Title: Brooks v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 586, 2006
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 10, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DASHAWN BROOKS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 586, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0203008352A 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 11, 2007 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: July 10, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 10th day of July 2007, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Dashawn Brooks, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s October 26, 2006 order denying his postconviction 
motion pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find no merit to 
the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
In March 2003, Brooks was found guilty by a Superior Court 
jury of Murder in the Second Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the 
Commission of a Felony, and Conspiracy in the Second Degree.  He was 
 
2
sentenced to a total of 20 years of Level V incarceration.  Brooks’ 
convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.1 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Brooks claims that his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to: a) move for a directed verdict on the 
conspiracy charge on the ground that one of the State’s witnesses testified 
that there was no agreement to murder the victim; b) investigate the jurors’ 
possible knowledge of a newspaper article about Brooks; and c) properly 
investigate Brooks’ criminal history in connection with his sentencing. 
 
(4) 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the proceedings would have been different.2  Although not insurmountable, 
the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a “strong 
presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.”3  The 
defendant must make concrete allegations of ineffective assistance, and 
substantiate them, or risk summary dismissal.4 
                                                 
1 Brooks v. State, Del. Supr., No. 310, 2003, Berger, J. (Aug. 16, 2004). 
2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
3 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
 
 
 
3
 
(5) 
As to Brooks’ ineffectiveness claims, the record reflects that 
Brooks’ co-defendant, Charles White, gave testimony supporting the 
conspiracy charge.  Thus, Brooks’ counsel acted reasonably in not moving 
for a directed verdict on that charge.  The record also reflects that the trial 
judge instructed the jury on the newspaper article.  Brooks’ counsel acted 
reasonably in relying on that instruction to mitigate any potential prejudice 
to Brooks.  Finally, the record reflects that, at sentencing, Brooks’ counsel 
misspoke concerning the number of Brooks’ prior felony offenses.  
However, he also argued that the mitigating factors in Brooks’ history 
warranted nothing more than the minimum mandatory sentence.  There is no 
evidence that the judge sentenced Brooks improperly as a result of his 
counsel’s misstatement.  We, thus, conclude that Brooks’ has not 
demonstrated that any error on the part of his counsel resulted in prejudice to 
him.         
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice