Title: State v. Melerine
Citation: 109 So. 2d 454, 236 La. 881
Docket Number: N/A
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: February 16, 1959

109 So. 2d 454 (1959) 236 La. 881 STATE of Louisiana v. Celestine MELERINE and James Licciardl. No. 44317. Supreme Court of Louisiana. February 16, 1959. Rehearing Denied March 23, 1959. *456 F. Irvin Dymond, John P. Dowling, Russell J. Schonekas, George W. Reese, Jr., New Orleans, for defendants-appellants. Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., M. E. Culligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., L. H. Perez, Dist. Atty., L. H. Perez, Jr., 2nd Asst. Dist. Atty, New Orleans, August A. Nobile, Jr., Chalmette, Sp. Counsel, for appellee. HAMLIN, Justice. The defendants, Celestine Melerine and James Licciardi, were charged by bill of information with malfeasance in office,[1] a *457 crime prohibited by LSA-R.S. 14:134. They were tried, found guilty, and sentenced to serve three months in the parish jail and pay a fine of $500, in default of payment thereof to serve sixty additional days in the parish jail. They have appealed to this Court, presenting for our consideration fourteen bills of exceptions. Defendants filed a motion to recuse the district attorney, Leander H. Perez, averring that he had a personal interest in the matter adverse to that of the prosecution. Such personal interest is set forth as follows: The district attorney denied the grounds set forth in the motion to recuse and prayed for its dismissal. Upon its dismissal defendants applied to this Court for writs, which were refused with the statement: "Applicants will have an adequate remedy in the event of conviction." Defendants reserved Bill of Exceptions No. 1 to the trial judge's overruling their motion to recuse the district attorney after the hearing of evidence. The causes for recusation of a district attorney, as set forth in LSA-R.S. 15:310, are: The persons referred to in defendants' motion, supra, are not the parties accused. The evidence discussed in the trial judge's per curiam to the bill does not show that they have employed the district attorney as counsel or that they have asked that he intercede for them. Leander H. Perez, Jr., Second Assistant District Attorney, testified that he, the district attorney, and Chalin O. Perez, were not engaged in the practice of law as a law firm or partnership. There is no allegation or showing that the district attorney would have to personally pay any part of the monthly salaries of the persons referred to in defendants' motion. The interest that a third person might have in keeping his job or that he will not suffer a reduction in pay is a personal interest, but it cannot be classed as an interest adverse to the prosecution. To say that an officer of the court, elected by the people, has an interest adverse to the prosecution because third parties will profit if the accused are removed from their positions or offices is mere speculation. Article IX, Sec. 7, Louisiana Constitution of 1921, LSA, provides for the filling of such offices as are herein involved by the appointing power during the removal proceedings. The district attorney is therefore disassociated with the offices insofar as the appointment of successors is concerned. The State sets forth in its brief that the suits for removal referred to by the defendants were filed by the district attorney in his official capacity and in the discharge of a mandatory duty provided by Article IX, Secs. 1, 6 and 7, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, which requires a district attorney, without pecuniary or personal reward, to file removal suits against parochial or ward officers when requested in writing by twenty-five citizens and taxpayers, and that the record in these removal cases (referring to Perez v. Licciardi, 236 La. 236, 107 So. 2d 455, *459 in which this Court acted upon an application for writs) show that more than the necessary amount of citizens and taxpayers requested the district attorney to institute the suits for removal. This is not contradicted. We find no direct connection between the removal proceedings and the present prosecution. In Stanley v. Jones, 197 La. 627, 2 So. 2d 45, 48, we stated: The above statement means that removal proceedings and a criminal prosecution against the same defendants are not interdependent; the mere fact that the district attorney has filed suit for the removal of the defendants from office reflects no reason for recusing him in a criminal prosecution. Defendants contend that the case of State v. Tate, 185 La. 1006, 171 So. 108, 112, has extended LSA-R.S. 15:310 so as to require recusation in cases where the district attorney has a personal interest in the conviction rather than a personal interest adverse to that of the prosecution. In the Tate case, supra, the defendant urged as grounds for the recusation of the district attorney the fact that he had previously acted as counsel for