Title: State v. Davis
Citation: 349 N.C. 1
Docket Number: 452A96
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: October 9, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 452A96
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JAMES FLOYD DAVIS
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from
three judgments imposing sentences of death entered by Payne, J.,
on 1 October 1996 in Superior Court, Buncombe County, upon jury
verdicts of guilty of first-degree murder.  Heard in the Supreme
Court 27 May 1998.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by David Roy Blackwell,
Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
David G. Belser for defendant-appellant.
ORR, Justice.
This case arises out of the shooting deaths of Gerald
Allman, Tony Balogh, and Frank Knox.  On 11 September 1995,
defendant was indicted for three counts of first-degree murder,
one count of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill
inflicting serious injury, and one count of assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill.  Defendant was tried before a jury,
and on 27 September 1996, the jury found defendant guilty of all
charges.  Following a capital sentencing proceeding, based upon
the jury’s finding defendant guilty of all three murders on the
basis of premeditation and deliberation and the felony murder
theory, the jury recommended sentences of death for each of the
murder convictions.  In accordance with the jury’s
recommendation, the trial court entered three sentences of death. 
The trial court additionally sentenced defendant to 79 to 104
months’ imprisonment for the assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to kill inflicting serious injury conviction and 31 to 47
months’ imprisonment for the assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to kill conviction, to be served consecutive to each other
and to the sentences of death.
After consideration of the assignments of error brought
forward on appeal by defendant and a thorough review of the
transcript of the proceedings, the record on appeal, the briefs,
and oral arguments, we find no error meriting reversal of
defendant’s convictions or sentences. 
At trial, the State’s evidence tended to show the following: 
Defendant James Floyd Davis had been employed in the warehouse of
Union Butterfield since 1991.  On 10 May 1995, an altercation
occurred between defendant and two other employees.  The
management of Union Butterfield, including Herb Welsh, Larry
Cogdill, Tony Balogh, and Debbie Medford, conducted a fact-
finding meeting concerning the altercation.  Defendant was
suspended with pay until the following Monday, 15 May 1995. 
Subsequently, management made a decision to terminate defendant’s
employment.
On 15 May 1995, defendant met with Tony Balogh and Debbie
Medford.  During the meeting, Balogh informed defendant that his
employment was being terminated.  Medford informed defendant of
the benefits he was entitled to receive upon his termination. 
Defendant appeared nervous and tearful during the meeting. 
Balogh and Medford asked defendant if there was anything they
could do for him.  Defendant responded by saying, “If you were
going to help me, you would have.”
On 17 May 1995, at approximately 9:00 a.m., defendant
purchased from Pawn World a Winchester .30-caliber M1 carbine
rifle, two clips, and ammunition.  At approximately 11:20 a.m.,
defendant entered the facility of his former employer, Union
Butterfield, carrying the Winchester rifle and a Lorcin .380-
caliber semiautomatic pistol.  Defendant proceeded to the break
room, where he found Robert Walker, Tim Walker, Howard Reece,
Gerald Allman, and Tony Balogh.  The men were in the middle of a
meeting about the building’s sprinkler system.  Defendant entered
the break room and told Robert Walker and Tim Walker, 
representatives from the sprinkler company, to “get the hell out
of here.”  Defendant aimed the gun at Allman and fired, shooting
him in the head.  Defendant then turned to Balogh and fired the
gun.  Reece ran from the room and felt pieces of the wall hitting
him as defendant attempted to shoot him.
Defendant then proceeded down the hallway where the plant
management offices were located.  He began to fire shots into
each office as he walked down the hallway.  Larry Cogdill was in
an office that he shared with Gerald Allman and Herb Welsh. 
Cogdill looked out and saw defendant coming down the hallway and
slammed the office door shut.  Defendant turned the door handle
and opened the door slightly until Cogdill slammed his body
against the door to keep defendant out.  Defendant then shot
through the door, with one bullet striking Cogdill in the arm. 
Cogdill fell to the side and watched as defendant shot holes in
the door.  At some point, Cogdill was also shot in the leg.
Defendant continued to move down the hallway, shooting into
management offices and reloading his gun at least once.  Frank
Knox, an employee of Dormer Tools, parent company to Union
Butterfield, was working in one of the offices.  When Knox heard
shots being fired, he hid under his desk.  Defendant fired three
shots through Knox’s door, and two of the shots struck Knox in
the wrist and chest.
Defendant returned to the office where Cogdill and Welsh
were located and fired several more shots through the door. 
Defendant then entered the warehouse area of the plant.  Larry
Short then saw defendant standing in a doorway and smoking a
cigarette.  Short attempted to flag down cars for assistance. 
When defendant and Short made eye contact, defendant raised his
gun and began firing at Short.  Short ducked, ran, and then dove
and rolled out of defendant’s sight.  Soon after, defendant
surrendered to the Asheville police.
While in police custody, defendant stated, “I got fired. 
Damn it.  I got set up.  They drove me crazy out there.” 
Furthermore, when the arrest warrants for the murders were served
upon defendant, he pointed to one of the victims’ names on the
warrant and stated, “That’s the son of a bitch that fired me.” 
While looking at another warrant, defendant stated, “That’s a
troublemaker.  He’s made my life hell since I’ve worked there.” 
Finally, while looking at the warrant for the murder of Frank
Knox, defendant stated that he did not remember him.
I.
First, defendant contends that the trial court committed
reversible error in excusing prospective jurors for cause based
on their beliefs regarding the death penalty.  Defendant argues
that the trial court’s ruling denied defendant his rights to a
fair and impartial jury, to due process of law, and to freedom
from cruel and unusual punishment.  We do not agree.
The standard for determining whether a prospective juror may
be excused for cause for his or her views on capital punishment
is whether those views would “prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath.”  Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,
424, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 851-52 (1985).  “The granting of a
challenge for cause where the juror’s fitness or unfitness is
arguable is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of
discretion.”  State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 343, 451 S.E.2d
131, 145 (1994).  Prospective jurors with reservations about
capital punishment must be able to “‘state clearly that they are
willing to temporarily set aside their beliefs in deference to
the rule of law.’”  State v. Brogden, 334 N.C. 39, 43, 430 S.E.2d
905, 908 (1993) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176,
90 L. Ed. 2d 137, 149 (1986)).  This Court has recognized that a
prospective juror’s bias may not always be provable with
unmistakable clarity and that, in such cases, reviewing courts
must defer to the trial court’s judgment concerning the
prospective juror’s ability to follow the law.  State v. Davis,
325 N.C. 607, 624, 386 S.E.2d 418, 426 (1989), cert. denied, 496
U.S. 905, 110 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1990).
In the present case, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by excusing the prospective jurors for cause.  Our
review of the record indicates that each of the prospective
jurors excused for cause stated that he or she would be unable to
follow the law and recommend a sentence of death, even if that
was what the facts and circumstances suggested.  Defendant has
pointed to nothing in the record to support his contention. 
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in allowing
the State’s challenges for cause of the prospective jurors.  This
assignment of error is overruled.
II.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in
conducting an ex parte hearing concerning defendant’s competency
evaluation in the absence of defendant and defense counsel. 
Defendant argues that he suffered prejudice when the State
allegedly handpicked the forensic psychiatrist to evaluate his
competency to stand trial, moved the site of the evaluation from
Central Prison to Dorothea Dix Hospital, and subsequently
utilized the results of that evaluation to cross-examine the
defense’s psychiatric expert.  Specifically, defendant argues
that this procedure violated:  (1) his unwaivable right to
presence at every stage of his capital proceeding and to confront
the witnesses against him pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 23 of the North
Carolina Constitution; (2) his right to a true, complete, and
accurate record of the proceedings pursuant to N.C.G.S. §
15A-1241; and (3) his right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution.  Defendant also
argues that the cumulative effect of the denial of these rights
operated to deprive him of his rights to due process of law.  We
do not agree.
On 16 October 1995, the State filed a motion for an order
directing Dr. Robert Rollins, director of forensic psychiatry at
Dorothea Dix Hospital, to examine defendant and prepare a written
report describing the state of defendant’s mental health. 
Pursuant to statutory mandate, Judge Loto G. Caviness conducted a
hearing on the motion.  At the hearing, defendant appeared
through counsel.  The hearing transcript indicates that both the
prosecutor and defense counsel expressed concerns for defendant’s
capacity to stand trial.  After this hearing, defense counsel
requested and received an ex parte hearing with the trial court. 
Following these hearings, the trial court entered an order
directing defendant’s transfer to Central Prison and evaluation
by Dr. Rollins of the Dorothea Dix forensic unit.  At defendant’s
request, this order limited the examination to the issue of
defendant’s competency to stand trial.
Subsequently, on 19 December 1995, Judge Dennis J. Winner
entered an “Order to Move Defendant And Assign Specific Forensic
Evaluator.”  In this order, Judge Winner referred to the
16 October 1995 order and explained that
Dorothea Dix Hospital, Amy Taylor, Forensic Case
Analyst, has requested a Court Order assigning
Dr. Nicole Wolfe as the forensic evaluator.  Ms. Taylor
has further requested that the Defendant James Floyd
Davis be moved to Dorothea Dix Hospital so that his
evaluation can be completed.
Defendant contends that this order was entered after an ex parte
hearing between the trial court and the prosecutor.
First, we will address defendant’s contention that his
constitutional right to presence was violated.  In State v.
Buchanan, 330 N.C. 202, 410 S.E.2d 832 (1991), this Court was
asked to determine whether defendant’s federal and state
constitutional rights were violated by conducting bench
conferences with defense counsel and counsel for the State
outside of defendant’s presence.  As this Court noted, “the
essential characteristic of defendant’s constitutional right to
presence is just that, his actual presence during trial.”  Id. at
219, 410 S.E.2d at 842.  The Court concluded that defendant’s
state constitutional right to presence is not violated by such
conferences “unless the subject matter of the conference
implicates the defendant’s confrontation rights, or is such that
the defendant’s presence would have a reasonably substantial
relation to his opportunity to defend.”  Id. at 223-24, 410
S.E.2d at 845.
Here, defendant asserts that his right to presence was
violated by an ex parte hearing concerning his competency
evaluation which resulted in the entry of an amended order. 
First, we note that it is not clear from the record whether an ex
parte hearing actually occurred.  Although an amended order was
entered by the trial court, it does not indicate that the State
took part in a hearing.  In fact, the amended order states that a
case analyst at Dorothea Dix Hospital requested a court order
assigning Dr. Nicole Wolfe as the forensic evaluator and
transferring defendant to Dorothea Dix Hospital.  Thus, the
amended order appears to be entered upon motion of the hospital,
not the State.
Further, the purpose of a competency evaluation is to
determine whether defendant is competent to stand trial for the
charged offense.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1001 (1997).  This determination
does not implicate defendant’s confrontation rights and does not
have a substantial relation to his opportunity to defend.  In
fact, the competency evaluation is to ensure that a defendant is
able “to understand the nature and object of the proceedings
against him” before he is “tried, convicted, sentenced, or
punished for a crime.”  Id.  For the foregoing reasons, we hold
that defendant’s state constitutional right to presence was not
violated by the entry of this amended order.
Similarly, defendant’s federal constitutional claim is
without merit.  In Buchanan, this Court noted that “the United
States Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether
defendant has a federal constitutional right to presence in terms
of whether the conference at issue involves either the receipt of
evidence without an opportunity for cross-examination or the
usefulness of defendant’s presence in assuring fairness in the
proceeding.”  Buchanan, 330 N.C. at 211-12, 410 S.E.2d at 837. 
Although, unlike the present case, Buchanan involved a bench
conference, the same analysis applies.  There is no proof that an
actual proceeding took place, and even if it had, it did not deny
defendant an opportunity for cross-examination or necessitate his
presence to assure fairness in the proceedings.
Defendant has also failed to establish that the trial court
violated N.C.G.S. § 15A-1241 by conducting a hearing without
recording the proceedings.  First, as noted above, there is
nothing in the record which suggests that the trial court
conducted a hearing concerning the hospital’s request to amend
the order.  Second, a full record exists concerning the hearing
on the State’s motion for a competency evaluation.  The order
entered by the trial court on 16 October 1995 contains all
required findings.  The modified order entered on 19 December
1995 recites that the hospital requested a change in the forensic
evaluator and defendant’s relocation.  Thus, there is a
sufficient record for appellate review.
Defendant also contends that he suffered a deprivation of
his right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 23 of the North
Carolina Constitution.  The Sixth Amendment, which is made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  The parallel provision of the
North Carolina Constitution, Article I, Section 23, tracks this
language.  The Sixth Amendment ensures that the accused “‘need
not stand alone against the State at any stage of the
prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s
absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair
trial.’”  Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 470, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359,
373 (1981) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27,
18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 1157 (1967)).  Once again, there is no proof
that an actual proceeding took place.  Further, the amended order
does not affect defendant’s right to a fair trial.
Finally, because we have found no violation of defendant’s
constitutional or statutory rights, defendant’s argument that the
cumulative effect of the denial of these rights operated to
deprive him of his rights to due process of law is without merit. 
Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.
III.
Defendant next contends that his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel was violated when the trial court ordered a competency
evaluation by a forensic evaluator but declined to allow defense
counsel to be present during the examination.  Defendant argues
that defense counsel’s presence would have demonstrated the
unreasonable and irrational manner in which defendant related to
people and also would have helped defense counsel in preparing to
cross-examine Dr. Wolfe concerning her examination.  We disagree.
As noted above, the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”  U.S. Const.
amend. VI.  In Estelle, the United States Supreme Court
determined that defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had
attached when he was examined by a psychiatrist.  In making the
decision whether to proceed with a psychiatric examination, the
Court held that “a defendant should not be forced to resolve such
an important issue without ‘the guiding hand of counsel.’” 
Estelle, 451 U.S. at 471, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 374 (quoting Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 77 L. Ed. 158, 170 (1932)).  However,
the Court noted:
Respondent does not assert, and the Court of
Appeals did not find, any constitutional right to have
counsel actually present during the examination.  In
fact, the Court of Appeals recognized that “an attorney
present during the psychiatric interview could
contribute little and might seriously disrupt the
examination.”
Id. at 470 n.14, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 374 n.14 (quoting Smith v.
Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 708 (5th Cir. 1979)).
For the same reasons, we hold that defendant had no
constitutional right to have counsel present during his
competency evaluation.  Here, Dr. Wolfe testified that defense
counsel’s presence would interfere with the process.  She stated
that
[defendant’s] concerns about his attorney were the main
reason I found him incompetent when I last saw him at
Dix, and those are questions that I want to be asking
him about, and I think he’d be more likely to tell me
about dissatisfaction with his attorneys if they’re not
present.
Further, it was upon motion of defense counsel that defendant was
committed to Dorothea Dix Hospital for examination of his
capacity to proceed and sanity.  Accordingly, this assignment of
error is without merit.
IV.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in
finding that defendant had the capacity to proceed to trial. 
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support
any of the three prongs of the competency test contained in
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1001(a).
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1001(a) sets forth the standard for measuring
capacity as follows:
No person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or
punished for a crime when by reason of mental illness
or defect he is unable to understand the nature and
object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend
his own situation in reference to the proceedings, or
to assist in his defense in a rational or reasonable
manner.  This condition is hereinafter referred to as
“incapacity to proceed.”
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1001(a).  “[This] statute provides three separate
tests in the disjunctive.  If a defendant is deficient under any
of these tests he or she does not have the capacity to proceed.” 
State v. Shytle, 323 N.C. 684, 688, 374 S.E.2d 573, 575 (1989).
In the present case, defendant was given a competency test
on 3 June 1996.  Dr. Nicole Wolfe, an expert in the field of
forensic psychiatry, testified that she first examined defendant
at Dorothea Dix Hospital in January 1996.  Following physical
examinations, laboratory studies, psychological tests, and a
review of defendant’s medical records, Dr. Wolfe formed an
initial impression that defendant suffered from post-traumatic
stress disorder.  She also diagnosed defendant as having a
schizotypal personality disorder.  Subsequently, defendant became
increasingly anxious and agitated.  On 23 April 1996, Dr. Wolfe
determined that defendant was unable to converse in a coherent
manner and was incapable of proceeding to trial at that time.
Dr. Wolfe did not see defendant from 23 April 1996 until
3 June 1996 when she met with him at the Buncombe County jail. 
At that time, defendant expressed distrust of his attorneys. 
However, Dr. Wolfe testified that defendant appeared to be doing
fairly well on the prescribed medications.  She also testified
that she questioned defendant about his relationship with his
attorneys.  Dr. Wolfe stated that although defendant exhibited
paranoid ideas about his attorneys, he indicated that he had been
able to speak with them about his case.  She discussed the
possibility that defendant might want to obtain different
counsel, but defendant declined to do that, stating that he
“didn’t want to start over.”
Dr. Wolfe subsequently testified that when she examined
defendant on 3 June 1996, he appeared to understand her
explanation of the difference between the question of competency
to stand trial and the question of insanity.  In Dr. Wolfe’s
opinion, defendant was capable of proceeding to trial.  She
testified that defendant possessed the ability to understand the
nature and extent of the charges against him and also possessed
the ability to aid and assist his attorneys in his defense. 
Dr. Wolfe further testified that defendant understood the nature
and purpose of the court proceedings, as well as the seriousness
of the charges against him.  Dr. Wolfe stated that she believed
defendant possessed the ability to understand his legal rights
and the capacity to give relevant testimony.  Dr. Wolfe also
testified that the main reason she found defendant incapable of
proceeding in April was his paranoia against his attorneys. 
Based upon the testimony presented at the competency hearing, the
trial court concluded that “[defendant] does possess the capacity
to proceed to trial at this time” and ordered that the matter
proceed to trial.
Defendant now asserts that the record fails to support the
trial court’s conclusion and that he suffered prejudice when the
trial court ordered him to proceed.  However, after reviewing the
testimony presented at the competency hearing, we do not agree. 
As noted above, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1001 sets forth the standard for
determining capacity to proceed.  The evidence must demonstrate
that defendant is capable of:  (1) understanding the nature and
object of the proceedings against him, (2) comprehending his own
situation in reference to the proceedings, and (3) assisting in
his defense in a rational and reasonable manner.  N.C.G.S. §
15A-1001.  Dr. Wolfe’s testimony clearly indicates that defendant
met each prong of the competency test.  The trial court properly
concluded that defendant possessed the capacity to proceed to
trial.  Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.
V.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court committed 
error in allowing the State’s opening statement and closing
argument to include matters outside of the record.  Specifically,
defendant contends it was error for the State to argue that
defendant understood his rights, because the jury may infer
defendant’s mental competence based upon the exercise of his
constitutional rights.
Arguments of counsel are left largely to the control and
discretion of the trial judge, and counsel is allowed wide
latitude in the argument of hotly contested cases.  State v.
Williams, 317 N.C. 474, 481, 346 S.E.2d 405, 410 (1986). 
Further, the remarks are to be viewed in the context in which
they are made and the overall factual circumstances to which they
refer.  State v. Womble, 343 N.C. 667, 692-93, 473 S.E.2d 291,
306 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 719 (1997). 
Where, as here, defendant failed to object to the arguments at
trial, defendant must establish that the remarks were so grossly
improper that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
intervene ex mero motu.  To establish such an abuse, defendant
must show that the prosecutor’s comments so infected the trial
with unfairness that they rendered the conviction fundamentally
unfair.  State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 202, 451 S.E.2d 211, 229
(1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995).
In the present case, during her opening statement to the
jury, the prosecutor told the jury that defense counsel will
“tell you how [defendant] appeared to understand his rights when
they were read to him.”  The prosecutor continued by stating that
the jury would hear defendant’s comments to law enforcement
officers after the arrest warrants were read to him.  Further,
during closing arguments, the prosecutor stated:
I told you in my opening everything that would
happen and who would tell you what happened in the
break room.  And I told you how the defendant acted
after he murdered those men, how he held that gun by
the trigger guard with his little finger and threw it
out so the police didn’t shoot him graveyard dead.
And you did hear everything I told you you would
hear?  I told you [that] you would hear how he
understood his rights and when those police officers
said, Throw out your weapons and we won’t shoot you,
after he said, Don’t shoot me, and he complied and they
did not shoot him.
Defendant asserts that this argument is not supported by the
evidence and implies to the jury that it may infer defendant was
competent based upon the exercise of his constitutional rights. 
Defendant cites Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 88 L. Ed.
2d 623 (1986), in support of his position.  In Wainwright, the
defendant responded to the officer’s Miranda warning by stating
that he understood his rights and by requesting an attorney.  In
closing arguments, and over defense counsel’s objection, the
prosecutor made the following argument:
He goes to the car and the officer reads him his
Miranda rights.  Does he say he doesn’t understand
them?  Does he say “what’s going on?”  No.  He says “I
understand my rights.  I do not want to speak to you. 
I want to speak to an attorney.”  Again on [sic]
occasion of a person who knows what’s going on around
his surroundings, and knows the consequences of his act
. . . .  And here we are to believe that this person
didn’t know what he was doing at the time of the act,
and then even down at the station, according to
Detective Jolley -- He’s down there.  He says, “Have
you been read your Miranda rights?”  “Yes, I have.” 
“Do you want to talk?”  “No.”  “Do you want to talk to
an attorney?”  “Yes.”  And after he talked to the
attorney again he will not speak.  Again another
physical overt indication by the defendant . . . .
So here again we must take this in consideration
as to his guilt or innocence, in regards to sanity or
insanity.
Id. at 287 n.2, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 627 n.2.
However, the present case is distinguishable from
Wainwright.  Here, the prosecutor never directly asked the jury
to use defendant’s statements to law enforcement officers in
determining defendant’s competence or sanity.  The prosecutor’s
comments also did not indicate that defendant exercised his right
to counsel or silence as was the case in Wainwright.  Further,
unlike in Wainwright, defense counsel did not object to the
prosecutor’s argument.  Finally, prior to the prosecutor’s
closing arguments, the trial court in the case sub judice
instructed the jury as follows:
I will tell you at this point and I will tell you again
when I instruct you on the law that you are to apply
that if during the course of their arguments one of the
lawyers states the evidence a certain way and you
recall it differently, one of your duties as a juror is
to be guided by your own recollection of the evidence. 
That’s why we’ve sat here and you’ve listened to all
this evidence as it’s being presented.
When taken in context, the remarks about which defendant
complains were not so grossly improper as to require the trial
court to intervene ex mero motu.  Accordingly, this assignment of
error is overruled.
VI.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in
admitting certain evidence about the victim Tony Balogh. 
Defendant argues that the evidence admitted pertained to the
victim’s character and temperament and is irrelevant to any issue
at the guilt phase of the trial.
During direct examination of Debbie Medford, a Union
Butterfield employee and the victim’s co-worker, the following
exchange occurred:
[THE PROSECUTOR]:  Describe Tony’s [the victim’s]
temperament.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection.
THE COURT:  Overruled.
[MEDFORD]:  Tony was -- he was a good listener.  He was
an easy person to work with.  He had a lot of concern
for the employees at work.  He was involved with
everybody that worked there.  He had an open-door
policy.  Anytime --
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection, Your Honor.  This
is not responsive to the question.
THE COURT:  Well, sustained.  I believe she’s gone
beyond the next question.
The trial court later stated that it was overruling defense
counsel’s objection “to what’s already been testified to.”
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.” 
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (1992).  Generally, all
relevant evidence is admissible.  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule
402 (1992).  We have said that “in a criminal case
every circumstance calculated to throw any light upon
the supposed crime is admissible and permissible.” 
State v. Collins, 335 N.C. 729, 735, 440 S.E.2d 559,
562 (1994).
State v. Macon, 346 N.C. 109, 115, 484 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1997).
Here, evidence concerning Tony Balogh is relevant in showing
the circumstances of the Union Butterfield shootings.  A review
of the record demonstrates that defendant contended that the
victims were not willing to assist him with his difficulties and,
indeed, tried to “ruin” him.  Thus, the prosecution was properly
permitted to present evidence of Tony Balogh’s temperament and
management style in order to prove the circumstances of the
crime, and the evidence introduced was in fact relevant.
Defendant also argues that this error was compounded by the
trial court’s instruction that the jury could consider evidence
from the guilt phase during its penalty phase deliberations.  The
trial court instructed the jury that
[t]here is no requirement to resubmit during the
sentencing proceeding any evidence which was submitted
during the guilt phase of this case.  All the evidence
which you have heard in both phases of the case
remain[s] competent for your consideration and
recommending punishment.
As noted above, it was not error for the trial court to admit the
evidence during the guilt phase; therefore, its reconsideration
during the sentencing phase is also proper.
Finally, defendant contends that even if the testimony was
relevant, any minimal probative value was outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.  However, we do not agree.  The
testimony presented by Medford was relevant testimony and did not
unduly prejudice defendant.  This assignment of error is without
merit.
VII.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in
admitting hearsay evidence of what victim Tony Balogh and
defendant said in a meeting two days prior to the murders. 
Defendant argues that much of the testimony constituted hearsay
and that all of the challenged evidence proved only the victim’s
good character.
During direct examination by the State, Debbie Medford
testified regarding defendant’s dismissal conference attended by
both Medford and Balogh as follows:
James [defendant] came in.  And he was nervous, a
little tearful.  He told us that he had missed us, that
he was glad to be there, he was glad to see us.  He sat
down.  And Tony told him, he said, “James, I’m sorry. 
But I’m going to have to terminate your employment.”
Defense counsel objected to this testimony, and the trial court
subsequently overruled the objection.  Medford then continued her
testimony in response to an instruction from the prosecutor:
I can’t remember word for word the things that were
said.  I know that James told him right away that he
had gone to the Employee Assistance Program.  He wanted
him to know that he had done that.  And he asked him
was there anything that he could do to keep his job.
After Medford’s testimony concerning the dismissal conference,
the trial court denied defendant’s motion to strike.
As we have previously stated, the State is entitled to prove
the circumstances of the crime and to introduce evidence tending
to support the theory of the case.  State v. Coffey, 326 N.C.
268, 280, 389 S.E.2d 48, 55 (1990).  Here, the conversation
between Balogh and defendant showed the circumstances of the
crime, particularly the motive for the killings.  This crime was
committed at defendant’s former place of employment, and his
victims were former co-workers.  The fact that Balogh terminated
defendant’s employment two days prior to the murder is clearly
relevant to show the motive for the crime.  Thus, the trial court
properly admitted Medford’s testimony concerning the dismissal
conference.
Defendant also contends that much of Medford’s testimony
constitutes hearsay.  Hearsay is “a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” 
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (1992).  Here, the State never
offered Balogh’s or defendant’s statements to prove the truth of
the matter asserted.  Rather, the statements were offered to
prove defendant’s motive for the crime.  Thus, the trial court
did not err in admitting Medford’s testimony regarding the
conversation between Balogh and defendant at defendant’s
dismissal conference.
Finally, defendant contends that even if the testimony was
relevant, any minimal probative value was outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.  However, we do not agree.  As noted
above, the testimony presented by Medford was highly relevant to
the motive of the case and did not unduly prejudice defendant. 
This assignment of error is without merit.
VIII.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred by
allowing State witnesses Howard Reece, Larry Cogdill, and Helen
Pittman to read into the record their prior written statements. 
Defendant argues that the pretrial statements are inadmissible
hearsay admitted under the guise of corroboration.  We do not
agree.
As previously noted, hearsay is “a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” 
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c).  Here, the prior statements were
not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather
to bolster the testimony given by Reece and Cogdill.  “The wide
latitude which this jurisdiction grants to the admission of
[prior consistent statements] is set forth in recent decisions
which state the rule that prior consistent statements are
admissible even when the witness has not been impeached.”  State
v. Martin, 309 N.C. 465, 476, 308 S.E.2d 277, 284 (1983).  This
Court has previously stated that
“prior statements of a witness can be admitted as
corroborative evidence if they tend to add weight or
credibility to the witness’ trial testimony.  New
information contained within the witness’ prior
statement, but not referred to in his trial testimony,
may also be admitted as corroborative evidence if it
tends to add weight or credibility to that testimony.”
State v. Francis, 343 N.C. 436, 439, 471 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1996)
(quoting State v. McDowell, 329 N.C. 363, 384, 407 S.E.2d 200,
212 (1991)) (citations omitted).  Here, the statements were given
by the witnesses immediately after the shooting occurred.  Thus,
they were the witnesses’ present-sense impressions and added
weight and credibility to the witnesses’ trial testimony.
At trial, defense counsel objected to the reading of the
prior statements of Reece and Cogdill, but failed to object to
the reading of Pittman’s statement.  The objection was a general
objection to the reading of the statements.  Also, for the first
time on appeal, defendant has specified statements within each
pretrial statement which he claims are prejudicial:  the
statement of Cogdill that “someone yelled it was James, and
apparently everyone figured that Davis would do something foolish
after he was fired”; the statement of Reece that “[w]ithin
seconds, for no apparent reason, he fired and shot Gerald
Allman”; and the statements of Pittman that she “felt like he was
out to get revenge and was probably targeting employees both in
management and in the warehouse” and that “folks knew that he was
going to come back some day and do something.”  None of these
statements was specifically objected to at the time of its
reading into the record.
Having not objected to this evidence at trial, defendant
alleges this error for the first time on appeal under the plain
error rule.  The plain error rule holds that the Court may review
alleged errors affecting substantial rights even though defendant
failed to object to the admission of the evidence at trial. 
State v. Cummings, 346 N.C. 291, 313, 488 S.E.2d 550, 563 (1997),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1998).  This Court
has chosen to review such “unpreserved issues for plain error
when Rule 10(c)(4) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure has been
complied with and when the issue involves either errors in the
trial judge’s instructions to the jury or rulings on the
admissibility of evidence.”  Id. at 313-14, 488 S.E.2d at 563. 
The rule must be applied cautiously, however, and only in
exceptional cases where, “after reviewing the entire record, it
can be said the claimed error is a  ‘fundamental error, something
so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice
cannot have been done.’”  State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300
S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676
F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir.) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1018, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982)).  Thus, the appellate court
must study the whole record to determine if the error had such an
impact on the guilt determination, therefore constituting plain
error.  Id. at 661, 300 S.E.2d at 378-79.
A review of the evidence in the present case reveals that
this is not the exceptional case where such a pervasive defect or
plain error occurred which would have tainted all results and
denied defendant a right to a fair trial.  Accordingly, this
assignment of error is without merit.
IX.
Next, defendant contends that his constitutional right to
confront his accusers with evidence was violated by the trial
court’s exclusion of a jail nurse’s opinion of defendant’s mental
condition.  We disagree.
Jail nurse Pat Orsban was one of the first medical personnel
to evaluate defendant after the shootings upon his admission to
the jail.  Orsban testified that for about fifteen to twenty
minutes, he was in close proximity to defendant and observed that
defendant appeared very upset, with rapid speech and mood swings. 
Based on these visual observations, Orsban circled the term
“mentally disturbed” on the jail screening form.  Orsban’s
opinion based on this visual perception is not disputed. 
However, at trial, defense counsel attempted to elicit a
psychiatric diagnosis of defendant’s mental condition from
Orsban.  During defense counsel’s questioning of Orsban, the
following exchange took place:
Q.
Mr. Orsban, as a result of your training as a
nurse, your years of experience, your time at
Copestone, are you familiar with the term “psychotic”?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you know what that means?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you know what someone who is psychotic looks
like?
A.
Most of the time.
Q.
Based on the time that you saw [defendant] May the
17th, do you have an opinion as to whether he appeared
to be psychotic to you?
[PROSECUTOR]:  Objection.
THE COURT:  Well, sustained.
We disagree that the exclusion of Orsban’s opinion violated
defendant’s constitutional rights to confront his accusers with
evidence.  Rule 701 establishes the standard for a lay witness’
testimony:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is
limited to those opinions or inferences which are
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness
and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 701 (1992).  The question posed by defense
counsel called for Orsban, a lay witness, to make a psychiatric
diagnosis of defendant’s mental condition.  Orsban was not an
expert witness, and no foundation had been laid to show that he
had the expertise to make such a psychiatric diagnosis.  While it
may have been appropriate for Orsban to make a general
observation that defendant appeared to be “mentally disturbed”
upon admission to jail, it was beyond Orsban’s ability as a lay
witness to make a specific psychiatric diagnosis of defendant’s
being “psychotic.”  Thus, this assignment of error is overruled.
X.
Defendant also contends that the trial court committed plain
error by instructing defendant on his right to testify on his own
behalf.  Defendant argues that the trial court’s instructions
overstated the permissible scope of cross-examination to which
defendant might be subjected.  Thus, defendant contends that the
trial court’s instructions impermissibly chilled defendant’s
right to testify.
Defendant cites to State v. Autry, 321 N.C. 392, 364 S.E.2d
341 (1988), as support for his position.  In Autry, this Court
held that the following instruction constituted error:
[The prosecutor] could, on good faith, ask you about
prior misconduct, whether it resulted in convictions in
court if they had some good faith reason to ask those
questions, and you would be under oath to answer the
questions truthfully.
Id. at 402, 364 S.E.2d at 347.  This Court stated that “[t]he
trial court, though it made an admirable and lengthy effort to
explain to defendant his various options, clearly, as to one
part, gave instructions inconsistent with Rule 608(b) and
therefore committed error.”  Id. at 403, 364 S.E.2d at 347. 
However, this Court concluded that the error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt based upon the overwhelming evidence of
defendant’s guilt.  Id.  The Court further stated:
We hold that, here, where the trial court’s error in
its instructions to defendant was insulated by
defendant’s access to and actual conference with his
attorney, the trial court’s instructional error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 404, 364 S.E.2d at 348.
Here, the trial court did not make the error discussed in
Autry.  Instead, the trial court correctly instructed defendant
on the general rules which guide cross-examination.  As this
Court has previously noted, “‘[t]he bounds of cross-examination
are limited by two general principles:  1) the scope of cross-
examination rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge;
and 2) the questions must be asked in good faith.’”  State v.
Larry, 345 N.C. 497, 523, 481 S.E.2d 907, 922 (quoting State v.
Bronson, 333 N.C. 67, 79, 423 S.E.2d 772, 779 (1992)), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1997).  In the present
case, the trial court did not attempt to give defendant detailed
instructions concerning the scope of cross-examination and did
not give an instruction inconsistent with any of the Rules of
Evidence.  Further, as demonstrated by the following exchange,
defendant had discussed the consequences of testifying with his
attorneys:
THE COURT:  Mr. Hufstader, Ms. Burns [defense
counsel], I take it you have advised your client about
his right to testify and have discussed that with him?
MR. HUFSTADER:  We have previously.
THE COURT:  I just want Mr. Davis -- Mr. Davis,
can you hear me, sir?
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.
THE COURT:  Have you discussed with your lawyers
whether or not you would want to testify in this
matter?
THE DEFENDANT:  I have.
THE COURT:  Do you understand that you have the
absolute right to testify, but if you do that you would
be subject to cross-examination on a very wide matter
of subjects, subject only to the discretion of the
Court and the relevancy of this matter?  Do you
understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.
THE COURT:  You’ve elected not to testify.
THE DEFENDANT:  I elected not to testify.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in its
instructions regarding the scope of cross-examination and, thus,
did not impermissibly chill defendant’s right to testify.  This
assignment of error is overruled.
XI.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred by
failing to dismiss the charge of first-degree murder of Frank
Knox based upon the insufficiency of the evidence.  Defendant
argues there was no evidence from which the jury could find that
defendant possessed the specific intent to kill Knox, or any
other person.  We disagree.
Defendant argues that there is no evidence that defendant
bore any malice toward Knox.  In his brief, defendant points out
that there was no evidence that he knew Knox and that Knox was
not present at the dismissal conference discussed above. 
Defendant notes that when Detective Romick was reading the arrest
warrants to defendant, defendant indicated that he knew and was
angry at Balogh and Allman, but when defendant was read his third
warrant, he said he did not remember Frank Knox.  Essentially,
defendant’s argument appears to be that he had no motive to
murder Knox.  However, motive is not an element of first-degree
murder.  State v. Van Landingham, 283 N.C. 589, 600, 197 S.E.2d
539, 546 (1973).
Because a specific intent to kill is a necessary constituent
of the elements of premeditation and deliberation, proof of
premeditation and deliberation is also proof of intent to kill. 
State v. Lowery, 309 N.C. 763, 768, 309 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1983). 
In discussing premeditation and deliberation, this Court has
stated that
[p]remeditation means that the act was thought out
beforehand for some length of time, however short, but
no particular amount of time is necessary for the
mental process of premeditation.  State v. Myers, 299
N.C. 671, 263 S.E.2d 768 (1980).  Deliberation means an
intent to kill, carried out in a cool state of blood,
in furtherance of a fixed design for revenge or to
accomplish an unlawful purpose and not under the
influence of a violent passion, suddenly aroused by
lawful or just cause or legal provocation.  State v.
Bush, 307 N.C. 152, 297 S.E.2d 563 (1982).
State v. Brown, 315 N.C. 40, 58, 337 S.E.2d 808, 822-23 (1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 90 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1986), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d
373 (1988).
Here, the evidence showed that defendant purchased a
semiautomatic weapon the morning of the killings.  Defendant then
drove to the Union Butterfield facility and killed Balogh and
Allman in the break room.  He then proceeded down the hallway of
management offices, firing shots into the offices as he made his
way down the hall.  Knox was working at his desk at the time and
dove underneath the desk to avoid the shots.  As Knox lay behind
and underneath his desk, defendant fired at least three rounds
through the office door.  One round penetrated Knox’s wrist and
proceeded through his body.  After the killings, while his
victims bled to death, defendant stood in the doorway of the
facility, smoking a cigarette as if nothing had happened. 
Further, there was no evidence presented that Knox provoked
defendant before defendant shot him.  Finally, based on the
doctrine of transferred intent, as discussed below, a jury could
reasonably find that defendant formed the requisite premeditation
and deliberation required under first-degree murder. 
Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.
XII.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court committed
plain error in its instructions on lack of mental capacity as a
factor tending to negate the specific intent required for first-
degree murder.  Defendant argues that the instructions regarding
the murder of Knox were clearly erroneous, thus entitling him to
a new trial.  We do not agree.
In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury on
the diminished-capacity defense as follows:
Members of the jury, you would also consider the
charge of first degree murder as it relates to
Mr. Frank Knox.  Members of the jury, the burden of
proof is on the State.  And they would have to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements as I
have explained those to you as it relates to Mr. Knox. 
The defense contends that he shall -- that the
defendant, Mr. Davis, should be found not guilty of
first degree murder by lack of diminished capacity as
I’ve previously instructed you on that.  That is, he
could not form the specific intent required of first
degree murder.  If you so find, then you would consider
second degree murder.  And you would also consider the
charge of second degree murder if you have a reasonable
doubt as to one or more of the things which the State
must prove.
Defendant concedes that he did not object to these
instructions at trial.  Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to
any relief unless any error constituted plain error.  See Odom,
307 N.C. at 659-60, 300 S.E.2d at 378.  We have previously
explained that plain error is that error in the instructions
which is “so fundamental as to amount to a miscarriage of justice
or which probably resulted in the jury reaching a different
verdict than it otherwise would have reached.”  State v. Bagley,
321 N.C. 201, 213, 362 S.E.2d 244, 251 (1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 1036, 99 L. Ed. 2d 912 (1988).
Having reviewed the trial court’s instructions on lack of
mental capacity under this standard, we find no plain error. 
Defendant contends there are three separate errors with regard to
the trial court’s instruction.  First, the trial court erred by
using the phrase “lack of diminished capacity” as opposed to
“lack of mental capacity.”  Second, the reference “as I’ve
previously instructed you on that” reinforced the error in the
diminished-capacity instructions given earlier.  Third, the jury
was told that if it found that defendant could not form the
specific intent to commit first-degree murder, then it could
consider second-degree murder.
First, the trial court’s use of the phrase “lack of
diminished capacity” appears to be a mere lapsus linguae.  As we
have previously stated, “a lapsus linguae not called to the
attention of the trial court when made will not constitute
prejudicial error when it is apparent from a contextual reading
of the charge that the jury could not have been misled by the
instruction.”  State v. Baker, 338 N.C. 526, 565, 451 S.E.2d 574,
597 (1994).  Here, although the trial court used the term
“diminished capacity,” it correctly defined the defense by
stating that it exists if defendant “could not form the specific
intent required of first degree murder.”  Accordingly, when read
contextually, the instructions properly conveyed to the jury what
it must find for the defense to apply.  Further, the trial
court’s previous instructions, contrary to defendant’s
assertions, appear to be correct.
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court instructed
the jury that if it found defendant could not form the specific
intent for first-degree murder, then it could consider second-
degree murder.  However, the trial court properly instructed that
if the jury found defendant could not form the specific intent
required for first-degree murder, then it “would consider second
degree murder.”  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, the trial court
properly conveyed the mandatory nature of this instruction. 
Having reviewed the trial court’s instructions on lack of mental
capacity, we find no error, much less plain error.  This
assignment of error is overruled.
XIII.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court committed
plain error in its instructions concerning defendant’s
diminished-capacity defense with regard to the murder of Tony
Balogh.  Specifically, defendant argues that the instructions
improperly gave the jury the option of finding defendant not
guilty if it found that he lacked the mental capacity to commit
murder, rather than requiring such a verdict.
The trial court gave the following instructions to the jury
with regard to the murder of Balogh:
Now, as to the charge of first degree murder, the
defendant[] contend[s] that the defendant should be
found not guilty because he lacked the mental capacity
at the time of the acts alleged in this case.  If you
find that there is evidence which tends to show that
the defendant lacked mental capacity at the time of the
acts alleged in this case, you may find him not guilty
of first degree murder.  However, if you find that the
defendant lacked mental capacity, you should consider
whether this condition affected his ability to
formulate the specific intent which is required for
conviction of first degree murder.  In order for you to
find the defendant guilty of first degree murder, you
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he killed the
deceased, in this case Mr. Balogh, with malice and in
the execution of an actual specific intent to kill
formed after premeditation and deliberation as I have
defined those terms to you.  If as a result of the lack
of mental capacity the defendant did not have the
specific intent to kill the deceased formed after
premeditation and deliberation, he is not guilty of
first degree murder.  Therefore, I charge that if upon
considering evidence with respect to the defendant’s
lack of mental capacity you have a reasonable doubt as
to whether the defendant formulated the specific intent
required for conviction of first degree murder, you
would not return a verdict of guilty of first degree
murder.  Now, if you so find you would then consider
whether the defendant is guilty of second degree
murder.
Once again, defendant concedes that he did not object to
these instructions at trial.  Accordingly, we must determine
whether the instructions constitute plain error.  Defendant
contends that the trial court’s use of the phrase “you may find
him not guilty of first degree murder” was ambiguous.  He argues
that this impermissibly gave the jurors the option of finding
defendant not guilty of first-degree murder if they found that he
lacked the mental capacity necessary, rather than requiring them
to find him not guilty.
“‘[A] single instruction to a jury may not be judged in
artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the
overall charge.’”  State v. Holden, 346 N.C. 404, 438, 488 S.E.2d
514, 533 (1997) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47,
38 L. Ed. 2d 368, 373 (1973)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 140 L.
Ed. 2d 132 (1998).  “‘[I]n determining the propriety of the trial
judge’s charge to the jury, the reviewing court must consider the
instructions in their entirety, and not in detached fragments.’” 
Id. (quoting State v. Wright, 302 N.C. 122, 127, 273 S.E.2d 699,
703 (1981)).
When read in context, the instructions correctly stated the
jurors’ obligations in determining lack of mental capacity. 
After stating that the jury “may find him not guilty of first
degree murder” if defendant lacks mental capacity, the trial
court proceeded to explain to the jury what constituted a lack of
mental capacity with regard to first-degree murder.  The trial
court noted that the jury should consider whether defendant’s
lack of capacity “affected his ability to formulate the specific
intent which is required for conviction of first degree murder.” 
It was not error for the trial court to qualify what lack of
capacity meant in this context.  Only if the jury found that
defendant could not formulate the required specific intent could
it find defendant not guilty of first-degree murder based upon
lack of mental capacity.  The trial court properly concluded that
“if upon considering the evidence with respect to the defendant’s
lack of mental capacity you have a reasonable doubt as to whether
the defendant formulated the specific intent required for
conviction of first degree murder, you would not return a verdict
of guilty of first degree murder.”  Thus, when read contextually,
the instructions do not amount to error, much less plain error. 
Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
XIV.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by
instructing the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent with
regard to the murder of Frank Knox.  Defendant argues that there
was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction and that
the instruction itself was flawed.  We disagree.
Under the doctrine of transferred intent:
It is an accepted principle of law that where one
is engaged in an affray with another and
unintentionally kills a bystander or a third person,
his act shall be interpreted with reference to his
intent and conduct towards his adversary.  Criminal
liability, if any, and the degree of homicide must be
thereby determined.  Such a person is guilty or
innocent exactly as [if] the fatal act had caused the
death of his adversary.  It has been aptly stated that
“[t]he malice or intent follows the bullet.”  40 Am.
Jur., 2d Homicide, § 11, p. 302 [(1968)].
State v. Wynn, 278 N.C. 513, 519, 180 S.E.2d 135, 139 (1971)
(citations omitted).
First, defendant argues that the evidence does not support
an instruction on transferred intent.  In the present case, all
of the management offices were located down one hallway.  Larry
Cogdill, an employee of Union Butterfield, testified that
defendant headed straight for that hallway upon entering the
building.  Once there, he fired into the door of the office that
Cogdill shared with Gerald Allman and Herb Welsh.  Mary Zellers
testified that she was hiding inside the company president’s
office when defendant fired through the door.  Debbie Medford,
the personnel administrator of the company, testified that she
was able to escape from her office before defendant reached that
end of the hall.  In statements to law enforcement officials,
defendant stated that the people at Union Butterfield had
“ruined” him.  He claimed that they had set him up and fired him. 
Upon his arrest, defendant commented as to one of the victims,
“That’s the son of a bitch that fired me.”  Defendant commented
about another victim, “That’s a troublemaker.  He’s made my life
hell since I’ve worked there.”  This evidence demonstrates that
defendant’s actions were aimed at employees of Union Butterfield,
particularly those who were involved in management.  Because Knox
was working inside management’s offices during the shooting, the
evidence is sufficient to support the transferred-intent
instruction given by the trial court.
Defendant also argues that the instruction on transferred
intent was flawed because “it did not specify any intended victim
toward who[m] the defendant’s malice and intent to kill were
allegedly directed.”  Defendant again concedes that he did not
object to these instructions at trial.  Accordingly, defendant is
not entitled to any relief unless any error constituted plain
error.  See Odom, 307 N.C. at 659-60, 300 S.E.2d at 378. 
In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury on
transferred intent as follows:
I would also instruct you on the matter of
Mr. Knox that the law is that if a person intends to
harm one person and actually harms a different person,
the legal effect would be the same as if he had harmed
the intended victim.  That is, if a killing of an
intended person would be with malice, then the killing
of a different person is also with malice.
Defendant contends that this instruction is flawed because it
does not specify whom the victim intended to kill.
In discussing the doctrine of transferred intent, this Court
has noted that “it is immaterial whether the defendant intended
injury to the person actually harmed; if he in fact acted with
the required or elemental intent toward someone, that intent
suffices as the intent element of the crime charged as a matter
of substantive law.”  State v. Locklear, 331 N.C. 239, 245, 415
S.E.2d 726, 730 (1992) (emphasis added).  It is not necessary
that the someone be named in the trial court’s instructions. 
Here, the evidence indicates that defendant sought revenge from
the management of Union Butterfield because of his allegedly
unjustified dismissal.  Thus, the jury was properly instructed on
the doctrine of transferred intent based on defendant’s intent to
harm the management of Union Butterfield.  Accordingly, this
assignment of error is without merit.
CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEEDING
XV.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by
allowing hearsay testimony from defendant’s sister Violet Bailey
during the sentencing proceeding.  Specifically, defendant argues
that it was error to permit his sister to testify that his mother
had told the police that defendant did not suffer any
psychological problems from being in the Vietnam War.
During the prosecutor’s questioning of Bailey, the following
exchange took place:
Q.
Ma’am, on the 17th day of May, the day that James
Floyd Davis was arrested, the officers went and talked
to your mama about 8:00 that evening.  Are you aware of
that?
A.
No, I don’t.
Q.
So --
A.
I might not even have been there.
Q.
You might not have been where?
A.
At my mama’s.
Q.
[So you] don’t know if the police were talking to
your mama any?
A.
I was living in Statesville.  I come up that next
day.  I don’t know what time I got there.  I don’t know
if I was there with her or not.
Q.
Well, do you remember your mama telling them that
James --
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection.  She says she
wasn’t there, Judge.
THE COURT:  Well, sustained.
[THE PROSECUTOR]:  I’m not asking about that time. 
She said she may have been there other times.  I’m
asking if she remembers her mama telling them
something.
THE COURT:  Ask the question.
Q.
[THE PROSECUTOR] Do you remember some of the times
when you were there and your mama talked to the
officers and her telling them [defendant] didn’t suffer
any psychological problems from being in the war?
A.
No.
Q.
You don’t?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection.
Q.
Don’t that --
A.
No.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection.
THE COURT:  Overruled.  She said she didn’t
remember.
Defendant argues that such questions were highly improper
and were designed to place before the jury clearly inadmissible
hearsay.  However, defendant’s argument is without merit.  No
improper testimony was admitted, and the jurors heard defendant’s
sister deny any knowledge of such conversation.  Further, upon
defense counsel’s objection, the trial court noted that the
witness “said she didn’t remember.”  Accordingly, this assignment
of error is without merit.
XVI.
Next, defendant contends that he suffered a deprivation of
his protection against self-incrimination pursuant to the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution, as well as his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
As noted previously, Dr. Wolfe performed a competency
evaluation of defendant at Dorothea Dix Hospital.  On 23 April
1996, defendant was moved from the hospital to the Buncombe
County jail.  Subsequently, on 1 May 1996, Dr. Wolfe completed
her report and submitted it to the trial court and counsel for
both the State and defendant.  On 3 June 1996, Dr. Wolfe
performed a competency evaluation.  Based upon the evidence
presented at a subsequent hearing, the trial court concluded that
defendant was competent to proceed.  On 5 August 1996, defense
counsel filed notice of an intent to present a defense of
insanity/diminished capacity and to introduce expert testimony
relating to a mental disease, defect, or other condition pursuant
to N.C.G.S. § 15A-959.  Also, shortly before trial, defense
counsel filed a “Motion to Commit Defendant to Dorothea Dix
Hospital for Examination on Capacity to Proceed and Sanity.”  The
motion requested that Dr. Wolfe reevaluate defendant to form an
opinion concerning the defenses of insanity and diminished
capacity.
On 3 September 1996, defense counsel filed an additional
motion to commit defendant to Dorothea Dix Hospital.  The motion
also noted that Dr. McKee, the defense expert, first examined
defendant on 20 July 1996 to determine defendant’s competency,
criminal responsibility, and mitigation.  Dr. McKee examined
defendant and ultimately testified for the defense during the
sentencing proceeding.  Among other things, Dr. McKee testified
that he had reviewed defendant’s records from Dorothea Dix
Hospital and also referred to testing which defendant underwent
at Dorothea Dix Hospital.  Subsequently, Dr. McKee faced cross-
examination concerning the contents of defendant’s records from
Dorothea Dix Hospital.  The cross-examination included discussion
concerning the possibility that defendant faked his mental
illness by producing invalid results on tests performed at
Dorothea Dix Hospital as part of the competency evaluation.
First, defendant asserts that the State’s cross-examination
of Dr. McKee using defendant’s statements from the records of his
competency evaluation at Dorothea Dix Hospital violated his
privilege against self-incrimination.  Defendant asserts that the
State requested the evaluation to determine competency and then
used the results for a different purpose.  Defendant cites
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359,  in support of
his contention.  In Estelle, the United States Supreme Court
found a Fifth Amendment violation when the State, without notice
to or knowledge of defense counsel, obtained an order for a
competency evaluation of defendant and then utilized the records
of that evaluation to prove an aggravating circumstance.
In Estelle, the United States Supreme Court noted:
Respondent, however, introduced no psychiatric
evidence, nor had he indicated that he might do so. 
Instead, the State offered information obtained from
the court-ordered competency examination as affirmative
evidence to persuade the jury to return a sentence of
death.  Respondent’s future dangerousness was a
critical issue at the sentencing hearing, and one on
which the State had the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.  To meet its burden, the State used
respondent’s own statements, unwittingly made without
an awareness that he was assisting the State’s efforts
to obtain the death penalty.  In these distinct
circumstances, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded
that the Fifth Amendment privilege was implicated.
Id. at 466, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 371 (citation omitted).
Here, defendant introduced the reports from Dorothea Dix
through his expert witness.  Dr. McKee’s testimony related to
defendant’s insanity and diminished-capacity defenses.  Unlike
Estelle, this was not a situation in which the State had the
burden of proof.  In fact, defendant had the burden of proving
the defenses asserted by him.
In Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 97 L. Ed. 2d 336
(1987), the United States Supreme Court expanded upon its holding
in Estelle as follows:
“A criminal defendant, who neither initiates a
psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce any
psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond
to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against
him at a capital sentencing proceeding.”  [Estelle, 451
U.S.] at 468, 68 L. Ed. 2d [at 372].  This statement
logically leads to another proposition:  if a defendant
requests such an evaluation or presents psychiatric
evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution may
rebut this presentation with evidence from the reports
of the examination that the defendant requested.  The
defendant would have no Fifth Amendment privilege
against the introduction of this psychiatric testimony
by the prosecution.
Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 422-23, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 355.
Here, defense counsel participated in the hearing concerning
defendant’s competency examination and voiced no opposition to
the examination so long as the trial court limited the scope of
the examination to determining competency.  Further, defense
counsel then sought to rely on the defenses of insanity and
diminished capacity during trial.  In forming his opinion, the
defense’s expert, Dr. McKee, testified that he reviewed
defendant’s records from Dorothea Dix Hospital and referred to
testing done at Dorothea Dix Hospital.  Because defendant relied
on this evidence at trial, the State should not be foreclosed
from also relying on it to rebut defendant’s contentions.  This
is the situation contemplated by Buchanan.  Accordingly, we hold
that defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-
incrimination was not violated by the cross-examination of
Dr. McKee.
Defendant also contends that he was deprived of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel when defense counsel was not notified
in advance that the information generated from the competency
evaluation would be used against defendant in the sentencing
proceeding.  We believe that State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 381
S.E.2d 635 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S.
1021, 111 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1990), controls this issue.
In Huff, this Court discussed a similar issue and stated:
In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 68 L. Ed. 2d
359, the United States Supreme Court also held that the
sixth amendment was violated by the State’s
introduction of a psychiatrist’s testimony at the
penalty phase of defendant’s trial.  The defendant had
not placed his mental state in issue and his attorney
had neither been informed that the order for
psychiatric examination had been entered nor did he
have notice that the scope of the examination would
include a determination of defendant’s future
dangerousness.
Although defendant asserts that Smith controls the
outcome in this case, we disagree.  Instead, we find
that Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 97 L. Ed. 2d
336, also states the principles that control our sixth
amendment analysis.  The defendant in Buchanan argued
that his right to counsel had been violated under
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359, by
the admission of this report.  However, the Court held
that no right to counsel violation had occurred, and
that the fact situation presented in Smith was
critically different from that presented in Buchanan. 
“In Smith, defendant had not received the opportunity
to discuss with his counsel the examination or its
scope.”  Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. at 424, 97 L.
Ed. 2d at 356.  In contrast, in Buchanan, defendant had
the opportunity to discuss with counsel the nature of
the psychiatric examination; in fact, “counsel himself
requested the psychiatric evaluation by . . . [the
psychiatrist].”  Id.  In Buchanan, the Court said, “It
can be assumed -- and there are no allegations to the
contrary -- that defense counsel consulted with
petitioner about the nature of this examination.”  Id.
Huff, 325 N.C. at 48, 381 S.E.2d at 662.
Similarly, in the present case, defendant had the
opportunity to discuss with counsel the nature of the psychiatric
evaluation.  Indeed, as defendant notes in his brief,
“defendant’s attorneys apparently advised him not to discuss the
actual facts of the crimes.”  Defendant argues that defense
counsel had no way of knowing that the examination would be used
against defendant during the sentencing proceeding.  However,
this Court noted in Huff that
“the proper concern of this [Sixth] Amendment” does not
focus on the potential uses to which the prosecution
might put the psychiatric report but on “the
consultation with counsel. . . .  Such consultation
[with counsel], to be effective, must be based on
counsel’s being informed about the scope and nature of
the proceeding [referring to defendant’s
examination]. . . .  To be sure, the effectiveness of
the consultation [between defendant and attorney] also
would depend on counsel’s awareness of the possible
uses to which petitioner’s statements in the proceeding
could be put.”  Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. at
424-25, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 357.  The Court concluded,
“Given our decision in Smith, however, counsel was
certainly on notice that if, as appears to be the case,
he intended to put on a ‘mental status’ defense . . . ,
he would have to anticipate the use of psychological
evidence by the prosecution in rebuttal.”  Id. at 425,
97 L. Ed. 2d at 357 (footnote omitted).
Huff, 325 N.C. at 48-49, 381 S.E.2d at 662 (alterations in
original).  Here, as in Huff, defense counsel should have
anticipated the use of the psychological evidence by the
prosecution in rebuttal to any defense involving defendant’s
mental status.  Accordingly, this assignment of error is
overruled.
XVII.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by
failing to intervene ex mero motu during the prosecutor’s closing
arguments in the sentencing proceeding.  Defendant argues that
the prosecutor’s statements were so prejudicial that a new
sentencing hearing is warranted.  We disagree.
As noted above, arguments of counsel are left largely to the
control and discretion of the trial judge, and counsel is allowed
wide latitude in the argument of hotly contested cases. 
Williams, 317 N.C. at 481, 346 S.E.2d at 410.  Further, the
remarks are to be viewed in the context in which they are made
and in light of the overall factual circumstances to which they
refer.  State v. Hipps, 348 N.C. 377, 501 S.E.2d 625 (1998). 
Because defendant did not object to the arguments at trial, he
must establish that the remarks were so grossly improper that the
trial court abused its discretion by failing to intervene ex mero
motu.  To establish such an abuse, defendant must show that the
prosecutor’s comments so infected the trial with unfairness that
they rendered the conviction fundamentally unfair.  Rose, 339
N.C. at 202, 451 S.E.2d at 229.
Defendant first asserts that the prosecutor improperly urged
the jurors to sentence defendant to death on behalf of the
victims.  Specifically, defendant complains of the following
remarks by the prosecutor:
And I’m urging you on behalf of [Gerald] Allman, Tony
Balogh, and Frank Knox -- and, again, you will have
this question to answer three times.  It’s the same
question.  The same factors will be on each sheet --
say, yes, the mitigating is insufficient to outweigh
the aggravating.  Yes.
. . . .
Now, Mrs. Dreher [the prosecutor] and myself are
here to speak on behalf of Tony and Gerald and Frank. 
The folks you’ve seen here for the last several weeks,
Ms. Knox, Tony’s boys, Mr. Knox’s children, Gerald’s
family, they relied on the law for justice, and that’s
why they’re here.
. . . .
I’m asking you to find the aggravating factors. 
I’m asking you to answer Issue Three and Four “yes.” 
And I’m asking you to on behalf of Gerald, Tony, and
Frank to put James Floyd Davis to death.
In State v. McNeil, 324 N.C. 33, 375 S.E.2d 909, (1989),
sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1050, 100 L. Ed. 2d
756 (1990), the prosecutor told the jury that “[b]eing a
prosecutor is not always a pleasant task, for I speak,
Mr. Hobgood speaks for two dead ladies who can not speak.”  Id.
at 48, 375 S.E.2d at 918.  The McNeil Court noted that the
prosecutor’s statement only reminded the jury that he was an
advocate for the two victims and concluded that the argument was
not so grossly improper that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to intervene ex mero motu.  Id.  In the
present case, the prosecutor’s remarks similarly reminded the
jury that he was an advocate for the State and the victim. 
Further, nothing in the prosecutor’s argument ever suggested or
implied to the jurors that they should impose the death penalty
because the victims or their families demanded it.  Rather, the
prosecutor argued for a death sentence because the law and
evidence supported it.  For example, the prosecutor told the
jurors that he spoke for the victims and their families, but
noted that the victims’ families “relied on the law for justice,
and that’s why they’re here.”  After reviewing the statements in
context, we hold that the trial court did not err by failing to
intervene ex mero motu.
Next, defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly
utilized biblical arguments throughout the closing argument.  For
example, the prosecutor argued to the jury as follows:
And while I am talking about life is never worse,
I want to talk a little bit about the Bible.  Our
Supreme Court doesn’t want us to make Biblical
arguments.  And I don’t wish to offend juries.  But
some of you expressed concerns of that nature.  And so
I want to say this.  You may recall that when Jesus was
questioned by the Herodians at the behest of the
Pharisees when they were trying to trip Jesus up, they
asked him, “Is it lawful to pay taxes to Caesar?”  And
Jesus said, “Let me see the coin you pay with.”  And he
looked at the coin, and he said, “Whose inscription
appears on this coin?”  And they said, “Caesar’s.”  And
Jesus said, “Then render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s
and unto God what is God’s.”  And for the purposes of
this sentencing hearing, James Floyd Davis belongs to
Caesar.  You all promised that you would apply the law
as it exists in North Carolina, the law of the state,
and not some other law and not the law as you wish it
was.
The prosecutor also argued that “‘God may have mercy on him
because God can do what man cannot.’  And man cannot
appropriately address what he did at that plant on May 17, 1995,
without a death sentence.”  The prosecutor continued to make
biblical allusions throughout the closing argument.
In State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 384 S.E.2d 470 (1989),
sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d
604 (1990), this Court discussed the bounds of biblical arguments
as follows:
In their arguments before the jury, counsel for
both sides are entitled to argue the law and the facts
in evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be
drawn therefrom.  Neither the “law” nor the “facts in
evidence” include biblical passages, and, strictly
speaking, it is improper for a party either to base or
to color his arguments with such extraneous material. 
However, this Court has repeatedly noted the wide
latitude allowed counsel in arguing hotly contested
cases, and it has found biblical arguments to fall
within permissible margins more often than not.  This
Court has distinguished as improper remarks that state
law is divinely inspired or that law officers are
“ordained” by God.
Id. at 331, 384 S.E.2d at 500 (citations omitted).
In the present case, the prosecutor did not state that the
law of this state is divinely inspired or refer to law officers
as being ordained by God.  In fact, as defendant points out, “the
prosecutor’s argument is . . . a jumble of biblical allusions and
legal catch phrases, and it is difficult to clearly understand
exactly what the source of the argument is.”  After reading the
remarks in context, we conclude that they were not so improper as
to require intervention by the trial court ex mero motu. 
However, we do urge caution in the use of biblical phrases and
allusions.  In closing arguments at the sentencing proceeding, it
is the prosecutor’s duty to convince the jury that the facts and
circumstances of the crime warrant the death penalty.  It is not
the duty of the prosecutor to preach to the jury, especially in
such a convoluted manner.  Because we conclude that the trial
court did not err by failing to intervene ex mero motu, this
assignment of error is overruled.
XVIII.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court committed
plain error by instructing the jury that an M-1 .30-caliber rifle
is a deadly weapon.  Defendant argues that this instruction
relieved the State of its burden of proving each element of the
(e)(10) aggravating circumstance, that defendant knowingly
created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of
a weapon or device that would normally be hazardous to the lives
of more than one person.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(10) (1997).
Defendant concedes that he did not object to these
instructions at trial.  Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to
any relief unless any error constituted plain error.  See Odom,
307 N.C. at 659-60, 300 S.E.2d at 378. 
During the guilt phase of the trial, the trial court
instructed the jury on the charge of assault with a deadly weapon
with intent to kill inflicting serious injury and the lesser
included offense of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting
serious injury.  In instructing the jury on the elements of these
offenses, the trial court noted that “[a] deadly weapon is a
weapon which is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury,”
and “[a]n M1 .30 caliber carbine is a deadly weapon.”
Subsequently, during the capital sentencing proceeding, the
trial court instructed the jury regarding the (e)(10) aggravating
circumstance as follows:
Did the defendant knowingly create a great risk of
death to more than one person by means of a weapon
which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more
than one person?
The defendant does so if at the time he kills he
is using a weapon and the weapon would normally be
hazardous to the lives of more than one person and the
defendant uses . . . it in such a way as to create a
risk of death to more than one person and the risk is
great and the defendant knows that he is thereby
creating such a great risk.
Defendant relies on Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 61
L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979), and Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 85 L.
Ed. 2d 344 (1985), in support of his position that the previous
instructions relieved the State of its burden of proving each
element of the (e)(10) aggravating circumstance.  In Franklin,
the United States Supreme Court held:
Because a reasonable juror could have understood
the challenged portions of the jury instruction in this
case as creating a mandatory presumption that shifted
to the defendant the burden of persuasion on the
crucial element of intent, and because the charge read
as a whole does not explain or cure the error, we hold
that the jury charge does not comport with the
requirements of the Due Process Clause.
Franklin, 471 U.S. at 325, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 360.
However, the trial court’s instructions in the present case
did not create a mandatory presumption that shifted the burden of
persuasion to defendant.  The trial court’s instructions at the
guilt phase of the trial simply informed the jurors that the
carbine rifle constituted a deadly weapon as a matter of law,
regardless of the weapon’s use.  The trial court’s instructions
concerning the (e)(10) aggravating circumstance focused on
totally separate issues.  In finding this circumstance, the jury
must determine whether the weapon in its normal use is hazardous
to the lives of more than one person and whether a great risk of
death was knowingly created.  See State v. Rose, 327 N.C. 599,
605, 398 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1990).  Further, this Court has stated
that “[a]s to the weapon, the crucial consideration in
determining what type of weapon or device is envisioned by G.S. §
15A-2000(e)(10) is its potential to kill more than one person if
the weapon is used in the normal fashion, that is, in the manner
for which it was designed.  The focus must be upon the
destructive capabilities of the weapon or device.”  State v.
Moose, 310 N.C. 482, 497, 313 S.E.2d 507, 517 (1984).  Thus, the
fact that a deadly weapon is used by defendant is not enough to
support a finding that the (e)(10) aggravating circumstance
exists.  Accordingly, the trial court’s instructions, contrary to
defendant’s assertions, did not create a mandatory presumption
which shifted the burden of persuasion to defendant.
Defendant also contends that the trial court’s instructions
violated well-settled principles of North Carolina sentencing
law.  Defendant argues that the trial court, in its instructions,
erroneously utilized evidence of the deadly weapon during the
sentencing proceeding because it also relied on the use of the
weapon to infer malice during the guilt phase.  Defendant cites
to State v. Blackwelder, 309 N.C. 410, 306 S.E.2d 783 (1983), to
support this proposition.  However, Blackwelder involved
interpretation of the statutory provisions of the Fair Sentencing
Act.  The statute involved in Blackwelder specifically prohibited
utilizing evidence necessary to prove an element of the offense
to also prove an aggravating factor.  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.1
to .7 (repealed 1993).  The capital sentencing scheme provided
for within chapter 15A of the General Statutes contains no such
prohibition.  In fact, the statute clearly contemplates a
sentencing determination by the jury based on the evidence
presented during both the guilt and sentencing phases.  See
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(a)(3).  Accordingly, this assignment of error
is overruled.
XIX.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by
submitting both the N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000 (e)(10) aggravating
circumstance, that the defendant knowingly created a great risk
of death to more than one person by means of a weapon or device
that would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one
person, and the N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000 (e)(11) aggravating
circumstance, that the murder was part of a course of conduct in
which the defendant engaged and which included the commission by
defendant of other crimes of violence against another person or
persons.  Defendant argues that the circumstances were based on
the same evidence and were inherently duplicative on the facts of
this case.  We do not agree.
“Aggravating circumstances are not considered redundant
absent a complete overlap in the evidence supporting them.” 
State v. Moseley, 338 N.C. 1, 54, 449 S.E.2d 412, 444 (1994),
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1091, 131 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1995).  This
Court has held that it is permissible to use the same evidence to
support multiple aggravating circumstances when the circumstances
are directed at different aspects of a defendant’s character or
the murder for which he is to be punished.  State v. Hutchins,
303 N.C. 321, 354, 279 S.E.2d 788, 808 (1981).
This Court, in discussing the (e)(11) circumstance, has
stated that “[e]vidence that a defendant killed more than one
victim is sufficient to support the submission of the course of
conduct aggravating circumstance.”  State v. Conaway, 339 N.C.
487, 530, 453 S.E.2d 824, 851, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 884, 133 L.
Ed. 2d 153 (1995).  Here, the evidence showed that defendant
killed three people and injured two others.
Further, in State v. Smith, 347 N.C. 453, 496 S.E.2d 357
(1998), in discussing the (e)(10) aggravating circumstance, this
Court stated that
[t]his circumstance speaks to a distinct aspect of
defendant’s character, that he not only intended to
kill a particular person when he set fire to the
apartment building, but that he disregarded the value
of every human life in the building by using an
accelerant to set the fire in the middle of the night.
Id. at 468, 496 S.E.2d at 366.  Similarly, in the present case,
defendant not only sought out the management of Union Butterfield
during his shooting spree, but also disregarded the value of
every human life in the building as he randomly fired into
offices while walking down the hall.  This aspect of defendant’s
character is not fully captured by the (e)(11) aggravating
circumstance.  Based on the facts and circumstances of this case,
there was independent evidence to support each of the
circumstances submitted, though some of the evidence may have
overlapped.  Accordingly, it was not error for the trial court to
submit both circumstances.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by
failing to instruct the jury that it could not utilize the
evidence of one aggravating circumstance to prove another. 
However, once again, defendant did not object to the trial
court’s instruction at trial.  Thus, plain error analysis
applies.  Here, the trial court properly instructed the jury on
both the (e)(10) and (e)(11) aggravating circumstances.  While we
have stated that “trial court[s] should . . . instruct the jury
in such a way as to ensure that jurors will not use the same
evidence to find more than one aggravating circumstance,” State
v. Gay, 334 N.C. 467, 495, 434 S.E.2d 840, 856 (1993) (emphasis
added), we have not required that trial courts do so.  Having
reviewed the instructions, we hold that the trial court did not
commit plain error by failing to instruct the jury not to
consider duplicative evidence with respect to the aggravating
circumstances submitted.  This assignment of error is overruled.
XX.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in its
instructions to the jury regarding mitigating circumstances. 
Specifically, defendant contends that “[i]n its initial
instructions about statutory mitigating circumstances, the trial
court was completely silent about whether those circumstances
were deemed by law to have mitigating value.”  Defendant argues
that the instructions given by the trial court allowed the jurors
to assign no weight to the statutory mitigating circumstances
which the jurors may have found.  He also argues that a
subsequent instruction by the trial court in response to a
question submitted by the jury similarly failed to distinguish
between statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  We
do not agree.
Before reviewing defendant’s argument, we note that the
terms “value” and “weight” which are utilized in separate
statutory provisions of our capital sentencing scheme have at
times been inadvertently used interchangeably.  We take this
opportunity to point out the statutory distinction between
“value” and “weight” to avoid any misunderstanding in this area
of the law.  The term “value” is found only in the statutory
catchall provision, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(9), and has also been
applied to nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  The term
“weight” or “weighing” is used only in N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(b)(2)
and (3), referring to the process of weighing the mitigating
circumstances found against the aggravating circumstances found. 
In Issue Two, the jury is asked, “Do you find from the evidence
the existence of one or more of the following mitigating
circumstances?”  Under Issue Two, the term “value” is used in the
trial court’s instructions regarding the statutory catchall, as
well as its instructions regarding nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances.  In both the statutory catchall and nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances, the jury is instructed that it must
first find that a circumstance has mitigating value before it can
answer “yes” to that mitigating circumstance.  This is the only
portion of our sentencing scheme which involves the term “value.”
The term “weight” subsequently comes into play in both
Issues Three and Four.  In Issue Three, the jury is asked, “Do
you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
mitigating circumstance or circumstances found is, or are,
insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or
circumstances found?”  The jurors are then instructed that in
answering this question, they must weigh the aggravating
circumstance or circumstances found against the mitigating
circumstance or circumstances found.  In Issue Four, the jury is
asked, “Do you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the aggravating circumstance or circumstances you found is, or
are, sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the
death penalty when considered with the mitigating circumstance or
circumstances found by one or more of you?”  The jurors are then
instructed that in weighing the circumstances, they may give more
weight to one circumstance than another.  “Value” does not enter
into either Issue Three or Issue Four.
Having clarified this terminology, we turn now to the issue
at hand.  In the present case, as to each murder, three statutory
mitigating circumstances, twenty-six nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances, and the statutory catchall were submitted to the
jury.  The jury was instructed to determine whether any of these
circumstances existed prior to answering Issue Two.  The three
statutory mitigating circumstances submitted were (1) defendant
has no significant history of prior criminal activity, N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(f)(1); (2) this murder was committed while defendant was
under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance, N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-2000(f)(2); and (3) the capacity of defendant to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law was impaired, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(6). 
The trial court also submitted the statutory catchall, which
provides that the jury may consider “any other circumstance
arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have mitigating
value.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(9).
With regard to the first statutory mitigating circumstance
submitted, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Now, I would instruct you that the defendant has
the burden of proving this and establishing this
mitigating circumstance by a preponderance of the
evidence, as I’ve explained it to you.  Accordingly as
to this mitigating circumstance[], I charge that if one
or more [of] you have found the facts to be as all the
evidence tends to show, you will answer “yes” to the
mitigating circumstance number 1 on the Issues and
Recommendation form.  If none of you find this
circumstance to exist, you would so indicate by having
your foreperson write “no” in that space.
The trial court gave similar instructions regarding each of the
two remaining statutory mitigating circumstances.
Prior to listing the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances
individually, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Members of the jury, you will also -- should also
consider the following circumstances arising from the
evidence which you find have mitigating value.  If one
or more of you find by a preponderance of the evidence
that any of the following circumstances exist and also
are deemed by you to have mitigating value, you would
so indicate by having your foreperson write “yes” in
the space provided.  If none of you find the
circumstance to exist or if none of you deem it to have
mitigating value, you can so indicate by having your
foreperson write “no” in that space.
Then, after reading each nonstatutory mitigating circumstance,
the trial court further instructed that “if one or more of you
find the facts to be as all the evidence tends to show and if you
determine that this circumstance has mitigating value, then you
will answer ‘yes.’”  (Emphasis added.)
Finally, the trial court instructed the jury on the
statutory catchall mitigating circumstance as follows:
Now, members of the jury, I would also instruct
you as to number 30.  You would also consider and you
should consider any other circumstance or circumstances
arising from the evidence which one or more of you deem
to have mitigating value.  If one or more of you do so
find by the preponderance of the evidence, you would so
indicate by having your foreperson write “yes” in the
space provided after this mitigating circumstance, that
is number 30, on the Issues and Recommendation form. 
If none of you find any such circumstances to exist,
you would so indicate by having your foreperson write
“no” in this space.
Subsequently, in response to a question from the jury
concerning the meaning of “mitigating,” the trial court stated:
A mitigating circumstance is a fact or group of
facts which do not constitute a justification or excuse
for a killing or reduce it to a less degree of crime
than first degree murder but which may be considered as
extenuating or reducing the moral culpability of the
killing or making it less deserving of extreme
punishment than other first degree murders.
Now, our law identifies several possible
mitigating circumstances.  However, in considering
Issue Number Two, it would be your duty to consider as
a mitigating circumstance any aspect of the defendant’s
character, record or any other circumstances of this
murder that the defendant contends is a basis for a
sentence less than death and any other circumstances
arising from the evidence which you deem to have
mitigating value.
First, defendant contends that the trial court erred by
simply instructing the jurors to answer “yes” for a given
statutory mitigating circumstance if one or more jurors found
that circumstance to exist.  Defendant argues that the
instructions were erroneous because “the trial court was
completely silent about whether those circumstances were deemed
by law to have mitigating value.”  Defendant cites State v.
Jaynes, 342 N.C. 249, 464 S.E.2d 448 (1995), cert. denied, 518
U.S. 1024, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1080 (1996), in support of his position.
In Jaynes, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
A number of mitigating circumstances listed on the form
have been submitted to the jury for its consideration;
the same being (1) through and including (37).  Now as
to these listed circumstances, it is for you to
determine from the circumstances and the facts in this
case whether or not any listed circumstance has
mitigating effect.  And if one or more of you should
determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the
mitigating circumstance listed exists and that it has
mitigating value, then you would find that it existed
and answer so.  If none of you finds that, then you
would indicate, no, as to that.
Id. at 285, 464 S.E.2d at 470 (alteration in original). 
Subsequently, after the jury submitted a question to the trial
court, the trial court informed the jury that it was
not able to answer your question any more clearly than
to say that it is for you to determine as a juror
whether or not the listed circumstance has mitigating
value or effect.
Id.  This Court concluded that the trial court committed error by
combining both the statutory and nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances and instructing that “if one or more of you should
determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the mitigating
circumstance listed exists and that it has mitigating value, then
you would find that it existed and answer so.”
These instructions improperly placed a higher burden on the
jury’s finding statutory mitigating circumstances than is
required by law.  Under our law, in order to find that a
statutory mitigating circumstance exists, one or more of the
jurors have only to find that it exists factually by a
preponderance of the evidence.  The jurors are not required by
law to determine whether it has mitigating value.  As noted
above, the only time “value” comes into play is in determining
whether the statutory catchall or the nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances exist.  In order to find that these exist, the
jurors must first find that they have mitigating value.  By
distinguishing between statutory and nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances, “[t]he General Assembly has determined as a matter
of law that statutory mitigating circumstances have mitigating
value.”  Id.  This means that jurors are not required to find
value as to statutory mitigating circumstances, as in the case of
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  It does not mean that the
trial court is required to instruct that statutory mitigating
circumstances have value as a matter of law.  However, the trial
court’s instructions in Jaynes failed to appropriately
distinguish between statutory and nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances and, in fact, required the same finding as to both. 
Accordingly, the Court vacated the defendant’s sentence of death
and ordered a new capital sentencing proceeding.
In the present case, the trial court properly instructed the
jurors from the pattern jury instructions regarding both
statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  See
N.C.P.I.--Crim. 150.10 (1997).  For example, with regard to the
first statutory mitigating circumstance, the trial court
instructed that “if one or more [of] you have found the facts to
be as all the evidence tends to show, you will answer ‘yes’ to
the mitigating circumstance number 1 on the Issues and
Recommendation form.”  With regard to the nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances, the trial court instructed the jurors that “[i]f
one or more of you find by a preponderance of the evidence that
any of the following circumstances exist and also are deemed by
you to have mitigating value, you would so indicate by having
your foreperson write ‘yes’ in the space provided.”  (Emphasis
added.)  Thus, the trial court properly informed the jurors that
in order to find a statutory mitigating circumstance to exist,
all they must find is that the circumstance is supported by a
preponderance of the evidence.  However, unlike statutory
mitigating circumstances, the trial court instructed the jurors
that in order to find nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, they
must (1) find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
circumstance existed, and (2) find that the circumstance has
mitigating value.  These instructions properly distinguished
between statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and
informed the jurors of their duty under the law.  We have upheld
instructions virtually identical to the ones given in the present
case.  See State v. Conner, 345 N.C. 319, 480 S.E.2d 626, cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1997); State v. Simpson,
341 N.C. 316, 462 S.E.2d 191 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1161,
134 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1996); State v. Daniels, 337 N.C. 243, 446
S.E.2d 298 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1135, 130 L. Ed. 2d 895
(1995).
In the present case, as noted on the Issues and
Recommendation as to Punishment forms submitted for each of the
three murders, each of the three individual statutory mitigating
circumstances was found to exist by the jury, as well as the
twenty-six nonstatutory mitigating circumstances submitted.  The
only circumstance submitted which the jury did not find was the
statutory catchall.  Because the jurors found mitigating
circumstances to exist, they were required to answer Issue Two
“yes.”  Once Issue Two is answered “yes,” the jury then must
answer both Issues Three and Four.  Here, the trial court
properly instructed the jurors in Issue Three that they must
“weigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances against the
mitigating circumstance or circumstances.”  Thus, the jurors were
required to take into account any statutory and nonstatutory
mitigating circumstance or circumstances they found prior to
answering Issue Three.  The jurors were also instructed on Issue
Four as follows:  “In deciding this issue you are not to consider
the aggravating circumstances standing alone.  You must consider
them in connection with any mitigating circumstances found by one
or more of you.”  Thus, the jurors were required to give the
mitigating circumstances they had found, both statutory and
nonstatutory, weight in determining both Issues Three and Four. 
Further, the trial court properly instructed that the weight to
be given each mitigating circumstance is for the individual
jurors to determine.  See State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 400 S.E.2d
712 (1991).  As we stated in Daniels, “[t]hese instructions are
in accord with the pattern jury instructions.  We conclude that
the instructions here were given in accordance with the law and
that the jury was able to follow the instructions as they were
given.”  Daniels, 337 N.C. at 275, 446 S.E.2d at 318.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in
instructions given in response to a question sent out by the
jury, which stated:  “Are the mitigating questions under Issue #2
to be answered yes or no in relation to (1) [b]eing a factor that
contributed to the crime on May 17th or (2) [b]eing true that the
defense presented this evidence and we agree/disagree to its
truth[?]”  As noted above, the trial court responded to the
question as follows:
A mitigating circumstance is a fact or group of
facts which do not constitute a justification or excuse
for a killing or reduce it to a less degree of crime
than first degree murder but which may be considered as
extenuating or reducing the moral culpability of the
killing or making it less deserving of extreme
punishment than other first degree murders.
Now, our law identifies several possible
mitigating circumstances.  However, in considering
Issue Number Two, it would be your duty to consider as
a mitigating circumstance any aspect of the defendant’s
character, record or any other circumstances of this
murder that the defendant contends is [sic] a basis for
a sentence less than death and any other circumstances
arising from the evidence which you deem to have
mitigating value.
These instructions track the language of the pattern jury
instructions.  See N.C.P.I.--Crim. 150.10.  The instructions
provide a general discussion of what constitutes a mitigating
circumstance and a summary of what Issue Two is about, that is,
considering mitigating circumstances submitted by defendant that
would be a basis for a sentence less than death.  Generally,
these instructions are given in Issue Two, prior to the trial
court’s instructions on the statutory and nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances.  In fact, the jurors in the present case had
previously received instructions identical to those set out
above.  However, the instructions above do not affect the trial
court’s previous instructions, which specifically addressed the
distinction between statutory and nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances and the method the jury must utilize to find them. 
In responding to the jurors’ question, the trial court elected to
reinstruct the jurors using the pattern jury instructions in an
attempt to avoid a misstatement of the law.  These instructions
do not constitute error.
Further, as this Court has previously stated, “‘a single
instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation,
but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.’”  State
v. McNeil, 327 N.C. 388, 392, 395 S.E.2d 106, 109 (1990) (quoting
Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 373), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 942, 113 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1991).  “If the charge as a whole
presents the law fairly and clearly to the jury, the fact that
isolated expressions, standing alone, might be considered
erroneous will afford no ground for reversal.”  State v. Terry,
337 N.C. 615, 623, 447 S.E.2d 720, 724 (1994).  When viewed as a
whole, the trial court’s instructions in the present case
properly informed the jurors of their duties under the law. 
Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.
PRESERVATION ISSUES
Defendant raises sixteen additional issues which he concedes
have been previously decided contrary to his position by this
Court:  (1) the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion
to prohibit death-qualification of the prospective jurors;
(2) the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to strike
the death penalty from consideration; (3) the trial court erred
by denying defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars regarding
aggravating circumstances; (4) the trial court erred by denying
defendant’s motion for individual, sequestered jury voir dire;
(5) the trial court erred by giving a blanket instruction that
all evidence offered by the State during the guilt phase could be
considered as evidence in aggravation during the sentencing
phase; (6) the trial court erred by instructing on the definition
of mitigating circumstances which did not adequately focus the
jury on the culpability of defendant, as opposed to the facts of
the murder; (7) the trial court erred by denying defendant’s
motion to declare the North Carolina capital sentencing statute
unconstitutional because it places a burden on defendant to
overcome the weight of aggravation; (8) the trial court erred by
incorporating the terms “recommend” and “recommendation” when
referring to the capital sentencing decision in its instructions;
(9) the trial court erred by making jury unanimity a condition to
a “no” answer by the jury on sentencing Issue Four; (10) the
trial court erred in its instructions on defendant’s burden of
proof on mitigating circumstances; (11) the trial court erred by
permitting jurors to reject submitted nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances on the basis that they had no mitigating value;
(12) the trial court erred by using the term “may” in its
instructions in sentencing Issues Three and Four; (13) the trial
court erred by failing to instruct on the meaning of a life
sentence; (14) the trial court erred by submitting aggravating
circumstances not supported by the evidence; (15) the trial court
erred by denying defendant’s motion to strike the death penalty;
and (16) the trial court erred by making jury unanimity a
condition to a “no” answer by the jury on sentencing Issues One
and Three.
Defendant raises these issues so that this Court may
reexamine its prior holdings and also to preserve the issues for
any possible further judicial review.  We have considered
defendant’s arguments on these issues and find no compelling
reason to depart from our prior holdings.  These assignments of
error are overruled.
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
Having found no error in either the guilt or sentencing
phase, we must determine whether:  (1) the evidence supports the
aggravating circumstances found by the jury; (2) passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor influenced the
imposition of the death sentence; and (3) the sentence is
“excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.”  N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(d)(2).
In the present case, defendant was convicted of three counts
of first-degree murder on the basis of malice, premeditation, and
deliberation and also under the felony murder rule.  With respect
to each murder, the jury found the aggravating circumstances that
the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more
than one person by means of a weapon or device which would
normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person,
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(10), and that the murder was part of a
course of conduct in which the defendant engaged and which
included the commission by defendant of other crimes of violence
against another person or persons, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(11).
We conclude that the evidence supports each aggravating
circumstance found.  We further conclude, based on a thorough
review of the record, that the sentences of death were not
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary factor.  Thus, the final statutory duty of this Court
is to conduct a proportionality review.
Proportionality review is designed to “eliminate the
possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action
of an aberrant jury.”  State v. Holden, 321 N.C. 125, 164-65, 362
S.E.2d 513, 537 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 100 L. Ed.
2d 935 (1988).  In conducting proportionality review, we
determine “whether the sentence of death in the present case is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases considering both the crime and the defendant.”  State v.
Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 79, 301 S.E.2d 335, 355, cert. denied, 464
U.S. 865, 78 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1983).  Whether the death penalty is
disproportionate “ultimately rest[s] upon the ‘experienced
judgments’ of the members of this Court.”  State v. Green, 336
N.C. 142, 198, 443 S.E.2d 14, 47, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046,
130 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994).
In our proportionality review, it is proper to compare the
present case with other cases in which this Court has concluded
that the death penalty was disproportionate.  State v. McCollum,
334 N.C. 208, 240, 433 S.E.2d 144, 161 (1993), cert. denied, 512
U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994).  It is also proper for this
Court to compare this case with the cases in which we have found
the death penalty to be proportionate.  Id. at 244, 433 S.E.2d at
164.  Although we review all of these cases when engaging in this
statutory duty, we will not undertake to discuss or cite all of
those cases each time we carry out that duty.  Id.
This Court has determined that the sentence of death was
disproportionate in seven cases:  State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318,
372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d
653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483
S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997),
and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373; State v.
Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311
N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C.
674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); and State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26,
305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).
However, we find that the present case is distinguishable
from each of these seven cases.  First, defendant was convicted
of three counts of first-degree murder.  As this Court has
previously noted, we have never found the sentence of death
disproportionate in a case where the defendant was found guilty
of murdering more than one victim.  State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513,
552, 461 S.E.2d 631, 654 (1995).  Further, the jury convicted
defendant on the theory of malice, premeditation, and
deliberation and also under the felony murder rule.  We have said
that “[t]he finding of premeditation and deliberation indicates a
more cold-blooded and calculated crime.”  Artis, 325 N.C. at 341,
384 S.E.2d at 506.
We recognize that juries may have imposed sentences of life
imprisonment in cases which are similar to the present case. 
However, this fact “does not automatically establish that juries
have ‘consistently’ returned life sentences in factually similar
cases.”  Green, 336 N.C. at 198, 443 S.E.2d at 47.  This Court
has long rejected a mechanical or empirical approach to comparing
cases that are superficially similar.  State v. Robinson, 336
N.C. 78, 139, 443 S.E.2d 306, 337 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
1089, 130 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1995).  “We note that in deciding
whether a death sentence is disproportionate, this Court
independently considers each individual defendant and the nature
of the crimes that defendant has committed.”  State v. Lynch, 340
N.C. 435, 483, 459 S.E.2d 679, 703 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S.
1143, 134 L. Ed. 2d 558 (1996).
The evidence in the present case shows that defendant
engaged in a shooting rampage at the Union Butterfield facility
which resulted in the murder of three employees, as well as the
wounding of two others.  Defendant fired multiple rounds from two
semiautomatic weapons throughout the facility as employees hid
under desks or fled the building in fear for their lives.  With
the killings completed, defendant stood in the doorway, smoking a
cigarette.
Based on the nature of this crime, and particularly the
distinguishing features noted above, we cannot conclude as a
matter of law that the sentences of death were excessive or
disproportionate.  We hold that defendant received a fair trial
and capital sentencing proceeding, free from prejudicial error.
NO ERROR.
Justice WYNN did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.