Title: Hopkins v. Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families (DSCYF)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 427, 2023
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TORI HOPKINS,1 
 
Respondent Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES 
FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND 
THEIR FAMILIES (DSCYF), 
 
Petitioner Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 427, 2023 
§ 
§  Court Below–Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  File No. 22-10-08TN 
§  Petition No. 22-22280 
§   
§   
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: April 4, 2024 
Decided: 
June 10, 2024 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the no-merit brief and motion to withdraw filed by 
appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c), the appellee’s response, the 
Child Attorney’s response, and the Family Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1 The Court previously assigned a pseudonym to the appellant under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
2 
 
(1) 
By order dated October 30, 2023, the Family Court terminated the 
parental rights of the appellant, Tori Hopkins, in her minor daughter, born in March 
2021 (the “Child”).2  Mother appeals. 
(2)  
On appeal, Mother’s counsel has filed an opening brief and motion to 
withdraw under Rule 26.1(c).  Counsel asserts that she has conducted a conscientious 
review of the record and the relevant law and has determined that Mother’s appeal 
is wholly without merit.  Counsel informed Mother of the provisions of Rule 26.1(c), 
provided her with a copy of counsel’s motion to withdraw and the accompanying 
brief, and advised her that she could submit in writing any additional points that she 
wished for the Court to consider.  Mother has not provided any points for the Court’s 
consideration.  The appellee, the Delaware Department of Services for Children, 
Youth and Their Families (DSCYF), and the Child’s Attorney have responded to 
counsel’s Rule 26.1(c) brief and argue that the Family Court’s judgment should be 
affirmed. 
(3) 
In August 2021, DSCYF was alerted to Mother’s possible substance 
abuse and opened a treatment case for her family.  After police responded to an 
incident where Mother, who appeared to be under the influence, struggled to 
maneuver the Child out of her stroller, DSCYF filed for emergency custody of the 
 
2 The Family Court’s order also terminated the parental rights of the Child’s father.   We refer only 
to facts in the record that relate to Mother’s appeal. 
3 
 
Child and her older siblings.3  With the filing of DFS’s dependency-and-neglect 
petition, the mandated hearings ensued.4  At the adjudicatory hearing, Mother 
stipulated to dependency based on her possible substance abuse and voluntarily 
consented to custody remaining with DSCYF.  At the hearing, the parties agreed that 
the Child would be placed with her godmother.5   
(4) 
At the January 2022 dispositional hearing, Mother testified that she had 
previously been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, depression, and anxiety and that 
she had been engaged in counseling services with Connections for three years.   
DSCYF presented the case plan that it had developed to facilitate Mother’s 
reunification with the Child.  The plan required Mother to: (i) complete a mental 
health evaluation and take her medication as prescribed; (ii) complete a substance 
abuse evaluation and comply with any recommended treatment; (iii) enroll in 
parenting classes; (iv) engage with a family interventionist through WrapAround 
Delaware; (v) obtain employment and, if necessary, to supplement her income with 
 
3 The dependency-and-neglect proceedings regarding the Child’s older siblings are not at issue in 
this appeal. 
4 When a child is removed from her home by DSCYF and placed in foster care, the Family Court 
is required to hold hearings at regular intervals under procedures and criteria detailed by statute 
and the court’s rules. 13 Del. C. § 2514; Del. Fam. Ct. Civ. P. Rs. 212-219. 
5 Later, Mother objected to the characterization of the placement resource as the Child’s 
“godmother.”  Nevertheless, the record reflects that the placement resource’s name was provided 
to DSCYF (presumably, by Mother) as a possible placement option from the outset of the 
dependency-and-neglect proceedings. 
4 
 
community resources to meet the economic needs of the family; and (vi) obtain and 
maintain stable housing.  The Family Court found the case plan to be reasonable and 
adopted it as an order of the court.   
(5) 
At the March 25, 2022 review hearing, the Family Court found that 
Mother was in partial compliance with her case plan: (i) she was attending 
counseling sessions (albeit, irregularly) and was consistently taking her prescribed 
medication; (ii) she was attending parenting classes; (iii) she was employed and had 
submitted pay stubs to DSCYF; and (iv) DSCYF had no concerns regarding her 
housing.  However, Mother had not completed a substance abuse evaluation nor a 
mental health evaluation.  DSCYF was also concerned because Mother was having 
inappropriate outbursts during her visits with the Child.  The Child was doing well 
in her foster home and was meeting her developmental milestones.  The Family 
Court found that DSCYF was making reasonable efforts to reunite the family and 
that the Child remained dependent in Mother’s care. 
(6) 
As of the June 3, 2022 review hearing, Mother: (i) was unemployed; 
(ii) had not completed a substance abuse evaluation; (iii) had been discharged from 
WrapAround Delaware on April 25, 2022, because the family interventionist felt 
threatened by Mother’s behavior; and (iv) had not been visiting with the Child.  At 
the conclusion of the hearing, the Family Court found that Mother was “regressing 
in any progress she [had] made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes 
5 
 
necessitating [the Child’s] placement in foster care.”6  The Child continued to do 
well in foster care.  The court found that DSCYF was making reasonable efforts to 
reunify the family and that the Child remained dependent in Mother’s care. 
(7) 
On September 9, 2022, DSCYF moved to change the permanency goal 
from reunification to the concurrent goals of reunification and termination of 
parental rights for the purposes of adoption.  On November 15, 2022, the Family 
Court held another review hearing.  Mother was incarcerated on pending criminal 
charges and had not visited with the Child.  Although Mother had completed the 
parenting-class portion of her case plan, she had made no progress on its other 
components.  The Family Court noted that the friction between Mother and the 
DSCYF workers and Mother’s recent arrests were negatively affecting her ability to 
focus on completing her case plan.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the Family 
Court scheduled a permanency hearing for December 2, 2023. 
(8) 
As of the December permanency hearing, Mother was still incarcerated 
and had not made any progress on her case plan.  Moreover, Mother had not been 
visiting with the Child and had not been engaged with DSCYF since her 
incarceration.  The Child was thriving in her foster home, and her foster mother was 
a permanent placement option for the Child.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
 
6 App. to DSCYF’s Answering Br. at B025. 
6 
 
Family Court granted DSCYF’s motion to change the permanency goal from 
reunification to the concurrent goals of reunification and termination of parental 
rights for the purposes of adoption.  In doing so, the Family Court observed that it 
was in the Child’s best interests to grant the motion because Mother had completed 
only one component of her case plan since the plan was put in place in November 
2021. 
(9) 
On March 9, 2023, the Family Court held a post-permanency hearing.  
Mother had been released from prison the day before the hearing.  She advised the 
court that: (i) she planned to complete the mental-health and substance-abuse 
components of her case plan while she was on probation; (ii) she wished to reengage 
with a family interventionist; and (iii) she intended to find employment.  The Child 
continued to do well in foster care.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the Family 
Court found that Mother had not made any progress on her case plan. 
(10) The Family Court held another post-permanency hearing on May 18, 
2023.  As of the hearing, Mother was incarcerated for violating the terms of her 
probation.  As part of her violation-of-probation sentence, Mother testified that she 
was engaged with the Road to Recovery Program, through which she intended to 
complete the mental-health and substance-abuse components of her case plan.  
Mother also advised the court that she intended to secure employment after she 
finished the Road to Recovery Program and was released to the work-release 
7 
 
program.  The Child continued to do well in her foster home, and the foster mother 
was an adoptive resource. 
(11) At the October 30, 2023, termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) hearing, 
the Family Court heard testimony from Mother, Mother’s DSCYF treatment worker, 
and the Child’s DSCYF permanency worker.  DSCYF acknowledged that Mother 
had completed the parenting-class component of her case plan.  However, the 
evidence presented at the TPR hearing fairly established that Mother: (i) was 
incarcerated at the Department of Correction’s Hazel D. Plant Treatment Center and 
the Child was not permitted to live there; (ii) was unemployed; (iii) had not 
completed a substance abuse evaluation; (iv) had not completed a mental health 
evaluation despite DSCYF’s repeated efforts to schedule one; and (v) in July 2022, 
Mother had been arrested for carrying a concealed deadly weapon, disorderly 
conduct, and terroristic threatening.  
(12) Following the hearing, the Family Court issued a bench ruling 
terminating Mother’s parental rights in the Child on the basis of her failure to plan 
and issued a written order summarizing its findings.  This appeal followed. 
(13) On appeal, this Court is required to consider the facts and the law as 
well as the inferences and deductions made by the Family Court.7  We review legal 
 
7 Wilson v. Div. of Family Servs., 988 A.2d 435, 439-40 (Del. 2010).   
8 
 
rulings de novo.8  We conduct a limited review of the factual findings of the trial 
court to assure that they are sufficiently supported by the record and are not clearly 
erroneous.9  If the trial judge has correctly applied the law, then our standard of 
review is abuse of discretion.10  On issues of witness credibility, we will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.11 
(14) The statutory framework under which the Family Court may terminate 
parental rights requires two separate inquiries.12  First, the court must determine 
whether the evidence presented meets one of the statutory grounds for termination.13  
When the statutory basis for termination is failure to plan, the Family Court must 
also find proof of at least one additional statutory condition.14  If the Family Court 
finds a statutory basis for termination of parental rights, the court must then 
determine whether, under 13 Del. C. § 722, severing parental rights is in the best 
 
8 Id. at 440.  
9 Id.  
10 Id.   
11 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
12 Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000).   
13 Id. at 537. 
14 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5)(a)-(e) (listing additional conditions). 
9 
 
interests of the child.15  Both of these requirements must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence.16 
(15) Here, the Family Court found that DSCYF had proved, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the termination of Mother’s parental rights was 
appropriate based on her failure to plan adequately for the Child’s physical needs or 
mental and emotional health and development17 and that the Child had been in 
DSCYF custody for more than one year.18  The Family Court then examined the 
best-interests factors set out in 13 Del. C. § 722 and—giving particular weight to 
factors 4 (the Child’s adjustment to her home, school, and community), 5 (the mental 
and physical health of the individuals involved), 6 (Mother’s past and present 
compliance with her rights and responsibilities to the Child), and 8 (the parties’ 
criminal histories)—found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of 
Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interests.   
(16)  Having carefully reviewed the parties’ positions and the record on 
appeal, we find that the Family Court’s factual findings are supported by the record, 
and we can discern no error in the court’s application of the law to the facts.  We 
 
15 Shepherd, 752 A.2d at 536-37. 
16 Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth and Their Families, 963 A.2d 724, 731 (Del. 
2008). 
17 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5). 
18 Id. § 1103(a)(5)(b). 
10 
 
therefore conclude that Mother’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any 
arguably appealable issues.  We are satisfied that Mother’s counsel made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and properly determined that 
Mother could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court be AFFIRMED.  Counsel’s motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice