Title: In Re Bridges
Citation: 298 Or. 53, 688 P.2d 1335
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: October 9, 1984

688 P.2d 1335 (1984)
298 Or. 53
In re Complaint As to the Conduct of Wesley Scott BRIDGES, Accused.
SC S30853.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.[*]
Submitted on Record and Brief September 24, 1984.
Decided October 9, 1984.
Dean Heiling, Roseburg, filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar.
PER CURIAM.
In this attorney discipline case the accused is charged with violating DR 6-101(A)(1), (2) and (3), DR 7-101(A)(1), (2) and (3), DR 1-102(A)(4) and ORS 9.480(4).[1]
DR 6-101(A)(1), (2) and (3) provide:
DR 7-101(A)(1), (2) and (3) provide:
DR 1-102(A)(4) provides:
ORS 9.480(4) provided at that time:
The Oregon State Bar and the accused entered into a stipulated facts agreement. Pertinent parts of that agreement include the following portions of the complaint.
The Stipulated Facts also include the following:
The Trial Board made the following "Conclusions of Fact":
The Trial Board concluded that the accused was guilty of violation of DR 6-101(A)(1), (2) and (3), DR 7-101(A)(2) and DR 1-102(A)(4). The Trial Board observed that if DR 7-101(A)(3) requires specific intent the accused was not guilty of that violation, but if the Disciplinary Rule requires only reckless indifference he was guilty of the violation. The Trial Board also noted that DR 1-102(A)(4) is duplicative of ORS 9.480(4) and questioned whether it had the authority to invoke the statute. If it had the authority, the Board found the accused guilty of violating the statute also.
The Trial Board observed that "the accused has not offered one word in defense *1339 of his license to practice law. [This] is, to us, both incredible and perhaps symptomatic of his problem." The Board recommended a suspension from the practice of law for no less than six months, and also recommended that the requirements governing a suspended lawyer's conduct as set out in In re Kraus, 295 Or. 743, 751-53, 670 P.2d 1012 (1983), be imposed. The Board also suggested that the accused be required "to prove, in some suitable way, when he applies for reinstatement that he has undergone such education or other activities, during the suspension, as will effect a change in professional attitude and conduct."
The Disciplinary Review Board concurred in the conclusions of the Trial Board as to all the violations, but recommended a 60 day suspension because it thought the six months suspension "excessive under the circumstances and considering past sanctions for similar violations."
We first consider two points raised by the Trial Board's opinion. With regard to the required mental state for a violation of DR 7-101(A)(3), we said in In re Collier, 295 Or. 320, 328, 667 P.2d 481 (1983), that "`[i]ntentionally' is a material and key element of DR 7-101(A)(3)." We concluded that negligently prejudicing and damaging a client does not rise to the level required by the Disciplinary Rule. Likewise, we conclude here that reckless indifference is not sufficient to find a lawyer guilty of violating DR 7-101(A)(3). Therefore, we find that the accused did not violate DR 7-101(A)(3).
The Trial Board also posed the question whether it had jurisdiction to find a violation of ORS 9.480(4). Bar proceedings relating to discipline are within the inherent power of this court to control. ORS 9.529. In accordance with that statute the Trial Board and Disciplinary Review Board act as an arm of the court. Where a statute, as here, speaks specifically to the discipline of lawyers, the Trial Board and Disciplinary Review Board may consider whether there has been a violation of the statute. We agree with the Trial Board and the Disciplinary Review Board that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(4). We also find that the accused is guilty of wilful deceit and misconduct in violation of ORS 9.480(4).
We agree with the Trial Board and the Disciplinary Review Board that the accused violated DR 6-101(A)(1), (2) and (3) and DR 7-101(A)(2).
In determining the proper sanction in this case we disagree with the Trial Board and the Oregon State Bar that some significance should be placed on the fact that the accused did not defend himself. Many discipline cases proceed on the basis of stipulated facts. If lawyers knew this would penalize them before the Trial Board, the Disciplinary Review Board or this court, stipulated facts proceedings would rarely, if ever, occur. We agree with the Disciplinary Review Board that the appropriate sanction is a 60 day suspension from the practice of law.
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for 60 days beginning November 1, 1984. The Oregon State Bar is awarded its costs and disbursements.
[*]  Lent, J., did not participate in this decision.
[1]  ORS 9.480(4) is now ORS 9.527(4).