Title: Henry Perry Sireci v. Michael W. Moore
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC01-1399
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 2002

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC01-1399
____________
HENRY PERRY SIRECI,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE, etc., et al.,
Respondents.
[February 28, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
Henry Perry Sireci petitions this Court for writ of habeas corpus.  Under
article V, section 3(b)(9) of the Florida Constitution, we have jurisdiction.
Factual and Procedural History
In October 1976, a jury found Mr. Sireci guilty of the first-degree murder of
Howard Poteet.  On November 15, 1976, the trial court sentenced Mr. Sireci to
death.  The jury’s conviction and Judge Maurice M. Paul’s sentence were upheld
by this Court in Sireci v. State, 399 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
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984 (1982).  The petitioner then unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief in the
trial court pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, and that decision
was affirmed on appeal as well.  Sireci v. State, 469 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1985), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986).  On September 19, 1986, the Governor signed a
death warrant for Mr. Sireci.
Following the signing of his death warrant, Mr. Sireci filed a second motion
for postconviction relief.  This Court affirmed the trial court’s order mandating a
limited evidentiary hearing on this postconviction motion.  State v. Sireci, 502 So.
2d 1221 (Fla. 1987).  After conducting the limited evidentiary hearing, the trial court
ordered a new penalty phase, which was affirmed by this Court in State v. Sireci,
536 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1988).  The resentencing jury recommended the death penalty
by a vote of eleven to one, and the trial court again imposed the death penalty.  The
death sentence was again affirmed by this Court.  Sireci v. State, 587 So. 2d 450
(Fla. 1991).  Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. 
Sireci v. Florida, 503 U.S. 946 (1992).
Mr. Sireci then challenged his new sentence of death by filing an original and
then three amended motions for postconviction relief.  Pursuant to Huff v. State,
622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993), Judge Richard F. Conrad presided over a hearing on
the rule 3.850 motion on January 21, 1999.  The court summarily denied the
1.  The petitioner alleges that (1) his appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s
finding of the avoiding or preventing lawful arrest aggravator; (2) his appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court’s findings of the cold,
calculated, and premeditated aggravator, the avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest
aggravator, and the in the course of a robbery or for pecuniary gain aggravator
were all unconstitutionally based upon the same facts; (3) his appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the trial
court’s finding of the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator; (4) his
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on appeal that Mr. Sireci’s
constitutional rights were violated by the trial court’s requiring him to remain
shackled during the penalty phase of his trial; (5) the Florida capital sentencing
statute, as applied here, is unconstitutional under the United States Supreme
Court’s opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); (6) when viewed
cumulatively, the errors that Mr. Sireci’s counsel failed to raise on appeal deprived
him of a fundamentally fair trial, necessitating a new penalty phase hearing; and (7)
his execution will violate the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment contained
in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as he may be
incompetent at the time his sentence is carried out.
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petitioner’s motion on February 9, 1999, and this Court affirmed in Sireci v. State,
773 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 2000).  This habeas petition, in which seven claims regarding
Mr. Sireci’s 1990 resentencing and subsequent direct appeal are presented,1
followed.
Discussion
I. 
Avoiding or Preventing Lawful Arrest Aggravator
In his first claim, the petitioner asserts that there was insufficient evidence
before the trial court to establish that the murder here was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest by eliminating a witness. 
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Accordingly, petitioner contends that the failure of his appellate counsel to raise this
issue on direct appeal amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel.  Despite
petitioner’s contentions to the contrary, it is nonetheless plain here that this claim
was indeed asserted and rejected by this Court on Mr. Sireci’s original appeal.  See
Sireci v. State, 399 So. 2d 964, 971 (Fla. 1981) (rejecting Mr. Sireci’s claim that the
aggravators found by the trial court were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt). 
Thus, raising it again here as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is improper. 
See Medina v. State, 573 So. 2d 293, 295 (Fla. 1990).
Additionally, we are certain that there was competent evidence before the trial
court establishing that the dominant motive for the murder here was avoidance of
arrest.  The import of the testimony given by David Wilson at trial is plain:
Q: What did you ask Mr. Sireci?
A: How come he stabbed the people, the person so many times.
Q: What did he answer?
A: That he believed in leaving no witnesses.
Additionally, Harvey Woodall testified as follows:
Q: Did he know whether or not the man was dead?
A: Was dead when he left?
Q: Yes, Sir.
A: Yeah, he knew he was dead.  He said he wasn’t going to leave
nobody who could identify him, no witnesses to testify against him.
Based upon the record before us, it is clear to this Court that there was sufficient
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evidence before the trial court to establish that the murder here was committed for
the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest by eliminating a witness. 
Therefore, even if the rejection of this claim on petitioner’s direct appeal to this
Court did not operate to bar its further assertion in this cause, it is without merit. 
As the underlying assertion of error is meritless, the claim that appellate counsel
was ineffective must also fail.  See Engle v. Dugger, 576 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1991).
II. 
Unconstitutional Doubling of Aggravators
In his second claim, the petitioner asserts that the trial court
unconstitutionally based its findings of the cold, calculated, and premeditated
aggravator; the avoiding or preventing lawful arrest aggravator; and the in the
course of a robbery or for pecuniary gain aggravator upon the same facts.  Since
petitioner’s appellate counsel did not raise this issue on direct appeal, Mr. Sireci
now asserts that the assistance rendered by his appellate attorney was ineffective.
In Banks v. State, 700 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1997), we enunciated the proper
analysis concerning the duplication of aggravating factors:
Improper doubling occurs when both aggravators rely on the
same essential feature or aspect of the crime.  However, there is no
reason why the facts in a given case may not support multiple
aggravating factors so long as they are separate and distinct
aggravators and not merely restatements of each other, as in murder
committed during a burglary or robbery and murder for pecuniary
gain, or murder committed to avoid arrest and murder committed to
2.  This motive-method dichotomy mirrors the rationale we relied upon in
upholding the death sentence in Stein v. State, 632 So. 2d 1361, 1366 (Fla. 1994).
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hinder law enforcement.
Id. at 367 (citation omitted).  Hence, the focus in an examination of a claim of
unconstitutional doubling is on the particular aggravators themselves, as opposed
to whether different and independent underlying facts support each separate
aggravating factor.
In the instant case, the three aggravators Mr. Sireci challenges are the cold,
calculated, and premeditated aggravator; the avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest
aggravator; and the in the course of a robbery or for pecuniary gain aggravator.  In
accordance with Banks, all of these aggravators are distinct from each other. 
Further, even though the aggravators are all based upon interrelated facts, the focus
of each aggravator is upon a different facet or motivation of Mr. Sireci’s crime.
The avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest aggravator, found based upon a
witness elimination rationale, focuses on the petitioner’s motive for murdering the
victim.  In sharp contrast, in finding that Mr. Sireci’s acts were cold, calculated,
and premeditated, the focus of the trial court was upon the manner in which the
crime was executed.2  Finally, the finding that the murder was committed in the
course of a robbery and for pecuniary gain is a conclusion regarding the context in
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which the murder occurred--during a robbery.
Upon close scrutiny, it is clear that this claim is without merit.  Therefore,
appellate counsel cannot be faulted for not raising it before this Court on direct
review.  See Engle, 576 So. 2d at 703-04.  Counsel’s assistance was not ineffective,
and this Court remains confident that the correct result was attained.
III. 
Cold, Calculated, and Premeditated Aggravator
In his third claim, Mr. Sireci argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s
determination that the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator was
established.  In Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 1994), this Court outlined the
requirements for finding the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating factor
to have been established, stating:
[T]he jury must determine that the killing was the product of cool and
calm reflection and not an act prompted by an emotional frenzy, panic,
or a fit of rage (cold); and that the defendant had a careful plan or
prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal incident
(calculated); and that the defendant exhibited heightened premeditation
(premeditated); and that the defendant had no pretense of moral or
legal justification.
Id. at 89 (citation omitted).  The trial court below relied upon the fact that the
petitioner called to ensure that the victim would wait at the business for his arrival
and that he obtained a weapon (a tire iron) before proceeding to the scene of the
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crime in holding that “[t]he evidence establishes that the murder of Howard Poteet
was intended from the very beginning of the robbery plot.”
The petitioner is correct in asserting that the trial court did not specifically
enunciate the individual facets of its finding that the murder here was cold,
calculated, and premeditated.  Clearly, however, the trial court had adequate facts
upon which to base its finding here.  During her testimony, Barbara Perkins outlined
the extent of Mr. Sireci’s planning.  He instructed her on where to drop him off (a
neighboring vacant lot) and pick him up (the nearby gas station), called Poteet
Motors before the event to ensure that the victim would be there, and located a “lug
wrench” to take with him.
The trial court concluded that the preparatory steps taken by Mr. Sireci (the
telephone call and acquisition of the tire iron) evinced the reflection and careful
planning required by Florida law.  See, e.g., Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526, 533
(Fla. 1987) (requiring “a careful plan or prearranged design to kill”).  In addition,
the court decided that the murder had been intended from the beginning, thus
satisfying the “heightened premeditation” requirement.  Hill v. State, 515 So. 2d 176
(Fla. 1987).
Our review of this question is governed by our holding in Almeida v. State,
748 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1999), in which we stated:
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A trial court’s ruling on an aggravating circumstance will be sustained
on review as long as the court applied the right rule of law and its
ruling is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. 
Competent substantial evidence is tantamount to legally sufficient
evidence, and we assess the record evidence for its sufficiency only,
not its weight.
Id. at 932 (citation omitted).  As the trial court below had sufficient evidence before
it to support the finding of this aggravator, its ruling would have been sustained on
direct review.  For this reason, appellate counsel cannot be faulted for not asserting
this meritless claim.
Even assuming, however, that insufficient evidence existed to support the
trial court’s finding this aggravating circumstance, four other valid aggravators exist
in this case.  Among them are two of the most weighty in Florida’s sentencing
calculus--prior violent felony conviction and that the murder was heinous,
atrocious, or cruel.  Therefore, even if the trial court had committed error in finding
the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator here, which it did not, such
would be harmless.  See, e.g., Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2000) (finding
wrongful application of the avoiding a lawful arrest aggravator harmless error where
four other valid aggravators--prior violent felonies; pecuniary gain; heinous,
atrocious, and cruel; and cold, calculated, and premeditated--existed); Guzman v.
State, 721 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 1998) (upholding imposition of the death penalty
3.  See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986) (holding that certain
practices, including the binding and gagging of criminal defendants “pose such a
threat to the fairness of the factfinding process that they must be subjected to close
judicial scrutiny”); see also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), Elledge v.
Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439 (11th Cir. 1987).
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where the trial court’s finding the CCP aggravator was overturned, but the
remaining four other aggravators--prior violent felony; committed in the course of a
robbery; heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and avoiding arrest--existed); Jimenez v.
State, 703 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1997) (death sentence upheld where prior violent felony
conviction; committed in the course of a robbery; committed while under
community control; and heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravators were found).
IV. 
Shackling of the Petitioner
Fourth, the petitioner asserts that his appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to argue on appeal that Mr. Sireci’s constitutional rights were violated by the
trial court’s order that required him to remain shackled during the new penalty
phase of his trial.  It is well established that the decision to restrain a criminal
defendant in the presence of the jury is subject to very close judicial scrutiny.3  It is
just as plain, however, that it is well within a trial court’s authority to restrain a
defendant “when circumstances involving the security and safety of the proceeding
warrant it.”  Bryant v. State, 785 So. 2d 422, 428 (Fla. 2001).  In addition, brief
exposure of the jury to the defendant in prison garb or restraints is not per se
4.  This was based upon the trial court receiving information that the
defendant had been found in possession of a comb fashioned into a knife while in
jail.  See Correll, 558 So. 2d at 424.
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prejudicial so as to require a mistrial.  See Singleton v. State, 783 So. 2d 970, 976
(Fla. 2001); Neary v. State, 384 So. 2d 881, 885 (Fla. 1980).
In the instant case, there is nothing in the record that leads us to conclude
that the jury ever saw Mr. Sireci in restraints.  Indeed, the trial court here made
every effort to keep the petitioner’s restraints from being viewed by the jury by
placing tables in front of his seat.  Additionally, the trial court certainly had
justification for restraining the petitioner--an alleged attempt by the petitioner to
have his brother-in-law killed so that he could not testify for the State.  See Sireci v.
State, 399 So. 2d 964, 968 (Fla. 1981).  Thus, the instant case is much like Correll
v. Dugger, 558 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1990), where this Court held that appellate counsel
could not be faulted for not complaining of the restraints placed on his client at
trial.  There, as here, the trial court concluded that the defendant was a security
risk,4 placed items in front of the defense counsel table, and had the defendant
shackled.  See Id. at 424.  The longstanding principle that trial judges must have
discretion to properly manage their courtrooms, in combination with a complete
absence of evidence indicating any prejudice to the petitioner, requires this Court to
deem this argument without merit.
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V.
Remaining Claims
Mr. Sireci’s final three claims may be resolved in a summary fashion.  He
asserts first that under the United States Supreme Court’s Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000), opinion, the Florida capital sentencing scheme is
unconstitutional.  In our recent holding in Mills v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 532 (Fla.
2001), this Court stated that “[t]he majority opinion in Apprendi forecloses Mills’
claim because Apprendi preserves the constitutionality of capital sentencing
schemes like Florida’s.  Therefore, on its face, Apprendi is inapplicable to this
case.”  Id. at 537.  We have already resolved this issue adversely to Mr. Sireci’s
claim, and see no need to reconsider our Mills opinion.
The petitioner also asserts that when viewed cumulatively, the errors allegedly
occurring at trial that Mr. Sireci’s counsel failed to raise on appeal deprived the
petitioner of a fundamentally fair trial, necessitating a new penalty phase hearing. 
As we have determined that none of the petitioner’s assertions of error have merit,
we must also conclude that there is no cumulative error to consider.  See Melendez
v. State, 718 So. 2d 746, 749 (Fla. 1998).
Finally, despite acknowledgment by the petitioner that this claim is not yet
ripe, he asserts that his execution will violate the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
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as he may be incompetent at the time his sentence is carried out.  Since no death
warrant has been issued here, this claim is certainly not ripe for review by this
Court.  See Martin v. Wainwright, 497 So. 2d 872, 873 (Fla. 1986) (holding that a
claim that the death penalty will be cruel and unusual punishment because the
prisoner will be incompetent at the time of execution is not properly reviewed until
that prisoner’s execution is pending).  Thus, we decline to address this issue at this
time.
Conclusion
Based upon the preceding determinations that the petitioner’s claims are
either without merit or not yet ripe for review, we decline to grant the petitioner’s
requested relief.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Middle, Peter J. Cannon, Assistant
CCRC, Kevin T. Beck, Assistant CCRC, and Lelslie Anne Scalley, Staff Attorney,
Office of Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Middle, Tampa, Florida,
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for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Scott A. Browne, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Respondent