Title: Commonwealth v. Sheridan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11543
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 27, 2015

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SJC-11543 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MATTHEW J. SHERIDAN. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     November 6, 2014. - February 27, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, 
Probable cause.  Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, 
Threshold police inquiry, Probable cause, Inevitable 
discovery, Plain view, Search incident to lawful arrest.  
Threshold Police Inquiry.  Probable Cause. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Quincy Division of 
the District Court Department on June 21, 2011. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Robert 
P. Ziemian, J.  
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Gants, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to 
the Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court granted an 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Paul R. Rudof, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
Pamela Alford, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In the early morning hours of June 21, 2011, 
police officers stopped the defendant, Matthew J. Sheridan, for 
driving a minivan with an unilluminated headlight.  During the 
stop, the officers saw in the vehicle a portion of what an 
officer identified as "about a [one]-ounce bag" of marijuana, 
protruding from under a rumpled T-shirt lying on the floor 
between the vehicle's two front seats.  The officers ordered the 
defendant out of the vehicle, handcuffed him, and conducted a 
search of the minivan.  Lifting the T-shirt, an officer found, 
in addition to the bag previously partially seen, another one-
ounce bag of marijuana, and a third, smaller bag of marijuana.  
The defendant was arrested and taken to the police station.  
After he was booked on charges of possession of marijuana with 
intent to distribute, officers seized and searched his cellular 
telephone, finding several text messages that they identified as 
consistent with sales of marijuana. 
The defendant moved to suppress the marijuana seized from 
his vehicle and the text messages found on his telephone.  In 
Massachusetts, "possession of one ounce or less of marihuana 
[is] only . . . a civil offense," punishable by a "civil penalty 
of one hundred dollars and forfeiture of the marihuana."  
G. L. c. 94C, § 32L.  Because it is not a crime, police 
3 
 
 
 
observation of one ounce or less of marijuana is insufficient, 
by itself, to give rise to the probable cause necessary to 
conduct a search.  See Commonwealth v. Daniel, 464 Mass. 746, 
752 (2013) (Daniel).  A judge of the District Court nevertheless 
denied the defendant's motion to suppress.   He concluded the 
police were permitted to enter the minivan to effect the 
forfeiture of the marijuana that they saw, and that the 
discovery of the additional marijuana, the defendant's arrest, 
and the subsequent seizure and search of the defendant's 
telephone followed from the initial lawful entry into the 
defendant's vehicle.   We conclude that the search of the 
defendant's vehicle and of the cellular telephone violated his 
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  Accordingly, the judge's order denying the defendant's 
motion to suppress must be reversed. 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We summarize the relevant 
facts as found by the District Court judge, supplemented by 
uncontroverted evidence derived from the testimony of witnesses 
that the judge explicitly or implicitly credited.  See 
Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450 
Mass. 818 (2008). 
4 
 
 
 
Sean Glennon, an officer of the Quincy police department, 
initiated the stop of the defendant's minivan at approximately 
2:50 A.M.  Glennon approached the driver's side window and 
requested the defendant's driver's license and registration.  
Glennon observed that the defendant looked extremely nervous; 
his hands shook as he fumbled for his driver's license and 
registration, and, although he readily produced his license, he 
at first provided an expired registration.  He eventually 
provided a current valid registration. 
Scott Walker, a State police trooper who happened to be 
patrolling the area, also had stopped at the scene shortly after 
Glennon stopped the defendant's vehicle.  As Glennon was 
conversing with the defendant, Walker approached the vehicle's 
passenger side window.  Walker observed, on the floor between 
the vehicle's two front seats, the corner of a plastic sandwich 
bag that appeared to contain marijuana, protruding from under a 
T-shirt.  Walker discreetly indicated to Glennon the apparent 
presence of marijuana. 
Glennon ordered the defendant to step out of the vehicle 
and performed a patfrisk, during which he found $285 in cash and 
a cellular telephone.  After returning the money and the 
telephone to the defendant, Glennon asked whether there was 
5 
 
 
 
