Title: REBECCA GROSSMAN V OTTO W BROWN MD
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 122458
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 20, 2004

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 20, 2004 
REBECCA GROSSMAN, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
FRED GROSSMAN, Deceased, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 122458 
OTTO W. BROWN, M.D., SINAI HOSPITAL,
an assumed name of SINAI HOSPITAL OF 
GREATER DETROIT, a Michigan Non-Profit
Corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
ROBERT MURRAY, M.D., 
Defendant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
TAYLOR, J. 
At issue here is whether plaintiff’s attorney had a 
reasonable belief under MCL 600.2912d(1) that plaintiff’s 
medical expert satisfied the expert witness requirements of 
MCL 600.2169 in order to sign plaintiff’s affidavit of 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
merit. 
We hold that plaintiff’s attorney had such a 
reasonable belief. Having reached the same conclusion, the 
circuit court decision is affirmed, and this case is 
remanded to that court for further proceedings. 
I. FACTS 
Plaintiff’s husband, Fred Grossman, went to defendant 
Sinai 
Hospital 
to 
undergo 
an 
elective 
carotid 
endarterectomy (surgical removal of the lining of the 
carotid artery).1  The physician who performed the surgery 
was defendant Dr. Otto Brown. He is board-certified in the 
specialty of general surgery and possesses what is somewhat 
ambiguously 
described 
as 
“a 
certificate 
of 
special 
qualifications in vascular surgery.” 
After the surgery, 
Mr. Grossman began bleeding internally and had to be rushed 
back into surgery. 
Approximately two days later, Mr. 
Grossman died. 
In preparation for her lawsuit, plaintiff sent a 
notice of intent to file a claim to defendants as required 
by MCL 600.2912b(1). 
The notice of intent alleged that 
defendants Dr. Brown and Sinai Hospital, as well as another 
doctor who is not a party to this appeal, were negligent by 
failing to properly evaluate Mr. Grossman and by failing to 
1 This is a type of vascular surgery. 
2  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
provide appropriate postoperative care, the culmination of 
which was Mr. Grossman’s death. 
In 
commencing 
her 
lawsuit, 
plaintiff 
filed 
an 
affidavit of merit with her medical malpractice complaint 
as required by MCL 600.2912d(1)2 and MCL 600.2169.3  These 
two statutes require the plaintiff’s counsel to file an 
affidavit of merit signed by a physician who counsel 
2 MCL 600.2912d(1) states the following, in pertinent
part: 
T]he plaintiff in an action alleging medical
malpractice or, if the plaintiff is represented
by an attorney, the plaintiff’s attorney shall
file with the complaint an affidavit of merit
signed 
by 
a 
health 
professional 
who 
the 
plaintiff’s attorney reasonably believes meets 
the requirements for an expert witness under [MCL
600.2169]. 
3 MCL 600.2169 states the following, in pertinent part: 
In an action alleging medical malpractice, a
person shall not give expert testimony on the
appropriate standard of practice or care unless
the person is licensed as a health professional
in this state or another state and meets the 
following criteria: 
(a) If the party against whom or on whose
behalf the testimony is offered is a specialist,
specializes at the time of the occurrence that is
the basis for the action in the same specialty as
the party against whom or on whose behalf the
testimony is offered. However, if the party
against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is
offered is a specialist who is board certified,
the expert witness must be a specialist who is
board 
certified 
in 
that 
specialty. 
[MCL
600.2169(1).] 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
reasonably believes specializes in the same specialty as 
the defendant physician. 
If, however, the defendant 
physician is a board-certified specialist, the plaintiff’s 
counsel must reasonably believe the affidavit-of-merit 
expert is board-certified in that specialty.4  Consequently, 
plaintiff’s 
counsel 
researched 
defendant 
Dr. 
Brown’s 
qualifications in order to obtain a qualified expert 
witness. Plaintiff’s counsel asserted that he accessed the 
American Medical Association’s (AMA) website where he 
viewed defendant Brown’s qualifications, saw that he was 
board-certified only in general surgery, and confirmed that 
there is no vascular surgery board certification. 
Thus, 
according to plaintiff’s counsel’s research, Dr. Brown was 
board-certified 
only 
in 
general 
surgery. 
That 
is, 
plaintiff’s counsel believed that there was no board 
certification for the specialty of vascular surgery. 
Accordingly, for the affidavit of merit, plaintiff’s 
counsel obtained a physician board-certified in general 
surgery who specialized in vascular surgery, Dr. Alex 
4 See Halloran v Bhan, 470 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___
(2004). 
We ordered Halloran to be argued and submitted
with this case. 468 Mich 868 (2003). 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Zakharia,5 who reinforced counsel’s belief that there is no 
board certification in vascular surgery. 
After answers to the complaint had been filed, 
defendants Sinai Hospital and Dr. Brown moved for summary 
disposition on the basis that plaintiff’s expert was not 
qualified to sign the affidavit of merit under MCL 
600.2169. 
Defendants argued that defendant Dr. Brown, 
while being board-certified in general surgery, also has a 
certificate of special qualifications in vascular surgery, 
which they claim is itself another board certification. 
Because Dr. Zakharia lacks such a certification, defendant 
concluded that Dr. Zakharia is disqualified from signing 
the affidavit. Counsel for plaintiff responded that he had 
a reasonable belief under MCL 600.2912d(1) that Dr. 
Zakharia met the expert witness requirements of MCL 
600.2169(1). 
The trial court denied defendants’ summary disposition 
motion, holding in relevant part that plaintiff’s attorney 
had a reasonable belief that Dr. Zakharia met the statutory 
prerequisites for an expert witness. 
The Court of Appeals 
denied defendants’ motion for leave for an interlocutory 
5 Dr. Zakharia has been practicing in the field of
vascular surgery for many years and has written articles
that have been published in numerous journals and books,
many in the area of cardiovascular and vascular medicine. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
appeal “for failure to persuade the Court of the need for 
immediate appellate review.” 
We granted defendants leave 
for an interlocutory appeal.6 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We 
review 
de 
novo 
questions 
of 
statutory 
interpretation. Omelenchuk v City of Warren, 466 Mich 524, 
527; 647 NW2d 493 (2002). 
Likewise, we review de novo 
decisions 
on 
summary 
disposition 
motions. 
American 
Federation of State, Co & Municipal Employees v Detroit, 
468 Mich 388, 398; 662 NW2d 695 (2003). 
III. ANALYSIS 
Because the issue in this case is one of statutory 
interpretation, the paramount rule is that we must effect 
the intent of the Legislature. 
In re MCI, 460 Mich 396, 
411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). 
Statutory language is read 
according to its ordinary and generally accepted meaning. 
If the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, we 
assume 
the 
Legislature 
intended 
its 
plain 
meaning; 
therefore, we enforce the statute as written and follow the 
plain meaning of the statutory language. 
Tryc v Michigan 
Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135-136; 545 NW2d 642 
(1996). 
6 468 Mich 869 (2003). 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
Under 
Michigan’s 
statutory 
medical 
malpractice 
procedure, plaintiff must obtain a medical expert at two 
different 
stages 
of 
the 
litigation—at 
the 
time 
the 
complaint is filed and at the time of trial. 
With regard 
to the first stage, under MCL 600.2912d(1), a plaintiff is 
required to file with the complaint an affidavit of merit 
signed by an expert who the plaintiff’s attorney reasonably 
believes meets the requirements of MCL 600.2169. 
With 
regard to the second stage, the trial, MCL 600.2169(1) 
states that “a person shall not give expert testimony . . . 
unless 
the 
person” 
meets 
enumerated 
qualifications 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, while at the affidavit-of-merit 
stage a plaintiff’s attorney need only “reasonably believe” 
the expert is qualified, at trial the standard is more 
demanding because the statute states that a witness “shall 
not give expert testimony” unless the expert “meets the 
[listed] criteria” in MCL 600.2169(1). 
The Legislature’s rationale for this disparity is, 
without doubt, traceable to the fact that until a civil 
action is underway, no discovery is available. 
See MCR 
2.302(A)(1). 
Thus, the Legislature apparently chose to 
recognize that at the first stage, in which the lawsuit is 
about to be filed, the plaintiff’s attorney only has 
available publicly accessible resources to determine the 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
defendant’s board certifications and specialization. 
At 
this stage, the plaintiff’s attorney need only have a 
reasonable 
belief 
that 
the 
expert 
satisfies 
the 
requirements of MCL 600.2169. 
See MCL 600.2912d(1). 
However, by the time the plaintiff’s expert witness 
testifies at trial, the plaintiff’s attorney has had the 
benefit of discovery to better ascertain the qualifications 
of the defendant physician, and, thus, the plaintiff’s 
attorney’s reasonable belief regarding the requirements of 
MCL 600.2169 does not control whether the expert may 
testify. 
Because this case presents a dispute involving the 
affidavit-of-merit stage, the issue before us is whether, 
according to MCL 600.2912d(1), plaintiff’s attorney had a 
“reasonable 
belief” 
that 
his 
expert 
satisfied 
the 
requirements of MCL 600.2169. 
We hold that given the 
information available to plaintiff’s attorney when he was 
preparing the affidavit of merit, he had a reasonable 
belief that Drs. Brown and Zakharia were both board­
certified in their specialty of general surgery and that 
there was no board certification in vascular surgery. 
The salient and dispositive facts are that plaintiff’s 
attorney consulted the AMA website, which supplied him with 
information that defendant Brown was only board-certified 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
in general surgery and that there is no vascular surgery 
board certification. 
Further, counsel consulted Dr. 
Zakharia, his expert, who reiterated that there is no 
vascular surgery board certification. 
Thus, at the moment the affidavit of merit was being 
prepared, plaintiff’s attorney used the resources available 
to him and reasonably concluded that he had a match 
sufficient to meet the requirements for naming an expert. 
It may be that what satisfies the standard at this first 
stage will not satisfy the requirements of MCL 600.2169 for 
expert testimony at trial. This will be decided on remand. 
To address this matter now, especially because there has 
been no fact-finding on the disputed factual questions, 
would be premature.7  It will be for the trial court, in its 
role as initial interpreter of the statute and qualifier of 
experts, to decide these issues as they become timely. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because plaintiff has complied with the requirements 
of the affidavit-of-merit statute, MCL 600.2912d(1), we 
7 Thus, we expressly do not decide the additional issue
raised by the concurring justices in this case because it
is not properly before us: whether board certifications
must match in all cases or only those in which the board
certifications are relevant to the alleged malpractice. 
9  
 
 
 
affirm the circuit court and remand this case to that court 
for further proceedings. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
                                                 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
REBECCA GROSSMAN, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
FRED GROSSMAN, Deceased, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 122458 
OTTO W. BROWN, M.D., SINAI HOSPITAL,
an assumed name of SINAI HOSPITAL OF 
GREATER DETROIT, a Michigan Non-Profit
Corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
and 
ROBERT MURRAY, M.D., 
Defendant. 
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in the result only). 
I concur with the majority that plaintiff’s counsel 
had a reasonable belief that plaintiff’s expert met the 
requirements for filing an affidavit of merit under MCL 
600.2912d. 
However, I write separately because I do not 
believe that MCL 600.2169 requires an expert witness to 
match board certifications in all cases.1  A proper reading 
1 I still strongly believe that MCL 600.2169 is 
unconstitutional, as discussed in my dissent in McDougall v
Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 37-72; 597 NW2d 148 (1999). 
 
 
 
 
of the statute indicates that board certifications and 
specialties must match only when the board certification or 
specialty is relevant to the alleged malpractice at issue. 
Therefore, I concur with the result reached in this case. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
2  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
REBECCA GROSSMAN, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
FRED GROSSMAN, deceased, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 122458 
OTTO W. BROWN, M.D., SINAI HOSPITAL,
an assumed name of SINAI HOSPITAL OF 
GREATER DETROIT, a Michigan non-profit
corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
ROBERT MURRAY, M.D., 
Defendant. 
WEAVER, J. (concurring in result only). 
I concur with the majority only in its conclusion 
that, in this case, plaintiff’s attorney had a reasonable 
belief that plaintiff’s medical expert met the requirements 
for filing an affidavit of merit under MCL 600.2912d. 
I 
write separately to clarify, as I explain in my dissenting 
opinion in Halloran v Bhan, 
Mich 
; 
NW2d 
(2004) 
(WEAVER, J. dissenting), that MCL 600.2169 requires that a 
standard-of-care 
expert’s 
board 
certifications 
and 
 
 
 
specialties match those of the defendant only where the 
specialty 
or 
board 
certification 
is 
appropriate 
for 
(correct for the purpose of explaining) the standard of 
care to which the expert will be testifying in the case. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
2