Title: Ford v. Ford
Citation: 616 S.W.2d 3
Docket Number: 80-227
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: May 18, 1981

616 S.W.2d 3 (1981) Bonnie Faye FORD, Appellant, v. Taid FORD, Jr., Appellee. No. 80-227. Supreme Court of Arkansas. May 18, 1981. Rehearing Denied June 15, 1981. Cathey, Goodwin, Hamilton &amp; Moore by Donis B. Hamilton, Paragould, for appellant. Burris &amp; Berry, Pocahontas, for appellee. JOSEPH C. KEMP, Special Justice. The Decree of the Chancery Court granted Appellee (husband) an absolute divorce from Appellant (wife) and further granted Appellee custody of their minor daughter with Appellant given reasonable rights of visitation, all on uncontested evidence. The Appellant appealed from certain portions of the Decree raising three issues, namely: (1) That the Chancellor erred in the division of personal property by not applying the criteria contained in Act 705 of 1979; (2) Not awarding alimony to Appellant; and (3) Not awarding Appellant's attorneys an adequate fee. The Court of Appeals in Ford v. Ford, 270 Ark. 349, 605 S.W.2d 756 (Ark.App.1980) upheld the Chancellor's (1) refusal to award alimony to Appellant retaining jurisdiction for the purpose of awarding alimony in the future should the needs of the Appellant require modification of the Decree; and (2) awarding to Appellant's attorneys a temporary fee of $500.00 and a fee of $1,000.00 at the completion of the case; but (3) reversed the Chancery Court in its division of personal property finding that the Chancellor had *4 not applied Act 705 of 1979, which requires an equal division, but for exceptional circumstances. The Court of Appeals allowed Appellant's attorneys as additional fee of $1,500.00 and costs for their services in connection with the appeal to that Court. We granted Certiorari. We reverse the Court of Appeals and modify and affirm the Chancery Court in the division of personal property; we affirm the Court of Appeals and the Chancery Court in the allowance of fees and costs to Appellant's solicitors for services, both in the Chancery Court and on appeal to the Court of Appeals, and reverse that portion of the Decree and the decision of the Court of Appeals pertaining to alimony. The parties were married in March of 1960. Two children were born of the union, namely: a son in 1961 and a daughter in 1974. The parties began their marriage farming on rented land. The Appellant, as the housewife, worked in the home and helped considerably in the fields until approximately 1968. She then worked approximately two years away from the home in private enterprise. Her earnings from such were used for family purposes and/or invested jointly with Appellee. It is disputed as to whether Appellant was a good homemaker, especially in providing for the needs of the Appellee normally coming from within the home. The record reflects that the Appellant began experiencing depression prior to becoming pregnant with their daughter and that such depression became acute a short time prior to the daughter's birth. She was hospitalized prior to the birth of the daughter in Missouri to be treated for the depression and immediately following the birth was transferred directly from the Maternity Wing to the wing for psychological treatment. Since 1974 the Appellant has had intermittent lengthy institutional care for recurrent severe depression and has been regularly under the care of a psychiatrist since that time. She has undergone electric shock therapy and has attempted suicide. The evidence clearly supports the conclusion that Appellant has a genuine longstanding depression of immobilizing effect. The parties have not resided together for the past five and one-half years, although they have had sexual relations on several occasions, most recently the day before Appellant was served with summons after this suit was filed. The Appellee has clearly been an industrious, capable farmer. Over the years the parties were able to acquire and improve farm lands of approximately 190 acres, to build a home and to accumulate substantial savings and farm equipment, with personal property aggregating approximately $300,000 all debt free. In addition, the Appellee farms some additional 800 acres which he rents from his father. At the close of the trial the Chancellor made lengthy comments concerning his findings of fact. The decree on uncontested evidence granted the divorce to the Appellee along with custody of their daughter, which Appellant conceded to be in the daughter's best interest. All real estate owned as an estate by the entirety was converted to tenancy in common; all real estate, with the exception of the homestead and one acre of land on which it was situated, was ordered sold. Possession of the homestead and one acre of land was given to Appellee until the daughter reaches her majority, or leaves home, at which time the Court may order it sold. Alimony was denied for the time being, but the Court retained jurisdiction as to possible future needs of the Appellant. All personal property owned jointly was converted to tenancy in common and divided equally. All other personal property, with a net value of approximately $300,000.00 was divided, 10% to Appellant and 90% to Appellee, and Appellee ordered to pay Appellant $30,000.00. The Brief of Appellant addresses the issue of division of personal property with two arguments, namely: THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN NOT DISTRIBUTING PERSONAL PROPERTY EQUALLY AS REQUIRED BY ACT 705 OF 1979; and NOTWITHSTANDING ACT 705 OF 1979, THE CHANCELLOR SHOULD HAVE DIVIDED THE PERSONAL PROPERTY EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES UNDER THE FACTS HERE. We choose to treat the two arguments together. The provisions of Act 705 of 1979 pertaining to the division of personal property and applicable here, same being Arkansas Statutes § 34-1214, are as follows: At the close of the trial the Chancellor dictated into the record extensive findings of fact so as to give clarity to the Decree. They are: *8 The court finds that even though Mr. Ford is without fault, the court can award a reasonable attorney's fee considering all the circumstances and that Mrs. Ford's attorney has done a good deal of work for a relatively impecunious client and, therefore, the court assesses $1,000.00 against Mr. Ford to be paid to Mrs. Ford's attorneys. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Act 705 of 1979 was the applicable law pertaining to division of property. Act 705 was effective at the time the Decree of Divorce was dated on December 19, 1979 and at the time it was entered of record on January 23, 1980. We disagree, however, with the Court of Appeals in holding that the Chancellor did not comply with the provisions of Act 705 of 1979 by failing to divide the personal property equally. We hold that the Chancellor's findings fully support his division of the property owned other than as tenancy in common on the basis of 90% to the Appellee and 10% to the Appellant. We note particularly that his findings address the criteria to be given consideration by the Court in making a division other than equal set forth in Arkansas Statutes § 34-1214(A)(1) above cited. We therefore reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals on this point. We further find that the Chancellor mistakenly found that the Appellee had only 20,000 bushels of rice valued at $4.00 per bushel for a total of $80,000.00 when in fact the record reflects that there were 25,000 bushels of rice at $4.00 per bushel for a total of $100,000.00. Therefore, we modify the Chancellor's money award to the Appellant increasing it by the sum of $2,000.00 making a total award of $32,000.00. We turn next to Appellant's argument No. 3, which is: The Court of Appeals upheld that portion of the Decree of the Chancery Court holding that "The Court declines to award alimony to the Defendant, but retains jurisdiction for the purpose of awarding alimony in the future should the needs of the Defendant require modification of the Decree." Arkansas Statutes § 34-1211 pertaining to alimony, in part provides: We recognize that the allowance or disallowance of alimony in a divorce action is at the chancellor's discretion, after consideration of all circumstances (Lewis v. Lewis, *9 255 Ark. 583, 502 S.W.2d 505 (1973). However, we interpret Arkansas Statute § 34-1211 as requiring that the Decree of Divorce allow or disallow alimony and not retain jurisdiction for the purpose of allowing it or disallowing it in the future based on changed conditions. We therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals and the Chancery Court and award Appellant alimony in the amount of Fifty ($50.00) dollars per month subject, of course, to modification based on changed circumstances. Finally, we address Appellant's argument No. 4, which is: The Chancellor allowed Appellant's solicitors a temporary fee of $500.00 and a fee of $1,000.00 at the completion of the trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Chancery Court on this point and allowed Appellant's solicitors an additional fee of $1,500.00 and costs for services rendered in the appeal to that Court. Appellant argues that the allowance of these fees is grossly insufficient. For the record we note again that the allowance of fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of clear abuse. Equitable Insurance Society v. Rummell, 257 Ark. 90, 514 S.W.2d 224 (1974). We agree with the Court of Appeals that this principle is especially apt when applied to domestic suits where, as here, substantial assets are involved; where, as here, the wife's share of all the properties is sizable, it is even more appropriate for the trial court's discretion to govern as he is in the position of balancing and weighing many factors against each other. The Appellant is receiving substantial resources for her own use and doubtless can financially afford to participate in her attorneys' charges. Many cases affirm the wisdom of giving the trial court broad discretion to determine what portion of a wife's attorneys' fees should be paid by the husband. Lytle v. Lytle, 266 Ark. 124, 583 S.W.2d 1 (1979). McGuire v. McGuire, 231 Ark. 613, 331 S.W.2d 257 (1960); Yohe v. Yohe, 238 Ark. 642, 383 S.W.2d 665 (1964); Cook v. Cook, 233 Ark. 961, 349 S.W.2d 809 (1961). We affirm the trial court's award of $1,500.00 attorneys' fees and the Court of Appeals award of $1,500.00 and costs for services involved in the appeal to that Court, and further and additionally allow Appellant's solicitors a fee of $750.00 for services rendered in this Certiorari Review. REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. SAM HILBURN, Special Justice, joins in this opinion. DUDLEY and HAYS, JJ., disqualifying and not participating. PURTLE, J., dissents. PURTLE, Justice, dissenting. I disagree with the majority in the matter of the settlement of the personal property owned by these parties at the time of the divorce. I accept the figure of $300,000 as the value of the personal property owned by them at the time of the dissolution of the marriage. However, I cannot accept the division of the property in a manner which gives the husband 90% and the wife 10% of the jointly owned property. Equity requires reversal of these figures if the property is to be divided other than in equal shares as required by Act 705 of 1979. According to the majority ruling in this case, women are worse off now than they were before Act 705 was enacted by the General Assembly. Divorced women cannot stand any more progress if this is progress. The parties to this action were married when appellant was 17 years of age and still enrolled in high school. She went to New Jersey, where he was stationed in the service, and married her 21 year old sweetheart who was a college graduate. At that time neither party owned any property and in fact the appellee was in debt to his father. The following year (1961) the couple *10 started their life together as sharecroppers. Soon they purchased a 157-acre farm and subsequently paid for it. His family gave them 29 acres upon which they built a home. The appellee has continued to expand his operations even while the appellant has been hospitalized. He, no doubt, is a hard worker and has a head for business. It cannot be doubted that she toiled in the fields, worked in a factory, kept house, and bore and helped raise their children up until recently. Perhaps this couple drove too hard in their attempt to get ahead. Unfortunately, the wife is no longer able, either physically or mentally, to help on the farm. She became mentally distressed some 13 years after the marriage and was hospitalized from time to time for treatment. She was in the hospital before her daughter was born and in fact was moved from the psychiatric ward to the obstetrics ward for the birth of the child and later moved back to the psychiatric ward. Finally, in 1977 she attempted suicide when it became apparent she would again have to be hospitalized. Appellee has recently acquired an 80-acre farm in his name as a trust estate. He also acquired another 80-acre farm and placed it in the name of their son. As previously stated, they owned personal property of the value of at least $300,000 at the time of the divorce. The trial court awarded appellee $270,000 and appellant $30,000 out of the personal property. She received nothing for the two 80-acre farms mentioned above. The appellee was given possession of the house and one acre of land and custody of the children. This unfortunate woman has been divorced and her children taken from her through no fault of her own. This court and the trial court have paid no heed to Act 705 of 1979 which clearly states: The act further declares marital property means all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage. There are certain exceptions which are not involved in this case. The appellee had no grounds for divorce, and the fact that appellant did not contest it did not give the court the right to grant a divorce. We have not yet adopted no-fault divorce in Arkansas. The court of appeals did at least apply the principles of equity to the settlement of the personal property instead of accepting the harsh treatment of the appellant in the trial court and which is now adopted by this court. If I understand the meaning of equity, it has not been done by this court. I would at least award appellant $150,000 from the personal property.