Title: In re A.A.
Citation: 2015 IL 118605
Docket Number: 118605
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: November 19, 2015

2015 IL 118605 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
(Docket No. 118605) 
In re A.A., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Matthew 
A., Appellant (Caitlin S., Appellee)).  
 
 
Opinion filed November 19, 2015. 
 
 
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Karmeier, and 
Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
This appeal arises from an order of the circuit court of Jefferson County which 
granted a petition filed by the guardian ad litem (GAL) for the minor, A.A., to 
vacate a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity (VAP) signed by respondents 
Matthew A. and Caitlin S. with regard to A.A. The appellate court affirmed and 
held that after DNA testing established that Matthew was not the biological father 
of A.A., the trial court was not required to make a “best interests of the child” 
determination prior to granting the petition. 2014 IL App (5th) 140252. For the 
reasons that follow, we affirm. 
 
 
 
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¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
Following the birth of A.A. on April 26, 2013, Matthew and Caitlin signed a 
VAP pursuant to section 6(a) of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Parentage Act) 
(750 ILCS 45/6(a) (West 2012)). Caitlin, A.A.’s mother, had been married to Jakob 
S., who signed a denial of paternity as to A.A.  
¶ 4 
 
On June 10, 2013, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship in 
juvenile court following an investigation by the Department of Children and 
Family Services (DCFS) into the conditions of the home where A.A. was living 
with Caitlin, Matthew, and Caitlin’s three other children, J.S., A.S., and P.S. The 
State alleged neglect and injurious environment based upon inadequate 
supervision, lack of cleanliness in the home, and hygiene issues concerning the four 
children.  
¶ 5 
 
On June 13, 2013, the trial court entered an agreed order which awarded 
temporary custody of the four minors to the guardianship administrator of DCFS. 
At the same hearing, the court ordered DNA testing to determine if Matthew or 
Jakob was the biological father of P.S.  
¶ 6 
 
On August 1, 2013, a status hearing was held without a court reporter present. 
The docket record entry sheet indicates that the trial court ordered DNA testing on 
that date to determine whether Matthew was the biological father of A.A. The 
record is silent on whose motion this DNA testing was ordered. At the time of the 
hearing, A.A. and P.S. had been placed together in one foster home while J.S. and 
A.S. were living together in another foster home.  
¶ 7 
 
On September 23, 2013, Kathy Bass, a DCFS representative, testified at a 
review hearing that Caitlin had identified Cort H., who had died the previous 
month, as the possible biological father of A.A. Bass testified that DNA testing of 
A.A. and Matthew would be done that day. The State informed the court that DNA 
testing indicated that Jakob was not the father of P.S.  
¶ 8 
 
On November 15, 2013, an adjudicatory hearing was held. Caitlin and Matthew 
were represented by the same attorney and Sean Featherstun appeared as the GAL 
for the four minors. At the hearing, DCFS representatives testified about 
troublesome conditions in the home, with the house and children being filthy and 
unkempt, and about the children being left alone on occasion. Matthew testified 
 
 
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that he is the father of P.S., but unfortunately had learned that he was not A.A.’s 
father.  
 
¶ 9 
 
Following the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court found the State proved the 
allegations of neglect and injurious environment against Caitlin and Matthew. The 
trial court also ordered DNA testing to determine if Cort was A.A.’s biological 
father. Because Cort was deceased, this would be accomplished through DNA 
testing of Cort’s parents, Gloria H. and Larry H. Thereafter, on January 21, 2014, 
the docket entry indicates that the court had been advised by Caitlin and Matthew’s 
attorney that the couple “broke up.” The docket entry further indicates that the 
court was advised that the DNA test results showed that Matthew was not the 
biological father of A.A. The trial court at that time appointed a separate attorney to 
represent Matthew.  
¶ 10 
 
On February 10, 2014, Gloria and Larry filed a petition to intervene, asserting 
that the DNA testing revealed that they are A.A.’s biological grandparents, and that 
if the court terminated the rights of A.A.’s parents, they desired to adopt A.A.  
¶ 11 
 
On February 18, 2014, a dispositional hearing was conducted. Guardianship of 
the four minors remained with DCFS, and a service plan for Caitlin and Matthew 
was put in place. On the same day, the GAL sought leave to file a petition to declare 
the nonexistence of a parent-child relationship between A.A. and Matthew and to 
vacate the VAP signed by Matthew and Caitlin. The GAL’s motion was filed in 
family court and was consolidated with the neglect proceeding in juvenile court.  
¶ 12 
 
On February 21, 2014, the trial court allowed the GAL, over Matthew’s 
objection, to file the petition to declare the nonexistence of a parent-child 
relationship. The trial court postponed consideration of Gloria and Larry’s petition 
to intervene until the GAL’s petition was decided. Although Matthew recognized 
that the GAL had standing to challenge the VAP on behalf of A.A., and that the 
DNA test results identified Cort as A.A.’s biological father, he advanced that it 
would not be in A.A.’s best interests to vacate the VAP. Matthew also filed a 
motion to dismiss Gloria and Larry’s petition to intervene.  
¶ 13 
 
On March 17, 2014, a multiday hearing began on the GAL’s petition. Caitlin 
testified that she knew Cort was A.A.’s father and that it contributed to their break 
up after he denied it. Caitlin was still married to Jakob when A.A. was conceived. 
She believed that someone had to acknowledge paternity before she could leave the 
hospital with A.A. Matthew signed the VAP after she was unable to reach Cort. 
 
 
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Caitlin further testified that it was Matthew’s intent to raise A.A. as his own. Caitlin 
admitted having some trouble with Gloria and Larry in the past, but felt they should 
take placement of A.A. if A.A. could not be with her. Caitlin testified that Matthew 
should not be considered A.A.’s father, stating that, “there is no emotional 
attachment,” and that although Matthew loves A.A., he still hates Cort. Caitlin 
acknowledged that Matthew provided financially for A.A. and assisted in 
parenting.  
 
¶ 14 
 
Matthew testified that he works full-time for a subcontractor of a tire company. 
He and Caitlin had been together for four years, including at the time when A.A. 
was conceived. He testified that they also have a biological son, P.S., who was born 
in 2011. He learned that Caitlin was seeing Cort during her pregnancy with A.A., 
but remained with her, including when A.A. was born. When Matthew signed the 
VAP he believed that he might be A.A.’s father. He further testified that A.A. and 
P.S. live in the same foster home and that he visits with both of them. A court 
appointed special advocate (CASA) volunteer testified that she had been assigned 
to A.A.’s case.1 Although she had several meetings with Caitlin and Matthew, she 
only once observed Matthew with A.A. She witnessed “a lot of affection” between 
them. She testified that as long as Matthew continues services with DCFS he 
should remain as A.A.’s legal father.  
¶ 15 
 
Carrie Donnen, a caseworker with DCFS, testified that she worked with Caitlin 
and the family from January to June 2013, and had seen Matthew interact with A.A. 
on numerous occasions. She opined that it would not be in A.A.’s best interest to 
remove Matthew as his legal father.  
¶ 16 
 
On May 8, 2014, the trial court entered an order declaring the nonexistence of a 
parent-child relationship between Matthew and A.A. based on the DNA test results 
that established Cort was A.A.’s biological father. The trial court vacated the VAP 
and declared a parent-child relationship between Cort and A.A. The trial court 
subsequently granted the petition of Gloria and Larry to intervene and stayed 
further proceedings pending the disposition of Matthew’s appeal.  
¶ 17 
 
The appellate court affirmed the order of the trial court and remanded for 
further proceedings. 2014 IL App (5th) 140252, ¶ 33. In doing so, the appellate 
court rejected Matthew’s claim that the trial court was required to make a best 
                                                 
 
1For privacy purposes, the CASA volunteer is identified in the record only by her first name, 
Amanda.  
 
 
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interests of the child determination before granting the GAL’s petition. See id. ¶ 30. 
The appellate court held that before the best interests standard can be applied to 
determine a parent’s rights to custody, visitation, and support, the party must first 
be a parent. Id. Although the appellate court recognized that a man who signs a 
VAP is presumed to be the child’s father, the DNA test results in this case 
established that Cort is A.A.’s father. Id. ¶ 31. The appellate court further 
recognized that establishing Cort as A.A.’s biological father will have future 
implications, noting that A.A. should be able to receive social security benefits 
through his deceased father. Id. ¶¶ 31-32. 
¶ 18 
 
This court allowed Matthew’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) 
(eff. July 1, 2013). This court also allowed Lambda Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, Inc., and the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services to file 
briefs amici curiae in support of Matthew. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). 
Additionally, we allowed Larry and Gloria, the Cook County Public Guardian, and 
the Family-PAC to file briefs amici curiae in support of A.A. Id.  
 
¶ 19 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 20 
 
The sole issue raised by Matthew for our review is whether a best interests of 
the child determination was required prior to the trial court granting the GAL’s 
petition to declare the nonexistence of a parent-child relationship between Matthew 
and A.A.   
¶ 21 
 
This argument requires us to construe the Parentage Act. Statutory construction 
presents a question of law which we review de novo. First American Bank Corp. v. 
Henry, 239 Ill. 2d 511, 515 (2011). The primary objective of this court in 
construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. In re 
Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 246 (2006). The plain language of a statute is the most 
reliable indication of the legislature’s intent. In re Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d 348, 
364 (2005). Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we will 
enforce it as written and will not read into it exceptions, conditions, or limitations 
that the legislature did not express. Id.  
¶ 22 
 
In enacting the Parentage Act, our legislature created a statutory mechanism 
that serves to legally establish parent and child relationships in Illinois. J.S.A. v. 
M.H., 224 Ill. 2d 182, 198 (2007). Section 1.1 of the Parentage Act declares that the 
 
 
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purpose of this statutory enactment is to further the public policy of Illinois to 
“recognize[ ] the right of every child to the physical, mental, emotional and 
monetary support of his or her parents under this Act.” 750 ILCS 45/1.1 (West 
2012). Pursuant to the Parentage Act, a father-child relationship may be established 
in a number of different ways: by presumption (750 ILCS 45/5(a) (West 2012)); by 
consent (750 ILCS 45/6 (West 2012)); or by judicial determination (750 ILCS 45/7 
(West 2012)).   
¶ 23 
 
Relevant to the instant case, pursuant to section 6(a) of the Parentage Act, “[a] 
parent and child relationship may be established voluntarily by the signing and 
witnessing of a voluntary acknowledgement of parentage [by the biological mother 
and a man claiming to be the child’s father].” 750 ILCS 45/6(a) (West 2012). 
Paternity established in that way has the full force and effect of a judgment entered 
under the Paternity Act. 750 ILCS 45/6(b) (West 2012). “A judicial or 
administrative proceeding to ratify paternity established in accordance with 
subsection (a) is neither required nor permitted.” 750 ILCS 45/6(c) (West 2012). 
Here, it is undisputed that Matthew and Caitlin signed, in accordance with section 
6(a), a VAP with regard to A.A. shortly after the child’s birth on April 26, 2013.  
¶ 24 
 
Section 7 of the Parentage Act details the requirements for bringing an action to 
determine the existence of a parent and child relationship or, as in this case, declare 
the nonexistence of a parent and child relationship. 750 ILCS 45/7 (West 2012). 
Pursuant to section 7(b), “[a]n action to declare the non-existence of the parent and 
child relationship may be brought by the child, the natural mother, or a man 
presumed to be the father.” 750 ILCS 45/7(b) (West 2012). If any party is a minor, 
the statute provides that he or she may be represented by his or her GAL. 750 ILCS 
45/7(c) (West 2012). Consequently, section 7 of the Parentage Act specifically 
recognizes that a child, through his or her GAL, may challenge a VAP. That is what 
occurred here. 
¶ 25 
 
Section 11(a) of the Parentage Act then provides that in any action brought 
under section 7 to determine the existence of the father and child relationship or to 
declare the nonexistence of the parent-child relationship, the trial court is 
authorized to order genetic testing. 750 ILCS 45/11(a) (West 2012). “If the court 
finds that the conclusion of the expert or experts, as disclosed by the evidence based 
upon the tests, is that the alleged father is not the parent of the child, the question of 
paternity shall be resolved accordingly.” 750 ILCS 45/11(f)(1) (West 2012). The 
 
 
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parties before us do not dispute that the DNA test results established that Matthew 
is not the biological father of A.A. and that instead Cort is the biological father. 
¶ 26 
 
Matthew claims that the appellate court incorrectly minimized the significance 
of the best interests of the child determination under which the court and the GAL 
must act, and that the court failed to recognize the important interests of 
nonbiological parents. Matthew’s arguments before this court, however, are not 
tied to any language in the Parentage Act.  
¶ 27 
 
We find the statutory language to be clear and unambiguous. An action brought 
under the Parentage Act on behalf of a minor to declare the nonexistence of a parent 
and child relationship does not provide for the court to consider the best interests of 
the child prior to granting the petition. We decline to read into the Parentage Act, as 
Matthew’s argument would require us to do, language that is not expressed by the 
legislature. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000). Where a party’s objections “pose 
what are essentially questions of policy [they] are more appropriately directed to 
the legislature than to this court.” Hayen v. County of Ogle, 101 Ill. 2d 413, 420-21 
(1984). 
¶ 28 
 
Matthew, in making his argument that he has parental rights that must be 
respected and not set aside based on genetics alone, primarily relies upon two cases 
from our appellate court, In re Custody of C.C., 2013 IL App (3d) 120342, and In re 
Parentage of G.E.M., 382 Ill. App. 3d 1102 (2008). In C.C., the appellate majority, 
while not commenting on the parental status of the VAP father, stated that the 
parental rights of such an “adjudicated parent” do not become void because a child 
is not genetically linked to him. C.C., 2013 IL App (3d) 120342, ¶¶ 63-64. In 
G.E.M., the appellate court addressed the limits placed on the mother’s right to 
challenge a VAP in the context of a VAP father who was not contesting his 
paternity and had been allowed to remain the legal father of the child. G.E.M., 382 
Ill. App. 3d at 1112-13. The facts of both appellate cases are distinguishable and do 
not shed light on whether a best interests determination is required prior to granting 
a minor’s petition to extinguish a father-child relationship under section 7(b).  
¶ 29 
 
In contrast, our decision in In re Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d 253 (2004), 
is instructive and consistent with our holding today. In John M., a biological father 
brought a petition under section 7(a) of the Parentage Act to establish a parent-child 
relationship between himself and a child born during the marriage of the mother to 
another man. Id. at 256. The presumed father from the marriage argued, among 
 
 
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other claims, that there should be a best interests hearing prior to allowing the 
biological father’s petition to proceed. Id. at 257.  
¶ 30 
 
In rejecting this argument, we recognized that legal determinations regarding 
the father-child relationship are governed by section 7 of the Parentage Act. Id. at 
263. Therein, a “father-child relationship may be established pursuant to section 
7(a), or disestablished pursuant to sections 7(b) and 7(b-5).” (Emphases omitted.) 
Id. We explained that “a man alleging himself to be the biological father of a child 
has standing to bring an action to establish his relationship to the child, without 
regard to whether another man is already presumed to be the child’s father pursuant 
to section 5(a) of the Act.” Id. at 264. Additionally, “once a petition to establish 
parentage is filed with the court, the court, pursuant to section 11(a) of the Act, 
‘may, and upon request of a party shall, order or direct the mother, child and alleged 
father to submit to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) tests to determine inherited 
characteristics.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. (quoting 750 ILCS 45/11(a) (West 
2002)). “If the results of paternity testing obtained pursuant to this section show 
that the presumed father is not the biological father, the presumption in section 5 is 
rebutted.” Id. 
¶ 31 
 
This court in John M. specifically acknowledged that the Parentage Act 
“contains no express requirement that a court consider the best interests of the child 
before any testing is conducted or a legal determination of paternity is made.” Id. 
Instead, the first step in the proceeding is to establish or disestablish parentage. This 
court further recognized that once parentage has been established, then the trial 
court is charged with the responsibility of deciding other issues which surround 
paternity, including custody and visitation, where the best interests of the child are 
of paramount concern. Id. at 264-65; see also 750 ILCS 45/14 (West 2012) (any 
decisions regarding custody and visitation “shall [be] determine[d] in accordance 
with the relevant factors set forth in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of 
Marriage Act and any other applicable law of Illinois, to guide the court in a finding 
in the best interests of the child”). 
¶ 32 
 
Finally, we held in John M. that section 7(a) is not facially unconstitutional 
because it does not require a best interests determination before allowing a 
biological father to file a petition to declare the existence of a parent-child 
relationship where a presumed father already exists. John M., 212 Ill. 2d at 270. In 
doing so, this court recognized that “when a best interests hearing is required prior 
 
 
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to some action, it is for the protection of the child,” and not of the rights of the 
presumed father. (Emphasis added.) Id. 
 
¶ 33 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 34 
 
For the above stated reasons, we conclude that the trial court was not required to 
make a best interests of the child determination prior to granting the GAL’s petition 
to disestablish paternity between Matthew and A.A. The judgment of the appellate 
court is therefore affirmed. 
 
¶ 35 
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed.