Title: Carter v. Ryburn Ford Sales, Inc.
Citation: 451 S.W.2d 199
Docket Number: 5-5146
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: March 9, 1970

451 S.W.2d 199 (1970) Cleveland CARTER et al., Appellants, v. RYBURN FORD SALES, INC., Appellee. No. 5-5146. Supreme Court of Arkansas. March 9, 1970. *200 Tiner &amp; Henry, Harrisburg, for appellants. Rice Van Ausdall and Edward S. Maddox, Harrisburg, for appellee. BYRD, Justice. Appellee Ryburn Ford Sales, Inc., brought this action against appellants Cleveland Carter and Anthony Carter to recover a deficiency of $845.31 arising out of the repossession and sale of a 1968 Ford truck. Appellants answered denying each material allegation and counterclaimed for damages of $400, alleging that Ryburn Ford Sales, Inc. had held a private sale and had purchased at their own private sale in violation of Ark.Stat.Ann. § 85-9-504 (Add. 1961). After the conclusion of the evidence appellants, through their attorneys, Tiner and Henry, and appellee through its attorney, Mr. Van Ausdall, made the following motions: After the court granted appellee's motion for directed verdict and entered judgment against appellants for $845.31, appellants had the record show that the following instructions were offered: On appeal appellants contend that it was error to direct a verdict upon the unsupported testimony of interested witnesses and to refuse to direct a verdict for appellants. Appellee argues that the cause was properly decided by the court because both sides asked for a directed verdict and that in such cases it is entirely proper for the trial court to withdraw the matter from the jury and to decide the issue. Appellee further contends that the court was correct in directing a verdict for it and in refusing a directed verdict for appellants. The record shows that Mr. Frank C. Ryburn, executive vice president and general manager of Ryburn Ford Sales, a Jonesboro corporation, has had many years experience in automobile sales. On July 25, 1968, appellants bought a 1968 truck and grain bed for $4,529.00. After a $500 down payment there remained a total time price of $4,569.30, payable in three annual installments of $1,523.10. The contract was assigned to Ford Motor Credit Co. and upon default was repurchased by Ryburn Ford Sales for $4,245.31. After repurchase Mr. Ryburn promptly notified appellants the truck would be sold on March 6, 1969. On March 6, Mr. Ryburn called several dealers who were not interested in buying the vehicle. He then called together four of his salesmen and asked, "What amount would you be willing to let this be placed on your books for, for sale at a profit?" The highest bid he received from his salesmen was $3300. He says that he thought the truck was worth $3400 and that is what he placed it on the books for and credited the contract. After the truck was placed on his books, a $530 hydraulic hoist was installed on the truck and $25 spent to transfer the warranty. Thereafter the truck was sold to another purchaser for $4450. He estimates that after overhead he made a profit of $5.50. Other testimony by Mr. Ryburn shows that he used an NADA book with published data or information giving some indication of what vehicles are worth and that because of the particularly low mileage on this vehicle he paid $500 in excess of what the book showed. Appellee also called W. W. Bryant, Jr., an employee of Ryburn Ford Sales, who testified that he bid the vehicle in for $3300, which he considered the wholesale price. That a fair retail price of the vehicle at that time was $3995. He testified that in the automobile business the NADA book is used as a guide to the factory average delivered price and loan value of a vehicle. On cross-examination the witness admitted that Mr. Ryburn bought the automobile back in for the company and he understood it was bought back for $3300. Appellant Cleveland Carter testified that the value of the vehicle at the time of the sale was $4400. As we understand the record and the appropriate law, appellants, by moving for a directed verdict while reserving their right to submit the issue to a jury in the event the directed verdict should be overruled, did not waive their right to have any disputed questions of fact submitted to the jury. In Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Carter, 92 Ark. 378, 123 S.W. 384, 124 S.W. 764 (1909), we held: In Gee v. Hatley, 114 Ark. 376, 170 S.W. 72 (1914), we held: In Gill v. Burks, 207 Ark. 329, 180 S.W.2d 578 (1944), it was stated: In 53 Am.Jur. Trial § 344 (1945), the same principle is stated: Also see Aetna Ins. Co. Inc. v. Warren Adm'x, 231 Ark. 405, 329 S.W.2d 536 (1959), and the numerous cases cited in 16A Ark.Digest, Trials, 177. As we view the evidence neither party was entitled to a directed verdict as a matter of law. The Uniform Commercial Code, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 85-9-504 (Add.1961), provides: Section 85-9-507 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that if a secured party is not proceeding in accordance with the Article on Secured Transactions in disposing of the property, the debtor has a right to recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of the Code. Appellee readily recognizes our opinion in Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966), where we held that a used automobile did not come within the term "a type customarily sold on a recognized market" for purposes of holding a sale without notice. However, appellee suggests that the last sentence of § 85-9-504(3) permits the secured party to purchase at a private sale when the collateral is of a type "which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations." Upon this basis it contends that the NADA book is a widely *203 distributed standard price quotation. With this we do not agree, for the undisputed proof furnished by appellee's own witnesses is that the book is merely a guide to the price of a vehicle of that year, make and model in an average condition. Consequently we hold that a secured party is not complying with the Commercial Code when he purchases a used automobile at his own private sale. Since the disposition of the collateral by appellee was not in accordance with the Article on Secured Transactions (Ark. Stat.Ann. §§ 85-9-501-85-9-507), the burden of proof was upon appellee as plaintiff to prove the amount of any alleged deficiency owing as a result of the appellants' breach of the purchase contract, Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, supra. Under that condition appellee is not in a position to argue that the testimony of its general manager, Mr. Ryburn, and its employee, Mr. Bryant, stands uncontradicted as to the amount of the damage. We held in the Norton case that a secured party's failure to comply with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code with reference to disposition of the collateral did not ipso facto relieve the debtor from his obligation for any deficiency. In view of this holding it also follows that appellants were not entitled to a directed verdict as a matter of law. Reversed and remanded. HARRIS, C. J., and FOGLEMAN, J., dissent. FOGLEMAN, Justice (dissenting). I am in accord with what I believe to be the position of the majority as to the effect of requests by both parties for a directed verdict. I am not in accord with the application of the rule made in the majority opinion. It has been made quite clear by the decisions of this court that, when each litigant asks for an instructed verdict in his favor, and no other instruction is requested by either side, they, in effect, agree that the issue may be decided by the court; and its ruling, having the same effect as the verdict of a jury, will be permitted to stand if there is substantial evidence to support it. National Garages v. Barry, 217 Ark. 593, 232 S.W.2d 655. Submission or withdrawal of fact questions is then discretionary with the trial judge, but, if withdrawn, his judgment has the same effect as if the issues had been decided by the jury. Holloway v. Parker, 197 Ark. 209, 122 S.W.2d 563, 119 A.L.R. 1359. This rule is of no practical effect if the majority's application is correct. Any party by asking any instruction, however erroneous or abstract, could avoid this rule. I do not believe that this is intended. An examination of the two requested instructions clearly indicates to me that appellants did not present requests that required the submission of any issue. Requested instruction No. 1 was a binding instruction to return a verdict for appellant, because Frank Ryburn, the responsible officer of appellee, himself removed any doubt about the sale having been a private one. Surely, the majority does not mean to say that requested instructions that would inevitably result in a verdict for the party asking them are "other instructions." There are many different forms of requests by which an instructed verdict may be sought. Where each requested instruction is, in effect, a peremptory instruction, the rule applies. Upson v. Robison, 179 Ark. 600, 17 S.W.2d 305. The instruction that appellant was entitled to recover any loss caused by a failure to comply with the Uniform Commercial Code would have submitted no issue to the jury. No provision or requirement of this comprehensive code is mentioned or set out. I cannot understand, and I doubt that the average juror could understand what, if any, issue he was to decide. To say the least, it is ambiguous, indefinite and uncertain. An indefinite instruction is not a *204 proper instruction. Laster v. Raper, 173 Ark. 1181, 294 S.W. 994. The giving of an instruction so broad and unqualified as to mislead the jury is erroneous. Bertrand v. Byrd, 5 Ark. 651; Armistead v. Brooke, 18 Ark. 521. An instruction embracing matters and explanations not responsive to the pleadings or evidence so as to obscure the issue is error. Taylor v. Martin, 151 Ark. 200, 235 S.W. 411. It is also error to give an instruction so uncertain that standards and measures of the duty of a party are left to determination by the jury, although they are fixed by law. Little Rock Ry. &amp; Electric Co. v. Goerner, 80 Ark. 158, 95 S.W. 1007, 7 L.R.A.,N.S., 97, 10 Ann. Cas. 273. The purpose of an instruction to the jury is to define the law applicable to the issues of fact in a particular case and to furnish a guide to assist in reaching a verdict. Hearn v. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, 219 Ark. 297, 241 S.W.2d 259; J. C. Engleman, Inc. v. Briscoe, 172 Ark. 1088, 291 S.W. 795. This second requested instruction certainly would have performed none of these functions. It was abstract in that, if it submitted any issue to the jury, it was so comprehensive as to submit issues not raised by the pleadings or evidence. Harkrider v. Cox, 230 Ark. 155, 321 S.W.2d 226. There are literally dozens of commercial code requirements. Clearly this instruction was so abstract that it would have left the determination of both law and facts to the jury and so general as to leave the jury to apply its own devices to the testimony, and should not have been given. See Wisconsin &amp; Arkansas Lumber Co. v. McCloud, 168 Ark. 352, 270 S.W. 599. It was so deficient in this respect as to amount to no instruction. I submit that these two requests did not render improper the trial court's proceeding to determine the issues. In Interstate Business Men's Acc. Ass'n v. Sanderson, 144 Ark. 271, 222 S.W. 51, it was held that one who sought a peremptory instruction did not waive his right to a jury trial when he requested a correct instruction which would have submitted a fact issue to the jury. I submit that the holding in that case, in effect, applies the rule properly. The request for an instruction relied upon to take the case out of the operation of the rule must be both timely and sufficient. See Annot., 68 A.L. R.2d 300, 305[1] (1959). There is no question but what the requests were timely. See Gill v. Burks, 207 Ark. 329, 180 S.W.2d 578. They were neither sufficient nor proper. I do not agree with the conclusion that a secured party does not comply with the requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code as a matter of law when he purchases a used automobile at his own private sale, nor do I agree that the disposition of the collateral here was not in compliance with Ark.Stat.Ann. § 85-9-501 et seq. (Add. 1961) as a matter of law. I think that a question of fact was involved and that the judgment rendered resolved those questions of fact. A review of Ark.Stat.Ann. §§ 85-9-501 through 9-507 (Add.1961) shows clearly that there was no intention to require a public sale for disposition of collateral. Comment 1 to § 85-9-504 indicates that the only restriction upon the sale of collateral by a secured party is that it be commercially reasonable. Section 85-9-507(2) states specifically that sales in the usual manner in a recognized market or at a price current in that market at the time or otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold are, as a matter of law, sales made in a reasonably commercial manner, but does not limit such sales to those three alternatives. See Comment 1, § 85-9-504. The only limitation upon the sale is that it be in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. Comments 1 &amp; 2, § 85-9-507. The code specifically provides that the sale may be public or private and at any time or place and *205 on any terms commercially reasonable. § 85-9-504(3). Purchase by the secured party at private sale is permissible if the collateral is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market or is the subject of widely distributed price quotations. We have held that used automobiles are not the type of collateral sold on a recognized market. Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538. Yet I do not see how it can be said, as a matter of law, that there is not a widely distributed standard price quotation for used cars. It seems more in keeping with the recognized purpose of the commercial code to eliminate "red tape" in such dispositions of collateral to say that there is a question of fact as to whether there is a "widely distributed standard price quotation." Mr. W. W. Bryant, Jr., a man of wide experience in the automobile business since 1936 and who has served as an appraiser of automobiles for 19 years, testified on this point. He stated that the NADA manual is a widely distributed guide or index used as a guide by all automobile dealers, banks and finance companies. According to him, it shows not only the factory average delivered price and loan value for each series in the truck line, but also the retail value and wholesale value. He stated that this manual is also used by insurance companies for replacement purposes and as "a unit symbol" on cars and trucks. Even though the circuit judge "directed a verdict," the sole question for our determination is whether there was substantial evidence to support the judgment. Strange v. Planters' Gin Co., 142 Ark. 100, 218 S.W. 188; Casteel v. K. Lee Williams Theatres, Inc., 221 Ark. 935, 256 S.W.2d 732. I submit that the testimony of Bryant constitutes substantial evidence. His testimony could well be taken to show that there was a widely distributed standard price quotation for the type of collateral involved here. I do not think that we could say that this book was or was not a widely distributed standard price quotation as a matter of law. The evidence indicates that the dealer realized a profit of $5.00 on his resale of the truck and that his private sale bid was $500 more than the price listed in the NADA manual. This result could well be more favorable to a defaulting buyer than the usual ceremonial public sale, where the seller can usually bid without competition. I would affirm the judgment. HARRIS, C. J., joins in this dissent. [1] In Shore v. Coats, 29 S.D. 603, 137 N.W. 402 (1912), it was said that the request must be reasonable and proper.