Title: Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r v. Chadwell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 962266
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 12, 1997

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson,
1 Lacy, Hassell, 
 
 
Keenan, and Koontz, JJ. 
 
COMMONWEALTH TRANSPORTATION 
COMMISSIONER OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 962266 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
                                     September 12, 1997 
A.B. CHADWELL, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LEE COUNTY 
 
William C. Fugate, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal of a judgment confirming an award in an 
eminent domain proceeding, the dispositive issue is whether the 
trial court erred in refusing to strike for cause a prospective 
commissioner based on his ownership of property directly across 
the highway from the condemnees' land. 
 
In October 1994, the Commonwealth Transportation 
Commissioner (the Commonwealth) recorded a certificate condemning 
0.036 acre in fee and 0.006 acre owned by A.B. and Yvonne 
Chadwell for a permanent utility easement.  The Commonwealth's 
certificate included a deposit of $69,125, its estimated value of 
the land taken, the easement, and the damage to the residue.   
 
The condemned property was part of an 0.8 acre parcel owned 
by the Chadwells near the intersection of state Routes 58 and 693 
in Lee County.  Two commercial structures are located on the 
property, a convenience store with a gasoline pump, leased to Lee 
Oil Company and subleased to Patty Fee Young, and a building 
                     
     
1Justice Stephenson participated in the hearing and decision 
of this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 
July 1, 1997. 
 
 
 
 
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leased to the Lee County Office on Youth for use as a "Teen 
Center."   
 
In December 1994, the Commonwealth filed a petition in the 
trial court, requesting appointment of a commission to ascertain 
the value of the land taken and any damage which may accrue to 
the residue as a result of the taking.  Lee Oil and Young 
intervened in the action. 
 
Nine condemnation commissioners were summoned and seated in 
accordance with Code § 25-46.20.  After the parties conducted 
their voir dire of the prospective commissioners, the 
Commonwealth moved to strike James C. Brown for cause on the 
ground that he was not impartial and disinterested.  Brown had 
stated that he currently owned property directly across Route 58 
from the Chadwells' land, and that he had settled his case with 
the Commonwealth concerning property taken for the same highway 
project. 
 
The trial court denied the Commonwealth’s motion, stating 
that a ruling automatically eliminating anyone who owned land on 
 Route 58 affected by the project would "seriously reduce the 
[number of] people that might be available" to serve as 
commissioners.  Brown was removed from the panel by a peremptory 
strike. 
 
After the commissioners were seated, they inspected the 
property and heard evidence concerning the value of the land 
taken and the damage to the residue caused by the take.  The 
 
 
 
 
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chief issue in dispute was whether the taking, which eliminated 
vehicular access to the convenience store from Route 58, deprived 
the residue of its commercial value.  After the taking, access to 
the convenience store was limited to entry from Route 693.  
 
The commissioners returned an award of $162,275 for the land 
taken and $161,425 for the damage to the residue.  The trial 
court overruled the Commonwealth’s exceptions and entered 
judgment confirming the award. 
 
On appeal, the Commonwealth contends that Brown should have 
been struck from the panel for cause on the ground that he owned 
property directly across Route 58 from the condemned parcel.  The 
Commonwealth argues that its right to a panel of five 
commissioners, chosen from a group of nine disinterested and 
impartial freeholders, was violated because Brown had a personal 
and financial interest in the outcome of this case. 
 
In response, the Chadwells, Lee Oil, and Young 
(collectively, the Chadwells) assert that the trial court 
properly refused to strike Brown for cause.  They contend that 
Brown did not have a personal or financial interest in this 
proceeding because he did not own property adjacent to the 
condemned property or property that was currently the subject of 
a present or anticipated condemnation proceeding.  We disagree 
with the Chadwells. 
 
The issue of just compensation in an eminent domain 
proceeding may be determined by a commission, which must be 
 
 
 
 
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comprised of disinterested freeholders.  Code § 25-46.20.  When 
nine commissioners are summoned, as occurred in this case, the 
condemnor and the landowners are each entitled to two peremptory 
strikes, after which the remaining five freeholders are appointed 
to fix the value of the property to be taken and the damage, if 
any, to the residue.  Id.
 
The commissioners must be "upright and capable,...without 
bias or prejudice."  Chairman of the Highway Comm'n v. Fletcher, 
153 Va. 43, 46-47, 149 S.E. 456, 457 (1929).  The commissioners, 
like a jury, hear the evidence, evaluate the credibility of 
witnesses, and make factual determinations in ascertaining the 
proper award due the landowner.  Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r v. 
Thompson, 249 Va. 292, 295, 455 S.E.2d 206, 207 (1995). 
 
To maintain public confidence in the integrity of 
condemnation proceedings, the selection of condemnation 
commissioners is subject to the same rule applicable to the 
selection of jurors, namely, that any person who may be 
improperly influenced in the proceedings must be stricken for 
cause from the panel.  See May v. Crockett, 202 Va. 438, 440-41, 
117 S.E.2d 648, 649-50 (1961).  The trial court is given 
discretionary authority to determine whether a prospective 
commissioner should be stricken for this reason.  State Highway 
and Transp. Comm'r v. Dennison, 231 Va. 239, 243, 343 S.E.2d 324, 
327 (1986).  Under its discretionary authority, the trial court 
must decide, among other things, whether any members of the 
 
 
 
 
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venire have a financial interest so intimately related to the 
issue at trial that they cannot sit indifferent in the cause.  
Id. 
 
In May, we held that the trial court should have stricken 
for cause a commissioner who owned property adjoining the land to 
be condemned and held an equitable interest in other property in 
the same project on which condemnation proceedings were pending. 
 202 Va. at 441, 117 S.E.2d at 650.  By comparison, in Dennison, 
we upheld the trial court's refusal to strike for cause two 
prospective commissioners, one who had sold the landowner some 
personal insurance policies before the taking, and the other who 
had done some construction work for the landowner three years 
before the taking.  231 Va. at 243, 343 S.E.2d at 327.  The 
standard distinguishing these decisions was whether the panel 
member had a present financial interest that may have affected 
his ability to be disinterested in the cause. 
 
Applying this standard to the present case, we conclude that 
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike Brown 
for cause.  Like the commissioner challenged in May, Brown was 
not disinterested in the cause, because he owned property in very 
close proximity to the land taken.  His ownership of that 
property could have affected his ability to render a 
disinterested valuation of the land taken, or a disinterested 
determination of the damage to the residue.
2
                     
     
2Based on our holding, we need not address the remaining 
 
 
 
 
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For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment confirming 
the award and remand the case for a new trial. 
 
Reversed and remanded.
                                                                  
issues raised by the Commonwealth.