Title: People v. Brown
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S271877
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: March 27, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
DAJAH BROWN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S271877 
 
Sixth Appellate District 
H048462 
 
Santa Clara County Superior Court 
17AP002184, C1646856 
 
 
March 27, 2023 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Kruger and Jenkins 
concurred. 
 
Justice Groban filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, in 
which Justices Liu and Evans concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
S271877 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
As part of their inherent power to control the litigation 
before them, trial courts enjoy broad discretion to deny 
continuances unsupported by a showing of good cause.  
However, established case law holds that it is an abuse of 
discretion to deny a trial continuance, solely because good cause 
is lacking, when doing so will result in dismissal of the charges 
and the continuance can be granted without violating the 
defendant’s speedy trial rights.  (See People v. Ferguson (1990) 
218 Cal.App.3d 1173 (Ferguson); see also Pen. Code., §§ 1050, 
subd. (l), 1050.5, subd. (b).)1 
 
This case involves a motion to continue the hearing on a 
suppression motion.  (§ 1538.5.)  We conclude the Ferguson 
principles apply when the People are unable to proceed with 
such a hearing.  If the challenged evidence is so critical that its 
suppression would require dismissal of the case, the court must 
generally grant a continuance unless dismissal would be in 
furtherance of justice.  The burden is on the prosecution to show 
an inability to go forward without the evidence in dispute.  The 
court, however, must ultimately determine whether dismissal of 
the case is reasonably probable absent a continuance.  
 
1  
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 
otherwise noted. 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Near 11:30 p.m. on July 13, 2016, San Jose Police 
Department Officer Nader Yasin saw defendant and another 
woman standing in an area known for prostitution.  Upon 
noticing the officer’s patrol car, the women walked away in 
opposite directions.  Officer Yasin followed defendant and 
detained her.  Defendant admitted she worked as a prostitute 
but said she had not had any “dates” that night.  When asked if 
she had any condoms, she produced four.  After an advisement, 
defendant waived her Miranda rights and admitted she had 
been loitering for purposes of prostitution.  (Former § 653.22, 
subd. (a); Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.)  She was 
cited and released.  
 
Defendant was arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty, and 
waived her right to a speedy trial.  On January 19, 2017, she 
moved to suppress both her statements and the physical 
evidence gathered by Officer Yasin as the fruit of an unlawful 
detention.  (§ 1538.5.)  On the date scheduled for the suppression 
hearing, the prosecutor orally requested a continuance.  He 
explained that Yasin was under subpoena but had called during 
the lunch recess to report that he was the only gang unit officer 
available to interview a percipient witness to a shooting.  The 
interview was scheduled at the same time as the hearing.  
Without consulting the court or notifying opposing counsel, the 
prosecutor told Yasin “it would be okay” for him to conduct the 
interview rather than come to court.  Defendant objected to a 
continuance, arguing a lack of good cause.  The court agreed and 
passed the matter to the afternoon to allow the prosecutor to 
secure the officer’s presence.  
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
 
When the case was recalled, Officer Yasin did not appear 
and the prosecutor gave no further explanation.  Nevertheless, 
he urged the court to continue the matter, noting Yasin’s 
testimony was needed to respond to the motion and the 
challenged evidence was critical to the People’s case.  He 
observed that the People needed only a brief continuance and 
argued defendant would suffer no prejudice because she was out 
of custody and had waived her speedy trial rights.  The court 
rejected these arguments and denied the continuance for lack of 
good cause.  Because the People had no witness, the suppression 
motion was granted.  Asked how he wished to proceed, the 
prosecutor relayed his understanding that “a lot of the evidence 
in this case was evidence obtained by . . . observation from the 
police officer before any contact with the defendant.”  He asked 
the court not to dismiss the case but instead to give the People 
additional time to determine whether they could proceed 
without the suppressed evidence.  Defense counsel responded 
that the People had no remaining evidence sufficient to prove 
the charges and invited the court to dismiss the case under 
section 1385.  Defendant then withdrew her time waiver, 
making March 20, 2017 the last day on which trial could begin 
under section 1382.  The court set a trial date of March 6, 2017.  
 
On March 2, the People moved for reconsideration based 
on People v. Ferrer (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 873 (Ferrer), which 
held that a court abuses its discretion by denying a prosecutor’s 
request to continue a suppression hearing when the denial will 
foreseeably result in dismissal of the case.  The prosecutor 
stated that the People would be unable to proceed to trial if the 
evidence was suppressed.  The court declined to impose 
monetary sanctions because it found the prosecutor had not 
acted in bad faith.  Based on Ferrer, the court vacated its prior 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
orders and held a new suppression hearing on March 17.  After 
hearing testimony from both Officer Yasin and defendant, the 
court denied the suppression motion.  
 
When the case was called for trial on March 20, 2017, 
defendant agreed to a “slow plea” pursuant to Bunnell v. 
Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592.  Under this procedure, a 
defendant waives the right to jury trial and allows the court to 
decide the case based on police reports or other agreed-upon 
evidence.  (People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 39–40.)  The 
court accepted defendant’s plea, found her guilty, and placed her 
on probation for three years.  It imposed fines and fees of $235 
but ordered no jail time.  
 
Defendant appealed, challenging the court’s decision to 
reconsider its continuance and suppression rulings.  The 
superior court’s appellate division affirmed, noting the Ferrer 
decision was dispositive.  (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior 
Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)  A lengthy concurrence urged 
that Ferrer was wrongly decided.  The Sixth District Court of 
Appeal granted defendant’s petition to transfer (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 8.1006) and issued an opinion disagreeing with 
Ferrer.  The Court of Appeal concluded Ferrer’s rule was 
unsupported 
and 
criticized 
the 
rule’s 
“difficulties 
in 
application.”  (People v. Brown (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 15, 31 
(Brown).)  Instead, the court held that trial courts retain 
authority to deny a continuance unsupported by good cause even 
if the decision will foreseeably result in dismissal of the case for 
lack of evidence.  (Id. at p. 32.)  We granted review to resolve the 
conflict.  We reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment and clarify 
the Ferrer rule. 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
The trial court’s authority to grant continuances in 
criminal cases is governed by statute.  Accordingly, we begin 
with an examination of the relevant provisions, guided by 
familiar principles.  “ ‘ “We first examine the statutory 
language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning.  We do 
not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the 
statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope 
and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the 
enactment.  If the language is clear, courts must generally follow 
its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in 
absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.  If the 
statutory language permits more than one reasonable 
interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the 
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.” ’ ”  (City 
of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 616–617.)  
Issues of statutory construction are reviewed de novo.  (People 
v. Jimenez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 53, 61.) 
A. 
Statutory Text 
 
Originally enacted in 1927 and amended many times 
since, section 1050 regulates the granting of continuances in 
criminal cases.2  Its initial subdivision describes the statute’s 
aim as follows:  “The welfare of the people of the State of 
California requires that all proceedings in criminal cases shall 
be set for trial and heard and determined at the earliest possible 
 
2  
Early versions of section 1050 placed limits only on 
continuances of trial (see People v. Iocca (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 
73, 78), but amendments have expanded the statute’s reach to 
all criminal hearings.  (See People v. Johnson (2013) 218 
Cal.App.4th 938, 942 (Johnson).) 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
time.  To this end the Legislature finds that the criminal courts 
are becoming increasingly congested with resulting adverse 
consequences to the welfare of the people and the defendant.  
Excessive continuances contribute substantially to this 
congestion and cause substantial hardship to victims and other 
witnesses.  Continuances also lead to longer periods of 
presentence confinement for those defendants in custody and 
the concomitant overcrowding and increased expenses of local 
jails.  It is therefore recognized that the people, the defendant, 
and the victims and other witnesses have the right to an 
expeditious disposition, and to that end it shall be the duty of all 
courts and judicial officers and of all counsel, both for the 
prosecution and the defense, to expedite these proceedings to the 
greatest degree that is consistent with the ends of justice.”  
(§ 1050, subd. (a).)  Later provisions set out both procedural 
requirements and the necessary substantive showing.   
 
Subdivisions (b) through (d) of section 1050 address 
procedure.  As relevant here, subdivision (b) requires that 
motions for a continuance be supported by written notice, filed 
and served at least two court days before the hearing in 
question, together with “affidavits or declarations detailing 
specific facts showing that a continuance is necessary.”  (§ 1050, 
subd. (b).)  Subdivision (c) provides that a party who has not 
followed the procedures in subdivision (b) may still request a 
continuance, but “unless the moving party shows good cause for 
a failure to comply with those requirements, the court may 
impose sanctions as provided in Section 1050.5.”  (§ 1050, 
subd. (c).)  Those sanctions may include a fine of up to $1,000 
and a report to “an appropriate disciplinary committee” 
(§ 1050.5, subd. (a)), but they may not include dismissal of the 
case (§ 1050.5, subd. (b)).  Finally, when the moving party has 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
failed to satisfy the procedural requirements of section 1050, 
subdivision (b), subdivision (d) requires the court to hold a 
hearing to determine whether good cause excuses the lack of 
procedural compliance.  If the moving party cannot show good 
cause for that failure, subdivision (d) states that “the motion for 
continuance shall not be granted.”  (§ 1050, subd. (d).)   
 
Other subdivisions of section 1050 go on to explain the 
substantive 
requirements 
for 
obtaining 
a 
continuance.  
Subdivision (e) states:  “Continuances shall be granted only 
upon a showing of good cause.  Neither the convenience of the 
parties nor a stipulation of the parties is in and of itself good 
cause.”  (§ 1050, subd. (e).)  Convenience of witnesses is, 
however, a factor for the court to consider both in deciding 
whether good cause has been shown and in selecting the new 
date.  (§ 1050, subd. (g)(1).)  If the court concludes that a 
continuance is necessary, it must state on the record the facts 
justifying that finding.  (§ 1050, subd. (f).)  Any permitted 
continuance must be limited to “only . . . that period of time 
shown to be necessary by the evidence considered at the hearing 
on the motion.”  (§ 1050, subd. (i).)  Section 1050, then, provides 
for two different good cause showings.  If the moving party has 
not complied with the procedures of subdivision (b), it must 
show that there is good cause to excuse that failure.  If such a 
showing is not made the court may impose sanctions.  As to the 
merits of a continuance motion, subdivision (e) requires a good 
cause showing that a continuance is necessary.   
 
A trial court’s exercise of its broad discretion when ruling 
on a continuance motion is accorded substantial deference on 
appeal.  (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 508; 
People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 920 (Beames).)  
Although 
section 1050 
states 
conditions 
under 
which 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
continuances “shall” and “shall not” be granted, case law has 
long recognized that various aspects of section 1050 are 
directory rather than mandatory.3  This principle is confirmed 
by the statute’s final subdivision.  Enacted in 2003, 
subdivision (l) states:  “This section is directory only and does 
not mandate dismissal of an action by its terms.”  (§ 1050, 
subd. (l).)  Accordingly, “a failure to comply with a particular 
directive set forth in section 1050 does not, in itself, require 
dismissal of a criminal proceeding.”  (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th 
at p. 1151, fn. 8, italics added; see Johnson, supra, 218 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 942–943; see also Malengo v. Municipal 
Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 813, 816; People v. Brown (1956) 141 
Cal.App.2d 299, 302–303.)  Thus, despite the seemingly 
mandatory phrasing of some portions of section 1050, a number 
of appellate decisions have recognized the trial court’s discretion 
to allow a continuance even without a factual showing of 
necessity.  (See Johnson, at pp. 942–943; Brown, at p. 303.) 
 
Section 1050.5 was also added in 2003.  After prescribing 
sanctions for a movant’s failure to comply with section 1050’s 
procedural requirements, section 1050.5 states that these 
sanctions “shall be in addition to any other authority or power 
available to the court, except that the court or magistrate shall 
not dismiss the case.”  (§ 1050.5, subd. (b).) 
 
3  
As we explained in People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 
1131, 1148, footnote 7 (Engram) in regard to another aspect of 
section 1050:  “[T]he term ‘directory,’ when used in reference to 
a statute, has been employed to denote different concepts — 
sometimes referring solely to the lack of (or limited type of) 
remedy prescribed when the statute is violated, and sometimes 
referring to whether a statute is simply ‘directive’ or ‘permissive’ 
rather than ‘obligatory,’ ‘compulsory,’ or ‘mandatory.’ ”  
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
 
The text of section 1050 speaks only to continuances; it is 
not an independent source of dismissal authority.  It is 
important to keep the distinction in mind.  Although 
section 1050, subdivision (l) makes clear that dismissal of an 
action is never required, the statute does not explicitly forbid 
dismissals that may result from a continuance denial.  Further, 
section 1050.5 is inapplicable here.  The sanctions statute 
forbids dismissal of an action as punishment for a party’s failure 
to satisfy procedural requirements (§ 1050.5, subd. (b)), but it 
does not speak to the court’s authority in ruling on a motion that 
fails to demonstrate a continuance is necessary.   
 
The language of section 1050 thus does not resolve the 
issue before us, because it neither authorizes nor prohibits 
dismissals.  To consider how the relevant statutes can be read 
together, we turn to their legislative history and interpretative 
case law.   
B. 
Case Law Context and Legislative History 
 
Both section 1050, subdivision (l) and the language of 
section 1050.5, subdivision (b) discussed above were added by 
Assembly Bill No. 1273 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.).  The Legislature 
acted in response to a series of cases, which we discuss before 
reviewing the bill’s legislative history. 
 
1. 
Cases Addressing Continuance of Trial 
 
Several opinions have examined how the time limits in 
section 1382 affect the court’s discretion in ruling on 
continuances that would delay the start of trial.  Without the 
defendant’s waiver or consent, or a showing of “good cause to the 
contrary,” section 1382 requires that the court dismiss an action 
not brought to trial within:  (1) 60 days after the defendant’s 
arraignment or plea in felony cases; (2) 30 days after the 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
arraignment or plea in misdemeanor cases when the defendant 
is in custody; or (3) 45 days after the arraignment or plea in 
misdemeanor cases when the defendant is not in custody.  
(§ 1382, subd. (a)(2)–(3).)  Whenever the defendant has 
requested or agreed to begin trial on a date beyond the 
applicable period, the case must be brought to trial no later than 
10 days after that date.  (Id., subd. (a)(2)(B), (a)(3)(B).) 
 
An early decision touching on the interplay between 
section 1382 and continuances was People v. Kessel (1976) 61 
Cal.App.3d 322 (Kessel).  On the day set for trial, the People 
moved for a seven-day continuance because the deputy district 
attorney assigned to the case was unavailable.  The court denied 
the continuance and dismissed the case under section 1382.  
(Kessel, at pp. 324–325.)  Although the Court of Appeal did not 
separately address the propriety of the continuance ruling, it 
held that dismissal of the case was an abuse of discretion 
because the seven-day continuance would have resulted in a 
trial date set within section 1382’s 10-day grace period.  (Kessel, 
at p. 325.)  Further, the dismissal could not be justified under 
section 1385, which permits an action to be dismissed “in 
furtherance of justice” (§ 1385, subd. (a)), because there had 
been no showing of prejudice to the defendant.  (Kessel, at 
p. 325.)  The court explained:  “The People’s right to be heard 
cannot be frustrated to accommodate judicial convenience or 
because of court congestion.  A dismissal under section 1385 for 
such a reason is an abuse of discretion.”  (Id. at p. 326; see People 
v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 946–947 (Orin).) 
 
People v. Flores (1978) 90 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 6 (Flores), 
highlighted 
the 
distinction 
between 
continuances 
and 
dismissals.  On the date of trial, the prosecution requested a one-
week continuance because the arresting officer was unavailable 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
to testify.  The court denied the request and dismissed the case 
because the People were not ready to proceed.  (Ibid.)  The 
superior court’s appellate division reversed.  First, it observed 
that the requested continuance was “well within” the time limit 
prescribed by section 1382.  (Flores, at p. 6.)  So that statute 
provided no basis for dismissing the action.  (Id. at p. 7.)  Nor 
would a continuance have impinged on the defendant’s 
constitutional speedy trial rights.  (Id. at pp. 7–8.)  The appellate 
division then considered section 1050’s requirement that 
continuances be granted “only upon a showing of good cause.”  
(§ 1050, subd. (e); see Flores, at pp. 8–9.)  Noting that 
section 1050’s provisions are not mandatory, the court relied on 
the language of section 1382 to conclude an action that can be 
brought to trial within the applicable section 1382 time limit 
may not be dismissed despite the absence of good cause for a 
continuance.  (Flores, at p. 9.)  Finally, the court concluded 
dismissal was not appropriate under section 1385 because such 
a dismissal arbitrarily prevents the People from prosecuting an 
offense supported by probable cause, without any showing of 
detriment to the defendant.  (Flores, at p. 9.) 
 
Subsequent Court of Appeal decisions reached the same 
conclusion.  In People v. Arnold (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 456, 458 
(Arnold), the prosecution sought a trial continuance to locate an 
essential witness, requesting a date within section 1382’s 10-
day grace period.  The request was denied and the case 
dismissed, assertedly pursuant to section 1382.  (Arnold, at 
p. 459.)  The Court of Appeal held the ruling erroneous, under 
both section 1382 and section 1385.  A dismissal within the 10-
day grace period was directly contrary to section 1382.  In 
addition, because such a dismissal undermined the legislative 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
policy expressed in section 1382, it was not “in furtherance of 
justice” under section 1385.  (Arnold, at p. 459.) 
 
Similarly, People v. Hernandez (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 451 
(Hernandez) held that a trial court lacks discretion to dismiss a 
criminal case before expiration of section 1382’s 10-day grace 
period.  (Hernandez, at p. 454.)  Although the prosecution had 
failed to show good cause for its inability to proceed, the court 
reasoned no such showing was necessary because section 1382’s 
grace period operates as an exception to the statute’s good cause 
requirement.  (Hernandez, at pp. 454–455.)  Echoing Kessel, 
Arnold, and Flores, the Hernandez court also concluded the 
dismissal contravened the legislative policy underlying 
section 1382’s grace period.  As a result, the dismissal was not 
in furtherance of justice, as required by section 1385.  
(Hernandez, at p. 455.)  People v. Rubaum (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 
930 (Rubaum) was in accord, holding the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying a continuance and dismissing the case 
under section 1385 when the People’s requested a continuance 
date within section 1382’s time limit. 
 
Ferguson, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d 1173 reaffirmed these 
decisions.  The court there concluded the trial court had 
improperly dismissed a case under section 1385 after denying a 
brief continuance for the prosecutor to complete a different trial.  
(Ferguson, at pp. 1176–1177, 1180.)  The Court of Appeal’s 
reasoning was “strongly guided” (id. at p. 1181) by our decision 
in Orin, which had explained that the furtherance of justice 
determination under section 1385 “ ‘requires consideration both 
of the constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of 
society represented by the People, in determining whether there 
should be a dismissal.’ ”  (Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 945.)  The 
dismissal in Ferguson was held to be “without proper and 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
adequate reason” and “served no policy objective.”  (Ferguson, at 
pp. 1182–1183.)  Nor would the requested continuance have 
harmed the defendant, who was not in custody and had 
previously “seemed in no rush to get to trial.”  (Ibid.) 
 
However, People v. Torres (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8 
(Torres) articulated an important limitation on these general 
rules.  There, a prosecutor sought continuances of trial in two 
cases within the section 1382 time period but offered no showing 
of why the People could not proceed.  Instead, the prosecutor 
disclosed a strategy of seeking “ ‘to always drag things out till 
[sic] the last possible moment so that even if the case was lost or 
dismissed, the defendants paid the price through the hassle of 
multiple appearances and the expenses of private counsel.’ ”  
(Torres, at p. 11.)  Finding no good cause for delay, the trial court 
denied the continuances and dismissed the cases under 
section 1385.  (Torres, at pp. 11, 15–16.)   
 
The appellate division affirmed.  It explained that a trial 
court has “ ‘discretion to dismiss pursuant to section 1385’ ” 
provided “ ‘that the reasons for the court’s decision be such as 
“would motivate a reasonable judge.” . . . There must be ‘a 
balancing of society’s interest against that of the defendant.’  
[Citation.]  There must also be a showing of detriment to the 
defendant.”  (Torres, supra, 159 Cal.App.3d Supp. at pp. 12–13.)  
The court distinguished the line of cases discussed above 
because none involved a situation in which the People were 
capable of proceeding to trial but chose not to in order to 
manipulate the court and harass the defendant.  (Ibid.)  Torres 
explained, “It was never the intent of [the case law] to shift the 
control of the calendar from the court to the prosecutor,” and 
emphasized that trial courts retain discretion to dismiss a case 
under section 1385 to address “a flagrant abuse” of power or “an 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
attempt by the prosecutor to usurp the inherent right of the 
court to control the courtroom.”  (Id. at p. 13.) 
 
2. 
Assembly Bill No. 1273 
 
The Legislature responded to these decisions by enacting 
Assembly Bill No. 1273 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.), which added 
subdivision (l) to section 1050 to make clear that the statute “is 
directory only and does not mandate dismissal of an action by 
its terms.”  The bill also amended section 1050.5, subdivision (b) 
to add the final clause:  “The authority to impose sanctions 
provided for by this section shall be in addition to any other 
authority or power available to the court, except that the court or 
magistrate shall not dismiss the case.”  (§ 1050.5, subd. (b), 
italics added.)  Legislative history confirms that the purpose of 
these amendments was to codify holdings in the Ferguson line 
of cases.  (See, e.g., Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem. 
Bill No. 1273 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 1, 2003, 
pp. 2–3; Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1273 
(2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 1, 2003, pp. 2, 5–6.) 
 
A report prepared by the Senate Committee on Public 
Safety described the need for Assembly Bill No. 1273 as follows:  
“Current law (Penal Code section 1382) provides the People and 
the defendant with a right to a speedy trial, but that right is 
balanced against the right of both parties to have at least 60 
days to prepare their case.  [¶] The problem AB 1273 attempts 
to resolve involves situations when a court seeks to dismiss a 
case before the expiration of the statutory 60 day time limit.  
[¶] The confusion involves an apparent conflict between two 
Penal Code sections. . . . [O]ne section (Penal Code Section 1050) 
requires a showing of good cause to trail a case within the 60 
day statutory period and the other section (Penal Code 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
Section 1382) does not require a showing of good cause within 
the 60 day period.”  (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem. 
Bill No. 1273, supra, pp. 4–5.)4  According to the bill’s sponsor, 
courts had sometimes “dismissed cases after the prosecutor 
failed to establish good cause to continue the trial of the matter 
even though it was still within the 60-day statutory speedy trial 
period.”  (Id. at p. 5.)  The report stated that Assembly Bill 
No. 1273 was intended to codify Ferguson’s holding that 
section 1050 “ ‘is directory only and does not mandate any 
dismissal of an action by its terms.’ ”  (Id. at p. 6.)5  “Thus, under 
this bill a case could not be dismissed as a sanction for failing to 
comply with the rules governing continuances if the statutory 
time for a speedy trial has not run.”  (Ibid.) 
 
By clarifying that sections 1050 and 1050.5 do not 
independently authorize dismissal for failure to satisfy either 
the procedural or substantive requirements, the Legislature 
confirmed that trial courts may dismiss a case, or force a 
dismissal by denying a continuance, only under the aegis of 
some other conferred authority.  Despite limits on their 
discretion 
imposed 
by 
case 
law 
and 
these 
statutory 
amendments, trial courts retain the power to dismiss “in 
 
4  
This analysis addressed the final version of the bill, after 
it had passed in the Assembly. 
5  
Although the report cited Ferguson, the language was in 
fact a quotation from Rubaum, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at 
page 935.  (See Ferguson, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 1181.)  
The original source of this language appears to be Malengo v. 
Municipal Court, supra, 56 Cal.2d at page 816 (“section 1050 . . . 
is directory only and contains no provision for the dismissal of a 
case when its terms are not complied with”). 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
furtherance of justice” (§ 1385, subd. (a); see Torres, supra, 159 
Cal.App.3d Supp. at pp. 12–13.) 
 
It is evident from committee reports on Assembly Bill 
No. 1273 that the Legislature was specifically concerned with 
continuances of trial.  But, in codifying Ferguson, the 
Legislature would have been aware of its factual context:  The 
People were not ready to proceed on the scheduled date because 
the deputy district attorney assigned to the case was engaged in 
a different trial.  (Ferguson, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 1176.)  
When the Legislature amended section 1050 to clarify that the 
statute does not require dismissal in such a circumstance, it also 
effectively placed constraints on the court’s ability to deny 
continuances.  “In codifying the result in Ferguson, the 
Legislature must have understood that it was obligating trial 
courts to grant continuances where necessary to avoid a 
dismissal, even in the absence of a showing of good cause” 
(Ferrer, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 881), unless dismissal 
would be in furtherance of justice.  Broad language in the 
legislative history is consistent with applying Ferguson’s 
reasoning to continuance requests in other proceedings.  For 
example, committee reports consistently stated that passing 
Assembly Bill No. 1273 would mean that “courts may not 
dismiss a case due to a failure to meet the good cause 
requirements for a continuance” before the statutory period has 
expired.  (Sen. Rules Com., Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1273 (2003–
2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 1, 2003, p. 1; see Sen. Com. on 
Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1273, supra, p. 2; Off. Crim. 
Justice Planning, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1273 
(2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) prepared for Governor Davis (July 15, 
2003) p. 1.)   
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
C. 
Applications Beyond the Trial Continuance Context 
 
The Courts of Appeal have considered how these 
principles apply to continuances of proceedings other than trial, 
like preliminary hearings and motions to suppress evidence 
(§ 1538.5).  With the exception of the Court of Appeal below, all 
courts addressing the question have concluded the trial court’s 
discretion to deny a continuance is also limited in such 
circumstances.  We agree with this prevailing view. 
 
1. 
Preliminary Hearings 
 
Shortly after the passage of Assembly Bill No. 1273, 
People v. Henderson (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 922 (Henderson) 
considered whether Ferguson’s limits on continuance denials 
apply to preliminary hearings.  In Henderson, the People sought 
to continue a preliminary hearing because the victim was 
absent.  Although the victim had been mailed a subpoena, the 
prosecutor made no additional efforts to secure attendance.  
(Henderson, at p. 928.)  Finding the request lacked good cause, 
the magistrate denied the continuance.  (Id. at p. 929.)  The 
People were unable to proceed, and the case was dismissed.  
(Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal held the ruling was improper.  
 
First, the court concluded dismissal was not appropriate 
under section 859b, which requires that a felony preliminary 
hearing be held 10 days after a defendant’s arraignment or plea 
unless the prosecution establishes good cause for a continuance 
or the defendant waives time.  If there is such a showing or 
waiver, the statute sets an outside date of 60 days after the 
arraignment or plea.  That period that can be extended only with 
the defendant’s personal consent.  (§ 859b.)  The complaint is 
subject to dismissal if a preliminary hearing is not held within 
these statutory deadlines.  (Ibid.; see Henderson, supra, 115 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 930–931.)  Henderson had waived the 10-day 
deadline.  (Henderson, at p. 928.)  Thus, a continuance was 
permissible under section 859b without a showing of good cause 
so long as the continued hearing date was within the 60-day 
window.  (Henderson, at pp. 931–932.) 
 
Next, the court considered whether any other statute 
authorized dismissal.  Although section 1050 sets out 
procedural requirements and section 1050.5 permits sanctions 
for non-compliance, neither statute authorizes dismissal of the 
case when a continuance is denied.  (Henderson, supra, 115 
Cal.App.4th at p. 934.)  The court discussed Assembly Bill 
No. 1273’s amendments prohibiting dismissal as a sanction for 
failure to comply with the continuance statute’s procedural 
requirements and concluded “dismissal is a disfavored and 
possibly unauthorized remedy” under the circumstances 
presented.  (Henderson, at p. 936.) 
 
Nor was dismissal appropriate under section 1385.  
Henderson observed that several decisions, including Ferguson, 
had “rejected the application of section 1385 to dismiss cases 
before trial after a failed request for a continuance made within 
the statutory period.”  (Henderson, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 936.)  The court concluded “the same analysis applies to 
section 859b” 
and 
preliminary 
hearing 
continuances.  
(Henderson, at p. 936.)  “[B]oth sections 1382 and 859b establish 
statutory limits to safeguard a defendant’s constitutional right 
to a speedy trial,” yet neither statute authorizes dismissal when 
its prescribed time period has not expired.  (Id. at p. 939.)  
Henderson declined to confine the Ferguson line of cases to the 
trial context.  It held “the trial court has no authority to dismiss 
an action, even when the People have failed to show good cause 
for a continuance under section 1050, so long as the requested 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
date for the preliminary hearing is within the statutory time 
limit established in section 859b.”  (Ibid.)  The court stressed 
that lesser sanctions are available to punish belated 
continuance requests, and trial courts need not reschedule the 
hearing to the prosecutor’s preferred date.  (Henderson, at 
pp. 939–940.)  But, so long as the continuance is “ ‘not sought 
arbitrarily or for an unlimited period,’ ” it must be granted if the 
alternative is dismissal, since a dismissal under these 
circumstances would not be “in the furtherance of justice within 
the meaning of section 1385.”  (Henderson, at p. 941.) 
 
2. 
Suppression Hearings 
 
The Ferrer decision was the first to consider these 
questions in the suppression hearing context.  After Ferrer was 
held to answer, he moved to suppress statements made and 
evidence seized during a warrantless detention and search.  
(Ferrer, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 877–878.)  The prosecutor 
appeared at the suppression hearing but requested a 
continuance, explaining “she had not subpoenaed her witnesses 
due to a ‘mix up.’ ”  (Id. at p. 878.)  The court denied the 
continuance and then granted the suppression motion because, 
due to the witness’s absence, the People failed to establish the 
lawfulness of the detention and search.  (Ibid.)  After a short 
delay, the People announced that they were unable to proceed 
against Ferrer without the suppressed evidence, and the court 
dismissed the information.  (Ibid.) 
 
On appeal, the People conceded they had failed to show 
good cause but argued the court nevertheless could not deny a 
continuance because there was adequate opportunity to conduct 
the suppression motion before the timely trial date.  (Ferrer, 
supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 878–879.)  The Ferrer court 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
agreed, applying Henderson’s analysis in the suppression 
motion context.  It explained:  “In Henderson, the lower court 
did not literally dismiss the criminal case as a sanction for the 
prosecutor’s failure to show good cause, but denial of the motion 
to continue meant the prosecution lacked the necessary evidence 
to present at the preliminary hearing, which led to dismissal of 
the case.  (Henderson, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 929.)  The 
Henderson court treated the dismissal as an unauthorized 
sanction for the failure to show good cause even though the 
dismissal was a consequence of the denial of the continuance 
rather than an express sanction.  (Id. at p. 935.)”  (Ferrer, at 
p. 882, italics added.)  This application of the statutes was 
consistent with legislative intent, Ferrer reasoned, because 
Assembly Bill No. 1273 sought to prevent dismissals resulting 
from a prosecutor’s temporary inability to proceed.  (Ferrer, at 
p. 882, citing Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill 
No. 1273, supra, pp. 5–6.)  “Thus, the Legislature intended that 
a dismissal that causally follows from denial of a motion for a 
continuance be treated as a sanction of dismissal.”  (Ferrer, at 
p. 882.)   
 
Ferrer found the suppression hearing context “analogous” 
to the preliminary hearing and trial situations addressed in 
Henderson and Ferguson.  (Ferrer, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 882.)  It reasoned that, although the trial court did not 
literally dismiss the action as a sanction, it was clear that the 
continuance denial was likely to lead to dismissal of the case.  
(Ibid.)  The People bore the burden to justify the warrantless 
search and seizure, and the unavailability of their witnesses 
“would necessarily result in” the motion being granted.  (Id. at 
p. 883.)  If the evidence in question, which was the only support 
for the charges, was no longer available, a dismissal of the case 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
for lack of evidence would follow.  (Ibid.)  Ferrer ultimately held 
that “[w]here it is reasonably foreseeable that granting a motion 
to suppress will result ultimately in dismissal of the case, the 
fact that the dismissal is not inevitable or immediate does not 
create a material distinction from the circumstances involved in 
Henderson and Ferguson.”  (Ibid.) 
 
Ferrer grounded its analysis on the language of 
sections 1050 and 1050.5.  (Ferrer, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 879–881.)  However, the court went on to discuss the 
conclusions in Ferguson and Henderson that dismissals based 
solely on a failure to show good cause are not “in furtherance of 
justice.”  (§ 1385, subd. (a)); see Henderson, supra, 115 
Cal.App.4th at p. 940; Ferguson, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 1182.)  It reasoned that the same can be said for dismissals 
resulting from the court’s refusal to continue a hearing to 
determine whether evidence supporting the charges was legally 
obtained.  (Ferrer, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 885.)  Indeed, 
the policy balance is arguably even more compelling in the 
suppression hearing context because, unlike preliminary 
hearings and trial, the Legislature “has not provided any 
independent right to a speedy suppression hearing.”  (Id. at 
p. 884.)  It would be anomalous to conclude the Legislature 
intended greater protection for a defendant’s interest in a 
prompt suppression hearing than in a prompt preliminary 
hearing or trial.  (Ibid.)6  Accordingly, Ferrer concluded, “the 
Legislature did not intend for a dismissal to result unless the 
 
6  
And, because a suppression hearing is usually conducted 
before trial or in connection with a preliminary hearing (see 
§ 1538.5, subds. (f)–(g)), the time limits required in those 
contexts protect a defendant’s right to speedy adjudication.   
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
requested continuance results in violation of a statutory time 
limit (such as § 859b or § 1382) or defendant’s constitutional 
right to a fair trial (see Henderson, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 940).”  (Ferrer, at p. 884, fn. omitted.) 
 
The Court of Appeal below disagreed with Ferrer’s reading 
of both the statutory text and legislative history.  Construing 
section 1050, subdivision (l)’s statement that the statute “does 
not mandate dismissal of an action by its terms,” the court noted 
that the provision does not require dismissal but does not 
preclude dismissal either.  It observed the statute “can hardly 
stand for proposition that the trial court has no authority — for 
example, under section 1385 . . . — to dismiss an action in the 
first place.”  (Brown, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 26, fn. omitted.)  
The court concluded there was no basis in the statutory text for 
Ferrer’s rule.  (Id. at p. 25.) 
 
In disagreeing with Ferrer’s reading of legislative history, 
the Court of Appeal focused on language that was removed from 
the original version of Assembly Bill No. 1273.  As introduced, 
the bill proposed to add an express exception to section 1050’s 
good cause requirement.  Proposed subdivision (e)(2) would have 
stated:  “The good cause requirement shall not apply to a 
prosecution or defense motion to continue a felony trial to a date 
not more than 60 days from the date of the defendant’s 
arraignment on the information, or to a date not more than 10 
days from a trial date set following the defendant’s waiver 
pursuant to [section 1382, subdivision (a)(2)(B)].  This exception 
to the requirement of a finding of good cause is intended to codify 
existing case law.”  (Assem. Bill No. 1273 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) 
as introduced Feb. 21, 2003, § 1.)  Amendments removed this 
proposed language, which would have eliminated the good cause 
requirement for continuances within the speedy trial period, 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
and replaced it with subdivision (l) and an amendment to 
section 1050.5, subdivision (b) specifying that “the court or 
magistrate shall not dismiss the case” as a sanction.  (Assem. 
Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 1273 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) May 1, 
2003, § 2.) 
 
As discussed, even after the amendment, committee 
reports consistently stated that Assembly Bill No. 1273’s 
purpose was to codify case law holding that dismissals resulting 
from a party’s failure to satisfy the requirements for a 
continuance are disfavored.  (See, e.g., Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, 
Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1273, supra, p. 2; Sen. Rules Com., Off 
of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading of analysis of Assem. Bill 
No. 1273, supra, p. 1.)  The Court of Appeal below asserted these 
statements of purpose should be disregarded because they were 
erroneously referring to the original version of the bill.  (See 
Brown, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 29.)  Instead, the court 
stressed that the changes to sections 1050 and 1050.5 actually 
enacted did not eliminate the good cause requirement and did 
not prohibit dismissals.  Accordingly, the court concluded, trial 
courts have authority to deny a continuance unsupported by 
good cause “even if this decision may foreseeably result in a 
dismissal of the matter for lack of evidence.”  (Brown, at p. 32.)  
That reading is overly expansive.  
 
Although legislative history does not disclose why the 
original bill was amended, it is evident that the Legislature did 
not want to abandon the requirement that parties seeking a 
continuance show good cause for the attendant delay or 
potentially face sanctions.  That choice is consistent with the 
statute’s 
express 
intent 
to 
discourage 
unwarranted 
continuances and to change a legal culture in which 
continuances had become unacceptably commonplace.  (See 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
§ 1050, subd. (a).)  But it does not follow that the amendment 
signaled an intent to read a new dismissal authority into 
section 1050 and upset the balance between the court’s control 
of its calendar and a strong policy preference for cases to be 
resolved on their merits.  Because the Legislature chose to 
retain the good cause requirement, prosecutors who seek a 
continuance within the speedy trial window remain obligated to 
provide the court with a showing of necessity.  But if they do not, 
case law codified in Assembly Bill No. 1273 places limits on the 
court’s ability to deny the continuance when such a denial will 
foreseeably result in dismissal of the case.  
D. 
Limits on the Court’s Discretion To Deny a Continuance 
 
As we explain, a review of the relevant statutory text, 
legislative history, and case law leads us to a different 
conclusion from that reached by the Court of Appeal below.  
However, we do not completely embrace Ferrer’s statutory 
analysis, either.  The court below was correct to observe that the 
trial court retains its discretion to dismiss a case under 
section 1385.  But it overlooked the line of cases, codified in 
Assembly Bill No. 1273, holding it is an abuse of that discretion 
to dismiss a case based solely on a failure to show good cause 
when a continuance can be granted within the section 1382 
window.  The Ferrer court was correct in concluding that the 
trial court abuses its discretion when it declines such a request 
to continue a suppression hearing if a dismissal of the 
underlying case is reasonably foreseeable.  But it went astray in 
basing its analysis on sections 1050 and 1050.5.   
 
Sections 1050 and 1050.5 continue to require a showing of 
good cause that the continuance of any criminal hearing is 
necessary.  They do not prohibit the trial court from denying a 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
continuance when the prosecutor fails to make such a showing.  
Because the continuance statutes do not themselves authorize 
dismissal, however, a dismissal under these circumstances is 
appropriate only if it is “in furtherance of justice.”  (§ 1385, 
subd. (a).) 
 
Section 1385 grants trial courts the power to dismiss if, 
under the totality of the circumstances, after weighing “ ‘the 
constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of society 
represented by the People’ ” (Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 945), 
the court finds that dismissal would be “in furtherance of 
justice” (§ 1385, subd. (a)).  In conducting this inquiry, a court 
may consider whether the prosecution acted abusively or in bad 
faith (Torres, supra, 159 Cal.App.3d Supp. at pp. 12–13), 
whether the defendant has suffered prejudice (Kessel, supra, 61 
Cal.App.3d at p. 325), society’s interest in the prosecution of the 
crime (Orin, at p. 945), and other relevant factors.    
 
When the People are unable to proceed to trial because the 
court has suppressed evidence following a hearing on the merits, 
a dismissal is generally appropriate under section 1385.  (See 
People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 722; People v. Bonds 
(1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 732, 738–740.)  But there is a “distinction 
between evidence that does not exist and evidence that is simply 
unavailable at the moment.”  (Henderson, supra, 115 
Cal.App.4th at p. 942.)  Dismissals under section 1385 are 
disfavored when “the People are thereby prevented from 
prosecuting defendants for offenses of which there is probable 
cause to believe they are guilty as charged.  Courts have 
recognized that society, represented by the People, has a 
legitimate interest in ‘the fair prosecution of crimes properly 
alleged’  [Citation]  ‘ “[A] dismissal which arbitrarily cuts those 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
rights without a showing of detriment to the defendant is an 
abuse of discretion.” ’ ”  (Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 947.)   
 
For nearly 50 years, appellate decisions have held that it 
is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny a continuance 
within the speedy trial period, absent countervailing factors 
warranting dismissal.  (See Ferguson, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 1183; Rubaum, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 935; Arnold, 
supra, 105 Cal.App.3d at p. 459; Hernandez, supra, 97 
Cal.App.3d at p. 455; Flores, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d Supp. at p. 9; 
Kessel, supra, 61 Cal.App.3d at pp. 325–326; see also Henderson, 
supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 936.)  The Legislature was aware 
of this settled case law and expressly set out to codify it in 
Assembly Bill No. 1273. When time remains to bring the matter 
to trial, and thus to hear the defendant’s motion to suppress, it 
typically does not further justice for the court to force a 
dismissal and forestall a legitimate prosecution conducted in 
compliance with the speedy trial statutes.  As we have observed 
in other circumstances, “[I]t would frustrate the orderly and 
effective operation of our criminal procedure as envisioned by 
the Legislature if without proper and adequate reason 
section 1385 were used to terminate the prosecution of 
defendants for crimes properly charged in accordance with legal 
procedure.”  (Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 947.) 
 
Accordingly, consistent with Ferrer and the case law 
codified in Assembly Bill No. 1273, we hold that it is an abuse of 
discretion for the court to deny continuance of a suppression 
hearing when it is reasonably foreseeable that dismissal of the 
case will result, unless dismissal would be in furtherance of 
justice.  (§ 1385, subd. (a).) 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
 
This is not to say that the court’s hands are tied when the 
prosecution 
seeks 
a 
continuance 
without 
satisfying 
section 1050’s requirements.  It may impose fines, refer the 
prosecutor for discipline, and impose any other sanctions at its 
disposal short of dismissal for procedural noncompliance.  
(§ 1050.5, subd. (b); see § 1050, subd. (b).)  “And, of course, the 
trial court may exercise its discretion in selecting the length of 
a continuance; it need not necessarily accede to the prosecutor’s 
preferred date.”  (Ferrer, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 886.)  
 
The 
court 
below 
criticized 
Ferrer’s 
“reasonable 
foreseeability” standard as posing some practical difficulties in 
application.  (See Brown, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 31–32.)  
In determining whether the denial of a continuance will make it 
reasonably foreseeable that a case will be dismissed, the court 
must consider the totality of the extant circumstances.  One of 
the factors to be considered is the People’s representation that 
they will be unable to proceed without the challenged evidence.  
But the court must independently examine that representation.  
In the end it is the court’s determination, not the People’s 
representation, 
that 
is 
dispositive. 
 
The 
reasonable 
foreseeability standard comes into play when the case cannot be 
tried absent the evidence, not when the case will simply be more 
difficult to prove.  The standard requires the prosecution to 
defend its assertion that the contested evidence is vital.  At the 
same time, the defense, in possession of discovery, will be poised 
to argue against this assertion, as it did here.  Of course the 
defense cannot be put to the burden of arguing the strength of 
the prosecution’s case.  And while the court is generally 
precluded from reading the police reports and other supporting 
documents (see § 1204.5), the defense may give its consent for 
the court to do so, to assist in its consideration of the question.  
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
In the final analysis, the burden is on the People to make this 
showing.  If that showing falls short, the court is free to deny the 
continuance and proceed with the suppression hearing.  Since 
Ferrer was decided more than a decade ago, neither parties nor 
trial courts appear to have struggled unduly with this 
procedure. 
 
As an alternative to the reasonable foreseeability 
standard, the Attorney General argues trial courts should 
simply rely on prosecutors’ representations as to their ability to 
proceed.  We reject this suggestion.  That approach would 
abrogate the court’s independent responsibility and deprive the 
defense of its legitimate opportunity to challenge the 
prosecutor’s 
assertions. 
 
Although 
the 
prosecutor’s 
representation is certainly a relevant consideration, we stress 
that trial courts are obliged to take into account all facts and 
arguments presented on the issue and to make their own 
independent determination of whether dismissal of the case is 
reasonably foreseeable if a continuance is denied. 
E. 
Application 
 
Here, the prosecutor failed to satisfy either the procedural 
or substantive requirements of section 1050 in moving for a 
continuance.  He provided neither advance written notice nor 
documentary support for the motion.  (See § 1050, subd. (b).)  He 
also failed to present a showing of good cause.  (See § 1050, 
subd. (e).)  The prosecutor had unilaterally excused a 
subpoenaed witness from attending a court hearing, for reasons 
the court rightly viewed with skepticism.  The trial court was 
thus correct in concluding good cause did not support the 
continuance request, even if the prosecutor acted with poor 
judgment rather than bad faith.  We emphasize that the 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
prosecutor’s unilateral decision to tell Officer Yasin he need not 
appear is not condoned under these circumstances.  The 
subpoenaing of witnesses is part of the process by which courts 
and parties can ensure cases will be ready to proceed when 
scheduled.  In subpoenaing witnesses, the parties ultimately 
rely on the authority of the court to compel those summoned to 
appear.  Parties who release a witness from that duty do so at 
their peril.  The prosecutor’s action here, without consultation 
with the court, was distinctly ill-advised.   
 
When the prosecution moved for reconsideration of the 
court’s ruling, it alerted the court to Ferrer’s holding and 
represented that the People would be unable to proceed to trial 
if the challenged evidence was suppressed.  After reviewing 
Ferrer, the court vacated its prior orders, held a suppression 
hearing, and ultimately denied the suppression motion.  This 
decision reposed within the court’s sound discretion.  Defendant 
was out of custody, and the continuance was within the speedy 
trial timeframe.  There is no indication that she suffered any 
prejudice by the hearing’s delay.  The court also expressly found 
that the prosecutor had not sought the continuance in bad faith.  
The court said it had reviewed portions of the police report at 
the initial suppression hearing, and it was provided additional 
facts in the People’s opposition to the suppression motion.  From 
these materials, the court would have readily appreciated the 
centrality of defendant’s incriminating statements and the 
items collected by Officer Yasin.  The trial court repeated that it 
had not suppressed the officer’s observations, but then 
concluded the People were unable to proceed “because those 
were the — all of the facts that were available.”  This record is 
sufficient to show the trial court made an independent 
conclusion that the People could not proceed without the 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
30 
suppressed evidence.  Defendant has not established that the 
court abused its discretion by concluding that dismissal of the 
case was reasonably foreseeable should a continuance be 
denied.7 
 
In summary, reading the statutes together, the following 
legislative intent is evident.  Requests for continuances in 
criminal cases are to be justified by good cause following the 
procedures and showings required in section 1050.  Failure to 
follow the required procedures can be sanctioned under 
section 1050.5.  While the statutory requirements cannot be 
ignored without consequences, they are not intended to be so 
 
7  
In speculating that the trial court “may have” based its 
ruling on the prosecutor’s representation alone (conc. & dis. 
opn., post, at p. 13, fn. 3) and arguing reversal is necessary 
because “we simply cannot determine . . . whether the trial court 
understood or applied” Ferrer’s reasonable probability standard 
(id. at p. 11), the concurring and dissenting opinion loses sight 
of our standard of review.  The California Constitution prohibits 
a judgment from being set aside on appeal absent an error that 
“has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”  (Cal. Const., art. VI, 
§ 13.)  The separate opinion identifies no such error.  Nor can 
reversal be justified on the theory that our opinion announces a 
new legal standard (see conc. & dis. opn., post, at pp. 13–14).  We 
have merely affirmed and elaborated on the standard set forth 
in Ferrer.  That case, contrary to the separate opinion’s 
assertion, considered the totality of the circumstances and never 
suggested courts should abdicate their role and rely solely on 
prosecutors’ 
representations. 
 
(See 
Ferrer, 
supra, 
184 
Cal.App.4th at p. 883.)  Because the trial court applied a legal 
standard we have now approved, reversal of its decision would 
be appropriate only if the court had abused its discretion by 
acting arbitrarily or basing its decision on insufficient evidence.  
(See Beames, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 920–921.)  As the party 
opposing continuance, it is the defendant’s burden to show such 
an abuse of discretion.  (See id. at p. 920.)  She has not done so. 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
31 
rigidly applied as to require dismissal of the case.  Thus 
understood, the statutes empower the court to hold accountable 
those who fail to comply with them.  But they should not be 
applied so stringently that legitimate prosecutions cannot be 
pursued within statutory time frames and constitutional 
protections. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The Court of Appeal’s decision is reversed.  The trial 
court’s judgment, finding defendant guilty of the charge, is 
affirmed.  While this appeal was pending, the Legislature 
decriminalized the act of loitering for purposes of prostitution, 
the offense of which defendant was convicted.  (See Stats. 2022, 
ch. 86 (Sen. Bill No. 357), § 4, effective Jan. 1, 2023.)  In doing 
so, the Legislature provided a mechanism for those previously 
convicted of that offense to request resentencing or dismissal 
and sealing of their case, as applicable.  (See § 653.29.)  Nothing 
we say here prohibits defendant from seeking that relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J.
 
1 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
S271877 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Groban 
 
 
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Penal Code 
provisions governing continuances and dismissals (see, e.g., 
Pen. Code, §§ 1050; 1385)1 do not permit a trial court to deny a 
continuance of a suppression hearing “solely because good cause 
is lacking, when doing so will result in dismissal of the charges 
and the continuance can be granted without violating the 
defendant’s speedy trial rights.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1.)  I 
write separately for two reasons.   
First, I share the Court of Appeal’s concerns that the 
statutory procedures governing continuance requests of 
suppression hearings pose various practical complications for 
defendants and our trial courts.  (See People v. Brown (2021) 
69 Cal.App.5th 15, 31–32 (Brown); cf. maj. opn., ante, at p.  27.)  
Whether those complications warrant amendment of the 
controlling statutes, however, is ultimately a question for the 
Legislature to decide.   
Second, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that 
the record in this case demonstrates the prosecution and the 
trial court complied with the standards articulated in today’s 
opinion.  Because I am not persuaded the record supports such 
a finding, I dissent from that portion of the opinion and the 
disposition affirming Brown’s judgment of conviction.  I would 
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
2 
reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court 
with directions to conduct a hearing on whether the prosecution 
has satisfied (or can satisfy) its burden to show “the case cannot 
be tried absent the [challenged] evidence.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 27, italics omitted.) 
I. 
 
Although I find the language of Penal Code section 1050, 
and in particular subdivision (l), to be susceptible to more than 
one reading, I agree that the statutory scheme is most 
reasonably construed as requiring trial courts to grant a 
continuance of a suppression hearing if the prosecution shows 
“the challenged evidence is so critical that its suppression would 
require dismissal of the case.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1.) 
 
Nonetheless, I agree with the Court of Appeal that this 
“reasonable foreseeability standard” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 27) 
poses some “distinctive difficulties in application” (Brown, 
supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 31; see People v. Brown (Santa Clara 
App.Div., Aug. 20, 2020, No. 17AP002184) [nonpub. opn.], conc. 
opn. of Saban, J. [describing practical difficulties of requiring 
trial courts to determine whether dismissal is likely]; cf. maj. 
opn., ante, at p.  27).  It is unclear, for example, what type of 
evidentiary showing the prosecution must make to establish 
that denial of a continuance will result in dismissal.  Nor is it 
clear how a trial court should go about making an “independent 
determination of whether dismissal” will occur.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 28.)  Is the prosecution required to describe all of the 
admissible evidence that remains in the case and explain why 
that evidence is insufficient to continue?  Does the court have a 
duty to independently review the entire record to ensure the 
prosecution’s representations are accurate?  Should the court 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
3 
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the remaining 
strength of the prosecution’s case?  At a minimum, forcing the 
trial court to assess the state of the prosecution’s evidence, 
without having heard or seen that evidence, seems to place the 
court in a very difficult position.  
The “reasonable foreseeability” inquiry places defendants 
and their counsel in an even more difficult position.  The 
majority notes that the defense can challenge the prosecution’s 
assertion that denial of a continuance is likely to result in 
dismissal.  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 27.)  It seems highly 
unusual, however, to place defense counsel in the position of 
arguing in favor of the strength of the State’s case.  I agree  with 
the majority that the “burden of arguing the strength of the . . . 
case” ultimately resides with the prosecution, and not the 
defendant.  (Ibid.)  I also agree with the majority’s rejection of 
the Attorney General’s proposal that trial courts should simply 
rely on prosecutors’ representations as to their ability to 
proceed.  (Id. at p. 28.)  Even so, our decision today leaves 
defense counsel in a quandary.  Take the situation here:  Brown  
surely would have benefitted if the trial court had denied a 
continuance and forced the prosecution to proceed to trial 
without Officer Yasin’s challenged statements.  But to advocate 
for such a result, defense counsel would have had to argue that 
the prosecution’s remaining evidence against Brown was strong 
enough  to move forward with the case.  Does the possibility of 
having the continuance denied, and thus the challenged 
evidence suppressed, warrant arguing in favor of the strength of 
the State’s case?  Perhaps, but that is a tricky position for any 
defense lawyer to be in.   
Moreover, requiring our trial courts to grant continuance 
requests of suppression hearings that are unsupported by good 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
4 
cause diminishes their ability to manage their calendars.  As we 
have previously explained in interpreting section 1050, “one 
important element of a court’s inherent judicial authority . . . is 
‘the power . . . to control the disposition of the causes on its 
docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and 
for litigants.”  (People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1146.)  
Creating a rule that trial courts must grant continuances of 
suppression hearings, regardless of good cause, undoubtedly 
cuts against those interests.  This case is illustrative.  Without 
consulting the defense or the trial court, the prosecution 
instructed a subpoenaed police officer that he could skip the 
suppression hearing to conduct a routine witness interview in 
another matter.  As a result of such conduct, Brown, her defense 
counsel and the trial court were all required to expend time and 
resources to reschedule a hearing for which there was no good 
reason to delay.  One might fairly question whether that 
outcome is consistent with the purposes underlying subdivision 
(e)’s good cause requirement.  (See § 1050, subd. (a) [“the 
Legislature finds that . . . . [e]xcessive continuances contribute 
substantially to th[e] congestion [of criminal courts] and cause 
substantial hardship to victims and other witnesses”].)   
The complications described above take on added 
significance given that, at least in the context of felony cases, 
section 1538.5 substantially mitigates the consequences of the 
trial court’s grant of a suppression order.  If a suppression 
motion is granted in a felony case, the prosecutor is statutorily 
authorized to dismiss the case, refile, and relitigate the 
suppression ruling.  (See § 1538.5, subd. (j).)  Thus, when a court 
grants a suppression motion, the prosecution is left to determine 
whether the suppressed evidence is sufficiently important to go 
through the inconvenience of refiling the case and relitigating 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
5 
the motion.  One might wonder why that remedy — which places 
the onus on the prosecution rather than the courts to evaluate 
the importance of the evidence in question — is not equally 
appropriate when a prosecutor lacks good cause for being 
unprepared to participate in a suppression hearing.   
In 
the 
end, 
however, 
whether 
these 
practical 
complications warrant changing the statutory procedures that 
govern continuance requests of suppression hearings, or 
otherwise warrant giving our trial courts more discretionary 
authority to deny such requests when unsupported by good 
cause, are questions for the Legislature to decide.   
II. 
I agree that the reasonable foreseeability standard places 
the burden on the People to show the contested evidence “is so 
critical that its suppression would require dismissal of the case.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, p. 1; see id. at pp. 27–28.)  I also agree that trial 
courts cannot “simply rely on prosecutors’ representations as to 
their ability to proceed” (id. at p. 28), but rather must make 
their “own independent determination” (ibid.) whether the 
prosecution has shown “the case cannot be tried absent the 
evidence” (id. at p. 27, italics omitted).   
I do not agree, however, with the majority’s further finding 
that the record here shows the prosecution and the trial court 
actually complied with these requirements — requirements that 
are articulated for the first time in today’s opinion.  I would 
therefore reverse the judgment of guilt and remand the matter 
to allow the trial court to hold further hearings on whether the 
prosecution can proceed without the suppressed evidence. 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
6 
A. Factual summary  
Prior to trial, Brown filed a motion to suppress evidence 
that had been gathered by Officer Yasin during an allegedly 
unlawful detention.  (See § 1538.5.)  On the day of the 
suppression hearing, the People requested a continuance.  The 
prosecutor explained that he had told Yasin, who was then 
under subpoena, that he could skip the hearing to conduct a 
witness interview in another case.  The prosecutor described 
Yasin as the People’s only witness, but provided no description 
of what Yasin would testify to or the nature of the evidence at 
issue in the suppression hearing.2   
The court concluded the prosecution had failed to establish 
good cause and then granted the motion to suppress due to 
Yasin’s absence.  The court clarified it was excluding all 
statements Brown had made to Yasin during the allegedly 
unlawful stop but was not excluding any of Yasin’s observations 
of Brown.  Defense counsel argued that the case should be 
dismissed in light of the suppression ruling.  The prosecutor, 
however, requested time to evaluate whether to proceed, 
explaining that he believed the State might be able to continue 
with the case because “a lot of the evidence in this case was 
evidence obtained by . . . observation from the police officer 
 
2  
The majority asserts that the prosecution told the court 
that “the challenged evidence was critical to the People’s case.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 3.)  However, the hearing transcript shows 
the prosecution  merely asserted that Yasin was the State’s only 
witness; it did not make any representations about the 
importance of the evidence at issue in the suppression hearing.  
Indeed, as discussed below, later in the same hearing, the 
prosecutor clarified that he believed much of the evidence Yasin 
had gathered came in the form of observations that were not at 
issue in the suppression motion. 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
7 
before any contact with the defendant.”  The court then set the 
matter for trial. 
Two weeks later, the People filed a motion for 
reconsideration arguing that the court was required to grant a 
continuance under People v. Ferrer (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 873 
(Ferrer).  The motion and accompanying memorandum of points 
and authorities contained an extensive discussion of Ferrer but 
did not include any discussion of the evidence against Brown or 
otherwise explain why the prosecution could not continue 
without the suppressed evidence.  At the hearing on the motion, 
the prosecution asserted that it intended to dismiss if the 
suppression order was left in place but again presented no 
argument regarding the state of the remaining evidence.  The 
prosecution did not mention its earlier claim that much of the 
evidence against Brown consisted of “observation[s] from the 
police” that were not subject to suppression, nor did it explain 
why the State’s evaluation of the case had apparently changed.  
The court concluded that Ferrer required it to grant the 
continuance, explaining that the People had stated “they were 
unable to go forward.”  The court withdrew its prior orders, 
rescheduled the suppression hearing, and ultimately denied the 
suppression motion.  Brown was later found guilty.   
 
On appeal, Brown argued that even if Ferrer, supra, 
184 Cal.App.4th 873, was correctly decided, the prosecution had 
failed to satisfy the “reasonable foreseeability” standard because 
it had presented no argument that the remaining evidence was 
insufficient to move forward with the case.  The Attorney 
General’s answer brief did not respond to that argument.  
Instead, the Attorney General argued that the appropriate 
inquiry under Ferrer “is not whether it is reasonably foreseeable 
that the case will still be strong enough to prosecute without the 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
8 
suppressed evidence,” but rather “whether it is reasonably 
foreseeable that the district attorney’s office, in its discretion, 
will express an inability to proceed or prove the case beyond a 
reasonable doubt once the evidence is suppressed.”  The People 
further contended that applying that standard here, the trial 
court had properly granted a continuance because it had been 
“advised [by the prosecution] that the case would be dismissed 
absent the suppressed evidence.”  Because the Court of Appeal 
ultimately rejected Ferrer’s conclusion that a trial court must 
grant a continuance of a suppression hearing when it is 
reasonably foreseeable that denying such a request will result 
in dismissal, the court did not address what showing the 
prosecution must make under the reasonable foreseeability 
standard or whether the prosecution had in fact made such a 
showing. 
In its briefing before this court, the Attorney General has 
again declined to evaluate the state of the remaining evidence 
against Brown.  While acknowledging that Ferrer does “not 
provide any specific guidance for determining when a denial of 
a continuance may result in a dismissal,” the Attorney General 
instead reiterates that the People believe the appropriate  “test 
. . . is whether . . . the prosecutor expresses an inability to 
proceed to trial.  If so, the continuance must be granted.”  
Indeed, the Attorney General goes so far as to argue that “[t]he 
prosecutor’s assessment of the case without the challenged 
evidence must necessarily be the determinative factor in 
deciding whether denial of the continuance will lead to 
dismissal,” and that it would be improper for “a court or 
magistrate to conduct an ‘independent review’ of the evidence.”  
While the majority rejects the Attorney General’s proposed 
approach (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 28), it nonetheless concludes 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
9 
that the record here shows the continuance was properly 
granted in accord with the procedures that we have articulated 
in today’s opinion.    
B. Analysis   
On this record, I am not persuaded we can conclude that 
the prosecution satisfied its burden to show “the case cannot be 
tried absent the [suppressed] evidence.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 27, italics omitted.)  Nor do I believe we  can assess whether 
the trial court did “not simply rely on prosecutors’ 
representations as to their ability to proceed” (id. at p. 28), but 
rather made an “independent determination” (ibid.) that 
dismissal would be required.   
The fact that the record provides no indication that the 
prosecutor or the trial court complied with these requirements 
is not particularly surprising given that, before today, it was 
unclear what standards courts should apply when evaluating a 
continuance request of a suppression hearing that is 
unsupported by good cause.  There is nothing in Ferrer, supra, 
184 Cal.App.4th 873, signifying that the prosecution has the 
burden to show the “challenged evidence is so critical that its 
suppression would require dismissal of the case” (maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 1) or that trial courts must “make their own 
independent determination of whether dismissal of the case is 
reasonably foreseeable” (id. at p. 28).  Indeed, the Attorney 
General has consistently argued that under Ferrer, a trial court 
can (and indeed should) rely solely on the prosecution’s 
representation regarding dismissal and not make any 
independent determination of that question — a proposition 
that the majority correctly rejects. 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
10 
Nor do I find anything in the record that suggests the trial 
court intuited the standards we have articulated in our opinion 
today.  As noted, the court provided no indication that it had 
independently evaluated the state of the evidence or that it 
believed the prosecution had a burden to show the case could not 
proceed without the disputed evidence.  Nor did the court make 
any inquiry regarding the People’s prior representation that “a 
lot of evidence” in the case consisted of “observations from the 
police officer before any contact with the defendant.”  The fact 
that the court made no inquiry about the remaining evidence, 
and instead seems to have relied on the prosecution’s assertion 
that it would dismiss, suggests it may well have wrongly 
interpreted Ferrer’s standard in accordance with the Attorney 
General’s position.  
And it appears beyond dispute that the prosecution did not 
believe it had any burden to show the suppressed evidence was 
“so critical that its suppression would require dismissal of the 
case.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1.)  Instead, the State has 
consistently 
taken 
the 
position 
that 
the 
prosecution’s 
representation to the court that it would dismiss was, in itself, 
sufficient to require a continuance.  (See ante, at pp. 7–8.)  
Indeed, I find it noteworthy that despite multiple opportunities 
to do so, neither the prosecution nor the Attorney General has 
ever argued that the case would not merely “be more difficult to 
prove” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 27) without the suppressed 
evidence, but rather would require dismissal.  
The majority, however, appears to conclude that various 
items in the record demonstrate the trial court did make an 
independent determination that the case could not proceed 
without the suppressed evidence.  First, the majority surmises 
that the court “would have readily appreciated the centrality of 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
11 
defendant’s incriminating statements” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 29) 
based on the police report and the factual summary set forth in 
the People’s opposition to the original suppression motion, both 
of which were provided to the court before the prosecution had 
ever requested a continuance.  Those materials, however,  
merely contain a brief description of the events that preceded 
Yasin’s stop of Brown.  The prosecution never represented to the 
court, nor was it ever asked, whether the summary contained in 
either document represented a full description of the evidence 
against Brown.  Indeed, at the time those materials were 
presented to the court, the prosecutor argued against dismissal, 
contending that “a lot” of the evidence against Brown was not 
subject to the suppression order.  (See ante, at p. 6.)   
But even if these materials  could be said to support a trial 
court’s “independent determination” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 28) 
that the denial of a continuance would result in dismissal, they 
do nothing to show the trial court actually made such an 
independent determination here or otherwise understood that it 
was required to do so.  To be clear, the relevant problem as I 
view it is not that the record contains insufficient evidence to 
support a finding that the denial of a continuance would result 
in dismissal.  Rather, the problem is that on this record we 
simply cannot determine (and indeed have reason to doubt) 
whether the trial court understood or applied the standards we 
have articulated for the first time in today’s opinion.  The 
materials submitted at the initial suppression hearing do 
nothing to rectify that problem. 
The majority next asserts that during the hearing on the 
prosecution’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court stated 
that it did not believe the People could proceed with the case 
because the suppressed statements were “ ‘all of the facts that 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
12 
were available.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 29.)  Contrary to the 
majority’s characterization, however, the record shows the trial 
court did not state that it had found the suppressed statements 
made up all the facts of the case.  Rather, the record makes clear 
that the court was referring to statements defense counsel made 
at the initial hearing on the motion to suppress.  The full 
statement at issue made by the court is:  “The Defense at the 
time conceded, uh, as much because those were the — all the 
facts that were available.”  (Italics added.)   
The discussion from the initial suppression hearing  (that 
the court is referring to above) is illuminating.  It shows that 
after the court had denied a continuance and granted the motion 
to suppress, the court had an exchange with the parties about 
how to proceed.  During that exchange, the court explained that 
it intended to dismiss unless the prosecution believed there was 
“other evidence” in the case that would allow it “to proceed.”  
Defense counsel argued dismissal would be appropriate because 
Yasin’s 
suppressed 
statements 
comprised 
“essentially 
. . .everything” in the case and there was no longer sufficient 
evidence to prove the charges.  Crucially, the trial court noted in 
response that defense counsel’s evaluation of the remaining 
evidence was “not necessarily” accurate.  The prosecution then 
expressly disagreed with the defense, contending that the 
People might be able to proceed because “a lot of the evidence” 
against Brown was comprised of observations that were not 
subject to the suppression order.  The trial court, apparently 
having accepted the prosecution’s representations, declined to 
dismiss the case and set the matter for trial.  
On this record, I cannot conclude that the trial court 
understood the prosecution had a burden to show the People 
could not proceed without the suppressed evidence or that the 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
13 
court made an independent determination that the case would 
have to be dismissed.  In my view, the trial court’s reference to 
statements and arguments defense counsel made during the 
original suppression hearing, which was held before any party 
had even brought Ferrer to the court’s attention, does not show 
that the court evaluated the prosecution’s continuance request 
under the standards we have articulated today.   
Indeed, the only thing that appears to have changed 
between the suppression hearing and the hearing on the motion 
for reconsideration was the prosecution’s representations about 
whether the case could continue:  When faced with dismissal at 
the first hearing, the prosecution argued that it might be able to 
continue, but after identifying the Ferrer holding (which 
requires the court to grant a continuance if dismissal would 
otherwise result) the prosecution asserted that it could not 
proceed without the suppressed evidence.  As noted, the trial 
court granted the continuance without ever asking the 
prosecution why its evaluation of the case had changed or 
otherwise inquiring about the state of the remaining evidence.  
In my view, the court’s actions suggest that rather than making 
any independent determination of the issue, it may have 
granted the continuance based solely on the prosecution’s 
representation that it would dismiss.3 
 
3  
While noting that a presumption of correctness generally 
applies to judgments on appeal, the majority appears to agree 
that remand is appropriate when a reviewing court has 
announced a new legal standard.  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 30, 
fn. 7.)  The majority insists, however, that today’s opinion does 
nothing more than “approve” (ibid.) standards that were already 
articulated in Ferrer, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th 873.  This 
conclusion is at odds with the parties’ reading of that opinion.  
 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
14 
Because I understand our decision today to clarify the 
legal standards that govern continuance requests in the context 
of suppression hearings, and because I do not believe we can 
discern from this record whether the trial court applied those 
standards here — indeed, if anything the record suggests it did 
not — I would reverse the judgment of guilt and remand the 
matter to the trial court with directions to hold a hearing as to 
whether the prosecution can satisfy its “burden . . . to show an 
inability to go forward without the evidence in dispute.”4  (Maj. 
 
The Attorney General explains that Ferrer does “not provide any 
specific guidance for determining when a denial of a continuance 
may result in a dismissal,” while Brown’s briefing before the 
Court of Appeal notes that the decision raises “fundamental 
uncertainties” regarding how trial courts should decide that 
question.  I agree with the parties.   
Although the majority adopts the same “reasonably 
foreseeable” parlance as Ferrer, I find nothing in Ferrer 
directing that the prosecution has an initial burden to show the 
case “cannot be tried” (maj. opn., ante, at p.  27, italics omitted) 
without the challenged evidence.  Nor does Ferrer direct trial 
courts that they must make an independent assessment of the 
prosecution’s representations about its ability to proceed.  
Although the majority characterizes these requirements as 
mere “elaborat[ions]” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 30, fn. 7) on what 
was already said in Ferrer, I view them as addressing an issue 
Ferrer simply did not reach:  What standards should trial courts 
apply in assessing whether it is reasonably foreseeable that 
denial of a continuance will result in dismissal?   
4  
As the majority notes, while this appeal was pending, “the 
Legislature decriminalized the act of loitering for purposes of 
prostitution, the offense of which defendant was convicted.  (See 
Stats. 2022, ch. 86 (Sen. Bill No. 357), § 4, effective Jan. 1, 
2023.)”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 31.)  Were we to reverse the 
judgment and remand, I would direct the trial court to consider 
whether this intervening legislation requires the People to 
 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
15 
opn., at p. 1; see People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 609, 
overruled by People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478 on another 
ground [where opinion clarified uncertainty in the law, 
reviewing court would not “presume[] that the trial court 
applied the correct standard in those cases in which the record 
is silent in this regard”]; Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 
Cal.4th 798, 824 [“proper course” is to remand for application of 
“new” standard “to the facts of this case”].)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
LIU, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
dismiss this case.  Under the majority’s approach, however, 
Brown’s judgment of conviction has now been affirmed, meaning 
that she must file a petition or application in the trial court 
(which will presumably require the assistance of counsel) 
requesting dismissal of her conviction.  (See § 653.29, subds. (a), 
(b).) 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Brown 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 69 Cal.App.5th 15 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S271877 
Date Filed:  March 27, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Santa Clara 
Judge:  Jesus Valencia, Jr. 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
William M. Robinson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant 
Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit and Bridget Billeter, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
William M. Robinson 
Attorney at Law 
95 South Market Street, Suite 570 
San Jose, CA 95113 
(408) 241-6171 
 
Bridget Billeter 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 510-3763