Title: Gramegna v. Parole Com'n
Citation: 666 So. 2d 135
Docket Number: 83955
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 1996

666 So. 2d 135 (1996)
Vincent GRAMEGNA, Petitioner,
v.
PAROLE Commission, Respondent.
No. 83955.

Supreme Court of Florida.
January 11, 1996.
*136 Scott D. Makar and Andrew H. Nachman of Holland &amp; Knight, Jacksonville, for Petitioner.
William L. Camper, General Counsel and Kurt E. Ahrendt, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
SHAW, Justice.
We have for review Gramegna v. Florida Parole Commission, 638 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), wherein the district court certified two questions:
Gramegna, 638 So. 2d  at 207-08. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer the first question in the negative, the second in the affirmative, and approve the result in Gramegna.
Gramegna was sentenced to three concurrent ten-year terms of imprisonment after pleading no contest to lewd assault under section 800.04(1), Florida Statutes (1991), for fondling the breasts and vagina of a fourteen-year-old and placing her hand on his genitals. The Florida Parole Commission (the "Commission") denied Gramegna eligibility for control release based on section 947.146(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1991), which denies eligibility to an inmate convicted of the "nonconsensual" touching of the sexual organs of another. Gramegna filed a petition for writ of mandamus in circuit court protesting the Commission's ruling and the court denied relief. The district court affirmed, certifying the above questions.
The State contends that because the consent of a minor is not a defense to the crimes enumerated in section 800.04, it follows that violations of this section are nonconsensual as a matter of law for control release purposes. We agree.
Section 947.146 creates the Control Release Authority (the "authority") which is composed of members of the Commission and has "as its primary purpose the implementation of a system of uniform criteria for the determination of the number and type of inmates who must be released into the community under control release in order to maintain the state prison system at or below 97.5 percent of its lawful capacity." § 947.146(2), Fla. Stat. (1991).
Inmates convicted of certain sexual offenses, including the nonconsensual fondling of the sexual organs of another, are ineligible for control release:
§ 947.146(4), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added).
The statute under which Gramegna was convicted, section 800.04, proscribes the commission of lewd acts upon minors and expressly states that consent is not a defense:
§ 800.04, Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). The legislature thus has determined that a child is incapable of understanding the full consequences of the lewd acts enumerated in section 800.04 and cannot give meaningful  or legally significant  consent.
We answer the first certified question in the negative and hold that Gramegna's fondling of the child-victim was nonconsensual as a matter of law and may serve as a basis for the denial of control release.
Gramegna argues that the Commission improperly relied on an arrest report to determine that his touching of the victim was "nonconsensual" for control release purposes. Our holding above renders this claim moot, but we find that the question is likely to recur and is deserving of review. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984).
Although section 947.146(4), Florida Statutes (1991), is silent as to whether the authority may use documents other than the judgment of conviction as a basis for determining eligibility for control release, the legislature has clarified its intent, amending the statute to read:
§ 947.146(3), Fla. Stat. (1993).
We conclude that the amendment refers to documents contained in the court file and means what it says: Control release ineligibility may be based on any reasonably reliable official document contained in the record and generated during the course of a criminal investigation or proceeding, including an arrest report. Cf. Dugger v. Grant, 610 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1992) (Department of Corrections may rely on arrest report contained in presentence investigation file in denying eligibility for provisional credits under section 944.277, Florida Statutes (1989)). Accordingly, we answer the second certified question in the affirmative.
In sum, we agree with the State on both issues and answer the first certified question in the negative and the second in the affirmative. We approve the result in Gramegna.
It is so ordered.
GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion, in which KOGAN, J., concurs.
ANSTEAD, Justice, dissenting.
I would discharge jurisdiction in this case since, as noted by both parties, we have no actual viable dispute before us. There is no active control release program in operation, so the question as to petitioner's eligibility for such a program is hypothetical. In addition, both parties agree that regardless of the resolution of the issues involved herein, the petitioner was entitled to be released on June 15, 1995. Presumably he is no longer in custody.
KOGAN, J., concurs.