Title: United Leasing Corp. v. The Lehner Family Business Trust
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 090254
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 25, 2010

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Millette, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
 
UNITED LEASING CORPORATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 090254 
 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  February 25, 2010 
THE LEHNER FAMILY BUSINESS TRUST  
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Walter W. Stout, III, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a defendant preserved 
an objection made in a motion to strike at the conclusion of the 
plaintiff’s evidence, when the defendant moved to renew its 
motion to strike at the conclusion of the trial.  We hold that 
the defendant failed to preserve its argument regarding the 
validity of an assignment of a breach of contract claim to the 
plaintiff, because the defendant failed to state its renewed 
objection with reasonable certainty. 
BACKGROUND 
 
This case involves a breach of contract action filed by the 
plaintiff, the Lehner Family Business Trust (the Trust), against 
the defendant, United Leasing Corporation (United Leasing), 
pursuant to a purported assignment of the cause of action to the 
Trust.  Following a trial by jury, the circuit court entered 
judgment on the jury’s verdict in favor of the Trust for $1.1 
million. 
We will include a limited recitation of the facts as our 
decision in this case rests on procedural grounds.  As certain 
facts are in dispute, we apply well-settled principles of 
appellate review and view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Trust, which has in its favor a jury verdict 
confirmed by the trial judge.  Dunn Construction Co., Inc. v. 
Cloney, 278 Va. 260, 266, 682 S.E.2d 943, 946 (2009); Williams 
v. Dominion Technology Partners, L.L.C., 265 Va. 280, 283, 576 
S.E.2d 752, 753 (2003). 
Brothers Aurelio and Hugo V. Garcia founded a trash removal 
business called Garcia’s, Inc. (Garcia’s).  Prior to the 
dissolution of Garcia’s, Hugo Garcia (Hugo) served as president 
and director. 
Garcia’s leased trucks and trash containers from United 
Leasing under a series of equipment leases and pledged various 
assets as security.  As additional security, United Leasing 
required the execution of a “Stock Pledge Agreement,” pledging 
the brothers’ stock in Garcia’s as collateral and authorizing 
United Leasing to vote the brothers’ shares in the event the 
company defaulted on the leases.  The “Stock Pledge Agreement” 
named Hugo as a “director” of Garcia’s. 
United Leasing declared Garcia’s in default and began to 
liquidate Garcia’s assets, stating that it was foreclosing upon 
 
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security for the equipment leases.  United Leasing assumed 
control of Garcia’s and Garcia’s was defunct by June 2002. 
James C. Lehner (Lehner), a former employee of United 
Leasing, formed the Trust in 2005, and shortly thereafter, 
Lehner offered Hugo $50,000 to assign all claims against United 
Leasing to the Trust.  Hugo executed the requested assignment, 
which assigned all of the legal claims, rights, and causes of 
action that Garcia’s, “a Virginia corporation in dissolution,” 
and Hugo, “individually and as trustee in liquidation for 
Garcia’s, Inc.” had under the equipment leases with United 
Leasing and otherwise. 
The Trust sued United Leasing for breach of contract1, 
claiming that “[b]y assignment . . . , the Trust acquired all of 
Garcia’s claims, causes of action, choses in action, rights of 
action, rights and interests against [United Leasing] . . . and 
all claims and rights, etc., relating to the Garcia’s Leases.”  
The Trust claimed that United Leasing failed to pay Garcia’s 
over $1 million in surplus proceeds from the disposition of 
collateral held as security for the equipment leases, which 
amount the Trust claimed United Leasing held in constructive 
trust for the benefit of Garcia’s. 
                                                 
1 The complaint alleged three counts against United Leasing, 
arising from an alleged undistributed surplus from the 
disposition of Garcia’s collateral.  Only the breach of contract 
claim is the subject of this appeal. 
 
