Title: Avitia v. Superior Court
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S242030
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: December 24, 2018

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
LEO BRIAN AVITIA, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY,  
Respondent; 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Real Party in Interest. 
 
S242030 
 
Third Appellate District 
C082859 
 
San Joaquin County Superior Court 
STKCRFE2016881, GJ20164112415 
 
 
December 24, 2018 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the court, in which  
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger and Rubin* concurred. 
Justice Chin filed a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice  
Cantil-Sakauye concurred. 
                                        
* 
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
SEE CONCURRING OPINION 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT 
S242030 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
After a prosecutor questioned and dismissed a grand juror 
outside the presence of other jurors and the trial court, the 
resulting grand jury returned an indictment against defendant 
Leo Brian Avitia.  Before trial, Avitia moved to set aside the 
indictment under Penal Code section 995 on the ground that the 
prosecutor’s dismissal violated his constitutional and statutory 
rights to an impartial and independent grand jury.  (All 
undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.)  The 
trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeal found no 
error.  We consider whether an indictment must be set aside 
because of a prosecutor’s dismissal of a juror during grand jury 
proceedings. 
We hold that a prosecutor’s dismissal of a grand juror 
violates section 939.5; only the grand jury foreperson may 
dismiss a grand juror.  We further hold that a defendant may 
seek dismissal of an indictment on the ground that the 
prosecutor violated section 939.5 by filing a pretrial motion 
under section 995, subdivision (a)(1)(A).  In order to prevail on 
such a motion, the defendant must show that the error 
reasonably might have had an adverse effect on the impartiality 
or independence of the grand jury. 
In this case, a grand juror explicitly acknowledged that he 
could not fairly evaluate the case, and the prosecutor dismissed 
that juror outside the presence of other jurors.  Because Avitia 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
 
has not shown that the error reasonably might have had an 
adverse effect on the impartiality or independence of the grand 
jury, the motion here fails.   
I. 
Avitia was allegedly driving under the influence of alcohol 
when he crashed into another driver and killed him.  The San 
Joaquin County District Attorney’s Office filed a complaint 
charging Avitia on six counts:  second degree murder (§ 187), 
gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated with gross 
negligence and prior convictions (§ 191.5, subd. (d)), resisting an 
executive officer (§ 69), driving under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)), driving 
with a blood-alcohol content level of 0.08 percent or more 
causing injury (id., § 23153, subd. (b)), and driving when the 
privilege has been suspended or revoked (id., § 14601.2, 
subd. (a)).   
The trial court impaneled a grand jury of 19 members.  At 
a grand jury proceeding, the prosecutor said to the jurors, “I’m 
asking if anybody here, after listening to the charges, or 
listening to the witnesses, has the state of mind which will 
prevent him or her from acting impartially and without 
prejudice to the substantial rights of parties.”  The prosecutor 
also asked, “Does anyone have any bias as a result of the 
charges, or as a result of the witnesses that were read?”  Grand 
Juror No. 6, the foreperson, responded, “Yeah.”  Grand Juror 
No. 18 responded, “I’ve arrested people for 148.”  The prosecutor 
then said, “What we’re going to do now, everybody is going to get 
out of the jury room and we’re going to talk to Juror Number 6, 
the jury foreman.  So can everybody leave?”   
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
 
The prosecutor questioned Juror No. 6 outside the 
presence of the grand jury.  Juror No. 6 said to the prosecutor, 
“I just want to divulge that my religion, we don’t believe in 
drinking at all.  I do acknowledge people have their agency to do 
what they want.  But I’m morally opposed to drinking, period.  
But I realize other people don’t feel that way.”  The prosecutor 
asked, “You do know that it is not against the law to drink and 
then drive a car?”  Juror No. 6 said yes.  The prosecutor then 
asked, “Do you have a problem finding that there’s not probable 
cause just because you have these religious beliefs?”  Juror No. 6 
said no.  The prosecutor then asked, “So you can follow the law?”  
Juror No. 6 responded, “Yeah.”  The prosecutor did not dismiss 
Juror No. 6. 
The prosecutor then questioned Juror No. 18, also outside 
the presence of the grand jury.  Juror No. 18 said to the 
prosecutor, “I am a peace officer.  I work for the Department of 
Alcohol Beverage Control, and I have arrested subjects for 148 
PC.”  The prosecutor asked, “Aren’t you exempt from jury duty?”  
Juror No. 18 responded, “I’m not.  I’m 830.2.  We don’t follow the 
exemption.”  The prosecutor then asked, “The fact that you 
arrested people for resisting arrest before, do you think that’s 
going to affect your impartiality in this case?”  Juror No. 18 said, 
“Yes.”  The prosecutor asked, “You do?”  Juror No. 18 said, “I do, 
in addition to the fact that I’m currently conducting an 
investigation that’s very similar to these charges.”  The 
prosecutor asked, “So you don’t think you can be fair?”  Juror 
No. 18 answered, “No, I don’t think so.”  The prosecutor then 
concluded, “What I’m going to ask you to do is go down to the 
basement, let them know that you were excused.”  Juror No. 18 
followed the prosecutor’s instruction and did not serve on the 
grand jury.  After three days of proceedings, the grand jury 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
 
returned an indictment on all six counts as well as an additional 
count of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated with 
ordinary negligence while operating a vehicle (§ 191.5, 
subd. (b)). 
Avitia moved to dismiss the grand jury’s indictment by 
way of a nonstatutory motion to the trial court.  The trial court 
granted permission for Avitia to include the nonstatutory 
motion as part of a section 995 motion to dismiss the indictment 
either entirely or at least as to count 6 on resisting an executive 
officer.  But the trial court ultimately denied the motion.  In a 
written ruling, the court concluded that there was no evidence 
that the dismissal impacted the mindset of the grand jury panel 
or led it to believe that the prosecutor’s judgment ultimately 
controlled the operation and functions of the grand jury.  
Furthermore, the court concluded that a violation of section 
939.5 does not require a per se finding of a due process violation, 
and Avitia had not shown actual bias or prejudice.  The court 
refrained from deciding whether Avitia had a due process right 
to an unbiased grand jury, instead concluding that Avitia had 
failed to establish that any of the grand jurors were in fact 
biased.  The court similarly concluded that because Avitia had 
not demonstrated that the error reasonably might have affected 
the outcome of the grand jury proceedings, Avitia had not shown 
any denial of a substantial right. 
Avitia filed a petition for a writ of mandate seeking relief 
from the trial court’s denial.  The Court of Appeal denied the 
petition in an unpublished opinion.  Section 995 provides that 
an “indictment . . . shall be set aside by the court” either 
“[w]here it is not found, endorsed, and presented as prescribed 
in 
this 
code” 
(§ 995, 
subd. (a)(1)(A) 
(hereafter 
section 
995(a)(1)(A))) or when “the defendant has been indicted without 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
 
reasonable or probable cause” (id., subd. (a)(1)(B) (hereafter 
section 995(a)(1)(B))).  The Court of Appeal rejected Avitia’s 
argument under section 995(a)(1)(A) that the indictment was 
“not found, endorsed, and presented as prescribed in this code.”  
But the court said Avitia had properly raised a due process 
challenge to the indictment, whether under section 995(a)(1)(B) 
or through a nonstatutory motion. 
Evaluating this claim, the Court of Appeal observed “two 
parallel standards:  (1) Whether the error substantially 
impaired the independence and impartiality of the grand jury, 
or (2) whether the error constituted the denial of a substantial 
right.”  The court said “it does not matter which analysis is used 
because . . . neither standard was met.”  The court held that 
Avitia had made no showing that the improper dismissal 
substantially impaired the independence and impartiality of the 
grand jury, or that it otherwise reasonably might have impacted 
the outcome of the proceedings to constitute a denial of a 
substantial right.  The court also held that the dismissal did not 
constitute structural error and that the grand jury was properly 
constituted.  The court said “the prosecutor’s violation of 
statutory requirements is troubling, [but] the trial court’s 
decision to deny petitioner’s motion was not error.” 
We granted review. 
II. 
“ ‘Under the ancient English system . . . the most valuable 
function of the grand jury was not only to examine into the 
commission of crimes, but to stand between the prosecutor and 
the accused, and to determine whether the charge was founded 
upon credible testimony or was dictated by malice or personal ill 
will.’ [Citation.]  [¶] . . . .  [¶] The grand jury’s ‘historic role as a 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
 
protective bulwark standing solidly between the ordinary 
citizen and an overzealous prosecutor’ [citation] is as well-
established in California as it is in the federal system. . . .  A 
grand jury should never forget that it sits as the great inquest 
between the State and the citizen, to make accusations only 
upon sufficient evidence of guilt, and to protect the citizen 
against unfounded accusation, whether from the government, 
from partisan passion, or private malice.’  [Citation.]  [¶] The 
protective role traditionally played by the grand jury is 
reinforced in California by statute.”  (Johnson v. Superior Court 
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 248, 253–254 (Johnson).) 
Several provisions of the Penal Code establish procedures 
to select and dismiss grand jurors.  Regarding initial selection, 
section 909 provides:  “Before accepting a person drawn as a 
grand juror, the court shall be satisfied that such person is duly 
qualified to act as such juror.  When a person is drawn and found 
qualified he shall be accepted unless the court, on the 
application of the juror and before he is sworn, excuses him from 
such service for any of the reasons prescribed in this title or in 
Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 190), Title 3, Part 1 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure.”  Section 910 provides:  “No challenge 
shall be made or allowed to the panel from which the grand jury 
is drawn, nor to an individual grand juror, except when made by 
the court for want of qualification, as prescribed in Section 909.” 
After selection, the dismissal of a grand juror must also 
follow certain procedures.  Section 935 provides:  “The district 
attorney of the county may at all times appear before the grand 
jury for the purpose of giving information or advice relative to 
any matter cognizable by the grand jury, and may interrogate 
witnesses before the grand jury whenever he thinks it 
necessary.”  But the statute confers no authority on a prosecutor 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
 
to dismiss a grand juror.  Rather, section 939.5 provides:  “Before 
considering a charge against any person, the foreman of the 
grand jury shall state to those present the matter to be 
considered and the person to be charged with an offense in 
connection therewith.  He shall direct any member of the grand 
jury who has a state of mind in reference to the case or to either 
party which will prevent him from acting impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party to retire.  
Any violation of this section by the foreman or any member of 
the grand jury is punishable by the court as a contempt.”  These 
statutes serve to ensure the impartiality and independence of 
the grand jury.  
The parties agree, and we also agree, that a prosecutor’s 
dismissal of a grand juror violates section 939.5.  During 
selection of the grand jury, section 909 authorizes “the court” to 
“excuse[] [a juror] from such service” for lacking certain 
qualifications.  After selection, section 939.5 authorizes “the 
foreman of the grand jury” to “direct any member of the grand 
jury who has a state of mind in reference to the case or to either 
party which will prevent him from acting impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party to retire.”  
Section 935 authorizes the prosecutor to “give[] information or 
advice relative to any matter cognizable by the grand jury.”  But 
no provision authorizes a prosecutor to dismiss a grand juror, as 
the prosecutor did here.  The prosecutor could have made his 
concerns about Juror No. 18 known to the foreperson, who in 
turn could have directed the juror to retire in accordance with 
section 939.5.  But the prosecutor’s dismissal of Juror No. 18 
exceeded his authority.   
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
 
III. 
 
We next consider whether an indictment must be set aside 
because of a prosecutor’s violation of section 939.5.  That 
provision says:  “Any violation of this section by the foreman or 
any member of the grand jury is punishable by the court as a 
contempt.”  But the provision does not say what remedy is 
available for a violation by the prosecutor.  Avitia argues that 
an indictment can nonetheless be set aside under section 995.  
We agree that a defendant may seek a remedy under section 
995(a)(1)(A) when a prosecutor dismisses a grand jury member 
in violation of section 939.5. 
 
In two early cases, we said that a grand jury foreman’s 
noncompliance with section 907, the precursor to section 939.5, 
was not grounds for dismissing an indictment under section 995.  
In People v. Kempley (1928) 205 Cal. 441 (Kempley), two 
defendants appealed from their convictions for accepting bribes 
and moved for a new trial under section 995(a)(1)(A).  (Kempley, 
at p. 444.)  The defendants offered to prove that several 
members of the grand jury personally interviewed individuals 
outside those named in the proceedings, used private funds to 
employ detectives to obtain evidence, and had already decided 
to indict without having heard any evidence.  (Id. at p. 446.)  We 
understood the defendants’ claim as a challenge to “the 
individual members of the grand jury on the ground of bias or 
prejudice” (ibid.), and we observed that section 907 provides the 
proper recourse to address such defects (Kempley, at p. 447).  
Rejecting the defendants’ claim, we said:  “The provisions of 
[section 907] were not complied with; but the neglect or failure 
of the foreman to comply therewith is not made a ground for 
setting aside the indictment by section 995 of the Penal Code 
and section 907 contains within itself the penalty for the 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
 
violation of its provisions,” i.e., the foreman’s violation is 
punishable as a contempt.  (Ibid., italics added.)  In People v. 
Jefferson (1956) 47 Cal.2d 438 (Jefferson), we applied Kempley 
to reject another motion to set aside an indictment under section 
995(a)(1)(A) where the grand jury foreperson again did not 
comply with former section 907.   
Kempley and Jefferson are distinguishable because they 
concerned violations of section 939.5 (former section 907) by the 
grand fury foreperson and not, as here, by a prosecutor.  Section 
939.5 specifies a penalty of contempt for violations by the 
foreperson but provides no comparable mechanism to deter 
violations by a prosecutor.  (Kempley, supra, 205 Cal. at pp. 447–
448.)  Nor does such a violation fall within the coverage of 
section 995(a)(1)(B), which requires setting aside an indictment 
where the defendant “has been indicted without reasonable or 
probable cause.”  (Cf. Stark v. Superior Court (2011) 52 Cal.4th 
368, 407 (Stark) [setting aside an indictment under section 
995(a)(1)(B) “when a grand jury is not asked to consider the 
mental state required for the commission of the offense”]; 
Cummiskey v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1018, 1029 
[refusing to set aside an indictment under section 995(a)(1)(B) 
because a challenged instruction on probable cause was 
adequate and there was sufficient evidence to find probable 
cause]; People v. Backus (1979) 23 Cal.3d 360, 385–391 [refusing 
to set aside an indictment under section 995(a)(1)(B) because 
there was sufficient evidence to find probable cause].)  Avitia 
does not claim that the prosecutor’s dismissal of Juror No. 18 
resulted in a grand jury that indicted him without reasonable or 
probable cause. 
Section 995(a)(1)(A)’s directive to set aside an indictment 
“not found, endorsed, and presented as presented in this code” 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
 
may provide a remedy in certain cases when procedural rights 
of the accused have been violated.  In the related context of 
setting aside an information under section 995, we have 
explained that “ ‘[a]n information . . . will not be set aside merely 
because there has been some irregularity or minor error in 
procedure in the preliminary examination.  [Citation.]  But 
where it appears that, during the course of the preliminary 
examination, the defendant has been denied a substantial right, 
the commitment is unlawful within the meaning of section 995, 
and it must be set aside upon timely motion.’ ”  (Jennings v. 
Superior Court (1967) 66 Cal.2d 867, 874.)  Because the text of 
section 939.5 also addresses substantial rights, we see no reason 
why a similar rule should not apply to ensure the procedural 
integrity of an indictment when a prosecutor violates this 
section.  (§ 939.5 [“[the foreperson] shall direct any member of 
the grand jury who has a state of mind in reference to the case 
or to either party which will prevent him from acting impartially 
and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party to 
retire”] (italics added).) In this context, section 995(a)(1)(A) 
allows a defendant to pursue a motion to set aside an indictment 
where the defendant alleges that a prosecutor’s violation of 
section 939.5 has prejudiced a substantial right. 
The Attorney General relies on Jefferson’s observation 
that section 995(a)(1)(A) “has been interpreted as applying only 
to those sections in part 2, title 5, chapter 1, of the Penal Code 
beginning with section 940.”  (Jefferson, supra, 47 Cal.2d at 
p. 442, citing Kempley, supra, 205 Cal. at p. 447.)  But this dicta 
was only an observation about how our precedent had 
interpreted section 995(a)(1)(A) up to that point.  Neither 
Kempley nor Jefferson contemplated the availability of a section 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
 
995(a)(1)(A) remedy when a prosecutor, rather than the grand 
jury foreperson, was responsible for a section 939.5 violation.  
We next address whether a section 939.5 violation by a 
prosecutor can amount to the violation of a substantial right.  
Although we have focused our analysis on “substantial rights” 
in some contexts (People v. Standish (2006) 38 Cal.4th 858, 882 
(Standish)) and “due process” in others (Stark, supra, 52 Cal.4th 
at p. 417), we understand the inquiries to be one and the same 
in this context:  a right is substantial when denial of the right 
results in a denial of due process.  In Stark, we said that a 
prosecutor’s conflict of interest — there it was alleged that the 
district attorney’s office was “financially impacted” by the 
defendant’s misconduct and that the prosecutor was “personally 
involved” in the events under investigation (id. at p. 414) — can 
result in a denial of due process if it is shown that the conflict 
“substantially impaired the independence and impartiality of 
the grand jury” (id. at p. 417).  A prosecutor’s violation of section 
939.5 likewise can threaten the basic function of the grand jury 
as “ ‘a protective bulwark standing solidly between the ordinary 
citizen and an overzealous prosecutor.’ ”  (Johnson, supra, 15 
Cal.3d at p. 253.)  A prosecutor’s improper dismissal of a grand 
juror may result in a grand jury that is skewed in its 
composition.  It also risks creating a perception in the jurors’ 
minds that the prosecutor exercises control over the operation 
and functions of the grand jury, beyond the authority vested in 
the foreperson and the jurors themselves.  Section 939.5’s 
conferral of authority on the foreperson to dismiss a biased juror 
is an important safeguard to ensure that the grand jury remains 
impartial and independent of the prosecutor. 
Although not every prosecutorial violation of section 939.5 
is reason to set aside an indictment, an indictment must be set 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
 
aside where the violation results in the denial of a substantial 
right.  (See Stark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 417 [“the manner in 
which the grand jury proceedings are conducted may result in a 
denial of defendant’s due process rights, requiring dismissal of 
the indictment”]; cf. Beck v. Washington (1962) 369 U.S. 541; 
Packer v. Superior Court (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 152.)  We hold 
that a defendant can proceed by a section 995(a)(1)(A) motion to 
set aside an indictment on the ground that a section 939.5 
violation 
substantially 
impaired 
the 
impartiality 
and 
independence of the grand jury. 
IV. 
Next, we consider what standard applies in determining 
whether a prosecutor’s violation of section 939.5 amounts to the 
denial of a defendant’s substantial right to an impartial and 
independent grand jury.  Avitia argues that no showing of 
prejudice is required because he is seeking dismissal of the 
indictment in a pretrial motion.  The Attorney General 
disagrees.  We hold that the defendant, when proceeding by way 
of a section 995(a)(1)(A) motion, must show that the section 
939.5 violation reasonably might have had an adverse effect on 
the impartiality or independence of the jury. 
“[S]ome errors such as denial of the right to counsel by 
their nature constitute a denial of a substantial right.”  
(Standish, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 882; see, e.g., People v. 
Gamache (2010) 48 Cal. 4th 347, 396 [“[S]tructural errors not 
susceptible to harmless error analysis are those that go to the 
very construction of the trial mechanism — a biased judge, total 
absence of counsel, the failure of a jury to reach any verdict on 
an essential element.”]; Vasquez v. Hillery (1986) 474 U.S. 254, 
263–264 [“[D]iscrimination in the grand jury undermines the 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
 
structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself, and is not 
amenable to harmless-error review.”].)  In certain instances, we 
have set aside informations because of procedural defects 
without conducting a prejudice analysis.  (See People v. Elliot 
(1960) 54 Cal.2d 498, 504 (Elliot) [defendant was denied the 
right under “section 868 of the Penal Code, to require that all 
unauthorized persons be excluded from the courtroom during 
the preliminary examination”]; People v. Napthaly (1895) 105 
Cal. 641, 644–645 [defendant was denied the right to counsel]; 
see also Harris v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1129, 
1144 [defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel 
because counsel “had a material conflict of interest with him at 
the time of his preliminary hearing”].) 
More recently, we have explained that “whether a showing 
of prejudice is required depends on the stage of the proceedings 
at which the claim is raised in the reviewing court.”  (People v. 
Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 157.)  In People v. Pompa-Ortiz 
(1980) 27 Cal.3d 519 (Pompa-Ortiz), we considered a defendant’s 
request, on appeal from a judgment of conviction, to set aside an 
information under section 995 because his preliminary 
examination had been closed to the public.  (Pompa-Ortiz, at 
p. 522.)  We said “[i]t is settled that denial of a substantial right 
at 
the 
preliminary 
examination 
renders 
the 
ensuing 
commitment illegal and entitles a defendant to dismissal of the 
information on timely motion.”  (Id. at p. 523.)  Applying this 
interpretation of section 995, we held that a defendant “has a 
statutory right to a public preliminary examination and that 
denial of the right renders the commitment unlawful within the 
meaning of Penal Code section 995[(a)(2)(A)].”  (Id. at p. 522.)  
But we also held that “such illegality can be successfully urged 
as a ground of reversal on appeal only if it in some way 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
 
prejudiced defendant at his subsequent trial.”  (Ibid., citing Cal. 
Const., art. VI, § 13.)  Because the defendant made “no showing 
that he was denied a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice 
from the closure of the preliminary examination,” we affirmed 
the judgment of conviction.  (Id. at p. 530.)  In reaching this 
conclusion, we held that “irregularities in the preliminary 
examination procedures which are not jurisdictional in the 
fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the appropriate 
standard of prejudicial error and shall require reversal only if 
defendant can show that he was deprived of a fair trial or 
otherwise suffered prejudice as a result of the error at the 
preliminary examination.”  (Id. at p. 529.)  We added, “The right 
to relief without any showing of prejudice will be limited to 
pretrial challenges of irregularities.”  (Ibid.)  We have since said 
“[t]he reasoning of Pompa-Ortiz applies with equal force in the 
grand jury context.”  (People v. Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 
123.) 
Pompa-Ortiz involved a posttrial motion and did not 
provide an occasion for application of its language concerning 
“pretrial challenges of irregularities.”  (Pompa-Ortiz, supra, 27 
Cal.3d at p. 529.)  We clarified in Standish, which involved a 
pretrial motion to set aside an information, that Pompa-Ortiz 
did not mean that “any and all irregularities that precede or 
bear some relationship to the preliminary examination require 
that the information be set aside pursuant to section 995.”  
(Standish, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 885.)  We recognized that 
certain errors, even if challenged before trial, will be considered 
a denial of a substantial right “only if the error ‘reasonably 
might have affected the outcome.’ ”  (Id. at p. 882, quoting People 
v. Konow (2004) 32 Cal.4th 995, 1024–1025.)  We distinguished 
two pretrial cases where we presumed prejudice in light of 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
 
statutory violations because “they were based in large part on 
the circumstance that the relevant statute required dismissal as 
the proper remedy when, without a showing of good cause, the 
defendant had not been brought to trial within the statutory 
period.”  (Id., at p. 886, citing Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 
Cal.3d 239, 263 [“Prejudice is presumed when relief is sought on 
section 1382 grounds pretrial because the statute commands 
that the court ‘must order the action to be dismissed.’ ”]; People 
v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 151 [“[S]ection 1382, subdivision 
2, is mandatory . . . ; hence—there being no sufficient showing 
of good cause for delay in the case at bench—defendant then had 
the right to have the action dismissed on his motion.”].)  The 
violation of other statutes that “do[] not implicate a core right at 
the preliminary examination itself” or “call[] for dismissal” are 
“subject to the general test for prejudice because . . . the error is 
not inherently prejudicial.”  (Standish, supra, 38 Cal.4th at 
p. 883.) 
In light of this case law, we hold that outside a narrow 
category of errors that “by their nature constitute a denial of a 
substantial right” and hence require dismissal “without any 
showing of prejudice,” a defendant seeking to set aside an 
indictment before trial must show that an error “reasonably 
might have affected the outcome.”  (Standish, supra, 38 Cal.4th 
at pp. 882, 886.)  This showing is less onerous than the 
“reasonably probable” showing required to prevail on a similar 
motion after trial, when interests in finality are greater.  (See 
id., at pp. 882–883 [“By this language, we do not mean that the 
defendant must demonstrate that it is reasonably probable he 
or she would not have been held to answer in the absence of the 
error.  Rather, the defendant’s substantial rights are violated 
when the error is not minor but ‘reasonably might have affected 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
 
the outcome’ in the particular case.”].)  We agree with the Court 
of Appeal in this case that a section 939.5 violation is “not 
inherently prejudicial.”  When a defendant seeks to set aside an 
indictment before trial under section 995(a)(1)(A) on the ground 
that the prosecutor violated section 939.5, the indictment must 
be set aside only when the defendant has shown that the 
violation reasonably might have had an adverse effect on the 
independence or impartiality of the grand jury. 
V. 
We now apply this inquiry to the facts of this case.  As 
noted, the prosecutor’s dismissal of Juror No. 18 was unlawful 
under section 939.5.  But Juror No. 18 had said he thought he 
would be biased in evaluating the case, and the prosecutor 
appeared to dismiss the juror on that basis.  We cannot be 
certain what the foreperson would have done if not for the 
prosecutor’s actions or how the grand jury would have otherwise 
proceeded.  But in light of Juror No. 18’s unequivocal statement 
that he would not be able to fairly review the case, there is a 
high probability that the foreperson ultimately would have 
removed the juror.  In any event, the dismissal of Juror No. 18 
helped to ensure the grand jury’s impartiality by removing a 
potential juror who said he could not be impartial. 
As for the independence of the grand jury, the prosecutor 
unquestionably influenced the composition of the grand jury by 
removing Juror No. 18.  But mere influence over the composition 
of the grand jury is not impermissible; section 935 provides that 
the prosecutor may “giv[e] information or advice relative to any 
matter cognizable by the grand jury.”  The facts here are 
different from cases where the prosecutor was actively involved 
in the selection of grand jurors or excused a grand juror in the 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
 
presence of other grand jurors.  In those cases, the prosecutor’s 
actions could have led grand jurors to believe they were 
beholden to the prosecutor during the decisionmaking process.  
(See De Leon v. Hartley (N.M. 2014) 316 P.3d 896, 901 (De Leon) 
[setting aside an indictment where the district court permitted 
the prosecutor to select the grand jury without the court’s 
involvement]; Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 
1049, 1061 [setting aside an indictment where “[t]he 
prosecutor’s actions supplanted the court’s role in the 
proceedings and, because the excusal colloquy took place in front 
of the other jurors, allowed the remaining jurors to mistakenly 
believe the prosecutor had legal authority to approve a hardship 
request”].) 
In this case, nothing in the record suggests that the 
prosecutor was improperly involved in the selection of the grand 
jurors or in the grand jury’s subsequent decisionmaking process.  
Instead, the record indicates that the prosecutor dismissed 
Juror No. 18 outside the presence of other grand jurors after the 
grand jury heard Juror No. 18 express concern about his own 
bias.  The fact that the prosecutor dismissed Juror No. 18 
outside the presence of the other grand jurors does not make the 
dismissal any less unlawful.  But it reduced the likelihood that 
the independence of the remaining grand jury was impaired.  
The other members had no reason to think that the prosecutor, 
as opposed to the foreperson, dismissed Juror No. 18.  On the 
record before us, the foreperson was the only grand juror who 
could have known that he was not the one who removed Juror 
No. 18, and even the foreperson did not necessarily know it was 
the prosecutor who had done so.  Avitia therefore has not shown 
that the error reasonably might have affected the impartiality 
or independence of the grand jury in an adverse manner. 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
 
Dustin v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1311 is 
distinguishable.  The court there held “it was error for the trial 
court to have placed the burden on defendant to show prejudice 
as a result of the denial of his right to a transcript of the entire 
grand jury proceedings.”  (Id. at p. 1326.)  But the court did so 
where “[i]n the absence of a transcript, coupled with the fact that 
no judge or defense representative was present, it is difficult to 
imagine how a defendant could ever show prejudice.”  (Ibid.)  
Further, the court said the prosecutor apparently excluded a 
court reporter “for the express purpose of precluding discovery 
by the defendant of his opening statement and closing 
argument” and that “the prosecutor’s behavior is relevant in 
addressing whether dismissal is an appropriate remedy for the 
failure to provide a complete transcript of the grand jury 
proceedings.”  (Id. at pp. 1323–1324.)  No similar circumstance 
is present here. 
Although we conclude that Avitia’s motion fails on the 
facts before us, we emphasize that prosecutors must be mindful 
of the dictates of section 939.5 and conform their conduct 
accordingly.  We agree with the New Mexico high court’s 
admonition that the “entity charged with the actual selection 
and excusal of grand jurors is of paramount importance to the 
process.  As such, the statutory provisions assigning that role 
. . . should be seen as mandatory, not directory, because they are 
critical to ensuring that the process of impaneling a grand jury 
is impartial and free of unfair influences.  [Citations.]  [¶] . . . .  
[¶] The manner in which grand jurors are selected and excused 
goes to the very heart of how the public views the integrity of 
the grand jury system.  [¶] . . . .  [¶] And if the integrity of the 
grand jury is called into question, there is little hope that the 
public at large, or the accused in particular, will view the grand 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
 
jury as capable of returning well-founded indictments or serving 
as a realistic barrier to an overzealous prosecution.”  (De Leon, 
supra, 316 P.3d at pp. 900–901.)  Section 939.5 makes clear that 
the foreperson, not the prosecutor, has authority to dismiss 
grand jurors.  The prosecutor, who “ ‘ “is in a peculiar and very 
definite sense the servant of the law” ’ ” (People v. Eubanks 
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 589), is expected to know the law and to 
follow it. 
CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal and vacate 
the stay we previously imposed. 
 
LIU, J. 
We Concur:  
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
RUBIN, J.* 
                                        
*  
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT 
S242030 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Chin 
 
I agree that Penal Code section 995, subdivision (a)(1)(A), 
permits a motion to dismiss the grand jury indictment on the 
ground that the prosecutor violated Penal Code section 939.5.  I 
also agree that the superior court correctly denied the motion in 
this case.  But the prosecutor’s action in dismissing the grand 
juror is not as pernicious as the majority opinion makes it 
appear. 
Although the majority barely acknowledges it, the 
prosecutor excused a grand juror who was biased against 
defendant, Leo Brian Avitia.  Excusing a grand juror who was 
biased against a defendant does not violate that defendant’s 
substantial rights.  Nor does it call into question “ ‘the integrity 
of the grand jury.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.) 
As a result, I do not read today’s opinion as answering the 
question that both the high court and our state courts have 
previously avoided answering — whether defendants have a due 
process right to enforce procedures that ensure the impartiality 
of a grand jury under pain of dismissal.  (Beck v. Washington 
(1962) 369 U.S. 541, 546; Jackson v. Superior Court (2018) 25 
Cal.App.5th 515, 530, review granted Sept. 19, 2018, S250995; 
Packer v. Superior Court (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 152, 168-169.)  
Like those cases, and to an even greater extent here, it is 
sufficient to state that defendant failed to show he was judged 
by a biased grand juror.   
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Chin, J., concurring 
2 
This is an odd case.  Decades ago, we noted with approval 
that the Court of Appeal in the case had “held that the obligation 
of the prosecutor to assure independence, procedural regularity, 
and fairness in grand jury proceedings is compelled by due 
process . . . .”  (People v. Backus (1979) 23 Cal.3d 360, 392, italics 
added.)  The prosecutor might have had that admonition in mind 
when excusing a grand juror who was biased against defendant. 
A credible argument exists that the prosecutor has 
inherent authority under People v. Backus, supra, 23 Cal.3d 392, 
to excuse a grand juror who is biased against the defendant.  
Arguably, doing so would be necessary to ensure fairness.  To 
say that the prosecutor is obligated to ensure fairness implies 
that the prosecutor also has the authority to do so.  The law 
cannot 
obligate 
a 
prosecutor 
to 
do 
something 
and 
simultaneously prohibit the prosecutor from doing that same 
something.  If the biased juror had not been excused, defendant 
might now be contending, with more credibility than his actual 
contention, that his substantial right to an unbiased grand jury 
was violated. 
But no party is arguing that, as part of his obligation to 
ensure fairness, the prosecutor had inherent authority to excuse 
the biased juror.  Accordingly, I accept that the prosecutor erred; 
only the foreperson may excuse a grand juror.  But it was a 
technical error.  Rather than excuse the juror himself, the 
prosecution could have advised the foreperson to excuse the 
juror.  Certainly, the prosecutor had the authority to do that.  
“The district attorney of the county may at all times appear 
before the grand jury for the purpose of giving information or 
advice relative to any matter cognizable by the grand jury . . . .”  
(Pen. Code, § 935, italics added.)  In turn, the foreperson 
AVITIA v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Chin, J., concurring 
3 
probably would have excused the juror, and perhaps would have 
been required to do so to ensure fairness.   
The difference between excusing the biased juror directly 
and advising the foreperson to do so could not have affected any 
substantial right of the defendant.  Either way, a juror biased 
against him would have been removed. 
I do not suggest that an indictment can never be set aside 
because of a Penal Code section 939.5 violation.  In some 
situations, such a violation could infringe a defendant’s 
substantial right — for example, if the prosecutor manipulated 
excusals and selections to keep as grand jurors only those 
perceived to be favorable to the prosecution, and to remove those 
perceived to be favorable to the defendant.  But this case is not 
remotely similar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
I Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Avitia v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion NP opn. filed 4/18/17 – 3d Dist. 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S242030 
Date Filed: December 24, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Joaquin 
Judge: Brett H. Morgan and Seth Hoyt 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
David J. Cohen and Alexander P. Guilmartin for Petitioner. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, 
Assistant Attorney General, Rachelle A. Newcomb and Catherine Chatman, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
David J. Cohen 
300 Montgomery Street, Suite 660 
San Francisco, CA  94104 
(415) 398-3900 
 
Catherine Chatman 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 210-7699