Title: Davison v. Williams
Citation: 242 N.E.2d 101, 251 Ind. 448
Docket Number: 1268S200
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: December 4, 1968

251 Ind. 448 (1968)
242 N.E.2d 101
DAVISON
v.
WILLIAMS.
No. 1268S200.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed December 4, 1968.
*450 Robert W. Davis, Corydon, for appellant.
James D. Williams, Corydon, for appellee.
HUNTER, J.
This is a civil action brought by Herman L. Williams for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by him as a result of a collision which occurred when an automobile driven by Henry Davison, the Defendant and Petitioner herein, crashed into the rear-end of Williams' automobile. After trial by jury, Williams was awarded damages in the amount of $7,500. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Appellate Court of Indiana, Division I. Davison v. Williams (1968), 142 Ind. App. 402, 235 N.E.2d 90. The case is now before this Court on a petition to transfer. Rule 2-23, Rules of the Supreme Court of Indiana.
The evidence offered at trial revealed that Plaintiff-Respondent Williams was driving to work on the day of the collision traveling over rather hilly terrain when it became necessary for him to stop his automobile on the traveled portion of the highway to await the passage of a train. The Defendant-Petitioner, who was traveling in the same direction behind *451 Respondent, upon making a curve in the road, saw that Respondent's auto was stopped for the train. However, Petitioner's brakes failed completely, causing him to collide with the rear-end of Respondent's auto.
In his petition to transfer, Petitioner asserts that the Appellate Court's opinion in this case contravenes the ruling precedent of this Court by approving the following instructions given by the trial court to the jury:
At the same time, the trial court refused to give Defendant's Instruction 8, which reads as follows
The opinion of the Appellate Court suggests that its refusal to accept Petitioners' claim of error on the part of the trial court in giving Plaintiff's Instructions 5, 6 and 7, above, was based primarily upon Petitioner's failure at trial to tender instructions which would have corrected the mistakes he was objecting to in the instructions submitted by Plaintiff. In so holding the Appellate Court cites the following language from Wiltrout, Indiana Practice:
However, it should be noted that the next sentence appearing in Wiltrout makes the above statement inapplicable to the present case. The next sentence reads:
The exception relating to mandatory instructions is classically applicable to the case here before us.
Plaintiff's Instructions 5, 6 and 7 can only be viewed as mandatory instructions. They had the effect of instructing the *454 jury that if they found from the evidence that Petitioner violated a safety regulation they could only find that Petitioner had been "guilty of negligence as a matter of law," and upon a finding of proximate cause they were required to grant damages to the Respondent. No mention was made of the Indiana law regarding excuse or justification in cases of alleged negligence involving violation of safety regulations.
As noted above, it is well-settled in Indiana that a mandatory instruction must set out all elements essential for recovery, and if an essential element is omitted, the instruction is erroneous and cannot be cured by other instructions. Taylor v. Fitzpatrick (1956), 235 Ind. 238, 132 N.E.2d 919; Redd v. Indianapolis Railways (1951), 121 Ind. App. 472, 97 N.E.2d 501. As the discussion below will indicate, information regarding the effect of excuse or justification in statutory negligence cases was essential to the completeness of all three of the above-quoted Plaintiff's instructions.
In approving the giving of the mandatory Plaintiff's Instructions 5, 6 and 7, and in approving the refusal to give Defendant's Instruction 8, the Appellate Court, in effect, declared the law of Indiana to be as follows: the violation of the provisions of a statute in the operation of a motor vehicle on a public highway, which violation is the proximate cause of the injury, is negligence per se and, once such violation is proved, as a matter of law the violator is liable for all injuries thereby caused. Since 1916, the law of Indiana has been to the contrary. Condor v. Griffith (1916), 61 Ind. App. 218, 111 N.E. 816.
In Larkins v. Kohlmeyer (1951), 229 Ind. 391, 98 N.E.2d 896, this Court approved the excuse or justification exception to the statutory negligence rule:
The theory underlying the excuse or justification exception in this area of law was discussed in detail by Dean Foust in his article, "The Use of Criminal Law as a Standard of Civil Responsibility in Indiana," 35 Ind. L.J. 45 (1959):
So long as the fault concept is central to the law of negligence, a rule imposing strict liability without regard to excuse or justification would be "something like using a yardstick to measure a pint of spaghetti simply because the yardstick happens to be handy." 35 Ind. L.J. 58.
Even though the Indiana rule is well-settled that violation of a safety statute will constitute negligence as a matter of law only in the absence of justification or excuse, there is much confusion as to how a violation of a safety regulation will affect the proof burdens of the parties in a civil suit. The crux of the problem is the difficulty in deciding what weight should be given to a legislative definition of a criminal wrong in the adjudication of a civil action for damages involving a violation of that legislative enactment.
We believe that the wisest course for the courts of Indiana to take in the adjudication of a suit involving negligence by violation of a safety regulation is to treat plaintiff's proof of defendant's violation of the safety regulation as creating a rebuttable presumption of negligence. This rule has long been followed by the courts of California. Pete v. Norberg (1958), 163 Cal. App. 2d 154, 329 P.2d 20; Alarid v. Vanier (1958), 50 Cal. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897; Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist. of San Diego County *457 (1947), 29 Cal. 2d 581, 117 P.2d 279. In Satterlee, supra, the Court stated the California rule as follows:
This is also the rule favored in Foust, The Use of Criminal Law as a Standard of Civil Responsibility in Indiana, 35 Ind. L.J. 45 at 61, on the basis of strikingly similar language in Larkins v. Kohlmeyer, supra.
As for the question of what will constitute proof sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence raised by violation of a safety regulation, we believe the best test for a jury to follow is:
A standard of rebuttal similar to this was approved in Alarid v. Vanier, supra. In that case, the defendant was charged with statutory negligence due to failure of his auto's brakes. The same factual pattern is present in this case.
One final point should be made. The Appellate Court opinion seems to intimate that the defense of excuse or justification cannot be proved unless it is specially pleaded. In Crum v. Yundt (1895), 12 Ind. App. 308, 40 N.E. 79, it was said that:
Although the general denial is no longer a part of the law of Indiana, Rule 1-3, Rules of the Supreme Court, the language of Crum v. Yundt, supra, is relevant in all other respects. Its application would clearly allow proof of excuse or justification in statutory negligence cases without pleading those matters specially. The circumstances which the defendant must establish in order to excuse or justify his non-compliance with the safety regulation are not in the nature of an affirmative defense like confession and avoidance. The ultimate issue, as far as defendant's liability is concerned, is not whether or not the regulation was violated, but whether or not there was negligence. Ordinarily, as noted above, by the time the defendant begins to present his case, proof of the violation has already been presented, and on that basis, a rebuttable presumption of negligence has been raised against him. The defendant's case must then persuade the fact-finder that, in spite of the violation, he was not negligent. Thus, his evidence of circumstances showing excuse or justification under the circumstances is relevant to a simple denial of the plaintiff's allegation of negligence. See: Foust, The Use of Criminal Law as a Standard of Civil Responsibility in Indiana, 35 Ind. L.J. 45 at 61.
For all the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court erred in giving mandatory instructions to the jury to the effect that violation of a safety regulation constitutes negligence as a matter of law without also instructing the jury as to the exception raised by possible excuse or justification. We further hold that the trial court erred in refusing to give Defendant's Instruction 8, supra, which embodied, in substance, the excuse or justification exception.
We therefore hold that the petition to transfer should be granted and that this cause should be reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant Petitioner's *459 motion for a new trial and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
Petition to Transfer Granted and Judgment Reversed.
Lewis, C.J., Arterburn, DeBruler and Jackson, JJ. concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 242 N.E.2d 101.