Title: Zimmerman v. First Nat. Bank of Birmingham
Citation: 348 So. 2d 1359
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 27, 1977

348 So. 2d 1359 (1977)
Bonnie Gale ZIMMERMAN, a minor, and Miles Raymond Zimmerman, Jr., a minor, et al.
v.
The FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BIRMINGHAM, as Trustee Under the Will of Hattie Lee Guess Matthews, Deceased.
The FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BIRMINGHAM, as Trustee Under the Will of Hattie Lee Guess Matthews, Deceased
v.
The FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BIRMINGHAM, as Executor Under the Will of Harriet Matthews Zimmerman, et al.
Bonnie Gale ZIMMERMAN, a minor, and Miles Raymond Zimmerman, Jr., a minor, et al.
v.
The FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BIRMINGHAM, as Trustee Under the Will of Hubert W. Matthews, Deceased.
The FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BIRMINGHAM, as Trustee Under the Will of Hubert W. Matthews, Deceased
v.
The FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BIRMINGHAM, as Executor Under the Will of Harriet Matthews Zimmerman, et al.
SC 1987, SC 1987-X, SC 1988, SC 1988-X.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 27, 1977.
*1361 Michael F. Bolin, Birmingham, for Unknown Heirs and/or Unknown Parties in Interest.
Frank Dominick, Birmingham, for FNB as Executor under Will of Harriet Matthews Zimmerman.
Johnathan E. Lyerly, W. A. Jenkins, Jr., Birmingham, for Miles Raymond Zimmerman, individually and as guardian for Bonnie Gale and Miles R. Zimmerman, Jr., minors.
Rodney E. Nolen, Birmingham, guardian ad litem for Bonnie Gale Zimmerman, a minor and Miles R. Zimmerman, Jr., a minor.
Erle Pettus, Jr., Birmingham, for appellee and cross appellant FNB, as Trustee under Wills of Hattie Lee Guess Matthews and Hubert W. Matthews, deceased.
Jack B. Porterfield, Jr., Birmingham, for Wm. Hutchins Cole, Jr. and Hubert Matthews Cole.
John T. Natter, Birmingham, guardian ad litem for Wm. Hutchins Cole, III and all yet unborn children of Wm. Hutchins Cole, Jr.
Walter L. Mims, Birmingham, for Harriet Lee Cole Wiltsie.
Harold D. Rice, Jr., Birmingham, for Donna Lee Wiltsie and George Arthur Wiltsie, Jr.
BLOODWORTH, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment in consolidated actions for the construction of the wills of Hubert W. Matthews ("Testator") and his wife Hattie Lee Guess Matthews ("Testatrix"). We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand.
There are three issues which we answer as follows:
I. Was the trial court correct in holding that ITEM THREE of each will does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities? Yes.
II. Was the trial court correct in holding that the term "my daughter's children" in each will does not include certain adopted children? No.
III. Was the trial court correct in assessing attorneys' fees for all parties against the trust estates of the Testator and the Testatrix? No.
The wills of the Testator and the Testatrix were executed in 1958. The Testator died on September 1, 1960, and the Testatrix died on January 5, 1966.
Both issues I and II, regarding the construction of the wills, arise from ITEM THREE, which in each will is substantially the same. The following is ITEM THREE of the Testatrix's will:
ITEM THREE of the Testator's will contains the bracketed language instead of "my husband Hubert W. Matthews," and it contains a provision for payment of the income of the trust to his wife during her lifetime and then to his daughter during her lifetime. Section (b) above is identical to section (c) in the will of the testator.
The Testatrix was survived by her only child, Harriet Matthews Cole Zimmerman, who died on December 13, 1972. Harriet was survived by three children of a prior marriage to William H. Cole and by two children of her marriage to Miles Raymond Zimmerman, to whom she was married at the time of her death.
William H. Cole, Jr., a natural child was 27 years old at the time of his mother's death. Harriet Lee Cole Wiltsie ("Lee") was adopted in 1948 and was 25 years old at the time of her mother's death. Hubert M. Cole, also a natural child, was 21 years old at the time of his mother's death.
Bonnie Gale Zimmerman was adopted on August 30, 1965, the final decree being entered on April 3, 1967, and was seven years old at the time of her mother's death. Miles R. Zimmerman, Jr., was adopted on April 27, 1966, the final decree being entered on January 29, 1968, and was six years old at the time of his mother's death.
Both testators were fully aware of the adoption of Lee and had, in fact, been instrumental in her adoption. Lee lived in the home of the testators from the date of her adoption until shortly before the death of the Testator. She was accepted as a grandchild by the testators and was treated in the same manner as the two natural grandchildren.
Mr. W. H. Sadler, who had prepared both wills in 1958, testified without contradiction that he was instructed by the Testator to establish a trust for Harriet's three children. Harriet's only children at that time were William, Jr., Hubert, and Lee. The Testator also directed Mr. Sadler as to the terms of the Testatrix's will.
The Testator died before the adoption or even the birth of either of the Zimmerman children. The Testatrix died before the final adoption decree was entered for Bonnie Gale and before Miles, Jr., was born. The adoption of Bonnie Gale was begun about six months before the death of the Testatrix, who had, however, been completely senile for a period of three to four years prior to her death. There is no evidence that she was ever fully aware of Bonnie Gale.
After the death of the daughter Harriet, the First National Bank of Birmingham, as Trustee under the will of Hubert W. Matthews and as Trustee under the will of Hattie Lee Guess Matthews, brought the present actions for declaratory judgments construing the wills.
The trial court rendered the following judgment, inter alia: (1) "The provisions of ITEM THREE of the subject wills are not violative of the Rule Against Perpetuities"; (2) "Harriet Lee Cole Wiltsie, the adopted daughter of Harriet Matthews (Cole) Zimmerman, is included in the term `my daughter's children' as used in ITEM THREE of the subject wills," but "Bonnie Gale Zimmerman *1363 and Miles Raymond Zimmerman, Jr., also the adopted children of Harriet Matthews Zimmerman, are not included in the term `my daughter's children' as used in Item Three of the subject wills;" and (3) attorneys' fees for attorneys representing all the parties to the two actions "shall be paid equally by the testamentary trusts created by Hubert W. Matthews and Hattie Lee Guess Matthews."
Appeals have been taken from the judgment by the Zimmerman children, by the First National Bank of Birmingham, as Executor under the will of Harriet Matthews Cole Zimmerman ("Executor"), by a representative of unknown heirs and parties, and by Miles Raymond Zimmerman, individually and as guardian for the Zimmerman children.
The First National Bank, as Trustee under the wills of the Testator and the Testatrix ("Trustee"), has appealed the order directing it to pay all attorneys' fees from the trust estates.
The trial court's rationale for its holding that ITEM THREE does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities is summarized in the following paragraph from the court's final decree:
As appellant on this issue, the Executor (under Harriet's will) relies primarily on the provision of ITEM THREE that if any child died leaving no bodily heirs his share would be divided equally among the surviving children and merged with and administered with the other property held for the survivors. The Executor argues that this provision indicates that the interests were not to vest until each child reached age 25 and age 35 and that consequently the interests might not vest within the Perpetuities period.
We hold that the gifts to "my daughter's children" in the wills of the Testator and the Testatrix do not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Unless the testator clearly expresses an intention to the contrary, remainders are construed as vesting at the earliest possible moment, generally the death of the testator. Springer v. Vickers, 259 Ala. 465, 66 So. 2d 740 (1953).
In the wills under consideration, there are certain provisions which might appear, at first blush, to indicate an intention to postpone vesting. We are thus confronted with the issues as to whether such an intention is expressed and, if it is, whether the time set for vesting is too remote.
The first provision which might appear to indicate an intention to postpone vesting is the clause which says, "If any of my daughter's children die before receiving his or her share . . . leaving no bodily heirs, said share shall in that event be divided equally among the surviving children
. . . ." [Italics supplied.] This clause does not, however, indicate a clear intention to postpone vesting. Thus, the following rule of construction applies:
Bergin &amp; Haskell, Preface to Estates in Land and Future Interests 75 (1966).
The clause under consideration here follows language which, as will be seen, would, if taken alone, be said to create a vested remainder. Thus, the clause is a condition subsequent, which may operate to divest the vested interest of any of the children should he or she not live long enough to receive his or her share. Id. at 74. See also Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 108 (4th ed. 1942). The interest created, we hold, is a vested interest subject to complete divestment, or total defeasance, and does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. Crawford v. Carlisle, 206 Ala. 379, 388, 89 So. 565 (1921); Simes &amp; Smith, The Law of Future Interests §§ 113, 1269 (2d ed. 1956).
A caveat is in order, however. Although the gift to "my daughter's children" is good because vested, the divesting provision and the executory gift over are, according to these authorities, bad because based upon a contingency which may occur too remotely. There is no occasion, however, to pass upon this issue because the divesting contingency has not occurred. Crawford v. Carlisle, supra.
The second provision which might appear to indicate an intention to postpone vesting is the clause which says, "At the time each of my daughter's children attains the age of twenty-five years my trustees shall pay one half of the share of the trust estate to said child and the remaining one half at the time said child attains the age of thirty-five years." This language does not, however, clearly indicate an intention on the part of the testators to postpone vesting until the times set, but merely indicates the times at which each child's share of the corpus is to be paid or distributed. The applicable rule of construction is that, if futurity is annexed to the substance of the gift, it is contingent, but if annexed to the time of payment, enjoyment, or delivery of possession, it is vested. Austin v. Pepperman, 278 Ala. 551, 562, 179 So. 2d 299 (1965); Crawford v. Carlisle, supra. Cf. Simes &amp; Smith, supra at § 586.
The final provision which might indicate an intention to postpone vesting is that which makes the gift a class gift to "my daughter's children." Because Harriet survived the testators, the size of the class was uncertain at the death of the testators. The rule of construction applicable to this provision is stated in Blue v. Davis, 273 Ala. 450, 452, 142 So. 2d 702, 704 (1962):
The interest thus created has been designated a vested remainder subject to open, or to partial divestment. Bergin &amp; Haskell, supra at 73; Gray, supra at § 110.1; Simes &amp; Smith, supra at §§ 114, 146. Nevertheless, the interest may not be said to be vested at the death of the testator for purposes of the Rule Against Perpetuities. As this Court said in Crawford v. Carlisle, supra, 206 Ala. at 386, 388, 89 So.  at 572-573, 574:
Although the remainder in this case did not, for purposes of the Rule Against Perpetuities, "vest" at the death of the testators, the size of the class was certain to be determined well within the time allowed by the Rule. The size of the class would be finally determined at the death of Harriet, the life tenant, because the class consisted of her children and obviously she could have no more children after her death. Consequently, the remainder would and did "vest," for purposes of the Rule, upon the death of Harriet. See Simes &amp; Smith, supra at § 640.
Therefore, we affirm the trial court's holding that the gift to "my daughter's children" does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities.
The trial court's holding that the Zimmerman children are not included in "my daughter's children" and that Lee Wiltsie is included is based on its analysis of relevant Alabama cases, from which it drew the following conclusion:
The Zimmerman children and those aligned with their interests, as appellants with respect to this aspect of the trial court's judgment, contend basically that Alabama case law concerning adopted children should be modified so that adopted children are treated exactly as natural children, unless a contrary intent clearly appears.
The modification urged by the appellants was effected, after this case was orally argued and submitted, in McCaleb v. Brown, 344 So. 2d 485 (Ala.1977), in which this Court held that an adopted child "is presumptively within the designation of the *1366 adopter's descendants unless the context or circumstances clearly establish a contrary intention." Since the term "descendants" includes children, we can see no reason for following a different rule with respect to the term "children." There being no indication of contrary intention on the part of the testators, we hold that the phrase "my daughter's children" in both wills includes adopted children.
The most cogent argument for reaching a different result is that the testators may have relied on our previous case law that the term "children" does not include adopted children. See Whitfield v. Matthews, 334 So. 2d 876, 878 (Ala.1976). This argument is vitiated in this case because there is testimony to the effect that the testators intended that the phrase "my daughter's children" include adopted children. When the wills were executed, one of the testators' daughter's children was, in fact, adopted. The wills spoke of Harriet's children in terms of "him or her," but Harriet's adopted child was her only female child then existing. Furthermore, Mr. Sadler testified that the Testator indicated to him that he intended for the adopted child Lee to be included in the class "my daughter's children." Since the testators obviously intended for one adopted child to be included in the class, they saw no need to mention specifically that the term "my daughter's children" was meant to include adopted children.
Even under our previous case law, Lee would probably have been included in the class "my daughter's children" without a specific mention in the will. But, surely any scrivener who had those previous cases in mind would not have left the inclusion of an adopted child to an event as unpredictable as a court's interpretation of the testator's intent. Apparently, the testators were not relying on our previous holdings that "children" does not include adopted children, but were using the term as it is commonly used to include all children, whether natural or adopted.
Therefore, we reverse the trial court's holding that the class "my daughter's children" does not include Bonnie Gale Zimmerman and Miles Raymond Zimmerman, Jr.
The trial court did not cite any authority for its order directing payment of all attorneys' fees out of the trust estates. All parties to the appeal of this order agree, however, that the principal issue is whether the court's action is authorized by Tit. 46, § 63, Code of Alabama 1940 (Recompiled 1958):
On its appeal of this order, the Trustee contends, and we here hold, that under Tit. 46, § 63, the trial court has the power to charge a trust with attorneys' fees for services rendered for the common benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust, but not for services rendered in opposition to the validity of the trust or for services rendered in behalf of individual interests only.
The appellees on the appeal of this order contend that Tit. 46, § 63, does not require that services be rendered for the common benefit, but authorizes payment of attorneys' fees for "any party in the suit or proceeding".
*1367 All parties agree that the trial court properly awarded attorneys' fees for guardians ad litem appointed under Rule 17(d), ARCP.
According to a well-established line of cases,
Penney v. Pritchard &amp; McCall, 255 Ala. 13, 17, 49 So. 2d 782, 784 (1950). Or, as stated in Pate v. Law, 277 Ala. 608, 612, 173 So. 2d 596 (1965),
In Troy Bank &amp; Trust Co. v. Brantley, 263 Ala. 428, 82 So. 2d 618 (1955), Justice Mayfield, with Justice Simpson concurring in his opinion, unsuccessfully attempted to overrule this line of cases. Although a majority of the Court concurred in the result reached by Justice Mayfield, a majority did not concur in his construction of Tit. 46, § 63. Moreover, this Court has, in subsequent opinions, adhered to the common-benefit rule. See, e. g., McCulloch v. Roberts, 292 Ala. 451, 296 So. 2d 163 (1974); Pate v. Law, supra.
We must reject the appellees' contention that services rendered in opposition to the validity of the trust or in behalf of individual interests were for the common benefit. The services rendered must be for the common benefit of all the beneficiaries. Farmers' Bank &amp; Trust Co. v. Borroughs, 217 Ala. 97, 99, 114 So. 909 (1927). Neither destroying the trusts nor increasing the number of beneficiaries can reasonably be regarded as benefitting all the beneficiaries. It is therefore that we reverse the trial court's judgment awarding fees to attorneys for all parties out of the trust estates.
In conclusion, we affirm the trial court's judgment holding that ITEM THREE of each will does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities, and, reverse and remand the judgment holding that the wills do not include certain adopted children and awarding attorney's fees to all parties. We remand for entry of a judgment in conformity herewith.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
TORBERT, C. J., and JONES, ALMON and EMBRY, JJ., concur.