Title: Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Arlie Taylor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1070900
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 2009

REL: 06/12/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1070900
_________________________
Dolgencorp, Inc.
v.
Arlie Taylor
Appeal from Clarke Circuit Court
(CV-05-40)
SMITH, Justice.
Dolgencorp, Inc. ("Dolgencorp"), which owns and operates
Dollar General retail discount stores, appeals from a judgment
entered on a jury verdict in favor of Arlie Taylor on Taylor's
1070900
2
claims alleging negligence and wantonness.  We reverse the
trial court's judgment and render a judgment for Dolgencorp.
Facts and Procedural History
On December 2, 2004, Taylor, who was then 68 years old,
went to a Dollar General retail discount store ("the store")
in Jackson to purchase laundry products.  After entering the
store, Taylor attempted to push her shopping cart to the back
aisle of the store where the laundry products were located by
way of the middle aisle; however, the middle aisle was
impassible because of displays of Christmas decorations and
candy.  Taylor then attempted to push her shopping cart to the
back aisle by way of an aisle on the right side of the store.
She testified at trial that she was "going around boxes" of
merchandise that were located on the floor of the aisle as she
moved toward the back aisle.
When Taylor arrived at the back aisle of the store, she
turned her shopping cart to the left and began looking for the
laundry detergent.  Taylor testified that there were unopened
cases of merchandise on the floor of the back aisle and that
she "had to avoid one ... when [she] went to get [her] washing
powder."  After placing a box of laundry detergent in her
1070900
Taylor's deposition was read into the record at trial.
1
3
shopping cart, Taylor pushed her shopping cart further along
the back aisle to the section where the laundry bleach was
located.  After placing a bottle of bleach in her shopping
cart, Taylor moved further down the aisle in search of fabric
softener, which was located on the top shelf of the back
aisle.  Taylor testified at trial that she "step[ped] out from
behind the [shopping cart]" to reach for the fabric softener
and that when she did she fell over two unopened cases of
merchandise that were stacked one on top of the other in the
aisle.  Taylor testified both in her deposition  and at trial
1
that she did not see the two cases of merchandise before she
fell over them; she also testified that, based on her
observation of other cases of merchandise she had maneuvered
around in the store on the day that she was injured, two cases
stacked one on top of the other would be approximately "knee
or thigh high."       
On March 3, 2005, Taylor and her mother, Rena Cave
(sometimes referred to collectively as "the plaintiffs"), sued
Dolgencorp; Linda Bailey, the manager of the store from
January 2004 until January 2005; and fictitiously named
1070900
The complaint also stated three additional counts that
2
are not at issue in this appeal: Count II alleged that, under
the doctrine of respondeat superior, Dolgencorp is liable for
Bailey's negligent and/or wanton actions; count III alleged
that Dolgencorp negligently and/or wantonly hired, trained,
and/or supervised Bailey; and count IV asserted a loss-of-
consortium claim against Dolgencorp and Bailey on behalf of
Cave.   
4
defendants (Dolgencorp and Bailey are sometimes referred to
collectively as "the defendants").  The complaint alleged,
among other things,  that Dolgencorp and Bailey had
negligently and/or wantonly failed to maintain the premises of
the store in a safe condition.   The plaintiffs' complaint
2
requested compensatory and punitive damages, plus interest and
costs.  The defendants filed an answer denying liability and
asserting a number of affirmative defenses including the
defense that the cases of merchandise in the aisle were an
"open and obvious condition."
On September 11, 2007, the defendants filed a motion for
a summary judgment, which the trial court denied.  At trial,
the defendants filed a motion for a judgment as a matter of
law ("JML") at the close of the plaintiffs' evidence.  In
their motion for a JML, the defendants asserted, among other
things, that they owed no duty of care to Taylor because, the
defendants said, the hazardous condition was "open and
1070900
The trial court also stated that Cave's loss-of-
3
consortium claim was "evaded [sic] by [Cave's] death."  The
record on appeal reveals that Cave died before trial. 
5
obvious" and that the plaintiffs failed to present substantial
evidence 
establishing 
that 
the 
defendants 
had 
acted
negligently or wantonly.
The defendants also made an oral motion to the trial
court to supplement their written motion for a JML.  After
hearing argument on the defendants' motion for a JML, the
trial court stated that it was "striking the punitive damages
claim against ... Bailey" and denied the motion for a JML as
to the negligence and wantonness claims asserted against
Dolgencorp and as to the negligence claim asserted against
Bailey.   The defendants renewed their motion for a JML at the
3
close of all the evidence; the trial court granted that motion
as to the remaining claims asserted against Bailey but denied
that motion as to the claims asserted against Dolgencorp.  
On September 28, 2007, the jury returned the following
verdict:
"We the jury, find for [Taylor], and against
[Dolgencorp], on the count of negligence, and fix
[Taylor's] 
compensatory 
damages 
therefore 
at
$85,000.  Further, we the jury, find for [Taylor]
and 
against 
[Dolgencorp], 
on 
the 
count 
of
wantonness, and fix [Taylor's] punitive damages at
1070900
In January 2009, this Court entered an order remanding
4
the case to the trial court, noting that the "claims stated by
plaintiff Rena Cave against the defendants, and claims stated
by plaintiffs against defendant Linda Bailey, have not been
adjudicated ...."  Subsequently, the trial court entered an
"order of dismissal and final judgment" dismissing with
prejudice 
Cave's 
loss-of-consortium 
claim, 
entering 
a 
judgment
in favor of Bailey on all claims asserted against her, and
entering a judgment in favor of Taylor and against Dolgencorp
in the amount of $260,000 ($85,000 compensatory damages and
$175,000 punitive damages).  
6
$175,000, in addition to the compensatory damages
for negligence." 
On October 25, 2007, the trial court entered a judgment
on the jury's verdict.  That judgment provided, in pertinent
part:  
"The jury, having returned a verdict for the
Plaintiff, Arlie Taylor, and against the Defendant,
Dolgencorp, Inc., in the amount of $85,000 in
compensatory 
damages and $175,000 in punitive
damages; a judgment is hereby entered accordingly
for the Plaintiff, Arlie Taylor, and against the
Defendant, Dolgencorp, Inc., in the amount of
$85,000 in compensatory damages and $175,000 in
punitive damages."
On October 29, 2007, Dolgencorp filed a postjudgment
motion styled as a "motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or,
in the alternative, motion for new trial, and for remittitur";
that motion was denied by operation of law pursuant to Rule
59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P.  This appeal followed.   
4
1070900
7
Standard of Review      
"When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML,
this Court uses the same standard the trial court
used initially in deciding whether to grant or deny
the motion for a JML. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v.
Crawford, 689 So. 2d 3 (Ala. 1997). Regarding
questions of fact, the ultimate question is whether
the nonmovant has presented sufficient evidence to
allow the case to be submitted to the jury for a
factual resolution. Carter v. Henderson, 598 So. 2d
1350 (Ala. 1992). The nonmovant must have presented
substantial evidence in order to withstand a motion
for a JML. See § 12-21-12, Ala. Code 1975; West v.
Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d
870, 871 (Ala. 1989). A reviewing court must
determine whether the party who bears the burden of
proof has produced substantial evidence creating a
factual dispute requiring resolution by the jury.
Carter, 598 So. 2d at 1353. In reviewing a ruling on
a motion for a JML, this Court views the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant and
entertains such reasonable inferences as the jury
would have been free to draw. Id. Regarding a
question of law, however, this Court indulges no
presumption of correctness as to the trial court's
ruling. Ricwil, Inc. v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So.
2d 1126 (Ala. 1992)." 
Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins. Co., 875
So. 2d 1143, 1152 (Ala. 2003).
Issues
Dolgencorp raises two issues on appeal.  Dolgencorp first
argues that the trial court erred in denying its motions for
a JML as to Taylor's negligence claim against it because,
Dolgencorp contends, the hazardous condition in the store was
1070900
8
open and obvious; thus, Dolgencorp says, it had no duty either
to eliminate the hazardous condition or to warn Taylor of the
hazardous condition.  Conversely, Taylor argues that the cases
of merchandise were not open and obvious; instead, Taylor
argues that the cases of merchandise were a "hidden danger"
because, 
she 
says, 
"it 
is 
not 
only 
foreseeable 
to
[Dolgencorp], but expected, that a customer such as Ms. Taylor
would focus her attention on the shelves when looking for a
particular item and not anticipate any tripping hazards in the
aisle while doing so."     
Dolgencorp also argues that the trial court erred in
denying its motions for a JML on Taylor's wantonness claim
against it and the request for punitive damages because,
Dolgencorp contends, the evidence was not sufficient to
support a finding that it "had deliberately engaged in conduct
that was in reckless or conscious disregard of the safety of
the store's customers."  Rather, Dolgencorp argues, the
evidence established that "the cases or boxes were placed
along the walls of the aisles, out in the open, where they
could 
be 
seen 
by 
any 
reasonably 
vigilant 
shopper."
Conversely, Taylor argues that there was "sufficient evidence
1070900
9
that [Dolgencorp] knew the boxes were dangerous, exhibited a
conscious disregard for the safety of [its] customers, and
that [its] customers were ultimately placed in danger for the
wantonness claim to be submitted to the jury."  
I. Negligence Claim
It is undisputed that Taylor was a business invitee of
Dolgencorp.  See Ex parte Mountain Top Indoor Flea Market,
Inc., 699 So. 2d 158, 161 (Ala. 1997) ("'In order to be
considered an invitee, the plaintiff must have been on the
premises for some purpose that materially or commercially
benefited the owner or occupier of the premises.'" (quoting
Sisk v. Heil Co., 639 So. 2d 1363, 1365 (Ala. 1994),
overruling on other grounds recognized by Sessions v.
Nonnenmann, 842 So. 2d 649, 654 (Ala. 2002))).  The liability
of a premises owner to an invitee is well settled.
"In a premises-liability setting, we use an
objective standard to assess whether a hazard is
open and obvious. As discussed in Sessions [v.
Nonnenmann, 842 So. 2d 649 (Ala. 2002)], the
question is whether the danger should have been
observed, not whether in fact it was consciously
appreciated:
"'[I]n order for a defendant-invitor
in a premises-liability case to win a
summary judgment or a judgment as a matter
of law grounded on the absence of a duty on
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10
the invitor to eliminate open and obvious
hazards or to warn the invitee about them,
the record need not contain undisputed
evidence 
that 
the 
plaintiff-invitee
consciously appreciated the danger at the
moment of the mishap.  While Breeden [v.
Hardy Corp., 562 So. 2d 159 (Ala. 1990)],
does recite that "[a]ll ordinary risks
present are assumed by the invitee," 562
So. 2d at 160, this recitation cannot mean
that the invitor's duty before a mishap is
determined by the invitee's subjective
state of mind at the moment of the mishap.
This Court has expressly rejected the
notion that an invitor owes a duty to
eliminate open and obvious hazards or to
warn the invitee about them if the invitor
"should anticipate the harm despite such
knowledge or obviousness."  Ex part Gold
Kist, Inc., 686 So. 2d 260, 261 (Ala. 1996)
....'
"842 So. 2d at 653-54 (some emphasis added)."
Jones Food Co. v. Shipman, 981 So. 2d 355, 362-63 (Ala. 2006).
Similarly, this Court has stated that "'[t]he owner of
premises has no duty to warn an invitee of open and obvious
defects in the premises which the invitee is aware of, or
should be aware of, in the exercise of reasonable care on the
invitee's part.'"  Mountain Top Indoor Flea Market, 699 So. 2d
at 161 (quoting Shaw v. City of Lipscomb, 380 So. 2d 812, 814
(Ala. 1980), citing in turn  Tice v. Tice, 361 So. 2d 1051
(Ala. 1978)).  The test for determining whether a hazard is
1070900
11
open and obvious "'"is an objective one."'"  Id. (quoting
Hines v. Hardy, 567 So. 2d 1283, 1284 (Ala. 1990), quoting in
turn Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A (1965)).
Dolgencorp's argument that the condition that caused
Taylor's fall was open and obvious is an affirmative defense,
for which it bears the ultimate burden of proof.  Horne v.
Gregerson's Foods, Inc., 849 So. 2d 173, 176 (Ala. Civ. App.
2002) (citing Ex parte Neese, 819 So. 2d 584 (Ala. 2001), and
Furgerson v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 438 So. 2d 732, 734 (Ala.
1983)).  
Dolgencorp, citing Sessions, 842 So. 2d at 652, asserts
in its brief on appeal that
"openness 
and 
obviousness 
of 
a 
hazard, 
if
established, negates the invitor's duty to eliminate
the hazard or to warn the invitee of the hazard.
This negation of duty, in and of itself, defeats the
invitee's injury claim without the operation of any
affirmative defense such as contributory negligence
or assumption of risk. In other words, in this
context, openness and obviousness, if established,
negates the duty [and] defeats the claim ...."  
Dolgencorp primarily relies on the following undisputed
evidence in asserting that the cases of merchandise in the
aisles were an open and obvious hazard.  Dolgencorp asserts
that Taylor had shopped at the store approximately once every
1070900
12
two weeks during the two- to three-year period preceding the
accident and that, as a result, she had long been aware of the
cluttered condition of the store; in fact, Taylor testified
during her deposition that she was aware that "the place was
cluttered" to the extent that "[y]ou couldn't help but know
it."  Dolgencorp also notes that Taylor testified during her
deposition that at some point before the date of her injury
she had asked a store cashier, "[H]ow come y'all had all these
boxes and stuff down here?"  
Dolgencorp also asserts that the cases of merchandise in
the back aisle were an open and obvious hazard because Taylor,
by her own admission, had maneuvered around other cases of
merchandise on the floor of the store before falling over the
two cases located on the back aisle.  Dolgencorp further
asserts that Taylor, in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have seen the cases she fell over but did not because,
according to her deposition testimony, she had become
"distracted" while looking for fabric softener.
Taylor cites several cases in support of her contention
that the hazard created by the cases of merchandise was not an
open and obvious one, including Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
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13
McClinton, 631 So. 2d 232 (Ala. 1993), Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Rolin, 813 So. 2d 861 (Ala. 2001), Williams v. Bruno's,
Inc., 632 So. 2d 19 (Ala. 1993), Blizzard v. Food Giant
Supermarkets, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (M.D. Ala. 2002), and
Ryles v. Wal-Mart Stores East L.P. (No. 2:04cv334-T, December
16, 2004) (M.D. Ala. 2004) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d).  
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. McClinton, McClinton sued
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart"), alleging negligence.
McClinton was injured when he slipped and fell in a Wal-Mart
store on a piece of wood molding located either on or near a
wooden gun cabinet that protruded approximately six inches
into the aisle.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of
McClinton.  This Court affirmed the trial court's judgment
entered on the jury's verdict and rejected Wal-Mart's argument
that the hazard was open and obvious, concluding that "[w]hile
it is evident that McClinton saw the displayed cabinet, it is
not evident that he knew, or should have known, or that he
appreciated, the danger caused by the fact that the cabinet
and its molding protruded into the aisle."  631 So. 2d at 234.
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rolin, Rolin sued Wal-Mart
alleging negligence and wantonness.  Rolin was injured when
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14
she tripped and fell in a Wal-Mart store over a barbeque-grill
display that allegedly protruded into a walkway.  After the
trial court granted Rolin's motion to dismiss the wantonness
claim, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Rolin on the
negligence claim.  As Taylor specifically notes in her brief
on appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's judgment
entered on the jury's verdict and rejected Wal-Mart's argument
that it had no notice that the grill display was hazardous,
concluding that "the barbeque-grill display is analogous to
the gun cabinet in McClinton[, supra,] ... in that there is
evidence to indicate that the hazardous condition was created
by employees of the premises owner."  813 So. 2d at 865.   
In Williams v. Bruno's, Inc., Williams sued, among
others, Bruno's, Inc. ("Bruno's"), alleging negligence and
wantonness.  Williams was injured when he slipped and fell in
a Food World grocery store.  Williams testified that he did
not know what caused his fall, but that after his fall he
noticed "four to eight small strips of an unidentified
material in the floor around him" and that one of the strips
was 
"protruding 
out" 
from 
the 
bottom 
grocery 
shelf
approximately six inches into the aisle.  632 So. 2d at 20.
1070900
We note that United States district court decisions are
5
not controlling authority in this Court.  See Buist v. Time
Domain Corp., 926 So. 2d 290, 297 (Ala. 2005) ("Even
considering these cases directly on point, however, they are
United States district court cases and can serve only as
persuasive authority." (citing Glass v. Birmingham S. R.R.,
905 So. 2d 789, 794 (Ala. 2004))).
15
The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of
Bruno's.  This Court reversed the summary judgment as to the
negligence claim, concluding that the evidence did not
establish that the strips were an open and obvious condition.
Specifically, this Court stated: 
"One 
could 
reasonably infer from [Williams's]
testimony that Williams was focusing his attention
on the shelves, not that he was not looking where he
was going. Nowhere in Williams's testimony does he
say that the strips were obvious to him before he
fell; in fact, Williams stated that he did not see
the strips until after he fell."    
632 So. 2d at 22.
In Blizzard v. Food Giant Supermarkets, Inc.,  Blizzard
5
sued Food Giant Supermarkets, Inc. ("Food Giant"), alleging
negligence, wantonness, and failure to maintain a common area.
Blizzard was injured when she tripped and fell in a Pic-N-Sav
grocery store.  Blizzard tripped over an "end-cap pallet,"
which is a platform that rests on the floor at the end of
grocery aisles and is used to display products.  Food Giant
1070900
See note 5, supra. 
6
16
moved for a summary judgment and, regarding Blizzard's
negligence claim, argued that it was entitled to judgment as
a matter of law because, among other reasons, the end-cap
pallet was an open and obvious hazard.  The district court,
citing Williams, supra, denied Food Giant's summary-judgment
motion as to the negligence claim and concluded that "there is
evidence that [Blizzard's failure to perceive the danger
occurred because] she was looking at the products put in place
by [Food Giant]."  Blizzard, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 1208.
Finally, Taylor cites Ryles v. Wal-Mart Stores East L.P.,6
a case in which Ryles sued  Wal-Mart Stores East L.P. ("Wal-
Mart Stores") alleging negligence and wantonness.  Ryles was
injured when she tripped and fell over a box of merchandise
that had been placed on the floor near a counter.  The
district 
court 
denied 
Wal-Mart 
Stores' 
summary-judgment 
motion
as to the negligence claim and concluded that the box Ryles
tripped over "did not, as a matter of law, constitute an open
and obvious danger ...."  Taylor cites Ryles specifically for
the following statement:  "The above cases [cited in the
district 
court's 
order, 
including 
Williams, 
supra], 
therefore,
1070900
17
clearly indicate that [the plaintiff's] failure to stare at
the floor while walking down the shopping aisle, in particular
where the store sought to draw her attention to its shelves,
does not prevent her negligence claim from surviving summary
judgment." 
Viewing, as we must, the evidence in the light
most favorable to Taylor, there is plainly no dispute
regarding whether Taylor saw the cases of merchandise in the
aisles of the store, appreciated the hazard posed by those
cases, and acted more carefully because of that hazard.  The
evidence–-Taylor's 
deposition 
and 
trial 
testimony--established
that Taylor, a regular shopper at the store, had been aware
for some time of the "cluttered" condition of the store, that
she had at some point before the date of her injury questioned
a store employee about the "boxes and stuff" in the aisles,
and that she had seen and maneuvered around several other
cases of merchandise in the aisles of the store on the day she
was injured.     
It 
seems 
evident 
that 
the 
presence 
of 
cases 
of
merchandise--each of which was at least 12-13 inches high and
15-16 inches wide–-in the aisles of the store presents an open
and obvious hazard of a fall.  No evidence was presented
1070900
18
indicating that the cases of merchandise were in any way
obscured or hidden from view; rather, the evidence clearly
established that the cases of merchandise had been placed in
the aisles in plain view of anyone attempting to navigate the
aisles.  The application of an objective standard, as set
forth in Jones Food, supra, and Mountain Top, supra, compels
the conclusion that such a hazard was open and obvious.  The
condition of the premises was open and obvious for all to see,
and it is undisputed that Taylor had noticed and maneuvered
around several cases of merchandise in the aisles before her
fall.  
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the cases of
merchandise that caused Taylor to fall were an open and
obvious hazard and that, accordingly, Dolgencorp owed Taylor
no duty to eliminate the hazard or to warn her of the hazard.
Thus, Taylor's negligence claim fails as a matter of law, and
the trial court erred by denying Dolgencorp's motions for a
JML on the negligence claim.
II. Wantonness Claim
As mentioned above, Dolgencorp argues, among other
things, that the trial court erred by denying its motions for
1070900
19
a JML on the wantonness claim against it because the cases of
merchandise were an open and obvious hazard and, thus, it
says, it had no duty to eliminate the hazard or to warn Taylor
of the hazard.  See Sessions, 842 So. 2d at 652.  Dolgencorp
correctly notes that this Court previously has defined
wantonness "'as the conscious doing of some act or the
omission of some duty, while knowing of the existing
conditions and being conscious that, from doing or omitting to
do an act, injury will likely or probably result.'"  Bozeman
v. Central Bank of the South, 646 So. 2d 601, 603 (Ala. 1994)
(quoting Stone v. Southland Nat'l Ins. Corp., 589 So. 2d 1289,
1292 (Ala. 1991), quoting in turn McDougle v. Shaddrix, 534
So. 2d 228 (Ala. 1988) (emphasis added)); in her brief on
appeal, 
Taylor 
expressly 
adopts 
Dolgencorp's 
"general
statement of the law regarding wantonness."  
Taylor 
primarily 
relies 
on 
the 
following 
factual
assertions in contending that Dolgencorp's conduct rises to
the level of wantonness.  Taylor contends that cases of
merchandise had been stored in the aisles of the store for
several years before her accident because, she says, the
stockroom was overcrowded with Christmas merchandise and could
1070900
20
not hold any additional merchandise.  Taylor also contends
that, although store employees had made numerous requests of
their 
district 
manager 
for 
assistance 
regarding 
the
overcrowded stockroom since 1999, their requests had gone
unheeded.  Taylor further contends that Dolgencorp's wanton
conduct is evidenced by the fact that, in October 2001,
another 
store 
customer 
had 
fallen 
over 
"some 
excess
merchandise stored in the aisle," but, despite being aware of
that accident, Dolgencorp made no effort to remedy the
hazardous 
condition. 
 
Moreover, 
Taylor 
contends 
that
Dolgencorp acted with reckless disregard for the safety of its
customers because, Taylor says, the cases of merchandise were
stored in the aisles in violation of store policy. 
Taylor contends that the testimony of certain store
employees also evidences the wanton nature of Dolgencorp's
conduct.  Taylor notes that a former store employee, Vicki
Brown, testified that the store "was an accident ready to
happen" on the day Taylor fell because, according to Brown,
"our stockroom was full and we had a floor full of boxes."
Taylor also notes that another former store employee, James
Bettis, testified that the store was a "wreck," a "mess," and
1070900
21
so cluttered that "[y]ou couldn't hardly get through" on the
day Taylor fell.
Regarding Taylor's negligence claim, we concluded that
the cases of merchandise that caused Taylor to fall were an
open and obvious hazard and, accordingly, that Dolgencorp owed
Taylor no duty to eliminate the hazard or to warn her of the
hazard.  Because Dolgencorp owed no duty to Taylor, her
wantonness claim must also fail as a matter of law; thus, the
trial court erred by denying Dolgencorp's motions for a JML on
the wantonness claim.  See Sessions, supra; see also Lilya v.
Greater Gulf State Fair, Inc., 855 So. 2d 1049, 1056 (Ala.
2003) (concluding in a case in which Lilya was injured when he
fell from a mechanical bull ride while attending a fair on the
premises owned by Greater Gulf State Fair, Inc., that the
condition that caused Lilya's injuries was an open and obvious
hazard, that the premises owner thus owed no duty to warn
Lilya of the possible danger, that "[w]ithout the existence of
a duty, Lilya's negligence and wantonness claims fail as a
matter of law, and that the trial court's summary judgment as
to those claims was appropriate" (emphasis added)). 
1070900
22
Because Taylor's negligence and wantonness claims fail as
a matter of law, we reverse the trial court's judgment and
render a judgment for Dolgencorp.
REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED.
Woodall, Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, and Shaw, JJ.,
concur.  
Cobb, C.J., dissents.
1070900
23
COBB, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully disagree with my colleagues that the trial
court should have granted the motion for a judgment as a
matter of law filed by Dolgencorp, Inc.  Therefore, I dissent.
This Court has long held that "a premises owner owes any
business invitee '"a duty to exercise reasonable care to
maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition."'" Shiv-
Ram, Inc. v. McCaleb, 892 So. 2d 299, 314 (Ala. 2003) (quoting
Kmart Corp. v. Peak, 757 So. 2d 1138, 1144 (Ala. 1999),
quoting in turn Norris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 628 So. 2d
475, 477 (Ala. 1993)).  See also Borden v. Consumer Warehouse
Foods, Inc., 601 So. 2d 976, 979 (Ala. 1992) ("The duty of a
shopkeeper to maintain premises in a reasonably safe condition
for its invitees is well settled.").  However, "as a general
rule, an invitor will not be liable for injuries to an invitee
resulting from a danger which was known to the invitee or
should have been observed by the invitee in the exercise of
reasonable care."  Quillen v. Quillen, 388 So. 2d 985, 989
(Ala. 1980).  
1070900
24
As I noted in my dissent to the overruling of the
application for rehearing in Jones Food Co. v. Shipman, 981
So. 2d 355 (Ala. 2006):
"'The question whether a danger is open and obvious
is generally one of fact.'  Howard v. Andy's Store
for Men, 757 So. 2d 1208, 1211 (Ala. Civ. App.
2000).  '[T]he plaintiff's appreciation of the
danger is, almost always, a question of fact for the
determination of the jury.'  F.W. Woolworth Co. v.
Bradbury, 273 Ala. 392, [396], 140 So. 2d 824, [827]
(1962).  Furthermore, '[t]here is a presumption that
a jury's verdict is correct; that presumption is
strengthened when the trial court has denied a
motion for a new trial.'  SouthTrust Bank v. Donely,
925 So. 2d 934, 943 (Ala. 2005) (citing First
Alabama Bank of South Baldwin v. Prudential Life
Ins. Co. of America, 619 So. 2d 1313 (Ala. 1993))."
981 So. 2d at 370 (Cobb, C.J., dissenting).  
The majority discusses three opinions of this Court as
well as two of the federal district court for the Middle
District of Alabama applying Alabama law, all of which held
that the question whether an item protruding into the aisle of
a store is an open and obvious hazard is one for the trier of
fact.  The majority in fact quotes Williams v. Bruno's, Inc.,
632 So. 2d 19 (Ala. 1993), in which this Court opined:
"One 
could 
reasonably infer from [Williams's]
testimony that Williams was focusing his attention
on the shelves, not that he was looking where he was
going.  Nowhere in Williams's testimony does he say
that the strips were obvious to him before he fell;
1070900
25
in fact, Williams stated that he did not see the
strips until after he fell."
632 So. 2d at 22.  I believe the same rationale holds true in
this case.
I also find persuasive the federal district court's
decision in Hunter v. Durr Systems, Inc., (No. 2:06cv411-WHA,
April 24, 2007) (M.D. Ala. 2007) (not reported in F. Supp.
2d), a case not discussed in the majority opinion.  In Hunter,
a freelance photographer was taking photographs of a robotic
paint booth at the Hyundai Motor Manufacturing plant in
Montgomery.  The booth contained an elevated walkway with a
metal grated floor.  On the day the photographer was present,
a grate approximately 4 feet by 2 feet was missing from the
walkway.  During the photo session, the photographer fell
through the hole created by the missing grate and sustained
injuries.  Relying on Williams, the federal district court
denied the motion for a summary judgment filed by Durr
Systems, Inc., stating:
"Just as the Williams court found that protruding
strips on the floor of a grocery store were not
definitively open and obvious where the shopper's
focus was on the shelves instead of the walkway,
this court believes that a jury potentially could
find that the missing grate was not open and obvious
1070900
26
because Hunter was focused on photographing the
robotic arms instead of the walkway."
The federal district court for the Middle District of
Alabama addressed a similar issue in Blizzard v. Food Giant
Supermarkets, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (M.D. Ala. 2002), a
case discussed in the majority opinion.  In Blizzard, a
grocery store customer tripped over an end-cap pallet,
approximately 4 feet by 4 feet by 8 inches in size, at the end
of the grocery store aisle.  In denying Food Giant's motion
for a summary judgment, the federal district court, again
relying on Williams, wrote: "The court cannot conclude,
however, that there is a legally significant difference in
this case between Blizzard's looking at cereal apparently
intended by Food Giant to be viewed by customers while she was
attempting to buy a particular product, and the plaintiff in
Williams who was shopping for products on the shelves."  196
F. Supp. 2d at 1208.  
Considering the foregoing, and viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to Taylor, the nonmovant, I conclude that
Taylor presented sufficient evidence for the case to be
submitted to the jury for a factual resolution.  I firmly
believe that the question whether a danger is open and obvious
1070900
I am also troubled by what appears to be a trend of this
7
Court as exemplified by this case and Jones Food Co. v.
Shipman, supra, to interject itself into the place of the jury
and hold that a danger is open and obvious as a matter of law.
This Court should be respectful of the long-standing principle
that the question whether a danger is open and obvious is
generally one for the trier of fact.  See Denmark v.
Mercantile Stores Co., 844 So. 2d 1189, 1195 (Ala. 2002)
("Whether a condition is open and obvious is generally a
question for the jury."); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Bradbury, 273
Ala. 392, 396, 140 So. 2d 824, 827 (1962) ("We have long been
committed to the proposition that the plaintiff's appreciation
of the danger is, almost always, a question of fact for the
determination of the jury.").
27
is generally one of fact and that this Court should use
restraint in holding, as a matter of law, that something is an
open and obvious danger.   Taylor entered the Dollar General
7
store to do her shopping.  Dolgencorp, as does any other
retail store, placed items on its shelves to draw the
consumer's attention to those items.  Because Taylor was
focused on her shopping and was looking for the fabric
softener on the shelf instead of focusing on the floor of the
shopping aisle, I believe that reasonable persons could differ
as to whether the boxes were an open and obvious hazard, and,
thus, I believe that the entry of a judgment as a matter of
law for Dolgencorp on this issue would be improper.   See
Brookwood Med. Ctr. v. Lindstrom, 763 So. 2d 951, 952 (Ala.
2000) ("A judgment as a matter of law 'is proper (1) where the
1070900
28
nonmoving party has failed to present substantial evidence
regarding some element essential to her claim, or (2) where
there is no disputed issue of fact upon which reasonable
persons could differ.'").  Although the record indicates that
Taylor noticed other boxes in the aisles of the store, there
is no indication in the record that Taylor saw the specific
boxes in the back aisle before she fell over them.
I also dissent from the majority's holding that Taylor's
wantonness claim must likewise fail as a matter of law.
Statutorily, wantonness is defined as "[c]onduct which is
carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard for the
rights or safety of others." Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3).
Likewise, "'"[w]antonness" has been defined by the Court as
the conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty,
while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious
that, from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely
or probably result.  McDougle v. Shaddrix, 534 So. 2d 228
(Ala. 1988).'"  Bozeman v. Central Bank of the South, 646 So.
2d 601, 603 (Ala. 1994) (quoting Stone v. Southland Nat'l Ins.
Corp., 589 So. 2d 1289, 1292 (Ala. 1991)).  
1070900
29
The record is replete with evidence indicating that
Dolgencorp and its employees knew about the condition of the
Dollar General store in Jackson and appreciated the potential
consequences of its cluttered aisles.  A former employee
testified that "our stockroom was full and we had a floor full
of boxes that we -- it was all over the store, full of boxes.
All around the store.  It was an accident ready to happen."
Another former employee testified that the store was "a mess"
and "a wreck" on the day Taylor was injured.  The former
manager of the Jackson store testified that it was against
company policy to have boxes in the aisles of the store, that
she recognized that having boxes in the aisles was a potential
hazard, and that she had complained to her direct supervisor
to no avail about the overflowing stockroom that necessitated
the storage of merchandise in the aisles.  This evidence is
substantial enough to warrant a finding that Dolgencorp
appreciated the hazardous condition created by the unopened
boxes of merchandise in the aisles and that it consciously
refused to remedy the situation.
Because I believe substantial evidence was presented to
defeat Dolgencorp's motion for a judgment as a matter of law
1070900
30
and because substantial evidence was presented of Dolgencorp's
inaction, which I believe amounted to evidence of wantonness,
I respectfully dissent.