Title: Jones v. City of Jackson
Citation: 259 S.W.2d 649
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 1953

259 S.W.2d 649 (1953) JONES v. CITY OF JACKSON et al. Supreme Court of Tennessee. June 5, 1953. Herron C. Pearson and Oliver H. Jones, Jackson, for complainant. W.E. Leech and Waldrop, Hall &amp; Winningham, Jackson, for defendants. PREWITT, Justice. The bill in this cause was filed by Kirby Jones, a furniture dealer in the City of Jackson, to have declared void an ordinance of the city which undertakes to regulate the sale of personal property by auction within the corporate limits, but excepting auction sales by a judicial order and such sales by executors or administrators, trustees, etc. A demurrer was filed by the city and the eighth ground thereof was sustained by the Chancellor, which meant that he sustained and upheld the ordinance as a valid exercise of the police power of the city. While *650 the Chancellor upheld the validity of the ordinance, he deleted certain sections, to-wit: paragraphs c, f, g and j of Section 2, subsection 1; and subsections 6 and 13 of Section 4. In the opinion of the Chancellor, these deleted sections offended Section 1, Article 8, of the Constitution of Tennessee, which provides: In order to understand the problem, it is necessary that we copy the ordinance, which is as follows: The Chancellor deleted paragraph c under Section 2 requiring the names and addresses of the owners of the merchandise or other personal property to be offered at such auction, with the true and sworn inventory of the property, showing the cost price thereof and the source of title thereto. The lower court also deleted paragraph f of said Section 2 which required the applicant to state whether or not additional merchandise, other than the inventory filed, or what is called "fill in" stock, will be offered at such auction, and if so, the general nature and previous ownership of such additional or "fill in" stock with the true and sworn inventory thereof, showing the cost price and source of title thereof. The lower court also deleted paragraph g of Section 2 requiring a copy of proposed advertisements to be made of such auctions. The Chancellor deleted paragraph j of Section 2 which would have required the applicant to give reasons for the conducting of the auction. Further, subsections 6 and 13 of Section 4 were stricken from the Ordinance. Subsection 6 prohibited the sale of any merchandise which did not have firmly attached thereto the name of the manufacturer; and subsection 13 of Section 4 prohibited the dealer from selling or offering for sale at such auction any article not specifically listed in the inventory, filed with the Board of Commissioners. The ordinance attacked, if upheld, must be under the police power of the city which enables municipalities to pass regulations to promote the public health, morals, safety and general welfare. The leading case in Tennessee is Spencer-Sturla Co. v. City of Memphis, 155 Tenn. 70, 290 S.W. 608, in which it was held in a zoning ordinance that exclusion from a residential district of a commercial enterprise generally is a valid exercise of the police power and is not unreasonable. We have no case in point in Tennessee. The decision of the Legislature as to what is a sufficient reason to justify a classification made in police measures will not be reviewed by the courts unless it is palpably arbitrary. Darnell v. Shapard, 156 Tenn. 544, 3 S.W.2d 661; Chattanooga Dayton Bus Lines v. Burney, 160 Tenn. 294, 23 S.W.2d 669. *652 Where the specific power to regulate a business is conferred by the Legislature upon the Board of Commissioners of a city, such Board of Commissioners has the right to "regulate" and to adjust by rule, method or governing principles of law. State ex rel. Saperstein v. Bass, 177 Tenn. 609, 152 S.W.2d 236; Silverman v. City of Chattanooga, 165 Tenn. 642, 57 S.W.2d 552. The power to exercise a sound discretion is implicit in the power to regulate. State ex rel. Major v. Cummings, 178 Tenn. 378, 158 S.W.2d 713, 139 A.L.R. 837; Large v. City of Elizabethton, 185 Tenn. 156, 203 S.W.2d 907. An ordinance is not invalid merely because it regulates a lawful business and due process of law is not denied when an ordinance fairly and reasonably regulates a lawful business. The holding of certain provisions of an Act invalid does not destroy the entire Act so long as there is enough left where it is capable of being executed in accordance with the apparent legislative intent. Miller v. City of Memphis, 181 Tenn. 15, 178 S.W.2d 382, 151 A.L.R. 1172. Complainant's statement in his bill that the ordinance is not valid is not supported by statements of specific facts from which complainant might draw such a conclusion and in the absence of further statements of specific facts justifying the conclusions therein, such statements are insufficient to evoke the aid of a court of equity, as is here sought. From 111 A.L.R., p. 473, we quote the following: In City of San Antonio v. South Trunk Co., Tex.Civ.App., 13 S.W.2d 401, the court had under consideration the validity of an ordinance of the City of San Antonio regulating, among other things, the sale of trunks by auction. This ordinance also proposed to regulate the auction sales of jewelry, pictures, paintings, rugs, trunks, suitcases, etc., but should not apply to judicial sale or sales by trustees, etc. Practically all of the courts that have passed on what are called "jewelry auction ordinances" have upheld them. Davidson v. Phelps, 214 Ala. 236, 107 So. 86; Ex parte West, 75 Cal. App. 591, 243 P. 55; Mogul v. Gaither, 142 Md. 380, 121 A. 32. As will be seen from City of San Antonio v. South Trunk Co., supra, that ordinance was broader than the ordinary jewelry ordinance and covered pictures, paintings, rugs, trunks and suitcases. The whole idea of these ordinances is to protect the public and to minimize deception. Deception can be had in the auction sale of furniture just as much as in the auction sale of rugs, suitcases and trunks. We think the holding in the Texas case just referred to is sound. We have considered the case of Perry Trading Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 128 Fla. 424, 174 So. 854, 111 A.L.R. 463, holding invalid an ordinance such as the one now before us but we are of the opinion *653 that the Texas case supra is the sounder view. We have not taken up the various parts of the Ordinance separately but we have carefully read the Ordinance and we believe the Chancellor has reached the right conclusion in upholding the validity of the Ordinance after striking out the several parts enumerated in his decree. It results that the decree of the Chancellor is affirmed.