Title: Commonwealth v. Jessup
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11376
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 8, 2015

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SJC-11376 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANTHONY EUGENE JESSUP. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     December 5, 2014. - April 8, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Constitutional Law, 
Imprisonment, Freedom of speech and press.  Wanton or 
Reckless Conduct.  Robbery.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, Motion to suppress, Instructions to jury, Assistance 
of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 30, 2010. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by 
Constance M. Sweeney, J., and the cases were tried before 
Richard J. Carey, J. 
 
 
 
Elaine Pourinski for the defendant. 
 
Deborah D. Ahlstrom, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  In the early morning hours of May 30, 2010, 
Jonathan Santiago was shot and killed as he sat in his vehicle 
parked near a Springfield sports bar.  The defendant was 
indicted for the shooting, and a jury convicted him of murder in 
2 
 
the first degree on the theory of felony-murder (with attempted 
armed robbery as the underlying felony), unlawful possession of 
a firearm, and unlawful possession of a loaded firearm.1,2  
Represented by new counsel on appeal, he argues (1) error in the 
denial of his motion to suppress a letter he wrote to another 
detainee while he was detained awaiting trial; (2) that a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arose from 
the trial judge's failure to instruct on involuntary 
manslaughter; and (3) that his trial counsel was ineffective in 
not requesting an instruction on involuntary manslaughter based 
on wanton or reckless conduct.  We affirm the order denying the 
defendant's motion to suppress as well as the defendant's 
convictions, and discern no basis to exercise our authority 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  Based on the evidence adduced by the 
Commonwealth at trial, the jury could have found the following 
facts.  On May 29, 2010, the victim met up with his friends, 
                     
1 The defendant also was convicted of armed assault with 
intent to rob, which was dismissed as duplicative of the 
predicate felony underlying the felony-murder conviction, and of 
unlawful possession of ammunition, which was dismissed as a 
lesser included offense of unlawful possession of a loaded 
firearm. 
 
2 The defendant was tried together with Jason Jamal Stovall, 
who was charged with the same offenses as the defendant, but as 
an aider and abettor or joint venturer, see Commonwealth v. 
Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 466-467 (2009).  The jury found Stovall 
not guilty on all charges against him. 
3 
 
Andrew Cooke, Marquis Chase, Kasheef Sheppard, Timothy 
Henderson, and Alan Bamber, outside a sports bar in Springfield 
where Virgil Vargas was celebrating her twenty-first birthday.3  
Vargas previously had attended high school in Springfield with 
the victim, the defendant, and James Jamal Stovall, who was 
tried with the defendant.  Stovall was her friend.  She spoke 
with Stovall and the defendant outside the bar about fifteen to 
twenty minutes before the shooting.4  According to Vargas, both 
men wore black hooded sweatshirts, and hats.5  The defendant's 
braided hair was visible under his hat.  At the time of the 
shooting, which Vargas estimated had occurred at approximately 
12:35 A.M., she had returned inside the bar. 
 
The victim, who was wearing a "long, big chain," was parked 
in a lot across the street from the bar.  He waited by the trunk 
                     
3 Virgil Vargas had promoted the party on social media 
sites. 
 
4 Others saw the defendant and Stovall in the area outside 
the bar before the shooting.  Andrew Cooke, who previously had 
worked at a restaurant with Stovall and "knew of" the defendant, 
testified that he saw the defendant and that the defendant was 
wearing a black "pilot's" jacket and a black baseball cap.  He 
did not "get a good look" at Stovall.  Marquis Chase also saw 
the defendant and Stovall before the shooting.  Chase testified 
that the defendant was wearing a black sweatshirt and hat and 
had braided hair, and that Stovall was wearing a black 
sweatshirt.  Another person present testified that he saw the 
defendant and Stovall before the shooting and that both were 
wearing hooded sweatshirts and one wore a hat. 
 
5 In her invitations to her party, Vargas had asked people 
to wear black clothing. 
4 
 
of his automobile while some of his friends were deciding 
whether to stay or leave.  When the group decided to leave, 
Cooke approached the victim, who was then seated in the driver's 
seat of his automobile, to inform him. 
 
The testimony varied about what happened next.  Cooke 
testified that when he reached the victim's automobile, he 
leaned over to speak with the victim through the front driver's 
side window, which was partially opened.  As Cooke was doing so, 
he heard a sound and turned back toward it.  He saw a light-
skinned African-American male,6 with braids, a hat, and a 
"pilot's" jacket approach from behind with a gun.  The person 
put the gun into the rear driver's side window, and stated, 
"Give me some money," or "Give me what you have."7  Cooke 
testified that he heard a gunshot, saw the victim's automobile 
back up and then move forward, and then heard the automobile 
crash into a fire hydrant.  Cooke did not see anyone else at or 
approaching the victim's automobile.8̓9 
                     
6 Cooke testified that he only saw part of the shooter's 
face, namely, the shooter's chin. 
 
7 After the shooting and while at the scene, Cooke told one 
officer that the shooter had pointed the gun at the victim and 
ordered the victim to get out of the automobile and then pointed 
the firearm at him (Cooke). 
 
8 During his cross-examination, Cooke acknowledged that he 
told a police officer that there might have been someone on the 
other side of the automobile. 
 
5 
 
 
Chase testified that just before the shooting, Cooke was 
speaking to the victim through the driver's side window.  Chase 
heard someone say, "Open the door or I'll kill you."  He went to 
see what was going on and saw a black male with braids10 behind 
Cooke with his arm inside the rear driver's side window of the 
victim's automobile (but did not see a gun).  Chase testified 
that he observed another person, who also was a black male, 
standing by the passenger's side mirror of the victim's 
automobile.  Chase heard a gunshot and then observed the 
victim's automobile travel in reverse, eventually crashing into 
a fire hydrant.  Chase testified that after the shooting, the 
two men who had approached the vehicle took off running across 
the street.11 
 
Another individual who was present, Kashawn Harris, 
testified that he knew Stovall from high school and was familiar 
with the defendant.  After Harris learned that his friends were 
going to leave and not attend the party, he went back to his 
automobile.  He heard yelling and turned around.  Harris saw a 
light-skinned black male in dark clothing on the driver's side 
                                                                  
9 At trial, Cooke made an in-court identification of the 
defendant as the shooter. 
 
10 Chase testified that he did see some of this man's face. 
 
11 When Chase first spoke with police, he did not mention 
Cooke's presence or that anyone was in the area of the 
passenger's side door. 
6 
 
of the victim's automobile reaching into the automobile and 
another person in dark clothing running up on the other side of 
the automobile.  He saw the person on the passenger's side of 
the automobile touch the roof and a door.  From the direction of 
the victim's automobile, he heard a shot, and he then saw the 
victim's automobile move and crash into a fire hydrant.  Harris 
could not recall whether the victim's automobile moved before 
the shot was fired, but the two occurrences were close in time.  
He testified that after the shooting, the two people he had seen 
by the victim's automobile took off running across the street. 
 
After the shooting, the victim's friends rushed over to his 
automobile, and Chase and Henderson entered the vehicle and 
tried to revive him.  The scene was chaotic with people running 
and screaming. 
 
Police and medical response personnel arrived at the scene 
within minutes.  The victim died as the result of a gunshot 
wound to his back and chest.  The medical examiner who conducted 
the autopsy testified that the victim had an entrance wound in 
the middle of the left side of his back.  The bullet traveled 
through his left lung, which collapsed; went through his aorta, 
a major blood vessel; and exited through his upper right chest.  
The track of the wound was left to right, and back to front.  
Although the victim suffered other injuries to his face, the 
gunshot wound caused his death.  The medical examiner also 
7 
 
opined that the gunshot wound was not one which would have 
resulted from a gun being fired from within two inches of the 
victim, so that the wound could not be characterized as a 
contact or close contact wound. 
 
Police searched the area.  One officer found a discharged 
nine millimeter cartridge casing which he opined likely would 
have been fired from a semiautomatic weapon.  No weapon was ever 
recovered. 
 
The victim's automobile subsequently was processed for the 
presence of fingerprints.  Fingerprints taken from the front and 
rear passenger's side windows matched those of Stovall.  
Fingerprints removed from other areas inside and outside the 
automobile matched those of Henderson and Chase.  There were no 
fingerprints matching the defendant's. 
 
Police took statements from various people who were present 
at the time of the shooting.  They brought several people to the 
police station to view (separately) photographs of possible 
suspects. 
 
One officer, based on a description that Chase had given of 
the shooter, generated about 900 photographs of possible 
suspects through a computer search.  The officer asked Chase to 
view the suspects on the computer, which displayed about twelve 
photographs per screen.  After viewing approximately 300 
photographs, Chase selected the defendant's photograph, 
8 
 
identifying him as the shooter.  At this point, the police 
learned the defendant's name. 
 
Cooke told Springfield police Sergeant Kevin Devine that 
the shooter was a light-skinned black male between five feet, 
four inches and five feet, seven inches; wore a black baseball 
cap with a "B" on it; wore a dark-colored coat; and had braids 
to the back of his neck.  Cooke testified that he also told 
police that the shooter had a moustache and some markings on his 
face.  Cooke was not able to positively identify the defendant 
from any photographs shown to him on a computer screen, but 
later from a photographic array of eight individuals he selected 
three photographs depicting individuals who bore a resemblance 
to the shooter, one of which was a photograph of the defendant.  
Cooke stated that if he were to see the shooter in person, he 
would be able to make a positive identification. 
 
On May 31, Cooke returned to look at a photographic array,12 
but was not able to make an identification.  Again, he pointed 
to one photograph (of the defendant), stating that the person 
resembled the shooter. 
 
In the early afternoon of June 1, Cooke, Bamber, Sheppard, 
and Chase went to a park to go swimming.  While there, they saw 
the defendant and his girl friend.  Cooke "stopped dead in his 
                     
12 This photographic array contained the same subjects as 
the earlier one referenced, but displayed a profile view of 
those subjects. 
9 
 
tracks" when he saw the defendant.  Someone asked, "Is that 
him?" to which Cooke replied that it was.13  Cooke's friends then 
attacked the defendant, who eventually was able to escape.  
Later, Cooke contacted Sergeant Devine and went to the police 
station; there, looking at a different photograph array 
containing eight photographs, Cooke positively identified a 
photograph of the defendant as the person who had shot the 
victim. 
 
Police had Chase return to the police station to view a 
photographic array containing eight photographs.  Chase selected 
the defendant's photograph from the array and stated that the 
person depicted therein was one of the two men at the victim's 
automobile at the time of the shooting.  From a different 
photographic array, Chase also identified one of the two men as 
Stovall. 
 
Police also had Harris view photographic arrays on June 1.  
From an array, Harris selected the defendant's photograph as 
depicting the person on the driver's side of the victim's 
automobile and, from another array, selected Stovall's 
photograph as being one of the two men who fled from the 
victim's automobile after the shooting.  At trial, Harris 
testified that, at the time of the shooting, he had not seen the 
                     
13 Cooke testified that it was his cousin Chase who had 
asked this question, but Chase denied it at trial. 
10 
 
faces of the men who had approached the victim, but had assumed 
from the clothing worn by the men who had been by the victim's 
automobile that the men were the defendant and Stovall. 
 
After the encounter with the victim's friends, the 
defendant and his girl friend fled Massachusetts.  They were 
apprehended in Virginia on June 2, the next day, and detained at 
the Southside regional jail (jail) in Emporia, Virginia, pending 
extradition to Massachusetts.  While awaiting extradition, the 
defendant sent his girl friend, who also was being detained at 
the same facility, a letter that was the subject of the motion 
to suppress.  The Commonwealth introduced a redacted portion of 
this letter at trial as admissions of the defendant as well as 
consciousness of guilt evidence.  In the letter, the defendant 
stated: 
 
"I hated being broke.  I mean the lights got cut off, 
there was no cable, . . . gas, . . . et cetera.  I wanted 
to do so much with so little and it didn't help, you kept 
reminding me that I wasn't shit and I didn't have shit.  I 
. . . felt worthless and it hurt, so it caused me to not 
think clearly and to go out and do some dumb shit. 
 
 
"But I got good news, I'm not going to do life, first 
the bullet didn't kill him, the accident did, and second, 
they don't have any evidence just those stupid school kids 
saying I did it, but you know how that is that.  All I know 
is that I was driving with you all day and left and went 
home, so I don't know what them kids are talking about. 
 
 
"I'm going to beat this case so stick by me please and 
then we can move if you want and start a new life, I swear.  
I don't know about you, but I was kind of glad this shit 
happened because we went on a road trip together.  I was so 
11 
 
excited to go to ATL with you.  I couldn't wait to start 
over." 
 
 
Neither the defendant nor Stovall testified.  The defendant 
presented a case of misidentification.  His former attorney 
testified that while interviewing Sheppard on May 20, 2011, 
Sheppard stated that he had spoken with Chase, Bamber, and Cooke 
before they were interviewed at the police station on the 
morning of the shooting and that none of them had seen who shot 
the victim.  The defendant's trial counsel argued that the 
identifications made by Harris, Cooke, and Chase were not 
credible.  Defense counsel also underscored the absence of 
physical evidence connecting the defendant to the crime and 
argued that the defendant had to flee the Commonwealth for his 
own safety. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Motion to suppress.  Prior to trial, the 
defendant filed a motion to suppress two letters, one that he 
sent to, and one he received from, his girl friend, while both 
the defendant and his girl friend were being held pending 
extradition to Massachusetts.  The Virginia authorities seized 
the letters under the jail's policy prohibiting inmate-to-inmate 
correspondence without prior approval.  The defendant argued 
that the letters were seized in violation of the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, as applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
12 
 
Constitution.  After conducting an evidentiary hearing, a judge 
denied the motion. 
 
One witness, Lieutenant Richard Miles, an employee of the 
jail, testified at the evidentiary hearing on the motion.  We 
recite the facts found or implicitly credited by the motion 
judge, supplemented by additional undisputed facts where they do 
not detract from the judge's ultimate findings.  See 
Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450 
Mass. 818 (2008). 
 
On June 2, three days after the murder and the next day 
after the encounter with the victim's friends, the defendant was 
arrested in Virginia.  His girl friend was with him at the time 
and, shortly thereafter, also was arrested on an outstanding 
warrant.  At the jail, the defendant and his girl friend were 
held in separate units based on their gender.  Male and female 
inmates were not permitted to communicate with each other.  The 
jail's written policy precluded inmate-to-inmate correspondence 
by mail without prior approval.14  Inmates were notified of this 
policy, among others, when they were admitted to jail.  The 
policies and procedures of the jail were established to ensure 
safety and security. 
                     
14 Specifically, the policy provided:  "Inmate to inmate 
correspondence within the facility will only be approved when a 
prior family relationship is verified." 
13 
 
 
On June 17, 2010, Miles collected outgoing mail that had 
been placed in a window in the common room of the housing unit 
in which the defendant and seven other male inmates were being 
detained.  One item of mail, an envelope addressed to, and with 
the same return address of, the defendant's girl friend (the 
return address and sending address were that of the jail)15 
raised a "red flag."  Miles confiscated the letter because, as 
indicated by the envelope's return address, "it was mail from a 
female [who obviously did not reside] in a housing unit that was 
male." 
 
The jail's policy permitted an inmate's mail to be read by 
jail personnel only if the mail was first deemed to be 
contraband.  Miles considered the letter contraband and opened 
it to identify the sender, as it appeared to have a female 
sender and only a male inmate in the unit would have authored 
it.  He called out the defendant's name, but the defendant did 
not respond.  Another inmate went to the defendant's cell and 
informed the defendant that his mail had been confiscated. 
 
Miles returned to the defendant the envelope in which the 
letter had been contained, but Miles kept the letter itself.  He 
then verified that the defendant's girl friend was housed at the 
jail, that she and the defendant were "codefendants," and that 
                     
15 The envelope was addressed to "Cherily Nixon, 244 Uriah 
Branchway, Emporia, VA  23847," and had the return address of 
"Cherily Nixon, 244 Uriah Branchway, Emporia, VA  23847." 
14 
 
neither the defendant nor the defendant's girl friend had 
obtained permission to correspond.  Miles read the letter16 and 
then returned to the defendant's cell to retrieve the envelope.  
Miles also confiscated a second letter from the defendant's cell 
(that letter was sent to the defendant from his girl friend).17  
Miles forwarded the letters to his supervisor. 
 
The defendant maintains on appeal that his letter to his 
girl friend18 should have been suppressed because it was 
confiscated in violation of his right to free speech under the 
First Amendment.  In reviewing a decision on a motion to 
suppress, "we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact 
absent clear error 'but conduct an independent review of [the 
judge's] ultimate findings and conclusions of law.'"  
Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Jimenez, 438 Mass. 213, 218 (2002). 
 
Courts "must take cognizance of the valid constitutional 
claims of prison inmates."  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 
                     
16 The relevant portions of this letter appear earlier in 
this decision. 
 
17 Lieutenant Richard Miles testified that, pursuant to a 
policy of the Southside regional jail, the discovery of 
contraband authorizes a cell search. 
 
18 Only some of the contents of the letter that the 
defendant had written to his girl friend were admitted in 
evidence over his objection at trial.  The prosecutor did not 
seek to admit the letter that the defendant's girl friend had 
written to him. 
15 
 
(1987).  Because prisoners retain their constitutional rights, 
"[w]hen a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental 
constitutional guarantee, . . . courts will discharge their duty 
to protect constitutional rights."  Id., quoting Procunier v. 
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-406 (1974) (Martinez).  Regulations, 
policies, or practices that restrict the written correspondence 
or mail of prisoners no doubt implicate the First Amendment's 
guarantee of freedom of speech.  See, e.g., Martinez, supra at 
406, 408. 
 
At the same time, "[p]rison [officials] are responsible for 
maintaining internal order and discipline, for securing their 
institutions against unauthorized access or escape, and for 
rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature and inadequate 
resources allow, the inmates placed in their custody."  
Martinez, 416 U.S. at 404.  "The Herculean obstacles to 
effective discharge of these duties are too apparent to warrant 
explication."  Id.  Running a prison requires "expertise, 
comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of 
which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and 
executive branches of government."  Id. at 405.  As such, 
"courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent 
problems of prison administration and reform."  Id.  
Consequently, "[w]here a [S]tate penal system is involved . . . 
courts have . . . additional reason to accord deference to the 
16 
 
appropriate prison authorities."  Turner, 482 U.S. at 85, citing 
Martinez, supra. 
 
In Martinez, 416 U.S. at 398, 416, the United States 
Supreme Court first addressed the issue of prisoner mail when it 
considered the constitutionality of a California Department of 
Corrections regulation that censored inmate mail deemed to 
magnify grievances or contain other inflammatory statements.  In 
determining whether "censorship of prisoner mail is justified," 
id. at 413, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test: 
 
"First, the regulation or practice in question must 
further an important or substantial governmental interest 
unrelated to the suppression of evidence.  Prison officials 
. . . must show that a regulation authorizing mail 
censorship furthers one or more of the substantial 
government interests of security, order, and 
rehabilitation.  Second, the limitation of First Amendment 
freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential 
to the protection of the particular governmental interest 
involved." 
 
Id. 
 
Subsequently, in Turner, 482 U.S. at 81, the Supreme Court 
considered a Missouri regulation that forbade communication 
between inmates at different institutions.  The Supreme Court 
took care to distinguish its earlier holding in Martinez, noting 
that the Martinez case "turned on the fact that the challenged 
regulation caused a 'consequential restriction on the First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights of those who are not prisoners'" 
(emphasis in original).  Turner, supra at 85, quoting Martinez, 
17 
 
416 U.S. at 409.  The Supreme Court upheld the challenged 
regulation and in so doing set forth a standard to be applied 
different from that stated in Martinez.  Turner, supra at 89, 
93.  Recognizing that courts must balance First Amendment rights 
of prisoners against legitimate penological governmental 
interests, the Supreme Court expressly adopted a deferential 
standard of scrutiny for the review of regulations and policies 
in the prison context that infringe on free speech rights under 
the First Amendment.19  Id. at 89.  Specifically, the Supreme 
Court directs that, "when a prison regulation impinges on 
inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."  Id.  
Under Turner, the reasonableness inquiry focuses on several 
factors, none of which suggests a violation of the defendant's 
First Amendment rights in this case. 
 
"The first Turner factor is multifold [and involves 
determining] whether the governmental objective underlying the 
regulations at issue is legitimate and neutral, and that the 
regulations are rationally related to that objective."  
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414 (1989) (Abbott).  The 
second factor requires determining whether alternative means 
                     
19 We have adopted this standard.  See Massachusetts 
Prisoners Ass'n Political Action Comm. v. Acting Governor, 435 
Mass. 811, 819 (2002), quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 
(1987). 
18 
 
exist for exercising the challenged right.  Id. at 417.  The 
third factor considers the "impact the accommodation of the 
asserted constitutional right will have on others (guards and 
inmates) in the prison."  Id. at 418.  Last, Turner stated that 
"the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence 
that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an 'exaggerated 
response' to prison concerns. . . .  [I]f an inmate claimant can 
point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's 
rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a 
court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not 
satisfy the reasonable relationship standard."  Id., quoting 
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91. 
 
As an initial matter, the defendant argues that the letter 
itself was not contraband because it did not contain any 
physical items such as drugs or weapons.  The term contraband, 
however, is not so narrowly construed and includes, in 
accordance with its ordinary meaning and usage, any item not 
approved for retention.  See, e.g., 103 Code Mass. Regs. 403.06 
(2001) (defining contraband as "any item[s] not approved for 
retention by an inmate at an institution").  See also Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 494 (1993) (defining 
"contraband" as "goods or merchandise the importation, 
exportation, or sometimes possession of which is forbidden").  
Here, the letter was addressed to a female inmate and thus was 
19 
 
sent in violation of the jail's policy prohibiting inmate-to-
inmate correspondence without prior approval.  The letter was a 
prohibited item.  Miles properly considered it contraband. 
 
We turn now to application of the reasonableness test, 
commencing with an analysis of the first Turner factor.  The 
policy's prohibition on inmate-to-inmate correspondence in the 
absence of a family relationship and where approval to 
correspond had not been first obtained is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests.  Here, the policy was 
established to ensure safety and security within the prison.  
The policy recognizes that inmate-to-inmate correspondence has 
the potential to be significantly disruptive, as such 
correspondence may involve planned escapes, acts of violence, or 
other schemes in the cases of pretrial detainees, including 
witness intimidation or tampering with evidence before trial.  
See Turner, 482 U.S. at 91-92; Nasir v. Morgan, 350 F.3d 366, 
372 (3d Cir. 2003).  These concerns justify implementation of 
the challenged policy.  See Abbott, 490 U.S. at 404-405, 415, 
quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974) (regulations 
authorizing warden to reject inmate's subscription publication 
were aimed at protecting prison security, "a purpose [Supreme] 
Court has said is 'central to all other corrections goals'"); 
Turner, supra at 81, 91 (prohibition on correspondence between 
inmates of different facilities is logically connected to 
20 
 
legitimate security concerns); Martinez, 416 U.S. at 412-413 
("the legitimate governmental interest in the order and security 
of penal institutions justifies the imposition of certain 
restraints on inmate correspondence"); Farrell v. Peters, 951 
F.2d 862, 863 (7th Cir. 1992) (prison officials may exercise 
discretion over delivery of correspondence between inmates in 
different correctional facilities based on safety and security 
concerns). 
 
Turning to neutrality, the Supreme Court has "found it 
important to inquire whether prison regulations restricting 
inmates' First Amendment rights operated in a neutral fashion, 
without regard to the content of the expression."  Turner, 482 
U.S. at 90.  Here, the prohibition on inmate-to-inmate 
correspondence applies to all inmate-to-inmate correspondence, 
without regard to the content of the correspondence.  We thus 
conclude that the neutrality requirement is satisfied.20  See id. 
 
Concerning the last part of the first Turner factor, the 
challenged policy is rationally connected to the legitimate 
safety concerns enunciated above.  Of significance, the policy 
differentiates between inmates who are family members and 
                     
20 The defendant contests neutral application of the policy 
because his girl friend was able to send a letter to him.  The 
defendant points to no other instances where the policy was not 
enforced.  Under the circumstances and on this record, the fact 
that the defendant's girl friend was able to send a letter to 
the defendant appears to be an isolated occurrence in which one 
parcel of mail inadvertently was not discovered and confiscated. 
21 
 
inmates who are not.  Recognizing that there may be legitimate 
reasons for fellow inmates who are family members to 
communicate, the policy focuses "a limited class of other people 
with whom prison officials have particular cause to be 
concerned," Turner, 482 U.S. at 92, namely other inmates who are 
not family members.  Because of the legitimate safety concerns 
enunciated above, and the dangers inherent in inmates of the 
same facility being able to freely converse, the challenged 
policy of limiting such correspondence to family members and 
requiring prior approval reasonably relates to maintaining order 
and security in the jail.  While family members who are fellow 
inmates also may have ulterior motives behind their 
communications, the risk reasonably could be considered less 
likely than that concerning those inmates sharing no family 
background and is minimized by an approval process. 
 
As to the second Turner factor, the defendant did not have 
an alternative means to exercise the challenged right because 
the defendant and his girl friend were not family members.  We 
note, however, that in the defendant's case, the limitation on 
communication at the time was to be temporary, as he was 
awaiting extradition to Massachusetts.  The policy, as applied 
to him, did not effect a permanent limitation on his right to 
correspond with his girl friend. 
22 
 
 
Next, concerning the impact of accommodating the asserted 
right if the policy is invalidated, we conclude that such 
accommodation would likely have a significant potential negative 
impact on jail personnel and other inmates.  Internal 
correspondence to nonfamily members no doubt would increase, and 
with no confiscation and review of the content, there would be 
no way of knowing if concerted criminal activity were afoot, 
thus compromising security.  Jail officials would not be able to 
prevent, deter, and discover threats, escape plans, or planned 
acts of violence.  The safety of noncorresponding inmates would 
be at risk. 
 
Last, the defendant contends that, as an alternative to 
enforcing the policy, Miles could have just reminded him about 
the policy and returned the letter to him.  Such action, 
however, would obviate the need for the policy in the first 
instance and, again, would fail to uncover whether in fact any 
type of coordinated criminal activity was occurring.  We are 
satisfied, therefore, that the policy is not an "exaggerated 
response" to the problem posed by inmate-to-inmate written 
correspondence.  See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91.  We conclude 
that an inmate does not have a First Amendment right to 
unmonitored written correspondence with another inmate at the 
same detention facility and that the policy did not violate 
First Amendment guarantees. 
23 
 
 
We address one additional argument made by the defendant.  
Relying on Abbott, 490 U.S. at 411-412, in which the Supreme 
Court noted that outgoing mail by its very nature does not "pose 
a serious threat to prison order and security," or a "danger to 
the community inside the prison" (emphasis in original), the 
defendant argues that his outgoing mail should be afforded 
greater constitutional protection than incoming mail.  No doubt, 
some Federal courts, relying on Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413, have 
applied a different standard to the outgoing mail of prisoners 
as opposed to their incoming mail.  See, e.g., Koutnik v. Brown, 
456 F.3d 777, 784 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 809 
(2007) (inmates' outgoing mail scrutinized under Martinez 
standard); Nasir, 350 F.3d at 371 (noting that many Federal 
courts apply Martinez standard to outgoing mail and Turner 
standard to incoming mail).  Other Federal courts, however, have 
rejected such a distinction.  See, e.g., Gassler v. Wood, 14 
F.3d 406, 410 n.6 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting distinction drawn 
by type of mail); Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 824 & n.10 
(5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1123 (1994) (reasoning 
that Abbott suggests that Turner standard could apply to 
outgoing mail because in Turner, Court explained that when 
determining "whether the existence of other alternatives 
evidenced the unreasonableness of a prison regulation or 
practice, a court was not to employ a 'least restrictive means 
24 
 
test'" set forth in Martinez).  The latter approach, rejecting 
any distinction between outgoing and incoming mail, recognizes 
that outgoing mail may pose just as many dangers as incoming 
mail, including escape plans, illegal activities, and threats.  
See Smith v. Delo, 995 F.2d 827, 831 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 1052 (1994).  We need not offer our own 
resolution of the conflict, if any exists, of what standard of 
review to apply to outgoing mail as opposed to incoming mail, 
because the mail at issue in this case was addressed to a fellow 
inmate, thus rendering the mail not only outgoing mail, but also 
incoming mail.  We point out that the Martinez decision did not 
address inmate-to-inmate correspondence.  We note also, for 
comprehensiveness, that Abbott expressly overruled Martinez to 
the extent that it might support the drawing of a "categorical 
distinction between incoming correspondence from prisoners . . . 
and incoming correspondence from nonprisoners."  Abbott, supra 
at 413-414. 
 
For the reasons stated, we discern no error in the denial 
of the motion to suppress. 
 
2.  Other errors.  a.  Jury instructions.  The defendant 
argues error in the absence of an instruction on involuntary 
manslaughter based on reckless and wanton conduct.  Because the 
defendant did not specifically request this instruction at 
trial, or object to the charge on the ground of its absence, we 
25 
 
review whether there was error, and if so, whether it created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Tolan, 453 Mass. 634, 648 (2009). 
 
"An instruction on [involuntary] manslaughter is required 
where any view of the evidence will permit a finding of 
manslaughter and not murder."  Commonwealth v. Sires, 413 Mass. 
292, 301 (1992).  "In deciding whether a manslaughter 
instruction is supported by the evidence, all reasonable 
inferences must be resolved in favor of the defendant."  
Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 367 Mass. 743, 746 (1975).  As 
relevant here, "[i]nvoluntary manslaughter is an unlawful 
homicide unintentionally caused by an act which constitutes such 
a disregard of probable harmful consequences to another as to 
amount to wanton or reckless conduct."21  Id. at 747.  However, 
"[w]here the felony-murder rule applies, generally the defendant 
is not entitled to an instruction on manslaughter."  
Commonwealth v. Evans, 390 Mass. 144, 151 (1983). 
 
The defendant's claim that he was entitled to an 
instruction on involuntary manslaughter flows in part from his 
contention that the shooting could have been accidental.  In 
                     
21 Involuntary manslaughter may be based on one other 
theory, namely, an unintentional killing resulting from "a 
battery not amounting to a felony which the defendant knew or 
should have known endangered human life."  Commonwealth v. 
Sanna, 424 Mass. 92, 105 (1997), quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 
419 Mass. 28, 33 (1994). 
26 
 
that regard, he points out that several witnesses, Harris, 
Cooke, and Bamber, testified that the victim's automobile moved 
before the gun discharged.  Thus, the defendant contends, the 
movement of the victim's automobile could have startled him or 
caused his hand to jerk in such a way that the gun "went off."  
This assertion of an accidental shooting is nothing more than a 
recasting of the argument made below that correctly was rejected 
by the trial judge.  See Evans, 390 Mass. at 151-152 ("A 
defendant who kills a victim in the commission or attempted 
commission of a robbery, while the defendant is armed with a 
gun, is guilty of murder by application of the felony-murder 
rule. . . .  The fact that, according to the defendant, the gun 
was discharged accidently, is of no consequence"). 
 
The defendant also contends that an involuntary 
manslaughter instruction based on wanton or reckless conduct was 
warranted because there was evidence that he was not engaged in 
the predicate felony, namely, attempted armed robbery.  
Specifically, the defendant asserts that the jury could have 
concluded, based on an alternative view of the evidence, that 
the defendant did not intend to rob the victim.  He points to 
Chase's testimony that before the shooting, he heard the 
defendant say, "Open the door or I'll kill you," and Bamber, who 
heard someone state, "Unlock the door before I shoot."  This 
testimony, he asserts, contradicted the only evidence of an 
27 
 
attempted robbery, which the defendant states was Cooke's 
testimony that the defendant said something to the effect of, 
"Give me what you have."  Certainly, the jury were free to 
reject Cooke's testimony.  The defendant's argument, however, 
ignores other evidence of his intent to rob, namely, his letter 
in jail to his girl friend in which he complained that he "hated 
being broke," that she reminded him that he "wasn't shit and 
. . . didn't have shit," and that these circumstances caused him 
"to not think clearly and to go out and do some dumb shit."  
Defense counsel argued in his closing that the letter should not 
be construed as inculpatory, but the defendant did not testify.  
Nor was evidence presented to refute the reasonable inference of 
a financial motive for attempted robbery that the jury could 
have drawn from the letter's content.  Thus, contrary to the 
defendant's contentions, no view of the evidence supported an 
involuntary manslaughter instruction on the theory that an 
attempted armed robbery had not occurred. 
 
Assuming, however, the absence of evidence of an intent to 
rob the victim, the defendant does not explain how his conduct 
otherwise qualified as wanton or reckless.  It was undisputed 
that whoever killed the victim had a gun because, irrespective 
of what any witnesses saw, the unchallenged evidence of the 
medical examiner established that the victim had been shot and 
died as a result of a gunshot wound.  There was no error in the 
28 
 
judge not instructing, sua sponte, on involuntary manslaughter 
based on wanton or reckless conduct. 
 
b.  Ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  The defendant 
argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective 
because she did not request a jury instruction on involuntary 
manslaughter based on wanton or reckless conduct.  Where we have 
reviewed and rejected the defendant's contention that an 
involuntary manslaughter instruction based on wanton or reckless 
conduct was warranted, this claim cannot serve as the basis for 
a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  See 
Commonwealth v. Silva, 455 Mass. 503, 528 (2009). 
 
3.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
examined the record pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, and discern no basis on which to grant the defendant 
relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.