Title: Tyson v. Safeco Ins. Companies
Citation: 461 So. 2d 1308
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 21, 1984

461 So. 2d 1308 (1984)
John M. TYSON, Sr.
v.
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANIES.
83-869.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 21, 1984.
*1309 Charles S. Street, Mobile, for appellant.
Geary A. Gaston and Lucian Gillis, Jr. of Reams, Vollmer, Philips, Killion, Brooks &amp; Schell, Mobile, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Cross-claim plaintiff John M. Tyson, Sr., appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of co-defendant Safeco Insurance Companies on a cross-claim seeking damages for breach of contract, outrage, and bad faith. The cross-claim arose from a suit filed by Simpson Construction Company against both Tyson and Safeco, after a dispute arose concerning repair work Simpson was engaged to perform on the fire-damaged home of Tyson. Safeco moved for and was granted summary judgment on the claim brought by Simpson, which was not appealed.
Summary judgment on this cross-claim was certified as final by the trial court and, hence, made appealable, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the following facts in its order granting summary judgment:
*1311 The court thereupon granted Safeco's motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.
Tyson's contract claim against Safeco, including accrued interest, was fully satisfied prior to this appeal. Remaining for our consideration, therefore, are the claims for outrage and bad faith.
We first recognized an independent theory of recovery for the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress in American Road Service Company v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361 (Ala.1980). Expressly utilizing the language of § 46, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1948), we wrote:
394 So. 2d  at 362.
We also adopted in Inmon, Comment (d) of § 46 of the Restatement, which defines the proscribed behavior as conduct "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Restatement, supra, at 72.
In the instant case, there was nothing in Safeco's actions to amount to conduct so outrageous and extreme as to be "utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Safeco wanted to pay Tyson and Simpson jointly to avoid the possibility of double liability. Significantly, after the time to appeal the summary judgment Safeco obtained against Simpson lapsed, along with the possibility of double liability, Safeco promptly paid Tyson all monies due under the insurance contract. It is clear, therefore, that the trial court properly withheld this count from the jury. Empiregas, Inc. of Gadsden v. Geary, 431 So. 2d 1258 (Ala.1983).
The elements which must be proven to establish a prima facie case of bad faith refusal to pay an insurance claim are as follows:
National Security Fire &amp; Casualty Co. v. Bowen, 417 So. 2d 179, 183 (Ala.1982).
Additionally, we have held that in a normal case, the plaintiff must be entitled to a directed verdict on the contract claim as a matter of law. National Savings Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 419 So. 2d 1357 (Ala. 1982). Thus, a plaintiff's burden of proving facts sufficient to sustain a case of bad faith is a heavy one.
In the instant case, it is readily evident that Tyson has not sustained this burden.
Safeco's refusal to unconditionally pay the claim owed Tyson was prompted by a demand by Simpson to be named as a joint payee on any further checks representing payments under the insurance policy. We note that Safeco's fear of double liability in this regard was not unfounded. Simpson, for example, by virtue of performing work on the home of Tyson, was entitled to a lien on the house, the land, and any other improvements thereon to insure payment for its work. Ala.Code 1975, § 35-11-210. This Court need not, however, determine in hindsight the precise legal relationships between Safeco, Tyson, and Simpson, to conclude that Safeco was *1312 faced with a situation of sufficient uncertainty to supply it with a debatable reason to act in the manner it did.
Summary judgment, therefore, in favor of Safeco on the bad faith count was proper.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.