Title: the Florida Bar v. Edward H. Wohl
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95-770
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 20, 2003

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC95770
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant, 
vs.
EDWARD H. WOHL,
Respondent.
[March 20, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a referee’s report regarding an alleged ethical breach by
Edward H. Wohl.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  The Florida
Bar filed a complaint alleging that Wohl violated rule 4-3.4(b) of the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar, "Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel," by offering
an inducement to a witness.  
FACTS
After a hearing, the referee made the following findings of fact.  
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Edward H. Wohl is a member of The Florida Bar.  He has represented Bruce
Winston (hereinafter "Bruce") in various matters for over twenty-five years, but
always retained co-counsel when litigation was involved.  Bruce and his brother,
Ronald Winston (hereinafter "Ronald"), were engaged in a bitter dispute concerning
the Florida estate of their mother, Edna Winston, which included substantial assets
in the New York estate of their father, jeweler Harry Winston.  Bruce was allegedly
having difficulty obtaining information from Ronald, who was a trustee of their
father's estate.  Bruce located Katherine Kerr, a former employee of the Winston
family diamond business "Harry Winston International" (HWI), to help him
understand the business practices of the company.  
Subsequently, there was a meeting between Kerr's lawyers and Bob Silver
and David Boies (representing Bruce as trial attorneys), to draw up an agreement
between Bruce and Kerr.  Wohl was involved in drafting the agreement as well as
some aspects of the negotiations.  The final agreement stated that Kerr would
provide "assistance" to Bruce and included compensation to Kerr of: (1) $25,000
for her first fifty hours of assistance; (2) a potential "bonus" ranging between
$100,000 and over $1,000,000, depending on "the usefulness of the information
provided," which would be paid after a "culmination event" by which Bruce would
have received some relief against Ronald; and (3) additional hours of assistance
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would be paid at the rate of $500 per hour over the bonus amount and after the
culmination event.
The referee examined whether Kerr was a consultant, an expert witness, or a
fact witness.  Wohl testified, and other attorneys provided affidavits, that no one
expected Kerr to testify in the litigation.  However, Kerr did testify at depositions in
the Florida proceedings involving Edna Winston's estate.  Also, she was listed as a
witness by the estate's personal representative after Wohl disclosed that Kerr had
personal knowledge about Ronald's possible diversions of assets, including a
missing diamond necklace.  After the personal representative listed Kerr as a
witness, Wohl also listed Kerr as a possible witness.  The referee determined that
Kerr was a fact witness for Wohl because she provided factual information about
what she had seen, heard, and experienced while working at the family business.  
The referee also examined whether the agreement was an inducement to Kerr. 
The referee noted that the "bonus" provision of the agreement was especially
significant; Kerr could earn up to $1,000,000 depending on the usefulness of the
information she provided to enable Bruce to recover assets, damages by settlement,
or a judgment.  Therefore, Kerr's ability to receive the bonus only arose if Bruce
was successful in reaching a culmination event.  The referee stated that such
"provisions go to the very heart of the evil sought to be avoided by [rule 4-3.4(b)]:
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the temptation of a witness to color his or her testimony" and concluded that the
agreement was "an inducement that went far beyond reasonable expenses incurred
by the witness." 
Wohl argued that he should not be found guilty of offering the inducement to
Kerr, claiming that he had minimal involvement in the agreement.  However, the
referee found that Wohl participated in the formation and negotiation of the
agreement.  Wohl had written to the other attorneys involved and suggested
changes to the agreement.  He also received drafts from the other attorneys and
engaged in phone conversations with them regarding the agreement.  The referee
stated that even if Kerr's attorneys and Bruce's other attorneys handled most of the
negotiation, Wohl could not do through others that which he could not do himself. 
See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-8.4(a) (a lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate
the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or
do so through the acts of another).  
As to guilt, the referee recommended that by participating in the development
of the agreement, Wohl offered an inducement to a witness in violation of rule 4-
3.4(b).  
The referee next considered the appropriate disciplinary sanction.  Relying
on the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the referee found one
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aggravating factor, 9.22(i), substantial experience in the practice of law.  The referee
found four mitigating factors: (1) 9.32(a), absence of a prior disciplinary record; (2)
9.32(b), absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) 9.32(e), full and free
disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; and,
(4) 9.32(g), character or reputation.  The referee recommended that Wohl be
sanctioned by an admonishment for minor misconduct and placed on probation for
one year, with the condition that Wohl successfully complete a Practice and
Professionalism Enhancement Program.  
The Bar petitioned for review of the referee's disciplinary recommendation. 
Wohl cross-petitioned, arguing against the referee's findings of fact,
recommendation as to guilt, and disciplinary recommendation. 
ANALYSIS
We first consider Wohl's challenges to the referee's findings of fact.  Wohl
argues that the referee's report needs to be "supplemented."  Wohl alleges that no
one expected Kerr to testify when the agreement was originally made.  He claims
that Kerr's knowledge about the diamond necklace is the reason she later became a
witness, and that her knowledge about the necklace did not come to light until after
the agreement.  
Our standard of review regarding a referee's factual findings is as follows: 
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A referee's findings of fact regarding guilt carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without
support in the record.  Absent a showing that the referee's findings are
clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support, this Court is
precluded from reweighing the evidence and substituting its judgment
for that of the referee. 
Florida Bar v. Sweeney, 730 So. 2d 1269, 1271 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Florida Bar v.
Spann, 682 So. 2d 1070, 1073 (Fla. 1996)).
Wohl insists that the point when Kerr told him about the diamond necklace is
a key factor, arguing that the attorneys considered Kerr to be a consultant, and not
a witness, until they knew about the missing necklace.  However, despite Wohl's
claims, knowledge of the diamond necklace is not the determinative factor.  The
record indicates that Kerr was a fact witness, not a consultant.  Kerr had personal
knowledge about the workings of HWI and Ronald's actions.  Furthermore, the
agreement that Wohl helped prepare even specified that Kerr would assist Bruce in
identifying and recovering assets and damages related to and arising from the
diversion of assets and other misconduct.  Kerr was to be compensated for what
she had witnessed.  As the referee stated, paying an individual who has personal
knowledge of the facts is to pay a witness, whether or not that person is expected
to testify.  Therefore, Wohl has not met the burden of demonstrating that the
referee's findings of fact are clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record.  See
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Sweeney, 730 So. 2d at 1271.  We approve the referee's findings of fact.  
Next we consider Wohl's challenge to the referee's recommendation as to
guilt.  Wohl alleges that the findings of fact do not support a violation of rule 4-
3.4(b).  He argues that he should not be found guilty of inducing a witness because
his participation in developing the agreement was minimal.  Further, Wohl continues
to claim that he did not intend to have Kerr testify when the agreement was made. 
Rather, he considered Kerr to be a consultant.  Wohl argues that this is significant
because rule 4-3.4(b) is meant to apply to testifying witnesses, not all witnesses. 
He notes that the comment to the rule states that the proscribed conduct is payment
to "an occurrence witness . . . for testifying."   
We find Wohl's arguments are without merit.  First, we do not view Wohl's
participation as minimal.  He participated in the formation and negotiation of the
agreement.  Second, although Wohl claims that rule 4-3.4(b) applies only to
testifying witnesses, the plain language of the rule does not support that view:
A lawyer shall not: 
. . . .
(b) fabricate evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify
falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness, except a lawyer may pay a
witness reasonable expenses incurred by the witness in attending or
testifying at proceedings; a reasonable, noncontingent fee for
professional services of an expert witness; and reasonable
compensation to reimburse a witness for the loss of compensation
incurred by reason of preparing for, attending, or testifying at
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proceedings. 
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.4(b) (emphasis added).  Clearly, the rule is not limited to
testifying witnesses.  Further, the history of the rule indicates that it was amended to
address situations such as the instant case.  In 1992, in Florida Bar v. Cillo, 606 So.
2d 1161 (Fla. 1992), Cillo was accused of paying money to a former client as an
inducement for the client to dismiss his Bar complaint against Cillo.  The question
arose whether it was misconduct to induce a witness to tell the truth by offering
money or other valuable considerations.  At the time, there was no rule governing
such a situation so we did not impose discipline for that conduct.  We were
concerned, however, that the payment of compensation other than costs to a
witness could adversely affect credibility and fact-finding functions.  We directed
that a rule be developed to clarify that any compensation paid would be improper
unless certain conditions were met.  Id. at 1162.  Thereafter, in 1994, in Florida Bar
re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 644 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1994),
we amended rule 4-3.4(b) to its present form.  In so doing, we established that a
witness may not be paid, unless the payments fall within the clearly delineated
exceptions, such as payments for reasonable expenses or payments to an expert
witness.  None of the exceptions to the rule are present in Wohl's case.  Therefore,
we conclude that the referee's findings of fact support his recommendation that
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Wohl be found guilty of violating rule 4-3.4(b).  
DISCIPLINE
Next, we consider the Bar’s challenge to the referee’s recommended
discipline of an admonishment for minor misconduct and probation for one year,
with the condition that Wohl successfully complete a Practice and Professionalism
Enhancement Program.  It is well established that in reviewing a referee’s
recommended discipline, this Court’s “scope of review is somewhat broader than
that afforded to findings of facts because, ultimately, it is [the Court’s]
responsibility to order an appropriate punishment.”  Florida Bar v. Anderson, 538
So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989).  However, the referee's recommendation will generally
be upheld if supported by "a reasonable basis in existing caselaw."  Florida Bar v.
Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).  
The Bar argues that the appropriate discipline is a ninety-day suspension. 
Wohl argues that the referee's recommendation of an admonishment is too severe
and that diversion to ethics school is more appropriate.  We agree with the Bar and
find that the referee's recommended discipline of an admonishment for minor
misconduct under the circumstances of this case does not have a reasonable basis
in existing case law.  
In Florida Bar v. Jackson, 490 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 1986), a Florida attorney
1.  Machin was decided before rule 4-3.4(b) was amended.  Machin was
found guilty of violating rules 3-4.3 (conduct contrary to honesty and justice) and
4-8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
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contacted a New York attorney and requested that his clients be paid $50,000 for
their testimony in a pending insurance claim case in New York.  We quoted with
approval the referee's report which stated: 
[T]he very heart of the judicial system lies in the integrity of the
participants . . . .  Justice must not be bought or sold.  Attorneys have
a solemn responsibility to assure that not even the taint of impropriety
exists as to the procurement of testimony before courts of justice.  It
is clear that the actions of the respondent . . . violates [sic] the very
essence of the integrity of the judicial system and . . . the oath of his
office.
Jackson, 490 So. 2d at 936.  Jackson was decided under the former Code of
Professional Responsibility, well before the adoption of rule 4-3.4(b).  We found
that Jackson's actions violated Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice) and suspended
Jackson for three months.  
In Florida Bar v. Machin, 635 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 1994),1 we imposed a ninety-
day suspension on an attorney who offered to set up a $30,000 trust fund for the
minor child of a victim in a criminal case if the victim agreed not to testify at the
client's sentencing hearing.  Like Wohl, Machin had no prior disciplinary record. 
Unlike Wohl, Machin disclosed his agreement to the state attorney, the sheriff, and
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the victim assistance representative.  The Court suspended Machin for ninety days.
Offering financial inducements to a fact witness is extremely serious
misconduct.  As the referee stated, tempting a witness to color testimony is an evil
that should be avoided.  We condemn the practice of compensating fact witnesses
in violation of rule 4-3.4(b) in no uncertain terms.  We find that Wohl's misconduct
has demonstrated an attitude that is wholly inconsistent with professional standards. 
Case law requires that Wohl be suspended.  But for the four mitigating factors,
Wohl could have earned a more severe sanction.  Thus, we disapprove the
referee’s recommended discipline of an admonishment and conclude that the
seriousness of Wohl's misconduct and violation of rule 
 4-3.4(b) warrant a ninety-day suspension.  
We approve the referee’s other recommendations that require Wohl to
participate in probation for one year and to successfully complete a Practice and
Professionalism Enhancement Program.  Such requirements are not unusual in
disciplinary cases.  Florida Bar v. Nunes, 679 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1996) (attorney
suspended for ninety days and required to complete specified continuing legal
education hours).  
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we approve the referee’s recommended findings of fact and
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recommendation of guilt as to the violation of rule 4-3.4(b).  We disapprove the
referee’s recommended discipline of an admonishment for minor misconduct.  
Edward H. Wohl is hereby suspended from the practice of law for ninety
days.  The suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of this opinion so
that Wohl can close out his practice and protect the interests of existing clients.  If
Wohl notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing and does not need
the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an order making the
suspension effective immediately.  Wohl shall accept no new business from the
date this opinion is filed until the suspension is completed.  Judgment is entered for
The Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399, for recovery
of costs from Edward H. Wohl in the amount of $1,601.85, for which sum let
execution issue.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE and CANTERO, JJ.,
and SHAW, Senior Justice, concur.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, John Anthony Boggs, Division Director
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and Edward Iturralde, Bar Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Complainant
John A. Weiss of Weiss & Etkin, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent