Title: Moye v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 324, 2006
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: February 22, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JERMAINE MOYE, 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 324, 2006 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below—Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§    
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§   I.D. No. 0410023765 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  January 10, 2007 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  February 22, 2007 
 
O R D E R 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
This 22nd day of February 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
1) 
The defendant-appellant, Jermaine Moye, appeals from final 
judgments entered by the Superior Court.  Moye was sentenced on three charges of 
Rape in the Fourth Degree.  In this direct appeal, Moye contends that the trial 
judge committed plain error by not declaring a mistrial sua sponte. 
 
2) 
The record reflects the trial judge sustained defense counsel’s 
objection to the prosecutor’s closing argument and granted the only request made 
by defense counsel:  to give the jury a curative instruction.  Accordingly, we have 
determined that Moye’s plain error argument is without merit.  Therefore, the 
judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed. 
 
 
2
3) 
The State’s case against Moye was established at trial primarily 
through the testimony of the victim, Chantel Holley,1 who was sixteen years old at 
the time of the second trial.  However, the State also introduced evidence that 
semen found on Chantel’s underwear was determined to be that of Moye through 
DNA analysis, as was an unidentified substance located on Chantel’s body.  In 
addition, the State presented the testimony of a sexual assault nurse who examined 
the victim and found signs of sexual abuse. 
 
4) 
Chantel testified that she first had contact with Moye in March 2004, 
when she was fourteen years old.  According to Chantel, she missed the bus to 
school and was walking along King Street when Moye drove up alongside of her 
and asked her her name and where she was going.  Moye offered Chantel a ride 
home, and she accepted.  Chantel had never seen Moye before.  However, he lived 
near her home.  Moye stopped at his house to get a movie.  He and Chantel then 
drove to her house.  No one was home.  They watched the movie in the basement.  
The two eventually had sexual intercourse.   
 
5) 
Chantel next met Moye in October of the same year.  The encounter 
occurred as she was returning home from school. They went to Moye’s house 
where, at Moye’s direction, she performed fellatio.  Chantel was late arriving home 
that day, angering her mother.  Following that dispute with her mother, Chantel 
                                          
 
1 The Court has assigned a pseudonym to the victim pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d).   
 
 
 
3
went to a girlfriend’s house.  From there, Chantel telephoned Moye, who picked 
her up and drove her back to his house.  Chantel spent the night and part of the 
following day with Moye, during which period the two had sex twice more. 
 
6) 
Moye did not testify at his second trial,2 which is the subject of this 
appeal.  During jury summation, the prosecutor referred to the victim’s testimony 
as “uncontradicted”:  “What Chantel told you is uncontradicted evidence about the 
sexual experiences that she had with the defendant.  Her statements have been, for 
the most part . . ..”  Defense counsel objected immediately and stated that the 
prosecutor’s use of the term “uncontradicted” amounted to a comment on Moye’s 
right to remain silent.  The prosecutor explained that he meant to argue that 
Chantel’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence in the case, statements she 
had made to police.  The trial judge agreed with defense counsel that the 
prosecutor’s use of the term “uncontradicted” rather than “corroborated” was 
problematic.  At defense counsel’s request, the trial judge instructed the jury: 
 
THE COURT:  Ladies and gentlemen, just a few minutes ago I 
gave you an instruction of law which I told you that the defendant’s 
decision not to testify could not be held against him.  So when Mr. 
Chernev says to you that Chantel Holley’s statement is 
uncontradicted, that’s kind of an implicit comment on the defendant’s 
exercise of his rights.  And you’re therefore to disregard that argument 
entirely. 
 
                                          
 
2 Moye’s first trial ended with a mistrial. 
 
 
4
 
7) 
On appeal, Moye argues that the trial judge should have sua sponte 
declared a mistrial and that it was plain error not to have done so.  Moye 
acknowledges that the only relief requested at trial was a curative instruction, 
which was given.  Consequently, his claim that the trial judge should have sua 
sponte ordered a mistrial can only be reviewed for plain error in this appeal.   
8) 
Plain error, however, assumes oversight—that is, error affecting 
substantial rights not brought to the attention of the trial judge.3  In Moye’s case, 
there was no oversight.  Defense counsel raised a timely objection to the 
prosecutor’s argument.  Defense counsel specifically requested a curative 
instruction rather than a mistrial.  The trial judge granted the requested relief.  
Accordingly, since Moye’s attorney made a strategic decision to request a curative 
instruction, and not a mistrial, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion or commit 
plain error by not sua sponte ordering a mistrial.4 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgments of the 
Superior Court are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
3 Tucker v. State, 564 A.2d 1110, 1118 (Del. 1989). 
4 Hardin v. State, 840 A.2d 1217, 1220 (Del. 2003).