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The trial took place over three days.  At the close of the 
Trust’s case-in-chief on the second day, United Leasing moved to 
strike the Trust’s evidence on two grounds:  (1) a failure to 
prove an assignment from Garcia’s to the Trust because Hugo had 
relinquished any assignable rights; and (2) a failure to prove a 
breach of contract.  With regard to the second ground, United 
Leasing argued that the Trust failed to prove any damages 
because Garcia’s debt at default was $3.1 million and after the 
application of any credit due, there was a deficiency of at 
least $1.1 million remaining owed to United Leasing.  After 
hearing arguments by counsel, the circuit court overruled United 
Leasing’s motion to strike.  Concerning the validity of the 
assignment, the circuit court stated that there was testimony 
about the assignment by Hugo, and “it appears [Hugo] was a 
trustee at that time.” 
United Leasing presented evidence in its defense, including 
the testimony of two witnesses.  The Trust then called Lehner as 
a rebuttal witness, and Lehner testified that he accepted from 
Hugo, as trustee in liquidation and on behalf of Garcia’s, an 
assignment of all the claims against United Leasing.  After the 
jury retired at the conclusion of all of the evidence, counsel 
for United Leasing stated, “Renew my motion to strike.  For the 
record, I wanted to renew my motion to strike.”  United Leasing 
made no argument in support of its renewed motion, nor did the 
 
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trial judge rule on the motion at that time, as the court 
proceeded to review with counsel the trial exhibits and proposed 
instructions. 
Following closing arguments and after the jury began its 
deliberations, the trial judge addressed counsel for United 
Leasing, “you want to renew your motion to strike?”  Counsel for 
United Leasing responded:  “I wanted to renew my motion to 
strike at the end as we had stated, stating that the plaintiff 
did not prove that there was a deficiency in this situation.”2  
In support of its renewed motion to strike, United Leasing 
argued only the issue of whether the Trust proved damages.  
United Leasing did not make any reference to the validity of the 
assignment from Hugo to the Trust.  The circuit court overruled 
                                                 
2 In order to prevail on its breach of contract claim, the 
Trust had to prove that the sum United Leasing collected from 
the disposition of Garcia’s collateral exceeded the sum Garcia’s 
owed to United Leasing as a result of its default on the 
equipment leases.  In other words, the Trust had to prove a 
surplus.  United Leasing’s position was that the debt owed by 
Garcia’s at default exceeded the amount United Leasing 
collected, and therefore Garcia’s was responsible for the 
deficiency.  However, in its renewed motion to strike, United 
Leasing appears to refer to an alleged “deficiency” in its 
accounting to Garcia’s for sums United Leasing collected in 
excess of what Garcia’s owed.  Regardless of what United Leasing 
meant when it referred to a “deficiency” in its arguments, there 
is no doubt that those arguments did not refer to the issue of 
the assignment, but only to the issue of damages.  To avoid 
further confusion, we will hereafter refer to United Leasing’s 
arguments pertaining to surplus and deficiency as regards to 
proof of damages. 
 
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the renewed motion to strike, concluding that there were factual 
issues to be resolved by the jury. 
The jury returned a $1.1 million verdict for the Trust.  
United Leasing orally moved for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, which the circuit court denied.  The circuit court 
entered judgment on the verdict.  United Leasing subsequently 
filed a “Motion to Reconsider[,] Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding Verdict or, Alternately, Motion to Set Aside 
Verdict and For New Trial.”  The circuit court also denied 
United Leasing’s post-trial motions.  United Leasing’s appeal to 
this Court followed. 
DISCUSSION 
 
On appeal, United Leasing assigns error to the circuit 
court’s denial of its motion to strike the Trust’s evidence, 
contending that the evidence does not establish that Hugo had 
authority to assign Garcia’s breach of contract claim to the 
Trust. 
The Trust argues that United Leasing is procedurally barred 
from asserting any argument regarding the validity of the 
assignment, because it did not renew its motion to strike as to 
the validity of the assignment at the conclusion of the trial 
following presentation of defense and rebuttal evidence.  The 
Trust maintains that United Leasing only renewed its motion to 
strike as to whether the Trust failed to prove damages, and 
 
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never addressed its earlier argument that Hugo lacked the 
authority to assign claims to the Trust.  According to the 
Trust, United Leasing abandoned its argument regarding Hugo’s 
authority to make an assignment. 
United Leasing responds that no authority supports the 
Trust’s position that a renewed motion to strike on previously 
stated grounds must be treated as a nullity unless the movant 
repeats arguments the circuit court has already heard.  Rather, 
United Leasing asserts that Code § 8.01-384(A) provides that 
“[n]o party, after having made an objection or motion known to 
the court, shall be required to make such objection or motion 
again in order to preserve his right to appeal, challenge, or 
move for reconsideration of, a ruling, order, or action of the 
court” and that arguments made at trial, unless expressly 
withdrawn or waived, are preserved. 
Citing Helms v. Manspile, 277 Va. 1, 671 S.E.2d 127 (2009), 
United Leasing contends that once it informed the circuit court 
of its assignment argument, its objection was preserved in the 
absence of an affirmative showing in the record that it 
abandoned that objection or demonstrated by its conduct the 
intent to abandon the objection.  Id. at 6, 671 S.E.2d at 129.  
United Leasing asserts that it never withdrew or abandoned 
Hugo’s lack of authority as a ground for the motion to strike. 
 
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United Leasing further contends that the renewal of its 
motion was unqualified, and therefore encompassed all arguments 
made in support of its original motion to strike.  Specifically, 
United Leasing maintains that  
[t]he Trust’s argument turns Code § 8.01-384 on 
its head [and that] [t]he Trust would have this 
Court construe an unqualified renewal of a motion 
as a waiver of previously stated arguments.  
Rather than require an express withdrawal of an 
argument, such construction would affirmatively 
require a party to repeat arguments previously 
made to the trial court, in contravention of the 
statute’s command. 
 
We disagree with United Leasing and agree with the Trust 
that United Leasing failed to preserve its objection concerning 
the validity of the assignment.  United Leasing’s failure to 
preserve its objection is dispositive of this appeal. 
We begin our analysis by restating the rule of appellate 
procedure that an appellate court will not review a challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence when a defendant who has chosen 
to introduce evidence in his or her defense, after the trial 
court has overruled his or her motion to strike made at the 
conclusion of the plaintiff’s case, does not make either a 
motion to strike at the conclusion of all the evidence or a 
motion to set aside the verdict.  Murillo-Rodriguez v. 
Commonwealth, 279 Va. 64, 72-74, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2010).  In 
those circumstances, the defendant cannot rely on a previously 
made motion to strike, because any challenge to the sufficiency 
 
8
of the evidence, which includes evidence presented by the 
defense, will necessarily raise a new and distinct issue from 
the issue presented by the denied motion to strike.  Id. at 83, 
___ S.E.2d at ___. 
When a defendant chooses to introduce evidence in his or 
her defense, the defendant “demonstrates ‘by his conduct the 
intent to abandon’ the argument that the [plaintiff] failed to 
meet its burden through the evidence presented in its case-in-
chief.”  Id. (quoting Graham v. Cook, 278 Va. 233, 248, 682 
S.E.2d 535, 543 (2009)).  Thus, the defendant must inform the 
circuit court of the grounds upon which he or she relies in 
making a new motion to strike so that the circuit court has the 
opportunity to consider the asserted grounds for the defendant’s 
belief that the plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient in light of 
all the evidence presented, including defense and rebuttal 
evidence.  The motion that United Leasing contends is a renewed 
motion is in reality a new motion because it addresses a 
different quantum of evidence.  Id. at 79-80, ___ S.E.2d at ___. 
Code § 8.01-384(A) specifically states the necessity of 
making the court aware of the grounds for an objection at the 
time of the ruling.  Code § 8.01-384(A) provides, in pertinent 
part, that 
[f]ormal exceptions to rulings or orders of the 
court shall be unnecessary; . . . it shall be 
sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling 
 
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. . . is made or sought, makes known to the court 
the action which he desires the court to take or 
his objections to the action of the court and his 
grounds therefor. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  In Brown v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 210, 217, 
___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2010), we reiterated that under Code 
§ 8.01-384(A) and Helms, for an argument to remain preserved for 
appeal, the court must be aware of a litigant’s legal position.  
In Helms, the circuit court was well aware of the Helms’ legal 
position because their position was preserved in their closing 
argument and through a written memorandum of law submitted at 
the conclusion of the evidence.  277 Va. at 7, 671 S.E.2d at 
129.  Likewise, in Brown, not only did the Commonwealth 
expressly argue its position, the circuit court even 
acknowledged that it understood the Commonwealth’s position when 
the court articulated its ruling.  279 Va. at 218, ___ S.E.2d at 
___. 
Unlike in Helms, the procedural posture of this case 
involves a motion to strike at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s 
evidence, then presentation of evidence by the defense as well 
as rebuttal evidence by the plaintiff, followed by a renewed 
motion to strike by the defense at the conclusion of the trial.  
United Leasing did not merely renew the motion to strike made at 
the conclusion of the Trust’s case-in-chief, but proceeded to 
assert only one of the grounds originally argued.  Renewing a 
 
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motion to strike at the conclusion of all of the evidence in the 
trial required United Leasing to identify the grounds upon which 
that relief was sought in order for the court to be apprised of 
what arguments were being renewed.  In making its renewed motion 
to strike, which was a separate and distinct motion from its 
original motion to strike, United Leasing failed to inform the 
circuit court that one of the grounds upon which it relied was 
the validity of the assignment.  In fact, in addressing its 
renewed motion to strike, United Leasing focused exclusively on 
its argument that the Trust did not prove damages.  In its 
renewed motion to strike, United Leasing made no mention 
whatsoever of its objection to the validity of the assignment. 
The record contains additional support for the conclusion 
that the circuit court was not aware of United Leasing’s 
objection to the validity of the assignment.  In closing 
argument, United Leasing did not argue the assignment issue to 
the jury, but again focused on its contention that the Trust had 
not proven damages.  Additionally, United Leasing’s post-trial 
motions only refer to the monetary calculations of debits and 
credits associated with the dissolution of Garcia’s, and no 
argument was made contesting the validity of the assignment.  In 
fact, in the only section of the post-trial motions that even 
mentions the concept of assignment, United Leasing communicated 
to the trial court only its implicit acceptance of the validity 
 
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of the assignment when it referred to “the Trust, as Hugo 
Garcia’s assignee” in its written contention that the Trust 
failed to prove damages. 
Because United Leasing did not make a contemporaneous 
objection to the validity of the assignment when it renewed its 
motion to strike, the circuit court was not given “an 
opportunity to rule intelligently” on that issue.  Shelton v. 
Commonwealth, 274 Va. 121, 126, 645 S.E.2d 914, 916 (2007).  
Although United Leasing asked the circuit court, at the 
conclusion of the Trust’s evidence, to rule on the validity of 
the assignment, “the [circuit] court was never asked to rule on 
this issue based on the entire record.”  Murillo-Rodriguez, 279 
Va. at 75, ___ S.E.2d at ___.  By failing to make a motion to 
strike as to the validity of the assignment after United Leasing 
presented its evidence and the Trust introduced rebuttal 
evidence, United Leasing “waived [its] challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence just as if [it] ‘failed to object to 
any other matter at trial.’”  Id. (quoting White v. 
Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 231, 233, 348 S.E.2d 866, 867 (1986)). 
As we have previously stated, this concept of waiver is 
nothing more than a straightforward application 
of the contemporaneous objection rule.  “The 
primary purpose of requiring timely and specific 
objections is to allow the trial court an 
opportunity to rule intelligently on the issues 
presented, thereby avoiding unnecessary appeals 
and reversals. . . . If a party fails to make a 
 
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timely objection, the objection is waived for 
purposes of appeal.” 
 
Id. at 79, ___ S.E.2d at ___ (quoting Shelton, 274 Va. at 126, 
645 S.E.2d at 916). 
The failure of United Leasing to renew its motion to strike 
concerning the validity of the assignment at the conclusion of 
the trial deprived the circuit court of the opportunity to rule 
on that issue in the context of all of the evidence presented.  
This failure constitutes a waiver of United Leasing’s right to 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.  Id. at 80, 
___ S.E.2d at ___. 
CONCLUSION 
United Leasing demonstrated the intent to abandon its 
argument regarding the validity of the assignment when it failed 
to clearly renew its motion to strike on that basis at the 
conclusion of all the evidence.  United Leasing did not satisfy 
the requirements of Code § 8.01-384(A), because it failed to 
make known to the circuit court that the validity of the 
assignment was grounds for its renewed motion to strike based 
upon all of the evidence presented at the trial.  Therefore, 
United Leasing cannot obtain appellate review of its assignment 
of error regarding an issue not preserved in the court below.  
Rule 5:25. 
 
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Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court will be 
affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
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