various insurance companies in proceedings against the defendant for damages alleged to have resulted from the crime for which he was being prosecuted. In upholding the defendant's contention this Court stated: The Tate case, supra, is not apposite. There the district attorney definitely had an interest adverse to the prosecution. This Court, in State v. Henry, 200 La. 875, 9 So. 2d 215, 217, interpreted Article 310 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is now incorporated in the Revised Statutes as R.S. 15:310, as follows: In the instant case, it is self-evident that the accused never employed nor requested the services of the district attorney. Defendants further contend that this Court, under the provisions of LSA-R.S. 15:422(6), should take judicial notice of the political conditions prevailing in St. Bernard Parish prior to the trial and at the time of the trial, as well as at the present time. In support of this contention, they urge that it is a well-known fact that the Parish of St. Bernard is a political hot-bed, and that the district attorney herein has lost control of the Police Jury. It is argued that this being the case the district attorney had a political advantage at stake in connection with the trial of the defendants. Political conditions exist at all times where there is a democratic form of government, but we do not believe that the conditions alleged herein are of the type which would justify our taking special judicial notice. This Court has consistently held that a district attorney may not be recused nor recuse himself on any ground other than one of those prescribed by law, because such grounds for recusation are limitative. State v. Boasberg, 124 La. 289, 50 So. 162; State v. Bryan, 175 La. 422, 143 So. 362; State v. Bussa, 176 La. 87, 145 So. 276. For the reasons hereinabove assigned, there is no merit in Bill of Exceptions No. 1. Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved to the trial judge's overruling defendants' objection to the testimony of George Humble, former Road District Superintendent for the St. Bernard Parish Police Jury who assisted the district attorney in securing evidence for the prosecution, as to a conversation between him and the defendants with respect to kick-backs on a contract let by the Police Jury. The pertinent testimony to which the objection was raised is as follows: Counsel for the defendants contended that the conversation had been recorded and that the recording itself constituted the best evidence of what took place at the purported meeting. The testimony of the witness was relative to the events made the basis of the instant charge independent of any recordings of conversations between any of the parties and himself. Since recordings were introduced later in the case and played in open court, we do not find that the defendants were prejudiced or that there was a violation of the Best Evidence Rule. LSA-R.S. 15:436. Cf. Thompson v. State, Okl.Cr., 298 P.2d 464. A determination of whether any conflict existed between the testimony of Humble and the tape recordings was a matter for the trial judge's consideration. *461 The witness was not testifying regarding the contents of the purported wire recordings, as was the situation in the case of State v. McMullan, 223 La. 629, 66 So. 2d 574, cited by defendants. That case is not apposite. There the coroner testified that the defendant had made a verbal statement which had been tape recorded. Later, it was reduced to writing in question and answer form but had not been signed by the defendant. When the witness attempted to testify regarding its contents, counsel for the defense in that case objected on the ground that the statement itself was the best evidence. This objection was overruled. This Court held, however, that there was no prejudicial error in view of the fact that counsel for the defense later introduced the written statement in evidence. Bill of Exceptions No. 2 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 3 was reserved when the trial judge overruled defendants' objection to his order not permitting the witness George Humble to answer a question propounded to him on cross-examination at the end of the following testimony with respect to having recorded his conversations with the defendants and other parties: On re-direct examination, the witness Humble answered, in detail, questions propounded to him relative to his turning off the recording apparatus, known as a Minifone. His testimony is as follows: The above conversation, attached to the instant bill of exceptions, conclusively reflects that Humble did not turn off the Minifone when he was recording conversations which form the basis of the instant charge. The control of cross-examination resides within the sound discretion of the trial court;[2] there was no abuse in overruling the instant objection. State v. Sauls, 226 La. 694, 77 So. 2d 8. Bill of Exceptions No. 3 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 