Title: Schutt v. Hull
Citation: 193 Or. 18, 236 P.2d 937
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: October 24, 1951

Affirmed October 24, 1951.
*19 Sidney Lezak argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Lenske, Spiegel, Spiegel, Martindale and Lezak, of Portland.
James Arthur Powers, of Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Earle P. Skow and Norman N. Griffith, of Portland.
Before BRAND, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, LUSK, LATOURETTE and WARNER, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
LATOURETTE, J.
The trial judge, sitting without a jury, found for defendant in a personal injury case brought by plaintiff who was riding in her husband's car while he *20 was proceeding in a westerly direction along East Glisan Street near 139th Street outside of the city of Portland. Plaintiff appeals.
Defendant was driving his car in an easterly direction on said Glisan Street, and, while he was attempting to make a left turn into Glendoveer Golf Course, a collision occurred between the two cars. It appears from the record that when plaintiff's husband was about a block away from defendant, he saw defendant making a left-hand turn, his testimony being:
Before making the left-hand turn, defendant testified that he observed plaintiff's car about a block up the highway and thought he had ample time in which to make the crossing, but, after proceeding about a *21 foot over the yellow line, he came to the conclusion that he would not have time to make the turn on account of the speed of the car operated by plaintiff's husband and returned to his side of the highway where the collision occurred. His estimate of the speed of plaintiff's car was 60 or 65 miles per hour. There was evidence that plaintiff's car skidded 60 feet before the impact.
Following is the first assignment of error:
Plaintiff argues that:
Section 115-335(a), O.C.L.A., insofar as applicable, follows:
*22 1, 2. Plaintiff contends that defendant was guilty of negligence per se because of his failure to give a signal at the time and place in question. The law does not require a motorist in every instance to give a signal of his intention to make a left-hand turn but only "whenever the operation of any other vehicle may be affected by such movement." Since when the left-hand turn was being effected and plaintiff's car, so far as defendant's version of the distance is concerned, was a considerable distance away and defendant thought that, on account of such distance separating the two cars, he was warranted in believing that he could pass safely to the opposite side of the highway, it would be a question of fact for the court to determine whether or not, under the circumstances, the operation of plaintiff's car would be affected by such movement of defendant's car, and, therefore, whether in fact defendant was guilty of negligence.
Of course, there could be some instances in which a party might be guilty of negligence as a matter of law under the above statute, for example, where a party made a left-hand turn immediately in front of an oncoming car. Such was the situation in Burnett v. Weinstein, 154 Or. 308, 311, 59 P.2d 258, cited by appellant and upon which she relies considerably. In that case defendant "suddenly swung his truck over in front of him, giving, so far as he could see, no signal of his intention so to do." The facts in the instant case are obviously different. See also Lidfors v. Pflaum, 115 Or. 142, 205 P. 277, 236 P. 1059.
3. The trial judge made a finding that any carelessness or negligence of defendant did not proximately cause the accident and injury to plaintiff in the following language: "That the accident and injury to *23 plaintiff did not result through any carelessness or negligence on the part of defendant Wilber B. Hull." So that if it were assumed that defendant was guilty of negligence in failing to give a warning signal, such assumed negligence under the court's finding was not the proximate cause of the accident; therefore, the alleged error would be of no consequence, it being elementary that to create liability, even though there be negligence, such negligence must be the proximate cause of the accident.
4-6. The trial judge found "that the defendant Hull was faced with an emergency and was forced to act in an emergency." Plaintiff assigns as error the making of such finding and argues that the emergency doctrine is not available to defendant because the accident was occasioned by defendant's negligence. It is the law that a person cannot invoke the emergency doctrine if the emergency is created by his own negligence. The negligence claimed in this case was the failure on defendant's part to give plaintiff warning of his intention to make a left-hand turn. Since the court found on substantial evidence that defendant was free from negligence, such finding of an emergency was proper. In any event, such emergency finding was immaterial since defendant was absolved from liability by the court's finding that he was not negligent, and, further, that any negligence on the part of the defendant was not the proximate cause of the accident. Affirmed.