Title: Mattina v. Rodolfich
Citation: 461 So. 2d 751
Docket Number: 55275
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: December 12, 1984

461 So. 2d 751 (1984) Glen MATTINA and Anthony Mattina, d/b/a a &amp; G Enterprises v. Steve RODOLFICH, d/b/a Dixie Amusement Company. No. 55275. Supreme Court of Mississippi. December 12, 1984. Michael P. Collins, Michael F. Cavanaugh, Donald C. Dornan, Jr., Biloxi, for appellants. Russell S. Gill, Biloxi, for appellee. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, HAWKINS and SULLIVAN, JJ. ROY NOBLE LEE, Justice, for the Court: Steve Rodolfich, d/b/a Dixie Amusement Company, filed suit in the Circuit Court of Harrison County against Anthony Mattina and Glen Mattina, d/b/a A &amp; G Enterprises, to collect nineteen thousand two hundred thirty dollars seventy-five cents ($19,230.75) on an account for the sale of eight (8) video games. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the lower court directed a verdict in favor of Rodolfich and the Mattinas have appealed here. *752 The appellants have assigned three (3) errors in the trial below, but they all relate to the one question of whether or not the lower court erred in granting the directed verdict. The appellants own two excursion boats which run from Biloxi to Ship Island and from Gulfport to Ship Island in the Mississippi Gulf Coast Sound. On April 7, 1982, they purchased four video games for installation on their boat operating out of Biloxi. Approximately one week later, they decided to purchase eight additional video games for installation on the Gulfport boat and possibly on Ship Island. The purchase price of those games was $19,230.75. Appellants were delivered three games on April 14, four on April 14, and one on April 16, 1982 (three separate invoices). A check in the full amount of the purchase price was delivered to appellee on April 21, 1982. Subsequently, the check was returned because of insufficient funds in the account upon which it was drawn. This suit for collection of the purchase price, together with interest and attorney's fees, followed. The trial judge apparently was of the opinion that appellants had not pled their breach of contract defense and that the only question before the court to establish the appellant's defense were provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, which were affirmatively pled by the appellants. In ruling on the directed verdict, he said: The appellants filed an answer to the complaint, denied that they owed the amount sued for and stated in Paragraph II thereof the following defense: The affirmative defenses of the answer dealt with the UCC, but the defense of breach of contract was clearly set forth in Paragraph II of the answer.[1] Prior to the trial on the merits, appellee filed a motion in limine which sought an order to preclude the appellants from introducing or attempting to introduce any statements, representations or understandings between appellants and appellee concerning the sale of the video machines which are the subject of this suit; specifically to preclude introduction of testimony that the check given as payment for the purchase price of the machines was to be held by the appellee until such time as the defendants allegedly accepted the machines, and that the plaintiff's attempt to negotiate said instrument prior to the approval of the appellants was an alleged breach of the agreement between the parties. Appellee's motion in limine was overruled by the lower court on October 5, 1982, prior to the trial on its merits.[2] The appellants were permitted without objection to introduce evidence covering their principal defense in the case, viz, that they purchased the eight machines from appellee with the condition and understanding that they could try out the machines and determine whether or not the machines were satisfactory, and, if not, *753 appellants could return them to appellee. Likewise, their proof indicated that appellee agreed he would not negotiate the check for the purchase price until the Mattinas were satisfied with the machines. That evidence followed the defense stated in Paragraph II of the answer. The lower court was of the opinion that the contract defense had not been pled. Although we hold that the contract defense was pled under Paragraph II of the answer, the attorneys for appellants immediately should have requested permission to amend their answer to conform with the proof, or the trial judge should have suggested that they amend to conform. Rule 15(b), Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, states: In Paymaster Oil Mill Co. v. Mitchell, 319 So. 2d 652 (Miss. 1975), which has been cited many times since the opinion was rendered, the Court, quoting from General Tire &amp; Rubber Co. v. Darnell, 221 So. 2d 104 (Miss. 1969), said: 319 So. 2d at 657. We are of the opinion that the lower court erred in directing a verdict in favor of the appellee and, consequently, the case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial. We again note for the benefit of trial judges the statement made by this Court in Claiborne v. Greer, 354 So. 2d 1109 (Miss. 1978), following: 354 So. 2d at 1111. REVERSED AND REMANDED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER, P.J., and BOWLING, HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur. [1] See Rule 8(e)(2), Miss.Rules Civ.Proc. [2] The trial judge who presided at the hearing on the motion in limine and entered the order was Honorable Kosta N. Vlahos. The presiding judge on the trial of the case on its merits was Honorable J. Ruble Griffin.