Title: Natalie R. Ross, Appellant, vs. Director of Revenue, Respondent.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC90317
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: February 9, 2010

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
NATALIE R. ROSS, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant, 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC90317 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent.  
 
 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PLATTE COUNTY 
The Honorable Daniel M. Czamanske, Judge 
 
Opinion issued February 9, 2010 
 
 
At issue in this case is whether the Director of Revenue properly revoked the 
driver's license of a driver who refused to submit to a breathalyzer test offered more than 
90 minutes after a police officer encountered her at the scene of an accident.1    
Background 
 
 
A police officer was sent to investigate a report of a woman standing on the 
shoulder of an interstate.  When the officer arrived at the reported location, he observed 
fresh scrape marks on the roadway, but he did not immediately see the woman.  He 
                                                 
1 This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10, as this case 
was taken on transfer after its disposition by the court of appeals.   
 
 
1
followed the scrape marks and discovered that a vehicle had traveled off the roadway and 
down an embankment, suffering extensive damage to its front end and driver's side.   
 
The officer discovered a woman and a man inside the vehicle.  Natalie Ross was in 
the front passenger seat, and Ryan Newbury was lying across the rear seats.  Neither was 
injured, but a strong odor of intoxicants came from the car.  The officer saw a marijuana 
pipe in the driver's seat of the vehicle, and the pipe contained the residue and odor of 
marijuana.  The officer noticed that Ross's eyes were watery and bloodshot, and her 
speech was also impaired.  She denied that she was the woman seen walking on the 
shoulder of the interstate, and she also denied that she was the driver of the vehicle.  She 
identified the driver as a friend whom she could not name. 
 
The officer asked Ross to exit the vehicle.  She was missing a shoe, and she 
elected to walk barefoot up the snowy embankment to the interstate shoulder.  She then 
was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia and placed in the officer's patrol car.   
During the officer's investigation at the accident scene, he saw footprints in the 
snow from the shoulder of the roadway to the driver's side of the vehicle.  He believed 
the footprints were from high-heeled or female shoes.  About halfway up the hillside, he 
found Ross's missing shoe.  He saw footprints consistent with Newbury's shoes around 
the passenger side of the vehicle, but he did not see Ross's footprints near the passenger 
side.  The officer informed Ross she was also being arrested for careless and imprudent 
driving. 
 
Because of Ross's lack of shoes and the cold temperature, the officer chose not to 
administer field sobriety tests at the scene.  He transported her to a detention facility, 
 
2
where she was given and failed a series of field sobriety tests.  She then was placed under 
arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI), a charge to which she later pleaded guilty.  
See sec. 577.010, RSMo 2000.2    
 
After her arrest for DWI, the officer read Ross the implied consent law for 
chemical testing.  The implied consent law, section 577.020, outlines the circumstances 
in which a motor vehicle operator gives implied consent for chemical testing for blood 
alcohol or drug content (BAC).  Relevant to the issues in Ross's case, it provides for 
implied consent in any circumstance in which the motor vehicle operator is "arrested for 
any offense arising out of acts which the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to 
believe were committed while the person was driving a motor vehicle while in an 
intoxicated or drugged condition."  Sec. 577.020.1(1).  After being informed of the 
implied consent law, Ross refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.   
The timeline for the officer's interactions with Ross is as follows: 
Around 2:15 a.m. 
The police officer encountered Ross at the crash site. 
Around 2:20 a.m. 
Ross was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia, then 
shortly afterward also was arrested for careless and imprudent 
driving. 
Around 3:50 a.m. 
Ross was tested for sobriety, was placed under arrest for 
DWI, and refused to submit to a breathalyzer test after being 
read an implied consent advisory. 
 
Based on Ross's refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test, the Director of Revenue 
sought to revoke her driver's license pursuant to the revocation statute, section 577.041.  
                                                 
2 All statutory references to sections 577.010 and 577.039 are to RSMo 2000.  All other statutory 
references are to RSMo Supp. 2008. 
 
3
Ross challenges the revocation of her driver's license pursuant to subsection 4 of the 
revocation statute, which provides in relevant part: 
If a person's license has been revoked because of the person's refusal to 
submit to a chemical test, such person may petition for a hearing before a 
circuit or associate circuit court in the county in which the arrest or stop 
occurred. … At the hearing the court shall determine only: 
 
(1) Whether or not the person was arrested or stopped; 
 
(2) Whether or not the officer had [r]easonable grounds to believe that the 
person was driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated or drugged 
condition …; [and] 
 
(3) Whether or not the person refused to submit to the test. 
 
Sec. 577.041.4. 
 
Ross argues that her license could not be revoked based on her refusal of the 
breathalyzer test because the officer was untimely in arresting her for DWI under the 
provisions of the warrantless DWI arrest statute, section 577.039. 3  Section 577.039 
provides in relevant part: 
An arrest without a warrant … for a violation of section 577.010 or 577.012 
is lawful whenever the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe 
that the person to be arrested has violated the section, whether or not the 
violation occurred in the presence of the arresting officer and when such 
arrest without warrant is made within one and one-half hours after such 
claimed violation occurred …. 
 
Sec. 577.039 (emphasis added).  
Ross asserts that her DWI arrest violated the warrantless DWI arrest statute 
because it occurred more than 90 minutes after she was allegedly driving, and she argues 
this unlawful DWI arrest provided no basis for the breathalyzer test that she refused.  She 
                                                 
3 Section 577.039 also applies to warrantless arrests for driving with excessive BAC.  
 
4
contends that the 90-minute time limitation for a warrantless DWI arrest limited the reach 
of the implied consent law and, therefore, negated the consequences of her breathalyzer 
refusal.  She maintains the implied consent law language stating that implied consent is 
given "subject to the provisions of sections 577.019 to 577.041" means the 90-minute 
time limitation of section 577.039 is incorporated into the implied consent provisions.  
See sec. 577.020.1. 
 
The trial court rejected Ross's arguments that the 90-minute time limitation for 
warrantless DWI arrests applied to her license revocation based on a breathalyzer refusal.  
It upheld the revocation of her driver's license after determining that the revocation 
provisions outlined in section 577.041.4 were met because Ross was arrested, the 
arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that she was driving while intoxicated, 
and she refused a chemical test of her breath.   
Ross's appeal asks this Court to determine whether her license was revoked 
properly despite the untimeliness of her DWI arrest under section 577.039.   
Standard of Review 
 
This Court reviews de novo Ross's statutory arguments.  Finnegan v. Old Republic 
Title Co. of St. Louis, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 928, 930 (Mo. banc 2008).  "Where a statute's 
language is clear, courts must give effect to its plain meaning and refrain from applying 
rules of construction unless there is some ambiguity."  Home Builders Ass'n of Greater 
St. Louis, Inc. v. City of Wildwood, 107 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Mo. banc 2003).  There is no 
need to refer to other similar statutes where a statute's own language is clear.  See id.  
Words in statutes are given their plain and ordinary meaning unless there is a contrary 
 
5
specific statutory definition, and where the plain and ordinary meaning controls, there is 
no need to apply rules of statutory construction.  Vance Bros., Inc. v. Obermiller Const. 
Servs., Inc., 181 S.W.3d 562, 564 (Mo. banc 2006). 
Where statutory interpretation is necessary, the legislature's intent must be 
ascertained and given effect.  S. Metro. Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Lee's Summit, 278 
S.W.3d 659, 666 (Mo. banc 2009).  Statutory language is considered in context and in 
comparison with other sections when necessary to determine its meaning, such as when 
two statutory provisions covering the same subject matter are unambiguous standing 
separately but are in conflict when examined together.  See id.  Statutes that are remedial, 
because they are intended to protect the public, are construed so they provide the public 
protection intended by the legislature.  See Hudson v. Dir. of Revenue, 216 S.W.3d 216, 
222 (Mo. App. 2007). 
Revocation Was Proper 
 
This Court must uphold the revocation of Ross's driver's license if the revocation 
statute's requirements under section 577.041.4 were satisfied.  Fick v. Dir. of Revenue, 
240 S.W.3d 688, 690-91 (Mo. banc 2007) ("In a proceeding in which a person's driver's 
license is revoked for refusing to submit to a chemical test, the trial court shall determine 
only whether:  (1) the person was arrested; (2) the arresting officer had reasonable 
grounds to believe that the person was driving while intoxicated; and (3) the person 
refused to submit to the test."). 
 
6
 
The only issue before this Court is Ross's contention that her license revocation 
cannot be upheld because she was not "arrested" in satisfaction of section 577.041.4(1).4  
She contends she was not "arrested" for revocation purposes because her DWI arrest was 
unlawful under the 90-minute time limitation of the warrantless DWI arrest statute, 
section 577.039.   
Ross's arguments are not persuasive because nothing in the plain language of the 
warrantless DWI arrest statute, section 577.039, compels application of its 90-minute 
time limitation to the revocation statute, section 577.041.  Section 577.039 is a statute 
applicable to criminal matters and by its own terms it applies to violations for DWI 
(section 577.010) and driving with excessive blood alcohol content (section 577.012).  
Civil license-revocation proceedings under the revocation statute are unrelated to the 
criminal provisions of the warrantless DWI arrest statute.  The lawfulness of Ross's DWI 
arrest under the provisions of section 577.039 had no impact on whether she was 
"arrested" in satisfaction of the revocation statute.   
Ross complains that it is unfair to uphold a license revocation where a DWI arrest 
fails to comply with the warrantless DWI arrest statute.  But it is logical that the 
legislature has created distinctions between the available criminal penalties for DWI and 
the civil driver's license revocation procedures applied against intoxicated drivers.  The 
                                                 
4 While Ross's briefs in this case challenge the trial court's findings as to probable cause, her 
attorney admitted during oral argument that there were no issues preserved as to the trial court's 
determinations related to probable cause under section 577.041.4(2).  Accordingly, this Court 
need not review the trial court's finding that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to 
believe that Ross was driving while intoxicated.  There is also no need for this Court to discuss 
the trial court's finding that Ross refused the breathalyzer test, as she does not dispute this fact. 
 
 
7
legislature's intent in formulating these provisions was to ensure that the Director of 
Revenue can protect the public by suspending the licenses of persons who drive drunk, 
even when those same persons might benefit from procedural circumstances that shield 
them from certain criminal sanctions.  See Riche v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 335 
(Mo. banc 1999) (noting that the purpose of license revocation proceedings is entirely 
distinct from criminal punishment of drunken drivers and "designed to protect the public 
by quickly removing drunken drivers from Missouri's roads and highways").   
Ross maintains that this Court's opinion in Reed v. Director of Revenue, 184 
S.W.3d 564 (Mo. banc 2006), instructs that an untimely DWI arrest pursuant to the 90-
minute limitation of section 577.039 provides no basis for a driver's license revocation.  
But Reed was not a revocation case.  Reed held that the requirements of section 577.039 
apply to proceedings under section 577.037, relating to the admissibility of chemical 
testing results into evidence.  See Reed, 184 S.W.3d at 568.  Nothing in Reed compels its 
application to Ross's case.   
Further, regardless of Ross's contentions about the impropriety of her arrest under 
the warrantless DWI arrest statute, she was also "arrested" in satisfaction of the 
revocation statute because she was under arrest for possession of drug paraphernalia as 
well as careless and imprudent driving.  Section 577.041.4(2)(a) of the revocation statute 
required the trial court to determine if the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to 
believe that Ross was driving while intoxicated.  But this case demonstrates that there can 
be facts providing the reasonable grounds that satisfy section 577.041.4(2)(a) even before 
or without a DWI arrest.  Nothing in section 577.041.4(1) of the revocation statute 
 
8
requires the court to find that a person was arrested for DWI.  Importantly, the implied 
consent law applies to any motor vehicle operator "arrested for any offense arising out of 
acts which the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe were committed while 
the person was driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated or drugged condition."  
Sec. 577.020.1(1) (emphasis added).  Where the arresting officer had reasonable grounds 
to believe that a person was driving while intoxicated, that person's arrest for any offense 
committed in conjunction with the suspected DWI offense would satisfy the requirement 
of section 577.041.4(1) for a refusal-based license revocation.    
In Ross's case, her arrests for possession of drug paraphernalia and careless and 
imprudent driving arose out of acts existing simultaneously with the facts forming the 
arresting officer's reasonable grounds to believe she had been driving while intoxicated.  
At the time of her first two arrests, the officer already knew that her car had gone off an 
interstate and down an embankment and that it emitted a strong odor of intoxicants.  He 
also had reasonable grounds to believe that she was in possession of a marijuana pipe, 
had watery and bloodshot eyes and mumbled speech, and had lied about driving her 
vehicle.  Consequently, the facts of Ross's case satisfy the requirements of the revocation 
statute, section 577.041.4, regardless of Ross's DWI arrest. 
Because the trial court did not err in finding that Ross was "arrested" in 
satisfaction of section 577.041.4(1), its judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mary R. Russell, Judge 
 
Price, C.J., Teitelman, Wolff, Breckenridge and Stith, JJ., and Gaertner, Sp.J., concur. 
Fischer, J., not participating. 
 
9