Title: State v. Anthony
Citation: 239 N.W.2d 850
Docket Number: 58273
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: March 17, 1976

239 N.W.2d 850 (1976) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Robert Earl ANTHONY, Appellant. No. 58273. Supreme Court of Iowa. March 17, 1976. Charles T. Mattson, Waterloo, for appellant. Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Darby M. Coriden, Asst. Atty. Gen., and David Dutton, County Atty., for appellee. Submitted to MOORE, C. J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, LeGRAND and REES, JJ. LeGRAND, Justice. The sole question presented here is whether the trial court erred in transferring this juvenile defendant to criminal court for prosecution on a charge of murder committed in violation of § 690.1, The Code. He subsequently entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to serve a term of 50 years in the penitentiary as provided by § 690.3, The Code. We affirm that judgment. On September 19, 1974, a petition was filed in juvenile court in Black Hawk County alleging defendant, then 17 years of age, was delinquent. On the same day, an application was filed to transfer defendant to criminal court for prosecution in connection with an incident at a Waterloo high school during which defendant stabbed Jeffrey Bawek, 16 years of age, to death. Our law requires every juvenile accused of a crime (with exceptions not applicable here) to be referred first to juvenile court. That court, after hearing, may waive its jurisdiction and order the juvenile held responsible as an adult. § 232.72, The Code; In re Brown, 183 N.W.2d 731, 732-733 (Iowa 1971). The decision to transfer belongs by statute to the juvenile court. Mallory v. Paradise, 173 N.W.2d 264, 268 (Iowa 1969). The pertinent portion of § 232.72 is here set out: In State v. Halverson, 192 N.W.2d 765, 767-769 (Iowa 1971) we considered the principles by which the transfer provisions of § 232.72 should be governed, with particular reference to Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966). Halverson establishes that a transfer from juvenile court may be made only after a hearing solely on the question of transfer. Some of the circumstances entitled to consideration are the amenability of the juvenile to the rehabilitative procedures available; the necessity of protecting the public from the child; and the heinous character of the alleged crime. (192 N.W.2d at 769). In re Brown, supra, 183 N.W.2d at 733, dictates the hearing afforded must be a meaningful one, including the production of evidence relied on in asking the transfer and the right to cross-examine with the assistance of counsel. See also discussion in Orcutt v. State, 173 N.W.2d 66, 67-71 (Iowa 1969). Defendant argues Kent and Halverson demonstrate he was wrongfully transferred from juvenile to criminal court. On the contrary, we find those cases fully support the juvenile court's transfer order. First, the juvenile court ordered a psychiatric examination, the results of which were available to the court and to counsel for the defendant and for the State. Then a hearing was held limited strictly to the question of transfer. The juvenile court carefully excluded any consideration of the merits of the case. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 539, 95 S. Ct. 1779, 1790, 44 L. Ed. 2d 346, 357-359 (1975) and State v. Halverson, supra, 192 N.W.2d at 769. Evidence was introduced, subject to cross-examination by defendant's two lawyers. Although not required for a transfer hearing (see § 232.11), defendant's mother was present at the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court made detailed findings, from which we quote approvingly: Contrary to the defendant's argument, he was afforded full constitutional and statutory rights in the procedure by which the juvenile court transfer order was entered. Although we have not ignored the question whether defendant's subsequent guilty plea waives his right to appeal from the transfer orderan issue not raised by the Statewe have elected to decide the case on the merits. Having done so, we affirm the judgment. AFFIRMED.