Title: Sigmon v. Dir. of Dep't of Corr.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 121216
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 18, 2013

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
CLIFFORD LEE SIGMON, NO. 1147304 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.   Record No. 121216 
CHIEF JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
April 18, 2013 
DIRECTOR OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS  
 
UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS  
 
In this petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed under 
this Court's original jurisdiction, we first hold that a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a direct appeal from a 
final judgment of conviction can proceed simultaneously in this 
Court.  With regard to the claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel raised in the petition, we conclude that the petitioner 
failed to prove that, but for his counsel's alleged errors, the 
outcome of his trial would have been different.  Therefore, we 
will dismiss the petition. 
Clifford Lee Sigmon was convicted in the Circuit Court of 
Amherst County of petit larceny, third or subsequent offense, in 
violation of Code §§ 18.2-96 and -104; and breaking and entering 
with the intent to commit larceny, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-
90 and -91.  In an order dated January 4, 2012, the circuit 
court sentenced Sigmon to 12 months in jail, suspended; and 20 
years of imprisonment, all but five years suspended, 
respectively. 
2 
 
Sigmon, represented by counsel, appealed the circuit 
court's judgment to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which 
denied his appeal on July 12, 2012 by unpublished order.  Sigmon 
v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0185-12-3 (July 12, 2012).  Sigmon 
then timely filed a petition for appeal in this Court 
challenging the judgment of the Court of Appeals.1  Sigmon also 
filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this 
Court, challenging the legality of his confinement and asserting 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  The Director of 
the Department of Corrections (the Director) moved to dismiss 
Sigmon's petition. 
Because Sigmon's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and 
his direct appeal were pending simultaneously in this Court, we 
directed Sigmon and the Director to address the following 
question:2 
Is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed in this Court prior to the conclusion 
of the petitioner's direct appeal of his 
criminal conviction premature, requiring 
dismissal of the petition without prejudice, 
                         
1 As he did in the Court of Appeals, Sigmon raises two 
issues on appeal: (1) whether a blank check is a thing of value 
under Code § 18.2-96; and (2) whether the evidence was 
sufficient to sustain his convictions.  See Sigmon v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 121321, Pet. for Appeal (filed Aug. 6, 
2012). 
2 The Court appointed counsel to represent Sigmon in this 
habeas corpus proceeding. 
3 
 
or may the petition for writ of habeas 
corpus and the direct appeal proceed 
simultaneously? 
 
While the precise origin of the writ of habeas corpus is 
unknown, it is believed to have been in use before the date of 
the Magna Carta.  Rollin C. Hurd, A Treatise on the Right of 
Personal Liberty, and on the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the 
Practice Connected with It: With a View of the Law of 
Extradition of Fugitives 144 (1858).  "From its earliest known 
appearance to the present, habeas corpus has been a judicial 
order directing a person to have the body of another before a 
tribunal at a certain time and place."  Daniel J. Meador, Habeas 
Corpus and Magna Carta:  Dualism of Power and Liberty 7 (1966).  
The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to "test the validity 
of detention, and, for this purpose, the law permits a prisoner 
to mount a collateral attack upon his conviction or sentence."  
Howard v. Warden of Buckingham Corr. Ctr., 232 Va. 16, 19, 348 
S.E.2d 211, 213 (1986); see also Buchanan v. Buchanan, 170 Va. 
458, 464, 197 S.E. 426, 429 (1938) ("The primary object of 
habeas corpus is to determine the legality of the restraint 
under which a person is held.").  
The writ of habeas corpus "was claimed as the birthright of 
every Englishman, and our ancestors brought it with them as such 
to this country."  United States ex rel. Wheeler v. Williamson, 
4 
 
28 F. Cas. 686, 688 (E.D. Pa. 1855).  Sometimes referred to as 
the "most celebrated writ in the English law," Click v. Click, 
127 S.E. 194, 195 (W. Va. 1925), it has been preserved in our 
federal and state constitutions.  In the Commonwealth, "the writ 
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of 
invasion or rebellion, the public safety may require."  Va. 
Const. art. I, § 9 (1971); see also U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 
2.  Pursuant to Code § 8.01-654(A)(1), the "writ of habeas 
corpus ad subjiciendum shall be granted forthwith by the Supreme 
Court or any circuit court, to any person who shall apply for 
the same by petition, showing by affidavits or other evidence 
probable cause to believe that he is detained without lawful 
authority." 
Habeas corpus "is designed to challenge the civil right of 
the validity of the petitioner's detention" and is therefore "a 
civil and not a criminal proceeding."  Smyth v. Godwin, 188 Va. 
753, 760, 51 S.E.2d 230, 233 (1949); see also Ex parte Tom Tong, 
108 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1883) (Habeas corpus "is a new suit 
brought by [the petitioner] to enforce a civil right, which he 
claims, as against those who are holding him in custody, under 
the criminal process.").  It is not "a continuation of the 
criminal prosecution," Smyth, 188 Va. at 760, 51 S.E.2d at 233, 
and "may not be used as a substitute for an appeal or writ of 
5 
 
error."  Brooks v. Peyton, 210 Va. 318, 321, 171 S.E.2d 243, 246 
(1969); accord Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 29, 205 S.E.2d 
680, 682 (1974). 
As both parties acknowledge, none of the statutes 
addressing habeas corpus, see Code §§ 8.01-654 through -668, 
expressly or implicitly prohibits a petitioner from seeking 
habeas corpus relief in this Court prior to completing a direct 
appeal from a final judgment of conviction.  Those statutes 
prescribe only a limitation as to the time period in which a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be filed.  Except in 
cases in which a death sentence was imposed, 
[a] habeas corpus petition attacking a 
criminal conviction or sentence . . . shall 
be filed within two years from the date of 
final judgment in the trial court or within 
one year from either final disposition of 
the direct appeal in state court or the time 
for filing such appeal has expired, 
whichever is later. 
 
Code § 8.01-654(A)(2).  Before the enactment of Code § 8.01-
654(A)(2), which became effective on July 1, 1998,3 a petitioner 
could seek habeas corpus relief at any time provided the 
respondent was not prejudiced in its ability to reply because of 
the petitioner's delay in filing.  Haas v. Lee, 263 Va. 273, 
275, 560 S.E.2d 256, 257 (2002). 
                         
3 See 1998 Acts ch. 577; Code § 1-214(A). 
6 
 
Relying on our decisions in Bowman v. Washington, 269 Va. 
1, 605 S.E.2d 585 (2004), and Davis v. Johnson, 274 Va. 649, 652 
S.E.2d 114 (2007), Sigmon argues that in the absence of statutes 
to the contrary, this Court should exercise its discretion to 
dismiss without prejudice a habeas corpus petition filed in this 
Court prior to the disposition of any pending direct appeal 
challenging the criminal conviction.  In Bowman, the petitioner 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in circuit court 
and asserted numerous claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, including a claim that his attorney was ineffective for 
failing to file a timely petition for appeal challenging his 
criminal conviction.  269 Va. at 1, 605 S.E.2d at 585.  The 
petitioner asked the circuit court to permit him to file a 
belated appeal to the Court of Appeals of Virginia and to 
dismiss his remaining claims without prejudice.  Id.  The 
circuit court granted the requested relief as to the belated 
appeal but dismissed the other claims with prejudice.  Id. 
Prior to the amendment of Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) in 2005, 
see 2005 Acts ch. 836, a petitioner was barred from asserting in 
a subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus new claims 
based on facts of which the petitioner had knowledge at the time 
7 
 
of filing the previous petition.4  A petitioner could, however, 
reassert claims previously dismissed without prejudice.  Id. at 
1-2, 605 S.E.2d at 585.  Because the petitioner in Bowman had 
requested that his remaining habeas claims be dismissed without 
prejudice so as to preserve them while he pursued his direct 
appeal, we concluded that the circuit court abused its 
discretion by dismissing those remaining claims with prejudice.  
Id. 
Similarly, the circuit court in Davis granted the 
petitioner's habeas corpus claim seeking a belated appeal from a 
final judgment of conviction and also adjudicated the merits of 
his other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
dismissing them with prejudice.  274 Va. at 652, 652 S.E.2d at 
115.  On appeal, however, we found no abuse of discretion by the 
circuit court.  Id. at 654, 652 S.E.2d at 117.  Noting the 2005 
amendment to Code § 8.01-654(B)(2), we explained that our 
decision in Bowman "did not suggest that a circuit court must[,] 
in every case[,] dismiss without prejudice all additional habeas 
corpus claims accompanying a successful request for a belated 
appeal."  Id. 
                         
4 Pursuant to the 2005 amendment to Code § 8.01-654(B)(2), a 
petitioner is no longer precluded from asserting new claims in a 
subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus when the sole 
claim in the first petition was a denial of the right of appeal 
from a final judgment of conviction.  See 2005 Acts ch. 836. 
8 
 
Instead, the discretionary nature of the 
circuit court's authority permits a circuit 
court to evaluate a petitioner's additional 
claims. If the circuit court is able to 
determine from the record that these claims 
are insufficient as a matter of law, or are 
procedurally barred as a matter of law, the 
circuit court retains the discretionary 
authority to dismiss those deficient claims 
with prejudice. If, however, the additional 
claims cannot be resolved as a matter of law 
on the face of the record, the circuit court 
should dismiss those claims without 
prejudice to enable a petitioner to reassert 
the same claims in a later petition after 
his belated appeal is concluded. 
 
Id. 
The decisions in Bowman and Davis signify that it lies 
within the sound discretion of the court whether to adjudicate 
all habeas corpus claims when ruling on a claim for a belated 
appeal.  However, contrary to Sigmon's argument, those cases are 
not dispositive of the question we posed to the parties in this 
case: whether a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a 
direct appeal can proceed simultaneously in this Court.  We now 
answer that question affirmatively. 
The writ of habeas corpus has always been regarded "'as a 
palladium of liberty'" and recognized as one of "'the greatest 
and most effective remedies known to the law.'"  Click, 127 S.E. 
at 195 (citations omitted).  Moreover, Code § 8.01-654(A)(1) 
commands that when a petitioner shows that he or she is detained 
without lawful authority, the "writ of habeas corpus ad 
9 
 
subjiciendum shall be granted forthwith."  (Emphasis added.)  We 
find no justification to dismiss without prejudice a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus filed in this Court merely because a 
direct appeal is also pending either in the Court of Appeals or 
in this Court.  Indeed, such a procedure would ignore the fact 
that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not 
reviewable on direct appeal and thus can be raised only in a 
habeas corpus proceeding.  See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 
654, 675, 529 S.E.2d 769, 781 (2000); Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 
Va. 324, 335 n.4, 468 S.E.2d 98, 105 n.4 (1996); Walker v. 
Commonwealth, 224 Va. 568, 570-71, 299 S.E.2d 698, 699-700 
(1983).  A petitioner with a meritorious claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel should not be forced either to forego all 
direct appeal remedies in order to seek habeas corpus relief 
immediately after a criminal conviction, or to wait until the 
completion of any direct appeal remedies before pursuing the 
habeas corpus claim.  Thus, Sigmon's petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus can proceed simultaneously with his direct appeal 
in this Court.  Cf. Walker, 224 Va. at 570, 299 S.E.2d at 699 
(direct appeal of conviction and appeal from denial of a habeas 
corpus petition both pending before the Court simultaneously). 
We turn now to the merits of his habeas corpus claims.  
Before addressing them, we will summarize the pertinent evidence 
10 
 
presented at Sigmon's trial for petit larceny and breaking and 
entering with the intent to commit larceny.  The victim, William 
L. Higginbotham, testified that he and Sigmon are cousins and 
that although they have known each other since childhood, he had 
not seen Sigmon for at least 20 years.  Higginbotham related 
that on the day in question, May 29, 2011, Sigmon came to his 
house two times.  According to Higginbotham, he felt 
uncomfortable during the first encounter because Sigmon asked 
him for money.  Higginbotham did not give Sigmon a definite 
answer but merely told Sigmon he would "try to see what [he] 
could do." 
Higginbotham testified that Sigmon returned to his house 
about 30 to 45 minutes later.  Higginbotham decided to "try to 
give the impression that no one was home," so he concealed 
himself in a closet and did not respond to Sigmon's knocking on 
the door.  Higginbotham observed Sigmon enter the house 
uninvited, rummage through the drawers of a computer desk, take 
a blank check from a checkbook lying on the desk, and then 
leave.  Higginbotham later placed a "hold" on the check, which 
was never cashed. 
Sigmon testified at trial and admitted that he went to 
Higginbotham's house twice on the day in question.  He also 
admitted that he entered the house the second time uninvited, 
11 
 
after receiving no response to his knocking and calling for 
Higginbotham.  He further acknowledged that he took the blank 
check.  Sigmon claimed, however, that he took the check solely 
to get Higginbotham's telephone number so he would not need to 
leave Higginbotham a note.  Sigmon also testified that he tore 
off the part of the check containing the telephone number and 
threw the remaining portion away.  Sigmon admitted that he had 
been released from prison in December 2010 and had been 
convicted of a "bunch" of felonies. 
In his habeas corpus petition, Sigmon alleges that he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel on the following grounds: 
(1) that counsel failed to meet with him until 30 minutes prior 
to trial and to discuss trial strategy or possible defenses to 
the charges; (2) that counsel failed to investigate the charges; 
(3) that counsel failed to prepare for trial and to interview 
and/or subpoena witnesses, in particular John Gilbert Huffman 
and Peggy Sue Vaughan, petitioner's fiancée; (4) that counsel 
failed to discuss with petitioner whether he should request a 
trial by jury; (5) that counsel failed to present exculpatory 
evidence at trial; (6) that counsel failed to request a 
continuance of the trial because counsel was not prepared to 
proceed; and (7) that counsel incorrectly informed the trial 
12 
 
court that petitioner wished to change his plea from not guilty 
to guilty. 
In this collateral attack on his convictions, Sigmon has 
the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence his 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Jerman v. Dir., 
267 Va. 432, 438, 593 S.E.2d 255, 258 (2004); Green v. Young, 
264 Va. 604, 608, 571 S.E.2d 135, 138 (2002).  To prevail on 
those claims, he must satisfy both parts of a two-part test 
established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984).  First, Sigmon must show that his counsel's "performance 
was deficient," which means "counsel made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment."  Id.  Second, he must prove 
that counsel's "deficient performance prejudiced the defense," 
that is to say "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial."  Id. 
As explained in Strickland, a court is not required to 
determine "whether counsel's performance was deficient before 
examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of 
the alleged deficiencies."  Id. at 697.  Instead, a court can 
proceed directly to the prejudice prong of the two-part test 
"[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the 
13 
 
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice." Id.  We will do so in 
this case. 
Upon reviewing the record, including the transcript of 
Sigmon's trial and his counsel's affidavit, the Court concludes 
Sigmon has not demonstrated that "there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's [alleged] errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different."  Id. at 694.  
Sigmon failed to provide affidavits or other evidence to show 
what additional trial strategies and defenses were available if 
counsel had met with him more often and engaged in additional 
trial preparation; what additional investigation of the charges 
would have revealed; what testimony John Gilbert Huffman, Peggy 
Sue Vaughan and any other witnesses would have provided if 
counsel had interviewed and subpoenaed them to testify at trial; 
what factors informed his decision to have a bench trial and 
what additional information from his counsel would have prompted 
him to request a jury trial; what exculpatory evidence counsel 
should have introduced at trial; what further evidence and/or 
defenses could have been developed if counsel had requested a 
continuance of the trial; and how any miscommunication about 
whether he wished to change his plea affected the trial court's 
finding of guilt on the charges.  As the Director states in his 
motion to dismiss, Sigmon's claims are facially lacking under 
14 
 
the prejudice prong of the two-part test because Sigmon fails 
even to assert, much less demonstrate, that but for counsel's 
alleged errors, the result of his trial would have been 
different. 
Furthermore, Higginbotham's account of Sigmon's entering 
his house the second time without permission, taking the blank 
check out of the checkbook, and leaving with it is 
uncontradicted.  Sigmon admitted to these actions but claimed he 
took the check merely to get Higginbotham's telephone number.  
His counsel argued that the blank check had no value until it 
was signed and endorsed, that there was no evidence that Sigmon 
used the check in any manner, and that he lacked the intent to 
steal anything of value.  Sigmon has identified no alternative 
defense that counsel should have pursued at trial. 
In sum, Sigmon failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the 
two-part Stickland test.  Therefore, we will dismiss Sigmon's 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
Dismissed.