Title: Chris Gentilli v. Board of the Police and Fire Commissioners of the City of Madison
Citation: 2004 WI 60
Docket Number: 2002AP003208
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 2, 2004

2004 WI 60 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-3208 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Chris Gentilli,  
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Board of the Police and Fire  
Commissioners of the City of Madison,  
          Respondent-Respondent, 
 
Fire Chief Debra H. Amesqua,  
          Intervenor-Respondent. 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 2, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 8, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Paul B. Higginbotham   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant there were briefs by Bruce F. 
Ehlke and Shneidman, Hawks & Ehlke, S.C., Madison, and oral 
argument by Bruce F. Ehlke. 
 
For the respondent-respondent there was a brief by Scott 
Herrick and Herrick & Kasdorf, L.L.P., Madison, and oral 
argument by Scott N. Herrick. 
 
For the intervenor-respondent there was a brief James M. 
Voss and Carolyn S. Hogg, City Attorney,Madison, and oral 
argument by Carolyn S. Hogg. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Gordon E. McQuillen, 
Madison, 
on 
behalf 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Professional 
Police 
 
 
2
Association/Law Enforcement Employee Relations Division and the 
Madison Professional Police Officers Association. 
 
2004 WI 60 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-3208  
(L.C. No. 
01-CV-1585) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Chris Gentilli,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Board of the Police and Fire  
Commissioners of the City of Madison,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent, 
 
Fire Chief Debra H. Amesqua,  
 
          Intervenor-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 2, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, 
Paul B. Higginbotham, Judge.  Reversed and remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is an appeal of an 
order 
of 
the 
Circuit 
Court 
for 
Dane 
County, 
Paul 
B. 
Higginbotham, 
Judge. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
dismissed 
Chris 
Gentilli's petition for certiorari review of an order of the 
Board of Police and Fire Commissioners of the City of Madison 
No. 
02-3208   
 
2 
 
(PFC board).1  This case comes before this court on certification 
by the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 
(2001-02).2   
¶2 
This case concerns the interaction of Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.13(5)(i), governing circuit court review of an order of a 
board 
of 
police 
and 
fire 
commissioners, 
and 
common 
law 
certiorari review of such an order.  More specifically, the 
question is whether § 62.13(5)(i) as amended in 19933 is the 
exclusive remedy for Gentilli's claim that the rules he was 
found to have violated were unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad. 
¶3 
We conclude that § 62.13(5)(i) as amended in 1993 is 
not the exclusive remedy for a claim that the rules a 
subordinate was found to have violated were unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad.  The constitutional issues of vagueness or 
overbreadth of administrative rules that Gentilli raised in his 
petition for a writ of certiorari are issues of law that even if 
somewhat overlapping with the issues in the statutory appeal 
proceeding may be considered under certiorari because they 
concern whether the PFC board kept within its jurisdiction and 
                                                 
1 The fire chief is intervenor-respondent and filed her own 
brief.  The briefs of the PFC board and the fire chief make 
similar arguments, and for ease of reference, when we refer to 
the arguments of either or both of them, we shall simply refer 
to the PFC board.   
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated.   
3 1993 Wis. Act 53, §§ 6, 7. 
No. 
02-3208   
 
3 
 
proceeded on a correct theory of the law.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in 
quashing the writ of certiorari and dismissing the action 
without considering the merits of Gentilli's constitutional 
claims.  We remand the certiorari proceeding to the circuit 
court.     
I 
¶4 
The facts are undisputed for purposes of this appeal.  
During a series of police investigations into drug-related 
offenses within the City of Madison Fire Department, Gentilli 
allegedly acknowledged that over a ten-year period he had 
purchased, possessed, and consumed cocaine and shared cocaine 
with and provided cocaine to others.  His actions did not result 
in criminal prosecution.  In the internal fire department 
investigation, Gentilli denied many of the admissions he 
allegedly made in the course of the police investigation.   
¶5 
In September of 2000, Fire Chief Debra H. Amesqua 
filed charges against Gentilli before the PFC board.  After a 
hearing, the PFC board recommended Gentilli's termination, and 
the Madison Fire Department discharged him.   
¶6 
Gentilli sought review of the PFC board's order in two 
parallel actions filed in the circuit court.  The first was an 
appeal of his termination in the circuit court pursuant to the 
statutory 
appeal 
procedures 
embodied 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 62.13(5)(i).  This appeal was a review of whether there was 
No. 
02-3208   
 
4 
 
"just cause" for the termination.4  The second was a review of 
his termination in the circuit court pursuant to a petition for 
writ of certiorari.  This certiorari proceeding sought to 
determine whether the PFC board had kept within its jurisdiction 
and proceeded on a correct theory of the law.  Both proceedings 
were assigned to the same branch of the circuit court. 
¶7 
Upon motion of the PFC board, the circuit court held 
the certiorari action in abeyance while it considered the 
statutory appeal.  The circuit court concluded that Gentilli's 
termination was supported by just cause under the statutory 
standards.  This circuit court decision is not appealable.  
¶8 
Upon the PFC board's motion, the circuit court 
dismissed the certiorari action, concluding that all of the 
issues raised in the petition were "encompassed within the scope 
of the companion statutory appeal . . . pursuant to 62.13(5), 
Wis. Stat., and were effectively resolved by the Court's 
decision in that matter."  The matter before this court involves 
the dismissal of the certiorari action.  
¶9 
Gentilli appeals the dismissal of his certiorari 
action.  In his certiorari petition before the circuit court and 
in his appeal, Gentilli asserts, among other claims, that the 
PFC board's order violated his right to due process.  Gentilli 
alleges that the administrative rules relied on by the fire 
chief to justify his termination were overbroad and vague.  
                                                 
4 In re Charges of Debra H. Amesqua v. Firefighter Chris 
Gentilli, Dane County Circuit Court Case No. 01-CV-1659. 
No. 
02-3208   
 
5 
 
Arguing these defects, Gentilli asserts that the PFC board did 
not keep within its jurisdiction and proceeded on an incorrect 
theory of law. 
¶10 The record of the PFC board proceeding, which the 
circuit court reviewed in the statutory appeal, was not 
certified to the circuit court in the certiorari proceedings and 
is not a part of the record in the instant appeal.   
II 
¶11 This case turns on the interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.13(5).  More specifically, the question of statutory 
interpretation is whether § 62.13(5), as amended in 1993, 
proscribes consideration of a constitutional claim of vagueness 
and overbreadth in a common law certiorari proceeding.   
¶12 This 
court 
decides 
questions 
of 
statutory 
interpretation independently of the circuit court and court of 
appeals, but benefiting from their analyses. 
III 
¶13 To 
resolve 
this 
dispute 
we 
must 
examine 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13 (5), governing an appeal from an order of a 
board 
of 
police 
and 
fire 
commissioners, 
and 
common 
law 
certiorari.  
¶14 As a preliminary matter, it is important to understand 
that significant consequences attach to the use of either the 
statutory appeal or a certiorari proceeding.  Under a statutory 
appeal, if the order of the board of police and fire 
commissioners is sustained, it "shall be final and conclusive"; 
No. 
02-3208   
 
6 
 
it is not reviewable by an appellate court.5  In contrast, a 
circuit 
court's 
decision 
in 
a 
certiorari 
proceeding 
is 
reviewable by the court of appeals and this court.  
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.13(5)(i) provides:  
Any person suspended, reduced, suspended and reduced, 
or removed by the board may appeal from the order of 
the board to the circuit court by serving written 
notice of the appeal on the secretary of the board 
within 10 days after the order is filed.  Within 5 
days after receiving written notice of the appeal, the 
board shall certify to the clerk of the circuit court 
the 
record 
of 
the 
proceedings, 
including 
all 
documents, testimony and minutes.  The action shall 
then be at issue and shall have precedence over any 
other cause of a different nature pending in the 
court, which shall always be open to the trial 
thereof.  The court shall upon application of the 
accused or of the board fix a date of trial, which 
shall not be later than 15 days after such application 
except by agreement.  The trial shall be by the court 
and upon the return of the board, except that the 
court may require further return or the taking and 
return of further evidence by the board.  The question 
to be determined by the court shall be:  Upon the 
evidence is there just cause, as described under par. 
(em), to sustain the charges against the accused?  No 
costs shall be allowed either party and the clerk's 
fees shall be paid by the city.  If the order of the 
board is reversed, the accused shall be forthwith 
reinstated and entitled to pay as though in continuous 
service.  If the order of the board is sustained it 
shall be final and conclusive (emphasis added). 
See also Clancy v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs of 
Milwaukee, 150 Wis. 630, 633, 138 N.W. 109 (1912).  
No. 
02-3208   
 
7 
 
¶15 We examine first Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) governing an 
appeal 
from 
an 
order 
of 
a 
board 
of 
police 
and 
fire 
commissioners.  
¶16 Under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(i), any person suspended, 
reduced, suspended and reduced, or removed by a board of police 
and fire commissioners may appeal from the order to the circuit 
court.   
¶17 Prior 
to 
1993, 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(i) 
(1991-92) 
provided that in this statutory appeal from a board order "[t]he 
question to be determined by the [circuit] court shall be:  Upon 
the evidence was the order of the board reasonable?"6   In 1993, 
§ 62.13(5)(i) was amended to provide that in this statutory 
appeal "[t]he question to be determined by the [circuit] court 
shall be:  Upon the evidence is there just cause, as described 
under par. (em), to sustain the charges against the accused?"7  
Aside from the addition of paragraph (em) and this change in 
language, § 62.13(5)(i) has remained substantially the same over 
the years.  
                                                                                                                                                             
The final and conclusive judicial review provided by the 
statute is limited to determinations of sufficiency of the 
evidence and the relationship between the discipline imposed and 
the seriousness of the conduct that was the reason for the 
discipline.  State ex rel. Enk v. Mentkowski, 76 Wis. 2d 565, 
572, 252 N.W.2d 28 (1977); Durkin v. Bd. of Police & Fire 
Comm'rs for Madison, 48 Wis. 2d 112, 117, 180 N.W.2d 1 (1970); 
State ex rel. Kaczkowski v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs of 
Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 488, 500-02, 148 N.W.2d 44 (1967).  
6 Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(i) (1991-92).   
7 Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(i).   
No. 
02-3208   
 
8 
 
¶18 Both 
before 
and 
after 
the 
1993 
amendment, 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(i) governing statutory appeal has provided 
that if the circuit court sustains the order of the board, the 
order shall be final and conclusive.  The public policy 
undergirding the finality of the statutory appeal is to balance 
the benefits of a speedy judicial process against the right of 
an accused to mount a full defense.8  Finality limits the 
negative 
effects 
on 
public 
employees 
of 
long, 
drawn-out 
proceedings while allowing the accused a fair hearing.9   
¶19 We turn to the common law writ of certiorari.  The 
right to seek certiorari review of an administrative agency 
decision exists when statutory review is inadequate or not 
available.10  Certiorari does not lie, however, when the 
legislature 
has 
created 
an 
exclusive 
statutory 
review 
procedure.11 
 
Certiorari 
review 
of 
a 
decision 
of 
an 
administrative agency is limited to questions of law and 
addresses the following issues:  
(1) Whether the board kept within its jurisdiction; 
(2) Whether the board proceeded on a correct theory 
of the law;  
                                                 
8 Kaczkowski, 33 Wis. 2d at 497 (citing Clancy, 150 Wis. at 
634).   
9 Id.   
10 See, e.g., Franklin v. Housing Auth. of Milwaukee, 155 
Wis. 2d 419, 424, 455 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1990).  
11 Kaczkowski, 33 Wis. 2d at 496. 
No. 
02-3208   
 
9 
 
(3) Whether 
the 
board's 
action 
was 
arbitrary, 
oppressive, or unreasonable and represented its 
will and not its judgment; and  
(4) Whether the evidence was such that it might 
reasonably make the order or determination in 
question.12  
¶20 In 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Kaczkowski 
v. 
Fire 
& 
Police 
Commissioners of Milwaukee,13 the court concluded that statutory 
appeal under  Wis. Stat. § 63.13(5)(i) provided an exclusive 
procedure for a circuit court to determine certain issues, 
namely whether a board's action was arbitrary, oppressive, or 
unreasonable, and whether the board could reasonably make the 
order or determination at issue.14  These issues, the court held, 
are encompassed by the standard of review, namely "under the 
evidence was the decision of the board reasonable."15  Circuit 
courts retained jurisdiction to review by certiorari, however, 
those strictly legal questions that were not or could not have 
                                                 
12 See Kaczkowski, 33 Wis. 2d at 500 (quoting State ex rel. 
Ball v. McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d 190, 199, 94 N.W.2d 711 (1959)); State 
ex rel. Gudlin v. Civil Service Comm'n of West Allis, 27 
Wis. 2d 77, 133 N.W.2d 799 (1965); State ex rel. Wasilewski v. 
Bd. of School Dirs. of Milwaukee, 14 Wis. 2d 243, 111 N.W.2d 197 
(1961); Tomaszewski v. Giera, 2003 WI App 65, ¶18, 260 
Wis. 2d 569, 659 N.W.2d 882.   
13 33 Wis. 2d 488, 148 N.W.2d 44 (1967).     
14 Kaczkowski, 33 Wis. 2d at 501. 
15 Id. 
No. 
02-3208   
 
10 
 
been raised through a statutory judicial review proceeding under 
§ 63.13(5)(i).16   
¶21 Thus, 
according 
to 
Kaczkowski, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 62.13(5)(i) is not an exclusive procedure for review of a 
disciplinary order of a board of police and fire commissioners.  
The statute merely limits a circuit court's scope of certiorari 
review,17 but does not eliminate a circuit court's ability to 
issue writs of certiorari.  Under Kaczkowski, the first two 
questions a circuit court may address in a certiorari proceeding 
are not encompassed by Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5), and therefore a 
circuit court can issue a writ of certiorari to answer those 
questions.18  Consequently a circuit court may determine in a 
certiorari 
action 
whether 
a 
board 
of 
police 
and 
fire 
commissioners kept within its jurisdiction and whether the board 
                                                 
16 Kaczkowski, 33 Wis. 2d at 500 (quoting State ex rel. Ball 
v. McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d 190, 199, 94 N.W.2d 711 (1959)); State ex 
rel. Smits v. City of DePere, 104 Wis. 2d 26, 31-32, 310 
N.W.2d 607 (1981); Herek v. Police & Fire Comm'n of Menomonee 
Falls, 226 Wis. 2d 504, 510, 595 N.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1999).  
See also Petition of Heffernan, 244 Wis. 104, 108, 11 
N.W.2d 680 (1943) (jurisdictional errors are beyond the scope of 
the statutory appeal process and must be addressed by certiorari 
review); Lamasco Realty Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 242 Wis. 357, 
394-396, 8 N.W.2d 372 (1943) (when statutory review is limited, 
courts may entertain questions of jurisdiction which could not 
be raised by way of the exclusive statutory process); Borgnis v. 
Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 359, 133 N.W. 209 (1911) (the question 
of whether a board exceeded its jurisdiction is always open to 
the examination and decision of the proper court by writ of 
certiorari).   
17 Kaczkowski, 33 Wis. 2d at 496.   
18 Id. at 501, 504; Borgnis, 147 Wis. at 359.   
No. 
02-3208   
 
11 
 
proceeded on correct theory of the law.19  That said, writs of 
certiorari should be issued sparingly and only when those errors 
clearly appear.20   
¶22 As the court of appeals noted in its certification, 
this bifurcated review process set forth in Kaczkowski was 
followed in subsequent cases decided prior to the adoption of 
the 1993 amendment.21   
¶23 Since the 1993 amendment, this court and the court of 
appeals have continued to treat jurisdictional and legal errors 
of a board of police and fire commissioners as reviewable by a 
circuit court on a writ of certiorari.22  For example, in City of 
                                                 
19 Kaczkowski, 33 Wis. 2d at 501. 
20 Id. at 504.   
21 See, e.g., State ex rel. Hennekens v. City of River Falls 
Police & Fire Comm'n, 124 Wis. 2d 413, 419, 369 N.W.2d 670 
(1985); Smits, 104 Wis. 2d at 31-32; Enk, 76 Wis. 2d at 572 
(whether board applied proper burden of proof was deemed outside 
the scope of statutory review proceeding); State ex rel. Reedy 
v. Law Enforcement Disciplinary Comm., 156 Wis. 2d 600, 606, 457 
N.W.2d 505 (Ct. App. 1990); Owens v. Bd. of Police & Fire 
Comm'rs of Beloit, 122 Wis. 2d 449, 451-52, 362 N.W.2d 171 (Ct. 
App. 1984) (whether board failed to follow its own rules 
regarding the investigation of the police officer was deemed 
outside the scope of certiorari proceeding).   
22 City of Madison v. DWD, 2003 WI 76, ¶33, 262 Wis. 2d 652, 
664 N.W.2d 584 (citing Kaczkowski, 33 Wis. 2d at 500).  See also 
State ex rel. Heil v. Green Bay Police & Fire Comm'n, 2002 WI 
App 228, 256 Wis. 2d 1008, 652 N.W.2d 118; Umhoefer v. Police & 
Fire Comm'n of Mequon, 2002 WI App 217, 257 Wis. 2d 539, 652 
N.W.2d 412; Herek v. Police & Fire Comm'n of Menomonee Falls, 
226 Wis. 2d 504, 595 N.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1999); Younglove v. 
City of Oak Creek Fire & Police Comm'n, 218 Wis. 2d 133, 579 
N.W.2d 294 (Ct. App. 1998).   
No. 
02-3208   
 
12 
 
Madison v. DWD, 2003 WI 
76, ¶33, 
262 Wis. 2d 652, 664 
N.W.2d 584, the court commented that "there are 'two exclusive 
avenues of review of the determinations of a fire and police 
commission . . . the 
appeal 
procedures 
provided 
by 
the 
legislature or by means of a writ of certiorari.'"23   
¶24 None of these cases, however, directly raised the 
issue presented in the instant case:  whether the Kaczkowski 
bifurcated review of an order of a board of police and fire 
commissioners remains good law after the 1993 amendment.  
¶25 As we stated previously, the 1993 amendment to 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) changed 
the question addressed 
by a 
circuit court in a statutory appeal of an order of a board of 
police and fire commissioners.  The former statute required a 
circuit court to determine whether upon the evidence the order 
of the board was reasonable.24  The present amended version 
requires a circuit court to determine whether upon the evidence 
there is just cause to sustain the charges against the accused;25 
the 1993 amendment added paragraph (em) setting forth statutory 
standards for just cause, as we discuss below.   
¶26 Although under both the pre- and post-1993 statutes a 
circuit court determines the validity of an order of a board of 
police and fire commissioners on the basis of the evidence, the 
                                                 
23 City of Madison, 262 Wis. 2d 652, ¶33 (quoting Enk, 76 
Wis. 2d at 571).   
24 Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(i) (1991-92). 
25 Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(i).   
No. 
02-3208   
 
13 
 
PFC board argues that the 1993 amendment expanded the scope of 
the available statutory appeal and concomitantly narrowed the 
scope of common law certiorari review.       
¶27 The 1993 amendment added statutory standards for 
determining whether "just cause" exists, and the PFC board 
argues that these new standards, which a board of police and 
fire 
commissioners 
and 
a 
circuit 
court 
must 
apply 
in 
disciplinary proceedings against subordinates, include matters 
previously reviewed in a petition for a writ of certiorari. 
According 
to 
the 
PFC 
board, 
these 
standards 
provide 
a 
comprehensive 
blueprint 
for 
a 
board 
of 
police 
and 
fire 
commissioners and a circuit court to apply in disciplinary 
proceedings against subordinates.  The PFC board argues that 
this 
blueprint 
encompasses 
and accommodates 
all 
arguments 
Gentilli 
now 
seeks 
to 
make 
in 
this 
separate 
certiorari 
proceeding. 
 
In 
sum, 
the 
PFC 
board 
asserts 
that  
"reasonableness" differs from "just cause," the former being 
narrower than the latter.  The PFC board concludes that after 
1993 the statutory standards encompass issues that could have 
previously been raised in a petition for a writ of certiorari:  
whether the rule was overbroad or vague, violating due process, 
or otherwise constitutionally unsound.    
¶28 The standards adopted in the 1993 amendment for just 
cause are as follows: 
No subordinate may be suspended, reduced in rank, 
suspended and reduced in rank, or removed by the board 
under par. (e), based on charges filed by the board, 
members of the board, an aggrieved person or the chief 
No. 
02-3208   
 
14 
 
under par. (b), unless the board determines whether 
there is just cause, as described in this paragraph, 
to sustain the charges.  In making its determination, 
the board shall apply the following standards, to the 
extent applicable: 
1. 
Whether 
the 
subordinate 
could 
reasonably 
be 
expected to have had knowledge of the probable 
consequences of the alleged conduct. 
2. Whether the rule or order that the subordinate 
allegedly violated is reasonable. 
3. Whether the chief, before filing the charge against 
the subordinate, made a reasonable effort to discover 
whether the subordinate did in fact violate a rule or 
order. 
4. Whether the effort described under subd. 3 was fair 
and objective. 
5. Whether the chief discovered substantial evidence 
that the subordinate violated the rule or order as 
described 
in 
the 
charges 
filed 
against 
the 
subordinate. 
6. Whether the chief is applying the rule or order 
fairly 
and 
without 
discrimination 
against 
the 
subordinate. 
7. Whether the proposed discipline reasonably relates 
to the seriousness of the alleged violation and to the 
subordinate's record of service with the chief's 
department.26 
¶29 According to the PFC board, allegations that a rule is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad address the content of 
the rules and their application and are at the heart of the 
first two standards of just cause.27  The PFC board contends that 
                                                 
26 Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em). 
27 The board also argues that standards 4, 6, and 7 cannot 
be met if the prosecution is based on a vague and overbroad 
rule. 
No. 
02-3208   
 
15 
 
a rule that is vague or overbroad in the constitutional sense is 
unreasonable and does not provide reasonable notice to a 
subordinate; it does not satisfy the standards of just cause.28 
¶30 The PFC board further argues that if Gentilli could 
have made the constitutional claims before the PFC board and the 
circuit court in his statutory appeal, he is now barred from 
making the claims in a certiorari proceeding.  The PFC board 
characterizes its position as simple and its conclusion as 
straightforward:  Gentilli was accorded the opportunity in the 
statutory appeal to state all claims, defenses, challenges, and 
arguments he wished to advance, and the statutory appeal 
resolved all issues that Gentilli sought an opportunity to argue 
or reargue on certiorari.   
¶31 We do not agree with the PFC board's position for 
several reasons.   
¶32 First, the legislature has given no indication in 
amending 
the 
one 
sentence 
in 
the 
text 
of 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 63.15(5)(i) and adding the paragraph (em) standards for just 
cause that it intended to further limit or eliminate the common 
law writ of certiorari.  Nor do the context, scope, or history 
                                                 
28 The PFC board cites City of Madison v. DWD, 2003 WI 76, 
262 Wis. 2d 652, 664 N.W.2d 558, in which the court held that 
the Equal Rights Division of the Department of Workforce 
Development could not take jurisdiction over a complaint 
alleging conviction record discrimination arising out of a 
disciplinary proceeding under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5).  The court 
stated that under the just cause standard a rule or discipline 
that violates a statute cannot be reasonable.  262 Wis. 2d 652, 
¶28. 
No. 
02-3208   
 
16 
 
of the amendment indicate a legislative intent to limit or 
eliminate the common law writ of certiorari. 
¶33 Second, none of the standards enumerated in Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.13(5)(em) for determining "just cause" state that a board 
of police and fire commissioners or a circuit court should 
determine whether a PFC board acted in accordance with the law 
and 
within 
its 
jurisdiction. 
 
Thus, 
on 
the 
face 
of 
§ 62.13(5)(em) and (i), the statutory appeal does not encompass 
the first two issues to be determined in a petition for a writ 
of certiorari. 
¶34 Over the years courts have consistently held that the 
"final and conclusive" judicial review provided by statute was 
limited to the sufficiency of the evidence and the relationship 
between the discipline imposed and the seriousness of the 
conduct justifying the discipline and that the "reasonableness" 
standard did not encompass claims of legal error. 29   
¶35 Third, although the text of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(i) 
has changed and § 62.13(5)(em) has been added, the role of a 
circuit court in a statutory appeal remains the same under both 
the new and old texts.  A circuit court continues to determine 
whether an order of a board of police and fire commissioners is 
supported by the evidence.  While the post-1993 statute more 
specifically defines the "just cause" test than the pre-1993 
statute defined the "reasonableness" test, both the "just cause" 
                                                 
29 See, e.g., Enk, 76 Wis. 2d at 572; Durkin, 48 Wis. 2d at 
117; Kaczkowski, 33 Wis. 2d at 500-02. 
No. 
02-3208   
 
17 
 
and the "reasonableness" determinations are based "upon the 
evidence." 
¶36 Furthermore, the pre-1993 "reasonableness" standard 
seems to encompass much if not all of the "just cause" standard, 
and both the "just cause" and the "reasonableness" standards are 
ultimately based on the proposition that the grounds for an 
order of a board of police and fire commissioners must be 
reasonable. 
Thus 
even 
though 
Gentilli's 
vagueness 
and 
overbreadth allegations may relate to reasonableness, as the PFC 
board argues, Gentilli's constitutional arguments apparently 
would have been permitted in certiorari under the pre-1993 
"reasonableness" standard and should be permitted in certiorari 
under the post-1993 "just cause" standard.  
¶37 Fourth and finally, if the 1993 amendment were 
interpreted as invalidating the bifurcated review process, 
appellate court review of the PFC board's exercise of its 
jurisdiction 
and 
the 
lawfulness 
of 
its 
action 
would 
be 
eliminated. 
 
Such 
an 
interpretation 
would 
undermine 
the 
legislative purpose.  The legislature has explicitly stated that 
it intends Wis. Stat. § 62.13 to "be construed as an enactment 
of statewide concern for the purpose of providing a uniform 
regulation of police and fire departments."30  
¶38 Given the lack of precedential value of an unpublished 
circuit court decision in a Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(i) statutory 
appeal and the finality of the circuit court decision, the 
                                                 
30 Wis. Stat. § 62.13(12).   
No. 
02-3208   
 
18 
 
legislative policy to provide "uniform regulation of police and 
fire departments" would be undermined if a circuit court could 
not review orders of a board of police and fire commissioners on 
questions of law in a certiorari proceeding and if an appellate 
court could not independently review a circuit court's rulings 
on issues of law.31  Without appellate review and without 
published appellate decisions that are precedential in all 
circuit and appellate courts, the legislative policy of "uniform 
regulation of police and fire departments" could not be 
achieved. 
¶39 In sum, the bifurcated system of statutory appeal and 
certiorari action has apparently functioned well before and 
after the 1993 amendments to fulfill the legislative purposes, 
and we see nothing in the 1993 amendment to indicate that the 
legislature intended to make any change in certiorari review of 
orders of a board of police and fire commissioners.    
¶40 The PFC board also argues that the doctrine of issue 
preclusion estops Gentilli in a certiorari proceeding from 
relitigating issues that were heard and determined in the 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) statutory appeal.  Issue preclusion wards 
off endless litigation, ensures the stability of judgments, and 
guards against inconsistent decisions on the same set of facts.  
Issue preclusion is ordinarily determined as a matter of 
                                                 
31 The PFC board argued that the 1993 amendment reduced the 
application of certiorari.  However, no example was cited 
illustrating when a writ of certiorari would be used under the 
PFC board's broad view of statutory appeal.   
No. 
02-3208   
 
19 
 
discretion by the circuit court on a case-by-case basis.32  A 
court balances competing goals in determining whether to invoke 
the doctrine.   
¶41 In the present case, a significant factor to balance 
in applying issue preclusion is that issues of law in a 
certiorari action are reviewable by an appellate court and that 
issues arising in a just cause determination in a statutory 
appeal are not.  As we noted previously, the legislature has 
mandated that Wis. Stat. § 62.13 "be construed as an enactment 
of statewide concern for the purpose of providing a uniform 
regulation of police and fire departments."33  If this goal is to 
be achieved, an analysis of just cause by a board of police and 
fire commissioners and a circuit court should not be the final 
and conclusive determination of whether the board kept within 
its jurisdiction and proceeded on a correct theory of the law.  
These 
latter 
issues 
are 
subject 
to 
independent 
judicial 
determination in a certiorari proceeding and in appellate 
courts.   
¶42 Accordingly, we conclude that issue preclusion does 
not apply with respect to a certiorari proceeding subsequent to 
a § 62.13(5)(i) statutory appeal even though factors that a 
board of police and fire commissioners and a circuit court might 
consider 
in 
determining 
just 
cause 
under 
Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
32 Michelle T. v. Crozier, 173 Wis. 2d 681, 698, 495 
N.W.2d 327 (1993). 
33 Wis. Stat. § 62.13(12).   
No. 
02-3208   
 
20 
 
§ 62.13(5)(em) and (i) might overlap with issues that are 
subject to a certiorari proceeding, namely whether the board 
kept within its jurisdiction and proceeded on a correct theory 
of the law.34 
¶43 For 
the 
reasons 
set 
forth, 
we 
conclude 
that 
§ 62.13(5)(i) as amended in 1993 is not the exclusive remedy for 
a claim that the rules a subordinate was found to have violated 
were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  The constitutional 
issues of vagueness or overbreadth of administrative rules that 
Gentilli raised in his petition for a writ of certiorari are 
issues of law that, even if somewhat overlapping with the issues 
in the statutory appeal proceeding, may be considered under 
certiorari because they concern whether the PFC board kept 
within its jurisdiction and proceeded on a correct theory of the 
law.  Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court erred as a 
matter of law in quashing the writ of certiorari and dismissing 
the 
action 
without 
considering 
the 
merits 
of 
Gentilli's 
constitutional claims.   
¶44 For the reasons set forth we reverse the order of the 
circuit court dismissing the certiorari action and remand the 
cause to the circuit court.  
By the Court.—The order of the Circuit Court for Dane 
County is reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit 
court. 
                                                 
34 See Umhoefer v. Police & Fire Comm'n of the City of 
Mequon, 2002 WI App 217, 257 Wis. 2d 539, 652 N.W.2d 412;  
Herek, 226 Wis. 2d at 510.  
No. 
02-3208   
 
21 
 
¶45 PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
No. 
02-3208   
 
 
 
1