Title: In re L.R.L.B.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 289A20
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: April 23, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-49 
No. 289A20 
Filed 23 April 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: L.R.L.B. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) and on writ of certiorari  
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) from orders entered on 31 March 2020 and 15 
November 2019 by Judge Hal G. Harrison in District Court, Yancey County. This 
matter was calendared in the Supreme Court on 19 March 2021, but determined on 
the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North 
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Hockaday & Hockaday, P.A., by Daniel M. Hockaday, for petitioner-appellee 
Yancey County Department of Social Services. 
 
Matthew D. Wunsche for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Parent Defender Wendy C. Sotolongo and Deputy Parent Defender Annick 
Lenoir-Peek for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
MORGAN, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her 
parental rights to her son “Liam,”1 and from the trial court’s earlier permanency 
planning order which eliminated reunification from Liam’s permanent plan. See 
                                            
1 A pseudonym is used to protect the juvenile’s identity and to facilitate ease of 
reading. 
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N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1)–(2) (2019). The termination order also terminated the 
parental rights of Liam’s father, who is not a party to this appeal. Due to our 
conclusion that the permanency planning order lacked findings which address one of 
the four issues contemplated by N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d) (2019), we remand to the trial 
court for the entry of additional findings. However, because the resolution of 
respondent-mother’s claim of error concerning the trial court’s permanency planning 
order is accomplished by remand, instead of by vacation or reversal of the 
permanency planning order at issue as authorized by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a2), it is 
presently premature for this Court to consider the trial court’s order terminating 
respondent-mother’s parental rights.  
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
¶ 2 
 
On 29 August 2018, Yancey County Department of Social Services (DSS) 
obtained nonsecure custody of Liam, who was born almost a year earlier in September 
2017. DSS filed a juvenile petition seeking an adjudication that Liam was neglected. 
The petition alleged that DSS had received a report in July 2018 that respondent-
mother had been arrested for driving while impaired as Liam rode with her in the 
car. In a second report dated 25 July 2018, respondent-mother accused Liam’s father 
of engaging in domestic violence against her and sexually molesting Liam. While a 
DSS investigation and a forensic examination of Liam would subsequently result in 
a determination that no sexual abuse had occurred, DSS’s first visit with the family 
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following the receipt of the second report occurred while both parents were 
intoxicated and resulted in respondent-mother and Liam moving into a domestic 
violence shelter on the same day.   
¶ 3 
 
The petition further alleged that, following respondent-mother’s transition to 
the domestic violence shelter, DSS received a series of telephone calls during the week 
of 20 August 2018 reporting changes in respondent-mother’s behavior that raised 
concerns about Liam’s safety. Shelter staff workers and Liam’s father described 
respondent-mother as exhibiting “extreme paranoia, uncontrollable crying, [and] 
lapses in memory[,]” including occasions when she left Liam “completely unattended 
causing alarm to shelter staff and the agency.” When DSS attempted to assist 
respondent-mother, she refused to cooperate with the social worker and treatment 
providers. Respondent-mother also refused to submit to a drug screen. Liam’s father 
was excluded as a placement option “due to recent domestic violence incidents and 
ongoing concerns, a criminal history and an active substance abuse issue.”  
¶ 4 
 
Respondent-mother obtained a comprehensive clinical assessment at RHA 
Health Services on 13 September 2018; she signed a Family Services Agreement 
(FSA) with DSS the following day. As part of her FSA, respondent-mother agreed to 
follow the recommendations of her comprehensive clinical assessment, including 
engaging in intermediate-level mental health and substance abuse services, along 
with parenting classes. Respondent-mother also agreed to obtain stable housing and 
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employment in order to demonstrate her ability to provide for Liam’s needs.             
¶ 5 
 
After adjudicatory and dispositional hearings on 15 November and 12 
December 2018, the trial court entered orders on 19 February 2019 adjudicating Liam 
as neglected and ordering DSS to maintain custody of the child. In ordering 
respondent-mother to comply with the requirements of her FSA, the trial court 
specifically mentioned respondent-mother’s compliance with requested drug screens 
and granted her three hours of weekly supervised visitation with Liam. At an initial 
review hearing on 11 March 2019, the trial court found that respondent-mother had 
resumed living with Liam’s father and ordered both parents to submit to a domestic 
violence assessment and to follow any resulting recommendations in addition to 
complying with the existing requirements of their respective case plans.    
¶ 6 
 
The trial court held a permanency planning hearing on 14 June 2019 during 
which it established a primary plan of reunification for Liam with a concurrent plan 
of adoption. At the next review hearing on 9 August 2019, the trial court found that, 
while respondent-mother had “completed some portions of her case plan” including 
parenting classes, she had tested positive for alcohol and amphetamines, and 
continued to exhibit inappropriate behaviors. Specifically, the trial court noted that 
respondent-mother had “acted in a disrespectful way to DSS workers and [did] not 
appreciate the DSS role in protecting the health, safety and welfare of her minor 
child[.]” The trial court ordered DSS to “promptly arrange a psychological evaluation 
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for the respondent-mother through Grandis.” Respondent-mother was admonished 
by the trial court and was directed to “adopt a better attitude.” She was ordered to 
cooperate with DSS, to abstain from using illicit substances, and to “make significant 
progress on her DSS case plan[.]” Despite the identified concerns, the trial court 
maintained Liam’s permanent plan as reunification with a concurrent plan of 
adoption.  
¶ 7 
 
Following the next review hearing on 11 October 2019, the trial court entered 
a permanency planning order on 15 November 2019 which relieved DSS of further 
reunification efforts and changed Liam’s permanent plan to adoption. On 13 January 
2020, respondent-mother filed notice pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(2)(a) (2019) 
to preserve her right to appeal the order eliminating reunification from the 
permanent plan2. 
¶ 8 
 
On 8 January 2020, DSS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of 
respondent-mother and Liam’s father. The trial court held a hearing to address the 
petition on 12 March 2020 and entered an order terminating the parental rights of 
both parents on 31 March 2020. The trial court adjudicated the existence of grounds 
                                            
2 Although respondent-mother filed her notice beyond the required thirty days as 
established by N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1001(a1)(2)(a) & (b) (2019), after entry and service of the order, 
nonetheless we allowed respondent-mother’s petition for writ of certiorari to review the 
permanency planning order along with the order terminating her parental rights entered on 
18 December 2020. See generally In re S.C.R., 198 N.C. App. 525, 531 (holding respondent-
parent waived appellate review under former statute authorizing appeal from order ceasing 
reunification efforts by failing to give timely notice of his intent to appeal), appeal dismissed, 
363 N.C. 654 (2009). 
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for termination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(2) (2019), based on respondent-
mother’s neglect of Liam and on her willful failure to make reasonable progress to 
correct the conditions that led to the juvenile’s removal from the home in August 
2018. After considering the dispositional factors enumerated in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) 
(2019), the trial court concluded that it was in Liam’s best interests for the rights of 
both parents to be terminated.  
II. 
Respondent-mother’s Appeal 
¶ 9 
 
Respondent-mother filed her notice of appeal from the 15 November 2019 
permanency planning order which eliminated reunification from Liam’s permanent 
plan and from the 31 March 2020 termination order which terminated respondent-
mother’s parental rights. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1) (2019). Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 
7B-1001(a2) (2019), we “review the order eliminating reunification together with an 
appeal of the order terminating parental rights.” 
¶ 10 
 
Respondent-mother limits her appeal to challenges to the trial court’s 15 
November 2019 permanency planning order. Although she does not identify any error 
in the order terminating her parental rights, respondent-mother contends that the 
alleged reversible errors in the permanency planning order require us to vacate the 
termination order under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a2), which provides that “[i]f the order 
eliminating reunification is vacated or reversed, the order terminating parental 
rights shall be vacated.” 
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A. Standard of review 
¶ 11 
 
Our review of a permanency planning order “ ‘is limited to whether there is 
competent evidence in the record to support the findings [of fact] and whether the 
findings support the conclusions of law.’ The trial court’s findings of fact are 
conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence.” In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 
165, 168 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting In re P.O., 207 N.C. App. 35, 41 
(2010)). The trial court’s dispositional choices—including the decision to eliminate 
reunification from the permanent plan—are reviewed only for abuse of discretion, as 
those decisions are based upon the trial court’s assessment of the child’s best 
interests. See In re J.H., 373 N.C. 264, 267–68 (2020). 
B. Challenged findings 
¶ 12 
 
Respondent-mother challenges several portions of the trial court’s Finding of 
Fact 6 in its permanency planning order, claiming that those portions are “either not 
supported or contrary to the evidence.” Although respondent-mother offers no 
argument or discussion about the significance of these asserted errors, we address 
each of her challenges to the trial court’s findings in turn. Finding of Fact 6 states, in 
pertinent part: 
that since the matter was last reviewed, the juvenile has 
remained in foster care placement; that the respondent 
parents have signed DSS case plans; that respondent 
mother has completed Triple P Parenting; obtained her 
[comprehensive clinical assessment]; completed intensive 
outpatient substance abuse treatment; is now engaged in 
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the intermediate SA program; reports that she attends 
AA/NA weekly; has provided clean drug screens through 
RHA but has tested positive on two (2) occasions for 
alcohol; has participated in peer support and medication 
management through RHA; has not complied with DSS 
requested drug screens; has not maintained stable 
residence; has not maintained stable employment; has 
received three (3) separate sanctions through Yancey Drug 
Court (one (1) occasion for missed appointment and two (2) 
occasions for failed screens for alcohol); has not obtained 
her psychological evaluation (delayed scheduling the 
evaluation until recently); that the respondent father . . . 
has a pending criminal charge for assault (respondent 
mother is the alleged victim); . . . the respondent parents 
(despite current Release Order in the pending criminal 
matter) are currently residing with each other; that there 
have been recent incidents of domestic violence and 
continued alcohol abuse; that the parents recently were 
evicted from their prior residence; that the juvenile was 
removed from the care of the respondent parents as a result 
of domestic violence and substance abuse issues; that the 
parents have not made reasonable progress on their DSS 
case plan to eliminate the issues the juvenile [sic] came into 
custody . . . .   
All portions of this finding which are not specifically contested by respondent-mother 
are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. 
Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97 (1991). 
¶ 13 
 
Respondent-mother first objects to the trial court’s determination that she 
tested positive for alcohol on two occasions, asserting that “those [positive tests] 
occurred several months prior to the 11 October 2019 hearing, on 22 March 2019 and 
27 May 2019.” While respondent-mother accurately characterizes the evidence, her 
observation does not undercut the evidentiary support for the trial court’s finding in 
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any way. Finding of Fact 6 reflects the trial court’s summary of respondent-mother’s 
progress through the entirety of the case, as reflected by the determinations that she 
had signed a DSS case plan, obtained a comprehensive clinical assessment, and 
completed parenting classes. The evidence introduced at the hearing showed that 
respondent-mother had five positive drug screens at RHA between 6 March 2019 and 
2 July 2019, four of which included a positive result for alcohol. While the trial court 
did find that Liam had remained in his foster placement “since the matter was last 
reviewed,” it did not purport to limit its remaining findings to that sole time interval. 
Therefore, the trial court’s unconditional determination that respondent-mother 
“tested positive on two (2) occasions for alcohol” is supported by competent evidence 
and is binding on appeal. 
¶ 14 
 
Respondent-mother next challenges the determination within Finding of Fact 
6 that she “has not complied with DSS requested drug screens[.]” Respondent-mother 
represents that she submitted to drug screens as requested by DSS on 30 July 2019 
and on 7 and 14 August 2019, “in addition to the multiple screens she undertook with 
RHA and Drug Treatment Court.” However, competent evidence supports the 
challenged portion of the finding. DSS social worker Tammy Carpenter testified at 
the hearing that respondent-mother failed to comply with the agency’s call-in system 
for drug screens, through which parents are assigned “dates and times they need to 
call” to be notified as to whether to appear for a drug screen that day. DSS also 
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introduced a log of respondent-mother’s call schedule for a period of time between 8 
and 31 July 2019 which reflected that respondent-mother placed telephone calls to 
DSS on only three of the fifteen days that she was assigned to contact DSS through 
its call-in system. While the evidence does show that negative drug screens for 
respondent-mother were registered on the three dates listed by her, other competent 
evidence supports the finding that she was not fully compliant with DSS’s drug screen 
requests. This challenged portion of the trial court’s Finding of Fact 6 is thus binding 
on appeal. See In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. at 168. 
¶ 15 
 
Respondent-mother also disputes the determination that she failed to 
maintain stable housing because the evidence “show[ed] that she had lived at the 
same address for over a year prior to her eviction.” However, respondent-mother’s 
argument is contradictory. As respondent-mother acknowledged in her testimony, 
she and Liam’s father were evicted from their apartment in the weeks leading up to 
the 11 October 2019 permanency planning hearing. Respondent-mother testified that 
she stayed with her mother for a period of time thereafter, but moved into a new 
apartment with Liam’s father two weeks before the hearing date. DSS social worker 
Carpenter testified that she had “no idea” where respondent-mother had resided 
since respondent-mother’s eviction and that respondent-mother had not complied 
with the housing component of respondent-mother’s case plan. Respondent-mother’s 
admission that she was evicted from her home after some period of time exceeding 
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just more than one year, followed by her two different residences shortly before the 
permanency planning hearing date of 11 October 2019, does not comport with the 
maintenance of stable housing by respondent-mother. These circumstances coupled 
with the testimony of the DSS social worker concerning the stability of respondent-
mother’s housing provide ample credence to the trial court’s determination contained 
in Finding of Fact 6 that respondent-mother “has not maintained stable residence.” 
¶ 16 
 
Respondent-mother next challenges the trial court’s finding that she received 
“three . . . separate sanctions” in drug treatment court. Respondent-mother correctly 
notes that the hearing testimony established two, rather than three, occasions for 
which respondent-mother was sanctioned in drug court: once for missing an 
appointment and once for a positive alcohol screen. We shall disregard the trial 
court’s erroneous finding of a third sanction, which we deem to be a harmless error 
in light of the unequivocal existence of two separate sanctions. See In re B.E., 375 
N.C. 730 (2020). 
¶ 17 
 
Finally, respondent-mother likewise takes issue with the trial court’s 
determination “that there have been recent incidents of domestic violence and 
continued alcohol abuse,” contending that the evidence showed only one additional 
incident of domestic violence between her and Liam’s father. As support for her 
stance, respondent-mother points to the arrest warrant included in the record on 
appeal which charges Liam’s father with an assault on respondent-mother which was 
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allegedly committed on 26 September 2019.  
¶ 18 
 
Assuming arguendo that the evidence showed only a single episode of domestic 
violence between respondent-mother and Liam’s father, which was recent at the time 
of the trial court’s determination, we discern no error. Respondent-mother’s 
argument is based upon her convenient construction of the trial court’s phraseology 
in its determination and does not constitute a substantive objection. We believe the 
phrase “recent incidents of domestic violence and continued alcohol abuse” may be 
fairly interpreted to combine one or more recent incidents of domestic violence with 
one or more recent incidents of continued alcohol abuse. We further note that, in 
addition to the evidence that Liam’s father allegedly assaulted respondent-mother on 
26 September 2019, DSS social worker Carpenter testified that the couple’s landlord 
reported that the eviction of respondent-mother and Liam’s father from their 
apartment transpired “because of domestic violence, yelling, arguing, people call[ing] 
and telling him that [respondent-mother and Liam’s father] were making a fuss all 
the time[,] and due to finding lots of alcohol, liquor bottles outside of the residence.” 
This testimony tends to establish a series of occurrences of domestic violence and 
alcohol abuse rather than, as respondent-mother contends, one solitary additional 
incident. Consequently, the trial court’s reference to multiple “incidents” is properly 
supported and binding on appeal. In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. at 168. 
 
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C. Sufficiency of Findings 
¶ 19 
 
Respondent-mother claims that the trial court erred in eliminating 
reunification from Liam’s permanent plan without making the findings of fact which 
are required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d) (2019).3 While the trial court complied with 
the majority of N.C.G.S. § 906.2(d)’s mandate regarding the establishment of specific 
findings of fact which the trial court must reduce to writing as a preface to the 
elimination of reunification from the permanent plan, we agree with respondent-
mother that the trial court’s findings are sufficiently inadequate so as to compel us to 
remand the case to the trial court for the entry of additional findings consistent with 
the mandate of N.C.G.S. 7B-906.2(d). 
¶ 20 
 
Under N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(b) (2019), the trial court may eliminate 
reunification from a child’s permanent plan if the trial court “makes written findings 
that reunification efforts clearly would be unsuccessful or would be inconsistent with 
the juvenile’s health or safety.” Id. Subsection (d) of the statute further provides that, 
in making its determination about the appropriate permanent plan, 
the court shall make written findings as to each of the 
following, which shall demonstrate the degree of success or 
                                            
3 Respondent-mother notes that the trial court’s failure to include a secondary 
permanent plan in the 15 November 2019 permanency planning order would appear to 
violate N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(a1) and (b) (2019), under which the trial court must designate 
concurrent permanent plans “until a permanent plan is or has been achieved.” Respondent-
mother concedes, however, that the trial court established concurrent plans of adoption and 
guardianship at the next permanency planning hearing on 13 January 2020, “thereby 
rendering [her] argument moot.”  
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failure toward reunification: 
(1) Whether the parent is making adequate progress 
within a reasonable period of time under the plan. 
(2) Whether the parent is actively participating in or 
cooperating with the plan, the department, and the 
guardian ad litem for the juvenile. 
(3) Whether the parent remains available to the court, 
the department, and the guardian ad litem for the 
juvenile. 
(4) Whether the parent is acting in a manner 
inconsistent with the health or safety of the juvenile. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d).   
¶ 21 
 
We have held that “[t]he trial court’s written findings must address the 
statute’s concerns, but need not quote its exact language.” In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. at 
168 (interpreting former N.C.G.S. § 7B-507(b)(1) (2011)). “Instead, ‘the order must 
make clear that the trial court considered the evidence in light of whether 
reunification would be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile’s health, 
safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time.’ ” 
In re L.E.W., 375 N.C. 124, 129–30 (2020) (quoting In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. at 168).   
¶ 22 
 
Moreover, when reviewing an order that eliminates reunification from the 
permanent plan in conjunction with an order terminating parental rights pursuant 
to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(2), “we consider both orders ‘together’ ” as provided in 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a2). In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. at 170. Based on this statutory 
directive, we concluded in In re L.M.T. that “incomplete findings of fact in the cease 
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reunification order may be cured by findings of fact in the termination order.”4 Id. 
Although respondent-mother contends that a 2017 amendment to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001 
“abrogated” our ruling in In re L.M.T. on this issue, we find her argument 
unpersuasive. 
¶ 23 
 
In Session Law 2017-41, § 8, 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 214, 233, the General 
Assembly amended N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001 to transfer appellate jurisdiction in 
termination of parental rights cases from the Court of Appeals to this Court effective 
1 January 2019. The session law deleted a portion of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a)(5) 
requiring the Court of Appeals to “review the order eliminating reunification as a 
permanent plan together with an appeal of the termination of parental rights 
order[,]” and inserted the following text in a revised version of N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1001(a2): 
In an appeal filed pursuant to subdivision (a1)(2) of this 
section, the Supreme Court shall review the order 
eliminating reunification together with an appeal of the 
order terminating parental rights. If the order eliminating 
reunification is vacated or reversed, the order terminating 
parental rights shall be vacated. 
                                            
4 At the time of our decision in In re L.M.T., a parent’s right to appeal from a 
permanency planning order was triggered by the trial court’s cessation of reunification efforts 
rather than its elimination of reunification from the permanent plan as in current N.C.G.S. 
§§ 7B-1001(a)(5) and (a1)(2) (2019). In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. at 167–70 (discussing former 
N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-507(b)(1) and 7B-1001(a)(5) (2011)). Section 7B-906.2 now directs the trial 
court to “order the county department of social services to make efforts toward finalizing the 
primary and secondary permanent plans” until permanence is achieved. N.C.G.S. § 7B-
906.2(b).  
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S.L. 2017-41, § 8(a), 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws at 233 (emphasis added).  The amended 
statute thus retained the requirement that the appellate court review the two orders 
“together” while adding language to require that if this Court vacates or reverses the 
order eliminating reunification from the permanent plan, we must also vacate the 
termination of parental rights order. Id.   
¶ 24 
 
As opposed to respondent-mother’s interpretation, we do not construe the 2017 
amendment to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001 to alter the approach that we adopted in In re 
L.M.T.; the amendment, on its face, merely precludes a determination by this Court 
that a harmful error in an order eliminating reunification from a permanent plan can 
be rendered moot solely by the subsequent entry of an order terminating parental 
rights. Cf., e.g., In re H.N.D., 265 N.C. App. 10, 19 (2019) (“hold[ing] that the question 
of whether the trial court erred in ceasing reunification efforts was rendered moot by 
the proper termination order”)5. For this reason, we reject the argument of the 
guardian ad litem in the present case that the order terminating respondent-mother’s 
parental rights “moots [respondent-mother’s] arguments about the order ceasing 
reunification efforts.” As for respondent-mother’s construction of the 2017 legislative 
amendment and her view of the amendment’s impact on In re L.M.T., respondent-
                                            
5 The Court of Appeals exercised its jurisdiction in the case of In re H.N.D. prior to the 
transfer of appellate jurisdiction in termination of parental rights cases from the Court of 
Appeals to this Court and revision of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a)(2) which was accomplished by 
the General Assembly in Session Law 2017-41, § 8, 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 214, 233. 
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mother erroneously conflates a fatally defective order eliminating reunification from 
a permanent plan, which cannot be cured by the subsequent termination order, with 
an incomplete order with insufficient findings of fact, which may be cured under In 
re L.M.T. by findings of fact in the termination order. 
¶ 25 
 
In light of these observations, we recognize that the trial court’s 15 November 
2019 permanency planning order includes findings “that reunification is no longer 
the appropriate permanent plan for the juvenile” and “[t]hat further reasonable 
efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for placement of the juvenile are clearly futile 
or inconsistent with the juvenile’s need for a safe, permanent home within a 
reasonable period of time.” The trial court thus made the finding required by N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-906.2(b) to eliminate reunification from the permanent plan. See In re L.E.W., 
375 N.C. at 133. However, with regard to N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d), although the trial 
court’s findings of fact adequately address the issues reflected in N.C.G.S. § 7B-
906.2(d)(1), (2), and (4), the tribunal’s findings fail to address the issue in N.C.G.S. § 
7B-906.2(d)(3), “[w]hether the parent remains available to the court, the department, 
and the guardian ad litem for the juvenile.” As a result, we deem it to be appropriate 
to remand this matter to the trial court in order to rectify the order’s deficiencies. 
¶ 26 
 
Consistent with N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(1), the trial court addresses in Finding 
of Fact 6 whether each parent is making adequate progress within a reasonable time 
under the permanent plan by detailing their achievements and shortcomings in 
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meeting the conditions of their respective case plans. The trial court goes on to make 
an express finding “that the parents have not made reasonable progress on their DSS 
case plan to eliminate the issues [since] the juvenile came into custody[.]” The trial 
court’s determinations contained in Finding of Fact 6 also note that Liam had been 
in DSS custody for more than twelve months and identify “the parents’ failure to 
comply with their case plan requirements” as “the barrier to . . . reunification[.]” To 
the extent that respondent-mother contends that Finding of Fact 6 shows that she 
“made adequate progress” by obtaining a comprehensive clinical assessment, 
completing parenting classes, participating in substance abuse treatment, and 
providing several clean drug screens, we conclude that the trial court’s contrary 
evaluation is a reasonable view of the evidence and is therefore binding on appeal. 
See generally In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 843 (2016) (recognizing the trial court’s 
authority as fact-finder to weigh competing evidence and draw reasonable inferences 
therefrom); see also In re J.H., 373 N.C. at 270 (finding “ample evidentiary support 
for the trial court’s finding that respondent only made ‘some progress’ with respect to 
her parenting skills”).  
¶ 27 
 
Similarly, with regard to N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(2), Finding of Fact 6, in 
addressing whether the parents are actively participating in or cooperating with the 
plan, the department, and the guardian ad litem for the juvenile, adequately 
describes respondent-mother’s degree of participation with her case plan and 
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indicates her non-cooperation with DSS drug screens. This portion of the finding of 
fact featured the evidence adduced at the hearing of respondent-mother’s inability to 
address the domestic violence, housing, and substance abuse issues which resulted 
in Liam’s removal from her care. These determinations by the trial court satisfy the 
requirements of Section 7B-906.2(d)(2), and are analogous to the trial court’s findings 
which were deemed to have satisfactorily addressed this subsection of the statute by 
the Court of Appeals in In re N.T., 264 N.C. App. 753, 2019 WL 1471147, *6 (2019) 
(unpublished). 
¶ 28 
 
Although the trial court made no specific finding as to whether respondent-
mother was “acting in a manner inconsistent with the health or safety of the juvenile” 
under the exact language of N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(4), the trial court found that 
respondent-mother and Liam’s father were residing together despite “recent 
incidents of domestic violence and continued alcohol abuse”—the very problems that 
necessitated Liam’s removal from the home; that Liam’s father had yet to complete 
his court-ordered domestic violence assessment; and that returning Liam to his 
parents’ home would be “contrary to his welfare and best interests at this time.” The 
trial court also concluded in its 15 November 2019 permanency planning order that 
further efforts to “eliminate the need for placement” of Liam outside of the home 
would be “inconsistent with the juvenile’s need for a safe, permanent home within a 
reasonable period of time.” Further, the termination order contains additional 
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uncontested findings that respondent-mother failed to maintain stable housing; that 
she “never obtained her [court-ordered] psychological evaluation” and “was kicked 
out of the [drug treatment court program] for noncompliance”; and that the failure of 
respondent-mother and Liam’s father to “eliminate those reasons the juvenile came 
into custody demonstrates their continued neglect of [Liam] and the probability of 
future neglect if [Liam] is returned to their care.” See generally In re Stumbo, 357 
N.C. 279, 283 (2003) (“requir[ing] that there be some physical, mental, or emotional 
impairment of the juvenile or a substantial risk of such impairment” in order for a 
parent’s conduct to constitute “neglect”). We conclude that these findings by the trial 
court adequately address the substance and concerns of N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(4) 
through the application of the principle in In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. at 168, in which we 
recognized earlier that the trial court is not required to quote the exact language of 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(4) as long as the trial court’s written findings address the 
statute’s concerns. 
¶ 29 
 
However, we agree with respondent-mother that the trial court failed to make 
the findings required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(3), as to whether respondent-mother 
“remains available to the court, the department, and the guardian ad litem[.]” Aside 
from acknowledging respondent-mother’s attendance at the 11 October 2019 
permanency planning hearing and referencing her absence from the termination 
hearing on 12 March 2020, the trial court found no facts addressing the issue 
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embodied in Section 7B-906.2(d)(3) with regard to respondent-mother.6 In re L.M.T., 
367 N.C. at 168. While the record contains little evidence presented by the parties on 
the issue of respondent-mother’s availability as contemplated by the statute, we note 
that DSS’s written report to the trial court for the permanency planning hearing 
includes information about respondent-mother’s attendance at court dates and 
scheduled visitations, as well as her failure to attend child and family team (CFT) 
meetings. The report submitted by the guardian ad litem also alludes to respondent-
mother’s failure to attend CFT meetings and states that “[t]he GAL has spoken to the 
parents three times but . . . has had no significant interactions in the last six months.” 
This information contained in the respective reports of DSS and the GAL, however, 
does not satisfy the trial court’s statutory obligation to fulfill the requirements of 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(3) by making written findings on the issue of respondent-
mother’s availability. 
¶ 30 
 
Having concluded that the trial court failed to make the findings of fact 
required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(3), the identification of the appropriate remedy 
for the omission has provided the next determination for this Court. In citing 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a2) for her assertion that the trial court’s non-compliance with 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d) in the order eliminating reunification from the permanent 
                                            
6 The permanency planning order includes a finding that Liam’s father “has not 
maintained consistent contact with DSS[,]” thereby addressing at least part of the statutory 
mandate as to him.    
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plan “requires reversal of both [the permanency planning order] and the resulting 
termination order,” respondent-mother identifies two cases in which the Court of 
Appeals vacated a permanency planning order because “ ‘the trial court failed to make 
the requisite findings required to cease reunification efforts’ under Section 7B-
906.2(d).” In re J.M., 843 S.E.2d 668, 676 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting In re D.A., 
258 N.C. App. 247, 254 (2018)).  
¶ 31 
 
It is axiomatic that “this Court is not bound by precedent of our Court of 
Appeals[.]” In re B.L.H., 376 N.C. 118, 126 (2020). Moreover, as we discuss below, we 
find neither In re J.M. nor In re D.A. to be instructive in our determination regarding 
the implementation of the directive in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a2) that, “[i]f the order 
eliminating reunification is vacated or reversed, the order terminating parental 
rights shall be vacated.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a2). 
¶ 32 
 
In In re J.M., the respondent-mother appealed from a permanency planning 
order that placed her child in the guardianship of the juvenile’s foster parents, waived 
further review hearings, and relieved DSS of reunification efforts.  843 S.E.2d at 670, 
676; see also N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a)(4). Hence, the appeal was taken from a single 
order which transferred the child’s legal custody, see N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a)(4) (2019), 
and did not address a subsequent order terminating the respondent’s parental rights. 
The Court of Appeals vacated the portion of the order ceasing reunification efforts 
due to the trial court’s failure to make findings under N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(2)–(3), 
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while affirming the order in part as to the guardianship provisions and the waiver of 
further review hearings. Id. at 676.   
¶ 33 
 
In In re D.A., the Court of Appeals vacated a permanency planning order that 
granted custody of the respondents’ child to the juvenile’s foster parents. 258 N.C. 
App. at 248. As in In re J.M., the appeal was taken from a single order transferring 
the legal custody of the child. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s findings 
did not support its conclusion that the father had acted inconsistently with his 
constitutionally protected status as a parent, the sine qua non of an award of 
permanent custody of the child to a non-parent. Id. at 252. While the Court of Appeals 
also concluded that “[t]he trial court failed to make findings related to whether 
[r]espondents were acting in a manner inconsistent with D.A.’s health or safety” 
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(4), the lower appellate court further held that the trial 
court made “no findings that embrace the requisite ultimate finding that 
‘reunification efforts clearly would be unsuccessful or would be inconsistent with the 
juvenile’s health or safety’ ” as required to eliminate reunification from the child’s 
permanent plan under N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(b). Id. at 254. The deficiencies in the order 
in In re D.A. materially exceeded the mere lack of findings under one of the specified 
issues of N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d), and therefore justified the vacation of the order in 
the case. Id.; see also In re D.C., 852 S.E.2d 694, 698–99 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020) 
(“Because the trial court ceased reunification efforts without making sufficient 
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findings pertinent to section 7B-906.2(d) and the ultimate finding required by section 
7B-906.2(b), we vacate the trial court’s orders and remand for further proceedings.”).  
¶ 34 
 
Due to these critical distinctions, neither In re J.M. nor In re D.A. presents this 
Court with correlating examples of the manner in which to settle an order’s 
termination of a respondent’s parental rights when an earlier permanency planning 
order does not include sufficient written findings as to one of the four issues—but 
does include findings on the ultimate issue—which must be addressed as a preface to 
the elimination of reunification from the permanent plan, where this Court must 
consider both orders together, adhere to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001 (a1)(2) and the amended 
§ 7B-1001(a2), and comply with our precedent in In re L.M.T.  
¶ 35 
 
We do not discern that the Legislature enacted N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a2) with 
the intention of disengaging an entire termination of parental rights process in the 
event that a trial court omits a single finding under N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(1)–(4) 
from its trial court order which eliminates reunification from a child’s permanent 
plan. Unlike the specific finding that “reunification efforts clearly would be 
unsuccessful or would be inconsistent with the juvenile’s health or safety” which is 
required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(b) before eliminating reunification from the 
permanent plan, no particular finding under N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(3) is required to 
support the trial court’s decision. N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d) merely requires the trial 
court to make “written findings as to each of the” issues enumerated in N.C.G.S. § 
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7B-906.2(d)(1)–(4), and to consider whether the issues “demonstrate the [parent’s] 
degree of success or failure toward reunification[.]” N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d). A finding 
that the parent has remained available to the trial court and other parties under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(3) does not preclude the trial court from eliminating 
reunification from the permanent plan based on the other factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-
906.2(d). Cf. In re R.D., 376 N.C. 244, 259 (2020) (concluding that the balancing of the 
six dispositional factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) “is uniquely reserved to the trial 
court and will not be disturbed by this Court on appeal”). 
¶ 36 
 
“[T]o obtain relief on appeal, an appellant must not only show error, but that 
. . . the error was material and prejudicial, amounting to denial of a substantial right 
that will likely affect the outcome of an action.” In re L.E.W., 375 N.C. at 128. It is 
the trial court’s authority as the finder of fact to assign weight to various pieces of 
evidence, In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843, in exercising “its discretion [to] determine[e] 
that ceasing reunification [is] in the best interests of the child[,]” In re J.H., 373 N.C. 
at 270. Upon considering the trial court’s order that eliminated reunification from the 
permanent plan together with its order terminating parental rights, and determining 
that the trial court’s order eliminating reunification may be cured upon remand to 
the trial court—pursuant to the application of In re L.M.T.—due to insufficient 
findings of fact contained in the order because it does not address the issue embodied 
in N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(3) as to “whether the parent remains available to the court, 
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the department, and the guardian ad litem for the juvenile,” we conclude that 
respondent-mother has not shown that the trial court’s error was material and 
prejudicial so as to warrant vacating and reversing the permanency planning order 
at issue and vacating the termination of parental rights order.  
¶ 37 
 
We therefore believe that the appropriate remedy for the trial court’s error here 
is to remand this matter to the trial court for the entry of additional findings in 
contemplation of N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(3). Cf. In re N.K., 375 N.C. 805, 825 (2020) 
(remanding for findings on the trial court’s compliance with the Indian Child Welfare 
Act (ICWA)); State v. Peterson, 344 N.C. 172, 177–178 (1996) (holding no error in part 
as to the judgment but remanding in part for further findings on suppression issue). 
This Court’s precedent, especially our express determination in In re L.M.T. 
regarding the relationship between incomplete findings in an order which ceases 
reunification efforts and the findings of fact in a subsequent termination of parental 
rights order, authorizes such a remedy. In the event that the trial court concludes, 
after making additional findings, that its decision to eliminate reunification from the 
juvenile Liam’s permanent plan in its 15 November 2019 permanency planning order 
was in error, then the trial court shall vacate said order as well as vacate the order 
terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights, enter a new permanent plan for the 
juvenile that includes reunification, and resume the permanency planning review 
process. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a2); cf. In re N.K., 375 N.C. at 825 (“In the event that 
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the trial court determines on remand that Ned is, in fact, an Indian child, it shall 
vacate the trial court’s termination order and proceed in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of ICWA.” (extraneity omitted)). If the trial court’s additional findings 
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(3) do not alter its finding under N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(b) 
that further reunification efforts “are clearly futile or inconsistent with the juvenile’s 
need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time[,]” then the trial 
court may simply amend its permanency planning order to include the additional 
findings, and the 31 March 2020 order terminating respondent-mother’s parental 
rights may remain undisturbed. Cf. In re N.K., 375 N.C. at 825 (“[If] the trial court 
concludes upon remand, after making any necessary findings or conclusions, that the 
notice requirements of ICWA were properly complied with . . . , it shall reaffirm the 
trial court’s termination order.”).    
III. 
Conclusion 
¶ 38 
 
Respondent-mother does not identify any error in the order terminating her 
parental rights as to the child Liam, and we do not consider the termination order in 
this decision. With regard to the order eliminating reunification from Liam’s 
permanent plan, competent evidence supports all of the trial court’s findings of fact 
except for its finding that respondent-mother was sanctioned three times in drug 
treatment court; in determining from the evidence that respondent-mother was 
sanctioned on two occasions in drug treatment court rather than on three occasions 
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as the trial court erroneously found, we conclude that this constitutes harmless error 
by the trial court. We further hold that the trial court sufficiently addressed the 
majority of the issues mandated by N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2, and that this substantial 
compliance with the statute obviates the need for vacation or reversal of the trial 
court’s order eliminating reunification from the permanent plan, since there is the 
availability of a sanctioned remedy which is less drastic and more plausible. 
Consequently, in light of the trial court’s failure to make written findings as required 
by N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(3), we remand to the District Court, Yancey County, to 
enter such necessary findings and to determine whether those findings affect its 
decision to eliminate reunification from the permanent plan pursuant to N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-906.2(b). The trial court may receive additional evidence upon this remand as it 
deems appropriate within its sound discretion, and shall enter new or amended 
orders consistent with this opinion. See In re K.R.C., 374 N.C. 849, 865 (2020). 
REMANDED.