Title: Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Company, Inc.
Citation: 2007 WI 88
Docket Number: 2005AP002837
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 2007

2007 WI 88 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2837 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Trinity Petroleum, Inc., 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Scott Oil Company, Inc., 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 219 
Reported at:  296 Wis. 2d 666, 724 N.W.2d 259 
(Ct. App. 2006-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 11, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
James R. Kieffer   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs in part and dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and PROSSER, JJ., join the 
concur/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Alan H. Marcuvitz, Susan M. Sager, Juan S. Ramirez, Aaron H. 
Kastens, and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Juan S. Ramirez. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Douglas 
W. Rose and Rose & DeJong, S.C., Brookfield, and oral argument 
by Douglas W. Rose. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, 
Milwaukee, and Lynn R. Laufenberg and Laufenberg & Hoefle, S.C., 
on behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
2007 WI 88
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2837  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV846) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Trinity Petroleum, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Scott Oil Company, Inc., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals affirming the order 
of the circuit court for Waukesha County, James R. Keiffer, 
Judge.1  The circuit court denied Scott Oil Company, Inc.'s (the 
defendant's) motion for sanctions against Trinity Petroleum, 
Inc. (the plaintiff) for alleged frivolous commencement and 
maintenance of a lawsuit.   
                                                 
1 Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2006 WI App 219, 
296 Wis. 2d 666, 724 N.W.2d 259.   
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
2 
 
¶2 
At issue in this case is the application of new Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) to the present litigation.  
¶3 
This court adopted new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 
(2005-06), pursuant to its rule-making authority under Wis. 
Stat. § 751.12 (2005-06), by Supreme Court Order 03-06 on March 
31, 2005.2  Supreme Court Order 03-06 repealed both Wis. Stat. 
§§ 802.05 and 814.025 (2003-04), and recreated Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06).  The effective date of the new rule 
was July 1, 2005.3  On the effective date of the new rule the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment had not yet been decided 
by the circuit court.  After the effective date of the new rule, 
the circuit court granted the summary judgment motion in favor 
of the defendant, and the defendant made oral and written 
motions to impose sanctions against the plaintiff for frivolous 
conduct, relying on former Wis. Stat. §§ 802.05 and 814.025 
(2003-04).     
¶4 
We are asked to determine whether new Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) should be applied retroactively to the 
instant case.  Inherent in this question are two issues:  (1) 
whether the new rule has retroactive application, and (2) if the 
new rule has retroactive application, whether the instant case 
falls within an exception to retroactive application. 
¶5 
The circuit court in the instant case determined as a 
matter of law that the new rule, Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 
                                                 
2 Supreme Court Order 03-06, 2005 WI 38, 278 Wis. 2d xiii. 
3 Id. at xiv. 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
3 
 
(2005-06), had retroactive application, without exception, and 
further determined that because the defendant did not and could 
not comply with the "safe harbor" notice provision, no sanctions 
would be imposed.  In light of its conclusion of law, the 
circuit court did not determine in the instant case whether 
retroactive application of the new rule impaired contract 
rights, disturbed vested rights, or imposed an unreasonable 
burden on a party in the instant case and did not make final and 
conclusive 
findings 
on 
whether 
the 
plaintiff 
had 
either 
commenced or maintained a frivolous action.   
¶6 
The court of appeals affirmed the order of the circuit 
court denying the defendant's motion for sanctions, based on 
similar reasoning.  
¶7 
For the reasons set forth, we hold, like the circuit 
court 
and 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
that 
new 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 
(2005-06) 
is 
a 
procedural 
rule 
and 
that 
procedural rules generally have retroactive application.  We 
conclude that new rule Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) is 
not to be applied retroactively when the new rule diminishes a 
contract, disturbs vested rights, or imposes an unreasonable 
burden on the party charged with complying with the new rule's 
requirements. 
¶8 
We therefore reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and the order of the circuit court.  These courts erred 
as a matter of law in holding that new rule Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) had retroactive application without 
exception.  We remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
4 
 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  The circuit court 
must determine whether retroactive application of new Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) imposes an unreasonable burden on a 
party who must comply with the procedural requirements of the 
new rule.  After determining which provision——either Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) or §§ 802.05 and 814.025 (2003-04)——to 
apply using the unreasonable burden standard, the circuit court 
must determine under the applicable provision whether the 
plaintiff 
engaged 
in 
frivolous 
conduct 
in 
commencing 
or 
maintaining the lawsuit and what sanctions, if any, should be 
imposed on the plaintiff.  
I 
¶9 
This review arises from the circuit court's order 
denying the defendant's motion for sanctions against the 
plaintiff for commencing and maintaining a frivolous lawsuit.  
The procedural posture of the case for purposes of deciding the 
issue on review, the retroactive application of Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06), is set forth below and is not in 
dispute. 
¶10 The parties entered into a five-year written contract 
pursuant to which the plaintiff would transport the defendant's 
petroleum products to the defendant's customers.  According to 
contractual provisions, the defendant could terminate the 
contract with 60 days' notice if the plaintiff failed to perform 
to the "customer's satisfaction." 
¶11 On February 6, 2004, the defendant formally notified 
the plaintiff that, pursuant to its rights under the contract, 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
5 
 
it was terminating the contract because it was not satisfied 
with the plaintiff's performance; the defendant explained that 
it had received several complaints from its customers about the 
plaintiff's poor service in delivering petroleum products.   
¶12 On April 6, 2004, the plaintiff filed suit against the 
defendant alleging breach of contract.  The parties disagreed 
about the meaning of the phrase "customer's satisfaction" in the 
contract.  In its responsive pleadings, the defendant did not 
raise any issue of frivolousness.  The defendant, however, 
contends that at subsequent stages of the proceeding it alerted 
the 
plaintiff 
of 
its 
belief 
that 
the 
commencement 
and 
maintenance of the action were frivolous.4 
¶13 The defendant submitted interrogatories and document 
requests to the plaintiff, beginning in December 2004, to prove 
that even under the plaintiff's own contractual interpretation, 
the plaintiff did not have a viable case for breach of contract.   
¶14 On April 5, 2005, the defendant moved for summary 
judgment against the plaintiff.  The circuit court initially 
scheduled the hearing on the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment for June 6, 2005.  This hearing was postponed, however, 
until July 5, 2005, in order to accommodate the receipt of 
                                                 
4 The defendant points to its assertions that the lawsuit 
was frivolous in its mediation statement in March 2005, in its 
response to the plaintiff's motion to quash the defendant's 
motion to compel in April 2005, in its brief in response to the 
plaintiff's motion to quash in April 2005, in the defendant's 
pretrial report of April 5, 2005; and in the hearing on May 16, 
2005 on the plaintiff's motion to quash.  
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
6 
 
transcripts from a deposition taken on May 27, 2005.5  The 
defendant blames the plaintiff for this delay.  A letter 
submitted by the defense counsel to the circuit court states, 
however, that both parties requested this postponement.6   
¶15 While the litigation in the instant case was before 
the circuit court, this court issued Supreme Court Order 03-06 
on March 31, 2005, changing the rules governing sanctions for 
frivolous conduct.  Effective July 1, 2005, Wis. Stat. §§ 802.05 
and 
814.025 
(2003-04) 
were 
repealed 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) was adopted. 
¶16 At the conclusion of the summary judgment hearing on 
July 5, 2005, the circuit court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant,7 and the defendant orally moved for costs 
and reasonable attorney fees, claiming that the plaintiff 
frivolously commenced and maintained its claim against the 
                                                 
5 This deposition had been scheduled for an earlier date but 
was delayed to accommodate an ultimately unsuccessful motion 
brought by the plaintiff to quash the deposition. 
6 The letter drafted by defense counsel, dated May 27, 2005, 
and addressed to the Honorable James R. Keiffer, reads in 
relevant part:  "Because the deposition transcripts would not be 
available by the Tuesday date, and such a short time frame 
before the reply brief due date, both counsel asked your clerk 
for a new hearing date.  She complied and changed the June 6, 
2005 summary judgment hearing date to July 5, 2005, at 10:00 
a.m."  The letter continues, "By mutual agreement of counsel, 
and with the court's approval, we are thus requesting that the 
summary judgment briefing schedule be changed based upon the new 
hearing date of July 5." 
7 The plaintiff does not challenge the circuit court order 
granting summary judgment as part of the instant proceedings and 
its validity is therefore not before the court. 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
7 
 
defendant.  The circuit court refused to grant the defendant's 
oral motion, concluding that the motion was not properly before 
it.  The circuit court, however, invited the defendant to file a 
written motion for sanctions.  Specifically, the circuit court 
stated: "If Scott Oil [the defendant] wishes to renew that 
request saying that in its opinion it believes this action was a 
frivolous matter and they are then continuing to ask the court 
to impose costs, they can file that motion at the appropriate 
time . . . ."  
¶17 The defendant filed a written motion for imposition of 
sanctions (costs and reasonable attorney fees) on July 21, 2005, 
after the effective date of new rule Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 
(2005-06).  The defendant argued that, in light of the 
contract's clear terms and the numerous customer complaints, the 
plaintiff frivolously commenced and maintained its lawsuit.  The 
defendant grounded its written motion for sanctions on former 
Wis. Stat. §§ 802.05 and 814.025 (2003-04).  The defendant's 
motion did not mention Supreme Court Order 03-06 repealing 
former §§ 802.05 and 814.025 (2003-04) and recreating Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06).  
¶18 The circuit court heard arguments on August 29, 2005 
on the defendant's written motion for sanctions.  The circuit 
court concluded that "the new 802.05 applied in this case" and 
that the defendant had to comply with the "safe harbor" notice 
provision.  Because the defendant had not complied and could not 
comply with the "safe harbor" notice provision, the circuit 
court denied the defendant's motion for sanctions. 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
8 
 
¶19 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court's order denying the defendant's motion for sanctions, 
holding that new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) was a 
procedural rule with retroactive application and that sanctions 
could not be granted because the defendant had not complied and 
could not comply with its "safe harbor" notice provisions.8   
¶20 Court of Appeals Judge Daniel P. Anderson dissented 
from the court of appeals decision.  Judge Anderson agreed with 
the majority that new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) is a 
procedural rule.  He did "not agree that it is to be applied 
retroactively under the particular facts of this case."9  Judge 
Anderson concluded that the new rule's "retroactive application 
would impose an unreasonable burden upon the administration of 
the judicial system and [the defendant]."10  Just as amendments 
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 should not be 
applied retroactively if not "just and practicable," the dissent 
reasoned that the 2005 recreation of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 
(2005-06) should not be applied retroactively if the amended 
version imposed an unreasonable burden on the party that has to 
comply with the procedural requirements. 
II 
¶21 We begin our inquiry with a review of the provisions 
governing sanctions for frivolous claims.  When the plaintiff 
                                                 
8 Trinity, 296 Wis. 2d 666, ¶¶25, 28, 35-36. 
9 Id., ¶37. 
10 Id. 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
9 
 
commenced its action for breach of contract in April 2004, two 
provisions governed sanctions for commencing and maintaining 
frivolous actions:  Wis. Stat. §§ 802.05 and 814.025 (2003-04). 
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.05 (2003-04) was adopted as a 
court rule regulating pleading, practice, and procedure.  Before 
it was recreated in 2005, it required in relevant part that 
pleadings, motions, and other papers had to be signed by an 
attorney or party and that such signature certifies "that to the 
best of the attorney's or party's knowledge, information and 
belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, the pleading, motion or 
other paper is well-grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law . . . ."11 
                                                 
11 Former Wis. Stat. § 802.05(1)(a) (2003-04) provided in 
full: 
Every pleading, motion or other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall contain the name, 
state bar number, if any, telephone number, and 
address of the attorney and the name of the attorney's 
law firm, if any, and shall be subscribed with the 
handwritten signature of at least one attorney of 
record in the individual's name.  A party who is not 
represented 
by 
an 
attorney 
shall 
subscribe 
the 
pleading, motion or other paper with the party's 
handwritten signature and state his or her address.  
Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or 
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied 
by affidavit.  The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party 
has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to 
the best of the attorney's or party's knowledge, 
information 
and 
belief, 
formed 
after 
reasonable 
inquiry, the pleading, motion or other paper is well-
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, modification or 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
10 
 
¶23 This provision also authorized a circuit court to 
order sanctions for a violation of any of these statutorily 
imposed duties.  Sanctions were for the commencement of a 
frivolous action and were in the discretion of the court.12  The 
sanction imposed by the circuit court "may include an order to 
pay to the other party the amount of reasonable expenses 
incurred by that party because of the filing of the pleading, 
motion or other paper, including reasonable attorney fees."13   
                                                                                                                                                             
reversal of existing law; and that the pleading, 
motion or other paper is not used for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.  
If a pleading, motion or other paper is not signed, it 
shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after 
the omission is called to the attention of the pleader 
or movant.  If the court determines that an attorney 
or party failed to read or make the determinations 
required under this subsection before signing any 
petition, motion or other paper, the court may, upon 
motion 
or 
upon 
its 
own 
initiative, 
impose 
an 
appropriate sanction on the person who signed the 
pleading, motion or other paper, or on a represented 
party, or on both.  The sanction may include an order 
to pay to the other party the amount of reasonable 
expenses incurred by that party because of the filing 
of the pleading, motion or other paper, including 
reasonable attorney fees. 
12 In this regard, former Wis. Stat. § 802.05(1)(a) (2003-
04) provided in pertinent part: 
 
If the court determines that an attorney or party 
failed to read or make the determinations required 
under this subsection before signing any petition, 
motion or other paper, the court may, upon motion or 
upon 
its 
own 
initiative, 
impose 
an 
appropriate 
sanction on the person who signed the pleading, motion 
or other paper, or on a represented party, or on both. 
13 Wis. Stat. § 802.05(1)(a) (2003-04). 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
11 
 
¶24 Wisconsin Stat. § 814.025 (2003-04) governed sanctions 
for commencing or continuing a frivolous action, counterclaim, 
defense, or cross claim and thus overlapped with § 802.05 (2003-
04) regarding the commencement of a frivolous action.14  Section 
814.025 (2003-04) provided in relevant part that the circuit 
court shall award the successful party costs and reasonable 
attorney fees if the circuit court finds at any time of the 
proceedings, including at the conclusion of the case, that an 
action, counterclaim, defense or cross claim commenced or 
continued by a party is frivolous.15  In adopting subsection (4) 
of § 814.025 (2003-04) in 1988, the legislature explicitly 
provided that "[t]o the extent s. 802.05 [2003-04] is applicable 
and differs from [s. 814.025], s. 802.05 applies."16  The 
legislative intent as clearly expressed in the text was to have 
                                                 
14 Jandrt ex rel. Brueggeman v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 227 
Wis. 2d 531, 547, 597 N.W.2d 744 (1999) ("Both §§ 802.05 and 
814.025 authorize a circuit court to sanction a party for 
commencing a frivolous action, while § 814.025 alone authorizes 
the imposition of sanctions upon a party maintaining a frivolous 
action."). 
15 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 814.025(1) 
(2003-04) 
provided 
as 
follows:  
If an action or special proceeding commenced or 
continued by a plaintiff or a counterclaim, defense or 
cross complaint commenced, used or continued by a 
defendant is found, at any time during the proceedings 
or upon judgment, to be frivolous by the court, the 
court shall award to the successful party costs 
determined under s. 814.04 and reasonable attorney 
fees. 
16 Wis. Stat. § 814.025(4) (2003-04). 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
12 
 
§ 814.025 complement § (Rule) 802.05 and to have § (Rule) 802.05 
be the governing provision. 
¶25 As we explained previously, effective July 1, 2005, 
Supreme Court Order No. 03-06 repealed Wis. Stat. § 814.025 
(2003-04) in its entirety17 and repealed and recreated § 802.05 
(2003-04) as Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06). 
¶26 The new rule, Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06), 
differs from the previous provisions governing sanctions for 
frivolous conduct, Wis. Stat. §§ 802.05 and 814.025 (2003-04), 
in several respects.  Relevant to the instant case are two 
changes in new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06). 
¶27 First, 
new 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 
(2005-06) 
includes a "safe harbor" notice provision.  A party alleging 
frivolous conduct and seeking sanctions must serve on the non-
                                                 
17 The court explained its repeal of Wis. Stat. § 814.025 
(2003-04) as follows:  
In response to the concerns regarding our decision to 
repeal s. 814.025, we note that in April 1988, the 
legislature adopted subsection (4) to s. 814.025 to 
explicitly provide that, "to the extent s. 802.05 is 
applicable and differs from this section, s. 802.05 
applies."  As we revise s. 802.05, we heed the 
legislative directive; the differences between these 
two 
provisions 
have 
engendered 
confusion. 
 
The 
legislature has indicated that to the extent the two 
provisions differ, Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 802.05 should 
control.  Therefore, in order to prevent confusion for 
litigants and the courts, as we repeal and recreate s. 
802.05, we also repeal s. 814.025.  We conclude that 
this repeal is in keeping with the legislative 
directive set forth in s. 814.025(4). 
Supreme Court Order 03-06, 278 Wis. 2d at xiii-xiv. 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
13 
 
moving party its motion for sanctions at least 21 days before 
filing the motion with the circuit court, providing the non-
moving party an opportunity to correct or withdraw its allegedly 
offending paper.  The motion for sanctions may not be filed with 
the circuit court unless within 21 days the non-moving party 
does not withdraw or appropriately correct the offending matter.  
This 
part 
of 
§ (Rule) 802.05(3)(a)1. 
(2005-06) 
states 
in 
relevant part as follows: 
A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made 
separately from other motions or requests and shall 
describe the specific conduct alleged to violate sub. 
(2).  The motion shall be served as provided in s. 
801.14, but shall not be filed with or presented to 
the court unless, within 21 days after service of the 
motion 
or 
such 
other 
period 
as 
the 
court 
may 
prescribe, 
the 
challenged 
paper, 
claim, 
defense, 
contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or 
appropriately corrected. 
¶28 Second, sanctions, including costs and reasonable 
attorney fees, are no longer mandatory upon a circuit court's 
finding of frivolousness.18  Former Wis. Stat. § 802.05 (2003-04) 
                                                 
18 New Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) now provides 
that "[i]f, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to 
respond, the court determines that sub. (2) has been violated, 
the court may impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, 
law firms, or parties that have violated sub. (2) or are 
responsible for the violation . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
802.05(3) (2005-06).   
This sanction may include attorneys fees:  "[T]he sanction 
may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, 
an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion 
and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing 
payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney 
fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the 
violation . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05(3)(b) (2005-06).  
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
14 
 
provided that the imposition of sanctions, including costs and 
reasonable attorney fees, was in the circuit court's discretion, 
but under Wis. Stat. § 814.025 (2003-04) sanctions in the form 
of costs and reasonable attorney fees were mandatory upon a 
circuit court's appropriate findings. 
¶29 Several 
other 
aspects 
of 
new 
rule 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) differ from former §§ 802.05 and 
814.025 (2003-04).  The differences include the description of 
the conduct subjecting a party to sanctions and the type of 
sanctions that may be imposed.  The differences between the 
former provisions and the new rule may become relevant on 
remand, but we will not discuss them further here. 
¶30 We turn next to examine whether the new rule, Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 
(2005-06), 
should 
have 
retroactive 
application in the instant case or whether the defendant's 
motion for sanctions should be analyzed under former Wis. Stat. 
§§ 802.05 and 814.025 (2003-04). 
III 
¶31 The central issue before the court is the application 
of new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) to the defendant's 
motion for sanctions, which the defendant filed after the 
effective date of the new rule.  The motion, however, relates to 
the plaintiff's conduct occurring prior to the effective date of 
the new rule.  
¶32 The interpretation of a statute promulgated under this 
court's rule-making authority presents a question of law, which 
this court reviews independently, but benefiting from the 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
15 
 
analyses of the circuit court and the court of appeals.19  
Whether a statute promulgated under this court's rule-making 
authority merits retroactive or prospective application is also 
a question of law, which this court decides independently, but 
benefiting from the analyses of the circuit court and the court 
of appeals.20  
¶33 The 
defendant 
insists 
that 
new 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) does not apply to its motion for 
sanctions, including costs and reasonable attorney fees, filed 
after the effective date of the new rule but relating to conduct 
occurring before the effective date.  The defendant asserts that 
a prospective application of the new procedural rule is 
necessary under the Chevron/Kurtz21 factors to mitigate the 
hardships that would occur with retroactive application and 
beseeches this court to apply former Wis. Stat. §§ 802.05 and 
814.025 (2003-04) to its motion. 
¶34 In contrast, the plaintiff asserts that new Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) applies in the instant case.  The 
plaintiff argues that the new rule is one of procedure and 
should be given retroactive application.  According to the 
                                                 
19 Waters ex rel. Skow v. Pertzborn, 2001 WI 62, ¶16, 243 
Wis. 2d 703, 627 N.W.2d 497. 
20 Snopek v. Lakeland Medical Center, 223 Wis. 2d 288, 293, 
588 
N.W.2d 19 
(1999) 
(whether 
a 
statute 
can 
be 
applied 
retroactively is a question of law the court determines 
independently of other courts). 
21 Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); Kurtz v. 
City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 280 N.W.2d 757 (1979). 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
16 
 
plaintiff, no need exists to consider whether retroactive 
application of the new rule would impose an unreasonable burden 
on the defendant attempting to comply with the new procedural 
requirements. 
¶35 We do not agree completely with either party.  The 
plaintiff errs in asserting that retroactive application is an 
absolute rule applying to all procedural rules.  The defendant 
errs in applying the Chevron/Kurtz factors to gauge whether 
retroactive application of the new rule is appropriate in the 
instant case.  Accordingly, we set forth the analysis to be used 
in determining whether new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) 
has retroactive application in the instant case. 
¶36 We begin by examining whether the text of the new rule 
and the order adopting it hold the answer to this dispute about 
the retroactive application of the new rule.  They do not. 
¶37 The text of the new rule is silent about its 
prospective or retroactive application to conduct occurring 
prior to the effective date of the rule.  
¶38 Supreme Court Order 03-06, which recreated new Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06), does not provide any explicit 
guidance regarding the retroactive or prospective application of 
the new rule to conduct that occurred before the rule's 
effective date.  All that Supreme Court Order 03-06 states is 
that "[e]ffective July 1, 2005 Wis. Stat. § 814.025 is repealed" 
and "[e]ffective July 1, Wis. Stat. § 802.05 is repealed and is 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
17 
 
recreated . . . ."22  "The establishment of effective dates does 
not determine whether a statute will apply retroactively.  All 
statutes have effective dates."23 
¶39 In the absence of any help from the text of the new 
rule or the order, we turn to the cases that govern retroactive 
application of a statute (including one adopted by the court 
through its rule-making authority).  The cases require us to 
determine whether the newly adopted rule is procedural or 
substantive. 
¶40 The 
general, 
well-recognized 
rule 
in 
Wisconsin 
jurisprudence is that "if a statute is procedural or remedial, 
rather 
than 
substantive, 
the 
statute 
is 
generally 
given 
retroactive application."24 
¶41 The definitions of "substantive" and "procedural" are 
relatively easy to state but are not always easy to apply.  
                                                 
22 Supreme Court Order 03-06, 278 Wis. 2d at xiv. 
23 Salzman v. DNR, 168 Wis. 2d 523, 530, 484 N.W.2d 337 (Ct. 
App. 1992). 
24 Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis. 2d 1, 17, 308 N.W.2d 403 
(1981).  In Gutter, this court explained that "[t]he general 
rule of statutory construction is that statutes are to be 
construed as relating to future and not to past acts.  There is 
an exception to this rule: if a statute is procedural or 
remedial, rather than substantive, the statute is generally 
given retroactive application."  Id.  The Gutter court quoted 
Chancellor Kent, as follows:  "This doctrine [prospective 
construction of statutes] is not understood to apply to remedial 
statutes, which may be of a retrospective nature, provided that 
they do not impair contracts or disturb absolute vested rights 
and 
only 
go 
to 
confirm rights already existing and in 
furtherance of the remedy, by curing defects and adding to the 
means of enforcing existing obligations."  Id.    
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
18 
 
Indeed, the procedural/substantive dichotomy depends on the 
context of the analysis.  It is often written that if a statute 
creates, defines, and regulates rights and obligations, it is 
substantive.  If a statute prescribes the method, that is, the 
legal machinery, used in enforcing a right or remedy, it is 
procedural.25  "Procedural statutes have as their primary purpose 
the provision of expeditious means whereby someone who has a 
claim against someone else may apply for the assistance of the 
government to enforce it, and the means whereby the other party, 
against whom the claim is made, may interpose his defenses."26  
In other words, "[a] procedural law is that which concerns the 
manner and order of conducting suits or the mode of proceeding 
to enforce legal rights and the substantive law is one that 
establishes the rights and duties of a party."27  
¶42 In adopting new rule Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-
06), the court carefully deliberated whether the new rule was 
                                                 
25 Betthauser v. Med. Protective Co., 172 Wis. 2d 141, 147-
48, 493 N.W.2d 40 (1992) (quoting City of Madison v. Town of 
Madison, 127 Wis. 2d 96, 377 N.W.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1985)). 
26 3A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, 
§ 67.2 at 104-05 (6th ed. 2001). 
27 2 Singer, supra note 26, § 41.4 at 398. 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
19 
 
procedural or substantive and determined that the new rule is a 
procedural rule.28 
¶43 The new rule was adopted pursuant to the rule-making 
authority of this court under Wis. Stat. § 751.12 (2005-06).29  
Under this statute, this court has authority to regulate 
                                                 
28 The adoption of this rule was part of an extensive 
process.  On December 19, 2003, the court held a public hearing 
on a petition filed on July 8, 2003, by the American Board of 
Trial Advocates, Wisconsin Chapter; the Civil Trial Counsel of 
Wisconsin; the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers; and the 
Litigation Section of the State Bar of Wisconsin, seeking repeal 
of Wis. Stat. §§ 802.05 and 814.025 (2003-04), and adoption of 
the 1993 amendments to Federal Rule 11.  At an ensuing open 
conference, the court approved the petition, subject to further 
consideration of certain issues.  The court continued its 
discussion and deliberation at open administrative conference on 
November 
16, 
2004. 
 
This 
process, 
which 
included 
the 
participation and advice of many lawyers and organizations, 
culminated in the adoption of Supreme Court Order 03-06 on March 
31, 2005.  
Three Justices (Wilcox, Prosser, and Roggensack) dissented 
from Supreme Court Order 03-06, on the ground that Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.025 was a substantive law, creating substantive rights, 
and the court did not have the power under § 751.12 or the 
constitution to repeal it.  Supreme Court Order 03-06, 278 
Wis. 2d at xxvi-xxxiii. 
For further discussion of this court's adoption of Supreme 
Court Order 03-06, see Janine P. Geske & William C. Gleisner 
III, Frivolous Sanction Law in Wisconsin, Wisconsin Lawyer, Feb. 
2006, at 16. 
29 Wisconsin Stat. § 751.12(1) states in relevant part: 
The state supreme court shall, by rules promulgated by 
it from time to time, regulate pleading, practice, and 
procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts, for 
the purposes of simplifying the same and of promoting 
the 
speedy determination of litigation upon its 
merits.  The rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or 
modify the substantive rights of any litigant. 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
20 
 
pleading, practice, and procedure.  Wisconsin Stat. § 751.12(1) 
clearly commands that the rules adopted by the supreme court 
"shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of 
any litigant."30  Accordingly, new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 
(2005-06) was intended by this court as a rule of procedure 
designed to deter frivolous filings because they disrupt and 
delay the legitimate court cases, thereby bogging down the court 
system.  
¶44 In Supreme Court Order 03-06, the court stated that 
"[t]he court's intent is to simplify and harmonize the rules of 
pleading, practice and procedure, and to promote the speedy 
determination of litigation on the merits."31  With the new rule, 
"the court intends to provide Wisconsin courts with additional 
tools to deal with frivolous filing of pleadings and other 
papers."32 The court stated that it did "not intend to deprive a 
party wronged by frivolous conduct of a right to recovery."33  
¶45 Nothing presented in the instant case dissuades us 
from concluding that the court created in new Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 a new rule of procedure designed (as was the 
former § 802.05 (2003-04)) to deter frivolous actions to benefit 
                                                 
30 We confine our discussion to the court's rule making 
powers as defined in Wis. Stat. § 751.12, not other powers of 
the court.  See In re Constitutionality of Section 251.18, Wis. 
Stats., 204 Wis. 501, 236 N.W.717 (1931). 
31 Supreme Court Order 03-06, 278 Wis. 2d at xvii. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
21 
 
sound judicial administration of the court system.  Several 
factors continue to persuade us that the new rule is procedural. 
¶46 First, Wis. Stat. § 802.05 (2003-04) has always been 
part of the state rules of civil procedure, which are designed 
as 
a 
procedural 
system 
to 
provide 
a 
just 
and 
speedy 
determination of civil litigation.  The Judicial Council 
initially petitioned the court in 1974 to adopt § 802.05 and 
other provisions, explaining that the proposed rules were 
limited to matters of procedure and did not create substantive 
rights.  
¶47 Second, the same procedural purposes underlie former 
and new Wis. Stat. § 802.05:  § 802.05 is primarily designed to 
deter baseless filings in court and unnecessary or improper 
litigation, to promote the speedy determination of litigation on 
the merits, and to promote judicial efficiency.  Moreover, these 
same purposes underlie former Wis. Stat. § 814.025 (2003-04).  
In Jandrt ex rel. Brueggeman v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 227 
Wis. 2d 531, 576, 597 N.W.2d 744 (1999), the court explained 
that the underlying purposes of § 814.025 are deterrence and 
punishment.  In Stoll v. Adriansen, 122 Wis. 2d 503, 511, 362 
N.W.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1984), the court of appeals stated that 
"[t]he trial court must enforce sec. 814.025 for the purpose of 
maintaining the integrity of the judicial system and the legal 
profession." Section 814.025 (2003-04) is therefore at its 
essence procedural, although the court has recognized that 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
22 
 
compensation 
of 
a 
victimized 
party 
is 
an 
appropriate 
consideration.34 
¶48 The legislature did not create a substantive, vested 
right to costs and reasonable attorney fees in former Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.025 (2003-04).35  Only upon a finding by a circuit court 
that an action was frivolous under § 814.025 (when that statute 
was still in effect) would an aggrieved party obtain a vested 
right to recover reasonable expenses under the statute.  The 
circuit court made no such finding in the instant case before 
the repeal of § 814.025.  "No litigant has a vested right in a 
particular remedy, so he can have none in rules of procedure 
which relate to the remedy."36  As is clear from the text, no 
                                                 
34 Jandrt, 227 Wis. 2d at 578. 
35 Because no substantive rights are implicated, we need 
not, and do not, address Wis. Stat. § 990.04 (2005-06).  This 
statute provides in relevant part: 
The repeal of a statute hereafter shall not remit, 
defeat or impair any civil or criminal liability for 
offenses committed, penalties or forfeitures incurred 
or rights of action accrued under such statute before 
the repeal thereof, whether or not in the course of 
prosecution or action at the time of such repeal; but 
all such offenses, penalties, forfeitures and rights 
of action created by or founded on such statute, 
liability wherefore shall have been incurred before 
the time of such repeal thereof, shall be preserved 
and remain in force notwithstanding such repeal, 
unless specially and expressly remitted, abrogated or 
done away with by the repealing statute.   
36 Strange v. Harwood, 172 Wis. 24, 26, 177 N.W. 862 (1920), 
quoted with approval in Elm Park Iowa, Inc. v. Denniston, 91 
Wis. 2d 227, 229, 280 N.W.2d 262 (1979). 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
23 
 
right to relief under former § 814.025 could accrue until there 
was a finding of frivolousness by the circuit court. 
¶49 Third, when it first drafted Wis. Stat. § 802.05 
(2003-04) in the early 1970s, the Judicial Council indisputably 
patterned it after Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Subsequent amendments to § 802.05 have explicitly 
incorporated amendments to Rule 11.  The latest version of 
§ 802.05 is no exception.  New Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-
06) was patterned after Rule 11, as amended in 1993.37   
¶50 Rule 11 is a well-known rule of procedure.  The United 
States Supreme Court has emphasized that "the central purpose of 
Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in district court and 
thus . . . streamline the administration and procedure of the 
federal courts."38  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has also 
emphasized the procedural nature of Rule 11, announcing that the 
goal of Rule 11 is to "discourag[e] dilatory and abusive 
litigation 
tactics 
and 
eliminat[e] 
frivolous 
claims 
and 
defenses, thereby speeding up and reducing the costs of the 
litigation process."39   
                                                 
37 In Supreme Court Order 03-06, the court announced that 
"[t]he court now adopts the current version of FRCP 11."  278 
Wis. 2d at xvii. 
38 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393, 
(1990). 
39 McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 896 F.2d 17, 21 
(2d Cir. 1990). 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
24 
 
¶51  For these reasons, we reaffirm our decision that new 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) is procedural in nature.  
We agree with the court of appeals when it concluded in the 
present case that "[a]t its heart, then, the frivolous action 
statute is a rule of judicial administration."40  We therefore 
reject, as did the court of appeals, the defendant's contention 
that new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) is substantive in 
nature. 
¶52 Because we characterize new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 
(2005-06) as a procedural rule, we conclude, in accordance with 
case law, that the application of the new rule is ordinarily 
retroactive, that is, there is a presumption of retroactive 
application of the new rule to cases like the instant one in 
which the conduct occurred prior to the new rule's effective 
date and the motion was made after the new rule's effective 
date.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Substantial scholarly commentary exists on Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Most agree that the 
overriding purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings and 
improve the litigation process.  Several commentaries, however, 
have been critical of Rule 11, especially as amended in 1983.  
For a discussion of whether the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 were 
beyond the Supreme Court's power, see Steven B. Burbank, 
Comment, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 Hofstra 
L. Rev. 997 (1983).  For a summary of the criticisms of the 1983 
amendments, see Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 
11, 70 Ind. L.J. 171 (1994) (explaining that many view Rule 11 
as amended in 1983 as a fee-shifting statute that provided 
compensation to aggrieved parties).  
40 Trinity, 296 Wis. 2d 666, ¶21. 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
25 
 
¶53 Retroactive application of procedural rules is not, 
however, an absolute rule.  For example, a procedural statute 
will not have retroactive application if it impairs contracts or 
disturbs vested rights.  The court has stated that "it is a 
fundamental rule of statutory construction that a retroactive 
operation is not to be given so as to impair an existing right 
or obligation otherwise than in matters of procedure . . . ."41  
Furthermore, retroactive application of a procedural rule must 
not "impose[] an unreasonable burden" upon the party attempting 
to comply with the procedural requirements of the rule.42 
¶54 This 
court's 
analysis 
in 
Mosing 
v. 
Hagen, 
33 
Wis. 2d 636, 148 N.W.2d 93 (1967), is particularly instructive 
in teaching that retroactive application of procedural rules is 
not absolute.  Mosing held that a statute (that was adopted by 
the court through its rulemaking authority pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 751.12) applied retroactively unless it affected a 
vested or contractual right or imposed an unreasonable burden 
upon the party attempting to comply with the procedural 
requirements. 
¶55 In Mosing, the new statute at issue provided that 
service of summons is invalid if the summons is not filed with 
the clerk of the circuit court within one year of service.  The 
effective 
date 
of 
the 
statute 
establishing 
the 
filing 
                                                 
41 Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis. 2d 1, 17-18, 308 N.W.2d 403 
(1981) (quoted source omitted).   
42 Mosing v. Hagen, 33 Wis. 2d 636, 642, 148 N.W.2d 93 
(1967). 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
26 
 
requirement for a summons was May 1, 1965 (although the statute 
had been adopted January 20, 1964). 
¶56 The summons was served in Mosing on November 20, 1964, 
but it was not filed with the circuit court until January 20, 
1966.  If service was void in Mosing because the summons was not 
filed within the one-year period, the plaintiff could not 
reinstitute the suit because the statute of limitations had run.  
The plaintiff argued that the statute affected a vested right of 
the plaintiff and was therefore substantive in effect and should 
not be applied retroactively.  According to the plaintiff, he 
acquired a vested right to pursue his personal injury action on 
November 12, 1964, when he served the summons, and on that date 
he had no obligation to file his summons with the circuit court 
within one year in order for the summons to be valid. 
¶57 The 
Mosing court examined whether the statute's 
"application affects any substantive rights [a phrase that is 
used in the cases interchangeably with "vested rights"]" and 
whether the statute "imposes an unreasonable burden upon the 
plaintiff as to its procedural requirements."43 
¶58 The Mosing court concluded that the statute did not 
diminish the period of limitations and was therefore not 
substantive in effect, that is, it did not disturb the 
plaintiff's vested right to assert his cause of action. 
¶59 The Mosing court further concluded that the statute 
did not impose an unreasonable burden on the party charged with 
                                                 
43 Id. 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
27 
 
complying with the procedural requirements because the court had 
given notice of the statute and delayed the effective date of 
the statute.  In short, the party serving the summons was aware 
of the new requirement and could have complied with it. The 
Mosing court held that the new procedural statute should 
therefore be applied retroactively to the summons served before 
the effective date of the statute at issue.44   
¶60 The court should adhere to the teachings of Mosing to 
determine whether new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) 
should be applied retroactively in the present case.  We first 
must decide whether any substantive rights, that is, whether any 
contractual or vested rights, would be disturbed by the 
retroactive application of new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-
06).  
 
¶61 No contract right is disturbed in the present case if 
new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) were to apply in the 
instant litigation.   
 
¶62 No substantive vested right is disturbed in the 
present case.  As we discussed earlier, until a circuit court 
made a finding of frivolousness under Wis. Stat. § 814.025 
(2003-04), no right to relief accrued.  Recovery of reasonable 
attorney fees was not a vested right; it was a remedy for 
violation of a procedural statute.  The circuit court in the 
instant case did not make any finding of frivolousness before 
the effective date of new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (205-06).  
                                                 
44 Id. 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
28 
 
As we stated before, a litigant does not have a vested right in 
a particular remedy or in rules of procedure that relate to a 
remedy.   
¶63 Our analysis is also guided by the federal court's 
application of Rule 11, which has been amended several times 
from 1938 through 1993.  In the course of the amendments, the 
sanctions in Rule 11 have shifted from discretionary sanctions 
to mandatory sanctions and then back to discretionary sanctions.   
Federal courts have not viewed mandatory sanctions under Rule 11 
as vesting rights to certain sanctions when Rule 11 was amended 
once again to provide sanctions only in the discretion of the 
federal courts.  We conclude that "[r]ules governing the award 
of attorneys' fees do not affect the substantive rights of the 
parties; rather, they are closer to rules that regulate the 
conduct of the trial or affect the remedy available . . . ."45  
 
¶64 Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not modify 
or eliminate any vested rights belonging to any party when it 
repealed Wis. Stat. §§ 802.05 and 814.025 (2003-04) and replaced 
them with new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06).  
 
¶65 We therefore turn to the question whether, in the 
words of the Mosing court, the retroactive application of Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) to the instant case "imposes an 
unreasonable burden" upon a party required to comply with the 
procedural requirements of the new rule.   
                                                 
45 Midwest Grain Prods. of Ill. v. Productization, Inc., 228 
F.3d 784, 792 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Illinois law). 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
29 
 
 
¶66 The plaintiff argues that the Mosing standard, which 
requires that the retroactive application of a procedural 
statute "not impose an unreasonable burden," is unsupported in 
the case law.  As an example, the plaintiff cites Gutter v. 
Seamandel, which states the standard governing the retroactive 
application of statutes but does not include the "unreasonable 
burden" test.  The plaintiff insists that Mosing's "unreasonable 
burden" language is superfluous and does not amount to a 
precedential rule of law.  
 
¶67 We do not agree with the plaintiff.  Mosing has never 
been overturned.  It is good law, and it is supported by federal 
Rule 11 and federal cases interpreting and applying Rule 11.  
The federal order adopting the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 
expressly instructed that the amended version Rule 11 governs 
"all proceedings in civil cases thereafter commenced and, 
insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings in civil cases 
then pending."46 
 
¶68 The federal standard for retroactive application of 
Rule 11, namely "just and practicable," requires essentially the 
same analysis as, in the words of the Mosing court, whether 
retroactive 
application 
of 
a 
statute 
would 
"impose 
an 
unreasonable burden upon [the party] as to its procedural 
requirement."  The Mosing holding regarding the application of a 
                                                 
46 Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 
F.R.D. 404 (Apr. 22, 1993) (emphasis added).  Other orders 
amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also include this 
language. 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
30 
 
statute adopted by the court under its rule-making powers 
parallels the federal law and cases governing retroactive 
application of Rule 11, and we apply Mosing to the instant 
case.47  
 
¶69 In determining whether new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 
(2005-06) should be applied retroactively in the instant case, a 
circuit court must consider whether such retroactive application 
not only would affect contractual or vested rights but also 
would impose an unreasonable burden upon the party required to 
comply with the procedural requirements of the new rule.  
 
¶70  We summarize three federal cases to illustrate the 
approaches taken by federal courts in determining whether the 
retroactive 
application 
of 
Rule 
11 
would 
be 
"just 
and 
practicable." 
¶71 First is a federal case involving a situation parallel 
to the instant case, that is, a case in which the conduct at 
issue occurred prior to the effective date of the amended 
version of Rule 11 but the motion for sanctions was filed after 
the effective date of the amendment.  In Ware v. United States, 
                                                 
47 In its comment accompanying Order 03-06, the court 
explained that "Judges and practitioners will now be able to 
look to applicable decisions of federal courts since 1993 for 
guidance in the interpretation and application of the mandates 
of FRCP 11 in Wisconsin."  Supreme Court Order 03-06, 278 
Wis. 2d at xvii. 
Although the court did not formally adopt the 1993 Federal 
Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the court included them in the Order for 
"information purposes."  Id. 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
31 
 
154 F.R.D. 291 (M.D. Fla. 1994), the federal district court 
declared that to apply amended Rule 11 retroactively, the 
application of the amended rule must be "just and practicable."  
The federal court concluded that retroactive application of the 
amendment would not be "just and practicable" under the 
circumstances of the case.  The federal district court reasoned 
that "[b]ecause this case has been ongoing for several years, 
and has a complex procedural history, this Court does not 
believe that it would be 'just and practicable' to consider 
Plaintiff's motion for sanctions under the new Rule 11, and thus 
declines to do so at this time."48    The federal district court 
specifically noted, however, "that this decision is based on the 
facts of this case only, and applies to the instant motion 
only."49  
 
¶72 The 
second 
federal 
case 
involves 
a 
motion 
for 
sanctions that was filed before the effective date of the 
amended Rule 11 but was not heard by the federal district court 
until after the effective date.  In Kraemer Export Corp. v. Peg 
Perego U.S.A., Inc., No. 93CIV198(PKL), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
3071, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 1994), the United States Court 
for the Southern District of New York examined whether it would 
be "just and practicable" to apply the amended Rule 11 to this 
pending litigation and concluded that "the Court finds it just 
                                                 
48 Ware v. United States, 154 F.R.D. 291, 292-93 (M.D. Fla. 
1994). 
49 Id. at 293.   
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
32 
 
and appropriate to apply the version in effect at the time the 
motions were filed [that is, the unamended version of Rule 11].  
Both plaintiff's cross-motion and defendant's response were 
submitted prior to the effective date of the Rule's amendment.  
Thus, counsel were familiar with the language and standards of 
the unamended Rule, and tailored their arguments before the 
Court accordingly.  Moreover, to 'charge [a party] with 
knowledge of a rule not in effect at the time of filing [of the 
motion and the response] would not advance Rule 11's central 
goal of deterring baseless filings.'"50 
 
¶73 Third and lastly, we look at a federal case in which 
the motion for sanctions was filed and heard by a federal 
district court before the effective date of amended Rule 11, but 
the decision of the district court regarding sanctions was on 
appeal after the effective date of the amendments.  In Land v. 
Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union, 25 
F.3d 509, 516 (7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh Circuit held that 
former Rule 11 should be applied because to conclude otherwise 
and impose the strictures of the amended Rule 11 would not be 
just and practicable: "Both at the time [the plaintiff] filed 
his complaint and when [the defendant] moved for sanctions, the 
old Rule 11 was in effect, and both parties presumably were 
operating under the standards and procedures propounded in that 
                                                 
50 Kraemer Export Corp. v. Peg Perego U.S.A., Inc., No. 
93CIV0198(PKL), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3071, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 17, 1994) (quoted source omitted). 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
33 
 
rule.  Counsel's conduct should therefore be judged under those 
standards." 
 
¶74 These three cases are not the only examples of how 
federal courts have examined whether it would be "just and 
practicable" to apply an amended version of Rule 11 to 
litigation in which the conduct occurred before the adoption of 
an amendment.  We provide these examples of interpretation and 
application of Rule 11 to illustrate that federal courts, in 
determining whether retroactive application would be "just and 
practicable," specifically focus on and consider the unique 
circumstances and procedural posture of each particular case. 
 
¶75 As mentioned earlier, the defendant has proposed the 
court apply the Chevron/Kurtz factors in determining whether new 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) was retroactive in the 
instant case.  
¶76 In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), the 
Supreme 
Court 
established 
three 
factors 
to 
consider 
in 
determining whether the presumption of retroactivity for a 
judicial holding is overcome such that the new judicial holding 
would apply prospectively only.  This court adopted this 
standard in Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 109, 280 
N.W.2d 757 (1979).  Although the Supreme Court abandoned the 
Chevron standard in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23 
(1987) (holding that a new judicial rule is retroactive to 
criminal cases pending on direct review or not final), and 
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
34 
 
(1993) (abandoning Chevron in civil cases), this court continues 
to adhere to the Chevron/Kurtz standard.51 
 
¶77 The Chevron/Kurtz standard sets forth three factors a 
court considers in determining whether a new judicial holding 
should be applied retroactively or prospectively.  These factors 
are: 
(1) Does the judicial holding "establish a new 
principle of law, either by overruling clear past 
precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by 
deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution 
was not clearly foreshadowed?" 
(2) Will retroactive operation further or retard the 
operation of the judicial holding in question? 
(3) Will retroactive application produce substantial 
inequitable results?52 
If these factors are met, the judicial holding in question 
should not be applied retroactively.   
 
¶78  The Chevron test is not applicable to the present 
case.  The Chevron test for determining prospectivity or 
retroactivity was adopted for application to judicial holdings, 
that is, to judicial declarations of the law in a particular 
case. 
 
When 
adopting 
the 
Chevron 
factors 
for 
Wisconsin 
jurisprudence, the court in Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 
Wis. 2d 103, 108, 280 N.W.2d 757 (1979) specifically referred to 
judicial holdings:  "Retroactive application of a judicial 
                                                 
51 State ex rel. Brown v. Bradley, 2003 WI 14, ¶13, 259 
Wis. 2d 630, 658 N.W.2d 427. 
52 See Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106; see also Brown, 259 
Wis. 2d 630, ¶15. 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
35 
 
holding is a question of policy, not constitutional law.  In 
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson . . . , the Court articulated three 
factors to be considered in deciding whether a holding ought not 
to be applied retrospectively . . ." (citations omitted).   
 
¶79 Cases involving the retroactive application of a 
statute or a rule, however, do not apply the Chevron/Kurtz 
factors.  For instance, in Snopek v. Lakeland Medical Center, 
223 Wis. 2d 288, 293, 588 N.W.2d 19 (1999), a case decided after 
Chevron and Kurtz, this court concluded that "[g]enerally, 
statutes are applied prospectively," but that a statute may be 
applied retroactively if the statute is "remedial or procedural 
rather than substantive."53  The Snopek court restated the test 
enunciated in numerous cases, that if a statute is remedial or 
procedural, it nonetheless cannot be applied retroactively if 
the legislature clearly expressed its intent that it be applied 
prospectively only or if retroactive application would impair 
contracts or vested rights.54  The Snopek court never mentioned 
the Chevron/Kurtz factors.  
 
¶80 In asking this court to apply Chevron/Kurtz, the 
defendant relies on State ex rel. Brown v. Bradley, 2003 WI 14, 
259 Wis. 2d 630, 658 N.W.2d 427.  In Brown, the court spoke 
specifically of rules of civil procedure adopted by this court:  
"The standards for civil procedural rules differ [from criminal 
                                                 
53 Snopek, 223 Wis. 2d at 294. 
54 Id. 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
36 
 
procedural rules] in that retroactive application is presumed."55  
The Brown court proceeded to apply the Chevron/Kurtz factors, 
explaining that "in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, the Supreme Court 
established factors to consider in determining whether the 
presumption is overcome such that the new civil rule would apply 
prospectively."56  This language, at first blush, seems to 
suggest that Chevron/Kurtz should be applied to any case 
involving a rule of civil procedure, including the instant case. 
 
¶81 At issue in Brown was the retroactive application of a 
judicial 
holding, 
not 
the 
retroactive 
application 
of 
a 
procedural statute adopted by the court as part of its rule-
making authority and codified in the statutes.57  Brown did not 
apply Chevron/Kurtz to statutes or rules.  Brown is thus 
inapposite.  This court has not extended Chevron/Kurtz to 
determine whether statutes or rules (in contrast to judicial 
holdings) should have retroactive or prospective application.   
¶82 We conclude that the Chevron/Kurtz test does not come 
into play when determining the retroactive application of a 
statute.  Rather, a circuit court should adhere to the teachings 
of Mosing and the federal cases applying Rule 11 to determine 
                                                 
55 Brown, 259 Wis. 2d 630, ¶13. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. (internal citations omitted).  Specifically at issue 
in Brown was the retroactivity of the "tolling" tenet for self 
represented petitioners and the "prison mailbox rule," both 
judicial holdings in cases. 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
37 
 
whether new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) is to be 
applied retroactively in a particular case.  
IV 
¶83 The defendant's motion for sanctions alleges that the 
plaintiff engaged in frivolous conduct, both in commencing and 
maintaining its breach of contract action.  The circuit court in 
the instant case held that, as a matter of law, the new Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) applied; that the defendant, in 
the instant case, could not comply with the "safe harbor" notice 
provision; and that the defendant's motion for sanctions must 
fail.  The circuit court did not conclusively find that the 
plaintiff had engaged in frivolous conduct, and if so, whether 
any sanctions (including what kind) should be imposed.   
¶84 Because it determined as a matter of law that new Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) applied retroactively, without 
exception, the circuit court did not determine whether the 
application of the new rule imposed an unreasonable burden in 
the instant case.58 
                                                 
58 Federal courts have taken different approaches in whether 
to apply all or just parts of Rule 11 retroactively.  For 
instance, in Knipe v. Skinner, 19 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1994), 
and cases relying on this case, federal courts have judged the 
questionable conduct under Rule 11 in effect at the time the 
conduct occurred but assessed the sanctions under the amended 
rule.   
Other federal courts apply the same version of Rule 11 to 
determine both whether sanctions were warranted and what kind of 
sanctions to impose.  See, e.g., Runfola & Assocs., Inc. v. 
Spectrum Reporting II, Inc., 88 F. 3d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 1996).   
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
38 
 
¶85 The defendant provides several reasons why retroactive 
application of new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) would 
impose an unreasonable burden on it in the instant case.  For 
instance, the defendant argues that retroactive application of 
new rule Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) would impose an 
unreasonable burden because the defendant can no longer, under 
any 
circumstances, 
comply 
with 
the 
"safe 
harbor" 
notice 
provisions.  It would impose an unreasonable burden and would 
not be just and practicable to apply a procedural rule 
retroactively to circumstances in which the defendant cannot 
comply with the new rule.   
¶86 The defendant also contends that it has complied with 
the substance of the "safe harbor" notice provision.  The 
defendant insists that throughout the course of the litigation, 
it put the plaintiff on notice that it believed the plaintiff's 
lawsuit was frivolous, and that the plaintiff did not withdraw 
its lawsuit.  
¶87 The defendant asserts that the plaintiff's frivolous 
conduct occurred before the effective date of the new rule and 
that applying the new rule retroactively would give the 
plaintiff a "free pass," allowing it to escape any form of 
sanction for its frivolous conduct.   
                                                                                                                                                             
If new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 is to be applied 
retroactively in the instant case, we do not address whether it 
should be applied retroactively in whole or in part.  The 
parties did not raise or brief this issue.  
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
39 
 
¶88 The defendant also insists that it was the plaintiff's 
fault that the hearing on summary judgment (and subsequent 
motion for sanctions) did not occur before the effective date of 
the new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06).  The hearing was 
initially scheduled for June 6, 2005.  The defendant argues that 
the hearing was postponed because of the plaintiff's delays in 
producing materials for discovery.  The defendant emphasizes 
that the hearing on the summary judgment motion, wherein it 
orally requested sanctions, occurred mere days after the new 
rule became effective.  These scheduling fortuities should not, 
according to the defendant, result in frivolous conduct going 
unpunished. 
¶89 The 
plaintiff 
offers 
reasons 
why 
retroactive 
application of new § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) would not impose an 
unreasonable burden on the defendant.  The plaintiff emphasizes 
that the new rule was adopted, after extensive and prolonged 
proceedings, on March 31, 2005, months before it became 
effective.  Accordingly, the plaintiff argues that the defendant 
was on notice about the adoption of the new rule and had time to 
comply with the new rule's requirements.  
¶90 Further, the plaintiff contends that the defendant had 
numerous opportunities to bring a motion for sanctions if it 
believed that the plaintiff had commenced or continued a 
frivolous action; it did not have to wait until after summary 
judgment was granted and the new rule went into effect.  
¶91 
The plaintiff also disputes that it was at fault for 
the delay that resulted in the hearing on summary judgment 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
40 
 
occurring after the effective date of new rule Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06).  Moreover, the plaintiff asserts that 
the defendant could have requested a stay of the proceedings to 
bring the motion for sanctions in compliance with the new rule, 
despite this delay.   
¶92 As this brief recitation of some of the parties' 
arguments illustrates, the question remains whether it is an 
unreasonable burden to apply new Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 
(2005-06) retroactively to the instant case.  Rather than have 
this court make the determination without an appropriate record 
and without the circuit court's findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, we remand the cause to the circuit court. 
¶93 In addition to deciding which provisions governing 
sanctions for frivolous conduct——either the new Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) or former Wis. Stat. §§ 802.05 and 
814.025 (2003-04)——to apply, the circuit court on remand must 
also decide, under the appropriate provision, whether sanctions 
are warranted, and if so, what kind.  A party's conduct might be 
found to be frivolous under one version of the rule or statute 
but not under another.  Likewise, the nature of sanctions 
differs 
among 
the 
various 
provisions 
governing 
frivolous 
conduct.   
¶94 In the instant case, the circuit court only ruminated 
about whether the plaintiff's conduct might be found frivolous 
were the former provisions, §§ 802.05 and 814.025 (2003-04), 
applicable. 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
41 
 
¶95 Several isolated statements of the circuit court can 
be read to suggest that it found that the plaintiff commenced or 
continued 
a 
frivolous 
lawsuit 
according 
to 
the 
former 
provisions.  For instance, the circuit court announced that: 
So I conclude on that at least on the basis of 
fact and at law that the continuation of this lawsuit 
by Trinity [the plaintiff], along with the multitude 
of documents that they had gotten clearly showing 
dissatisfaction with Trinity's actions in this case, 
that there was probably more than ample material 
available to Trinity that they should have realized 
that the continuation of this case would have been 
fruitless and it should have been terminated at an 
earlier time and fashion, but it didn't.  It continued 
on. 
I believe that, in summary, if we were using the 
old law under 802.05 and 814.025, that this was not an 
action that was well grounded in fact or in law.   
The defendant points to these statements and insists that the 
circuit court indisputably found frivolousness. 
 
¶96 Some of the circuit court's statements suggesting that 
the plaintiff maintained a frivolous action, however, are 
ambivalent.  For instance, the circuit court stated in equivocal 
terms that "there was probably more than ample material 
available to [the plaintiff] that they should have realized that 
the continuation of this case would have been fruitless and it 
should have been terminated at an earlier time and fashion" 
(emphasis added).  
¶97 Other comments of the circuit court undermine our 
confidence that the circuit court clearly concluded that the 
plaintiff commenced a frivolous lawsuit.   
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
42 
 
¶98 For instance, the circuit court described how the 
plaintiff's arguments that an objective standard must be used to 
gauge the "customer's satisfaction" for purposes of contract 
termination were "somewhat arguable" and "possibly" could "carry 
weight with a different court."  This language definitely is not 
a clear finding that the plaintiff's commencement of the action 
was not "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification or reversal of existing law."59  The 
circuit court stated in pertinent part:  
And then I turn to whether the position taken by 
Trinity [the 
plaintiff] on the objective versus 
subjective standard was a position that they could 
argue asking for some change in Wisconsin law or an 
extension of Wisconsin law.  I guess that might be 
somewhat arguable.  I concluded that Wisconsin law was 
very clear that we don't follow an objective standard 
and I wasn't necessarily convinced at all, my remarks 
clearly show that, that Trinity's argument for an 
objective standard just didn't carry any weight with 
the court.   
Could that carry weight with a different court? 
Possibly. . . . 
The circuit court seemingly recognized that, even if not 
justified by current law, the plaintiff's argument for a 
modification of the law had some merit. 
¶99 In short, 
the circuit court's ruminations about 
frivolousness were not necessary for its decision and should not 
under the circumstances of the present case substitute for clear 
                                                 
59 Wis. Stat. § 802.05(1)(a) (2003-04). 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
43 
 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.60  Noncommittal, 
inconclusive suggestions and ruminations by a circuit court do 
not constitute a reviewable ruling on frivolousness.  We remand 
the cause for the circuit court to determine whether the 
plaintiff engaged in frivolous conduct, the nature and timing of 
the conduct, and the appropriate sanctions, if any. 
* * * * 
¶100 For the reasons set forth, we hold, like the circuit 
court 
and 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
that 
new 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 
(2005-06) 
is 
a 
procedural 
rule 
and 
that 
procedural rules generally have retroactive application.  We 
conclude that new rule Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) is 
not to be applied retroactively when the new rule diminishes a 
contract, disturbs vested rights, or imposes an unreasonable 
burden on the party charged with complying with the new rule's 
requirements. 
¶101 We therefore reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and the order of the circuit court.  These courts erred 
as a matter of law in holding that new rule Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) had retroactive application without 
exception.  We remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
                                                 
60 In Jandrt, 227 Wis. 2d at 538, reviewing the circuit 
court's exercise of discretion in imposing sanctions under 
former §§ 802.05 and § 814.025 (2003-04), the court noted that 
the circuit court made 118 findings of fact and 74 conclusions 
of law in regard to the defendant's motion for sanctions.  In 
the instant case, the circuit court made no formal findings of 
fact or conclusions of law regarding frivolousness. 
No. 
2005AP2837   
 
44 
 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  The circuit court 
must determine whether retroactive application of new Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) imposes an unreasonable burden on a 
party who must comply with the procedural requirements of the 
new rule.  After determining which provisions——either new Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 (2005-06) or §§ 802.05 and 814.025 (2003-
04)——to apply using the unreasonable burden standard, the 
circuit court must determine under the applicable provision 
whether the plaintiff engaged in frivolous conduct in commencing 
or maintaining the lawsuit and what sanctions, if any, should be 
imposed on the plaintiff. 
¶102 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded. 
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶103 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).   While I agree with the majority's 
decision to reverse and remand to the circuit court because the 
court was not required to apply Wis. Stat. § 802.05 (2005-06) to 
Scott Oil Company, Inc.'s (Scott) claim, majority op., ¶7, I 
write separately because I disagree with the majority's analysis 
and also because I conclude that it is Wis. Stat. § 814.025 
(2003-04)1 that the circuit court should apply on remand, if 
Scott proves its claim that Trinity Petroleum, Inc. (Trinity) 
commenced or continued a frivolous action. 
¶104 The majority opinion's analysis omits three necessary 
determinations:  (1) it fails to analyze and decide whether 
Scott's claim under Wis. Stat. § 814.025 is a substantive claim 
that accrued prior to July 1, 2005; (2) it fails to analyze the 
effect of Wis. Stat. § 990.04 and Supreme Court Order 03-06 on 
Scott's § 814.025 claim; and (3) it fails to apply the test we 
set out in Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 109, 280 
N.W.2d 757 (1979), the Chevron/Kurtz test, to determine whether 
Supreme Court Order 03-06 ought not be applied retroactively.  
Instead, it focuses on whether the circuit court is required to 
apply Wis. Stat. § 802.05 on remand.  The determinations I 
outline are necessary to analyzing the parties' rights and 
obligations in the case before the court. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to Wis. Stat. § 814.025 are to 
the 2003-04 version.  All subsequent references to other 
statutes are to the 2005-06 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
2 
 
¶105 Because I conclude that:  (1) Scott's claim for relief 
under Wis. Stat. § 814.025 is a substantive claim that accrued 
before July 1, 2005; (2) Wis. Stat. § 990.04 precludes applying 
Wis. Stat. § 802.05 or Supreme Court Order 03-06 to negate 
Scott's § 814.025 claim; and (3) under the Chevron/Kurtz test, 
Supreme Court Order 03-06 should not be applied retroactively to 
preclude Scott's claim under § 814.025, I respectfully dissent 
from the analysis of the majority opinion.  However, I do concur 
in its decision to reverse and remand to the circuit court, 
where I would direct the court to apply § 814.025 if Scott 
proves its claim.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶106 Scott and Trinity had a contractual relationship 
wherein Trinity agreed to deliver petroleum products to Scott's 
customers for a period of five years.  The terms of the contract 
permitted cancellation if Trinity did not perform to the 
"customer's 
satisfaction." 
 
After 
Scott 
received 
several 
complaints from its customers about the poor delivery services 
Trinity was providing, Scott gave notice to Trinity that it was 
terminating the contract.  
¶107 On April 6, 2004, Trinity commenced an action against 
Scott for breach of contract.  It is out of Trinity's lawsuit 
for breach of contract that Scott's claim under Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.025 arose.  Over the course of the litigation——during 
mediation 
proceedings 
and 
circuit 
court 
proceedings——Scott 
repeatedly asserted to Trinity that its claim was frivolous to 
file and frivolous to continue.   
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
3 
 
¶108 On May 5, 2005, Scott moved for summary judgment of 
dismissal.  A hearing was set for June 6, 2005, but was 
postponed until July 5, 2005, because certain deposition 
transcripts could not be made available in sufficient time for 
Trinity to reply to Scott's motion.   
¶109 On July 5, 2005, the circuit court granted Scott 
summary judgment of dismissal, and Scott orally moved for costs 
and fees, claiming Trinity commenced and continued a frivolous 
action.  The circuit court asked that Scott place its motion in 
writing, which it did on July 21, 2005, alleging violations of 
Wis. Stat. § 814.025 and Wis. Stat. § 802.05 (2003-04).  
¶110 During the course of Trinity's lawsuit against Scott, 
this court engaged in rule-making under the authority granted in 
Wis. Stat § 751.12(1).2  Rule-making is a quasi-legislative 
function wherein the court is empowered to regulate pleadings, 
practice and procedure before the courts.  See Wick v. Mueller, 
105 Wis. 2d 191, 313 N.W.2d 799 (1982).3  The rule-making process 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 751.12(1) states: 
The state supreme court shall, by rules promulgated by 
it from time to time, regulate pleading, practice, and 
procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts, for 
the purposes of simplifying the same and of promoting 
the 
speedy determination of litigation upon its 
merits.  The rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or 
modify the substantive rights of any litigant. 
3 The court's power in rule-making is limited.  For example, 
although the supreme court could by rule establish the point at 
which the time for appeal would begin to run, it could not 
establish by rule whether a particular type of order was 
appealable.  Wick v. Mueller, 105 Wis. 2d 191, 196-97, 313 
N.W.2d 799 (1982).  The legislature has the sole prerogative to 
legislate whether a particular order is appealable.  Id. at 196. 
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
4 
 
was commenced by a petition from members of the State Bar of 
Wisconsin.  They requested the court to "repeal" Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.025 and Wis. Stat. § 802.05 (2003-04) and to recreate 
§ 802.05 in parallel form with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.   
¶111 In 1978, this court created the original version of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 802.05 
during 
rule-making 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 751.12(1), which permits the court to legislate to regulate 
"pleading, practice, and procedure in judicial proceedings in 
all courts."  § 751.12(1).  However, Wis. Stat. § 814.025 was 
not created by this court.  Section 814.025 was created by the 
legislature.   
¶112 Thomas S. Hanson, who was a member of the Wisconsin 
State Assembly in 1978 when the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.025, wrote to the court during its rule-making process in 
2004.  He said that he had been the author of 1977 Assembly Bill 
237 that began the legislative creation of § 814.025.  Mr. 
Hanson explained to the court that by enacting § 814.025, it was 
the intent of the legislature to establish a mandatory make-
whole remedy for persons victimized by frivolous lawsuits.  See 
Letter from Thomas S. Hanson to the Supreme Court (Oct. 29, 
2004).  He explained that "[m]aking sanctions discretionary and 
permitting something less than a 'make whole' recovery for the 
victim are clearly contrary to what I intended when we passed 
§ 814.025."  Id.  Mr. Hansen said that by enacting § 814.025, 
the legislature intended to create a "substantive right of 
recovery" for members of the public who are victimized by 
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
5 
 
frivolous lawsuits.  Id.  He asked the court to deny the 
lawyers' petition to "repeal" § 814.025.  Id.   
¶113 This court did as requested by the lawyer-petitioners.  
In Supreme Court Order 03-06, it "repealed" Wis. Stat. § 802.05 
and Wis. Stat. § 814.025 (2003-04) and recreated § 802.05 in 
parallel form to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.  Supreme Court Order 03-06, 
2005 WI 38, 278 Wis. 2d xiii-xiv (eff. Mar. 31, 2005).  In so 
doing, it ignored the fact that § 814.025 was not a judicial 
rule subject to the court's rule-making powers.  It also ignored 
the strong dissents of three members of the court.  Supreme 
Court Order 03-06, 278 Wis. 2d at xxvi–xxxiii.  This is the 
first time this court has struck down an act of the legislature 
that was not held unconstitutional.  The court's new version of 
§ 802.05 became effective July 1, 2005.4  
¶114 In deciding Scott's motion alleging that Trinity 
commenced and continued a frivolous action, the circuit court 
                                                 
4 In 
response 
to the court's "repealing" Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.025, the legislature passed 2005 Senate Bill 501.  This 
new legislation attempted to reinstate the make whole remedy the 
legislature had created in 1978.  According to the analysis 
prepared by the Legislative Reference Bureau, 2005 S.B. 501: 
requires a court to award a successful party the 
actual costs of the action, including reasonable 
attorney fees, if the court finds that the action is 
frivolous.  The bill uses the same standards for 
determining if an action is frivolous as were used in 
the law before July 1, 2005. 
Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of 2005 S.B. 501.  Both 
houses of the legislature passed 2005 S.B. 501 and presented it 
to the governor for his signature; however, he vetoed it.  The 
senate could not muster the two-thirds majority needed to 
override the governor's veto.  Bill history for 2005 S.B. 501. 
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
6 
 
concluded that it could not award sanctions because Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.05 must be applied.  The circuit court reasoned that the 
new § 802.05 applied because it was a procedural statute; the 
motion was filed after July 1, 2005, the effective date of 
§ 802.05; and the new § 802.05 required a 21-day notice of 
intent to file a claim alleging the action was frivolous, which 
notice Scott had not given.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court, and we accepted Scott's petition for review.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶115 Deciding when a claim for relief accrues based on 
undisputed facts is a question of law.  See Meracle v. 
Children's Serv. Soc. of Wis., 149 Wis. 2d 19, 25-26, 437 N.W.2d 
532 (1989).  Whether a statute is procedural or has substantive 
components is also a question of law for our independent review.  
See Matthies v. Positive Safety Mfg. Co., 2001 WI 82, ¶¶15, 21, 
244 Wis. 2d 720, 628 N.W.2d 842; Schulz v. Ystad, 155 Wis. 2d 
574, 596, 456 N.W.2d 312 (1990). 
¶116 The interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 990.04 and its 
application to a particular set of facts are legal questions for 
which we do not defer to the decisions of other courts.  
Warehouse II, LLC v. DOT, 2006 WI 62, ¶4, 291 Wis. 2d 80, 715 
N.W.2d 213.  However, we are aided by the prior analyses of the 
court of appeals and the circuit court.  Spiegelberg v. State, 
2006 WI 75, ¶8, 291 Wis. 2d 601, 717 N.W.2d 641. 
¶117 Whether a judicial holding, such as Supreme Court 
Order 03-06, should be applied retroactively or prospectively is 
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
7 
 
a question of policy for our independent review.  Kurtz, 91 
Wis. 2d at 108.   
B. 
Scott's Claim 
¶118 The majority opinion spends most of its energy 
addressing 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 802.05 
is 
procedural 
or 
substantive.  
It 
does not analyze whether Scott had a 
substantive right of action under Wis. Stat. § 814.025 that had 
accrued before the statute was "repealed."  Instead, it 
summarily asserts that § 814.025 "did not create a substantive, 
vested right to costs and reasonable attorney fees."  Majority 
op., ¶48.  The majority opinion is heavily invested in 
concluding 
that 
§ 814.025 
has 
no 
substantive 
component;5 
therefore, its attempt to shift the reader's focus to analyzing 
§ 802.05 is understandable.  However, an analysis of the 
remedies available under § 814.025 before its "repeal" is 
required by the case before us. 
¶119 Wisconsin Stat. § 814.025(1) states in relevant part: 
If an action or special proceeding commenced or 
continued by a plaintiff or a counterclaim, defense or 
cross complaint commenced, used or continued by a 
defendant is found, at any time during the proceedings 
or upon judgment, to be frivolous by the court, the 
court shall award to the successful party costs 
                                                 
5 While this court has been delegated a rule-making function 
by the legislature, that delegation is limited.  Under Wis. 
Stat. § 751.12(1), which this court cited as its authority for 
the actions taken in Supreme Court Order 03-06, the rules this 
court creates "shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify the 
substantive rights of any litigant."  § 751.12(1).  Therefore, 
the only way this court can assert it had authority to strike 
down Wis. Stat. § 814.025 is if that statute does not encompass 
any substantive rights.  
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
8 
 
determined under s. 814.04 and reasonable attorney 
fees. 
It provided substantive rights and remedies that should be held 
to apply to Scott's claim because Scott had a claim capable of 
present enforcement (that Trinity commenced and continued a 
frivolous action) and a suable party (Trinity) against whom it 
could enforce its claim before the "repeal" of § 814.025.  
Meracle, 149 Wis. 2d at 26 (citing Barry v. Minahan, 127 Wis. 
570, 573, 107 N.W. 488 (1906)).   
¶120 Determining whether a statute is procedural or has 
substantive components can have profound implications.  See 
Snopek v. Lakeland Med. Ctr., 223 Wis. 2d 288, 294, 588 N.W.2d 
19 (1999); State ex rel. Schmidt v. Dist. No. 2, Town of Red 
Springs, 237 Wis. 186, 190, 295 N.W. 36 (1941).  Substantive 
statutes create, define or regulate rights or obligations.  
Betthauser v. Med. Protective Co., 172 Wis. 2d 141, 147-48, 493 
N.W.2d 40 (1992) (citing City of Madison v. Town of Madison, 127 
Wis. 2d 96, 102, 377 N.W.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1985)).  A statute 
cannot be procedural if it takes away "vested rights."  Id.  A 
vested right can be a remedy that is available, but not yet 
awarded, to a party who could successfully petition the court 
for the remedy.  See Schulz, 155 Wis. 2d at 598.   
¶121 We discussed this concept in Schulz when we considered 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m), which eliminated a child support 
obligor's right to petition for the remedy of retroactive 
modification of support, when previously the "circuit courts had 
discretion to modify, reduce, or eliminate accumulated child 
support arrearages."  Id.  We concluded that § 767.32(1m) was 
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
9 
 
substantive because it worked "such a substantial change in the 
legal rights and obligations of a child support obligor."  Id.  
So too in the case before us, the "repealing" of Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.025 changed legal rights and remedies that had previously 
existed.   
¶122 The majority asserts that Scott had no "vested right" 
under Wis. Stat. § 814.025 to recover reasonable attorney fees 
if Trinity's conduct were held to be frivolous "until a circuit 
court made a finding of frivolousness."  Majority op., ¶62.  The 
majority opinion's assertion, for which it cites no authority, 
is contrary to controlling precedent because the right to a non-
discretionary remedy is "vested" before a court makes a finding 
that supports an order for the remedy.  Matthies, 244 Wis. 2d 
720, ¶22.  The right to a remedy is vested when a right to the 
remedy "accrues" under the facts of the case.  Id.  A claim 
"accrues" 
when 
there 
exist 
"a 
claim 
capable 
of 
present 
enforcement, a suable party against whom it may be enforced, and 
a party who has a present right to enforce it."  Meracle, 149 
Wis. 2d at 26 (quoting Barry, 127 Wis. at 573).  
¶123 In 
Matthies, 
we 
reviewed 
whether 
a 
statute 
on 
comparative negligence that was amended after Matthies was 
injured, but before he filed his lawsuit, applied to limit the 
damages he could collect to an amount representative of each 
tortfeasor's causal negligence.  Matthies, 244 Wis. 2d 720, ¶1.  
In our analysis of the question presented, we first determined 
when Matthies' claim for relief accrued.  Id., ¶¶21-22.   
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
10 
 
¶124 Matthies asserted his claim accrued at the time of his 
injury, and the tortfeasors asserted "Matthies ha[d] no vested 
or accrued right in a particular remedy" until a final judgment.  
Id., ¶21.  We disagreed with the tortfeasor's contention.  Id.  
And even though Matthies had not yet filed his lawsuit when the 
law was changed from joint and several liability for negligence 
to comparative negligence, we held that "Matthies d[id] have a 
vested right to recover all of his damages that are adjudged due 
to him from any defendant that may be jointly and severally 
liable for his injuries."  Id. 
¶125 We reasoned that "Matthies ha[d] a vested right in his 
claim for negligence" because his claim "accrued on the date of 
his accident and injury" and it was the "date of injury which 
[was] the triggering event with respect to the application of 
Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1)."  Id., ¶22.  We then explained that 
because he was entitled to recover under the doctrine of joint 
and several liability when his claim accrued, the statutory 
change in forms of liability affected vested rights.  Id., ¶23.   
¶126 Applying Matthies to the question of whether Trinity 
has a claim to a substantive remedy under Wis. Stat. § 814.025 
that accrued before it was "repealed" on July 1, 2005, I look to 
the injury-producing conduct, just as we did in Matthies.  It is 
alleged that Trinity injured Scott by commencing and continuing 
a 
frivolous 
lawsuit. 
 
Trinity's 
injury-producing 
conduct 
occurred before July 1, 2005.  Therefore, under Matthies, 
Scott's claim for the mandatory make-whole remedy as set out in 
§ 814.025 accrued prior to July 1, 2005 and it became a vested 
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
11 
 
right at that time.  Id., ¶22; Schulz, 155 Wis. 2d at 598 
(concluding that a change in legal rights and obligations is 
prospective only).  Therefore, the circuit court should apply 
the remedy of § 814.025 on remand, if Scott proves its claim.6   
¶127 My conclusion that the circuit court should apply Wis. 
Stat. § 814.025 on remand if Scott proves its claim finds 
further support in Niesen v. State, 30 Wis. 2d 490, 141 N.W.2d 
194 (1966). In Niesen, the plaintiff brought an action for 
damages alleging that "the state highway commission, during the 
construction of Highway I-94 in the fall of 1963, blocked the 
highway ditch and failed to provide the proper drainage, causing 
the flooding of the plaintiff's land in the spring of 1964 and 
thereby rendering it useless for planting."  Id. at 491.  During 
1964, Wis. Stat. § 88.38(2) (1961-62), which permitted a suit 
for 
damages 
under 
factual 
circumstances 
such 
as 
Niesen 
presented, was repealed and recreated as Wis. Stat. § 88.87 by 
ch. 572, Laws of 1963.  Id. at 492.  It became effective 
June 13, 1964.  Id.  It did not permit a claim for damages 
directly against the State as § 88.38(2) (1961-62) had.  Id.   
¶128 We concluded that Niesen's claim for relief arose 
prior to the effective date of the new statute because the 
State's negligent conduct preceded the effective date of the 
statutory change.  Id. at 493.  We also concluded that there was 
no statement in the new statute that the legislature intended by 
the repeal of Wis. Stat. § 88.38(2) (1961-62) to terminate 
                                                 
6 The Wis. Stat. § 814.025 make-whole remedy is a non-
discretionary remedy.  Jandrt v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 227 Wis. 2d 
531, 576, 597 N.W.2d 744 (1999). 
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
12 
 
rights of action that had accrued before the statutory change.  
Id. at 493-94.  Accordingly, we looked to the effect of Wis. 
Stat. § 990.04 on Niesen's claim under the repealed statute.  
Id. at 493-95.  We held that Niesen could maintain his suit for 
damages because the "rights which had arisen in favor of the 
plaintiff under sec. 88.38(2), Stats., prior to its being 
repealed are preserved to Mr. Niesen by sec. 990.04."  Id. at 
495.  
¶129 Here, Scott's right to make a claim under Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.025 arose at the time of Trinity's conduct of allegedly 
filing and continuing a frivolous lawsuit.  This occurred before 
July 1, 2005.  There was no discussion at the rule-making 
hearing prior to the "repeal" of § 814.025 that the court 
intended to cut off rights of action that had accrued before 
July 1, 2005.  Accordingly, as under Niesen, on remand, the 
circuit court should apply § 814.025 if Scott proves its claim.7  
Id. at 493-95. 
                                                 
7 The majority asserts that Wis. Stat. § 802.05 is the 
"governing 
provision" 
when 
comparing 
it 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 814.025.  Majority op., ¶24.  I am uncertain what a "governing 
provision" is.  However, we have concluded that when an action 
is proved frivolous, the relief accorded to those victimized by 
a frivolous action is the mandatory make-whole remedy of 
§ 814.025.  Jandert, 227 Wis. 2d at 563.  As we explained: 
Costs 
and 
reasonable attorney fees must be 
awarded [] if the court is satisfied that the [law] 
firm knew or should have known that its allegation of 
causation was "without any reasonable basis in law or 
equity." 
Id. 
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
13 
 
 
C. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 990.04 
¶130 The 
majority 
opinion 
discards 
Scott's 
claimed 
application of Wis. Stat. § 990.04 in a footnote.  Majority op., 
¶48 n.35.  Section 990.04 states in relevant part: 
The repeal of a statute hereafter shall not remit, 
defeat or impair any civil or criminal liability for 
offenses committed, penalties or forfeitures incurred 
or rights of action accrued under such statute before 
the repeal thereof, whether or not in course of 
prosecution or action at the time of such repeal; but 
all such offenses, penalties, forfeitures and rights 
of action created by or founded on such statute, 
liability wherefore shall have been incurred before 
the time of such repeal thereof, shall be preserved 
and remain in force notwithstanding such repeal, 
unless specially and expressly remitted, abrogated or 
done away with by the repealing statute.  
As I have explained above, Trinity's allegedly frivolous acts 
occurred before the "repeal" of Wis. Stat. § 814.025; and 
therefore, Scott's "right of action" accrued before the statute 
was struck down.   
 
¶131 We construed and applied Wis. Stat. § 990.04 in 
Jackson County Iron Co. v. Musolf, 134 Wis. 2d 95, 396 N.W.2d 
323 (1986).  In Jackson County Iron, we reviewed § 990.04 in the 
context of a court of appeals decision that held the repeal of 
Wis. Stat. § 70.94(3)(a) (1975) deprived Jackson County Iron of 
its administrative appeal.  Id. at 104.  We concluded that the 
court of appeals erred because "it is the clear intention of 
sec. 990.04 to preserve all rights which may have arisen before 
the repeal of a statute unless such rights are 'specially and 
expressly remitted, abrogated or done away with by the repealing 
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
14 
 
statute.'"  Id. (quoting Niesen, 30 Wis. 2d at 493).  We also 
explained that "an act which repeals or modifies a remedy does 
not affect a pending action."  Id. (citing Bratton v. Town of 
Johnson, 76 Wis. 430, 434, 45 N.W. 412 (1890)).   
¶132 As was the case in Jackson County Iron, Scott's right 
of action against Trinity arose before Wis. Stat. § 814.025 was 
"repealed."  By the statute's plain wording, which we described 
in Jackson County Iron as "the clear intention" of Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.04, id., Scott's claim against Trinity was unaffected by 
the "repeal" of § 814.025.  Accordingly, I conclude that 
§ 990.04 provides additional support for the conclusion that 
Scott's claims under § 814.025 should be addressed upon remand 
of this action.  
D. 
The Chevron/Kurtz Standards 
¶133 The majority opinion repeatedly focuses on whether 
Wis. Stat. § 802.05 was required to be applied retroactively to 
Scott's claim that Trinity commenced and continued a frivolous 
action.  Majority op., ¶¶4, 7, 8, 32-39, 52-62.  In so doing, it 
does not analyze whether Supreme Court Order 03-06, that 
"repealed" Wis. Stat. § 814.025 and Wis. Stat. § 802.05 (2003-
04), should be applied to eliminate rights that would otherwise 
affect a claim that had accrued under § 814.025 in an action 
that had commenced.   
¶134 In my view, Supreme Court Order 03-06 is not a 
judicial holding such that the Chevron/Kurtz test applies, nor 
do any of the order's conclusions about Wis. Stat. § 814.025 
establish 
precedent. 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
agrees 
that 
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
15 
 
Chevron/Kurtz does not apply to the issues presented.  Majority 
op., ¶78.  However, it comes to that conclusion by shifting the 
reader's focus to Wis. Stat. § 802.05 and asserting that 
Chevron/Kurtz is not the correct test for determining whether a 
statute should 
be 
applied prospectively or retroactively.  
Majority op., ¶79.   
¶135 However, one must note that it was Supreme Court Order 
03-06 that eliminated the rights established by Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.025 by "repealing" it.  There is nothing in Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.05 that even mentions § 814.025, let alone "repeals" it.  
By shifting the reader's focus from Supreme Court Order 03-06, 
the majority opinion ducks the issue of how it is actually 
employing Supreme Court Order 03-06 in its decision.  That is, 
the majority opinion does treat Supreme Court Order 03-06 as 
though it were a judicial holding when it relies on the 
majority's prior determination during rule-making that § 814.025 
has no substantive components.8  Majority op., ¶42.  However, 
since the rule-making proceeding appears to have caused Supreme 
Court 
Order 
03-06 
to 
become 
a 
"judicial 
holding," 
the 
Chevron/Kurtz test should be applied to determine whether that 
holding in regard to § 814.025 should have retroactive effect. 
¶136 In Kurtz, this court analyzed how to decide whether a 
"judicial 
holding" 
should 
or 
should 
not 
be 
applied 
                                                 
8 Until today, we have never held or implied that we 
establish binding precedent for this or any other court by rule-
making.  Our rules remain subject to interpretation and testing, 
just as any other legislation does.  However, the majority 
refuses to test its own rule here.   
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
16 
 
retroactively.  Kurtz, 91 Wis. 2d at 108-09.  The court quoted 
and then applied a three-factor test employed by the United 
States Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 
(1971) to determine whether a holding ought not be applied 
retroactively: 
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively 
must establish a new principle of law, either by 
overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may 
have relied, or by deciding an issue of first 
impression 
whose 
resolution 
was 
not 
clearly 
foreshadowed.  Second, . . . "we must . . . weigh the 
merits and demerits in each case by looking to the 
prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and 
effect, 
and 
whether 
retrospective 
operation 
will 
further or retard its operation."  Finally, we . . . 
weigh[] 
the 
inequity 
imposed 
by 
retroactive 
application, for "[w]here a decision of the Court 
could 
produce 
substantial 
inequitable 
results 
if 
applied 
retroactively, 
[we 
avoid] 
'injustice 
or 
hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity." 
Id. at 109 (quoting Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106-07) (further 
citations omitted).  When the court applied the Chevron test, it 
concluded that the judicial holdings then under consideration 
did not satisfy the test's three factors and therefore they were 
applicable to the claims before the court.  Id.    
¶137 If Supreme Court Order 03-06 is a "judicial holding," 
then we should analyze it under the Chevron/Kurtz test.  In 
applying the Chevron/Kurtz test to the court's 03-06 Order, I 
conclude that it should not be applied to preclude the 
application of Wis. Stat. § 814.025 to Scott's claim because the 
order established a new rule that changed the law; there are 
significant demerits in applying it here; and applying the order 
to negate Scott's claims would be inequitable.   
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
17 
 
¶138 The "repeal" of Wis. Stat. § 814.025 creates a new 
rule under Chevron/Kurtz for several reasons.  First, § 814.025 
provided that, as a sanction for filing or continuing a 
frivolous claim, reasonable attorney fees must be paid to the 
prevailing party.9  Jandrt v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 227 Wis. 2d 
531, 576, 597 N.W.2d 744 (1999); Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 
799, 299 N.W.2d 856 (1981); Stoll v. Adriansen, 122 Wis. 2d 503, 
511, 362 N.W.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1984).  Under the rule established 
by Supreme Court Order 03-06, the circuit court may, but is not 
required, to award attorney fees as a sanction for filing a 
frivolous action.  Second, § 814.025 required that any sanctions 
ordered must be paid to the person injured.  Jandrt, 227 Wis. 2d 
at 577.  Under the rule established by Supreme Court Order 03-
06, any sanction ordered may be paid to the court, rather than 
to the prevailing party.  Third, § 814.025 applies to one who 
commences or continues a frivolous action, while the rule 
established by Supreme Court Order 03-06 applies only to 
commencing a frivolous action.  Therefore, under the court's new 
rule, no sanctions are available if the action was not frivolous 
when commenced, but at some point in the litigation it became 
frivolous to continue it.  See id. at 547 (concluding that 
wording identical to that in Wis. Stat. § 802.05 does not 
                                                 
9 In the absence of a statute or contract that authorizes 
payment of attorney fees to the prevailing party, Wisconsin 
follows the American Rule where each party pays its own attorney 
fees.  Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 798, 299 N.W.2d 856 
(1981). 
 
Therefore, 
a 
party's 
opportunity 
to 
receive 
compensation under Wis. Stat. § 814.025 for attorney fees 
generated by required participation in a frivolous lawsuit was a 
significant departure from the common law.  Id.  
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
18 
 
"authorize[] 
the 
imposition 
of 
sanctions 
upon 
a 
party 
maintaining a frivolous action").  This last change in the law 
could be important to Scott, as it was in Jandrt.  In Jandrt, we 
concluded that Jandrt did not violate Wis. Stat. § 814.025 when 
she filed the action, but that she should have known the action 
was frivolous when she continued it.  Id. at 564.   
¶139 In addition, under the second Chevron/Kurtz factor, 
there are significant demerits in applying Supreme Court Order 
03-06 to preclude the use of Wis. Stat. § 814.025 for Scott's 
claim.  Because the change in law that was caused by Supreme 
Court Order 03-06 occurred during judicial rule-making, the 
change in the law did not receive the public notice that other 
legal issues this court has addressed have received when a 
change in the law occurred as part of a case-opinion of this 
court.  For example, there was no petition for review of another 
court decision; there was no announcement in the popular press 
that we had accepted for review the potential "repealing" 
of § 814.025, as the court routinely does through the court 
information office when petitions for review are accepted; there 
was no press coverage to inform members of the public that we 
were considering striking down § 814.025; and there were no 
briefs filed with the court on both sides of the petition to 
"repeal" § 814.025, so that the court could examine in a full 
adversarial posture whether § 814.025 contained remedies that 
were substantive.   
¶140 Finally, 
under 
the 
third 
Chevron/Kurtz 
factor, 
applying Supreme Court Order 03-06 to preclude Scott's claim 
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
19 
 
under Wis. Stat. § 814.025 would produce inequitable results, 
such as the circuit court being without the power to make Scott 
whole if it concludes Trinity's action was not frivolous when 
filed or frivolous when continued.  Accordingly, under the 
Chevron/Kurtz test, Supreme Court Order 03-06 should not be 
applied retroactively to Scott's claim under § 814.025, which is 
a substantive claim to a make-whole remedy that had accrued 
before this court entered its order. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶141 Because I conclude that:  (1) Scott's claim for relief 
under Wis. Stat. § 814.025 is a substantive claim that accrued 
before July 1, 2005; (2) Wis. Stat. § 990.04 precludes applying 
Wis. Stat. § 802.05 or Supreme Court Order 03-06 to negate 
Scott's § 814.025 claim; and (3) under the Chevron/Kurtz test, 
Supreme Court Order 03-06 should not be applied retroactively to 
preclude Scott's claim under § 814.025, I respectfully dissent 
from the analysis of the majority opinion.  However, I do concur 
in its decision to reverse and remand to the circuit court, 
where I would direct the court to apply § 814.025, if Scott 
proves its claim. 
¶142 For the foregoing reasons, I concur in part and 
dissent in part. 
¶143 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and DAVID T. PROSSER join this concurrence/dissent. 
 
No.  2005AP2837.pdr 
 
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