Title: Marsalis v. Lehmann
Citation: 566 So. 2d 217
Docket Number: 07-CA-59031
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: August 29, 1990

566 So. 2d 217 (1990) Lois L. MARSALIS &amp; Judy Marsalis Clark v. Albert LEHMANN, Amy Lehmann Garraway, Louis Lehmann, Jr., Geoffrey Lehmann, &amp; Lucy Lehmann. No. 07-CA-59031. Supreme Court of Mississippi. August 29, 1990. *218 John W. Prewitt, Sr., James L. Penley, Jr., Vicksburg, for appellants. R. Kenneth Hudson, Gwin Lewis Punches &amp; Hudson, Natchez, for appellees. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and ROBERTSON and BLASS, JJ. ROY NOBLE LEE, Chief Justice, for the Court: Lois Marsalis and Judy Marsalis Clark, proponents of the last will and testament of Mrs. Tamma Lehmann, deceased, appealed from a judgment of the Chancery Court, Claiborne County, Mississippi, sustaining the motion for summary judgment of Albert Lehmann, Amy Lehmann Garraway, Louis Lehmann, Jr., Geoffrey Lehmann, and Lucy Lehmann, contestants of the will. The judgment set aside the will, revoked letters testamentary to Lois Marsalis, ordered a full inventory and accounting by Lois Marsalis and distribution of the estate according to Mississippi laws of descent and distribution. The proponents have appealed to this Court and present four issues for decision. Mrs. Tamma M. Lehmann died August 21, 1984, in the Mercy Hospital, Vicksburg, Mississippi, at the age of ninety four years. On February 14, 1984, she executed her last will and testament naming as beneficiaries the appellants and appellees. She named her daughter, Lois L. Marsalis, Executrix of the will and the bulk of her estate was devised and bequeathed to Lois. Mrs. Lehmann's husband died in 1972. They owned a home and property in Hermanville and had lived there for a number of years. Mrs. Lehmann continued to reside at the home in the Hermanville Community until October 1973, when she moved to Vicksburg and lived in the home of her daughter, Lois L. Marsalis, until her death. She was eighty four years at the time and was physically and mentally alert and able to tend to her own needs. In 1979, Mrs. Lehmann broke her hip and, afterward, could walk only with the aid of a walker. She could move around the house but confined those movements primarily to her own bedroom and bathroom. She had a television set in her room, which she enjoyed, and when the family had guests, she joined her daughter and son-in-law and the guests in the den. The record reflects that Lois had a relationship of trust, love and affection with both parents and was attentive to their needs when they were well and she was devoted to caring for her mother when her mother's physical condition declined. Both parents had reposed trust in their daughter. Mrs. Lehmann executed an oil lease in 1980 or 1981 for which she was paid approximately $31,000. In her deposition, Lois Marsalis was asked what she did with the proceeds of the lease money, and she testified: The money was put in money market certificates in the joint names of Tamma Lehmann and Lois Marsalis. Lois attended to the business transactions of Mrs. Lehmann, explicitly following Mrs. Lehmann directions. In 1981, Mrs. Lehmann told Mrs. Marsalis to give certain information to Mrs. Lehmann's long time attorney, Drake, in order to draw up a new will for her. Lois conveyed the information to Mr. Drake's office *219 and he drew the new will and sent it to Mrs. Lehmann. He executed the will on February 14, 1981, in the presence of Lois Marsalis and her husband, Buster Marsalis, and two attesting witnesses, Katherine and Dwayne Stagg. At the time of executing the will, Mrs. Lehmann's hearing was good but her eyesight was failing. She was mentally alert. Although four issues were presented on this appeal, issue number one is dispositive of the case and will be the only issue discussed. Pertinent parts of the chancellor's finding of fact and conclusion of law follow: It is apparent that the learned chancellor was of the opinion that Mrs. Lehmann did not receive any independent advice or counsel in the matters involved here and that he was strongly influenced by that view. This Court has modified the test for rebutting a presumption of undue influence and no longer requires the independent advice of a competent person but instead requires a showing of the grantor's "independent consent and action." Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So. 2d 1183, 1193 (Miss. 1987). In Blissard v. White, 515 So. 2d 1196 (Miss. 1987), Thera B. White died at the age of ninety one. She executed a will leaving her entire estate to one of her brothers, Dwight Blissard. Five nieces and nephew contested the will contending that there was a fiduciary relationship between the testatrix and Blissard and that Blissard *220 exercised undue influence over her. Thera White had executed a general power of attorney empowering Blissard to act on her behalf and the contestants claimed that the attorney had done legal work for Blissard which rendered him incompetent to give independent advice to the testatrix. After a full trial, the lower court held that there was no undue influence exercised upon the testatrix and that her acts were her own free and independent expressions of her will. In affirming the judgment of the lower court, this Court stated the following with reference to independent advice and counsel: Blissard v. White, 515 So. 2d 1196, 1200 (Miss. 1987) In Matter of Will of Adams, 529 So. 2d 611 (Miss. 1988), the parties stipulated that there was a confidential relationship between the testatrix and the beneficiary. The case proceeded to trial before the chancellor without a jury. At the close of the testimony, the chancellor found that Simm, the beneficiary, failed to overcome the presumption of undue influence and he found that the will was invalid. On appeal, this Court held that there must be a showing (by clear and convincing evidence) that Simm abused the relationship by asserting dominance over the testator. The Court further held that the facts did not mandate a holding that an abuse of confidential relationship of the type which gives rise to a presumption of undue influence existed between the testator and the beneficiary, and reversed and remanded for a new trial. This Court found in Minor v. Bertasi, 530 So. 2d 168 (Miss. 1988) that though a father lived with and was financially and physically dependent on one son and relied on that son to contact an attorney, and another son regarding a conveyance of land to the two sons, the father was sharp mentally; was aware of his family and finances; was strong willed and was not susceptible to outside influence. We affirmed holding that the evidence supported the lower court's finding that there was no undue influence. This Court conducts a de novo review in determining whether or not the lower court was correct in granting a summary judgment and, in doing so, we follow the same procedure that is required of the trial court. Miss.R.Civ.P. 56. The movant has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact exists while non-movant is given the benefit of every reasonable doubt. Newell v. Hinton, 556 So. 2d 1037, 1041-42 (Miss. 1990); Dennis v. Searle, 457 So. 2d 941, 944 (Miss. 1984); Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So. 2d 358, 362 (Miss. 1983). We are of the opinion that the record in this case indicates that there was a genuine issue of fact on the question of undue influence and that the lower court committed reversible error in declining to permit the appellant to proceed with a full trial and to present evidence in rebuttal of the confidential relationship. Therefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the case is remanded for a full trial on the merits. REVERSED and REMANDED. *221 DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON, PITTMAN and BLASS, JJ., concur. HAWKINS, P.J., concurs with specially concurring opinion joined by DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, J. HAWKINS, Presiding Justice, specially concurring: I concur in reversing this case. In the first place, chancery courts, which do not have the same consideration as circuit courts, should be very loathe to become side-tracked on a motion for summary judgment when hearing the entire case will in all likelihood result in little more expenditure of time. McMullan v. Geosouthern Energy Corp., 556 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Miss. 1990). I would regret any emasculation of the presumption of undue influence which arises from a dominant party to a confidential relationship receiving a benefit, either by gift or will. This bright line rule has served this state well for almost two centuries. We made the following observation in the recent case, Estate of McRae, 522 So. 2d 731 (Miss. 1988): Id. at 737. The entire problem in this case could have been avoided by the experienced and able lawyer in this case taking the simple precaution of seeing that the main beneficiary under the will was not present when the will was discussed with or executed by the testatrix. He had been the attorney for the testatrix for many years. The careful draftsman and practitioner will make certain that his conversations with the testator or grantor are entirely private. There is another reason why the motion for summary judgment in this case should have been overruled. It is not at all clear that Lois L. Marsalis actively participated in the preparation or procurement of this will, at least to the degree to trigger the presumption. As opposed to a lifetime gift, in order to set aside a will in which the dominant party to a confidential relation was a beneficiary, it must also appear that such person actively engaged in its preparation or execution. Croft v. Alder, 237 Miss. 713, 115 So. 2d 683, 686 (1959); In re Will of Adams, 529 So. 2d 611, 614 (Miss. 1988). Mrs. Marsalis did not employ the *222 attorney, did not pay him, nor did she give him any instructions on her own. DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, J., join this opinion.