Title: Whitten v. Allstate Ins. Co.
Citation: 447 So. 2d 655
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 10, 1984

447 So. 2d 655 (1984)
Lyndell A. WHITTEN, as personal representative of the estate of Harry H. Whitten, deceased
v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY.
82-1083.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 10, 1984.
Robert Wyeth Lee, Jr. of Wininger &amp; Lee, Birmingham, for appellant.
*656 Jasper P. Juliano of McDaniel, Hall, Parsons, Conerly, Scott &amp; Lusk, Birmingham, for appellee.
BEATTY, Justice.
Plaintiff, Mrs. Lyndell Whitten, appeals from the trial court's denial of her motion for a new trial. We reverse and remand.
The following issues are presented for review:
(1) Whether extraneous facts were introduced into the jury's deliberations;
(2) Whether the trial court could have found that the effect of such extraneous facts, if any, was not prejudicial; and
(3) Whether the trial court erred in denying Mrs. Whitten's motion for a new trial.
Mrs. Lyndell A. Whitten, as personal representative of her deceased husband's estate, instituted an action on June 18, 1979, against Allstate Insurance Company to recover under a policy of liability insurance. Mrs. Whitten made the following allegations in her complaint:
On April 20, 1983, the trial court submitted the case to the jury. Following their deliberations, the jury returned a verdict for Allstate. Mrs. Whitten filed a motion for a new trial based upon an affidavit of Elizabeth Ann Armstrong, one of the jurors in the case. The motion stated:
After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial.
The general rule in Alabama is that affidavits of jurors will not be accepted for the purpose of impeaching their own verdict. Weekley v. Horn, 263 Ala. 364, 365, 82 So. 2d 341, 342 (1955). This general rule is subject to an exception which arises when the affidavits tend to show extraneous facts which have influenced the verdict. 263 Ala. at 366, 82 So. 2d  at 342 (holding that remarks between jurors during their deliberations, even though improper, are not extraneous facts).
Ms. Armstrong stated in her affidavit:
Two other jurors in the case, Connie Bailey and Patricia Ann Jordan, testified at the hearing on the motion for a new trial that they had visited the scene of the accident during an overnight break in the deliberations.
A similar fact situation was before this Court in Allman v. Beam, 272 Ala. 110, 130 So. 2d 194 (1961). In that case, a juror took an unauthorized view of the scene of the accident at issue in the lawsuit. This Court found that the extraneous facts exception to the general rule against jurors' impeaching their own verdict was invoked. Under the authority of Allman v. Beam, the evidence of Connie Bailey's and Patricia Ann Jordan's unauthorized views of the accident scene is sufficient to show that extraneous facts were before some members of the jury.
Mrs. Whitten argues that this evidence of the introduction of extraneous facts into the jury's deliberations requires a finding of prejudice as a matter of law. She cites Nichols v. Seaboard Coastline Railway Co., 341 So. 2d 671 (Ala.1977). Although the Nichols opinion contains several reasons for the decision to reverse for a new trial on account of juror misconduct, all the Justices agreed (with the exception of Heflin, C.J., who concurred in the result) that prejudice had resulted under the facts of that case. The Court did not hold that prejudice could not be presumed as a matter of law. Six of the Justices agreed in a special concurrence stating that prejudice must be shown; however, that case did not hold that prejudice could not be presumed from extraneous facts as a matter of law.
Nevertheless, this Court recently wrote to that issue in Jones v. McMonigal, 409 So. 2d 1381 (Ala.1982). In that case, jurors visited the scene of the accident on which the lawsuit was based, and this Court affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a new trial, stating:
That statement of legal principle is, of course, too narrow, for it would prevent the recognition by this Court of instances demonstrated by extraneous matters from which it might be presumed that a party was prejudiced as a matter of law. To the extent that Jones v. McMonigal is so limited, therefore, it is overruled. Juror misconduct will justify a new trial when it indicates bias or corruption, or when the misconduct affected the verdict, or when from the extraneous facts prejudice may be presumed as a matter of law.
Alabama case law appears contradictory on the issue of what a court may consider in determining whether a jury's verdict was unduly prejudiced by extraneous facts.
For example, in Weekley v. Horn, 263 Ala. 364, 366, 82 So. 2d 341, 342 (1955), this Court stated that the extraneous facts exception "arises when the affidavits tend to show the extraneous facts which have influenced the verdict." (Emphasis in original.) The juror's affidavit which was offered to impeach the verdict in that case was held to be inadmissible, because it concerned the jury's deliberations. This Court found that those deliberations were not extraneous facts.
The Weekly opinion was cited in Allman v. Beam, supra, 272 Ala. at 115, 130 So. 2d  at 198, for the following premise: "[T]he general rule is subject to an exception, the exception being that the affidavits tend to show that there were extraneous facts brought before the jury and such extraneous facts influenced the verdict." (Emphasis added.)
In Jones v. McMonigal, supra, two jurors visited the scene of the accident which was the basis of the case on which they were serving. One juror testified that she thought the juror's discussions of those unauthorized views caused some of the other jurors to be biased. The other jurors testified that they were not biased. This Court upheld the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial.
The trial courts and this Court considered the affidavits of jurors in Allman and Jones to determine the existence of extraneous facts and also to determine prejudice. Leith v. State, 206 Ala. 439, 90 So. 687, (1921), provides ample precedent for the rule applied in Allman and Jones allowing consideration of such affidavits. In Leith, supra, this Court stated:
Then the Court went on to discuss the following exception to this general rule:
However, the opinion of this Court in Dulaney v. Burns, 218 Ala. 493, 497, 119 So. 21, 25 (1928), interprets the extraneous facts exception more narrowly than Leith, supra: "In the case of McCormick v. Badham, supra, this court held that a juror, to impeach the verdict, may not testify as to what transpired in their deliberations, further *659 than the fact that extraneous matter was received and read by the jury." This interpretation would limit the use of jurors' affidavits to proof of extraneous matter, and would not allow jurors to state whether or not they were influenced by the extraneous matter.
The Dulaney and Leith decisions both cited an earlier decision, McCormick v. Badham, 204 Ala. 2, 85 So. 401 (1919), but they differ on the law stated in McCormick. Actually, neither Dulaney nor Leith states the law precisely as it appears in McCormick. In that case, this Court stated the general rule prohibiting a juror from testifying about the jury's deliberations and went on to give the following exception: "The affidavit of a juror may, however, be allowed to show extraneous facts which may have influenced their verdict." 204 Ala. at 9, 85 So.  at 407. Therefore, McCormick did not specifically allow for jurors to testify concerning the influence of the extraneous matter, as Leith makes it appear; nor did McCormick specifically deny the allowance of jurors' affidavits to determine the influence of extraneous matter, as stated in Dulaney.
The Leith opinion also relies on Louisville &amp; N.R. Co. v. Sides, 129 Ala. 399, 29 So. 798 (1901). In Sides, the brief of defendant's counsel was accidentally placed in the file of papers which went into the jury room when the jury retired to consider their verdict. Affidavits of all jurors serving on the case were considered. Those affidavits showed that the jury did not consider the brief of counsel as evidence in the case and that it did not have any influence or effect upon the verdict. Sides, supra, 129 Ala. at 403, 29 So.  at 799. Accordingly, the Court's interpretation of the "extraneous exception" rule as expressed in Leith follows a well-established precedent, and Dulaney, insofar as it contradicts Leith, is hereby overruled.
A review of the affidavits and testimony in the case at bar shows that the jurors were affected in different ways by the unauthorized views of three jurors and the subsequent discussions about those views.
Elizabeth Ann Armstrong stated in her affidavit:
Connie Bailey, one of the jurors who visited the scene, testified at the hearing on the motion for a new trial:
However, she also testified:
Another juror who visited the scene was Patricia Ann Jordan, who testified:
Several other jurors stated in their affidavits that their decision was based upon the evidence presented in the case and that they were not influenced by the discussions among the jurors of the unauthorized views.
In Reed v. L. Hammel Dry Goods Co., 215 Ala. 494, 497, 111 So. 237, 239-40 (1927), this Court observed:
The case at bar is distinguishable from Reed, supra, because in that case there was no evidence of prejudice. In the case before us, Connie Bailey and Patricia Ann Jordan both testified that the scene of the accident appeared the same as the scene which was admitted into evidence by photographs. However, Connie Bailey, at the hearing, and Elizabeth Ann Armstrong, in her affidavit, each said that she was influenced to change her decision about the case by the extraneous material which was before the jury. The record shows that no evidence was offered to contradict these statements. For example, no evidence was offered showing that these two jurors voted the same way before and after the unauthorized views and discussions about them took place. Therefore, the evidence is undisputed that these two jurors were influenced to change their decisions about the case by the extraneous material which was before them.
On the basis of these undisputed facts, we conclude that the trial court could not have found that the effect of the unauthorized views and the discussions about them were not prejudicial. It follows that the trial court's ruling which denied Mrs. Whitten's motion for a new trial must be reversed and the cause remanded. It is so ordered.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All the Justices concur except FAULKNER, J., who dissents.
FAULKNER, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent.
*661 Jones v. McMonigal, 409 So. 2d 1381 (Ala. 1982), is a correct statement of the law and should not be overruled or even modified as held by the majority.
The evidence and logic used by the majority to reverse the ruling of the trial judge in this case are less than substantial. Moreover, to reverse the trial judge in this case is a message to him that "Whatever you did at the trial with facts and evidence, we can do it better."
The majority premises its holding on the affidavit of Elizabeth Ann Armstrong and the testimony of Patricia Jordan and Connie Bailey. The majority states that these jurors were influenced to change their decision by a visit to the scene of the accident.
Connie Bailey's testimony does not reveal that her visit to the scene affected her decision at all. On the contrary she testified that she followed the trial judge's instructions, and that the scene of the accident was substantially the same as the scene presented by the photographs. Patricia Ann Jordan, who also visited the scene of the accident, stated categorically in her testimony at her hearing on the post-trial motion that her visit to the scene did not have any effect on her decision.
The majority further states, "Several other jurors stated in their affidavits that their decision was based upon the evidence presented in the case and they were not influenced by the discussions among the jurors of the unauthorized views." I do not know how to count "several" in arriving at the number 12, but jurors Bibeau, Ferguson, Fox, and Hayes must have been among those counted. They testified they were not affected. I do not know whether Annette Collins, who also visited the scene of the accident with Connie Bailey and Patricia Jordan, was affected by the visit. There is no mention of her by the majority.
So, two out of the three jurors who visited the scene of the accident testified at the motion for new trial that their decision was not affected by their visit. It is not known whether the third visitor was affected. That brings me to the affidavit of Elizabeth Ann Armstrong. In the stark reality of the testimony of Patricia Jordan and Connie Bailey that they were not affected by their visit to the scene of the accident, Ms. Armstrong stated, "They [the jurors who viewed the scene] further said that their visit to the scene caused them to change their opinion about the case." Obviously, Ms. Armstrong must not have been aware of the testimony of visitors Jordan and Bailey. She says that their discussions with her caused her to change her decision. It appears to be strange indeed, that she changed her decision, and yet Jordan and Bailey did not change theirs.
There is simply not sufficient evidence to support the majority's conclusion that there was any bias or prejudice on the part of the jurors in reaching their verdict. There is not sufficient evidence that their verdict was affected by the jurors' visit to the scene. The trial judge was certainly in a better position to weigh the evidence and to determine whether there was any bias or prejudice because of the misconduct of the three jurors, and I do not think he committed error by overruling the motion for new trial. I would affirm.