Title: In re Smith
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S056148
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 2010

FILED: July 15, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct
of
FREDERICK T. SMITH,
Accused.
(OSB 07-53; SC S056148)
En Banc
On review of the
decision of a trial panel of the Disciplinary Board.
Argued and
submitted May 13, 2010.
Frederick T.
Smith argued the cause and filed the briefs in propria persona.
Mary A. Cooper,
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, argued the cause and filed the brief for the
Oregon State Bar.
PER CURIAM
The accused is
suspended from the practice of law for a period of 90 days, commencing 60 days
from the date of this decision. 
PER CURIAM
In this lawyer disciplinary
proceeding, the Oregon State Bar charged Frederick T. Smith (the accused) with
four violations of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) in connection
with his representation of a client, Rochelle Leveque, in 2005.  Specifically,
the Bar alleged that the accused violated RPC 3.1 (taking action on behalf of a
client with no nonfrivolous basis); RPC 4.1(a) (making a false statement of
material fact or law to a third person in the course of representing a client);
RPC 8.4(a)(2) (committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on a lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects); and RPC
8.4(a)(3) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law).  Following a
hearing, a trial panel of the Disciplinary Board concluded that the accused had
violated the rules as alleged and suspended the accused for 90 days.  
The accused seeks review pursuant to
ORS 9.536(1) and Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 10.1, challenging the findings and
conclusions of the trial panel with respect to each alleged violation.  We
review bar disciplinary matters de novo.  ORS 9.536(2); BR 10.6.  The
alleged misconduct must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.  BR 5.2. 
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the accused violated the four
rules listed above.  We also conclude that the accused should be suspended for
90 days.
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The charges against the accused arise
out of his advice to Leveque and his conduct in connection with a dispute
between Leveque and her employer, The Hemp &amp; Cannabis Foundation (the
corporation),(1)
which operated a clinic that helped patients register for the Oregon Medical
Marijuana Program.  In brief, Leveque, who had been asked to leave the clinic
premises in early October 2005 due to an issue with another employee -- and who
had not thereafter returned to work -- entered the clinic with several other
individuals before business hours on November 14, 2005, and attempted to
physically take over management of the clinic.  The accused also came to the
clinic that morning, in the course of his representation of Leveque, and
participated in the events as described below.  Eventually, after the
corporation's attorney and the police arrived, the accused, Leveque, and the
others who had come with Leveque left.
Many of the facts were disputed
during the hearing, and the trial panel (and this court) faced the added
difficulty that Leveque died before the hearing and did not testify. 
Nevertheless, the trial panel generally found the facts as alleged by the Bar.(2)  Although the
accused correctly identifies certain factual errors in the trial panel's
opinion, based on our de novo review, the findings that we make are
consistent with most of the trial panel's findings.  We first describe the
context of the event that led to the Bar's charges and then, in discussing each
alleged violation, we set out additional facts related to that violation. 
Except as otherwise noted, we find each of the facts stated below by clear and
convincing evidence.
The accused met Leveque in 2004 when
he became a patient at the clinic while Leveque was employed there.  In 2005,
Leveque asked the accused for legal advice about difficulties that she was
having with her employer and Paul Stanford, who ran the clinic and several
similar clinics in other states.  The accused agreed to represent Leveque. 
Although the parties disagree about Stanford's exact position with the
corporation in 2005, it is undisputed that he was the sole incorporator of the
corporation when it was established in 1999, that an October 2005 printout from
the Secretary of State's online business names registry identified him as
president, and that, at the time of the events at issue here, employees of the
corporation (including Leveque) considered him to be in charge of the
corporation's business.   
On October 7, 2005, as noted above,
the clinic manager asked Leveque to go home.  She attempted to file an
unemployment claim, although she told the accused that she was uncertain
whether she had been fired.  Over the next month, Leveque did not return to
work at the clinic; however, she was apparently attempting to get back (or
retain) her job and still had a key to the clinic.  
Meanwhile, the accused contacted Ann Witte,
the corporation's attorney, to attempt to resolve Leveque's employment dispute. 
Leveque also had a number of concerns about the way the corporation was being
run by Stanford -- including whether revenues were being appropriately accounted
for, whether corporate assets were improperly being used to advocate for
marijuana legalization, and other corporate governance issues -- and the
accused advised Leveque in connection with those issues.  As part of his legal
work for Leveque, the accused researched the corporation's status.  
We pause briefly to discuss the law
regarding the administrative dissolution of nonprofit corporations, because it
relates to the accused's position that he gave sound legal advice and that he
relied in good faith on information that he had received from the Secretary of
State's office.  A nonprofit corporation, like the corporation here, that fails
to file an annual report (or to take certain other required actions) may be
dissolved by action of the Secretary of State if it does not correct the
grounds for dissolution after receiving notice of its deficiencies.  See ORS
65.647 (describing grounds for administrative dissolution); ORS 65.651
(describing procedure for administrative dissolution).  A corporation that is
administratively dissolved "continues its corporate existence but may not
carry on any activities except those necessary to wind up and liquidate its
affairs."  ORS 65.651(3).  However, within five years of the dissolution,
a corporation may apply for "reinstatement," which, if allowed,
relates back to the date of the administrative dissolution, "and the
corporation resumes carrying on its activities as if the administrative
dissolution had never occurred."  ORS 65.654(1), (3).  (Moreover, the
five-year reinstatement deadline can be waived by the Secretary of State for "good
cause."  ORS 65.654(4).)  Expert testimony at the disciplinary hearing
established that it is common for nonprofit corporations to fail to file
required reports or notices, to be administratively dissolved, and then to be
reinstated.  Indeed, the corporation here has been administratively dissolved
and reinstated at least three times.
In researching the corporation's
status, the accused obtained a certificate dated October 31, 2005, from the
Secretary of State, which stated that the corporation had been "administratively
dissolved" for more than five years.  That certificate, however, was
inaccurate.  The person who prepared the certificate inserted the original date
of incorporation (August 19, 1999) in the certificate as the date of
dissolution, rather than the actual date of the most recent administrative
dissolution (October 14, 2005), thus incorrectly indicating that the dissolution
had occurred more than five years before the date of the certificate.  In fact,
the Secretary's business names registry, available to the public through the
Secretary's website, shows (accurately) that the corporation had been dissolved
for less than a month on October 31, 2005, and therefore easily could have been
reinstated.  As discussed further below, the accused maintains that he did not
check the website and did not know, at the time of the events that led to this
proceeding, that the certificate that he had obtained from the Secretary of
State was inaccurate.  
The accused also claims that in
November 2005 he believed -- because he believed that the corporation had been
administratively dissolved for more than five years, and because he had found
no records indicating that Stanford was an officer or director of the
corporation -- that Stanford had no legal authority within the corporation and
that he had improperly "operated it as though it was his personal asset." 
The accused explained to Leveque, however, that she "had no claim against
the corporation because she had no standing."  He told her, "the only
route that you can take here is to go through the attorney general."  The
accused and Leveque agreed that the appropriate course for her to raise her
concerns about the governance of the corporation would be to file a complaint
with the Attorney General.
On November 9, 2005, when Witte had
not responded to the accused's attempts to contact her, the accused sent Witte
a letter discussing Leveque's employment issue and her complaints about
Stanford's running of the corporation.  He noted that Leveque's "route to
right the wrongs which have occurred on the former leader[']s watch is to file
a complaint with the Oregon Attorney General's office."  He stated that he
was "very familiar with the process" and that, after a complaint is
filed, the Attorney General "issues an immediate Cease and Desist Order
and enforces that order."  The accused informed Witte that if she did not
contact him by November 15, he would file a complaint with the Attorney
General.
After sending the November 9 letter,
the accused met with Leveque.  According to the accused, once Leveque saw the
threat to go to the Attorney General in writing, she "freaked out." 
Leveque was concerned that the Attorney General might shut down the clinic and
that, as a result, thousands of patients would not be able to get access to
medical marijuana.  The accused told Leveque that he could not assure her with
certainty that the Attorney General would not shut down the clinic if he filed
the complaint.  
According to the Bar, the accused
then advised Leveque that another option would be to go to the clinic, use her
key to enter before business hours, and physically take over.  The accused
claims, however, that Leveque decided on her own that she would use her key to
open the office and attempt to take over management of the clinic.  He then
advised her that she had "equal rights with Mr. Stanford" to run the
clinic and that he could defend her from criminal or civil actions that might
arise out of an attempted takeover.  
On November 14, 2005, as noted,
Leveque and some other individuals (including a nurse, a doctor, a computer
technician, and a locksmith) arrived at the clinic before it opened and before
any employees were there.  Leveque used her key to let them in.  The locksmith
began changing the locks, and others attempted to begin working on the clinic's
computers.  The accused also came to the clinic that morning, although he states
that he came separately from Leveque.  The first employee of the clinic to
arrive was Kim Murphy, whose job was to open the clinic for business.  Murphy
testified that Leveque, her associates, and the accused were inside the clinic
when she arrived at about 7:45 a.m.  When Murphy asked Leveque what was going
on, Leveque told her, "We're taking over the clinic."  Other clinic
employees who arrived testified that Leveque made similar statements to them. 
At one point, Leveque began taking patient schedules and placing them in her
bag.  
At least two clinic employees, office
manager Janus Brown and clinic administrator Scott Carr, told Leveque and the
accused to leave.  They refused.  The accused maintains that he believed at
that time that the lease was in the corporation's name and that, because he
believed that Stanford had no legal authority to run the corporation, neither Stanford
nor those working for him had any right to direct them to leave the premises. 
At some point, a clinic employee
called the police.  According to police records, the initial call came at 9:32
a.m., and the first police officers arrived at the scene at 9:37 a.m.  A clinic
employee also phoned Stanford, who was in Hawaii; Stanford phoned Witte.  Witte
arrived at the clinic at about the same time as the police. 
According to the Bar, the accused
told clinic employees and the police that he and Leveque had a court order or
some written authorization from the Attorney General to be there.  According to
the accused, he said only that he had a complaint letter that he had drafted to
send to the Attorney General.  He claims that he showed the complaint letter to
the police and Witte and told them that he was going to go to the Attorney
General the following day if Leveque's issues could not be resolved.
 The police attempted to resolve the
dispute.  Sergeant Kim Keist understood that Leveque believed that the clinic
was not being properly operated and that there was a disagreement over who had
the right to run the clinic.  It was her view at the time, which she explained
to Leveque and the accused, that this was a civil dispute that would have to be
resolved in court and that Leveque -- because she had "walked away from
[the clinic]" -- was not authorized to enter the clinic and take it over. 
In the meantime, someone had contacted the landlord, who faxed the lease
agreement to the clinic.  The lease showed the corporation as the lessee and
Stanford as the "guarantor."  After the accused saw the lease, he
advised Leveque and her associates to leave, and they all left the premises. 
The police left the scene at 10:27 a.m.
II.  ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
A.        RPC 3.1
The Bar argues that the accused
violated RPC 3.1 when he told Leveque that (1) she was legally entitled to take
over the clinic and (2) she was legally entitled to enter the clinic's premises
when it was closed to the public.  Indeed, the Bar suggests that the accused
knew in advance that Leveque intended to try to take over the clinic and that
he assisted in that effort, also in violation of RPC 3.1.  RPC 3.1 provides:
"In representing a client or the lawyer's
own interests, a lawyer shall not knowingly bring or defend a
proceeding, assert a position therein, delay a trial or take other action on
behalf of a client, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that
is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law, except that a lawyer for the
defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that
could result in incarceration may, nevertheless[,] so defend the proceeding as
to require that every element of the case be established."
(Emphases added.)
Although the Bar and the accused
focus on whether the accused's legal advice to Leveque had a
nonfrivolous basis, we note that the Bar did not charge the accused with
failing to "provide competent representation to a client," in
violation of RPC 1.1.  The text of RPC 3.1 refers not to legal advice, but to a
lawyer's "action on behalf of a client."  The word "action,"
in this context, appears to mean "a thing done : DEED."  See Webster's
Third New Int'l Dictionary 21 (unabridged ed 2002) (defining
"action").  Moreover, the rule uses the phrase "other action on
behalf of a client," in contrast to the "actions" mentioned
earlier in the rule, viz., "bring[ing] or defend[ing] a proceeding,
assert[ing] a position therein[, or] delay[ing] a trial."  RPC 3.1
(emphasis added).  Giving legal advice to a client is "a thing done,"
a "deed."  So is appearing with a client at premises over which the
client believes she has a right to assert control and acting with and on behalf
of the client in discussions with other persons on the premises and with
police.  We conclude that the accused's advice to Leveque and his conduct on
November 14, 2005, in the course of representing her were "action[s]"
within the scope of RPC 3.1.  The pivotal factual issue, then, is whether
defendant took the actions alleged by the Bar.  If he did, the pivotal legal
issue is whether there was a nonfrivolous basis in law or fact for the accused's
actions.
As to the factual dispute, the
accused argues that he did not advise Leveque that she had the right to take
over the clinic or to enter the premises before the clinic was open to the
public.  Instead, he argues, the actions that Leveque took on November 14,
2005, were on her own initiative; he advised her only that she had as much
right as Stanford to run the clinic and that he thought that he could defend
her in any resulting civil or criminal proceedings if she chose to attempt to
take over the clinic.(3) 
He claims that, based on his understanding of the facts when he gave the advice
(including the legal status of the corporation), his advice was legally sound. 
He also appears to argue that, even if he had advised Leveque that she had a
right to take over the clinic, that advice would have been sound as well.  He
asserts that the legal doctrines of "choice of evils" and "self-help"
support his position.   
The Bar's theory that defendant
assisted Leveque in planning to take over the clinic is plausible and is
supported by some circumstantial evidence.  Nevertheless, in the absence of
testimony from Leveque, and given the accused's denials, we do not find by
clear and convincing evidence that the accused worked with Leveque in advance to
plan the attempted "takeover."  That said, clear and convincing
evidence does support the Bar's contentions that (1) the accused appeared at
the clinic early on the morning of November 14 in the course of his
representation of Leveque and asserted to Witte and Officer Keist that Leveque
had the same right to operate the clinic as did Stanford and therefore had the
right to take over physical control of the clinic, and (2) the accused previously
had told Leveque that she could assert the defenses of "choice of evils"
and "self-help" in response to any civil or criminal proceedings that
might arise if she attempted to take over the clinic.  
We turn to the legal issue, whether
the accused made those statements and gave that advice without "a basis in
law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous."  Id.  We conclude
that he did.  
Even if the accused's advice that
Leveque and Stanford had an "equal" right to operate the clinic had a
nonfrivolous basis in law or fact, that nevertheless would not justify his
position that Leveque could use "self-help" to take physical control
of the clinic's operations or the accused's participation in her efforts to do
just that.  Both the Bar's and the accused's experts agreed that the nonprofit
corporation laws do not give an employee any legal authority to walk in and
take over an operating nonprofit corporation, even if the corporation has been
administratively dissolved for more than five years.  Although certain statutes
authorize "self-help" remedies in some contexts, see, e.g.,
ORS 79.0609(2)(b) (secured party's right to self-help under Uniform
Commercial Code), the accused cites no statute or case that supports his
contention that Leveque, as a current or former employee of the clinic, was
authorized to enter the clinic and claim that she was "taking over"
because she disagreed with various aspects of the way the clinic was being
operated.  Further, the accused has not demonstrated that he acted in furtherance
of a "good faith argument for an extension" of the self-help remedies
that are permitted, in certain limited circumstances, under current law.  See
RPC 3.1 (defining "frivolous").
The accused also argues that the "choice
of evils" doctrine supports his advice to Leveque and his and Leveque's
conduct, although the precise nature of his argument is unclear.  He appears to
be attempting to demonstrate that his statement that he could defend Leveque
from a trespass action for entering the clinic before business hours was not
frivolous.  He also appears to argue that the choice of evils defense applies
to Leveque's attempt to take over the clinic. 
In describing the defense, the
accused cites Black's Law Dictionary, which defines "necessity"
as "[a] privilege that may relieve a person from liability for trespass or
conversion if that person, having no alternative, harms another's property in
an effort to protect life or health."  He argues that Leveque was
attempting to "protect life or health" by taking over the clinic,
because she believed that, if she complained to the Attorney General, he would
shut down the clinic and the patients would have no way to get their medical
needs met.  To state the accused's argument is to refute it.  Leveque had an "alternative"
-- not complaining to the Attorney General.  Moreover, even if she had
complained to the Attorney General, the accused does not indicate why Leveque
would have been justified in believing that the Attorney General would act in a
way that would harm "life or health" and why, as a result, her only
alternative was to trespass and attempt to take over the clinic.(4)
The accused also cites two cases -- La
Grande/Astoria v. PERB, 281 Or 137, 576 P2d 1204 (1978), and Sizemore v. Myers, 327 Or 456, 964 P2d 255 (1998) -- that he claims demonstrate "the
breadth that Oregon courts apply to this concept of choice between competing
values."  In La Grande/Astoria, the court noted that competing
policies advanced by state and local governments "must often involve a
choice among values," and then noted that "[s]uch choices are the
essence of political, not judicial, decision."  281 Or at 148.  The
accused claims that that "choice among values" is "directly
analogous to the [a]ccused's dilemma when navigating the uncharted waters of
non-profit corporation law."  
Sizemore involved a challenge
to a ballot title explanatory statement composed by a committee directed by statute
to prepare such a statement.  In determining that that statute did not require
the explanatory statement to explain the effect of the measure, the court
examined the statute's legislative history.  The court concluded that that
history showed that "the requirement that the explanatory statement
committees explain such effects left divided committees with a choice of two
evils -- either have an acrimonious debate concerning the potential effect
of a measure or disobey the law and omit the effect from the explanatory
statement altogether."  Sizemore, 327 Or at 466 (first
emphasis in original; second emphasis added).  
We are not persuaded.  Neither LaGrande/Astoria
nor Sizemore has any bearing on the accused's claim that the
positions he took in the course of representing Leveque were not frivolous. 
They were.   
The accused claims that, to the
extent that he is incorrect in his legal conclusions, he believed, when
advising Leveque and acting on her behalf, that those conclusions were
correct.  We find, however, that the accused knew that the positions he took in
the course of representing Leveque were frivolous.  First, the accused's claim is
undermined both by his advice to Leveque that her only redress for any concerns
that she had about the corporation was to seek the assistance of the Attorney
General and by his letter to Witte, in which he made a similar statement.  Second,
as discussed in greater detail below, on the morning of November 14, the
accused lied to various individuals at the clinic, telling them that he had
some written authorization permitting Leveque and her associates to take over
the clinic.  That supports the Bar's position that the accused knew that,
without some such authorization, he and Leveque had no legal right -- self-help
or otherwise -- to take over the clinic.  Finally, the accused has practiced
law in Oregon for more than 40 years, has substantial experience in securities
and corporate litigation, and has some experience working with nonprofit
corporations.  He is a sophisticated lawyer with extensive experience.  We find
that the accused knew that his advice to his client -- that she had some legal
basis for her attempt to take control of the clinic's operations -- was
frivolous.
B.        RPC 4.1(a) and RPC 8.4(a)(3)
The Bar alleged that, during the
attempted takeover, the accused told various people that he had written
authorization from some government entity to take over the clinic.  The trial
panel agreed and concluded that the accused had violated RPC 4.1(a) and RPC 8.4(a)(3). 
RPC 4.1(a) provides:
"In the course of representing a client a
lawyer shall not knowingly:
"(a) make a false statement of material
fact or law to a third person[.]"
RPC 8.4(a)(3) provides:
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to:
"* * * * *
"(3) engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's fitness to practice law[.]"
The accused responds that the Bar did
not demonstrate that he violated either rule because it failed to prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, that he had told anyone that he or Leveque had
written authorization to take over the clinic.  We disagree.  Two clinic
employees who were present at the time of the attempted takeover testified that
the accused told them that he had authorization from the Attorney General or a
court order to take over the clinic.  
First, Janus Brown, the clinic
manager, in describing the attempted takeover, testified as follows:
"So when [the accused] addressed me by my name I just
said, What is going on and how come you can do this?
"And he said something about the attorney
general, like they've got permission to do this.  And I was just floored, and I
immediately went to my desk * * * and called Paul [Stanford] * * *.
"* * * * *
"And I'm going, Oh, my god, Paul, I don't
know what's going on but, you know, she's got a lawyer here.  And he said, you
know, in essence, what it seemed to me that he had permission from the attorney
general to be in and I don't know what's going on." 
Scott Carr, a clinic administrator,
testified that when he asked the accused to leave during the attempted
takeover, the accused "stepped forward and said that he had a court order
to be there[.]"  When asked if the accused showed him the order, Carr
testified,
"No.  He was kind of, you know, fondling his * * *
briefcase as if he, you know, had * * * you know, he held it up halfway * * *
you know, as if he was prepared to produce it, but I didn't know what he was
talking about."  
 He also testified,
"He had a leather briefcase as I remember.  And when I
had asked him to leave, he stepped forward and held it up halfway in front of
his torso and said, I have a court order, I believe he said, from the attorney
general to be here." 
In addition, Witte similarly testified that she heard the
accused state or imply to the police that he had an order from the Attorney
General authorizing Leveque to take control of the clinic.  
Although the accused cross-examined
the witnesses at length as to the specific persons to whom the accused
allegedly made his remarks and whether he referred to a "court order"
or to some official document from the Attorney General, the three witnesses all
clearly testified that they heard the accused state that he had a government
document that authorized Leveque's actions.(5) 
We find that the Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence that the accused
made such statements.  We also find that the statements were false.  The
accused did not at that time (or at any later time) have any official
authorization from the Attorney General or a court for Leveque or the accused
to take control of the clinic or any other aspects of the corporation's
operations.
A lawyer violates RPC 4.1(a) if, in
the course of representing a client, he or she knowingly makes a "false
statement of material fact."  A lawyer violates RPC 8.4(a)(3) if he or she
engages in conduct involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice
law."  Here, the Bar contends that the accused engaged in conduct
involving "misrepresentation."  The Bar therefore can demonstrate
both violations by demonstrating that the accused made a material
misrepresentation of fact.  See In re Kluge, 332 Or 251, 255-56, 27 P3d
102 (2001) (describing requirements for violation of former rules).  A fact is
material if hearing that fact "would or could significantly influence the
hearer's decision-making process."  Id. at 255.
The accused argues that, even if he
made the statements described above, he did not engage in "conduct
involving * * * fraud [or] deceit" under RPC 8.4(a)(3).  He maintains that
the terms "fraud" and "deceit" are used "in their
tortious sense" in the disciplinary rules.  See In re Brown, 326 Or
582, 595, 956 P2d 188 (1998) (so noting).  He argues that the Bar must
therefore prove each element of the torts of fraud and deceit, including that
the persons to whom the representation was made relied on the representation.  See
id. (describing elements).  The accused contends that none of the employees
relied on his alleged misrepresentation.  Instead, they "insisted that the
[a]ccused and his client depart [and] called the police," exactly as they
would have if he had not made the misrepresentation.
Although this court did state in In
re Brown that "fraud" and "deceit" were  used in their
tortious sense in former DR 1-102(A)(3), it also noted that a lawyer can
violate the rule by engaging in "dishonest" conduct and that the Bar
need not prove fraud or deceit to show a violation of the rule.  The court
explained the meaning of fraud and deceit because, "if the accused did
violate the rule, it may be important to place a specific name on the conduct,
for purposes of determining the appropriate sanction."  Id.  Here,
the Bar argues that the accused engaged in conduct involving "misrepresentation"
(not conduct involving "fraud" or "deceit").  Proof of
reliance is not necessary to establish that the accused engaged in conduct
involving misrepresentation.  Kluge, 332 Or at 256.  
We conclude that the accused made
statements to several individuals that he had an order or some other written
authorization from the Attorney General or a court permitting the takeover. 
Those statements were false and the accused knew them to be false.  The
statements were intended to convince the employees of the corporation or the
police that Leveque was authorized to take over the clinic and therefore that
they should permit her to do so.  They were material.(6)  The accused therefore
violated RPC 8.4(a)(3) and RPC 4.1(a). 
C.        RPC 8.4(a)(2).
The Bar argues that the accused
violated RPC 8.4(a)(2) by (1) trespassing at the clinic and (2) advising
Leveque to trespass at the clinic.  A lawyer violates RPC 8.4(a)(2) when he or
she "commit[s] a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects[.]"  The accused
maintains that neither he nor Leveque trespassed at the clinic.(7)
ORS 164.245(1) provides:
"A person commits the crime of criminal
trespass in the second degree if the person enters or remains unlawfully in a
motor vehicle or in or upon premises."
An individual "enters or remains unlawfully" if he
or she "enter[s] or remain[s] in or upon premises when the premises, at
the time of such entry or remaining, are not open to the public or when the
entrant is not otherwise licensed or privileged to do so."  ORS
164.205(3)(a).  Although the Bar stated in its brief that the accused arrived
at the clinic during "normal business hours," and thus when the
premises were "open to the public," we disagree.  Testimony before
the trial panel demonstrated that the accused arrived before 7:45 a.m. -- when
Leveque and her associates were at the clinic and before the arrival of the
clinic employee who was to open the clinic for business that day. 
The accused argues, however, that Leveque
was "otherwise licensed or privileged" to enter because she had a key
that still worked and that no one had asked her to return.  Because the accused
entered the clinic with Leveque, then, he, too, was "licensed or
privileged" to enter.  
The Bar argues that Leveque's
permission to enter by way of her key was limited to use as an employee of the
clinic.  It argues (1) that Leveque was no longer an employee at the time she
attempted to take over and (2) that, even if she could be considered an
employee, she did not have permission to use the key "for purposes hostile
to" the corporation.  We agree with the Bar that Leveque's permission to
use her key to enter the clinic was limited and that she acted outside of the
scope of her "license or privilege" when she entered the clinic's
premises before business hours on November 14, 2005, to execute her plan to
take over the clinic's operations.  Because Leveque did not have authority to
use her key to enter the clinic for that purpose, she also did not have authority
to permit the accused to accompany her onto the clinic's premises for that
purpose.  
Moreover, we find that the accused
knew that Leveque was not authorized to use her key to enter the clinic or to grant
him entry.  See State v. Hartfield, 290 Or 583, 595, 624 P2d 588 (1981)
(to prove that a person is "not otherwise licensed or privileged" to
enter, state must prove that "the person extending the permission or
invitation was without actual authority to do so and that the entrant knew or
believed there was no such actual authority").  The accused knew that
Leveque was engaged in an employment dispute with the clinic and that she had
not been to work at the clinic in weeks.  Indeed, the accused had issued a
demand letter on Leveque's behalf, and he testified before the trial panel that
he had advised Leveque not to return to work until the problems with Stanford
were resolved.  Even assuming that Leveque remained an employee, the accused knew
of her status at the clinic; he knew that she was not entering the clinic on
the morning of November 14 to perform her duties as an employee.(8) 
The Bar therefore proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the accused
committed criminal trespass when he entered the clinic before business hours.(9)
The accused does not dispute that, if
he engaged in criminal trespass, that act "reflects adversely" on his
"fitness as a lawyer."  Because the criminal act here was committed "in
furtherance of his legal services," the Bar argues, "[t]he connection
between the criminal conduct and the [a]ccused's fitness to practice * * *
requires no special analysis."  We agree. 
We find by clear and convincing
evidence that the accused engaged in conduct that constituted the crime of
criminal trespass in the second degree.  Because he did so as part of his
representation of a client, that conduct reflects adversely on his fitness as a
lawyer.  The accused violated RPC 8.4(a)(2).(10)
III.  SANCTION
In determining the appropriate
sanction, we identify a presumptive sanction based on "(1) the ethical
duty violated; (2) the lawyer's mental state; and (3) the actual or potential
injury caused" by the conduct.  In re Paulson, 346 Or 676, 712, 216
P3d 859 (2009).  We then adjust that sanction based on the presence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.  Id.  As a final step, we
consider whether the sanction is consistent with Oregon case law.  Id.  Here,
the Bar argues that the accused should be suspended for "at least"
the 90 days that the trial panel imposed.  The accused does not address the
issue of the appropriate sanction.
The accused in this case violated the
duties he owed to his client and to the legal system, see American Bar
Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions  4.0, 6.0 (1991)
(amended 1992) (ABA Standards) (describing duties to client and to legal system),
when he knowingly provided frivolous legal advice to Leveque.  He also violated
his duties to the public when he engaged in criminal conduct and made
misrepresentations to further that conduct.  See ABA Standard 5.0 (describing
duties to public). 
We turn to the accused's mental state. 
A lawyer acts "knowingly" if he acts with the "conscious
awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without
the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result."  ABA
Standards at 7.  With respect to the accused's advice to Leveque, for the reasons
discussed above, we conclude that the accused "knowingly" took action
on behalf of Leveque that did not have a nonfrivolous basis in fact or law.(11) 
We also conclude that the accused knowingly or intentionally committed trespass
in the second degree.  As discussed previously, he knew that Leveque had been
asked to leave the clinic premises following a dispute with another employee. 
Although Leveque still had her key to the clinic and her employment status was
unclear, the accused knew that she was not authorized by Stanford or any other
corporate official to use her key to enter the clinic for the purpose of taking
it over.  Finally, we agree with the Bar that the accused acted intentionally
when he misrepresented to clinic employees and police that he had a document
from the Attorney General or a court order authorizing Leveque to take over
control of the clinic. 
Turning to the injury caused by the
accused's conduct, we conclude that the accused caused actual injury and
created a risk of potential injury.  First, his advice created the risk of
potential injury to Leveque.  Acting at least in part on the accused's advice,
Leveque could have been (although she was not) prosecuted for trespass.  In
addition, she lost any chance to return to her employment at the clinic.  The
accused's advice, and his participation with Leveque when she acted on his
advice, also created a risk of potential injury to Leveque and others because
of the potential for a physical confrontation.  The accused's
misrepresentations, as well as his other conduct supporting Leveque's efforts, posed
a risk of potential injury to the clinic because they might well have caused
the employees to relinquish control of the clinic to Leveque, when there was no
legal requirement that they do so.  The clinic and its patients also suffered at
least some actual injury, because its business operations were disrupted for
over two hours during the attempted takeover.
The presumptive sanction is
suspension.  As to the accused's criminal conduct, suspension is appropriate
when a lawyer "knowingly engages in criminal conduct" that is not
listed in ABA Standard 5.11 (which trespass is not) and "that seriously
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice."  ABA Standard
5.12.  As to the accused's frivolous actions, the ABA Standards do not address
the sanction for taking such action outside the context of litigation.  RPC 3.1
prohibits both asserting frivolous positions in litigation and taking other
frivolous "action" on behalf of a client.  The closest analogy is the
ABA standard that provides that a suspension is appropriate when a lawyer "knowingly
violates a court order or rule, and there is injury or potential injury to a
client or party."  ABA Standard 6.22.  We find that standard useful in
suggesting, as a preliminary matter, that a lawyer who violates RPC 3.1 by knowingly
taking action, including advising a client, that is without a nonfrivolous
basis in law or fact, should be suspended.  Finally, regarding the accused's
misrepresentation, a reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly
engages in noncriminal conduct involving misrepresentation.  ABA Standard
5.13.  
The Bar argues that there are two
aggravating factors:  the accused refused to recognize the wrongful nature of
his conduct, ABA Standard 9.22(g); and the accused had substantial experience
in the practice of law, ABA Standard 9.22(i).  There is no dispute as to the
second factor.  As to the first factor, the accused, in his responses to the
Bar's investigation and before the trial panel, continued to assert that he had
given sound legal advice to his client.  That was his principal defense to the
Bar's charges.  In our view, the accused's reliance on those arguments --
although unavailing -- cannot be used to enhance the penalty that would
otherwise be imposed for his violations.  The Bar also notes three mitigating
factors, which we also find to be present here:  the accused had no prior
disciplinary record, ABA Standard 9.32(a); the accused did not have a dishonest
or selfish motive, ABA Standard 9.32(b); and the accused had a cooperative
attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, ABA Standard 9.32(e).  
We therefore conclude that a
suspension of some term is appropriate in this case.  The Bar notes several
Oregon cases that it argues are similar to this one.(12)  It argues that the
accused's conduct is most similar to that of the accused in In re Strickland,
339 Or 595, 124 P3d 1225 (2005).  In Strickland, the accused was
involved in a dispute concerning the construction of a reservoir across the
street from his mother's (and his) home.  The accused staged a disturbance
between himself and the construction workers and then called 9-1-1, claiming
that the workers had threatened him.  When police arrived, the accused claimed,
falsely, that a construction worker had assaulted him.  The Bar alleged that
the accused had engaged in criminal conduct reflecting adversely on his fitness
to practice law and in conduct involving dishonesty.  After noting several
aggravating factors (selfish motive, substantial experience, refusal to
acknowledge wrongdoing, multiple offenses) and mitigating ones (no disciplinary
record, cooperated with disciplinary proceedings, received other sanctions in
criminal justice system), this court imposed a one-year suspension.  The Bar
argues that the accused's conduct here was similar to that of the accused in Strickland
because he "unlawfully created a situation that predictably required
police intervention."
Although Strickland bears some
similarities to this case, it involved a lawyer acting with a selfish motive
and with the intent to protect his own interests (and those of his mother). 
Moreover, the accused in Strickland clearly initiated the disruptive
plan himself and was the principal actor in the plan, whereas here the accused,
based on the facts as we have found them, was not the instigator of the
takeover plan, although he was a participant in Leveque's effort.  We do not
discount the seriousness of the accused's conduct or the potential for a
physical confrontation caused by his advice, but in fact the matter was
resolved quickly and peacefully and, so far as this record shows, without later
charges of any kind.   
A case involving somewhat similar
conduct to that at issue here is In re Glass, 308 Or 297, 779 P2d 612
(1989).  In Glass, the accused registered an assumed business name for a
fraudulent purpose.(13) 
The court noted that the accused had acted with a selfish motive but also
determined that two mitigating factors applied -- the accused had acted on the
advice of his lawyer and later recognized that his conduct was wrongful.  There
is one important difference between Glass and this case, however.  In Glass,
the accused had failed to cooperate with the Bar in the disciplinary
proceedings.  The court noted that a 60-day suspension had been deemed
appropriate for similar conduct in In re Hopp, 291 Or 697, 634 P2d 238
(1981) (accused registered an assumed business name to harass opponent), but
determined that the accused's conduct in Glass was "compounded"
by his failure to cooperate, resulting in a 91-day sanction.  Glass, 308
Or at 305 n 7.  However, the conduct here is more serious than that in Glass
and Hopp, because the accused engaged in criminal conduct and his
conduct resulted in greater potential injury (police involvement, risk of
physical confrontation).(14)
In our view, the conduct involved
here was more serious than in Glass and Hopp, but less serious
than in Strickland.(15) 
We conclude, as did the trial panel, that the appropriate sanction is a suspension
of 90 days.                    
The accused is suspended from the
practice of law for a period of 90 days, commencing 60 days from the date of
this decision.
1. As
described in greater detail in the text, around the time of the events at issue
in this proceeding, the corporation failed to file required reports with the
Secretary of State's office and therefore was "administratively
dissolved" under ORS 65.651 for a period of several months.  During that
time, a third party registered the name "The Hemp and Cannabis
Foundation" under Oregon's assumed business name statute and incorporated
a different nonprofit corporation using that name.  Because the third party had
acquired the right to that name, in January 2006 the corporation changed its
name to "THCF."
2. The
public member of the trial panel agreed with the panel's findings but included
an additional statement of his views in the trial panel's opinion.  The public
member was more skeptical of the accused's veracity than the other members.
3. Before
the trial panel, the accused offered different versions of events.  At one
point, he claimed that he did not know that Leveque was going to attempt a
takeover; at another, he admitted that he knew and advised against it, but that
he could not stop her.  In a letter to the Bar during its investigation of the
case, the accused wrote, "I then arranged for my client to meet me on
November 14 at the clinic to try to catch Mr. Stanford and tell him that we felt
constrained to either complain to the Attorney General's Office or take over
the clinic with new management."
4. In
this court, the accused makes clear that he is not relying on ORS 161.200,
which codifies "choice of evils" as a defense to a criminal
prosecution.  Under that statute, the defense is available only when illegal
conduct is necessary to avoid an imminent injury and "[t]he threatened
injury is of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence
and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly
outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the
statute defining the offense in issue."  The accused could not justify
Leveque's conduct using that statute; any harm caused by the Attorney General
shutting down the clinic was not "imminent."  Indeed, as of the time
of the attempted takeover of the clinic, neither the accused nor Leveque had
had any contact with the Attorney General at all regarding the corporation.  
5. As
noted previously, the accused testified that those witnesses were wrong and
that he had stated only that he had a letter that he had written to the
Attorney General regarding the alleged irregularities at the corporation. 
Based on the consistent testimony of two of the clinic's employees and the
clinic's outside counsel, we find those witnesses, rather than the accused, to
be credible on this point.
6. The
accused makes no argument that, if proved, his conduct did not "reflect[]
adversely on [his] fitness to practice law," under RPC 8.4(a)(3). 
7. The
accused does not distinguish between his alleged trespass and his participation
in Leveque's alleged trespass.   
8. The
accused testified before the trial panel that he believed that Leveque was
going to the clinic on November 14, 2005, to open the clinic and perform her
normal duties as an employee.  We do not find that testimony credible, however,
considering the accused's conduct on November 14, along with the accused's
testimony that he told Leveque, before the attempted takeover, that he could
defend her against criminal or civil charges arising out of her entry and that
he believed that the doctrine of self-help could apply to the situation. 
9. The
accused argues that the Bar was required to prove every element of criminal
trespass beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, to prove a violation of RPC
8.4(a)(2), the Bar need only prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
accused engaged in the relevant conduct and that that conduct constituted
criminal trespass.  See BR 5.2 (clear and convincing evidence standard
in disciplinary cases); see also In re Leisure, 338 Or 508, 516, 113 P3d
412 (2005) (noting, under the predecessor to RPC 8.4(a)(2), that the Bar
"must 'establish the criminal act by clear and convincing evidence'").
10. The
Bar also contends that the accused violated RPC 8.4(a)(2) by the criminal act of
acting as an accomplice to Leveque's criminal trespass.  Because we have
already concluded that the accused violated RPC 8.4(a)(2), we do not address
that issue.
11. The
trial panel opined that the accused's mental state with respect to this
violation was "negligent," because he continued to maintain that his
advice was justified.  However, RPC 3.1 specifically identifies
"knowingly" as the mental state required to prove a violation of that
rule.  For the reasons stated in the text, we believe that the Bar proved by
clear and convincing evidence that the accused acted "knowingly" when
he gave the advice he did.
12. The
Bar cites several cases "in which a lawyer has pursued a frivolous claim
to the extent of committing criminal conduct" that resulted in disbarment
or a lengthy sanction.  Those cases, however, involved more serious misconduct,
more aggravating circumstances, or both.  See, e.g., In re Kluge,
332 Or 251, 27 P3d 102 (2001) (three-year suspension for lawyer who falsely
represented that he was a notary, engaged in the practice of law without PLF
coverage, falsely represented to PLF that he did not require coverage, and
failed to withdraw when required to give testimony prejudicial to client;
aggravating factors included pattern of misconduct, bad-faith obstruction of
disciplinary proceeding, refusal to acknowledge wrongful behavior, and
substantial experience; the only mitigating factor was lack of disciplinary
history).
13. An
individual, John Pearce, had filed a construction lien against the accused and
initiated an action to foreclose the lien in the name "John Pearce, dba
Quicksilver Construction Company."  Pearce had not registered the name
Quicksilver Construction Company; the accused registered that name to avoid the
suit.
14. In
Glass and Hopp, each attorney registered an assumed business name
for an inappropriate purpose; we note that, in this case, we do not find that
the accused was involved in the third party's registration of the corporation's
name.  Instead, the conduct in Glass and Hopp is analogous to the
accused's conduct because here, as in those cases, the accused attempted to
take advantage of the corporation's failure to maintain appropriate administrative
records.
15. In
Glass, as noted, the court concluded that the accused's conduct was
similar to the conduct in Hopp and ordinarily would result in a 60-day
suspension.  The court imposed a 91-day suspension in Glass because the
accused did not cooperate with the Bar's investigation.  Although the conduct
here was more serious than that in Glass, a similar sanction is
appropriate, because this case does not involve the same aggravating factors as
in Glass.