Title: People v. Diaz
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 85444
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: August 10, 2000

Docket No. 85444-Agenda 9-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								JOSE DIAZ, Appellee.
Opinion filed August 10, 2000.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in this appeal is whether a defendant must withdraw
his guilty plea prior to challenging his sentence where, in
exchange for pleading guilty, the State dismissed charges against
defendant, agreed that defendant's sentences would be served
concurrently, and agreed not to seek extended-term sentences. A
majority of the appellate court applied this court's decision in
People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 332 (1996), and held that because
the State did not agree to recommend a specific sentence to the
trial court as part of the plea bargain, defendant was not required
to file a motion to vacate his guilty plea prior to challenging his
sentence. Nos. 2-96-0848, 2-96-0849, 2-96-0850 cons.
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate
court majority proceeded to reach the merits of defendant's appeal,
and, after determining that the circuit court erred in allowing
certain evidence to be introduced during defendant's sentencing
hearing, vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the
cause for further proceedings. The State appealed to this court. 177
Ill. 2d R. 315. We now vacate the judgment of the appellate court
and remand this cause to the circuit court with directions.
BACKGROUND
	Defendant, Jose Diaz, was charged by indictment with seven
counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS
5/12-14(b)(1) (West 1994)), a Class X felony, and 10 counts of
aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(c)(1) (West
1994)), a Class 2 felony. These charges related to incidents
occurring in Kane County between 1982 and 1995, and involved
four minor victims in three separate cases.
	On January 18, 1996, defendant pled guilty to one count of
aggravated criminal sexual assault, and three counts of aggravated
criminal sexual abuse, with each count relating to a different
minor victim. In exchange for defendant's guilty pleas to these
four counts, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining 13 charges.
In addition, the State agreed that it would not object to any
sentences imposed upon defendant to run concurrently, rather than
consecutively. Finally, the State agreed that it would not seek
extended-term sentences against defendant. However, there was no
agreement between defendant and the State that a specific sentence
would be recommended to the circuit court.
	During defendant's guilty plea hearing, the circuit court
informed defendant that, in the absence of the plea agreement
between defendant and the State, defendant was eligible to receive
consecutive sentences because three separate cases were involved.
In addition, the circuit court informed defendant that, absent the
plea agreement, defendant was eligible for extended-term
sentences for each conviction. In explaining the plea agreement to
defendant, the circuit court summarized the sentencing aspects of
the agreement as follows: "the attorneys are requesting and
agreeing and asking me to agree not to sentence you to a
consecutive or extended term, meaning that I won't sentence you
to more than 30 years." The defendant thereafter indicated that he
understood these aspects of the plea agreement.
	The State then provided the factual basis for the charges
against defendant. Following the statement of the factual basis for
the plea, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the four charges
enumerated above. The trial court accepted the guilty plea, finding
that the plea was voluntary and that there was a factual basis for
the plea.
	Defendant's sentencing hearing was held on March 28, 1996.
The sole witness called by the State in aggravation was Elgin
police officer David Berg, who testified that after the indictments
were returned against defendant, two additional incidents of sexual
abuse involving defendant were brought to Berg's attention.
Officer Berg testified that he had interviewed J.B., a 15-year-old
boy, who stated that he had been sexually assaulted by defendant
when he was 14 years old. Officer Berg further testified that the
Elgin police department had received a report from the
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) indicating
that defendant had had sexual contact with a nine-year-old boy
identified as L.E. Officer Berg stated that he had never spoken
with L.E., and his knowledge of these incidents was based solely
upon the report prepared by DCFS. At the conclusion of Officer
Berg's direct examination, the prosecutor stated that, pursuant to
the plea agreement between the State and defendant, no charges
would be filed against defendant in connection with the alleged
incidents involving J.B. and L.E. Instead, the State agreed to use
the allegations only in aggravation at sentencing.
	In mitigation, defendant called Timothy Brown, a clinical
psychologist and director of the Kane County Diagnostic Center.
Brown testified that he met with defendant on two occasions,
during which defendant revealed that, between the ages of 12 and
18, he had been sexually abused by a police officer while living in
Puerto Rico. Brown stated that defendant expressed a willingness
to undergo long-term sexual-offender counseling, that defendant
feared that without counseling "he could harm children," and that
he believed that defendant would benefit from such counseling.
During cross-examination, Brown admitted that he was aware that
defendant had been previously convicted in Cook County of
aggravated criminal sexual abuse and that defendant had received
court-ordered sex offender treatment at that time. Brown also
acknowledged that, despite such counseling, defendant had again
engaged in similar conduct.
	Also testifying on defendant's behalf was Kimberly Diaz,
defendant's wife of two years. She testified that she had one child
with defendant, and that defendant adopted another one of her
children. She stated that defendant was a "very warm person," that
he was "good hearted," and that he had provided the family with
financial support for the first year of their marriage. However,
soon after their first anniversary the couple separated and, before
he was taken into custody, defendant was neither living with her
nor supporting her. During cross-examination, she acknowledged
that defendant had brought the minor male victims to the family
home and that defendant committed the alleged sexual acts on the
premises. She also testified that defendant had told her that the
minor male victims were related to him, specifically, that the boys
were his "nephews."
	During the sentencing hearing, the circuit court also reviewed
a presentence report regarding defendant, prepared by the Kane
County department of adult court services. The report revealed that
defendant had a 1990 Cook County conviction for aggravated
criminal sexual abuse, which was subsequently reduced and
amended to a misdemeanor charge of criminal sexual abuse. An
addendum to the presentence report contained a letter from
defendant's GED instructor and included his GED scores.
Defendant also made a statement in allocution. In his statement,
defendant asked for forgiveness, acknowledged his wrongdoing,
took full responsibility for his actions, and expressed remorse.
	The circuit court then made the following findings. In
aggravation, the court found that defendant's prior 1990 Cook
County charge for aggravated criminal sexual abuse "carrie[d] a
lot of weight," because it was "similar to the charges here. " In
addition, the circuit court found that defendant's commission of
these crimes, despite his prior sex-offender counseling, "mean[t]
a lot" in terms of aggravation, and that defendant stood in a
position of trust in respect to his minor victims. The circuit court
also considered the deterrence of others from committing the same
crime, as well as the protection of the public. In mitigation, the
circuit court considered that by pleading guilty, defendant
prevented the minors from having to testify during a trial. The
court also found defendant's statement in allocution and his
admission of wrongdoing to be mitigating factors.
	Taking all the above factors into consideration, the circuit
court sentenced defendant to a 20-year term of imprisonment on
the aggravated criminal sexual assault conviction, and to
concurrent three-year terms for the three aggravated criminal
sexual abuse convictions. After sentencing, the court informed
defendant that he could appeal the decision. The circuit court
judge instructed defendant as follows: "you have to file within this
court within 30 days a motion to withdraw your guilty plea or
reconsider the sentence."
	On April 24, 1996, defense counsel filed a motion requesting
the circuit court to "reconsider and reduce [defendant's] sentence
in light of his age, his minimal criminal history, the lack of injury
to the complainants, and his expression of remorse and candor at
the sentencing hearing." Attached to this motion was a certificate
filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(d), wherein defendant's
trial counsel stated that he "consulted in person with [defendant]
to ascertain his contentions of error in the sentence or entry of the
plea of guilty and has determined that [defendant] seeks to
challenge the sentence imposed for the reasons stated in the
motion, but does not desire to withdraw his plea of guilty." A
hearing on this motion was held on July 12, 1996, wherein defense
counsel again requested the court to reduce defendant's sentence.
In denying defendant's motion, the circuit court found that the
sentence was appropriate under the circumstances.
	In an unpublished order filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23), a majority of the appellate court vacated the
judgment of the circuit court and remanded this cause for further
proceedings. Before the appellate court, defendant argued, for the
first time, that he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing because
the trial court improperly allowed certain evidence to be
introduced during the sentencing proceedings. The majority
rejected the argument advanced by the State that, pursuant to this
court's then-recent decision in People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320,
332 (1996), defendant's appeal should have been dismissed
because of his failure to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea
prior to challenging his sentence. The majority concluded that,
because the State did not agree to recommend a specific sentence
to the trial court in exchange for defendant's plea of guilty, Evans
did not apply. Therefore, the majority concluded, defendant was
not obligated to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea prior to
challenging his sentence. The majority then reached the merits of
defendant's appeal, and determined that defendant was entitled to
a new sentencing hearing as a result of evidentiary errors
committed by the circuit court. In dissent, Justice Rathje
concluded that Evans required defendant to move to withdraw his
guilty plea prior to appealing his sentence.
ANALYSIS
	The State contends that the appellate court erroneously
reached the merits of defendant's sentencing challenge, because
defendant has waived issues relating to his sentencing by failing
to first file with the circuit court a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, as required pursuant to this court's decision in People v.
Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996). We agree. Under the rationale of
Evans and its progeny, defendant was required to file a motion to
withdraw his plea of guilty before challenging his sentence.
	There are at least four types of distinct plea scenarios which
can arise when a defendant chooses to enter a plea of guilty. See
People v. Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d 182, 185 (2000). First, a defendant
may enter an "open" or "blind" plea, wherein the defendant pleads
guilty "without receiving any promises from the State in return."
Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 332. Under these circumstances, both the
State and the defendant may argue for any sentence permitted by
statute, and the trial court exercises its full discretion in
determining the sentence to be imposed. Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d  at 185.
Supreme Court Rule 604(d) governs the appeal of a conviction or
sentence imposed upon a defendant who enters an open guilty plea
(Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d  at 185; Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332), and provides
in pertinent part:
			"No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of
guilty shall be taken unless the defendant, within 30 days
of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial
court a motion to reconsider the sentence, if only the
sentence is being challenged, or, if the plea is being
challenged, a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and
vacate the judgment." 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).
	In contrast to an open guilty plea where no agreement has
been reached between the defendant and the prosecution, a
defendant may "negotiate" a plea of guilty with the State.
However, " 'not all "negotiated" pleas are the same.' "Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d  at 185, quoting People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67, 77 (1999)
(Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). We have previously
discerned three types of "negotiated" pleas.
	A defendant may enter into a "fully" negotiated plea of guilty,
in which he agrees to plead guilty in exchange for the State's
dismissal of charges and a specific sentencing recommendation by
the State. See Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d  at 185. In People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), we examined the provisions of Rule 604(d) as
they relate to a defendant's appeal from a judgment entered in the
circuit court upon a fully negotiated plea of guilty. In Evans, the
defendants and the State had entered into plea agreements in
which the defendants pleaded guilty to certain charges. In return,
the State agreed to dismiss other charges and to recommend
specific terms of imprisonment. After being sentenced to the
recommended terms, both defendants appealed their sentences
without first moving to withdraw their guilty pleas and vacating
the judgments of the circuit court. The defendants argued that
because they were challenging only the sentences they received,
Rule 604(d) required only that they move to reconsider their
sentences.
	We held in Evans that the motion-to-reconsider-sentence
clause of Rule 604(d) applies only to "open" guilty pleas, and held
that a defendant seeking to challenge his sentence after entering a
guilty plea which was negotiated with the State as to charging and
sentencing must first move to withdraw that plea and vacate the
judgment against him. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 332. We explained in
Evans that this result was dictated both by the nature of plea
agreements and the application of contract law principles. We
reasoned that to allow a defendant who had negotiated his plea
agreement with the State to challenge his sentence without first
requiring him to move to withdraw his plea would be
fundamentally unfair to the State, as, under these circumstances,
"the guilty plea and the sentence 'go hand in hand' as material
elements of the plea bargain." Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 332. We noted
that under a contrary result, "[t]he accused could negotiate with
the State to obtain the best deal possible in modifying or
dismissing the most serious charges and obtain a lighter sentence
than he would have received had he gone to trial or entered an
open guilty plea, and then attempt to get that sentence reduced
even further by reneging on the agreement." Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at
327-28. Thus, we concluded that in order for a defendant to
challenge his sentence following the entry of a guilty plea which
was negotiated as to charging and sentencing, "he must move to
withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the judgment so that, in the
event the motion is granted, the parties are returned to the status
quo." Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 332.
	A second type of "negotiated" plea occurs where a defendant
enters a plea of guilty as a result of an agreement between
defendant and the State solely as to charging. See Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d  at 187. Under such circumstances, a defendant may plead guilty
in exchange for the State's agreement to dismiss certain charges
or reduce the original charge to a lesser offense. However, the plea
negotiations do not include any agreement between the State and
the defendant with regard to sentencing.
	This type of plea agreement was recently addressed by this
court in People v. Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d 182 (2000). In Lumzy, the
State agreed to drop a charge against the defendant in exchange for
the defendant pleading guilty to another charge. However, the plea
agreement was "utterly silent" as to the sentence that defendant
would receive. Therefore, both the State and the defendant were
free to argue for any sentence available pursuant to the Code of
Corrections, and the trial court would exercise its full discretion in
imposing any sentence permitted by law. We held that "where the
record is clear that absolutely no agreement existed between the
parties as to defendant's sentence," a defendant is not required to
withdraw his guilty plea as a prerequisite to challenging his
sentence. (Emphasis in original.) Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d  at 187. We
determined that, under these circumstances, allowing the
defendant to challenge his sentence without first requiring him to
move to withdraw his guilty plea did not violate the contract
principles which animated the Evans decision. In Lumzy, unlike in
Evans, "the sentence did not go 'hand in hand' with the plea,"
because the "State did not make any facet of sentencing an
element of its bargain with defendant." Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d  at 189
(Freeman, J., specially concurring). Thus, "[w]hen the State does
not provide any sentencing inducement for a defendant in its plea
bargain, such a 'negotiated' plea, at least for purposes of the
sentencing hearing, more closely resembles an 'open' plea in that
the trial court retains all of its discretion at sentencing." Lumzy,
191 Ill. 2d  at 189 (Freeman, J., specially concurring).
	A third type of "negotiated" guilty plea occurs where a
defendant pleads guilty in exchange for the State's agreement to
dismiss other pending charges and make sentencing concessions.
See Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d  at 185-86. Under this circumstance, the
State's ability to argue for the full range of penalties provided for
in the Code of Corrections is constrained by the parameters of its
agreement with the defendant. We addressed this type of plea
agreement in People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67 (1999), where we
considered whether Evans applied in instances where the
defendants agreed to plead guilty to certain charges in exchange
for the State's dismissal of other charges and recommendations of
a sentence "cap." We held in Linder that the contract-law
principles employed in Evans applied with equal force where a
defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for a recommended
sentencing cap. Under these circumstances, "allowing the
defendant to seek reconsideration of his sentence without also
moving to withdraw his guilty plea unfairly binds the State to the
terms of the plea agreement while giving the defendant the
opportunity to avoid or modify those terms. That is precisely the
situation the Evans rule was designed to prevent." Linder, 186 Ill. 2d  at 74.
	In the matter at bar, the State contends that the plea agreement
negotiated between itself and defendant is analogous to the type of
plea agreement addressed in Linder, and, therefore, defendant was
required to file a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty in the
circuit court before challenging his sentence on appeal. In
response, defendant contends that the plea agreement related only
to the dismissal of charges, and that "because there was no
agreement as to the length of [defendant's] sentence, the sentence
was not a part of the plea bargain." According to defendant, it
therefore follows that the plea he entered is more akin to an
"open" plea in which the sentence may be challenged without
impairing his agreement with the State. We reject defendant's
argument.
	Defendant was indicted for seven counts of aggravated
criminal sexual assault, a Class X felony (see 720 ILCS
5/12-14(b)(1) (West 1994)), and 10 counts of aggravated criminal
sexual abuse, a Class 2 felony (see 720 ILCS 5/12-16(c)(1) (West
1994)). During the guilty plea hearing on January 18, 1996, the
circuit court advised defendant of the charges against him and that
he faced possible prison sentences of 6 to 30 years for the
aggravated criminal sexual assault charges, and 3 to 7 years for the
aggravated criminal sexual abuse charges. The circuit court further
advised defendant that, in the absence of his plea agreement with
the State, defendant was eligible to receive extended prison terms
of 30 to 60 years for the aggravated criminal sexual assault
charges, and from 7 to 14 years for the aggravated criminal sexual
abuse charges. In addition, the circuit court informed defendant
that, in the absence of his plea agreement, defendant was eligible
to serve those sentences consecutively.
	We find that defendant negotiated a plea agreement with the
State in regard to both the charging and sentencing aspects of his
case. Therefore, this cause is factually analogous to Evans and
Linder. First, the record is clear that in exchange for defendant's
plea of guilty to one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault
and three counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, the State
agreed to dismiss the 13 remaining charges against defendant, 6 of
which were Class X felonies. Next, the record is also clear that the
State not only agreed that extended-term sentences would not be
imposed, but also agreed that it would not seek consecutive
sentences. In sharp contrast to the plea bargain in Lumzy, where
the agreement between the defendant and the State was "utterly
silent" as to sentencing, the plea agreement in this case entails
significant sentencing concessions on the part of the State as part
of its bargain with defendant. See Linder, 186 Ill. 2d  at 79
(Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). Indeed, by virtue of its
agreement with defendant, the State "limited its ability to argue at
sentencing from the full panoply of penalties contained in the
Code of Corrections" (Linder, 186 Ill. 2d  at 79 (Freeman, C.J.,
specially concurring)), as it was foreclosed from urging the circuit
court to impose extended and/or consecutive sentences upon
defendant. The result of the agreement between defendant and the
State was that defendant would not receive a sentence in excess of
30 years. In the absence of the plea agreement, defendant faced a
maximum extended-term sentence of 60 years for the Class X
crime of aggravated criminal sexual assault, as well as the
possibility that this sentence could have been served consecutively
with the sentences imposed upon him for the aggravated criminal
sexual abuse convictions, which carry an extended-term maximum
of 14 years' imprisonment. Therefore, it is clear that the State
made sentencing concessions in entering into the plea agreement
with defendant, and that defendant reaped a sentencing benefit
from this plea bargain. Under the circumstances presented,
defendant's guilty plea and sentence "go hand in hand" as material
elements of the plea bargain (Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332), and that
it "flies in the face of contract law principles" (Evans, 174 Ill. 2d
at 327) to allow defendant to unilaterally modify his agreement
under these circumstances while holding the State to its end of the
bargain. Therefore, we hold that defendant was required to file a
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty in the circuit court, prior to
challenging his sentence on appeal.
	Accordingly, the appellate court majority erred in this case
when it determined that Evans did not apply because the State did
not recommend a specific sentence as part of its agreement with
defendant. We note, however, that the appellate court rendered its
decision in this matter shortly after our opinion in Evans was filed,
and before our subsequent decisions in Linder and Lumzy.
Therefore, the appellate court did not have the benefit of the
analysis in Linder and Lumzy, wherein we considered whether the
rationale of Evans applied to different plea bargain scenarios.
	Summarizing, we take this opportunity to reiterate that where
a plea agreement reached between a defendant and the State is
silent as to sentencing, a defendant is not required to move to
withdraw his guilty plea as a prerequisite to challenging his
sentence. Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d  at 187. A plea bargain which is silent
as to sentencing is analogous to an "open" plea, and the motion-to-reconsider-sentence clause of Rule 604(d) applies. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 332. However, where a plea agreement between a defendant
and the State concerns both the charging and sentencing aspects of
the defendant's case, the contract principles animating the Evans
decision apply, because, under these circumstances, the sentence
is premised upon the plea. See Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 327. The
existence of a sentencing concession by the State activates the
application of the Evans rule, as the sentence is thereby made a
part of the bargain between the parties. Therefore, if a plea
agreement limits or forecloses the State from arguing for a
sentence from the full range of penalties available under law, in
order to challenge his sentence, a defendant must first move to
withdraw his plea in the trial court. If the court grants the motion,
both parties are then returned to the status quo as it existed prior
to the acceptance of the plea.
	In an attempt to preclude the application of the rationale of
Evans to the instant matter, defendant attempts to draw an analogy
between the cause at bar and our prior decisions in People v.
Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 331 (1997), and People v. Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d 409 (1998), wherein we held that defendants are not required to
withdraw their guilty pleas prior to a sentence challenge if the
sentence is "void" because it "does not conform with the statute."
Williams, 179 Ill. 2d  at 333; Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d  at 413. We find
that both Williams and Wilson are factually inapposite to the
matter at bar.
	In Williams, the defendant pled guilty to retail theft after the
State agreed to dismiss another charge and recommend a seven-year sentencing cap. The circuit court imposed consecutive
sentences of 3 years' imprisonment, followed by 30 months'
probation for the theft. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit
court lacked statutory authority to impose consecutive prison and
probation terms for a single offense. We agreed, and held that
Evans does not bar a sentence challenge where a defendant claims
that his sentence is void because it does not conform with the
sentencing provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections.
Williams, 179 Ill. 2d  at 333. We have since reaffirmed this holding
in Wilson, stating that a "challenge to a trial court's statutory
authority to impose a particular sentence is not waived when a
defendant fails to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the
judgment." Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d  at 413. We concluded in Wilson
that, under the specific circumstances where the circuit court
imposed sentences which violated the statutory requirements
found in the Unified Code of Corrections, a court may review a
challenge to a statutorily improper sentence without requiring the
defendant to first move to withdraw his guilty plea. We find
defendant's reliance upon Williams and Wilson to be misplaced,
as no allegation has been made in this case that defendant's
sentence is statutorily void.
	Finally, in his brief to this court, defendant contends that, if
we determine under these circumstances that he was required to
move to withdraw his guilty plea prior to challenging his sentence,
we should also remand this cause to the circuit court, where
defendant may be properly admonished and, if he so chooses, file
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the circuit court's
judgment. We agree.
	The case at bar presents factual circumstances which we find
to be analogous to those present in People v. Clark, 183 Ill. 2d 261
(1998). In Clark, we remanded the defendant's cause to the circuit
court to allow the defendant an opportunity to file a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea and vacate judgment. We determined that
the disposition was appropriate because the proceedings in the
circuit court "took place some two years prior to our decision in
Evans so that neither defense counsel nor the circuit court had the
benefit of its analysis as to the proper post-plea motion to be filed
after a guilty plea is entered pursuant to a negotiated agreement."
Clark, 183 Ill. 2d  at 270. In the instant matter, defendant entered
his guilty plea on January 18, 1996, and was sentenced on March
28, 1996. The record reflects that, after defendant was sentenced,
the trial court instructed defendant as follows concerning an
appeal: "Now, you still have the right to appeal what we're doing
and if you wish to appeal what we're doing, you have to file within
this court within 30 days a motion to withdraw your guilty plea or
reconsider the sentence. *** If I deny *** the request for
reconsideration, you have 30 days after that date to file a notice of
appeal." Defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider sentence on
April 24, 1996, and the circuit court denied the motion for
reconsideration on July 12, 1996. All of these events occurred well
before our decision in Evans. As in Clark, neither defense counsel
nor the circuit court had the benefit of our Evans ruling with
regard to the proper post-plea proceedings. Under these specific
circumstances, fundamental fairness dictates that we remand this
cause to the circuit court with instructions to vacate its order
denying defendant's reconsideration motion. We further instruct
the circuit court to properly admonish defendant and allow
defendant the opportunity to move to withdraw his guilty plea and
vacate the judgment, if he so chooses. See Clark, 183 Ill. 2d  at
271.
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the
appellate court, and remand this cause to the circuit court with
instructions that it vacate its order denying defendant's motion to
reconsider, that it properly admonish defendant, and that it allow
defendant the opportunity to move to withdraw his guilty plea and
vacate judgment.
Appellate court judgment vacated;
cause remanded with directions.
	JUSTICE RATHJE took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	JUSTICE BILANDIC, specially concurring:
	I agree that People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), applies to
the plea agreement in this case. I write separately, however, to set
forth my continued adherence to the views expressed in my
dissenting opinion in People v. Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d 182, 190 (2000)
(Bilandic, J., dissenting).
	In Evans, we held that the motion-for-sentence-reconsideration provisions of Rule 604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d))
apply only to "open," as opposed to "negotiated," guilty pleas.
Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 331-32. We defined an open guilty plea as
one in which a defendant pleads guilty "without receiving any
promises from the State in return." (Emphasis added.) Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 332. The defendants in Evans agreed to plead guilty and,
in exchange, the State promised to dismiss other charges and
recommend a specific sentence. The trial court accepted the plea
agreements in both cases and entered judgments in accordance
with the terms of the agreements. The defendants later sought to
reduce their sentences to which they agreed without first moving
to vacate their guilty pleas. We held that the defendants could not
do this. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 333-34. To hold otherwise would
violate basic contract law principles by allowing the defendants to
hold the State to its part of the bargain while unilaterally reneging
on or modifying the terms that they had previously agreed to
accept. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 327-28.
	In Lumzy, the defendant was charged with robbery, a Class 2
felony (see 720 ILCS 5/18-1 (West 1998)), and aggravated
battery, a Class 3 felony (see 720 ILCS 5/12-4 (West 1998)). At
a hearing, the trial court advised defendant of the charges against
him and that he faced possible prison sentences of three to seven
years for the robbery, and two to five years for the aggravated
battery. The trial court further advised defendant that he could
receive extended prison terms and therefore be sentenced to prison
terms of 14 and 10 years, respectively. The defendant and the
State, however, ultimately reached a plea agreement. The
defendant agreed to plead guilty to robbery in exchange for the
State's promise to dismiss the aggravated battery charge. The trial
court accepted the plea agreement and, following the defendant's
guilty plea to robbery, sentenced the defendant to seven years in
prison. See Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d  at 192 (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
	A majority of this court in Lumzy held that the principles
enunciated in Evans did not apply to the plea scenario at issue, and
that the defendant could therefore challenge the length of his
sentence without first filing a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
The majority reasoned that the defendant "never agreed, impliedly
or otherwise, to accept whatever sentence the trial court might
have imposed." Thus, according to the majority, the contract
principles that guided this court's decision in Evans did not
prevent the defendant in Lumzy from appealing only the length of
his sentence. See Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d  at 187.
	I dissented in Lumzy on the basis that the defendant's plea
agreement was negotiated within the meaning of Evans. The plea
agreement that the parties in Lumzy negotiated provided the
defendant with the valuable benefit of a less severe sentence than
he could have received had he been convicted of both robbery and
aggravated battery. Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d  at 192-93 (Bilandic, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, by pleading guilty to robbery in exchange
for the State's promise to dismiss the aggravated battery charge,
the defendant in effect agreed that a sentence within the statutory
range for robbery was appropriate. The defendant was in fact
sentenced to seven years in prison for the robbery-a sentence
within the statutory range. Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d  at 193 (Bilandic, J.,
dissenting). Allowing the defendant to challenge the length of his
sentence without also requiring him to move to withdraw his
guilty plea unfairly binds the State to its part of the plea bargain,
i.e., the dismissal of the aggravated battery charge, while allowing
the defendant the opportunity to renege on or modify the terms to
which he had previously agreed. Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d  at 193
(Bilandic, J., dissenting). Such a result is not proper under this
court's holding in Evans.
	Today, the majority cites Lumzy and states that the plea
agreement in Lumzy is distinguishable from the plea agreement in
this case. Slip op. at 10. The majority reasons that, in contrast to
the plea agreement in Lumzy, where there was no agreement as to
sentencing, the plea agreement in this case entails an agreement
between the parties regarding the defendant's sentence and,
therefore, Evans applies. Slip op. at 10. Although I agree that the
principles set forth in Evans apply to the plea agreement in this
case, I adhere to my view that these principles likewise apply to
the plea agreement in Lumzy.
	With the foregoing understanding, I concur in the majority's
decision.
	JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
	I agree with the majority that the facts of this case are
analogous to those in People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67 (1999).
However, for the same reasons that led me to dissent in Linder, I
believe that defendant in this case did not have to move to
withdraw his guilty plea before challenging the length of his
sentence on appeal. 
	Defendant in this case pled guilty to one count of aggravated
criminal sexual assault and three counts of aggravated criminal
sexual abuse. In exchange for this guilty plea, the State agreed to
dismiss several other charges against defendant. The agreement
did not specify the sentence defendant would receive; however, the
State did agree not to seek extended-term sentences against
defendant.
	After a hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term
of 20 years in prison on the aggravated criminal sexual assault
charge, and concurrent three-year terms on each of the aggravated
criminal sexual abuse charges. Defendant then filed a motion to
reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied. Defendant
appealed.
	The majority today holds that defendant should not be
permitted to appeal the length of his sentence without first moving
to withdraw his guilty plea. According to the majority, by entering
into the plea deal with the State, defendant impliedly agreed not to
challenge any non-extended-term sentence which the trial court
might impose. The majority relies upon the reasoning of this
court's opinion in People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67 (1999), in which
a majority of this court held that a defendant entering into a plea
agreement which includes a sentencing cap impliedly agrees not
to challenge any sentence falling underneath that cap.
	I dissented in Linder. In that case, I noted that:
		"Presumably, if the State and the defendants had been
able to agree on an appropriate sentence, they would have
decided to recommend that specific sentence to the trial
court. In the absence of such agreement, neither party was
entitled to expect the entry of any particular sentence
within the recommended range. In other words, at the
time a plea agreement involving a sentencing cap is
accepted by the trial court, the appropriate sentence, as far
as the two parties are concerned, has yet to be determined.
A defendant thus does not violate any term of such an
agreement by seeking reconsideration of the sentence
imposed by the trial court. This situation is no different
than that where a defendant enters an open or blind plea,
thus exposing himself to the maximum statutory sentence.
In such a case, the maximum sentence is the cap. In that
situation, the defendant may challenge the length of his
sentence without moving to withdraw his plea of guilty.
[Citation.]" Linder, 186 Ill. 2d  at 82 (Heiple, J.,
dissenting).
So too, in the instant case, defendant and the State were unable to
agree as to the appropriate sentence for defendant's crimes.
Accordingly, at the time the parties entered into the plea
agreement, the appropriate sentence was yet to be determined. 
	The parties in this case surely could have expressly agreed
that defendant would not challenge any non-extended-term
sentence. Indeed, if the parties had so agreed, it would obviously
have been in the interest of the State to memorialize that
understanding. The fact that the record in this case does not reflect
such a meeting of the minds, however, strongly indicates that the
State and defendant did not reach that agreement. Under these
circumstances, there is no reason why this court should feel
compelled to award the State concessions which it was unable to
win at the bargaining table. 
	For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that defendant did not
violate any term of his agreement by challenging the length of the
sentence imposed by the trial court. Accordingly, defendant should
have been permitted to appeal the length of his sentence without
first moving to withdraw his guilty plea.
	I therefore dissent.