Title: Van Liew v. Stansfield
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11905
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 30, 2016

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SJC-11905 
 
ROLAND VAN LIEW  vs.  COLLEEN STANSFIELD. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     January 8, 2016. - March 30, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
"Anti-SLAPP" Statute.  Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss, 
Appeal, Review of interlocutory action.  District Court, 
Appellate Division.  Civil Harassment. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Lowell Division of the 
District Court Department on February 22, 2012. 
 
 
A special motion to dismiss was heard by Laurence D. 
Pierce, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Michael J. Fencer for the defendant. 
 
Karen A. Pickett for the plaintiff. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  In this case we first consider a procedural 
issue concerning the appropriate forum to hear appeals from the 
allowance of a special motion to dismiss under G. L. c. 231, 
2 
 
§ 59H (§ 59H), the so-called "anti-SLAPP"1 statute, by a judge in 
the District Court.  This case also requires us to evaluate the 
relationship between G. L. c. 258E, the statute governing civil 
harassment prevention orders, and allegedly political speech.  
On the procedural issue, we conclude that a party seeking to 
appeal from a District Court order allowing or denying a special 
motion to dismiss may file the appeal directly in the Appeals 
Court, rather than in the Appellate Division of the District 
Court Department (Appellate Division).  We further conclude that 
with one possible exception, the speech at issue here -- 
primarily concerning a local municipal election and more 
generally issues of local public concern -- did not qualify as 
either "fighting words" or "true threats," see O'Brien v. 
Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 425 (2012), and therefore, no civil 
harassment prevention order should have issued in this case.  In 
the circumstances presented, Roland Van Liew established that 
Colleen Stansfield's petition for a civil harassment prevention 
order was devoid of factual support, that he had sustained 
injury, and that Stansfield's special motion to dismiss Van 
Liew's complaint for abuse of process and malicious prosecution 
should have been denied. 
                     
 
1 "Anti-SLAPP" stands for anti-strategic lawsuit against 
public participation.  See Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. 
Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 160 n.7 (1998). 
3 
 
 
Background.2  Van Liew and Stansfield are both residents of 
Chelmsford (town).  Stansfield has been an elected member of the 
local planning board since April, 2009.  At the time of the 
events at issue here, in 2012, Van Liew did not hold public 
office but was an active participant in local civic and 
political affairs.  Over the years, Van Liew has disagreed 
publicly with many positions taken by Stansfield on the planning 
board and in her role supporting local political campaigns. 
 
In 2012, Van Liew was a candidate for selectman in the 
town, and on February 1, 2012, he held a public "meet and greet" 
event at the town library in connection with his candidacy.  
Stansfield attended the event and challenged various positions 
taken by Van Liew during the discussion.  At the close of the 
event, Stansfield approached Van Liew and asked whether he was 
going to take part in upcoming debates.  According to 
Stansfield, Van Liew responded loudly, "[O]f course . . . and I 
know what you do. . . .  [Y]ou sent an anonymous letter to my 
wife and I'm coming after you," to which Stansfield responded, 
"[Y]ou are looking at a restraining order," and left.3 
                     
 
2 The following background facts are taken from the 
pleadings of this case and the affidavits filed in support of 
and in opposition to the special motion to dismiss filed by 
Colleen Stansfield pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H (§ 59H).  
Where facts are in dispute, it is noted in a footnote. 
 
 
3 As set out in his affidavit, Roland Van Liew contends he 
answered Stansfield's question without threatening her and told 
4 
 
 
Later that day, after speaking with local police, 
Stansfield sought in the District Court a harassment prevention 
order against Van Liew pursuant to G. L. c. 258E, § 3.  She 
alleged four incidents of harassment in her complaint:  (1) Van 
Liew threatened Stansfield at the meet and greet event, where he 
was "in [her] face" and told her he was "coming after" her and 
she left shaking in fear; (2) Van Liew sent several mailings in 
the past year calling Stansfield corrupt and a liar; (3) during 
a recall election in July, 2011, Van Liew again called her a 
liar and corrupt; and (4) during their first interaction in a 
two-hour telephone call initiated by Stansfield (that took place 
at some point prior to 2009) Van Liew screamed at her and called 
her "terrible names."  A District Court judge held an initial, 
ex parte hearing at which Stansfield testified; the judge issued 
a temporary harassment prevention order against Van Liew.4  The 
judge scheduled a full hearing on Stansfield's request for a 
permanent order to take place two weeks later, on February 15, 
2012.  Five days after the temporary order issued, it was 
modified at Stansfield's request to prevent Van Liew from 
mentioning Stansfield's name in any "email, blog, [T]witter or 
                                                                  
her, "I don't want any more anonymous letters sent to my wife," 
to which Stansfield responded, "You need a restraining order." 
 
 
4 The February 1, 2012, temporary order required Van Liew 
not to abuse, harass, or contact Stansfield and to stay away 
from Stansfield's residence. 
5 
 
any document through [I]nternet, television show, ad or 
otherwise."  On February 15, 2012, the scheduled hearing on 
Stansfield's request for an order took place before a different 
District Court judge.  It was attended by Stansfield, who 
represented herself, and Van Liew, represented by counsel.  
Stansfield testified about the verbal exchange at Van Liew's 
meet and greet event, and further testified that, in the past, 
Van Liew had called Stansfield "corrupt and a liar" with regard 
to her work on the planning board, specifically pointing to two 
electronic mail (e-mail) messages written by Van Liew, one of 
which Stansfield read to the judge.  The e-mail message appears 
to mention Stansfield twice by name but goes on at great length 
to provide highly critical commentary about certain development 
projects that were being proposed for the town pursuant to G. L. 
c. 40B and other programs.5  The judge concluded that she could 
not find the requisite three acts of harassment for a harassment 
prevention order under G. L. c. 258E and that some of the acts 
alleged by Stansfield were political speech, not threatening in 
                     
 
5 Stansfield told the judge that in the second electronic 
mail (e-mail) message, which was sent after the temporary 
harassment prevention order had issued and had been modified to 
prohibit Van Liew from using Stansfield's name in any e-mail 
message, Van Liew did in fact mention her by name and called her 
a liar.  However, Stansfield did not read into the hearing 
record the text of the e-mail message in question and it is not 
included in the record before us. 
6 
 
any way; the judge vacated the temporary harassment prevention 
order. 
 
Van Liew then filed the present action against Stansfield 
in the District Court, asserting claims for abuse of process and 
malicious prosecution.  The complaint alleges that Stansfield 
sought the harassment prevention order against him "for the 
purpose of disrupting [Van Liew's] campaign" and that she sought 
the order even though she knew she lacked probable cause for its 
issuance.  Stansfield answered and also filed a special motion 
to dismiss the complaint pursuant to § 59H along with a 
supporting affidavit.  Van Liew filed an opposition to 
Stansfield's special motion to dismiss and a supporting 
affidavit.  A third District Court judge allowed the special 
motion after a hearing, and ruled that Van Liew "failed to show 
that the application for a harassment prevention order 'was 
devoid of any reasonable factual support,'" quoting G. L. 
c. 231, § 59H.  Van Liew then appealed the ruling to the 
Appellate Division, which concluded after a hearing that Van 
Liew had presented sufficient evidence to show that Stansfield 
lacked any reasonable factual support for her petitioning 
activity; the Appellate Division vacated the order of dismissal 
and remanded the case to the District Court for trial.  
Stansfield filed an appeal in the Appeals Court from the 
7 
 
decision and order of the Appellate Division; we transferred her 
appeal to this court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Stansfield's right to appeal.  We first 
consider whether Stansfield may proceed with her appeal, given 
that the Appellate Division's order vacating the allowance of 
the special motion to dismiss and remanding the case for trial 
is interlocutory, and generally may not be the subject of an 
appeal.  Van Liew argues that this court lacks jurisdiction 
because by statute, G. L. c. 231, § 109, only final decisions of 
the Appellate Division are appealable to the Appeals Court.  We 
disagree. 
 
This court previously has held that regardless of where -- 
i.e., in which department of the trial court -- a suit may be 
commenced, a trial judge's denial of a special motion to dismiss 
brought pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, § 59H,6 may be 
                     
 
6 Section § 59H provides in relevant part: 
 
 
"In any case in which a party asserts that the civil 
claims, counterclaims, or cross claims against said party 
are based on said party's exercise of its right of petition 
under the constitution of the United States or of the 
[C]ommonwealth, said party may bring a special motion to 
dismiss.  The court shall advance any such special motion 
so that it may be heard and determined as expeditiously as 
possible.  The court shall grant such special motion, 
unless the party against whom such special motion is made 
shows that:  (1) the moving party's exercise of its right 
to petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or 
any arguable basis in law and (2) the moving party's acts 
caused actual injury to the responding party.  In making 
its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings 
8 
 
appealed directly to the Appeals Court.  See Fabre v. Walton, 
436 Mass. 517, 521-522 (2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9 (2004).  The 
reasons for our holding, set out in Fabre,7 apply with equal 
force to an Appellate Division decision denying a special motion 
to dismiss, and therefore to Stansfield's appeal.  But more 
generally, and based on the same concerns that we expressed in 
Fabre about certainty, uniform treatment of similarly situated 
litigants, and consistent development of the law relating to the 
anti-SLAPP statute, see id. at 522, we conclude that any party 
in a case pending in the District Court who seeks to appeal from 
the denial or the allowance of a § 59H special motion to dismiss 
                                                                  
and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts 
upon which the liability or defense is based. 
 
 
7 Section 59H protects "individuals who exercise their right 
to petition from harassing litigation and the costs and burdens 
of defending against retaliatory lawsuits."  Fabre v. Walton, 
436 Mass. 517, 520 (2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9 (2004), citing 
Duracraft Corp., 427 Mass. at 161-162.  As part of these 
protections, the defendant in a SLAPP suit may file a "special 
motion to dismiss" early in the litigation.  G. L. c. 231, 
§ 59H.  In Fabre, supra at 521, we specifically recognized that 
"the denial of a special motion to dismiss interferes with 
[anti-SLAPP statute] rights in a way that cannot be remedied on 
appeal from the final judgment," and notwithstanding the general 
rules of appellate review, immediate appeal of an interlocutory 
order denying a special motion to dismiss is necessary to 
preserve the protected rights; to force a defendant to endure 
litigation before allowing the appeal undermines the purpose of 
the special motion to dismiss.  We further stated that "for 
purposes of certainty, uniformity of treatment of litigants, and 
the development of a consistent body of law, an interlocutory 
appeal from the denial of a special motion to dismiss should 
proceed to the Appeals Court, regardless of the court in which 
the SLAPP suit was brought."  Id. at 522.  See Benoit v. 
Frederickson, 454 Mass. 148, 151-152 (2009). 
9 
 
should file the appeal directly in the Appeals Court rather than 
in the Appellate Division of the District Court or the Appellate 
Division of the Boston Municipal Court.  See Zullo v. Goguen, 
423 Mass. 679, 681 (1996) ("This court has wide discretion in 
devising various procedures for the course of appeals in 
different classes of cases" [citation omitted]).  In sum, 
Stansfield's appeal was filed properly in the Appeals Court, and 
like the Appeals Court, this court has jurisdiction to decide 
it. 
 
2.  Stansfield's special motion to dismiss.  We turn to the 
merits.  Stansfield, as the party filing a special motion to 
dismiss under § 59H, bore the initial burden to demonstrate 
through her pleadings and affidavits that Van Liew's claims she 
sought to dismiss were based on her "petitioning activities 
alone and ha[d] no substantial basis other than or in addition 
to the petitioning activities."  Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes 
Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 167-168 (1998).  See G. L. c. 231, 
§ 59H.  There is no dispute that Stansfield met that burden; Van 
Liew's complaint focused solely on Stansfield's application for 
a harassment prevention order, which originally was granted ex 
parte as a temporary order.  Van Liew makes no claim here, nor 
could he, that Stansfield's application for this order did not 
qualify as petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.  
Cf. McLarnon v. Jokisch, 431 Mass. 343, 347 (2000) (anti-SLAPP 
10 
 
statute covers filings for abuse protection orders, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 209A, and supporting affidavits).  As a consequence, 
Van Liew was required by the statute to show by a preponderance 
of the evidence –- again based on pleadings and affidavits -- 
that Stansfield's petitioning activities were "devoid of any 
reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law" and 
that such petitioning activities "caused actual injury" to him.  
G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  See Benoit v. Frederickson, 454 Mass. 148, 
152-153 (2009).  See also Baker v. Parsons, 434 Mass. 543, 553-
554 (2001) (nonmoving party's obligation to show moving party's 
petitioning activities were devoid of either reasonable factual 
support or arguable legal basis is not "an insurmountable 
barrier to relief").  Stansfield argues that Van Liew failed to 
meet either prong of his burden.  We agree with the Appellate 
Division, however, that Van Liew met both prongs, and the 
special motion to dismiss should have been denied. 
 
A party seeking a harassment prevention order under G. L. 
c. 258E, § 3,8 must demonstrate "harassment," which the statute 
                     
 
8 General Laws c. 258E, § 3, provides in relevant part: 
 
 
"(a) A person suffering from harassment may file a 
complaint in the appropriate court requesting protection 
from such harassment.  A person may petition the court 
under this chapter for an order that the defendant: 
 
 
"(i) refrain from abusing or harassing the plaintiff, 
whether the defendant is an adult or minor; 
 
11 
 
defines in relevant part to mean "[three] or more acts of 
willful and malicious conduct aimed at a specific person 
committed with the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or 
damage to property that does in fact cause fear, intimidation, 
abuse or damage to property."  G. L. c. 258E, § 1.9  The 
definition of "harassment" in c. 258E was crafted by the 
Legislature to "exclude constitutionally protected speech," 
O'Brien, 461 Mass. at 425, and to limit the categories of 
constitutionally unprotected speech that may qualify as 
"harassment" to two:  "fighting words" and "true threats."  Id.  
See Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58, 63 (2014).  To qualify as 
"fighting words" the words "must be a direct personal insult 
addressed to a person, and they must be inherently likely to 
provoke violence."  O'Brien, supra at 423.  As for "true 
threats," these include "direct threats of imminent physical 
harm," as well as "words or actions that -- taking into account 
the context in which they arise -- cause the victim to fear such 
[imminent physical] harm now or in the future."  Id. at 425.  
                                                                  
 
"(ii) refrain from contacting the plaintiff, unless 
authorized by the court, whether the defendant is an adult 
or minor; [and] 
 
 
"(iii) remain away from the plaintiff’s household or 
workplace, whether the defendant is an adult or minor 
. . . ." 
 
 
9 The word "malicious" is also defined in G. L. c. 258E, 
§ 1, and means "characterized by cruelty, hostility or revenge." 
12 
 
Moreover, to constitute "harassment" within the definition of 
the term in c. 258E, the fighting words or true threats must 
have been made with an intention to cause, and must actually 
cause, abuse, fear, intimidation, or damage to property.10  G. L. 
c. 258E, § 1.  And fear is narrowly defined as fear of physical 
harm or fear of physical damage to property; it must be more 
than "a fear of economic loss, of unfavorable publicity, or of 
defeat at the ballot box."  O'Brien, supra at 427. 
 
In her request for the harassment prevention order, 
Stansfield pointed to the following conduct on Van Liew's part 
that, she claims in this appeal, compelled her to seek the 
harassment prevention order against him:  during a telephone 
call, Van Liew called her uneducated and stupid; in public 
mailings, Van Liew stated that Stansfield was corrupt and a 
liar, and further referred to her as corrupt and a liar during a 
local recall election; and Van Liew threatened her at the meet 
                     
 
10 To obtain a harassment prevention order, a plaintiff must 
show that the defendant intended to cause "fear, intimidation, 
abuse, or damage to property" with respect to each of the three 
claimed acts of harassment.  O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 
426 n.8 (2012).  In determining whether the acts did in fact 
cause "fear, intimidation, abuse, or damage to property," 
however, the fact finder "must look to the cumulative pattern of 
harassment, and need not find that each act in fact caused fear, 
intimidation, abuse, or damage to property."  Id. 
13 
 
and greet event held in support of his candidacy for the office 
of selectman.11 
 
We will assume that the most recent incident alleged by 
Stansfield, occurring at the meet and greet event, qualified as 
an act of harassment under G. L. c. 285E, § 1; that is, we will 
assume that Van Liew's declaration to Stansfield, "I'm coming 
after you," was an "act[] of willful and malicious conduct," and 
further that it was aimed at Stansfield, was committed with the 
requisite intent, and caused Stansfield fear.  However, the 
other three instances complained of by Stansfield -- accusations 
made in public mailings, accusations made during the 2011 recall 
election, and insults made during a telephone call that took 
place before 2009 -- did not qualify as harassing acts within 
the scope of G. L. c. 258E. 
 
The public accusations by Van Liew that Stansfield was 
"corrupt and a liar" -- the subject of two of the four incidents 
of harassment -- plainly were remarks about Stansfield's 
performance as an elected planning board member, i.e., as a 
public official.  See Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & 
Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769, 777 (1976).  These remarks about a 
local public official constituted political speech and were at 
                     
 
11 According to the police report regarding the meet and 
greet encounter -- submitted to the District Court by Van Liew 
in support of his opposition to the special motion to dismiss -- 
Stansfield stated that she attended the political event to 
"rattle Van Liew's cage." 
14 
 
the core of the speech that the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution protects.  See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995) ("Discussion of public issues 
and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to 
the operation of the system of government established by our 
Constitution.  The First Amendment affords the broadest 
protection to such political expression in order 'to assure 
[the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people'" [citation 
omitted]).  Although these types of public accusations may be 
"vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp," New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), this form of 
political speech must remain "uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open," id.  Van Liew's challenged accusations were neither 
fighting words nor true threats, but at most qualify as 
political hyperbole.  See Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 Mass. 229, 
236 (2001) ("The term 'true threat' has been adopted to help 
distinguish between words that literally threaten but have an 
expressive purpose such as political hyperbole, and words that 
are intended to place the target of the threat in fear"). 
 
The remaining act of which Stansfield complained occurred 
when she telephoned Van Liew to become acquainted with him and 
his views about issues of concern in the town, and Van Liew 
spoke "very loudly . . . telling [her she] was wrong, uneducated 
15 
 
or stupid."  The record indicates that at the time of this 
telephone call, Stansfield was not yet a planning board member 
and therefore not a public official, but the discussion involved 
matters of public interest.  Regardless of whether the discourse 
was political in nature, however, Van Liew's insults certainly 
failed to qualify as fighting words or true threats.  The 
insults were not "so personally abusive that they [were] plainly 
likely to provoke a violent reaction and cause a breach of the 
peace," O'Brien, 461 Mass. at 423, nor did such insults, even if 
delivered in a loud voice, rise to the level of a "true threat" 
of "imminent physical harm" or words that would cause someone to 
fear such harm.  Id. at 425.  As such, these telephone 
conversation insults do not qualify as harassing conduct within 
the scope of G. L. c. 258E.  Accordingly, because Stansfield 
failed to present three or more acts of harassment, she was not 
entitled to a harassment prevention order.  See Seney, 467 Mass. 
at 63-64 (evidence was insufficient to establish three acts of 
harassment under c. 258E where plaintiff failed to show 
defendant intended to cause fear or intimidation; e-mail message 
addressed to third party using unflattering terms to describe 
plaintiff was not directed at plaintiff and was not motivated by 
cruelty, hostility, or revenge).  As a result, and as Van Liew 
showed below in accordance with his burden to do so, 
Stansfield's petitioning activity -– seeking a harassment 
16 
 
prevention order -- was "devoid of any reasonable factual 
support or any arguable basis in law."  G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  
See Benoit, 454 Mass. at 154 n.7. 
 
Stansfield contends that the original issuance of a 
temporary harassment prevention order and its subsequent 
modification is proof that a reasonable person may conclude 
there was sufficient factual support for the petitioning 
activity.  The argument fails.  Although a judge granted the 
request for a harassment prevention order after a brief ex parte 
hearing and the order was modified thereafter to increase its 
restrictions on Van Liew,12 that order was only temporary.  Two 
weeks later, after a full hearing that presented Van Liew with 
his first opportunity to be heard, the temporary order was 
vacated.  Contrast Fabre, 436 Mass. at 524 (where judge extended 
restraining order for six months after evidentiary hearing and 
final judgment entered, "the judgment is conclusive evidence 
that the petitioning activity was not devoid of any reasonable 
factual support or arguable basis in law").  It was clear from 
the text of Stansfield's complaint for a harassment prevention 
order that no valid basis for such an order was presented; the 
insufficiency of facts pleaded could not be cured by a temporary 
order that was entered erroneously. 
                     
12 The record does not indicate whether the modification of 
the temporary order involved any type of hearing before a judge. 
17 
 
 
Finally, Van Liew adequately demonstrated that Stansfield's 
petitioning activity caused him "actual injury," the second 
prong of the showing he was required to make to defeat 
Stansfield's special motion to dismiss.  To defend against the 
harassment protection order sought by Stansfield, Van Liew 
retained an attorney to represent him at the full hearing before 
the District Court judge and submitted supporting evidence of 
the attorney's fees and costs he was responsible for paying as a 
result.13,14  The costs of defending against improper petitioning 
activity, once affirmatively proved, are evidence of reasonable 
damages.  Cf. Millennium Equity Holdings, LLC v. Mahlowitz, 456 
Mass. 627, 645-647 (2010).  We accordingly conclude that Van 
Liew met his burden as the nonmoving party and the Appellate 
                     
 
13 Stansfield argues that the attorney's bill for his 
services was sent to a corporate nonparty, Hands on Technology 
Transfer, Inc., and not to Van Liew, and therefore does not 
evidence damages suffered by Van Liew himself.  The attorney's 
bill, however, was addressed to "Mr. Roland Van Liew" at the 
corporate address, and based on this record, we decline to infer 
that Van Liew did not bear responsibility to pay for his 
attorney's services. 
 
 
14 Van Liew further alleged reputational harm caused by 
Stansfield's petitioning activity.  Because we conclude that Van 
Liew's evidence of legal expenses was sufficient to meet his 
burden under § 59H to show damages, we do not consider his 
allegations of reputational harm. 
 
18 
 
Division correctly denied Stansfield's special motion to 
dismiss.15 
 
Conclusion.  We vacate the order of the District Court and 
remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
15 Stansfield argues also that the allegations made by Van 
Liew in his complaint -- that Stansfield sought the harassment 
prevention order out of malice and with intent to disrupt his 
campaign -- are unfounded accusations.  The argument is not 
relevant to our analysis of the issues before us, and we do not 
reach it.