Title: New Jersey v. Hummel
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: March 13, 2018

New Jersey v. Hummel Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary On December 5, 2010, Thomas Carbin was stabbed to death. The Gloucester County Prosecutor’s Office began interviewing individuals to obtain information about Carbin and learned that defendant Lori Hummel was in Carbin’s “circle of acquaintances.” Investigator Krohn discovered that defendant had two outstanding traffic bench warrants. Investigator Krohn advised defendant that he was going to bring her to the police station for the traffic warrants but assured her that she would be released on her own recognizance. Detectives began asking defendant substantive questions without advising her of her Miranda rights. Defendant resisted answering any more questions, stating she thought she wanted to get a lawyer. Detectives thereafter notified defendant she had an outstanding warrant. Defendant asked several times whether she could make a phone call to her lawyer. One detective took defendant’s purse from the table, and defendant stated that she did not like that he had her pocketbook. Defendant was then notified she was “in custody,” at that point, detectives began taking everything out of defendant’s purse and placing each item on the table in the interrogation room. Police arrested defendant three days later; a Grand Jury ultimately returned an indictment, charging defendant with first-degree murder; first-degree felony murder; first-degree robbery; third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose; and fourth-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. Later, third-degree conspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) was added to defendant’s list of charges. Defendant waived her right to an indictment in exchange for the State amending her first-degree murder charge to first-degree aggravated manslaughter. The indictment and accusation were then consolidated for disposition. Defendant moved to suppress her statements to police and the physical evidence obtained during her 2010 interrogation. After review, the New Jersey Supreme Court found no valid inventory search, affirming the Appellate Division’s determination that the evidence seized during the search should have been suppressed. The Court remanded to permit defendant to withdraw her guilty plea and continue at the trial court level or, in the alternative, to proceed before a PCR court on other issues she has preserved. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State v. Lori A. Hummel (A-36-16) (078476)Argued October 24, 2017 -- Decided March 13, 2018TIMPONE, J., writing for the Court. The Court considers the legality of the police’s search and seizure of the contents of defendant Lori Hummel’s handbag while she was detained at the Gloucester County Prosecutor’s Office. On December 5, 2010, Thomas Carbin was stabbed to death. On December 7, 2010, Investigator Gary Krohn advised defendant that he was going to bring her to the police station for two outstanding traffic bench warrants; he drove her to the Gloucester County Prosecutor’s Office. There, he introduced defendant to Detective Bryn Wilden and Sergeant James Ballenger. Detective Wilden then escorted defendant into an interrogation room. Defendant placed her purse on the table in front of her. Around 1:56 p m., Detective Wilden and Sergeant Ballenger entered defendant’s interrogation room to begin questioning her. The detectives took seats at the table without removing defendant’s purse or frisking her. About a minute into questioning, defendant reached into and rummaged through her purse to retrieve her cell phone. She checked the time and advised the detectives that she had to pick up her daughter by 3:20 p m. The detectives did not comment on her time constraint. Detective Wilden then asked defendant to raise her right hand and swore her in. The detectives began asking defendant substantive questions without advising her of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In response to questions from the detectives about her cell phone, defendant began to look through her purse for a receipt showing her recent cell phone purchase. The detectives kept questioning defendant about her relationship with the victim. The detectives left defendant alone in the room. She put her belongings back into her purse and stepped outside, asking if she could leave to pick up her daughter. The detectives did not permit her to leave. She then asked, “Am I arrested?” Detective Wilden responded that “technically” she had traffic warrants and that they still had questions for her. Defendant stated that she thought she wanted to get a lawyer. After briefly asking questions about defendant’s decision to retain a lawyer, the detectives ceased talking to defendant and left the room. Soon after, Detective Wilden cuffed defendant’s right ankle to a bar on the floor and told defendant that she was being detained and that she had an outstanding warrant. Defendant asked several times whether she could make a phone call to her lawyer. Detective Wilden took defendant’s purse from the table, and defendant stated that she did not like that he had her pocketbook. Sergeant Ballenger responded that defendant was “in custody.” As Detective Wilden began walking out, defendant said, “Hopefully that $500 ain’t missing out of there.” In response to defendant’s comment, the detectives began taking everything out of her purse. They asked if she would rather search the purse herself, but defendant declined. Detective Wilden found two electronic benefits transfer (EBT) cards issued through New Jersey’s “Families First” supplemental income program. He asked defendant if the cards were hers. She responded that everything in the pocketbook was hers. Detective Wilden read her the name of another individual on one of the cards. Defendant disavowed that she knew that individual or how the card wound up in her purse. Detective Wilden then put all the items back into the purse and left the room with it. The detectives left defendant shackled for over two hours. At one point she asked why she could not get a lawyer, and the detectives failed to allow her to call one. Around 5:48 p.m., the detectives unsecured defendant’s ankle and escorted her out of the room to be released. Police arrested defendant three days later. Defendant moved to suppress her statements to police and the physical evidence obtained during her interrogation. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress her statements to police but denied her motion to suppress physical evidence. Defendant appealed from the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress physical evidence. The Appellate Division panel found that the Families First EBT card should have been suppressed 1 because the detectives’ inventory search developed into a warrantless investigatory search. The panel ruled that defendant could apply within thirty days to withdraw her guilty plea and to have her conviction vacated and her case listed for trial. The Court denied defendant’s petition for certification, 229 N.J. 3 (2017), but granted the State’s cross-petition for certification, 229 N.J. 17 (2017).HELD: The Court finds no valid inventory search and therefore affirms the Appellate Division’s determination that the evidence seized during the search should be suppressed.1. One narrow exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is the inventory search. An inventory search is not an independent legal concept but rather an incidental administrative step following arrest and preceding incarceration. Police may search an arrestee without a warrant and inventory the property in the arrestee’s possession before he or she is jailed. Such searches “serve[] a three-fold purpose: protection of the inventoried property while in police custody, shielding the police and storage bailees from false property claims, and safeguarding the police from potential danger.” State v. Mangold, 82 N.J. 575, 581-82 (1980). (pp. 12-13)2. An inventory search must be reasonable under the circumstances to pass constitutional muster. In Mangold, the Court explained that the propriety of an inventory search involves a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the impoundment of the property is justified; and (2) whether the inventory procedure was legal. Id. at 583. For there to be a lawful inventory search, there must be a lawful impoundment. Courts need only analyze the reasonableness of the inventory search if the impoundment is justified. Several factors are relevant to the reasonableness inquiry. They include “the scope of the search, the procedure used, and the availability of less intrusive alternatives.” Id. at 584. (pp. 13-14)3. Under the first Mangold inquiry, the detectives’ impoundment of defendant’s purse was not justified. The detectives had not arrested defendant before seeking to impound her purse. Defendant kept her purse open and within her reach for the entire interrogation. She rummaged through her bag several times in front of the detectives. The detectives did not frisk defendant at any point during her detention. They sought to remove her bag from the interrogation room only after she asked for an attorney. Crucially, they asked defendant if she would rather examine the contents of her purse herself. It is clear that had valid safety concerns existed at the time they sought to impound her bag, the officers would not have given defendant the option to search her own purse. (pp. 14-15)4. Even if the initial impoundment was justified under the first Mangold inquiry, the search would fail under the balancing test required by the second. The detectives initiated the search to find the $500 defendant claimed her purse contained. The scope of the search should have been limited to that $500. The State concedes that the departmental policy for inventory searches is unknown. There is no way then to determine whether the detectives’ search was executed according to any purported policy or practice. Finally, the detectives had reasonable, less intrusive alternatives available to protect them against false theft claims that would have simultaneously respected defendant’s constitutionally protected privacy rights. The inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement does not apply, and the detectives’ search was unconstitutional. (pp. 15-18)5. The State concedes that the detectives did not conduct a “traditional” inventory search. The record reveals that nearly every aspect of the purported inventory search was not “traditional.” They did not formally arrest her that day, but rather let her leave and arrested her three days later. The Court remands to permit defendant to raise issues she has preserved before a PCR court, or withdraw her guilty plea and continue before the trial court. (pp. 18-19) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART, concurs in the judgment but expresses the view that the Court should have re-considered the denial of defendant’s petition for certification. By not hearing now defendant’s multi-faceted argument that improper police procedures rendered all of her statements and all evidence obtained during her custodial interrogation fruits of the poisonous tree, the Court missed addressing the prerequisite question to an inventory-search analysis, according to Justice LaVecchia. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a separate, partially concurring and partially dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE ALBIN joins. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 36 September Term 2016 078476STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.LORI A. HUMMEL, Defendant-Respondent. Argued October 24, 2017 – Decided March 13, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Sara M. Quigley, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Sara M. Quigley, of counsel and on the briefs). Elizabeth C. Jarit, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Elizabeth C. Jarit, of counsel and on the briefs). Alexi Machek Velez argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation (Edward L. Barocas, Legal Director, attorney; Alexi Machek Velez, Alexander R. Shalom, Edward L. Barocas, and Jeanne M. LoCicero on the brief).JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court. This case is before us on the narrow issue of the legalityof the police’s search and seizure of the contents of defendantLori Hummel’s handbag while she was detained at the Gloucester 1 County Prosecutor’s Office. We find no valid inventory search.We therefore affirm the Appellate Division’s determination thatthe evidence seized during the search should be suppressed. Weremand to permit the defendant to withdraw her guilty plea andcontinue at the trial court level or, in the alternative, toproceed before a PCR court on other issues she has preserved. I. We cull the following facts from the record. A. On December 5, 2010, Thomas Carbin was stabbed to death inhis apartment in Westville, New Jersey. His lifeless body wasfound the following morning. The Gloucester County Prosecutor’sOffice began interviewing individuals to obtain informationabout Carbin and learned that defendant was in Carbin’s “circleof acquaintances.” On December 7, 2010, Woodbury Heights Investigator GaryKrohn observed defendant at a Wawa convenience store located inWoodbury Heights. Defendant knew Investigator Krohn from herprior employment and approached his vehicle to talk. Duringtheir conversation, Investigator Krohn discovered that defendanthad two outstanding traffic bench warrants. He contacted theGloucester County Prosecutor’s Office to confirm that detectiveswanted to speak with defendant. Investigator Krohn thereafteradvised defendant that he was going to bring her to the police 2 station for the traffic warrants but assured her that she wouldbe released on her own recognizance. Investigator Krohn drove defendant and her friend, who hadbeen driving defendant’s car without a valid driver’s license,to the Gloucester County Prosecutor’s Office instead of thecourt that had issued the warrant. There, Investigator Krohnintroduced defendant to Detective Bryn Wilden and Sergeant JamesBallenger. Detective Wilden then escorted defendant and herfriend into separate interrogation rooms. Defendant placed her purse on the table in front of her.Around 1:56 p.m., Detective Wilden and Sergeant Ballengerentered defendant’s interrogation room to begin questioning her.The detectives took seats at the table without removingdefendant’s purse or frisking her. Defendant immediately askedthe detectives, “What is it about?” Detective Wilden repliedthat they would “explain that to [her] in just a minute” andbegan asking defendant about her background. About a minuteinto questioning, defendant reached into and rummaged throughher purse to retrieve her cell phone. She checked the time andadvised the detectives that she had to pick up her daughter by3:20 p.m. The detectives did not comment on her timeconstraint. Detective Wilden then asked defendant to raise herright hand and swore her in. The detectives began asking 3 defendant substantive questions without advising her of herrights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Detective Wilden asked defendant if she had any idea whythey were interested in talking to her, to which she responded,“I have no idea. I thought it was over a taillight, butapparently not, and now I’m scared.” Detective Wilden assureddefendant that there was no reason to be scared and told herthat her name had come up during an investigation. Defendantindicated her apprehension to give the detectives her homeaddress, and Detective Wilden assured her that anything she toldthem would be kept confidential. Detective Wilden then asked defendant questions about herwhereabouts the day before. In response to questions from thedetectives about her cell phone, defendant began to look throughher purse for a receipt showing her recent cell phone purchase.After handing Sergeant Ballenger the receipts from her purse,defendant asked, “Can you tell me what’s going on here?”Detective Wilden explained that they were investigating someonenamed “Tom.” He assured defendant that she would be able toleave in time to pick up her daughter. Defendant again expressed concern about giving thedetectives certain information. The detectives nonetheless keptquestioning her, asking more specifically about her relationshipwith the victim. Defendant consistently denied being at the 4 victim’s apartment on the date of the murder. A little over anhour into the interrogation, Sergeant Ballenger beganquestioning defendant about the victim’s roof, claiming thatthey had collected footprints. Defendant offered her boots toSergeant Ballenger for inspection by lifting her feet towardhim, allowing him to see the bottom of each boot. Thedetectives noted that they saw “discoloration” on one boot.Sergeant Ballenger left the room, and defendant took that bootoff her foot and handed it to Detective Wilden. Withdefendant’s boot in his possession, Detective Wilden also leftthe room. The detectives returned with a consent-to-search form.Defendant stated that they could “absolutely” search her bootand initialed next to each item on the consent form as DetectiveWilden read the form to her. The detectives again leftdefendant alone in the room. She put her belongings back intoher purse and stepped outside the door, asking if she couldleave because she needed to pick up her daughter. Thedetectives did not permit her to leave. She then asked, “Am I arrested?” Detective Wildenresponded that “technically” she had traffic warrants.Defendant claimed that the two officers had “jerked [her]around.” Detective Wilden told defendant that they still hadquestions for her. Defendant indicated that she did not want to 5 give any more answers at that time. She stated that she thoughtshe wanted to get a lawyer. After briefly asking questionsabout defendant’s decision to retain a lawyer, the detectivesceased talking to defendant and left the room. Soon after, Detective Wilden and Sergeant Ballenger askeddefendant to sit down in a chair in the corner of theinterrogation room. Detective Wilden cuffed defendant’s rightankle to a bar on the floor next to the chair and told defendantthat she was being detained and that she had an outstandingwarrant. Defendant asked several times whether she could make aphone call to her lawyer. Detective Wilden took defendant’spurse from the table, and defendant stated that she did not likethat he had her pocketbook. Sergeant Ballenger responded thatdefendant was “in custody.” As Detective Wilden began walkingout, defendant said, “Hopefully that $500 ain’t missing out ofthere.” In response to defendant’s comment, the detectives begantaking everything out of her purse and placing each item on thetable in the interrogation room. Sergeant Ballenger asked wherethe $500 was located; defendant responded that it was in herwallet. They asked if she would rather search the purseherself, but defendant declined. While conducting the search,Detective Wilden found two electronic benefits transfer (EBT)cards issued through New Jersey’s “Families First” supplemental 6 income program. He asked defendant if the cards were hers. Sheresponded that everything in the pocketbook was hers. DetectiveWilden read her the name of another individual on one of thecards. Defendant disavowed that she knew that individual or howthe card wound up in her purse. Detective Wilden then put allthe items back into the purse and left the room with it. The detectives left defendant shackled in the interrogationroom for over two hours. At one point she asked why she couldnot get a lawyer, and the detectives failed to allow her to callone. Around 5:48 p.m., the detectives unsecured defendant’sankle and escorted her out of the room to be released. B. Police arrested defendant three days later, on December 10,2010. On April 27, 2011, a Gloucester County Grand Juryreturned an indictment, charging defendant with first-degreemurder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); first-degreefelony murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3); first-degreerobbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; third-degree possessionof a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); and fourth-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawfulpurpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d). On February 15, 2013,an accusation additionally charged defendant with third-degreeconspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (CDS),contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(3). Defendant waived 7 her right to an indictment in exchange for the State amendingher first-degree murder charge to first-degree aggravatedmanslaughter, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1). Theindictment and accusation were then consolidated fordisposition. Defendant moved to suppress her statements to police andthe physical evidence obtained during her December 7, 2010interrogation. After hearing testimony and the parties’arguments and reviewing the video-recorded interrogation, thetrial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress herstatements to police, but denied her motion to suppress physicalevidence. Regarding the first motion, the court ruled that theofficers conducted a custodial interrogation of defendantwithout giving defendant her Miranda warnings. The trial courtreached this conclusion after considering the totality of thecircumstances, which it found demonstrated defendant’sreasonable basis to believe that she was not free to leave theprosecutor’s office. Despite its ruling that defendant’s statements should besuppressed, the trial court determined that Miranda did notapply to the physical evidence the officers retrieved fromdefendant. Finding that defendant’s action of placing her bootson the table in front of the officers constituted voluntary,non-custodial conduct, the court ruled that the boots did not 8 warrant suppression under the “fruit of the poisonous tree”doctrine. The court likewise denied suppression of the FamiliesFirst EBT card that did not bear defendant’s name because theofficers had discovered the card in plain view while conductinga valid inventory search of defendant’s purse. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty tofirst-degree aggravated manslaughter and third-degree conspiracyto distribute CDS. On March 28, 2013, the trial court sentenceddefendant to a twenty-four-year prison term with an eighty-fivepercent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No EarlyRelease Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a), on the aggravatedmanslaughter conviction to run concurrently with a four-yearprison sentence on defendant’s conviction for conspiracy todistribute a CDS. Defendant appealed from the trial court’s denial of hermotion to suppress physical evidence. The Appellate Divisionpanel affirmed in part and reversed in part in an unpublishedopinion filed on September 14, 2016. The panel affirmed as tothe boots but found that the Families First EBT card should havebeen suppressed because the detectives’ inventory searchdeveloped into a warrantless investigatory search. The panelruled that defendant could apply within thirty days to withdrawher guilty plea and to have her conviction vacated and her caselisted for trial. 9 Defendant petitioned for certification, which we denied.229 N.J. 3 (2017). We granted the State’s cross-petition forcertification. 229 N.J. 17 (2017). We also granted theAmerican Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey’s (ACLU) motion toparticipate as amicus curiae. II. A. The State asserts that the detectives sought to removedefendant’s purse from the interrogation room to protect theirsafety, not to search it. The State argues that the detectivesconducted a lawful inventory search of the purse after defendantstated that she hoped the $500 in her purse was not missing whenthey returned to the room with it. Characterizing thatstatement as a threat, the State urges this Court to balance theofficers’ intrusion on defendant’s Fourth Amendment privacyinterests in the purse against the legitimate governmentalinterest to protect the detectives from defendant’s potentialfalse theft claim. The State argues that balancing thosecompeting interests reveals that an immediate inventory searchof her purse was “absolutely necessary” in light of defendant’sexplicit threat to accuse the detectives of theft. B. Defendant argues that the inventory-search exception to theFourth Amendment is “a limited rule of necessity” that is only 10 applicable upon satisfaction of certain conditions. Defendantasserts that the detectives here conducted an unlawful inventorysearch of her belongings for four reasons: (1) the detectivesdid not become bailees of her belongings because they neverarrested and jailed defendant; (2) there is no evidencesuggesting that the detectives followed a standard inventoryprocedure or created an inventory search list; (3) thedetectives did not provide defendant an opportunity to makeother arrangements for her property before they began theirintrusive search; and (4) the search went beyond that necessaryto prevent any false theft claims. Finally, defendant arguesthat the State’s interests in protecting the detectives fromfalse theft claims and safety threats are undermined by thedetectives’ failures to create an inventory list of defendant’sitems and frisk her at any point during her detainment. C. Amicus curiae the ACLU insists that the detectivesconducted an unlawful investigatory search contrary to theFourth Amendment and urges this Court to uphold our well-established precedent for inventory searches. The ACLU echoesdefendant’s argument that the narrow inventory-search exceptionapplies only where officers satisfy certain conditions. TheACLU contends that: (1) the detectives did not searchdefendant’s purse as part of a routine pre-incarceration 11 administrative procedure; (2) the State cannot justify anillegal search based upon defendant’s conduct after thedetectives had already begun that search; and (3) the detectivescould have accomplished the goal of avoiding false theftaccusations and ensuring safety through less intrusive means. III. A. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution andArticle I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protectindividuals against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. This fundamentalprotection encompasses the privacy rights of our citizenry.Through it, our Court has carefully delineated standards ofpolice conduct that strike a balance between individual privacyexpectations and government interests. While recognizing this balance, our Fourth Amendmentopinions have “expresse[d] a clear preference for governmentofficials to obtain a warrant issued by a neutral and detachedjudicial officer before executing a search.” State v. Edmonds,211 N.J. 117, 129 (2012). For that reason, “a warrantlesssearch is presumptively invalid.” Id. at 130. The State bearsthe burden to demonstrate that a warrantless search isreasonable because it fits within a recognized exception to the 12 warrant requirement. State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 111-12(2010) (citing State v. Hill, 115 N.J. 169, 173-74 (1989)). One narrow exception to the Fourth Amendment warrantrequirement is the inventory search. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 , 371 (1987); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 ,643-48 (1983); State v. Mangold, 82 N.J. 575 (1980). An“inventory search is not an independent legal concept but ratheran incidental administrative step following arrest and precedingincarceration.” Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 644 (emphasis added).Police may search an arrestee without a warrant and inventorythe property in the arrestee’s possession before he or she isjailed. Id. at 646; accord State v. Paturzzio, 292 N.J. Super. 542, 550 (App. Div. 1996). Such searches “serve[] a three-foldpurpose: protection of the inventoried property while in policecustody, shielding the police and storage bailees from falseproperty claims, and safeguarding the police from potentialdanger.” Mangold, 82 N.J. at 581-82 (citing South Dakota v.Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 369 (1976)). That an inventory search is administrative in nature doesnot relieve it from Fourth Amendment strictures. See id. at583. An inventory search is still a search and must bereasonable under the circumstances to pass constitutionalmuster. See id. at 584. In Mangold, we explained that thepropriety of an inventory search involves a two-step inquiry: 13 (1) whether the impoundment of the property is justified; and(2) whether the inventory procedure was legal. Id. at 583. Forthere to be a lawful inventory search, there must be a lawfulimpoundment. Ibid. (“The threshold consideration is offundamental importance as it is the act of impoundment whichgenerates the necessity for the inventory.”). Courts need onlyanalyze the reasonableness of the inventory search if theimpoundment is justified. Several factors are relevant to the reasonableness inquiry.They include “the scope of the search, the procedure used, andthe availability of less intrusive alternatives.” Id. at 584.While no factor alone is dispositive, a balancing of eachagainst the others ensures that “[t]he inventory searchprocedure [is] no more intrusive than reasonably necessary torespond to the protective functions which fostered itscreation.” Id. at 587. B. Applying those principles to the present case, we hold thatthe detectives conducted an invalid inventory search contrary tothe Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the NewJersey Constitution. Under the first Mangold inquiry, we conclude that thedetectives’ impoundment of defendant’s purse was not justified.82 N.J. at 583. The State argues that the detectives sought to 14 remove defendant’s purse from the interrogation room due tosafety concerns. Although we recognize that safety concerns maywarrant the impoundment of property in some cases, thoseconcerns did not justify the impoundment here. The detectives had not arrested defendant before seeking toimpound her purse. Defendant kept her purse open and within herreach for the entire interrogation. During questioning, sherummaged through her bag several times in front of thedetectives. The detectives did not frisk defendant at any pointduring her detention. They sought to remove her bag from theinterrogation room only after she asked for an attorney.Crucially, at the beginning of their search, they askeddefendant if she would rather examine the contents of her purseherself. It is clear that had valid safety concerns existed atthe time they sought to impound her bag, the officers would nothave given defendant the option to search her own purse. Wetherefore reject any contention that safety concerns justifiedthe detectives’ removal of her bag from the interrogation room. Because we find that the impoundment of defendant’s pursewas not justified, the inventory search exception does not applyto the detectives’ search. See ibid. However, even if theinitial impoundment was justified under the first Mangoldinquiry, the search would fail under the balancing test requiredby the second. 15 The State asserts that the detectives inventoried the itemsin defendant’s purse to protect themselves against defendant’simmediate and explicit theft threat. Their search, however,cannot withstand the balancing test we articulated in Mangold.Under that test, we consider factors like “the scope of thesearch, the procedure used, and the availability of lessintrusive alternatives.” Id. at 584. Here, the detectives initiated the search to find the $500defendant claimed her purse contained. The scope of the searchshould have been limited to that $500. Detective Wilden insteadbroadened his search to include an inspection of the details oncards found inside. As this clearly exceeded the search’sscope, that first factor weighs in defendant’s favor. With respect to the second factor, whether law enforcementconducted the search pursuant to routine police procedures isessential. Law enforcement may not use inventory searches as “aruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminatingevidence.” Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 , 4 (1990).Standardized procedures prevent the searching officer fromhaving “so much latitude that inventory searches are turned into'a purposeful and general means of discovering evidence ofcrime.’” Ibid. (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376 (Blackmun, J.,concurring)). Searches conducted at variance with or in the 16 absence of standardized practices are unlikely to satisfy theinventory-search warrant exception. The State concedes that the departmental policy forinventory searches pertaining to Detective Wilden and SergeantBallenger is unknown. There is no way then for this Court todetermine whether the detectives’ search was executed accordingto any purported administrative policy or practice. Indeed, theState acknowledges that the detectives had to “improvise” inlight of defendant’s perceived theft threat. If anything, thatconcession suggests to the Court that the detectives did not actin accordance with a standard inventory search procedure. Finally, we find that the detectives had reasonable, lessintrusive alternatives available to protect them against falsetheft claims that would have simultaneously respecteddefendant’s constitutionally protected privacy rights. Theycould have, for example, placed defendant’s purse directly intoa sealed evidence bag or asked defendant to make arrangementsfor