Title: Pruett v. State
Citation: 234 N.E.2d 501, 250 Ind. 359
Docket Number: 30,896
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: March 7, 1968

250 Ind. 359 (1968)
234 N.E.2d 501
PRUETT
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30,896.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed March 7, 1968.
Rehearing denied May 2, 1968.
*360 David W. Dennis, of Richmond, John T. Cook, of Winchester, Ralph O. Lafuze, of Hagerstown, for appellant,
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and R. Robert Yeager, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
JACKSON, J.
This was a criminal prosecution charging the appellant, by indictment, with murder in the first degree, in that he did on the 10th day of June, 1965, at Wayne County, Indiana, unlawfully and feloniously kill one Robert Mopps, a human being, while he, the appellant, was engaged in the perpetration of a robbery. As stated in appellant's brief, we are concerned here with an alleged "felony murder."
The evidence introduced by the State of Indiana indicated that the homicide in question occurred between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., Central Daylight Time, on June 10, 1965, at a DX Gasoline Filling Station, located at the northeast corner of South Ninth and "M" Streets in the City of Richmond, Indiana. Robert Mopps was at the time an attendant at said DX filling station. The evidence indicated that Roy Waskom, another attendant, was, apparently, killed at the same time and place. Waskom's death was not charged in the indictment in this cause.
The indictment was returned by a Wayne County Grand Jury and, following a change of venue to Randolph County, Indiana, and after hearing and disposition of certain preliminary motions, the cause was tried to a petit jury in the Randolph Circuit Court, upon appellant's pleas of not guilty, and not guilty by reason of insanity.
Upon trial, the jury found the appellant guilty as charged and "that he shall suffer death."
A motion for a new trial was duly filed, was argued in the Randolph Circuit Court, and was by that court overruled.
*361 This appeal followed.
The indictment, omitting heading, formal parts and signatures, reads as follows, to-wit:
To the indictment appellant entered a plea of not guilty, which reads as follows:
The appellant filed his affidavit for change of venue from Wayne County, alleging he could not receive a fair trial *362 therein on account of excitement and prejudice against him in said County and in the City of Richmond in said County.
The affidavit for change was granted and the venue was changed to Randolph County, Indiana.
Thereafter appellant filed notice of his intention to offer the defense of alibi and caused notice to be served on the Prosecuting Attorney.
Thereafter the State of Indiana filed its notice of the time and date it expected to prove the offense was committed.
The appellant next filed his plea of insanity to the effect "that he was of unsound mind at the time the offense charged herein was committed."
The State of Indiana filed its written answer to such plea to the effect:
Thereafter appellant filed his written motion "to suppress all statements given by the defendant to the police for the reason that said statements were made under the influence of fear produced by threats or by undue influence." Notice of the filing of the motion was given to the Prosecuting Attorney of Randolph County, Indiana.
The appellant also filed his written motion to suppress physical evidence taken by search and seizure and evidence of ballistic tests based thereon. Such motion, omitting heading, formal parts and signatures thereof, reads as follows:
*364 Appellant's Motion to Suppress Statements given to Police was overruled by the court prior to trial without taking testimony.
Appellant's Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence was overruled by the court prior to trial after a hearing at which testimony was taken.
Trial began before a jury on August 30, 1965.
Appellant's Motion for New Trial was filed on the 6th day of October, 1965, and is found in its entirety at pages 78 to and including 110 of the transcript. In view of the determination we are required to make in this matter the appellant's motion is set forth only in pertinent part, encompassing the question determined in this appeal. Such motion, so limited, reads as follows, to-wit:
The instruction objected to reads as follows:
The appellant's objection to the above instruction reads as follows, to wit:
Appellant's Assignment of Errors, omitting caption, signatures, and portions thereof not deemed necessary for inclusion herein by reason of the determination we are here required to reach, reads as follows:
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 1 when it stated, "It is not necessary to show any premeditation or any specific intent for the commission of this particular type of crime." In felony murder cases it is not necessary to show appellant had the specific intent to kill. Jones v. State (1964), 244 Ind. 682, 195 N.E.2d 460. But the State has the burden of proving the essential elements of the felony appellant is charged to have been perpetrating at the time of the killing. Since appellant was charged with murder while in the perpetration of a robbery, the State had to prove he had to have the specific intent to commit robbery. See: Anderson v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 215, 214 N.E.2d 172; Sinks, Taylor v. State (1956), 235 Ind. 484, 133 N.E.2d 563.
*366 The giving of Instruction No. 1 constituted reversible error. The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant appellant's Motion for a New Trial and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed.
Lewis, C.J., and Hunter, J., concur. Arterburn and Mote, JJ. dissent.
NOTE.  Reported in 234 N.E.2d 501.