Title: CALKINS v OXBOW RANCH INC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12164
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 9, 1972

No. 12164 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1972 KATHLEEN A. H E C K CALKINS, individually and a s Guardian A d Litem of DEBRA HECK, SALLY HECK, LAURA HECK and EDWARD HECK, Minors, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant , OXBO?? RANCH, INC., a Montana Corporation, d/b/a GILLIS AVIATION, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable C. B. Sande, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Walter H. B i t h e l l argued, Boise, Idaho. Howard I, Manweiler argued, Boise, Idaho. Jones, Olsen and Christensen, B i l l i n g s , Montana. Webb and Tway, Boise, Idaho. For Respondents : Anderson, Symmes, Forbes, Peete & Brown, B i l l i n g s , Montana, John L. H i l t s argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana. Submitted: March 16, 1972 Filed: AYFi iJ 1972 M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a summary judgment f o r defendant i n a wrongful death action. The judgment was entered upon the granting of a motion for summary judgment by the d i s t r i c t court of the t h i r t e e n t h j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , Yellowstone County, Judge Charles B. Sande presiding. The action was brought by Kathleen A . Heck Calkins a s the surviving spouse of Donald E. Heck, deceased, and the n a t u r a l mother and guardian ad litem of Debra, Sally, Laura and Edward Heck, who a r e minor children of the marriage of Kathleen A . Heck Calkins and Donald E. Heck, deceased. P l a i n t i f f , individually and a s guardian ad litem, i n s t i t u t e d a c t ion against defendant a lleging t h a t defendant furnished t o Dow, Inc. a licensed commercial p i l o t by the name of Andrew Deichel, "* * * an employee, servant, and agent of s a i d Defendant * * * t o s a f e l y carry the s a i d Donald E. Heck, a s a passenger from Billings, Montana t o Eugene, Oregon." It was the conten- tion of p l a i n t i f f t h a t the p i l o t was acting within t h e course and scope of h i s employment; t h a t he was an agent of defendant a t the time of the accident; and t h a t he was negligent. Defendant is Oxbow Ranch, Inc. , a Montana corporation, doing business a s G i l l i s Aviation. On April 4 , 1968, Donald E. Heck was k i l l e d while a passenger i n an a i r c r a f t owned by h i s employer, Dow, Inc., a Wyoming corpora t i o n , with corporate headquarters located a t Billings, Montana. The crash of the airplane occurred i n Oregon, while M r . Heck was on a business t r i p originating i n Billings enroute t o Eugene, Oregon. Also k i l l e d were the p i l o t , Deichel, and Donald A . Dow, president of Dow, Inc. owner of the airplane and on whose business the t r i p was taken. Defendant moved f o r summary judgment on the basis of the depositions i n t h i s action pursuant t o Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., on the grounds t h a t the p i l o t , Deichel, was neither an a c t u a l nor an ostensible agent of the defendant and t h a t there was no r a t i f i c a - t i o n of any of the a c t s of the p i l r t on t h e part of the defendant, such t h a t the dqctrine of respond&it superior did not apply a s t o the defendant and t h a t therefore no l i a b i l i t y could be predicated upon any agency relationship of the defendant. The issue is whether there is any evidence tending t o e s t a b l i s h an agency relationship implied or ostensible, upon the doctrine of respondea t superior. While the appellant's brief includes "actualrt agency i n i t s statement of the issue, it is conceded t h a t there is no proof of a c t u a l agency. F i r s t , appellant urges t h a t where an appeal is taken from the granting of a summary judgment t h i s Court w i l l review the testimony i n the most favorable aspect it w i l l bear i n support of a p l a i n t i f f ' s claim of the r i g h t t o present the merits of h i s case t o the f a c t finder. Mally v. Asanovich, 149 Mont. 99, 423 P.2d 294; Knowlton v. Sandaker, 150 Mont. 438, 436 P.2d 98. In discussing a motion f o r summary judgment i n Gallatin T r . & Sav. Bk. v. Henke, 154 Mont. 170, 172, 461 P.2d 448, t h i s Court c i t i n g from Silloway v. Jorgenson, 146 Mont. 307, 406 P.2d 167, said: " I * * * the party opposing motion [for summary judgment] must present f a c t s i n proper form --- conclusions of law w i l l not s u f f i c e ; and the opposing party's f a c t s must be material and of a substantive nature, not fanciful, frivolous, gauzy, nor merely suspicions. ' 6 ~ o o r e I s Federal Practice 2d, 5 56.15[3], pp. 2346,2347; Hager v. Tandy, 146 Mont. 531, 410 P.2d 447." In the i n s t a n t case most of the p a r t i e s t o the arrange- ment of the f l i g h t a r e dead. This presents t o the surviving spouse a d i f f i c u l t proof problem. But, proof of an a c t u a l o r ostensible agency may be i n the form of circumstantial proof a s well a s d i r e c t proof. In Freeman v. Withers, 1.04 Mont. 166, 172, 65 P.2d 601, t h i s Court said: "It [agency] may be implied from conduct and from a l l the f a c t s and circumstances i n the case * * * and may be shown by circumstantial evidence." Also, i n Hamilton v. Lion Head Ski L i f t , Inc., 139 Mont. 335, 340, 363 P.2d 716, t h i s Court said: "!* * * agency is a matter, not t o be presumed, but t o be proven, and the burden of proving it must be borne by the party who a s s e r t s it. "' Before proceeding t o an analysis of the f a c t s , we s h a l l b r i e f l y s e t f o r t h provisions pertaining t o agency. Sections 2-104, 2-105, 2-106, and 2-124, R.C.M. 1947, define a c t u a l and ostensible agency. Section 2-106 s t a t e s t h a t an agency is ostensible when t h e principal intentionally, or by want of ordinary care, causes or allows a t h i r d person t o believe an- other t o be h i s agent who is not r e a l l y employed by him. The deceased pi l o t , Deichel, had worked for Herrod Avia- t i o n from January 1968 u n t i l April 1968, when he q u i t because he wanted a few days off prior t o the commencement of new em- ployment with Northwest Airlines a s a p i l o t . Deichel had an Airline Transport p i l o t ' s r a t i n g , the highest attainable. Deichel had never worked for G i l l i s Aviation. In February 1968, Dow, Inc. had begun negotiations with G i l l i s Aviation for the purchase of an airplane. O n February 16, D o w made a deposit on the a i r c r a f t . O n March 30, D o w made a $1500 payment and financial arrangements a t a bank t o ,pay the balance. G i l l i s Aviation issued a b i l l of s a l e . This is the a i r c r a f t t h a t crashed on April 4, 1968. The two main o f f i c e r s and owners of Dow, Inc. were Donald A . DOW, President, and Terry Lowell, Vice-President. They had purchased the a i r c r a f t . They made a l l arrangements. The de- ceased Heck was t h e i r employee. Both D o w and Lowell e i t h e r were taking flying lessons from G i l l i s Aviation or were planning t o . t The a i r c r a f t was t o be used i n Dow, Inc. s business. In addition t o the business dealings between Dow, Inc. and G i l l i s Aviation on t h e purchase of the a i r c r a f t , Dow, Inc. had used c e r t a i n of the p i l o t s employed by G i l l i s Aviation t o p i l o t the company a i r c r a f t . It is c l e a r from the depositions t h a t the company r e l i e d on M r . Gallagher, manager of G i l l i s Aviation, for many things such a s advice, p i l o t arrangements, f l i g h t training and others. However, t h e depositions reveal t h a t r l i g h t s were made by Dow, Inc. personnel i n the a i r c r a f t involved with one Barovich a s the p i l o t and Dow, Inc. paid only f o r h i s meals and h i s room, but not for h i s services a s a p i l o t . N o charge was ever made by G i l l i s Aviation f o r any of the f l i g h t s of Barovich. The only charges received by G i l l i s were for the p i l o t who was teaching D o w how t o f l y and f o r log books, rather than f o r any charter f l i g h t s . In attempting t o make arrangements for, the f l i g h t from Billings t o Eugene, which proved t o be the f a t a l f l i g h t , Dow, Inc. representatives contacted various p i l o t s who had previously flown them. They were advised t h a t none of them could p i l o t the a i r - c r a f t . One of these p i l o t s , Barovich, was a college student, holder of a private license, who had worked a s a f l i g h t l i n e employee of G i l l i s Aviation. D o w representatives were told t h a t Barovich could not f l y them a s a free-lance operator, and they would have t o go through G i l l i s Aviation t o g e t a p i l o t . Dow, the president of Dow, Inc., did ultimately contact Gallagher and requested t h a t he, Gallagher, secure a p i l o t . Gallagher f i n a l l y contacted Deichel. P i l o t Deichel was introduced by Gallagher t o the Dow, Inc. representatives a s a qualified p i l o t who, while awaiting a c a l l t o employment by Northwest Airlines, would take the t r i p t o Eugene t o earn some extra money. P i l o t Deichel made it c l e a r t o a l l t h a t immediately upon Northwest's c a l l , Dow, Inc. would be required t o return him t o Billings. There was never any discussion with G i l l i s Aviation by any member of Dow, Inc. concerning any charges f o r the f l i g h t by Deichel. The only testimony concerning any arrangements f o r charges by Deichel came from Gallagher who s t a t e d t h a t he intro- duced Deichel t o Lowell and D o w and s a i d , "You fellows make your own arrangements with Andy Deichel." Lowell simply did not know what arrangements were made with p i l o t Deichel. Diane Dow, wife of the deceased president of Dow, Inc. and i t s then bookkeeper, did not know what arrangements were made with Deichel, but she did know t h a t on a previous occasion o r occasions, Dow, Inc. had paid for p i l o t s through G i l l i s Avia- tion. The deceased, Heck, was an employee of Dow, Inc. accompany- ing h i s boss, Don Dow, and apparently never knew what arrange- ments had been made. P l a i n t i f f , appellant here, recognizes t h a t there is no d i r e c t testimony of an agency, but i n s i s t s t h a t a l l inferences from f a c t s of prior business transactions between Dow, Inc. and G i l l i s Aviation concerning a i r c r a f t , f l i g h t instruction, and procurement of p i l o t s , together with the foregoing summary of how p i l o t Deichel was procured, supply circumstantial evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o withstand a motion for summary judgment. Plaint i f f would go even further i n s e t t i n g f o r t h f a c t s by referring t o G a llagher 's a c t i v i t i e s i n checking weather information f o r t h e t r i p ; making arrangements for an a i r search i n Oregon a f t e r hearing t h a t the a i r c r a f t was missing; volunteering f r e e trans- portation of the bodies back from Oregon; and a statement by Gallagher t o a M r . Peterson a f t e r the a c c i d e n t - - - " ~ r . Peterson, don't be concerned about l i a b i l i t y . That is covered. " A l l of these matters, mostly a f t e r the accident, p l a i n t i f f reasons a r e consistent with an ostensible agency and a r e , i n the l i g h t most favorable t o her, f a c t s proving ag ostensible agency. However heretofore, we s e t out a brief summary of pro- visions pertaining t o agency. There we noted t h a t where the principal, intentionally o r by want of ordinary care, causes or allows a t h i r d person t o believe another t o be h i s agent who is not r e a l l y employed by him r a i s e s a question of agency. Dow, Inc. is not a party. Everyone knew Dow, Inc. owned the a i r c r a f t . The deceased, Heck, has not been shown, i n any manner, t o have r e l i e d on p i l o t ~ e i c h e l 's supposed agency from G i l l i s Aviation. Heck here is the t h i r d person. There simply i s no evidence t o show whether or not he r e l i e d on, i n any manner, an agency of Deichel. As previously noted, the burden of proving agency must be borne by the party who a s s e r t s it. Hamilton v. Lion Head Ski L i f t , Inc., 139 Mont. 335, 363 P.2d 716. Prior t o the departure or the f l i g h t there is no evidence t h a t Gallagher, representing G i l l i s Aviation, did anything t o create a belief in the mind of Heck t h a t p i l o t Deichel was G i l l i s g via ti on's agent f o r t h a t klight. A s t a r a s t h i s record i s concerned, there i s no basis for the application of the rules o t ostensible agency. Ostensible agency necessarily would be predicated upon an estoppel. The estoppel would a r i s e against the principal for the benefit of the p a r t i e s who have d e a l t with the principal prior t o changing t h e i r position i n reliance upon the representations by the principal. As s t a t e d heretofore, there simply i s no evidence of any representation. Statements and actions by Gallagher a f t e r departure of the f l i g h t do not supply the evidence of ostensible agency. W e a r e not concerned here with "ratification" because there was no representation by the principal nor any evidence ok reliance by the t h i r d party, Heck. See Searle v. Great Northern Railway Company, 189 F.Supp. 423, f o r requirement of represenation or "holding out" by the alleged principal. Also see: Hartt v. Jahn, 59 Mont. 173, 182, 196 P. 153; Elkins v. Husky O i l Co., 153 Mont. 159, 455 P.2d 329. To the foregoing discussion we add t h a t t o further develop factual testimony only amounts t o an attempt t o prove the negative. There was no actual agency relationship shown. There was no implied agency shown because there is no proof t h a t p i l o t Deichel believed he had such agency authority. There i s no proof of ostensible agency. Thus, there is no genuine issue of material f a c t and the summary judgment was properly granted under Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ. P. Accordingly, the judgment is a ffirmed. ~ s s o c i a t d J u s t i c e Chief ~ u s c i c e I I- ci Associate Justices.