Title: Foley-Ciccantelli, et al. v. Bishop's Grove Condominium Assoc., Inc
Citation: 2011 WI 36
Docket Number: 2009AP000688
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 24, 2011

2011 WI 36 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP688 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Susan Foley-Ciccantelli and Dr. Mark J. 
Ciccantelli, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Bishop's Grove Condominium Association, Inc and 
State Farm  
Fire & Casualty Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 24, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 6, 2010 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Kathryn W. Foster 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
 
ROGGENSACK, J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER and GABLEMAN, JJ. join the concurrence   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief and oral 
argument by Timothy J. Andringa, Cramer, Multhauf & Hammes, LLP, 
Waukesha. 
 
For the defendant-respondents there was a brief and oral 
argument by Neal C. Schellinger, Schellinger & Associates, 
Waukesha. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by John F. Ebbott, 
Milwaukee for Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc., and oral argument 
by John F. Ebbott. 
 
 
 
2011 WI 36
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports. 
No.   2009AP688 
(L.C. No. 
2008CV1627) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Susan Foley-Ciccantelli and Dr. Mark J. 
Ciccantelli, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Bishop's Grove Condominium Association, Inc. 
and State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 24, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of an order of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, Kathryn W. Foster, Judge.  Reversed and remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is an appeal from 
an order of the Circuit Court for Waukesha County, Kathryn W. 
Foster, Judge, on certification by the court of appeals pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2007-08).1  
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The circuit court granted the motion of Bishop's Grove 
Condominium Association, Inc., the defendant, to disqualify the 
attorney representing Susan Foley-Ciccantelli and Dr. Mark J. 
Ciccantelli, the plaintiffs, in their personal injury slip-and-
fall action against the defendant.2  The motion made no 
allegation of unethical conduct.  The circuit court concluded 
that the plaintiffs' law firm did not engage in any unethical 
conduct of any kind.  The instant case is not a determination of 
unethical conduct.  Violations of the Code of Professional 
Conduct are determined only by means of disciplinary action.  
This is a disqualification proceeding, not a disciplinary 
proceeding.     
¶3 
The 
circuit court determined, however, that the 
attorney's law firm had previously represented Bishop's Grove's 
exclusive property manager, the Foster Group, Ltd., and Wayne 
Foster, the principal in the Foster Group; that the attorney had 
communicated with Wayne Foster in regard to the present case; 
and that the attorney's representation of the plaintiffs in the 
present case created an appearance of impropriety. 
¶4 
The court of appeals certified two questions.  The 
first addresses whether Bishop's Grove has standing to bring a 
motion to disqualify plaintiffs' attorney:  
(1) Does a non-client party (Bishop's Grove) have 
standing 
in 
a 
civil 
action 
to 
move 
for 
the 
                                                 
2 Susan Foley-Ciccantelli alleges she slipped and fell and 
was injured.  Her husband is also a plaintiff; he seeks recovery 
for his personal injury resulting from his wife's injury.  The 
opinion will refer to both as "the plaintiffs." 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
3 
 
disqualification of the opposing party's attorney3 
based on that attorney's prior representation of a 
non-party (The Foster Group and Wayne Foster)?4 
¶5 
There is no single longstanding or uniform test to 
determine standing in the case law.  Courts have inconsistently 
used 
a 
variety 
of 
terminologies 
as 
tests 
for 
standing.  
Therefore, as a prerequisite to answering the first question, we 
review the law of standing.  Upon careful analysis of the case 
law, it is clear that the essence of the determination of 
standing is: (1) whether the party whose standing is challenged 
has a personal interest in the controversy (sometimes referred 
to in the case law as a "personal stake" in the controversy); 
(2) whether the interest of the party whose standing is 
challenged will be injured, that is, adversely affected; and (3) 
whether judicial policy calls for protecting the interest of the 
party whose standing has been challenged.   
¶6 
These three aspects of standing do not necessarily 
eliminate 
the 
various 
tests 
that 
have 
been 
applied 
in 
administrative review cases, in constitutional law cases, and in 
declaratory judgment cases.  These various tests, while at times 
inconsistently used by courts, when appropriately used in 
                                                 
3 The attorney's firm had represented the Foster Group and 
Wayne 
Foster. 
 
Supreme 
Court 
Rule 
20:1.10 
imputes 
disqualification to all members of a law firm. 
4 The court of appeals stated the issue as follows:  "Can a 
circuit court disqualify retained counsel-of-record in a civil 
suit, thereby denying the client the right to representation by 
chosen counsel and restricting the attorney's right to practice 
law in a civil action, where the attorney previously represented 
a nonparty witness for the opposing side?" 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
4 
 
particular types of cases are tools for determining personal 
interest, adverse effect, and judicial policy, the three 
essential aspects of standing.  When a statute, rule, or 
constitutional provision is at issue, a court determines these 
three aspects of standing by examining the facts to determine 
whether an injured interest exists that falls within the ambit 
of the statute, rule, or constitutional provision involved that 
judicial policy calls for protecting.  When no statute, rule, or 
constitutional provision directly governs the standing analysis, 
a court determines these three aspects of standing by examining 
the facts to determine whether an injured interest exists that 
falls within the ambit of relevant legal principles that 
judicial policy calls for protecting.  The present case falls 
within the latter group of cases.     
¶7 
We address the first question relating to standing in 
light of our analysis of the standing cases.  We conclude that 
as a general rule only a former or current client has standing 
to move to disqualify an attorney from representing someone else 
in a civil action.  Nevertheless, a non-client party may 
establish standing, that is, may establish that a personal 
interest in the controversy is adversely affected and that 
judicial policy calls for protection of that interest, when the 
prior representation is so connected with the current litigation 
that the prior representation is likely to affect the just and 
lawful determination of the non-client party's position. 
¶8 
We conclude that Bishop's Grove, the non-client 
defendant, has standing to move to disqualify opposing counsel.  
No. 
2009AP688   
 
5 
 
Bishop's Grove has shown that the plaintiffs' attorney's prior 
representation of the Foster Group and Wayne Foster is so 
connected 
with 
the 
current 
litigation 
that 
the 
prior 
representation 
is 
likely 
to 
affect 
the 
just 
and 
lawful 
determination of Bishop's Grove's position.5 
¶9 
Because we conclude Bishop's Grove has standing to 
bring a motion for disqualification in the present case, we next 
address the second question presented: 
(2) Did the circuit court err as a matter of law in 
applying an "appearance of impropriety" standard in 
deciding the motion for disqualification?  If so, what 
is the correct standard? 
¶10 In answer to this question, we conclude that the 
circuit 
court 
applied 
an 
incorrect 
standard 
of 
law 
in 
disqualifying the plaintiffs' attorney, namely, disqualifying 
the plaintiffs' attorney on the basis of an "appearance of 
impropriety." 
¶11 The appropriate standard a circuit court applies to 
determine a motion for disqualification of counsel based on an 
attorney's duty to a former client is guided by SCR 20:1.9.  A 
circuit court must determine:  (1) whether there was an 
attorney/client relationship between counsel and the former 
                                                 
5 In other words, Bishop's Grove has standing to advance the 
Foster Group's and Wayne Foster's rights as former clients of 
the plaintiffs' counsel.  Justice Roggensack's concurrence, on 
the other hand, would limit Bishop's Grove's standing to 
assertions 
that 
the 
plaintiffs' 
attorney 
has 
obtained 
information through a breach of the duty of confidentiality owed 
to Bishop's Grove.  See Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶¶138, 
180-183. 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
6 
 
client and whether it is over; (2) whether the subsequent 
representation involves the same or a substantially related 
matter as the former representation; (3) whether the interests 
of the subsequent client are materially adverse to those of the 
former client; and (4) whether the former client consented to 
the new representation. 
¶12 In the present case, it is necessary to determine 
whether the current and former representations involve a 
substantially related matter and whether the interests of the 
plaintiffs are materially adverse to those of the former 
clients, the Foster Group and Wayne Foster.   
¶13 Given the paucity of facts in the affidavits in the 
record relating to the attorney's prior representation of the 
Foster Group and Wayne Foster, we are unable to determine 
whether the two representations involve substantially related 
matters and whether the interests of the plaintiffs are 
materially adverse to the former clients' interests.  
¶14 Therefore, we cannot determine from the record before 
us 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court's 
order 
disqualifying 
the 
plaintiffs' attorney is erroneous when applying the correct 
standard.  Accordingly, we reverse the order of the circuit 
court disqualifying the plaintiffs' attorney and remand the 
matter to the circuit court for such further proceedings as the 
circuit court determines are appropriate to resolve the question 
presented.  
I 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
7 
 
¶15 The factual background presented in this appeal can be 
simply stated.  
¶16 The plaintiffs purchased a condominium from Bishop's 
Grove on or about February 1, 2007.  Thereafter, the plaintiffs, 
by their attorney, Timothy J. Andringa of Cramer, Multhauf & 
Hammes, LLP, brought a personal injury action against Bishop's 
Grove and Bishop's Grove's insurer, State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co., stemming from the plaintiffs' "slip-and-fall" injury on 
February 6, 2007, at Bishop's Grove's condominium complex.  The 
allegation in the complaint is that the slip and fall occurred 
on common property owned by Bishop's Grove at an accumulation of 
ice resulting from negligently maintained rain gutters.   
¶17 The Foster Group is "the exclusive managing agent" 
under a management agreement between Bishop's Grove and the 
Foster Group (a copy of which is in the record).  Under the 
management agreement, the Foster Group is to, inter alia, "cause 
the buildings, appurtenances, and grounds of the condominium to 
be maintained according to the standards acceptable to the 
association."   
¶18 According 
to 
the 
plaintiffs, 
Bishop's 
Grove's 
liability in the slip-and-fall case might arise from the acts or 
omissions of the Foster Group in maintaining the common property 
at Bishop's Grove.   
¶19 Neither Wayne Foster nor the Foster Group is a party 
in the slip-and-fall action.  However, the plaintiffs and 
Bishop's Grove view Wayne Foster as a likely witness in the 
slip-and-fall case.  The Foster Group, as real estate property 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
8 
 
manager, is an insured under State Farm's comprehensive business 
liability policy issued to Bishop's Grove.  The same defense 
counsel in this slip-and-fall case represents Bishop's Grove and 
the insurance company.6         
¶20 Bishop's 
Grove's 
counsel 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
disqualification of plaintiffs' attorney upon learning that the 
Foster Group and Wayne Foster had been represented by the 
plaintiffs' attorney's law firm (the Cramer firm) in the past.  
The plaintiffs and Bishop's Grove submitted affidavits and 
briefs in support of their respective positions on the motion 
for disqualification.        
¶21 Wayne Foster's affidavit describes the relationship 
between the Cramer firm and the Foster Group and himself as 
follows:  
3) Peter Plaushines [an attorney with the Cramer firm] 
has represented the Foster Group Ltd. for over fifteen 
years. 
4) 
Peter 
Plaushines 
has 
represented 
me 
as 
the 
principal of Foster Group, Ltd. for a variety of 
business matters. 
5) Most of Peter Plaushines['] representation of 
Foster Group, Ltd. has involved real estate or real 
estate development. 
                                                 
6 The parties disagree as to whether Wayne Foster and the 
Foster Group are represented by defense counsel.  The plaintiffs 
assert that Wayne Foster and Foster Group are not parties to the 
action and so defense counsel does not represent them in this 
action.  Defense counsel asserts that, because they are insureds 
under the policy, he represents Wayne Foster and the Foster 
Group in this action.  
No. 
2009AP688   
 
9 
 
6) Peter Plaushines was counsel for Foster Group, Ltd. 
development of the Ruff's Preserve subdivision and the 
Water's 
Edge 
Condominium 
on 
Lake 
Nagawicka 
development, among others. 
7) Peter Plaushines defended Foster Group in the law 
suit of Gulseth vs. Cousel, 2004 CV-1286, Washington 
County, which ended in about the year 2006 and also 
involved another land development called Island View. 
8) Peter Plaushines has, as Fosters [sic] Group's 
attorney, drafted condominium documents and provided 
advice 
and 
counsel 
regarding 
all 
aspects 
of 
condominium development in prior years. . . . 
¶22 Nothing in the record demonstrates that either Wayne 
Foster or the Foster Group has consented to the Cramer firm's 
representation of the plaintiffs.  Nowhere in the record does 
Wayne 
Foster 
explicitly 
object 
to 
the 
Cramer 
firm's 
representation of the plaintiffs.  Wayne Foster's affidavit is, 
however, attached to Bishop's Grove's motion to disqualify the 
plaintiffs' counsel.  
¶23 The affidavit of Attorney Peter Plaushines of the 
Cramer firm states that to the best of his knowledge he did not 
receive confidential information from Wayne Foster regarding the 
subject matter of the current slip-and-fall representation; that 
he did not represent Wayne Foster or the Foster Group in any 
matters involving Bishop's Grove, Inc.; and that he did not 
receive any confidential information from Wayne Foster or the 
Foster Group relating to Bishop's Grove.    
¶24 Attorney Timothy G. Andringa of the Cramer firm filed 
an affidavit averring that prior to representing the plaintiffs, 
the firm ran a conflict of interest check against Bishop's 
Grove; that the firm has never represented Bishop's Grove; and 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
10 
 
that the firm did not represent Bishop's Grove or the Foster 
Group with respect to any management agreement involving 
Bishop's Grove.  According to the affidavit, the slip-and-fall 
action involves neither real estate development nor contractual 
issues of property management, and the Cramer firm's prior 
representation of the Foster Group has "no relationship of any 
kind to the current personal injury case."7  
¶25 At 
the 
hearing 
on 
the 
disqualification 
motion, 
Bishop's Grove argued that the Cramer firm had a long-term 
relationship and familiarity with the Foster Group, which gave 
the plaintiffs' counsel an unfair advantage in the present case.   
¶26 Following arguments on the disqualification motion, 
the circuit court did not make any findings of fact.  The 
circuit court ordered the plaintiffs' attorney disqualified, 
balancing the plaintiffs' right to retain counsel of their 
choosing with the "appearance of impropriety" caused by the 
Cramer firm's prior representation of the Foster Group and Wayne 
Foster, 
all 
in 
light 
of 
plaintiffs' 
attorney's 
two 
communications with Wayne Foster in connection with the current 
litigation, which we discuss later.     
¶27 No evidentiary hearing was held to determine whether 
the Cramer firm's previous representations of the Foster Group 
                                                 
7 The 
record 
is 
composed 
of 
documents 
such 
as 
the 
Condominium Association documents, the insurance policy, and 
affidavits. 
The Bishop's Grove condominium association documents were 
drafted by the Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren S.C. law firm.  
No. 
2009AP688   
 
11 
 
or Wayne Foster were substantially related to the subject matter 
of the slip-and-fall action or whether the plaintiffs' interests 
were materially adverse to those of the former clients.  
II 
¶28 We turn first to the question whether Bishop's Grove, 
a party in the case but not a former client of the plaintiffs' 
counsel, has standing in a civil action to move for the 
disqualification of the plaintiffs' counsel, based on the 
plaintiffs' counsel's prior representation of non-parties.     
¶29 The question whether Bishop's Grove has standing to 
move for the disqualification is a question of law that this 
court 
determines 
independently 
of 
the 
circuit 
court 
but 
benefiting from its analysis.8 
A 
¶30 The 
parties' 
briefs 
on 
the 
standing 
issue 
are 
relatively cursory.  Bishop's Grove relies predominantly on case 
law 
establishing that Wisconsin courts liberally construe 
standing.9   
¶31 The plaintiffs essentially rely on two cases (with 
facts different from the present case) relating to a lawyer's 
conflict of interest to persuade the court that Bishop's Grove 
                                                 
8 Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶38, 327 
Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177; State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, 
¶23, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611. 
9 Bishop's Grove cites Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, 
Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, 69 Wis. 2d 1, 
13, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975), and Ramme v. Madison, 37 Wis. 2d 102, 
116, 154 N.W.2d 296 (1967). 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
12 
 
has no standing under the facts of the present case.  The two 
cases are Forecki v. Kohlberg, 237 Wis. 67, 295 N.W. 7 (1940), 
and In Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Marine, 82 
Wis. 2d 602, 264 N.W.2d 285 (1978).  
¶32 Forecki, 
upon 
which 
the 
plaintiffs 
and 
Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence rely, is an appeal of a jury verdict.  
The defendants in Forecki objected to opposing counsel's 
potential breach of duty to an adversarial party.  The 
defendants alleged that the plaintiffs were adverse to each 
other and therefore that the circuit court erred in permitting 
the plaintiffs' counsel to represent both plaintiffs.    
¶33 The Forecki court concluded that the defendants had no 
right to attack the verdict on these grounds.10 
¶34 The Forecki court quoted 7 C.J.S., Attorney and 
Client, 827, § 47 for the proposition that "[o]nly a party who 
sustains a relation of client to an attorney . . . may be 
entitled to object to [a current] representation."11  The court 
also ruled that the plaintiffs were "both intelligent and 
experienced business men" who made no objections to their 
representation.12  Further, upon review of the record, and 
relying on Canon 6 of the Professional Ethics of the American 
Bar Association, the court determined that "there was in fact no 
                                                 
10 Forecki v. Kohlberg, 237 Wis. 67, 75-76, 295 N.W. 7 
(1940). 
11 Id. at 75.   
12 Id. 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
13 
 
conflict of interests upon which defendants' objections on that 
ground could have been sustained."13  
¶35 In the second case upon which the plaintiffs rely, the 
Marine disciplinary action, the court cited Forecki for the 
principle that "only the client, and not third persons, has 
standing to complain of an attorney's representation while 
adversely interested."14  Otherwise, the Marine case offers no 
insight into the present case. 
¶36 These two cases do not answer the standing question 
posed in the present case.  They do not present the fact 
situation of the instant case.  We conclude that the question of 
standing of a non-client party in a civil action to move for the 
disqualification of the opposing party's attorney is one of 
first impression in Wisconsin. 
B 
¶37 We have undertaken a more exhaustive review of the law 
of standing than presented by the parties.  Three teachings 
emerge from the standing cases: 
                                                 
13 Id. at 76. 
14 In Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Marine, 82 
Wis. 2d 602, 605, 264 N.W.2d 285 (1978) (quoting Forecki). 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
14 
 
¶38 One:  Standing in Wisconsin is not to be construed 
narrowly or restrictively, but rather should be construed 
liberally.15  
¶39 Two:  Cases have used a variety of tests to determine 
whether 
the 
party 
challenged 
has 
standing. 
 
No 
single 
longstanding or uniform test for standing appears in the case 
law.  The terminology used in standing cases often turns on the 
nature of the case, but even in the same category of cases, the 
terminology for the test for standing or the application of the 
test is not consistent.  In stating the test for standing, the 
cases have not paid close attention to the factual or legal 
distinctions among the cases.  Two recent court of appeals cases 
have acknowledged the lack of uniformity in the case law on 
standing.16  The court of appeals has explained: 
The formulation for analyzing the issue of standing 
has varied somewhat in the case law, in part depending 
on the nature of the claim asserted.  The parties each 
use 
a 
somewhat 
different 
formulation 
in 
their 
arguments.   
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Schill, 327 Wis. 2d 572, ¶38; McConkey v. Van 
Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶15, 326 Wis. 2d 1, 783 N.W.2d 855; Krier v. 
Vilione, 2009 WI 45, ¶20, 317 Wis. 2d 288, 766 N.W.2d 517; State 
v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, ¶24, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611; 
Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee County, 2001 WI 65, ¶38, 
n.7, 
244 
Wis. 2d 333, 
627 
N.W.2d 866; 
Fox 
v. 
DHSS, 
112 
Wis. 2d 514, 524, 334 N.W.2d 532 (1983); Bence v. City of 
Milwaukee, 
107 
Wis. 2d 469, 
478, 
320 
N.W.2d 199 
(1982); 
Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 69 
Wis. 2d 1, 13, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975).   
16 Metro. Builders Ass'n of Greater Milwaukee v. Vill. of 
Germantown, 2005 WI App 103, 282 Wis. 2d 458, 698 N.W.2d 301; 
Chenequa Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Vill. of Hartland, 2004 WI 
App 144, 275 Wis. 2d 533, 685 N.W.2d 573. 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
15 
 
Chenequa Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Vill. of Hartland, 2004 WI 
App 144, ¶13, 275 Wis. 2d 533, 685 N.W.2d 573. 
¶40 Three:  On careful analysis of the cases, it is clear 
that the basic thrust of all the cases, the essence of the 
determination of standing, regardless of the nature of the case 
and the particular terminology used in the test for standing, is 
that standing depends on (1) whether the party whose standing is 
challenged has a personal interest in the controversy (sometimes 
referred to in the case law as a "personal stake" in the 
controversy); (2) whether the interest of the party whose 
standing is challenged will be injured, that is, adversely 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
16 
 
affected;17 and (3) whether judicial  policy calls for protecting 
the interest of the party whose standing is challenged.18   
                                                 
17 Schill, 327 Wis. 2d 572, ¶38 (injunction action; "[a] 
person has standing to seek judicial review when that person has 
a personal stake in the outcome and is directly affected by the 
issues in 
controversy"); Popenhagen, 309 Wis. 2d 601, ¶24 
(action to suppress bank documents; "[a] person has standing to 
seek judicial intervention when that person has 'a personal 
stake in the outcome' and is 'directly affected by the issues in 
controversy'"); Zellner v. Cedarburg Sch. Dist., 2007 WI 53, 
¶21, 
300 
Wis. 2d 290, 
731 
N.W.2d 240 
(public 
employee 
challenging release of records has standing because he will be 
impacted 
personally 
and 
his 
interests 
will 
be 
adversely 
affected); City of Waukesha v. Salbashian, 128 Wis. 2d 334, 349-
50, 382 N.W.2d 52 (1986) (quo warranto action under Wis. Stat. 
§ 784.02 (1985); "[i]n determining whether the municipalities 
are proper private plaintiffs for a quo warranto action, a 
court's analysis must be couched in terms of injury and 
interest, not semantics;" relator must show danger of sustaining 
injury and a "special interest"); City of Madison v. Town of 
Fitchburg, 
112 
Wis. 2d 224, 
228, 
332 
N.W.2d 782 
(1983) 
(declaratory judgment; "[i]n order to have standing to sue, a 
party must have a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy"); Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Koenigs, 110 
Wis. 2d 522, 526-28, 329 N.W.2d 157 (1983) (parents of injured 
child challenge dismissal of action against their insurer even 
though they asserted no claim to appeal against insurer; parents 
are 
aggrieved 
parties 
with 
standing; 
dismissal 
adversely 
affected their financial interest in having insurance coverage); 
Kiser v. Jungbacker, 2008 WI App 88, ¶12, 312 Wis. 2d 621, 754 
N.W.2d 180 (appeal of award of attorney's fees; "[t]he essence 
of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking review has 
alleged a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy"); 
Shovers v. Shovers, 2006 WI App 108, ¶28, 292 Wis. 2d 531, 718 
N.W.2d 130 
(declaratory 
judgment; 
"[s]tanding 
requires 
a 
personal stake in the outcome of a controversy"); Lake Country 
Racquet & Athletic Club v. Vill. of Hartland, 2002 WI App 301, 
¶15, 259 Wis. 2d 107, 655 N.W.2d 189 (declaratory judgment; "a 
party must have a personal stake in the outcome and must be 
directly affected by the issues in controversy"); Vill. of 
Slinger v. City of Hartland, 2002 WI App 187, ¶9, 256 
Wis. 2d 859, 650 N.W.2d 81 (declaratory judgment; "a party must 
have a personal stake in the outcome and must be directly 
affected by the issues in controversy"); Sandroni v. Waukesha 
County Bd. of Supervisors, 173 Wis. 2d 183, 186, 496 N.W.2d 164 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
17 
 
¶41 These three aspects of standing were aptly summarized 
in Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Service 
Commission, 
69 
Wis. 2d 1, 
13, 
230 
N.W.2d 243 
(1974), 
an 
administrative review case, as follows:  
The only problems about standing should be what 
interests deserve protection against injury, and what 
should be enough to constitute an injury.  Whether 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Ct. App. 1992) (challenge to allegedly illegal county contract; 
"[i]t is axiomatic that to have standing to sue, a party must 
have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy").  
An injury to even a "trifling interest" may suffice. 
McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶15; Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club v. 
DHSS, 130 Wis. 2d 56, 65, 387 N.W. 245 (1986); City of Madison 
v. Town of Fitchburg, 112 Wis. 2d 224, 230, 332 N.W.2d 782 
(1983); Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 524.   
The injury need not be physical, economic, or pecuniary; it 
may, for example, be aesthetic, conservational, or recreational. 
Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 525; Chenequa, 275 Wis. 2d 533, ¶17. 
18 Wisconsin courts evaluate standing as a matter of 
judicial policy rather than as a jurisdictional prerequisite.  
Schill, 327 Wis. 2d 572, ¶38 (injunction action); Milwaukee 
Dist. Council 48, 244 Wis. 2d 333, ¶38 n.7 (declaratory judgment 
action); First Nat'l Bank of Wis. Rapids v. M&I Peoples Bank of 
Caloma, 95 Wis. 2d 303, 308 n.5, 290 N.W.2d 321 (1980) ("[T]he 
doctrine of standing to sue in federal courts is generally 
regarded 
as 
constitutionally 
mandated 
by 
the 
'cases 
and 
controversies' limitation of Article III.  U.S. Const., art. 
III, sec. 2, cl. 1.  In Wisconsin, the circuit courts have been 
granted jurisdiction 'in all matters civil and criminal.'  Wis. 
Const., art. VII, sec. 8 (emphasis added).  While no case can be 
found holding standing to be a jurisdictional prerequisite, the 
doctrine has generally been applied as a matter of 'sound 
judicial policy.'" (internal citations omitted); Wisconsin's 
Envtl. Decade, 69 Wis. 2d at 13 (administrative agency review); 
Metro. Builders Ass'n, 282 Wis. 2d 458, ¶15 (administrative 
review; "public policy and the mandate to construe standing 
rules liberally [are] independent reasons supporting standing"); 
Zehetner v. Chrysler Fin. Co. LLC, 2004 WI App 80, ¶12, 272 
Wis. 2d 628, 679 N.W.2d 919 (violation of statute claimed). 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
18 
 
interests 
deserve 
legal 
protection 
depends 
upon 
whether they are sufficiently significant and whether 
good policy calls for protecting them or for denying 
them protection.19  
C 
¶42 The terminology used to analyze these three aspects of 
standing, the personal interest, the adverse effect, and 
judicial policy, has often depended on the nature of the case, 
although the decisions do not always make this point clearly.  
Indeed, the decisions often select the terminology used in the 
test for standing without carefully analyzing the nature of the 
case 
from 
which 
the 
terminology 
is 
derived. 
 
Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence offers a good illustration of this 
point.  It pulls out the "legally protectable interest" language 
from Fox v. Wis. Department of Health and Social Services, 112 
Wis. 2d 514, 
524, 
334 
N.W.2d 532 
(1983), 
but 
fails 
to 
acknowledge that the court in Fox established this language 
explicitly for administrative law review cases.20          
¶43 In cases that involve an administrative rule or 
decision, as well as cases that raise a constitutional challenge 
to executive or legislative action or cases initiated as 
declaratory judgment actions, the decisions most often examine 
and interpret a particular statute or constitutional provision 
at issue in the case to determine whether the party has 
                                                 
19 Quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 
§ 22.00-4, at 722 (1970 Supp.). 
20 Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 524 ("This court has established a 
two-part analysis . . . for determining whether parties seeking 
to challenge an administrative rule have standing."). 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
19 
 
standing.  Thus, these cases often refer to "legally protectable 
interests."  This phrase or a similar phrase means interests 
protected by a statute or constitutional provision at issue.       
¶44 For example, in cases involving review of a rule or 
decision of an administrative agency, courts have interpreted 
standing in light of the substantive statutes and regulations at 
issue and the text of chapter 227.  Chapter 227 governs 
administrative procedure and review and speaks in terms of 
review by "persons aggrieved" and persons "directly affected."   
¶45 In Fox the personal interest, the adverse effect, and 
the judicial policy aspects of standing were set forth as 
follows:  
This 
court has established a two-part analysis, 
similar to the federal test, for determining whether 
parties seeking to challenge an administrative rule 
have standing.  The first step is to determine 
"whether the decision of the agency directly causes 
injury to the interest of the petitioner.  The second 
step is to determine whether the interest asserted is 
recognized 
by 
law" 
(citations 
omitted; 
emphasis 
added).   
Fox v. DHSS, 112 Wis. 2d 514, 524, 334 N.W.2d 532 (1983) (citing 
Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 69 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
20 
 
Wis. 2d 1, 9, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975)).21  The Fox opinion 
describes the second step as not only "whether the interest 
asserted is recognized by law" but also as whether the injury is 
to a "legally protected interest."22  Thus, a legally protected 
interest in Fox is an interest recognized by law.  
¶46 In contrast to the administrative review cases, in 
Wisconsin 
cases 
involving 
a 
constitutional 
challenge 
to 
legislative or executive action, to determine the personal 
interest, the adverse effect, and the judicial policy aspects of 
standing, the decisions frequently rely on language from federal 
cases governing standing in constitutional challenges.23  Thus in 
                                                 
21 For substantially similar formulations of the test for 
determining standing in administrative review cases, see, e.g., 
Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc v. DNR, 144 Wis. 2d 499, 503-504, 424 
N.W.2d 685 (1988); Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club, 130 Wis. 2d 
at 65; Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, 69 Wis. 2d at 9-10;  Eller 
Media, Inc. v. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 2001 WI App 269, ¶7, 
249 Wis. 2d 198, 637 N.W.2d 96; Town of Delevan v. City of 
Delevan, 160 Wis. 2d 403, 411, 466 N.W.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1991); 
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 164 
Wis. 2d 489, 494-95, 476 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1991); Mendonca v. 
DNR, 126 Wis. 2d 207, 209, 376 N.W.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1985). 
22 Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 526. 
23 See, e.g., State v. Iglesias, 185 Wis. 2d 117, 132-33, 
517 N.W.2d 175 (1994) (citing Bence v. City of Milwaukee, 107 
Wis. 2d 469, 478, 320 N.W.2d 199 (1982)); Bence v. City of 
Milwaukee, 107 Wis. 2d 469, 478, 320 N.W.2d 199 (1982) (citing 
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 
59, 72)); First Nat'l Bank, 95 Wis. 2d at 308-09 (citing Sierra 
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972)); Polan v. DOR, 147 
Wis. 2d 648, 658, 433 N.W.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Bence). 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
21 
 
State ex rel. First National Bank of Wisconsin Rapids v. M&I 
Peoples Bank of Coloma, 95 Wis. 2d 303, 308, 290 N.W.2d 321 
(1980), relying on federal cases, the court described the 
standing question as two-fold:  is there an injury and does the 
constitutional provision on which the claim rests grant the 
party whose standing is challenged a right to judicial relief.  
The court explained the standing inquiry as follows: 
Whether the plaintiff himself has suffered "some 
threatened 
or 
actual 
injury 
resulting 
from 
the 
putatively 
illegal 
action" . . . and 
"whether 
the 
constitutional . . . provision 
on 
which 
the 
claim 
rests properly can be understood as granting persons 
in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial 
relief" (citations omitted).24  
                                                                                                                                                             
