Title: People v. Jolly
Citation: 2014 IL 117142
Docket Number: 117142
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 4, 2014

Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JOHN 
WILLIE JOLLY, Appellant. 
 
 
 
Docket No. 
 
117142 
 
 
 
Filed 
Modified upon 
denial of rehearing 
 
 
December 4, 2014 
 
January 28, 2015 
 
 
 
Held 
(Note: 
This 
syllabus 
constitutes no part of the 
opinion of the court but 
has been prepared by the 
Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of 
the reader.) 
 
 
The common law developed from the 1984 Krankel decision provides 
that a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective trial assistance calls for 
appointment of new counsel if a factual inquiry shows possible 
neglect, but not if the claim lacks merit or pertains only to trial 
strategy; and, because new counsel is not appointed at this stage, 
prosecutorial participation, if any, should be only de minimis, and 
adversarial participation by the State against a pro se defendant called 
for the remand of a cocaine case for a new preliminary Krankel 
hearing without such participation and before a different judge. 
 
 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
 
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District; heard in that 
court on appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County, the Hon. 
Scott D. Drazewski, Judge, presiding. 
 
 
Judgment 
 
 
Reversed and remanded with instructions. 
 
 
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Counsel on 
Appeal 
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Karen Munoz and 
Jacqueline L. Bullard, Deputy Defenders, and Martin J. Ryan, 
Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate 
Defender, of Springfield, for appellant. 
 
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Carolyn E. Shapiro, 
Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Erica Seyburn, Assistant 
Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People. 
 
 
 
Justices 
 
JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Karmeier, 
Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
This case arises in the context of a preliminary inquiry into a defendant’s pro se posttrial 
allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel pursuant to this court’s decision in People 
v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984). More specifically, this appeal requires us to resolve a 
conflict in the appellate court on the appropriate treatment of a circuit court’s decision to allow 
the State’s adversarial participation in a preliminary Krankel inquiry. The State concedes that 
the circuit court’s decision to allow its adversarial participation is erroneous. 
¶ 2 
 
Here, defendant, John Willie Jolly, filed a pro se posttrial motion alleging ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel. Ultimately, the circuit court of McLean County conducted a 
preliminary Krankel inquiry on defendant’s claims. In relevant part, the circuit court 
erroneously permitted the State to participate in an adversarial manner and relied on matters 
outside the record during that inquiry. 
¶ 3 
 
On direct appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s 
posttrial motion, concluding that the trial court’s errors were harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 2013 IL App (4th) 120981. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand. 
 
¶ 4 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 5 
 
In 2010, defendant was charged with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. At his 
jury trial in the circuit court of McLean County, the State’s evidence consisted largely of the 
testimony of Robbie Gunn, a 45-year-old confidential informant. Gunn, a self-admitted drug 
addict, had three felony convictions for delivery of a controlled substance. In June 2009, a 
Bloomington police detective arrested Gunn for selling illegal drugs. In exchange for the 
State’s agreement to dismiss that charge and an unrelated misdemeanor drug charge, Gunn 
agreed to act as a confidential informant for controlled buys. 
 
 
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¶ 6 
 
On March 18, 2010, Gunn arranged to buy cocaine from defendant, whom Gunn knew as 
“Bud.” Gunn explained that he had dealt with defendant on multiple prior occasions, and he 
recognized defendant’s voice and appearance. At the direction of a police detective, Gunn 
called defendant to purchase cocaine. Gunn agreed to purchase $50 worth of cocaine from 
defendant at their “normal spot” on Mulberry Street. Defendant arrived at the agreed upon 
location in a burgundy car, and Gunn purchased the cocaine through the passenger window of 
defendant’s car. On cross-examination, Gunn explained that he did not wear a surveillance 
wire during the transaction, and he used his own cell phone to call defendant. Gunn admitted 
that working as a confidential informant was his only source of income during that time period. 
¶ 7 
 
The State also presented the testimony of the police officers involved in the operation. One 
officer observed defendant leave his residence at 1:41 p.m. in a car matching Gunn’s 
description. Shortly thereafter, at 1:47 p.m., a second officer saw defendant arrive in the 
vehicle, and then saw Gunn briefly lean into the passenger window. After the sale was 
complete, police officers attempted to stop defendant’s vehicle, but defendant drove away. The 
officers pursued defendant in unmarked squad cars with their lights and sirens activated. As 
defendant fled in his vehicle, the pursuing officers saw defendant throw out paper. 
¶ 8 
 
Police officers ended the vehicle pursuit for reasons of public safety, but they successfully 
apprehended defendant about 10 or 15 minutes later when another officer observed defendant 
exit his parked car. Defendant possessed a cell phone with a number matching the one called 
by Gunn. Officers also recovered the paper thrown from defendant’s vehicle, and discovered 
that it was torn United States paper currency. Although the damaged currency could not be 
conclusively matched, the recovered pieces with partial serial numbers matched with numbers 
on the prerecorded currency that law enforcement provided to Gunn for the controlled buy. 
The parties stipulated that the substance that Gunn purchased from defendant weighed 0.1 
gram and contained cocaine. 
¶ 9 
 
Defendant did not present any evidence. Following closing arguments, the jury found 
defendant guilty of delivery of a controlled substance. The circuit court sentenced defendant to 
16 years’ imprisonment as a Class X offender, based on his prior felony convictions. 
¶ 10 
 
On October 25, 2010, defendant filed a pro se motion, titled “Motion to Reduce Sentence.” 
In addition to challenging his sentence, defendant challenged the effectiveness of his trial 
counsel. Specifically, defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel 
failed to: (1) move to reduce defendant’s bond; (2) obtain defendant’s consent before waiving 
his right to a speedy trial; (3) appear in court to represent defendant during one or more pretrial 
hearings; (4) provide defendant access to discovery materials; (5) discuss trial strategy with 
defendant or visit him; and (6) prepare to represent defendant at trial because counsel was 
preparing for another criminal case. 
¶ 11 
 
On November 19, 2010, the McLean County public defender’s office filed a letter 
notifying the court that defendant’s trial counsel was no longer a public defender contract 
attorney and that a new assistant public defender had been assigned. 
¶ 12 
 
On November 23, 2010, defendant filed a second pro se motion, titled “Motion to Amend 
the Motion to Reduce Sentence.” In relevant part, defendant added new claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to: (1) object to the State’s testimony on the recovered currency; (2) challenge 
Gunn’s credibility; (3) challenge the sufficiency of the evidence; (4) object to the police 
 
 
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officer’s testimony that defendant’s voice was recorded; (5) object to the lack of testimony 
from experts on the State’s exhibits, including the admission of cocaine; (6) file a motion to 
dismiss the charges for lack of evidence; and (7) file a motion to suppress the recovered 
cocaine and pieces of currency. 
¶ 13 
 
Following a hearing with defendant represented by new counsel from the public defender’s 
office, the circuit court denied defendant’s pro se motion to reduce sentence, finding that the 
sentence was not excessive. The court also rejected defendant’s claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, finding those claims untimely. Alternatively, the court found that 
defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance could be considered as plain error by the appellate 
court or pursued in a postconviction petition. 
¶ 14 
 
In the first direct appeal in this case, the appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court 
erred by failing to conduct any inquiry into defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel. The court remanded the matter to the circuit court for a new hearing and preliminary 
inquiry under Krankel. People v. Jolly, 2012 IL App (4th) 110033-U. 
¶ 15 
 
On remand, the circuit court conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry, the subject of the 
instant appeal. At the beginning of the hearing, the court allowed defendant’s new attorney 
from the public defender’s office to be excused from the proceeding. Thus, defendant 
proceeded pro se at the hearing. 
¶ 16 
 
Upon seeing defendant’s original trial counsel, Mr. Welch, in the courtroom, the circuit 
court asked defendant whether he preferred that Welch leave the courtroom until he was 
needed to testify. Defendant replied that he did not want Welch present until he was needed. 
¶ 17 
 
The circuit court then explained to defendant that the preliminary inquiry under Krankel 
was intended to address defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance that he raised in his two 
posttrial motions. The court opined that “there is no specific method that the reviewing courts, 
whether it [is] the Illinois Appellate or the Illinois Supreme Court, have defined as far as the 
manner in which this type of proceeding would be conducted.” Nonetheless, the court 
explained that it would seek to keep the proceeding as “informal as possible recognizing that 
the ultimate determination is to make a good record” of the court’s final ruling on those claims. 
¶ 18 
 
Next, the circuit court extensively reviewed each of defendant’s claims and allowed 
defendant to explain each claim. During that exchange, however, the trial court repeatedly 
stopped defendant from making any argument on his claims. At one point, the court explained 
that its goal in the hearing was to “ascertain what the assertions of ineffective assistance are,” 
but that “we are not here to go ahead and argue, that being the specific merits of [defendant’s 
claims].” 
¶ 19 
 
When the circuit court finished questioning defendant about his claims, the court asked the 
State if it wanted to submit any evidence. More specifically, the court offered the State the 
opportunity to “rebut” defendant’s claims but repeated its earlier observation that the 
proceeding was “not a full evidentiary hearing.” The State replied affirmatively and indicated 
that they wanted to call Welch as a witness. The court agreed to let the State call Welch as a 
witness but prohibited defendant from cross-examining Welch because of the preliminary 
nature of the proceeding. The court again emphasized that the proceeding was not intended to 
be an evidentiary hearing, regardless of whether the court or the State questioned Welch. 
¶ 20 
 
After Welch was called and sworn in as a witness, the State questioned him at length on 
defendant’s claims that he was ineffective. In answering the State’s questions, Welch generally 
 
 
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rebutted or otherwise denied defendant’s claims that he provided ineffective trial assistance. 
The State also solicited testimony from Welch explaining that he did not file a motion to 
reduce defendant’s bond or a motion to suppress the recovered evidence because he did not 
believe those motions would have been successful. In response to the State’s questioning, 
Welch also informed the court that he had substantial experience trying criminal cases, 
estimating that he had “handled” over 1,000 criminal cases in his 31-year career as an attorney. 
After the State finished questioning Welch, the circuit court also asked Welch questions about 
defendant’s claims. 
¶ 21 
 
The circuit court then permitted the parties to present argument on whether a full 
evidentiary hearing under Krankel was necessary. Both parties presented brief arguments. 
Defendant, appearing pro se, contended that he was entitled to a full evidentiary hearing 
because he was denied a “proper trial” as a result of his counsel’s ineffective assistance. The 
State countered that defendant failed to show that his counsel was ineffective and, therefore, 
was not entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on his claims. 
¶ 22 
 
At the close of the hearing, the circuit court reemphasized the preliminary nature of the 
proceeding and explained that it was not intended to be a full evidentiary hearing. When 
describing how it reviewed defendant’s claims, the court stated that it considered the factual 
basis of the claims, the merit of the claims, whether the claims pertained to trial strategy, and 
whether they constituted ineffectiveness under the governing Strickland test. In addition, the 
court indicated that it would consider the statements of defendant and Welch, the court file, and 
its own observation of Welch’s performance during defendant’s trial. Last, and relevant to this 
appeal, the trial court also indicated that it would consider evidence not in the record. 
Specifically, the trial judge stated he would rely on his personal knowledge of Mr. Welch’s 
work as an attorney in prior unrelated criminal cases. The judge explained that he was familiar 
with Mr. Welch’s work “during that period of time that both of us were in the criminal felony 
division” and “would have had numerous encounters with one another.” The court then ruled 
that it would not appoint new counsel or proceed to a full evidentiary hearing because each of 
defendant’s allegations lacked merit or pertained to trial strategy. 
¶ 23 
 
On direct appeal, the appellate court affirmed. Although finding that the circuit court erred 
when it allowed the State to question Welch and considered Welch’s conduct in other cases, 
the court concluded that those errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 2013 IL App 
(4th) 120981. 
¶ 24 
 
This court allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 
2013). 
 
¶ 25 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 26 
 
On appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court’s judgment must be reversed because the 
court failed to hold a proper preliminary Krankel hearing limited to investigating the factual 
basis for his claims and, instead, erroneously transformed the proceeding where he appeared 
pro se into an adversarial evidentiary hearing. Defendant also faults the circuit court for 
relying on matters outside the record, namely, the trial judge’s experience with defendant’s 
trial counsel in other criminal cases. Citing the appellate court’s decision in People v. Fields, 
2013 IL App (2d) 120945, defendant argues that it is not harmless error when the trial court 
permits the State’s adversarial involvement in a preliminary Krankel hearing. 
 
 
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¶ 27 
 
In response, the State concedes that the circuit court erred in permitting the State’s 
adversarial participation in the preliminary inquiry and erred when it relied on matters outside 
the record. Nonetheless, the State argues that those procedural errors were harmless because 
the circuit court created a record sufficient for appellate review, the primary goal of a 
preliminary Krankel inquiry. Thus, the State contends that the appellate court here correctly 
determined that the errors made by the circuit court were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
because the record demonstrates that defendant’s underlying claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel lacked merit. The State cautions this court that accepting defendant’s argument 
“would require this Court to classify procedural Krankel errors as ‘reversible’ or ‘structural’ 
errors.” The State argues that reversible structural error is reserved to a narrow class of cases 
not including Krankel-related errors. 
¶ 28 
 
The issue of whether the circuit court properly conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry 
presents a legal question that we review de novo. See People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 75 
(2003). Similarly, we review de novo the legal question of whether harmless error applies to 
errors committed during a Krankel proceeding. See Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 80-81; People v. Nitz, 
143 Ill. 2d 82, 135 (1991). 
¶ 29 
 
The common law procedure developed from our decision in Krankel is triggered when a 
defendant raises a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. People v. 
Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984); People v. Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, ¶ 29. Under the rule 
developed from Krankel and its progeny, it is settled that new counsel is not automatically 
appointed when that type of claim is raised. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 77. Instead: 
“when a defendant presents a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
the trial court should first examine the factual basis of the defendant’s claim. If the trial 
court determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, 
then the court need not appoint new counsel and may deny the pro se motion. However, 
if the allegations show possible neglect of the case, new counsel should be appointed.” 
Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 77-78. 
As this court has repeatedly recognized, the goal of any Krankel proceeding is to facilitate the 
trial court’s full consideration of a defendant’s pro se claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel and thereby potentially limit issues on appeal. Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, ¶ 41; People 
v. Jocko, 239 Ill. 2d 87, 91 (2010). 
¶ 30 
 
The general subject of this appeal is the circuit court’s preliminary Krankel inquiry. As we 
explained in Moore, “[d]uring this evaluation, some interchange between the trial court and 
trial counsel regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective 
representation is permissible and usually necessary in assessing what further action, if any, is 
warranted on a defendant’s claim.” Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78. Thus, the trial court may inquire 
with trial counsel about the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s allegations. 
Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78. The court may also briefly discuss the allegations with defendant. 
Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78. Finally, the trial court is permitted to base its evaluation of the 
defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel on its knowledge of defense 
counsel’s performance at trial. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 79. 
¶ 31 
 
The specific question presented here is the proper resolution of errors made by the circuit 
court when conducting the preliminary Krankel hearing. The parties agree that the circuit court 
erred in permitting the State’s adversarial participation in the preliminary inquiry when 
 
 
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defendant appeared pro se, and the court further erred in relying on matters outside the record, 
i.e., its knowledge of Welch’s performance in other criminal cases. The parties disagree, 
however, on how those errors should be addressed and whether they are harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
¶ 32 
 
We first address the circuit court’s error in permitting the State’s adversarial participation 
at the preliminary Krankel inquiry. We note that the parties’ respective positions on this issue 
mirror a conflict in the appellate court. We now address that conflict. 
¶ 33 
 
Defendant directs our attention to the Appellate Court, Second District’s decision in 
People v. Fields, 2013 IL App (2d) 120945. In Fields, the circuit court at the preliminary 
Krankel hearing permitted the State to argue against, or otherwise rebut, each of the 
defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The State also made argument in 
support of defense counsel’s explanations of his actions at the defendant’s trial. Fields, 2013 
IL App (2d) 120945, ¶¶ 22, 41. 
¶ 34 
 
The appellate court in Fields observed that case law did not suggest that the State should be 
an active participant in a preliminary Krankel inquiry. To the contrary, the Fields court 
observed that in most instances “virtually no opportunity for State participation is offered 
during the preliminary inquiry.” Fields, 2013 IL App (2d) 120945, ¶ 40. Accordingly, the court 
concluded that the State should be limited to a de minimis role in the preliminary Krankel 
inquiry to limit the risk that the inquiry would be transformed into an adversarial proceeding 
with both the State and trial counsel opposing defendant. Fields, 2013 IL App (2d) 120945, 
¶ 40. After reviewing the record, the appellate court in Fields concluded: 
“Where the trial court, at various times, allowed both defense counsel and the State to 
assert that defendant’s claims warranted no further investigation, the hearing changed 
from one consistent with Krankel and its progeny to an adversarial hearing where 
defendant, without waiving his right to be represented, was forced, unrepresented, to 
argue the merits of his claims.” Fields, 2013 IL App (2d) 120945, ¶ 41. 
¶ 35 
 
Ultimately, the Fields court rejected the State’s argument that its improper adversarial 
participation in the preliminary Krankel inquiry was harmless when the trial court’s reasoning 
for denying the defendant’s ineffective assistance claims was correct. Fields, 2013 IL App (2d) 
120945, ¶ 42. Rather, the Fields court decided to adopt the remedy used in other decisions 
when the preliminary Krankel hearing “morphed into an adversarial hearing with the State 
participating and the defendant appearing pro se,” specifically, reversing and remanding to the 
circuit court for a new preliminary inquiry before a different judge without the State’s 
adversarial participation. Fields, 2013 IL App (2d) 120945, ¶ 42 (citing People v. Cabrales, 
325 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6 (2001)). 
¶ 36 
 
In contrast, the State relies on the Appellate Court, Fourth District’s opinion in this case, 
reaching the opposite conclusion on analogous facts. 2013 IL App (4th) 120981.1 As noted 
above, the circuit court here improperly allowed the State to participate in an adversarial role in 
the preliminary Krankel hearing while defendant appeared pro se. The circuit court also erred 
when it relied on matters outside the record when evaluating defendant’s claims. 2013 IL App 
(4th) 120981, ¶¶ 51-54. 
                                                 
 
1On rehearing, the appellate court in this case acknowledged the contrary holding of Fields but 
“decline[d] to go so far based on the facts of this case.” 2013 IL App (4th) 120981, ¶ 63. 
 
 
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¶ 37 
 
Although finding that the circuit court erred in allowing the State’s adversarial role and 
relying on matters outside the record during the preliminary Krankel inquiry, the appellate 
court here nevertheless found that the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
court explained that the errors were harmless because the circuit court thoroughly examined 
the factual matters and questioned both defendant and his trial counsel in a fair and impartial 
manner. The court reasoned that the circuit court could have “easily denied defendant’s request 
for new counsel based on its own investigation of the facts in open court.” 2013 IL App (4th) 
120981, ¶ 56. The appellate court also reviewed, and rejected, the merits of two specific claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel raised by defendant on direct appeal. 2013 IL App (4th) 
120981, ¶¶ 57-60. 
¶ 38 
 
Having carefully reviewed both decisions, we find that Fields better comports with our 
Krankel jurisprudence when a circuit court erroneously permits the State’s adversarial 
participation at the preliminary inquiry. The common law procedure available under Krankel is 
intended to address fully a defendant’s pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel and thus potentially limit issues on appeal. Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, ¶ 41; Jocko, 239 
Ill. 2d at 91. By initially evaluating the defendant’s claims in a preliminary Krankel inquiry, 
the circuit court will create the necessary record for any claims raised on appeal. See Nitz, 143 
Ill. 2d at 134-35 (reviewing the record of the preliminary inquiry to assess defendant’s claims 
on appeal); Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 81 (explaining that failure to conduct a preliminary Krankel 
inquiry precludes appellate review). For these reasons, we believe that a preliminary Krankel 
inquiry should operate as a neutral and nonadversarial proceeding. Because a defendant is not 
appointed new counsel at the preliminary Krankel inquiry, it is critical that the State’s 
participation at that proceeding, if any, be de minimis. Certainly, the State should never be 
permitted to take an adversarial role against a pro se defendant at the preliminary Krankel 
inquiry. 
¶ 39 
 
As Fields similarly determined, the purpose of Krankel is best served by having a neutral 
trier of fact initially evaluate the claims at the preliminary Krankel inquiry without the State’s 
adversarial participation, creating an objective record for review. This goal, however, is 
circumvented when the circuit court essentially allows the State to bias the record against a 
pro se defendant during the preliminary Krankel inquiry. A record produced at a preliminary 
Krankel inquiry with one-sided adversarial testing cannot reveal, in an objective and neutral 
fashion, whether the circuit court properly decided that a defendant is not entitled to new 
counsel. See Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, ¶ 39 (noting that “Krankel serves the narrow purpose of 
allowing the trial court to decide whether to appoint independent counsel to argue a 
defendant’s pro se posttrial ineffective assistance claims”). This, however, is precisely what 
occurred in this case. 
¶ 40 
 
Here, the circuit court permitted the State to question defendant and his trial counsel 
extensively in a manner contrary to defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of 
counsel and to solicit testimony from his trial counsel that rebutted defendant’s allegations. In 
other words, the circuit court allowed the State to confront and challenge defendant’s claims 
directly at a proceeding when defendant was not represented by counsel. The State also 
presented evidence and argument contrary to defendant’s claims and emphasized the 
experience of defendant’s trial counsel. Thus, as in Fields, the State and defendant’s trial 
counsel effectively argued against defendant at a proceeding when he appeared pro se. As we 
explained above, this is contrary to the intent of a preliminary Krankel inquiry. Cognizant of 
 
 
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the rationale of Krankel and its progeny, we cannot conclude that the circuit court’s error in 
this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
¶ 41 
 
Although the parties agree that the circuit court committed further error in this case by 
relying on matters outside the record, we have concluded that the circuit court committed 
reversible error when it permitted the State to participate in an adversarial fashion during the 
preliminary Krankel inquiry. Consequently, we limit our holding in this case to that error. 
¶ 42 
 
The State’s reliance on our decision in People v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82 (1991), in support of its 
harmless-error argument is misplaced. In Nitz, we held that the circuit court’s failure to appoint 
new counsel for an evidentiary hearing under Krankel was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d at 135. 
¶ 43 
 
In stark contrast to this case, however, the circuit court in Nitz held a proper preliminary 
inquiry under Krankel and then concluded that an evidentiary hearing was warranted. The 
circuit court in Nitz erred, though, when it failed to appoint new counsel at the evidentiary 
hearing. After observing that the defendant’s underlying ineffective assistance claims were 
rebutted by his proposed witnesses’ testimony at that hearing, we concluded that the circuit 
court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d at 134-35. 
¶ 44 
 
Unlike this case, in Nitz there was no concern with the adequacy of the record from the 
preliminary Krankel proceeding or with the manner in which the proceeding was conducted. 
Instead, the contested error in Nitz occurred during the second stage of the Krankel proceeding, 
when defendant was represented by counsel, and after the circuit court held a proper 
preliminary inquiry. Accordingly, we find that our decision in Nitz does not control the 
outcome of this case. 
¶ 45 
 
The State is concerned that our endorsement of Fields will constitute a new type of 
reversible structural error. The State’s concern is unfounded. Notably, defendant has not 
argued in this case that the circuit court’s error constituted structural error. Moreover, Fields 
did not find that the State’s improper adversarial participation in a preliminary Krankel hearing 
was structural error. 
¶ 46 
 
Finally, we address the remedy in this case. As we have explained, the purpose of Krankel 
is best served by having a neutral trier of fact initially evaluate the claims at the preliminary 
Krankel inquiry without the State’s adversarial participation, creating an objective record for 
review. Here, the State’s improper adversarial participation at that inquiry effectively thwarted 
that purpose. We thus believe the appropriate remedy is to remand for a new preliminary 
Krankel inquiry before a different judge and without the State’s adversarial participation. 
Fields, 2013 IL App (2d) 120945, ¶ 42. 
 
¶ 47 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 48 
 
The circuit court erred when it allowed the State’s adversarial participation in the 
preliminary Krankel inquiry. For the reasons explained above, we reverse the appellate court’s 
judgment finding that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We remand the cause to the 
circuit court with instructions. 
 
¶ 49 
 
Reversed and remanded with instructions.