Title: State v. Campbell
Citation: 661 So. 2d 1321
Docket Number: 95-K-0824
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: October 2, 1995

661 So. 2d 1321 (1995) STATE v. Terry CAMPBELL. No. 95-K-0824. Supreme Court of Louisiana. October 2, 1995. Rehearing Denied November 3, 1995. *1322 PER CURIAM.[*] WRIT GRANTED. Defendant was indicted for second degree murder. Prior to trial, defendant filed a Motion to Quash Grand Jury Indictment, alleging the grand jury foreman selection process in Evangeline Parish was discriminatory. The motion was denied. Defendant was later convicted of second degree murder. On appeal, one of defendant's assignments of error asserted the trial court had erred by denying his motion to quash on the basis that he, as a white man, lacked standing to claim discrimination against blacks in the selection of grand jury foremen in Evangeline Parish. The third circuit found defendant had standing to pursue the claim, but did not reach the merits of his claim. The court instead found the statistical information compiled by the defense in support of the claim was incomplete and remanded for further evidence to be adduced.[1] The state filed a writ application with this Court, arguing the court of appeal erred in finding defendant had standing to make a discrimination claim on behalf of the excluded black potential grand jury foremen and also that the court of appeal erred in remanding the case to allow the defendant to put on more evidence. We grant the state's writ application, reverse the court of appeal decision, and remand to the court of appeal for further proceedings. In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 99 S. Ct. 2993, 61 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1979), the United States Supreme Court implicitly held two black defendants had standing to bring an equal protection claim that blacks had been unconstitutionally excluded from serving as grand jury foremen when it "assume[d] without deciding that discrimination with regard to the selection of only the foreman requires that a subsequent conviction be set aside." Rose, Id. at 551, n. 4, 99 S. Ct. at 2998, n. 4. Therefore, "in order to show that an equal protection violation has occurred in the context of grand jury ... foreman ... selection, the defendant must show that the procedure employed resulted in substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifiable group to which he belongs." Id. at 565, 99 S. Ct. at 3005 (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494, 97 S. Ct. 1272, 1280, 51 L. Ed. 2d 498 (1977)). Thus, in the context of an equal protection claim with respect to the selection of a grand jury foreman, Rose requires the defendant claiming the violation be of the same "race or identifiable group" as those he alleges were excluded from serving as grand jury foremen. In Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 104 S. Ct. 3093, 82 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1984), the Court was faced with determining whether discrimination in the selection of federal grand jury foremen, resulting in the underrepresentation of blacks and women in that position, required reversal of the conviction of a white male defendant. The defendant had argued this discrimination was a violation of his due process right under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court noted that in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 92 S. Ct. 2163, 33 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1972), a plurality opinion, it had held a person of any race had standing to bring a Due Process Clause claim challenging the exclusion of any group from petit or grand jury service. The Hobby Court held that this would not be the case, however, where a defendant was bringing a due process claim challenging the exclusion of a particular group from serving as grand jury foremen. The Hobby Court held that discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman, as opposed from discrimination in the selection of the grand jury itself, did not impede the defendant's due process rights. "[Even] assuming *1323 discrimination entered into the selection of federal grand jury foremen, such discrimination does not warrant the reversal of the conviction of, and dismissal of the indictment against, a white male bringing a claim under the Due Process Clause." Id. 468 U.S. at 350, 104 S. Ct. at 3099. The Court focused on the fact that the impact of a discriminatorily chosen grand jury foreman, as opposed to the exclusion of certain groups from participation in the petit or grand jury itself, has only an incidental effect on the criminal justice system: Id. at 345-46, 104 S. Ct. at 3096-97 (citations omitted). The Court distinguished Rose on the basis that it involved an equal protection claim brought by a black defendant claiming discrimination against members of his own race in the selection of the grand jury foreman, as opposed to Hobby, where the white defendant brought only a due process challenge. In this case, defendant alleges violations of both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. The court of appeal in the instant case analogized to Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1991) in support for its holding that a white defendant had standing to bring a due process or equal protection claim attacking the process for selecting grand jury foremen as discriminatory against blacks. In Powers, the Court held that a white defendant had standing to raise the equal protection claims of jurors excluded because of their race by the prosecution through the improper use of peremptory challenges. The Court reached this decision after a thorough discussion of the great impact racial discrimination in the selection of jurors would have on the defendant as well as on the integrity of the judicial process. The Court stated: Powers, 499 U.S. at 411-13, 111 S. Ct. at 1371-72 (citations omitted). Under Rose, defendant does not have standing to bring an equal protection claim challenging the exclusion of blacks from serving as grand jury foremen as he is not of the same race or "identifiable group" as those he alleges were excluded from serving as foremen. Under Hobby, defendant does not have standing to bring a due process claim challenging discrimination against blacks in the selection of grand jury foremen, as in that case, the Supreme Court held that the "ministerial role of the office of federal grand jury foreman is not such a vital one that discrimination in the appointment of an individual to that post significantly invades the distinctive interests of the defendant protected by the Due Process Clause." Hobby, 468 U.S. at 346, 104 S. Ct. at 3097. The role of the grand jury foreman in Louisiana appears to be similarly ministerial. Furthermore, under La.C.Cr.P. art. 436, any grand juror who objects to a rule of procedure made by the foreman may seek review from the court. Therefore, as in Hobby, discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman from a properly constituted venire has little, if any, effect on the defendant's due process right of fundamental fairness. The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether a white defendant would have standing to raise the equal protection claims of members of another race who were not selected to serve as grand jury foremen because of their race. Although Powers gives to white defendants standing to bring an equal protection claim on behalf of jurors who were excluded from serving on the petit jury because of their race through the improper use of peremptory challenges, that holding was based on the considerable and substantial impact that such obvious discrimination by the prosecutor during voir dire would have on the defendant's trial as well as on the integrity of the judicial system as a whole. The same cannot be said for discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman, and we decline to extend Powers to such a situation. The court of appeal erred in holding defendant had standing to bring either the due process or equal protection claims. The case is remanded to the court of appeal for treatment of defendant's remaining assignments of error. REVERSED AND REMANDED. DENNIS, J., would deny the writ. The majority's opinion is premature and incomplete inasmuch as it is based on an inadequate *1325 record and does not address state constitutional law. [*] Calogero, C.J. not on panel. See Rule IV, Part 2, § 3. [1] The court of appeal did not address defendant's remaining assignments of error.