Title: Roten v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 437, 2011
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 8, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BEN ROTEN,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 437, 2011 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0907011738 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: October 28, 2011 
Decided: November 8, 2011 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 8th day of November 2011, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Ben Roten, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s July 19, 2011 order denying his first motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.1  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
                                                 
1 Because this was Roten’s first postconviction motion, the Superior Court requested 
affidavits from Roten’s trial and appellate counsel pursuant to Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 61(g) (2).  Horne v. State, 887 A.2d 973, 975 (Del. 2005). 
 
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Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.2  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in January 2010, Roten was 
found guilty by a Superior Court jury of Assault in a Detention Facility for 
throwing a bucket of boiling water on a fellow inmate and beating him with 
a broom handle.  The Superior Court admitted into evidence a letter written 
by Roten to his girlfriend, which admitted to the crime.  The Superior Court 
sentenced Roten as a habitual offender to 25 years at Level V incarceration, 
to be followed by 6 months of Level IV Work Release.  This Court affirmed 
Roten’s conviction on direct appeal.3 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Roten makes a number of claims that may fairly 
be summarized as follows: the Superior Court erred when it denied his 
postconviction motion because a) his constitutional rights were violated 
when the Department of Correction seized and read the letter he wrote to his 
girlfriend; b) it was improper for the Superior Court to admit the letter into 
evidence at trial and to refuse to permit the jury to be informed that the 
injured inmate was in prison on a rape conviction; and c) his trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance because he did not object to the admission of 
the letter into evidence and did not object to the Superior Court’s refusal to 
                                                 
2 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
3 Roten v. State, Del. Supr., No. 108, 2010, Berger, J. (Oct. 4, 2010).  
 
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permit the jury to be informed that the injured inmate was in prison on a rape 
conviction. 
 
(4) 
The Superior Court must first determine if the defendant has 
satisfied the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before reaching the 
substantive merits of any motion for postconviction relief.4  In this case, the 
Superior Court properly determined that Roten’s first four claims were 
procedurally barred under Rule 61(i) (3) because he had failed to raise them 
in his direct appeal and, moreover, had failed to show cause for relief from 
the procedural default and prejudice from a violation of his rights.5  
 
(5) 
To the extent that Roten attempts to overcome the procedural 
bar by demonstrating a colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice because of 
a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, 
reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to his conviction,6 
that attempt is unavailing.  This Court has ruled that prison officials may 
undertake reasonable inspections of outgoing prisoner mail in the interest of 
promoting prison security and that a prisoner does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in mail sent outside the prison.7  Moreover, because 
rape is not a crime of dishonesty or false statement, the nature of the injured 
                                                 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3) (A) and (B). 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5). 
7 Johnson v. State, 983 A.2d 904, 917-19 (Del. 2009). 
 
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inmate’s conviction was not admissible to impeach his credibility.8  There 
was no violation of Roten’s rights as a result of the rulings made at his trial 
and the Superior Court properly so concluded. 
 
(6) 
Roten’s final claim is that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance.  In order to prevail on that claim, Roten must demonstrate that his 
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
and that, but for his counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that 
the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.9  As the record 
reflects, Roten’s allegation that his counsel failed to object to the 
admissibility of the letter is incorrect.  Counsel argued both that the letter 
was inadmissible on the grounds of foundation and authenticity and that the 
injured inmate’s rape conviction should be admitted into evidence.  Both 
arguments were properly rejected by the Superior Court.  There was no error 
on the part of Roten’s trial counsel and the Superior Court properly so 
concluded.10 
 
(7) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
                                                 
8 Del. R. Evid. 609(a). 
9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
10 Roten’s claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective will not be addressed, since it 
was not presented to the Superior Court in the first instance.  Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
 
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settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice