Title: Joe Hudson Collision Center, Joe Hudson and Traweek Dickson v. Blake Dymond
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1060809
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 30, 2009

Rel: 12/30/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649)), of any typographical or other errors, in 
order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010
____________________
1060809
____________________
Joe Hudson Collision Center, Joe Hudson, and Traweek Dickson
v.
Blake Dymond
____________________
1060856
____________________
Kenneth Stringfellow
v.
Blake Dymond
Appeals from Montgomery Circuit Court 
(CV-06-2109)
1060809, 1060856
2
PARKER, Justice.
These two appeals are from the denial of two  motions to
compel the arbitration of claims asserted in a single
complaint in the Montgomery Circuit Court.  The appeals have
been consolidated for the purpose of writing one opinion. 
Background
Blake Dymond was hired by Joe Hudson Collision Center
("JHCC") as a painter's helper, and within days he was moved
to the position of painter. He participated with two other
painters in a plan under which each painter would receive one-
third pay for all hours worked by the three painters, but when
Dymond returned from a two-day leave, the compensation method
had been modified so that each painter was paid a commission
for each job he completed. Dymond allegedly spoke to Kenneth
Stringfellow, his immediate supervisor, to complain that the
new payment method was unfair to him and that he was not being
assigned jobs. Stringfellow responded that Dymond worked more
slowly than the others and that the earlier compensation
method unfairly penalized the other two painters. Dymond
alleges that on or about August 6, 2004, Stringfellow
assaulted him when he attempted to bring the matter to the
1060809, 1060856
In the complaint and in places in the record Dickson is
1
referred to as "Dixon."
The document bears a date of "5/24/05," but Dickson has
2
provided his sworn affidavit stating that it was executed on
the day Dymond began work at JHCC, May 24, 2004.
3
attention of Stringfellow's supervisor.
 On August 4, 2006, Dymond filed an action in the
Montgomery Circuit Court, naming as defendants Stringfellow,
in his individual capacity; JHCC; Joe Hudson, as an owner and
operator of JHCC; Traweek Dickson,  as an owner and operator
1
of JHCC; and fictitiously named defendants. He claimed that
Stringfellow committed an assault and battery against him;
that JHCC, Hudson, and Dickson ("the JHCC appellants") were
vicariously liable under the theory of respondeat superior and
were negligent and/or  wanton in their hiring, training, and
supervision of Stringfellow; and that all defendants were
guilty of the tort of outrage. 
Stringfellow and the JHCC appellants each filed a motion
to compel arbitration under an agreement that was part of an
"employment-dispute-resolution program," which Dymond and
Dickson signed on May 24, 2004  ("the agreement"). In their
2
motion, the JHCC appellants averred that "[b]y executing the
[agreement], ... Dymond agreed to participate in a dispute-
1060809, 1060856
4
resolution program which compels that all disputes involving
matters directly or indirectly related to his employment ...
be resolved through binding arbitration pursuant to the
American Arbitration Association 'National Rules for the
Resolution of Employment Disputes.'"  The agreement reads, in
pertinent part, as follows:
"A. INTRODUCTION
"Please 
take 
time 
to 
read 
the 
following
material. IT APPLIES TO YOU. It will govern all
future legal disputes between you and [JHCC]. ...
"Effective July 15, 2003, all employee disputes
will be referred for resolution through the JHCC
Dispute Resolution Program (the 'Program'). ...
"This Program is binding on all employees. ...
Except as expressly provided below, this Program
precludes an employee and JHCC from going to court
to have disputes heard by a judge or a jury.
"....
"B. SCOPE OF PROGRAM
"This [Program] covers all matters directly or
indirectly related to your ... employment including,
but not limited to, claims involving discrimination,
harassment, or retaliation, whether brought under
federal, state, of local laws. Except as provided in
the following paragraph neither the employee nor
JHCC may initiate or prosecute any lawsuit or action
in any way related to any dispute covered by this
Program.
"Excluded ... are employees claims for workers'
1060809, 1060856
5
compensation 
benefits 
(except 
that 
retaliation
claims 
must 
be 
arbitrated) 
or 
unemployment
compensation. Also excluded ... are claims by JHCC
for injunctions or other types of injunctive relief
for unfair competition [and for the protection of
trade 
secrets, 
confidential 
information, 
and
restrictive covenants]. Moreover, nothing contained
[herein shall be construed as] prohibiting an
employee or JHCC from filing an administrative
charge of discrimination or an unfair labor practice
charge, or from reporting alleged violations of the
law to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
the National Labor Relations Board, or any other
governmental agency acting pursuant to federal or
state law.
"Arbitration under this Program may be used to
resolve only those disputes that would constitute a
legal cause of action in a court of law. This
Program is intended to substitute final and binding
arbitration for going to court. ... Arbitration must
be initiated within the applicable statute of
limitation.
"....
"D. THE ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
"Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, any
arbitration 
under 
this 
Program 
shall 
be 
in
accordance 
with 
the 
[American 
Arbitration
Association's] National Rules for the Resolution of
Employment Disputes .... The Arbitrator, and not any
federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have
exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating
to 
the 
interpretation, 
applicability,
enforceability, formation, or scope of this Program,
including but not limited to any claim that all or
any part of this Program is void or voidable.
"....
1060809, 1060856
6
"F. JUDICIAL REVIEW
"Either party may bring an action in any proper
court to require arbitration ... and to enforce an
arbitration award. A party opposing enforcement of
an award may not do so in an enforcement proceeding
but must bring a separate action in any court of
competent jurisdiction to set aside the award where
the scope of review will be that established by the
Federal Arbitration Act.
"G. GENERAL
"1.
Interstate Commerce. By ... becoming or
remaining employed with JHCC, you agree that JHCC
engages 
in 
transactions 
involving 
interstate
commerce and that your employment involves such
commerce.
"2.
Requirements 
for 
Modification 
or
Revocation. 
This 
Program 
shall 
survive 
the
termination of employment and shall apply to all
disputes whether they arise or are asserted before,
during, or after termination of employment with
JHCC.
"3.
Severability. If any portion or provision
of 
this 
Program 
is 
found 
to 
be 
invalid 
or
unenforceable in any respect, the remainder of the
Program will remain in full force and effect."
(Capitalization in original.)
In their brief on appeal the JHCC appellants present
Dickson's affidavit, in which he stated, in support of the
motion to compel arbitration, that the business of JHCC both
involves, and has a significant nexus with, interstate
commerce. Also, as quoted above, section G of the agreement
1060809, 1060856
7
states that Dymond's employment involves interstate commerce.
Stringfellow quoted in his motion to compel arbitration that
part of the agreement that says that the agreement "'covers
all matters directly or indirectly related to [the employee's]
recruitment, employment, terms and conditions of employment,
including, 
but 
not 
limited 
to, 
claims 
involving 
...
harassment.'"
Dymond filed an objection on October 19, 2006, to the
JHCC appellants' motion to compel arbitration, arguing that
his employment at JHCC did not involve interstate commerce,
that he was rushed when he signed the agreement and did not
understand the implications of the agreement, which were not
explained to him, and that he was told that he would not be
paid until he signed the agreement.
In his motion to compel arbitration, Stringfellow adopted
the motion of the JHCC appellants. He also asserted in the
motion, as he does in his brief on appeal, that although he
was not a signatory to the agreement, he is a third-party
beneficiary of the agreement. Stringfellow also asserts in his
motion and appellate brief that, because the claims against
him are so closely related to the claims against the JHCC
1060809, 1060856
The trial court also heard argument on a motion by Alfa
3
Mutual Insurance Company to intervene in the case. Alfa sought
a judgment declaring its liability to cover Stringfellow under
his homeowner's liability policy for the claims asserted
against him by Dymond. Alfa's action, however, has no bearing
on the issue before this Court, i.e., whether the motions to
compel arbitration should have been granted. 
8
appellants, Dymond is equitably estopped from denying the
arbitrability of the claims against him. Because we find, as
discussed below, that Stringfellow may compel arbitration of
the claims against him, we do not reach these assertions.
The trial court held a hearing on January 23, 2007, at
which 
the 
arguments 
regarding 
the 
motions 
to 
compel
arbitration were presented.  The trial court determined that
3
the agreement did not require arbitration of the dispute. The
order of the trial court denying both motions to compel
arbitration reads:
"This matter came before the Court on January
23, 2007 for a hearing on Motions to Stay/Compel
Arbitration filed by Defendants Joe Hudson Collision
Center, Joe Hudson, [Traweek Dickson], and Kenneth
Stringfellow. Upon consideration of these motions,
this Court is of the opinion that said motions are
due to be DENIED.
"Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the
Motions to Stay/Compel Arbitration filed by all
defendants are DENIED, which order is a FINAL order
of this Court on the issue.
"DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of Jan, 2007."
1060809, 1060856
9
(Capitalization 
in 
original.) The JHCC appellants 
and
Stringfellow appeal. Dymond did not file an appellee's brief.
Issues Presented on Appeal
The JHCC appellants present three issues for resolution
by this Court. The JHCC appellants allege that the trial court
erred when it denied their motion to compel arbitration on the
basis that the agreement did not encompass the disputes here.
The JHCC appellants next contend that Dymond offered
insufficient evidence that the agreement is invalid or
inapplicable, because, they say, Dymond failed of meet his
burden under Polaris Sales, Inc. v. Heritage Imports, Inc.,
879 So. 2d 1129 (Ala. 2003), requiring the party opposing
arbitration 
to 
present 
evidence 
indicating 
that 
the
arbitration agreement was either invalid or inapplicable to
the dispute in question. Finally, they also argued that, by
incorporating 
the 
rules 
of 
the 
American 
Arbitration
Association ("the AAA") into the agreement, the JHCC
appellants and Dymond agreed that the issue of arbitrability
of disputes would be decided by an arbitrator. 
Stringfellow presents one issue on appeal:
"Whether the trial court committed reversible error
in 
denying 
Stringfellow's 
Motion 
to 
Compel
1060809, 1060856
10
Arbitration where the arbitration agreement at issue
encompasses 'all matters directly or indirectly
related' to [Dymond's] employment, and [Dymond's]
claims arose out of a dispute with his former
manager regarding compensation."
Stringfellow's brief, at 4.
Standard of Review
"[T]he review applied to a trial court's ruling on
a motion to compel arbitration at the instance of
either party is a de novo determination of whether
the trial judge erred on a factual or legal issue to
the substantial prejudice of the party seeking
review. Ex parte Roberson, 749 So. 2d 441 (Ala.
1999)."
Brown v. Dewitt, Inc., 808 So. 2d 11, 13 (Ala. 2001).
"Initially, the party seeking to compel arbitration
has the burden of proving the existence of a
contract calling for arbitration and proving that
that contract evidences a transaction involving
interstate commerce. Polaris Sales, Inc. v. Heritage
Imports, Inc., 879 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (Ala. 2003).
The moving party 'must "'produce some evidence which
tends to establish its claim.'"' Wolff Motor Co. v.
White, 869 So. 2d 1129, 1131 (Ala. 2003)(quoting Jim
Burke Auto., Inc. v. Beavers, 674 So. 2d 1260, 1265
(Ala. 1995), quoting in turn In re American Freight
Sys., Inc., 164 B.R. 341, 345 (D. Kan. 1994)). Once
the moving party has properly supported his or her
motion to compel arbitration, the burden then shifts
to the nonmovant to present evidence tending to show
that the arbitration agreement is invalid or
inapplicable to the case. Polaris Sales, 879 So. 2d
at 1132."
Edwards v. Costner, 979 So. 2d 757, 761 (Ala. 2007).
Furthermore, 
"[t]he 
[Federal] 
Arbitration 
Act 
establishes
1060809, 1060856
11
that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration ...." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
Analysis
Case No. 1060809 -- The JHCC Appellants
The JHCC appellants contend that the trial court erred
when it denied their motion to compel arbitration on the basis
that the agreement did not encompass this dispute. The JHCC
appellants argue that by incorporating the AAA rules into the
agreement, the parties agreed that the issue of arbitrability
of any dispute would be decided by an arbitrator. We agree. 
Section D of the agreement incorporates the AAA National
Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes. Rule 8(a) of
the AAA National Rules provides that the arbitrator "shall
have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction,
including any objections, with respect to the existence,
scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement." JHCC
appellants' brief, at 27. "[A]n arbitration provision that
incorporates rules that provide for the arbitrator to decide
issues of arbitrability clearly and unmistakably evidences the
1060809, 1060856
12
parties' intent to arbitrate the scope of the arbitration
provision. CitiFinancial Corp., L.L.C. v. Peoples, [973 So. 2d
332, 340,  (Ala. 2007)]." JHCC appellants' brief, at 27.
Moreover, there are two provisions in the agreement,
which  Dymond signed, that defined the authority of the
arbitrator and the scope of the agreement. The agreement, in
section D, specifically states that the "Arbitrator, and not
any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have
exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the ...
applicability, or scope of this Program ...." In section B,
the parties agreed that the agreement "covers all matters
directly of indirectly related to [the] ... employment,
including ... claims involving discrimination, harassment, or
retaliation."
In response to Dymond's claim that his employment at JHCC
did not involve interstate commerce, the JHCC appellants cite
Wolff Motor Co. v. White, 869 So. 2d 1129 (Ala. 2003), for the
proposition that "'[t]he automobile, if anything, is the
paradigm of modern interstate commercial activity ... [and
that] "cars themselves are instrumentalities of commerce,"'"
such that JHCC's operation of "numerous businesses within
1060809, 1060856
13
Alabama and an additional  location in the state of Florida,"
all of which receive parts and equipment in interstate
commerce, indicates, "without question that the business of
[JHCC] and the plaintiff's employment at one of the locations
... 
affected 
interstate commerce" and "the employment
relationship and all legal disputes arising therefrom" are
governed by the agreement. JHCC appellants' brief, at 21-22.
In addition, Dickson, as president of JHCC, submitted his
affidavit to the trial court stating that the "business of
[JHCC] involves and affects interstate commerce and has a
significant nexus with interstate commerce in its day-to-day
operations." We agree that JHCC is engaged in interstate
commerce, that Dymond's employment there involves interstate
commerce, and that the agreement applies to Dymond.
The JHCC appellants respond to Dymond's claim that the
agreement was never explained to him, stating that although
Dymond's allegation is totally unsupported by any evidence, 
"[t]he law is well settled that:
 
"'A party to a contract is responsible for
reading the contract. See Ex parte Perry,
744 So. 2d 859, 863 (Ala. 1999) (opinion of
three Justices). "[W]hen a competent adult,
having the ability to read and understand
an instrument, signs a contract, he will be
1060809, 1060856
14
held to be on notice of all the provisions
contained in that contract, including an
arbitration provision, and will be bound
thereby." First Family Fin. Servs., Inc. v.
Rogers, 736 So. 2d 553, 558 (Ala. 1999).'
"Advance Tank and Construction Company, Inc. v. Gulf
Coast Asphalt Company, L.L.C., [968 So. 2d 520, 528
(Ala. 2006).]"
JHCC appellants' brief, at 22. Thus, it is immaterial whether
the agreement was explained to Dymond. As a competent and
literate adult, he is responsible for the contracts that he
makes. Advance Tank & Constr. Co. v. Gulf Coast Asphalt Co.,
968 So. 2d 520 (Ala. 2006).
This Court recently reiterated its recognition of the
strong federal policy favoring arbitration.
"The United States Supreme Court recognizes a
strong federal policy favoring arbitration:
"'The 
[Federal] 
Arbitration 
Act 
establishes
that, as a matter of federal law, any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is
the construction of the contract language
itself or an allegation of waiver, delay,
or a like defense to arbitrability.'
"Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765
(1983) (footnote omitted)."
Ex parte Johnson,  993 So. 2d 875, 885 (Ala. 2008). Because
1060809, 1060856
15
the agreement, which was mutually executed, unambiguously
stated that the arbitrator, and not any court or agency, would
have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute concerning the
applicability and scope of the agreement, the trial court
erred when it denied the JHCC appellants' motion to compel
arbitration. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court
denying the JHCC appellants' motion to compel arbitration is
reversed.
Case No. 1060856 -- Stringfellow
Stringfellow, a nonsignatory to the agreement he seeks to
enforce, argues that the claims against him are so closely
related with those asserted against the JHCC appellants that
Dymond is equitably estopped from denying the arbitrability of
the claims against him. Moreover, Stringfellow argues that he
is a third-party beneficiary of the agreement and that he is
entitled to the benefit of the agreement. We need not reach
Stringfellow's assertions, however, because he is entitled to
compel Dymond to arbitrate his claims against Stringfellow. 
In count 5 of his complaint, Dymond stated that "at the
time of the incident ... Stringfellow was acting in the line
and scope of his employment. He was acting in the capacity of
1060809, 1060856
16
assistant manager [in the service] of the 'Center,' Hudson and
[Dickson]." The claims filed against the other defendants are
intimately founded in the same incident. In his objection to
the motions to compel arbitration, Dymond did not challenge
Stringfellow's standing to seek arbitration.
As this Court has previously stated: "[An] employee[] of
a signatory to the contract[] ha[s] standing to enforce the
arbitration provision." Ex parte Rush, 730 So. 2d 1175, 1177
n.2 (Ala. 1998). Because Stringfellow has standing to compel
arbitration, 
the 
order 
of 
the 
trial 
court 
denying
Stringfellow's motion to compel arbitration is in error and
must be reversed.  
Conclusion
Case No. 1060809 -- The JHCC Appellants
The determination of the arbitrability of this dispute is
a question reserved for an arbitrator under the agreement.
Thus, the ruling of the trial court was in error. Therefore,
we reverse the judgment of the trial court, and we remand the
case with directions to grant the motion of the JHCC
appellants to stay the proceedings in the trial court and to
compel arbitration. 
1060809, 1060856
17
Case No. 1060856 -- Stringfellow
As an employee of JHCC, Stringfellow is entitled to
compel 
Dymond 
to 
arbitrate 
the 
claims 
against 
him.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, and
we remand the case with directions to grant the motion to stay
the proceedings in the trial court and to compel arbitration.
1060809 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
1060856 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and Shaw, JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons and Woodall, JJ., concur specially.
1060809, 1060856
18
WOODALL, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion, but I write to clarify that
Kenneth Stringfellow, in both the trial court and this Court,
has adequately argued that Ex parte Rush, 730 So. 2d 1175
(Ala. 1998), supports his claim that his status as an employee
of Joe Hudson Collision Center allows him to enforce the
arbitration agreement.  As noted in the main opinion, Dymond's
objections to the motions to compel arbitration did not
include any challenge to Stringfellow's standing to enforce
the arbitration agreement, and Dymond has filed no brief in
this Court. Therefore, I question whether it is necessary for
this Court to address the issue of Stringfellow's standing to
enforce that agreement.  However, I certainly agree that,
under the facts of this case, he had standing to do so.  
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, J., concur.