Title: Labrant D. Dennis v. Kenneth S. Tucker
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC09-2289
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 20, 2012

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-1089 
____________ 
 
LABRANT D. DENNIS,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-2289 
____________ 
 
LABRANT D. DENNIS,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
KENNETH S. TUCKER, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[December 20, 2012] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Labrant Dennis appeals the denial of his motion to vacate his convictions of 
first-degree murder and sentences of death filed under Florida Rule of Criminal 
 
 
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Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.1  For the 
reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of his postconviction motion and deny his 
habeas petition. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The facts of this case were fully set out in this Court’s opinion on direct 
appeal.  Dennis v. State, 817 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 2002).  Briefly, “[o]n the morning of 
April 13, 1996, University of Miami football player Earl Little arrived at his on-
campus apartment.”  Id. at 744.  When Little opened his apartment door, he 
discovered his roommate and teammate, Marlin Barnes, on the floor leaning 
against the door.  Id.  Marlin was badly beaten and bloody, but still breathing.  Id. 
at 744-45.  The police later found Timwanika Lumpkins also beaten, but still 
breathing, in a bedroom.  Id. at 745.  Barnes was pronounced dead at the scene, and 
Lumpkins was later pronounced dead at the hospital.  Id.  According to the medical 
examiner, both Barnes and Lumpkins died from massive head trauma, and both 
had defensive wounds to their hands.  Id. at 749-50. 
In the living room where Barnes was discovered, the police found wooden 
and metal fragments, which were later determined to be from a shotgun.  Id. at 745, 
749.  Joseph Stewart, an acquaintance of Dennis, testified that, on April 7, he had 
loaned Dennis an old sawed-off shotgun, which had a wood-type grill.  Id. at 747.  
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.   
 
 
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After Dennis returned the gun to Stewart, Stewart noticed that the gun had been 
considerably damaged.  Id.   Stewart also discovered a knife and black clothing in 
the duffel bag containing the gun.  The police recovered the shotgun and knife 
from the sewer drain where Stewart had disposed of them.  Id. at 748.  Barnes’ and 
Lumpkins’ wounds were consistent with having been inflicted by this shotgun.  Id. 
at 750.   
The evidence presented at trial revealed that Dennis, Lumpkins, and Barnes 
had been at the same club earlier that night.  Id. at 746.  Barnes drove to the bar in 
his roommate’s Ford Explorer.  Id. at 748.  However, after discovering that the 
tires had been punctured, Barnes had the truck towed back to his apartment.  Id.  A 
gas station attendant testified that someone generally matching Dennis’ description 
was parked at the station, which was across from where the Explorer had been 
parked.  Id. at 746-47.  The gas station attendant identified Dennis’ girlfriend’s car 
as the car in which the person matching Dennis’ description waited.  Id. at 747.  
And the knife retrieved from the sewer drain was “consistent with the puncture 
marks on the tires of the Explorer.”  Id. at 749.   
 
The jury found Dennis guilty of two counts of first-degree murder, one count 
of burglary with assault or battery while armed, and one count of criminal 
mischief.  Id. at 748, 750.  At the penalty phase, Dennis’ mother and grandmothers 
testified regarding his positive relationships with his family and his children.  Id. at 
 
 
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750.  Following the penalty phase, the jury recommended death sentences for both 
murders by a vote of eleven to one.  Id.  The trial court followed the jury’s 
recommendation, finding that the aggravating circumstances2 outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances.3   
On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Dennis’ convictions and death 
sentences.4  Id. at 767.  Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court denied 
                                          
 
 
2.  The trial judge found four aggravating circumstances:  “(1) that the 
defendant had been convicted of a prior capital felony (the contemporaneous 
murder); (2) that the murder was committed in the course of a felony (burglary); 
(3) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (4) that 
the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without 
any pretense of legal or moral justification (CCP).”  Dennis, 817 So. 2d at 750. 
 
3.  “The [trial] court considered the following statutory and nonstatutory 
mitigation:  (1) that the defendant did not have a significant history of prior 
criminal activity (not found and therefore given no weight); (2) that the defendant 
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (given little 
weight); (3) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially 
impaired (given no weight); (4) a catchall category of mitigation—the defendant’s 
kindness to others and love and affection towards his family (given some weight); 
(5) that defendant’s demeanor at trial was good (given some weight); (6) the length 
of sentence defendant could receive if not sentenced to death (found not to be 
mitigating and therefore given no weight); and (7) lingering or residual doubt as to 
defendant’s guilt (found not to be mitigating and therefore given no weight).”  Id. 
 
4.  On direct appeal, Dennis argued that:  (1) the trial court failed to provide 
the jury with a cautionary instruction on accomplices; (2) the State improperly 
bolstered the credibility of several of its witnesses; (3) the State improperly 
impeached its own witness, Watisha Wallace; (4) the trial court erred in denying a 
motion to suppress the identification of the car; (5) the trial court erred in allowing 
the State to impeach its own witness, Jessie Pitts; (6) the trial court erred in 
admitting collateral evidence that Dennis stalked, threatened, and assaulted 
 
 
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Dennis’ petition for writ of certiorari.  Dennis v. Florida, 537 U.S. 1051 (2002) 
(table). 
 
In November 2003, Dennis filed a motion for postconviction relief.  And on 
October 7, 2004, the trial judge entered an order denying all of Dennis’ claims.  
However, this order did not include any reasoning or findings of fact.  Then, on 
November 15, 2004, the trial court issued an amended order.  The amended order 
did not include findings of fact for all of Dennis’ claims.  On appeal, this Court 
remanded to the trial court for a new proceeding on Dennis’ postconviction motion 
and dismissed his habeas petition without prejudice.  Dennis v. State, 999 So. 2d 
644 (Fla. 2008) (table).   
 
Upon remand, the new trial judge allowed Dennis to file an amendment to 
his postconviction motion, an amendment which included two new claims.  A 
Huff5 hearing was held on May 11, 2009.  And on June 12, 2009, without holding 
                                                                                                                                        
Lumpkins; (7) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence that 
Dennis had a jealous character; (8) the trial court erred in admitting several autopsy 
photographs; (9) the sentencing order provided an inadequate basis for review in 
that it contained several factual inaccuracies; (10) the trial court erred in finding 
the CCP aggravator; (11) the trial court erred in finding the HAC aggravator; (12) 
the trial court erred in giving little or no weight to the extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance mitigator; and (13) the death sentence is not proportionate because this 
was a crime of passion.  See id. at 750-67. 
 
5.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order denying postconviction 
relief. 
On appeal, this Court remanded the case for the trial court to hold an 
evidentiary hearing on two claims.  Specifically, this Court ordered the trial court 
to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Dennis’ claims that (a) counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate and present further mitigation evidence at the 
penalty phase; and (b) the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 
by failing to disclose the assistant state attorney’s memo to Dr. Rao, the medical 
examiner who testified during the penalty phase.  After holding an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court denied the claims.   
Dennis appeals the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief and also 
petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. 
II. POSTCONVICTION MOTION 
A. Ineffective Assistance During the Guilt Phase 
Dennis argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during 
the guilt phase for:  (1) waiving his right to a speedy trial; (2) failing to adequately 
prepare for trial; (3) failing to object to improper opinions and bolstering; (4) 
failing to object to irrelevant and prejudicial evidence; (5) failing to object to 
improper comment on Dennis’ right to remain silent; (6) failing to investigate other 
 
 
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suspects; and (7) failing to hire a crime scene expert.  Because Dennis has failed to 
establish the requirements necessary for relief, we affirm the trial court’s denial. 
After the United State Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court explained that for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two prongs must be satisfied: 
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  
Bolin v. State, 41 So. 3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 
490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)).   
Regarding the deficiency prong of Strickland, there is a strong presumption 
that trial counsel’s performance was not ineffective.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  
Moreover, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort 
be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Id. at 689.  Further, counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective for failing to make a meritless argument.  Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 
3d 535, 546 (Fla. 2010).  Regarding the prejudice prong of Strickland, “the 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, ‘absent the 
[deficient performance], the factfinder would have [had] a reasonable doubt 
 
 
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respecting guilt.’ ”  Henry v. State, 948 So. 2d 609, 617 (Fla. 2006) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).  “A reasonable probability is a ‘probability sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ”  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694). 
An evidentiary hearing must be held on an initial 3.851 motion whenever the 
movant makes a facially sufficient claim that requires a factual determination.  See 
Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.851, 3.852 & 3.993, 772 So. 2d 488, 
491 n.2 (Fla. 2000).  Thus, “[a] hearing is warranted on an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim only where a defendant alleges specific facts, not conclusively 
refuted by the record, which demonstrate a deficiency in the performance that 
prejudiced the defendant.”  Ragsdale v. State, 720 So. 2d 203, 207 (Fla. 1998).  “A 
summary or conclusory allegation is insufficient to allow the trial court to examine 
the specific allegations against the record.”  Id.   
Because both prongs of Strickland present mixed questions of law and fact, 
this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the trial court’s factual 
findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the 
trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-
72 (Fla. 2004).  Additionally, because a court’s decision whether to grant an 
evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion is ultimately based on written materials 
 
 
- 9 - 
before the court, its ruling is tantamount to a pure question of law, subject to de 
novo review.  See State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137 (Fla. 2003).   
1. Right to a Speedy Trial 
First, Dennis claims that trial counsel was ineffective for agreeing to an early 
trial date or for agreeing to a defense continuance, thereby waiving Dennis’ right to 
a speedy trial.  We uphold the trial court’s summary denial of this claim.  
Dennis did not sufficiently allege either deficiency or prejudice.  
Specifically, given that Dennis did not allege that trial counsel could have been 
prepared for this capital trial involving two victims by the initial trial date or within 
the speedy trial period, Dennis did not sufficiently allege that trial counsel’s 
decisions were outside the range of reasonable professional performance.  
Moreover, Dennis did not include any allegations regarding how he was prejudiced 
by trial counsel’s decisions.  He vaguely implied that there was prejudice because a 
continuance was not charged to the State (and Dennis was not released) as a result 
of the State’s failure to provide a copy of a police report that was not in existence 
during the speedy trial period.  However, before a defendant may have a 
continuance charged to the State based upon a discovery violation, the defendant 
must demonstrate that the discovery violation prejudiced his ability to prepare for 
trial in a manner that could not be corrected within the speedy trial period.  State v. 
Guzman, 697 So. 2d 1263, 1264 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).  Here, Dennis did not allege 
 
 
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that, but for the lack of access to this police report, Dennis could have been 
prepared for trial within the speedy trial period. 
 
Accordingly, Dennis is not entitled to relief on this claim.  
2. Failure to Adequately Prepare for Trial 
Next, Dennis argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure a 
second chair and for representing other clients while representing Dennis.  
However, this claim is facially insufficient as Dennis failed to include any 
allegations regarding the prejudice prong of Strickland.  Dennis generally claimed 
that trial counsel failed to adequately prepare for Dennis’ trial.  But he did not 
include any allegation that there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial 
counsel’s failure to secure a second chair and his failure to represent only Dennis, 
the result of Dennis’ trial would have been different or that confidence in the 
outcome is undermined.  See Ragsdale, 720 So. 2d at 208 (finding that trial judge 
properly denied evidentiary hearing where defendant provided insufficient facts as 
to “how the outcome would have been different had counsel acted otherwise”).  
Moreover, the record reflects that it was Dennis’ desire that Guralnick be his sole 
attorney at both phases of the trial.  And counsel is not ineffective for following his 
client’s wishes.  See Cole v. State, 841 So. 2d 409, 426 (Fla. 2003) (holding that 
counsel is not ineffective for following his client’s wish to not call his mother to 
testify).   
 
 
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Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of this claim. 
3. Failure to Object to Improper Opinions and Bolstering 
Dennis argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
several witnesses’ testimony that allegedly bolstered the testimony of other 
witnesses and that allegedly included improper opinions.  With respect to Joseph 
Stewart’s testimony, Dennis contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object to testimony that improperly bolstered Stewart’s own credibility.  We 
affirm the trial court’s summary denial of this claim.   
 
First, this claim is facially insufficient because Dennis’ postconviction 
motion did not allege prejudice.  See Lott v. State, 931 So. 2d 807, 816 (Fla. 2006) 
(“[W]e have repeatedly held that ‘conclusory allegations are insufficient to warrant 
relief’ on an ineffective assistance claim.”) (quoting Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 
861, 877 (Fla. 2003)). 
 
Second, Dennis’ improper bolstering claim can be conclusively refuted by 
the record.  For example, as the State accurately notes, the record demonstrates that 
the State was anticipatorily rehabilitating Stewart when asking him whether he had 
been afraid he was going to be arrested and whether he “had been told that there is 
anything at this point that you could be arrested for.”  Anticipatory rehabilitation is 
an acceptable practice in Florida.  See Lawhorne v. State, 500 So. 2d 519, 520 (Fla. 
1986).  Additionally, trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to object to 
 
 
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Detective Sanchez’s testimony regarding the gas station attendant’s identification 
of the car because trial counsel did, in fact, object repeatedly.   
Further, Dennis’ claim that Detective Romagni’s testimony improperly 
bolstered other witnesses’ testimony is procedurally barred because it was raised 
and rejected on direct appeal.  See Arbelaez v. State, 775 So. 2d 909, 915 (Fla. 
2000) (“[Defendant] may not relitigate procedurally barred claims by couching 
them in terms of ineffective assistance of counsel.”).  Specifically, this Court 
determined on direct appeal that trial counsel’s cross-examination of Romagni 
opened the door to Romagni’s testimony on redirect regarding Stewart, the 
investigation, and Romagni’s conversations with other witnesses.  Dennis, 817 So. 
2d at 752-53.  Also, this Court concluded that even if there was error, any such 
error was harmless because “every point mentioned in Romagni’s testimony on 
redirect was properly admitted into evidence through the testimony of other 
witnesses.”  Id. at 753. 
Based solely upon the record, Dennis’ claim regarding Detective Charles’ 
testimony is also without merit.  For instance, Charles’ testimony about the 
punctures in Little’s tires is simply a description of his observations of the 
evidence he had processed as a crime scene investigator.  Thus, trial counsel was 
not ineffective for failing to object on this meritless basis.  Trial counsel was also 
not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection to Charles’ allegedly 
 
 
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improper expert and improper bolstering testimony about blood spatter.  Charles 
testified that he had been trained in blood spatter analysis, and the trial court 
eventually ruled that Charles was an expert in blood spatter analysis.   
In light of the above, we affirm the denial of this claim. 
4. Admission of Irrelevant and Prejudical Evidence 
Dennis contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
testimony regarding a gun purchase, testimony regarding a cloned cell phone, and 
various statements during Detective Poitier’s testimony.  However, we uphold the 
denial of this claim. 
 
Like the above guilt phase claims of ineffectiveness, this claim is facially 
insufficient because Dennis’ postconviction motion did not allege prejudice.  He 
did not explain how there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have 
been different had trial counsel objected to this testimony.  He did not explain how 
the confidence in the outcome of the trial is undermined. 
 
With regard to Watisha Wallace’s allegedly irrelevant and prejudicial 
testimony that she and Dennis purchased a gun in her name for Dennis, the record 
refutes that there was any prejudice.  On cross-examination, trial counsel elicited 
testimony from Wallace explaining that the gun was later transferred into Dennis’ 
name.  Moreover, during closing argument, trial counsel argued that Dennis would 
 
 
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not have needed to borrow the shotgun used in the crimes since Dennis owned a 
gun.   
 
Additionally, Dennis’ subclaim that trial counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to the cloned cell phone testimony is without merit.  While the testimony 
implied that Dennis had illegally used a cloned cell phone, the record demonstrates 
that this testimony was relevant to the State’s case.  The State’s case included 
presenting evidence that Dennis made a call to a friend and, during that call, he 
admitted information about the murders that was not generally available. 
Moreover, the State’s case included evidence that Dennis had made particular 
phone calls to Stewart from his cell phone.  Thus, this cell phone testimony was 
admissible.  See Bryan v. State, 533 So. 2d 744, 747 (Fla. 1988) (evidence that 
defendant committed robbery using the murder weapon admissible to demonstrate 
that defendant possessed the murder weapon).  And counsel cannot be ineffective 
for failing to raise a meritless objection.   
 
Furthermore, most of Dennis’ subclaim regarding Detective Poitier’s 
testimony was addressed on direct appeal and is therefore procedurally barred.  See 
Jones v. State, 949 So. 2d 1021, 1033 (Fla. 2006) (“Jones’ allegation of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is merely a variant of the issues raised on direct appeal and is 
therefore procedurally barred.”).  During his direct appeal, Dennis argued that the 
State was permitted to elicit, over a defense hearsay objection, Poitier’s testimony 
 
 
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that he had concluded Dennis committed the crimes because of his history of 
domestic abuse of the victim and because of Dennis’ interview with Romagni.  
Dennis, 817 So. 2d at 753-54.  He argued that this constituted inadmissible hearsay 
and an impermissible opinion as to Dennis’ guilt.  Id. at 754.  This Court held that 
Poitier’s testimony regarding Romagni’s interview and the domestic abuse history 
was harmless “as everything the detective referred to on redirect was testified in 
detail by other witnesses.”  Id.  Moreover, this Court held that Poitier’s testimony 
regarding Dennis’ guilt did not reach the level of fundamental error.  Id.  The only 
thing not raised on direct appeal in regard to Poitier’s testimony was Poitier’s 
identification of the sexual assault kit.  While the sexual assault kit was irrelevant 
to proving the State’s case as Dennis was never accused of raping Lumpkins, it 
does demonstrate that the State conducted a thorough investigation, including 
investigating the possibility of a rape motive.  And, as Dennis acknowledged in his 
postconviction motion, “[a]ccording to the defense, this was a case of negligent 
investigation.”  Thus, this testimony was relevant because Dennis challenged the 
completeness of the police investigation, and trial counsel cannot be rendered 
ineffective for failing to raise a meritless issue. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of this subclaim. 
 
5. Improper Comment on Right to Remain Silent 
 
 
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Dennis contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
Romagni’s testimony that allegedly commented on Dennis’ right to remain silent.  
We disagree. 
 
During cross-examination, trial counsel elicited testimony from Romagni 
tending to indicate that Dennis was completely cooperative with police.  On 
redirect, the State attempted to demonstrate that Dennis was not entirely 
cooperative.  Therefore, Romagni’s testimony regarding his inability to interview 
Dennis for a second time was relevant to Dennis’ lack of complete cooperation 
with police.  Accordingly, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise what 
would have been a meritless objection.  See Melendez v. State, 612 So. 2d 1366, 
1369 (Fla. 1992), receded from on other grounds by Deren v. State, 985 So. 2d 
1087, 1088 (Fla. 2008). 
6. Failure to Investigate Other Suspects 
Dennis contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate 
other suspects, particularly Lumpkins’ other sexual partners, whom she referenced 
in her daily planner.  We affirm the denial of this claim. 
Like Dennis’ other ineffectiveness claims, this claim is facially insufficient.  
Dennis did not specifically allege what information an investigation would have 
revealed and what information could have been presented at trial.  See Nelson v. 
State, 875 So. 2d 579, 583 (Fla. 2004) (“Under the circumstances of this case, a 
 
 
- 17 - 
defendant would be required to allege what testimony defense counsel could have 
elicited from witnesses and how defense counsel’s failure to call, interview, or 
present the witnesses who would have so testified prejudiced the case.”).  He also 
did not allege that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different had counsel investigated Lumpkins’ boyfriends and had 
counsel presented any evidence revealed by the investigation to the jury.  He did 
not allege that the confidence in the outcome is undermined due to trial counsel’s 
failure to investigate other suspects.  
 
Further, the record demonstrates that trial counsel did present the arguments 
that Dennis now contends were inadequately presented due to trial counsel’s 
failure to investigate other suspects.  During the guilt phase, trial counsel argued 
that Lumpkins had other boyfriends, that Dennis had not been bothered by these 
other boyfriends, and that these other boyfriends might have had a motive to kill 
her.  Specifically, trial counsel raised this issue during open arguments and during 
the cross-examination of Romagni.  Therefore, as the trial court’s order pointed out 
when denying this claim, “since counsel did present this information, he was not 
ineffective for failing to do so.”     
 
Accordingly, we affirm the summary denial of this claim. 
7. Failure to Hire a Crime Scene Expert 
 
 
- 18 - 
Dennis argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the 
testimony of a crime scene expert.  We affirm the denial of this claim. 
 
As the trial court explained in its order denying relief, Dennis “fail[ed] to 
allege what experts should have been hired, what these experts would have 
testified about and how this failure prejudiced the Defendant.”  See Ragsdale, 720 
So. 2d at 207 (explaining that conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a 
claim for postconviction relief).  Instead, Dennis argued that evidence that this 
crime could not have been committed by one person and that the assailants would 
not have been able to leave the scene without some blood on their persons is the 
type of evidence that would have supported Dennis’ defense that he did not 
commit the crime.  However, on cross-examination of State witnesses, trial counsel 
elicited that the evidence did not establish the number of perpetrators and that 
whoever committed the crime may have gotten blood or other biological material 
on them.  Thus, trial counsel, without hiring a crime scene expert, actually elicited 
the information Dennis’ postconviction motion mentioned.   
 
Consequently, we affirm the denial of relief. 
B. Ineffective Assistance During the Penalty Phase 
Dennis contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate 
and present further mitigation evidence at the penalty phase.  The United States 
Supreme Court has stated the following with regard to claims of ineffective 
 
 
- 19 - 
assistance of counsel for failing to investigate and present mitigation evidence at 
the penalty phase: 
[O]ur principal concern in deciding whether [counsel] exercised 
“reasonable professional judgmen[t]” is not whether counsel should 
have presented a mitigation case.  Rather, we focus on whether the 
investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to introduce mitigating 
evidence . . . was itself reasonable.  In assessing counsel’s 
investigation, we must conduct an objective review of their 
performance, measured for “reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms,” which includes a context-dependent 
consideration of the challenged conduct as seen “from counsel’s 
perspective at the time.” 
 
Cummings-El v. State, 863 So. 2d 246, 250-51 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003) (emphasis and citations omitted)).   
Additionally, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that he was 
prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigation.  See id. 
at 253.  The defendant “must show that but for his counsel’s deficiency, there is a 
reasonable probability he would have received a different sentence.  To assess that 
probability, we consider ‘the totality of the available mitigation evidence—both 
that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the [postconviction] 
proceeding’—and ‘reweig[h] it against the evidence in aggravation.’ ”  Porter v. 
McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 453-54 (2009) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
362, 397-98 (2000)).  “A reasonable probability is a ‘probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ”  Henry v. State, 948 So. 2d 609, 617 (Fla. 
2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
 
 
- 20 - 
Dennis did not meet his burden of demonstrating prejudice.  During the 
evidentiary hearing after the second remand, Dennis presented evidence of an 
upbringing in poor and violent neighborhoods primarily with two different 
grandmothers as well as expert testimony establishing that this upbringing would 
have left him feeling isolated, abandoned, and desensitized to violence.  However, 
the testimony also demonstrated that the family that raised him loved him and did 
not abuse him.  Furthermore, while there was conflicting mental health evidence 
that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, even the evidence supporting 
the presence of this disorder demonstrated that the disorder was mild and in partial 
remission.  Thus, considering the evidence presented during the evidentiary 
hearing as well as the evidence presented during the penalty phase, the mitigating 
circumstances would not have outweighed the four aggravating circumstances 
present in this case, namely HAC, CCP, during the course of a burglary, and 
conviction of a capital felony.  See Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 453-54; Breedlove v. State, 
692 So. 2d 874, 878 (Fla. 1997).  Therefore, confidence in the outcome of the 
penalty phase is not undermined. 
 
Accordingly, this Court affirms the denial of relief. 
C. State Withheld Evidence 
Dennis contends that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), by failing to disclose the assistant state attorney’s memo to Dr. Rao, which 
 
 
- 21 - 
Dennis alleges improperly coached the medical examiner’s penalty phase 
testimony.  We affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim. 
Brady requires the State to disclose material information within its 
possession or control that is favorable to the defense.  Mordenti v. State, 894 So. 
2d 161, 168 (Fla. 2004).  To establish a Brady violation, the defendant has the 
burden to show (1) that favorable evidence, (2) was willfully or inadvertently 
suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant 
was prejudiced.  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); see also Way v. 
State, 760 So. 2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000); Cardona v. State, 826 So. 2d 968, 973 (Fla. 
2002).  To meet the materiality prong, the defendant must demonstrate a 
reasonable probability that had the suppressed evidence been disclosed the jury 
would have reached a different verdict.  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289.  A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  
Way, 760 So. 2d at 913; see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290.     
When reviewing Brady claims, this Court gives deference to the trial court 
on findings of facts and reviews de novo the application of law and independently 
reviews the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence.  See Mordenti, 894 So. 
2d at 169-70; Way, 760 So. 2d at 913. 
 
Here, Dennis’ argument regarding prejudice centers upon the possibility of 
using the memo to impeach Dr. Rao’s penalty phase testimony, which Dennis 
 
 
- 22 - 
argues was improperly inflammatory and coached in support of the HAC 
aggravator.  However, other evidence supporting HAC would not have been 
affected by this impeachment.  For instance, it is undisputed that both victims in 
this case died as a result of brutal beatings and that both sustained defensive 
wounds.  Dr. Gulino testified to those facts.  Dr. Gulino also testified that the 
victims remained conscious and possibly heard the attacks on each other.  Earl 
Little testified that Barnes was alive when Little entered the apartment.  
Furthermore, a police officer testified that Lumpkins was alive when he arrived at 
the apartment.   
In fact, on direct appeal, this Court upheld the trial court’s finding of the 
HAC aggravator based upon Dr. Gulino’s and Toby Wolson’s guilt phase 
testimony, not Dr. Rao’s penalty phase testimony.  Specifically, this Court stated: 
Both victims in this case suffered horrid injuries.  The medical 
examiner, Dr. Gulino, testified that both victims suffered skull 
fractures as a result of the brutal beating they endured.  Moreover, the 
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the victims were 
conscious for at least part of the attack as they had defensive wounds 
to their hands and forearms.  Further, the State’s blood stain pattern 
expert, Toby Wolson, testified that the bloodiness of the crime scene 
and the patterns of the blood stains strewn about the apartment 
supported the conclusion that Barnes got to his feet and struggled 
about the room after Dennis had already left.  Accordingly, we find no 
error in the trial court’s application of the HAC aggravator. 
Dennis, 817 So. 2d at 766.  Similarly, when this Court upheld the CCP aggravator, 
it did not do so based upon Dr. Rao’s testimony during the penalty phase.  See id. 
 
 
- 23 - 
at 766 (“There is substantial evidence in the record supporting the trial court’s 
finding of the CCP aggravator.  In addition to the record evidence recited in the 
trial court’s sentencing order, Stewart testified that Dennis told him, “Don’t worry 
about it.  Nobody would think to come here.  I just had to do what I had to do and I 
didn’t even go in my car.”).  Confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase is not 
undermined.  As a result, Dennis cannot demonstrate the materiality prong of 
Brady.     
 
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief.  
D. Alleged Conflict of Interest 
In this claim, Dennis asserts that trial counsel was operating under an actual 
conflict of interest due to trial counsel’s workload and that conflict adversely 
affected his representation of Dennis.  This Court affirms the trial court’s summary 
denial of this claim. 
 
In Quince v. State, 732 So. 2d 1059, 1064 (Fla. 1999), this Court explained 
the following regarding conflict of interest claims: 
A conflict of interest claim emanates from the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee that criminal defendants have the right to 
effective assistance of counsel.  This guarantee includes the right to 
representation free from conflict.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 688 (1984).  The question of whether a defendant’s counsel 
labored under an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected 
counsel’s performance is a mixed question of law and fact.  See 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342 (1980). 
. . .  In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is 
presumed and the claimant need not make a specific showing of 
 
 
- 24 - 
prejudice.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (stating that actual or 
constructive denial of assistance of counsel and various kinds of state 
interference with counsel’s assistance are legally presumed to result in 
prejudice); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 & n.25 (1984).  
However, as to most claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based 
upon conflict of interest, a more limited presumption of prejudice 
applies.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (“Prejudice is presumed only 
if the defendant demonstrates that counsel ‘actively represented 
conflicting interests’ and that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely 
affected his lawyer’s performance.’ ”) (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 
350, 348).   
 
Accordingly, a defendant is required to allege that trial counsel “ ‘actively 
represented conflicting interests’ and that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely 
affected his lawyer’s performance.’ ”  Quince, 732 So. 2d at 1064 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 348)).  And this 
Court has explained: 
A lawyer suffers from an actual conflict of interest when he or she 
“actively represent[s] conflicting interests.”  Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350.  
To demonstrate an actual conflict, the defendant must identify specific 
evidence in the record that suggests that his or her interests were 
compromised.  See Herring v. State, 730 So. 2d 1264, 1267 (Fla. 
1998).  A possible, speculative or merely hypothetical conflict is 
“insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction.”  Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 
350. 
Bell v. State, 965 So. 2d 48, 77-78 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Hunter v. State, 817 So. 2d 
786, 791-92 (Fla. 2002)) (emphasis added). 
Here, instead of identifying anything specific in the record suggesting that 
his interests were compromised by an actual conflict, Dennis alleges that trial 
counsel’s “work load” related to his other clients, including clients involved in 
 
 
- 25 - 
other high profile cases, adversely affected his representation.  This allegation of a 
conflict is overly speculative and hypothetical.  Dennis failed to allege that counsel 
actively represented conflicting interests, and we affirm the denial of relief. 
E. Improper Comments & Improper Examination of Witnesses 
Dennis next contends that he is entitled to relief because of the State’s 
allegedly improper voir dire, improper examination of witnesses, and improper 
comments throughout the trial.  The trial court summarily denied this claim, 
concluding that portions of it were raised or should have been raised on direct 
appeal, that the voir dire questions were appropriate, and that wide latitude is 
permitted during closing arguments.   
We affirm the trial court’s denial because this claim is procedurally barred.  
Dennis’ claims regarding improper voir dire, improper comments during closing 
arguments, and improper examination of witnesses should have been raised on 
direct appeal.  See Robinson v. State, 707 So. 2d 688, 697-99 (Fla. 1998).  And 
Dennis’ specific argument about the evidence of abuse and violence between 
Lumpkins and Dennis is procedurally barred because the issue was decided on 
direct appeal.  Specifically, this Court determined that this evidence was 
admissible because “[a]lthough certainly prejudicial, the evidence of the nature of 
Dennis’s relationship with the victim was relevant to establish Dennis’s motive.”  
Dennis, 817 So. 2d at 762.  To any extent that Dennis may now be claiming that 
 
 
- 26 - 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s conduct, the claim is 
facially insufficient as Dennis’ postconviction motion contains only conclusory 
allegations regarding ineffectiveness.  See Gordon v. State, 863 So. 2d 1215, 1218 
(Fla. 2003) (“A defendant may not simply file a motion for postconviction relief 
containing conclusory allegations that his or her trial counsel was ineffective and 
then expect to receive an evidentiary hearing.”  (quoting Kennedy v. State, 547 So. 
2d 912, 913 (Fla. 1989))).  Therefore, the trial court’s summary denial of this claim 
was proper. 
F. Interviewing Jurors 
Dennis further claims that Florida Bar Rule of Professional Conduct 4-
3.5(d)(4) is unconstitutional and that an individual should be appointed to assist 
him in interviewing jurors to establish juror bias.  However, this claim is 
procedurally barred as it should have been raised on direct appeal.  See Israel v. 
State, 985 So. 2d 510, 522 (Fla. 2008) (concluding that juror interview claim was 
procedurally barred because it was not raised on direct appeal).  Moreover, “this 
Court has consistently rejected constitutional challenges to rule 4-3.5(d)(4).”   Id. 
at 522-23 (citing Barnhill v. State, 971 So. 2d 106, 117 (Fla. 2007); Power v. State, 
886 So. 2d 952, 957 (Fla. 2004); Johnson v. State, 804 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2001)).  
Accordingly, this Court affirms the denial of this claim. 
G. Records Requests 
 
 
- 27 - 
Dennis argues that the trial court erred in denying several of his requests for 
additional public records.  In reviewing a trial court’s denial of public records 
requests, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard.  Hill v. State, 921 So. 
2d 579, 584 (Fla. 2006). 
 
All but one of the requests at issue were made pursuant to Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.852(g).   The scope of requests made pursuant to rule 
3.852(g) is governed by rule 3.852(l), which provides that the records must not be 
“privileged or immune from production” and that the records are “either relevant to 
the subject matter of the proceeding” or “reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.”  If an agency files an objection to the written 
demand for additional public records, the trial court must hold a hearing and order 
the agency to produce the records if the court determines that each of the following 
exists:  
(A) Collateral counsel has made a timely and diligent search as 
provided in this rule. 
(B) Collateral counsel’s written demand identifies, with 
specificity, those additional public records that are not at the records 
repository. 
(C) The additional public records sought are relevant to the 
subject matter of a proceeding under rule 3.851, or appear reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
(D) The additional public records request is not overly broad or 
unduly burdensome. 
 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852(g)(3). 
 
 
- 28 - 
 
First, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dennis’ request to 
the Miami-Dade Police Department for “any and all documentation” regarding 
Criminalists Quirk’s and Wolson’s past casework.  These particular criminalists 
had worked for the department for decades.  In that time, they had participated in 
countless cases.  Thus, this request for all documentation related to their past 
casework was unduly burdensome.  Moreover, this request appears to have been a 
fishing expedition, and “this Court has held that the production of public records is 
not intended to be a ‘procedure authorizing a fishing expedition for records 
unrelated to a colorable claim for postconviction relief.’ ”  Diaz v. State, 945 So. 
2d 1136, 1150 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Sims v. State, 753 So. 2d 66, 70 (Fla. 2000)). 
 
Second, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dennis’ request 
for the personnel file of Assistant State Attorney Flora Seff.  During the hearing on 
this request, Dennis stated that he sought the file in order to discover any 
documents related to the original trial judge’s recusal in this case due to an ex parte 
conversation with Michael Von Zamft, another state attorney.  This request was 
simply an improper fishing expedition. 
   
Third, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for 
the personnel records of all fourteen officers of the Coral Gables Police 
Department that documented their presence at the crime scene.  The trial court 
ordered the production of the personnel files of those officers who had substantive 
 
 
- 29 - 
roles at the crime scene.  Dennis’ request for the other officers’ files was nothing 
more than a fishing expedition.  Additionally, it is unlikely that any complaints of 
misconduct in the other officers’ personnel files would have been helpful to 
Dennis’ case because nothing at the crime scene directly implicated Dennis.    
 
Fourth, relief is not warranted on Dennis’ subclaim involving his requests to 
the Departments of Corrections and Health.  Dennis appears to be arguing that he 
was entitled to be present during the trial court’s in camera review and that he was 
entitled to a more detailed order so that he could object to any claimed exemptions 
(or any claims of confidential materials) with which he disagreed.  However, the 
record demonstrates that Dennis was aware of the specific exemptions that both 
departments were claiming.  Thus, Dennis was not prevented from objecting to 
those claims of exemptions and confidential materials.  Accordingly, this subclaim 
is without merit. 
 
Finally, the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in denying Dennis’ 
request to various agencies for records regarding Florida’s lethal injection protocol.  
In Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1090 (Fla. 2008), this Court denied relief 
on the defendant’s claim “that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim 
that he was deprived of his rights under chapter 119, Florida Statutes, and Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852, when the trial court granted the objections of 
FDLE and DOC to his public records requests.”  This Court concluded that the 
 
 
- 30 - 
records requested were neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.  Tompkins, 994 So. 2d at 1090; see also Walton 
v. State, 3 So. 3d 1000, 1013-14 (Fla. 2009).  This Court explained that it “has 
repeatedly upheld summary denial of challenges to Florida’s lethal injection 
procedure.”  Tompkins, 994 So. at 1090 (citing Power, 992 So. 2d at 223; Sexton 
v. State, 997 So. 2d 1073, 1089 (Fla. 2008); Henyard v. State, 992 So. 2d 120, 132 
(Fla. 2008)).   
 
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dennis’ 
requests for additional public records. 
H. National Academy of Sciences Report 
In an amendment to his postconviction motion upon this Court’s first 
remand, Dennis asserts that his convictions and sentences are unreliable due to 
newly discovered evidence that the forensic science used to convict and sentence 
him was neither reliable nor valid.  His claim is based upon a 2009 report by the 
National Academy of Sciences regarding the field of forensic science.6  However, 
in Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11, 20-21 (Fla. 2010), this Court concluded that the 
report cited by Dennis does not constitute newly discovered evidence.  
Accordingly, the trial court properly denied relief. 
                                          
 
 
6.  Nat’l Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United 
States: A Path Forward (2009). 
 
 
- 31 - 
I. Lethal Injection 
 
Dennis argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claims that 
Florida’s lethal injection statute and procedure are unconstitutional.  However, this 
Court has repeatedly affirmed summary denials of constitutional challenges to 
Florida’s lethal injection protocol.  See Tompkins, 994 So. 2d at 1080-82; Power, 
992 So. 2d 218; Henyard, 992 So. 2d at 131-32; see also Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 
530, 546 (Fla. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1 (2011); Lightbourne v. McCollum, 
969 So. 2d 326, 353 (Fla. 2007); Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d 318, 325 (Fla. 2007).  
Therefore, we affirm the summary denial of Dennis’ lethal injection claims.   
J. Sufficency of the Evidence 
  
Dennis’ claim that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions 
for first-degree murder is procedurally barred as this Court decided the issue on 
direct appeal.  Specifically, this Court stated, “Lastly, although not raised by 
Dennis, we have independently reviewed the evidence and find it sufficient to 
support the convictions.”  Dennis, 817 So. 2d at 767.  Accordingly, the trial court’s 
summary denial of this claim was proper. 
III.  HABEAS PETITION 
A. Failure to Raise Claims Regarding Improper Testimony 
 
 
- 32 - 
In his habeas petition, Dennis argues that his appellate counsel on direct 
appeal provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise claims regarding allegedly 
inflammatory and improper testimony.  However, Dennis is not entitled to relief. 
Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are appropriately 
presented in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 
2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000).  Consistent with the Strickland standard, to grant 
habeas relief based on ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, this Court must 
determine: 
first, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result. 
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986); see also Freeman, 761 So. 
2d at 1069; Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660-61 (Fla. 2000).   
“If a legal issue ‘would in all probability have been found to be without 
merit’ had counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel 
to raise the meritless issue will not render appellate counsel’s performance 
ineffective.”  Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000) (quoting 
Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1994)).  “In fact, appellate counsel 
is not necessarily ineffective for failing to raise a claim that might have had some 
possibility of success; effective appellate counsel need not raise every conceivable 
 
 
- 33 - 
nonfrivolous issue.”  Valle v. Moore, 837 So. 2d 905, 908 (Fla. 2002) (citing Jones 
v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-53 (1983); Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So. 2d 541, 
549 (Fla. 1990)).     
The first portion of Dennis’ claim concerns testimony that trial counsel 
objected to, namely testimony from Lumpkins’ aunt regarding Dennis having a 
gun, testimony from Detective Hudak regarding the reactions of Barnes’ 
teammates to the murders, and testimony from Dr. Gulino regarding smeared blood 
near the door demonstrating that Barnes was blinded and reaching for the door.  
“With regard to evidentiary objections which trial counsel made during the trial 
and which appellate counsel did not raise on direct appeal, this Court evaluates the 
prejudice or second prong of the Strickland test first.”  Valle, 837 So. 2d at 910 
(quoting Jones v. Moore, 794 So. 2d 579, 583 (Fla. 2001)).   
Here, even if the admission of this testimony was erroneous, Dennis cannot 
demonstrate prejudice because any error was harmless.  See id. (“If that error was 
harmless, the petitioner . . . would not have been prejudiced.” (quoting Jones, 794 
So. 2d at 584)).  The State’s blood pattern expert testified “that the pooling and 
smearing of blood near the front door of the apartment and other nearby patterns 
were consistent with Barnes struggling and flailing about.”  Dennis, 817 So. 2d at 
749.  Furthermore, multiple witnesses testified that Dennis possessed a gun.  In 
fact, Stewart testified that he had loaned Dennis a sawed-off shotgun, a gun that 
 
 
- 34 - 
was consistent with having been used to inflict the victims’ wounds.  Stewart, who 
led the police to the gun, testified that the gun was damaged when Dennis returned 
it.  And the State’s expert “testified that the metal fragments recovered from 
Barnes’ apartment conclusively matched the trigger guard of the recovered 
shotgun.”  Id. at 749.  There was also testimony that, a month prior to the murders, 
Dennis visited a friend on the University of Miami campus and asked that friend 
where Barnes lived, explaining that “he wanted the information because he wanted 
to find out if [Barnes] was ‘f---ing around with his baby’s mother.’ ”  Id. at 748.  
Therefore, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the 
allegedly improper testimony to which trial counsel objected did not affect the 
jury’s verdict.    
The next portion of Dennis’ ineffectiveness of appellate counsel claim 
relates to allegedly improper testimony that trial counsel did not object to, namely 
a paramedic’s testimony that the crime scene was bloody, a detective’s testimony 
that the skull of one of the victims was “mushy,” Dr. Gulino’s testimony that the 
victim’s head injuries were consistent with being hit with the blunt side of the 
shotgun, and Coach Shannon’s testimony that he called Ray Lewis in Lakeland the 
morning of the murders.7  If a claim “was not preserved at trial by objection, 
                                          
 
 
7.  Dennis’ allegations regarding Dr. Rao’s testimony, Detective Charles’ 
testimony, and other portions of Dr. Gulino’s testimony are simply variations of 
claims raised in his postconviction motion.  “[C]laims of ineffective assistance of 
 
 
- 35 - 
appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise this claim on appeal 
unless the claim constituted fundamental error.”  Valle, 837 So. 2d at 909. 
“Fundamental error is error that reaches ‘down into the validity of the trial itself to 
the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the 
assistance of the alleged error.’ ” Jones, 949 So. 2d at 1037 (Fla. 2006) (quoting 
State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643, 644-45 (Fla. 1991)). 
We conclude that this portion of Dennis’ claim does not rise to the level of 
fundamental error.  Several witnesses testified that the crime scene was bloody, 
including the State’s blood pattern expert.  See Dennis, 817 So. 2d at 749.  
Moreover, Dr. Gulino, the medical examiner, properly testified about the gruesome 
injuries to the victim’s head.  See id. at 749-50.  Furthermore, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Gulino to testify about the consistency between 
the wounds and the shotgun.  See Cox v. State, 966 So. 2d 337, 352-54 (Fla. 2007).   
Even if this had been an abuse of discretion, it would not be fundamental error 
because, as this Court explained on direct appeal, “the State introduced several 
composite pictures comparing the victims’ wounds with the shotgun that made it 
readily apparent that the victims were struck with such force that their skin retained 
what amounted to the shotgun’s ‘fingerprints.’ ”  Dennis, 817 So. 2d at 750.     
                                                                                                                                        
appellate counsel may not be used to camouflage issues that should have been 
raised on direct appeal or in a postconviction motion.”  Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 
643.   
 
 
- 36 - 
Accordingly, this Court denies relief on this claim. 
B. Failure to Raise Claims Regarding Juror Interactions & Judicial Bias 
Dennis claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to claim 
fundamental error based upon alleged juror misconduct and alleged judicial bias.  
However, no relief is warranted. 
Dennis has not pointed to anything in the record that indicates that 
potentially prejudicial juror misconduct occurred.  See Morris v. State, 811 So. 2d 
661, 667 (Fla. 2002) (“[P]otentially harmful misconduct is presumptively 
prejudicial, but the defendant has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie 
case that the conduct is potentially prejudicial.” (quoting Amazon v. State, 487 So. 
2d 8, 11 (Fla. 1986)).  Instead, Dennis’ petition expresses hypothetical arguments 
about (1) what could have happened in addressing Juror Reid’s scheduling 
problem, (2) why the State may have asked whether Juror Thomas was fired, and 
(3) why jurors may have asked to be escorted to their cars.  Such speculation 
would not provide a basis for this Court to conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to adequately inquire about the alleged misconduct.  Cf. Kelley 
v. State, 569 So. 2d 754, 761-62 (Fla. 1990) (relinquishing jurisdiction for trial 
court to interview jurors based upon a specific report from attorneys that one juror 
informed the attorneys of certain misconduct on the part of another juror during 
 
 
- 37 - 
trial).  Therefore, such speculation does not provide this Court with a basis to 
conclude that fundamental error occurred. 
 
Next, Dennis asserts that judicial bias is evidenced by adverse rulings, an 
alleged ex parte communication with the jury, and a friendship with Dr. Rao.  
However, none of these allegations rises to the level of fundamental error.  As this 
Court has explained, adverse trial court rulings do not generally provide a legally 
sufficient basis for disqualification.  Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1194 
(Fla. 2001).  Additionally, when viewed in context, it is clear that the record does 
not support Dennis’ claim that an ex parte conversation regarding the jury 
instructions occurred.  Furthermore, Dennis’ allegation regarding the judge’s 
friendship with Dr. Rao is based upon information disclosed at an evidentiary 
hearing that took place during the first proceeding on Dennis’ postconviction 
motion.  It is not based upon the appellate record.  See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 
646. 
 
Accordingly, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to present 
these alleged instances of fundamental error, and Dennis is not entitled to relief. 
C. Admissibility of Dr. Rao’s Testimony 
Next, Dennis contends that the admission of Dr. Rao’s testimony during the 
penalty phase violated his confrontation rights under the United States Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Melendez-
 
 
- 38 - 
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), because her testimony was based 
upon a report written by a medical examiner whom she supervised.  However, 
Crawford does not apply retroactively, and by extension neither does its progeny, 
Melendez-Diaz.  See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007); Chandler v. 
Crosby, 916 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2005).  Accordingly, this claim is without merit. 
D. Dennis’ Absence from Pretrial Hearings 
Dennis contends that his constitutional right to be present during pretrial 
hearings was violated.  As this Court has explained, 
[a] defendant has a constitutional right to be present at all “crucial 
stages of his trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the 
proceedings.”  Garcia v. State, 492 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1986).  However, 
the right “does not confer upon the defendant the right to be present at 
every conference at which a matter pertinent to the case is discussed, 
or even at every conference with the trial judge at which a matter 
relative to the case is discussed.”  United States v. Vasquez, 732 F.2d 
846, 848 (11th Cir. 1984); see also Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 
637 (Fla. 2000); Cole v. State, 701 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1997) (finding 
that the constitutional right to be present does not extend to 
conferences involving purely legal matters because the defendant’s 
presence would be of no assistance to counsel). 
Orme v. State, 896 So. 2d 725, 738 (Fla. 2005). 
However, Dennis is not entitled to relief.  First and foremost, this claim is 
procedurally barred because it was not raised on direct appeal.  See Morris v. State, 
931 So. 2d 821, 832 n.12 (Fla. 2006); Phillips v. State, 894 So. 2d 28, 35 n.6 (Fla. 
2004).  Second, Dennis has failed to point to anything discussed during the pretrial 
hearings that required his consultation.  In other words, he has failed to 
 
 
- 39 - 
demonstrate that his absence during these pretrial hearings frustrated the fairness of 
the proceedings.   
Accordingly, we deny relief.8 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of Dennis’ postconviction 
motion and deny his habeas petition. 
 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.  
 
 
Two Cases:  
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County,  
Dava J. Tunis, Judge - Case No. F96-13558 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
Neal Andre Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Suzanne Myers Keffer, 
Chief Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel and Paul Edward Kalil, 
Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
                                          
 
 
8.  Dennis’ habeas petition also argues that there was insufficient evidence to 
prosecute, convict, and sentence Dennis.  However, this habeas claim is simply a 
variation of the postconviction sufficiency claim discussed above.  And as 
explained above, this Court determined on direct appeal that the evidence was 
sufficient.  See Dennis, 817 So. 2d at 767.  Accordingly, Dennis is not entitled to 
relief.   
 
 
- 40 - 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Sandra Sue Jaggard 
Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent