Title: Gary Tate v. David H. Schwarz
Citation: 2002 WI 127
Docket Number: 2000AP001635
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: November 21, 2002

2002 WI 127 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1635 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Gary Tate,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
David H. Schwarz, Administrator, Division of 
Hearings and Appeals,  
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 131 
Reported at:  246 Wis. 2d 293, 630 N.W.2d 761 
(Ct. App. 2001-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 21, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 9, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washington   
 
JUDGE: 
Leo F. Schlaefer   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Jerome F. Buting, Pamela S. Moorshead and Buting & Williams, 
S.C., Brookfield, and oral argument by Jerome F. Buting. 
 
For the respondent-respondent the cause was argued by 
William C. Wolford, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert R. Henek and 
Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
2002 WI 127 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-1635 
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 534) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Gary Tate,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
David H. Schwarz, Administrator, Division  
of Hearings and Appeals,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 21, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.   
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  The issue in this case is whether 
the state may constitutionally revoke a defendant's probation 
because he refuses, during court-ordered sex offender treatment, 
and before the time for a direct appeal has expired or an appeal 
has been denied, to admit to the crime of which he was 
convicted. 
¶2 
Gary Tate was convicted of repeated sexual assault of 
a child after a jury trial in which he testified and denied the 
No. 
00-1635   
2 
 
offense.  He was placed on probation and ordered into sex 
offender treatment.  He was required, as a part of the treatment 
program, to admit to the offense.  He refused, asserting his 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  As a result, 
he was terminated from the program.  He moved to modify the 
conditions of probation, requesting that his treatment be 
delayed until after his appeal.  This motion was denied.  In the 
meantime, his probation was revoked for failure to cooperate 
with treatment. 
¶3 
On certiorari review of the probation revocation, the 
court of appeals found a Fifth Amendment violation, but 
summarily concluded that it had been waived, because Tate had 
not appealed the denial of his motion to modify the conditions 
of probation.  We reverse. 
¶4 
All parties to this review now agree, as do we, that 
the revocation of Tate's probation was premised on a legitimate 
assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, and was therefore unconstitutional.  The parties 
also agree, as do we, that Tate's failure to appeal the denial 
of his motion to delay sex offender treatment did not constitute 
a waiver of his right to challenge his probation revocation on 
Fifth Amendment grounds.  Finally, the parties agree that the 
immunity rule of State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, 252 N.W.2d 664 
(1977), as expanded by State v. Thompson, 142 Wis. 2d 821, 419 
N.W.2d 564 (Ct. App. 1987), should be applied in these 
circumstances.  We agree and hold that a defendant in this 
situation cannot be subjected to probation revocation for 
No. 
00-1635   
3 
 
refusing to admit to the crime of conviction, unless he is first 
offered the protection of use and derivative use immunity for 
what are otherwise compulsory self-incriminatory statements. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 
Gary Tate was charged in Washington County Circuit 
Court with repeated sexual assault of a child in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.025 (1999-2000).1  The complaint accused him of 
sexually assaulting his former stepdaughter, D.L., on at least 
three occasions between August 1993 and August 1996.  Tate 
maintained his innocence in interviews with police, pleaded not 
guilty, and demanded a jury trial.  He testified at trial, 
denying the offense, but was convicted by the jury.  On February 
3, 1999, the Honorable Annette K. Ziegler stayed a 25-year 
prison sentence and placed Tate on probation for 20 years, with 
one year in jail as a condition of probation.  The court also 
ordered Tate to "participate in all counseling programs arranged 
by probation agent[s], including sex offender treatment." 
¶6 
Tate 
pursued 
postconviction 
relief, 
including 
a 
postconviction motion and an appeal, the latter of which was 
denied by the court of appeals on July 25, 2001.2  In the 
meantime, however, Tate was participating in the sex offender 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version.   
2 Tate petitioned this court for review of the court of 
appeals' decision; the petition was denied October 23, 2001.  
See 2001 WI 117, 247 Wis. 2d 1032, 635 N.W.2d 782 (unpublished 
table decision). 
No. 
00-1635   
4 
 
treatment program that had been ordered as a condition of 
probation. 
¶7 
While serving his one-year jail term, and beginning on 
February 16, 1999, Tate was released one hour per week for sex 
offender treatment with Joe Henger, a treatment provider under 
contract with the Department of Corrections (DOC). Henger placed 
Tate in a "denier's group"——group therapy designed to help 
convicted sex offenders overcome their denials. 
¶8 
As a part of the treatment program, Henger required 
Tate to sign a release authorizing Henger to disclose any 
information he might acquire to Tate's "probation and parole 
agent, the Department of Corrections and any officer of court, 
or any court proceedings."  Tate signed the form, but on advice 
of counsel refused to discuss any facts surrounding the offense 
for which he was convicted, believing that any statements he 
made could be used against him if he obtained a new trial as a 
result of a postconviction motion or appeal. 
¶9 
On April 13, 1999, after eight sessions, Henger 
terminated Tate from the treatment program because of his 
resistance to admitting sexual misconduct with the victim and 
his refusal "to give any details of any sexual inappropriateness 
with his victim."   
¶10 On April 19, 1999, Tate filed a motion in the circuit 
court to modify the conditions of his probation to delay his 
treatment.  On May 4, 1999, Tate was served with notice of the 
initiation of probation revocation; the sole violation cited was 
his failure to cooperate with sex offender treatment. On June 
No. 
00-1635   
5 
 
18, 1999, the circuit court denied Tate's motion to modify his 
probation conditions.  Tate did not appeal the court's order 
denying this motion.   
¶11 Tate's revocation hearing was held less than two weeks 
later, on July 1, 1999.  At the hearing, Tate expressed his 
willingness to undergo treatment, but explained that he had a 
fear of self-incrimination, based on the release he was required 
to sign and the presence of other participants in the treatment 
sessions who could be witnesses against him in future court 
proceedings should he secure a new trial.  He was also concerned 
that any admission of sexual contact with the victim in his case 
could support a perjury charge, since he had testified at trial 
that no sexual misconduct had occurred.  Tate's agent had warned 
him that his probation could be revoked if he refused to admit 
guilt in treatment.  He had not been offered any form of 
immunity, nor was he advised that any statements he made in 
treatment would not be used against him in the event of a new 
trial.  To the contrary, the release he was required to sign 
indicated that all such information would in fact be disclosed 
to his agent and the DOC and could be used against him "in any 
court proceedings."   
¶12 On July 26, 1999, the administrative law judge issued 
his decision revoking Tate's probation, concluding that Tate had 
"violated his probation by failing to cooperate and complete Sex 
Offender Treatment."   
¶13 After exhausting his administrative appeals, Tate 
filed a certiorari petition in Washington County Circuit Court.  
No. 
00-1635   
6 
 
The Honorable Leo F. Schlaefer denied relief and upheld the 
probation revocation.  Tate appealed, and the court of appeals 
held 
that 
there 
was 
a 
Fifth 
Amendment 
violation, 
but 
nevertheless affirmed, concluding that it had been waived. 
¶14 More specifically, the court of appeals held that "a 
probationer with an active direct appeal on the merits cannot be 
revoked for refusing to admit to the crime."3  State ex rel. Tate 
v. Schwarz, 2001 WI App 131, ¶11, 246 Wis. 2d 293, 630 
N.W.2d 761.  The court, however, declined to grant Tate any 
relief, holding that Tate's failure to separately appeal the 
circuit court's earlier denial of his motion to delay his 
treatment constituted a waiver of his Fifth Amendment challenge 
to the probation revocation: 
Tate's obligation, if he wanted to preserve his 
rights, was to appeal [the denial of his motion to 
modify the conditions of probation] to this court.  He 
failed to do so.  Therefore, we affirm, holding that 
there is waiver.  We emphasize that the appropriate 
vehicle to seek a remedy is a motion to the circuit 
court to amend the conditions of probation before 
there is a revocation hearing.  A writ of certiorari, 
coming after a probation revocation hearing, will 
result 
in 
waiver 
of 
a 
challenge 
to 
probation 
conditions. 
Id. at ¶14, 246 Wis. 2d at 301.  We accepted review. 
 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that Tate's probation was revoked on 
July 26, 1999, which was before he filed his direct appeal on 
November 15 of that same year. 
No. 
00-1635   
7 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 Certiorari review of a probation revocation order by 
the Department of Administration, Division of Hearings and 
Appeals ("the Department"), "is limited to four inquiries: (1) 
whether 
the 
Department 
acted 
within 
the 
bounds 
of 
its 
jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to law; (3) whether 
its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and 
represented its will, not its judgment; and (4) whether the 
evidence was sufficient that the Department might reasonably 
make the determination that it did."  State ex rel. Warren v. 
Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 628-29, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998).  See 
also Van Ermen v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 84 Wis. 2d 57, 
63, 267 N.W.2d 17 (1978). 
¶16 This case requires an application of the second 
inquiry——whether the Department acted according to law——which is 
a question of law that we review de novo, without deference to 
the conclusions of the Department, the circuit court, or the 
court of appeals.  See Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 629. 
 
III. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
¶17 The self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
No. 
00-1635   
8 
 
himself."4  Because the Fifth Amendment "speaks of compulsion," 
United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943), the United 
States Supreme Court "has insisted that the 'constitutional 
guarantee is only that the witness not be compelled to give 
self-incriminating testimony.'"  McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. ___, 
122 S. Ct. 2017, 2026 (2002) (quoting United States v. 
Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977)).  "It is well settled that 
the government need not make the exercise of the Fifth Amendment 
cost free."5  Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 2029.  The Department now 
concedes that the "cost" at issue here——probation revocation, 
the loss of conditional liberty——constitutes compulsion for 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment.    
¶18 The Department also now concedes that compelling a 
probationer to admit to the crime of conviction before the time 
for a direct appeal has expired or an appeal has been denied is 
                                                 
4 The 
Fifth 
Amendment's 
self-incrimination 
clause 
is 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688 (1993) (citing Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)).  Independently, Article I, Section 8 
(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that no person "may 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself or herself." 
5 While McKune is a plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor's 
concurrence is in agreement with this point of law.  See McKune 
v. Lile, 536 U.S. ___, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2033 (2002) (O'Connor, 
J., concurring) ("The text of the Fifth Amendment does not 
prohibit all penalties levied in response to a person's refusal 
to 
incriminate 
himself."); 
see 
also 
id. 
(O'Connor, 
J., 
concurring) 
("Not 
all 
pressure 
necessarily 
'compel[s]' 
incriminating statements . . . .  [S]ome penalties are so great 
as to 'compe[l]' such testimony, while others do not rise to 
that level.").   
No. 
00-1635   
9 
 
self-incriminatory within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.  
It has been established generally that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege extends to those already convicted of a crime, and 
even to those who are in prison or on probation when the 
incriminating statements are made.  Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 
2026 ("[t]he privilege against self-incrimination does not 
terminate at the jailhouse door"); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 
420, 438 (1984) ("Our decisions have made clear that the State 
could not constitutionally carry out a threat to revoke 
probation for the legitimate exercise of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege."); 
State 
v. 
Evans, 
77 
Wis. 2d 225, 
234, 
252 
N.W.2d 664 (1976) (probationer cannot be revoked for invoking 
his privilege against self-incrimination absent a grant of 
immunity); 
State 
v. 
Thompson, 
142 
Wis. 2d 821, 
832, 
419 
N.W.2d 564 (Ct. App. 1987) (probationer's compelled admissions 
may not be used against him for any evidentiary purpose in a 
pending or subsequent criminal prosecution). 
¶19 More 
specifically, 
where 
the 
claimed 
self-
incrimination pertains to the crime for which the defendant has 
already been convicted, we have held that "the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination extends beyond sentencing 
as long as a defendant has a real and appreciable fear of 
further incrimination."  State v. Marks, 194 Wis. 2d 79, 95, 533 
N.W.2d 730 (1995).  Such is the case "where an appeal is 
pending, before an appeal as of right or plea withdrawal has 
expired, or where the defendant intends to or is in the process 
No. 
00-1635   
10 
 
of moving to modify his or her sentence and can show an 
appreciable chance of success."6  Id. at 95-96. 
¶20 In Evans, this court first acknowledged that persons 
on probation remain protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.  Evans, 77 Wis. 2d at 234.  We held 
that compelled admissions about particular instances of criminal 
activity by a probationer given in response to questions by a 
probation agent or at a probation revocation hearing are 
inadmissible against the probationer in subsequent criminal 
proceedings.7  Id. at 235-36.  We created a rule of use and 
derivative use immunity for this situation,8 and required that 
                                                 
6 However, where there is "no threat of any new criminal 
consequences" from a compelled admission of guilt to the crime 
of conviction during sex offender treatment, there is no Fifth 
Amendment violation.  State v. Carrizales, 191 Wis. 2d 85, 92, 
528 N.W.2d 29 (Ct. App. 1995).  See also Minnesota v. Murphy, 
465 
U.S. 
420, 
435 
n.7 
(1984) 
(distinguishing 
compelled 
admissions 
of 
guilt 
that 
"posed 
no 
realistic 
threat 
of 
incrimination in a separate criminal proceeding"). 
7 We noted in Evans that the holding applied to parolees as 
well as probationers.  State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, 228 n.1, 
252 N.W.2d 664 (1977). 
8 "Immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with 
the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and 
therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the 
privilege . . . .  It prohibits the prosecutorial authorities 
from using the compelled testimony in any respect, and it 
therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the 
infliction of criminal penalties on the witness."  Kastigar v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).  "Use and derivative 
use 
immunity 
permits 
prosecution 
for 
the 
crimes 
if 
the 
prosecuting agency does not offer the immunized testimony and 
establishes that the evidence offered is not derived from the 
immunized testimony."  State v. J.H.S., 90 Wis. 2d 613, 617, 280 
N.W.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1979). 
No. 
00-1635   
11 
 
the probationer be advised that his otherwise self-incriminating 
statements are "inadmissible against the probationer or parolee 
during subsequent proceedings on related criminal charges."  Id. 
at 235.  Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decisions 
in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), and Lefkowitz v. 
Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973), and Kastigar v. United States, 406 
U.S. 441 (1972), we held that the state may compel a probationer 
to answer self-incriminating questions from his probation or 
parole agent, or suffer the consequence of revocation for 
refusing to do so, only "if he is protected by a grant of 
immunity that renders the compelled testimony inadmissible 
against the [probationer] in a criminal prosecution."  Evans, 77 
Wis. 2d at 235-36. 
¶21 We said in Evans that the immunity rule would not 
apply to use of the probationer's self-incriminating statements 
to rebut or impeach "clearly inconsistent" later testimony by 
the probationer in subsequent criminal proceedings.  Evans, 77 
Wis. 2d at 235-36.  The court of appeals, however, has since 
extended the Evans immunity rule to protect against the use of 
compelled 
self-incriminating 
statements 
for 
impeachment 
or 
rebuttal purposes.  State v. Thompson, 142 Wis. 2d 821, 825, 419 
N.W.2d 564 (Ct. App. 1987).  Thompson's extension of Evans in 
this regard was mandated by several decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court subsequent to Evans.  See Thompson, 142 
Wis. 2d at 831 (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 
(1984) (if a probationer is required to choose between making 
incriminating 
statements 
and 
jeopardizing 
his 
conditional 
No. 
00-1635   
12 
 
liberty by remaining silent, his statement cannot be used for 
any evidentiary purpose in a criminal prosecution); New Jersey 
v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) (defendant's compelled 
statements "may not be put to any use whatever against him in a 
criminal trial"); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) 
("any criminal trial use against a defendant of his involuntary 
statement is a violation of due process of law")).  We agree 
with the court of appeals' conclusion in Thompson that these 
post-Evans decisions of the United States Supreme Court require 
expansion of the Evans immunity rule to protect against 
impeachment or rebuttal use of compelled self-incriminating 
statements in this context.9 
¶22 We adopt the Evans immunity rule, as expanded by 
Thompson, for use in this situation.10  In this case, Tate's 
right to appeal had not yet lapsed at the time he was required 
to admit, during sex offender treatment, to the crime of which 
                                                 
9 We have recently noted that "[a]ll state courts, of 
course, are bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court on matters of federal law" because "the Supremacy Clause 
of the United States Constitution governs the outcome of any 
direct 
conflict 
between 
state 
and 
federal 
supreme 
court 
precedent on a matter of federal law."  State v. Jennings, 2002 
WI 44, ¶18, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142.  
10 The parties and the amicus disagree about whether 
immunity should extend to admissions made during treatment 
regarding uncharged conduct, and whether immunity should be 
required where the probationer pleaded guilty or no contest.  We 
note these issues but do not decide them, as they are not 
implicated by the facts of this case.  Tate was convicted after 
a jury trial, not a guilty or no-contest plea.  The admissions 
required of him in treatment pertained to the crime of 
conviction, not uncharged conduct. 
No. 
00-1635   
13 
 
he was convicted.  The DOC had required him to sign a release 
allowing all of his statements during treatment to be used in 
"any 
court 
proceeding." 
Future 
criminal 
proceedings 
were 
possible in his case, as well as the potential for a perjury 
prosecution arising out of his trial testimony.  The price of 
remaining silent was probation revocation. Accordingly, the 
admissions demanded of him by his treatment program were both 
self-incriminating 
and 
compulsory. 
 
Revocation 
of 
Tate's 
probation for refusing to admit his crime of conviction under 
these circumstances violated his Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination.   
IV. WAIVER 
¶23 Although the court of appeals held that a probationer 
in Tate's position cannot be revoked for refusing to admit to 
the crime of conviction, it nevertheless refused to grant Tate 
any relief, concluding that he had waived any Fifth Amendment 
challenge to his revocation by failing to appeal the circuit 
court's denial of his motion to modify the conditions of his 
probation.  The Department concedes, and we agree, that this 
conclusion is insupportable.  
¶24 Tate was terminated from the sex offender treatment 
program on April 13, 1999.  He filed his motion to modify the 
conditions of his probation to delay his sex offender treatment 
just six days later, on April 19, 1999.  He did not receive a 
decision from the circuit court until June 18, 1999. 
¶25 In the meantime, on May 4, 1999, Tate was notified of 
the DOC's intention to revoke his probation.  The final 
No. 
00-1635   
14 
 
revocation hearing was scheduled for July 1, 1999.  Accordingly, 
by the time the circuit court denied Tate’s motion to delay 
treatment, revocation proceedings were already well under way 
and the final hearing was less than two weeks away.  An appeal 
of the circuit court's denial of his motion to delay treatment 
would not have halted the ongoing revocation proceedings; the 
failure to appeal that order did not eliminate the availability 
of the remedy of certiorari review once revocation occurred.  
The court of appeals' waiver rule creates a strange procedural 
anomaly in which a probationer must seek modification, in the 
circuit and appellate courts, of any condition of probation that 
he is alleged to have violated in order to avoid waiving the 
right to argue against revocation based upon that violation.  
And the probationer is required, under such a rule, to pursue 
the modification in the circuit and appellate courts while 
simultaneously undergoing revocation and pursuing certiorari 
review once revoked.  
¶26 The court of appeals cited no authority for its 
conclusion on waiver, and the parties agree that there is none.  
We note that Tate did exactly what the defendant in Evans did——
he contested the Department's revocation of his probation by 
filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the circuit court 
and then appealed the circuit court's denial of his petition.  
See Evans, 77 Wis. 2d at 227-230.  We did not require in Evans 
that the defendant first seek relief from the conditions of his 
probation in the circuit and appellate courts before his 
No. 
00-1635   
15 
 
constitutional challenge to his revocation would be entertained.  
We decline to impose such a requirement now. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶27 The constitutional principles underlying our decision 
in Evans also apply to a probationer who invokes the Fifth 
Amendment privilege during court-ordered sex offender treatment 
in refusing to admit his crime of conviction, and we extend the 
Evans immunity rule to this situation.  We also reaffirm the 
principle set forth in Thompson barring the use of any such 
compelled 
self-incriminating 
statements 
for 
impeachment 
or 
rebuttal.  A probationer who is revoked for refusing, during 
court-ordered sex offender treatment, and before the time for a 
direct appeal has expired or an appeal has been denied, to admit 
to the crime of conviction has suffered a violation of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege.  An immunity rule mirroring the one adopted 
in Evans, as modified by Thompson, allows the DOC to seek such 
admissions as a part of sex offender treatment without violating 
the probationer's privilege against self-incrimination. 
¶28 The revocation of Tate's probation must be and hereby 
is reversed, because it was premised on a legitimate assertion 
of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and 
because Tate was not afforded immunity co-extensive with the 
privilege. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
No. 
00-1635   
 
 
1