Title: Anderson v. Attorney General
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12422
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 2018

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12422 
 
CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON & others1  vs.  ATTORNEY GENERAL & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 6, 2018. - June 18, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Initiative.  Constitutional Law, Initiative petition, Taxation, 
Income tax.  Attorney General.  Taxation, Income tax. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on October 3, 2017. 
 
 
The case was reported by Gants, C.J. 
 
 
 
Kevin P. Martin (David J. Zimmer & Joshua J. Bone also 
present) for the plaintiffs. 
 
Kate R. Cook (Lisa C. Goodheart also present) for the 
interveners. 
 
Juliana deHaan Rice, Assistant Attorney General (Daniel J. 
Hammond, Assistant Attorney General, also present) for the 
defendants. 
                     
1 Christopher Carlozzi, Richard Lord, Eileen McAnneny, and 
Daniel O'Connell. 
 
2 Secretary of the Commonwealth; and Angel M. Cosme, Rebecca 
A. Cusick, Jose A. Encarnacion, Deborah L. Frontierro, Rebekah 
L. Gewirtz, Arnold Hiatt, Mary Clare Higgins, Marven-Rhode 
Hyppolite, Barbara Ann Mann, Kirsis Rafaela Nina, Kimberly 
Selwitz, and Mary Ann Stewart, interveners. 
2 
 
 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Francis X. Wright, Jr., City Solicitor of Somerville, David 
P. Shapiro, Assistant City Solicitor of Somerville, Charles D 
Boddy, Jr., City Attorney of Lawrence, George Markopoulos, 
Assistant City Solicitor of Lynn, Mark Rumley, City Solicitor of 
Medford, Mikaela A. McDermott, City Solicitor of New Bedford, & 
Alan Seewald, City Solicitor of Northampton, for mayor of 
Somerville & others. 
 
Joseph E. Sandler & Dara Lindenbaum, of the District of 
Columbia, Ben T. Clements, & Jessica Dormitzer for Ballot 
Initiative Strategy Center. 
 
Thomas O. Bean for Alliance for Business Leadership. 
 
Andrea C. Kramer for Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 
& another. 
 
John Pagliaro & Martin J. Newhouse for New England Legal 
Foundation. 
 
Mark G. Matuschak, Robert K. Smith, & Colleen McCullough 
for Pioneer Institute, Inc., & another. 
 
Steven P. Lehotsky, Dan Himmelfarb, & John T. Lewis, of the 
District of Columbia, for Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States of America. 
 
Richard Juang for Adela Gonzalez & others. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The Attorney General certified as suitable for 
printing on the 2018 Statewide ballot an initiative petition 
that would ask voters in the Commonwealth to decide whether to 
amend the existing flat tax rate mandated by the Massachusetts 
Constitution in order to impose a graduated tax on residents 
with incomes in excess of $1 million.  The language of 
Initiative Petition 15-17 also provides that, "subject to 
appropriation" by the Legislature, all revenues received from 
the proposed tax "shall" be earmarked for two budgetary 
purposes:  education and transportation. 
The plaintiffs, registered voters in the Commonwealth, seek 
to exclude the petition from the ballot on the ground, inter 
3 
 
 
alia, that it does not meet the related subjects requirement of 
art. 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution.  In 
addition, the plaintiffs contend that the petition would 
constitute a "specific appropriation of money from the treasury 
of the commonwealth," contrary to the explicit prohibition in 
art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 2, of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution against such appropriations, and that 
the drafters of art. 48, at the Constitutional Convention of 
1917-1918, did not intend that tax rates be set by initiative 
petitions.3  The plaintiffs filed a complaint in the county court 
challenging the Attorney General's certification of the 
initiative petition and seeking to enjoin the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth (Secretary) from placing the petition on the 2018 
Statewide ballot.  The single justice reserved and reported the 
case for consideration by the full court. 
We conclude that the initiative petition should not have 
been certified by the Attorney General as "in proper form for 
submission to the people," because, contrary to the 
certification, the petition does not contain only subjects 
"which are related or which are mutually dependent," pursuant to 
                     
3 See Bates v. Director of the Office of Campaign & 
Political Fin., 436 Mass. 144, 155-156 (2002), citing D.B. 
Magleby, Direct Legislation:  Voting on Ballot Propositions in 
the United States 20–25 (1984), and 2 Debates in the 
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention 1917–1918, at 3-16 
(1918) (Constitutional Debates). 
4 
 
 
art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by art. 74 of the 
Amendments.4 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Article 44.  To place the issue in 
context, a brief description of the mandatory flat tax rate in 
the Massachusetts Constitution is necessary.  Article 44 of the 
Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, ratified in 1915, 
allows the Legislature to levy a State income tax on 
Massachusetts residents at a "uniform rate."  See Drapkin v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, 420 Mass. 333, 336 (1995).  Article 44 
provides, in relevant part: 
 
"Full power and authority are hereby given and granted 
to the general court to impose and levy a tax on income in 
the manner hereinafter provided.  Such tax may be at 
different rates upon income derived from different classes 
of property, but shall be levied at a uniform rate 
throughout the commonwealth upon incomes derived from the 
same class of property." 
 
Pursuant to art. 44, the State income tax "must be calculated by 
applying a single, flat rate percentage to a particular class of 
                     
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs of the New England Legal 
Foundation; the Pioneer Institute, Inc., and the Tax Foundation; 
and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, in 
support of the plaintiffs.  We acknowledge the amicus brief of 
the mayors of Somerville, Lawrence, Lynn, Medford, New Bedford, 
and Northampton; the amicus brief of the Ballot Initiative 
Strategy Center; the amicus brief of the Alliance for Business 
Leadership; and the amicus brief of the Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities and the Institute on Taxation and Economic 
Policy, in support of the defendants.  We also acknowledge the 
amicus brief of Adela Gonzalez; Zuleyka Hernandez; Ayomide 
Olumuyiwa, Greenroots, Inc.; and Alternatives for Community & 
Environment, Inc. 
5 
 
 
income."  Peterson v. Commissioner of Revenue, 441 Mass. 420, 
427 (2004).  As a result of this provision, therefore, the 
Legislature is precluded from imposing a graduated income tax on 
Massachusetts taxpayers.  See Opinion of the Justices, 383 Mass. 
940, 941-942 (1981); Opinion of the Justices, 266 Mass. 583, 588 
(1929). 
Over the past fifty years, a number of initiative petitions 
seeking to amend art. 44, in order to permit a graduated income 
tax, have been certified and presented to the voters.  In 1962, 
1968, 1972, and 1976, proposals to amend the flat tax rate were 
placed on the ballot by the Legislature; in 1994, the ballot 
initiative seeking to amend the flat tax was the product of a 
voter-initiated petition.  In all five of these measures, the 
graduated income tax, alone, was the sole subject of the ballot 
question.  In 1994, for example, the ballot question stated: 
 
"This proposed constitutional amendment would require 
Massachusetts income tax rates to be graduated, in order to 
distribute the burden of the tax fairly and equitably.  The 
proposed amendment would require the rates for taxpayers in 
higher income brackets to be higher than the rates for 
taxpayers in lower income brackets.  The proposed amendment 
would also allow the state Legislature to grant reasonable 
exemptions and abatements and establish the number and 
range of tax brackets.  The proposed amendment would 
eliminate from the Massachusetts Constitution the present 
requirement that income taxes must be levied at a uniform 
rate throughout the state upon incomes derived from the 
same class of property." 
 
Voters rejected this petition by a margin of sixty-five to 
twenty-eight per cent of votes cast.  On the same ballot, voters 
6 
 
 
also rejected, by a margin of sixty-five to twenty-seven per 
cent of votes cast, an initiative petition that a statute be 
enacted requiring graduated income tax rates. 
 
b.  Initiative Petition 15-17.  By August 5, 2015, at least 
ten registered voters had filed with the Attorney General the 
initiative petition at issue here, entitled, "An Initiative 
Petition for An Amendment to the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth to Provide Resources for Education and 
Transportation through an additional tax on Incomes in excess of 
One Million Dollars."  The petition would amend art. 44 by 
adding the following: 
 
"To provide the resources for quality public education 
and affordable public colleges and universities, and for 
the repair and maintenance of roads, bridges and public 
transportation, all revenues received in accordance with 
this paragraph shall be expended, subject to appropriation, 
only for these purposes.  In addition to the taxes on 
income otherwise authorized under this Article, there shall 
be an additional tax of 4 percent on that portion of annual 
taxable income in excess of $1,000,000 (one million 
dollars) reported on any return related to those taxes.  To 
ensure that this additional tax continues to apply only to 
the commonwealth's highest income residents, this 
$1,000,000 (one million dollar) income level shall be 
adjusted annually to reflect any increases in the cost of 
living by the same method used for federal income tax 
brackets.  This paragraph shall apply to all tax years 
beginning on or after January 1, 2019." 
 
 
On September 2, 2015, the Attorney General certified to the 
Secretary that the petition "is in proper form for submission to 
the people; that the measure is not, either affirmatively or 
negatively, substantially the same as any measure which has been 
7 
 
 
qualified for submission to the people at either of the two 
preceding biennial state elections; and that it contains only 
subjects that are related or are mutually dependent and which 
are not excluded from the initiative process pursuant to 
Article 48, the Initiative, Part II, Section 2." 
 
After the Attorney General's certification, the proponents 
of the initiative petition gathered and submitted sufficient 
additional signatures to the Secretary so that the Secretary 
transmitted the measure to the Legislature.  See art. 48, The 
Initiative, II, §§ 1, 3, 4, as amended by art. 74.  On May 18, 
2016, more than one-quarter of the members of both houses of the 
Legislature voted in favor of the proposed constitutional 
amendment, and it was referred to the next legislative session.  
See art. 48, The Initiative, IV, § 4.  On June 14, 2017, more 
than one-quarter of the members of both houses again voted to 
approve the proposed amendment.  This litigation followed. 
 
On October 3, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the 
county court seeking a declaration pursuant to G. L. c. 214, 
§ 1, that the initiative petition does not comply with the 
requirements of art. 48; they also sought an order quashing the 
Attorney General's certification and an injunction preventing 
the Secretary from placing the initiative petition on the 
general election ballot to be put before the voters in 
November, 2018.  Ten registered voters who support the petition 
8 
 
 
were allowed to intervene in the case.  The single justice then 
reserved and reported the matter for decision by the full court. 
 
The plaintiffs contend that the Attorney General's 
certification of the petition was improper for three reasons.  
First, they argue that the petition combines "three very 
different subject matters:  whether to impose a graduated income 
tax, and whether to give preferential treatment in state 
spending to two unrelated subject matters -- education and 
transportation," contrary to the requirement of art. 48, The 
Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74, that an initiative 
petition address only related or mutually dependent subjects.  
Second, the plaintiffs maintain that the earmarking of the tax 
revenues that would be raised by the new tax would violate the 
prohibition of art. 48 against imposing "specific 
appropriation[s]" by initiative petitions.  See art. 48, The 
Initiative, II, § 2.  Third, the plaintiffs assert that an 
initiative petition may not be used to usurp the Legislature's 
authority to tax, and that a petition to modify the 
Massachusetts Constitution is on a different footing in this 
regard from a petition to create a statute. 
 
2.  Standard of review.  A challenge to the Attorney 
General's decision to certify an initiative petition is reviewed 
de novo.  See Abdow v. Attorney Gen., 468 Mass. 478, 487 (2014).  
In reviewing a challenge to an initiative petition proposed by 
9 
 
 
at least ten registered voters in the Commonwealth, we construe 
art. 48 in a manner "mindful that art. 48 establishes a 
'people's process,'" Bates v. Director of the Office of Campaign 
& Political Fin., 436 Mass. 144, 154 (2002), quoting Buckley v. 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 371 Mass. 195, 199 (1976), that 
"gives the people of Massachusetts the opportunity 'to enact 
statutes regardless of legislative opposition'" and to "move 
forward on measures which they deem[] necessary and desirable," 
regardless of legislative opposition.  Bates, supra, quoting 
Citizens for a Competitive Mass. v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, 413 Mass. 25, 30 (1992).  See Carney v. Attorney 
Gen., 451 Mass. 803, 814 (2008). 
 
At the same time, however, we are obligated to safeguard 
the integrity of the initiative petition process by requiring 
that those seeking to change the law strictly comply with 
art. 48.  "[T]he provisions of art. 48 are mandatory rather than 
directory. . . .  [W]hen [the people] . . . seek to enact laws 
by direct popular vote they must do so in strict compliance with 
those provisions and conditions" (citations omitted).  Opinion 
of the Justices, 422 Mass. 1212, 1219 (1996).  See Hurst v. 
State Ballot Law Comm'n, 427 Mass. 825, 828 (1998) ("The State 
Constitutional Convention of 1917-1918 sought a balance between 
competing impulses toward direct versus representative 
democracy.  The proper form and use of petitions is an important 
10 
 
 
aspect of the balance art. 48 represents, and our review must 
respect that balance"). 
 
3.  Discussion.  The plaintiffs challenge the Attorney 
General's certification that Initiative Petition 15-17 contains 
only subjects "which are related or which are mutually 
dependent."  Art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by 
art. 74. 
a.  Related subjects requirement.  In deciding whether an 
initiative petition contains subjects "which are related or 
which are mutually dependent," we examine whether "the 
similarities of an initiative's provisions dominate what each 
segment provides separately so that the petition is sufficiently 
coherent to be voted on 'yes' or 'no' by the voters[.]  That is 
the crux of the relatedness controversy."  Carney v. Attorney 
Gen., 447 Mass. 218, 226 (2006) (Carney I).  The mandate that an 
initiative petition contain a single "common purpose" arises 
because a voter, unlike a legislator, "has no opportunity to 
modify, amend, or negotiate the sections of a law proposed by 
popular imitative."  Id. at 230, 231.  A voter cannot "sever the 
unobjectionable from the objectionable," and must vote to 
approve or reject an initiative petition in its entirety.  Id. 
at 230.  Accordingly, to avoid "abuse" of the process and 
confusion among voters, while an initiative petition may contain 
numerous subjects, it must embody one purpose, and "must express 
11 
 
 
an operational relatedness among its substantive parts that 
would permit a reasonable voter to affirm or reject the entire 
petition as a unified statement of public policy."  Id. at 230-
231. 
The language of art. 48 emerged from the Constitutional 
Convention of 1917-1918, "from which we may discern the 
conditions under which art. 48 came into existence, and how it 
appears then to have been received and understood by the 
convention, and ultimately, by the voters" (citation and 
quotations omitted).  Carney I, 447 Mass. at 226.  The 
requirement of art. 48 that an initiative petition must 
"contain[] only subjects . . . which are related or which are 
mutually dependent" was intended to balance the "interests of 
initiative petitioners and the interests of those who would 
ultimately vote on the petition."  Abdow, 468 Mass. at 499. 
The convention adopted the related subjects requirement in 
response to two concerns raised by the delegates:  the potential 
for voter confusion and "the dangers of 'log-rolling,'"5 which 
had given rise to harms in other States.  Dunn v. Attorney Gen., 
474 Mass. 675, 679-680 (2016).  See Carney I, 447 Mass. at 226-
                     
5 "Logrolling" is the "practice of including several 
propositions in one measure or proposed constitutional amendment 
so that the . . . voters will pass all of them, even though 
these propositions might not have passed if they had been 
submitted separately."  Dunn v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 675, 
679 (2016), quoting Carney v. Attorney Gen., 447 Mass. 218, 219 
n.4 (2006) (Carney I). 
12 
 
 
227.  Otherwise put, the relatedness requirements were intended 
to protect against petitions which include "as alluring a 
combination of what is popular with what is desired by selfish 
interests as the proposers of the measures may choose."  
Carney I, supra at 227, quoting 2 Debates in the Massachusetts 
Constitutional Convention 1917-1918, at 12 (1918) 
(Constitutional Debates).  See Dunn, supra; Hensley v. Attorney 
General, 474 Mass. 651, 652, 658 (2016); Gray v. Attorney 
General, 474 Mass. 638, 644-647 (2016); Abdow, 468 Mass. at 498-
499. 
The relatedness requirement was imposed in its current 
form, mandating that initiative petitions contain only subjects 
that are "related" or "mutually dependent," after much debate 
among the delegates about how best to avoid "packaging proposed 
laws in a way that would confuse the voter," Carney I, 447 Mass. 
at 228, or otherwise be "misleading."  See id. at 225, 227-230 & 
n.21.6  "To prevent initiative petitions from being exploited in 
                     
6 As an example of impermissible log-rolling, the delegates 
to the convention debated a provision placed before voters in 
Oregon through an initiative process: 
 
 
"But, sir, you now invite the self-seekers who cannot 
get their legislation through the General Court to turn to 
the people whom they may wheedle or deceive into granting 
the privileges that our representatives never would permit.  
I have time to refer but incidentally to the measures that 
become law through the blind wording of titles or to catchy 
provisions, as illustrated by a case in Oregon, where, in 
order to secure the passage of the single tax, there was 
13 
 
 
this manner, the delegates considered potential limitations on 
their subject matter. . . .  One delegate offered an amendment 
to require that '[n]o proposed law shall contain more than one 
subject,' which another delegate proposed modifying to state 
that a proposed law 'shall not contain unrelated 
subjects.' . . .  This modified amendment was adopted by the 
convention, and, after some reworking by the committee on form 
and phraseology, ultimately was approved as the provision in 
art. 48 . . . , requiring the Attorney General to certify that a 
proposed measure 'contains only subjects . . . which are related 
or which are mutually dependent.'"  Dunn, 474 Mass. at 679-680, 
citing Carney I, 447 Mass. at 227-228; Constitutional Debates, 
supra at 12, 537, 567, 701-702. 
We were first called upon to construe the "related subjects 
requirement" in 1941, in a petition involving education about 
birth control for married couples.  See Opinion of the Justices, 
309 Mass. 555, 560-561 (1941).  In that case, we determined that 
the requirement that initiative petitions contain "only 
                                                                  
hitched to the front of it, like a locomotive to the front 
of a freight train, a proposal that there should be no more 
poll or head taxes.  The important part of them had been 
abolished for years, but nevertheless that proposal hauled 
the heavy freight through and put into the Constitution of 
Oregon the single-tax proposition that the people had 
previously rejected." 
 
Carney I, 447 Mass. at 227 n.20, quoting Constitutional Debates, 
supra at 567. 
14 
 
 
subjects . . . which are related or which are mutually 
dependent" was met because "[t]he particular subjects of the 
proposed law appear[ed] to be germane to the general subject of 
prevention of pregnancy or conception, to such an extent, at 
least, that they [could not] rightly be said to be unrelated."  
Id. at 561. 
Forty years later, we relied on that test in Massachusetts 
Teachers Ass'n v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 209, 
221 (1981), quoting Opinion of the Justices, 309 Mass. at 561, 
in discussing the related subjects requirement of art. 48, The 
Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by § 74, where we concluded that 
the requirement that an initiative petition contain "only 
subjects . . . which are related or which are mutually 
dependent," would be satisfied if "one can identify a common 
purpose to which each subject of an initiative petition can 
reasonably be said to be germane."  Massachusetts Teachers 
Ass'n, supra at 219-220.  We cautioned, however, that while 
"[i]t is not for the courts to say that logically and 
consistently other matters might have been included or that 
particular subjects might have been dealt with differently," 
"the general subject of an initiative petition cannot be so 
broad as to render the 'related subjects'" limitation 
meaningless.  Id., citing Opinion of the Justices, supra.  In 
1996, in considering whether an initiative petition met the 
15 
 
 
requirement of "relatedness," defined as whether it violated 
"the art. 48 requirement that all subjects of an initiative be 
related or mutually dependent," the Justices again relied upon 
the test in Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n, supra, whether "one 
can identify a common purpose to which each subject of an 
initiative petition can reasonably be said to be germane."  
Opinion of the Justices, 422 Mass. at 1220. 
Ten years later, in Carney I, 447 Mass. at 220, 226, 228, 
we examined the history of the constitutional debates on the 
"relatedness limitation," as it was enacted in its final form, 
requiring that an initiative petition "contain[] only subjects 
. . . which are related or which are mutually dependent," and 
held that "[t]he plain wording of art. 48 and the context in 
which it was enacted demonstrate that the relatedness limitation 
is one of many restrictions on the popular initiative process 
intended to avoid confusion at the polls and to permit citizens 
to exercise a meaningful choice when voting to accept or reject 
a proposed law." 
In our subsequent decisions, we have continued to follow 
what has been known as the "related subjects" requirement or the 
"relatedness requirement."  In Dunn, 474 Mass. at 679-680, we 
analyzed the "related subjects requirement," which we defined as 
the requirement of art. 48 that "a proposed measure 'contain[ ] 
only subjects . .  which are related or which are mutually 
16 
 
 
dependent," in terms of whether the two distinct provisions in 
the petition shared a "common purpose" as defined in Carney I, 
447 Mass. at 226.  In Hensley, we determined that an initiative 
petition "easily satisfie[d] the related subjects requirement of 
art. 48" because, first, its provisions met the requirements 
that their "similarities . . . dominate what each segment 
provides separately so that the petition is sufficiently 
coherent to be voted on 'yes' or 'no' by the voters."  Hensley, 
474 Mass. at 658, quoting Carney I, supra.  Second, the multiple 
provisions in the petition expressed "an operational relatedness 
among its substantive parts that would permit a reasonable voter 
to affirm or reject the entire petition as a unified statement 
of public policy."  Hensley, 474 Mass. at 658, quoting Abdow, 
468 Mass. at 501.  We concluded that the petition met the 
relatedness requirement of art. 48 because it "[laid] out a 
detailed plan to legalize marijuana . . . for adult use" and to 
create a system that would license, regulate, and tax retail 
sales.  Hensley, supra. 
Similarly, in Gray, 474 Mass. at 644-649, in considering 
the "related subjects requirement," we determined that the 
subjects of the petition were not mutually dependent because 
they could "exist independently," and then decided the matter 
relying on the "relatedness limitation" as defined in Carney I, 
447 Mass. at 226, and concluded that the subjects had no "common 
17 
 
 
purpose."  In Abdow, 468 Mass. at 498-499, we concluded that the 
"proposed measure" did not violate the "so-called 'relatedness' 
or 'related subjects' requirement of art. 48, which states that 
an initiative petition must 'contain[] only subjects .  . . 
which are related or which are mutually dependent."  We 
determined that the petition contained "a significant 'common 
purpose,'" and its provisions were "not so loosely tied together 
as to render the related subjects requirement meaningless, and 
[were] operationally related in a way that would 'permit a 
reasonable voter to affirm or reject the entire petition as a 
unified statement of public policy.'"  Id. at 501.  See Albano 
v. Attorney General, 437 Mass. 156, 161 (2002) (discussing "the 
relatedness requirement" as whether "a petition contains only 
subjects 'which are related or which are mutually dependent'" 
and deciding that "entire petition" [with several distinctly 
separate provisions] shared "[a] common purpose" that was not 
"so broad as to render the 'related subjects' limitation 
meaningless" [citations omitted]); Mazzone v. Attorney Gen., 432 
Mass. 515, 529 (2000) (under subheading "[r]elated or mutually 
dependent subjects," discussing and determining that subjects of 
petition were "related to a single, common purpose" of expanding 
scope of drug treatment and drug abuse prevention programs). 
As mentioned, in Gray, 474 Mass. at 648, one of the few 
occasions in which we have concluded that a petition did not 
18 
 
 
meet the related subjects requirement, we did discuss briefly, 
under the subheading of "[r]elatedness," whether two subjects 
were mutually dependent, and concluded that they were not.  In a 
lengthy discussion under the same subheading, we also considered 
"the core of the related subjects requirement," that is, whether 
the "initiative petition's provisions share a 'common 
purpose,' . . . put slightly differently but making the same 
point, . . . a 'unified statement of public policy' that the 
voters can accept or reject as a whole" (footnote omitted).  Id. 
at 645-646, quoting Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n, 384 Mass. at 
219-220, and Carney I, 447 Mass. at 231.  Since then, other than 
in quoting the language of art. 48, we have not had cause to 
address separately whether the subjects of a petition are 
"mutually independent."  See Gray, supra at 644-649. 
 
As these cases demonstrate, the language "or which are 
mutually dependent" in the relatedness requirement does not 
lessen the limitation that an initiative petition under art. 48, 
The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74, must contain a 
single common purpose and express a unified public policy.  Nor 
does it impose a separate requirement that may be satisfied even 
if the subjects of a petition are not related.  The questions 
whether "the similarities of an initiative's provisions dominate 
what each segment provides separately so that the petition is 
sufficiently coherent to be voted on 'yes' or 'no' by the 
19 
 
 
voters," and whether two or more provisions in an initiative 
petition "express an operational relatedness among its 
substantive parts that would permit a reasonable voter to affirm 
or reject the entire petition as a unified statement of public 
policy," are two sides of the same coin.  See Carney I, 447 
Mass. at 226, 230-231.  See also Dunn, 474 Mass. at 680; 
Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n, 384 Mass. at 219. 
 
"A constitutional amendment should be 'interpreted in the 
light of the conditions under which it . . . [was] framed, the 
ends which it was designed to accomplish, the benefits which it 
was expected to confer and the evils which it was hoped to 
remedy.'"  Mazzone, 432 Mass. at 526, quoting Tax Comm'r v. 
Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 524 (1917).  "'Its words are to be given 
their natural and obvious sense according to common and approved 
usage at the time of its adoption,' although the historical 
context should not 'control[] the plain meaning of the 
language.'"  Mazzone, supra, quoting General Outdoor Advertising 
Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 158 (1935). 
 
In its dictionary definition, "mutual" means "directed by 
each toward the other or others; reciprocal."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 1178 (10th ed. 2014).  In common usage, "mutual" is 
defined as "having the same relation each toward the other" and 
"of or pertaining to each of two or more; held in common; 
shared."  Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 1270 
20 
 
 
(2003).  A "dependent" is defined as "[s]omeone who relies on 
another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself 
without the power or aid of someone else," and "dependence" is 
defined as "[a] relationship between two . . . things whereby 
one is sustained by the other or relies on the other for support 
or necessities."  Black's Law Dictionary, supra at 531.  In 
common usage, "dependent" also means "conditioned or determined 
by something else"; "contingent"; and "not used in isolation; 
used only in connection with other forms."  Webster's New 
Universal Unabridged Dictionary, supra at 534. 
  
While the word "or" is often used as a disjunctive, it also 
has a number of other meanings.  The word "or" may be "used to 
correct or rephrase what was previously said."  Webster's New 
Universal Unabridged Dictionary, supra at 1360.  It is 
fundamental to statutory construction that the word "or" is 
disjunctive "unless the context and the main purpose of all the 
words demand otherwise."7  Eastern Mass. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts 
                     
7 In Gaynor's Case, 217 Mass. 86, 89-90 (1914), the court 
observed: 
 
"It is argued that 'or' in the clause quoted from [St. 
1911, c. 751,] Part V, § 2, should be construed to mean 'to 
wit,' or identity with or explanation of that which goes 
before.  Sometimes it is necessary to attribute this 
signification to the word in order to effectuate the plain 
legislative purpose.  Commonwealth v. Grey, [2 Gray 501 
(1854)].  Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Mass. 59 [(1811)].  It 
often is construed as 'and' in order to accomplish the 
intent manifested by the entire act or instrument in which 
21 
 
 
Bay Transp. Auth., 350 Mass. 340, 343 (1966), citing 
Commonwealth v. Keenan, 139 Mass. 193, 194 (1885).  See, e.g., 
Miller v. Miller, 448 Mass. 320, 329 (2007) (same); Bleich v. 
Maimonides Sch., 447 Mass. 38, 46–47 (2006) (same); Nuclear 
Metals, Inc. v. Low–Level Radioactive Waste Mgt. Bd., 421 Mass. 
196, 212 (1995) (same).  "Although the disjunctive 'or' may 
suggest separate meanings for the two terms . . . , it does not 
require mutual exclusivity.  The word 'or' commonly introduces a 
synonym or 'definitional equivalent.'"  McCarthan v. Director of 
Goodwill Indus. Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1087 (2017), 
quoting A. Scalia & B.A. Garner, Reading Law:  The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 122 (2012).  See 1A N.J. Singer & 
J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 21.14 
(7th ed. 2009).  See also United States v. Harris, 838 F.3d 98, 
105 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 840, (2017), 
quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) ("In 
any event, even when striving to ensure separate meanings, the 
                                                                  
it occurs. . . .  It is not synonymous with 'and' and is to 
be treated as interchangeable with it only when the obvious 
sense requires it, or when otherwise the meaning is 
dubious.  But the word 'or' in its ordinary use and also in 
accurate meaning is a disjunctive particle.  It marks an 
alternative and not a conjunctive.  It indicates one or the 
other of two or several persons, things or situations and 
not a combination of them. . . .  It is construed as having 
a different meaning only when the context and the main 
purpose to be accomplished by all the words used seems to 
demand it." 
22 
 
 
disjunctive canon does not apply absolutely, particularly where 
'the context dictates otherwise'"). 
 
In other words, while operationally related subjects need 
not be mutually dependent, "we need not pause to consider 
whether any subjects which are mutually dependent could ever be 
said not also to be related."  Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n, 384 
Mass. at 218 n.8.  As discussed, the provision the delegates 
referred to as the "unrelated matters" provision, Constitutional 
Debates, supra at 960, was approved by the delegates, under that 
designation, when it comprised the phrase "shall not contain 
unrelated subjects."  Id. at 856.  The provision was adopted 
after much debate by the delegates on how to prevent particular 
misuses of the initiative process, and whether initiative 
petitions should be limited to a single subject.  Id. at 12, 
537, 567, 701-702.  The words "or which are mutually dependent" 
were added at the last moment, when the "related subjects" 
language was "referred back" to the committee on form and 
phraseology.  Constitutional Debates at 953.  The committee "on 
its own initiative, moved the relatedness limitation from its 
'isolated' position and incorporated it into the section of the 
final draft initiative amendment concerning the Attorney 
General's certification duties" that the committee reported back 
to the delegates.  See Carney I, 447 Mass. at 228, citing 
Constitutional Debates, supra at 1051.  These changes were 
23 
 
 
described by the delegates themselves as "unimportant" and as 
not affecting the meaning of the provision.  Constitutional 
Debates, supra at 773, 911, 959-960.  The delegates then adopted 
the final language without further debate.  Id. at 1050-1051.  
Thus, the words "or which are mutually dependent" were added as 
a means of assisting, first, the Attorney General and, 
thereafter, the court, in language that was then well 
understood, to examine a petition to determine if its core 
purpose "dominate[s] what each segment provides separately so 
that the petition is sufficiently coherent to be voted on 'yes' 
or 'no' by the voters."  Carney I, supra at 226.  See Ashley v. 
Three Justices of the Superior Court, 228 Mass. 63, 81 (1917); 
County of Berkshire v. Cande, 222 Mass. 87, 90-91 (1915); 
Edwards v. Bruorton, 184 Mass. 529, 530-531 (1904); Nolan's 
Case, 122 Mass. 330, 332-333 (1877); Warren v. Mayor & Aldermen 
of Charlestown, 2 Gray 84, 99 (1854). 
 
To construe the phrase "or which are mutually dependent" as 
eliminating the requirement of relatedness would be to vitiate 
the purpose of protecting the voters from misuse of the 
petitioning process for which it was enacted.  "An amendment to 
the Constitution is one of the most solemn and important of 
instruments. . . .  Its words should be interpreted in 'a sense 
most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its 
adoption,' because it is proposed for public adoption and must 
24 
 
 
be understood by all entitled to vote."  Carney I, 447 Mass. 
at 224, quoting Opinion of the Justices, 324 Mass. 746, 749 
(1949).  "We reject any restrictive reading of art. 48, as 
amended, that results in a failure to give effect to the purpose 
for which its words were chosen."  Carney I, supra at 225, 
quoting Hurst v. State Ballot Law Comm'n, 427 Mass. 825, 828 
(1998).  This is no doubt why, since its introduction, our 
jurisprudence construing art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as 
amended by art. 74, has focused largely, or almost exclusively, 
on the question of "relatedness," rather than on "mutual 
dependence." 
 
b.  Application.  With this guidance in mind, we turn to 
the petition at issue.  Initiative Petition 15-17 contains three 
provisions on three distinct subjects presented as a single 
ballot question.  First, the petition would amend the flat tax 
rate mandated by art. 44 to impose a graduated income tax on 
certain high-income taxpayers.  Second, the petition would 
prioritize spending for public education by earmarking revenues 
raised by the new tax for "quality public education and 
affordable public colleges and universities."  Third, the 
petition would prioritize spending for transportation by 
earmarking revenues raised by the new tax for "the repair and 
maintenance of roads, bridges and public transportation." 
25 
 
 
 
The parties understandably do not raise any arguments 
specifically concerning whether the provisions of the petition 
are mutually dependent.  It is immediately apparent, however, 
that the three provisions are not mutually dependent.  As 
discussed, petitions seeking to impose a graduated tax rate or a 
tax on specific high-income earners previously have been 
presented to the voters of the Commonwealth as stand-alone 
initiatives.  It is also evident that funds for "quality public 
education" and "affordable public colleges and universities" 
could be raised and provided to educational institutions 
separately from any expenditures on transportation, and that 
raising funds for "repair and maintenance of roads, bridges and 
public transportation" could proceed without any expenditures on 
education, at any grade level.  Indeed, the dissent states as 
much when it notes that a differently worded petition, directing 
one-half of the funds raised to transportation and the other 
one-half to education, would remove from the Legislature "the 
latitude accorded it by the original proposed law to spend on 
the two identified areas as it saw fit, and instead would be 
limited to spending the funds raised specifically for each area 
regardless of the particular needs in each area."  Post at    .  
Because the provisions here can "exist independently," they are 
not "mutually dependent," just as in Gray, 474 Mass. at 648, 
where the diagnostic assessment tests and the reporting of the 
26 
 
 
prior year's test results were not "mutually dependent" because 
they could "exist independently."8 
                     
8 Even if we were to accept the argument that the proposed 
spending provisions are dependent upon a particular funding 
mechanism -- the proposed tax  -- that would not change the 
evident fact that the proposed tax can stand on its own, and 
neither spending provision depends upon the other.  Moreover, 
that the two funding provisions rely on a particular source of 
funds does not make the provisions "mutually dependent."  At the 
time of the Constitutional Debates of 1917-1918, it was well 
established that the source of funds for a desired public 
expenditure could be severed from the purpose of the 
expenditure, and that the two were not mutually dependent.  See 
Edwards v. Bruorton, 184 Mass. 529, 530-532 (1904), citing 
Warren v. Mayor & Aldermen of Charlestown, 2 Gray 84, 99, 100 
(1854), and compiling cases ("In statutes providing for the 
expenditure of money for the benefit of the public, containing 
an unconstitutional provision for raising money by taxation, it 
has been held in different jurisdictions that the invalid part 
may be disregarded and the substantial part enforced, leaving 
payment to be provided for in a constitutional way"). 
 
By the same token, in Mazzone v. Attorney General, 432 
Mass. 515, 517 (2000), we considered a petition proposing an 
"[a]ct to expand the scope of the commonwealth's drug treatment 
program and provide funding through fines for drug violations 
and the forfeiture of assets used in connection with drug 
offenses."  We concluded that the distinct taxing and funding 
provisions of the petition were "related to a single, common 
purpose.  All provisions of the petition relate directly or 
indirectly to expanding the scope of the Commonwealth's drug 
treatment programs and, as the Attorney General aptly describes 
it, 'fairly' funding those programs.  To that end, the various 
provisions of the petition expand the class of individuals 
entitled to diversion into the Commonwealth's drug treatment 
programs, provide a source of funds, 'fairly' obtained, for 
those programs, and direct the development of drug abuse 
prevention programs."  Id. at 529. Accordingly, because the 
"fines" and "other proceeds" to be raised and the drug 
rehabilitation programs to be funded served the single common 
purpose of expanding access to drug treatment programs, the 
petition met the "relatedness" requirement of art. 48.  See id. 
at 524, 529. 
27 
 
 
 
Although she certified the subjects as sufficiently 
related, the Attorney General has not articulated a common 
purpose between these spending priorities, beyond the abstract 
determination that both purposes are "broad areas of public 
concern."  The interveners, for their part, assert that 
prioritizing spending for education and transportation will 
"strengthen[] the Massachusetts economy and set[] a foundation 
for inclusive growth."  Some of the amici characterize the 
petition as intended "for economic advancement and social 
mobility" of specific groups within the Commonwealth.  The 
difficulty the proponents have in stating the purported purpose 
of the initiative petition is itself telling. 
 
As a general matter, we agree with the Attorney General's 
observation that the subjects of education and transportation 
are areas of broad public concern, and efforts to improve them 
may be characterized as socially beneficial and for the common 
good.  We also agree that education and transportation are among 
the many keys to "inclusive growth."  Nonetheless, as we 
emphasized in Gray, 474 Mass. at 648, the related subjects 
requirement is not satisfied by the ability to articulate a 
"conceptual or abstract bond" between diverse subjects, such as 
"broad areas of public concern" and "keys to inclusive growth."  
See Carney I, 447 Mass. at 230 ("It is not enough that the 
provisions in an initiative petition all 'relate' to some same 
28 
 
 
broad topic at some conceivable level of abstraction").  See, 
e.g., id. at 226, citing Opinion of the Justices, 422 Mass. at 
1220 (parties disputed whether common purpose of initiative 
petition was characterized broadly as "to make Massachusetts 
government more accountable to the people" or more narrowly as 
"legislative accountability").  As we have cautioned, a common 
purpose cannot be so overbroad as to "render the 'related 
subjects' limitation meaningless."  Massachusetts Teachers 
Ass'n, 384 Mass. at 219. 
There is "no single 'bright-line' test for determining 
whether an initiative meets the related subjects requirement." 
See, e.g., Dunn, 474 Mass. at 680; Hensley, 474 Mass. at 657; 
Abdow, 468 Mass. at 500; Carney I, 447 Mass. at 226.  "On the 
one hand, the requirement must not be construed so narrowly as 
to frustrate the ability of voters to use the popular initiative 
as 'the people's process' to bring important matters of concern 
directly to the electorate; the delegates to the constitutional 
convention that approved art. 48 did, after all, permit more 
than one subject to be included in a petition, and we ought not 
be so restrictive in the definition of relatedness that we 
effectively eliminate that possibility and confine each petition 
to a single subject."  Abdow, supra at 499, citing Massachusetts 
Teachers Ass'n, 384 Mass. at 219-229 and nn.9, 10.  "On the 
other hand, relatedness cannot be defined so broadly that it 
29 
 
 
allows the inclusion in a single petition of two or more 
subjects that have only a marginal relationship to one another, 
which might confuse or mislead voters, or which could place them 
in the untenable position of casting a single vote on two or 
more dissimilar subjects."  Abdow, supra, citing generally 
Carney I, supra at 224-232. 
 
In Gray, 474 Mass. at 640-643, for example, the Attorney 
General certified an initiative petition which purported to 
address related subjects in the area of educational reform.  The 
petition sought to end the use of "Common Core" educational 
standards, and also would have required the annual release of 
the prior year's comprehensive assessment tests.  Id. at 640-
643.  Finding "the twin educational facets of curriculum and 
assessment . . . inextricably coupled," the Attorney General 
determined that the provisions were "operationally related" to 
serve a "common purpose of imposing 'new procedural requirements 
on the development and implementation of educational 
standards.'"  Id. at 648.  In considering whether the questions 
were sufficiently related for purposes of art. 48, we noted that 
the two subjects of curriculum content and comprehensive 
assessments -- which test knowledge of the curriculum -- were 
connected at a "conceptual level."  Id.  Aside from this 
theoretical connection, however, we concluded that the two 
provisions addressed separate public policy issues:  the 
30 
 
 
elimination of Common Core curriculum standards and the 
publication of assessment tests.  We determined that it would be 
unfair to place voters in the untenable position of casting a 
single vote on two dissimilar subjects, which each happened 
broadly to pertain to aspects of educational reform. 
 
Similarly, in Carney I, 447 Mass. at 224, 232, we rejected 
the Attorney General's certification of two unrelated subjects 
that had been grouped together and designated as a provision to 
promote "the more humane treatment of dogs."  The initiative 
petition in that case, entitled "An Act to protect dogs," 
proposed to expand criminal sanctions against those who abuse 
dogs, and to dismantle the dog racing industry.  Id. at 219-222.  
We concluded that the provisions did not "express an operational 
relatedness among its substantive parts that would permit a 
reasonable voter to affirm or reject the entire petition as a 
unified statement of public policy."  Id. at 230-231.  As for 
the likely impact of that initiative petition at the polls, we 
observed, "The voter who favors increasing criminal penalties 
for animal abuse should be permitted to register that clear 
preference without also being required to favor eliminating 
parimutuel dog racing.  Conversely, the voter who thinks that 
the criminal penalties for animal abuse statutes are strong 
enough should not be required to vote in favor of extending the 
reach of our criminal laws because he favors abolishing 
31 
 
 
parimutuel dog racing."  Id. at 231.  Likewise, in Opinion of 
the Justices, 422 Mass. at 1220-1221, we concluded that the 
stated common purpose of "legislative accountability" was 
insufficient to bind together disparate provisions in a petition 
that was designed to address compensation for legislators and 
the inspection of records kept by the commissioner of veterans' 
services. 
 
By contrast, in Dunn, 474 Mass. at 676, 682, we concluded 
that an initiative petition prohibiting (1) the confinement of 
egg-laying hens, calves raised for veal, and breeding pigs on a 
farm "in a cruel manner," and (2) the sale of eggs or meat 
produced from animals so confined contained matters that were 
sufficiently related to satisfy art. 48.  The opponents of the 
initiative petition in that case maintained that the Attorney 
General's certification of the petition was improper because the 
farm provisions and the sales provisions addressed different 
public policies.  Id. at 681.  They argued that it would be 
unfair to ask voters to choose between banning certain farming 
methods and requiring retailers to alter their purchasing 
decisions.  Id.  We determined that "[b]oth the farm provision 
and the sales provision share a common purpose of preventing 
farm animals from being caged in cramped conditions."  Id.  
Moreover, the two provisions complemented each other "in the 
means of accomplishing this common purpose."  Id. 
32 
 
 
 
Examination of the diverse subjects of Initiative 
Petition 15-17, by contrast, discloses no "operational 
relatedness among its substantive parts" (citation omitted), 
Dunn, 474 Mass. at 680, and we are unable to discern a common 
purpose or unified public policy that the voters fairly could 
vote up or down as a whole.  The two subjects of the earmarked 
funding themselves are not related beyond the broadest 
conceptual level of public good.  In addition, they are entirely 
separate from the subject of a stepped rather than a flat-rate 
income tax, which, by itself, has been the subject of five prior 
initiative petitions.  Because a reasonable voter could not 
fairly accept or reject the petition as a unified statement of 
public policy, Initiative Petition 15-17 does not meet the 
relatedness requirement set forth in art. 48, The Initiative, 
II, § 3, as amended by art. 74.9  Including it on the ballot 
would place a reasonable voter in the "untenable position of 
                     
9 Given the result we reach, we need not address the 
plaintiffs' argument that the petition violates the provision in 
art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 2, that "[n]o measure . . . that 
makes a specific appropriation of money from the treasury of the 
commonwealth . . . shall be proposed by an initiative petition."  
See Associated Indus. of Mass. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 
413 Mass. 1, 6-8 (1992) (prohibition on initiative petition that 
"removes public monies, and the decision how to spend them, from 
the control of the Legislature" is not violated where language 
of petition concerned raising of public revenues and petition 
included provision that such funds were designated for specific 
purposes "subject to" appropriation by Legislature).  For 
similar reasons, we do not address the claim that the delegates 
to the Constitutional Convention of 1917-1918 did not intend 
that tax rates be set by initiative petition. 
33 
 
 
casting a single vote on two or more dissimilar subjects."  See 
Abdow, 468 Mass. at 499. 
 
The Attorney General maintains that "[t]he reasonably 
cognizant voter, simply by reading the text of the petition, is 
on alert that, if she objects to how this new revenue will be 
raised or spent, she should vote 'no' on the measure."  This 
view would leave a voter who favored a graduated income tax but 
disfavored earmarking any funds for a specific purpose, for 
example, in the untenable position of choosing which issue to 
support and which must be disregarded.  A voter who favored 
designating specific State funds for schools and transportation 
(subject to legislative appropriation), but not a graduated 
income tax, would be confronted with the same conundrum.  A 
voter who commuted to work on an unreliable subway line, but who 
did not have school-aged children and was unconcerned about 
public education, might want to prioritize spending for public 
transportation, without devoting additional resources to public 
education, but would be unable to vote for that single purpose.  
A parent of young children, who lived in a rural part of the 
Commonwealth and did not own a motor vehicle, would be unable to 
vote in favor of prioritizing funding for early childhood 
education without supporting spending for transportation.10  See 
                     
 
10 We are not entirely unaware of the possibility that, as 
the plaintiffs argue, these "broad areas of public concern" were 
34 
 
 
Carney I, 447 Mass. at 231.  Placing voters in the untenable 
position of either supporting or rejecting two important, but 
diverse, spending priorities, accompanied, in either case, by a 
major change in tax policy, is "the specific misuse of the 
initiative process that the related subjects requirement was 
intended to avoid."  See Gray, 474 Mass. at 649.  "We are not 
free to temper the stringent formal limitations adopted by the 
people to ensure the integrity of the initiative process."  
Carney I, 447 Mass. at 224-225. 
 
In essence, the dissent raises three issues.  The dissent 
argues that:  (1) a taxing proposition and a funding proposition 
cannot be separated and are always mutually dependent; (2) if 
                                                                  
added to the initiative petition as a means to "sweeten the pot" 
for voters.  In discussing the differences between the prior, 
unsuccessful, petitions for constitutional amendments to the 
flat tax rate that were presented as single-issue petitions and 
this petition, then Senate President Stanley Rosenberg remarked, 
"In the past, constitutional amendments have been very 
differently constructed.  This one because it is focused 
specifically on money for education and transportation will 
stand a better chance of being approved.  And, also because it 
is very clear that it (affects) people who make more than $1 
million in taxable income."  See Tuthill, Backers of Proposed 
Tax Hike on Massachusetts Millionaires File Signatures, WAMC 
Northeast Public Radio (Dec. 2, 2015), http://wamc.org/post 
/backers-proposed-tax-hike-massachusetts-millionaires-file-
signatures [https://perma.cc/6UR3-NHP6].  Thus, the focus of 
legislators, like Rosenberg, was specifically on proposals to 
appropriate funds for education and transportation, because 
those proposals would stand a better chance of being approved by 
voters who would be forced to disregard the elimination of the 
flat tax in order to approve publicly beneficial funding 
initiatives.  This, of course, is precisely what art. 48, The 
Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74, seeks to prevent. 
35 
 
 
the subjects of a petition are mutually dependent, there is no 
concern about the possibility of misleading or confusing the 
voters, and thus no need for consideration whether the petition 
expresses a single common purpose; and (3) the decision in this 
case that the provisions are neither related nor mutually 
dependent deprives the voters of their right to express an 
opinion on the petition. 
 
The gravamen of the dissent's argument is that any 
collection of provisions that would tax any number of different 
sources, and would provide funds to some indeterminate list of 
distinct entities and purposes, should be placed before the 
voters, because the list of provisions would be "mutually 
dependent," and therefore inseparable; in this view, removing 
any one of the taxing sources or funding priorities would 
fundamentally alter the proposed law.  The problem with this is 
that, at the time of the 1917-1918 Constitutional Convention, 
this court had established that a taxing provision establishing 
a source of funds, and a spending provision, could be separated.  
See Edwards, 184 Mass. at 530-532. 
 
In addition, in this view, there is no requirement of a 
common purpose or a coherent statement of public policy that the 
voters can accept or reject as a whole.  Because the provisions 
are inseparable, the dissent would have it, there is no concern 
about logrolling, or that the voters would be confused, misled, 
36 
 
 
or placed in the untenable position of having to choose between 
two or more dissimilar subjects in casting a single vote.  Thus, 
petitions that contain only "mutually dependent" provisions, as 
crafted by the proponents of the petitions, would be insulated 
from the protections that art. 48 was intended to provide.  In 
particular, any petition containing provisions for both taxing 
and spending would be shielded from review by the Attorney 
General and, thereafter, the courts, to determine whether the 
proposed law presented a single statement of public policy, 
suitable to be placed before the voters.  Taken to its logical 
conclusion, merely by adding to each provision a statement that 
the provision is intended to be part of a particular package, 
and cannot stand on its own, petitioners would be able to 
guarantee that none of their petitions were subject to any sort 
of meaningful review.  This would leave the question of 
relatedness, which was so intensely debated by the delegates to 
the 1917-1918 Constitutional Convention, on the cutting room 
floor. 
 
Lastly, the dissent argues that construing the requirement 
of related or mutually dependent subjects as required under 
art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74, and, 
therefore, concluding that the petition is not suitable to be 
placed on the ballot, deprives the voters of the Commonwealth of 
the right to "express their opinion on a one-section, four-
37 
 
 
sentence petition."  Post at    .  To the contrary, however, a 
decision to place before the voters three distinct policy 
provisions, yet permit them only to accept, or reject, all three 
as a package, would deprive the voters of the Commonwealth of 
their right "to exercise a meaningful choice when voting to 
accept or reject a proposed law."  Carney I, 447 Mass. at 220.  
They would be unable to express a reasoned view on each distinct 
provision, independently, and on its own merits. 
 
Moreover, while the dissent asserts that the petitioners 
have an absolute "right" to place before the voters "this 
petition," in contrast to some other law that would be proposed 
if any of the provisions were not included, there is no such 
right.  Article 48 was designed precisely to prevent any 
conceivable collection of provisions from being presented to the 
voters.  See Carney I, 447 Mass. at 220-222.  The relatedness 
requirement of the language in art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, 
as amended by art. 74, was intended to balance the "interests of 
initiative petitioners and the interests of those who would 
ultimately vote on the petition."  Abdow, 468 Mass. at 499.  In 
other words, art. 48 was designed to safeguard the rights of the 
voters to be presented with a coherent, single statement of 
public policy, rather than be misled by efforts to "wheedle or 
deceive [them] into granting the privileges that our 
representatives never would permit" by presenting "measures that 
38 
 
 
become law through the . . . wording of titles or . . . catchy 
provisions . . . that the people had previously rejected."  
Carney I, 447 Mass. at 227 n.20, quoting Constitutional Debates, 
supra at 567.  It is hard to view a proposed "constitutional 
amendment" that one of its proponents said was deliberately 
"very differently constructed" from prior similar amendments, 
and where "because it is focused specifically on money for 
education and transportation will stand a better chance of being 
approved," as other than the precise type of wheedling and 
deceiving that the delegates had in mind when they adopted the 
relatedness requirement.  See note 10, supra. 
 
"Neither the Attorney General nor this court is required to 
check common sense at the door when assessing the question of 
relatedness.  The relatedness limitation of art. 48 must not be 
permitted to drift from its intent to secure to voters the right 
to enact a uniform statement of public policy through exercising 
a meaningful choice in the initiative process."  Carney I, 447 
Mass. at 232. 
 
Conclusion.  The matter is remanded to the county court, 
where a judgment shall enter declaring that the Attorney 
General's certification of Initiative Petition 15-17 is not in 
compliance with the related subjects requirement of art. 48 and 
the petition is not suitable to be placed on the ballot in the 
2018 Statewide election. 
39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
LENK, J. (concurring).  I concur with the result and with 
much of the court's reasoning as to whether Initiative Petition 
15-17 contains related subjects.  I write separately because I 
agree with the dissent's view that the mandate in art. 48 of the 
Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution requiring that a 
petition contain "only subjects . . . which are related or which 
are mutually dependent" is disjunctive in nature; it sets out 
two alternatives and calls for two different analyses.  I agree, 
further, with the dissent that the court should consider the 
phrase "mutually dependent" as it would have been understood at 
the time of the 1917-1918 Constitutional Convention, as 
discussed in the court's then extant jurisprudence concerning 
the severability of statutory provisions.  Although this case 
presents squarely the question whether unrelated subjects may be 
mutually dependent -- they can be, if rarely -- I disagree with 
the dissent that Initiative Petition 15-17 contains subjects 
which are in fact mutually dependent. 
 
In the years leading up to the Constitutional Convention, 
to decide whether statutory provisions were severable, this 
court would consider whether they were "mutually dependent and 
must stand or fall together."  See Nolan's Case, 122 Mass. 330, 
333 (1877).  Where each provision of a statute could "stand 
independently," the provisions were not considered mutually 
dependent and, accordingly, were deemed severable.  See 
2 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Petranich, 183 Mass. 217, 220 (1903).  See also 
County of Berkshire v. Cande, 222 Mass. 87, 90-91 (1915) 
(statutory parts that are "wholly independent of each other" are 
severable).1 
 
Although severability analysis concerns statutory 
provisions, art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, of the Amendments 
to the Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by art. 74 of the 
Amendments, speaks of "subjects . . . which are mutually 
dependent."  To determine whether Initiative Petition 15-17 
satisfies this constitutional requirement, we must ask whether 
the subjects of Initiative Petition 15-17 can "stand 
independently" and, if not, whether they must instead "stand or 
fall together."  See Petranich, 183 Mass. at 220; Nolan's Case, 
122 Mass. at 333.  That, in turn, requires us to ascertain what 
those subjects are.  While the number of provisions in a statute 
turns on how the statute is written, discerning the subjects 
contained therein is a question of substance.  Compare Century 
Dictionary and Cyclopedia 4806 (1904) (defining "provision" as 
"a distinct clause in an instrument or statute") with id. at 
                     
 
1 The dissent cites Warren v. Mayor & Alderman of 
Charlestown, 2 Gray 84, 100 (1854), for the proposition that 
"'mutually dependent' subjects are those which, if separated 
from one another, would no longer convey the meaning or purpose 
of the proposition."  Post at    .  This, however, too broadly 
construes the Warren court's view of mutual dependence.  Only 
statutory parts which were "conditions, considerations or 
compensations for each other" could be deemed mutually 
dependent.  Warren, supra at 99. 
3 
 
 
6020 (defining "subject" as "[t]hat on which any mental 
operation is performed; that which is thought, spoken, or 
treated of").  See 2 Debates in the Massachusetts Constitutional 
Convention 1917-1918, at 567-568 (1918) (chair of committee on 
rules and procedure using "matters" and "subjects" 
interchangeably). 
If Initiative Petition 15-17 is viewed as containing two 
subjects -- a tax on millionaires and how to spend it -- as 
framed, the two are not severable and are mutually dependent.  
This is so because, although the tax could "stand 
independently," see Petranich, 183 Mass. at 220, the spending 
matter could not.  The latter merely places conditions on the 
revenue raised by the tax; without the tax, it would be 
ineffectual. 
There is no requirement, however, that our analysis be 
controlled by the structure of the petition imposed by its 
proponents.  As discussed, art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as 
amended by art. 74, speaks of subjects, rather than provisions; 
a provision may be drafted to concern multiple subjects.  In 
this regard, Initiative Petition 15-17 contains three subjects, 
insofar as the spending matter consists of two:  education and 
transportation.  These two subjects have no apparent 
interaction, and are "distinct and in their nature separable the 
one from the other."  Ashley v. Three Justices of the Superior 
4 
 
 
Court, 228 Mass. 63, 81 (1917).  Nor can they be deemed 
"conditions, considerations or compensations for each other."  
Warren v. Mayor & Alderman of Charlestown, 2 Gray 84, 99 (1854).  
A tax on millionaires, dedicated to funding education, could 
"stand independently" as its own petition, with an internal 
mutual dependence.  See Petranich, 183 Mass. at 220.  The same 
is true of a tax on millionaires that funded transportation 
projects.  In addition to a taxing provision without spending 
provisions, therefore, Initiative Petition 15-17 could be 
severed into two stand-alone petitions, each containing two of 
its three subjects.  Because Initiative Petition 15-17 could be 
severed in this way, its three subjects need not all "stand or 
fall together," Nolan's Case, 122 Mass. at 333, and there is no 
mutual dependence shared among them. 
 
Given that the three subjects in Initiative Petition 15-17 
are neither related nor mutually dependent, I am constrained to 
agree with the court that the petition may not be put before the 
people. 
 
 
BUDD, J. (dissenting, with whom Gants, C.J., joins).  
Disregarding the plain text of art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, 
of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, as amended 
by art. 74 of the Amendments, which requires that an initiative 
petition contain "only subjects . . . which are related or which 
are mutually dependent," the court concludes that, in drafting 
this language the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 
1917-1918 inserted the words "or which are mutually dependent" 
as superfluous text.  Ante at    ,   .  The court goes on to 
conclude that the people may not express their opinion on a one-
section, four-sentence petition because it contains subjects 
that are not related.  Ante at    ,   .  That analysis is 
flawed. 
The constitutional text is the written expression of the 
Constitutional Convention's intent to ensure that ballot 
questions containing multiple severable distinct, independent, 
and unrelated subjects cannot be asked of voters together in one 
ballot question, but instead must be severed and asked of voters 
independently.1  The court's analysis ignores the meaning of 
                     
1 Without the "subjects . . . which are related or which are 
mutually dependent" requirement, nothing would prohibit a group 
of petitioners from placing before the electorate the type of 
omnibus legislation that is commonly considered by the 
Legislature.  As an example, on April 13, 2018, the Governor 
signed into law an omnibus criminal justice reform package sent 
to him by the Legislature.  The law consists of 239 different 
sections.  See St. 2018, c. 69.  Among its numerous provisions, 
2 
 
 
"mutually dependent" as it was understood at the time art. 48 
was drafted and ratified.  Despite the fact that Initiative 
Petition 15-17's subjects are mutually dependent and are not 
distinct, independent, and severable, the court incorrectly 
concludes that the petition cannot be asked of voters even 
though it falls under no "excluded matter" listed under art. 48, 
The Initiative, II, § 2, of the Amendments.2  Prohibiting the 
                                                                  
it repeals various mandatory minimum sentence requirements for 
certain crimes, including those relating to some retail drug 
offenses and drug paraphernalia.  Id. at §§ 47-48, 55.  At the 
same time, it expands mandatory minimum sentences for fentanyl 
and carfentanil trafficking.  Id. at §§ 50-51.  It also creates 
a Statewide sexual assault evidence kit tracking system.  Id. at 
§ 11.  The bill includes numerous other provisions that could 
have been voted on separately but instead were packaged together 
for a single vote.  It raises the minimum age a child can be 
tried in the Juvenile Court, §§ 77-79; reforms the drug-free 
school zone law, § 57; establishes a process for expunging 
criminal records, §§ 18, 104, 195; permits survivors of human 
trafficking to vacate convictions of certain crimes, § 132; 
limits the use of restrictive housing for prisoners, §§ 85-87, 
93-94, 230, 236; prohibits prisons from unreasonably limiting 
in-person visits between prisoners and families, § 92; raises 
the felony threshold for malicious destruction of property, 
§ 154; removes the penalty of license suspension from the 
offense of vandalism, § 152; requires the availability of high 
school equivalency certificate programming to inmates, § 95; and 
requires prisons to provide reentry preparation programming at 
least six months before prisoners' release date, § 93. 
 
2 Excluded matters under art. 48 include measures that 
"relate[] to religion, religious practices or religious 
institutions; or to the appointment, qualification, tenure, 
removal, recall or compensation of judges; or to the reversal of 
a judicial decision; or to the powers, creation or abolition of 
courts; or the operation of which is restricted to a particular 
town, city or other political division or to particular 
districts or localities of the commonwealth; or that makes a 
specific appropriation of money from the treasury of the 
3 
 
 
people from voting on this petition undermines the legislative 
power given to the people to draft and enact laws in a manner 
that is incompatible with the separation of powers principles 
set forth in art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
For these reasons I dissent. 
1.  The meaning of "mutually dependent" in art. 48.  We 
have recently held that a petition is not mutually dependent if 
its provisions can "exist independently."  Gray v. Attorney 
Gen., 474 Mass. 638, 648 (2016).  However, while clarifying the 
circumstances where a petition's subjects are not mutually 
dependent, our modern jurisprudence provides little explanation 
for the reverse, i.e., the circumstances in which a petition's 
subjects are "mutually dependent." 
"A constitutional amendment['s] . . . 'words are to be 
given their natural and obvious sense according to common and 
approved usage at the time of its adoption.'"  Mazzone v. 
Attorney Gen., 432 Mass. 515, 526 (2000), quoting General 
Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 
149, 158 (1935).  A review of case law prior to and during the 
time that art. 48 was ratified demonstrates that, contrary to 
                                                                  
commonwealth" and matters relating to art. 18 of the Amendments 
to the Massachusetts Constitution, art. 48 itself, provisions in 
the Constitution specifically excluding matters from popular 
initiative and referendum, and certain rights in the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Art. 48, The Initiative, 
II, § 2. 
4 
 
 
the court's interpretation, "mutually dependent" has a specific 
meaning distinct from "related."  See, e.g., Ashley v. Three 
Justices of the Superior Court, 228 Mass. 63, 81 (1917). 
The concept of mutual dependence as applied to legislation 
has its roots in the doctrine of severability.  Whenever a court 
determines that a portion of a statute is unconstitutional, it 
must consider whether that portion is severable from the rest 
and determine whether the remainder of the statute may be left 
intact.  Prior to 1854, many courts simply severed 
unconstitutional provisions from statutes, assuming that "full 
effect will be given to such as are not repugnant to the 
[C]onstitution."  Bank of Hamilton v. Lessee of Dudley, 27 U.S. 
492, 526 (1829).  See Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and 
the Rule of Law, 41 Harv. J. on Legis. 227, 232 (2004) 
(Shumsky); Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the 
Supreme Court, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 76, 79 (1937) (Stern). 
However, Warren v. Mayor & Aldermen of Charlestown, 2 Gray 
84, 99 (1854), was "particularly important to the development of 
modern severability doctrine," providing a "vexing exception" to 
the general rule permitting the severability of constitutional 
clauses from those held to be unconstitutional.  Shumsky, supra 
at 233.  See Stern, supra at 79-80.  In Warren, the court held 
that the part of a State statute annexing Charlestown to Boston 
was invalid because it conditioned the annexation on the 
5 
 
 
maintenance of representation in the Legislature in a manner 
that violated the Massachusetts Constitution.  The court 
reasoned that the presumption of severability 
"must be taken with this limitation, that the [statute's] 
parts, so held respectively constitutional and 
unconstitutional, must be wholly independent of each other.  
[For] if they are so mutually connected with and dependent 
on each other, as conditions, considerations or 
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that 
the legislature intended them as a whole, and that, if all 
could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not 
pass the residue independently, and some parts are 
unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus 
dependent, conditional or connected, must fall with them" 
(emphasis added). 
 
Warren, supra at 99.  The court concluded that because the 
"various provisions of the act, . . . all providing for the 
consequences of . . . annexation, . . . are connected and 
dependent[,] . . . look to one object and its incidents, and are 
so connected with each other," the drafters and enactors of the 
legislation could not have intended the dysfunctional but 
constitutionally valid statutory remnant to stay in force and 
struck down the entire statutory enactment.  Id. at 100, 107. 
After 1854, the court sometimes simplified the language 
originally used in Warren to refer to portions of statutes that 
were not distinct and independent.  Over time, the phrase 
originally expressed as "mutually dependent and connected" was 
sometimes expressed as "mutually dependent."  See Ashley, 228 
Mass. at 81; Nolan's Case, 122 Mass. 330, 332-333 (1877). 
6 
 
 
Thus, based on Warren and its progeny, "mutually dependent" 
subjects are those that, if separated from one another, would no 
longer convey the meaning or purpose of the proposition.3  See 
Ashley, 228 Mass. at 81 ("the two parts are distinct and in 
their nature separable the one from the other and are not so 
interwoven and mutually dependent" [emphases added]); Warren, 2 
Gray at 100 ("various provisions of the act . . . , all 
providing for the consequences of [another provision], more or 
less immediate or remote, are connected and dependent; the 
different provisions of the act look to one object and its 
incidents, and are so connected with each other").  Each 
mutually dependent provision is reliant on the others to express 
its singular meaning.  In other words, there is no way to 
separate the provisions in legislation with mutually dependent 
subjects and still have the law.  See Commonwealth v. Petranich, 
183 Mass. 217, 220 (1903) (provisions dependent where severance 
would mean "so chang[ing] the character of the original" 
legislation "that the [drafters and enactors] would not be 
                     
3 The court cites to Warren v. Mayor & Alderman of 
Charlestown, 2 Gray 84, 99 (1854), signaling that it understands 
the relationship between the severability of portions of 
statutes deemed to be unconstitutional, and the term "mutually 
dependent" in art. 48.  However, its application of the case is 
flawed.  As explained infra, Warren supports the conclusion that 
all aspects of the instant petition are mutually dependent. 
 
7 
 
 
presumed to have enacted [one provision] without the other").4 
2.  Mutual dependence in modern art. 48 case law.  As 
discussed infra, in most of the cases interpreting art. 48's 
requirement that petitions contain only "subjects . . . which 
are related or which are mutually dependent," the court has 
concluded that a petition met the relatedness test, and 
therefore has not necessarily discussed the mutual dependence 
prong.  However, where the court has concluded that the petition 
does not meet either prong (and, therefore, cannot be asked of 
voters), it has either expressly or implicitly considered 
whether the petition "contains only subjects . . . which are 
mutually dependent" in a manner consistent with the term as it 
was understood in 1917. 
For example, in Gray, 474 Mass. at 648, separately from our 
                     
4 The regular use of the term "mutually dependent" by courts 
to describe severability of statutes at the time of the 1917-
1918 Constitutional Convention alone is sufficient to connect 
the term as used in art. 48 with the debates among the delegates 
regarding the danger of combining of numerous unrelated, 
distinct, and independent proposals into a single ballot 
question for an up or down vote.  However, it is interesting to 
note that this court applied the "mutually dependent" test to 
determine if provisions of a statute were severable in an 
opinion that was released during the Constitutional Convention.  
See Ashley v. Three Justices of the Superior Court, 228 Mass. 
63, 66 (1917).  Further, John W. Cummings, who represented the 
petitioner in the Ashley case, was also the chair of the 
Constitutional Convention's committee on initiative and 
referendum.  2 Debates in the Massachusetts Constitutional 
Convention 1917-1918, at ix, 2 (1918) (Constitutional Debates).  
As chair of that committee, he would have played a major role in 
seeing the written expression of what would become art. 48 
through the Constitutional Convention's proceedings. 
8 
 
 
determination that the petition contained subjects that were not 
related, we analyzed whether it contained subjects that were 
mutually dependent: 
"An initiative petition properly may contain only 
subjects 'which are related or which are mutually 
dependent.'  Art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3[, as amended 
by art. 74].  The two subjects in this petition are clearly 
not 'mutually dependent.'  In fact, the opposite seems 
true.  That is, whether the diagnostic assessment tests are 
based on the common core standards or some previous set of 
academic standards -- the focus of sections 1 through 3 of 
the petition -- will not affect in any way the 
commissioner's obligation under section 4 to release before 
the start of every school year all of the previous year's 
test items in order to inform educators about the testing 
process; the commissioner's obligation will exist 
independently of the specific curriculum content on which 
the tests are based." 
 
The "exist independently" test is the same as the mutual 
dependence requirement from Warren and its progeny.  See, e.g., 
Ashley, 228 Mass. at 81 (no mutual dependence where "the two 
parts are distinct and in their nature separable"); Petranich, 
183 Mass. at 220 (one part of statute not dependent on another 
where other parts "may well stand independently of it"). 
In Carney v. Attorney Gen., 447 Mass. 218, 226 (2006), 
S.C., 451 Mass. 803 (2008), the court stressed that the 
relatedness limitation only "requires the Attorney General to 
scrutinize the aggregation of laws proposed in the initiative 
petition for its impact at the polls" (emphasis added).  In 
other words, because each law in an "aggregation of [proposed] 
laws" could inherently "exist independently," Gray, 474 Mass. at 
9 
 
 
648, the different proposed laws that make up the aggregation 
are not mutually dependent and therefore must be related in 
order to survive the two-prong test.  See Massachusetts Teachers 
Ass'n v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 209, 218 
(1981) (where it is obvious that there is packaging of 
independent proposals, proper question is whether those 
proposals are sufficiently related). 
The court's conclusion that relatedness and mutual 
dependence are one and the same appears to stem partially from a 
misinterpretation of cases in which mutual dependence is not at 
issue.5  In many cases where we concluded that a petition 
contained related subjects and therefore met the first prong of 
the two-pronged disjunctive test, we used a "related subjects" 
or "relatedness requirement" heading.  See, e.g., Dunn v. 
Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 675, 679 (2016); Hensley v. Attorney 
Gen., 474 Mass. 651, 657 (2016); Abdow v. Attorney Gen., 468 
Mass. 478, 498 (2014); Albano v. Attorney Gen., 437 Mass. 156, 
161 (2002); Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n, 384 Mass. at 218. 
The court did not evaluate the "mutually dependent" 
requirement in these cases; thus, the court should not look to 
these cases for an analysis of mutual dependence, nor should it 
assume that the two prongs mean the same thing.  In Gray, supra 
                     
5 The court's conflation of relatedness and mutual 
dependence is discussed further, in part 4, infra. 
10 
 
 
at 644, the court used the heading "relatedness" in analyzing 
the subjects in the petition before the court.  There, whether 
the subjects were related was the operative question because the 
petition's provisions were plainly not mutually dependent, but 
instead, distinct and independent.  Id. at 648. 
The same is true in Carney, where the court considered the 
"relatedness limitation" in art. 48 because the provisions of 
the petition were not mutually dependent.  See Carney, 447 Mass. 
at 226 ("relatedness limitation requires the Attorney General to 
scrutinize the aggregation of laws proposed in the initiative 
petition for its impact at the polls" [emphasis added]).  The 
court's suggestion that we can read "or which are mutually 
dependent" out of the Constitution based on the headings in 
cases in which there was no need to discuss mutual dependence in 
any detail if at all is hazardous and has no jurisprudential 
support. 
3.  This petition "contains only subjects . . . which are 
mutually dependent."  The subjects in this one-section, four-
sentence petition are mutually dependent because the subjects 
cannot be severed without changing the meaning of the petition.  
Cf. Warren, 2 Gray at 99-100.  Standing alone, each provision 
means something different from the provisions together.  Cf. id. 
Attempting such a separation proves the point.  It is 
possible to ask voters:  "Should the people adopt a tax on 
11 
 
 
incomes exceeding one million dollars?"  But the remaining 
portions of the petition, regarding how the money should be 
spent, cannot stand on their own.  See Gray, 474 Mass. at 648 
(rejecting petition after considering whether propositions could 
"exist independently").  What is left is a portion of a 
proposition regarding whether the people should dedicate some 
nonexistent revenue to education and transportation.  This 
remaining partial proposition would not propose a 
"constitutional amendment" or "law," as required by art. 48, but 
instead would be no more than a policy question, which would not 
be a valid exercise of the legislative power under art. 48.  See 
Paisner v. Attorney Gen., 390 Mass. 593, 601 (1983), citing 
Cohen v. Attorney Gen., 357 Mass. 564, 578 (1970) ("nonbinding 
expression of opinion . . . [is] a plebiscite or declaration 
. . . and is not an appropriate subject for the popular 
initiative"). 
If the remaining partial proposition were to be refashioned 
so as to ask questions that would propose a "constitutional 
amendment" or "law," they would necessarily be different from 
the question presented by the petitioners.  For example, 
questions regarding whether voters would like an additional 
amount of existing revenue (without a new source of revenue) to 
go toward education or to transportation, or both, would be 
entirely different from the one presented by the petitioners. 
12 
 
 
Similarly, separating the question so as to ask about two 
separate taxes, one to fund education and one to fund 
transportation, also would fundamentally alter the question 
contained in the original petition.  For example, rather than 
one four per cent tax to fund both education and transportation, 
the proposal could be severed to ask voters (1) whether to 
impose a two per cent tax on incomes over $1 million to fund 
education spending; and (2) whether to impose a separate two per 
cent tax on incomes over $1 million in order to fund 
transportation spending.  Assuming both passed, the Legislature 
would not have the latitude accorded it by the original proposed 
law to spend on the two identified areas as it saw fit, and 
instead would be limited to spending the funds raised 
specifically for each area regardless of the particular needs in 
each area. 
Thus, there is no way to separate the question into 
subjects and still have the same question -- the petition does 
not have the same meaning if its subjects are separated.  See 
Petranich, 183 Mass. at 220 (provisions dependent where 
severance would mean "so chang[ing] the character of the 
original statute that the [drafters and enactors] would not be 
presumed to have enacted [one provision] without the other").  
As in Warren, 2 Gray at 100, the various provisions of the 
instant petition all "look to one object and its incidents."  
13 
 
 
They are "mutually connected with and dependent on each other, 
as conditions, considerations or compensations for each other."  
Id. at 99.  See Ashley, 228 Mass. at 81 ("the two parts are 
distinct and in their nature separable the one from the other 
and are not so interwoven and mutually dependent as to require 
the belief that the Legislature would not have enacted the one 
without the other"); Nolan's Case, 122 Mass. at 333, citing 
Warren, supra at 84 ("the two parts of this enactment are not 
distinct and independent, but . . . are mutually dependent and 
must stand or fall together" [emphasis added]). 
The court relies on Edwards v. Bruorton, 184 Mass. 529 
(1904), for the proposition that "the source of funds for a 
desired public expenditure could be severed from the purpose of 
the expenditure."  Ante at    ,   .  However, a close reading of 
Edwards reveals that the opinion does not go that far.  In 
Edwards, the court was called upon to determine the severability 
of parts of an 1891 special act.  The act sought to "provid[e] 
for the expenditure of money for the benefit of the public" by 
granting the city of Boston the power to take land by eminent 
domain and to issue bonds for public works projects.  Edwards, 
supra at 531.  See St. 1891, c. 323, §§ 1-3, 10, as amended by 
St. 1892, c. 418, §§ 1, 5.  The act also provided the city with 
the power to make an assessment on property abutting certain new 
road construction projects that could be spent to pay for the 
14 
 
 
improvements.  Edwards, supra.  See St. 1891, c. 323, §§ 10, 14-
17, as amended by St. 1892, c. 418, §§ 5, 7-10.  The taxing 
provision had been held unconstitutional in an earlier case, and 
the court concluded that the remaining provisions could stand on 
their own, "leaving payment to be provided for in a 
constitutional way."  Edwards, supra. 
Unlike the provisions in the ballot question at issue in 
this case, a State's grant of powers to a municipality to take 
land, to float bonds, and to make special assessments on certain 
properties could plainly exist independently of one another.  
See Loeb v. Columbia Township Trustees, 179 U.S. 472, 489 
(1900), cited in Edwards, 184 Mass. at 531 ("The power to issue 
bonds to raise the money, and the mode in which the township 
should raise the necessary sums to pay the bonds when due . . . 
are distinct and separable matters" [emphasis added]).  In 
contrast, although one part of the instant petition (and the 
statute at issue in Warren) could stand alone, the remainder 
could not; the remainder acts only as a modifier, changing the 
meaning of that which could stand independently.6 
                     
6 To the extent that the reasoning in Edwards v. Bruorton, 
184 Mass. 529 (1904), is inconsistent with the reasoning of 
Warren, the inconsistency may be explained by the context in 
which Edwards was decided.  At the time of Edwards, many States 
had authorized cities to make public improvements, engage in 
planning, and, on occasion, tax abutters in a manner later 
determined to be unconstitutional, to help pay for street 
improvements.  See, e.g., Loeb v. Columbia Township Trustees, 
15 
 
 
Based on the language of the petition, rather than seeking 
to impose a tax combined with the broad authority to spend the 
associated revenue on all areas of State government, the ballot 
initiative grants the Legislature with power to assess a 
particular tax and limits the areas where the revenue from that 
tax can be spent.  The petitioners want to ask the electorate 
whether this question should be law, and the electorate has the 
                                                                  
179 U.S. 472, 489 (1900).  When the same statute made such an 
assessment and also provided the authority to float bonds to pay 
for infrastructure projects, many courts first concluded that 
all of these provisions were mutually dependent.  See, e.g., 
Loeb v. Trustees of Columbia Township, Hamilton County, Ohio, 91 
F. 37, 45 (S.D. Ohio 1899).  See also Loeb, 179 U.S. at 489 
("There is some ground for saying that the legislature would not 
have passed the act without the [assessment] section"). 
 
The Edwards court acknowledged that its decision in the 
case regarding mutual dependence was "not free from difficulty," 
Edwards, 184 Mass. at 533, and described the case as one 
"present[ing] difficulties of determination upon the question," 
id. at 531.  However, the court ultimately followed the 
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court and concluded that 
the assessment provisions were not mutually dependent on the 
power to take land and the power to issue bonds.  Id., citing 
Loeb, 179 U.S. 472.  In the intervening thirteen years between 
the enactment of the statute and the court's conclusion that a 
special benefit assessment was unconstitutional, the city of 
Boston would have issued many bonds and taken many parcels of 
land from property owners.  Had the court concluded, years 
later, that all of the provisions of the 1891 special act, as 
amended, were invalid, the transactions would have been 
difficult if not impossible to undo.  See Loeb, supra at 488-
489; A. Scalia & B.A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation 
of Legal Texts 66 (2012) (Scalia & Garner) (describing 
presumption of validity as one that "disfavors interpretations 
that would nullify the provision or the entire instrument -- for 
example, an interpretation that . . . would cause a statute to 
be unconstitutional").  Similar considerations are not present 
in considering whether the provisions of Initiative Petition 15-
17 are mutually dependent. 
16 
 
 
right under art. 48 to consider whether this question should be 
law -- not a different question. 
4.  The court's conflation of relatedness and mutual 
dependence in art. 48.  Disregarding the second half of art. 
48's requirement that a petition contain "only subjects . . . 
which are related or which are mutually dependent," the court 
concludes that the subjects of the petition are unrelated, and 
thus holds that the ballot question cannot be put before voters.7 
In explaining its view that "or which are mutually 
dependent" is surplusage,8 the court stresses that "[t]he words 
. . . were added at the last moment, when the 'related subjects' 
language was 'referred back' to the committee on form and 
phraseology," ostensibly to show that the addition was not given 
much thought.  Ante at    , quoting 2 Debates in the 
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention 1917-1918, at 953 (1918) 
(Constitutional Debates).  Yet, as the chair of that committee 
explained when they released the draft, the changes were "made 
purely and simply to carry out what the committee believed to be 
                     
7 The court asserts that this test in art. 48 does not 
"impose a separate requirement that may be satisfied even if the 
subjects of a petition are not related."  Ante at    .  
Nonetheless, the court asserts that the provisions of the 
petition are not mutually dependent.  Ante at    . 
 
8 This view ignores a basic tenet of statutory 
interpretation that every word is to be given effect and none 
should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to 
duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.  Scalia & 
Garner, supra at 174. 
17 
 
 
the wishes of the Convention."  Constitutional Debates, supra at 
960 (remarks of Augustus P. Loring).  Far from adding 
surplusage, that committee "cut down [by] about [fifteen] per 
cent" the text of the document.  Id. at 959.  "Unnecessary words 
were cut out," not put in.  Id. at 960. 
In redrafting the text, the committee on form and 
phraseology worked closely with those who had been active in the 
earlier debates, including the sponsor of the initiative and 
referendum, Joseph Walker, as well as Robert Luce and Josiah 
Quincy.  Id.  The Committee also worked closely with the advisor 
to the Convention, Lawrence B. Evans.  Id.  Evans explained that 
the role of that committee was to reduce "the amount of 
litigation which is due entirely to the careless drafting of 
constitutions or statutes."  Evans, The Massachusetts 
Constitutional Convention, 11 Law. Libr. J. 51, 56 (1918).  
Evans explains that, instead of adding unnecessary words, the 
committee's role was to counter the insistence among delegates 
"who have not had the benefit of legal training and are afraid 
to trust the concise and exact language of the Committee" to 
insert "clauses which add nothing to the amendment except 
superfluous words."  Id. 
Our cases have explained that the requirement that a 
petition "contains only subjects . . . which are related or 
which are mutually dependent" was put in place in order to limit 
18 
 
 
the dangers of logrolling.  See Dunn, 474 Mass. at 679; Carney, 
447 Mass. at 227-229.  Reasonable minds may disagree as to the 
precise definition of "logrolling"; however, based on the 
language of the constitutional text, we know that by enacting 
and ratifying art. 48, the delegates were concerned about the 
inclusion of multiple severable distinct, independent, and 
unrelated proposals combined together to be asked of voters 
together in one ballot question.  See art. 48, The Initiative, 
II, § 3, as amended by art. 74.  This written expression is 
consistent with the definition of "logrolling" that we have used 
in our cases, which also reference the severability element,9 as 
well as the understanding of the delegates who were concerned 
                     
9 "'Logrolling' . . . is defined as '[t]he legislative 
practice of including several propositions in one measure or 
proposed constitutional amendment so that the legislature or 
voters will pass all of them, even though these propositions 
might not have passed if they had been submitted separately'" 
(emphasis added).  Carney v. Attorney Gen., 447 Mass. 218, 219 
n.4 (2006), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 960 (8th ed. 2004).  
See Dunn v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 675, 679 (2016) (same); 
Abdow, v. Attorney Gen., 468 Mass. 478, 502 n.19 (same). 
 
"Logrolling" has also been defined as "the practice of 
several minorities combining their several proposals as 
different provisions of a single bill and thus consolidating 
their votes so that a majority is obtained for the omnibus bill 
where perhaps no single proposal of each minority could have 
obtained majority approval separately" (emphasis added).  Ruud, 
No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 
389, 391 (1958).  Ruud contended that, in States that have 
single subject rules, "[t]he disposition of money raised by a 
tax or fee is clearly germane to the subject of the tax and so 
is an appropriation to administer the tax."  Id. at 428, citing 
Winter v. Barrett, 352 Ill. 441 (1933). 
19 
 
 
about logrolling.10 
 
5.  The court's relatedness analysis.  The court's holding 
rests upon its conclusion that the subjects of the petition are 
not related, and correctly notes that our jurisprudence has 
similarly focused on relatedness rather than on mutual 
dependence.  However, that is because, before now, each time 
that we have concluded that a ballot question was not in 
compliance with art. 48 because it failed to contain "only 
subjects . . . which are related or which are mutually 
dependent," the petition comprised provisions that contained 
more than one proposition that could have been severed and 
"submitted separately" to be considered by voters without 
fundamentally altering the proposed laws.  See Gray, 474 Mass. 
at 647; Carney, 447 Mass. at 231-232; Opinion of the Justices, 
422 Mass. 1212, 1221 (1996).  Cf. Ashley, 228 Mass. at 81; 
Petranich, 183 Mass. at 220.  In other words, the petitions were 
not mutually dependent, hence there was little, if anything, 
                     
10 See, e.g., Constitutional Debates, supra at 537 (remarks 
of Francis N. Balch) (suggesting that there be special body to 
review ballot questions for seven different requirements as to 
proper form, including one stating that "[t]he measure touches 
only one subject-matter, or on subject-matters so related as not 
fairly to require separation" [emphasis added]).  Furthermore, 
it is consistent with the examples given by delegates concerned 
about logrolling such as the Oregon example provided by Robert 
Luce.  Id. at 567 (discussing "a case in Oregon, where, in order 
to secure the passage of the single tax, there was hitched to 
the front of it, like a locomotive to the front of a freight 
train, a proposal that there should be no more poll or head 
taxes"). 
20 
 
 
said about mutual dependence in our art. 48 cases. 
a.  Relatedness in art. 48 jurisprudence.  For example, in 
Carney, 447 Mass. at 219, the court considered whether a 
petition that (1) would prohibit dog racing in the Commonwealth 
and (2) would broaden criminal statutes penalizing dog fighting 
and neglect of dogs met the requirements of art. 48.  These two 
sections of the petition are distinct and could be severed and 
asked of voters independently without altering their meanings:  
(1) whether the people should prohibit the practice of legalized 
dog racing and live betting, and (2) whether the people should 
broaden the criminal statutes penalizing animal abuse.  See id.  
The court referred to this as an "aggregation of these two very 
different sets of laws into one petition."  Id. at 220.  As the 
two subjects (in separate sections) were severable, i.e., not 
mutually dependent, the court analyzed the propositions to 
determine whether they were sufficiently related.  Id. at 231.  
Determining that there was no operational relationship between 
the provisions and that the petition could not give voters a 
meaningful choice when voting yes or no, the court concluded 
that the severable propositions in the petition were not 
sufficiently related under art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as 
amended by art. 74, and must be asked of voters separately.  Id. 
at 231-232 & n.23. 
 
Similarly in Gray, 474 Mass. at 638, the court considered 
21 
 
 
an initiative petition that concerned the use of certain 
educational standards in defining the educational curriculum of 
public school students and also concerned the standardized 
testing process used in school districts.  The petition 
comprised six sections, many of which contained propositions 
that could have been severed and asked of voters separately.  
See id. at 641-643.  For example, at least two separate 
questions could have been asked without altering their meanings:  
(1) whether the people should repeal the "Common Core" academic 
standard; and (2) whether the people should require the annual 
publication of all the previous year's questions, constructed 
responses, and essays included in mandatory standardized 
performance assessment tests.  See id.  Here again, upon 
determining that the provisions were not mutually dependent, we 
analyzed whether they were nonetheless sufficiently related to 
be asked of voters together.  See id. at 644-649.  We concluded 
that the first few sections (sections 1-3), which essentially 
sought to rescind a vote of the Board of Elementary and 
Secondary Education and modify the process for developing and 
reviewing academic standards, were sufficiently related to a 
common purpose.  Id. at 647.  However, the section requiring 
annual publication of test items (section 4) had a different 
purpose.  Id. at 647-648.  We thus determined that sections 1-3 
and 4 were not sufficiently related to be asked of voters 
22 
 
 
together; the petitioners were required to sever them and ask 
them of voters independently to satisfy the requirements of art. 
48.  Id. at 649. 
Finally, in Opinion of the Justices, 422 Mass. at 1213-
1214, 1220, the court considered an initiative petition that 
would have (1) reduced compensation for members of the 
Legislature, (2) required that they receive all of their 
compensation in the first six months of any year, (3) tied 
future compensation to Massachusetts median household income, 
"(4) eliminate[d] or reduce[d] additional compensation for 
legislative leadership positions, . . . (5) permit[ted] the 
State Auditor and Inspector General to oversee legislative 
financial accounts and purchasing activities," and (6) permitted 
the Inspector General to have oversight power over the 
commissioner of veterans' services. 
Many of these propositions could have been severed from the 
others and asked of voters independently without changing their 
meanings, thus they were not mutually dependent.  See id.  For 
example, at least four separate questions could have been asked:  
(1) whether the people should reduce compensation for members of 
the Legislature; (2) whether the people should eliminate 
additional compensation for legislative leadership positions; 
(3) whether the people should permit the State Auditor and 
Inspector General to oversee legislative financial accounts and 
23 
 
 
purchasing activities; and (4) whether the people should permit 
the Inspector General to oversee the commissioner of veterans' 
services.  See id.  Therefore, the court considered whether 
these separate questions were related to a common purpose.  Id. 
at 1220-1221.  The court concluded that, at the least, 
permitting the Inspector General to access the records of the 
commissioner of veterans' services was not related to 
legislative accountability and therefore the proposition 
regarding Inspector General oversight of the commissioner of 
veterans' services should have been severed from the petition's 
other propositions and asked of voters separately in order to be 
valid under art. 48.  See id. at 1221. 
Thus, although our case law has properly focused on 
relatedness, the tests articulated to determine whether the 
subjects of a petition are related need not be applied to this 
petition, which is not severable.11  See art. 48, The Initiative, 
                     
11 I take no position whether the subjects of the petition 
are related, except to note that subjects can be both related 
and mutually dependent.  See Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n v. 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 209, 218 n.8 (1981) 
("We need not pause to consider whether any subjects which are 
mutually dependent could ever be said not also to be related").  
Further, the question whether subjects are related is often a 
subjective one.  See Dunn, 474 Mass. at 680 ("there is no single 
'bright-line' test for determining whether an initiative meets 
the related subjects requirement"); R. Luce, Legislative 
Procedure 551 (1922) (discussing difficulty in interpreting 
single subject rules and noting that "[p]erhaps our language 
does not permit a more accurate statement of what is meant"); 
Cooter & Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single 
24 
 
 
II, § 3, as amended by art. 74. 
b.  The fairness inquiry.  The fairness inquiry the court 
undertakes when it asks if it is fair to voters to be asked this 
question is part of the relatedness analysis.  See Gray, 474 
Mass. at 644-645, quoting Carney, 447 Mass. at 226, 230-231.  It 
attempts to answer the question:  "Do the similarities of an 
initiative's provisions dominate what each segment provides 
separately so that the petition is sufficiently coherent to be 
voted on 'yes' or 'no' by the voters?"  Gray, supra, quoting 
Carney, supra at 226.  Any petition that cannot be severed into 
different questions (like this one) is inherently fair to be 
voted up or down because there is no other way to ask the 
question presented.  Inherently, the "similarities of [the] 
initiative's provisions dominate what each segment provides 
separately" because, of the three "segment[s]" identified by the 
court, only the segment providing for a tax on high incomes 
separately "provide[s]" anything at all.  See Gray, supra, 
quoting Carney, supra.  The other two "segment[s]," if separated 
from the first, do not "provide" or stipulate anything; they are 
merely a condition modifying the consequences of the first 
segment.  See Gray, supra, quoting Carney, supra.  It is worth 
noting that, in fact, contrary to the court's conclusion 
regarding the "fairness" of asking this question to voters, the 
                                                                  
Subject Rule, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 687, 709-712 (2010). 
25 
 
 
ballot question at issue here is no different from any proposal 
for a law; that is, it suggests a particular means to achieve a 
particular end. 
Drafters of proposed laws (and constitutional amendments) 
designed to achieve goals (such as increasing spending on public 
investments) must choose a means by which to do so.  Here the 
drafters chose a tax on incomes over $1 million.  They could 
have chosen any number of other ways to reach this goal:  
alternative means to achieve a desired end in any proposed law 
are always available.  If voters do not like the proposed means 
to achieve a particular end within a ballot question (or do not 
agree with the particular end proposed), they are, as always, 
free to vote against the question. 
Here, if opponents of the petition wish to achieve 
increased spending on education and transportation but dislike 
the proposed means, or wish to provide the Legislature with 
discretion to invest the revenue on more or fewer areas of 
public investment than education and transportation, they are 
free to express their opinion that voters should reject the 
question, just like in any other ballot question proposal.  We 
should not stifle the policy debate by preventing the people 
from considering the petition altogether. 
The court also suggests that the petition violates the 
spirit of logrolling because ballot questions seeking to amend 
26 
 
 
art. 44's prohibition on a graduated income tax were defeated 
numerous times in the past (most recently in 1994).12  In fact, 
art. 48 is designed to allow petitioners to modify a previously 
rejected proposal, just as was done here, so that it might be 
more appealing to voters, provided that it meets art. 48's mode 
of origination requirements. 
Although the requirement in art. 48, The Initiative, II, 
§ 3, as amended by art. 74, that initiative petitions only 
contain "subjects . . . which are related or which are mutually 
dependent" prohibits petitioners from tacking on an unrelated, 
distinct, independent and separate proposal for a law or 
constitutional amendment to their original proposal as part of 
one petition, art. 48 in no way prohibits petitioners from 
attempting to modify or limit a proposal with conditions until 
they are successful.  In other words, if a majority of voters 
did not like a certain proposition because of its breadth, but a 
majority of voters would support the proposition if it were more 
limited, the more limited proposal may of course be asked.13 
                     
12 This view ignores the canon of statutory interpretation 
providing that a "determination of statutory meaning [cannot] be 
overridden by a judicially perceived, at-large 'spirit' of the 
law that overcomes its letter."  Scalia & Garner, supra at 343. 
 
13 The court's opinion appears to allow a ballot question 
permitting a graduated income tax to be asked of voters alone 
such that any associated revenue would be available for 
legislators to spend on all areas of government spending.  But 
by the court's logic, a question that called for the same tax 
27 
 
 
For example, a hypothetical gun safety advocacy group that 
advanced a previously rejected petition to outlaw automatic 
weapons could not return with a different petition that both 
outlawed automatic weapons and legalized recreational marijuana 
because the two subjects are severable and unrelated.  That same 
group, however, could advance a new petition to regulate (rather 
than prohibit) automatic weapons. 
The court contends that this reading of mutual dependence 
would permit "any collection of provisions that would tax any 
number of different sources, and would provide funds to some 
indeterminate list of distinct entities and purposes, should be 
placed before voters, because the list of provisions would be 
'mutually dependent.'"  Ante at    .  This is a misunderstanding 
of mutual dependence.  To the extent that a petition contained 
numerous distinct taxes, they would not necessarily be mutually 
dependent.  Also, to the extent that a petition removed the 
Legislature's spending discretion, the provisions of this 
question would not likely be mutually dependent, but severable.  
Furthermore, the delegates to the 1917-1918 Constitutional 
Convention expressly considered and rejected the contention that 
the initiative petition process could be used to "provide funds 
                                                                  
but enumerated each area of government spending in the text 
would violate art. 48 because it would contain "unrelated 
subjects" despite the fact that it would be fundamentally the 
same question with the same outcome. 
28 
 
 
to some indeterminate list of distinct entities," id., by 
including "specific appropriation[s]" on the list of matters 
excluded from the initiative process.  Art. 48, The Initiative, 
II, § 2. 
Article 48 permits the people to adopt laws through the 
initiative process that are properly narrowed to the popular 
will.  To prohibit advocates from asking more limited 
propositions than others previously rejected by the people 
ignores the purpose of art. 48 and interferes directly with the 
democratic process. 
6.  Article 30 and the people's legislative power under 
art. 48.  Finally, by ratifying art. 48, the people extended the 
legislative power from the General Court to the people.  See 
art. 48, The Initiative, II; Bowe v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 243-247 (1946); Horton v. Attorney 
Gen., 269 Mass. 503, 514 (1929).  With the exception of a list 
of enumerated "excluded matters" expressly prohibited in Part 
II, art. 48 provides the people with broad authority to create 
laws.14  See art. 48, The Initiative, I, of the Amendments (art. 
                     
14 In fact, the Constitutional Convention's decision to move 
the requirement that a petition contain "only subjects . . . 
which are related or which are mutually dependent" to the "Mode 
of Originating" section, art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as 
amended by art. 74, and away from the "Excluded Matters" section 
reflects the conscious intent that the provision was not 
designed to prohibit certain proposed laws from being asked of 
voters.  Constitutional Debates, supra at 960; Convention Doc. 
29 
 
 
48 provides "the power of a specified number of voters to submit 
constitutional amendments and laws to the people for approval or 
rejection"). 
"The principle of the initiative and referendum in its 
purity means that the people of this Commonwealth may have such 
laws and may have such a Constitution as they see fit themselves 
to adopt."  Buckley v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 371 Mass. 
195, 199 (1976), quoting Constitutional Debates, supra at 16 
(remarks of Joseph Walker).  By citing Warren, the court 
acknowledges that the correct lens to look at mutual dependence 
is through severability.  Ante at note 8.  As mentioned supra, 
until now, in every case in which we have declared that a 
petition could not be submitted to the people, the provisions 
were severable and could be asked separately without changing 
the meaning of each provision. 
By reversing the Attorney General's decision to certify the 
instant petition, the court fundamentally interferes with the 
ability of the people to exercise the constitutionally granted 
legislative power under art. 48.  Because the proposed question 
is not severable, the effect of the court's holding is to turn 
art. 48's mode and form requirements into absolute 
disqualifiers; that is, rather than having the option of putting 
the question into what the court considers proper form, the 
                                                                  
No. 370, at 2-3. 
30 
 
 
question cannot be asked at all.  See Horton, 269 Mass. at 514 
("The popular initiative relates to legislation. . . .  The 
judicial department of government cannot interfere with the 
ordinary processes of legislation").  The court's opinion unduly 
operates to "deprive the people of a 'meaningful way' to express 
their will."  Carney, 447 Mass. at 230.15  I cannot support an 
interpretation that results in such an intrusion by the judicial 
power into the legislative power without a clearer expression in 
art. 48 providing the judicial department with that authority. 
7.  Conclusion.  "[W]hether [the substance of this 
petition] is wise as a matter of economic and social policy is, 
of course, not subject to judicial review."  Town Taxi Inc. v. 
Police Comm'r of Boston, 377 Mass. 576, 585 (1979).16  The 
                     
15 Although the delegates at the 1917-1918 Constitutional 
Convention expressly rejected a single subject rule, instead 
opting for a rule requiring there to be "related" or "mutually 
dependent" subjects, the court's opinion is written as if our 
Constitution does in fact provide a single subject rule.  See 
Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n, 384 Mass. at 220. 
 
16 It is well worth noting that at the time of the debates 
over art. 48, many proponents of the initiative and referendum 
favored it because it would let voters vote on the exact type of 
question being posed by the ballot question in this case, and 
opponents opposed it for that same reason.  However, the 
opponents lost.  Albert E. Pillsbury was one of the most hard-
line opponents of the initiative and referendum provisions.  
Pillsbury viewed the debate as "between the believers in 
constitutional representative government on the one hand and 
socialistic democracy on the other."  Constitutional Debates, 
supra at 604.  He believed that "[t]he ultimate effect if not 
the object of the initiative and referendum, say what you will, 
is to enable a majority at the polls to appropriate the property 
31 
 
 
court's holding overrides the Constitution's text, which limits 
matters excluded from the initiative petition only to those 
thoughtfully and specifically enumerated under art. 48, The 
Initiative, II, § 2, and permits an initiative petition that 
"contains only subjects . . . which are mutually dependent."  
art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74. 
I see nothing in art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as 
amended by art. 74, that prohibits the power of the people to 
accept or reject this ballot question in November; therefore, I 
dissent. 
                                                                  
of those who have it to the use of those who want it.  With this 
weapon in their hands they can do . . . anything."  Id. at 613. 
 
On the other side of the issue was Grenville S. MacFarland, 
an editorial writer for the Boston American, who was once 
referred to as "the most influential force for the [initiative 
and referendum provisions]."  R.L. Bridgman, The Massachusetts 
Constitutional Convention of 1917, at 42 (1923).  MacFarland 
sent a personal letter to all candidates for the Legislature 
expressing concerns about economic inequality in the industrial 
era: 
 
"In my judgment, and I hope in yours, that convention 
will be a failure if it does not enable us to obtain the 
initiative and referendum by which the direct power of the 
whole body of citizens may supplement the present form of 
representative government and keep it free from those vices 
which the unequal distribution of wealth and the resulting 
concentration of financial and political power, through the 
rise of powerful public service and industrial 
corporations, have introduced into our body politic and are 
now threatening our representative form of government." 
 
Id. at 42-43.