Title: State v. R.A.M.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2023AP000441
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 25, 2024

2024 WI 26 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2023AP441 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the termination of parental rights to    
P. M., a person under the age of 18: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
R. A. M., 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 408 Wis. 2d 794, 994 N.W.2d 18 
(2023 - unpublished) 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 25, 2024   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 24, 2024    
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Ellen R. Brostrom   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET, and 
PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., joined. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting 
opinion in which HAGEDORN, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the guardian ad litem, there were briefs filed by 
Courtney L.A. Roelandt and The Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, 
INC., Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Courtney L.A. 
Roelandts. 
 
 
 
2 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Jenni S. Karas, assistant district attorney. There was an oral 
argument by Jenni S. Karas, assistant district attorney.  
 
For the respondent-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Pamela Moorshead, assistant state public defender. There was an 
oral argument by Pamela Moorshead, assistant state public 
defender.  
 
 
 
 
2024 WI 26
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.   The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.    
No.   2023AP441 
(L.C. No. 2021TP159) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
P. M., a person under the age of 18: 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
R. A. M., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
FILED 
JUN 25, 2024 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET, and 
PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., joined. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting 
opinion in which HAGEDORN, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   This case concerns whether the 
circuit court1 lawfully terminated R.A.M.'s parental rights.  Our 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Ellen R. Brostrom of the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2023AP441  
 
 
 
2 
task is to interpret Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3. (2021-22)2 in 
order to answer two questions.  First, was the court required to 
wait at least two days before proceeding to a dispositional 
hearing once the court found R.A.M.'s conduct in failing to 
appear 
as 
ordered 
was 
"egregious 
and 
without 
clear 
and 
justifiable excuse"?  And second, did the court lack competency 
to conduct the dispositional hearing because it failed to wait 
the statutorily mandated two days before proceeding?  We hold 
that the circuit court was statutorily bound to wait at least 
two 
days 
before 
holding 
a 
dispositional 
hearing 
under 
§ 48.23(2)(b)3.  Because those two days are central to the 
statutory scheme in ch. 48, the circuit court lacked competency 
when it proceeded to the dispositional phase without abiding by 
the statutorily mandated waiting period.  Therefore, R.A.M. is 
entitled to a new dispositional hearing. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
R.A.M. is the parent of P.M., a son born in February 
2015.3  In 2017, a police officer who was already in R.A.M.'s 
apartment building for an unrelated reason heard a woman 
shouting, a child crying loudly, and a loud thump, after which 
he said the child became louder.  The officer knocked on the 
door, and R.A.M. allowed the officer to enter the residence.  
The officer found P.M. with scratches, bruising, and bleeding 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2021-22 version. 
3 P.M.'s father passed away in 2020, and his rights are not 
at issue in this case. 
No. 
2023AP441  
 
 
 
3 
from the nose.  R.A.M. was the only adult present at the time of 
the incident.  She was subsequently convicted of one count of 
Child Abuse——Recklessly Causing Harm, and was sentenced to one 
year 
of 
initial 
confinement 
and 
two 
years 
of 
extended 
supervision.  Immediately following the incident, the State 
placed P.M. in foster care.  In 2019, P.M. was placed with his 
paternal uncle, with whom he continues to reside. 
¶3 
The 
State 
filed 
the 
present 
petition 
for 
the 
termination of R.A.M.'s parental rights in 2021, after P.M. had 
resided outside of R.A.M.'s home for more than three years.  The 
grounds for the petition were that P.M. was a child with a 
continuing need for protection and services (CHIPS) under Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(2) and that R.A.M. had failed to assume parental 
responsibility 
under 
§ 48.415(6). 
 
R.A.M. 
contested 
both 
grounds, and a court trial began on March 28, 2022.  Two 
additional hearing dates were set in March and April of 2022, 
both of which R.A.M. attended.  When more time was needed to 
conclude the grounds phase and hold a dispositional hearing,4 the 
court set three more dates in July (5, 6 and 15).   
¶4 
On July 5, 2022, R.A.M. failed to appear in court.  
The parties disagree as to the cause of R.A.M.'s absence; 
however, there is no dispute that the judge had previously 
                                                 
4 Termination of parental rights cases proceed in two 
phases.  In the grounds phase of the proceeding, the petitioner 
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of 
the grounds for termination of parental rights enumerated in 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415 exists.  If the petitioner does so, the case 
proceeds to the dispositional phase, where the court must 
determine whether the termination of parental rights is in the 
best interest of the child.  Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2).  
No. 
2023AP441  
 
 
 
4 
issued a standing order requiring R.A.M. to attend all court 
appearances or risk being found in default.  When R.A.M. did not 
appear, the State and the guardian ad litem asked the court to 
enter a default judgement against R.A.M. in the grounds phase.  
The circuit court made the following finding:  
[S]he was ordered to be here this morning and we can't 
proceed on the merits without her.  The State is 
prejudiced in not being able to finish its cross-
examination.  I think she's misleading the Court; I 
think she's misleading [her counsel] in her version of 
the events.  And I do find that to be egregious and 
bad faith and without justification.  
The court then granted the Petitioners' motion for default 
judgment.5  
¶5 
At the conclusion of the grounds phase, the court 
found that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence 
both a continuing need for CHIPS and a failure to assume 
parental responsibility.  As a result, the court determined that 
R.A.M. was an unfit parent.   
¶6 
The court immediately moved to the dispositional phase 
and concluded the dispositional hearing on that same day without 
R.A.M. present.6  The court found that termination would be in 
the best interest of P.M. and ordered the termination of 
R.A.M.'s parental rights. 
                                                 
5 R.A.M. does not challenge the egregiousness finding, so we 
do not examine that issue here. 
6 The court held the dispositional hearing on July 5, even 
though it had reserved two other days in July to potentially 
accommodate a dispositional hearing and had assured R.A.M.'s 
attorney 
that 
R.A.M. 
would 
be 
not 
be 
precluded 
from 
participating were she to appear in court the following day.    
No. 
2023AP441  
 
 
 
5 
¶7 
R.A.M. appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the 
order terminating her parental rights.  That court held that the 
circuit 
court 
lost 
competency 
when 
it 
proceeded 
to 
the 
dispositional hearing on the same day that the grounds phase 
concluded.  The court of appeals also held that R.A.M.'s due 
process rights were violated.  The case was remanded to the 
circuit court with instructions to hold a new dispositional 
hearing.  Subsequently, the guardian ad litem filed a petition 
for review, which this court granted.   
II.  ANALYSIS 
¶8 
We begin by interpreting Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3., 
and determine that the circuit court was required to wait at 
least two days after finding R.A.M.'s conduct in failing to 
appear as ordered was egregious and without justification before 
proceeding to the dispositional phase of proceedings.  We then 
address whether the circuit court lacked competency to proceed 
to the dispositional hearing without abiding by the waiting 
period, and we determine that it did.    
A.  Interpreting Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3. 
¶9 
This is a case of statutory interpretation.  We review 
questions of statutory interpretation de novo.  State v. 
Forrett, 2022 WI 37, ¶5, 401 Wis. 2d 678, 974 N.W.2d 422.  We 
interpret statutes by discerning the plain meaning of the 
language in the context of the statute.  "If the meaning of the 
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 
2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quotations omitted).  We use the 
No. 
2023AP441  
 
 
 
6 
"common, ordinary, and accepted meaning" of words absent a 
technical 
or 
specially 
defined 
usage 
or 
meaning. 
 
Id.  
"Statutory language is read where possible to give reasonable 
effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  Id., ¶46.   
¶10 To resolve this case we must interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.23(2)(b)3., which reads in pertinent part:  
[A] parent 18 years of age or over is presumed to have 
waived his or her right to counsel and to appear by 
counsel if the court has ordered the parent to appear 
in person at any or all subsequent hearings in the 
proceeding, the parent fails to appear in person as 
ordered, and the court finds that the parent's conduct 
in failing to appear in person was egregious and 
without clear and justifiable excuse.  Failure by a 
parent 18 years of age or over to appear in person at 
consecutive hearings as ordered is presumed to be 
conduct that is egregious and without clear and 
justifiable excuse.  If the court finds that a 
parent's conduct in failing to appear in person as 
ordered 
was 
egregious 
and 
without 
clear 
and 
justifiable 
excuse, 
the 
court 
may 
not 
hold 
a 
dispositional hearing on the contested adoption or 
involuntary termination of parental rights until at 
least 2 days have elapsed since the date of that 
finding.    
(Emphasis added). 
¶11 The crux of this case is the last sentence of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3. (underlined above), which presents a 
straightforward conditional statement.  If the court finds that 
the parent's failure to appear as ordered was "egregious and 
without clear and justifiable excuse," then the court "may not" 
hold a dispositional hearing until at least two days after the 
court made the egregiousness finding.   
¶12 No party contests that the "if" condition was met 
here, and for good reason.  The court ordered R.A.M. to appear 
No. 
2023AP441  
 
 
 
7 
in person, and R.A.M. failed to do so.  Then the court found her 
failure to appear to be "egregious" and "without justification."  
Because the "if" condition was met, the last sentence of 
§ 48.23(2)(b)3. requires the court to wait at least two days 
before conducting a dispositional hearing.  Here the court 
violated § 48.23(2)(b)3. when it failed to abide by the 
statutorily imposed waiting period.  
 
¶13 The petitioners disagree with this application, but do 
not 
meaningfully 
contend 
with 
the 
conditional 
statement 
discussed above.  Instead, they urge us to consider the statute 
in context, and argue that a waiver of counsel must occur in 
order for the subdivision to apply.  Additionally, petitioners 
insist that the statute is ambiguous.  To resolve the ambiguity, 
petitioners encourage us to look to both the statute's title and 
its legislative history.  
¶14 Petitioners 
maintain 
that 
the 
last 
sentence 
of 
§ 48.23(2)(b)3. should be read in context with the full statute.  
According to the petitioners, such a reading leads to the 
conclusion that the two-day waiting period applies only when a 
parent has waived their right to counsel (or when counsel has 
withdrawn or been discharged——the petitioners are inconsistent 
on this point).  We are not persuaded.  While we agree that 
analyzing the last sentence in context is essential ("statutory 
language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not 
in isolation but as part of a whole," Kalal 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶46) 
we see no support in the text for petitioners' assumption 
regarding waiver of counsel.  When (as here) a parent fails to 
No. 
2023AP441  
 
 
 
8 
appear as ordered, and the court finds the parent's failure to 
appear 
egregious 
and 
unjustified, 
then 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.23(2)(b)3. provides for two consequences. First, the 
statute creates a statutory presumption that the parent has 
waived counsel, and second the statute imposes a waiting period 
for 
a 
dispositional 
hearing. 
 
Once 
a 
court 
makes 
the 
egregiousness finding, the two-day waiting period is triggered.  
The statute does not require additional unwritten elements such 
as the waiver of counsel, the withdrawal of counsel, or the 
discharge of counsel, in order for the two-day waiting period to 
apply.  In short, the statute's two-day waiting period language 
is plain and unambiguous. 
¶15 Because the conditions that trigger the two-day 
waiting period are plain and unambiguous, we will not use Wis. 
Stat § 48.23's title——"right to counsel"——to create ambiguity or 
rewrite the plain text of the statute.  Statutory titles may be 
helpful 
"for 
the 
purpose 
of 
relieving 
ambiguity," 
but 
ultimately, "titles are not part of the statutes."  State v. 
Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, ¶30, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 410, 906 N.W.2d 158, 
170 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also 
Williams v. Am. Transmission Co., 2007 WI App 246, ¶12, 306 Wis. 
2d 181, 742 N.W.2d 882 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Wisconsin courts 
ordinarily follow the rule that, although statutory titles may 
assist in resolving ambiguity in statutory language, statutory 
titles cannot be used to create ambiguity.").  Therefore, the 
title of the statute does not alter our understanding of the 
No. 
2023AP441  
 
 
 
9 
statute, or compel us to add any additional conditions for the 
two-day waiting period to occur.  
¶16 Similarly, when the meaning of a statute is plain, we 
do not consult legislative history to ascertain its meaning.  
See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51 ("This rule generally prevents 
courts from tapping legislative history to show that an 
unambiguous 
statute 
is 
ambiguous." 
(internal 
quotations 
omitted)).  Consequently, we do not consult the statutory title 
or legislative history in this case, or use either of them to 
supplant the language of the statute itself.   
¶17 To 
summarize, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.23(2)(b)3. 
is 
unambiguous, allowing us to rely on its plain language without 
reliance on extrinsic sources.  That plain language dictates 
that when a court finds that a parent's failure to appear was 
egregious and without justifiable excuse, there is a presumption 
that the parent has waived their right to counsel, and, 
importantly for this case, the court must wait two days to hold 
the dispositional hearing.7 
B. Lack of Competency 
¶18 Having determined that the circuit court violated Wis. 
Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3. by failing to wait two days to hold the 
dispositional hearing, we next must determine whether the court 
lacked competency to hold the dispositional hearing before the 
two days had elapsed.  This is a question of law that this court 
                                                 
7 Our determination that the two-day waiting period applies 
is dispositive.  Therefore, we decline to address whether a 
waiver of the right to counsel occurred here, or delve further 
into the statutory presumption of waiver. 
No. 
2023AP441  
 
 
 
10 
reviews independently.  Village of Trempeleau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 
79, ¶7, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190. 
¶19 The two-day waiting period at issue here is couched in 
mandatory language.  The statute states that if a court makes an 
egregiousness finding, it may not proceed to a dispositional 
hearing without waiting two days.  "'May not' is a negative 
term.  Where statutory restrictions are couched in negative 
terms, they are usually held to be mandatory."  Brookhouse v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 130 Wis. 2d 166, 170, 387 N.W.2d 
82 (Ct. App. 1986).  Interpreting a similar "may not" structure, 
the court of appeals wrote in Brookhouse: "Negative words in a 
grant of power should never be construed as directory.  Where an 
affirmative direction is followed by a negative or limiting 
provision, it becomes mandatory.  Thus, where the statute says 
that the time for motions after verdict may not be enlarged, 
these are negative words regarding the grant of power.  We hold 
that the language is mandatory."  Id. (internal citations 
omitted).  And here the circuit court clearly failed to follow 
the statute's mandate.  
¶20 Given the circuit court's failure to follow the 
statutory mandate, we must next decide if that failure resulted 
in a loss of competency.  As we said in Mikrut, a court's 
"failure to comply with a statutory mandate pertaining to the 
exercise of subject matter jurisdiction may result in a loss of 
the circuit court's competency to adjudicate the particular case 
before the court."  Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶9.   
No. 
2023AP441  
 
 
 
11 
¶21 Not all errors of statutory compliance result in a 
loss of competency.  However, when a circuit court's error is 
central to the statutory scheme, a loss of competency results.  
"Many errors in statutory procedure have no effect on the 
circuit court's competency. Only when the failure to abide by a 
statutory mandate is 'central to the statutory scheme' of which 
it is a part will the circuit court's competency to proceed be 
implicated."  Id., ¶10.   
¶22 This court has previously held that statutory time 
limits in ch. 48 cases are central to the statutory scheme.  In 
Sheboygan Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Matthew S., 2005 WI 84, 
¶36, 282 Wis. 2d 150, 698 N.W.2d 631, a termination of parental 
rights case, we held that a failure to adhere to statutory time 
limits in ch. 48 cases violates the central scheme of the 
statute and therefore the court lacked competency to proceed.   
¶23 It is true that the legislature subsequently passed 
Wis. Stat. § 48.315(3), stating that the failure "by the 
court . . . to act within any time period specified in [Chapter 
48] 
does 
not 
deprive 
the 
court . . . of 
competency."  
Importantly, 
however, 
the 
failure 
to 
act 
within 
a 
time 
limitation is not at issue in this case.  Instead, this case is 
about a failure to wait an adequate amount of time before 
proceeding.  The legislature has not passed a law concerning a 
court's failure to abide by a ch. 48 mandatory waiting period.  
Therefore, we must evaluate whether or not the two-day waiting 
period requirement is central to the statutory scheme of ch. 48 
No. 
2023AP441  
 
 
 
12 
such that a violation of the requirement deprives the court of 
competency. 
¶24 Here, we conclude that the two-day waiting period is 
central to the statutory scheme.  The two-day waiting period 
serves 
as 
a 
basic 
procedural 
safeguard 
for 
parents 
in 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
proceedings, 
potentially 
providing them opportunity to participate in the disposition 
hearing, or to ask the court to reconsider a default judgment 
following 
an 
egregiousness 
finding. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 48.427(1); 48.23(2)(c).  Affording parents basic procedural 
safeguards serves the express legislative purpose of providing 
"judicial and other procedures through which children and all 
other interested parties are assured fair hearings."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.01(1)(ad).  The requirement also serves the underlying 
purpose of ch. 48: "the best interests of the child . . . shall 
always 
be 
of 
paramount 
consideration." 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.01(1).  This is true not least because a brief, two-day 
window may allow certain matters to be resolved that would 
otherwise result in months or even years of appeal. The waiting 
period is therefore no mere technical requirement, but is 
instead central to the statutory scheme of ch. 48.   
¶25 Because the two-day waiting period is central to the 
statutory scheme, a court lacks competency to proceed to a 
dispositional hearing when it fails to wait at least two days 
after 
finding 
a 
parent's 
absence 
to 
be 
egregious 
and 
No. 
2023AP441  
 
 
 
13 
unjustifiable.  As a result, we hold that the circuit court here 
lacked competency to proceed with the dispositional hearing.8       
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶26 We affirm the court of appeals' ruling and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this decision.  The circuit court 
violated Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3. when it failed to wait at 
least two days before proceeding to a dispositional hearing once 
the court found R.A.M.'s absence was "egregious and without 
clear and justifiable excuse."  Consequently, the court lacked 
competency to proceed in this case and R.A.M. is therefore 
entitled to a new dispositional hearing.   
 
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
                                                 
8 Because we determine that the circuit court lacked 
competency to proceed with the dispositional hearing, we do not 
address R.A.M.'s alternative argument that the failure to wait 
two days violated her due process rights.  Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship 
v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 
("Issues that are not dispositive need not be addressed."  
(citation omitted)). 
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
1 
 
¶27 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (dissenting).  What 
happens when a parent, who is represented by a lawyer, fails to 
attend the fourth day of a termination of parental rights 
("TPR") trial,1 even though the court ordered her to attend?  For 
the majority opinion, the parent's intentional violation of the 
court order and choice not come to court results in her being 
able to control the outcome of the proceeding, derail stability 
for the child, and undermine the circuit court's conclusion that 
parental rights be terminated.  "Because of the majority's 
conclusion, a circuit court's authority to enforce its orders is 
diminished, a non-appearing party's behavior is rewarded, and [a 
child's life] continue[s] to hang in the balance."  Dane Cnty. 
Dep't of Human Servs. v. Mabel K., 2013 WI 28, ¶76, 346 
Wis. 2d 396, 828 N.W.2d 198 (Ziegler, J., dissenting).  I 
dissent.  
¶28 The purpose of the TPR statutes is to provide 
predictability, permanency, and stability for the child.  Wis. 
Stat. § 48.01(1)(ag).2  In pursuit of this purpose, "[t]he courts 
                                                 
1 Judge Ellen R. Brostrom of the Milwaukee County circuit 
court presided.  
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.01(1)(ag) provides: 
To recognize that children have certain basic needs 
which must be provided for, including the need for 
adequate food, clothing and shelter; the need to be 
free from physical, sexual or emotional injury or 
exploitation; the need to develop physically, mentally 
and emotionally to their potential; and the need for a 
safe and permanent family.  It is further recognized 
that, under certain circumstances, in order to ensure 
that the needs of a child, as described in this 
paragraph, are provided for, the court may determine 
that it is in the best interests of the child for the 
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
2 
 
and agencies responsible for child welfare should also recognize 
that instability and impermanence in family relationships are 
contrary to the welfare of children," so they exist to help 
"eliminat[e] the need for children to wait unreasonable periods 
of time for their parents to correct the conditions that prevent 
their safe return to the family."  § 48.01(1)(a).  But the 
opposite is happening for this child.  P.M.'s best interests 
have not been paramount.  P.M. has been left waiting in a place 
of ongoing instability for his biological mother, R.A.M., to 
correct the conditions preventing his safe return.  P.M. has 
suffered 
long 
periods 
of 
instability 
and 
impermanence, 
culminating in the State's petition to terminate R.A.M.'s 
parental rights to P.M.   
¶29 R.A.M. failed to appear for a court-ordered trial date 
in the TPR proceeding.  Despite having knowledge of the TPR 
trial and of the court order requiring her attendance, R.A.M. 
chose not to attend day four of the scheduled TPR trial.  In 
situations such as these, the statutes do not divest the circuit 
court of the ability to enter default, sanction the non-
appearing parent, and proceed to disposition.  R.A.M. was 
represented by a lawyer, who advocated for her in court.  The 
court never dismissed R.A.M.'s counsel from representation.  In 
fact, counsel actively represented R.A.M.  We must afford 
deference to the circuit court's credibility determinations and 
ability to default the non-appearing party.  R.A.M. chose to not 
                                                                                                                                                             
child 
to 
be 
removed 
from 
his 
or 
her 
parents, 
consistent with any applicable law relating to the 
rights of parents. 
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
3 
 
attend the "grounds phase" of the hearing, and the circuit court 
proceeded immediately to disposition, ultimately granting the 
State's petition to terminate R.A.M.'s parental rights.  
¶30 To 
be 
clear, 
the 
record 
reflects 
that 
R.A.M. 
understood the gravity of these proceedings.  The record is 
replete 
with 
unpleasant 
facts 
demonstrating 
R.A.M. 
had 
unfortunately been down this road before.3  The court clearly 
ordered her to attend the TPR proceedings.  R.A.M. was informed 
of the consequences of failing to attend.  Yet, R.A.M. chose, 
for whatever reason, not to appear.  
¶31 The majority errs in applying the timing requirements 
of Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3. to the facts and procedural 
posture of this case.  Section 48.23 addresses the right to 
counsel and waiver of counsel, not default.  While the title of 
a statute is not dispositive,4 the words of the statute are, and 
every single part of that statute deals with TPR proceedings and 
whether a parent has a right to counsel.  Here, R.A.M. had 
counsel, and counsel was present and actively participated at 
                                                 
3 This case presents a statutory claim.  To that end, 
R.A.M.'s familial history, which pre-dates the TPR proceeding 
involving P.M., are simply illustrative.  But, they are 
illustrative in speaking to R.A.M.'s general knowledge and 
cognizance of court proceedings in general, and TPR proceedings 
specifically.  Her experience with the system, and the court's 
recognition 
of 
her 
track 
record 
of 
appearing 
for 
court 
proceedings, belie any insinuation that R.A.M.'s decision to not 
obey a court order to appear in this proceeding was done 
unknowingly or unwittingly.   
4 See Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6) ("Statute titles and history 
notes.") "The titles to subchapters, sections, subsections, 
paragraphs and subdivisions of the statutes and history notes 
are not part of the statutes." 
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
4 
 
R.A.M.'s TPR trial.  Counsel was never even presumed waived.  
The statute the majority relies upon is inapplicable here.  
¶32 The majority misapplies the second subsection of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.23 to reverse the circuit court's decision to proceed 
immediately to disposition.  However, the language of that 
subsection addresses when a parent is presumed to have waived 
their right to counsel by their conduct.  As the record clearly 
demonstrates, the court never found a presumption that R.A.M. 
waived counsel.  Counsel was present in court and meaningfully 
participated.  Waiver of counsel was never discussed.  A finding 
of waiver of counsel was never made.  In fact, the court's 
finding, that R.A.M. egregiously failed to appear in the 
courtroom,5 was made pursuant to a standard default judgment 
sanction with her counsel present, not a waiver of counsel 
standard.  Hence, the majority applies a statute addressing 
                                                 
5 A finding of egregiousness pursuant to a default sanction 
for a parent's failure to appear at a TPR trial is important 
because "the extreme sanction of dismissal or default judgment 
may not be imposed for mere nonappearance, in the absence of a 
showing of bad faith or egregious conduct."  Schneider v. Ruch, 
146 Wis. 2d 701, 706, 431 N.W.2d 756 (Ct. App. 1988); see also 
Dane Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Mabel K., 2013 WI 28, ¶100, 
346 Wis. 2d 396, 828 N.W.2d 198 (Ziegler, J., dissenting) 
("Before a circuit court may sanction a party who failed to 
comply with a court order, the party's conduct must be egregious 
or in bad faith."); Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism, 
777 F.2d 1538, 1542 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he decision to enter a 
default judgment ought to be the last resort——ordered only if 
noncompliance is due to willful or bad disregard of court 
orders."); United States v. DeFrantz, 708 F.2d 310, 311 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (holding that the federal rules of civil procedure 
"authorizes the entry of a default judgment as a sanction for a 
defendant's failure to show up at his deposition, whether or not 
the court has ordered him to attend, . . . but the sanction is 
proper only if the failure [to show up] is willful"). 
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
5 
 
presumed waiver of counsel via conduct to the wrong context.  
The majority relies on the wrong statute to impose time 
constraints which handcuff the circuit court from acting.   
¶33 In summary, the facts of this case demonstrate that 
the majority is not properly applying this statutory scheme.  
R.A.M. can be sanctioned for violating a court order by 
absenting herself from these proceedings.  Default judgment is 
an appropriate sanction for R.A.M.'s nonattendance.   
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶34 As 
the 
majority 
lays 
out, 
TPR 
cases 
follow 
a 
bifurcated process——grounds and disposition.  Majority op., ¶3 
n.4.  At the grounds phase, the State must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds 
for termination of parental rights exist.  Wis. Stat. § 48.415.  
If the State succeeds in making this showing, the case proceeds 
then to the dispositional phase.  At the dispositional phase, 
the court must determine whether terminating parental rights is 
in the best interests of the child.  Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2).   
¶35 "Parental rights termination adjudications are among 
the most consequential of judicial acts, involving as they do 
'the awesome authority of the State to destroy permanently all 
legal recognition of the parental relationship.'"  Steven V. v. 
Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶21, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856 
(quoting Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ¶20, 246 
Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768 (quoting another source)).  "The 
profound consequences of termination have necessitated the 
development of detailed statutory requirements [as] set out in 
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
6 
 
Subchapter VIII of Chapter 48."  Sheboygan Cnty. Dep't of Health 
& Human Servs. v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶23, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 
648 N.W.2d 402.  Chapter 48, also known as the "Children's 
Code," directs that "[i]n construing this chapter, the best 
interests of the child . . . shall always be of paramount 
consideration."  Wis. Stat. 48.01(1); see also Darryl T.-H. v. 
Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶33, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475 
("The best interests of the child is the polestar of all 
determinations under ch. 48, the Children's Code."); David S. v. 
Laura S., 179 Wis. 2d 114, 149-50, 507 N.W.2d 94 (1993) ("The 
legislature and this court have made clear that the best 
interests of the child is the polestar of all determinations 
under ch. 48.").   
¶36 R.A.M., who was appointed a lawyer, contested the TPR 
petition.  The record reflects that she understood the court's 
standing order that she was required to appear in person for all 
court appearances and could be found in default for failing to 
appear.  The court informed R.A.M. of the standing orders in her 
case, including ordering R.A.M. to "make all court appearances" 
and warning that if she failed to do so, "[the court] could find 
you in default in which we would be making decisions without 
your input."  The court further ordered that R.A.M.  
communicate with and cooperate with your attorney once 
you get one, and you respond to any discovery should 
that come about with their help and also continue to 
comply with the CHIPS dispositional order.   
Again, any failure to do those things could 
result in a default judgment.  Okay? 
[R.A.M.]:  All right.  
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
7 
 
THE COURT:  All right. We will get an adjourned 
initial appearance date.   
¶37 R.A.M. appeared for the first three dates of the 
scheduled bench trial on March 28 and 31, 2022, and April 1, 
2022.  She was present when the court scheduled three more trial 
dates for July 5, 6, and 15, 2022.  R.A.M. failed to appear for 
the July 5 trial date.  Interestingly, that was the date the 
State would have had the opportunity to cross-examine her.  
¶38 The court gave counsel an opportunity to call R.A.M.  
R.A.M. said she was "attempting to clear a bench warrant issued 
for a criminal complaint with interference with custody."  State 
v. R.A.M., No. 2023AP441, ¶7, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. June 6, 2023).  R.A.M. claimed she was only recently made 
aware of the warrant.  Id.  R.A.M. further claimed that she was 
advised to contact the sheriff department and was told to 
contact the local police.  
¶39 According to the State, R.A.M. had ample opportunity 
to resolve the warrant prior to her missed trial date.  The 
trial court questioned the advice that R.A.M. had "purportedly" 
received.  The court noted that the warrant had been filed on 
June 22, 2022, well before the trial date.  The court concluded 
that R.A.M. had opportunity to resolve the case before a warrant 
was issued and that her testimony conflicted with other facts.  
¶40 The State made a motion for default judgment and to 
"strike [R.A.M.'s] contest posture and find her in default for 
failing to comply with court orders and failing to appear here 
in court."  R.A.M., No. 2023AP441, ¶8.  The guardian ad litem 
("GAL") joined the motion.   
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
8 
 
¶41 The court weighed the credibility of R.A.M.'s reason 
for not appearing, noting that it was "conveniently timed."  The 
court did not immediately grant the motion and instead gave 
R.A.M. time to appear later that day.  Following a break in the 
afternoon proceedings, "the court, after discussion with the 
prosecutor and the family case manager, decided R.A.M. may not 
have been candid with trial counsel" and concluded that R.A.M.'s 
story was not credible.  R.A.M., No. 2023AP441, ¶12.  The 
circuit court further concluded that the State was prejudiced by 
R.A.M.'s nonappearance and inability to finish its cross-
examination, and that the court was being manipulated by R.A.M.  
After an afternoon recess, the court concluded that the State 
proved both grounds for termination as alleged in the petition.  
It found that R.A.M.'s failure to appear was "egregious, in bad 
faith, and without justification."  The circuit court made an 
egregiousness finding, specifically addressing R.A.M.'s counsel 
in declaring that 
[R.A.M.'s] story does not seem credible.  I -- I think 
she's manipulating all sorts of systems.  But again, 
she was ordered to be here this morning, and we can't 
proceed on the merits without her.  The State is 
prejudiced in not being able to finish its cross-
examination.  I think she's misleading the Court; I 
think she's misleading you in her version of the 
events.  And I do find that to be egregious and bad 
faith and without justification.  
So at this point, I am going to grant the State's 
motion.  I am going to strike her contest posture.  
I can, I think, use the testimony and evidence 
that's already been admitted for prove-up, and then 
we'll move to disposition.  
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
9 
 
The court stated that it would entertain a motion to re-open the 
default if R.A.M. appeared the next day, but "[o]nly if she's 
got . . . a really good reason with solid documentation."  
However, the circuit court then decided to proceed immediately 
to the dispositional stage.  The record reflects that testimony 
was taken from the family case manager.  R.A.M.'s counsel 
participated in the "grounds" and "disposition" proceedings, in 
fact 
conducting 
cross-examination, 
lodging 
objections, 
and 
making closing arguments.  The record is not clear that R.A.M. 
had any witnesses to present, except potentially for herself.   
¶42 Ultimately, the court concluded that it was "in 
[P.M.'s] best interest that" the court terminate R.A.M.'s 
rights.  The circuit court therefore granted the TPR petition, 
entered an order terminating R.A.M.'s rights, and vacated the 
two remaining trial dates.  The circuit court sanctioned her 
non-appearance, and entered default judgment against R.A.M.   
¶43 R.A.M. appealed.  The court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court's TPR order: 
[I]f [Wis. Stat. ]§ 48.23(2)(b)3. applies to the case 
before the court——meaning the court has found the 
parent waived a right to counsel——then, the court may 
not immediately proceed to disposition and must wait 
at least the two days required by statute (and not 
more than forty-five days, as is also required).  When 
the court fails to obey the statutory time periods, it 
not only lacks competency to proceed, it violates the 
parent's right to due process.   
R.A.M., No. 2023AP441, ¶40.  The GAL petitioned this court for 
review.  The argument made before us is that the circuit court's 
failure to abide by a two-day delay before proceeding to 
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
10 
 
disposition violated the requirements of § 48.23(2)(b)3.  That 
statute is inapplicable to the facts of this case.6 
II.  WISCONSIN STAT. § 48.23(2)(b)3. 
¶44 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 48.23 
is 
entitled 
"Right 
to 
counsel."  This section contains the subsection at issue:  Wis. 
Stat. § 48.23(2), entitled "Right of parent to counsel," which 
states: 
Notwithstanding subd. 1, a parent 18 years of age or 
over is presumed to have waived his or her right to 
counsel and to appear by counsel if the court has 
ordered the parent to appear in person at any or all 
subsequent hearings in the proceeding, the parent 
fails to appear in person as ordered, and the court 
finds that the parent's conduct in failing to appear 
in 
person 
was 
egregious 
and 
without 
clear 
and 
justifiable excuse.  Failure by a parent 18 years of 
age or over to appear at consecutive hearings as 
ordered is presumed to be conduct that is egregious 
and without clear and justifiable excuse.  If the 
court finds that a parent's conduct in failing to 
appear in person as ordered was egregious and without 
clear and justifiable excuse, the court may not hold a 
dispositional hearing on the contested adoption or 
involuntary termination of parental rights until at 
least 2 days have elapsed since the date of that 
finding.  
§ 48.23(2)(b)3. 
                                                 
6 Because the record does not reflect that R.A.M.'s counsel 
was presumed waived, I determine that Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3. 
is not applicable.  The circuit court did not violate the 
statute when it proceeded to disposition after making an 
egregiousness finding.  Since I do not find the circuit court to 
have violated an inapplicable statute, I do not reach the second 
question of whether the circuit court lost competency to 
proceed.  Bergmann v. McCaughtry, 211 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 564 
N.W.2d 712 (1997) ("Because our resolution of the first issue is 
dispositive, 
we 
need 
not 
and 
do 
not 
address 
the 
second . . . issue."). 
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
11 
 
¶45 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  The purpose 
of our inquiry is to give the statute "its full, proper, and 
intended effect."  Id., ¶44.  "Context is important to meaning."  
Id., ¶46.  "[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context 
in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results."  Id.  "A statute's purpose or scope may be readily 
apparent from its plain language or its relationship to 
surrounding or closely-related statutes——that is, from its 
context or the structure as a coherent whole."  Id., ¶49.  
¶46 The majority ignores Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3.'s 
contextual clues to hyper-fixate on the last sentence of the 
statute, see majority op., ¶11, which states:  
If the court finds that a parent's conduct in failing 
to appear in person as ordered was egregious and 
without clear and justifiable excuse, the court may 
not hold a dispositional hearing on the contested 
adoption or involuntary termination of parental rights 
until at least 2 days have elapsed since the date of 
that finding.  
When we interpret statutes, we begin with the language of the 
statute.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  So, while "[c]ontext is 
important to meaning," id., ¶46, we cannot isolate portions of a 
statute's plain language to analyze while ignoring the rest.  
Rather, the "statutory language is interpreted in the context in 
which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a 
whole . . . ."  Id.   
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
12 
 
¶47 The language of this entire statute is plain:  This 
statute 
deals 
with 
waiver 
of 
counsel. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 48.23(2)(b)3. addresses the scenario in which a parent, by 
their conduct, is presumed to have waived their right to 
counsel.  This understanding of the statute mirrors the plain 
language of the sentences which immediately precede the sentence 
the majority focuses on, which references when a parent over 18 
years of age is presumed to have waived counsel.7  This 
understanding of the statute is further reflected in the 
subsection which immediately follows the sentence the majority 
                                                 
7 The majority, in focusing on the final sentence of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3. as the "crux of this case," majority op., 
¶11, completely ignores the rest of the statute from which they 
pulled the final sentence.  The purpose of conducting statutory 
interpretation is to give the statute "its full, proper, and 
intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We 
cannot give § 48.23(2)(b)3. its "full proper, and intended 
effect" if we excise the final sentence in a paragraph from the 
sentences which immediately precede it in that same paragraph.  
These preceding sentences provide important context aiding in 
determining the statute's meaning, that this two-day delay 
statutory scheme is implicated in situations in which a parent, 
by their conduct, is presumed to have waived their right to 
counsel.  Section 48.23(2)(b)3.'s opening sentences state: 
Notwithstanding subd. 1, a parent 18 years of age or 
over is presumed to have waived his or her right to 
counsel and to appear by counsel if the court has 
ordered the parent to appear in person at any or all 
subsequent hearings in the proceeding, the parent 
fails to appear in person as ordered, and the court 
finds that the parent's conduct in failing to appear 
in 
person 
was 
egregious 
and 
without 
clear 
and 
justifiable excuse.  Failure by a parent 18 years of 
age or over to appear at consecutive hearings as 
ordered is presumed to be conduct that is egregious 
and without clear and justifiable excuse. 
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
13 
 
focuses on, which again deals with waiver of counsel.8  As the 
plain language of the statute shows, this entire statutory 
scheme deals with the waiver of counsel.  This statute is 
intended to apply to situations in which a parent, by their 
conduct, is presumed to have waived their right to counsel. 
¶48 Because the statutory meaning is plain, we need not 
consult the statute's title.  But even if we do, the title of 
this statute "provide[s] further confirmation for our plain 
meaning analysis"9 that the statute is only concerned with the 
right to counsel.  State v. Lopez, 2019 WI 101, ¶25, 389 
Wis. 2d 156, 936 N.W.2d 125. 
¶49 The statute at issue here, Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3., 
"Right of parent to counsel," clearly deals with the right to 
counsel.  It is a subsection of Wis. Stat. § 48.23, entitled 
"Right to counsel," which deals entirely with whether a parent 
                                                 
8 Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(c) ("In a proceeding to vacate or 
reconsider 
a 
default 
judgment 
granted 
in 
an 
involuntary 
termination of parental rights proceeding, a parent who has 
waived counsel under par. (b)1. or who is presumed to have 
waived counsel under par. (b)3. in the involuntary termination 
of parental rights proceeding shall be represented by counsel, 
unless in the proceeding to vacate or reconsider the default 
judgment the parent waives counsel as provided in par. (b)1. or 
is presumed to have waived counsel as provided in par. (b)3."). 
9 While not dispositive, statute titles do provide valuable 
"[c]ontext [which] is important to meaning."  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46; see also Aiello v. Vill. of Pleasant Prairie, 
206 Wis. 2d 68, 73, 556 N.W.2d 697 (1996) ("Although titles are 
not 
part 
of 
statutes, . . . they 
may 
be 
helpful 
in 
interpretation."); Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6) ("The titles . . . of 
the statutes . . . are not part of the statutes."); State v. 
Lopez, 2019 WI 101, ¶25, 389 Wis. 2d 156, 936 N.W.2d 125 
("Statute titles are not dispositive.").  
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
14 
 
has a right to counsel, the process of accessing counsel, waiver 
of counsel, and more.10 
¶50 The facts of this case are also clear.  R.A.M. was 
represented by counsel throughout the TPR proceedings.  Counsel 
advocated on her behalf.  The court never once discussed waiver 
of counsel.  The issue never came up.  Nor did the court make 
any findings relating to waiver of counsel.  Such would be 
required if waiver of counsel occurred.  In short, this case had 
nothing to do with R.A.M. having the right to representation of 
counsel.  The circuit court ultimately determined that R.A.M.'s 
failure to appear when the court had ordered her to, to be the 
reason why the court found R.A.M. to have engaged in "egregious 
conduct."  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.23 is, therefore, not even 
applicable.  
¶51 Instead, 
as 
the 
record 
shows, 
the 
court's 
egregiousness finding was made pursuant to a standard default 
judgment sanction.  The circuit court found that R.A.M. was not 
being honest about her reasons for failing to appear as the 
court ordered her to, and determining that R.A.M.'s behavior was 
not forthcoming, the circuit court granted default judgment 
against R.A.M.  Notably, R.A.M.'s counsel was still present and 
still representing R.A.M. even in R.A.M.'s absence.  These 
factual findings are due our deference.  See Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
10 See 
e.g., 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.23 
"Right 
to 
counsel"; 
§ 48.23(2) "Right of parent to counsel"; § 48.23(3) "Power of 
the court to appoint counsel"; § 48.23(4) "Providing counsel"; 
§ 48.23(4m) "Discharge of counsel"; § 48.23(5) "Counsel of own 
choosing." 
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
15 
 
§ 805.17(2) ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous . . . ."); State v. Williams, 2002 WI 1, ¶5, 
249 Wis. 2d 492, 637 N.W.2d 733 ("An appellate court reviews the 
circuit court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous 
standard of review.").  There was no waiver of counsel connected 
to these egregiousness findings.  R.A.M.'s counsel was still 
present and representing her.  
¶52 Given this context, we are not in a waiver of counsel 
posture as required under Wis. Stat. § 48.23.  Instead, default 
proceedings and the rules of civil procedure apply, "except 
where different procedure is prescribed by statute or rule."  
Wis. Stat. § 801.01.   
III.  DEFAULT JUDGMENT POSTURE, NOT WAIVER OF COUNSEL. 
¶53 Courts can enter a default judgment sanction for a 
variety of reasons, such as in this case, for violating the 
court's scheduling order requiring R.A.M.'s appearance.11  See 
Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶17 ("[A] circuit court has both 
inherent authority and statutory authority . . . to sanction 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.02, "Default judgment," provides, 
"A default judgment may be rendered against any party who has 
appeared in the action but who fails to appear at trial.  If 
proof of any fact is necessary for the court to render judgment, 
the court shall receive the proof."  Wis. Stat. § 806.02(5).  
See also Gaertner v. 880 Corp., 131 Wis. 2d 492, 494-95, 499, 
504-06, 389 N.W.2d 59 (Ct. App. 1986) (affirming the circuit 
court's entry of default judgment against a party for failure to 
appear at a scheduling conference, but reversing as to damages 
requested as they were unsupported by the record); State v. 
L.M.-N., Nos. 2014AP2405 & 2014AP2406, ¶18, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2015) ("Our supreme court has concluded 
that circuit courts have the authority to sanction parties who 
do not comply with court orders, including by entering default 
judgments.").   
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
16 
 
parties for failing to obey court orders.").  "The decision to 
sanction a party is within the sound discretion of the circuit 
court." 
 
Mabel 
K., 
346 
Wis. 2d 396, 
¶99 
(Ziegler, 
J., 
dissenting) (quoting Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶18).  Of the 
sanctions circuit courts can impose, "default judgment is the 
ultimate sanction."  Miller v. Hanover Ins. Co., 2010 WI 75, 
¶31, 326 Wis. 2d 640, 785 N.W.2d 493 (quoting other sources).  
Courts imposing this "ultimate sanction" of default must ensure 
that it is "just."   See Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2)(a)3. ("If a 
party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit 
discovery, . . . the court . . . may make such orders in regard 
to the failure as are just, [including] rendering a judgment by 
default against the disobedient party[.]"); Wis. Stat. § 805.03 
("For failure . . . of any party . . . to obey any order of the 
court, the court . . . may make such orders in regard to the 
failure as are just, including but not limited to orders 
authorized under s. 804.12(2)(a).").  For a court to justly 
sanction a parent with default, the court must first find the 
parent's conduct was "egregious[] or in bad faith."  See Mable 
K., 346 Wis. 2d 396, ¶69.  "Failure to comply with a circuit 
court scheduling order without a clear and justifiable excuse is 
egregious conduct."  Id., ¶100 (Ziegler, J., dissenting); see 
also Indus. Roofing Servs. Inc. v. Marquardt, 2007 WI 19, ¶43, 
299 Wis. 2d 81, 726 N.W.2d 898 (lead op.).  Again, we owe 
deference to the circuit court's exercise of discretion. 
¶54 Default or finding of default is different than waiver 
of the right to counsel under Wis. Stat. § 48.23.  Section 
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
17 
 
48.23(2)(b)3. is reflective of how important the right to 
counsel is, and how the court must make certain findings before 
presuming parents have waived their right to counsel.  Here, the 
court's findings were related to default by R.A.M. not appearing 
as required pursuant to the court's scheduling order.  Nothing 
in the court's findings dealt with R.A.M. waiving the right to 
counsel by conduct, as is discussed in § 48.23(2)(b)3.  R.A.M. 
was represented by counsel at disposition.  The court permitted 
R.A.M.'s counsel to continue her representation in R.A.M.'s 
absence.  The court definitely did not dismiss R.A.M.'s counsel.  
So, even though R.A.M. was defaulted at grounds, she was still 
actively represented by counsel at disposition.  The court made 
egregiousness and bad faith findings here pursuant to the court 
entering a default judgment sanction against R.A.M.  As a 
result, the statutory two-day delay is not implicated. 
¶55 The majority argues Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3.'s two-
day waiting period is intended to be triggered by default.  
Majority op., ¶14.  But that understanding creates conflicting 
factual situations like R.A.M.'s, in which counsel could be 
present and participating yet presumed waived.   
¶56 Finally, the TPR statutes are not designed to reward a 
party who may strategically decide to not appear because the 
case is not going well for them.  Quite obviously, if a case is 
not going well, a party may not want to attend for any number of 
reasons——such as not wanting to testify or not having to answer 
for failing to comply with discovery requests.  For any number 
of reasons, in a civil proceeding, a party may choose to have 
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
18 
 
their lawyer appear on their behalf instead to advocate for 
them.  That is typically allowable in most civil cases.    
¶57 Here, the court ordered R.A.M.'s appearance.  R.A.M. 
violated 
that 
order. 
 
Violation 
of 
a 
court 
order 
is 
sanctionable.  The two-day waiting period is not implicated by 
every default or sanction.  I conclude that the record 
demonstrates that the circuit court's findings did not presume a 
waiver of the right to counsel and instead, the court's findings 
related to plain old traditional default judgment and a sanction 
for failing to comply with the court order.  The two-day delay 
before disposition has no bearing on this sanction.  
¶58 I would also note that not all default sanctions will 
implicate the waiver of counsel.  TPR disposition time periods 
are outlined in Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4), and a judge may proceed 
immediately from receipt of a TPR after factfinding to hear 
evidence and motions for disposition.  It is only if counsel is 
presumed waived by the parent egregiously violating an order to 
appear without clear and justifiable cause that the court has to 
wait two days before holding a dispositional hearing.  To 
conclude otherwise would allow the tail to wag the dog:  a 
parent who wishes, for whatever reason, to cause additional 
delay could simply choose to not show up to the remainder of the 
hearing and thereby receive additional time they would not 
otherwise have.  But judges must be able to control their 
calendars and courtrooms.  Default judgment is a tool available 
for judges to use in TPRs, and does not always extinguish the 
parent's right to counsel.   
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
19 
 
¶59 Here, the statutory two-day waiting period was not 
automatically triggered, as the facts of the case, and the 
findings supported in the record, clearly indicate that the 
circuit court sanctioned R.A.M. with default for her violation 
of the scheduling order.  Default judgment is an appropriate 
sanction for R.A.M.'s nonattendance.  The court never made a 
determination that R.A.M.'s still-present counsel was presumed 
waived.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3. does not properly apply 
to the facts of this case.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶60 The 
statutory 
scheme 
the 
majority 
employs 
is 
inapplicable as counsel was not presumed waived.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3. addresses a circuit court who makes an 
egregiousness finding pursuant to a parent being presumed to 
have waived counsel.  Section 48.23(2)(b)3. does not apply to 
situations such as the one here, where the circuit court made a 
finding that R.A.M.'s conduct was "egregious and without 
justifiable excuse" and entered default against her, even though 
R.A.M.'s counsel was still present, was still communicating with 
her client, and was still able to represent R.A.M.'s interests 
at the dispositional phase of the TPR trial.  As the record 
reflects, the circuit court did not make any findings of 
egregiousness pursuant to an implied or express waiver of 
counsel.  Thus, while the majority may be right that the statute 
itself is straightforward and unambiguous, majority op., ¶¶14-
15, and 17, it must be applied to the right context.  This case 
does not present a waiver of counsel issue.  The circuit court 
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
20 
 
was not statutorily bound to wait two days to proceed to 
disposition.  
¶61 Because the findings which the circuit court made in 
this case met standard default judgment sanction posture, we 
should be affirming that determination.  The majority, as did 
the court of appeals, applies the wrong statute to the facts of 
this case:  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3.'s two-day waiting 
period does not apply to the default judgment finding the 
circuit court made here. 
¶62 For all the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶63 I am authorized to state that Justice BRIAN HAGEDORN 
joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2023AP441.akz 
 
1