Title: P. v. Sutton
Citation: 48 Cal. 4th 533. modification : 48 Cal. 4th 811a
Docket Number: S166402, S166402m
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: April 5, 2010

1 
Filed 4/5/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S166402 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/3 B195337 
MICHAEL JEROME SUTTON et al., 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BA304502 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
Penal Code section 1382 — one of the principal provisions implementing 
California‟s statutory right to a speedy trial — provides that when a defendant 
charged with a felony is not brought to trial within 60 days of arraignment on an 
indictment or information (and the defendant has not expressly or impliedly 
consented to having trial set for a date beyond that period), the criminal charges 
against the defendant shall be dismissed unless there is “good cause” for the delay. 
In the present case, on the 60th day after arraignment, the appointed 
counsel of one of two jointly charged defendants was engaged in another trial that 
had extended longer than anticipated but that was expected to be completed very 
shortly.  For that reason, the trial court found there was good cause to delay the 
trial of both defendants (without their consent) on a day-to-day basis until the 
attorney‟s other trial was completed.  Ultimately, the trial in the present 
2 
proceeding commenced on the 66th day after arraignment.  At that trial, both 
defendants were convicted of all charged offenses. 
In the Court of Appeal, defendants principally contended that the trial court 
erred in finding that appointed counsel‟s engagement in another trial constituted 
good cause to delay the trial in this case beyond the 60th day without the consent 
of defendants, maintaining that the trial court‟s finding of good cause conflicted 
with this court‟s decision in People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557 (Johnson) 
and subsequent cases that applied the holding in Johnson.  The Court of Appeal 
rejected defendants‟ contention, concluding that the circumstances of this case 
were distinguishable from Johnson.  We granted review to consider the validity of 
the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal. 
In this court, defendants vigorously assert that the Court of Appeal‟s 
decision is inconsistent with this court‟s holding in Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557.  
The Attorney General disputes this assertion, and further requests that we 
reconsider the holding in Johnson itself. 
As we explain, although there is language in the opinion in Johnson, supra, 
26 Cal.3d 557, that supports defendants‟ position, a careful reading of the entire 
decision demonstrates that the language in Johnson relied upon by defendants is 
overbroad and should be clarified.  The circumstances presented in Johnson — in 
which a lengthy delay in bringing a criminal case to trial was attributable to the 
state‟s chronic failure to provide a number of public defenders sufficient to enable 
indigent defendants to proceed to trial within the presumptive statutory period — 
are clearly distinguishable from those in the present case.  Here, trial was delayed 
on a day-to-day basis for a brief period of time in order to permit one 
codefendant‟s appointed counsel to complete an ongoing trial in another case that 
ran longer than had been anticipated, a delay that —unlike the delay in Johnson — 
cannot fairly or reasonably be attributed to the fault or neglect of the state.  We 
3 
conclude that Johnson should not be understood to preclude a trial court from 
finding good cause to delay trial under the circumstances presented by the case 
before us and accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal upholding 
the trial court‟s action.   
I 
A 
The facts giving rise to the criminal charges against defendants Willie J. 
Jackson and Michael Jerome Sutton (set forth verbatim from the Court of Appeal‟s 
opinion) are as follows: 
On May 31, 2006, Officer Anthony Jackson [(Officer Jackson)], a member 
of the [Los Angeles Police Department‟s] narcotics division buy team, was 
working undercover at 7th and Ceres in Los Angeles.  Defendant Jackson was 
counting money on Ceres.  The officer looked at defendant Jackson, who 
approached the officer and asked what he wanted.  The officer said he wanted “a 
20,” meaning $20 worth of [drugs].  Defendant Jackson said he had to get it; he 
crossed the street to a waist-high camping tent, where [defendant] Sutton was 
waiting.   
Sutton and defendant Jackson talked, although the officer could not 
overhear their conversation.  Sutton opened a white bottle out of which he poured 
an off-white solid substance into his hand and gave it to defendant Jackson.  
Defendant Jackson walked back to the officer and asked him for the money.  The 
officer gave defendant Jackson a prerecorded $20 bill, and defendant Jackson gave 
the officer an off-white solid substance resembling rock cocaine.  As the officer 
walked away, he signaled to his partners that the buy was complete. 
Jackson was arrested.  Officers recovered $14 from his pants pockets.  
Sutton was arrested.  Officers recovered an off-white substance resembling rock 
cocaine, a white canister also containing an off-white substance resembling 
4 
cocaine, and $44 from him.  Detective Vip Kanchanamongkol, who was in charge 
of the operation, compared a $20 bill recovered from Sutton to the prerecorded bill 
Officer Jackson used to buy the drugs from defendant Jackson.  The bills matched.  
Testing confirmed that the substance Officer Jackson bought was 0.33 grams of 
cocaine base and that the substance recovered from Sutton was 0.99 grams of 
cocaine base.  [End of quoted passage from Court of Appeal opinion.] 
B 
As just noted, defendants were arrested on May 31, 2006 — immediately 
following the drug transaction — and a felony complaint was originally filed 
against both of them on June 2, 2006, charging Jackson and Sutton with sale of a 
controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11382) and charging Sutton 
additionally with possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 11351.5).   
Under Penal Code section 859b, in the absence of a waiver or unless good 
cause exists, a preliminary hearing must be held within 10 court days of the date 
on which a defendant is arraigned on a complaint.  On June 16, 2006 — which the 
trial court described as day “10 of 10” — neither defendant was present in the 
court in which the preliminary hearing was set, apparently because the defendants, 
both of whom were in custody, had been brought to the wrong courthouse.  At that 
time, the trial court dismissed the complaint (as required by § 859b), and Sutton 
was released from custody.  Jackson remained in custody on a probation 
revocation.  The trial court stated that it assumed the People would refile the 
complaint.   
The People refiled the felony complaint three days later on June 19, 2006, 
and Sutton was again arrested and placed in custody.  (Thereafter both defendants 
remained in custody throughout the pretrial proceedings.)  After a preliminary 
hearing, Sutton and Jackson were held to answer and were arraigned on an 
5 
information on July 21, 2006.  Trial of the matter then was scheduled for Monday, 
September 11, 2006, as day “52 of 60” for purposes of Penal Code section 1382.1  
(Under section 1382, in a felony case a defendant must be brought to trial within 
60 days of his or her arraignment on an indictment or information, unless (1) the 
defendant enters a “general waiver” (§ 1382, subd. (a)(2)(A)); (2) the defendant 
“requests or consents to” a trial date beyond the 60-day period, in which case he or 
she shall be brought to trial within 10 days of the date set for trial (§ 1382, 
subd. (a)(2)(B)); or (3) “good cause” for setting a trial date beyond that period is 
shown (§ 1382, subd. (a)).) 
The trial date later was changed to Tuesday, September 12, 2006 — day 
“53 of 60” — and on September 12 all parties and counsel2 appeared in 
Department 111 and announced ready for trial, although Jackson‟s appointed 
counsel, Steven Flowers, stated that he was “supposed to start trial today” in a case 
“which I think will settle.”  Flowers further stated: “I am supposed to start another 
trial tomorrow [(Wednesday, Sept. 13)] which will not settle.  I am already in 
[Department] 100 on Thursday, and the date for this case to go to 100 is on 
Friday.”3  After noting that his client in the trial scheduled for Thursday was not in 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated.   
2  
The record reflects that Jackson was represented at the September 12, 2006 
proceeding and in all subsequent proceedings by Steven Flowers, an appointed 
bar-panel attorney, and that Sutton was represented at the September 12 
proceedings and all subsequent proceedings by Thomas J. White, also an 
appointed bar-panel attorney.   
3  
Department 100 is the criminal master calendar court of the Los Angeles 
County Superior Court, from which cases are assigned “for trial to any court 
throughout the county.”  (Super. Ct. L.A. County, Local Rules, rule 6.0(a) [see 
ch. 6, crim. div. procedures].)   
6 
custody and that Flowers did not believe that client would object to a continuance, 
Flowers indicated he would request a continuance in the noncustody case.  The 
trial court then reviewed separate plea offers that had been proffered by the 
prosecution to Sutton and to Jackson but not yet accepted or rejected by either 
defendant, and thereafter directed that the case be transferred to Department 100 
for trial assignment on Friday, September 15, 2006, as “day 56 of 60.”  The court 
stated: “[A]ll parties are announcing ready for trial subject to the possibility that 
you [counsel Flowers] could be engaged in that other case, but you‟re going to 
make a motion.”  Flowers responded: “Exactly.”   
On Friday, September 15, 2006, day 56 of 60, the parties and counsel 
appeared in Department 100.  At that time, Flowers stated he was then engaged in 
trial in another case.4  The court asked Flowers when that trial would be 
completed, and Flowers responded: “I would anticipate, it‟s more than likely the 
testimony will be done today in my other case.”  The court stated: “But you‟ve got 
to do jury instructions and argument, so you‟re not going to finish until Monday or 
Tuesday?”  Flowers responded: “Monday probably.”  When both defense counsel 
indicated that they wanted to bring the present case back for trial on Tuesday, 
September 19 (day 60 of 60), the court informed them, “I‟m going to try to get a 
time waiver [from defendants] because I don‟t want . . . to go to [the] last day,” 
and thereafter stated to defendant Jackson: “Your lawyer is engaged in trial right 
now, and he can only try one case at a time.  But he will be available to try your 
case on the 19th of September.  Is it agreeable with you that you come back here 
on September 19th and have your trial within two days of that date?”  Jackson 
                                              
4  
The record does not disclose the name of the other case in which attorney 
Flowers was engaged or on what date that other trial had begun.   
7 
responded: “As long as no time is being waived.”  The court stated, “Oh, you 
don‟t want to waive time?” and Jackson responded: “No time.  I don‟t want to 
waive time.”   
The court then stated: “That‟s fine.  Then whether he‟s available or not, I‟ll 
have you back here on Monday and you guys can sit.  You‟re coming back for 
nothing because he‟s engaged in trial.  It doesn‟t require a time waiver, but I‟m not 
the one who has to sit here.  So that‟s fine, we‟ll bring you back on Monday, both 
of you, and you can sit.”  The court further observed: “[I]t seemed like a waste to 
bring them back.  But if there‟s no time waiver, I have to bring them back every 
day.”  The court directed the parties and counsel to return on Monday, 
September 18, 2006, as day “59 of 60.”   
On Monday, September 18, 2006, day 59 of 60, counsel for the People and 
for Sutton announced ready, but Flowers, Jackson‟s counsel, stated he still was 
engaged in trial.  The court noted that it was “trailing this day to day” and that the 
trailing was “on motion of Mr. Flowers, correct?”  Flowers responded, 
“Continuing motion that started last Friday.”  The court ordered the parties and 
counsel to return on Tuesday, September 19, at 8:30 a.m.   
On Tuesday, September 19, 2006, day 60 of 60, Flowers informed the court 
that he still was engaged in trial.  The court inquired, “When is it supposed to be 
over?”  Flowers responded:  “Probably tomorrow.  We‟re dark today.”  The court 
noted on the record that neither defendant was waiving time, and ordered both 
defendants back to court the following morning.  When Sutton asked the court 
when the 60-day period started to run, the court informed Sutton that “this is the 
60th day.  But if . . . the lawyer is engaged in trial, there‟s good cause to put the 
matter over for both defendants.  Mr. Flowers is still engaged in trial.  The court 
finds good cause.  The matter is trailed.  We‟ll have you back tomorrow.”   
8 
On Wednesday, September 20, 2006, day 61 of 60, Flowers stated he still 
was engaged in trial.  Nonetheless, Flowers stated that “I‟m told I should make at 
least a pro forma motion to dismiss.”  The following colloquy ensued: 
The Court:  “On what basis?” 
Mr. Flowers: “Because [d]ay 61 of 60 and —”  
The Court: “But you‟re engaged in trial —” 
Mr. Flowers: “And I‟m still —” 
The Court: “ — You‟ve asked for the continuance. Now, how can you 
make a motion to dismiss?  Do you want to go to trial on this second case at the 
same time as your first?  I don‟t care.” 
Mr. Flowers: “No.” 
The Court:  “Well, how can you make a motion to dismiss if you‟ve made 
the motion to continue?” 
Mr. Flowers: “Because I‟m still engaged in trial because I‟m on day eight 
of a two-day trial.” 
The Court: “Well, so what?” 
Mr. Flowers: “I just . . .” 
The Court:  “That‟s not a good faith motion to dismiss if you‟re making the 
motion to continue.  You cannot make both.”   
The prosecutor stated that “The People have been ready, your honor, every 
day.”  The court acknowledged that was accurate. 
The trial court then ruled: “Matter will trail.  It will remain last day.  All 
parties are ordered back on September 21st.  The court finds good cause in that 
Mr. Flowers is engaged in trial.  We‟ll see you guys tomorrow for trial.”   
On Thursday, September 21, 2006, day 62 of 60, Flowers arrived before the 
defendants were present and, stating he still was engaged in trial, asked the court 
whether, “if my jury goes out today, there is a high possibility they will, . . . am I 
9 
considered available or do I have to wait for the verdict?”  The court responded: 
“That‟s up to you.  Technically there is a case that says while a jury is deliberating 
you‟re still engaged but I don‟t generally wait.”  Flowers asked: “If I call at 3:00 
o‟clock [and say] the jury is out[,] you will consider me available for tomorrow?”  
The court stated: “Tomorrow.  Yes.”  When defendants Jackson and Sutton 
arrived, the court addressed them: “Mr. Flowers was here this morning.  He is still 
engaged in trial.  Mr. White was here, your lawyer [addressing Sutton], but you 
guys were on the way from Lancaster, Wayside.  And Mr. White had a Norwalk 
appearance.  He is ready for trial and waiting for Mr. Flowers who should be done 
today.  So I anticipate that you will go to trial tomorrow.  [¶]  We will see you 
tomorrow.  I find good cause, Mr. Flowers being engaged in trial, to trail this case 
until the 22nd of September.  Mr. Flowers indicates he expects to have the jury out 
late this afternoon and even though he is technically engaged while the jury is 
deliberating, I will send you out to trial tomorrow.”  Defendant Sutton asked:  
“This doesn‟t make us waiving time?”  The court responded: “You haven‟t waived 
one second.  I find good cause because one of the two counsel [is] engaged in trial, 
which is good cause to trail the case.”   
On Friday, September 22, 2006, counsel Flowers appeared and stated that 
his other trial had not yet ended but that “[t]he prosecution rested yesterday 
afternoon.  Jury instructions have already been gone through and approved.  So 
final argument after that.  They may go out this morning; if not that, then this 
afternoon.”  The court asked: “You‟ll be available then for trial Monday?,” and 
Flowers answered: “Hopefully, yes.”  The court asked: “Is it your request the 
matter trail till Monday the 25th?” and Flowers stated: “Yes.”  The court stated:  
“Court finds good cause in that Mr. Flowers is engaged in trial and will be 
available for trial on September 25.  There‟s no time waiver.  All parties are 
ordered back at 8:30 a.m. on that date.”  When Sutton again asked for an 
10 
explanation of “what‟s the good cause,” the court responded: “[T]he good cause is 
that one of the lawyers is engaged and can‟t try two cases at one time.  And if one 
of the lawyers is engaged on a case with two defendants, it‟s good cause to put 
both over.” 
On Monday, September 25, 2006, Flowers informed the court that he had 
completed his other trial.  The case then was transferred from Department 100 to 
Department 124 for trial.  After the trial court in Department 124 explained to 
defendants the plea offers that had been made to each, they both indicated they 
wanted to go to trial.  Sutton‟s counsel then moved for dismissal on the ground 
that Sutton had been denied a speedy trial, relying upon a number of Court of 
Appeal decisions holding that the state‟s interest in conducting a joint trial did not 
constitute good cause to delay a codefendant‟s trial simply because delay was 
warranted with regard to a jointly charged defendant.  The trial court denied the 
motion to dismiss, and the joint trial of both defendants commenced that same 
day. 
At trial, each defendant was convicted of all offenses with which he was 
charged. 
C 
In the Court of Appeal, defendants contended, among other issues, that the 
trial court erred under Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, in finding that the 
unavailability of Jackson‟s counsel constituted good cause to delay Jackson‟s trial 
when Jackson expressly had refused to waive time and his counsel‟s unavailability 
related to counsel‟s representation of another client and was not for the benefit of 
Jackson.  In addition, Sutton contended that even if the trial court properly found 
that the engagement of Jackson‟s counsel in another trial constituted good cause to 
11 
 
delay Jackson‟s trial, the circumstance that Sutton was jointly charged with 
Jackson did not constitute good cause to delay Sutton‟s trial. 
The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments.  With respect to the first 
contention, the appellate court held that the circumstances presented in this 
case — “in which trial counsel is presently engaged in another matter and the 
matter before the court trails for a minimal number of days” — were 
distinguishable from the circumstances presented in Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 
557, in which the trial court, over the defendant‟s objection, had granted repeated 
delays not only to permit a public defender to complete an ongoing trial but also to 
accommodate the public defender‟s obligations with regard to numerous other 
older cases to which he had been assigned.  With respect to the second contention, 
the Court of Appeal held that the significant state interests served by permitting 
jointly charged defendants to be tried together in a single trial can constitute good 
cause to delay the trial of a jointly charged codefendant, and that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding that those interests justified the relatively brief 
delay in the joint trial at issue in the present case.  The Court of Appeal affirmed 
the convictions of both defendants. 
Each defendant petitioned for review, contending (among other unrelated 
issues) that the Court of Appeal‟s decision was inconsistent with Johnson, supra, 
26 Cal.3d 557, and a number of Court of Appeal decisions following Johnson.  
We granted review, limiting the issues to be reviewed to those related to the 
statutory speedy-trial issue.5 
                                              
5  
Our order granting review stated: “The issue to be briefed and argued is 
limited to the following:  Were defendants‟ statutory speedy trial rights violated 
when defense counsel announced ready but that he might be in another trial, and 
the court continued trial for six days over defendants‟ personal objection, and if 
(footnote continued on next page) 
12 
II 
A 
As noted, section 1382 is one of the principal provisions implementing a 
criminal defendant‟s statutory right to a speedy trial.  The statute provides that, in 
a felony case, the court shall dismiss the action when a defendant is not brought to 
trial within 60 days of his or her arraignment on an indictment or information, 
unless (1) the defendant enters a general waiver of the 60-day trial requirement, 
(2) the defendant requests or consents (expressly or impliedly) to the setting of a 
trial date beyond the 60-day period (in which case the defendant shall be brought 
to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter), or (3) “good cause” is 
shown.6 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
so, was the error prejudicial?”   
 
As the foregoing statement of facts reveals, the phrasing of the question in 
our order granting review does not precisely reflect the circumstances disclosed by 
the record in this case, inasmuch as Jackson‟s counsel indicated up to the 60th day 
that he expected his other trial to be completed prior to the 60th day and the trial 
court continued the trial on a day-to-day basis for six days rather than simply “for 
six days.”  The briefs filed by the parties in this court, however, appropriately are 
based on the facts as reflected in the record, and fully discuss each aspect of the 
speedy-trial issue addressed in this opinion.  Accordingly, we conclude there is no 
need to solicit supplemental briefing pursuant to Government Code section 68081.   
6  
Section 1382, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: “The court, unless 
good cause to the contrary is shown, shall order the action to be dismissed in the 
following cases: . . .  [¶]  (2) In a felony case, when a defendant is not brought to 
trial within 60 days of the defendant‟s arraignment on an indictment or 
information . . . .  However, an action shall not be dismissed under this paragraph 
if either of the following circumstances exist:  [¶]  (A) The defendant enters a 
general waiver of the 60-day trial requirement. . . .  [¶]  (B) The defendant requests 
or consents to the setting of a trial date beyond the 60-day period.  . . . Whenever a 
case is set for trial beyond the 60-day period by request or consent, expressed or 
implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought 
to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.”   
13 
As reflected in the statement of facts set forth above, in this case each 
defendant repeatedly informed the trial court that he was not willing to “waive 
time,” or, in other words, to consent to having his case brought to trial beyond the 
60-day period; the trial court, in permitting the matter to trail beyond that period 
on a day-to-day basis, repeatedly acknowledged that defendants had not waived 
time and expressly rested its continuance orders on a determination that there was 
“good cause” for the delay.  Our resolution of this case thus requires an analysis of 
the “good cause” concept embodied in section 1382. 
Section 1382 does not define “good cause” as that term is used in the 
provision, but numerous California appellate decisions that have reviewed good-
cause determinations under this statute demonstrate that, in general, a number of 
factors are relevant to a determination of good cause:  (1) the nature and strength 
of the justification for the delay, (2) the duration of the delay, and (3) the prejudice 
to either the defendant or the prosecution that is likely to result from the delay.  
(See, e.g., Stroud v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 952, 969-970; People v. 
Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 29-30; Jensen v. Superior Court (2008) 160 
Cal.App.4th 266, 271-275.)  Past decisions further establish that in making its 
good-cause determination, a trial court must consider all of the relevant 
circumstances of the particular case, “applying principles of common sense to the 
totality of circumstances . . . .”  (Stroud, supra, 23 Cal.4th 952, 969; see, e.g., 
Jensen v. Superior Court, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th 266, 270-275.)  The cases 
recognize that, as a general matter, a trial court “has broad discretion to determine 
whether good cause exists to grant a continuance of the trial”  (People v. Jenkins 
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1037), and that, in reviewing a trial court‟s good-cause 
determination, an appellate court applies an “abuse of discretion” standard.  (Ibid.; 
14 
see People v. Shane (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 196, 200-203; Hollis v. Superior 
Court (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 642, 645.)7   
Past California decisions have examined a wide variety of circumstances 
that have been proffered or relied upon as a basis under section 1382 for finding 
good cause to delay a trial, including (1) the unavailability of a witness, (2) the 
unavailability of a judge, (3) the unavailability of a courtroom, (4) counsel‟s need 
for additional time to prepare for trial, (5) the unavailability of counsel, and (6) the 
interest in trying jointly charged defendants in a single trial.  (See generally 5 
Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) §§ 308-316, pp. 457-471, and 
cases cited; Cal. Criminal Law: Procedure and Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2009) 
§§ 19.27-19.29, pp. 529-532, and cases cited.) 
As briefly noted above, defendants‟ challenges to the trial court‟s actions in 
the present case raise two distinct questions relating to good cause: (1) whether the 
trial court acted within its discretion in determining that the circumstance that 
Jackson‟s appointed counsel currently was engaged in an ongoing trial in another 
case constituted good cause to delay Jackson‟s trial pending completion of 
counsel‟s other trial, and (2) if so, whether the trial court acted within its discretion 
in determining that this circumstance also provided good cause to delay the trial of 
                                              
7  
A trial court‟s broad discretion in determining whether good cause has been 
shown for a delay of a scheduled trial is just one of the numerous instances in 
which a trial court enjoys broad discretion over the management of the cases 
pending before it and in determining a fair and reasonable manner to 
accommodate the various and sometimes competing interests that frequently are 
present in cases involving multiple defendants.  (See, e.g., §§ 1048 [authority to 
direct that an action be tried out of the statutorily designated order of calendar 
preference], 1094 [authority to depart from the statutorily designated order of trial 
procedure], 1270 [authority to release defendant on own recognizance], 1385 
[authority to dismiss a criminal action in furtherance of justice].)   
15 
Sutton, a jointly charged codefendant.  We turn first to the trial court‟s good-cause 
determination as it relates to the delay of Jackson‟s trial. 
B 
In asserting that the Court of Appeal erred in failing to find that the trial 
court abused its discretion in determining that Jackson‟s counsel‟s continuing 
engagement in an ongoing trial constituted good cause to delay Jackson‟s trial, 
both defendants rely principally upon this court‟s decision in Johnson, supra, 26 
Cal.3d 557.  Because of the centrality of the Johnson decision to defendants‟ 
claim, we begin by reviewing that decision in some detail.   
1 
In Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, the defendant, represented by a deputy 
public defender, was arraigned on February 2, 1977, on robbery charges and trial 
originally was set for March 23, 1977.  On that date, the defendant appeared in 
court with counsel.  Counsel explained to the court that he was presently engaged 
in another trial, had two other trials already scheduled in cases that were older than 
Johnson‟s case, and had no available trial date until May 6, 1977.  (See 26 Cal.3d 
at pp. 563-564 & fn. 2.)  The trial court viewed counsel‟s explanation as an 
implied request for a continuance beyond the 60-day period set forth in section 
1382.8  Although the defendant, who was unable to make bail and thus remained 
                                              
8  
Under the provisions of section 1382 as they read at the time of the trial 
proceedings in Johnson, the statute‟s 60-day period ran from the filing of the 
information or the finding of the indictment, rather than from the date of the 
arraignment (as is now the case).  (See Stats. 1973, ch. 847, § 1, pp. 1513-1514.)  
Although the Johnson decision does not explicitly state on which date the 
information was filed, the opinion states that the case ultimately was brought to 
trial on June 27, 1977, “144 days after the information was filed against him.”  
(26 Cal.3d at p. 565.)  Counting back from June 27, 1977, it appears that the 
information was filed on or about February 2, 1977, the same day the defendant 
(footnote continued on next page) 
16 
incarcerated pending trial (26 Cal.3d at p. 565), refused to consent to the proposed 
continuance, the trial court found good cause to continue the matter and postponed 
trial until May 6, 1977. 
On that date, Johnson‟s counsel again requested a continuance, explaining 
that he then had three other trials to complete prior to trying Johnson‟s case and 
did not expect to be available for that case until June 14, 1977.  (See Johnson, 
supra,  26 Cal.3d at p. 564 & fn. 3.)  The defendant again refused to consent to a 
continuance of his trial,  but the trial court found good cause to continue the trial 
to June 14, “ „which it appears to the court is the earliest opportunity counsel has 
to try [the] matter.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 564, fn. 3.) 
On that date, the court excused counsel until June 23, 1977, and at the same 
time entered a minute order indicating that “ „due to congested calendar‟ ” the 
court was trailing the case to a date “ „not later than June 27, 1977, or to such 
earlier date as a trial court is available (deemed 10th day, pursuant to 
stipulation).‟ ”  (Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 565.) 
Finally, on June 27, 1977, 144 days after the information had been filed, the 
court called the case for trial and jury selection began.  (Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 
at p. 565.) 
In addressing the propriety of the trial court‟s actions, the majority opinion 
in Johnson first considered whether, under the circumstances of that case, defense 
counsel had the right over the defendant‟s objection to waive the defendant‟s 
statutory right to be brought to trial within 60 days.  In Townsend v. Superior 
Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 774, 779-784, this court had held that defense counsel‟s 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
was arraigned on the information.  Accordingly, the 60-day period would have 
ended in early April 1977. 
17 
general authority to control the defendant‟s participation in judicial proceedings 
authorized counsel to consent to a continuance of the trial beyond the 60-day 
period, even over the defendant‟s objection.  But in Johnson, the court qualified 
the holding in Townsend, stating: “The power of appointed counsel to control 
judicial strategy and to waive nonfundamental rights despite his client‟s objection 
(see Townsend v. Superior Court[, supra,] 15 Cal.3d 774, 781 and cases there 
cited) presumes effective counsel acting for the best interest of the client.  As the 
court pointed out in People v. Corona (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 684, 720, 
„[e]ffectiveness . . . is not a matter of professional competence alone.  It also 
includes the requirement that the services of the attorney be devoted solely to the 
interest of his client undiminished by conflicting considerations.‟  Thus when the 
public defender, burdened by the conflicting rights of clients entitled to a speedy 
trial, seeks to waive one client‟s right, that conduct cannot be justified on the basis 
of counsel‟s right to control judicial proceedings.  The public defender‟s decision 
under these circumstances is not a matter of defense strategy at all; it is an attempt 
to resolve a conflict of interest by preferring one client over another.  As a matter 
of principle, such a decision requires the approval of the disfavored client 
[citation].  We conclude that the consent of appointed counsel to a postponement 
of trial beyond the statutory period, if given solely to resolve a calendar conflict 
and not to promote the best interests of [the] client, cannot stand unless supported 
by the express or implied consent of the client himself.”  (Johnson, supra, 26 
Cal.3d at pp. 566-567, fn. omitted.) 
Having concluded that the delay of the trial in that case could not be upheld 
on the basis of defense counsel‟s consent, the court in Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 
557, turned to the question whether, under the circumstances of that case, the trial 
court properly could find good cause existed to support the numerous 
continuances of the trial beyond the 60-day period.  In addressing the good-cause 
18 
issue, the court in Johnson recognized that “[w]hat constitutes good cause for the 
delay of a criminal trial is a matter that lies within the discretion of the trial court.”  
(Id. at p. 570.)  The court in Johnson then reviewed a variety of circumstances 
determined by past decisions either to constitute or not constitute good cause 
under section 1382, observing: “The courts agree, for example, that delay caused 
by the conduct of the defendant constitutes good cause to deny his motion to 
dismiss.  Delay for defendant‟s benefit also constitutes good cause.  Finally, delay 
arising from unforeseen circumstances, such as the unexpected illness or 
unavailability of counsel or witnesses constitutes good cause to avoid dismissal.  
Delay attributable to the fault of the prosecution, on the other hand, does not 
constitute good cause.  Neither does delay caused by improper court 
administration.”   (26 Cal.3d at p. 570, fns. omitted.) 
The court in Johnson then stated: “Although we perceive no objection to 
the principles stated in the preceding paragraph, we question those decisions 
which assume that court congestion or excessive public defender caseloads 
necessarily constitute good cause to deny dismissal.  (See, e.g., In re Lopez 
[(1952)] 39 Cal.2d 118, 120 (court congestion); People v. Weiss (1958) 50 Cal.2d 
535, 559 (same); People v. Yniquez (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13, 19 (same); 
People v. Superior Court (Lerma) [(1975)] 48 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1009-1010 
(unavailability of public defender).)”  (Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 570-571.)  
The court explained:  “A defendant‟s right to a speedy trial may be denied simply 
by the failure of the state to provide enough courtrooms or judges to enable 
defendant to come to trial within the statutory period.  The right may also be 
denied by failure to provide enough public defenders or appointed counsel, so that 
an indigent must choose between the right to a speedy trial and the right to 
representation by competent counsel.  „[U]nreasonable delay in run-of-the-mill 
criminal cases cannot be justified by simply asserting that the public resources 
19 
provided by the State‟s criminal-justice system are limited and that each case must 
await its turn.‟  [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 571.) 
The Johnson opinion quoted from a discussion of the problem of delay 
caused by court congestion, contained in the American Bar Association‟s 
standards for speedy trial:  “ „[D]elay arising out of the chronic congestion of the 
trial docket should not be excused . . . .  [¶]  But, while delay because of a failure 
to provide sufficient resources to dispose of the usual number of cases within the 
speedy trial time limits is not excused, the standard does recognize congestion as 
justifying added delay when “attributable to exceptional circumstances.”  
Although it is fair to expect the state to provide the machinery needed to dispose 
of the usual business of the courts promptly, it does not appear feasible to impose 
the same requirements when certain unique, nonrecurring events have produced an 
inordinate number of cases for court disposition.‟ ”  (Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at 
p. 571, quoting ABA Project on Stds. for Crim. Justice, Stds. Relating to Speedy 
Trial (Approved Draft 1968) pp. 27-28 (ABA Stds. Relating to Speedy Trial).) 
The court in Johnson continued:  “The same reasoning, distinguishing 
between chronic conditions and exceptional circumstances, applies to the delay 
caused by the crowded calendars of public defenders.  The state cannot reasonably 
provide against all contingencies which create a calendar conflict for public 
defenders and compel postponement of some of their cases.  On the other hand, 
routine assignment of heavy caseloads to understaffed offices, when such practice 
foreseeably will result in the delay of trials beyond the 60-day period without 
defendant‟s consent, can and must be avoided.  A defendant deserves not only 
capable counsel, but counsel who, barring exceptional circumstances, can defend 
him without infringing upon his right to a speedy trial.  Thus the state cannot rely 
upon the obligations which an appointed counsel owes to other clients to excuse 
20 
its denial of a speedy trial to the instant defendant.”  (Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at 
p. 572.)   
Turning to the facts before it, the court in Johnson stated: “In the present 
case the record does not indicate any ground for the postponements of March 23 
and May 6 which would suggest good cause to deny defendant‟s motion to 
dismiss.  When the public defender moved for a continuance on March 23, he 
clearly posited his request not upon a benefit to Johnson but upon commitment to 
clients other than Johnson.  He revealed that his representation of other clients 
created a conflict which he proposed to resolve to Johnson‟s detriment.  Under 
these circumstances we think the court should inquire whether the assigned deputy 
could be replaced by another deputy or appointed counsel who would be able to 
bring the case to trial within the statutory period.  In some instances, appointment 
of new counsel will serve to protect defendant‟s right to a speedy trial.  If, on the 
other hand, the court cannot ascertain a feasible method to protect defendant‟s 
right, the court will have no alternative but to grant a continuance; upon a 
subsequent motion to dismiss, however, the court must inquire into whether the 
delay is attributable to the fault or neglect of the state; if the court so finds, the 
court must dismiss.”  (Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 572-573.)   
Because the circumstances revealed by the record in Johnson did not 
demonstrate good cause for delay, the court concluded that the trial court had erred 
under section 1382 in failing to dismiss the proceeding.  (Johnson, supra, 26 
Cal.3d at pp. 573-574.)  Nonetheless, the court in Johnson went on to hold that the 
defendant in that case was not entitled to relief, explaining that (1) because the 
defendant had raised the issue on appeal from a subsequent conviction (rather than 
pretrial), he was required to demonstrate prejudice (see People v. Wilson (1963) 60 
Cal.2d 139, 151-152), and (2) the defendant had failed to demonstrate prejudice, 
21 
because the charges against him could have been refiled had the trial court granted 
the motion to dismiss.  (Johnson, at pp. 574-575.) 
2 
In contending that the Court of Appeal in the present case erred in finding 
that the trial court‟s determination of good cause was consistent with this court‟s 
decision in Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, both defendants rely in part on an 
introductory passage contained in the opinion, in which the court purported to 
“summarize briefly” its conclusions regarding the speedy-trial issue.  (Id. at 
p. 561.)  In summarizing the court‟s holding on the issue of good cause, this 
passage states: “[W]e conclude that, at least in the case of an incarcerated 
defendant, the asserted inability of the public defender to try such a defendant‟s 
case within the statutory period because of conflicting obligations to other clients 
does not constitute good cause to avoid dismissal of the charges.”  (Id. at p. 562.)  
Because in the present case the inability of Jackson‟s counsel to try Jackson‟s case 
within the 60-day period was based upon Jackson‟s counsel‟s obligation to another 
client (whose trial the attorney was then engaged in), defendants maintain that, 
under Johnson, counsel‟s engagement in that other trial could not constitute good 
cause to delay Jackson‟s trial, even for the limited period involved in the present 
case.   
Although this introductory passage from Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, 
relied upon by defendants — viewed in isolation — reasonably can be read as 
supporting defendants‟ claim, when we consider the opinion in Johnson in its 
entirety it is evident that the language in that passage is imprecise and overstates 
the decision‟s actual holding on the good-cause issue.  As the foregoing review of 
the opinion in Johnson reveals, the focus of the court‟s concern in Johnson with 
respect to the good-cause issue involved the impropriety of justifying a delay in 
trial upon appointed counsel‟s inability or unavailability to try the case when it is 
22 
the state that realistically bears responsibility for counsel‟s unavailability because 
of its chronic failure to provide a number of public defenders or appointed counsel 
sufficient to enable indigent defendants to come to trial within the prescribed 
statutory period.  (See 26 Cal.3d at p. 571 [“A defendant‟s right to a speedy trial 
may be denied simply by the failure of the state to provide enough courtrooms or 
judges to enable defendant to come to trial within the statutory period.  The right 
may also be denied by failure to provide enough public defenders or appointed 
counsel, so that an indigent must choose between the right to a speedy trial and the 
right to representation by competent counsel.”]; id. at p. 573 [in considering a 
motion to dismiss after the court has granted a continuance beyond the statutory 
period because of counsel‟s unavailability due to his or her commitment to other 
clients, “the court must inquire into whether the delay is attributable to the fault or 
neglect of the state; if the court so finds, the court must dismiss” (italics added)]; 
see also Barsamyan v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2008) 44 Cal.4th 
960, 981 [describing good-cause holding in Johnson].)   
As demonstrated by the circumstances of the present case, there are some 
(indeed, undoubtedly many) instances in which an appointed counsel‟s 
unavailability to try one client‟s case on a particular date because of a calendar 
conflict arising from counsel‟s obligations to another client cannot fairly be 
attributed to the fault or neglect of the state.  Here, Jackson‟s counsel was 
unavailable on the 60th day after Jackson‟s arraignment because another trial in 
which counsel was engaged ran longer than anticipated.  It is often difficult to 
predict how long a trial will take, and unexpected events that prolong another trial 
in which appointed counsel is engaged cannot fairly or reasonably be laid at the 
feet of the state.  This type of calendar conflict, although arising from appointed 
counsel‟s obligation to another client, clearly is distinguishable from the 
circumstances that were before the court in Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557.   
23 
Defendants contend, however, that in view of the number of cases in which 
Jackson‟s counsel acknowledged he was involved when this matter was called for 
trial on Tuesday, September 12, 2006 (day 53 of 60) (see, ante, at p. 6), it was 
reasonably foreseeable that counsel might be engaged in another trial on the 60th 
day, and that the state should bear responsibility for failing to take some 
ameliorative action at that point.  Although the record in this case does indicate 
that Jackson‟s counsel had a full caseload during the time period in question, in a 
contemporary urban criminal court system in which a substantial proportion of 
criminal charges are disposed of without a trial, by plea negotiations that often 
occur close in time to a scheduled trial date, the commitments of Jackson‟s 
counsel do not amount to a systemic flaw, like the one involved in Johnson, that is 
fundamentally incompatible with the 60-day rule.   
As the record indicates, on Friday, September 15, 2006 (day 56 of 60), 
Jackson‟s counsel informed the court that although he was then engaged in another 
trial, he expected the other trial probably would be completed on Monday, 
September 18 (day 59 of 60).  Thus, at that time, the trial court reasonably could 
anticipate that Jackson‟s counsel would be available for trial of the current matter 
within the 60-day period.  On Monday, September 18, it still appeared that 
counsel‟s other trial might well be completed in time to commence trial in the 
present proceeding within the 60-day period.  It was not until Tuesday, 
September 19 (day 60 of 60), that it became clear that counsel would be engaged 
in the other trial beyond the 60-day period because that trial was continuing to take 
longer to complete than anticipated.  (The following day, Jackson‟s counsel stated 
that he was on “day eight of a two-day trial.”)  From September 19 forward, the 
trial court continued to trail this matter on a day-to-day basis to minimize the delay 
in the start of the trial in the present case.  The other trial in which Jackson‟s 
counsel was engaged concluded by the end of that week, and trial in the present 
24 
case commenced the following Monday, the 66th day after defendants‟ 
arraignment.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that the delay in the 
commencement of defendants‟ trial cannot reasonably be attributed to the fault or 
neglect of the state.   
Indeed, as the record of the trial proceedings in this case clearly indicates, 
the general policies and practices followed by the Los Angeles Superior Court in 
this case relating to the commencement of trial differed markedly from the general 
trial court policies and practices that led to this court‟s decision in Johnson, supra, 
26 Cal.3d 557.  As we have seen, in Johnson the trial court followed a practice of 
routinely finding good cause to continue a trial date beyond the 60-day period, 
over a defendant‟s objection, solely to accommodate the public defender‟s chronic 
heavy backload of cases.  No effort was made to establish a schedule that would 
facilitate meeting the 60-day deadline; instead, early in the process, the trial court 
set a trial date beyond the 60-day period because counsel was assigned to a 
number of older cases, and thereafter the court granted another lengthy 
continuance to further accommodate counsel‟s increasing backload of other cases.   
By contrast, the policies and practices followed by the trial court in the 
present case clearly were designed to respect and implement the 60-day rule.  In 
setting an initial trial date, the court assigned a date that afforded the court and 
counsel an opportunity to coordinate schedules so as to meet the 60-day deadline.  
As the 60-day deadline approached, the criminal master calendar judge met with 
counsel and the parties daily, in an effort to ensure that the trial would not be 
unduly delayed.  When on the 60th day Jackson‟s counsel informed the court that, 
contrary to counsel‟s prior expectation, he still was engaged in his other trial, the 
court trailed this case on a day-to-day basis, to ensure that the delay would be as 
minimal as possible.  Finally, as soon as counsel‟s other trial was completed, the 
trial of the present matter commenced.  Unlike the situation in Johnson, the cause 
25 
of the instant delay — an unanticipated extended duration of another trial in which 
a defendant‟s appointed counsel was engaged — was the type of contingency that 
may occur even in a reasonably funded and efficiently administered trial court 
system that handles a large volume of criminal cases.  The state cannot fairly or 
reasonably be held responsible for all such contingencies that may occur.   
Defendants contend, however, that under Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, 
the unavailability of counsel resulting from an appointed counsel‟s commitment to 
another client can justify a finding of good cause only in “exceptional 
circumstances,” and that the unavailability of Jackson‟s counsel because of his 
continued engagement in another trial cannot be viewed as “exceptional.”  This 
argument is based upon a misreading of the pertinent passage in Johnson referring 
to “exceptional circumstances.”  Although the court in Johnson explained that it 
was appropriate to distinguish between “chronic conditions” and “exceptional 
circumstances” in determining whether the delay caused by the “crowded 
calendars of public defenders” would support a finding of good cause (id. at 
p. 572) — thus recognizing that unusual circumstances such as a large-scale riot or 
other mass public disorder might result in an inordinate number of cases that 
would overwhelm even a reasonably staffed public defender‟s office and justify a 
reasonable delay in trial to deal with the exceptional volume of cases9 — the 
                                              
9  
As discussed above (ante, at p. 19), the distinction drawn by the court in 
Johnson between delay caused by “chronic conditions” and delay attributable to 
“exceptional circumstances” was based on a similar distinction drawn in the 
American Bar Association‟s report on standards for speedy trial in discussing trial 
delay caused by court congestion.  (ABA Stds. Relating to Speedy Trial, supra, 
pp. 27-28, quoted in Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 571.)  In providing examples 
of the type of “unique, nonrecurring events” that would constitute “exceptional 
circumstances,” the American Bar Association‟s report stated: “Thus, when a 
large-scale riot or other mass public disorder has occurred, some leeway for 
additional time is required to ensure that the many resulting cases may receive 
(footnote continued on next page) 
26 
passage in Johnson in question did not purport to exclude other circumstances, 
such as the “unexpected illness or unavailability of counsel” (id. at p. 570), for 
which the state properly could not be held responsible and that would support a 
finding of good cause under section 1382.  The reference in Johnson to 
“exceptional circumstances” simply acknowledges that even when a delay is 
attributable to the state‟s failure to provide sufficient resources to bring all cases to 
trial within the statutory period, there can be instances in which a trial court 
properly may find good cause for the delay under section 1382.  Where, as here, 
the unavailability of counsel was not fairly attributable to the state‟s fault or 
neglect, the circumstance that the unavailability of Jackson‟s counsel was not 
caused by an “exceptional circumstance” did not preclude the trial court from 
determining that counsel‟s unavailability constituted good cause under section 
1382 to delay the trial.   
Defendants further contend the trial court‟s determination of good cause 
was flawed because the court, in making that determination, failed to follow the 
procedural steps set out in Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557.  As discussed above, 
the court in Johnson indicated that when appointed counsel seeks a continuance 
beyond the 60-day period because of a commitment to another client, “the court 
should inquire whether the assigned [counsel] could be replaced by another . . . 
appointed counsel who would be able to bring the case to trial within the statutory 
period. . . .  If . . . the court cannot ascertain a feasible method to protect 
defendant‟s right, the court will have no alternative but to grant a continuance; 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
adequate attention from the prosecutor‟s office, defense counsel (possibly a single 
defender office), and the judiciary.”  (ABA Stds. Relating to Speedy Trial, supra, 
at p. 28.)   
27 
upon a subsequent motion to dismiss, however, the court must inquire into 
whether the delay is attributable to the fault or neglect of the state; if the court so 
finds, the court must dismiss.”  (Id. at pp. 572-573.)  Defendants fault the trial 
court in this case for failing to inquire on Friday, September 15, 2006 (day 56 of 
60) whether Jackson‟s counsel could be replaced by another counsel who could 
bring the case to trial within the 60-day period, and further for failing, on 
Wednesday, September 20 (day 61 of 60), when Jackson‟s counsel made his “pro 
forma motion to dismiss,” to require the prosecution to establish that the delay was 
not attributable to the fault or neglect of the state.   
We find no merit in defendants‟ procedural objections.  On Friday, 
September 15, Jackson‟s counsel told the court that his other trial probably would 
be completed on Monday, September 18 (day 59 of 60); thus there was no reason 
for the court to inquire at that time whether replacement counsel should be 
considered.  As we have seen, it was not until Tuesday, September 19 (day 60 of 
60) that counsel informed the court that, contrary to counsel‟s previous 
expectation, he still was engaged in the other trial.  Because Jackson‟s counsel 
indicated that he expected the trial to be completed very shortly, and continued to 
express a similar expectation on succeeding days, the trial court was not required 
to make any specific inquiry in order to conclude reasonably that the appointment 
of new counsel for Jackson only would lengthen, rather than shorten, the delay in 
bringing Jackson‟s case to trial.  Finally, on September 21, when Jackson‟s 
counsel proffered his “pro forma motion to dismiss,” the trial court was already 
fully aware from statements on the record that the delay was attributable to the 
unexpected length of the other trial in which Jackson‟s counsel continued to be 
engaged, and there was no need to request the prosecution to present evidence 
regarding whether the delay was attributable to the fault or neglect of the state.  
The prosecution had announced its readiness for trial at all relevant times, and it 
28 
was evident that the delay at issue was not attributable to the fault or neglect of the 
state.  Contrary to defendants‟ contention, our decision in Johnson, supra, 26 
Cal.3d 557, cannot properly be interpreted to require a trial court, on its own 
initiative, to conduct an evidentiary hearing or inquiry under such circumstances 
before finding good cause for the delay.10   
For all of the foregoing reasons, we reject defendants‟ contention that under 
Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, the continued engagement of Jackson‟s counsel in 
another client‟s trial could not constitute a legitimate justification for continuing 
Jackson‟s trial beyond the 60-day period so as to support a determination of good 
cause under section 1382.11 
                                              
10  
Although the trial court properly denied the motion for dismissal made by 
Jackson‟s counsel on September 20, we disagree with the trial court‟s comment 
that the motion was “not a good faith motion.”  The motion was an appropriate 
means of preserving Jackson‟s rights by timely raising the question of the 
propriety of granting a continuance of the trial without Jackson‟s consent based 
upon his counsel‟s engagement in another client‟s trial.   
11  
In addition to their reliance upon Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, 
defendants contend that the trial court‟s good-cause determination conflicts with 
the Court of Appeal‟s decision in People v. Escarcega (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 379 
(Escarcega).   
 
In Escarcega, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d 379, the defendant, who had been in 
custody since April 5, 1983, awaiting trial, had agreed to a continuance of trial 
until October 31, 1983, at the request of his appointed counsel (Attorney Part), but 
thereafter refused to agree to any further continuance.  On November 1, 1983, Part 
informed the court that he was not ready for trial in Escarcega‟s case because he 
was in the fifth day of trial in another case (the Lawrence case) and stated that he 
would be ready to try Escarcega‟s case by November 15 “at the latest.”  The trial 
court, observing that, if it relieved Part, new counsel would need about two 
months to prepare for trial, found good cause to continue the trial to November 14.  
On November 14, Part informed the court he still was engaged in the Lawrence 
trial but would be finished with that trial by November 28.  The trial court found 
good cause to continue the Escarcega trial to November 28.  On November 28, 
Part appeared and announced he was ready for trial, but at that time the defendant 
asked to substitute privately retained counsel.  The trial court permitted the 
(footnote continued on next page) 
29 
As explained above, a good-cause determination under section 1382 
involves an assessment of a number of factors: (1) the legitimacy and strength of 
the justification for the delay, (2) the duration of the delay, and (3) the likelihood 
or probability that the delay will prejudice or adversely affect any party.  Having 
found that the engagement of Jackson‟s counsel in another trial constituted a 
legitimate ground to delay Jackson‟s trial, we conclude that in light of the very 
brief duration of the delay in the commencement of the trial and the absence of 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
substitution of new counsel, and the defendant in Escarcega ultimately was 
convicted at the subsequent trial.  On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court‟s 
determination that there was good cause to delay the trial in Escarcega on the 
basis of attorney Part‟s engagement in another trial.   
 
The Court of Appeal in Escarcega, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d 379, agreed with 
the defendant‟s claim, holding that “there was no justification for the delay from 
November 10 to November 28, 1983, about two and one-half weeks.  The sole 
reason for such delay was the congested calendar of Part, defendant‟s appointed 
counsel.  In the absence of „extraordinary circumstances‟ such explanation for 
delay cannot constitute a sufficient excuse.”  (Id. at p. 386.)   
 
The particular circumstances of Escarcega, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d 379, 
may provide some basis for questioning the trial court‟s good-cause determination 
in that case, inasmuch as (1) the defendant had been incarcerated prior to trial for 
almost six months, (2) his appointed counsel apparently began a lengthy trial for 
another client shortly before the scheduled October 31 trial date without 
consulting the defendant to determine whether the defendant would consent to an 
additional continuance, and (3) the trial court did not inquire whether defense 
counsel could either transfer the Lawrence trial to another attorney or alternatively 
prepare another attorney to try the Escarcega case within the 10-day period 
following the date to which the defendant had consented.  (Cf. Batey v. Superior 
Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 952, 957-958.)  Nonetheless, to the extent that the 
Court of Appeal‟s decision in People v. Escarcega, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d 379, 
suggests appointed counsel‟s engagement in another trial never can constitute 
good cause under section 1382, that decision is disapproved.  As explained above, 
when an appointed counsel‟s unavailability is not fairly attributable to the fault or 
neglect of the state, his or her continuing engagement in another client‟s trial may 
constitute good cause for a reasonable delay of trial.   
30 
any indication that the delay adversely affected defendants‟ ability to defend 
themselves against the charges, the Court of Appeal properly found that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause existed to deny Jackson‟s 
motion to dismiss the proceeding under section 1382.12 
C 
Defendant Sutton contends that even if the continued engagement of 
Jackson‟s counsel in another trial constituted good cause to continue Jackson‟s 
trial, the trial court erred in determining that there was good cause to continue 
Sutton‟s trial date beyond the 60-day period, inasmuch as Sutton‟s counsel was 
ready and available to go to trial within the 60-day period.  The Court of Appeal 
rejected this argument, concluding that because the proceedings against Jackson 
and Sutton properly had been joined, the state interests that would be served by 
                                              
12  
As noted above (ante, at p. 2), the Attorney General, in addition to 
contending (as we have concluded) that the trial court‟s finding of good cause is 
not inconsistent with the decision in Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, also urges this 
court to reconsider our holding in that case that a public defender or appointed 
counsel lacks the authority to waive a client‟s statutory right to a speedy trial over 
the objection of the client when the attorney‟s action is not for the client‟s benefit 
but to fulfill a conflicting obligation to another client who also has a comparable 
right to a speedy trial.  In briefing this point, however, the Attorney General 
acknowledges that the state‟s chronic failure to provide a sufficient number of 
public defenders or appointed counsel potentially poses a serious systemic 
problem to the speedy-trial rights of persons facing criminal charges, and suggests 
that the solution is to permit a trial court to consider all the circumstances of each 
case on a case-by-case basis, in order to enable the court to identify those 
instances in which the delay properly is attributable to the fault or neglect of the 
state.  A trial court‟s undertaking of such case-by-case oversight, however, can 
best be effectuated — as demonstrated in the present case — through a trial 
court‟s exercise of the discretion afforded by section 1382‟s good-cause standard, 
rather than by a modification of the holding in Johnson regarding the scope of an 
appointed counsel‟s unilateral authority to waive a client‟s statutory speedy-trial 
rights over the client‟s objection.   
31 
conducting a single joint trial supported the trial court‟s determination that good 
cause existed to delay Sutton‟s trial.  For the reasons discussed below, we agree 
with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal. 
Section 1050.1 — an initiative statute enacted in 1990 as part of 
Proposition 115 — provides in full: “In any case in which two or more defendants 
are jointly charged in the same complaint, indictment, or information, and the 
court or magistrate, for good cause shown, continues the arraignment, preliminary 
hearing, or trial of one or more defendants, the continuance shall, upon motion of 
the prosecuting attorney, constitute good cause to continue the remaining 
defendants‟ cases so as to maintain joinder.  The court or magistrate shall not 
cause jointly charged cases to be severed due to the unavailability or 
unpreparedness of one or more defendants unless it appears to the court or 
magistrate that it will be impossible for all defendants to be available and prepared 
within a reasonable period of time.”   
Thus, when, as here, two defendants are jointly charged in an information 
and the trial court continues the trial as to one of the defendants for good cause, 
section 1050.1 provides that the continuance of the trial as to that defendant 
constitutes good cause to continue the trial “a reasonable period of time” as to the 
other defendant in order to permit the defendants to be tried jointly.   
Defendant Sutton — relying upon the language of section 1050.1 “upon 
motion of the prosecuting attorney” — argues the statute does not apply in this 
case, because the prosecutor never explicitly moved to continue Sutton‟s trial.  In 
our view, however, the language of section 1050.1 in question was not intended, 
and reasonably cannot be interpreted, to require an explicit motion by the 
prosecutor seeking such a continuance as a necessary prerequisite to a trial court‟s 
finding of good cause to continue a codefendant‟s trial in order to permit a joint 
trial.  The statute does not purport to preclude a trial court from finding that the 
32 
state interest in a joint trial constitutes good cause for a continuance in the absence 
of such a motion by the prosecuting attorney, and the evident legislative intent 
underlying the statute — to facilitate joint trials and to minimize the instances in 
which a severance is required — is consistent with a trial court‟s authority to make 
such a good cause determination on its own.  Indeed, because under section 1382 
the determination whether good cause is shown to justify the delay of a trial 
constitutes a judicial (rather than an executive) function, a significant 
separation-of-powers question would be presented were the statute to be 
interpreted to condition a trial court‟s determination of good cause upon the 
approval or concurrence of the prosecuting attorney.  (Cf., e.g., People v. Tenorio 
(1970) 3 Cal.3d 89, 94; People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 
509-517.)  Accordingly, the familiar jurisprudential principle that statutes should 
be interpreted, if reasonably possible, to avoid constitutional questions (see, e.g., 
Miller v. Municipal Court (1943) 22 Cal.2d 818, 828) supports a reading of 
section 1050.1 that does not condition the validity of a trial court‟s determination 
of good cause under the statute upon the prosecutor‟s motion for a continuance.   
Furthermore, long before the enactment of section 1050.1 in 1990, 
California decisions had recognized that a trial court properly may find that the 
significant state interests that are furthered by conducting a single trial of jointly 
charged criminal defendants constitute good cause to continue a codefendant‟s 
trial beyond the presumptive statutory period designated in section 1382.  More 
than 40 years ago, in People v. Teale (1965) 63 Cal.2d 178, this court rejected a 
contention that the trial court had violated the defendant‟s statutory speedy-trial 
rights under section 1382 in continuing one defendant‟s trial date beyond the 
statutory period in order to permit a single joint trial with a codefendant whose 
trial date properly had been continued.  The court in Teale concisely explained that 
“[w]here a continuance is granted upon good cause to a codefendant the rights of 
33 
the other defendants are generally not deemed to have been prejudiced.”  (Teale, 
supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 186, citing Ferenz v. Superior Court (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d 
639 and People v. McFarland (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 772; see also People v. 
Clark (1965) 62 Cal.2d 870, 882-883.)13  And although past California decisions 
have held that a lengthy continuance of an objecting codefendant‟s trial to 
facilitate a joint trial is permissible only in instances in which the state interest in 
avoiding multiple trials is especially compelling — as when the trials are likely to 
be long and complex and impose considerable burdens on numerous witnesses 
(see, e.g., Greenberger v. Superior Court (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 487, 501-506 
[upholding six-month continuance of a complex murder trial involving numerous 
witnesses, where trial court found counsel for codefendants needed substantial 
time to prepare adequately for trial]) — when the proposed delay to permit a 
single joint trial is relatively brief, the substantial state interests that are served in 
every instance by proceeding in a single joint trial generally will support a finding 
of good cause to continue the codefendant‟s trial under section 1382, even when 
there is no indication that, were the defendants‟ trials to be severed, the separate 
                                              
13  
In People v. Clark, supra, 62 Cal.2d 870, although recognizing that the 
state interest in trying jointly charged defendants in a single trial may support a 
finding of good cause to continue a trial beyond the period designated in section 
1382, this court cautioned that it would constitute an abuse of discretion to grant 
such a delay “if it can be shown that the insistence on joint trial was not in good 
faith, or that it was solely for the purpose of obtaining an otherwise illegal delay, 
to take unfair advantage of the defendants, or was not reasonably predicated upon 
the purpose and intent of the statute which grants the right to try the defendants 
jointly.”  (62 Cal.2d at p. 883.)  In the present case, there is no suggestion that any 
such improper motivation underlay the decision to jointly charge Sutton and 
Jackson or to seek a single trial.   
34 
trials would be unusually long or complex.  (See, e.g., People v. McFarland, 
supra, 209 Cal.App.2d 772, 776-778; see also § 1050.1.)14   
In contending that the state interests served by a joint trial cannot properly 
support a finding of good cause to delay a codefendant‟s trial for even a relatively 
short period of time beyond the presumptive statutory deadline, defendants rely 
upon the Court of Appeal‟s decision in Sanchez v. Superior Court (1982) 131 
Cal.App.3d 884 (Sanchez), but that case is clearly distinguishable from the present 
case.  In Sanchez, one of the jointly charged defendants was in custody pending 
trial and another codefendant was at liberty on bail.  On the date initially set for 
trial, the public defender who represented the noncustody codefendant advised the 
court that he (the attorney) was then engaged in another trial, that he had two other 
“must-go” criminal trials immediately after, and that he would not be available to 
try the Sanchez matter until seven days beyond the 60-day period.  Counsel then 
moved for a continuance to that date beyond the 60-day period, and his client, free 
on bail, consented to that continuance.  (Id. at p. 887.)  The trial court continued 
                                              
14  
In People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 772, we recently listed a number 
of the advantages achieved by a joint trial, explaining that such a trial “ „ordinarily 
avoids the increased expenditure of funds and judicial resources which may result 
if the charges were to be tried in two or more separate trials.‟  [Citation.]  „A 
unitary trial requires a single courtroom, judge, and court attach[és].  Only one 
group of jurors need serve, and the expenditure of time for jury voir dire and trial 
is greatly reduced over that required were the cases separately tried.  In addition, 
the public is served by the reduced delay on disposition of criminal charges both in 
trial and through the appellate process.‟  [Citations.]”  Although Soper involved a 
joint trial of multiple charges against a single defendant, the advantages referred to 
in that case accrue as well in the case of a joint trial of multiple defendants.   
 
Further, in addition to the advantages set forth in Soper, a joint trial of 
multiple defendants charged with the same or related offenses avoids the often 
significant increased burden on crime victims and witnesses that would be 
imposed by multiple trials.   
35 
the trial to the requested date.  The incarcerated codefendant, however, objected to 
a continuance of his trial beyond the statutory period, contending that this court‟s 
decision in Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557 stood for the proposition that “an in-
custody defendant‟s trial may not be so delayed [beyond the 60-day period] to 
accommodate the overcrowded case load of appointed counsel.”  (Sanchez, supra, 
131 Cal.App.3d at pp. 887-888.)  The trial court rejected the argument of the in-
custody defendant, ruling that Johnson was inapplicable to multiple defendants 
jointly charged with the same offense.   
On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court‟s decision, 
concluding that “[t]he rule stated in Johnson is equally applicable to the present 
underlying prosecution where delay beyond the statutory period is caused by the 
unavailability of appointed counsel for a codefendant rather than petitioner‟s own 
appointed counsel.  The cause of the delay is the same: failure of the state to 
provide the facilities and personnel needed to implement the right to speedy trial.  
The result is identical: the right of an in-custody defendant demanding a speedy 
trial is subordinated to the convenience of appointed counsel and the criminal 
justice system as he remains confined beyond the time prescribed until the system 
will accommodate him.”  (Sanchez, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 890.)   
Although the holding in Sanchez rested upon the appellate court‟s 
conclusion that good cause to continue the defendant‟s trial beyond the 60-day 
period was not shown in that case because the delay was directly attributable to 
the state’s failure to provide a sufficient number of public defenders to implement 
the statutory right to a speedy trial, the opinion in Sanchez contained broad 
language that went beyond the circumstances presented in that case and suggested 
that, in general, the state interests served by a joint trial cannot support a finding of 
good cause to delay a trial under section 1382.  (See Sanchez, supra, 131 
Cal.App.3d at p. 893 [“We conclude that on balance, whatever unspecified 
36 
„interests of justice‟ might be promoted by a joint trial in the underlying 
prosecution, the state interest cannot be permitted to subordinate the conflicting 
right of petitioner to a trial within the 60-day period”].)  A number of subsequent 
Court of Appeal decisions have relied upon this language in Sanchez as supporting 
the general principle that “[t]he preference for a joint trial of jointly charged 
defendants does not constitute good cause to delay one defendant‟s trial beyond 
the time period set forth in . . . section 1382 . . . .”  (Escarcega, supra, 186 
Cal.App.3d 379, 386, fn. 4; see also Arroyo v. Superior Court (2004) 119 
Cal.App.4th 460, 465-466.)   
As we have explained above, however, past decisions of this court make it 
clear that the substantial state interests served by a joint trial properly may support 
a finding of good cause to continue a codefendant‟s trial beyond the presumptive 
statutory period set forth in section 1382.  (See People v. Teale, supra, 63 Cal.2d 
178; People v. Clark, supra, 62 Cal.2d 870.)  And numerous Court of Appeal 
decisions properly have applied this general principle.  (See, e.g., Ferenz v. 
Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.App.2d 639, 641-643; People v. McFarland, supra, 
209 Cal.App.2d 772, 776-778; Hollis v. Superior Court, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d 
642, 646-647; Greenberger v. Superior Court, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d 487, 496-
501; 219 Cal.App.3d at pp. 508-511 (conc. & dis. opn. of Johnson, J.).)  
Furthermore, the provisions of section 1050.1 also clearly establish that the state 
interest in permitting jointly charged defendants to be tried in a single trial 
generally constitutes good cause to continue a defendant‟s trial to enable that 
defendant to be tried with a codefendant whose trial properly has been continued 
37 
to a date beyond the presumptive statutory deadline.15  Accordingly, the decisions 
in People v. Sanchez, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d 884, People v. Escarcega, supra, 186 
Cal.App.3d 379, and Arroyo v. Superior Court, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th 460, are 
disapproved to the extent they hold or suggest that the state interests served by a 
joint trial cannot constitute good cause under section 1382 to continue a 
codefendant‟s trial beyond the presumptive statutory deadline.16   
In the present case, the trial court correctly found that the circumstance that 
defendant Jackson‟s trial properly was continued beyond the 60-day period 
constituted a legitimate and appropriate justification for also delaying codefendant 
Sutton‟s trial beyond that period.  Further, because the trial court continued 
Jackson and Sutton‟s trial on a day-to-day basis and the joint trial ultimately 
commenced only six days after the 60-day period, the duration of the delay in this 
case clearly was reasonable.  Finally, Sutton makes no claim that the short delay in 
the commencement of the trial adversely affected his ability to defend the charges 
against him.   
Under these circumstances, we conclude the Court of Appeal properly 
found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause to delay 
                                              
15  
We note that the decisions in both Sanchez, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d 884, 
and Escarcega, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d 379, predated the 1990 enactment of 
section 1050.1.   
16. 
The federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974 similarly recognizes that the interest 
in conducting a single joint trial of jointly charged codefendants constitutes a 
legitimate and appropriate basis for extending the ordinary presumptive deadline 
set forth in the statute.  (See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6) [excluding from the 
presumptive speedy-trial period “a reasonable period of delay when the defendant 
is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and 
no motion for severance has been granted”]; see generally 5 LaFave et al., Crim. 
Procedure (3d ed. 2007) § 18.3(b), p. 144 & fn. 36.)   
38 
Sutton‟s trial to permit him to be tried jointly with Jackson and in denying 
Sutton‟s motion under section 1382 to dismiss the charges against him. 
III 
For the reasons discussed above, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is 
affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR:   
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Sutton 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 165 Cal.App.4th 646 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S166402 
Date Filed: April 5, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Judith L. Champagne 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Michael 
Jerome Sutton. 
 
J. Courtney Shevelson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Jennifer L. Peabody, under 
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Willie J. Jackson. 
 
Michael P. Judge, Public Defender (Los Angeles) and John Hamilton Scott, Deputy Public Defender for 
Public Defender of Los Angeles County as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. 
Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Lawrence M. Daniels and David E. Madeo, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Steve Cooley, District Attorney (Los Angeles), Irene Wakabayashi, Head Deputy District Attorney, Phyllis 
C. Asayama and Shirley S. N. Sun, Deputy District Attorneys, for District Attorney of Los Angeles County 
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
William L. Heyman 
3152 Big Sky Drive 
Thousand Oaks, CA  91360 
(805) 493-4112 
 
J. Courtney Shevelson 
316 Mid Valley Center 
Carmel, CA  93923-8516 
(831) 625-6581 
 
David E. Madeo 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-4925 
 
Shirley S. N. Sun 
Deputy District Attorney 
320 West Temple Street, Suite 540 
Los Angeles, CA  90012-3213 
(213) 893-0632