Title: State v. Flippin
Citation: 186 S.E.2d 917, 280 N.C. 682
Docket Number: 79
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: March 15, 1972

186 S.E.2d 917 (1972) 280 N.C. 682 STATE of North Carolina v. Willie FLIPPIN. No. 79. Supreme Court of North Carolina. March 15, 1972. *919 Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan, Asst. Atty. Gen. Burley B. Mitchell, Jr., and Associate Atty. Gen. Edwin M. Speas, Jr., for the State. Price, Osborne &amp; Johnson by D. Floyd Osborne, Eden, and Gwyn, Gwyn &amp; Morgan by Melzer A. Morgan, Jr., Reidsville, for defendant. BRANCH, Justice. Defendant assigns as error the failure of the trial judge to instruct the jury that they could return a verdict of assault with intent to commit rape or of assault on a female. Rape is the carnal knowledge of a female person by force and against her will. State v. Primes, 275 N.C. 61, 65 S.E.2d 225; State v. Crawford, 260 N.C. 548, 133 S.E.2d 232. "Carnal knowledge" is effected in law if there is the slightest penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ. State v. Sneeden, 274 N. C. 498, 164 S.E.2d 190; State v. Jones, 249 N.C. 134, 105 S.E.2d 513. The provisions of G.S. § 15-169 and G.S. § 15-170 are pertinent to decision of this assignment of error and are set out below. The case of State v. Hicks, 241 N.C. 156, 84 S.E.2d 545, involved a charge of armed robbery, one of the felonies included within the provisions of G.S. § 15-169. The Court there considered the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction of a lesser included offense, and stated: This Court considered the same question in State v. Jones, supra. There the State's evidence tended to show that defendant, who lived in the same apartment building, *920 found an eight-year-old girl alone in her parents' apartment. He removed her clothes and carnally abused her. He told the child that "if she told it he was going to kill her." The defendant contended that the trial judge erred because he instructed the jury to return one of three possible verdicts, to wit: (1) guilty of rape, (2) guilty of rape with recommendation that the punishment be imprisonment in State's Prison for life, and (3) not guilty. The Court, rejecting defendant's contention, stated: In State v. Williams, 275 N.C. 77, 165 S.E.2d 481, we find the following statement: In instant case defendant offered no evidence. Nor did his counsel by cross examination elicit evidence which conflicted with testimony as to any element of the crime. Each element of the crime of rape is supported by testimony in the record. Disbelief of testimony relating to any essential element of the crime charged would require a verdict of not guilty. There was no error in the court's failure to instruct the jury on the crimes of assault with intent to commit rape and of assault on a female. Defendant next contends that the court erred by not fully explaining the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt. Judge Exum instructed the jury as follows: In Strong's, 3 North Carolina Index, 2d, Criminal Law, § 112, p. 3, it is stated: *921 See also: State v. Mundy, 265 N.C. 528, 144 S.E.2d 572. Absent request, the court is not required to define reasonable doubt, State v. Potts, 266 N.C. 117, 145 S.E.2d 307; however, when it does define the term, the definition must be substantially correct. State v. Hammonds, 241 N.C. 226, 85 S.E.2d 133. In the case of State v. Brackett, 218 N.C. 369, 11 S.E.2d 146, this Court approved a similar instruction as to presumption of innocence and definition of reasonable doubt: See also State v. Schoolfield, 184 N.C. 721, 114 S.E. 466; State v. Hege, 194 N.C. 526, 140 S.E. 80. When the trial judge charges correctly on reasonable doubt, he is not required to charge on the presumption of innocence unless there be a special request for such charge. State v. Perry, 226 N.C. 530, 39 S.E.2d 460; State v. Alston, 210 N.C. 258, 186 S.E. 354. In instant case defendant did not request such an instruction. The charge given by Judge Exum concerning reasonable doubt was clearly and concisely stated, and is in substantial accord with the definitions approved by this Court. This assignment of error is overruled. Finally, defendant says that the court erred in failing to answer an inquiry by the foreman of the jury regarding parole. After the jury retired, they returned for further instructions, and the record discloses the following colloquy: In the case of State v. Conner, 241 N.C. 468, 85 S.E.2d 584, the defendant was charged with the capital crime of murder. At trial the jury, after some deliberation, returned to the courtroom, and one of the jurors asked the court this question: "Will the defendant be eligible for parole if he were given life imprisonment?" To the inquiry the court replied without further elaboration: "Gentlemen, I cannot answer that question." In granting a new trial because the trial judge did not instruct the jury that the question of eligibility for parole was not a *922 proper matter for them to consider, the Court stated: Judge Exum properly declined to answer the foreman's question and adequately instructed the jury that the question of eligibility for parole was not a proper matter for their consideration. A careful examination of this entire record discloses no prejudicial error. No error.