Title: In re R.L.O.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 87A20
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: November 20, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 87A20 
Filed 20 November 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: R.L.O., L.P.O., and C.M.O. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 
20 December 2019 by Judge Christine Underwood in District Court, Iredell County. 
This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 7 October 2020 
but determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) 
of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Lauren Vaughan for petitioner-appellee Iredell County Department of Social 
Services. 
 
Matthew D. Wunsche, GAL Appellate Counsel, for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Christopher M. Watford, for respondent-appellant father. 
 
 
EARLS, Justice.  
 
Respondent-Father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights to 
his minor children, R.L.O. (Ron), L.P.O. (Larry), and C.M.O. (Cathy).1 Having 
successfully appealed an earlier order that was vacated and remanded by the Court 
of Appeals, respondent’s central argument before this Court is that the trial court 
failed to hear new evidence on remand and therefore could not make appropriate 
                                            
1 Pseudonyms are used in this opinion to protect the children’s identities and for ease 
of reading. 
IN RE R.L.O. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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findings of fact to justify the termination of his parental rights on grounds of neglect, 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1).  However, on remand, respondent stipulated 
that the trial court could proceed without receiving new evidence.  While that does 
not relieve the trial court of the responsibility to determine whether the petitioner 
has presented “clear, cogent, and convincing” evidence of the grounds for termination, 
see N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2019) (“The burden in such proceedings shall be upon the 
petitioner or movant and all findings of fact shall be based on clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence.”), the stipulation is binding here as well and does prevent 
respondent from raising the trial court’s failure to hear new evidence as a reason for 
this Court to reverse its order.  The trial court’s supplemental findings of fact 
establish a pattern of neglect by respondent and a course of conduct from which it 
was reasonable to conclude that his neglect of the children would continue in the 
future.  Therefore we affirm the trial court’s order.   
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
The Iredell County Department of Social Services (DSS) obtained non secure 
custody of the children and filed juvenile petitions alleging that they were neglected 
and dependent juveniles on 3 July 2017.2 On 4 October 2017, prior to the hearing of 
the juvenile petition filed by DSS, the guardian ad litem (GAL) for the children filed 
                                            
2 The Court of Appeals’ opinion in this case includes a detailed discussion of the 
underlying facts surrounding the filing of the juvenile petitions which will not be repeated 
here. See In re R.L.O., No. COA18-593, 2018 WL 6613855 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2018) 
(unpublished). 
IN RE R.L.O. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of respondent and the children’s 
mother. The GAL alleged that grounds existed to terminate their parental rights 
based on abuse, neglect, and the commission of a felony assault resulting in serious 
bodily injury to another child who lived in the home. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (8) 
(2019). The trial court consolidated the proceedings for hearing and entered orders in 
the matters on 5 April 2018. The trial court adjudicated the children to be neglected 
and dependent juveniles but concluded the entry of a disposition in the juvenile 
matter was “moot” because it also entered an order terminating parental rights. The 
trial court found the existence of all three grounds alleged in the petition to terminate 
the parental rights of respondent and the children’s mother and concluded that 
termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Respondent and 
the children’s mother appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed the order adjudicating the children to be 
neglected and dependent juveniles but vacated the trial court’s determination that 
the disposition was moot and remanded for entry of a disposition order. 
In re R.L.O., No. COA18-593, 2018 WL 6613855, at *14 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2018) 
(unpublished). The Court of Appeals also affirmed the orders terminating the 
parental rights of the children’s mother. Id. As to respondent, the Court of Appeals 
held that the trial court erred in concluding that respondent committed a felony 
assault resulting in serious bodily injury to another child who lived in the home 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(8) because there was insufficient evidence. Id. at 
IN RE R.L.O. 
 
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*10. The Court of Appeals further concluded that the trial court erred by ruling that 
grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) to terminate respondent’s 
parental rights because the trial court failed to make findings demonstrating abuse 
or neglect at the time of the termination hearing or that there was a probability of a 
repetition of abuse or neglect if the children were returned to respondent’s care. Id. 
at *12–13. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals vacated the order terminating 
respondent’s parental rights and remanded for additional findings on whether there 
was a probability of repetition of neglect. Id. at *11–14. In remanding the matter, the 
Court of Appeals explicitly stated that whether to receive additional evidence on 
remand was in the trial court’s discretion. Id. at *14. 
On remand, the trial court did not receive additional evidence and entered new 
adjudication and disposition orders terminating respondent’s parental rights on 
20 December 2019 based on “a review of the record[ ] and . . . without consideration 
of new evidence.” The trial court did make additional findings of fact, again found the 
existence of all three grounds alleged in the petition, and concluded that termination 
of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Respondent 
appeals.  
B. Legal Analysis 
The legal standards applicable to this case are well established.  “Our Juvenile 
Code provides for a two-step process for termination of parental rights proceedings 
consisting of an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage.” In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 
IN RE R.L.O. 
 
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88, 94 (2020) (citing N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019)). “At the adjudicatory stage, 
the petitioner bears the burden of proving by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ 
the existence of one or more grounds for termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the 
General Statutes.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 5–6 (2019) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) 
(2017)). We review a trial court’s adjudication of grounds to terminate parental rights 
“to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing 
evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 
392 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). “Unchallenged 
findings of fact made at the adjudicatory stage are binding on appeal.” In re Z.V.A., 
373 N.C. 207, 211 (2019) (citing Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97 (1991)).  
Whether or not to receive additional evidence on remand is a determination within 
the trial court’s discretion so long as the reviewing court’s mandate does not specify 
otherwise. See In re S.M.M., 374 N.C. 911, 914 (2020) (holding that when the Court 
of Appeals is silent as to whether the trial court should take new evidence on remand, 
that decision is left to the trial court’s discretion). 
Additionally, “[a] trial court’s finding of fact that is supported by clear, cogent, 
and convincing evidence is deemed conclusive even if the record contains evidence 
that would support a contrary finding.” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 379 (2019) (citing 
In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 403−04 (1982)). “The trial court’s conclusions of law are 
reviewable de novo on appeal.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19 (2019). 
IN RE R.L.O. 
 
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With regard to respondent’s appeal, the Court of Appeals’ instructions for the 
trial court on remand were clear: 
On remand, the trial court must consider the evidence of a 
probability of a repetition of neglect by respondent-father 
in light of a parent’s right to reunification efforts when a 
child is placed in DSS custody following an initial 
adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency and the 
limited grounds upon which the trial court is authorized to 
forgo such efforts under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-901(c). The 
court may receive additional evidence as it deems 
appropriate. See In re D.R.B., 182 N.C. App. 733, 739, 643 
S.E.2d 77, 81 (2007). 
 
In re R.L.O., 2018 WL 6613855, *14.  The Court of Appeals explicitly left to the trial 
court the determination of whether to consider new evidence on the issue of the 
probability of future neglect by respondent.  Respondent contends that the trial court 
erred by making new findings of fact and entering its new adjudication order without 
receiving new evidence. However, respondent stipulated that the trial court could 
enter an order on remand without receiving new evidence.3 The adjudication and 
disposition orders on remand both specifically state that “[t]he attorneys stipulated 
that the Court conduct a review of the record, and to enter this order without 
consideration of new evidence.” Respondent does not dispute the existence of this 
stipulation, stating in his brief that “[i]n its order following remand, the trial court 
and the parties who stipulated agreed that the trial court could enter a new order 
                                            
3 Between the time of the first termination hearing and the hearing on remand, 
respondent was found guilty of felony child abuse and sentenced to a term of incarceration. 
Any reopening of the record would have permitted consideration of that fact. 
IN RE R.L.O. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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without a hearing and ‘without consideration of new evidence.’ ” Having made that 
stipulation before the trial court, respondent is bound by it now.  Therefore, it was 
not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to decide not to open the record to receive 
additional evidence on remand. 
Nevertheless, we still must consider respondent’s argument that the trial court 
erred by adjudicating that grounds existed to terminate his parental rights based on 
neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). “[A]n adjudication of any single ground 
in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient to support a termination of parental rights.” 
In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 395.  
A trial court may terminate parental rights when it concludes that the parent 
has neglected the juvenile within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15). N.C.G.S. § 
7B-1111(a)(1). A neglected juvenile is defined, in pertinent part, as a juvenile “whose 
parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker does not provide proper care, supervision, 
or discipline; . . . or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.” 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019).  
Termination of parental rights based upon this statutory 
ground requires a showing of neglect at the time of the 
termination hearing or, if the child has been separated 
from the parent for a long period of time, there must be a 
showing of past neglect and a likelihood of future neglect 
by the parent. 
 
In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 843 (2016) (citing In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 713–15 
(1984)). “When determining whether such future neglect is likely, the district court 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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must consider evidence of changed circumstances occurring between the period of 
past neglect and the time of the termination hearing.” In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. at 212 
(citing In re Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715). 
Respondent objects to the findings made by the trial court but does not 
challenge the trial court’s evidentiary basis supporting those findings. Instead, 
respondent argues that the findings improperly attempt to implicate him in the abuse 
perpetrated by the mother against the children’s sibling. Respondent contends the 
trial court’s findings are irrelevant and apply only to the time before DSS removed 
the children from his care. He argues the trial court failed to make findings on 
remand that demonstrated that it considered evidence of changed circumstances and 
instead relied solely on pre-removal evidence for its conclusions of law. Ultimately, 
he contends the trial court’s findings do not support its conclusion that there is a high 
likelihood of repetition of neglect should the children be returned to his care, and thus 
the trial court erred in adjudicating the existence of the ground of neglect. 
Respondent’s arguments are misplaced. 
Respondent’s failure to challenge the evidentiary basis for the trial court’s 
findings of fact makes them binding on appeal. In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. at 211. The trial 
court’s findings establish that the children were removed from respondent’s home on 
3 July 2017 and subsequently adjudicated to be neglected juveniles. The children’s 
mother was suffering from postpartum depression after the birth of Cathy and was 
not fit to care for them. Respondent knew the mother was incapable of providing for 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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their care, yet he regularly left her to care for the children without providing her 
assistance or ensuring that she was receiving proper treatment for her mental health 
issues. The trial court found respondent willfully failed to ensure the children were 
properly cared for and placed them at a substantial risk of harm by other than 
accidental means when he left them in their mother’s care. Their home was in poor 
condition, with “scraps of food, insects, and trash in the home,” and “[o]utside of the 
home, there was a copious amount of trash, including tires and scrap metal.” During 
one visit by a social worker, the home had a non-functioning toilet that was clogged 
with human waste and toilet paper; there were bags of trash inside the home, some 
of which were torn; the kitchen was dirty; clothes were strewn about the house; some 
of the rooms could not be accessed due to the clutter found therein. The social worker 
described the home at times as appearing to have been “ransacked.” Respondent was 
responsible for keeping the home in a habitable condition but failed to do so and did 
not ensure the children were properly cared for.  
Respondent also entered into a safety agreement with DSS and moved with 
the children to temporarily reside with a family friend. Shortly thereafter, however, 
he returned with the children to the home and left them in their mother’s 
unsupervised care knowing she had not received treatment for her mental health 
issues and that she was not a proper caregiver for them. The trial court found that 
respondent failed to comply with the safety agreement and placed the children at 
substantial risk of harm by other than accidental means.  
IN RE R.L.O. 
 
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DSS identified problems in the home, discussed the problems with respondent, 
and offered him services to alleviate the problems. DSS made a referral for day care 
to assist respondent and the children’s mother, in part to alleviate pressures on the 
mother, but respondent and the mother failed to properly follow up with that offered 
assistance. DSS also recommended services to assist with the following: (1) therapy 
for the children’s sibling; (2) the mother’s mental health; (3) improper supervision of 
the children; (4) “domestic discord”; and (5) lack of transportation. Nonetheless, 
respondent and the mother failed to take advantage of the services and address the 
problems.  
The trial court also made detailed findings about the mother’s child abuse 
which showed that respondent had to have been aware of the abuse and did nothing 
to either protect his children or seek medical treatment for the abused child. The trial 
court’s findings demonstrate that respondent and the mother did not provide proper 
care for the children. Among the findings found by the trial court were that (1) 
respondent and the mother failed to seek proper treatment for diaper rashes; (2) 
respondent and the mother allowed the children to become extremely dirty with ants 
in their hair and mouse feces in their diapers; (3) the children suffered from numerous 
insect bites; and (4) Larry had a bruise on his arm consistent with a human bite mark. 
The lack of care continued up until DSS obtained custody of the children. Police 
officers and social workers found Larry in his bed with roaches and ants, his clothing 
so dirty it was sticking to his skin, roaches running around the house, the house 
IN RE R.L.O. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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uninhabitable and smelling of human feces, and the house full of trash and personal 
belongings strewn about making it difficult to walk inside. Ron also suffered from a 
speech delay for which respondent and the mother failed to seek treatment. The 
parents had been arrested and remained in custody through the hearings on charges 
for felony child abuse. Based on these findings, the trial court concluded respondent 
had neglected the children, and there was a high probability the neglect would 
reoccur if the children were returned to his care and custody.  
Respondent argues the trial court based its entire conclusion on findings of fact 
regarding events that occurred prior to the children’s removal from the home by DSS. 
Respondent concedes there was evidence to support prior neglect but argues the trial 
court made no findings regarding changed circumstances occurring between the 
period of past neglect and the time of the termination hearing and thus failed to 
comply with the Court of Appeals’ mandate and our law regarding neglect. See In re 
Z.V.A., 373 N.C. at 212. We disagree.  
The mandate from the Court of Appeals was that “the trial court must consider 
the evidence of a probability of a repetition of neglect by respondent-father.” 
In re R.L.O., 2018 WL 6613855, at *14. The mandate did not require the trial court 
to make specific findings of fact, and the trial court’s new findings on remand 
establish a probability of repetition of neglect. Moreover, respondent directs this 
Court to no evidence of changed circumstances from the time the children were 
removed from his care through the hearing from which the trial court may have made 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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the findings sought by respondent. “It is not the role of the appellate courts . . . to 
create an appeal for an appellant,” Viar v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 402 
(2005), and this Court will not presume error where none is shown. See State v. 
Williams, 274 N.C. 328, 333 (1968) (“An appellate court is not required to, and should 
not, assume error by the trial judge when none appears on the record before the 
appellate court.”). 
We hold the trial court’s findings on remand, which are binding on this Court, 
fully support its determination that the ground of neglect existed to terminate 
respondent’s parental rights. Because only one ground is needed to terminate 
parental rights, we need not address respondent’s arguments as to the remaining two 
grounds found by the trial court. See In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 395. 
We next address respondent’s argument that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it determined that termination of respondent’s parental rights was 
in the best interests of the children. “ ‘If a trial court finds one or more grounds to 
terminate parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a), it then proceeds to the 
dispositional stage,’ at which it ‘determine[s] whether terminating the parent’s rights 
is in the juvenile’s best interest.’ ” In re I.N.C., 374 N.C. 542, 546 (2020) (alteration 
in original) (first quoting In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 6 (2019); then quoting 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)). In determining whether termination of parental rights is in 
the child’s best interests, 
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the court shall consider the following criteria and make 
written findings regarding the following that are relevant: 
 
(1) The age of the juvenile. 
 
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile. 
 
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in 
the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile. 
 
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent. 
 
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and 
the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other 
permanent placement.  
 
(6) Any relevant consideration. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). “The trial court’s assessment of a juvenile’s best 
interests at the dispositional stage is reviewed solely for abuse of discretion.” 
In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. at 6 (citing In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 842 (2016)). “[A]buse of 
discretion results where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is 
so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Id. at 6–7 
(alteration in original) (quoting In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107 (2015)). 
Respondent contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it accepted 
counsel’s stipulation that new evidence need not be considered on remand and by 
failing to consider the children’s current circumstances when making its best 
interests determination. Certainly the trial court was not restricted from considering 
new evidence on remand.  However, there is nothing in the record suggesting the trial 
court believed it was bound by the stipulation of trial counsel or that it felt restricted 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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in any manner from receiving new evidence in this case if such evidence were 
required. The Court of Appeals specified that, on remand, “[t]he court may receive 
additional evidence as it deems appropriate” and “the trial court may hear additional 
evidence in its sound discretion.” In re R.L.O., 2018 WL 6613855, at *14. Moreover, 
respondent has not demonstrated any need for the trial court to receive new evidence 
in this case beyond his mere speculation, which is insufficient to show that the trial 
court abused its discretion by not receiving additional evidence on remand. See In re 
S.M.M., 374 N.C. 911, 915 (2020) (“Mere speculation that some facts may have 
changed in the eighteen months since the court originally heard the evidence is not 
sufficient to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
respondent’s motion to reopen the evidence on remand. Absent any forecast of 
relevant testimony or other evidence bearing upon the Court’s ultimate 
determination of the child’s best interests, the trial court’s decision to refrain from 
reopening the record is entirely consistent with this Court’s general admonition that 
a trial court must always hear any relevant and competent evidence concerning the 
best interests of the child.”). Respondent has not forecast any evidence concerning the 
children’s current circumstances that would have had a bearing on the trial court’s 
determination of the children’s best interests. Thus, we conclude respondent has not 
shown that the trial court abused its discretion by entering its dispositional order 
without taking new evidence, and we hold this argument is without merit. 
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Respondent also challenges the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that it was in 
the children’s best interests to terminate his parental rights. Respondent contends 
that the trial court’s findings as to the ages of the children are unsupported because 
they are based on the date of the original termination hearing and not the date of the 
hearing on remand. However, the trial court’s order was based on evidence from the 
original termination hearing and its analysis of that evidence. Consequently, there is 
no error.  
Respondent additionally argues the trial court’s finding that there is a high 
likelihood the children will be adopted is unsupported in the absence of new evidence 
of the children’s circumstances since the original termination hearing. He presents a 
similar argument regarding the finding that the children have been placed in the 
same foster home and have a loving bond with their foster parents who desire to adopt 
them. Respondent’s arguments are speculative, and he has not shown that the trial 
court abused its discretion by not receiving new evidence on remand. See In re 
S.M.M., 374 N.C. at 914–15. Additionally, respondent concedes that, as found by the 
trial court, there was no permanent plan for the children at the time of the hearing. 
Respondent asserts, however, that the trial court’s dispositional finding that adoption 
would be the most appropriate permanent plan for the children is an expression of 
preference and not a proper finding of fact. We agree and ignore this portion of the 
trial court’s finding of fact. 
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The trial court made findings of fact regarding the relevant factors under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), which are either unchallenged by respondent or supported by 
competent evidence. The trial court’s findings reflect reasoned decision-making and 
support its conclusion that termination of respondent’s parental rights is in the 
children’s best interests. Respondent has not shown that the trial court abused its 
discretion in so concluding, and we affirm the trial court’s orders terminating 
respondent’s parental rights to Ron, Larry, and Cathy. 
AFFIRMED.