Title: Watson v. Division of Family Services
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 18, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 24, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
EMILY WATSON, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 18, 2002 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below—Family Court   
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware,  
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for Sussex County  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  File No. 99-09-01TPR 
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES, §  CPI No. 99-28280 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  September 24, 2002 
Decided:  December 24, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER, and 
STEELE, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.  
 
 
 
Appeal from the Family Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED. 
 
 
Bruce A. Rogers, Esquire, Georgetown, Delaware, for Appellant.  
 
 
James S. Reichert, Esquire (argued) and Peter S. Feliceangeli, 
Esquire, Deputy Attorneys General, Department of Justice, Georgetown, 
Delaware, for Appellee.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice:  
 
2
The respondent-appellant, Emily Watson1 (the “Mother”), filed a 
timely notice of appeal with this Court from a final judgment of the Family 
Court.  Pursuant to that judgment, the Family Court granted the petition of 
the Division of Family Services (“DFS”), petitioner-appellee, to terminate 
the Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.  Only the Mother challenges that 
judgment.  
The Mother has raised two issues on appeal.  First, she contends that 
the decision of the Family Court to terminate her parental rights was not 
supported by clear and convincing evidence and was not the result of an 
orderly and logical deductive reasoning process.  Second, the Mother 
submits that her due process rights under both the United States Constitution 
and the Delaware Constitution were violated by the failure of the Family 
Court to appoint an attorney to represent her when the dependency and 
neglect petition was filed by DFS.    
In Brown v. DFS, this Court recently discussed the issue of 
appointment of counsel for indigent parents during dependency and neglect 
proceedings.2  This Court, however, has never decided whether an indigent 
parent has a due process right to counsel at State expense in a dependency 
and neglect proceeding under the United States Constitution and the 
                                          
 
1 The Court has assigned pseudonyms to the parties in this case.  Supr. Ct. R. 7(d). 
2 Brown v. Div. of Family Servs., 803 A.2d 948 (Del. 2002).  
 
3
Delaware Constitution.3  That issue of first impression must be decided in 
this case.   
Today, we hold that the due process requirements in both the United 
States Constitution and the Delaware Constitution require the Family Court 
to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether indigent parents have a right 
to be represented by counsel in a dependency and neglect proceeding.  In 
applying that holding to the facts of this case, we have concluded that the 
judgment of the Family Court must be reversed.  Nevertheless, the children 
will remain in the custody of DFS and continue to reside with their 
grandparents when this matter is remanded for further proceedings in 
accordance with this opinion. 
Facts4 
 
In November 1997, DFS learned that the Mother was leaving her four 
children home alone at night while she went out.  Shortly before this, the 
Mother and the Father of these children were divorced.  The Father was no 
longer in the home.  After an investigation, DFS opened a treatment case for 
the Mother.  A number of services were offered to the Mother between 
November 1997 and July 28, 1998. 
                                          
 
3 Id. at 955. 
4 There is no substantial dispute between the parties about the material facts.  The 
recitation in this opinion relies extensively upon the brief filed on behalf of DFS. 
 
4
 
Even before it filed a petition for dependency and neglect on July 28, 
1998, DFS workers had concerns about the Mother’s mental health status 
based on the Mother’s erratic behavior when meeting with them, as well as 
her prior history of psychiatric services and treatment.  In November 1995, 
the Mother became intoxicated after arguing with the Father, barricaded 
herself in the home and threatened to kill herself and the children with a 
shotgun.  She was involuntarily hospitalized at the Delaware State Hospital 
for 24 hours, then discharged with a referral for out-patient drug and alcohol 
treatment.  The year before she had been treated by a psychologist but had 
stopped therapy before being discharged.   
During its investigation after the report in November 1997, DFS 
offered to arrange for a mental health evaluation for the Mother.  DFS 
workers also had concerns about the Mother having substance abuse 
problems.  The Mother had a prior history of abuse of alcohol and drugs as 
well as referrals for treatment.  The Mother repeatedly refused to cooperate 
with any of the services suggested by DFS.  Throughout this period, DFS 
received reports that the Mother lacked sufficient funds to buy food for 
herself and the children, or to pay her utilities at her residence, and that her 
electricity was repeatedly disconnected for nonpayment. 
 
5
On July 28, 1998, DFS received a report that the Mother had been 
arrested on a drug-related charge.  The record reflects that on July 27, 1998, 
the police were called when neighbors heard the Mother and the Father 
talking in loud voices at the residence. The Mother and the Father had a 
history of domestic violence, including a recent conviction for the Father.  
The police later determined that the electricity to the home had been 
disconnected due to nonpayment of the bill.  In looking through the 
residence, the police found a crack pipe in the Mother’s possession.  She was 
charged with possession of drug paraphernalia, and subsequently pled guilty.  
DFS applied for and was granted emergency custody of the four children on 
July 28, 1998. 
 
On August 5, 1998, a DFS caseworker offered the Mother and the 
Father a case plan designed to address the issues he saw in the home.  Since 
the Mother and the Father had reconciled at this time, they were offered a 
joint case plan.  Prior to the Mother signing the case plan in October, the 
Family Court ordered the Mother to submit to a mental health evaluation and 
a drug and alcohol evaluation, as scheduled by DFS, on September 15, 1998. 
Both parents initially declined to sign a case plan at that time.  The 
Mother subsequently signed the case plan on October 2, 1998.  The 
requirements of the case plan provided for the Mother to visit the children 
 
6
weekly.  To insure that she was sober, she agreed to submit to a breath test 
prior to visits.  The Mother agreed to attend all doctor visits and all other 
appointments for the children.  The Mother agreed that she would sign all 
necessary consents to permit DFS to provide services.  The Mother agreed 
that she would submit to a drug and alcohol evaluation and mental health 
evaluation within the next thirty days.  The Mother also agreed to submit to 
drug screenings at least two times per month. The Mother agreed to obtain 
and keep appropriate housing.  She agreed to find and maintain steady 
employment and arrange for day care for the children while she was 
working.  She agreed that she would take parenting classes, anger 
management classes and domestic violence classes within thirty days of 
signing the case plan.   
 
At the adjudicatory hearing held in the Family Court on October 7, 
1998, both parents appeared and consented to the entry of an order for 
custody.  Based on this consent, the Family Court found that the children 
were dependent and entered an order of custody in favor of DFS.  Although 
the Mother had signed a case plan, she made little progress on her case plan 
after this date. 
 
The Family Court scheduled the matter for a dispositional hearing on 
November 4, 1998 to review the Mother’s progress.  Although thirty days 
 
7
had passed since the Mother signed the case plan and approximately sixty 
days had passed since the Family Court ordered her to submit to the mental 
health and substance abuse evaluations, the Mother had not completed any 
of the evaluations.  The Mother claimed that she lacked insurance and could 
not afford to pay for these evaluations.  The Family Court determined that 
this was not true, however, since DFS had advised the Mother that it would 
pay the costs of the evaluations.  Apparently, the Mother had simply refused 
to cooperate.  The Family Court scheduled the Mother’s case for further 
review on February 8, 1999.   
 
The Mother’s cooperation with DFS did not improve between the 
November hearing and the February hearing.  The Mother did not attend her 
scheduled evaluations, did not visit the children regularly, and did not keep 
her appointments with her case worker.  On those occasions when she met 
with her case worker, she admitted to ongoing abuse of drugs and alcohol.  
She also reported incidences of domestic violence with the Father.  The 
Mother later admitted that her abuse of drugs and alcohol had reached 
alarming levels during this time.  The Mother also testified that she was 
drinking on a daily basis and smoking crack cocaine every week or every 
other week when she signed the case plan. 
 
8
 
At the review hearing held on February 8, 1999, the Mother admitted 
that she had not completed her substance abuse evaluation or the mental 
health evaluation.  She also was homeless.  She admitted that she was still 
drinking and was still smoking crack cocaine with her husband, most 
recently a few weeks before the February review.  The Family Court 
expressed its concern to the Mother about the fact that the four children had 
been in foster care for six months as of the date of this hearing, yet she had 
made little or no progress on her case plan.  The Family Court urged the 
Mother to cooperate fully with DFS.  The Family Court scheduled the case 
for a further review on May 12, 1999.   
 
The Mother’s lack of cooperation continued until the next review 
hearing.  A DFS caseworker scheduled the Mother for mental health and 
drug and alcohol evaluations but she did not attend them.   She did not visit 
regularly with the children.  A DFS caseworker stopped the Mother’s 
visitation with the children due to her lack of cooperation.  After the 
February hearing, the Mother moved into the home of Everett Cassidy5 in 
March 1999 and began working for him on his chicken farm.  They were 
subsequently married.  
                                          
 
5 The Court has assigned pseudonyms to the parties in this case.  Supr. Ct. R. 7(d). 
 
9
 
At the review hearing on May 14, 1999, the Family Court advised the 
Mother that her continued failure to cooperate with the services arranged by 
DFS would be held against her.  She still had not completed her substance 
abuse evaluation or her mental health evaluation as of the date of the 
hearing.  The Family Court directed DFS to schedule these evaluations one 
more time.  If the Mother failed to attend them, the Family Court ruled that 
DFS would be relieved from any further obligation to reschedule them.  The 
Family Court scheduled the case for a permanency hearing in three months 
to determine if some other permanency plan for the children should be 
ordered by the Family Court. 
 
From the date of the May hearing until the permanency hearing, the 
Mother made little progress on her case plan. The case was transferred to a 
DFS permanency worker in June 1999.  DFS had rescheduled the Mother for 
a third mental health evaluation on July 27, 1999 through Delaware 
Guidance Services.  Although the Mother was informed of the date of the 
appointment by letter, she did not attend.  DFS also provided the Mother 
with the phone number for Sussex County Counseling for her drug and 
alcohol evaluation, and various phone numbers for providers of the 
parenting classes.  As of June 1999, the Mother was not involved with either 
service.   
 
10
 
On August 3, 1999, the Family Court held a permanency hearing.  
Based on the lack of progress by the Mother on her case plan, DFS 
recommended that reunification services end, and that DFS file a petition for 
termination of the Mother’s and the Father’s parental rights.  The Family 
Court approved DFS’s permanency plan, and directed DFS to file its petition 
within thirty days.   
 
The record reflects that from the time of her initial loss of custody 
through the permanency hearing, the Mother was not appointed counsel nor 
was she able to retain private counsel.  The record does not indicate the 
Family Court made any findings regarding whether due process required the 
appointment of counsel for the Mother during the initial dependency and 
neglect proceedings.  An order appointing counsel was issued by the Family 
Court for the termination proceedings six months after the petition for 
termination was filed by DFS. 
Trial on DFS’s petition occurred over four days, on April 30, May 1, 
October 1 and November 6, 2001.  Based on the evidence presented at trial, 
the Family Court ruled that the Mother had failed to plan for the welfare of 
her children.  It granted DFS’s petition for termination of both the Mother’s 
and the Father’s parental rights.  
 
11
Dependency Due Process Claim 
 
The Mother contends the Family Court failed to institute appropriate 
safeguards to protect her due process rights by not appointing counsel to 
represent her when the dependency and neglect proceeding was commenced 
by DFS on behalf of the State.  In Brown, this Court reviewed the dynamic 
evolution of the law in both neglect and termination proceedings.  In 
particular, we noted how the decision to terminate parental rights is directly 
related to a parent’s conduct following commencement of a dependency and 
neglect proceeding.6  A brief review of our analysis in Brown demonstrates 
why the same due process procedural safeguards that are guaranteed to 
indigent parents by the United States Constitution and the Delaware 
Constitution in a termination proceeding are also guaranteed to indigent 
parents in a dependency and neglect proceeding. 
Dependency Termination Continuum 
 
When the State files a petition to terminate parental rights, it is the end 
stage in a continuum that usually begins with a dependency and neglect 
proceeding.  After a dependency and neglect proceeding is commenced, if 
the Family Court finds that a child is dependent, custody is transferred to the 
State and that child is placed in foster care.  The State is then obligated to 
                                          
 
6 Brown v. Div. of Family Servs., 803 A.2d 948, 954-55 (Del. 2002). 
 
12
reunite the family, if possible.  If the efforts at reuniting the parent and child 
are unsuccessful, the State files a petition to terminate parental rights. 
 
When a termination proceeding is commenced, the factual basis for 
terminating parental rights is found in the conduct that occurred from the 
time that child was placed in foster care until the State concluded that the 
efforts at reunification had failed.  If an attorney is only appointed to 
represent an indigent parent after the petition to terminate has been filed then 
the outcome is almost inevitable, assuming the factual allegations in the 
petition to terminate can be established with credible evidence.  
Accordingly, more than two decades ago, the United States Supreme Court 
noted that “informed opinion has clearly come to hold that an indigent 
parent is entitled to the assistance of counsel not only in parental termination 
proceedings, but also in dependency and neglect proceedings as well.”7 
Representation Rights Generally 
 
The right to have counsel appointed at State expense in any 
proceeding is determined by the due process requirements in the United 
States Constitution8 and the Delaware Constitution.9  This Court has 
consistently stated that the term “due process of law” in the Federal 
                                          
 
7 Lassiter v. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33-34 (1981) (emphasis added). 
8 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
9 Del. Const. art I, § 9.  
 
13
Constitution is a synonym for the phrase “law of the land” as used in article 
7 and article 9 of the Delaware Constitution.10  The United States Supreme 
Court has determined that the due process requirement in the United States 
Constitution is a flexible concept that calls for such procedural and 
substantive protections as the situation demands.11  Accordingly, the United 
States Supreme Court has held that due process clause in the United States 
Constitution is not a fixed concept but implicitly means “fundamental 
fairness” in the context of specific circumstances.12 
 
In the Delaware Constitution, however, the phrase “law of the land” is 
connected conjunctively with the phrase “justice administered according to 
the very right of the cause.”13  Thus, although the flexible concept of due 
process is only implicit in the United States Constitution, the framers of 
Delaware’s Constitution explicitly guaranteed fundamental fairness in the 
administration of justice for the citizens of Delaware, with regard to the 
specific context, in all causes of action.14  In some circumstances, the textual 
differences between the Federal Constitution and the Delaware Constitution 
                                          
 
10 Gannon v. State, 704 A.2d 272, 278 (Del. 1998); Black v. Div. of Child Support 
Enforcement, 686 A.2d 164, 168 (Del. 1996).  
11 Lassiter v. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981), citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 
U.S. 778, 788 (1973).  
12 Lassiter v. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. at 31 (1981). 
13 Del. Const. art I, § 9. 
14 Randy J. Holland, The Delaware State Constitution:  A Reference Guide 58-59 (2002). 
 
14
have naturally led to different interpretations of their corollary due process 
provisions.15 
Nevertheless, with regard to an indigent person’s right to have counsel 
appointed at State expense, this Court’s construction of the Delaware 
Constitution’s mandate for due process “in accordance with the right of the 
cause” has been consistent with the flexible standards of due process 
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge.16  
Those factors, commonly referred to as the Eldridge factors, are:  (1) the 
private interests at stake, (2) the government’s interests, and (3) the risk the 
procedures used will lead to an erroneous result.17 
Termination Representation Rights 
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the United States 
Supreme Court had an opportunity to weigh the Eldridge factors where the 
appellant claimed due process required the appointment of counsel for an 
indigent person in a termination of parental rights proceeding.18  In Lassiter, 
that Court concluded there was a “presumption that an indigent litigant has a 
right to appointed counsel only when, if the loser, he may be deprived of his 
                                          
 
15 Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956 (Del. 1992); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81 (Del. 1989); 
Weber v. State, 547 A.2d 948 (Del. 1988); DeBerry v. State, 457 A.2d 744 (Del. 1983).  
16 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
17 Id.  
18 Lassiter v. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981). 
 
15
personal liberty.”19  In Lassiter, after considering the sum total of all three 
Eldridge factors against the presumption that there is no right to counsel 
except in cases involving a potential loss of liberty, the United States 
Supreme Court concluded the United States Constitution does not require 
the appointment of counsel in every termination of parental rights 
proceeding.  Instead, it held that the decision to appoint counsel would be 
left for trial judges to determine, on a case-by-case basis.20 
In Lassiter, although the United States Supreme Court left the 
decision whether to appoint counsel for indigent parents to individual trial 
judges, it noted that even two decades ago, courts generally ruled that 
counsel must be appointed for indigent parents in termination proceedings.21  
At the present time, forty-five states require the appointment of counsel in 
termination of parental rights proceedings.22  Delaware remains one of the 
few states to continue to use the case-by-case approach.23 
In Carolyn S.S., this Court adopted the Lassiter presumption in 
construing the Delaware Constitution instead of holding that there was a 
                                          
 
19 Id. at 33-34. 
20 Id. at 31-32.  
21 Id. at 30. 
22 Rosalie R. Young, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Termination of Parental Rights 
Proceedings: The States’ Response to Lassiter, 14 Touro L. Rev. 247, 260 (1997); Joel E. 
Smith, Annotation, Right of Indigent Parent to Appointed Counsel in Proceedings for 
Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 80 A.L.R. 3d 1141 (2001).  
23 Brown v. Div. of Family Servs., 803 A.2d 948, 957 (Del. 2002).  
 
16
fixed rule of entitlement to counsel for indigent parents in all termination 
proceedings.24  Accordingly, when an indigent litigant is not confronted with 
a deprivation of personal liberty, the due process right to the appointment of 
counsel guaranteed by both the United States Constitution and the Delaware 
Constitution is decided on a case-by-case basis, i.e., justice administered 
according to the right of the cause.25  In making that determination, the 
Delaware Constitution and the United States Constitution require courts to 
look at the same three elements that are now known as the Eldridge factors:  
“the private interests at stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that the 
procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions.”26  Today, Delaware 
judges routinely appoint counsel to represent indigent parents in termination 
of parental rights proceedings. 
Dependency Representation Reviewed 
 
In 1995, Delaware was awarded a federal grant to assess and improve 
Delaware’s child welfare system.  In May 1997, this Court released the 
findings and recommendations that resulted from the Delaware Court 
Improvement Project grant.  One of those final recommendations was that 
                                          
 
24 In re Carolyn S.S., 498 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Del. 1984).  
25 Black v. Div. of Child Support Enforcement, 686 A.2d 164, 168 (Del. 1996).  
26 Lassiter v. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. at 27. 
 
17
every indigent parent and child should have representation in child welfare 
proceedings from the inception of a dependency and neglect proceeding.27   
 
In 1997, the United States Congress also passed the Adoption and 
Safe Families Act (“ASFA”).  Upon its passage, the ASFA mandated that a 
“child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern” and that the State 
should be making timely permanency decisions for children.28  The ASFA 
mandates that states develop a system to provide legal representation for 
children in dependency and neglect proceedings.29  We noted in Brown that 
legal representation is provided for Delaware children who are in foster case, 
indirectly, by the attorneys for each CASA and, directly, by the recent 
statutory establishment of the Office of the Child Advocate.30  Legal 
representation in a dependency and neglect proceeding is provided for the 
DFS at State expense by Deputy Attorneys General. 
 
Consequently, in Delaware, at the present time, the indigent parents 
are the only parties to a dependency and neglect proceeding who are not 
provided with representation.  The Guidelines for Public Policy and State 
                                          
 
27 Court Improvement Project of the Delaware Supreme Court, An Assessment of 
Delaware’s Court Performance in Child Welfare Cases with Recommendations for 
Improvements, 3 (1997).  
28 42 U.S.C. §§ 671 (a)(15)(A), 675 (5)(E) (1998). 
29 Id.  
30 The Office of the Child Advocate is an independent state agency created in June of 
1999 that is charged with safeguarding the welfare of Delaware’s children. Del Code 
Ann. title 29, §§ 9001A-9008A (Supp. 2000).   
 
18
Legislation Governing Permanence for Children (“Guidelines”), however, 
specifically recommend that “states guarantee that counsel represent 
biological parents (or legal guardians) at all court hearings, including at the 
preliminary protective proceeding.  Such representation should be provided 
at government expense when the parent or guardian is indigent.”31 
Dependency Representation Rights 
 
In Carolyn S.S., in the context of a termination proceeding, this Court 
held that Article I, Section 9 in the Delaware Constitution provides the same 
due process guarantees as the United States Constitution:  a Delaware trial 
judge must decide whether to appoint counsel for indigent parents in a 
termination proceeding by applying the Eldridge factors on a case-by-case 
basis.32  In this appeal, we hold that the same due process guarantee in the 
Delaware Constitution requires a trial judge to decide whether to appoint 
counsel for indigent parents in a dependency and neglect proceeding on a 
case-by-case basis.  In Brown, this Court held that the due process guarantee 
in Article I, Section 9 of the Delaware Constitution requires that notice of 
the right to counsel and how to exercise that right must be given to parents 
                                          
 
31 Donald N. Duquette & Mark Hardin, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 
Guidelines for Public Policy and State Legislation Governing Permanence for Children, 
VII-5 (1999).  We note that, to date, the federal government has not provided the states 
with any funds to defray the cost of appointing counsel to represent indigent parents in 
dependency and neglect proceedings. 
32 In re Carolyn S.S., 498 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Del. 1984). 
 
19
when a petition is filed for the termination of parental rights.”33  In this 
appeal, we hold that same due process guarantee in the Delaware 
Constitution requires similar notice to be given to parents when a petition for 
dependency and neglect is filed. 
 
The procedures that are reflected in the facts underlying this appeal 
are no longer followed in the Family Court.  In fact, today’s holding is 
consistent with the current practices and rules of the Family Court.34  At the 
present time, the Family Court routinely appoints counsel to represent 
indigent parents in dependency and neglect proceedings.  Although the 
General Assembly has not enacted a statute establishing such a right for 
indigent parents, it has begun to provide limited funding to the Family Court 
for the purpose of appointing attorneys to represent indigent parents in 
dependency and neglect proceedings.  In the future, the General Assembly 
will be called upon to provide funding to the extent that the Family Court 
determines, probably routinely, that the due process provisions in the United 
States Constitution and the Delaware Constitution require the appointment 
of counsel to represent indigent parents when dependency and neglect 
proceedings are initiated by the State.  
                                          
 
33 Brown v. Div. of Family Servs., 803 A.2d 948, 958 (Del. 2002).  
34 See Rules Applicable to all proceedings involving dependent, neglected, or abused 
children in the custody of the Department of Services for Children, Youth and their 
Families.  Del. Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 206-07 (effective Dec. 1, 2002). 
 
20
Dependency Representation Analysis 
The Mother contends the Family Court did not protect her due process 
rights when it failed to appoint counsel for her after the dependency and 
neglect proceedings were commenced by DFS.  To determine whether the 
failure to appoint counsel violated the Mother’s due process rights, the 
presumption against the right to counsel except where personal liberty is at 
stake must be weighed against the Eldridge factors.35  In Black, this Court 
held “should one side of the analysis not clearly outweigh the other, the [trial 
judge] should err on the rule of appointing counsel in order to further the due 
process right to fundamental fairness in judicial proceedings.”36   
To rebut the presumption against appointment of counsel, the due 
process clause of the United States Constitution and the Delaware 
Constitution require considering the sum total of the three Eldridge factors.  
Those factors are:  (1) the private interest at stake, (2) the government 
interest, and (3) the risk of error.37  We will consider each of them in the 
context of requiring the appointment of counsel in a dependency and neglect 
proceeding. 
                                          
 
35 Brown v. Div. of Family Servs., 803 A.2d at 958.  
36 Black v. Div. of Child Support Enforcement, 686 A.2d 164, 169 (Del. 1996).  
37 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  
 
21
First, the private interests at stake in dependency/neglect proceedings 
are great.  The parent faces the loss of temporary custody of her child that 
may eventually lead to permanent termination.  Although the State is not yet 
seeking to terminate the parent’s interest in his or her children, it is 
beginning the process.  In Lassiter, the United States Supreme Court held 
that parents have a right to the “companionship, care, custody and 
management” of their children.  That right not only requires deference but 
also warrants protection.38  Thus, the private interests of the Mother that 
were at stake when the dependency and neglect petition was filed are 
compelling. 
 
Second, the government interest when a dependency petition is filed is 
similar to the interest in a termination proceeding that was described in 
Lassiter by the United States Supreme Court.  The State has an interest in 
the welfare of children and in fostering an accurate decision.  The State is 
also subject to a federal statutory mandate for a permanency decision to be 
made as quickly and efficiently as possible.39  In Lassiter, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that, while the State’s economic interest is important, it 
                                          
 
38 Lassiter v. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981). 
39 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(15)(A), 675 (5)(E) (1998). 
 
22
is not enough to override the great compelling interests of the parents that 
are at stake.40 
 
Third, the accuracy of the procedures in a dependency and neglect 
proceeding must be examined.  This Court noted in Brown that at the present 
time, indigent parents are the only parties who, from the outset of 
dependency and neglect proceedings, do not have appointed legal 
representation.41  The indigent parents of children who have been placed in 
foster care are not only without economic resources but are also often 
dysfunctional, usually due to parental substance abuse.42  Children cannot be 
safely and successfully reunited with their parents unless the conditions that 
led to the judicial determination of dependency and neglect are corrected 
permanently.  Respected authorities have concluded that it is unrealistic to 
expect that these already challenged indigent parents will turn their lives 
around, especially on the accelerated ASFA time table, without an attorney 
to advocate their need for the reunification resources that are available 
through the DFS.43   
                                          
 
40 Lassiter v. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. at 28. 
41 Brown v. Div. of Family Servs., 803 A.2d at 954. 
42 Kathleen A. Bailie, Note, The Other “Neglected” Parties in Child Protective 
Proceedings:  Parents in Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66 
Fordham L. Rev. 2285, 2291-92 (1998). 
43 See generally, Kathleen A. Bailie, Note, The Other “Neglected” Parties in Child 
Protective Proceedings:  Parents in Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent 
Them, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2285, 2291-02 (1998).  Raul V. Esquivel, III, Comment, The 
 
23
Representation Was Required 
When the Family Court granted the dependency petition and awarded 
custody of the children to DFS, it ordered the Mother to be evaluated for 
substance abuse and mental health problems.  The Mother was unemployed 
at the time of the initial dependency and neglect proceedings.  She was still 
in the midst of an abusive relationship with her ex-husband.  In addition, she 
had just been arrested and pled guilty to a drug-related charge.   
At the inception of the dependency/neglect proceedings, the Mother 
admitted to abusing alcohol and drugs.  Both DFS and the Family Court 
were aware of her drug and alcohol problems.  DFS was also aware of the 
Mother’s mental health problems because of her erratic behavior towards 
caseworkers as well as her prior psychiatric services and treatment.  DFS 
made these facts known to the Family Court.   The Mother was in no 
condition to effectively and intelligently defend herself against the 
knowledge and experience of the State.  She did not have the proper state of 
mind to effectively voice her case due to her mental health and substance 
abuse problems.  The Mother was indigent and could not afford a lawyer.   
                                                                                                                             
 
Ability of the Indigent to Access the Legal Process in Family Law Matters, 1 Loy. J. Pub. 
Inc. L. 79 (2000).  Compare Jennifer L. Saulino, Book Note, NOTICE Are We Protecting 
the Wrong Rights?, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1455 (2001) (reviewing Elizabeth Bartholet, 
Nobody’s Children:  Abuse and Neglect, Foster Drift, and the Adoption Alternative 
(1999)). 
 
24
Without the assistance of counsel to act as an intermediary on her 
behalf with DFS and as her advocate in the Family Court, it was impossible 
for her to receive either mental health or substance abuse treatment and a 
fortiori impossible for her to make any progress in being reunited with her 
children.  The Mother’s inability to comply with the Family Court’s 
directives, without the assistance of counsel is reflected on the record in the 
periodic reports to the Family Court from DFS that eventually changed the 
permanency plan for these children from reunification to a termination of 
parental rights.  When counsel was finally appointed for the Mother, six 
months into the termination proceeding, the factual basis for that petition 
had been established. 
 
The Mother asserts that her rights to due process under both the 
United States Constitution and the Delaware Constitution required the 
appointment of counsel at State expense to represent her when the 
delinquency and neglect petition was filed, if justice was to be administered 
in accordance with the right of the cause. We agree.  The record reflects that 
when the Mother appeared for the dependency hearing, the Family Court 
was aware that she had a history of mental health problems and had been 
recently arrested for drug offenses as a result of continuing substance abuse.  
Considering the Eldridge factors, in the context of the Mother’s condition at 
 
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the time of the inception of the dependency and neglect proceedings, her due 
process rights under both the United States Constitution and the Delaware 
Constitution were violated when the Family Court did not appoint an 
attorney to represent her at State expense.   
Conclusion 
 
The judgment of the Family Court that terminated the Mother’s 
parental rights is reversed.  This matter is remanded to the Family Court 
with directions as follows:  to leave its judgment of dependency and neglect 
in place; to leave custody of the children with DFS; to leave the residence of 
the children with the respective grandparents; to appoint counsel to represent 
the Mother at State expense; and to direct DFS to prepare a new case plan 
for the Mother.