Title: Flagstar Enterprises, Inc. v. Davis
Citation: 709 So. 2d 1132
Docket Number: 1960141
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 12, 1997

709 So. 2d 1132 (1997)
FLAGSTAR ENTERPRISES, INC.
v.
Maureen DAVIS.
1960141.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 12, 1997.
Rehearing Denied January 23, 1998.
*1133 Bert P. Taylor and Scott P. Hooker of Taylor &amp; Smith, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
Gary D. Hooper and R. Stephen Griffis of Hooper &amp; Griffis, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee.
HOUSTON, Justice.
The defendant, Flagstar Enterprises, Inc. ("Flagstar"), appeals from a judgment entered on a $250,000 general jury verdict ($100,000 in compensatory damages and $150,000 in punitive damages) for the plaintiff, Maureen Davis, in this action seeking damages under theories of negligence and wantonness and under the Alabama Extended *1134 Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine ("AEMLD"). We reverse and remand.
Davis sued after discovering human blood in a styrofoam package containing a biscuit with gravy; she had purchased the biscuit from a Hardee's restaurant, which was operated under a franchise agreement with Flagstar. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Davis, as it must be in accordance with our standard for reviewing the denial of a motion for a judgment as a matter of law,[1]St. Clair Federal Savings Bank v. Rozelle, 653 So. 2d 986 (Ala.1995), was set out in Davis's brief as follows:
(Citations to the record omitted; emphasis by Davis.)
The trial court denied Flagstar's motion for a judgment as a matter of law made before submission of the case to the jury and later denied its motion for a judgment as a matter of law made after the verdict. It is those rulings that form the basis for Flagstar's appeal.[2]
With respect to the negligence claim, Flagstar contends that Davis failed to present any evidence that the Hardee's restaurant breached a duty with respect to the manner in which its employee or employees had prepared her food. Specifically, Flagstar argues:
Davis contends that she presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of each element of her negligence claim to submit that claim to a jury. Based on our review of the evidence, we conclude that it was sufficient to create a jury question with respect to the negligence claim. It is well established that there are three essential elements to a right of recovery for negligence: 1) a duty owing from the defendant to the plaintiff; 2) a breach of that duty; and 3) an injury to the plaintiff in consequence of that breach. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. v. Ferguson, 271 Ala. 120, 122 So. 2d 356 (1959); South Coast Properties, Inc. v. Schuster, 583 So. 2d 215 (Ala.1991). It cannot be seriously disputed that the restaurant owed a duty to Davis to exercise reasonable care in the preparation and packaging of her food, i.e., that it had a duty to sell her merchantable food or food that was not unreasonably dangerous. In McCarley v. Wood Drugs, Inc., 228 Ala. 226, 227, 153 So. 446, 446 (1934), this Court stated:
A Hardee's employee would certainly take reasonable steps so as not to allow his or her own food to become contaminated with human blood, and a Hardee's customer certainly would not reasonably expect to find human blood in a biscuit with gravy, a fact conceded by Flagstar. See Cain v. Sheraton Perimeter Park South Hotel, 592 So. 2d 218 (Ala.1991), discussing the "reasonable expectation" test adopted by this Court in Ex parte Morrison's Cafeteria of Montgomery, Inc., 431 So. 2d 975 (Ala.1983). The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Davis, indicated that Davis purchased a biscuit with gravy from the Hardee's restaurant; that that biscuit with gravy was contaminated with human blood; that Annetta Cohill, a Hardee's employee, was primarily responsible for preparing Davis's food on the morning in question; that Cohill's supervisor had to bandage Cohill's arm on that same morning;[3] that Cohill's supervisor sent her home before her shift was over, even though the restaurant was busy with customers; and that no one outside the restaurant who came into contact with the food (Eric Cohill) or in close proximity to it (customers paying for gasoline at the store's counter) had a reasonable opportunity to bleed into the styrofoam container. A jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that Annetta Cohill failed to exercise reasonable care in packaging Davis's food, either by failing to properly bandage a cut or abrasion on her arm or by failing to observe that blood had gotten onto the styrofoam container, and that Davis suffered emotional distress as a result of eating blood-tainted food.[4] We hold, therefore, that *1141 the trial court properly denied Flagstar's motion for a judgment as a matter of law on Davis's negligence claim.[5]
As to the AEMLD claim, Flagstar concedes, as previously noted, that a consumer would not reasonably expect to find *1142 human blood in food purchased from a restaurant and, therefore, that food contaminated in such a manner would be "defective" within the meaning of the AEMLD. For a discussion of the AEMLD in the context of allegedly defective food served by a restaurant, see Cain v. Sheraton Perimeter Park South Hotel, supra. Flagstar contends, however, that Davis failed to present sufficient evidence that the biscuit with gravy left the restaurant's control in an unreasonably dangerous or defective condition. Flagstar also contends that "the evidence conclusively demonstrates that the product was substantially changed from its original condition." These two contentions appear to be based on Flagstar's belief that the evidence conclusively established that the styrofoam package containing the biscuit with gravy was contaminated by someone after it was taken from the restaurant by Eric Cohill. Suffice it to say that the evidence presents a question of fact for a jury as to whether the food could have been contaminated after it was taken from the restaurant. We hold, therefore, that the trial court properly denied Flagstar's motion for a judgment as a matter of law with respect to the AEMLD claim.
Wantonness is "[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3). Flagstar contends that Davis's evidence was not of such quality and weight that a jury of reasonable and fair-minded persons could find that evidence "clear and convincing" on Davis's claim that an employee or employees of the Hardee's restaurant had deliberately engaged in conduct that was in reckless or conscious disregard of the safety of the restaurant's customers. See Ex parte Norwood Hodges Motor Co., 680 So. 2d 245 (Ala.1996). Davis, of course, takes the contrary position, arguing primarily that she presented evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that employees of the restaurant, and Flagstar itself, failed to fully cooperate with Davis following the incident and could infer that a "cover up" had been undertaken in an attempt to avoid liability. After carefully examining the evidence, we conclude that Davis presented insufficient evidence to submit the wantonness claim to a jury. We hasten to point out again that in reviewing the evidence we have indulged all reasonable inferences in favor of Davisconsidering the evidence exactly as Davis set it out in her brief. Although we agree with Davis that a reasonable person might conclude from the evidence that employees of Hardee's and Flagstar took evasive measures to hinder and possibly "cover up" the investigation into the incident by the health department and Davis's attorney, that evidence, standing alone, in no way indicates that on November 30, 1993, Annetta Cohill, or any other employee of Hardee's, deliberately engaged in conduct (preparing food) in reckless or conscious disregard for the safety of the restaurant's customers. The evidence of a "cover up" of what may have been negligence on the part of Annetta Cohill in packaging Davis's food cannot logically support a finding of wantonness and a consequent assessment of punitive damages. A conclusion based solely on conjecture or speculation cannot serve as a proper basis for a jury verdict. South Coast Properties, Inc. v. Schuster, supra. Therefore, we are constrained by our standard of review to hold that, with respect to the wantonness claim, the trial court erred in denying Flagstar's motions for a judgment as a matter of law. Because Flagstar challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the wantonness claim and because the wantonness claim constituted a "bad count" within the meaning of Aspinwall v. Gowens, 405 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1981), we reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[6]
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
*1143 HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, KENNEDY, and SEE, JJ., concur.
ALMON, SHORES, and COOK, JJ., dissent.
COOK, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that sufficient evidence existed to submit the wantonness claim to the jury.
I agree with the majority that evidence offered to prove that employees of Hardee's and Flagstar subsequently attempted to "cover-up" the investigation into the incident does not indicate that any employees engaged in conduct in reckless or conscious disregard for the safety of Hardee's customers. However, the conduct of Hardee's employees prior to the incident has a direct bearing on the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the wantonness claim. On two occasions, Annetta Cohill stated under oath that she may have cut herself and that it may have been her blood in the styrofoam container in question. During cross-examination at trial, "substantial portions of the [Annetta Cohill] deposition [were] read to her and placed into the record without objection by Flagstar. Particularly, Annetta Cohill admitted in her deposition testimony and in her trial testimony, under oath, that when Davis's counsel inquired as to whether or not she had information with regard to the bloody biscuit, her first response was, `I could have cut myself,' [and] `It might have been my blood,' and that her supervisor, Hilda Bryant, sent her home early on that day." (Appellee's brief at 12.) (Citations to the record omitted; emphasis added.) These statements were made by Cohill to Davis's attorney when Cohill believed she was speaking *1144 with an attorney for Hardee's. Not only did Cohill admit during her sworn deposition testimony that she had made the statements to Davis's attorney in a telephone conversation, but she also admitted the same at trial. It was not until after Cohill realized that she was not talking to a Hardee's attorney that she stated that she did not cut her hand and that it could not have been her blood in the biscuit. If the jury believed, and apparently it did, that Cohill knew she was bleeding and that her blood may have gotten into the styrofoam container, yet continued to work and package biscuits and gravy for customers, then the jury could have found that Cohill's conduct occurred with a reckless or conscious disregard for Hardee's customers, including Davis.
Furthermore, at no time during trial did Flagstar object to the testimony of Annetta Cohill. In fact, Flagstar failed to request, in regard to Cohill's testimony, a limiting instruction specifying that the testimony could be used for impeachment purposes only. Therefore, Flagstar failed to properly preserve this argument for appeal.
I agree with the majority that the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to support the negligence and AEMLD claims. However, based on the fact that Cohill stated under oath on two occasions that she might have cut herself and that it might have been her blood in the biscuit, I dissent from the holding that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient on the wantonness claim. I would affirm the judgment.
ALMON and SHORES, JJ., concur.
[1]  See Rule 50, Ala.R.Civ.P. Such a motion was formerly known as a motion for a directed verdict, when it was made before submission of the case to the jury, and as a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, when it was made after an unfavorable verdict.
[2]  In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support Davis's claims, Flagstar also contends that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. In light of our holding on the sufficiency issue, we pretermit any discussion of the weight-of-the-evidence issue.
[3]  There was testimony indicating that the supervisor had bandaged an old scab on Cohill's arm as a precautionary measure only, not out of any concern that it may have been bleeding. The credibility of this testimony and the weight to which it is entitled in deciding this case are matters reserved to the jury.
[4]  We note that our holding in this respect is not based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In McCarley v. Wood Drugs, Inc., supra, this Court noted:

"[In] Hooper Cafe Co. v. Henderson, [223 Ala. 579, 137 So. 419 (1931)], it was noted that the case of Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 Ill. 518, 45 N.E. 253, 34 L.R.A. 464, 54 Am.St.Rep. 483, cited approvingly in Travis v. L. &amp; N.R.R. Co., [183 Ala. 415, 62 So. 851 (1913)], held, in effect, that proof that plaintiff ate the food, and in consequence became sick, did not make out a prima facie case of negligence, nor shift the burden to defendant, and this holding was approved, with the concluding observation, that negligence or breach of duty is not to be presumed.
"Measured by the rule of these decisions, now firmly established in this jurisdiction, the trial court correctly ruled in giving the affirmative charge in favor of the defendant.
"The evidence is not voluminous and has been duly considered by the court in consultation, and we find it was sufficient from which the jury might reasonably infer plaintiff's sickness was in some manner produced by the food served her in the purchased lunch. But this alone will not suffice for the submission of plaintiff's case to the jury. There must be some fact or circumstance from which a reasonable inference may also be drawn that defendant failed in the proper degree of care in the selection or preparation thereof.
"Of course, as insisted by counsel for plaintiff, negligence may be inferred from circumstances (Lawson v. Mobile Electric Co., 204 Ala. 318, 85 So. 257), and direct acts need not be shown, but proof must nevertheless be adduced from which a reasonable inference of negligence may be drawn. It was so adduced in Hooper Cafe v. Henderson, supra, where fish with an unpleasant odor and taste was served with the added proof that spoiled fish may be readily detected by the senses of sight, touch, and smellall of which justified the inference of negligence on the defendant's part. And in Travis v. L. &amp; N.R.R. Co., supra, proof was offered as to the oysters served, upon which negligence might be reasonably inferred; and in Pantaze v. West, 7 Ala.App. 599, 61 So. 42, 44, cited by appellant, where plaintiff became sick from eating tainted brains, proof was adduced showing that such condition was easily detected, and that in fact the harmful effects might be removed by proper cooking. The court observed: `The inferences that might easily and reasonably be drawn from this evidence, it seems to us, are that, if the plaintiff was made sick from eating tainted brains, the defendant or his servants, for whose acts the defendant is liable, were negligent either in not using due care in properly cooking the brains or in failing to discover that they were tainted or in an unfit and dangerous condition to cook and serve to patrons for consumption; for it was established by the testimony that the taint was easily and readily detected by any one giving ordinary attention to the matter, and a want or failure to observe this duty and exercise due care in this regard would constitute that negligence for which the defendant would be held liable.'
"In the instant case there was no proof of peculiar or unpleasant odor or taste as to the food consumed, nor anything to indicate that it was in any manner improper for human consumption. Plaintiff rests her case upon proof tending to show sickness in consequence of the food consumed. But, as previously stated, this will not suffice for submission of the matter of defendant's negligence for the jury's determination."
228 Ala. at 227-28, 153 So.  at 447. As previously stated, the evidence in the present case suggested that the blood was clearly visible inside the styrofoam container and that it could have been readily detected by Cohill if she had been exercising reasonable care at the time she packaged Davis's food.
Citing a number of cases from other jurisdictions, Flagstar also contends that, as a matter of law, Davis should not be allowed to recover damages based on allegations that she suffered emotional distress arising out of a fear of contracting HIV, the virus that causes AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome). The record indicates that Flagstar tried its case below on the theory that Davis had failed to prove each of the elements of her claims, not on the theory, presented here for the first time, that as a matter of law she could recover no damages for emotional distress. Characterizing Davis's assertions of emotional distress as "AIDS phobia," Flagstar argues that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the ground that Davis suffered no injury as the result of eating blood-tainted food. We find it unnecessary to reach this issue because, in our view, it constitutes a new theory that was not raised in the trial court. Relying on Beavers v. County of Walker, 645 So. 2d 1365 (Ala.1994), Flagstar takes the position that it preserved the issue for appellate review by making the general argument that the evidence was insufficient to submit the negligence claim to a jury. This Court did recognize in Beavers that the rule requiring adherence to the theory relied on in the trial court does not mean that the parties are limited on appeal to the same reasons or arguments advanced in the trial court upon the matter or question in issue. 645 So. 2d  at 1372. However, the rule remains that a party may not change theories on appeal in an attempt to set aside the judgment. This Court, in First National Bank of Pulaski, Tenn. v. Thomas, 453 So. 2d 1313 (Ala.1984), implicitly rejected the notion that a general motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is sufficient to preserve for appellate review every theory that might be relied on to support the motion. One of the issues in that case concerned whether the bank had trespassed on the plaintiffs' property. At trial, the bank took the position that it had had permission to send one of its representatives onto the plaintiffs' property; therefore, according to the bank, the evidence was insufficient to show that it had committed a trespass. On appeal, however, the bank argued that no trespass had occurred because it had a right under its mortgage to enter onto the plaintiffs' property. This Court stated:
"The assertion now, for the first time, that the Bank as mortgagee had a right to enter upon plaintiffs' premises raises a theory which we cannot consider. Dixie Highway Express, Inc. v. Southern Railway Co., 286 Ala. 646, 244 So. 2d 591 (1971). Having permission or consent to enter upon the land, on the one hand, and having the right as mortgagee to enter upon that land, are obviously inconsistent and different theories. Having permission or consent implies that plaintiffs had the right to control the Bank's entry, while having the right to enter the land as mortgagee implies a right of entry not dependent upon permission or consent of the plaintiff mortgagors. Having tried its case below on the theory of consent, the Bank cannot now pursue the new theory of entrance by right as mortgagee."
453 So. 2d  at 1319.
[5]  We note, as Flagstar points out, that there is no cause of action in Alabama for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. Implied in our holding in Allen v. Walker, 569 So. 2d 350 (Ala. 1990), a case involving allegations of verbal abuse and threats of physical violence, is the idea that one cannot negligently "inflict" emotional distress on another. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1969), defines "inflict" as follows: "1. To cause or carry out by physical assault or other aggressive action. 2. To impose.... 3. To afflict." Accordingly, this Court has recognized that only the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress is actionable as a separate tort. However, the present action is based on allegations that a Hardee's employee negligently packaged Davis's food and that that negligence resulted in Davis's suffering emotional distress. Damages for emotional distress may be awarded in a negligence case, even in the absence of physical injury. Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, Inc., 400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981). See, also, Reserve National Ins. Co. v. Crowell, 614 So. 2d 1005, 1011 (Ala.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 824, 114 S. Ct. 84, 126 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1993), wherein this Court recognized the difference between a claim alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress and a claim not based on infliction of emotional distress, but pursuant to which damages for emotional distress may nonetheless be awarded.
[6]  We note that in considering the question of the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the negligence and wantonness claims, we have not considered as substantive evidence Annetta Cohill's testimony that she "could have" cut herself or that the blood "might have been" hers. That testimony was admissible at the trial for impeachment purposes after Cohill had denied that the blood could have been hers, and Flagstar concedes as much; however, it could be considered as substantive evidence only if the statements had been made in an appropriate proceeding at which Cohill was under oath and was subject to being penalized for perjury. See Rule 801(d)(1), Ala.R.Evid., which provides:

"Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if
"(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition...."
See, also, Patrick v. Femco Southeast, Inc., 590 So. 2d 259 (Ala.1991); and C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 159.02(1) (5th ed.1996):
"A self-contradictory statement by a witness who is not a party, whether testified to by the witness during questioning or proven extrinsically by others, generally is not substantive evidence of the matter asserted. The statement customarily operates only to impeach or discredit the witness and has no other effect; in particular, such statement cannot be the basis of a finding of fact necessary to the establishment of civil or criminal liability or a defense to either.
"....
"With the advent of the Alabama Rules of Evidence, however, at least some inconsistent statements constitute substantive evidence as to the truth of the matter asserted in them. When a witness, for example, testifies at a trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination then that witness' prior inconsistent statement is admissible as substantive evidence if it was given under oath subject to penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, other proceeding or in a deposition. This particular rule of admissibility had been embraced by the Alabama courts before adoption of the Alabama Rules of Evidence. A statement qualifies [as substantive evidence] under [Rule 801(d)(1)(A)] only if: 1) it is inconsistent with the witness' present testimony; 2) the witness is subject to cross-examination; and 3) the statement was given in an appropriate proceeding. Appropriate proceedings include such proceedings as hearings before a grand jury, prior trials and depositions. When a prior inconsistent statement is offered for substantive proof of its contents under the present principle, the offering party is due an instruction that it is usable both as going to the credibility of the witness and as substantive proof of the matter asserted."
Davis argues that because Cohill admitted under oath in her deposition and at trial that she had made the statements to Davis's attorney in a telephone conversation over two years after the incident, Rule 801(d)(1) is satisfied and the statements should be considered as evidence that Cohill could have cut herself and that she could have gotten blood in the container. The rule is clear, however, and it requires that the statement one seeks to have admitted have been made under oath at an appropriate proceeding. Testifying under oath that she had made the statements to Davis's attorney is not the same as making the statements under oath. The rule contemplates that a statement is more reliable if it was made under oath, with the declarant subject to penalty for perjury. Stretching the rule in the way Davis suggests would tend to remove the prophylactic effect of that requirement.
In any event, we note that even if we were to consider the statements as substantive evidence, they in no way indicate that Cohill engaged in wanton conduct while preparing Davis's food.