Title: New Jersey in the Interest of C.K.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: April 24, 2018

New Jersey in the Interest of C.K. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In New Jersey, juveniles adjudicated delinquent of certain sex offenses were barred for life from seeking relief from the registration and community notification provisions of Megan’s Law. That categorical lifetime bar cannot be lifted, even when the juvenile becomes an adult and poses no public safety risk, is fully rehabilitated, and is a fully productive member of society. Defendant C.K. was adjudicated delinquent for sex offenses committed more than two decades ago and challenged the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g)’s permanent lifetime registration and notification requirements as applied to juveniles. After review of the specific facts of this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded subsection (g)’s lifetime registration and notification requirements as applied to juveniles violated the substantive due process guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. “Permanently barring juveniles who have committed certain sex offenses from petitioning for relief from the Megan’s Law requirements bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective.” The Court determined that in the absence of subsection (g), N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) provided the original safeguard incorporated into Megan’s Law, and a criminal defendant may petition to be released from registration and notification requirements when a superior court judge is persuaded the defendant has been offense-free and does not likely pose a societal risk after a fifteen-year look-back period. Defendant may apply for termination from the Megan’s Law requirements fifteen years from the date of his juvenile adjudication, and be relieved of those requirements provided he meets the standards set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f). Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State of New Jersey in the Interest of C.K. (A-15-16) (077672)Argued September 25, 2017 -- Decided April 24, 2018ALBIN, J., writing for the Court. Subsection (f) of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 subjects all sex offenders, including juveniles, to presumptive lifetime registration and notification requirements but allows a registrant to seek relief from those requirements fifteen years after his juvenile adjudication, provided he has been offense-free and is “not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.” Subsection (g) imposes an irrebuttable presumption that juveniles adjudicated delinquent of certain sex offenses, such as defendant C.K., are irredeemable, even when they no longer pose a public safety risk and are fully rehabilitated. In this case, the Court addresses the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) as applied to juveniles. When C.K. was approximately fifteen years old, he began sexually assaulting his younger adopted brother, A.K., who was then seven years old. After A.K. turned sixteen, he disclosed his older brother’s abuse. The State charged C.K. with aggravated sexual assault. At the time of the charge, C.K. was twenty-three years old. In his plea colloquy, C.K. admitted that when he was between the ages of fifteen and seventeen, he performed oral sex on his younger brother. In 2003, C.K. was sentenced to a three-year probationary term, conditioned on his attending sex-offender treatment and having no contact with his brother unless recommended by a therapist. The court also ordered C.K. to comply with the Megan’s Law requirements, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11, -19, and barred him from working with children without the court’s permission. The State classified C.K. as a Tier One offender—the lowest risk category for re-offense. C.K. received an undergraduate degree in psychology and a master’s degree in counseling. At the time of his arrest, C.K. was a teacher’s assistant for children with autism. After his juvenile adjudication, C.K. stopped working with children. By age thirty-three, C.K. had worked for many years at a nonprofit agency that provides adults suffering from mental illness a range of services. C.K. has turned down opportunities for advancement from fear that a background check might “out” his status as a Megan’s Law registrant. It has now been more than twenty years since C.K. engaged in any unlawful conduct and more than fourteen years since his juvenile adjudication. C.K. filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) petition challenging the constitutionality of his Megan’s Law requirements. A second PCR court held an evidentiary hearing. C.K. presented five expert witnesses who testified about the current body of research on juvenile sex offender recidivism. The evidentiary hearing also focused on the experts’ individualized risk assessments of C.K., now thirty-eight years old, and on the negative impact the registration requirements continue to have on his ability to lead a normal life. The PCR court found the “evidence presented by [C.K.’s] psychologists [to be] credible and persuasive” and noted that “[t]he State did not present any evidence to the contrary.” The PCR court concluded, however, that any loosening of the strictures of Megan’s Law must come from the Supreme Court of New Jersey in assessing the constitutionality of the registration scheme as applied to juveniles or from the Legislature, which has the paramount role in forging public policy. A panel of the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of C.K.’s second PCR petition. The Court granted C.K.’s petition for certification “limited to the issue of the constitutionality of imposing the lifetime registration requirements of Megan’s Law on juvenile offenders.” 228 N.J. 238 (2016).HELD: N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles adjudicated delinquent as sex offenders. In the absence of subsection (g), N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) provides the original safeguard incorporated into Megan’s Law: no juvenile adjudicated delinquent will be released from his registration and notification requirements unless a Superior Court judge is persuaded that he has been offense-free and does not likely pose a societal risk after a fifteen-year look- back period. 1 1. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) is part of the registration and community notification provisions of Megan’s Law. The requirements imposed by N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) are categorical. A juvenile, fourteen years or older, who has committed an enumerated sex offense, or multiple sex offenses, under subsection (g) cannot seek relief ever from those requirements. Subsection (g) was not part of the original legislative scheme that became Megan’s Law in 1994. The Legislature enacted subsection (g) in 2002 with the intended purpose of conforming our State registration and notification scheme to federal law. In 2006, Congress passed a new law, under which C.K. would be classified as a Tier III offender. Unlike N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g), that law has no permanent lifetime registration provision for juveniles. 34 U.S.C. § 20915(a)(3) to (b). (pp. 18-25)2. Before the passage of subsection (g) of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 in 2002, subsection (f) governed the termination of registration requirements for all adult and juvenile sex offenders. Subsection (f) was part of the original Megan’s Law registration and notification requirements, which the Court declared constitutional in Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 12 (1995). In In re Registrant J.G., 169 N.J. 304 (2001), the Court held that for juveniles under the age of fourteen the “registration and community notification orders shall terminate at age eighteen,” provided the juvenile can establish in the Law Division by “clear and convincing evidence that [he] is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.” Id. at 337. Neither Doe nor J.G. addressed whether permanent lifetime registration and notification requirements imposed on a juvenile would violate our State Constitution. (pp. 25-30)3. Laws and jurisprudence recognize that juveniles are different from adults. The United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional legal regimes that imposed capital punishment on juvenile offenders, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 568-70 (2005); life without parole on juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 , 82 (2010); and mandatory life without parole on juveniles convicted of homicide offenses, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 489 (2012). The Court grounded its decisions on scientific and sociological notions. In the wake of Roper, Graham, and Miller, this Court held in State v. Zuber that sentencing judges must consider “the mitigating qualities of youth” and “exercise a heightened level of care before they impose multiple consecutive sentences on juveniles which would result in lengthy jail terms.” 227 N.J. 422, 429-30 (2017). In In re C.P., the Ohio Supreme Court declared an Ohio statute that subjected certain juvenile offenders to automatic and mandatory lifetime sex-offender registration requirements—with the potential for reclassification after twenty-five years—violative of the Federal and Ohio Constitutions. 967 N.E.2d 729, 732, 737 (Ohio 2012). Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that a statute imposing lifetime registration requirements on sexually violent juvenile offenders violated its state constitution. In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 2, 10, 14-16 (Pa. 2014). (pp. 31-39)4. Since the passage of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) in 2002, scientific and sociological studies have shined new light on adolescent brain development and on the recidivism rates of juvenile sex offenders compared to adult offenders. Our commonsense and historical understanding that children are different from adults is enshrined in our juvenile justice system and fortified by recent United States Supreme Court decisions and Zuber, which embraced those studies that found that juveniles do not possess immutable psychological or behavioral characteristics. That body of jurisprudence and the evidentiary record in this case tell us that adolescents are works in progress and that age tempers the impetuosity, immaturity, and shortsightedness of youth. They tell us that, generally, juvenile sex offenders are less likely to reoffend than adult sex offenders and that the likelihood of recidivism is particularly low for those who have not reoffended for a long period of time. Subsection (g), as applied to juveniles, no longer bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose and arbitrarily denies those individuals their right to liberty and enjoyment of happiness guaranteed by Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. C.K.’s case in many ways exemplifies why. Solely because of the nature of the offense he committed as a juvenile, C.K. is presumed under subsection (g) to be a permanent, lifetime risk to the safety of the public. That irrebuttable presumption is not supported by scientific or sociological studies, our jurisprudence, or the record in this case. (pp. 39-46)5. Under subsection (f) of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2, fifteen years from the date of his juvenile adjudication, C.K. will be eligible to seek the lifting of his registration requirements. At that time, he must be given the opportunity to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he has not reoffended and no longer poses a threat to others and therefore has a right to be relieved of his Megan’s Law obligations and his status as a registrant. (pp. 46-47) CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 15 September Term 2016 077672STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF C.K. Argued September 25, 2017 – Decided April 24, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. James H. Maynard argued the cause for appellant C.K. (Maynard & Sumner, attorneys; James H. Maynard, on the briefs). Elizabeth R. Rebein, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney; Elizabeth R. Rebein, of counsel and on the briefs). Fletcher C. Duddy, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Office of the Public Defender (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Fletcher C. Duddy, on the letter brief). Laura A. Cohen argued the cause for amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, the Advocates for Children of New Jersey, and the Northeast Juvenile Defender Center (Rutgers University School of Law – Newark Criminal and Youth Justice Clinic and Constitutional Litigation Clinic, attorneys; Rebecca J. Livengood, on the brief). Louise T. Lester, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; 1 Louise T. Lester, of counsel and on the brief). Karen U. Lindell submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Juvenile Law Center (Juvenile Law Center, attorneys; Karen U. Lindell, and Marsha L. Levick, of the Pennsylvania bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the brief). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. Juveniles adjudicated delinquent of certain sex offensesare barred for life from seeking relief from the registrationand community notification provisions of Megan’s Law. N.J.S.A.2C:7-1 to -11, -19; N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g). That categoricallifetime bar cannot be lifted, even when the juvenile becomes anadult and poses no public safety risk, is fully rehabilitated,and is a fully productive member of society. Defendant C.K. wasadjudicated delinquent for sex offenses committed more than twodecades ago and now challenges the constitutionality of N.J.S.A.2C:7-2(g)’s permanent lifetime registration and notificationrequirements as applied to juveniles. Subsection (f) of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 subjects all sexoffenders, including juveniles, to presumptive lifetimeregistration and notification requirements. Unlike subsection(g), however, subsection (f) allows a registrant to seek relieffrom those requirements fifteen years after his juvenileadjudication, provided he has been offense-free and is “notlikely to pose a threat to the safety of others.” Subsection 2 (g) imposes an irrebuttable presumption that juveniles, such asdefendant, are irredeemable, even when they no longer pose apublic safety risk and are fully rehabilitated. The record in this case reveals what is commonly knownabout juveniles -- that their emotional, mental, and judgmentalcapacities are still developing and that their immaturity makesthem more susceptible to act impulsively and rashly withoutconsideration of the long-term consequences of their conduct.See State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017). The record alsosupports the conclusion that juveniles adjudicated delinquent ofcommitting sex offenses, such as C.K., who have been offense-free for many years and assessed not likely to reoffend, poselittle risk to the public. Indeed, categorical lifetimenotification and registration requirements may impede ajuvenile’s rehabilitative efforts and stunt his ability tobecome a healthy and integrated adult member of society. We conclude that subsection (g)’s lifetime registration andnotification requirements as applied to juveniles violate thesubstantive due process guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 1 ofthe New Jersey Constitution. Permanently barring juveniles whohave committed certain sex offenses from petitioning for relieffrom the Megan’s Law requirements bears no rational relationshipto a legitimate governmental objective. In the absence ofsubsection (g), N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) provides the original 3 safeguard incorporated into Megan’s Law: no juvenileadjudicated delinquent will be released from his registrationand notification requirements unless a Superior Court judge ispersuaded that he has been offense-free and does not likely posea societal risk after a fifteen-year look-back period. Defendant may apply for termination from the Megan’s Lawrequirements fifteen years from the date of his juvenileadjudication, and be relieved of those requirements provided hemeets the standards set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f). I. A. We begin with the juvenile offenses that triggered theregistration and notification requirements in this case. WhenC.K. was approximately fifteen years old, he began sexuallyassaulting his younger adopted brother, A.K., who was then sevenyears old. After A.K. turned sixteen, he disclosed his olderbrother’s abuse to his priest and then to the police. The State charged C.K. with committing, while he was ajuvenile, the offense of aggravated sexual assault against hisadopted brother. At the time of the charge, C.K. was twenty-three years old. The State moved to waive C.K. to the Criminal Part, LawDivision, for trial as an adult. The State withdrew its waivermotion after C.K. agreed to plead guilty to the aggravated 4 sexual assault charge in juvenile court. In his plea colloquy,C.K. admitted that when he was between the ages of fifteen andseventeen, he performed oral sex on his younger brother. In2003, C.K. was sentenced to a three-year probationary term,conditioned on his attending sex-offender treatment and havingno contact with his brother unless recommended by a therapist.The court also ordered C.K. to comply with the Megan’s Lawrequirements and barred him from working with children withoutthe court’s permission. The State classified C.K. as a Tier One offender -- thelowest risk category for re-offense. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(1).As a Tier One offender, C.K. is required to register annuallywith the law enforcement agency in the municipality where heresides. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2; Attorney General Guidelines forLaw Enforcement for the Implementation of Sex OffenderRegistration and Community Notification Laws 9 (rev’d Feb. 2007)[hereinafter Attorney General Guidelines]. In the years after turning eighteen, C.K. received anundergraduate degree in psychology from Catholic University anda master’s degree in counseling from Montclair State University.At the time of his arrest, C.K. was a teacher’s assistant forchildren with autism. After his juvenile adjudication, C.K.stopped working with children. By age thirty-three, C.K. hadworked for many years at a nonprofit agency that provides adults 5 suffering from mental illness a range of services, such assecuring psychiatric treatment and affordable housing. C.K. hasturned down opportunities for professional advancement from fearthat a background check might “out” his status as a Megan’s Lawregistrant. It has now been more than twenty years since C.K.engaged in any unlawful conduct and more than fourteen yearssince his juvenile adjudication. B. In 2008, five years after his juvenile adjudication, C.K.filed his first petition for post-conviction relief (PCR),seeking, among other things, a judicial declaration that theMegan’s Law lifetime registration and notification requirementsviolated his constitutional rights. The PCR court denied thepetition in its entirety. The Appellate Division affirmed thedenial of C.K.’s petition, suggesting that an evidentiary recordwould be necessary to support his constitutional arguments. In November 2012, C.K. filed his second PCR petition,alleging that his earlier PCR counsel provided ineffectiveassistance by failing to properly challenge theconstitutionality of his Megan’s Law requirements. The secondPCR court held an evidentiary hearing. C.K. presented fiveexpert witnesses who testified about the current body ofresearch on juvenile sex offender recidivism. C.K. also offeredpsychological assessments about his mental, emotional, and 6 career development during his adult life. The State cross-examined C.K.’s witnesses but offered no rebuttal testimony orexpert reports. The following summarizes the record before us. 1 At the evidentiary hearing, C.K. called Dr. Jackson TayBosley, Dr. Sean Hiscox, Dr. Robert Prentky, and Dr. JamesReynolds, clinical psychologists with expertise in the treatmentand rehabilitation of both juvenile and adult sex offenders.Dr. Hiscox was additionally qualified as an expert in the riskassessment of adult and juvenile offenders. Nicole Pittman,Esq., testified about the effects of placing juvenile offenderson registries based on her nationwide research on the subject. All of the expert witnesses asserted that juvenile sexoffenders are more amenable to rehabilitation and less likely toreoffend than adult sex offenders. They stressed that juvenileoffenders, because of their lack of maturity and delayed social1 Notification of the constitutional challenge was provided to the Attorney General’s Office, which declined to participate in the PCR proceeding. At oral argument before this Court, neither the Bergen County Prosecutor, appearing for the State, nor the Attorney General, appearing as amicus curiae, identified any additional evidence that contradicted the testimony presented at the PCR hearing. We gave the Attorney General’s Office an additional opportunity to “bring to the Court’s attention expert evidence that is contrary to the expert testimony presented to the PCR court with respect to the application of N.J.S.A. 2C:7- 2(g) with respect to juveniles.” The Attorney General’s Office responded with a proffer of the expert testimony it would “potentially” offer. The information was too speculative and therefore not helpful to the Court. 7 and emotional development, are fundamentally different fromadult offenders. The experts pointed to multiple studies confirming thatjuveniles who commit sex offenses are more likely to actimpulsively and be motivated by sexual curiosity, in contrast toadult sex offenders who are commonly aroused by deviant sexualbehavior or engage in predatory or psychopathic conduct. SeeElizabeth J. Letourneau & Michael H. Miner, Juvenile SexOffenders: A Case Against the Legal and Clinical Status Quo, 17Sexual Abuse: J. Res. & Treatment 293, 297-99 (2005); HumanRights Watch, Raised on the Registry: The Irreparable Harm ofPlacing Children on Sex Offender Registries in the US 27-29(2013) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Raised on the Registry].Dr. Hiscox explained that “adolescent sex offense recidivismrates are relatively low” when compared “with higher sex offenserecidivism rates of individuals who commit sex offenses asadults.” Dr. Bosley and other experts also noted that previousassumptions about high rates of juvenile sex offender recidivismas adults are inaccurate. One recent study -- cited by all five expert witnesses --analyzed sixty-three data sets with information about more than11,200 juvenile sex offenders. The study averaged the datasets, some of which followed juvenile sex offenders for lessthan five years and others for more than five years, and 8 concluded that the overall juvenile sex re-offense rate wasseven percent. Michael F. Caldwell, Study Characteristics andRecidivism Base Rates in Juvenile Sex Offender Recidivism, 54Int’l J. Offender Therapy & Comp. Criminology 197, 201-03(2010). According to a report of psychologist Dr. Philip Witt, therecidivism rate for those falling into C.K.’s risk assessmentcategory is 1.1% over a two-year period and 2.0% over a four-year period. In that report, he indicated that “a siblingincest offender whose offense [was] in his early to mid-teenshas little bearing on his risk” many years later. None of the risk assessment statistics accounted for ajuvenile sex offender who had been offense-free for a period offifteen or more years since his adjudication. The experts,however, explained that juvenile sex offenders who commitsubsequent sex offenses generally do so within the first fewyears following their last offense. See, e.g., James R. Worlinget al., 20-Year Prospective Follow-Up Study of SpecializedTreatment for Adolescents Who Offended Sexually, 28 Behav. Sci.& L. 54 (2010) (“[M]ost sexual and nonsexual recidivism occursin the first few years after adolescents are initiallyassessed.”). According to Dr. Hiscox, the longer a juvenileturned adult remains offense-free in the community, the lowerthe risk that he will re-offend. 9 The experts generally agreed that the best way to assess anoffender’s risk of recidivism is with individualizedassessments. As Dr. Prentky explained, “Risk is not fixed, andit certainly can’t be adequately captured by one single event inthe life of . . . an adolescent who is constantly changing.” Ms. Pittman observed that categorical lifetime registrationrequirements based on an aggravated sex offense convictiondisproportionately impact juveniles. That is so becausejuveniles commonly commit sex offenses against their peers orsomewhat younger children. 2 See Human Rights Watch, Raised onthe Registry at 25 (“[R]ecent laws . . . reserve the harshestpunishments for those who target children without seeming toappreciate that child offenders, whose crimes almost alwaysinvolve other kids, are particularly likely to be subjected tothese harsher penalties.”). Last, according to the experts, studies reveal thatregistration policies do not necessarily reduce recidivism amongjuvenile sex offenders. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Letourneau etal., The Influence of Sex Offender Registration on Juvenile2 Under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1), an adult or juvenile is guilty of aggravated sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual penetration with a person who is less than thirteen years old. Therefore, a thirteen-year old who sexually penetrates a person under the age of thirteen, pursuant to that statute, is guilty of aggravated sexual assault as a juvenile. 10 Sexual Recidivism, 20 Crim. Just. Pol’y Rev. 136, 138, 143(2009) (finding no significant difference in recidivism ratesbetween registered and nonregistered juvenile male sex offendersover a nine-year period). Correspondingly, Ms. Pittmanexpressed her concern that inflexible lifetime registrationrequirements imposed on juveniles impede their rehabilitationand their quest for normal and productive lives in welcomingcommunities. C. The evidentiary hearing also focused on the experts’individualized risk assessments of C.K., now thirty-eight yearsold, and on the negative impact the registration requirementscontinue to have on his ability to lead a normal life. C.K. participated in several psychological assessments,including two with Dr. Witt. In his 2003 assessment, madeshortly after C.K.’s arrest, Dr. Witt did not find anyindication that “[C.K.’s] sexual behavior with his brother waspart of a broader pattern of illegal sexual behavior.” Heconsidered C.K. “a low risk.” In 2009, Dr. Witt reevaluated C.K., then twenty-nine yearsold, and observed that C.K. was “an adult with a productive,appropriate lifestyle and healthy sexual adjustment” whopresented a low risk to reoffend. Dr. Witt noted that the “riskassessment is really just a reflection of commonsense: When an 11 individual’s risk is relatively low to begin with and theindividual has had a stable, offense-free lifestyle for manyyears, his current risk is minimal.” At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Hiscox testified thatC.K.’s 2013 psychological evaluation was “completely consistentwith Dr. Witt’s two risk assessments.” Dr. Hiscox furtherobserved that C.K. had “gone 16 to 20 years in the communitywithout a new sexual or non-sexual offense” and the research wasclear: “the longer an individual goes without committing a newsex offense while at liberty in the community, the lower hisrisk of reoffending.” That same year, in interviews with Ms. Pittman, C.K.expressed his feelings of isolation, anxiety, and depressionresulting from his Megan’s Law status. He also disclosed hissense of hopelessness, and his fear that his registrant statuswill interfere with his ability to one day be a normal parentwho can attend his children’s sports games and schoolconferences. II. A. The PCR court found the “evidence presented by [C.K.’s]psychologists [to be] credible and persuasive” and noted that“[t]he State did not present any evidence to the contrary.” ThePCR court summarized some of the opinions reached by C.K.’s 12 experts: (1) “[y]outh sex offenders differ from