Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. John J. Carter
Citation: 2014 WI 126
Docket Number: 2012AP001827-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 12, 2014

2014 WI 126 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP1827-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against John J. Carter, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
John J. Carter, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST CARTER 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 12, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 10, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, ROGGENSACK, JJ., did not participate.     
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs by Franklyn 
M. Gimbel, Kathryn A. Keppel, and Gimbel, Reilly, Guerin & Brown 
LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Franklyn M. Gimbel. 
 
For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief by 
Matthew J. Price, and Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Matthew J. Price.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 126
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP1827-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John J. Carter, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
John J. Carter, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 12, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   We 
review 
a 
referee's 
report 
and 
recommendation concluding that Attorney John J. Carter violated 
the rules of professional conduct in connection with his 
representation of N.N.  The referee recommended that this court 
impose a three-year suspension of Attorney Carter's law license 
and that it require Attorney Carter to pay full costs in 
connection with this matter, which total $6,680.62 as of 
September 24, 2014.  We adopt the referee's findings of fact, 
No. 
2012AP1827-D   
 
2 
 
conclusions of law, and recommendation regarding discipline and 
costs. 
¶2 
Attorney Carter was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1974.  He has no disciplinary history. 
¶3 
On August 16, 2012, the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) filed a complaint against Attorney Carter alleging 11 
counts 
of 
professional 
misconduct 
arising 
out 
of 
his 
representation of his former client, N.N.  Attorney Carter filed 
an answer and Christine Harris Taylor was appointed as referee 
in the matter. 
¶4 
Attorney Carter later entered a stipulation by which 
he withdrew his answer; pled no contest to the 11 counts of 
misconduct charged in the OLR complaint; and agreed that the 
referee could use the allegations of the complaint as a factual 
basis for the referee's determination of misconduct.  Attorney 
Carter reserved his right to argue the appropriate sanction.  
After a hearing, the referee filed a report recommending the 
above-stated discipline and finding the following facts.   
¶5 
Attorney Carter represented N.N. in the sale of her 
business.  Attorney Carter and N.N. did not enter into any 
written fee agreement for this work.  In January 2009, the buyer 
of N.N.'s business wired a significant portion of the sale 
price——$112,500——into Attorney Carter's trust account.  Despite 
N.N.'s repeated requests, Attorney Carter did not release this 
amount to N.N.  Over the course of the next few months, Attorney 
Carter converted a total of $72,053.59 of N.N.'s funds held in 
No. 
2012AP1827-D   
 
3 
 
trust:  $32,400 to his own purposes and $39,653.59 attributable 
to third party purposes.   
¶6 
In answer to N.N.'s repeated requests for her funds, 
Attorney Carter lied to N.N., telling her that he had placed her 
funds in various short-term investment instruments which had not 
yet matured.  Attorney Carter maintained this lie for many 
months.   
¶7 
Occasionally, Attorney Carter made payments to N.N. of 
her funds held in trust.  These periodic payments totaled just 
over $90,000 by September 2009.   
¶8 
During the first year of his work for N.N. related to 
the sale of her business, Attorney Carter did not send N.N. any 
bills for his work, despite N.N.'s several requests for a bill.  
Without informing N.N., Attorney Carter issued a $5,000 trust 
account check to himself.  The check bore a notation that it was 
for a partial fee payment for the N.N. matter.  Attorney Carter 
also requested and received from N.N. two checks totaling $7,000 
as payment for fees.   
¶9 
In late October 2009, Attorney Carter sent N.N. a bill 
for his work.  The bill listed a subtotal of $66,930 in fees, 
for 223.1 hours of work at $300 per hour.  The bill then listed 
a 25% reduction in the number of hours worked, which reduced the 
total to $50,400.  From that figure, Attorney Carter subtracted 
$7,000 for the two checks that N.N. had sent him for fees, for a 
total net due of $43,400.  The bill was itemized by general 
categories of work ("Correspondence," "Meetings," "Telephone 
Conferences," "Draft/Review Documents,"  "Research") rather than 
No. 
2012AP1827-D   
 
4 
 
by specific entries.  The billing statement made no reference to 
the $5,000 in fees that Attorney Carter had paid himself, 
without N.N.'s knowledge, out of his trust account.  
¶10 N.N. was surprised to receive the $43,400 bill from 
Attorney Carter, as she believed the two had never agreed to the 
terms of Attorney Carter's fees, and his $300 hourly rate was 
considerably higher than the rates he had charged her in 
previous legal matters.   
¶11 When N.N. objected to the bill, Attorney Carter became 
defensive 
and 
adversarial. 
 
