Title: Watson v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 148, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOHN E. WATSON,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 148, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 91008490DI 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 4, 2009 
 
 
 
 
Decided:    July 13, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 13th day of July 2009, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief 
filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to 
withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
In January 1993, the defendant-appellant, John E. Watson, 
pleaded guilty to Felony Murder, Intentional Murder, Robbery in the First 
Degree, and three counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the 
Commission of a Felony.  Watson was sentenced in March 1993 and 
received two life sentences, plus an additional 33 years at Level V.  In 
August 2007, Watson filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief.  In July 
2008, Watson, represented by counsel, filed an amended motion for 
 
2 
postconviction relief.1  This is Watson’s appeal from the Superior Court’s 
March 4, 2009 order denying his motion for postconviction relief. 
 
(2) 
Watson’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims 
that could arguably support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its 
own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without 
an adversary presentation.2 
 
(3) 
Watson’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and 
complete examination of the record and the law, there are no arguably 
appealable issues.  By letter, Watson’s counsel informed Watson of the 
provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him with a copy of the motion to 
withdraw, the accompanying brief and the complete transcript.  Watson also 
was informed of his right to supplement his attorney’s presentation.  Watson 
responded with a brief that raises two issues for this Court’s consideration.  
                                                 
1 In January 2008, the Superior Court appointed counsel to represent Watson in 
postconviction proceedings due to the apparent complexity of the issues presented. 
2 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
3 
The State has responded to the position taken by Watson’s counsel as well as 
the issues raised by Watson and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s 
judgment.   
 
(4) 
Watson raises two issues for this Court’s consideration.  First, 
Watson claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion when it denied 
his postconviction motion as time-barred.3  Specifically, he contends that, 
because the Superior Court gave him an inaccurate explanation of the “in 
furtherance of” language of the felony murder statute and incorrectly stated 
the elements of the offense during his guilty plea colloquy, his guilty plea 
was involuntary and the “manifest injustice” exception renders the time bar 
inapplicable.4   Second, Watson claims that his appointed counsel asserted 
an erroneous argument in support of his postconviction motion and requests 
that the matter be remanded for consideration of the argument Watson 
originally asserted in his pro se motion.5   
 
(5) 
Watson’s first claim is that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion when it denied his postconviction motion as time-barred.  The 
record reflects that Watson’s conviction became final 30 days after sentence 
                                                 
3 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (1). 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5). 
5 Watson originally argued that his felony murder charge was erroneous under Chao v. 
State, 931 A.2d 1000 (Del. 2007) and Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906 (Del. 2003).  
Watson’s appointed counsel argued that the felony murder charge was erroneous under 
Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351 (Del. 1992), the governing case at the time Watson entered 
his guilty plea in January 1993. 
 
4 
was imposed---that is, in April 1993.6  Under the version of Rule 61(i) (1) in 
effect at that time, Watson had 3 years from that date to file his 
postconviction motion.  His postconviction motion was not filed until 
August 2007 and, therefore, was plainly untimely.   
 
(6) 
Watson further claims that the “miscarriage of justice” 
exception of Rule 61(i) (5) applies to his postconviction motion because the 
Superior Court gave an inaccurate explanation of the “in furtherance of” 
language of the felony murder statute and misstated the elements of the 
offense during the plea colloquy.  The transcript of Watson’s 1993 plea 
colloquy reflects that the Superior Court judge stated the following, “Count 
V charges that . . . you did recklessly or intentionally cause the death of [the 
victim] in the course of and in furtherance of the commission of the felony 
of robbery first degree . . . .”   
 
(7) 
While the transcript reflects that the Superior Court erroneously 
included the word “intentionally” in its recitation of the statute, it is apparent 
that this inadvertent mistake had no prejudicial effect.  Moreover, contrary to 
Watson’s argument, the Superior Court correctly recited the “in furtherance 
of” language of the statute. Finally, as outlined in the Superior Court’s 
findings after Watson’s penalty hearing, the acts Watson admitted to 
                                                 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m) (1). 
 
5 
committing in connection with his guilty plea plainly were “in furtherance 
of” the crime of robbery and, therefore, constituted the crime of felony 
murder.7  As such, we conclude that the “miscarriage of justice” exception is 
inapplicable to Watson’s claim and that the Superior Court properly denied 
it as untimely.   
 
(8) 
Watson’s second claim is that his appointed counsel asserted an 
erroneous argument in support of his postconviction motion, necessitating a 
remand to the Superior Court for consideration of the arguments Watson 
originally raised in his pro se motion.  Because there is no constitutional 
right to counsel in postconviction proceedings, Watson’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is not viable.8  Even if the claim were viable, Watson 
has failed to demonstrate that any alleged errors on the part of his counsel 
resulted in prejudice to him.9  Specifically, there is no evidence that 
Watson’s claim would have succeeded had his counsel made the argument 
he originally asserted in his pro se motion.  As such, Watson’s second claim 
also is unavailing.    
 
(9) 
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Watson’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
                                                 
7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 636(a) (2).  Specifically, Watson, a crack addict, broke into his 
aunt’s house late at night to steal money to buy drugs.  He beat her to death with a 
hammer when she woke up during the course of the robbery. 
8 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). 
9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
 
6 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Watson’s counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Watson could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State of Delaware’s 
motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is 
AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice