Title: Cary Michael Lambrix v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC08-64
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 2010

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-64 
____________ 
 
CARY MICHAEL LAMBRIX, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[April 15, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Cary Michael Lambrix was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder 
and sentenced to death for the 1983 murders of Clarence Moore and Aleisha 
Bryant.  This Court affirmed the convictions and sentences of death in Lambrix v. 
State, 494 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 1986).  This case is now before the Court on appeal 
from an order denying a successive motion for postconviction relief.  Among other 
claims raised, Lambrix asserted two claims that were the subject of an evidentiary 
hearing:  that the main witness against him at trial, Frances Smith,1 had a sexual 
                                          
 
 
1.  Frances Smith has subsequently remarried and is currently known as 
Frances Ottinger.  For purposes of this appeal, we refer to her as Smith.  
 
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relationship with one of the State’s investigators and that another witness, Deborah 
Hanzel, recanted her trial testimony. The trial court, following an evidentiary 
hearing on both of these issues, rejected the claim that Smith had a sexual 
relationship with an investigator and concluded that Hanzel’s recantation was 
unreliable.  We affirm the trial court’s order denying postconviction relief as to 
these claims, as well as all other claims raised, for the reasons more fully explained 
in this opinion.  
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
This death case, which has been in the judicial system for a substantial 
period of time, has a lengthy procedural history.  The first trial ended in a mistrial 
after the jury could not agree on a verdict.  A second trial was held before a 
different judge, Judge Richard M. Stanley, and the jury found Lambrix guilty of 
both counts of murder.  After a penalty phase hearing, the jury recommended a 
sentence of death by a vote of ten to two for the murder of Aleisha Bryant and by a 
vote of eight to four for the murder of Clarence Moore.  The trial court sentenced 
the defendant to death, after finding five aggravating circumstances2 and no 
                                          
 
 
2.  The trial judge found the following five aggravating circumstances: (1) 
the capital felonies were committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment; 
(2) the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony; (3) the capital 
felony was committed for pecuniary gain; (4) the capital felonies were especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (5) the capital felonies were committed in 
a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal 
justification (CCP). 
 
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mitigation in regard to the murder of Moore and four aggravating3 and no 
mitigating circumstances in regard to the murder of Bryant.  
On appeal, this Court discussed the relevant facts of the underlying crime: 
On the evening of February 5, 1983, Lambrix and Frances 
Smith, his roommate, went to a tavern where they met Clarence 
Moore, a/k/a Lawrence Lamberson, and Aleisha Bryant.  Late that 
evening, they all ventured to Lambrix’ trailer to eat spaghetti.  Shortly 
after their arrival, Lambrix and Moore went outside.  Lambrix 
returned about twenty minutes later and requested Bryant to go 
outside with him.  About forty-five minutes later Lambrix returned 
alone.  Smith testified that Lambrix was carrying a tire tool and had 
blood on his person and clothing.  Lambrix told Smith that he killed 
both Bryant and Moore.  He mentioned that he choked and stomped 
on Bryant and hit Moore over the head.  Smith and Lambrix 
proceeded to eat spaghetti, wash up and bury the two bodies behind 
the trailer.  After burying the bodies, Lambrix and Smith went back to 
the trailer to wash up.  They then took Moore’s Cadillac and disposed 
of the tire tool and Lambrix’ bloody shirt in a nearby stream. 
 
On Wednesday, February 8, 1983, Smith was arrested on an 
unrelated charge.  Smith stayed in jail until Friday.  On the following 
Monday, Smith contacted law enforcement officers and advised them 
of the burial. 
 
A police investigation led to the discovery of the two buried 
bodies as well as the recovery of the tire iron and bloody shirt.  A 
medical examiner testified that Moore died from multiple crushing 
blows to the head and Bryant died from manual strangulation.  
Additional evidence exists to support a finding that Lambrix 
committed the two murders in question. 
 
 
Lambrix v. State, 494 So. 2d 1143, 1145 (Fla. 1986).  Some of the additional 
evidence included testimony by Deborah Hanzel, who met Lambrix after the 
                                          
 
 
3.  The trial judge found all of the same aggravating factors except that the 
capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. 
 
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murders and saw him in a black Cadillac.  She and her boyfriend, Preston Branch, 
helped Lambrix retrieve some of his possessions from Lambrix’s trailer and on the 
way back home, Lambrix offered to show them where two bodies were buried and 
made incriminating statements.  On appeal, Lambrix raised five issues.4  This 
Court affirmed the convictions and sentences of death.  494 So. 2d at 1148. 
A death warrant for Lambrix was issued, and his execution was scheduled 
for November 30, 1988.  Lambrix filed a motion for postconviction relief in the 
trial court and a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court.  In his habeas 
petition, Lambrix asserted that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to 
argue numerous issues.5  This Court denied habeas relief.  See Lambrix v. Dugger, 
529 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1988).  During this time, Lambrix’s motion for 
                                          
 
 
4.  Lambrix raised the following claims: (1) it was unconstitutional to 
exclude jurors opposed to the death penalty; (2) the trial court erred in excluding a 
certain juror because it violated the standards set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 
391 U.S. 510 (1968); (3) the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of 
the State’s key witness, Frances Smith; (4) the trial court erred in restricting the 
cross-examination of Connie Smith (no relation to Frances), a special agent with 
the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), concerning a certain 
notebook found in a vehicle belonging to one of the victims; and (5) the trial court 
erred in allowing the medical examiner, Dr. Schultz, to use the term ―homicide‖ in 
reference to the deaths of the victims because there was no proper predicate for 
that conclusion.   
 
5.  This Court addressed only two of his claims in its written opinion: (1) 
whether appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to argue several issues 
regarding voir dire and the defendant’s absence; and (2) whether appellate counsel 
was ineffective for not raising whether the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct 
the jury as to voluntary intoxication.   
 
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postconviction relief was also proceeding before the circuit court.  After the circuit 
court summarily denied postconviction relief, Lambrix appealed this decision, 
raising two claims.6  This Court denied relief.  See Lambrix v. State, 534 So. 2d 
1151 (Fla. 1988).  Lambrix then filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus 
with the trial court, which was summarily denied.  On appeal, Lambrix raised one 
issue: that his collateral counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim of juror 
misconduct in his prior motion for postconviction relief.  This Court again denied 
relief.  Lambrix v. State, 559 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1990).  Lambrix also filed a second 
motion for postconviction relief in the circuit court, which was summarily denied 
because ―his claims were without merit and procedurally barred as untimely and 
successive or abusive.‖  Lambrix v. State, 698 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla. 1996).  In 
affirming the summary denial, this Court concluded that Lambrix was untimely in 
presenting the claim that he should have been allowed to represent himself in 
postconviction proceedings, particularly since Lambrix waited six years to raise 
this claim.  Id. at 248.   
Lambrix also filed postconviction attacks in the federal courts.  He filed a  
                                          
 
 
6.  Lambrix raised the following claims: (1) trial counsel was ineffective in 
failing to develop additional evidence that would have entitled Lambrix to jury 
instructions on voluntary intoxication; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in not 
introducing evidence of Lambrix’s alcoholism during the penalty phase.    
 
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federal habeas petition, raising numerous claims including whether jury 
instructions on HAC and CCP violated Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992).  
See Lambrix v. Dugger, No. 88-12107-CIV-Zloch (S.D. Fla. May 12, 1992), aff’d 
sub nom. Lambrix v. Singletary, 72 F.3d 1500 (11th Cir. 1996), aff’d, 520 U.S. 
518 (1997).  Lambrix’s Espinosa claim was eventually denied.7   
As to the remaining issues, the Eleventh Circuit then affirmed the denial of 
relief of Lambrix’s federal habeas corpus petition after an evidentiary hearing.  
Lambrix v. Singletary, 72 F.3d 1500 (11th Cir. 1996).  The Eleventh Circuit denied 
relief without further discussion as to certain claims.8  After analysis, the Eleventh 
                                          
 
 
7.  After the federal district court denied relief, Lambrix appealed to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.  Because this Court had 
not been given an opportunity to address the substance of the Espinosa claim, the 
Eleventh Circuit stayed the proceedings and directed Lambrix to return to the 
Supreme Court of Florida to settle any unresolved issues regarding this claim.  
Lambrix v. Dugger, No. 92-4539 (11th Cir. Mar. 3, 1993).  In Lambrix v. 
Singletary, 641 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1994), this Court held that Lambrix’s Espinosa 
claim was procedurally barred because although it was raised before the trial court, 
appellate counsel failed to preserve the error on appeal.  Further, this Court held 
that Lambrix was procedurally barred from asserting that appellate counsel was 
ineffective based on this failure since he had previously litigated other alleged 
instances of ineffective appellate counsel in prior habeas proceedings.  Id. at 848.  
The Eleventh Circuit held that the decision in Espinosa could not retroactively 
apply under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).  See Lambrix v. Singletary, 72 
F.3d 1500, 1503 (11th Cir. 1996).  The Supreme Court of the United States granted 
certiorari and affirmed the Eleventh Circuit court’s decision, holding that Espinosa 
v. Florida was a new rule and the failure to apply this case retroactively could not 
be the basis for federal habeas relief.  Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997).  
8.  The Eleventh Circuit did not elaborate on the following claims, but 
simply denied them as meritless: (1) Lambrix’s counsel rendered ineffective 
 
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Circuit denied Lambrix’s claim that he received ineffective assistance during the 
sentencing phase of his trial because counsel failed to investigate and present 
mitigating evidence of Lambrix’s alcoholism and drug dependence and evidence 
that Lambrix had been subject to sexual and physical abuse as a child.  Lambrix, 
72 F.3d at 1504-06.  The Eleventh Circuit also denied Lambrix’s claim that 
appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present certain 
sentencing issues, that his second trial conducted after the first trial ended in 
mistrial was barred by double jeopardy, and that Lambrix was denied his 
fundamental right to testify.  Id. at 1506-08. 
Lambrix has filed numerous pro se extraordinary writ petitions that this 
Court has either denied or dismissed.9  During postconviction proceedings and 
before this Court, Lambrix also filed a pro se complaint against some of his 
attorneys.  He also previously sought to have this entire Court disqualified because 
                                                                                                                                        
assistance during the guilt phase; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to grant a 
change in venue; (3) the trial court denied Lambrix his right to confront witnesses 
against him by limiting the cross-examination of some witnesses; (4) the trial court 
erred by failing to give a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication; and (5) the trial 
court made miscellaneous erroneous rulings and instructions during sentencing. 
 
 
9.  See, e.g., Lambrix v. Reece, 705 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1998) (denying petition 
for writ of mandamus); Lambrix v. State, 727 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1998) (denying 
petition for writ of prohibition); Lambrix v. State, 766 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 2004) 
(unpublished order dismissing petition for writ of mandamus as moot); Lambrix v. 
State, 900 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 2005) (unpublished order dismissing petition for writ of 
mandamus); Lambrix v. State, 944 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2006) (unpublished order 
dismissing petition for writ of mandamus). 
 
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Chief Justice Quince is recused.  In his most recent filing, Lambrix filed a pro se 
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 against his attorneys, Governor 
Charlie Crist, Clerk of Court Thomas Hall, Chief Justice Quince, and others, 
asserting that there is a conspiracy to deny meritorious claims against death penalty 
defendants.  Counsel for Lambrix consequently filed a motion to withdraw, 
asserting that this action creates a conflict.  Lambrix then filed a pro se motion 
waiving any potential conflict for the limited scope of permitting oral argument to 
continue.  This Court denied counsel’s motion to withdraw. 
THE PRESENT PROCEEDINGS 
 
This current successive postconviction litigation was pending in the circuit 
court for a substantial period of time based on changes in judges, changes in 
counsel, and various amendments to the postconviction motion that occurred after 
counsel discovered new evidence.  Ultimately, after several evidentiary hearings, 
the postconviction court denied relief on all of Lambrix’s claims.  On appeal, 
Lambrix raises five issues: (1) whether the State withheld material exculpatory or 
impeachment evidence involving a sexual relationship between witness Frances 
Smith and State Attorney Investigator Robert Daniels in violation of Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) whether an important witness (Deborah Hanzel) 
recanted her trial testimony; (3) whether the circuit court failed to allow a full and 
 
- 9 - 
fair hearing; (4) whether there was judicial bias during the retrial proceedings; and 
(5) whether Lambrix is entitled to a new trial because he is actually innocent.10 
Alleged Sexual Relationship  
In his first claim, Lambrix alleges that the State suppressed evidence that 
would have impeached a key witness: Frances Smith.  In support, he asserts that 
new evidence shows Smith had a sexual affair with State Attorney Investigator 
Robert Daniels and that she was given an undisclosed plea deal in exchange for her 
testimony.  After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that no sexual 
relationship between Smith and Daniels occurred and that there was no undisclosed 
plea deal.   
The two most important witnesses to this claim (Smith and Daniels) 
presented diametrically opposed testimony as to whether a sexual relationship ever 
occurred.  Specifically, Smith testified at the evidentiary hearing that while 
Lambrix was being prosecuted, Smith had a ―one-night stand‖ with the State 
Attorney’s investigator, Daniels, who also served as a pilot for the State Attorney’s 
Office.  She asserted that she was not attracted to him, that it was not a romantic 
affair, and that she was ―definitely not‖ proud of her behavior.  She testified that 
                                          
 
 
10.  We reject without discussion Lambrix’s claim that he is entitled to 
relitigate whether he is innocent of the crime based on Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 
298 (1995).  Lambrix mischaracterizes the holding of Schlup, which does not 
provide a freestanding claim to relitigate claims that are procedurally barred. 
 
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after Daniels flew her down during one of her trips, he called her at her hotel room 
and asked her to join him in his hotel room.  They were both probably drinking and 
had sex just the one time.  She could not recall when the affair occurred, but it was 
during one of the trials against Lambrix—well after she first cooperated in the 
investigation and had already given numerous statements as to the events 
surrounding the crime.  She did not tell anyone else about this incident and did not 
consider this to be an affair or a relationship.   
 Smith explicitly denied that anyone at the State Attorney’s Office asked her 
to change her story and denied that she modified her testimony against Lambrix 
after her sexual encounter.  Smith acknowledged that she had no interest in seeing 
Lambrix released from prison or obtaining a new trial. 
 Smith married Douglas Schwendeman about two years after the second trial 
concluded.  Schwendeman also testified at the hearing, stating that Smith told him 
that during the trial proceedings, she had an affair with an investigator and pilot 
named Bob after they flew down and she stayed in his room.  He did not tell 
anyone about this conversation until 2004.    
Investigator Daniels also testified.  When he first met Smith, he was a little 
―jaundiced‖ about her because he believed she had some sort of involvement in the 
murder.  Based on her cooperation, he and his current wife (who was an 
investigator with him at the time) were able to find the victims’ bodies.  Daniels 
 
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explicitly stated that he did not have sex with Smith and that he ―certainly did not‖ 
ask her to change her testimony.  During the second trial, he did stay at a hotel in 
Moore Haven, but did not recall staying at a hotel at any other time.  He further 
provided and discussed his flight logs, which documented the times that Daniels 
picked up Smith and other witnesses. 
The postconviction court found that no affair occurred, based on the 
following findings: 
- Frances Smith Ottinger 
 
Frances Smith, n.k.a. Frances Ottinger, was living with the 
Defendant at the time of the homicides.  She was a witness for the 
State at both trials in 1983 and 1984.  Her testimony at the trials and 
every recorded statement or deposition she has made in the past were 
received in evidence at the hearing. 
 
Ms. Ottinger testified that she had one sexual encounter with 
Mr. Daniels, although she cannot state where or when it occurred in 
relation to the pretrial investigation or either of the two trials.  She 
does not know when it occurred.  She testified that she remembered 
only that it happened in a hotel.  When questioned about details of the 
encounter, Ms. Ottinger did not remember any significant facts.  She 
repeatedly answered that she ―does not recall,‖ ―does not remember‖ 
or ―does not know‖ about the time and place of the encounter.  She 
could not state the name [of] the town in which the hotel was located.  
 
Ms. Smith answered each question slowly and deliberately.  
Her responses were sometimes halting. With nearly every answer that 
she gave, she paused for a significant time between the question and 
the answer.  She related that she takes several medications for anxiety 
and depression. 
 
The Court has listened carefully to what Ms. Ottinger said and 
how she said it.  The Court observed how she acted and the Court also 
heard what she said. Her testimony is not credible, when considered in 
light of all of the evidence. 
 - Robert M. Daniels 
 
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Robert Daniels also testified.  Mr. Daniels was employed as an 
investigator with the State Attorney’s Office of the Twentieth Judicial 
Circuit from 1980 through 1994.  He was also a pilot for that office 
during those years.  Throughout his tenure, he maintained records of 
the flights he made.  Copies of his flight logs were received in 
evidence.  At the time of the prosecution of the Defendant, Mr. 
Daniels was a lead investigator, and his supervisor was William 
McQuinn.  The Chief Investigator at the time of the Defendant’s 
prosecution was Ralph Cunningham, now deceased. 
 
Mr. Daniels testified that he first became involved in the case in 
1983 after the State Attorney’s Office was notified by FDLE that it 
had Ms. Frances Smith, now Ottinger, in their custody and that she 
might be involved in the double homicide that is the subject of this 
case.  After that notification, Mr. Daniels flew to Tampa and picked 
up FDLE Agent Connie Smith (no relation to Frances Smith), and 
Frances Smith’s brother.  Mr. Daniels flew them to the Fort Myers 
area so that they could talk to the law enforcement officers who were 
investigating the homicides.  
On cross-examination by the State, Mr. Daniels expressly 
denied any sexual relationship with Ms. Ottinger.  Mr. Daniels was at 
all times forthright and direct.  He did not evade the questions posed 
to him, and he answered each question promptly and without delay.  
He never wavered in his denial of a sexual encounter between himself 
and Ms. Ottinger.  He said that he did not stay in a hotel during the 
pendency of the first trial, but during the second trial he did stay in a 
hotel in Moore Haven with the prosecution team. 
In addition, the State introduced into evidence copies of the 
flight logs maintained by Mr. Daniels throughout his tenure at the 
State Attorney’s Office. These records set forth the details of the 
flights Mr. Daniels made as a pilot while working for the State 
Attorney’s Office.  The records tend to corroborate Mr. Daniels’s 
denial of a sexual encounter with Ms. Ottinger, although they do not 
negate the possibility of an encounter. 
 - Doug Schwendeman  
The only other witness with any knowledge that might bear 
upon the alleged sexual encounter between Ms. Ottinger and Mr. 
Daniels was Ms. Ottinger’s ex-husband, Doug Schwendeman.  Mr. 
Schwendeman testified for the Defendant that he and Ms. Ottinger 
were married on May 31, 1986.  He testified that Ms. Ottinger told 
him just prior to their marriage that she had one and perhaps two 
 
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sexual encounters with a ―pilot‖ named ―Bob‖ at sometime during the 
prosecution of the Defendant. 
That testimony notwithstanding, both the State and defense 
stipulated, at pages 151, 152, and 153 of the transcript of the hearing 
of July 19 and 20, 2006, that Ms. Ottinger, if called to the stand again, 
would testify consistently with her deposition taken January 1, 2006.  
At that time she denied ever telling Mr. Schwendeman about the 
alleged sexual encounter with Mr. Daniels. 
The circumstances surrounding Mr. Schwendeman’s testimony 
about the admission of the encounter by Ms. Smith to Mr. 
Schwendeman are suspect.  Mr. Schwendeman kept this information 
to himself for 18 years, from before May of 1986 until 2004.  Ms. 
Ottinger and Mr. Schwendeman had a difficult divorce proceeding. 
Finally, Mr. Schwendeman admitted on cross-examination to having 
been convicted in 1998 of six counts of sexual abuse on Ms. 
Ottinger’s children, as well as domestic violence against Ms. Ottinger. 
The testimony of Mr. Schwendeman, offered to rebut a claim of 
recent fabrication by Ms. Ottinger, is unpersuasive and did not lend 
any clarity to the vagueness of Ms. Ottinger’s testimony. 
 
. . . . 
The Court finds that Ms. Ottinger’s testimony is not credible 
and that Mr. Daniels’s testimony is credible.  The testimony of Mr. 
Schwendeman is unpersuasive on the issue before the Court. 
The Court finds that the alleged sexual encounter between Ms. 
Ottinger and Mr. Daniels did not occur. 
 
As is clear from the trial court’s review of the testimony and its detailed 
order, the trial court carefully weighed the credibility of the witnesses, ultimately 
concluding that no sexual encounter between Frances Smith and Robert Daniels 
occurred.  When the postconviction court rules after holding an evidentiary 
hearing, this Court ―review[s] the trial court’s findings on questions of fact, the 
credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence for competent, substantial 
evidence.‖  Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1100 (Fla. 2008).  Appellate courts do 
 
- 14 - 
not ―reweigh the evidence or second-guess the circuit court’s findings as to the 
credibility of witnesses.‖  Nixon v. State, 2 So. 3d 137, 141 (Fla. 2009) (quoting 
Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 146, 149 (Fla. 2007)).  ―[W]e review the trial court’s 
application of the law to the facts de novo.‖  Green, 975 So. 2d at 1100.   
We conclude that there is no basis in the record to reject the trial court’s 
factual finding that no sexual encounter occurred between Smith and Daniels.  The 
trial court evaluated the substance of Smith’s testimony, concluding that Smith was 
vague as to when the alleged one-night relationship occurred and that her ex-
husband’s testimony was not credible.  The trial court provided its reasoning in 
detail.  The court evaluated Daniels’ explicit denial of a sexual relationship and 
found his testimony in this regard was credible and consistent with the flight logs. 
 However, even if the circuit court had accepted the testimony that a one-
time sexual encounter had occurred, we would conclude that Lambrix cannot show 
prejudice, which is the third critical prong of a Brady claim.  To meet the 
requirements of Brady, Lambrix must show that (1) favorable evidence—either 
exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the 
State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.  
See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); see also Way v. State, 760 
So. 2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000).  To meet the materiality prong, the defendant must 
demonstrate ―a reasonable probability that the jury verdict would have been 
 
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different had the suppressed information been used at trial.‖  Smith v. State, 931 
So. 2d 790, 796 (Fla. 2006) (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289, 296).  A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine our confidence in the outcome.  
See Way, 760 So. 2d at 913; see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290. 
An affair between the State’s key witness and the state attorney investigator 
would be considered favorable evidence.  Evidence as to a sexual affair between 
these witnesses could be used to impeach both Smith and Daniels, because it could 
be a basis as to why Daniels focused his investigation on Lambrix (as opposed to 
Smith, who was initially arrested while driving the victim’s car).   
However, Lambrix cannot demonstrate prejudice—that this suppressed 
evidence was sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  Specifically, the 
record established that the affair could have only occurred at one time—during the 
second trial, when they both had hotel rooms in the same hotel.  Thus, even if the 
evidence about the affair had been admitted as proper impeachment, the State 
would have been able to present Smith’s prior statements and testimony, which 
were consistent with Smith’s testimony at the second trial, in order to rebut any 
allegation that her testimony was recently fabricated.11   
                                          
 
 
11.  See § 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009) (providing that a statement is not 
hearsay ―if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement and the statement is . . . [c]onsistent with the 
declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against 
the declarant of improper influence, motive, or recent fabrication‖). 
 
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  In fact, Smith’s testimony from the second trial was substantially similar to 
statements that she had made at the beginning of the investigation and to the 
testimony she provided in the first trial.  Lambrix raises aspects of the testimony 
that he asserts represent a change in her testimony.  After reviewing these alleged 
discrepancies, we find that any differences as to the specific details were minor and 
that these details did not change in any respect the key evidence she provided 
regarding the night of the crime, including Lambrix’s confession to her and her 
assistance in helping Lambrix to bury the bodies.  Further, during the evidentiary 
hearing, Smith again affirmed her prior testimony and neither recanted nor 
changed her testimony inculpating Lambrix.   
Even if the subject of the alleged one-time affair could be the subject of 
cross-examination in an attempt to impeach Smith, there is no basis to conclude 
that the jury would have disregarded or not found credible the substantial 
testimony Smith provided as to the facts of the murders.  Thus, Lambrix cannot 
establish the materiality prong of Brady—that confidence in the outcome is 
undermined.  See Way, 760 So. 2d at 910.   
As another part of the Brady claim, Lambrix asserts that there was an 
undisclosed plea agreement between Smith and the State.12   
                                          
 
 
12.  In addition, Lambrix asserts that he was denied due process because the 
trial court limited his ability to call certain witnesses.  This issue is also raised in 
claim 3 and is discussed there.   
 
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In the final order denying relief, the circuit court found: 
In addition, there is no evidence before this Court that the State 
in any way participated in the various improprieties that have been 
alleged throughout these postconviction proceedings.  There is no 
evidence of a plea deal with Ms. Ottinger, nor is there any evidence 
that the State was aware of any misconduct on the part of one of its 
investigators.  Of course it goes without saying that because the Court 
has found that no such misconduct occurred, it is plain that the jury 
would never have heard about it at the time this case was tried. 
There is competent, substantial evidence to support the finding that there was no 
undisclosed plea deal between the State and Smith, and accordingly we deny this 
aspect of the claim. 
Alleged Recantation of Deborah Hanzel 
 In his second claim, Lambrix asserts that the postconviction court erred in 
failing to find that witness Deborah Hanzel recanted and that Smith and a state 
agent coerced her to lie.  This claim is based on the newly discovered evidence of 
Hanzel’s recent testimony.   
Hanzel was one of the witnesses who testified at both the initial trial and the 
second trial as to certain incriminating statements that Lambrix allegedly made.  
Specifically, she met Lambrix with her boyfriend, Preston Branch, and saw 
Lambrix drive a black Cadillac.  Around February 12, 1983, she, Branch, and 
Lambrix drove to an abandoned trailer to help Lambrix gather some of his 
possessions.  On the way back, Lambrix said that for $100, he could show her 
―where I killed two people and buried [them].‖  He later called her after a 
 
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newspaper article stated that police were looking for Lambrix, and during that 
conversation, she asked him if it was true that he killed the victim for his car.  
Lambrix replied, ―[T]hat was of the reason [sic].‖  Branch, who was with Lambrix 
and Hanzel when the statements were made, corroborated Hanzel’s testimony.  
During successive postconviction proceedings, Hanzel was deposed in 1998 
and stated that Lambrix never admitted that he killed anyone, which contradicted 
her trial testimony.  During an evidentiary hearing, Hanzel again testified that 
Lambrix never stated that he killed two people and that she testified otherwise 
because police made her fearful of Lambrix.  The trial court denied the claim, 
stating in pertinent part: 
The Court has reviewed the transcript of the sworn statement 
given by Deborah Hanzel before trial, as well as the transcript of her 
trial testimony.  The Court compared those transcripts with the 
testimony given at this evidentiary hearing.  Even when taken in the 
light most favorable to the Defendant, perhaps all that counsel has 
proven is that Ms. Hanzel does not now have a very good memory of 
something that occurred nearly twenty years ago. 
 
For example, Ms. Hanzel recalls today that the Defendant told 
her about buried bodies, but she now asserts that he did not say 
anything about killing them.  Ms. Hanzel also states that she does not 
now remember ―the phone calls‖ she received from the Defendant 
after the crimes were committed (although she testified about them at 
trial).  Ms. Hanzel does not, however, now deny that the calls were 
placed. 
 
In addition, Ms. Hanzel concedes that she remembers some 
things, but not others.  She allowed that some statements she made 
which were recorded twenty years ago did not refresh her recollection, 
while at the same time asserting that she does not ―recollect‖ that the 
Defendant confessed to the killings. 
 
- 19 - 
 
Upon evaluation of the testimony of Ms. Hanzel (and the other 
two witnesses who testified at the hearing), it is apparent that perhaps 
the only thing Ms. Hanzel knows for certain at this time is that twenty 
years ago she believed Mr. Lambrix killed two people and buried their 
bodies behind a trailer in Glades County, but now she does not. 
 
At no time during this proceeding did Ms. Hanzel repudiate her 
prior testimony or otherwise acknowledge that she did not tell the 
truth at any time she was placed under oath in 1983 or 1984. 
 
After the trial court denied the claim, but while the motion for rehearing was 
pending, Hanzel wrote a letter to the court that stated Lambrix never threatened 
her; rather, the police and Smith convinced her that Lambrix was a threat.  In the 
letter, she further asserted that Smith told Hanzel that if Hanzel would ―back up‖ 
Smith that Lambrix admitted the murders, they would no longer need to worry 
about him.  In her letter, she further stated that she did not tell the truth at the most 
recent evidentiary hearing.  Hanzel followed the letter with an affidavit to the same 
effect.  The postconviction court ordered a further evidentiary hearing based on 
Hanzel’s latest statements.  At this hearing, Hanzel testified that Lambrix never 
told her that he killed Bryant or Moore.  Moreover, Hanzel testified that Smith 
stated Lambrix attacked Moore after Moore ―went nuts.‖ 
Lambrix also testified under oath at the evidentiary hearing to support 
Hanzel’s testimony regarding what Lambrix told Smith (that he had to hit the male 
victim after he ―went nuts‖).  According to Lambrix, he told Smith the following 
account: after he invited both victims outside, Bryant and Moore began to fight, so 
Lambrix attempted to leave.  On his way back, he heard a scream, grabbed a tire 
 
- 20 - 
iron, and ran back.  He saw Moore straddling Bryant and tried to push him off.  
Moore attempted to ―come at [him],‖ so he continued to swing the tire iron at 
Moore until he realized that Moore ―was down.‖  He denied that he ever admitted 
to killing either victim on purpose. 
In its final order denying relief, the circuit court made the following findings 
as to Hanzel’s credibility: 
With regard to Deborah Hanzel, the Court is presented with a 
confused witness who made equivocating statements about testimony 
she gave with respect to a double homicide that occurred well over 
twenty years ago.  As the Court previously ruled on July 9, 2003, 
Hanzel’s testimony never met the legal requirements for a recantation.  
The court then denied relief as follows: 
 With regard to Claim II (the Hanzel recantation) the Court finds that 
there is no credible evidence to support the Defendant’s allegations.  
The Court stands by its ruling previously made on July 9, 2003, and 
nothing that the Court has heard since has caused it to reach a contrary 
conclusion.  Claim II is, one [sic] again, DENIED. 
To set aside a conviction based on newly discovered evidence, Lambrix 
must meet two prongs: (1) the ―asserted facts must have been unknown by the trial 
court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that 
defendant or his counsel could not have known them by the use of diligence;‖ and 
(2) ―the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably 
produce an acquittal on retrial.‖  Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915-16 (Fla. 1991) 
(emphasis in original).  In determining whether the evidence compels a new trial, 
 
- 21 - 
the trial court must ―consider all newly discovered evidence which would be 
admissible and must evaluate the weight of both the newly discovered evidence 
and the evidence which was introduced at the trial.‖  Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 
1072, 1086 (Fla. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jones, 591 So. 
2d at 916), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1305 (2009).  As newly discovered evidence 
pertains to a recent recantation, this Court has stated: 
Recantation by a witness called on behalf of the prosecution 
does not necessarily entitle a defendant to a new trial.  In determining 
whether a new trial is warranted due to recantation of a witness’s 
testimony, a trial judge is to examine all the circumstances of the case, 
including the testimony of the witnesses submitted on the motion for 
the new trial.  ―Moreover, recanting testimony is exceedingly 
unreliable, and it is the duty of the court to deny a new trial where it is 
not satisfied that such testimony is true.  Especially is this true where 
the recantation involves a confession of perjury.‖  Only when it 
appears that, on a new trial, the witness’s testimony will change to 
such an extent as to render probable a different verdict will a new trial 
be granted. 
Archer v. State, 934 So. 2d 1187, 1196 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Armstrong v. State, 
642 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1994)).   
As this Court has noted repeatedly, recanted testimony is ―exceedingly 
unreliable.‖  Heath v. State, 3 So. 3d 1017, 1024 (Fla. 2009); see also Kormondy v. 
State, 983 So. 2d 418, 438 (Fla. 2007); Archer, 934 So. 2d at 1196.  When 
reviewing a trial court’s determination relating to the credibility of a recantation, 
this Court is ―highly deferential‖ to the trial court and will affirm the lower court’s 
 
- 22 - 
determination so long as it is supported by competent, substantial evidence.  Heath, 
3 So. 3d at 1024.    
Having reviewed the full record and the postconviction court’s findings, we 
conclude that there is competent, substantial evidence for the court’s ruling.  The 
statements that most strongly support Lambrix’s recantation claim were presented 
in Hanzel’s affidavit.  However, when Hanzel was questioned about these 
statements at the second evidentiary hearing, she generally could not testify to 
those statements on her own and referred to the affidavit to ―refresh‖ her 
recollection.   
Further, even if Hanzel had not testified at trial that Lambrix stated he killed 
two people, the recantation would not be of such a nature that it would ―probably 
produce an acquittal on retrial.‖  Hanzel never recanted her testimony that Lambrix 
offered to show her where two bodies were buried.  Even without Hanzel’s 
testimony, there would still be the testimony of Branch that he heard Lambrix 
make statements similar to those to which Hanzel testified.   
Moreover, Hanzel was not the main witness to testify against Lambrix.  
Even without her testimony, there would still be the testimony of Lambrix himself 
at this most recent evidentiary hearing that he struck one of the victims using a tire 
iron, although he denied that he intended to kill either victim.  Further, there was 
other significant evidence at the trial that pointed to Lambrix as the perpetrator of 
 
- 23 - 
these murders.  This evidence included the following: Smith’s testimony regarding 
the murders and that Lambrix threatened her if she did not help him bury the 
bodies; Deputy Sheriff Ron Council’s testimony that he saw Lambrix and Smith 
with the victims on the night of the murders; John Chezum’s testimony that on 
February 6 around 2:30 in the morning, Lambrix drove up in a car that resembled 
the victims’ car and asked to borrow a shovel; and the victims were found buried 
near the trailer in which Lambrix was living.  For the reasons above, Lambrix is 
not entitled to relief on this claim.13 
Whether Lambrix Was Given a Full and Fair Hearing 
In his third claim, Lambrix asserts that the postconviction court prevented 
Lambrix from presenting various witnesses who would have supported Hanzel’s 
recantation, thus denying him a full and fair evidentiary hearing.  Specifically, 
Lambrix sought to have the following three categories of witnesses testify: (1) two 
forensic pathologists who would have explained the significance of the 
deficiencies that they found in Bryant’s autopsy; (2) an expert in police procedures 
and criminal investigations who would have discussed how an unbiased and 
                                          
 
13.  As a part of this claim, Lambrix also raises numerous allegations about 
the ―state intervention and misconduct.‖  He does not challenge any circuit court 
rulings, and to the extent that he raises those claims here as a basis for relief, he has 
waived such claims because he failed to secure a ruling by the court below on such 
matters.  See, e.g., Jones v. State, 998 So. 2d 573, 581 (Fla. 2008) (―To be 
preserved, the issue or legal argument must be raised and ruled on by the trial 
court.‖). 
 
- 24 - 
objective investigation should have been conducted and how a sexual affair would 
have impacted an investigation; and (3) three additional witnesses who would have 
testified that the property where the murder occurred did not have a pond. 
None of the general testimony of the expert witnesses or the lay witnesses 
would have been relevant to either the Brady or newly discovered evidence claims 
in this case.  Accordingly, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to admit this testimony, we deny this claim. 
Alleged Judicial Bias 
The fourth and last issue we address is Lambrix’s claim that newly 
discovered evidence established that his trial judge was biased.14  He based this 
claim on statements Judge Stanley made during a January 1997 evidentiary hearing 
in another death penalty case, which involved defendant Raleigh Porter.  In that 
case, Judge Stanley overrode the jury’s recommendation of life and imposed a 
death sentence.  Porter v. State, 723 So. 2d 191, 193 (Fla. 1998).  The defendant in 
                                          
 
 
14.  We summarily reject Lambrix’s claim that he was deprived of a full and 
fair hearing because Judge Stanley died before the circuit court permitted Lambrix 
to take a deposition of Judge Stanley.  As another subclaim to this issue, Lambrix 
asserts that the trial court erred in failing to order either production or an in camera 
inspection as to his request for records from the Florida Parole Commission, which 
he had requested in order to review Judge Stanley’s comments concerning 
clemency for Lambrix in 1987, 1988, and 1994.  We reject this claim because 
Lambrix failed to obtain a ruling on this motion.  Rhodes v. State, 986 So. 2d 501, 
513 (Fla. 2008) (―To be preserved, the issue or legal argument must be raised and 
ruled on by the trial court.‖). 
 
- 25 - 
Porter subsequently learned, through a variety of sources, including the Clerk of 
the Circuit Court of Glades County, that Judge Stanley had made statements 
indicating his predisposition to sentence that particular defendant to death, even 
before the jury made its recommendation.  Id. at 194.  This Court vacated the death 
sentence based on the statements of actual judicial bias and remanded for a new 
penalty phase before an impartial judge.  Id. at 197. 
In this case, the defendant relies on specific statements Judge Stanley made 
during the Porter case, as well as testimony that Judge Stanley gave in that case 
pertaining to his general beliefs about the death penalty.  The postconviction court 
summarily denied relief, holding in relevant part: 
[T]his claim is legally insufficient because the motion does not allege 
any evidence of judicial bias in this case.  The defendant bases this 
claim on the decision of Porter v. State, 723 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1998) 
and the facts of judicial bias relied on by the supreme court in 
reaching its decision in that case.  In this case, the state does not 
dispute any of the facts from the record in Porter.  The trial judge in 
Porter was the same trial judge who tried this case.  Porter was tried in 
November, 1978, and sentencing in that case was concluded in 1981 
after the first sentencing order was reversed due to a procedural 
defect.  This case was tried in February, 1984. 
In Porter, the defendant’s motion alleged evidence of judicial 
bias against Mr. Porter, that is, statements of the trial judge in March 
1995 to newspaper reporters and the affidavit of the clerk of court 
dated that same month which told of a conversation between the clerk 
and the trial judge before or during Mr. Porter’s trial in 1978.  Once 
these allegations were developed by discovery and an evidentiary 
hearing, the supreme court found evidence of actual bias against Mr. 
Porter. 
However, in this case, there is no evidence of bias against Mr. 
Lambrix alleged in the motion beyond the trial judge’s statements in 
 
- 26 - 
the record in Porter to the effect that he favored the death penalty.  
Porter did not decide the trial judge was generally unable to be 
impartial in capital cases.  Further, in Porter, the trial judge overrode 
the jury’s recommendation of the death penalty. 
 
We affirm this ruling.  In Lambrix’s successive postconviction motion, Lambrix 
confines his argument to very limited portions of Judge Stanley’s testimony in the 
Porter evidentiary hearing.  As the trial court pointed out, although some of the 
trial judge’s statements indicate that he favored the death penalty, Lambrix did not 
point to any specific statements that were directed to his case and did not point to 
any statements that Judge Stanley was predisposed in Lambrix’s case to impose the 
death penalty.  His argument rests on the assumption that because there is evidence 
to show that Judge Stanley was predisposed to sentence Porter to death, he was 
therefore predisposed to sentence all defendants to death.   
We reject that argument.  In Porter, we never held that the trial judge was 
unable to be impartial in all capital cases, but held only that Judge Stanley lacked 
the necessary impartiality as to the sentencing phase of Porter’s trial.  Porter, 723 
So. 2d at 198-99.  This case does not involve a judicial override of a life 
recommendation or any statements attributable to Judge Stanley indicating a 
predisposition to sentence Lambrix to death.  This Court has recognized that 
judicial misconduct in one case does not mean that courts must presume 
misconduct in all cases.  See, e.g., Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 952 (Fla. 
 
- 27 - 
2000).  Accordingly, we deny this claim and hold that Lambrix is not entitled to 
relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Lambrix’s successive 
motion for postconviction relief. 
It is so ordered.  
PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
QUINCE, C.J., recused. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Glades County,  
R. Thomas Corbin, Judge – Case No. 83-12 CF 
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, William M. Hennis, III, 
Litigation Director, and Craig J. Trocino, Staff Attorney, CCRC- South, Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Carol M. Dittmar, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee