Title: Russell v. American Guild of Variety Artists
Citation: 497 P.2d 40
Docket Number: 5081
State: Hawaii
Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court
Date: May 15, 1972

497 P.2d 40 (1972) Kit A. RUSSELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN GUILD OF VARIETY ARTISTS et al., Defendants-Appellees. No. 5081. Supreme Court of Hawaii. May 15, 1972. *41 John H. Robinson, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellant. Raymond Lee, Honolulu, for defendants-appellees. Before RICHARDSON, C.J., and MARUMOTO, ABE, LEVINSON and KOBAYASHI, JJ. KOBAYASHI, Justice. Appellant, Kit Russell, brought suit in circuit court against appellees, American Guild of Variety Artists (A.G.V.A.) and A.G.V.A.'s Honolulu agent, Fred O'Brien, for damages resulting from a defamatory letter written and published by O'Brien while acting as an agent of A.G.V.A. This appeal comes from the trial court's entry of judgment for appellees. Because the trial court's explicit findings of fact are particularly significant for purposes of this appeal, they are here included in toto. In holding for appellees, the trial court concluded that O'Brien had a qualified privilege to publish the erroneous communication and that such communication having been made in good faith and without malice, it was not actionable. Appellant brings to issue whether the erroneous letter written by O'Brien constituted defamation per se, whether a qualified privilege existed under the facts shown, and whether, assuming the existence of such qualified privilege, it was abused and therefore lost. This court, in Kahanamoku v. Advertiser Publishing Co., 25 Haw. 701, 709 (1920), recognized that if the publication in question is libelous per se, the "injury to the plaintiff will be presumed and special damages need not be alleged or proven, but general and punitive damages may be recovered. Whereas, if it is not libelous per se, the plaintiff must allege and prove special damages or his action will fail." After citing at length authority on the test to be utilized in determining what constitutes libel per se, the court in Kahanamoku classified libels that affect the character of private persons according to their objects as "(1) Libels which impute to a person the commission of a crime. (2) Libels which have a tendency to injure him in his office, profession, calling or trade. (3) Libels which hold him up to scorn and ridicule and to feelings of contempt or execration, impair him in the enjoyment of society and injure those imperfect rights of friendly intercourse and mutual benevolence which man has with respect to man." Kahanamoku, supra at 712-713. The court then went on to hold that the defamation in question was libelous per se because it tended "to subject the person charged to social degredation [sic] and to the contempt of all right thinking people." Kahanamoku, supra at 716. *43 This court has also held as libelous per se words which impute to one unfitness to perform the duties of his employment or which have a tendency to prejudice him in such employment. Rice v. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Ltd., 26 Haw. 196, 206 (1921). Although not considered previously in this jurisdiction, it has generally been held that imputation of insanity or impairment of mental faculties is libelous per se. E.g., Cowper v. Vannier, 20 Ill. App.2d 499, 156 N.E.2d 761 (1959); Brauer v. Globe Newspaper Co., 351 Mass. 53, 217 N.E.2d 736 (1966); Kenney v. Hatfield, 351 Mich. 498, 88 N.W.2d 535 (1958). In accordance with the above authority, we find merit in appellant's contention that the letter written by O'Brien constituted libel per se. Certainly a statement that one has been committed to a state mental hospital would, among other things, have a tendency to prejudice him in such employment. This would clearly be true in a case such as the one before us where the defamatory letter specifically concerned the employment of the person defamed. A finding that the publication is libelous per se presumes damages to the injured party and thus special damages need not be shown.[2] This is not, however, determinative of the issue whether defendant is liable. The claim for relief remains subject to a privilege defense asserted by the publisher of the defamatory material. The distinction between an absolute privilege and a conditional or qualified privilege concerning the defamation of a private person, and the basis for the privilege itself is aptly set forth in Prosser, The Law of Torts, 776-77 (4th ed. 1971): In Aku v. Lewis, 52 Haw. 366, 371, 477 P.2d 162, 166 (1970), we set forth the appropriate test for determining under what *44 circumstances a qualified privilege is to be considered applicable. The above test places emphasis on the reasonable action of the author of the publication and the corresponding interest between the author and the recipient.[3] O'Brien must have satisfied both of these requirements for us to sustain the finding that a qualified privilege defense was available to appellees. Appellant contends that at the time the defamatory letter was published, there existed no relationship between Levy and appellant. It is appellant's position that any agency relationship that previously existed was terminated when appellant signed her contract with the Oasis Club in Honolulu. Apparently if appellant were aware of our decision in Aku v. Lewis, supra, it would be her contention that at the time the defamation was published, Levy had no interest in the subject matter of the letter. As such, appellant would doubtlessly assert that a qualified privilege was not applicable to O'Brien's publication. We cannot agree. We are not here presented with the issue whether Levy, as a theatrical booking agent who lined up the Oasis job for appellant, lost his interest in appellant under the qualified privilege test when appellant signed the contract for that job. The facts as borne out from the testimony given at trial indicate that both O'Brien and Levy had a common, corresponding interest in appellant's working status at the time of the publication. Apparently appellant lost her job at the Oasis because she failed to show up one night for work. Her contention is that she was sick and therefore her employment was wrongfully terminated. After her dismissal she filed a complaint with O'Brien, her A.G.V.A. union representative. The following portion of appellant's testimony at trial concerning her communications with Levy subsequent to her dismissal is significant. "Q [D]id you hear from Mr. Levy in California, for instance? "A I had called Los Angeles to inform them of what had happened. And being that I didn't have enough money to continue my conversation, I just told them to write me or let me know or try to find me another position. "Q And what was the response to this? "A I never heard again from them until later in January. "Q What did you hear then? *45 "A He asked Mr. Levy wrote to me and asked me what was this, that he had received a letter from Fred O'Brien stating that I was in a mental institution in Kaneohe committed for a period of one year and what to do with my belongings." Appellant indicates in the above passage that after she was dismissed from her employment at the Oasis she communicated with Levy's agency asking them to find her another booking. In light of such testimony we are unable to understand how appellant can in good faith argue that Levy did not acquire a direct interest in appellant's working status at that point. Such a conclusion seems inevitable even if the argument that Levy acquired a disinterested status under the qualified privilege test when appellant signed the Oasis contract were considered valid. As such, the trial court's finding that a common interest in the work status of appellant existed at the time of the publication between O'Brien, appellant's A.G.V.A. representative, and Levy, her booking agent, must be sustained. The question remains whether O'Brien acted reasonably in communicating with Levy, or whether he abused any privilege he may have held. The trial court found that the communication from O'Brien to Levy, although erroneous in part, was made in good faith and without malice.[4] We must go to the record to determine if there exists substantial evidence to sustain this finding. As stated in the findings of fact of the trial court, O'Brien wrote to Levy in response to an inquiry made by Levy, apparently seeking information as to appellant's work status. This point is not entirely clear because Levy did not appear at trial nor was his deposition taken. O'Brien's letter to Levy does, however, support such a conclusion. The first line itself reads "In reply to your letter of January 19, 1967 regarding Kit Russell, ...." We do not feel that the existence of an inquiry or request for information should alone be considered determinative of the qualified privilege issue where the response contains defamatory material, but the fact that the publication was solicited must be considered relevant to the reasonableness issue.[5] Appellant's request to Levy that another job be located for her apparently precipitated Levy's inquiry to O'Brien. The *46 justification for O'Brien's response must be found in O'Brien's deposition as he was not present at trial: Based on the evidence presented, it would not have been unreasonable for the trial court as the trier of fact to have concluded that: Appellant upon being dismissed from the Oasis contacted O'Brien to register a complaint with the A.G.V.A. and Levy's agency to find her another job. Then Levy made an inquiry to O'Brien as to why she was dismissed and as to what her status was. O'Brien, after having discussed appellant's status with court personnel and reasonably believing that she had been committed, then responded to Levy's inquiry with the letter containing the erroneous statement. We recognize that the trial court found O'Brien's deposition testimony to be credible. As such we would be remiss to find that the record is without substantial evidence to support the factual findings of the trial court. See Ashford v. Thos. Cook &amp; Son, Ltd., 52 Haw. 113, 123, 471 P.2d 530, 536 (1970). A qualified privilege was properly held applicable to O'Brien and there being substantial evidence to show that the privilege was not abused, the decision of the trial court must be affirmed. [1] "In reply to your letter of January 19, 1967 regarding Kit Russell, a hearing was held by the Hawaii Branch Executive Committee with Mr. Pacheco and Kit Russell both present. The dancer did violate her contract by not appearing on New Year's Eve the biggest night of them all and she never informed the club she would not appear. The board voted in the night club's favor and denied Miss Russell's claim. "In the meantime, Miss Russell is in the State Mental Hospital in Kaneohe. She was picked up by the police department for trespassing and was given a mental examination as ordered by the judge and has been committed to the hospital for a period of a year. "This is all the information we have and hope this information will help straighten out your records." [2] There exists in many jurisdictions some confusion as to general distinctions between libel, libel per se and slander per se. The English rule is and the early American rule was that any libel, as distinguished from most slander, is actionable without proof of damage. E.g., Restatement of Torts § 569 at 165 (1938), "One who falsely, and without a privilege to do so, publishes matter defamatory to another in such a manner as to make the publication a libel is liable to the other although no special harm or loss of reputation results therefrom." A minority of American jurisdictions still adhere to this position. Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 Va. L.Rev. 839, 847 (1960). The majority of courts, however, have held that where the written publication is not defamatory on its face (libel per quod) or where it does not fall within one of the slander per se categories (imputation of crime, loathsome disease, defamation affecting business, or unchastity on the part of a woman) it is not actionable without a showing of special damages. Prosser, The Law of Torts, 763 (4th ed. 1971). For a general discussion of the origin of the confusion concerning the divergent meanings of defamation "per se" see Note, Libel Per Se and Special Damages, 13 Vand.L.Rev. 730 (1960). [3] Among the areas where such a common interest has been recognized is the credit agency area which presents situations not unlike the one before us today. It is felt that credit agencies perform a useful business service for the benefit of those who have a legitimate interest in obtaining credit information. Where honest inquiries are made to the agencies and the information is furnished in a reasonable manner and in good faith, such agencies are held to have a qualified privilege. Altoona Clay Products, Inc. v. Dun &amp; Bradstreet, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 899 (W.D.Pa. 1968), vacated on other grounds 308 F. Supp. 1068; Petition of Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., 342 Mass. 515, 174 N.E.2d 376 (1961); Retail Credit Co. v. Garraway, 240 Miss. 230, 126 So. 2d 271 (1961). [4] The word malice as used in the context of an abuse of a qualified privilege is not given the same meaning as that attributed to it in the constitutional privilege area. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280, 84 S. Ct. 710, 726, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, it was held that "`actual malice' [constituted] knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not... ." We recognized this "actual malice" standard in the case of Tagawa v. Maui Publishing Co., Ltd., 50 Haw. 648, 652, 448 P.2d 337, 340 (1968). Recently the U.S. Supreme Court extended the constitutional first amendment privilege, which previously had encompassed cases involving "public officials" and "public figures", to include cases involving private individuals involved in "matters of public or general concern". Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S. Ct. 1811, 1820, 29 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1971). The instant case does not fall within the above categories but, as explained supra, is a qualified privilege case. As such, the qualified privilege "must be exercised in a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose." Prosser, The Law of Torts, 792 (4th ed. 1971). Addressing himself directly to the use of the word malice in this area, Prosser says that "[d]iscarding `malice' as a meaningless and quite unsatisfactory term, it appears that the privilege is lost if the publication is not made primarily for the purpose of furthering the interest which is entitled to protection... . Probably the best statement of the rule is that the defendant is required to act as a reasonable man under the circumstances, with due regard to the strength of his belief, the grounds that he has to support it, and the importance of conveying the information". Id. at 795-796. [5] See Restatement of Torts, § 595, comment i at 253 (1938).