Title: Oregon v. Haley
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S069671
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 1, 2023

108	
June 1, 2023	
No. 14
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
JOHN MICHAEL HALEY,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 19CR61540, CC 19CR50469);  
(CA A173760 (Control), A173761)  
(SC S069671)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 3, 2023, at Willamette 
University College of Law, Salem, Oregon.
Erica Herb, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued 
the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. Also 
on the briefs were Ellen Rosenblum, Attorney General, and 
Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Rond Chananudech, Deputy Public Defender, Office of 
Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed 
the brief for respondent on review. Also on the brief was 
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender.
Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett, 
DeHoog, Bushong, Justices, and Balmer and Baldwin, 
Senior Judges, Justices pro tempore.**
BUSHONG, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The 
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
______________
	
*  On appeal from the Multnomah County Circuit Court, Heidi H. Moawad, 
Judge. 319 Or App 629, 511 P3d 440 (2022).
	
**  James, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Cite as 371 Or 108 (2023)	
109
110	
State v. Haley
	
BUSHONG, J.
	
The issue presented in this criminal case is whether 
a college administrator’s office within a university building 
is a “separate unit” in the building, thereby making the office 
a “separate building” for purposes of the second-degree bur-
glary statute, ORS 164.215. Defendant was convicted under 
that statute after he entered the administrator’s office and 
stole a briefcase. On appeal of that conviction, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that the office was not a “separate unit,” 
and thus not a “building” as defined in ORS 164.205(1), 
because the administrator shared the room’s “function and 
occupation” with the university. State v. Haley, 319 Or App 
629, 633-34, 511 P3d 440 (2022).
	
We disagree with that court’s interpretation and 
application of the statute. Whether a space within a building 
is considered a “separate unit” as defined in ORS 164.205(1) 
depends on the structure, occupancy, function, physical lay-
out, and appearance of both the building as a whole and the 
space at issue. Here, there was sufficient evidence in the 
record for a factfinder to find, based on those factors, that 
the administrator’s office was a “separate unit” as defined 
in ORS 164.205(1) for purposes of the second-degree bur-
glary statute. The trial court did not err in denying defen-
dant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on that charge. 
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision and 
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
	
Because the issue on review arises from the trial 
court’s denial of defendant’s motion for judgment of acquit-
tal, we describe the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the state. See State v. Reed, 339 Or 239, 243, 118 P3d 791 
(2005) (“In reviewing a trial court’s order denying a motion 
for judgment of acquittal, this court views the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the state to determine whether 
a rational factfinder could have found the elements of the 
crimes in question beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
	
Defendant entered Waldschmidt Hall on the 
University of Portland’s campus. The hall has five floors. 
The first two floors are generally open to the public and 
Cite as 371 Or 108 (2023)	
111
contain offices frequented by students and others; the offices 
include the registrar’s office, the financial aid office, and 
the admissions office. The remaining three floors contain 
administrative and executive offices. Defendant went to the 
third floor and approached Room 307, which is the office 
for the Associate Director for Major Gifts. A plaque outside 
the door bears the office number and Associate Director’s 
name and title. Room 307 is fully enclosed; it has four walls 
and a door. The room contains a desk, computer, bookcase, 
and three chairs. The room’s door locks automatically when 
shut. But, on the day that defendant approached the room, 
the Associate Director had propped the door open and left 
the room unoccupied. While he was away, defendant entered 
the room and stole a briefcase.
	
The state charged defendant with second-degree 
burglary, among other crimes. Count 2 of the indictment 
alleged that defendant “did unlawfully and knowingly enter 
and remain in a building located at UNIVERSITY OF 
PORTLAND, WALDSCHMIDT[ 
] HALL ROOM 307” with 
the intent to commit a crime therein. The case was tried 
to the court, and, at the close of the state’s case-in-chief, 
defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the burglary 
charge, asserting that the state had failed to present suffi-
cient evidence that Room 307 was a “separate building” for 
the purposes of the burglary statutes. The trial court denied 
that motion. Later, when delivering its verdict, the trial 
court explained its reasoning. It stated that, under Court of 
Appeals case law, a “separate unit” is “a constituent and isol-
able member of some more inclusive whole.” See, e.g., State v. 
Rodriguez, 283 Or App 536, 542, 390 P3d 1104, rev den, 361 
Or 543 (2017) (so stating). The court then applied that test 
and concluded that Room 307 was a “separate unit.” Based 
on that conclusion, the court convicted defendant of second-
degree burglary.
	
Defendant appealed, assigning error to the trial 
court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. The 
Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that, “[b]ecause Room 
307’s function and occupation were shared with that of the 
parent building, it was not a separate unit, and the trial 
court erred in denying defendant’s [motion for judgment of 
112	
State v. Haley
acquittal] on the burglary conviction.” Haley, 319 Or App at 
633-34. We allowed the state’s petition for review.
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW AND  
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
	
When, as here, a trial court denies a defendant’s 
motion for judgment of acquittal based on an interpretation 
of a statute, we review the denial for errors of law. See State 
v. Thompson, 328 Or 248, 256, 971 P2d 879, cert den, 527 
US 1042 (1999) (trial court’s interpretation of a statute is 
reviewed for legal error).
	
To resolve the parties’ dispute in this case, we must 
interpret ORS 164.205(1), which defines “building” to include 
“separate units” within a building. When interpreting a 
statute, we attempt to discern the intent of the legislature 
that enacted it. ORS 174.020; see also State v. McDowell, 352 
Or 27, 30, 279 P3d 198 (2012) (explaining that “[o]ur task 
is to discern what the legislature contemplated” in enact-
ing the statute at issue). To determine that intent, we give 
primary weight to the statutory text in context, with appro-
priate additional weight accorded to any relevant legislative 
history. City of Portland v. Bartlett, 369 Or 606, 610, 509 P3d 
99 (2022); State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 
(2009). Context includes other provisions of the same stat-
ute and other related statutes, PGE v. Bureau of Labor and 
Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), as well as 
case law interpreting the statute at issue and related stat-
utes, including earlier versions of those statutes, SAIF v. 
Walker, 330 Or 102, 109, 996 P2d 979 (2000).
	
We begin with a brief statutory summary, to further 
assist in understanding the statutory issue and the parties’ 
arguments. Under ORS 164.215(1), a person commits second-
degree burglary if the person “enters or remains unlawfully 
in a building with intent to commit a crime therein.” ORS 
164.205(1) defines “building” for purposes of that statute, 
in part, as follows: “Where a building consists of separate 
units, including, but not limited to, separate apartments, 
offices or rented rooms, each unit is, in addition to being a 
part of such building, a separate building.” Thus, under that 
definition, a “building” includes “separate units” within a 
building. Id. And each separate unit within a building is 
Cite as 371 Or 108 (2023)	
113
treated as “a separate building,” in addition to being part of 
the building it occupies. Id. As noted, ORS 164.205(1) also 
includes a list of examples, stating that the term “separate 
units” “includ[es], but [is] not limited to, separate apart-
ments, offices or rented rooms[.]” Id.; see also State v. Kurtz, 
350 Or 65, 75, 249 P3d 1271 (2011) (“Typically, statutory 
terms such as ‘including’ and ‘including but not limited to,’ 
when they precede a list of statutory examples, convey an 
intent that an accompanying list of examples be read in a 
nonexclusive sense.”).
	
The key interpretive question in this case, then, 
is the meaning of “separate units” in ORS 164.205(1). The 
state contends that the test for determining whether an 
office within a building is treated as a “separate unit” under 
that statute should be whether the office is “isolable and 
structurally distinct” from the building that it occupies. 
Defendant, by contrast, contends that a “separate unit” 
requires a “possessory or ownership interest” that is differ-
ent from the building that it occupies. As noted above, the 
Court of Appeals’ test focused on the office’s “function and 
occupation,” concluding that an office that shares the same 
broad function and occupation as the main structure is not 
a “separate unit.” Haley, 319 Or App at 633-34.
	
We decline to adopt any of those tests. Instead, as 
explained below, we conclude—based on the text, context, 
and legislative history of ORS 164.205(1)—that whether a 
space within a building is a “separate unit”—and, thus, a 
“building” for purposes of the burglary statutes—depends 
on the structure, occupancy, function, layout, and appear-
ance of both the space and the building containing that 
space.
III.  ANALYSIS
A.  Text
	
We begin with the text of ORS 164.205(1), which, 
again, defines “building” for purposes of the burglary and 
criminal trespass statutes as follows:
	
“ 
‘Building,’ in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes 
any booth, vehicle, boat, aircraft or other structure adapted 
for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on 
114	
State v. Haley
business therein. Where a building consists of separate 
units, including, but not limited to, separate apartments, 
offices or rented rooms, each unit is, in addition to being a 
part of such building, a separate building.”
Thus, the term “building” includes (1) structures that fall 
within the “ordinary meaning” of “building”; (2) any other 
structure “adapted for overnight accommodation of persons 
or for carrying on business therein”; and (3) “separate units” 
within those two types of structures.
	
This case concerns the meaning of the third type 
of “building”: a “separate unit.” As we will explain, the text 
of the definition of “building” provides several indications of 
what the legislature intended “separate unit” to mean.
	
First, the sentence at issue states, “Where a build-
ing consists of separate units, * 
* 
* each unit is * 
* 
* a separate 
building.” ORS 164.205(1) (emphasis added). The introduc-
tory phrase of that sentence indicates that, in the legisla-
ture’s view, not all buildings consist of “separate units.” And, 
because most buildings contain rooms, it further indicates 
that, in the legislature’s view, not all rooms are “separate 
units.”
	
Second, the legislature used the term “separate.” 
The definition of the word “separate,” when used as an adjec-
tive as it is in this statute, includes:
• 
“set or kept apart : standing alone : detached, isolated,”
• 
“not shared with another : individual, single,”
• 
“existing by itself : autonomous, independent,” and
• 
“dissimilar in nature or identity : distinct, different.”
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2069 (unabridged ed 
2002). All those meanings are similar. They overlap with 
each other and can all describe parts of a building. As dis-
cussed next, together, they provide clues about what consti-
tutes a “separate unit.”
	
The first meaning—“set or kept apart : standing 
alone : detached, isolated”—indicates that, to be a “sepa-
rate unit,” a unit must be physically separate from other 
units; that is, it must be physically isolable from other units. 
Cite as 371 Or 108 (2023)	
115
The second meaning—“not shared with another : individ-
ual, single”—indicates that the unit must be used or occu-
pied by some person or persons to the exclusion of others. 
That suggests that whether a unit is used or occupied by 
a single person or a discrete group of persons to the exclu-
sion of others is relevant to whether a unit is a “separate 
unit.” The third meaning—“existing by itself : autonomous, 
independent”—reinforces that indication and suggests that 
a unit’s function or purpose is relevant when determining 
whether it is a “separate unit.” That is because the defini-
tion of “autonomous” includes “undertaken or carried on 
without outside control : self-contained.” Id. at 148. Finally, 
the fourth meaning—“dissimilar in nature or identity : dis-
tinct, different”—indicates that the unit must have its own 
identity that is distinct or different in layout or appearance 
from other units. To be a “separate unit,” then, a unit must 
be recognizable as separate from other units. See id. at 659 
(defining “distinct,” as relevant here, as “capable of being 
easily perceived”).
	
The legislature’s use of the term “unit” provides a 
third indication of the intended meaning of “separate unit.” 
Notably, the legislature did not provide that, if a building 
contains separate rooms, each room is itself a building. 
Instead, it used the term “separate unit.” The relevant defi-
nition of “unit” is as follows:
“a single thing or person or group that is a constituent and 
isolable member of some more inclusive whole : a member 
of an aggregate that is the least part to have clearly defin-
able separate existence and that normally forms a basic 
element of organization within the aggregate <the town-
ship in the usual [unit] of government> <the family as a 
basic [unit] of society>.”
Id. at 2500.
	
The legislature’s use of the term “unit” is signifi-
cant. A “unit” is a part of a whole, but it is not just any part; 
it is a particular type of part. It is “a single thing or person 
or group” that is an “isolable member of some more inclusive 
whole”; it is “a member of an aggregate that is the least part 
to have clearly definable separate existence and that normally 
forms a basic element of organization within the aggregate.” 
116	
State v. Haley
Id. (emphases added). Thus, a “unit” is not necessarily the 
smallest part of an aggregate. As the example of the fam-
ily as a basic unit of society illustrates, a “unit” itself can 
have individual members. A “unit” can be, for example, a 
group of persons or a group of rooms. What constitutes a 
“unit” depends on how the aggregate is divided and orga-
nized. Thus, the legislature’s choice of the term “unit” shows 
that the legislature did not necessarily intend for all rooms, 
or all groups of rooms, in a building to be “separate units.” 
Whether a room, or a group of rooms, constitutes a “separate 
unit” depends on how the building itself is divided and orga-
nized, which can depend on the purpose or function of the 
building. Thus, if a building has multiple rooms, each room 
could be—but is not necessarily—a “separate unit” within 
the building.
	
That understanding is supported by a fourth aspect 
of the text of the definition of “building”: the examples of 
“separate units” included in the definition. Again, the sec-
ond sentence of the definition states, “Where a building con-
sists of separate units, including, but not limited to, separate 
apartments, offices or rented rooms, each unit is, in addition 
to being a part of such building, a separate building.” ORS 
164.205(1) (emphasis added).
	
The first example is “separate apartments.” Apart-
ments can be single rooms—a studio apartment, for example— 
or they can have multiple rooms, including rooms that are 
physically isolable, like most bedrooms and bathrooms. 
An apartment building can have multiple “separate apart-
ments,” each consisting of one or multiple rooms. The fact 
that the legislature chose “separate apartments” as an exam-
ple shows that (1) separate occupancy can define a “separate 
unit”; and (2) not all rooms in a building are deemed to be 
“separate units.” It shows that the legislature intended that, 
to be a “separate unit,” a room must be both (1) “separate”— 
that is, physically isolable, used or occupied by a single per-
son or discrete group of persons, self-contained, and recog-
nizable as its own unit—and (2) a “unit”—in that, like an 
apartment in an apartment building, it must be the “least 
part to have a clearly definable separate existence” from the 
other units that “normally forms a basic element of organiza-
tion within the aggregate” of all the units. Webster’s at 2500.
Cite as 371 Or 108 (2023)	
117
	
Notably, the legislature also included “rented rooms” 
as examples of “separate units.” The inclusion of “rented 
rooms” indicates that the legislature was aware that not all 
rooms within a building should necessarily be considered 
“separate units.” The legislature’s choice of “rented rooms” 
as an example is consistent with the view that whether a 
room is a “separate unit” depends, in part, on how the build-
ing containing the room is divided and organized. It makes 
sense for a rented room, such as a hotel room, to be a “sep-
arate unit” for the purposes of the burglary statutes; but it 
would not make sense for the bathroom within a hotel room 
to be a “separate unit” for those purposes because the bath-
room is not rented separately from the hotel room.
	
The examples of “apartments” and “rented rooms” 
inform the other example of “separate units” listed in the 
statutory definition set out in ORS 164.205(1): “offices.” 
“Office” is a term that can be used to describe both groups 
of rooms as well as individual rooms. The dictionary defines 
“office,” in part, as follows:
“[A] place where a particular kind of business is transacted 
or a service is supplied[, such] as a : a place in which the 
functions (as consulting, record-keeping, clerical work) of a 
public officer are performed[;] b : the directing headquar-
ters of an enterprise or organization[;] * 
* 
* [or] c : the place 
in which a professional * 
* 
* (as a physician or lawyer) con-
ducts * 
* 
* professional business[.]”
Webster’s at 1567. That definition suggests that an “office” 
can be a single room where business is conducted, but it 
also may consist of multiple rooms. For example, one of the 
meanings—“the directing headquarters of an enterprise or 
organization”—may consist of multiple rooms or even mul-
tiple buildings. Physicians and lawyers may conduct busi-
ness in offices with one room or with multiple rooms. A “law 
office” is an office, as is a “lawyer’s office.” Thus, on its own, 
the term “office” does not resolve whether every room where 
a person does business is a “separate unit” for the purposes 
of the burglary statutes. But the context of the term indi-
cates that whether a room where a person does business is 
a “separate unit” depends on whether it is akin to “apart-
ments” and “rented rooms.” See State v. McCullough, 347 Or 
350, 361 n 8, 220 P3d 1182 (2009) (under the textual canon 
118	
State v. Haley
of construction noscitur a sociis, “the meaning of words may 
be indicated or controlled by those with which they are asso-
ciated” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
	
In sum, from the text of the definition of “building” 
set out in ORS 164.205(1), we can draw several conclusions. 
First, the legislature did not intend to treat every room as 
a “building” for the purposes of the burglary statutes. It did 
not so provide; instead, it provided that “[w]here a building 
consists of separate units, * 
* 
* each unit is * 
* 
* a separate 
building.” ORS 164.205(1) (emphases added). Second, to be 
“separate,” a room (or a combination of rooms) must be phys-
ically isolable, used or occupied by a single person or dis-
crete group of persons, self-contained, and recognizable as 
its own unit. Third, to be a “unit,” a room (or a combination 
of rooms) must be the “least part to have a clearly definable 
separate existence” and be in the form of the “basic element 
of organization” within the building. Fourth, to be a “sepa-
rate unit,” a room (or a combination of rooms) must be akin 
to “separate apartments” or “rented rooms.”
B.  Context
	
The context of ORS 164.205(1) sheds some additional 
light on the legislature’s intent. “Building” is defined in ORS 
164.205(1) for purposes of the offenses of burglary and crim-
inal trespass in ORS 164.205 to 164.270. In this case, defen-
dant was charged with second-degree burglary—a Class C 
felony—which is defined by ORS 164.215. Under that stat-
ute, a person commits second-degree burglary if the person 
“enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to 
commit a crime therein.” ORS 164.215(1). A person commits 
first-degree burglary—a Class A felony—if the person vio-
lates ORS 164.215 and the building is a “dwelling.” ORS 
164.225.
	
The burglary statutes parallel the criminal tres-
pass statutes. A person commits second-degree crimi-
nal trespass—a Class C misdemeanor—when the person 
“enters or remains unlawfully in a motor vehicle or in or 
upon premises.” ORS 164.245(1). A person commits first-
degree criminal trespass—a Class A misdemeanor—when 
the person enters or remains unlawfully in, among other 
things, a “dwelling.” ORS 164.255.
Cite as 371 Or 108 (2023)	
119
	
“Premises” is defined in ORS 164.205(6) to include 
“any building and any real property, whether privately or pub-
licly owned.” And “dwelling”—defined in ORS 164.205(2)—
means “a building which regularly or intermittently is occu-
pied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not a 
person is actually present.” Thus, the statutory definitions of 
both “premises” and “dwelling” for purposes of the criminal 
trespass and burglary statutes include a “building,” which, 
as noted above, includes “separate units” within a building.
	
As a result, a person could commit a criminal tres-
pass or a burglary if the person enters or remains unlaw-
fully in a separate unit within a building. And, as explained 
next, “enter or remain unlawfully” is defined for purposes of 
these offenses in ORS 164.205(3) by reference to the person’s 
authority to be in the forbidden space.1
	
The burglary and criminal trespass statutes do not 
expressly specify the mental state required to hold a per-
son criminally culpable for violating those statutes. But, 
to establish the element of “enter or remain unlawfully” as 
required for criminal liability for committing the offenses of 
burglary or criminal trespass, the person charged with the 
offense must have acted with the required culpable mental 
state. See ORS 161.095(2) (providing that criminal liability 
requires proof that a person “acts with a culpable mental 
state with respect to each material element of the offense 
that necessarily requires a culpable mental state”).
	
Generally, if the operative statute does not spec-
ify the required culpable mental state, culpability is estab-
lished “only if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, reck-
lessly or with criminal negligence.” ORS 161.115(2). Without 
	
1  ORS 164.205(3) provides:
	
“ 
‘Enter or remain unlawfully’ means:
	
“(a)  To enter or remain in or upon premises when the premises, at the 
time of such entry or remaining, are not open to the public and when the 
entrant is not otherwise licensed or privileged to do so; 
	
“(b)  To fail to leave premises that are open to the public after being law-
fully directed to do so by the person in charge; 
	
“(c)  To enter premises that are open to the public after being lawfully 
directed not to enter the premises; or
	
“(d)  To enter or remain in a motor vehicle when the entrant is not autho-
rized to do so.” 
120	
State v. Haley
deciding what culpable mental state is required to establish 
the element of “enter or remain unlawfully”—an issue not 
presented in this case—we note that the minimum culpable 
mental state (criminal negligence) would seem to at least 
require that a person charged with criminal trespass or 
burglary “fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifi-
able risk” that entering or remaining in the space at issue 
is not authorized. See ORS 161.085(10) (defining “criminal 
negligence”).
	
And in any event, in the context of determining 
whether a person “enters or remains unlawfully” in a “sep-
arate unit” of a “building,” the physical layout and appear-
ance of the “separate unit” in a building must put a person 
charged with criminal trespass or burglary on notice that 
there is a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person 
is entering or remaining in a “separate unit.” See, e.g., State 
v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 160, 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den, 
508 US 974 (1993) (“The terms of a criminal statute must 
be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it 
of what conduct on their part will render them liable to its 
penalties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
C.  Case Law
	
