Title: Lambrix v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC16-8, SC16-56
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 9, 2017

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-8 
____________ 
 
CARY MICHAEL LAMBRIX,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-56 
____________ 
 
CARY MICHAEL LAMBRIX,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[March 9, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Cary Michael Lambrix is a prisoner under sentence of death for whom a 
death warrant was signed.  This Court stayed the death warrant as a result of the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 
 
 
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(2016), to determine if that opinion was entitled to retroactive application to a 
death sentence that was final in 1986.  
Lambrix was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1983 first-degree 
murder of two victims after Lambrix had invited them to his trailer to eat dinner.  
Lambrix v. State, 494 So. 2d 1143, 1145 (Fla. 1986).  On direct appeal, this Court 
upheld Lambrix’s two convictions of first-degree murder and his two death 
sentences.  Id. at 1148.   
After the Governor signed a death warrant on November 30, 2015, and the 
execution was set for February 11, 2016, this Court entered a scheduling order, 
providing a deadline by which Lambrix could file any successive motions for 
postconviction relief.  Lambrix filed both a successive motion for postconviction 
relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and a motion for 
postconviction DNA testing pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853.  
On December 21, 2015, the postconviction court summarily denied both Lambrix’s 
successive motion for postconviction relief and his motion for DNA testing.  
Lambrix appealed these orders to this Court and filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus.  After the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hurst v. 
Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, this Court stayed his execution and permitted supplemental 
briefing and oral argument in order to fully consider the impact of Hurst v. Florida 
in this case.  In accordance with our opinion in Asay v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly 
 
 
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S646, 2016 WL 7406538 (Fla. Dec. 22, 2016), we conclude that Lambrix is not 
entitled to a new penalty phase based on Hurst v. Florida, and our opinion in Hurst 
v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), and we further reject the other grounds 
for relief that he raised as devoid of merit.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
postconviction court’s denial of relief and also deny Lambrix’s separate petition 
for habeas corpus.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The facts of this case are set forth in Lambrix’s direct appeal of his 
conviction and sentence of death: 
On the evening of February 5, 1983, Lambrix and Frances 
Smith, his roommate, went to a tavern where they met Clarence 
Moore, a/k/a Lawrence Lamberson, and Aleisha Bryant.  Late that 
evening, they all ventured to Lambrix’ trailer to eat spaghetti.  Shortly 
after their arrival, Lambrix and Moore went outside.  Lambrix 
returned about twenty minutes later and requested Bryant to go 
outside with him.  About forty-five minutes later Lambrix returned 
alone.  Smith testified that Lambrix was carrying a tire tool and had 
blood on his person and clothing.  Lambrix told Smith that he killed 
both Bryant and Moore.  He mentioned that he choked and stomped 
on Bryant and hit Moore over the head.  Smith and Lambrix 
proceeded to eat spaghetti, wash up and bury the two bodies behind 
the trailer.  After burying the bodies, Lambrix and Smith went back to 
the trailer to wash up.  They then took Moore’s Cadillac and disposed 
of the tire tool and Lambrix’ bloody shirt in a nearby stream. 
 
 
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Lambrix, 494 So. 2d at 1145.  Lambrix raised four issues on direct appeal, which 
this Court denied.1   
The Governor signed a death warrant for Lambrix, scheduling his execution 
for November 30, 1988.  In response to the death warrant, Lambrix then filed an 
initial postconviction motion, which was summarily denied.  This Court affirmed 
the summary denial, concluding that even taking all of Lambrix’s allegations as 
true, there was no prejudice.2  Lambrix v. State, 534 So. 2d 1151, 1153-54 (Fla. 
1988).  The dissent asserted that an evidentiary hearing should have been held.  
Id. at 1154 (Kogan, J., dissenting).  Lambrix also filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in this Court, alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 
to raise numerous claims, including: (1) the trial court erred in denying a motion 
for individual and sequestered voir dire concerning the effect of pretrial publicity; 
                                          
 
 
1.  On direct appeal, Lambrix asserted: (1) the exclusion of jurors opposed to 
the death penalty is unconstitutional and the trial court erred in excluding one of 
the potential jurors for cause; (2) the trial court violated his right to confront 
witnesses by limiting his cross-examination of the state’s key witness, Frances 
Smith; (3) the trial court erred in restricting the cross-examination of Connie Smith 
(no relation to Frances), a special agent with the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement; and (4) the trial court erred in allowing the medical examiner, Dr. 
Schultz, to use the term “homicide” in reference to the deaths of the victims.  
Lambrix, 494 So. 2d at 1145-48. 
 
2.  On appeal, Lambrix asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective 
because: (1) counsel failed to develop additional evidence that would have 
permitted a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication, and (2) counsel failed to 
introduce evidence of Lambrix’s alcoholism during the penalty phase of the trial.   
 
 
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(2) it was error for Lambrix not to be present during a part of voir dire; (3) it was 
error for the court to have approved certain stipulations in Lambrix’s absence 
while the jury was being selected; and (4) the trial court erred in not instructing the 
jury as to voluntary intoxication.  Lambrix v. Dugger, 529 So. 2d 1110, 1111-12 
(Fla. 1988).  This Court denied relief.  Id. at 1112.   
 
In addition, either through counsel or in a pro se capacity, Lambrix has filed 
numerous successive petitions for postconviction relief and successive habeas 
petitions before the trial court and this Court—all of which have been denied.  See, 
e.g., Lambrix v. State, 559 So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 1990) (affirming the summary 
denial of a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed with the trial court, in 
which Lambrix asserted that his collateral counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise a claim of juror misconduct because one of the jurors in his second trial failed 
to disclose that she had been on the venire prior to Lambrix’s first trial); Lambrix 
v. Singletary, 641 So. 2d 847, 848-49 (Fla. 1994) (denying a successive habeas 
petition that asserted an entitlement to relief based on Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 
1079 (1992), challenged various aggravators, and raised an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim); Lambrix v. State, 698 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla. 1996), cert. denied, 
522 U.S. 1122 (1998) (affirming the summary denial of a successive 
postconviction motion that raised new ineffective assistance of counsel claims and 
alleged a Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), violation); Lambrix v. State, 
 
 
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39 So. 3d 260, 275 (Fla. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1145 (2011) (affirming the 
denial of multiple claims including newly discovered evidence claims); Lambrix v. 
State, 124 So. 3d 890, 904 (Fla. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1789 (2014) 
(affirming the denial of two successive postconviction motions and denying a writ 
petition in a consolidated opinion).  Lambrix also filed numerous other pleadings 
in this Court that have been denied or dismissed.3   
 
Lambrix has likewise filed federal pleadings before the federal district court, 
including a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus brought pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2254 in 1988.  After granting an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the 
federal district court denied relief and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the denial of relief.  Lambrix v. Dugger, No. 88-12107-CIV-Zloch (S.D. 
                                          
 
 
3.  See, e.g., Lambrix v. Friday, 525 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1988) (table decision 
dismissing extraordinary relief) (Case No. 71,818); Lambrix v. Martinez, 534 So. 
2d 400 (Fla. 1988) (table decision dismissing mandamus) (Case No. 73,120); 
Lambrix v. Reese, 705 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1998) (table decision denying mandamus) 
(Case No. 91,724); Lambrix v. State, 727 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1998) (table decision 
denying prohibition) (Case No. 94,221); Lambrix v. State, 766 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 
2000) (table decision dismissing mandamus) (Case No. SC00-744); Lambrix v. 
State, 900 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 2005) (table decision dismissing mandamus) (Case No. 
SC04-2020); Lambrix v. State, 944 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2006) (table decision 
dismissing mandamus) (Case No. SC06-38); Lambrix v. State, 74 So. 3d 1083 
(Fla. 2011) (unpublished order denying petition for writ of mandamus and/or writ 
of prohibition) (Case No. SC10-1517); Lambrix v. Crews, 118 So. 3d 221 (Fla. 
2013) (unpublished order denying claim based on Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 
(2010)) (Case No. SC11-1138); Lambrix v. State, 139 So. 3d 298 (Fla.), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 174 (2014) (unpublished order denying claim based on Martinez 
v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012)) (Case No. SC13-1471). 
 
 
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Fla. May 12, 1992), aff’d 72 F.3d 1500 (11th Cir. 1996).  In these federal 
proceedings, Lambrix challenged whether he was entitled to relief based on his 
Espinosa claim.  The United States Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the denial 
of relief on that claim, holding that Espinosa was not dictated by then-existing 
precedent, but announced a “new rule” as defined in Teague,4 and does not apply 
retroactively.  Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 528 (1997).   
In addition, Lambrix filed numerous other pro se pleadings in federal court 
that have been denied.  See, e.g., Lambrix v. Jones, 136 S. Ct. 541 (2015) (denying 
petition for writ of certiorari); In re Lambrix, 136 S. Ct. 537 (2015) (denying 
petition for writ of habeas corpus); In re Lambrix, 131 S. Ct. 2907 (2011) (denying 
petition for writ of habeas corpus); In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789, 793 (11th Cir. 
2015) (denying Lambrix’s application for leave to file a successive § 2254 petition, 
because the claims were precluded by the law-of-the-case doctrine and/or the prior-
panel-precedent rule); Lambrix v. Sec’y, Fla. Dept. of Corrs., 756 F.3d 1246, 1249 
(11th Cir. 2014) (affirming the district court’s denial of Lambrix’s motion for 
substitute counsel and denying his assertion that he was entitled to raise 
procedurally-defaulted claims in a successive § 2254 habeas petition based on 
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012)); In re Lambrix, 624 F.3d 1355 (11th 
                                          
 
 
4.  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 
 
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Cir. 2010) (denying leave to file a successive petition for writ of habeas corpus).  
Lambrix filed his latest Motion for Relief from Judgement, which the federal 
district court denied on December 22, 2015, and subsequently denied the motion 
for certificate of appealability on January 28, 2016. 
After the Governor signed a death warrant on November 30, 2015, Lambrix 
filed both a successive motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.851 and a motion for postconviction DNA testing pursuant 
to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853.  On December 21, 2015, the 
postconviction court summarily denied both Lambrix’s successive motion for 
postconviction relief and his motion for DNA testing.  Lambrix appeals these 
orders and has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.   
ANALYSIS 
On appeal to this Court, Lambrix raises the following claims: (1) whether he 
was deprived of effective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of interest and 
whether a United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), violation occurred; (2) 
whether he was denied his due process rights and a full and fair hearing on his 
DNA motion; (3) whether he was denied full and fair postconviction proceedings; 
and (4) whether the totality of punishment that the State has imposed on him is 
unconstitutional.  In addition, Lambrix filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 
raising three additional claims: (1) whether his constitutional rights were violated 
 
 
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by the jury’s nonunanimous recommendation for death during the penalty phase; 
(2) whether his postconviction judge was biased; and (3) whether the clemency 
proceedings violated his constitutional rights.  After the United States Supreme 
Court issued its opinion in Hurst v. Florida, this Court permitted supplemental 
briefing and oral argument so that the Court could fully consider the impact of 
Hurst v. Florida in this case.  Following oral argument this Court issued its opinion 
in Hurst on remand from the United States Supreme Court.  We address each of 
these claims in turn. 
POSTCONVICTION MOTION 
Conflict of Interest and Cronic Claim 
In his first claim on appeal, Lambrix contends that his trial counsel had a 
conflict of interest.  As support for this claim, Lambrix relies on an FBI report that 
allegedly reflects that at the time of trial, a member of the defense team believed 
Lambrix was a difficult client and had lied to them—a document that was received 
by defense counsel in 1999.  Lambrix frames this claim both as a conflict of 
interest claim and a claim supported by Cronic, 466 U.S. at 648.  The 
postconviction court denied this claim, first concluding that the FBI report, raised 
now, is untimely and procedurally barred since defense counsel recognized that 
Lambrix’s prior attorney received the document in 1999, and thus the claim was 
clearly not raised within the one-year deadline from the time that the evidence was 
 
 
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or could have been discovered.  Further, the postconviction court held that even on 
the merits, the claim should be denied, explaining: 
[T]he person giving the statement merely indicated to the FBI agent 
that Defendant was a difficult client, had not been forthcoming, and 
had threatened to complain about counsel in collateral proceedings if 
his trial outcome was not favorable.  The record reflects that these 
statements have all turned out to be true.  There is no actual conflict of 
interest on the part of trial counsel based solely on the statement of an 
unknown individual from the Public Defender’s Office to the FBI 
agent. 
The postconviction court did not err in denying relief.   
 
Lambrix’s claim is untimely.  As this is a successive postconviction motion 
filed more than one year after the convictions and sentences became final, in order 
for this claim to be considered, it must meet one of three narrow exceptions: (1) the 
facts on which the claim is predicated were not known to himself or his attorney 
and “could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence;” (2) a 
fundamental constitutional right that was not established within the one-year time 
frame after the judgment and sentence became final and which has been held to 
apply retroactively; or (3) postconviction counsel negligently failed to file a full or 
timely motion.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2).   
In this case, Lambrix asserts he can raise this claim based on newly 
discovered evidence and relies on an FBI report that he acknowledges his counsel 
received in 1999.  “To be considered timely filed as newly discovered evidence, 
the successive rule 3.851 motion was required to have been filed within one year of 
 
 
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the date upon which the claim became discoverable through due diligence.”  
Jimenez v. State, 997 So. 2d 1056, 1064 (Fla. 2008).   
While Lambrix recognizes that this “new” evidence was received seventeen 
years ago, he asks this Court to excuse the extreme untimeliness for two reasons.  
First, he asserts that three days after his counsel received the annotated FBI 
records, his counsel at Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-Middle Region 
(CCRC-Middle) was removed from the case, and the judge appointed registry 
counsel and later CCRC-South.  By the time that Lambrix’s case was finally 
moved to CCRC-South and his new attorneys obtained all of the files, more than 
one year had passed from the date CCRC-Middle received the report.  However, 
Lambrix never explains how such a justification would excuse a seventeen-year 
delay, particularly when Lambrix has filed numerous successive postconviction 
motions since 1999 without raising this claim.  In essence, Lambrix is asserting 
that no time limit should exist in this case—a clearly meritless position.   
Second, Lambrix contends that there was never an opportunity to file his 
Cronic claim in a timely manner because a 2007 order by the postconviction court 
prohibited any ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be litigated after the 
initial rounds of postconviction litigation ended in 1992.  However, if Lambrix 
sought to raise a claim to the postconviction court and was denied the opportunity, 
he was required to appeal it in those proceedings, as opposed to waiting until a 
 
 
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death warrant was signed.  Accordingly, we deny this claim because it is untimely 
and procedurally barred.  See, e.g., Porter v. State, 653 So. 2d 374, 378 (Fla. 1995) 
(affirming summary denial of conflict of interest claim where the information 
which formed the basis of the conflict claim was available to the defendant). 
Even if we addressed this claim on the merits, the allegations raised are 
inadequate to establish a Cronic claim.  Specifically, in Cronic, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires that the accused have 
“counsel acting in the role of an advocate” by requiring defense counsel to put the 
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing and that if no meaningful 
adversarial testing occurred at all, a defendant does not need to specifically show 
prejudice.  466 U.S. at 656-59; see also Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1152 
(11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (holding that Cronic “created an exception to the 
Strickland [ v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),] standard for ineffective 
assistance of counsel and acknowledged that certain circumstances are so 
egregiously prejudicial that ineffective assistance of counsel will be presumed”).  
In Cronic, however, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment was not 
violated—despite the fact that defense counsel was given only twenty-five days to 
prepare for trial, that counsel was young and inexperienced in criminal matters, 
that the charges were complex, and that some witnesses were not easily 
 
 
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accessible—in the absence of showing of actual ineffectiveness.  Cronic, 466 U.S. 
at 665-67. 
This case does not involve the situation required to create a Cronic violation, 
which is limited to circumstances where “the assistance of counsel has been denied 
entirely or withheld during a critical stage of the proceeding such that the 
‘likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-by-case inquiry is 
unnecessary.’ ”  Crain v. State, 78 So. 3d 1025, 1042 n.11 (Fla. 2011) (quoting 
Chavez v. State, 12 So. 3d 199, 212 (Fla. 2009)).  In this case, counsel was never 
denied so Lambrix cannot rely on the per se rule from Cronic to avoid establishing 
prejudice.  See, e.g., id. (denying a Cronic claim where the assistance of counsel 
was not denied entirely or withheld during a critical stage of the proceeding).  
Thus, this claim is meritless. 
Full and Fair Hearing on Lambrix’s DNA Motion 
In his second claim, Lambrix challenges the postconviction court’s denial of 
his motion for DNA testing, which summarily denied the motion as follows: 
1.  Defendant requests DNA testing of the female victim’s 
clothing, the tire iron, and the t-shirt wrapped around the tire iron.  
The motion indicates that Defendant believes the latter two items are 
in the custody of the Glades Clerk, but that he has been unable to 
locate the female victim’s clothing.  Defendant believes that had DNA 
evidence that did not match Defendant been presented to the jury, it 
would have been “more likely” to present a reasonable doubt to the 
jury, leading to an acquittal. 
2.  Rule 3.853 requires that a motion for DNA testing must 
demonstrate (1) a statement of the facts relied upon in support of the 
 
 
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motion, including a description of the physical evidence containing 
DNA to be tested and, if known, the present location or last known 
location of the evidence and how it originally was obtained; (2) a 
statement that the evidence was not previously tested for DNA, or a 
statement that the results of previous DNA testing were inconclusive 
and that subsequent scientific developments in DNA testing 
techniques likely would produce a definitive result establishing that 
the movant is not the person who committed the crime; (3) a statement 
that the movant is innocent and how the DNA testing requested by the 
motion will exonerate the movant of the crime for which the movant 
was sentenced, or a statement how the DNA testing will mitigate the 
sentence received by the movant for that crime; and (4) a statement 
that identification of the movant is a genuinely disputed issue in the 
case and why it is an issue or an explanation of how the DNA 
evidence would either exonerate the defendant or mitigate the 
sentence that the movant received. 
3.  Defendant has failed to make facially or legally sufficient 
allegations.  While Defendant asserts his innocence, he has failed to 
demonstrate how testing those items would exonerate him or mitigate 
his sentence.  Further, Defendant’s identity is not a genuinely disputed 
issue in this case, since Defendant admits he was present, and asserts 
the defense of self defense.  Defendant filed a prior 3.853 motion in 
conjunction with his fourth successive 3.851 motion, seeking testing 
of the hairs found on the t-shirt, which were both denied on the merits.  
Defendant concedes that the female victim’s clothing is missing.  
Apparently, inquiries to the Lee, Hendry and Glades Clerks, and the 
Hendry and Lee County Sheriff’s Offices resulted in responses that 
those locations did not have that evidence.  The agencies deny having 
any physical evidence.  Letters between defense counsel and the 
Glades County Sheriff’s Office indicate that a hurricane damaged the 
storage facility, and the evidence in this case was likely destroyed 
with the files.  Copies are attached.  Thus, it appears that the victim’s 
clothing is unavailable, through no fault of the State. 
4.  In this case, even if the items were available to be tested, it is 
unlikely that, after three decades, there would be any viable DNA 
remaining to test, especially since the tire iron and t-shirt were found 
submerged in a stream, which would have washed away any blood 
evidence.  Indeed, Defendant concedes that the FDLE report indicated 
no blood was found on those two items.  Where a defendant cannot 
show that DNA will prove or negate a material fact, a request for 
 
 
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testing should be denied.  Scott v. State, 46 So. 3d 529 (Fla. 2009).  
Since the female victim was strangled, and Defendant admits he was 
involved in an altercation with the male victim, he cannot reasonably 
show how DNA testing of these items would give rise to a reasonable 
probability that he did not commit the crimes, or would result in a 
lesser sentence.  Even if testing of the evidence found DNA and 
demonstrated that the DNA did not match Defendant, it would not 
prove that Defendant was not present at the crime scene or the 
perpetrator of the crime.  This kind of speculation has been held as a 
basis for denying a Rule 3.853 motion.  See Overton v. State, 976 So. 
2d 536, 568-570 (Fla. 2007).  As such, the evidence would not prove 
or negate a material fact, and would likely be inadmissible and 
irrelevant at trial or any future hearings. 
5.  Defendant has not established that the evidence would 
exonerate him, or result in a lesser sentence.  The Court finds there is 
no reasonable probability that Defendant would have been acquitted 
or received a lesser sentence if the DNA results had been admitted at 
trial, especially in light of the other overwhelming evidence adduced 
at trial, including the testimony of witnesses that the Defendant 
admitted killing the victims.  DNA testing will not be permitted if the 
requested DNA testing would shed no light on the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence.  Consalvo v. State, 3 So. 3d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 2009).  The 
Court notes that, while Rule 3.853 allows for a motion to be filed at 
any time, Defendant had three decades to bring such a motion, and 
instead waited to file this motion until the death warrant had been 
signed.  It appears that the motion was filed solely for the purposes of 
delaying the execution. 
 
As this Court has previously set forth when addressing the denial of a 
previous motion for DNA testing that Lambrix filed, “[i]t is the defendant’s burden 
to explain, with reference to specific facts about the crime and the items requested 
to be tested, how the DNA testing will exonerate the defendant of the crime or will 
mitigate the defendant’s sentence.”  Lambrix, 124 So. 3d at 895-96 (quoting Scott 
v. State, 46 So. 3d 529, 533 (Fla. 2009)).  “[A] trial court does not err in denying a 
 
 
- 16 - 
motion for DNA testing where the defendant cannot show that there is a reasonable 
probability that the absence or presence of DNA at a crime scene would exonerate 
him or lessen his sentence.”  Id. at 896.   
Lambrix has failed to explain how DNA testing of any of the items would 
lead to his exoneration of the crime or a reduced sentence.  As to the tire iron and 
the shirt wrapped around the tire iron, as Lambrix himself acknowledges, prior 
testing already established that there was no blood on these items—an unsurprising 
result since the items were disposed of in a stream.  Regarding Bryant’s clothing, 
Lambrix provides no reason how Moore’s DNA on Bryant would exonerate 
Lambrix.  The facts already established that Lambrix and Smith invited a couple 
they met at a bar to their trailer—Bryant and Moore.  Further, DNA testing was 
performed on Bryant’s panties.  Simply alleging that Bryant was found nude from 
the waist down and Moore’s DNA may be on her clothing does not establish how 
that would exonerate Lambrix of killing both Bryant and Moore, particularly when 
Moore and Bryant were together that evening.  As this Court has held, “[i]t is the 
defendant’s burden to explain, with reference to specific facts about the crime and 
the items requested to be tested, how the DNA testing will exonerate the defendant 
of the crime or will mitigate the defendant’s sentence.”  Zeigler v. State, 116 So. 
3d 255, 258 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Consalvo v. State, 3 So. 3d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 
2009)).  Lambrix has not done so. 
 
 
- 17 - 
 
Accordingly, Lambrix is not entitled to relief.   
Full and Fair Postconviction Proceedings 
As his third claim, Lambrix states vague and conclusory allegations that this 
Court’s December 1, 2015, scheduling order, providing a deadline by which 
Lambrix could file any successive motions for postconviction relief, prevented him 
from making the record he feels would be necessary in the case, but never states 
exactly what records he was denied based on the scheduling order.  This claim is 
insufficiently pled.  Further, a review of the evidentiary hearing and the circuit 
court’s order likewise does not support the contention that the circuit court was 
unable to undertake any specific action based on the schedule.  As this Court has 
repeatedly held, conclusory allegations do not establish a legally sufficient claim 
for postconviction relief.  Troy v. State, 57 So. 3d 828, 840 (Fla. 2011).  Further, if 
Lambrix had raised a meritorious claim and needed additional time to litigate the 
claim or to ensure an accurate and full record, a stay could be granted.  He simply 
has not raised any claim that requires a stay.   
 
Further, to the extent that Lambrix is challenging the constitutionality of 
section 119.19, Florida Statutes, and Rule 3.852, he has previously raised this same 
challenge, which this Court denied as follows: 
As this Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of 
section 119.19 and rule 3.852, we deny Lambrix’s constitutional 
challenge to section 119.19 and rule 3.852 without further discussion.  
See, e.g., Wyatt v. State, 71 So. 3d 86, 111 (Fla. 2011) (denying claim 
 
 
- 18 - 
that these provisions unconstitutionally restrict a defendant’s right to 
public-records access because they impermissibly mandate that his 
demand for public records not be “overly broad or unduly 
burdensome” and that he make his own search for records). 
Lambrix, 124 So. at 895 n.2.  Thus, Lambrix is not entitled to relief. 
Whether the Totality of the Punishment is Unconstitutional 
In his final postconviction claim, Lambrix alleges that the totality of the 
punishment the State has imposed on him, which now includes not just execution, 
but also more than three decades of being on death row, violates the Eighth 
Amendment.  In support, Lambrix relies on language contained in Justice Stevens’ 
memorandum opinion regarding the United States Supreme Court’s denial of 
certiorari review in Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995).   
This Court has consistently rejected this claim, including for inmates who 
have been on death row longer than Lambrix: 
Correll next contends that the length of time he has spent on 
death row, over twenty-nine years, constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment. . . .  [T]his Court has repeatedly rejected such challenges.  
See, e.g., Pardo v. State, 108 So. 3d 558, 569 (Fla. 2012) (twenty-four 
years); Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11, 27 (Fla. 2010) (almost twenty-
five years); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1085 (Fla. 2008) 
(twenty-three years); Booker v. State, 969 So. 2d 186, 200 (Fla. 2007) 
(almost thirty years).  Further, executions of inmates who have been 
on death row as long as, or longer than, Correll have been permitted.  
See, e.g., Ferguson v. State, 101 So. 3d 362, 366 (Fla. 2012) (more 
than thirty years); Waterhouse v. State, 82 So. 3d 84, 87 (Fla. 2012) 
(more than thirty-one years); Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 552 (Fla. 
2011) (thirty-three years).  Correll is not entitled to relief on this 
claim. 
 
 
- 19 - 
Correll v. State, 184 So. 3d 478, 486 (Fla.), cert. denied, Nos. 15-6551 & 15A424, 
2015 WL 6111441 (Oct. 29, 2015).  Further, Lambrix has contributed to the 
lengthy time and delay by continually challenging his convictions and sentences.  
He “cannot now contend that his punishment has been illegally prolonged because 
the delay in carrying out his sentence is in large part due to his own actions in 
challenging his conviction[s] and sentence[s].”  Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 552 
(Fla. 2011) (quoting Tompkins, 994 So. 2d at 1085).   
Thus, we deny this claim. 
HABEAS PETITION 
Nonunanimous Jury Recommendation for Death and Hurst Challenge 
In his motion for postconviction relief, Lambrix raised a Sixth Amendment 
claim based on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), arguing that his case should 
be stayed pending the outcome of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).  The postconviction court summarily 
denied the claim, relying on our decision in Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435 (Fla. 
2014), which denied a Ring claim based on prior United States Supreme Court 
precedent that upheld Florida’s capital sentencing scheme.  Before this Court, 
Lambrix raised his Ring/Hurst v. Florida claim in his habeas petition, rather than in 
the appeal of his postconviction motion.  While this case was pending, the United 
States Supreme Court reversed our decision in Hurst v. State and, for the first time, 
 
 
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expressly overruled Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), and Hildwin v. 
Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989), two decisions that had held Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme did not violate the Sixth Amendment.  Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. 
Ct. at 624.  Lambrix contends that he is entitled to retroactive application of Hurst 
v. Florida and thus, his sentences of death must be vacated. 
For the reasons cited in Asay, 41 Fla. L. Weekly at S646, we reject 
Lambrix’s claim.  Lambrix’s conviction was final in 1986 and accordingly he is 
not entitled to relief based on Hurst. 
Whether the Postconviction Judge was Biased 
In his second habeas claim, Lambrix challenges whether this Court erred in 
denying a claim in prior proceedings that alleged his postconviction judge was 
biased.  See Lambrix, 124 So. 3d 890.  In particular, during a prior appeal from a 
successive motion for postconviction relief and a petition for writ of prohibition, 
Lambrix asserted that the postconviction judge was biased based on her rulings and 
because the judge failed to reveal that she had been previously employed as an 
Assistant State Attorney.  In addition, Lambrix asserted that a staff attorney 
working for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit had assisted Lambrix.  Id. at 897.  
During those prior proceedings, this Court remanded the proceeding for an 
evidentiary claim, but the claim was subsequently denied.  Id.  This Court fully 
considered Lambrix’s position and rejected it in that proceeding.  Id. at 898. 
 
 
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Lambrix cannot use a successive petition for writ of habeas corpus to raise 
claims that he raised in a prior proceeding.  As this Court has long held, “[h]abeas 
corpus should not be used as a vehicle for presenting issues which should have 
been raised at trial and on appeal or in postconviction proceedings.”  Diaz v. State, 
132 So. 3d 93, 122 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861, 874 (Fla. 
2003)).  As this ground clearly was already raised and rejected by this Court, this 
claim is procedurally barred.   
Clemency Proceedings 
In his final habeas claim, Lambrix contends that his clemency proceedings 
have been inadequate, even though he acknowledges that he had three prior 
opportunities, or three prior “bites of the clemency apple.”  In support, he contends 
that his initial clemency proceeding occurred prior to his federal habeas 
proceedings and the clemency board did not even question him, while the last two 
proceedings did not involve any interviews or formal proceedings.   
This Court has previously rejected similar claims.  For example, in Pardo v. 
State, 108 So. 3d 558, 568-69 (Fla. 2012), we denied a challenge to the clemency 
proceeding based on a lack of opportunity to present witnesses and evidence and 
based on allegations that the clemency interview took place decades before Pardo’s 
death warrant was signed.  This Court reasoned as follows: 
First, Pardo had a clemency proceeding in 1990 at which he 
was represented by counsel, and we have previously rejected the 
 
 
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argument that a defendant is entitled to present a full accounting of 
mitigation evidence as part of the clemency process.  See Grossman v. 
State, 29 So. 3d 1034, 1044 (Fla. 2010); Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 
11, 25 (Fla. 2010); Glock v. Moore, 776 So. 2d 243, 252-53 (Fla. 
2001).  Second, we have likewise rejected the argument that a long 
time lapse between a defendant’s clemency proceeding and the 
signing of his death warrant renders the clemency process inadequate 
or entitles the defendant to a second proceeding.  See Gore[v. State], 
91 So. 3d [769,] 778-79 [(Fla. 2012)]; Johnston, 27 So. 3d at 25-26; 
Bundy v. State, 497 So. 2d 1209, 1211 (Fla. 1986).   
Id. at 568.  To the extent that Lambrix is challenging the decision reached by the 
executive branch, we have consistently held, “clemency is an executive function 
and . . . , in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers, we will not 
generally second-guess the executive’s determination that clemency is not 
warranted.”  Id.; see also Johnston, 27 So. 3d at 26 (“[W]e decline to depart from 
the Court’s precedent, based on the doctrine of separation of powers, in which we 
have held that it is not our prerogative to second-guess the executive on matters of 
clemency in capital cases.”); Rutherford v. State, 940 So. 2d 1112, 1122-23 (Fla. 
2006) (denying a similar clemency claim because the defendant had a clemency 
proceeding and because clemency is an executive function).  Accordingly, this 
claim should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
In accordance with our analysis above, we affirm the postconviction court’s 
denial of Lambrix’s successive rule 3.851 motion for postconviction relief and 
 
 
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deny his petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Additionally, we lift the stay entered 
on February 2, 2016. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and POLSTON, J., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
QUINCE, J., recused. 
LAWSON, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result. 
Lambrix is the subject of a pending death warrant.  Majority op. at 1.  The 
jury’s recommendations for a sentence of death by votes of eight to four and ten to 
two without any factual findings indicate that the Hurst error in Lambrix’s case 
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 65 
(Fla. 2016); Lambrix v. State, 494 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 1986).  Therefore, I would 
vacate Lambrix’s sentences of death and remand for a new penalty phase under 
Hurst based on my opinion in Asay v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S646, 2016 WL 
7406538 (Fla. Dec. 22, 2016), and elaborated on in Gaskin v. State, 42 Fla. L. 
Weekly S16, 2017 WL 224772 (Fla. Jan. 31, 2017).  Nevertheless, I recognize that 
I am bound by this Court’s precedent in Asay, which is now final; and, because 
 
 
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Lambrix’s sentences became final in 1986, a majority of this Court would not 
apply Hurst retroactively to his case.  Accordingly, I concur in result. 
Two Cases:  
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Glades County,  
James Dean Sloan, Judge - Case No. 221983CF000012CFAXMX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
Neal Andre Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, 
William McKinley Hennis, III, Litigation Director, Capital Collateral Regional 
Counsel, Southern Region, Martin J. McClain, Special Assistant, Capital Collateral 
Regional Counsel, Southern Region, and Jessica Leigh Houston, Michael Chance 
Meyer, and Bryan E. Martinez, Staff Attorneys, Capital Collateral Regional 
Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Scott Andrew Browne, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, and C. Suzanne Bechard, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Appellee/Respondent 
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Robert Arthur Young, Assistant 
Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Florida Public Defender Association 
 
Billy Horatio Nolas, Chief, Capital Habeas Unit, Office of the Federal Public 
Defender, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Amicus Curiae Capital Habeas Unit of the Office of the Federal Public 
Defender for the Northern District of Florida 
 
Nancy Gbana Abudu, Miami, Florida, and Norman Adam Tebrugge, Tampa, 
Florida, 
 
 
 
- 25 - 
for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union Capital Punishment 
Project and the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida 
 
Sonya Rudenstine, Gainesville, Florida, and Karen Marcia Gottlieb, Florida Center 
for Capital Representation, Florida International University College of Law, 
Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers