Title: Knox v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 242, 2015
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 17, 2015

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE  
 
JAMES E. KNOX, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 242, 2015 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0008001802 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 11, 2015 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: August 17, 2015 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 17th day of August 2015, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief, the State’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court 
that: 
(1) 
The appellant, James E. Knox, filed this appeal from a Superior Court 
order denying his motion for correction of sentence.  The State of Delaware has 
filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the 
face of Knox’s opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm.   
(2) 
The record reflects that, in February 2001, Knox pled guilty to 
Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the Second Degree.  This conviction arose from 
Knox’s sexual abuse of his minor stepdaughter.  Knox was sentenced to twenty 
 
 
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years of Level V incarceration, suspended after ten years for decreasing levels of 
supervision.  Knox did not file an appeal from the Superior Court’s judgment.  In 
2003, this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of Knox’s first motion for 
postconviction relief.1   
(3) 
On October 29, 2010, the Superior Court found that Knox had 
committed his first violation of probation (“VOP”).  Knox was sentenced to ten 
years of Level V incarceration, suspended after fifteen days for decreasing levels 
of supervision.  On April 12, 2013, the Superior Court found that Knox had 
committed his second VOP.  Knox was sentenced to fourteen years of Level V 
incarceration, suspended immediately for one year of Level III probation.   
(4) 
On February 25, 2014, an administrative warrant was filed for Knox’s 
third VOP.  After initially contesting the VOP at the April 25, 2014 VOP hearing, 
Knox admitted to violating his probation.  The Superior Court found that Knox had 
committed his third VOP and sentenced him to ten years of Level V incarceration, 
suspended upon successful completion of the Family Problems Program for one 
year of Level III probation.  Knox did not appeal any of the VOPs, but did file 
multiple motions for modification or correction of sentence.       
(5) 
On April 20, 2015, Knox filed a motion for correction of his April 25, 
2014 VOP sentence.  The motion set forth eighteen overlapping grounds for relief 
                                                 
1 Knox v. State, 2003 WL 21456287 (Del. June 17, 2003). 
 
 
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that fell into the following categories: (i) defects in the arrest and the arrest 
warrant; (ii) lack of notice of the VOP charges; (iii) errors at the April 25, 2014 
VOP hearing before imposition of the sentence; (iv) innocence of the third VOP, 
despite Knox’s admission to the VOP at the hearing; (v) attacks on the sentence; 
and (vi) ineffective assistance of counsel.  Knox attacked his sentence on the 
grounds that it violated Tapia v. United States,2 he was not present for all of the 
sentencing, the sentence did not comply with the Delaware Sentencing 
Accountability Commission Benchbook (“SENTAC”), and requiring completion 
of the Family Problems Program constituted cruel and unusual punishment.  On 
April 23, 2015, the Superior Court denied the motion, finding that the sentence was 
appropriate for the reasons stated at sentencing and that no additional information 
was provided to warrant a reduction or modification of sentence.  This appeal 
followed.3 
(6) 
We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for correction of 
sentence for abuse of discretion.4  To the extent the claim involves a question of 
law, we review the claim de novo.5  With the exception of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel and cruel and unusual punishment claims, Knox raises the 
same claims in his opening brief that he raised in his motion for correction of 
                                                 
2 131 S.Ct. 2382 (2011). 
3 On May 4, 2015, Knox filed a motion for correction of his April 12, 2013 VOP sentence.  The 
Superior Court’s denial of that motion is on appeal in Knox v. State, No. 250, 2015. 
4 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 
5 Id. 
 
 
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sentence in the Superior Court.  The ineffective assistance of counsel and cruel and 
unusual punishment claims are deemed waived because Knox does not make any 
arguments regarding those claims in his opening brief.6  
(7) 
Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”), a defendant may 
file a motion for correction of an illegal sentence or a motion for reduction of 
sentence.  A proceeding under Rule 35 presumes a valid conviction.7  Rule 35 is 
not a means for a defendant to attack the legality of his convictions or to raise 
allegations of error in the proceedings before the imposition of sentence.8  A 
defendant may not use an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion “to 
collaterally attack the merits of his VOP conviction.”9  We will therefore only 
consider Knox’s attacks on his sentence.  Knox’s other claims (alleged defects in 
the arrest and arrest warrant, lack of notice of the VOP charges, errors at the April 
25, 2014 VOP hearing before imposition of the sentence, and actual innocence of 
the VOP) are outside the scope of Rule 35 and will not be considered.    
(8) 
A motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 35(a) may be filed 
at any time.10  A sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates double 
jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be 
served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, 
                                                 
6 Supr. Ct. R. 14(b)(vi)(A)(3); Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del.1993). 
7 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
8 Id. 
9 Pipkin v. State, 2004 WL 2419087, at *1 (Del. Oct. 26, 2004). 
10 Super. Ct. R. 35(a). 
 
 
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is uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence that the judgment 
of conviction did not authorize.11  A motion to correct a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner or a motion for reduction of sentence filed more than ninety days 
after imposition of the sentence will be considered only in extraordinary 
circumstances or if the Department of Correction files an application under 11 Del. 
C. § 4217.12   
(9) 
Knox first claims that his VOP sentence violated Tapia because the 
Superior Court lengthened his sentence so that he would not be released from 
Level V incarceration until he completed the Family Problems Program.  In Tapia, 
the United States Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
(“SRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., precluded a district court from lengthening a 
defendant’s prison term to ensure completion of a substance abuse program.13  
Even assuming that Knox’s Tapia claim constitutes a claim that his sentence is 
illegal under Rule 35(a) and not a claim that the sentence was imposed in an illegal 
manner (and thus subject to the ninety day requirement of Rule 35(b)), this claim is 
without merit.  The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Tapia was based 
upon language in the SRA that a sentencing court must recognize “that 
imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and 
                                                 
11 Brittingham, 705 A.2d at 578. 
12 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a), (b). 
13 131 S.Ct. at 2391-93. 
 
 
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rehabilitation.”14  Knox was sentenced under the Delaware Criminal Code, not the 
SRA.  Knox does not point to any similar language in the Delaware Criminal Code 
or any other Delaware authority that would prohibit the Superior Court from 
sentencing Knox to ten years of Level V incarceration, suspended after his 
completion of the Family Problems Program.  Knox’s claim that his sentence is 
illegal under Tapia is therefore without merit.         
(10) Knox next contends that he was not present for all of the sentencing.  
Because this constitutes a claim that the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner 
and Knox filed the motion for correction of sentence more than ninety days after 
imposition of the sentence, he was required to show extraordinary circumstances to 
overcome the ninety day limit.15  The transcript of the April 25, 2014 VOP hearing 
reflects that the substance of Knox’s sentence remained the same before and after 
he left the courtroom.  Before Knox left the courtroom, he was sentenced to ten 
years of Level V incarceration, suspended after two years of Level V incarceration 
or completion of the Family Problems Program, whichever occurred later, to be 
followed by one year of Level III probation.  After Knox left the courtroom, his 
counsel and the prosecutor informed the Superior Court that the Family Problems 
Program is a two-year minimum program.  The Superior Court then entered an 
                                                 
14 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a). 
15 Del. Super. Ct. R. 35(a), 35(b). 
 
 
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order sentencing Knox to ten years of Level V incarceration, suspended after 
completion of the Family Problems Program for one year of Level III probation.  
Thus, Knox always knew that his Level V sentence would not be suspended until 
he completed the Family Problems Program and he has not established 
extraordinary circumstances to overcome the ninety day time limit in Rule 35(b).       
(11) Finally, Knox argues that his VOP sentence was not compliant with 
the SENTAC guidelines.  Again, Knox had to show extraordinary circumstances 
because this constitutes a claim that the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner, 
and he filed the motion for correction of sentence more than ninety days after 
imposition of the sentence.16  It is settled that a defendant “has no legal or 
constitutional right to appeal a statutorily authorized sentence simply because it 
does not conform” to the SENTAC guidelines.17  Knox has not shown 
extraordinary circumstances based on any deviations from the SENTAC 
guidelines.  Having carefully reviewed the parties’ submissions and the record, we 
affirm the Superior Court’s denial of Knox’s motion for correction of his second 
VOP sentence.  
 
 
                                                 
16 See supra n.12. 
17 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 845 (Del. 1992). 
 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that motion to affirm is GRANTED 
and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice