Title: Ragland v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 259, 2007
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 17, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
EDGAR RAGLAND, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 259, 2007 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0606001306 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: November 1, 2007 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: December 17, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 17th day of December 2007, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
brief filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to 
withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Edgar Ragland, was found guilty by a 
Superior Court jury of Trafficking in Cocaine, Possession of Cocaine With 
Intent to Deliver, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.1  On the trafficking 
conviction, Ragland was sentenced to 15 years of Level V incarceration, to 
                                                 
1 Prior to trial, the State voluntarily dismissed the charges of Possession With Intent to 
Deliver Crack Cocaine and Possession of Marijuana.  The charge of Conspiracy to 
Maintain a Dwelling was dismissed by the judge at the close of the State’s case.  The jury 
found Ragland not guilty of the charge of Maintaining a Dwelling for the Keeping of 
Controlled Substances.    
 
2
be suspended after 6 years for decreasing levels of supervision.  On the 
conviction of possession with intent to deliver, he was sentenced to 15 years 
at Level V, to be suspended after 3 years for 18 months of concurrent Level 
III probation.  On the conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia, he was 
sentenced to 1 year at Level V, to be suspended for one year of concurrent 
Level II probation.  This is Ragland’s direct appeal. 
 
(2) 
Ragland’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims 
that could arguably support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its 
own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without 
an adversary presentation.2   
 
(3) 
Ragland’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and 
complete examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  
By letter, Ragland’s counsel informed Ragland of the provisions of Rule 
26(c) and provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the 
                                                 
2 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
3
accompanying brief and the complete trial transcript.  Ragland also was 
informed of his right to supplement his attorney’s presentation.  Ragland 
responded with a brief that raises eleven issues for this Court’s 
consideration.  The State has responded to the position taken by Ragland’s 
counsel as well as the issues raised by Ragland and has moved to affirm the 
Superior Court’s judgment. 
 
(4) 
Ragland raises eleven issues for this Court’s consideration, 
which may fairly be summarized as follows: a) the Superior Court 
improperly permitted a biased juror to remain on the jury panel; b) the 
prosecutor engaged in misconduct by failing to reveal that he was acquainted 
with the juror; c) the trial judge engaged in misconduct by improperly 
interfering with one of the witnesses and by hindering the defense; and d) his 
attorney provided ineffective assistance.  
 
(5) 
The trial transcript reflects the following:  Around 6:00 a.m. on 
June 2, 2006, several Delaware State Police officers responded to Lot A4, 
Lakeland Trailer Park, Ontario Avenue, Dover, Delaware, to execute a 
search warrant.  Upon entering the trailer, Corporal David Hake forced open 
one of the bedroom doors and found Ragland lying in bed.  Ragland was 
secured and taken to the living room while the police officers searched the 
 
4
trailer.  Duane Richardson, the owner of the trailer, also was taken into 
custody.   
 
(6) 
A search of the bedroom where Ragland was found turned up 
five plastic bags of what was later determined to be powder cocaine, a 
number of loose pieces of what was later determined to be crack cocaine, 
and $314 in cash.  No suspected illegal drugs were found anywhere else in 
the trailer, although a digital scale with white residue on it was found in the 
kitchen.  Two suspected crack pipes were found under the bed in 
Richardson’s bedroom.   
 
(7) 
Ragland was transferred to Troop 3, Kent County, Delaware, 
where Corporal Hake interviewed him.  Videotapes of the interview were 
admitted into evidence at trial.  Corporal Hake testified that he read Ragland 
his Miranda rights and that Ragland waived those rights prior to the 
interview.  During the interview, Ragland stated that he had sold an “eight 
ball,” which Corporal Hake described as 3.55 grams of cocaine.  Ragland 
also stated that the cocaine found in his bedroom had been “fronted” to him, 
meaning that he had paid only a part of the money for the drugs up front.  
Ragland, finally, stated that he combined powder cocaine, baking soda and 
water and “cook[ed] it up” into crack cocaine.       
 
5
 
(8) 
Richardson was charged as Ragland’s co-defendant and later 
pleaded guilty to conspiracy in connection with the cocaine found in his 
trailer.  Richardson was a witness at Ragland’s trial and testified that the 
cocaine did not belong to him and that other individuals besides Ragland had 
stayed in the bedroom where the cocaine was found.  The police witnesses 
testified that just under 100 grams of cocaine had been seized.  
 
(9) 
The trial transcript reflects that, during the lunch recess on the 
first day of trial, juror number four informed the Superior Court bailiff that 
she thought she recognized one of the prosecutors.  During a colloquy with 
the judge, the juror stated that she believed she lived in the same housing 
development with the prosecutor, had seen the prosecutor at community 
meetings, and that their sons had played on the same baseball team.  The 
prosecutor stated that he initially thought the juror looked familiar.  After 
hearing her testify, he agreed that she lived in his development and that their 
sons had played on the same baseball team about four years previously.  He 
stated, and the juror agreed, that they had a “nodding acquaintance” only.  
When the judge asked the juror if her acquaintance with the prosecutor 
would affect her judgment, she said it would not.  In light of the information 
elicited during the colloquy, and in the absence of any objection from the 
defense, the judge permitted the juror to remain on the jury.   
 
6
 
(10) Ragland’s first and second claims are that the Superior Court 
improperly permitted juror number four to remain on the jury panel and that 
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he failed to reveal that he was 
acquainted with the juror.  We review the Superior Court’s decision to allow 
a juror to remain on the jury panel for abuse of discretion.3  Given the 
minimal nature of the relationship between the prosecutor and the juror, the 
juror’s statement that her acquaintance with the prosecutor would not affect 
her judgment, and in the absence of any objection from the defense, we find 
no abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior Court in permitting the 
juror to remain on the jury panel.  Moreover, there is no indication that the 
prosecutor intended to deceive anyone regarding the juror.  The trial 
transcript reflects that the prosecutor did not fully recognize the juror until 
she testified before the judge.  He then agreed that he had a “nodding 
acquaintance” with her.  We conclude, therefore, that Ragland’s first and 
second claims are without merit. 
 
(11) Ragland’s third claim is that the trial judge improperly 
interfered with Duane Richardson’s testimony by ruling that he could not 
testify concerning his guilty plea.  The trial transcript reflects that the 
prosecutor requested that Richardson not be permitted to testify about his 
                                                 
3 Weber v. State, 547 A.2d 948, 954 (Del. 1988). 
 
7
guilty plea and, in the absence of any objection on the part of defense 
counsel, the judge granted the request.  Ragland ultimately benefited from 
Richardson’s testimony, since Richardson was able to testify that others 
besides Ragland had occupied the bedroom where the cocaine was found.  
Moreover, contrary to Ragland’s contention, the trial transcript does not 
reflect that the trial judge improperly interfered in any way with defense 
counsel’s case.  To the contrary, the trial transcript reflects that the trial 
judge properly exercised control over the conduct of the trial, as he is 
obliged to do.4  We, therefore, conclude that Ragland’s third claim is without 
merit.       
 
(12) Ragland’s fourth, and final, claim is that his attorney provided 
ineffective assistance.  It is axiomatic that this Court will not entertain an 
ineffectiveness claim for the first time on direct appeal.5  Because the 
Superior Court did not adjudicate the claim in the first instance, we decline 
to address it in this appeal.  Ragland’s fourth claim is, therefore, also 
unavailing.  
 
(13) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Ragland’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Ragland’s counsel has made a 
                                                 
4 D.U.R.E. 611(a). 
5 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). 
 
8
conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly determined that 
Ragland could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
                                                 
6 On November 9, 2007, Ragland filed a “motion for the appointment of new counsel” on 
the ground that his counsel had moved to withdraw.  Under Rule 26(c), counsel is 
required to review the record and the law for arguably appealable issues and, if counsel 
believes there are none, to move to withdraw.  The client is then given the opportunity to 
supplement his counsel’s presentation.  The record reflects that the proper procedures 
under Rule 26(c) were followed in this case and, therefore, there are no grounds for the 
appointment of new counsel.  As such, Ragland’s motion is hereby denied.