Title: FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S244157
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: May 6, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
FILMON.COM INC.,  
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
DOUBLEVERIFY INC., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
S244157 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Three 
B264074 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BC561987 
 
 
May 6, 2019 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
 
1 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
S244157 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
The Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 
425.16 to address so-called strategic lawsuits against public 
participation (SLAPP).  (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16 [the anti-
SLAPP statute].)1  This anti-SLAPP statute makes available a 
special 
motion 
to 
strike 
meritless 
claims 
early 
in 
litigation — but only if the claims arise from acts in furtherance 
of a person’s “right of petition or free speech under the United 
States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection 
with a public issue.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (b).)  In a catchall provision 
relevant to this case, the statute specifies that such acts include 
“conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right 
of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection 
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”  (§ 425.16, 
subd. (e)(4).)  But nowhere does the statute further define these 
terms.   
FilmOn.com Inc. (FilmOn) is a for-profit business entity 
that distributes web-based entertainment programming.  In this 
case, FilmOn sued DoubleVerify Inc. (DoubleVerify), another 
for-profit business entity that offers online tracking, verification 
and “brand safety” services to Internet advertisers.  FilmOn 
alleged that DoubleVerify disparaged its digital distribution 
network in confidential reports to DoubleVerify’s paying clients.  
DoubleVerify responded by filing an anti-SLAPP motion to 
strike. 
                                        
1  
All further undesignated statutory references are to the 
Code of Civil Procedure. 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
We granted review to decide whether the commercial 
nature of a defendant’s speech is relevant in determining 
whether that speech merits protection under the catchall 
provision.  To resolve this question, we also clarify how the 
context of a statement more broadly — including the identity of 
the 
speaker, 
the 
audience, 
and 
the 
purpose 
of 
the 
speech — informs the same analysis.  
What we hold is that the context of a defendant’s 
statement is relevant, though not dispositive, in analyzing 
whether the statement was made “in furtherance of” free speech 
“in connection with” a public issue.  (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)  In 
an age of easy public access to previously private information 
through social media and other means, context allows us to 
assess the functional relationship between a statement and the 
issue of public interest on which it touches — deciding, in the 
process, whether it merits protection under a statute designed 
to “encourage continued participation in matters of public 
significance.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (a).)   
In giving effect to this statutory purpose, we find that 
DoubleVerify’s reports — generated for profit, exchanged 
confidentially, without being part of any attempt to participate 
in a larger public discussion — do not qualify for anti-SLAPP 
protection under the catchall provision, even where the topic 
discussed is, broadly speaking, one of public interest.  This is not 
because confidential statements made to serve business 
interests 
are 
categorically 
excluded 
from 
anti-SLAPP 
protection.  It is instead because DoubleVerify’s reports are too 
tenuously tethered to the issues of public interest they 
implicate, and too remotely connected to the public conversation 
about those issues, to merit protection under the catchall 
provision.   
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
Because the Court of Appeal found DoubleVerify’s reports 
protected under the anti-SLAPP statute, and held that context 
is irrelevant to the anti-SLAPP analysis under subdivision 
(e)(4), we reverse.  
I. 
Internet use has become pervasive in less than a 
generation, and along with it, advertising through online 
platforms.  (See Interactive Advertising Bureau, IAB Internet 
Advertising 
Revenue 
Report 
(May 
2018) 
<https://www.iab.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/IAB-2017-
Full-Year-Internet-Advertising-Revenue-Report.REV2_.pdf> 
[as of May 2, 2019].)2  To ensure their advertising dollars are 
wisely spent and the ads are placed on sites with content 
appropriate for their target customers, businesses monitor the 
websites on which they advertise or may wish to advertise.  One 
company offering such monitoring services — which include 
collecting and packaging information about a website’s content, 
viewers, and advertising practices — is defendant DoubleVerify. 
For its large stable of clients, DoubleVerify gathers and 
provides information about the websites on which the clients are 
interested in advertising.  The businesses pay for the reports 
and agree to keep them confidential.  In return, they receive 
from DoubleVerify information on the location of the website’s 
viewers, whether a competitor advertises on the website, where 
the 
website 
displays 
advertisements, 
how 
long 
the 
advertisements are shown, and — crucial to this litigation — a 
description of the website’s content.  Such a description comes 
                                        
2  
All Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, 
docket 
number, 
and 
case 
name 
at 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/38324.htm. 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
in the form of a “tag” or “label classifying the website’s content.”  
(FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify, Inc. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 707, 
712 (FilmOn).)  For instance, DoubleVerify may tag a website as 
containing “Adult Content,” which it then defines, in a glossary 
included in the report, as “ ‘ “[m]ature topics which are 
inappropriate viewing for children including explicit language, 
content, sounds and themes.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  Similarly, DoubleVerify 
also has a “Copyright Infringement:  Streaming or File Sharing” 
tag, defined as “ ‘ “Sites, presently or historically, associated 
with access to or distribution of copyrighted material without 
appropriate controls, licensing, or permission; including but not 
limited to, sites electronically streaming or allowing user file 
sharing of such material.” ’ ”  (Ibid.) 
Some of the websites DoubleVerify labeled as containing 
“Adult Content” or “Copyright Infringement” material belonged 
to plaintiff FilmOn.  FilmOn provides entertainment content on 
the web, including “hundreds of televisions channels, premium 
movie channels, pay-per-view channels and over 45,000 video-
on-demand titles.”  (FilmOn, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 712.)  
FilmOn brought this lawsuit against DoubleVerify after 
DoubleVerify allegedly distributed confidential reports to its 
clients “ ‘falsely classify[ing] FilmOn Websites under the 
categories of “Copyright Infringement-File Sharing” and 
“Adult Content.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  FilmOn alleges that “as a direct 
result of [DoubleVerify’s] false and disparaging statements 
published in the [] Reports,” FilmOn incurred damages because 
“ad partners and potential ad partners have refused to advertise 
through websites in FilmOn’s network.”  Claiming that its 
websites neither engage in copyright infringement nor feature 
adult content, FilmOn sued DoubleVerify for trade libel, tortious 
interference 
with 
contract, 
tortious 
interference 
with 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
prospective economic advantage, and violation of California’s 
unfair competition law.   
DoubleVerify responded by filing an anti-SLAPP motion.  
The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeal 
affirmed.  The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that 
DoubleVerify’s reports “concerned issues of interest to the 
public” because “the public ha[s] a demonstrable interest in 
knowing what content is available on the Internet, especially 
with respect to adult content and the illegal distribution of 
copyrighted materials.”  (FilmOn, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 
719, 714.)  To support its conclusion, the court analogized 
DoubleVerify’s confidential reports to ratings by the Motion 
Picture Association of America, writing, “the Motion Picture 
Association of America (MPAA) engages in conduct quite similar 
to DoubleVerify’s activities by rating movies concerning their 
level of adult content, and the MPAA does so, because the public 
cares about the issue.”  (Id. at p. 720.) 
As is relevant to our review, the court rejected the 
argument that DoubleVerify’s reports, in fact, are different from 
MPAA’s ratings.  (FilmOn, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 720.)  
According to FilmOn, DoubleVerify’s reports differ from the 
MPAA’s film ratings because the latter are made widely 
available to the public, while DoubleVerify’s reports are 
delivered to individual clients, and must be kept confidential.  
The court disagreed, stating its conclusion in absolute terms:  “it 
is irrelevant that DoubleVerify made its reports confidentially 
to its subscribers,” since “[n]either the identity of the speaker 
nor the identity of the audience affects the content of the 
communication, or whether that content concerns an issue of 
public interest.”  (Id. at p. 723.)  So, “if an ‘R’ rating for adult 
content is a matter of ‘public interest’ when communicated by 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
the MPAA to the public at large, it remains a matter of public 
interest when communicated by DoubleVerify in confidential 
reports to its clients.  Likewise, if FilmOn’s alleged copyright 
infringement is an issue of public interest when reported by the 
press, it remains so when included in DoubleVerify’s 
confidential reports.”  (Ibid.)  In short, “[w]hether a statement 
concerns an issue of public interest depends on the content of 
the statement,” and only that content, “not the statement’s 
speaker or audience.”  (Id. at p. 722.) 
We granted review to decide if and how the context of a 
statement — including the identity of the speaker, the audience, 
and the purpose of the speech — informs a court’s determination 
of whether the statement was made “in furtherance of” free 
speech “in connection with” a public issue.  (§ 425.16, subd. 
(e)(4).)  
II. 
A. 
The anti-SLAPP law was enacted “to protect nonprofit 
corporations and common citizens ‘from large corporate entities 
and trade associations’ in petitioning government.”  (USA Waste 
of California, Inc. v. City of Irwindale (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 
53, 66.)  Attempting to protect against “lawsuits brought 
primarily to chill” the exercise of speech and petition rights, the 
Legislature embedded context into the statutory preamble, 
“declar[ing] that it is in the public interest to encourage 
continued participation in matters of public significance.”  
(§ 425.16, subd. (a).) 
In the paradigmatic SLAPP suit, a well-funded developer 
limits free expression by imposing litigation costs on citizens 
who protest, write letters, and distribute flyers in opposition to 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
a local project.  (See Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. 
Bill No. 1296 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 23, 1997, 
pp. 2–3; Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the 
Problem of SLAPPs (1993) 26 Loyola L.A. L.Rev. 395, 396.)  
Identifying the problem as one involving particular litigants, 
their motivations, and the effects of litigation, the Assembly 
Committee on Judiciary observed that approximately 25 percent 
of SLAPP suits “relate to development and zoning,” while 20 
percent “arise out of complaints against public officials and 
employees.”  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill. 
No. 1296, supra, at p. 3.)  The Committee recognized that “such 
lawsuits are often pernicious, masquerading as standard 
defamation and interference with prospective economic 
advantage litigation, while really brought by well-heeled parties 
who can afford to misuse the civil justice system to chill the 
exercise of free speech . . . by the threat of impoverishing the 
other party.”  (Ibid.)  To curb what it took to be the “disturbing 
increase” in such lawsuits (§ 425.16, subd. (a)), the Legislature 
shifted burdens of proof and fees onto the lawsuit filer to 
“compensate[] the prevailing defendant for the undue burden of 
defending against litigation designed to chill the exercise of free 
speech and petition rights.”  (Barry v. State Bar of California 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 328.)   
Consistent with the statute’s purpose, its text defines 
conduct in furtherance of the rights of petition and free speech 
on a public issue not only by its content, but also by its location, 
its audience, and its timing.  (See § 425.16, subd. (e)(1) [“before 
a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding”]; § 425.16, subd. 
(e)(2) [“in connection with an issue under consideration or 
review by” a government entity]; § 425.16, subd. (e)(3) [“in a 
place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
issue of public interest”].)  Indeed, we have previously noted that 
the Legislature “ ‘equated a public issue with the authorized 
official proceeding to which it connects,’ ” effectively defining the 
protected status of the statement by the context in which it was 
made.  (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 
19 Cal.4th 1106, 1117, italics in original (Briggs).)  
Admittedly, the catchall provision contains no similar 
contextual references to help courts discern the type of conduct 
and speech to protect.  (See § 425.16, subd. (e)(4) [“any other 
conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional 
right . . . of free speech in connection with a public issue or an 
issue of public interest”].)  But we interpret statutory language 
within its context, and in light of its structure, analogous 
provisions, and any other appropriate indicia of its purpose.  
(See Poole v. Orange County Fire Authority (2015) 61 Cal.4th 
1378, 1385 [reading the statutory language in the context of its 
neighboring provisions]; Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 
Cal.3d 727, 735 [“[T]he words must be construed in context, and 
provisions relating to the same subject matter must be 
harmonized to the extent possible.”].)  Nothing in subdivision 
(e)(4) or other portions of the statute supports the conclusion 
that subdivision (e)(4) is the only subdivision where contextual 
information is excluded from consideration in discerning the 
type of conduct and speech worthy of procedural protection.   
Indeed, that the language of the provision refers to “other 
conduct in furtherance” supports the inference that this 
provision encompasses conduct and speech similar to what is 
referenced in subdivision (e)(1) through (e)(3).  (§ 425.16, subd. 
(e)(4), italics added; see International Federation of Professional 
& Technical Engineers, Local 21, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court 
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 319, 342 [explaining that where a statute lists 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
a series of specific categories followed by a catchall category, the 
catchall is “ ‘ “restricted to those things that are similar to those 
which are enumerated specifically” ’ ”].)   
The reference to “any other conduct” in subdivision (e)(4) 
also underscores its role as the “catchall” provision meant to 
round out the statutory safeguards for constitutionally 
protected expression.  (See, e.g., Lieberman v. KCOP Television, 
Inc. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 156, 164 [observing that subdivision 
(e)(4) “provides a catchall”].)  In protecting “any other conduct” 
that meets the requirements laid out in its text (§ 425.16, 
subd. (e)(4), italics added), subdivision (e)(4) proves both 
broader in scope than the other subdivisions, and less firmly 
anchored to any particular context.  (See San Diegans for Open 
Government 
v. 
San 
Diego 
State 
University 
Research 
Foundation (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 76, 101 (San Diegans) 
[characterizing § 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) as “a ‘catchall’ that 
extends the anti-SLAPP statutes beyond actual instances of free 
speech to ‘all conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the right 
of free speech in connection with a public issue’ ”]; Collier v. 
Harris (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 41, 51 [same]; accord Briggs, 
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1122 [stating that, in contrast to 
subdivision (e)(3) and (4), the first two subparts in subdivision 
(e) provide “a bright-line ‘official proceeding’ test”].)  This 
provision consequently suggests that courts should engage in a 
relatively careful analysis of whether a particular statement 
falls within the ambit of “other conduct” encompassed by 
subdivision (e)(4). 
It would be all but impossible, as part of such a careful 
analysis, to justify ignoring the ordinary contextual cues 
affecting how people generally evaluate speech.  Our courts have 
not ignored such cues.  (See San Diegans, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
at p. 106 [the identity of the actor matters; “[Defendant] 
Inewsource is not a construction company.  It is in the news 
reporting business, and the contracts [San Diegans for Open 
Government] challenges shape the way inewsource and KPBS 
gather, produce, and report the news”]; Mendoza v. ADP 
Screening & Selection Services, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 
1644, 1653 (Mendoza) [the audience of the speech (in this case, 
an employer) matters; “We are also swayed by the public 
interest in safe workplaces, and in the liability which may 
attach to employers who fail to investigate prospective 
employees where prudence justifies such an investigation.  
Thus, as a foundational, broad-based proposition, we conclude 
that 
providing 
employment-screening 
reports 
is 
a 
constitutionally founded, protected activity within the meaning 
of the anti-SLAPP statute”]; All One God Faith, Inc. v. Organic 
& Sustainable Industry Standards, Inc. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 
1186, 1204 (All One) [the purpose of the speech matters; “The 
purpose of the ‘ “OASIS Organic” seal’ is to promote the sale of 
the product to which it is affixed, not the standard or its 
elements”].) 
Nor are contextual considerations relevant merely to some 
generalized evaluation implicit in the analysis.  In articulating 
what constitutes a matter of public interest, courts look to 
certain specific considerations, such as whether the subject of 
the speech or activity “was a person or entity in the public eye” 
or “could affect large numbers of people beyond the direct 
participants” (Wilbanks v. Wolk (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 883, 898 
(Wilbanks)); and whether the activity “occur[red] in the context 
of an ongoing controversy, dispute or discussion” (Du Charme v. 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (2003) 110 
Cal.App.4th 107, 119 (Du Charme)), or “affect[ed] a community 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
in a manner similar to that of a governmental entity” (Damon v. 
Ocean Hills Journalism Club (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 468, 479).  
The Court of Appeal’s contrary position in this case is not 
supported by the cases on which it relied.  Leaning on Terry v. 
Davis Community Church (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1534 (Terry) 
and 
Hecimovich 
v. 
Encinal 
School 
Parent 
Teacher 
Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450 (Hecimovich), the 
appellate court held that “[n]either the identity of the speaker 
nor the identity of the audience affects the content of the 
communication, or whether that content concerns an issue of 
public interest.”  (FilmOn, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.)  But 
those two decisions stand only for the proposition that section 
425.16 could apply “to private communications concerning 
issues of public interest.”  (Terry, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 
1546; see also Hecimovich, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 465 
[“ ‘ “ ‘[T]he focus of the speaker’s conduct should be the public 
interest. . . .’ ”  [Citation.]  Nevertheless, it may encompass 
activity between private people.’ ”].)  Long before Terry and 
Hecimovich, we held that section 425.16 may protect private 
events and conversations.  (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 
82, 91 [“When previously construing the statute, however, we 
have declined to hold ‘that section 425.16 does not apply to 
events that transpire between private individuals’ . . . .” quoting 
Briggs, supra, 19 Cal. 4th at p. 1116].)  But we have never 
suggested quite a different proposition:  that it will never matter 
whether the conversations were private or widely broadcasted 
and received, and for what purpose.  
Indeed, those contextual factors mattered in both Terry 
and Hecimovich. In Terry, the court considered that the 
speakers were church leaders attempting to protect children in 
the church’s youth groups, as evidenced by the fact that “the 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
matter was referred to the Davis Police Department for 
investigation.”  (Terry, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1547; id. at 
p. 1548.)  In Hecimovich, too, the court highlighted the 
relationship between the speech, the speaker, and the audience.  
(Hecimovich, 
supra, 
203 
Cal.App.4th 
at 
pp. 
465–466 
[emphasizing that “communications in issue here concern the 
well-being of young children in an afterschool sports program, 
as discussed between and among members of the PTO, parents 
of the young team members, and league officials”].)  The court 
below erred in using these cases to constrain its inquiry to the 
content of DoubleVerify’s speech, deracinated of context.  
B. 
DoubleVerify concedes that section 425.16 invites courts 
to consider the context in which statements were made.  But it 
argues that one kind of contextual cue –– commercial 
context — is irrelevant except as specified in a neighboring 
provision, section 425.17, subdivision (c).  We disagree. 
Section 425.17, subdivision (c) categorically exempts 
certain expressive actions from the scope of section 425.16.  To 
fall within the scope of the exemption, the speaker must be “a 
person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing 
goods or services” making “representations of fact about that 
person’s or a business competitor’s business operations, goods, 
or services” to “an actual or potential buyer or customer, or a 
person likely to repeat the statement to, or otherwise influence, 
an actual or potential buyer or customer” with “the purpose of 
obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing sales or leases of, 
or commercial transactions in, the person’s goods or services, or 
the statement or conduct was made in the course of delivering 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
the person’s goods or services.”3  (§ 425.17, subd. (c).)  So whether 
section 425.17, subdivision (c) exempts the speech depends not 
only on the content of that speech but also the identity of the 
speaker, the intended audience, and the purpose of the 
statement. 
                                        
3  
In its entirety, section 425.17, subdivision (c), states:  
“Section 425.16 does not apply to any cause of action brought 
against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or 
leasing goods or services, including, but not limited to, 
insurance, securities, or financial instruments, arising from any 
statement or conduct by that person if both of the following 
conditions exist: 
(1) The statement or conduct consists of representations of 
fact about that person’s or a business competitor’s 
business operations, goods, or services, that is made for 
the purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or 
securing sales or leases of, or commercial transactions 
in, the person’s goods or services, or the statement or 
conduct was made in the course of delivering the 
person’s goods or services. 
(2) The intended audience is an actual or potential buyer 
or customer, or a person likely to repeat the statement 
to, or otherwise influence, an actual or potential buyer 
or customer, or the statement or conduct arose out of or 
within the context of a regulatory approval process, 
proceeding, 
or investigation, 
except 
where 
the 
statement or conduct was made by a telephone 
corporation in the course of a proceeding before the 
California Public Utilities Commission and is the 
subject of a lawsuit brought by a competitor, 
notwithstanding that the conduct or statement 
concerns an important public issue.” 
 
 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
14 
Notice how the language of section 425.17, subdivision (c) 
and subsequent case law indicate that the provision exempts 
“only a subset of commercial speech” — specifically, comparative 
advertising.4  (All One, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1217; see 
Simpson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 32–33 [quoting Mendoza, 
supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1652, for the notion that “ ‘the 
Legislature appears to have enacted section 425.17, subdivision 
(c), for the purpose of exempting from the reach of the anti-
SLAPP statute cases involving comparative advertising by 
businesses’ ”].)  So certain commercially oriented statements 
will fall outside the scope of section 425.17, subdivision (c).  (All 
One, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1217 [“the better 
understanding of section 425.17, subdivision (c), is that all of the 
speech exempted from the anti-SLAPP statute is commercial 
speech, 
but 
not 
all 
commercial 
speech 
is 
exempted 
thereunder”].)  Like all other statements that do not fall within 
the scope of an exemption, such statements are eligible for anti-
SLAPP protection under section 425.16.5   
                                        
4  
The parties agree that DoubleVerify’s reports to its clients 
are not exempted under section 425.17, subdivision (c), because 
DoubleVerify was not making representations about its own 
business but FilmOn’s, and DoubleVerify and FilmOn were not 
competitors.  (See Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore (2010) 
49 Cal.4th 12, 32 (Simpson) [finding that § 425.17, subd. (c) did 
not apply when “ ‘the representation was not “about” 
[defendant’s] 
or 
a 
competitor’s 
services 
or 
business 
operations’ ”]; Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC (2010) 181 
Cal.App.4th 664, 676 (Stewart) [same].) 
5  
We disapprove Rezec v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, 
Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 135 to the extent it is inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
15 
DoubleVerify argues that considering commercial context 
under the catchall provision would “render[] [s]ection 425.17(c) 
redundant and mere surplusage,” because it would involve 
importing the analysis for the exemption into the analysis for 
the catchall provision.  But the Legislature’s decision to 
explicitly 
require 
consideration 
of 
certain 
contextual 
factors — like speaker, audience, and purpose — in defining the 
comparative advertising exception should not lead us to decide 
these contextual factors are categorically excluded from 
consideration under section 425.16.  When the statutory 
language and structure otherwise cut so sharply in favor of 
considering context in applying the anti-SLAPP statute, we 
should not lightly assume that context may be considered only 
under one subdivision merely because that subdivision explicitly 
mentions certain contextual factors. 
Nor does it seem the Legislature contemplated that 
outcome when it added section 425.17, subdivision (c).  Instead, 
the relevant legislative history included language observing how 
the exception allowed certain lobbying activities and marketing 
to “be viewed in the context of its offering, just as a speech by a 
person against the building of a waste facility in the 
neighborhood.”  (Sen. Judiciary Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 
515 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 1, 2003, pp. 9–10, 
italics added.)  It noted that while the latter “can clearly be seen 
to have been made in the context of exercising the person’s 
constitutional right of speech,” the “content and context of the 
former activities are clearly more in furtherance of business 
considerations.”  (Id. at p. 10.) 
We do not, as FilmOn urges, sort statements categorically 
into commercial or noncommercial baskets in analyzing whether 
they are covered by the catchall provision.  We merely conclude 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
16 
that the very contextual cues revealing a statement to be 
“commercial” in nature — whether it was private or public, to 
whom it was said, and for what purpose — can bear on whether 
it was made in furtherance of free speech in connection with a 
public issue.  (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)  In other words, context 
matters under the catchall provision, and commercial context is 
no exception. 
III. 
A. 
So within the framework of section 425.16, subdivision 
(e)(4), a court must consider the context as well the content of a 
statement in determining whether that statement furthers the 
exercise of constitutional speech rights in connection with a 
matter of public interest.  Having established this principle, we 
now turn to analyzing how context should feature in a court’s 
analysis under the catchall provision, and to applying that 
framework to the facts of this case.  
Our courts have ably distilled the characteristics of “a 
public issue or an issue of public interest.”  (§ 425.16, subd. 
(e)(4); see Rivero v. American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 
919–924 (Rivero) [describing three non-exclusive categories of 
public interest]; Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 
1132–1133 (Weinberg) [describing additional attributes of 
protected 
conduct].) 
 
But 
they 
have 
struggled — understandably — to articulate the requisite nexus 
between the challenged statements and the asserted issue of 
public interest — to give meaning, in other words, to the “in 
connection with” requirement.  (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)   
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
17 
Most often, courts strive to discern what the challenged 
speech is really “about” — a narrow, largely private dispute, for 
example, or the asserted issue of public interest.  (See Bikkina 
v. Mahadevan (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 70, 85 [defendant’s speech 
was “about falsified data and plagiarism in two scientific papers, 
not about global warming”]; World Financial Group, Inc. v. 
HBW Ins. & Financial Services, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 
1561, 1572 [defendants’ attempts to solicit competitor’s agents 
and customers were not “about” the public issues of “workforce 
mobility and free competition” or “the pursuit of lawful 
employment”]; Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2004) 
120 Cal.App.4th 90, 111 [defendants’ statements “were not 
about pollution or potential public health and safety issues in 
general, but about [the plaintiffs’] specific business practices”].)  
This focus on discerning a single topic of speech is less than 
satisfying; if the social media era has taught us anything, it is 
that speech is rarely “about” any single issue.   
The inquiry under the catchall provision instead calls for 
a two-part analysis rooted in the statute’s purpose and internal 
logic.  First, we ask what “public issue or [] issue of public 
interest” the speech in question implicates — a question we 
answer by looking to the content of the speech.  (§ 425.16, subd. 
(e)(4).)  Second, we ask what functional relationship exists 
between the speech and the public conversation about some 
matter of public interest.  It is at the latter stage that context 
proves useful.   
The travails of the lower courts demonstrate that virtually 
always, defendants succeed in drawing a line –– however 
tenuous –– connecting their speech to an abstract issue of public 
interest.  (See Consumer Justice Center v. Trimedica 
International, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 595, 601 [defendants’ 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
18 
advertisements of a breast enlargement product were not “about 
the general topic of herbal supplements” but were instead 
“commercial speech about the specific properties and efficacy of 
a particular product”]; Rivero, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
919, 924 [rejecting union’s argument that, in publishing 
statements heralding suspension of a custodial supervisor, it 
was commenting on the abusive supervision of employees 
throughout a publicly financed educational institution].)  
DoubleVerify is no exception.  As it does now, 
DoubleVerify argued before the appellate court that its reports 
“concerned” or “addressed” topics of widespread public interest:  
the presence of adult content on the internet, generally, and the 
presence of copyright-infringing content on FilmOn’s websites, 
specifically.  To support its argument that FilmOn’s alleged 
copyright infringement is a matter of public interest, 
DoubleVerify offered evidence that FilmOn has been subject to 
media reports and litigation over its streaming model.6  The 
Court of Appeal agreed, finding that DoubleVerify’s reports 
were made “in connection with” matters of public interest 
because the company’s tags “identif[ied]” content that fell within 
categories of broad public interest.  (FilmOn, supra, 13 
Cal.App.5th at p. 720.)  
But the catchall provision demands “some degree of 
closeness” between the challenged statements and the asserted 
public interest.  (Weinberg, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132.)  
                                        
6 
We grant DoubleVerify’s requests for judicial notice of 
certain court orders and legislative history materials.  (Evid. 
Code, §§ 451–452.)  The court orders were entered in cases 
brought against FilmOn for copyright infringement, and the 
legislative history materials are of bills relating to the 
enactment of sections 425.16 and 425.17, subdivision (c). 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
19 
So even if adult content on the Internet and FilmOn’s particular 
streaming model are in fact issues of public interest, we agree 
with the court in Wilbanks that “it is not enough that the 
statement refer to a subject of widespread public interest; the 
statement must in some manner itself contribute to the public 
debate.”  (Wilbanks, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 898; see also 
Dyer v. Childress (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1280 [“[t]he fact 
that ‘a broad and amorphous public interest’ can be connected 
to a specific dispute” is not enough].)  
What it means to “contribute to the public debate” 
(Wilbanks, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 898) will perhaps differ 
based on the state of public discourse at a given time, and the 
topic of contention.  But ultimately, our inquiry does not turn on 
a normative evaluation of the substance of the speech.  We are 
not concerned with the social utility of the speech at issue, or 
the degree to which it propelled the conversation in any 
particular 
direction; 
rather, 
we 
examine 
whether 
a 
defendant — through 
public 
or 
private 
speech 
or 
conduct — participated in, or furthered, the discourse that 
makes an issue one of public interest.  (See All One, supra, 183 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1203–1204 [finding the “OASIS Organic seal” 
did not “contribute to a broader debate on the meaning of the 
term ‘organic’ ”]; Cross v. Cooper (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 357, 
375 [finding the defendant’s conduct “directly related” to an 
issue of public interest because it “served th[e] interests” of 
preventing child abuse and protecting children].)  
Contrary to DoubleVerify’s arguments, the Wilbanks rule 
adds no additional requirement beyond those already in the 
catchall provision.  It is instead a reasonable interpretation of 
the provision’s existing requirement that statements be made 
“in connection with” an issue of public interest — an 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
20 
interpretation informed by the statutory purpose explicitly 
articulated in the preamble to the anti-SLAPP statute.  Section 
425.16, subdivision (a) “declares that it is in the public interest 
to encourage continued participation in matters of public 
significance.”  Though we have cautioned that statutory 
preambles do not impose substantive requirements (Briggs, 
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1118), our task when interpreting 
legislation is to effectuate the statutory purpose –– and 
“statements of purpose in a statute’s preamble can be 
illuminating,” particularly if a statute is ambiguous (Yeager v. 
Blue Cross of California (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1103).   
We adopted the same approach in Briggs, where we 
construed subdivision (e)(1) and (e)(2) of the anti-SLAPP 
statute.  (Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1118.)  We explained in 
Briggs that although the statutory preamble did not impose “an 
across-the-board 
‘issue 
of 
public 
interest’ 
pleading 
requirement,” we understood the Legislature to equate 
statements made in certain official proceedings with matters of 
“public significance.”  (Ibid. [“Any matter pending before an 
official 
proceeding 
possesses 
some 
measure 
of 
‘public 
significance’ owing solely to the public nature of the proceeding 
. . . .”].)  Likewise, here, the preamble’s reference to “continued 
participation” in matters of public significance (§ 425.16, subd. 
(a)) adds no substantive requirement to a defendant’s burden to 
show conduct “in furtherance of” free speech “in connection with 
a public issue or an issue of public interest” (§ 425.16, subd. 
(e)(4)).  The two are instead coextensive:  a statement is made 
“in connection with” a public issue when it contributes to — that 
is, “participat[es]” in or furthers — some public conversation on 
the issue.  But the inquiry of whether a statement contributes 
to the public debate is one a court can hardly undertake without 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
21 
incorporating considerations of context — including audience, 
speaker, and purpose.   
B. 
When it declined to consider the context in which 
DoubleVerify made its statements, the Court of Appeal 
overlooked critical details bearing on the court’s scrutiny of the 
relationship between speech and the matter of public interest 
with which it is assertedly “in connection.”  (§ 425.16, subd. 
(e)(4).)  We examine those contextual details now, working 
within the two-part framework we just described. 
DoubleVerify has identified the public issues or issues of 
public interest to which its reports and their “tags” relate.  It 
argues FilmOn is notorious for its long history of violating 
copyright laws, and “FilmOn’s CEO and billionaire owner, Mr. 
David, regularly injects himself in the public spotlight to discuss 
himself, his companies, and the purported legality of FilmOn’s 
services.”  The Court of Appeal, meanwhile, determined 
DoubleVerify’s report “concerned an issue of public interest” 
because “the presence of adult content on the Internet generally, 
as well as copyright infringing content on FilmOn’s websites 
specifically, has been the subject of numerous press reports, 
regulatory actions, and federal lawsuits.”  (FilmOn, supra, 13 
Cal.App.5th at p. 720.)  It also concluded DoubleVerify’s reports 
were related to “the public debate over legislation to curb 
children’s exposure to adult and sexually explicit media 
content.”  (Ibid.) 
It is true enough that the various actions of a prominent 
CEO, or the issue of children’s exposure to sexually explicit 
media content –– in the abstract –– seem to qualify as issues of 
public interest under subdivision (e)(4).  But even assuming so, 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
22 
the focus of our inquiry must be on “the specific nature of the 
speech,” rather than on any “generalities that might be 
abstracted from it.”  (Commonwealth Energy Corp. v. Investor 
Data Exchange, Inc. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 26, 34, italics 
omitted.)  Defendants cannot merely offer a “synecdoche theory” 
of public interest, defining their narrow dispute by its slight 
reference to the broader public issue.  (Ibid.)   
So the second part of the test moves from a focus on 
identifying the relevant matters of public interest to addressing 
the specific nature of defendants’ speech and its relationship to 
the matters of public interest.  We cannot answer this second 
question simply by looking at the content of the challenged 
statements –– though no doubt in some cases that content will 
prove illuminating.  In this case, that content comprises three 
columns listing various Internet domains and subdomains, 
“[t]otal [impressions]” from viewers, and the thematic 
“[c]ategories” to which each domain belongs, as defined by 
DoubleVerify.  That DoubleVerify identifies FilmOn as falling 
within certain categories, however, tells us nothing of how that 
identification relates to the issues of copyright and adult 
content.  We can answer that question only by looking at the 
broader context in which DoubleVerify issued its reports, 
discerning through that context whether the company’s conduct 
qualifies for statutory protection by furthering the public 
conversation on an issue of public interest.  (See § 425.16, 
subd. (a) [declaring it is “in the public interest to encourage 
continued participation in matters of public significance”]; 
Wilbanks, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 898 [explaining that 
conduct must “contribute to the public debate” to warrant 
protection under the catchall provision].)  
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
23 
It seems plain enough that DoubleVerify’s reports did no 
such thing.  DoubleVerify issues its reports not to the wider 
public — who may well be interested in whether FilmOn hosts 
content unsuitable for children or whether its streaming 
platform infringes copyright — but privately, to a coterie of 
paying clients.  Those clients, in turn, use the information 
DoubleVerify provides for their business purposes alone.  The 
information never entered the public sphere, and the parties 
never intended it to.  
Yet no single element is dispositive — not DoubleVerify’s 
for-profit status, or the confidentiality of the reports, or the use 
to which its clients put its reports.  Nor does the combination of 
these contextual factors create a “commercial speech” category 
onto which we automatically map the presence or absence of 
anti-SLAPP protections.  Some commercially oriented speech 
will, in fact, merit anti-SLAPP protection.     
Consider, for example, Industrial Waste & Debris Box 
Service, Inc. v. Murphy (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1135, 1148 
(Industrial Waste), in which the appellate court found that a for-
profit consultant’s report fell within the ambit of the catchall 
provision.  “Commercial” though that report may have been, it 
analyzed public reports, landfill records, and state agency data 
to conclude a client’s competitor — the plaintiff waste 
hauler — had overcalculated and misreported the rate at which 
it diverted waste for reuse, recycling, and composting.  (Id. at p. 
1143.)  Following a rough approximation of the two-part 
framework we outline here, the court decided first that “limited 
landfill capacity and the environmental effects of waste 
disposal” are indeed issues of “significant interest” to the public 
and municipal governments; and second, that the report “shed 
light on these subjects” — that is, contributed to the issue of 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
24 
public interest — by deriving data from public reports and 
commenting on “whether and to what degree waste hauling 
companies in Sonoma County were meeting government 
standards.”  (Id. at pp. 1148–1149.)  These findings, in turn, 
prompted the sanitation board to alter its contracts and policies.   
(Id. at p. 1144.) 
It is in the extent of its contribution to, or participation in, 
the public discussion that DoubleVerify’s report diverges from 
the report at issue in Industrial Waste.  As the court in that case 
aptly noted, “[w]hether speech has a commercial or promotional 
aspect is not dispositive” of whether it is made in connection 
with an issue of public interest.  (Id. at p. 1150.)  After all, the 
anti-SLAPP statute protects more than those activities “ ‘which 
meet the lofty standard of pertaining to the heart of self-
government.’ ”  (Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1116, quoting 
Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 
1046–1047.)  But nothing in the statute or our precedent elides 
the potential relevance of that commercial character in deciding 
whether speech merits protection under the catchall provision.  
Instead, a court must consider whether a statement — including 
the identity of its speaker, for example, or the audience 
sought — contributes to or furthers the public conversation on 
an issue of public interest.  It is by carefully observing this 
wedding of content and context that we can discern if conduct is 
“in furtherance of” free speech “in connection with” a public 
issue or issue of public interest.  (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)  What 
this union of content and context lets us discern in this case is 
that DoubleVerify’s report does not qualify for protection under 
the catchall provision of the anti-SLAPP statute.  
 
FILMON.COM INC. v. DOUBLEVERIFY INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
25 
IV. 
The scenario before us involves two well-funded for-profit 
entities 
engaged 
in 
a 
private 
dispute 
over 
one’s 
characterization –– in a confidential report –– of the other’s 
business practices.  Because our “primary goal is to determine 
and give effect to the underlying purpose of” the anti-SLAPP 
statute (Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332), this 
context matters.  It allows courts to liberally extend the 
protection of the anti-SLAPP statute where doing so would 
“encourage continued participation in matters of public 
significance,” but withhold that protection otherwise.  (§ 425.16, 
subd. (a).)  And here, it allows us to discern what content alone 
conveys less clearly:  DoubleVerify did not issue its report in 
furtherance of free speech “in connection with” an issue of public 
interest.  (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)  
Because the Court of Appeal held to the contrary, we 
reverse. 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 13 Cal.App.5th 707 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S244157 
Date Filed: May 6, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Terry A. Green 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Baker Marquart, Ryan G. Baker, Scott M. Malzahn, Jaime W. Marquart, Christian A. Anstett and Blake D. 
McCay for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Fox Rothschild, Lincoln D. Bandlow, Margo J. Arnold and Rom Bar-Nissam for Defendant and 
Respondent. 
 
Davis Wright Tremaine, Kelli L. Sager, Rochelle L. Wilcox and Thomas R. Burke for Motion Picture 
Association of America, Inc., The Hearst Corporation, Tegna Inc., California News Publishers Association 
and First Amendment Coalition as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Ryan G. Baker 
Baker Marquart 
777 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 2850 
Los Angeles, CA  90071 
(424) 652-7800 
 
Lincoln D. Bandlow 
Fox Rothschild 
10250 Constellation Boulevard, Suite 900 
Los Angeles, CA  90067 
(310) 598-4150 
 
Rochelle L. Wilcox 
Davis Wright Tremaine 
865 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 2400 
Los Angeles, CA  90017-2566 
(213) 633-6800