Title: Hammond v. State
Citation: 354 So. 2d 294
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 1977

354 So. 2d 294 (1977)
In re Kenneth HAMMOND
v.
STATE of Alabama.
Ex parte Kenneth Hammond.
SC 2515.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 16, 1977.
Rehearing Denied February 10, 1978.
*295 John W. Kelly, III, of Jackson &amp; Sikes, Selma, Loma B. Beaty, Patrick H. Tate, Fort Payne, for petitioner.
William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and James S. Ward and Edward E. Carnes, Asst. Attys. Gen., opposed, for the State.
BEATTY, Justice.
The petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals is quashed as improvidently granted.
WRIT QUASHED.
TORBERT, C. J., and BLOODWORTH, MADDOX, JONES, ALMON and SHORES, JJ., concur.
FAULKNER and EMBRY, JJ., dissent.
FAULKNER, Justice (dissenting).
By quashing the writ the majority of this court lets stand the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. I would reverse and remand because, in my opinion, Hammond has been denied due process of law, under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Kenneth Hammond, while serving as a Commissioner on the Alabama Public Service Commission was indicted for inciting to a felonybribery. Under Count 1 of the indictment the case went to the jury, charging Hammond in the disjunctive with inciting Rex Moore or John Moore of Tops Vending Company, or Charles Price of South Central Bell Telephone Company, to:
Hammond was convicted by a jury, and the trial court sentenced him to three years in the penitentiary. On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, affirmed. We granted certiorari on the alleged ground of whether Hammond received constitutional due process of law by being convicted without substantial evidence on all elements of the crime to support the conviction. The majority did not write an opinion giving their reasons for affirmance, yet it is obvious that the Court of Criminal Appeals had grave doubts about this case. The court said:
Further, the court said:
The majority, by quashing the writ, agrees with the Court of Criminal Appeals. By doing so, they have introduced a new standard of evidence to support a convictionbare minimum standardsin the field of criminal law. This is a dangerous departure from the substantial evidence rule, and the "bare minimum standards" violate Hammond's constitutional rights. In Ex Parte Grimmett, 228 Ala. 1, 152 So. 263 (1963) this court held that there must be substantial evidence to prove all the elements of the charge. The scintilla rule of evidence applicable in civil cases does not apply to criminal cases because the presumption of innocence, shielding every prisoner at bar, is not overcome by a mere scintilla of evidence.
Here, there was no evidence at all that Hammond was offered, promised, or given any gift, gratuity, or thing of value to influence his vote on a pending rate case. This court held in Clemons v. City of Birmingham, 277 Ala. 447, 171 So. 2d 456 (1965) that it is a violation of due process of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to convict and punish a person without any evidence at all of his guilt. Where is there any evidence at all of guilt here that Hammond incited Charles Price to bribe him to vote favorably on a pending rate case?
Price testified that in 1974, Hammond told him that he had friends in the vending machine business and wanted to know whether machines could be put in some of Bell's buildings. He and Hammond discussed, on several occasions, whether the machines (Moore's machines) had been placed in Bell's buildings. Finally, the machines owned by Moore were placed in the buildings in January, 1975. Two or three months later, he testified, Hammond told him to take out the machines. On direct examination Price testified:
It must be remembered that Hammond was charged with inciting Price to corruptly offer, promise, or give him $10,000, with intent to influence his vote on a rate case pending before the Public Service Commission. The proof just does not agree with the charge.
It is my opinion that Hammond has been denied due process of law. I am shocked that a "bare minimum standard of evidence to sustain a conviction" rule adopted by the Court of Criminal Appeals, has been approved by a majority of this court. Is one class of defendants subject to the "substantial evidence rule" and holders of a political office subject to the "bare minimum standard" rule? What has happened to that saying, "Equal justice under the law" without regard to that person's persuasion?
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
EMBRY, J., concurs.