Title: Commonwealth v. Martin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12056
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 25, 2016

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12056 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PIERCE A. MARTIN. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     September 7, 2016. - November 25, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Costs, Fees and costs, Probation. 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Quincy Division of 
the District Court Department on October 19, 2010. 
 
 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea, filed on October 3, 
2012, was heard by Mary Hogan Sullivan, J., and motions for the 
return of seized property, filed on November 21, 2012, and July 
22, 2013, were heard by Mark S. Coven, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Ilse Nehring for the defendant. 
 
Susanne M. O'Neil, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  In October, 2011, the defendant, Pierce A. 
Martin, pleaded guilty in the Quincy Division of the District 
Court Department to possession of a class D substance (second 
offense).  At sentencing, the plea judge imposed a one-year term 
2 
 
 
of probation and, as mandated by statute, the probation 
supervision fees (G. L. c. 276, § 87A) and the victim-witness 
assessment (G. L. c. 258B, § 8).  In October, 2012, after the 
revelation of misconduct at the William A. Hinton State 
Laboratory Institute (Hinton laboratory), a judge granted the 
defendant's unopposed motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the 
ground that Annie Dookhan,1 the subsequently discredited analyst 
at the center of the misconduct allegations, performed the 
analysis of the substances seized during the defendant's arrest.  
See Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336 (2014).  The 
Commonwealth entered a nolle prosequi on the underlying 
complaint.  Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for return 
of property, including probation supervision fees ($780) paid 
during the term of probation and the victim-witness assessment 
(fifty dollars), claiming a right to recoup these amounts where 
the conviction, in the defendant's view, was vacated on 
constitutional grounds.2  The judge denied the motion, and the 
defendant appealed.  We transferred the case from the Appeals 
Court on our own motion.  We conclude that there is no statutory 
                     
 
1 For a comprehensive description of Dookhan's indictment 
and guilty pleas, and the investigation of the Hinton 
laboratory, see Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 337-342 
(2014). 
 
 
2 The defendant's motion also sought the return of cash 
($109) seized during the arrest.  The judge allowed this aspect 
of the motion. 
3 
 
 
authority for the return of the probation supervision fees and 
the victim-witness assessment paid by the defendant.  Therefore, 
we affirm the denial of the defendant's motion for return of 
property. 
 
Background.  We summarize the relevant facts from the 
record.  On October 18, 2010, Quincy police officers arrested 
the defendant following a motor vehicle stop.  Incident to the 
arrest, the police seized a large plastic bag containing seven 
smaller plastic bags filled with what appeared to be marijuana 
and $109 in United States currency.  The next day, a five-count 
complaint issued charging the defendant with possession of a 
class D substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute, 
subsequent offense, G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (b); commission of a 
drug offense in a school zone, G. L. c. 94C, § 32J; unlicensed 
operation of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 10; failure to 
stop, G. L. c. 98, § 9; and failure to wear a seatbelt, G. L. 
c. 90, § 13A. 
 
On October 13, 2011, the defendant pleaded guilty to 
possession of a class D substance, subsequent offense.  In 
contemplation of a guilty plea, the Commonwealth dismissed the 
school zone violation and filed the remaining charges with the 
defendant's consent.  The plea judge imposed the defendant's 
recommended sentence:  a one-year supervised term of probation, 
with conditions requiring the defendant to abstain from drugs 
4 
 
 
and submit to random drug testing.  In addition, the judge 
imposed statutorily mandated fees including a one-time victim-
witness assessment of fifty dollars, as well as a monthly  
probation supervision fee of sixty dollars and a monthly victim 
services surcharge of five dollars (collectively, probation 
fees). 
 
On January 4, 2012, a violation of probation notice issued 
for the defendant.  On August 28, 2012, the defendant waived his 
right to a probation hearing and stipulated to the violation for 
failing to comply with probation conditions including drug 
testing, payment of the monthly probation fees, and reporting to 
his probation officer.3  The plea judge extended the defendant's 
probation for one year on the same terms, and imposed office of 
community corrections "Level III" supervision with global 
positioning system monitoring for ninety days. 
On October 31, 2012, a judge allowed the defendant's 
unopposed motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on Dookhan's 
involvement as the analyst of the substance seized from the 
defendant during his arrest.  The Commonwealth entered a nolle 
prosequi for the underlying complaint "in the interest of 
justice in light of the ongoing criminal investigation into the 
mishandling of evidence at the [Hinton laboratory]," while 
                     
 
3 The defendant concedes that he was absent from supervised 
probation for eight and one-half months. 
5 
 
 
maintaining the existence of sufficient evidence to prosecute 
the complaint. 
 
On July 22, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for return 
of property, seeking the return of the probation fees and the 
victim-witness assessment paid during his probation.4  After a 
hearing, the judge denied the motion. 
 
Discussion.  The defendant argues that the language of 
G. L. c. 258B, § 8 (§ 8), requires the return of the victim-
witness assessment where the underlying conviction is vacated 
through postconviction relief.  Specifically, he argues that he 
is entitled to recoup the payment of probation fees assessed 
pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 87A (§ 87A), on the ground that his 
conviction is "void" and that equity requires the relief he 
seeks.  He also claims that the probation fees are an 
impermissible fine or penalty where the underlying conviction is 
vacated.  We address these arguments in turn, both of which lack 
merit. 
 
1.  Victim-witness assessment.  The defendant argues that 
the language in § 8 requiring the return of the victim-witness 
assessment where a conviction is "overturned on appeal" also 
applies to this case where the conviction was vacated as a 
                     
 
4 The defendant was ordered to pay the victim-witness 
assessment for both his initial probationary term and his 
extended term of probation. 
6 
 
 
consequence of the judge's order granting the defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea.  We disagree. 
 
The issue is one of statutory interpretation.  "We review 
questions of statutory interpretation de novo."  Chin v. 
Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 531 (2015), citing Sheehan v. Weaver, 
467 Mass. 734, 737 (2014).  "[T]he meaning of a statute must, in 
the first instance, be sought in language in which the act is 
framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the 
courts is to enforce it according to its terms."  Commonwealth 
v. Dalton, 467 Mass. 555, 557 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Boe, 456 Mass. 337, 347 (2010).  "We are obliged to discern and 
give effect to the intent of the Legislature."  Wing v. 
Commissioner of Probation, 473 Mass. 368, 373 (2015), citing 
Oxford v. Oxford Water Co., 391 Mass. 581, 587–588 (1984). 
 
Thus, we begin the analysis with the language of the 
statute: 
 
"The court shall impose an assessment of [fifty 
dollars] against any person who has attained the age of 
seventeen and who is convicted of a misdemeanor or against 
whom a finding of sufficient facts for a conviction is made 
on a complaint charging a misdemeanor. . . .  The 
assessment from any conviction or adjudication of 
delinquency which is subsequently overturned on appeal 
shall be refunded by the court to the person whose 
conviction or adjudication of delinquency is overturned" 
(emphasis added). 
 
G. L. c. 258B, § 8.  The plain language of § 8 demonstrates that 
the disposition in this case, the withdrawal of a guilty plea 
7 
 
 
followed by an order vacating the conviction, does not 
constitute a conviction that was "overturned on appeal."  See 
Dalton, 467 Mass. at 557.  Here, the defendant did not appeal 
from his conviction; rather, his conviction was vacated after a 
judge of the District Court granted postconviction relief 
through Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 
(2001), and the Commonwealth subsequently entered a nolle 
prosequi.  That procedural difference is dispositive here.  The 
plain language of § 8 specifically limits persons entitled to a 
refund to those whose conviction or adjudication of delinquency 
was overturned on appeal.  G. L. c. 258B, § 8.  See Commonwealth 
v. Chamberlin, 473 Mass. 653, 660 (2016). 
 
The Legislature clearly intended to provide a refund for 
the § 8 assessment to a narrow category of defendants because it 
used the specific phrase "overturned on appeal."  If the 
Legislature had intended to expand the pool of eligible 
claimants to those whose convictions were overturned through 
postconviction relief under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, or other types 
of judicial relief, it could have stated that intention 
expressly.  See Chin, 470 Mass. at 532.  Contrast G. L. c. 258D, 
§ 1 (B) (ii) (eligible defendants include "those who have been 
granted judicial relief by a state court of competent 
jurisdiction").  Moreover, the phrase "overturned on appeal" has 
remained unchanged in the statute despite the fact that the 
8 
 
 
Legislature has amended § 8 eight times since it was enacted in 
1983.  See St. 1983, c. 694, § 2; St. 1985, c. 794, § 9; St. 
1989, c. 362, § 1; St. 1990, c. 150, § 341A; St. 1991, c. 138, 
§§ 209, 210; St. 1994, c. 60, §§ 169-171; St. 1996, c. 151, 
§§ 485, 486; St. 2002, c. 184, §§ 125-128; St. 2014, c. 260, 
§§ 20-22. 
 
The defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Zawatsky, 41 
Mass. App. Ct. 392 (1996), to support his argument that he is 
entitled to recoup the victim-witness assessment because the 
conviction to which the assessment applied is void is misplaced.  
In Zawatsky, supra at 397, 400-401, the Appeals Court set aside 
$600 in victim-witness assessments, which were attributed to 
specific convictions, where those convictions were vacated as 
void because the District Court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction.  The court determined that those assessments could 
not stand where the supporting convictions were void.  Id. at 
400-401. 
 
Here, although the defendant's guilty plea was vacated, the 
District Court had proper subject matter jurisdiction.  The 
defendant's conviction was merely voidable, not void ab initio, 
as the defendant suggests.  See Lewis v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 
445, 448 (1952) (erroneous original sentence merely voidable, 
not void, until reversed, where court had proper jurisdiction).  
"'A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was a 
9 
 
 
complete nullity and without legal effect.' . . .  To be void, a 
judgment must issue from a court that 'lacked jurisdiction over 
the parties, lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, or 
failed to provide due process of law.'"  McIntire, petitioner, 
458 Mass. 257, 264 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1012 (2011), 
quoting Harris v. Sannella, 400 Mass. 392, 395 (1987). 
 
Therefore, we conclude that the plain language of § 8 does 
not provide a statutory basis for the refund of the victim-
witness assessment to the defendant.  See Chamberlin, 473 Mass. 
at 660. 
 
2.  Probation fees.  The defendant argues that because his 
conviction is void, equitable principles and fundamental 
fairness require the return of the probation fees.  As discussed 
above, the defendant's conviction was not void; the judge merely 
vacated the conviction to allow for a new trial, and the 
Commonwealth declined to further prosecute the matter.  See 
McIntire, petitioner, 458 Mass. at 264; Lewis, 329 Mass. at 448.  
The defendant's argument that equity requires the return of his 
probation fees is unavailing. 
 
Significantly, the defendant does not point to, nor did we 
find, a statutory basis for the defendant to recoup his 
probation fees.  Compare G. L. c. 276, § 87A, with G. L. 
c. 258B, § 8.  The statute is silent as to a defendant's 
entitlement to the return of probation fees after a conviction 
10 
 
 
is vacated.  G. L. c. 276, § 87A.  "We will not 'read into the 
statute a provision which the Legislature did not see fit to put 
there.'"  Chin, 470 Mass. at 537, quoting Commissioner of 
Correction v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court for the 
County of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 126 (2006). 
 
We next address the defendant's assertion that the 
statutory probation fees he paid were in fact impermissible 
financial penalties or fines.  See G. L. c. 280, § 6 
(prohibition on costs imposed as penalty for crime).  Section 
87A provides, in pertinent part: 
 
"The court shall assess upon every person placed on 
supervised probation . . . a monthly probation supervision 
fee . . . in the amount of [sixty dollars] per month.  Said 
person shall pay said probation fee once each month during 
such time as said person remains on administrative 
supervised probation. . . .  The court shall also assess 
upon every person placed on supervised probation . . . a 
monthly probationer's victim services surcharge . . . in 
the amount of [five dollars] per month.  Said person shall 
pay said victim services surcharge once each month during 
such time as said person remains on supervised probation." 
 
G. L. c. 276, § 87A.  The statute also provides for the waiver 
of probation fees where the court "has determined, after a 
hearing and upon written finding, that such payment would 
constitute an undue hardship on said person or his [or her] 
family due to limited income, employment status[,] or any other 
factor."  Id. 
 
The plain language of the statute specifically refers to 
the monthly payments as "fees," rather than fines.  Fees "are 
11 
 
 
charged in exchange for a particular governmental service which 
benefits the party paying the fee in a manner 'not shared by 
other members of society,' . . . and the charges [that] are 
collected . . . [are] to compensate the governmental entity 
providing the services for its expenses."  Emerson College v. 
Boston, 391 Mass. 415, 424-425 (1984).  In contrast, "[a] fine 
is a pecuniary imposition by way of punishment upon one who has 
been convicted of [a] crime."  Commonwealth v. Hersey, 324 Mass. 
196, 206 (1949). 
 
"[I]t can fairly be said that the intent of § 87A is 
to defray the costs associated with the provision of 
services to probationers, as an alternative to 
imprisonment.  The fees are assessed on all persons placed 
on supervised probation, irrespective of the nature or 
severity of their offenses, suggesting a nonpunitive, 
regulatory purpose" (footnote omitted). 
 
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 620 (2011) (Doe No. 10800). 
 
Doe No. 10800 is instructive in addressing the defendant's 
argument that the probation fees operate as punitive fines in 
his circumstances.  In that case, the plaintiff claimed that a 
statutory "increase in his probation fees constitute[d] an 
enhancement of his punishment, and, as such, violate[d] the ex 
post facto clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions."  Id. 
at 617.  In concluding that the statutory increase of probation 
fees during the plaintiff's probationary term did not violate 
either the Federal or State ex post facto clause, we explained 
12 
 
 
that the § 87A probation fees had a regulatory rather than 
punitive purpose.  See id. at 619.  "The fees under § 87A are a 
component of probation, the primary goals of which are 
rehabilitation of a defendant and protection of the public; the 
fees themselves suggest more of civil than a criminal 
orientation."  Id., citing Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 
11, 15 (2010).  Moreover, we noted that "the language of § 87A 
provides that the probation fees may be waived by the court on a 
showing that their payment would constitute an undue hardship, 
further suggesting that the fees are not intended to be a 
criminal penalty."  Doe No. 10800, supra at 619-620.  Based on 
the plain language of the statute and legislative intent, we 
conclude that § 87A probation fees are nonpunitive regulatory 
fees, rather than punitive fines.5 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above we conclude that 
the plain language of G. L. c. 258B, § 8, does not provide the 
                     
 
5 During oral argument, the defendant conceded that the 
probation fees were not fines or penalties.  Instead, he appears 
to argue that he is entitled to recoup the fees assessed during 
the eight-month period of his unexcused absence from supervised 
probation and that those fees became punitive because he did not 
actually receive services during that period.  Additionally, the 
defendant argues that the fees should be returned to him to 
prevent the Commonwealth's unjust enrichment.  These arguments 
are without merit.  We decline the defendant's invitation to 
fashion a remedy that would operate to entitle a defendant to 
recoup probation fees upon vacation of a conviction, on the 
basis of noncompliance with the terms of probation.  Such a 
remedy goes against the goals of probation and would incentivize 
the rejection of rehabilitative services. 
13 
 
 
statutory basis for a refund of the victim-witness assessments 
for convictions that are vacated after the withdrawal of a 
guilty plea.  Similarly, we conclude that G. L. c. 276, § 87A, 
does not provide the statutory basis for the return of probation 
fees where a defendant's conviction is subsequently vacated.  
Therefore, we affirm the District Court judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.