Title: Ogden v. Collins, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 540, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 29, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JUSTINE OGDEN and TRAVIS 
GORDON,1 
 
Petitioners Below- 
Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
BRIAN COLLINS, JANE HUDSON, 
and THE DIVISION OF FAMILY 
SERVICES, 
 
Respondents Below- 
Appellees. 
§ 
§  No. 540, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  File No. CK08-02645 
§  Petition Nos. 08-29581 and 
§  09-14006 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 10, 2010 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: November 29, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 29th day of November 2010, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
This is an appeal from a Family Court order dismissing the appellants’ 
petition for guardianship and denying their petition for permanent guardianship.  
Justine Ogden, appellant, is the cousin of the mother of appellee, Brian Collins.  
Ogden and her husband, appellant Travis Gordon, filed two separate petitions 
seeking guardianship and permanent guardianship of Collins’ minor daughter, 
                                                 
1 Pseudonyms have been assigned to the parties, the minor child, and the foster family pursuant 
to Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
2 
 
Karen.  The Family Court dismissed the guardianship petition after appellants’ 
then-counsel advised the trial court that they no longer intended to pursue that 
petition.2  The Family Court denied Ogden’s permanent guardianship petition3 
based on its determination that permanent guardianship was not in Karen’s best 
interests.  We find the Family Court’s rulings to be supported by the record and, 
for the reasons set forth herein, affirm the judgment below. 
(2) 
The record reflects the following relevant facts:  Karen was born to 
appellees, Brian Collins (Father) and Jane Hudson (Mother), on September 7, 
2006.  Mother also had an older son, born August 2, 2002, who was not the 
biological child of Father.4  Both children had birth defects.  In December 2006, a 
hot line report to the Division of Family Services (DFS) indicated that Karen, who 
was then three months old, may be malnourished.  DFS investigated and 
determined the report was unfounded.  Shortly thereafter, Karen had corrective 
surgery to fix the birth defect to her throat and was hospitalized from December 
2006 until April 2007.  A tracheotomy tube was inserted, which allowed Karen to 
gain weight.   In April 2007, Karen was transferred to a long-term care facility, 
                                                 
2 Appellants, who are now pro se on appeal, appear to deny that they agreed to dismiss their 
guardianship petition. 
3 Once the Family Court dismissed the guardianship petition, the parties represented to the 
Family Court that they agreed Travis Gordon should be excluded as a petitioner on the 
permanent guardianship petition because he is not a blood relative of Karen and, thus, lacked 
standing to seek permanent guardianship.  See 13 Del. C. § 2351 (2009) (providing that only a 
blood relative, parent, or foster parent may petition for permanent guardianship of a minor child). 
4 The parents had been working with DFS for a number of years with respect to Karen’s older 
half-brother, who already was in DFS custody at the time Karen entered DFS custody. 
3 
 
Exceptional Care for Children (ECC), because of her ongoing medical needs and 
because of her parents’ lack of medical training and lack of adequate housing.  
DFS entered a case plan with the parents at that time, which required them to 
obtain employment, find suitable housing, get necessary medical training, work 
with a parent aide, and continue with mental health treatment. 
(3) 
On August 21, 2008, when Karen was due to be discharged from EEC 
after a sixteen-month stay, DFS filed an emergency dependency and neglect 
petition seeking custody of Karen on the ground that Mother and Father had failed 
to complete their case plan.  DFS was granted custody of Karen and thereafter 
placed her in foster care.  The foster mother was a nurse at EEC who was familiar 
with Karen and her medical needs.  On August 26, 2008, counsel was appointed to 
represent Mother and Father, and the Family Court held a preliminary protective 
hearing.  During the course of that proceeding, Mother and Father agreed to have 
Karen remain in DFS custody, and waived their rights to both the preliminary 
protective hearing and an adjudicatory hearing for Karen.  On the same day, 
August 26, 2008, Ogden and Gordon filed their petition to be appointed guardians 
of Karen. 
(4) 
At the dispositional hearing held in the dependency case on 
September 16, 2008, Mother and Father entered into a written DFS case plan, 
which set forth the requirements that they needed to meet to be reunified with 
4 
 
Karen.  Several review hearings were held thereafter in order to review the 
progress Mother and Father were making with their case plan and to determine 
whether Karen could be returned to their care. 
(5) 
On November 3, 2008, the Family Court held a separate hearing on 
the petition for guardianship.  DFS opposed granting guardianship to Ogden and 
Gordon because of Karen’s medical needs.  DFS also requested that a home study 
be performed to ensure that Ogden and Gordon were capable of meeting Karen’s 
special needs in their home.  The Family Court continued the guardianship 
proceeding until January 2009 in order to have Ogden and Gordon arrange for a 
home study and for them to receive training on Karen’s medical care.  The Family 
Court also ordered that Ogden and Gordon could have weekly visitation with 
Karen of two hours per week.  The trial judge expressed concern that the petition 
for guardianship did not offer a permanent solution for Karen’s placement, and 
encouraged the petitioners to consider filing a petition for permanent guardianship. 
(6) 
The Family Court held the rescheduled hearing on the guardianship 
petition on January 26, 2009.  Ogden and Gordon’s counsel informed the trial court 
that he believed the hearing was only a status hearing since the home study, which 
had begun in November, was not yet completed.  At that hearing, DFS called the 
director of social services of EEC to testify about her observations and interactions 
with Ogden while Karen was at the facility.  Among other things, the director 
5 
 
testified that Ogden had only begun to visit Karen in July 2008, shortly before her 
release, and that those visits, which occurred in the evenings, were disruptive to 
Karen’s bedtime routine.  The director also testified about a document Ogden had 
presented to EEC, before filing the petition for guardianship, which purported to be 
a “Voluntary Consent to Guardianship,” signed by Ogden, Mother, Father, and 
Father’s mother.  That document provided that Karen would be passed between 
Ogden and Father’s mother until they decided to return Karen to her parents.  EEC 
informed Ogden that it would not honor the “voluntary guardianship” because it 
was not a signed court order. 
 (7) 
At the January 2009 hearing, DFS also called Karen’s foster mother, 
Kelly Smith, who testified about Karen’s steady progress while in foster care and 
about Karen’s apparent anxiety and night terrors following visits with her 
biological family.  Ogden testified on her own behalf stating, among other things, 
that Karen had developed a strong bond with her and her husband and that she 
showed no signs of anxiety during their visits.  At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the Family Court continued the guardianship matter until April to allow the 
completion of the home study.  The Court also ordered, at the request of DFS, that 
the guardianship case involving Karen be consolidated with DFS’ dependency case 
involving Karen. 
6 
 
(8) 
On April 20, 2009, the Family Court held a consolidated hearing on 
the status of the guardianship and dependency cases.  At that time, Mother and 
Father’s lawyer informed the Court that his clients intended voluntarily to 
terminate their parental rights with respect to Karen.  DFS also reported to the trial 
judge that the home study report had not yet been received, and thus the Child 
Placement Review Board had not yet held a hearing on Karen’s placement.  
Accordingly, the trial court rescheduled the hearing until July.  During the 
intervening months, the trial court ordered that a certified therapist work with 
Karen to determine if she was experiencing anxiety and also to sit as an observer 
during at least one of Karen’s two-hour visits with Ogden and Gordon.  On April 
27, 2009, Ogden and Gordon filed their petition for permanent guardianship. 
(9) 
On July 8 and 17, 2009, the Family Court held a second, two-day 
consolidated hearing, which also served as Karen’s permanency hearing.  At that 
hearing, Odgen and Gordon, and several of Ogden’s relatives testified.  Ogden and 
Gordon both testified to the strong bond they had developed with Karen and the 
efforts they would make to assimilate Karen into their home, care for her, and tend 
to her medical needs.  Also admitted into evidence was the Child Placement 
Review Board’s decision, that Karen’s reunification with her parents was not 
appropriate given their failure to comply with their case plan objectives.  The 
Board found that placement of Karen in the Smith’s foster home was appropriate, 
7 
 
but concluded that, for adoption purposes, equal weight should be given to Ogden 
and Gordon’s guardianship petition. 
(10)  DFS presented the testimony of several witnesses, including Karen’s 
court-appointed therapist.  The therapist testified that she had had five sessions 
with Karen since April, and had also sat as an observer during a two-hour visit 
between Karen and Ogden and Gordon.  The therapist testified that during her two-
hour observation period, Karen did not appear to be bonded with Ogden.  After her 
foster father dropped her off for the visit and left the room, Karen continued to ask, 
“Where did my daddy go?”  The therapist opined that the visit seemed to cause 
Karen stress.  Karen’s daycare teacher also testified that on days after visits with 
Ogden and Gordon, Karen exhibited behavior changes, such as clinging to her 
foster parents and being antisocial with the other children.  The parent aide 
appointed to supervise Mother and Father’s visits with Karen also testified that 
Karen was very bonded to her foster family, called them “mommy” and “daddy,” 
and would continue to ask for her foster parents after she was dropped off for 
visitation with Mother and Father.  The aide testified that in the one visit she 
observed between Karen and Ogden and Gordon, Karen did not seem as 
comfortable with Ogden and Gordon.  Karen’s Court Appointed Special Advocate 
(CASA) also testified that, given Karen’s close bond with her foster family, she did 
8 
 
not believe it was in Karen’s best interests to grant Ogden and Gordon’s petition 
for guardianship or permanent guardianship. 
(11) Both Mother and Father testified at the hearing that they wished for 
Karen to be adopted by her foster family because she had bonded so closely with 
them.  Both parents believed it would be disruptive to place Karen with Ogden and 
Gordon, and both denied Ogden’s suggestion that they were not competent to make 
this judgment.   Mother and Father also testified that they intended voluntarily to 
terminate their parental rights to Karen, and each denied that anyone had made 
promises to them in exchange for their decision to voluntarily terminate their 
parental rights.  Given the parents’ position and the fact that they had failed to 
complete their case plan, DFS requested to change the permanency goal for Karen 
from reunification to termination of parental rights and adoption.  At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Family Court reserved decision in the case. 
(12) The Family Court issued its decision, which dismissed Ogden and 
Gordon’s petition for guardianship and denied Ogden’s petition for permanent 
guardianship, on August 14, 2009.  The Family Court considered all of the factors 
governing permanent guardianships, as set forth in 13 Del. C. § 2353(a), and 
found, among other reasons, that granting Ogden’s petition for permanent 
guardianship was not in Karen’s best interests.  This appeal followed. 
9 
 
(13) On June 11, 2010, appellants filed a document purporting to be their 
opening brief on appeal.  The document contained a 42-page opening brief, a 25-
page “supplemental opening brief,” and a 22-page “second supplemental opening 
brief.”  Although the Court initially struck the appellants’ brief for failure to 
comply with the 35-page limit for opening briefs, the appellants were later granted 
a page extension and were permitted to file their 89-page “opening brief.5”  
Appellants enumerate seven issues in their opening brief and “supplements.”  First, 
they argue that the State illegally seized Karen and violated her constitutional 
rights.  Second, they contend that the trial court erred in failing to obtain a 
meaningful social report.  Third, they assert that the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying their petition for permanent guardianship.  The appellants’ fourth, fifth, 
and sixth arguments, which appear in their “first supplemental brief,” are difficult 
to discern.  Appellants appear to argue that, given the consolidation of the 
dependency/neglect case with the guardianship case, they were entitled to all 
records related to the dependency/neglect case, including the separate 
dependency/neglect case involving Karen’s half-brother, and that their due process 
rights were denied when they were excluded from proceedings and denied access 
                                                 
5 See Gunzl v. R&K Motors & Mach. Shop, 2004 WL 1058367 (Del. May 4, 2004) (noting that 
self-represented litigants are afforded a degree of leniency in filing documents on appeal that 
would not otherwise be afforded to lawyers). 
10 
 
to certain records.  Finally, appellants contend that the Family Court erred in 
denying them visitation with Karen after the guardianship petition was denied.   
(14) Before addressing the merits of any of these arguments, we first note 
what is properly before the Court for consideration.  Because the appellants are pro 
se, and because the Court wanted to move this appeal forward as expeditiously as 
possible, the Court afforded the appellants substantial leeway in filing their 
documents on appeal, but without prejudice to the appellees’ later right to object.  
At the outset, we note that the appellants’ appendices contain numerous documents 
that were never presented to the trial court in the first instance for its consideration.  
Those documents are clearly inappropriate for consideration, because they are not 
a part of the record on appeal.6  The Court has limited its consideration in this 
matter to the Family Court record, excluding those transcripts of Karen’s half-
brother’s dependency proceedings, which were prepared by the court reporter and 
inadvertently included in the record transmitted by the Family Court. 
(15) We further note that many of the arguments appellants raise on appeal 
relate to the dependency/neglect proceedings.  The appellants were not parties to 
the dependency/neglect proceedings, however, and thus have no standing to 
                                                 
6 See Delaware Elec. Coop. v. Duphily, 703 A.2d 1202, 1207 (Del. 1997) (holding that only 
those materials that were admitted into evidence at trial or were entered into the trial court record 
through motion are considered part of the “record on appeal” under Supreme Court Rule 9). 
11 
 
challenge those proceedings on appeal.7  The Family Court’s consolidation of the 
dependency/neglect proceedings with the guardianship proceedings was an effort 
to streamline two cases involving common legal and factual issues to avoid 
duplication of effort and prevent any conflicting outcomes.8  The consolidation did 
not, as appellants seem to argue, make them “parties” to the dependency/neglect 
proceedings.  As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, “[c]onsolidation 
does not merge [two] suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties, 
or make those who are parties in one suit parties in another.”9   Although Father 
has filed a brief in support of Ogden in this appeal, Father did not file his own 
appeal.10  Any issue with respect to the dependency/neglect proceeding involving 
Karen is not properly before this Court for consideration.  Nor do the appellants, 
who are not Karen’s parents, or her guardians or legal counsel, have standing to 
raise any arguments asserting a violation of Karen’s constitutional rights in the 
dependency/neglect proceedings.11 
                                                 
7 See Hughes v. DFS, 836 A.2d 498, 506 (Del. 2003) (holding that mother, in an appeal from the 
Family Court’s termination of her parental rights, had no standing to challenge the Family 
Court’s denial of maternal aunt’s petition for guardianship as the aunt was not a party to the 
proceedings and had not filed an appeal in her own right).    
8 See Del. Fam. Ct. R. Civ. R. 42(a) (2010). 
9 In re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 613, 724 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Johnson v. Manhattan R. Co., 
289 U.S. 479, 497 (1933)). 
10 Father’s position in support of Ogden’s appeal obviously contradicts the position he took in 
Family Court. 
11 Townsend v. Griffith, 570 A.2d 1157, 1158 (Del. 1990).   
12 
 
(16) Lastly, we note that the appellants filed their notice of appeal in this 
matter on September 14, 2009.  Their notice specified that the appeal was being 
taken from the Family Court’s August 14, 2009 decision denying their 
guardianship and permanent guardianship petitions.  That notice did not identify or 
include the Family Court’s August 21, 2009 decision rescinding their visitation 
rights as a subject of their appeal.  Accordingly, that order is not properly before 
the Court for consideration.12 
(17) The scope of this Court’s review of a Family Court order denying a 
petition for guardianship includes a review of both law and facts.13  Where the 
Family Court correctly applied the law, we review under an abuse of discretion 
standard.14  The Family Court’s factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal if 
those findings are supported by the record.15  Where the determination of facts 
turns on the credibility of the witnesses who testified under oath before the trial 
judge, this Court will not substitute its opinion for that of the trial judge.16 
(18) We first address the appellants’ challenge to the Family Court’s 
dismissal of their regular guardianship petition.  The Family Court dismissed the 
petition based on counsel’s representation that the appellants were withdrawing 
                                                 
12 Trowell v. Diamond Supply Co., 91 A.2d 797, 801 (1952) (holding that, when a notice of 
appeal is clear and unambiguous as to the order being appealed, it is binding on the appellant and 
is ineffectual to bring up any other judgment for review other than the one specified). 
13 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
14 Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185, 186-87 (Del. 1991). 
15 Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983). 
16 Wife (J.F.V) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d at 1204. 
13 
 
their regular guardianship petition in favor of their later-filed permanent 
guardianship petition.  In their opening brief on appeal, the appellants deny that 
they ever agreed to withdraw their regular guardianship petition.  Despite the 
appellants’ present contention, however, their attorney is deemed to have had the 
general authority to act on their behalf,17 and the appellants cannot avoid the 
consequences of their attorney’s representation to the court. Under our system of 
representative litigation, each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-
agent.18  Accordingly, we find no error in the Family Court’s dismissal of the 
appellants’ regular guardianship petition. 
(19) Next, we address Ogden’s contention that she was denied the right to 
have a meaningful social report19 submitted in support of her permanent 
guardianship petition.  The record discloses however, that Ogden did submit a 
social report into evidence at the hearing and that the social report was very 
favorable to Ogden.  To the extent that Ogden now claims that this report was 
somehow deficient, she has waived that claimed for failing to raise it before the 
Family Court in the first instance.20  Further, to the extent that Ogden claims that 
the Family Court erred in failing to permit the author of the social report to testify 
                                                 
17 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 394 A.2d 241, 244 (Del. Ch. 1978). 
18 Gebhart v. Ernest DiSabatino & Sons, Inc., 264 A.2d 157, 160 (Del. 1970). 
19 See 18 Del. C. § 2354 (requiring that a permanent guardianship petitioner obtain a social report 
from a licensed child-placing agency analyzing the factors for permanent guardianship under 
Section 2353). 
20 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (2010). 
14 
 
at the hearing, she waived that claim as well.  The record reflects that a week 
before the hearing, Ogden’s counsel filed a motion seeking permission for the 
author of the social report to testify via telephone.  The Family Court, however, 
had not acted on the motion before the hearing began, and counsel failed to renew 
his request or otherwise seek a ruling on his motion.  The hearing went forward 
and counsel never attempted to call the author of the report as a witness.  Failure to 
pursue the motion at trial constitutes an abandonment of the issue and operates as a 
waiver of the claim on appeal.21    
(20) Finally, we turn to Ogden’s claim that the Family Court erred in 
denying her petition for permanent guardianship.  The standards for a permanent 
guardianship are set forth in 13 Del. C. § 2353(a), which provides, in relevant part, 
that the Family Court shall grant a petition for permanent guardianship if it finds 
by clear and convincing evidence that:   
(1)  One of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights as set 
forth in 1103(a) of this title has been met; 
(2)  Adoption of the child is not possible or appropriate; 
(3)  Permanent guardianship is in the best interest of the child;22 
                                                 
21 See United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 2000). 
22 To determine the best interests of the child, 13 Del. C. § 722(a) provides a list of eight factors 
for the Family Court to consider: 
1) The wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his or her custody and residential 
arrangements;  
2) The wishes of the child as to his or her custodian(s) and residential arrangements;  
3) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parents, grandparents, 
siblings, person cohabitating in the relationship of husband and wife with a parent of the 
child, any other residents of the household or persons who may significantly affect the 
child's best interests;  
15 
 
(4)  The proposed permanent guardian: 
a. Is emotionally, mentally, physically and financially suitable to 
become the permanent guardian; 
b. Is a foster parent(s) who has been caring for the child for at least 6 
months at the time of the filing of the petition or is a blood relative; 
c. Has expressly committed to remain the permanent guardian and 
assume the rights and responsibilities for the child for the duration of the 
child’s minority; and 
d. Has demonstrated an understanding of the financial implications of 
becoming a permanent guardian; 
 
(21) In its decision, the Family Court reviewed all of the testimony and 
evidence presented.  The court found by clear and convincing evidence that one of 
the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights had been established, 
namely that Mother and Father had failed to plan for Karen.23  The court also found 
that Ogden, as the proposed permanent guardian was emotionally, mentally, 
physically and financially suitable to become the permanent guardian, was a blood 
relative of Karen, had expressly committed to remain the permanent guardian and 
assume the rights and responsibilities for Karen for the duration of her minority, 
and had demonstrated an understanding of the financial implications of becoming a 
permanent guardian. 
                                                                                                                                                             
4) The child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community;  
5) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved;  
6) Past and present compliance by both parents with their rights and responsibilities of their 
child under § 701 of this title;  
7) Evidence of domestic violence as provided for in Chapter 7A of this title; and  
8) The criminal history of any party or any other resident of the household including whether 
the criminal history contains pleas of guilty or no contest or a conviction of a criminal 
offense.  
 
23 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5) (2009). 
16 
 
(22) The Family Court found, however, that Ogden had failed to establish 
why an adoption of Karen was neither possible nor appropriate under Section 
2353(a)(2).  Kelly Smith, the foster mother, testified that her family was willing to 
serve as an adoptive resource for Karen.  The Family Court noted that Ogden had 
attempted to argue that there was a conflict of interest between Kelly Smith’s 
professional obligations as one of Karen’s former nurses and her wish to adopt 
Karen.  The Family Court concluded, however, that the evidence presented was 
insufficient to establish that adoption of Karen by the Smith family was not 
possible or appropriate. 
(23) Finally, the Family Court reviewed the best interest factors.  The court 
noted that both Mother and Father testified that it was their wish that Karen be 
adopted by her foster family.  Accordingly, neither Mother nor Father’s testimony 
supported Ogden’s petition for permanent guardianship.  As for Karen’s 
interactions with Ogden and her family, the Family Court noted evidence that 
Karen was affectionate with both Ogden and Gordon during their visits and that 
their family and extended family were very supportive of Ogden’s guardianship 
petition and would help Karen’s transition if the guardianship were granted.  But, 
the Family Court also noted that Karen had been living with her foster family for 
months, had become closely bonded with the Smith family and referred to Mr. and 
Mrs. Smith as mommy and daddy.  Karen had adjusted to living with the Smiths 
17 
 
and had exhibited signs of stress after visits with her biological family.  The 
Family Court specifically noted the testimony of Karen’s therapist, who testified 
that Karen was very bonded to her foster family and that it would be emotionally 
traumatic to remove Karen from their home and place her with Ogden.  Based on 
all of the evidence, the Family Court concluded that Ogden had failed to establish 
by clear and convincing evidence that granting the permanent guardianship was in 
Karen’s best interests. 
(24) We have reviewed the record carefully in this case.  The Family 
Court’s factual findings are amply supported by the record and are not clearly 
wrong.  Moreover, the Family Court correctly applied the law.  Under the 
circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the Family Court’s denial of 
Ogden’s petition for permanent guardianship.  
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that judgment of the Family Court 
is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice