Title: The Florida Senate v. Katherine Harris
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95-960
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 28, 1999

Supreme Court of Florida
 
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No. 95,960
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THE FLORIDA SENATE, et al.,
Petitioners/Cross-Respondents, 
vs.
KATHERINE HARRIS, etc., et al.,
Respondents/ Cross-Petitioners.
[October 28, 1999]
HARDING, C.J.
The Florida Senate and Senate President Toni Jennings petition this Court
for a writ of mandamus ordering the Florida Secretary of State to expunge from the
official records the gubernatorial veto directed at portions of the proviso language
in Line Item 117C of the 1999-2000 General Appropriations Act, chapter 99-226,
Laws of Florida (the Act).  Petitioners also request that the writ order the Florida
Comptroller to ensure that this expunction is reflected in the state financial
1 Governor Bush was permitted to intervene as a respondent.
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operations.  Governor Jeb Bush1 counterpetitions for a writ of mandamus which
would require the expunction of a proviso to Line Item 117C of the Act as
unconstitutional.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.
Line Item 117C involves a $40 million appropriation for an extended school
year program in Florida public schools.  Under this program, participating schools
would extend the academic year for students from 180 to 210 days.  A sum of
$500,000 was earmarked for summer training programs for representatives from
the schools implementing the extended school year.  The remaining fund of $39.5
million was earmarked "for both planning and operations grants" for participating
schools.  Fla. SB 2500, §2, at 49, line 117C (1999).  The proviso specifies that
eligibility for such grants is limited to the 234 schools that expressed an interest in
an extended school year in response to a February 1999 survey by the Department
of Education.  However, in order to receive funds from this appropriation, the
eligible schools were required to submit to the Commissioner of Education by
August 1, 1999, a letter of commitment to extend the school year and to file an
implementation plan by January 1, 2000.  The proviso also includes a formula for
determining how much money will be available for planning grants to participating
schools based upon student population and a second formula for calculating each
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school district's allocation for the operation of an extended school year.  In the
event that the amount required to fund the planning and operation grants for all
eligible schools exceeds the amount of the appropriation, the proviso authorizes the
Commissioner to "fund the cost of extended school year operations on a first-come
first-served basis."  Id. at 50.
In his May 27, 1999, veto message, Governor Bush vetoed the $500,000
summer training program and $16,140,000 for operation grants.  The Governor let
stand $23,360,000 for extended school year planning grants.  The Senate
challenges the veto of the operation grants as a violation of the Florida
Constitution.
Article III, section 8(a) of the Florida Constitution provides in pertinent part
that "[t]he governor may veto any specific appropriation in a general appropriation
bill, but may not veto any qualification or restriction without also vetoing the
appropriation to which it relates."  As explained by this Court in Brown v.
Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654, 664 (Fla. 1980), the governor's constitutional "veto
power is intended to be a negative power, the power to nullify, or at least suspend,
legislative intent.  It is not designed to alter or amend legislative intent."  See also
Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, and F, 589 So.2d 260, 265 (Fla. 1991) ("[I]t is
well settled that the executive branch does not have the power to use the veto to
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restructure an appropriation.").  Thus, where the Legislature attaches "a rationally
and directly related qualification or restriction to [an] appropriation . . . the
governor [must] make the hard choice whether to give up the appropriation entirely
or to follow the legislative direction for its use."  Brown, 382 So. 2d at 667.
In Brown, this Court adopted the following rule to determine what
constitutes a "specific appropriation" for purposes of a gubernatorial veto:  
A specific appropriation is an identifiable, integrated fund which the
legislature has allocated for a specified purpose.
Id. at 668.  However, we later recognized that "[t]his rule, while simple in theory,
has been somewhat more difficult to apply in actual practice."  Florida House of
Representatives v. Martinez, 555 So. 2d 839, 843 (Fla. 1990).  This difficulty
increases when the Legislature appropriates a sum of money "under a vague or
broad line-item category and then specifies in proviso language the precise way this
money may be spent."  Id.  As explained in Martinez, proviso language which
expressly breaks the line item into a definite unit intended for a stated purpose
clearly constitutes a specific appropriation.  See id.  In contrast, where the proviso
language does not identify a sum of money but merely specifies that some
unidentified portion of the line item shall be used for particular purposes, the
governor is not permitted to veto the language.  See id. at 844.
2 The third paragraph of the proviso language provides that schools with 500 or
fewer students will receive an $80,000 planning grant; schools with 500 to 1,000
students will receive $100,000; and schools with greater than 1,000 students will
receive $120,000.
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In the instant case, the parties agree that the Governor's veto of the summer
training program was permissible.  The proviso language at issue in this veto
clearly falls within the first category discussed above:  the proviso broke the line
item appropriation of $40 million into the smaller definite unit of $500,000, which
was earmarked for the stated purpose of the summer training program.  This
proviso, thus, constituted a specific appropriation as stated in Brown and could
properly be vetoed by the Governor pursuant to article III, section 8(a).
The real issue in the instant case is the constitutionality of the Governor's
veto of the operations grants.  Unlike the summer training program, the proviso
does not expressly state the amount of the remaining $39.5 million that has been
assigned to the operations grants.  The proviso does explain the formula by which
the planning grants for the participating schools will be calculated2 and includes a
formula for calculating the allocation to districts for the operation of an extended
school year.  The Governor contends that this operations grants funding formula
unconstitutionally amends the statutory funding process of the Florida Education
3 Section 236.081, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), governs funds for the
operation of schools.  Subsection (1) describes the procedure to be followed in
computing the annual allocation to each district for school operation.
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Finance Program (FEFP).3  The Governor vetoed the operations grants for this
reason.
In assigning a dollar amount to the operations grants, the Governor
calculated a figure of $23,360,000 for planning grants for the 234 eligible schools
based upon school population information supplied by the Department of
Education to the Senate and the formula contained in the proviso.  The Governor
then subtracted this figure and the summer training program figure from the $40
million fund and vetoed the remainder of $16,140,000 that he calculated to be
earmarked for the operations grants.  The Senate contends that there was no
amount specified for operations grants alone and that the entire $39.5 million fund
is a specific appropriation.
In calculating the amount he vetoed for the operations grants, the Governor
had to look beyond the face of the proviso itself.  As stated in his brief, the
Governor referred to documents from the Department of Education and the
Senate's working papers and intent documents.  As we explained in Martinez, "no
matter how accurate the Governor's monetary estimate [of a proviso] might be," he
may not veto a proviso or portion of a proviso by "supplying his own 'estimate' of
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its monetary cost." 555 So. 2d at 844.  Before the Governor can veto specific
proviso language "that language on its face must create an identifiable integrated
fund--an exact sum of money–that is allocated for a specific purpose."  Id.
Here, the proviso language itself also convinces us that the $39.5 million
was "an identifiable, integrated fund which the legislature has allocated for [the]
specific purpose" of an extended school year program.  See Brown, 382 So. 2d at
668.  The proviso language specifically states that the "[f]unds in Specific
Appropriation 117C are provided for both planning and operations grants."  Fla.
SB 2500, §2, at 49, line 117C (1999) (emphasis added).  Moreover, the legislature
intentionally structured the funding scheme to encompass both the planning and
operations grants.  While 234 schools were eligible to participate in the extended
school year program, the Legislature did not know the exact number that would
choose to participate and apply for the grants.  In order to accommodate this
uncertainty, the Legislature created a fund that was fluid between the planning and
operations grants.  After the planning grants were distributed to the participating
schools, the remaining funds would be used for operations grants.  In fact, the
Legislature recognized that if every eligible school chose to participate in the
program and received a planning grant, then the allocation would not provide
operations grants for all of the participating schools.  Thus, the Legislature
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authorized the Commissioner of Education to "fund the cost of extended school
year operations on a first-come first-served basis."  Fla. SB 2500, §2, at 50, line
117C (1999).  This funding structure indicates that the $39.5 million is a specific
appropriation as defined in Brown.
Moreover, "a fund is not 'integrated'–it is not a 'specific
appropriation'–unless it consists of all those elements necessary to achieve the
stated purpose."  Martinez, 555 So. 2d at 845.  Here the Legislature's purpose was
to expend this money for an extended school year program, during both the
planning and the operations phases.  The Governor could properly have vetoed the
whole appropriation for the extended school year program, thereby nullifying the
legislative intent.  However, he may not alter or amend this legislative intent by
separating out the operations component from the appropriation.  Thus, we
conclude that the Governor's veto of the operations grants was unconstitutional.
The Governor has filed a counterpetition for a writ of mandamus, arguing
that the operations grants proviso language is unconstitutional because the funding
formula amends the statutory scheme of the FEFP.  The Governor contends that
this Court need not rule on the Senate's writ petition if we determine that the
operations grants proviso language in the Act changes or amends existing law on a
subject other than appropriations in violation of the one subject requirement of
4 Article III, section 12 of the Florida Constitution provides that "[l]aws making
appropriations for salaries of public officers and other current expenses of the state
shall contain provisions on no other subject."  This Court has explained that two major
considerations underlie this one subject requirement:  to prevent logrolling in
appropriations bills; and to ensure the integrity of the legislative process in substantive
lawmaking.  See Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654, 663 (Fla. 1980).
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article III, section 12 of the Florida Constitution.4  For the reasons discussed below,
we deny the Governor's petition but recognize that he may pursue his claim of
unconstitutionality in circuit court.
Mandamus is the appropriate vehicle for addressing the constitutionality of
the provisos only “where the functions of government will be adversely affected
without an immediate determination.”  Division of Bond Finance v. Smathers, 337
So. 2d 805, 807 (Fla. 1976); see also Dickinson v. Stone, 251 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla.
1971).  While this Court has entertained mandamus petitions involving
constitutional challenges of provisos, “[o]rdinarily the initial challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute should be made before a trial court.”  Smathers, 337
So. 2d at 807.  In Smathers, the Court accepted jurisdiction because both parties
agreed that the State Bond Program and the Environmentally Endangered Lands
Bond Program were jeopardized by the questionable constitutionality of a proviso
and the doubt over the effectiveness of the Governor’s veto.  Id.  In a footnote we
elaborated on these adverse effects to the functions of government, noting that the
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proviso in question “has caused, and on a daily basis continues to cause the State to
be in arrears on a previously executed contract with the government of the United
States for the purchase of environmentally endangered lands in the State, and that it
is only by grace of a federal extension of time that a default has not been declared.” 
Id. at 807 n.1.  Indeed, the Court cautioned that “[w]e would hesitate long before
accepting jurisdiction in different circumstances.”  Id.
We do not find that the instant case involves circumstances of direct and
immediate adverse effect and thus deny the Governor's petition for mandamus.  "If
the governor believes that the appropriations to which these vetoes were directed
are unconstitutional, his recourse lies in the filing of a suit for declaratory decree in
circuit court."  Martinez, 555 So. 2d at 848 (Grimes, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the Senate's request for a writ of
mandamus, but deny the Governor's request.  We hereby direct the Secretary of
State to expunge from the official records of the State the Governor's veto of the
portions of the proviso relating to operations grants.  Additionally, we direct the
Comptroller to ensure that the expunction of this veto is reflected in the financial
operations of the State.  Because we believe the parties to this action will fully
comply with this opinion, we withhold the formal issuance of the writ of
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mandamus at this time.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - Writ of Mandamus
Alan C. Sundberg, Tallahassee, Florida; Cynthia S. Tunnicliff of Pennington,
Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, Tallahassee, Florida; and D. Stephen Kahn,
General Counsel, The Florida Senate, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioners/Cross-Respondents
Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel, Office of the Secretary of State,
Tallahassee, Florida; and Harry Hooper, General Counsel, Office of the
Comptroller, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondents/Cross-Petitioners
Carol A. Licko, General Counsel, Frank R. Jimenez, Deputy General Counsel, and
Reginald J. Brown and Daniel J. Woodring, Assistant General Counsels,
Tallahassee, Florida,
for Governor Jeb Bush, Intervenor-Respondent/Counterpetitioner
Tatjana L. Martinez, Tallahassee, Florida,
for the Florida School Boards Association, Amicus Curiae