Title: State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Travis L. Bailey
Citation: 2007 WI 90
Docket Number: 2003AP002482
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 10, 2007

2007 WI 90 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2482 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
     v. 
Travis L. Bailey, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant-
Cross Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 290 Wis. 2d 509, 712 N.W.2d 86 
(Ct. App. 2005—Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 10, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 5, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy G. Dugan 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BUTLER, Jr., J., join the 
dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendant-respondent-cross-appellant-cross 
petitioner there were briefs by Burton A. Strnad and Burton A. 
Strnad, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Burton A. Strnad. 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent-petitioner 
there were briefs by Thomas E. Goss, Jr. and Mueller, Goss & 
Possi, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Thomas E. Goss, Jr.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Lynn R. Laufenberg and 
Laufenberg & Hoefle, Milwaukee, on behalf of Wisconsin Academy 
of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
2007 WI 90
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2482  
(L.C. No. 
2002CV4615) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Travis L. Bailey, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant-
Cross-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed in 
part and affirmed in part.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This is a review of an unpublished 
court of appeals decision,1 which affirmed in part, reversed in 
part, and remanded with directions the judgment of Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court, Timothy G. Dugan, Judge.  Judge Dugan 
entered an order that deemed the reducing clause in a policy 
                                                 
1 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, No. 2003AP2482, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. December 1, 2005). 
No. 
2003AP2482   
 
2 
 
issued by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State 
Farm) unenforceable, dismissed the bad faith claim of Travis L. 
Bailey (Bailey),2 and declared that State Farm's liability to 
Bailey is for provable damages in excess of $62,000 up to State 
Farm's $50,000 underinsured motorist (UIM) limit. 
¶2 
Two issues are before this court.3  First, does 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)1. (2005-06),4 which allows an insurer 
to reduce the limit of underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage by 
"[a]mounts paid by or on behalf of any person or organization 
that may be legally responsible for the bodily injury or death 
                                                 
2 Travis Bailey's bad faith claim was not the subject of 
appeal to the court of appeals or this court. 
3 The issues presented and our respective holdings are the 
same in this case and Marotz v. Hallman, 2007 WI 89, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, which has been released the same 
day. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(5)(i) (2005-06) states: 
A policy may provide that the limits under the 
policy for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage 
for bodily injury or death resulting from any one 
accident shall be reduced by any of the following that 
apply: 
1. Amounts paid by or on behalf of any person or 
organization that may be legally responsible for the 
bodily injury or death for which the payment is made. 
2. Amounts paid or payable under any worker's 
compensation law. 
3. Amounts paid or payable under any disability 
benefits laws. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version, unless otherwise stated. 
No. 
2003AP2482   
 
3 
 
for which the payment is made," permit an insurer to reduce the 
UIM limit by the amount paid by a non-UIM tortfeasor?  We hold 
that § 632.32(5)(i)1. does allow an insurer to reduce the limit 
of UIM liability by the amount paid to an insured by a non-UIM 
tortfeasor.  Second, does the reducing clause in the policy 
issued by State Farm unambiguously comply with § 632.32(5)(i)1.?  
We 
hold 
that 
the 
language 
unambiguously 
complies 
with 
§ 632.32(5)(i)1.   
¶3 
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals in part 
and affirm the court of appeals in part.  We reverse the court 
of appeals in its holding that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)1. does 
not permit an insurer to reduce the limits of UIM liability by 
payments the insured receives from non-UIM tortfeasors.  We 
affirm the court of appeals in its holding that the reducing 
clause is unambiguous in the context of the entire policy.     
I 
¶4 
On April 8, 1998, Bailey rode as a passenger in a 
vehicle driven by Adrian J. Levy (Levy).  Levy's vehicle, 
traveling at a high rate of speed, proceeded through a red 
light.  Leticia T. Regala's (Regala) vehicle had already entered 
the intersection and was struck by Levy's vehicle.  As a result 
of the accident, Bailey sustained injuries. 
¶5 
Levy's vehicle was insured by a liability policy, 
which American Family Insurance Company (American Family) issued 
with a limit of $25,000 per person.  Regala's vehicle was also 
insured by a liability policy issued by American Family, which 
had a limit of $250,000 per person.  American Family made a 
No. 
2003AP2482   
 
4 
 
payment of $25,000 to Bailey on behalf of Levy and a payment of 
$37,500 on behalf of Regala. 
¶6 
Bailey's mother, Loretta Bailey, had a policy issued 
by State Farm in effect at the time of the accident.  Her policy 
provided UIM coverage for her relatives, such as her son.5  The 
UIM coverage provided a limit of liability of $50,000 per 
person. 
¶7 
The declarations page of the policy listed the types 
of coverage included in the policy and the limits of liability 
for each.  Included in the list was "UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE" as 
one of the coverages.  Beneath the list of coverages and limits 
of liability, a list of exceptions and endorsements was 
provided.  Included in the list was a document labeled 6083BB 
and 
entitled 
"AMENDMENTS 
TO 
UNINSURED 
MOTOR 
VEHICLE 
AND 
UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGES." 
¶8 
The UIM section of the policy, as amended by the 
endorsement, provided the following:  
We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is 
legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver 
of an underinsured motor vehicle.  The bodily injury 
must be caused by accident arising out of the 
operation, maintenance or use of an underinsured motor 
vehicle.   
 . . . . 
Underinsured Motor Vehicle – means a land motor 
vehicle:   
                                                 
5 The policy defined "relative" as "a person related to you 
or your spouse by blood, marriage or adoption who lives with 
you.  It includes your unmarried and unemancipated child away at 
school."  
No. 
2003AP2482   
 
5 
 
1. 
the ownership, maintenance or use of which is 
insured or bonded for bodily injury liability at 
the time of the accident; and 
2. 
whose limits of liability for bodily injury 
liability: 
a. 
are less than the limits of liability of 
this coverage; or  
b. 
have been reduced by payments to persons 
other than the insured to less than the 
limits of liability of this coverage.     
Levy's vehicle was a UIM vehicle because the liability limit of 
his coverage was $25,000 per person, which is less than the 
$50,000 liability limit of Bailey's UIM coverage.  On the other 
hand, Regala's vehicle was not a UIM vehicle because the 
liability limit of her coverage was $250,000 per person, which 
is more than the $50,000 liability limit of Bailey's UIM 
coverage. 
¶9 
The policy also included a reducing clause, which read 
as follows: 
2.  The most we will pay is the lesser of:   
a. 
the limits of liability of this coverage 
reduced by any of the following that apply:   
(1) the amount paid to the insured by or on 
behalf of any person or organization 
that may be legally responsible for the 
bodily injury; or 
(2) the amount paid or payable under any 
worker’s 
compensation 
or 
disability 
benefits law; or  
b. 
the amount of damages sustained, but not 
recovered. 
No. 
2003AP2482   
 
6 
 
¶10 Bailey made a claim for UIM benefits against State 
Farm.  State Farm denied that Bailey was entitled to collect on 
his claim.  State Farm asserted that the reducing clause 
permitted it to reduce the $50,000 UIM liability limit by 
payments Bailey received from both Levy and Regala.  Because the 
payments from both of them exceeded the $50,000 UIM liability 
limit, State Farm claimed it did not have to pay Bailey UIM 
benefits.   
¶11 State Farm filed a complaint against Bailey, seeking a 
declaratory judgment from the court stating that it did not owe 
Bailey UIM benefits for the accident involving the collision 
between Levy and Regala.  Bailey filed a counterclaim alleging 
that State Farm had acted in bad faith.   
¶12 Both parties moved for summary judgment.  The circuit 
court issued an order stating that the reducing clause on the 
policy issued by State Farm was unenforceable.  It concluded 
that contextual ambiguity caused the reducing clause to be 
ambiguous because a reasonable person in the insured's position 
would not understand that the limits of UIM liability could be 
reduced by payments received from sources other than a UIM 
tortfeasor.  The circuit court also dismissed Bailey's bad faith 
claim.   
¶13 State Farm filed a motion to reconsider, which the 
court denied.  The court also granted State Farm's motion for 
declaratory relief in which State Farm requested a ruling that 
its liability to Bailey is for provable damages in excess of 
No. 
2003AP2482   
 
7 
 
$62,500 up to the $50,000 limit of UIM liability, based on the 
court's prior ruling that the reducing clause was unenforceable. 
¶14 State Farm appealed to the court of appeals the 
circuit 
court's 
ruling 
that 
its 
reducing 
clause 
was 
unenforceable.  Bailey cross-appealed the circuit court's ruling 
that State Farm's liability to Bailey is for provable damages in 
excess of $62,500 up to State Farm's $50,000 UIM limit.  Bailey 
did not appeal his bad faith claim. 
¶15 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
considered 
whether 
§ 632.32(5)(i)1. permits the reducing clause to be construed in 
a way that permits State Farm to reduce its liability limit by 
the amount of payment Bailey received from Regala.  It held that 
§ 632.32(5)(i)1. does not permit a reducing clause to be 
construed in a way that permits an insurer to reduce its 
liability limit by the amount of payment received by an injured 
insured from a non-UIM tortfeasor.  The court of appeals also 
considered whether State Farm's reducing clause complied with 
§ 632.32(5)(i).  Specifically, it concluded that clause 2.a. of 
the reducing clause was unambiguous in the context of the entire 
policy and clause 2.b. was valid. 
¶16 The parties each petitioned this court for review, 
which was granted. 
II 
¶17 This 
review 
presents 
two 
issues. 
 
First, 
does 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)1. permit an insurer to reduce the UIM 
limit by the amount paid to an insured by a non-UIM tortfeasor?  
Second, does the reducing clause in the policy issued by State 
No. 
2003AP2482   
 
8 
 
Farm unambiguously comply with § 632.32(5)(i)1.?  Because State 
Farm's policy must conform with § 632.32(5)(i)1., we focus 
initially on the statute.  See Theis v. Midwest Sec. Ins. Co., 
2000 WI 15, ¶13, 232 Wis. 2d 749, 606 N.W.2d 162. 
A. Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)1. 
¶18 We first address whether Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)1. 
permits an insurer to reduce an insured's UIM limit by the 
amount paid to an insured by a non-UIM tortfeasor.  This issue 
involves statutory interpretation and the application of a 
statute to specific facts, which are questions of law that we 
review de novo.  Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 
89, ¶9, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258. 
¶19 In Marotz v. Hallman, 2007 WI 89, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___, 
which 
we 
issued 
today, 
we 
concluded 
that 
§ 632.32(5)(i)1. does allow an insurer to reduce the UIM limit 
by the amount paid to an insured by a non-UIM tortfeasor.  
Although an unambiguous statute in one context may be ambiguous 
in another, Teschendorf, 293 Wis. 2d 123, ¶20, that does not 
apply in this case.  The context of this case and Marotz is the 
same.  Both cases involved an injured insured receiving a 
payment from a UIM tortfeasor and a non-UIM tortfeasor.   
¶20 Applying 
our 
interpretation 
from 
Marotz, 
___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ¶¶15-37, § 632.32(5)(i)1. does not bar State Farm 
from including in its policies a reducing clause that reduces 
the limit of UIM liability by payments the injured insured 
receives from non-UIM tortfeasors. 
No. 
2003AP2482   
 
9 
 
B. Policy Language 
¶21 We now turn to whether the reducing clause in the 
policy 
issued 
by 
State 
Farm 
unambiguously 
complies 
with 
§ 632.32(5)(i)1.  The interpretation of an insurance policy 
presents a question of law that we review de novo.  Folkman v. 
Quamme, 2003 WI 116, ¶12, 264 Wis. 2d 617, 665 N.W.2d 857.  
Construing the provisions of an insurance policy requires an 
examination 
of 
the 
specific 
provisions 
at 
issue 
and 
an 
assessment of whether contextual ambiguity exists.  Badger Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Schmitz, 2002 WI 98, ¶61, 255 Wis. 2d 61, 647 
N.W.2d 223. 
1. The reducing clause in the policy issued by State Farm 
¶22 General principles of contract construction control 
the interpretation of an insurance contract.  Taylor v. Greatway 
Ins. Co., 2001 WI 93, ¶10, 245 Wis. 2d 134, 628 N.W.2d 916 
(citing Kremers-Urban Co. v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 
722, 735, 351 N.W.2d 156 (1984)).  Discerning and giving effect 
to the intent of the parties is the objective.  Sprangers v. 
Greatway Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 521, 536, 514 N.W.2d 1 (1994).  
Toward that end, courts give the common, ordinary meaning to the 
policy language (i.e., what the reasonable person in the 
insured's position would understand it to mean).  Folkman, 264 
Wis. 2d 617, ¶17.  Any ambiguity that may exist is construed in 
favor of the insured, while exclusions in coverage are narrowly 
construed against the insurer.  Id., ¶16 (citing Smith v. 
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 155 Wis. 2d 808, 811, 456 N.W.2d 597 
(1990)).  Ambiguity arises if the language of the policy is 
No. 
2003AP2482   
 
10 
 
"susceptible to more than one reasonable construction."  Id.  
The resulting interpretation of the policy's language "should 
advance the insured's reasonable expectations of coverage."  
Taylor, 245 Wis. 2d 134, ¶10. 
¶23 The reducing clause in the case states the following: 
The most we will pay is the lesser of:   
a. 
the limits of liability of this coverage reduced 
by any of the following that apply:   
(1) the amount paid to the insured by or on 
behalf of any person or organization that 
may be legally responsible for the bodily 
injury; or 
(2) the 
amount 
paid 
or 
payable 
under 
any 
worker’s compensation or disability benefits 
law; or  
b. 
the 
amount 
of 
damages 
sustained, 
but 
not 
recovered. 
The provision indicates that payments to an insured from any 
legally responsible person will reduce the limit of UIM 
liability when the language is given its common, ordinary 
meaning.  
¶24 Similar to the use of "legally responsible" in 
§ 632.32(5)(i)1., subsection 1 limits the scope of the reducing 
clause to payments received by an insured from those "legally 
responsible."  A reasonable person in the position of the 
insured would read that language to mean that the limits of UIM 
liability would be reduced by payment an insured received by 
those who may have caused the accident.  Nothing in the language 
of the reducing clause indicates that the payor's UIM status 
No. 
2003AP2482   
 
11 
 
would prevent his or her payment from falling within the scope 
of the reducing clause. 
¶25 Section b of the reducing clause does not affect the 
limits of UIM liability.  Rather, it provides that State Farm 
will pay for only uncompensated damages.  It is a windfall 
prevention provision, which has been deemed valid previously.  
Calbow v. Midwest Sec. Ins. Co., 217 Wis. 2d 675, 682, 579 
N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1998).       
¶26 The 
reducing 
clause 
unambiguously 
complies 
with 
§ 632.32(5)(i)1.  Based on the common, ordinary language, a 
reasonable person in the insured's position would understand the 
clause to have the effect of reducing the UIM liability limit by 
payments made to an insured by or on behalf of those legally 
responsible for the accident at issue, regardless of their UIM 
status. 
2. The reducing clause in the context of the entire policy 
¶27 Our inquiry does not end because of our conclusion 
that the language of the reducing clause is unambiguous.  
Schmitz, 255 Wis. 2d 61, ¶42.  As the court noted in Folkman, 
"[s]ometimes it is necessary to look beyond a single clause or 
sentence to capture the essence of an insurance agreement."  
Folkman, 264 Wis. 2d 617, ¶21.  The essence of the agreement may 
reveal that an unambiguous provision read in isolation is 
ambiguous in the context of other provisions of the policy.  
Schmitz, 255 Wis. 2d 61, ¶61.   
¶28 Contextual 
ambiguity exists when a provision is 
reasonably susceptible to more than one construction when read 
No. 
2003AP2482   
 
12 
 
in the context of the policy's other language.  Folkman, 264 
Wis. 2d 617, ¶29.  "To prevent contextual ambiguity, a policy 
should avoid inconsistent provisions, provisions that build up 
false expectations, and provisions that produce reasonable 
alternative meanings."  Id., ¶31.  For inconsistencies to alter 
the construction of an otherwise unambiguous provision, the 
inconsistencies must be "material to the issue in dispute and be 
of such a nature that a reasonable insured would find an 
alternative meaning."  Id., ¶32. 
¶29 Other provisions of the policy in this case do not 
render the reducing clause reasonably susceptible to more than 
one construction.  The policy begins with declarations, which is 
"generally the portion of an insurance policy to which the 
insured looks first."  Schmitz, 255 Wis. 2d 61, ¶62. The 
declarations page of the policy lists the types of coverage 
included in the policy and the limits of liability for each.  
Included in the list was "UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE" as one of 
the coverages. 
¶30 Beneath the list of coverages and limits of liability, 
a list of exceptions and endorsements was provided.  Included in 
the list is a document labeled 6083BB and entitled "AMENDMENTS 
TO UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE AND UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
COVERAGES."  6083BB is one of the endorsements that Loretta 
Bailey received.  It is clearly marked as "6083BB" at the top of 
the first page.  Additionally, "6083BB" appears in the lower 
right-hand corner of each page.  The document itself is also 
entitled, in bold uppercase letters, "AMENDMENTS TO UNINSURED 
No. 
2003AP2482   
 
13 
 
MOTOR VEHICLE AND UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGES."  To a 
reasonable 
person 
in 
the 
position 
of 
the 
insured, 
the 
endorsement would be easily located.    
¶31 The UIM section of the policy issued by State Farm, as 
amended by the endorsement, provides the following:  
We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is 
legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver 
of an underinsured motor vehicle.  The bodily injury 
must be caused by accident arising out of the 
operation, maintenance or use of an underinsured motor 
vehicle.   
 . . . . 
Underinsured Motor Vehicle – means a land motor 
vehicle:   
1. 
the ownership, maintenance or use of which is 
insured or bonded for bodily injury liability at 
the time of the accident; and 
2. 
whose limits of liability for bodily injury 
liability: 
a. 
are less than the limits of liability of 
this coverage; or  
b. 
have been reduced by payments to persons 
other than the insured to less than the 
limits of liability of this coverage. 
Read in isolation, one may conclude that the language stating 
the payments that State Farm would make indicates that the UIM 
coverage relates to payments made from a UIM tortfeasor.  
However, the point of contextual ambiguity is not to read 
provisions in isolation.  Folkman, 264 Wis. 2d 617, ¶21 (stating 
that "[t]he language of a policy should not be made ambiguous by 
isolating a small part from the context of the whole").  On the 
No. 
2003AP2482   
 
14 
 
declarations page itself, the policy indicates that there are 
"EXCEPTIONS AND ENDORSEMENTS" to the various types of coverage 
provided.  In the list of those exceptions and endorsements 
appears the endorsement related to UIM coverage.  At the top of 
the endorsement, it states, "This endorsement is a part of your 
policy. Except for the changes it makes, all other terms of the 
policy remain the same and apply to this endorsement."  A 
reasonable 
person 
in 
the 
position 
of 
the 
insured 
would 
understand that the reducing clause, amended by the endorsement, 
would affect the benefits he or she may receive from the UIM 
coverage. 
¶32 Considering context, State Farm's policy "clearly sets 
forth that the insured is purchasing a fixed level of UIM 
recovery that will be arrived at by combining payments made from 
all sources."  Dowhower v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 73, 
¶33, 236 Wis. 2d 113, 613 N.W.2d 557.  In this case, the 
combination of explicitly listing the endorsement related to UIM 
coverage on the declarations and the reducing clause that 
complies with § 632.32(5)(i)1. creates the requisite clarity for 
the reducing clause to be deemed enforceable.  Accordingly, we 
hold that the reducing clause in the policy issued by State Farm 
unambiguously complies with § 632.32(5)(i)1. 
III 
¶33 Based on the plain language of § 632.32(5)(i)1., UIM 
insurers may reduce the limit of UIM liability by amounts an 
insured receives from or on behalf of tortfeasors, regardless of 
the payors' UIM status.  The reducing clause included in the 
No. 
2003AP2482   
 
15 
 
policy issued by State Farm unambiguously sets forth the 
coverage that Bailey's mother purchased, making it enforceable.  
Because the payments Bailey received from American Family exceed 
the limit of UIM liability in the State Farm policy, State Farm 
need not pay any benefit to Bailey.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed in part and affirmed in part. 
 
 
 
No.  2003AP2482.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶34 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  For the same 
reasons which are more fully set forth in Marotz v. Hallman, 
2007 
WI 
89, 
__ 
Wis. 2d __, 
__ 
N.W.2d __ 
(Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting), I write separately here.  
¶35 I cannot join the majority's opinion because its 
interpretation that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i) is "plain" and 
unambiguous is based on an analysis that violates a basic 
principle of statutory construction by rendering statutory 
language superfluous.  Additionally, it fails to follow prior 
decisions interpreting the statute. Id., ¶2. 
¶36 The majority concludes that State Farm can reduce UIM 
limits by payments made from non-UIM tortfeasors. Majority op., 
¶2. I disagree. Rather, I determine that § 632.32(5)(i) does not 
permit State Farm to reduce its UIM limits by amounts paid to 
Bailey on behalf of Regala, a non-UIM tortfeasor. Because I 
conclude that § 632.32(5)(i) does not permit such a reduction, I 
need not reach the issue of contextual ambiguity. Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent.  
¶37 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2003AP2482.awb 
 
 
 
1