Title: Michael Knight v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-1987
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 24, 2002

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC00-1987
____________
MICHAEL KNIGHT,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[January 24, 2002]
ANSTEAD, J.
We have for review the decision in Knight v. State, 791 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2000), in which the First District certified the following question as one of
great public importance:
DOES SECTION [775.082(8)(a)2.a.], FLORIDA STATUTES
(1997), WHICH MANDATES A LIFE SENTENCE FOR PRISON
RELEASEE REOFFENDERS WHO COMMIT “A FELONY
PUNISHABLE BY LIFE,” APPLY BOTH TO LIFE FELONIES
AND FIRST DEGREE FELONIES PUNISHABLE BY
IMPRISONMENT FOR A TERM OF YEARS NOT EXCEEDING
1.  The First District asked this Court to address section 775.082(9)(a)3.a.,
Florida Statutes (1999).  However, because Knight’s offense occurred on August
23, 1998, his prison releasee reoffender sentence is controlled by the 1997 Florida
Statutes, and we therefore revise the certified question to involve section
775.082(8)(a)2.a., Florida Statutes (1997).  Cf. Ellis v. State, 762 So. 2d 912 (Fla.
2000) (stating that the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes give citizens
constructive notice of the consequences of their actions, including the Prison
Releasee Reoffender (PRR) act).  The section of the PRR act that is at issue in this
case, although renumbered, remained substantively unchanged from 1997 to 1999.
2.  Knight was also charged in the same information with possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon.  However, that count is not an issue in this review
proceeding.
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LIFE?1
791 So. 2d at 490.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the
reasons set forth below, we answer the certified question in the affirmative.  
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Michael Knight (Knight) was charged in an information filed by the State
Attorney with armed robbery with a firearm pursuant to section 812.13(2)(a),
Florida Statutes (1997), which states, “If in the course of committing the robbery
the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony
of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding
life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.”
(Emphasis Added.)2  The State Attorney also filed a notice of intent to seek
enhanced penalties against Knight as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) under the
3.  On direct appeal, the First District certified the question of whether the
PRR act violated the separation of powers clause of the Florida Constitution.  See
Knight, 791 So. 2d at 490.  However, this question is no longer at issue as we
subsequently held that the PRR act does not violate the separation of powers
clause of the Florida Constitution in Cotton v. State, 769 So. 2d 345, 349-50 (Fla.
2000).
-3-
provisions of section 775.082(8)(a)2.a., Florida Statutes (1997).  At trial, the jury
returned a verdict finding Knight guilty of robbery with a firearm.  The trial court
then sentenced Knight to be imprisoned for a term of natural life as a PRR,
pursuant to section 775.082(8)(a)2.a., as well as imposing a three-year minimum
mandatory term due to the robbery being committed with a firearm, pursuant to
section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1997).    
On direct appeal, the First District affirmed Knight’s sentence.3  See Knight,
791 So. 2d at 490.  On motion for rehearing and certification the First District
added the aforementioned certified question of great public importance.  See id.
ANALYSIS
Section 775.082(8)(a)2.a. provides that if the trial court determines that a
defendant is a prison releasee reoffender, the defendant must be sentenced: “For a
felony punishable by life, by a term of imprisonment for life.”  On the other hand,
the PRR provision in section 775.082(8)(a)2.b. provides that for an offender
convicted of a first-degree felony, offenders must receive “a term of imprisonment
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for 30 years.”  Knight asserts that for purposes of application of the PRR act, his
armed robbery conviction should be treated as a felony of the first degree even
though the conviction is subject to a sentence of life.  Hence, he contends his
sentence should have been limited to a maximum term of thirty years imprisonment. 
The First District rejected Knight’s contention: “This Court has also found
that the term felony punishable by life in subsection 775.082(8)(a)2.a., Florida
Statutes (1997), covers both life felonies and first degree felonies punishable by a
term of years not exceeding life.”  791 So. 2d at 490.  The First District relied upon
the reasoning set out in its earlier decision in Brown v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly
D2753 (Fla. 1st DCA Dec. 8, 1999).  
In Brown, the First District reasoned that the wording “felony punishable by
life” in section 775.082(8)(a)2.a., Florida Statutes (1997), included both life felonies
and first-degree felonies punishable by life.  See id. at D2754.  The court explained:
Appellant also challenges his life sentence, asserting that
because his armed burglary conviction is a first degree felony
punishable by life, not a life felony, the maximum sentence he could
have received under section 775.082(8) was 30 years; hence, his life
sentence is illegal.  In support of his argument, appellant points to
Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1992), wherein the Florida
Supreme Court designated the following five types of felonies: capital,
life, first degree, second degree, and third degree, and stated that first
degree felonies punishable by life were first degree felonies regardless
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of the sentence imposed (life or a term of years).  Id. at 268-69. 
Appellant argues that because he was convicted of a first degree
felony, section 775.082(8)(a)(2)(b) provides a maximum sentence of
30 years.  We cannot agree.
Subsection 775.082(8)(a)(2)(a) provides for an enhanced life
sentence for a “felony punishable by life.”  The statute does not use
the term “life felony,” but rather uses the term “felony punishable by
life,” which includes both life felonies and first degree felonies
punishable by life.  Because appellant’s armed burglary conviction
under section 810.02(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), is a first degree
felony punishable by life, the life sentence imposed under section
775.082(8)(a)(2)(a) was legal.  In so saying, we are not persuaded by
appellant’s analogy to the habitual felony offender statute, which at
one point did not include an enhancement for life felonies.  See
Burdick; Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1992).  Unlike the
habitual felony offender statute, section 775.082(8)(a)(2)(a)
unambiguously includes both life felonies and first degree felonies
punishable by life.
Id.  We agree with and approve of the First District’s analysis in Brown.
Here, as in Brown, Knight cites this Court’s holding in Burdick v. State, 594
So. 2d 267, 268-69 (Fla. 1992), in which we held that “[t]here is no separate
classification for first-degree felonies punishable by life imprisonment” in section
775.081, Florida Statutes (1989).  Further, Knight argues that section
775.082(8)(a)2.a. is ambiguous because it is susceptible to different interpretations
and it should thus be construed in the manner most favorable to the accused as
provided for under the statutory lenity rule set out in section 775.021(1), Florida
Statutes (1997).  
4.  Legislative history may be helpful to ascertain legislative intent when
statutory language is susceptible to more than one meaning.  See Rollins v.
Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294, 299 (Fla. 2000).  See also State ex rel. Davis v. Rose,
122 So. 225, 233 (Fla. 1929) (holding that ambiguous terms within a statute should
be applied and interpreted in light of the legislative intent).  However, this would not
help Knight.  Although the portion of the PRR act that refers to a “felony
punishable by life” does not expressly articulate that it includes both life felonies
and first-degree felonies punishable by life, the legislative history contained in the
bill’s Staff Analysis indicates that the Legislature intended to include both life
felonies and first-degree felonies punishable by life in that term.  The Staff Analysis
states: “Any first degree felony that is punishable by life, is treated as a life felony.” 
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Criminal Justice Appropriations, HB1371 (1997) Staff
Analysis 5 (final April 2, 1997) (on file with comm.).  The Staff Analysis also
specifically states that one of the goals of the PRR act was to convert the statutory
maximum penalties into the mandatory minimum penalties for those who have
offended within three years of being released from prison.  Fla. H.R. Comm. on
Criminal Justice Appropriations, HB1371 (1997) Staff Analysis 1 (final April 2,
1997) (on file with comm.).  Compare § 775.082(3), Fla. Stat. (1997), with §
775.082(8), Fla. Stat. (1997).
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Initially, we conclude that Knight’s reliance on Burdick is misplaced.  In
Burdick, we addressed how first-degree felonies and first-degree felonies
punishable by life should be treated under Florida’s habitual felony offender statute. 
See Burdick, 594 So. 2d at 267-68.  However, in this case, we must determine the
meaning of the term “felony punishable by life” as used in the PRR act.  We agree
with the First District that this term is not ambiguous.  Hence, we also reject
Knight’s second argument that the PRR act is ambiguous, and must be construed
in the manner he advocates.4  
As the First District held, it appears the Legislature used the catch-all phrase
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“felony punishable by life” to include life felonies and first-degree felonies
punishable by life since they both carry the maximum penalty of life imprisonment. 
Logically, prison releasee reoffenders who commit either life felonies or first-degree
felonies punishable by life are to receive mandatory life sentences, since life
sentences are the statutory maximum penalties provided for those crimes.
Based upon the Legislature’s unambiguous language and its apparent
purpose in providing for mandatory life sentences in PRR cases when the
underlying offense carries a maximum life sentence, we conclude that the phrase
“felonies punishable by life,” used in section 775.082(8)(a)2.a., Florida Statutes
(1997), provides for a mandatory life sentence for prison releasee reoffenders who
commit either life felonies or first-degree felonies punishable by life.  
Accordingly, we approve the decision below of the First District and answer
the certified question in the affirmative.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ.,
concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
-8-
Great Public Importance
First District - Case No. 1D99-2561 
(Alachua County)
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and G. Kay Witt, Assistant Public Defender,
Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau
Chief, Criminal Appeals, and Anne C. Toolan, Assistant Attorney General,
Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent