Title: Isom v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 45S00-0803-DP-125
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: May 20, 2015

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Mark A. Bates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Office of the Public Defender 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Crown Point, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kelly A. Miklos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 45S00-0803-DP-125 
 
KEVIN CHARLES ISOM, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Lake Superior Court, No. 45G04-0708-MR-00008  
The Honorable Thomas P. Stefaniak, Jr., Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Direct Appeal  
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
May 20, 2015 
 
 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
 
May 20 2015, 9:35 am
 
2 
Case Summary 
 
After a trial by jury Kevin Charles Isom was found guilty of three counts of murder for 
which the jury recommended and the trial court imposed a death sentence.  In this direct appeal 
Isom raises the following rephrased issues: (1) did the trial court err by denying Isom’s for-cause 
challenges to certain prospective jurors; (2) did the trial court err in denying Isom’s motions for 
mistrial; (3) did the trial court abuse its discretion in instructing the jury;  (4) did the trial court 
err by refusing to allow a witness to answer a question posed by a juror; (5) did the State commit 
prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments in the penalty phase of trial; (6) is revision of 
Isom’s death sentence warranted; and (7) did the trial court issue an illegal or void sentence.  We 
affirm Isom’s conviction and death sentence, but remand with instructions to issue a new 
sentencing order consistent with this opinion.   
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
On the evening of August 6, 2007, police officers were dispatched to the Lakeshore 
Dunes Apartments in Gary, Indiana after reports of repeated gunfire rang out in the complex.  
Unable to identify immediately the source of the gunfire or enter the apartment building to 
investigate, the officers were held at bay while the assailant shot rounds of gunfire in their 
direction.  After several hours, a SWAT team gained entry into the apartment.  Once inside, the 
officers found Isom sitting on the floor in the back bedroom leaning against the wall, and 
reaching underneath a sheet and moving his hands about.  Isom did not comply with police 
commands to show his hands, and after a brief struggle officers placed him in handcuffs.  A .357 
Magnum handgun fell from Isom’s waistband.  Nearby, officers discovered a .40 caliber Smith 
& Wesson handgun, a 12-gauge shotgun, and multiple rounds of ammunition.  The officers also 
located the bodies of Isom’s wife Cassandra Isom, Isom’s thirteen-year-old stepdaughter 
Ci’Andria Cole, and Isom’s sixteen-year-old stepson Michael Moore.  Cassandra was killed by a 
close-range shotgun blast to the top of her head.  She had also been shot with the Smith & 
Wesson handgun.  Ci’Andria was shot with the Magnum, the Smith & Wesson, and the shotgun.  
Michael was killed by a shotgun blast to his chest and flank area, probably while sitting at a 
computer.  And he was also shot with the Smith & Wesson handgun.  Blood from all three 
 
3 
victims was found on Isom’s clothing.  Isom was arrested and the next day, after being read his 
Miranda1 warnings, gave a statement to police which included an account of his activities during 
the course of the day and an explanation of where the victims were positioned when they were 
shot.  At times Isom seemed not to remember the shootings, declaring at one point, “I can’t 
believe I killed my family, this can’t be real.”  Tr. at 12616.  
 
The State charged Isom with three counts of murder for the shooting deaths of Cassandra, 
Ci’Andria, and Michael, and sought the death penalty alleging as a statutory aggravating 
circumstance the multiple murders.  See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(8) (2007).2  The State also 
charged Isom with four counts of attempted murder in connection with his firing at police 
officers.  Prior to trial the State dismissed one of the attempted murder counts.  After several 
delays, Isom’s jury trial began November 26, 2012 and the guilt phase concluded February 5, 
2013.  Isom was found guilty of murder as charged.  The jury also found Isom guilty of three 
counts of criminal recklessness as lesser included offenses of attempted murder.  The following 
day the jury reconvened for the penalty phase of trial, after which the jury found that Isom 
intentionally killed Cassandra, Ci’Andria, and Michael, and that the State proved the charged 
aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt.  The jury also found that Isom’s proffered mitigating 
circumstances were outweighed by the charged aggravator.  The jury thus recommended a 
sentence of death for each of the three murder convictions.  The court accepted the jury’s 
recommendations and sentenced Isom to three death sentences to be served consecutively.3  
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 4(A)(1)(a), this Court has mandatory and exclusive 
jurisdiction over this appeal.  Additional facts are set forth below as necessary. 
 
                                                 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
 
2 Specifically, the statute provides: “The defendant has committed another murder, at any time, regardless 
of whether the defendant has been convicted of that other murder.”  I.C. § 35-50-2-9(b)(8).  This 
aggravator is applicable only in “cases involving double or multiple murders for which the defendant is 
being tried in one proceeding.”  Hough v. State, 560 N.E.2d 511, 519 (Ind. 1990). 
 
3 The trial court also sentenced Isom to an aggregate term of three years for the criminal recklessness 
convictions.  Giving Isom credit for time served in pre-trial confinement, the trial court noted this was in 
excess of the sentences imposed and thus considered the sentences for criminal recklessness already 
served.  In this appeal Isom does not challenge his convictions or sentences for these offenses.    
 
4 
Discussion 
 
I. 
Challenges for Cause 
 
Isom contends the trial court erred in failing to grant his for-cause challenges of certain 
prospective jurors.  The essential facts follow.  On motion of the defense team, the trial court 
awarded both sides thirty peremptory challenges (more than the twenty contemplated by Indiana 
Jury Rule 18).  See App. at 407-09, 479.  In advance of jury selection each prospective juror was 
provided a detailed forty-five page jury questionnaire.  During a fifteen-day voir dire proceeding 
each prospective juror was questioned extensively by the State, the defense, and the trial court.  
Isom moved to strike numerous jurors for cause.  The trial court granted some of the motions but 
denied the motions with respect to twelve jurors, specifically Jurors No. 8, 31, 44, 57, 100, 105, 
114, 168, 246, 375, 391, and 398.  By the time eleven jurors had been seated, Isom had 
exhausted all of his peremptory challenges, so he had none left when the trial court denied his 
for-cause challenge to Juror No. 398.  That person was seated as the twelfth juror.  Isom claims 
error with the seating of this juror as well as the denial of his eleven other for-cause challenges 
which compelled him to remove those jurors by use of peremptory challenges.  See Whiting v. 
State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 29-30 (Ind. 2012) (declaring appellate review of alleged trial court error in 
the denial of a challenge for cause is available where a defendant has exhausted all of his 
peremptory challenges).  
 
Challenging jurors for cause is the primary means by which a defendant may exclude any 
prospective juror whose “views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his 
duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath[.]”  Oswalt v. State, 19 N.E.3d 
241, 246 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 433 (1985) (internal quotation 
omitted)).  These challenges “must be supported by specified causes or reasons that demonstrate 
that, as a matter of law, the venire member is not qualified to serve.”  Whiting, 969 N.E.2d at 29 
(quoting Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 652 n.3 (1987) (citation omitted)).  We review a trial 
court’s denial of a defendant’s for-cause challenge for an abuse of discretion.  Oswalt, 19 N.E.3d 
at 245.  “[T]he trial court has ‘a broad discretion and duty . . . to see that the jury as finally 
selected is subject to no solid basis of objection on the score of impartiality.’”  Whiting, 969 
N.E.2d at 29 (omission in original) (quoting Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 511 (1948)).  
 
5 
We afford substantial deference to the trial court’s ruling and will reverse only upon a showing 
that the decision is illogical or arbitrary.  Id.   
 
Isom’s challenges to the twelve jurors fall within three broad categories: (1) the 
prospective juror would not consider mitigation evidence during the penalty phase of trial; (2) 
the prospective juror would not give serious consideration to all three penalty options—death, 
life without parole, or a term of years; and (3) the prospective juror failed to understand legal 
concepts relevant to the case.  We address these challenges in turn. 
 
A. Refusal to consider mitigation 
 
Isom challenged Jurors No. 8, 31, 375, 391, and 398 contending that they would not 
consider mitigation evidence.  The record shows that each of these jurors initially expressed 
skepticism either on the jury questionnaire or during voir dire itself.  But their positions changed 
after further explanation and inquiry, especially by the trial court.  In each instance the trial court 
explained the manner in which mitigation evidence would be introduced, the reason for the 
mitigation evidence, and the juror’s obligation to consider that evidence.  See Tr. at 1638-66 
(Juror No. 8); Tr. at 1856-1910 (Juror No. 31); Tr. at 5643-5717 (Juror No. 375); Tr. at 6030-68 
(Juror No. 391); Tr. at 6101-43 (Juror No. 398).  It is certainly the case that “[a] juror who will 
automatically vote for [a particular] penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the 
evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do.”  
Ward v. State, 903 N.E.2d 946, 955 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 
(1992)), adhered to on reh’g, 908 N.E.2d 595, 597 (Ind. 2009).  However, “a constitutionally 
impartial juror is one who is able and willing to lay aside his or her prior knowledge and 
opinions, follow the law as instructed by the trial judge, and render a verdict based solely on the 
evidence presented in court.”  Whiting, 969 N.E.2d at 28 (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 
722-23 (1961)).  In this case, it was only after assuring itself that the potential juror fully 
understood his/her duty as explained by the court and genuinely believed that he/she could fulfill 
such a duty that the trial court denied Isom’s challenges for cause predicated on the jurors’ 
alleged refusal to consider mitigation evidence.  Isom’s claim of error essentially amounts to a 
request for this Court to reweigh the credibility of the jurors’ declarations.  We decline.  
Credibility determinations lie within the province of the trial court.  Cf. Oswalt, 19 N.E.3d at 245 
 
6 
(“Selecting impartial juries depends upon the parties’ discernment and the trial court’s discretion 
to select a panel of objective and unbiased jurors ‘who will conscientiously apply the law and 
find the facts.’” (quoting Witt, 469 U.S. at 423)).  And we will not disturb that finding absent a 
showing that the trial court’s determination was illogical or arbitrary.  Whiting, 969 N.E.2d at 29.  
We find no such showing in this instance. 
 
B. Failure to consider all three penalty options 
 
Isom next contends the trial court also improperly failed to dismiss Jurors No. 57, 100, 
105, 114, 168, 246, 391, and 398 because, according to Isom, these jurors “fail[ed] to give 
meaningful consideration to all three penalty options . . . .”  Br. of Appellant at 17.  In each 
instance the trial court explained that should the jury return a verdict of guilty of murder, the jury 
would be reconvened for the penalty phase of trial, and that the available options were death, life 
imprisonment without parole, or a term of years.  See Tr. at 2014-15 (Juror No. 57); Tr. at 2749-
51 (Juror No. 100); Tr. at 3527-28 (Juror No. 105); Tr. at 3801-02 (Juror No. 114); Tr. at 4102-
04 (Juror No. 168); Tr. at 4751-52 (Juror No. 246); Tr. at 6015-16 (Juror No. 391); Tr. at 6091-
92 (Juror No. 398).  
 
It is true that each of the challenged prospective jurors initially expressed an inclination 
towards one option over the other.  However, the transcript of voir dire clearly reflects that each 
of these individuals stated that he/she would follow the court’s instructions and consider all of 
the testimony as well as the three penalty options.  See, e.g., Tr. at 2063 (Juror No. 57 
explaining, “[she] would be willing to change [her] opinion if [she] thought that maybe it was 
not quite as [she] originally thought”); Tr. at 2750 (Juror No. 100 affirming, “yes,” when asked if 
she would be “able to give full and fair consideration to all three of those as a potential penalty”); 
Tr. at 3528 (Juror No. 105 answering, “[y]es, I could,” when asked if he was “able to consider all 
three of those as a potential penalty”); Tr. at 3802 (Juror No. 114 affirming that he could “give 
meaningful consideration to all of those”); Tr. at 4103-04 (Juror No. 168 confirming that he 
“would [neither] automatically just dismiss” nor “just automatically impose” “any of those 
penalties”); Tr. at 4785 (Juror No. 246 responding, “I think I can” to defense counsel’s 
questioning as to whether he was “able to vote for any one of the three penalties”); Tr. at 6016 
(Juror No. 391 testifying that he could “give fair, meaningful consideration to all three of those 
 
7 
potential penalties if called upon”); Tr. at 6092 (Juror No. 398 declaring that she “would [not] 
automatically impose or disregard” “any one of those potential penalties”).  To accept Isom’s 
claim that the trial court erred in denying his for-cause challenges to these jurors on the basis the 
jurors refused to consider the potential penalty options would preclude the trial court from 
making a credibility determination as to whether the juror is sincere in “stat[ing] on oath that the 
juror feels able, notwithstanding the juror’s opinion, to render an impartial verdict upon the law 
and evidence.”  I.C. § 35-37-1-5(b)(2).  This is precisely what our statute proscribes and what the 
trial court did here.  See Id.  We repeat for emphasis, “a constitutionally impartial juror is one 
who is able and willing to lay aside his or her prior knowledge and opinions, follow the law as 
instructed by the trial judge, and render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in 
court.”  Whiting, 969 N.E.2d at 28 (citing Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722-23).  We find no error here. 
 
C.  Failure to understand legal concepts applicable to the case 
 
Isom’s remaining challenges for cause involved the following prospective jurors:  Juror 
No. 44, contending the juror failed to understand the defendant’s presumption of innocence; 
Juror No. 57, asserting the juror did not believe that the defendant had the right to remain silent; 
and Juror No. 398, positing that the juror had predetermined that the defendant was guilty and 
that the burden lied with the defense to prove his innocence.  See Tr. at 2356, 2369-71, 2387-90, 
(Juror No. 44); Tr. at 2028-29 (Juror No. 57); Tr. at 6101-03, 6112-17 (Juror No. 398). 
 
As with Isom’s other challenges for cause, the trial court—along with counsel for the 
State and the defense—engaged in an extensive colloquy with each prospective juror.  And 
although the record reflects an initial lack of understanding of the requisite legal standards 
governing the presumption of innocence and a defendant’s right to remain silent, without more, 
this is simply insufficient to hold that the jurors should have been dismissed for cause.  
Particularly where, as here, the trial court explained each legal principle that Isom now 
complains of and in each instance the prospective juror acknowledged that he/she understood 
and would be able to apply that standard to the evidence as presented at trial.  Tr. at 2028, 2029 
(explaining to Juror No. 57 that “Defendant never has to speak on his own behalf and he is 
presumed innocent throughout the entire trial” to which she declared, “if Mr. Isom does not 
testify, [she would not] somehow hold it against him”); Tr. at 2356 (Juror No. 44 responding, 
 
8 
“[y]es,” to the trial court’s question, “are you able to presume that he is innocent, ma’am?”); Tr. 
at 6102 (Juror No. 398 testifying that “if the State or the Prosecutor failed to provide [her] with 
enough evidence to convince [her] beyond a reasonable doubt” that Isom had committed the 
charged crimes she would vote “not guilty”).  Again Isom’s argument to the contrary amounts to 
a request that we reject the trial court’s credibility determination which, again, we decline to do.  
See I.C. § 35-37-1-5; Oswalt, 19 N.E.3d at 245.  There was no error here. 
 
II. 
Motions for Mistrial 
 
Whether to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the 
trial court.  Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 628 (Ind. 2010).  We afford great deference to 
the trial court’s decision and review the decision solely for abuse of that discretion.  Id.  Isom 
claims such abuse for two motions, which the trial court denied.  
 
A. Testimony of Eddie Green 
 
For his first challenge to the denial of his motion for mistrial, these are the facts.  During 
its case-in-chief, the State presented Eddie Green, a man who lived in the apartment beneath that 
of the Isom family.  Green was at home at the time of the shootings and called 911 reporting 
gunfire.  During his direct examination, Green testified that he heard a girl say, “daddy,” and that 
he heard Isom’s “daughter talking” inside the apartment just before the shooting began.  Tr. at 
7577, 7578.  The trial court sustained defense counsel’s hearsay objection to this testimony and 
struck the references to “daddy” at counsel’s request.  The trial court gave the following 
admonishment: “All right.  Ladies and gentlemen, any comment about the words, ‘that was the 
daughter’ or ‘the daughter’, are ordered stricken from the record and you are to disregard that.”  
Tr. at 7583.  Isom then moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied.  Later during trial Isom 
submitted a curative instruction which the trial court read to the jury.  The instruction provided: 
“Any testimony from any witness which has been struck by the Court is not evidence and . . . 
you may not consider it for any purpose in this case.”  Tr. at 7602-03, 7607.  Ultimately Green 
was allowed to testify that he heard a “soft, calm” “female voice” and then heard “gunshots.”  Tr. 
at 7609.  Isom now claims error in the denial of his motion for mistrial.   
 
9 
“[A] mistrial is an extreme remedy that is only justified when other remedial measures 
are insufficient to rectify the situation.”  Mickens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Ind. 2001).  
Here Isom does not explain why the trial court’s admonishments—one of which was given at 
Isom’s request—were not sufficient.  Indeed he acknowledges “[a] properly submitted 
admonition to the jury is presumed to cure any error in admission of the evidence,” Br. of 
Appellant at 27 (citation omitted), but nonetheless argues that the admonishment in this case 
“would not cause the jury to disregard Green’s testimony” as instructed.  Id.  We reject Isom’s 
argument.  “On appeal, we must presume that the jury obeyed the court’s instructions in reaching 
its verdict.”  Tyson v. State, 386 N.E.2d 1185, 1192 (Ind. 1979).  As we have noted a “clear 
instruction, together with strong presumptions that juries follow courts’ instructions and that an 
admonition cures any error, severely undercuts the defendant’s position.”  Lucio v. State, 907 
N.E.2d 1008, 1010-11 (Ind. 2009) (rejecting defense argument of trial court error in denying 
motion for mistrial where trial court admonished the jury to disregard witness’s improper 
statement).  The same is true here.  We are not persuaded the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying Isom’s motion for mistrial.    
 
B. Testimony of Officer Thomas Pawlak 
 
For Isom’s second motion for mistrial the facts are as follows.  Thomas Pawlak was one 
of the police officers dispatched to the scene that evening.  After he arrived and exited his 
vehicle he heard multiple gunshots but was unable to identify the precise location from where the 
shots were coming.  At about the same time, a car pulled up and two unidentified black males got 
out of the vehicle and ran to the middle of the street in front of the apartment building.  “They 
were waving their hands, jumping up and down, yelling and screaming towards the building.”  
Tr. at 8084.  Officer Pawlak heard the men shouting, “Kevin, what are you doing?  Stop this 
sh**.”  Tr. at 8085.  When attempts to order the men to get out of the street failed, Officer 
Pawlak pulled the men aside to safety behind a parked car at which point he inquired who was 
doing the shooting.  The men stated that the shooter was their cousin, Kevin Isom, and he was 
inside the apartment with his wife and two children.  Two other officers—Sargent Mark Davis 
and Officer Peter Baum—who had been dispatched to the scene joined Officer Pawlak behind 
the parked car.  Shortly thereafter the two unidentified black males left the scene, purportedly to 
retrieve Isom’s mother who lived a short distance away.  Officer Baum attempted to follow 
 
10 
them, which prompted another round of gunfire, forcing him to seek cover behind another parked 
car.  Officer Pawlak and Sargent Davis also remained trapped.  The officers remained there for 
approximately 3 hours until the SWAT team arrived to provide assistance.  The two men never 
returned to the scene, none of the officers obtained their names, and neither of the men appeared 
at trial.  Instead, their statements were recounted through the testimony of Officer Pawlak.  Isom 
objected on grounds of hearsay and a violation of his right of confrontation.  The trial court 
overruled the objection.  As to Isom’s hearsay objection, the trial court cited exceptions under 
Evidence Rule 803(1) (present sense impression) and Rule 803(2) (excited utterance).4  With 
respect to Isom’s right of confrontation claim, the court concluded that under the circumstances 
there was no such right.  Isom moved for a mistrial, which the court denied.  
 
As a preliminary matter, the State contends that Isom has waived this issue for review.  
The State argues that because Isom failed to request an admonishment regarding Officer 
Pawlak’s testimony, the issue has been waived.   
 
When faced with a circumstance that a defendant believes might warrant a mistrial, 
generally the correct procedure is to request an admonishment.  Etienne v. State, 716 N.E.2d 
457, 461 (Ind. 1999).  If counsel is unsatisfied with the admonishment or it is obvious that the 
admonishment will not be sufficient to cure the error, then counsel may move for mistrial.  Id.  A 
“failure to request an admonishment or move for a mistrial results in waiver of the issue.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  First, it is not apparent what admonishment Isom might have requested.  
After extended argument outside the presence of the jury, the trial court overruled Isom’s 
objection to Officer Pawlak’s testimony.  See Tr. at 8016-83.  Essentially no admonishment 
                                                 
4 At the time of trial, Indiana Evidence Rule 803 provided in relevant part:  
 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness.  
 
(1) Present Sense Impression.  A statement describing or explaining a 
material event, condition or transaction, made while the declarant was 
perceiving the event, condition or transaction, or immediately thereafter.   
 
(2) Excited Utterance.  A statement relating to a startling event or 
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement 
caused by the event or condition. 
 
11 
could cure the error about which Isom complained.  See Holsinger v. State, 750 N.E.2d 354, 366 
(Ind. 2001) (Dickson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“When an admonishment 
would be futile, the failure to request one does not preclude appellate review of a denial of an 
otherwise timely motion for mistrial.”).  In any event waiver occurs where there was neither a 
request for admonishment nor a motion for mistrial.  Because Isom sought a mistrial, appellate 
review of his claim has not been waived.  We thus proceed to the merits.   
 
A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence and we will 
disturb the court’s rulings only where the petitioner has shown an abuse of that discretion.  
Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ind. 2011) (quotation omitted).  “But where, as here, a 
constitutional violation is alleged, the proper standard of appellate review is de novo.”  Speers v. 
State, 999 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. 2013), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 2299 (2014). 
 
Isom does not challenge the trial court’s ruling with respect to his hearsay objection.  
Rather, Isom contends the trial court violated his federal constitutional right of confrontation.  
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is 
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, provides in relevant part: “In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  The United States Supreme Court has determined that a 
statement violates the Confrontation Clause if, among other things, it is “testimonial” in nature.  
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004).  To determine whether a statement is 
testimonial, we must decide whether it has “a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court 
substitute for trial testimony.”  Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, ___, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1155 
(2011).  “Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable 
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 
(2006).  Conversely, a declarant’s statements “are testimonial when the circumstances 
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.”  Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  
 
 
12 
In order to determine whether a statement is testimonial versus nontestimonial, we must 
consider: (1) whether the declarant is describing present or past events; (2) whether there is an 
ongoing emergency at the time that the statements are made; (3) whether the nature of the 
questions asked and the responses given were made in an effort to resolve a present emergency; 
and (4) the degree of formality during the course of the police questioning.  Id. at 827.  Simply 
put, statements generally elicited from individuals seeking help during an ongoing emergency 
are not classified as testimonial.  See Id. at 828.  
 
Isom’s claim requires us to consider two separate statements made to the police.  The first 
is “Kevin, what are you doing?  Stop this sh**.”  Tr. at 8085.  This statement was made almost 
immediately after the two unidentified men arrived and not made in response to any police 
questioning.  Indeed, it was blurted out by two men who appeared in the middle of the street 
while someone was firing a weapon pinning down police officers, and their comments were 
directed towards the individual they believed to be shooting inside the apartment building rather 
than in response to police questioning.  Officer Pawlak simply happened to be within earshot 
when the statement was made because he too was on the scene at the time the crisis was ongoing.  
As the trial court explained: “The words are an effort by the concerned parties to stop the event 
which is still in progress, not an interrogation by the police.”  Tr. at 8072.  Consequently, the 
trial court concluded that this statement was not testimonial and thus did not implicate the 
Confrontation Clause.  We agree and discern no error on this point.  
 
The second statement about which Officer Pawlak was allowed to testify was offered in 
response to the officer’s question, “who’s shooting,” to which the men responded, “their cousin 
Kevin Isom.”  Tr. at 8166.  Because this statement was apparently “made in the course of police 
interrogation” at the scene of the crime, the question to be resolved is whether the 
“circumstances objectively indicat[e] that the primary purpose of the interrogation [wa]s to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”  Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.   
 
According to Isom, “[t]he testimony that Kevin was doing the shooting was elicited in 
violation of the appellant’s confrontation rights because he was not allowed to cross examine the 
declarant and it was extremely prejudicial to his defense.”  Br. of Appellant at 29.  As best we 
 
13 
can discern Isom seems to contend that because the information that Officer Pawlak received 
from the declarants identified a particular individual as the shooter, it “was not elicited to help 
with the ongoing emergency but was elicited by the police in their investigative role.”  Id. at 28.  
We cannot agree.  
 
When Officer Pawlak arrived at the scene he was greeted with the sound of gunfire and 
soon thereafter forced to run for cover.  Before the police were able to identify the source of 
gunfire, two men arrived and began shouting towards the apartment from where the shots 
originated.  After Officer Pawlak secured the men behind a vehicle—sheltered from the gunfire’s 
range—he began to inquire what the men knew of the shooting.  At this time, he was informed 
that they believed the defendant to be the shooter and that he resided in the apartment with his 
wife and two children.  This information was regarding “events as they were actually 
happening,” and was necessary to aid the officers who were “facing an ongoing emergency.”  
Davis, 547 U.S. at 827 (emphasis omitted).  Because the shooting was ongoing at the time the 
information was sought, it was certainly “necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency” 
rather than simply investigating past events.  Id. (emphasis omitted).  “Officers called to 
investigate [ongoing] disputes need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the 
situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.”  Hiibel v. 
Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004).  Based on the 
facts presented here, we conclude the declarants’ identification of Isom as the shooter was a 
nontestimonial statement and the trial court did not violate Isom’s constitutional rights by 
allowing it at trial.  See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (concluding that declarant’s identification of the 
defendant to an emergency response agent during her 911 call was not testimonial and thus 
admissible at trial because “the circumstances of [the victim’s] interrogation objectively indicate 
its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency”); but see 547 
U.S. at 832 (concluding that declarant’s identification in Hammon v. Indiana of the defendant as 
her abuser after the alleged attack occurred was testimonial because the declarant’s “statements 
were neither a cry for help nor the provision of information enabling officers immediately to end 
a threatening situation”).  
 
14 
III. 
Jury Instructions 
 
 “The purpose of a jury instruction ‘is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts 
without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, 
fair, and correct verdict.’”  Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Chandler v. 
State, 581 N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (Ind. 1991)).  We review a trial court’s instructions to the jury for 
an abuse of discretion.  Treadway, 924 N.E.2d at 636.  An abuse of discretion arises when the 
instruction is erroneous and the instructions taken as a whole misstate the law or otherwise 
mislead the jury.  Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390, 394 (Ind. 2001).  “When evaluating the jury 
instructions on appeal this Court looks to whether the tendered instructions correctly state the 
law, whether there is evidence in the record to support giving the instruction, and whether the 
substance of the proffered instruction is covered by other instructions.”  Treadway, 924 N.E.2d at 
636.   
 
A. Voluntary manslaughter  
 
Isom makes two claims concerning jury instructions.  He first contends the trial court was 
wrong in failing to give his tendered instruction on voluntary manslaughter.  The essential facts 
are these.  During a jury-instruction conference before final summation in the guilt phase of trial 
Isom tendered an instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of the 
murder charges.  Isom contended that a knife discovered at the crime scene supported an 
instruction for voluntary manslaughter.  According to Isom the presence of the knife “could 
certainly lead the jury to infer that in fact there was an argument.  That there was, in fact, sudden 
heat . . . .”  Tr. at 13082.  Isom insisted “the knife could lead the jury to infer . . . there was an 
argument.  That there was anger, there was rage, there was resentment, there was jealousy, that 
there was terror and that as a result of an excited mind, the perpetrator of the crime did what he 
did.”  Tr. at 13085.  The trial court denied the motion explaining in part:  
 
[T]here is no evidence in the record that there was an argument 
that preceded any actions.  And therefore, this Court concludes that 
there is no serious evidentiary dispute that exists as to the evidence 
on sudden heat.  There is no appreciable evidence of sudden heat 
that justifies an instruction on Voluntary Manslaughter.  
 
15 
Tr. at 13091.  Following the State’s closing argument, Isom again moved the trial court for an 
instruction on voluntary manslaughter declaring: 
 
[I]n the closing argument by the State, they talk about anger.  They 
talk about rage . . . .  You add that to the knife situation . . . the 
State is making its conclusion of anger and rage.  And that in the 
defense’s point of view, again establishes sudden heat, which 
would be a lesser included of murder in this case.   
 
Tr. at 13155-56.  The trial court again denied the motion.  Isom claims error.  
 
A trial court must engage in a three-step analysis when determining whether to instruct a 
jury on a lesser included offense of the crime charged.  Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 566-67 
(Ind. 1995).  First, the trial court must consider whether the alleged lesser included offense is an 
inherently included offense to the principal charge.  Id.  If it is not, then the trial court must 
decide whether the alleged lesser included offense is a factually included offense to the principal 
charge.  Id. at 567.  Finally, if the alleged lesser included offense is either an inherently or 
factually included offense to the principal charge, then the trial court must determine if there is a 
serious evidentiary dispute regarding the element that distinguishes the lesser offense from the 
principal charge.  Id.  If such a dispute is present and a jury could conclude that the lesser offense 
was committed but not the principal charge, then it is reversible error for the trial court to refuse 
to give the jury instructions on the lesser included offense.  Id. 
 
Our jurisprudence teaches that voluntary manslaughter is an inherently lesser included 
offense of murder.  See Watts v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (Ind. 2008).  This is not a typical 
example of a lesser included offense in that what distinguishes voluntary manslaughter from 
murder is the existence of sudden heat, which is not an element of murder, but rather “a 
mitigating factor in conduct that would otherwise be murder.”  Wilson v. State, 697 N.E.2d 466, 
474 (Ind. 1998) (quoting Estes v. State, 451 N.E.2d 313, 314 (Ind. 1983)).  “Sudden heat occurs 
when a defendant is provoked by anger, rage, resentment, or terror, to a degree sufficient to 
obscure the reason of an ordinary person, prevent deliberation and premeditation, and render the 
defendant incapable of cool reflection.”  Conner v. State, 829 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Ind. 2005).  Thus, 
an instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense to a murder charge is 
 
16 
warranted only if the evidence reflects a serious evidentiary dispute regarding the presence of 
sudden heat.  Watts, 885 N.E.2d at 1232. 
 
Isom contends “the testimony of the witnesses showed that Isom’s anger continued as he 
was shooting recklessly” such that the evidence of his “anger and rage about the end of his 
marriage” as introduced by the State is sufficient to establish a serious evidentiary dispute.  Br. 
of Appellant at 40, 39.  We make the following observations.  First, it is true that one of the 
State’s proffered motives for the killings was that “Isom was angry about the marriage falling 
apart.”  Id. at 40; see also Tr. at 13140 (arguing to the jury during closing remarks: “It was the 
wedding anniversary in which there wasn’t much to celebrate.  Kevin recently unemployed.  And 
Cassandra days before mentioned she may be leaving him.”).  But “[a]nger standing alone is not 
sufficient to support an instruction on sudden heat.”  Wilson, 697 N.E.2d at 474.  Further “[a]n 
otherwise normally stressful encounter does not suddenly inflame sudden heat, mitigating 
murder, simply because a person suffers from a [particular state of mind] which gives him a ‘hair 
trigger.”’  Id. (rejecting defendant’s claim that post-traumatic stress disorder triggered flashbacks 
in stressful situations—such as seeing his wife with her boyfriend—and was sufficient to give 
rise to the presence of sudden heat because “the record indicate[d] he was angry about the 
relationship his wife was having.”  (emphasis added)).   
 
Second, to the extent Isom contends that Cassandra must have said something to provoke 
his rage, we note there is simply nothing in the record about a conversation between the two in 
the moments before Cassandra and the children were shot.  And we reject as pure speculation 
Isom’s contention that “[w]hatever was said may have triggered the rage which erupted from 
Isom, the very rage that the State described to the jury in its closing.”  Br. of Appellant at 40 
n.15.5  Third, and importantly, even assuming Cassandra or the children said something to Isom 
that may have been provocative, “[w]ords alone are not sufficient provocation to reduce murder 
to manslaughter.”  Perigo v. State, 541 N.E.2d 936, 939 (Ind. 1989). 
 
                                                 
5 We note that in his statement to police, which was introduced into evidence over Isom’s objection (and 
for which no claim of error has been raised on appeal), Isom answered, “No,” to the question, “Was there 
an argument or fight before the [sic] this incident occurred.”  Tr. at 12620.  He also answered, “No,” to 
the question, “Did your wife or kids make any threats against you yesterday.”  Tr. at 12621.  
 
17 
In this case there was no evidentiary dispute—and certainly not a serious one—regarding 
sudden heat, the mitigating circumstance that distinguishes voluntary manslaughter from murder.  
As such the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give a voluntary manslaughter 
instruction to the jury.  
 
B. Weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors  
 
Isom next contends the trial court improperly instructed the jury during the penalty phase 
of the proceedings.  According to Isom the trial court erred in reading to the jury Instruction No. 
8 because it did not instruct the jury that it must find that the aggravating circumstance 
outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt in order to recommend a 
sentence of death.  Essentially, this argument amounts to a claim that the trial court’s instruction 
was not a correct statement of the law.  Instruction No. 8 reads as follows:  
 
You may recommend the sentence of death or life imprisonment 
without parole only if you unanimously find:  
 
1. That the State of Indiana has proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the charged aggravating circumstance exists as 
to each count in Counts VIII, IX and X 
 
And 
 
2. That any mitigating circumstance or circumstances that 
exist are outweighed by the charged and proven 
aggravating circumstance.   
 
App. at 849 (emphasis added). 
 
During the instruction conference preceding the penalty phase of trial, defense counsel 
objected to the emphasized portion of this tendered instruction.  Isom claims that this instruction 
is not a correct statement of the law because the latter sentence should read, “[t]he aggravating 
circumstance must outweigh the mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Br. of Appellant at 19 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (alteration in original).   
 
 
18 
We recently addressed this same argument in Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 190 (Ind. 2014).  
In that case, Inman argued that Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9(l),6 also the governing statute 
here, was unconstitutional because it does not require the weighing of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances be determined beyond a reasonable doubt.  We were not persuaded by this 
argument and affirmed the defendant’s conviction and life without parole sentence.  In so doing, 
we rejected his challenge to our decision in Ritchie v. State where a majority of this Court 
concluded “the Indiana Death Penalty Statute does not violate the Sixth Amendment as 
interpreted by Apprendi7 and Ring8 [because] [o]nce a statutory aggravator is found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Ring and Apprendi is 
satisfied.”  809 N.E.2d 258, 268 (Ind. 2004).  Our conclusion in Inman is controlling here.  As 
we explained in that case: “Because we concluded in Ritchie that neither federal constitutional 
doctrine under Apprendi and Ring nor Indiana state jurisprudence leads to the requirement that 
weighing be done under a reasonable doubt standard, the trial court was not required to [instruct 
the jury to] weigh the aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Inman, 4 N.E.3d at 196 (internal quotation omitted).  We laid whatever 
                                                 
6 The statute provides: 
 
(l) Before a sentence may be imposed under this section, the jury, in a 
proceeding under subsection (e), or the court, in a proceeding under 
subsection (g), must find that: 
 
(1) the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one 
(1) of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (b) 
exists; and 
 
(2) any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the 
aggravating circumstance or circumstances. 
 
I.C. § 35-50-2-9(l). 
 
7 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding: “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 
8 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial 
precludes “a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for 
imposition of the death penalty” where the “enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‘the functional 
equivalent of an element of a greater offense’” (internal citation omitted) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 
494 n.19)).  
 
19 
uncertainty there may have been regarding this issue to rest in Inman and we decline to revisit 
the issue here.9 
 
IV. 
Juror’s Question 
 
Isom next challenges the trial court’s refusal to allow a witness to answer a juror’s 
question during the penalty phase of trial.  This claim is based on the following facts.  In his 
case-in-chief Isom called as witnesses two of his cousins, one of whom testified that she had 
spoken to Cassandra’s parents who “told [her] that they forgive.  They forgive him.”  Tr. at 
13442.  The other testified that Cassandra’s parents “don’t want the death penalty.”  Tr. at 13533.  
In rebuttal the State called as witnesses Cassandra’s father and sister.  Both denied having any 
conversations with the family about their forgiveness or the State’s request for the death penalty.  
Before Cassandra’s sister was excused, the trial court invited questions from the jury.  One juror 
inquired, “does the family forgive Kevin?”  Tr. at 13828.  The trial court did not permit the 
witness to answer the question.  Isom claims reversible error. 
 
“This Court has previously held that it is proper to permit jurors to propound questions 
during the progress of a trial, subject to proper regulation by the trial court.”  Tyson v. State, 386 
N.E.2d 1185, 1192 (1979) (citing Carter v. State, 234 N.E.2d 650, 652 (Ind. 1968)).  Isom 
argues, “[f]orgiveness is potentially a significant piece of evidence that should have been 
considered by the jury before it made its recommendation to the court.”  Br. of Appellant at 60-
61.  Thus, according to Isom, the failure to permit the witness to answer the juror’s question as to 
whether “the family forgive[s] Kevin” impinged upon his right to present mitigation evidence 
and was thus improper.   
 
 
Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9(c) sets forth a number of mitigating circumstances that 
the jury (or the judge in the case of a bench trial) may consider when determining whether a 
                                                 
9 In Ritchie the author of this opinion dissented in part believing the plain language of the statute makes 
death eligibility contingent upon certain findings that must be weighed by the jury on proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  But the author acknowledges Ritchie as stare decisis on this issue.  
 
 
20 
sentence of death should be imposed.10  There is a statutory “catch-all” mitigator—“[a]ny other 
circumstances appropriate for consideration.”  I.C. § 35-50-2-9(c)(8).  We have observed: 
 
[T]he Legislature’s choice to allow death penalty defendants to 
present every conceivable mitigator is in compliance with Lockett 
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 [(1978)], which requires that “the sentencer . 
. . not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any 
aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis 
for a sentence less than death.”   
 
Minnick v. State, 698 N.E.2d 745, 761 (Ind. 1998) (omission in original) (quoting Lockett, 438 
U.S. at 604 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).  It is this proposition upon which Isom relies 
in contending the trial court committed reversible error in not allowing the witness to answer the 
juror’s question.  
 
 
 
It is true that expressions of forgiveness by a victim of a crime may be considered a 
mitigating circumstance.  See e.g. Deane v. State, 759 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ind. 2001) (involving a 
defendant convicted of murder and attempted murder in the shooting death of his brother and the 
serious wounding of his mother.  Surviving mother expressed forgiveness and sought leniency.  
                                                 
10 The statute provides: 
 
The mitigating circumstances that may be considered under this section are as 
follows: 
 
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal conduct. 
(2) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance when the murder was committed. 
(3) The victim was a participant in or consented to the defendant’s conduct. 
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person, 
and the defendant’s participation was relatively minor. 
(5) The defendant acted under the substantial domination of another person. 
(6) The defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of the defendant’s 
conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law was 
substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or of 
intoxication. 
(7) The defendant was less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time the murder 
was committed. 
(8) Any other circumstances appropriate for consideration. 
 
I.C. § 35-50-2-9(c).  
 
21 
The trial court considered as mitigating factors the hardship on the defendant’s son, and the 
mother’s “expression of forgiveness and request for leniency.”); Rowe v. State, 539 N.E.2d 474, 
478 (Ind. 1989) (involving a defendant convicted of murder and two counts of attempted murder 
in the shooting death of his mother and the wounding of his father and sister.  The surviving 
father and sister expressed forgiveness recommending the defendant receive drug rehabilitation 
rather than prison.  On appeal, rejecting defendant’s Appellate Rule 7(B) challenge to his 100-
year sentence we declared “the trial court was well within its discretion in finding the 
aggravating factors to outweigh the mitigating factors of appellant’s age and his family’s 
forgiveness.”).  However, unlike in Deane and Rowe, here there were no surviving victims to 
express forgiveness.  To be sure family members as well as close friends and perhaps even the 
community at large may be considered “victims” of these horrendous crimes in a general sense.  
But for purposes of mitigation evidence the issue is whether Cassandra, Ci’Andria, or Michael 
forgave Isom for his crimes.  This is unknowable.  In short Isom does not explain how the 
family’s forgiveness is a mitigating factor.  That is to say, he does not explain how or why the 
family’s thoughts on the killings have a bearing on Isom’s character or any circumstances of the 
offenses.  See Minnick, 698 N.E.2d at 761.  The trial court committed no error in disallowing the 
witness’ testimony.11   
 
V. 
Allegations of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
During the penalty phase of trial the deputy prosecutor made several comments that Isom 
contends amount to prosecutorial misconduct because, according to Isom, they focused not on 
the charged aggravator and how that aggravator outweighed any mitigating factors, but rather 
“direct[ed] the jury to focus on the horrible nature of the killings and on Kevin Isom’s failure as 
a provider, protector and as [a] man who could not even hold onto a job.”  Br. of Appellant at 63.   
 
                                                 
11 Even assuming for the sake of argument that the family’s forgiveness qualifies as a mitigating factor 
Isom’s argument still fails.  His implicit presumption is that the family did in fact forgive him and thus an 
affirmative answer to the question was forthcoming.  But this is pure speculation.  Further, it ignores 
events occurring only moments before.  The witness—Cassandra’s sister—had just testified in rebuttal 
and denied having any conversation with the family about forgiveness.  Isom does not explain why he 
believes her answer to the juror’s question would have reflected a different reality. 
 
22 
 
Before addressing the merits of this contention, we pause to observe that Isom did not 
object at trial to the purported misconduct.  A party’s failure to present a timely objection to the 
alleged misconduct at trial results in waiver of appellate review.  Stevens v. State, 691 N.E.2d 
412, 420 (Ind. 1997).  If a defendant properly raises and preserves the issue of prosecutorial 
misconduct, then the reviewing court determines: “(1) whether the prosecutor engaged in 
misconduct, and if so, (2) whether the misconduct, under all of the circumstances, placed the 
defendant in a position of grave peril to which he or she would not have been subjected.”  Baer 
v. State, 866 N.E.2d 752, 756 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ind. 
2006)).  
 
 
“Where a claim of prosecutorial misconduct has not been properly preserved, our 
standard for review is different from that of a properly preserved claim.  More specifically, the 
defendant must establish not only the grounds for the misconduct but also the additional grounds 
for fundamental error.”  Cooper, 854 N.E.2d at 835.  “The ‘fundamental error’ exception is 
extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic 
principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the 
defendant fundamental due process.”  Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013) 
(alteration omitted) (quoting Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006)).  “The error 
claimed must either make a fair trial impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic 
and elementary principles of due process.”  Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) 
(internal quotations omitted).  
 
With the foregoing standard in mind we now address the merits of Isom’s claim.  Under 
the death penalty statute, following the completion of the guilt-determination phase of the trial 
and the rendering of the jury’s verdict, the trial court reconvenes the jury for the penalty phase.  
I.C. § 35-50-2-9(d); Brown v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1121, 1127 (Ind. 2003).  “The jury may 
recommend . . . the death penalty” only if it finds: “(1) the state has proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that at least one (1) of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (b) exists; and (2) 
any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or 
circumstances.”  I.C. §§ 35-50-2-9(e), (l). 
 
 
23 
 
As noted earlier in this opinion, the State sought the death penalty based on the (b)(8) 
aggravator—that Isom committed multiple murders.  Proceeding to the penalty phase of trial the 
State moved to “incorporate, by reference, all parts, components of the guilt phase, specifically 
but not limited to the verdicts returned on Counts I, II, III, IV, V and VI.”  Tr. at 13297.  The 
trial court granted the motion declaring: “Ladies and gentlemen, you may properly consider all 
of the evidence that has been submitted in this case so far.”  Id.  After then introducing into 
evidence the certified death certificates of Cassandra, Michael, and Ci’Andria, the State rested.  
 
 
The defense presented its case over the next two days calling eighteen witnesses that 
included four psychologists, a special education elementary school teacher who taught school in 
the neighborhood where Isom lived as a child, two Lake County correctional officers, Isom’s 
mother, and several of Isom’s other relatives.  In summary their collective testimony established 
the following.  Isom, who was forty-one years of age at the time of the killings, was an only child 
with an absent father.  He and his mother moved frequently.  During high school, he and his 
mother lived in a housing project in Chicago where gangs controlled the turf.  Isom was 
assaulted at least once and began to withdraw into himself and disassociate from everyone except 
his family, but he nonetheless graduated from high school.  He has a degenerative back disorder 
that constantly plagued him and prevented him from entering military service.  Essentially he 
was a loner who eventually got a job as a security guard, but he had lost that job just a few 
months before the killings and had started drinking.  He felt pressured because his wife was the 
sole support of the family and wanted him to get another job.  She told him she was going to 
divorce him.  Isom served nearly six years in the Lake County jail awaiting trial without any 
disciplinary incidents.  Isom suffered extreme emotional distress that set him off that night and 
explained why he experienced dissociative amnesia after the killings.  See Tr. at 13300-728.  The 
defense then rested. 
 
 
The State then proceeded with the opening phase of its closing remarks.  Following are 
the remarks that Isom contends represent prosecutorial misconduct:  
 
 
[T]he State of Indiana endorses the penalty of death in this case. . . 
. It’s the appropriate penalty when you look at aggravating 
circumstance in this case.  The aggravation relative to the multiple 
 
24 
killing circumstance.  That, in fact, three individuals were 
murdered by Mr. Isom.  Those individuals were a mother, and her 
two children.  That, in fact, those three individuals are family.  
Multiple killing dictates, tells us Mr. Isom eliminated a family 
from this earth.   
 
That mother had two children, a 16-year-old son and a 13-year-old 
daughter.  Neither provided, allowed the opportunity to grow and 
develop into adults.  Their lives were terminated on August 6, 
2007.  
  
In regard to the aggravation in terms of the facts and 
circumstances, you will recall from the evidence brought forward 
Cassandra received that devastating shotgun blast that was put to 
her head as she was on the floor and evacuated her brain from her 
skull.  That followed, were involved additionally, five entrance 
wounds from a small firearm, from the handguns, where the 
wounds were inflicted additionally to her chest, her abdomen, and 
her back.   
 
Michael Moore also having received the shotgun blast, two 
additional handgun wounds to the back and flank area along with 
grace [sic] wounds to his arms. 
 
And finally 13-year-old Ci’Andria.  Ci’Andria’s reward for being 
home that afternoon, that early evening was that she was shot with 
a 12-gauge pump action pistol grip Mossberg shotgun.  That she 
received eight separate unrelated entry wounds from the handgun.  
One of those wounds to her head.  Additional to her arms and her 
back. 
 
. . . [T]he State has proven to you the aggravating circumstance in 
this case. . . .  And . . . the appropriate penalty upon concluding 
your thoughts, your balancing is that a sentence of death deserves 
to be returned. 
 
Tr. at 13835-37.  By these remarks, according to Isom, “[t]he deputy prosecutor then amped up 
the aggravating factor from simply proving multiple murders to include the nature and 
circumstance of the crime.”  Br. of Appellant at 63.  
 
 
“[T]he circumstances of a crime often provide ‘an appropriate context for consideration 
of the alleged aggravating and mitigating circumstances.’”  Corcoran v. State, 739 N.E.2d 649, 
657 (Ind. 2000) (quoting Prowell v. State, 687 N.E.2d 563, 567 (Ind. 1997)).  Here, the defense 
 
25 
team had just concluded two days of trial presenting testimony exploring, among other things, 
Isom’s troubled childhood and stress-filled adult life.  The State merely highlighted, albeit in 
graphic and dramatic fashion, the circumstances surrounding its multiple murder aggravator, and 
by implication why the strength of this aggravator outweighed any of the defense team’s 
proposed mitigating factors.  In essence the deputy prosecutor recounted the evidence introduced 
during the guilt phase of trial, arguing that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Isom 
intentionally killed three people—an aggravating circumstance.  We discern no misconduct with 
these remarks. 
 
 
During his closing remarks defense counsel talked about Isom’s troubled childhood and 
growing up in a neighborhood that one of the defense witnesses characterized as a “war zone.”  
Tr. at 13842.  Counsel specifically focused on Isom’s “extreme emotional disturbance” that 
triggered the events of August 6, 2007.  Tr. at 13850.  Counsel continued: “We are all talking 
about anger, we are all talking about leaving marriage, losing a job.  Those are all, to someone of 
Kevin’s makeup, is devastating.  This is the man that locked himself in a room over the death of 
a family member.”  Tr. at 13851.  Counsel implored the jury: “I am asking you on behalf of 
Kevin to sentence him to a term of years.”  Tr. at 13853-54.  
 
 
Among other things, during the rebuttal phase of its closing remarks, the State appeared 
to encourage the jury to consider Isom’s character in reaching its decision: 
 
[T]he State proposes to you that, in fact, those acts of murder, of 
killing, of slaughtering his family were the a [sic] culmination of 
Kevin Isom slowly and consciously and deliberating making those 
decisions. . . .   
 
And those facts demand death.   
 
Because ultimately, ladies and gentlemen, Kevin Isom failed 
Cassandra as a wife [sic] and as a life partner.  He failed the 
children as a father.  He failed himself as a man.  He failed his 
mother as a son.  And he failed the community as a productive and 
constructive member of that community.   
 
 
26 
And for what he did, under the constrain[t]s that you’re given of 
balancing aggravating and mitigating facts, ladies and gentlemen, 
death is appropriate.  
 
Tr. at 13862-63 (emphasis added).  As we have repeatedly held “when the death sentence is 
sought, courts must . . . limit the aggravating circumstances eligible for consideration to those 
specified in the death penalty statute.”  Cooper, 854 N.E.2d at 840 (quoting Pope v. State, 737 
N.E.2d 374, 383 (Ind. 2000) (quoting Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 955 (Ind. 1994))); 
Corcoran, 739 N.E.2d at 655.  Here, in essence, the State invited the jury to recommend the 
death sentence, because “Kevin Isom failed Cassandra . . . as a life partner.  He failed the 
children as a father.  He failed himself as a man.  He failed his mother as a son.  And he failed 
the community as a productive and constructive member of that community.”  Tr. at 13863.   
 
Regarding these comments we make the following observations.  First, Isom’s character 
has no place in the penalty phase of the proceedings.  “None of the statutory factors include the 
character of the defendant.”  Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 469 (Ind. 2012) (citing I.C. § 35-
50-2-3(b)).  Second, the defendant’s relationships with the victims have no bearing on 
establishing the alleged aggravator of multiple killings, nor do they rebut the proffered mitigators 
by the defense, nor explain why the sole aggravator outweighs the dozens of mitigating 
circumstances.  While perhaps relevant in determining his commission of the charged crimes 
during the guilt phase, such an invitation to consider any facts of the case other than the 
proscribed statutory aggravators—even in part—during the penalty phase where the State seeks 
death is inappropriate.  See Cooper, 854 N.E.2d at 839, 840-41 (finding prosecutorial misconduct 
during the penalty phase where “the State encouraged the jury on several occasions to consider 
Cooper’s character in reaching its decision”). 
 
It is misconduct for a prosecutor to request a jury to return a death penalty for anything 
other than that the mitigating factors are outweighed by the aggravating factor or factors.  Id. at 
841.  In this case the State stepped over the line.  However, we emphasize that Isom did not 
object at trial to the State’s remarks.  So the question now before us is whether the remarks were 
so prejudicial to Isom’s right of fundamental due process as to make a fair trial impossible.  That 
is, was the resulting harm or potential for harm substantial?  Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 678.  We 
 
27 
think not.  These remarks were relatively isolated and came near the end of a fairly lengthy 
summation.  The jury had listened to several weeks of testimony, including two days of 
testimony and evidence in mitigation.  We are of the opinion that any harm done by the 
prosecutor’s remark was de minimus and not substantial.  Thus, the error did not result in 
denying Isom fundamental due process thereby making a fair trial impossible.   
 
VI. 
Appropriateness of Death Sentence 
 
Isom seeks our review of his death sentence for appropriateness.  The Indiana Legislature 
has determined that in capital jury trials, the question of whether to sentence a defendant to the 
death penalty is determined by the jury, after which the trial court “shall sentence the defendant 
accordingly.”  I.C.  § 35-50-2-9(e).  And here, correctly following the statutory mandate, the trial 
court sentenced Isom to death.  Thus “[t]he factual predicates of a sentence—the eligibility for 
death or life without parole—are reserved to the jury by the Sixth Amendment” as well as by 
statute.  Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 121 (Ind. 2005) (citing Ring, 536 U.S. at 589).  But death 
sentences are subject to our “automatic review” under Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9(j) and 
importantly, Article 7, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution grants this Court, in all criminal 
appeals, the authority “to review and revise the sentence imposed.”  Ind. Const. art. 7, § 4.  “We 
have implemented this discretionary authority in all criminal cases through our adoption of 
Indiana Appellate Rule 7[(B)].”  Baer, 866 N.E.2d at 764.  The Rule provides: “The Court may 
revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the 
Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the 
character of the offender.”  Ind. App. R. 7(B).  Accordingly, the appropriateness of a death 
sentence, unlike the eligibility for a death sentence, is a matter left to the discretion of this Court.  
See Pruitt, 834 N.E.2d at 121-22.  Nonetheless, a defendant must persuade the court “that his or 
her sentence has met this inappropriateness standard of review.”  Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 
1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).  
 
In considering the nature of the offense, a term of years is the starting point the 
legislature selected as appropriate for the crime of murder.  See I.C. § 35-50-2-3.  However, 
alternative penalties of life without parole or death are available upon proof of certain proscribed 
 
28 
aggravating factors.  See I.C. § 35-50-9-2.  Here, the jury recommended death sentences upon a 
finding that the sole aggravating circumstance of multiple killings outweighed the proffered 
mitigating circumstances.  The record shows Isom murdered his wife and his two, teenage step-
children, who spent most of their lives with Isom as a father-figure.  All three victims were shot 
to death apparently unexpectedly and without provocation inside their home.  The autopsy of 
Cassandra’s body revealed multiple gunshot wounds to her chest, abdominal region, and back.  
The cause of her death was a shotgun blast to the top of her head evacuating her brain from her 
skull.  Michael also sustained multiple gunshot wounds and was killed by a shotgun blast to his 
chest.  Ci’Andria received eight separate entrance wounds to her body caused by three different 
weapons.  Each victim was shot multiple times at close range.   
“We have usually regarded multiple murder as constituting weighty aggravation.”  
McManus v. State, 814 N.E.2d 253, 266 (Ind. 2004); see also Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 
502 (Ind. 2002) (concluding that a quadruple killing was weightier than Defendant’s proffered 
evidence in mitigation).  Further, this Court has determined that a defendant is deserving of an 
enhanced sentence under facts where “the nature of the killings are brutal.”  Brown v. State, 10 
N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 341 (Ind. 2006)).  The record 
makes clear that the nature of the offense is a brutal triple murder Isom committed against his 
own family.  
The character of the offender, rather than the nature of the offense, presents Isom’s 
strongest support for revision.  In many ways, his background was pretty solid and 
unremarkable.  Dr. Parker’s testimony for example revealed in part that Isom graduated from 
high school, had good family support, went to work after graduating from high school, and 
apparently was reasonably successful.  Isom had good educational accomplishment, minimal 
legal history, no prior psychiatric history, and he had not suffered from serious mental illness.  
Further, Isom had a successful marriage for twelve years, provided for his family, and had no 
history of domestic violence.  According to Isom theses factors coupled with his lack of criminal 
history and incident-free term of incarceration weighs in favor of revising his sentence.  We 
disagree.  It appears to this Court that the nature of the offenses Isom committed far outweigh his 
otherwise favorable character.  Under the facts presented here we cannot say that Isom has met 
 
29 
his burden to show that the jury’s unanimous recommendation, which the trial court properly 
imposed, was inappropriate. 
 
VII. 
Imposition of Consecutive Sentences 
 
As previously indicated the jury recommended the death penalty for each of the three 
murder convictions.  The court accepted the jury’s recommendation and over Isom’s objection 
ordered the three death penalties to be served consecutively.  The trial court reasoned, “from a 
legal perspective and a practical perspective, each victim is entitled to their own sentence.”  Tr. 
at 13903.  Isom claims error.12  
 
A trial court cannot impose consecutive sentences in the absence of express statutory 
authority.  Mask v. State, 829 N.E.2d 932, 935 (Ind. 2005).  Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2(c), which 
governs the court’s authority to impose such sentences, provides in relevant part “[e]xcept [for 
factors not pertinent here] the court shall determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be 
served concurrently or consecutively.”  (emphasis added).  As we have explained:  
 
A “term of imprisonment” is a penalty under which the convict is sent to 
incarceration for some period (such as two years or five to ten years) and then 
released after the period has passed.  Execution is a penalty of a radically different 
sort.  It features incarceration only while appellate processes persist and does not 
contemplate a future release into society. 
 
State v. Price, 715 N.E.2d 331, 332 (Ind. 1999).  Accordingly, “the death penalty is not ‘a term 
of imprisonment’” within the meaning of I.C. § 35-50-1-2.  Id.  In consequence the trial court 
here exceeded its statutory authority by ordering Isom’s death sentences to be served 
consecutively.  
 
                                                 
12 Neither Isom nor the State provides much in the way of analysis on this issue.  Without citation to 
authority Isom’s one page argument essentially boils down to “Kevin Isom cannot be put to death three 
times . . . .”  Br. of Appellant at 68.  In its one page response, also without citation to authority, the State 
asserts, “Defendant is not prejudiced or harmed by having three death sentences instead of one.”  Br. of 
Appellee at 64.  
 
30 
Conclusion 
We affirm Isom’s convictions and remand this cause to the trial court with instructions to 
issue a new sentencing order consistent with this opinion. 
 
Rush, C.J., and Dickson, David and Massa, JJ., concur.