Title: Mundy v. Devon
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 174, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GEORGE S. MUNDY,  
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 174, 2005 
 
Petitioner Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below – Family Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   File No. CK01-03205 
MARY J. DEVON, 
 
 
§   Petition No. 03-39008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Respondent Below, 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  April 5, 2006 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:  April 6, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Family Court.  REMANDED with 
jurisdiction retained. 
 
 
Gerald I. H. Street, Esquire (argued) and Mitchell W. May, Esquire, 
Street & Ellis, P.A., Dover, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Michael W. Arrington, Esquire, Parkowski, Guerke & Swayze, P.A., 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Family Court involving 
a Petition for Modification of Custody.   George S. Mundy (the “Father”) 
and Mary Devon (the “Mother”) originally entered into a stipulation 
regarding the custody of their minor child, Casey Mundy (“Casey”), who 
was born on February 7, 1996.1  The parents agreed to share joint custody, 
with primary placement alternating annually on a school year basis.  The 
Father lives in Delaware and the Mother lives in Michigan.   
The Father petitioned the Family Court to modify the consent 
agreement and to reassign the primary placement of Casey to him only.2  
The Family Court carefully considered the Father’s petition in accordance 
with Title 13, section 722, of the Delaware Code, which provides: 
(a) 
The Court shall determine the legal custody and 
residential arrangements for a child in accordance with the best 
interests of the child.  In determining the best interests of the 
child, the Court shall consider all relevant factors including:  
(1) The wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his or 
her custody and residential arrangements;  
(2) The wishes of the child as to his or her custodian(s) 
and residential arrangements;  
(3) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with 
his or her parents, grandparents, siblings, persons cohabiting 
in the relationship of husband and wife with a parent of the 
                                          
 
1 The Court has assigned pseudonyms to the parties and their minor child pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule 7(d).   
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 729(b) (1999) (“[a]n order entered by the Court by consent of 
all parties, an interim order or a written agreement between the parties concerning the 
legal custody of a child or his or her residence may be modified at any time by the Court 
in accordance with the standards set forth in § 722 of this title.”) 
 
3
child, any other residents of the household or persons who 
may significantly affect the child's best interests; 
(4) The child's adjustment to his or her home, school and 
community;  
(5) The mental and physical health of all individuals 
involved;  
(6) Past and present compliance by both parents with 
their rights and responsibilities to their child under § 701 of 
this title;  
(7) Evidence of domestic violence as provided for in 
Chapter 7A of this title; and  
(8) The criminal history of any party or any other 
resident of the household including whether the criminal 
history contains pleas of guilty or no contest or a conviction 
of a criminal offense. 3 
 
The Family Court concluded that it would be in the best interests of the 
child, Casey, to continue alternating primary placement annually on a school 
year basis, in accordance with the existing consent order. 
 
The Father raises three arguments in this appeal.   First, he claims that 
the Family Court erred because it did not consider and apply six non-
statutory factors prior to ordering the continuation of what he characterizes 
as a “shared placement” arrangement.  Second, the Father contends that the 
Family Court erred when it described some of the expert testimony 
presented by the psychologists as speculative.  Finally, the Father argues that 
the Family Court should have considered a full spectrum of placement 
options and that the failure to do so was an error of law.   
                                          
 
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 722(a) (1999 & Supp. 2004). 
 
4
 
We have concluded that the Father’s final argument is meritorious.  
Therefore, the judgment of the Family Court must be reversed.  This matter 
will be remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.   
Standard of Review 
 
Appellate review of an appeal from a Family Court’s custody decision 
extends to both the facts and the law as well as to a review of the inferences 
and deductions made by the trial judge.4 To the extent the Family Court's 
decision implicates rulings of law, our review is de novo.5  Findings of fact 
will not be disturbed, unless they are found to be clearly erroneous and 
justice requires they be overturned.6  The judgment of the Family Court must 
be affirmed when the inferences and deductions upon which it is based are 
supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical 
deductive process.7 
Non-Statutory Factors Discretionary 
 
The Father’s first argument is that the Family Court failed to consider 
its own mandatory precedents, which require the consideration of six non-
statutory factors in determining whether a shared placement arrangement is 
appropriate in a joint custody decree.  Those factors are: 
                                          
 
4 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
5 In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995). 
6 Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983). 
7 Id. 
 
5
 (1) that the parents communicate effectively; (2) that the 
children need not make adjustments from one parent's home to 
the other's because the parents have a “uniform pattern of child 
rearing;” (3) that the parents are flexible; (4) that it would be 
beneficial for the children; (5) that the children are biologically 
and physically capable of making such a change; and (6) that 
there is uniformity in the children's education and religious 
upbringing.8 
 
Our review of the applicable statutes and the Family Court’s 
jurisprudence reflects that those six non-statutory factors are neither 
mandatory nor dispositive.  The six factors have been considered in joint 
custody cases by at least two Family Court judges when shared placement 
was at issue.  In each of those cases, however, the six “factors” were simply 
mentioned in a cursory manner, following a comprehensive substantive 
evaluation of the mandatory statutory factors set forth in section 722.9   
This Court recently addressed the Family Court’s need to consider the 
non-statutory factors set forth in the Model Relocation Act in deciding a 
custody and visitation proceeding.10  We held that a Family Court judge “has 
discretion to consider additional factors as long as it considers all of the 
                                          
 
8 In re Isabel P.D. and Henry A.D., 1996 WL 862344, *6 (Del. Fam. Ct. Dec. 20, 1996) 
(quoting Daniel S.C. v. Susan F.C., Del. Fam., File No. CN92-9125, Horgan, J. at 5 (May 
19, 1993)).   
9 See also, G.J.G. v. L.K.M., 2003 WL 22476209, *7 (Del. Fam. Ct. July 10, 2003); 
V.S.K. v. D.M.K., 2003 WL 22269175, *5 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 20, 2003); In re D.A.L. and 
M.S.L., 2002 WL 1940037, *6 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 31, 2002); M.G.T. v. J.W.T., 2000 WL 
1663701, *5 (Del. Fam. Ct. July 24, 2000); Diane M.P. v. Ronald E.P., 2000 WL 
1692944, *5 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan 28, 2000). 
10 Potter v. Branson, 2005 WL 1403823 (Del. June 13, 2005).   
 
6
statutory enumerated factors” mandated in section 722.11  The ratio 
decidendi of Potter is equally applicable to the six non-statutory factors cited 
by the Father in this case, when shared placement is at issue in a custody 
proceeding.   
 
The Father’s first challenge to the Family Court’s decision fails for 
two independent reasons.  First, because the six non-statutory factors were 
never presented to the Family Court at trial, that issue is waived on appeal in 
the absence of plain error.12  The record reflects no plain error because, in 
accordance with our holding in Potter, any consideration of those six non-
statutory factors would have been discretionary. 
Alternating Primary Placement 
 
Second, to the extent consideration of those six non-statutory factors 
is discretionary when shared placement is considered in making a joint 
custody award, the non-statutory factors were not applicable to the facts of 
this case.  Shared placement is generally an alternating weekly or monthly 
arrangement when the parents’ homes are in close proximity.  The stipulated 
arrangement in this case provided for joint custody with primary placement 
– not shared placement – alternating annually on a school-year basis, and 
where the parents’ homes are located in different states.     
                                          
 
11 Id. *2. 
12 Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
 
7
 
 
Alternating primary placement must be distinguished from shared 
placement.  Under primary placement arrangements, one parent is the 
primary residential custodian.  In a shared placement arrangement, the child 
resides with each parent on an alternating weekly, monthly or similar basis.13   
Most courts have concluded that it is generally not in a child’s best 
interests to be transferred between his or her parents on a short-term basis.14  
Some courts have declined to divide primary placement based on a finding 
that such a division is not in the child’s best interests.15  Other courts have 
concluded that the child is entitled to the love, advice, and training of both 
parents;16 and have awarded alternating or shared primary placement17 when 
such placement was found to be in the child’s best interests.18 
                                          
 
13 In re Strizic, 867 P.2d 386 (1994). 
14 See, e.g., Jarvis v. Jarvis, 584 N.W.2d 84, 92 (N.D. 1998).   
15 Lamelas v. Granados, 730 So. 2d 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1999); In re of 
Deem, 766 N.E.2d 661 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); In re Muell, 408 N.W.2d 774 (Iowa Ct. App. 
1987); In re Pergament, 559 P.2d 942 (Or. App. 1977); Albrecht v. Albrecht, 974 S.W.2d 
262 (Tex. App. 1998). 
16 Vinson v. Vinson, 83 So. 2d 215 (Ala. 1955); McDonald v. McDonald, 253 P.2d 249 
(Or. 1953); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 222 P.2d 400 (Wash. 1950). 
17 Wing v. Wing, 671 S.W.2d 204 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984); Watson v. Watson, 310 P.2d 554 
(Colo. 1957); Gerscovich v. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); 
Clark v. Madden, 725 N.E.2d 100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Palmer v. Palmer, 223 A.D.2d 
944 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121 (N.D. 1980); Hubbell v. 
Hubbell, 107 A.2d 388 (Pa. Super. 1954); Grant v. Grant, 286 S.W.2d 349 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1954); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 275 P.2d 421 (Wash. 1954). 
18 Sheldon v. Sheldon, 423 A.2d 943 (Me. 1980); In re Pobst, 957 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1997). 
 
8
 
Some custody decisions from other jurisdictions recognize a court’s 
authority to make an award alternating the child’s primary residence on an 
annual basis.  These cases also reflect, however, that such arrangements are 
unique and constitute an exception to the general preference for one 
continuous primary placement even when custody is joint.  Orders granting 
each parent primary placement in alternating years have been entered based 
on evidence that such placement would be in the child’s best interests or that 
the potential harm of a stable single primary placement arrangement 
outweighs the problems inherent in an alternating arrangement.19 
Expert Witness Testimony 
The Father’s second argument is that the Family Court disregarded the 
weight of the evidence when it concluded the psychologists’ testimony was 
speculative.  On appeal, the Father has the burden of demonstrating that the 
Family Court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous.20  He has not 
sustained that burden.   
It was the exclusive province of the trial judge, as the trier of fact, to 
assess the credibility of the witnesses and then to weigh all of the evidence 
presented.  The Family Court acknowledged that the psychologists identified 
                                          
 
19 In re Murphy, 834 P.2d 1287 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (disapproved of on other grounds 
by In re Wall, 868 P.2d 387 (Colo. 1994)); In re Riggert, 537 N.W.2d 789 (Iowa Ct. App. 
1995). 
20 See Boyer v. Poole, 2003 WL 141267 (Del. Jan. 17, 2003). 
 
9
some negative aspects of the Mother’s conduct.  Nevertheless, the Family 
Court pointed out several positive factors that counterbalanced the 
psychologists’ negative observations about the Mother.  The record does not 
support the Father’s assertion that the Family Court’s factual assessment of 
the psychologists’ expert testimony was clearly erroneous.   
Only Two Options Considered 
 
Finally, the Father contends that the Family Court erred in failing to 
consider the full panoply of placement alternatives available.  In this case, 
the Family Court was deciding a petition for a modification of custody filed 
by the Father that requested primary placement with him every school year.  
The record reflects that Casey preferred to have primary placement every 
school year with her Mother.  Although the Mother desired to have primary 
placement, she did not file a petition for primary placement and testified that 
continuing to alternate primary placement annually would enable Casey to 
establish a stronger relationship with her Father.  
Accordingly, the Family Court stated that it “was faced with the 
unenviable position of determining whether to continue the current 
[alternating] primary placement arrangement or to grant Father primary 
placement of the child.”  As between those two choices, the Family Court 
held that Casey’s best interests would be served by continuing the joint 
 
10
custody arrangement with primary placement being alternated annually on a 
school-year basis.  Therefore, the Father’s petition to modify custody was 
denied.    
Agreement and Remand 
The Father filed the petition for modification because he felt that 
alternating primary placement annually was not in Casey’s best interests.  
Although the Father seeks primary placement with him every year in 
Delaware, his position on appeal is that the Family Court erred by not 
considering all placement options.  His argument on appeal recognizes that, 
inter alia, primary placement with the Mother in Michigan is also an 
appropriate option for the Family Court to consider in evaluating Casey’s 
best interests.   
Since the Mother did not file a petition for primary placement, we 
directed the parties to file supplemental memoranda addressing the 
residential placement options that were available for consideration by the 
Family Court.  In those supplemental memoranda, both parties agree that the 
Family Court should have considered all residential placement options and 
then decided which arrangement was in Casey’s best interests.   
The record reflects that the parties did not make it clear to the Family 
Court that they agreed all options for residential placement were before it for 
 
11
consideration.  It also is unclear whether the Family Court did consider all 
options.  Therefore, this matter will be remanded to the Family Court to:  i) 
report whether it did consider all options; and ii) if it did not, to do so and 
report its conclusion as to what residential placement arrangement is in 
Casey’s best interests.21 
Conclusion 
 
This matter is remanded to the Family Court for further proceedings 
in accordance with this opinion.  Jurisdiction is retained.22  Within sixty 
days, the Family Court shall file a report in this Court setting forth its 
finding of facts and conclusions of law. 
 
                                          
 
21 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 722(a) (1999 & Supp. 2004). 
22 Supr. Ct. R. 19(c).