Title: In re Masters
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S130495
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 12, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re JARVIS J. MASTERS 
 on Habeas Corpus. 
 
S130495 
 
Marin County Superior Court 
10467 
 
 
August 12, 2019 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Cuéllar 
concurred. 
 
1 
In re MASTERS 
S130495 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
A jury convicted petitioner Jarvis J. Masters of the first 
degree murder of Sergeant Dean Burchfield, a correctional 
officer at San Quentin State Prison (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 
189; further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 
Code), and conspiracy to commit murder and to commit assault 
on correctional staff (§§ 182, 4501).  The jury found true the 
special circumstance allegation that the murder involved the 
knowing and intentional killing of a peace officer engaged in the 
performance of his duties (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(7)).  The jury 
returned a verdict of death, and the trial court sentenced 
Masters to death for the murder and to life with the possibility 
of parole for the conspiracy.  On direct appeal, we affirmed 
Masters’s convictions and sentence.  (People v. Masters (2016) 
62 Cal.4th 1019 (Masters).) 
Masters’s codefendants, Andre Johnson and Lawrence 
Woodard, also were convicted of Burchfield’s murder, and they 
were sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole.  The Court of Appeal affirmed their convictions and 
sentences.  (People v. Johnson (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 778.)   
In 2005, while his appeal was pending, Masters filed a 
petition in this court seeking a writ of habeas corpus.  Having 
found the petition stated a prima facie case for relief on several 
claims, we issued an order to show cause why relief should not 
be granted on a subset of the claims raised.  After considering 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
the return and traverse, we appointed a referee, whom we 
directed to take evidence and make certain findings of fact.  
Following an evidentiary hearing, the referee filed a report with 
this court, and the parties filed their exceptions to it. 
We accept most of the referee’s report and findings as 
supported by substantial evidence and discharge the order to 
show cause. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Many of the facts of the crime and proceedings in the trial 
court that are relevant to Masters’s petition for writ of habeas 
corpus are set forth in our opinion on appeal.  (Masters, supra, 
62 Cal.4th at pp. 1026–1041.)  We summarize those facts here. 
Masters, Woodard, and other members of the Black 
Guerilla Family (BGF) gang were housed in the Carson section 
of San Quentin State Prison.  According to BGF member Rufus 
Willis, the prosecution’s main witness, Masters suggested to 
him, Woodard, and other BGF members that they attack prison 
guards.  Masters, Woodard, and others decided that Sergeant 
Dean Burchfield would be the first target of the plot and that 
Johnson was to stab him with a prisoner-made weapon.  Masters 
was to obtain a piece of metal from another BGF member, 
sharpen it, and pass it to Johnson.  Masters also was to arrange 
for an inmate to signal when Burchfield was approaching the 
second tier of cells.  Johnson, who was housed on the second tier, 
was to stab Burchfield when he came to Johnson’s cell.  After 
the assault, Johnson was to pass the weapon to another BGF 
member, who would dispose of it. 
On June 8, 1985, Burchfield was stabbed outside 
Johnson’s cell during his nightly rounds; he later died of a single 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
chest wound.  At the time of the assault, Masters was housed on 
the fourth tier of cells. 
After the murder occurred, Willis tried to contact prison 
officials with an offer to provide information in exchange for 
release from prison.  Charles Numark, an investigator from the 
Marin County District Attorney’s Office, initially suggested that 
Willis would be released from prison if he cooperated with the 
investigation.  Specifically, Numark offered to help Willis secure 
release on parole if he testified.  But the prosecutors, Deputy 
District Attorneys Edward Berberian and Paula Kamena, told 
Willis he would not be released from prison if he testified against 
Masters.  Rather, in exchange for Willis’s testimony, they 
offered to notify the parole board of his assistance; told Willis he 
would be granted immunity for the crimes he had committed in 
prison, including his participation in Burchfield’s murder; and 
said he would be moved to an out-of-state prison for his 
protection.  Willis accepted the offer. 
Willis gave prison officials several handwritten notes 
concerning the murder.  Willis testified, and a handwriting 
expert confirmed, that at least some of the notes were in 
Masters’s handwriting.  Willis also asked Masters to write a 
report about the murder, which he apparently did.  Masters’s 
report implicated himself, Johnson, and others in Burchfield’s 
murder.  In a series of notes written to Willis, Johnson 
implicated himself in the murder. 
At trial, Masters attacked Willis’s testimony.  While in 
prison, Willis had committed and ordered the stabbings of 
several inmates, distributed illegal drugs, and extorted prison 
staff.  Masters also presented evidence suggesting that Willis 
was angry with the BGF and had planned the attack on 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
Burchfield but set up BGF members to be blamed for the 
murder. 
Another BGF member, Bobby Evans, also testified against 
Johnson, Masters, and Woodard.  After Burchfield was 
murdered, Johnson, Masters, and Woodard were transferred to 
the Adjustment Center, the section of the prison where Evans 
was housed.  According to Evans, each of them separately told 
Evans about their respective actions in the assault.  Those 
accounts generally were consistent with Willis’s testimony.  
Specifically, Evans testified that Masters had been transferred 
to the Adjustment Center “around” August 1985 and told him 
“around” September that he voted in favor of killing Burchfield. 
At trial, Masters attacked Evans’s credibility by 
presenting evidence of his extensive criminal history.  Evans 
had been convicted of four burglaries and an attempted robbery, 
had stabbed numerous inmates, and had supervised the BGF’s 
street crimes.  Masters also presented evidence that Evans was 
testifying for the prosecution to reduce his sentence in his own 
criminal proceedings.  During the guilt phase, Evans admitted 
that while on parole, he had pleaded guilty to attempted robbery 
and was awaiting sentencing in Alameda County.  During the 
penalty phase, Evans testified that he had been hired on several 
occasions to shoot people and had shot six people, though none 
died. 
Unlike Willis, however, Evans did not testify under a 
grant of immunity.  Rather, after Evans had pleaded guilty, he 
contacted James Hahn, a parole agent for the then-Department 
of 
Corrections 
(now 
Department 
of 
Corrections 
and 
Rehabilitation), and offered to disclose information in exchange 
for protection from the BGF.  Hahn made no guarantees but said 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
he might be able to do a favor for Evans “sometime down the 
line.”  According to Evans, before Masters’s trial, he had 
provided information to Hahn on only one other occasion. 
Evans testified that in an effort to reduce the amount of 
time he would serve in state prison, he wanted to spend as much 
time as possible before sentencing in local custody.  Evans’s 
sentencing hearing was repeatedly postponed.  During the guilt 
phase deliberations, Masters learned that after Evans testified, 
Evans had been granted probation at his sentencing hearing. 
Hahn testified about actions he took on Evans’s behalf.  He 
spoke to Evans around 10 times between June 1989 and October 
30, 1989, the date Evans first testified in Masters’s case.  In 
June, Evans told Hahn that he was facing prison time after 
pleading guilty in Alameda County to attempted robbery and 
that he did not want to return to prison because the BGF had 
threatened to kill him.  Hahn told Evans he would “take care” of 
Evans’s safety and security but could not make any promises 
regarding Evans’s Alameda County case or that Evans would 
receive any benefit for providing information.  Hahn also told 
Evans that if he did have to return to prison, Hahn would try to 
arrange it so Evans could serve his sentence in another state.  
Hahn also said he would try to place Evans and his family in a 
witness relocation program.  Alameda County prosecutors 
testified that at Hahn’s behest they twice requested that 
Evans’s sentencing hearing be postponed. 
During the penalty phase, the jury learned that an 
inmate, David Jackson, was stabbed to death on an exercise 
yard at San Quentin.  According to Johnnie Hoze, a BGF 
member, Masters told him that Masters stabbed Jackson. 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
II.  HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 
Masters filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus raising 
numerous issues.  We found the petition stated a prima facie 
case for relief as to some claims that asserted his innocence or 
challenged the veracity of the evidence presented at trial, and 
we ordered the Director of Corrections and Rehabilitation (now 
the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation) to show cause why relief should not be granted 
because  “(1) material false evidence was admitted at the guilt 
phase of his trial; (2) newly discovered evidence casts 
fundamental doubt on the prosecution’s guilt-phase case; (3) 
[Masters]’s trial was fundamentally unfair because prosecution 
witness Rufus [Willis’s] testimony was unreliable due to 
improper coercion by the prosecution[;] (4) the prosecution 
violated Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 by failing to 
disclose the promises of leniency to prosecution witness Bobby 
Evans and other facts bearing on [Evans’s] credibility that have 
come to light after the judgment was imposed[;] (5) the 
prosecution knowingly presented the false testimony of Bobby 
Evans[;] (6) [Masters]’s trial was fundamentally unfair because 
Bobby [Evans’s] testimony was unreliable due to improper 
coercion by the prosecution[;] (7) material false evidence — the 
testimony of [Johnnie] Hoze — was admitted at the penalty 
phase regarding [Masters]’s participation in the murder of 
David Jackson; and (8) newly discovered evidence regarding 
Hoze’s testimony casts fundamental doubt on the accuracy and 
reliability of the penalty-phase proceedings . . . .” 
After considering the return and traverse, we appointed a 
referee to answer these questions:  (1) “Was false evidence 
regarding [Masters]’s role in the charged offenses admitted at 
the guilt phase of [Masters]’s trial?  If so, what was that 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
evidence?”; (2) “Is there newly discovered, credible evidence 
indicative of [Masters]’s not having been a participant in the 
charged offenses?  If so, what is that evidence?”; (3) “What, if 
any, promises or threats were made to guilt phase prosecution 
witness Rufus Willis by District Attorney Investigator Charles 
Numark or Deputy District Attorneys Edward Berberian or 
Paula Kamena?  Was Willis’s trial testimony affected by any 
such promises or threats, and, if so, how?”; (4) “Were there 
promises, threats or facts concerning guilt phase prosecution 
witness Bobby Evans’s relationship with law enforcement 
agencies of which Deputy District Attorneys Berberian and 
Kamena were, or should have been, aware, but that were not 
disclosed to the defense?  If so, what are those promises, threats 
or facts?”; (5) “Did Deputy District Attorneys Berberian and 
Kamena knowingly present false testimony by Bobby Evans?  If 
so, what was that testimony?”; (6) “What, if any, promises or 
threats were made to Bobby Evans by District Attorney 
Investigator Numark, Department of Corrections Investigator 
James Hahn, or Deputy District Attorneys Berberian and 
Kamena?  Was Evans’s trial testimony affected by any such 
promises or threats, and, if so, how?”; (7) “Did penalty phase 
prosecution witness [Johnnie] Hoze provide false testimony 
regarding [Masters]’s involvement in the murder of inmate 
David Jackson?  If so, what was that false testimony?” 
At the reference hearing, several BGF members testified, 
and other BGF members’ statements were introduced into 
evidence.  One of the prosecutors from Masters’s trial and 
various law enforcement officials testified, as did Masters’s 
investigators and trial counsel.  Two additional witnesses 
testified as experts. 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
Two former San Francisco police officers testified about 
the investigation of the 1988 killing of James Beasley.  The 
officers testified that Evans, a BGF member and a key 
prosecution witness, was a possible suspect in Beasley’s killing, 
but they had never contacted him.  They denied forgoing 
investigating Evans in exchange for his testimony at Masters’s 
trial. 
James Hahn had worked for what is now the Department 
of Corrections and Rehabilitation.  Hahn identified and tracked 
gang members, including parolees.  Evans was among the gang 
members whom Hahn tracked.  Prior to Masters’s trial, Evans 
had provided Hahn with information on multiple occasions, but 
most of it was of little value.  Hahn also arranged for Evans to 
work for other law enforcement agencies as an informant, and 
Evans often was paid for his efforts.  The testimony of two 
former Oakland police officers generally corroborated the pre-
existing, ongoing working relationship between Evans and 
Hahn.  Hahn believed that Evans was a “professional liar,” as 
he had provided inaccurate information on multiple occasions. 
Hahn testified that Evans approached him with 
information about Sergeant Burchfield’s murder and that Hahn 
made no offer to Evans for his testimony other than to help keep 
him secure.  After Evans testified at Masters’s trial, Hahn 
arranged to have Evans placed on parole in Texas.  Evans 
wanted to enter the federal witness protection program.  Hahn 
explained that a person on parole could not enter the program, 
so he wrote to Texas’s parole board on Evans’s behalf, noted how 
Evans had assisted law enforcement, and urged the board to end 
his parole. 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
Hahn testified that he became aware that Evans was a 
suspect in Beasley’s killing, but he could not recall exactly when 
he learned this.  Hahn testified that an investigator from San 
Francisco had asked him questions about Evans.  An Oakland 
police officer testified he had told Hahn that Evans was a 
suspect.  Hahn could not recall whether he informed the 
prosecutors that Evans was a suspect in Beasley’s killing. 
Edward Berberian, then a Marin County Deputy District 
Attorney, prosecuted Burchfield’s murder.  Berberian testified 
he was not aware of anyone from his office directing Hahn’s 
actions in regard to the investigation of Burchfield’s murder.  
Berberian testified that he did not make any threats or promises 
in exchange for Evans’s testimony at Masters’s trial.  David 
Gasser, who had served as the prosecution’s investigator, 
recalled some mention of Evans being a potential suspect in 
Beasley’s killing.  Both Hahn and Gasser acknowledged they 
were in regular contact with each other during the investigation 
of Burchfield’s murder. 
Due to concerns about Evans’s health, the referee presided 
over Evans’s deposition, which occurred before the reference 
hearing.  The parties stipulated that Evans’s deposition could be 
used as evidence at the reference hearing, and Evans did not 
testify at the hearing.  During his deposition, Evans stated that 
he had never spoken to Masters.  Evans said he did not know if 
Masters was involved in Burchfield’s murder.  Evans 
acknowledged he had testified to the contrary at Masters’s trial. 
Evans said he had worked regularly as a paid informant 
for various law enforcement agencies and had previously 
provided information to Hahn.  Evans admitted that some of the 
information he had provided to Hahn was false. 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
Evans said that Hahn and Gasser supplied him with 
information about Burchfield’s murder in order for him to 
implicate Masters.  Evans said Hahn and Gasser assured him 
that he would receive a sentence of less than year on his own 
pending charges in Alameda County if he testified against 
Masters.  Evans also said that Hahn, prior to Masters’s trial, 
had told him to underplay his informant work so that he could 
later resume his work as an informant. 
Evans said that he changed his mind about testifying at 
Masters’s trial, but then Hahn, Hahn’s partner, and Gasser 
threatened Evans with prosecution in numerous cases — 
including Burchfield’s murder — if he did not implicate Masters.  
Evans also testified that the Alameda County District Attorney 
had threatened to charge him under a recidivist statute, with a 
possible prison sentence of 18 years, if he did not cooperate. 
Evans denied any involvement in Beasley’s killing and 
denied being questioned by the police about the killing.  Evans 
admitted that he knew of Beasley, that he had worked for 
Beasley’s son as an “enforcer,” and had received payments from 
the son. 
Graham McGruer, a former correctional officer, testified 
as an expert on California prisons.  McGruer had reviewed San 
Quentin’s records and concluded that Masters was not sent to 
the Adjustment Center until December 1985.  (Evans had 
testified at Masters’s trial that the two of them discussed 
Burchfield’s murder in the center around September 1985.)  
McGruer testified that an attack on a prison guard would 
normally have been ordered only by the highest echelon of a 
gang’s leadership.  If the attack had not been sanctioned by the 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
gang’s leaders, McGruer opined, the leadership quickly and 
personally would have investigated the matter. 
Willis, a BGF member and the main prosecution witness 
at Masters’s trial, invoked his privilege against self-
incrimination at the reference hearing.  Willis later indicated he 
wished to testify.  The referee advised Masters that she would 
allow him to call Willis as a witness.  Masters declined the 
referee’s offer, accepted the referee’s initial ruling that Willis 
was unavailable to testify, and instead offered into evidence 
prior statements made by him.  For example, in 2001, Willis had 
declared under penalty of perjury that Masters played no role in 
the attack on Burchfield.  Willis further declared that Masters 
did not author two of the notes that were admitted at trial but 
merely copied their contents.  Willis also declared that he told 
Berberian he did not want to testify at Masters’s trial and that 
Berberian told him if he did not testify, he would be returned 
“right to San Quentin,” which Willis interpreted as “a death 
threat.”  In 2002, however, Willis declared that he “never lied 
during [Masters’s] trial . . . .”  In 2010, Willis recounted to 
representatives of the Attorney General his involvement in the 
murder conspiracy, some of which was consistent with his trial 
testimony. 
Robert Leonard, a linguistics professor, testified as an 
expert.  Dr. Leonard compared how language was used in two 
documents that were introduced at Masters’s trial against 14 
other documents authored by Masters.  Notably, one of the two 
documents compared against the others was the report about 
Burchfield’s murder that Willis had asked Masters to write.  
Dr. Leonard testified that in his opinion it was more likely than 
not that these two documents were not authored by the same 
person who authored the other 14 documents. 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
Woodard, a BGF member and Masters’s codefendant, 
testified that he had assumed leadership of the BGF cell in 
Carson section after its previous leader was sent to the 
Adjustment Center.  Woodard testified that in April or May 
1985, prior to his assuming command of Carson section, Willis 
had suggested that the BGF attack other gangs.  Woodard’s 
predecessor and Willis then changed the plan to attack 
Burchfield.  Masters was present when this new plan was 
discussed but disagreed with it.  Woodard testified that after he 
had 
assumed 
command, 
he 
relieved 
Masters 
of 
his 
responsibilities in the BGF due to Masters’s disagreement with 
the plan to attack Burchfield.  Woodard also testified that he 
had punished Masters by assigning him to perform extra 
exercise and to write an essay about his insubordination. 
Woodard testified that the weapon used to stab Burchfield 
was crafted on the second tier.  Woodard also testified that 
Masters was not good at making weapons.  Woodard testified 
that he ordered Masters and their codefendant Andre Johnson 
to neither discuss the case nor testify at trial.  Woodard 
threatened to kill Masters if he did not obey, and the two had 
some physical altercations while their trial was proceeding. 
Michael Rhinehart, a BGF member who was housed on the 
second tier in Carson section, testified that he learned of the 
plan to attack a prison guard from Woodard, Willis, and another 
BGF member, Harold Richardson.  Rhinehart testified that his 
own participation in the attack was limited to passing notes and 
that Masters did not participate at all.  Rhinehart testified that 
Masters had voted against the plan to assault a guard.  As a 
result of Masters’s opposition, Rhinehart said, Woodard became 
hostile toward Masters.  Rhinehart denied any participation in 
passing the weapon to Johnson but claimed it was made on the 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
second tier.  Rhinehart testified that he told Evans the details 
of Burchfield’s murder. 
Welvie Johnson (“Welvie”) was the overall third-in-
command of the BGF gang and a “shot caller,” that is, part of 
the process that could authorize BGF attacks.  Welvie did not 
know Masters before the attack on Burchfield, and he testified 
the attack was not sanctioned by the BGF’s governing body.  The 
governing body investigated Burchfield’s murder, and Welvie 
learned of no information indicating that Masters was involved.  
Welvie also testified that a “short-timer” like Johnson would not 
have been selected to carry out the attack.  Welvie further 
testified it would have been a breach of BGF protocol to pass a 
weapon between tiers or to allow a non-BGF member to pass a 
weapon.  Welvie testified that he had been questioned by Hahn 
about Burchfield’s murder, and Hahn confirmed this.  Welvie 
denied that he had previously told prison officials that Woodard 
ordered Johnson and Masters to attack Burchfield, and he did 
not recall telling officials that Masters had killed David Jackson. 
Hoze, a BGF member who testified at Masters’s trial, was 
subpoenaed to testify at the reference hearing but ultimately 
was not called as a witness.  Statements previously made by 
Hoze exonerating Masters in Jackson’s killing were received 
into evidence. 
Correctional officers had interviewed Richardson in 1986 
about his involvement in gang activities, including Burchfield’s 
murder.  (See Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1054.)  In his 
statements to correctional officers, Richardson implicated 
himself in the attack but did not mention Masters.  (See id. at 
pp. 1054–1058 [ruling that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by excluding these statements because they contained 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
inadmissible hearsay].)  Richardson did not testify at the 
reference hearing.  Reports detailing Richardson’s interview, as 
well as a letter written by Richardson to a prison official, were 
admitted into evidence at the reference hearing.  During the 
course of these proceedings, Masters submitted to this court 
additional reports from prison officials about Richardson’s 
debriefing. 
III.  REFEREE’S REPORT 
The referee found, as a general matter, that it was likely 
that some false testimony was offered at Masters’s trial.  The 
referee specifically found that the prosecution’s key witnesses, 
Willis and Evans, had recanted their trial testimony.  But the 
referee also found that both were “liars with highly unreliable 
and selective memories.  [¶] . . . [¶]  Evans and Willis are utterly 
lacking in credibility.  Both are career criminals whose word, 
under oath or otherwise, means nothing.  Both are well-known 
snitches.  Both would say anything to save their own hide — and 
both have so admitted.  Both are manipulative and unreliable.”  
(Again, Willis did not testify at the reference hearing, and the 
referee presided over Evans’s deposition, which was presented 
in lieu of his testifying at the reference hearing.) 
The referee further found that every BGF member who 
testified at the reference hearing had lied during Masters’s trial, 
this proceeding, or both.  “All of them, as members of the same 
prison gang, have a motive now to give testimony favorable to 
Masters,” the referee found. 
The referee also noted that the testimony of the BGF 
members at the reference hearing often was contradictory.  For 
example, there was no clear agreement among the witnesses as 
to who was in charge, who ordered and organized Burchfield’s 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
killing, why the killing was ordered, who made the weapon, who 
stabbed Burchfield, and whether there was a backup plan. 
The law regarding our review of the referee’s report is 
settled.  “ ‘The referee’s factual findings are not binding on us, 
and we can depart from them upon independent examination of 
the record even when the evidence is conflicting.  [Citations.]  
However, such findings are entitled to great weight where 
supported by substantial evidence.  [Citations.]’  [Citations.]  ‘On 
the other hand, any conclusions of law or resolution of mixed 
questions of fact and law that the referee provides are subject to 
our independent review.’ ”  (In re Cowan (2018) 5 Cal.5th 235, 
243–244 (Cowan).) 
“ ‘[T]he referee is entitled to discredit portions of a 
witness’s testimony while finding the witness credible in other 
particulars.  [Citation.]  Thus, the fact that the referee expressly 
or impliedly disbelieved a witness in some respects, or that 
portions of a witness’s testimony seem unlikely on their face, 
does not mean that any finding based solely or primarily on the 
same witness’s testimony on other matters is without 
substantial support.’  [Citation.]  ‘Deference to the referee is 
particularly appropriate on issues requiring resolution of 
testimonial conflicts and assessment of witnesses’ credibility, 
because the referee has the opportunity to observe the 
witnesses’ demeanor and manner of testifying.’ ”  (Cowan, supra, 
5 Cal.5th at pp. 244–245.) 
A.  Question One 
Our first question to the referee asked, “Was false 
evidence regarding [Masters]’s role in the charged offenses 
admitted at the guilt phase of [Masters]’s trial?  If so, what was 
that evidence?” 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
1.  Referee’s findings 
The referee’s answer to this question focused on Willis and 
Evans.  Although Willis did not testify at the reference hearing, 
the referee found that he initially recanted his trial testimony 
but then later recanted his recantation.  The referee further 
found that Willis was neither coerced into testifying against 
Masters nor coerced into recanting his testimony.  The referee 
ultimately did not believe Willis’s recantation of his trial 
testimony:  “The jury saw Willis testify.  They knew of his 
murder conviction.  They knew he was given immunity.  They 
heard about his disappointment in not being released from 
prison in exchange for giving State’s evidence.  The jury was in 
the very best position to evaluate him as a witness.” 
The referee similarly found Evans’s testimony at his 
deposition to be “spectacularly unreliable.”  Specifically, the 
referee disbelieved Evans’s testimony that Hahn had coerced 
him into implicating Masters. 
2.  Masters’s exceptions 
Masters takes exception to the referee’s findings.  
Preliminarily, he contends that Willis at most only partially 
disavowed his initial recantation.  More importantly, Masters 
contends the totality of Willis’s statements about Burchfield’s 
murder shows that Willis has been so inconsistent that none of 
his statements is worthy of belief and therefore cannot be the 
basis for Masters’s conviction.  Masters also notes that the 
referee found that some false evidence likely had been admitted 
at his trial and that Willis and Evans were both liars.  From 
this, Masters concludes that Evans’s and Willis’s trial testimony 
implicating him in the conspiracy to attack Burchfield was false. 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
Masters’s exceptions lack merit.  “It has long been 
recognized that ‘the offer of a witness, after trial, to retract his 
[or her] sworn testimony is to be viewed with suspicion.’ ”  (In re 
Roberts (2003) 29 Cal.4th 726, 742.)  We agree with the referee 
that there is no sound reason to credit Willis’s recantation of his 
trial testimony.  (See id. at p. 743 [declining to “disturb the 
jury’s verdict based upon a recantation that must be viewed with 
suspicion and was subsequently disavowed”].)  To the extent 
Masters relies on Willis’s other posttrial statements that are 
inconsistent with his trial testimony, we agree with the referee 
that those statements are unbelievable due to Willis’s lack of 
credibility. 
Masters also contends that Willis’s trial testimony about 
the two notes that he said Masters sent to him was false.  But 
at trial Willis testified that he sent notes to Masters, requesting 
him to write reports about the attack.  Willis further testified at 
trial that Willis received two notes in response, both of which 
were written in Masters’s handwriting.  There is no evidence 
suggesting that Willis’s testimony on this subject was false. 
Masters nonetheless contends that Willis’s testimony 
falsely implied that Masters authored the notes.  The referee 
accepted, and we accept as well, Dr. Leonard’s opinion that it 
was more likely than not that these two documents were not 
authored by the same person who authored the other 14 
documents offered at the reference hearing.  But the referee also 
found that whether Masters wrote the two notes in his own 
words or in the words of another did not exonerate him from the 
conspiracy to attack Burchfield. 
Overall, the referee found that the jury had sufficient 
information to gauge Willis’s credibility.  We agree.  Masters 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
here mounts a generalized attack on Willis’s credibility, but this 
general attack does not render false any particular aspect of 
Willis’s trial testimony about Masters’s role in the murder of 
Burchfield.   
Evans, in his deposition, also retracted his trial testimony.  
But the referee had the opportunity to observe Evans’s 
demeanor and, as noted, found his recantation to be “wholly 
incredible.”  We accept the referee’s finding regarding Evans’s 
lack of credibility and her ultimate finding rejecting Evans’s 
recantation. 
Masters notes that the trial testimony concerning Evans 
and Hahn’s pre-existing, ongoing working relationship was 
incomplete.  The referee found this contention “appear[s] to be 
true,” and the Attorney General concedes that Evans did lie at 
Masters’s trial about the number of meetings he had with Hahn.  
But the referee further found that “Evans had many contacts 
with Hahn, although it is unlikely that Evan gave useful 
information to Hahn more than a few times.”  We accept the 
finding that Evans testified falsely at Masters’s trial regarding 
his relationship with Hahn.  This finding, however, goes to 
Evans’s general credibility, which defense counsel vigorously 
attacked at trial.  (Post, at p. 29.)  And Evans’s false testimony 
about his relationship with Hahn does not render false any 
particular aspect of Evans’s trial testimony concerning 
Masters’s role in the attack on Burchfield. 
Masters further notes that Evans testified at trial that the 
two of them discussed the attack on Burchfield around 
September 1985 in the Adjustment Center.  The evidence 
adduced at the reference hearing showed that Masters was not 
transferred to the Adjustment Center until December 1985.  
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
From this, Masters infers that Evans’s trial testimony about it 
was false.  But even if Evans’s testimony about the timing of the 
conversation was false, this does not necessarily mean his 
testimony about the content of the conversation was false.  In 
any event, Masters’s trial counsel was aware of this discrepancy 
as to when the conversation occurred and argued this point to 
the jury during guilt phase closing arguments. 
Masters also notes that Rhinehart and Woodard testified 
at the reference hearing that Masters was not involved in the 
conspiracy to attack Burchfield.  But the referee discounted the 
testimony of all BGF members because all of them had lied at 
some point and now had a motive to testify in Masters’s favor.  
We accept the referee’s finding regarding their credibility, as she 
observed their testimony at the reference hearing and was in the 
best position to assess their credibility. 
Masters also points to other evidence that demonstrates 
his innocence and thereby suggests that false evidence of his 
guilt was presented at his trial.  Masters’s theory of the case is 
that he was not involved with Burchfield’s murder and that 
Harold Richardson was Woodward and Johnson’s other main 
coconspirator.  In support of this contention, he relies in part on 
statements made by Richardson during his debriefing.  At 
Masters’s trial, however, the court did not abuse its discretion 
in excluding Richardson’s statements implicating himself 
because they were unreliable hearsay.  (Masters, supra, 
62 Cal.4th at pp. 1054–1058.)  We are not now persuaded by 
Masters’s contention that Richardson’s unreliable hearsay 
statements indicate that false evidence was presented at trial; 
indeed, the unreliability of Richardson’s statements is the 
reason we upheld the trial court’s exclusion of them. 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
In sum, we accept the referee’s findings with respect to the 
first question because they are supported by substantial 
evidence. 
B.  Question Two 
Our second question to the referee asked, “Is there newly 
discovered, credible evidence indicative of [Masters]’s not 
having been a participant in the charged offenses?  If so, what 
is that evidence?” 
Newly discovered, credible evidence, in the context of our 
second question, means “evidence that has been discovered after 
trial, that could not have been discovered prior to trial by the 
exercise of due diligence, and is admissible and not merely 
cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching.”  (§ 1473, 
subd. (b)(3)(B), as amended by Stats. 2016, ch. 785, § 1, eff. Jan. 
1, 2017.) 
1.  Referee’s findings 
The referee answered the first part of this question in the 
negative.  The prosecutors at trial argued that the murder 
weapon was delivered from the fourth tier in the prison (where 
Masters was housed) to the second tier (where Johnson was 
housed).  Several BGF members testified at the reference 
hearing that it would have been less dangerous to fabricate the 
murder weapon on the same tier as Johnson and then pass it to 
him.  The referee found that even if it would have been less 
dangerous to fabricate the weapon on the same tier, it does not 
follow that this is what actually happened. 
With respect to Dr. Leonard, the linguistics expert, the 
referee found him to be a convincing witness, but she also found 
that his testimony was not “new.”  The referee ultimately 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
concluded that Dr. Leonard’s testimony did not exonerate 
Masters because the notes in Masters’s handwriting indicated 
his involvement in the conspiracy to attack Burchfield 
regardless of whether he was the source of the notes’ contents. 
Both parties take exception to the referee’s findings. 
2.  The Attorney General’s exceptions 
As mentioned above, Willis had stated posttrial that 
Masters did not author two of the notes that were admitted into 
evidence at trial.  To bolster this contention, Masters offered the 
testimony of Dr. Leonard at the reference hearing.  The 
Attorney General, pursuant to People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 
24, moved to exclude Dr. Leonard’s testimony on the ground 
that his analytical technique of determining a document’s 
author had not been sufficiently accepted by the scientific 
community or the courts.  The referee denied the motion, ruling 
that Kelly did not apply to this type of evidence.  The Attorney 
General takes exception to the referee’s ruling. 
The referee accepted Dr. Leonard’s testimony as credible 
but nonetheless found that Masters had participated in the 
conspiracy.  As explained further below, because the referee’s 
consideration of this evidence did not benefit Masters, we need 
not decide whether the referee erred by not conducting a Kelly 
hearing. 
3.  Masters’s exceptions 
Preliminarily, Masters takes exception to the referee’s 
exclusion of evidence indicating that Willis “framed” him.  In a 
2005 letter from Willis to Masters’s habeas corpus counsel, 
Willis wrote, “Why [Masters’s trial] lawyers never looked 
through my property in San Quentin — Hint Hint.”  Masters 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
sought to have his habeas corpus counsel testify about the 
conversation that counsel had with Willis about this topic, but 
the referee did not permit the testimony.  Masters then made an 
offer of proof that Willis had told Masters’s habeas corpus 
counsel that he hid some notes in his prison-issued portable 
television.  Willis also told Masters’s habeas corpus counsel that 
the hidden notes were the original notes that he later directed 
Masters to copy into his own handwriting.  And Willis told 
Masters’s habeas corpus counsel that the television set and the 
notes it contained later disappeared. 
The proffered evidence indicated Willis had instructed 
Masters to copy notes that Willis had authored, which was 
consistent with Dr. Leonard’s testimony.  But even if we were to 
assume that habeas corpus counsel had testified about what 
Willis told him, Willis’s credibility remains the ultimate issue.  
We agree with the referee that Willis was not credible, and his 
statements do not become more credible when conveyed through 
a layer of hearsay.  Thus, even if the referee abused her 
discretion by excluding this evidence, it was harmless because 
we agree with the referee’s determination that Willis was not 
credible. 
a.  Notes’ authorship 
Masters takes exception to the referee’s characterization 
that Dr. Leonard’s testimony was not new evidence.  Dr. 
Leonard’s testimony about the authorship of the two notes was 
presented for the first time at the reference hearing, but the 
notes themselves were introduced at Masters’s trial.  The 
Attorney General observes that “authorship analysis,” that is, a 
stylistic comparison of questioned writings and utterances to 
known exemplars, predates Masters’s 1989 trial.  (E.g., United 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
States v. Clifford (3d Cir. 1983) 704 F.2d 86, 90; United States v. 
Hearst (9th Cir. 1977) 563 F.2d 1331, 1349–1350; but cf. 
Coulthard, Author Identification, Idiolect, and Linguistic 
Uniqueness (2004) 25 Applied Linguistics 431 [noting little 
growth in forensic linguistics as a discipline until the 1990s].)  
The Attorney General contends that Masters was not diligent in 
presenting this linguistic evidence in these habeas corpus 
proceedings:  Although Masters in 1998 had received, from a 
different expert, a preliminary linguistic analysis regarding the 
two notes, he neither included this expert’s analysis as an 
exhibit to, nor did he discuss its contents in, his petition for writ 
of habeas corpus filed in 2005. 
As we explain further below, regardless of whether Dr. 
Leonard’s testimony constituted new evidence, and regardless 
of whether Masters was diligent in discovering and presenting 
it, it ultimately does not benefit Masters.  Masters specifically 
takes exception to a portion of the referee’s report in which she 
wrote, “Dr. Leonard’s testimony does not exonerate [Masters].  
It may suggest that Masters was not a planner or leader of the 
conspiracy, but Masters was not tried as the planner or leader 
of the conspiracy; he was tried as the knife-sharpener and 
messenger.”  The evidence presented at Masters’s trial arguably 
suggests he was a planner and leader.  But even if we were to 
assign no weight to the referee’s suggestion that Masters only 
relayed messages and helped fabricate the weapon, we conclude 
that substantial evidence supports the referee’s ultimate 
conclusion that the notes’ authorship is not material because 
Masters’s purported lack of authorship does not exonerate him.  
(Post, at pp. 42–43.) 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
b.  Weapon’s fabrication 
Masters also takes exception to the referee’s finding 
regarding who fabricated the weapon used to stab Burchfield.  
Preliminarily, whether this evidence is new is debatable, as 
Masters does not explain why these witnesses could not have 
testified at his trial.  We nonetheless will assume these 
witnesses would have invoked their constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination at Masters’s trial and therefore could 
not have been compelled to testify.  Regardless, newly 
discovered evidence must be credible (§ 1473, subd. (b)(3)(A)), 
and the referee found these witnesses were not credible. 
Even if we were to assume the testimony about the 
possibility that the weapon was fabricated completely on the 
second tier might be newly discovered evidence, there was no 
credible evidence that it actually was sharpened there.  
Rhinehart, for example, testified that the weapon never left the 
second tier, that Johnson and the source of metal for the weapon 
were housed on one side of him, and that the person who 
sharpened the metal was housed on the other side of him.  Yet 
Rhinehart also testified that he did not observe its fabrication 
or participate in passing it to Johnson.  And, as the referee 
noted, 
Masters’s 
witnesses 
named 
numerous 
possible 
fabricators of the weapon.  Because the evidence at the reference 
hearing amounted only to speculation pointing in many 
different directions, we accept the referee’s ultimate finding that 
Masters has not provided new, credible evidence that someone 
else fabricated the weapon used to stab Burchfield. 
c.  Other evidence 
Masters notes the referee made other findings that were 
indicative of new evidence having been presented, such as 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
Evans’s having lied at trial and Willis’s posttrial declaration and 
statements, and he therefore contends this evidence should have 
been included in the answer to this question.  Again, newly 
discovered evidence must be credible (§ 1473, subd. (b)(3)(A)), 
and the referee found Willis and Evans were not credible.  The 
same is true for the testimony of the other BGF witnesses who 
testified at the reference hearing. 
Masters correctly notes that the referee found Evans’s 
trial testimony about his relationship with Hahn was false.  
Because the referee found Evans credible on this discrete topic, 
we agree with Masters that this portion of the Evans’s 
deposition can constitute newly discovered evidence.  As we 
explain more fully below, however, it is ultimately unavailing.  
(Post, at pp. 40–41.) 
Similarly, Masters contends Richardson was the actual 
mastermind behind the conspiracy to murder Burchfield, and in 
support he cites correctional officers’ reports concerning 
statements made by Richardson that previously had been 
redacted and thus were unknown and unavailable to Masters at 
time of his trial.  Masters also notes the new evidence about 
Evans’s possible involvement in Beasley’s killing.  As we explain 
more fully below, none of this evidence, even if new, entitles 
Masters to relief. 
C.  Question Three 
Our third question to the referee asked, “What, if any, 
promises or threats were made to guilt phase prosecution 
witness Rufus Willis by District Attorney Investigator Charles 
Numark or Deputy District Attorneys Edward Berberian or 
Paula Kamena?  Was Willis’s trial testimony affected by any 
such promises or threats, and, if so, how?” 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
1.  Referee’s findings 
The referee found that Numark, Berberian, and Kamena 
did not make any undisclosed promises or threats to Willis.  As 
noted, Willis did not testify at the reference hearing, but 
Masters introduced statements Willis had made previously.  
The referee found that Willis was manipulative and 
untrustworthy, and that any new claims of undisclosed 
prosecutorial promises or threats were unsubstantiated.   
2.  Masters’s exceptions 
Masters takes exception to the referee’s findings with 
respect to Berberian and Numark.  Masters notes that Willis in 
2010 stated that Berberian threatened to not honor a prior 
agreement to release him from prison if he did not testify.  Willis 
also stated that after he had been released on parole, Berberian 
threatened to return him to San Quentin.  And Masters observes 
that Berberian testified at the reference hearing but did not 
affirmatively refute Willis’s accusations.  Masters further notes 
that Willis stated that Numark promised him he would take 
steps to ensure no one would oppose Willis’s parole.  Masters 
does not dispute that there was no evidence of Kamena’s having 
made any promises or threats to Willis. 
Masters’s exceptions lack merit.  With respect to 
Numark’s efforts to shorten Willis’s incarceration, it was 
disclosed at Masters’s trial that Numark had offered to help 
Willis secure his release from prison, but this offer was retracted 
before Masters’s trial.  Thus, to the extent Numark’s offer to 
help affected Willis’s trial testimony, the jury was aware of the 
investigator’s efforts.  Masters is correct that our question was 
not limited to undisclosed threats or promises, but the jury was 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
27 
able to assess the effect, if any, of Numark’s offers on Willis’s 
decision to implicate Masters. 
In support of his claim that Berberian had threatened to 
return Willis to prison, Masters presented Willis’s prior 
statements of what Berberian purportedly said to him.  The 
referee found Willis’s claims to be unbelievable, and we agree 
with this finding. 
Moreover, the evidence of the purported threats is a web 
of hearsay.  (Evid. Code, § 1200.)  Masters contends that 
Berberian’s failure to refute Willis’s claims about the threats 
constitutes an adoptive admission, which is an exception to 
hearsay rule.  (Id., § 1221.)  According to Masters, because there 
was no affirmative refutation of Willis’s claims by Berberian, 
who did testify at the reference hearing, Berberian has adopted 
the statements attributed to him by Willis.  But even if we were 
to assume Willis’s statements concerning Berberian’s purported 
threats were admissible under section 1221, that section 
governs 
only 
the 
admissibility 
of 
certain 
out-of-court 
statements, not the weight the factfinder may accord to them.  
(See People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 190–191; CACI No. 
213 [the jury “may consider that statement as evidence against” 
the party against whom the statement was offered under 
specified conditions (italics added)]; see also CALCRIM No. 
357.)  The referee found that Willis was untrustworthy, and by 
extension, she found the claims of prosecutorial threats to be 
unsubstantiated.  We agree with these findings. 
In sum, the jury was aware of the discussions between 
Numark and Willis, as well as the terms of the immunity 
agreement between Willis and Berberian.  To the extent 
Masters contends the totality of the circumstances nonetheless 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
28 
indicates Numark, Berberian, and Kamena made some sort of 
undisclosed threat or promise to Willis, substantial evidence 
supports the referee’s contrary finding. 
D.  Question Four 
Our fourth question to the referee asked, “Were there 
promises, threats or facts concerning guilt phase prosecution 
witness Bobby Evans’s relationship with law enforcement 
agencies of which Deputy District Attorneys Berberian and 
Kamena were, or should have been, aware, but that were not 
disclosed to the defense?  If so, what are those promises, threats 
or facts?” 
1.  Referee’s findings 
The referee answered the first part of this question in the 
negative.  The referee found that Evans had more extensive 
contacts with Hahn than were disclosed at trial, but that 
Berberian and Kamena did not know about these contacts.  The 
referee also found that the evidence of the contact between 
Evans and Hahn was not material because Masters was aware 
of Evans’s lack of credibility and had extensively urged the jury 
not to believe him. 
2.  Masters’s exceptions 
Masters again takes exception to the referee’s finding 
regarding Evans’s contacts with Hahn.  Masters first contends 
that Evans was, in essence, a professional informant who 
worked regularly with Hahn.  Although the referee did not 
expressly characterize Evans as such, she agreed that Hahn and 
Evans’s working relationship was underplayed at Masters’s 
trial.  Masters also contends that Hahn was a member of the 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
29 
prosecution team and, for that reason, Berberian’s and 
Kamena’s actual knowledge is immaterial because Hahn’s 
knowledge is imputed to them. 
Masters similarly contends the prosecution team should 
have known about Evans’s possible involvement in James 
Beasley’s killing.  As the testimony of Hahn and others 
indicates, Hahn knew Evans was a suspect in Beasley’s killing.  
In addition, one of the prosecutors’ investigators, David Gasser, 
recalled some discussion about Evans’s possible involvement in 
Beasley’s killing.  Masters therefore again contends that Hahn’s 
knowledge is imputed to Berberian and Kamena. 
As Masters does not dispute that Berberian and Kamena 
did not actually know the extent of Hahn’s working relationship 
with Evans or Evans’s status as a suspect in Beasley’s killing, 
we accept the referee’s finding that the prosecuting attorneys 
lacked actual knowledge of any promises, threats, or facts 
concerning Evans that were not disclosed to Masters or 
otherwise discovered during his trial.  With respect to facts that 
can be imputed to Berberian and Kamena, we address those 
contentions below. 
E.  Question Five 
Our fifth question to the referee asked, “Did Deputy 
District Attorneys Berberian and Kamena knowingly present 
false testimony by Bobby Evans?  If so, what was that 
testimony?” 
The referee found that Berberian and Kamena did not 
knowingly present false testimony by Evans at Masters’s trial.  
At the reference hearing, Masters conceded there was no 
evidence to support this contention. 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
30 
Neither party makes an exception to the referee’s finding, 
and we accept it. 
F.  Question Six 
Our sixth question to the referee asked, “What, if any, 
promises or threats were made to Bobby Evans by District 
Attorney Investigator Numark, Department of Corrections 
Investigator James Hahn, or Deputy District Attorneys 
Berberian and Kamena?  Was Evans’s trial testimony affected 
by any such promises or threats, and, if so, how?” 
1.  Referee’s findings 
The referee found that there was no evidence that 
Berberian, Kamena, or Numark had made any threats or 
promises to Evans, and Masters conceded there was no evidence 
to support these contentions.  At the reference hearing, Masters 
contended that Hahn promised Evans that if he testified against 
Masters, then Hahn would ensure that Evans would not be 
implicated in Beasley’s killing.  The referee found that the 
evidence presented did not support this contention. 
2.  Masters’s exceptions 
Masters takes exception to the referee’s finding only with 
respect to Hahn.  Preliminarily, Masters contends that the 
referee erred by not considering prior statements made by 
Evans in other proceedings that were consistent with his 
deposition testimony here.  We have reviewed these statements, 
and they generally are consistent with Evans’s deposition 
testimony.  But even if we were to assume they should have been 
admitted during the reference hearing, it is doubtful they would 
have altered the referee’s finding that Evans had not been 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
31 
truthful in his deposition testimony, which the referee described 
as “spectacularly unreliable.” 
Masters concedes there is “no direct evidence” that Hahn 
promised Evans that he would not be implicated in Beasley’s 
killing if he testified against Masters.  Rather, Masters contends 
that Evans was the primary suspect in Beasley’s killing but was 
no longer considered a suspect after he implicated Masters.  As 
such, “one of the most plausible explanations” for this shift, 
according to Masters, was Hahn’s involvement.  The officers 
investigating Beasley’s killing, however, expressly denied that 
they stopped investigating Evans in exchange for his testimony 
at Masters’s trial, and the referee found this testimony credible.  
We accept the referee’s credibility findings as well as the 
referee’s ultimate finding that Hahn did not influence the 
investigation of Beasley’s killing. 
Masters also contends that Hahn’s threats or promises to 
Evans were not limited to the Beasley investigation.  Rather, 
Masters contends that Evans and Hahn had a pre-existing, 
ongoing relationship in which Evans supplied Hahn and other 
law enforcement agencies with information.  Masters further 
contends any threats or promises made to Evans ought to be 
viewed in the context of the expectation of their working 
relationship continuing past Evans’s testifying against Masters.  
But besides this generalized expectation of their working 
relationship continuing past Masters’s trial, he presented no 
evidence of any specific promises made by Hahn to Evans that 
were not otherwise disclosed or discovered during the course of 
Masters’s trial. 
Masters further contends that the jury had incomplete 
information about the threats made against Evans.  Although 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
32 
Evans testified at Masters’s trial that he had pleaded guilty to 
attempted robbery in exchange for serving no more than 
16 months, in his deposition he said he was facing 18 years in 
prison if he did not testify against Masters.  But the only source 
of evidence indicating that Evans was threatened with a much 
longer sentence was Evans.  Because the referee found Evans to 
be an unbelievable witness, we accept the referee’s finding that 
Evans received no threat or promise that was not otherwise 
disclosed or discovered during Masters’s trial. 
G.  Question Seven 
Our seventh and final question to the referee asked, “Did 
penalty phase prosecution witness [Johnnie] Hoze provide false 
testimony regarding [Masters]’s involvement in the murder of 
inmate David Jackson?  If so, what was that false testimony?” 
The referee found no basis to believe that Hoze testified 
falsely at Masters’s trial.  Although Hoze did not testify at the 
evidentiary hearing, the referee reviewed his numerous 
previous inconsistent statements about Masters’s involvement 
in Jackson’s murder.  The referee’s review of Hoze’s statements 
led her to conclude that “Hoze recant[s] and [unrecants] with 
alarming frequency” and “admits he has a motive to do so . . . .  
His recantations [of his trial testimony] are not believable.” 
Neither party makes an exception to the referee’s finding, 
and we agree with it. 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
“Because a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a 
collateral attack on a presumptively final criminal judgment, 
‘the petitioner bears a heavy burden initially to plead sufficient 
grounds for relief, and then later to prove them.’  [Citation.]  To 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
33 
obtain relief, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence the facts that establish entitlement to relief.”  
(Cowan, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 243.) 
A.  False Evidence 
In his habeas corpus petition, Masters contends false 
evidence was presented at his trial.  We deny relief on this claim. 
Habeas corpus relief is available if “[f]alse evidence that is 
substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or 
punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or 
trial relating to his or incarceration.”  (§ 1473, subd. (b)(1).)  
“Determining that the evidence was false clears the first hurdle 
to relief.  ‘The statute and the prior decisions applying section 
1473 make clear that once a defendant shows that false evidence 
was admitted at trial, relief is available under section 1473 as 
long as the false evidence was “material.” ’  [Citation.]  
Materiality is shown if there is a reasonable probability the 
result would have been different without the false evidence.”  (In 
re Figueroa (2018) 4 Cal.5th 576, 588–589.)  “This required 
showing of prejudice is the same as the reasonably probable test 
for state law error established under People v. Watson (1956) 46 
Cal.2d 818, 836.  [Citation.]  We make such a determination 
based on the totality of the relevant circumstances.”  (In re 
Richards (2016) 63 Cal.4th 291, 312–313.) 
1.  Willis, Evans, and other BGF members 
Masters contends that Willis and Evans testified falsely at 
his trial.  As noted, the referee found that Willis and Evans had 
generally recanted their trial testimony but that both were 
chronic liars.  As such, the referee did not believe their 
recantations.  The referee presided over Evans’s deposition, and 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
34 
we have accepted her findings regarding his credibility.  We 
independently reviewed Willis’s statements and have agreed 
with her finding regarding his credibility.  Habeas corpus is an 
attack on a presumptively final judgment, and neither Masters’s 
generalized arguments about Willis’s and Evans’s credibility nor 
his generalized arguments that he was falsely accused are 
sufficient to warrant relief.  Those arguments do not show the 
falsity of any specific evidence of his involvement in the 
conspiracy.  The referee similarly rejected the testimony of the 
other BGF members who testified at the reference hearing in 
support of Masters, and we have accepted her findings on these 
matters as well. 
The referee did find that the trial testimony concerning 
Evans and Hahn’s pre-existing, ongoing working relationship 
was false because it failed to adequately describe the nature and 
extent of their relationship, and we have accepted this finding.  
As an initial matter, we note the referee found that Evans had 
more extensive contacts with law enforcement than was 
disclosed at trial, but she did not expressly find that Hahn’s trial 
testimony was false.  And it does not appear that Hahn, at any 
time during Masters’s trial, was questioned about the extent of 
his relationship with Evans before June 1989. 
The jury knew that Hahn tracked parolees such as Evans, 
which suggests that Hahn was aware of Evans’s criminal history 
and his propensity to not tell the truth.  The jury also knew that 
Evans was a violent felon, had contacted Hahn and offered to 
disclose information about Burchfield’s murder, and was 
testifying to receive a benefit for his cooperation, that is, a 
possible reduction in his own sentence to be facilitated by 
Hahn’s intervention. 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
35 
With respect to Evans’s trial testimony regarding the 
nature and extent of his previous contacts with Hahn, Evans 
testified that before he met with “the District Attorney,” he had 
met Hahn only “[o]ne time prior.”   But Evans also testified, 
before Masters’s trial, that he (or, in one instance, his wife) had 
provided Hahn with incriminating information about a 
correctional officer and, in separate incidents, about two BGF 
members other than Johnson, Masters, and Woodard.  The jury 
further knew that Evans wanted to avoid going to prison 
because his “life had been threatened” by the BGF and that 
Hahn was aware that Evans feared retaliation by the BGF.  
Evans also testified that Hahn had put some money on his books 
in a correctional facility and had given him money for cigarettes.  
In sum, the jury heard that Evans, before testifying at Masters’s 
trial, had provided Hahn with information on multiple occasions 
in addition to the information about Burchfield’s murder, and 
that Hahn had given Evans money. 
The evidence at the reference hearing showed that Evans, 
before coming forward about Burchfield’s murder, had often 
been paid by various law enforcement agencies for his informant 
work, including work that had been arranged by Hahn.  The 
evidence also showed that Hahn knew Evans previously had 
provided false information, but nonetheless made efforts to 
ensure Evans would testify at Masters’s trial.  Masters further 
suggests that Evans had an expectation to continue his work as 
an informant after Masters’s trial.  Although this additional 
information sheds further light on Evans’s credibility, it is not 
so different from the evidence adduced at trial, which provided 
the jury ample knowledge about Evans for purposes of assessing 
his credibility. 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
36 
Masters contends that the jury did not know that Evans 
had served as an informant before Evans disclosed information 
about Burchfield’s murder to Hahn.  But the jury was aware 
that Evans had provided information, including information 
about members of his own gang, to law enforcement.  And, as 
the referee noted, Masters “staged an unsparing attack on 
Evans” and his credibility at trial.  Indeed, Masters’s counsel 
specifically argued to the jury that Evans had “snitched” on 
others besides Johnson, Masters, and Woodard. 
Moreover, Willis was the primary witness against 
Masters, as he had personal knowledge about the conspiracy; 
“Evans’s testimony served only to confirm Willis’s testimony.”  
(Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1068.)  The notes in Masters’s 
handwriting further implicated him.  In addition, there was no 
material falsity regarding the benefits Evans actually received 
in exchange for his testimony at Masters’s trial.  (See id. at 
pp. 1036–1037, 1064–1068.) 
In sum, the false evidence at Masters’s trial provided the 
jury with an incomplete account of Evans and Hahn’s 
relationship.  But there was ample evidence at trial that 
provided the jury with strong reasons to question Evans’s 
credibility and to view his testimony with caution or suspicion.  
The totality of the circumstances does not make it reasonably 
probable that the jury would have returned a different verdict 
had it known the full scope of the relationship between Evans 
and Hahn, including any possible expectation regarding future 
informant assignments. 
In his habeas corpus petition, Masters contends that Hoze 
testified falsely during the penalty phase.  The referee found no 
basis for believing Hoze testified falsely at Masters’s trial, and 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
37 
Masters does not dispute this finding.  Because we agree with 
the referee’s finding, Masters is not entitled to relief on this 
basis. 
2.  Authorship of the notes 
Masters also contends that the evidence at trial that he 
authored the two notes attributed to him was false.  Again, 
Willis testified at trial that he sent Masters a note requesting 
written details about the murder.  Willis then received a note in 
Masters’s handwriting but signed with an ambiguous code 
name.  This note discussed some aspects of the murder.  Willis 
then sent Masters another note requesting another report, and 
Willis received a second note, again in Masters’s handwriting, 
which contained more details about the attack.  The second note 
was signed with a code name assigned to Masters.  Willis’s 
testimony, when coupled with the testimony of the handwriting 
expert, 
suggests 
that 
Masters 
physically 
wrote 
the 
incriminating notes, even though Willis did not observe Masters 
having done so.  The timing of Willis’s requests and Masters’s 
responses, moreover, also supports the inference that Masters 
had enough time to compose the contents of the notes, that is, 
he was not merely copying notes that someone else had 
composed.  (See Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1030.)  And 
Willis testified at Masters’s trial that Masters had written other 
letters about Burchfield’s murder that Willis later destroyed.  
But Willis also testified that the BGF sometimes had its 
members copy notes that originated from another author.  At 
the reference hearing, Masters produced Willis’s prior 
statements in which he said Masters did not author these two 
notes. 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
38 
Masters does not now show that any of the trial testimony 
or evidence concerning these two notes was false.  Notably, 
Willis never testified at trial that Masters authored the notes.  
Although the jury could have inferred from Willis’s trial 
testimony that Masters authored the contents of the notes, 
Masters does not show that Willis’s testimony about his 
receiving the two notes, in Masters’s handwriting, was false.  
Nor does Masters now dispute the trial evidence that showed 
that the notes were in his handwriting.  Rather, Masters’s claim 
is that the evidence adduced at the reference hearing, including 
Dr. Leonard’s expert opinion, casts doubt on any inference that 
Masters authored the contents of the notes. 
Ultimately, even assuming this evidence showed the 
falsity of any suggestion in Willis’s trial testimony that Masters 
authored the notes’ contents, the fact that Masters did not 
author the notes, if accurate, does not lead us to conclude there 
was a reasonable probability of a different outcome.  The jury 
knew that BGF members sometimes copied notes authored by 
others.  Even if Masters only copied notes composed by others, 
this would not mean their contents were false, and Masters has 
not provided any credible evidence to show that their contents 
were false.  Further, as the referee observed, even if Masters 
merely copied the notes, his doing so could reasonably be viewed 
as evidence that he participated in the conspiracy to murder 
Burchfield. 
B.  Newly Discovered Evidence 
In his habeas corpus petition, Masters contends that 
newly discovered evidence casts doubt on the verdicts at both 
the guilt and penalty phases of his trial.  Habeas corpus relief 
based on newly discovered evidence may be granted when “[n]ew 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
39 
evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without 
substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it 
would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.”  
(§ 1473, subd. (b)(3)(A).) 
In support of this claim, Masters presented the following 
evidence:  (1) Willis’s, Evans’s, and Hoze’s posttrial recantations 
of their trial testimony; (2) testimony that Masters did not 
fabricate the weapon used to kill Sergeant Burchfield; (3) 
Dr. Leonard’s testimony that Masters did not author the notes 
introduced at his trial; (4) Evans’s possible involvement in 
Beasley’s killing; and (5) statements concerning Harold 
Richardson, which previously were unknown to Masters.  We 
conclude that none of this evidence, individually or collectively, 
would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial. 
Preliminarily, we note that Masters contends some of the 
evidence that he presented at the reference hearing supports his 
claims for both false evidence and newly discovered evidence.  
Newly discovered evidence does not necessarily mean that false 
evidence was presented at trial.  But under the circumstances 
before us, we accept Masters’s contention that at least some of 
his evidence supports both types of claims. 
1.  Witnesses’ recantations 
At the reference hearing, Masters presented evidence of 
Willis’s, Evans’s, and Hoze’s posttrial recantation of their trial 
testimony.  With respect to Willis and Evans, the referee 
observed that she “cannot find that there is any ‘new evidence’ 
now — there is only ‘different evidence’ from the same 
witnesses, in the form of their recantations and unreliable 
memories.”  Willis’s and Evans’s posttrial recantations are, 
strictly speaking, new.  But the referee’s comments make clear 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
40 
that she was finding these witnesses not credible; she also found 
Hoze not credible. 
Regardless of how the referee characterized the posttrial 
statements of these witnesses, she did not believe their 
recantations.  We have accepted the referee’s findings regarding 
Evans’s credibility, and we agree with her findings regarding 
Willis’s and Hoze’s credibility.  (§ 1473, subd. (b)(3)(B) [newly 
discoverable evidence must be credible].)  At best, Masters has 
demonstrated that these witnesses generally are liars, but he 
does not offer any persuasive reason to credit their recantations 
over their trial testimony. 
As we have accepted Masters’s contention that Evans’s 
testimony about his relationship with Hahn was false, we accept 
his contention that Evans’s recantation on this topic also 
constitutes newly discovered evidence.  However, just as we 
have found no reasonable probability of a different result at trial 
absent this false evidence, we also conclude that Masters has 
not shown that this newly discovered evidence would have more 
likely than not changed the outcome at his trial.  Again, the trial 
evidence already gave the jury ample reason to doubt Evans’s 
credibility.  Further, the inconsistency in Evans’s statements is 
notable.  In the context of a motion for a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence, for example, we have said “ ‘the trial 
court may consider the credibility as well as materiality of the 
evidence in its determination [of] whether introduction of the 
evidence in a new trial would render a different result 
reasonably probable.’ ”  (People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 
329; see Evid. Code § 780, subd. (h) [when assessing a  witness’s 
credibility, the trier of fact may consider a witness’s prior 
inconsistent statements].)  Similarly here, Evans’s new 
statements about his preexisting relationship with Hahn need 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
41 
not be considered in a vacuum but may be considered in light of 
his prior inconsistent statements on this topic. 
2.  Weapon’s fabrication 
At the reference hearing, several witnesses testified about 
the fabrication of the weapon used to kill Burchfield.  But the 
referee found none of them credible, we have accepted the 
referee’s finding in this matter, and therefore their testimony 
cannot constitute newly discovered evidence. 
In addition to their lack of credibility, Masters’s witnesses 
named multiple possible fabricators, but they could not all have 
fabricated the weapon used to kill Burchfield.  Given the 
inconsistencies in and between their testimony, it is not more 
likely than not that the evidence now presented about the 
weapon’s fabrication would have changed the outcome of the 
trial.  Moreover, Masters’s participation in the conspiracy was 
not limited to helping fabricate the weapon. 
3.  Authorship of the notes 
Masters contends that Dr. Leonard’s testimony that 
Masters did not author the contents of the two incriminating 
notes introduced at his trial constitutes new evidence.  As noted, 
evidence was introduced at Masters’s trial that two notes about 
the attack were written in his handwriting, and Willis testified 
at trial that notes were sometimes copied by several people to 
obscure the identity of their authors.  (Masters, supra, 62 
Cal.4th at p. 1031.) 
Masters contends that Dr. Leonard’s testimony helps 
show that he did not plan or carry out the plan to attack 
Burchfield.  But evidence that Masters did not author the notes 
does not necessarily mean he did not plan or participate in the 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
42 
attack on Burchfield.  Rather, a reasonable jury could have 
believed that although Masters copied and did not author the 
notes, he still participated in the planning of the attack and 
sharpened the weapon that was used.  Because the accuracy of 
the contents of these notes under these circumstances is not 
necessarily dependent on who authored them, we cannot say 
Dr. Leonard’s testimony about the authorship of the notes more 
likely than not would have changed the outcome of Masters’s 
trial. 
Evidence that someone other than Masters authored the 
notes supports Masters’s theory that Willis framed him.  It is 
also consistent with the possibility that Masters was coerced 
into falsely confessing that he planned Burchfield’s murder.  But 
evidence that Masters did not author the notes does not 
establish that their contents were false.  Moreover, the jury 
already had reason to doubt Willis’s credibility, and Masters’s 
trial counsel argued to the jury that Willis “doctor[ed] up” the 
notes and specifically suggested that Willis had provided 
Masters with a draft for him to copy.  In other words, the jury 
had grounds for doubting Masters’s authorship of the notes but 
nonetheless convicted him. 
At trial, the case against Masters rested to a significant 
degree on Willis’s credibility.  Through a variety of sources, 
Masters now attempts to further undermine the credibility of 
Willis’s testimony.  But even with these additional bases for 
doubting his credibility, we are not persuaded it is more likely 
than not that the outcome of the trial would have been different, 
especially since Willis’s credibility was litigated extensively at 
trial. 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
43 
4.  Beasley’s killing 
Evans’s possible involvement in Beasley’s killing likely 
constitutes new evidence because we accept the premise that 
Masters, at the time of his trial, reasonably could not have been 
expected to know the details of an unrelated homicide or Evans’s 
status as a possible suspect.  Nonetheless, the officers 
investigating Beasley’s killing testified that they did not forgo 
investigating Evans in exchange for his trial testimony, the 
referee credited this testimony, and we have accepted this 
finding.  Further, in light of what the jury already knew about 
Evans’s violent criminal past, Masters fails to show that Evans’s 
possible involvement in Beasley’s killing would have more likely 
than not changed the outcome at his trial. 
5.  Richardson’s statements 
Before his trial, in an effort to sever his trial from 
Johnson’s and Woodard’s, Masters unsuccessfully sought to rely 
on partially redacted statements made by Richardson about 
Burchfield’s murder; at his trial, the prosecutor sought to 
exclude these statements.  In these statements, Richardson 
implicated himself and did not mention Masters.  The trial court 
excluded Richardson’s statements as unreliable hearsay, and we 
ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in doing so.  
(Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 1054–1058.)  At the reference 
hearing, to bolster Richardson’s credibility and otherwise cast 
doubt on the prosecution’s case, Masters relied on an unredacted 
version of Richardson’s statements as well as correctional 
officers’ reports concerning statements made by Richardson.  
During these proceedings, Masters provided us with additional 
and more complete reports, authored by correctional officers, 
concerning Richardson’s statements. 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
44 
The unredacted portions of Richardson’s statements and 
some of the related reports are not new evidence; Masters had 
access to them at his trial.  The redacted portions and the 
reports not disclosed previously to him are new to Masters, 
however, as he did not have access to them at trial.  We have 
reviewed these additional materials, including the materials 
recently supplied directly to us by Masters.  Even if we were to 
assume that this additional evidence would have been 
admissible at trial, it enhances only slightly Richardson’s 
credibility, and none of it would have altered our conclusion that 
Richardson’s statements were not sufficiently trustworthy. 
At the time of his trial, Masters was aware of most of 
Richardson’s statements to prison officials, and the trial court 
excluded them as unreliable hearsay.  As the trial court 
observed, Richardson did not speak to prison officials about 
Burchfield’s murder until more than a year after the attack had 
occurred.  Richardson thus had ample opportunity to glean the 
relevant details from others and then pass them off to prison 
officials as his own personal knowledge.  Masters now presents 
no new information from Richardson about Burchfield’s murder; 
instead, he relies on additional, generalized information from 
others about Richardson that, at most, somewhat bolsters 
Richardson’s credibility.  In light of the totality of the evidence 
at trial, Masters has not shown that this additional information 
from the reports concerning Richardson’s debriefing, even if 
somehow admissible at his trial, would have more likely than 
not changed its outcome. 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
45 
C.  Prosecutorial Misconduct 
In his habeas corpus petition, Masters contends that 
various actions by the prosecutors rendered his trial unfair.  We 
reject these contentions. 
“In California, the law regarding prosecutorial misconduct 
is settled:  ‘When a prosecutor’s intemperate behavior is 
sufficiently egregious that it infects the trial with such a degree 
of unfairness as to render the subsequent conviction a denial of 
due process, the federal Constitution is violated.  Prosecutorial 
misconduct that falls short of rendering the trial fundamentally 
unfair may still constitute misconduct under state law if it 
involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to 
persuade the trial court or the jury.’ ”  (Masters, supra, 62 
Cal.4th at p. 1052.) 
1.  Threats or promises of leniency 
Masters contends that his trial was fundamentally unfair 
because Willis’s testimony was unreliable due to improper 
coercion by the prosecution.  Specifically, Masters alleges that 
Berberian threatened that if Willis’s testimony did not implicate 
Masters, Willis would be returned to San Quentin, where he 
feared he would be killed by other inmates. 
Offering witnesses immunity in return for testifying or 
“confronting [witnesses] with the predicament” they are in is not 
necessarily improper coercion.  (People v. Badgett (1995) 10 
Cal.4th 330, 355.)  Such conduct is acceptable so long as it is 
with the understanding that the witness’s gaining the benefit or 
avoiding the punishment is conditioned on the witness’s 
testifying “fully and fairly.”  (Ibid.)  It is unacceptably coercive, 
however, for an agreement to require that the witness testify 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
46 
consistently with a previous statement to the authorities.  (Id. 
at p. 358.)  “ ‘ “[A] defendant is denied a fair trial if the 
prosecution’s case depends substantially on accomplice 
testimony and the accomplice witness is placed, either by the 
prosecution or the court, under a strong compulsion to testify in 
a particular fashion.”  [Citation.]  Thus, when the accomplice is 
granted immunity subject to the condition that his testimony 
substantially conform to an earlier statement given to police 
[citation], or that his testimony result in defendant’s conviction 
[citation], the accomplice’s testimony is “tainted beyond 
redemption” [citation] and its admission denies defendant a fair 
trial.  On the other hand, although there is a certain degree of 
compulsion inherent in any plea agreement or grant of 
immunity, it is clear that an agreement requiring only that the 
witness testify fully and truthfully is valid.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
Although Willis had stated that Berberian threatened to 
return him to San Quentin if he did not testify at Masters’s trial, 
the referee found that Willis’s statement was unconvincing.  We 
agree with this finding, and no other credible evidence was 
presented showing that Berberian made such a threat.  To the 
extent Masters contends that Numark promised Willis his 
release in exchange for the incriminating notes in Masters’s 
handwriting, Berberian had made clear that there would be no 
agreement involving Willis’s release. 
Similarly, Evans stated at his deposition that he was 
threatened with being prosecuted in numerous cases and 
charged under a recidivist statute if he did not implicate 
Masters.  As with Willis, the referee rejected Evans’s statements 
as unbelievable.  We have accepted this finding, and no other 
credible evidence was presented showing that Evans ever was 
improperly coerced into testifying against Masters. 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
47 
2.  Exculpatory material 
Masters contends the prosecutors failed to disclose threats 
or promises of leniency made to Evans or other facts that might 
have affected his credibility with the jury. 
“ ‘ “In Brady [v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83], the United 
States Supreme Court held ‘that the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 
violates due process where the evidence is material either to 
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith 
of the prosecution.’  [Citation.]  The high court has since held 
that the duty to disclose such evidence exists even though there 
has been no request by the accused [citation], that the duty 
encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory 
evidence [citation], and that the duty extends even to evidence 
known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor 
[citation].  Such evidence is material ‘ “if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” ’  
[Citation.]  In order to comply with Brady, therefore, ‘the 
individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable 
evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf 
in the case, including the police.’ ” ’  [Citation.]  As such, the 
prosecutor has a duty to ‘disclose to the defense and jury any 
inducements made to a prosecution witness to testify and must 
also correct any false or misleading testimony by the witness 
relating to any inducements.’  [Citation.] 
“For a defendant to obtain relief under Brady, ‘ “ ‘[t]he 
evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either 
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that 
evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
48 
willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’  
[Citation.]  Prejudice, in this context, focuses on ‘the materiality 
of the evidence to the issue of guilt and innocence.’  [Citations.]  
Materiality, in turn, requires more than a showing that the 
suppressed evidence would have been admissible [citation], that 
the absence of the suppressed evidence made conviction ‘more 
likely’ [citation], or that using the suppressed evidence to 
discredit a witness’s testimony ‘might have changed the 
outcome of the trial’ [citation].  A defendant instead ‘must show 
a “reasonable probability of a different result.” ’  [Citation.]”  
[Citation.]  We independently review the question whether a 
Brady violation has occurred, but give great weight to any trial 
court findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence.  
[Citation.]’ ”  (Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 1066–1067.) 
Preliminarily, the parties dispute whether Hahn was a 
member of the prosecution team.  As we noted in Masters’s 
automatic appeal, a prosecutor has a duty to learn of any 
possible inducements made by law enforcement officers or other 
agents of the state, provided that these agents are acting on the 
prosecutor’s behalf in the case.  (See Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th 
at p. 1067.)  And we had assumed under these circumstances 
that Hahn was part of the prosecution team.  (Ibid.)  Moreover, 
the prosecutors’ investigators knew at least some information 
about Evans, and they undoubtedly were members of the 
prosecution team.  Thus, for Brady purposes, we consider the 
information about Evans to have been in the prosecutors’ 
possession. 
Masters contends the prosecutors failed to disclose three 
categories of information about Evans:  (1) the prosecutors 
threatened Evans with a lengthy incarceration if he did not 
implicate Masters; (2) Evans was a suspect in Beasley’s killing, 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
49 
with the implication that he was not prosecuted for that 
homicide in exchange for his testimony against Masters; and 
(3) Evans and Hahn had a pre-existing, ongoing working 
relationship, which included Hahn referring Evans to other 
government agencies for paid informant work, and that the 
extent of this relationship was greater than what was described 
at Masters’s trial. 
As to the first category, even assuming the agreement 
between Evans and Hahn contained any threats (or otherwise 
was coercive), the referee found the coercion or threats were 
already disclosed or discovered at Masters’s trial and therefore 
not suppressed.  (See People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 
715 [“evidence that is presented at trial is not considered 
suppressed, regardless of whether or not it had previously been 
disclosed during discovery”].)  The referee found no credible 
evidence of other, undisclosed threats, and we have accepted the 
referee’s finding on this issue. 
Next, with respect to Evans’s possible involvement in 
Beasley’s killing, Masters speculates that the police did not 
investigate Evans’s involvement in exchange for his testimony 
and that the prosecutor failed to disclose this arrangement.  
Masters presented no evidence in support of this speculation, 
and multiple witnesses denied that such an arrangement 
existed.  To the extent Masters contends that Evans’s status as 
a suspect in a homicide case was by itself exculpatory for 
Masters because it implicated Evans’s credibility, we are not 
persuaded.  Even if Evans’s possible involvement in Beasley’s 
killing was favorable to Masters and therefore should have been 
disclosed, it was not material under Brady because the jury was 
aware of Evans’s extensive and violent criminal history.  It is 
not reasonably probable that information concerning Evans’s 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
50 
possible involvement in Beasley’s killing would have altered the 
jury’s assessment of his credibility or the weight to place on his 
testimony to such an extent that it would have produced a 
different trial outcome. 
Similarly, with respect to Evans’s relationship with Hahn, 
Masters fails to demonstrate that this information was 
material.  In Masters’s automatic appeal, we generally agreed 
with him that the prosecutor disclosed incomplete information 
about the extent of the agreement concerning the benefits Evans 
received to testify.  (Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 1064–
1069.)  We held, however, that the jury knew that Evans had 
testified in exchange for measures to protect his safety and that 
the undisclosed details of the arrangement were not material 
because there was no reasonable probability of a different result 
had the full extent of the agreement been disclosed.  In addition, 
the jury was aware of Evans’s negative character.  And, as we 
have explained, the additional evidence of Evans and Hahn’s 
pre-existing, ongoing relationship presented during the 
reference hearing does not materially alter the calculus. 
Masters also contends that additional evidence of Evans 
and Hahn’s relationship indicates that Evans had a motive to 
curry Hahn’s favor for possible future benefits or consideration 
(and that this additional exculpatory evidence was not 
addressed in his automatic appeal).  Initially, we doubt that 
Evans’s expectations regarding future assignments as an 
informant induced him to testify against Masters; Evans 
appeared to have been motivated primarily by his desire to avoid 
being sent to state prison, as he feared the BGF would retaliate 
against him for providing information about its members to law 
enforcement.  Even if we were to agree that Evans’s testimony 
might have been motivated partially by his desire for future 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
51 
assignments, such additional motivation was not material 
under Brady because the jury already knew that Evans provided 
Hahn information in exchange for measures to protect his 
safety.  It is not reasonably probable that this additional 
expectation of future benefits (not otherwise inferable from the 
evidence that was presented at trial) would have affected the 
jury’s determination of Evans’s credibility or the weight to place 
on his testimony to such an extent that it would have produced 
a different trial outcome. 
3.  Presentation of false testimony 
Masters contends Berberian and Kamena knowingly 
presented Evans’s false testimony.  A defendant’s due process 
rights are violated if a prosecutor knowingly presents false 
testimony or fails to correct such testimony after it has been 
elicited.  (See People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 874.) 
At the reference hearing, Masters conceded there was no 
evidence showing that the prosecutors knew that Evans’s 
testimony was false.  To the extent Masters contends that the 
prosecutors intentionally withheld exculpatory material about 
Evans, there was no evidence presented that the prosecutors 
personally knew of such information, and we previously rejected 
this claim based on their presumed duty to learn about such 
information.  In any event, a prosecutor’s presentation of 
conflicting evidence does not necessarily mean that a prosecutor 
has presented false evidence.  So long as impeachment material 
is not concealed, a prosecutor may present conflicting testimony 
and let the jury make a determination as to the witnesses’ 
credibility.  (See People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 
99, 167.) 
In re MASTERS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
52 
CONCLUSION 
Based on our acceptance of most of the referee’s findings, 
we hereby discharge the order to show cause because Masters 
has not met the applicable standards for relief under any claim 
raised in his habeas corpus petition and referenced in our order 
to show cause. 
Because our order to show cause and reference order were 
limited to these questions and claims, we do not address any 
other claim raised in the petition for writ of habeas corpus.  The 
remaining claims will be resolved by a separately filed order.  
(See Cowan, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 248–249.) 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
In re MASTERS 
S130495 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
Habeas 
corpus 
is 
a 
limited 
remedy 
against 
a 
presumptively valid final judgment.  The availability of this 
remedy is governed by judicially articulated standards and, as 
relevant here, by statutes applicable to claims involving false 
evidence or new evidence.  False evidence must be “substantially 
material” to warrant habeas corpus relief.  (Pen. Code, § 1473, 
subd. (b)(1); see In re Figueroa (2018) 4 Cal.5th 576, 589 
[“Materiality is shown if there is a reasonable probability the 
result would have been different without the false evidence.”].)  
Statutory relief based on newly discovered evidence is available 
only if the evidence is “of such decisive force and value that it 
would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.”  
(Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b)(3)(A).)  As today’s opinion explains, 
petitioner Jarvis Masters has not met those standards. 
Masters contends that the referee’s findings cast serious 
doubt on the credibility of the prosecution’s two main witnesses, 
Rufus Willis and Bobby Evans, and thereby undermine 
confidence in their trial testimony.  As the referee put it, both 
are “ ‘liars with highly unreliable and selective memories.  
[¶] . . . [¶] Evans and Willis are utterly lacking in credibility.  
Both are career criminals whose word, under oath or otherwise, 
means nothing.  Both are well-known snitches.  Both would say 
anything to save their own hide — and both have so admitted.  
Both are manipulative and unreliable.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 14.)  But the jury heard both witnesses and made its own 
In re MASTERS 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
2 
credibility determinations, and the judgment at trial is entitled 
to a presumption of finality.  The standards for habeas corpus 
relief are crafted with this presumption in mind.  Still, it is 
understandable why Masters finds the referee’s report 
unsettling. 
The denial of relief in this matter follows from the 
statutory standards of review applicable to claims of false 
evidence and newly discovered evidence.  We have no occasion 
in this posture to consider whether, in light of the trial evidence 
as well as the reference hearing and findings, we can be 
confident of the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.  Nor do we 
have occasion here to consider whether, in light of all relevant 
circumstances, the fact that Masters was sentenced to death — 
while his codefendants Andre Johnson (the actual killer) and 
Lawrence Woodard (a prison gang “lieutenant” who, according 
to one witness, “had given the order for Burchfield’s murder” 
(People v. Johnson (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 778, 780, 783)) were 
not — may be indicative of arbitrariness in the application of the 
death penalty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
I Concur: 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Masters 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S130495 
Date Filed: August 12, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Marin 
Judge: M. Lynn Duryee 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Joseph Baxter and Chris P. Andrian, under appointments by the Supreme Court; Law Office of Joseph 
Baxter, Sara Baxter; Law Office of Richard I. Targow, Richard I. Targow; Law Office of Jenni Klose and 
Jenni Klose for Petitioner Jarvis J. Masters. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorneys General, Glenn R. Pruden, Sarah J. 
Farhat and Alice B. Lustre, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent State of California. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Joseph Baxter 
Law Office of Joseph Baxter 
645 Fourth Street, Suite 205 
Santa Rosa, CA  95404 
(707) 544-1149 
 
Chris Andrian 
Andrian & Gallenson 
1100 Mendocino Avenue 
Santa Rosa, CA  95401-4363 
(707) 527-9381 
 
Alice B. Lustre 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 510-3821