See also State v. Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, ¶19, 580 
N.W.2d 260 (1998) (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 
350 (1977): "In the First Amendment arena, however, courts have 
altered their traditional rules of standing to permit 'attacks 
on overly broad statutes without requiring that the person 
making the attack demonstrate that in fact his specific conduct 
was protected'" (internal citations omitted).). 
The requirement of an actual or threatened injury for 
standing under federal law is derived from the Article III 
"cases 
and 
controversies" 
limitation 
on 
federal 
court 
jurisdiction.  First Nat'l Bank, 95 Wis. 2d at 308-309 (cited 
with approval in Chenequa, 275 Wis. 2d 533, ¶14 n.7). 
Federal law of standing is not binding on Wisconsin but has 
been viewed as persuasive in certain cases.  See, e.g., 
McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶15 n.7;  First Nat'l Bank, 95 
Wis. 2d at 
308 
n.4; 
Wisconsin's 
Environmental 
Decade, 
69 
Wis. 2d at 11. 
24 Federal standing terminology has been used in cases that 
do 
not 
involve 
constitutional 
challenges. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, 69 Wis. 2d at 11; Metro. 
Builders Ass'n, 282 Wis. 2d 458, ¶13. 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
22 
 
¶47 In declaratory judgment actions governed by Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.04, one component of justiciability under the declaratory 
judgment statute is that the complainant "must have a legal 
interest 
in 
the 
controversy——that 
is 
to 
say, 
a 
legally 
protectible interest."25  The courts have declared that this 
"legal interest/legally protectable interest" requirement in 
declaratory judgment cases "has often been expressed in terms of 
standing."26  Thus the concepts of standing and justiciability (a 
legally protectable interest) have been viewed as overlapping 
concepts in declaratory judgment cases.   
¶48 In 
City 
of 
Madison 
v. 
Town 
of 
Fitchburg, 
112 
Wis. 2d 224, 228, 332 N.W.2d 782 (1983), a declaratory judgment 
action, the issue was whether the City of Madison had standing 
                                                 
25 Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 410, 320 N.W.2d 175 
(1982) (emphasis added). 
The four requisite conditions for declaratory relief are: 
(1) There must exist a justiciable controversy——that is to 
say, a controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against 
one who has an interest in contesting it. 
(2) The controversy must be between persons whose interests 
are adverse. 
(3) The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal 
interest 
in 
the 
controversy——that 
is 
to 
say, 
a 
legally 
protectable interest. 
(4) The issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for 
judicial determination. 
Loy, 107 Wis. 2d at 409. 
26 City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 112 Wis. 2d 224, 
228, 332 N.W.2d 782 (1983) (citing numerous cases). 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
23 
 
to challenge an incorporation proceeding under Wis. Stat. 
§ 60.81 (1981).  Standing did not turn directly on a statute.  
Section 60.81 was silent regarding standing to challenge 
incorporation.  City of Madison, 112 Wis. 2d at 228.  The court 
determined the three aspects of standing by evaluating the facts 
and relevant legal principles.  City of Madison, 112 Wis. 2d at 
230-31.  Accordingly, the court decided that the City of Madison 
had a personal interest in the outcome of the controversy that 
was adversely affected by the proceeding.  City of Madison, 112 
Wis. 2d at 231.27  The court then concluded that the City of 
Madison had standing to advance its claim.  City of Madison, 112 
Wis. 2d at 231-32. 
¶49 Many declaratory judgment cases do, however, involve 
interpretation 
of 
a 
statute 
or 
declaration 
of 
                                                 
27 In other cases standing similarly did not turn directly 
on the interpretation of a statute or constitutionality.  See, 
e.g., Lake Country Racquet & Athletic Club v. Vill. of Hartland, 
2002 WI App 301, 259 Wis. 2d 107, 655 N.W.2d 189 (declaratory 
judgment; examines facts to determine whether party whose 
standing is challenged has been adversely affected); Zehner v. 
Vill. of Marshall, 2006 WI App 6, 288 Wis. 2d 660, 709 N.W.2d 64 
(declaratory judgment; ¶11 cites declaratory judgment test of 
standing 
set 
forth 
in 
Chenequa, 
275 
Wis. 2d 533, 
¶17-30 
(examining facts and various statutes to determine personal 
interest at stake, adverse effect on party whose standing has 
been challenged, and sound judicial policy to determine whether 
party should be granted standing, that is, should be granted "a 
legally protectible interest.")).  
No. 
2009AP688   
 
24 
 
constitutionality.28  Recently, in Chenequa Land Conservancy, 
Inc. v. Village of Hartland, 2004 WI App 144, ¶¶10-16, 275 
Wis. 2d 533, 685 N.W.2d 573, a declaratory judgment/standing 
case, the complainant alleged that a conveyance violated a 
statutory requirement.  The court of appeals decided the 
standing of the party by determining whether the party suffered 
an actual or threatened injury and whether the interest injured 
"is legally protectible, meaning that the interest is arguably 
within the zone of interests" that the statute at issue seeks to 
protect.  Chenequa, 275 Wis. 2d 533, ¶16; see also id., ¶15.   
 
¶50 Chenequa is an example of a recent court of appeals 
decision 
pointing 
out 
the 
confusing 
use 
of 
different 
terminologies in the test for standing and pondering their 
differences.  Chenequa, 275 Wis. 2d 533, ¶13; see also Metro. 
Builders Ass'n of Greater Milwaukee v. Vill. of Germantown, 2005 
WI App 103, ¶20, 282 Wis. 2d 458, 698 N.W.2d 301.   
¶51 In Chenequa, the court of appeals acknowledged that in 
some declaratory judgment cases the court analyzed standing 
applying a "logical nexus" requirement.  Under the logical nexus 
requirement, the party whose standing is challenged must have 
suffered an actual or threatened injury and there must be a 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., Zehetner, 272 Wis. 2d 628, ¶12 (examining the 
substantive 
statutes 
at 
issue, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 421.301, 
427.105(1), to determine "whether the party seeking standing was 
injured in fact, and whether the interest allegedly injured is 
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or 
regulated 
by 
the 
statute 
or 
constitutional 
guarantee 
in 
question").   
No. 
2009AP688   
 
25 
 
logical link between that party's status and the claim sought to 
be adjudicated.  The court of appeals queried whether the 
"logical 
nexus" requirement in declaratory judgment cases 
differs from the formulation of standing used in appeals from 
administrative agency decisions.  In the latter cases, the party 
whose standing is challenged must suffer an "injury in fact and 
the interest injured must be one protected by law, that is, 
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or 
regulated 
by 
the 
statute 
or 
constitutional 
provision 
in 
question."29 
¶52 In Chenequa, the court of appeals viewed the "logical 
nexus" terminology about standing from declaratory judgment 
cases and the "zone of interest" terminology about standing from 
administrative law cases as "essentially equivalent."  Chenequa, 
275 Wis. 2d 533, ¶16.   
¶53 After 
the 
Chenequa 
decision, 
the 
parties 
in 
Metropolitan Builders Association of Greater Milwaukee v. 
Village of Germantown, 2005 WI App 103, 282 Wis. 2d 458, 698 
N.W.2d 301, debated the significance of Chenequa and the 
different terminologies used in the test for standing.  In 
Metropolitan Builders, the court of appeals declared that the 
differences in the terminology for determining standing in 
administrative review cases such as Wisconsin's Environmental 
Decade and declaratory judgment cases such as Chenequa are 
"purely 
semantic." 
 
Metropolitan 
Builders 
Ass'n, 
282 
                                                 
29 Chenequa, 275 Wis. 2d 533, ¶15. 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
26 
 
Wis. 2d 458, ¶20.  But the differences in terminology used in 
the test for standing have never been adequately explained in 
the cases.  We agree with the observation of the court of 
appeals in Chenequa:  "Generally, in prior cases we have either 
concluded there was no injury, and thus there was no need to 
analyze whether there was a 'legally protectible' interest that 
was 
injured 
or 
threatened 
with 
injury, . . . or, 
without 
specifically discussing the meaning of 'legally protectible,' we 
have analyzed the relevant constitutional provision or statute."  
Chenequa, 275 Wis. 2d 533, ¶16 n.8 (citations omitted). 
¶54 The case law can be better understood (even though 
there are inconsistencies in terminology) upon a careful 
analysis of the nature of each case.  In all three types of 
cases discussed above——administrative law review, constitutional 
challenges, and declaratory judgments——substantive statutory or 
constitutional provisions are at issue and govern standing.  The 
essence of the question of standing in these cases (that is, the 
essence of determining personal interest, adverse effect, and 
judicial policy, the three aspects of standing) is whether there 
is an injury and whether the injured interest of the party whose 
standing is challenged falls within the ambit of the statute or 
constitutional provision involved.  
¶55 In other words, the question is whether the party's 
asserted injury is to an interest protected by a statutory or 
constitutional provision.  Contrary to the assertions in Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence, our delineating the essence of this 
court's standing analyses does not necessarily eliminate the 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
27 
 
two-part test established in Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 524, which is 
applicable to administrative review cases, or the two-fold 
analysis described in First National Bank, 95 Wis. 2d at 308, 
applicable to actions based in the constitution, or the 
justiciability analysis established by Loy v. Bunderson, 107 
Wis. 2d 400, 410, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).  These "tests," while 
at times inconsistently used by courts, when appropriately used 
are tools for determining personal interest, adverse effect, and 
judicial policy, the three essential aspects of standing.  In 
these cases a court decides standing by examining the facts and 
interpreting a statute, rule, or constitutional provision at 
issue.30       
¶56 In other cases, such as the present case and several 
cases cited in the margin at notes 17 and 27, no statute or 
constitutional provision is viewed as directly governing the 
standing analysis.  No statute or constitutional provision 
expressly relates to or protects the interest asserted by the  
party whose standing is challenged.  Therefore that party's 
personal interest does not necessarily involve a "legally 
protectable interest," as that phrase is used in the case law to 
mean "an interest within the zone of interests protected by a 
statute or constitution."  Instead, in such cases, a court 
determines whether the asserted interest of the party whose 
                                                 
30 See, e.g., Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, 69 Wis. 2d at 14-20 
(statute recognizes an interest in environment as basis for 
standing; facts show members of association live within affected 
area). 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
28 
 
standing is challenged is to be recognized by the court on the 
basis of the facts and relevant legal principles.  
¶57 Declaring that the party has a legally protectable 
interest is the legal conclusion a court reaches after examining 
the interests involved, applicable statutes, constitutional 
provisions, rules, and relevant common law principles.31   
D 
¶58 We now turn to the standing question presented in the 
instant case, in which no statutory or constitutional provision 
is directly at issue.  
¶59 A non-client party's standing to seek disqualification 
of an opposing party's attorney on the ground that the current 
representation may breach a duty to a non-party former client is 
one of first impression in Wisconsin.  This issue requires the 
court to determine whether under the facts and relevant legal 
principles Bishop's Grove has a personal interest in the 
controversy; whether Bishop's Grove's interest will be adversely 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., Krier v. Vilione, 2009 WI 45, ¶¶15-46, 317 
Wis. 2d 288, 766 N.W.2d 517 (determining that under the facts 
and legal principles applicable in that case the plaintiffs did 
not have standing, stating:  "While the law of standing is to be 
liberally construed, this theory of liability set forth by the 
plaintiffs is not recognized in Wisconsin jurisprudence, and we 
will not pave the way for such relief with today's decision 
because corporate law principles establish that the plaintiffs 
have no standing to seek these damages in this case.  Third-
party liability precedent does not convey standing to the 
plaintiffs, and the damages claimed by the plaintiffs do not 
correspond with the claims alleged" (emphasis added).).    
See also cases cited at n.27, supra. 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
29 
 
affected; and whether judicial policy calls for protecting 
Bishop's Grove's interest.  
¶60 In Wisconsin former clients have standing to object to 
their former attorney's representation of someone else.  The 
former client is protecting the duties the attorney owes to the 
client.32           
¶61 When a non-client party moves for disqualification of 
opposing counsel who has represented a non-party former client, 
the non-client party is urging that the duties owed to a non-
party former client be enforced because the prior representation 
is so connected with the current litigation that the prior 
representation 
is 
likely 
to 
affect 
the 
just 
and 
lawful 
determination of the non-client party's position.  Thus, in the 
present case, in moving for disqualification of the plaintiffs' 
attorney, 
Bishop's 
Grove 
is 
urging 
that 
the 
duties 
the 
plaintiffs' counsel owes to the Foster Group and Wayne Foster be 
enforced because the prior representation is so connected with 
the current litigation that the prior representation is likely 
                                                 
32 In several Wisconsin cases, the court has recognized the 
standing of a current or past client to complain of an 
attorney's representation.  See, e.g., Forecki v. Kohlberg, 237 
Wis. 67, 295 N.W. 7 (1940); Berg v. Marine Trust Co., 141 
Wis. 2d 878, 416 N.W.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1987); Mathias v. Mathias, 
188 Wis. 2d 280, 283, 525 N.W.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1994).  
In Berg and Mathias, the parties did not contest that the 
party moving for disqualification was a former client, and 
therefore the court did not analyze standing, but instead 
focused its analysis on the application of the "substantially 
related" test to a motion for disqualification.        
No. 
2009AP688   
 
30 
 
to affect the just and lawful determination of Bishop's Grove's 
position.     
¶62 Ordinarily, the "doctrine of standing prohibits a 
litigant from raising another's legal rights."33  Jurisdictions 
have divided, however, on whether a non-client party has 
standing to assert the duties owed to a non-party former client.  
¶63 Some jurisdictions adhere to a strict rule that a non-
client party does not have standing to move to disqualify an 
attorney.34  These jurisdictions conclude that only a client or 
former client has standing to seek disqualification of its 
attorney.35  This strict position seems contrary to the general 
doctrine in Wisconsin law that standing is generally not 
construed narrowly or restrictively but rather broadly in favor 
of those seeking access to the courts.36      
                                                 
33 Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032, 
1055 (Wash. 1987) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 
(1984)). 
34 One district court has characterized this position as the 
majority position.  Colyer v. Smith, 50 F. Supp 2d 966, 969 
(C.D. Cal. 1999).  
35 See, e.g., In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 
530 F.2d 83, 88 (5th Cir. 1976) ("As a general rule, courts do 
not disqualify an attorney on the grounds of conflict of 
interest unless the former client moves for disqualification").  
For an analysis of federal cases discussing whether a non-
client has standing to move to disqualify a party's counsel 
either as a constitutional or prudential issue, see Colyer v. 
Smith, 50 F. Supp. 2d 966 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
36 Popenhagen, 309 Wis. 2d 601, ¶24. 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
31 
 
¶64 Furthermore, this strict position does not seem 
appropriate in Wisconsin, in which direct actions against  
insurance companies are allowed.  Under Wis. Stat. § 632.24, a 
plaintiff may bring a direct action against an insurance company 
without naming the insured as a party.37  Adhering to the strict 
standing rule in this context would be too restrictive.  An 
insurance company sued under the direct action statute would be 
prohibited as a non-client party defendant from bringing a 
motion to disqualify opposing counsel on the basis of counsel's 
prior representation of the insurance company's insured.  Such a 
rule of standing would be too restrictive.  Yet, the insurance 
company has a personal interest in the litigation that is 
adversely affected when the insurance company's insured (who is 
not a named party) is a former client of the complaining party's 
attorney.   
¶65 Reasons often cited for prohibiting a non-client party 
from seeking disqualification of an opposing party's counsel are 
that an attorney's duties a to client are designed to protect 
the client, not other persons;38 that disqualification motions 
might be used abusively as a litigation tactic and this should 
                                                 
37 For instance, in the present case, although the Foster 
Group is not a named party in the litigation, it is an insured 
under Bishop's Grove's business liability insurance policy as 
exclusive property manager of Bishop's Grove.     
38 "[T]he only injury that results from the breach of 
confidentiality is personal to [the former client]. [The non-
client] 
has 
no 
standing 
to 
complain 
that 
information 
obtained . . . will be used against him."  Colyer v. Smith, 50 
F. Supp. 2d 966, 973 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
32 
 
be discouraged;39 and that the rules of professional conduct are 
to be enforced through disciplinary agencies, not to be used as 
procedural weapons in civil actions.          
¶66 At the other end of the spectrum, a minority of 
jurisdictions concludes that a non-client party has standing to 
move to disqualify opposing counsel.40  These courts rely in part 
on a "court's well recognized power to control the conduct of 
attorneys practicing before it."41  This expansive standing rule 
is also based on an attorney's obligation to report violations 
of rules of professional conduct.42   
¶67 This broad view of standing might open the door to 
numerous motions to disqualify and might enable parties to 
misuse the motion as a procedural weapon to obtain delay and 
                                                 
39 Yarn 
Processing, 
530 
F.2d 
at 
90 
("To 
allow 
an 
unauthorized surrogate to champion the rights of the former 
client would allow that surrogate to use the conflict rules for 
his own purposes where a genuine conflict might not really 
exist."); Colyer, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 973 ("The standing 
requirement protects against the strategic exploitation of the 
rules of ethics long disfavored by the Courts.").  
40 See, e.g., Dawson v. City of Bartlesville, 901 F. Supp. 
314, 315 (N.D. Okla. 1995). 
41 Colyer, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 970 (analyzing Kevlik v. 
Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1984) (non-client party has 
standing to bring a motion for disqualification of opposing 
counsel); Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 
Inc., 345 F. Supp. 93, 97-98 (S.D.N.Y 1972) (non-client has 
standing to move for disqualification of counsel)).  
42 See, e.g., Kevlik, 724 F.2d at 847 ("The Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility, DR 1-103(A) clearly requires that 
an attorney come forward if he has knowledge of an actual or 
potential violation of a Disciplinary Rule . . . ."). 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
33 
 
increase the opposing parties' costs.  On the other hand, a 
bright-line rule barring a non-client's standing may encourage a 
party to strategically refuse to name a former client as a party 
although in proving the case counsel must necessarily implicate 
the former client.   
¶68 A third group of jurisdictions seems to take a middle 
position.43  In these courts, the general rule is that a non-
client party cannot move to disqualify opposing counsel on the 
ground that the current representation may be a breach of duties 
owed to the former client.  Narrow exceptions to the general 
rule, however, are recognized.44   
¶69 We are persuaded that a middle course represents a 
good balance of conflicting goals and is in keeping with our law 
broadly recognizing standing "as a matter of sound judicial 
policy."  The middle course avoids the pitfalls of a rule that a 
non-client party has no standing to move to disqualify opposing 
counsel and a rule that every non-client party has standing.  
The middle course recognizes that a rule of professional conduct 
"does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or 
                                                 
43 Stephen Gillers, Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law 
and Ethics 279 (8th ed. 2009) (citing In re Appeal of 
Infotechnology, 582 A.2d 215, 221 (Del. 1990); Colyer v. Smith, 
50 F. Supp. 2d 966 (C.D. Cal. 1999)). 
44 For a discussion of some exceptions, see Yarn Processing, 
530 F.2d at 89. 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
34 
 
transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the rule;"45 that 
rules of professional conduct "can be subverted when they are 
invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons;"46 and that a 
non-client party does not generally have standing to enforce a 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys.47    
¶70 Yet the middle course also recognizes that under some 
circumstances a breach of duties owed to a non-party former 
client may impact the just and lawful determination of a non-
client party's position and that under these circumstances it is 
sound judicial policy for the non-client party to have standing 
to move for disqualification.  
¶71 Accordingly, we conclude that as a general rule only a 
former or current client has standing to move to disqualify an 
attorney from representing someone else in a civil action.  
Nevertheless, in cases involving a challenge to a party's 
standing to bring a motion for disqualification of opposing 
counsel on the ground that opposing counsel is breaching duties 
to a non-party former client, to determine the personal 
interest, the adverse effect, and the judicial policy aspects of 
standing in Wisconsin we conclude that a non-client party has 
                                                 
45 SCR Ch. 20, Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 
Scope ¶20 ("[V]iolation of a rule does not necessarily warrant 
any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a 
lawyer in pending litigation"). 
46 SCR Ch. 20, Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 
Scope ¶20. 
47 In re Appeal of Infotechnology, 582 A.2d 215, 220-21 
(Del. 1990). 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
35 
 
standing to move for disqualification of opposing counsel, when 
the prior representation is so connected with the current 
litigation that the prior representation is likely to affect the 
just 
and 
lawful 
determination 
of 
the 
non-client 
party's 
position.48   
¶72 The doctrine of standing in the present case explores 
whether a connection exists between the current and prior 
representations and whether the prior representation is likely 
to affect the just and lawful determination of the non-client 
party's position.  In contrast, the standard of law (examined in 
Part III, below) for determining whether an attorney should be 
disqualified 
explores 
whether 
the 
current 
and 
subsequent 
representations involve a substantially related matter.   
E 
¶73 We now turn to the facts of this case.  Although Wayne 
Foster and the Foster Group are not parties to the slip-and-fall 
litigation, Wayne Foster as well as employees of the Foster 
Group may be key witnesses for the plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs' 
witness 
list 
includes 
Wayne 
Foster 
and 
authorized 
representatives of Bishop's Grove Condominium to testify about 
maintenance of the premises.  The plaintiffs apparently intend 
                                                 
48 See Infotechnology, 582 A.2d at 221; FMC Techs., Inc. v. 
Edwards, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1156-57 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (when 
complainant 
shows 
that 
the 
ethical 
conflict 
at 
issue 
sufficiently impacts the just and lawful determination of their 
claims and the conflict is so intertwined with the current 
litigation, the court will consider the complainant's motion to 
disqualify opposing counsel). 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
36 
 
to rely upon the testimony of Wayne Foster regarding the duties 
and actions of the Foster Group as the exclusive property 
manager of the Condominium in establishing Bishop's Grove's 
liability.     
¶74 Moreover, in the instant case, Wayne Foster and the 
employees of the Foster Group may not merely be witnesses.  
Rather, according to the plaintiffs' theory of the case,  
Bishop's Grove is liable for the acts and omissions of Wayne 
Foster and the Foster Group.  According to the record, Bishop's 
Grove's liability in the slip-and-fall action will likely turn 
on the actions or omissions of the Foster Group or Wayne Foster, 
as Bishop's Grove's exclusive property manager. 
¶75 The Foster Group's and Wayne Foster's conduct as 
manager connects the current litigation with counsel's prior 
representation of Wayne Foster and the Foster Group.  The record 
demonstrates that opposing counsel's firm represented the Foster 
Group 
and 
Wayne 
Foster 
for 
many 
years 
and 
that 
the 
representation related to condominiums.  Nothing in the record 
limits the nature of the attorney's representation involving 
condominiums.  Except for statements denying any representation 
specifically 
connected 
with 
Foster 
Group's 
management 
of 
Bishop's Grove, the record does not affirmatively state that the 
prior representation was not in any way related to the Foster 
Group's management of condominium properties.   
¶76 According to Bishop's Grove's counsel, the plaintiffs 
have an unfair advantage arising out of their counsel's prior 
representation of the Foster Group and Wayne Foster.  Implicit 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
37 
 
in the affidavits and argument is Bishop's Grove's claim that 
opposing counsel has special insight into how the Foster Group 
operates and manages condominium developments and a special 
relationship with Wayne Foster that advantages the plaintiffs.  
In support of its argument about the plaintiffs' counsel's 
familiarity with Wayne Foster, Bishop's Grove relied on the 
plaintiffs' attorney's communications with Wayne Foster with 
respect to the present litigation.   
¶77 The 
first 
communication 
between 
the 
plaintiffs' 
counsel and Wayne Foster was a phone call to Wayne Foster prior 
to the commencement of litigation.  At the plaintiffs' counsel's 
request, Wayne Foster agreed to communicate with the claims 
adjuster and explain condominium law and the concept of common 
property.  In the opinion of the plaintiffs' counsel, the 
insurance 
company's 
claims 
adjuster 
did 
not 
understand 
condominium law and the concept of common property.     
¶78 The 
second 
communication 
between 
the 
plaintiffs' 
counsel and Wayne Foster was a letter that the plaintiffs' 
attorney sent to Wayne Foster notifying him of the time and 
place of his deposition, instead of serving a subpoena or 
communicating with opposing counsel. 
¶79 Bishop's Grove asserts that these communications show 
the familiarity between Wayne Foster and the plaintiffs' counsel 
based on their attorney-client relation and that the familiarity 
helps the plaintiffs to Bishop's Grove's disadvantage.      
¶80 On the basis of this record, we conclude that Bishop's 
Grove fits under the exception to the general rule that a non-
No. 
2009AP688   
 
38 
 
client party does not have standing to bring a disqualification 
motion against opposing counsel.  In the present case, Bishop's 
Grove has standing to move for disqualification of opposing 
counsel.  Bishop's Grove has a personal interest in the motion 
to disqualify opposing counsel that is adversely affected 
because the prior representation is connected with the current 
litigation so that the prior representation appears to have an 
impact on the just and lawful determination of Bishop's Grove's 
position.  
III 
¶81 We now turn to the second question presented on 
appeal, 
namely 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court's 
standard 
for 
determining disqualification of the Cramer firm, the "appearance 
of impropriety," is the correct legal standard.  If not, what is 
the correct standard?   
¶82 A circuit court has "broad discretion" in determining 
whether an attorney should be disqualified.49  An appellate court 
will sustain a circuit court's discretionary determination of an 
attorney's disqualification if the determination is based on the 
facts of record and on the appropriate and applicable law and is 
the product of a rational mental process by which the facts and 
law are considered together to reach a reasoned and reasonable 
determination.50    
                                                 
49 In the Interest of Steveon R.A., 196 Wis. 2d 171, 177, 
537 N.W.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1995); Berg v. Marine Trust Co., 141 
Wis. 2d 878, 887, 892, 416 N.W.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1987).  
50 Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 
(1981). 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
39 
 
¶83 A circuit court's discretionary determination based on 
an error of law is an erroneous exercise of discretion.51  
Whether a circuit court applied the appropriate and applicable 
law is a question of law that an appellate court determines 
independently of the circuit court but benefiting from its 
analysis.52  In determining the applicable law in the present 
case, we may have to interpret and apply the Supreme Court Rules 
of Professional Conduct for Attorneys.  Interpretation and 
application of a Supreme Court Rule is a question of law that an 
appellate court determines independently of the circuit court, 
benefiting from its analysis.53  Whether the facts fulfill a 
legal standard is ordinarily a question of law that an appellate 
court determines independently of the circuit court, benefiting 
from its analysis.54 
A 
                                                                                                                                                             
But when, as in this case, the circuit court did not hold 
an evidentiary hearing on the disqualification motion, and all 
evidence is in written form, the circuit court has no advantage 
over an appellate court in the formulation of ethical norms. 
Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Labs., 
Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir. 1979).  
51 State v. Hutnik, 39 Wis. 2d 754, 763, 159 N.W.2d 733 
(1968); Berg, 141 Wis. 2d at 887, 892. 
52 Popenhagen, 309 Wis. 2d 601, ¶23. 
53 Filppula-McArthur ex rel. Angus v. Halloin, 2001 WI 8, 
¶32, 241 Wis. 2d 110, 622 N.W.2d 436.  
54 Acuity Mut. Ins. Co. v. Olivas, 2007 WI 12, ¶67, 298 
Wis. 2d 640, 726 N.W.2d 258. 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
40 
 
¶84 In the present case, Bishop's Grove, the non-client, 
asserts the client's (the Foster Group's and Wayne Foster's) 
grounds for disqualification of plaintiffs' counsel.  We 
therefore apply in the present case the law of disqualification 
relating to a former client's attempt to disqualify counsel in a 
subsequent representation of another person.55     
¶85 A 
fundamental 
principle 
in 
an 
attorney-client 
relationship is that the lawyer owes duties to a client and a 
former client.   Most of the core concepts of lawyer conflicts 
of interest were developed through common-law decisions long 
before jurisdictions officially adopted lawyer codes.56  "[T]he 
confidence and trust underlying the attorney-client relationship 
are foundational to the practice of law and deeply rooted in our 
law and Professional Rules."57 
                                                 
55 See, e.g., FMC Techs., 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1157 (when 
determining a non-client's motion to disqualify on the ground 
that a client's right to confidentiality may be breached, the 
court refers to the rules regulating the conduct of attorneys). 
Bishop's Grove may thus advance the Foster Group's and 
Wayne Foster's rights as former clients of the plaintiffs' 
counsel.  Justice Roggensack's concurrence, on the other hand, 
would limit Bishop's Grove's standing to assertions that the 
plaintiffs' attorney has obtained information through a breach 
of the duty of confidentiality owed to Bishop's Grove.  See 
Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶¶138, 180-183.  
56 Introductory Note to The Restatement (Third) of Law 
Governing Lawyers (2000). 
57 Sands v. Menard, Inc., 2010 WI 96, ¶53, 328 Wis. 2d 647, 
787 N.W.2d 384. 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
41 
 
¶86 The resolution of the issue of disqualification in the 
present case is thus guided by our prior case law and the 
precepts of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys regarding an attorney's duties to former clients.58  
Appellate courts have often cited the Rules of Professional 
Conduct for guidance in non-disciplinary cases, including 
                                                 
58 Nothing in the Supreme Court Rules of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys, or in the Preamble or in the Scope, 
states that a violation of a rule of professional responsibility 
cannot 
be 
used 
in 
a 
court's 
ruling 
on 
a 
motion 
for 
disqualification of a lawyer in litigation. 
The Scope does present a caution that a violation "does not 
necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as 
disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation" or establish 
"a basis for civil liability."  Preamble, ¶14 explains that the 
Rules of Professional Conduct "are rules of reason" and "should 
be 
interpreted 
with 
reference 
to 
the 
purposes 
of 
legal 
representation and of the law itself."    
No. 
2009AP688   
 
42 
 
disqualification 
cases.59 
 
The 
Introductory 
Note 
to 
the 
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers (2000) explains 
that lawyer code provisions may be relevant for the purpose of a 
motion for disqualifying a lawyer.     
¶87 The Wisconsin cases explain that the standard to apply 
in disqualifying an attorney on the ground of the attorney's 
                                                 
59 See, 
e.g., 
Sands, 
328 
Wis. 2d 647, 
¶53 
(reviewing 
arbitration award; attorney's fiduciary duty of loyalty based on 
Rules of Professional Conduct); Tensfeldt v. Haberman, 2009 WI 
77, ¶62 n.25, 319 Wis. 2d 329, 768 N.W.2d 641 ("The Supreme 
Court Rules of professional conduct for attorneys provide 
guidance regarding the scope of representation."); State v. 
Meeks, 2003 WI 104, ¶¶59-60, 263 Wis. 2d 794, 666 N.W.2d 859 
("Policy considerations play a fundamental role in protecting 
the very important relationship between attorney and client.  
The attorney-client privilege provides sanctuary to protect a 
relationship based upon trust and confidence. . . . We hold that 
Scholle's opinions, perceptions, and impressions of Meeks' 
competency to proceed are within the attorney-client privilege 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 905.03 and SCR 20:1.6."); D&D 
Carpentry, Inc. v. U.S. Bancorp, 2010 WI App 122, ¶8, 329 
Wis. 2d 435, 792 N.W.2d 193 ("[S]o far as settlements are 
concerned, the general rule is that an attorney has no authority 
to enter into a binding settlement agreement without his or her 
client's consent. . . . SCR.20.1.2(a) (2007-08)"); Rand v. Rand, 
2010 WI App 98, ¶6, 327 Wis. 2d 778, 787 N.W.2d 445 ("When a 
circuit court awards attorney fees, the amount of the award is 
left to the discretion of the court. . . . Among the factors to 
be considered are those set out in Supreme Court Rule 20:1.5(a), 
which we quote below.") 
See also Steveon R.A., 196 Wis. 2d at 178-80 (determining 
attorney disqualification on basis of SCR 20:1.7); Burkes v. 
Hales, 165 Wis. 2d 585, 588-89, 478 N.W.2d 37 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(determining attorney disqualification on basis of Code of 
Professional 
Responsibility); 
Berg, 
141 
Wis. 2d at 
890-91 
(disqualification case; "the need to maintain that trust forms 
the basis for one of the ethical canons underlying the 
substantial relationship test: that lawyers should avoid 'even 
the 
appearance 
of 
professional 
impropriety.' 
 
SCR 
20.48 
[1986].").   
No. 
2009AP688   
 
43 
 
former representation of a client is the "substantially related" 
standard.  "[T]he attorney will be disqualified if the subject 
matter 
of 
the 
two 
representations 
[is] 
'substantially 
related.'"60   
¶88 Our case law further explains that matters are 
substantially related "if the lawyer could have obtained 
confidential information in the first representation that would 
have been relevant in the second."61  A court need not find that 
an attorney has actually breached ethical standards or revealed 
client confidentiality.62  It is only necessary that an attorney 
have undertaken representation that is adverse to the interests 
of a former client.63  A serious possibility that the interest 
represented by the attorney in the subsequent employment is 
adverse to the interest represented in the original employment 
may be enough for disqualification.64 
¶89 The circuit court did not apply the substantially 
related standard in the present case.  Instead, it applied an 
"appearance of impropriety" test.  The circuit court thus erred 
as a matter of law.  The "appearance of impropriety" test that 
                                                 
60 Berg, 141 Wis. 2d at 885.  See also Burkes, 165 
Wis. 2d at 588-89 (citing Berg).  
61 Berg, 141 Wis. 2d at 886. 
62 Id. at 892; City of Whitewater v. Baker, 99 Wis. 2d 449, 
453, 299 N.W.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1980). 
63 Berg, 141 Wis. 2d at 892. 
64 State v. Miller, 160 Wis. 2d 646, 659, 467 N.W.2d 118 
(1991). 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
44 
 
the circuit court applied is not the appropriate standard for 
disqualification of an attorney based on duties to a former 
client.  "The possible appearance of impropriety . . . is simply 
too 
weak 
and 
too 
slender 
a 
reed 
on 
which 
to 
rest 
a 
disqualification order . . . ."65    
                                                 
65 Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 
723 (7th Cir. 1982).  See Charles W. Wolfram, Symposium: 
Restatement 
of 
the 
Law 
Governing 
Lawyers: 
Former-Client 
Conflicts, 10 Geo. J. Leg. Ethics 677, 686-87, n.35 (1997) (the 
"appearances" concept is antiquated although occasionally shows 
spasmodic signs of life).  
Before the court of appeals adopted the substantially 
related standard in 1987 in the Berg case, two other cases 
raised the issue of disqualification of an attorney because of 
prior representation.  In one of the cases, City of Whitewater 
v. Baker, 99 Wis. 2d 449, 299 N.W.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1980), the 
court of appeals made two references to avoiding the "appearance 
of impropriety" in deciding the disqualification of an attorney.  
Id. at 453, 456.  
The Berg court, 141 Wis. 2d at 883-85, analyzed these two 
prior cases as follows:  
There are few Wisconsin cases on the subject of 
disqualification of an attorney on grounds that he or 
she has undertaken representation of a client whose 
interests are adverse to those of a former client, and 
none has adopted a methodology for determining when 
disqualification is appropriate.  In Ennis v. Ennis, 
88 Wis. 2d 82, 276 N.W.2d 341 (Ct. App. 1979), we held 
that an attorney who represented the wife in a 
postjudgment divorce proceeding, where another member 
of his law firm had represented the husband in the 
original action, was guilty of "a serious breach of 
the Code of Professional Responsibility" and should be 
disqualified.  Id. at 98, 276 N.W.2d  at 347.  Noting 
that 
the 
attorney's 
conflict 
of 
interest 
was 
"obvious," id. at 99, 276 N.W.2d at 348, we did not 
discuss the matter further. 
In City of Whitewater v. Baker, 99 Wis. 2d 449, 299 
N.W.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1980), an attorney represented 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
45 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Baker in connection with his purchase of real estate, 
drafting the deed, and providing related services.  A 
few years later, Baker became involved in a dispute 
with the city over the widening of an adjoining 
street.  He brought an action to declare his interest 
in the property and was promptly sued by the city to 
force removal of several alleged encroachments on the 
street 
right-of-way. 
 
Baker's 
former 
lawyer 
represented the city in both actions, and we held that 
the trial court erred when it declined to disqualify 
him.  We noted that a court need not find that the 
attorney has actually engaged in unethical conduct or 
disclosed the former client's confidences in order to 
be disqualified on grounds of conflict of interest.  
All that is required is that "the attorney has 
undertaken representation of a client whose interests 
are adverse to those of the former client."  Id. at 
453, 299 N.W.2d at 586. This is so, we said, because 
"[a]ttorneys 
are 
obligated 
to 
avoid 
even 
the 
appearance of impropriety."  Id.; Ennis, 88 Wis. 2d at 
98-99, 276 N.W.2d at 348. 
In Whitewater, 99 Wis.2d at 455, 299 N.W.2d at 587, as 
in Ennis, the conflict was "obvious," and we were not 
called upon to analyze the facts under any particular 
test for disqualification.  The Whitewater opinion 
does, however, acknowledge the existence of two tests 
for disqualification based on inconsistent or adverse 
representations.  One test was said to be whether the 
new employment will require the attorney to do 
anything "that will injuriously affect a former client 
in any matter in which he formerly represented him and 
also whether the attorney will be called on . . . to 
use 
against 
a 
former 
client 
any 
knowledge 
or 
information acquired in the former relationship."  Id. 
at 454, 299 N.W.2d at 587, citing 7 Am.Jur.2d 
Attorneys at Law, sec. 156, p. 140 (1963) [now sec. 
186, pp. 238-39] (footnote omitted).  The Whitewater 
court 
also 
referred 
to 
a 
"federal" 
test 
for 
inconsistent 
employment——"whether 
a 
'substantial 
relation' exists between the subject matter of the 
former representation and the issues in the later 
adverse representation," id. at 454-55 n.1, 299 N.W.2d 
at 587——and suggests that the attorney would have been 
subject to disqualification under either standard 
because his subsequent representation was "obviously 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
46 
 
¶90 The seminal case setting forth the substantially 
related standard, and the case upon which Wisconsin case law is 
based,66 is T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Brothers Pictures, 113 
F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).  "[W]here any substantial 
relationship can be shown between the subject matter of a former 
representation and that of a subsequent adverse representation, 
the latter will be prohibited."67  In establishing this standard, 
the federal district court in Theatre Corp. relied upon the 
American Bar Association's Model Canons of Professional Ethics, 
although the case was not a disciplinary case.68   
                                                                                                                                                             
adverse" to his representation of the former client.  
Id. at 455, 299 N.W.2d at 587. 
In this case the parties argued, and the trial court 
applied, the "substantial relationship" test.  The 
test has been applied in every federal circuit for 
more than thirty years, and in most state courts as 
well.  Because we believe it to be the appropriate 
test to be utilized in attorney disqualification 
cases, we adopt and apply it here. 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
66 Burkes, 165 Wis. 2d at 591, n.4. 
67 T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. 
Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
68 "A lawyer's duty of absolute loyalty to his client's 
interests does not end with his retainer.  He is enjoined for 
all time, except as he may be released by law, from disclosing 
matters 
revealed 
to 
him 
by 
reason 
of 
the 
confidential 
relationship.  Related to this principle is the rule that where 
any substantial relationship can be shown between the subject 
matter of a former representation and that of a subsequent 
adverse representation, the latter will be prohibited."  T.C. 
Theatre, 113 F. Supp. at 268. 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
47 
 
¶91 Thus, likewise, in determining whether the Cramer firm 
should be disqualified under the substantially related standard, 
we refer to the Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys governing the conduct of members of the bar.  The 
Rules provide principles for an attorney's duties to former and 
current clients.  We again emphasize that the instant case does 
not involve a determination of unethical conduct.  This is a 
disqualification proceeding, not a disciplinary proceeding.  The 
circuit court concluded that the plaintiffs' law firm did not 
engage in any unethical conduct of any kind.   
¶92 In examining the Rules of Professional Conduct, we 
look at SCR 20:1.9 because Bishop's Grove's motion to disqualify 
the Cramer firm is based on the firm's duty owed to former 
clients.69     
¶93 In pertinent part, SCR 20:1.9(a) provides as follows: 
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in 
a matter shall not thereafter represent another person 
in the same or a substantially related matter in which 
that person's interests are materially adverse to the 
interests of the former client unless the former 
client gives informed consent, confirmed in a writing 
signed by the client. 
                                                 
69 Supreme 
Court 
Rule 
20:1.7, 
entitled 
"Conflicts 
of 
interest current clients," is generally relevant in the present 
case, too.  Although Rule 20:1.7 focuses on current client 
conflicts, it implicates former client conflicts as well.  Rule 
20:1.7 provides, inter alia, that "a lawyer shall not represent 
a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of 
interest.  A concurrent conflict of interest exists if . . . (2) 
there is a significant risk that the representation of one or 
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's 
responsibilities 
to . . . a 
former 
client . . ." 
(emphasis 
added). 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
48 
 
. . . . 
 
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a 
client in a matter or whose present or former firm has 
formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter:  
 
(1) use 
information 
relating 
to 
the 
representation to the disadvantage of the former 
client except as these rules would permit or require 
with respect to a client, or when the information has 
become generally known; or 
 
(2) reveal 
information 
relating 
to 
the 
representation except as these rules would permit or 
require with respect to a client. 
¶94 In 
applying 
SCR 
20:1.9 
to 
determine 
whether 
disqualification is required, a court must determine: (1) 
whether there was an attorney-client relationship and whether it 
has ceased; (2) whether the subsequent representation of another 
person involves the same or a substantially related matter; (3) 
whether the interests of the subsequent client are materially 
adverse to those of the former client; and (4) whether the 
former client consented to the new representation.70 
B 
¶95 In the instant appeal, it is undisputed that an 
attorney-client relationship had existed between the Cramer firm 
and Wayne Foster and the Foster Group and that the Cramer firm 
no longer represented Wayne Foster or the Foster Group at the 
time the slip-and-fall litigation began.71  Furthermore, no one 
                                                 
70 American Bar Association, Annotated Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.9 Duties to Former Clients (6th ed. 
2007). 
71 If 
the 
attorney-client 
relationship 
were 
ongoing, 
disqualification would be guided by SCR 20:1.7. 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
49 
 
asserts that the former clients (Wayne Foster and the Foster 
Group) have consented to the Cramer firm's representation of the 
plaintiffs in the present case.    
¶96 The disagreement in the present case lies mainly with 
the interpretation of "substantially related."  Wisconsin courts 
have been using the substantially related standard in attorney 
disqualification cases when an attorney represents a party in a 
matter in which the adverse party is that attorney's former 
client.72  We now apply the substantially related standard in the 
present case in which the attorney's former client is not a 
party.  
¶97 The 
substantially 
related 
standard 
is 
not 
only 
explained in our case law but is further explained in the 
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct and 
comments thereto, which are not binding on Wisconsin courts but 
are instructive when interpreting Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules 
that are analogous to the ABA Model Rules.73  The Comments to ABA 
                                                 
72 Burkes, 165 Wis. 2d at 591 n.4 (the substantially related 
standard is employed in virtually all jurisdictions); Berg, 141 
Wis. 2d at 885.  
73 See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Marks, 2003 WI 
114, ¶65, 265 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 836; State v. Maloney, 2005 
WI 74, ¶20, 281 Wis. 2d 595, 698 N.W.2d 583.  
No. 
2009AP688   
 
50 
 
Model Rule 1.974 describe the "substantially related" standard as 
follows: 
Matters are "substantially related" for purposes of 
this Rule if they involve the same transaction or 
legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial 
risk that confidential factual information as would 
normally 
have 
been 
obtained 
in 
the 
prior 
representation would materially advance the client's 
position in the subsequent matter.   
¶98 The Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers 
similarly describes the substantially related standard.75  The 
Comments 
to 
§ 132 
of 
the 
Restatement 
explain 
that 
"[a] 
                                                 
74 The text of SCR 20:1.9 is substantially identical to 
§ 1.9 
of 
the 
American 
Bar 
Association's 
Model 
Rules 
of 
Professional Responsibility.  The Wisconsin comment to the Rule 
states:  "The Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule differs from the 
Model Rule in requiring informed consent to be confirmed in a 
writing 'signed by the client.'" 
The comments to ABA Model Rule 1.9 are published in the 
Supreme Court rules and while not adopted "may be consulted for 
guidance in interpreting and applying the Rules of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys."  Wisconsin Comment to SCR ch. 20 
Preamble:  A Lawyer's Responsibilities.  
75 Section 132 governing a representation adverse to the 
interests of a former client is similar to SCR 20:1.9 and 
provides as follows: 
The current matter is substantially related to the 
earlier matter if:  
(1) the current matter involves the work the lawyer 
performed for the former client; or  
(2) there is a substantial risk that representation of 
the present client will involve the use of information 
acquired in the course of representing the former 
client, unless that information has become generally 
known. 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
51 
 
subsequent matter is substantially related to an earlier 
matter . . . if there is a substantial risk that the subsequent 
representation will involve the use of confidential information 
of 
the 
former 
client 
obtained 
in 
the 
course 
of 
the 
representation . . . . Substantial risk exists where it is 
reasonable to conclude that it would materially advance the 
client's position in the subsequent matter to use confidential 
information obtained in the prior representation."76  
¶99 The substantially related standard "has sometimes 
proved much easier to recite than to describe accurately or to 
apply confidently."77  To assist courts in applying the standard, 
it is helpful to understand the rationale of the substantially 
related standard.  The standard reflects several concerns, 
including protecting the confidential information of the former 
client obtained in the course of representation; protecting the 
present client by disqualifying counsel who might be constrained 
in effective representation because of an obligation to a former 
client;78 and protecting the lawyer such that retention of the 
lawyer for services on specific cases or issues will not be 
transformed into the lawyer's lifetime commitment.79     
                                                 
76 Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 132 
cmt. d(iii) (2002). 
77 Wolfram, supra note 65, at 680. 
78 See SCR Rule 1.7 (a)(2), set forth in the margin at note 
80, supra. 
79 Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers, § 132 
cmt. b (2002). 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
52 
 
¶100 A central concern underlying the substantially related 
standard in SCR 20:1.9, and disqualification based on a breach 
of duties owed a former client, is confidentiality between the 
attorney and the former client.  Maintaining confidentiality of 
information 
relating 
to 
representation 
is 
a 
fundamental 
principle 
in 
the 
attorney-client 
relationship.80 
 
This 
fundamental 
principle 
encourages 
clients 
"to 
seek 
legal 
assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer 
even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter."  
SCR 20:1.6, ABA Comment 2.  By protecting attorney-client 
confidentiality, a court maintains public confidence in the 
legal profession and protects the integrity of the judicial 
process.81    
¶101 If 
attorney-client 
confidentiality 
were 
the 
only 
interest to consider in disqualification of counsel, there would 
be 
no 
need 
for 
the 
substantially 
related 
standard, 
as 
confidentiality would be best protected by a blanket rule 
precluding lawyers from representations adverse to any former 
client. 
 
But, 
a 
blanket 
disqualification 
rule 
would 
unnecessarily deny persons their chosen counsel.   
¶102 In Wisconsin, a litigant's right to prosecute or 
defend a suit with an "attorney of the suitor's choice" is 
protected by the state Constitution.  Article I, Section 21(2) 
                                                 
80 Meeks, 263 Wis. 2d 794, ¶33. 
81 Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instr. Co., 689 F.2d 715, 721 
(7th Cir. 1982). 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
53 
 
of the Wisconsin Constitution states: "In any court of this 
state, any suitor may prosecute or defend his suit either in his 
own proper person or by an attorney of the suitor's choice" 
(emphasis added).82   
                                                 
82 Five states, Alabama, Georgia, Michigan, Mississippi, and 
Utah, have comparable constitutional guarantees to counsel in 
civil proceedings.  Only Wisconsin provides that such counsel 
may be freely selected by the individual represented.  
Alabama Constitution Art. I, § 10 (2010) 
Sec. 10. Right to prosecute civil cause.  That no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this state, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party 
(emphasis added). 
Georgia Constitution Art. I, § I, ¶XII (2010) 
PARAGRAPH XII. Right to the courts 
No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute 
or defend, either in person or by an attorney, that 
person's own cause in any of the courts of this state 
(emphasis added). 
Michigan Constitution Art. I, § 13 (2010) 
§ 13. Conduct of suits in person or by counsel.  A 
suitor in any court of this state has the right to 
prosecute or defend his suit, either in his own proper 
person or by an attorney (emphasis added). 
Mississippi Constitution Art. 3, § 25 (2010) 
§ 25. Access to courts.  No person shall be debarred 
from prosecuting or defending any civil cause for or 
against him or herself, before any tribunal in the 
state, by him or herself, or counsel, or both 
(emphasis added). 
Utah Constitution Art. I, § 11 (2010) 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
54 
 
¶103 The state constitutional right of representation in 
any court "by an attorney of the suitor's choice" is not, 
however, absolute.   
¶104 For example, in Lorscheter v. Lorscheter, 52 Wis.2d 
804, 808, 191 N.W. 200 (1971), the court concluded that a party 
in a default divorce proceeding was not entitled to substitute a 
new attorney on the day of the hearing when she had not complied 
with the statutory framework governing attorney substitution in 
pending actions.  The right to counsel of one's choice may be 
denied when it unduly interferes with the administration of 
justice.  Id.  
¶105 Similarly, a suitor's choice of counsel is limited by 
the court's licensure and bar membership requirements.83  The 
constitutional right to an attorney of the suitor's choice is 
tempered by the requirement that counsel be licensed in 
Wisconsin.   
¶106 The Wisconsin Constitution grants each person a right 
of representation in any court "by an attorney of the suitor's 
choice."  This constitutional right is safeguarded when the 
                                                                                                                                                             
§ 11.  [Courts open —— Redress of injuries.]  All 
courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation, 
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and 
no 
person 
shall 
be 
barred 
from 
prosecuting 
or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
party (emphasis added). 
83 See SCR 10.03(4).  
No. 
2009AP688   
 
55 
 
court protects clients by maintaining high ethical standards of 
attorney professional responsibility. 
¶107 Cognizant of the interests to be balanced in deciding 
disqualification 
motions, 
we 
turn 
to 
the 
factors 
to 
be 
considered 
in 
determining 
whether 
an 
attorney's 
current 
representation is substantially related to the attorney's prior 
representation.  
¶108 The assessment of whether the former and current 
representations are "substantially related" is case-specific and 
involves a process of factual reconstruction.  It requires a 
court to determine first the likelihood that the lawyer was 
exposed to confidential information based on the matter of the 
prior representation.  Then the court must assess the likelihood 
that confidential information will be relevant in the current 
representation.84  
¶109 Incidental similarities between the prior and current 
representations do not support disqualification.85  Relying upon 
incidental similarities creates a standard that is overly broad 
and improperly infringes on the rights of persons to obtain 
counsel of their choosing.  "[T]he fact that a lawyer has once 
served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using 
                                                 
84 Wolfram, supra note 65, at 717. 
85 "[R]epresentation 
in 
cases 
of 
mere 
positional 
conflict . . . should almost never be barred in the serial 
context."  1 Hazard & Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, § 1.9:202 (2d ed. 
1996).  
No. 
2009AP688   
 
56 
 
generally known information about that client when later 
representing another client."86  
¶110 Finally, we examine the remaining criterion under SCR 
20:1.9, 
that 
is, 
whether 
the 
current 
representation 
is 
materially adverse to the former client.  Whether an attorney's 
current representation is materially adverse to a former client 
is likewise a fact-intensive analysis. 87   
¶111 The analysis should focus on whether the current 
representation may cause the former client financial, legal, or 
some other identifiable harm.88  The court must determine "the 
degree to which the current representation may actually be 
harmful to the former client."89    
C 
¶112 The circuit court in the present case did not examine 
whether the attorney's current representation was "substantially 
related" to the prior representation or was "materially adverse" 
                                                 
86 SCR 20:1.9, ABA Comment 8.  See Vestron Inc. v. Nat'l 
Geographic Soc'y, 750 F. Supp. 586, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("[I]f 
insight into a former client's general 'litigation thinking' 
were to constitute 'relevant privileged information,' then 
disqualification would be mandated in virtually every instance 
of 
successive 
representation. 
 
That 
clearly 
is 
not 
the 
law . . . .").  See also Annot. Model Rules of Prof. Conduct, 
Rule 1.9. (2007).  
87 See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers, § 132 
cmt. e. (2002) (discussing "materially adverse"). 
88 See Simpson Performance Prods., Inc. v. Robert W. Horn, 
P.C., 92 P.3d 283, 288 (Wyo. 2004) (citing ABA/BNA Lawyers' 
Manual on Professional Conduct, § 51:220 (2002)). 
89 Simpson Performance Prods., 92 P.3d at 288. 
No. 
2009AP688   
 
57 
 
to the former client.  Instead, the circuit court relied on an 
erroneous standard, whether an "appearance of impropriety" 
resulted from the plaintiffs' attorney's communication with 
Wayne Foster in the present litigation.  
¶113 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
applied 
an 
incorrect standard of law in disqualifying the plaintiffs' 
attorney, namely disqualifying the attorney on the basis of the 
"appearance of impropriety."  Given the paucity of facts in the 
record relating to the attorney's prior representation of the 
Foster Group and Wayne Foster, we are unable to determine 
whether the two representations are substantially related such 
that the confidences of the Foster Group and Wayne Foster are 
implicated in this personal injury action or whether the current 
representation is materially adverse to the former client.  
¶114 We cannot determine from the record before us whether 
the circuit court's order disqualifying the plaintiffs' attorney 
is erroneous when applying the correct standard.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the order of the circuit court disqualifying the 
plaintiffs' attorney and remand the matter to the circuit court 
for such further proceedings as the circuit court determines are 
appropriate to resolve the question presented.  
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2009AP688.dtp 
1 
 
 
¶115 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
certification from the court of appeals asked this court to 
resolve a specific question of standing:  
Does a non-client party (Bishop's Grove) have standing 
to move for the disqualification of the opposing 
party's attorney based on that attorney's prior 
representation of a non-party (the Foster Group and 
Wayne Foster)? 
¶116 The lead opinion concludes that Bishop's Grove has 
standing in this case, and in this I concur. 
¶117 In reaching this result, however, the lead opinion 
engages in a lengthy review of Wisconsin cases and produces, in 
effect, a restatement of the law.  It is this restatement of 
Wisconsin law on standing that triggers two concurrences and 
some angst. 
¶118 To the extent that the lead opinion attempts to bring 
order out of chaos in our law on standing, it serves a 
constructive purpose.  We all benefit when the court provides a 
clear restatement of the law.  However, if the restatement 
changes the law while purporting simply to clarify it, it goes 
beyond the facts, effects a result that was neither requested 
nor briefed by the parties, and creates confusion among the 
bench and bar. 
¶119 My concern may be summarized as follows.  "Any 
particular 
standing 
regime 
can 
fall 
on 
a 
spectrum 
from 
restrictive, where potentially no one can challenge certain 
wrongs, to permissive, where almost anyone can sue."  Eugene 
Kontorovich, What Standing is Good For, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1663, 
1668 (Nov. 2007).  A good faith effort to help the bar identify 
No.  2009AP688.dtp 
2 
 
where 
Wisconsin 
law 
is 
on 
this 
"spectrum" 
is 
helpful.  
Conversely, an effort to move Wisconsin's position on the 
"spectrum" from one place to another is not helpful unless there 
is a full appreciation of what is being done——and has majority 
support. 
¶120 When the lead opinion relies on new and different 
terms and employs a different analysis, it permits an inference 
that the law is being changed.  In my view, the majority of the 
court does not favor changing the law. 
¶121 The statement in the lead opinion that "[s]tanding in 
Wisconsin is not to be construed narrowly or restrictively, but 
rather should be construed liberally," lead op., ¶38, has ample 
rhetorical support in our cases.  Nevertheless, Wisconsin case 
law does not support the proposition that standing is such a low 
hurdle that "almost anyone can sue."   
¶122 The lead opinion reads: 
Upon careful analysis of the case law, it is clear 
that the essence of the determination of standing is: 
(1) whether the party whose standing is challenged has 
a personal interest in the controversy (sometimes 
referred 
to . . . as 
a 
"personal 
stake" 
in 
the 
controversy); (2) whether the interest of the party 
whose standing is challenged will be injured, that is, 
adversely affected; and (3) whether judicial policy 
calls for protecting the interest of the party whose 
standing has been challenged. 
Lead op., ¶5; see also lead op., ¶40. 
¶123 For the most part, the lead opinion substitutes the 
phrase "personal interest" for "personal stake."  See id.  So 
long as these phrases mean the same thing, there should be no 
complaint.  If, however, the phrase "personal interest" means 
something less than "personal stake," I do not subscribe to it.     
No.  2009AP688.dtp 
3 
 
¶124 "A person has standing to seek judicial review when 
that person has a personal stake in the outcome and is directly 
affected by the issues in controversy."  Schill v. Wis. Rapids 
Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶38, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177 
(emphasis added).  A person has a personal stake in the outcome 
when a person has suffered an actual injury to a legally 
protected interest, McConkey v. Van Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶15, 326 
Wis. 2d 1, 783 N.W.2d 855 (citing State ex rel. First Nat'l Bank 
v. M&I Peoples Bank, 95 Wis. 2d 303, 308, 290 N.W.2d 321 
(1980)), or is threatened with such an injury, Krier v. Vilione, 
2009 WI 45, ¶20, 317 Wis. 2d 288, 766 N.W.2d 517 (citing 
Chenequa Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Vill. of Hartland, 2004 WI 
App 144, ¶¶13-16, 275 Wis. 2d 533, 685 N.W.2d 573). 
¶125 The second prong listed by the lead opinion is 
"injury," that is, "the interest [personal stake] of the 
party . . . is adversely affected."  I take "adversely affected" 
to mean actual injury.   
¶126 The third prong of the lead opinion is "judicial 
policy."  What this means is not entirely clear, but it may be 
illuminated by considering the differences between standing 
under federal law and standing under Wisconsin law.   
¶127 The United States Supreme Court has described the law 
of standing under the federal Constitution as "a blend of 
constitutional 
requirements 
and 
prudential 
considerations."  
Valley 
Forge 
Christian 
College 
v. 
Americans 
United 
for 
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982).  
Under Article III of the Constitution, the judicial power of the 
federal courts is limited to the resolution of "cases" and 
No.  2009AP688.dtp 
4 
 
"controversies."  Id.  Accordingly, standing must exist in order 
to invoke the jurisdiction of the court.  Horne v. Flores, __ 
U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2592 (2009).   
¶128 The Court has explained that the requirement of 
"actual injury redressable by the court serves several of the 
implicit policies embodied in Article III."  Valley Forge, 454 
U.S. at 472 (citations and quotations omitted).  These policies 
include ensuring that legal questions are decided in a "concrete 
factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the 
consequences" of the court's decision.  Id.  This concrete 
factual context also allows the court to make a decision without 
worrying that its decision will have unforeseen consequences in 
cases presenting different facts.  Id.   
¶129 Another policy underlying federal standing doctrine is 
a respect for the autonomy of the individuals who may be most 
directly affected by a judicial decision, by refusing to allow 
courts to be used as "a vehicle for the vindication of the value 
interests of concerned bystanders."  United States v. SCRAP, 412 
U.S. 669, 687 (1973).  By requiring litigants to have a personal 
stake in the outcome, federal standing doctrine assures that the 
arguments presented will sharpen the presentation of issues and 
thus be of greater assistance to the court in making its 
decision.  Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968). 
¶130 As the lead opinion has noted, in Wisconsin the law of 
standing does not have a jurisdictional component, but is rather 
a matter of "judicial policy," lead op., ¶40 n.18.  The 
discussion of "judicial policy" in our precedent has tended to 
emphasize the difference between our doctrine and the federal, 
No.  2009AP688.dtp 
5 
 
jurisdictional doctrine, instead of providing clear analysis of 
what "judicial policy" is.  In my view, judicial policy embodies 
the same prudential considerations discussed by the Supreme 
Court in Valley Forge.     
¶131 Judicial policy is not, and has not been, carte 
blanche for the courts of Wisconsin to weigh in on issues 
whenever the respective members of the bench find it desirable.  
Nor, it should be noted, is it an escape hatch that allows 
courts to avoid issues that would be troubling or politically 
inconvenient to decide.  While the question of standing does 
require a case by case analysis, "judicial policy" should not 
allow us to create an ad hoc standard for every new case. 
¶132 This court has recently attempted to articulate some 
of the prudential considerations that underlie our standing 
doctrine, in Krier and McConkey.  
¶133 In Krier, the court declined to extend standing to 
plaintiffs whose arguments had no basis in Wisconsin or 
traditional corporate law.  Krier, 317 Wis. 2d 288, ¶20.  The 
court specifically pointed out that if it were to find standing 
in 
this 
context, 
"there would be no stopping point to 
liability."  Id., ¶23.  We did not find it appropriate to open a 
"universe of entities or people" who could potentially bring 
suit by recognizing standing.  Id., ¶20.  
¶134 In McConkey, on the other hand, the court recognized 
standing 
because——among 
other 
reasons——if 
the 
case 
were 
dismissed on standing grounds, another plaintiff would bring an 
identical suit.  McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶17-18.  Even though 
the court stated it was "troubled by the broad general voter 
No.  2009AP688.dtp 
6 
 
standing articulated by the circuit court," it found that 
judicial efficiency would best be served by allowing the case to 
proceed.  Id., ¶17.  The court also considered many of the 
prudential 
considerations enumerated by the United States 
Supreme Court, including whether another plaintiff might argue 
the case more zealously or present more fully the issues 
involved.  Id., ¶18.  
¶135 In sum, it should be clear that the third prong listed 
by the lead opinion is not a "catch-all" provision that would 
allow courts to act as they see fit.  If it is analyzed as a 
separate element, it is merely a continuation of the prudential 
considerations this court has upheld in the past. 
¶136 With these caveats, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶137 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   The lead 
opinion concludes that the defendants have standing to object to 
the plaintiffs' choice of attorney in this slip and fall 
negligence action.  The lead opinion so concludes based on a 
potential 
witness's 
past 
employment 
of 
the 
plaintiffs' 
attorney's law firm for land and condominium development that is 
unrelated to the Bishop's Grove Condominiums.1  The interest that 
the lead opinion identifies is the attorney-client confidences 
of the potential witness that are protected by Supreme Court 
Rule (SCR) 20:1.9.2   
¶138 I do not join the lead opinion for three reasons:  (1) 
it creates and then applies a new test for standing that does 
not require Bishop's Grove to make a showing that it has a 
legally protectable interest in the Cramer law firm's attorney-
client relationship with a potential witness; (2) it employs ch. 
20 of the Supreme Court Rules as a legal basis upon which to 
confer standing to Bishop's Grove to disqualify plaintiffs' 
attorney; and (3) whether defendants have standing to challenge 
plaintiffs' choice of attorney based on a communication of 
Bishop's Grove's confidential information cannot be decided 
conclusively on the record before us.  Accordingly, I would 
remand to the circuit court to hold an evidentiary hearing in 
order to permit Bishop's Grove to demonstrate whether Wayne 
Foster improperly transmitted Bishop's Grove's confidential 
information to plaintiffs' attorney. 
                                                 
1 Lead op., ¶¶5-8. 
2 Id., ¶94. 
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
2 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶139 The background underlying this appeal is ably set out 
in the lead opinion.  Therefore, I relate only what is necessary 
to understand this concurrence.   
¶140 On February 1, 2007, Susan Foley-Ciccantelli and her 
husband, Mark Ciccantelli, purchased Unit 175C in the Bishop's 
Grove Condominiums, Inc. (Bishop's Grove).  On February 6, 2007, 
Susan slipped and fell on ice in the driveway of Unit 175C, a 
common area of Bishop's Grove.  She sustained serious injuries 
that have required multiple surgeries.   
¶141 Susan and Mark retained Attorney Timothy Andringa of 
the law firm of Cramer, Multhauf & Hammes, LLP (Cramer law firm) 
to represent them in regard to Susan's slip and fall.  As part 
of his representation, Attorney Andringa contacted State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Company's (State Farm)3 adjuster about his 
clients' claim.  When the adjuster responded that Bishop's Grove 
was not responsible for ice on the driveway of Susan's 
condominium, Attorney Andringa contacted Wayne Foster.  The 
Foster Group, Ltd., Wayne Foster's agency, manages Bishop's 
Grove.  Attorney Andringa asked Foster to explain to the 
adjuster where the common areas of Bishop's Grove are and that 
Bishop's Grove is responsible for maintaining common areas.   
¶142 Attorney Andringa was familiar with Foster because 
Attorney Peter Plaushines of the Cramer law firm had represented 
Foster and The Foster Group in land and condominium development 
unrelated to Bishop's Grove.  The law firm of Reinhart Boerner 
                                                 
3 State Farm is Bishop's Grove's insurer. 
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
3 
 
Van Deuren S.C. (Reinhart law firm) represented Wayne Foster and 
The Foster Group in regard to the development and management of 
Bishop's Grove.   
¶143 No settlement was reached with State Farm.  Therefore, 
on May 7, 2008, Attorney Andringa filed suit against Bishop's 
Grove and State Farm.  He alleged that Susan's injuries were 
caused by Bishop's Grove's negligent maintenance of the common 
area where Susan fell.   
¶144 On 
January 26, 
2009, 
Bishop's 
Grove 
moved 
to 
disqualify Attorney Andringa from representing Susan and Mark.  
The motion alleged that Foster was the exclusive agent for 
managing Bishop's Grove and that Foster had a "long standing 
attorney/client relationship with the Cramer law firm."  The 
motion further alleged that "The Cramer firm could have obtained 
facts, information or knowledge to use against Foster in this 
case 
regarding 
knowledge 
of 
condominium 
documents, 
their 
interpretation and continuing duties under property management."  
And finally, the motion alleged, "To establish liability against 
Bishop's Grove it is likely Cramer will need to prove that their 
former client did something wrong as it pertained to duties and 
obligations under 
the condominium documents vis-à-vis the 
plaintiff or failed in their duties of property management thus 
placing Cramer in an adverse position as to a former client."   
¶145 Foster submitted an affidavit in which he averred 
Attorney Plaushines has represented Foster and The Foster Group 
"for a variety of business matters."  Foster mentions Attorney 
Plaushines' representation of The Foster Group in "Ruff's 
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
4 
 
Preserve," "Water's Edge" and "Island View."  Foster does not 
aver any connection between Attorney Plaushines and Bishop's 
Grove, nor does he aver that Attorney Andringa received 
confidential information about Bishop's Grove in regard to the 
management agreement of Bishop's Grove, this pending lawsuit or 
any other matter.   
¶146 Attorney Andringa submitted an affidavit explaining 
that his firm had run a conflict of interest check on Bishop's 
Grove before agreeing to represent Susan and Mark in this slip 
and fall action.  He found that the Cramer law firm had never 
represented Bishop's Grove, nor has it had any involvement in 
the creation or development of Bishop's Grove.   
¶147 Attorney Andringa attached a certified copy of the 
Articles of Incorporation of Bishop's Grove to his affidavit.  
That document shows that the Reinhart law firm prepared the 
condominium document. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶148 The lead opinion concludes that Bishop's Grove has 
standing to object to Attorney Andringa's representation of 
Susan and Mark because of confidences of Foster developed 
through past representations of him and The Foster Group by the 
Cramer law firm.4  It cites SCR 20:1.9 as the context in which 
Bishop's Grove's motion to disqualify Attorney Andringa is to be 
decided.5   
                                                 
4 Id., ¶8.   
5 Id., ¶11. 
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
5 
 
¶149 The lead opinion errs in its discussion of Bishop's 
Grove's standing when it creates and then applies a new standing 
analysis6 and arrives at conclusions that are unsupported by 
facts in the affidavits of record.7  
A.  Standard of Review 
¶150 We determine whether a petitioner has standing to 
proceed as a question of law that is subject to our independent 
                                                 
6 The lead opinion concludes that "a non-client party has 
standing to move for disqualification of opposing counsel, when 
the prior representation is so connected with the current 
litigation that the prior representation is likely to affect the 
just 
and 
lawful 
determination 
of 
the 
non-client 
party's 
position."  Id., ¶71. 
After discarding Wisconsin's long-term standing analysis 
without acknowledging that it is changing the test for standing, 
the lead opinion then accords Bishop's Grove's standing.  The 
lead opinion does so on the ground that the attorney's 
representation may be a breach of the former client's right to 
confidentiality inasmuch as the defendant has shown that the 
attorney's "prior representation is so connected with the 
current litigation that the prior representation is likely to 
affect the just and lawful determination of the non-client 
party's position."  Id., ¶7.  As I explain below, this analysis 
omits the requirement that the petitioner prove a legally 
protected interest that is personal to the petitioner, which is 
one part of the two-part test for standing. Fox v. DHSS, 112 
Wis. 2d 514, 529, 334 N.W.2d 532 (1983). 
7 The lead opinion relates, "The Foster Group's and Wayne 
Foster's conduct as manager connects the current litigation with 
counsel's prior representation of Wayne Foster and the Foster 
Group."  Lead op., ¶75.  However, there is no statement of 
undisputed fact in any affidavit that supports the conclusion 
that the Cramer law firm's past representation of Foster and The 
Foster Group is connected with the current litigation.  To the 
contrary, all affiants who commented on whether there was a 
connection between past representation of Foster or The Foster 
Group and Bishop's Grove did not aver that the Cramer law firm's 
representation of Foster and The Foster Group had anything to do 
with Bishop's Grove.   
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
6 
 
review.  Metro. Builders Ass'n of Greater Milwaukee v. Vill. of 
Germantown, 2005 WI App 103, ¶12, 282 Wis. 2d 458, 698 N.W.2d 
301.   
B.  Standing Principles 
¶151 Questions of standing are not new to Wisconsin courts.  
Well reasoned opinions have recently and repeatedly explained 
that a standing analysis has two parts.  Krier v. Vilione, 2009 
WI 45, ¶20, 317 Wis. 2d 288, 766 N.W.2d 517; Fox v. DHSS, 112 
Wis. 2d 514, 524-25, 334 N.W.2d 532 (1983); Wis.'s Envtl. 
Decade, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 69 Wis. 2d 1, 9-10, 
230 N.W.2d 243 (1975).8   
¶152 In Fox, an often cited case, we explained that 
standing to proceed requires the petitioner to prove that:  (1) 
he has some "threatened or actual injury resulting from the 
putatively illegal action"; and (2) the injury or threatened 
                                                 
8 The same two-part test for standing employed herein has 
been repeatedly recognized by Wisconsin courts.  See Metro. 
Builders Ass'n of Greater Milwaukee v. Vill. of Germantown, 2005 
WI App 103, ¶13, 282 Wis. 2d 458, 698 N.W.2d 301 (noting that 
the Wisconsin standing analysis has two parts, "first, whether 
the challenged action caused direct injury to the petitioner's 
interest and second, whether the interest affected was one 
recognized by law"); Eller Media, Inc. v. Div. of Hearings & 
Appeals, 2001 WI App 269, ¶7, 249 Wis. 2d 198, 637 N.W.2d 96 
(recognizing and applying the above two-part test for standing); 
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 164 Wis. 2d 
489, 494-95, 476 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1991) (applying the two-
part standing test and concluding that MCI did not prove a 
legally protectable interest); Town of Delavan v. City of 
Delavan, 160 Wis. 2d 403, 410-11, 466 N.W.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(recognizing Wisconsin's two-part test for standing); Mendonca 
v. DNR, 126 Wis. 2d 207, 209, 376 N.W.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(employing the same two-part test for standing set out in this 
concurrence). 
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
7 
 
injury is to his legally protectable interest, i.e., an interest 
of the petitioner that is recognized by law.  Fox, 112 Wis. 2d 
at 524-25 (quoted citation omitted).  
¶153 In Fox, District Attorney E. Michael McCann and other 
petitioners objected to the proposed location of a prison, 
contending the proposed location was too remote, thereby having 
the potential to cause adverse psychological effects on the 
inmates who would be far removed from their families.  Id. at 
526-27.  In order to support their efforts to stop the building 
of the prison at the proposed location, the petitioners asserted 
that the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) failed to 
comply 
with 
the 
statutory 
requirements 
of 
Wisconsin's 
Environmental Policy Act (WEPA).  Id. at 517.  In the course of 
the litigation, petitioners' standing to challenge the FEIS was 
raised.  Id. at 523.  
¶154 We discussed the two parts of a standing analysis that 
are required in order to have standing to proceed under 
Wisconsin law.  We explained that the actual or threatened 
injury resulting from the complained of action need not be 
large.  Id. at 524.  However, an "[a]bstract injury is not 
enough.  The plaintiff must show that he has sustained or is 
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury."  Id. at 
525 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 
(1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  After a thorough 
discussion, we concluded that the petitioners lacked standing 
based on the first part of the standing test, i.e., petitioners 
had not set out a direct injury or the threat of such an injury 
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
8 
 
that is personal to them and was caused by the proposed location 
of the prison.  Id. at 529. 
¶155 We also concluded that the petitioners had failed to 
show that any claimed injury is to a "legally protected 
interest" of the petitioners.  Id. at 529.  The petitioners had 
raised the WEPA as the legal protection for the interest they 
asserted.  However, we concluded that WEPA provided no legal 
protection for their asserted interest, in part because "WEPA 
does not create a public trust in the environment such that any 
citizen of this State may bring suit to question compliance with 
its provisions."  Id. at 531.   
¶156 We again examined the two parts of the standing test 
in City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 112 Wis. 2d 224, 332 
N.W.2d 782 (1983).  There, the City of Madison and Russell 
Mueller, a former resident of Fitchburg, objected to Fitchburg's 
incorporation resolution.  Id. at 227.  The City of Madison 
explained that the incorporation of Fitchburg would extinguish 
Madison's extraterritorial zoning and plat approval jurisdiction 
in Fitchburg, which interests were created by and conferred on 
Madison by statute.  Id. at 231.  We concluded that these 
factual allegations were sufficient to allege that Madison had a 
threatened direct injury to an interest that was legally 
protected 
because 
the 
interest 
was 
granted 
in 
the 
extraterritorial zoning and plat approval statutes.  Id. at 231-
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
9 
 
32.9  Accordingly, we concluded that Madison had standing to 
proceed. 
¶157 The lead opinion sets out a test for "all the cases 
. . . regardless of the nature of the case" as follows:  "(1) 
whether the party whose standing is challenged has a personal 
interest in the controversy . . .; (2) whether the interest of 
the party whose standing is challenged will be injured, that is 
adversely affected; and (3) whether judicial policy calls for 
protecting 
the 
interest 
of 
the 
party 
whose 
standing 
is 
challenged."10   
¶158 While I agree with the lead opinion that the test for 
standing has not always been stated with absolute clarity, I 
part company with the lead opinion's elimination of the 
requirement that the petitioner must show it has a "legally 
protectable interest" that is being harmed.  Removal of the 
"legally 
protectable 
interest" 
determination 
from 
the 
traditional Wisconsin standing test and replacing it with 
"whether judicial policy calls for protecting the interest of 
the party whose standing is challenged" changes a discernable 
legal standard to no standard at all.  Thereafter, the 
determination of standing will be driven by whether a court 
thinks that "judicial policy" warrants standing, whatever that 
means.   
                                                 
9 We concluded that Mueller lost his potential for standing 
when he moved out of Fitchburg; therefore, we did not analyze 
the standing question as to him.  City of Madison v. Town of 
Fitchburg, 112 Wis. 2d 224, 232, 332 N.W.2d 782 (1983).   
10 Lead op., ¶40.   
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
10 
 
¶159 Furthermore, removing the requirement to show a 
legally protectable interest in declaratory judgment actions 
will be a very significant change in Wisconsin's standing rules 
and cause unnecessary confusion.  Long ago in Loy v. Bunderson, 
107 Wis. 2d 400, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982), we explained a four-part 
test for declaratory judgment that is currently employed.  The 
test provides that in order to proceed to declaratory judgment, 
the following must be present:   
(1) A controversy in which a claim of right is 
asserted against one who has an interest in contesting 
it.  
(2) The controversy must be between persons 
whose interests are adverse.   
(3) The party seeking declaratory relief must 
have a legal interest in the controversy——that is to 
say, a legally protectible interest.   
(4) The issue involved in the controversy must 
be ripe for judicial determination. 
Chenequa Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Vill. of Hartland, 2004 WI 
App 144, ¶11, 275 Wis. 2d 533, 685 N.W.2d 573 (citing Loy, 107 
Wis. 2d at 410).  There is no benefit to making such a change in 
long standing law. 
¶160 The lead opinion also asserts that there has been no 
requirement to show a legally protectable interest outside of a 
claim based on constitutional provision, statute, administrative 
rule or declaratory judgment.11  Those are formidable categories 
of cases that the lead opinion will change.  Furthermore, we 
have required a showing of a legally protectable interest when 
the claim was based on Wisconsin common law.  
                                                 
11 E.g., id., ¶¶32, 45. 
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
11 
 
¶161 For example, in our recent discussion of standing in 
Krier, 
we 
addressed 
whether 
plaintiffs' 
contention 
that 
corporate identities should be disregarded to permit plaintiffs' 
common law claim.  Krier, 317 Wis. 2d 288, ¶34.  As we began our 
analysis, we emphasized that in order to have standing, "the 
plaintiffs must show that they suffered or were threatened with 
an injury to an interest that is legally protectable."  Id., ¶20 
(citing Chenequa, 275 Wis. 2d 533, ¶¶13-16).  We concluded that 
the plaintiffs had no legally protectable interest in a 
corporation's assets when they were not shareholders of that 
corporation; and therefore, they had no standing to proceed on 
their claim.  Id., ¶34 (citing Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis. 2d 222, 
229, 201 N.W.2d 593 (1972)).12  
C.  Bishop's Grove Claim of Standing 
¶162 Here, 
Bishop's 
Grove's 
attorney 
averred 
in 
his 
affidavit that Bishop's Grove has standing to object to Attorney 
Andringa's representation of Susan and Mark because a member of 
Attorney Andringa's firm, Attorney Plaushines, represented non-
parties, Wayne Foster and The Foster Group.  Consequently, 
Bishop's Grove's attorney claims that Attorney Andringa would 
                                                 
12 Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Koenigs, 110 Wis. 2d 522, 
527, 329 N.W.2d 157 (1983) (construing standing to appeal based 
on an alleged interest that was legally protected under 
contract); Sandroni v. Waukesha Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 173 
Wis. 2d 183, 189, 496 N.W.2d 164 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding 
that a subcontractor has no legally protectable interest in 
actually performing the work for the prime contractor if the 
prime contractor is awarded the contract; therefore, the 
subcontractor has no injury and no standing to challenge the 
award of the contract). 
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
12 
 
know that Foster has general knowledge13 of how to interpret 
condominium documents and property management agreements; that 
Foster is the agent of Bishop's Grove and probably will be a 
witness at trial; and that plaintiffs may be required to prove 
Foster's management of Bishop's Grove was deficient in order to 
prevail on their claim.   
¶163 Based 
on 
those 
allegations 
and 
applying 
well 
established Wisconsin law to Bishop's Grove's standing claim, it 
becomes apparent that Bishop's Grove does not clearly identify 
the two components necessary for standing:  (1) a threatened or 
actual direct injury to Bishop's Grove and (2) a legally 
protectable interest of Bishop's Grove that is subject to the 
claimed injury.  
¶164 When a petitioner does not clearly articulate those 
two components, it is difficult to evaluate accurately whether 
the petitioner may suffer a direct injury, without first 
evaluating whether the interest that the petitioner asserts is 
legally protectable for the petitioner.  See Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 
531.  In evaluating whether the interest asserted is a legally 
protectable interest of the petitioner who is asserting it, we 
examine whether the asserted interest is recognized by law.  
Krier, 317 Wis. 2d 288, ¶20.  In determining whether the 
asserted interest is recognized by law as a legally protectable 
                                                 
13 Bishop's Grove's allegations in its motion do not specify 
that this knowledge is specific to some unique feature of 
Bishop's Grove's condominium documents or management agreement.  
Therefore, I assume herein that it is a general level of 
knowledge.  
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
13 
 
interest of the petitioner, it is helpful to consider the 
purpose for which the asserted interest was established and the 
intended beneficiaries of the law that established the claimed 
interest.  Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 531.   
¶165 In Krier, we recently cautioned that while standing is 
to be liberally construed, the claim asserted must be legally 
recognizable in Wisconsin jurisprudence.  Krier, 317 Wis. 2d 
288, ¶22.  We also discussed the requirement that a petitioner 
seeking standing must prove that it has a legally protectable 
interest before standing may be conferred in Waste Management of 
Wisconsin, Inc. v. DNR, 144 Wis. 2d 499, 424 N.W.2d 685 (1988).  
There, Waste Management sought to prevent the development of a 
landfill, 
claiming 
that 
the 
landfill 
would 
affect 
Waste 
Management's economic interests.  Id. at 505.  While we 
acknowledged that Waste Management's economic interests may be 
affected, we concluded that Wis. Stat. § 144.44(2)(nm) (1983-
84), on which statute Waste Management relied to show its 
interest was legally protected, did not protect economic 
interests.  Id. at 508-09.  After a thorough discussion of all 
Waste Management's arguments, we concluded that Waste Management 
did not have standing to challenge the landfill because the 
interest to which it claimed injury was not a legally protected 
interest.  Id. at 513.   
¶166 In its brief, Bishop's Grove asserts that SCR 20:1.9 
establishes legal protection for Bishop's Grove's interest in 
attorney-client 
confidences 
of 
former 
clients. 
 
However, 
Bishop's Grove has not alleged it is or was a client of the 
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
14 
 
Cramer law firm.  Instead, it raises Foster and The Foster 
Group's past attorney-client relationship with the Cramer law 
firm, without any allegation that the Cramer law firm has ever 
represented Foster or The Foster Group in regard to Bishop's 
Grove.   
¶167 Bishop's Grove alleges that because Foster will be a 
witness in the trial of this case and the plaintiffs may attempt 
to show Foster's management contributed to Susan's slip and 
fall, Bishop's Grove has a legally protectable interest in 
assuring that the Cramer law firm does not use its knowledge of 
Foster's general familiarity with condominium creation and 
management to Bishop's Grove's disadvantage.   
¶168 While Bishop's Grove may have an interest in assuring 
that Foster has not transmitted confidential information about 
Bishop's Grove to Attorney Andringa if it can allege facts 
showing 
such 
information, 
Bishop's 
Grove 
has 
no 
legally 
protectable interest that arises under SCR ch. 20.  Also, it 
cannot be based on the attorney-client relationship alleged in 
the record before us because the attorney-client relationship 
asserted was not Bishop's Grove's attorney-client relationship.  
Mathias v. Mathias, 188 Wis. 2d 280, 283, 525 N.W.2d 81 (Ct. 
App. 1994).14   
                                                 
14 There was no evidentiary hearing on the issue of 
standing.  The record relevant to Bishop's Grove's motion to 
disqualify Attorney Andringa consists of the affidavits of Wayne 
Foster, Attorney Andringa, Attorney Plaushines, and Attorney 
Schellinger (defendants' counsel). 
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
15 
 
¶169 To explain further, Bishop's Grove raises SCR 20:1.9 
directives that relate to protecting confidences of former 
clients.  In relevant part, SCR 20:1.9 provides: 
(c) A lawyer . . . whose present or former firm 
has formerly represented a client in a matter shall 
not thereafter: 
(1) 
use 
information 
relating 
to 
the 
representation to the disadvantage of the former 
client except as these rules would permit or require 
with respect to a client, or when the information has 
become generally known; or 
(2) 
reveal 
information 
relating 
to 
the 
representation except as these rules would permit or 
require with respect to a client.   
¶170 In order to prevail on a motion to disqualify an 
attorney based on the transmission of confidential information 
during legal representation in another matter, the petitioner 
must prove both parts of a two-part test:  "(1) that an 
attorney-client relationship existed between the attorney and 
the former client; and (2) that there is a substantial 
relationship between the two representations."  Mathias, 188 
Wis. 2d at 283.   
¶171 In Mathias, a husband attempted to disqualify the firm 
that was representing his wife in their divorce because that 
firm had acted as the husband's attorney for estate planning.  
Id. at 282.  There was no dispute that an attorney-client 
relationship had existed between the husband and the wife's law 
firm.  Therefore, there was little discussion about this part of 
the test, except to note that such proof was required in order 
for a petitioner to disqualify an attorney from a pending 
proceeding based on past legal representation.  Id. at 283.   
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
16 
 
¶172 It is undisputed that Bishop's Grove has never been a 
client of the Cramer law firm.  Therefore, Bishop's Grove has no 
attorney-client relationship with the Cramer law firm upon which 
to base its alleged interest under SCR 20:1.9 by which Bishop's 
Grove attempts to disqualify Attorney Andringa.  Id.   
¶173 Moreover, SCR 20:1.9 is directed at protecting the 
confidences of former clients and seeks to prevent conflicts of 
interest wherein a lawyer may use the confidences of a former 
client to the detriment of that client in service of another 
client.  SCR ch. 20 Preamble:  A Lawyer's Responsibilities [8].  
The Preamble demonstrates that the purpose of the rules is not 
to 
provide 
remedies 
outside 
the 
realm 
of 
professional 
discipline.  Id., Scope [20].  
¶174 As the Preamble states, the rules set out in ch. 20 
"define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline."  
Id., Scope [14].  "Failure to comply with an obligation or 
prohibition imposed by a rule is a basis for invoking the 
disciplinary process."  Id., Scope [19].  However, even the 
"violation of a rule does not necessarily warrant any other 
nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in 
pending litigation."  Id., Scope [20].  Furthermore, "[t]he fact 
that a rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or 
for 
sanctioning 
a 
lawyer 
under 
the 
administration 
of 
a 
disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a 
collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek 
enforcement of the rule."  Id. (emphasis added).  
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
17 
 
¶175 Here, Bishop's Grove asserts that it has standing to 
enforce its interpretation of SCR 20:1.9 against Attorney 
Andringa.  Bishop's Grove's attempted enforcement of SCR 20:1.9 
is contrary to the purpose of SCR ch. 20.  SCR ch. 20 is 
intended to protect clients and former clients and to assist 
lawyers in proper conduct.  It does not provide a legally 
protectable interest for those who are not and have never been 
clients.  Id.   
¶176 The lead opinion eliminates one part of Wisconsin's 
test for standing by not requiring Bishop's Grove to prove that 
it 
has 
a 
legally 
protectable 
interest 
in 
confidential 
communications of Foster and The Foster Group that do involve 
Bishop's Grove, thereby forming a basis for disqualifying 
Attorney Andringa, and instead, construes SCR ch. 20 to provide 
the legal basis for such an interest.15  The Preamble to SCR ch. 
20 specifically states it does not provide the legal basis for 
standing to assert the interest Bishop's Grove alleges.   
¶177 As we explained in Waste Management, in order to have 
legal protection for the interest asserted, the petitioner must 
show that it falls within the class of persons the statute or 
regulation was enacted to protect and that its claimed injury is 
of a type proscribed by that statute or regulation.  Waste 
Mgmt., 144 Wis. 2d at 508-09.  Bishop's Grove has made no 
showing that it has, or has ever had, an attorney-client 
relationship with the Cramer law firm.  Therefore, Bishop's 
Grove is not within the class of persons that SCR 20:1.9 was 
                                                 
15 Lead op., ¶¶5, 11.   
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
18 
 
meant to protect and the injury it claims is not of the type of 
injury described in SCR 20:1.9. 
¶178 Few cases have directly addressed standing to utilize 
rules or legal principles governing lawyers' relationships with 
their clients.  However, we squarely addressed this question in 
Forecki v. Kohlberg, 237 Wis. 67, 295 N.W. 7 (1940), reh'g 
denied, 237 Wis. 67, 296 N.W. 619 (1941).  In Forecki, Forecki 
and Zaleski commenced an action to recover damages for personal 
injuries they sustained in a collision between the Kohlberg and 
Zaleski automobiles.  Id. at 69.  Both plaintiffs were of the 
opinion that Kohlberg was the sole cause of the collision.  Id. 
at 73-74.  Therefore, Forecki did not sue Zaleski, who was the 
driver of the car in which Forecki was a passenger.  Id. at 70, 
73-74.  We saw no problem with Forecki's decision not to sue 
Zaleski.16  Id. at 75. 
¶179 The defendants asserted error occurred when the trial 
court permitted two lawyers who were affiliated with one another 
to represent all plaintiffs, alleging that the plaintiffs were 
potentially adverse and that by permitting the representation 
that occurred, the defendants were disadvantaged.  Id. at 73.  
It was argued that the defendants did not have standing to raise 
the contention that Forecki and Zaleski had adverse interests 
and 
were 
represented 
by 
lawyers 
who 
were 
affiliated, 
a 
                                                 
16 Bishop's Grove similarly implies that it is disadvantaged 
because Susan and Mark did not sue Foster or The Foster Group as 
the managers of Bishop's Grove.  However, Bishop's Grove cites 
no statute or other law requiring plaintiffs to sue Foster or 
The Foster Group, and this writer has found none. 
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
19 
 
proposition with which we agreed.  "[W]e think it clear that 
defendants have no right to object on the ground that Attorneys 
Hess and Wickham represented adverse interests. . . .  'Only a 
party who sustains a relation of client to an attorney who 
undertakes to represent conflicting interests may be entitled to 
object to such representation.'"  Id. at 75 (citation omitted).  
¶180 The Preamble to SCR ch. 20 is consistent with the 
conclusion in Forecki that it is the client or former client who 
has a legally protectable interest in the principles attendant 
to the attorney-client relationship, not a third party who 
attempts 
to 
gain 
an 
advantage 
from 
the 
attorney-client 
relationship of another.  SCR ch. 20 Preamble, Scope [20].  
Accordingly, I conclude that Bishop's Grove has no legally 
protectable interest in the Cramer law firm's representation of 
Foster or The Foster Group grounded in the Supreme Court Rules 
or the common law that protects the confidential nature of 
attorney-client communications, even if one were to assume that 
Susan 
and 
Mark's 
claims 
cause 
them 
to 
question 
the 
reasonableness of The Foster Group's management of Bishop's 
Grove.   
¶181 Furthermore, Bishop's Grove has no legally protectable 
interest in Foster's general knowledge of condominium documents 
or 
condominium 
management. 
 
Foster's 
interpretation 
of 
condominium documents that do not relate to Bishop's Grove has 
nothing to do with conferring standing on Bishop's Grove, and 
Foster's 
interpretation 
of 
Bishop's 
Grove's 
condominium 
documents and management agreement will become readily apparent 
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
20 
 
to any attorney who represents Susan and Mark during the civil 
discovery process that is applicable to this case.  Therefore, 
because Bishop's Grove has identified no legally protectable 
interest of Bishop's Grove, Bishop's Grove does not have 
standing to object to Attorney Andringa's representation of 
Susan and Mark in this action based on the attorney-client 
relationship between Attorney Plaushines of the Cramer law firm 
and Foster or The Foster Group.   
¶182 However, it does not necessarily follow from this 
conclusion that Bishop's Grove has no legally protectable 
interest in preserving the confidential nature of its own 
proprietary information, if such is at issue here.  I have 
interpreted 
Bishop's 
Grove's 
disqualification 
motion's 
allegation, 
"The 
Cramer 
firm 
could 
have 
obtained 
facts, 
information or knowledge to use against Foster in this case 
regarding 
knowledge 
of 
condominium 
documents, 
their 
interpretation and continuing duties under property management," 
as an allegation that the Cramer law firm knows that Foster has 
a general understanding of condominiums and their management 
because they have represented Foster and The Foster Group in the 
development of other condominiums.  However, if Bishop's Grove 
actually is asserting that the Cramer law firm has some 
knowledge 
of 
proprietary 
and 
confidential 
information 
of 
Bishop's Grove, the specifics of any such allegation do not 
appear in the affidavits that form the record for this appeal 
and would require an evidentiary hearing. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
21 
 
¶183 I do not join the lead opinion for three reasons:  (1) 
it creates and then applies a new test for standing that does 
not require Bishop's Grove to make a showing that it has a 
legally protectable interest in the Cramer law firm's attorney-
client relationship with a potential witness; (2) it employs ch. 
20 of the Supreme Court Rules as a legal basis upon which to 
confer standing to Bishop's Grove to disqualify plaintiffs' 
attorney; and (3) whether defendants have standing to challenge 
plaintiffs' choice of attorney based on a communication of 
Bishop's Grove's confidential information cannot be decided 
conclusively on the record before us.  Accordingly, I would 
remand to the circuit court to hold an evidentiary hearing in 
order to permit Bishop's Grove to demonstrate whether Wayne 
Foster improperly transmitted Bishop's Grove's confidential 
information to plaintiffs' attorney.  
¶184 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
 
No.  2009AP688.pdr 
 
 
 
1