4 was reserved to the ruling of the trial judge admitting the introduction in evidence of alleged transcriptions of wire recordings involving the defendants and the actual recordings themselves. These transcriptions were identified as "State 12," December 14, 1957; "State 15," December 26, 1957; and "State 17," January 23, 1958. Counsel for the defendants urged that the transcriptions did not constitute the best evidence; that the authenticity and integrity of the recordings were not established; that the voices on the three recordings were not properly identified; that repeated playings were necessary for transcription; and that the last three and one-half pages of "State 15" were irrelevant and immaterial, being suggestive of a different offense. There is error in counsel's assertion that the transcriptions present a question of best or secondary evidence. They are independent in nature and form a part of the evidence submitted on the trial of the case. Monroe v. United States, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 234 F.2d 49, certiorari denied 352 U.S. 873, 77 S. Ct. 94, 1 L. Ed. 2d 76; 352 U.S. 937, 77 S. Ct. 219, 1 L. Ed. 2d 170; 355 U.S. 875, 78 S. Ct. 114, 2 L. Ed. 2d 79. The testimony attached to this bill, and the trial judge's per curiam, definitely establish the authenticity and integrity of the recordings. Prior to trial, and in furtherance of a stipulation, the defendants and their attorneys met with the district attorney, the court reporter and others. The trial judge in his per curiam states: We find, as did the trial judge, that the transcriptions and the recordings introduced during the course of trial were those made prior to trial to be used as evidence in the instant prosecution. This State has previously permitted the offering in evidence of similar recordings and transcriptions. State v. Alleman, 218 La. 821, 51 So. 2d 83; Cf., State v. Dooley, 208 La. 203, 23 So. 2d 46; State v. Di Vincenti, 225 La. 689, 73 So. 2d 806. We, therefore, conclude that the evidence was properly admitted. There is no merit in counsel's contention that the voices on the recordings *465 were not properly identified. They were identified by the witness Humble and by the trial judge himself, who states in his per curiam: The fact that some of the recordings in the instant case had to be played more than once by the Court Reporter before his transcription is of no consequence. In Monroe v. United States, supra, it is stated: This case was not tried by a jury, and the fact that the last three and one-half pages of "State 15" were disassociated with the present charge caused no prejudice to the accused. The per curiam of the trial judge conclusively states that he was not influenced by the transcription or recording of the matter complained of. Counsel for the defendants have showed us no injury suffered by the defendants justifying the setting aside of the conviction. State v. Cascio, 219 La. 819, 54 So. 2d 95; State v. Shoemake, 143 La. 65, 78 So. 240. For the detailed reasons above assigned, we conclude that there is no merit in Bill of Exceptions No. 4. Bill of Exceptions No. 5 was reserved when the trial judge, over the objection of counsel for the defendants, allowed the playing of "State 12" while the State witness Humble was on the witness stand for the purpose of identifying voices on the recording. Grounds for this bill were the same as those set forth in Bill of Exceptions No. 4. For the reasons set forth in our discussion of Bill of Exceptions No. 4, supra, there is no merit in this bill. Bill of Exceptions No. 6 was reserved to the trial judge's overruling defendants' objection to the introduction in evidence of additional pages of "State 12," which had not been transcribed from the recordings prior to trial, and to the playing of the entire recording in open court. It was contended that there had been insufficient identification of the parties alleged to have been speaking in the transcription; that a sufficient predicate had not been laid for the introduction; that the transcription did not constitute the best evidence; that the transcription of the recordings contained references to the possible commission of other crimes not charged in the instant prosecution; and that the deletion of the additional portion of "State 12" would in no way destroy the continuity nor defeat *466 the purpose of the introduction of whatever part of "State 12" might be admissible. The events leading up to the reservation of Bill of Exceptions No. 6 were, as stated in the trial judge's per curiam, that while George Humble was on the witness stand for the second time the district attorney informed the court that the reporter had not completed the entire transcription of the December 14, 1957 recording, and that there were a few more minutes thereon of the conversation between George Humble and the two defendants; the court adjourned to its chambers with counsel, thereupon learning that the untranscribed recording pertained to another transaction; the court reporter transcribed the untranscribed portion of the recording, except about three minutes of conversation, during the court's recess; the district attorney offered to have the untranscribed part of the recording played in open court, but the defendants did not accept the offer; the court then allowed the additional pages to be offered in evidence and the playing of that portion of the wire recording from which they were transcribed. We do not find that the defendants were prejudiced by the events detailed above, nor do we find that the trial judge committed reversible error. He was called upon to exercise his discretion, and we see no abuse thereof. In his per curiam, he gives the following explanation of what transpired: Bill of Exceptions No. 6 is without substance. Bill of Exceptions No. 7 was reserved when the trial judge permitted the recording of "State 15" to be played through an amplifier and loud speaker while George Humble was on the stand the second time. Objections of counsel for the defendants were the same as those raised in Bill of Exceptions No. 4. We find no merit to this bill, for the same reasons as those set forth in our discussion of Bill of Exceptions No. 4, supra. Bill of Exceptions No. 8 was taken to the ruling of the trial judge permitting the introduction in evidence of "State 12", "State 15", and "State 17". The testimony attached to Bills of Exceptions Nos. 4 and 8, and the trial judge's per curiam to Bill of Exceptions No. 4, set forth in detail the facts that the witness Humble recorded through a Minifone conversations he had with the defendants and others; August A. Nobile, Jr. re-recorded the wire recordings of the Minifone on an Ampro tape recorder, and they were transcribed by Charles A. Neyrey, Court Reporter; the recordings made by Humble were not handled, being kept safe in a bank box. The transcriptions were independent evidence. Monroe v. United States, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 234 F.2d 49, supra. Defendants contend that they were made in answer to their prayer for oyer, but the testimony shows that they were part of the stipulation discussed, supra. Since they constitute independent evidence, their admission did not violate the Best Evidence Rule, *467 LSA-R.S. 15:436; there was no violation of the Hearsay Rule, LSA-R.S. 15:434, because the method of procuration, supra, is now permitted by the courts of this State, as well as those of many other jurisdictions. (Authorities cited supra.) We find no merit in Bill of Exceptions No. 8. Bill of Exceptions No. 9 was reserved when the trial judge permitted the introduction in evidence of the original wire recordings from which "State 12", "State 15", and "State 17", were transcribed. For the same reasons set forth in our discussions of Bills of Exceptions Nos. 4 and 8, supra, there is no substance to Bill of Exceptions No. 9. After the State rested its case, defendants moved the trial court for a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground that the defendants were charged with malfeasance in office, in that they performed the duties of their office in an unlawful manner, and that since there had been no evidence presented showing that the acts committed by the defendants were in violation of any law of Louisiana, there was no performance of duty in an unlawful manner. Upon denial of this motion, Bill of Exceptions No. 10 was reserved. LSA-R.S. 15:402.1 provides: In the case of State of Louisiana v. Crovetto, 229 La. 793, 86 So. 2d 907, 908, certiorari denied 352 U.S. 833, 77 S. Ct. 50, 1 L. Ed. 2d 53, we interpreted the above statute as follows: See, also, State v. Domino, 234 La. 950, 102 So. 2d 227. In view of the above law and jurisprudence, the merits of Bill of Exceptions No. 10 are not subject to review. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 11, 12, and 13, were reserved to the refusal of the trial judge to charge himself as follows: The trial judge properly summarizes the above contentions as follows: Article XIX, Section 1, Louisiana Constitution of 1921, provides that LSA-R.S. 14:2 states: In the case of State ex rel. Porterie v. Smith, 184 La. 263, 166 So. 72, 76, we said: From the foregoing, we conclude as did the trial judge that a police juror is a "State Officer" and a "Public Officer," his pay being provided for in LSA-R.S. 33:1233. The oyster shells which the St. Bernard Parish Police Jury contracted to buy from John B. Lopez were construction materials; the above statute empowered it to enter into a contract for such purchase. It follows that in exercising such power, defendant Celestine Melerine, as President, and defendant James Licciardi, as Vice-President, had a mandatory duty to conform to the standards of conduct required by their oath of office, supra. LSA-R.S. 14:134 prescribes that malfeasance in office shall be committed by any public officer or public employee when he shall: We conclude that the bill of information, which sets forth that the defendants"intentionally and unlawfully negotiated and contracted with John B. Lopez to sell steamed oyster shells to the St. Bernard Parish Police Jury with the understanding and agreement that the said Lopez would kick-back or pay 25¢ per yard *470 of said shells sold by him to said Police Jury to George Humble,[3] said Police Jury employee as said Melerine's and Licciardi's intermediary or agent, and for account and benefit of the said Melerine and Licciardi, and in accordance with said unlawful agreement the said Lopez remitted said kick-back or payments to the said Humble for account of said Melerine and Licciardi, and the said Humble delivered said kick-backs to the said Melerine and Licciardi," charges the defendants with the intentional performance of their duties in an unlawful manner, in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:134. The trial judge in his per curiam states: For the reasons above assigned, we find, as did the trial judge, that the requested special charges were argumentative, abstract, and not wholly correct and wholly pertinent; they required qualification, limitation, and explanation. Finally, as required by LSA-R.S. 15:391 and 393, defendants did not accompany Bills of Exceptions Nos. 11, 12, and 13, with a statement of facts showing the error in the charge given or in the refusal to charge as requested. Even though we have passed upon the correctness of the requested chargesfinding them not wholly correct, the omission of the statement of facts would deprive appellants of our review of these bills. We, therefore, conclude that Bills of Exceptions Nos. 11, 12, and 13, are without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 14 was taken to the trial judge's overruling defendants' motion for a new trial. Nothing new is presented for our review, the motion is based on the assigned errors of the thirteen aforediscussed bills. State v. Smith, 234 La. 19, 99 So. 2d 8. There is no merit to this bill. For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. SIMON, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully submit that the majority ruling holding that Bill of Exception No. 3 is without merit is contrary to and in direct conflict with R.S. 15:450, the text of which is as follows: In connection with the testimony of the state witness Humble, an investigator for the district attorney's office, employed for the purpose of secretly obtaining recorded admissions and statements from the defendants *471 through the use of a Minifone, a wire recording device, which recorded statements and admissions were offered in evidence over objection, it appears that this witness admitted on cross-examination that such admissions and statements of the defendants were not taken in their entirety; that at times when he thought the admissions or statements were not pertinent or relevant to a criminal offense he would "cut off" the recording instrument for the reason that he "didn't see any need in wasting a good wire". In other words, he arrogated to himself the right of determining from the admissions and statements of the defendants what was culpable and what was not. This, in the words of the statute, supra, deprived the defendants of the benefit of any exculpation or explanation that the whole statements may have afforded in the light of guilt or innocence. [1] "* * * while Celestine Melerine was serving as a duly elected and qualified member and as President of the St. Bernard Parish Police Jury and while James Licciardi was serving as a duly elected and qualified Member and as Vice-President of said Police Jury, the said Melerine and Licciardi wilfully and intentionally performed duties of their said offices in an unlawful manner, the said Melerine and Licciardi intentionally and unlawfully negotiated and contracted with John B. Lopez to sell steamed oyster shells to the St. Bernard Parish Police Jury with the understanding and agreement that the said Lopez would kick-back or pay 25¢ per yard of said shells sold by him to said Police Jury to George Humble, said Police Jury employee as said Melerine's and Licciardi's intermediary or agent, and for account and benefit of the said Melerine and Licciardi, and in accordance with said unlawful agreement the said Lopez remitted said kick-back or payments to the said Humble for account of said Melerine and Licciardi, and the said Humble delivered said kick-backs to the said Melerine and Licciardi, * * *" [2] "In the discipline of his court the trial judge is vested with a sound discretion to stop the prolonged, unnecessary and irrelevant examination of a witness, whether such examination be direct or cross, and even though no objection be urged by counsel." LSA-R.S. 15:369. [3] Humble wanted to quit his job but was induced by his superior to remain in his position in order to secure the evidence for the instant prosecution.