Title: BOWLING v. State
Citation: 230 N.E.2d 439, 248 Ind. 663
Docket Number: 31,108
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: October 26, 1967

248 Ind. 663 (1967)
230 N.E.2d 439
BOWLING ET AL.
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 31,108.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed October 26, 1967.
*664 John G. Bunner, of Evansville, for appellants.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Murray West, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
MOTE, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered on a jury verdict finding Appellants guilty of the crime of robbery, as defined by Indiana Statute, Burns' § 10-4101, which provides in part as follows:
The charge against Appellants was brought by affidavit filed on September 1, 1966, and omitting the formal parts thereof, said affidavit is as follows:
Apellants pleaded not guilty to the charge and requested a jury trial, which request was granted. Trial by jury was commenced on September 26, 1966, and concluded on September 29, 1966. As above stated, the jury found both Appellants guilty of the offense charged. On October 14, 1966, both Appellants filed a motion in arrest of judgment and both filed their objections to the jurisdiction of the court.
The jury's verdict was as follows:
On October 26, 1966, the Appellants' motion in arrest of judgment and their objection to jurisdiction was overruled. Thereafter, Appellants were sentenced by the court as follows:
On October 28, 1967, both Appellants filed their joint and several motion for a new trial, which, omitting the formal parts, is as follows:
Said motion for new trial was overruled on November 10, 1966, from which ruling this appeal is brought.
The record indicates the existence of the following facts upon which the jury could base its verdict:
*667 About one o'clock in the morning of May 28, 1966, the prosecuting witness, Thomas Parker, was walking on Eighth Street in the City of Evansville, Indiana. The Appellant Bowling came up behind him with a gun in his hand and putting the gun in Mr. Parker's back, he told him to drop his wallet. When Mr. Parker replied that he didn't have one, Appellant Bowling told him he would drop him if he did not drop the wallet. At that time, Appellant Hawkins walked in front of Mr. Parker and struck him on the head and he then dropped his wallet on the ground. Appellant Bowling picked up Mr. Parker's wallet. Before both Appellants left the scene, they had struck and knocked down Mr. Parker's woman companion in an attempt to take her purse. Mr. Parker reported the incident to the police and he identified both of the Appellants in the courtroom at the trial as having been the men who struck and robbed him. A police officer testified that on June 19, 1966, he took a statement from Appellant Bowling at the Evansville Police Headquarters. He said that before he took such statement he advised Appellant Bowling of his constitutional rights and that such statement was taken in the presence of one other officer besides himself. When asked if he had been involved in the robbery described by Mr. Parker, Appellant Bowling said "yes." This Appellant testified that he had been drinking at the time of the questioning and that the police officers told him that if he cooperated, he would "probably get a break." Appellant Bowling further said that at the time of the taking of the statement he at first did not agree to involve Appellant Hawkins, but later said that he split the money with him.
Appellants have devoted about ten pages of their brief to their argument, citation of authorities and some quotations from the latter, in their effort to demonstrate three different contentions of reversible error in the trial court, all applied to certain specifications of the motion for new trial. We shall discuss such contentions in the order presented.
*668 Basing their contentions on Specifications 1, 2, 4 and 5 of their motion for new trial, supra, Appellants assert "that there is no evidence in the record from which the jury could have legally found them guilty of the offense" of robbery with which they were charged. Proceeding from such assertion, Appellants then attempt a characterization and interpretation of the evidence in a manner suitable to their own purpose and without according to the jury the right and the duty to perform such task. As we review and appraise the effect of the evidence succinctly set forth above, it is clear that the jury was well within its prescribed limits in arriving at its verdict in finding the Appellants guilty. The evidence before the jury and which it was permitted to deliberate upon may be considered not only ample, but sufficiently poignant to establish all of the necessary and essential elements of the crime of robbery. Moreover, Appellant, Bowling confessed to the crime charged; however, as will later appear in this opinion, an attack was launched against the admission into the evidence and consideration thereof by the jury. Furthermore, we consider that the direct and circumstantial evidence in the record, with legitimate inferences therefrom, amply sustain the charge. See: Shipman v. State (1962) 243 Ind. 245, 183 N.E.2d 823.
In Sinks v. State (1956) 235 Ind. 484, 133 N.E.2d 563, in reference to the question presently under discussion, this Court stated:
The judgments are therefore affirmed."
For Appellant Hawkins to assert that there is insufficient evidence to establish that he took from another an article of value by violence or by putting the victim of the robbery in fear is not at all reasonable or logical in view of the record before us. Whether he assisted his co-Appellant Bowling in the robbery was for the jury's determination and we would suggest that the evidence in this respect amply points to the fact established.
In denying the Petition for Rehearing in the case of Workman v. State (1939) 216 Ind. 68, 21 N.E.2d 712, this Court announced a rule to guide us, as follows:
There is no merit in Appellants' second contention. There are no authorities cited or applied to their proposition that the trial court was without jurisdiction because the affidavit charging the crime did not bear the approval and signature of the prosecuting witness. Also, it has been long the rule that in the absence of such approval and signature, objections must be voiced promptly by a motion to quash the affidavit; otherwise, such defect is considered to have been waived. In the present instance, Appellants presented no objections to the defect until after the verdict, at which time they attempted to present and to rely *670 upon such defect by filing a Motion in Arrest of Judgment. This was neither the time nor the method to present the defect. Having failed to employ the correct means at the proper time, the defect is waived.
In Mattingly v. State (1952) 230 Ind. 431, 104 N.E.2d 721, this Court remarked upon this question, as follows:
In Craig v. State (1957) 236 Ind. 434, 140 N.E.2d 881, this Court stated:
In State ex rel. Henderson v. Boone Circuit Court (1965) 246 Ind. 207, 204 N.E.2d 346, the foreman of the grand jury failed to endorse the indictment. In its opinion, this Court stated:
Appellant Bowling contends thirdly that his confession should not have been admitted into the evidence because it was not voluntarily given, as he alone testified. There was conflicting evidence as to the state of sobriety of said Appellant, which presented the age-old matters of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to *672 the testimony. We do not recall any authorities, and none has been cited, which even indicate other than that such matters are left to the jury or to those who try and decide the facts.
In support of what we have said, we quote from Randolph v. State (1954) 234 Ind. 57, 122 N.E.2d 860:
Matthews v. State (1959) 239 Ind. 252, 156 N.E.2d 387, held:
According to the record, Appellant Bowling was accorded a full hearing with conflicting testimony on the admissibility of his confession, after which the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, sustained the offer of admission, after which it was for the jury to determine the validity and import of that which was contained therein.
We conclude from the record before us that both Appellants herein were accorded a fair and impartial trial; that no error has been demonstrated in this appeal; and, indeed, it appears that the entire record indicates a just and valid conviction of both Appellants of the crime of robbery, as charged.
*673 Judgment affirmed.
Hunter, C.J., Arterburn and Lewis, JJ., concur.
Jackson, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 230 N.E.2d 439.
[1]  233 Ind. 111.