Title: Dowd, Warden v. Todd
Citation: 184 N.E.2d 4, 243 Ind. 232
Docket Number: 30,079
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: July 24, 1962

243 Ind. 232 (1962)
184 N.E.2d 4
DOWD, WARDEN ETC.
v.
TODD.
No. 30,079.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed July 24, 1962.
*233 Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, and Richard C. Johnson, Deputy Attorney General, for appellant.
Robert S. Baker, Public Defender, and Thomas A. Hoadley, Deputy Public Defender, for appellee.
ACHOR, J.
The appellee brought an action for writ of habeas corpus against the Warden of the Indiana *234 State Prison in the Superior Court of LaPorte County, claiming that the judgment under which he was committed was void, and that the Criminal Court Division Two of Marion County had no jurisdiction to enter the sentence which was imposed upon him. The LaPorte Circuit Court granted the writ of habeas corpus, from which judgment this appeal is taken by the Warden.
It appears from the record that the prisoner was tried and convicted on two counts, one for auto banditry, which carried a determinate sentence of ten to twenty-five years, and another on a count of robbery, which carried an indeterminate sentence of ten to twenty-five years.
In Mims et al. v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 439, 140 N.E.2d 878, in a similar situation on an appeal from a conviction on two counts, one of which was included in the other, we held that the court erred in sentencing the defendant on two counts. We held further that a judgment should be entered and that the defendant should be sentenced on the greater offense only. We did not hold in that case, as appellee here urges, that the judgment was void in that the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the erroneous sentence.
The appellant in this appeal points out that the statute of this state provides:
...
*235 It has long been the law in this state, as well as all other jurisdictions, that courts of coordinate jurisdiction do not have the power to review or correct the errors of each other in a habeas corpus proceeding. Judgments of such courts are final unless the error complained of is presented by a proper appeal to the reviewing court, the exception being that the erroneous action of the court is outside its lawful jurisdiction and, therefore, void.
The appellee relies entirely, so far as we can determine, upon the case of Witte v. Dowd, Warden (1951), 230 Ind. 485, 496, 497, 102 N.E.2d 630. An examination of that case reveals that it is of no help to the appellee. The court, in that case, gives a scholarly review of the history of the writ of habeas corpus. The opinion states the proposition that habeas corpus is available to all persons restrained of their liberty by reason of void judgments. This discourse is coupled with an extended discussion as to what are void, as distinguished from merely voidable judgments. However, the court in the end affirmed the action of the trial court and denied the writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, statements made in the case, which were not material to the decision and upon which appellee here relies, were merely dicta.
In the above cited case, the LaPorte Circuit Court was asked to examine the final judgment of another trial court. In that case the trial court failed to enter a formal sentence of imprisonment for forgery before proceeding to sentence the appellant for life as an habitual criminal. The court held that the judgment was not void, but merely erroneous, and that the sentencing court had jurisdiction. The court in that opinion made the following comment:
...
All other matters commented upon in the Witte case, supra, and here relied upon by the appellee, as authority for the right of the LaPorte Circuit Court to go back of the judgment and examine and review the action of another trial court, can be regarded only as dicta which had no application to the issue presented to the court in that case. The opinion, therefore, does not provide controlling precedent for the decision in the case at bar.
Far too frequently the term "lack of jurisdiction" is loosely used and overworked as a catchall to support a desired remedy. From such a premise it is then argued that all actions of a court are "void." We cannot ascribe "lack of jurisdiction" indiscriminately as a basis for achieving every remedy, however desirable.
In the case before us the court had general jurisdiction of the subject matter, namely, the crimes involved. The court also had jurisdiction of the party involved. Under no theory can it be urged that there was lack of jurisdiction in the Marion Criminal Court, Division Two, or that the judgment was void. At the most, it was contrary to law and therefore erroneous. This fact was recognized in the more recent case of Shoemaker v. Dowd, Warden *237 (1953), 232 Ind. 602, 607, 115 N.E.2d 443, which limits and criticizes the dicta in the Witte case, supra. In the Shoemaker case, in denying a writ of habeas corpus, this court stated:
Furthermore, we must give consideration to the fact that since the case of Witte v. Dowd, Warden (1951), supra, this court has promulgated Rule 2-40B, which provides as follows:
The result is, that the procedure approved in the Witte case, supra, and here relied upon by the appellee, has been nullified by the remedy afforded by the above rule, which expressly gives the appellee the right to apply to the court which sentenced him for a correction of the judgment. It also provides for an appeal from any denial of such petition.
*238 It appears to us that the appellee here has been erroneously sentenced for the lesser included offense of robbery, and should have been sentenced on the conviction of auto banditry only. It also appears that appellee's remedy is to make application pursuant to Rule 2-40B, supra, to the Marion Criminal Court, Division Two, for correction of this apparent error, which we have reason to believe, in view of the decision of this court in Mims et al. v. State, supra (236 Ind. 439, 140 N.E.2d 878), will be granted promptly.
The judgment of the LaPorte Circuit Court is reversed, with directions to sustain the motion to quash the writ herein.
Arterburn, C.J., and Landis, J., concur.
Bobbitt, J., not participating.
Jackson, J., dissents with opinion.
JACKSON, J.
This is an appeal by the Warden of the Indiana State Prison from the judgment of the Superior Court of LaPorte County, discharging appellee from the Indiana State Prison.
The record discloses that an indictment in two counts was filed against appellee and another in the Criminal Court of Marion County, Indiana, Division Two, in cause No. CR 7136-Z. Count one of said indictment charged appellee with the offense of robbery; and count two thereof charged appellee with the crime of automobile banditry.
Trial was by jury, resulting in verdicts of guilty on both counts. In view of the issues in this case we set out both the verdicts and the judgment entered thereon. The verdict is as follows:
The trial court entered judgment on the verdicts as follows:
*241 On December 13, 1960, appellant filed his motion for a new trial, which, omitting formal parts and signature, reads as follows:
The motion for new trial was overruled by the court on January 13, 1961. Thereafter, appellant filed his Praecipe for Transcript and on March 29, 1961, filed his assignment of errors which, omitting formal parts and signature, reads as follows:
Appellee asserts, and we agree, that only two questions are presented by this appeal.
(a) Was the judgment rendered by the original trial court against the appellee for robbery null and void, and,
(b) Did the LaPorte Superior Court have jurisdiction to entertain appellee's petition for a writ of habeas corpus?
*242 In arriving at a determination of the first question, it is necessary that we examine the judgment rendered on the verdicts, such judgment in pertinent part reads: "... the defendant, Carl Linly [Lindley] Todd, be and is hereby, sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for a period of ten years for the crime of automobile banditry; it is further ordered, ... that the defendant, Carl Linly [Lindley] Todd, for the crime of robbery, be, and is hereby, sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for not less than 10 years nor more than 25 years...."
The crime of robbery is defined and the punishment prescribed therefor by Acts 1941, ch. 148, § 6, p. 447, being § 10-4101, Burns' 1956 Replacement, and provides in part: "... on conviction shall be imprisoned not less than ten [10] years nor more than twenty-five [25] years...."
The crime of automobile banditry was defined and the punishment prescribed therefor at the time sentence was imposed on appellee by Acts 1929, ch. 54, § 3, p. 136, being § 10-4710, Burns' 1956 Replacement. It provided in part as follows: "... upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the state prison for any determinate period not less than ten [10] years nor more than twenty-five [25] years." [Emphasis supplied.]
The appellee argued, successfully, in his Petition for Habeas Corpus that the sentence imposed for the crime of robbery was void for the reason that the same was a lesser included offense in the crime of automobile banditry and that since he had served the time required under the provisions of Acts 1933, ch. 164, § 1, p. 858, 1947, ch. 85, § 1, p. 257, being § 13-116, Burns' 1956 Replacement, providing for the *243 diminution of sentences, he was, therefore, entitled to his release.
It is clear that the charge of robbery set out in count one of the indictment was the identical charge of robbery set out in count two thereof, with the additional allegations bringing the charge within the automobile banditry statute.
Before the appellee could have been found guilty of automobile banditry, it was incumbent upon the State to first prove appellee committed or attempted to commit the robbery charged in count one of the indictment, and in addition, to have proved that the appellee had at the time, on or near the premises, an automobile, etc., by the use of which he escaped, attempted or intended to escape. Steffler v. State (1952), 230 Ind. 557, 568, 104 N.E.2d 729; Mims et al. v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 439, 140 N.E.2d 878.
It is contended by appellant in the case at bar that the crime of robbery is not a lesser and included offense in the crime of automobile banditry because of the penalty provided for each crime. That question has heretofore been determined by this court, adversely to the appellant in the case of Beck v. State (1958), 238 Ind. 210, 213, 149 N.E.2d 695, where it is said:
In the case at bar the charge of automobile banditry contained all of the elements of robbery, and contained additional elements not contained in the robbery count to bring it within the purview of the automobile banditry statute.
*244 The next question for consideration is that of the jurisdiction of the LaPorte Superior Court to entertain appellee's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Appellant challenges the jurisdiction of the LaPorte Superior Court in the case at bar on the theory that Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 38, § 790, p. 240, being § 3-1918, Burns' 1946 Replacement, is in bar of those proceedings. The pertinent part of the statute reads,
..."
In the case of Witte v. Dowd, Warden (1952), 230 Ind. 485, 102 N.E.2d 630, it was held that the second section of the above quoted statute could not be constitutionally construed to prohibit an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment as determined by the intrinsic record of that court. That a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, in a habeas corpus proceeding, had the power and jurisdiction to go behind the commitment and inquire into the intrinsic record of the committing court to ascertain not only whether such court had general jurisdiction and jurisdiction of the party, but also to ascertain whether the committing court had jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment which it did enter.
Appellant's contention is correct that the Witte case, supra, did not abrogate the rule that habeas corpus will not lie to correct errors or irregularities of another court of co-ordinate jurisdiction.
*245 It is only when the errors or irregularities are such that the record proper of the trial court shows that the court did not have jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment which it did enter, does habeas corpus lie. (See footnotes 7 and 8  Witte v. Dowd, Warden (1952), 230 Ind. 485, 494, 495.)
When the trial court rendered judgment against appellee, sentencing him for a term of imprisonment for ten years for automobile banditry, and also sentenced him for a term of not less than ten and no more than twenty-five years for the included offense of robbery, the judgment for robbery was beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court to render, was excessive and void as to the excess.
The remedy suggested in the concluding paragraphs of the majority opinion is not now available to the appellee for the reason that the term of court at which the judgment was rendered has terminated. Even if such remedy still existed appellee need not avail himself of it as in the case at bar the judgment complained of is void and not erroneous.
The LaPorte Superior Court had jurisdiction to entertain and grant appellee's petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Judgment of the court should be affirmed.
NOTE.  Reported in 184 N.E.2d 4.