Title: AUTRY v. MULTIPLE INJURY TRUST FUND
Citation: 2001 OK 79, 38 P.3d 213, 72OBJ3055
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: September 25, 2001

AUTRY v. MULTIPLE INJURY TRUST FUND Annotate this Case AUTRY v. MULTIPLE INJURY TRUST FUND 2001 OK 79 38 P.3d 213 72 OBJ 3055 Case Number: 94919 Decided: 09/25/2001 Mandate Issued: 11/28/2001 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA Charles Tom Autry, Petitioner v. The Multiple Injury Trust Fund and The Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION III ¶0 Claimant was awarded permanent partial disability in separate adjudications of two work-related injuries. He then sought benefits from Multiple Injury Trust Fund. Workers' Compensation Court, Honorable Jerry L. Salyer, held that, under 1999 amendment to section 172 (A) of Workers' Compensation Act, Claimant was not entitled to Fund benefits. Court of Civil Appeals vacated order and remanded matter to Workers' Compensation Court. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; ORDER OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT VACATED AND CAUSE REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. David Custar, McCaffrey & Tawwater, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Petitioner. Georgiana Peterson, Gregory J. Crawford, Pray, Walker, Jackman, Williamson & Marlar, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent Multiple Injury Trust Fund. HODGES, J. ¶1 The facts are not disputed. Charles Thomas Autry (Claimant) sustained a compensable injury to his lower back on March 8, 1994. On January 2, 1995, he suffered a second injury, this one to his right foot. Both injuries occurred while he was working for Lance, Inc. (Employer). A workers' compensation claim was filed for each injury. ¶2 Permanent partial disability was awarded on September 1, 1999, for the first injury and on September 14, 1999 for the second injury. Claimant challenged the trial tribunal's calculation of benefits for the first injury before an en banc panel of the Workers' Compensation Court. On November 1, 1999, while that decision was pending, the 1999 amendment to section 172 (A) of the Workers' Compensation Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 85, §§ 1-211 (1991 & Supp. 2000), went into effect. On December 16, 1999, the en banc panel issued an order correcting the trial tribunal's calculation of benefits. ¶3 Claimant filed a claim for benefits from the Multiple Injury Trust Fund (Fund) on January 26, 2000. The Workers' Compensation Court adopted the argument of the Fund and held that Claimant could not recover benefits from the Fund under the 1999 amendment. The Court of Civil Appeals vacated the order adopting Claimant's argument that the pre-1999 version of section 172(A) applied as the law in effect at the time of the subsequent injury. ¶4 The legal issue arises from the Legislature's amendment of § 172 (A) of the Workers' Compensation Act effective November 1, 1999. Prior to that date, certain permanent partial disability claimants were entitled to receive benefits from the Fund. After the 1999 amendment, however, section 172 (A) (2) (b) provides that "for actions filed after October 31, 1999" the claimant shall receive permanent partial disability from the employer only. Thus additional benefits were no longer available from the Fund. ¶5 Claimant argues that the Court of Civil Appeals was correct in applying the pre-1999 version of section 172(A) as the law in effect at the time of the most recent injury. The Fund argues that the express language of the 1999 amendment demonstrates the legislative intent that the statute should be applied retroactively to all claims filed for benefits from the Fund after October 31, 1999, without regard to the date of the most recent injury. ¶6 The dispositive threshold question is not which version of section 172 (A) applies. On November 1, 1999, the 1999 amendment became effective, contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Civil Appeals. Rather, it is the meaning of the phrase "for actions filed after October 31, 1999" which controls. Does the phrase refer to an "action" for permanent partial disability benefits for the second injury or an "action" for benefits from the Fund following an adjudication of the second injury? This Court determines that the Legislature was referring to an action on the second injury when it drew the distinction between actions filed before November 1, 1999, and those filed after that date. The Creation and Dissolution of the Fund ¶7 The Fund, formerly the Special Indemnity Fund, was first established in 1943 to relieve employer hesitation to hire workers who suffered previous impairment by assuring employers that they would not be responsible for the combination of old and new disabilities. See Special Indem. Fund v. Archer, ¶8 In 1994, a joint legislative committee was created to study the Fund including "[a] determination of the impact that dissolution of the [Fund] would have on businesses located in this state." Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 182 (Supp. 1995). In 1999, dissolution of the Fund began with the amendment of section 172(A). ¶9 Under the amendment, "[f]or actions filed after October 31, 1999," a combination of disabilities resulting in permanent partial disability would result in employer responsibility only for the disability caused by the subsequent injury. Id. at § 172 (A) (2) (b). Nor would the employee receive any additional compensation for the combined disability from the Fund. Id. Thus, the disabled worker now bore the responsibility for any material increase in permanent partial disability resulting from the combination of disabilities. Inexplicably, the Legislature made the filing of an "action", rather than the date of injury, the event which triggered operation of the new rule for calculating benefits. ¶10 At the end of the 2000 legislative session, the dissolution was completed when the Legislature discontinued benefits from the Fund for a material increase in combined disability resulting in permanent total disability. 2000 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 248, § 12, emerg. eff. May 26, 2000. Curiously, the controlling event in the 2000 amendment Construction of the 1999 Amendment ¶11 The dispute in this matter is the effect of the 1999 amendment on workers' claims for subsequent injuries filed but pending before the Workers' Compensation Court on November 1, 1999. Claimant persuaded the Court of Civil Appeals to apply the well-settled rule that the law in effect at the time of the subsequent injury controls in determining the liability of the Fund. See Archer, 847 P.2d at 794-795. The Fund argues that the Legislature intended to retroactively disallow any claim against the Fund not commenced by the filing of a valid form 3-f4A timely filed Form 3 claim for benefits against the employer is deemed timely as to the Fund. Special Indem. Fund v. Carlile, ¶12 "The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and follow the intention of the Legislature . . . . [W]here a statute is ambiguous or its meaning is uncertain it is to be given a reasonable construction, one that will avoid absurd consequences if this can be done without violating legislative intent." TRW/Reda Pump v. Brewington ¶13 Guided by these rules of construction, this Court concludes that the Legislature intended the term "action" to refer to a form 3 claim for benefits for the subsequent injury, not a form 3-f claim for benefits from the Fund. The 1999 amendment established an "action" to be the operative event in determining whether a claimant could receive benefits from the Fund for permanent partial disability. If the term "action" referred to the filing of a form 3-f there would be no reason to file one on or after November 1, 1999, as no compensation from the Fund would be recoverable. Yet, the statute unequivocably contemplates "actions" filed after that date. It is unlikely that the Legislature would have intended to tie the operative event in the statute to the filing of a form which, after October 31, 1999, would be ineffectual. Thus, the Legislature must have intended the term "action" to refer to the filing of a form 3 claim for benefits for the subsequent injury. ¶14 In addition, the Fund's proposed construction of the statute would apply the provision retroactively to claims for permanent partial disability pending on November 1, 1999. "Statutes are generally presumed to be prospective in application. This presumption is rebutted when there is legislative intent 'expressly declared' or 'necessarily implied from the language used.' Doubt must be resolved against retrospective application." FOP Lodge No. 165 v. City of Choctaw, ¶15 This Court's construction of the term "action' as a claim on the subsequent injury is consistent with the general rule that statutes apply prospectively. No expression of legislative intent to do otherwise appears in the statute, nor is it necessarily implied by its terms. Thus, the 1999 amendment to section 172 (A) applies prospectively ¶16 The Court of Civil Appeals erred by applying the date of subsequent injury to this claim. That holding ignored the Legislature's express intent that the date of the filing of an "action" controls the application of the changes enacted by the 1999 amendment. The patent ambiguity presented by the term "action" required statutory construction. The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is therefore vacated. The Workers' Compensation Court's denial of benefits from the Fund, was also based on an erroneous interpretation of the applicable law. It is therefore vacated and the cause is remanded to the Workers' Compensation Court. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; ORDER OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT VACATED AND CAUSE REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ¶17 Hargrave, C.J., Watt, V.C.J., Hodges, Lavender, Boudreau, Winchester, JJ., concur. ¶18 Opala, Kauger, Summers, JJ., concur in result. FOOT