Title: C., Rebecca Lynn v. B., Michael Joseph
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 30411
State: west-virginia
Issuer: west-virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 27, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA September 2002 Term FILED November 27, 2002 RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA RELEASED November 27, 2002 RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA No. 30411 REBECCA LYNN C., Plaintiff Below, Appellant, V. MICHAEL JOSEPH B., Defendant Below, Appellee. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Ohio County Honorable Ronald E. Wilson, Judge Civil Action No. 88-C-734 AFFIRMED Submitted: November 6, 2002 Filed: November 27, 2002 David C. White, Esq. Christopher P. Riley, Esq. Law Offices of Bailey, Riley, Buch Neiswonger and White & Harman, L.C. Moundsville, West Virginia Wheeling, West Virginia Attorney for the Appellant Attorney for the Appellee CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the Opinion of the Court. JUSTICES STARCHER AND ALBRIGHT dissent and reserve the right to file dissenting opinions. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. “A motion to vacate a judgment made pursuant to Rule 60(b), W. Va. R. C. P.,isaddressedtothesounddiscretion of the court and the court’s ruling on such motion will notbedisturbedonappealunlessthereisashowingofanabuseofsuchdiscretion.” Syllabus point 5, Toler v. Shelton, 157 W. Va. 778, 204 S.E.2d 85 (1974). 2. “AppealofthedenialofaRule60(b)motionbringstoconsideration for reviewonlytheorderofdenialitselfandnotthesubstance supporting the underlying judgment nor the final judgment order.” Syllabus point 3,Tolerv.Shelton,157W.Va.778,204S.E.2d 85 (1974). 3. A final order terminating parental rights completely severs the parent-childrelationship,anddeprivesthecourtoftheauthority to impose a post-termination awardofchildsupporton the parent whose rights have been terminated. However, termination ofparentalrightsdoesnotdepriveacourtofjurisdiction to enforce payment of child support that accrued before the obligor’s parental rights were terminated. i Davis, Chief Justice: Theappellant and plaintiff below, Rebecca Lynn C. 1[hereinafterreferredtoas “Ms.C.”],appealsfromanorderenteredJuly2,2001,bytheCircuit Court of Ohio County. Inthatorder,thecircuitcourtupheldaprioragreementbetweenMs.C. andMichaelJoseph B. [hereinafter referred to as “Mr. B.”], the appellee herein and defendant below, whereby Mr. B. agreed to make a lump sum child support payment to Ms. C. in exchange for his relinquishment of all parental rights in and to the parties’ child. On appeal to this Court, Ms. C. contends that a change of circumstances involving the child’s health necessitates a modificationoftheparties’prioragreementandanawardofadditional child support. Upon a review of the parties’ briefs, the record submitted for appellate consideration, and the parties’ arguments, we affirm the decision of the Circuit Court of Ohio County. 1Mr.B.movedthisCourttodenominatethe parties by their initials in light of the sensitive nature of the facts involved in this proceeding. We granted the motion. Therefore, we adhere to the practice we follow in similar cases wherein it is necessary to protect the privacy of the parties involved. See, e.g., In re Emily B., 208 W. Va. 325, 329 n.1, 540 S.E.2d 542, 546 n.1 (2000); In re Michael Ray T., 206 W. Va. 434, 437 n.1, 525 S.E.2d 315, 318 n.1 (1999); State ex rel. Diva P. v. Kaufman, 200 W. Va. 555, 559 n.2, 490 S.E.2d 642, 646 n.2 (1997). 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY During its consideration of this matter, the circuit court found the following facts. Ms. C. and Mr. B. had a romantic relationship, which ended shortly before Ms. C. discovered that she was pregnant with the parties’ child. Prior to the child’s birth, Ms. C. discussedwithherattorneyanarrangementwherebyMr. B. would pay a set amount of child supportandrelinquishhisparentalrightstothechild. Although Ms. C.’s counsel subsequently communicated this proposal to counsel for Mr. B., the birth of the parties’ child on May 27, 1988, foreclosed further discussions. Thereafter, on October 12, 1988, Ms. C. instituted a paternityactionseekingtoestablishthatMr.B.wasthefatherofMs.C.’schildandto obtain an award of child support. Following hearings before the family law master2 and the receipt of his recommended decision,thecircuitcourtenteredorders on January 17,1990,and April 11, 1990, determining Mr. B. to be the father of Ms. C.’s child; awarding custody to Ms. C.; extending visitation rights to Mr. B.; imposing joint liability on Ms. C. and Mr. B. for the child’s medical expenses; and granting child support to Ms. C. By subsequent order entered 2The West Virginia Legislature has abolished the office of family law master and replaced it with the judicialofficeoffamilycourtjudge. See W.Va.Code § 51-2A-1, et seq. To maintain consistency with the proceedings underlying this appeal, however, we will continue to use the phrase “family law master.” 2 June 7, 1990, the circuit court modified the amount of its prior award of child support.3 In the months after the court’s June order, Ms. C. and Mr. B. resumed their earliernegotiationsregardingasettlementtoinvolve a lump sum payment of child support by Mr.B.,andhisrelinquishmentofallparentalrightstotheparties’child. As a result of Ms. C. notbeingrepresentedby counsel at that time, Mr. B.’s attorney declined to assist him with the draftingofsuchanagreement. By letter dated August 28, 1990 [hereinafter referred to as the “letter agreement”], Mr. B. memorialized the parties’ arrangement, in pertinent part, as follows: I [Mr. B.] will pay you [Ms. C.] the total amount of Thirty Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00)forallpast and future support of [the parties’ child], as well as all past and future medical expenses for you and [the child]. . . . . . . . 3UndertheJune7order,the circuit court modified the amount of its prior award of child support as follows: 1. That [Mr. B.] is responsible for child support at the rate of Three Hundred Dollars ($300) from and after June 1, 1988. 2. That [Ms. C.] is granted a decretal judgment in the sum ofSevenThousandTwoHundredDollars for child support from June 1, 1988 to May 31, 1990. 3. That [Mr. B.] is responsible to pay the sum of One Thousand Five Hundred Forty-one Dollars Thirty-eight Cents ($1,541.38) for child birth costs as previously ordered by the Family Law Master[.] 3 I will relinquish any custodial or parental right to [the child], including any rights of visitation. Iwillagreetoexecuteallnecessaryforms relinquishing any custodial or parental right to [the child] necessary for any future adoption purposes. The form also will provide that [the child’s] name can be changed or adopted without further notice. . . . . To the extent that this agreement must be approved by JudgeBroadwater,Iwillassume all fees and expenses associated with obtaining the consent. Ifthislettercontainsourcompleteunderstanding, please sign your name at the end of this letter and I will attempt to obtain all necessary consents from the court. Upon Ms. C.’s acquiescence to the terms of the letter agreement, Mr. B. petitioned the circuit court to approve the parties’ letter agreement. By order entered November14,1990,thecircuitcourtdeterminedtheparties’ letter agreement to be “fair and reasonable,andinthebestinterestsoftheplaintiff [Ms. C.] and [the parties’ child], and under the circumstances, ratif[ied] and approve[d] the letter agreement dated August 28, 1990.” 4 4Inaccordancewiththisdecision,thecircuit court made the following pertinent rulings: (1) Judgment is hereby entered in favor of [Ms. C.] in the amount of Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00) representingallpastandfuture support of [the parties’ child], as wellasall past and future medical expenses for[Ms.C.] ...and [the child]. . . . (continued...) 4 ItisundisputedthatMr.B.madetherequisite payments to Ms. C. in accordance with the letter agreement and court order. Further, there is no dispute that Mr. B. correspondingly has foregone any attempt to contact, communicate, or otherwise form a relationship with the parties’ child. OnOctober24,1994, Ms. C.’s child (and former child of Mr. B.) was diagnosed with Type I, Brittle Juvenile Diabetes. The record indicates the child is generally in good health and is active. The treatment of the child’s medical condition requires regular blood sugartestingandinsulinshots,aswellasquarterlyphysician’s appointments and laboratory 4(...continued) . . . . It is further, ORDERED that based upon said Letter Agreement,whichishereby ratified and approved, the petitioner [Mr.B.] befoundtohaverelinquishedanyandallcustodialand parental rights in and to [the parties’ child] and that this order shall be sufficient evidence of that relinquishment and may be utilized by the plaintiff [Ms. C.] in any future adoption proceedingsasacompleterelinquishmentbythenaturalfather [Mr. B.] of any parental rights that he may have in [the child]. It is further, ORDERED that any future proceedings designed to either change the name of [the child] or to adopt [the child] may proceed and occur without any future notice to [Mr. B.]. It is further, ORDERED that the decretal judgment containedintheorderofJune7, 1990, be and the same is hereby held for naught andthepetitionerreleasedfromanyobligation thereunder[.] 5 tests. The approximate cost for such care is $218.85 per month, and is not covered by Ms. C.’s medicalinsuranceforthechild. Presumably as a result of these expenses, Ms. C., on February 26, 1996, petitioned the circuit court to set aside its earlier ratification of the parties’ letter agreementinsofarasitterminatedMr.B.’s obligation to pay child support. 5 Mr. B. responded by filing a motion to dismiss Ms. C.’s petition. Thefamilylawmastertookevidenceonbothmotions. A decision was filed by the family law master recommending Ms. C.’s motion be denied and Mr. B.’s motion be granted. Ms. C. objected to the family law master’s recommendation. The circuit court, by orderenteredJuly2, 2001, adopted the recommendation of the family law master. From this order of the circuit court, Ms. C. appeals to this Court. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The circuit court characterized Ms. C.’s motion as seeking relief under Rule 60(b)oftheWestVirginiaRulesofCivilProcedure. We have held that “[a] motion to vacate ajudgment made pursuant to Rule 60(b), W. Va. R. C. P., is addressed to the sound discretion ofthecourtandthecourt’sruling on such motion will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing of an abuse of such discretion.” Syl. pt. 5,Tolerv.Shelton,157 W. Va. 778, 204 5Inherpetition,Ms. C. did not challenge,orrequestmodificationof,Mr.B.’s relinquishment of his parental rights and the ratification thereof by the circuit court. 6 S.E.2d85(1974). We further held in Syllabus point 3 ofToler that“[a]ppealofthedenialof aRule60(b)motionbringstoconsiderationforreviewonly the order of denial itself and not thesubstancesupporting the underlying judgment nor the final judgment order.” 157 W. Va. 778, 204 S.E.2d 85. Insofarasthe circuit court’s order denying Ms. C.’s Rule 60(b) motion adopted therecommendation ofthefamilylawmaster,ourreviewisalsoguidedbySyllabuspoint1 of Burnside v. Burnside, 194 W. Va.263,460 S.E.2d 264 (1995),whereweheld,inpart,that: Inreviewing challenges to findings made by a family law master that also were adopted by a circuitcourt,athree-prongedstandard of review is applied. Under these circumstances, a final . . . order is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings are reviewedunderaclearly erroneous standard; and questionsoflawandstatutoryinterpretationsare subject to a de novo review. See also Stephen L.H. v. Sherry L.H., 195 W. Va. 384, 393 n.11, 465 S.E.2d 841, 850 n.11 (1995) (“In reviewing the decisions of the circuit court [reviewing a family law master’s recommended order],thescopeofthisCourt’sreview is relatively narrow. Our role is limited toconsideringerrorsoflawandmakingcertain thatthecircuitcourtadheredtoitsstatutory standardofreviewoffactualdeterminations, that is, whether the family law master’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and consistent with the law.”). III. 7 DISCUSSION Theprimary issue presented by the instant appeal is whether Ms. C. established grounds to require Mr. B. to pay additional child support, after his parental rights were terminated. The circuit court’s order set out numerous substantive and procedural reasons to deny the relief sought by Ms. C. However, we need address only one of the reasons given by the circuit court in order for us to dispose of this case. The circuit court found that it did not have continuing jurisdiction to award additional child support in this case. We agree.6 As a general matter, a circuit court “is vested with continuing jurisdiction to modifyitsoriginalorderregardingchildsupport...,asthecircumstances of the parties or the welfareofthechildrenmayrequire.” Carterv. Carter, 198 W. Va.171,177n.10,479S.E.2d 681,687 n.10(1996). See W.Va.Code§48-11-105 (2001) (Supp.2002). The decisions of this Court that have recognized a circuit court’s continuing jurisdiction to modify a child supportorderhaveprimarilybeeninthecontextofaparentwhose parental rightshadnot been 6Thecircuitcourtalsoconcluded,andweagree,thatMs.C.wasnotentitled to reliefbecauseshefailedtotimelyfileherRule60(b)(1) motion. Under the version of Rule 60(b)thatwasinplace when Ms. C. filedhermotion,shehadonlyeightmonthstobringthe motionafter the final judgment was entered. Cf.W.Va.R.Civ.P.60(b)(1)(extending,under currentversionofrule,timewithinwhich aggrieved party must file motion within one year). In this case, Ms. C. filed her Rule 60(b)(1) motion six years after the entry of judgment of which she complains. It goes without saying, then, that Ms. C’s untimely motion precludes her from seeking the relief she desires. See State ex rel. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res. v. Sinclair, 210 W. Va. 354, 362, 557 S.E.2d 761, 769 (2001) (Davis, J., dissenting)(“We have previously recognized that ‘in general, the law ministers to the vigilant, not to those who sleep on their rights.’ State v. LaRock, 196 W. Va. 294, 316, 470 S.E.2d 613, 635 (1996).”). 8 terminated. We have never squarely addressed the issue of a circuit court’s authority to award additionalchildsupportafteranobligor’sparental rights have been terminated. 7 The resolution of this issue, however, was alluded to in dicta by this Court in In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620 (2001). One of the issues in Edward B. involved the circuit court’s termination of parentalrightsofamotherandputativefather. This Court reversed the lower court’s ruling as it related to the mother and remanded the case for further consideration. In doing so, the Court notedindictathat“[i]fthe[mother’s]rights are not terminated after consideration on remand, adoptionisnolongeranissue,andthe [mother’s] rights to receive support fromthenatural fatherwouldbenegatedbytermination of the father’s parental rights.”EdwardB.,210W.Va. at 636 n.24, 558 S.E.2d at 635 n.24. Edward B. alluded to, in dicta, what appears to be the position taken by a majority of courts addressing the issue. That is, a majority of courts have held that “an order terminatingparentalrightscompletelyseverstheparent-childrelationship and deprives the court of the authority to make an award of child support.” Countyof Ventura v.Gonzales 106 7This case concerns only the issue of the termination of parental rights. We do notaddresstheissueoftheeffectofanadoptionofachildasitrelatestopost-adoptionchild support. See W.Va.Code§48-22-703(a)(2001)(Repl.Vol.2001)(“Uponthe entry of such order of adoption, any person previously entitled to parental rights . . . shall be divested of all obligations in respect to the said adopted child[.]”). 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 461, 462 (2001). See Erwin v. Luna, 443 So.2d 1242, 1244 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983); In re Bruce R., 662 A.2d 107, 111 (Conn. 1995); Ponton v. Tabares, 711 So. 2d 125, 126 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998); Department of Human Res. v. Ammons, 426 S.E.2d 901, 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Kansas ex rel. Sec’y of Soc. & Rehab. Servs. v. Clear, 804 P.2d 961, 966 (Kan. 1991); Mauk v. Mauk, 873 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994); Louisiana v. Smith, 571 So. 2d 746, 748 (La. Ct. App. 1990); In re Estate of Braa, 452 N.W.2d 686, 688 (Minn.1990); Schleisman v. Schleisman, 989 S.W.2d 664, 671 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Nevada v. Vine, 662 P.2d 295, 297-98 (Nev. 1983); Gabriel v. Gabriel, 519 N.W.2d 293, 295 (N.D. 1994); In re Scheehle, 730 N.E.2d 472, 475 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999); Kauffman v. Truett, 771 A.2d 36, 39 (Pa. 2001); Coffey v. Vasquez, 350 S.E.2d 396, 398 (S.C. App. 1986); Estes v. Albers, 504 N.W.2d 607, 608 (S.D. 1993); Swatev.Swate,72S.W.3d763,771(Tex.Ct.App. 2002); Virginia ex rel. Spotsylvania County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Fletcher, 562 S.E.2d 327, 329 (Va. Ct. App. 2002); In re Dependency of G.C.B., 870 P.2d 1037, 1042 n.6 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). But see Evink v. Evink, 542 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that child support obligation continues after parental rights have been terminated); Rhode Island v. Fritz, 801 A.2d 679, 685 (R.I. 2002) (same). The majority rule is premised upon the reality that “termination of parental rights is a complete severance of all ties between the child and parent so as to render them ‘legal strangers[.]’” Virginia ex rel. Spotsylvania County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Fletcher, 562 S.E.2d 327, 329 (Va. Ct. App. 2002). Consequently, “[b]ecause a party whose parental rights 10 have been terminated is a ‘legal stranger’ to the child, that parent no longer has a duty to supportthechild.” Fletcher,562S.E.2dat329. Of course, “[t]ermination does not foreclose the possibility that a parent may seek to recover the amount of past due child support.”Swate v. Swate, 72 S.W.3d 763, 771 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002). See Runner v. Howell, 205 W. Va. 359, 518 S.E.2d 363 (1999) (per curiam) (disapproving cancellation of child support payments that accrued before obligor agreed to relinquish parental rights). Even so, “[a] judgment terminating a parent’s rights . . .absolvesthatparentofallfuturesupportobligations.” Inre Bruce R., 662 A.2d 107, 111 (Conn. 1995). In view of the foregoing authorities, we hold that a final order terminating parentalrightscompletelyseverstheparent-child relationship, and deprives the court of the authority to impose a post-termination award of child support on the parent whose rights have been terminated. However, termination of parental rights does not deprive a court of jurisdiction to enforce payment of child support that accruedbeforetheobligor’s parental rights were terminated. Thepositionadoptedtodayisdistinguishablefrom this Court’s ruling inKimble v. Kimble, 176 W. Va.45,341S.E.2d420(1986). InKimble,the ex-husband of the appellant executed an agreement to permit the appellant’s new husband to adopt the parties’ child. As aconditionforthisagreement,theex-husbandwouldberelievedof child support payments once the adoption was finalized. The adoption was never finalized, and the appellant, a year 11 later,soughtpastchild support payments from her ex-husband. The circuit court awarded past childsupportpaymentsuptothedaythepartiesexecutedthe adoption agreement, but relieved the ex-husband of all child support payments that had accrued after execution of the agreement. OnappealthisCourtheld,inSyllabuspoint 1, that “[t]he execution of consent to the adoption ofachildbyitscustodialparentandthecustodialparent’scurrentspouse is alone insufficient toterminateanoncustodialparent’s decretal obligation to make child support payments.” 176 W. Va. 45, 341 S.E.2d 420. We therefore reversed and remanded the case for the trial court todeterminewhetherprinciples of equitable estoppel precluded the appellant from obtaining child support payments. Thedecisionin Kimble standsfortheproposition that an agreementtoallowa child to be adopted that has not been approved by a court order, will not relieve a parent of his/her child support obligation.8 Kimble didnotaddresstheissue confronting this Court in 8The holding in Kimble was applied by this Court in Stevens v. Stevens, 186 W.Va.259,412 S.E.2d 257 (1991) (per curiam). In Stevens, oneoftheissuesweaddressed involvedanagreementmadebytheappellant father to have his parental rights terminated as to oneofhischildren. As a result of the parental termination agreement, the appellant argued on appealthatthecircuitcourterroneouslyrequired him to pay child supportforthechild.We disagreed with the appellant. In doing so, we held that Inviewofthecircumstancesandtheholdingin Kimblev. Kimble, this Court concludes that in the present case the appellant’sparentalrightstohisdaughterwereneverjudicially terminatedandthatconsistentwiththeruleset forth inKimblev. Kimble,hisobligationtosupportthechild appropriately should continue. (continued...) 12 the instant case. That is, in the matter sub judice, we are confronted with an agreement to terminate parental rights that was approved of and executed by the circuit court.9 In the instant proceeding, Ms. C. does not challenge the validity of the terminationofMr.B.’sparentalrights.Thatis,Ms.C.doesnotseektohaveMr. B.’s parental rightsrestored to the child. Instead, Ms. C. argues that she is entitled to have additional child supportfromMr.B.becauseofchangedcircumstancesinthehealthofthechild. Additional support is not available as a result of the termination of Mr. B.’s parental rights. The order terminating Mr.B.’s parentalrightsrequiredhimtopay$35,000.00tofulfillallofhis child support obligations. In this appeal, Ms. C. does not allege that Mr. B. failed to comply with the childsupportprovisionsof the order that terminated his parental rights. Instead, Ms. C. seeks to impose additional post-termination child support upon Mr. B. The relief sought by Ms. C. cannotbeawardedbecause Mr. B. has become a “legal stranger” to Ms. C.’s child. Simply put, “[a]parentwhoseparentalrightshavebeenterminatedis relieved of all duties and obligations to support the child[.]” Kansas ex rel. Sec’y of Soc. & Rehab. Servs. v. Clear, 804 P.2d 961, 8(...continued) Stevens, 186 W. Va. at 262, 412 S.E.2d at 260. 9Not only did one circuit judge approve the agreement and conclude such termination to be in the best interest of the child, but, subsequent to the termination, the agreementandthe “best interest of the child” was again reviewed by a family law master and byasecondcircuit judge. As three judges have reviewed the matter and made lengthy findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the best interest of the child, we conclude that, if therehadbeenachallengetothetermination of parental rights, we would have found that there was no abuse of discretion in the lower court’s ruling. 13 966(Kan. 1991). It is quite clear that in applying our holding to the facts of this case, we must affirm the circuit court’s determination that it lacked authority to award additional child support to Ms. C. IV. CONCLUSION We affirm the July 2, 2001, order of the Circuit Court of Ohio County. Affirmed. 14