Title: New Jersey v. Maisonet
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: March 23, 2021

New Jersey v. Maisonet Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Defendant Luis Masionet was charged with first-degree murder and other offenses in connection with a September 2016 shooting. After learning that his ex-girlfriend and her new boyfriend, Christopher Romero, were expecting a child, defendant went to the store in the outlet mall where Romero worked, pulled out a handgun, and fatally shot Romero. Trial was scheduled to start in late 2017. By then, defendant had been represented by the same assistant deputy public defender for fifteen months. Right before jury selection was to begin, defendant asked the court for an adjournment, stating that, although he would have stayed with his attorney “all the way to the end” if he had taken a plea, “I cannot go to trial with [appointed counsel]” because she had tried only two cases in her career, neither of which were murder trials. The trial judge denied the adjournment request and indicated that appointed counsel would represent defendant through trial. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury convicted defendant on all counts presented. The issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review was whether defendant's constitutional right to counsel was denied when, on the day his murder trial was set to begin, he sought an adjournment to see if he could hire a private attorney and his request was denied. Like the Appellate Division, the Supreme Court rejected defendant's claim: "If a trial judge does not conduct the proper analysis...it may be necessary to reverse a conviction and start anew. But defendants are not automatically entitled to a new trial. ...the Appellate Division found no abuse of discretion under the circumstances. We agree and affirm defendant's conviction." Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Luis A. Maisonet (A-28-19) (083066)Argued September 15, 2020 -- Decided March 23, 2021RABNER, C.J., writing for the Court. The Court considers whether defendant Luis Maisonet was denied his constitutional right to counsel when, on the day his murder trial was set to begin, he sought an adjournment to see if he could hire a private attorney and his request was denied. Defendant was charged with first-degree murder and other offenses in connection with a September 2016 shooting. After learning that his ex-girlfriend and her new boyfriend, Christopher Romero, were expecting a child, defendant went to the store in the outlet mall where Romero worked, pulled out a handgun, and fatally shot Romero. Defendant then walked to the nearby store where his ex-girlfriend worked and pointed the gun at her before shooting himself in the chest area. Defendant was treated at the hospital and was arrested days later. He requested that a public defender represent him. Trial was scheduled to start on December 4, 2017. By then, defendant had been represented by the same assistant deputy public defender for fifteen months. Right before jury selection was to begin, defendant asked the court for an adjournment. He stated that, although he would have stayed with his attorney “all the way to the end” if he had taken a plea, “I cannot go to trial with [appointed counsel]” because she had tried only two cases in her career, neither of which were murder trials. The trial judge offered defendant two choices -- to hire his own attorney or to represent himself -- and stated, “I don’t decide who represents you.” When defendant interjected, the trial judge told defendant to stop talking and stated, “I have no reason to believe that [appointed counsel] cannot represent you fairly and to the best of her ability. She is an experienced lawyer.” The judge denied the adjournment request and indicated that appointed counsel would represent defendant through trial. Defendant then repeated his request for a postponement to “go back and call family . . . to see if they can get some money together” to hire a private lawyer. The judge noted that they were “here for trial” and that defendant had known about the trial, his plea offer, and who his attorney was “for a long period of time.” The judge again 1 denied the adjournment request; when defendant pressed on, the judge asked defendant to take a seat so she could bring the jury in. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury convicted defendant on all counts presented. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s convictions. The Court granted certification limited to this question: “whether defendant’s constitutional right to counsel of his choice was violated.” 240 N.J. 159 (2019).HELD: The Court affirms settled principles of law that require trial judges to conduct a “reasoned, thoughtful analysis” of certain factors when they consider a request for an adjournment to hire new counsel. See State v. Kates, 216 N.J. 393, 396-97 (2014); State v. Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. 395, 402 (App. Div. 1985). If a trial judge does not conduct the proper analysis, it may be necessary to reverse a conviction. But defendants are not automatically entitled to a new trial. When a reviewing court can glean or infer the relevant considerations from the record, it may evaluate the appropriate factors. The Court does not find an actual deprivation of the right to counsel of choice here, so the doctrine of structural error does not apply.1. The trial court must strike a balance between (a) its right to control its own calendar and the public’s interest in the orderly administration of justice and (b) a defendant’s constitutional right to obtain counsel of his choice. To do so, New Jersey courts use eight factors from United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See Kates and Furguson. The Court reaffirms the use of those factors and reminds trial judges to analyze them when defendants request an adjournment to obtain counsel. (pp. 11-13)2. Trial courts have broad discretion in weighing the factors. An arbitrary or erroneous ruling that amounts to an actual deprivation of the right to counsel of one’s choice implicates structural error, and prejudice is presumed. But courts cannot presume structural error from a trial court’s failure to ask questions or make explicit findings about the Furguson factors if the record otherwise reveals that an adjournment to seek to hire new counsel was not appropriate. If an appellate court can glean or infer the relevant considerations from the record, it can analyze the factors to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying an adjournment. (pp. 13-14)3. The Court reviews in detail case law from the D.C. Circuit and other jurisdictions which assess relevant factors on appeal in light of the record if the trial court neglected to analyze them. That approach sensibly protects both the constitutional rights of defendants and the public’s interest in the orderly administration of justice. (pp. 14-17)4. The Court evaluates the Furguson factors on the record here; though thin, the record allows consideration of nearly all of the factors. First, as to the length of the requested delay, defendant’s request was open-ended, and he acknowledged he had not yet approached either his family, to see if they could provide funds, or a private attorney. 2 One can infer the delay would have been considerable. Second, the Court cannot tell whether other continuances had been requested and granted. The Court measures the third factor -- the balanced convenience or inconvenience to the litigants and the court -- in part by the timing of the request. Here, the jurors were summoned, witnesses were prepared, and the trial court’s schedule was cleared prior to defendant’s last-minute request. (pp. 17-18)5. As to the fourth factor, defendant’s sole reason for the request was that his lawyer lacked sufficient experience. The trial court made an express finding there was no reason to believe the experienced counsel could not represent defendant fairly. This implied the trial court’s view that denying the continuance would not result in identifiable prejudice to defendant, the seventh factor. Fifth, defendant alone contributed to the circumstance that gave rise to the motion by waiting until the day of trial to ask for an adjournment and failing to act with reasonable diligence. Sixth, no other competent counsel was prepared to try the case: defendant had not yet approached his family or private counsel. As to the complexity of the case, the eighth factor, no defendant can be expected to stand trial for murder with an attorney who has not begun to prepare the case. (pp. 18-19)6. The Court disapproves of what happened at the abbreviated hearing and directs that trial courts analyze requests for continuances to hire counsel of choice in accordance with settled case law. To accomplish that, trial judges should ask defendants questions designed to elicit information relevant to the Furguson factors. That inquiry does not have to be lengthy to facilitate a reasoned analysis of the applicable factors. (pp. 19-20) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS, dissenting, writes that the trial court summarily denied defendant’s request without conducting the level of analysis required, which is an abuse of discretion. The trial court did not address the Furguson factors and also failed to elicit any facts from defendant or conduct any inquiry regarding his request. Further, the trial court’s assessment of counsel’s abilities cannot cure defendant’s own concerns regarding his attorney’s abilities. Justice Pierre-Louis agrees that on an adequate factual record, an appellate court can glean the relevant considerations and determine whether the trial court appropriately denied an adjournment request, but not here. This case involved a thin record of a brief proceeding during which defendant was not allowed to speak to explain his request or take advantage of one of the two options the trial court offered him before denying his request. In Justice Pierre-Louis’s view, this amounts to structural error.JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS filed a dissent, in which JUSTICE ALBIN joins. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 28 September Term 2019 083066 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Luis A. Maisonet, Defendant-Appellant. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division . Argued Decided September 15, 2020 March 23, 2021 Margaret McLane, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Margaret McLane, on the brief). Nicole L. Campellone, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Damon G. Tyner, Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney; Nicole L. Campellone, of counsel and on the brief). Joe Johnson argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Joe Johnson, Jeanne LoCicero, and Alexander Shalom, on the brief).CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 In this case, defendant asked for an adjournment of his murder trial onthe day it was set to begin. He had been represented by an assistant deputypublic defender since his arrest. Fifteen months later, and a full year after hisindictment, he told the judge for the first time that he wanted to call familymembers “to see if they can get some money together” so that he could hire “aprivate lawyer.” After a brief exchange with defendant, the trial judge deniedthe request. Defendant later challenged his conviction on the ground that hewas denied his constitutional right to counsel. Like the Appellate Division, we reject defendant’s claim. We alsoaffirm settled principles of law that require trial judges to conduct a “reasoned,thoughtful analysis” of certain factors when they consider a request for anadjournment to hire new counsel. See State v. Kates, 216 N.J. 393, 396-97(2014) (discussing factors outlined in State v. Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. 395,402 (App. Div. 1985)). If a trial judge does not conduct the proper analysis, as happened in thiscase, it may be necessary to reverse a conviction and start anew. Butdefendants are not automatically entitled to a new trial. When a reviewingcourt can glean or infer the relevant considerations from the record, it mayevaluate the appropriate factors, as the Appellate Division did here. 2 The Appellate Division found no abuse of discretion under thecircumstances. We agree and affirm defendant’s conviction. I. A. The facts relating to the offense are not central to defendant’s argumenton appeal. For that reason, we summarize them briefly. Defendant Luis Maisonet and Jennifer Villanueva had a long-termrelationship that ended in 2015 or 2016. Defendant wanted to resume therelationship afterward and texted Villanueva often. Over time, he also texted,confronted, and threatened Christopher Romero, Villanueva’s new boyfriend. Villanueva and Romero worked at different retail stores in an outlet mallin Atlantic City. On September 1, 2016, they drove to work together. Severalmonths earlier, Villanueva had told defendant that she and Romero wereexpecting a child. Around noon on September 1, defendant entered the store where Romeroworked, pulled out a handgun, and shot Romero. Romero fell to the ground ,and defendant shot him two more times. Several witnesses in the store sawdefendant shoot Romero, who died from the gunshot wounds. Defendant then walked over to the store where Villanueva worked,pointed the gun at her, and said “bye-bye baby.” He fired a round into the 3 store’s ceiling and then shot himself in the chest area. An off-duty policeofficer who was shopping in the store heard defendant fire the gun and sawhim fall. The officer wrestled the gun away from defendant. After the shooting, defendant was treated at the hospital. According tothe court’s intake form, defendant was arrested days later and requested that apublic defender represent him. B. On November 30, 2016, a grand jury in Atlantic County chargeddefendant in an indictment with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)and (2); second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1); second-degree possession of a handgun without apermit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); fourth-degree aggravated assault (pointing afirearm), N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4); and second-degree possession of a handgunafter having been convicted of a crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). The Statedismissed an additional charge before trial. Trial was scheduled to start one year later, on December 4, 2017. Bythen, defendant had been represented by an assistant deputy public defenderfor fifteen months. Defendant does not dispute the State’s representation thatthe same public defender represented him the entire time. 4 Right before jury selection was to begin, defendant asked the court foran adjournment. The following exchange took place: DEFENDANT: Well, good morning, Judge -- Judge []. Your reputation and your word -- the word of the county is you’re a very fair judge, a very fair judge, and I want to appeal to your fairness. When I got together with Ms. Weigel -- she’s a very nice lady. I have a lot of respect for her. I told her if she could get me a deal, I’d go with her all the way to the end. Ms. Weigel has never been in murder trials before. She’s only had two murder -- two trials in her practice, none of this magnitude. And I feel it’s not fair to me for her to represent me in a case of this magnitude. If I’m going to -- anything that’s going to happen to me in this trial, as long as I’m defended by a lawyer that has experience in murder trials and a trial of this magnitude, I’m okay with it, but she has no experience whatsoever in this type of case and the magnitude of this case. So I don’t feel that I’m being represented right. When I got together with her in the beginning, I said if she could get me the right deal, I was okay with that. But to go to murder -- to go through a trial for murder and be represented by an attorney that has no experience, only two trial experience and lost one of them, minor trials, how do you see that’s fair? So I’m going to appeal to your fairness, because in the county the word is that you’re fair, you’re a very fair judge. And I cannot go to trial -- I cannot go to trial with Ms. Weigel. I respect her. I admire her very much, but I cannot go to trial with Ms. Weigel. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Maisonet, you have a couple of choices. You can either hire your own attorney or 5 you can represent yourself. I don’t decide who represents you. I have no --DEFENDANT: Well, then --THE COURT: Don’t -- stop talking.DEFENDANT: I’m sorry.THE COURT: I have no reason to believe that Ms. Weigel cannot represent you fairly and to the best of her ability. She is an experienced lawyer. I have no reason to doubt that she’s unable to represent you. So at this time we haven’t even started the trial, and you’ve already asked for a new attorney, claiming that she can’t represent you. I have no evidence of that. I have no reason to believe she cannot.DEFENDANT: In my -- in my opinion --THE COURT: So you’re shaking your head, but that’s my decision. She is your attorney, and she’ll be representing you through this trial.DEFENDANT: Then I ask for a postponement so I can go back and call family members so they -- they can get some -- to see if they can get some money together and I can get me a private lawyer.THE COURT: Okay.DEFENDANT: Because I will not go to trial with Ms. Weigel.THE COURT: Okay. How --DEFENDANT: I respect her. I admire her very much. I have nothing against her, but I cannot go to trial with Ms. Weigel. 6 THE COURT: I heard -- and you said all those things already. Your request is denied. We’re here for trial. So you’ve known about this trial for a long period of time.DEFENDANT: But --THE COURT: You’ve known about your offer. You’ve known who your attorney is.DEFENDANT: Right.THE COURT: So we’re going to proceed with trial today. So your request is denied.DEFENDANT: That’s -- you don’t think that’s unfair to me to go to trial with Ms. Weigel?THE COURT: I’ve made my ruling. I’ve made my ruling.DEFENDANT: I’m actually -- no disrespect, Your Honor, to the Court.THE COURT: Well, right now you are disrespecting me, because I’ve made a ruling.DEFENDANT: I’m sorry.THE COURT: So I’m not going to hear anything else about that. So you can take a seat, because I’m going to bring the jury in after we have some preliminary discussions about some other matters.DEFENDANT: I just want it to be on record that it’s unfair to me --THE COURT: You’re on record. You’re certainly on record. 7 DEFENDANT: -- to go to trial with an inexperienced lawyer -- THE COURT: You’re saying the same things over -- DEFENDANT: -- who never been to a trial of this magnitude. THE COURT: You’re saying the same things over again. It’s on record. Okay. The case proceeded to trial on all but the last count of the indictment,possession of a handgun after having been convicted of a crime. The juryconvicted defendant on all four counts. In a separate trial afterward, the juryalso convicted defendant of the additional handgun possession count. The trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison for murder, subjectto the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The court also imposed aconsecutive sentence of eighteen months for aggravated assault. Oneadditional count was merged, and the sentences on the two remaining countswere to run concurrently. C. Defendant appealed. Among other arguments, he claimed that he wasdeprived of his constitutional right to counsel when the trial court arbitrarilydenied his request for a continuance to retain private counsel. The AppellateDivision rejected the argument and affirmed defendant’s convictions andsentence. 8 Citing prior precedent, the appellate court initially identified factors thattrial courts should consider to assess a request for an adjournment: the length of the requested delay; whether other continuances have been requested and granted; the balanced convenience or inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court; whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons, or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance; whether the defendant has other competent counsel prepared to try the case, including the consideration of whether the other counsel was retained as lead or associate counsel; whether denying the continuance will result in identifiable prejudice to defendant’s case, and if so, whether this prejudice is of a material or substantial nature; the complexity of the case; and other relevant factors which may appear in the context of any particular case. [Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. at 402 (quoting United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1978).]We refer to those factors as the Furguson or Burton factors. Alluding to some of the factors, the Appellate Division highlighted thetrial court’s statements that there was no reason to believe defendant’s attorneycould not represent defendant fairly; that she was an experienced lawyer; andthat defendant had known about the trial, the plea offer, and who his attorneywas for a long period of time. The appellate court also observed thatdefendant offered no explanation for why he waited until the first day of trial 9 to seek a continuance and had no concrete financial plan or timetable to securea private lawyer. As a result, the court reasoned, any continuance would havebeen for an indefinite period with no assurance defendant could retain privatecounsel. Under the circumstances, the Appellate Division found no mistakenexercise of discretion in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s belatedadjournment request. We granted defendant’s petition for certification limited to this question:“whether defendant’s constitutional right to counsel of his choice wasviolated.” 240 N.J. 159 (2019). We also granted leave to the American CivilLiberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) to appear as amicus curiae. II. As he did before the Appellate Division, defendant contends the trialcourt arbitrarily denied his request for a continuance to hire private counsel.By doing so, defendant argues, the trial court deprived him of hisconstitutional right to counsel. He claims the error was structural and requiresthe reversal of his convictions. At the core of his argument, defendant stresses that the trial court“simply did not consider the Furguson factors at all.” As a result, defendantsubmits, the court’s decision cannot amount to an exercise of discretion. 10 The ACLU likewise contends the trial court failed to engage inmeaningful analysis before rejecting defendant’s request for an adjournment.Because the record was sparse, the Appellate Division had little to review todetermine if the court’s ruling was appropriate, according to the ACLU. TheACLU also argues the Appellate Division failed to analyze the denial ofdefendant’s adjournment request for structural error, which calls for automaticreversal. The State submits defendant’s constitutional right to counsel was notviolated when the trial court denied his late request for a postponement toretain private counsel. The State maintains that the colloquy betweendefendant and the court provided the judge with the essential information tomake the proper decision -- and enough information to deny defendant’srequest. According to the State, a more detailed factual inquiry was notrequired because the trial court listened to defendant’s reasons and did notneed additional information. III. Both the Federal and State Constitutions guarantee criminal defendantsthe right to counsel. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10. Aspart of that guarantee, defendants who do not need appointed counsel have the 11 right “to choose who will represent” them. Kates, 216 N.J. at 395 (quotingUnited States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 , 144 (2006)). The right is not absolute, however. Indigent defendants represented bycourt-appointed counsel do not have a right to choose their lawyer. Id. at 395n.1; see also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 , 11-14 (1983) (concluding it was noterror to deny a continuance after one public defender substituted for another,in light of the record presented). And all defendants must act “with reasonablediligence” when choosing counsel to avoid delaying the efficient operation ofthe justice system. Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. at 401. In the end, “the trial court must strike a balance between its inherent andnecessary right to control its own calendar and the public’s interest in theorderly administration of justice, on the one hand, and the defendant’sconstitutional right to obtain counsel of his own choice, on the other.” State v.Hayes, 205 N.J. 522, 538 (2011) (quoting Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. at 402). To help trial judges balance the relevant interests when a defendantseeks an adjournment to retain counsel, we adopted a series of factors from theD.C. Circuit’s 1978 ruling in Burton. See, e.g., Kates, 216 N.J. at 396;Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. at 402. The factors are recited above. We reaffirm their use today and remind trial judges to analyze themwhen defendants request an adjournment to obtain counsel of their choice. As 12 we noted in Kates, trial court judges should “conduct[] a reasoned, thoughtfulanalysis of the appropriate factors.” 216 N.J. at 396. Trial courts have broad discretion in weighing the factors and strikingthe proper balance, and their decisions are entitled to deference on appeal. Seeid. at 397; State v. Miller, 216 N.J. 40, 65 (2013) (noting the deferentialstandard of review and stressing that “broad discretion must be granted trialcourts on matters of continuances” (quoting Morris, 461 U.S. at 11)). Anarbitrary or erroneous ruling that amounts to an actual deprivation of the rightto counsel of one’s choice, however, implicates structural error. SeeGonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150; Kates, 216 N.J. at 395-97. In such cases,prejudice is presumed. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146; Kates, 216 N.J. at 395-97. But courts cannot presume structural error from a trial court’s failureto ask questions or make explicit findings about the Furguson factors if therecord otherwise reveals that an adjournment to seek to hire new counsel wasnot appropriate under the circumstances. Even the most conscientious judges make mistakes. If a trial judge failsto analyze the Furguson factors, that error -- in certain instances -- mayamount to structural error and lead to the reversal of a conviction. Defendantand the ACLU press for a blanket rule that reversals are automatic whenever atrial court neglects to analyze the factors. We are not aware of any courts that 13 follow that course. Instead, if an appellate court can glean or infer the relevantconsiderations from the record, it can analyze the factors to determine whetherthe trial court abused its discretion in denying an adjournment. 1 The D.C. Circuit, our source for the proper inquiry, has followed thatapproach. In United States v. Rettaliata, for example, the defendant asked toreplace his attorney on the day of trial. 833 F.2d 361, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Inresponse, the court conducted a hearing and heard arguments from the partieson whether the case should proceed. Ibid. The trial court then denied therequest for a postponement to retain new counsel but “did not specifically listthe factors that it relied upon.” Id. at 362-63. On appeal, in an opinionauthored by Circuit Judge Abner Mikva, the court cited the Burton factors,applied just a few of them to the record, and concluded “the trial judge did notabuse his discretion in denying [a] last-minute plea to obtain new counsel.” Id.at 363. In short, although the trial court did not mention any factors, let aloneconduct a reasoned analysis, the appellate court stepped in to perform that taskbased on the record. In United States v. Poston, a defendant moved for a continuance theafternoon before trial was scheduled to begin so that his newly retained lawyer1 A reviewing court can also consider whether a remand might be appropriate in a given case to expand the record. 14 could “prepare more fully for trial.” 902 F.2d 90, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1990).2 Thetrial judge stated he would grant the continuance only if the defendant “agreedto pay all the expenses already incurred for the trial, including the fee of hisformer court-appointed attorney and the expenses of the jury.” Ibid. Thedefendant refused, and trial began with both attorneys present. Id. at 96-97. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit recited the Burton factors and appliedseveral of them. The Circuit effectively stepped into the shoes of the trialjudge when it observed the court “could reasonably have concluded that [thedefendant’s] motion was 'dilatory, purposeful, or contrived’” because thedefendant “provided no justification for the delay in selecting new counsel.”Id. at 97 (quoting Burton, 584 F.2d at 491). Ultimately, the Circuit found noabuse of discretion. Id. at 98. In another case, the Circuit addressed a defendant’s motion to changecounsel on the day of trial. United States v. Jefferson, 974 F.2d 201, 203(D.C. Cir. 1992). For more than a year after his arrest, the defendant had beenrepresented by an attorney who was prepared to try the case. Id. at 203-04.That lawyer informed the court that the defendant’s family had retained newcounsel and also moved for a continuance to allow the new lawyer time to2 The defendant offered a second reason that is not relevant here: to postpone the case until after the trial of his codefendant, who “might possibly provide exculpatory testimony.” Poston, 902 F.2d at 96. 15 prepare for trial. Id. at 203. The trial court denied the motion for acontinuance, citing the court’s crowded trial calendar, and invited new counselto “sit at the counsel table . . . and participate.” Id. at 203-04 (ellipsis inoriginal). The Circuit also noted the original lawyer tried the caseprofessionally. Id. at 204. The defendant challenged the denial of his motion for a continuance onappeal. Once again, the D.C. Circuit cited the Burton factors, applied a few ofthem in light of the record, and found no abuse of discretion. Id. at 204-05.See also United States v. Gantt, 140 F.3d 249 , 256-58 (D.C. Cir. 1998)(considering several Burton factors on appeal and concluding the trial courtacted within its discretion when it granted replacement counsel, who had beenin the case for two weeks, only a two-day continuance rather than the thirtydays he requested). Other jurisdictions have taken the same approach. See, e.g., State v.Hein, 674 P.2d 1358 , 1366-68 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc) (applying the Burtonfactors on appeal, after the trial court did not set forth its reasons on therecord, and finding no abuse of discretion in the denial of a defendant’srequest for a continuance in order to be represented by a particular attorney);State v. Roth, 881 P.2d 268, 279 & n.12 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (finding noabuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of a requested continuance and 16 rejecting the defendant’s challenge to “the trial court’s failure to engage in on -the-record balancing to decide the counsel of choice issue” in part because “therecord in this case amply permits effective appellate review of the issue”). The above approach -- assessing the relevant factors on appeal in light ofthe record if the trial court neglected to analyze them -- sensibly protects boththe constitutional rights of defendants and “the public’s interest in the orderlyadministration of justice.” Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. at 402. Neither interestis served by a retrial if it can be determined on appeal that a trial court’s denialof an adjournment request was appropriate under the circumstances. IV. We next consider whether the Furguson factors can be evaluated on therecord here. Although the record is thin, it is adequate to allow considerationof most of the factors. We agree with the Appellate Division that a number offact-specific considerations weighed against defendant’s request for anadjournment. We address each factor in turn. First, as to the length of the requested delay, defendant plainly stated he“cannot go to trial with” appointed counsel. His request was open-ended. Heacknowledged he had not yet approached either his family, to see if they couldprovide funds, or a private attorney. And any attorney new to the case wouldhave needed time to prepare to defend a murder charge. Under the 17 circumstances, even though neither the court nor defendant focused on howlong of a continuance defendant wanted, one can reasonably infer the delaywould have been considerable. Second, we cannot tell “whether other continuances ha[d] been requestedand granted.” See Kates, 216 N.J. at 396 (quoting Furguson, 198 N.J. Super.at 402). The third factor, “the balanced convenience or inconvenience to thelitigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court,” ibid., is measured, in part, by thetiming of an adjournment request. As the trial court stated, “We’re here fortrial.” To prepare for the start of a trial, jurors are summoned, witnesses areprepared, and the court’s schedule is cleared. Those events took place beforedefendant’s last-minute request, and jury selection began almost immediatelyafter the court’s ruling. The State presented its witnesses the following day.We cannot tell, however, whether the court could have begun a different trialwith the assembled jury pool. As to the fourth factor, the sole reason defendant advanced for anadjournment was that, although he was fine staying with his attorney “all theway to the end” to negotiate a plea, he thought she lacked sufficient experienceto try the case. The court made an express finding on that point: “[s]he is anexperienced lawyer” and there was “no reason to believe” counsel could not 18 represent defendant fairly. Implicit in that finding was the court’s view thatdenying a continuance would not “result in identifiable prejudice” todefendant, the seventh factor. See ibid. Defendant alone “contributed to the circumstance which [gave] rise” tothe motion, the fifth factor. See ibid. He acknowledged he had worked withthe same public defender “in the beginning,” yet he waited until the day of trial-- more than a year after his arrest and indictment -- to ask for an adjournment.Despite having ample time to try to hire a private lawyer, he did not act withreasonable diligence. See State v. McLaughlin, 310 N.J. Super. 242, 259(App. Div. 1998). The record also reveals that no “other competent counsel [was] preparedto try the case,” the sixth factor. See Kates, 216 N.J. at 396. Defendantexplained that he had not yet even spoken with family members to see if theycould provide funds for him to retain private counsel. As to the complexity of the case, the eighth factor, no defendant can beexpected to stand trial for murder with an attorney who has not even begun toprepare the case. The record thus enables us to assess nearly all of the relevant factors.To be clear, we do not approve of what happened at the abbreviated hearingand once again direct that trial courts analyze requests for continuances to hire 19 counsel of choice in accordance with settled case law. See Kates, 216 N.J. at 396-97. To accomplish that, trial judges should ask defendants questionsdesigned to elicit information relevant to the Furguson factors. That inquirydoes not have to be lengthy to facilitate a reasoned analysis of the applicablefactors. Id. at 397. Here, however, it is difficult to imagine a different outcome on the factspresented. When a defendant shows up on the morning of a murder trial, ayear after indictment, and asks for time to call family members to see if theymight provide funds for a private attorney, it can hardly be said that denying arequest for an adjournment amounts to an abuse of discretion. See Miller, 216 N.J. at 65. We do not find an actual deprivation of the right to counsel of choice inthis case, so the doctrine of structural error does not apply. V. For the reasons outlined above, we affirm the judgment of the AppellateDivision. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. JUSTICE PIERRE- LOUIS filed a dissent, in which JUSTICE ALBIN joins. 20 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Luis A. Maisonet, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS, dissenting. In this matter, the trial court summarily denied defendant’s request foran adjournment to secure private counsel of his choosing. As this Court madeclear in State v. Kates, “if a trial court summarily denies an adjournment toretain private counsel without considering the relevant factors . . . adeprivation of the right to choice of counsel [can] be found” and structuralerror requiring reversal can be triggered. 216 N.J. 393, 397 (2014). Becausethe trial court summarily denied defendant’s request without conducting thelevel of analysis required by our case law, I respectfully dissent. This Court’s opinion in Kates was written specifically to underscore theprinciple that “[i]f a trial court conducts a reasoned, thoughtful analysis of theappropriate factors, it can exercise its authority to deny a request for anadjournment to obtain counsel of choice.” Id. at 396-97. That simply did notoccur in this case, and it is my view that the trial court’s failure to conduct any 1 analysis whatsoever in denying defendant’s adjournment request amounts to anabuse of discretion. As detailed in the majority’s recitation of the facts, prior to juryselection, defendant attempted to explain to the trial judge his concerns withhis representation. Defendant told the court that he was uncomfortableproceeding to trial with his assistant deputy public defender who had limitedtrial experience and had never handled a murder case. The trial judge adviseddefendant as follows: “[Y]ou have a couple of choices. You can either hireyour own attorney or you can represent yourself. I don’t decide whorepresents you.” Moments later, however, the trial judge did in fact decidewho would represent defendant when she ruled that the public defender wouldcontinue as defense counsel. That ruling was made without giving defendantan opportunity to speak or choose from the two options that the trial judge hadoffered him just moments earlier. Specifically, the trial judge stated, uponseeing defendant shake his head, “So you’re shaking your head, but that’s mydecision. She is your attorney, and she’ll be representing you through thistrial.” When defendant was given an opportunity to speak, he indicated that hewished to avail himself of one of the two choices the trial judge had offeredand asked for a postponement to determine whether his family could obtain a 2 private attorney. The trial judge simply responded, “Your request is denied.”It is quite evident from the record that what transpired was a summary denialof defendant’s request. During the brief exchange between defendant and the trial court, thecourt unquestionably did not address the factors set forth in State v. Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. 395, 402 (App. Div. 1985), and also failed to elicit any factsfrom defendant or conduct any inquiry whatsoever regarding his request.Similar to what occurred in Kates, the trial court here did not “inquire ofdefendant himself, to determine the length of the requested delay”; did not“assess whether [the] request was made in good faith”; and did not make any“findings regarding the imperatives of its calendar.” See State v. Kates, 426 N.J. Super. 32, 51-53 (App. Div. 2012). In denying defendant’s request, the court noted that defense counsel wasan experienced lawyer and that the court had no reason to believe defensecounsel could not represent defendant fairly and to the best of her ability.Defense counsel, however, had tried only two cases to a jury. The court’sassessment of defense counsel’s abilities, moreover, cannot cure thedefendant’s own concerns regarding his attorney’s ability to properly representhim in a murder trial. See id. at 51 (“The court’s only expressed basis fordenying the requested continuance was its satisfaction . . . that [counsel] was 3 prepared to try the case . . . . As we have observed, the availability ofcompetent counsel may not replace the right to choose one’s own counsel.”).Without question, a defendant’s lack of confidence in his attorney can bedetrimental to the attorney-client relationship. “[T]he court’s confidence inthe assigned counsel’s competence [is] no substitute for the exercise ofdefendant’s rights. 'The issue in this case is the attorney-client relationshipand not the comfort of the court or the competency of the attorney.’” Id. at 49(quoting United States v. Nguyen, 262 F.3d 998 , 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)). I agree with the majority that on an adequate factual record, an appellatecourt can glean the relevant considerations regarding an adjournment requestand determine whether the trial court acted within its discretion to deny therequest even in the case of a summary denial, like this one. Unfortunately,such an adequate factual record does not exist here. As the majority accuratelypointed out, “the record is thin.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 17). In reviewing therecord presented, we can do no more than make assumptions in attempting toapply a reasoned and thoughtful analysis of the Furguson factors. Forexample, we have no idea how long the delay would have been. Defendantmight have conferred with his family and determined fairly quickly that theywere either able or not able to pay for private counsel, but that is speculationsince he was not allowed to do so. The record is likewise devoid of any 4 indication whether other continuances had been requested and granted in thiscase. And with regard to any potential inconvenience of the court, similar toKates, “[w]e do not know whether other cases were available for the court totry, nor the impact of a continuance on the State and its witnesses, as the courtdid not inquire whether the State objected to the continuance.” Kates, 426 N.J.Super. at 53. The sparse record here simply does not allow us to analyze theFurguson factors the way that the trial court, which was in the best position todo so, should have. The majority cites several cases from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appealsand other jurisdictions in which the appellate courts searched the record forinformation to assist in conducting a meaningful inquiry regarding anadjournment request. Assessing a continuance request, however, involves “anintensely fact-sensitive inquiry.” State v. Hayes, 205 N.J. 522, 538 (2011).Indeed, the cases cited by the majority are factually distinguishable from thepresent matter, and the trial courts in two of those cases actually held fullhearings on defendants’ motions for a continuance to obtain private counsel.United States v. Poston, 902 F.2d 90, 97 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (trial courtheld a hearing on the defendant’s motion for a continuance that would allownewly acquired counsel to prepare for trial); United States v. Rettaliata, 833 F.2d 361, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (trial court held a hearing and heard argument 5 from all the parties, including a co-defendant, on the defendant’s motion topostpone trial and obtain new counsel). In two other cases, courts deniedcontinuances based on a developed record. State v. Hein, 674 P.2d 1358 , 1367(Ariz. 1983) (record reflected two previously granted continuances, a rapidlyapproaching speedy trial deadline, witnesses present from out of state, and aco-defendant who was anxious to go to trial); State v. Roth, 881 P.2d 268, 277-78 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (record reflected that the trial court had previouslygranted a continuance the defendant requested when defense counsel was stillhandling another trial and would miss jury selection). The records in those cases were thus sufficient to allow the appellatecourts to stand in the place of the trial courts and determine whether anadjournment was appropriate under the circumstances. The record here,however, is scant because “the trial court did not adequately elicit facts andapply the relevant factors to reasonably balance defendant’s desire to retaincounsel of his choice against the court’s need to proceed with the scheduledtrial.” See Kates, 426 N.J. Super. at 51. As the majority points out, the Appellate Division here noted that whendefendant moved for the adjournment, he did not provide an explanation forhis delay in seeking the continuance or offer a concrete plan or timetable forretaining private counsel. First, it is evident from the transcript that defendant 6 was not given the opportunity to expound upon his request: the trial judgedirected him to “stop talking” and further told him to sit down because she was“not going to hear anything else about [his request]” after making her ruling.Second, “[i]t was incumbent upon the trial court to develop that record, and toapply [the Furguson] factors.” Id. at 53. It certainly was not defendant’sburden to craft an adjournment request perfectly tailored to this Court’sjurisprudence. There may well have been an adequate basis to deny defendant’s request,but that basis was not explored prior to the court’s summary denial of theadjournment request and cannot be determined from the meager record beforeus. See ibid. (“[W]e can imagine facts that conceivably would have justifiedthe discretionary denial of defendant’s continuance request here, based on thefactors we identified in Furguson and our Supreme Court endorsed in Hayes.However, it is not for us to speculate.”). The majority notes that it does not approve of the abbreviated hearingthat occurred in this case and reaffirms that “trial judges should 'conduct[] areasoned, thoughtful analysis of the appropriate factors.” Ante at ___ (slip op.at 13). Although that clearly did not happen here, the majority does not find adeprivation of defendant’s right to counsel of his choice. I disagree. This caseinvolved a thin record of a brief proceeding during which defendant was not 7 allowed to speak to provide further explanation for his request or actually takeadvantage of one of the two options the trial court offered him before denyinghis request. As the majority notes, “[i]f a trial judge fails to analyze theFurguson factors, that error -- in certain instances -- may amount to structuralerror and lead to the reversal of a conviction.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 13). Inmy view, this case represents one of those instances. No amount ofspeculation on appellate review with this sparse record can cure the denial ofdefendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice. For all those reasons, I respectfully dissent. 8