Title: South Alabama Brick Co., Inc. v. Carwie
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1130345
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 18, 2016

REL: 03/18/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1130345
____________________
South Alabama Brick Co., Inc.,
d/b/a Riley-Stuart Supply Co.
v.
J. Gregory Carwie, as temporary conservator 
of Benito Perez, an incapacitated person
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-10-902631)
MURDOCK, Justice.
South Alabama Brick Co., Inc., d/b/a Riley-Stuart Supply
Co. ("SAB"), appeals from the Mobile Circuit Court's judgment
in the amount of approximately $12.6 million in favor of
J. Gregory Carwie, as temporary conservator of Benito Perez,
1130345
who suffered catastrophic injuries when he fell through a
skylight in the roof of a warehouse owned and operated by SAB. 
We reverse.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
SAB is a Dothan, Alabama, based supplier of building
materials, including bricks and roofing materials, which has
seven locations throughout Alabama and Florida.  One of those
locations is a warehouse in Mobile, 
Alabama 
("the warehouse").
The roof of the warehouse includes a large flat area.
Contiguous to the large flat area is a large pitched area. The
pitched area of the roof contains 37 skylights that are raised
above the contours of the roof itself.  The flat area of the
roof contains 12 skylights that are not raised above the
contours of the roof.  The surfaces of both the pitched and
flat areas of the roof are corrugated. 
In October 2010, SAB noticed that water was dripping into
the warehouse from leaks somewhere in the roof.  Ramsey
Stuart, the general manager of SAB's Mobile location,
contacted Cooner Roofing and Construction, Inc. ("Cooner
Roofing"), regarding the need for repairs to the roof.
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Bobby Cooner is the president and owner of Cooner Roofing
(a business begun by his father).  Stuart testified that, when
SAB had experienced any "roof issues, leaks or whatever over
the years" it would call Cooner Roofing.  He testified that he
would rely upon Cooner to determine what repairs might be
necessary.  According to Stuart, Cooner Roofing's services in
repairing leaks had been acceptable, and, during Stuart's
lengthy association with SAB, he had no recollection of anyone
other than Cooner Roofing performing repair work on SAB's
roof.1
Cooner examined the warehouse roof and gave SAB two
proposals for repairing it.  For a price of approximately
$10,000, which SAB accepted, Cooner proposed to repair the
roof of the warehouse by putting a coating on some portions of
the flat area of the roof, installing a Hydro Stop brand
waterproofing system in the middle seam and upper seam of the
flat area of the roof, and repairing or replacing the covers
Records showed that, in just the last seven years before
1
the incident, Cooner Roofing had performed work on SAB's roof
on at least three other occasions.
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for the 37 skylights on the pitched area of the roof.   The 12
2
skylights on the flat area of the roof were not included as
part of the work Cooner proposed. 
Stuart testified that he had worked at SAB, a business
started by his father, for over 30 years and that the
skylights had been part of the roof since before he began
working at the facility.  According to Stuart,  neither he
nor, to his knowledge, any SAB employee had ever been on the
warehouse roof.  The record contains no evidence indicating
that any SAB employee had ever been on the roof.   
3
SAB was not aware exactly of where Cooner Roofing's work
on the roof would be performed.  Stuart did testify that
Cooner had advised him that some of his "crew" would be
working around some of the skylights.  On cross-examination,
Stuart testified that he knew that the skylights would not
support the weight of a man and that if a person fell through
a skylight he likely would suffer grievous injury or death. 
Cooner also gave SAB an option for more extensive work
2
to the roof at a greater cost, which SAB did not accept.
Stuart testified that SAB did not even possess a ladder
3
that could have enabled any of its employees to go onto the
roof.
4
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At the time of the events in question, Cooner Roofing
used subcontractors and/or temporary employees to perform its
work.  Cooner testified that approximately 90 percent of the
company's work consists of residential roofing projects; he
could not name any commercial projects the company had
performed other than those it had performed for SAB.
Stuart testified that he could not recall any prior
"incidents" 
involving 
the 
safety 
of 
Cooner 
Roofing's 
employees
or subcontractors and that there had never been any indication
that Cooner or Cooner Roofing did not have knowledge of
whatever hazards there might be working on metal roofs.
Further, Stuart testified that he had no knowledge regarding
any 
fall-protection requirements for working on roofs and 
that
he had left it up to Cooner Roofing to take whatever safety
measures it deemed necessary to do its work from time to time
on SAB's roof.  There is no evidence indicating that SAB
exercised, or reserved the right to exercise, any control over
the manner in which Cooner Roofing performed its contractual
obligations to SAB.
Cooner Roofing hired Rocael Perez and his "crew,"
including Benito Perez, to perform the work on the roof of the
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warehouse.  According to Rocael Perez, the members of his crew
were not his employees and they all shared equally the money
Cooner Roofing paid for the roofing work.4
Cooner testified that he warned Rocael Perez and his crew
that the skylights on the flat area could be dangerous.
Specifically, Cooner testified that he went up on the flat
roof with Stuart and Rocael Perez and that he pointed out each
of the 12 skylights on the flat area of the roof to Rocael
Perez.  Cooner stated that he then told Rocael Perez to follow
fall-protection regulations of the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration ("OSHA") in dealing with the skylights,
which he said dictate covering skylights with plywood and
using harnesses with ropes while working on the roof.  Cooner
added, however, that he expected Rocael Perez to purchase his
own safety supplies for the project, including the plywood, as
well as workers' compensation insurance.  Cooner testified
that the estimate he provided to Stuart for the cost of the
It is unclear whether Rocael Perez was a subcontractor
4
of Cooner Roofing who, in turn, employed Benito Perez, or
whether Benito was a direct employee of Cooner Roofing along
with the other members of the crew.   The rationale for our
decision applies to either circumstance.  For purposes of
this opinion, we treat Benito Perez as an employee of Cooner
Roofing.
6
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roofing project included the cost of any safety supplies that
might be necessary.
Rocael Perez testified that before the roofing project
for SAB, he had never worked around skylight panels similar to
the ones installed in the flat area of the warehouse roof.  He
stated that before the accident he did not know whether those
skylights could hold the weight of a person and he did not
know that they could be dangerous.  He testified that Cooner
did not tell him that there were skylights on the flat area of
the roof and thus did not relate that those skylights could be
dangerous.  He stated that Cooner Roofing did not provide the
crew with any safety guidelines or supplies.  Rocael Perez
also testified that the skylights on the flat area of the roof
were "fitted into the roof," not raised like ordinary
skylights, and that they were "practically identical to the
metal" portion of the roof.  He conceded  that the skylight
panels in the flat area of the roof were a different color
than the rest of the roof, but he stated that the skylights
were old and that the color looked kind of like metal.   He
5
Pictures of the roof introduced by both parties showed
5
that the skylight panels on the flat area of the roof were a
black or faded brown color while the rest of the roof was
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testified that, when you are on the roof in the sunlight, the
whole roof looks black and the skylights look no different
than the rest of the roof. 
Another crew member, Byron Perez, testified that Cooner
spent only eight minutes on the roof with the crew explaining
the job to them.  He stated that Cooner did not tell them
about the skylights or warn them to be careful because the
skylights could be dangerous.  Byron gave testimony to the
same effect as Rocael about the difficulty of distinguishing
between the roof and the skylights.  Carwie also presented
expert testimony to the effect that the skylights and the
danger they presented were not open and obvious.
On October 29, 2010, the second or third day the crew had
been working on the warehouse roof, Benito Perez was working
on the pitched area of the roof near the crease between the
pitched area and the flat area of the roof.  According to
Byron Perez, Benito Perez stood up, took a step backward, and
lost his balance. Benito Perez then proceeded to fall backward
onto one of the skylights on the flat area of the roof.  He
fell through the skylight and hit the concrete floor of the
gray in color.
8
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warehouse at least 20 feet below the roof.  The fall resulted
in catastrophic injuries to Benito Perez.
Carwie, as temporary conservator of Benito Perez, sued
Cooner Roofing.  The complaint alleged negligence and
wantonness; Carwie later added SAB as a defendant.
Following a bench trial, but before the trial court
entered a judgment, both SAB and Cooner Roofing filed
separate motions they styled as motions for a judgment as a
matter of law.  SAB also filed a "Supplemental Motion for a
Judgment as a Matter of Law."  Carwie agreed at the close of
trial that he was not pursuing the wantonness claims against
SAB and Cooner Roofing, and the trial court entered a
judgment in favor of SAB and Cooner Roofing on the wantonness
claims.  The trial court thereafter entered what it entitled
an "Order and Verdict."  At the outset of that order, the
trial court noted that SAB's and Cooner Roofing's respective
motions purporting to request judgments as a matter of law in
a bench trial were actually motions for a judgment on partial
9
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findings by the trial court pursuant to Rule 52(c), Ala. R.
Civ. P.   The trial court denied the motions.  
6
As to SAB, the trial court noted in its order that SAB
had argued that the only duty it owed Benito Perez was the
duty a premises owner has to a business invitee.  SAB argued
that it was not liable to Benito Perez because, irrespective
of whether the skylights and the danger presented thereby
were open and obvious to Benito, Cooner Roofing, the entity
that had employed Benito and that was responsible for
stationing him on the roof, had superior knowledge about the
dangers presented by the skylights on the flat area of the
roof and was responsible for providing any necessary warnings
Rule 52(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
6
"If during a trial without a jury a party has been
fully heard on an issue and the court finds against
the party on that issue, the court may enter
judgment against that party with respect to a claim
or defense that cannot under the controlling law be
maintained or defeated without a favorable finding
on that issue, or the court may decline to render
any judgment until the close of all the evidence.
Such a judgment may be supported by findings of
fact and conclusions of law."
10
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to its own employees.  The trial court rejected SAB's
argument.  
7
The trial court also concluded that SAB owed "an
additional duty under the facts of this case" besides the
traditional common-law duty of a premises owner to a business
invitee.  Specifically, relying largely on expert testimony
presented by Carwie, the trial court held that SAB had a duty
to Benito Perez to ensure that Cooner Roofing was a safe,
qualified contractor.
SAB also argued that it was entitled to a judgment on
partial findings because Carwie failed to present expert
testimony as to the reasonableness of the medical bills
resulting from Benito Perez's care at University of South
Alabama ("USA") Hospital.   SAB contended that because Carwie
8
The trial court took the position that SAB's motion for
7
a judgment on partial findings "hinges on what ... Cooner
..., the owner of Cooner Roofing, knew about the dangers of
the skylights on SAB's warehouse roof."  The trial court
expressed 
utter 
disdain 
for 
Cooner 
and 
decided 
his
uncontroverted testimony was not worthy of belief.  For the
reasons explained in the text, the trial court's disbelief of
Cooner's testimony is not dispositive of whether SAB owed a
duty directly to Cooner Roofing's employee, Benito Perez, in
this case.
Carwie introduced certified medical bills totaling
8
$800,960.70.  Also, Kathy Smith, a registered nurse and life-
care-planning expert, testified that the future care for
11
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failed to prove  by competent evidence any medical expenses
or recoverable damages, his negligence claim must fail.  For
several reasons, the trial court also rejected this argument.
First, the trial court noted that Carwie had sought damages
not only for Benito Perez's medical expenses, but also for
Benito's pain, suffering, and mental anguish.  Second, the
trial court concluded that testimony from the collections
manager of USA Hospital, Teresa Englestead, and from the
collections supervisor at USA Physicians Health Services
Foundation, Lucy Wilson, was competent to establish the
reasonableness of the medical expenses submitted by Benito
Perez.  Third, the trial court noted that SAB had objected
that Englestead and Wilson were not named as expert witnesses
in accordance with the pretrial order, but the court concluded
that "admission of testimony from witnesses whose identity as
an expert may not have been disclosed in accordance with
properly conducted pretrial discovery procedure is within the
trial court's sound discretion."   
9
Benito Perez, if he is transferred to a long-term-care
facility, would range from $1,930,610 to $2,279,119.54 over
the course of his life.   
Before trial, Carwie listed Englestead and Wilson as
9
fact witnesses, not as expert witnesses.
12
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As noted, the trial court also rejected Cooner Roofing's
motion for a judgment on partial findings.  Cooner Roofing
argued that the danger of the skylights was open and obvious
and, therefore, that it was not liable for Benito Perez's
injuries. The trial court rejected this argument, stating in
its order that the question was not simply whether the
skylights themselves presented an open and obvious 
danger 
"but
whether [Benito] Perez appreciated the risk they posed" and
that "whether the danger associated with the skylights was
open and obvious is a question to be determined by the trier
of fact."
After denying SAB's and Cooner Roofing's motions for a
judgment on partial findings, the trial court entered its
judgment in the same order.  The trial court noted that no
party had requested that it find the facts specially or state
its conclusions of law separately per Rule 52, Ala. R. Civ.
P., and so the trial court chose not to detail separate
findings of fact or conclusions of law beyond what it had
already stated.  The trial court entered a judgment in favor
of Carwie and against SAB and Cooner Roofing in the amount of
$12,601,676.
13
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SAB filed a "Motion to Amend Judgment, for Judgment as a
Matter of Law or, in the alternative, for New Trial or
Remittitur."  Thereafter, Cooner Roofing filed a "Notice of
Joinder in all Post-Judgment Motions Filed by Defendant South
Alabama Brick." Carwie filed a motion to strike Cooner
Roofing's motion.  After conducting a hearing, the trial court
denied SAB's motion and granted  Carwie's motion to strike
Cooner Roofing's motion.  
SAB filed a timely appeal of the trial court's judgment.
Cooner Roofing has not appealed the judgment against it. 
II.  Standard of Review
 Under Alabama law, the existence of a duty is a legal
question to be determined by the court.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Smitherman, 872 So. 2d 833, 837 (Ala. 2003).  On appeal,
this Court reviews de novo rulings on the legal issue of the
existence of a duty.  Ex parte City of Brundidge, 897 So. 2d
1129, 1131 (Ala. 2004) ("A ruling on a question of law carries
no presumption of correctness, and appellate review is de
novo.").  In addition, although factual determinations based
on evidence received ore tenus are entitled to a presumption
of correctness, the question whether the trial court applied
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the correct legal standard is one of law to which the ore
tenus rule has no application.  E.g., Ex parte Perkins, 646
So. 2d 46, 47 (Ala. 1994).10
III.  Analysis
A. SAB's Duty to Benito Perez as a Business Invitee
A premises owner's legal duty to a party injured by a
condition of the premises depends upon the legal status of the
injured party.  Galaxy Cable, Inc. v. Davis, 58 So. 3d 93, 98
(Ala. 2010).  In this case, Benito Perez was on SAB's premises
to confer a material or commercial benefit to SAB.
Accordingly, 
the 
relationship 
between 
SAB, 
the 
premises 
owner,
and Benito Perez, a roofer, is that of invitor/invitee.  See
Ex parte Mountain Top Indoor Flea Mkt., Inc., 699 So. 2d 158,
161 (Ala. 1997) ("'In order to be considered an invitee, the
plaintiff must have been on the premises for some purpose that
materially or commercially benefited the owner or occupier of
In addition to its argument that it owed no duty to
10
Benito Perez, SAB makes several arguments relating to the
damages award in this case.  These include an argument that
Carwie failed to prove medical expenses by competent evidence
and that the damages award, particularly the damages
attributable to mental anguish and pain in excess of
$9 million, is excessive.  Because of our decision on the
issue of duty, we pretermit consideration of these latter
issues. 
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the premises.'" (quoting Sisk v. Heil Co., 639 So. 2d 1363,
1365 (Ala. 1994))).
Alabama law is well-settled regarding the scope of the
duty an invitor owes a business invitee. "The owner of
premises owes a duty to business invitees to use reasonable
care and diligence to keep the premises in a safe condition,
or, if the premises are in a dangerous condition, to give
sufficient warning so that, by the use of ordinary care, the
danger can be avoided."  Armstrong v. Georgia Marble Co., 575
So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Ala. 1991) (emphasis added).  We have said
that a premises owner's duty to warn extends only to "hidden
defects and dangers that are known to [the premises owner],
but that are unknown or hidden to the invitee."  Raspilair v.
Bruno's Food Stores, Inc., 514 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Ala. 1987).
More specifically, we have explained that a plaintiff must
establish "'(1) that the defect or danger was "hidden";
(2) that it was "known to the owner"; and (3) that it was
"neither known to the contractor, nor such as he ought to
know."'"  Roberts v. NASCO Equip. Co., 986 So. 2d 379, 384
(Ala. 2007) (quoting Ex parte Meadowcraft Indus., Inc., 817
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So. 2d 702, 706 (Ala. 2001), quoting in turn Glenn v. United
States Steel Corp., 423 So. 2d 152, 154 (Ala. 1982)).
"In discussing a premises owner's liability
towards an independent contractor, this Court has
recognized that an '"'owner of premises is not
responsible to an independent contractor for injury
from defects or dangers which the contractor knows
of, or ought to know of.'"'"
986 So. 2d at 383 (quoting Veal v. Phillips, 285 Ala. 655,
657–58, 235 So. 2d 799, 802 (1970)).  See also Quillen v.
Quillen, 388 So. 2d 985, 989 (Ala. 1980) (to the same effect).
This Court has elaborated on the nature of a premises
owner's duty to a business invitee as follows:
"'"'The duty to keep an area
safe for invitees is limited to
hidden defects which are not
known to the invitee and would
not be discovered by him in the
exercise of ordinary care.  All
ordinary 
risks 
present 
are
assumed by the invitee, and the
[invitor] is under no duty to
alter the premises so as to
[alleviate] known and obvious
dangers.  The [invitor] is not
liable to an invitee for an
injury resulting from a danger
that was obvious or that should
have 
been 
observed 
in 
the
exercise of reasonable care.'"'"
Jones Food Co. v. Shipman, 981 So. 2d 355, 362 (Ala. 2006)
(quoting Sessions v. Nonnenmann, 842 So. 2d 649, 651-52 (Ala.
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2002), quoting in turn Breeden v. Hardy Corp., 562 So. 2d 159,
160 (1990) (bracketed language in original; some emphasis
omitted)).  Of particular importance to this case, the Court
in Jones Food then stated:
"'"'The entire basis of an invitor's
liability 
rests 
upon 
his 
superior 
knowledge
of the danger that causes the invitee's
injuries.  If that superior knowledge is
lacking, as when the danger is obvious, the
invitor cannot be liable.'"'"
981 So. 2d at 362 (quoting Sessions v. Nonnenmann, 842 So. 2d
at 651-52, quoting in turn Breeden v. Hardy Corp., 562 So. 2d
at 160 (emphasis added)).  And as to an independent contractor
in particular, we have explained:  "'"There is no duty to
warn" ... an independent contractor "who has equal or superior
knowledge of a potential danger."'"  Roberts, 986 So. 2d at
383-84 (quoting Fielder v. USX Corp., 726 So. 2d 647, 650
(Ala. 1998), quoting in turn Alabama Power Co. v. Williams,
570 So. 2d 589, 592 (Ala. 1990) (emphasis added)). 
In Gray v. Mobile Greyhound Park, Ltd., 370 So. 2d 1384
(Ala. 1979) this Court took note of these same  fundamental
precepts, as set out in Corpus Juris Secundum, to explain what
the Court referred to as the "no-duty" rule applicable to a
premises owner that lacks "superior knowledge" of a danger:
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"Th[e] absence of duty is commonly referred to as
the 'no duty' rule and has been thoroughly discussed
in 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 63(53), at pages 764-68,
as follows:
"'....
"'The basis of the inviter's liability
for injuries sustained by the invitee on
the premises rests on the owner's superior
knowledge of the danger, and, as a general
rule, he is not liable for an injury to an
invitee resulting from a danger which was
known to the invitee or which was obvious
or should have been observed by the invitee
in the exercise of reasonable care, or from
a condition which was as well known or as
obvious to the invitee as to the inviter,
or from a danger which the invitee should
reasonably 
have 
appreciated 
before 
exposing
himself to it, or which the inviter had no
reason to believe would not be discovered
by the invitee.'"
370 So. 2d at 1388 (emphasis added); accord General Motors
Corp. v. Hill, 752 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Ala. 1999) ("'[A]n
invitor is not liable for injuries to an invitee resulting
from a danger that was known to the invitee or that the
invitee should have observed through the exercise of
reasonable care.'"  
(quoting  Ex parte 
Industrial 
Distribution
Servs. Warehouse, Inc., 709 So. 2d 16, 19 (Ala. 1997))).
As indicated by the "ought to know" and "should have
known" aspects of the standard quoted above, the duty of a
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premises owner is measured by an objective standard, not the
subjective state of the invitee's knowledge.  The question is
what was objectively reasonable for the invitor to expect the
invitee to know.  "As discussed in Sessions [v. Nonnenmann,
842 So. 2d 649 (Ala. 2002)], the question is whether the
danger should have been observed, not whether in fact it was
consciously appreciated ...."  Jones Food, 981 So. 2d at 362. 
And as we explained in Sessions, 842 So. 2d at 653-54, an
invitor's duty before an accident is not determined by "the
invitee's subjective state of mind" at the moment of the
accident.
With these legal prinicples in mind, we turn to the
particulars of this case.  Ultimately, the trial court's
judgment holds 
SAB responsible for not directly 
warning 
Benito
Perez of the danger posed by the skylights.  We consider this
judgment in the context of the fact that Benito Perez's
injuries did not result from his deliberately stepping onto a
skylight.  Rather, Benito Perez was injured as a result of an
accidental fall onto and through one of the skylights. 
Benito Perez was injured on the second or third day he
was working on the warehouse roof.  Nonetheless, the parties
20
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disagree (and the trial court undertook to resolve their
factual disagreement) as to what information Cooner 
had 
shared
with Benito Perez regarding the skylights and, if Cooner had
not done enough in this regard, whether Benito Perez
reasonably could have been expected to discern the existence
of the skylights and the danger they posed.  But the question
presented in this appeal is not the existence of a legal duty
on the part of Cooner Roofing to warn or otherwise to provide
a safe work environment for its employee, Benito Perez.
(Clearly there was such a duty and we do not have before us an
appeal by Cooner Roofing of the trial court's judgment against
Cooner Roofing for the breach of that duty.)  Instead, the
question is whether there existed a direct duty on the part of
SAB to Benito Perez.  
Benito Perez was an employee of Cooner Roofing, not SAB. 
SAB contracted with Cooner Roofing, not Benito Perez, to
repair the warehouse roof.  The resolution of this appeal
therefore does not turn on whether the danger posed by the
skylights was open and obvious to Benito Perez.  It turns on
whether, applying the standards set out above, we can say it
was reasonable for SAB to expect that its independent
21
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contractor, Cooner Roofing, had knowledge equal or 
superior 
to
that of SAB as to the danger that would be posed if an
employee of Cooner Roofing were to fall from an elevated
position onto one of the skylights on the flat area of the
roof. 
As set out above, the existence of a duty by a premises
owner to a business invitee, and particularly to an
independent contractor, depends on superiority of knowledge.
In this case, there is no evidence that, in fact, SAB had
knowledge superior to that of its roofing contractor as to the
danger posed to a man accidentally falling onto a skylight on
the roof of the warehouse.  Moreover, as noted, the standard
by which we judge the premises owner is whether the premises
owner acted in an objectively reasonable manner.  The premises
owner is not an insurer of his premises and, by the same
token, is not an insurer of the acts or omissions of the
contractors it brings onto its premises.  The existence of a
duty on the part of the premises owner to an employee of such
a contractor depends, then, on what information the premises
owner reasonably could have expected that contractor to have
known and acted upon.  Accordingly, we must ask whether it was
22
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reasonable for SAB to expect that Cooner, as a professional
roofer who had prior experience on multiple occasions with
SAB's roof and who also had inspected that roof on the present
occasion to determine the source of multiple leaks and where
repairs would be needed to correct those leaks, and who told
Stuart that his crew would need to work near the skylights,
would have an awareness of the danger that would exist if a
member of that crew were to fall onto one of those skylights
from an elevated position on the adjacent slanted roof.  Was
it objectively reasonable for SAB to expect a roofing
contractor in Cooner Roofing's position to issue to its own
employees any necessary warnings regarding the hazard of
working near, or to take any necessary physical measures to
prevent, or to mitigate the consequences of, a fall onto, one
of those skylights?   
We must conclude under the circumstances presented that
SAB reasonably could have expected that Cooner Roofing had at
least as much knowledge as did SAB of the danger that would
exist if one of Cooner Roofing's employees were to fall onto
a skylight, especially from the elevated position where, as it
turned out, the employee was stationed by Cooner Roofing. 
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Where a premises owner can reasonably expect that its
contractor knows as much or more than the premises owner does
regarding a dangerous condition -- whether this is so because
the danger is open and obvious to anyone, because the owner
has told the contractor all it knows, or because of the
contractor's 
expertise 
and 
previous 
experience 
on 
the 
premises
-- the superiority-of-knowledge test is not met and the
premises owner has no further duty to warn the contractor.  By
extension, in that circumstance, the premises owner has no
additional, direct duty to warn the contractor's employees or
any subcontractors.  To hold otherwise would be to say that a
premises owner, despite hiring a contractor whom the owner,
for one of the reasons stated above, reasonably expects knows
as much of more about the owner's land, building, or fixtures
as does the premises owner, must somehow "pull aside" or
otherwise communicate directly with each and every 
employee of
the contractor, subcontractor, employee of any subcontractor,
etc.  Obviously, at the point at which the contractor knows as
much or more as does the premises owner regarding the land,
building, or fixtures, the responsibility for sharing that
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information with its own employees or with subcontractors
falls to the contractor. 
In Armstrong, this Court held that when a premises owner
is found to owe a duty to warn, that duty is satisfied, as a
matter of law, when the contractor or supervisory personnel
has knowledge of the dangerous condition:
"Once a third party discharges its duty by
warning the employer, the duty of warning each of
the employer's individual employees falls to the
employer.  '[T]he owner or occupier of particular
property has a duty to warn the employees of an
independent contractor who has undertaken to do work
on the property, of dangers that are hidden on or
inhere in that property, and ... this duty is
discharged if those in charge of the work for the
independent contractor are given warning or have
knowledge of the danger.'  Gulf Oil Corp. v. Bivins,
276 F.2d 753, 758 (5th Cir. 1960) cert. denied, 364
U.S. 835, 81 S. Ct. 70, 5 L. Ed. 2d 61 (1960); see,
also, Cook v. Branick Manufacturing, Inc., 736 F.2d
1442 (11th Cir. 1984)."
575 So. 2d at 1053.  Moreover, in Ex parte Meadowcraft
Industries, supra, we explained that knowledge of a general
contractor 
retained 
to install a conveyor at defendant's plant
concerning 
the 
dangers of the conveyor-belt system was imputed
to the employee of a subcontractor.   817 So. 2d at 708.  The
11
Carwie's attempt to distinguish Meadowcraft is without
11
merit.  Although it is true that the Court in Meadowcraft
noted that the injured worker knew or should have known of
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constructive knowledge imputed to individuals working on the
project, by virtue of the knowledge of a general contractor,
is sufficient to discharge the premises owner of any duty to
warn each individual worker of the condition of the premises. 
See also Farr Metal, Inc. v. Hines, 738 So. 2d 863, 864 (Ala.
1999) 
(holding 
that 
"direct 
knowledge" 
possessed 
by
supervisory employees of plaintiff's employer, as to opening
in upper floor of building through which plaintiff fell,
"removed 
any 
duty 
on 
part 
of 
[defendant]," 
another
subcontractor which created the hole, "to inform [plaintiff]
of the possible danger presented by the opening"); Crawford
Johnson & Co. v. Duffner, 279 Ala. 678, 189 So. 2d 474 (1966)
(holding that premises owner's duty to warn is discharged if
plaintiff's employer has knowledge of dangerous condition);
Ramirez v. Alabama Power Co., 898 F. Supp. 1537, 1547-48 (M.D.
Ala. 1995) (applying Alabama law and explaining  that a
premises owner fulfills a duty to warn by warning plaintiff's
employer of any danger).
the hazard from his own experience, that fact was not
necessary to the holding that the premises owner's duty was
discharged based upon the general contractor's awareness of
the hazard.  See 817 So. 2d at 709.
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In fact, faced with similar factual situations where a
worker has fallen through a skylight, often with tragic
consequences, courts around the country have held that the
premises owner is not liable.  See, e.g., Strickland v. Timco
Aviation Servs., Inc., 66 So. 3d 1002 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011) (holding that airplane-hangar owner had no legal duty to
warn independent contractor of danger posed by skylights on
roof); Crenshaw v. Arkansas Warehouse, Inc., 379 S.W.3d 515
(Ark. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that warehouse owner did not
have duty to warn independent contractor of danger of
skylights on roof); Saunders v. Industrial Metals & Surplus,
Inc., 285 Ga. App. 415, 646 S.E.2d 294 (2007) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of warehouse owner on claim of
roofer who fell through skylight); and Merrill v. Knauf Fiber
Glass GmbH, 771 N.E.2d 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (to the same
effect).
B.  The Additional Duty Imposed by the Trial Court
After purportedly applying to SAB the duty owed by a
premises owner to a business invitee, the trial court
undertook to impose a different, additional duty on SAB.  It
held that SAB had a duty to Cooner Roofing's employee, Benito
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Perez, "to insure that Cooner Roofing was a qualified
contractor."  In essence, the trial court held that SAB had a
duty to protect Benito Perez from the negligence of his own
employer by not hiring that employer in the first place.  In
support of this additional duty, the trial court cited and
described three cases:
"Hathcock v, Mitchell, [277 Ala. 586,] 173 So. 2d
576, 584 (Ala. 1965) (building owner has duty to
employ 
qualified 
and 
competent 
architect 
and
contractor; negligence where owner knew or should
have known in exercise of due diligence that
architect and contractor were not qualified) (citing
Sloss Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Bibb, [164 Ala.
62,] 51 So. 345 (Ala. 1910) (negligence for master
to employ unqualified servant where servant's
incompetency was proximate cause of the injury));
see also Mentzer v. Ognibene, [408 Pa. Super. 578,]
597 A.2d 604, 610 (1991) (The general rule
'recognize[s] that the owner who has entrusted the
responsibility 
for 
the 
work 
to 
a 
qualified
contractor justifiably depends upon the contractor's
expertise')."
These cases, however, are inappposite.  The issue they
address is when, if ever, a premises owner is responsible for
(a) injuries to third parties (b) resulting, not from some
preexisting condition of the premises known to the owner, but
from conditions created by the faulty workmanship or other
negligence of an independent contractor committed by the
contractor in the course of performing its contract.  In
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Hathcock v, Mitchell, 277 Ala. 586, 173 So. 2d 576 (1965), the
Court addressed the liability of a landlord for damage
suffered by its tenant as a result of the collapse of a roof
negligently installed several days earlier by the owner's
contractor.  Similarly, in Sloss Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v.
Bibb, 164 Ala. 62, 51 So. 345 (1910), the issue was a
landowner/employer's liability to its employee for personal
injuries suffered as a result of the negligent operation of a
mine car by a contractor of the employer.  See also Mentzer v.
Ognibene, 408 Pa. Super. 578, 597 A.2d 604 (1991) (holding
that property owners were not personally negligent in failing
to prevent negligence of independent contractor or to warn
contractor's own employee of dangers created by contractor's
negligence).
The issue of the responsibility of a premises owner for
the negligence of its contractor that injures another is an
altogether different issue than the issue of a premises
owner's duty to the contractor (and by extension its
employees) to warn or protect against preexisting conditions
29
1130345
of the premises into which the premises owner invites the
contractor.  
12
Even if the issue in this case could be said to fall in
12
the former category, the law provides that it is the
independent contractor in such cases, not the premises owner,
who bears responsibility for the employee's injury where the
premises owner has not retained control over the manner in
which the contractor performs its work.  
"Generally, the owner of premises ... owes no
duty to the employees of an independent contractor
with respect to conditions arising in the progress
of work on the contract.  Hughes v. Hughes, 367
So. 2d 1384 (Ala. 1979).  The test for whether such
an owner will be viewed as a prime contractor is
whether the owner reserved the right of control over
the contractor's work. ...
"More specifically, the issue presented here is
whether [the defendant] retained the right to direct
the manner in which [the contractor] performed its
work."
Pate v. United States Steel Corp., 393 So. 2d 992, 994 (Ala.
1981).  See also Armstrong, 575 So. 2d at 1053 ("Because
Georgia Marble Company did not retain any control over the
work to be done, the relationship between Georgia Marble
Company and Armstrong was not that of a master and a servant. 
Their relationship was that of an owner of premises and a
business invitee."); Weeks v. Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc., 419
So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Ala. 1982) ("[A] premises owner owes no
duty of care to employees of an independent contractor with
respect to working conditions arising during the progress of
the work on the contract.").  The evidence at trial was
undisputed that SAB did not retain or purport to exercise any
control over the manner in which Cooner Roofing or Benito
Perez, or any other person working on the roof, performed the
work on SAB's roof.
30
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IV.  Conclusion
The condition at issue here was a preexisting condition
of a facility owned by SAB.  SAB hired an independent roofing
contractor, 
Cooner 
Roofing, 
with 
previous 
experience 
repairing
the roof of that facility, to make repairs determined by that
contractor to be necessary and appropriate.  Under the
circumstances of this case, SAB was not legally responsible
for warning Cooner Roofing's employees of the risks of working
on that roof.  Because of our disposition of the issue of
liability, we need not reach  SAB's arguments relating to the
damages awarded against it.  
The judgment of the trial court against SAB is reversed,
and this cause remanded for entry of a judgment in favor of
SAB.            
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Moore, C.J., and Bolin, Main, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
31