Title: Adam Davis v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-313
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2001

Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-313
____________
ADAM DAVIS,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[July 12, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal a first-degree murder conviction and attendant death
sentence.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  Appellant Adam
Davis has filed with this Court a pro se motion to dismiss his appellate counsel. 
We strike the pro se filing.
We issue this interlocutory opinion in order to state this Court’s procedure in
respect to pro se filings of papers in direct appeals of capital cases.  We hold that
we will not accept pro se filings in which there are claims of ineffective assistance
1.  By order dated April 16, 2001, we granted appellant’s counsel’s motion
for an extension of time but directed appellate counsel to file the initial brief in this
matter on or before May 18, 2001.  In that order, we indicated that this opinion
would follow regarding pro se filings in capital cases.
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of appellate counsel, requests to dismiss appellate counsel, or which supplement
bases for relief from appellants on direct appeal of a death sentence.
Robert F. Moeller, an assistant public defender, is representing appellant on
the appeal of Davis’s conviction for capital murder and death sentence.  On
January 11, 2001, Davis filed in this Court a pro se “Motion to Dismiss Counsel.” 
In that motion, Davis alleges that his appellate counsel is ineffective in not pursuing
the appeal with sufficient due diligence and in failing to keep Davis notified of the
status of the appeal.  In his pro se motion, Davis further alleges that appellate
counsel’s ineffectiveness is depriving Davis of due process and equal protection
under the federal and Florida constitutions.
At the time Davis filed his pro se motion, appellate counsel was preparing to
file the initial brief in this matter.  As a direct result of Davis’s pro se filing,
appellate counsel did not file the initial brief.  Instead, appellate counsel filed a
motion for an extension of time, arguing that appellate counsel should not file the
initial brief in this matter while Davis’s pro se discharge motion was pending.1  The
issue before us is whether we will accept Davis’s pro se filing even though he is
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represented by counsel.
The issue of whether a defendant has a federal constitutional right of self-
representation at trial was decided in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).  In
Faretta, the United States Supreme Court held that implicit in the Sixth Amendment
was the right to defend oneself at trial under certain circumstances.  See id. at 836. 
However, the extension of this implicit right to appellate proceedings occurring as a
matter of right has been debated for the last quarter century.  Compare Myers v.
Collins, 8 F.3d 249, 252 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding right of self-representation extends
to appeals), with United States v. Gillis, 773 F.2d 549, 560 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding
no right of self-representation extending to appeals).
The Supreme Court recently clarified that a convicted defendant does not
have a federal constitutional right of self-representation on an initial appeal of right. 
See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152 (2000).  At issue in
Martinez was a California appellate court’s denial of appellant Martinez’s pro se
motion to discharge his appellate counsel and proceed pro se.  See id. at 155.  The
Court affirmed the California court, explaining that the rationale underlying the
Faretta decision, and hence the Sixth Amendment itself, did not apply to appellate
proceedings.  See id. at 160-61.  The Court then indicated that if there is any such
right of self-representation in appellate proceedings, such a right would have to be
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grounded in the Due Process Clause.  See id. at 161.  The Court then dismissed
that notion, writing, “we are entirely unpersuaded that the risk of either disloyalty or
suspicion of disloyalty is a sufficient concern to conclude that a constitutional right
of self-representation is a necessary component of a fair appellate proceeding.”  Id.
The Court in Martinez left to the States the ability to find a right of self-
representation on appeal under the state constitution.  See Martinez, 528 U.S. at
163.  The Court commented:
Our holding is, of course, narrow.  It does not preclude the States
from recognizing such a right under their own constitutions.  Its
impact on the law will be minimal, because a lay appellant’s rights to
participate in appellate proceedings have long been limited by the well-
established conclusions that [appellant] has no right to be present
during appellate proceedings, or to present oral argument.  Meanwhile
the rules governing appeals in California, and presumably those in
other States as well, seem to protect the ability of indigent litigants to
make pro se filings.  In requiring Martinez, under these circumstances,
to accept against his will a state-appointed attorney, the California
courts have not deprived him of a constitutional right.
Martinez, 528 U.S. at 163-64 (citations omitted).  Regarding the existence of such a
state constitutional right, we previously have rejected requests by appellants
sentenced to death to conduct their own direct appeal and, in doing so, implicitly
acknowledged that no such right exists in Florida.  See Klokoc v. State, 589 So. 2d
219, 221-22 (Fla. 1991).  We make that practice explicit today, holding that in
Florida there is no state constitutional right to proceed pro se in direct appeals in
2.  Postconviction capital defendants are represented by postconviction
counsel pursuant to sections 27.7001-27.711, Florida Statutes (2000).
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capital cases.
An appellant has a right to effective assistance of appellate counsel in a direct
appeal of a capital case and has an opportunity to present claims of appellate
counsel’s ineffectiveness in state habeas corpus proceedings.  See, e.g.,
Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000) (“Habeas petitions are the
proper vehicle to advance claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.”). 
We conclude that under our procedures, any claim concerning the effectiveness of
appellate counsel must be advanced through the habeas corpus proceeding and not
by pro se filings in the direct appeal. 2
The decision to allow a convicted defendant the ability to proceed pro se in
appellate proceedings is vested in the sound discretion of the appellate court.  See
Hooks v. State, 253 So. 2d 424, 427 (Fla. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1044
(1972).  Also vested in the sound discretion of an appellate court is the decision
whether to accept pro se filings.  See Hill v. State, 656 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla.
1995).  We have in isolated instances exercised our discretion to accept pro se
filings in direct appeal cases where the represented appellant has been sentenced to
death.  See id. (accepting pro se brief in lieu of request to proceed pro se); Klokoc
3.  This holding does not prohibit an appellant who does not wish to pursue
an appeal from submitting a pro se filing setting forth the reasons he or she does
not want to pursue the appeal.
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v. State, 589 So. 2d at 221-22 (accepting pro se filing to allow appellant to argue
why the death penalty should be imposed upon him).  However, those occasions
occurred prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Martinez.  We presently are
receiving an increase in pro se filings in direct appeals in capital cases and find that
it is appropriate to announce a consistent procedure in these cases.  Pro se filings
in direct appeals of capital cases in which there are claims of ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel, requests to dismiss appellate counsel, or which supplement
bases for relief will be docketed and then stricken.3
Accordingly, Davis’s pro se motion is stricken.  No motion for rehearing of
this opinion will be allowed.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, with which
PARIENTE, J., concurs.
ANSTEAD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I am in general agreement with a rule that prohibits both the defendant
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pro se and his assigned counsel from advocating the appellant’s appeal, I am not
certain that a rigid no-exception prohibition on pro se filings in this Court and the
trial court during an appeal is the wise course.  In this case, for example, by
separate order, we are simultaneously granting appellate counsel’s motion to
withdraw at the same time we are acting here to bar appellant from complaining
about his counsel’s representation.  Further, we have also acted, of course, in
numerous instances, to allow capital defendants to file pro se requests to discharge
counsel and to waive their rights to continue attacks on their convictions or
sentences. 
The Legislature has recently explicitly charged the courts with the
responsibility of monitoring counsel’s performance in capital cases to be certain
capital defendants are receiving competent services.  Obviously, that effort will be
hampered by a blanket ban on pro se filings.  Indeed, we have issued several
opinions criticizing counsel’s conduct based not only upon our observations but
also on pro se communications filed with the Court.  Of course, courts have
traditionally been charged with responding to legitimate complaints from defendants
about the conduct of appointed counsel.  In most instances, this process serves to
resolve problems as they arise, such as simple problems of communication, rather
than allowing small problems to become big ones later in the process.  We have
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also allowed capital defendants in limited instances to file pro se supplemental
briefs in addition to the briefs filed by appellate counsel. 
In conclusion, I am in agreement that appeals should be prosecuted through
the services of counsel, and it should be the rare case where we will allow
supplemental pro se filings.  There should be a single voice advocating on appeal,
and when a defendant is represented by counsel that single voice should be
counsel’s voice.  However, we should not adopt a blanket policy prohibiting any
pro se communication with the Court.  Rather, we should continue with our policy
of evaluating these filings on a case-by-case basis.
PARIENTE, J., concurs.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,
Cynthia A. Holloway, Judge - Case No. 
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Robert F. Moeller, Assistant Public
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Candance Sabella, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee