Title: State v. Wiskowski
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2021AP002105-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 2024

2024 WI 23 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP2105-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael Gene Wiskowski, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 18, 2024   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 24, 2024   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan  
 
JUDGE: 
Kent R. Hoffmann   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET, 
KAROFSKY, and PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., joined. HAGEDORN, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined 
with respect to ¶¶39-75, and PROTASIEWICZ, J., joined with 
respect to ¶¶72 and 74-75. PROTASIEWICZ, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined.  ZIEGLER, C.J., 
filed a dissenting opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Kirk B. Obear, and Birdsall Obear & Associates, 
Sheboygan. There was an oral argument by Kirk B. Obear.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Michael J. Conway, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
 
 
2 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Michael J. Conway, assistant attorney general.
 
 
2024 WI 23
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2021AP2105-CR 
(L.C. No. 2019CF628) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael Gene Wiskowski, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 18, 2024 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET, 
KAROFSKY, and PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., joined. HAGEDORN, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined 
with respect to ¶¶39-75, and PROTASIEWICZ, J., joined with 
respect to ¶¶72 and 74-75. PROTASIEWICZ, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined.  ZIEGLER, C.J., 
filed a dissenting opinion. 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   Michael Wiskowski fell asleep in 
a McDonald's drive-thru lane behind the wheel of his truck.  An 
employee knocked on his window to wake him up and called the 
police.  Officer Devin Simon was about a minute away when he 
No. 
2021AP2105-CR   
 
2 
 
received a call from dispatch regarding the incident.  He headed 
to the scene and watched a truck matching dispatch's description 
pull out of the drive-thru and make a proper turn.  Officer 
Simon then pulled Wiskowski over.  Wiskowski explained that he 
was tired because he had just finished a 24-hour shift.  
Although Officer Simon did not notice any signs of impairment or 
criminality, he felt something was off, and prolonged the stop 
to determine whether he had grounds to investigate further.  
Officer Simon ultimately ordered Wiskowski out of his truck, at 
which point Wiskowski manifested signs of intoxication, leading 
to an arrest and charges. 
¶2 
Wiskowski moved to suppress the evidence discovered 
during the stop.  The circuit court denied the motion, 
concluding 
that 
the 
stop 
and 
further 
investigation 
were 
justified as a permissible "community caretaking function."  The 
court of appeals agreed, and we now reverse.  We first conclude 
the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion.  
Furthermore, assuming without deciding that the traffic stop was 
permissible as a bona fide community caretaking activity, we 
hold 
that 
the 
stop 
was 
prolonged 
unreasonably 
when 
it 
transformed into an unjustified criminal investigation.  The 
scope of caretaking stops should be guided and limited by the 
justification for the stop.  This means that, absent another 
permissible reason to detain someone, the detention must end 
when 
the 
original 
community 
caretaking 
justification 
is 
resolved. 
No. 
2021AP2105-CR   
 
3 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
At around 1:00 p.m., while waiting in the drive-thru 
lane of McDonald's, Michael Wiskowski fell asleep behind the 
wheel of his truck.  An employee knocked on his truck window to 
wake him up and called the Plymouth Police Department to report 
it.  Plymouth Police Officer Devin Simon received word from 
dispatch about the incident.  When he arrived at McDonald's a 
minute or so later, he saw a truck matching the caller's 
description near the end of the drive-thru lane.   
¶4 
Officer Simon saw Wiskowski exit the drive-thru lane, 
turn right, stop at a stop sign, and make a "correct, proper, 
and legal left turn onto the road."  Officer Simon then quickly 
turned around in the parking lot and briefly followed Wiskowski.  
Wiskowski drove normally and did not commit any traffic 
violations; at no time did his driving appear abnormal or arouse 
Officer Simon's suspicions.  Officer Simon nonetheless activated 
his lights and siren and performed a traffic stop.  Wiskowski 
complied, pulling over into an empty parking lot.   
¶5 
Officer Simon approached the vehicle, asked Wiskowski 
about the report that he fell asleep in his truck, and took 
Wiskowski's driver's license and insurance card.  Wiskowski 
explained that he had been working for the past 24 hours.  
Officer Simon later testified that, up to this point, Wiskowski 
did not appear sleepy, was not slurring his speech or suffering 
from any obvious medical issue like a heart attack or seizure, 
and was otherwise "acting normal."  He also testified that he 
did not see or smell any alcohol on Wiskowski, nor did he 
No. 
2021AP2105-CR   
 
4 
 
observe any other signs of intoxication.  The only behavior 
Officer 
Simon 
characterized 
as 
"odd" 
was 
that 
Wiskowski 
initially gave him an insurance card for the wrong car before 
handing him the correct one around 20 seconds later.   
¶6 
Following 
this 
initial 
encounter, 
Officer 
Simon 
returned to his squad car.  By this point, a more experienced 
colleague——Officer Cobalt——had arrived on the scene.  Officer 
Simon told Officer Cobalt what Wiskowski had said about working 
for 24 hours, and stated that he wanted to get Wiskowski out of 
his truck.  Officer Cobalt asked, "What are you going to pull 
him out for?"  The two conversed further, and Officer Cobalt 
told Officer Simon to pull up Wiskowski's driving record, which 
revealed that Wiskowski had three past OWIs.  The two officers 
continued to discuss whether there was "enough to take him out" 
of the truck and investigate further.  Officer Simon said that 
he would feel better "smelling booze" on Wiskowski before 
pulling him out.  Ultimately, he decided to do so, citing 
Wiskowski's reported sleepiness and "odd" behavior in handing 
him two insurance cards.  Officer Simon later testified his goal 
was to see if there was something "going on that maybe [he] 
wasn't seeing in the car," by which he meant determining whether 
Wiskowski had been drinking.  Approximately five to six minutes 
transpired after Officer Simon's initial conversation with 
Wiskowski concluded and when he ordered him out of his truck.   
¶7 
Once Wiskowski got out of his truck, Officer Simon 
smelled alcohol for the first time and noticed Wiskowski 
stumble.  Officer Simon asked how much he had to drink, to which 
No. 
2021AP2105-CR   
 
5 
 
Wiskowski replied, "a couple beers."  At that point, Officer 
Simon took Wiskowski back to the police station to perform field 
sobriety tests.  Based on his observations during the tests, 
Officer Simon determined Wiskowski had been driving under the 
influence of alcohol and arrested him.  The State charged 
Wiskowski with one count of operating a motor vehicle under the 
influence and one count of operating with prohibited alcohol 
concentration, both as fourth offenses.   
¶8 
Wiskowski moved to suppress the evidence resulting 
from the traffic stop.  After an evidentiary hearing and 
briefing, the circuit court1 denied Wiskowski's motion, finding 
that Officer Simon's stop was justified as community caretaking 
activity.  A year later, Wiskowski asked the court to hold 
another evidentiary hearing to consider bodycam footage that had 
not been presented to the court the first time around.  The 
court did so, construing it as a motion to reconsider.  The 
court 
once 
again 
denied 
Wiskowski's 
motion 
to 
suppress, 
continuing to find that Officer Simon "acted reasonably under 
the community caretaker function."   
¶9 
Wiskowski eventually pled no contest to one count of 
operating a motor vehicle under the influence as a fourth 
offense.  He appealed the judgement of conviction, arguing that 
the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress.  The 
court of appeals affirmed on the same community caretaking 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Kent Hoffmann of the Sheboygan County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2021AP2105-CR   
 
6 
 
grounds.  State v. Wiskowski, No. 2021AP2105-CR, unpublished 
order (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2023).  Wiskowski then petitioned 
this court for review.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶10 Wiskowski argues that Officer Simon's traffic stop was 
unlawful 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment, 
which 
prohibits 
"unreasonable searches and seizures."2  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
He seeks the suppression of evidence obtained against him.3  The 
facts are not in dispute, so this is a question of law we review 
independently. 
 
State 
v. 
Genous, 
2021 
WI 50, 
¶10, 
397 
Wis. 2d 293, 961 N.W.2d 41.   
¶11 The State contends the stop was lawful for two 
independent reasons.  First, the State maintains it was a 
permissible 
investigatory 
stop 
supported 
by 
reasonable 
suspicion.4  Second, the State agrees with the circuit court and 
                                                 
2 Wiskowski also references Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, but he makes no independent argument on 
this basis.  We decline to address this further.  As we have 
said, "any argument based on the Wisconsin Constitution must 
actually be grounded in the Wisconsin Constitution."  State v. 
Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶24, 395 Wis. 2d 385, 953 N.W.2d 847.   
3 When a search or seizure is unlawful, a common remedy is 
to suppress any evidence found as a result.  State v. Burch, 
2021 WI 68, ¶16, 398 Wis. 2d 1, 961 N.W.2d 314.  The parties 
agree that suppression would be the proper remedy here.   
4 Neither party argued reasonable suspicion in the circuit 
court.  In the court of appeals, however, Wiskowski argued that 
Officer Simon's stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion.  
The State did not press the issue, and the court of appeals did 
not 
substantively 
address 
it. 
 
State 
v. 
Wiskowski, 
No. 
2021AP2105-CR, unpublished order, at 4 n.5 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 
No. 
2021AP2105-CR   
 
7 
 
court of appeals that this was a permissible community caretaker 
activity.  Neither succeed. 
A.  Investigatory Stop 
¶12 One type of intrusion deemed reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment is an investigatory stop.  Id., ¶7.  This 
temporary infringement on personal liberty must be supported by 
reasonable suspicion——that is, in view of the whole picture, 
whether a reasonable police officer would reasonably suspect 
that criminal activity is afoot.  Id., ¶10.  While reasonable 
suspicion doesn't demand much, it does demand more than a hunch.  
Id., ¶8.  And that is all we see here.   
¶13 It is true that falling asleep in a drive-thru during 
the day could be a sign someone is impaired.  It is also black-
letter law that officers need not rule out the possibility of 
innocent behavior to initiate a traffic stop.  Id.  But by 
itself, without any additional indicators of impairment, we 
conclude this is too speculative to amount to reasonable 
suspicion.   
¶14 By the time Officer Simon arrived, Wiskowski was 
driving normally out of the drive-thru and onto the road.  
                                                                                                                                                             
15, 2023).  In briefing submitted to us, Wiskowski again 
defensively raises reasonable suspicion, which the State now 
contends is an independent basis to deny the motion to suppress.  
Although forfeiture generally applies to arguments not raised in 
the circuit court, we will address the State's reasonable 
suspicion argument given the unusual path by which this argument 
comes to us. 
No. 
2021AP2105-CR   
 
8 
 
Officer Simon did not observe nor were there any reports of 
erratic 
driving. 
 
Wiskowski 
did 
not 
commit 
any 
traffic 
violations, and there were no other clues suggesting he was 
operating his vehicle while intoxicated.  Other than falling 
asleep, no one reported any other kind of problematic behavior 
or indications of impairment during his visit to McDonald's.  
Midday drowsiness standing alone, without any other indicators 
of impairment, is simply not enough.  Reasonable suspicion may 
be a low bar, but it's not that low.  The State's contention 
that Officer Simon's traffic stop was supported by reasonable 
suspicion fails.5   
B.  Community Caretaking 
¶15 The State also argues that Officer Simon's seizure of 
Wiskowski during the traffic stop was justified as a permissible 
community caretaker activity.  The line of community caretaker 
cases is rooted in the recognition that law enforcement work is 
multifaceted. 
 
State 
v. 
Kramer, 
2009 
WI 14, 
¶32, 
315 
Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598.  Officers wear multiple hats.  Id.  
Sometimes they are acting to enforce the law by investigating 
and stopping illegal activity.  Id.  Other times they act to 
protect property or help "a member of the public who is in need 
                                                 
5 The State relies in part on State v. Rutzinski, 2001 
WI 22, 
241 
Wis. 2d 729, 
623 
N.W.2d 516 
and 
Navarette 
v. 
California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014).  Both deal with the reliability 
of informant tips and are not relevant to this case. 
No. 
2021AP2105-CR   
 
9 
 
of assistance."  Id.  This is what we have called the community 
caretaking function.   
¶16 These diverse strains of law enforcement action 
sometimes blend together.  An officer might aid someone in need 
and at the same time have a hunch something illegal occurred or 
observe evidence that gives rise to a criminal investigation.  
Id., ¶30.  Yet when analyzing the permissibility of a seizure in 
the community caretaking context, we have emphasized that 
officers act as community caretakers when, viewed objectively, 
they engage in activities "totally divorced from the detection, 
investigation, or acquisition of evidence" of a crime.  Id., ¶23 
(quoting another source).   
¶17 Although a recent decision of the United States 
Supreme Court raises questions regarding the proper way to 
analyze community caretaking claims, no party argues that we 
should alter or modify our precedent based on the facts of this 
case.6  We therefore apply our precedent, which provides a three-
step framework to guide our analysis.  Id., ¶21.   
                                                 
6 Our cases, like those of other jurisdictions, have 
described the community caretaking doctrine as arising out of a 
1973 United States Supreme Court decision, Cady v. Dombrowski.  
See, e.g., State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶32, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 
759 N.W.2d 598.  However, the Supreme Court recently held that, 
although it has recognized law enforcement community caretaking 
duties, it has not created "a standalone doctrine that justifies 
warrantless searches and seizures in the home."  Caniglia v. 
Strom, 593 U.S. 194, 196 (2021).  Several justices concurred and 
raised questions about community caretaking as a separate 
doctrinal 
category, 
and 
how 
to 
properly 
analyze 
law 
enforcement's role in assisting citizens in need.  See, e.g., 
id. at 199-200 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); 
id. at 200-04 
(Alito, 
J., 
concurring); 
id. at 
204-08 
(Kavanaugh, 
J., 
No. 
2021AP2105-CR   
 
10 
 
¶18 The first step in cases like this is to determine 
whether a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
occurred.  Id., ¶22.  In this case, no one disputes that Officer 
Simon seized Wiskowski when he pulled him over.   
¶19 Step two asks as an initial matter whether the officer 
was engaging in a bona fide community caretaking function.  Id., 
¶23.  This means we examine whether this was an objective effort 
to assist a member of the public in need that was "totally 
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of 
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute."  Id. 
(quoting another source).  Even if the answer is yes, however, 
that is not enough on its own to determine whether the seizure 
was lawful.  The third step goes further.  Tracking the Fourth 
Amendment's command, courts must balance the various interests 
to determine whether the exercise of that community caretaking 
activity was reasonable.  Id., ¶40.  We ultimately determine 
that, assuming without deciding Officer Simon had a bona fide 
community caretaking justification when he stopped Wiskowski, 
the continuation of the stop was unreasonable under the facts of 
this case.  So we focus our analysis there.   
¶20 Under this third step in a community caretaker 
analysis, we balance the "public interest or need that is 
furthered by the officer's conduct against the degree of and 
nature of the restriction upon the liberty interest of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
concurring).  Given the briefing in this case and the narrow 
question presented, we too leave these questions for another 
day.   
No. 
2021AP2105-CR   
 
11 
 
citizen."  Id.  This involves evaluating how important the 
intervention was and comparing it with how intrusive and 
proportional the seizure was given the alternatives.7  Id., ¶¶41-
45.  The central question is——was the police intrusion aimed at 
assisting a member of the public in need reasonable under the 
circumstances?   
¶21 In this case, key to our analysis is whether and when 
it is reasonable to extend a seizure undertaken for community 
caretaking purposes once an officer resolves the reason for the 
stop.  The general rule across jurisdictions——and we agree——is 
that a seizure should not be extended beyond its initial 
justification absent some other justification that emerges, like 
reasonable suspicion.   
¶22 In an instructive federal case, the Tenth Circuit 
considered whether officers who responded to a home in their 
community caretaking capacity acted unconstitutionally when they 
                                                 
7 We have often analyzed the balance of interests in the 
third step by examining four factors:    
(1) the degree of the public interest and the exigency 
of the situation; (2) the attendant circumstances 
surrounding the seizure, including time, location, the 
degree of overt authority and force displayed; (3) 
whether an automobile is involved; and (4) the 
availability, 
feasibility 
and 
effectiveness 
of 
alternatives 
to 
the 
type 
of 
intrusion 
actually 
accomplished. 
Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶41.  These factors are a less useful 
guide here because, as we explain below, the balancing in this 
case is conclusively settled by the principle that a community 
caretaking stop must end when the justification for the stop 
dissipates. 
No. 
2021AP2105-CR   
 
12 
 
detained a man they mistakenly believed was someone else.  
Martinez v. Mares, 613 F. Appx 731, 733 (10th Cir. 2015).  After 
officers were informed that the man they detained was not who 
they thought, they nonetheless continued to detain him and 
proceeded to pat him down.  Id.  The man sued, arguing the 
detention was unlawful.  Id. at 734.  The officers responded 
that the stop fell within their community caretaker function.  
Id. at 738.  The court held that, without "some independent 
basis to detain and search him," officers were required to 
release the man once they discovered he was not the suspect.  
Id. at 739.  Why?  Because a "detention justified under an 
officer's community caretaking authority 'must last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate its purpose, and its scope must 
be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.'"  Id. at 
738 (quoting another source).   
¶23 In another case, an officer responded to a call 
concerning an irregularly parked vehicle with the driver 
"slumped over the steering wheel."  State v. Zeimer, 510 
P.3d 100, ¶2 (Mont. 2022).  When the officer went to check on 
the driver, he saw him "perk-up, check his mirrors, put the 
truck in gear, and lawfully drive away without any apparent 
indicia of peril, distress, or need for assistance."  Id., ¶33.  
At 
that 
point, 
the 
officer's 
welfare-check 
justification 
"evaporated."  Id.  But the officer detained and questioned the 
driver anyway.  Id., ¶¶3-6.  The Montana Supreme Court explained 
that welfare checks cannot be used as a pretext for an illegal 
search or seizure.  Id., ¶33.  "Once the objective facts and 
No. 
2021AP2105-CR   
 
13 
 
circumstances manifest that the subject is not or no longer in 
peril, distress, or otherwise in need of assistance, the 
original constitutional justification for a CCD stop ends unless 
some other constitutional justification exists or arises for 
completing or prolonging the stop."  Id. (cleaned up).   
¶24 These cases reflect the general Fourth Amendment 
principle that "any warrantless intrusion must be as limited as 
is reasonably possible consistent with the purpose justifying it 
in the first instance."8  Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 469, 251 
N.W.2d 461 (1977).  Accordingly, the scope of caretaking stops 
should 
be 
guided 
and 
limited 
by 
the 
original 
community 
caretaking justification.  The justification for restricting a 
person's liberty ends when the welfare-check justification is 
resolved, provided no other independent reason exists to detain 
the person.9 
                                                 
8 See also State v. Brooks, 2020 WI 60, ¶10, 392 Wis. 2d 
402, 944 N.W.2d 832 (A traffic stop can "last no longer than 
necessary to complete the purpose of the [] stop."); Rodriguez 
v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) ("Like a Terry stop, 
the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop 
context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'——to address the 
traffic violation that warranted the stop, and attend to related 
safety concerns.") (cleaned up). 
9 See State v. Ellis, 469 P.3d 65, 77 (Kan. 2020) (holding 
that "a public safety or welfare stop is not for investigative 
purposes and must end as soon as the officer determines the 
citizen is not in need of help");  United States v. Harris, 747 
F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting that the "scope of the 
encounter must be carefully tailored to satisfy the purpose of 
the initial detention, and the police must allow the person to 
proceed once the officer has completed the officer's inquiry, 
unless, of course, the officer obtains further reason to justify 
the stop"); State v. Acrey, 64 P.3d 594, 600 (Wash. 2003) (en 
banc) (welfare check "must end when reasons for initiating an 
No. 
2021AP2105-CR   
 
14 
 
¶25 Applying these principles to this case, we conclude 
that even if the original stop was a bona fide community 
caretaking activity, Officer Simon unreasonably extended the 
stop beyond its original justification.  Officer Simon initially 
stopped Wiskowski to perform a welfare check and ensure he was 
safe to drive.  But after their first conversation, nothing 
reinforced continued concern on that basis.  In Officer Simon's 
telling, Wiskowski was "acting normal."  Officer Simon asked 
Wiskowski about falling asleep in the drive-thru and received a 
reasonable explanation.  Wiskowski did not show signs of 
sleepiness during their interaction.  And Officer Simon did not 
see signs of a medical emergency.  At that point, the public 
interest or exigency that may have existed was resolved; Officer 
Simon had no community caretaking justification to prolong the 
stop.10   
¶26 Yet Officer Simon did prolong the stop.  He held 
Wiskowski there as he endeavored to determine whether he had 
enough to justify a criminal investigation.  Wiskowski was 
clearly 
not 
free 
to 
leave, 
despite 
the 
welfare-based 
justification for the initial stop failing to reveal further 
                                                                                                                                                             
encounter are fully dispelled") (quoting another source). 
10 The only behavior Officer Simon cites as "odd" was 
Wiskowski initially handing him the wrong insurance card, only 
to produce the correct one seconds later.  Even entertaining the 
belief that this is odd, it did not portend that Wiskowski was 
suffering from any malady or otherwise in need of further 
assistance.  Thus, it did not provide a justification for 
extending the stop.   
No. 
2021AP2105-CR   
 
15 
 
concern.  Under the facts of this case, Wiskowski was in no 
additional need of assistance.  This means Officer Simon had no 
community caretaking justification to extend the stop, and 
should have allowed Wiskowski to leave.   
¶27 It is true that when the community caretaking concern 
dissipated, Officer Simon could have continued Wiskowski's 
detainment if facts emerged during their initial conversation 
that gave rise to reasonable suspicion.  Indeed, Officer Simon's 
focus turned to criminal investigation as he probed for a reason 
to pull Wiskowski out of his car.  But Officer Simon did not 
smell alcohol on Wiskowski and did not observe any other 
evidence of possible impairment.  Having nothing more than a 
thought that "something was kind of going on that maybe [he] 
wasn't seeing in the car"——i.e., a "hunch"——Officer Simon 
detained Wiskowski well beyond the stop's justification.  If 
Officer Simon, armed solely with a report that a driver fell 
asleep in a drive-thru, did not have reasonable suspicion when 
he stopped Wiskowski, reasonable suspicion certainly did not 
materialize following an initial encounter revealing no new 
evidence of impaired driving. 
¶28 In 
short, 
Officer 
Simon's 
original 
community 
caretaking justification of helping a member of the public who 
is in need of assistance dissipated after their initial 
encounter.  At this point, the restriction on Wiskowski's 
liberty should have ended.  The stop transformed from a welfare 
check into the "detection, investigation, or acquisition of 
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute," 
No. 
2021AP2105-CR   
 
16 
 
without the attendant reasonable suspicion necessary to justify 
further detention.  Id., ¶11 (quoting another source).  Officer 
Simon ceased being a community caretaker and, thus, had no 
authority to extend the stop on that basis.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶29 We conclude that Officer Simon's seizure of Wiskowski 
violated Wiskowski's rights under the Fourth Amendment.  Officer 
Simon did not possess reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop.  
And even assuming Officer Simon initially engaged in bona fide 
community caretaker activity when he stopped Wiskowski, he 
unlawfully prolonged the stop and began an investigation without 
reasonable suspicion.  We therefore reverse the court of appeals 
decision and remand to the circuit court with instructions to 
vacate the judgment of conviction and grant the motion to 
suppress. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
1 
 
 
¶30 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  The opinion for 
the court applies our precedent on the community caretaking role 
of law enforcement, which the parties did not call into question 
in this case.  I write separately for two reasons.  First, I 
explain why the State is wrong to suggest that Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.62(3m)(b)1. permits it to raise a reasonable 
suspicion argument before us despite not raising it in the 
circuit court.  Second, I discuss why our precedents on 
community caretaking may need refinement to better accord this 
legitimate function of law enforcement with the Fourth Amendment 
principles outlined by the United States Supreme Court.   
I.  WIS. STAT. § (RULE) 809.62(3m)(b)1. 
¶31 In our system of appellate review, the default rule is 
that parties may not raise new arguments on appeal that have not 
been briefed or preserved in the circuit court.  Estate of 
Miller v. Storey, 2017 WI 99, ¶67, 378 Wis. 2d 358, 903 
N.W.2d 759.  If parties do not timely assert their rights, they 
forfeit their opportunity to raise them later.1  Id.   
¶32 The rule of forfeiture is "as old as the common law 
system of appellate review," and for good reason.  State v. 
Counihan, 2020 WI 12, ¶60, 390 Wis. 2d 172, 938 N.W.2d 530 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) (quoting another 
source).  By requiring issues and objections to be timely 
                                                 
1 Appellate courts can, however, exercise their discretion 
to hear forfeited issues.  Estate of Miller v. Storey, 2017 
WI 19, ¶67, 378 Wis. 2d 358, 903 N.W.2d 759. 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
2 
 
raised, errors can be corrected by the circuit court, thereby 
eliminating the need for or circumscribing the scope of 
appellate review.  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶30, 315 
Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612.  This also prevents sandbagging, 
where litigants might strategically fail to object or raise 
issues so they can make later claims for reversal.  State v. 
Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶12, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727.  
Forfeiture thus incentivizes diligent preparation on the front 
end, and saves appellate courts from being "in the awkward 
position of 'telling a lower court it was wrong when it was 
never presented with the opportunity to be right.'"  State ex 
rel. Davis v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2024 WI 14, ¶78, 411 
Wis. 2d 123, 4 N.W. 2d 273 (Hagedorn, J., concurring) (quoting 
another source).  The appellate system exists to review errors 
in the court below, not to give litigants a do-over on claims 
that could have been tried or addressed the first time around.  
In short, forfeiture is critical to the accuracy, efficiency, 
and fairness of the case-deciding function of the judiciary.   
¶33 In this case, the State argued in the circuit court 
that Officer Simon lawfully stopped Wiskowski based on the 
community caretaking doctrine.  It made no mention of reasonable 
suspicion.  The circuit court agreed with the State's community 
caretaking argument, so Wiskowski appealed.  But in the court of 
appeals, 
Wiskowski 
defensively 
argued 
that 
Officer 
Simon 
possessed neither reasonable suspicion nor a valid community 
caretaking justification for the stop.  The State explained that 
it would not respond to Wiskowski's reasonable suspicion 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
3 
 
argument because the circuit court relied only on the community 
caretaking doctrine.  The court of appeals did not address 
reasonable suspicion.   
¶34 Wiskowski then petitioned us for review.  Rather than 
raise the only legal claim relied on by the State at the circuit 
court (community caretaking), Wiskowski again asserted that 
Officer Simon lacked reasonable suspicion.  After we granted the 
petition for review, Wiskowski briefed both questions.  Then, 
unlike its position in the court of appeals, the State argued 
for the first time that Officer Simon had reasonable suspicion 
for the stop, in addition to a valid community caretaking 
justification.  It acknowledged that normally forfeiture would 
prohibit it from raising this new issue on appeal.  But the 
State argued that Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(3m)(b)1. permits 
parties to defend the court of appeals' outcome on any ground——
even grounds not presented to the circuit court——as long as it 
wouldn't change the ultimate result.  Thus, because reasonable 
suspicion could support the same outcome in this case, the State 
contends the rule permits it to be raised.  Although Wiskowski's 
unusual tactic of raising reasonable suspicion rather than 
relying on forfeiture causes us to address the argument in this 
case, the State's reliance on § (Rule) 809.62(3m)(b)1. is 
misplaced.2   
¶35 Section 809.62 governs petitions for review——formal 
requests for this court to review a decision of the court of 
                                                 
2 I respond only to the State's argument on Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.62(3m)(b)1., and express no opinion on how other 
provisions or rules might apply here. 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
4 
 
appeals.  These are brought by parties who did not achieve their 
preferred outcome——i.e., what the rule calls an "adverse 
decision."  § (Rule) 809.62(1g).  Following a petition for 
review, non-petitioning parties have an opportunity to respond, 
telling us why we should not take the case.   
¶36 The rule also permits petitions for cross-review 
during the time frame when initial petitions are filed, or 
within 30 days after a petition for review is filed by another 
party.  § (Rule) 809.62(3m)(a).  The rule relied upon by the 
State here says: 
A petition for cross-review is not necessary to enable 
an opposing party to defend the court of appeals' 
ultimate result or outcome based on any ground, 
whether or not that ground was ruled upon by the lower 
courts, as long as the supreme court's acceptance of 
that ground would not change the result or outcome 
below. 
§ (Rule) 809.62(3m)(b)1.  In other words, parties don't have to 
file cross-petitions to defend the result or outcome obtained in 
the court of appeals on different grounds.  The obvious 
application of the rule is that a party who argues in the 
circuit court that it should win for reasons A and B can still 
argue both A and B without filing a petition for cross review——
even if the circuit court ruled in their favor for reason A 
alone, and did not address reason B at all.   
¶37 The State, however, reads this to mean that even a 
legal argument not raised below can be argued on appeal if it 
supports the same legal outcome.  Not so.  That would require 
interpreting this common-sense procedural rule as overriding or 
abandoning the principle of forfeiture——a rule as old as the 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
5 
 
common law system itself.  Nothing in the text of the rule 
suggests so radical a proposition.  And nothing in this court's 
practice suggests we have abandoned basic forfeiture standards, 
as the State's position implies.  Indeed, we discuss, debate, 
and apply forfeiture all the time.   
¶38 In short, § (Rule) 809.62(3m)(b)1. should not be 
understood as altering the regular rules regarding forfeiture; 
it is not an invitation for litigants to raise new, unpreserved 
arguments.  Rather, it permits parties to argue previously 
raised or preserved arguments that were not addressed by the 
circuit court without needing to file a petition for cross-
review. 
II.  COMMUNITY CARETAKING 
¶39 Turning to the substantive issue, both the United 
States 
and 
Wisconsin 
constitutions 
prohibit 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wis Const. art. 
I, § 11.  As evidenced by the text, the ultimate touchstone of 
the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.  Lange v. California, 
141 S. Ct. 2011, 2017 (2021).  Wisconsin courts have held that 
searches and seizures may be reasonable when officers act "as a 
community caretaker to protect persons and property."  State v. 
Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶14, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592.  As 
the majority opinion explains, this line of cases reflects the 
reality that police work is not one-dimensional.  While officers 
investigate and respond to criminal activity, they also secure 
property and help members of the public in need of assistance.  
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
6 
 
This is what we have called the "community caretaker function."  
State 
v. 
Kramer, 
2009 
WI 14, 
¶32, 
315 
Wis. 2d 414, 
759 
N.W.2d 598.   
¶40 Our cases addressing this doctrine do not derive from 
an independent analysis of the Wisconsin Constitution's text or 
history.  Rather, we rely on United States Supreme Court 
precedent.  Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶14 ("[W]e look to the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the community 
caretaker 
exception 
to 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment's 
warrant 
requirement.").  To that end, our cases point back to a United 
States Supreme Court case, Cady v. Dombrowski,3 as the origin of 
this doctrine.  Id., ¶15.  Just a few terms ago, however, the 
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not grant 
officers a broad community caretaking license to search homes.  
Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194, 199 (2021).  The Court further 
cast at least some doubt about whether the community caretaker 
doctrine is a standalone category through which police conduct 
should be analyzed.  Id. 
¶41 If that's true, the doctrines our cases use to address 
this kind of law enforcement action may be due for a 
reassessment.  My aim in this writing is to start the 
conversation by briefly telling the story of how the community 
caretaker doctrine came to be, surveying where it stands now, 
and raising questions that this and other courts may need to 
address in future cases. 
                                                 
3 413 U.S. 433 (1973). 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
7 
 
A.  Cady and Community Caretaking 
¶42 This court (along with many others) has said that the 
community caretaking doctrine "has its origins" in Cady.  
Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶19; Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶15.  
Cady itself comes from a line of cases involving what the United 
States Supreme Court would describe as "caretaking" searches of 
vehicles in police custody.   
¶43 Six years prior to Cady, the Supreme Court was asked 
whether officers could lawfully search a vehicle within their 
custody.  Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 60 (1967).  Police 
impounded 
the 
vehicle 
after 
arresting 
the 
defendant 
for 
transporting narcotics.  Id.  California law required the police 
to seize vehicles used to transport narcotics and to hold them 
as evidence until the conclusion of forfeiture proceedings.  Id.  
After seizing the defendant's vehicle, the officers conducted a 
search and found a small piece of a brown paper sack that was 
later used as evidence in the defendant's trial.  Id. at 58.  
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the search.  Because 
California law required the police to impound the car and hold 
it until forfeiture proceedings finished, the search was 
"closely related to the reason petitioner was arrested, the 
reason his car had been impounded, and the reason it was being 
retained."  Id.  Further, the court explained, "it would be 
unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain the car 
in their custody for such a length of time, had no right, even 
for their own protection, to search it."  Id. at 61-62.  Thus, 
the search did not offend the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
8 
 
¶44 The Court dealt with another vehicle search the next 
term.  In Harris v. United States, police had impounded the 
defendant's vehicle and searched it to remove all valuables 
pursuant to department regulations.  390 U.S. 234, 235 (1968) 
(per curiam).  Following the search, an officer rolled up the 
windows and locked the doors to protect the car, when he then 
discovered evidence of a robbery that was later used at the 
defendant's trial.  Id. at 234-35.  The defendant challenged the 
search, unsuccessfully.  Id. at 234.  The Court concluded that 
the discovery of incriminating evidence was not the result of a 
search requiring a warrant, "but of a measure taken to protect 
the car while it was in police custody."  Id. at 236. 
¶45 These cases served as the foundation for Cady——the 
supposed originator of the community caretaking doctrine.  Like 
its 
predecessors, 
Cady 
concerned 
the 
scope 
of 
officers' 
authority to search a vehicle within their custody.  413 
U.S. 433, 446-47 (1973).  The search in Cady took place after 
the defendant——a Chicago police officer——drunkenly crashed his 
car in West Bend, Wisconsin.  Id. at 436.  The West Bend 
officers who responded to the scene believed that Chicago police 
officers were required to carry their service revolvers at all 
times, but they did not find one on the defendant.  Id.  Their 
department had a "standard procedure" to search for weapons that 
might "fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands," so they 
searched the car's front seat and glove compartment.  Id. at 
436, 443.  They found no revolver, however, and eventually had 
the car towed to a private garage.  Id. at 436.  One of the 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
9 
 
officers then went to the garage to keep searching for weapons.  
Id.  While doing so, he discovered evidence of a murder that was 
later used to convict the defendant.  Id. at 438-39. 
¶46 The search was challenged under the Fourth Amendment.  
Id. at 434.  The Supreme Court began its analysis by observing 
the wide variety of reasons state and local law enforcement may 
come into contact with automobiles——reasons that go well beyond 
criminal investigation.  Id. at 441.  Examples might include 
responding to accidents, assisting disabled vehicles, and 
enforcing vehicle regulations.  Id.  The Court described these 
noncriminal police-citizen contacts as the "community caretaking 
functions" of police: 
Local 
police 
officers, 
unlike 
federal 
officers, 
frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which 
there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in 
what, for want of a better term, may be described as 
community caretaking functions, totally divorced from 
the 
detection, 
investigation, 
or 
acquisition 
of 
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal 
statute. 
Id. (emphasis added).  The Court noted that these considerations 
guided its decision in Cooper——where officers searched the 
vehicle to "guarantee the safety of the custodian"——and in 
Harris——where officers searched the vehicle "to safeguard the 
owner's property."  Id. at 447.  This case involved a search 
with similar motivations——"concern for the safety of the general 
public" should someone find the revolver.  Id.  And although the 
police did not have physical custody of the car, they exercised 
control of it by directing it to be towed to a private garage.  
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
10 
 
Id. at 446.  Thus, the officers' "caretaking 'search'" did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.  Id.   
¶47 The Court revisited vehicle searches three years 
later.  South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 365 (1976).  By 
that time, police departments throughout the country had 
established standard procedures to search and inventory the 
contents of impounded vehicles.  Id. at 369, 376.  In Opperman, 
officers inventoried the defendant's car, found marijuana, and 
charged him accordingly.  Id. at 366.  He argued the search was 
unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court disagreed.  Id. at 376.   
¶48 Citing Cady, the Court recognized that police officers 
will come into frequent, noncriminal contact with automobiles as 
part of their "community caretaking functions."  Id. at 367-69.  
The Court mentioned examples such as responding to accidents or 
disabled vehicles, removing vehicles that violate parking 
ordinances, 
and 
examining 
vehicles 
for 
other 
regulatory 
violations.  Id.  Officers' authority to do so was "beyond 
challenge."  Id. at 369.  Inventory——or "caretaking"——procedures 
fell into the same category of noncriminal activities.  Id.  
Police departments developed these policies to safeguard the 
owner's property, prevent claims against the police for lost or 
stolen items, and protect officers from potential danger.  Id.  
Citing Cooper, Harris, and Cady, the Court noted that it had 
consistently upheld vehicle intrusions "aimed at securing or 
protecting the car and its contents."  Id. at 373.  Those cases 
"unmistakably" pointed to the conclusion that "inventories 
pursuant to standard police procedures are reasonable."  Id. at 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
11 
 
372.  Thus, the inventory search in Opperman did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 376. 
¶49 To summarize, this line of cases stands for the 
proposition that some noncriminal "caretaking" searches of 
vehicles in police custody are reasonable.  See Colorado v. 
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (noting that Cooper, Harris, 
Cady, and Opperman "accorded deference to police caretaking 
procedures designed to secure and protect vehicles and their 
contents 
within 
police 
custody"). 
 
None 
of 
these 
cases 
explicitly created a freestanding doctrine by which courts 
should evaluate all "community caretaking" actions by the 
police.4   
B.  How Cady Became a Doctrine 
¶50 That raises the question of how Cady's recognition of 
the noncriminal community caretaking actions of police came to 
take on a life of its own.  This story is related to and 
occurred 
alongside 
of 
other 
cases 
involving 
exigent 
circumstances and the emergency aid doctrine.         
¶51 We begin with exigent circumstances.  The Supreme 
Court had for years required police to obtain a warrant before 
entering a person's home.  See Katz v. United States, 389 
                                                 
4 See United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204, 208-09 (7th 
Cir. 1982) (explaining that the Supreme Court did not "intend to 
create a broad exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement" for various caretaking activities; rather, the Cady 
Court "articulated several premises behind its decision which 
indicate that the holding in the case extended only to 
automobiles temporarily in police custody").   
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
12 
 
U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (collecting cases).  But the court began 
outlining various circumstances of an urgent character where 
there wasn't time to obtain a warrant, yet a search was 
permissible.  Id.  This applied to a wide variety of exigencies, 
some criminal and some noncriminal——for example, fighting a fire 
and investigating its cause;5 preventing imminent destruction of 
evidence;6 engaging in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect;7 and 
rendering 
emergency 
aid 
to 
persons 
seriously 
injured 
or 
threatened with serious injury.8 
¶52 The last of these exigencies eventually became known 
as the emergency aid exception.  See Kentucky v. King, 563 
U.S. 452, 460 (2011); Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) 
(per curiam).  The Court identified this category of reasonable 
searches only a few years after Cady.  See Mincey v. Arizona, 
437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).  In Mincey, it recognized that the 
Fourth Amendment "does not bar police officers from making 
warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe 
that a person within is in need of immediate aid."  Id.  The 
"need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury" 
justified what would otherwise be impermissible absent an 
emergency.  Id. 
                                                 
5 Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978). 
6 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963) (plurality 
opinion). 
7 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967); United States 
v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976). 
8 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 403 (1978); Brigham City 
v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
13 
 
¶53 But the emergency aid exception was understood to be 
limited in nature, applying only to the provision of emergency 
aid.  It was not extended to assisting a disabled vehicle, for 
example, 
or 
conducting 
a 
non-emergency 
welfare 
check 
in 
someone's home.  This led litigants and courts to Cady, which 
had 
recognized 
that 
officers 
routinely 
engage 
in 
many 
noncriminal, community caretaking functions such as assisting 
disabled vehicles or responding to accidents.  413 U.S. at 441.  
Courts thus began citing Cady to justify these non-emergency 
situations.  And soon enough, in most courts around the country, 
Cady's identification of the community caretaking functions of 
police evolved into a doctrine that justified searches and 
seizures of all kinds. 
¶54 The Texas Court of Appeals issued a decision fifteen 
years after Cady following this logic.  In McDonald v. State, an 
officer observed the defendant pull off the road and slump over 
his steering wheel.  759 S.W.2d 784, 784 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).  
After the defendant awoke and attempted to drive off, the 
officer stopped him to make sure he was okay.  Id.  He then 
observed signs of intoxication.  Id.  On appeal, the Texas Court 
of Appeals upheld this seizure.  Id. at 785.  Although the court 
observed that it was "unclear when a police officer may make a 
stop for reasons other than criminal ones," it quoted Cady for 
the proposition that police officers "have a duty to protect the 
general welfare and safety of the public at large and 
individuals on the highways."  Id.  This was such a situation.  
The defendant's behavior could have rendered him "unfit to 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
14 
 
drive" which would endanger both himself and others.  Id.  The 
court found the situation analogous to that "of the right of a 
fireman to enter a burning building to fight the fire without a 
warrant."  Id.  It therefore held that the officer's welfare 
check did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
¶55 Similar cases proliferated around the country.  See 
Ullom v. Miller, 705 S.E.2d 111, 120 (W. Va. 2010) (collecting 
cases).  These cases dealt largely with searches and seizures of 
vehicles——which was, after all, what Cady was about.9  But in 
time, the "community caretaking exception" was also extended to 
searches of the home.  See State v. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 221, ¶36 
n.8 (S.D. 2009) (collecting cases).   
¶56 This same evolution took place in Wisconsin.  We too 
developed what we called the "emergency doctrine."  This 
permitted warrantless home entries if the officer subjectively 
perceived a need to render emergency aid and the situation 
objectively presented such an emergency.  State v. Boggess, 115 
Wis. 2d 443, 449, 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983). 
¶57 The community caretaker doctrine emerged around the 
same time, though by a different path.  In 1977, four years 
after Cady, we addressed whether it was lawful for a police 
officer to peer into the defendant's garage after a neighbor 
                                                 
9 See State v. Mitchell, 498 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Iowa 1993) 
(burned-out taillight); State v. Vistuba, 840 P.2d 511, 514 
(Kan. 1992) (driving on shoulder); State v. Pinkham, 565 
A.2d 318, 318 (Me. 1989) (improper lane change); State v. Oxley, 
503 A.2d 756, 759 (N.H. 1985) (unsecured furniture on back of 
car); State v. Harrison, 533 P.2d 1143, 1144 (Ariz. 1975) 
(bouncing left tire). 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
15 
 
filed a noise complaint.  Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 462, 
257 N.W.2d 461 (1977).  We said yes.  We explained that checking 
on noise complaints was "probably more a part of the community 
caretaker function of the police which, while perhaps lacking in 
some 
respects 
the 
urgency 
of 
criminal 
investigation, 
is 
nevertheless an important and essential part of the police 
role."  Id. at 467.     
¶58 The court of appeals took it a step further a decade 
later.  In State v. Anderson, two officers were patrolling an 
alley in the early hours of the morning when they saw the 
defendant turn into the alley and drive in their direction.  142 
Wis. 2d 162, 164, 417 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1987).  But upon 
noticing their presence, the defendant exited the alley.  Id.  
They recognized the defendant because several businesses had 
complained that he had been parking in their reserved spots.  
Id.  Based on his abrupt exit of the alley and the parking 
complaints, the officers pulled him over.  Id. at 165.  After 
speaking with him, they discovered several weapons that led to 
felon in possession and other related charges.  Id. at 164-65.  
Among other things, he challenged the officers' authority to 
pull him over.  Id. at 166.  The circuit court upheld the 
seizure based on reasonable suspicion but, on appeal, the 
arguments focused on whether the officers lawfully seized the 
defendant as part of their "community caretaker function."  Id.   
¶59 The court of appeals began by explaining the concept, 
citing Cady and Bies.  Id. at 166-67.  Although "lacking in some 
respects the urgency of criminal investigation," the court 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
16 
 
described community caretaking as an "important and essential 
part of the police role."  Id. at 167.  That did not, however, 
remove such actions from constitutional scrutiny.  Id.  The 
court fashioned a three-part test for analyzing such claims:  
"(1) that a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment 
has occurred; (2) if so, whether the police conduct was bona 
fide community caretaker activity; and (3) if so, whether the 
public need and interest outweigh the intrusion upon the privacy 
of the individual."  Id. at 169.  The court, however, did not 
decide the question.  Although it noted that "police contacts 
with citizens seeking to resolve or defuse private disputes 
(such as trespassing) are certainly within the community 
caretaker function," there was a suggestion that the officers' 
stop was pretextual.  Id. at 170.  The court therefore remanded 
the case to the circuit court to employ the test.10  Id. 
¶60 In 2000, the court of appeals extended the doctrine to 
the home.  State v. Horngren, 2000 WI App 177, ¶¶10-18, 238 
Wis. 2d 347, 617 N.W.2d 508.  Officers there entered the 
defendant's home after the police received a report that he was 
attempting to commit suicide.  Id., ¶¶2-3.  Although the court 
explained that the officers were rendering "immediate aid and 
                                                 
10 Subsequent court of appeals decisions used Anderson's 
test, although not resulting in a decision in the State's favor.  
See State v. Dull, 211 Wis. 2d 652, 659, 565 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. 
App. 1997) (officer's warrantless entry into home not justified 
under community caretaking because he arrested a juvenile and 
had thus stepped out of his caretaking role); State v. Paterson, 
220 Wis. 2d 526, 535-36, 583 N.W.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1998) (even if 
officer's warrantless home entry in response to a reported 
burglary was bona fide community caretaking activity, the 
balancing test tipped in defendant's favor). 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
17 
 
assistance," it upheld the warrantless entry using the community 
caretaking framework outlined in Anderson, not the emergency aid 
doctrine.11  Id., ¶11.   
¶61 The court of appeals applied the doctrine to a variety 
of similar scenarios in the following years.  See State v. 
Ferguson, 2001 WI App 102, ¶1, 244 Wis. 2d 17, 629 N.W.2d 788 
(upholding 
warrantless 
bedroom 
search 
because 
officers 
discovered underage drinking in the apartment and feared 
occupants of a locked room may be injured); State v. Ziedonis, 
2005 WI App 249, 
¶¶17-34, 287 Wis. 2d 831, 707 N.W.2d 565 
(upholding warrantless home entry after police received 911 call 
about the defendant's two vicious dogs on the loose and officers 
found his back door ajar); State v. Truax, 2009 WI App 60, ¶¶11-
21, 318 Wis. 2d 113, 767 N.W.2d 369 (upholding seizure because 
officer saw defendant abruptly exit the roadway and wanted to 
make sure the driver was not suffering from a medical problem or 
the car from mechanical failure). 
¶62 A lead opinion in this court first applied Anderson's 
test in 2001.12  State v. Kelsey C.R., 2001 WI 54, ¶¶36-37, 243 
Wis. 2d 422, 626 N.W.2d 777 (lead op.).  The officers in that 
case had seized the defendant, a young girl who was sitting 
                                                 
11 Horngren was not the only case to blend community 
caretaking and emergency aid.  See State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, 
¶26 n.8, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 (collecting cases 
mixing the two); State v. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 221, ¶22 (S.D. 
2009) (observing the confusion).   
12 Although the majority opinion was not joined by four 
justices, all seven appeared to agree with its application of 
Anderson's community caretaking test. 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
18 
 
alone in a high-crime area at night, to make sure she was not a 
runaway.  Id., ¶5.  The opinion upheld the seizure as a 
reasonable exercise of the officers' community caretaking 
function.  Id., ¶¶36-37.   
¶63 Eight years after Kelsey C.R., we officially adopted 
the Anderson test.  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶¶20-21.  Kramer, 
like Anderson and Kelsey C.R., involved a seizure.  Id., ¶2.  An 
officer seized the defendant who had parked his car on the side 
of a county highway with its hazards flashing.  Id., ¶¶4-5.  We 
upheld the seizure as a lawful exercise of the officer's 
community caretaking function.  Id., ¶3. 
¶64 A year after Kramer, we held that the exception 
permits warrantless home entries.  Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 
¶¶13-27.  Officers in Pinkard had entered the defendant's home 
to check on the welfare of its residents after an anonymous 
caller expressed concern for the house's occupants.  Id., ¶¶2-4.  
Once inside, officers discovered drugs which led to charges.  
Id., ¶¶5-6.  The circuit court upheld the officers' actions 
based on the community caretaking exception.  Id., ¶7.  In this 
court, the defendant argued that Cady and Opperman limited the 
community 
caretaking 
exception 
to 
incidents 
involving 
automobiles.  Id., ¶19.  We disagreed.  We concluded Cady and 
Opperman 
were 
not 
limited 
to 
automobiles; 
instead, 
they 
counseled a cautious approach when employing the exception in 
the home.  Id., ¶20.  We also harkened back to the very first 
community caretaker case in Wisconsin——Bies v. State.  Id., ¶21.  
Bies upheld an officer's search of a homeowner's garage——an area 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
19 
 
constitutionally protected as part of the home.  76 Wis. 2d at 
467.  Bies, therefore, implied that such community caretaker 
searches within the home are permissible, and other states had 
come to a similar conclusion.  Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶¶22-
27.  We therefore upheld the search.  Id., ¶63. 
¶65 Our use of community caretaking grew as time went on.  
In 2013, we upheld officers' warrantless entry into the 
defendant's bedroom to make sure he was not injured after a car 
accident.  State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶3, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 
N.W.2d 87.  In 2015, we held officers' seizure of the defendant 
reasonable because they sought to transport him to the hospital 
for carbon monoxide poisoning, reported chest pain, and suicidal 
comments. 
 
State 
v. 
Blatterman, 
2015 
WI 46, 
¶¶1-2, 
362 
Wis. 2d 138, 864 N.W.2d 26.  In 2016, we permitted a warrantless 
room entry after officers followed a blood trail to the 
defendant's house and entered a room to make sure no one was 
hurt.  State v. Matalonis, 2016 WI 7, ¶3, 366 Wis. 2d 443, 875 
N.W.2d 567.  Finally, in 2017, we upheld officers' seizure of 
the defendant's car because it was blocking access to a private 
storage unit, officers wanted to protect the property inside the 
car from theft, and the car was registered to someone else.  
State v. Asboth, 2017 WI 76, ¶¶1, 18-21, 376 Wis. 2d 644, 898 
N.W.2d 541. 
¶66 Our cases——and those in other states——paint a clear 
picture.  After four decades, the community caretaker functions 
of police recognized in Cady expanded from its original 
application to automobile inventory searches into a broad 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
20 
 
doctrine.  Courts utilized this framework to permit all kinds of 
noncriminal searches and seizures, both on the road and in the 
home.  These doctrinal developments marched forward in the lower 
courts with little to no direction from the United States 
Supreme Court.  That changed in 2021.  
C.  Caniglia and the Future of the Doctrine 
¶67 Almost 50 years after Cady, the United States Supreme 
Court heard a case questioning whether the community caretaker 
doctrine supported a warrantless home entry.  Caniglia, 593 
U.S. at 194.  In Caniglia, the plaintiff and his wife got into 
an argument in their home.  Id. at 196.  The husband eventually 
pulled out his handgun and told his wife to "shoot him now and 
get it over with."  Id. (cleaned up).  She left, but called the 
police the next day after she couldn't reach him.  Id.  When 
officers arrived, they found the plaintiff on his porch.  Id.  
He agreed to go to the hospital, and the officers then searched 
his home for the gun.  Id. at 197.  They found and confiscated 
two firearms.  Id.  The plaintiff sued the city and the police 
officers, arguing his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.  
Id.  The District Court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants, and the First Circuit affirmed based on the 
"community caretaking exception."  Id.   
¶68 The Supreme Court saw it differently.  In a brief, 
unanimous opinion, the Court reiterated that officers are 
sometimes permitted to enter the home and its curtilage without 
a warrant, such as when rendering emergency aid.  Id. at 198.  
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
21 
 
The First Circuit's community caretaking rule, however, went 
beyond anything the Court had recognized.  Id.  Cady involved 
the search of an impounded vehicle, not a home.  Id. at 199.  
And the Cady court "expressly contrasted its treatment of a 
vehicle already under police control with a search of a car 
'parked adjacent to the dwelling place of the owner.'"  Id. 
(quoting another source).  This distinction between vehicles and 
homes placed Cady's use of the phrase "community caretaking" 
into its proper context.  Id.  The Court had used the phrase to 
explain why frequent traffic accidents and disabled vehicles 
often require the police to perform noncriminal "community 
caretaking functions," such as aiding motorists.  Id.  This 
recognition that officers perform a variety of noncriminal tasks 
as part of their duties was exactly that——"a recognition that 
these tasks exist, and not an open-ended license to perform them 
anywhere."  Id.  Therefore, because the First Circuit had 
extended Cady beyond its holding and logic, the Supreme Court 
reversed.  Id. 
¶69 Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and Justice 
Kavanaugh concurred.  Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice 
Breyer, clarified that the Court's decision should not be read 
as changing the Court's prior holdings that officers can enter 
homes without warrants when assisting persons who are seriously 
injured or threatened with such injury.  Id. at 199-200 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring).  Police have a proper role in 
"preventing violence and restoring order, not simply rendering 
first aid to casualties."  Id. at 199. 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
22 
 
¶70 Justice Alito agreed with the Court "that there is no 
special Fourth Amendment rule for a broad category of cases 
involving 'community caretaking.'"  Id. at 200 (Alito, J., 
concurring).  He worried that community caretaking was too 
amorphous a concept that could involve a variety of tasks, with 
no clear limiting principle.  Id.  Given this, the same Fourth 
Amendment principles used in criminal cases "may not be 
appropriate for use in various non-criminal-law-enforcement 
contexts."  Id. at 201.  In addition, among other concerns, 
Justice Alito pointed to the lack of cases addressing a very 
real world scenario:  a risk of suicide that is real, but whose 
immediacy is unclear.  Id. at 202.  This type of encounter falls 
outside of the typical "exigent circumstances" exception to the 
warrant requirement because it lacks an apparent exigency.  Id.  
Thus, courts will likely need "to grapple with the basic Fourth 
Amendment question of reasonableness."  Id. at 203.   
¶71 Justice Kavanaugh wrote to underscore Chief Justice 
Roberts's point that the Court's decision did not "prevent 
officers from taking reasonable steps to assist those who are 
inside a home and in need of aid."  Id. at 204 (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring).  Although Cady dealt with vehicles rather than 
homes, the issue was "more labeling than substance."  Id. at 
205.  The Court's case law already included the "exigent 
circumstances doctrine" which permitted officers to enter homes 
without warrants to assist persons "who are seriously injured or 
threatened with such injury."  Id. at 206 (quoting another 
source).  The officers in Caniglia had not relied on that 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
23 
 
doctrine, leading to the Court's ultimate conclusion.  But that 
did not change longstanding exigent circumstances precedent.  
Id.  
¶72 So where does that leave us now?  First, Caniglia 
appears to mean that Wisconsin cases permitting home entries 
under community caretaking are no longer good law——at least 
insofar as they rely on community caretaking to justify the 
intrusion.  It remains to be seen whether other doctrines might 
lead to the same outcome.     
¶73 More generally, 
Caniglia also suggests that the 
Supreme Court is uncomfortable with community caretaking as a 
broad category authorizing warrantless searches and seizures.  
However, it seems equally clear that the Court is not abandoning 
the 
proposition 
that 
some 
searches 
and 
seizures 
by 
law 
enforcement conducted to aid citizens, protect property, and 
ensure safety are permissible under the Fourth Amendment.   
¶74 Therefore, we may soon need to address whether to 
formally 
abandon 
community 
caretaking 
as 
a 
separate, 
freestanding doctrine through which warrantless searches and 
seizures should be evaluated.  If we do so, courts may need to 
wrestle with whether functions we might now categorize as 
"community caretaking" may be better understood or evaluated 
under other doctrines, such as emergency aid or exigent 
circumstances, as Justice Kavanaugh suggested.  See State v. 
Ware, 2021 WI App 83, ¶15, 400 Wis. 2d 118, 968 N.W.2d 752 
("Because the community caretaker exception cannot justify the 
warrantless search of a home under Caniglia, we frame our 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.bh 
 
24 
 
analysis using the related——but conceptually distinct——emergency 
aid 
exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment.").  In addition, it's possible some of the more 
expansive understandings of community caretaking in Wisconsin 
and elsewhere may need to be circumscribed.  This is especially 
true where the need for the search or seizure is less urgent or 
could be accomplished through other means.     
¶75 Given this newfound uncertainty, both this court and 
the court of appeals must work to ensure our decisions have a 
firm foundation in United States Supreme Court precedent.  While 
this case does not ask us to resolve these questions, I write 
here to highlight them so the discussion can begin. 
¶76 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence with respect to ¶¶39-75, and 
Justice JANET PROTASIEWICZ joins with respect to ¶¶72, 74-75. 
 
 
 
No.  2021AP2105.jcp 
 
1 
 
 
¶77 JANET C. PROTASIEWICZ, J.   (concurring).  I concur 
with the majority opinion.  I write separately to address 
confusion in the law regarding a respondent's ability to argue 
alternative grounds for affirming the court of appeals in its 
response brief.  The State seems confused because it erroneously 
cited Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(3m)(b)1. regarding petitions 
for cross-review to justify waiting until its response brief to 
argue reasonable suspicion.  And this court has sown confusion 
by, in some cases, ignoring Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(3)(d) and 
improperly holding respondents to rules that govern only 
petitioners.  The court should clarify the law on these matters. 
I. 
RULES 
¶78 Rule 809.62 governs how petitioners and respondents 
preserve issues for this court's review.  The rule governing 
petitioners uses "shall" and is mandatory.  The rule governing 
respondents uses "may" and is permissive.1 
¶79 A petition for review "must contain a statement of the 
issues the petitioner seeks to have reviewed" and "shall also 
identify any issues the petitioner seeks to have reviewed that 
were not decided by the court of appeals."  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.62(2)(a) (emphasis added).  If the court grants the petition 
for review, the petitioner "cannot raise or argue issues not set 
                                                 
1 The word "shall" ordinarily is presumed to be mandatory.  
The word "may" indicates a possibility. When the two words 
appear in the same statute, courts presume that the words have 
their precise meanings.  Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. 
Co., 2012 WI 26, ¶32, 339 Wis. 2d 125, 810 N.W.2d 465. 
No.  2021AP2105.jcp 
 
2 
 
forth in the petition . . . unless ordered otherwise by the 
supreme court."  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(6) (emphasis added).2 
¶80 In contrast, the rules governing the responses are 
permissive.  The respondent "may file a response to a petition." 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(3) (emphasis added).  But a response 
is not required.  If the respondent chooses to file a response, 
it "may contain . . . any alternative ground supporting the 
court of appeals result or a result less favorable to the 
opposing party than that granted by the court of appeals."  Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(3)(d) (emphasis added).  This rule 
"addresses the circumstances in which the respondent asserts an 
alternative ground to defend the court of appeals' ultimate 
result or outcome, whether or not that ground was raised or 
ruled upon by the lower courts."  Judicial Council Committee 
Comment, July 2008, Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(3)(d) (emphasis 
added).3 
¶81 Similarly, 
Rule 
809.62(3m)(b)1. 
provides 
that 
a 
respondent need not file a petition for cross-review in order 
"to defend the court of appeals' ultimate result or outcome 
based on any ground, whether or not that ground was ruled upon 
by the lower courts, as long as the supreme court's acceptance 
of that ground would not change the result or outcome below."  
                                                 
2 However, "[o]nce a case is before us, it is within our 
discretion to review any substantial and compelling issue which 
the case presents."  Univest Corp. v. Gen. Split Corp., 148 
Wis. 2d 29, 32, 435 N.W.2d 234 (1989). 
3 Judicial Council Committee Comments "may be consulted for 
guidance in interpreting and applying Wis. Stat. ss. 809.30, 
809.32 and 809.62." Sup. Ct. Order No. 04-08, 2008 WI 108. 
No.  2021AP2105.jcp 
 
3 
 
(Emphasis added).  "Any such alternative ground for affirmance 
or 
lesser 
relief 
should, 
however, 
be 
identified 
in 
the 
response."  Judicial Council Committee Comment, July 2008, Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(3m)(b) (citing Rules 809.62(3)(d), (3)(e), 
and (6)).  The rule uses the word "should" not "shall." 
¶82 Our 
case 
law 
provides 
additional 
guidance 
for 
respondents on these matters.  Where an issue was presented to, 
but not decided by, the court of appeals, the respondent may 
assert it in its brief for this court and fully discuss it.  
Cynthia E. v. LaCrosse Cnty. Hum. Servs. Dep't, 172 Wis. 2d 218, 
232-33, 493 N.W.2d 56 (1992); Smith v. Anderson, 2017 WI 43, 
¶¶24-26, 374 Wis. 2d 715, 893 N.W.2d 790 (Abrahamson, J. 
dissenting).  This court may exercise its discretion to review 
the issue.  Univest Corp. v. General Split Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 
29, 39, 435 N.W.2d 234 (1989).  Nothing guarantees that this 
court will exercise its discretion to review it.  Cynthia E., 
172 Wis. 2d at 232. 
¶83 In addition, the respondent's brief may raise grounds 
for affirming the lower courts, even if those grounds were not 
presented to the lower courts.  Liberty Trucking Co. v. DILHR, 
57 Wis. 2d 331, 342, 204 N.W.2d 457 (1973) (appellate court may 
sustain the circuit court "on a theory or on reasoning not 
presented to the lower court").  This is "well-established law 
in Wisconsin."  Blum v. 1st Auto & Cas. Ins. Co., 2010 WI 78, 
¶27 n.4, 326 Wis. 2d 729, 786 N.W.2d 78; see also State v. 
Delap, 2018 WI 64, ¶5 n.2, 382 Wis. 2d 92, 913 N.W.2d 175 
(applying the rule where both parties had an opportunity to 
No.  2021AP2105.jcp 
 
4 
 
brief the new grounds); State v. Holt, 128 Wis. 2d 110, 122-25, 
382 N.W.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1985) (explaining the rule), superseded 
by statute on other grounds, Wis. Stat. § 940.225(7).4   
¶84 We abide by the rule of forfeiture, but we acknowledge 
that concerns about judicial economy "are less relevant when new 
arguments are raised by respondents who seek 'to uphold rather 
than reverse the result reached at trial.'"  Blum, 326 
Wis. 2d 729, ¶27 n.4.  Again, we have the discretion to 
disregard arguments presented for the first time in a response 
brief.  We have done so, for example, to prevent prejudice to 
the petitioner.  See, e.g., Paynter v. ProAssurance Wisconsin 
Ins. Co., 2019 WI 65, ¶¶105-09, 387 Wis. 2d 278, 929 N.W.2d 113.  
Thus, a respondent would be prudent to assert alternative 
grounds for affirming the lower courts in its response to the 
petition for review. 
¶85 While the rules governing a respondent's presentation 
of issues for this court's review seem clear enough, the court 
and the State in this case have stumbled over them.  
                                                 
4 Rule 809.62(3)(d) and (e) "are intended to facilitate the 
supreme court's assessment of the issues presented for review, 
not to change current law regarding the application of waiver 
principles to a respondent."  Judicial Council Committee 
Comment, July 2008, Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(3)(d), (e). The 
Comment specifically cites State v. Holt, 128 Wis. 2d 110, 125, 
382 N.W.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1985) ("An appellate court may sustain 
a lower court's holding on a theory or on reasoning not 
presented to the lower court.")  Id. 
No.  2021AP2105.jcp 
 
5 
 
 
CONFUSING CASE LAW 
¶86 In recent years, the court has issued decisions 
ignoring Rule 809.62(3)(d) and making incorrect and confusing 
statements of law regarding the respondent's ability to argue 
alternative grounds supporting the court of appeals result.  Two 
examples are State v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, ¶7 n.5, 369 Wis. 2d 
225, 800 N.W.2d 659 and State v. Smith, 2016 WI 23, ¶41, 367 
Wis. 2d 483, 878 N.W.2d 135. 
¶87 In Sulla, the defendant raised multiple issues in the 
court of appeals.  The court of appeals reversed without 
deciding some of them.  The State's petition for review did not 
raise the undecided issues.  We granted the State's petition.  
The defendant filed a response brief arguing the undecided 
issues, but the court refused to address them because they were 
"not raised in the petition for review" and "[w]e did not order 
that any issues presented outside of the petition for review be 
granted and briefed."  Id., ¶7 n.5 (emphasis added) (citing 
Jankee v. Clark County, 2000 WI 64, ¶7, 235 Wis. 2d 700, 612 
N.W.2d 297). 
¶88 Sulla 
erred 
by 
taking 
the 
rule 
requiring 
the 
petitioner to preserve issues in the petition for review and 
applying it to the respondent.  Sulla also incorrectly relied on 
Jankee, which concerned petitioners who forfeited issues by not 
raising them in their petition for review.  See 235 Wis. 2d 700, 
¶7.  Jankee did not address forfeiture by respondents.  In 
addition, Sulla ignored Rule 809.62(3)(d), which provides that a 
No.  2021AP2105.jcp 
 
6 
 
respondent "may" but is not required to file a response raising 
alternative grounds supporting the court of appeals' result.   
¶89 Smith compounded the confusion.  The defendant raised 
three issues in the court of appeals, and the court of appeals 
decided one of them.  The state's petition for review preserved 
only the decided issue.  The defendant did not raise the 
undecided issues in his response to the petition.  After we 
granted review, the defendant argued the undecided issues in his 
response brief.  The court refused to address them because: 
"[A]ll of these claims are not properly before us, as they were 
raised in neither the State's petition for review nor in Smith's 
response to the State's petition for review."  Smith, 367 Wis. 
2d 483, ¶41 (citing Jankee, 235 Wis. 2d 700, ¶7). 
¶90 Smith appropriately considered whether the undecided 
issues had been raised in either the petition for review or the 
response.  But Smith incorrectly applied a rigid rule: The 
failure to raise issues not decided by the court of appeals in 
either the petition for review or the response forfeits them.  
Smith ignored Rule 809.62(3)(d), which permits, but does not 
require, 
the 
respondent 
to 
identify 
alternative 
grounds 
supporting the court of appeals' result in his response to the 
petition for review.  Smith also invoked Jankee incorrectly.  
Jankee did not involve, and does not govern, forfeiture by 
respondents.  Smith should have stated (but did not) that the 
defendant was free to argue the undecided issues in his response 
brief, but the court had the discretion to disregard them.  
No.  2021AP2105.jcp 
 
7 
 
¶91 In two recent cases, this court has cited Sulla and 
Smith placing its imprimatur on their erroneous statements of 
law.  See State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, ¶49, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 
N.W.2d 89; Security Finance v. Kirsch, 2019 WI 42, ¶11 n.3, 386 
Wis. 2d 388, 926 N.W.2d 167.  To prevent further confusion on 
this matter, the court should clarify that Sulla, 369 Wis. 2d 
700, ¶7 n.5 and Smith, 367 Wis. 2d 483, ¶41 are incorrect for 
the reasons I have stated. 
III. APPLICATION 
¶92 In this case, the State waited until its response 
brief to argue reasonable suspicion——an issue the court of 
appeals did not decide.  The State argued that its strategy was 
permissible for two reasons.  First, Wiskowski raised the issue 
below and in his petition for review.  The State is correct.  
Wiskowski argued that the State lacked reasonable suspicion in 
his motion to suppress, his initial court of appeals' brief, and 
his petition for review.  The State's response did not raise 
reasonable suspicion as an alternative ground for affirming the 
court of appeals as permitted by Rule 809.62(3)(d).  That does 
not matter because Wiskowski himself preserved the issue under 
Rule 809.62(2)(a). 
¶93 The 
State's 
second 
reason 
is 
the 
source 
of 
controversy.  The State argues that under Rule 809.62(3m)(b)1. 
and Delap, a respondent may defend the court of appeals' 
ultimate result based on any ground whether or not it was ruled 
on by the lower courts.  This prompted Justice Hagedorn's 
No.  2021AP2105.jcp 
 
8 
 
concurrence, which argues that the State's reliance on Rule 
809.62(3m)(b)1. is misplaced.  The rule does not allow the State 
to assert an argument not raised below to support the same 
result.  Justice Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶8.  "That would 
require interpreting this common-sense procedural rule as 
overriding or abandoning the principle of forfeiture——a rule as 
old as the common law system itself."  Id. 
¶94 I agree with Justice Hagedorn that the State's 
reliance on Rule 809.62(3m)(b)1. is misplaced, but for a 
different reason.  Rule 809.62(3m) governs petitions for cross-
review.  The State prevailed in the court of appeals.  It had no 
adverse decision to challenge in a cross-petition.  See Cynthia 
E., 172 Wis. 2d at 232.  Instead, the State should have 
proceeded under Rule 809.62(3)(d). 
¶95 On the other hand, I agree with the State that a 
response brief may raise alternative grounds for sustaining the 
court of appeals result.  The State may do so even if the 
alternative ground was not raised in the lower courts.  Holt, 
128 Wis. 2d at 124-25.  Like it or not, that is "well-
established law in Wisconsin."  Blum, 326 Wis. 2d 729, ¶27 n.4.  
But the respondent proceeds at its own risk.  This court is not 
required to address arguments presented for the first time in a 
respondent's brief. 
¶96 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶97 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
C.J.   (dissenting).  
Wiskowski was arrested and charged with operating a motor 
vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant and with a 
prohibited alcohol concentration that was nearly 10 times over 
his legal limit.  In the middle of the day, Wiskowski placed his 
order at a McDonald's drive-through and then did not appear at 
the window to pick it up.  He evidently fell asleep at some 
point between ordering and the pick-up window.  Understandably, 
the McDonald's employee who found him slumped over the steering 
wheel was concerned and called the police.  Law enforcement 
responded within a minute or so and ultimately determined that 
Wiskowski, who had been convicted three prior times for drunk 
driving, was again drunk driving.  Well over his legal limit, he 
was charged a fourth time. 
¶98 The entirety of the interaction with law enforcement 
at this traffic stop was just over eight minutes.  Most likely, 
the average traffic stop is longer than this eight minute 
inquiry.  But the majority concludes that the evidence against 
Wiskowski must be suppressed because the officer inquired a bit 
too long.  Apparently, after Wiskowski explained that he fell 
asleep because he was tired, the police were no longer community 
caretakers and had to let him drive on.  The majority does not 
say how long is too long, but they know it when they see it.  
The majority opinion addresses traditional community caretaker 
and extension of stop principles.  The majority opinion also 
opines that the officer could not have had reasonable suspicion 
to believe Wiskowski was drunk driving.  Under the totality of 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
the circumstances, the officer's conduct was reasonable.  I 
dissent, because, among other things, this case does not develop 
the law and is at most error correction.  Our court should  not  
accept review merely to correct error. 
¶99 Clearly, this court does not grant every petition for 
review.1  Rather, we accept or deny cases based on evaluating the 
following statutory criteria: 
(a) A real and significant question of federal 
or state constitutional law is presented. 
(b) The petition for review demonstrates a need 
for the supreme court to consider establishing, 
implementing 
or 
changing 
a 
policy 
within 
its 
authority. 
(c) A decision by the supreme court will help 
develop, clarify or harmonize the law, and 
1. 
The case calls for the application of a new 
doctrine rather than merely the application of well-
settled principles to the factual situation; or 
2. 
The question presented is a novel one, the 
resolution of which will have statewide impact; or 
3. 
The question presented is not factual in 
nature but rather is a question of law of the type 
that is likely to recur unless resolved by the supreme 
court. 
(d) The 
court 
of 
appeals' 
decision 
is 
in 
conflict with controlling opinions of the United 
                                                 
1 Jessie Opoien, The Wisconsin Supreme Court is headed for 
its lowest output term ever. A look behind the numbers, 
Milwaukee 
Journal 
Sentinel 
(May 
10, 
2024), 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2024/05/10/wisconsi
n-supreme-court-headed-for-its-lowest-output-term-in-
history/73630399007/; Alan Ball, How Many Decisions Can We 
Expect 
in 
2023-2024?, 
SCOWstats 
(Apr. 
30, 
2024), 
https://scowstats.com/2024/04/30/how-many-decisions-can-we-
expect-in-2023-24/. 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
States Supreme Court or the supreme court or other 
court of appeals' decisions. 
(e) The court of appeals' decision is in accord 
with opinions of the supreme court or the court of 
appeals but due to the passage of time or changing 
circumstances, 
such 
opinions 
are 
ripe 
for 
reexamination. 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r). 
¶100 Given these criteria, and the fact that the majority 
opinion engages in only "error-correction" and develops no new 
law, we should not have accepted review of this case.  Rather 
than applying a "new doctrine," the majority merely applies 
"well-settled principles to [a new] factual situation."  Both 
the circuit court and the court of appeals denied Wiskowski's 
motion to suppress. 
¶101 We are not an error-correcting court.2  We are a law-
developing court.3  It is the court of appeals which is charged 
primarily with error correcting.  State ex rel. Swan v. 
Elections Bd., 133 Wis. 2d 87, 93-94, 394 N.W.2d 732 (1986) 
                                                 
2 State ex rel. Davis v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2024 
WI 14, ¶¶79-83, 411 Wis. 2d 123, 4 N.W.3d  273 (Ziegler, C.J., 
dissenting) (arguing case should be dismissed as  improvidently 
granted because this court is not an error-correcting court and 
the case was not law-developing). 
3 See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 188-89, 560 N.W.2d 246 
(1997) (determining that the court of appeals' "primary function 
is error correcting" while "[i]n contrast, the supreme court's 
primary function is that of law defining and law development"); 
State v. Lee, 197 Wis. 2d 959, 970, 542 N.W.2d 143 (1996) ("The 
rules of appellate practice applicable to the court of appeals 
are not always applicable to this court, which functions 
primarily as a law-developing court."); State v. Schumacher, 144 
Wis. 2d 388, 407, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988) (stating the court of 
appeals is an error-correcting court while the supreme court is 
a law-developing or law-declaring court). 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
("The 
supreme 
court 
is 
primarily 
concerned 
with 
the 
institutional functions of our judicial system, while the court 
of appeals is charged primarily with error correcting in the 
individual case.").  "This means that, unlike the supreme court, 
the court of appeals does not have a law-developing or law-
declaring function."  State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 407, 
424 N.W.2d 672 (1988); see also id. (citing State v. Mosley, 102 
Wis. 2d 636, 665-66, 307 N.W.2d 200 (1981) ("The court of 
appeals is an error-correcting court.")).   
¶102 The 
majority 
opinion 
does 
not 
engage 
in 
law 
development.  It restates established principles to a fact 
specific situation.  The current law is (1) that officers can 
engage in community caretaking;4 (2) that a traffic stop cannot 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 2020 WI 60, ¶23, 392 
Wis. 2d 402, 944 N.W.2d 832; State v. Asboth, 2017 WI 76, ¶15, 
376 Wis. 2d 644, 898 N.W.2d 541; State v. Matalonis, 2016 WI 7, 
¶¶29-30, 366 Wis. 2d 443, 875 N.W.2d 567; State v. Blatterman, 
2015 WI 46, ¶39, 362 Wis. 2d 138, 864 N.W.2d 26; State v. 
Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶¶14-15, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87; 
State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶14, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 
N.W.2d 592; State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶32, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 
759 N.W.2d 598; State v. Anderson, 142 Wis. 2d 162, 167-68, 417 
N.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1987). 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
be unnecessarily extended;5 and that an officer must have 
reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle.6  The majority applies 
well-established law to the specific facts of this case.7  
                                                 
5 I recognize that "[t]he temporary detention of individuals 
during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for 
a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a 
'seizure' of 'persons' within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment."  State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶11, 317 Wis. 2d 118, 
765 N.W.2d 569 (quoting State v. Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d 600, 605, 
558 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Whren v. United States, 
517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996)).  Because a seizure implicates a 
party's Fourth Amendment rights, "[t]he scope of the detention 
must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification."  
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).  "[E]vidence may not 
be introduced if it was discovered by means of a seizure and 
search which were not reasonably related in scope to the 
justification" for the stop.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 
(1968).  "Authority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the 
traffic 
infraction 
are——or 
reasonably 
should 
have 
been——
completed."  Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 
(2015).  See, e.g., Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 469, 251 
N.W.2d 461 (1977) (determining that "any warrantless intrusion 
must be as limited as is reasonably possible consistent with the 
purpose justifying it in the first instance"); Rodriguez, 575 
U.S. at 354 ("Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of 
police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by 
the seizure's 'mission'——to address the traffic violation that 
warranted the stop[.]"); State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶21, 377 
Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560 ("Traffic stops are meant to be 
brief interactions with law enforcement officers, and they may 
last no longer than required to address the circumstances that 
make them necessary.").  
6 "An investigatory stop is constitutional if the police 
have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, is 
being committed, or is about to be committed."  State v. Young, 
2006 WI 98, ¶20, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729 (citing State v. 
Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 56, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996)).  "An 
investigatory stop, though a seizure, allows police officers to 
briefly 'detain a person for purposes of investigating possible 
criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make 
an arrest.'"  Id. (quoting Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d at 55). 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
¶103 While 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
recently 
considered the community caretaker warrant exception in Caniglia 
v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194 (2021), the majority does not rest its 
opinion on that case.  Notably, the majority does not adopt that 
analysis, nor does it in any way alter the community caretaker 
exception to the warrant requirement.  Perhaps it does not 
because the facts of Caniglia, which involved entry into a home, 
differ from those here——a vehicle stop.  Indeed, while Caniglia 
may have further refined the community caretaker doctrine and 
some of my colleagues may wish to further consider the community 
caretaker doctrine in Wisconsin, the majority opinion merely 
applies previously accepted doctrine regarding an extended stop.  
See majority op., ¶¶2, 21.   
¶104 Since this case turns on its facts, I briefly engage 
in an alternative legal analysis of those facts.  Wiskowski 
placed an order in the McDonald's drive-through at about 1:00 in 
the afternoon.  Wiskowski did not arrive at the pickup window.  
The McDonald's employee called the police to explain that 
someone had fallen asleep behind the wheel in the drive-through 
lane.  Wiskowski placed his order and fell asleep before 
arriving at the pick-up window.  Law enforcement arrived within 
a minute or so in response to the employee's call and witnessed 
Wiskowski pulling out of the parking lot into the street.  It is 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 See majority op., ¶2 ("The scope of caretaking stops 
should be guided and limited by justification for the stop.  
This means that, absent another permissible reason to detain 
someone, the detention must end when the original community 
caretaking function is resolved."). 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
undisputed that Wiskowski had fallen asleep after ordering food.  
It was not unreasonable for the officer to take a closer look. 
¶105 Wiskowski was thereafter properly pulled over by law 
enforcement.  Wiskowski explained that he fell asleep because he 
had been working 24 hours straight and was tired.  However, that 
did not dispel the officer's belief that he might need some sort 
of assistance.  While the officer did not immediately smell 
alcohol on Wiskowski's breath, the officer did eventually ask 
Wiskowski to step out of his truck, and Wiskowski stumbled as he 
did so.  At that point, the officer did smell alcohol on 
Wiskowski's breath.  Wiskowski admitted to having a couple of 
beers, a few hours before the stop.  The officer took Wiskowski 
to the police station, administered field sobriety tests, and 
arrested him for fourth offense operating while under the 
influence of an intoxicant and operating with a prohibited 
alcohol concentration of nearly 10 times his legal limit of less 
than .02.  Wiskowski was subsequently charged with fourth 
offense drunk driving.  
¶106 I disagree with the majority's assertion that law 
enforcement did not possess reasonable suspicion in pulling over 
Wiskowski.  Reasonable suspicion is a low bar:  "[It] need not 
rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls 
considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence 
standard."  United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) 
(citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).  "The 
essential question is whether the action of the law enforcement 
officer was reasonable under all the facts and circumstances 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
present."  State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 139-40, 456 
N.W.2d 830 (1990); see also State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶23, 317 
Wis. 2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569 ("[A] police officer may still 
conduct a traffic stop when, under the totality of the 
circumstances, he or she has grounds to reasonably suspect that 
a crime or traffic violation has been or will be committed.") 
(citing State v. Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d 600, 605, 558 N.W.2d 696 
(Ct. App. 1996)).  The test is reasonableness.  An analysis of 
reasonable suspicion asks "whether the facts of the case would 
warrant a reasonable police officer, in light of his or her 
training and experience, to suspect that the individual has 
committed, was committing, or is about to commit a crime."  
State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶13, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634 
(citing State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 83-84, 454 N.W.2d 763 
(1990)).  While an officer's "inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or hunch" is not enough to satisfy reasonable 
suspicion justifying an investigative stop, id., ¶10, "officers 
are not required to rule out the possibility of innocent 
behavior before initiating a brief stop."  State v. Genous, 2021 
WI 50, ¶8, 397 Wis. 2d 293, 961 N.W.2d 41 (quoting Anderson, 155 
Wis. 2d at 84).  "Therefore, if any reasonable inference of 
wrongful conduct can be objectively discerned, notwithstanding 
the existence of other innocent inferences that could be drawn, 
the officers have the right to temporarily detain the individual 
for the purpose of inquiry."  State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶21, 
294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729 (quoting Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d at 
84)).   
No.  2021AP2105-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
¶107 Under 
the 
facts 
of 
this 
case, 
law 
enforcement 
responded to a named informant's call about a driver asleep 
behind the wheel of his vehicle, in a McDonald's drive-through, 
in the middle of the day.  Law enforcement arrived shortly 
thereafter on scene and observed a vehicle matching the named 
informant's description, exiting the drive-through.  The driver, 
who according to the named informant had been sleeping a moment 
prior, was now operating his vehicle out of the parking lot and 
back into traffic.  Law enforcement was not required to "rule 
out the possibility of innocent behavior" or make "other 
innocent inferences" to explain this unusual behavior.  Genous, 
397 Wis. 2d 293, ¶8; Young, 294 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21.  Rather, the 
officer based his decision to initiate a traffic stop on the 
"totality of the circumstances" present at the time.  Reasonable 
suspicion demands no more. 
¶108 The majority seems to make much of the fact that the 
officer testified that he did not initially smell the odor of 
intoxicants and somehow the stop lasted a bit too long.  
Majority op., ¶¶5-6.  The majority rests its community caretaker 
conclusion on the officer asking and requiring too much of 
Wiskowski in his exchange with him, extending the stop beyond 
what is necessary for the community caretaker function.  Id., 
¶25.  The majority sheds little light on what rule law 
enforcement should follow in the future other than the Wiskowski 
stop was a bit too long.  Id., ¶2.  In other words, this case is 
very fact-dependent.   
No.  2021AP2105-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
¶109 If the officer testified that he stopped the vehicle 
for a traffic violation, such as Wiskowski not using a turn 
signal, the majority analysis would likely be different.  
Officers also can base a vehicular stop upon a call from an 
informant, whether unknown, or as in this case, known.8  If just 
a bit earlier in this stop the officer smelled intoxicants or 
witnessed slurred speech or stumbling, the majority likely would 
not reach the same conclusion.  Here, the majority says, this 
information came to the officer too late even though it was 
within minutes.  The majority essentially manufactures a two-
part stop out of what is one continuous inquiry.  This officer 
did 
not 
unreasonably 
extend 
this 
stop. 
 
The 
officer's 
observations occurred within a fairly short time period and his 
                                                 
8 See Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 398-99 (2014) 
(concluding that a traffic stop based on tip from unknown 911 
caller "bore adequate indicia of reliability for the officer to 
credit the caller's account"); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 
326-27, (1990) (holding officers were justified in conducting a 
traffic stop based off of an unknown informant's tip and 
"corroborated by independent police work"); Adams v. Williams, 
407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972) (concluding that an officer "acted 
justifiably" in responding to an informant's tip as "[t]he 
informant was known to him personally" and gave information 
"that was immediately verifiable at the scene"); State v. 
Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, ¶¶37-38, 241 Wis. 2d 729, 623 N.W.2d 516 
(holding that a tip from unknown informant observing erratic 
driving "provided sufficient justification for an investigative 
stop" as, among other things, the tip "reported contemporaneous 
and verifiable observations," and the allegations in the tip 
"could suggest to a reasonable police officer that [the driver] 
was operating his vehicle while intoxicated"); State v. Miller, 
2012 WI 61, ¶5, 341 Wis. 2d 307, 815 N.W.2d 349 (concluding that 
"under the totality of the circumstances police acted reasonably 
when they conducted an investigatory stop of the vehicle" as the 
officers "had the requisite reasonable suspicion primarily based 
on the reliability" of an informant and his verifiable tip).  
No.  2021AP2105-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
inquiry was reasonable under the circumstances.  After all, the 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.   
¶110 Also consider that any variety of other substances, 
which do not necessarily have an odor, can constitute "drunk 
driving" or operating under the influence of another drug.  
Operating a motor vehicle with any amount of these prohibited 
substances 
in 
one's 
system 
constitutes 
operating 
with 
a 
prohibited substance.9  For example, a person could be driving 
illegally while having any amount of these prohibited substances 
in their system.  Many prohibited substances are odorless, such 
as oxycodone, heroin, or tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).  The fact 
that this officer did not initially detect of an odor of alcohol 
should not automatically dispel the officer, under these facts, 
from looking further into whether Wiskowski was otherwise unsafe 
                                                 
9 Chapter 961 of the Wisconsin Statutes, referred to as the 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act, lists the standards and 
schedules of various prohibited substances as well as the 
correlated 
offenses 
and 
penalties. 
 
While 
Wiskowski 
was 
convicted for driving with a prohibited alcohol concentration, 
fourth offense, Wis. Stat. § 346.63 also forbids any person from 
driving or operating a motor vehicle while:  
(a)  Under the influence of an intoxicant, a 
controlled substance, a controlled substance analog or 
any 
combination 
of 
an 
intoxicant, 
a 
controlled 
substance and a controlled substance analog, under the 
influence of any other drug to a degree which renders 
him or her incapable of safely driving, or under the 
combined influence of an intoxicant and any other drug 
to a degree which renders him or her incapable of 
safely driving; or 
(am)  The person has a detectable amount of a 
restricted controlled substance in his or her blood. 
§ 346.63(1)(a), (am). 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
to operate his motor vehicle.  The majority opinion feels no 
need to address this fact. 
¶111 Instead, the majority assumes without deciding that 
the traffic stop was conducted under the community caretaker 
exception to the warrant requirement.  The community caretaker 
exception allows police to conduct a seizure without first 
obtaining a warrant.  See State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶¶13-14, 
327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592.  Under the community caretaker 
exception the court must determine (1) whether a Fourth 
Amendment seizure occurred; (2) if so, whether the officer was 
acting as a bona fide community caretaker; and (3) if so, 
whether the public need and interests outweigh the intrusion on 
the individual's privacy.  State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶21, 315 
Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598.  In the case at issue, neither 
party disputed that there was a Fourth Amendment seizure, so the 
court of appeals focused on the other two elements of the test.   
¶112 Regarding the second element——whether the officer was 
acting as a bona fide community caretaker——the court of appeals 
correctly concluded that there was an "objectively reasonable 
basis" to believe that a member of the public is in need of 
assistance.  State v. Wiskowski, No. 2021AP2105-CR, unpublished 
order, at 4 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2023).  See State v. Maddix, 
2013 WI App 64, ¶20, 348 Wis. 2d 179, 831 N.W.2d 778 (stating 
that an analysis of whether police are engaged in a bona fide 
community caretaker function "requires us to determine whether 
there is 'an "objectively reasonable basis" to believe [that] 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
there is "a member of the public who is in need of assistance"'" 
(quoting another source)).   
¶113 The court of appeals observed: 
[The officer] was called to the scene because of a 
report about a person sleeping in a drive-through in 
the middle of the day.  This was not where one would 
fall asleep absent some substantial problem, including 
a potential medical issue, because one must maneuver a 
vehicle through the drive-through and interact with 
restaurant employees.  Though [the officer] observed 
the truck turn out of the parking lot when he arrived, 
he still had an objectively reasonably basis to be 
concerned that the driver needed assistance or might 
not be able to safely drive the truck. 
Wiskowski, No. 2021AP2105-CR, unpublished order, at 5. 
¶114 The third element of the test——whether the public need 
and interests outweigh the intrusion on the individual's 
privacy——further supports the legality of the stop.10  The 
balancing test employed militated in favor of there being a 
significant public interest in ensuring that drivers are able to 
safely operate their vehicles on public roads.  I agree with the 
court of appeals' conclusion that by immediately stopping 
                                                 
10 Courts consider the following "relevant considerations" 
when assessing the balancing act of the third element of the 
community caretaker test, namely: 
(1) the degree of the public interest and the exigency 
of the situation; (2) the attendant circumstances 
surrounding the seizure, including time, location, and 
degree of overt authority and force displayed; (3) 
whether an automobile is involved; and (4) the 
availability, 
feasibility 
and 
effectiveness 
of 
alternatives 
to 
the 
type 
of 
intrusion 
actually 
accomplished. 
Anderson, 142 Wis. 2d at 169-70 (footnotes omitted). 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.akz 
 
14 
 
Wiskowski, the officer was able to check on his condition and 
mitigate the risk to public safety——and to Wiskowski himself.   
¶115 The 
circumstances 
surrounding 
the 
stop 
do 
not 
demonstrate that the officer used a high degree of overt 
authority or force, nor was there an extensive intrusion into a 
private space.  In fact, the average speeding or traffic stop 
would likely take about the same amount of time——perhaps more.  
In 
short, 
the 
officer 
had 
reasonable 
suspicion 
to 
stop 
Wiskowski, the officer was acting as a bona fide community 
caretaker, and the traffic stop was not unreasonably extended.    
¶116 Unfortunately, our court's review of this fact-
specific case fails to provide a clear rule for law enforcement.  
No law is developed.  Long established law about reasonable 
suspicion is misapplied, even though its application to the case 
at issue should militate against suppression of the evidence.  
Under the totality of the circumstances, the officer's conduct 
was reasonable.   
¶117 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
No.  2021AP2105-CR.akz 
 
1