Title: Joseph McLain v. William J. Bose, M.D., and Advanced Orthopaedics, LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1200554
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 18, 2022

Rel: March 18, 2022
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2021-2022
_________________________
1200554
_________________________
Joseph McLain
v.
William J. Bose, M.D., and Advanced Orthopaedics, LLC
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-20-900135)
PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED.  NO OPINION.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Bryan, Mendheim, and  Mitchell, JJ.,
concur.
1200554
Wise, J., concurs specially.
Sellers and Stewart, JJ., dissent.
2
1200554
WISE, Justice (concurring specially).
Although I understand the unique posture of the proceedings below,
I write specially to point out that the record before this Court does not
indicate that Joseph McLain, the plaintiff, timely and properly preserved
for appellate review the argument the dissent addresses.  Therefore, it
would be inappropriate for this Court to address the merits of that
argument. 
On November 19, 2020, the Baldwin Circuit Court granted the
parties' joint motion to continue the hearing on the motion for a summary
judgment filed by the defendants, William J. Bose, M.D., and Advanced
Orthopaedics, LLC.  It rescheduled the hearing to February 23, 2021, at
9:15 a.m.  On January 8, 2021, the trial court sent the parties notice that
the hearing was scheduled for February 23, 2021, at 9:15 a.m.  On
February 10, 2021, at 11:16 a.m. and 11:19 a.m., the trial court's senior
judicial assistant sent e-mails to the parties reminding them that the
hearing on the motion for a summary judgment was scheduled to be heard
on February 23, 2021, at 9:15 a.m.
On February 23, 2021, at 6:58 a.m., McLain's counsel sent an e-mail
3
1200554
to the trial court's senior judicial assistant, stating:
"I will plan on being online at the start of the hearing.
The hearing was re-set on defendant's [motion for a summary
judgment]. 
"The parties previously filed a joint motion to continue
because Plaintiff has been given until June 1, 2021 to disclose
an expert under the scheduling order.  The [motion for a
summary judgment] hearing is premature until after that
date.
"I'm sorry to be late pointing this out.  I am recovering
from COVID and am recently out of quarantine.
"I will see y'all online unless the Court moves the hearing
before 9:15."
The trial court sent at least four notices during the three-month
period between granting the parties' joint motion to continue and the date
of the rescheduled hearing that the hearing on the defendants' motion for
a summary judgment had been reset for February 23, 2021.  Nevertheless,
McLain did not file anything with the trial court during that three-month
period.  He did not file an objection on the basis that the trial court had
set the hearing before the date that had been set in the scheduling order
for designating his expert witnesses; a request for a continuance, pursuant
to Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., to permit affidavits to be obtained or
4
1200554
depositions to be taken; or any other response opposing the defendants'
motion for a summary judgment.  At most, McLain merely mentioned the
June 1, 2021, deadline for designating his expert witnesses and the
alleged prematurity of the hearing on the motion for a summary judgment
only in an e-mail his attorney sent to the trial court's senior judicial
assistant approximately two hours before the hearing was scheduled to
start.  Therefore, before the hearing, he did not timely present any
objection or argument to the trial court about holding a hearing on the
motion for a summary judgment before the June 1, 2021, deadline.
McLain alleges that he opposed the motion for a summary judgment
during the hearing on the ground that it was premature.  However, he did
not include a transcript of that hearing in the record on appeal or a
statement of the evidence or proceedings pursuant to Rule 10(d), Ala. R.
App. P.
" 'The law is settled that it is the appellant's
duty to ensure that the appellate court has a record
from which it can conduct a review.  Cooper & Co.
[v. Lester, 832 So. 2d 628 (Ala. 2000) ]; [Alfa Mut.
Gen. Ins. Co. v.] Oglesby, [711 So. 2d 938 (Ala.
1997)]; and Gotlieb v. Collat, 567 So. 2d 1302 (Ala.
1990).  Further, in the absence of evidence in the
5
1200554
record, this Court will not assume error on the part
of the trial court.  Browning v. Carpenter, 596 So.
2d 906 (Ala. 1992); Smith v. Smith, 596 So. 2d 1
(Ala. 1992); Totten v. Lighting & Supply, Inc., 507
So. 2d 502 (Ala. 1987).'
"Zaden v. Elkus, 881 So. 2d 993, 1009 (Ala. 2003).  Williams
(the appellant in this cross-appeal) had the burden of ensuring
that the record on appeal contains sufficient evidence to
warrant a reversal of the judgment he challenges.  Gotlieb v.
Collat, 567 So. 2d 1302 (Ala. 1990).  The law in Alabama is
settled that when the record is silent as to evidence considered
by the trial court, we must presume that the evidence
considered was sufficient to support the trial court's judgment. 
Browning v. Carpenter, 596 So. 2d 906 (Ala. 1992); Smith v.
Smith, 596 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1992); and Totten v. Lighting &
Supply, Inc., 507 So. 2d 502 (Ala. 1987)."
Parker v. Williams, 977 So. 2d 476, 481-82 (Ala. 2007).  Therefore, there
is not anything in the record that is before us to support McLain's
assertion that he raised this argument during the hearing on the motion
for a summary judgment.  Instead, based on the record that is before us,
it appears that McLain first presented this argument in his motion to
alter, amend, or vacate the summary judgment that the trial court
entered in favor of the defendants.  This Court addressed a similar
situation in Espinoza v. Rudolph, 46 So. 3d 403, 415-16 (Ala. 2010), and
explained:
6
1200554
"Jabez argues that the redemption was invalid because
Rudolph did not make a written demand for a statement of the
value of improvements, and the parties did not resolve their
dispute over moneys allegedly due Jabez for improvements
according to the process required in § 40-10-122(d)[, Ala. Code
1975].  Not until his postjudgment motion did Jabez argue that
the redemption was invalid because Rudolph had not
submitted a written request for an itemization of Jabez's
expenses or because she had otherwise failed to comply with
the requirements of § 40-10-122(d).  ' "[A] trial court has the
discretion to consider a new legal argument in a post-judgment
motion, but is not required to do so." '  Special Assets, L.L.C.
v. Chase Home Fin., L.L.C., 991 So. 2d 668, 678 (Ala. 2007)
(quoting Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Blalock, 525 So. 2d
1366, 1369 (Ala. 1988)). There is no indication that the trial
court considered the merits of the legal argument raised for
the first time in Jabez's postjudgment motion, and we will not
presume that it did.  See Special Assets, 991 So. 2d at 678.
 Jabez offers no justification for the delayed presentation of his
argument.  The trial court did not exceed its discretion in
refusing to grant Jabez's postjudgment motion on the basis of
Rudolph's failure to request an itemization of expenses Jabez
incurred to improve the property.  See Green Tree Acceptance,
Inc. v. Blalock, 525 So. 2d 1366, 1370 (Ala. 1988) ('Based on
the record before this Court on appeal, we conclude that there
was no justification given by Green Tree for failing to raise the
argument prior to its post-judgment motion.')."
Likewise, in this case, there is not any indication that the trial court
considered arguments that were raised for the first time in McLain's
motion to alter, amend, or vacate, and McLain has not offered any
7
1200554
justification for not raising those arguments before the hearing on the
motion for a summary judgment.  
For these reasons, it does not appear from the record before this
Court that the argument the dissent addresses was properly and timely
presented to the trial court.  Accordingly, McLain's argument in this
regard is not properly before this Court, and the trial court's judgment is
due to be affirmed.
8
1200554
SELLERS, Justice (dissenting). 
Joseph McLain sued William J. Bose, M.D., and Advanced
Orthopaedics, LLC, Dr. Bose's employer, alleging medical malpractice. 
According to McLain, Dr. Bose damaged McLain's knee while performing
surgery.
"To maintain a medical-malpractice action, the plaintiff
ordinarily must present expert testimony from a 'similarly
situated health-care provider' as to (1) 'the appropriate
standard of care,' (2) a 'deviation from that standard [of care],'
and (3) 'a proximate causal connection between the
[defendant's] act or omission constituting the breach and the
injury sustained by the plaintiff.' Pruitt v. Zeiger, 590 So. 2d
236, 238 (Ala. 1991) (quoting Bradford v. McGee, 534 So. 2d
1076, 1079 (Ala. 1988)). The reason for the rule that proximate
causation must be established through expert testimony is
that the issue of causation in a medical-malpractice case is
ordinarily 'beyond "the ken of the average layman." ' Golden v.
Stein, 670 So. 2d 904, 907 (Ala. 1995), quoting Charles W.
Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 127.01(5)(c), p. 333
(4th ed. 1991). The plaintiff must prove through expert
testimony 'that the alleged negligence "probably caused the
injury." ' McAfee v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 641 So. 2d 265, 267 (Ala.
1994)."
Lyons v. Walker Reg'l Med. Ctr., 791 So. 2d 937, 942 (Ala. 2000).  It is well
established that expert testimony is crucial in a medical-malpractice
9
1200554
action.  Shadrick v. Grana, 279 So. 3d 553, 556 (Ala. 2018); HealthSouth
Rehab. Hosp. of Gadsden, LLC v. Honts, 276 So. 3d 185, 198 (Ala. 2018).
McLain filed his complaint in January 2020.  Based on a joint
request by the parties, the trial court entered a scheduling order giving
McLain until June 1, 2021, to designate any expert witnesses, giving the
defendants until September 1, 2021, to depose those experts, and giving
McLain until November 1, 2021, to depose the defendants' experts. 
Deadlines in scheduling orders "shall not be modified except by leave of
court upon a showing of good cause."  Rule 16(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Pretrial
orders entered after scheduling conferences "shall control the subsequent
course of the action unless modified by a subsequent order."  Rule 16(e),
Ala. R. Civ. P.  In November 2020, before the expiration of the referenced
deadlines, the defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment,
asserting that McLain could not present substantial evidence in the form
of expert testimony indicating that Dr. Bose had breached the applicable
standard of care.  
The trial court entered an order setting the summary-judgment
motion for a hearing on December 1, 2020.  The parties, realizing that the
10
1200554
hearing date was premature based on the expert-witness deadlines set out
in the scheduling order, filed a joint motion to continue the hearing.  In
their motion, the parties specifically pointed out that McLain had an
additional six months in which to designate his expert witnesses. 
Nevertheless, the trial court inexplicably reset the hearing for February
2021, a little more than three months before expiration of McLain's
expert-disclosure deadline.
On the morning of the rescheduled hearing, McLain's counsel sent
an e-mail to the trial court's judicial assistant pointing out that the trial
court had again prematurely set the hearing on the summary-judgment
motion.  The trial court, however, went forward with the hearing and,
thereafter, entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
presumably based on McLain's failure to present evidence indicating that
Dr. Bose had breached the standard of care.  McLain appealed.1
1The trial court's judgment states that "[n]o response having been
filed by the plaintiff, defendants' motion for summary judgment ... is
hereby granted."  But the failure to file a response to a summary-
judgment motion is not, by itself, a ground for granting the motion.  Ex
parte Oden, 617 So. 2d 1020, 1028 (Ala. 1992)  Accordingly, I assume the
trial court concluded that McLain had failed to present substantial
11
1200554
Dr. Bose is board certified in orthopaedic surgery.  Thus, pursuant
to § 6-5-548(c), Ala. Code 1975, McLain was required to present expert
testimony by a surgeon "licensed by the appropriate regulatory board or
agency of this or some other state," who is "trained and experienced in the
same specialty" as Dr. Bose, and who is "certified by an appropriate
American board in [that] specialty" and has "practiced in [that] specialty
during the year preceding the date that the alleged breach of the standard
of care occurred."  Finding the right expert requires time, and the trial
court gave McLain until June 1, 2021, to do so.  In conflict with that
deadline, the trial court granted the defendants' summary-judgment
motion more than three months before the deadline expired.
McLain's failure to file a response to the summary-judgment motion
was not, by itself, sufficient to justify entering a summary judgment.  Ex
parte City of Montgomery, 758 So. 2d 565, 569 (Ala. 1999) ("Rule 56(e)[,
Ala. R. Civ. P.,] does not provide that the nonmoving party will be in
default for failing to respond to a summary-judgment motion. A trial court
evidence in support of his assertion that Dr. Bose had breached the
standard of care.
12
1200554
should grant a motion for summary judgment only where there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."), abrogated on other grounds by  Ex parte
Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000).  The defendants bore the initial
burden of establishing that McLain did not have sufficient evidence to
support his claims and that there was no genuine issue of material fact for
trial.  Pritchett v. ICN Med. All., Inc., 938 So. 2d 933, 935 (Ala. 2006).  In
attempting to meet their burden, the defendants averred that McLain had
not submitted the necessary expert testimony.  But, because McLain had
several more months in which to designate an expert, the defendants'
averment was simply irrelevant.  Thus, the defendants did not establish
that they were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law based on a lack
of evidence supporting McLain's claims.  I would therefore reverse the
trial court's summary judgment.
Stewart, J., concurs.
13