request for a jury waiver.  See 81 Spooner Rd. LLC v. Brookline, 
452 Mass. 109, 115 (2008) ("Where we are unable to ascertain the 
intent of the Legislature from the words of a statute, we look 
to external sources, including the legislative history of the 
statute, its development, its progression through the 
Legislature, prior legislation on the same subject, and the 
history of the times"). 
 
Examination of the legislative history of G. L. c. 263, 
§ 6, is illuminating on the question of a judge's authority to 
deny a request for a jury waiver.  See Montarvo, 486 Mass. 
at 536, quoting Commonwealth v. Garvey, 477 Mass. 59, 61 (2017) 
(words of statute may be clarified by construing them "in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished" [quotation and citation omitted]).  The 
requirement in G. L. c. 263, § 6, that a court must approve a 
request for a jury waiver was added in 1979, see St. 1979, 
c. 344, § 19, following a fifty-year period in which criminal 
14 
 
defendants in noncapital cases had an unqualified right to waive 
a jury trial.  See Collado, 426 Mass. at 677-678 (discussing how 
St. 1929, c. 185, § 1, amended G. L. c. 263, § 6, to include 
provisions for jury waivers, which previously had been deemed 
beyond courts' jurisdiction). 
 
In 1979, the rules of criminal procedure were substantially 
revised; Mass. R. Crim. P. 19 (a) was modified to incorporate 
the portion of Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a) that provides that the 
waiver of a jury trial must be approved by the court.  See 
Reporters' Notes to Rule 19, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules 
of Criminal Procedure (LexisNexis 2021).  In parallel, G. L. 
c. 263, § 6, was amended to reflect the addition of the 
requirement for court approval in Mass. R. Crim. P. 19 (a).  See 
Commonwealth v. Greene, 400 Mass. 144, 147 (1987) (discussing 
how Mass. R. Crim. P. 19 [a] "essentially mirrors" G. L. c. 263, 
§ 6).  The emergency preamble to St. 1979, c. 344, states that 
"one purpose of the legislation [was] to have its provisions in 
effect on the same date as the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure."  Id.  Thus, we construe the statute in harmony with 
the 1979 amendment to Mass. R. Crim. P. 19 (a), providing that a 
"judge may refuse to approve [a jury] waiver for any good and 
sufficient reason"; this language remains in place today.  See 
Commonwealth v. Wright, 479 Mass. 124, 133 (2018) (rules of 
15 
 
procedure are construed under same canons as rules of statutory 
interpretation, beginning with plain language of rule). 
 
Because a decision on a request for a jury waiver is within 
the discretion of the judge, see Commonwealth v. Kope, 30 Mass. 
App. Ct. 944, 946 (1991), we review a decision denying such a 
request for an abuse of discretion, see Boulter-Hedley v. 
Boulter, 429 Mass. 808, 809-811 (1999) (statute was construed to 
grant judge discretionary authority, and therefore judge's 
ruling was reviewed for abuse of discretion).  Unlike a 
reviewing court, a presiding judge is able to observe a 
defendant and his or her attorney firsthand and therefore is in 
the best position to determine whether a jury waiver is sought 
to obtain some unfair advantage.  See Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 
Mass. 770, 776-777 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007) and 460 
Mass. 12 (2011); State v. Dunne, 124 N.J. 303, 317 (1991).4 
 
 
4 Courts in other jurisdictions generally have concluded 
that the appropriate standard of review for a judge's denial of 
a request for jury waiver is abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., 
Deshields v. State, 706 A.2d 502, 509 (Del. 1998); State v. 
Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349, 1366-1367 (Me. 1981); State v. Jones, 270 
Md. 388, 393-394 (1973); State v. Linder, 304 N.W.2d 902, 904-
905 (Minn. 1981); State v. Richardson, 313 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2010); Commonwealth v. Garrison, 242 Pa. Super. 509, 
515 (1976).  By contrast, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin 
appears to review the scope of a judge's authority to deny a 
jury waiver de novo.  See State v. Burks, 2004 WI App 14, ¶ 9. 
 
 
Federal courts similarly have adopted an abuse of 
discretion standard of review for a judge's denial of a jury 
waiver.  See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 841 F.3d 299, 302 
(5th Cir. 2016) ("We adopt the abuse of discretion standard in 
16 
 
 
Although a judge possesses broad discretion to deny a 
defendant's motion for a jury waiver, the denial of a request 
for such a waiver cannot stand where "the judge made a 'clear 
error of judgment in weighing' the factors relevant to the 
decision . . . such that the decision falls outside the range of 
reasonable alternatives" (citation omitted).  L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  In adopting the 
1979 changes to the rules of criminal procedure, the Legislature 
sought to uphold the fair and efficient administration of the 
Commonwealth's courts.  See Greene, 400 Mass. at 148.  See also 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 2 (a), 378 Mass. 844 (1979) (rules of criminal 
procedure "shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, 
fairness in administration, and the elimination of expense and 
delay").  Accordingly, it would be absurd to construe G. L. 
c. 263, § 6, to empower a judge with unfettered discretion to 
deny a defendant's request for a jury waiver.  See Wallace W. v. 
Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 789, 793 (2019) ("we are careful to 
avoid any construction of statutory language which leads to an 
absurd result" [quotation and citation omitted]).  Rather, a 
judge may deny a defendant's request for a jury waiver if, in 
 
our examination of the district court's denial of a written 
waiver of a jury trial that has been approved by both the 
defendants and the Government"). 
17 
 
the circumstances of the case, doing so would serve the fair and 
efficient administration of justice. 
 
With respect to the fair administration of justice, a range 
of circumstances might lead a judge to conclude that a 
particular case should be tried by a jury.  For instance, the 
judge might be aware of certain pretrial matters that "would 
unfairly prejudice, at least in appearance, the rights of the 
defendant."  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Collins, 11 Mass. App. 
Ct. 126, 141 (1981).  Alternatively, resolution of a case might 
require the consideration of complex factual questions or 
numerous credibility determinations, such that a judge 
reasonably could conclude that they were "best left to a jury of 
twelve."  See, e.g., United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 
1151 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1085 (1984), abrogated on 
other grounds by McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).  
See also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) ("Our 
Constitution and the common-law traditions it entrenches . . . 
do not admit the contention that facts are better discovered by 
judicial inquisition than by adversarial testing before a 
jury").  As discussed infra, there also may be circumstances 
where a defendant is, or appears to be, using a jury waiver to 
steer a case away from a jury and toward a particular judge, a 
practice that could incite public cynicism as to the fair 
administration of justice.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wallace, 
18 
 
522 Pa. 297, 312 (1989) (defendant's right to waive jury trial 
"is not absolute and it does not include the right to judge-
shop").5 
 
As to judicial economy, a judge "may grant [a motion for 
waiver] at any time and should do so whenever it will promote 
the fair, reasonable, and efficient administration of justice."  
State v. Godfrey, 182 Neb. 451, 458, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 937 
(1968).  To ensure efficient proceedings, our rules of criminal 
procedure and District and Municipal Court rules require a 
defendant to make an initial election of trial by jury or a 
jury-waived trial at a pretrial conference or a compliance 
 
 
5 Although there is no constitutional right to a jury-waived 
trial, see Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 134 (2007), 
S.C., 477 Mass. 582 (2017), the denial of a request for a jury 
waiver is not a trivial matter for a defendant, see Ciummei v. 
Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 504, 508 n.7 (1979) (jury waiver is 
"decision regarding trial strategy").  A trial by jury is the 
preferred mode of adjudicating factual disputes, but a defendant 
may be entitled to a jury-waived trial in the rare case where 
"passion, prejudice . . . public feeling or some other factor" 
render an impartial trial by jury "impossible or unlikely" 
(quotation, citation, and footnote omitted).  See Singer v. 
United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37-38 (1965).  See also United 
States v. United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Cal., 
464 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1133 
(2007) ("The Supreme Court has never determined whether the 
circumstances alluded to in Singer actually existed -- i.e., 
where requiring a defendant to undergo trial by jury would 
infringe his [or her] constitutional right to a fair trial -- 
nor has it ever decided what circumstances would create such an 
unusual situation"); Polk v. State, 567 A.2d 1290, 1295 (Del. 
1989) ("In Singer, the United States Supreme Court implied that 
where the denial of a bench trial would interfere with the 
defendant's right to a fair trial, waiver should be permitted"). 
19 
 
hearing, once the pretrial conference report and discovery are 
complete.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 11 (b) (2) (iii); Dist./Mun. 
Cts. R. Crim. P. 4(e).  See also Commonwealth v. Durning, 406 
Mass. 485, 495 (1990), quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 11 (purpose of 
pretrial conference is to promote "fair and expeditious 
disposition of the case").  This procedure comports with G. L. 
c. 263, § 6, because a defendant who initially elects a jury 
trial nonetheless may submit a request for a jury-waived trial 
before jury empanelment.  See Police Dep't of Salem v. Sullivan, 
460 Mass. 637, 641 n.7 (2011) (statute supersedes court rule 
where they are in "irreconcilable conflict").  "[N]othing in the 
rule prevents a defendant who elects a jury trial from waiving 
the right at a later date."  Reporters' Notes (Revised, 2004) to 
Rule 11, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (LexisNexis 2021). 
 
Here, the judge denied the defendant's request for a jury 
waiver based on concerns that the defendant's request gave "the 
appearance or the inkling of judge shopping."  "Judge shopping" 
refers to a litigant's attempt to steer a case toward or away 
from a particular judge, generally out of some belief that the 
judge's idiosyncrasies would make it more or less beneficial to 
the litigant that that particular judge preside over the 
litigation.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pagan, 445 Mass. 315, 
321 (2005); Demoulas v. Demoulas, 432 Mass. 43, 53 (2000).  The 
20 
 
practice is inherently unfair to other litigants, undermines 
public confidence in the judiciary, and properly has earned the 
condemnation of courts across the country.  See United States v. 
Mavroules, 798 F. Supp. 61, 68 (D. Mass. 1992) ("the appearance 
of judge-shopping where there is no basis for recusal is itself 
antithetical to the interests of justice"); Municipal Publs., 
Inc. v. Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, 507 Pa. 
194, 202 (1985) ("Judge shopping has been universally condemned, 
and will not be tolerated at any stage of the proceedings"); 
Norwood, Shopping for a Venue:  The Need for More Limits on 
Choice, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 267, 299 (1996) ("Courts 
consistently treat judge shopping as an impermissible form of 
shopping for justice").  See, e.g., United States v. El-
Gabrowny, 844 F. Supp. 955, 958-959 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); In re 
Anwiler, 958 F.2d 925, 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 
882 (1992); Matter of Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990); 
Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 839 F.2d 1296, 1302 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 
869 (1988).  Because it affords an unfair advantage to 
defendants with better access to highly experienced attorneys, 
who may possess unique insights into particular judges, judge 
shopping also disturbs equity among defendants at large.  "No 
defendant, indeed, no person, has a vested interest in having a 
21 
 
particular judge assigned to his [or her] case."  Commonwealth 
v. O'Brien, 432 Mass. 578, 584 (2000). 
 
One version of judge shopping in criminal cases involves a 
defendant's use of a request for a jury waiver to secure a jury-
waived trial after the identity of the trial judge has become 
known.  In 2011, this court, led by then Chief Justice Roderick 
L. Ireland, commissioned a special counsel investigation into 
cases involving charges of operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of drugs and alcohol (OUI), in order to examine 
potential disparities in acquittal rates in jury-waived trials 
and jury trials.  See R.J. Cinquegrana, Report to the Supreme 
Judicial Court 1 (Oct. 2012).  See also Bombardieri & Saltzman, 
SJC Seeks to Halt 'Judge Shopping' in OUI Cases, Boston Globe, 
Nov. 1, 2012.  The special counsel found that "[w]hen the cases 
were resolved in a jury trial, 58% of the defendants were 
acquitted.  When judges considered the merits of OUI cases in 
bench trials, 86% were acquitted."  Cinquegrana, supra at 6.  In 
addition, the special counsel observed, 
"[I]t appears that judges rarely reject proffered waivers 
in OUI cases.  More importantly, judges generally permit 
waivers to be filed on the day of trial, even after there 
has been a colloquy between the court and counsel 
indicating which judge is available to try the case.  We 
heard several reports that defense lawyers may indicate, in 
that setting, that the defendant would waive a jury in one 
session but not another.  Faced with pressure to dispose of 
cases in a busy court, judges may acquiesce and assign the 
case to a session where the case will be resolved in a 
jury-waived trial much more quickly than in a jury trial.  
22 
 
Thus, judges who are perceived to be more favorable to the 
defendant end up handling more bench trials, and in turn 
some of those judges establish a record which perpetuates 
this selection process." 
 
Id. at 45. 
 
Although the investigation specifically focused on cases 
involving charges of OUI, the special counsel noted that "it is 
difficult to see how a rule change could be effected for only 
one category of offenses."  Id.  The report suggested that "the 
interests of justice and perception of fairness would be served 
by changes to the practice of allowing a defendant's decision as 
to jury waiver to be postponed until the eve of trial."  
Statement of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court 6 
(Nov. 1, 2012). 
 
