Title: Dawson v. Griffin
Citation: 249 Kan. 115, 816 P.2d 374
Docket Number: 65,527
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 1991

249 Kan. 115 (1991)
816 P.2d 374
JAY D. DAWSON, Appellant,
v.
CAROLE A. GRIFFIN, Defendant, and AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
No. 65,527

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 12, 1991.
Bernis G. Terry, of Olathe, argued the cause, and Richard L. Roberts, of Olathe, was with him on the briefs for appellant.
Kevin Bennett, of Wallace, Saunders, Austin, Brown and Enochs, Chartered, of Overland Park, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee American Family Mutual Insurance Company.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SIX, J.:
This is a summary judgment case flavored by a phantom truck driver motioning another motorist into a left turn through an intersection in Olathe, Kansas. The plaintiff's insurance carrier under the uninsured motorist provision of plaintiff's policy is the defendant/appellee.
The propriety of granting summary judgment to the insurance carrier is the issue for resolution.
Jay D. Dawson filed a personal injury action against Carole A. Griffin and American Family Mutual Insurance Company (American Family). Dawson named American Family as a defendant because Griffin claimed that a phantom truck driver motioned her to turn in front of Dawson, causing or contributing to his damages. Dawson settled with Griffin, who was dismissed from the lawsuit. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of American Family.
*116 We find no error and affirm.
Our jurisdiction arises under K.S.A. 20-3018(c). The appeal was transferred to this court from the Court of Appeals.
Facts
Dawson and American Family adopted the following facts:
(a) Failure to keep a proper look-out;
(c) Failure to warn.'
Summary Judgment
The trial court sustained American Family's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the only reasonable inference from the wave by the phantom truck driver to Griffin was, "Go ahead. I'll stay here." The trial court also concluded, as a matter of law, that the phantom truck driver did not owe a duty of care to Dawson.
A party seeking summary judgment bears a heavy burden. We have repeatedly stated the rules controlling summary judgment. A recent recitation is found in Hammig v. Ford, 246 Kan. 70, 72-73, 785 P.2d 977 (1990).
Dawson argues that Griffin's testimony, set forth in the trial court's findings at paragraph 8, establishes a genuine issue of fact *118 as to whether the phantom driver assumed and breached the duty to ascertain whether it was safe for Griffin to turn. Dawson asserts that: (1) Griffin's testimony indicates the phantom truck driver looked in his side and rearview mirrors; and (2) the phantom truck driver's hand motion was in the form of a demand; consequently, summary judgment is precluded.
American Family responds that the phantom truck driver's hand motion was simply a courteous act, that Griffin's misinterpretation of the trucker's motion, as a matter of law, should not be permitted to support a contention of the trucker's negligence, and that K.S.A. 8-1527 creates a duty to yield the right-of-way to oncoming vehicles when making a left turn which may not be delegated.
The Signaling Cases
Numerous cases have addressed the motor vehicle voluntary signal-response-accident scenario. See 90 Annot., A.L.R.2d 1431. Dawson relies upon the oft quoted phrase of Justice Cardozo: "It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all." Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 239, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) 23 A.L.R. 1425.
Courts that have recognized a duty have required the plaintiff to show that the signal was intended to mean it was safe to proceed rather than merely an intention to yield the right-of-way out of courtesy. In determining whether the signaling was intended to mean that it was safe to proceed, i.e., no other cars were approaching in the crossed lanes, courts have looked at the signaler's ability to ascertain whether it was safe to proceed. Kerfoot v. Waychoff, 501 So. 2d 588, 589 (Fla. 1987); Perret v. Webster, 498 So. 2d 283, 285 (La. App. 1986).
During oral argument, Dawson's counsel indicated his "best case" was Perret, 498 So. 2d  at 286. In Perret, the Louisiana Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict finding a signaling driver liable for injuries sustained by a third person (Perret) when the signaled driver heeded the signal and collided with Perret.
In Perret, the question of whether the signaling driver assumed a duty to determine if it was safe to proceed was allowed to go to the jury. There was a question of fact whether the signaling *119 driver was in a position to ascertain whether it was safe to proceed. A passenger in the bus provided independent testimony that the signaling bus driver looked in his side view mirror.
According to the passenger, who was seated behind the driver, the bus stopped for a few minutes at the corner of DeGaulle (the street the bus was on) before turning onto Sandra (the side street defendant Webster was on). While there, the bus driver signaled a "maroon colored car" (the Webster car) to go ahead. This act took a few minutes, however, because the driver did not immediately move forward and, consequently, Kennedy (the bus driver) made several more motions with his head and hand signaling Webster to proceed. Webster testified that the bus driver motioned Webster to continue across DeGaulle in order for the bus to turn to the right onto Sandra.
American Family relies primarily on Harris v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 132 Kan. 715, 297 Pac. 718 (1931); Kerfoot v. Waychoff, 501 So. 2d 588; Government Emp. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 351 So. 2d 809 (La. App. 1977); and Van Jura v. Row, 175 Ohio St. 41, 191 N.E.2d 536 (1963).
In Kerfoot, the Florida Supreme Court cited numerous "signal" cases and stated:
The Kerfoot court limited its holding to the facts presented: "Our holding in this case is limited to its circumstances and should not be broadly construed to hold that drivers who give gratuitous signals to other drivers cannot be guilty of negligence for causing an accident." 501 So. 2d  at 590.
In Harris, a 1931 opinion of this court, a pedestrian, Harris, was injured when she was struck by a streetcar at the intersection *120 of Twelfth and Walnut in Kansas City, Missouri. Walnut runs north and south, and Twelfth runs east and west. Double streetcar tracks were on both streets. She was on the southwest corner of Twelfth and Walnut and desired to cross to the north side of Twelfth. Several streetcars were standing on the south railway of Twelfth Street headed eastward. One of these cars was projected into Walnut. Behind this car, a second car was standing so that its front was in the sidewalk lane. A motorman on the second car nodded his head and beckoned Harris to cross. She started to cross, and passed in front of the second streetcar, behind the first. When she stepped beyond these two streetcars, she was struck by another streetcar headed west on the north track. Harris alleged the motorman was negligent by failing to warn her of the approaching westbound streetcar. The jury found for Harris. We reversed, stating:
Harris also relied on the negligence of the motorman in the westbound streetcar that struck her. We acknowledged the west-bound car's negligence but held Harris contributorily negligent as a matter of law, stating:
Government Emp. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 351 So. 2d 809, involved a fact situation similar to the case at bar. Thomas was stopped in the inside southbound lane of a four-lane street waiting for traffic to clear so that he might turn left onto an intersecting street. Decuir was stopped in the inside northbound lane of traffic on the four-lane street. The northbound inside lane was backed up due to a stoplight farther north. Decuir made room and signaled *121 Thomas to turn left. As Thomas did so, he was struck by a vehicle operated by Prejean proceeding in the outside northbound lane. Pejean's suit against Decuir was dismissed. On appeal, Prejean argued that Decuir was negligent in leading Thomas to believe it was safe to turn. With little analysis the Louisiana Court of Appeals disagreed, stating:
Kerfoot and Harris considered whether the signaler was in a position to ascertain if it was safe to proceed. Each decision noted that the signaler was not in a position to make this determination or, at least, in no better position than the person signaled.
The collision facts of Van Jura v. Row, 175 Ohio St. 41, are similar to the collision facts in the case at bar.
In Van Jura, Row was driving south on the inside lane of a five-lane street (two southbound lanes and three northbound lanes). Row intended to make a left turn across the three northbound lanes to go to a restaurant. The inside northbound lane was clear. The traffic in the center northbound lane was backed up to a stoplight farther north. The driver of a large truck stopped just south of where Row wanted to turn and motioned Row to proceed. The truck obstructed Row's ability to see the northbound outside (curb) lane. Row collided with Bires, who was northbound in the outside lane. The truck driver was not a party to the action and his identity was unknown. The jury was instructed that it could find the sole proximate cause of the accident to be the act of the truck driver who, having the right to proceed, nevertheless stopped and motioned a left turning motorist to pass in front of him. The jury found for the defendants. On appeal, this instruction was held to be erroneous. 175 Ohio St. at 43, 45.
The Ohio Supreme Court noted that this traffic situation occurs everyday. The court framed the issue as follows: "Can one who is waiting to make a left turn depend upon the action of another motorist and absolve himself from liability for injury committed upon a party, by showing that he was invited to proceed in his *122 left turn by such other motorist, who, at that time, had the right to proceed uninterruptedly in the direction in which he was headed?" 175 Ohio St. at 43. The Van Jura court quoted the following Ohio statute: "`No person shall turn a vehicle ... from a direct course upon a highway until such person has exercised due care to ascertain that the movement can be made with reasonable safety to other users of the highway....'" 175 Ohio St. at 44. The court held that the conduct required by the statute may not be delegated to another. 175 Ohio St. at 45.
American Family urges us to adopt the Van Jura rationale and cites K.S.A. 8-1527, which states:
American Family argues that K.S.A. 8-1527 creates a nondelegable duty on the driver to yield the right-of-way. Thus, Griffin's sole negligence caused Dawson's injuries. We agree that the duty imposed by K.S.A. 8-1527 cannot be delegated; however, Van Jura is not a persuasive precedent for a total resolution of the instant case. The signaling truck driver in Van Jura was not a party in the lawsuit. Van Jura, the plaintiff, was asserting no claim against the phantom truck driver. Row, the sole defendant, was attempting to absolve himself from all liability by delegating his offensive left turn to the unidentified nonparty truck driver.
In the case at bar, there was no verbal communication. In our view, any reliance on the alleged hand wave as a guaranty of safety, in the instant case, was unjustified as a matter of law. Perhaps the trucker meant one thing and Griffin assumed another. We will never know.
What we do know is this: Griffin had a nondelegable duty to yield to oncoming traffic while making a left turn; and the only reasonable and safe thing to assume from a hand wave is, "I won't hit you."
Other cases will present other facts and in a comparative negligence state, such as ours, each case will necessarily stand or fall on those unique facts. There may be a case where more can *123 be safely understood from a hand wave. This, however, is not such a case.
Affirmed.
ABBOTT, J., not participating.
TERRY L. BULLOCK, District Judge, assigned.[1]
[1]  REPORTER'S NOTE: Judge Bullock was appointed to hear case No. 65,527 vice Justice Abbott pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme Court by article 3, § 6(f) of the Kansas Constitution.