Title: Ex parte Alabama Department of Transportation
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC-2023-0056, SC-2023-0354, SC-2023-0364, SC-2023-0359, SC-2022-1034
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 25, 2023

Rel: August 25, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
SPECIAL TERM, 2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0056 
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte John R. Cooper, in his official capacity as Director of 
the Alabama Department of Transportation 
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
 
 (In re: Baldwin County Bridge Company, LLC 
 
v. 
 
John R. Cooper, in his official capacity as Director of the 
Alabama Department of Transportation, and Scott Bridge 
Company, Inc.) 
 
(Montgomery Circuit Court: CV-22-901306) 
 
SC-2023-0056; SC-2023-0354; SC-2023-0364 
 
2 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0354 
_________________________ 
 
John R. Cooper, in his official capacity as Director of the 
Alabama Department of Transportation 
 
v. 
 
Baldwin County Bridge Company, LLC 
 
 
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court 
(CV-22-901306) 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0364 
_________________________ 
 
Scott Bridge Company, Inc. 
 
v. 
 
Baldwin County Bridge Company, LLC 
 
 
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court 
(CV-22-901306) 
 
 
MITCHELL, Justice. 
 
 
Baldwin County Bridge Company, LLC ("BCBC"), filed suit against 
John R. Cooper, in his official capacity as Director of the Alabama 
SC-2023-0056; SC-2023-0354; SC-2023-0364 
 
3 
 
Department of Transportation ("ALDOT"), seeking to halt construction 
of a bridge that ALDOT had hired Scott Bridge Company, Inc. ("Scott 
Bridge"), to build over the Intracoastal Waterway in Baldwin County.  
BCBC later added Scott Bridge as a defendant.  That lawsuit has since 
spawned three matters that are now pending before this Court.   
In the first matter, Cooper seeks mandamus relief because the trial 
court entered an order compelling him to respond to certain discovery 
requests made by BCBC; he argues that the information sought is 
protected from disclosure by the executive-privilege doctrine.  On 
Cooper's motion, we stayed enforcement of the trial court's discovery 
order to allow us to consider his privilege argument. 
Meanwhile, the trial-court proceedings continued and, before we 
were able to rule on Cooper's mandamus petition, the trial court granted 
BCBC's motion for a preliminary injunction to halt construction of the 
bridge.  Cooper has appealed that injunction, arguing that it was 
unwarranted and that the $100,000 preliminary-injunction bond put up 
by BCBC was insufficient.  Scott Bridge has filed its own appeal 
challenging the preliminary injunction, while also arguing that the trial 
SC-2023-0056; SC-2023-0354; SC-2023-0364 
 
4 
 
court erred by dismissing it from the case and by stating that it is not 
entitled to the protection of an injunction bond.  
After reviewing the briefs submitted by the parties in all three of 
these matters, we now conclude that BCBC's claim on which the 
preliminary injunction is based is barred by State immunity.  
Accordingly, the trial court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over that 
claim and the preliminary injunction must be reversed.  Although we rule 
in favor of Cooper on this point, we reject his companion argument that 
the trial court should be directed to increase the $100,000 preliminary-
injunction bond on remand.   We also reject Scott Bridge's argument that 
that it is entitled to recover on the preliminary-injunction bond.  Finally, 
because the discovery that Cooper seeks to withhold based on executive 
privilege is being sought in conjunction with the claim that is barred by 
State immunity, the trial court's order compelling Cooper to produce that 
information is moot, as is Cooper's petition challenging that order. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
BCBC is a private company that operates the Beach Express Bridge 
("the BEX Bridge"), a toll bridge that crosses the Intracoastal Waterway 
in Orange Beach.  There is one other bridge over the Intracoastal 
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5 
 
Waterway in Baldwin County, Holmes Bridge, which is located on 
Highway 59 in Gulf Shores about four miles west of the BEX Bridge.  
These are the only two bridges crossing the Intracoastal Waterway in 
Alabama. 
 
After becoming Director of ALDOT in 2011, Cooper approached 
BCBC about the possibility of ALDOT's buying the BEX Bridge and 
removing the toll to make it a free public bridge.  Cooper says that this 
inquiry and ALDOT's ongoing interest in purchasing the BEX Bridge was 
always motivated by a desire to reduce congestion on Holmes Bridge and 
Highway 59 caused by people unwilling to pay the BEX Bridge's toll.  
BCBC disputes this; it says that Cooper was actually motivated by his 
dislike of the deal the State struck with BCBC in 1996, which granted 
BCBC a license to set and collect tolls on the BEX Bridge in perpetuity.  
In any event, after BCBC rebuffed ALDOT's interest, Cooper decided to 
revisit an idea ALDOT had once considered -- building a third bridge over 
the Intracoastal Waterway between the BEX Bridge and Holmes Bridge. 
For about a decade, Cooper and ALDOT continued on a dual track, 
negotiating with BCBC and its corporate owners about the BEX Bridge, 
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6 
 
while also making plans to build a third bridge.1  It is undisputed that 
BCBC has been aware that Cooper was making plans to build a third 
bridge since at least 2015.  Nonetheless, negotiations concerning the BEX 
Bridge continued until October 2022, at which point the State entered 
into a formal contract with Scott Bridge for construction of the third 
bridge.2  Six days later, BCBC filed suit in the Montgomery Circuit Court, 
asserting (1) a bad-faith claim seeking an injunction to stop construction 
of the third bridge and (2) an inverse-condemnation claim requesting 
compensation from the State for the value of the BEX Bridge.  See Ex 
parte Neely, 653 So. 2d 945, 946 (Ala. 1995) (recognizing the general rule 
that "where an officer of the state is a defendant … venue is proper only 
in Montgomery County").  The theory underlying both claims was that 
Cooper wanted to construct the third bridge -- not to alleviate traffic 
congestion in Baldwin County -- but to intentionally harm BCBC and to 
 
1At different times the negotiations about the future of the BEX 
Bridge included discussions about a potential sale of the bridge to the 
State or another governmental entity, the potential expansion of the 
bridge to increase its capacity, and lowering the toll on the bridge to 
attract more vehicles. 
 
2That contract was signed on behalf of the State by both Cooper and 
Governor Kay Ivey. 
 
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7 
 
destroy the value of the BEX Bridge.  After Scott Bridge began initial 
construction work on the third bridge, BCBC amended its complaint to 
add Scott Bridge as a necessary defendant. 
 
In conjunction with its complaint, BCBC served discovery requests 
on Cooper seeking, among other things, records of all communications 
ALDOT had engaged in relevant to the bridge dispute, including (1) 
intraoffice communications between ALDOT employees and (2) 
communications between ALDOT and other State and local government 
officials, including Governor Kay Ivey and her office.  After Cooper 
objected to this request, arguing that much of the information sought was 
protected from disclosure by executive privilege,3 BCBC moved the trial 
court to compel him to turn over the requested information.  Cooper 
opposed that motion and moved the trial court to enter a protective order.  
Following a hearing, the trial court granted BCBC's motion and ordered 
 
3Executive privilege stems from "the undeniable interest of the 
executive branch of government in maintaining confidentiality over 
certain types of information necessary for the performance of its 
constitutional duties."  Assured Invs. Life Ins. Co. v. National Union 
Assocs., Inc., 362 So. 2d 228, 233 (Ala. 1978) (overruled on other grounds, 
Ex parte Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 897 So. 2d 290 (Ala. 2004)). 
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8 
 
Cooper to produce unredacted copies of all documents being withheld on 
the basis of executive privilege.   
 
Cooper then petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus.  In his 
petition, he asked us to direct the trial court to vacate its order compelling 
him to produce the requested discovery and to instead enter an order 
granting his motion for a protective order.  Cooper simultaneously filed a 
motion asking us to stay the trial court's discovery order until we ruled 
on his mandamus petition.  We granted that request and ordered a 
limited stay to allow us to consider the issues raised in Cooper's petition. 
 
While this discovery dispute was playing out, proceedings 
continued below and BCBC moved for a preliminary injunction that 
would prohibit Cooper and Scott Bridge from continuing construction on 
the third bridge.  Before responding to that motion, Cooper moved to 
dismiss BCBC's complaint on various grounds, including State immunity 
and BCBC's alleged failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.   
 
Scott Bridge filed its own motion to dismiss, arguing that it was not 
an indispensable party to the case.  But two weeks later Scott Bridge 
withdrew that motion, arguing that it would be irreparably injured if a 
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9 
 
preliminary injunction halting construction of the third bridge was 
entered.  Scott Bridge therefore argued that it was an indispensable 
party under Rule 19(a)(2)(i), Ala. R. Civ. P., and that it was entitled to 
recover on the preliminary-injunction bond if an injunction was entered 
but later found to be unwarranted.  At this point, BCBC reversed course 
and filed a response in which it argued that Scott Bridge was not an 
indispensable party and that Scott Bridge's initial motion to dismiss 
should be granted.  BCBC further moved to amend its complaint to 
remove Scott Bridge as a defendant. 
 
The trial court thereafter held a seven-day hearing on BCBC's 
motion for a preliminary injunction.  At the outset, the trial court stated 
that it had jurisdiction over the case and that it would be denying 
Cooper's motion to dismiss.  The trial court also dismissed Scott Bridge, 
expressly stating that it was not an indispensable party and that it was 
"not entitled to an injunction bond." 
 
Over the course of the hearing, the trial court took testimony from 
13 witnesses and admitted over 200 exhibits.  After testimony concluded, 
Cooper filed a renewed motion to dismiss, arguing again that BCBC's 
lawsuit was barred by State immunity and that BCBC's claims were not 
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10 
 
recognized by Alabama law.  But the trial court again rejected those 
arguments, entering separate orders (1) denying Cooper's motion to 
dismiss4 and (2) granting BCBC's request for a preliminary injunction 
halting work on the third bridge and ordering BCBC to post a $100,000 
preliminary-injunction bond.  Cooper filed his appeal challenging the 
"preliminary injunction and denial of related motions" that same day; 
Scott Bridge filed its own appeal two days later. 
Jurisdiction 
 
As always, when a jurisdictional issue has been raised by the 
parties or is apparent to us, we begin our analysis there.  See Johnson v. 
Washington, [Ms. SC-2022-0897, June 30, 2023] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 
2023) ("We address the jurisdictional disputes first because, absent 
subject-matter jurisdiction, we have no authority to reach the merits.").  
Cooper argues that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over 
BCBC's bad-faith claim -- the only basis for the preliminary injunction 
now on appeal -- because, he says, that claim is barred by the doctrine of 
 
4The trial court did dismiss BCBC's inverse-condemnation claim to 
the extent that the claim was based on State law, but it held that BCBC 
had asserted a viable inverse-condemnation claim under federal law.  
 
SC-2023-0056; SC-2023-0354; SC-2023-0364 
 
11 
 
State immunity.5  See Butler v. Parks, 337 So. 3d 1178, 1182 (Ala. 2021) 
(explaining that when State immunity applies the trial court is divested 
of subject-matter jurisdiction).   The trial court rejected Cooper's 
argument; we review the issue de novo.  See Hawkins v. Ivey, [Ms. 
1200847, Mar. 18, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2022) (stating that 
matters of subject-matter jurisdiction are subject to de novo review). 
 
The doctrine of State immunity is rooted in the Alabama 
Constitution, which provides that "the State of Alabama shall never be 
made a defendant in any court of law or equity." Ala. Const. 1901, Art. I, 
§ 14 (Off. Recomp.).  We have explained that § 14's grant of immunity is 
a jurisdictional bar that strips courts of all power to adjudicate not only 
claims against the State and its agencies, but also claims against State 
officers, employees, and agents in their official capacities when a result 
favorable to the plaintiff would directly affect a contract or property right 
 
5Cooper has also argued that there is no such thing as a bad-faith 
cause of action outside of certain insurance disputes. Our discussion of 
BCBC's bad-faith claim in the context of Cooper's State-immunity 
argument should in no way be viewed as implicit recognition of the 
viability of that claim.  See Ex parte City of Bessemer, 142 So. 3d 543, 
549 (Ala. 2013) (explaining that this Court was reviewing the plaintiff's 
bad-faith claim to determine "whether the [defendant municipality was] 
immune from such a suit, leaving aside any questions as to the legal or 
factual merits of that claim"). 
SC-2023-0056; SC-2023-0354; SC-2023-0364 
 
12 
 
of the State.  Ex parte Pinkard, [Ms. 1200658, May 27, 2022] ___ So. 3d 
___, ___ (Ala. 2022). 
 
Here, BCBC's bad-faith claim has been asserted against Cooper in 
his official capacity -- and there can be no dispute that a result favorable 
to BCBC would directly affect a contract right of the State.  The bad-faith 
claim therefore appears to be within the category of claims barred by § 
14 that a trial court has no subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain.  
Nonetheless, BCBC argues that its claim should be allowed to proceed 
because, it says, the claim falls within a limited class of claims against 
State officers that this Court has held are not claims against the State 
for § 14 purposes.   
 
In Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119,1141 (Ala. 2013), this Court 
explained that § 14 does not bar certain categories of actions, including 
"actions for injunction brought against State officials in their 
representative capacity where it is alleged that they had acted 
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken 
interpretation of law."  BCBC argues that its bad-faith claim seeking an 
injunction falls within this class of permitted actions because the claim 
alleges Cooper has acted in bad faith throughout his dealings with BCBC.   
SC-2023-0056; SC-2023-0354; SC-2023-0364 
 
13 
 
 
But BCBC's argument confuses the inquiry.  The touchstone is not 
whether a claim can be framed as falling within one of the Moulton 
categories -- it is whether the claim is against the State, that is, whether 
a result favorable to the plaintiff would directly affect a contract or 
property right of the State.  Pinkard, ___ So. 3d at ___.  The categories 
enumerated in Moulton are simply illustrations of claims for which State 
immunity generally does not apply because the action is -- both in form 
and in substance -- against an individual person rather than "the State" 
as such.6  As relevant here, § 14 typically does not bar claims against a 
State official alleging that the official acted in an ultra vires, fraudulent, 
or bad-faith fashion because such claims almost always seek to control 
only the unlawful conduct of the official; they do not seek to control the 
rights or property of the State itself.   Still, that logic does not hold when 
a claim is styled as a "bad-faith" claim yet seeks in substance to enjoin 
the State from exercising its contractual rights.  As always, it is the 
 
6The Moulton categories are commonly referred to as "exceptions" 
for the sake of convenience or as shorthand, but they are not actually 
"exceptions" to the doctrine of State immunity, as Moulton itself outlined.  
See 116 So. 3d at 1132 ("'These actions are sometimes referred to as 
"exceptions" to § 14; however, in actuality these actions are simply not 
considered to be actions "'against the State' for § 14 purposes."'" 
(citations omitted)). 
SC-2023-0056; SC-2023-0354; SC-2023-0364 
 
14 
 
substance of the claim that matters, not its label.  Pinkard, ___ So. 3d at 
___. 
 
The upshot here is that, even when a claim might appear to fall 
within one of the categories discussed in Moulton, a court has subject-
matter jurisdiction to consider that claim only if a favorable result for the 
plaintiff would not directly affect a contract or property right of the State 
and would not result in the plaintiff's recovery of money from the State 
treasury.  That this limitation applies even to the categories of cases 
discussed in Moulton was made clear in Alabama Agricultural & 
Mechanical University v. Jones, 895 So. 2d 867, 873 (Ala. 2004), in which, 
after listing several "'species of action that are not "against the State" for 
§ 14 purposes,'" the Court expressly stated:  "However, '[a]n action is one 
against the [S]tate when a favorable result for the plaintiff would directly 
affect a contract or property right of the State, or would result in the 
plaintiff's recovery of money from the [S]tate.'"  (Citations omitted.)  See 
also Moulton, 116 So. 3d at 1132 (recognizing that this Court has 
"qualified" the so-called "exceptions" to § 14's bar by recognizing that an 
action is nonetheless against the State when a result in favor of the 
plaintiff would affect a contract or property right of the State or would 
SC-2023-0056; SC-2023-0354; SC-2023-0364 
 
15 
 
result in the plaintiff recovering money from the State).  Thus, because 
BCBC's bad-faith claim seeks to directly affect a State contract right by 
sinking the State's contract with Scott Bridge, that claim is against the 
State and is barred by § 14 regardless of BCBC's efforts to fit it into one 
of the Moulton categories. 
 
BCBC argues that ruling in favor of Cooper would be contrary to 
this Court's previous decisions in both Ingle v. Adkins, 256 So. 3d 62 (Ala. 
2017) (plurality opinion), and Ex parte Alabama Department of 
Transportation, 143 So. 3d 730 (Ala. 2013) ("Ex parte ALDOT") (plurality 
opinion); but those cases are not controlling and, in any event, are readily 
distinguishable.7  In Ingle, the plaintiff sought a judgment declaring that 
a State contract was illegal as well as injunctive relief barring State 
officials from making payments under that contract.  256 So. 3d at 68.  A 
plurality of this Court held that the plaintiff's claims fell within the sixth 
Moulton category and thus rejected the defendants' State-immunity 
claims.  Id.  BCBC summarizes that holding as follows:  "Even though 
the plaintiff sought to halt performance under the State's 'contract,' this 
 
7See Ex parte DBI, Inc., 23 So. 3d 635, 647 (Ala. 2009) (recognizing 
that a plurality opinion does not constitute binding precedent). 
SC-2023-0056; SC-2023-0354; SC-2023-0364 
 
16 
 
Court found it was not an 'action against the State' and permitted the 
claim to proceed under the sixth exception to § 14 immunity."  BCBC's 
brief at 53 (in appeal no. SC-2023-0354).  BCBC argues that its bad-faith 
claim against Cooper should similarly be allowed to proceed.   
 
But there is a crucial distinction between Ingle and this case -- the 
contract at issue in Ingle was alleged to be "unconstitutional, illegal, and 
void."  Id. at 65.  If that were true here, then the State would have no 
valid contract right that could be affected by a judgment in favor of BCBC 
-- and BCBC's action would not be considered "against the State" for § 14 
purposes.  Moulton, 116 So. 3d at 1132.   BCBC, by contrast, has not 
asserted in this case that the State's contract with Scott Bridge to build 
the third bridge was illegal.  And while BCBC challenges Cooper's 
motivations for entering the contract and whether the contract was wise, 
it has not argued that the State was prohibited from entering it.8  Thus, 
unlike in Ingle, the State has a contract right here that is protected by § 
14. 
 
8In fact, § 23-1-40(a), Ala. Code 1975, expressly gives ALDOT the 
authority to enter into such contracts, stating:  "It shall be the duty of 
[ALDOT] … to construct, standardize, repair, and maintain roads and 
bridges of this state; and it shall have authority to make contracts or 
agreements to construct or pave the roadway …." 
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17 
 
 
Ex parte ALDOT also provides no help to BCBC.  In that case, this 
Court rejected Cooper's argument that the plaintiff's claim against him 
should be barred because the plaintiff sought "to recover money from the 
State"; but the claim at issue there was an inverse-condemnation claim.   
143 So. 3d at 739.  Such claims fall within a different Moulton category 
and have a fundamentally different nature.  As this Court explained in 
Engelhardt v. Jenkins, 273 Ala. 352, 354, 141 So. 2d 193, 194 (1962), 
while the Alabama Constitution bars claims against the State, that same 
Constitution -- as well as the United States Constitution -- prohibits the 
taking of private property by the State without due process and the 
payment of just compensation.  See §§ 23 and 235, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. 
Recomp.); U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.  Thus, the Court explained, "no 
sort of rationale can bring [an inverse-condemnation] case within the ban 
of § 14 of our constitution, prohibiting suits against the State."  273 Ala. 
at 354, 141 So. 2d at 195.9  Our holding today is in no way inconsistent 
with Ex parte ALDOT. 
 
9As the Ex parte ALDOT Court explained, "[t]he very point" of an 
inverse-condemnation claim is for the property owner to recover 
compensation the property owner would have received had the 
government properly initiated eminent-domain proceedings.  143 So. 3d 
at 739.  Thus, the Ex parte ALDOT Court observed, "[i]t would make no 
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18 
 
 
Finally, we address BCBC's argument that our acceptance of 
Cooper's State immunity argument "would gut" the so-called "exception" 
to § 14 for injunctive suits against State officials in their representative 
capacity when it is alleged that they have acted fraudulently, in bad faith, 
beyond their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law.  BCBC's 
brief at 53 (in appeal no. SC-2023-0354).  BCBC argues that our holding 
today would effectively permit the State "to immunize otherwise 
actionable conduct" by contracting with a third party to achieve it.  Id.  
We disagree.  As explained above in our discussion of Ingle, § 14 does not 
operate to bar a properly brought action when it is shown that the State 
contract being challenged is illegal or unconstitutional.  And, to the 
extent that BCBC is arguing that the result today is unfair, we repeat 
the observation made by this Court in Dunn Construction Co. v. State 
Board of Adjustment, 234 Ala. 372, 376, 175 So. 383, 386 (1937), that "all 
persons dealing with the state are charged with knowledge that no one 
has authority to subject the state to suit."  BCBC says that Cooper has 
dealt with it in bad faith for years, but it was on notice that Cooper was 
 
sense for valid inverse-condemnation actions to fall outside § 14 
immunity and yet to conclude that such a plaintiff could not recover 
damages from the State."  Id. at 739-40. 
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a State official that entire time.  Considering our caselaw explaining 
what constitutes an action against the State for § 14 purposes, see, e.g., 
Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ., 895 So. 2d at 873, the result today is 
hardly unforeseeable.   
 
In sum, because BCBC's bad-faith claim is barred by State 
immunity, the trial court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over that 
claim.  And because the trial court's order entering a preliminary 
injunction enjoining construction of the third bridge is predicated on the 
bad-faith claim, that order is void.  See Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Hum. 
Res., 999 So. 2d 891, 898 (Ala. 2008) (holding that, because State 
immunity barred the underlying claim, "the trial court's order granting 
… injunctive relief is void").  The preliminary-injunction order is hereby 
reversed, and, on remand, the trial court is directed to dismiss BCBC's 
bad-faith claim.10 
 
10Cooper also argues that the trial court lacks subject-matter 
jurisdiction over BCBC's inverse-condemnation claim because, he says, 
that claim is not ripe.  See, e.g., Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 915 So. 2d 557, 562 (Ala. 2005) ("Ripeness implicates subject-matter 
jurisdiction.").  In essence, Cooper argues that this claim is not ripe 
because BCBC is not in immediate danger of sustaining a legally 
cognizable injury.  But that is a challenge to the merits of the claim.  See 
Ex parte Safeway Ins. Co. of Alabama, Inc., 990 So. 2d 344, 353-55 (Ala. 
2008) (Murdock, J., concurring in the result) (emphasizing the difference 
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20 
 
The Preliminary-Injunction Bond 
 
Because the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to 
enter the preliminary injunction against Cooper, it follows that Cooper 
was "wrongfully enjoined" from continuing construction on the third 
bridge.  In fact, he "'had the right all along to do what [he] was enjoined 
from doing.'"  Ex parte Waterjet Sys., Inc., 758 So. 2d 505, 512 (Ala. 1999) 
(citation omitted).  Cooper is therefore entitled to "recover those damages 
that are 'the actual, natural and proximate result of the [wrongful] 
injunction.'"  Id. at 511 (citation omitted).  Notably, however, his recovery 
of damages is limited to the amount of the preliminary-injunction bond; 
BCBC cannot be held liable for any amount in excess of that bond unless 
it is determined that the injunction was pursued in bad faith.  Id. at 513.  
See also DeVos v. Cunningham Grp., LLC, 297 So. 3d 1176, 1185 (Ala. 
 
between an issue of ripeness, which implicates subject-matter 
jurisdiction, and the ability of the plaintiff to prove the elements of the 
asserted claim).  BCBC has alleged that it faces an imminent injury (the 
total loss of the value of its property) caused by a government action (the 
building of the third bridge) that is redressable by the payment of 
compensation for the value of that property.  That is sufficient to assert 
a ripe claim appropriate for judicial review regardless of whether the 
claim is ultimately determined to have any merit.  See Ex parte Riley, 11 
So. 3d 801, 807 (Ala. 2008) (explaining that ripeness requires that the 
case involve "a dispute that is '"'a real and substantial controversy 
admitting of specific relief through a [judgment]'"'" (citations omitted)).   
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21 
 
2019) ("The amount of the damages recoverable on the bond, however, is 
limited to the amount of the injunction bond.").   
 
In recognition of this limitation, and because he claims ALDOT's 
damages will likely exceed $100,000, Cooper urges us to "reverse the trial 
court's ruling on the bond amount" and to remand the case "for the 
setting of a proper bond," after which the trial court should take evidence 
as to ALDOT's actual damages and enter an award consistent with that 
evidence.  Cooper's brief at 69 (in appeal no. SC-2023-0354).  But 
regardless of what ALDOT's damages might be, Cooper has not shown 
that it would be proper for us to permit the trial court to increase the 
amount of the preliminary-injunction bond after we have already held 
that the preliminary injunction itself was wrongful and due to be 
reversed.  Indeed, the weight of authority indicates that such retroactive 
increases are generally not allowed.  See Michael T. Morley, Erroneous 
Injunctions, 71 Emory L.J. 1137, 1169 (2022).   
 
The holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit in Sprint Communications Co. L.P. v. CAT Communications 
International, Inc., 335 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2003), is instructive.  The 
federal district court in that case initially awarded Sprint a preliminary 
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22 
 
injunction conditioned on the submission of a $250,000 bond.  Id. at 238.  
When CAT Communications later moved the district court to terminate 
the injunction and increase the amount of the injunction bond, the 
district court granted both requests, dissolving the injunction and 
increasing the amount of the bond to $4.95 million.  Id. at 239.  On appeal, 
the Sprint court affirmed the dissolution of the injunction but reversed 
the increase in the injunction bond.  Id. at 243.  The court explained that 
while the primary purpose of an injunction bond is to provide a fund for 
compensating incorrectly enjoined defendants, the bond also protects the 
party that sought the injunction by limiting that party's liability and 
informing the party of the potential cost of a wrongful injunction.  Id. at 
240.  But, "[i]f a retroactive increase is permissible, the injunction bond 
is no longer cabined; the bond no longer fixes exposure nor caps liability."  
Id. at 240-41.  Thus, the Sprint court concluded, "[a] retroactive increase 
in the amount of an injunction bond on dissolution or reversal is generally 
improper."  Id. at 241.  Following this same reasoning, another federal 
circuit court similarly concluded that "there is neither logical nor legal 
room for a post-reversal increase in an injunction bond."  Mead Johnson 
& Co. v. Abbott Lab'ys, 209 F.3d 1032, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000).    
SC-2023-0056; SC-2023-0354; SC-2023-0364 
 
23 
 
 
We agree with the rationale of the Sprint and Mead Johnson courts.  
It would be improper for the trial court here to increase the amount of 
the preliminary-injunction bond on remand so as to expand BCBC's 
potential liability beyond the amount to which BCBC previously agreed.  
Of course, this holding does not mean that the amount of a preliminary-
injunction bond can never be increased.  We have previously considered 
appeals involving that question and did so as recently as DeVos.11  But 
such requests can be entertained only while the injunction is still in 
 
11In DeVos, this Court considered consolidated appeals challenging 
both the entry of a preliminary injunction and the denial of a later 
request to increase the amount of the preliminary-injunction bond.  Id. 
at 1178.  The Court first held that the trial court had not properly 
considered whether the plaintiffs had a reasonable chance to prevail on 
the merits, one of the factors that must be weighed before a preliminary 
injunction is entered.  Id. at 1183-84.  But the Court also held that the 
trial court had erred by denying the defendants' request for an increased 
bond.  Id. at 1187.  Thus, the Court instructed the trial court to first 
increase the amount of the injunction bond and, after doing that, to 
reconsider "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that [the plaintiffs] 
will prevail on the merits to warrant the continuation of injunctive relief."  
Id. at 1187.  The net effect of this procedure was that the trial court could 
properly increase the injunction bond (after which the plaintiffs could 
presumably decide not to proceed with their request for injunctive relief 
if they found the increased potential liability to be unpalatable) before 
making a separate determination as to whether the preliminary 
injunction was warranted.  The Court gave the trial court 30 days to 
complete this procedure, at which point the injunction would 
automatically be dissolved if the court had not affirmatively determined 
it should be continued.  Id.  
SC-2023-0056; SC-2023-0354; SC-2023-0364 
 
24 
 
place; once the injunction is determined to be unwarranted, any request 
to increase the bond is moot.  See Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 
65 F.3d 654, 664 n.13 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Because the preliminary 
injunction is dissolved, [the defendant's] appeal of the magistrate judge's 
refusal to increase the bond amount is dismissed as moot.").  Thus, 
Cooper's recovery under the preliminary-injunction bond is limited to 
$100,000 in the absence of a finding by the trial court that BCBC sought 
the injunction in bad faith. 
 
This rationale also compels us to reject Scott Bridge's argument 
that it should be allowed to recover its damages for being wrongfully 
enjoined.  A preliminary-injunction bond is a contract whereby the party 
providing the bond agrees to compensate the enjoined party if it is later 
determined that the preliminary injunction was wrongful.  Sycamore 
Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. Coosa Cable Co., 81 So. 3d 1224, 1235 (Ala. 2011).  
The bond submitted by BCBC and approved by the trial court provides 
that BCBC is "bound unto the Defendant [Cooper] in the sum of $100,000 
dollars, as security for the payment of such costs, damages and 
reasonable attorneys fees as may be incurred or suffered by the 
Defendant in the event the Defendant is found to have been wrongfully 
SC-2023-0056; SC-2023-0354; SC-2023-0364 
 
25 
 
enjoined or restrained."  (Emphasis added.)  If we altered the terms of 
the bond here to permit Scott Bridge to recover under the bond, it would 
effectively increase the exposure of BCBC -- which agreed only to be liable 
for expenses incurred by Cooper (and by extension ALDOT) -- beyond 
what it agreed to when the injunction was entered.  As explained above, 
that should be avoided.  See Mead Johnson, 209 F.3d at 1033 (explaining 
that the plaintiff should know "what his exposure is when the bond is set 
by the district court.  It is not unlimited."); see also Alabama Power Co. 
v. Hamilton, 201 Ala. 62, 65, 77 So. 356, 359 (1917) ("After all that may 
be said on the subject of liability to the obligee of [injunction] bonds, it 
cannot be held to be extended beyond the precise terms of the 
undertaking. … [T]he surety is entitled to the protection of, and to 
subjection to liability by, the letter of the contract.  That obligation cannot 
be added to nor taken from by either party to the suit, nor by the court 
itself."); Marengo Cnty. v. Matkin, 144 Ala. 574, 576-77, 42 So. 33, 34 
(1905) ("[The plaintiff] has a right of action upon the bond if on the facts 
averred he has shown that he has suffered any recoverable damages. [¶] 
It is true he is not named as an obligee in it, neither was he a party to 
the proceeding in which the writ of injunction was issued, but the bond 
SC-2023-0056; SC-2023-0354; SC-2023-0364 
 
26 
 
is conditioned 'To pay or to cause to be paid all damages and costs which 
any person may sustain by the suing out of said injunction if the same is 
dissolved.'  This obligation is broad enough to confer upon him a right of 
action for all damages resulting to him from the direct effects of the 
injunction.").12  Scott Bridge is therefore not entitled to recover on the 
preliminary-injunction bond.   
 
Our holding on this point makes it unnecessary to consider Scott 
Bridge's argument that the trial court erred by dismissing it as a 
defendant.  Scott Bridge sought to remain in the case only so it could seek 
recovery on the injunction bond.  We have concluded that it cannot, which 
means there is no reason for Scott Bridge to be a defendant in the case 
(which now consists only of BCBC's inverse-condemnation claim) on 
 
12Scott Bridge notes that, in Sycamore, "a competitor of a plaintiff 
cable-television provider was permitted to make a claim on a preliminary 
injunction bond when the plaintiff had obtained an improper injunction 
stopping a defendant owner of [an] apartment complex from switching 
cable-television providers."  Scott Bridge's brief at 20 (in appeal no. SC-
2023-0364).   But, unlike here, the language of the bond in that case 
expressly contemplated the claim.  See Sycamore, 81 So. 3d at 1228 
("'Surety, hereby acknowledges that it is bound to pay the sum of 
$100,000 … for any damages incurred as a result of the [preliminary-
injunction] [o]rder if it is determined that [the owner of the apartment 
complex and competing cable-television provider] were wrongly enjoined 
or restrained.'" (quoting bond; emphasis added)). 
 
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27 
 
remand. The trial court's order dismissing Scott Bridge is therefore 
affirmed. 
The Discovery Order 
 
Finally, we turn to Cooper's petition challenging the trial court's 
order compelling him to produce certain records that he alleges are 
protected from disclosure by executive privilege.  As BCBC's motion to 
compel made clear, BCBC sought the records that are the subject of this 
discovery dispute because "[t]he key issue that will be tried at the 
preliminary injunction [stage] is whether Director Cooper decided to 
build an expensive new bridge with Alabama taxpayer money to harm 
BCBC and put it out of business, and whether he acted with a dishonest 
purpose in proceeding with the new bridge."  Thus, BCBC continued, "the 
deliberative process of Director Cooper and [ALDOT] is the central issue 
in this case."   
 
From these statements, it is evident that BCBC's discovery request 
was targeted toward its bad-faith claim.  And as we have already 
explained above, that claim is due to be dismissed because it is barred by 
State immunity.  BCBC therefore has no need for the discovery sought 
because Cooper's intent and motivations for building the third bridge 
SC-2023-0056; SC-2023-0354; SC-2023-0364 
 
28 
 
have no relevance to BCBC's sole remaining claim that the State has 
effectively condemned its property.  See Housing Auth. of Birmingham 
Dist. v. Logan Props., Inc., 127 So. 3d 1169, 1174 (Ala. 2012) ("[A] plaintiff 
asserting an inverse-condemnation claim is required to put forth 
substantial evidence of the following elements: (1) that the defendant is 
an entity 'invested with the privilege of taking property for public use'; 
(2) that the plaintiff's property was 'taken, injured, or destroyed'; and (3) 
that that taking, injury, or destruction was caused 'by the construction 
or enlargement of [the defendant's] works, highways, or improvements.'" 
(citation omitted)).  The trial court's order compelling Cooper to produce 
the requested discovery is therefore moot, as is Cooper's petition 
challenging that order. 
Conclusion 
 
The trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the 
bad-faith claim that served as the basis of the preliminary injunction; the 
order entering that injunction is therefore void, and we reverse it.  On 
remand, the trial court is directed to dismiss the underlying bad-faith 
claim.  Because Cooper was wrongfully enjoined, we affirm the order 
permitting him to recover expenses up to the $100,000 limit of the 
SC-2023-0056; SC-2023-0354; SC-2023-0364 
 
29 
 
injunction bond.  Finally, the trial court's judgment dismissing Scott 
Bridge from the case is affirmed, and Cooper's petition challenging the 
trial court's discovery order is dismissed as moot. 
 
SC-2023-0056 -- PETITION DISMISSED. 
 
Shaw, Wise, Sellers, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur. 
 
Parker, C.J., concurs specially, with opinion. 
 
Cook, J., recuses himself. 
 
SC-2023-0354 -- AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; 
AND REMANDED. 
 
Shaw, Wise, Sellers, and Stewart, JJ., concur.  
 
Parker, C.J., concurs specially, with opinion. 
 
Mendheim, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result, with 
opinion.  
 
Cook, J., recuses himself. 
 
SC-2023-0364 -- AFFIRMED. 
 
Shaw, Wise, and Stewart, JJ., concur.  
 
Parker, C.J., concurs specially, with opinion.  
 
Sellers, J., concurs in the result.  
 
Mendheim, J., concurs in the result, with opinion.  
 
Cook, J., recuses himself. 
 
 
SC-2023-0056; SC-2023-0354; SC-2023-0364 
 
30 
 
PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring specially).  
 
"You shall not show partiality in judgment; you shall hear the small 
and the great alike." Deuteronomy 1:17 (NASB). Unless the Alabama 
government is the defendant. See Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const. 2022.  
 
 
SC-2023-0056; SC-2023-0354; SC-2023-0364 
 
31 
 
MENDHEIM, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the result in 
appeal no. SC-2023-0354 and concurring in the result in appeal no. 
SC-2023-0364). 
 
 
I concur in the result as to the section of the main opinion entitled 
"The Preliminary-Injunction Bond."  I concur as to all other parts of the 
main opinion.