Title: Devine v. Bank of New York Mellon Company
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1171002
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 22, 2019

November 22, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1171002
____________________
Patricia Devine
v.
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-17-901237)
MITCHELL, Justice.
Patricia Devine filed an action seeking to invalidate a
foreclosure sale that divested her interest in a property
located in Elberta.  The trial court entered a summary
1171002
judgment against Patricia, from which she now appeals.  We
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
In January 2007, Patricia's husband Jerry Devine executed
a promissory note ("the note") in favor of Taylor, Bean &
Whitaker Mortgage Corp. ("TBW"), evidencing a debt for
$744,000.  That note was secured by a mortgage on the Devines'
residence in Elberta ("the Elberta property"), and both Jerry
and Patricia signed the mortgage documents.  
In August 2009, TBW declared bankruptcy and commenced
liquidation proceedings.  In July 2010, TBW sold assets,
including the note executed by Jerry, to The Bank of New York
Mellon Corporation, as trustee for TBW Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-1 ("BNYM").  It is undisputed,
however, that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.,
the nominal mortgagee, did not reassign the Devines' mortgage
to BNYM until February 2011.  
At some point Jerry defaulted on the note, and in January
2011 BNYM foreclosed on the Elberta property.  BNYM was the
highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, and in March 2011 it
brought an ejectment action against the Devines seeking to
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take possession of the Elberta property.  While that action
was pending, Jerry died.  Patricia filed a notice with the
court informing it of Jerry's death and that she no longer
resided at the Elberta property, but she never formally
answered the complaint.  In May 2011, a default judgment was
entered in favor of BNYM, and in December 2011 BNYM sold the
Elberta property to Tracy Kruse, who has continuously resided
on the Elberta property since that time.
In October 2017, Patricia filed a nine-count complaint
against BNYM and Kruse seeking ownership and possession of the
Elberta property and compensation for various torts she
alleged BNYM had committed.  Before filing an answer, BNYM
moved the trial court to dismiss Patricia's complaint,
arguing, among other things, that Patricia's claims were all
barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.  Patricia
thereafter agreed to the dismissal of all of her claims except
the illegal-foreclosure and quiet-title claims.  The 
thrust of
those remaining claims was that Patricia was entitled to
ownership and possession of the Elberta property because, she
alleged, BNYM had not been assigned the mortgage at the time
of the January 2011 foreclosure sale.
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After BNYM and Kruse submitted answers denying Patricia's
claims, all parties filed motions for a summary judgment.  The
trial court denied those motions.  BNYM moved the trial court
to reconsider, arguing:
"[Patricia] has two counts remaining against
[BNYM] –– illegal/void foreclosure and quiet title. 
[BNYM's] 
[summary-judgment] 
motion 
demonstrated 
both
res judicata and statute-of-limitations grounds that
bar [Patricia's] illegal/void foreclosure claim. 
These are purely legal arguments that do not depend
on any issues of fact.  As for [Patricia's] quiet
title action, she does not contest that she no
longer possesses the subject property.  [BNYM's]
motion showed that [Patricia's] failure to be in
actual, peaceable possession of the [Elberta]
property dooms her quiet-title claim.  Taken
together, [BNYM] presented both legal and undisputed
factual arguments that were ripe for summary
judgment.  Additional discovery will not undercut or
otherwise affect these arguments."
Kruse filed a similar motion, and the trial court thereafter
held a hearing to consider the parties' arguments.  On June
13, 2018, the trial court entered an order vacating its
previous orders denying BNYM's and Kruse's motions for a
summary judgment and granting those motions.  The trial court
explained in its June 13 order that Patricia's illegal-
foreclosure claim failed because BNYM was the holder of the
note at the time of the foreclosure sale and that possession
entitled it to foreclose on the Elberta property.  The trial
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court further noted that, in any event, the illegal-
foreclosure claim was barred by the statute of limitations and
the doctrine of res judicata.  Finally, the trial court held
that Patricia could not prevail on her quiet-title claim
because she undisputedly was not in possession of the
property.  After her postjudgment motion was denied, Patricia
filed her notice of appeal to this Court.
Standard of Review
On appeal, Patricia challenges the summary judgment
entered against her on the illegal-foreclosure claim.  She
does not address the summary judgment entered against her on
her quiet-title claim and has not made Kruse a party to this
appeal.  Thus, the only issue before this Court is whether the
summary judgment in favor of BNYM and against Patricia on the
illegal-foreclosure claim was proper.
In Nationwide Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. DPF
Architects, P.C., 792 So. 2d 369, 372 (Ala. 2000), this Court
stated that, when a party "appeals from a summary judgment,
our review is de novo."  The Nationwide Court further
explained how that standard of review is applied:
"We apply the same standard of review the trial
court used in determining whether the evidence
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presented to the trial court created a genuine issue
of material fact.  Jefferson County Comm'n v. ECO
Preservation Services, L.L.C., 788 So. 2d 121 (Ala.
2000) (quoting Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d
860, 862 (Ala. 1988)).  Once a party moving for a
summary judgment establishes that no genuine issue
of material fact exists, the burden shifts to the
nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating
a genuine issue of material fact.  Bass v.
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797–98 (Ala. 1989).  'Substantial evidence' is
'evidence 
of 
such 
weight 
and 
quality 
that
fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial
judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the
fact sought to be proved.'  West v. Founders Life
Assur. Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.
1989).  In reviewing a summary judgment, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant and entertain such reasonable inferences
as the jury would have been free to draw.  Jefferson
County Comm'n v. ECO Preservation Servs., L.L.C.,
supra (citing Renfro v. Georgia Power Co., 604 So.
2d 408 (Ala. 1992))."
Analysis
The summary judgment in favor of BNYM on Patricia's
illegal-foreclosure claim was premised on three grounds: (1)
BNYM had the right to foreclose on the Elberta property
because BNYM held the note at the time of foreclosure; (2)
Patricia's claim was barred by the statute of limitations; and
(3) Patricia's claim was precluded by the doctrine of res
judicata.  On appeal, Patricia challenges only the first
ground of the judgment, leaving the other two grounds
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uncontested.  For that reason, as explained below, we must
affirm the judgment in favor of BNYM.
Patricia argues that the trial court erred by entering a
summary judgment in favor of BNYM because, she alleges, BNYM
never submitted evidence establishing that it was legally
entitled to foreclose on the Elberta property.  Patricia
argues that the evidence submitted by BNYM in fact
demonstrated that BNYM was not authorized to foreclose on the
Elberta 
property 
because, 
she 
says, 
that 
evidence 
undisputedly
showed that BNYM was not assigned the mortgage until February
2011 –– after BNYM foreclosed on the property in January 2011. 
Patricia 
argues 
that 
this 
documentary 
evidence 
also
establishes that the affidavits submitted by BNYM to support
its right to foreclose on the property are inaccurate, if not
fraudulent. 
BNYM states in response that Patricia has misinterpreted
the law and that her arguments have already been rejected by
Alabama courts.  See, e.g., Coleman v. BAC Servicing, 104 So.
3d 195, 200-01 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (explaining that the
holder of a note secured by a mortgage may initiate
foreclosure proceedings before the mortgage is assigned to
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it).  Ultimately, however, BNYM states that it is unnecessary
for this Court to analyze Patricia's arguments about the
validity of the January 2011 foreclosure sale because the
trial court also determined that summary judgment was
appropriate 
on 
statute-of-limitations 
and 
res 
judicata 
grounds
and Patricia has wholly failed to address those issues on
appeal.
When a trial court has stated that a judgment is
warranted on multiple grounds, it is incumbent upon a party
that subsequently appeals that judgment to address all of
those grounds in the opening appellate brief because any issue
not argued at that time is waived.  See Crews v. National Boat
Owners Ass'n Marine Ins. Agency, Inc., 46 So. 3d 933, 942
(Ala. 2010) ("'When an appellant fails to argue an issue in
its [initial] brief, that issue is waived.'"  (quoting Boshell
v. Keith, 418 So. 2d 89, 92 (Ala. 1982))).  When the issue
that is waived is one of the grounds supporting the judgment,
that waiver is fatal to the entire appeal.  See Austin v.
Providence Hosp., 155 So. 3d 1028, 1031 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014)
("When a trial court enters conclusions of law stating
alternative legal grounds for its judgment, the failure of an
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appellant to show error as to each ground in his or her
opening brief constitutes a waiver of any argument as to the
omitted ground and results in an automatic affirmance of the
judgment.").  This Court explained in Soutullo v. Mobile
County, 58 So. 3d 733, 739 (Ala. 2010), that affirmance is
required because an appellate court will not presume error on
the part of the trial court.  
Applying this principle to Patricia's case, she has
contested one of the grounds supporting the trial court's
summary judgment (i.e., that BNYM had the right to foreclose),
but she has not contested the two additional grounds (statute
of limitations and res judicata) supporting that judgment.  In
the absence of any argument indicating that the trial court
erred in its statute-of-limitations or res judicata analysis,
we will not presume that such error exists.  Therefore, it is
unnecessary for us to review Patricia's substantive argument
about BNYM's right to foreclose because the summary judgment
entered on her illegal-foreclosure claim is due to be affirmed
on 
statute-of-limitations 
and 
res 
judicata 
grounds, 
regardless
of any conclusion we might make about BNYM's right to
foreclose.  See Soutullo, 58 So. 3d at 739 ("Because the
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[appellants] have pretermitted discussion of one of the two
grounds forming the basis for the [judgment as a matter of
law], we pretermit discussion of the other ground, and we
affirm the judgment.").
Conclusion
Patricia sued BNYM arguing that it illegally foreclosed
on the Elberta property in January 2011.  The trial court
entered a summary judgment in favor of BNYM, explaining that
the foreclosure was lawful and that Patricia's lawsuit was, in
any event, barred by the statute of limitations and precluded
by the doctrine of res judicata.  Patricia insists on appeal
that the foreclosure was illegal and therefore void, but she
has failed to address the trial court's application of the
statute of limitations and the doctrine of res judicata.  The
judgment of the trial court is therefore due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, J., concur.
Bryan and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.
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