Title: Bruce Joseph Croushore v.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1998AP000437-BA
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 14, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0437-BA 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
In the Matter of the Bar Admission of: 
 
Bruce Joseph Croushore and Axley  
Brynelson, LLP, 
 
Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Board of Bar Examiners, 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS DECISION 
Previously reported at:  221 Wis. 2d 245, 
  584 N.W.2d 542 (1998) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 14, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
No. 
98-0437-BA 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-0437-BA 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of the Bar Admission of: 
Bruce Joseph Croushore and Axley 
Brynelson, LLP, 
 
 
Petitioners, 
 
v.  
Board of Bar Examiners, 
 
 
Respondent. 
FILED 
 
MAY 14, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
Review of 
Board of 
Bar 
Examiners decision;  decision 
affirmed.  
¶1 
PER CURIAM   This is a continuation of the review 
pursuant to SCR 40.08(5)1 of the decision of the Board of Bar 
Examiners (Board) declining to certify Bruce Joseph Croushore’s 
satisfaction of the legal competence requirement for bar 
admission on the basis of practice elsewhere. We earlier 
                     
1  
SCR 
40.08 
provides, 
in 
pertinent 
part: 
Adverse 
determination. 
 . . .  
(5) A petition to the supreme court for review of an 
adverse determination of the board under this rule shall be 
filed with the clerk within 30 days of the date on which written 
notice thereof was mailed to the applicant.   
No. 
98-0437-BA 
 
2 
determined that the Board did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion by not addressing in its findings, conclusions, and 
ultimate determination Mr. Croushore’s request for a waiver of 
the bar admission rule, SCR 40.05(2),2 that permits legal service 
as corporate counsel in another jurisdiction to be deemed the 
practice of law in satisfaction of the legal competence 
requirement only if that work occurred in a jurisdiction where 
the applicant was admitted to the bar. Croushore v. Board of Bar 
Examiners, 221 Wis. 2d 245, 584 N.W.2d 542 (1998). The Board had 
stated in an earlier letter notifying Mr. Croushore of its 
intent to decline to certify his eligibility for bar admission 
that it had determined that he did not present an exceptional 
case or good cause for waiver, but because that determination 
was set forth in the conclusory language of the bar admission 
waiver rule, SCR 40.10,3 we remanded the matter to the Board with 
directions to address more fully the issue of waiver, setting 
forth the reasons underlying its determination that the nature 
                     
2  SCR 40.05 provides, in pertinent part: Legal competence 
requirement: Proof of practice elsewhere.  
 . . .  
(2) Legal service as corporate counsel or trust officer, if 
conducted in a state where the applicant was admitted to 
practice law, may be deemed to be the practice of law for the 
purposes of sub. (1)(b) and (c).  
3  SCR 40.10 provides: Waiver of requirements.  
Except for the requirements under SCR 40.03, the board may 
waive any of the requirements of this chapter in exceptional 
cases and for good cause if failure to waive the requirement 
would be unjust.  
No. 
98-0437-BA 
 
3 
of Mr. Croushore’s corporate practice did not constitute “an 
exceptional case [or] good cause” for a waiver. The facts 
underlying this review are set forth in our earlier opinion.  
¶2 
In its response to the court’s remand, the Board 
determined that Mr. Croushore met none of the three conditions 
for a waiver under SCR 40.10. First, he did not establish “an 
exceptional case,” as he is in the same position as many other 
corporate lawyers who are not admitted to the practice of law in 
the jurisdiction where they are employed and physically located. 
The Board described those persons, who customarily do not seek 
bar admission 
in 
the 
state 
where 
they are 
located, as 
“ . . . practic[ing] 
entirely 
within 
a 
corporate 
setting, 
reporting to and advising officers and staff of the corporation 
which employs them. They do not appear in the courts of the 
state in which they are located and employed, do not sign 
pleadings, and do not consult with or advise clients in the 
ordinary meaning of the word.” The Board noted that Attorney 
Croushore admitted he did not seek bar admission where he was 
employed by a corporation for 14 years merely because that state 
did not require corporate counsel to be admitted to its bar. The 
Board asserted that seven of the 55 jurisdictions in the 
American legal system have separate registration procedures for 
counsel not admitted in the jurisdiction, recognizing thereby 
that many corporate lawyers do not seek admission in states 
where they are employed.  
¶3 
Second, the Board determined that Mr. Croushore did 
not establish “good cause” for waiver of the rule but merely 
No. 
98-0437-BA 
 
4 
asserted an argument of convenience: that he preferred not to 
take time out of his work schedule with a law firm, including 
considerable travel on behalf of the firm’s clients, in order to 
prepare for and take the bar examination. The Board pointed out 
that other lawyers who formerly worked as corporate counsel and 
are now admitted to the bar in Wisconsin were admitted here 
either on the basis of their work in another jurisdiction where 
they were admitted to the bar or by taking the Wisconsin bar 
examination.  
¶4 
Third, the Board determined that Mr. Croushore did not 
establish that failure to grant him a waiver of the bar 
admission 
rule 
“would 
be 
unjust.” 
The 
Board 
viewed 
Mr. 
Croushore’s contention in this respect in light of his law firm 
employer’s assertions that it would not be in the interests of 
justice 
for 
him 
to 
be 
“diverted 
from 
his 
significant 
responsibilities to become conversant [with Wisconsin law]” and 
that his financial relationship with his clients and the law 
firm “would be seriously impaired” if he were required to 
prepare for the bar examination.  
¶5 
In his response to the Board’s decision on remand, Mr. 
Croushore 
contended 
that 
he 
did 
establish 
“exceptional 
circumstances” and “good cause” for waiver on the basis of what 
he 
terms 
his 
“unique 
qualifications” 
by 
virtue 
of 
his 
“substantial legal experience” and the “complex transactional 
work” he performed as corporate counsel. Notwithstanding the 
nature and extent of the corporate practice he engaged in, Mr. 
Croushore has not distinguished his experience from that of 
No. 
98-0437-BA 
 
5 
other 
corporate 
counsel 
so 
as 
to 
present 
“exceptional 
circumstances” 
for 
consideration 
in 
his 
bar 
admission 
application.  
¶6 
Mr. Croushore next contended that the court should 
amend the corporate practice bar admission rule to avoid what he 
considers 
arbitrary 
distinctions 
between 
corporate 
legal 
practice conducted in a jurisdiction where the person is 
admitted to the bar and the same practice where the person is 
not admitted. He asserted that while engaged in corporate legal 
practice in Alabama for the 14 years preceding his bar admission 
application he continued to be a member in good standing of the 
New York bar and remained under the power and regulation of that 
bar while performing corporate work in Alabama. It does not 
appear, however, nor did Mr. Croushore suggest, that New York 
would have had disciplinary jurisdiction over his performance of 
corporate work in Alabama. His assertion that the attorney 
references he provided in his application were sufficient to 
satisfy the Board that he had been subjected to “ongoing peer 
review and professional scrutiny” is unpersuasive.  
¶7 
Mr. Croushore also urged the court to amend the 
admission rule to include legal service as corporate counsel 
with those activities that may be deemed to constitute the 
practice of law for the purpose of bar admission whether or not 
conducted in a jurisdiction where the applicant is admitted to 
the bar, such as service as a judge of a court of record, legal 
service with local, state, or federal government, and teaching 
in a law school approved by the American Bar Association. As an 
No. 
98-0437-BA 
 
6 
alternative, he suggested that the rule be amended to permit 
corporate legal practice to constitute the practice of law for 
purposes of bar admission if the applicant had been a member of 
any state bar, even if not the bar of the jurisdiction in which 
the work was performed.  
¶8 
In its decision, the Board stated that it does not 
oppose an amendment of the corporate practice bar admission rule 
by recourse to the court’s rule making procedure. However, the 
Board did not indicate any precise amendment it would favor. 
Accordingly, we direct the Board to consider and propose for 
adoption an amendment of the corporate practice bar admission 
rule that it deems sufficient to satisfy the interest of the 
court in ensuring the competent practice of those it admits to 
the practice of law in Wisconsin.  
¶9 
We determine that the Board properly decided the issue 
of 
waiver 
in 
respect 
to 
Mr. 
Croushore’s 
bar 
admission 
application 
and 
adequately 
set 
forth 
the 
basis 
for 
its 
determination on the issues relevant to waiver.  
¶10 IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Board of Bar 
Examiners 
declining 
to 
certify 
Bruce 
Joseph 
Croushore’s 
satisfaction of the legal competence requirement for bar 
admission on the basis of practice elsewhere is affirmed.  
 
 
1