Title: People v. Segoviano
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 86183
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 2000

Opinion filed February 17, 2000.
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a trial in the circuit court of Cook County, a jury convicted 
defendant, Antonio Segoviano, of one count of first degree murder on an 
accountability theory (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1992)), and two counts of 
attempted armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/8-4, 18-2 (West 1992)). After vacating one 
of the attempted armed robbery convictions based on insufficiency of the 
evidence, the circuit court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 45 years' 
imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction and 15 years' imprisonment 
for the remaining conviction for attempted armed robbery. The appellate court 
reversed defendant's convictions and remanded the matter for a new trial, 
holding that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to declare a 
mistrial when it was discovered during trial that the testimony of one of the 
State's occurrence witnesses was perjurious. 297 Ill. App. 3d 860. We granted 
the State's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and now reverse 
the appellate court and reinstate defendant's convictions.
BACKGROUND
On November 9, 1993, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Onesimo Beltran and Martin 
Alvarez, the homicide victim, drove their truck into an alley near a currency 
exchange where the victim intended to purchase a City of Chicago vehicle 
sticker. Beltran waited in the truck with the door open, removing the old 
sticker from the windshield, while the victim went into the exchange.
Before the victim returned, a person later identified as defendant approached 
Beltran and asked him for money. Beltran closed the door, and defendant walked 
away, towards the mouth of the alley. Shortly thereafter, Beltran heard gunshots 
from behind the truck, and saw people scatter away from the victim. Beltran was 
uncertain whether defendant was among the people he saw running away from the 
victim, although he testified that defendant had walked in that direction after 
asking him for money. The victim died as the result of a single gunshot wound to 
the back.
Steven Schoenberg, the manager of the currency exchange, testified that while 
the victim was in the exchange defendant entered and began scribbling on the 
wall near one of the windows. Defendant followed the victim out of the exchange. 
Schoenberg testified that what was written on the wall of the exchange where 
defendant had been standing was "Little Cap or Little Capone." Chicago Police 
Officer Thomas Taglioli testified that he had seen graffiti around the 
neighborhood with defendant's name on it and that the graffiti in the currency 
exchange was written the way that defendant wrote his name.
Mario Rodriguez testified that shortly before the crime he, defendant, Arnel 
Robinson, and "J.J." were at a bank of telephones located near the currency 
exchange. Rodriguez did not know "J.J."s real name, but he knew defendant and 
knew that his nickname was "Little Cap," short for "Little Capone." While "J.J." 
was using the telephone, Rodriguez heard defendant ask Robinson if he wanted to 
"get some money." Robinson agreed, lifted his shirt, and adjusted a gun in his 
waistband. Defendant said he would "find someone" and walked over to the 
currency exchange while Robinson went to the alley nearby. In Rodriguez's 
written statement, which was introduced into evidence, he stated that defendant 
had said that he would find "someone to rob."
Rodriguez testified that a few minutes later defendant followed the victim 
out of the exchange and into the alley, out of Rodriguez's view. Rodriguez next 
heard Robinson shouting "give me your money." Rodriguez walked over to the 
alley, where he saw Robinson pointing a gun at the victim and saw defendant next 
to the truck. At this point Rodriguez panicked and walked back towards the 
telephones. As he was walking away he heard two shots, and he left the area. He 
did not see where the defendant or Robinson went.
The State's next witness represented that his name was Jerome Lewis, and that 
he went by the nickname "J.J." The witness testified that he was with defendant, 
Rodriguez, and Robinson at the time of the shooting. He stated that defendant 
asked Robinson to help him "stick up the Mexican guy," and Robinson agreed. 
Defendant thereafter followed the victim into the currency exchange, ducked back 
out for a moment, holding his hand over his head, then reentered the currency 
exchange. When the victim left the exchange defendant followed him into the 
alley where Robinson was waiting. A short while later "J.J." heard two gunshots 
in the alley, then saw defendant exit the alley.
On cross-examination "J.J." initially testified that his name was Stacy 
Lewis, and that his older brother was named Jerome, but that they were both 
known as "J.J." He later stated that his brother's name was Stacy and his own 
name was Jerome.
The State proceeded to introduce into evidence statements defendant made to 
police after his arrest. Defendant gave an oral statement to Chicago Police 
Detective Steven Glynn and signed a written statement in the presence of 
Assistant State's Attorney Margaret Wood. In each statement, defendant admitted 
that he had suggested to Robinson that they "make some money" and that they 
planned to have defendant follow a man out of the currency exchange and have 
Robinson rob him in the alley. Defendant admitted scratching his nickname on the 
wall of the currency exchange while waiting for the victim, then following the 
victim into the alley. In the alley, Robinson grabbed the victim while defendant 
approached the truck parked in the alley. Defendant demanded money from Beltran, 
but was told that he had no money. As he walked back to where Robinson was 
confronting the victim, defendant heard two shots and then ran from the area 
along with Robinson.
The next several events occurred outside the presence of the jury. Defendant 
contended that the State's witness who had testified as Jerome Lewis was in fact 
Stacy Cueto, Lewis' brother. To support this allegation, defendant called as a 
witness the real Jerome Lewis, who testified that Cueto sometimes used Lewis' 
name. After hearing Lewis' testimony, the trial court recessed for the day and 
directed the State to ascertain who was in fact Jerome Lewis by the next day, 
when the case would be recalled.
When court reconvened, the prosecutor informed the trial court that the 
person who had previously testified at trial was Cueto. According to the 
prosecutor, Cueto had admitted his identity when the prosecutor confronted him. 
Cueto informed the prosecutor that he had testified instead of Lewis because he 
thought Lewis might "run into some problems" if he testified, whereas Cueto 
believed he would be safe because he was incarcerated in Minnesota. The 
prosecutor confirmed that Cueto was not the person at the scene by asking 
Rodriguez to view him; Rodriguez stated that Cueto was not the "J.J." who was 
present at the time of the crime. However, the prosecutor maintained that the 
State had no knowledge of the fact that Cueto was not "J.J." until the defense 
raised that possibility.
Based on these events the State moved for a mistrial. Defendant opposed the 
State's motion, arguing that the proper course was not to grant a mistrial, but 
rather to explain to the jury what had occurred and direct the jury to disregard 
the evidence. He contended that "it would be a jeopardy issue" if the court 
declared a mistrial. The court declined to declare a mistrial, stating that 
"[a]t this time the trial in my opinion has not been reduced to a farce and a 
sham."
The jury was recalled, and the State admitted that the person who had 
testified was not Jerome Lewis but rather was his brother. Accordingly, the 
State requested leave of court to withdraw the earlier testimony and asked the 
court to instruct the jury to disregard it. The court struck the testimony and 
directed the jury "to disregard completely all the testimony that this person 
from Minnesota penitentiary said and completely disregard that."
The State then called the real Jerome Lewis to testify. Lewis stated that he 
was with defendant, Robinson and Rodriguez at the scene of the shooting several 
minutes before the shooting occurred. However, Lewis testified that defendant 
was standing next to him at the pay telephones when they heard the two shots. He 
stated that he and defendant had parted ways with Robinson and Rodriguez three 
to five minutes before.
The State proceeded to introduce as evidence a written statement Lewis had 
given to the police shortly after the crime. Therein, Lewis stated that he, 
Robinson, Rodriguez and defendant were at the pay telephones when he "heard 
[defendant] talk about robbing a guy who had just gone in the currency 
exchange." Robinson agreed to commit the robbery with defendant. Defendant then 
went into the exchange and came back out holding up five fingers "to indicate 
$500." He then reentered the exchange and shortly thereafter followed the other 
man into the alley, towards Robinson. A short while later, Lewis heard two 
gunshots coming from the alley and saw Robinson and defendant leaving the alley, 
after which Lewis left the area.
After the State rested, the defense presented the testimony of James 
Stilwell. Stilwell testified that he had been drinking with Robinson and Lewis 
at the home of a Raphael Martinez earlier in the day of the shooting. He 
testified that he was in the alley at the time of the shooting and saw Robinson 
and Rodriguez in the alley, but not defendant. Afterwards, Robinson and 
Rodriguez returned to Martinez's house, where Robinson claimed he had shot 
someone. Stilwell was impeached with a signed statement he had given to an 
assistant State's Attorney and with his testimony before the grand jury. In both 
his statement and his grand jury testimony Stilwell claimed that it was Robinson 
and defendant who had returned to Martinez's house claiming that they had shot 
someone. Defendant's mother also testified that she was in the area at the time 
of the shooting and that defendant was not in the alley when the shooting 
occurred.
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and of two counts of 
attempted armed robbery on August 24, 1995. Defendant filed a post-trial motion 
on September 26, and filed an amended motion on September 28. The court reversed 
defendant's conviction for attempted armed robbery of Beltran "based on the 
sufficiency of the evidence," but otherwise denied defendant's post-trial 
motion.
Defendant appealed his convictions, and the appellate court reversed and 
remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion 
in failing to grant the State's motion for a mistrial. 297 Ill. App. 3d at 
867.
ANALYSIS
I. Direct Appeal
The State contends that the appellate court erred in granting defendant a new 
trial based on the trial court's failure to declare a mistrial. Relying 
primarily on United States v. Andrews, 895 F.2d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 
1990), and People v. Allen, 268 Ill. App. 3d 279, 287 (1994), the State 
contends that the trial court acted correctly in allowing the case to proceed in 
light of defendant's opposition to the State's motion for a mistrial. The State 
suggests that, moreover, defendant's stance at trial should bar him from arguing 
on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial.
The Seventh Circuit in Andrews and our appellate court in 
Allen held that a criminal defendant who opposed a declaration of 
mistrial during the trial proceedings would not be heard on appeal to complain 
of the failure to declare a mistrial over his own objection. Andrews, 
895 F.2d  at 409; Allen, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 287. In each case the trial 
court and counsel learned during jury deliberations that the jury had 
inadvertently been allowed to see police reports containing inadmissible 
information. Although the trial courts were prepared to grant mistrials in both 
cases, the defendants indicated that they wished their cases to be decided by 
their current juries after admonitions to consider only the evidence presented 
at trial. After being found guilty, defendants raised as error on appeal the 
failure to declare a mistrial. Both courts rejected the argument on the basis 
that a criminal defendant would be required to abide by the decisions made at 
trial (Allen, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 287; Andrews, 895 F.2d at 
409), although the Andrews court noted in dictum that in an 
appropriate case a court might have to declare a mistrial even over a 
defendant's objection. See Andrews, 895 F.2d  at 409, quoting United 
States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L. Ed. 165, 165 (1824) 
(stating that such an exception would exist only in a case involving an error so 
grave that there existed a " 'manifest necessity for the [mistrial], or the 
ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated' ").
Defendant attempts to distinguish Allen and Andrews. He 
first contends that the type of error which occurred in the instant 
case-admission of perjured testimony-is so serious as to make Allen and 
Andrews inapposite. However, defendant cites no precedent to support 
his contention, nor do Allen and Andrews make any distinction 
based on the type of error involved. Rather, the sole consideration is, as 
previously noted, that the gravity of an error may be so great as to mandate a 
mistrial even over a defendant's objection. See Andrews, 895 F.2d  at 
409. We decline to hold, as defendant suggests, that the type of error 
involved is determinative of whether the trial court should override an 
accused's opposition to the court's declaring a mistrial.
Defendant also attempts to distinguish Allen and Andrews on 
the basis that in those cases it was clear that the client, rather than counsel, 
made the decision to reject the mistrial. Defendant argues that the record in 
this case is not so clear. We agree with defendant that the record before us 
does not show that defendant personally made the decision to reject the 
mistrial. As the State observes, defendant may well have known that Cueto was an 
impostor and so informed his counsel during Cueto's testimony, since counsel 
immediately began cross-examining the witness concerning his identity. However, 
we do not believe that these facts raise the inference that defendant himself 
made the decision to reject the mistrial.
Nevertheless, this decision is not one which must be made by a criminal 
defendant. The only trial-related decisions over which a defendant ultimately 
must have control are: whether to plead guilty; whether to waive a jury trial; 
whether to testify in his own behalf; whether to appeal; and whether to submit a 
lesser-included offense instruction. People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d 224, 227-29 (1994); People v. Davison, 292 Ill. App. 3d 981, 988 
(1997). Decisions whether to seek a mistrial, by contrast, are matters of trial 
strategy. See People v. Cordevant, 297 Ill. App. 3d 193, 200 (1998); 
People v. Steward, 295 Ill. App. 3d 735, 745 (1998). We find no basis 
for adopting defendant's suggestion that the decision to oppose a mistrial is in 
effect a decision to waive a jury trial, and we will not vitiate the objection 
to the mistrial on the basis that the record does not reflect that the decision 
was made by defendant. We note that a defendant still retains the ability to 
raise on appeal an ineffective-assistance challenge to counsel's decision to 
oppose a mistrial, as defendant in fact does in this case.
We find no basis upon which to ascribe error to the trial court for declining 
to declare a mistrial in this case. When the State suggested a mistrial after 
discovering that Cueto's testimony was perjurious, defendant strongly objected 
to such a course of action, demanding that the trial continue after an 
instruction to the jury to disregard the perjurious testimony. As noted by the 
Allen court, it is well established that "an accused may not ask the 
trial court to proceed in a certain manner and then contend in a court of review 
that the order which he obtained was in error." People v. Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d 195, 199 (1992). Accord People v. Abston, 263 Ill. App. 3d 665, 
671 (1994) ("where the trial court's course of action is taken at defendant's 
suggestion and the defendant thereafter acquiesces in the court's expressed 
course of conduct, the defendant should be precluded from raising such course of 
conduct as error on appeal").
Nor did the trial court err in failing to declare a mistrial over defendant's 
objection. This drastic course of action should be taken only " '[w]here, 
for reasons deemed compelling by the trial judge, who is best situated 
intelligently to make such a decision, the ends of substantial justice cannot be 
attained without discontinuing the trial.' " People v. Chaffin, 49 Ill. 2d 356, 362 (1971), quoting Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 
368, 6 L. Ed. 2d 901, 904, 81 S. Ct. 1523, 1526 (1961). See also 
Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462-63, 35 L. Ed. 2d 425, 430, 93 S. Ct. 1066, 1069-70 (1973) (a mistrial should be declared over a defendant's 
objection only if "dictated by 'manifest necessity' or the 'ends of public 
justice' "). The trial court's evaluation of whether this threshold has 
been reached is reviewed only for abuse of discretion (Arizona v. 
Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 514, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717, 733, 98 S. Ct. 824, 834-35 
(1978); Chaffin, 49 Ill. 2d at 362), and must be afforded the "highest 
degree of respect," as the trial court "is far more 'conversant with the factors 
relevant to the determination' than any reviewing court can possibly be" 
(Washington, 434 U.S.  at 511, 514, 54 L. Ed. 2d  at 732, 733, 98 S. Ct. 
at 833, 834, quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 93 L. Ed. 974, 
978, 69 S. Ct. 834, 837 (1949)).
In this case, although at first glance Cueto's testimony might appear quite 
damaging, several facts militate against this conclusion. First and foremost is 
the fact that the perjury was discovered during the trial and strong steps were 
taken to correct it. "Faith in the ability of a properly instructed jury to 
separate issues and reach a correct result is the cornerstone of the jury 
system." People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 376 (1991). It is true that 
the perjury was not withdrawn until two days after it had been offered. However, 
not only was the jury clearly, directly, and unequivocally instructed to 
disregard Cueto's testimony, the jury was presented with the testimony of the 
real Jerome Lewis, which would also naturally have helped to dispel any 
lingering belief in the impostor. The prosecution did not refer to the false 
testimony in closing argument except to apologize for having offered it.
Also, Cueto's testimony was entirely cumulative of other evidence at trial. 
Specifically, defendant's oral statement to detective Glynn and defendant's 
signed statement, Rodriguez's testimony and signed statement, and, most 
significantly, the real Lewis' signed statement were all nearly identical to 
each other and to the version of events testified to by Cueto. All of this 
evidence established that defendant knew that Robinson had a weapon, defendant 
and Robinson agreed to commit a robbery, and defendant followed the victim into 
the currency exchange and shadowed him into the alley, where he was shot. This 
testimony was completely consistent with the testimony of Beltran and 
Schoenberg.
Defendant argues that Cueto's testimony was prejudicial because the only 
evidence that defendant explicitly suggested a robbery was Cueto's testimony and 
the real Lewis' written statement. Defendant argues the other evidence only 
showed that defendant suggested "getting some money." However, our review of the 
evidence reveals that defendant's and Rodriguez's written statements also 
established that defendant and Robinson agreed to commit an armed 
robbery.
II. Cross-Appeal
Defendant raises three issues on cross-appeal. He asserts that (1) the trial 
court erred in denying his pretrial motion to quash arrest and suppress 
statements; (2) the court abused its discretion in denying defense counsel's 
motion to withdraw and for a continuance; and (3) he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel.
The State argues that the first two issues defendant raises on cross-appeal 
should be rejected on the basis of waiver. As the State observes, defendant's 
post-trial motion was filed beyond the 30-day deadline imposed by the 
legislature. See 725 ILCS 5/116-1(b) (West 1992). The State argues that the 
untimeliness of the motion should waive issues for purposes of appellate review 
in the same manner as a failure to file any post-trial motion. Defendant argues 
that the issues were not waived, and argues in the alternative that if they were 
waived, the tardy filing of the post-trial motion constitutes ineffective 
assistance by his trial counsel.
The statutory 30-day requirement is mandatory. People v. Stacey, 68 Ill. 2d 261, 267 (1977); People v. Barry, 202 Ill. App. 3d 212, 215 
(1990). It could be argued that an untimely filing operates as a procedural 
default just as does a failure to comply with the statutory requirement that 
post-trial motions be in writing. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 
187-88 (1988); People v. Friesland, 109 Ill. 2d 369, 377 (1985) (and 
cases cited therein); People v. Schrems, 224 Ill. App. 3d 988, 994 
(1992). However, the waiver rule is one of administrative convenience rather 
than jurisdiction, and the goals of obtaining a just result and maintaining a 
sound body of precedent may sometimes override considerations of waiver. 
People v. Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d 194, 200 (1995); Hux v. Raben, 
38 Ill. 2d 223 (1967).
Accordingly, since in this case the issues were in fact brought to the 
attention of the trial court, ruled on by the trial court while the trial court 
had jurisdiction over the matter, and involved the potential of substantial 
prejudice to the defendant, we choose to relax the waiver rule and address the 
merits of defendant's cross-appeal.(1) See 
People v. Talach, 114 Ill. App. 3d 813, 818-19 (1983); People v. 
Evans, 80 Ill. App. 3d 444, 454 (1979).
Defendant first claims that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial 
motion to quash his arrest and suppress his statements at the police station as 
the product of an unlawful arrest.
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that Martha 
Jacquez, an acquaintance of defendant, gave the police consent to enter her 
home, where defendant was arrested without a warrant. This claim merits but 
brief discussion, because it is irrelevant whether Jacquez gave consent. Prior 
to defendant's arrest, Rodriguez had identified defendant to the police as 
having been involved in the shooting, and defendant does not controvert that 
this gave the police probable cause to arrest him. This renders irrelevant 
Jacquez's consent. Even an arrest made during a warrantless nonconsensual entry 
of a home does not vitiate a defendant's subsequent custody nor does it require 
suppression of a defendant's subsequent voluntary statement outside the home, so 
long as the authorities had probable cause to arrest the suspect. New York 
v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 18-21, 109 L. Ed. 2d 13, 21-22, 110 S. Ct. 1640, 
1643-45 (1990); People v. Shelby, 221 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1041 (1991); 
People v. Long, 208 Ill. App. 3d 627, 635 (1990). Accordingly, there is 
no merit to defendant's argument that the trial court erred in denying the 
motion.
Defendant's second argument, that the trial court erred in denying defense 
counsel's pretrial motion to withdraw from the case and obtain a 21-day 
continuance to seek substitute counsel, is also without merit. The determination 
whether to grant a continuance for substitution of counsel is a matter left to 
the discretion of the trial court, and will not be overturned absent an abuse of 
that discretion. People v. Howery, 178 Ill. 2d 1, 49 (1997); People 
v. Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d 341, 347-48 (1980). The factors to be considered in 
evaluating a trial court's exercise of its discretion include the diligence of 
the movant, the right of the defendant to a speedy, fair and impartial trial, 
and the interests of justice. Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d  at 347; People 
v. Coleman, 203 Ill. App. 3d 83, 100 (1990). However, it is well 
established that a trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion 
in denying a motion for substitution of counsel in the absence of ready and 
willing substitute counsel. People v. Hardin, 299 Ill. App. 3d 33, 37 
(1998); People v. Jones, 269 Ill. App. 3d 925, 932 (1995); People 
v. Langley, 226 Ill. App. 3d 742, 747 (1992); People v. Free, 112 
Ill. App. 3d 449, 454 (1983); People v. Koss, 52 Ill. App. 3d 605, 
607-08 (1977). In this case, the motion did not even contain a representation 
that substitute counsel had been secured, much less an averment that such 
substitute counsel was ready and willing to enter an appearance in the case. The 
trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
Defendant's final argument on cross-appeal is that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel. In this argument defendant raises three specific 
allegations of error: counsel's failure to file the motion for new trial in 
timely fashion; counsel's failure to object to the State proceeding on the 
charge of attempted armed robbery of Beltran; and counsel's opposition to the 
State's mistrial motion.
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show (1) 
that his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, and (2) that the attorney's deficient performance resulted in 
prejudice to defendant. People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 320 
(1998), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The failure to satisfy either element 
of the test will preclude a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 320. To establish prejudice, the defendant must 
demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v. 
Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 184-85 (1996). However, showing prejudice entails 
more than an "outcome-determinative" test: a defendant "must show that counsel's 
deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or the 
proceeding fundamentally unfair." People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93 
(1999), citing People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 74 (1997).
Defendant's first allegation of ineffective assistance concerns the belated 
filing of the motion for a new trial. With regard to this claim we note 
initially that the trial court considered the merits of the motion. Accordingly, 
the only manner in which defendant could show prejudice would be if the tardy 
filing waived any of his claims on appeal and if any claims which were waived 
would otherwise have been found to be meritorious on appeal. If the claims were 
without merit defendant could not show prejudice even if they were waived, and 
he thus would be entitled to no relief on this claim of ineffective assistance. 
See Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 320-22 (considering merits of issues in 
order to determine that counsel was not ineffective for having failed to 
preserve them); Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 202 (rejecting claim that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve trial errors for appellate 
review because "it cannot be reasonably contended that the results would 
possibly have been different but for the alleged substandard representation by 
counsel"). The two claims which were potentially waived by the late filing of 
the post-trial motion are defendant's claims on cross-appeal regarding the trial 
court's denial of his two pre-trial motions. As we have previously discussed, 
these two claims are without merit. Accordingly, defendant cannot satisfy the 
prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis on his claim that counsel 
was ineffective in his untimely filing of the post-trial motion. Enoch, 
122 Ill. 2d  at 201-02. Defendant is therefore entitled to no relief on this 
claim. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 320.
Defendant also contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
object to the jury being allowed to find him guilty of the attempted armed 
robbery of Beltran, which charge the State had nol-prossed before trial. Again, 
defendant can show no prejudice. Although the jury did return a guilty verdict 
on the charge of the attempted armed robbery of Beltran, the trial court 
reversed this conviction "based on the sufficiency of the evidence" and the 
State subsequently nol-prossed this charge. Defendant does not stand convicted 
of this charge, nor can he hereafter be tried for this attempted armed robbery. 
See People v. Daniels, 187 Ill. 2d 301, 312 (1999), citing People 
v. Blake, 287 Ill. App. 3d 487, 491 (1997).
Nor do we find counsel to have been ineffective for opposing the State's 
motion for a mistrial after the revelation of Cueto's perjury. At oral argument 
before this court defense counsel contended that trial counsel was "per 
se ineffective" in suggesting in opposition to the mistrial that if a 
mistrial was declared, "it would be a jeopardy issue," i.e., the 
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy might prevent defendant's 
retrial. Appellate counsel suggests that if trial counsel was correct, a 
declaration of mistrial would have secured defendant's freedom, which is the job 
of defense counsel. This contention may be briefly answered, in that if 
defendant had consented to, or even merely failed to object to the mistrial, 
double jeopardy would not have barred his reprosecution unless by its conduct 
the prosecution had deliberately sought to cause a mistrial. People v. 
Camden, 115 Ill. 2d 369, 376-79 (1987); People v. Roche, 258 Ill. 
App. 3d 194, 199 (1994). Defendant has never alleged that the State deliberately 
introduced perjurious testimony in order to cause a mistrial, nor would the 
record on appeal support such an accusation. Accordingly, had defense counsel 
failed to object to the mistrial, defendant's reprosecution would not in fact 
have been barred.
Moreover, as we have previously discussed, the decision whether to seek a 
mistrial is a matter of trial strategy. Cordevant, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 
200; Steward, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 745. Counsel has the ultimate 
authority to direct trial strategy and we will generally not sustain a claim of 
ineffectiveness of counsel based on inadequate trial strategy except where 
counsel "entirely fails to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing." 
People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 394 (1995). The strategy of opposing 
the mistrial instead attempting to argue reasonable doubt by highlighting the 
State's accidental introduction of perjurious testimony, can hardly be said to 
have constituted a lack of meaningful adversarial testing. The testimony of 
Cueto was struck in its entirety and defense counsel effectively used the 
State's presentation of the impostor's testimony to cast doubt on the State's 
case in closing argument. In this respect we note the following excerpts from 
that argument:
Counsel's strategic decision to oppose the mistrial, have the State confess 
error, and then use the error as a sword against the State would appear a fairly 
ingenious strategy, quite the contrary of a failure to test the State's case 
through a meaningful adversarial process.
III. Remand
As a final issue, the State notes that because of its ruling that defendant 
was entitled to a new trial, the appellate court failed to reach defendant's 
argument that his separate convictions for murder and armed robbery violated the 
one-act, one-crime doctrine (see People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551 
(1977)). The appellate court also failed to reach the State's counter-argument 
that the trial court erred failing to impose consecutive sentences as mandated 
by statute. These issues have not been briefed in this court. We therefore 
remand these issues to the appellate court for consideration.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court 
and remand to the appellate court for consideration of the remaining issues.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.
JUSTICE RATHJE, specially concurring:
I agree with the majority's substantive disposition of the issues. I write 
separately because I cannot join the majority's unjustified expansion of the 
waiver rule.
The issue in contention is whether issues raised in an untimely post-trial 
motion are waived on appeal if the trial court, in its discretion, adjudicated 
the merits of the motion. In a somewhat convoluted analysis, the majority 
apparently agrees with the State and holds that defendant waived the issues 
raised in his cross-appeal because his post-trial motion was filed two days 
beyond the 30-day deadline. The majority concedes, however, that the trial court 
adjudicated the merits of the motion despite the motion's untimeliness. In my 
opinion, because the trial court adjudicated the merits of the motion, the 
issues raised therein are not waived.
For some reason, the majority purports to avoid this issue but then decides 
it. The majority claims that "[i]t could be argued that an untimely 
filing operates as a procedural default." (Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 10. 
After almost sounding like it is not going to decide the issue, the majority 
claims that it will relax the waiver rule. If the court is relaxing the waiver 
rule, then it must be holding that the issues are waived. If the issues are not 
waived, there is no need to relax the waiver rule.
There is no reason to purport to avoid this issue. On at least two occasions, 
this court has suggested that issues raised in an untimely post-trial motion are 
waived on appeal. See People v. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68, 83 (1993); 
People v. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d 479, 528 (1992). However, the timeliness 
of the post-trial motions was not at issue in those cases. This case, unlike 
Robinson and Scott, directly presents the issue and gives this 
court the opportunity not to perpetuate an unsound rule.
In Robinson, this court stated that, to preserve issues for appeal, 
"the defendant must both contemporaneously object and present the issue in a 
timely post-trial motion." (Emphasis added.) Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d  at 83. However, Robinson cited People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176 (1988), which nowhere contains that statement. In Enoch, 
this court held that the failure to raise an issue in a written motion 
for a new trial results in waiver of the issue on appeal, not that the failure 
to raise the issue in a timely motion for a new trial results in 
waiver. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186. Further, the timeliness of the 
post-trial motion was not an issue in Robinson.
In Scott, the defendant argued that statements he made during 
court-ordered psychiatric examinations should have been suppressed. This court 
disposed of this argument by stating, "Because defendant did not raise this 
issue in the trial court, or include it in a timely filed post-trial motion, it 
is not clear from the record which statements were made by defendant during each 
particular interview. Therefore, defendant has waived appellate review of this 
issue." Scott, 148 Ill. 2d  at 528. No citation to authority follows 
this statement. Further, it seems clear that Scott was basing its 
waiver conclusion on the fact that defendant's argument was not made in the 
trial court. Neither Robinson nor Scott addressed the issue 
presented in this case, and in both cases the use of the word "timely" was 
unnecessary and unsupported by proper citations.
By suggesting that the timely filing of a post-trial motion is necessary to 
preserve issues for review, this confused two different concepts. First, written 
motions for a new trial must be filed "within 30 days following the entry of a 
finding or the return of a verdict." 725 ILCS 5/116-1(b) (West 1998). Second, 
issues must be raised first in a post-trial motion if a defendant wishes to 
argue those issues on appeal. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186. The majority 
seems to infer a relationship between these two propositions that simply does 
not exist. The majority cites no authority holding that issues raised in an 
untimely motion are waived on appeal if the trial court chooses, in its 
discretion, to adjudicate the merits of the motion.
Defendant had not yet been sentenced when the court considered and denied his 
motion. Consequently, the trial court retained jurisdiction over the action. As 
the appellate court noted in People v. Talach, 114 Ill. App. 3d 813, 
818 (1983), the 30-day limitation applies to the defendant rather than to the 
court, and there is no jurisdictional bar to a court considering a late motion 
for a new trial when the court still has jurisdiction over the case.
The irony in the majority opinion is that the majority's purported reason for 
relaxing waiver is to "maintain a sound body of precedent." What sound body of 
precedent holds that issues raised in the trial court, presented in a written 
post-trial motion, adjudicated by the trial court, and properly argued on appeal 
are waived? This court stated the purposes of the waiver rule in People v. 
Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23, 31-32 (1984):
The appellate court has also recognized that "[t]he underlying purpose of 
waiver is to preserve finite judicial resources by creating an incentive for 
litigants to bring to trial courts' attention alleged errors, thereby giving 
trial courts an opportunity to correct their mistakes." People v. 
McKay, 282 Ill. App. 3d 108, 111 (1996).
Here, the purposes of the waiver rule are not served by holding that these 
issues are waived. Defendant raised the issues in a post-trial motion that was 
filed two days late. The trial court exercised its discretion to consider the 
motion despite its untimeliness. The trial court was given a chance to correct 
any errors. The issues were ruled on by the trial court before they were 
presented to this court, and the scope of this appeal was properly limited to 
issues that defendant raised in the trial court. I see no justification for this 
court now holding that these issues are waived.
The majority ultimately resolves the merits of defendant's cross-appeal 
issues by relaxing the waiver rule and considering whether defendant received 
the ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney filed the post-trial 
motion two days late. I agree with the majority's resolution of the merits of 
these issues, but would reach the issues by holding that they are not 
waived.
1. 1Waiver would not in any event preclude 
consideration of defendant's appellate claims that he received ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel. See People v. Friesland, 109 Ill. 2d 369, 
375 (1985).