Title: People v. Miller
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 91241
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: May 23, 2002

Docket No. 91241-Agenda 16-November 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
JASON SETH MILLER, Appellant.
	Defendant, Jason Seth Miller, pleaded guilty to the charge of
aggravated criminal sexual abuse. 720 ILCS 5/12-16(d) (West
1996). He was sentenced to two years' probation on June 6, 1997.
Defendant's probation was revoked on March 29, 1999, after he
admitted allegations contained in the State's petition to revoke his
probation; the trial court resentenced him to an additional two
years' probation. On September 7, 1999, the State filed a second
petition to revoke defendant's probation. The petition alleged: (1)
defendant failed to keep appointments with the probation office;
(2) defendant failed to obtain an alcohol evaluation; and (3)
defendant failed to complete a court-ordered treatment program. 
	At the probation revocation hearing, over the objection of
defendant's attorney the State called defendant as an adverse
witness. The State called no other witnesses. Following
defendant's testimony, the trial court revoked the order of
probation and sentenced defendant to a term of five years'
imprisonment. The trial court denied defendant's motion to
reconsider the sentence. The appellate court affirmed the judgment
of the trial court. No. 4-00-0020 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted defendant's petition for
leave to appeal (see 177 Ill. 2d R. 315).
	On appeal to this court, defendant argues that the State
violated his right against self-incrimination, pursuant to article I,
section 10, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
§10), by calling him as an adverse witness to testify against
himself. Further, defendant argues that the prosecutor at
defendant's motion to reconsider his sentence labored under a per
se conflict of interest.
	We reject defendant's first claim of error for the reasons set
forth in People v. Lindsey, No. 91381 (May 23, 2002). It is clear
from the record that defendant did not face a realistic threat that
his answers at the probation revocation hearing would incriminate
him in any further proceedings. Therefore, defendant's testimony
at the probation revocation hearing did not violate defendant's
privilege against self incrimination, pursuant to article I, section
10.
	Defendant next argues that the prosecutor, at defendant's
motion to reconsider the sentence following the probation
revocation hearing, labored under a per se conflict of interest. We
review this issue de novo. People v. Carlson, 185 Ill. 2d 546, 551
(1999).
	In the present case, Gayle Garner represented defendant as an
assistant public defender at the beginning of the case. She
represented defendant at the waiver of the preliminary hearing.
Further, she filed a discovery motion, a discovery answer, and a
bond-reduction motion on defendant's behalf. Throughout the
remaining proceedings, defendant was represented by a different
assistant public defender. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to probation. The probation was
later revoked and defendant was sentenced to a term of five years'
imprisonment. At the hearing on the motion to reconsider the
sentence, Garner appeared as an assistant State's Attorney and
argued that defendant willfully disregarded the trial court's order
and that the sentence was proper. The trial court denied
defendant's motion.
	An attorney cannot represent conflicting interests or undertake
to discharge inconsistent duties. People v. Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d 187,
209 (1994); People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1, 13-17 (1988);
People v. Washington, 101 Ill. 2d 104, 110 (1984); People v.
Kester, 66 Ill. 2d 162, 166-67 (1977); People v. Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d 109, 112-13 (1968). A defendant who fails to raise a conflict of
interest issue in the trial court cannot succeed on appeal unless he
demonstrates that he was actually prejudiced. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 
at 17. An exception exists in the case of a per se conflict of
interest. When a per se conflict exists, prejudice is presumed;
defendant is not required to demonstrate that the conflict
contributed to the conviction. Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d  at 210, 218.
	A per se conflict of interest arises where "certain facts about
the defense counsel's status, by themselves, *** engender a
disabling conflict." (Emphasis added.) Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d  at 211;
Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d  at 113 ("the mere existence of the conflict is
sufficient to constitute a violation"). Often this conflict is the
attorney's previous or contemporaneous association with either the
victim, the prosecution, or an entity assisting the prosecution.
Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d  at 211. For example, in Kester, 66 Ill. 2d  at
167, the defendant was represented by appointed defense counsel
who previously appeared in the same case as the prosecuting
assistant State's Attorney. We held that a potential conflict was
present and applied the per se conflict of interest rule, holding that
it was unnecessary for the defendant to show actual prejudice.
Kester, 66 Ill. 2d  at 167 (there was the "possibility that the
attorney might be subject to subtle influences which could be
viewed as adversely affecting his ability to defend his client in an
independent and vigorous manner"); see also Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d 
at 218 (holding that defendant was entitled to reversal where
defendant's court-appointed defense counsel also previously
served in the same criminal proceeding as the assistant State's
Attorney); Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d  at 113 (despite any apparent lack of
diligence on the part of the defense counsel, sound policy
disfavored the representation because the defendant's second
court-appointed counsel previously represented the store that the
defendant allegedly burglarized).
	In the instant matter, the court-appointed attorney who
represented defendant as defense counsel later acted as the
prosecutor in the same criminal case. We find that such
representation creates a per se conflict of interest. We realize that
due to the high volume of cases circulating through both the public
defender's office and the State's Attorney's office, Garner may not
have realized that she had previously represented defendant.
Further, it is apparent that neither Garner nor her supervisors
recognized the possible conflict. Nonetheless, it is clear from the
record that Garner was personally involved as both defense
counsel and as the prosecutor. As defense counsel at the
preliminary hearing, she announced defendant's intention to assert
a variety of defenses. She further conferred with defendant, filed
a motion for reduction of bail and filed discovery on behalf of
defendant. As the prosecutor, however, she argued that defendant
had willfully disregarded the trial court's probation order. Even
though her initial role as the assistant public defender involved
routine motions and her role as the prosecutor occurred at the tail
end of the case, her involvement, nevertheless, spanned the entire
criminal proceeding. We find that under the circumstances here,
a conflict of interest existed and that fairness dictates application
of the per se conflict of interest rule. See Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d  at
218; Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d  at 113; Kester, 66 Ill. 2d  at 167-68.
	For the foregoing reasons, we hold that defendant's testimony
at the probation revocation proceeding did not implicate the
privilege against self-incrimination contained in article I, section
10, of the Illinois Constitution. However, because a per se conflict
of interest exists, we remand the matter for rehearing on
defendant's motion to reconsider the sentence. Accordingly, we
affirm in part and reverse in part the judgments of the appellate
and circuit courts and remand this matter to the circuit court for
rehearing on defendant's motion to reconsider the sentence.
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part;
circuit court judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part; 
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE GARMAN took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	I join in the result reached by the plurality because the State
did not charge defendant with indirect criminal contempt and the
circuit court did not impose any punishment for contempt upon
defendant. I do so with the understanding that where the State calls
a defendant as an adverse witness at a probation revocation
hearing, the defendant's answers may not be used to support a
finding of criminal contempt. 
	At least two Illinois courts have held that sentencing for
contempt of court is a proper sanction for a violation of probation.
See People v. Gallinger, 191 Ill. App. 3d 488, 490 (1989) ("The
contempt power of the circuit court is a proper sanction for a
violation of probation"); People v. Patrick, 83 Ill. App. 3d 951,
954 (1980) ("Because of the court's inherent contempt power and
because the comments of the group drafting the Unified Code of
Corrections indicate that the format of the Code was adopted with
a recognition of the existence of that inherent power as one added
sanction, we deem the court to have possessed power to punish for
contempt in this case"); see also People v. Colclasure, 48 Ill. App.
3d 988, 991 (1977) ("Because of the statutory history of use of the
contempt sanction for probation violations, the similarity between
sentences of probation and periodic imprisonment and analogy to
the common law treatment of sanctioning willful violations of
other court orders by contempt, we conclude that a trial court is
empowered to punish a willful violation of a condition of periodic
imprisonment by holding the violator in indirect criminal
contempt"). Further, as noted in the council commentary to the
probation revocation statute (730 ILCS Ann. 5/5-6-4, Council
Commentary, at 95 (Smith-Hurd 1997)), "the court retains the
sanctions of criminal contempt and fining the offender for
violating the conditions of probation." Because a defendant may
be sanctioned for criminal contempt for a violation of the
conditions of probation, it is imperative that the defendant's
answers at the probation revocation hearing not be used to support
a finding of contempt. Neither may the State use the fruits of the
defendant's testimony against him in a proceeding for contempt.
See McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990 (Alaska 1980) (where the
court used its inherent supervisory powers to exclude the parolee's
testimony as well as the fruits of the parolee's revocation hearing
for purposes of the parolee's subsequent criminal trial). A
defendant may not be required to choose between answering the
State's questions, thus supplying the foundation for a finding of
contempt, and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining
silent. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 79 L. Ed. 2d 409,
104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984). However, "a State may validly insist on
answers to even incriminating questions and hence sensibly
administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes that the
required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding and
thus eliminates the threat of incrimination." Murphy, 465 U.S.  at
435 n.7, 79 L. Ed. 2d  at 425 n.7, 104 S. Ct.  at 1146 n.7.
	I agree that the prosecutor who appeared on defendant's
motion for reconsideration of his new sentence labored under a per
se conflict of interest. I would further hold, however, that the
probation revocation proceedings preceding the resentencing were
constitutionally infirm.
	Probation is a criminal sentence authorized under the Unified
Code of Corrections (see 730 ILCS 5/5-6-1 (West 2000)) where
a defendant has been adjudicated guilty of committing a criminal
offense in violation of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS
5/1-1 et seq. (West 2000)). It is an appropriate disposition for all
felonies and misdemeanors, with certain statutorily defined
exceptions. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 (2000).
	Compliance with the terms of probation is supervised by
probation officers (730 ILCS 110/12 (West 2000)), who are
judicial employees (730 ILCS 110/9b(3) (West 2000)) and are
considered peace officers under Illinois law (730 ILCS 110/15(12)
(West 2000)). If a defendant violates the terms of his probation,
the violation is dealt with in accordance with section 5-6-4 of the
Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-6-4 (West 2000)).
Under that statute, the defendant may be subject to arrest,
revocation of probation and resentencing to any other sentence that
was available under the Unified Code of Corrections at the time of
his original sentencing.
	Because probation is a criminal sentence the violation of
which may lead to imposition of another criminal sentence
following proceedings under the Unified Code of Corrections, I do
not share the view adopted in People v. Lindsey, No. 91381, slip
op. at 6 (May 23, 2002) that probation revocation proceedings are
civil in nature. Rather, I would follow the authority which holds
that such proceedings are part of a "criminal case" within the
meaning of article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §10). See People v. McNairy, 309 Ill. App.
3d 220, 222-23 (1999).
	Under article I, section 10, "[n]o person shall be compelled in
a criminal case to give evidence against himself ***." Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, §10. The circuit court violated that prohibition here
when it required defendant to testify, over the objection of his
attorney, at his probation revocation hearing. To the extent that
decisions by our appellate court have taken a contrary view, they
should be overruled.
	Because defendant's privilege against self-incrimination was
violated, we should reverse the order of the circuit court which
revoked defendant's probation and resentenced him and remand
for a new probation revocation hearing. We should further hold
that the circuit court may not require defendant to take the witness
stand at the new hearing and that it is prohibited from making any
presumptions based on the absence of testimony by him. See 725
ILCS 5/115-16 (West 2000) (in a criminal case or proceeding, a
defendant's "neglect to testify shall not create a presumption
against [him]").
	For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.