Title: Tenczar v. Indian Pond Country Club, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13297
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 20, 2022

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-13297 
 
ERIK TENCZAR & another1  vs.  INDIAN POND COUNTRY CLUB, INC. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     October 7, 2022. - December 20, 2022. 
 
Present (Sitting at Plymouth):  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, 
Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Trespass.  Real Property, Trespass, Easement.  Easement.  
Practice, Civil, Instructions to jury, Waiver, Directed 
verdict, Judgment notwithstanding verdict.  Waiver. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 13, 2018. 
 
The case was tried before William M. White, Jr., J., and 
motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new 
trial were heard by him. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
John B. Flemming (Leon C. Nowicki also present) for the 
defendant. 
Robert W. Galvin (Anthony J. Riley also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
Michael H. Brady, of Virginia, & Thomas K. McCraw, Jr., for 
National Golf Course Owners Association, Inc., amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
1 Athina Tenczar. 
2 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  After purchasing a home next to a golf course 
in a subdivision subject to various covenants and restrictions 
regarding the operation of the golf course, the plaintiffs, Erik 
and Athina Tenczar, sued the golf course, Indian Pond Country 
Club, Inc. (Indian Pond), in trespass when their home was hit by 
errant golf balls.  The jury awarded them $100,000 for property 
damage and $3.4 million in emotional distress damages.  The 
court also entered an injunction forbidding operation of the 
course in a manner that allows golf balls on the property. 
We conclude that the trial judge erred when he did not 
interpret the documents creating the covenants and restrictions 
as a whole and in light of attendant circumstances.  When read 
as a whole, the documents provide that the plaintiffs' home was 
subject to an easement allowing for the "reasonable and 
efficient operation" of a golf course in a "customary and usual 
manner."  As the jury were not instructed accordingly, and the 
failure to give the instruction was prejudicial, the verdict 
must be reversed and the injunction lifted.  We decline, 
however, to direct a verdict in the defendant's favor, as we 
cannot decide as a matter of law that the operation of the 
fifteenth hole and the number of errant shots hitting the 
plaintiffs' home was reasonable.  With golf, some errant shots, 
way off line, are inevitable, but a predictable pattern of 
3 
 
errant shots that arise from unreasonable golf course operation 
is not.  In the instant case, a properly instructed jury are 
required to resolve whether the operation of the fifteenth hole, 
including the number of errant shots hitting the plaintiffs' 
home, was reasonable.2 
1.  Background.  The subdivision in Kingston where the 
plaintiffs live consists of homes on both sides of Country Club 
Way, which rings a golf course.  The subdivision developer, 
Indian Pond, built the golf course in 1999 and 2000.3  By the 
time the golf course opened in 2001, Indian Pond had already 
sold a few of the residential lots surrounding the golf course.  
It continued to sell lots over the following years.  Lot 4-80, 
which would become the plaintiffs' home, was sold in 2014. 
a.  Declaration and amendment.  The town planning board 
endorsed the subdivision plan on September 22, 1998, which was 
subsequently recorded.  On January 5, 1999, Indian Pond recorded 
a declaration of covenants and restrictions (declaration), which 
set out certain "covenants, restrictions, conditions and 
agreements" for the subdivision.  Two provisions are relevant 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by National Golf 
Course Owners Association, Inc. 
 
3 Frederick Tonsberg developed the community and operated 
the golf course through two companies, High Pines Corp. and 
Indian Pond Country Club, Inc. (collectively referred to here as 
"Indian Pond"). 
4 
 
here.  First, paragraph 16, entitled "Golf Course Lots," 
articulated a "perpetual right and easement" on "[a]ny lot 
adjacent to or in close proximity to golf course areas" for 
golfers to have "reasonable foot access . . . to retrieve errant 
golf balls on unimproved areas of such residential lots."  
Second, paragraph 20 provided that Indian Pond retained "the 
right to create, operate and maintain a golf course and country 
club facilities . . . on all portions of the land . . . other 
than" forty-eight specified lots (which would be those developed 
first).  As lot 4-80 was not one of the specified lots, it was 
subject to this right. 
On January 19, 2001, Indian Pond recorded an amendment to 
the declaration (amendment).  By this time, the golf course had 
been constructed and briefly opened, and additional lots 
adjacent to the course were being sold.  The amendment applied 
to sixty-one lots adjacent to and in close proximity to the golf 
course, including lot 4-80, labeling these additional lots as 
"golf course lots" and subjecting them to paragraph 16 of the 
original declaration; the amended declaration also provided that 
golf course lots are subject to Indian Pond's "right to reserve 
or grant easements for the benefit of the owner of the golf 
course for the reasonable and efficient operation of the golf 
course and its facilities in a customary and usual manner."  In 
addition, lot owners were restricted from building pools or 
5 
 
having swing sets, play sets, or clotheslines without Indian 
Pond's consent, and were required to "minimize any adverse 
impact to the golf course" when doing work on the lots.  The 
developer also reserved the right to "maintain, replace, remove 
or add to the vegetation on the golf course lots in those areas 
in close proximity to the golf course." 
Indian Pond sold lot 4-80 to Spectrum Building Co., Inc. 
(Spectrum), on March 7, 2014, which built a house on the lot.  
Spectrum oriented the house so that the garage -- the side with 
the fewest windows -- faces away from the tee.  The back side, 
facing the fairway, has approximately sixteen to eighteen 
windows, and the side of the house facing the tee has five.  
Spectrum did not install impact-resistant windows, as used 
elsewhere in the subdivision, and removed trees between the 
house and the golf course during construction.4 
Spectrum sold the lot to the plaintiffs on April 27, 2017.  
Both deeds referenced the recorded plan and expressly 
incorporated "restrictions and easements of record" that were 
"in force."  In addition, the sale contract released Spectrum 
from liability for "occurrences that are the natural result of 
residing adjacent to a golf course including but not limited to 
errant golf balls." 
 
4 There are over fifty other homes directly abutting the 
golf course, many of which are also built along fairways. 
6 
 
b.  The design and operation of the fifteenth hole and 
errant golf balls.  Lot 4-80, the plaintiffs' home, is located 
off the fairway of the fifteenth hole of the golf course.  The 
fifteenth hole, like the rest of the course, was designed by a 
golf course architect named Damian Pascuzzo.  At the tee, 
players first hit down to a landing area at a lower elevation.  
Then, there is a "dogleg left," meaning that the hole is 
situated to the left of the landing area.  Lot 4-80 is at a 
sharper angle left from the landing area than the hole.  If, at 
the tee, a golfer tried to cut the corner and hit directly 
toward the hole, an errant shot (241 yards from the championship 
tee, 217 yards from the member's tee, and 192 yards from the 
middle tee) could hit the house.  There is a bunker (that is, a 
sand trap) located to the left of the landing area to discourage 
golfers from cutting the corner.  In addition, trees form a 
buffer between the fairway and the house.  However, many of the 
trees have been removed since the course was designed, and 
because the fairway slopes down from the tee, the treetops and 
the tees are at a similar elevation, thereby reducing somewhat 
the trees' efficacy as a buffer. 
At trial, the parties introduced conflicting testimony 
regarding the design and operation of the course.  The golf 
course architect explained that "there's no building code in 
golf course architecture, unlike traditional architecture, so 
7 
 
designers rely on experience and information from other 
designers and what is published."  He further testified that 
"the [fifteenth] hole was designed properly within modern design 
standards."  He, like the plaintiffs' expert, referenced and 
relied on a book by Dr. Michael Hurdzan, setting out a "safety 
cone" analysis, a method of assessing safe distances for a golf 
course.  The architect explained that he used standards that 
would keep everything 165 feet left of the center line and 185 
right of the center line to establish a reasonable safety zone.5  
The architect further explained that these standards were 
consistent with the safety cone analysis developed by Hurdzan, 
which defined the safety zone via two rays extending out at a 
fifteen-degree angle from the tee (centered on the middle of the 
fairway).  Although the house did not exist at the time the 
architect designed the fifteenth hole, it was built further than 
165 feet left of the center line and, thus, according to the 
architect, within a reasonable safety zone. 
The plaintiffs' expert, a golf course accident 
investigator, drew the opposite conclusion, testifying that the 
house was not within the safety zone, relying on the same 
 
5 As both experts testified, there is a larger buffer on the 
right because more golfers are right-handed than left, and they 
are more likely to hit off line via a "slice" to the right than 
a "hook" to the left. 
8 
 
research from Hurdzan.6  The plaintiffs' expert had expanded the 
cone from fifteen degrees to eighteen degrees, to take into 
account changes in golf technology in the thirty years since the 
book was written that increased the length of golf shots and 
their likely dispersion.  The expert further testified that, 
according to Hurdzan, eighty percent of shots typically fall 
within the safety cone. 
The experts also disagreed on the other aspects of the 
design and operation of the course.  The plaintiffs' expert 
testified that due to the "visual cues off of the tee" and "lack 
of barriers," most golfers aimed to cut or hit close to the 
corner, inconsistent with the original design of the hole.  He 
further testified that the golf course website "recommends that 
players aim at the first sand trap bunker that's on the left 
side of the fairway."  The golf course architect testified to 
the contrary, explaining:  "We provided a nice, big, generous, 
open landing area in the corner . . . to the right side of the 
fairway away from the bunkers, because that's where we wanted 
them to aim." 
 
6 According to the golf course architect, the plaintiffs' 
expert incorrectly drew a center line assuming golfers would aim 
toward the left, rather than the intended landing area. 
9 
 
At trial, the plaintiffs testified that 651 golf balls had 
hit the property since 2017, breaking eight windows and damaging 
the house's siding and a railing on the deck. 
After the lawsuit was commenced, Indian Pond implemented a 
number of remedial measures suggested by the original course 
architect after he was consulted about the dispute.7  Indian Pond 
planted three arborvitae trees on the left side of each tee box 
and angled the boxes to the right.  To signal golfers to hit to 
the intended area, it put a barber pole in the middle of the 
fairway, moved the out-of-bounds marker on the left side of the 
dogleg further to the right, away from the plaintiffs' home, and 
expanded the right side of the landing area.  Indian Pond did 
not, however, install protective netting at the tee boxes, 
suggested by a contractor hired by the plaintiffs.  In addition, 
it did not plant trees along the cart path or move the members' 
tee further back, as the course architect suggested, or move the 
tees to force players to hit toward the right, as the 
plaintiffs' expert suggested. 
The effect of Indian Pond's remedial measures was as 
follows.  In 2018, before the measures were implemented, 130 
 
7 The parties agreed to these measures in lieu of a ruling 
on a motion for a preliminary injunction that the plaintiffs had 
filed before the 2019 golf season.  The agreement was in place 
during the 2019 season, but the plaintiffs found the measures 
ineffective, so in 2020, the court ruled on the motion (denying 
it, as discussed infra). 
10 
 
balls were found on the property, thirty of which struck the 
house.  After, in each of the next three years, between eighty-
nine and ninety-nine balls were found on the property, nine to 
thirteen of which had struck the house. 
c.  Procedural history.  On July 13, 2018, the plaintiffs 
sued Indian Pond for equitable relief and money damages.  After 
the 2019 golf season, the plaintiffs requested a preliminary 
injunction to prevent play on the fifteenth hole until Indian 
Pond implemented additional remedial measures, such as 
installing netting or reconfiguring the hole.  The motion judge 
denied the request on May 26, 2020.  In doing so, she found that 
Indian Pond "expressly reserved the right to create and operate 
a golf course on the land within the subdivision," explaining 
that the golf course was meant "to operate as the centerpiece of 
the subdivision."8  A single justice of the Appeals Court 
affirmed the denial. 
The case was tried in the Superior Court from November 29 
to December 6, 2021, on the trespass claim.  After the first day 
of trial, the plaintiffs sought a ruling from the judge (via a 
motion in limine, which Indian Pond contested as premature) that 
Indian Pond did not have an easement for golf ball intrusions on 
 
8 The motion judge correctly found that the amendment 
created an easement "for the benefit of the golf course for 
'reasonable and efficient operation of the golf course . . . in 
a customary and usual manner'" (quoting amendment). 
11 
 
the plaintiffs' improved property.  The attorney for Indian Pond 
responded, "No. 1, . . . the declaration and covenants and 
easements and the amendment as a matter of law do establish the 
right of the country club to conduct the operation of the 
country club in a normal way."  He further explained, "No. 2, if 
there is some ambiguity [in the language], then recourse can be 
[had] to the attend[ant] circumstances existing at the time the 
declaration was completed."  The judge denied the motion but 
indicated that he would revisit the issue later in the trial. 
On December 2, the judge revisited the motion and 
determined that Indian Pond did not have an easement pertaining 
to the improved areas of the property, based on the "plain 
language" of the documents.  The judge focused only on one 
provision, the easement regarding ball retrieval, which allowed 
golfers to retrieve golf balls from the unimproved but not the 
improved portions of the plaintiffs' property.  He did not 
address any other provision, most notably the language providing 
for reasonable operation of the golf course.  Indian Pond noted 
its objection, explaining its reasoning, including that the 
court should consider not only the language of the declaration 
and amendment but also attendant circumstances, and further 
stating that it would be moving for a directed verdict after the 
close of evidence.  In the motion, Indian Pond argued that it 
had "specifically reserved the right . . . to operate a golf 
12 
 
course" via the declaration and amendment.  Because "[e]rrant 
golf ball shots are a natural occurrence in the game of golf," 
Indian Pond argued, the plaintiffs were precluded from bringing 
a trespass claim as a matter of law.  The judge denied the 
motion.9 
 
On the last day of trial, Indian Pond made a written 
request for a jury instruction.  Its requested instruction 
stated that "the [d]eclaration . . . and the [a]mendment to the 
[d]eclaration ha[ve] been presented into evidence.  The meaning 
of these documents and what rights, if any, are established by 
them presents a matter of law for the [c]ourt, and only the 
[c]ourt, to decide."  Therefore, it proposed to instruct the 
jury, "[Y]ou cannot consider the terms of the [d]eclaration or 
its [a]mendment or any testimony given by any witness concerning 
the meaning of the documents."  At a sidebar discussion before 
closing arguments, the trial judge indicated that he would give 
the jury an instruction that he had "determined that the 
easement was only extended to the unimproved portions of the 
property."  The defendant's attorney did not further object, but 
clarified:  "So I just want to be sure that I know that I'm not 
supposed to argue it -- argue the meaning of the easement.  
 
9 After the close of the plaintiffs' evidence, Indian Pond 
had moved for a directed verdict on similar grounds, which the 
court denied before ruling on the motion in limine. 
13 
 
That's my understanding. . . .  I just want to confirm that."  
The judge responded, "Correct." 
The judge did not give the instruction during the jury 
charge at first.  In a second sidebar discussion, counsel for 
Indian Pond asked what the judge planned to do regarding an 
instruction about the covenants and restrictions.  The judge 
told counsel that he would tell the jury that there was a "right 
to retrieve" golf balls.  Although somewhat unclear, counsel for 
Indian Pond seemed to ask whether "that [was] all," but did not 
object.  Then, the judge told the jury that "there is an 
exhibit, which is the covenants and restrictions document which 
you've heard a lot of testimony about . . . and you can read it 
to make the determination as to what . . . significance you want 
to give it."  He stated that it provides a right "for golfers to 
be able to retrieve golf balls from the unimproved portions of 
the lots," but that "you have to make the determination" 
regarding "the improved portions of lots."  There were no 
instructions regarding the course operation easement, discussed 
infra.  Indian Pond did not object. 
 
The jury returned a verdict of $100,000 for property damage 
and $3.4 million for emotional distress.  Evidence of emotional 
distress was from the plaintiffs' testimony.  Erik Tenczar 
testified to the mental exhaustion of worrying about golf ball 
strikes and his children's safety, and his observations of his 
14 
 
wife's "hopeless[ness]" and his children's fear, stress, and 
nervousness.  Athina Tenczar testified that golf ball strikes 
interrupted her work calls and woke up her children during naps, 
describing the golf balls as "scary" and "chaotic."  Her 
expectations of being able to use the outdoor space at her home 
were unfulfilled.  In addition, the jurors saw a video recording 
(without audio) that Athina recorded on her cell phone, showing 
her crying while talking to golfers who had just broken a 
railing on the deck.  The court entered judgment on the verdict.  
In addition, the court enjoined Indian Pond from "operating its 
golf course in any manner" that allows golf balls to go onto the 
plaintiffs' improved property. 
Indian Pond timely moved for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict (judgment n.o.v.), renewing its motion for a directed 
verdict.  It argued that it had reserved an "easement to operate 
a golf course" via the declaration and amendment, which 
permitted errant golf balls to enter the plaintiffs' property.  
In addition, it moved for a new trial (and, in the alternative, 
for a remittitur of damages), arguing that damages were not 
supported by the evidence admitted at trial.  The court denied 
all three motions.  In denying the motion for judgment n.o.v., 
the trial judge explained that from "a plain reading of the 
covenants and restrictions," Indian Pond's easement "extended 
only to the unimproved portions" of the property. 
15 
 
Indian Pond filed a timely notice of appeal.  This court 
granted Indian Pond's request for direct appellate review. 
2.  Discussion.  Indian Pond argues that the trial judge 
erred by failing to find that it "reserved the right to operate 
a golf course in a normal manner on properties adjacent to the 
golf course," which includes "the right to have errant golf 
balls enter the lots."  Indian Pond contends that the judge 
incorrectly interpreted the declaration and amendment because he 
focused only on the ball retrieval easement and did not consider 
the other covenants or examine attendant circumstances to 
ascertain the drafter's intent.  Indian Pond argues not only 
that the jury instructions regarding the easement were incorrect 
but also that its motion for a directed verdict and motion for 
judgment n.o.v. should have been allowed.  In addition, Indian 
Pond challenges the amount of damages awarded. 
The legal rights of the respective parties set out in the 
declaration and amendment are questions of law, which we review 
de novo.  Martin v. Simmons Props., LLC, 467 Mass. 1, 8 (2014); 
Trace Constr., Inc. v. Dana Barros Sports Complex, LLC, 459 
Mass. 346, 351 (2011).  We conclude that the documents grant 
Indian Pond two relevant easements:  one for reasonable 
operation of the golf course, which includes the flight of 
errant balls; and another for golfers to retrieve their balls 
from the unimproved but not improved portions of the plaintiffs' 
16 
 
lot.  The trial judge, however, misconstrued the declaration and 
amendment by instructing only on the ball retrieval easement and 
not on the easement providing for the reasonable operation of 
the golf course.  Because the result of the trial "might have 
differed absent the error" in jury instructions, a new trial is 
required.  Blackstone v. Cashman, 448 Mass. 255, 270 (2007). 
a.  Waiver.  Before addressing the jury instruction error, 
we determine whether, as the plaintiffs argue, Indian Pond 
waived the issue by failing to object to the instructions 
ultimately given at trial.  We conclude that there was no 
waiver.  A party objecting to a jury instruction must "clearly 
bring the objection and the grounds for it to the attention of 
the judge," but this "rule may be satisfied in various ways."  
Selmark Assocs., Inc. v. Ehrlich, 467 Mass. 525, 547 n.37 
(2014), quoting Rotkiewicz v. Sadowsky, 431 Mass. 748, 751 
(2000).  See Devaney v. Zucchini Gold, LLC, 489 Mass. 514, 523 
n.19 (2022) (defendant preserved argument despite failure to 
make postcharge objection to jury instructions). 
Here, the judge was clearly "on notice" of the contested 
issue and the defendant's position, as the waiver rule requires.  
Selmark, 467 Mass. at 547 n.37.  During its opening remarks, 
throughout trial, and in multiple motions, the defendant argued 
that the declaration and amendment gave Indian Pond the right to 
operate a golf course over the plaintiffs' property in a 
17 
 
reasonable manner.  The defendant also repeatedly argued that 
errant shots are a natural occurrence in the game of golf.  The 
defendant further attempted to explain to the court that the 
declaration and amendment must be construed in light of 
attendant circumstances, establishing its right to operate a 
golf course in a reasonable manner, including errant shots.  
Although there was confusion on the part of both parties and the 
judge about what was a question of law for the judge to decide 
and what were questions of fact for the jury, the clear thrust 
of the defendant's argument was that the relevant documents and 
attendant circumstances provided it with a right to reasonably 
operate a golf course, which, as explained infra, is a correct 
interpretation of the law that the judge ignored in both his 
legal interpretation and his instructions to the jury. 
The judge ultimately instructed the jury only on the ball 
retrieval easement, although he referenced the declaration and 
amendment.  Although the defendant did not object to the final 
instruction, as counsel for Indian Pond candidly disclosed at 
oral argument, he "had given up" by that point, after having 
received a number of adverse rulings on the matter throughout 
the trial.  Perceived futility or not, the "better practice" 
would have been to place on the record a final objection to the 
instructions.  Rotkiewicz, 431 Mass. at 751.  Nonetheless, we 
conclude that the defendant had sufficiently explained and 
18 
 
argued its position that the declaration and amendment 
(interpreted in light of attendant circumstances) had provided 
it with the right to reasonable operation of the golf course so 
as to preserve and not waive its objection when the judge 
ignored this correct interpretation of the law in his final 
instructions. 
b.  Course operation easement.  We now turn to the 
easements that Indian Pond reserved when it sold the residential 
lots.  "An easement is an interest in land which grants to one 
person the right to use or enjoy land owned by another."  
Commercial Wharf E. Condominium Ass'n v. Waterfront Parking 
Corp., 407 Mass. 123, 133 (1990) (Commercial Wharf), S.C., 412 
Mass. 309 (1992).  "Where an easement is created by deed . . . 
its meaning, 'derived from the presumed intent of the grantor, 
is to be ascertained from the words used in the written 
instrument, construed when necessary in the light of the 
attendant circumstances.'"  Chamberlain v. Badaoui, 95 Mass. 
App. Ct. 670, 674 (2019), quoting Patterson v. Paul, 448 Mass. 
658, 665 (2007).  See Sheftel v. Lebel, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 175, 
179 (1998). 
Paragraph 20 of the 1999 declaration, by its explicit 
terms, reserved the right of Indian Pond to operate a golf 
course "on all portions of the land" shown on the plan, "other 
19 
 
than those expressly subjected to [the] [d]eclaration."10  The 
only lots "expressly subjected" to the declaration were those 
forty-eight lots enumerated in the declaration's fourth 
prefatory paragraph.11  As the plaintiffs' lot was not among that 
set, the plain language of the declaration provided that Indian 
Pond retained an easement to operate its golf course that 
extended over the plaintiffs' property.  Indeed, at that point, 
prior to the amendment, the lot could essentially be included as 
part of the golf course itself. 
The 2001 amendment reflected changes in the golf course and 
the subdivision.  By this time, the golf course was constructed 
and in the process of opening, and additional lots were being 
sold.  The amendment applied to sixty-one lots adjacent to and 
in close proximity to the golf course, including lot 4-80.  
Instead of essentially being held in reserve to be included as 
part of the golf course pursuant to paragraph 20 of the original 
 
10 Although the language of paragraph 20 does not call the 
retained right an easement, it plainly describes one.  See 
Commercial Wharf, 407 Mass. at 133-134 (finding easement where 
"Declaration grants to the developer [and its successors] the 
right to use a portion of the land owned by [the grantee] for a 
specific purpose" and noting that "the label placed upon the 
interest in the Declaration is not controlling"). 
 
11 The specified lots were those that were first developed.  
Nineteen of them directly abut the golf course, and the other 
twenty-nine are across Country Club Way. 
20 
 
declaration, they were now being considered "golf course lots" 
pursuant to an amended paragraph 16. 
Consistent with that change, the amendment refined the 
course operation easement in respect to these abutting lots.  It 
did so by providing that the golf course lots are "subject to" 
Indian Pond's "right to reserve or grant easements for the 
benefit of the owner of the golf course [over these lots] for 
the reasonable and efficient operation and maintenance of the 
golf course and its facilities in a customary and usual 
manner."12  This differed, at least in its extent, from the 
declaration's paragraph 20, which provided Indian Pond the right 
"to create, operate and maintain a golf course . . . on all 
portions of the land," including what was then lot 4-80.  This 
language allowed Indian Pond to operate the golf course on the 
plaintiffs' lot, which was obviously not possible once the lot 
was sold.  In light of the express language in the amended 
paragraph 16 and these "attendant circumstances," Patterson, 448 
Mass. at 665, we read the amendment to "reserve" paragraph 20's 
course operation easement in regard to these golf course lots 
 
12 The amendment also effected a number of other 
restrictions designed to fine-tune the relationship between the 
now-operational golf course and the adjacent residential lots.  
For example, the course retained some control over vegetation on 
golf course lots, above-ground swimming pools were not allowed 
on any golf course lots, and owners of golf course lots adjacent 
to the golf course were not allowed to build in-ground swimming 
pools. 
21 
 
but to limit its scope to "reasonable" operation of the course 
in a "customary and usual manner."13 
Pursuant to amended paragraph 16, lot 4-80 and the other 
abutting golf course lots were thus subject to the reasonable 
operation of the golf course.  Thus, if the errant shots that 
hit the plaintiffs' home were the result of reasonable golf 
course operation, they were within Indian Pond's rights.14 
 
13 We do not read the "right to reserve" language in 
paragraph 16 as providing Indian Pond with only an option (a 
right to create an easement in the future) rather than a right 
to an easement for the reasonable operation of the golf course.  
Indian Pond already had provided for an easement to operate a 
golf course pursuant to paragraph 20, so there was no need for 
an option to create a right it already had.  The last provision 
in the 2001 amendment also stated that all other terms in the 
declaration, including paragraph 20, remained in effect.  As the 
easement rights that could be granted pursuant to an option 
under paragraph 16 were already provided by paragraph 20, this 
would render the reasonable golf course operation option in 
paragraph 16 essentially superfluous.  Estes v. DeMello, 61 
Mass. App. Ct. 638, 642-643 (2004), quoting Jacobs v. United 
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 417 Mass. 75, 77 (1994) (in 
interpreting deed, "[a]n interpretation which gives a reasonable 
meaning to all of the provisions . . . is to be preferred to one 
which leaves a part useless or inexplicable"). 
 
14 To be sure, an easement where the scope is explicitly 
defined by "reasonable operation" is atypical.  It is more usual 
to define a specific location for a permitted activity, like a 
right of way for beach access.  See, e.g., Mazzola v. O'Brien, 
100 Mass. App. Ct. 424, 427 (2021).  However, we interpret an 
easement to "give effect to the express or implied intent of 
parties contracting for or acquiring an interest in land."  
Taylor v. Martha's Vineyard Land Bank Comm'n, 475 Mass. 682, 690 
n.17 (2016), quoting Bateman v. Board of Appeals of Georgetown, 
56 Mass. App. Ct. 236, 239 (2002).  Here, the express intent was 
to create an easement for reasonable golf course operation. 
22 
 
Although the language used in the relevant provision is the 
focal point of our inquiry, our interpretation is confirmed by 
other provisions in the documents and the attendant 
circumstances.  Patterson, 448 Mass. at 665.  The declaration 
provides that "the [d]eveloper[,] in addition to the creation of 
a residential community[,] intends to create, operate and 
maintain a golf course with country club facilities on a portion 
of the subject premises."  Via the amendment, the developer 
expressly reserved other rights over the plaintiffs' property, 
including the right to remove or add vegetation and to prevent 
swing sets and play sets, all of which serve and protect its 
operation of a golf course.  See Commercial Wharf, 407 Mass. at 
132 ("The remainder of the Declaration is indicative of the 
developer's intent . . .").  The recorded plan is as described 
in the declaration, depicting numerous subdivided lots on a road 
labeled "Country Club Way," with one large parcel in the center, 
suitable for a golf course.  See Reagan v. Brissey, 446 Mass. 
452, 459 (2006) (details depicted in plan referenced in deed 
significant to determination of grantor's intent to create 
easement). 
Indian Pond's course operation easement necessarily extends 
to some number of errant golf balls going onto the servient 
property.  See Commercial Wharf, 407 Mass. at 138 ("When an 
easement is created, every right necessary for its enjoyment is 
23 
 
included by implication").  Errant golf balls are a natural and 
inevitable -- and, thus, "customary and usual" -- part of the 
game of golf, and that includes golf balls well off the intended 
line.  Despite the best intentions of golfers, mishits are 
common.  See Mazzuchelli v. Nissenbaum, 355 Mass. 788, 788 
(1969) ("a golf ball when hit by a club constitutes a peril to 
anyone within its range in any direction"); Katz v. Gow, 321 
Mass. 666, 667 (1947) ("It is common knowledge that a golf ball 
does not always fly straight toward the intended mark . . ."); 
Patton v. Weston Country Club Co., 18 Ohio App. 2d 137, 139 
(1969) ("It is generally known that the average golfer does not 
always hit the ball straight").  Errant golf balls are to golf 
what foul balls and errors are to baseball.  They are a natural 
part of the game.  They demonstrate the difficulty and challenge 
of the sport even for the very best players.  Despite practice, 
instruction, technological improvements, and even good golf 
course design and operation -- disputed in the instant case -- 
golf shots go awry, as a matter of course. 
Any ambiguity in the scope of this provision is informed by 
the attendant circumstances.  See Commercial Wharf, 407 Mass. at 
132 ("To the extent that there remains any doubt [in the 
interpretation of an easement], we think that the actions of the 
parties clarify the arrangement"); Chamberlain, 95 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 674, quoting Patterson, 448 Mass. at 665 (easement is 
24 
 
"construed when necessary in the light of the attendant 
circumstances").  Any golf course operated in the "customary and 
usual" manner will result in some errant shots.  Neither golfers 
nor course operators can wholly prevent them, as both experts 
here testified. 
More particularly, the golf course lots, including the lot 
at issue, were built adjacent to the golf course.  As the 
plaintiffs' contract with Spectrum cautioned them, errant golf 
balls are the "natural result of residing adjacent to a golf 
course." 
Thus, the declaration and amendment, their context, and the 
attendant circumstances, including the natural consequences of 
golf course operation, show that Indian Pond retained an 
easement for those golf ball intrusions onto plaintiffs' 
property that resulted from the reasonable operation of the golf 
course.  The jury should therefore have been presented with this 
easement and instructed according to its terms.  Instead, they 
were instructed only on the ball retrieval easement discussed 
infra.  This was clear error. 
c.  Ball retrieval easement.  Instead of reading the 
declaration and amendment as a whole, the trial judge ignored 
the provisions discussed supra and focused exclusively on the 
ball retrieval easement:  "The 'golf course lots' are also 
subject to . . . [t]he perpetual right and easement for the sole 
25 
 
and exclusive use of providing reasonable foot access for 
golfers to retrieve errant golf balls on unimproved areas of 
such lots." 
This easement serves a narrower and more specific purpose 
than the course operation easement discussed supra.  It allows 
golfers to retrieve out-of-bounds balls on unimproved property, 
while protecting homeowners' enjoyment of their houses and 
yards.  Golfers can enter part of the plaintiffs' property, but 
not all of it.  This balances the golfers' and homeowners' 
rights, recognizing that golfers will try to retrieve golf balls 
if they see them, even if the balls are out of bounds.  Cf. 
World Species List -- Natural Features Registry Inst. v. 
Reading, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 302, 307 (2009), quoting World 
Species List -- Natural Features Registry Inst. v. Reading, 15 
Land Ct. Rep. 606, 609 (2007) (describing easement that 
"represents a compromise between the desired uses of the 
easement property -- an open meadow for a view on the one hand 
and the potential restoration to a natural landscape on the 
other"). 
Reading this provision in isolation, the trial judge 
concluded that this easement alone governed the flight of errant 
golf balls as well as their retrieval.  The judge apparently 
reasoned that if golfers were permitted to retrieve errant balls 
only on unimproved portions of the plaintiffs' property, the 
26 
 
errant balls themselves were only permitted there as well.  This 
inference is not reasonable.  While golfers can control where 
they walk to retrieve an errant ball, they cannot control where 
they hit their errant balls.  See, e.g., Mazzuchelli, 355 Mass. 
at 788; Katz, 321 Mass. at 667.  Thus, the dividing line between 
improved and unimproved portions of the lot makes sense for ball 
retrieval, but not ball flight. 
Reading the documents as a whole, the ball retrieval 
easement confirms our interpretation of the reasonable course 
operation easement described supra.  Implicitly, the language 
suggests that balls will go into the improved portions of the 
lot as well, but that golfers cannot retrieve them there.  It is 
reasonable to retrieve them from the unimproved but not the 
improved portions of the property.  The ball retrieval easement 
reinforces our understanding of Indian Pond's intent -- that it 
sought to create a residential subdivision with a golf course as 
its centerpiece and impose a series of servitudes for the 
reasonable and efficient operation of a golf course for the 
benefit of the course and its members, while respecting the 
rights of the homeowners on the residential lots abutting the 
course. 
The trial judge thus erred in interpreting the ball 
retrieval easement in isolation and applying it alone to the 
flight of errant golf balls as well as their retrieval.  His 
27 
 
instructions should have also focused on the easement governing 
the reasonable operation of a golf course, as discussed supra. 
d.  The failure to give the instruction.  Having determined 
Indian Pond's rights and the legal errors in the jury 
instructions, we turn to the issue whether the failure to give 
the instruction was prejudicial.  See Blackstone, 448 Mass. at 
270, citing Mass. R. Civ. P. 61, 365 Mass. 829 (1974) ("An error 
in jury instructions is not grounds for setting aside a verdict 
unless the error was prejudicial -- that is, unless the result 
might have differed absent the error").  See also Abramian v. 
President & Fellows of Harvard College, 432 Mass. 107, 118-119 
(2000) (analyzing remedy for erroneous jury instructions in 
terms of prejudice); S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New 
England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 110 (1950) 
("substantial rights of the plaintiffs are not injuriously 
affected if the course taken reaches the inevitable result of 
the case").  We conclude that the error was prejudicial because 
the course operation easement was relevant and applicable to the 
complained-of conduct, including at least some errant shots. 
In the instant case, the failure to give an instruction 
addressing the reasonable course operation easement was clearly 
prejudicial.  The reasonableness of the operation of the 
fifteenth hole was in dispute, but the jury were not instructed 
properly on how to decide that question, including how to 
28 
 
evaluate errant shots.  Instead, the jury were only instructed 
about the ball retrieval easement, which was misleading in 
isolation. 
More specifically, the easement at issue allows reasonable 
but not unreasonable operation of a golf course.  The question 
then becomes whether the operation of the fifteenth hole, 
including the number of errant shots hitting the plaintiffs' 
home, was reasonable.  The disputed question is not whether 
golfers will hit errant shots.  They will certainly do so.  
Rather, the question is whether the operation of the fifteenth 
hole was reasonable, given not only the inevitability of some 
widely errant shots but also the number of shots hitting the 
plaintiffs' home.  Although a golf course operator cannot 
reasonably prevent all widely errant shots from hitting a home 
next to its course, it can reasonably prevent a predictable and 
steady stream of shots from hitting such a home. 
Whether the operation of the fifteenth hole was inside or 
outside the range of reasonableness was a question for the jury 
to decide based on proper instruction.  This is because "[t]he 
question of reasonableness is a mixed one of fact and law . . . 
to be passed upon by the jury, under the direction of the court 
in matter of law."  Fifty Assocs. v. Tudor, 6 Gray 255, 260 
(1856) (discussing easement for light and air in city tenement).  
More particularly, the scope of the easement right at issue, 
29 
 
based on the declaration and amendment, is a question of law, 
and whether the scope was exceeded is a question of fact.  See 
Johnson v. Kinnicutt, 2 Cush. 153, 157-158 (1848) (whether 
easement was obstructed "depends on facts, which must first be 
inquired into and settled by a jury"); FOD, LLC v. White, 99 
Mass. App. Ct. 407, 413 (2021) (whether change in development of 
parcel would overburden easement was question of fact); Tindley 
v. Department of Envtl. Quality Eng'g, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 623, 
628 (1980) ("reasonableness of [easement's] use was a question 
of fact and created a triable issue which the affidavits did not 
obviate" [citations omitted]).  Thus, the jury should have been 
instructed to decide whether the course was reasonably operated 
with respect to the fifteenth hole.  See Johnson, supra 
(determining as matter of law that easement granted "suitable 
and convenient way," but requiring jury to decide whether it was 
obstructed).  Reasonableness inquiries are well within the 
wheelhouse of jurors, who decide such questions as a matter of 
course in negligence cases.  See, e.g., Reardon v. Country Club 
at Coonamessett, Inc., 353 Mass. 702, 704 (1968) (evidence 
sufficient to permit jury finding that golf course operator 
failed to exercise reasonable care). 
In the instant case, despite the absence of a relevant 
instruction, this key issue was hotly contested.  The golf 
course architect and the plaintiffs' golf course accident expert 
30 
 
gave directly contradictory testimony.  One concluded that the 
course was designed and operated according to modern golf course 
standards, and the other contested that determination.  In 
particular, they disagreed about whether the house was inside or 
outside the safety zone.  The plaintiffs' expert also opined 
that "[t]he basic geometry of the hole, the visual cues off of 
the tee, and the lack of barriers or other techniques to protect 
the home meant that the [plaintiffs] were going to experience 
frequent invasion of golf balls striking their home and landing 
in their yard."  The defendant's expert disagreed, explaining 
how the wide landing area and placement of the bunkers directed 
the golfers to aim to the right-side landing area, not to cut 
the corner, and that a line of trees buffered the plaintiffs' 
house to some extent.15 
The reasonableness of the defendant's response to the golf 
ball strikes was also contested.  Although the plaintiffs 
testified that Indian Pond did not respond to their complaints 
before they commenced the case, during litigation, the club made 
several alterations suggested by the course architect to 
encourage players to hit to the intended area on the right.  
 
15 The architect did testify that "the daily mowing patterns 
had changed" the alignment of the tees with the center line of 
the hole and that too many trees had been removed from the 
fairway:  "in a perfect world, . . . somebody wouldn't have 
cleared . . . as many trees as they did along the left side of 
the fairway." 
31 
 
These changes reduced the number of balls hitting the house from 
thirty in 2018 to around ten in each of the next three years, 
and the total number of balls on the property from 130 to around 
one hundred.  The plaintiffs' expert testified that he had no 
objections to the architect's suggested mitigation measures, but 
he thought that they "didn't go far enough." 
Despite attempts by plaintiffs' counsel to suggest that the 
number of balls hitting the home alone was enough to determine 
reasonableness, neither party's expert examined the issue of 
ball strikes in isolation.  The golf course architect rejected 
"a rule of thumb" regarding ball strikes and testified:  "as far 
as I know, there's nobody in the golf industry that has any sort 
of standard about what is acceptable and what's unacceptable."  
The plaintiffs' expert did not opine on the number of acceptable 
or unacceptable strikes but rather focused on the frequency of 
ball strikes caused by the house's position inside the safety 
cone.16 
In sum, the reasonableness of the golf course operation, 
including the reasonableness of the number of errant shots 
hitting the plaintiffs' home, was the subject of significant 
 
16 Both experts testified that the elimination of all errant 
shots is infeasible.  The course architect explained:  "When you 
are building a home adjacent to a golf course despite all the 
best intentions in the world, there's going to be a golf ball in 
your yard or hitting your house."  The plaintiffs' expert 
agreed, "You may never do [one hundred] percent." 
32 
 
disputed testimony.  The jury were not instructed on how to 
evaluate this testimony, so their verdict cannot stand. 
e.  The defendant's request for a directed verdict.  By the 
same token, Indian Pond is not entitled to a directed verdict or 
judgment n.o.v.  As discussed in detail supra, there was a 
disputed issue of fact regarding whether the golf course was 
reasonably operated with respect to the fifteenth hole.  
Although some widely errant golf balls are inevitable in the 
game of golf, we cannot conclude that the number of errant balls 
hitting the house or the yard was reasonable as a matter of law. 
As we have previously cautioned, "this court cannot assume 
the function of a Robert Trent Jones" and decide on our own the 
proper standards of golf course design and operation in the face 
of disputed expert testimony.  Fenton v. Quaboag Country Club, 
Inc., 353 Mass. 534, 539 (1968).  Because the jury were 
improperly instructed, and there is a disputed factual question 
regarding the reasonableness of the operation of the fifteenth 
hole, given the number of errant shots hitting the plaintiffs' 
home, a new trial is required. 
f.  The golf cases.  Finally, we briefly address the other 
golf cases cited by the parties and conclude that they are 
readily distinguishable.  The two Massachusetts cases cited by 
the plaintiffs, Fenton and Amaral, involved golf courses 
abutting neighboring homes, but the homes were not part of 
33 
 
golfing communities or subject to easements allowing the 
operation of the golf course.  See Fenton, 353 Mass. at 538 
(finding errant balls to be trespass in absence of any easement 
permitting intrusion); Amaral v. Cuppels, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 
91 (2005) (same).  As the Appeals Court in Amaral explained, "To 
the extent that the ordinary use of the defendants' golf course 
requires land beyond the course boundaries to accommodate the 
travel of errant shots, it is incumbent on the defendants to 
acquire either the fee in the additional land itself, or the 
right to use the additional land for that purpose."  Amaral, 
supra.  Here, Indian Pond reserved an easement providing for the 
reasonable operation of a golf course.  Unfortunately, the jury 
were not instructed regarding this easement. 
The Georgia case relied on by the defendant is also 
distinguishable on its face.  In that case, the easement 
expressly permitted "golf balls unintentionally to come upon 
[each] Lot" and provided that "[u]nder no circumstances shall 
the . . . Golf Course Owner . . . be held liable for any damage 
or injury resulting from errant golf balls or the exercise of 
these easements."  DeSarno v. Jam Golf Mgt., LLC, 295 Ga. App. 
70, 71 (2008).  We have no such express, wide-ranging language 
regarding errant golf balls here.  There is no express easement 
addressing and allowing errant golf balls or one protecting the 
34 
 
golf course owner from any damage or injury resulting from the 
errant golf balls. 
Thus, in the instant case, we are presented with an 
undecided issue.  We have a home subject to an easement 
providing for the "reasonable and efficient operation" of a golf 
course in the "customary and usual manner," and a disputed 
question not presented to the jury:  whether the operation met 
that standard, given the number of errant shots hitting the 
home. 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment of the Superior Court, 
including the permanent injunction, is vacated, the verdict is 
set aside, and the case is remanded for a new trial.17  If the 
 
17 As we are setting aside the jury verdict, we need not 
consider the defendant's arguments that the jury's award of $3.4 
million for emotional damages was excessive.  However, we do 
note that the plaintiffs provided mostly general and often 
metaphorical accounts of their emotional harm ("a nightmare," "a 
living hell," and so forth) and no specific evidence of physical 
symptoms, diagnosis, treatment, or other expert testimony on the 
matter.  At least in the context of discrimination cases, we 
have not required proof of "physical injury or psychiatric 
consultation" to sustain "an award of emotional distress 
damages."  Labonte v. Hutchins & Wheeler, 424 Mass. 813, 824 
(1997), quoting Buckley Nursing Home, Inc. v. Massachusetts 
Comm'n Against Discrimination, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 172, 182 
(1985).  However, the amount of the verdict must still be 
supported by the evidence.  See DaPrato v. Massachusetts Water 
Resources Auth., 482 Mass. 375, 393 (2019), quoting Labonte, 
supra ("It is an error of law for a court to allow an award of 
damages for emotional distress that is 'greatly disproportionate 
to the injury proven or represented a miscarriage of justice'").  
See, e.g., Labonte, supra at 824-825 (requiring remittitur of 
award of $550,000 in emotional damages where plaintiff sought 
treatment for depression after discriminatory firing, but 
35 
 
case is retried to a jury, the jury shall be instructed on the 
easements as a whole, and not on the ball retrieval easement 
alone, as it was in this case.  This will require the jury to 
determine whether the easement allowing for "the reasonable and 
efficient operation and maintenance of the golf course and its 
facilities in a customary and usual manner" encompassed the 
particular operation of the fifteenth hole, including the 
inevitable errant shots that golfers hit while playing the hole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
subsequently improved).  See also Fenton, 353 Mass. at 539 
(upholding $2,650 in damages for emotional harm caused by 
trespass of errant golf balls for over ten years).