Title: State v. Beadle
Citation: 326 P.2d 344, 84 Ariz. 217
Docket Number: 1107
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: May 28, 1958

84 Ariz. 217 (1958) 326 P.2d 344 The STATE of Arizona, Plaintiff, v. Alfred N. BEADLE, Defendant. No. 1107. Supreme Court of Arizona. May 28, 1958. Rehearing Denied June 24, 1958. *218 Robert Morrison, Atty. Gen., and Robert G. Mooreman, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff. Snell &amp; Wilmer, Phoenix, by Frederick K. Steiner, Jr., Phoenix, for defendant. *219 UDALL, Chief Justice. Defendant, Alfred N. Beadle, was charged by a direct information filed by the County Attorney of Maricopa County with two misdemeanors, allegedly committed on or about March 9, 1956, viz.: count No. 1, practicing as an architect without registration, and count No. 2, practicing as an engineer without registration, both in violation of section 67-1823, A.C.A. 1939 (now A.R.S. § 32-145). Upon various legal grounds the defendant moved to quash the information. Before a ruling was made thereon the trial court, pursuant to Rule 346, Rules of Criminal Procedure, and with the consent of defendant and the county attorney, certified six questions of law relative to the Technical Registration Act of 1935 (A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 1). These questions, in the opinion of the trial court, were "* * * sufficiently doubtful and important to require the decision * * *" of this court before proceeding to a trial of the case. For the purpose of certification the parties have stipulated that a trial of this action would show certain facts. The pertinent portion of that stipulation follows: This is a companion case to State Board of Technical Registration v. McDaniel, 84 Ariz. 223, 326 P.2d 348, and State Board of Technical Registration v. Bauer, 84 *220 Ariz. 237, 326 P.2d 358 (hereinafter referred to as McDaniel or Bauer). All three cases were consolidated for oral argument as each involves some phase of the Technical Registration Act. We shall, therefore, refrain from repeating any pronouncements made in the other decisions that are pertinent and applicable to similar questions presented here. The penal provisions of the Technical Registration Act of 1935 are found in section 67-1823, A.C.A. 1939 (now A.R.S. § 32-145). There being no material difference in the two sections we will quote from and refer to A.R.S. § 32-145. The pertinent portions of that section read as follows: The six certified questions will be stated and answered in the order presented to us. The parties will be referred to as the State and defendant. The Technical Registration Act will be referred to as the Act. Section 32-145 makes it a violation of the Act if one, inter alia, (a) practices; or (b) offers to practice; or (c) holds oneself out as qualified to practice; or (d) advertises he is qualified to practice; or (e) assumes the title of a profession in which he is not qualified. By the very wording of the Act fraud or misrepresentation are *221 not made essential elements of an offense under the above section and therefore this question is answered in the negative. This question is answered no. For (a) see the answer to question one, supra. For (b) and (c) see the McDaniel case, supra. The definitions in A.R.S. § 32-101 are different from those in section 67-1802, A.C.A. 1939, but for the reasons stated in the McDaniel case we hold they are sufficient. The purpose of an Act, promulgated under the State's police power, is to protect the public health, safety or welfare. *222 Where police regulation is unconnected with its avowed purpose it is stricken down as depriving the party of a property right without due process. Edwards v. State Board of Barber Examiners, 72 Ariz. 108, 231 P.2d 450; Buehman v. Bechtel, 57 Ariz. 363, 114 P.2d 227, 134 A.L.R. 1374; Atchison, T. &amp; S.F. Ry. Co. v. State, 33 Ariz. 440, 265 P. 602, 58 A.L.R. 563. This question was presented to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee in the case of State Board of Examiners v. Rodgers, 167 Tenn. 374, 69 S.W.2d 1093. Therein: The court said: The inclusion of design, insofar as it bears relation to the safety of the structure, regardless of the designer's assumption of responsibility therefor, is one of the primary objects of protection furnished by the statute. A person who designs buildings cannot escape the necessary responsibility therefor by merely declining to assure the safety of the structure when it is constructed according to his plans. He is practicing architecture and as such must be registered. This is contemplated by the Act. See, A.R.S. § 32-101, subd. 2 and § 32-144, subds. 4 and 5. Section 67-1802(b) and section 67-1818 (e) and (f), A.C.A. 1939. The answer to this question is yes. The parties have paraphrased questions four and five into one, as above stated. We will so treat them. We have stated in question three that design is connected with the public health, welfare and safety, and as such is subject to regulation. It must necessarily follow that designers performing architectural services are subject to regulation. It is urged this regulation creates a monopoly in the registrants and that qualifications for registration are unrelated to the purpose of regulation. The qualifications in question have been established under a valid exercise of the police power vested in the state. That a limited number of persons do thereby practice is not unlawful, for registration is open to all who *223 qualify. There is no discriminatory favoritism or monopoly created by the Act. There must appear an obvious and real connection between the conduct regulated and the purpose of the Act. There appears this connection between architectural design, and construction in accordance therewith, and the regulation of architectural designers. The answer to both of these questions is no. The final question (No. 6) certified to us for an answer, is substantially as follows: Defendant makes practically the same contentions and cites the same authority relied upon by appellees in the McDaniel and Bauer cases, supra. It is our view that the contentions made here are fully answered by the decisions rendered in the last named cases. The Attorney General has cited in support of the Board's position these additional cases not elsewhere cited that are in point and support the constitutionality of our Act as against the attack here asserted, viz.: Clayton v. Bennett, 5 Utah 2d 152, 298 P.2d 531; Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 43 S. Ct. 303, 67 L. Ed. 590, and Janeway v. State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 33 Tenn. App. 280, 231 S.W.2d 584. Our answer to the above question is "No". Summarizing: Questions numbered 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 are answered in the negative; question numbered 3 is answered in the affirmative. WINDES, PHELPS, STRUCKMEYER and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.