Title: People v. Conlan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 87147
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 2000

Opinion filed February 17, 2000.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:
At issue in these consolidated cases is the constitutionality of section 
15-111 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/15-111 (West 1998)), a 
statute regulating weights and loads of vehicles operating upon Illinois 
highways. The six cases in question come before this court from the circuit 
court of Jo Daviess County where an associate circuit judge dismissed them, 
holding that section 15-111 of the Code violates due process and is void for 
vagueness. The State appeals pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 
603). We reverse and remand.
The events which culminated in the court's rulings began on October 2, 1997, 
when defendant Robert Wittman was issued a traffic ticket in Jo Daviess County, 
Illinois, for allegedly operating a truck with a gross weight 6,320 pounds in 
excess of the maximum weight allowed by section 15-111 of the Code. The charge 
against defendant was dismissed after a bench trial conducted on May 12, 1998, 
the trial court finding that the statute was void for vagueness and violated 
fundamental guarantees of due process. As noted by both the circuit court and 
the State, that decision was not appealed and is not before this court for 
review. However, the circuit court chose to make the transcript of that 
abbreviated bench trial a part of subsequent rulings in other cases and, in that 
sense alone, it is a part of the record in the cases now before us.
Defendant Wittman, driving the same truck, was thereafter ticketed for 
violations of section 15-111(f) of the Code on October 9, 1997, December 12, 
1997, and November 19, 1998. On those dates, his truck was alleged to have been 
overweight by 4,780 pounds, 4,240 pounds and 8,050 pounds, respectively. Those 
three cases come before us as case No. 87150.
Defendant Daniel J. Conlan was ticketed for a violation of section 15-111(f) 
while driving the aforementioned truck on January 1, 1998. The truck was 
allegedly 5,380 pounds in excess of legal limits. That case comes before us as 
case No. 87147.
Defendant Stephen M. Maiers was driving the truck in question on March 29, 
1998, when he was charged with operating the vehicle at a weight 3,500 pounds in 
excess of the maximum weight allowed by section 15-111(f). That case comes 
before this court as case No. 87149.
Finally, defendant Rick C. Scott was charged on May 19, 1998, for operation 
of a different truck which was 11,560 pounds in excess of the weight 
limitation set forth in section 15-111(f). That case is before us as case No. 
87148.
Docket entries indicate that the first two cases involving defendant Wittman, 
and the cases against defendants Conlan and Maiers, were set for "further 
proceedings" on May 29, 1998. According to a summary order entered that date, 
the circuit court granted each defendant's oral motion to dismiss, based upon 
the court's prior ruling in the original Wittman case.
The State filed motions to reconsider findings that the statute is 
unconstitutional and dismissal of the respective charges. In the meantime, 
defendant Scott had filed a motion to dismiss his charge. Those matters were 
still pending on January 6, 1999, when defendant Wittman's final case came 
before the court for a bench trial.
At that trial, Trooper Michael Lowary testified that he and two Department of 
Transportation employees were operating portable scales in Jo Daviess County on 
November 19, 1998, when he observed a vehicle which had a significant bulge of 
its tires and appeared to be overweight. The five-axle, tanker truck, operated 
by defendant Wittman, was stopped and weighed on the portable scales. Individual 
axles were weighed and the results were added together to determine the gross 
weight of the loaded vehicle. The gross weight, which included the vehicle, the 
driver and the load being hauled, was found to be 67,550 pounds. Although 
Lowary's testimony is somewhat difficult to follow in places, because he 
referred to a diagram which was not made a part of the record on appeal, it 
appears that he then measured the distance between extreme axles (front and 
rear) of the vehicle. That distance measured 25 feet, 9 inches in length, which 
Lowary rounded to the nearest foot (thus 26 feet) pursuant to the directive of 
the statute. Apparently, Lowary also measured the distance between certain inner 
axles to determine if an excessive load was being carried over and between those 
axles, i.e., an inner bridge violation. Lowary testified there was no 
violation of individual axle load limitations and no "inner bridge violation"; 
however, he calculated the gross weight of the vehicle, with its load, to be 
8,050 pounds in excess of the legal limit as set forth in a table in section 
15-111(f) of the Code. According to Lowary, the applicable table provides that a 
vehicle 26 feet in length, with four axles, can have a maximum gross weight of 
59,500 pounds. He stated, "Illinois by law does not permit the tabulation of 
five axles on *** single vehicles." He testified, in the case of a single 
vehicle, as opposed to vehicles operated in combination, the maximum gross 
weight limit is calculated on the basis of a four-axle vehicle, irrespective of 
any additional axles on the vehicle. After Lowary's testimony, the court 
adjourned until January 14, 1999.
When court resumed, defendant Wittman, who represented himself throughout the 
trial, testified in his own behalf to his efforts to comply with the law and his 
belief that his "turnable axles," representing the "newest technology," do less 
damage to the road than older axles. Under cross-examination, defendant admitted 
that he was driving a "straight" truck, not a combination, that his vehicle was 
26 feet long and weighed 67,550 pounds, and that his vehicle was overweight, 
although he disputed the extent to which that was true. He noted that his 
individual axles were all under allowable limits and maintained that he was not 
damaging the highway. At the conclusion of defendant's testimony, the court took 
the matter under advisement.
On January 27, 1999, the circuit court entered an order denying the State's 
motion to reconsider disposition of the four cases previously dismissed and 
dismissing defendant Wittman's remaining case and that of defendant Scott. The 
court held section 15-111 of the Code constitutionally "infirm in all 
of its applications," violative of due process and "void for vagueness." 
The court found "several significant and substantial problems immediately 
apparent." We quote from the court's order:
It was the opinion of the circuit court that the statute did not provide fair 
warning of the conduct prohibited. The judge was also troubled by the different 
ways in which an offending vehicle could violate the statute, which he 
apparently felt accorded the police undue discretion in charging an offense. The 
circuit court found the "bridge method" a "particular mystery," and was 
uncertain whether calculation of a vehicle's "gross weight" included the driver 
and any other occupants of the cab of the vehicle. The court concluded that the 
statute "cannot be clearly understood by persons of ordinary intelligence," and 
it was thus unconstitutional.
The State filed timely notice of appeal in each case, and we consolidated the 
cases for review pursuant to the State's motion. The State has filed a brief; 
defendants neither have entered appearances nor have they filed briefs. We 
review de novo a circuit court's holding with respect to the 
constitutionality of a statute. Russell v. Department of Natural 
Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 441 (1998).
At the outset, we wish to emphasize, as we recently did in People v. 
Every, 184 Ill. 2d 281, 285 (1998), that statutes enjoy a presumption of 
constitutionality. While that certainly does not mean they are unassailable, 
neither should circuit courts lightly or cavalierly declare unconstitutional 
that which the representatives of the people have seen fit to enact.
In order to satisfy constitutional principles of due process, a statute must 
give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly, and provide explicit standards for 
those police officers, judges and juries who apply it in order to prevent 
arbitrary and discriminating enforcement. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 
408 U.S. 104, 108, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 227, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2298-99 (1972); 
Russell, 183 Ill. 2d  at 442. Where, as here, no first amendment concern 
is implicated, there is no right to challenge the statute as being vague on its 
face if it clearly applies to defendants' conduct. Russell, 183 Ill. 2d  
at 442. Thus, the issue is whether section 15-110 of the Code is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct for which these 
defendants were prosecuted. See People v. Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d 379, 385 
(1989); Russell, 183 Ill. 2d  at 442. We hold that it is not.
The circuit court first complained that the "sheer volume" of the statute was 
one of the factors which rendered it unconstitutionally vague. The court also 
believed it contained too many exceptions and "provided thats." We are aware of 
no case authority which would authorize invalidation of a statute on those 
bases. Many statutes and regulations are necessarily lengthy and replete with 
exceptions and conditions because they address diverse matters of considerable 
complexity. We live in a complex society. That reality is reflected in the 
history of the very statute in question, which has undergone substantial change 
since this court held application of a prior, simpler version constitutional in 
1967 (see People v. Hinchey, 37 Ill. 2d 410, 415 (1967); Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1965, ch. 95½, par. 228), a decision to which the instant judge also took 
exception. The "sheer volume" of the statute may indeed make it tedious to read, 
and exceptions therein may render it more laborious to follow, but it is not our 
role to rewrite the statute according to our preferences. The issue before us is 
whether the statute is comprehensible such that it provides fair notice of what 
is prohibited. Having thoroughly perused the statute, we find that it is, and it 
does.
The circuit court next found objectionable what it perceived as a lack of 
consistent "tone" or "theme" in the statute. Although the circuit court's 
concern with the statute's tone is certainly a novel legal notion, we believe 
such an observation would be better relegated to the realm of literary 
criticism, as it has no place in this context. As for the theme of the statute, 
we believe a person of ordinary intelligence would readily recognize that it 
regulates "wheel and axle loads and gross weights." One simply has to read the 
seven-word section title.
The circuit court also professed its belief that the statute lacks "a 
consistent use of defined terms" and uses "a variety of terms without 
definition, most of which are terms beyond ordinary understanding." Our review 
of the statute does not reveal inconsistent terminology or terms which are 
without definition or the meaning of which cannot be discerned from their 
context.
We believe anyone who attempts in earnest to understand the statute can fully 
comprehend its terms and, more importantly, understand what is prohibited. 
Tables set forth in the statute summarize and simplify certain matters addressed 
in text, providing a ready guide for application in specific situations. We see 
these tables as a significant aid in understanding what the statute prohibits, 
not a hindrance to comprehension, as the circuit court suggests. The algebraic 
formula set forth in the statute, apparently the "bridge" formula which the 
circuit court found confusing and ill-defined, is actually expressed in tabular 
form in subsection (f) of the statute to accommodate those who are not 
mathematically inclined. Of the terms which the circuit court highlighted in its 
order as problematic,"axle load" is in fact defined in the last sentence of the 
first full paragraph of the 1996 version of the statute. 625 ILCS 5/15-111(a) 
(West 1996). In 1998, the definition was moved and now appears in section 
1-105.6 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/1-105.6 (West 1998)) with other general 
definitions. The definitions of "gross weight" (625 ILCS 5/1-125 (West 
1998)) and "tandem axles" (625 ILCS 5/1-204.3 (West 1998)) also appear in that 
part of the Code. The term "wheel load," while not specifically defined, is in 
fact addressed in the third sentence of section 15-111(a) (625 ILCS 5/15-111(a) 
(West 1998)).
Finally, the term "allowable load" is used immediately preceding the table of 
subsection (f). Read in context, there can be no ambiguity in its meaning. The 
circuit court suggested the term might refer to the load, or weight of cargo, 
the vehicle is carrying, or the load of vehicle and cargo on the road 
surface. Clearly, the term is used in the statute synonymously with "gross 
weight." The last sentence of the first paragraph of subsection (f) prohibits 
weights in excess of 20,000 pounds on any one axle or 34,000 pounds on any 
tandem axle, then proceeds to prohibit "a gross weight in excess of 80,000 
pounds for vehicle combinations of 5 axles or more, or a gross weight on a group 
of 2 or more consecutive axles in excess of that weight produced by the 
application of the following formula." The algebraic "bridge" formula follows. 
Then, immediately preceding the table expressing the formula, the statute 
provides, "The above formula when expressed in tabular form results in 
allowable loads as follows." (Emphasis added.) The formula, which 
expresses permissible "gross weights," applicable to any set of consecutive 
axles on the vehicle, also expresses "allowable loads" for those consecutive 
axles. The terms are used in this context interchangeably. For another example, 
we note that the maximum "gross weight" of 80,000 pounds, referenced in text, 
appears as the "maximum [allowable] load" of 80,000 pounds in three different 
columns of the table.
We need not conduct an analysis of every term in the statute. As noted 
previously, we are only concerned here that the statute provided due notice to 
these defendants, giving them fair warning of what is prohibited, and 
explicit standards for those engaged in enforcement. The statute clearly passes 
that test.
Subsection (f) of section 15-111 applies by its terms to "the National System 
of Interstate and Defense Highways and other highways in the system of State 
highways that have been designated by the Department as Class I, II, or III." 
625 ILCS 5/15-111(f) (West 1998). U.S. Route 20, through Jo Daviess County, has 
been designated a Class II highway. Thus, the weight restrictions of subsection 
(f) apply to defendants, all of whom were traveling that highway when they were 
stopped and ticketed.
Although two of the charges-those against defendants Maiers and Scott-were 
designated as "bridge" violations, and the remaining tickets were written as 
"gross" weight violations, all of the charges were alleged as infractions of 
section 15-111(f) of the Code. In a sense, all charge "bridge" violations 
because they allege excessive weight, or load, over an area spanning certain 
consecutive axles. If the extreme axles on a vehicle, front and rear, are being 
considered, and the total weight or load exceeds allowable limits, a gross 
weight violation has occurred in the traditional sense. If, on the other hand, 
excessive weight or load exists over consecutive inner axles, then what is 
apparently referred to as an "inner bridge" violation has occurred. These 
semantic differences are not important for present purposes.
The table in subsection (f) of section 15-111 sets forth allowable loads or 
weights which may be "carried on any *** group of 2 or more consecutive axles," 
as calculated against the "distance measured to the nearest foot between 
extremes of any group of 2 or more consecutive axles." 625 ILCS 5/15-111(f) 
(West 1998). Regardless of how the violation was designated on the ticket, 
"gross" or "bridge," it appears that the officer in each instance totaled the 
weight of all axles, in essence taking into consideration the weight between the 
vehicle's extreme axles, measured the distance between those axles, and applied 
the relevant figures in the table to determine if the vehicle was overweight, 
taking into account the statute's admonishment that the table should be applied 
to a single vehicle with more than four axles as if it were a four-axle vehicle. 
625 ILCS 5/15-111(f) (West 1998).
Thus, pursuant to the table as applied, a vehicle such as the five-axle 
tanker truck at issue in five of these six cases, which was not a combination 
and which measured 26 feet between extreme axles, should have been allowed a 
weight or "load in pounds" of 59,500. That is the figure which was in fact 
applied to the vehicle in each case. The truck defendant Scott was driving 
allegedly measured 28 feet between axles and weighed 72,060 pounds. According to 
the table, the allowable load would have been 60,500 pounds. Thus, defendant 
Scott is charged with exceeding the allowable load by 11,560 pounds.
We find that the statute is not vague as applied to these defendants. A 
person of ordinary intelligence has a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited. Nor does the statute lend itself to arbitrary enforcement by the 
police. The statute provides clear standards for enforcement. The statute, as 
applied, violates no constitutional principles.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Jo Daviess 
County is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for further 
proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
This consolidated group of cases concerns the prosecution of defendants for 
driving overweight trucks in violation of Illinois statute. 625 ILCS 5/15-111 
(West 1998). All but one of the six cases involves the same truck. That truck 
was a milk-hauling truck based in the State of Iowa which picks up raw milk from 
dairy farmers in Jo Daviess County, Illinois, and transports it to Iowa for 
processing.
The issue in this case is whether the statute in question is vague and 
indecipherable by a person of ordinary intelligence and thus unconstitutional. 
The trial judge, Judge Sprengelmeyer, ruled that such was the case. On appeal to 
our court, the majority opines that the statute, though unclear to Judge 
Sprengelmeyer, should be clear to a person of ordinary intelligence. With that, 
I respectfully disagree. So that other people of ordinary intelligence can form 
their own opinions, I publish that statute as an appendix to this dissent. This 
tortuous creation of the legislature goes on for several pages without respite 
save such as may be afforded by algebraic formulae and cryptic tables.
Certainly, as Judge Sprengelmeyer pointed out in his trial court opinion, no 
one questions the legitimacy of regulating truck weights on highways. The 
problem with vagueness in a statute, however, is that it subjects citizens to 
selective prosecution at the whim of the police and prosecutors. Citizens are 
entitled to fair warning of what is prohibited. Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 227, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2298-99 
(1972).
Directing his attention to the language of the statute, Judge Sprengelmeyer's 
opinion stated:
While the majority opinion chides Judge Sprengelmeyer for his discussion of 
the problem, its own analysis adds no light to the understanding of the statute. 
The statute speaks for itself. In respect of those separate analyses, I agree 
with Judge Sprengelmeyer. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
APPENDIX
§ 15-111. Wheel and axle loads and gross 
weights.
(a) No vehicle or combination of vehicles 
equipped with pneumatic tires shall be operated, unladen or with load, upon the 
highways of this State when the gross weight on the road surface through any 
single axle thereof exceeds 18,000 pounds, except when a different limit is 
established and posted in accordance with Section 15-316 and except any single 
axle of a 2 axle motor vehicle weighing 36,000 pounds or less and not a part of 
a combination of vehicles, shall not exceed 20,000 pounds. Provided, however, 
that any single axle of a 2 axle motor vehicle equipped with a personnel lift or 
digger derrick, weighing 36,000 pounds or less, owned and operated by a public 
utility, shall not exceed 20,000 pounds. No vehicle or combination of vehicles 
equipped with other than pneumatic tires shall be operated, unladen or with 
load, upon the highways of this State when the gross weight on the road surface 
through any wheel thereof exceeds 800 pounds per inch width of tire tread or 
when the gross weight on the road surface through any axle thereof exceeds 
16,000 pounds. The gross weight transmitted to the road surface through tandem 
axles shall not exceed 32,000 pounds and no axle of the series shall exceed the 
maximum weight permitted under this Section for a single axle. Provided that on 
a 4 axle vehicle or on a 5 or more axle combination of vehicles the weight on a 
series of 3 axles whose centers are more than 96 inches apart, measured between 
extreme axles in the series, shall not exceed those allowed on 3 axles in the 
table contained in subsection (f) of this Section and no axle or tandem axle of 
the series shall exceed the maximum weight permitted under this Section for a 
single or tandem axle. Provided also that a 3 axle vehicle or 3 axle truck mixer 
registered as a Special Hauling Vehicle, used exclusively for the mixing and 
transportation of concrete, specially equipped with a road surface engaging 
mixer trailing 4th axle, manufactured prior to or in the model year of 2004 and 
first registered in Illinois prior to January 1, 2005, with a distance greater 
than 72 inches but not more than 96 inches between any series of 2 axles may 
transmit to the road surface a maximum weight of 18,000 pounds on each of these 
axles with a gross weight on these 2 axles not to exceed 36,000 pounds. Any such 
vehicle manufactured in the model year of 2004 or thereafter or first registered 
in Illinois after December 31, 2004 may transmit to the road surface a maximum 
of 32,000 pounds through these 2 axles and none of the axles shall exceed 18,000 
pounds.
A truck, not in combination and specially 
equipped with a selfcompactor, or an industrial roll-off hoist and roll-off 
container, used exclusively for garbage or refuse operations, and a truck used 
exclusively for the collection of rendering materials may, however, when laden, 
transmit upon the road surface of any highway except when part of the National 
System of Interstate and Defense Highways, a gross weight upon a single axle not 
more than 22,000 pounds, and upon a tandem axle not more than 40,000 pounds. 
When unladen, however, those trucks shall comply with the axle limitations 
applicable to all other trucks.
A 2 axle truck specially equipped with a front 
loading compactor used exclusively for garbage, refuse, or recycling may 
transmit 20,000 pounds per axle provided that the gross weight of the vehicle 
does not exceed 40,000 pounds.
(b) The gross weight of vehicles and combination 
of vehicles including the weight of the vehicle or combination and its maximum 
load shall be subject to the foregoing limitations and further shall not exceed 
the following gross weights dependent upon the number of axles and distance 
between extreme axles of the vehicle or combination measured longitudinally to 
the nearest foot.
VEHICLES HAVING 2 
AXLES............36,000 pounds
VEHICLES OR COMBINATIONS HAVING 3 
AXLES
VEHICLES OR COMBINATIONS HAVING 4 
AXLES
In applying the above table to a vehicle having 
more than 4 axles that is not in combination, only 4 axles shall be considered 
in determining the maximum gross weights.
COMBINATIONS HAVING 5 OR MORE 
AXLES
VEHICLES OPERATING ON CRAWLER TYPE 
TRACKS 40,000 pounds
TRUCKS EQUIPPED WITH SELFCOMPACTORS 
OR ROLL-OFF HOISTS AND ROLL-OFF CONTAINERS FOR GARBAGE OR REFUSE HAULS ONLY AND 
TRUCKS USED FOR THE COLLECTION OF RENDERING MATERIALS
On Highway Not Part of National 
System of Interstate and Defense Highways
with 2 axles 36,000 pounds
with 3 axles 54,000 pounds
TWO AXLE TRUCKS EQUIPPED WITH A 
FRONT LOADING COMPACTOR USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE COLLECTION OF GARBAGE, REFUSE, 
OR RECYCLING
with 2 axles 40,000 pounds
(c) Cities having a population of more than 
50,000 may permit by ordinance axle loads on 2 axle motor vehicles 33½% above 
those provided for herein, but the increase shall not become effective until the 
city has officially notified the Department of the passage of the ordinance and 
shall not apply to those vehicles when outside of the limits of the city, nor 
shall the gross weight of any 2 axle motor vehicle operating over any street of 
the city exceed 40,000 pounds.
(d) Weight limitations shall not apply to 
vehicles (including loads) operated by a public utility when transporting 
equipment required for emergency repair of public utility facilities or 
properties or water wells.
A combination of vehicles, including a tow truck 
and a disabled vehicle or disabled combination of vehicles, that exceeds the 
weight restriction imposed by this Code, may be operated on a public highway in 
this State provided that neither the disabled vehicle nor any vehicle being 
towed nor the tow truck itself shall exceed the weight limitations permitted 
under this Chapter. During the towing operation, neither the tow truck nor the 
vehicle combination shall exceed the following axle weight 
limitations:
A. 24,000 pounds-Single rear axle;
B. 44,000 pounds-Tandem rear axle;
Gross weight limits shall not apply to the 
combination of the tow truck and vehicles being towed. The tow truck license 
plate must cover the operating empty weight of the tow truck only. The weight of 
each vehicle being towed shall be covered by a valid license plate issued to the 
owner or operator of the vehicle being towed and displayed on that vehicle. If 
no valid plate issued to the owner or operator of that vehicle is displayed on 
that vehicle, or the plate displayed on that vehicle does not cover the weight 
of the vehicle, the weight of the vehicle shall be covered by the third tow 
truck plate issued to the owner or operator of the tow truck and temporarily 
affixed to the vehicle being towed. In addition, the following conditions must 
be met:
(1) the towing vehicle must be:
a. specifically designed as a tow truck having a 
gross vehicle weight rating of at least 18,000 lbs. and equipped with air brakes 
provided that air brakes shall be required only if the towing vehicle is towing 
a vehicle, semitrailer, or tractor-trailer combination that is equipped with 
airbrakes;
b. equipped with flashing, rotating or 
oscillating amber lights, visible for at least 500 feet in all directions; 
and
c. capable of utilizing the lighting and braking 
systems of the disabled vehicle or combination of vehicles.
(2) The towing of the vehicles on the highways 
of this State shall not exceed 20 miles from the initial point of wreck or 
disablement. Any additional movement of the vehicles shall only occur upon 
issuance of authorization for that movement under the provisions of Sections 
15-301 through 15-319 of this Chapter.
The Department may by rule or regulation 
prescribe additional requirements. However, nothing in this Code shall prohibit 
a tow truck under instructions of a police officer from legally clearing a 
disabled vehicle, that may be in violation of weight limitations of this 
Chapter, from the roadway to the berm or shoulder of the highway.
For the purpose of this subsection, gross 
vehicle weight rating, or GVWR, shall mean the value specified by the 
manufacturer as the loaded weight of the tow truck.
(e) No vehicle or combination of vehicles 
equipped with pneumatic tires shall be operated, unladen or with load, upon the 
highways of this State in violation of the provisions of any permit issued under 
the provisions of Sections 15-301 through 15-319 of this Chapter.
(f) Notwithstanding any other provision in this 
Code, except for those provisions of subsection (d) of this Section relating to 
emergency operations of public utilities and tow trucks while actually engaged 
in the towing of a disabled vehicle, and those vehicles for which the Department 
issues overweight permits under authority of Section 15-301 of this Code, the 
weight limitations contained in this subsection shall apply to the National 
System of Interstate and Defense Highways and other highways in the system of 
State highways that have been designated by the Department as Class I, II, or 
III. No vehicle shall be operated on the highways with a weight in excess of 
20,000 pounds carried on any one axle or with a tandem axle weight in excess of 
34,000 pounds, or a gross weight in excess of 80,000 pounds for vehicle 
combinations of 5 axles or more, or a gross weight on a group of 2 or more 
consecutive axles in excess of that weight produced by the application of the 
following formula:
W = 500 times the sum of (LN divided by N-1) + 
2N +36
Where "W" equals overall gross weight on any 
group of 2 or more consecutive axles to the nearest 500 pounds; "L" equals the 
distance measured to the nearest foot between extremes of any group of 2 or more 
consecutive axles; and "N" equals the number of axles in the group under 
consideration, except that 2 consecutive sets of tandem axles may carry a gross 
load of 34,000 pounds each, provided the overall distance between the first and 
last axles of the consecutive sets of tandem axles is 36 feet or more. Provided 
also that a 3-axle vehicle registered as a Special Hauling Vehicle manufactured 
prior to or in the model year of 2004, and first registered in Illinois prior to 
January 1, 2005, with a distance greater than 72 inches but not more than 96 
inches between the 2 rear axles may transmit to the road surface a maximum 
weight of 18,000 pounds on each of the 2 rear axles with a gross weight on these 
2 axles not to exceed 36,000 pounds. Any vehicle registered as a Special Hauling 
Vehicle manufactured prior to or in the model year of 2004 or thereafter or 
first registered in Illinois after December 31, 2004, may transmit to the road 
surface a maximum of 34,000 pounds through the 2 rear axles and neither of the 
rear axles shall exceed 20,000 pounds.
The above formula when expressed in tabular form 
results in allowable loads as follows:
* If 
the distance between 2 axles is 96 inches or less, the 2 axles are tandem axles 
and the maximum load permitted is 34,000 pounds, notwithstanding the higher 
limit resulting from the application of the formula.
In applying the above formula to a vehicle 
having more than 4 axles that is not a combination, only 4 axles shall be 
considered in determining the maximum gross weight, and for a combination of 
vehicles having more than 6 axles, only 6 axles shall be considered in 
determining the maximum gross weight.
Notwithstanding the above table, 2 consecutive 
sets of tandem axles may carry a gross weight of 34,000 pounds each if the 
overall distance between the first and last axles of the consecutive sets of 
tandem axles is 36 feet or more.
Local authorities and road district highway 
commissioners, with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction, 
without additional fees, may also by ordinance or resolution allow the weight 
limitations of this subsection, provided the maximum gross weight on any one 
axle shall not exceed 20,000 pounds and the maximum gross weight on any tandem 
axle shall not exceed 34,000 pounds, on designated highways when appropriate 
regulatory signs giving notice are erected upon the street or highway or portion 
of any street or highway affected by the ordinance or resolution.
Combinations of vehicles, registered as Special 
Hauling Vehicles that include a semitrailer manufactured prior to or in the 
model year of 2004, and first registered in Illinois prior to January 1, 2005, 
having 5 axles with a distance of 42 feet or less between extreme axles shall be 
limited to the weights prescribed in subsections (a) and (b) of this Section and 
not subject to the bridge formula on the National System of Interstate and 
Defense Highways and other highways in the system of State highways designated 
bv the Department. For all those combinations of vehicles, that include a 
semitrailer manufactured after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 
1986, the overall distance between the first and last axles of the 2 sets of 
tandems must be 18 feet 6 inches or more. All combinations of vehicles 
registered as Special Hauling Vehicles that include a semitrailer manufactured 
prior to or in the model year of 2004 or thereafter or first registered in 
Illinois after December 31, 2004, or that has had its cargo container replaced 
in its entirety after December 31, 2004, are limited to the gross weight allowed 
by the above formula.
A truck not in combination, equipped with a self 
compactor or an industrial roll-off hoist and roll-off container, used 
exclusively for garbage or refuse operations, shall be allowed the weights as 
prescribed in subsections (a) and (b) of this Section and not subject to the 
bridge formula, provided they are not operated on a highway that is part of the 
Interstate and Defense Highway System.
Vehicles operating under this subsection shall 
have access for a distance of one highway mile to or from a Class I highway on 
any street or highway, unless there is a sign prohibiting the access, or 5 
highway miles to or from either a Class I, II, or III highway on a street or 
highway included in the system of State highways and upon any street or highway 
designated by local authorities or road district commissioner to points of 
loading and unloading and to facilities for food, fuel, repairs and 
rest.
Section 5-35 of the Illinois Administrative 
Procedure Act relating to procedures for rulemaking shall not apply to the 
designation of highways under this subsection.
(g) No person shall operate a vehicle or 
combination of vehicles over a bridge or other elevated structure constituting 
part of a highway with a gross weight that is greater than the maximum weight 
permitted by the Department, when the structure is sign posted as provided in 
this Section.
(h) The Department upon request from any local 
authority shall, or upon its own initiative may, conduct an investigation of any 
bridge or other elevated structure constituting a part of a highway, and if it 
finds that the structure cannot with safety to itself withstand the weight of 
vehicles otherwise permissible under this Code the Department shall determine 
and declare the maximum weight of vehicles that the structures can withstand, 
and shall cause or permit suitable signs stating maximum weight to be erected 
and maintained before each end of the structure. No person shall operate a 
vehicle or combination of vehicles over any structure with a gross weight that 
is greater than the posted maximum weight.
(i) Upon the trial of any person charged with a 
violation of subsections (g) or (h) of this Section, proof of the determination 
of the maximum allowable weight by the Department and the existence of the 
signs, constitutes conclusive evidence of the maximum weight that can be 
maintained with safety to the bridge or structure.