In response to the special counsel investigation, this 
court convened a joint working group to further examine the 
issue and revert with recommendations.  Id.  The working group 
proposed that, in order to limit the use of jury waivers for 
judge shopping, a trial judge 
"who is asked to approve a waiver of trial by jury under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 19 (a) or to grant relief from a waiver, 
must consider all relevant factors including, in 
particular, whether the request is (1) timely, (2) based on 
a specific characteristic of the case or of the defendant, 
and (3) consistent with the need to maintain efficient 
caseflow management." 
 
Supreme Judicial Court Working Group Regarding Procedures for 
the Waiver of Trial by Jury in the Boston Municipal Court and 
23 
 
District Court Departments:  Report and Recommendations 32 
(Mar. 28, 2013).  The working group also highlighted potential 
inefficiencies associated with the use of jury waiver to judge-
shop, noting that a defendant "[w]aiting to request relief from 
an election for trial by jury . . . until the date of the trial 
when it would have been reasonable to make the request earlier 
may . . . diminish juror utilization and public support for jury 
service."6  Id. at 33. 
 
The defendant maintains that even if judge shopping is a 
valid basis for the denial of a defendant's request for a jury 
waiver, there was no indication here that the defendant in fact 
was judge shopping.  Specifically, the defendant points to 
language in G. L. c. 263, § 6, that permits a defendant to 
request a jury waiver on the day of trial, prior to jury 
empanelment. 
 
 
6 To implement these recommendations, the working group 
prepared a draft "Motion Pursuant to Rule 19 (a) for Relief from 
Election of Jury or Jury-Waived Trial" form.  The form asks a 
defendant who seeks a jury-waived trial, after previously 
electing a jury trial and after the case had been assigned to a 
jury session, to specify his or her reasons for requesting jury 
waiver.  Supreme Judicial Court Working Group Regarding 
Procedures for the Waiver of Trial by Jury in the Boston 
Municipal Court and District Court Departments:  Report and 
Recommendations (Mar. 28, 2013) (Appendix C).  In 2015, the 
Chief Justice of the District Court Department promulgated the 
form for use in the District Court.  Memorandum on New 
Recommendations Regarding Jury Waiver and Promulgation of Newly 
Amended Criminal Pretrial Conference Report Form 5 (Jan. 8, 
2015). 
24 
 
 
While we agree that the mere fact that a defendant seeks to 
waive his or her right to a jury trial on the day of trial 
cannot render the request for a jury-waived trial invalid per 
se, G. L. c. 263, § 6, does not circumscribe a judge's 
discretion to deny a request for a jury waiver where there are 
objective circumstances, apart from the timing of a defendant's 
request, that suggest the defendant is or may be judge shopping.  
Here, there were sufficient circumstances, based in the record 
and independent of the timing of the request, that tended to 
support the trial judge's concerns. 
 
Here, at the trial readiness conference in the District 
Court, pending discovery issues were resolved, and the judge 
then obtained the defendant's initial election as to whether the 
case was to be tried by a jury or to proceed jury-waived.  See 
Dist./Mun. Cts. R. Crim. P. 4(e).  As stated, the defendant 
elected a jury trial.  On the day of trial, when the identity of 
the trial judge became known to the defendant, she filed a 
motion for relief from her prior election.  On the motion form 
requesting a change to a jury-waived trial, the defendant 
selected from a list of options, "Specific characteristics of 
this case have caused me to reconsider my original election 
(Specify below)"; she did not provide additional information in 
the allotted space on the form.  This change in election 
apparently concerned the trial judge, who asked the defendant to 
25 
 
clarify why she sought a jury-waived trial at that time, after 
previously having elected to proceed to a trial with a jury.  
The defendant replied, "[G]iven the facts of this case, given 
the time, context of this case, a jury waived trial is 
appropriate." 
 
The judge initially commented that this explanation was not 
consistent with the procedural requirements.7  The explanation 
also evidently was unconvincing to the judge, who had had the 
benefit of examining the demeanor of the defendant's attorney as 
he spoke.  See Commonwealth v. Mercado, 456 Mass. 198, 210 
(2010) (trial judge is in "best position" to observe demeanor of 
attorneys).  The judge then observed that the defendant's 
request gave "the appearance or the inkling" of judge shopping.  
Given the circumstances before him, we cannot say that the 
judge's concern was so unreasonable as to constitute a "clear 
error of judgment" (citation omitted).  See L.L., 470 Mass. 
at 185 n.27.  Therefore, the judge did not abuse his discretion 
in denying the defendant's request for a jury-waived trial. 
 
Although we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion 
in the decision to deny the request for a jury-waived trial, we 
 
 
7 Although the judge first stated, incorrectly, that the 
defendant was required to show "good cause" in order to waive 
her right to a jury trial, the judge subsequently amended his 
rationale for the denial when he expressed his concerns as to 
the appearance of judge-shopping. 
26 
 
acknowledge the benefits to a defendant and the court of 
accepting a request for a jury waiver.  For a defendant, whether 
to waive the right to a jury trial is an important "decision 
regarding trial strategy."  See Ciummei v. Commonwealth, 378 
Mass. 504, 508 n.7 (1979).  Presumably, a defendant requests a 
jury waiver after having concluded that he or she would fare 
better before a judge than before a jury.  See Dietrich, 381 
Mass. at 461-462.  As for the court, it is clear that a jury-
waived trial typically is more efficient than a jury trial, 
because it eliminates the expense of empanelling jurors and 
spares the trial judge the time that otherwise would be spent 
facilitating a protracted jury trial.  Given these benefits, our 
decision today should not be construed as a general critique of 
any request by a defendant to waive his or her right to a jury 
trial.  A criminal defendant in a noncapital case is free to 
request a jury waiver in accordance with G. L. c. 263, § 6, and 
the rules of criminal procedure, after having elected a jury 
trial, but he or she should do so with the understanding that 
the statute allows a judge to deny such a request if it would 
undermine the fair and efficient administration of justice. 
 
b.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant also argues 
that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the chair was a 
"dangerous weapon" within the meaning of G. L. c. 265, § 15A.  
27 
 
We review the evidence at trial in the "light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth," asking whether "[a]ny rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 
676-677 (1979), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 
(1979). 
 
"The criminal law of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon expresses society's desire to punish the use of 
an instrument which is capable of producing serious bodily 
harm."  Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 306-307 (1980).  
Dangerous weapons are defined as either being dangerous per se, 
that is, "designed and constructed to produce death or great 
bodily harm" and "for the purpose of bodily assault or defense," 
or being dangerous as used.  Commonwealth v. Wynton W., 459 
Mass. 745, 749 (2011), quoting Appleby, supra at 303.  An object 
may be dangerous as used even if ordinarily it is innocuous.  
See Appleby, supra at 304, and cases cited.  See also Wynton W., 
supra at 754 n.5 (noting that "household items" can be used as 
dangerous weapons); Commonwealth v. Tevlin, 433 Mass. 305, 312 
(2001) ("sneakers may be determined to be a dangerous weapon").  
This broad construction promotes the "policy of [G. L. c. 265, 
§ 15A,] to deter the use of 'neutral' objects in a dangerous 
fashion."  Appleby, supra at 308. 
28 
 
 
Here, the victim testified that the defendant picked up a 
plastic chair and swung it at the victim's left arm.  The chair 
was swung with enough force to pierce the victim's skin and to 
leave an abrasion approximately one inch wide and two and one-
half inches long that bled profusely and required treatment at a 
hospital emergency room.  See United States v. Johnson, 324 F.2d 
264, 265-266 (4th Cir. 1963) (plastic and metal chair was 
dangerous weapon when swung at victim's head and caused 
laceration around eye). 
 
To the extent that the victim's bleeding was worsened by 
the fact that he was taking anticoagulants, that does not 
detract from the manner in which the defendant used the chair.  
See Tevlin, 433 Mass. at 313, quoting Commonwealth v. Starling, 
382 Mass. 423, 429 (1981) ("In a criminal case 'the wrongdoer 
takes the victim as he or she finds him'").  In addition, the 
victim stated that, after the initial blow, the defendant made 
another attempt to hit the victim with the chair.  Ordinarily, a 
chair is an innocuous object.  Here, however, the jury 
permissibly could have credited the victim's testimony 
describing how the defendant used the chair to strike him and to 
cause a serious injury to his wrist.  See Appleby, 380 Mass. 
at 307 n.5 ("the question whether a weapon is dangerous as used 
is always one for the fact finder").  Reviewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury 
29 
 
reasonably could have concluded that the chair, as used, 
satisfied the requirement to be a dangerous weapon within the 
meaning of G. L. c. 265, § 15A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.