Title: State v. Rendon
Citation: 161 Ariz. 102, 776 P.2d 353
Docket Number: CR-88-0350-PR
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 1989

161 Ariz. 102 (1989) 776 P.2d 353 STATE of Arizona, Respondent, v. Efrain Corral RENDON, Petitioner. No. CR-88-0350-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. July 11, 1989. Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen., Phoenix by Bruce Ferg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., and Stephen D. Neely, Pima County Atty. by Paul Lauritzen, Deputy Pima County Atty., Tucson, for respondent. Francisco Leon, P.C., Tucson, for petitioner. CAMERON, Justice. I. JURISDICTION This is a petition for review of an order of the Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirming a denial of relief by the Superior Court of Pima County. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4231 and Ariz. R.Crim.P. 32, 17 A.R.S. II. ISSUES We must answer two questions on appeal. 1. Does State v. Williams, 154 Ariz. 366, 742 P.2d 1352 (1987), apply to the facts in this case? 2. If so, should State v. Williams be applied retroactively? III. FACTS The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. During the course of a burglary, two rifles and two handguns were taken. Defendant was arrested and charged with burglary while armed, A.R.S. § 13-1508, and theft of property with a value of over $1000, A.R.S. § 13-1802, with two prior non-dangerous felony convictions, A.R.S. § 13-604. At trial, the court gave the following jury instructions: The court also gave the following form of verdict which was returned by the jury as follows: Defendant did not object to these instructions. Indeed, the instructions followed those given in a 1982 court of appeals case in which we declined review. State v. Romero, 135 Ariz. 102, 659 P.2d 655 (App. 1982). After being convicted of first degree burglary, defendant appealed. On 6 February 1986, the court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction. State v. Rendon, 148 Ariz. 524, 715 P.2d 777 (App. 1986). A month later, on 13 March 1986, we issued our decision in State v. Befford, 148 Ariz. 508, 715 P.2d 761 (1986). In that case, the defendant stole an unloaded shotgun in a zippered case during the course of a burglary, and stacked the gun next to the door with other stolen items. Id. at 509, 715 P.2d at 762. We held that this did not raise the burglary to first degree; that is, while armed with a gun. We stated: Id. at 510, 715 P.2d at 763. A year and one-half later we decided State v. Williams, 154 Ariz. 366, 742 P.2d 1352 (1987). In Williams, the defendant, in the course of a burglary, used a butcher knife taken from the victim's kitchen to intimidate the owners. We stated: Id. at 368, 742 P.2d at 1354. Following these decisions, which represented a significant change in the law regarding this instruction, defendant brought a petition in the superior court for post-conviction relief pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32, 17 A.R.S. The superior court denied relief and defendant petitioned the court of appeals for review. The court of appeals denied the petition stating: We granted defendant's petition for review because of what we believed to be a misinterpretation of Williams by the court of appeals. IV. DOES WILLIAMS APPLY? The difference between first degree burglary and second degree burglary is the possession of a deadly weapon, dangerous instrument, or explosives by defendant during the burglary. A.R.S. §§ 13-1507(A), -1508(A). The state contends, as did the court of appeals, that even though the jury had been incorrectly instructed as to whether petitioner was armed, the jury was properly instructed as to the burden of proof so that defendant was not prejudiced. We do not agree. Under the instruction in this case, the jury did not have to find that the defendant used the gun in such a manner *104 as to indicate his willingness to use it as a "weapon." Befford, 148 Ariz. at 510, 715 P.2d at 763. To convict defendant of first degree burglary, the jury only had to find that the defendant at some time had the gun in his possession for whatever purpose. We believe Williams is on point. In Williams, we noted the following: 154 Ariz. at 368, 742 P.2d at 1354. The instruction in the instant case mirrors that in Williams. The fact that the trial court correctly instructed the jury as to the burden of proof for first degree burglary does not distinguish this case from Williams, or blunt the impact of the specific instruction allowing the jury to find that theft of a gun after entering the premises is sufficient to find first degree burglary. We do not believe Williams is distinguishable from the instant case. V. DOES STATE V. WILLIAMS HAVE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION? Defendant brought this action under Rule 32, which allows a defendant to seek post-conviction relief when: Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(g), 17 A.R.S. Here, a significant change in the law has occurred. However, not all "significant" changes in the law that lead to a defendant's conviction will result in relief under Rule 32. Only when sufficient reasons exist for retroactive application may a defendant prevail. Fundamental error is one of those reasons. We have held that an instruction that does not correctly instruct the jury as to the state's burden of proof constitutes fundamental error. State v. Hunter, 142 Ariz. 88, 688 P.2d 980 (1984). As we noted in Williams: 154 Ariz. at 368, 742 P.2d at 1354. We believe the instruction in the instant case was not only erroneous but also fundamental error because it lessened the state's burden of proof as to first degree burglary. Because we cannot say that the jury would have, beyond a reasonable doubt, found the defendant guilty of first degree burglary without the incorrect instruction, the error was not harmless. State v. Zaragoza, 135 Ariz. 63, 659 P.2d 22, cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1124, 103 S. Ct. 3097, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1356 (1983). See also State v. Garcia, 152 Ariz. 245, 248, 731 P.2d 610, 613 (1987) (quoting State v. Gerlaugh, 144 Ariz. 449, 698 P.2d 694 (1985)). We also believe that Williams must apply retroactively because the giving of the erroneous instruction raises the very real possibility that the defendant was convicted of a crime he did not commit. As the United States Supreme Court has stated: Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653, 91 S. Ct. 1148, 1152, 28 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1971). While our decision is not a "new rule" of procedure or construction but, rather, a corrected definition of the crime, the Supreme Court's rationale nonetheless applies. Use of an instruction that incorrectly defines the elements of the crime threatens the accuracy of the verdict, and complete retroactive effect is the only method of protecting the integrity of the process. VI. DISPOSITION If the only basis for the finding of first degree burglary and of dangerousness was the theft of the gun after entering the structure, the appropriate disposition would be to reduce the conviction to one of a non-dangerous second degree burglary and remand for resentencing. However, because of the posture of this case, it is unclear to us whether the state might have alternative theories which would support a finding of first degree burglary or of dangerousness under proper instructions. If there is evidence which would support such a conviction or finding, the appropriate disposition would be to grant a new trial to be held under proper instructions. Since the parties have not had an opportunity to address these issues, we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. GORDON, C.J., FELDMAN, V.C.J., and MOELLER, J., concur. Justice WILLIAM A. HOLOHAN participated in this matter but retired prior to the filing of this opinion; Justice ROBERT J. CORCORAN did not participate in the determination of this matter.