adult sexoffenders” and “are more amenable to sex offender specifictreatment”; (2) “the adolescent brain is not fully mature”; (3)an individualized risk-based assessment of a juvenile sexoffender “adequately protects the public from recidivist sexoffenders”; (4) a categorical offense-based bar unnecessarilyprecludes low-risk juvenile offenders who pose no threat to thecommunity from relief from the Megan’s Law registrationrequirements; and (5) the offense-based bar to relief is “notrationally related to the State’s interest to protect personsfrom recidivist sex offenders.” The PCR court concluded, however, that any loosening of thestrictures of Megan’s Law must come from this Court in assessingthe constitutionality of the registration scheme as applied tojuveniles or from the Legislature, which has the paramount rolein forging public policy. The PCR court expressed that it wasconstrained by the precedents of this Court and, on that basis,“the adverse consequences of Megan’s law registration” do notgive rise to a constitutional issue. Finally, the PCR courtheld that C.K. did not satisfy the standard for provingineffective assistance of prior counsel, under Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42(1987), because the failure to present earlier the testimony 13 given at the evidentiary hearing would not have achieved adifferent outcome. B. In an unpublished opinion, a panel of the AppellateDivision affirmed the denial of C.K.’s second PCR petition. Thepanel acknowledged that C.K.’s “constitutional arguments arecompelling,” but believed that this Court’s decisions in Doe v.Poritz, 142 N.J. 1 (1995), and In re Registrant J.G., 169 N.J. 304 (2001), foreclosed any basis for relief. The panelindicated that “this case may present an appropriate occasionfor our Supreme Court to revisit J.G.,” but, as an intermediateappellate court, it was bound to follow this Court’s precedents. We granted C.K.’s petition for certification “limited tothe issue of the constitutionality of imposing the lifetimeregistration requirements of Megan’s Law on juvenile offenders.”228 N.J. 238 (2016). We also granted the motions of theAmerican Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, Advocates forChildren of New Jersey, and Northeast Juvenile Defender Center(collectively, ACLU-NJ), the Juvenile Law Center, the Office ofthe Public Defender, and the Attorney General of New Jersey toparticipate as amici curiae. Our grant of certification is limited to addressing theconstitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) as applied to juveniles,which, unlike subsection (f), imposes categorical lifetime 14 registration requirements for certain sex offenses. Wetherefore do not consider the parties’ general arguments thatall juvenile offense-based registration requirements areconstitutionally infirm because they do not assess the actualrisk posed by an individual juvenile. III. A. C.K. contends that the Megan’s Law lifetime registrationrequirements in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g), as applied to juveniles,violate his federal and state constitutional rights tosubstantive due process and to be free from cruel and unusualpunishment. C.K. claims that the registration scheme’sirrebuttable presumption that juveniles who commit certain sexoffenses are dangerous and irredeemable is at odds with theexpert testimony presented at the PCR hearing, the neuroscienceabout the developing juvenile brain, and his own life story. Heasserts that a lifetime registration scheme for juvenile sexoffenders that makes no allowance for a juvenile’srehabilitation and low risk for re-offense is penal, notremedial, in nature and advances no legitimate governmentalobjective. He describes how the registration scheme erectsbarriers to a juvenile’s acceptance into society, careeradvancement, and personal happiness, despite, as in his case, anoffense-free record and uniform expert testimony that he poses 15 no safety risk. According to C.K., a risk-based assessment issufficient to protect society’s interest in public safety. The ACLU-NJ, the Juvenile Law Center, and the PublicDefender, as amici curiae, echo the arguments advanced by C.K.and raise additional points, some collectively and othersindividually. Amici emphasize that juvenile sex offenders aredistinguishable from their adult counterparts due to theirimmaturity and lack of cognitive development, their amenabilityto rehabilitation, and their lower recidivism rate. N.J.S.A.2C:7-2(g) imposes an undifferentiated disability on juvenileregistrants, without regard to their actual risk, and thereforebears no relationship to a legitimate state interest. Accordingto amici, rehabilitated juvenile sex offenders, while on theregistry, face increased difficulties securing education,employment, and housing and suffer a stigma that has harmfulpsychological consequences. B. The State submits that “lifetime Megan’s Law registrationfor juveniles adjudicated delinquent or convicted of certainoffenses pass[es] constitutional muster” under Doe and J.G. TheState maintains that C.K.’s concerns about imposing lifetimeregistration on adolescents “are appropriately directed at theLegislature” rather than this Court. It assails the studiesrelied on by C.K.’s experts, reporting low juvenile recidivism 16 rates and high rehabilitative success, because they do notdistinguish between the general class of juvenile sex offendersand the subclass of offenders affected by subsection (g) --those adjudicated of committing aggravated sexual assault,forcible sexual assault, or multiple sex offenses. The State, moreover, claims that C.K. has presented largelytheoretical harms and unfounded fears, given his status as aTier One registrant not subject to the broader Megan’s Lawnotification requirements, and is not a proper classrepresentative of all Tier registrants to challenge theconstitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g). Additionally, theState explains that its failure to present witnesses at the PCRhearing flowed from its belief that “the issue was settled” andshould not be read as a concession that it agreed with C.K.’sexperts. The Attorney General, as amicus curiae, emphasizes many ofthe points made by the State. The Attorney General asserts thetwofold purpose of the registration and notification scheme isto allow law enforcement to keep track of the whereabouts of sexoffenders and to arm the public with information concerning anoffender’s identity, location, and offense. This registrationscheme, the Attorney General insists, is remedial, not punitive,and advances the goal of public safety. Finally, the AttorneyGeneral states that amending Megan’s Law is the province of the 17 Legislature, not this Court, and that C.K., and his amici,should bring the developing social science evidence to theattention of the branch of government responsible for publicpolicy. IV. A. We granted certification to address the constitutionalityof imposing the Megan’s Law lifetime registration andnotification requirements on juveniles adjudicated of committingcertain sex offenses, despite the peculiar procedural vehiclefor doing so. Typically, we would not consider a constitutionalchallenge on a second PCR. See R. 3:22-4(b). However, “when a'constitutional problem presented is of sufficient import tocall for relaxation of the rules [related to post-convictionrelief,] . . . we may consider the question on its merits.’”State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 528 (2005) (alterations inoriginal) (quoting State v. Johns, 111 N.J. Super. 574, 576(App. Div. 1970)). We have before us a full evidentiary recordon a constitutional issue that both the trial court andAppellate Division found compelling. We therefore will notreject consideration of this important issue on proceduralgrounds. See ibid. We begin our analysis with the statute at issue, with ourfocus on juvenile sex offenders. 18N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) provides that [a] person required to register under this section who has been convicted of, adjudicated delinquent, or acquitted by reason of insanity for more than one sex offense as defined in subsection b. of this section or who has been convicted of, adjudicated delinquent, or acquitted by reason of insanity for aggravated sexual assault pursuant to subsection a. of [ N.J.S.A.] 2C:14-2 or sexual assault [using physical force or coercion, without causing severe injury] is not eligible under subsection f. of this section to make application to the Superior Court of this State to terminate the registration obligation. [(emphases added).]N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) is part of the registration and communitynotification provisions of Megan’s Law. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11,-19. The legislative rationale for the registration andnotification scheme is public safety -- to “permit lawenforcement officials to identify and alert the public” aboutsex offenders who may pose a danger to children. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1(a). On adjudication of a sex offense identified in N.J.S.A.2C:7-2(b), a juvenile offender must register with the policedepartment in the municipality where he lives. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(c); New Jersey State Police, New Jersey Sex Offender InternetRegistry: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.njsp.org/sex-offender-registry/faqs.shtml (last visited Mar. 16, 2018). 19 Registration requires the collection of an offender’sfingerprints and such information as his residence, schoolenrollment, and employment. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-4(b)(1)-(2). Thejuvenile also must advise the appropriate law enforcement agencyof whether he has access to a computer or device with internetcapability, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(d)(2), and any change in residence,employment, or other required information, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(d)(1). A juvenile offender who fails to register or informthe appropriate law enforcement agency of a change of address orother status is guilty of a third-degree crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a)(3); 2C:7-2(d). For the purpose of determining the scope of publicnotification of a registrant’s sex-offender status, Megan’s Lawregistrants are categorized into three tiers based on anassessment of their risk of reoffending. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c).Registrants classified as Tier One are deemed to have the lowestrisk to reoffend and those classified as Tier Three are deemedto have the highest risk. Ibid. For offenders in Tier One, notification is limited to “lawenforcement agencies likely to encounter the person registered.”N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(1). For offenders in Tier Two, notificationextends to “organizations in the community including schools,religious and youth organizations.” N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(2). Foroffenders in Tier Three, notification further extends to 20 “members of the public likely to encounter the personregistered,” N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(3), such as those in privateresidences, businesses, schools, and community organizations inthe areas where the offender lives and works. Attorney GeneralGuidelines 17-18, 42-45. Although Tier Three juvenile offendersare placed on an online registry for notification purposes, TierTwo juvenile offenders are not, unless aggravating circumstancesare present. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(b) and (d); Attorney GeneralGuidelines 48-49. No Tier One offenders are included on theinternet registry. Attorney General Guidelines 48-49. The lifetime registration requirements imposed by N.J.S.A.2C:7-2(g) are categorical. A juvenile, fourteen years or older,who has committed an enumerated sex offense, or multiple sexoffenses, under subsection (g) cannot seek relief ever fromthose requirements -- however successful his rehabilitation,however many his achievements, and however remote thepossibility that he will reoffend. B. Subsection (g) of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 was not part of theoriginal legislative scheme that became Megan’s Law in 1994.The Legislature enacted subsection (g) in 2002 with the intendedpurpose of conforming our State registration and notificationscheme to Congress’s 1996 amendments to the Jacob WetterlingCrimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender 21 Registration Act of 1994 (Jacob Wetterling Act). Pub. L. No.104-236, §§ 3-7, 110 Stat. 3096, 3097 (repealed 2006). Theamended Jacob Wetterling Act -- the federal counterpart toMegan’s Law -- required law enforcement agencies to notify thecommunity when “necessary to protect the public.” 42 U.S.C.§ 14071(e)(2) (repealed 2006). Under the Act, offenders whocommitted certain enumerated sex crimes were subject to lifetimeregistration requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(6) (repealed2006). That provision was cited by the New Jersey Legislaturein enacting the permanent, offense-based bar contained inN.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g). See S. Law & Pub. Safety Comm. Statement toS. 2714 (Nov. 29, 2001) (L. 2001, c. 392). The rationale behindthe passage of subsection (g) evidently was to comply withfederal law and ensure continued specified federal crimefunding. See ibid. (explaining that “States that do not complywith [the Jacob Wetterling Act] will lose federal fundingbeginning in the year 2002”). The presence of subsection (g) of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 in ourlegislative scheme today, however, is not a precondition to themaintenance of federal funding. In 2006, Congress repealed theJacob Wetterling Act and passed the Adam Walsh Child Protectionand Safety Act (Adam Walsh Act). Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-91 (repealing 42 U.S.C.§§ 14071-73)). Title I of the Adam Walsh Act -- known as the 22 Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) --establishes a national baseline for sex offender registrationand requires that states receiving federal crime fundssubstantially comply with the guidelines it outlines. See 34U.S.C. § 20927; see also 34 U.S.C. § 10151 (establishing thatnon-compliant jurisdictions lose ten percent of funds fromfederal Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program).In effect, SORNA serves as model legislation that can be adoptedin part or in whole by the states. Nevertheless, most states,including New Jersey, have not substantially implemented SORNA.Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending,Registering, and Tracking, SORNA Implementation Status,https://smart.gov/sorna-map.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2018)(listing only twenty-two states and territories as havingsubstantially implemented SORNA). SORNA classifies sex offenders into three risk tiers --Tiers I, II, and III -- for registration and notificationpurposes, depending solely on the nature of the offense. 34U.S.C. § 20911. If New Jersey strictly followed federal law,C.K. would be classified as a Tier III offender based on hisjuvenile aggravated sexual assault adjudication. 34 U.S.C.§ 20911(4)(A). The offender’s tier assignment, in turn,determines the duration of his registration requirements. 34U.S.C. § 20915(a). Unlike N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g), SORNA has no 23 permanent lifetime registration provision for juveniles. Ajuvenile Tier III offender, although subject to presumptivelifetime registration, is eligible under SORNA to have hisregistration requirements terminated after twenty-five years ifhe has a “clean record.” 34 U.S.C. § 20915(a)(3) to (b).Although Tier I and II offenders are subject to fifteen-year andtwenty-five-year registration periods, respectively, Tier Ioffenders are allowed to apply for a shortened registrationperiod. 34 U.S.C. § 20915(a) to (b). Currently, under SORNA, states have discretion whether toinclude juveniles on their public sex-offender registrywebsites. Supplemental Guidelines for Sex Offender Registrationand Notification, 76 Fed. Reg. 1630, 1636-37 (Jan. 11, 2011). 3 In 2016, the United States Attorney General implemented newSORNA guidelines governing juvenile offenders. See SupplementalGuidelines for Juvenile Registration Under the Sex OffenderRegistration and Notification Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 50,552 (Aug. 1,2016). Under those guidelines, states that do not registerjuveniles who have committed serious sex offenses may still becompliant with SORNA if the federal government finds that those3 Initially, SORNA required online public notification for certain juvenile sex offenders. National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,030, 38,040-41 (July 2, 2008). 24 states have nonetheless “substantially implemented SORNA’sjuvenile registration requirements” through other means. Id. at50,558. Moreover, the United States Attorney General may exempt astate from implementing a provision of SORNA that “would placethe jurisdiction in violation of its constitution, as determinedby a ruling of the jurisdiction’s highest court.” 34 U.S.C.§ 20927(b). In short, a state’s highest court can declareunconstitutional a state’s sex-offender registration provisionwithout necessarily jeopardizing a state’s federal funding. C. Before the passage of subsection (g) of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 in2002, subsection (f) governed the termination of registrationrequirements for all adult and juvenile sex offenders. N.J.S.A.2C:7-2(f), which is still operative, provides that a person required to register under this act 4 may make application to the Superior Court of this State to terminate the obligation upon proof that the person has not committed an offense within 15 years following conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term of imprisonment imposed, whichever is later, and is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.4 “A person who has been convicted, adjudicated delinquent or found not guilty by reason of insanity for commission of a sex offense . . . shall register as provided . . . .” N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a)(1). 25 Subsection (f) was part of the original Megan’s Lawregistration and notification requirements, which we declaredconstitutional in Doe. 142 N.J. at 12-13. 5 In Doe, we rejectedthe argument that the registration and notification requirementsconstituted a form of punishment, finding instead that they are“remedial in purpose” and “designed simply and solely to enablethe public to protect itself from the danger posed by sexoffenders.” Id. at 73. We held that the “Constitution does notprevent society from attempting to protect itself from convictedsex offenders, no matter when convicted, so long as the means ofprotection are reasonably designed for that purpose.” Id. at 12(emphasis added). The validity of subsection (f)’s presumptivelifetime registration requirements was not at issue in Doe. TheCourt noted that, under subsection (f), a fifteen-year offense-free registrant could have his registration requirementsterminated if he could “persuade the court that he or she is notlikely to pose a threat to the safety of others.” Id. at 21-22(citing N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f)). The underlying assumption of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) is thatwhen a registrant, who has been offense-free for fifteen or more5 While the Court generally held that Megan’s Law is constitutional, we mandated due process hearings to afford registrants judicial review of both their proposed tier designations and the scope of community notification. Id. at 28-32, 107-08. 26 years, no longer poses a risk to the safety of the public,keeping him bound to the registration requirements no longerserves a remedial purpose. In J.G., this Court grappled with the implication ofapplying the presumptive lifetime registration requirements ofN.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) to juveniles under the age of fourteen. 169 N.J. 304. In that case, J.G. pled guilty in family court tocommitting a second-degree sexual assault. Id. at 309-10. Atthe time of the assault, J.G. was ten years old and the victim,his cousin, just eight years old. Id. at 309. The family courtimposed a suspended indeterminate custodial sentence not toexceed three years, ordered J.G. to attend a family counselingprogram, and advised J.G. that he was subject to the Megan’s Lawlifetime registration and community notification requirements.Id. at 311-12. The dilemma faced by the Court in J.G. was to reconcile theMegan’s Law presumptive lifetime registration requirements withthe Juvenile Code’s “mandate to terminate all dispositions otherthan incarceration at age eighteen, or within three years,whichever is later.” Id. at 334. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f),J.G. could not move to lift the registration requirements untilage twenty-six, fifteen years following his delinquencyadjudication. See id. at 319-20, 334. 27 We emphasized our Juvenile Code’s continued focus onrehabilitation as evidenced by such dispositional alternativesas individual and family counseling, academic and vocationaleducation, work programs, and community service. Id. at 321-27,335. We also acknowledged the goals of Megan’s Law, which focuson the need to protect society from sex offenders bydisseminating critical information to the public. Id. at 339.In viewing the two statutory schemes, seemingly in conflict, wefound “implausible and anomalous the notion that a child 'sexoffender’ such as J.G. should pursuant to Megan’s Law be subjectto a lifetime registration requirement merely on the basis of adelinquency adjudication that included no effort to assess histrue culpability.” Id. at 336. In reconciling the rehabilitative goals of the JuvenileCode and the public safety goals of Megan’s Law, we held thatfor an adjudicated juvenile sex offender under age fourteen, the“registration and community notification orders shall terminateat age eighteen,” provided the juvenile can establish in the LawDivision by “clear and convincing evidence that [he] is notlikely to pose a threat to the safety of others.” Id. at 337. In setting age fourteen as the dividing line, we focused onthe different treatment the Juvenile Code affords youths belowand above that age. Id. at 335-36. We stressed that treatingjuveniles under the age of fourteen differently “is essential if 28 we are to sensibly reconcile the Juvenile Code with Megan’sLaw.” Id. at 335. In light of our disposition, we rejectedJ.G.’s argument that Megan’s Law constitutes cruel and unusualpunishment under our Federal and State Constitutions. Id. at339. Importantly, at the time Doe and J.G. were decided, alljuveniles adjudicated of a sex offense could terminate theirMegan’s Law requirements after a period of fifteen years,provided they satisfied the criteria laid out in subsection (f)of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2. See J.G., 169 N.J. at 319-20; Doe, 142 N.J.at 21. Neither Doe nor J.G. addressed whether permanentlifetime registration and notification requirements imposed on ajuvenile would violate the substantive due process guarantee ofour State Constitution. D. Less than a year after our J.G. decision in 2001, for thereasons previously discussed, the Legislature enacted thepermanent, irrevocable lifetime registration requirements insubsection (g) that are applicable to adult as well as juvenileoffenders. L. 2001, c. 392 § 1. In this case, our focus isonly on those juveniles between the ages of fourteen andseventeen adjudicated delinquent in family court for sexoffenses falling within the ambit of subsection (g). We agreewith the Appellate Division’s determination in In re Registrant 29 L.E. that the Legislature did not intend to override the rightsprovided in J.G. to juvenile sex offenders under age fourteenwho are authorized to seek termination of their registration andnotification requirements at age eighteen. 366 N.J. Super. 61,64-65 (App. Div. 2003). Notably, since 2003 the Legislature hasnot enacted legislation that would signal disagreement with L.E.See Smith v. Fireworks by Girone, Inc., 180 N.J. 199, 215 (2004)(“[T]he construction of a statute by the courts, supported bylong acquiescence on the part of the Legislature . . . isevidence that such construction is in accord with thelegislative intent.” (quoting Quaremba v. Allan, 67 N.J. 1, 14(1975))). Neither Doe nor J.G. provides guidance for the resolutionof the substantive due process challenge to subsection (g) asapplied to juveniles. The implicit assumption underlyingsubsection (g) is that a juvenile, once adjudicated of certainsex offenses, will forever pose a danger to the safety ofothers, despite the offense-free and productive life he may leadin the future. C.K. challenges that assumption and theconstitutionality of a statutory provision that has no risk-based assessment for continued registration and notificationrequirements fifteen years following his juvenile adjudication. V. A. 30 Our laws and jurisprudence recognize that juveniles aredifferent from adults -- that juveniles are not fully formed,that they are still developing and maturing, that their mistakesand wrongdoing are often the result of factors related to theiryouth, and therefore they are more amenable to rehabilitationand more worthy of redemption. Our juvenile justice system is atestament to society’s judgment that children bear a specialstatus, and therefore a unique approach must be taken in dealingwith juvenile offenders, both in measuring culpability andsetting an appropriate disposition. Indeed, the United StatesSupreme Court has explained that juvenile courts were created“to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for thechild and protection for society, not to fix criminalresponsibility, guilt and punishment.” Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 , 554 (1966). Among the purposes of the Juvenile Code, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-20to -92, is “to remove from children committing delinquent actscertain statutory consequences of criminal behavior, and tosubstitute therefor an adequate program of supervision, care andrehabilitation, and a range of sanctions designed to promoteaccountability and protect the public.” N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-21(b).Although rehabilitation, historically, has been the primaryfocus of the juvenile justice system, a second purpose --increasingly so in recent times -- is protection of the public. 31 See State in Interest of K.O., 217 N.J. 83, 92-93 (2014); seealso J.G., 169 N.J. at 320-21 (noting that soon after enactmentof Megan’s Law, Legislature amended Juvenile Code’s statement ofpurpose to include “a range of sanctions designed to promoteaccountability and protect the public” (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-21)); State in Interest of M.C., 384 N.J. Super. 116, 128 (App.Div. 2006) (noting that rehabilitation and protection of societyare among considerations family court must weigh). Nevertheless, rehabilitation and reformation of thejuvenile remain a hallmark of the juvenile system, as evidencedby the twenty enumerated dispositions available to the familycourt in sentencing a juvenile adjudicated delinquent. SeeN.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(b); State in Interest of C.V., 201 N.J. 281,295 (2010). The range of dispositional options signifies that a“'one size fits all’ approach” does not apply in the juvenilejustice system. C.V., 201 N.J. at 296 (citing State of NewJersey, Office of the Child Advocate, Reinvesting in New JerseyYouth: Building on Successful Juvenile Detention Reform 16(2009)). The juvenile system’s flexibility in selecting anappropriate disposition for a young offender allows the familycourt to take into account “the complex, diverse, and changingneeds of youth” and to address “the unique emotional,behavioral, physical, and educational problems of each juvenilebefore the court.” Id. at 296. 32 B. In a series of landmark cases, the United States SupremeCourt declared unconstitutional legal regimes that imposedcapital punishment on juvenile offenders, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 568-70 (2005); life without parole on juvenilesconvicted of non-homicide offenses, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 , 82 (2010); and mandatory life without parole on juvenilesconvicted of homicide offenses, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 ,489 (2012). In striking down each of those statutory schemes,relying on the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusualpunishment, the Court grounded its decisions on commonlyaccepted scientific and sociological notions about the uniquecharacteristics of youth and the progressive emotional andbehavioral development of juveniles. We reviewed the breadth ofthe social science in Zuber, in which we held that sentencingjudges must consider “the mitigating qualities of youth” whenimposing consecutive prison sentences that are the “practicalequivalent of life without parole.” 227 N.J. at 429 (quotingMiller, 567 U.S. at 478). Based on scientific and sociological studies, the UnitedStates Supreme Court and this Court have acknowledged that (1)“[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense ofresponsibility are found in youth more often than in adults,”Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson 33 v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 , 367 (1993)); (2) “juveniles are morevulnerable or susceptible to negative influences” and “have lesscontrol . . . over their own environment,” ibid. (citationomitted); and (3) the personality and character traits ofjuveniles “are more transitory, less fixed,” and “not as wellformed as that of an adult,” id. at 570. See Zuber, 227 N.J. at 439-40. Scientific studies reveal that “parts of the braininvolved in behavior control continue to mature through lateadolescence,” accounting for one of the “fundamental differencesbetween juvenile and adult minds.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; seealso Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 n.5 (“It is increasingly clear thatadolescent brains are not yet fully mature in regions andsystems related to higher-order executive functions such asimpulse control, planning ahead, and risk avoidance.” (citationsomitted)). As a result, “[j]uveniles are more capable of changethan are adults, and their actions are less likely to beevidence of 'irretrievably depraved character.’” Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570). Because juvenilesare in a state of becoming, they “'have a greater claim thanadults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influencesin their whole environment,’ and there is 'a greater possibility. . . that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.’”Zuber, 227 N.J. at 440 (alteration in original) (quoting Roper,543 U.S. at 570). 34 In finding unconstitutional juvenile life sentences withoutparole in non-homicide cases, the United States Supreme Courtconcluded that just because a juvenile defendant “posed animmediate risk” at one point in his young life does not meanthat he will “be a risk to society for the rest of his life.”Graham, 560 U.S. at 73. The Court held that a life withoutparole sentence denies a juvenile “some meaningful opportunityto obtain release based on demonstrated maturity andrehabilitation.” Id. at 75. The Court also struck down theimposition of a mandatory sentence of life without parole injuvenile homicide cases because the disposition precludes any“consideration of [a juvenile’s] chronological age and itshallmark features -- among them, immaturity, impetuosity, andfailure to appreciate risks and consequences.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 477. In the wake of Roper, Graham, and Miller, we held in Zuberthat sentencing judges must consider “the mitigating qualitiesof youth” and “exercise a heightened level of care before theyimpose multiple consecutive sentences on juveniles which wouldresult in lengthy jail terms.” 227 N.J. at 429-30. Weencouraged “the Legislature to consider enacting a statute that 35 would provide for later review of juvenile sentences that havelengthy periods of parole ineligibility.” 6 Id. at 430. C. Other state courts of last resort that have addressed theconstitutionality of long-term registration and notificationrequirements imposed on juvenile sex offenders offer guidance. In In re C.P., the Ohio Supreme Court declared an Ohiostatute that subjected certain juvenile offenders to automaticand mandatory lifetime sex-offender registration andnotification requirements -- with the potential forreclassification after twenty-five years -- violative of thecruel-and-unusual-punishment and due-process clauses of theFederal and Ohio Constitutions. 967 N.E.2d 729, 732, 737 (Ohio2012). In that case, C.P., age fifteen, was adjudicateddelinquent of kidnapping and raping a six-year old malerelative. Id. at 732. The juvenile court sentenced C.P. to aminimum three-year period of commitment to the Ohio Departmentof Youth Services. Id. at 733. Under an Ohio statute, whichadopted federal SORNA, C.P. was automatically classified as aTier III sex offender, which required him to register with thesheriff every ninety days and to comply with community6 We also noted that other states had already enacted statutes that permitted a retrospective review of lengthy juvenile sentences. Zuber, 227 N.J. at 452 n.4. 36 notification requirements. Id. at 733-34, 738-39. Thenotification requirements not only authorized the disseminationof C.P.’s photograph and personal information to neighbors,schools, and various agencies and organizations, but also theplacement of C.P. on the electronic sex-offender database. Id.at 736. In striking down the statute on constitutional grounds, theOhio Supreme Court reasoned: (1) the lifetime registration andnotification requirements are imposed at an age when thejuvenile offender’s character is not yet fixed; (2) the“statutory scheme gives the juvenile judge no role indetermining how dangerous a child offender might be or whatlevel of registration or notification would be adequate topreserve the safety of the public”; and (3) “the juvenile judgenever gets an opportunity to determine whether the juvenileoffender has responded to rehabilitation or whether he remains athreat to society.” Id. at 741-42, 749. The Court observedthat “[f]ew labels are as damaging in today’s society as'convicted sex offender’” and that sex offenders are “'thelepers of the criminal justice system.’” Id. at 746 (quotingPhoebe Geer, Justice Served? The High Costs of Juvenile SexOffender Registration, 27 Dev. Mental Health L. 33, 47 (2008)).The Court determined that “[l]ifetime registration andnotification requirements run contrary to [the law’s] goals of 37 rehabilitating the offender and aiding his mental and physicaldevelopment.” Id. at 742. Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared thatPennsylvania’s statute imposing lifetime registration andnotification requirements on sexually violent juvenile offendersviolated the state constitution’s due process guarantee. In reJ.B., 107 A.3d 1, 2, 10, 14-16 (Pa. 2014). The Pennsylvaniastatute authorized termination of the registration requirementsafter twenty-five years, provided the juvenile could establishhe did not reoffend within that period, successfully completed arehabilitation program and court-ordered supervision, and was“not likely to pose a threat to the safety of any other person.”Id. at 7-8 (quoting 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9799.17(b)(2)). Likethe Ohio statute, Pennsylvania’s statute is modeled after thefederal SORNA statute. See id. at 3. Nevertheless, thePennsylvania high court held that the sex-offender registrationstatute violated the due process rights of juvenile offenders“by utilizing the irrebuttable presumption that all juvenileoffenders 'pose a high risk of committing additional sexualoffenses.’” Id. at 14 (quoting 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.§ 9799.11(a)(4)). The court explained that an irrebuttablepresumption doctrine should not apply when a “presumption is notuniversally true and a reasonable alternative means currently 38 exists for determining which juvenile offenders are likely toreoffend.” Ibid. In J.B., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that theregistration statute’s “presumption that sexual offenders pose ahigh risk of recidivating is not universally true when appliedto juvenile offenders” because, as studies suggest, “many ofthose who commit sexual offenses as juveniles do so as a resultof impulsivity and sexual curiosity, which diminish withrehabilitation and general maturation.” Id. at 17. The courtconcluded that the registration statute’s other parts,authorizing individualized assessments for determining whichjuveniles posed a high risk of reoffending, provided areasonable alternative to the use of a discredited presumption.Id. at 19-20. VI. We now determine whether the categorical lifetimeregistration and notification requirements imposed on juvenileoffenders by N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) passes muster under thesubstantive due-process guarantee of our State Constitution. Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitutionprovides: All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting 39 property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness. [N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1.] That paragraph “sets forth the first principles of ourgovernmental charter -- that every person possesses the'unalienable rights’ to enjoy life, liberty, and property, andto pursue happiness.” Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 442(2006). Those basic rights cannot be abridged by arbitrarygovernment action. See Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 491-92(1973). Although our State Constitution nowhere expresslystates that every person shall be entitled to substantive dueprocess of law, the expansive language of Article I, Paragraph 1embraces that fundamental guarantee. Caviglia v. Royal Tours ofAm., 178 N.J. 460, 472 (2004) (citing Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 568 (1985)). The guarantee of substantive due processrequires that a statute reasonably relate to a legitimatelegislative purpose and not impose arbitrary or discriminatoryburdens on a class of individuals. See Greenberg, 99 N.J. at 563. Although all laws are presumed to be constitutional, nolaw can survive scrutiny under Article I, Paragraph 1 unless ithas a rational basis in furthering some legitimate stateinterest. See ibid. Therefore, a statute that bears norational relationship to a legitimate government goal and that 40 arbitrarily deprives a person of a liberty interest or the rightto pursue happiness is unconstitutional. With those fundamental principles in mind, we conclude thatN.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) violates the substantive due process rightsof juvenile sex offenders. VII. A. We first acknowledge that since the passage of N.J.S.A.2C:7-2(g) in 2002, scientific and sociological studies haveshined new light on adolescent brain development and on therecidivism rates of juvenile sex offenders compared to adultoffenders. Our commonsense and historical understanding thatchildren are different from adults is enshrined in our juvenilejustice system and fortified by recent United States SupremeCourt decisions and Zuber, which embraced those studies thatfound that juveniles do not possess immutable psychological orbehavioral characteristics. That body of jurisprudence and theevidentiary record in this case tell us that adolescents areworks in progress and that age tempers the impetuosity,immaturity, and shortsightedness of youth. They tell us that,generally, juvenile sex offenders are less likely to reoffendthan adult sex offenders and that the likelihood of recidivismis particularly low for those who have not reoffended for a longperiod of time. They tell us that the permanent status of sex- 41 offender registrant will impair a juvenile, as he grows intoadulthood, from gaining employment opportunities, findingacceptance in his community, developing a healthy sense of self-worth, and forming personal relationships. In essence, thejuvenile registrant will forever remain a social pariah.N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) is grounded on the irrebuttablepresumption that juveniles adjudicated delinquent for committingcertain sex offenses will forever pose a danger to society.That irrebuttable presumption disregards any individualassessment of whether a particular registrant is likely toreoffend, long after the adjudication and long after thejuvenile has become an adult. Those juveniles are, in effect,branded as irredeemable -- at a point when their lives havebarely begun and before their personalities are fully formed.They must carry this stigma even if they can prove that theypose no societal threat. But that irrebuttable lifetimepresumption is not supported by scientific and sociologicalstudies or our jurisprudence and is not needed given thefifteen-year look back required by subsection (f). Even a lifetime presumption with a twenty-five-year look-back period has been found violative of some states’constitutions. New Jersey’s lifetime presumption ofdangerousness that attaches to juvenile sex offenders pursuantto N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) is more extreme than the registration and 42 notification schemes, as applied to juveniles, struck down bythe Ohio and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts. See C.P., 967 N.E 2dat 732, 737; J.B., 107 A.3d at 2, 17. The Ohio and Pennsylvaniaschemes, which allowed juvenile sex offenders to seek thelifting of registration and notification requirements after thepassage of twenty-five years, were deemed constitutionallyoffensive because the classifications were not based on ongoingindividual risk assessments. C.P., 967 N.E 2d at 741-42; J.B.,107 A.3d at 17. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) is even out of step withfederal SORNA, which has no permanent lifetime registrationprovision for juveniles. A juvenile Tier III offender under thefederal enactment is subject to a presumptive lifetimeregistration but, after twenty-five years, is eligible to havehis registration requirements terminated. 34 U.S.C.§ 20915(a)(3) to (b). Subsection (g) of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2, moreover, cannot beviewed in isolation from other provisions of the statute.Subsection (f) imposes presumptive lifetime registration andnotification requirements for sex offenses covered by subsection(g) but allows for a juvenile sex offender to be relieved ofthose requirements fifteen years after his juvenile adjudicationor release from a correctional facility, provided he has beenoffense-free and “is not likely to pose a threat to the safetyof others.” Thus, under subsection (f), those juvenile sex 43 offenders who have reoffended or pose a continuing threat afterfifteen years will not be relieved of their registration andnotification requirements. Subsection (g) has the perverseeffect of keeping on the sex-offender registry those juvenileswho have completed their rehabilitation, not reoffended, and whocan prove after a fifteen-year look-back period that they arenot likely to pose a societal threat. When, in the case ofjuveniles, the remedial purpose of Megan’s Law -- rehabilitationof the offender and protection of the public -- is satisfied,then the continued constraints on their lives and libertypursuant to subjection (g), long after they have become adults,takes on a punitive aspect that cannot be justified by ourConstitution. It is at that point that subsection (g), as applied tojuveniles, no longer bears a rational relationship to alegitimate state purpose and arbitrarily denies thoseindividuals their right to liberty and enjoyment of happinessguaranteed by Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New JerseyConstitution. It also bears emphasizing that holding that subsection (g)runs afoul of a fundamental right guaranteed under our StateConstitution will not likely jeopardize any federal funding tothis State. First, as mentioned earlier, subsection (g) is moresevere and inflexible than the Tier III provisions of the 44 federal SORNA. Second, a state is likely exempt from thefederal SORNA’s dictates when implementing one of its provisionsis violative of a state’s constitution, “as determined by aruling of the jurisdiction’s highest court.” 34 U.S.C.§ 20927(b). B. C.K.’s case in many ways exemplifies why subsection (g)does not bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate statepurpose when applied to juvenile offenders. Twenty years havepassed since C.K. committed his offense as a juvenile, and hisadjudication occurred more than fourteen years ago. C.K. is nowthirty-eight years old and has not committed an offense intwenty years and none since his juvenile delinquencyadjudication. Over the years, he has complied with his Megan’sLaw responsibilities. He has graduated from college andreceived a master’s degree in counseling, remained gainfullyemployed working for a nonprofit agency that provides servicesfor adults suffering from mental illness, and has been acontributing member of his community. Multiple psychologicalevaluations attest that he is an extremely low risk to reoffend. Nevertheless, C.K. remains a sex-offender registrant. Thattainted status has permeated various spheres of his life --professional, personal, and social. He often feels isolated anddepressed. He has turned down opportunities for professional 45 advancement for fear that his juvenile sex-offender registrantstatus will be revealed. He despairs that the permanentdesignation of sex offender registrant will impair his abilityto fully participate in the lives of his children, if he one dayhas a family. Solely because of the nature of the offense he committed asa juvenile, C.K. is presumed under subsection (g) to be apermanent, lifetime risk to the safety of the public. Thatirrebuttable presumption, however, is not supported byscientific or sociological studies, our jurisprudence, or therecord in this case. Because it does not further a legitimatestate interest when applied to juveniles, subsection (g) doesnot withstand scrutiny under Article I, Paragraph 1 of our StateConstitution. 7 VIII. For the reasons expressed, we hold that N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g)is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles adjudicateddelinquent as sex offenders. Under subsection (f) of N.J.S.A.2C:7-2, fifteen years from the date of his juvenileadjudication, C.K. will be eligible to seek the lifting of his7 In light of this disposition, we need not address C.K.’s claims that subsection (g) violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the New Jersey Constitution’s corollary provision under Article I, Paragraph 12. 46 sex-offender registration requirements. At that time, he mustbe given the opportunity to demonstrate by clear and convincingevidence that he has not reoffended and no longer poses a threatto others and therefore has a right to be relieved of hisMegan’s Law obligations and his status as a sex-offenderregistrant. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. 47