Title: Casseus v. Eastern Bus Company, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12315
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 8, 2018

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SJC-12315 
 
IBNER CASSEUS1 & another2  vs.  EASTERN BUS COMPANY, INC., 
& another.3 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 2, 2017. - February 8, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Labor, Overtime compensation.  Bus.  Carrier, Charter service, 
License.  School and School Committee, Transportation of 
students. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
May 30, 2014. 
 
 
Motions for summary judgment were heard by Dennis J. 
Curran, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Gabrielle R. Wolohojian, J., in the 
Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. 
 
2 Lyonel Telfort, individually and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated. 
 
3 Charles Winitzer. 
2 
 
 
 
Damien M. DiGiovanni (Joseph P. McConnell also present) for 
the defendants. 
 
Ian O. Russell for the plaintiffs. 
 
Peter J. Pingitore, for School Transportation Association 
of Massachusetts, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  This case requires us to construe an exemption to 
the Massachusetts overtime statute.  The overtime statute 
generally requires employers to pay an overtime premium to 
employees who work more than forty hours in a given week.  G. L. 
c. 151, § 1A.  The statute, however, "shall not be applicable to 
any employee who is employed . . . by an employer licensed and 
regulated pursuant to [G. L. c. 159A]," which governs motor 
vehicle common carriers of passengers in Massachusetts.  See 
G. L. c. 151, § 1A (11); G. L. c. 159A. 
 
The plaintiffs are bus drivers whose employer, the 
defendant Eastern Bus Company, Inc. (Eastern Bus), provides two 
types of transportation:  charter service, for which Eastern Bus 
must hold a license under the common carrier statute; and 
transportation of pupils between home and school, which does not 
constitute charter service.  See G. L. c. 159A, § 11A.  The bus 
drivers perform both of these services.  They claim that they 
are entitled to overtime payment.  Their argument is twofold. 
 
The bus drivers first assert that Eastern Bus is only 
"licensed and regulated" under the common carrier statute during 
the hours when it is providing charter service.  The exemption, 
3 
 
 
then, only applies during those hours, and not when Eastern Bus 
is providing school transportation.  The bus drivers further 
argue that this overtime exemption should be interpreted in the 
same manner as two similarly structured Federal overtime 
exemptions.  These Federal exemptions, for certain employees of 
air and rail common carriers, are not applied to employees who 
spend a substantial amount of time on work that is unrelated to 
the statutory provisions referenced in the exemptions.  If a 
similar interpretation were adopted here, the bus drivers argue, 
the common carrier overtime exemption would not apply to them, 
because they spend a substantial amount of time on work that is 
not governed by the common carrier statute. 
 
The plain language of the overtime statute, however, 
exempts any employee whose employer is licensed and regulated 
pursuant to the common carrier statute, rather than any employee 
who performs a service for which a license is required under the 
common carrier statute.  See G. L. c. 151, § 1A (11) (common 
carrier overtime exemption).  "Courts must follow the plain 
language of a statute when it is unambiguous and when its 
application would not lead to an absurd result, or contravene 
the Legislature's clear intent" (citation and quotations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 689 (2015).  
Proper construction of the exemption therefore depends on 
whether Eastern Bus is "licensed and regulated pursuant to" the 
4 
 
 
common carrier statute at all times, or only during the hours 
when it provides charter service.  Because the common carrier 
statute imposes certain continuous obligations on charter 
service providers, Eastern Bus is "licensed and regulated" at 
all times. 
 
Additionally, neither legislative history nor a comparison 
with Federal law indicates that the common carrier overtime 
exemption was modeled on the Federal overtime exemptions that 
the bus drivers argue are apt analogues.  Although the 
Massachusetts overtime statute was generally based on the 
Federal overtime requirement, there is inadequate basis upon 
which to conclude that this exemption was modeled on any 
particular Federal provision.  Accordingly, and absent any 
indication that doing so would fly in the face of legislative 
intent or produce an absurd result, the statutory language must 
be construed as written.  We thus conclude that the bus drivers 
are not entitled to overtime payment because their employer is 
licensed and regulated pursuant to the common carrier statute.4 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Statutory framework.  Enacted in 1960, 
the overtime statute was intended to be "essentially identical" 
to the 1938 Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).  See Swift 
v. AutoZone, Inc., 441 Mass. 443, 447 (2004), quoting Valerio v. 
                     
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by School 
Transportation Association of Massachusetts, Inc. 
5 
 
 
Putnam Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 1999).  The 
overtime statute "aims to reduce the number of hours of work, 
encourage the employment of more persons, and compensate 
employees for the burden of a long workweek."  Mullally v. Waste 
Mgt. of Mass., Inc., 452 Mass. 526, 531 (2008).  Like the FLSA, 
the overtime statute requires employers to provide a premium to 
covered employees who work more than forty hours in a given 
week.  See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); G. L. c. 151, § 1A.  Employers 
must compensate employees for those hours at one and one-half 
times their regular hourly wage.  G. L. c. 151, § 1A. 
 
Both the FLSA and the Massachusetts counterpart contain 
certain exemptions to the overtime requirement.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 213(b); G. L. c. 151, § 1A.  As relevant here, the 
Massachusetts overtime statute exempts "any employee who is 
employed . . . by an employer licensed and regulated pursuant to 
[G. L. c. 159A]."  G. L. c. 151, § 1A (11).  General Laws 
c. 159A (common carrier statute) is administered by the 
Department of Public Utilities (DPU) and governs, among others, 
motor vehicle common carriers that provide charter bus service.  
See G. L. c. 159A, §§ 10, 11A.5 
                     
 
5 The common carrier statute also regulates companies that 
operate buses along fixed and regular routes, providing "what 
might be described as public service transportation."  Goodwin 
v. Department of Pub. Utils., 351 Mass. 25, 27 (1966).  See 
G. L. c. 159A, § 1.  In addition to charter service, § 11A of 
the common carrier statute applies to "school service" and 
6 
 
 
To understand the parties' arguments, it is helpful to 
review the common carrier statute to which the relevant overtime 
exemption refers.  Section 11A of the common carrier statute 
sets forth DPU's authority over charter service providers, and 
defines "[c]harter service" as "the transportation of groups of 
persons who, pursuant to a common purpose and under a single 
contract, and at a fixed charge for the vehicle have acquired 
the exclusive use of the vehicle for the duration of a 
particular trip or tour."  See G. L. c. 159A, § 11A.  "Charter 
service" does not include "the transportation of school children 
to and from school pursuant to a written contract with a 
municipality or a municipal board or with the authorities of 
such school," provided that certain conditions are met (school 
transportation).6  Id. 
 
The common carrier statute requires that charter service 
providers obtain a license from DPU "certifying that the 
                                                                  
"special service."  See G. L. c. 159A, § 11A.  The plaintiffs' 
claims in this case involve charter service; as such, the other 
services subject to the common carrier statute are not relevant 
here. 
 
 
6 General Laws c. 159A, § 11A, excludes from the definition 
of charter service "the transportation of school children to and 
from school pursuant to a written contract with a municipality 
or a municipal board or with the authorities of such school, 
provided that the charges for such transportation are borne by 
such municipality or municipal board or school and provided, 
further, that no special charges for such transportation are 
made by the municipality or municipal board or such school on 
account of the children transported." 
7 
 
 
rendering of such service is consistent with the public 
interest, that public convenience and necessity require it and 
that the applicant is fit, willing and able properly to perform 
such service."  Id.  DPU also may promulgate relevant rules, 
orders, and regulations.  Id.  See 220 Code Mass. Regs. § 155.02 
(2008).  DPU may suspend or revoke a charter service provider's 
license for cause.  See G. L. c. 159A, § 11A. 
 
b.  Factual history.  "Because this is an appeal from an 
allowance of summary judgment, we set forth the undisputed 
material facts."  Kiribati Seafood Co. v. Dechert LLP, 478 Mass. 
111, 112 (2017).  Eastern Bus is a Massachusetts corporation 
that operates school buses in the Commonwealth.  The defendant 
Charles Winitzer established Eastern Bus in 1997, and is the 
owner and president of the company.  The plaintiffs represent a 
class of bus drivers employed by Eastern Bus who provide both 
charter service and school transportation, and who have not 
received overtime payment for hours over forty worked per week. 
 
In 1998, DPU granted Eastern Bus a charter service license 
pursuant to § 11A of the common carrier statute, subject to 
"such rules and regulations as [DPU] may from time to time 
prescribe, and to the right of [DPU] to suspend or revoke the 
[l]icense for violations" of the common carrier statute or 
regulations promulgated thereunder.  The company has held its 
charter service license without interruption since it was first 
8 
 
 
licensed in 1998.  The license states that Eastern Bus must "at 
all times maintain standards and conduct which in the opinion of 
[DPU] are satisfactory to establish proof of its continuing 
fitness, willingness and ability to perform the service 
authorized."  Eastern Bus incontestably provides some charter 
service, although the parties dispute how much of the company's 
work constitutes charter service. 
 
Eastern Bus also has contracted with a number of 
Massachusetts municipalities and school authorities to transport 
pupils to and from school.  In addition to this daily transport 
of pupils, Eastern Bus also provides transportation to and from 
school extracurricular activities, pursuant to contracts with a 
number of municipalities and school authorities.  Eastern Bus 
characterizes this work as "charter service" as defined under 
the common carrier statute.  See G. L. c. 159A, § 11A.  The bus 
drivers contend that these extracurricular trips constitute 
school transportation and are thus outside the definition of 
"charter service."7  See id. 
                     
 
7 The parties contest the proper characterization of this 
transportation because it affects the number of hours that the 
bus drivers spend on work that is charter service, and that 
therefore is subject to G. L. c. 159A, § 11A.  Because our 
resolution of this matter does not turn on the percentage of the 
bus drivers' work that is dedicated to services subject to the 
common carrier statute, we do not reach the question whether 
transportation for school extracurricular activities falls under 
that statute. 
9 
 
 
 
c.  Prior proceedings.  The bus drivers filed a complaint 
in the Superior Court, asserting a violation of the overtime 
statute because Eastern Bus does not provide overtime payment to 
drivers who work more than forty hours per week.8  The bus 
drivers sought class certification; damages and restitution for 
overtime payment allegedly due; statutory trebling of all wage-
related damages; attorney's fees and costs; and any other relief 
that they are due. 
 
Eastern Bus filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
arguing that, under the common carrier overtime exemption, the 
bus drivers are not entitled to overtime pay because their 
employer is licensed and regulated pursuant to the common 
carrier statute.  See G. L. c. 151, § 1A (11).  The bus drivers 
moved for class certification.9  A Superior Court judge concluded 
that, although Eastern Bus holds a charter service license under 
the common carrier statute, the corporation does not enjoy "a 
blanket exemption for all [c]ompany employees under [§ 1A (11)], 
regardless of the particular duties they perform" (emphasis in 
                     
8 The bus drivers twice amended their complaint to include a 
retaliation claim for the termination of named plaintiff Lyonel 
Telfort.  That claim has been stayed and is not before us. 
 
 
9 The bus drivers also moved for partial summary judgment, 
arguing that introduction of Eastern Bus's DPU license converted 
Eastern Bus's motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion 
for summary judgment.  The judge disagreed, and dismissed the 
bus drivers' motion for summary judgment without prejudice. 
10 
 
 
original).  The judge denied Eastern Bus's motion for judgment 
on the pleadings, and certified the bus drivers as a class. 
 
After discovery, the parties filed cross motions for 
summary judgment on the overtime claim.  A hearing on these  
motions was conducted by a different Superior Court judge.  
Eastern Bus continued to argue that the common carrier overtime 
exemption applies to the bus drivers.  The bus drivers sought 
overtime payment for all hours worked over forty per week, or, 
alternatively, all hours over forty per week spent performing 
services that are not governed by the common carrier statute, in 
other words, school transportation.10 
 
The second judge concluded that the "earlier determination 
must stand:  the overtime exemption does not apply, and the bus 
driver plaintiffs are now entitled to summary judgment on their 
claim for overtime wages."  Eastern Bus sought leave to file an 
interlocutory appeal to the Appeals Court on the ruling; a 
single justice of that court allowed the motion.  The bus 
drivers filed a notice of cross appeal from the Superior Court 
judge's order insofar as it does not state that they are 
                     
 
10 Eastern Bus acknowledges that school transportation does 
not constitute charter service, but maintains that this work is 
governed by the common carrier statute.  Because we determine 
that the bus drivers are exempt from overtime regardless of the 
percentage of their labor that is subject to the common carrier 
statute, we need not resolve the question whether school 
transportation is outside the scope of that statute. 
11 
 
 
entitled to overtime payment for all hours over forty worked per 
week.11 
 
The proceedings in the Superior Court on the remaining 
issues were stayed pending resolution of the appeal on Eastern 
Bus's liability for overtime payment.  We then transferred the 
case from the Appeals Court to this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  "Our review of a motion judge's decision 
on summary judgment is de novo, because we examine the same 
record and decide the same questions of law."  Kiribati Seafood 
Co., 478 Mass. at 116.  "The standard of review of a grant of 
summary judgment is whether, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have 
been established and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law" (citation omitted).  Massachusetts Insurers 
Insolvency Fund v. Smith, 458 Mass. 561, 564 (2010).  "In a case 
like this one where both parties have moved for summary 
judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to 
the party against whom judgment [has entered]," in this instance 
Eastern Bus (citation omitted).  Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 462 
Mass. 346, 350 (2012). 
                     
 
11 The bus drivers further argue that the judge made a 
factual error and overstated the percentage of charter jobs 
performed by Eastern Bus in 2015 for nonmunicipal clients.  We 
do not reach this issue, because resolution of this case does 
not depend on the percentage of charter jobs that Eastern Bus 
has provided to nonmunicipal customers. 
12 
 
 
 
We are called upon for the first time to construe G. L. 
c. 151, § 1A (11), the common carrier overtime exemption.  Under 
this exemption, the overtime statute "shall not be applicable to 
any employee who is employed . . . by an employer licensed and 
regulated pursuant to [G. L. c. 259A]," the common carrier 
statute.  See G. L. c. 151, § 1A (11).  The bus drivers argue 
that Eastern Bus is only "licensed and regulated" under the 
common carrier statute during the hours when it provides charter 
service, while Eastern Bus contends that it is continuously 
"licensed and regulated" under the common carrier statute. 
 
a.  The common carrier statute.  "[W]e consider the several 
statutes in question, not in isolation but in relation to each 
other."  Pereira v. New England LNG Co., 364 Mass. 109, 115 
(1973).  Accordingly, we must read the overtime and common 
carrier statutes together and "give rise to a consistent body of 
law."  Boswell v. Zephyr Lines, Inc., 414 Mass. 241, 247 (1993).  
Because proper construction of the common carrier overtime 
exemption turns on what it means to be "licensed and regulated 
pursuant to" the common carrier statute, we begin with that 
statute.  See G. L. c. 151, § 1A (11); G. L. c. 159A. 
 
Section 11A of the common carrier statute requires charter 
service providers to obtain a license which "shall remain in 
force" unless it is revoked.  See G. L. c. 159A, § 11A.  Charter 
service providers therefore are continuously "licensed" under 
13 
 
 
the common carrier statute, because their license does not lapse 
during the hours when they are not providing charter service. 
 
Additionally, the common carrier statute and regulations 
promulgated thereunder impose certain obligations on charter 
service companies, which are in effect at all times.  For 
example, under § 11A, a company holding a charter service 
license cannot change its "address, [its] place of business, the 
place where [its] buses or any of them are usually garaged, or 
[its] base of operations from one city or town to another," 
without DPU approval.  Id.  It would be nonsensical to prohibit 
a charter service provider from enacting such a change only 
during the hours when it actively is providing charter service.  
See Sperounes v. Farese, 449 Mass. 800, 807 (2007) (reading of 
provision that would "negate the words entirely" was absurd). 
 
Furthermore, under § 8 of the common carrier statute, no 
vehicle can be used in charter service unless DPU has granted a 
permit for that vehicle.  See G. L. c. 159A, § 8.  In order for 
a vehicle to obtain a permit, DPU must find that the vehicle is 
"equipped to comply with the rules and regulations promulgated 
by" DPU.  G. L. c. 159A, §§ 8, 11A.  DPU's regulations, 
promulgated pursuant to the common carrier statute, impose 
certain requirements as to charter service vehicles, including 
that they "be maintained in a safe and sanitary condition and 
shall, at all times, be subject to the inspection of" DPU.  220 
14 
 
 
Code Mass. Regs. § 155.02(22).  Additionally, DPU can revoke or 
suspend a vehicle permit "at any time when it appears to [DPU] 
that the motor vehicle covered by such permit does not conform 
to said rules and regulations."  G. L. c. 159A, § 8.  DPU's 
power to inspect a charter service vehicle or to revoke a 
vehicle permit at any time demonstrates that its regulatory 
authority over charter service providers is constant.12 
Other regulations governing common carriers -- which are 
promulgated under the common carrier statute -- similarly impose 
certain obligations that are continuously in effect.  For 
example, one regulation provides that a common carrier's 
"accounts, records and memoranda . . . shall be kept in such 
form as may be prescribed by [DPU]," and "shall be subject to 
inspection at any time."  See 220 Code Mass. Regs. § 155.02(8).  
Under another regulation promulgated pursuant to the common 
carrier statute, "[a]ll maintenance records, repair records, and 
                     
 
12 The bus drivers point to a 1947 Attorney General advisory 
opinion analyzing DPU's authority to regulate a vehicle used for 
both charter service and school transportation.  The Attorney 
General concluded that DPU "has no authority to deal with the 
vehicle" during the hours that it was used for school 
transportation, based on the exclusion of school transportation 
from the definition of charter service under the common carrier 
statute.  Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12, at 43 (1947).  We 
conclude that § 8 of the common carrier statute supersedes this 
opinion to the extent that they conflict.  See Fernandes v. 
Attleboro Hous. Auth., 470 Mass. 117, 126 n.9, quoting Spaniol's 
Case, 466 Mass. 102, 106 (2013) (although we grant deference to 
formal Attorney General advisory opinions, "the duty of 
statutory interpretation ultimately is for the courts"). 
15 
 
 
memoranda . . . shall be preserved for a period of [twelve] 
months unless [DPU] shall otherwise provide."  220 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 155.02(22).  Charter service companies are required 
consistently to maintain their documents in a particular way and 
over a specific period of time, and those documents are subject 
to inspection by DPU at any time.  These requirements are in 
effect at all hours, regardless of whether any one driver is in 
the middle of a charter route. 
 
The bus drivers argue that Eastern Bus is not "licensed and 
regulated pursuant to" the common carrier statute during the 
hours when the drivers provide school transportation.  Their 
argument is based on the definition of charter service under the 
common carrier statute, which excludes "the transportation of 
school children to and from school pursuant to a written 
contract with a municipality or a municipal board or with the 
authorities of such school."  See G. L. c. 159A, § 11A.  As 
relevant here, this language simply provides that furnishing 
school transportation does not require a charter service license 
under the common carrier statute; it does not mean that a 
company providing that service ceases to be licensed and 
regulated under the common carrier statute.  A bus company may 
be "licensed and regulated pursuant to" the common carrier 
statute while simultaneously providing an additional service 
that is not subject to the statute.  As a result, we conclude 
16 
 
 
that Eastern Bus is constantly "licensed and regulated pursuant 
to" the common carrier statute, regardless of whether the bus 
drivers are providing school transportation or charter service 
in any given hour. 
 
b.  The common carrier overtime exemption.  Having 
determined that Eastern Bus is an employer that is "licensed and 
regulated pursuant to" the common carrier statute, G. L. c. 151, 
§ 1A (11), we turn to the language of the overtime exemption at 
issue.  "Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to 
effectuate the intent of the Legislature . . . ."  AIDS Support 
Group of Cape Cod, Inc. v. Barnstable, 477 Mass. 296, 300 
(2017).  "The language of the statute is the primary source of 
insight into" this intent.  Commonwealth v. Millican, 449 Mass. 
298, 300 (2007).  "Where the language is clear and unambiguous, 
it is to be given its 'ordinary meaning.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 633 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 431 Mass. 772, 775 (2000).  The court must construe clear 
and unambiguous statutory language as written, unless doing so 
would produce an absurd outcome or otherwise frustrate 
legislative intent.  See Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 
465 Mass. 134, 138 (2013); Champigny v. Commonwealth, 422 Mass. 
249, 251 (1996). 
 
The overtime statute requires employers to pay overtime to 
covered employees for hours worked over forty per week.  G. L. 
17 
 
 
c. 151, § 1A.  The common carrier exemption provides that the 
overtime statute "shall not be applicable to any employee who is 
employed . . . by an employer licensed and regulated pursuant to 
[G. L. c. 159A]."  "Licensed and regulated" modifies "an 
employer."  See Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 475 Mass. 820, 822 
(2016) ("court uses standard rules of grammar when interpreting 
statutory language"); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement 
Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 432 (1983) ("the general rule of statutory 
as well as grammatical construction [is] that a modifying clause 
is confined to the last antecedent" [citation omitted]).  Under 
the exemption's plain meaning, then, employees of Eastern Bus 
are not entitled to overtime payment. 
 
"When the meaning of any particular section or clause of a 
statute is questioned, it is proper, no doubt, to look into the 
other parts of the statute:  otherwise the different sections of 
the same statute might be so construed as to be repugnant, and 
the intention of the [L]egislature might be defeated."  Leary v. 
Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 421 Mass. 344, 347 (1995), 
quoting Negron v. Gordon, 373 Mass. 199, 201 (1977).  
Accordingly, "[w]e . . . do not read statutory language in 
isolation," LeClair v. Norwell, 430 Mass. 328, 333 (1999), but, 
instead, examine the common carrier overtime exemption in the 
context of the overtime statute in its entirety. 
18 
 
 
 
Some exemptions to the overtime statute turn on the nature 
of an individual employee's work.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 151, 
§ 1A (10) (exempting any employee who is employed as seaman).  
Others define exempted employees by reference to their employer.  
See, e.g., G. L. c. 151, § 1A (17) (exempting any employee 
employed in nonprofit school).  Yet other exemptions depend on 
the type of compensation that an employee receives.  See, e.g., 
G. L. c. 151, § 1A (1) (exempting any employee employed "as a 
janitor or caretaker of residential property, who when furnished 
with living quarters is paid a wage of not less than thirty 
dollars per week"); G. L. c. 151, § 1A (3) (exempting any 
employee employed "as a bona fide executive . . . earning more 
than eighty dollars per week"). 
 
The Legislature plainly knew how to draft an overtime 
exemption that would apply narrowly to specific employees 
depending on their occupation, or even their compensation.  This 
indicates that a provision phrased as an exemption for any 
employee of a particular type of employer was designed to be 
just that.  The drafters of the overtime statute could have 
opted to exempt only employees who perform work for which a 
license is required under the common carrier statute, or who 
dedicate a certain number of hours per week to such labor.  "If 
that was the legislative intent, the wording of the statute 
could have easily reflected it.  It does not" (footnote 
19 
 
 
omitted).  Rowley v. Massachusetts Elec. Co., 438 Mass. 798, 802 
(2003).  Reading the overtime statute as a whole indicates that 
the Legislature intended to exempt from the overtime requirement 
any employee of an employer that is licensed and regulated under 
the common carrier statute.  See G. L. c. 151, § 1A (11). 
 
The bus drivers argue, nonetheless, that the amount of 
their work that is subject to the common carrier statute 
determines whether the exemption applies to them.  They ask us 
to adopt an interpretation that the United States Department of 
Labor has given to similarly structured overtime exemptions for 
certain airline and railroad employees.  See 29 C.F.R. §§ 786.1, 
786.150 (2011).  This interpretation takes into account the 
percentage of an employee's hours that are spent on work related 
to the statutory provisions referenced in the overtime 
exemptions.  See 29 C.F.R. §§ 786.1, 786.150.  The bus drivers' 
approach, however, would require us to read "licensed and 
regulated" to modify not "an employer," but, rather, the service 
that an employee provides.  See G. L. c. 151, § 1A (11) 
(exempting employees of "an employer licensed and regulated 
pursuant to" common carrier statute); Globe Newspaper Co., 388 
Mass. at 432 (modifying clause confined to last antecedent). 
 
As discussed, Eastern Bus remains "licensed and regulated 
pursuant to" the common carrier statute at all times, regardless 
of the transportation services its drivers perform during any 
20 
 
 
given hour.  Statutory text that reasonably can be construed in 
multiple ways is ambiguous, Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 447 
Mass. 814, 818 (2006), but the common carrier overtime exemption 
supports only one interpretation.  The exemption's plain 
language must be effectuated unless, as the bus drivers contend, 
this would contradict legislative intent.  See Champigny, 422 
Mass. at 251 ("[W]hen a literal reading of a statute would be 
inconsistent with legislative intent, we look beyond the words 
of the statute" [citation omitted]). 
 
We are mindful that, as a remedial measure, the overtime 
statute must be broadly construed in light of its purpose, which 
is in part to compensate for a long work week.  See Miekle v. 
Nurse, 474 Mass. 207, 210 (2016), quoting Case of Sellers, 452 
Mass. 804, 810 (2008); Mullally, 452 Mass. at 531.  "But this 
purpose should not be used as a means of disregarding the 
considered judgment of the Legislature" in crafting statutory 
exemptions.  Globe Newspaper Co., 388 Mass. at 436.  "Where, as 
here, the language of the statute is clear, it is the function 
of the judiciary to apply it, not amend it."  Commissioner of 
Revenue v. Cargill, Inc., 429 Mass. 79, 82 (1999).  Without a 
clear indication that the Legislature based the common carrier 
overtime exemption on the Federal air and rail overtime 
exemptions, Federal construction of those exemptions cannot be 
imported into Massachusetts law. 
21 
 
 
 
c.  Legislative history.  A statute's meaning "must be 
reasonable and supported by the . . . history of the statute."  
Mogelinski, 466 Mass. at 633, quoting Wright v. Collector & 
Treas. of Arlington, 422 Mass. 455, 457–458 (1996).  Legislative 
records show that the common carrier overtime exemption was not 
included in the original proposal for the overtime statute; it 
was proposed and adopted shortly before the bill's passage.  See 
1960 Senate J. 1487-1488.  Apart from this fact, available 
legislative history is silent as to the common carrier overtime 
exemption, its proper construction, or whether it was modeled on 
any Federal overtime exemption.  See id.; 1960 Senate Doc. No. 
1, at 22; 1960 Senate Doc. No. 754, at 400. 
 
d.  Guidance from Federal law.  The FLSA, which served as a 
model for the overtime statute, at times may shed light on the 
legislative intent behind a specific provision of the overtime 
statute.  See Swift, 441 Mass. at 447.  Not every overtime 
exemption, however, has a Federal analogue.  Indeed, the 
Massachusetts statute contains certain exemptions, apart from 
the exemption at issue here, that are absent from the FLSA.  
See, e.g., G. L. c. 151, § 1A (2) (exempting golf caddies); 
G. L. c. 151, § 1A (13) (exempting any employee employed in 
gasoline station).  Compare 29 U.S.C. § 213(a), (b) (FLSA 
contains no analogous exemptions for these occupations). 
22 
 
 
 
We examine the two statutes to determine whether, as the 
bus drivers claim, the common carrier overtime exemption was 
modeled on the Federal air and rail overtime exemptions.  As 
discussed infra, these exemptions apply to different types of 
workers and share none of the same terms.  Recognizing both that 
the exemptions at issue all apply to employees of common 
carriers, and that they are structurally similar, these 
commonalities alone are insufficient to demonstrate that the 
common carrier overtime exemption was based on the Federal air 
and rail overtime exemptions.  As a result, the statutory 
language remains "the primary source of insight into the intent 
of the Legislature."  See Millican, 449 Mass. at 300. 
 
The bus drivers argue that the common carrier exemption was 
modeled on the FLSA exemptions for employees of any "carrier by 
air subject to the provisions of title II of the Railway Labor 
Act" and any "employer engaged in the operation of a rail 
carrier subject to part A of subtitle IV of Title 49."  See 29 
U.S.C. § 213(b)(2), (3).  They point out that exempt employees 
are determined by the statutory authority governing their 
employer.  In other words, these exemptions are structurally 
similar to the common carrier overtime exemption, which exempts 
employees whose employer is licensed and regulated pursuant to 
the common carrier statute.  See G. L. c. 151, § 1A (11). 
23 
 
 
 
The bus drivers further ask us to adopt the United States 
Department of Labor's enforcement policy regarding these 
exemptions.  Each exemption refers to the statutory authority 
that governs the relevant employers; the Department of Labor 
applies the exemptions only to employees who spend at least 
eighty per cent of their hours on labor that is related to that 
statutory authority.  See 29 C.F.R. §§ 786.1, 786.150.  
Analogizing from this framework, the bus drivers argue that the 
common carrier overtime exemption does not apply to them, 
because they spend less than eighty per cent of their hours 
performing services that are governed by the common carrier 
statute. 
 
As the bus drivers note, in Goodrow v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 
432 Mass. 165, 170, 172 (2000), we embraced the United States 
Department of Labor's interpretation of the FLSA when construing 
a different exemption to the overtime statute.  In considering 
the exemption for any individual "employed . . . as a bona fide 
executive, or administrative or professional person," we were 
guided by Federal regulations concerning the FLSA exemption for 
"any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, 
or professional capacity."  Id. at 171-172.  See G. L. c. 151, 
§ 1A (3).  In that case, however, the Federal and Massachusetts 
overtime exemptions covered the same people, and referred to 
them using the same terms:  "bona fide executive," 
24 
 
 
"administrative," and "professional."  See Goodrow, supra 
at 171.  Indeed, the two exemptions had "nearly identical" 
language.  See id. 
 
Goodrow is inapposite here because the Federal and State 
exemptions at issue in this case do not apply to the same 
people.  The Federal exemptions affect employees working for 
Federally regulated airlines and railroads, while the common 
carrier overtime exemption concerns employees of State-regulated 
bus companies.  Compare 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(2), (3), with G. L. 
c. 151, § 1A (11).13  Indeed, the Massachusetts overtime statute 
already contains an exemption for the same employees who are 
covered by the Federal air and rail overtime exemptions.  See 
G. L. c. 151, § 1A (8) (exempting any "employee of an employer 
subject to the provisions of [part A of subtitle IV of Title 49] 
                     
 
13 Additionally, employees of Federally regulated airlines 
and railroads are unique in that they are subject to mediation 
over issues such as wages, as part of a system aimed at 
"minimizing interruptions in the [n]ation's transportation 
services by strikes and labor disputes."  See 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 
153, 183, 185; International Ass'n of Machinists, AFL-CIO v. 
Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 687 (1963).  In 
considering the FLSA in 1937, Congress heard extensive testimony 
on this labor dispute resolution system.  See, e.g., Statements 
of R.V. Fletcher, Counsel for Association of American Railroads, 
& Charles M. Hay, Attorney for Railway Executives' Association, 
Joint Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Education and 
Labor and the House Committee on Labor, 75th Cong., on Senate 
Bill No. 2475 and House Bill No. 7200 (1937). 
 
25 
 
 
or subject to title II of the Railway Labor Act").14  By 
contrast, the FLSA contains no exemption for common carrier bus 
companies such as Eastern Bus.  See generally 29 U.S.C. 
§ 213(a), (b).15 
 
Additionally, the Federal exemptions at hand are not 
"nearly identical" linguistically to the common carrier overtime 
exemptions.  See Goodrow, 432 Mass. at 171.  See also Scaccia v. 
State Ethics Comm'n, 431 Mass. 351, 354-355 (2000) (consulting 
Federal law for guidance on how to construe "virtually 
identical" Massachusetts statute).  The Legislature did not 
borrow Federal language in drafting the common carrier overtime 
exemption.  Although structurally similar, the exemptions use 
none of the same terms.16 
 
We previously have diverged from Federal law when 
construing a Massachusetts statute that was based on a Federal 
                     
 
14 The Federal air and rail common carrier exemptions apply 
to any employee of a "carrier by air subject to the provisions 
of title II of the Railway Labor Act" and any "employer engaged 
in the operation of a rail carrier subject to part A of subtitle 
IV of Title 49."  See 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(2), (3). 
 
 
15 The FLSA previously contained an exemption for local 
motor bus companies providing public transportation, which 
likely would not have applied to Eastern Bus.  See Conley v. 
Valley Motor Transit Co., 139 F.2d 692, 693, 694 (6th Cir. 1943) 
(local motor bus exemption did not apply to companies that 
charge fares on mileage basis); G. L. c. 159A, § 11A (charter 
service companies in Massachusetts charge fares on mileage 
basis). 
 
 
16 Indeed, only one word -- "to" -- appears in all three of 
them.  See 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(2), (3); G. L. c. 151, § 1A (11). 
26 
 
 
statute, but included an exemption with unique language.  In 
Globe Newspaper Co., 388 Mass. at 433 n.11, we analyzed the 
public records statute, which, "[i]n a general way," "is 
patterned on the Federal Freedom of Information Act."  Both the 
Massachusetts and Federal statutes contain exemptions for 
personnel and medical files.  Id. at 431, 433.  Given, however, 
that the terminology and punctuation vary slightly between the 
Massachusetts and Federal exemptions, we held that these 
distinctions evince "a decision to reject the legal standards 
embodied or implicit in the language of the Federal statute."  
Id. at 432-433.  Accordingly, "[w]e conclude[d] that this 
comparison with the Federal exemption is strong evidence that we 
should follow the plain language of our exemption."  Id. at 434.  
So too here.  Indeed, unlike in this case, the provisions 
compared in Globe Newspaper Co., supra at 431, 433, shared 
language and concerned the same subject matter. 
 
In sum, there is little reason to conclude that the 
Legislature modeled the common carrier overtime exemption on the 
Federal air and rail overtime exemptions, or intended it to be 
administered in the same manner as those exemptions.  There is 
thus no sound basis to justify a departure from the clear 
statutory language in favor of a Federal enforcement policy that 
is not binding on this court.  See Goodrow, 432 Mass. at 170 
27 
 
 
("we may look to interpretations of analogous Federal statutes 
for guidance, . . . but we are not bound by them").17 
 
e.  Avoidance of absurd result.  The bus drivers also argue 
that the plain language of the common carrier overtime exemption 
could not reflect the Legislature's intent, because its 
application would produce an absurd or unreasonable outcome.  
The court will not effectuate the unambiguous, plain language of 
a statute if doing so would lead to an absurd outcome.  
Worcester, 465 Mass. at 138.  That, however, is not the case 
here. 
 
The bus drivers first argue that the plain-language reading 
of the overtime exemption is absurd because it would allow a 
company to avoid paying its employees overtime by simply 
procuring a common carrier license.  DPU will grant such a 
license, however, only to companies that are fit to provide 
common carrier services, and then only if "public convenience 
and necessity require" those services.  See G. L. c. 159A, §§ 7, 
                     
 
17 In the alternative, Eastern Bus urges us to look for 
guidance to a Federal overtime exemption for "any employee with 
respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to 
establish qualifications and maximum hours of service" under the 
Motor Carrier Act.  See 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1).  We observe that 
this provision also is not an apt analogue, due, inter alia, to 
its linguistic distinctiveness; unlike the common carrier 
overtime exemption, it defines the exemption by describing the 
exempt employees, rather than by describing their employer.  See 
Commonwealth v. Resende, 474 Mass. 455, 465-466 (2016) 
(differences in language between Massachusetts statute and 
analogous Federal law indicate Legislature's intent to deviate). 
28 
 
 
11A.  Additionally, because the FLSA contains no exemption for 
common carrier bus companies, a company could not skirt its 
obligation to pay overtime under Federal law simply by obtaining 
a common carrier license.  See generally 29 U.S.C. § 213(a), 
(b).  Of greater concern is the bus drivers' second basis for 
claiming that this reading of the common carrier overtime 
exemption produces an absurd result:  all common carrier 
employees, even those who do not operate buses or perform any 
duties related to the common carrier statute, are exempt from 
the overtime requirement.  Although an overtime exemption for 
employees such as janitors and clerical workers may well be a 
harsh outcome, it is not thereby rendered absurd. 
The situation here is unlike cases where we have concluded 
that plain statutory language would produce an absurd result.  
An interpretation that causes a statute to "have . . . no 
practical effect," Champigny, 422 Mass. at 251, is absurd.  The 
overtime statute remains in effect, however, and nonexempt 
employees plainly are entitled to overtime payment, regardless 
of whether common carrier employees are exempted.  See G. L. 
c. 151, § 1A.  Nor does our reading of the exemption "negate the 
words entirely," Sperounes, 449 Mass. at 807, because it simply 
gives the exemption's words their literal meaning.  Construing 
the exemption as written also does not "achieve an illogical 
29 
 
 
result."  See AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc., 477 Mass. at 
301, quoting Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001). 
 
If applying the exemption's plain language "thwart[ed] the 
[overtime] statute's intended purpose," Commonwealth v. Diggs, 
475 Mass. 79, 83 (2016), doing so would be absurd.  See 
Zimmerling v. Affinity Fin. Corp., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 136, 143-
144 (2014) (result that would "run contrary to" statute's 
"enumerated purpose" was absurd).  That, however, is not the 
case here.  We are mindful that the overtime statute is intended 
both to deter and to compensate for long work weeks, Mullally, 
452 Mass. at 531, but those overarching goals do not preclude 
the Legislature from creating statutory exemptions.  See Globe 
Newspaper Co., 388 Mass. at 436 ("We agree that the dominant 
purpose of the [public records] law is to afford the public 
broad access to governmental records. . . .  But this purpose 
should not be used as a means of disregarding the considered 
judgment of the Legislature that the public right of access 
should be restricted in certain circumstances").  An overtime 
exemption for all common carrier employees irrespective of their 
job duties, while potentially creating hardship, is not an 
absurd result. 
 
"We cannot interpret a statute so as to avoid injustice or 
hardship if its language is clear and unambiguous and requires a 
different construction" (citation omitted).  Pierce v. Christmas 
30 
 
 
Tree Shops, Inc., 429 Mass. 91, 93 (1999).  The decision whether 
to exempt all common carriers employees from the overtime 
requirement as a matter of State law is a policy determination 
within the province of the Legislature.  The defendants' brief 
observes that employees who are not members of the plaintiff 
class are "likely entitled to overtime compensation under 
Federal law"; we are unable to determine, on the facts before 
us, the accuracy of this assertion.  In the event that this is 
not so, the Legislature may wish to revisit what could be an 
unnecessarily sweeping overtime exemption.  Because the outcome 
is not absurd, however, we are constrained to interpret the 
common carrier overtime exemption as written. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The allowance of the bus drivers' motion 
for summary judgment and the denial of Eastern Bus's motion for 
summary judgment are reversed.  The matter is remanded to the 
Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.