Title: CABINET RESOURCE GROUP v MT DEPT
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-096
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 25, 1980

N o . 80-96 I N T H E SUPREME COURT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A CABINET RESOURCE GROUP, A Montana Non-profit Corporation, M O N T A N A WILDERNESS ASSOCIATION, a Montana Non-profit Corporation, P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, M O N T A N A DEPARTMENT O F STATE LANDS, M O N T A N A DEPARTMENT O F HEALTH, and A S A R C O , INC . , Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: ~ i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and For t h e County o f Lewis and Clark. Honorable Gordon Bennett, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn & P h i l l i p s , K a l i s p e l l , Montana John L. Neff, Spokane, Washington Hughes, Bennett, K e l l n e r & S u l l i v a n , Helena, Montana John F. North, Dept. of S t a t e Lands, Helena, Montana Mona Jamison, Dept. of Health, Helena, Montana For Respondents : Morrison Law O f f i c e s , Missoula, Montana Goetz and Madden, Bozeman, Montana F i l e d : Submitted on b r i e f s : J u l y 2 2 , 1980 Decided : AU G 2 5 1 9 1 1 9 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f s brought t h i s amended a c t i o n i n the District Court, Lewis and Clark County, seeking a w r i t of mandamus and declaratory judgments a g a i n s t t h e Montana Department of S t a t e Lands (DSL) and t h e Montana Department of Health and Environmental Sciences (DHES). Several motions were f i l e d by defendants, including a motion f i l e d by defendant ASARCO, Inc., t o change venue from L e w i s and Clark County t o Lincoln County. O n January 28, 1980, the Honorable Gordon R. Bennett issued an opinion and order denying defendant ASARCO's motion f o r change of venue. ASARCO, Inc., appeals. ASARCO, Inc., i s developing a major copper-silver mine and o r e processing complex adjacent t o Mount Vernon i n the Cabinet Mountains, approximately seventeen miles south of Troy, Montana. DSL and the United S t a t e s Forest Service j o i n t l y prepared both d r a f t and f i n a l environmental impact statements on t h e proposed development, and on November 27, 1978, DSL issued an operating permit. The p l a i n t i f f s i n t h i s a c t i o n a r e two Montana nonprofit corporations, t h e Cabinet Resources Group and t h e Montana Wilderness Association; the former has i t s p r i n c i p a l place of business i n Libby, Lincoln County, Montana, and the l a t t e r i n Bozeman, G a l l a t i n County Montana. Defendants DSL and D H E S are agencies of t h e S t a t e of Montana with t h e i r o f f i c e s i n Helena, L e w i s and Clark County, Montana. ASARCO, Inc., i s a New Jersey corporation r e g i s t e r e d and doing business i n Montana with o f f i c e s and an authorized agent f o r s e r v i c e of process i n Helena, L e w i s and Clark County, Montana. DSL i s charged with t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of administering t h e Hard Rock ~ e c l a m a t i o n Act. Pursuant t o t h a t responsi- b i l i t y , DSL must review, and subsequently g r a n t o r deny, a hard rock mining permit based upon t h e a p p l i c a n t ' s mining plan and t h a t p l a n ' s conformance with water q u a l i t y , a i r q u a l i t y , mine w a s t e d i s p o s a l , and reclamation standards. ~ e f e n d a n t D H E S i s charged with t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of ad- ministering Montana water q u a l i t y laws. Pursuant t o t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , D H E S must i s s u e o r deny permits f o r d i s - charge of p o l l u t a n t s i n t o s t a t e waters. P l a i n t i f f s charge t h a t when D S L approved t h e mining permit it v i o l a t e d t h e Montana Environmental Policy Act, t h e 1972 Montana Constitution, and t h e Hard Rock Reclamation A c t . The complaint a l s o a l l e g e s t h a t D H E S v i o l a t e d s t a t e w a t e r q u a l i t y l a w s when it refused t o r e q u i r e t h a t A S A R C O o b t a i n a p o l l u t i o n discharge permit. Claiming t h a t recre- a t i o n and a e s t h e t i c b e n e f i t s derived from t h e geographic region of t h e A S A R C O mine site w i l l be adversely a f f e c t e d , p l a i n t i f f s seek a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment of l e g a l i n t e r p r e t a - t i o n of s t a t u t o r y d u t i e s made by D S L and DHES. They a l s o seek a w r i t of mandamus t o r e q u i r e t h e agencies' compliance with t h e i r d u t i e s . Neither t h e m e r i t s of t h e d e c l a r a t o r y judgment nor t h e m e r i t s of t h e p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t of mandamus a r e before t h i s Court on appeal. The s o l e i s s u e t o be decided i s whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t properly denied t h e motion of defendant ASARCO, I n c . , f o r a change of venue from L e w i s and Clark County t o Lincoln County. On August 2, 1979, defendant ASARCO, Inc., f i l e d a motion f o r a change of venue f o r t h e following reasons: (1) proper venue i s i n t h e county i n which t h e r e a l property involved i s located, pursuant t o s e c t i o n 25-2-103, MCA; ( 2 ) f o r t h e convenience of witnesses; and ( 3 ) t h e A S A R C O opera- t i o n s i n i s s u e a r e i n Lincoln County. Section 25-2-103, MCA, does n o t appear t o be intended f o r t h i s type of action. Cases brought under t h a t s t a t u t e d e a l with determination and recovery of p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r - ests i n real property, n o t t h e environmental i n t e r e s t s claimed by p l a i n t i f f s . Fraser v. Clark (1954), 128 Mont. 160, 273 P.2d 105; Beavers v. Rankin (1963), 142 Mont. 570, I n t h e p r e s e n t case p l a i n t i f f s a r e requesting declara- t o r y judgments and mandamus r e l i e f . The general venue s t a t u t e s , therefore, apply. B i l l i n g s Associated Plumbing v. Emerson (1977), 172 Mont. 369, 563 P.2d 1123; Lunt v. Divi- s i o n of Workmen's Comp., Dept. of Lab. & I. (1975), 167 Mont. 251, 537 P.2d 1080. Because t h i s a c t i o n is a g a i n s t s t a t e agencies and defendants a r e requesting a change of venue, s e c t i o n s 25-2-105 and 25-2-201, MCA, a r e s p e c i f i c a l l y applicable. They s t a t e : "Actions a g a i n s t a p u b l i c o f f i c e r o r person spe- c i f i c a l l y appointed t o execute h i s d u t i e s f o r an a c t done by him i n v i r t u e of h i s o f f i c e o r a g a i n s t a person who, by h i s command o r i n h i s a i d , does anything touching t h e d u t i e s of such o f f i c e r must be t r i e d i n t h e county where t h e cause o r some p a r t thereof arose, s u b j e c t t o t h e power of t h e c o u r t t o change t h e place of t r i a l . " Section 25-2-105, MCA. "The Court o r judge must, on motion, change t h e p l a c e of t r i a l i n t h e following cases: " (1) when t h e county designated i n t h e com- p l a i n t is n o t t h e proper county; " ( 2 ) when t h e r e i s reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t an i m p a r t i a l t r i a l cannot be had t h e r e i n ; " ( 3 ) when t h e convenience of witnesses and t h e ends of j u s t i c e would be promoted by t h e change." Section 25-2-201, MCA. There is no d i s p u t e t h a t a change of venue pursuant t o s e c t i o n 25-2-201(1), MCA, i s n o t a matter of d i s c r e t i o n with t h e D i s t r i c t Court, b u t i s mandatory i f t h e county i n which t h e a c t i o n was f i l e d " i s n o t t h e proper county." Guthrie v. Mont. Dept. of H. and E. Sciences (1977), 172 Mont. 142, 561 P.2d 913; Lunt v. Division of Workmen's Comp., Dept. of Lab. & I., supra. I n Guthrie w e e s t a b l i s h e d t h e general test r e l a t i n g t o proper venue: "Thus the answer t o t h e question of proper venue under s e c t i o n 93-2902 ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947 [now s e c t i o n 25-2-105, MCA], lies i n t h e a n a l y s i s of two dependent v a r i a b l e s , t h e na- t u r e of t h e cause of a c t i o n and t h e time and place where it springs i n t o existence." 561 P.2d a t 916. A S A R C O argues t h a t t h e proper county i s the county i n which t h e a l l e g e d harm i s threatened, t h e harm being caused by t h e physical a l t e r a t i o n of t h e land, and n o t by a c t i o n s o r i n a c t i o n s of p u b l i c agencies wherever they may be s i t u - a t e . P l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t when t h e a c t i o n i s one f o r mandamus r e l i e f , proper venue lies i n t h e county where t h e p u b l i c o f f i c i a l o r agency r e s i d e s . I n an attempt t o unravel t h e i n e x t r i c a b l y intertwined standards of nature, t i m e and place of t h e cause of a c t i o n t o determine proper venue, it i s necessary t o look a t case law a s it a p p l i e s t o t h e r e l e v a n t s t a t u t e s . A n a c t i o n t o e n j o i n enforcement of an order of t h e Public Service Commission reducing u t i l i t y r a t e s from n a t u r a l g a s s e r v i c e i n two counties was brought i n Montana Dakota U t i l i t i e s Co. v. Public Service Com'n (1940), 1 1 1 Mont. 78, 107 P. 2d 533. I n t h a t case we held t h a t where a cause of a c t i o n i s the threatened enforcement o r operation of an order, " i t i s n o t t h e mere making of t h e order b u t t h e p l a c e where it i s p u t i n operation t h a t determines where t h e cause of a c t i o n arose. " S i x months l a t e r , however, i n Bergin v. Temple (1941), 1 1 1 Mont. 539, 1 1 1 P.2d 286, we analyzed t h e c l a u s e "where t h e cause o r some p a r t therof arose" and a r r i v e d a t a more r e f i n e d r u l e . Defining "cause of a c t i o n " a s the r i g h t which a p a r t y has t o i n s t i t u t e a j u d i c i a l proceeding, and c i t i n g Anglo American L.M.&A. Co. v. Lombard ( 8 t h C i r . 1904), 132 F. 721, w e saw "arose" a s t h e key word and s t a t e d : "The p l a c e where a cause of a c t i o n a r i s e s i s t o be determined by i n q u i r i n g where t h e a c t o r breach occurs which gives t h e cause of complaint and c r e a t e s t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r bringing an a c t i o n . " Bergin, 1 1 1 P.2d a t 289. I n making such an i n q u i r y it i s e s s e n t i a l t o determine t h e o b j e c t i v e of t h e complaint. The o b j e c t i v e of t h e p r e s e n t complaint i s mandamus. I n Gildroy v. Anderson (1972), 159 Mont. 325, 497 P.2d 688, an a c t i o n t o e n j o i n t h e governor from implementing an executive order, t h i s Court discussed Montana Dakota U t i l i t i e s and held t h a t because t h e p l a i n t i f f was a t t a c k i n g t h e o f f i - c i a l a c t s of t h e governor exceeding h i s l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i - t y , venue was proper i n Lewis and Clark County. Further- more, when t h e nature of t h e a c t i o n i s mandamus, w e estab- l i s h e d i n Lunt, supra, venue is proper i n t h e county where t h e public o f f i c i a l , whose a c t t h e p e t i t i o n e r seeks t o compel, r e s i d e s . The p l a i n t i f f i n Guthrie sought t o permanently enjoin t h e defendants from physically a l t e r i n g land i n a subdivi- s i o n u n t i l s a n i t a r y r e s t r i c t i o n s were properly l i f t e d and t h e p l a t approval properly secured. I n holding t h a t t h e n a t u r e of the cause of a c t i o n was t o prevent i r r e p a r a b l e harm i n Teton County, and t h e r e f o r e t h a t i s where proper venue should be, w e attempted t o a l l e v i a t e t h e apparent c o n f l i c t between Montana Dakota U t i l i t i e s and Lunt by s t a t i n g : ". . . [ I n Lunt] t h e a c t i o n was f o r mandamus. It i s d i f f i c u l t t o imagine mandamus, based as it is on n e g l e c t o r r e f u s a l by a p u b l i c o f f i - c i a l t o perform a m i n i s t e r i a l duty, which d i d n o t a r i s e as t h e Court s a i d i n Lunt '. . . i n t h e county where t h e public o f f i c i a l o f f i c i - a l l y r e f u s e s t o a c t o r n e g l e c t s t o a c t . ' " 561 P.2d a t 916. Recently w e decided a case i n which t h e nature of t h e cause of a c t i o n was i d e n t i c a l t o t h a t i n t h e case a t bar. I n McGrath v. Dore (1978), 177 Mont. 179, 580 P.2d 1385, 35 St-Rep. 957, t h e S i l v e r B o w County Assessor brought a c l a i m f o r r e l i e f i n t h e form of d e c l a r a t o r y judgment and a mandamus a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e Department of Revenue. W e r u l e d t h a t t h e a l l e g e d wrongful acts of t h e Department of Revenue, i.e., t h e n e g l e c t f u l o r i n t e n t i o n a l f a i l u r e t o pay f u l l amount of wages a l l e g e d l y due p e t i t i o n e r , occurred i n Lewis and Clark County, hence giving rise t o p e t i t i o n e r ' s cause of a c t i o n i n mandamus i n t h a t county. H e r e we conclude t h e a l l e g e d wrongful a c t s , i.e., DSL's issuance of an operating permit and DHES's r e f u s a l t o re- q u i r e p o l l u t i o n discharge permits, occurred i n L e w i s and Clark County, thus allowing p l a i n t i f f s ' cause of a c t i o n f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment and mandamus. The i s s u e of inconvenience of witnesses w a s n o t r a i s e d on appeal and, t h e r e f o r e , it need n o t be d e a l t with a t t h i s time. The D i s t r i c t Court's order denying defendant ASARCO's motion f o r a change of venue i s affirmed. r J u s t i c e 1 W e concur: 3 & 4 d % 4 Chief J u s t i c e p a r t i c i p a t e .