Title: Commonwealth v. J.A.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12277
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 20, 2017

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SJC-12277 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  J.A., a juvenile. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 7, 2017. - November 20, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Dog.  Youthful Offender Act.  Statute, Construction.  Words, 
"Serious bodily harm." 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Suffolk County 
Division of the Juvenile Court Department on November 19, 2015.  
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Peter M. Coyne, J.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Elianna J. Nuzum, Special Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Benjamin L. Falkner for the juvenile. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Michael W. Morrissey, District Attorney for the Norfolk 
District, & Tracey A. Cusick & Stephanie Martin Glennon, 
Assistant District Attorneys, for District Attorney for the 
Norfolk District. 
 
Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Kimberly Cariani, & Jaclyn Collier for 
Juvenile Law Center of Suffolk University Law School & another. 
 
Virginia F. Coleman for Animal Legal Defense Fund. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The juvenile is alleged to have brutally attacked 
2 
 
his friend's dog.  The Commonwealth elected to proceed against 
the juvenile pursuant to the youthful offender statute, G. L. 
c. 119, § 54, on the ground that he caused serious bodily harm 
to the dog.1  The juvenile argues that the youthful offender 
indictments are not supported by probable cause because the 
phrase "serious bodily harm" in the statute contemplates harm to 
human beings, not animals.2  We agree and therefore affirm the 
dismissal below.  We note, however, that the Commonwealth still 
may take action against the juvenile by seeking a complaint for 
delinquency against him.3   
 
Background.  The following facts are taken from the 
testimony presented to the grand jury.  In August, 2015, when 
the juvenile was fourteen years old, he tortured a friend's dog 
by shoving a soap dispenser pump into the dog's vagina, 
                     
 
1 Unlike a delinquent child, who is subject to 
rehabilitative penalties and remedies, a "youthful offender" is 
subject to penalties that may include an adult sentence in the 
State prison.  Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 641 
(2013), citing Commonwealth v. Connor C., 432 Mass. 635, 645 
(2000). 
   
 
2 We use "animal" as a shorthand reference for "nonhuman 
animal."   
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the District 
Attorney for the Norfolk District, the Animal Legal Defense 
Fund, and the Juvenile Law Center and Juvenile Defender Clinic 
of Suffolk University Law School.   
 
3 
 
resulting in serious internal injuries to the dog.4   
 
A grand jury returned two youthful offender indictments 
against the juvenile, charging him with cruelty to animals and 
bestiality.  See G. L. c. 272, §§ 34, 77.  A Juvenile Court 
judge allowed the juvenile's motion to dismiss, concluding that 
the phrase "serious bodily harm" in the youthful offender 
statute refers only to human victims.  The Commonwealth 
appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own 
motion.   
 
Discussion.  A juvenile may be tried as a youthful offender 
when the following criteria are met:   
"[the] person is alleged to have committed an offense . . . 
while between the ages of fourteen and [eighteen] which, if 
he were an adult, would be punishable by imprisonment in 
the [S]tate prison, and the person has previously been 
committed to the [D]epartment of [Y]outh [S]ervices, or the 
offense involves the infliction or threat of serious bodily 
harm."   
 
G. L. c. 119, § 54.  Here, because the juvenile was between 
fourteen and eighteen years old at the time of the offense, the 
offense is punishable by imprisonment in State prison, and the 
juvenile has not been committed previously to the Department of 
Youth Services, the juvenile may be tried as a youthful offender 
only if the offense involved serious bodily harm or, more 
precisely, if the Legislature intended that the phrase "serious 
                     
 
4 The dog underwent surgery and survived. 
4 
 
bodily harm" apply to animal as well as human victims.   
 
Whether the scope of the phrase "serious bodily harm" 
encompasses harm to animals is a question of statutory 
interpretation requiring de novo review.  Commonwealth v. 
Martin, 476 Mass. 72, 75 (2016).  To determine the Legislature's 
intent, we look to the words of the statute, "construed by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished."  Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Boston, 
435 Mass. 718, 720 (2002), quoting O'Brien v. Director of the 
Div. of Employment Sec., 393 Mass. 482, 487-488 (1984).   
 
By its terms, the statute neither expressly includes nor 
excludes serious bodily harm to animals.  To determine whether 
the statute is properly interpreted to apply to both animals and 
humans, a canvassing of statutes specifically prohibiting harm 
to animals is instructive, as is a review of other statutes 
generally prohibiting bodily harm or injury.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 431 Mass. 417, 420 (2000) (explaining 
canon of in pari materia, i.e., looking to statutes of similar 
subject matter).   
 
1.  Animal protection statutes.  When the Legislature 
intends a statute to protect animals, it does so directly and 
unambiguously.  For example, it is a crime to "kill[], maim[] or 
5 
 
disfigure any horse, cattle or other animal of another person."  
G. L. c. 266, § 112.  It is also a crime to "overwork[], 
torture[], . . . or kill[] an animal."  G. L. c. 272, § 77.  The 
Legislature has further criminalized "exhibit[ing] . . . any 
wild animal" for "amusement," G. L. c. 272, § 77B, and 
"surgical[ly] devocaliz[ing] . . . a dog or cat," G. L. c. 272,  
§ 80 1/2 (b).  The Legislature has also created tort liability 
of a person who "kills, maims, entices or carries away a dog or 
other domesticated animal or bird," G. L. c. 272, § 85A, or who 
"steals or attacks [an] assistance animal," G. L. c. 272, 
§ 85B(a).  The Commonwealth has not pointed to any Massachusetts 
statute, and we have not found any in our review, that has ever 
been interpreted to cover animals where the statutory language 
did not include the word "animal" or a specific type of animal.  
Had the Legislature intended the general criminal statutes to 
protect animals, it need not have enacted animal cruelty laws at 
all.  Compare G. L. c. 265, §§ 1, 13 (murder and manslaughter), 
with G. L. c. 266, § 112 (killing of domestic "animal[s]").5   
                     
 
5 The Commonwealth relies upon Commonwealth v. Duncan, 467 
Mass. 746, 751-752, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 224 (2014), for the 
proposition that this court recognizes animal protection as a 
strong public policy interest.  In Duncan, we upheld as lawful a 
warrantless search for the purpose of aiding an animal.  Id. at 
753.  Although we referenced animal cruelty statutes and 
highlighted the public policy of promoting the humane treatment 
of animals, Duncan involved the extension of our common law, not 
statutory interpretation.  See id. at 752 (discussing cases 
 
6 
 
 
2.  "Serious bodily harm" in context.  By and large the 
statutes that prohibit the infliction of serious bodily injury 
apply only to human beings.6  See, e.g., G. L. c. 265, § 13J 
(injury to child); G. L. c. 265, § 13K (injury to elderly 
person); G. L. c. 265, § 13L (injury to child); G. L. c. 265, 
§ 15A (injury to person by means of dangerous weapon); G. L. 
c. 265, § 15D (injury to person by strangulation); G. L. c. 265,  
§ 40 (injury to physical exercise program participant).   
 
Notably, the only place where the term "bodily injury" is 
used specifically to refer to both humans and animals is in the 
statute that provides for restraining orders to protect a person 
or a member of his or her family or household, including 
"domesticated animal[s]."  G. L. c. 209A, § 11.  This lone 
example demonstrates again that when the Legislature intends to 
include animals as victims in a statute, it does so expressly.   
 
Thus, based on a review of statutes prohibiting harm to 
animals and those prohibiting harm generally, we conclude that 
the Legislature did not intend the "serious bodily harm" 
language in the youthful offender statute to apply to animal 
victims.   
                                                                  
developing emergency aid exception).   
 
 
6 We use "serious bodily harm" and "serious bodily injury" 
interchangeably.  See, e.g., Felix F. v. Commonwealth, 471 Mass. 
513, 517 (2015); Commonwealth v. Pike, 428 Mass. 393, 396 
(1998); Commonwealth v. Cataldo, 423 Mass. 318, 323 (1996).   
7 
 
 
3.  Legislative history.  The Commonwealth argues that the 
legislative history of the youthful offender statute militates 
in favor of interpreting the statute broadly to encompass 
serious bodily harm to animals.  However, we conclude that the 
legislative history further supports our more narrow reading of 
the statute.  See Quincy City Hosp. v. Rate Setting Comm'n, 406 
Mass. 431, 443 (1990) ("Statutes are to be interpreted . . . in 
connection with their development and history, and with the 
history of the times and prior legislation").   
 
The concept of trying juveniles as adults in certain 
circumstances goes back as far as the Nineteenth Century.  See, 
e.g., Pub. St. 1881, c. 155, § 49.  The phrase "serious bodily 
harm" first appeared in the 1975 amendments to what is now known 
as the youthful offender statute.  St. 1975, c. 840, § 1, 
amending G. L. c. 119, § 61.  The language was included, along 
with the other familiar criteria that still exist today, to 
limit the number of juveniles being tried as adults.  Until that 
time, it was within the discretion of a trial judge to determine 
whether transfer to adult court was in the public interest.  
G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 119, § 61.   
 
The current incarnation of the youthful offender statute, 
enacted in 1996, made comprehensive changes in the 
Commonwealth's juvenile law to "address growing concern about 
violent crimes committed by juveniles."  Doe v. Attorney Gen. 
8 
 
(No. 1), 425 Mass. 210, 213 n.8 (1997).  Although, among other 
things, the 1996 amendments, codified as G. L. c. 119, § 54, 
eliminated juvenile transfer hearings and automatically required 
juveniles over the age of fourteen who were charged with 
committing murder in the first or second degree to be tried as 
adults, the amendments did not alter the "serious bodily harm" 
language.  See St. 1996, c. 200, §§ 2, 15.  Compare St. 1996, 
c. 200, § 2, with St. 1975, c. 840, § 1.   
 
The impetus for the 1996 amendment had nothing to do with 
harm to animals; instead it was sparked by the murder of a woman 
by a then thirteen year old juvenile.  See Roundup, State House 
News Service, Mar. 14, 1996.  The legislative history of the 
youthful offender statute does not support the Commonwealth's 
view that "serious bodily harm" includes harm to animals.7   
 
Conclusion.  We do not discount the seriousness of the 
extremely disturbing allegations against the juvenile; they 
raise grave concerns about the juvenile's mental health.  Nor do 
                     
 
7 The Commonwealth points to the Legislature's rejection of 
a proposed amendment limiting the statute to crimes involving 
violations of G. L. c. 265, titled "Crimes Against the Person," 
as proof that it intended the statute to protect animals from 
serious bodily harm.  The failure to adopt an amendment intended 
to limit the types of crimes qualifying under the youthful 
offender statute does not demonstrate that the Legislature 
intended for the phrase "serious bodily harm" to extend to 
animal victims.  See Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611, 615-616 
(1980) (stressing fallacy in attributing particular motivation 
to rejection of legislative measure).   
9 
 
we wish to downplay the suffering the dog went through during 
and after the attack.  Nevertheless, "[o]ur primary duty in 
interpreting a statute is 'to effectuate the intent of the 
Legislature in enacting it.'"  Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 
737 (2014), quoting Water Dep't of Fairhaven v. Department of 
Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass. 740, 744 (2010).  Here, for the 
reasons discussed supra, we conclude that the "serious bodily 
harm" referenced in the statute does not apply to animals.  
Therefore, the juvenile's conduct does not meet the requirements 
of the statute.   
 
 Although the juvenile will not be treated as an adult and 
face criminal penalties, the Commonwealth certainly may proceed 
by way of a complaint for delinquency in the Juvenile Court, 
where the flexibility to order mental health treatment exists.  
See Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 808 (2013) (noting 
Juvenile Court's broad "discretion . . . to render 
individualized dispositions").   
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order granting the 
juvenile's motion to dismiss.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.   
 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J. (concurring).  A dog was horrifically tortured, 
and because her torturer was a teenager, the Commonwealth had 
limited recourse.  I agree with the court that bodily harm to 
animals does not fall within the purview of the youthful 
offender statute as drafted.  I write separately to highlight 
the Legislature's ability to amend the youthful offender statute 
or promulgate other legislation to better protect animals and 
the public.   
 
Preventing animal cruelty is a tenet of our collective 
humanity and a crucial public policy goal in Massachusetts.  See 
Commonwealth v. Duncan, 467 Mass. 746, 751, cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 224 (2014) ("Our statutes evince a focus on the prevention 
of both intentional and neglectful animal cruelty").1  The 
Commonwealth also has a strong interest in identifying young 
people with violent tendencies and in preventing additional 
violence.   
 
Not only is preventing animal cruelty and abuse an 
important public policy goal for the sake of the animals, but 
                     
 
1 The Legislature is considering many animal care and 
protection bills, indicating that this continues to be a concern 
to the citizens of the Commonwealth.  See, e.g., House Bill No. 
852 (establishing animal abuse registry); Senate Bill No. 2165 
(permitting damages when assistance animal is harmed or killed); 
House Bill No. 2290 (providing for imprisonment and fines for 
those who leave pet outside during extreme weather); Senate Bill 
No. 1155 (forbidding pet shops from selling dogs or cats 
purchased from breeder that is not in compliance with breeder 
licensure requirements).   
2 
 
 
the link between juvenile animal cruelty and abuse and later 
adulthood violence is well established as well.2  See Department 
of Correction, Childhood Animal Abuse and Violent Criminal 
Behavior:  A Brief Review of the Literature (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/doc/research-reports/briefs-
stats-bulletins/summaryofanimalabuseliteraturefinal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YGY2-7K7L]; Hensley, Browne, and Trentham, 
Exploring the Social and Emotional Context of Childhood Animal 
Cruelty and Its Potential Link to Adult Human Violence, 
Psychology, Crime & Law (2017) ("Existing research has 
repeatedly shown animal cruelty to be a predictor of adult 
interpersonal violence"); Animal Legal Defense Fund, Animal 
Cruelty's Link to Other Forms of Community Violence (2011), 
http://aldf.org/downloads/ALDFLinkStats2011.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/4YF6-LV7H] ("If a child exhibits aggressive or sexualized 
behavior toward animals it may be associated with later abuse of 
                     
 
2 In a time when social science is rapidly evolving, the 
Legislature is in a better position than a court to act on 
advances in social science research.  See, e.g., Deputy Chief 
Counsel for the Pub. Defender Div. of the Comm. for Pub. Counsel 
Servs. v. Acting First Justice of the Lowell Div. of the Dist. 
Court Dep't, 477 Mass. 178, 187 (2017) (noting that while social 
science may support change to statute at issue, it is 
nonetheless court's responsibility to enforce statutes as 
written by Legislature).  Courts are tasked with resolving 
particular disputes among parties and must limit rulings to 
those narrow issues, whereas the Legislature can more readily 
address most ills.  See Guzman v. MRM/Elgin, 409 Mass. 563, 570 
(1991) ("These are issues of broad public policy involving 
balancing the interests of future plaintiffs and defendants, 
which the Legislature is better equipped to resolve").   
3 
 
 
humans, unless the behavior is recognized and stopped"). 
 
A juvenile who intentionally harms an animal displays a 
concerning propensity for viciousness.  If the Commonwealth can 
respond to juvenile animal abuse effectively, it may help spare 
future victims, animal and human alike.   
 
The youthful offender statute, if amended, can provide the 
Commonwealth more flexibility when dealing with such disquieting 
cases of animal cruelty.  Prosecutors then may be able to enlist 
the comprehensive assistance of the criminal justice system in 
addressing allegations of animal cruelty that may be harbingers 
of violence to come.   
 
Although there may be other avenues available to the 
Commonwealth, the youthful offender statute could have been the 
most appropriate response.  If the Legislature wishes to empower 
prosecutors to respond to similar acts of animal brutality, it 
may expand the reach of the youthful offender statute and other 
statutes proscribing violence to better address animal abuse and 
cruelty in the Commonwealth.