Title: Commonwealth v. Lugo
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12546
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 24, 2019

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SJC-12546 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  NATHAN LUGO. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     November 5, 2018. - April 24, 2019. 
 
 
Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Sentence, Cruel and unusual 
punishment, Search and seizure, Standing to question 
constitutionality.  Due Process of Law, Sentence.  Cellular 
Telephone.  Search and Seizure, Standing to object, 
Expectation of privacy, Emergency, Exigent circumstances.  
Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Instructions to jury, 
Assistance of counsel, Motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 21, 2011, and August 19, 2014. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Thomas 
A. Connors, J., the cases were tried before him, and a motion 
for a new trial and resentencing, filed on May 9, 2017, also was 
heard by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Katherine C. Essington for the defendant. 
 
Stephanie Martin Glennon, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
2 
 
 
 
Marsha L. Levick, Karen U. Lindell, & Riya Saha Shah, of 
Pennsylvania, & Laura Chrismer Edmonds for Juvenile Law Center & 
others. 
 
Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, Eric T. Romeo, & Jaime A. Santos 
for Louis D. Brown Peace Institute & others. 
 
Meredith Shih for Boston Bar Association. 
 
Elizabeth Doherty for youth advocacy division of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services & others. 
 
John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for District 
Attorney for the Berkshire District & others. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  In November 2011, the victim, Kyle McManus, was 
murdered after a plan to rob him of marijuana failed.  A jury 
convicted the defendant, Nathan Lugo, of murder in the second 
degree.1  The defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time 
of the murder, was sentenced to the mandatory term of life 
imprisonment with eligibility for parole after fifteen years.2  
On appeal, the defendant argues that the mandatory sentence is 
unconstitutional because it does not allow the judge to exercise 
his or her discretion to impose anything less than a life 
sentence with the possibility of parole.  The defendant contends 
that the judge erred in denying his motion to continue his 
sentence so that he could present evidence related to his 
juvenile status.  He further argues that (1) the judge erred in 
                     
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of armed robbery, 
possession of a firearm without a license, possession of 
ammunition without a firearm identification card, and conspiracy 
to violate the controlled substance law. 
 
2 The defendant received concurrent sentences for the other 
convictions. 
3 
 
 
denying his request to instruct the jury on accident; (2) his 
counsel was ineffective for not requesting other jury 
instructions; and (3) the judge erred in denying the defendant's 
motion to suppress the warrantless "pinging" of his cellular 
telephone (cell phone). 
 
In Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 62 (2015), we 
concluded that the mandatory sentencing scheme as applied to 
juveniles convicted of second-degree murder was constitutional.  
We left for another day, however, the question whether juvenile 
homicide offenders require individualized sentencing.  We 
stated:  "Given the unsettled nature of the law in this area and 
the indication that it is still evolving, we think it prudent to 
allow this process to continue before we decide whether to 
revisit our interpretation of [Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 
(2012),] and the scope of its holding."  Okoro, supra at 61.  
Now, nearly four years after our decision in Okoro, the 
defendant asks us to address that very issue.  For the same 
reasons stated in Okoro, we continue to leave the individualized 
sentencing question for another day and reject the defendant's 
other arguments.3 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Louis D. 
Brown Peace Institute, Families for Justice as Healing, and the 
National Council for Incarcerated and Formerly Incarcerated 
Women and Girls; the Juvenile Law Center, the Center for Law, 
Brain and Behavior, and the Center on Wrongful Convictions of 
Youth; the Boston Bar Association; the youth advocacy division 
4 
 
 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts that the jury could 
have found, reserving pertinent facts for the discussion of the 
defendant's arguments.  In addition, we reserve the facts that 
the motion judge found for the discussion of the defendant's 
motion to suppress. 
 
The defendant and three friends, Alison Deshowitz, Devante 
Thames, and Brian Moulton, developed a plan to rob the victim of 
marijuana.  Deshowitz, who had dated the victim, contacted him 
under the guise that she was arranging a drug transaction.  The 
plan was for the group to meet the victim at a restaurant, bring 
him to his home to secure the marijuana, and then rob him of the 
marijuana.  The defendant drove the group in his mother's black 
sport utility vehicle (SUV) to meet the victim.  On the way to 
the restaurant, he informed the group that he was armed with a 
revolver. 
 
The group met the victim at the restaurant and drove him to 
his house to get the marijuana.  After going inside the victim's 
house to measure the marijuana, the victim and Thames walked 
back to the SUV that was idling in the victim's driveway.  The 
victim leaned into the front passenger's side window of the SUV 
                     
of the Committee for Public Counsel Services, the Children's Law 
Center of Massachusetts, Hon. Gail Garinger, and Robert 
Kinscherff; and the district attorneys for the Berkshire, 
Bristol, Cape and the Islands, Eastern, Hampden, Northwestern, 
Plymouth, Middle, and Suffolk districts. 
5 
 
 
to collect the money for the marijuana that Thames already was 
holding.  Moulton displayed the money to be used to complete the 
drug transaction, and the victim commented that it looked to be 
less than the agreed-upon purchase price.  Upon hearing the 
victim's suspicions, the defendant "threw the car in reverse" 
and backed out of the driveway with the victim still leaning 
through the window.  A scuffle ensued between the victim and 
Moulton as the victim attempted to grab the money in Moulton's 
hand and get out of the moving SUV.  The victim did not have a 
weapon but was carrying an open beer can or bottle that he had 
taken from the restaurant.  The victim shouted, "Help," before a 
loud pop was heard; the SUV sped away, leaving the victim 
behind.  Thames testified that the defendant extended his hand 
with the gun across the passenger seat.  Moulton bent down, and 
the defendant shot the victim in the chest.  The victim was 
pronounced dead at the hospital shortly thereafter. 
 
Police quickly discovered that the victim was last seen 
alive with Deshowitz.  After going to Deshowitz's house and 
learning that she was not home, police spoke to her on her cell 
phone.  Police then attempted to locate her cell phone by 
"pinging" it.  Deshowitz's cell phone location, coupled with 
other information that police gathered, indicated that she was 
located at the defendant's house.  Police proceeded to the 
6 
 
 
defendant's house, where they arrested the defendant and the 
group. 
 
At the defendant's house, police discovered a black SUV in 
the garage.  Police recovered several bags of marijuana in the 
defendant's bedroom and a .22 caliber revolver, later revealed 
to be the murder weapon, hidden in a hollowed-out hole under a 
patio brick. 
 
2.  Procedural history.  The offenses were committed three 
months before the defendant's eighteenth birthday.  At the 
conclusion of trial, he was sentenced to life in prison with the 
possibility of parole after fifteen years on the charge of 
murder in the second degree.  At the sentencing hearing, 
although defense counsel acknowledged that the judge had no 
discretion in imposing a sentence for murder in the second 
degree, he asked for a continuance so that he could present 
evidence of mitigation.  Defense counsel informed the judge that 
he had retained an expert in juvenile psychology and that he 
wanted to present the expert's testimony at sentencing.  
According to defense counsel, this testimony would have 
discussed "unique things about juveniles, their perception, 
their need for instant gratification, their likelihood of 
success and rehabilitation . . . all things that are important."  
The judge acknowledged the possible importance of this 
information when the defendant is eligible for parole, but 
7 
 
 
denied the defendant's request.  The judge believed that the 
information was better suited to be presented to the parole 
board at the time of the parole hearing. 
 
The defendant timely filed a notice of appeal, which was 
stayed so that he could pursue a motion for a new trial.  In his 
motion, the defendant argued, among other things, that the 
statutorily mandated sentence of life with the possibility of 
parole after fifteen years violated provisions of the State and 
Federal Constitutions; certain instructions given on the 
homicide charge were erroneous; and counsel was ineffective in 
failing to object to improper instructions.  After a 
nonevidentiary hearing, the motion was denied.  The motion 
judge, who was also the trial judge, found that 
"[r]eview of the Okoro ruling makes clear that a person in 
[the defendant's] position is not under the law as 
presently enunciated in a position to argue that he must 
receive an individualized sentencing hearing after his 
conviction of second degree murder, an offense which 
requires the imposition of the mandatory sentence called 
for in [G. L. c. 265, § 2]." 
 
The defendant's appeal from that denial was consolidated with 
his direct appeal, and we granted his application for direct 
appellate review. 
Discussion.  1.  Constitutionality of the defendant's 
sentence.  The defendant argues that the statutory sentencing 
scheme for juveniles convicted of murder in the second degree, 
G. L. c. 127, § 133A, which mandates a sentence of life in 
8 
 
 
prison with the possibility of parole after fifteen years, 
violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  He 
contends that the statutory scheme does not allow judges to 
exercise their discretion to impose anything less than a life 
sentence, with the possibility of parole, after an 
individualized hearing.4  He argues that such a mandatory 
sentence for a conviction of murder in the second degree is 
disproportional in light of the decisions in Okoro, 471 Mass. 
51; Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 
Mass. 12 (2015) (Diatchenko II); Diatchenko v. District Attorney 
for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (2013) (Diatchenko I); and 
Miller, 567 U.S. 460.  The defendant asks us to consider whether 
to expand Miller's due process interpretation, post-Diatchenko I 
and post-Okoro, to require individualized sentencing hearings 
for juveniles facing statutorily imposed mandatory life 
sentences with parole eligibility.  Further, relying on Miller, 
the defendant argues that the denial of his motion to continue 
the sentencing hearing prohibited him from presenting mitigating 
                     
 
4 The defendant does not contend that parole eligibility 
after fifteen years is cruel and unusual or disproportional to 
the offense, but is instead "challenging the legislature's one 
size fits all determination that a life sentence is necessary 
for every juvenile convicted of second degree murder." 
9 
 
 
evidence concerning his "distinctive mental attributes and 
environmental vulnerabilities." 
 
In Diatchenko I, we held that, in light of the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Miller,5 the Massachusetts 
statute imposing a sentence of mandatory life without parole, 
G. L. c. 265, § 2, violated the defendant's right of protection 
against cruel and unusual punishment and that the discretionary 
sentence of life without parole upon the defendant violated the 
State constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual 
punishment.  Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 667-671.  We concluded 
that a juvenile homicide offender who is convicted of murder in 
the first degree and receives a mandatory sentence of life in 
prison must be afforded a "meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation," and 
that this opportunity must come through consideration for 
release on parole.  Id. at 674, quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48, 75 (2011).  As a key distinguishing factor to the case 
before us, however, the sentencing statute was invalid only with 
respect to language prescribing life without the possibility of 
parole for juvenile offenders.  Diatchenko I, supra. 
                     
 
5 In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465, 469-480 (2012), 
the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory sentences of 
life without parole for offenders under the age of eighteen at 
the time of their crimes violates the prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
10 
 
 
 
Two years after the decision in Diatchenko I, we expanded 
its holding in Okoro, supra.  In Okoro, the defendant argued 
that the Eighth Amendment, as established in Miller, required 
individualized sentencing hearings in every case in which a 
juvenile homicide offender received a life sentence.  Okoro, 471 
Mass. at 56.  While we agreed with the defendant in Okoro that 
certain language in Miller could be read to suggest that 
individualized sentencing was required when juvenile homicide 
offenders faced a sentence of life in prison, that holding was 
narrow and specifically tailored to the cases before the Supreme 
Court at that time.  Id. at 56-57.  We concluded that "a 
mandatory life sentence with parole eligibility after fifteen 
years for a juvenile homicide offender convicted of murder in 
the second degree does not offend the Eighth Amendment or art. 
26."  Id. at 62.  We accepted this on the understanding that it 
is for the parole board to take into account the unique 
characteristics that make juvenile offenders constitutionally 
distinct from adults and ensure they are afforded a "meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation."  Id. at 58, quoting Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 
674. 
 
In Okoro, 471 Mass. at 58, we "[left] for later day the 
question whether juvenile homicide offenders require 
individualized sentencing" for several reasons.  First, we held 
11 
 
 
that the narrow holding in Miller was particularly directed at 
juveniles who were sentenced to life without parole.  Id.  See 
Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.  Second, the constitutional distinction 
between adults and juveniles for purposes of sentencing was of 
fairly recent origin.  Okoro, supra at 59.  The scientific and 
social scientific bases for this distinction were subject to 
continuing research, and we could not predict the ultimate 
results of that research.  Id. at 59-60.  The law relating to 
this distinction was continuing to change and develop.  Id. at 
60.  Finally, we cited the constitutional differences between 
adults and juveniles in our sentencing laws.  Id. at 61-62.  The 
Legislature had determined that every defendant convicted of 
murder in the second degree must serve a life sentence with the 
possibility of parole, but adult offenders must wait twenty-five 
years before becoming eligible while juvenile offenders become 
eligible in fifteen years.  See G. L. c. 279, § 24; G. L. 
c. 119, § 72B. 
 
At that point, we thought it prudent to allow this area of 
the law to settle further before revisiting our interpretation 
of Miller.  For the same reasons we stated in Okoro, we remain 
unwilling to revisit our interpretation in regard to 
individualized sentencing.  The Commonwealth suggests that in 
the four years since Okoro, our case law has only affirmed that 
the opportunity to seek parole after fifteen years is an 
12 
 
 
appropriate and proportional minimum sentence for murder in the 
second degree.  The defendant points to extrajurisdictional 
cases, dicta, and one scientific study to suggest that there 
have been significant changes in the relevant law and science 
since Okoro.  We are unpersuaded that the law and science are 
firmly established to warrant further consideration at this 
time.  In sum, we leave the question open and conclude, as we 
did in Okoro, that a mandatory life sentence with parole 
eligibility after fifteen years for a juvenile homicide offender 
convicted of murder in the second degree is constitutional.  The 
motion judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the 
defendant is not entitled to individualized sentencing. 
 
The defendant further contends that the judge violated his 
due process rights in denying his request for a continuance of 
sentencing so that he could present evidence of mitigation.  He 
argues that evidence available to him at the time of sentencing 
-- at a minimum, evidence of his mental state and immaturity -- 
may not be available to him at the time of his first parole 
hearing.  The judge acknowledged the possible importance of this 
evidence when the defendant is eligible for parole but denied 
the defendant's request.  The judge believed that the 
information was better suited to be presented to the parole 
board at the time of the parole hearing. 
13 
 
 
 
In Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 24, 27, 32, we extended 
certain due process protections to juveniles sentenced to life 
appearing before a parole board.  See Okoro, 471 Mass. at 62-63 
(due process protections of Diatchenko II apply to juveniles 
convicted of murder in second degree).  These protections 
included the right to appointment of counsel and the right to 
access funds to retain expert witnesses. 
 
Here, we agree with the judge.  Although the defendant 
constitutionally is entitled to funds to establish mitigating 
evidence that will be relevant before the parole board, he or 
she is not entitled to make a record through an adversarial 
process before sentencing.  The defendant may, for example, 
immediately seek funds for an expert report explaining the 
relationship between a defendant's neurobiological immaturity 
and culpability.  However, the appropriate time to make a record 
of any expert evidence will be at the parole board hearing.6 
 
2.  Jury instructions.  At trial, the defendant sought, but 
did not receive, jury instructions on accident, involuntary 
                     
 
6 We determine that juvenile homicide offenders are allowed 
to seek funds to investigate immediately because of the 
closeness in time to the conduct that resulted in their 
incarceration.  We also recognize that there is no mechanism -- 
in rule or procedure -- that grants a juvenile homicide offender 
the opportunity to seek immediate funds.  Allowing the defendant 
to seek immediate funds is necessary to ensure that the juvenile 
homicide offender receives a meaningful opportunity for release.  
See Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 
Mass. 12, 27-28 (2015). (Diatchenko II). 
14 
 
 
manslaughter, and voluntary manslaughter.  He argues that two of 
these instructions, on involuntary manslaughter and voluntary 
manslaughter by reason of sudden combat, would have allowed the 
jury to consider a lesser charge than murder and that an 
instruction on accident would have given the jury the 
opportunity to acquit.  We review the denial of a motion for a 
new trial for an abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 441–442 (2006).  We are cognizant that 
"[r]eversal for abuse of discretion is particularly rare where," 
as here, "the judge acting on the motion was also the trial 
judge."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Lucien, 440 Mass. 658, 670 
(2004). 
 
a.  Accident instruction.  The judge declined to instruct 
the jury on the defense of accident.  The defendant argues that 
the evidence at trial was sufficient to warrant such an 
instruction.  The Commonwealth argues that the judge was correct 
in not providing the accident instruction because the evidence 
did not support one and it would have contradicted the 
defendant's theory at trial of self-defense or defense of 
another.  We conclude that the evidence presented at trial did 
not warrant an accident instruction. 
 
An accident instruction is warranted where "the evidence at 
trial fairly raised the possibility that [the defendant caused 
the victim's death] unintentionally while engaged in conduct 
15 
 
 
that was neither wanton nor reckless."  Commonwealth v. Moore, 
92 Mass. App. Ct. 40, 48 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Figueroa, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 641, 650 (2002).  In cases in which 
the cause of death of a victim is by shooting, a defendant may 
be entitled to an accident instruction where such a defense is 
"fairly raised."  Commonwealth v. Palmariello, 392 Mass. 126, 
145 (1984).  "Where there is no evidence of accident, the issue 
is not fairly raised and the judge need not give an accident 
instruction."  Commonwealth v. Podkowka, 445 Mass. 692, 699 
(2006).  When analyzing whether a judge erred in declining to 
give an accident instruction, a reviewing court considers the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.  
Figueroa, supra at 651. 
 
Here, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, 
there is no evidence that the victim's fatal injuries were 
caused by an accident.  The evidence at trial showed that the 
defendant, along with his cohorts, planned to rob the victim of 
marijuana.  The defendant armed himself with a revolver and told 
his confederates not to "worry" about the robbery because he had 
ready access to the weapon and that he "wouldn't be afraid to 
use it."  Once the victim realized that the payment was short, 
the defendant effectuated the plan, "threw the car in reverse," 
and backed out of the victim's driveway with the victim still 
16 
 
 
leaning through the vehicle window.  Before the victim could get 
out of the moving SUV, the defendant shot him in the chest. 
 
Citing testimony from the Commonwealth's firearms expert, 
the defendant argues that evidence that the firearm used in the 
killing required a small amount of trigger pressure supported 
his request for an accident instruction because it would have 
been "very easy" for the gun to have discharged accidentally.  
This evidence does not warrant an accident instruction alone, 
and there was no additional evidence to support the contention 
that the firearm was discharged accidentally.  In fact, the jury 
heard evidence that the defendant extended his arm with the gun 
across the passenger seat and shot the victim in the chest.  The 
evidence showed that the defendant's intentional conduct caused 
the gun to fire, not mere "inadvertence, mistake, or 
negligence."  See Figueroa, 56 Mass. App. Ct. at 650. 
 
b.  Involuntary and voluntary manslaughter instructions.  
The defendant argues that the judge erred in denying his request 
to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter.  He further 
contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object 
to the judge's decision not to give the instruction.  We review 
for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 296 (2002) (equating 
ineffective assistance of counsel standard to substantial risk 
17 
 
 
standard in cases where waiver stems from omission by defense 
counsel). 
 
We have "stated repeatedly that, 'when the evidence permits 
a finding of a lesser included offense, a judge must, upon 
request, instruct the jury on the possibility of conviction of 
the lesser crime.'"  Commonwealth v. Gaouette, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 
633, 639 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass. 
659, 662-663 (1998).  If a manslaughter charge is not supported 
by any view of the evidence, however, then a judge does not 
commit error by declining to give such an instruction.  
Commonwealth v. Nichypor, 419 Mass. 209, 216 (1994).  "In 
deciding whether the evidence might have supported a 
manslaughter instruction, we draw all reasonable inferences in 
the defendant's favor."  Commonwealth v. Bins, 465 Mass. 348, 
368 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Masello, 428 Mass. 446, 449 
(1998). 
 
Involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional killing 
occurring while a defendant is engaged in wanton or reckless 
conduct that creates a high degree of likelihood that 
substantial harm will result to another.  Commonwealth v. Power-
Koch, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 735, 736-737 (2007).  "[W]here a 
defendant is charged with murder, an instruction on involuntary 
manslaughter is appropriate if any 'reasonable view of the 
evidence would [permit] the jury to find "wanton [or] reckless" 
18 
 
 
conduct rather than actions from which a "plain and strong 
likelihood" of death would follow.'"  Commonwealth v. Tavares, 
471 Mass. 430, 438 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 
Mass. 316, 331 (2007). 
Here, an involuntary manslaughter instruction was not 
warranted.  The evidence showed that the defendant armed himself 
with a firearm and planned to rob the victim.  A reasonable view 
of the evidence suggests that the defendant exhibited conduct 
from which a plain and strong likelihood of death would result.  
The defendant pulled out a revolver and pointed it at the victim 
before shooting him in the chest.  See Commonwealth v. Alebord, 
68 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 7 (2006) ("The likelihood of death ensuing 
when a loaded weapon is aimed at a person or group of people and 
then intentionally discharged is plain and strong indeed"). 
 
The defendant also raises the same arguments regarding the 
judge's denial of his request for a voluntary manslaughter 
instruction.  Specifically, he argues that the judge erred in 
not instructing the jury on reasonable provocation and sudden 
combat.7 
 
Voluntary manslaughter is "a killing from a sudden 
transport of passion or heat of blood, upon a reasonable 
                     
 
7 The judge instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter 
and imperfect self-defense, but did not mention reasonable 
provocation or sudden combat. 
19 
 
 
provocation and without malice, or upon sudden combat."  
Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 727 (1980), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Soaris, 275 Mass. 291, 299 (1931).  Not all 
physical confrontations, even those initiated by the victim, are 
sufficient.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Curtis, 417 Mass. 619, 
629 & n.6 (1994); Commonwealth v. Parker, 402 Mass. 333, 344–345 
(1988), S.C., 412 Mass. 353 (1992) and 420 Mass. 242 (1995); 
Walden, supra at 727-728.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Iacoviello, 90 
Mass. App. Ct. 231, 242 (2016).  Rather, "[t]here must be 
evidence that would warrant a reasonable doubt that something 
happened which would have been likely to produce in an ordinary 
person such a state of passion, anger, fear, fright, or nervous 
excitement as would eclipse his capacity for reflection or 
restraint, and that what happened actually did produce such a 
state of mind in the defendant."  Gaouette, 66 Mass. App. Ct. at 
639-640, quoting Walden, supra at 728.  The defendant's actions 
must be "both objectively and subjectively reasonable.  That is, 
the jury must be able to infer that a reasonable person would 
have become sufficiently provoked and would not have 'cooled 
off' by the time of the homicide, and that in fact a defendant 
was provoked and did not cool off."  Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 
Mass. 201, 220 (2001). 
 
In cases where sudden combat is the claimed provocation, 
the victim generally must attack the defendant, or at least 
20 
 
 
strike a blow against the defendant in order to warrant a 
manslaughter instruction.  See Curtis, 417 Mass. at 629.  Here, 
there is no evidence that the victim struck the defendant, much 
less created a risk of serious harm.  Nor is there evidence that 
the defendant objectively believed at the time of the shooting 
that the victim was armed with a firearm.  The defendant relies 
on Moulton's testimony, in which Moulton stated that after the 
victim realized that the money in exchange for the marijuana was 
short he "tussled" with Moulton through the open passenger's 
side window.  Moulton claimed that the victim had "a beer can or 
a bottle . . . in his hand" and was yelling "help."  This 
evidence is insufficient to support a sudden combat instruction.  
See Commonwealth v. Bianchi, 435 Mass. 316, 329 (2001) (sudden 
combat instruction not warranted where defendant's illegal 
conduct "intentionally precipitated the confrontation" and 
defendant was armed with loaded weapon); Curtis, supra. 
 
3.  Motion to suppress cell phone location.  Prior to 
trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence of 
his cell site location information (CSLI) that police obtained 
from his cell phone carrier.  The motion judge denied the 
motion, concluding that the emergency aid exception justified 
the warrantless pinging of Deshowitz's and the defendant's cell 
phones.  In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, "we 
accept the judge's subsidiary findings absent clear error 'but 
21 
 
 
conduct an independent review of [the] ultimate findings and 
conclusions of law.'"  Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 
429, 431 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Ramos, 470 Mass. 740, 
742 (2015).  The motion judge found the following.  After the 
shooting, police learned that the victim was last seen alive 
with Deshowitz.  Through records held by the registry of motor 
vehicles (registry), police determined that Deshowitz lived in 
Stoughton.  A Stoughton police detective, Michael Tuitt, who was 
familiar with both Deshowitz and her sister, went to their 
residence where he learned that Deshowitz was not home, but her 
sister offered to call her cell phone.  Tuitt recognized 
Deshowitz's voice on the call, but was concerned that she was 
speaking in a whisper and pausing before answering his 
questions.  Tuitt said to Deshowitz that if she was not able to 
talk freely she should say "Tennessee."  She responded, 
"Tennessee."  He then said that if she could not speak because 
people were with her to say "seven."  Deshowitz responded, 
"Seven."  He then asked her if she could not get away to say 
"four."  She responded, "Four."  Finally, the detective told her 
that if she were not really in Abington (where she claimed to be 
with friends) to say "seven."  She responded, "Seven."  After 
his conversation with Deshowitz, Tuitt believed that she was in 
danger. 
22 
 
 
 
Tuitt returned to the police station, where he spoke with 
Sergeant Detective Melissa McCormack about obtaining the 
location of Deshowitz's cell phone.  McCormack began the process 
of "pinging" Deshowitz's cell phone through her cell phone 
carrier.  McCormack contacted a representative of the carrier 
and stated that there were exigent circumstances that 
necessitated the request for the cell phone's location based 
upon her certification of "imminent danger of death or serious 
physical injury." 
 
In the interim, Tuitt received a telephone call from 
Deshowitz's mother, who told Tuitt that she believed something 
was wrong with her daughter.  When police received Deshowitz's 
cell phone coordinates at 1:26 A.M., they discovered that the 
cell phone was located in Brockton.  Tuitt asked Deshowitz's 
mother if Deshowitz knew anyone in Brockton.  The mother replied 
that she knew a "Nate" and gave his address.  The mother 
accompanied Tuitt to the address, where Tuitt observed a vehicle 
registered to the defendant's mother parked in the driveway.  
McCormack also learned from registry records that a licensed 
driver named "Nathan Lugo" resided at the residence. 
 
As part of the exigency request, the cell phone carrier 
also provided police with the cell phone numbers and subscriber 
names for cell phones that either received or made calls to 
Deshowitz's cell phone.  Among those numbers was a cell phone 
23 
 
 
subscribed to the defendant's mother.  McCormack had that cell 
phone pinged via its carrier, which showed it to be in the same 
general location as Deshowitz's cell phone. 
 
At approximately 3 A.M., police arrived at the defendant's 
residence and were allowed in by the defendant's mother.  Police 
retrieved Deshowitz and asked her to speak with responding 
officers.  Later that morning, the officers procured a search 
warrant.  During their search, police discovered evidence 
linking the defendant to the killing, including the murder 
weapon.  The officers proceeded to arrest the defendant, 
Deshowitz, Thames, and Moulton. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the motion judge erred 
in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a 
result of the pinging of Deshowitz's and his cell phones.  He 
argues that the emergency aid exception to the warrant 
requirement does not apply because police had no objectively 
reasonable basis to believe that Deshowitz was injured or was in 
"imminent danger of physical harm" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 213 (2012), cert. 
denied, 568 U.S. 1129 (2013).  The Commonwealth argues that the 
defendant lacked standing to contest the real-time "pinging" of 
Deshowitz's cell phone and that the motion judge's undisputed 
factual findings supported the application of the emergency 
exception to the search. 
24 
 
 
 
To prevail on a motion to suppress under art. 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, a defendant must 
demonstrate that he or she has standing to contest the search 
and that he or she had an expectation of privacy in the area 
searched or in the item seized that society recognizes as 
reasonable.  See Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 216 
(2014).  "A defendant has standing either if [he] has a 
possessory interest in the place searched or in the property 
seized or if [he] was present when the search occurred."  
Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 35, cert. denied, 138 S. 
Ct. 330 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 453 Mass. 203, 
208 (2009). 
 
We conclude that the action by police of causing 
Deshowitz's and the defendant's cell phones to reveal their 
real-time location constituted a search in the constitutional 
sense.  See Commonwealth v. Almonor, 482 Mass.    ,     (2019) 
("society reasonably expects that the police will not be able to 
secretly manipulate our personal cell phones for any purpose, 
let alone for the purpose of transmitting our personal location 
data").  Although the police's conduct was a search in the 
constitutional sense, our analysis does not end there. 
 
a.  Deshowitz's cell phone.  We first look to determine if 
the defendant has standing to challenge the search of 
Deshowitz's cell phone.  We conclude that he does not.  See 
25 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852, 857 n.9 (2015) 
(defendants did not have standing to contest collection of CSLI 
associated with cell phones that they were not using).  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 255 (2014), S.C., 470 
Mass. 837 (2015) (person has reasonable expectation of privacy, 
to certain extent, in historical CSLI relating to cell phone).  
The defendant does not have automatic standing to contest the 
search of Deshowitz's cell phone because he does not have a 
possessory interest in it.  See Commonwealth v. Cruzado, 480 
Mass. 275, 282 (2018).  Furthermore, the defendant does not have 
actual standing to contest the search of Deshowitz's cell phone.  
Police first pinged Deshowitz's cell phone at 1:26 A.M.  Police 
entered the defendant's home to talk with Deshowitz at 3 A.M.  
Although the defendant was with Deshowitz when her location was 
searched, the period of the search -- less than two hours -- was 
not sufficiently significant to allow the defendant standing in 
Deshowitz's cell phone.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 465 
Mass. 372, 382 (2013) (police tracking codefendant's vehicle for 
thirty-one days gave defendant, who was often with codefendant, 
standing to contest search); Commonwealth v. Fredericq, 482 
Mass.    ,     (2019) (defendant had automatic standing because 
police knew that he was in car with murder suspect whose 
movements were being tracked through CSLI of another cohort's 
cell phone for more than six days). 
26 
 
 
 
 Likewise, at the time of the initial search of Deshowitz's 
cell phone, police did not know that she was with the defendant.  
Police only knew that she was the last person seen with the 
victim.  It was not until the investigation unfolded that police 
discovered Deshowitz was at the defendant's house.  The 
defendant cannot establish a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in Deshowitz's cell phone when it was tracked for a brief period 
of time and he was never a target of the tracking.  Contrast 
Rousseau, 465 Mass. at 382 (CSLI search was specifically 
"targeted at [defendant's] movements"). 
 
In any event, the defendant's challenge of the search of 
Deshowitz's cell phone would be futile because the search was 
justified by the emergency aid exception.  See Commonwealth v. 
Raspberry, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 633, 640-641 (2018) (emergency 
exception applied where police had objectively reasonable 
grounds to believe that emergency aid might be needed).  Police 
were investigating a homicide and learned that the victim was 
last seen alive with Deshowitz.  Tuitt spoke with her on her 
cell phone, but was concerned that she was speaking in a whisper 
and pausing before answering his questions.  There were 
reasonable grounds to believe emergency aid might be needed 
especially after Deshowitz, in answering Tuitt's coded 
questions, indicated that she was not able to speak freely. 
27 
 
 
 
b.  Defendant's cell phone.  The defendant has standing to 
challenge the search of his cell phone.  However, the 
information gathered from the pinging of the defendant's cell 
phone -- confirmation of the location of his residence -- 
already had been gathered by other means, the search of 
Deshowitz's cell phone.  Put another way, all of the evidence 
that led police to locate the defendant was obtained through the 
initial search of Deshowitz's cell phone.  Prior to pinging the 
defendant's cell phone, police had gathered the following 
information:  (1) Deshowitz's cell phone's coordinates were at 
an address located in Brockton; (2) Deshowitz's mother informed 
police that she knew her daughter frequently visited an address 
in Brockton with a person named "Nate"; (3) at the address in 
Brockton, police discovered a vehicle in the driveway registered 
to the defendant's mother; (4) registry records also indicated 
that a driver named "Nathan Lugo" resided at the residence; and 
(5) Deshowitz's cell phone carrier provided police with 
information that her cell phone had been in contact with a cell 
phone registered to the defendant's mother.  Only then did 
police ping the defendant's cell phone and discover that it was 
in the same location as Deshowitz's cell phone -- the 
defendant's address.  Therefore, even if the pinging of the 
defendant's cell phone was improper, in the circumstances, the 
police eventually would have found the defendant, and all the 
28 
 
 
evidence that tied him to the crime, at his residence when they 
conducted the search for Deshowitz.  See Commonwealth v. 
Hernandez, 473 Mass. 379, 386 (2015).  The use of the 
defendant's cell phone's global positioning system coordinates 
merely confirmed the evidence gleaned from Deshowitz's cell 
phone.  See United States v. Ellis, 270 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1158 
(N.D. Cal. 2017).  We do not need to analyze whether there was 
probable cause and exigency to ping the defendant's phone, 
because no evidence came from the search. 
 
Conclusion.  We affirm the defendant's convictions and the 
order denying his motion for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.