Title: Grimes v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 131847
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: October 31, 2014

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
LEVIN GRIMES 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 131847 
CHIEF JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
OCTOBER 31, 2014 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
The defendant, Levin Grimes, appeals his conviction of 
statutory burglary in violation of Code § 18.2-91.  
Specifically, Grimes challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
to sustain his conviction, asserting that the Commonwealth 
proved only that he went into a "crawl space" underneath a 
dwelling house and failed to prove that he broke and entered 
into the actual dwelling house.  Because the crawl space was 
structurally part of the dwelling house, we will affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia upholding the 
conviction. 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
The crawl space at issue in this appeal is situated 
underneath a one-story, brick house located in the City of 
Newport News.  Built into the lower, exterior back wall of the 
house, a small, square door opens into an area containing 
plumbing, wiring, insulation, and ductwork.  This space is 
enclosed within the structure of the house, under the same roof, 
but contains no direct access to any other portion of the house.  
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Entry to this space is gained only through the small door 
located in the exterior wall of the house. 
On June 18, 2012, two neighbors standing behind the house 
heard noises underneath it and noticed that the door leading to 
the crawl space was opened slightly.  The neighbors observed 
Grimes and another man emerge from the crawl space covered in 
wet mud and sand and carrying several pieces of copper pipe 
under their arms.  A police officer subsequently apprehended 
Grimes and found copper pipe, a flashlight, and three cutting 
tools upon his person.  Additional police officers discovered 
identical copper pipe scattered throughout the house's yard and 
inside the crawl space.  Police officers observed that the lock 
on the door to the crawl space had been cut and the door was 
open. 
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's evidence during a 
bench trial in the Circuit Court for the City of Newport News, 
Grimes moved to strike the statutory burglary charge, arguing 
that his conduct did not satisfy the requirements for statutory 
burglary because he "didn't actually go into the house," but 
rather, "went underneath the house."  The circuit court denied 
the motion.  Grimes presented no evidence but renewed his motion 
to strike.  The circuit court found Grimes guilty of statutory 
burglary and other charges not relevant to this appeal.  Grimes 
appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals.  The Court of 
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Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court with regard 
to the statutory burglary conviction,1 concluding that because 
"the crawl space of the house is enclosed within the walls of 
the house" and because "[a]ccess to the crawl space is through a 
separate exterior door that is built into the lower part of one 
of the exterior walls of the dwelling house," the crawl space 
"thus physically constitutes part of the 'dwelling 
house.'"  Grimes v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 470, 480, 749 
S.E.2d 218, 223 (2013).  We awarded Grimes this appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
The elements of statutory burglary for which Grimes was 
convicted are set forth in Code § 18.2-91.  In pertinent part, 
the statute states that "[i]f any person commits any of the acts 
mentioned in § 18.2-90 with intent to commit larceny . . . he 
shall be guilty of statutory burglary."  Code § 18.2-90 includes 
the act of breaking and entering into a dwelling house in the 
daytime. 
This statute, like all burglary laws, is "based primarily 
upon a recognition of the dangers to personal safety created by 
the usual burglary situation – the danger that the intruder will 
harm the occupants in attempting to perpetrate the intended 
                                                        
1 The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment 
with regard to some of Grimes' other convictions and remanded 
for a new trial.  Grimes v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 470, 481, 
749 S.E.2d 218, 223 (2013). 
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crime or to escape and the danger that the occupants will in 
anger or panic react violently to the invasion, thereby inciting 
more violence."  Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 140, 410 
S.E.2d 254, 266 (1991) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Compton v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 48, 55, 55 
S.E.2d 446, 449 (1949) (holding that "[b]urglary [is] primarily 
an offense against the security of the habitation").  Indeed, we 
have defined a "dwelling house" for purposes of the burglary 
statutes as "a house that one uses for habitation, as opposed to 
another purpose."  Giles v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 369, 375, 672 
S.E.2d 879, 883 (2009); see also Graybeal v. Commonwealth, 228 
Va. 736, 740, 324 S.E.2d 698, 700 (1985) (holding that defendant 
did not commit statutory burglary because "the structures broken 
and entered into were trailers," and "there was no proof that 
the trailers were used as dwellings or places of human 
habitation"). 
Grimes does not dispute that the portion of the structure 
situated above the crawl space is a dwelling house.  Thus, the 
question in this appeal is whether the crawl space also 
constitutes part of the dwelling house for purposes of Code § 
18.2-91. 
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on 
appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prevailing party at trial, in this case the Commonwealth, 
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and accord to it all inferences fairly drawn from the 
evidence.  Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299, 609 S.E.2d 
26, 28 (2005).  We will not set aside a trial court's judgment 
unless it is "plainly wrong or without evidence to support it."  
Code § 8.01-680; Viney, 269 Va. at 299, 609 S.E.2d at 28. 
To the extent that the issue before us involves statutory 
interpretation, it is a question of law reviewed de novo on 
appeal.  Washington v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 455, 634 
S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006).  Although penal statutes are to be 
strictly construed against the Commonwealth, Turner v. 
Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983), we 
give the term "dwelling house" its ordinary and plain meaning, 
considering the context in which it is used.  See Southern Ry. 
Co. v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 114, 116-19, 135 S.E.2d 160, 164-66 
(1964).  A defendant is not "entitled to a favorable result 
based upon an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of [a] 
statute."  Ansell v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 761, 250 S.E.2d 
760, 761 (1979). 
Grimes contends that because there is no access between the 
crawl space and the remaining portion of the structure above it, 
and because the crawl space itself is not suitable for 
habitation, it does not constitute part of the dwelling house.  
The crawl space, however, is structurally part of the house.  It 
is physically contained within the four exterior walls, i.e., 
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the vertical plane, of the house; it is under the same roof; and 
it contains integral utilities, such as plumbing and ductwork, 
that are needed in a dwelling house.  As other courts have 
explained, when an area of a house is "functionally 
interconnected with and immediately contiguous to other portions 
of the house," it constitutes part of the dwelling 
house.  Burgett v. State, 314 N.E.2d 799, 803 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1974); accord People v. Moreno, 204 Cal. Rptr. 17, 19 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1984); State v. Moran, 324 P.3d 808, 812 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2014).  See also Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 11 S.W. 209, 209-10 
(Ky. 1889) (holding that a cellar located under a dwelling 
constituted part of the dwelling, despite "no means of internal 
communication between them," because the cellar "is under the 
same roof [and] is . . . part and parcel of the habitation").  
Based on the facts here, the crawl space falls within the plain 
meaning of the term "dwelling house."2 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we conclude, like the Court of Appeals, 
that the crawl space in this case constitutes part of the 
dwelling house.  Thus, the evidence was sufficient to sustain 
Grimes' conviction of statutory burglary.  We will therefore 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
                                                        
 
2 As the Court of Appeals noted, the evidence also showed a 
breaking and entering into the crawl space by Grimes.  Grimes, 
62 Va. App. at 480, 749 S.E.2d at 223. 
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Affirmed.