Title: P. v. Rodriguez
Citation: 47 Cal. 4th 501
Docket Number: S159497
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 20, 2009

1 
Filed 8/20/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S159497 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/4 B179650 
JUAN RODRIGUEZ, 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. MA025392 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
A jury convicted defendant of three counts of assault with a firearm.  (Pen. 
Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2).)1  As to each count, the jury found to be true two 
sentence enhancement allegations:  that defendant personally used a firearm 
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and that the assault was a “violent felony” committed to 
benefit a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).  The trial court 
sentenced defendant to prison for a total of 22 years and eight months.  That 
sentence included 18 years and eight months for the two sentence enhancements.   
 
The Court of Appeal, in a two-to-one decision, struck the additional five 
years and four months resulting from defendant‟s personal firearm use, but it left 
in place the additional 13 years and four months imposed for committing violent 
felonies to benefit a street gang.  The majority reasoned that application of both 
sentence enhancement provisions in this case violated section 654‟s prohibition 
                                              
1 
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2 
against multiple punishment for a single criminal act — here, that single act was 
defendant‟s firearm use in each of the three assaults.   
 
We agree with the Court of Appeal majority that the trial court erred in 
imposing additional punishment for defendant‟s firearm use under both section 
12022.5‟s subdivision (a) and section 186.22‟s subdivision (b)(1)(C).  But unlike 
the appellate court‟s decision, ours is not based on section 654.  Instead, it rests on 
section 1170.1, subdivision (f), which prohibits the imposition of additional 
punishment under more than one enhancement provision for “using . . . a firearm 
in the commission of a single offense.”  That provision was violated here.   
I 
 
Defendant Juan Rodriguez is a member of Varrio Nuevo Estrada (VNE), a 
criminal street gang in the Antelope Valley area of Los Angeles County.  While 
riding in a car with two other VNE members, defendant fired five or six shots at 
three brothers (Miguel, Jose, and Oscar Rodriguez)2 as they were playing soccer in 
front of their Lancaster home.  No one was injured.  The three victims were 
members of a rival gang, the 18th Street Gang. 
 
When arrested, defendant admitted firing the shots in retaliation for the 
18th Street Gang‟s assault on a VNE member known as “Sneaky.”  At trial, 
defendant denied any intent to harm the three victims, saying that he fired all of 
the shots “at the sky,” far over the victims‟ heads.   
 
As noted at the outset, a jury found defendant guilty of three counts of 
assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), and as to each count made findings 
under two different sentencing enhancement statutes:  (1) that defendant 
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)); and (2) that he committed a 
“violent felony” to benefit a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).   
                                              
2 
It does not appear that the brothers are related to defendant.   
3 
 
Section 12022.5‟s subdivision (a) provides that “any person who personally 
uses a firearm in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished 
by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment . . . for 3, 4, or 10 years 
. . . .”  (Italics added.)  Exempt from that additional punishment are crimes that 
necessarily involve firearm use.  (Ibid.)  But that exemption does not apply to “any 
violation of Section 245 if a firearm is used . . . .”  (§ 12022.5, subd. (d).)  Here, 
because defendant‟s crimes of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) 
necessarily involved firearm use, at first glance, that would exempt him from the 
additional punishment.  But because his firearm use pertained to “violation[s] of 
Section 245,” defendant falls within the exception to the exemption and thus is 
subject to additional punishment under section 12022.5, subdivision (a), for 
personally using a firearm in the three assaults.   
 
The other sentence enhancement statute involved is section 186.22, 
subdivision (b)(1).  It calls for additional punishment when a crime is committed 
to benefit a criminal street gang, with increasingly harsh levels of punishment:  
Subdivision (b)(1)(A) of section 186.22 provides for additional punishment of 
two, three, or four years‟ imprisonment for most felonies.  Under subdivision 
(b)(1)(B), the additional punishment is increased to five years for “serious” 
felonies, which are defined in section 1192.7‟s subdivision (c).  And under section 
186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) (the provision at issue here), the additional 
punishment is increased to 10 years for “violent” felonies “as defined in 
subdivision (c) of Section 667.5.”  Here, each of the three counts of assault with a 
firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) qualified as a “violent” felony under section 667.5, 
subdivision (c), because in committing each of those offenses defendant “use[d] a 
firearm which use has been charged and proved” under section 12022.5.  (§ 667.5, 
subd. (c)(8).)  
4 
 
The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of 22 years eight 
months, arrived at as follows:   
 
For defendant‟s assault on Miguel, the court imposed a three-year term for 
the assault, enhanced by four years for defendant‟s personal use of a firearm, and 
further enhanced by 10 years for committing a violent felony to benefit a street 
gang, resulting in a sentence totaling 17 years.  For the assault on Jose, the court 
imposed a one-year prison term (one-third of the midterm) for the assault, 
enhanced by one year and four months (one-third of the midterm) for defendant‟s 
personal use of a firearm, and further enhanced by three years and four months 
(one-third of the 10-year term) for committing a violent felony to benefit a street 
gang, resulting in a sentence totaling five years and eight months, to be served 
consecutively to the 17-year term imposed for the assault on Miguel.  For the 
assault on Oscar, the trial court imposed a 17-year sentence, to be served 
concurrently with the aggregate sentences for the assaults on Miguel and Jose. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeal majority, relying on section 
654‟s prohibition against multiple punishment, struck the additional punishments 
for defendant‟s personal firearm use (a total of five years and four months), 
leaving in place the sentence enhancements for committing violent felonies to 
benefit a street gang (a total of 13 years and four months).  The dissenting justice 
concluded that defendant had a different motive for personally using a firearm in 
the three assaults than for committing these crimes to benefit a street gang, and 
therefore it was proper to apply the two different sentence enhancement 
provisions, section 12022.5‟s subdivision (a) and section 186.22‟s subdivision 
(b)(1)(C).   
 
We granted the Attorney General‟s petition for review.   
5 
II 
 
Section 654, on which the Court of Appeal majority here relied, provides in 
relevant part:  “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different 
provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the 
longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be 
punished under more than one provision.”  (§ 654, subd. (a).) 
 
In Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, this court construed the 
statute broadly:  “ „Section 654 has been applied not only where there was but one 
“act” in the ordinary sense . . . but also where a course of conduct violated more 
than one statute and the problem was whether it comprised a divisible transaction 
which could be punished under more than one statute within the meaning of 
section 654.‟  [Citation.]  [¶]  Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible 
and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 
depends on the intent and objective of the actor.  If all of the offenses were 
incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such 
offenses but not for more than one.”  (Id. at p. 19, italics added.)   
 
With respect to punishment imposed under statutes that define a criminal 
offense, it is well settled that “[s]ection 654 bars multiple punishments for separate 
offenses arising out of a single occurrence where all of the offenses were incident 
to one objective.”  (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 519.)  But this court 
has never held that section 654 applies to sentence enhancements.  We have 
touched on that issue in three cases:  People v. Palacios (2007) 41 Cal.4th 720, 
People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, and People v. Coronado (1995) 12 
Cal.4th 145.  In Coronado, we observed that “there are at least two types of 
sentence enhancements:  (1) those which go to the nature of the offender; and 
(2) those which go to the nature of the offense.”  (Coronado, supra, at p. 156.)  
We then concluded that section 654‟s prohibition against multiple punishment for 
6 
a single “act or omission” does not apply to enhancements based on the nature of 
the offender.  (Coronado, supra, at p. 158.)   
 
In this case, the Court of Appeal majority held that when the same 
circumstance — here, firearm use — calls for additional punishment under two 
different sentence enhancement provisions based on the nature of the offense, 
section 654 precludes imposition of both enhancements.  Defendant makes the 
same argument here.  We need not, however, decide whether section 654 applies 
to sentence enhancements that are based on the nature of the offense, because of 
our conclusion that the additional punishments imposed under the two 
enhancement provisions in this case violated subdivision (f) of section 1170.1.  
We now turn to that statute.   
III 
 
Section 1170.1 is part of California‟s determinate sentencing law, which 
“seeks to achieve greater uniformity in sentencing by providing a limited range of 
sentencing options for each offense.”  (People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1238, 
1246, judg. vacated and cause remanded on other grounds in light of Cunningham 
v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270.)   
 
Section 1170.1‟s subdivision (a) describes sentencing for more than one 
crime:  “[T]he aggregate term of imprisonment . . . shall be the sum of the 
principal term [for the primary offense], the subordinate term [for additional 
offenses], and any additional term imposed for applicable enhancements.”  
Subdivision (f) pertains to sentence enhancements for, as relevant here, firearm 
use.  It states:  “When two or more enhancements may be imposed for being armed 
with or using a dangerous or deadly weapon or a firearm in the commission of a 
single offense, only the greatest of those enhancements shall be imposed for that 
offense.  This subdivision shall not limit the imposition of any other enhancements 
7 
applicable to that offense, including an enhancement for the infliction of great 
bodily injury.”  (§ 1170.1, subd. (f), italics added.)  
 
At issue here are the additional punishments that the trial court imposed, 
with respect to defendant‟s assaults on victims Miguel and Jose, under two 
different sentence enhancement provisions:  section 12022.5‟s subdivision (a), and 
section 186.22‟s subdivision (b)(1)(C).  These additional punishments comprised a 
total of 18 years and eight months — defendant‟s total prison sentence was 22 
years and eight months.  (See p. 4, ante.)   
 
There is no question that the additional punishments imposed under section 
12022.5‟s subdivision (a) for “personally us[ing] a firearm in the commission of a 
felony,” fall squarely within the limiting language of section 1170.1‟s subdivision 
(f).  This is why:  The additional punishments totaling five years and four months 
imposed under section 12022.5‟s subdivision (a) for defendant‟s personal use of a 
firearm in each of the three assaults were, in the words of section 1170.1‟s 
subdivision (f), punishments “for . . . using . . . a firearm in the commission of a 
single offense.”  The additional punishments totaling 13 years and four months 
under section 186.22‟s subdivision (b)(1)(C), the criminal street gang provision, 
were likewise based on defendant‟s firearm use.  Because two different sentence 
enhancements were imposed for defendant‟s firearm use in each crime, section 
1170.1‟s subdivision (f) requires that “only the greatest of those enhancements” be 
imposed.   
 
The Attorney General contends that section 186.22‟s subdivision (b)(1)(C) 
is not subject to the limiting language of section 1170.1‟s subdivision (f) because 
the former pertains to additional punishment that is imposed not for a defendant‟s 
firearm use but for committing a felony to benefit a street gang.  Thus, according 
to the Attorney General, defendant was not punished under two different sentence 
8 
enhancement provisions for using a firearm in a single offense.  We disagree.  Our 
reasoning follows. 
 
As mentioned earlier (see p. 3, ante), the standard additional punishment 
for committing a felony to benefit a criminal street gang is two, three, or four 
years‟ imprisonment.  (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A).)  But when the crime is a 
“violent felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5,” section 186.22‟s 
subdivision (b)(1)(C) calls for additional punishment of 10 years.  Here, defendant 
became eligible for this 10-year punishment only because he “use[d] a firearm 
which use [was] charged and proved as provided in . . . Section 12022.5.”  
(§ 667.5, subd. (c)(8).)  Thus, defendant‟s firearm use resulted in additional 
punishment not only under section 12022.5‟s subdivision (a) (providing for 
additional punishment for personal use of a firearm) but also under section 
186.22‟s subdivision (b)(1)(C), for committing a violent felony as defined in 
section 667.5, subdivision (c)(8) (by personal use of firearm) to benefit a criminal 
street gang.  Because the firearm use was punished under two different sentence 
enhancement provisions, each pertaining to firearm use, section 1070.1‟s 
subdivision (f) requires imposition of “only the greatest of those enhancements” 
with respect to each offense.   
 
Here, the Court of Appeal, relying on section 654‟s prohibition against 
multiple punishment for the same act (here, the firearm use), struck the trial 
court‟s imposition of additional punishment for defendant‟s personal use of a 
firearm under section 12022.5 (a total of five years and four months for 
defendant‟s assaults on Miguel and Jose, plus the additional punishment of four 
years‟ imprisonment for the assault on the third victim, Oscar, to be served 
concurrently to the sentences imposed for the assaults on Miguel and Jose).  The 
proper remedy, however, was not to strike the punishment under section 12022.5 
but to reverse the trial court‟s judgment and remand the matter for resentencing.  
9 
(See People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 681.)  Remand will give the trial 
court an opportunity to restructure its sentencing choices in light of our conclusion 
that the sentence imposed here violated section 1170.1‟s subdivision (f). 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is 
remanded to that court with directions to reverse the trial court‟s judgment and to  
remand the matter to that court for resentencing that does not violate section 
1170.1‟s subdivision (f).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Rodriguez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 157 Cal.App.4th 14 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S159497 
Date Filed: August 20, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: David Mintz 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Matthew Alger, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Murray A. Rosenberg, under appointment 
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. 
Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Kristofer Jorstad, Jason Tran and Allison H. 
Chung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Matthew Alger 
290 Shaw Avenue, Suite A 
Clovis, CA  93612 
(559) 324-0310 
 
Allison H. Chung 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2058