someone to retrieve the bag from the prosecutor’s office. Because the balance tips very heavily in favor ofdefendant’s constitutionally protected privacy interests, wecannot find that the handbag search here was conducted “with theintent to foster the protective functions it was designed topromote.” Mangold, 82 N.J. at 584. Our conclusion is furthersupported by the detectives’ decision to continue interrogating 17 defendant about items they found inside her purse other than the$500 she claimed was in the bag. We find that the inventorysearch exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirementdoes not apply and that the detectives’ search wasunconstitutional. See State v. Badessa, 185 N.J. 303, 311(2005) (explaining that “the State is barred from introductioninto evidence the 'fruits of an unlawful search or seizure bythe police’”). We therefore affirm the appellate panel’sdetermination that the evidence seized through the search shouldhave been suppressed. 1 See id. at 577-80. The State concedes that the detectives did not conduct a“traditional” inventory search. Our review of the recordreveals that nearly every aspect of the purported inventorysearch was not “traditional.” They did not formally arrest herthat day, but rather let her leave and arrested her three dayslater.1 Defendant argues that her trial counsel did not challenge the constitutionality of her detention before the trial court. She asserts, therefore, that the nature of defendant’s traffic warrant is not clear from the record, and the trial court did not address whether the detectives lawfully detained defendant at the Gloucester County Prosecutor’s Office. We acknowledge that the legality of defendant’s detention has not yet been briefed or argued before this or any other court. At this time, we defer any comment other than to recognize that defendant has preserved this issue for a possible later challenge -- either before a PCR court or, should defendant withdraw her guilty plea, before the trial court during further proceedings in this case. 18 IV. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division and remandto permit defendant to raise issues she has preserved before aPCR court, or withdraw her guilty plea and continue before thetrial court. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ- VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a separate, partially concurring and partially dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE ALBIN joins. 19 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 36 September Term 2016 078476STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.LORI A. HUMMEL, Defendant-Respondent. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I concur in the judgment affirming the suppression of theevidence seized during the search of defendant’s handbag. Wegranted the State’s cross-petition for certification todetermine the legality of the inventory search. We erred,however, in denying defendant’s petition. In her petition, defendant argued that the failure to honorher Miranda1 rights tainted all the police conduct that followedthe police taking her into custody. Underlying the petition,moreover, was whether the police unlawfully detained defendant.If she is right, plain error permeates her interrogation and thefruits of that poisoned investigation. Yet, by taking only theState’s petition and addressing only the State’s claimed errorin the suppression of its alleged inventory search, we havefomented piecemeal review of defendant’s claims. The Court’s1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 1 failure to reach those issues at this time disserves theinterest of justice. Arguments and issues are being reviewed in isolation wheninstead they should be considered in tandem because they affectone another. Issues concerning search and seizure are generallyassessed using a totality of the circumstances approach, lookingat the entire picture of the case, and not engaging in apiecemeal analysis. See, e.g., State v. Randolph, 228 N.J. 566,587 (2017); State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 275 (2017); State v.Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 214-17 (2002). In the petition that we did not take, defendant claimedthat her entire questioning was coercive and fundamentallyunfair in numerous respects, all exacerbated by the lack ofwarnings. No one contests that defendant should have beenwarned of her Miranda rights because she was in a custodialinterrogation. The trial court held as much, and the AppellateDivision affirmed. Both courts relied on the lack of warningsto suppress defendant’s verbal responses to questioning.However, because we did not take defendant’s petition, defendanthas been deprived of our review of the claimed coercive impactof the lack of warnings and custodial interrogation on all otherevidence the State secured from her during the unusualcircumstances surrounding her detention. The remand will notcorrect the mistake. 2 The majority’s analysis ignores the elephant in the room:There is absolutely no reason to analyze whether this was alawfully conducted inventory search if defendant was unfairlyquestioned in a custodial interrogation and unlawfully detained.A lawful detention is a condition precedent for a lawfulinventory search. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 , 643(1983) (“It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishesthe authority to search.”); see also State v. Padilla, 321 N.J.Super. 96, 111 (App. Div. 1999), aff’d o.b., 163 N.J. 3 (2000). I understand that trial counsel did not use the properincantation -- did not use words declaring a “challenge” todefendant’s detention. See ante at 18 n.1. But, the challengewas present nonetheless. The thrust of defendant’s appeal wasan attack on the voluntariness of her presence at theprosecutor’s office.2 Defendant contends there were multiple2 The trial court’s clear and compelling findings indicate that defendant was detained and suggest that the detention was unlawful: Here, in considering the totality of the circumstances, it appears to this Court that defendant did not believe she was free to leave. Defendant was confronted with active warrants at the Wawa convenience store and transported by law enforcement officers to the Prosecutor’s Office. Even if she was not arrested, she knew that the police had a basis to have her arrested based on those warrants. Defendant agreed to accompany the police upon being notified that they would release her on her own recognizance if she agreed to come in 3 misleading and coercive steps taken against her, including thatshe was told she was being brought to police headquarters to bereleased on her own recognizance on traffic warrants wheninstead she was transported to the prosecutor’s office as aperson of interest in a homicide investigation. She alleges shewas subjected to misinformation and duplicity during aninterrogation while uncounseled in her rights. (It bearsrepeating that no one disputes that her Miranda rights wereviolated, as found by the trial court and the AppellateDivision.) The officers also promised her confidentiality,which our appellate courts and sister states have held to beantithetical to the privilege against self-incrimination. See,e.g., Hopkins v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 579, 584 (5th Cir. 2003);Leger v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d 745 (Ky. 2013); State v.Fletcher, 380 N.J. Super. 80, 82 (App. Div. 2005). Thus, shechallenged directly the “consensual” nature of her interrogationby investigators, who refused to let her leave or receive phonecalls, and who eventually chained her to a bar on the floor. and speak to the Prosecutor’s Office. That inherent compulsion leads this Court to find that she was not 'invited’ and did not consent to going to police headquarters . . . . [She] had to leave her car behind . . . . Clearly, if defendant wanted to leave, she would have had to ask the police for a ride back or walk at least a mile. 4 Based on the Appellate Division’s opinion one can view thelack-of-Miranda-warnings argument by defendant as resolved.Rule 3:22-5 expressly bars post-conviction relief if “a prioradjudication upon the merits of any ground for relief isconclusive.” When this Court decided not to take defendant’spetition, we left defendant with two options: Being forced totry to convince a trial court or a PCR court that her argumentswere not fully resolved on appeal and attempt to secure from thecourt a fresh look at those arguments, or being relegated to aclaim that her trial attorney’s failure to challenge herdetention amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant’s arguments deserved review along with theState’s arguments on direct appeal. That contextual reviewmattered here. Defendant’s appellate counsel tried valiantly toplace in context the essential questions in this matter. Shedid so without breaching professional protocols, even whileincluding a forthright footnote in her Appellate Division brief,noted again to us in oral argument, preserving for a potentialineffective assistance of counsel claim the trial counsel’sfailure to utter the right words: I challenge theconstitutionality of defendant’s detention. We can recognize plain error when it stares us in the face.The issue of the lawfulness of defendant’s detention permeatedthe issues defendant raised in argument before the Appellate 5 Division and incorporated in her petition to this Court. Weshould not be sending this matter back for proceduralpermutations that will result in wasting judicial resources,time, and money. By not hearing now defendant’s arguments about the lack-of-warnings’ impact on her entire interaction with theinvestigators, we missed addressing the prerequisite question toan inventory-search analysis. We should have allowed that tocome to the fore, rather than waste time answering a back-endquestion that may well be unnecessary. After hearing the oralargument in this matter, we should have re-considered our denialof defendant’s petition for certification and indulgently viewedher multi-faceted argument that improper police proceduresrendered all of her statements and all evidence obtained duringher custodial interrogation fruits of the poisonous tree. SeeWong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 485 (1963); State v.Lee, 190 N.J. 270, 277-78 (2007) (“Pursuant to the exclusionaryrule, the State may not introduce evidence obtained from anunlawful search or seizure by the police.”). If furtherbriefing and additional argument was a collateral consequence,or if a remand for further fact-finding were necessary, none ofthat would have been extraordinary for this Court. See, e.g.,State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 525 (2017); State v. Moore, 180 N.J. 459, 460 (2004) (“And this Court having determined on prior 6 occasions that when resolution of a critical issue depends on afull and complete record the Court should await, beforedecision, the development of such a record.”). In the long run,it would have been more efficient than the road that now liesahead in this criminal matter. We could have and should have put this case swiftly ontrack, and that failure, for me, necessitates this separatedissent. 7