Title: Whitley v. Redden
Citation: 171 S.E.2d 894
Docket Number: 57
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: January 30, 1970

171 S.E.2d 894 (1970)
C. J. WHITLEY
v.
Monroe M. REDDEN, Executor of the Estate of Leon D. Hyder.
No. 57.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
January 30, 1970.
*897 Bailey &amp; Davis, Charlotte, for plaintiff-appellant.
Redden, Redden &amp; Redden, Hendersonville, for defendant-appellee.
BRANCH, Justice.
Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in failing to submit an issue as to the amount defendant owed plaintiff, if anything. The often-used issue, "How much, if anything, is plaintiff entitled to recover," is not sufficient when other issues of fact are raised. This is true because submission of the single issue may omit controverted facts upon which the right to recover is based. Yates v. W. F. Mickey Body Co., 258 N.C. 16, 128 S.E.2d 11. However, it is not error for the trial court to fail to submit to the jury an issue as to the amount of indebtedness where it appears that the amount is exclusively a matter of calculation. Union Indemnity Co. v. Perry, 200 N.C. 765, 158 S.E. 560. Issues are sufficient when they present to the jury proper inquiries as to all determinative facts in dispute and afford the parties opportunity to introduce pertinent evidence and to apply it fairly. Cherry v. Andrews, 231 N.C. 261, 56 S.E.2d 703. An issue should not be submitted to the jury unless the pleadings unequivocally raise such issue, Henderson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 171 N.C. 397, 88 S.E. 626, and unless such issue is supported by the evidence. Carland v. Allison, 221 N.C. 120, 19 S.E.2d 245.
Here, the notes became past due after plaintiff's demand for payment on 28 December 1967. The pleadings admit that demand had been made on both notes and that defendant had refused to pay any part of the amount due. When plaintiff introduced the past-due sealed notes, he made out a prima facie case as to the entire amount of the notes, which precluded nonsuit even though defendant asserted affirmative defenses. Parks v. Allen, 210 N.C. 668, 188 S.E. 100; Wachovia Bank &amp; Trust Co. v. Smith Crossroads, Inc., 258 N.C. 696, 129 S.E.2d 116. Defendant offered no evidence to controvert the amount due, but supported with evidence his main defenses of failure of delivery, lack of consideration, and lack of sufficient mental capacity on the part of his testator to execute and deliver the notes. Although it might have been better practice to have included with the other necessary issues an issue fixing the amount due, we conclude, after considering the pleadings and the evidence, that the issues submitted were sufficient to present all the contentions of the parties and to allow the court (even without necessity of calculation) to enter judgment upon the verdict which settled the rights of the parties.
Defendant assigns as error the refusal of the court to submit issues tendered by defendant as to each note, as follows:
Defendant argues that the court erred in failing to submit these issues, and relies upon the case of Chesson v. Pilot Life Insurance Company, 268 N.C. 98, 150 S.E.2d 40, which was an action to rescind a cancellation of a life insurance policy on the *898 ground that plaintiff's intestate was mentally incompetent. There, the court submitted issues similar to those above quoted, in addition to the issues of the intestate's mental capacity. Chesson may be distinguished from the instant case in that the jury, in Chesson, by its answer to the issue of competency, established the intestate to be incompetent. In the case before us the jury's answer to the issue of mental capacity established the testate to be competent. Had the jury by its verdict established defendant's testator to be incompetent, it would have been error for the trial court to refuse to submit the tendered issues and to charge thereon. The failure of the trial judge to submit the tendered issues and to charge thereon was cured by the verdict of the jury declaring testator to be competent.
Defendant, relying on G.S. § 8-51, contends that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of plaintiff Whitley and his assignor, Flowers, regarding their personal communications and transactions with the deceased, Hyder. Flowers testified for plaintiff that in his opinion Hyder was mentally competent in November 1964, on 11 June 1965, and on 2 August 1965. The witness was first questioned about a conversation between himself and Hyder in a Lakeland, Florida hospital during November 1964. Upon defendant's objection, the court instructed the jury:
Flowers then testified that Hyder told him and Whitley that he was in serious financial trouble and that in consideration for a commitment of one million dollars to save his company he wanted Whitley and Flowers each to have a one-third interest in the company.
The witness related several conversations which allegedly occurred between himself and Hyder. The following quotations from the record are representative:
Plaintiff Whitley testified that in his opinion Hyder had sufficient mental capacity to know what he was doing and to understand the nature and effects of his acts on November 12, 1964 and during the period of January to June 1965. He then testified, over objection, that he had a conversation with Hyder in Lakeland, Florida, in a hospital room on 12 November 1964, and at that time Hyder stated he would give Whitley and Flowers one-third of his business if they would help him obtain a million dollars for his business. One additional example of his testimony is as follows:
Plaintiff and Flowers also testified to transactions and conversations with Hyder which tended to prove the execution and delivery of the notes upon which this action was founded.
Applying G.S. § 8-51 as analyzed by this Court, it appears that Whitley, a party to the transactions, and Flowers, the person under whom plaintiff derived a part of his interest, were testifying in Whitley's interest and against the representative of a deceased person concerning personal transactions and communications between each of them and the deceased person. It does not appear that defendant has "opened the door" so as to come within the statutory exception. Ordinarily, both of the witnesses would have been disqualified by the statute, G.S. § 8-51. Bunn v. Todd, 107 N.C. 266, 11 S.E. 1043; Peek v. Shook, 233 N.C. 259, 63 S.E.2d 542. However, plaintiff contends that this evidence is competent by virtue of an exception to the statute, created by case law interpretation, to the effect that a person (who would otherwise be precluded from testifying by the statute), after testifying as to the mental capacity of a deceased person may testify to transactions and communications with deceased in order to show the jury that the opinion was well founded. Plaintiff relies upon the cases of McLeary v. Norment, 84 N.C. 235; Rakestraw v. Pratt, 160 N.C. 436, *900 76 S.E. 259; Bissett v. Bailey, 176 N.C. 43, 96 S.E. 648; Plemmons v. Murphy, 176 N.C. 671, 97 S.E. 648; In re Hinton, 180 N.C. 206, 104 S.E. 341; In re Will of Brown, 194 N.C. 583, 140 S.E. 192; In re Will of Brown, 203 N.C. 347, 166 S.E. 72; In re Will of Lomax, 226 N.C. 498, 39 S.E.2d 388; In re Will of Kestler, 228 N.C. 215, 44 S.E.2d 867; Goins v. McLoud, 231 N.C. 655, 58 S.E.2d 634.
We deem it necessary to briefly review the North Carolina case law in order to properly delineate the rule and apply it to the facts before us.
The landmark case of McLeary v. Norment, supra, was a suit to set aside a deed. An interested party was allowed to testify in plaintiff's behalf as to plaintiff's lack of mental capacity and to relate conversations had with plaintiff to show the opinion was well founded. However, the court in so holding stated:
This Court, considering the statute, G.S. § 8-51, in the case of In re Will of Lomax, supra, stated:
The case of In re Will of Chisman, 175 N.C. 420, 95 S.E. 769, considered the testimony of the chief beneficiary of a will, who was offered as a witness by the propounder and questioned as follows:
The Court held that the objection should have been sustained and, after recognizing holdings in McLeary v. Norment, supra, and Rakestraw v. Pratt, supra, stated:
Accord: Bissett v. Bailey, 176 N.C. 43, 96 S.E. 648; Hathaway v. Hathaway, 91 N.C. 139.
We conclude that North Carolina is one of those states which has a "Dead Man's" statute and allows an interested witness, where there is an issue of mental capacity, to relate personal transactions and communications between the witness and a decedent or lunatic as a basis for his opinion as to the mental capacity of the decedent or lunatic; however, such evidence will be rejected when it is offered for the purpose of proving and does tend to prove vital and material facts which will fix liability against the representative of a deceased person, or committee of a lunatic, or anyone deriving his title or interest through them.
The rule set forth in the case of In re Hinton, 180 N.C. 206, 104 S.E. 341, that evidence is admissible over a general objection if it is competent for any purpose, is not applicable to the testimony here challenged. The challenged testimony was so directed and weighted towards proving facts essential to establishing plaintiff's claim, rather than the basis of witnesses' opinions as to sanity, that it became impossible for the trial court to effectively remove the prejudice to defendant by a limiting instruction. Therefore, a limiting instruction by the court could not make the evidence admissible.
The trial judge erred in admitting the testimony of plaintiff Whitley and Flowers regarding their personal communications and transactions with the deceased Hyder.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as modified and the case is remanded to that court with direction to award a new trial, to be conducted in accordance with the principles herein set forth.
Modified and Affirmed.