Title: Disciplinary Matter Involving Burrell
Citation: 882 P.2d 1257
Docket Number: S-6178
State: Alaska
Issuer: Alaska Supreme Court
Date: October 14, 1994

882 P.2d 1257 (1994) In the DISCIPLINARY MATTER INVOLVING Homer L. BURRELL, Respondent, DOB: 12/10/25. No. S-6178. Supreme Court of Alaska. October 14, 1994. *1258 Before MOORE, C.J., RABINOWITZ, MATTHEWS and COMPTON, JJ. and BRYNER, J. pro tem.[*] 1. Homer L. Burrell was convicted of criminal contempt by this court on December 20, 1990. He was required to serve a prison term followed by a period of probation. A special condition of his probation provided: *1259 2. On January 31, 1994, the Alaska Bar Association petitioned to revoke Burrell's probation, which was due to expire on February 14. The petition alleged that Burrell had practiced law while on suspended status, in violation of the terms of his probation and Alaska Bar Rule 15. We appointed District Court Judge Natalie Finn as special master to make factual determinations regarding the Bar Association's allegations. 3. On July 7 Burrell moved to dismiss the Bar Association's petition, contending that Bar Rule 15 violated his constitutional rights to equal protection of law, due process of law, and freedom of association. Without ruling on these legal issues, Judge Finn found that Burrell had violated his probation. 4. On August 24 this court issued an order under which the parties had ten days within which to serve and file written objections to the special master's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The order also provided that this court, rather than the special master, would rule on Burrell's motion to dismiss the petition to revoke probation, and that either party could request oral argument concerning the master's findings of fact and conclusions of law or the motion to dismiss the petition to revoke probation. Burrell has filed objections to the master's report. Neither party has requested oral argument. 5. We adopt the special master's findings of fact and conclusions of law and set them forth here (deleting some of the procedural discussion set forth in the master's decision): 6. We now address the claims raised in Burrell's motion to dismiss petition to revoke probation. Burrell claims that nonlawyers may represent corporations as officers of the corporations before the State Commission for Human Rights, in district court small claims proceedings, and in district court civil proceedings. He claims that denying him the right to represent corporations of which he is an officer, merely because he is a suspended attorney, amounts to a denial of equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and under the Equal Rights Clause of Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution of Alaska. Concerning proceedings before the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights and non-small claim proceedings in district court, the premise for Burrell's argument is mistaken. Alaska Statute 22.20.040 provides in part: This statute governs all state court and state agency proceedings. Contrary to Burrell's contention, no provision of the Alaska Administrative Code contains an explicit exception to the rule that a corporation must appear by an attorney.[1] Further, no such exception appears in the Alaska rules pertaining to non-small claim matters in district court. Thus, as to Counts I and V (as well as to Counts II and IV which do not involve court or administrative appearances), the premise *1262 for Burrell's equal protection argument does not apply. The premise does exist, however, pertaining to Count III, which involved Burrell's appearance in small claims court as an officer of the corporate plaintiff. District Court Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) permits corporations to be represented by officers or employees notwithstanding the provisions of AS 22.20.040. It is our view, however, that it is necessary to prohibit suspended attorneys from appearing in court as corporate officers in order to prevent circumvention of the prohibition against the practice of law by suspended attorneys.[2] Thus, the classification as between suspended attorneys and other corporate officers has a fair and substantial relation to a legitimate governmental objective and is not in violation of the equal protection rights granted by the federal and state constitutions. See Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1264 (Alaska 1980) (fair and substantial relationship standard used to evaluate claim that classification deprived litigant of right to fish commercially). We thus reject Burrell's equal protection claim as to Count III. Burrell next argues that the words "representing another" and "practice of law" in Bar Rule 15 are unconstitutionally void for vagueness because they did not give him fair notice as to what conduct he had to avoid. Alaska Bar Rule 15(b) provides as follows: In our view, the term "practice of law" is clearly defined in Bar Rule 15(b)(1) and (2). Further, it is our view that the term "representing another" used in (b)(1)(ii) and the term "represent another" used in (b)(2) are self-explanatory and require no additional definition. See Christiansen v. Melinda, 857 P.2d 345, 347 (Alaska 1993) ("[w]hatever the precise nuances of [the definition of `practice of law'] may be for different `purposes,' in-court representation of another a paradigmatic function of the attorney-at-law falls within that definition"); Burrell v. Disciplinary Bd., 777 P.2d 1140, 1143 (Alaska 1989) (preparing letter for client stating that civil action would be filed in the future included within "the practice of law" as applied to suspended attorney); In re Robson, 575 P.2d 771, 781 (Alaska 1978) (various acts of suspended attorney held to be practice of law). Burrell's final argument is that, because his applications to resign from the *1263 Alaska Bar Association have been rejected, his fundamental right to freedom of association under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution has been violated. We reject this argument. Burrell is not forbidden from resigning from the Bar Association. However, in order to accomplish this, Burrell must comply with the requirements set forth in Article II, Section 7 of the By-Laws of the Alaska Bar Association. For the above reasons, IT IS ORDERED: 1. Burrell's motion to dismiss petition to revoke probation is DENIED. 2. Burrell's probation is REVOKED. 3. The Clerk of Court is directed to schedule a sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, Burrell shall have the right to allocution. Prior to the sentencing hearing, he may file a proposed plan for community work service to be performed by him, which may be wholly or partially in lieu of incarceration. Entered by direction of the court at Anchorage, Alaska on October 14th, 1994. [*] Sitting by assignment made pursuant to article IV, section 16 of the Alaska Constitution. [1] 6 AAC 30.440(b) provides: The parties may attend the [Human Rights Commission] hearing in person or by counsel, may present oral testimony or other evidence, and may examine and cross-examine witnesses. This regulation is not an explicit exception to the statutory requirement that corporations must appear through counsel, as the regulation does not mention corporations and it is unclear as to whether the term "in person" applies to corporations. Assuming, arguendo, that the regulation is an explicit exception, the discussion infra at 1261-62, pertaining to District Court Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) relating to Count III would also apply to Regulation 6 AAC 30.440(b) relating to Count I. [2] In Matter of Robson, 575 P.2d 771, 781 (Alaska 1978), we recognized that a suspended attorney might be barred from performing acts which could be lawfully performed by a non-attorney. We quoted from the case of State v. Butterfield, 172 Neb. 645, 111 N.W.2d 543, 546-47 (1961), as follows: It is the contention of respondent that these services were performed in his capacity as a licensed real estate broker, notary public, abstracter, and loan agent. It is not necessary for us to determine in this case if and under what circumstances others might perform such services, although not admitted to the bar... . A suspended lawyer will not be heard to say that services recognized as within the practice of law were performed in some other capacity when he is called to account. See also Alaska Bar Rule 15(b)(2), which provides that a suspended attorney "may represent another to the extent that a layperson would be allowed to do so," only when the attorney's suspension arises solely from the non-payment of fees.