Title: Shepard v. Capitol Foundry
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 002776
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 2, 2001

Present:  All the Justices 
 
ABE SHEPARD, ADMINISTRATOR OF 
THE ESTATE OF ERNESTINE SHEPARD 
 
v.  Record No. 002776  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   November 2, 2001 
CAPITOL FOUNDRY OF  
VIRGINIA, INC., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG 
James F. D’Alton, Jr., Judge 
 
 
 
In this wrongful death action, the dispositive 
question to be decided on appeal is whether the circuit 
court erred in remitting portions of a jury verdict for the 
plaintiff.  Because we conclude that the circuit court 
failed to consider the evidence relevant to damages in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, we will reverse the 
judgment of the circuit court and reinstate the jury 
verdict. 
FACTS AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
 
Ernestine Shepard died as a result of injuries 
sustained in an automobile accident that occurred in the 
City of Petersburg.  At the time of the accident, she was 
driving a pick-up truck and had stopped her vehicle 
immediately behind a tractor-trailer owned by Capitol 
Foundry of Virginia, Inc. (“Capitol Foundry”), and operated 
by its employee, Jack Guthrie, Jr.  Guthrie had stopped the 
tractor-trailer in the left travel lane of East Bank Street 
while waiting for parking space at a repair shop so that he 
could drive the tractor-trailer into the shop’s parking 
lot.1  After the decedent brought her pick-up truck to a 
stop behind the tractor-trailer, a third motorist crashed 
into the rear of the decedent’s vehicle, causing the front 
of her vehicle to collide with the rear of the tractor-
trailer. 
 
The decedent was 67 years of age at the time of her 
death and had been married to her husband, Abe Shepard, for 
44 years.  She is survived by her husband and six adult 
children.  The appellant, Abe Shepard, Administrator of the 
Estate of Ernestine Shepard, brought this wrongful death 
action against Capitol Foundry, Guthrie, and two other 
individuals who are not parties to this appeal. 
 
At trial, Mr. Shepard presented evidence regarding the 
emotional hardships and loss he has suffered as a result of 
the death of Mrs. Shepard.  Mr. Shepard spoke of preparing 
his own meals now and eating them alone.  He stated that 
since his wife’s death, he has eaten more “fast food” than 
ever before during his lifetime and that he has lost about 
15 pounds in weight.  Mr. Shepard acknowledged that, during 
his 30 years of military service, his wife handled the 
                     
1 Guthrie stopped at the repair shop because one of the 
tires on the tractor-trailer had “blown out” earlier that 
 
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family’s business matters and continued to do so after he 
retired.  So, in his words, “when she passed, I was lost.”  
Finally, Mr. Shepard described his frequent visits to his 
wife’s grave: 
 
I just feel like I have accomplished something 
whenever I would go out there and talk with her as if 
she was going to talk back, knowing that she can’t.  I 
tell her about the children.  I tell her about my life 
and what I’m going through since she’s been gone, how 
much I miss her, and all of that.  You would think 
that somebody was talking to me the way I be talking 
out there sometimes.  And I say a prayer or two, and 
then I leave. 
 
 
Five of the Shepard children also testified at trial 
about their loss and discussed the relationship that they 
had enjoyed with their mother through the years and her 
influence upon the lives of her children.  Two of the 
daughters were living at home with their parents at the 
time of the accident.  Mrs. Shepard was close to all her 
children, and several of them portrayed her as the primary 
care-giver when they were growing up because their father’s 
military career frequently took him away from home.  For 
example, the youngest son described the strength his mother 
displayed in caring for the family while Mr. Shepard was on 
active military duty in Vietnam.  Another son testified 
that his mother took care of the finances and the 
“spiritual things” in the home and was “a crutch” for his 
                                                             
day. 
 
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father.  Although Merritt Shepard, an Army officer residing 
in Germany, did not testify at the trial, his twin sister 
explained that her brother stayed in touch with his mother 
through telephone conversations, especially on holidays.  
All the children attended their mother’s funeral. 
During closing argument at trial, the plaintiff asked 
the jury to award damages in the amount of $1,000,000 for 
Mr. Shepard, and $500,000 for each of the six children.  
After deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff and assessed damages in the amount of 
$1,700,000, plus interest on that sum from April 23, 1996, 
the date of the accident.  Of the total damages awarded, 
the jury distributed $1,100,000 to Mr. Shepard and $100,000 
to each of the six adult children. 
In post-trial motions, Capitol Foundry and Guthrie 
asked the court to set aside the jury verdict and grant a 
new trial or, in the alternative, for remittitur of the 
verdict.2  Following argument by the parties, the circuit 
court ruled from the bench and denied the motion to set 
                     
2 Capitol Foundry and Guthrie also moved the court to 
reconsider its previous denial of their motion for a 
mistrial.  They had based that motion on an alleged 
inflammatory remark by the plaintiff’s counsel during 
closing argument.  However, since the motion for a mistrial 
came after the jury retired to deliberate, the court 
concluded that it was untimely. 
 
 
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aside the jury verdict.  However, the court concluded that 
the damages awarded were excessive and therefore remitted 
the jury’s award to $750,000 for Mr. Shepard and $50,000 
for Merritt Shepard (the son living in Germany).  The court 
also remitted the award of pre-judgment interest and 
allowed interest only from August 16, 2000, the date of the 
jury verdict.  The court did not remit the amount of 
damages awarded to the other five children. 
In the order memorializing its bench ruling, the court 
enunciated the following reasons for its decision: (1) the 
damages were so excessive as to shock the conscience of the 
court; (2) the jury misconceived the facts and the law to 
the extent that it was instructed that a verdict should not 
be based on bias or sympathy; (3) the award was out of 
proportion to the injuries suffered, thus suggesting the 
verdict was not the product of a fair and impartial 
decision; (4) Mr. Shepard received $100,000 more than 
requested and was 83 years old at the time of the trial; 
(5) Merritt Shepard did not testify at trial, yet received 
the same amount as the other children who did testify; (6) 
more interest was awarded than requested; and (7) there was 
no evidence regarding loss of income, expenses for 
treatment of the decedent, or funeral expenses.  The court 
also incorporated in its order the remarks that it had 
 
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previously made from the bench at the close of the hearing 
on the defendants’ post-trial motions.  In those remarks, 
the court alluded to certain statements made by the 
plaintiff’s attorney during closing argument and suggested 
that those statements inflamed and prejudiced the jury.3  
The court also characterized the assessment of pre-judgment 
interest and the award of $100,000 more to Mr. Shepard than 
requested during closing argument as being in the nature of 
punitive damages. 
Pursuant to Code § 8.01-383.1(A), the plaintiff 
elected to accept the remitted sums under protest rather 
than to submit to a new trial on all issues.  We awarded 
the plaintiff this appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
In their request that we affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court, Capitol Foundry and Guthrie assert that the 
court clearly stated its reasons for remitting the jury 
verdict and that those reasons support the court’s finding 
that the verdict was excessive.  They also contend that the 
recovery after remittitur bears a reasonable relationship 
to the damages, considering the fact that the issue of 
                     
3 At least one of those allegedly inflammatory remarks 
was the subject of the defendants’ motion for a mistrial 
made after the jury retired to deliberate.  In their post-
 
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liability was contested and all the losses claimed were 
non-pecuniary.  Thus, Capitol Foundry and Guthrie argue 
that the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering 
remittitur in this case.  We do not agree. 
 
When a verdict is challenged on the basis of alleged 
excessiveness, a trial court is compelled to set it aside 
“if the amount awarded is so great as to shock the 
conscience of the court and to create the impression that 
the jury has been motivated by passion, corruption or 
prejudice, or has misconceived or misconstrued the facts or 
the law, or if the award is so out of proportion to the 
injuries suffered as to suggest that it is not the product 
of a fair and impartial decision.”  Edmiston v. Kupsenel, 
205 Va. 198, 202, 135 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1964); accord 
Poulston v. Rock, 251 Va. 254, 258, 467 S.E.2d 479, 481 
(1996).  “Setting aside a verdict as excessive . . . is an 
exercise of the inherent discretion of the trial court and, 
on appeal, the standard of review is whether the trial 
court abused its discretion.”  Poulston, 251 Va. at 258-59, 
467 S.E.2d at 482 (citing Bassett Furniture v. McReynolds, 
216 Va. 897, 911, 224 S.E.2d 323, 332 (1976)). 
                                                             
trial motions, Capitol Foundry and Guthrie pointed to other 
allegedly inflammatory statements. 
 
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The process of determining whether a trial court 
abused its discretion in ordering remittitur involves two 
steps.  First, we must find in the record not only the 
trial court’s conclusion that the verdict was excessive, 
but also an explanation demonstrating that the court, in 
reaching its conclusion, considered “ ‘factors in evidence 
relevant to a reasoned evaluation of the damages.’ ”  
Poulston, 251 Va. at 259, 467 S.E.2d at 482 (quoting 
Bassett Furniture, 216 Va. at 912, 224 S.E.2d at 332).  
Second, we must ascertain whether the amount of recovery 
after remittitur bears a “ ‘reasonable relation to the 
damages disclosed by the evidence.’ ”  Id.
 
Both of these steps require an evaluation of the 
evidence relevant to the issue of damages.  In making that 
evaluation, the trial court, as well as this Court, is 
required to consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party that received the jury verdict, in 
this case the plaintiff.  Id. at 261, 467 S.E.2d at 483 
(citing Caldwell v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 238 Va. 148, 155, 
380 S.E.2d 910, 914 (1989)).  If there is evidence, when 
viewed in that light, to sustain the jury verdict, then 
remitting the verdict is error.  Edmiston, 205 Va. at 202-
03, 135 S.E.2d at 780. 
 
8
 
In the present case, the circuit court failed to view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
and thus erred in its determination that the verdict was 
excessive.  Both from the bench and in its order, the court 
listed several evidentiary factors that are relevant to the 
question of damages and whether the amounts awarded were 
excessive.  However, the court limited its review of the 
evidence to those factors, all of which are adverse to the 
plaintiff.  See Poulston, 251 Va. at 261-62, 467 S.E.2d at 
483 (trial court incorrectly limited its review of evidence 
to certain testimony and failed to consider other 
testimony).  It is not apparent from the record before us 
that the court also considered the evidence that supports 
the amount of damages awarded by the jury.  In other words, 
the court viewed the evidence in the light most unfavorable 
to the plaintiff.  For example, the evidence shows not just 
a man of 83 years of age, but also a husband who suddenly 
and tragically lost his wife of 44 years – a wife described 
by one of the sons as his father’s “crutch.”  The evidence 
also reveals a husband who is still so distraught over his 
wife’s death that he goes to her grave once or twice each 
month and tells her about the children. 
 
Similarly, with regard to Merritt Shepard, the court 
focused solely on the fact that he did not appear and 
 
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testify at the trial as did the other five children.  
However, the court apparently did not consider the fact 
that Merritt attended his mother’s funeral, and that she 
was very close to all her children and held the family 
together while Mr. Shepard was overseas on military duty. 
 
Finally, with regard to the award of pre-judgment 
interest, the court surmised that the jury simply wanted to 
punish the defendants and decided that interest should run 
“from the date of trial since this delay is something that 
is not attributable to either side.”  Yet, the court 
clearly instructed the jury that an award of interest was a 
matter entirely in its discretion: 
 
 
As to interest, you have a choice.  You may award 
interest.  You may not award interest.  It is up to 
you.  If you do award interest, you have a choice from 
the date of the accident up until the date of the 
trial.  Or you have a choice of not to award interest 
. . . . 
 
This instruction is in accord with Code § 8.01-382, which 
gives the fact-finder the discretion to decide whether to 
“provide for interest on any principal sum awarded, or any 
part thereof, and fix the period at which the interest 
shall commence.” 
 
“Prejudgment interest is normally designed to make the 
plaintiff whole and is part of the actual damages sought to 
be recovered.”  Monessen Southwestern Ry. v. Morgan, 486 
 
10
U.S. 330, 335 (1988), quoted in Dairyland Ins. Co. v. 
Douthat, 248 Va. 627, 631, 449 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1994).  
“ ‘[I]nterest is allowed, because it is natural justice 
that he who has the use of another’s money should pay 
interest for it.’ ”  J.W. Creech, Inc. v. Norfolk Air 
Conditioning Corp., 237 Va. 320, 325, 377 S.E.2d 605, 608 
(1989) (quoting Jones v. Williams, 6 Va. 85, 87, 2 Call 
102, 106 (1799)). 
 
Again, the court failed to consider the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  An example is 
the court’s reference to the lack of evidence regarding 
loss of income, expenses for treating the decedent, and 
funeral expenses.  Yet, we have said that evidence of 
sorrow, mental anguish, and solace can be sufficient to 
support a jury’s award.  Jan Paul Fruiterman, M.D. & 
Assocs. v. Waziri, 259 Va. 540, 545, 525 S.E.2d 552, 555 
(2000).  Code § 8.01-52 specifies that, in a wrongful death 
action, the verdict “shall include, but may not be limited 
to, damages for . . . [s]orrow, mental anguish, and solace 
which may include society, companionship, comfort, 
guidance, kindly offices and advice of the decedent.” 
CONCLUSION 
 
Because the circuit court failed to consider “factors 
in evidence relevant to a reasoned evaluation of the 
 
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damages” in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
Bassett Furniture, 216 Va. at 912, 224 S.E.2d at 332, we 
conclude that the court abused its discretion in finding 
the jury verdict excessive and remitting a portion of the 
damages awarded.  As acknowledged by Capitol Foundry and 
Guthrie on brief, “the inadequacy or excessiveness of each 
verdict must be determined on the facts of the case 
. . . .”  Williams Paving Co. v. Kreidl, 200 Va. 196, 204, 
104 S.E.2d 758, 764 (1958).  The facts of the present case, 
when considered in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, demonstrate that the verdict was not excessive. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court, reinstate the jury verdict, and enter final 
judgment for the plaintiff.4
Reversed and final judgment. 
                     
4 In light of our decision, we do not address the 
plaintiff’s other two assignments of error: (1) that, in 
deciding the motion for remittitur, the circuit court erred 
in considering alleged inflammatory statements by 
plaintiff’s counsel during closing argument since those 
statements were not the subject of a timely motion for a 
mistrial, and (2) that the circuit court erred in 
concluding that certain remarks by plaintiff’s counsel were 
improper. 
 
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