Title: Commonwealth v. Newberry
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12575
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 18, 2019

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SJC-12575 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DENEISHA D. NEWBERRY. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 5, 2019. - September 18, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
District Court, Pretrial diversion, Arraignment.  Practice, 
Criminal, Arraignment. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on July 9, 2018. 
 
 
The case was reported by Lowy, J. 
 
 
 
John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney (Cailin M. 
Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Sarah M. Joss, Special Assistant Attorney General 
(Nickeisha J. Davidson also present) for Massachusetts Probation 
Service. 
 
Maureen Stanton Flaherty for the respondent. 
 
Dana Alan Curhan, for Committee for Public Counsel Services 
& another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The pretrial diversion statute, G. L. c. 276A, 
allows certain first-time offenders, who are charged with 
specified offenses in the District Court or the Boston Municipal 
2 
 
 
Court, to seek pretrial diversion to a treatment program rather 
than proceed on the trial track.  If, after screening, the 
probation service determines that the individual is eligible for 
pretrial diversion, and the program to which the probation 
service refers the individual for assessment determines that the 
person would benefit from participation in the program, a judge 
has discretion to stay or continue the criminal proceedings and 
assign the individual to a diversion program.  See G. L. 
c. 276A, §§ 2, 3, 5.  If the person successfully completes the 
program, the judge may dismiss the criminal charges.  G. L. 
c. 276A, §§ 5, 7. 
 
In this matter, we consider two issues arising under the 
pretrial diversion statute.  First, whether the pretrial 
diversion statute, G. L. c. 276A, § 3, requires, at the 
Commonwealth's request, that a judge arraign a defendant before 
he or she may take advantage of a pretrial diversion program.  
Second, whether, during the statutory screening period, see 
G. L. c. 276A, § 3, or thereafter if the Commonwealth does not 
seek arraignment, a judge has authority to order conditions of 
release, including global position system (GPS) monitoring or 
drug screening by the probation service. 
 
As to the first question, we conclude that, under G. L. 
c. 276A, § 3, a judge may not decline to arraign an adult 
defendant, over the Commonwealth's objection, and instead direct 
3 
 
 
the defendant to a pretrial diversion program.  Although other 
pretrial diversion programs statutorily mandate that a judge may 
not arraign an eligible defendant before that defendant has an 
opportunity to complete a pretrial diversion program, the 
language of G. L. c. 276A, § 3, requires arraignment, at the 
Commonwealth's request, before a defendant can participate in a 
pretrial diversion program.  Compare G. L. c. 12, § 34, G. L. 
c. 119, § 54A, and G. L. c. 276B, § 2, with G. L. c. 276A, § 3. 
 
As to the second question, we conclude that, whether during 
the screening period prior to arraignment, see G. L. c. 276A, 
§ 3, or thereafter if the Commonwealth does not seek 
arraignment, a judge may order conditions of release.  In 
ordering those conditions, should a judge determine that 
supervision by the probation service is necessary, the judge has 
authority to order those services. 
 
Background.  The essential facts are undisputed.  In 
November 2017, the defendant was charged in the Boston Municipal 
Court with assault and battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a), after 
an alleged altercation with her boyfriend's former girlfriend.  
At her initial appearance before a judge of that court, the 
defendant moved to continue her arraignment so that she could be 
assessed for eligibility for pretrial diversion.  Over the 
Commonwealth's objection, the judge continued the arraignment 
for two weeks.  The judge also ordered, as a condition of 
4 
 
 
release, that the defendant stay away from the alleged victim; 
the Commonwealth did not object to the condition.  At the next 
hearing, the judge determined that the defendant was eligible 
for pretrial diversion and continued the case for about ninety 
days, pursuant to G. L. c. 276A, § 5.  The Commonwealth did not 
object to the defendant's placement in a pretrial diversion 
program, but again objected to the lack of arraignment. 
 
Thereafter, the matter was continued a number of times, for 
reasons, such as court scheduling, that are unrelated to the 
issues before us.  Arguing that the victim had accused the 
defendant of two instances of harassment after pretrial 
diversion had begun, the Commonwealth sought at several of those 
hearings, before different judges, to have the defendant removed 
from pretrial diversion and the case returned to the trial list.  
The Commonwealth also moved to arraign the defendant.  The 
defendant requested that GPS monitoring be imposed, in order to 
allow her to prove that she had not been in contact with the 
victim.  The Commonwealth did not oppose the imposition of GPS 
monitoring, and a judge allowed the request.  That judge also 
scheduled an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the 
defendant indeed had been in contact with the alleged victim, in 
violation of the terms of her pretrial diversion; the judge 
5 
 
 
commented that he would not arraign the defendant until he heard 
from the victim.1 
The probation service thereafter appeared ex parte before 
the judge, arguing that it had no authority to conduct GPS 
monitoring of the defendant, because she had not been arraigned; 
the judge again ordered that GPS be imposed.  While the 
evidentiary hearing was pending, the Commonwealth filed a 
petition for extraordinary relief, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, in the county court.  The single justice reserved and 
reported the matter to the full court. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Statutory framework.  The pretrial 
diversion statute, G. L. c. 276A, provides judges of the 
District Court and the Boston Municipal Court Departments 
authority to divert eligible individuals to a program of 
                     
 
1 The posture of this case is somewhat sui generis.  At the 
time of the offense, the defendant was twenty-eight years old 
and apparently not eligible for pretrial diversion under the 
then-existing version of the statute, which was intended for 
youthful offenders.  Nonetheless, the judge had discretion to 
refer the defendant for assessment by the probation service, 
even if she appeared preliminarily to be ineligible.  See G. L. 
c. 276A, § 3.  The Commonwealth did not raise any objection to 
the defendant being placed in a pretrial diversion program; it 
objected only to the lack of arraignment at any point in the 
proceedings.  By the time the defendant had been evaluated and 
determined to be eligible to participate in a specific program, 
the pretrial diversion statute had changed to include first-time 
adult offenders.  See St. 2018, c. 69, § 197. The parties' 
briefs address the statute as it is now in effect, and do not 
mention any question of ineligibility due to the defendant's age 
at the time of the alleged offense. 
6 
 
 
community supervision and services rather than subject them to 
the criminal trial process.  See G. L. c. 276A, § 2.  The 
statute "originally was intended to provide rehabilitation to 
those whose criminal habits had not become 'fixed'" (citation 
omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Morgan, 476 Mass. 768, 779 
(2017).  When it was first enacted in 1974, the statute applied 
only to young adults between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
two; in 2012, it was amended to include veterans and active duty 
members of the military.  See G. L. c. 276A, §§ 10, 11; 
St. 2012, c. 108, § 16. 
 
In 2018, as part of the comprehensive criminal justice 
reform act, the Legislature again amended the statute, this time 
to eliminate any age restrictions, making it applicable to all 
first-time offenders who are charged with offenses for which a 
term of imprisonment may be imposed by a judge of the District 
Court or the Boston Municipal Court, and who meet other 
eligibility criteria.2  See G. L. c. 276A, § 2, as amended 
                     
2 The pretrial diversion statute in its current form 
includes ten sections.  See St. 2018, c. 69, §§ 200, 201.  
General Laws c. 276A, § 1, contains applicable definitions.  
Section 2 describes the jurisdiction of the court to divert 
offenders for certain offenses that may be punished by a term of 
incarceration of no more than five years.  Section 3 defines the 
screening procedures for admission to a diversion program.  
Section 4 describes those defendants who are categorically 
ineligible for diversion, including those charged with violent 
crimes against the person, crimes by public officials, and 
certain sex offenses.  Section 5 defines the required assessment 
and recommendation for pretrial diversion, to be provided to the 
7 
 
 
through St. 2018, c. 69, § 197.3  Also as part of the criminal 
justice reform act, see St. 2018, c. 69, the Legislature adopted 
separate provisions establishing juvenile pretrial diversion 
(G. L. c. 119, § 54A, inserted by St. 2018, c. 69, § 75); 
pretrial diversion for those with mental health and substance 
abuse issues (G. L. c. 12, § 34, inserted by St. 2018, c. 69, 
§ 16); and community-based restorative justice diversion 
programs, with the consent of the district attorney and the 
victims (G. L. c. 276B, § 2, inserted by St. 2018, c. 69, 
§ 202). 
                     
judge at the conclusion of the assessment period, and the final 
determination and stay of proceedings if the judge, in his or 
her sole discretion, after having received a recommendation from 
the prosecutor, determines that diversion would be appropriate.  
Section 6 provides procedures for handling violations of the 
terms of a program.  Section 7 covers the process for dismissing 
charges following the successful completion of a program.  
Sections 10 and 11 concern diversions and continuances for 
veterans and active duty military personnel.  Section 12 
instructs that police officers and prosecutors have authority to 
divert an offender into a program that they operate. 
 
 
3 Under G. L. c. 276A, § 2, a defendant is eligible for 
pretrial diversion if he or she is charged with an offense for 
which a term of imprisonment may be imposed by a judge of the 
District Court or Boston Municipal Court; has not previously 
been convicted of a violation of any law, in the Commonwealth or 
elsewhere; does not have any outstanding warrants, continuances, 
appeals, or criminal cases pending; and would benefit from 
participation in a program. 
 
8 
 
 
 
General Laws c. 276A, § 3, is the sole applicable section 
of the pretrial diversion statute that mentions "arraignment."4  
It defines the procedures to be used in determining whether a 
defendant is eligible and would benefit from a pretrial 
diversion program: 
"The probation officers of a district or municipal court, 
or an official designee of such a probation officer, when 
gathering information in accordance with [G. L. c. 276, 
§ 85], shall also screen each defendant for the purpose of 
enabling the judge at arraignment to consider the 
eligibility of the defendant for diversion to a program.  
The probation officers or an official designee shall also 
confirm the defendant's status as a veteran or as a person 
on active service in the armed forces of the United States 
and shall determine if the defendant has previously been 
diverted pursuant to clause (ii) of [§ 4 (c)]. 
 
"Any defendant who is qualified for consideration for 
diversion to a program may, at his arraignment, be afforded 
a fourteen-day continuance for assessment by the personnel 
of a program to determine if he would benefit from such 
program. 
 
"A defendant who is determined to be a veteran or a person 
on active service in the armed forces of the United States 
and who is qualified for consideration to diversion to a 
program may, at arraignment, be afforded a [thirty]-day 
continuance for assessment by the United States Department 
of Veteran's Affairs or another state or federal agency 
with suitable knowledge and experience of veterans affairs 
to determine if the veteran or person on active service 
would benefit from such program. 
 
                     
 
4 General Laws c. 276A, § 10, which also mentions 
arraignment, applies only to veterans and active duty service 
members whose status must be verified by the probation service, 
at or prior to arraignment, in order to be eligible for pretrial 
diversion.  The statute allows a thirty-day assessment period 
during which the probation service must verify the individual's 
status.  See G. L. c. 276, §§ 3, 10. 
9 
 
 
"If a defendant chooses to accept the offer of a 
continuance for the purpose of such an assessment, he shall 
so notify the judge at arraignment.  Upon receipt of such 
notification, the judge shall grant a fourteen-day 
continuance.  The judge, through the probation office or 
its official designee, shall direct the defendant to a 
program and shall inform said program of such action. 
 
"The judge may, in his discretion, grant a defendant who is 
preliminarily determined not to be eligible because of a 
failure to satisfy all the requirements of section two, a 
like fourteen-day continuance for assessment.  In arriving 
at such a decision the opinion of the prosecution should be 
taken into consideration.  Such a continuance may be 
granted upon the judge's own initiative or upon request by 
the defendant."  (Emphases added.) 
 
 
Thus, a possibly qualified defendant "may, at his [or her] 
arraignment, be afforded a fourteen-day continuance" for 
assessment to determine whether he or she would benefit from 
participation in a particular program (emphasis added).  See 
G. L. c. 276A, § 3.  If a defendant qualifies for a program and 
consents to participate in it, his or her "criminal 
proceedings . . . shall be stayed for a period of ninety days" 
so that the defendant can complete the program.5  G. L. c. 276A, 
§ 5.  Upon successful completion of an assigned program, a judge 
may "dismiss the original charges pending against the 
                     
 
5 A stay may be granted only if a defendant "consents in 
writing to the terms and conditions of the stay of proceedings 
and knowingly executes a waiver of his [or her] right to a 
speedy trial."  G. L. c. 276A, § 5. 
10 
 
 
defendant," resulting in no criminal conviction on the 
defendant's record.6  See G. L. c. 276A, § 7. 
 
2.  Statutory construction.  We consider first whether the 
pretrial diversion statute requires that, on the Commonwealth's 
motion, a judge arraign a defendant before he or she may take 
advantage of a pretrial diversion program.  In the 
Commonwealth's view, requiring arraignment on the prosecutor's 
request is consistent with the statutory purpose; it ensures 
that pretrial diversion is available only to those adults who 
have no prior involvement in the criminal justice system, 
information that generally becomes available at arraignment.7 
The defendant argues that arraignment before diversion is 
inconsistent with the statutory purpose of allowing certain 
first-time offenders to avoid the considerable negative 
consequences that follow from having a criminal record.  She 
argues that even a dismissed charge can result in difficulties 
                     
 
6 If a defendant has not successfully completed a pretrial 
diversion program after an initial ninety-day period, the 
proceedings may be stayed or continued for an additional ninety 
days, to enable the defendant to do so.  See G. L. c. 276A, § 7. 
 
7 The Commonwealth argues also that the judge's decision not 
to arraign the defendant in this case constituted a violation of 
the separation of powers, as set forth in art. 30 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Given our result, we need 
not reach this argument.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Jones, 471 Mass. 
138, 143 (2015) (statutes are to be construed "where fairly 
possible so as to avoid constitutional questions" [citation 
omitted]). 
11 
 
 
in education, housing, and employment.  The defendant maintains 
that diverting offenders prior to arraignment is the best way to 
ensure, as the Legislature intended, that a first-time offender 
does not face these significant collateral consequences.  See 
Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 574-575 (2013). 
 
As with all matters of statutory construction, our goal in 
construing the pretrial diversion statute is to ascertain and 
effectuate the intent of the Legislature.  See Commonwealth v. 
Curran, 478 Mass. 630, 633 (2018).  "[C]onsistent with our 
general practice of statutory interpretation, we look first to 
the language of the statute because it is 'the principal source 
of insight' into the intent of the Legislature."  Sisson v. 
Lhowe, 460 Mass. 705, 708 (2011).  See Morgan, 476 Mass. at 777, 
citing Commonwealth v. Peterson, 476 Mass. 163, 167 (2017) ("The 
plain language of the statute, read as a whole, provides the 
primary insight into that intent").  Where the plain language is 
unclear or ambiguous, we strive to discern the legislative 
intent in enacting a statute "from all its parts and from the 
subject matter to which it relates, and must interpret the 
statute so as to render the legislation effective, consonant 
with sound reason and common sense."  See Seideman v. Newton, 
452 Mass. 472, 477 (2008). 
 
3.  Meaning of "at arraignment" in G. L. c. 276A, § 3.  
General Laws c. 276A, § 3, requires that the probation service 
12 
 
 
screen "each" defendant "for the purpose of enabling the judge 
at arraignment to consider the eligibility of the defendant for 
diversion to a program" (emphasis added).  "Any defendant who is 
qualified for consideration for diversion to a program may, at 
his [or her] arraignment, be afforded a fourteen-day continuance 
for assessment by the personnel of a program to determine if he 
[or she] would benefit from such program" (emphasis added).  Id.  
If a defendant chooses to be assessed for a pretrial diversion 
program, that defendant "shall so notify the judge at 
arraignment" (emphasis added).  Id. 
 
Starting from this plain language, and considering the 
words in their "ordinary and approved usage" (citation omitted), 
see Ciani v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 178 (2019), we understand 
the term "at arraignment" in the pretrial diversion statute to 
mean that the pretrial diversion process begins when a defendant 
is called to answer the charges against him or her for the first 
time, that is, at the time and place of arraignment. 
 
Although the statute has been amended a number of times 
since it was first enacted in 1974, the phrase "at arraignment" 
in this section of the statute has remained unchanged.  Indeed, 
in 2018, in conjunction with the removal of any age restriction, 
and the addition of the three new pretrial diversion programs 
established by the criminal justice reform act, a fourth 
occurrence of the phrase "at arraignment" was added to § 3.  See 
13 
 
 
G. L. c. 276A, § 3, as amended by St. 2018, c. 218, §§ 33, 34; 
St. 2018, c. 69, §§ 196-201.  Thus, in contrast to all the new 
pretrial diversion programs, when the Legislature expanded the 
statute so that it was applicable to all adults, the Legislature 
continued to use the language that had been in place for youths 
since 1974, which required the pretrial diversion process to 
begin "at arraignment." 
 
At the same time, the language the Legislature used for the 
new diversion programs was quite different.  The restorative 
justice program, for instance, provides that a "juvenile or 
adult defendant may be diverted to a community-based restorative 
justice program pre-arraignment or at any stage of a case with 
the consent of the district attorney and the victim.  
Restorative justice may be a final case disposition, with 
judicial approval.[8]  If a juvenile or adult defendant 
successfully completes the community-based restorative justice 
program, the charge shall be dismissed."9  (Emphasis added.)  See 
G. L. c. 276B, § 2. 
                     
 
8 Pretrial diversion under a restorative justice program 
differs from all other pretrial diversion programs in that it 
requires the consent of the prosecutor and the victim.  See 
G. L. c. 276B, § 2. 
 
 
9 The language used to begin a diversion program for a 
person charged with a drug crime who suffers from drug abuse 
also differs significantly from the "at arraignment" language of 
G. L. c. 276A, § 3.  "Any defendant who is charged with a drug 
offense shall, upon being brought before the court on such 
14 
 
 
 
The Legislature adopted similar prearraignment provisions 
for veterans, those with substance abuse issues, and those with 
mental health problems.  For those individuals, the criminal 
justice reform act mandates that each district attorney 
"establish a pre-arraignment diversion program which may be used 
to divert a veteran or person who is in active service in the 
armed forces, a person with a substance use disorder or a person 
with mental illness if such veteran or person is charged with an 
offense or offenses against the commonwealth" (emphasis added).10  
See G. L. c. 12, § 34, inserted by St. 2018, c. 69, § 16.  This 
section expands upon a pretrial diversion program for veterans 
                     
charge, be informed that he is entitled to request an 
examination to determine whether or not he is a drug dependent 
person who would benefit by treatment, and that if he chooses to 
exercise such right he must do so in writing within five days of 
being so informed. . . .  If the defendant requests assignment 
and if the court determines that he is a drug dependent person 
who would benefit from treatment the court may stay the court 
proceedings and assign him to a drug treatment facility.  An 
order assigning a person under this section shall specify the 
period of assignment, which shall not exceed eighteen months or 
the period of time equal to the maximum sentence he could have 
received had he been found guilty of every count alleged in the 
complaint or indictment, whichever is shorter" (emphasis added).  
G. L. c. 111E, § 10.  If an individual successfully completes a 
drug treatment program, a judge "shall" dismiss the charges 
(emphasis added).  Id. 
 
 
10 For all these programs, the rationale of treatment is to 
remove the cause of further offending by treating the addiction, 
mental illness, or posttraumatic stress disorder that is 
resulting in the offender's commission of the offenses.  Thus, 
treatment benefits both the individual and the public.  See 
G. L. c. 276A, § 1. 
15 
 
 
and military service members that the Legislature enacted in 
2012.  See G. L. c. 276A, §§ 10, 11.  At that point, in a 
provision unchanged with the more recent modifications, the 
Legislature required the probation service to determine an 
individual's status as a veteran "at or prior to arraignment."  
Compare G. L. c. 276A, § 10, inserted by St. 2012, c. 108, § 16, 
with G. L. c. 276A, § 3. 
 
Likewise, for juveniles, the criminal justice reform act 
created a new diversion program that explicitly requires 
prearraignment diversion.  "A child complained of as a 
delinquent child may, upon the request of the child, undergo an 
assessment prior to arraignment to enable the judge to consider 
the suitability of the child for diversion.  If a child chooses 
to request a continuance for the purpose of such an assessment, 
the child shall notify the judge prior to arraignment. . . .  If 
a case is continued pursuant to this subsection, the child shall 
not be arraigned and an entry shall not be made into the 
criminal offender record information system until a judge issues 
an order to resume the ordinary processing of a delinquency 
proceeding.  A judge may order diversion without first ordering 
an assessment in any case in which the court finds that 
sufficient information is available without an assessment."  
16 
 
 
(Emphasis added.)11  See G. L. c. 119, § 54A (b), inserted by 
St. 2018, 69, § 75. 
 
Thus, clearly, had the Legislature wished pretrial 
diversion for ordinary adult offenders to begin "prior" to 
arraignment, it could have used similar language; it chose not 
to do so.  See Commonwealth v. Dayton, 477 Mass. 224, 228 (2017) 
("where the Legislature used specific language in one part of an 
enactment . . . , but not in another . . . , the language should 
not be implied where it is not present").  Instead, the 
Legislature used different phrases to indicate when pretrial 
diversion is to begin for ordinary adult offenders and all other 
categories of offenders who are eligible for any form of 
pretrial diversion.  This evinced an evident legislative intent 
that, if the Commonwealth seeks arraignment, an arraignment must 
take place before an adult defendant may be referred to a 
pretrial diversion program.  See Sharris v. Commonwealth, 480 
                     
 
11 The rationale underlying this dissimilar treatment of 
adults and juveniles likely arises from a belief that "younger 
offenders are more susceptible to rehabilitation than older 
offenders."  See Zablotsky, An Analysis of State Pretrial 
Diversion Statutes, 15 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 1, 30 (1979).  
The Legislature and the courts often treat juvenile offenders 
differently from adult offenders, in recognition of the fact 
that the juvenile justice system "is primarily rehabilitative, 
cognizant of the inherent differences between juvenile and adult 
offenders, and geared toward the correction and redemption to 
society of delinquent children" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 574 
(2013). 
17 
 
 
Mass. 586, 594 (2018) (where language of statute is plain, it 
ordinarily is "conclusive as to legislative intent" [citation 
omitted]). 
 
Whatever the Legislature's reasoning in treating ordinary 
adult offenders differently, we may not rewrite the pretrial 
diversion statute to contain language the Legislature did not 
see fit to include.  Cf. Sisson, 460 Mass. at 720 (Spina, J., 
dissenting) ("The Legislature knows how to write exceptions," 
and where "it has expressed its intent as to only one 
exception," we do not add to it).  Courts may not read into a 
statute a provision that the Legislature did not enact, nor "add 
words that the Legislature had an option to, but chose not to 
include," see Commissioner of Correction v. Superior Court Dep't 
of the Trial Court, 446 Mass. 123, 126 (2006).  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the Legislature intended that participation in 
pretrial diversion for adult defendants begins "at arraignment," 
if the Commonwealth moves to arraign a defendant. 
We recognize that there is some tension between the 
statutory language and the apparent purpose underlying pretrial 
diversion.  Although the legislative history for the adult 
pretrial diversion statute is scant, we understand that its 
purpose, as with pretrial diversion for juveniles, is to provide 
rehabilitative programming so that individuals can address the 
underlying conditions that lead to their criminal behavior.  
18 
 
 
Treating the cause of the behavior is intended to reduce 
recidivism, increase public safety, and allow the individual to 
participate as a productive member of society, without incurring 
the serious collateral consequences (and concomitant difficulty 
in productive participation) that may arise from a criminal 
record.  See generally Morgan, 476 Mass. at 779-780; Zablotsky, 
An Analysis of State Pretrial Diversion Statutes, 15 Colum. J. 
L. & Soc. Probs. 1, 8 (1979); Note, Pretrial Diversion from the 
Criminal Process, 83 Yale L.J. 827, 827 & nn.1, 2 (1974).  
Nonetheless, "this purpose should not be used as a means of 
disregarding the considered judgment of the Legislature" in 
crafting statutory language that anticipated a formal 
arraignment at the Commonwealth's request.  See Globe Newspaper 
Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 436 (1983).12 
The pretrial diversion statute, as adopted, does provide 
significant opportunities for a defendant who successfully 
                     
 
12 In this case, the record indicates several reasons why 
the judges were reluctant to pursue an arraignment.  It is 
apparent that the judge who ordered the evidentiary hearing had 
serious doubts as to the victim's credibility, for 
understandable reasons.  On this record, the defendant had 
obtained a restraining order against the victim, had changed her 
telephone number, and had moved to another city, after the 
victim appeared at the defendant's house and allegedly engaged 
in repeated acts of harassment.  Indeed, at one of the hearings 
in this case, the victim was present in court on an unrelated 
criminal case and apparently attacked the defendant.  
Nonetheless, it is the Commonwealth's prerogative to decide 
whether to pursue an arraignment.  See G. L. c. 276, § 58. 
19 
 
 
completes a pretrial diversion program to avoid the more severe 
consequences that arise from having a criminal conviction, 
because the judge then may dismiss the case.  See G. L. c. 276A, 
§ 7; Morgan, 476 Mass. at 772 ("Imposing an alternative 
disposition to avoid a criminal conviction furthers these 
goals"). 
Moreover, although a judge may not decline to arraign an 
adult defendant over the Commonwealth's objection, see G. L. 
c. 276, § 58 ("The [C]ommonwealth shall be the only party 
permitted to move for arraignment . . ."), the Commonwealth also 
has the inherent authority to decide not to pursue an 
arraignment.  See Commonwealth v. Moore, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 73, 
77-79 (2018).  The pretrial diversion statute apparently 
contemplates a prosecutor's decision not to pursue formal 
arraignment.  See G. L. c. 276A, § 12, inserted by St. 2018, 
c. 69, § 201 (nothing in this chapter "shall limit or govern the 
authority of a district attorney or a police department to 
divert an offender").  The Commonwealth does appear to be 
choosing this route more frequently.  See Commonwealth v. Newton 
N., 478 Mass. 747, 758 & n.6 (2018).  The Commonwealth's 
decision not to pursue arraignment also serves the legislative 
purpose, and may be more consistent with the treatment of 
pretrial diversion in the other, more specialized diversion 
programs.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 119, § 54A (juveniles); G. L. 
20 
 
 
c. 276B, § 2 (restorative justice programming); G. L. c. 12, 
§ 34 (mental health and substance abuse).13  Where appropriate, 
pretrial diversion also saves significant police, prosecutor, 
and court resources.  See People v. Superior Court of San Mateo 
County, 11 Cal. 3d 59, 61-62 (1974) (pretrial diversion is "[a] 
quick and inexpensive method of disposition, when appropriate, 
reduces the clogging of the criminal justice system . . . , and 
thus enables the courts to devote their limited time and 
resources to cases requiring full criminal processing").  Cf. 
Eagle-Tribune Publ. Co. v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Lawrence Div. 
of the Dist. Court Dep't, 448 Mass. 647, 650 (2007). 
 
4.  Conditions of release.  We turn to the question of 
imposition of conditions of release prior to arraignment.  The 
Commonwealth argues that the judge lacked statutory or inherent 
authority to impose any conditions of release, such as the no-
contact order and GPS monitoring, because the defendant had not 
been formally arraigned.  For the same reason, the Commonwealth 
argues that the probation service could not supervise the 
defendant. 
                     
 
13 In continuing to use the "at arraignment" language for 
first-time adult offenders, it is possible the Legislature had 
in mind its recent expansion of the circumstances, after a 
specified period of time, in which a defendant may seek to have 
any record of his or her court appearances or alternative 
dispositions sealed.  See G. L. c. 276, § 100A, as amended 
through St. 2018, c. 69, §§ 186-192. 
21 
 
 
 
As an initial matter, we note that the Commonwealth did not 
lodge a contemporaneous objection to the imposition of 
conditions of release prior to the defendant's arraignment.  To 
the contrary, the Commonwealth agreed to the no-contact order.  
It later requested that the defendant be removed from pretrial 
diversion because of a suggestion that she had violated the no-
contact order, not because the condition had been imposed 
improperly.  The Commonwealth also did not object when the 
defendant subsequently sought imposition of GPS monitoring.  
Therefore, the Commonwealth's challenge to the conditions of 
release at this point is unavailing.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Plasse, 481 Mass. 199, 206 (2019) (party cannot properly 
challenge on appeal condition that he or she requested below).  
Where the defendant requested that a condition of release be 
imposed as a desirable alternative to arraignment, and the 
Commonwealth assented to that condition, we discern no error in 
the judge's imposition of the condition. 
 
Addressing the matter on the merits under our 
superintendence power, we do not agree that the judge had no 
authority to impose conditions of release.  Among other things, 
the imposition of conditions of release prior to arraignment is 
explicitly contemplated in the multiple programs that either 
require, or permit, pretrial diversion without arraignment.  
See, e.g., G. L. c. 12, § 34 (mental health and substance abuse 
22 
 
 
programming prior to arraignment); G. L. c. 111E, § 10 (drug 
offense where defendant is addict); G. L. c. 119, § 54A 
(pretrial diversion for juveniles prior to arraignment); G. L. 
c. 276B, § 2 (restorative justice programming prior to 
arraignment). Even where pretrial diversion is not contemplated, 
we have held that, at a defendant's initial appearance, 
ordinarily "the court must either arraign the defendant or set a 
time for arraignment, and determine the conditions of the 
defendant's release" (footnote omitted).  See Commonwealth v. 
Butler, 423 Mass. 517, 523 (1996).  Thus, a judge has authority 
to order conditions of release for a defendant who has not been 
arraigned.  See Commonwealth v. New York Cent. & H. R. R.R., 206 
Mass. 417, 429 (1910) ("Where there is power in a court to hear 
and determine a case, there is also power to issue proper 
process to enforce its orders"). 
When conditions are ordered, the probation service may need 
to monitor the defendant and perform "such other duties as the 
court requires."  See, e.g., First Justice of the Bristol Div. 
of the Juvenile Court Dep't v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Bristol 
Div. of the Juvenile Court Dep't, 438 Mass. 387, 400 (2003), 
quoting G. L. c. 276, § 85.  Thus, whether the arraignment took 
place had no bearing on whether the judge could order conditions 
of release such as GPS monitoring by the probation department. 
23 
 
 
 
5.  Conclusion.  The case is remanded to the county court 
for entry of an order remanding the matter to the District Court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.