Title: Hernandez v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 092524
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 2011

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
RAFAEL HERNANDEZ 
 
 
 
           OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 092524  
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
                                    January 13, 2011 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In Moreau v. Fuller, 276 Va. 127, 661 S.E.2d 841 (2008), 
we considered the question whether a court, having taken a 
criminal case under advisement for deferred disposition, had a 
ministerial duty, enforceable by mandamus, to enter final 
judgment in the case.  We held that the act of rendering 
judgment was within the inherent power of the court and that 
it was discretionary, not ministerial, and therefore not 
subject to compulsion by mandamus.  Id. at 138-39, 661 S.E.2d 
at 847-48.  Today, we revisit that question in a different 
factual context. 
Facts and proceedings 
 
The facts are undisputed and the appeal presents a pure 
question of law.  Rafael Hernandez was indicted for 
feloniously assaulting a police officer in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-57(C).  At the conclusion of the evidence at a bench 
trial, defense counsel, citing Moreau, moved the court to 
defer disposition of the case for a period of time to be fixed 
by the court, to continue the defendant’s bond in effect for 
that period, subject to such conditions as the court might 
prescribe, and at the end of that period to consider dismissal 
of the case in lieu of a conviction if the defendant complied 
with all the prescribed conditions.  The attorney for the 
Commonwealth did not agree.  The court stated from the bench 
that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilt 
and held that even though the case might be an appropriate one 
for a deferred disposition, the court did not have inherent 
authority to do so.  The defense waived a pre-sentence report 
and the court imposed a sentence of eleven months in jail with 
five months suspended subject to probation for eleven months 
after release. 
 
Hernandez appealed to the Court of Appeals, which granted 
him an appeal limited to the question whether the trial court 
erred in concluding that it lacked inherent authority to 
continue the defendant’s case for future determination.  By a 
published opinion, a panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the judgment, holding that the circuit court had neither 
statutory nor inherent authority to defer disposition of the 
case.  Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 190, 684 S.E.2d 
845 (2009).  We awarded Hernandez an appeal on a single 
assignment of error, that the Court of Appeals erred in 
concluding that the trial court lacked inherent authority to 
 
2
defer judgment “upon terms contemplating a future dismissal of 
criminal charges.” 
Analysis 
 
Because the appeal presents a pure question of law, we 
apply a de novo standard of review.  Moreau, 276 Va. at 133, 
661 S.E.2d at 845.  There are marked similarities between this 
case and Moreau.  Here, as in Moreau, the Commonwealth did not 
agree to a deferred disposition.  Here, as in Moreau, the 
trial judge stated that the evidence was sufficient to support 
a finding of guilt.  Here, as in Moreau, the trial court 
considered the question of deferred disposition before 
entering an order finding the defendant guilty of a crime.  
The trial courts, however, reached opposite conclusions in the 
two cases.  Here, the circuit court held that it lacked 
authority to defer disposition, while the juvenile and 
domestic relations district court in Moreau held that it had 
such authority. 
 
Moreau was a civil case, a petition for mandamus brought 
by a Commonwealth’s Attorney in a circuit court to compel the 
judge of a juvenile and domestic relations district court to 
perform the allegedly ministerial duty of entering final 
judgment in a criminal case that had been taken under 
advisement and continued for further disposition.  Our 
holdings in Moreau, although arising in a different context, 
 
3
nevertheless control the present case.  There, we held that 
“the act of rendering judgment is within the inherent power of 
the court and that the very essence of adjudication and entry 
of judgment by a judge involves discretionary power of the 
court.”  Id. at 139, 661 S.E.2d at 847-48.  In reaching that 
holding, we said: 
 
Upon hearing the evidence in the criminal 
proceeding at issue in this case, it was within the 
inherent authority of the court to "take the matter 
under advisement" or "continue the case for 
disposition" at a later date.  Such practices 
involve the essence of rendering judgment.  No one 
contends that the judge must immediately render 
judgment upon the instant that the presentation of 
evidence has been concluded. 
 
Id. at 137, 661 S.E.2d at 846-47.  We noted that while such a 
case was pending, the court has statutory authority to 
continue bail requirements.  Id. at 137 n.4, 661 S.E.2d at 847 
n.4. 
 
In Moreau, we left open the question whether a court may 
defer judgment and continue a case with a promise of a 
particular disposition at a later date.  Id. at 137, 661 
S.E.2d at 847.  That question was not before the Court in 
Moreau and is not before us here, as neither case involved 
such a promise. 
 
We agree with the Court of Appeals’ observation in the 
present case that once a court has entered a judgment of 
conviction of a crime, the question of the penalty to be 
 
4
imposed is entirely within the province of the legislature, 
and the court has no inherent authority to depart from the 
range of punishment legislatively prescribed.  Hernandez, 55 
Va. App. at 196-97, 684 S.E.2d at 848-49.  We do not agree, 
however, with the Court of Appeals’ holding that the mere 
statement by a judge that the evidence was sufficient to 
support a conviction amounts to a judgment of conviction.  See 
55 Va. App. at 202, 684 S.E.2d at 851. 
 
As we have repeatedly held, "a court speaks only through 
its written orders."  Moreau, 276 Va. at 137-38, 661 S.E.2d at 
847 (citing Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 
273 Va. 96, 103, 639 S.E.2d 174, 177 (2007)).  An observation 
by the court as to the sufficiency of the evidence does not 
amount to a formal adjudication of guilt.  Until the court 
enters a written order finding the defendant guilty of a 
crime, the court has the inherent authority to take the matter 
under advisement or to continue the case for disposition at a 
later date. 
Conclusion 
 
In the present case, during the interval between the 
conclusion of the evidence and the entry of a written order 
adjudicating the defendant guilty, the circuit court had the 
inherent power, in the exercise of its discretion, to take the 
matter under advisement and to continue the case for future 
 
5
disposition, subject to such lawful conditions as the court 
might prescribe.  The circuit court erred in holding that it 
lacked that power and in denying the defendant’s motion for 
that reason.  The Court of Appeals also erred in holding that 
the circuit court lacked that inherent power and in affirming 
the judgment accordingly. 
 
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that Court with 
direction to further remand the same to the circuit court for 
such consideration of the defendant’s motion for deferred 
disposition as the circuit court in its discretion may deem 
appropriate.  
Reversed and remanded. 
 
6