Title: Sherman v. Town of Randolph
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11711
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 24, 2015

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11711 
 
SCOTT SHERMAN  vs.  TOWN OF RANDOLPH & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 5, 2015. - September 24, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Civil Service, Decision of Civil Service Commission, Eligibility 
list, Findings by commission, Judicial review, Police, 
Promotion.  Police, Promotional examination.  
Administrative Law, Decision, Findings, Judicial review.  
Practice, Civil, Review respecting civil service. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
May 18, 2012. 
 
 
The case was heard by Heidi E. Brieger, J., on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, and a motion for reconsideration was 
considered by her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Frank J. McGee for the plaintiff. 
 
Bryan F. Bertram, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
personnel administrator of the human resources division of the 
Commonwealth. 
                     
1 Civil Service Commission (commission) and the personnel 
administrator of the human resources division of the 
Commonwealth (administrator). 
 
 
2 
 
John Foskett for town of Randolph. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The town of Randolph (town) decided to bypass 
the plaintiff, Scott Sherman, and appoint three candidates with 
lower scores on the police sergeant's examination to its three 
open police sergeant positions.  Sherman appealed, and, after an 
evidentiary hearing, a Division of Administrative Law Appeals 
(DALA) magistrate recommended that Sherman's appeal be 
dismissed.  The Civil Service Commission (commission) adopted 
the magistrate's findings and recommendation, and dismissed the 
appeal, concluding that there was "independent and reasonable 
justification" to bypass Sherman, although noting serious flaws 
in the town's interview process.  Sherman sought review of the 
commission's decision in the Superior Court.  A Superior Court 
judge denied Sherman's motion for judgment on the pleadings and 
his motion for reconsideration, and judgment entered for the 
commission.  Sherman appealed, and we allowed his petition for 
direct appellate review. 
Sherman argues that his bypass was impermissible because 
the personnel administrator of the Commonwealth (administrator)2 
improperly delegated to the appointing authority its duty under 
                     
2 The administrator is the personnel administrator of the 
human resources division (HRD) of the Commonwealth, within the 
Executive Office for Administration and Finance.  See G. L. 
c. 31, § 1.  In this context, the terms administrator and HRD 
are largely interchangeable. 
 
 
 
3 
G. L. c. 31, § 27, to "receive" statements of reasons for 
bypasses.  He argues also that the town's decision to bypass him 
in favor of candidates with lower scores on the civil service 
examination was not supported by a reasonable justification 
because the commission determined that the town's interview 
process was "fatally flawed."  In Malloch v. Hanover, 472 
Mass.     (2015), we determined that the administrator 
permissibly may delegate to an appointing authority its duty 
under G. L. c. 31, § 27, in light of the broad authority to 
delegate provided by G. L. c. 31, § 5 (l).  Sherman's contention 
that the administrator could not delegate its authority to the 
town thus is unavailing.  We address Sherman's alternative 
argument that the town's bypass was not supported by reasonable 
justification.  We agree that the town's procedure for selecting 
candidates was seriously flawed.  With this in mind, we have 
conducted an extensive review of the record to determine whether 
the flawed procedure indicated that the town's bypass was 
motivated by reasons incompatible with "basic merit principles."  
See G. L. c. 31, § 1 (defining term).  We conclude that, in this 
case, the record did not support the concern that the flawed 
procedure reflected a departure from basic merit principles, and 
that there is substantial evidence to support a reasonable 
justification for the town's bypass.  Therefore, we affirm the 
 
 
4 
Superior Court's denial of Sherman's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. 
Background.  1.  Civil service statute.  Police officer 
positions within the Commonwealth are subject to civil service 
law, both for initial appointments and for promotions.  See 
G. L. c. 31, § 58.  See generally Note, The Massachusetts Civil 
Service Law:  Is It Necessary to Destroy the Current System in 
Order to Save It?, 40 New Eng. L. Rev. 1103, 1106 (2006).  
Applicants for a civil service position must take an objective 
examination developed by the human resources division (HRD), 
specifically designed for that particular type of position.  See 
G. L. c. 31, § 16.  The goal of the examination requirement is 
to ensure that employees are appointed or promoted on the basis 
of their abilities, knowledge, and skills -- in other words, on 
the basis of merit -- and are not selected arbitrarily or for 
improper reasons, such as political or personal connections.  
See G. L. c. 31, § 1. 
To achieve this goal, when an appointing authority notifies 
HRD of an open position, HRD certifies a list of eligible 
candidates for the position, and ranks the names on the list in 
order of the scores the candidates received on the relevant HRD 
examination, with the inclusion of veterans' preferences.  See 
G. L. c. 31, §§ 25-26.  Candidates at the top of the list, 
however, may be bypassed if the appointing authority chooses a 
 
 
5 
candidate lower on the eligibility list based on reasonable 
justification.  See G. L. c. 31, § 27.  If an appointing 
authority bypasses a higher-ranked candidate, it must submit to 
the administrator a written statement of the reasons for the 
bypass, and the appointment "shall be effective only when such 
statement of reasons has been received by the administrator."  
Id.  The administrator, however, may permissibly delegate to an 
appointing authority its duty to receive the appointing 
authority's statement of reasons.  See Malloch, 472 Mass. at   .  
Candidates may challenge an appointing authority's decision to 
bypass them by appeal to the commission.  See G. L. c. 31, § 2 
(c). 
2.  Facts.  The commission adopted all of the DALA 
magistrate's findings of fact.  We recite the facts as found by 
the magistrate, supplemented with facts that have a substantial 
basis in the record and are consistent with the magistrate's 
findings.  We reserve some facts for later discussion of 
specific issues. 
In June, 2010, the town decided to appoint three permanent, 
full-time police sergeants and to promote them from within the 
Randolph police department (department).  HRD had certified nine 
candidates for the position of police sergeant in April, 2010, 
based on a previously administered promotional examination.  
Four of those candidates are relevant here:  Sherman, who was 
 
 
6 
ranked highest on the eligibility list, and the three candidates 
who ultimately bypassed him, whom we shall call Walter Burton, 
Blair Lewis, and Martin Duval.3  The candidates had the following 
certification scores:  Sherman (91), Burton (90), Lewis (82), 
and Duval (81).  On June 17, 2010, the town notified the nine 
candidates of their certification, asking them to indicate 
whether they would accept a promotion.  Sherman, Burton, Lewis, 
and Duval agreed to accept, and each was informed that he would 
be interviewed on June 25, 2010. 
The department's outgoing chief of police, Paul Porter, 
established an interview panel to evaluate the candidates.  The 
panel consisted of Porter, Sergeant William Pace (Porter's 
successor, who became chief of police when Porter retired on 
July 2, 2010 one week after the interview), Lieutenant John 
Hamelburg, and Officer Jeff Chaplin.  The panel interviewed the 
nine candidates on June 25, 2010, each for approximately thirty 
minutes.  Each candidate was allowed a brief opening statement 
and a closing statement.  The panel asked each candidate the 
same eight questions.4  The panelists were directed to score 
                     
3 Scott C. Sherman was a "police officer/school resource 
officer" assigned to the detective division of the Randolph 
police department (department); the officers whom we call Walter 
Burton and Blair Lewis were patrol officers, and an officer whom 
we call Martin Duval was a safety officer. 
 
4 The eight questions were the following: 
 
 
 
7 
candidates "on the totality of their interview performance," on 
a scale of zero to five, with five being the highest.  Each 
panelist was allotted fifteen points and, as the magistrate 
found, was supposed to assign a five to the top candidate, 
a four to the second-ranked candidate, and so forth, with the 
fifth-ranked candidate being assigned a one, and the four 
                                                                  
"1.  What personality traits and work ethic would you model 
for your subordinates?  Which trait/ethics are most important 
and why? 
 
"2.  You are the newly appointed sergeant of the Any Town 
Department.  The chief would like to see an effort to increase 
courtesy and civility in an attempt to reduce citizen complaints 
and increase satisfaction with the police department.  How would 
you as sergeant further this objective? 
 
"3.  If you witnessed an officer using excessive force how 
would you handle it? 
 
"4.  Tell me about a situation where you displayed an 
ability to lead. 
 
"5.  How would you apply the community policing model and 
philosophy to Randolph, taking into account the demographics of 
the town and the concepts of multicultural law enforcement and 
the 2004 Northeastern report regarding the Randolph Police bias-
based policing, traffic stop data collection[?]  As a set, how 
would you address these issues? 
 
"6.  Do you envision yourself as a leader or supervisor[?]  
Elaborate. 
 
"7.  Integrity is doing the right thing when no one else is 
watching.  How would you handle an officer's transgression that 
could be dealt with at your level? 
 
"8.  There is a saying which goes, if you tell the truth, 
it becomes part of your past; if you lie, then it becomes part 
of your future.  How would you handle an officer that lies to 
you?" 
 
 
 
8 
bottom-ranked candidates to receive zeroes.5  After all the 
candidates had been interviewed, the panelists voted by a show 
of hands for each candidate.  Because the panel's scores were 
not written down, the magistrate reconstructed the scores based 
on testimony at the hearing.  The final scores were:  Lewis 
(19), Burton (14), Duval (13), and Sherman (4).6 
Following the interviews, both Porter and Pace spoke with 
Lieutenant Detective Arthur Sullivan, the commanding officer of 
the detectives (who supervised Sherman's supervisors), and 
learned that Sherman "had difficulty following through on cases" 
and "needed supervision."  Sherman's supervisor on the day 
shift, Detective Sergeant David Avery, told Sullivan that 
Sherman had had "some issues with timely reports being done, 
timely charges being taken out on individuals and/or arrests 
being produced in a timely manner."  While Sherman had addressed 
those issues, he had ongoing issues with incomplete "log items."  
Sherman's supervisor on the night shift, Detective Sergeant 
Anthony Marag, reported that Sherman had difficulty following 
                     
5 This was the scoring method as described by the 
magistrate.  There was conflicting testimony about the scoring 
system actually used, with the former Chief, Paul Porter, 
providing several conflicting descriptions of how the candidates 
were scored. 
 
6 One of the other five certified candidates received a 
final score higher than Sherman's but below Duval's; the other 
four candidates scored lower than Sherman. 
 
 
 
9 
through on cases,7  and, three or four times, had had to be 
reminded about "taking those extra steps in an investigation."8 
Porter, with input from Pace, concluded that Burton, Lewis, 
and Duval should be promoted, basing this conclusion on the 
panel's interview scores; the candidates' conformance to 
Porter's "personal and informal list of [ten] to [fifteen] 
factors" concerning "community involvement and professionalism";9 
and the candidates' past job performance "as reported by 
commanding officers or supervisors."10  Porter discussed this 
                     
7 Lieutenant Detective Arthur Sullivan explained that the 
follow up "could be anything from an arrest report to an 
investigative report . . . where they're not completed." 
 
8 Detective Sergeant David Avery specifically testified that 
Sherman had been responsible for a case that had "time lapsed," 
and that Sherman had ongoing difficulties with "incomplete log 
items" in his roll call logs.  Detective Sergeant Anthony Marag 
testified that he had had to speak to Sherman three or four 
times about additional steps that needed to be taken in an 
investigation, and that, although Sherman improved immediately 
afterwards, the improvement was not sustained.  Porter was 
familiar with one week where Sherman was "in the office . . . 
almost every day . . . getting caught up on a multitude of 
reports." 
 
9 The factors included "leadership by example, which 
[Porter] considered the most important factor . . .; civil 
service examination score; departmental seniority; experience; 
ranks and positions held; arrest and citation statistics; 
education; military background; 'discipline issues' (which [the 
magistrate understood] to mean the applicant's record of 
discipline); 'sick leave'; command presence; community policing 
philosophy; dedication to and involvement in the community; and 
dedication and loyalty to the police department." 
10 Porter testified that he used the interview panel's 
scores only as a general indication of who the panel members 
thought were the top five candidates, and that he himself 
 
 
10 
recommendation with the town manager, David Murphy, who was the 
appointing authority under the town charter.  Murphy "wanted to 
dig a little bit deeper," because such a promotion would involve 
a bypass of Sherman.  He reviewed Sherman's personnel file, but 
"nothing there made a strong impression on him" -- which, the 
magistrate found, was "possibly because the police department 
does not conduct annual performance reviews."   Porter suggested 
that Murphy speak with Sullivan, and Murphy did so.  Based on 
this conversation, Murphy testified, "I think the feedback I got 
on . . . Sherman was that he's a good police officer, will be a 
good sergeant, but not yet." 
On July 6, 2010, Pace wrote a letter to Murphy, 
recommending that Sherman not be promoted to sergeant.  He wrote 
that several of Sherman's answers during the interview "were 
vague," and that in some areas Sherman "did not have a clear 
understanding of basic leadership qualities . . . such as 
leading by example and command presence."  Pace also wrote that 
Sherman's supervisors had reported that Sherman had "difficulty 
in following through on cases and . . . needs supervision."  On 
the same day, Pace wrote three very similar letters to Murphy 
recommending that Burton, Lewis, and Duval be promoted; all 
                                                                  
independently had ranked the candidates according to his own 
criteria, "pick[ing] who [he] thought were . . . the top three" 
candidates. 
 
 
 
11 
three letters stated that the reason for the promotion 
recommendation was the candidate's "interview and his overall 
work ethic and his solid command presence."  The letters 
provided specific positive comments on the candidate's 
background and interview performance; cited the candidate's 
length of service in the department; and, in two instances, 
described the candidate's prior military service.11 
On July 7, 2010, Murphy wrote to Sherman informing him that 
he had been bypassed, and explaining the reasons for the bypass.  
The letter stated: 
"The reasons for your nonselection include the 
totality of the review process including the 
interview, review of your personnel files, and 
discussion with your immediate supervisor.  
Specifically the committee found that some of your 
answers were vague.  You did not demonstrate a clear 
understanding of leadership qualities such as leading 
by example and command presence.  Your supervisor 
noted that you had difficulty following through on 
cases and that you needed supervision." 
 
                     
11 Regarding the interviews, Pace wrote that Burton 
"demonstrated an excellent understanding . . . of the use of 
progressive discipline in the supervision of police personnel 
and . . . exhibited a truly unique understanding of the use of 
mentoring and counseling in the role of police sergeant," and 
that he "was able to cite specific examples of how he has led 
during times when a police supervisor was not immediately 
available."  Lewis displayed "excellent knowledge surrounding 
use of force issues and the role of the police sergeant as 
trainer on a continuing and daily basis," and "impressed the 
panel with some innovative and creative ideas" about community 
policing.  Duval "truly understood the need for the police to be 
compassionate and work with the community," and could "cite 
specific examples of leading by example." 
 
 
 
12 
Murphy testified that he had based his decision primarily on 
Porter's recommendation and discussions with Porter, as well as 
his conversations with Sullivan and Pace.12 
3.  Prior proceedings.  Sherman appealed the bypass, and, 
following an evidentiary hearing, the DALA magistrate 
recommended that Sherman's appeal be dismissed, because, 
notwithstanding that the interview process had been flawed, and 
the evaluation of Sherman's job performance was "possibly 
flawed," the town had a reasonable justification for the bypass.  
The magistrate stated that the town's interview process "was not 
exactly a model to be followed," noting that the interviews were 
not recorded; that there was no "complete and contemporaneous 
record of the interviewees' evaluations and scoring"; and that 
the candidates' answers were not objectively determined to be 
right or wrong, or relatively better or worse compared to each 
other.  The magistrate also noted the town's lack of an annual, 
written process of evaluating job performance as not "a model to 
be followed," but concluded that the town had demonstrated, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that there were "sufficient 
reasons to justify [a] bypass" despite an "overly subjective" 
interview process  The magistrate observed that Sherman had "at 
                     
12 Murphy also testified that he would not have considered a 
negative opinion from an interview panel as a justifiable reason 
for a bypass of the highest-ranked candidate on the 
certification list. 
 
 
 
13 
no time introduced any evidence, or even suggested, that the 
[t]own's decision to bypass him for promotion was politically 
motivated." 
The commission adopted the magistrate's findings and 
recommendation, again noting that the interview process had been 
flawed.  The commission stated, "[W]e believe that the interview 
process was flawed and does not satisfy the standard we expect 
should be required to assure a properly reviewable 'level 
playing field' which 'protect[s] candidates from arbitrary 
action and undue subjectivity on the part of the interviewers,' 
which is the lynch-pin to the basic merit principle of the 
[c]ivil [s]ervice [l]aw" (citation omitted).  Nonetheless, the 
commission concluded that the "independent judgment of the 
[department's] senior commanders, including the former and 
current [p]olice [c]hief about [Sherman's] need to improve 
certain aspects of his job performance that would seem essential 
to the duties at a supervisory level, as well as the strong 
positive opinions about the ability of the selected candidates, 
provides sufficient independent and reasonable justification to 
bypass [Sherman] at this time."13  The commission stated that 
                     
13 The decision also stated that the commission expected  
that Sherman would improve his skills to correct his "management 
deficiencies," and commented that it had "every reason to 
believe" Sherman would obtain "promotion to a management 
position in the future." 
 
 
 
14 
"[n]o substantial evidence appears to have been presented that 
these judgments were formed out of bias or other unlawful 
predisposition against [Sherman]."   
After Sherman sought judicial review of the commission's 
decision, a Superior Court judge denied his motion for judgment 
on the pleadings and his motion for reconsideration, "find[ing] 
credible and substantial evidence in the administrative record 
to support the . . . commission's decision. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  Judicial review of a 
final decision of the commission is governed by G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 14.  See Police Dep't of Boston v. Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 
689 (2012) (Kavaleski).  "We may set aside or modify the 
commission's decision if we conclude that 'the substantial 
rights of any party may have been prejudiced' by a decision that 
is based on an error of law, unsupported by substantial 
evidence, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."  Id.  We 
generally defer "to the [commission] on questions of fact and 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom" (citation omitted).  Id. 
at 689. 
It is the role of the commission to determine, "'on the 
basis of the evidence before it, whether the appointing 
authority [has] sustained its burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that there was reasonable 
justification' for the decision to bypass the candidate."  Id. 
 
 
15 
at 688, quoting Brackett v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 447 Mass. 233, 
241 (2006).  Reasonable justification "means 'done upon adequate 
reasons sufficiently supported by credible evidence, when 
weighed by an unprejudiced mind, guided by common sense and by 
correct rules of law.'" Kavaleski, supra, quoting Brackett v. 
Civil Serv. Comm'n, supra.  "[T]he commission owes substantial 
deference to the appointing authority's exercise of judgment in 
determining whether there was 'reasonable justification,'" and 
"deference is especially appropriate with respect to the hiring 
of police officers."  Beverly v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 78 Mass. 
App. Ct. 182, 188 (2010).  Nonetheless, in determining whether 
an appointing authority's decision to bypass is justified, the 
commission's "primary concern is to ensure that the [appointing 
authority's] action comports with '[b]asic merit principles,' as 
defined in G. L. c. 31, § 1."14  Kavaleski, 463 Mass. at 688.  
                     
14 General Laws c. 31, § 1, defines "[b]asic merit 
principles" as follows: 
 
"(a) recruiting, selecting and advancing of employees on 
the basis of their relative ability, knowledge and skills 
including open consideration of qualified applicants for 
initial appointment; (b) providing of equitable and 
adequate compensation for all employees; (c) providing of 
training and development for employees, as needed, to 
assure the advancement and high quality performance of such 
employees; (d) retaining of employees on the basis of 
adequacy of their performance, correcting inadequate 
performance, and separating employees whose inadequate 
performance cannot be corrected; (e) assuring fair 
treatment of all applicants and employees in all aspects of 
personnel administration without regard to political 
 
 
16 
"[T]he commission must focus on the fundamental purposes of the 
civil service system -- to guard against political 
considerations, favoritism, and bias in governmental employment 
decisions, including, of course, promotions, and to protect 
efficient public employees from political control."  Cambridge 
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 304 (1997).  The 
commission must "properly place[] the burden on the [appointing 
authority] to establish a reasonable justification for the 
bypass[] . . . and properly weigh[] those justifications against 
the fundamental purpose of the civil service system . . . to 
ensure decision-making in accordance with basic merit 
principles" (citation omitted).  Massachusetts Ass'n of Minority 
Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 264 (2001). 
2.  Reasonable justification.  Relying on the commission's 
comments regarding the town's "flawed" interview process, 
Sherman contends that there was no reasonable justification for 
the town's decision to bypass him.  Specifically, Sherman argues 
that the bypass was not reasonably justified because it was 
substantially based on a "totally subjective" interview process 
                                                                  
affiliation, race, color, age, national origin, sex, 
marital status, handicap, or religion and with proper 
regard for privacy, basic rights outlined in this chapter 
and constitutional rights as citizens, and; (f) assuring 
that all employees are protected against coercion for 
political purposes, and are protected from arbitrary and 
capricious actions." 
 
 
 
17 
that was "not authorized by the [administrator]" and "amounted 
to an attempt to circumvent the results of the [c]ivil [s]ervice 
examination ."  While we agree that the town's interview process 
was flawed, we do not agree that, as a result, the bypass was 
not reasonably justified. 
An appointing authority may conduct oral interviews of 
candidates who have been certified to it from the eligible 
appointment list.  See Flynn v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 15 Mass. 
App. Ct. 206, 208 (1983).  While such interviews inevitably have 
a subjective component, they should be "structured in an attempt 
to protect candidates from arbitrary action and undue 
subjectivity on the part of the interviews."  Id.  We agree with 
the commission that the interviews conducted by the town failed 
to live up to that standard.  The interviewers did not agree in 
advance on criteria for scoring the candidates' interview 
performance, but, rather, scored the candidates on the 
"totality" of their performance.  The record also reflects a 
number of other irregularities in the town's procedure.15 
                     
15 For instance, there apparently was confusion among the 
panel members about how to score candidates.  Among other 
things, Officer Jeff Chaplin had been unaware that he was 
supposed to score the candidates numerically, and instead gave 
them letter grades.  The panel's final scores for the candidates 
were not available at the hearing and had to be reconstructed, 
to the extent possible, from testimony, because some of the 
panelists' scores had never been written down.  The 
reconstructed scores contained a few arithmetic errors.  Some 
members of the panel did not take notes on Sherman's 
 
 
18 
We recognize that procedural flaws conducive to subjective 
or arbitrary decision making could be a "red flag" signaling 
that a bypass decision resulting from the flawed procedures was 
motivated by political considerations, favoritism, or bias.  See 
Riffelmacher v. Board of Police Comm'rs of Springfield, 27 Mass. 
App. Ct. 159, 164-165 (1989), quoting Rowe v. General Motors 
Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 358-359 (5th Cir. 1972) ("open-ended and 
uncontrolled" interview procedure is "ready mechanism for 
discrimination").  Here, the commission considered this risk and 
found no evidence to support it.  Nor does Sherman suggest that 
his bypass was based on an unlawful motive. 
Nevertheless, because a flawed selection procedure raises 
the possibility of unlawful decision-making by the appointing 
authority, any decision arising from a flawed procedure warrants 
careful scrutiny by a reviewing court.  We therefore have 
examined the entire administrative record to determine whether 
there is evidence that the town's bypass was motivated by an 
improper reason.  See Massachusetts Ass'n of Minority Law 
Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. at 264-265 (examining 
"the entire administrative record . . . and tak[ing] into 
account whatever in the record would fairly detract from the 
                                                                  
performance, although they did so for other candidates.  And, in 
many cases, neither the panel members' written notes nor their 
testimony at the hearing provided substantive reasons why they 
awarded a given score to a particular candidate. 
 
 
 
19 
supporting evidence's weight" [citation omitted]).  Although the 
record includes evidence that gives us pause,16 we are satisfied 
that the commission's conclusion that Sherman's bypass was not 
motivated by an improper reason was supported by substantial 
evidence.17 
A promotional decision may be reasonably justified on the 
merits, even where the appointing authority uses flawed 
procedures for selecting candidates, in the following limited 
circumstance:  where the appointing authority had a reasonable 
justification on the merits for deciding to bypass a candidate, 
and the flaws in the selection process are not so severe that it 
is impossible to evaluate the merits from the record.  In such a 
case, the candidate's bypass appeal should be denied despite the 
                     
16 We note, for example, Porter's relatively unconstrained 
postinterview ranking of the candidates, which formed the basis 
of his recommendations to Murphy.  We note also that the record 
does not indicate whether the job performance of the other 
candidates was subjected to the same scrutiny as Sherman's. 
 
17 We recognize that a flawed interview process could serve 
to mask the presence of implicit gender and racial bias in the 
decision-making process.  See, e.g., Morris vs. Braintree Police 
Dep't, Civil Serv. Comm'n, No. G1-13-173 (Dec. 11, 2014) 
(commission allowed candidate's bypass appeal in part because 
police department "took few . . . steps to insure that the 
interview process was reasonably structured and capable of 
meaningful objective review," and candidate was bypassed 
"because of [only] slightly better interviews" by other 
candidates; bypassed candidate "had a well-documented record as 
a successful law enforcement professional"; and there were other 
"red flags," including differences between bypassed candidate's 
age and race and those of selected candidates).  No such claim 
was made here. 
 
 
 
20 
presence of procedural flaws, because the appointing authority 
comported with "the fundamental purpose of the civil service 
system, . . . to ensure decision-making in accordance with basic 
merit principles."  Id. 
Here, the town's decision to bypass Sherman is supported in 
part by the over-all low score the interview panel awarded 
Sherman relative to the promoted candidates.  It is supported 
also by Pace's post-interview letters to Murphy, articulating 
reasons why the candidates' interview performances warranted the 
bypass.  This would be a much closer case, however, if the 
candidates' interview performances were the only justification 
offered for the bypass decision.  Aside from the interviews, 
there is, as the commission noted, reasonable justification for 
the bypass based on the evaluation of Sherman's past job 
performance by his superiors.  The magistrate found that 
Sherman's supervisors had raised concerns that he had difficulty 
in following through on case investigations and needed 
supervision -- concerns that were communicated to Porter and 
Murphy by Sullivan.  Part of the job of a police sergeant is to 
ensure that those under his or her command follow through on the 
work needed to complete police investigations, and Sherman's 
failure to do so with his own cases is certainly reasonable 
 
 
21 
justification to bypass him for promotion to that position.18 
The bypass therefore was properly affirmed by the 
commission because, despite the flawed selection process, the 
town was reasonably justified in deciding that Sherman was not 
yet ready to assume the duties of a police sergeant -- a 
decision to which the commission appropriately showed deference.  
See Flynn v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 206, 208-211 
(1983) (upholding bypasses against challenges to interview and 
scoring procedures used in selection process because there was 
                     
18 The evidence that Sherman's job performance supported a 
reasonable justification for his bypass was somewhat limited, in 
part because the department did not conduct annual, written 
performance reviews under the performance evaluation system 
established by the administrator pursuant to G. L. c. 31, § 6A. 
 
An appointing authority may use any information it has 
obtained through an independent, impartial, and reasonably 
thorough review as the basis of its decision to bypass a 
candidate.  See Beverly v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 
182, 189 (2010).  The appointing authority may rely upon 
credible anecdotal evidence of job performance concerns to form 
the basis of a reasonable justification for bypass, so long as 
its decision satisfies basic merit principles.  The decision may 
not be arbitrary, based upon political or personal connections, 
or applied unequally to other candidates.  The closer that an 
appointing authority's procedures hew to those set out in G. L. 
c. 31, § 6A, the more confident we will be that the evaluation 
of job performance was fair and not arbitrary. 
 
Here, the town's evaluation of Sherman's job performance 
was based largely on informal conversations with Sullivan, who 
had difficulty identifying at the hearing particular instances 
of poor performance.  Testimony by Sherman's direct supervisors, 
however, did identify specific instances supporting the 
magistrate's finding that at least one of the supervisors had 
specific incidents to support his assessment of Sherman. 
 
 
 
22 
"no evidence to show that the appointing authority was motivated 
by anything other than merit or that its actions were . . . 
designed to conceal improper reasons").19 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
                     
19 Sherman also argues that Murphy's bypass letter cited the 
three selected candidates' training, length of experience, and 
military service as reasons for their selection, and that -- 
because these three factors are already considered by HRD in 
determining a particular candidate's final certification score -
- none of them is a valid reason for a bypass, and that offering 
them as reasons for a bypass is impermissible "double credit."  
At least on the facts of this case, we disagree.  Although 
credits are provided by statute to certified candidates for 
"training and experience," G. L. c. 31, § 22, and the names of 
veterans are placed "ahead of the names of all other persons" on 
the certification list, G. L. c. 31, § 28, it does not follow 
that an appointing authority may not consider factors relating 
to a candidate's experience, training, or military service in 
deciding to bypass a candidate.  As Porter explained during his 
testimony, for instance, where a veteran has been given a 
preference on the certification list simply by virtue of being a 
veteran, it is not "double credit" to consider what he or she 
"did in the military," and "what sort of leadership qualities" 
he or she has.