Title: New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. R.L.M.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: December 10, 2018

New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. R.L.M. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Plaintiff New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) brought a guardianship action against R.L.M. and J.J., seeking to terminate their parental rights to their daughter R.A.J. At a case management conference early in the proceeding, J.J. told the court that he did not want an attorney appointed for him. As the conference continued, J.J.’s previously assigned counsel continued to speak on his behalf. At the second case management conference, J.J. left the courtroom before the conference began. At the third conference, J.J. stated that he wanted to retain substitute counsel. The judge noted that J.J.’s assigned counsel would continue to represent him pending any substitution of attorney. J.J. did not retain private counsel. At the final case management conference and the pretrial conference, J.J.’s assigned counsel represented him; J.J. declined to appear. The Court granted J.J.’s petition for certification, in which he claimed only that he was entitled to a new trial by virtue of the trial court’s denial of his request to represent himself. "Although a parent’s decision to appear pro se in this complex and consequential litigation represents poor strategy in all but the rarest case," the New Jersey Supreme Court found N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4 plainly authorized that parent to proceed unrepresented. "The parent’s right of self-representation, however, is by no means absolute. That right must be exercised in a manner that permits a full and fair adjudication of the dispute and a prompt and equitable permanency determination for the child." In this case, the the Supreme Court found the trial court properly denied J.J.’s "untimely and ambivalent claim." Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. R.L.M. and J.J. (A-17-17) (079473)Argued September 12, 2018 -- Decided December 10, 2018PATTERSON, J., writing for the Court. This appeal raises an issue of first impression before the Court: whether a parent has the right to represent himself or herself in an action to terminate parental rights pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15 to -20. Plaintiff New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) brought a guardianship action against R.L.M. and J.J., seeking to terminate their parental rights to their daughter R.A.J. At a case management conference early in the proceeding, J.J. told the court that he did not want an attorney appointed for him. As the conference continued, J.J.’s previously assigned counsel continued to speak on his behalf. At the second case management conference, J.J. left the courtroom before the conference began. At the third conference, J.J. stated that he wanted to retain substitute counsel. The judge noted that J.J.’s assigned counsel would continue to represent him pending any substitution of attorney. J.J. did not retain private counsel. At the final case management conference and the pretrial conference, J.J.’s assigned counsel represented him; J.J. declined to appear. On the first day of the trial, J.J. told the trial court that did not want the attorney to represent him, citing his attorney’s refusal to correct the allegedly erroneous record of an earlier proceeding. Although the trial court and the Division’s counsel confirmed that the current matter was unrelated to any issues in the earlier proceeding, J.J. insisted that his attorney improperly refused to follow his instructions. The trial court denied J.J.’s request. J.J. renewed his request later that day; the judge again denied the request, reasoning that the dispute between J.J. and his attorney arose from J.J.’s failure to appear in court on numerous occasions and noting assigned counsel’s diligent efforts on J.J.’s behalf. The court found that J.J.’s “request at this late date would only serve to delay the proceedings and unduly interfere with the minor child’s attempt to gain permanency in this matter.” J.J. later interrupted the examination of a witness to demand again that his counsel be dismissed. The trial judge denied the application, noting that the trial was in progress. The judge acknowledged J.J.’s “right to terminate [his] attorney,” but stated that based on J.J.’s conduct over several months, he was unconvinced that J.J. could represent himself. The judge ruled that suspending the trial would be “unfair to the interest of [R.A.J.]” 1 In a detailed written opinion substantially based on his assessment of the credibility of fact and expert witnesses, the trial judge concluded that the best interests of R.A.J. necessitated the termination of the parental rights of R.L.M. and J.J. An Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s determination. 450 N.J. Super. 131, 151 (App. Div. 2017). As to J.J.’s self-representation claim, the panel held that any constitutional aspect of that claim must derive from principles of procedural due process and found that self-representation compounds the risk of error in family proceedings, thereby undermining the trial court’s effort to achieve a fair result. Id. at 142-45. The panel also addressed issues that J.J. did not raise, such as potential statutory and court-rule-based sources of a right to self-representation. Id. at 147. The panel found no explicit right of self- representation in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4 and concluded that Rule 1:21-1(a)’s general grant of a right of self-representation to competent litigants in matters that directly affect them could be relaxed pursuant to Rule 1:1-2(a). Id. at 148. The Court granted J.J.’s petition for certification, in which he claimed only that he was entitled to a new trial by virtue of the trial court’s denial of his request to represent himself. 231 N.J. 414 (2017).HELD: The Court reaffirms New Jersey’s longstanding adherence to the principle that a competent litigant may represent himself or herself in a matter in which he or she is a party, subject to exceptions set forth in statutes, court rules, and case law. No such exception is prescribed by the statute that governs this case. Although a parent’s decision to appear pro se in this complex and consequential litigation represents poor strategy in all but the rarest case, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4 plainly authorizes that parent to proceed unrepresented. The parent’s right of self-representation, however, is by no means absolute. That right must be exercised in a manner that permits a full and fair adjudication of the dispute and a prompt and equitable permanency determination for the child. In this case, the court properly denied J.J.’s untimely and ambivalent claim.1. The Court recently recognized a self-representation right in an involuntary commitment hearing pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In re Civil Commitment of D.Y., 218 N.J. 359, 384 (2014). As stated in D.Y., “competent litigants in New Jersey have long been permitted to represent themselves in civil proceedings, with specific exceptions identified in statutes, court rules, and case law.” Id. at 365. The Court acknowledged, however, that it has never viewed the right of self-representation to be absolute, id. at 377- 79, and set forth three principles to guide courts confronting claims of self-representation in the SVPA setting, id. at 385-86. (pp. 16-21)2. In a termination of parental rights case, the Division has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence the four factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). J.J.’s self- representation claim arose in a setting implicating several compelling interests -- a parent’s right to raise his or her child, the State’s parens patriae responsibility, and a child’s urgent need for a safe and permanent home. The judge was required to consider complex fact and expert evidence to make a fair and expeditious decision. (pp. 21-25) 2 3. As amended in 1999, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4(a) states that “the court shall provide the respondent parent with notice of the right to retain and consult with legal counsel. If the parent appears before the court, is indigent and requests counsel, the court shall appoint the Office of the Public Defender to represent the parent.” There is nothing mandatory about the statute’s discussion of the assignment of counsel. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4(b), in contrast, expressly provides that a child who is the subject of a termination of parental rights action must be represented by the Law Guardian. Thus, the Legislature plainly intended that legal representation be required only for the child at the center of a termination of parental rights action and envisioned that a parent could elect to appear pro se. (pp. 26-28)4. Based on the plain language of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4, a parent has the right to represent himself or herself in an action to terminate his or her parental rights, with the assistance of standby counsel at the court’s discretion. That right is constrained by important considerations. To assist the Family Part judges, the Court offers guidelines. First, the parent must assert the right of self-representation in a timely manner. Second, the parent must clearly and unequivocally invoke that right on the record and must knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to counsel. If the parent clearly and unequivocally invokes his or her right to proceed unrepresented, the court should engage in the “abbreviated yet meaningful colloquy” envisioned in the contested-adoption context in In re Adoption of a Child by J.E.V. and D.G.V., 226 N.J. 90, 114 (2016). Third, the trial court may, in its discretion, appoint standby counsel, but it is not required to do so. Fourth, the judge has the authority to take appropriate steps if an unrepresented parent declines to follow the court’s instructions, disrespects the court or any participant in the hearing, or refuses to take part in the proceedings. No decision by a parent to proceed unrepresented should be permitted to impede a just and expeditious outcome for the child. (pp. 25-31)5. The recognition of a right of self-representation by parents in termination of parental rights proceedings, subject to the limitations stated above, rests on statutory grounds. The Court does not reach whether there is a constitutional basis for that right and does not embrace the Appellate Division’s rejection of a constitutional right of self-representation in a termination of parental rights action. (pp. 31-32)6. In the proceedings to terminate his parental rights to R.A.J., J.J. did not assert his right of self-representation in the timely, clear, and unequivocal manner that New Jersey law requires. In a matter involving complex presentations of fact and expert evidence, the court correctly concluded that the dismissal of J.J.’s counsel would bring the proceeding to a halt for an indefinite period. Such a development would have delayed a permanency determination for R.A.J., undermining public policy. The trial judge acted appropriately to preserve the integrity of the proceeding and bring it to a conclusion, and the Appellate Division properly affirmed the trial court’s determination. (pp. 32-35) AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ- VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 17 September Term 2017 079473 New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. R.L.M., Defendant, and J.J., Defendant-Appellant.In the Matter of the Guardianship of R.A.J., a minor. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 450 N.J. Super. 131 (App. Div. 2017). Argued Decided September 12, 2018 December 10, 2018John A. Albright, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant J.J. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender Parental Representation, attorney; John A. Albright and T. Gary Mitchell, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs). 1 Jennifer A. Lochel, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and James D. Harris, and Cynthia A. Phillips, Deputy Attorneys General, on the briefs). Noel C. Devlin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent R.A.J. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender Law Guardian, attorney; Noel C. Devlin, of counsel and on the briefs). Liza Weisberg argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Liza Weisberg, Alexander Shalom, Jeanne LoCicero, and Edward Barocas, on the brief). JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal raises an issue of first impression in this Court: whether aparent has the right to represent himself or herself in an action to terminateparental rights pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15 to -20. Plaintiff New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency(Division) brought a guardianship action in the Family Part against R.L.M. andJ.J., seeking to terminate their parental rights to their daughter R.A.J. At acase management conference early in the proceeding, J.J. informed the trialcourt that he wanted to represent himself. Minutes later, J.J. changed course 2 and requested that the court assign counsel to represent him. J.J. did notreassert the right to represent himself until the guardianship trial wasunderway. Reasoning that the dismissal of J.J.’s counsel in the midst of trialwould suspend the proceedings, the court denied that request. At the trial’sconclusion, the court determined that the Division had met its burden of proofby clear and convincing evidence as to all four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)’s best-interests standard, and terminated the parental rights of R.L.M.and J.J. An Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s termination ofboth parents’ parental rights, rejecting J.J.’s constitutional claim to a right ofself-representation. We granted J.J.’s petition for certification. We reaffirm New Jersey’s longstanding adherence to the principle that acompetent litigant may represent himself or herself in a matter in which he orshe is a party, subject to exceptions set forth in statutes, court rules, and caselaw. In re Civil Commitment of D.Y., 218 N.J. 359, 365 (2014). No suchexception is prescribed by the statute that governs this case. N.J.S.A. 30:4C- -15.4 provides for the assignment of counsel, at the parent’s request, torepresent an indigent parent in an action to terminate parental rights. Thestatute, however, does not mandate such representation for any parent, whetherindigent or not. Although a parent’s decision to appear pro se in this complex 3 and consequential litigation represents poor strategy in all but the rarest case, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4 plainly authorizes that parent to proceed unrepresented. The parent’s right of self-representation, however, is by no meansabsolute. That right must be exercised in a manner that permits a full and fairadjudication of the dispute and a prompt and equitable permanencydetermination for the child. The parent must inform the court of his or herintention to appear pro se in a timely manner, so as to minimize delay of theproceedings. He or she must invoke the right of self-representation clearly andunequivocally. In the event of such an invocation, the court should conduct aninquiry “to ensure the parent understands the nature of the proceeding as wellas the problems she may face if she chooses to represent herself.” In reAdoption of a Child by J.E.V. and D.G.V., 226 N.J. 90, 114 (2016). The judgeshould take appropriate steps, which may include the appointment of standbycounsel, so that the parent’s decision to represent himself or herself does notdisrupt the trial. In this case, the court acted well within its discretion. Although J.J.initially asserted his right to represent himself in a timely and clear manner, heimmediately withdrew his request and sought the appointment of assignedcounsel. He did not reassert his right to represent himself until the trial was inprogress. At that late stage, the trial court was no longer in a position to grant 4 J.J.’s application without suspending the trial to the detriment of the child atthe heart of this case. The court properly denied J.J.’s untimely andambivalent claim. Accordingly, we affirm as modified the Appellate Division panel’sdetermination. I. A. R.L.M. is the biological mother of six children. J.J. is the biologicalfather of R.L.M.’s two youngest children, a son, R.J., and a daughter, R.A.J.,who is the subject of this appeal. The guardianship action that gave rise to this appeal is one in a series ofactions instituted by the Division with respect to the six children. Over thecourse of several years, the Family Part terminated R.L.M.’s parental rights toher five older children and terminated J.J.’s parental rights to his son R.J. Thefive older children were adopted, two by one family and three by another. The record in this appeal indicates that, in the prior proceeding involvingR.J., the Family Part made no finding that J.J. abused or neglected his son.Nonetheless, J.J. insisted in this matter that, in the earlier proceeding, someonehad mistakenly noted in the record that he had abused or neglected R.J. Herepeatedly expressed his belief that the Division sought to terminate his 5 parental rights to R.A.J. based on an erroneous finding that he had abused orneglected R.J. R.A.J. was born in 2013. Immediately after her birth, the Divisionconducted an emergency removal of R.A.J. pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.29.R.A.J. was placed with the same resource family who then cared for and lateradopted three of her older siblings. The Division filed a verified complaintseeking custody of R.A.J. The court granted that application. In May 2014, the court conducted a factfinding hearing. It made nofinding that either R.L.M. or J.J. had abused or neglected R.A.J. The courtconcluded that both parents required services and ordered psychological,psychiatric, and substance abuse evaluations. A psychologist conducted amental health evaluation of J.J. and reported his findings to counsel and thecourt. J.J. was granted visitation rights with respect to R.A.J. He visited hernine times between May and December 2014. Following a permanency hearing, in which J.J. was represented byappointed counsel, the court found that neither R.L.M. nor J.J. had participatedin sufficient services to remedy the issues that had led to the Division’s action.The court adopted the Division’s recommendation of a permanency plan oftermination of parental rights, to be followed by R.A.J.’s adoption by herresource family. 6 B. The Division filed a petition for guardianship pursuant to N.J.S.A.30:4C-15 to -20, seeking the termination of the parental rights of R.L.M. andJ.J. with respect to R.A.J. Accompanied by the appointed counsel who had represented him in theprior action regarding R.A.J., J.J. attended the first case managementconference in the action to terminate his parental rights. He told the court thathe did not want an attorney appointed for him, because he had “some motionsthat I want to put in myself.” J.J. explained to the court that his uncle, aparalegal, was preparing a package of applications, among them an applicationfor the complaint to “be dismissed or whatever the case may be.” The judgeconducting the conference told J.J., “you have the right to be represented bycounsel, and the right to represent yourself.” She admonished him that “[n]othaving an attorney is a big mistake.” J.J. responded that he was “not satisfied”with his attorney, citing the court’s decision to proceed to a permanencydetermination as evidence that his attorney was deficient. The judge reiteratedthat J.J. had the right to represent himself, “as long as I’ve explained to youwhat your rights are and I’ve impressed upon you the mistake that you’remaking in not having an attorney.” 7 As the case management conference continued, J.J.’s previouslyassigned counsel continued to speak on his behalf. The judge, evidentlyassuming J.J. had decided to represent himself, advised J.J. that he would haveto schedule his own evaluations by experts as the case moved forward. Statingthat he intended to show the judge he was “going to cooperate,” J.J. respondedthat if the judge would give him the form to request assignment of counsel forthe guardianship action, he would fill it out. The judge noted that her role wasto explain to J.J. “what your options are,” and that “[t]he choices that youmake are yours.” J.J. evidently applied for appointment of counsel, becausehis assigned attorney continued to represent him as the guardianship actionwent forward. At the second case management conference, J.J., citing illness, left thecourtroom before the conference began. At the third case management conference, conducted by a differentjudge, J.J.’s counsel advised the court that J.J. wanted him to move to have afinding of abuse or neglect “taken out of his record from a prior case.” Thecourt instructed J.J.’s counsel to file a motion. Later in the conference, J.J.raised the subject of his representation. Rather than assert his right of self-representation, J.J. stated that he wanted to retain substitute counsel. Herepresented to the court that he had the resources to retain a private attorney, 8 that he had consulted another lawyer who had declined to take his case, andthat he intended to hire a different attorney. The court instructed J.J. toarrange for any substitute counsel to confirm the representation in writing.The judge noted that J.J.’s assigned counsel would continue to represent himpending any substitution of attorney. J.J. did not retain private counsel. When the court held its final casemanagement conference and the trial judge conducted the pretrial conference,J.J.’s assigned counsel represented him.1 At both conferences, J.J. declined toappear in court. C. On the first day of the trial, J.J. appeared in court with his assignedcounsel. Unbeknownst to his attorney, J.J. had prepared several motions, onedesignated as a “motion for new counsel.” J.J. told the trial court that he had“disput[ed]” with his attorney for six or seven months and did not want theattorney to represent him. J.J. cited his attorney’s refusal to correct theallegedly erroneous record of the proceeding regarding his son, R.J. Althoughthe trial court and the Division’s counsel confirmed that the current matter was1 At the final case management conference, J.J.’s counsel advised the court that J.J., without the assistance of his attorney, had filed a motion to recuse the judge who had conducted a prior case management conference. The court confirmed to J.J.’s counsel that J.J. was authorized to file applications only through counsel. 9 unrelated to any issues in the earlier proceeding involving his son R.J., J.J.insisted that his attorney improperly refused to follow his instructions andreopen the prior matter. In response to the Division’s counsel’s observation that J.J.’s applicationincluded a request to have new counsel appointed or to represent himself, thetrial court asked J.J.’s attorney whether he sought to withdraw from the case.J.J.’s counsel confirmed that he did not seek to be relieved as counsel and thathe was prepared to try the case. The trial court denied J.J.’s request todischarge his attorney, noting counsel’s consistent preparation and efforts toserve J.J.’s interests in difficult circumstances. Later that day, J.J. interrupted his counsel’s cross-examination of thecaseworker assigned by the Division to handle the matter. He stated that he“object[ed]” to his counsel’s questions about R.A.J., which he considered“outrageous,” and insisted that his attorney should instead focus on thequestion of whether J.J. had been found to have abused or neglected his son,R.J. He stated at one point that he “would like to have differentrepresentation,” and at another point that he wanted to represent himself. Thetrial judge told J.J. that he would not “allow you to do that at this time, sir,”and confirmed that J.J.’s assigned counsel would continue to represent him. 10 The following day, the trial judge placed on the record a detailedstatement of the reasons for his determination. The judge noted that J.J.’sapplication to replace his assigned counsel was premised on J.J.’s belief thathis assigned counsel had improperly declined to reopen the Division’s actionregarding J.J.’s son, R.J. The trial court observed that the dispute between J.J.and his attorney arose from J.J.’s failure to appear in court on numerousoccasions and to communicate with his attorney, and noted assigned counsel’sconsistently diligent efforts on J.J.’s behalf. The court found that J.J.’s“request at this late date would only serve to delay the proceedings and undulyinterfere with the minor child’s attempt to gain permanency in this matter.” Again citing his attorney’s failure to file an application relating to therecord of the prior case, J.J. interrupted the examination of another witness todemand again that his counsel be dismissed. The trial judge denied theapplication, noting that the trial was in progress. The judge acknowledgedJ.J.’s “right to terminate [his] attorney,” but stated that based on J.J.’s conductover several months, he was unconvinced that J.J. could represent himselfduring the remainder of the trial. The judge noted his obligation “to balance somany issues with respect to terminating this trial right now to allow newcounsel to substitute in and come up to speed.” He ruled that suspending thetrial would be “unfair to the interest of the minor child . . . here at stak e.” 11 J.J. responded that if he were to “take over [the] case,” he would disputenone of the Division’s contentions regarding R.A.J. and would attempt only toestablish that he was “innocent of the abuse and neglect” of his son, R.J. Thecourt again denied the application, and J.J. left the courtroom. Because ofillness, he did not attend court the following day. On the final day of the trial,J.J. briefly appeared in court but declined to testify and was absent for theremainder of the trial. In a detailed written opinion substantially based on his assessment of thecredibility of fact and expert witnesses, the trial judge found that the Divisionsatisfied by clear and convincing evidence all four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)’s best-interests standard. The judge concluded that the best interests ofR.A.J. necessitated the termination of the parental rights of R.L.M. and J.J.,and awarded guardianship of R.A.J. to the Division. D. R.L.M. and J.J. appealed the trial court’s determination. Bothdefendants challenged the trial court’s best-interests findings under N.J.S.A.30:4C-15.1(a). Additionally, J.J. contended that he was entitled to a new trialbecause the trial court had denied his application to represent himself. An Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s determination.DCPP v. R.L.M., 450 N.J. Super. 131, 151 (App. Div. 2017). Substantially for 12 the reasons stated by the trial court, the panel concurred with the court’sconclusion that the Division had met its burden under the best-interests test of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). Id. at 134. The panel addressed J.J.’s self-representation claim, id. at 136-51, andheld that any constitutional aspect of that claim must derive from principles ofprocedural due process because the Sixth Amendment of the United StatesConstitution confers no right of self-representation on a non-criminaldefendant, id. at 142-43. The panel reasoned that in contrast to a parent’srepresentation by counsel in family proceedings, which reduces the risk oferror, self-representation compounds such a risk, thereby undermining the trialcourt’s effort to achieve a fair result. Id. at 144-45. The panel also addressed issues that J.J. did not raise, such as potentialstatutory and court-rule-based sources of a right to self-representation. Id. at147. The panel found no explicit right of self-representation in N.J.S.A.30:4C-15.4 and concluded that Rule 1:21-1(a)’s general grant of a right of self-representation to competent litigants in matters that directly affect them couldbe relaxed pursuant to Rule 1:1-2(a). Id. at 148. The panel noted that, in anyevent, J.J. effectively withdrew his initial request to represent himself when heappeared at subsequent proceedings and stated that he would hire substitutecounsel. Id. at 150-51. 13 We granted J.J.’s petition for certification, in which he claimed only thathe was entitled to a new trial by virtue of the trial court’s denial of his requestto represent himself. 231 N.J. 414 (2017). We also granted the motion of theAmerican Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) to appear as amicuscuriae. II. A. J.J. contends that, in a termination of parental rights action, a parent hasa fundamental right of self-representation protected by substantive dueprocess. In the alternative, he argues that the Court should find a right of self-representation based on N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4, without reaching anyconstitutional issue. J.J. construes the plain language of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4to permit a parent in a termination of parental rights proceeding to representhimself or herself. He claims that he had no obligation to assert his right ofself-representation unequivocally and timely, but argues that if he were subjectto such a requirement, his initial claim of that right was clear andunmistakable. Finally, J.J. asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of appellatecounsel based on his counsel’s reliance on a procedural due process claim,rather than substantive due process or statutory arguments. He asks the Courtto devise a procedure for the adjudication of such claims before a speciallyconstituted Appellate Division panel. 14 B. The Division disputes J.J.’s claim of a substantive due process right ofself-representation. It contends that a right of self-representation is not deeplyrooted in the history of the United States or New Jersey, and that a litigant’sappearance pro se may undermine the court’s effort to reach a just result in atermination of parental rights case. The Division asserts that any right of self-representation must be asserted unequivocally, timely, and in a manner thatdoes not disrupt the proceedings. It argues that J.J. equivocally articulated hisintent to represent himself and then withdrew his request by seeking theassignment of counsel. Finally, the Division urges the Court to reject J.J.’sclaim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, because any constitutionalor statutory claim made by J.J. would fail in light of his ambiguous anduntimely invocation of the right of self-representation. C. Contending that a parent’s self-representation in a termination ofparental rights proceeding raises the specter of an erroneous decision that mayharm the child at issue, the Law Guardian urges the Court to affirm theAppellate Division’s determination. The Law Guardian contends that J.J.’sself-representation during the guardianship trial would have imposed aninequitable hardship on R.A.J. The Law Guardian states that J.J. presented hisarguments in an ambiguous and irrational manner premised on his mistaken 15 belief that the guardianship proceedings in this case arose from an erroneousabuse or neglect finding with respect to a different child. Finally, the LawGuardian characterizes the evidence that J.J. was unable to parent R.A.J. asoverwhelming and asserts that the trial court correctly found that the Divisionmet its burden under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1. D. Amicus curiae the ACLU argues that procedural due process principleswarrant recognition of a parent’s right of self-representation in a terminationof parental rights proceeding in light of the prejudice imposed on a parentforced to accept the unwelcome services of an attorney, the trial court’s role asfactfinder in guardianship cases, and the Law Guardian’s advocacy on thechild’s behalf. The ACLU also asserts that parents have a substantive dueprocess right of self-representation in termination of parental rights cases.Relying on D.Y., the ACLU contends that N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4 establishes aparent’s right of self-representation in a termination of parental rightsproceeding because the Legislature envisioned the appointment of assignedcounsel for an indigent parent only at the parent’s request. III. A. This appeal turns on a single issue: whether J.J. was entitled torepresent himself in the Division’s action to terminate his parental rights. 16 Although that precise question has not been addressed in any previous decisionof this Court, we recently recognized a self-representation right in a differentsetting: an involuntary commitment hearing pursuant to the Sexually ViolentPredator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38. D.Y., 218 N.J. at 384. In D.Y., the individual subject to civil commitment was denied theopportunity to appear pro se in his SVPA commitment proceeding. On appeal,he asserted that he had a constitutional right to represent himself before theSVPA court, based on the Sixth Amendment right of self-representation incriminal cases recognized in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), andthe Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process factors articulated by theSupreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). An AppellateDivision panel rejected both constitutional arguments and affirmed the SVPAcourt’s commitment order. In re Civil Commitment of D.Y., 426 N.J. Super. 436, 441-47 (App. Div. 2012). We reversed the Appellate Division’s determination on statutory groundsand did not reach the constitutional issues raised by D.Y. in support of his self -representation claim. D.Y., 218 N.J. at 379-84, 386. We noted that the rightof self-representation, derived from the English common law and dating backto New Jersey’s colonial past, is deeply established in our State. Id. at 374-76.As stated in D.Y., “competent litigants in New Jersey have long been 17 permitted to represent themselves in civil proceedings, with specificexceptions identified in statutes, court rules, and case law.” Id. at 365.Moreover, as we observed in D.Y., our courts routinely encounter pro se trialand appellate litigants in civil, probate, and family disputes. Id. at 376.Indeed, our court rule governing qualifications to practice law recognizes that“[a] person not qualif[ied] to practice” pursuant to the rule’s provisions “shallnonetheless be permitted to appear and prosecute or defend an action in anycourt of this State if the person . . . is a real party in interest to the action or theguardian of the party.” R. 1:21-1(a). As we acknowledged in D.Y., however, we have never viewed alitigant’s right of self-representation to be absolute. 218 N.J. at 377-79. Asstated in D.Y., self-representation may undermine the litigant’s position in thecase, and an obstructive pro se party can impede -- if not derail entirely -- theprogress of the case. Id. at 377. Even if the litigant strives to cooperate withthe court, he or she may struggle to comprehend the proceedings andparticipate as the case unfolds. Ibid.; see also State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553,587 (2004) (observing that notwithstanding criminal defendant’s SixthAmendment right of self-representation, there may be circumstances in which“the defendant will be required to cede control of his defense to protect theintegrity of the State’s interest in fair trials and permit courts to ensure that 18 their judgments meet the high level of reliability demanded by theConstitution”). We recognized in D.Y. that the appointment of standbycounsel, long used in criminal cases involving pro se defendants, may be “aneffective solution to these challenges.” 218 N.J. at 377. Against that backdrop, we analyzed the SVPA’s provisions regarding therepresentation of individuals subject to civil commitment, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29(c) and -27.31(a). Id. at 379-84. We noted that among other enumeratedrights, the SVPA affords to such an individual the right to be represented bycounsel, or, if indigent, to the appointment of counsel at the State’s expense.Id. at 382 (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.31(a)). We considered the SVPA’s mandatethat “[a] person subject to involuntary commitment shall have counsel presentat the hearing and shall not be permitted to appear at the hearing withoutcounsel.” Id. at 383 (alteration in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29(c)).We found no legislative intent in those provisions to bar an individual facingSVPA commitment from representing himself or herself, as long as standbycounsel is “present throughout the hearing and available to assist [theindividual facing commitment] if needed.” Id. at 384. We concluded thatwhen a person subject to civil commitment appears pro se with standbycounsel at his or her side, the statutory mandate to have “counsel present” issatisfied. Ibid. 19 In D.Y., we set forth three principles to guide trial courts confrontingclaims of self-representation in the SVPA setting. First, any decision by an individual in an SVPA civil commitmentproceeding to waive his or her statutory right to full representation by counsel“should be clearly and unequivocally stated to the trial court,” and the judgeshould be satisfied that the waiver “is knowing, intelligent and voluntary.”Ibid. We required an inquiry to ensure that the individual facing civilcommitment “is aware of his or her statutory right to be fully represented bycounsel, and that he or she understands the importance of representation by anattorney in such a complex case.” Id. at 384-85 (citing State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499, 511-12 (1992)). The scope of the required colloquy was later refinedin J.E.V.; there, we held that when a parent seeks to proceed unrepresented in acontested adoption, the court “should conduct an abbreviated yet meaningfulcolloquy to ensure the parent understands the nature of the proceeding as wellas the problems she may face if she chooses to represent herself.” 226 N.J. at 114 (comparing abbreviated yet meaningful colloquy to the “more in-depthinquiry required before defendant in criminal case may waive right to counsel”set forth in Crisafi, 128 N.J. at 511-12). Second, the specific issues to be decided in the SVPA proceeding shouldshape the role of standby counsel in a given case. D.Y., 218 N.J. at 385. A 20 pro se litigant is unlikely to have the skills to defend himself or herself in acivil commitment hearing pursuant to the SVPA, in which psychiatric orpsychological experts typically testify. Ibid. Standby counsel “serves as aresource, explaining the court’s rulings and instructions to his or her client,guiding the committee through each stage of the hearing, and minimizingdisruption and delay.” Ibid. Finally, we reiterated that “the right of self-representation is not alicense to abuse the dignity of the courtroom.” Ibid. (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46). We underscored the SVPA court’s authority to take appropriateaction, including directing standby counsel to assume full representation of theindividual contesting civil commitment, in the event that the self-representinglitigant disrupts the hearing. Id. at 385-86. We held, subject to those guidelines, that D.Y. had the right to representhimself at his SVPA civil commitment hearing, and we remanded to the SVPAcourt for a new hearing. Id. at 386. B. 1. In this matter, J.J. asserted a right of self-representation in a proceedingdistinct from the civil commitment hearing at issue in D.Y. but equallychallenging to our judiciary: an action to determine whether the best interestsof a child warrant the termination of parental rights. 21 As we have observed, “[t]ermination of parental rights permanently cutsoff the relationship between children and their biological parents. 'Few formsof state action are both so severe and so irreversible.’” In re Guardianship ofJ.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 759(1982)). When our courts undertake those determinations, they “fullyrecognize the fundamental nature of parental rights and the importance offamily integrity.” In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347 (1999).These sensitive decisions “are guided by the principle that 'clearly favorskeeping children with their natural parents and resolving care and custodyproblems within the family.’” DYFS v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 165 (2010) (quotingJ.C., 129 N.J. at 7-8). That preference for family reunification “continueswhen a child is placed in foster care.” K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 347. “To be sure, the constitutional imperative of preserving familial integrityis not absolute.” Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 102 (2003) (citing Wisconsinv. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 , 233-34 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 ,166 (1944); V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 218 (2000)). “Balanced against theconstitutional protection of family rights is the State’s parens patriaeresponsibility to protect the welfare of children.” J.C., 129 N.J. at 10.Consequently, “children must be protected from serious physical andemotional injury and the court may examine whether 'it is in the child ’s best 22 interest to preserve the family unit’ or sever the parent-child relationship.”DYFS v. L.J.D., 428 N.J. Super. 451, 478 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting N.J.S.A.30:4C-1(a)). In a termination of parental rights case, the Division has the burden toprove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) The child’s safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship; (2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child; (3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child’s placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and (4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good. [N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).] The four statutory factors “are not discrete and separate; they relate toand overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard thatidentifies a child’s best interests.” K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348. The relevant 23 considerations “are 'extremely fact sensitive’ and require particularizedevidence that [addresses] the specific circumstances in the given case.” Ibid.(quoting In re Adoption of Children by L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 139 (1993)). In a termination of parental rights trial, the evidence often takes the formof expert opinion testimony by psychiatrists, psychologists, and other mentalhealth professionals. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 , 30(1981) (“[T]he ultimate issues with which a termination hearing deals are notalways simple . . . . Expert medical and psychiatric testimony, which fewparents are equipped to understand and fewer still to confute, is sometimespresented.”); Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276, 318 (1997) (“In implementingthe 'best-interest-of-the-child’ standard, courts rely heavily on the expertise ofpsychologists and other mental health professionals.”); cf. J.E.V., 226 N.J. at 109 (“The issues [in contested adoption proceedings] are not simple. Theymay involve complicated, expert medical and psychological evidence.”). The Family Part judge is charged with advancing the public policy ofachieving a timely, permanent placement for the child. As the Legislature hasdeclared, “each child placed outside his home by the State has the need forpermanency,” whether by family reunification, if it can be accomplishedwithout endangering the child’s health or safety; by adoption; or by analternative permanent placement. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-1(f). We have recognized 24 that in guardianship and adoption cases, “the child’s need for permanency andstability emerges as a central factor.” K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 357; see also J.C., 129 N.J. at 26 (“Because . . . children have an essential and overriding interestin stability and permanency, it is inimical to their welfare that their legal statusremain unresolved.”); L.J.D., 428 N.J. Super. at 483 (“[C]hildren must notlanguish indefinitely in foster care while a birth parent attempts to correct theconditions that resulted in an out-of-home placement.” (quoting DYFS v. S.F., 392 N.J. Super. 201, 210 (App. Div. 2007))). Given the impact of a trial delayor interruption on a child awaiting permanency, Family Part judges conductingtermination of parental rights proceedings must be mindful of the need forprompt determination of the difficult issues before them. In short, J.J.’s self-representation claim arose in a setting implicatingseveral compelling interests -- a parent’s right to raise his or her child, theState’s parens patriae responsibility, and a child’s urgent need for a safe andpermanent home. The Family Part judge was required to consider complexfact and expert evidence and to make a fair and expeditious decision based onthat evidence. 2. In a 1999 amendment to Title 30’s provisions addressing actions toterminate parental rights, the Legislature addressed “legal representation of 25 children and indigent parents in termination of parental rights proceedings.” S.Women’s Issues, Children & Family Servs. Comm. Statement to S. 1705 4(Mar. 15, 1999). As amended, the statute provides that, (a) [i]n any action concerning the termination of parental rights filed pursuant to [ N.J.S.A. 30:4C- 15], the court shall provide the respondent parent with notice of the right to retain and consult with legal counsel. If the parent appears before the court, is indigent and requests counsel, the court shall appoint the Office of the Public Defender to represent the parent. .... Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude the parent from retaining private counsel. (b) A child who is the subject of an application for the termination of parental rights pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15] shall be represented by a law guardian as defined in [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21]. [ N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4(a) to (b).] We discern the Legislature’s intent from the statute’s plain language. Inre Young, 202 N.J. 50, 63 (2010) (“When interpreting a statute, our mainobjective is to further the Legislature’s intent. To discern the Legislature’sintent, courts first turn to the plain language of the statute in question.”(citations omitted)); DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (“It is notthe function of this Court to 'rewrite a plainly-written enactment of theLegislature []or presume that the Legislature intended something other than 26 that expressed by way of the plain language.’” (alteration in original) (quotingO’Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002))). The Legislature clearlyenvisioned that an indigent parent would have access to appointed counsel in atermination of parental rights proceeding. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4(a). There is,however, nothing mandatory about the statute’s discussion of the assignmentof counsel; if an indigent parent does not apply for an assignment, no attorneywill be appointed to act on his or her behalf. Ibid. Similarly, a parent who isnot indigent is free to retain private counsel, but is not required to do so. Ibid.There is no language analogous to the SVPA’s requirement that an individualsubject to SVPA civil commitment have “counsel present,” let alone arequirement that the parent be fully represented by a lawyer. Compare N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4, with N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29(c). The statute expressly provides that a child who is the subject of atermination of parental rights action must be represented by the Law Guardian. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4(b). Notably, the Legislature used no such mandatorylanguage when it authorized the assignment of counsel to indigent parents intermination of parental rights actions. “[W]here [the Legislature] includesparticular language in one section of the statute but omits it in another sectionof the same [a]ct, it is generally presumed that [the Legislature] actsintentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” DYFS v. 27 A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 21 (2013) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 ,432 (1987)). Thus, when it enacted N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4, the Legislatureplainly intended that legal representation be required only for the child at thecenter of a termination of parental rights action and envisioned that a parentcould elect to appear pro se. C. Based on the plain language of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4, we hold that aparent has the right to represent himself or herself in an action to terminate hisor her parental rights, with the assistance of standby counsel at the court’sdiscretion. That right is constrained by two important considerations: the FamilyPart judge’s responsibility to reach an informed and fair determination of thechild’s best interests, and the child’s interest in permanency. See J.E.V., 226 N.J. at 110 (observing that in contested adoption proceeding that terminatesparental rights, “the public, the State, and the parent . . . share an 'interest inan accurate and just decision’” (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27)); K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 357 (recognizing importance of prompt determinations due to child’sneed for permanency); J.C., 129 N.J. at 26 (same). With a child’s future in thebalance, a parent’s self-representation must not impede the proceedings. Toassist our Family Part judges, we offer the following guidelines. 28 First, in light of the child’s need for permanency and the court’sauthority to control its calendar, the parent must assert his or her right of self-representation in a timely manner. The parent does not waive his or her rightof self-representation by failing to assert that right at the inception of theaction. In light of the complexity of the proofs and the child’s need forpermanency, however, the parent should state his or her intention to proceedpro se as early as possible in the proceedings, well in advance of trial. Thetrial court has the discretion to reject a parent’s untimely invocation of his orher right of self-representation. Second, the parent must clearly and unequivocally invoke the right ofself-representation on the record and must knowingly, intelligently, andvoluntarily waive his or her right to counsel. J.E.V., 226 N.J. at 114. Aparent’s complaint about his or her attorney, or his or her plan to replacecurrent counsel with another attorney, is not an invocation of the right of self-representation. As we have noted in a criminal appeal, “[t]he need for anunequivocal request for self-representation by a defendant is a necessaryprerequisite to the determination that the defendant is making a knowing andintelligent waiver of the right to counsel.” State v. Figueroa, 186 N.J. 589, 593n.1 (2006) (citing Reddish, 181 N.J. at 587; Crisafi, 128 N.J. at 509). 29 If the parent clearly and unequivocally invokes his or her right toproceed unrepresented, the court should engage in the “abbreviated yetmeaningful colloquy” envisioned in the contested-adoption context in J.E.V. 226 N.J. at 114. That inquiry need not be as comprehensive as the colloquymandated when a criminal defendant seeks to proceed unrepresented. Cf. Statev. DuBois, 189 N.J. 454, 468-69 (2007) (enumerating topics that must beaddressed in a colloquy when a criminal defendant waives the right tocounsel); Reddish, 181 N.J. at 592-95 (same); Crisafi, 128 N.J. at 510-12(same). The court, however, should be satisfied that the parent understands thenature of the termination of rights proceeding and the disadvantages of self-representation. J.E.V., 226 N.J. at 114. Third, the trial court may, in its discretion, appoint standby counsel, butit is not required to do so. In contrast to the statute governing legalrepresentation in the civil commitment hearing at issue in D.Y., the statuteaddressing representation in termination of parental rights proceedings doesnot mandate the presence of counsel. Compare N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29(c), with N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4. The court, however, may conclude in a particular casethat the appointment of standby counsel is essential to the effectivepresentation of evidence and the progress of the hearing toward a timelypermanency determination. If the court appoints standby counsel, the parent 30 remains in control of his or her case and is not obligated to follow the adviceof standby counsel. D.Y., 218 N.J. at 385. That counsel, however, may proveto be an invaluable resource to the parent and ensure the integrity of theproceeding. Ibid. Fourth, the judge has the authority to take appropriate steps if anunrepresented parent in a termination of rights action declines to follow thecourt’s instructions, disrespects the court or any participant in the hearing , orrefuses to take part in the proceedings. Id. at 385-86; State v. Wiggins, 158 N.J. Super. 27, 33 (App. Div. 1978). As the Legislature has declared, thefocus of a termination of parental rights proceeding is a determination of thechild’s best interests. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). No decision by a parent toproceed unrepresented should be permitted to impede a just and expeditiousoutcome for the child. D. Our recognition of a right of self-representation by parents intermination of parental rights proceedings, subject to the limitations statedabove, rests on statutory grounds. Accordingly, we do not reach the qu estionof whether parents in such proceedings have a constitutional right, based onprinciples of substantive or procedural due process, to represent themselves.See State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 72 (2017) (“[W]e strive to avoid reaching 31 constitutional questions unless required to do so . . . .” (quoting Comm. toRecall Robert Menendez from the Office of U.S. Senator v. Wells, 204 N.J. 79,95-96 (2010))); D.Y., 218 N.J. at 379. As we did in D.Y., 218 N.J. at 374-76,we recognize here that our courts have historically respected the right ofcompetent litigants to represent themselves, with limited exceptions prescribedin statutes, court rules, and case law.2 We do not embrace the AppellateDivision’s rejection of a constitutional right of self-representation in atermination of parental rights action. See R.L.M., 450 N.J. Super. at 142-47. IV. With our guidelines in mind, we review the Family Part judge’s denial ofJ.J.’s request to represent himself at trial. We defer to the court’s factfindingin recognition of its “special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters .”DCPP v. A.B., 231 N.J. 354, 369 (2017) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). We afford no deference to the court’s legal determination asto the scope of the right of self-representation, and review that determination2 As we noted in D.Y., “[c]ertain categories of litigants in civil, probate, and family court matters, such as minors or persons determined to be mentally incapacitated, are afforded special protections which may include appointment of counsel and/or a fiduciary.” 218 N.J. at 376 n.5 (citing examples of statutes, court rules, and case law providing for such appointment in certain settings). 32 de novo. See D.Y., 218 N.J. at 373; Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm.of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). We concur with the trial court that in the proceedings to terminate hisparental rights to R.A.J., J.J. did not assert his right of self-representation inthe timely, clear, and unequivocal manner that our law requires. Accordingly,the court’s denial of J.J.’s request did not constitute error. J.J. first raised the prospect of representing himself at an early stage ofthe guardianship action: the initial case management conference. He told thejudge overseeing the conference that he intended to decline the appointment ofcounsel and that he planned to submit motions on his own behalf with theassistance of his uncle. Had J.J. maintained that position, his statements to thecourt would have constituted a timely invocation of his right of self-representation and would have required the court to conduct a colloquy withJ.J. regarding the proceedings, the role of counsel, and the challenges that J.J.would face as a pro se litigant. See J.E.V., 226 N.J. at 114. Although thejudge did not conduct the full inquiry that would be required for a paren t toproceed on his own behalf, she confirmed to J.J. that he had the right torepresent himself as long as she explained his rights to him and impressedupon him that he would make a “big mistake” were he to appear pro se. Thejudge confirmed that advice when she told J.J. that it would be his 33 responsibility, as a pro se litigant, to arrange evaluations by experts as the casemoved forward. J.J. then changed his mind. Promising to “cooperate,” he requested theform necessary to apply for assigned counsel. Although the judge remindedJ.J. of the court’s obligation to explain to J.J. his options and his authority todecide how to proceed, J.J. sought and secured assigned counsel. J.J. laterannounced his intention to replace his counsel with a privately retainedattorney, but no such counsel appeared on his behalf. Accordingly, J.J.’spretrial invocation of his right of self-representation was unambiguouslywithdrawn. J.J. did not raise the subject of self-representation with the court againuntil the trial was underway. Following J.J.’s interruption of witnessexaminations to declare his intention to either substitute new counsel orproceed on his own behalf, the trial judge advised J.J., first in brief commentsand later in more detailed findings, that the court would authorize no change inhis representation at that late date. The trial court properly denied J.J.’s request during the trial to dischargehis attorney and represent himself. In a matter involving complexpresentations of fact and expert evidence, the court correctly concluded thatthe dismissal of J.J.’s counsel would bring the proceeding to a halt for an 34 indefinite period. Such a development would have delayed a permanencydetermination for R.A.J., undermining the public policy that the Legislaturedeclared. The trial judge acted appropriately to preserve the integrity of theproceeding and bring it to a conclusion, and the Appellate Division properlyaffirmed the trial court’s determination. 3 V. The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed as modified. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion.3 Before this Court, J.J. raised a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, premised on the argument that he suffered prejudice because his appellate counsel did not raise the statutory and substantive due process self- representation claims that J.J. asserts in this Court. See DYFS v. B.R., 192 N.J. 301, 305-09 (2007) (adopting standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 694 (1984), and adopted in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), for ineffective assistance of counsel claims asserted in termination of parental rights proceedings). In light of our recognition of a right of self-representation based on N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4, and our holding that J.J. did not timely, clearly, and unequivocally assert a right of self- representation in this matter, J.J. cannot meet the prejudice prong of the governing standard. See ibid. Accordingly, J.J.’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel fails. 35