Title: Legislature of the State of California v. Weber
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: and
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
SHIRLEY N. WEBER, as Secretary of State, etc., 
Respondent; 
THOMAS W. HILTACHK, 
Real Party in Interest. 
 
S281977 
 
 
June 20, 2024 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of Court, in which Chief 
Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred. 
 
1 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
S281977 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Petitioners — the Legislature of the State of California, 
Governor Gavin Newsom, and elector and former Senate 
President Pro Tempore John Burton — filed this original 
proceeding seeking a writ of mandate or prohibition to bar the 
Secretary of State (Secretary) from placing an initiative 
measure on the November 2024 general election ballot.  The 
measure at issue has been designated Attorney General 
Initiative No. 21-0042A1 and Secretary of State Initiative 
No. 1935, and has been named the “Taxpayer Protection and 
Government Accountability Act” by its drafters.  We refer to it 
as the “TPA.”  The petition primarily contends that the TPA is 
invalid because it attempts to revise the California Constitution 
via citizen initiative.  Petitioners also argue that the TPA is 
invalid because it would seriously impair essential government 
functions.  Petitioners named Thomas W. Hiltachk, the 
proponent of the challenged measure (Proponent), as real party 
in interest. 
We issued an order to show cause and established an 
expedited briefing schedule in order to resolve this matter before 
the date that the Secretary must formally qualify the initiative 
for the ballot and prepare related materials for the voter 
information guide. 
“We stress initially the limited nature of our inquiry.  We 
do not consider or weigh the economic or social wisdom or 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
general propriety of the initiative.”  (Amador Valley Joint Union 
High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 
208, 219 (Amador Valley).)  The only question before us is 
whether the measure may be validly enacted by initiative.  After 
considering the pleadings and briefs filed by the parties and 
amici curiae as well as the parties’ oral arguments, we conclude 
that Petitioners have clearly established that the challenged 
measure would revise the Constitution without complying with 
the appropriate procedure.  The changes proposed by the TPA 
are within the electorate’s prerogative to enact, but because 
those changes would substantially alter our basic plan of 
government, the proposal cannot be enacted by initiative.  It is 
instead 
governed 
by 
the 
procedures 
for 
revising 
our 
Constitution.  We therefore issue a peremptory writ of mandate 
directing the Secretary to refrain from taking any steps to place 
the TPA on the November 5, 2024 election ballot or to include 
the measure in the voter information guide. 
I. 
We begin by summarizing the terms of the TPA and then 
recount the procedural history of this matter.   
A. 
The complete text of the initiative is set forth in the 
appendix.  In the original, proposed deletions to constitutional 
text are denoted in strikeout and proposed additions are denoted 
by italics and underscoring.  When quoting the text here, we 
have omitted italics and underscoring, except where necessary 
to identify the proposed modifications. 
Section 1 provides that the initiative shall be known as the 
“Taxpayer Protection and Government Accountability Act.” 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
Section 2 sets forth several “Findings and Declarations.”  
Subdivision (a) declares that “Californians are overtaxed”; cites 
U.S. Census Bureau data concerning the state’s combined state 
and local tax burden, which the initiative declares to be “the 
highest in the nation”; and notes that legislation proposed in 
2021 continued to raise taxes and fees despite recent revenue 
surpluses.  Subdivision (b) declares that the state’s tax burden 
is “only part of the reason for California’s rising cost-of-living 
crisis” and refers to “hidden ‘fees’ passed through to consumers 
in the price they pay for products, services, food, fuel, utilities 
and housing.”  Subdivision (c) declares that the state’s high cost 
of living “not only contributes to the state’s skyrocketing rates 
of poverty and homelessness,” but also “push[es] working 
families and job-providing businesses out of the state.”  
Subdivision (d) recounts prior voter attempts “to assert control 
over whether and how taxes and fees are raised,” including 
Proposition 13 in 1978, Proposition 62 in 1986, Proposition 218 
in 1996, and Proposition 26 in 2010.  Subdivision (e) declares:  
“Contrary to the voters’ intent, these measures that were 
designed to control taxes, spending and accountability, have 
been weakened and hamstrung by the Legislature, government 
lawyers, and the courts, making it necessary to pass yet another 
initiative to close loopholes and reverse hostile court decisions.” 
Section 3 says the initiative’s purpose is to enable voters 
to “reassert their right to a voice and a vote on new and higher 
taxes by requiring any new or higher tax be put before voters for 
approval.”  (TPA, § 3, subd. (a).)  Section 3 goes on to state 
additional purposes of the initiative:  “to increase transparency 
and accountability . . . by requiring any tax measure placed on 
the ballot — either at the state or local level — to clearly state 
the type and rate of any tax, how long it will be in effect, and the 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
use of the revenue generated by the tax” (id., subd. (b)); to 
ensure that any new or increased form of state government 
revenue is “broadly supported and transparently debated” by 
requiring that any exaction “be authorized only by a vote of the 
Legislature and signature of the Governor” (id., subd. (c)); and 
“to ensure that taxpayers have the right and ability to effectively 
balance new or increased taxes and other charges with the 
rapidly increasing” cost of living and to “protect the existing 
constitutional limit on property taxes and ensure that the 
revenue from such taxes remains local” (id., subd. (d)).  The final 
purpose of the initiative, set forth in subdivision (e), is “to 
reverse loopholes in the legislative two-thirds vote and voter 
approval requirements for government revenue increases 
created by the courts including, but not limited to,” California 
Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924 
(Cannabis Coalition), California Chamber of Commerce v. State 
Air Resources Bd. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 604, Schmeer v. County 
of Los Angeles (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1310, Johnson v. County 
of Mendocino (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1017, Citizens Assn. of 
Sunset Beach v. Orange County Local Agency Formation Com. 
(2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1182, and Wilde v. City of Dunsmuir 
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 1105 (Wilde).   
Section 4 is the first substantive provision of the initiative.  
It would amend article XIII A, section 3 of the California 
Constitution, first, by adding a new subdivision (a) to provide 
that “[e]very levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by 
state law is either a tax or an exempt charge.”  (TPA, § 4.)  The 
term “ ‘tax’ ” is currently defined as “any levy, charge, or 
exaction of any kind imposed by the State,” with enumerated 
exceptions.  (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 3, subd. (b); all 
undesignated articles hereafter refer to provisions of the 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
California Constitution.)  The TPA would amend this definition 
to provide that, as used in article XIII A and in section 9 of 
article II, “ ‘tax’ means every any levy, charge, or exaction of any 
kind imposed by the State state law that is not an exempt 
charge,” and current exceptions to the definition of “tax” would 
be amended and incorporated into a new definition of “exempt 
charge.”  (TPA, § 4 [proposed art. XIII A, § 3, subds. (d), (e)].)  
Section 9 of article II recognizes the electorate’s referendum 
power to approve or reject statutes “except . . . statutes 
providing for tax levies or appropriations for usual current 
expenses of the State.”  (Art. II, § 9, subd. (a).)  Thus, under the 
TPA, every state exempt charge would be subject to referendum 
because it does not qualify as a “tax.”  The term “state law” 
would be defined in this context to include, but not be limited to, 
“any state statute, state regulation, state executive order, state 
resolution, state ruling, state opinion letter, or other legal 
authority or interpretation adopted, enacted, enforced, issued, 
or implemented by the legislative or executive branches of state 
government,” while excluding actions taken by The Regents of 
the University of California, the Trustees of the California State 
University, or the Board of Governors of the California 
Community Colleges.  (TPA, § 4 [proposed art. XIII A, § 3, 
subd. (h)(4)].) 
Second, section 4 imposes what Proponent refers to as the 
“State Tax Provision,” renumbering what is now article XIII A, 
section 3, subdivision (a) as new subdivision (b)(1) and 
amending that provision as follows:  “Any change in state 
statute law which results in any taxpayer paying a new or 
higher tax must be imposed by an act passed by not less than 
two-thirds of all members elected to each of the two houses of 
the Legislature, and submitted to the electorate and approved by 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
a majority vote, except that no new ad valorem taxes on real 
property, or sales or transaction taxes on the sales of real 
property, may be imposed.”  (TPA, § 4 [proposed art. XIII A, § 3, 
subd. (b)(1)].)  New subdivision (b)(1) would also specify the 
contents of any such act for voter approval, including, among 
other things, the duration of the time the tax would be imposed 
and an estimate of the annual amount of revenue derived (TPA, 
§ 4 [proposed art. XIII A, § 3, subd. (b)(1)(A)]) and “[a] specific 
and legally binding and enforceable limitation on how the 
revenue from the tax can be spent” (ibid. [proposed art. XIII A, 
§ 3, subd. (b)(1)(B)]).  Any such limitation could be changed only 
through a new legislative act passed by not less than two-thirds 
of all members of each house and submitted to the voters for 
approval by a majority vote.  (Ibid.)  Tax revenue “can be spent 
for ‘unrestricted general revenue purposes,’ ” but only if set forth 
as such in a statement contained in a separate, stand-alone 
section.  (Ibid.)  Proposed subdivision (b)(2) would set forth 
additional requirements for ballot materials to accompany any 
initiative that would impose a tax, including any measure 
proposed by an elector. 
Third, section 4 of the TPA would enact what Proponent 
refers to as the “State Exempt Charge Provision.”  This 
provision would add a new subdivision (c) to article XIII A, 
section 3, providing that “[a]ny change in state law which results 
in any taxpayer paying a new or higher exempt charge must be 
imposed by an act passed by each of the two houses of the 
Legislature.”  (TPA, § 4 [proposed art. XIII A, § 3, subd. (c)].)  
The TPA would put the burden on the state to prove “by a 
preponderance of the clear and convincing evidence” that a levy, 
charge, or other exaction is an exempt charge rather than a tax 
by showing that “the amount of the exempt charge is reasonable 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
and that the amount charged does not exceed the actual cost of 
providing the service or product to the payor,” with “actual cost” 
defined as set forth in the initiative.  (Ibid. [proposed art. XIII A, 
§ 3, subds. (g)(1), (h)(1)].)   
Fourth, section 4 of the initiative amends what is 
currently subdivision (c) of article XIII A, section 3 to provide 
the first of two rollback provisions, stating that “[a]ny tax or 
exempt charge adopted after January 1, 2022 . . . , but prior to 
the effective date of this act, that was not adopted in compliance 
with the requirements of this section is void 12 months after the 
effective date of this act unless the tax or exempt charge is 
reenacted . . . in compliance with the requirements of this 
section.”  (TPA, § 4 [proposed art. XIII A, § 3, subd. (f)].) 
Section 5 of the initiative would amend article XIII C, 
section 1 of the California Constitution, which defines terms 
relevant to voter approval for local tax levies, in much the same 
manner as state tax levies.  (TPA, § 5 [proposed art. XIII C, § 1, 
subds. (f) defining “local law,” (i) defining “tax,” (j) defining 
“exempt charge”].)  Among other changes, section 5 would 
subject all local fines and fees that qualify as exempt charges, 
including license fees and rental fees, to voter referendum.  
(Ibid. [proposed art. XIII C, § 1, subds. (i) redefining “tax” for the 
purposes of Cal. Const., art. II, § 9, which governs referenda, (j) 
defining “ ‘ exempt charge’ ”].) 
Section 6 of the initiative would enact what Proponent 
refers to as the “Local Tax Provision” by amending 
article XIII C, section 2 of the California Constitution in several 
aspects.  First, it would extend the current two-thirds voter 
approval requirement for local special taxes to apply not only 
when the tax is proposed by a local governing body but also when 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
proposed “by an elector.”  (TPA, § 6 [proposed art. XIII C, § 2, 
subd. (c)].)  Second, it would require that any exempt charge be 
imposed by “the governing body of a local government” or via 
initiative, and it would prohibit local governments from 
imposing a tax or exempt charge by way of charter amendment.  
(Ibid. [proposed art. XIII C, § 2, subds. (e), (f)].)  Third, it would 
enact the second rollback provision of the initiative, providing 
that “[a]ny tax or exempt charge adopted after January 1, 2022, 
but prior to the effective date of this act, that was not adopted 
in compliance with the requirements of this section is void 12 
months after the effective date of this act unless the tax or 
exempt charge is reenacted in compliance with the requirements 
of this section.”  (Ibid. [proposed art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (g)].)   
Section 7 of the TPA proposes to amend section 3 of 
article XIII D, which limits property taxes, assessments, fees, 
and charges.  It would add surcharges, including those “based 
on the value of property,” to the list of levies that state and local 
governments are barred from assessing “upon any parcel of 
property” or property ownership.  (TPA, § 7 [proposed 
art. XIII D, § 3, subd. (a)].)  Section 7 would also revise two of 
the enumerated exceptions to this bar.  First, article XIII D, 
subdivision (a)(1), which currently exempts ad valorem property 
taxes “imposed pursuant to article XIII and article XIII A,” 
would be modified to exempt ad valorem property taxes that are 
“described in Section 1(a) of Article XIII and Section 1(a) of 
Article XIII A” (TPA, § 7) as well as those “described and enacted 
pursuant to the voter approval requirement in Section 1(b) of 
Article XIII A” (ibid.).  Second, article XIII D, subdivision (a)(2), 
which now exempts “[a]ny special tax receiving a two-thirds vote 
pursuant to section 4 of article XIII A” (i.e., those imposed by 
cities, counties, and special districts), would be modified to 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
exempt “[a]ny special non-ad valorem tax receiving a two-thirds 
vote of qualified electors pursuant to section 4 of article XIII A” 
(TPA, § 7 [proposed art. XIII D, § 3, subd. (a)(2)]) or “a two-
thirds vote of those authorized to vote in a community facilities 
district by the Legislature pursuant to statute” (ibid.).   
Section 8 of the initiative proposes to amend sections 1 and 
14 of article XIII.  It would add a new provision to section 1, 
subdivision (c) that would require “[a]ll proceeds from the 
taxation of property” to be apportioned “to the districts within 
the counties.”  (TPA, § 8 [proposed art. XIII, § 1, subd. (c)].)  
Section 14 of article XIII would be amended to clarify that 
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” state and local 
property taxes must also be apportioned “to the districts within 
the counties.”  (TPA, § 8 [proposed art. XIII, § 14].) 
Section 9 contains several general provisions, including a 
severability clause (TPA, § 9, subd. C). 
B. 
On January 4, 2022, Proponent submitted the initiative 
measure to the Attorney General for preparation of a circulating 
title and summary, which are required before an initiative may 
be circulated for signature.  (Art. II, § 10, subd. (d); Elec. Code, 
§ 9002.)  On February 1, 2023, the Secretary certified that the 
initiative petition had received the required number of 
signatures to qualify for the November 2024 general election 
ballot. 
On September 26, 2023, Petitioners filed an emergency 
petition for writ of mandate, asserting that the proposed 
initiative is an impermissible attempt to revise rather than 
amend the California Constitution.  Secondarily, Petitioners 
argued that the proposed initiative is invalid because it would 
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10 
impair essential government functions.  Petitioners further 
claimed that preelection review was necessary for various 
reasons explained below.  Several amici curiae filed briefs in 
support of the petition. 
The petition named the Secretary as respondent and 
Proponent as real party in interest.  After requesting and 
reviewing preliminary responses from the Secretary and 
Proponent, and after receiving amicus curiae briefs opposing the 
petition, we issued an order to show cause and set the case for 
expedited briefing and decision.  
The Secretary filed a return to the petition in order to 
apprise the court of relevant election deadlines for the 
November 5, 2024 General Election as they relate to this 
proceeding.  Specifically, she requests that this matter be 
resolved by June 27, 2024, the date she must formally qualify 
the TPA for the November 5, 2024 General Election ballot.  The 
Secretary also provides some factual background on the 
potential effects of the initiative on election administration, as 
well as the processes and costs of conducting special elections.  
She takes no substantive position on the issues presented.   
II. 
We typically review constitutional challenges to an 
initiative after an election in order to avoid disrupting the 
electoral process and the exercise of the franchise.  (Brosnahan 
v. Eu (1982) 31 Cal.3d 1, 4.)  But preelection review is proper for 
challenges that go “to the power of the electorate to adopt the 
proposal in the first instance.”  (Legislature v. Deukmejian 
(1983) 34 Cal.3d 658, 667.)  Preelection review is available 
where, as here, “the challenge is based upon a claim . . . that the 
proposed measure may not properly be submitted to the voters 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
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11 
because the measure is not legislative in character or because it 
amounts to a constitutional revision rather [than] an 
amendment.”  (Senate of the State of Cal. v. Jones (1999) 21 
Cal.4th 1142, 1153 (Jones); see McFadden v. Jordan (1948) 32 
Cal.2d 330, 331–332 (McFadden) [granting preelection relief 
upon holding that proposed initiative sought to revise, not 
amend, the Constitution].) 
Most recently, we exercised preelection review in Jones to 
consider a challenge by the Senate and others to a proposed 
initiative that sought to restrict state officers’ pay and to 
transfer the power to reapportion state legislative districts from 
the Legislature to this court.  (Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1146–1149.)  Petitioners claimed the measure was invalid 
because it amounted to a constitutional revision rather than an 
amendment, because the measure violated the single-subject 
rule of the California Constitution, and because the petitions 
circulated to qualify the measure for the ballot contained 
misleading statements and omissions.  (Jones, at p. 1150.)  We 
found preelection review to be appropriate because “[u]nder 
such circumstances, deferring a decision until after the election 
not only will defeat the constitutionally contemplated procedure 
. . . , but may contribute to an increasing cynicism on the part of 
the electorate with respect to the efficacy of the initiative 
process.”  (Id. at p. 1154.)  “ ‘The presence of an invalid measure 
on the ballot steals attention, time, and money from the 
numerous valid propositions on the same ballot.  It will confuse 
some voters and frustrate others, and an ultimate decision that 
the measure is invalid, coming after the voters have voted in 
favor of the measure, tends to denigrate the legitimate use of 
the initiative procedure.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting American Federation 
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of Labor v. Eu (1984) 36 Cal.3d 687, 697 (American Federation 
of Labor).)   
As relevant 
here, article XVIII of the 
California 
Constitution provides that the electorate “may amend the 
Constitution by initiative” (art. XVIII, § 3) but that an effort “to 
revise the Constitution” must proceed by way of a constitutional 
convention and popular ratification (id., § 2) or by submission to 
the voters from a supermajority of the Legislature (id., §§ 1, 3).  
(See Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 221.)  After reviewing 
the petition and the opposition filed by Proponent, we 
determined that Petitioners had made a prima facie showing 
that the TPA would amount to an invalid constitutional revision 
based on its far-reaching changes to existing processes by which 
revenue measures are enacted and maintained at the state and 
local levels. 
In the present matter, postelection review would be more 
challenging than in a typical case because of the TPA’s rollback 
provisions.  Those provisions would void any state or local “tax 
or exempt charge” adopted after January 1, 2022 and prior to 
the TPA’s effective date if it was “not adopted in compliance 
with” the newly proposed requirements, unless it is reenacted 
with voter approval within one year of the TPA’s effective date.  
(TPA, § 4 [proposed art. XIII A, § 3, subd. (f)]; id., § 6 [proposed 
art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (g)].)  The TPA, if enacted, would thus 
require the state and localities to start preparing to administer 
special elections if they wish to avoid nullification of taxes or 
charges imposed after January 1, 2022.  These provisions would 
effectively transform any postelection review of the TPA into 
another form of preelection review in advance of the special 
elections expected to take place the following year.  The rollback 
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provisions also generate uncertainty before the election as to 
whether already enacted revenue measures will be later voided. 
For these reasons, we find that preelection review is 
appropriate in this matter.  
III. 
Petitioners’ primary claim is that the TPA would work an 
impermissible revision of the California Constitution.  Where a 
preelection challenge asserts that a proposed initiative would 
effect an unlawful revision, “[o]ur prior decisions have made it 
clear that to find such a revision, it must necessarily or 
inevitably appear from the face of the challenged provision that 
the measure will substantially alter the basic governmental 
framework set forth in our Constitution.”  (Legislature v. Eu 
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 510.)  “Particularly when a preelection 
challenge is brought against an initiative measure that has been 
signed by the requisite number of voters to qualify it for the 
ballot, the important state interest in protecting the 
fundamental right of the people to propose statutory or 
constitutional changes through the initiative process requires 
that a court exercise considerable caution before intervening to 
remove or withhold the measure from an imminent election.  
Only when a court is confident that the challenge is meritorious 
and justifies withholding the measure from the ballot, should a 
court take the dramatic step of ordering the removal of a 
measure that ostensibly has obtained a sufficient number of 
qualified signatures.”  (Costa v. Superior Court (2006) 37 Cal.4th 
986, 1007–1008.) 
We begin with the relevant provisions of the California 
Constitution governing amendment and revision, and a review 
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of our case law on the distinction between the two.  With those 
concepts in mind, we then analyze the TPA. 
A. 
Article II of the California Constitution, which pertains to 
voting and the initiative, referendum, and recall powers, begins 
with the following principle:  “All political power is inherent in 
the people.  Government is instituted for their protection, 
security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform 
it when the public good may require.”  (Art. II, § 1.)  As relevant 
here, article II sets out the basic framework for voter initiatives, 
defining “initiative” as “the power of the electors to propose 
statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or 
reject them” (id., § 8, subd. (a)) and setting forth procedural and 
substantive requirements for voter initiatives (id., subds. (b)–
(f)). 
Whereas article II reserves to the people the power to 
amend the Constitution via citizen initiative, article XVIII sets 
forth the applicable procedures to either amend or revise the 
Constitution.  Article XVIII is comprised of four sections: 
“SEC. 1.  The Legislature by rollcall vote entered in the 
journal, two-thirds of the membership of each house concurring, 
may propose an amendment or revision of the Constitution and 
in the same manner may amend or withdraw its proposal.  Each 
amendment shall be so prepared and submitted that it can be 
voted on separately. 
“SEC. 2.  The Legislature by rollcall vote entered in the 
journal, two-thirds of the membership of each house concurring, 
may submit at a general election the question whether to call a 
convention to revise the Constitution.  If the majority vote yes 
on that question, within 6 months the Legislature shall provide 
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for the convention.  Delegates to a constitutional convention 
shall be voters elected from districts as nearly equal in 
population as may be practicable. 
“SEC. 3.  The electors may amend the Constitution by 
initiative. 
“SEC. 4.  A proposed amendment or revision shall be 
submitted to the electors and, if approved by a majority of votes 
cast thereon, takes effect on the fifth day after the Secretary of 
State files the statement of the vote for the election at which the 
measure is voted on, but the measure may provide that it 
becomes operative after its effective date.  If provisions of two or 
more measures approved at the same election conflict, the 
provisions of the measure receiving the highest number of 
affirmative votes shall prevail.”   
In Strauss v. Horton (2009) 46 Cal.4th 364, 414 (Strauss), 
we summarized the import of these provisions as follows:  
“[U]nder these constitutional provisions an amendment to the 
California Constitution may be proposed to the electorate either 
by the required vote of the Legislature or by an initiative 
petition signed by the requisite number of voters.  A revision to 
the California Constitution may be proposed either by the 
required vote of the Legislature or by a constitutional 
convention (proposed by the Legislature and approved by the 
voters).  Either a proposed amendment or a proposed revision of 
the Constitution must be submitted to the voters, and becomes 
effective if approved by a majority of votes cast thereon at the 
election.  Under these provisions, although the initiative power 
may be used to amend the California Constitution, it may not be 
used to revise the Constitution.”  (Ibid., abrogated on another 
ground in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) 576 U.S. 644, 685.) 
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In elucidating the distinction between an amendment and 
a revision, Strauss “examine[d] the origin and history of this 
distinction in our state Constitution as well as the numerous 
California decisions that have analyzed and applied the 
distinction over the course of many years.”  (Strauss, supra, 46 
Cal.4th at p. 414; see id. at pp. 414–440.)  From that lengthy 
discussion, we distill a few points here.  As an initial matter, the 
distinction between amendment and revision dates back to the 
original 1849 Constitution, under which “[a]ny amendment or 
amendments” to the Constitution could be proposed by the 
Legislature upon a majority vote of both houses and thereafter 
submitted directly to the people.  (Cal. Const. of 1849, art. X, 
§ 1.)  By contrast, if the Legislature, by a two-thirds vote of both 
houses, “th[ought] it necessary to revise or change this entire 
constitution,” it could recommend to the voters that they 
convene a constitutional convention.  (Cal. Const. of 1849, art. X, 
§ 2.)  These provisions show “that the amendment/revision 
distinction long predates the appearance of the initiative 
process in California.”  (Strauss, at p. 416.) 
The provisions for revision and amendment were retained 
with modifications in the 1879 Constitution and placed in 
article XVIII.  Among other changes, the 1879 Constitution 
increased the required legislative support for constitutional 
amendment from a majority of both houses to a two-thirds vote 
in both houses, which is the same threshold for presenting 
voters the question of whether to call a constitutional 
convention.  What is significant for our purposes is that “under 
the 1879 Constitution as originally adopted, as under the 1849 
Constitution, a revision of the constitution could be proposed 
only by a constitutional convention and contemplated a 
potentially broad reworking of the constitutional structure and 
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provisions, whereas ‘any amendment or amendments’ to the 
Constitution could be proposed, and submitted directly to a vote 
of the people, by the Legislature.”  (Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th at 
p. 418.) 
From early on, our case law has distinguished between 
amendment and revision in similar terms:  “The very term 
‘constitution’ implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding 
nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision 
indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles 
upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the 
instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature.  On 
the other hand, the significance of the term ‘amendment’ implies 
such an addition or change within the lines of the original 
instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out 
the purpose for which it was framed.  Experience may disclose 
defects in some of its details, or in the practical application of 
some of the principles or limitations which it contains.  The 
changed condition of affairs in different parts of the state, or the 
changes of society or time, may demand the removal of some of 
these limitations, or an extended application of its principles.  
So, too, some popular wave of sociological reform, like the 
abolition of the death penalty for crime, or a prohibition against 
the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors, may induce a 
legislature to submit for enactment, in the permanent form of a 
constitutional prohibition, a rule which it has the power itself to 
enact as a law, but which might be of only temporary effect.”  
(Livermore v. Waite (1894) 102 Cal. 113, 118–119.) 
In 1948, we held in McFadden that a proposed initiative 
was an impermissible revision because its effect would have 
been to “substantially alter the purpose and to attain objectives 
clearly beyond the lines of the Constitution as now cast” rather 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
than working “ ‘within the lines of the original instrument’ ” to 
achieve “ ‘an improvement or better carry out the purpose for 
which it was framed.’ ”  (McFadden, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 350.)  
McFadden involved a preelection challenge to a proposed 
initiative that would have repealed or substantially altered “at 
least 15 of the 25 articles” contained in the Constitution at that 
time, while also introducing at least four new topics to the 
Constitution and “substantially curtail[ing]” the legislative and 
judicial functions of the state government.  (Id. at p. 345.)  Our 
summary of the initiative and its effects spanned more than 10 
pages (id. at pp. 334–345) and did “not purport to be exhaustive” 
(id. at p. 345), “demonstrat[ing] the wide and diverse range of 
subject matters proposed to be voted upon, and the revisional 
effect which it would necessarily have on our basic plan of 
government” (id. at pp. 345–346). 
“In 1956, the California Legislature created a Citizens 
Legislative Advisory Commission to study and evaluate the 
organization and procedures of the Legislature, and a few years 
later that commission was requested to study and to provide a 
recommendation with regard to problems and methods of 
constitutional revision.”  (Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 425.)  
In response to the commission’s recommendations, the 
Legislature 
approved 
and 
submitted 
to 
the 
voters 
a 
constitutional amendment to permit the Legislature to submit 
constitutional revisions, as well as amendments, to the 
electorate for approval.  Among the ballot materials 
accompanying this measure was the following description from 
the Legislative Counsel distinguishing between an amendment 
and a revision:  “Under existing provisions the Legislature can 
only propose ‘amendments,’ that is measures which propose 
changes specific and limited in nature.  ‘Revisions,’ i.e., 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
proposals which involve broad changes in all or a substantial 
part of the Constitution, can presently be proposed only by 
convening a constitutional convention.”  (Ballot Pamp., Gen. 
Elec. (Nov. 6, 1962) analysis of Prop. 7 by Legis. Counsel, p. 13.)  
The voters adopted the amendment as Proposition 7 at the 
November 1962 general election.  (Strauss, at pp. 425–426.) 
In Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d 208, we considered 
multiple challenges to article XIII A, which had been adopted by 
the voters in 1978 as Proposition 13.  Proposition 13 “contain[ed] 
four distinct elements”:  (1) “a limitation on the tax rate 
applicable to real property”; (2) “a restriction on the assessed 
value of real property”; (3) a requirement of a two-thirds vote of 
the Legislature for any change in state tax law with the purpose 
of increasing revenues, along with a prohibition on new ad 
valorem taxes on real property and on sales or transaction taxes 
on real property sales; and (4) “a restriction upon local taxes,” 
requiring a two-thirds vote of local electors to impose special 
taxes.  (Amador Valley, at p. 220.)  Proposition 13 also included 
general provisions relating to the effective dates and 
severability of the new constitutional article.  (Amador Valley, 
at p. 220; see id. at p. 257 [reproducing complete text of the 
initiative].) 
Among other claims, the petitioners in Amador Valley 
argued that the new article XIII A “represents such a drastic 
and far-reaching change in the nature and operation of our 
governmental structure that it must be considered a ‘revision’ of 
the state Constitution rather than a mere ‘amendment’ thereof.”  
(Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 221.)  We first reviewed 
Livermore and McFadden, and said those decisions together 
“mandate that our analysis . . . must be both quantitative and 
qualitative in nature.  For example, an enactment which is so 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
extensive in its provisions as to change directly the ‘substantial 
entirety’ of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of 
numerous existing provisions may well constitute a revision 
thereof.  However, even a relatively simple enactment may 
accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic 
governmental plan as to amount to a revision also.”  (Amador 
Valley, at p. 223.)  Applying this framework, we said that 
quantitatively Proposition 13 “comprises approximately 400 
words and . . . is limited to the single subject of taxation (with 
particular emphasis upon real property taxation).”  (Amador 
Valley, at p. 224.)  And qualitatively, we rejected the argument 
that Proposition 13 would result in the loss of “home rule” or 
convert the state from a “republican” to a “democratic” form of 
government.  (Amador Valley, at p. 224.)  We said that unlike 
the measure at issue in McFadden, the changes effected by 
Proposition 13 “operate functionally within a relatively narrow 
range to accomplish a new system of taxation which may provide 
substantial tax relief for our citizens.  We decline to hold that 
such a limited purpose cannot be achieved directly by the people 
through the initiative process.”  (Amador Valley, at p. 228.)   
Since Amador Valley, we have deployed the same mode of 
analysis in numerous cases.  (See People v. Frierson (1979) 25 
Cal.3d 142, 186–187; Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, 
260–261; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 891–892; Raven 
v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 349–355 (Raven); 
Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 506–512; Professional 
Engineers in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 
Cal.4th 1016, 1046–1047; Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 440–
457.)  The quantitative aspect of the inquiry has become less 
significant since the adoption of the single-subject rule in 1948, 
the year we decided McFadden.  (Art. II, § 8, subd. (d).)  Thus, 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
our cases since McFadden have focused primarily on the 
qualitative analysis. 
As we summarized in Strauss, “the numerous past 
decisions of this court that have addressed this issue all have 
indicated that the type of measure that may constitute a 
revision of the California Constitution is one that makes ‘far 
reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan’ 
(Amador [Valley], supra, 22 Cal.3d 208, 223, italics added), or, 
stated in slightly different terms, that ‘substantially alter[s] the 
basic governmental framework set forth in our Constitution.’  
(Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d 492, 510, italics added.)”  
(Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 441.)  For example, “an 
enactment which purported to vest all judicial power in the 
Legislature would amount to a revision without regard either to 
the length or complexity of the measure or the number of 
existing articles or sections affected by such change.”  (Amador 
Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 223.) 
As it turns out, this example set forth in Amador Valley 
presaged our holding in Raven that a provision of Proposition 
115, a 1990 ballot initiative titled the “Crime Victims Justice 
Reform Act,” was an improper constitutional revision.  (Raven, 
supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 340–341.)  In Raven, a postelection case, 
our finding of invalidity focused on one specific provision of 
Proposition 115:  an amendment to article I, section 24 of the 
state Constitution.  Section 24, as originally enacted in 1974, 
provided in relevant part:  “Rights guaranteed by this 
Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the 
United States Constitution.”  Proposition 115 would have added 
the following proviso:  “ ‘In criminal cases the rights of a 
defendant to equal protection of the laws, to due process of law, 
to the assistance of counsel, to be personally present with 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
counsel, to a speedy and public trial, to compel the attendance 
of witnesses, to confront the witnesses against him or her, to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, to privacy, to not 
be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself, to not be 
placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and not to suffer 
the imposition of cruel or unusual punishment, shall be 
construed by the courts of this state in a manner consistent with 
the Constitution of the United States.  This Constitution shall 
not be construed by the courts to afford greater rights to 
criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of 
the United States, nor shall it be construed to afford greater 
rights to minors in juvenile proceedings on criminal causes than 
those afforded by the Constitution of the United States.’ ”  
(Raven, at p. 350.) 
The petitioners in Raven argued that “the measure has in 
essence ‘vested’ or ‘delegated’ all judicial interpretive power 
respecting those rights in or to the federal courts.”  (Raven, 
supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 351.)  We agreed.  Referring to the 
example above from Amador Valley, we explained:  “Proposition 
115 contemplates a similar qualitative change.  In essence and 
practical effect, new article I, section 24, would vest all judicial 
interpretive power, as to fundamental criminal defense rights, 
in the United States Supreme Court.  From a qualitative 
standpoint, the effect of Proposition 115 is devastating.”  (Raven, 
at p. 352.)  Such a change “would substantially alter the 
substance and integrity of the state Constitution as a document 
of independent force and effect.”  (Ibid.)  The measure 
“substantially alters the preexisting constitutional scheme or 
framework heretofore extensively and repeatedly used by courts 
in interpreting and enforcing state constitutional protections.  It 
directly 
contradicts 
the 
well-established 
jurisprudential 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
principle that, ‘The judiciary, from the very nature of its powers 
and means given it by the Constitution, must possess the right 
to construe the Constitution in the last resort . . . .’  [Citations.]  
In short, in the words of Amador [Valley], . . . this ‘relatively 
simple enactment [accomplishes] . . . such far reaching changes 
in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a 
revision . . . .’ ”  (Id. at pp. 354–355.) 
B. 
When evaluating whether a voter initiative constitutes a 
valid amendment or invalid revision, we examine the challenged 
measure in its entirety.  (Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at 
p. 221.)  While a single provision of an initiative may constitute 
a revision standing alone (see Raven, supra, 52 Cal.3d at 
pp. 340–341), a proposed initiative may also be revisionary 
based on its combined effects.  (McFadden, supra, 32 Cal.2d at 
pp. 345–346.)  Viewed in isolation, one provision may not be so 
impactful as to change the “ ‘nature of our basic governmental 
plan’ ” (Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 441), yet it is possible 
that the collective impact of multiple provisions may accomplish 
such a change. 
Holistic analysis of an initiative measure’s effects is 
particularly appropriate here because the question before us 
concerns whether the initiative, in its entirety, may appear on 
the ballot.  While in postenactment review, courts may 
sometimes sever invalid provisions from valid ones, there is no 
precedent for granting severance as a remedy in the preelection 
context.  (Cf. Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1168 [“when an 
initiative measure violates the single-subject rule, severance is 
not an available remedy”]; Bennett v. Drullard (1915) 27 
Cal.App. 180, 183–185 (Bennett) [reasoning, based on the 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
language of the city charter at issue, that courts lack the 
authority to modify proposed initiatives by severance or 
amendment once they have qualified for the ballot].) 
Proponent has not requested severance in this case.  A 
group of local taxpayers’ associations, appearing as amici curiae 
in support of Proponent, suggest that we sever “the offending 
provisions [while] retaining those that do not suffer from the 
defects asserted by Petitioners.”  But the voters who sign 
initiative petitions understand that their signatures support 
putting the entirety of the measure before the electorate.  
Allowing or directing the Secretary to modify the initiative text 
before it is presented on the ballot may frustrate that intent.  
(Bennett, supra, 27 Cal.App. at p. 185.)  It could also lead to 
manipulation of initiative proposals, whereby invalid provisions 
are included at the signature-gathering stage to facilitate ballot 
qualification, only to be deleted later by judicial directive.  (Id. 
at p. 184.)  Conversely, permitting the Secretary to submit the 
entire text of an initiative to the electorate after this court has 
found its most significant provisions invalid “would confuse the 
electorate and mislead many voters into casting their ballot on 
the basis of provisions which had already been found invalid.”  
(American Federation of Labor, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 716.) 
We therefore proceed by considering the TPA as it would 
be presented to voters — as a whole.  We discuss three 
categories of changes that, according to Petitioners and their 
amici curiae, effect a revision of our basic plan of government.  
We focus on their arguments that the TPA would transform (1) 
the Legislature’s power to levy taxes, (2) the balance of power 
among the Legislature, state executive agencies, and the 
electorate over the setting of fees, and (3) the authority of local 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
government agencies to set fees without legislative approval or 
the possibility of referendum. 
1. 
From the state’s founding, the Legislature has had broad 
authority to levy taxes.  As Proponent notes, the 1849 
Constitution directed the Legislature to “restrict” local 
governments’ powers of taxation (Cal. Const. of 1849, art. IV, 
§ 37), while the 1879 Constitution prohibited the Legislature 
from imposing taxes on local governments or their inhabitants 
for “municipal purposes” (Cal. Const. of 1879, art. XI, § 12).  The 
1879 Constitution also exempted from taxation property owned 
by the state or federal government, as well as public schools and 
local governments (Cal. Const. of 1879, art. XIII, § 1), and 
prohibited poll taxes on certain people (id., § 12).  “Generally,” 
however, “the Legislature is supreme in the field of taxation, 
and the provisions on taxation in the state Constitution are a 
limitation on the power of the Legislature rather than a grant 
to it.”  (Delaney v. Lowery (1944) 25 Cal.2d 561, 568; see The 
Gillette Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 468, 477 
[same].)  In describing article XIII, section 24, subdivision (a), 
which was part of the original 1879 Constitution and declares 
that “[t]he Legislature may not impose taxes for local purposes 
but may authorize local governments to impose them,” we have 
said this provision operates as “a restriction on the Legislature’s 
otherwise plenary power of taxation” under the California 
Constitution.  (Santa Clara County Local Transportation 
Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 247 (Guardino), 
italics added.) 
It is true that starting in the 1970s, a series of initiatives 
have circumscribed the Legislature’s and local governments’ tax 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
authority, although in different ways.  “The series of reforms 
began with Proposition 13, a ballot initiative passed in 1978 to 
cap increases in property taxes and assessments, as well as 
other state and local taxes.”  (Wilde, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1112.)  
Among its effects, Proposition 13 enacted section 3 of 
article XIII A, which requires a two-thirds vote of both houses of 
the Legislature for “any changes in State taxes enacted for the 
purpose of increasing revenues collected pursuant thereto,” 
while prohibiting any “new ad valorem taxes on real property, 
or sales or transaction taxes on the sales of real property.”  (See 
Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 248.)  Proposition 13 also 
imposed “a restriction upon local taxes” by requiring “ ‘special 
taxes’ ” to be approved by a two-thirds vote of the local 
electorate.  (Amador Valley, at p. 220.) 
“Then, in 1996, voters passed Proposition 218, which 
further curbed state and local government authority to generate 
revenue through taxes and other exactions.”  (Wilde, supra, 9 
Cal.5th at p. 1112.)  Proposition 218 extended Proposition 13’s 
limitations on property tax assessments at both the state and 
local levels, and restricted local governments from imposing any 
taxes without voter approval.  (City of San Buenaventura v. 
United Water Conservation Dist. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1191, 1200; 
see art. XIII C, § 2, subds. (b), (d).)  We have upheld voter 
approval requirements for local taxes on the ground that local 
governments “have no inherent power to tax” and instead derive 
their taxing authority from the Legislature.  (Guardino, supra, 
11 Cal.4th at p. 248, citing art. XIII, § 24, subd. (a).)  The 
“Legislature’s authority to grant taxing power to local 
governments . . . includes the authority to prescribe the terms 
and conditions under which local governments may exercise 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
27 
that power,” such as voter approval requirements.  (Ibid.; see id. 
at p. 250.)   
“Finally, in 2010, voters approved Proposition 26, which 
expanded the reach of these limitations by broadening the 
definition of ‘tax’ ” to cover a wider set of government exactions.  
(Wilde, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1112.)  These definitional changes 
affected which charges are subject to the supermajority vote 
requirement in the Legislature or voter approval requirements 
at the local level for new taxes.  (Cf. Zolly v. City of Oakland 
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 780, 786 [describing Proposition 26’s 
amendments to the state and local definition of “tax” in 
art. XIII A, § 3 and art. XIII C, § 1, respectively].)       
Thus, Proposition 13 and its progeny withdrew the 
Legislature’s authority to enact certain types of taxes and 
imposed heightened vote requirements for any statutory change 
in taxes for the purpose of increasing revenues.  These 
initiatives also made any local tax subject to voter approval.  
Characterizing the TPA as simply more of the same, Proponent 
argues that “Petitioners do not explain, nor can they explain, 
how [the] TPA’s voter approval requirement is more damaging 
to their legislative power than any of the prior constitutional 
amendments and initiative statutes repealing a tax or fixing the 
rate and manner of assessing a tax.”   
This characterization belies the significance of the TPA, 
which would transform the process of levying state taxes that 
has existed since the state’s founding.  The TPA would prevent 
the Legislature from enacting any new tax without voter 
approval.  Although Proponent argues that California’s very 
first constitution required voter approval of general obligation 
bond debt (Cal. Const. of 1849, art. VIII) and that the 1879 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
28 
Constitution restated the same (Cal. Const. of 1879, art. XVI, 
§ 1), the specific carveout for bond debt in the original 
constitutions, adopted by constitutional conventions that 
otherwise retained the Legislature’s plenary authority over 
other forms of taxation and revenue, only underscores the 
significance of extending voter approval across the entire field 
of taxation. 
So central is the authority to levy taxes that tax legislation 
is exempt from referendum.  Like the initiative power, the 
referendum power was enacted in 1911.  (Wilde, supra, 9 Cal.5th 
at p. 1111.)  Whereas the initiative power “allows voters to 
propose new measures and place them on the ballot for a popular 
vote,” the referendum power “allows voters to weigh in on laws 
that have already been passed by their elected representatives.”  
(Ibid.)  “Any voter or group of voters that gathers enough 
signatures can place a legislative enactment on the ballot for an 
up or down vote.  A referendum suspends operation of the law 
until it is approved by a majority of voters.”  (Ibid.; see art. II, 
§ 9, subd. (a); id., § 10, subd. (a).)  The referendum power is 
subject to certain exceptions; as relevant here, “statutes 
providing for tax levies or appropriations for usual current 
expenses of the State” are exempt from referendum.  (Art. II, § 9, 
subd. (a).)  “One of the reasons, if not the chief reason, why the 
Constitution excepts from the referendum power acts of the 
Legislature providing for tax levies or appropriations for the 
usual current expenses of the state is to prevent disruption of 
its operations by interference with the administration of its 
fiscal powers and policies.”  (Geiger v. Board of Supervisors 
(1957) 48 Cal.2d 832, 839–840 (Geiger).) 
Although we have recognized that this reasoning does not 
preclude voter approval requirements for local taxes (Guardino, 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
29 
supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 245), we have never before considered a 
voter approval requirement imposed on the Legislature like the 
one at issue here.  In the context of local governments, which 
“have no inherent power to tax” (id. at p. 248), we said in 
Guardino that voter approval requirements “ ‘always will be 
known in advance . . . and thus the local entity will not include 
the anticipated tax revenue in its enacted budget until after the 
electorate has approved the tax’ ” (id. at pp. 245–246).  But it is 
a different question whether such uncertainty concerning state 
tax revenue would be disruptive to the basic operations of state 
government, which “provid[e] for the public welfare and the 
benefit of the entire people of the state” (People v. Central Pacific 
R. R. Co. (1894) 105 Cal. 576, 584) and include substantial 
subventions to local governments (art. XIII B, § 6).  We think it 
clear that a voter approval requirement for any new state tax 
measure would constitute a significant ‘interference with the 
administration of [the Legislature’s] fiscal powers and 
policies.’ ”  (Geiger, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 840.) 
Indeed, the TPA would strip the Legislature of authority 
to promptly raise revenues when necessary.  The Constitution 
currently provides that “statutes providing for tax levies or 
appropriations for the usual current expenses of the State . . . 
shall go into effect immediately upon their enactment.”  (Art. IV, 
§ 8, subd. (c)(3).)  The Constitution thus directs that the 
Legislature’s fiscal decisions must be effective immediately.  
This is particularly important when changes in revenue or 
appropriations are needed to respond to state or local 
emergencies.  Petitioners and amici curiae note multiple 
instances in which the Legislature has used this authority to 
respond swiftly to natural and financial disasters.  By requiring 
the electorate to approve any new tax or any change in the use 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
30 
of any special tax revenue previously approved by the voters, the 
TPA would preclude the state from raising new revenue or 
redirecting any existing special tax revenue in light of 
unforeseen events, until after a statewide election.  (See TPA, 
§ 4 [proposed art. XIII A, § 3, subd. (b)(1), (B)].) 
Proponent says “the Legislature (and local governments) 
are free to call a special election at any time to ask voters to 
approve taxes needed for an emergency reason, or even for no 
reason at all.”  But a special election requires time for legislative 
development and adoption of a ballot measure, legal review of 
the measure, preparation of the ballot and associated materials, 
and voter education and outreach.  The Elections Code provides 
for a minimum of 131 days between the adoption of a proposed 
ballot measure by the Legislature and the earliest date of a 
statewide special election.  (Elec. Code, § 9040.)  This period 
does not account for time needed on the front end to prepare a 
draft ballot measure for consideration by the Assembly and 
Senate, and it may not fully account for time needed on the back 
end to prepare the ballot measure for a statewide election. 
Further, Proponent argues that the TPA simply moves the 
taxing power from the Legislature to the electorate, thereby 
keeping that power within the legislative branch.  That may be 
true, but it is also true that such a change would significantly 
alter the legislative process and framework for exercising the 
taxing power.  The Legislature’s duty to ensure the welfare of 
our state and its people includes responsibility for fiscal 
planning, both short-term and long-term, that the Legislature 
historically has had authority to exercise without voter 
approval.  In “our continuing representative and republican 
form of government” (Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at 
p. 228), the Legislature’s deliberations on tax legislation may 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
31 
include public hearings, review by multiple committees, 
amendments, bargaining, and compromise.  The Legislature 
may enlist and apply expertise in crafting legislation, and may 
develop its own expertise through regular consideration of tax 
proposals.  A voter approval requirement would “add[] an 
important element of direct, active, democratic contribution by 
the people” (ibid.) in the form of an up or down vote on tax 
measures approved by the Legislature.  Voters may consider 
information from a variety of sources, including statements in 
the voter information guide by the Legislative Analyst and by a 
measure’s proponents and opponents, as well as information 
from various media, advertising, and other communication 
channels in the public square.  We express no view on what 
process achieves the optimal balance among efficiency, 
accountability, transparency, and other interests.  We observe 
only that requiring any new or higher tax levy to undergo voter 
approval would significantly alter the existing constitutional 
balance 
between 
direct 
democracy 
and 
representative 
democracy, with reverberations throughout the framework of 
our government. 
Petitioners also contend that the effect of the TPA’s 
statewide tax provision would be exacerbated by the 
requirements that each statute levying a new tax include “[a] 
specific and legally binding and enforceable limitation on how 
the revenue from the tax can be spent” and that “[a]ny proposed 
change to the use of the revenue from the tax shall be adopted 
by a separate act that is passed by not less than two-thirds of all 
members elected to each of the two houses of the Legislature and 
submitted to the electorate and approved by a majority vote.”  
(TPA, § 4 [proposed art. XIII A, § 3, subd. (b)(1)(B)].)  The 
cumulative effect of these taxing and spending limitations, 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
32 
Petitioners argue, would revoke two of the Legislature’s core 
powers and hinder the state’s ability to “ ‘effectively resolve the 
truly fundamental issues’ facing the State” because “[t]he 
Legislature simply could not rely on new tax revenues to meet 
emerging or urgent circumstances,” like natural disasters. 
In considering the TPA’s spending power limitations, we 
note that Proposition 4 in 1979 added article XIII B to the state 
Constitution, commonly known as the “Gann limit,” which caps 
per-person government spending at 1978–1979 levels.   (See City 
of Sacramento v. State of California (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51, 58–59 
[describing art. XIII B].)  The Gann limit effected an arguably 
more significant change to the Legislature’s spending power 
than what would be imposed by the TPA’s proposed limit on the 
ability to reallocate special tax revenue without voter approval.  
Thus, the TPA’s limitations on the Legislature’s spending power 
do not add much to support a finding that the measure works a 
revision, although they contribute to the TPA’s overall effect. 
We conclude that the TPA would substantially transform 
the process for enacting new statewide tax legislation that has 
existed since the state’s founding and that this transformation 
weighs significantly in favor of finding that the TPA would effect 
a constitutional revision. 
2. 
Beyond eliminating the Legislature’s ability to levy taxes 
without prior voter approval, the TPA shifts power between the 
executive branch and the legislative branch in three ways.  
First, the TPA would subject a broader range of state revenue 
actions to the two-thirds legislative vote requirement imposed 
by Proposition 13.  Article XIII A, section 3, subdivision (a) 
currently provides that “[a]ny change in state statute which 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
33 
results in any taxpayer paying a higher tax must be imposed by 
an act passed by not less than two-thirds of all members elected 
to each of the two houses of the Legislature.”  (Italics added.)  
The TPA would amend this provision to require a two-thirds 
vote not just on any “state statute” effecting such a change, but 
on any “state law” doing so.  (Compare art. XIII A, § 3, subd. (a) 
with TPA, § 4 [proposed art. XIII A, § 3, subd. (b)(1)].)  Similar 
changes are proposed at the local level, as discussed below.  
(Post, at pp. 41–49.) 
Second, the TPA would enact the following new 
subdivision within article XIII A:  “Any change in state law 
which results in any taxpayer paying a new or higher exempt 
charge must be imposed by an act passed by each of the two 
houses of the Legislature.  Each act shall specify the type of 
exempt charge as provided in subdivision (e), and the amount or 
rate of the exempt charge to be imposed.”  (TPA, § 4 [proposed 
art. XIII A, § 3, subd. (c)].)  The TPA makes clear that “state 
law” as used in these two provisions would include executive and 
agency actions; it defines “state law” to include “any state 
statute, state regulation, state executive order, state resolution, 
state ruling, state opinion letter, or other legal authority or 
interpretation 
adopted, 
enacted, 
enforced, 
issued, 
or 
implemented by the legislative or executive branches of state 
government,” while excluding “actions taken by the Regents of 
the University of California, Trustees of the California State 
University, or the Board of Governors of the California 
Community Colleges.”  (Ibid. [proposed art. XIII A, § 3, 
subd. (h)(4)].) 
Petitioners argue that the effect of these two provisions 
would be to “revoke[] the power of the Governor or state 
administrative agencies to impose or increase any charge, even 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
34 
those that are not a ‘tax.’ ”  Petitioners contend these changes 
“would dramatically slow if not impede critical government 
operations and force the Legislature and voters to become 
involved in the minutiae of governance.  For example, the 
Measure could deprive the State Board of Equalization or 
Department of Health Care Services of the ability to promulgate 
many of the regulations under their jurisdiction, and require the 
Legislature and voters to assume tasks that could include 
setting the annual fee for fishing licenses and parking fines.”  
“As a consequence of these two changes” (and analogous changes 
at the local level, discussed below), they say, “administrative 
agencies would lose the power to do much of the work they do 
today under legislatively delegated authority, such as assessing 
fees for the disposal of hazardous waste (at the state level) and 
setting fees for trash collection or charges for health care at 
public hospitals (at the local level).”  According to Petitioners, 
the TPA would deprive the Legislature of the ability to delegate 
tasks to administrative agencies with greater expertise if a task 
“results in any taxpayer paying a new or higher exempt charge.”  
(TPA, § 4 [proposed art. XIII A, § 3, subd. (c)].)   
Third, the TPA would expand the referendum power to 
encompass all fees imposed by state and local agencies.  As a 
result of its new definition of “tax,” the TPA would narrow the 
tax exception to the referendum power set forth in article II, 
section 9 of the Constitution and would exclude every newly 
defined “exempt charge” from the referendum exception.  
(See TPA, §§ 4 [proposed art. XIII A, § 3, subd. (d) defining state 
“tax” as used in art. II, § 9], 5 [proposed art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (i) 
defining local “tax” as used in art. II, § 9].)  Petitioners allege 
that this would subject thousands of government fees and 
charges to referendum, “including fees for trash collection and 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
35 
water service, sewer connections, permits and licenses, 
cemeteries, and parks and recreation.”  
We agree with Petitioners that the TPA would 
significantly rework the current balance between legislative and 
executive functions at the state and local level.  Legislative 
delegation of administrative tasks, including assessing fees and 
other charges, is not new.  We observed in 1917 that “[e]ven a 
casual observer of governmental growth and development must 
have observed the ever-increasing multiplicity and complexity 
of administrative affairs — national, state, and municipal — 
and even the occasional reader of the law must have perceived 
that from necessity, if for no better grounded reason, it has 
become increasingly imperative that many quasi-legislative and 
quasi-judicial functions, which in smaller communities and 
under more primitive conditions were performed directly by the 
legislative or judicial branches of the government, are intrusted 
to departments, boards, commissions, and agents.”  (Gaylord v. 
City of Pasadena (1917) 175 Cal. 433, 436 (Gaylord).)  “No sound 
objection can longer be successfully advanced to this growing 
method of transacting public business.  These things must be 
done in this way or they cannot be done at all, and their doing, 
in a very real sense, makes for the safety of the republic, and is 
thus sanctioned by the highest law.”  (Id. at pp. 436–437.)  On 
this latter point, we cited the high court’s observation in 1907 
that “a denial to Congress of the right, under the Constitution, 
to delegate the power to determine some fact or the state of 
things upon which the enforcement of its enactment depends 
would be ‘to stop the wheels of government’ and bring about 
confusion, if not paralysis, in the conduct of the public business.”  
(Union Bridge Co. v. United States (1907) 204 U.S. 364, 387.) 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
36 
More recently, the Court of Appeal in Schabarum v. 
California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205 (Schabarum) 
observed:  “It may well be impossible, without risking paralysis 
in the conduct of the public business, to return to a form of 
government in which all legislative and judicial functions are 
performed solely and directly by the Legislature and by the 
courts.  [Citation.]  But it is certainly too late in the day to return 
to such a form of government without effecting a constitutional 
revision.”  (Id. at p. 1224.) 
Proponent does not dispute the significance of these 
changes.  At oral argument, Proponent said the TPA would 
accomplish a “rollback to a condition that existed decades ago, 
prior to the Legislature deciding that it was going to empower 
executive agencies to raise revenue.”  Indeed, Proponent 
explained that a purpose of the TPA is to “restore” California to 
a time before modern administrative practice, when “all fees 
were approved, proposed, and enacted by statute.” 
Petitioners assert that these changes would “reorder the 
balance of powers by effectively (1) prohibiting the Legislature 
from delegating certain powers to the executive branch; (2) 
prohibiting the executive branch from exercising certain 
delegated powers; and (3) compelling the Legislature to perform 
administrative acts.”  To illustrate the scope of the change, they 
point to several statutes that delegate duties to administrative 
agencies to impose regulatory and other fees that are not 
deemed “taxes” under current law or the TPA.  (See, e.g., Bus. & 
Prof. Code, § 2340.8 [Medical Board of California to determine 
fees relating to the Physician and Surgeon Health and Wellness 
Program]; Food & Agr. Code, §§ 33291–33298 [Department of 
Food and Agriculture to establish certain inspection fees for 
milk production facilities]; Gov. Code, § 12182 [Secretary of 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
37 
State to establish fees relating to business programs]; Health & 
Saf. Code, §§ 13110 [State Fire Marshal to establish fire safety 
fees], 18870.3 [Department of Housing and Community 
Development to establish fees relating to mobilehome parks]; 
id., 
§§ 25205.2.1, 
25205.5.01, 
25205.6.1 
[Board 
of 
Environmental Safety to establish hazardous waste fees]; Lab. 
Code, § 5307.1 [Division of Workers’ Compensation to establish 
fees for medical services]; Pub. Util. Code, § 728 [Public Utilities 
Commission to adjust utility rates].) 
As these examples suggest, state agencies set and 
administer a variety of fees.  Among the more than 200 agencies 
to which the Legislature has delegated rulemaking authority, 
other examples abound.  The Department of Motor Vehicles lists 
more than 70 different fees on its website and reports that it 
collects over $8 billion in annual revenue.  (Dept. of Motor 
Vehicles, Licensing Fees <https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/driver-
licenses-identification-cards/licensing-fees/> [as of June 20, 
2024]; id., DMV Functions <https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/
about-the-california-department-of-motor-vehicles/> [as of June 
20, 2024]; see Office of Administrative Law, About the Office of 
Administrative 
Law 
<https://oal.ca.gov/about-the-office-of-
administrative-law/> [as of June 20, 2024]; all Internet citations 
in this opinion are archived by year, docket number and case 
name at .)  Also, the 
Legislature has authorized the Board of Environmental Safety 
within the Department of Toxic Substances Control to 
promulgate various fees for facilities and entities that generate 
or process hazardous waste and to adjust those rates as 
frequently as once per year, subject to certain statutory 
maximums.  (See, e.g., Health & Saf. Code, § 25205.2.1, 
subd. (a).)  The Legislature has further provided that such 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
38 
regulations “may be adopted as an emergency regulation . . . as 
necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, 
health, and safety, and general welfare.”  (Id., subd. (e).) 
Proponent says the TPA is “merely an extension” of the 
Legislature’s authority to set or limit fees for state agencies, 
offering many examples where the Legislature has done just 
that, including some of the examples discussed above.  (See, e.g., 
Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 1724 [authorizing the Dental Board of 
California to establish fees relating to the practice of dentistry, 
subject to statutory limits], 23320 [setting statutory fees to be 
charged by the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control]; Gov. 
Code, § 70600 et seq. [statutory filing fees and other civil fees 
that may be charged by Superior Courts]; Veh. Code, § 9101 et 
seq. [setting vehicle registration and weight fees to be charged 
by the Department of Motor Vehicles]; Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 25205.2 et seq. [setting maximum fees to be charged by the 
Board of Environmental Safety].) 
But the fact that the Legislature has chosen to set or limit 
certain fees does not answer Petitioners’ central point that the 
Legislature today is authorized to decide whether to set certain 
fees itself or to delegate the task to various agencies.  Under the 
TPA, the Legislature would be stripped of that authority and 
would instead be tasked with considering and voting on a 
multitude of fees currently set by agencies.  The TPA says this 
approach will ensure that “all fees and other charges are passed 
or rejected by . . . a governing body elected by voters and not 
unelected and unaccountable bureaucrats.”  (TPA, § 3, 
subd. (a).)  Whether the proposed changes will in fact promote 
transparency or accountability, and how such interests might be 
balanced 
against 
considerations 
of 
agency 
expertise, 
administrative efficiency, or practicality are not for us to say.  
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
39 
What we decide here is only whether the changes would 
substantially alter the current constitutional scheme, in which 
legislative delegation of power to administrative agencies is 
permissible, widespread, and fundamental to the operation of 
government.  (Schabarum, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1224.) 
It is no answer to say that if the Legislature can grant or 
withdraw agency authority in this area, so too can the voters 
under the initiative power.  Petitioners do not claim this change 
is beyond the electorate’s power to enact; instead, they claim it 
is beyond the scope of an initiative amendment to entirely 
withdraw from the Legislature its power to delegate fee-setting 
authority to administrative agencies.  As noted, the TPA 
requires “[a]ny change in state law which results in any 
taxpayer paying a new or higher exempt charge” to be enacted 
by the Legislature, and it defines “state law” expansively to 
include “any state statute, state regulation, state executive 
order, state resolution, state ruling, state opinion letter, or other 
legal authority or interpretation adopted, enacted, enforced, 
issued, or implemented by the legislative or executive branches 
of state government” apart from our public universities and 
community colleges.  (TPA, § 4 [proposed art. XIII A, § 3, 
subds. (c), (h)(4)].)  Shifting the authority to impose any such 
fees or other charges from administrative agencies to the 
Legislature would materially reshape the nature and volume of 
the Legislature’s everyday work and its overall function and 
efficacy in our system of governance. 
We also find the TPA’s expansion of the referendum power 
to cover all agency fines and fees that qualify as exempt charges 
to be a significant change.  In Wilde, this court examined the 
referendum power and explained why it was necessarily limited.  
The referendum power allows a small minority of voters to place 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
40 
a newly enacted law on the ballot for an up or down vote and 
suspend its operation until it is approved by the majority of 
voters.  (Wilde, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1111; see art.  II, § 9, 
subd. (b) [“A referendum measure may be proposed by 
presenting to the Secretary of State, . . . a petition certified to 
have been signed by electors equal in number to 5 percent of the 
votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial 
election”].)  Referendum “poses a distinct potential for 
disruption that sets it apart from the ordinary legislative 
process.”  (Wilde, at p. 1122.)  For that reason, “statutes 
providing for tax levies or appropriations” have been excluded 
from the referendum power since its inception.  (Art. II, § 9, 
subd. (a); see Wilde, at p. 1122 & fn. 8.)  “Article II, section 9’s 
exemptions from referendum reflect a recognition that in certain 
areas, legislators must be permitted to act expediently, without 
the delays and uncertainty that accompany the referendum 
process.  All of the exemptions — for urgency statutes, statutes 
calling elections, and statutes providing for tax levies or 
appropriations for usual current expenses of the state — are for 
‘measures 
having 
special 
urgency, 
a 
delay 
in 
the 
implementation of which could disrupt essential governmental 
operations.’ ”  (Wilde, at pp. 1122–1123.) 
In light of this purpose, we held in Wilde that the tax 
exception to the referendum power includes not only general-
purpose exactions such as sales and income taxes but also any 
charge that supports an essential governmental function, like 
public utility fees.  (Wilde, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1123–1124.)  The 
TPA is expressly intended to overrule Wilde and narrow the 
Constitution’s tax exception to the referendum power.  (TPA, 
§ 3, subd. (e).)  Proponent contends that this change is 
incremental because Wilde held only that a specific revenue 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
41 
measure — a city’s water utility rate — was a “tax” for the 
purposes of the Constitution’s referendum exception.  (See 
Wilde, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1126.)  Further, Proponent argues 
that the voters have rarely exercised their right to subject fees 
to referendum at the state or local level in the century prior to 
our decision in Wilde.   
We find it significant that under the TPA, every nontax 
government fee or charge would be subject to referendum, 
including those necessary to fund essential services.  All state 
and local charges, no matter how essential, would be subject to 
delays that could be triggered by a small minority of voters in a 
given jurisdiction.  The existing constitutional scheme 
recognizes that governments must be able to rely on the revenue 
measures they enact, and they “ ‘cannot have the viability of 
such measures continually placed in doubt by the possibility 
that a referendum may be initiated by a relatively small 
percentage of the electorate.’ ”  (Guardino, supra, 11 Cal.4th at 
p. 245.)  Expanding the referendum power as the TPA proposes 
would 
transform 
an 
occasionally 
used 
mechanism 
for 
government accountability into a ready tactic for fiscal 
disruption.  We conclude that the TPA’s requirement that all 
statewide nontax government charges be legislatively enacted 
would, like the TPA’s state tax voter-approval requirement, effect 
a significant change in how our state government raises revenue. 
3. 
Petitioners contend that the TPA would also “eliminate 
much of the power of local executive agencies to take actions 
that result in higher taxes or fees, requiring local legislative 
bodies and voters to assume much of the work that executive 
agencies now do.”  These changes, they argue, deprive local 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
42 
legislators 
of 
their 
constitutional 
power 
to 
delegate 
administrative tasks.  Local government amici curiae argue that 
the TPA thus “revises the structure of local government, 
fundamentally changing the responsibilities of local legislators 
and administrators, and stripping charter counties of their 
power to establish administrative structures and charter cities 
of their ‘plenary authority’ (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5) to determine 
the roles and responsibilities of their officials.”  Further, they 
argue that the TPA’s restrictions on the ability of state and local 
governments to raise revenue without voter approval or to enact 
fees not subject to referendum “transform[s] the constitutional 
relationship of state and local governments, making the latter 
dependent on the State for fiscal survival but stripping the State 
of the ability to provide necessary funding.”  
The 
Constitution 
distributes 
powers 
between 
the 
Legislature and local governments (art. XI, § 13) and provides 
for the Legislature’s establishment of local governments, 
including counties and cities (id., §§ 1, 2).  Article XI, section 3 
of the Constitution authorizes counties and cities to adopt and 
amend charters for their own governance by majority vote.  (Id., 
subd. (a).)  In addition, the Constitution provides that county 
charters shall fix the terms, compensation, and removal of 
elected officials and other employees, as well as provide for 
performance of statutorily required functions.  (Id., § 4, 
subds. (c)–(f).)  It likewise endows charter cities with “plenary 
authority” to provide for the terms, compensation, and removal 
of municipal officers and employees, and requires city charters 
to “make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect 
to municipal affairs,” including the regulation of city police 
forces, city elections, and city government.  (Id., § 5, subd. (a); 
id., subd. (b).)  The Constitution further provides the authority 
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43 
for local governments to “make and enforce within its limits all 
local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not 
in conflict with general laws.”  (Id., § 7.)  It also authorizes 
municipal corporations to establish and operate public utilities 
(id., § 9) and prohibits the Legislature from delegating 
municipal functions to private parties (id., § 11).  The 
Constitution requires the state to reimburse local governments 
for the cost of any new mandate (art. XIII B, § 6), though the 
Legislature has provided that reimbursement is not necessary if 
the local agency has the authority to levy service charges or 
other fees sufficient to pay for the mandated program or 
increased level of service (Gov. Code, § 17556, subd. (d)). 
Article XIII, section 24, subdivision (a) of the Constitution 
provides that the “Legislature may not impose taxes for local 
purposes but may authorize local governments to impose them.”  
The first clause of this provision is a “restriction on the 
Legislature’s otherwise plenary power of taxation”; it bars the 
Legislature from imposing taxes when the “proceeds are devoted 
to purely ‘local’ purposes.”  (Guardino, supra, 11 Cal.4th at 
p. 247.)  The second clause “is a confirmation of the Legislature’s 
authority to grant the taxing power to local governments insofar 
as necessary to enable them to impose such local taxes if they 
see fit.”  (Id. at pp. 247–248.)  Such a grant of power “is an 
essential prerequisite to all local taxation, because local 
governments have no inherent power to tax.”  (Id. at p. 248.)   
The Legislature has long conditioned the exercise of local 
taxing power on voter approval.  (Guardino, supra, 11 Cal.4th 
at pp. 250–252.)  Some statutes that authorize local 
governments to levy various taxes require approval by a simple 
majority of voters (id. at p. 251 & fn. 20), while others require a 
two-thirds vote (id. at p. 251, fn. 21).  In addition, the series of 
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44 
initiative reforms that have limited the Legislature’s authority 
to impose statewide taxes (ante, at pp. 25–27) also placed 
constitutional limitations on local governments’ ability to levy 
property, special, and general taxes.  Most relevant here is the 
1996 passage of Proposition 218, which added article XIII C 
requiring majority voter approval of local “general taxes” at a 
general election and reaffirming the two-thirds voter approval 
requirement for “special taxes.”  (Art. XIII C, § 2, subds. (b), (d); 
see Cannabis Coalition, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 930.)  The article’s 
definition of “tax” includes several exceptions, including charges 
for specific benefits or privileges, licensing fees, entrance fees, 
fines, and penalties.  (Art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (e).)  Proposition 
218 also added article XIII D, which limits the ability of local 
governments to levy charges or fees upon property.  (Art. XIII D, 
§§ 2, 4, 6; see Greene v. Marin County Flood Control & Water 
Conservation Dist. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 277, 284–286.)   
In 2017, we held in Cannabis Coalition that Proposition 
218’s requirement that local general taxes must first be 
submitted to the electorate at a regularly scheduled general 
election does not apply to local voter initiatives proposing 
general taxes; such initiatives may be submitted to voters at a 
special election.  (Cannabis Coalition, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 
p. 936.)  We explained that the voters, in enacting Proposition 
218, did not clearly indicate that the election timing provision 
applied to the initiative power.  (Cannabis Coalition, at p. 943.)  
And we said in dicta that special taxes introduced by initiative 
are not subject to article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (d)’s two-
thirds vote requirement for the same reason.  (Cannabis 
Coalition, at pp. 943–944.) 
In response to Cannabis Coalition, the TPA would amend 
section 2 of article XIII C to state that the two-thirds voter 
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45 
approval requirement for local special taxes also applies to taxes 
submitted to the electorate by initiative.  (TPA, § 6 [proposed 
art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (c)]; see id., § 3, subd. (e) [stating the 
measure’s intent “to reverse loopholes” in Cannabis Coalition 
and other court decisions].)  The TPA further prohibits local 
governments from proposing a local tax in a charter city as a 
majority vote charter amendment.  (Id., § 6 [proposed 
art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (f)].)  Finally, the TPA requires any 
proposal for a general tax to be labeled “for general government 
use” and prohibits the use of “advisory” measures to indicate 
that general tax revenue will, could, or should be used for a 
specific purpose.  (Ibid. [proposed art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (d)(3)].) 
As noted, the Constitution provides no inherent authority 
for local governments to raise taxes.  (Guardino, supra, 11 
Cal.4th at p. 248.)  And the Constitution and various statutes 
have long subjected local tax levies to majority and 
supermajority voter approval requirements.  (Ante, at pp. 25–
26.)  In other words, local governments have long been 
dependent on state appropriations for the revenue they need to 
function.  To the extent that the TPA would subject local tax 
measures to heightened voter approval requirements or make 
local governments more dependent on appropriations from the 
Legislature, we conclude that these changes by themselves have 
limited significance, though the TPA may intensify the 
dependency. 
But the TPA would go further.  As with its proposed 
changes to state taxes, the TPA proposes to redefine local “tax” 
and “exempt charge” in ways that broaden the types of 
government exactions subject to voter or legislative approval.  
(TPA, § 5 [proposed art. XIII C, § 1, subds. (f), (i), (j)].)  It would 
define “tax” to mean “every . . . levy, charge, or exaction of any 
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46 
kind, imposed by a local . . . law that is not an exempt charge,” 
including “any ordinance, resolution, regulation, ruling, opinion 
letter, or other legal authority or interpretation adopted, 
enacted, enforced, issued, or implemented by a local 
government.”  (Ibid. [proposed art. XIII C, § 1, subds. (f), (i)].)  It 
would define local “exempt charge” to mean only reasonable 
charges imposed for a specific local government service that does 
not exceed the “actual” costs to the local government, and only 
those fines and penalties imposed “pursuant to adjudicatory due 
process.”  (Ibid. [proposed art. XIII C, § 1, subds. (i), (j)(1), (4)].)  
The TPA further requires that all local “exempt charges” must 
be enacted by the local legislative body by ordinance rather than 
imposed directly by a local executive branch agency.  (Id., § 6 
[proposed art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (e)].)  As noted, in response to 
our decision in Wilde, the TPA would also subject all local fines 
and fees, including utility rates, to voter referendum.  (Id., § 5 
[proposed art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (i); redefining “tax” for purposes 
of Cal. Const., art. II, § 9].)  Finally, the TPA would require new 
measures proposing taxes or new ordinances enacting exempt 
charges to specify their type and amount.  (Id., §§ 4 [proposed 
art. XIII A, § 3, subds. (b)(1), (c)], 6 [proposed art. XIII C, § 2, 
subds. (d), (e)].)   
Taken together, these provisions of the TPA transform 
local revenue-raising by requiring that exempt charges go 
through legislative rather than administrative processes.  For 
example, a local utility would no longer be able to adjust rates 
without a local governing body passing an ordinance, and a 
community center would no longer be able to impose user fee 
charges for facility rentals without engaging in a legislative 
process.  (See TPA, § 6 [proposed art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (e)].)  In 
addition, the TPA’s directive that apart from local initiative, 
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“[o]nly the governing body of a local government . . . [may] 
impose any exempt charge” (ibid. [proposed art. XIII C, § 2, 
subd. (e)]), when read together with its definition that “impose” 
means “adopt, enact, reenact, create, establish, collect, increase 
or extend” (id., § 4 [proposed art. XIII A, § 3, subd. (h)(3)]), 
suggests that a city council would have to take action before a 
local utility could request or collect customers’ payments for 
their monthly bills.  Further, the TPA’s definition of an exempt 
charge would transform an overdue library book fine or an 
expired parking meter fine into a “tax” subject to voter approval 
if it is not imposed pursuant to an adjudicatory process.  (Id., § 5 
[proposed art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (j)(4)].)   
We conclude that the TPA’s transformation of the 
administrative process of local fee-setting and collection into a 
legislative process supports Petitioners’ claim that the TPA 
works a qualitative revision.  The Constitution endows local 
governments with broad authority over their own operations to 
fulfill their constitutional mandate to provide public services 
like policing, elections, and utilities.  (See art. XI, §§ 4, 5, 7; 
cf. Wilde, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1123 [a city’s ability to set water 
rates without disruption from referendum is necessary to 
ensuring its “ability to carry out one of its most basic and 
essential functions”].)  We have long recognized that local 
governments may delegate their legislative authority to their 
executive or administrative officers and that such delegation 
has become “imperative” in light of the “ever-increasing 
multiplicity and complexity of [their] administrative affairs.”  
(Gaylord, supra, 175 Cal. at p. 436; see id. at p. 440 [concluding 
that a city could “confer[] upon the city electrician judicial or 
legislative powers”].)  By substantially altering the power of 
local governments to delegate decision-making authority to 
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48 
their own agencies, the TPA would operate in a manner 
dissimilar to any of the prior initiatives that have restricted 
local governments’ ability to raise revenue.  Proponent does not 
dispute that the TPA would require local governing bodies to 
authorize the imposition and collection of utility bills, and to 
provide adjudicatory due process and legislative approval before 
imposing library fines (or else have such fines deemed a “tax” 
subject to voter approval).  Such changes would substantially 
overhaul how local governments go about ensuring that 
everyday services are properly provided.  In sum, the TPA would 
affect all local revenue measures — big or small, essential or 
nonessential — to an extent that leaves no aspect of government 
untouched. 
Proponent says it is “quite common for a local legislative 
body (e.g., city council or board of supervisors) to approve a fee 
schedule for their locality.”  But neither of the fee schedules 
Proponent cites as examples — those of Beverly Hills and Chula 
Vista — encompasses the new types of “exempt charges” that 
would require legislative action (and, for some charges, 
adjudicatory due process), nor the new means by which taxes 
may be “imposed” under the TPA.  (TPA, § 4 [proposed 
art. XIII A, § 3, subd. (h)(3)]; id., § 6 [proposed art. XIII C, § 2, 
subd. (e)].)  Further, Proponent provides no indication that these 
local legislative bodies’ voluntary approval of a master fee 
schedule is the norm for most local governments.  Finally, as 
local government amici curiae demonstrate, the fee schedules 
cited by Proponent may not even be compliant with the TPA 
because they vest discretion in local administrators to 
determine the actual amount charged for various services.   
Proponent further cites Government Code section 66016, 
subdivision (b) for the proposition that the Legislature 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
49 
“prohibits delegation of many types of local government fees.”  
But this nondelegation provision applies only to a subset of land 
use fees.  (Gov. Code, § 66016, subd. (d).)  There is a sizable gulf 
between this provision and the categorical prohibition on local 
fee-setting delegation that the TPA would impose.  In sum, the 
reassignment of local fee-setting from administrative to 
legislative processes would substantially alter the processes by 
which local governments raise revenue and, in so doing, would 
significantly alter the work of local government itself. 
C. 
In recognizing the fundamental changes the TPA would 
make to the operation of state and local government, we express 
no view on its wisdom.  The basic plan of our state government 
was set forth in the 1879 Constitution, and the electorate 
remains free to modify it through the appropriate procedures.  
The analysis above illuminates whether the TPA would 
“substantially alter the basic governmental framework set forth 
in our Constitution.”  (Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d at 
p. 510.)  We decide only whether the measure, taken as a whole, 
would accomplish a revision.  Whether any individual 
component of the TPA would constitute a revision standing 
alone is a question we do not answer here. 
No speculation regarding potential future consequences is 
needed to conclude that the TPA is a revision on its face.  The 
measure would fundamentally restructure the most basic of 
governmental powers.  The TPA would exclude the levying of 
new taxes from the Legislature’s control by requiring voter 
approval of all such measures.  In so doing, it would disturb the 
long settled understanding that “[t]he power of taxation is a 
power which the Legislature takes from the law of its creation, 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
50 
for it is an indispensable power, without which it would become 
impossible for that body to perform its functions . . . .”  (Taylor 
v. Palmer (1866) 31 Cal. 240, 252, disapproved on another 
ground in Turney v. Dougherty (1879) 53 Cal. 619, 620–621.)  
Further, the TPA would significantly alter the ability of state 
and local governments to delegate fee-setting authority to their 
executive or administrative officers (Gaylord, supra, 175 Cal. at 
pp. 436, 440) and ensure the provision of essential services 
(Wilde, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1124).  And the TPA would subject 
every revenue-raising measure enacted by state or local 
governments to voter approval or referendum, either because it 
is a tax that the voters must enact or because it is an exempt 
charge that can only be enacted by the legislative branch and 
thus becomes subject to referendum. 
Moreover, by enacting these changes together, along with 
others noted above, the effects of the TPA on our state and local 
governments would be intensified.  Whereas a restriction on the 
ability of local governments to raise revenue might previously 
have been offset by the power of the state to raise revenue, the 
TPA burdens both simultaneously.  And while the expansion of 
what constitutes an exempt charge and the requirement that 
such charges be adopted legislatively rather than imposed by an 
agency are significant in and of themselves, the TPA’s extension 
of the referendum power to these charges magnifies their effect 
and creates complications of its own.  The TPA’s voter approval 
requirements, its nondelegation rules, and its expansion of the 
referendum power to charges previously held to be essential 
operate 
together 
to 
fundamentally 
rework 
the 
fiscal 
underpinnings of our government at every level.  The TPA would 
shift so much authority, in such a significant manner, that it 
would substantially alter our framework of government. 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
51 
For these reasons, we conclude that the TPA would clearly 
“accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic 
governmental plan as to amount to a revision” of the 
Constitution.  (Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 223.)  The 
measure exceeds the scope of the power to amend the 
Constitution via citizen initiative.  (Art. II, § 8, subd. (a).)  It is 
within the people’s prerogative to make these changes, but they 
must be undertaken in a manner commensurate with their 
gravity:  through the process for revision set forth in article 
XVIII of the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
A peremptory writ of mandate shall issue, directing the 
Secretary of State to refrain from taking any steps to place 
Attorney General Initiative No. 21-0042A1, also known as 
Secretary of State Initiative No. 1935, on the November 5, 2024 
election ballot or to include the measure in the voter information 
guide. 
In light of the time constraints under which the Secretary 
of State is required to act, the opinion and judgment shall 
become final five days after it is filed.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
8.490(b)(2)(A); see Isaak v. Superior Court (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 
792, 801.)  Each party shall bear its own costs.  (See Strauss, 
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 475; Raven, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 356.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
1 
APPENDIX 
 
TEXT OF INITIATIVE 
[Deleted codified text is denoted in strikeout.  Added 
codified text is denoted by italics and underline.  We have put 
section titles in boldface to improve readability.]  
Section 1.  Title  
This Act shall be known, and may be cited as, the 
Taxpayer Protection and Government Accountability Act. 
Section 2.  Findings and Declarations 
(a)  Californians are overtaxed.  We pay the nation’s 
highest state income tax, sales tax, and gasoline tax.  According 
to the U.S. Census Bureau, California’s combined state and local 
tax burden is the highest in the nation.  Despite this, and despite 
two consecutive years of obscene revenue surpluses, state 
politicians in 2021 alone introduced legislation to raise more 
than $234 billion in new and higher taxes and fees. 
(b)  Taxes are only part of the reason for California’s rising 
cost-of-living crisis.  Californians pay billions more in hidden 
“fees” passed through to consumers in the price they pay for 
products, services, food, fuel, utilities and housing.  Since 2010, 
government revenue from state and local “fees” has more than 
doubled. 
(c)  California’s high cost of living not only contributes to 
the state’s skyrocketing rates of poverty and homelessness, they 
are the [sic] pushing working families and job-providing 
businesses out of the state.  The most recent Census showed that 
California’s population dropped for the first time in history, 
costing us a seat in Congress.  In the past four years, nearly 300 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Appendix 
2 
major corporations relocated to other states, not counting 
thousands more small businesses that were forced to move, sell 
or close. 
(d)  California voters have tried repeatedly, at great 
expense, to assert control over whether and how taxes and fees 
are raised.  We have enacted a series of measures to make taxes 
more predictable, to limit what passes as a “fee,” to require voter 
approval, and to guarantee transparency and accountability.  
These measures include Proposition 13 (1978), Proposition 62 
(1986), Proposition 218 (1996), and Proposition 26 (2010). 
(e)  Contrary to the voters’ intent, these measures that 
were designed to control taxes, spending and accountability, 
have been weakened and hamstrung by the Legislature, 
government lawyers, and the courts, making it necessary to pass 
yet another initiative to close loopholes and reverse hostile court 
decisions. 
Section 3.  Statement of Purpose  
(a)  In enacting this measure, the voters reassert their 
right to a voice and a vote on new and higher taxes by requiring 
any new or higher tax to be put before voters for approval.  
Voters also intend that all fees and other charges are passed or 
rejected by the voters themselves or a governing body elected by 
voters and not unelected and unaccountable bureaucrats. 
(b)  Furthermore, the purpose and intent of the voters in 
enacting this measure is to increase transparency and 
accountability over higher taxes and charges by requiring any 
tax measure placed on the ballot — either at the state or local 
level — to clearly state the type and rate of any tax, how long it 
will be in effect, and the use of the revenue generated by the tax. 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Appendix 
3 
(c)  Furthermore, the purpose and intent of the voters in 
enacting this measure is to clarify that any new or increased 
form of state government revenue, by any name or manner of 
extraction paid directly or indirectly by Californians, shall be 
authorized only by a vote of the Legislature and signature of the 
Governor to ensure that the purposes for such charges are 
broadly supported and transparently debated. 
(d)  Furthermore, the purpose and intent of the voters in 
enacting this measure is also to ensure that taxpayers have the 
right and ability to effectively balance new or increased taxes 
and other charges with the rapidly increasing costs Californians 
are already paying for housing, food, childcare, gasoline, energy, 
healthcare, education, and other basic costs of living, and to 
further protect the existing constitutional limit on property 
taxes and ensure that the revenue from such taxes remains 
local, without changing or superseding existing constitutional 
provisions contained in Section 1(c) of Article XIII A. 
(e)  In enacting this measure, the voters also additionally 
intend to reverse loopholes in the legislative two-thirds vote and 
voter approval requirements for government revenue increases 
created by the courts including, but not limited to, Cannabis 
Coalition v. City of Upland, Chamber of Commerce v. Air 
Resources Board, Schmeer v. Los Angeles County, Johnson v. 
County of Mendocino, Citizens Assn. of Sunset Beach v. Orange 
County Local Agency Formation Commission, and Wilde v. City 
of Dunsmuir. 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Appendix 
4 
Section 4.  Section 3 of Article XIII A of the 
California Constitution is amended to read:  
Sec. 3(a)  Every levy, charge, or exaction of any kind 
imposed by state law is either a tax or an exempt charge. 
(b)(1) (a)  Any change in state statute law which results in 
any taxpayer paying a new or higher tax must be imposed by an 
act passed by not less than two-thirds of all members elected to 
each of the two houses of the Legislature, and submitted to the 
electorate and approved by a majority vote, except that no new 
ad valorem taxes on real property, or sales or transaction taxes 
on the sales of real property, may be imposed.  Each Act shall 
include:  
(A)  A specific duration of time that the tax will be imposed 
and an estimate of the annual amount expected to be derived 
from the tax. 
(B)  A specific and legally binding and enforceable 
limitation on how the revenue from the tax can be spent.  If the 
revenue from the tax can be spent for unrestricted general 
revenue purposes, then a statement that the tax revenue can be 
spent for “unrestricted general revenue purposes” shall be 
included in a separate, stand-alone section.  Any proposed 
change to the use of the revenue from the tax shall be adopted by 
a separate act that is passed by not less than two-thirds of all 
members elected to each of the two houses of the Legislature and 
submitted to the electorate and approved by a majority vote. 
(2)  The title and summary and ballot label or question 
required for a measure pursuant to the Elections Code shall, for 
each measure providing for the imposition of a tax, including a 
measure proposed by an elector pursuant to Article II, include:  
(A)  The type and amount or rate of the tax;  
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Appendix 
5 
(B)  The duration of the tax; and  
(C)  The use of the revenue derived from the tax. 
(c)  Any change in state law which results in any taxpayer 
paying a new or higher exempt charge must be imposed by an act 
passed by each of the two houses of the Legislature.  Each act 
shall specify the type of exempt charge as provided in subdivision 
(e), and the amount or rate of the exempt charge to be imposed. 
(d) (b)  As used in this section and in Section 9 of Article II, 
“tax” means every any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind 
imposed by the State state law that is not an exempt charge. 
except the following: 
(e)  As used in this section, “exempt charge” means only the 
following:  
(1)  a charge imposed for a specific benefit conferred or 
privilege granted directly to the payor that is not provided to 
those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable 
costs to the State of conferring the benefit or granting the 
privilege to the payor. 
(1) (2)  A reasonable charge imposed for a specific 
government service or product provided directly to the payor 
that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not 
exceed the reasonable actual costs to the State of providing the 
service or product to the payor. 
(2) (3)  A charge imposed for the reasonable regulatory 
costs to the State incident to issuing licenses and permits, 
performing investigations, inspections, and audits, enforcing 
agricultural 
marketing 
orders, 
and 
the 
administrative 
enforcement and adjudication thereof. 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Appendix 
6 
(3)  A levy, charge, or exaction collected from local units of 
government, health care providers or health care service plans 
that is primarily used by the State of California for the purposes 
of increasing reimbursement rates or payments under the Medi-
Cal program, and the revenues of which are primarily used to 
finance the non-federal portion of Medi-Cal medical assistance 
expenditures. 
(4)  A reasonable charge imposed for entrance to or use of 
state property, or the purchase, rental, or lease of state property, 
except charges governed by Section 15 of Article XI. 
(5)  A fine, or penalty, or other monetary charge including 
any applicable interest for nonpayment thereof, imposed by the 
judicial branch of government or the State, as a result of a state 
administrative enforcement agency pursuant to adjudicatory due 
process, to punish a violation of law. 
(6)  A levy, charge, assessment, or exaction collected for the 
promotion of California tourism pursuant to Chapter 1 
(commencing with Section 13995) of Part 4.7 of Division 3 of 
Title 2 of the Government Code. 
(f) (c)  Any tax or exempt charge adopted after January 1, 
2022 2010, but prior to the effective date of this act, that was not 
adopted in compliance with the requirements of this section is 
void 12 months after the effective date of this act unless the tax 
or exempt charge is reenacted by the Legislature and signed into 
law by the Governor in compliance with the requirements of this 
section. 
(g)(1) (d)  The State bears the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the clear and convincing evidence that a levy, 
charge, or other exaction is an exempt charge and not a tax.  The 
State bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Appendix 
7 
evidence that the amount of the exempt charge is reasonable and 
that the amount charged does not exceed the actual cost of 
providing the service or product to the payor.  , that the amount 
is no more than necessary to cover the reasonable costs of the 
governmental activity and that the manner in which those costs 
are allocated to a payor bear a fair or reasonable relationship to 
the payor’s burdens on, or benefits received from, the 
governmental activity. 
(2)  The retention of revenue by, or the payment to, a non-
governmental entity of a levy, charge, or exaction of any kind 
imposed by state law, shall not be a factor in determining 
whether the levy, charge, or exaction is a tax or exempt charge. 
(3)  The characterization of a levy, charge, or exaction of 
any kind as being voluntary, or paid in exchange for a benefit, 
privilege, allowance, authorization, or asset, shall not be a factor 
in determining whether the levy, charge, or exaction is a tax or 
an exempt charge. 
(4)  The use of revenue derived from the levy, charge or 
exaction shall be a factor in determining whether the levy, 
charge, or exaction is a tax or exempt charge. 
(h)  As used in this section:  
(1)  “Actual cost” of providing a service or product means: 
(i) the minimum amount necessary to reimburse the government 
for the cost of providing the service or product to the payor, and 
(ii) where the amount charged is not used by the government for 
any purpose other than reimbursing that cost.  In computing 
“actual cost” the maximum amount that may be imposed is the 
actual cost less all other sources of revenue including, but not 
limited to taxes, other exempt charges, grants, and state or 
federal funds received to provide such service or product. 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Appendix 
8 
(2)  “Extend” includes, but is not limited to, doing any of 
the following with respect to a tax or exempt charge: lengthening 
its duration, delaying or eliminating its expiration, expanding 
its application to a new territory or class of payor, or expanding 
the base to which its rate is applied. 
(3)  “Impose” means adopt, enact, reenact, create, establish, 
collect, increase or extend. 
(4)  “State law” includes, but is not limited to, any state 
statute, state regulation, state executive order, state resolution, 
state ruling, state opinion letter, or other legal authority or 
interpretation 
adopted, 
enacted, 
enforced, 
issued, 
or 
implemented by the legislative or executive branches of state 
government.  “State law” does not include actions taken by the 
Regents of the University of California, Trustees of the California 
State University, or the Board of Governors of the California 
Community Colleges. 
Section 5.  Section 1 of Article XIII C of the 
California Constitution is amended, to read:  
Sec. 1.  Definitions.  As used in this article:  
(a)  “Actual cost” of providing a service or product means: 
(i) the minimum amount necessary to reimburse the government 
for the cost of providing the service or product to the payor, and 
(ii) where the amount charged is not used by the government for 
any purpose other than reimbursing that cost.  In computing 
“actual cost” the maximum amount that may be imposed is the 
actual cost less all other sources of revenue including, but not 
limited to taxes, other exempt charges, grants, and state or 
federal funds received to provide such service or product. 
(b)  “Extend” includes, but is not limited to, doing any of 
the following with respect to a tax, exempt charge, or Article XIII 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Appendix 
9 
D assessment, fee, or charge: lengthening its duration, delaying 
or eliminating its expiration, expanding its application to a new 
territory or class of payor, or expanding the base to which its rate 
is applied. 
(c) (a)  “General tax” means any tax imposed for general 
governmental purposes. 
(d)  “Impose” means adopt, enact, reenact, create, establish, 
collect, increase, or extend. 
(e) (b)  “Local government” means any county, city, city 
and county, including a charter city or county, any special 
district, or any other local or regional governmental entity, or 
an elector pursuant to Article II or the initiative power provided 
by a charter or statute. 
(f)  “Local law” includes, but is not limited to, any 
ordinance, resolution, regulation, ruling, opinion letter, or other 
legal authority or interpretation adopted, enacted, enforced, 
issued, or implemented by a local government. 
(g) (c)  “Special district” means an agency of the State, 
formed pursuant to general law or a special act, for the local 
performance of governmental or proprietary functions with 
limited geographic boundaries including, but not limited to, 
school districts and redevelopment agencies. 
(h) (d)  “Special tax” means any tax imposed for specific 
purposes, including a tax imposed for specific purposes, which is 
placed into a general fund. 
(i) (e)  As used in this article, and in Section 9 of Article II, 
“tax” means every any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind, 
imposed by a local government law that is not an exempt charge., 
except the following: 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Appendix 
10 
(j)  As used in this section, “exempt charge” means only the 
following:  
(1)  A charge imposed for a specific benefit conferred or 
privilege granted directly to the payor that is not provided to 
those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable 
costs to the local government of conferring the benefit or 
granting the privilege. 
(1) (2)  A reasonable charge imposed for a specific local 
government service or product provided directly to the payor 
that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not 
exceed the reasonable actual costs to the local government of 
providing the service or product. 
(2) (3)  A charge imposed for the reasonable regulatory 
costs to a local government for issuing licenses and permits, 
performing investigations, inspections, and audits, enforcing 
agricultural 
marketing 
orders, 
and 
the 
administrative 
enforcement and adjudication thereof. 
(3) (4)  A reasonable charge imposed for entrance to or use 
of local government property, or the purchase, rental, or lease of 
local government property. 
(4) (5)  A fine, or penalty, or other monetary charge 
including any applicable interest for nonpayment thereof, 
imposed by the judicial branch of government or a local 
government administrative enforcement agency pursuant to 
adjudicatory due process, as a result of to punish a violation of 
law. 
(5) (6)  A charge imposed as a condition of property 
development.  No levy, charge, or exaction regulating or related 
to vehicle miles traveled may be imposed as a condition of 
property development or occupancy. 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Appendix 
11 
(6) (7)  An Assessments and property related fees 
assessment, fee, or charge imposed in accordance with the 
provisions of subject to Article XIII D, or an assessment imposed 
upon a business in a tourism marketing district, a parking and 
business improvement area, or a property and business 
improvement district. 
(7)  A charge imposed for a specific health care service 
provided directly to the payor and that is not provided to those 
not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to 
the local government of providing the health care service.  As 
used in this paragraph, a “health care service” means a service 
licensed or exempt from licensure by the state pursuant to 
Chapters 1, 1.3, or 2 of Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code. 
The local government bears the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a levy, charge, or other 
exaction is not a tax, that the amount is no more than necessary 
to cover the reasonable costs of the governmental activity and 
that the manner in which those costs are allocated to a payor 
bear a fair or reasonable relationship to the payor’s burdens on, 
or benefits received from, the governmental activity. 
Section 6.  Section 2 of Article XIII C of the 
California Constitution is amended to read:  
Sec. 
2. 
 
Local 
Government 
Tax 
Limitation.  
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution:  
(a)  Every levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by 
local law is either a tax or an exempt charge.  All taxes imposed 
by any local government shall be deemed to be either general 
taxes or special taxes.  Special purpose districts or agencies, 
including school districts, shall have no power to levy general 
taxes. 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Appendix 
12 
(b)  No local law government, whether proposed by the 
governing body or by an elector, may impose, extend, or increase 
any general tax unless and until that tax is submitted to the 
electorate and approved by a majority vote.  A general tax shall 
not be deemed to have been increased if it is imposed at a rate 
not higher than the maximum rate so approved.  The election 
required by this subdivision shall be consolidated with a 
regularly scheduled general election for members of the 
governing body of the local government, except in cases of 
emergency declared by a unanimous vote of the governing body. 
(c)  Any general tax imposed, extended, or increased, 
without voter approval, by any local government on or after 
January 1, 1995, and prior to the effective date of this article, 
shall continue to be imposed only if approved by a majority vote 
of the voters voting in an election on the issue of the imposition, 
which election shall be held within two years of the effective date 
of this article and in compliance with subdivision (b).  (d)  No 
local law government, whether proposed by the governing body 
or by an elector, may impose, extend, or increase any special tax 
unless and until that tax is submitted to the electorate and 
approved by a two-thirds vote.  A special tax shall not be deemed 
to have been increased if it is imposed at a rate not higher than 
the maximum rate so approved. 
(d)  The title and summary and ballot label or question 
required for a measure pursuant to the Elections Code shall, for 
each measure providing for the imposition of a tax, include:  
(1)  The type and amount or rate of the tax;  
(2)  the duration of the tax; and  
(3)  The use of the revenue derived from the tax.  If the 
proposed tax is a general tax, the phrase “for general government 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Appendix 
13 
use” shall be required, and no advisory measure may appear on 
the same ballot that would indicate that the revenue from the 
general tax will, could, or should be used for a specific purpose. 
(e)  Only the governing body of a local government, other 
than an elector pursuant to Article II or the initiative power 
provided by a charter or statute, shall have the authority to 
impose any exempt charge.  The governing body shall impose an 
exempt charge by an ordinance specifying the type of exempt 
charge as provided in Section 1(j) and the amount or rate of the 
exempt charge to be imposed, and passed by the governing body.  
This subdivision shall not apply to charges specified in 
paragraph (7) of subdivision (j) of section 1. 
(f)  No amendment to a Charter which provides for the 
imposition, extension, or increase of a tax or exempt charge shall 
be submitted to or approved by the electors, nor shall any such 
amendment to a Charter hereafter submitted to or approved by 
the electors become effective for any purpose. 
(g)  Any tax or exempt charge adopted after January 1, 
2022, but prior to the effective date of this act, that was not 
adopted in compliance with the requirements of this section is 
void 12 months after the effective date of this act unless the tax 
or exempt charge is reenacted in compliance with the 
requirements of this section. 
(h)(1)  The local government bears the burden of proving by 
clear and convincing evidence that a levy, charge or exaction is 
an exempt charge and not a tax.  The local government bears the 
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the 
amount of the exempt charge is reasonable and that the amount 
charged does not exceed the actual cost of providing the service 
or product to the payor. 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Appendix 
14 
(2)  The retention of revenue by, or the payment to, a non-
governmental entity of a levy, charge, or exaction of any kind 
imposed by a local law, shall not be a factor in determining 
whether the levy, charge, or exaction is a tax or exempt charge. 
(3)  The characterization of a levy, charge, or exaction of 
any kind imposed by a local law as being paid in exchange for a 
benefit, privilege, allowance, authorization, or asset, shall not be 
factors in determining whether the levy, charge, or exaction is a 
tax or an exempt charge. 
(4)  The use of revenue derived from the levy, charge or 
exaction shall be a factor in determining whether the levy, 
charge, or exaction is a tax or exempt charge. 
Section 7.  Section 3 of Article XIII D of the 
California Constitution is amended, to read:  
Sec. 3.  Property Taxes, Assessments, Fees and Charges 
Limited 
(a)  No tax, assessment, fee, or charge, or surcharge, 
including a surcharge based on the value of property, shall be 
assessed by any agency upon any parcel of property or upon any 
person as an incident of property ownership except:  
(1)  The ad valorem property tax imposed pursuant to 
described in Section 1(a) of Article XIII and Section 1(a) of 
Article XIII A, and described and enacted pursuant to the voter 
approval requirement in Section 1(b) of Article XIII A. 
(2)  Any special non-ad valorem tax receiving a two-thirds 
vote of qualified electors pursuant to Section 4 of Article XIII A, 
or after receiving a two-thirds vote of those authorized to vote in 
a community facilities district by the Legislature pursuant to 
statute as it existed on December 31, 2021. 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Appendix 
15 
(3)  Assessments as provided by this article. 
(4)  Fees or charges for property related services as 
provided by this article. 
(b)  For purposes of this article, fees for the provision of 
electrical or gas service shall not be deemed charges or fees 
imposed as an incident of property ownership. 
Section 8.  Sections 1 and 14 of Article XIII are 
amended to read:  
Sec. 1 Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or 
the laws of the United States:  
(a)  All property is taxable and shall be assessed at the 
same percentage of fair market value.  When a value standard 
other than fair market value is prescribed by this Constitution 
or by statute authorized by this Constitution, the same 
percentage shall be applied to determine the assessed value.  
The value to which the percentage is applied, whether it be the 
fair market value or not, shall be known for property tax 
purposes as the full value. 
(b)  All property so assessed shall be taxed in proportion to 
its full value. 
(c)  All proceeds from the taxation of property shall be 
apportioned according to law to the districts within the counties. 
Sec. 14.  All property taxed by state or local government 
shall be assessed in the county, city, and district in which it is 
situated.  Notwithstanding any other provision of law, such state 
or local property taxes shall be apportioned according to law to 
the districts within the counties. 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Appendix 
16 
Section 9.  General Provisions  
A.  This Act shall be liberally construed in order to 
effectuate its purposes. 
B.  (1)  In the event that this initiative measure and 
another initiative measure or measures relating to state or local 
requirements for the imposition, adoption, creation, or 
establishment of taxes, charges, and other revenue measures 
shall appear on the same statewide election ballot, the other 
initiative measure or measures shall be deemed to be in conflict 
with this measure.  In the event that this initiative measure 
receives a greater number of affirmative votes, the provisions of 
this measure shall prevail in their entirety, and the provisions 
of the other initiative measure or measures shall be null and 
void. 
(2)  In furtherance of this provision, the voters hereby 
declare that this measure conflicts with the provisions of the 
“Housing Affordability and Tax Cut Act of 2022” and “The Tax 
Cut and Housing Affordability Act,” both of which would impose 
a new state property tax (called a “surcharge”) on certain real 
property, and where the revenue derived from the tax is 
provided to the State, rather than retained in the county in 
which the property is situated and for the use of the county and 
cities and districts within the county, in direct violation of the 
provisions of this initiative. 
(3)  If this initiative measure is approved by the voters, but 
superseded in whole or in part by any other conflicting initiative 
measure approved by the voters at the same election, and such 
conflicting initiative is later held invalid, this measure shall be 
self-executing and given full force and effect. 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Appendix 
17 
C.  The provisions of this Act are severable.  If any portion, 
section, subdivision, paragraph, clause, sentence, phrase, word, 
or application of this Act is for any reason held to be invalid by 
a decision of any court of competent jurisdiction, that decision 
shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this Act.  
The People of the State of California hereby declare that they 
would have adopted this Act and each and every portion, section, 
subdivision, paragraph, clause, sentence, phrase, word, and 
application not declared invalid or unconstitutional without 
regard to whether any portion of this Act or application thereof 
would be subsequently declared invalid. 
D.  If this Act is approved by the voters of the State of 
California and thereafter subjected to a legal challenge alleging 
a violation of state or federal law, and both the Governor and 
Attorney General refuse to defend this Act, then the following 
actions shall be taken:  
(1)  Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained 
in Chapter 6 of Part 2 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government 
Code or any other law, the Attorney General shall appoint 
independent counsel to faithfully and vigorously defend this Act 
on behalf of the State of California. 
(2) 
Before 
appointing 
or 
thereafter 
substituting 
independent counsel, the Attorney General shall exercise due 
diligence in determining the qualifications of independent 
counsel and shall obtain written affirmation from independent 
counsel that independent counsel will faithfully and vigorously 
defend this Act.  The written affirmation shall be made publicly 
available upon request. 
(3)  A continuous appropriation is hereby made from the 
General Fund to the Controller, without regard to fiscal years, 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. WEBER 
Appendix 
18 
in an amount necessary to cover the costs of retaining 
independent counsel to faithfully and vigorously defend this Act 
on behalf of the State of California. 
(4)  Nothing in this section shall prohibit the proponents 
of this Act, or a bona fide taxpayers association, from 
intervening to defend this Act.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Legislature of the State of California v. Weber 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding XX 
Review Granted (published) 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S281977 
Date Filed:  June 20, 2024 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:   
County:   
Judge:   
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Olson Remcho, Robin B. Johansen, Margaret R. Prinzing, Richard R. 
Rios and Inez Kaminski for Petitioners. 
 
Independent California Institute and Coyote Codornices Marin as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
Mastagni Holstedt and Kathleen N. Mastagni Storm for California 
Professional Firefighters as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
Neil K. Sawhney, Shilpi Agarwal; Catherine Rogers and Victor Leung 
for the ACLU Foundation of Northern California and the ACLU 
Foundation for Southern California as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Petitioners. 
 
Altshuler Berzon, Scott A. Kronland, Stacey M. Leyton and Matthew J. 
Murray for the Service Employees International Union California 
State Council as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
 
 
Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, Michael G. Colantuono and 
Matthew C. Slentz for Association of California Water Agencies, 
California Special Districts Association, California State Association of 
Counties, California Air Pollution Control Officers Association, 
California Association of Sanitation Agencies, California Fire Chiefs 
Association, California Municipal Utilities Association, City and 
County of San Francisco, City of Los Angeles, Fire Districts 
Association of California and League of California Cities as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
Kaufman Legal Group, Stephen J. Kaufman, Gary S. Winuk and 
George M. Yin for California Budget and Policy Center as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
Sharon Terman, Katherine Wutchiett and Shazzy Kamali for 
California Labor Federation, California Pan-Ethnic Health Network, 
California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., California Work & Family 
Coalition, Center For Workers’ Rights, Center For WorkLife Law, 
Child Care Law Center, Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, 
Equal Rights Advocates, First 5 California, Legal Aid at Work and 
Unite-LA as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
Covington & Burling, David B. Goodwin, Serena R. Saffarini, Natalie 
R. Maas and Stanley Young for Edmund G. Brown, Jr., as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
Strumwasser & Woocher, Michael J. Strumwasser, Beverly Grossman 
Palmer, Dale K. Larson and Salvador E. Pérez for Michael Cohen, B. 
Timothy Gage and Ana Matosantos as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Petitioners. 
 
Messing Adam & Jasmine, Gary M. Messing, Gregg McLean Adam, 
Jason H. Jasmine and Matthew Taylor for Operating Engineers Local 
3, California Statewide Law Enforcement Association, San Jose Police 
Officers’ Association, Superior Court Professional Employees’ 
Association, Davis Professional Firefighters’ Association, Local 3494, 
East Palo Alto Police Officers’ Association and Sacramento Housing & 
Redevelopment Agency Employees Association as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Petitioners. 
 
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Robin Meadow, Katarina E. 
Rusinas; Public Counsel, Gregory Bonett, Jonathan Jager and Faizah 
 
 
Malik for 45 Members of the United to House LA Coalition as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
Lozano Smith, Sloan R. Simmons, Daniel M. Maruccia, Constantine C. 
Baranoff; Keith J. Bray, Kristin D. Lindgren and Dana Scott for 
California School Boards Association’s Education Legal Alliance as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
Steven J. Reyes, Mary M. Mooney and Alexa P. Howard for 
Respondent. 
 
Bell, McAndrews & Hiltachk, Thomas W. Hiltachk, Paul Gough; 
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, Jonathan Coupal, Timothy 
Bittle and Laura Dougherty for Real Party in Interest. 
 
Jack Cohen as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent and Real Party 
in Interest. 
 
Turner Law and Wm. Gregory Turner for California Farm Bureau 
Federation, James Gallagher, Joe Coto and Don Perata as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Respondent and Real Party in Interest. 
 
Law Offices of Jason A. Bezis and Jason A. Bezis for Alameda County 
Taxpayers’ Association, California Taxpayer Protection Committee, 
Central Valley Taxpayers Association, Chico Taxpayers Association, 
Coalition of Sensible Taxpayers (Marin County), Gold Country 
Taxpayers Association, Los Angeles County Taxpayers Association, 
Orange County Taxpayers Association, Placer County Taxpayers 
Association, Reform California, Sacramento County Taxpayers 
Association, San Francisco Taxpayers Association, Silicon Valley 
Taxpayers’ Association, Solano County Taxpayers Association, Sutter 
Yuba Taxpayers Association, Ventura County Taxpayers Association, 
the Red Brennan Group and Moving Oxnard Forward as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion):  
 
Margaret R. Prinzing 
Olson Remcho, LLP 
1901 Harrison Street, Suite 1550 
Oakland, CA 94612 
(510) 346-6200 
 
Thomas W. Hiltachk 
Bell, McAndrews & Hiltachk, LLP 
455 Capitol Mall, Suite 600 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 442-7757