Title: Kluger v. White
Citation: 281 So. 2d 1
Docket Number: 42799
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 1973

281 So. 2d 1 (1973)
Clara H. KLUGER, Appellant,
v.
Bernadette WHITE and Manchester Insurance and Indemnity Company, Appellees.
No. 42799.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 11, 1973.
Michael E. Cox, Marathon, and Jeffrey M. Fenster, Miami, for appellant.
*2 Richard J. Thornton and John H. Wahl, Jr. of Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder, Carson &amp; Wahl, Miami, for appellee White.
R. Fred Lewis of Kuvin, Klingensmith &amp; Coon, Coconut Grove, for appellee Manchester Ins. and Indem. Co.
Frederick B. Karl of Raymond, Wilson, Karl, Conway &amp; Barr, Daytona Beach, for amicus curiae, American Ins. Assn.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Barry Scott Richard, Asst. Atty. Gen., for amicus curiae, State of Florida.
ADKINS, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order of dismissal entered for defendants and against plaintiff in this property damage action by the Dade County Circuit Court, specifically passing upon the constitutionality of Fla. Stat. § 627.738, F.S.A. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Fla. Const., art. V, § 3(b)(1), F.S.A.
The cause of action arose from an automobile collision between a car owned by appellant, and driven by her son, and one owned by appellee, and driven by another person. The amended complaint filed by appellant alleged that the driver of appellee's car was negligent and had been formally charged with failure to yield the right of way; that there were no personal injuries; that there were damages to appellant's car to the extent of $774.95; and that the fair market value of the car was $250.00.
Appellant was insured with appellee, Manchester Insurance and Indemnity Company, but the policy did not provide for "basic or full" property damage coverage. Appellant alleged that the Manchester agent had not specifically explained to her the possible results of failing to include property damage coverage.
Fla. Stat. § 627.738, F.S.A., provides, in effect, that the traditional right of action in tort for property damage arising from an automobile accident is abolished, and one must look to property damage with one's own insurer, unless the plaintiff is one who
In total, Fla. Stat. § 627.738, F.S.A., provides:
The appellant in the case sub judice falls into that class of accident victims with no recourse against any person or insurer for loss caused by the fault of another, taking her allegations as true. She did not choose to purchase either "full or basic coverage for accidental property damage" to her automobile, and her damages were the fair market value of her automobile since repair costs cannot be recovered where they exceed the fair market value of the automobile before the collision. Blashfield, Automobile Law, Vol. 15, § 480.1, and 25 C.J.S. Damages § 82.
Appellant has raised numerous constitutional challenges to Fla. Stat. § 627.738, F.S.A. As appellant points out in her brief, the issues are limited to the single statute dealing with property damage, and the remainder of the Florida Automobile Reparations Act is not under consideration in the case sub judice.
It is likewise unnecessary for this Court to consider but one of the constitutional issues raised by appellant, for we find, as explained below, that Fla. Stat. § 627.738, F.S.A., fails to comply with a reasonable interpretation of Fla. Const., art. I, § 21, F.S.A., which reads as follows:
This Court has never before specifically spoken to the issue of whether or not the constitutional guarantee of a "redress of any injury" (Fla. Const., art. I, § 21, F.S.A.) bars the statutory abolition of an existing remedy without providing an alternative protection to the injured party.
Corpus Juris Secundum provides:
This Court has held that the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida does apply to State government and to the Legislature. Spafford v. Brevard County, 92 Fla. 617, 110 So. 451 (1926). The right to a cause of action in tort for negligent causation of damage to an automobile in a collision was recognized by statute prior to the adoption of the 1968 Constitution of the State of Florida, as evidenced by the fact that Fla. Stat. § 627.738, F.S.A., the statute under attack, specifically exempts owners and drivers of automobiles from tort liability for such damages. In addition, the cause of action for damage to property by force or violence  trespass vi et armis  was one of the earliest causes of action recognized at English Common Law.
It is essential, therefore, that this Court consider whether or not the Legislature is, in fact, empowered to abolish a common law and statutory right of action without providing an adequate alternative.
Upon careful consideration of the requirements of society, and the ever-evolving character of the law, we cannot adopt a complete prohibition against such legislative change. Nor can we adopt a view which would allow the Legislature to destroy a traditional and long-standing cause of action upon mere legislative whim, or when an alternative approach is available.
We hold, therefore, that where a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular injury has been provided by statutory law predating the adoption of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida, or where such right has become a part of the common law of the State pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 2.01, F.S.A., the Legislature is without power to abolish such a right without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State to redress for injuries, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public necessity can be shown.
It is urged that this Court has previously approved action by the Legislature which violated the rule which we have laid down. We disagree.
In McMillan v. Nelson, 149 Fla. 334, 5 So. 2d 867 (1942), this Court approved the so-called "Guest Statute" which merely changed the degree of negligence necessary for a passenger in an automobile to maintain a tort action against the driver. It did not abolish the right to sue, and does not come under the rule which we have promulgated.
Workmen's compensation abolished the right to sue one's employer in tort for a job-related injury, but provided adequate, sufficient, and even preferable safeguards for an employee who is injured on the job, thus satisfying one of the exceptions to the rule against abolition of the right to redress for an injury.
The Legislature in 1945 enacted Fla. Stat. Ch. 771, F.S.A., which abolishes the rights of action to sue for damages for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction or breach of promise. This Court upheld the validity of the chapter in Rotwein v. Gersten, 160 Fla. 736, 36 So. 2d 419 (1948). The Court opined:
Thus, in abolishing the right of action for alienation of affections, etc., the Legislature showed the public necessity required for the total abolition of a right to sue.
*5 The Legislature has not presented such a case in relation to the abolition of the right to sue an automotive tortfeasor for property damage. Nor has alternative protection for the victim of the accident been provided, as evidenced by the facts here before the Court.
Had the Legislature chosen to require that appellant be insured against property damage loss  as is, in effect, required by Fla. Stat. § 627.733, F.S.A., with respect to other possible damages  the issues would be different. A reasonable alternative to an action in tort would have been provided and the issue would have been whether or not the requirement of insurance for all motorists was reasonable. That issue is not before us.
Retaining the right of action for damages over $550.00 (Fla. Stat. § 627.738(5), F.S.A.) does not correct the constitutional infirmity, but merely gives rise to another argument, that appellant has been deprived of the equal protection of the law solely on the basis of the value of her automobile in violation of Fla. Const., art. I, § 2, F.S.A., and U.S.Const., amend. XIV, § 1. It is unnecessary to reach the merits of this contention because the statute under consideration has already failed constitutional muster on other grounds.
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court holding Fla. Stat. § 627.738, F.S.A., to be constitutional and denying appellant a cause of action against appellee is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, ERVIN and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
BOYD, J., dissents with opinion.
CARLTON, C.J., and DEKLE, J., dissent and concur with BOYD, J.
BOYD, Justice (dissenting):
I dissent.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed for the following reasons:
The first reason is relatively simple. Plaintiff sought a judgment against defendant Manchester Insurance and Indemnity Company, from which she had acquired an automobile insurance policy, which admittedly did not protect her against the loss of her car by collision. She had signed a waiver, declining to purchase property damage insurance, after such coverage was offered to her, as provided by law.[1] Since the offer of property *6 insurance protection was made to plaintiff, and since she rejected that offer, the claim against the company that it was negligently liable for her losses was properly dismissed as being without merit.
The second reason we should affirm the judgment of the trial court reaches the Constitutional question involved. The question as to the constitutionality of the section of the statute denying plaintiff the opportunity to sue defendant White, on the ground that plaintiff had declined to purchase her own collision insurance, and was, therefore, her own insurer to the extent of $550.00, is one of great importance.
Plaintiff claims that the statute, by denying her the opportunity to litigate against defendant White, violates § 21 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Florida,[2] by denying "redress for an injury." This Court must determine whether the statute does indeed deny access to the courts in such a manner as to conflict with the foregoing constitutional provision. Obviously, a literal and dogmatic construction of said provision would deny both the Legislature and the Court the power to impose reasonable and logical limitations on the constitutional right to use the courts of Florida. It, of course, is assumed that the citizens who adopted the 1968 Constitution intended that the language therein be given the same construction as similar language in the prior Constitution of 1885.[3]
This Court has held that the right to maintain litigation is not absolute but, rather, is subject to reasonable restraints. We have repeatedly upheld statutes of limitation, which prevented aggrieved persons from litigating for redress of injury, unless the suits were filed within a time specified by Statute.[4]
In some instances, we have followed the principles of the Common Law to bar certain actions where, admittedly, wrongs have occurred. In Orefice v. Albert,[5] we noted that:
In other instances, the law of Florida contains many decisions which have upheld *7 the constitutional validity of legislation modifying Common Law causes of action. In most of those decisions, the party presenting a constitutional challenge presented arguments similar to those of plaintiff in the present case. For example, in Rotwein v. Gersten,[7] legislation which completely abolished the causes of action for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction, and breach of contract to marry was held to be proper and not prohibited by constitutional limitations. In Rotwein, this Court clearly stated that an individual does not have a vested interest or property right in a Common Law cause of action, and further noted that when a Common Law cause of action becomes an instrument of abuse, the Legislature can enact the necessary modifications.
The Florida "Guest Statute"[8] was also upheld in the face of constitutional attacks prior to its recent repeal by the Legislature. Prior to the enactment of the "Guest Statute," an individual could maintain a Common Law cause of action for the negligence of a driver of the vehicle in which he was riding. The "Guest Statute" modified such cause of action by relieving the driver from tort liability for ordinary negligence. In McMillan v. Nelson,[9] constitutional challenges were presented, urging, among other things, that the legislation deprived individuals of remedy under law, and violated equal protection and due process requirements. This Court rejected such arguments, and upheld the validity of the statute.
Finally, another instance of the latter type is the Workmen's Compensation Act.[10] Under that Act, an injured workman is provided a schedule of benefits from his employer without reference to the cause of injuries arising out of the course of his employment. The concept of "fault" has been eliminated. Despite the fact that they modify Common Law causes of action, such laws have universally been held to be a legitimate and constitutional exercise of legislature power.[11]
Recently, in the landmark decision of Pinnick v. Cleary,[12] the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld that state's newly-enacted no-fault insurance law. As Florida's law provides that those who decline to purchase property insurance coverage may sue to recover for collision damage only when such damage exceeds $550.00, the Massachusetts law, in an analogous manner, provided that those who elected a deductible in their otherwise compulsory medical payments coverage, could sue to recover for "pain and suffering" only when total medical expenses exceeded $500.00. The Massachusetts court noted that:
Additionally, the Pinnick case is of particular interest because the arguments raised against the Massachusetts law mirror those made against the Florida law. It was argued that the Massachusetts law was defective in that it altered a vested property right, i.e., the tort action. The Massachusetts court rejected this argument:
It was also argued that the Massachusetts law was defective in that it did not provide for a reasonable substitution for prior rights under the Common Law. The Massachusetts Court also rejected this argument:
Finally, it was argued that the Massachusetts law was defective in that it conflicted with a Massachusetts constitutional provision, quite similar to Florida's Article I, Section 21, guaranteeing "redress for an injury."[16] This argument, too, was rejected by the Massachusetts court:
*10 This Court is compelled to take notice of the controversy which existed for long years, relating to insurance rates and practices. A high percentage of the cases in Florida courts arose from tort claims, and these cases imposed upon the litigants the burdens of investigation of accidents, trials, appeals, and attendant legal fees. During all of this process, of course, the victims entitled to economic relief were required to "sweat out" the outcome. A better system was not only needed, but became mandatory. After extensive investigation, hearings, and study, the Legislature enacted the present no-fault law. Prior to the enactment of our Workmen's Compensation Laws, similar legal machinations commonly caused long delays, and injured employees (in situations analagous to those injured or damaged by automobiles, and seeking redress under our insurance laws prior to the enactment of the no-fault law) were often required to accept unjust amounts in quick settlements to prevent long delays. For the greater good of society and social justice, the Legislature thus enacted both our Workmen's Compensation Law, and the no-fault insurance statute sub judice.
Surely the Legislature could have made it mandatory for all automobile owners to acquire collision insurance.[18] Obviously, if the state can require an owner to acquire insurance to absorb his losses, it can permit that same owner, at his discretion, either to acquire said insurance, or to be his own insurer. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts seemed to have our no-fault law in mind when, in Pinnick v. Cleary, supra, it noted that:
I believe that the trial court was correct in dismissing the complaint and holding Section 627.738, Florida Statutes, 1971, F.S.A., constitutional. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
I therefore dissent to the majority opinion.
CARLTON, C.J., and DEKLE, J., concur.
[1]  Section 627.738(1)(2), Florida Statutes, 1971, F.S.A. Rule 4-27.11 of the Rules promulgated and adopted by the Insurance Commissioner on December 7, 1971, provides:

"4-27.11 Proof that insurers required to provide security under the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act have offered full (Collision insurance) or basic (basic property protection) coverage for accidental property damage to the insured motor vehicle.  When an insurer issues a policy providing security under the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act and such policy does not contain either collision insurance or basic property protection, the insurer shall have secured from the named insured a signed rejection form, which the insurer shall retain in its files. Unless the named insured subsequently requests such coverage in writing, such coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to the renewal policy where the named insured has rejected the coverage in connection with a policy previously issued to him by the same insurer. The rejection form shall contain the following text:
"REJECTION OF BASIC PROPERTY PROTECTION AND COLLISION INSURANCE
"The named insured acknowledges and agrees that (1) the Company has offered to provide basic property protection coverage or collision insurance; and (2) the named insured hereby rejects this offered coverage; and in effecting this rejection, the named insured acknowledges and understands that the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act may preclude recovery from others for accidental property damage to the automobile.
[2]  "The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."
[3]  § 4 of the Declaration of Rights in the 1885 Constitution provided:

"All courts in this State shall be open, so that every person for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy, by due course of law, and right and justice shall be administered [sic] without sale, denial or delay."
[4]  See, e.g., In re Brown's Estate, 117 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1960); Campbell v. Horne, 147 Fla. 523, 3 So. 2d 125 (1941). Both of these cases were decided in light of Art. III, § 33 of the 1885 Constitution.

"No statute shall be passed lessening the time within which a civil action may be commenced on any cause of action existing at the time of its passage."
The current applicable provision, Art. III, § 11(a)(7) of the 1968 Constitution, retains only one restriction upon the Legislature's power to alter the statutes of limitation  that such alteration may not be accomplished by means of a special law.
[5]  237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970).
[6]  Id. at 145. See, e.g., Bencomo v. Bencomo, 200 So. 2d 171 (Fla.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970, 88 S. Ct. 466, 19 L.Ed.2d (1967); Shiver v. Sessions, 80 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1955); Sullivan v. Sessions, 80 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1955); Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950).
[7]  160 Fla. 736, 36 So. 2d 419 (1948).
[8]  Section 320.59, Florida Statutes, 1971  repealed by § 1, ch. 72-1, Laws of Florida.
[9]  149 Fla. 334, 5 So. 2d 867 (1942).
[10]  Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, 1971, F.S.A.
[11]  See, e.g., Mullarkey v. Florida Feed Mills, Inc., 268 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1972); Carter v. Sims Crane Service, Inc., 198 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1967); Wilson v. McCoy Mfg. Co., 69 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1954); South Atlantic S.S. Co. v. Tutson, 139 Fla. 405, 190 So. 675 (1939).
[12]  271 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1971).
[13]  Id. at 598-599. (Footnotes omitted) (Emphasis supplied.)
[14]  Id. at 599-600.
[15]  Id. at 605-606. (Footnotes omitted) (Emphasis supplied.)
[16]  Mass.Const., pt. 1 Art. XI, providing:

"Every subject of the commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws."
[17]  271 N.E.2d  at 600. (Footnote omitted.)
[18]  Cf., Williams v. Newton, 236 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970), discussing the validity of Chapter 324, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the Financial Responsibility Law.
[19]  271 N.E.2d  at 597. (Emphasis supplied.)