He 
claimed 
that 
N.N. 
had 
strategically not insisted upon a written fee agreement so that 
she could later dispute his fees.  He threatened to take the fee 
dispute to court.  He refused to release the remainder of N.N.'s 
funds in his trust account until the fee dispute was resolved. 
¶12 Ultimately, N.N. agreed to pay a total of $38,970 for 
Attorney Carter's work.  N.N. and Attorney Carter agreed that 
Attorney Carter would offset that amount by the $7,000 in checks 
that N.N. had already sent him for fees, and by the amount of 
N.N.'s funds that remained in Attorney Carter's trust account.  
The amount of fees still owing after these offsets was 
$8,079.89.  N.N. sent Attorney Carter a check for that amount.  
At the time she sent this check, N.N. was still unaware that 
Attorney Carter had unilaterally withdrawn $5,000 from his trust 
No. 
2012AP1827-D   
 
5 
 
account as a partial fee payment.  The record is unclear as to 
whether N.N. ever became aware of this withdrawal.1   
¶13 Based on the stipulated facts set forth above, 
Attorney Carter pled no contest to the following seven counts of 
misconduct: 
 Count 1:  By failing to enter into a written fee 
agreement with N.N. for his representation of her in 
the sale of her business and other matters, Attorney 
Carter violated Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 20:1.5(b)(1).2   
 Count 2:  By failing to promptly disburse N.N.'s 
$112,500 in sale proceeds pursuant to her requests, 
and by refusing to release the balance of such sale 
                                                 
1 The parties have informed us that N.N. died before the OLR 
filed its complaint against Attorney Carter. 
2 SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) provides:  
The scope of the representation and the basis or 
rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will 
be responsible shall be communicated to the client in 
writing, before or within a reasonable time after 
commencing the representation, except when the lawyer 
will charge a regularly represented client on the same 
basis or rate as in the past.  If it is reasonably 
foreseeable that the total cost of representation to 
the client, including attorney's fees, will be $1000 
or less, the communication may be oral or in writing.  
Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or 
expenses shall also be communicated in writing to the 
client. 
No. 
2012AP1827-D   
 
6 
 
proceeds to her until they had resolved their fee 
dispute, Attorney Carter violated SCR 20:1.15(d)(1).3   
 Count 3:  By failing to respond to N.N.'s requests for 
the status of her funds, Attorney Carter violated 
SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).4   
 Count 4:  By failing to advise N.N. that he had 
withdrawn $5,000 in fees without providing her any 
notice 
whatsoever, 
Attorney 
Carter 
violated 
SCR 20:1.15(g)(1).5  
                                                 
3 SCR 20:1.l5(d)(1) provides: 
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 
client has an interest, or in which the lawyer has 
received notice that a 3rd party has an interest 
identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or 
contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client 
or 3rd party in writing.  Except as stated in this 
rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement 
with the client, the lawyer shall promptly deliver to 
the client or 3rd party any funds or other property 
that the client or 3rd party is entitled to receive. 
4 SCR 20:1.4(a)(4) provides that a lawyer shall "promptly 
comply with reasonable requests by the client for information." 
5 SCR 20:1.15(g)(1) provides: 
At least 5 business days before the date on which 
a disbursement is made from a trust account for the 
purpose 
of 
paying 
fees, 
with 
the 
exception 
of 
contingent fees or fees paid pursuant to court order, 
the lawyer shall transmit to the client in writing all 
of the following:  
a. an itemized bill or other accounting showing 
the services rendered;  
b. notice of the amount owed and the anticipated 
date of the withdrawal; and  
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP1827-D   
 
7 
 
 Count 5:  By failing to hold at least $72,053.59 of 
N.N.'s funds in trust and converting them to his own 
purposes or for third party purposes without her 
knowledge 
or 
consent, 
Attorney 
Carter 
violated 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(1)6 and SCR 20:8.4(c).7  
 Count 6:  By engaging in an ongoing scheme for months 
of making repeated misrepresentations to N.N. that he 
had invested on her behalf the balance of her $112,500 
in various investment instruments, when in fact he had 
never made any such investments and had already 
converted her funds for his own or third party 
purposes, Attorney Carter violated SCR 20:8.4(c).  
                                                                                                                                                             
c. a statement of the balance of the client's 
funds 
in 
the 
lawyer 
trust 
account 
after 
the 
withdrawal. 
6 SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) provides: 
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 
3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in 
connection with a representation.  All funds of 
clients and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm 
in connection with a representation shall be deposited 
in one or more identifiable trust accounts. 
7 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
No. 
2012AP1827-D   
 
8 
 
 Count 7:  By failing to respond to N.N.'s requests for 
a 
billing 
statement, 
Attorney 
Carter 
violated 
SCR 20:1.5(b)(3).8   
¶14 During the course of the OLR's investigation into 
N.N.'s grievance, the OLR requested Attorney Carter's 2009 trust 
account records.  The OLR's review of the records revealed 
deficiencies 
that 
led 
to 
the 
following 
four 
counts 
of 
misconduct, to which Attorney Carter also pled no contest: 
 Count 8:  In September 2009, Attorney Carter made an 
unidentified deposit to his trust account by telephone 
transfer in the amount of $2,500.  Carter was unable 
to identify to the OLR the reason for this transfer, 
but his business account bank statements confirm the 
funds came from him.  By making this telephone 
transfer 
to 
his 
trust 
account, 
Attorney 
Carter 
violated SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)b.9   
                                                 
8 SCR 20:1.5(b)(3) 
provides, 
"A 
lawyer 
shall 
promptly 
respond to a client's request for information concerning fees 
and expenses." 
9 SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)b. provides: 
No deposits or disbursements shall be made to or 
from a pooled trust account by a telephone transfer of 
funds.  This section does not prohibit any of the 
following:   
1. wire transfers.  
2. telephone transfers between non-pooled draft 
and non-pooled non-draft trust accounts that a lawyer 
maintains for a particular client. 
No. 
2012AP1827-D   
 
9 
 
 Count 9:  Another of Attorney Carter's clients, K.S, 
received $2,000 monthly payments related to K.S.'s 
sale 
of 
a 
business 
interest. 
 
Attorney 
Carter 
represented K.S. with respect to this sale.  Rather 
than depositing the monthly payments in his trust 
account and then disbursing the funds to K.S. by 
issuing checks from the trust account, Attorney Carter 
channeled the funds through his own business account 
on 
at 
least 
ten 
occasions, 
thereby 
violating 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(1).  
 Count 10:  By failing to maintain trust account 
records showing the required information, including a 
transaction 
register, 
subsidiary 
client 
ledgers, 
deposit records, canceled checks, and monthly account 
reconciliations, 
Attorney 
Carter 
violated 
SCR 20:1.15(f)(1).10   
                                                 
10 SCR 20:1.15(f)(1) provides: 
Complete records of a trust account that is a 
draft account shall include a transaction register; 
individual client ledgers for IOLTA accounts and other 
pooled trust accounts; a ledger for account fees and 
charges, if law firm funds are held in the account 
pursuant to sub. (b)(3); deposit records; disbursement 
records; 
monthly 
statements; 
and 
reconciliation 
reports, subject to all of the following:  
a. Transaction register. The transaction register 
shall contain a chronological record of all account 
transactions, and shall include all of the following:  
1. the date, source, and amount of all deposits;  
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP1827-D   
 
10 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
2. the date, check or transaction number, payee 
and amount of all disbursements, whether by check, 
wire transfer, or other means;  
3. the date and amount of every other deposit or 
deduction of whatever nature;  
4. the identity of the client for whom funds were 
deposited or disbursed; and  
5. 
the 
balance 
in 
the 
account 
after 
each 
transaction.  
b. Individual client ledgers. A subsidiary ledger 
shall be maintained for each client or 3rd party for 
whom 
the 
lawyer 
receives 
trust 
funds 
that 
are 
deposited in an IOLTA account or any other pooled 
trust account. The lawyer shall record each receipt 
and disbursement of a client's or 3rd party's funds 
and the balance following each transaction. A lawyer 
shall not disburse funds from an IOLTA account or any 
pooled trust account that would create a negative 
balance with respect to any individual client or 
matter.  
c. Ledger 
for 
account 
fees 
and 
charges. 
A 
subsidiary ledger shall be maintained for funds of the 
lawyer deposited in the trust account to accommodate 
monthly service charges. Each deposit and expenditure 
of the lawyer's funds in the account and the balance 
following each transaction shall be identified in the 
ledger.  
d. Deposit records.  Deposit slips shall identify 
the name of the lawyer or law firm, and the name of 
the account. The deposit slip shall identify the 
amount of each deposit item, the client or matter 
associated with each deposit item, and the date of the 
deposit. The lawyer shall maintain a copy or duplicate 
of each deposit slip. All deposits shall be made 
intact. No cash, or other form of disbursement, shall 
be deducted from a deposit. Deposits of wired funds 
shall 
be 
documented 
in 
the 
account's 
monthly 
statement.  
e. Disbursement records.  
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP1827-D   
 
11 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
1. Checks. Checks shall be pre-printed and pre-
numbered. The name and address of the lawyer or law 
firm, and the name of the account shall be printed in 
the upper left corner of the check. Trust account 
checks shall include the words "Client Account," or 
"Trust Account" or words of similar import in the 
account name. Each check disbursed from the trust 
account shall identify the client matter and the 
reason for the disbursement on the memo line.  
2. Canceled checks. Canceled checks shall be 
obtained from the financial institution. Imaged checks 
may be substituted for canceled checks.  
3. Imaged 
checks. 
Imaged 
checks 
shall 
be 
acceptable if they provide both the front and reverse 
of the check and comply with the requirements of this 
paragraph. The information contained on the reverse 
side 
of 
the 
imaged 
checks 
shall 
include 
any 
endorsement signatures or stamps, account numbers, and 
transaction dates that appear on the original. Imaged 
checks shall be of sufficient size to be readable 
without magnification and as close as possible to the 
size of the original check.  
4. Wire 
transfers. 
Wire 
transfers 
shall 
be 
documented by a written withdrawal authorization or 
other documentation, such as a monthly statement of 
the account that indicates the date of the transfer, 
the payee, and the amount.  
f. Monthly 
statement. 
The 
monthly 
statement 
provided to the lawyer or law firm by the financial 
institution shall identify the name and address of the 
lawyer or law firm and the name of the account.  
g. Reconciliation 
reports. 
For 
each 
trust 
account, the lawyer shall prepare and retain a printed 
reconciliation report on a regular and periodic basis 
not 
less 
frequently 
than 
every 
30 
days. 
Each 
reconciliation report shall show all of the following 
balances and verify that they are identical:  
1. the balance that appears in the transaction 
register as of the reporting date;  
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP1827-D   
 
12 
 
 Count 11:  By issuing numerous trust account checks 
without including the client matter and purpose of 
such checks on the memo line, Attorney Carter violated 
SCR 20:l.15(f)(l)e.1. 
¶15 The referee held a one-day hearing on sanctions.  
Several witnesses testified as to Attorney Carter's good 
character and reputation, as well as his long-time community 
involvement.  Attorney Carter also testified.  He admitted that 
he used funds from N.N.'s legal matter as a way to relieve 
significant financial pressures caused by a failed business 
investment.  He admitted that he erred in managing his trust 
account.  He admitted that his trust account records reflect 
that he converted to himself at least $32,400 of N.N.'s funds 
and converted for third party purposes approximately $39,600 of 
N.N.'s funds.  He admitted that his claim that he had invested 
N.N.'s funds was a lie.   
¶16 In her report, the referee recommended a three-year 
suspension of Attorney Carter's license.  The referee wrote that 
Attorney 
Carter's 
misconduct 
ranged 
from 
trust 
account 
                                                                                                                                                             
2. the total of all subsidiary ledger balances 
for IOLTA accounts and other pooled trust accounts, 
determined by listing and totaling the balances in the 
individual client ledgers and the ledger for account 
fees and charges, as of the reporting date; and  
3. the adjusted balance, determined by adding 
outstanding deposits and other credits to the balance 
in the financial institution's monthly statement and 
subtracting outstanding checks and other deductions 
from the balance in the monthly statement. 
No. 
2012AP1827-D   
 
13 
 
recordkeeping violations "to the most fundamental betrayals of 
the attorney-client relationship"——conversion of client trust 
funds.  The referee noted that Attorney Carter covered up his 
conversion of N.N.'s funds by perpetuating a "phony story about 
his investment of those funds," and that "[o]nce exposed, Carter 
proceeded to hold hostage the distribution of [N.N.'s] trust 
funds until Carter and [N.N.] reached an agreement as to the 
amount and payment of Carter's attorney's fees."  The referee 
noted that Attorney Carter "perpetuated his investment charade 
to OLR for months" before ultimately acknowledging that he never 
invested N.N.'s funds.  The referee also found as an aggravating 
factor Attorney Carter's lengthy legal experience, particularly 
in matters of ethics and professional conduct.  (Attorney Carter 
served on the Milwaukee County Ethics Board for 28 years; on a 
committee for the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility 
for 20 years; and as a special investigator for the OLR for four 
years.)  As mitigating factors, the referee noted that Attorney 
Carter ultimately pled no contest to all of the charged 
misconduct; 
owes 
no 
restitution; 
enjoys 
a 
very 
positive 
reputation in the Milwaukee area; suffers from blindness as a 
result of an injury incurred many years ago while on duty as a 
police officer; and has expressed genuine remorse for his 
actions. 
¶17 There is no claim that any of the referee's findings 
of fact are clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, we adopt them.  See 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, 
¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. 
No. 
2012AP1827-D   
 
14 
 
¶18 The only issue on appeal is whether the recommended 
discipline is appropriate.  The court may impose whatever 
discipline 
it 
sees 
fit, 
regardless 
of 
the 
referee's 
recommendation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶19 Attorney Carter asks for either a public reprimand or, 
at most, a suspension of less than six months.  Attorney Carter 
claims that his misconduct, while admittedly significant, caused 
N.N. no monetary loss.  He claims there is virtually no risk 
that he would repeat his misconduct given his personal history, 
his age, his acceptance of responsibility, and his remorse for 
his misconduct.  He further claims that, given his solid 
reputation, a reprimand or short suspension will be enough to 
deter other lawyers from similar misconduct.   
¶20 We disagree.  By any measure, and by Attorney Carter's 
own 
admission, 
Attorney 
Carter 
engaged 
in 
very 
serious 
misconduct.  As we have previously explained: 
Misappropriation or conversion of client funds held in 
trust is one of the most serious acts of lawyer 
misconduct.  It violates the fundamental principle of 
the lawyer-client relationship——the trust the client 
places in the lawyer and upon which the lawyer depends 
to properly represent the client.  Further, it places 
the lawyer's personal pecuniary interest above the 
client's interests, which the lawyer has undertaken to 
protect and promote, and it does so at the client's 
expense.  Accordingly, such misconduct should warrant 
the imposition of the most severe discipline——the 
license revocation.   
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bult, 142 Wis. 2d 885, 
890, 419 N.W.2d 245 (1988). 
No. 
2012AP1827-D   
 
15 
 
¶21 Nonetheless, 
we 
have 
cautioned 
that 
"license 
revocation ought not be imposed indiscriminately in every case 
of misappropriation or conversion of client funds, as there are 
other factors to consider and no two disciplinary cases present 
precisely the same circumstances."  Id. at 890-91. 
¶22 Thus, the question before the court is whether this 
case presents sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit a 
sanction short of revocation.  It is a close call. 
¶23 There are many aggravating factors.  Attorney Carter's 
conduct involved much more than simple negligence.  His conduct 
was reckless and highly unprofessional.  In answer to N.N.'s 
repeated requests for her funds——over $70,000 of which he had 
converted——Attorney Carter wove elaborate stories of investment 
instruments in which he had supposedly placed her money.  These 
supposed investments were pure fiction.  Not long after N.N. 
objected to Attorney Carter's supposed investment scheme, 
Attorney Carter took action to create leverage over N.N.:  he 
sent her a $43,400 legal bill.  He refused to release the 
remainder of N.N's funds in trust until they reached an 
agreement on his fees.  He accused N.N. of trying to take 
advantage of him by not insisting that he prepare a written fee 
agreement listing his hourly rate.  These forms of deception and 
subterfuge are highly damaging to the public's confidence in the 
integrity and trustworthiness of the bar. 
¶24 There are mitigating factors as well.  Attorney Carter 
has had no previous disciplinary troubles over the course of his 
long legal career.  He has earned a solid reputation among his 
No. 
2012AP1827-D   
 
16 
 
peers and in the community.  It appears he repaid most, and 
perhaps all, of the money he misappropriated from N.N. (The 
record is unclear as to whether he ever accounted for the $5,000 
fee payment he withdrew from his trust account without N.N.'s 
knowledge.)  He has admitted his wrongdoing, pled no contest to 
all 11 counts of misconduct, and expressed shame and remorse.   
¶25 On 
balance, 
we 
find 
that 
there 
are 
sufficient 
mitigating circumstances to call for a sanction short of 
revocation.  We agree with the referee's recommendation of a 
three-year suspension.  We find In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Goldstein, 2010 WI 26, 323 Wis. 2d 706, 782 N.W.2d 388 
instructive.  There, a lawyer received a two-year suspension for 
misconduct that included converting nearly $70,000 from three 
probate estates for which the attorney served as special 
administrator or personal representative.  This court noted that 
although it will "not hesitate to impose revocation when needed 
and many cases involving conversion of funds have warranted 
revocation," a two-year suspension was sufficient given the 
lawyer's lack of prior discipline over a long legal career, his 
acknowledgement of his wrongdoing, and his repayment of the 
converted funds to his clients.  Id., ¶¶28-29.  We agree with 
the referee's assessment that a suspension longer than the two-
year suspension imposed in Goldstein is appropriate here in 
light of Attorney Carter's "elaborate scheme specifically 
employed to avoid his client's demands for distributions of her 
trust funds," as well as the fact that he "[held] hostage the 
No. 
2012AP1827-D   
 
17 
 
distribution of her trust funds until he was successful at 
obtaining his attorney's fees." 
¶26 We pause to remark briefly on Attorney Carter's claim 
that at his age (he was born in 1943), a three-year suspension——
which will require him to petition this court for reinstatement 
under SCR 22.28(3)——might effectively end his career.  Attorney 
Carter generally maintains that it is sad for an otherwise 
untarnished career to potentially end this way.  We agree with 
this sentiment:  this is an unfortunate case involving anomalous 
behavior from an otherwise ethical lawyer, and we do not relish 
deciding it.  But we decline to transform this sentiment into 
anything more than what it is——a sentiment, not a principle of 
law.  This court cannot countenance a rule that would soft-pedal 
the discipline owed to attorneys who lie to and misappropriate 
funds from their clients so long as they do so in the twilight 
of their careers. 
¶27 No restitution was sought and none is ordered in this 
proceeding.  We note, however, that any attorney petitioning for 
reinstatement from a disciplinary suspension of six months or 
more is required to allege and demonstrate that the attorney 
"has made restitution to or settled all claims of persons 
injured or harmed by [the attorney's] misconduct . . . or, if 
not, the [attorney's] explanation of the failure or inability to 
do so."  SCR 22.29(4m). 
¶28 We agree with the referee's recommendation that 
Attorney Carter be required to pay the costs of this proceeding, 
which total $6,680.62 as of September 24, 2014. 
No. 
2012AP1827-D   
 
18 
 
¶29 IT IS ORDERED that the license of John J. Carter to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of three 
years, effective January 11, 2015. 
¶30 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, John J. Carter shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this disciplinary proceeding. 
¶31 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that John J. Carter shall comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a 
person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶32 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.29(4)(c). 
¶33 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, 
J., did not participate. 
 
 
No. 
2012AP1827-D   
 
 
 
1