Title: In re Coggins
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S52109
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: May 5, 2005

FILED:  May 5, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
DEVEN J. COGGINS,

Accused.

(OSB 04-161; SC S52109)
En Banc
On review of the recommendation of the State Professional
Responsibility Board.
Submitted on the record January 27, 2005.
Susan Roedl Cournoyer, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake
Oswego, filed the notice and reply for the Oregon State Bar.
Deven J. Coggins filed the answer for himself.
PER CURIAM
Recommendation for discipline denied.

PER CURIAM

In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) filed in this court a Notice of Discipline in
Another Jurisdiction concerning the accused.  BR 3.5(a).  The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently
reprimanded the accused for failing to respond to that court's
orders to show cause and failing to follow that court's rules. 
The Oregon State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB)
recommends that the accused also receive a reprimand in this
court.  The issue for this court is whether the court should
discipline the accused for the conduct for which the Tenth
Circuit disciplined him.  We conclude that, on the record before
us, the evidence does not permit this court to discipline the
accused.  We therefore reject SPRB's recommendation for
discipline.

We begin by outlining the procedural posture of this
matter.  Under BR 3.5, the Bar must notify this court that
another jurisdiction has disciplined an Oregon lawyer.  BR 3.5(a)
provides:


"Disciplinary Counsel, after reporting on the
matter to the SPRB, shall promptly notify the court
after receiving notice that an attorney has been
disciplined for misconduct in another jurisdiction. 
Disciplinary Counsel shall file a copy of the judgment,
order or determination of discipline with the court,
with written notice to the attorney.  A plea of no
contest, a stipulation for discipline or a resignation
while formal charges are pending shall be considered a
judgment or order of discipline for the purposes of
this rule.  The judgment or order or determination of
discipline shall be accompanied by a recommendation of
the SPRB as to the imposition of discipline in Oregon
based on the discipline in the jurisdiction whose
action is reported to the court, and such other
information as the Bar deems appropriate to file with
the court."

Once the Bar has filed its notice of discipline, the accused
lawyer may file an answer, BR 3.5(c), to which the Bar may reply,
BR 3.5(d).  The answer may discuss two issues:  (1) whether the
procedure in the other jurisdiction was lacking in notice or
opportunity to be heard; and (2) whether the lawyer should be
disciplined in this court.  BR 3.5(c).  A copy of the judgment of
discipline is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the lawyer
committed the conduct for which the lawyer was disciplined.  BR
3.5(b).  Once the court has reviewed the judgment and the
parties' submissions, this court determines whether it should
discipline the lawyer and in what manner.  BR 3.5(e). (1)

We take the facts from the Tenth Circuit's order and a 
a letter to the Tenth Circuit from the accused's law partner,
Snider, which the accused tendered as an exhibit to his answer
under BR 3.5(c).  The accused is a member of the state bars of
Utah and Oregon and two federal bars, the District of Utah and
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.  His office is in
Utah.  His law partner, Snider, represented a client, Bradley, in
a federal criminal matter.  In the trial court, the lawyer-client
relationship broke down, and Bradley's family stopped paying
Snider.  The trial judge, however, did not permit Snider to
withdraw from representing Bradley.  During the trial court
proceedings, the accused made one appearance on Bradley's behalf,
possibly at a scheduling hearing.  Another law partner of the
accused's, Larreau, arranged a plea bargain for Bradley.  When
Bradley was leaving the court, the client asked Snider for the
papers to file an appeal and told Snider that he did not want
Snider to represent him any further.  Bradley later filed an
appeal.  Despite Bradley's wishes, the Tenth Circuit contacted
Snider and ordered him to represent Bradley.  

The Tenth Circuit thereafter issued orders on March 5,
April 27,  and July 8, 2004, directing the accused to respond to
that court's inquiries regarding the accused's handling of
Bradley's appeal. (2)  The accused apparently did not respond
to the March order, but responded to the April and July orders. 
The Tenth Circuit's order of September 1, 2004, stated, in part:


"This disciplinary matter is before the court on
[the accused's] response to the court's order of July
8, 2004, which directed him to show cause why he should
not be sanctioned or otherwise disciplined for his
failure to zealously represent his client in case
number 03-4295, 
United States v. Bradley.  That order
was issued after a panel of this court, on April 27,
2004, ordered [the accused] removed from case number
03-4295 and referred to the court's attorney discipline
program, following his failure to file the preliminary
appellate documents and pay the appellate filing fee in
case number 03-4295, and following his failure to
respond to the court's order to show cause of March 5,
2004.

"Although [the accused] failed to respond to this
court's order of March 5, 2004, he has submitted a
letter which states that it is in response to the
court's April 27, 2004 order.  The court has considered
that response, along with the response to the court's
July 8, 2004 order, and concludes that [the accused's]
lapses in handling the 
Bradley appeal and in failing to
respond to this court's orders and notices were
unacceptable.  Although [the accused] asserts that he
was not the primary counsel in Mr. Bradley's case and
that he does not believe that he ever entered a formal
appearance for Mr. Bradley, the district court docket
sheet reflects a notice of appearance by [the accused]
on July 11, 2002.  In addition, it is clear that [the
accused] demonstrated a disregard for this court's
rules and directives and also failed to review either
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or the local
rules of this court.

"[The accused] is reprimanded for his failure to
respond to this court's orders and directives and for
his failure to follow the court's rules."

In response, the accused admits that he did not respond
to the Tenth Circuit's initial order because he "mistakenly
believed that the matter was being handled by the attorney in
[the] firm that was actively representing the client."

Because the accused concedes that the Tenth Circuit
afforded him notice and an opportunity to be heard, the only
issue here under BR 3.5(c) is whether this court should
discipline the accused.  We address that issue below.

In 
In re Devers, 317 Or 261, 855 P2d 617 (1993), this
court set out the analytical process that this court follows in
imposing discipline under BR 3.5:

"A further word is in order about the analytical
framework that we use.  In the 
usual reciprocal
discipline case, the acts of an accused violate the
disciplinary rules of both jurisdictions.  In
determining an appropriate sanction, however, this
court focuses on the accused's misconduct under the
Oregon disciplinary rules.  We do so because our choice
of a sanction vindicates the judicial authority of this
jurisdiction, not of the one in which the earlier
discipline occurred."

Id. at 264-65 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).

This, however, is not the usual case.  As previously
described, the record before this court consists of only the
Tenth Circuit's order, which the Bar forwarded to this court, and
the accused's response in this court to the Bar's notice of
discipline.  Attached to accused's response is a copy of a letter
to the Tenth Circuit that Snider wrote in the court of that
proceeding.

The Tenth Circuit's order reprimanding the accused
faults him for his alleged "failure to zealously represent his
client" and for his failure to respond to the court's March 5,
2004, order to show cause.  The order is otherwise devoid of any
identified factual findings and fails to identify any
disciplinary rule of the Tenth Circuit that the accused violated. 
As a result, the Tenth Circuit's order is not in and of itself
sufficient to establish that the accused's conduct in the Tenth
Circuit violated an Oregon disciplinary rule as set out in the
Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility. (3)

Nevertheless, the Bar argues that the accused violated
two Oregon rules, DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct prejudicial to
administration of justice) and DR 7-106(A) (disregard of
tribunal's ruling).  Although the accused concedes that he did
not respond to the Tenth Circuit's original order, he argues that
this court should not discipline him because his involvement in
the underlying case was limited to having his name listed as
counsel.

Under DR 1-102(A)(4), "[i]t is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to * * * [e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice."  To conclude that a lawyer has
violated DR 1-102(A)(4), this court must determine the existence
of each of three elements:  (1) the lawyer engaged in "conduct,"
that is, the lawyer did something that he or she should not have
done or failed to do something that the lawyer should have done;
(2) the conduct occurred during the "administration of justice,"
that is, during the course of a judicial proceeding or another
proceeding that carried the trappings of a judicial proceeding;
and (3) the lawyer's conduct resulted in "prejudice," either to
the functioning of the proceeding or to a party's substantive
interests in the proceeding.  In re Lawrence, 337 Or 450, 464, 98
P3d 366 (2004); 
In re Haws, 310 Or 741, 746-48, 801 P2d 818
(1990).  Although it is undisputed that the accused engaged in
conduct during a judicial proceeding, there is no evidence in the
record before us that his conduct resulted in any prejudice. 
Although the accused disregarded the Tenth Circuit's initial
letter, he responded to its additional inquiries.  So far as we
can determine on this record, the accused, unlike Snider, was not
Bradley's lawyer except in the most limited sense.  From the
record provided, we can conclude only that the accused made a
brief trial court appearance on July 11, 2002, but that Snider,
not the accused, had the responsibility to represent the client
and to respond to the Tenth Circuit's orders in Bradley's appeal
in 2004.  We therefore decline to conclude that the accused
violated DR 1-102(A)(4).  

Under DR 7-106(A), a "lawyer shall not disregard * * *
a standing rule of a tribunal or a ruling of a tribunal made in
the course of a proceeding but the lawyer may take appropriate
steps in good faith to test the validity of such rule or ruling." 

See
In re Gustafson, 333 Or 468, 484, 41 P3d 1063 (2002)
(applying rule).  Here, the limited evidence in the record
demonstrates that the accused believed in good faith that his law
partner either would submit or had submitted a sufficient
response in the Bradley appeal to the Tenth Circuit.  And, it is
undisputed that the accused had no responsibility in the Bradley
appeal in 2004.  Under those circumstances, we cannot conclude
that the accused disregarded a standing rule or a ruling of a
tribunal.  We conclude that the record fails to demonstrate that
the accused violated DR 7-106(A).

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that this court
should not discipline the accused on the basis of the Tenth
Circuit's order.

Recommendation for discipline denied.
1. 
This court, in its discretion, may refer the matter to
the Disciplinary Board for the purpose of taking testimony on the
issues relevant under BR 3.5(c).  We have determined that there
is no need to do so in this matter, because neither party asserts
that this court needs further information to resolve the
reciprocal discipline issue that this case presents.
2. The record before us does not disclose whether the Tenth
Circuit directed similar orders to Snider.
3. 
The Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct became
effective January 1, 2005.  The conduct at issue in this
proceeding occurred before that date, and the Code of
Professional Responsibility therefore applies.