Title: MARRIAGE OF WINN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 79-008
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: October 22, 1980

N o . 79-8 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1980 I N RE T H E MARRIAGE O F CAMDEN ELAINE W I N N , -vs- LESLIE NiND WINN, P e t i t i o n e r and Respondent, Respondent and,Appellant. Appeal from: The D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Nineteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Lincoln, The Honorable Robert C. Holter, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn and P h i l l i p s , K a l i s p e l l , Montana For Respondent: Fennessy, Crocker, Harmon and Bostock, Libby, Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : June 5, 1980 Decided:OC~ z 2 <.. . J;50$ Filed: J& 1 A h c , JJCJ Mr. J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. The f a t h e r , L e s l i e Rand Winn, a p p e a l s from a judgment of t h e Lincoln County D i s t r i c t Court denying h i s p e t i t i o n t o modify a custody d e c r e e . W e a f f i r m t h e D i s t r i c t Court, b u t a l s o deny t h e r e q u e s t of t h e w i f e t h a t s h e be awarded a t t o r n e y f e e s f o r expenses i n c u r r e d i n defending t h i s appeal. Camden E l a i n e Winn and L e s l i e Rand Winn were married on J u l y 27, 1973 i n Troy, Montana, and d i v o r c e d on May 26, 1976. A daughter was born d u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e and t h e L i n c o l n County D i s t r i c t Court d e c r e e gave custody t o t h e mother. The f a t h e r r e c e i v e d r e a s o n a b l e v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s . On J a n u a r y 1 9 , 1979, t h e f a t h e r f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e custody d e c r e e , and asked t h a t he be g i v e n custody of t h e minor d a u g h t e r . S h o r t l y b e f o r e , t h e mother had moved t o North C a r o l i n a w i t h t h e daughter t o be w i t h a man whom s h e was t o marry i n May of t h a t y e a r . The o r i g i n a l d e c r e e p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e m o t h e r f i r s t o b t a i n p e r m i s s i o n f r o m t h e D i s t r i c t Court i f s h e i n t e n d e d t o e s t a b l i s h r e s i d e n c e i n a n o t h e r s t a t e . The mother f a i l e d t o do t h i s . The e s s e n t i a l c o n t e n t i o n of t h e f a t h e r i n s u p p o r t of h i s r e q u e s t f o r c u s t o d y , was t h a t t h e m o t h e r had c h a n g e d h e r r e s i d e n c e many times w h i l e l i v i n g i n t h e Lincoln County a r e a , t h u s a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t i n g t h e c h i l d , and t h a t t h e mother had l i v e d w i t h o t h e r men o r had o t h e r men l i v i n g w i t h her b e f o r e her remarriage. The t r i a l c o u r t accepted n e i t h e r of t h e s e arguments; nor do w e . Although t h e mother had moved many t i m e s i n t h e g e n e r a l v i c i n i t y of Libby and K a l i s p e l l a f t e r t h e d i v o r c e and b e f o r e her move t o North C a r o l i n a , it was n o t e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e s e moves a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d t h e p h y s i c a l , m e n t a l , moral o r emotional h e a l t h of t h e c h i l d a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 40-4-219(1), MCA. The f a t h e r was n o t prevented from v i s i t i n g h i s c h i l d because of t h e s e many moves. The f a t h e r d i d n o t prove t h a t t h e m o t h e r ' s l i v i n g w i t h o t h e r men b e f o r e her remarriage a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d t h e h e a l t h of t h e c h i l d s o a s t o r e q u i r e a change i n custody under s e c t i o n 40-4-219. See Foss v. L e i f e r ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. 97, 550 P.2d 1309, 1312. The evidence, a t b e s t , shows t h a t t h e mother may have t e m p o r a r i l y l i v e d w i t h one man o t h e r t h a n t h e man s h e is now married t o . The evidence e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t t h e m o t h e r ' s p r e s e n t husband i n t e r a c t s w e l l w i t h t h e c h i l d and t h a t he is n e a t and c l e a n . I t a p p e a r s t h a t he is employed. W e cannot s a y t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n f i n d i n g t h a t t h e c h i l d ' s w e l f a r e was n o t a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d w i t h i n t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 40-4-219. Nonetheless, t h i s c a s e i l l u s t r a t e s a problem which may v e r y w e l l g e t worse. By n o t s e e k i n g t h e c o u r t ' s permission b e f o r e removing t h e c h i l d from t h e s t a t e , t h e mother f o r c e d h e r ex-husband t o t a k e some a c t i o n i n c o u r t t o r e e s t a b l i s h h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h i s d a u g h t e r . The o r i g i n a l d e c r e e a l l o w e d t h e f a t h e r t o v i s i t h i s daughter upon r e a s o n a b l e n o t i c e a s o f t e n a s he wished a s long a s t h e v i s i t s d i d n o t unreasonably i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e wife. That p o r t i o n of t h e d e c r e e was e f f e c t i v e l y n u l l i f i e d when t h e mother moved t o North C a r o l i n a w i t h her c h i l d . The f a t h e r was l e f t w i t h a v i s i t a t i o n d e c r e e which was v i r t u a l l y m e a n i n g l e s s . Undoubtedly it was t o p r e v e n t t h i s kind of s i t u a t i o n which caused t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n t h e o r i g i n a l o r d e r t o r e q u i r e t h e mother t o g e t permission from t h e c o u r t b e f o r e moving w i t h t h e c h i l d t o a n o t h e r s t a t e . Although w e do n o t s u g g e s t t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o u l d , a b s e n t some p e r s u a s i v e e v i d e n c e , p r e v e n t t h e mother from moving t o another s t a t e w i t h her c h i l d , it goes w i t h o u t s a y i n g t h a t had t h e mother g i v e n advance n o t i c e , t h e f a t h e r ' s v i s i t a t i o n p r i v i l e g e s could have been a c c o r d i n g l y modified. But when t h e mother left without first getting the decree modified as to visitation, she forced the father's hand. The only meaningful option he had was to force the issue by seeking a change in custody. Although he was not successful, he at least obtained a change in visitation to reflect the changed geographical distance between himself and his daughter. The trial court ordered that the father have custody for six weeks every summer, during alternate Christmas and Easter holidays and at other times convenient to the father and which would not interfere with the schooling or other activities of the child. District courts have the means to compel compliance with their orders concerning removal of children from the state. A trial court may assert continued power over domestic matters by requiring a bond conditioned upon a party's compliance with the court order. See Grimditch v. Grimditch (1951), 71 Ariz. 237, 226 P.2d 142 (permitting, under the facts, removal without bond); Wallace v. Wallace (1932), 92 Mont. 489, 15 P.2d 915, 918 (security can be required to enforce an alimony decree). The trial court may also hold in contempt a parent who violates an order to secure court approval before removing a child from the state. Ex Parte Sellers (1948), 250 Ala. 87, 33 So.2d 349; Benson v. Benson (1948), 121 Mont. 439, 193 P.2d 827, 829 (dictum); see also Kramer v. Kramer (1978), 176 Mont. 362, 578 P.2d 317, 318. We suggest that the trial court, in appropriate cases, employ these alternatives. The mother contends that this appeal is frivolous and asks us to assess a penalty against the father pursuant to Rule 32, M.R.App.Civ.P., or, alternatively, to award her attorney fees pursuant to section 40-4-110, MCA, because she cannot afford to pay her own attorney. She did not make this request at the trial level, and we are not inclined to act favorably on this request here. We cannot ignore the fact that it was the mother who moved to North Carolina without first getting a change in the visitation privileges, and thus forced the father to initiate the present litigation. Essentially, he had no other choice. Under the circumstances, the mother is not in an equitable position to argue that the father should pay her attorney fees. The order refusing to grant custody to the father is affirmed. y d & & J t e We Concur : C h b f Justice