Title: Commonwealth v. Muckle
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12269
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 6, 2017

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12269 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PAUL MUCKLE. 
 
 
October 6, 2017. 
 
 
Intimidation of Witness.  District Court, Jurisdiction.  Boston 
Municipal Court.  Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Mittimus. 
 
 
 
 
Paul Muckle was convicted in the Boston Municipal Court 
Department (BMC) of intimidating a person furthering a court 
proceeding, see G. L. c. 268, § 13B, and other offenses.  The 
alleged victim of Muckle's intimidation was opposing counsel in 
a civil action commenced by Muckle in Federal court.  His 
posttrial motion to vacate the intimidation conviction was 
allowed, and that charge was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction 
in the BMC.  On the parties' cross appeals, the Appeals Court 
reversed the dismissal of the intimidation charge and affirmed 
the convictions.  Commonwealth v. Muckle, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 384 
(2016).  A dissenting Justice would have affirmed the dismissal.  
See id. at 397-402 (Rubin, J., dissenting in part and concurring 
in part).  We granted Muckle's application for further appellate 
review, 476 Mass. 1111 (2017), limited to the issue of whether, 
under G. L. c. 218, § 26, the BMC and the District Court have 
jurisdiction over prosecutions under G. L. c. 268, § 13B, for 
intimidation of persons other than a witness or juror.  For 
essentially the reasons stated by the dissenting Appeals Court 
Justice, we conclude that such jurisdiction was absent.  We 
therefore affirm the order dismissing the intimidation charge. 
 
 
The underlying facts of the case are fully set forth in the 
Appeals Court's opinion and need not be repeated here.  Muckle, 
90 Mass. App. Ct. at 385-387.  Before us is a purely legal 
question concerning the correct interpretation of G. L. c. 218, 
2 
 
§ 26.1  We begin with the "general and familiar rule . . . that a 
statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the 
Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished."  Meikle v. Nurse, 474 Mass. 207, 209-210 (2016), 
quoting Lowery v. Klemm, 446 Mass. 572, 576-577 (2006).  The 
statute at issue provides that the BMC and the District Court 
have jurisdiction, concurrent with the Superior Court, over 
numerous offenses, including "intimidation of a witness or juror 
under [G. L. c. 268, § 13B]."  G. L. c. 218, § 26.  General Laws 
c. 268, § 13B, in turn, prohibits intimidation not only of a 
witness or juror, but also of "a judge . . . , prosecutor, 
                     
 
1 In full, G. L. c. 218, § 26, provides: 
 
 
"The district courts and divisions of the Boston 
municipal court department shall have original 
jurisdiction, concurrent with the superior court, of the 
following offenses, complaint of which shall be brought in 
the court of the district court department, or in the 
Boston municipal court department, as the case may be, 
within which judicial district the offense was allegedly 
committed or is otherwise made punishable: —- all 
violations of by-laws, orders, ordinances, rules and 
regulations, made by cities, towns and public officers, all 
misdemeanors, except libels, all felonies punishable by 
imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five-
years, the crimes listed in [G. L. c. 90B, § 8 (a) (1); 
G. L. c. 90, §§ 24 (1) (a) (1), 24G (a), and 24L (1); G. L. 
c. 94C, §§ 32 (a) and 32A (a); G. L. c. 94C, § 32J; G. L. 
c. 127, § 38B; G. L. c. 140, § 131E; G. L. c. 265, §§ 13K, 
15A, 15D, 21A, and 26; and G. L. c. 266, §§ 16, 17, 18, 19, 
28, 30, 49, and 127; and G. L. c. 273, §§ 1, 15, and 15A], 
and the crimes of malicious destruction of personal 
property under [G. L. c. 266, § 127], indecent assault and 
battery on a child under fourteen years of age, 
intimidation of a witness or juror under [G. L. c. 268, 
§ 13B], escape or attempt to escape from any penal 
institution, forgery of a promissory note, or of an order 
for money or other property, and of uttering as true such a 
forged note or order, knowing the same to be forged.  They 
shall have jurisdiction of proceedings referred to them 
under the provisions of [G. L. c. 211, § 4A]."  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
3 
 
police officer, federal agent, investigator, defense attorney, 
clerk, court officer, probation officer or parole officer," as 
well as other persons involved in court proceedings and criminal 
investigations.  G. L. c. 268, § 13B (1) (c) (i)-(v).2  The 
                     
 
2 General Laws c. 268, § 13B, provides, in relevant part: 
 
 
"(1) Whoever, directly or indirectly, willfully 
 
 
"(a) threatens, or attempts or causes physical injury, 
emotional injury, economic injury or property damage to; 
 
 
"(b) conveys a gift, offer or promise of anything of 
value to; or 
 
 
"(c) misleads, intimidates or harasses another person 
who is: 
 
 
"(i) a witness or potential witness at any stage of a 
criminal investigation, grand jury proceeding, trial or 
other criminal proceeding of any type; 
 
 
"(ii) a person who is or was aware of information, 
records, documents or objects that relate to a violation of 
a criminal statute, or a violation of conditions of 
probation, parole or bail; 
 
 
"(iii) a judge, juror, grand juror, prosecutor, police 
officer, federal agent, investigator, defense attorney, 
clerk, court officer, probation officer or parole officer; 
 
 
"(iv) a person who is furthering a civil or criminal 
proceeding, including criminal investigation, grand jury 
proceeding, trial, other criminal proceeding of any type, 
probate and family proceeding, juvenile proceeding, housing 
proceeding, land proceeding, clerk's hearing, court ordered 
mediation, any other civil proceeding of any type; or 
 
 
"(v) a person who is or was attending or had made 
known his intention to attend a civil or criminal 
proceeding, including criminal investigation, grand jury 
proceeding, trial, other criminal proceeding of any type, 
probate and family proceeding, juvenile proceeding, housing 
proceeding, land proceeding, clerk's hearing, court-ordered 
mediation, any other civil proceeding of any type with the 
intent to impede, obstruct, delay, harm, punish or 
otherwise interfere thereby, or do so with reckless 
4 
 
jurisdiction statute, G. L. c. 218, § 26, does not mention any 
of these other potential victims, nor does it contain any 
"catchall" language that would include them (such as 
"intimidation of a witness, juror, or any other person under" 
§ 13B).  Under the maxim, "expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius", the express inclusion of witnesses and jurors 
excludes all other persons listed in § 13B (1) (c) who are not 
expressly included.  See, e.g., Skawski v. Greenfield Investors 
Prop. Dev. LLC, 473 Mass. 580, 588 (2016) ("the expression of 
one thing in a statute is an implied exclusion of other things 
not included in the statute").  The plain language of G. L. 
c. 218, § 26, thus confers jurisdiction in the BMC and the 
District Court over intimidation of a witness or juror, but not 
over intimidation of any other person. 
 
 
Our interpretation of this provision in G. L. c. 218, § 26, 
is reinforced by other provisions in the same statute.  See 
Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 447 Mass. 88, 93 (2006), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Galvin, 388 Mass. 326, 328 (1983) ("When 
the meaning of any particular section or clause of a statute is 
questioned, it is proper, no doubt, to look into the other parts 
of the statute").  Elsewhere in § 26, the Legislature conferred 
jurisdiction in the BMC and the District Court over "the crimes 
listed in" several statutes listed solely by citation, without 
further description.  Had the Legislature intended, as the 
Appeals Court ruled, to confer jurisdiction over all offenses 
defined in § 13B, it presumably would have simply included § 13B 
in that list.3  It did not do so.  Rather, the jurisdiction 
                                                                  
disregard, with such a proceeding shall be punished by 
imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more 
than [two] and one-half years or by imprisonment in a 
[S]tate prison for not more than [ten] years, or by a fine 
of not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000, or by both 
such fine and imprisonment." 
 
 
3 According to the dissenting Appeals Court Justice, the 
Legislature considered doing exactly that.  See Commonwealth v. 
Muckle, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 384, 399-400 (2016) (Rubin, J., 
dissenting in part and concurring in part).  The language with 
which we are concerned was added by St. 1996, c. 393.  The 
original version of the bill that ultimately became that law 
would have inserted a citation to G. L. c. 268, § 13B, into the 
list of crimes identified solely by statute.  If that version of 
the bill had become law, c. 218, § 26, would have conferred 
jurisdiction in the BMC and the District Court over all crimes 
listed in § 13B.  During the legislative process, however, the 
5 
 
statute does not cite § 13B by chapter and section number only, 
but identifies a subset of the offenses defined therein, namely, 
intimidation of a witness and intimidation of a juror.  It is 
apparent that the Legislature did not intend to include all 
offenses defined by § 13B within the jurisdictional statute.  
Indeed, the Appeals Court's interpretation would render the 
language "intimidation of a witness or juror" superfluous.  Such 
an interpretation is to be avoided.  Matter of a Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 447 Mass. at 92, citing Bynes v. School Comm. of 
Boston, 411 Mass. 264, 267-268 (1991). 
 
 
We note, too, that the Legislature added the phrase 
"intimidation of a witness or juror under [§ 13B]" in the same 
act in which it increased the maximum penalty for the crime of 
intimidation above five years in the State prison.  St. 1996, 
c. 393.  Given this increased maximum penalty, the Legislature 
may well have intended the crime of intimidation to be 
prosecuted primarily in the Superior Court, but carved out an 
exception for cases of intimidation of witnesses or jurors.  It 
is plainly the Legislature's prerogative to draw this line after 
weighing the advantages and disadvantages of doing so.  The 
consequence is simply that cases of intimidation of any person 
other than a witness or juror must proceed in the Superior 
Court, not in the BMC or the District Court.  We cannot say that 
this is an absurd or illogical result.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Peterson, 476 Mass. 163, 167-169 (2017), and authorities cited 
("we do not adhere blindly to a literal reading of a statute if 
doing so would yield an 'absurd' or 'illogical' result," but 
"absurd results doctrine must be used sparingly"). 
 
 
In light of our disposition, we must briefly address a 
sentencing issue.  See Muckle, 90 Mass. App. Ct. at 394-395, 401 
n.4.  Originally, Muckle was sentenced to two years in the house 
of correction, one year to serve and the balance suspended, on 
the intimidation charge (count 1), and to suspended house of 
correction sentences on the remaining convictions.  After count 
1 was dismissed, the judge vacated the sentence on that 
conviction and did not modify the sentences on the remaining 
convictions.  The docket sheet and mittimus, however, stated 
that Muckle was given a committed sentence on one of the 
remaining counts of the complaint.  The Commonwealth concedes 
                                                                  
language was amended to include the "intimidation of a witness 
or juror" language.  The Legislature appears to have made a 
deliberate choice not to include all § 13B offenses in the 
jurisdiction statute. 
6 
 
that this is inaccurate and that the docket sheet and mittimus 
must be corrected. 
 
 
The order dismissing count 1 of the complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction is affirmed.  The matter is remanded to the Boston 
Municipal Court for amendment of the docket sheet and mittimus 
in accordance with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
Edward C. Gauthier, IV, for the defendant. 
 
Julianne Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth.