Title: State Dept. of Public Safety v. Kneisl
Citation: 251 N.W.2d 645
Docket Number: 46789
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 1977

251 N.W.2d 645 (1977) STATE of Minnesota, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellant, v. Lawrence Roman KNEISL, Respondent. No. 46789. Supreme Court of Minnesota. March 4, 1977. *646 Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Joel A. Watne, Sp. Asst., St. Paul, for appellant. Bradford, Kennedy &amp; Nervig and Charles R. Kennedy, Wadena, for respondent. Heard before KELLY, TODD and WINTON, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc. TODD, Justice. Lawrence Roman Kneisl was arrested by a Wadena policeman for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic *647 beverage, Minn.St. 169.121, and for other traffic offenses. Kneisl was transported to the county jail in Wadena where, after his arrival, he telephoned his attorney. The attorney appeared at the jail approximately ½ hour later and requested a private consultation with his client. After this request was denied, Kneisl refused to take any of the chemical tests provided for in the implied-consent statute, Minn.St. 169.123. The jury returned a verdict that Kneisl did not have reasonable grounds to refuse the testing. The trial court, in response to a motion for a directed verdict which had been taken under advisement, vacated the jury verdict and held that Kneisl had reasonable grounds to refuse the testing as a matter of law. We affirm. At the commencement of the trial, the parties stipulated that the only issue before the court was whether reasonable grounds were present for Kneisl to refuse to take the implied-consent tests. The evidence discloses that the arresting officer first offered to administer the implied-consent tests to Kneisl in the squad car on the way to the jail. Upon Kneisl's arrival at the jail at approximately 8:15 p.m., after his initial request to telephone his attorney had been refused, he was ultimately afforded an opportunity to do so. After Kneisl completed the telephone call to his attorney, the arresting officer read the implied-consent advisory to Kneisl, who indicated confusion concerning his rights. He offered to take a breath test, which could not be administered because the breathalyzer machine was out of order. The arresting officer then began to fill out the implied-consent advisory form, reading the questions to Kneisl and recording his answers. The officer testified that while reading the form, he avoided references to the breath test, and in two of the four places on the form where the word "breath" appears, he crossed it out. There is a conflict in testimony as to whether the form had been completed when Kneisl's attorney arrived at the jail. However, we do not regard this as a crucial factor. It is conceded that if the test had been administered after the attorney had arrived and after he had been allowed a short conference with his client, the validity of the results would not be impaired. Kneisl testified that the following took place when his attorney arrived at the jail: Kneisl's version of what transpired after his attorney's arrival at the jail is supported by the testimony of the arresting officer. The officer testified that, while Kneisl was in his custody, he would not permit a private consultation between Kneisl and his attorney because he did not "feel that he had the right to talk to him at that time." At the close of the state's case, a motion for directed verdict was made by Kneisl's counsel. The court took the motion under advisement. The matter was submitted to the jury which found that Kneisl did not have reasonable grounds to refuse the implied-consent tests. Thereafter, the trial court, acting on the motion for directed verdict, held that Kneisl had reasonable grounds to refuse testing as a matter of law and set aside the jury verdict. Judgment was entered denying revocation of Kneisl's driver's license. The state filed this appeal following a denial of its motion to vacate the judgment and reinstate the jury verdict. 1. We are presented with the application in an implied-consent case of Minn.St. 481.10 which provides: Recently, in Prideaux v. State, Dept. of Public Safety, Minn., 247 N.W.2d 385 (1976), we recognized a limited right to counsel under § 481.10 when a person is arrested for allegedly violating § 169.121. We stated: In this case a telephone call was allowed but a private conference with the attorney was prohibited at the jail. It is undisputed that the attorney arrived promptly at the jail and that a reasonable time for a conference with his client would not have affected the validity of any test administered thereafter. Under these circumstances, it would be a sham to permit the telephone call and then deny the arrested person an opportunity to consult with his attorney at the jail. The arrested person assumes the risk that his attorney will not *649 appear promptly enough so as to satisfy the reasonable time requirements of Prideaux. However, after permitting the arrested person to telephone his attorney, the police may continue with their routine processing of the individual and the implied-consent form. If the attorney arrives at the jail within a reasonable time so as to not affect the validity of the implied-consent testing, a private consultation between attorney and client must be allowed. After the private conference the arrested person must again be afforded the opportunity to submit to the implied-consent testing. 2. Minn.St. 481.10 provides for a private interview at the place of custody. In State v. Held, Minn., 246 N.W.2d 863, 864 (1976), in discussing what constitutes a private telephone conversation, we said: We apply the same rationale to a private interview. If security permits and a private room is available, it should be provided to counsel. If such a facility is unavailable or impermissible under the circumstances, counsel should be allowed to confer with his client out of the earshot of others in the room. None of this conversation between the attorney and his client can be used against the defendant, no matter how obtained, unless the defendant agrees to the introduction of such evidence. We regard this as a practical solution to the statutorily imposed requirements of privacy. We note that the trial court in its memorandum accompanying its order perceptively anticipated our decision in Prideaux and reached the conclusion with which we are in accord. The trial court stated: Affirmed.