Title: CASEY v. CASEY
Citation: 109 P.3d 345, 2005 OK 13
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: March 8, 2005

CASEY v. CASEY Annotate this Case CASEY v. CASEY 2005 OK 13 109 P.3d 345 Case Number: 99217 Decided: 03/08/2005 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA MAX CASEY, PATRICIA NICHOLS and CAROLYN O'NEAL Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. MARGIE CASEY, Defendant/Appellant, CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION IV APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DELAWARE COUNTY HONORABLE ROBERT HANEY, TRIAL JUDGE ¶0 This quiet title action stems from a dispute over joint tenancy property, in which the surviving spouse of a deceased joint tenant claims a probate homestead interest. The joint tenants, Plaintiffs/Appellees, Max Casey, Patricia Nichols, and Carolyn O'Neal (hereinafter "Joint Tenants") asserted title and ownership rights over certain joint tenancy property upon the death of their co-joint tenant father, the spouse of Margie Casey (hereinafter "Widow"). While Widow asserts no title or ownership claim in the property, she claims merely that the Joint Tenants' interest is subject to her homestead right to possession and occupancy as a surviving spouse pursuant to CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS AFFIRMED. James A. Williamson of Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs/Appellees. Charles J. Brackney of Jay, Oklahoma for Defendant/Appellant. Lavender, J. ¶1 The issue in the present cause is whether the trial court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Joint Tenants in its determination that Joint Tenants are sole owners of the joint tenancy property in question by virtue of right of survivorship and that Widow has no homestead interest in the property. Widow appealed, claiming a probate interest in the property pursuant to I FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 Earl Casey married his second wife, Widow, in 1982. Joint Tenants are the adult children of Earl Casey and his first wife. For many years prior to his marriage to Widow, Earl Casey owned property on Grand Lake (hereinafter "lake property"). ¶3 In 1983, during that period of their periodic use of the lake property as a vacation home, Earl Casey conveyed the lake property by warranty deed ¶4 Upon Earl Casey's death, Joint Tenants requested that Widow vacate the property and served Widow with a Notice to Quit in May, 2002. Widow refused to vacate the lake property, asserting her homestead right as the surviving spouse. ¶5 Joint Tenants filed the instant quiet title action on June 14, 2002 to clear title to the lake property as well as to other property not subject to this appeal. Joint Tenants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ¶6 Widow appealed and the COCA reversed and remanded with instructions, determining that Joint Tenant's "title and occupancy [was] subject to the right of homestead according to [ II THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED JOINT TENANTS WERE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AS TO THE LAKE PROPERTY ¶7 As a preliminary point, we note that "summary judgment is appropriate only when it appears [from the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions or other evidentiary materials] there is no substantial controversy as to any material fact and that one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Flanders v. Crane Co., ¶8 We also note preliminarily that it is uncontroverted that the lake property at issue in this case is joint tenancy property, the principle characteristic of which is a right of survivorship in the joint tenants. See In re Estate of MacFarline, ¶9 Widow asserts her constitutional Upon the death of either husband or wife, the survivor may continue to possess and occupy the whole homestead, which shall not in any event be subject to administration proceedings, except as in this title provided, until it is otherwise disposed of according to law. . . . Id. ¶10 In this case, we note that in 1983, Earl Casey executed a warranty deed to the lake property (acquired by him prior to the marriage) and thereby conveyed the property to himself and to his children in joint tenancy with a right of survivorship at a time when the lake property did not constitute the homestead of the couple. Thus, this is not a situation in which one intentionally sought to deprive his spouse of a homestead. See Gross v. Gross, 491 N.W.2d 751 , 753 (S.D. 1992)(providing homestead laws "are intended to prevent one spouse, in life or in death, from unilaterally depriving the other spouse of a homestead.") ¶11 Widow analogizes Joint Tenants' interest in the lake property to that of codevisees' interest and asserts the application of the rule in Mercer v. Mercer on the facts of this case. Joint Tenants argue this matter is distinguishable from Mercer and assert this is a case of first impression. ¶12 The COCA apparently agreed with Widow, as it determined that Joint Tenants' interest in this case was likewise subject to Widow's homestead right pursuant to Mercer. ¶13 Additionally, the COCA also appears to have ignored express language of § 311, which expressly provides for the surviving spouse's right to "continue to possess and occupy the whole homestead, which shall not in any event be subject to administration proceedings, except as in this title provided, until it is otherwise disposed of according to law." III SUMMARY ¶14 In sum, we hold the trial court correctly entered judgment in Joint Tenants' favor as a matter of law in its determination that Joint Tenants are sole owners of the joint tenancy property in question by virtue of right of survivorship and that Widow has no homestead interest in the property. We further hold pursuant to ¶15 Upon Certiorari previously granted, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT IS AFFIRMED. ¶16 WATT, C.J., WINCHESTER, V.C.J., LAVENDER, OPALA, EDMONDSON, TAYLOR and COLBERT, JJ., concur. ¶17 HARGRAVE, J., dissents. ¶18 KAUGER, J., dissenting. I would deny cert as improvidently granted. FOOT