"anything illegal in the car."  The defendant answered, "No."  
Glennon requested permission to search the vehicle; the 
defendant declined.  Glennon then informed the defendant that 
Walker had seen a bag of marijuana in the vehicle.  The 
defendant "slumped forward" and a "dejected type of look" 
crossed his face. 
Glennon handcuffed the defendant, whose hands by that point 
were "shaking uncontrollabl[y]," and began to search the 
vehicle.  Glennon saw a bag he described as "consistent with 
about a [one]-ounce bag" of marijuana, partially visible under a 
T-shirt on the floor between the vehicle's front seats.  He 
lifted the T-shirt, and observed two additional bags of 
marijuana, one approximately equal in size to the first bag, and 
one smaller.  The officers searched the remainder of the 
minivan, and also requested a narcotics-trained canine to 
perform a sniff search, but located no additional drugs or 
contraband and no other evidence of illegal activity.  The 
defendant was transported to the police station, where he was 
booked on charges of possession with intent to distribute 
marijuana.  During booking, officers again seized the 
defendant's money and cellular telephone.  Glennon viewed text 
messages stored on the telephone, and saw "several text messages 
6 
 
 
 
that appeared to be orders to purchase marijuana." 
b.  Procedural history.  The defendant was charged with 
possession with the intent to distribute marijuana, in violation 
of G. L. c. 94C, § 32, and a civil motor vehicle infraction 
based on the broken headlight.  The defendant filed a motion to 
suppress all of the physical evidence seized as a result of the 
search and the arrest, including the marijuana, the telephone, 
and the text messages found on the telephone.  The defendant 
argued that the officers lacked probable cause to believe that 
the minivan contained more than one ounce of marijuana, 
rendering the search impermissible.  A District Court judge held 
an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion, at which both 
Glennon and Walker testified. 
The judge denied the motion to suppress.  He observed that 
"[t]he issue of whether the police could ascertain whether the 
initial bag of marijuana, because it was partially hidden, 
contained more or less than one [ounce] of material was . . . 
contested . . . at the hearing."  The judge concluded, however, 
that "it is irrelevant whether Glennon or Walker could make such 
a determination."  Stating that, "while possession of less than 
[one ounce] of marijuana is not criminal, any quantity is 
'contraband,'" the judge determined that "the police are 
7 
 
 
 
entitled to issue an 'exit order' to completely ensure their 
safety (and for convenience) while they are in a vulnerable 
position reaching into the vehicle to seiz[e] the drugs."  
Furthermore, the judge concluded that, "once the police removed 
the shirt to seize the initial bundle of marijuana, a second one 
ounce bag as well as a smaller bag were revealed," giving rise 
to probable cause to arrest the defendant for possession of a 
criminal quantity of marijuana.  Finally, the judge concluded 
that "[t]he seizure of the [tele]phone [was] incident to the 
arrest," and that "the information obtained [from the search of 
the telephone's contents] [was] allowed as inevitable discovery 
during the investigation of whether the more than one [ounce] of 
marijuana were possessed with intent to distribute." 
The single justice granted the defendant's application for 
leave to file an interlocutory appeal to the Appeals Court 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as appearing in 422 
Mass. 1501 (1996), and also allowed the defendant to amend his 
filing to include a challenge to the search of the cellular 
telephone.  We allowed the defendant's application for direct 
appellate review. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "In reviewing a 
ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary 
8 
 
 
 
findings of fact absent clear error but conduct an independent 
review of [the judge's] ultimate findings and conclusions of 
law" (quotation omitted).  Daniel, 464 Mass. at 748-749. 
b.  The search of the vehicle.  i.  The Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution protects the "right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures."  Article 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights similarly protects against 
"unreasonable searches, and seizures, of [one's] person, [one's] 
houses, [one's] papers, and all [one's] possessions."  While 
"[g]enerally, a warrant is required" for a search to be 
reasonable, "several well-recognized exceptions exist."  
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 473 (2011) (Cruz).  "Under 
the automobile exception, a warrantless search of an automobile 
is permitted when police have 'probable cause to believe that a 
motor vehicle on a public way contains contraband or evidence of 
a crime, and exigent circumstances make obtaining a warrant 
impracticable.'"  Id. at 473-474, quoting Commonwealth v. Cast, 
407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990).  "[W]hen an automobile is stopped in 
a public place with probable cause, no more exigent 
circumstances are required . . . beyond the inherent mobility of 
an automobile itself to justify a warrantless search of the 
9 
 
 
 
vehicle."  Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 124 (1997). 
In 2008, voters in the Commonwealth approved a ballot 
initiative entitled "An Act establishing a sensible State 
marihuana policy."  See St. 2008, c. 387.  The initiative 
established that "possession of one ounce or less of marihuana 
shall only be a civil offense, subjecting an offender who is 
eighteen years of age or older to a civil penalty . . . and 
forfeiture of the marihuana, but not to any other form of 
criminal or civil punishment or disqualification."  G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32L. 
In Cruz, 459 Mass. at 462, we first confronted the 
decriminalization initiative's impact on the automobile 
exception.  There police officers, while conducting an otherwise 
permissible vehicle stop, smelled "a 'faint odor' of burnt 
marijuana."  Id.  Before the enactment of the decriminalization 
initiative, we had held "that the odor of burnt marijuana is 
sufficient to believe that there is contraband in the car."  Id. 
at 474, citing Commonwealth v. Garden, 451 Mass. 43, 47 (2008).  
The validity of a warrantless search, however, is determined 
according to the same standard used by a magistrate in deciding 
to issue a search warrant.  Cruz, supra at 475, citing Whiteley 
v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971).  In Massachusetts, the 
10 
 
 
 
standard for the issuance of a search warrant demands probable 
cause to believe that a crime is being committed.  Cruz, supra 
at 475-476.  Because the ballot initiative transformed the 
possession of one ounce or less of marijuana into a civil 
infraction, not a crime, we concluded in Cruz that a warrantless 
search of a vehicle is permissible only if police can establish 
"probable cause to believe that a criminal amount of contraband 
was present in the car."  Id. at 476 (emphasis in original). 
Similarly, in Daniel, supra at 749, police smelled "the 
odor of freshly burnt marijuana" while conducting a traffic 
stop.  When an officer asked whether the vehicle's occupants had 
any marijuana, a passenger gave the officer two small bags, 
collectively containing less than one ounce of marijuana.  Id.  
The officer then ordered the occupants out of the vehicle and 
searched it.  Id. at 750.  During the search, he found an 
unlicensed firearm in the glove compartment.  Id. 
We held that the officer lacked probable cause to search 
the vehicle.  Id. at 751-752.  Possession of the quantity of 
marijuana contained in the two small bags "constituted a civil 
infraction, not a criminal offense," id. at 751, and the 
vehicle's occupants "surrendered [the] bags . . . at the request 
of the officer."  Id.  Consequently, "[a]bsent articulable facts 
11 
 
 
 
supporting a belief that either occupant of the vehicle 
possessed a criminal amount of marijuana, the search was not 
justified by the need to search for contraband."  Id. at 752. 
Cruz and Daniel control the outcome of this case.  Glennon 
testified that the bag that was partially visible under the T-
shirt was "consistent with about a [one]-ounce bag" of 
marijuana.  Because the ballot initiative decriminalized 
"possession of one ounce or less" of marijuana, G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32L, the officer saw evidence of a civil infraction, not a 
criminal offense.  Absent articulable facts supporting a belief 
that the vehicle contained an additional, criminal quantity of 
marijuana, the officers lacked probable cause to believe that a 
crime was being committed, and the search was impermissible. 
ii.  The Commonwealth offers two reasons in support of its 
argument that the officers had probable cause to believe that a 
criminal amount of marijuana was present in the vehicle. 
The Commonwealth's first argument hinges on the word 
"about."  The Commonwealth contends that, because "'[a]bout' an 
ounce would include amounts both more and less than an ounce," 
and because possession of more than an ounce of marijuana would 
constitute a criminal offense, the officers had probable cause 
to search the vehicle. 
12 
 
 
 
The standard for probable cause demands that the officers 
know "enough facts and circumstances 'to warrant a person of 
reasonable caution in believing'" the vehicle contained a 
criminal quantity of marijuana.  Commonwealth v. Welch, 420 
Mass. 646, 650 (1995), quoting Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 
at 895.  Here Glennon testified that, based on his training and 
experience, he identified the amount of marijuana contained in 
the bag as "about . . . [one]-ounce," a noncriminal quantity.  
The Commonwealth identifies no facts or circumstances within the 
officers' knowledge that would have led a reasonable person to 
believe that Glennon underestimated the amount of marijuana 
contained in the bag.  That belief would be particularly 
unwarranted because the officers could only see a small portion 
of the bag, the remainder being covered by the T-shirt.  The 
imprecision in Glennon's estimate at best gives rise only to 
speculation that the quantity exceeded one ounce.  It does not 
establish probable cause. 
Next, the Commonwealth contends that, even if the 
observation of the marijuana alone were not sufficient to give 
rise to probable cause, the defendant's nervousness upon being 
stopped tipped the scales to probable cause.  In Cruz, 459 Mass. 
at 467, the Commonwealth similarly contended that the odor of 
13 
 
 
 
burnt marijuana, when coupled with "the stop's location, a high 
crime neighborhood; the defendant's nervous demeanor; and the 
occupants' sharing of a cigar" allegedly used to cover the odor 
of marijuana were sufficient to establish probable cause.  
Likewise, in Daniel, 464 Mass. at 749, an officer testified 
that, when he approached the stopped vehicle, he observed the 
defendant "sitting in the passenger seat" with "his head down 
and his shoulders . . . 'rocking back and forth.'"  The officer 
in Daniel, supra at 750, also testified that he regarded the 
defendant's conduct in emptying his pockets and placing the 
contents on the dashboard as "significant . . . because it was 
not common," and that it suggested to him that the defendant was 
"trying to conceal something."  In both cases, we determined 
that manifestations of allegedly nervous or furtive behavior, in 
conjunction with indications that the defendants possessed some 
amount of marijuana, were not sufficient to establish probable 
cause to believe that the defendants possessed a criminal 
quantity.  "It is common," we observed, "and not necessarily 
indicative of criminality, to appear nervous during even a 
mundane encounter with police."  Cruz, 459 Mass. at 468.  
Because the Commonwealth identifies no additional factors 
supporting probable cause beyond the defendant's apparent 
14 
 
 
 
nervousness and the noncriminal quantity of marijuana that the 
officers observed, we reach the same conclusion here. 
iii.  The decriminalization initiative transformed 
possession of one ounce or less of marijuana into a civil 
offense, subjecting the possessor to "a civil penalty" and 
"forfeiture of the marihuana."  G. L. c. 94C, § 32L.  The 
District Court judge determined that the police officers were 
permitted to order the defendant out of his vehicle, and then to 
enter the vehicle themselves to effect this forfeiture.  The 
Commonwealth echoes this argument on appeal, asserting that 
"[t]he limited entry was reasonable as it effected the 
forfeiture as envisioned by G. L. c. 94C, § 32L." 
In evaluating this argument, it is important to distinguish 
an officer's power to seize the marijuana from the officer's 
power to make an entry into the vehicle to effect that seizure.  
We agree with the District Court judge's determination that any 
quantity of marijuana is "contraband" and is subject to seizure. 
We disagree, however, with the judge's conclusion that, to 
effect that seizure, the officers were entitled to make an entry 
into the vehicle that -- lacking probable cause -- they 
otherwise would be prohibited from making. 
The Commonwealth contends that the seizure of the marijuana 
15 
 
 
 
was proper because it was in "plain view."  "Under our plain 
view doctrine, a police officer may seize objects in plain view 
where four requirements are met: (1) the officer is 'lawfully in 
a position to view the object'; (2) the officer has 'a lawful 
right of access to the object'; (3) with respect to 'contraband, 
weapons, or other items illegally possessed, where the 
incriminating character of the object is immediately apparent' 
or, with respect to 'other types of evidence . . . where the 
particular evidence is plausibly related to criminal activity of 
which the police are already aware'; and (4) the officer 
'come[s] across the object inadvertently.'"  Commonwealth v. 
White, 469 Mass. 96, 102 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Sliech–
Brodeur, 457 Mass. 300, 306–307 (2010).  There is no dispute 
here that the first and fourth requirements are met:  the 
officers were lawfully in a position to observe the bag of 
marijuana, since the bag was visible from outside the vehicle 
where the officers were positioned in effecting a permissible, 
routine traffic stop; and the officers came across the marijuana 
inadvertently, since there is no contention that the officers 
effected the traffic stop to search for marijuana. 
The Commonwealth, however, cannot satisfy the doctrine's 
second requirement, which demands that the officer have "a 
16 
 
 
 
lawful right of access to the object."  Commonwealth v. White, 
supra.  In typical plain view cases, officers see and seize an 
object while conducting a permissible search, pursuant either to 
a warrant, see Commonwealth v. Sliech-Brodeur, supra at 306, or 
to an exception to the warrant requirement, see Commonwealth v. 
White, supra; Commonwealth v. Stack, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 227, 234-
235 (2000).  In those cases, police officers are already in the 
process of conducting a permissible search of a certain location 
(i.e. a vehicle, a house), and the plain view doctrine operates 
to allow officers to seize an object to which, by virtue of the 
search, they already have access.  In other cases, police 
officers see, in plain view from a lawful vantage point outside 
a vehicle, an item that itself gives rise to "probable cause to 
believe that they would find 'the instrumentality of a crime or 
evidence pertaining to a crime' in the vehicle."  Commonwealth 
v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 49 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 55 (1974).  Because the observation 
gives rise to probable cause to conduct a search, the subsequent 
entry into the vehicle and seizure of the item is permissible.  
Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra at 50. 
Here, although the officers could see the marijuana from 
their lawful vantage point outside the minivan, they did not 
17 
 
 
 
have a "lawful right to access" it from that vantage point.  To 
seize the marijuana, the police officers had to enter the 
minivan.  Because the observation of a noncriminal quantity of 
marijuana alone did not give rise to probable cause that the 
vehicle contained evidence of a crime, the validity of the 
officers' seizure of the marijuana turns on the existence of 
some other basis, besides probable cause, to justify the 
officers' entry into the vehicle. 
The Commonwealth characterizes the entry into the minivan 
as a "limited intrusion," and likens it to the intrusion 
involved in a police officer's request for license and 
registration documentation during a routine motor vehicle stop.  
The analogy is inapposite.  In the context of traffic stops, we 
have never held that officers may routinely enter vehicles to 
acquire driver's license and registration documents, in the same 
way that the officers entered the defendant's vehicle here to 
seize the marijuana.  On the contrary, we have stated that, 
"[g]enerally, the officer may simply direct the driver to 
retrieve his identification from the vehicle."  Commonwealth v. 
Lopes, 455 Mass. 147, 160 (2009).  Only when the officers have 
"a reasonable basis to believe that [the vehicle's occupants 
are] armed and dangerous" are police officers permitted to order 
18 
 
 
 
the occupants out of the vehicle and then conduct a limited 
search for the purposes of recovering the identification and 
registration documents.  Id.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Pagan, 440 
Mass. 62, 68 (2003) (police officers permitted to search 
"container that they reasonably fear may contain a weapon" 
before returning it to defendant to locate his identification 
documentation); Commonwealth v. Lantigua, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 526, 
528-529 (1995) (concluding that, where circumstances of search 
"justifie[d] heightened precautions for the officers' own 
safety[,] . . . the officers could properly have entered the 
passenger compartment, including the glove compartment, to 
retrieve the registration themselves"). 
Indeed, our jurisprudence has diverged from the United 
States Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in that we 
have held that art. 14 prohibits automatic exit orders during 
routine traffic stops.  Compare Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 
Mass. 658, 662-663 (1999), with Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 
106, 109-110 (1977).  Instead, we have concluded that a police 
officer must "have a reasonable suspicion of danger before 
compelling a driver to leave his motor vehicle."  Commonwealth 
v. Gonsalves, supra at 662.  Here the District Court judge 
acknowledged that, "except for the extreme nervousness of the 
19 
 
 
 
defendant, there [were] not present any other factors that would 
indicate a dangerous situation may exist."  The judge never 
found that the officers' exit order and the patfrisk of the 
defendant that followed were based on any reasonable 
apprehension of danger.  Rather, the record indicates that these 
events were precipitated solely by the officers' observation of 
what they believed to be a noncriminal portion of marijuana.  
Under these circumstances, the exit order and the patfrisk were 
impermissible, and the officers' entry into the vehicle to seize 
the marijuana cannot be justified under the logic that enables 
police officers to enter a vehicle to recover license and 
registration documentation in situations where the officer 
reasonably believes that the driver is armed and dangerous. 
Finally, the Commonwealth suggests that the officers' entry 
into the minivan was permissible under the logic that allows 
warrantless administrative inspections to enforce certain 
regulatory schemes.  Such searches, however, are typically 
confined to "commercial premises" that are "utilized in the 
context of a 'closely regulated' industry," where "an 
individual's expectation of privacy" is "particularly 
attenuated."  Commonwealth v. Tart, 408 Mass. 249, 253-254 
(1990).  Where warrantless administrative searches for evidence 
20 
 
 
 
of suspected regulatory violations have been upheld, moreover, 
typically "there is no possibility of criminal action and thus 
no necessity to comply with the more stringent standards of 
criminal probable cause" (quotations and citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Frodyma, 386 Mass. 434, 442 (1982).  
Administrative searches are permissible because they are 
"conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance 
of an administrative purpose, rather than as part of a criminal 
investigation to secure evidence of crime."  United States v. 
Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled on other 
grounds, United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(en banc).  They are not permissible, by contrast, where they 
serve as a "tool for law enforcement."  United States v. 
$124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1989). 
The facts of this case aptly demonstrate how the type of 
intrusion that occurred here could become a tool for law 
enforcement to search for evidence of criminal activity despite 
the absence of probable cause.  Contrary to the Commonwealth's 
characterization, the search went beyond a "limited intrusion" 
for the "sole purpose of seizing marijuana in [the officers'] 
plain view."  Upon entering the vehicle, the officers did not 
merely seize the one bag of marijuana that was partially in 
21 
 
 
 
plain view under the T-shirt.  Instead, they lifted the T-shirt, 
discovering and then seizing two additional bags.  The judge 
made no factual finding that the officers had to lift the T-
shirt to seize the bag, rather than simply grasping the portion 
of the bag that was partially visible.  And although the 
District Court judge found that, "in addition to the visible 
one-ounce bag of marijuana, other objects lay underneath the 
same t-shirt," the judge never found, and nothing in the 
officers' testimony supports a finding, that the officers had 
reason to believe that these other objects were other bags of 
marijuana, rather than innocuous, noncontraband items. 
For these reasons, we reject the Commonwealth's contention 
that the officers here were permitted to effect a "limited 
intrusion" into the defendant's vehicle to seize the marijuana.  
The officers observed a noncriminal quantity of marijuana from a 
lawful vantage point, and might well have informed the defendant 
that the possession of that marijuana constituted a civil 
offense, subjecting the possessor to a fine, and that the 
marijuana was subject to forfeiture.  They could have requested 
that the defendant turn the marijuana over to them.1  They could 
                                                 
1 We leave to another day an examination of the consequences 
if the defendant had declined to turn over the marijuana on 
22 
 
 
 
also have issued a civil citation, see G. L. c. 94C, § 32N, and 
pursued the forfeiture of the marijuana, see G. L. c. 94C, § 47. 
They did not do so.  Instead, they entered the vehicle and 
conducted a search that went beyond even what would be necessary 
to seize the bag that they had seen.  Because they lacked 
probable cause to believe that the van contained evidence of a 
crime, we conclude that their entry into the minivan was 
impermissible. 
c.  The search of the cellular telephone.  Our 
determination that the search of the defendant's vehicle was 
impermissible resolves any question whether the subsequent 
search of the defendant's cellular telephone was permissible.  
The District Court judge concluded that the additional bags of 
marijuana that the officers discovered as a result of their 
entry into the minivan gave rise to probable cause to arrest the 
defendant; that the seizure of the cellular telephone was 
permissible as a seizure incident to the defendant's arrest; and 
that, once the telephone was seized, the search of the text 
messages contained on the telephone was permissible under the 
inevitable discovery doctrine.  In the District Court judge's 
analysis, then, the validity of the search of the cellular 
                                                                                                                                                             
request. 
23 
 
 
 
telephone ultimately turned on the validity of the officers' 
entry into the minivan.  Because we have determined that the 
officers' entry into the minivan was impermissible, the thread 
leading to the search of the text messages is unwound, and the 
text messages must be suppressed.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Pietrass, 392 Mass. 892, 900 (1984). 
If there were any doubt about that result, the United 
States Supreme Court has set it to rest.  After the District 
Court judge issued his decision in this case, the United States 
Supreme Court decided Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 
(2014).  There, the Court held that "the search incident to 
arrest exception does not apply to cell phones."  Id. at 2494.  
For both of those reasons, the text messages obtained as a 
result of the search of the defendant's cellular telephone must 
be suppressed. 
3.  Conclusion.  The decision denying the defendant's 
motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the searches 
of his vehicle and of the defendant's cellular telephone is 
reversed.  The matter is remanded to the District Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.