As part of considering text and context, we also con-
sider “case law interpreting the statute at issue and related 
statutes, including earlier versions of those statutes.” Walker, 
330 Or at 109. We summarized the history and evolution of 
Oregon’s burglary statutes in State v. Henderson, 366 Or 1, 
455 P3d 503 (2019). There, we noted that Oregon’s original 
statutory definition of burglary, adopted in 1864, provided 
as follows:
“If any person shall break and enter any dwelling house in 
the night time, in which there is at the time some human 
being, with intent to commit a crime therein; or having 
entered with such intent, shall break any such dwelling 
house in the night time, * 
* 
* such person shall be deemed 
guilty of burglary * 
* 
*.”
366 Or at 8-9 (quoting General Laws of Oregon, Crim Code, 
ch XLIV, § 542, p 535 (Deady 1845-1864)). We also noted 
that, between 1864 and 1970, “Oregon’s burglary statute 
Cite as 371 Or 108 (2023)	
121
had changed in three respects: eliminating the elements of 
night time entry, presence of a person, and actual breaking.” 
Id. at 9-10. Those changes “reflected a significant expansion 
from the common-law understanding of burglary.” Id. at 10.
	
The 1971 Legislative Assembly enacted a revised 
Criminal Code, which included the definition of “building” 
in ORS 164.205(1) at issue here. See Or Laws 1971, ch 743, 
§ 135 (essentially unchanged since that time). That revised 
Criminal Code, enacted on recommendations from the 
Criminal Law Revision Commission (Commission), “further 
expand[ed] the scope of burglary.” Henderson, 366 Or at 10. 
Broadly defining “building” for purposes of criminal tres-
pass and burglary was consistent with that expansion.
D.  Legislative History
	
The legislative history sheds some additional light 
on the legislature’s intent in defining the term “building” 
in ORS 164.205(1) to include “separate units” and, in par-
ticular, “offices” within a building for purposes of the bur-
glary and criminal trespass laws. As noted above, the leg-
islature enacted that statute as part of the 1971 revision 
of the Criminal Code proposed by the Commission. Records 
of the Commission and its subcommittees “provide a rich 
source for determination of the drafters’ intent.” State v. 
Garcia, 288 Or 413, 416, 605 P2d 671 (1980). We generally 
“assume in the absence of other legislative history that the 
Legislative Assembly accepted the Commission’s explana-
tions.” State v. Woodley, 306 Or 458, 462, 760 P2d 884 (1988); 
see Henderson, 366 Or at 10 (stating the same); see also 
State v. Carpenter, 365 Or 488, 497 n 4, 446 P3d 1273 (2019) 
(“When evaluating statutes developed by the Criminal Law 
Revision Commission, we look to both the commentary and 
the discussions that preceded the adoption of the final draft 
as legislative history for the resulting laws.”).
	
The definition of “building” was first proposed and 
approved without discussion at a May 1968 subcommittee 
meeting; that definition is essentially identical to the defini-
tion currently found in ORS 164.205(1). Minutes, Criminal 
Law Revision Commission, Subcommittee No. 1, May 27, 
1968, 7; Article 15, Preliminary Draft No. 1, Criminal Law 
122	
State v. Haley
Revision Commission, May 1968.2 That definition was briefly 
discussed at subsequent full Commission and subcommit-
tee meetings. See, e.g., Minutes, Criminal Law Revision 
Commission, July 19, 1968, 7 (where Commission Director 
Donald Paillette advised that the definition of “building” 
was “intended to cover structures of a nature that would 
be likely to have people in them for extended periods of 
 
time”).
	
At a November 1970 subcommittee meeting, Judge 
Virgil Langtry—on behalf of the University of Oregon 
Alumni Association—raised the issue of sit-ins, suggest-
ing that the statutory scheme encompassing burglary and 
criminal trespass could be utilized to terminate student or 
nonstudent disturbances on university property through 
the “unlawfully entering or remaining” requirement of 
criminal trespass. Tape Recording, Criminal Law Revision 
Commission, Subcommittee No. 1, Nov 19, 1970, Tape 
22, Side 1 (statement of Judge Virgil Langtry); Minutes, 
Criminal Law Revision Commission, Subcommittee No. 1, 
 
Nov 19, 1970, 1-2. At that same meeting, Commission 
Director Paillette asked whether, for the purposes of unlaw-
fully entering or remaining on premises, the draft should be 
made more specific with respect to offices within buildings, 
to reflect that a license to remain in one part of a build-
ing did not provide a license to go elsewhere in the build-
ing. Tape Recording, Criminal Law Revision Commission, 
Subcommittee No. 1, Nov 19, 1970, Tape 22, Side 2 (state-
ment of Commission Director Donald Paillette); Minutes, 
Criminal Law Revision Commission, Subcommittee No. 1, 
Nov 19, 1970, 8. Commissioner Spaulding responded that 
that issue was already covered by the definition of “building” 
in subsection (1). Tape Recording, Criminal Law Revision 
Commission, Subcommittee No. 1, Nov 19, 1970, Tape 22, 
Side 2 (statement of Commissioner Bruce Spaulding). That 
	
2  Preliminary Draft No. 1 proposed defining “building” for purposes of the 
offenses of burglary and criminal trespass as follows:
	
“(1)  ‘Building,’ in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any vehi-
cle, boat, aircraft, or other structure adapted for overnight accommodation 
of persons or for carrying on business therein. Where a building consists of 
separate units, including, but not limited to, separate apartments, offices, 
or rented rooms, each unit is, in addition to being a part of such building, a 
separate building.”
Cite as 371 Or 108 (2023)	
123
discussion suggests that entering or remaining in a uni-
versity administrator’s office located within a university 
building without authorization would be a criminal trespass 
under the intended definition of “premises,” which included 
any “building and any real property, whether privately or 
publicly owned,” because “building” includes all parts of a 
building.
	
The Commission ultimately approved the definition 
of “building.” Minutes, Criminal Law Revision Commission, 
Dec 10, 1970, 3; see also Commentary to Criminal Law 
Revision Commission Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, 
Final Draft and Report § 135, 143 (July 1970) (including the 
proposed definition of “building” within the statute without 
amendment). It noted that the “type of premises at which 
the amendments were aimed”—including amendments 
to the “unlawfully entering or remaining” and “premises” 
 
definitions—was intended to include the following:
“[B]uildings such as the State Capitol, a university build-
ing or a county courthouse where the premises were open 
for certain purposes and the public was privileged to use 
them for those purposes, recognizing that certain portions 
of the premises were designed to be subjected to a usage 
different from other portions.”
Minutes, Criminal Law Revision Commission, Dec 10, 1970, 
2; Tape Recording, Criminal Law Revision Commission, 
 
Dec 10, 1970, Tape 2, Side 1 (statement of Commission 
Director Donald Paillette).
	
In addition, the Commission’s commentary to the 
proposed code revision states that “building” was meant “to 
include those structures and vehicles which typically con-
tain human beings for extended periods of time, in accor-
dance with the original and basic rationale of the crime: 
protection against invasion of premises likely to terrorize 
occupants.” Commentary §  135 at 143. That suggests an 
intent to expand the original crime of burglary to protect 
other spaces that could be invaded in such a way as to ter-
rorize the occupants of those spaces in the same way that 
homes had been protected.
	
Moreover, including “offices” within the list of exam-
ples of “separate units” reflected the drafters’ recognition 
124	
State v. Haley
that invasion of an office violates the occupant’s personal pri-
vacy, akin to the violation that follows from the invasion of a 
“separate apartment” or “rented room.”3 Including “offices” 
in the list of “separate units” that would be treated as sepa-
rate buildings made it unnecessary to be more specific with 
respect to separate offices within a building, as Commission 
Director Paillette had suggested during the Commission’s 
discussion about amending the definition of “enter or remain 
unlawfully.” That legislative history suggests that the legis-
lature understood that some buildings—including the State 
Capitol, a university building, or a courthouse—may be gen-
erally open to the public but may contain separate offices 
that are not open to the public.
	
The history further confirms that the legislature 
understood that offices within those buildings may be legally 
shared by the occupants and the state, county, or univer-
sity that owned and controlled the building. For example, a 
legislator’s office in the State Capitol—one of the buildings 
expressly mentioned in the legislative history—is physically 
separate from the common areas of the capitol building. The 
office and the capitol are legally owned by the state, but the 
office is “separate” from other parts of the capitol in that it 
is physically isolable from other parts, is used or occupied 
by a single person or discrete group of persons to the exclu-
sion of others, is self-contained, and is distinct from other 
parts of the capitol. The legislative history, consistent with 
the statutory text and context, confirms that the legislature 
would have intended that a person entering a legislator’s 
locked office in the capitol without authorization would com-
mit a criminal trespass, and a person who entered without 
authorization with the intent to commit theft therein would 
commit a burglary. The person would commit those crimes 
even though the person may have been authorized to enter 
the capitol building and even though the legislator’s office 
and the building itself are owned by the state.
	
3  Although a person may also feel violated if someone enters their room with-
out permission, the legislature chose to draw the line at “rented rooms”—not 
simply “rooms”—for purposes of the burglary statutes. ORS 164.205(1) (“sepa-
rate units” includes, but is not limited to “separate apartments, offices or rented 
rooms”). Thus, violating someone’s private space alone is not enough to constitute 
a burglary.
Cite as 371 Or 108 (2023)	
125
	
In sum, the legislature broadly defined the nature 
of the space that could be unlawfully invaded for purposes of 
the burglary and criminal trespass statutes to include enter-
ing or remaining in “separate units”—including “offices”—
within a building. The statutory text, read in context and 
consistent with the legislative history, reveals that whether 
a space within a building was intended to be considered a 
“separate unit” within the building—and, thus, a “separate 
building”—for purposes of the burglary and criminal tres-
pass statutes depends on the structure, occupancy, function, 
layout, and appearance of both the building as a whole and 
the space within the building.4
E.  Application
	
Having determined the intended meaning of “sep-
arate unit” within a “building,” ORS 164.205(1), we return 
to the evidence in this case. Because this case comes to 
us on defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of his 
motion for judgment of acquittal, we view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the state. Reed, 339 Or at 243. As 
described above, the room that defendant entered was Room 
307 within Waldschmidt Hall, a five-story building. The 
room had four walls and a door that automatically locked 
when closed. It was used as a workspace by a single person. 
It was separately numbered from other rooms in the build-
ing, and a plaque outside the door identified its user by name 
and title. It functioned as an office—one of the examples of 
	
4  Our interpretation of ORS 164.205(1) and what it requires is consistent 
with the Court of Appeals’ previous construction of the definition of “building” 
in Rodriguez, 283 Or App at 540-43. In that case, the defendant was convicted of 
first-degree burglary, among other crimes, after taking a firearm and other prop-
erty from his parents’ locked bedroom in the house where the three of them lived. 
On appeal, the issue was whether the bedroom was a “separate unit” within the 
house. To resolve the issue, the court looked to the function, occupation, and 
physical characteristics of the house and bedroom. 
	
Based on various considerations—including the court’s conclusions that the 
bedroom had a function that was inseparable from the purpose of the house; that 
the occupation of the bedroom was not exclusive to the defendant’s parents, and 
the defendant had permission to enter the room at certain times; and that the 
lock on the bedroom door did not change the overall nature or function of the bed-
room in a way that made it a separate unit from the rest of the house—the court 
determined that the evidence “[did] not support a conclusion that the parents’ 
bedroom operated as a standalone, self-contained unit from the rest of the house” 
and, therefore, the trial court had erred in denying the defendant’s motion for 
judgment of acquittal. Id. at 543-44. 
126	
State v. Haley
“separate units” specified in the statute—for the adminis-
trator who typically occupied that room.
	
Based on that evidence, a reasonable trier of fact 
could find that Room 307 was a “separate unit” within 
Waldschmidt Hall.5 That is, a factfinder could find that the 
room was “separate” from the building itself because it was 
physically isolable, was used as an office by one person, was 
a self-contained office workspace, and was visibly distinct 
from other areas. A reasonable trier of fact could also find 
that Room 307 was a “unit” within Waldschmidt Hall. That 
is, they could find that Room 307 had a “clearly definable 
separate existence” from other areas, that Waldschmidt 
Hall was organized into self-contained workspaces, and that 
Room 307 was such a workspace occupied by an administra-
tor who used it as his office. Therefore, the trial court did not 
err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal 
on the second-degree burglary charge.
IV.  CONCLUSION
	
We conclude that, for purposes of Oregon’s burglary 
and criminal trespass statutes, whether a space within a 
building was intended to be considered a “separate unit” 
and, thus, a separate “building,” ORS 164.205(1), depends 
on the structure, occupancy, function, layout, and appear-
ance of both the building as a whole and the space within 
the building. Applying that definition, we further conclude 
that the room that defendant entered qualified as a “sep-
arate unit” and thus a separate “building,” and, therefore, 
that the trial court did not err when it denied defendant’s 
motion for judgment of acquittal.
	
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
	
5  A factfinder also might have concluded, after considering the required fac-
tors, that the entire third floor of Waldschmidt Hall—not just Room 307—was a 
“separate unit.” Because the state charged defendant with unlawfully entering 
one office—Room 307—we need not decide whether a person who has unlawfully 
entered separate offices in a portion of a single building that itself could be con-
sidered a “separate unit” has committed one or multiple offenses.