Title: MONEYPENNEY v. DAWSON
Citation: 141 P.3d 549, 2006 OK 53
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: July 5, 2006

MONEYPENNEY v. DAWSON Annotate this Case MONEYPENNEY v. DAWSON 2006 OK 53 141 P.3d 549 Case Number: 101311 Decided: 07/05/2006 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA DEWAYNE MONEYPENNEY, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. RICHARD E. DAWSON, Defendant/Appellee. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION III APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA HONORABLE CAROLYN R. RICKS, TRIAL JUDGE ¶0 Plaintiff/Appellant, Dewayne Moneypenney (Plaintiff) filed a Petition for monetary relief against Defendant/Appellee, Richard E. Dawson (Defendant) claiming damage to his residential real property was caused by water flowing onto Plaintiff's lot by virtue of Defendant having altered the natural water drainage or flow on the latter's own lot. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss that asserted the suit was time-barred based on the assertion the two year statute of limitations had expired prior to the filing of Plaintiff's Petition. The trial court sustained the motion and dismissed Plaintiff's entire case with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed. In an unpublished opinion the Court of Civil Appeals, Division III affirmed. We hold the trial court erred. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT ORDER REVERSED AND MATTER REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. F. Smith Barnes, F. SMITH BARNES, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Plaintiff/Appellant. Maurice G. Woods, II and Thomas M. Wright, McATEE & WOODS, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Defendant/Appellee. LAVENDER, J. ¶1 Plaintiff/Appellant, Dewayne Moneypenney (Plaintiff) filed a Petition (Petition 2) for monetary relief against Defendant/Appellee, Richard E. Dawson (Defendant) claiming damage to his residential real property was caused by water flowing onto Plaintiff's lot by virtue of Defendant having altered the natural water drainage or flow on the latter's own lot. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss asserting the suit was time-barred because the two year statute of limitations found at ¶2 The bar of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. ¶3 On March 1, 2004 Plaintiff filed Petition 2 against Defendant in Oklahoma County District Court Case No. CJ-2004-1685, the underlying case giving rise to this appeal. In full the body of Petition 2 states: COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Dewayne Moneypenney, and for his cause of action against the Defendant, Richard E. Dawson ... alleges and states: 1. Plaintiff is and all times mentioned in this Petition was a resident of Oklahoma County, State of Oklahoma. Defendant is a resident of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. Property subject to this litigation is located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. 2. On August 18, 2000, Plaintiff purchased residential property described as 7200 N.W. 129th Street, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 3. In April, 2001, Defendant commenced bringing in additional soil on [the] lot located at 13105 Dawson Court, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Such lot is immediately behind the residential lot owned by Plaintiff. In the process of construction, the Defendant added substantial amounts of soil and caused the natural drainage to be altered. 4. As a result of the alteration of the natural water flow by Defendant, at such time as rains occur or the adjoining lot owner waters the grass, Plaintiff's property is flooded and damaged. This damage was caused by the wrongful act of the Defendant by the improper change in the natural flow of water. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment in an amount in excess of $10,000.00 against the Defendant, Richard E. Dawson, together with attorney's fees and court costs. Boiled down, Petition 2 alleges Defendant altered the natural topography of his own lot by adding dirt to it and when it rains or Defendant waters his own lawn, Plaintiff's lot is flooded and damaged. ¶4 In May 2004 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Petition 2 with prejudice asserting it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted based solely on the argument Plaintiff's claim was time-barred because the two year limitation period found at § 95(A)(3) expired before it was filed. ¶5 Defendant, at pg. 1 of a June 8, 2004 reply to Plaintiff's response to the dismissal motion, informs that DKG "was involved in the building of [D]efendant's home on [D]efendant's lot ...." For the purposes of our disposition of this appeal, we will assume that is true. We also note that the record does not indicate any other relation between DKG, or the individual Gary Dawson, with Defendant, notwithstanding they share the same last name. In any event, the only noteworthy differences in Petition 1 and Petition 2 (other than the difference in defendants) are that the earlier suit alleged additional soil was brought onto two lots (rather than one) immediately behind Plaintiff's lot (i.e., both onto 13105 Dawson Court and 13109 Dawson Court) and it was, apparently, water from rain or lawn watering traveling from both adjoining lots (rather than one) that caused flooding and damage to Plaintiff's real property. ¶6 In affirming the trial court's dismissal Order the COCA reasoned, in effect, that Plaintiff knew at some time between April 2001 (the beginning of dirt addition to Defendant's property) and September 14, 2001 (the date Petition 1 was filed against DKG) about the damage to his house and/or lot by the alteration of the natural water flow. Obviously, the September 14, 2001 date is more than two years before Petition 2 was filed on March 1, 2004. ¶7 There can be no question Plaintiff knew on or before September 14, 2001, the date he filed the previous suit against DKG, that the claimed diversion of water from Defendant's property onto his own caused him some injury and that the underlying instant case was initiated by Petition 2 more than two years after the September 14, 2001 date, i.e., on March 1, 2004. However, in view of the type of tort sued for here (or those of a similar nature) merely because Plaintiff knew of some injury to his property more than two years prior to filing Petition 2 is insufficient at the pleading stage to make a determination that his entire claim is time-barred. ¶8 This Court has plainly recognized that a landowner may not in diverting surface waters from its usual and ordinary course collect and convey it by the construction of artificial embankments, ditches or the like from that person's land onto the land of an adjoining neighbor causing injury to the latter's property and that such conduct is actionable. See City of Ardmore v. Orr, ¶9 As a general proposition, "[w]hen a cause of an injury is abatable either by an expenditure of labor or money, it will not be held permanent." City of Ardmore v. Orr, ¶10 In a case decided about a decade ago the Court of Civil Appeals correctly stated the general rule applicable in cases of reoccurring, temporary damages caused by a nuisance susceptible of abatement. "To the extent damages caused by a nuisance are temporary in nature -- i.e., damages reasonably capable of abatement -- they will be held not permanent and the statute [of limitations] will not begin to run until injury is suffered." N. C. Corff Partnership, Ltd. v. OXY USA, Inc., ¶11 As to any permanent damage Plaintiff claims was caused, the period of limitation would not commence for such "permanent damage to realty until the damage is apparent and it becomes obvious that such damage is of a permanent character." See Harper-Turner Oil Co. v. Bridge, ¶12 Neither Petition 1 nor 2 (nor anything else in this record) shows that more than two years before the filing of Petition 2 it was apparent to Plaintiff or would have been apparent to a reasonable person under the same circumstances that any damage to his realty was of a permanent nature. It therefore cannot be said as a matter of law at the pleading stage that any claim for permanent damage is time-barred. ¶13 Of course, at this stage of the litigation, i.e., the initial pleading stage, we do not know what the actual facts are concerning Plaintiff's claim. However, a fair reading of Petition 2 posits a reoccurring tortious situation. Ultimately, the statute of limitations issue might be subject to jury determination or involvement and might be dependent on facts concerning the character of the cause of Plaintiff's alleged damages and/or the type of damages, if any, he has suffered. Further, the following from Commercial Drilling Co. v. Kennedy, [W]hen it becomes obvious that a permanent injury has been suffered by the real estate, a cause of action for permanent injuries accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run as to the damages, present and prospective, resulting exclusively from the permanent injury then suffered. But the statute cannot run as to damages which may later be caused by future possible injuries not yet inflicted by the possible continuance of the abatable source of injury. We think the trial court sufficiently excluded from the consideration of the jury damages flowing from injuries, permanent or temporary, which may have occurred more than 2 years before this action was commenced. Id. ¶14 In sum, it cannot be determined from the face of Petition 1 or 2 that the entire claim of Plaintiff for which he seeks monetary relief is barred by the statute of limitations found at ¶15 The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is VACATED, the trial court Order dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff's suit against Defendant is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. ¶16 WATT, C.J., LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, OPALA, KAUGER, EDMONDSON and COLBERT, JJ., concur. ¶17 WINCHESTER, V.C.J. and TAYLOR, J., dissent. FOOT