Title: Jerry Griffis v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC92-160
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 18, 2000

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC92160
____________
JERRY GRIFFIS,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[May 18, 2000]
SHAW, J.
We have for review Griffis v. State, 703 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997),
wherein the district court certified the following question:
Should the holding in State v. Gurican, 576 So. 2d 709
(Fla. 1991), be re-evaluated in light of Ortega-Rodriguez
v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 113 S. Ct. 1199, 122 L.
Ed. 2d 581 (1993)?
Griffis, 703 So. 2d at 523.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
We answer in the affirmative and quash Griffis.
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Griffis was charged in 1989 with committing multiple counts of sexual battery
and lascivious assault on a five-year old male in 1988.  Griffis absconded in 1990
following jury selection and was tried in absentia, and the jury found him guilty as
charged.  He subsequently was arrested in Virginia in 1996 and was returned to
Florida.  He was adjudicated guilty on June 5, 1996, and was sentenced to
concurrent life terms with twenty-five year minimum mandatory sentences.  The
district court dismissed his appeal on December 30, 1997, pursuant to State v.
Gurican, 576 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1991), wherein this Court held that "[the] appellate
courts of this state shall dismiss the appeal of a convicted defendant not yet
sentenced who flees the jurisdiction before filing a notice of appeal."  Id. at 712.
The State contends that Gurican was correctly decided and that the present
district court decision should be approved.  The State's position, while attractive at
first blush, is contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent.
The defendant in Gurican absconded after the jury returned its verdict but
before the court adjudicated her guilty.  She voluntarily returned to the jurisdiction
four years later, and the court adjudicated her guilty and sentenced her.  She
subsequently filed an appeal.  The district court denied the State's motion to dismiss
the appeal, and this Court quashed that decision, ruling as follows:
[W]here the convicted defendant escapes and fails to
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appear for sentencing, we advise trial courts to proceed in
absentia and render their final judgments adjudicating the
defendant guilty.  Thus, the thirty-day period for filing an
appeal will commence running unless it is tolled until the
court disposes of any authorized and timely post-trial
motion . . . .  If the defendant fails to return and timely file
an appeal of the conviction, the appellate court shall
dismiss any later appeal unless the defendant can establish
that the escape or failure to appear was legally justified.
Gurican, 576 So. 2d at 712.  Thus, under the analysis in Gurican, the line of
demarcation governing appellate dismissal is whether the trial has begun, for if a
defendant absconds after that point, the process is automatic:  The court will
proceed with the trial in absentia and render judgment, and the thirty day appeal
period will commence.
In the federal system, on the other hand, the traditional line of demarcation
governing appellate dismissal is more logical:  It is not whether the trial has begun,
but whether the appellate process has begun.  The United States Supreme Court in
Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 240 (1993), addressed the issue posed
in Gurican and reached a contrary result.  The Court in Ortega-Rodriguez noted
preliminarily that it is well-settled in the federal system that when a defendant
absconds after the appellate process has begun the appellate court may dismiss the
appeal.  This long-standing rule is based on several common-sense considerations: 
1  The United States Supreme Court explained:  (1) There is no point in continuing with
the appeal if the appellate judgment will be unenforceable, i.e., if the defendant will not be present
to submit to the judgment; (2) the dismissal rule promotes an orderly, efficient appellate process
by allowing the court to dispose of the matter promptly; (3) a defendant who flouts the appellate
process is not entitled to pursue an appeal; and (4) the dismissal rule deters escapes.  See Ortega-
Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 240-42.
2  See Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 244 ("A defendant returned to custody before he
invokes the appellate process presents no risk of unenforceability; he is within control of the
appellate court throughout the period of appeal and issuance of judgment."); id. at 245 (noting
that the court that is disrupted by a defendant's fugitivity during trial is the trial court, not the
appellate court); id. (explaining that a defendant's fugitivity during trial flouts the dignity and
authority of the trial court and thus disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of that
court, not the appellate court). 
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enforceability, efficiency, unentitlement, and deterrence.1  
Where the defendant absconds and returns before entering the appellate
process, on the other hand, the above considerations are attenuated:
[T]he justifications we have advanced for allowing
appellate courts to dismiss pending fugitive appeals all
assume some connection between a defendant's fugitive
status and the appellate process, sufficient to make an
appellate sanction a reasonable response.  These
justifications are necessarily attenuated when applied to a
case in which both flight and recapture occur while the
case is pending before the [trial] court, so that a
defendant's fugitive status at no time coincides with his
appeal.
Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 244 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
Specifically, the above rationales of enforceability, efficiency, and unentitlement are
not dispositive.2  The deterrence rationale, too, is inapplicable, for the trial court is
3  The Court explained why the deterrence rationale is inapplicable when the defendant
absconds before entering the appellate process:  
Finally, [the] deterrence rationale offers little support for the
[dismissal] rule.  Once jurisdiction has vested in the appellate court
. . . then any deterrent to escape must flow from the appellate
consequences, and dismissal may be an appropriate sanction by
which to deter.  Until that time, however, the [trial] court is quite
capable of defending its own jurisdiction.  While a case is pending
before the [trial] court, flight can be deterred with the threat of a
wide range of penalties available to the [trial] court judge.
Moreover, should this deterrent prove ineffective, and a
defendant flee while his case is before a [trial] court, the [trial]
court is well situated to impose an appropriate punishment.  While
an appellate court has access only to the blunderbuss of dismissal,
the [trial] court can tailor a more finely calibrated response.  Most
obviously, because flight is a separate offense punishable under the
[federal statutes], the [trial] court can impose a separate sentence
that adequately vindicates the public interest in deterring escape and
safeguards the dignity of the court. . . .
Indeed . . . punishment by appellate dismissal introduces an
element of arbitrariness and irrationality into sentencing for escape. 
Use of the dismissal sanction as, in practical effect, a second
punishment for a defendant's flight is almost certain to produce the
kind of disparity in sentencing that the . . . Sentencing Guidelines
were intended to eliminate. 
Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 247-48 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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equipped with a variety of sanctions that will deter this conduct.3
The Court in Ortega-Rodriguez concluded that, absent some detrimental
connection between the defendant's fugitive status and the appellate process,
dismissal of an appeal is generally improper where a defendant absconds and returns
prior to filing the appeal:
Accordingly, we conclude that while dismissal of
an appeal pending while the defendant is a fugitive may
4  The Court noted that at times the connection between the defendant's absconding and
the appellate process may be sufficiently detrimental to warrant dismissal of the appeal:
We do not ignore the possibility that some actions by a
defendant, though they occur while his case is before the [trial]
court, might have an impact on the appellate process sufficient to
warrant an appellate sanction.  For that reason, we do not hold that
a court of appeals is entirely without authority to dismiss an appeal
because of fugitive status predating the appeal.  For example . . . a
long escape, even if ended before sentencing and appeal, may so
delay the onset of appellate proceedings that the Government
would be prejudiced in locating witnesses and presenting evidence
at retrial after a successful appeal.  We recognize that this problem
might, in some instances, make dismissal an appropriate response.
Ortega-Rodriquez, 507 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted).
5  The Court explained as follows:
In short, when a defendant's flight and recapture occur
before appeal, the defendant's former fugitive status may well lack
the kind of connection to the appellate process that would justify an
appellate sanction of dismissal.  In such cases, fugitivity while a
case is pending before a [trial] court, like other contempts of court,
is best sanctioned by the [trial] court itself.
Id. at 251 (emphasis added).  
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serve substantial interests, the same interests do not
support a rule of dismissal for all appeals filed by former
fugitives, returned to custody before invocation of the
appellate system.  Absent some connection between a
defendant's fugitive status and his appeal as provided
when a defendant is at large during "the ongoing appellate
process," the justifications advanced for dismissal of
fugitives' pending appeals generally will not apply.
Id. at 249 (citation omitted).4  The offensive conduct is best sanctioned by the trial
court, not the appellate court.5  The Court remanded the case to the lower appellate
6  See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. ("District courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction to
hear appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right, from final judgments or orders of trial
courts . . . ."); Amendments to the Rules of Appellate Procedure, 685 So. 2d 773, 774 (Fla. 1996)
("[W]e construe the language of article V, section 4(b) as a constitutional protection of the right
to appeal.").  
7  See generally Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 962 (Fla. 1992) ("In any given state, the
[federal law] thus represents the floor for basic freedoms; the state constitution, the ceiling.").
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court to determine whether there was a sufficiently detrimental nexus between
Ortega-Rodriguez's fugitive status and his appeal to warrant appellate dismissal.
The question posed in the present case is whether this Court should recede
from Gurican in light of Ortega-Rodriguez.  We answer in the affirmative for several
reasons.  First, the Florida Constitution, unlike its federal counterpart, contains an
express right of appeal, 6 and logic dictates that this state constitutional right should
receive at least the same level of protection as the federal statutory right.7  Second,
Ortega-Rodriguez is not inconsistent with our established rules of procedure in
Florida.  And finally, as explained below, Ortega-Rodriguez comports with the
statutory scheme in Florida.
In the present case, the fact that Griffis absconded during trial several years
earlier is insufficient under Ortega-Rodriguez to warrant automatic dismissal of his
appeal.  Griffis absconded and returned prior to filing his notice of appeal, and the
offense thus was committed while he still was within the jurisdiction of the trial
court, not the appellate court.  Florida's trial courts have at their disposal a variety of
8  See § 944.40, Fla. Stat. (1997).
9  See § 843.15, Fla. Stat. (1997).
10  See §§ 38.22, 900.04 Fla. Stat. (1997).
11  See § 921.0011, Fla. Stat. (1997).
12  See § 921.0021, Fla. Stat. (1997).
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sanctions with which to punish this affront to their authority.  A defendant can be
charged with and prosecuted for (where appropriate) escape8 or failure to appear,9
or the court can hold the defendant in contempt10 or assess status points under the
sentencing guidelines11 or the Criminal Punishment Code.12  The trial court in the
present case thus had before it a number of options.
The district court, on the other hand, pursuant to the reasoning of Ortega-
Rodriguez, should have dismissed Griffis's appeal only if there had been an affront
to its authority--i.e., only if there was a sufficiently detrimental connection between
Griffis' fugitive status and the appellate process.  For instance, if it had been shown
by the State that during his fugitivity crucial evidence grew stale or key witnesses
became unavailable, then the State's burden at retrial (i.e., its obligation to establish
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt) would have been unduly prejudiced and the district
court could have dismissed the appeal.  Instead of making this determination, the
district court felt compelled under Gurican to summarily dismiss the appeal.
13  See, e.g., Bretti v. Wainwright, 225 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1969), language expunged, 255
So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1971).
14  Appellate dismissal should be imposed rarely, for an element of arbitrariness is injected
into the criminal justice system whenever the appellate safety net is withdrawn.  See Ortega-
Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 248 ("Indeed . . . punishment by appellate dismissal introduces an element
of arbitrariness and irrationality into sentencing for escape."); see also Estelle v. Dorrough, 420
U.S. 534, 544 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("If an escaped felon has been convicted in
violation of law, the loss of his right to appeal results in his serving a sentence that under law was
erroneously imposed.  If, on the other hand, his trial was free of reversible error, the loss of his
right to appeal results in no punishment at all.  And those whose appeals would have been
reversed if their appeals had not been dismissed serve totally disparate sentences, dependent not
upon the circumstances of their escape, but upon whatever sentences may have been meted out
under their invalid convictions.").
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In sum, it is well settled that when a defendant absconds after filing an
appeal, the appellate court has the authority to dismiss the appeal. 13  However,
where the defendant absconds and returns before filing an appeal, trial courts are
better suited to address the matter.  The latter misconduct is committed within the
jurisdiction of the trial court, and the Florida Legislature has armed that court with a
series of statutory sanctions (which does not include appellate dismissal).  The court
can fine-tune a response to fit the circumstances of each case.  The district court, on
the other hand, has only a single big gun in its arsenal--i.e., appellate dismissal--and
this court-made blunderbuss should be fired only when the defendant's misconduct
has unduly prejudiced the State.14
We cannot fault the district court for following our holding in Gurican, but we
now recede from that decision in light of Ortega-Rodriguez.  We answer the
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certified question in the affirmative, quash the district court decision below, and
remand this case so the district court can decide if Griffis' fugitivity has unduly
prejudiced the State.  
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, J., concurs in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified Great
Public Importance
First District - Case No. 1D96-2480 
(Alachua County)
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Paula S. Saunders, Assistant Public Defender,
Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau Chief,
Criminal Appeals, and Trina Kramer, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent