Title: PEOPLE OF MI V RODOLFO G RODRIGUEZ JR
Citation: 463 Mich. 466, 620 N.W.2d 13
Docket Number: 115939
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: December 27, 2000

______________________________________________________________________________ 
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________________ 
________________________________ 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED DECEMBER 27, 2000  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 115939  
RUDOLFO G. RODRIGUEZ, JR.,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
The defendant has been convicted of tax evasion, for  
failure to pay use tax on several motor vehicles. The Court  
of Appeals affirmed.  We reverse the judgments of the Court of  
Appeals and the circuit court because the circuit court failed  
to instruct the jury regarding a statutory exemption to the  
tax.  
I  
 
The defendant lived in Hudson and owned carpeting stores  
in Adrian and Hillsdale. 
He also bought and sold used  
vehicles. He knew an automobile dealer in Texas who allowed  
him to use some of that dealership’s temporary permits. While  
there was no fixed pattern to his purchases and sales, the  
defendant typically would buy a vehicle at auction in Ohio,  
place the Texas permit on it, and bring it back to Michigan.  
Here, he would repair the vehicle, and then sell it, again at  
auction.  
A tax investigation led to the present charges. 
The  
defendant faced six felony counts of evading the use tax1 owed  
on six vehicles. 
MCL 205.27(2); MSA 7.657(27)(2). 
They  
included (a) a 1985 one-ton Ford cube van that was painted  
with the name of the defendant’s carpet business, (b) a 1988  
Pontiac Bonneville that was titled in the name of the  
defendant’s wife and that she sometimes drove, (c) a 1988  
Chevrolet van that police found hooked to a trailer that  
contained carpeting for the defendant’s business, (d) a 1978  
Jaguar, (e) a 1984 Mazda 626, and (f) a 1985 Chevrolet Blazer.  
1 The Use Tax Act is MCL 205.91 et seq., MSA 7.555(1) et  
seq.  The use tax is designed to complement the sales tax. It  
applies 
to 
certain personal property transactions in 
which 
the 
seller does not collect a sales tax on behalf of the state.  
The sale of a motor vehicle by one private individual to 
another is one of the most common circumstances to which the  
use tax applies. 
The purchaser must pay the tax-
--six  
percent, the same the sales tax-
--in order to obtain a  
certificate of title. The tax is imposed by MCL 205.93(1); 
MSA 7.555(3)(1). 
Further, the Motor Vehicle Code requires 
payment of the use tax as a condition of obtaining a vehicle 
title. MCL 257.814; MSA 9.2514.  
2  
 
This case was tried in January 1997.  The jury’s  
conclusion was that the defendant was guilty of one felony  
count, for evading the use tax on the Ford cube van.  The  
jurors also found him guilty of misdemeanor counts for evading  
the tax on the Bonneville and the Chevy van. MCL 205.27(4);  
MSA 7.657(27)(4). 
They acquitted him of the charges  
pertaining to the other three vehicles.  
The defendant was fined and placed on probation.  He  
appealed his convictions, but the Court of Appeals affirmed.  
236 Mich App 568; 601 NW2d 134 (1999).2
 Judge SMOLENSKI  
dissented.  
The defendant has filed a delayed application for leave  
to appeal in this Court.  
II  
The defendant raises three issues in this Court.  Two  
have merit, and require that we remand this case to the  
circuit court for a new trial.  
A  
The defendant’s theory of the case was that he acquired  
the vehicles with the intent to hold them just long enough to  
do necessary repairs and then to resell them.  He therefore  
believed 
himself 
to 
fall 
within 
MCL 
205.94(c); 
MSA  
7.555(4)(c), which exempts from the use tax “[p]roperty  
2 
 Reh den, unpublished order entered October 7, 1999 
(Docket No. 202538).  
3  
purchased for resale.”3  
The defendant asked the circuit court to instruct the  
jury regarding the exemption stated in MCL 205.94(c); MSA  
7.555(4)(c).4  The court refused the request, agreeing with  
the Attorney General5 that the “resale” exemption applied only  
to persons who held Michigan dealer licenses.  The court came  
to this conclusion on the basis of the language in the first  
3 MCL 205.94; MSA 7.555(4) provides that "[t]he tax  
levied . . . does not apply" to several categories of 
property. One is described in subsection (c):  
Property purchased for resale, demonstration 
purposes, or lending or leasing to a public or 
parochial school offering a course in automobile 
driving except that a vehicle purchased by the 
school shall be certified for driving education and 
shall not be reassigned for personal use by the 
school's administrative personnel.  For a dealer  
selling a new car or truck, exemption for  
demonstration purposes shall be determined by the 
number of new cars and trucks sold during the 
current calendar year or the immediately preceding 
year without regard to specific make or style 
according to the following schedule of 0 to 25, 2 
units; 26 to 100, 7 units; 101 to 500, 20 units; 
501 or more, 25 units; but not to exceed 25 cars 
and trucks in 1 calendar year for demonstration 
purposes.  Property purchased for resale includes 
promotional merchandise transferred pursuant to a 
redemption offer to a person located outside this 
state or any packaging material, other than  
promotional merchandise, acquired for use in  
fulfilling a redemption offer or rebate to a person 
located outside this state.  
Other exemptions are stated in MCL 205.93(3); MSA 7.555(3)(3) 
and MCL 205.94; MSA 7.555(4).  
4 
 
Each 
side 
submitted 
a 
set 
of 
proposed 
jury 
instructions.  The defendants’ included an instruction that  
“the defendant is exempted from the use tax if the vehicle was 
purchased for resale or for demonstration purposes.”  
5 The Attorney General prosecuted this case.  
4  
 
sentence of a different subsection, MCL 205.93(2); MSA  
7.555(3)(2).6  That sentence provides:  
The tax imposed by this section for the  
privilege of using, storing, or consuming a  
vehicle, ORV, mobile home, aircraft, snowmobile, or 
watercraft shall be collected before the transfer  
of the vehicle, ORV, mobile home, aircraft, 
snowmobile, or watercraft, except a transfer to a 
licensed dealer or retailer for purposes of resale 
that arises by reason of a transaction made by a 
person who does not transfer vehicles, ORVs, mobile 
homes, aircraft, snowmobiles, or watercraft in the 
ordinary course of his or her business done in this 
state.  
6  
The tax imposed by this section for the  
privilege of using, storing, or consuming a  
vehicle, ORV, mobile home, aircraft, snowmobile, or 
watercraft shall be collected before the transfer  
of the vehicle, ORV, mobile home, aircraft, 
snowmobile, or watercraft, except a transfer to a 
licensed dealer or retailer for purposes of resale 
that arises by reason of a transaction made by a 
person who does not transfer vehicles, ORVs, mobile 
homes, aircraft, snowmobiles, or watercraft in the 
ordinary course of his or her business done in this 
state. The tax on a vehicle, ORV, snowmobile, and 
watercraft shall be collected by the secretary of 
state before the transfer of the vehicle, ORV, 
snowmobile, or watercraft registration. The tax on  
a mobile home shall be collected by department of 
commerce, mobile home commission, or its agent 
before the transfer of the certificate of title.  
The tax on an aircraft shall be collected by the 
department 
of 
treasury. 
Notwithstanding 
any 
limitation contained in [MCL 205.92; MSA 7.555(2)], 
the price tax base of any vehicle, ORV, mobile 
home, aircraft, snowmobile, or watercraft subject 
to taxation under this act shall be not less than  
its retail dollar value at the time of acquisition 
as fixed pursuant to rules promulgated by the 
department.  
This is the language of the statute as it read at the time of 
these events.  In 1999 PA 117, the Legislature changed the 
third sentence, so that it names the Department of Consumer 
and Industry Services rather than the Department of Commerce.  
5  
 
The court’s refusal to give the requested instruction  
limited defense counsel to arguing that the defendant had not  
intended to evade the use tax.  
The Court of Appeals majority agreed with the circuit  
court that the instruction need not be given.  It said that  
the exemption stated in MCL 205.94(c); MSA 7.555(4)(c) was  
inapplicable to this case because MCL 205.93(2); MSA  
7.555(3)(2) is more specific, and thus controls.  236 Mich App  
572.  
This analysis failed to persuade the dissenting judge in  
the Court of Appeals, who wrote:  
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that 
defendant could not take advantage of the resale 
exemption in MCL 205.94(c); MSA 7.555(4)(c) . . . 
because the more specific section for vehicle 
transfers, MCL 205.93(2); MSA 7.555(3)(2) . . . 
applied.  On the contrary, I conclude that [MCL  
205.94(c); MSA 7.555(4)(c)], which creates a  
separate tax exemption for property purchased for 
resale, 
specifically 
applies 
to 
defendant’s  
transactions.  I further conclude that the trial  
court erred in failing to instruct the jury that 
defendant was exempt from paying use tax if he 
intended to resell the vehicles pursuant to the 
specific exemption set forth in [MCL 205.94(c); MSA 
7.555(4)(c)]. [236 Mich App 574.]  
The meaning of these statutory provisions “is a question  
of law that we decide de novo.  People v Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich  
431, 436, n 10; 606 NW2d 645 (2000); People v Morey, 461 Mich  
325, 329-330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999).”  In re Investigation of  
1999 Riots, 463 Mich 378, 383; 617 NW2d 310 (2000).  
We agree with the dissenting judge.  In MCL 205.94(c);  
MSA 7.555(4)(c), the Legislature provided in clear and  
6  
 
 
unambiguous language an exemption for property purchased for  
resale.  The reliance by the Court of Appeals majority on MCL  
205.93(2); MSA 7.555(3)(2) was misplaced. 
The latter  
provision spells out such details as the time of payment and  
the identity of the payee.  
The Attorney General argues that the MCL 205.94(c); MSA  
7.555(4)(c) 
and 
MCL 
205.93(2); 
MSA 
7.555(3)(2) 
“are  
complements of one another and are intended to provide the  
same exemption for licenced dealers who purchase vehicles for  
the purpose of resale.”  Otherwise, “a person could buy  
vehicles out of the state, tax-free, and bring them into  
Michigan and never pay taxes on the vehicles in Michigan,  
arguing that he intended to resell it eventually, perhaps  
50,000 or 100,000 miles later.” Two responses are apparent.  
First, in enacting the language of MCL 205.94(c); MSA  
7.555(4)(c), the Legislature did not restrict the “purchased  
for resale” exemption to dealers. Second, the plain meaning  
of the phrase “purchased for resale” conveys a legislative  
intent inconsistent with purchase for another purpose.  
With regard to transactions exempt from the use tax,  
Judge SMOLENSKI is correct that MCL 205.94(c); MSA 7.555(4)(c)  
provides the specific and controlling language.  Under that  
provision, the defendant was-
-
-if a properly instructed jury  
were to believe his version of the facts-
-
-exempt from the tax.  
B  
The 
Legislature has mandated that a 
trial 
court 
“instruct  
7  
 
the jury as to the law applicable to the case.” MCL 768.29;  
MSA 28.1052.  The court’s obligation to instruct on a proposed  
defense was described in People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 80-81;  
537 NW2d 909 (1995):7  
A criminal defendant has the right to have a 
properly instructed jury consider the evidence 
against him. People v Vaughn, 447 Mich 217; 524 
NW2d 217 (1994); People v Lewis, 91 Mich App 542; 
283 NW2d 790 (1979).  However, a trial court is not 
required 
to 
present 
an 
instruction 
of 
the  
defendant's theory to the jury unless the defendant 
makes such a request. People v Wilson, 122 Mich App  
1, 3; 329 NW2d 513 (1982).  Further, when a jury 
instruction is requested on any theories or  
defenses and is supported by evidence, it must be 
given to the jury by the trial judge.  People v  
Rone (On Remand), 101 Mich App 811; 300 NW2d 705 
(1980).
 A trial court is required to give a 
requested instruction, except where the theory is 
not supported by evidence.  People v Stubbs, 99 
Mich App 643; 298 NW2d 612 (1980); People v Staph, 
155 Mich App 491; 400 NW2d 656 (1986).  
In the present case, the statutory exemption would apply  
if the evidence introduced by the defendant were believed by  
the jury, and thus the circuit court erred in failing to give  
the requested instruction. 
There remains, however, the  
question whether this error was harmless.  
C  
A chart outlining the principles governing an inquiry  
into harmless error is set forth in People v Carines, 460 Mich  
750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).  As one can readily see from  
that page of Carines, nonconstitutional preserved error is  
evaluated under the standard set forth in People v Lukity, 460  
7 Judgment order modified 450 Mich 1212 (1995).  
8  
Mich 484; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).  In Lukity, we quoted our  
statement in People v Mateo, 453 Mich 203, 211; 551 NW2d 891  
(1996), that MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096 “should be viewed as a  
legislative directive to presume the validity of verdicts.”  
In light of that presumption, we said in Lukity:  
[MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096], with its rebuttable 
presumption, clearly places the burden on the 
defendant 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
a 
preserved, 
nonconstitutional error resulted in a miscarriage 
of justice. [460 Mich 493-494.]  
and  
[T]he bottom line is that [MCL 769.26; MSA 
28.1096] 
presumes 
that 
a 
preserved,  
nonconstitutional error is not a ground for  
reversal unless “after an examination of the entire  
cause, it shall affirmatively appear” that it is 
more probable than not that the error was outcome 
determinative. [460 Mich 495-496.]  
These principles were further refined 
in 
People 
v 
Snyder,  
462 Mich 38, 45; 605 NW2d 831 (2000), and People v Elston, 462  
Mich 751-766; 614 NW2d 595 (2000).  As we explained in Elston:  
In order to overcome the presumption that a 
preserved nonconstitutional error is harmless, a 
defendant must persuade the reviewing court that it 
is more probable than not that the error in  
question was outcome determinative. 
People v  
Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).  
An 
error 
is 
deemed 
to 
have 
been 
“outcome  
determinative” if it undermined the reliability of 
the verdict.  See People v Snyder, 462 Mich 38, 45; 
605 NW2d 831 (2000), citing Lukity, supra at 495­
496.  In making this determination, the reviewing 
court should focus on the nature of the error in  
light of the weight and strength of the untainted 
evidence.
 See Lukity, supra at 495; People v  
Mateo, 453 Mich 203, 215; 551 NW2d 891 (1996). 
[462 Mich 766.]  
Under the standard set forth in Lukity and Elston, the  
9  
 
 
error in this case was not harmless.  The jury received no  
instruction on an exception to the use tax statute that was  
crucial to the defendant’s defense and was clearly supported  
by the evidence. 
There is no question that the error  
undermined the reliability of the verdict, and thus was  
“outcome-determinative” under Lukity and Elston.  
III  
The Assistant Attorney General objected during defense  
counsel's closing argument.  In the course of ruling on the  
objection, 
the circuit court (referring to 
the 
defendant) 
told  
the jury, "he's subject to the tax." That statement was made  
during the following discussion by the attorneys and the  
court:  
[Defense Counsel]: 
. . . 
The unrefuted  
testimony is that every single one of these other 
vehicles at some point-
-
-nobody knows for sure when 
or where-
-
-were sold at auction, either in this  
State or in another state, and as long as it is a 
dealer-to-dealer transaction, the sales use [sic] 
tax doesn’t apply.  That’s the purpose of being a 
dealership, and, therefore, it’s when the ultimate 
consumer-
-
-that’s what a sales tax is all about.  
It's when the ultimate consumer gets it, and that's 
why it's on the cash register tape if there's a 
sales tax on it.  When it goes from wholesale to 
retail, that’s the point at which the duty to pay 
taxes applies.  
[Assistant Attorney General]: Objection, Your 
Honor.  It's-
-
-that part I'm not going to say that's 
part [sic] a misstatement of the law.  It’s not the  
statement of law that’s applicable here because of 
the Defendant’s lack of being a dealer, and, so, 
therefore, it . . .  
[Defense Counsel]: 
That’s his argument, 
Judge.  
10  
 
 
 
[Assistant Attorney General]: . . . it  
shouldn’t go to this jury.  
The Court: 
No, that-
-
-that’s true.  That’s  
not applicable to a nondealer, and Defendant is a  
nondealer.  
[Defense Counsel]: 
I understand, Judge, but 
I have a-
-
-I have argued, and there is no proof from 
any 
witness 
for 
the 
Prosecution 
that 
his  
dealer-
-
-that his Texas dealer tags were invalid in 
Michigan. Nobody testified . . .  
The Court: He’s not a Michigan dealer.  
[Defense Counsel]: I understand he's . . .  
The Court: Counsel, I've ruled.  
[Defense Counsel]:  I understand he’s not a  
Michigan dealer.  
The Court: 
He’s not a Michigan dealer, and  
that means he’s subject to the tax.  
[Defense Counsel]: Judge, that . . .  
The Court: Counsel, I have ruled.  
[Defense Counsel]:  Your Honor, I believe that  
that is wrong.  
The Court:  You may believe it’s wrong all you 
want, but it is the law of this State, and you’re 
to follow it in your argument. 
[Emphasis  
supplied.]  
At the next recess, defense counsel moved for a mistrial.  
One of his several grounds was that the court's statement that  
the defendant was subject to the tax "is a direct violation of  
the province of the Court and the jury and is, in effect,  
directing a verdict of guilt." The court denied the motion.  
The Court of Appeals majority likewise denied relief,  
interpeting the circuit court's statement as an instruction  
11  
  
regarding the proper application of MCL 205.93(2); MSA  
7.555(3)(2).  236 Mich App 573.  The majority added, "we do  
not find that the trial court’s instruction to the jury that  
the exemption did not apply amounted to a directed verdict of  
guilt.” 236 Mich App 574.  
Again, we find the dissent to be more persuasive.  Judge  
SMOLENSKI wrote:  
I 
also 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority's 
interpretation of the trial court's statement in 
the presence of the jury that defendant was "not a 
Michigan dealer, and that means he's subject to the 
tax," as an instruction to the jury that the 
exception 
set 
forth 
in 
[MCL 
205.93(2); 
MSA  
7.555(3)(2)] did not apply because defendant was 
not a Michigan dealer. "There is a difference  
between commenting on the evidence and making a 
finding of fact for the jury." People v Reed, 393 
Mich 342, 351; 224 NW2d 867 (1975).  When the court  
made this statement, it invaded the province of the 
jury. 
Id. at 351. 
Furthermore, if the trial  
court's 
statement 
is 
construed 
to 
be 
an  
instruction, then the court committed an error  
requiring reversal because it instructed the jury 
that an essential element of the criminal offense  
exists as a matter of law. Id. at 349-351; People  
v Tice, 220 Mich App 47, 54; 558 NW2d 245 (1996). 
[236 Mich App 574-575.]  
Because the instructional error discussed in part II of  
this opinion compels 
us 
to 
reverse 
the defendant's convictions  
and remand this case for a new trial, we will not extend our  
discussion of this second issue.  For the reasons stated by  
the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals, however, the  
proceedings on remand must be free of a judicial statement to  
the jury resolving the central question of the defendant's  
obligation to pay the disputed tax.  
12  
 
 
 
IV  
For the reasons stated in part II of this opinion, we  
reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the circuit  
court, and we remand this case to the circuit court for a new  
trial. MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
WEAVER, C.J., and TAYLOR, CORRIGAN, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ., concurred in the result only.  
13  
People v Rodriguez  
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey,  
Solicitor General, John D. O’Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and  
K. Naomi Lim, Assistant Attorney General [1200 Sixth Street,  
Suite 1500, Detroit, MI 48226] [(313) 256-2352], for the  
people.  
Hugh M. Davis, Jr. [719 Griswold, Suite 1630, Detroit, MI  
48226] [(313) 961-2255], for the defendant.  
1