Title: Smith v. State
Citation: 477 So. 2d 191
Docket Number: N/A
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: May 8, 1985

477 So. 2d 191 (1985) Turner Paul SMITH v. STATE of Mississippi. Misc. No. 1800. Supreme Court of Mississippi. May 8, 1985. Rehearing Denied October 2, 1985. *192 Turner Paul Smith, pro se. Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen. by Billy L. Gore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before PATTERSON, C.J., and HAWKINS and PRATHER, JJ. PRATHER, Justice, for the Court: Constitutionality of sentence is the subject of this motion seeking correction of sentence. This Court affirmed the conviction of Turner Paul Smith on a charge of burglary. Turner Paul Smith v. State, 386 So. 2d 1117 (Miss. 1980). Upon appeal, no issue was assigned regarding the sentence to life imprisonment as an habitual offender, and the court's opinion reflects this omission. 386 So. 2d at 1118. On November 30, 1984, more than four years after affirmance of his conviction in this Court, Turner Paul Smith files his application for leave to file a motion to correct sentence in the Circuit Court of Forrest County, asserting two grounds, that he was (1) improperly indicted as an habitual offender under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Supp. 1984); and (2) denied effective assistance of counsel both at trial and on his first appeal to this Court. The indictment against Smith charges burglary and alleges two "... separate incidences at different times and having been sentenced thereon to separate terms of one (1) year or more in various state penal institutions... ." On the back side of the indictment under the heading "charge" appear the words "Habitual Criminal Burglary 97-17-33". The Mississippi Code has two statutes permitting sentence as an habitual offender. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81 (Supp. 1984) is as follows: The second statute is Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Supp. 1984) and provides as follows: As noted, section 99-19-81 does not require the serving of any time on the two prior felony crimes; whereas, section 99-19-83 does require that the defendant shall have "served separate terms of one (1) year or more in any state and/or federal penal institution ...," one of which felonies shall be a crime of violence. Likewise, the former statute provides a sentence "to the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for such felony," referring to the felony for which the defendant is currently being tried. The latter statute, section 99-19-83 requires a sentence of life imprisonment. Both statutes provide that the sentence shall not be reduced or suspended nor shall *193 such person be eligible for parole or probation. In the case sub judice, the indictment did not cite under which of the two habitual offender statutes the state was proceeding by reference to the code section number. This Court has held that the failure to include habitual offender section number in the indictment was not essential to the validity of the indictment, if the indictment itself was sufficient to apprise the defendant that the state was seeking to impose a life sentence. Dalgo v. State, 435 So. 2d 628 (Miss. 1983). However, applying the Dalgo analysis to this case, several omissions are apparent. (1) The indictment against Smith does not allege that Smith had "... served separate terms of one (1) year or more ..." in a penal institution as required by section 99-19-83 in order for a life sentence to be imposed. The partial transcript of the hearing is as follows: The defendant himself replied to the sentence as follows: Nonetheless, the trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Supp. 1984), without eligibility for parole or probation. In its response to defendant's motion to correct sentence, the state claims that the defendant is procedurally barred from raising this claim, not having addressed the issue on direct appeal. As a basis for its position the state cites the Court to § 99-39-21, which provides: This Court has repeatedly and consistently held that "post-conviction relief in Mississippi is not granted upon facts and issues which could or should have been litigated at trial and on appeal." Smith v. State, 434 So. 2d 212, 215 (Miss. 1983), and the numerous authorities cited therein. Post-conviction proceedings are for the purpose of bringing to the trial court's attention facts not known at the time of judgment. Questions not alleged and raised at trial and/or on direct appeal are procedurally barred and may not be litigated collaterally in a post-conviction environment. Gilliard v. State, 446 So. 2d 590 (Miss. 1984); Pruett v. Thigpen, 444 So. 2d 819 (Miss. 1984); King v. Thigpen, 441 So. 2d 1365 (Miss. 1983); Evans v. State, 441 So. 2d 520 (Miss. 1983); Smith v. State, 434 So. 2d 212 (Miss. 1983); Edwards v. Thigpen, 433 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1983); Wheat v. Thigpen, 431 So. 2d 486 (Miss. 1983); Callahan v. State, 419 So. 2d 165 (Miss. 1982). As the state suggests, it is noted that this issue was not raised on direct appeal, nor does the motion here show such facts as are necessary to demonstrate that this claim is not procedurally barred. However, this Court has previously held that errors affecting fundamental rights are exceptions to the rule that questions not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Read v. State, 430 So. 2d 832 (Miss. 1983); Brooks v. State, 209 Miss. 150, 46 So. 2d 94 (1950). It is noted that in the case sub judice that the defense counsel failed to raise the sentence issue on appeal, but that this defendant is raising the issue in his pro se post-conviction motion to correct sentence. This Court recognizes that citizens may not be deprived of constitutional rights without due process of law and that due process requires reasonable advance notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Read, supra. An analysis of the indictment in this case, together with the foregoing transcript of the sentencing hearing, clearly show a denial of due process in sentencing. The comparison of a seven year sentence, as opposed to a life sentence, without probation or parole is too significant a deprivation of liberty to be subjected to a procedural bar. *196 Therefore, this Court is compelled to address this plain error in the sentencing order. Mississippi Supreme Court Rule 6(b); Payne v. State, 462 So. 2d 902 (Miss. 1984); Glover v. State, 419 So. 2d 588 (Miss. 1982), Burnett v. State, 285 So. 2d 783 (Miss. 1973). It is clear that the state sought conviction and sentence of the defendant as a recidivist. Only the quantity of time is in doubt, and the indictment clearly notices the defendant that the state was seeking only a seven year term. The defendant was wrongfully sentenced under section 99-19-83 to life imprisonment. This plain error is of constitutional dimensions. This Court therefore reverses the sentencing portion of this case and remands to the trial court for resentencing to no more than seven years imprisonment without eligibility for parole or probation. The second assigned error here is ineffective assistance of counsel at both the trial and appellate stages. The allegations address the failure of defense counsel to object to alleged improper evidence in the sentencing phase and to challenge the imposition of a life sentence on appeal. All alleged allegations of ineffectiveness address the sentence enhancement portion of the defendant's trial. Since under the first assignment of error, this Court noted plain error and is remanding for proper sentencing under the statute applicable of section 99-19-81 (Supp. 1984), the ineffectiveness issue on this ground has now become moot. Read, supra. REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P. JJ., and HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, ROBERTSON and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur.