Title: Patterson v. Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC15-228
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: August 25, 2016

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-228 
____________ 
 
LAWRENCE WILLIAM PATTERSON,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[August 25, 2016] 
 
POLSTON, J. 
In two vehicle arson cases, our First and Fourth District Courts of Appeal 
reached conflicting decisions regarding the due process implications of admitting 
the testimony of State experts who physically examined the vehicle prior to its 
destruction where the defendant’s expert did not have that opportunity.  Compare 
Patterson v. State, 153 So. 3d 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (finding no due process 
violation), with Lancaster v. State, 457 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (finding 
due process violation).1  Applying the well-established rule from Arizona v. 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), that the State’s loss or destruction of evidence 
potentially useful to the defense violates due process only when done in bad faith, 
we hold that no due process violation occurred in Patterson’s case because there is 
no evidence of bad faith.  Accordingly, for the reasons explained below, we 
approve the result of the First District’s decision in Patterson and disapprove the 
Fourth District’s pre-Youngblood decision in Lancaster.     
BACKGROUND 
Patterson’s jury convicted him of multiple crimes stemming from the alleged 
arsons of his truck and residence.  As the First District explained, 
[t]he arsons for which Patterson was tried and convicted completely 
destroyed his house and truck (which was parked in the garage at the 
time).  It was alleged that Patterson used the truck to start one of the 
two arson fires in the house.  [Not long after firefighters extinguished 
this first fire that allegedly originated in the truck, they were called 
back to Patterson’s residence in response to a second fire that 
allegedly originated in one of the bedrooms.]  After State Fire Marshal 
and insurance company investigators completed their work, including 
inspecting the truck, and after the auto insurer paid Patterson the 
proceeds of his insurance policy, the insurer took custody of the truck 
and had it destroyed.  This occurred five months before Patterson was 
arrested and charged.  With the vehicle itself unavailable, Patterson’s 
fire investigation expert reviewed approximately 300 photographs of 
the burned truck and garage area.  (He also personally inspected the 
dwelling.) 
Before trial, Patterson moved the trial court to dismiss all the 
charges, or alternatively, to exclude any testimony from State expert 
witnesses opining, based on their physical examination of the truck, 
on whether the truck fire was intentionally started.  He argued the 
State had intentionally destroyed the truck, making it unavailable to 
his expert and, as a consequence, violated his constitutional right to 
due process.  The trial court denied the requested relief, allowing 
 
 
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prosecution experts Stephen Callahan, Mike Miller and Bob Hallman 
to describe for the jury how they each examined the truck, and to give 
the jury their opinions on how the truck fire started.  [In addition to 
these experts, the State presented expert testimony from David 
Cheers, an investigator retained by Patterson’s homeowner’s 
insurance company who also physically examined the truck.] 
 
Patterson, 153 So. 3d at 309. 
 
At trial, the experts’ testimony conflicted as to the origin of the fire, with the 
State’s experts testifying that the fire was not accidental and Patterson’s expert 
testifying that it was.  Though the State’s experts had physically examined the 
truck before it was destroyed, whereas Patterson’s expert did not have that 
opportunity, the experts relied heavily on extensive photographs of the truck and 
garage to support their testimony.   
For example, the State’s experts relied on the following in support of their 
conclusion that the fire was not accidental:  (i) burn patterns in the truck indicating 
that the fire primarily came from the passenger compartment, rather than from 
electrical components in the engine compartment; (ii) burn patterns on the inside 
wall of the garage on the passenger side of the truck indicating that the truck’s 
passenger door was open during the fire; (iii) a sample taken from the passenger 
compartment that tested positive for gasoline, indicating that accelerant had been 
poured inside the truck and ignited by an open heat source; (iv) the presence of 
combustible material remaining in the engine compartment that would not be 
expected to withstand a fire that began in the engine, including plastic on the 
 
 
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battery and aluminum, which has a low melting point, on the radiator; and (v) 
wiring in the engine compartment, passenger compartment, and under the 
dashboard that showed no signs of arcing as would be expected if the fire’s origin 
was electrical. 
In contrast, Patterson’s expert, Cam Cope, testified that from his 
examination of the photographs, “all of the burn patterns would certainly tell me 
that [the fire was] electrical,” and that there was no evidence in the photographs 
that someone ignited gas in the seat, which Cope testified would be extremely 
difficult to do without suffering serious injuries that Patterson lacked.  Cope further 
explained that it was not surprising that a sample taken from the passenger 
compartment tested positive for gasoline because during the fire the gas tank 
burned and leaked (which he said caused the burn pattern on the wall beside the 
truck), and the fire department then sprayed the area where gasoline had leaked on 
the ground with high pressure hoses back toward the truck.  In addition, Cope 
noted that the lack of burning of combustible material in the passenger 
compartment, including the center console, further informed his opinion that the 
fire began in the engine, likely in the powertrain control module, which was not 
photographed.   
Cope also testified to his perceived shortcomings of the State’s experts’ 
opinions and investigation.  Specifically, Cope testified that he did not agree with 
 
 
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the testimony regarding the absence of arcing because some circuits in a vehicle 
are energized 100% of the time, and as long as a battery is in a vehicle there will be 
cross arcing.  Cope also identified several electrical components that should have 
been further examined, such as the powertrain control module, electronic seats, 
seat heaters, headlights, and aftermarket components that had been added to the 
truck, and he testified that x-rays would have been required to properly examine 
some of those components.  In addition to noting that those components were 
impossible to examine since the truck had been destroyed, Cope testified that the 
State’s experts did not address them in their reports and that they cannot be 
eliminated as the cause of the accidental fire.   
After Patterson’s jury found him guilty on all counts, he appealed to the First 
District, arguing that “the trial court should have dismissed the charges against him 
because the destroyed truck was of critical evidentiary value,” or, alternatively, 
that under the Fourth District’s decision in Lancaster, “the trial court should have 
excluded the testimony of the State’s experts because the truck’s unavailability 
rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.”  Patterson, 153 So. 3d at 309, 310.  The 
First District rejected both arguments and affirmed.  In so holding, the First District 
relied on Youngblood to reject Patterson’s argument that due process required 
dismissal of the charges against him because the record was devoid of any 
evidence that the truck was destroyed in bad faith.  Id. at 310.  In rejecting 
 
 
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Patterson’s alternate argument that due process required exclusion of the State’s 
experts’ testimony, the First District factually distinguished Lancaster, 
emphasizing that in Lancaster’s case, the State “neither photographed the burned 
truck, nor preserved any samples taken from it,” leaving Lancaster (unlike 
Patterson) with “no basis on which to challenge [the State’s experts’] findings and 
conclusions.”  Id. at 311.   
ANALYSIS 
Relying on the Fourth District’s decision in Lancaster, Patterson argues that 
the trial court’s failure to preclude the testimony of the State’s experts who 
physically examined his truck violates his due process right to a fair trial.2  We 
disagree.   
As this Court has explained, the standard for analyzing an alleged due 
process violation in cases involving the defendant’s constitutional right to access 
evidence “depends on the type of error asserted and whether the evidence is 
exculpatory, impeaching, or merely potentially useful.”  Beasley v. State, 18 So. 3d 
473, 487 (Fla. 2009).   
Claims involving the State’s suppression of favorable evidence are analyzed 
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), recognizing a due process violation 
                                          
 
 
2.  We review this legal question de novo.  See Delgado v. State, 162 So. 3d 
971, 981 (Fla. 2015). 
 
 
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where the defendant shows “(1) that favorable evidence—either exculpatory or 
impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) that 
because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.”  Beasley, 18 So. 
3d at 487.   
In contrast, claims involving the State’s destruction of evidence “potentially 
useful to the defense” are analyzed under Youngblood, recognizing a due process 
violation “only if the defendant can show bad faith on the part of the [State].”  
Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 509 (Fla. 2003); see also King v. State, 808 So. 
2d 1237, 1242 (Fla. 2002) (“The landmark case of . . . Youngblood[], and all cases 
since, requires a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the person destroying 
evidence before any relief can be afforded.”); see also 1 Charles W. Ehrhardt, 
Florida Evidence § 401.1, at 164-65 (2015 ed.) (“In a criminal case, due process 
apparently is not violated by the state introducing circumstantial evidence or 
testimony which the state has lost or destroyed unless it is shown that the 
destruction was in bad faith and there is actual prejudice to the accused.”). 
Thus, Brady and Youngblood “involve two different tests regarding 
evidence possessed by the State,” with a defendant’s ability to prove the State’s 
bad faith is not relevant to securing relief on a Brady claim, but critical to securing 
relief on a Youngblood claim.  Beasley, 18 So. 3d at 500 (Pariente, J., concurring); 
see also Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57 (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
 
 
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Amendment, as interpreted in Brady, makes the good or bad faith of the State 
irrelevant when the State fails to disclose to the defendant material exculpatory 
evidence.  But we think the Due Process Clause requires a different result when we 
deal with the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more 
can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which 
might have exonerated the defendant.”).   
The Supreme Court explained the reason for requiring the defendant to show 
bad faith where the lost or destroyed evidence is only “potentially useful” evidence 
(as opposed to material exculpatory evidence under Brady) as follows: 
Part of the reason for the difference in treatment is found in the 
observation made by the Court in [California v. ]Trombetta[, 467 U.S. 
479, 486 (1984)], that “[w]henever potentially exculpatory evidence is 
permanently lost, courts face the treacherous task of divining the 
import of materials whose contents are unknown and, very often, 
disputed.”  Part of it stems from our unwillingness to read the 
“fundamental fairness” requirement of the Due Process Clause . . . as 
imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain 
and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary 
significance in a particular prosecution.  We think that requiring a 
defendant to show bad faith on the part of the police both limits the 
extent of the police’s obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable 
bounds and confines it to that class of cases where the interests of 
justice most clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which the police 
themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a 
basis for exonerating the defendant.    
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-58. 
 
 
Patterson does not quarrel with the well-established standards of Brady and 
Youngblood.  Nor does Patterson attempt to escape the obligation to prove bad 
 
 
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faith by arguing that the destroyed truck is material exculpatory evidence rather 
than potentially useful evidence.  It clearly is not material exculpatory evidence.  
The most that could be said is that, if the components that Patterson’s expert 
identified as potential causes of the fire had been subjected to additional 
examination and testing, they might have supplied evidence to further support 
Patterson’s theory that the fire was electrical and therefore accidental.  Instead, 
rather than seek relief under either of the two possible standards, Patterson urges 
this Court to apply a different standard—i.e., Lancaster’s—because “he is not 
seeking a blanket exclusion of evidence [but] merely seeking that the experts from 
both parties be placed on a level playing field” in a new trial at which only experts 
who have not physically examined the truck may testify. 
In Lancaster, four years before the United States Supreme Court’s decision 
in Youngblood, the Fourth District held that Lancaster’s due process rights were 
violated by allowing the State to present testimony from an expert who had 
examined the truck that Lancaster was accused of intentionally burning.  Lancaster, 
457 So. 2d at 507.  The Fourth District emphasized that Lancaster could not refute 
the testimony of the State’s expert because his own expert did not have the 
opportunity to examine the vehicle.  Id.  As a remedy for the violation, the Fourth 
District reversed for a retrial in which “the state will be precluded from calling as 
witnesses the experts who physically examined the truck.”  Id.   
 
 
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In so holding, the Fourth District rejected the State’s argument that “the 
‘mere possibility’ that examination of the truck would have assisted [Lancaster] 
should not result in reversal.”  Id.  Instead, the Fourth District relied on its prior 
decision in Stipp v. State, 371 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), for the proposition 
that “a due process violation exists when the state unnecessarily destroys the most 
critical inculpatory evidence and then is allowed to introduce essentially irrefutable 
testimony of the most damaging nature.”  Lancaster, 457 So. 2d at 507 (citing State 
v. Counce, 392 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Johnson v. State, 249 So. 2d 470 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1971)); see also Lancaster, 457 So. 2d at 507 (“It would be 
fundamentally unfair, as well as a violation of rule 3.220, to allow the state to 
negligently dispose of critical evidence and then offer an expert witness whose 
testimony cannot be refuted by the Defendant.”) (quoting State v. Ritter, 448 So. 
2d 512, 514 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)).   
However, the law has changed since the Fourth District decided Lancaster.  
As the First District explained below, Youngblood is now “the pertinent 
authoritative decision” for analyzing whether the State’s destruction of evidence 
“potentially useful” to the defendant violates due process.  Patterson, 153 So. 3d at 
310 (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58).  The remedy the defendant seeks for 
the alleged due process violation does not change the standard applicable to 
determining whether a due process violation occurred.  In other words, 
 
 
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Youngblood is the proper standard for judging whether due process has been 
violated whenever the State’s loss or destruction of potentially useful evidence is at 
issue, even where—as here—the remedy sought for the alleged violation is the 
exclusion of evidence as opposed to the complete dismissal of the charges.  See 
State v. Coleman, 911 So. 2d 259, 261 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (reversing trial court’s 
decision to exclude evidence (rather than dismiss the case) because “to sanction the 
State on due process grounds, based upon the loss or destruction of potentially 
exculpatory, documentary evidence, there must be a showing of bad faith” 
(emphasis added) (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58)). 
Applying Youngblood’s standard to the facts of Patterson’s case, no due 
process violation occurred.  “There simply is no evidence in this record 
establishing that the State acted in bad faith,” as everyone who physically 
examined the truck determined the fire was not accidental, and Patterson’s own 
insurance company had the truck destroyed after the State released it.  Patterson, 
153 So. 3d at 310; see also Armstrong v. State, 73 So. 3d 155, 172 (Fla. 2011) 
(“Youngblood explained that the ‘presence or absence of bad faith for purposes of 
the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge of the 
exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed.’ ”) (quoting 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.*)).   
 
 
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Furthermore, as the First District held below, a key factual difference 
between Lancaster and this case illustrates why Patterson’s argument that 
fundamental fairness requires a new trial (which if we accepted would effectively 
require us to circumvent Youngblood by way of Lancaster) is misplaced:  
[An] important difference between Patterson’s case and Lancaster is 
that the sheriff’s fire investigators in Lancaster appear to have neither 
photographed the burned truck, nor preserved any samples taken from 
it.  Consequently, the defendant had no basis on which to challenge 
their findings and conclusions.  And, that is the circumstance that led 
the Fourth District to reverse the defendant’s conviction, order a new 
trial, and direct the trial court on retrial to prohibit the [State’s] 
investigators from testifying. 
   
Patterson, 153 So. 3d at 311.   
In contrast to the truck in Lancaster, Patterson’s truck was extensively 
photographed prior to its destruction.  Relying on these photographs, Patterson’s 
expert presented detailed testimony as to why, in his opinion, the truck fire’s origin 
was electrical and therefore accidental in nature.  Similarly, the State’s experts 
made extensive use of the photographs to support their contrary opinions that the 
fire’s origin was not accidental.  See Patterson, 153 So. 3d at 311 (“[M]uch of the 
testimony from both sides’ experts centered on their respective interpretations of 
observed burn patterns.”).  Patterson also used his expert to undermine the 
thoroughness of the examinations performed by the State’s experts, including 
through his expert’s testimony identifying components that the electrical engineer 
did not address in his report and components that should have been removed and 
 
 
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examined (including x-rayed) but were not.  Therefore, even though Patterson’s 
expert did not have the same opportunity to physically examine the truck as the 
State’s experts, because the State preserved extensive photographs of the truck, 
Patterson, unlike Lancaster, was able to defend against the State’s charges.   
Accordingly, there is no basis to depart from Youngblood as the proper 
standard for analyzing Patterson’s due process argument.  And, as explained 
above, there is no due process violation under Youngblood because there is no 
evidence that Patterson’s truck was destroyed in bad faith.3  
CONCLUSION 
 
Finding no due process violation under Youngblood, we approve the result 
of the First District’s decision in Patterson and disapprove the Fourth District’s 
decision in Lancaster.     
 
It is so ordered. 
 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
 
                                          
 
3.  Patterson also takes issue with the State’s request during closing 
argument for the jury to consider “how thorough” its experts’ investigations were, 
arguing that this statement improperly suggested that the jury should find the 
State’s experts more credible than his because they physically examined the truck.  
However, Patterson’s trial counsel did not object to or request any relief as a result 
of this statement (perhaps for good reason because, in the context of the entire 
record, this statement appears to have been a fair response to Patterson’s expert’s 
testimony faulting the quality of the State’s experts’ investigation).  In any event, 
Patterson has not argued in this Court that his trial counsel’s failure to object was 
fundamental error, nor is it.  See Evans v. State, 177 So. 3d 1219, 1234 (Fla. 2015). 
 
 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D12-3982 
 
 
(Escambia County) 
 
Michael Robert Ufferman of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and 
Kathryn Lane, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent