Title: Malvern Sullivan v. Waukesha County
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP003376
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 4, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3376 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
In re the Matter of Brian David Sullivan: 
 
Malvern Sullivan,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Waukesha County,  
 
Respondent.  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 4, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 7, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick L. Snyder 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner-appellant there were briefs 
(in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals) by William A. Denny, 
Jonathan Cermele, Joseph S. Heino and Denny & Yanisch, Elm Grove 
and oral argument by William A. Denny and Michael W. Steinhafel. 
 
 
For the respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument(in the Supreme Court) by Danni L. Caldwell, Waukesha 
County Corporation Counsel. 
 
No.  96-3376 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-3376 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Matter of Brian David Sullivan: 
 
Malvern Sullivan,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Waukesha County,  
 
          Respondent.  
FILED 
 
JUN 4, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, Patrick L. Snyder, Circuit Court Judge.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.   This case raises two issues 
for review:   
(1) Which standard of review must a circuit court apply 
when conducting a hearing under Wis. Stat. § 69.12(1) (1993-94)1 
to 
determine 
whether 
a 
petitioner 
has 
established 
that 
information on a certificate of death "does not represent the 
actual facts in effect at the time" the certificate of death was 
filed? 
(2) 
Did 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercise 
its 
discretion in refusing to receive into evidence under the Wis. 
                     
1 Unless otherwise stated, all future references to Wis. 
Stats. are to the 1993-94 version of the statutes.  
No.  96-3376 
 
2 
Stat. § 908.03(8) hearsay exception for public records and 
reports a training pamphlet published by the Department of 
Transportation? 
¶2 
This case is before the court on certification from 
the court of appeals under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61.  The 
court of appeals asks that this court clarify the circuit 
court's role in reviewing a certificate of death under Wis. 
Stat. § 69.12(1).  After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the 
Circuit Court for Waukesha County, Patrick L. Snyder, Judge, 
denied Malvern Sullivan's petition under Wis. Stat. § 69.12(1) 
requesting that the circuit court amend her son's certificate of 
death so that the manner and cause of his death would be 
officially designated as something other than "suicide."  The 
Petitioner appealed the circuit court's order, and the court of 
appeals requested certification. 
¶3 
The relevant facts of this case are simple.  In the 
early morning hours of August 25, 1990, Brian Sullivan died from 
injuries he suffered from being struck by a train.  The record 
establishes that, on the night of his death, Sullivan returned 
home from a night of socializing with friends and made his way 
approximately 70 feet from his home to a set of railroad tracks—
a location familiar to Sullivan as a place he occasionally went 
to smoke cigarettes and marijuana.  According to the railroad 
company's official report, Sullivan was sitting on the railroad 
tracks and never looked up as the train approached.  Although 
the train crew blew the train's whistle and began to brake, they 
could not stop the train before it struck Sullivan.  The crew of 
No.  96-3376 
 
3 
the train explained that because of a blind spot in front of the 
locomotive, they could not see if Sullivan attempted to escape 
being hit by the train.  A medical toxicology report revealed 
that at the time of his death, Sullivan had a blood alcohol 
concentration of .165% by weight.  
¶4 
Due to the circumstances surrounding Sullivan's death, 
the Waukesha County Medical Examiner was required to conduct an 
investigation to determine the manner and cause of Sullivan's 
death.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 59.38 and 979.01 (1989-90).  The 
Acting 
Medical 
Examiner, 
Paul 
Hibbard, 
conducted 
an 
investigation into Sullivan's death.  The examiner reviewed the 
findings of the autopsy, reviewed statements made to police 
officers by the conductor of the train that struck Sullivan, and 
reviewed statements made by a number of Sullivan's friends and 
members of his family. 
¶5 
Based on the information he gathered during his 
investigation, the examiner believed that Sullivan had been 
experiencing business and financial problems; that Sullivan's 
girlfriend of six years had recently ended their relationship; 
and that Sullivan looked at the approaching train, placed his 
head on his arms, and did not appear to be startled before being 
struck by the train.  Based on this information, the examiner 
concluded that Sullivan committed suicide.2  After reaching this 
                     
2 At the evidentiary hearing, Paul Hibbard testified as 
follows:  
Q. 
So on the side of supporting suicide in this case 
what would you have listed? 
 
No.  96-3376 
 
4 
conclusion, the examiner issued a certificate of death for 
Sullivan stating that his "manner of death" was "suicide" and 
that he was struck by a train "as a consequence" of "suicide."  
This certificate of death was received by the State Registrar on 
September 4, 1990, and corrected in part on October 1, 1990. 
¶6 
On November 6, 1995, Brian Sullivan's mother, Malvern 
Sullivan, petitioned the circuit court under Wis. Stat. § 69.12 
to find that the designation of "suicide" as the manner and 
cause of death on her son's certificate of death did not reflect 
the "actual facts" at the time the certificate of death was 
filed.  The circuit court conducted hearings during June and 
August of 1996, at which the Petitioner presented evidence she 
believed contradicted the medical examiner's conclusion that her 
son committed suicide. 
¶7 
At the hearing, the Petitioner presented evidence 
principally showing that her son lacked suicidal motive or 
intent.  The testimony of friends and family showed that 
Sullivan was positive, upbeat, outgoing, fun-loving, gregarious, 
and active.  The Petitioner presented evidence to counter the 
examiner's finding that Brian Sullivan was having financial, 
business, and personal problems.  The Petitioner also showed 
that the doctor performing the autopsy specifically noted that 
injuries to Sullivan's right leg were consistent with Sullivan 
attempting to stand at the time he was struck by the train. 
                                                                  
A. 
The conductor's statements, the interviews by the 
police officers of the—Mr. Sullivan's friends, the 
breakup of the girlfriend, and that was about it.   
No.  96-3376 
 
5 
¶8 
The Petitioner also proffered as evidence a pamphlet 
published by the Wisconsin Department of Transportation and the 
Wisconsin State Patrol entitled "Basic Training Program for 
Breath Examiner Specialist."  The pamphlet contains information 
regarding the effects alcohol has on a person's judgment, 
emotions, and perception.  The Respondent objected, arguing that 
the pamphlet was inadmissible hearsay.  See Wis. Stat. § 908.02.3 
 The circuit court sustained the objection on the ground that 
the pamphlet was hearsay and did not fit within the hearsay 
exception for public records and reports provided in Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.03(8).4  The Petitioner made an offer of proof.  
¶9 
After the hearing, the circuit court issued a written 
decision denying the petition.  The circuit court first 
concluded that under Wis. Stat. § 69.12(1) it sat as a reviewing 
court rather than as a finder of fact and could not order the 
                     
3 Wis. Stat. § 908.02 provides that "[h]earsay is not 
admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules 
adopted by the supreme court or by statute."  
4 Wis. Stat. § 908.03(8) provides that the following are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness: 
PUBLIC 
RECORDS 
AND 
REPORTS. 
 
Records, 
reports, 
statements, or data compilations, in any form, or 
public offices or agencies, setting forth (a) the 
activities of the office or agency, or (b) matters 
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law, or (c) in 
civil cases and against the state in criminal cases, 
factual findings resulting from an investigation made 
pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the 
sources of information or other circumstances indicate 
lack of trustworthiness.  
 
No.  96-3376 
 
6 
certificate of death changed unless it found that the medical 
examiner's determination was "arbitrary and capricious."  After 
it determined that the Petitioner failed to establish that the 
medical examiner's determination was arbitrary and capricious, 
the circuit court denied the petition.  The Petitioner appealed 
the circuit court's denial and its refusal to admit into 
evidence the pamphlet.  We accepted the court of appeals' 
request for certification. 
¶10 The first issue to consider is whether the circuit 
court applied the proper standard under Wis. Stat. § 69.12(1).  
This is a matter of statutory interpretation.  Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law that this court reviews 
independent of the judgment of the circuit court.  See Lake City 
Corp. v. City of Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 155, 162-63, 558 N.W.2d 100 
(1997).  The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain 
the legislature's intent.  See Stockbridge School Dist. v. DPI, 
202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996).  The main source for 
statutory interpretation is the plain language of the statute 
itself.  See Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 
548 N.W.2d 519 (1996).  If the language is clear, we may not 
look beyond the language of the statute to ascertain its 
meaning.  See  Lake City Corp., 207 Wis. 2d at 164 (citing 
Stockbridge School Dist., 202 Wis. 2d at 220). 
¶11 Wis. Stat. § 69.12(1) provides: 
 
If . . . a person with a direct and tangible interest 
in the vital record alleges that information on the 
vital record does not represent the actual facts in 
effect at the time the record was filed, the person 
No.  96-3376 
 
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may petition the circuit court of the county in which 
the event which is the subject of the vital record is 
alleged to have occurred. . . . If the court finds 
that the petitioner has established the actual facts 
of the event in effect when the record was filed, the 
clerk of court shall report the court's determination 
to the state registrar . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶12 The circuit court interpreted the language of Wis. 
Stat. § 69.12(1) as requiring it to sit as a reviewing court, 
reviewing 
the 
medical 
examiner's 
determination 
under 
the 
standard of review traditionally accorded to decisions of 
administrative agencies.  In its decision denying the petition, 
the circuit court concluded that "the appropriate standard of 
review for the case herein and therefore for Wisconsin courts is 
to limit the court's review of the exercise of discretion to 
determining 
whether 
the 
medical 
examiner's 
decision 
was 
arbitrary or capricious."  We disagree.   
¶13 By 
its 
plain 
language, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 69.12(1) 
prescribes a very limited role to the circuit court—that of a 
factfinder. The court's scope of review under Wis. Stat. 
§ 69.12(1) is not limited to facts underlying a certificate of 
death; it encompasses facts represented in all "vital records," 
including "certificates of birth, death, divorce or annulment, 
marriage documents and data related thereto."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 69.01(26).  A person who files a petition under Wis. Stat. 
§ 69.12(1) alleges only that the information in a vital record 
does not represent the actual facts existing at the time the 
vital record was filed.  The relief sought by a petitioner is to 
have the circuit court enter the actual facts and order the 
No.  96-3376 
 
8 
state registrar to change the vital record.  When considering a 
petition filed under this section, the circuit court's only role 
is to review the evidence presented by a petitioner and to 
determine whether the petitioner "has established the actual 
facts of the event in effect when the record was filed."  Wis. 
Stat. § 69.12(1).  If the circuit court finds that a vital 
record does not represent the actual facts, the court reports 
the actual facts to the state registrar.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 69.12(1).  The state registrar will then change the vital 
record to reflect the actual facts entered by the circuit court. 
 See Wis. Stat. § 69.12(1), (4)(a).   
¶14 When entertaining a petition to review the facts 
represented 
in 
a 
certificate 
of 
death 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 69.12(1), a circuit court must consider and enter the "actual 
facts" existing at the time the certificate of death was filed. 
 The actual facts may include the information contained in the 
certificate of death or other facts existing at the time the 
certificate of death was filed that were unavailable to or not 
considered by the party filing the certificate. 
¶15 The manner and cause of a person's death listed in a 
certificate of death are not administrative determinations.  The 
information contained in a certificate of death, including the 
manner and cause of death, can be certified by a physician, a 
coroner, a medical examiner, or a circuit court, see Wis. Stat. 
§§ 69.18(2) and 69.19, depending on the circumstances of a 
particular case.  The circuit court's review of the actual facts 
existing when a certificate was filed does not vary with the 
No.  96-3376 
 
9 
party certifying that certificate.  Although the petition must 
include a certified copy of the original certificate of death, 
the person who certified that certificate need not be a party 
nor called as a witness.   As with other information contained 
in a certificate of death, the manner and cause of a person's 
death, do 
not become 
administrative 
determinations 
simply 
because they were certified by a medical examiner.  Accordingly, 
the actual manner and cause of Sullivan's death was a matter of 
fact for the circuit court to resolve.  
¶16 As 
a 
factfinder, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
principal 
determination is whether the petitioner has met his or her 
burden of proof.  Wisconsin Statutes § 69.12 does not set forth 
a special burden of proof.  Absent a special burden, we conclude 
that the appropriate burden of proof in this civil matter, as 
with other civil actions, is proof by the greater weight of the 
credible evidence.  See Wis JICivil 200 (1991); Kruse v. 
Horlamus Indus., Inc., 130 Wis. 2d 357, 362-63, 387 N.W.2d 64 
(1986); Jones v. Dane County, 195 Wis. 2d 892, 926, 537 N.W.2d 
74 (Ct. App. 1995); accord Wyatt v. Williams, 669 So.2d 1380, 
1382 (La. App. 1996).  Accordingly, a petitioner under Wis. 
Stat. § 69.12(1) must prove by the greater weight of the 
credible evidence the actual facts existing at the time the 
certificate of death was filed. 
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 69.12(1) requires a petitioner to 
attach a certified copy of the original certificate of death.  
In reviewing the actual facts existing at the time a certificate 
of death was filed, a circuit court must accord the information 
No.  96-3376 
 
10
certified by a medical examiner a presumption of validity.  This 
is a rebuttable presumption that the information on the 
certificate of death represents the actual facts in effect at 
the time the certificate was filed.  Like other presumptions, 
this presumption then imposes upon the party against whom it is 
directed the burden of proving that the non-existence of the 
presumed facts is more likely than not.  See Wis. Stat. § 903.01 
 In other words, the party petitioning the court under Wis. 
Stat. § 69.12(1) bears the burden of showing by the greater 
weight of the credible evidence that the facts contained in the 
certificate of death do not represent the actual facts in effect 
at the time the certificate of death was filed. 
¶18 In 
light 
of 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 69.12(1), we find unpersuasive the Respondent's argument that 
the Petitioner must establish that the medical examiner's 
findings were arbitrary and capricious.  Rather, we conclude 
that the circuit court acts as a factfinder, independently 
reviewing the evidence presented by the Petitioner.  The circuit 
court, however, must afford the findings in the certificate of 
death a presumption of validity and place on the Petitioner the 
burden of rebutting this presumption by the greater weight of 
the credible evidence.  Consequently, we reverse the circuit 
court's order denying Malvern Sullivan's petition and remand 
this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
¶19 The 
second 
issue 
is 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it refused to allow 
No.  96-3376 
 
11
into evidence a pamphlet published by the Department of 
Transportation and the Wisconsin State Patrol entitled "Basic 
Training Program for Breath Examiner Specialist."  
¶20 A toxicology test showed that at the time of his death 
Sullivan had a blood alcohol concentration of .165% by weight.  
Before the circuit court, the Petitioner argued that this high 
level of alcohol concentration altered Sullivan's emotional 
state, judgment, and perception.  The Petitioner alleged that 
the effects of the alcohol, rather than a desire to commit 
suicide, may have led to Sullivan's death.  The Petitioner 
proffered the pamphlet to establish that the consumption of 
alcohol affects a person's judgment and perception and may 
create a feeling of euphoria.5  The Respondent objected to the 
                     
5 The pamphlet states, and provides statistical information 
showing, that, as the concentration of alcohol increases, the 
effects the alcohol has on an individual also increase and are 
magnified: "Increasing the alcohol concentration above 0.08% wt. 
results in further impairment of normal physical and mental 
faculties." 
 
Basic 
Training 
Program 
for 
Breath 
Examiner 
Specialist at D-18.  The pamphlet explains: 
The first effect of alcohol is the impairment of 
judgment.  Judgment is the general name given to 
various decision-making aspects of human behavior. . . 
. 
Alcohol 
also 
impairs 
an 
individual's 
self-
evaluation, the ability to judge one's own behavior or 
performance in a particular situation. . . . Because 
of the induced state of euphoria, an intoxicated 
individual's perception of reality may be altered.   
Another aspect of judgment is that of risk assessment. 
 Each person  has the ability to determine what risks 
are 
acceptable 
to 
him 
and 
to 
understand 
the 
consequences 
of 
his 
actions. 
 
An 
intoxicated 
individual 
may 
accept 
risks 
which 
would 
be 
unacceptable when alcohol free.  . . . Alcohol also 
impairs the hearing perception.  Although no direct 
No.  96-3376 
 
12
proffer, arguing that the pamphlet was inadmissible hearsay.  
The circuit court concluded that the pamphlet was hearsay and 
did not fall within the hearsay exception for public records and 
reports provided in Wis. Stat. § 908.03(8). 
¶21 A circuit court's decision to admit or exclude 
evidence is discretionary, and an appellate court will not 
overturn a discretionary determination absent a showing that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.  See Barrera 
v. State, 99 Wis. 2d 269, 282, 298 N.W.2d 820 (1980).  We are 
mindful, however, that a misapplication or an erroneous view of 
the law constitutes an erroneous exercise of discretion.  See 
State v. Hutnik, 39 Wis. 2d 754, 763, 159 N.W.2d 733 (1968).  
Accordingly, a court erroneously exercises its discretion if it 
bases its 
decision 
on an 
erroneous 
view 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 908.03(8).  We conclude that the circuit court's refusal to 
accept this pamphlet into evidence in this case was an erroneous 
exercise of the court's discretion. 
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.03(8) excepts public records and 
reports from the general prohibition against hearsay.  Under 
§ 908.03(8) public records and reports include "[r]ecords, 
reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of 
                                                                  
evidence has been shown on the physical mechanism of 
hearing, alcohol raises the minimum level of noise to 
which the person will respond. 
 
Id. at D-18-19. 
 
  
No.  96-3376 
 
13
public offices or agencies, setting forth . . . matters observed 
pursuant to a duty imposed by law, or . . . factual findings 
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority 
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness." 
¶23 Applying 
the 
hearsay 
exception 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 908.03(8), 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
has 
previously 
found 
admissible a blood alcohol chart contained in the same training 
pamphlet proffered by the Petitioner in this case.  See State v. 
Hinz, 121 Wis. 2d 282, 288-89, 360 N.W.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1984).  
In Hinz, a defendant appealed a conviction of intoxicated use of 
a motor vehicle.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the 
circuit court had erred by excluding a blood alcohol chart 
included in the training pamphlet, which he proffered to 
determine his blood alcohol concentration on which he was 
arrested.  The court of appeals reversed, finding, inter alia, 
that the chart fit within the hearsay exception in Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.03(8).  See id. at 288. 
¶24 Similarly, the court of appeals has allowed into 
evidence under Wis. Stat. § 908.03(8) a different Department of 
Transportation handbook containing information that was in form 
and content similar to the information offered in this case.  
See Lievrouw v. Roth, 157 Wis. 2d 332, 459 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 
1990).  In Lievrouw, the plaintiff sought to introduce findings 
in the department's Wisconsin Motorists Handbook as evidence of 
the effects alcohol has on a person's ability to drive.  The 
circuit court accepted the entire handbook into evidence and 
No.  96-3376 
 
14
allowed the plaintiff's attorney to read to the jury excerpts 
therefrom, including the document's assessment of alcohol's 
effect on a person's driving ability.  See id. at 354. 
¶25 On appeal, the court of appeals in Lievrouw affirmed. 
 The court found (1) that the handbook was published by a public 
agency, the Department of Transportation, and (2) that the 
department is charged with the administration and enforcement of 
the laws relating to the licensing of drivers, see id. at 355 
(citing Wis. Stat. § 343.02), and with the responsibility of 
educating drivers about the dangers of driving while under the 
influence of alcohol, see id. (citing Wis. Stat. § 346.637).  
Accordingly, 
the 
court 
concluded 
that 
the 
handbook 
was 
admissible under the public records exception in Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.03(8).  See id.6 
¶26 We see no reason to treat the training pamphlet 
proffered in this case any differently than the court of appeals 
treated the reports in Hinz and Lievrouw.  The pamphlet is a 
compilation of a public agency, the Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation.  It contains information on the pharmacology and 
toxicology of alcohol and on the specific effects of alcohol.  
The findings and statistical data in the pamphlet pertaining to 
the effects alcohol has on a person are factual and were made 
pursuant to the department's duty to administer and enforce the 
                     
6 Accord Roth v. Black & Decker, U.S., Inc., 737 F.2d 779, 
783 (8th Cir. 1984)(concluding that reports published by the 
Consumer Products Safety Commission were admissible under Rule 
803(8)(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the federal analog 
to Wis. Stat. § 908.03(8)).   
No.  96-3376 
 
15
laws relating to the licensing of drivers, see Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.02, and its duty to employ and train state traffic 
officers, see Wis. Stat. §§ 110.065 and 110.07.  Accordingly, 
excerpts from the pamphlet concerning alcohol and its effects on 
a person's judgment, emotions, and perception satisfy the 
requirements of the hearsay exception for public records and 
reports contained in Wis. Stat. § 908.03(8). 
¶27 We 
therefore 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion by refusing to accept the 
training pamphlet into evidence as inadmissible hearsay.  On 
remand, the circuit court should allow the Petitioner to 
introduce the pamphlet into evidence. 
By the Court.—The order of the Waukesha County Circuit 
Court  is reversed and cause remanded. 
  
 
 
1