Title: Daniel Kevin Schmidt v. John E. Crusoe
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-2512
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 2003

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC00-2512
____________
DANIEL KEVIN SCHMIDT,
Petitioner,
vs.
JOHN E. CRUSOE, etc., 
Respondent.
[May 1, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
Daniel Kevin Schmidt petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus.  We have
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.  For the reasons set out below, we
grant the petition and hold that an inmate's petition for writ of mandamus
challenging a loss of gain time is a collateral criminal proceeding and not a civil
lawsuit as contemplated by the Prisoner Indigency Statute.
-2-
FACTS
Schmidt is serving a criminal sentence and was disciplined for allegedly
having lied to prison staff.  As punishment, the Department of Corrections forfeited
a portion of the gain time that Schmidt had already earned as a reduction to his
sentence.  Schmidt filed a mandamus petition in the circuit court contesting the
forfeiture.  The circuit court sought a filing fee or an affidavit of indigency and a
printout of Schmidt’s inmate account pursuant to the Prisoner Indigency Statute. 
See § 57.085, Fla. Stat. (2002).  Schmidt responded that he was not subject to
these requirements because his petition was not a civil lawsuit, but rather was a
“collateral criminal proceeding” exempted under the statute.  See § 57.085(10), Fla.
Stat. (2002).  When the circuit court rejected this contention, Schmidt sought
review by a petition for writ of prohibition in the First District Court of Appeal. 
The district court also invoked the statute and advised Schmidt that his case would
be dismissed if compliance or a filing fee was not forthcoming.  Schmidt then filed
a petition in this Court, and we stayed proceedings pending consideration of the
merits of his petition and the responses thereto.  
ANALYSIS
I. Jurisdiction
At the time Schmidt filed his petition here, this Court was about to issue
-3-
Geffken v. Strickler, 778 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 2001), which held that a writ petition that
contests a conviction or sentence is a collateral criminal proceeding and is therefore
exempt from the Prisoner Indigency Statute.  Schmidt alleged that the First District
was about to dismiss his case because he had failed to comply with the Prisoner
Indigency Statute.  Since it was at least debatable that a writ petition contesting the
forfeiture of gain time which results in a longer period of incarceration should also
be considered a collateral criminal proceeding and thus exempt from the statute,
this Court stayed the pending case in the First District Court of Appeal, requested
responses, and held oral argument.  
This Court has used its extraordinary writ jurisdiction to address indigency
determinations by the district courts in quite a few cases over the years.  See, e.g.,
Geffken v. Strickler, 778 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 2001).  In most cases, the petition filed in
this Court was a petition for writ of mandamus and the petitioner's case had already
been dismissed in the district court.  In Caldwell v. Estate of McDowell, 507 So. 2d
607 (Fla. 1987), for example, this Court held that the petitioner had a clear legal
right to be deemed insolvent and thus the district court had a duty to reinstate the
appeal it had dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee.  Later mandamus cases from
this Court have also required district courts to reinstate actions dismissed for failure
to pay filing fees.  See, e.g., Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2001)
1.  Mandamus may be used by a superior tribunal to compel a lower tribunal
to perform a clear legal duty.  See Hatten v. State, 561 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1990).  One
legal duty of an appellate court is to exercise its jurisdiction once that jurisdiction is
properly invoked.  See Sky Lake Gardens Recreation, Inc. v. District Court of
Appeal, 511 So. 2d 293, 294 (Fla. 1987) (concluding district court had duty to
consider and decide the appeal).  
Thus, for decades, this Court and other Florida courts have used mandamus
to reinstate appeals and other types of actions which were erroneously dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Pino v. District Court of Appeal, 604 So. 2d
1232 (Fla. 1992) (reinstating appeal); Sky Lake Gardens Recreation, Inc. v. District
Court of Appeal, 511 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1987) (reinstating appeal); State ex rel.
Gaines Constr. Co. v. Pearson, 154 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1963) (reinstating appeal);
State ex rel. Goethe v Parks, 179 So. 780 (Fla. 1938) (reinstating circuit court
action); State ex rel. Baggs v. Frederick, 168 So. 252 (Fla. 1936) (reinstating
appeal); State ex rel. Hillman v. Hutchins, 158 So. 716 (Fla. 1935) (reviewing
dismissal of landlord-tenant action); State ex rel. Rembrandt Corp. v. Thomas, 157
So. 337 (Fla. 1934) (reviewing trial court's refusal to take jurisdiction over a cause);
State ex rel. Garrett v Johnson, 150 So. 239 (Fla. 1933) (compelling circuit court to
reinstatement action improperly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); State v. Horne,
77 So. 672 (Fla. 1918); State v. Wills, 38 So. 289 (Fla. 1905) (reinstating appeal to
circuit court); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v Calhoun, 341 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 2nd DCA
1976) (reviewing inappropriate dismissal of personal injury action), aff'd, 354 So.
2d 882 (Fla. 1978).
-4-
(instructing district court to reinstate appeal it had dismissed when inmate appellant
failed to comply with the copy requirement of the Prisoner Indigency Statute);1
Quigley v. Butterworth, 708 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1998) (instructing district court that
had dismissed appeal due to trial court's denial of indigency to consider action in
the district court as an appeal of the trial court's denial of indigency); McFadden v.
Fourth District Court of Appeal, 682 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 1996) (instructing district
court to reinstate appeal it had dismissed when inmate appellant failed to either pay
-5-
a filing fee or obtain an order of indigency from the trial court). 
In this Court's prior mandamus cases concerning filing fees, the district court
had already dismissed the petitioner's case and this Court used its mandamus
jurisdiction to direct the district court to reinstate the case.  This case differs
somewhat because we stayed Schmidt's case in the district court before it was able
to dismiss it for failure to comply with the Prisoner Indigency Statute.  Thus, even
though there is no need to direct the district court to reinstate Schmidt's case, we
must determine whether to direct the district court to consider Schmidt's indigency
without requiring him to comply with the Prisoner Indigency Statute.  If the
Prisoner Indigency Statute does not apply in this case, Schmidt has a clear legal
right and the district court has a clear legal duty to determine his indigency without
requiring compliance with the statute.  The Prisoner Indigency Statute is still
relatively new and questions as to what types of cases it covers continue to arise. 
The fact that we may need to examine and interpret the statute in order to determine
whether there is such a right does not make the right any more or less "clear." 
II. The Merits
The Prisoner Indigency Statute, section 57.085, Florida Statutes (2002), was
enacted as part of an act which created or amended several statutory provisions for
the purpose of reducing unnecessary or frivolous prisoner filings.  See ch. 96-106,
2.  Not only did the act amend the statute which regulates pleadings filed by
indigents to exclude prisoners and create a new indigency statute for prisoner
filings, it also created statutory authority permitting the courts, upon a determination
that a pleading is frivolous, to send that finding to the prisoner's institution for
disciplinary action, see § 944.279, Fla. Stat. (2002); ch. 96-106, § 5, Laws of Fla. 
In addition, it amended the gain time forfeiture statute to add that the filing of a
pleading found frivolous by a court may also subject a prisoner to gain time
forfeiture.  See § 944.28(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002); ch. 96-106, § 6, Laws of Fla. 
-6-
Laws of Fla.2  Before the enactment of the Prisoner Indigency Statute, indigent
prisoners, like all other indigent persons, could file civil lawsuits without the
payment of a filing fee and other court costs.  However, section 57.085, Florida
Statutes (2002), the Prisoner Indigency Statute, now provides that while an indigent
inmate may still initiate a civil lawsuit without first paying a filing fee, a lien may be
placed on the inmate's account, and if any money is deposited in the account, a
portion of the filing fee is deducted each month until the filing fee is paid in full. 
The statute specifically excludes “criminal” and “collateral criminal proceedings,”
see § 57.085(10), Fla. Stat. (2002), from its reach.  
Here, Schmidt asserts that regardless of the particular denomination of the
petition he filed in the trial court contesting the forfeiture of earned gain time and the
calculation of his sentence by the Department of Corrections, it is akin to a
traditional habeas corpus action or a motion for postconviction relief under Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 or 3.800, which have long been deemed hybrid
3.  Schmidt further asserts that when he sought relief in the First District, that
action was also a “collateral criminal proceeding,” as is the mandamus action filed
in this Court because they are both simply the continuation of Schmidt’s attempt to
“correct or reduce his sentence.”
4.  The instant case before this Court is a mandamus case, and while the
federal courts have not discussed mandamus petitions in particular as concerns this
question, the reason they have not is that all gain time petitions in the federal courts
must be filed as habeas petitions.  Therefore, we conclude that, for purposes of
deciding whether the federal courts’ analysis would be applicable, the fact that this
case is a mandamus does not alter the appropriate analysis. 
-7-
criminal-civil actions and clearly meet the Prisoner Indigency Statute’s and this
Court’s definition of a “collateral criminal proceeding.”3 
Florida’s Prisoner Indigency Statute was fashioned, at least in part, on the
federal Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA).  See Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2000)). 
Similar to Florida’s act, the PLRA's requirement that prisoners pay at least a partial
filing fee applies only to civil lawsuits.  As a result, the federal circuits have been
grappling for years with virtually the same issue now presented to this Court — that
is, whether the filing fee provisions of the federal version of the Prisoner Indigency
Statute (the PLRA) should be applied to writ petitions which seek relief traditionally
available under habeas corpus or other collateral or postconviction proceedings.4 
Acknowledging the hybrid civil-criminal character of such actions, the federal
courts have looked to the legislative history of the PLRA to determine whether
-8-
Congress meant to restrict inmates from filing such actions, and have found that
Congress was principally interested in discouraging civil damage suits involving
frivolous challenges to prison conditions.  See, e.g., United States v. Simmonds,
111 F.3d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 1997) (referencing Senator Dole's statement in regard
to limiting such prison condition suits involving a challenge to the amount of
storage space and the infamous “creamy peanut butter” versus “chunky peanut
butter” controversy).  
The federal decisions have found no indication in the text of the PLRA or its
legislative history to indicate that Congress expected its filing fee payment
requirements to apply to traditional hybrid civil-criminal, habeas-type actions in
which inmates assert an entitlement to gain time and an accelerated release from
prison but were not contesting their conditions of confinement.  In Santana v.
United States, 98 F.3d 752 (3rd Cir. 1996), the Third Circuit explained:
The PLRA applies to prisoners who bring a "civil action" or
who appeal a judgment in a "civil action or proceeding."  28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(2), (b).  But the PLRA neither defines "civil action" for
purposes of in forma pauperis litigants nor expressly excludes habeas
corpus proceedings from its scope.  
. . . .
We do not believe, however, that the meaning of the phrase
"civil action" as used in the PLRA is plain.  First, habeas corpus cases
are, in effect, hybrid actions whose nature is not adequately captured
by the phrase "civil action" . . . . 
. . . . 
-9-
. . . Congress enacted the PLRA primarily to curtail claims
brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Torts
Claims Act, most of which concern prison conditions and many of
which are routinely dismissed as legally frivolous.  See H.R. CONF.
REP. NO. 104-378, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (The PLRA "limits
the remedies for prison condition lawsuits."); 141 CONG. REC.
S14418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (The
PLRA will limit frivolous "prison condition lawsuits," such as a
prisoner who "sued demanding that he be issued Reebok . . . instead
of Converse brand shoes."). 
. . . .
Furthermore, when the PLRA is read as a whole, it is apparent
that Congress did not intend for the statute to apply to habeas
proceedings.
Id. at 754-56.  Thus, the federal courts have concluded that claims contesting the
computation of criminal sentences should continue to be treated as traditional
collateral proceedings under habeas corpus, since they were not the type of civil
lawsuits Congress meant to discourage or restrict.  See Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151
F.3d 1036, 1039-41 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the PLRA does not apply to any
requests for collateral relief under the federal habeas corpus statutes); Martin v.
Bissonette, 118 F.3d 871, 874 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding broadly that PLRA does not
apply to habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners); Kincade v. Sparkman,
117 F.3d 949, 950-51 (6th Cir. 1997) (same with respect to several of the federal
habeas corpus statutes); Smith v. Angelone, 111 F.3d 1126, 1131 (4th Cir. 1997)
(same with respect to habeas corpus actions); Anderson v. Singletary, 111 F.3d
5.  Interestingly, for a time there was a split in the federal circuits, with the
Seventh Circuit holding that only writ petitions which were “the functional
continuation of the criminal prosecution” were exempt from the filing fee provision. 
See Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 1997); Thurman v. Gramley, 97 F.3d
185 (7th Cir. 1996).  Recently, however, the Seventh Circuit has receded from
those decisions and in Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2000), announced
that it has joined the rest of the federal circuits in giving a broader reach to the
meaning of collateral criminal proceedings.
-10-
801, 806 (11th Cir. 1997) (same with respect to several of the federal habeas
corpus statutes);5 Naddi v. Hill, 106 F.3d 275, 277 (9th Cir. 1997) (same with
respect to habeas corpus actions); Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 756 (3d
Cir. 1996) (same with respect to actions under several of the federal habeas corpus
statutes); Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676, 678 (2d Cir. 1996) (same with respect to
habeas corpus actions).
A review of Florida’s legislative history shows that our Legislature had an
intent almost identical to that of Congress when enacting its version of the Prisoner
Indigency Statute.  Section 57.085 was created pursuant to chapter 96-106, Laws
of Florida.  At the beginning of the act, the Legislature provided a preamble in
which it set forth the basis or reasons for the act.  The preamble provides, in
pertinent part:
WHEREAS, frivolous inmate lawsuits congest civil court dockets and
delay the administration of justice for all litigants, and
WHEREAS, each year self-represented indigent inmates in Florida's
6.  See also Cinnamon Blair, Law Aims To Reduce Prisoner Lawsuits; Top
10 Frivolous Lawsuits, The Ledger, Apr. 28, 1996, at F1 (reporting that bill called
for by Attorney General Bob Butterworth would allow for the imposition of a filing
fee for frivolous lawsuits such as one where inmate complained that he had to
watch network (instead of satellite) programs which contained violence and
profanity); Phil Davis, Frivolous Inmate Lawsuits Face Possible Legislative
Crackdown, Sun Sentinel, Apr. 26, 1995 (reporting that Representative Lori
Edwards was sponsoring legislation that would make inmates pay for their
“onslaught” of lawsuits because there was no reason why inmates should not pay
when the courthouse was “inaccessible to most middle class people” and that such
lawsuits included one where an inmate complained that his pancake ration had been
reduced; another in which inmate claimed he should have the right to have sex with
his fellow inmates; and another in which inmate complained that a prison guard told
him his wife wore a revealing dress); End the Travesties, The Florida Times-Union,
Mar. 30, 1996, at A-10 (“Florida inmates have filed suit over such ‘abuses’ as
getting one bread roll at dinner instead of two, being deprived of a third pancake
and [the] blatant disregard for the right to have a salad with lunch. . . .  Fortunately,
both houses of the Legislature have unanimously passed a reform bill . . . [which]
makes it more difficult for inmates to get legal costs waived on indigency
grounds.”); Michael Griffin, Inmate-Lawsuit Bill Ok’d, Sent To Chiles, Orlando
-11-
jails and prisons file an ever-increasing number of frivolous lawsuits at
public expense against public officers and employees, and
WHEREAS, state and local governments spend millions of dollars
each year processing, serving, and defending frivolous lawsuits filed
by self-represented indigent inmates, and
WHEREAS, the overwhelming majority of civil lawsuits filed by
self-represented indigent inmates are frivolous and malicious actions
intended to embarrass or harass public officers and employees, and
WHEREAS, under current law frivolous inmate lawsuits are
dismissible by the courts only after considerable expenditure of
precious taxpayer and judicial resources . . . .
Ch. 96-106, preamble, Laws of Fla.6  Based upon this express language and a close
Sentinel, Mar. 28, 1996, at D6 (reporting that “enough is enough” and that
legislators had authorized new law deterring frivolous lawsuits such as the one
where an inmate sued because his dinner was served on paper plates instead of fine
china).
-12-
reading of the legislative scheme, we conclude that the Florida act was enacted for
substantially the same reasons Congress acted at the federal level:  to discourage
the filing of frivolous civil lawsuits, but not to prevent the filing of claims contesting
the computation of criminal sentences.  Hence, the federal decisions provide a valid
framework for our own analysis and decision.
Initially, we note that it is apparent that an action affecting gain time does in
fact affect the computation of a criminal defendant’s sentence, because the length
of time the inmate will actually spend in prison is directly affected.  As noted in
many of the federal decisions, such a conclusion is also suggested by those
decisions of the United States Supreme Court that have treated gain time issues. 
Long ago, that Court made clear that “[a] prisoner’s eligibility for reduced
imprisonment is a significant factor entering into both the defendant's decision to
plea bargain and the judge’s calculation of the sentence to be imposed.”  Weaver v.
Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 32 (1981).  More recently, in Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433
(1997), the Court rejected the contention of the Florida Department of Corrections
that the retroactive cancellation of overcrowding gain time bore no relationship to
7.  Because the Prisoner Indigency Statute (section 57.085) does not apply
herein, the general indigency statute (section 57.081) does.  That means that if
Schmidt still seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, he must prove his inability to pay
-13-
the original penalty assigned to the crime.  The Supreme Court declared that “[t]o
the extent that respondents’ argument rests on the notion that . . . gain-time is not
‘in some technical sense part of the sentence,’ this argument is foreclosed by our
precedents.  [Gain-time] credits are 'one determinant of petitioner's prison term . . .
and . . . [his] effective sentence is altered once this determinant is changed.' ”  Id. at
445.  It is clear that the Supreme Court has refused to be bound by the variations in
terminology used in the various challenges to the computation of an inmate’s
sentence.  Instead, it has looked to the effect the challenged action had on the
amount of time an inmate has to actually spend in prison.  We think we should do
the same; thus, we conclude that a gain time challenge is analogous to a collateral
challenge to a sentence in a criminal proceeding because the end result is the
same—the inmate’s time in prison is directly affected.  
In the instant case, Schmidt’s loss of gain time effectively lengthened his
sentence, since by the Department of Corrections’ action he now has to serve that
additional time in prison.  Therefore, we agree, in accord with the authorities
discussed above, that his gain time challenge should be considered a “collateral
criminal proceeding,” and the Prisoner Indigency Statute should not apply.7  To
by filing an affidavit with the information required according to section 57.081.  See
§ 57.081(a), Fla. Stat. (2001) (requiring a litigant seeking an indigency waiver of
"services of the courts, sheriffs, and clerks" to file an affidavit "claiming that the
applicant is indigent and unable to pay . . . providing the details of the applicant's
financial condition, and containing a statement that certifies that no person has been
paid or promised any payment of any remuneration by the applicant for services
performed on behalf of the applicant in connection with the action or proceeding").
-14-
hold otherwise would result in an unlawful “ ‘chilling’ of a criminal defendant’s
right to appeal or otherwise challenge the propriety or constitutionality of the
conviction or sentence,” Geffken v. Strickler, 778 So. 2d 975, 977 n.5 (Fla. 2001),
and raise a serious issue as to criminal defendants’ constitutional rights of access to
the courts to challenge their sentences.  
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we lift the stay we previously granted,
grant the petition filed in this Court, and direct the district court to consider
Schmidt's indigency without regard to the Prisoner Indigency Statute.  Because we
are confident that the district court will act in a manner consistent with this opinion,
we withhold issuance of the writ. 
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., and SHAW and HARDING,
Senior Justices, concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which QUINCE, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
-15-
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, J., dissenting.
I dissent because this Court does not have jurisdiction pursuant to article V,
section 3(b)(8), Florida Constitution.  The present petition in this Court does not
present a claim based upon a clear legal right, which is a prerequisite to this Court’s
mandamus jurisdiction.  Hatten v. State, 561 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1990).  Nor does this
case involve a writ of habeas corpus.  The defendant in this proceeding is not
contesting his actual loss of gain time—he is contesting whether a court filing fee
should be paid.
This case involves an issue of statutory interpretation, as is plainly seen in the
majority opinion’s analysis of what section 57.085, Florida Statutes, includes and
what it does not include.  Legislative history of a statute is obviously not germane
to the enforcement of a clear legal right by mandamus.  Resorting to legislative
history is a tool of statutory construction.
I dissent from the majority’s departure from long-standing and constitutional
bases for this jurisdiction.  I do not agree with crafting this Court’s writ jurisdiction
to reach an issue over which this Court constitutionally only has jurisdiction if there
becomes a conflict in statutory construction among the district courts.  This Court
does not have common law certiorari jurisdiction.  Trepal v. State, 754 So. 2d 702
-16-
(Fla. 2000).
QUINCE, J., concurs.
Original Proceeding - Mandamus
Susan L. Kelsey and Stephen F. Hanlon of Holland & Knight, LLP, Tallahassee,
Florida; Robin L. Rosenberg of Holland & Knight, LLP, St. Petersburg, Florida;
and Wendell T. Locke of Holland & Knight, LLP, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Petitioner
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Robert C. Brannan, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent