Title: State v. Moeller
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 124611
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 2024

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 124,611 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
DAVID W. MOELLER, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1.  
 
Kansas precedent establishes that the death of a criminal defendant during the 
appeal of his or her conviction does not automatically abate the appeal but may render 
some issues moot.  
 
2.  
 
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, once a point of law has been established by a 
court, that point of law will generally be followed by the same court and all courts of 
lower rank in subsequent cases where the same legal issue is raised. Even so, this court 
will overturn precedent, no matter how longstanding, if it is clearly convinced the rule of 
law was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and 
that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent. 
 
3.  
As used in the securities fraud statute, K.S.A. 17-12a501(3), the words "fraud" and 
"deceit" carry their ordinary meanings.  
 
 
2 
 
 
 
4. 
 
Under the Kansas Uniform Securities Act, K.S.A. 17-12a101 et seq., an 
investment contract is a type of security. An investment contract consists of four 
elements:  (1) an investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with the 
expectation of profits; and (4) from the efforts of others.  
 
5. 
 
For purposes of an investment contract as defined in K.S.A. 17-12a102(28)(D) 
under the Kansas Uniform Securities Act, K.S.A. 17-12a101 et seq., a common enterprise 
may be shown either by horizontal commonality—an enterprise common to a group of 
investors—or by vertical commonality—an enterprise common to the investor and the 
seller, promoter, or some third party.  
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed June 30, 2023. 
Appeal from Jefferson District Court; CHRISTOPHER ETZEL, judge. Oral argument held March 27, 2024. 
Opinion filed June 7, 2024. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. 
Judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the 
briefs for appellant.  
 
Kristafer R. Ailslieger, deputy solicitor general, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, former 
attorney general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by  
 
WALL, J.:  In State v. Hollister, 300 Kan. 458, Syl. ¶ 1, 329 P.2d 1220 (2014), this 
court held that the death of a criminal defendant during the appeal of his or her conviction 
does not automatically abate the appeal but may render some issues moot. And the 
doctrine of stare decisis directs us to adhere to this precedent in subsequent cases raising  
3 
 
 
 
the same legal issue. Nevertheless, we may depart from established precedent under 
certain conditions. This appeal requires us to decide whether stare decisis warrants our 
continued adherence to Hollister. We conclude it does.  
 
David Moeller was convicted of securities fraud after finagling an acquaintance 
out of $9,500 by promising an investment opportunity in a new business that never 
materialized. Moeller appealed, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support his 
conviction. But he died during the pendency of his appeal. Applying Hollister, the Court 
of Appeals held Moeller's death did not render his appeal moot. The panel thus addressed 
the merits of Moeller's sufficiency challenge and affirmed his conviction and sentence. 
State v. Moeller, No. 124,611, 2023 WL 4278212, at *2-5 (Kan. App. 2023) (unpublished 
opinion). Defense counsel petitioned for review, arguing that we should overrule 
Hollister and that the panel erred in concluding his conviction was supported by 
sufficient evidence. 
 
Today, we continue to adhere to Hollister under the doctrine of stare decisis. For 
one, we are not clearly convinced Hollister was originally erroneous. Furthermore, we 
are not clearly convinced that more good than harm would come from departing from 
Hollister. Hollister strikes a fair balance between the competing interests in a criminal 
appeal, and any alternative approach would raise problems of its own. 
 
We also hold the State presented sufficient evidence to support Moeller's 
conviction for securities fraud under K.S.A. 17-12a501(3). Moeller argues the State 
failed to prove he violated that statute because the trial evidence does not show he 
engaged in "an act [of] . . . fraud or deceit" upon the victim, nor does it show the 
transaction between Moeller and the victim involved a security as that term is defined by 
law. K.S.A. 17-12a501(3); see also K.S.A. 17-12a102(28) (defining "security"). But 
Moeller's argument essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence, which appellate courts do 
4 
 
 
 
not do. When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient 
to support Moeller's conviction. We thus affirm Moeller's conviction and sentence. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Diane Brunner gave Moeller a check for $9,500 to invest in a new business that 
would manufacture and sell the "Blade Caddy," a carrying case for saw blades. There was 
no new business. Instead, Moeller used the money to pay off a personal financial 
obligation, and he never fully reimbursed Brunner. After a bench trial, Moeller was 
convicted of securities fraud, sentenced to 24 months' probation, and ordered to pay 
$5,500 in restitution to Brunner and $513 in court costs and fees. Moeller appealed, 
arguing there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. The evidence 
supporting his conviction will be discussed in more detail in Issue II along with the 
merits of his sufficiency challenge.  
 
After both parties filed their opening briefs, the Court of Appeals issued an order 
indicating it "ha[d] become aware of information suggesting that [Moeller] died after 
filing this appeal." The Court of Appeals directed both defense counsel and the State to 
investigate whether Moeller had died and to inform the court of the results of their 
investigations. In his response, defense counsel provided an order from the district court 
terminating Moeller's probation because of his death. Defense counsel also disclaimed 
the ability to conduct a more extensive investigation in a timely manner and thus he did 
not definitively confirm or deny Moeller's death. The State responded by providing 
confirmation of a death certificate for Moeller. 2023 WL 4278212, at *2. 
 
 
In its decision, the panel found Moeller had died, but also chastised defense 
counsel for not conducting a more extensive investigation and not providing a definitive 
answer on whether Moeller had died. 2023 WL 4278212, at *2. Nonetheless, the panel 
held the appeal was not moot under Hollister because the only issue Moeller raised—
5 
 
 
 
sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction—could exonerate him. Moeller, 
2023 WL 4278212, at *2; see Hollister, 300 Kan. at 458-59 (court may address issues 
that may exonerate defendant). And the panel affirmed Moeller's convictions. Moeller, 
2023 WL 4278212, at *3-5. 
 
 
Defense counsel petitioned for review, asking us to revisit the abatement rule in 
Hollister. He also petitioned for review of the panel's holding that sufficient evidence 
supported Moeller's conviction.  
 
We granted review, and we heard oral argument on March 27, 2024. Jurisdiction is 
proper. See K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (providing for petitions for review of Court of Appeals 
decisions); K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review Court of 
Appeals decisions upon petition for review). 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
I. 
We Adhere to Hollister Under the Doctrine of Stare Decisis 
 
 
The main issue in this appeal is whether we should continue to adhere to Hollister. 
Defense counsel asks us to overrule that decision and adopt the doctrine of abatement ab 
initio. Under that doctrine, "a criminal defendant's death abates the appeal and all 
proceedings from the beginning of the criminal case." Hollister, 300 Kan. at 465. Thus, in 
jurisdictions that follow the doctrine, the appellate court not only abates the appeal but 
also vacates the conviction and remands the case for the district court to dismiss the 
indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Libous, 858 F.3d 64, 66 (2d Cir. 2017). 
Alternatively, defense counsel asks us to allow the appeal to continue as to all issues after 
substitution of a party for the deceased defendant.  
 
 
6 
 
 
 
The State responds that we should continue to adhere to Hollister. It argues 
Hollister is sensible and allows both the defendant and the State to vindicate important 
rights. The State also adamantly opposes adoption of the doctrine of abatement ab initio, 
arguing the doctrine harms both the public generally and crime victims specifically. 
 
A. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Framework 
 
Because this issue involves consideration of a court policy developed through 
court precedent, our review is unlimited. See State v. Hilton, 295 Kan. 845, 849, 286 P.3d 
871 (2012) ("A court policy necessarily comes about through prior opinions of the court, 
i.e., the mootness doctrine developed through court precedent. Accordingly, our review is 
unlimited."); State v. May, 293 Kan. 858, 862, 269 P.3d 1260 (2012) ("To the extent our 
decision involves . . . the interpretation and application of prior court precedent, we are 
resolving questions of law and, thus, exercising unlimited review."). 
 
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, "'once a point of law has been established by a 
court, that point of law will generally be followed by the same court and all courts of 
lower rank in subsequent cases where the same legal issue is raised.'" Crist v. Hunan 
Palace, Inc., 277 Kan. 706, 715, 89 P.3d 573 (2004). "Stare decisis—while not a 'rigid 
inevitability'—serves as a 'prudent governor on the pace of legal change.'" McCullough v. 
Wilson, 308 Kan. 1025, 1035, 426 P.3d 494 (2018). Even so, "this court will overturn 
precedent, no matter how longstanding, if it is '"clearly convinced [the rule of law] was 
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more 
good than harm will come by departing from precedent."'" 308 Kan. at 1036.  
 
 
To address the abatement question, we first review the historical development of 
our abatement policy before conducting the stare decisis analysis.  
 
 
7 
 
 
 
B. Development of Our Abatement Policy 
 
In two cases issued in the early years of Kansas' statehood, this court declined to 
abate a criminal appeal after the defendant's death. See State v. Ellvin, 51 Kan. 784, Syl. 
¶ 1, 33 P. 547 (1893); State v. Fisher, Adm'r, 37 Kan. 404, 15 P. 606 (1887). In both 
cases, the defendant's death did not abate the judgment of costs and this court considered 
the merits of the appeal. Ellvin, 51 Kan. at 789; Fisher, 37 Kan. 404.  
 
Many years later, in State v. Jones, 220 Kan. 136, 551 P.2d 801 (1976), the court 
revisited its abatement policy. It explained that while many other jurisdictions had 
adopted the doctrine of abatement ab initio, Kansas had historically allowed appeals to 
continue, citing Fisher and Ellvin. Jones, 220 Kan. at 137. The Jones court also reasoned 
it was in the interests of both the defendant's family and society to review the appeal on 
its merits: 
 
"A defendant's conviction is at this stage in midair. The judgment of conviction is 
not final due to the pendency of an appeal. While death moots the sentence, renders 
impossible a new trial, and abates any fine imposed, the matter of costs remains. The 
state and the defendant (not to mention his family) have endured the strain, the tribulation 
and the expense of trial and appeal. Oftentimes rights other than those of an individual 
defendant are involved. The right to inherit, or to take by will or otherwise, may be 
affected. K.S.A. 1975 Supp. 59-513. The family of the defendant and the public have an 
interest in the final determination of a criminal case." 220 Kan. at 137. 
 
Jones thus held that the deceased defendant's appeal "should be adjudicated upon the 
merits." 220 Kan. at 137. See also State v. Salts, 288 Kan. 263, 265, 200 P.3d 464 (2009) 
(defendant's death 12 days after his notice of appeal was filed did not render his direct 
appeal moot); State v. Burnison, 247 Kan. 19, 32, 795 P.2d 32 (1990) ("[I]n Kansas the 
death of a defendant does not abate his direct appeal as it is in the interest of the public 
that the issue[s] raised on appeal be adjudicated upon the merits."). 
8 
 
 
 
 
Then our course changed slightly in State v. Karson, 297 Kan. 634, 304 P.3d 317 
(2013). There, the court again reiterated that a defendant's death does not automatically 
abate an appeal. But it also signaled that not all issues survive the death of an appellant, 
stating:  "The issues may be fully reviewed and adjudicated when doing so is in the 
public interest or when it is in the interest of the appellant's family and estate." (Emphasis 
added.) 297 Kan. 634, Syl. ¶ 1. The Karson court opted to address the merits of the 
appeal because the issues raised presented matters of public importance. 297 Kan. at 638. 
 
The next year, in Hollister, we solidified the approach suggested in Karson—that 
not all issues raised in a criminal appeal would be addressed after a defendant's death. We 
recognized Karson's approach was "consistent with this court's broader approach to 
addressing moot issues in other contexts." Hollister, 300 Kan. at 467. So, based on 
mootness jurisprudence, Hollister identified several criteria for appellate courts to apply 
in determining which issues to address when a criminal defendant dies during the 
pendency of an appeal. "[A]n appellate court should consider whether an issue:  (1) is of 
statewide interest and of the nature that public policy demands a decision, such as those 
issues that would exonerate the defendant; (2) remains a real controversy; or (3) is 
capable of repetition." 300 Kan. at 467. And Hollister held "[o]nly issues meeting one of 
these criteria should be addressed." 300 Kan. at 467. 
 
Applying those criteria in Hollister, the court addressed only the defendant's 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence because it was the only issue that might 
exonerate him—that is, an issue that remained a real controversy. We held the 
defendant's other claims of trial error would not exonerate him; rather, a finding of error  
"would require a remand for a new trial . . . but a new trial would be impossible given 
[the defendant's] death." 300 Kan. at 467. We also held the other issues were too case-
specific to settle any issues of statewide interest or capable of repetition. 300 Kan. at 467.  
 
9 
 
 
 
Then-Justice Luckert dissented. She acknowledged Kansas courts had traditionally 
held that the death of a criminal defendant during the pendency of an appeal does not 
automatically abate the appeal, but she argued the flaw in this approach is that "without 
the defendant there is no one to pursue the appeal." 300 Kan. at 472 (Luckert, J., 
dissenting). She also noted that other jurisdictions allowing appeals to continue provide 
for substitution, but Kansas had no procedural mechanism to substitute a party for the 
deceased defendant in a criminal appeal. 300 Kan. at 473 (Luckert, J., dissenting). Then-
Justice Luckert would have "follow[ed] the lead of the federal courts and most other 
courts and appl[ied] the doctrine of abatement ab initio." 300 Kan. at  474 (Luckert, J., 
dissenting). 
 
These decisions confirm the court's long-standing commitment to the rule that 
criminal appeals do not automatically abate upon the death of the defendant. See Karson, 
297 Kan. at 637. And over 10 years ago in Karson and Hollister, we refined this 
approach by adding certain criteria to limit the issues an appellate court may address out 
of mootness concerns. See Hollister, 300 Kan. at 467.  
 
Defense counsel now asks us to overrule Hollister and adopt a different approach 
to handling criminal appeals after a defendant's death. To do so, however, we would need 
to be clearly convinced Hollister was originally erroneous or unsound due to changing 
conditions and that more good than harm would come from departing from established 
precedent. McCullough, 308 Kan. at 1036. Moeller has not persuaded us that any of these 
conditions have been met.  
 
C. Stare Decisis Warrants Our Continued Adherence to Hollister  
 
As part of our stare decisis analysis, we must first consider whether Hollister was 
originally erroneous or is no longer sound due to changing conditions and then assess 
10 
 
 
 
whether more good than harm would come from overruling the precedent. See 
McCullough, 308 Kan. at 1036. 
 
1. We Are Not Clearly Convinced Hollister Was Originally Erroneous or 
Is Unsound Due to Changing Conditions 
 
Defense counsel urges us to overrule Hollister because he believes it creates 
ethical and practical problems for attorneys appointed to represent criminal defendants on 
appeal. Counsel claims "the application of Hollister by the Court of Appeals in this case 
and others requires appointed counsel to conduct factual investigation regarding their 
own clients (even though appointed counsel lacks investigative resources) and report 
potentially adverse facts to the appellate court." According to counsel, the panel's order 
directing him to investigate Moeller's death created a conflict of interest between him and 
his client and required him to disclose potentially confidential communications. And he 
claims these problems stem from Hollister because under that decision, the defendant's 
death is now an "adverse fact" because it may prevent an appellate court from addressing 
all issues raised by the defendant on appeal. 
 
It is unclear to us whether the Court of Appeals' order created an ethical dilemma 
for defense counsel. We note that the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 
allow (but do not require) an attorney to reveal information relating to the client's 
representation in response to a court order. See KRPC 1.6(b)(4) (2024 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 
333); see also KRPC 1.6, comment 25 (2024 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 338). If an attorney 
believes a court order requires him or her to reveal information protected from disclosure, 
the attorney may assert that claim in his or her response. KRPC 1.6, comment 23 (2024 
Kan. S. Ct. R. at 337). And in the event of an adverse ruling, the attorney may seek 
review. KRPC 1.6, comment 23 (2024 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 337). This procedure was not 
followed in this case.  
 
11 
 
 
 
In any event, the argument is a red herring as it pertains to a stare decisis analysis. 
Any purported ethical dilemma arises from a Court of Appeals practice that is not 
mandated by Hollister. Hollister did not impose an obligation on criminal defense 
attorneys to investigate and report on a client's death. Nor does Hollister compel courts to 
order criminal defense attorneys to do so. Thus, we are unpersuaded that the purported 
ethical conflict created by the panel's order establishes that Hollister was originally 
erroneous. 
 
Furthermore, Hollister is consistent with our mootness jurisprudence. We have 
held that "'[a]n appellate court may sometimes elect to entertain issues which, although 
moot, are subjects of real controversy and include issues of statewide interest and 
importance'" or are "capable of repetition." Smith v. Martens, 279 Kan. 242, 244, 106 
P.3d 28 (2005). The criteria identified in Hollister accurately reflect this jurisprudence. 
 
We recognize the Hollister rule does not answer the question of who is left to 
pursue the appeal. As then-Justice Luckert pointed out, a criminal defendant's death 
"leaves no one as the appellant and [the defendant's] attorney without a client." Hollister, 
300 Kan. at 473 (Luckert, J., dissenting). And because the attorney-client relationship is 
one of agency and ordinarily ends with the client's death, the attorney generally lacks 
authority to continue to act on behalf of the deceased defendant. See State v. Dickens, 214 
Kan. 98, 102, 519 P.2d 750 (1974). Nor does the defendant's death "transform the State—
as representative of the public—into an appellant." Hollister, 300 Kan. at 473 (Luckert, 
J., dissenting). And "Kansas statutes do not provide a criminal procedure for substituting 
a party in a criminal defendant's appeal." 300 Kan. at 473 (Luckert, J., dissenting). 
 
But the question of who has authority to pursue a criminal appeal after the 
defendant's death is a separate question from whether Hollister's abatement rule was 
originally erroneous or unsound due to changing legal conditions. In fact, some states that 
allow substitution in criminal appeals also apply the same criteria in Hollister to decide 
12 
 
 
 
which issues remain justiciable controversies. See State v. Reed, 248 Ariz. 72, 80-81, 456 
P.3d 453 (2020) (allowing substitution in criminal appeal after defendant's death but also 
applying criteria identified in Hollister). So, resolving the open question of who has 
authority to pursue a criminal appeal after the defendant's death would not answer the 
first prong of our stare decisis framework.  
 
Moreover, Hollister has not proven to be unworkable, notwithstanding the 
unresolved question of who is left to pursue the appeal. See State v. Sims, 308 Kan. 1488, 
1504, 431 P.3d 288 (2018) (this court is "not constrained to follow precedent when 
'governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned'"). Kansas courts have applied 
Hollister in several cases, allowing some appeals to proceed as to certain issues while 
finding others entirely moot. Compare State v. Belt, 305 Kan. 381, 382, 381 P.3d 473 
(2016) (addressing some of defendant's issues on appeal after defendant's death but 
dismissing others as moot); State v. Lingenfelter, No. 121,953, 2021 WL 1836441, at *2-
4 (Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished opinion) (same), with State v. Baker, No. 119,832, 2020 
WL 1649850, at *7 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion) (dismissing all issues raised 
by defendant as moot after defendant's death); State v. Cada, No. 111,440, 2016 WL 
367999, at *2 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion) (same). And neither the appellate 
courts nor the parties in those cases identified any difficulty in applying Hollister.  
 
As for changing conditions, there have been no developments in our mootness 
jurisprudence that would undermine the rationale of Hollister. See, e.g., State v. Roat, 
311 Kan. 581, 590, 466 P.3d 439 (2020) (recognizing Kansas courts will address issues 
that are otherwise moot but are capable of repetition and present concerns of public 
importance). And Kansas has always been among a minority of states that allow criminal 
appeals to continue after a defendant's death. See Hollister, 300 Kan. at 466 (recognizing 
that "Kansas and a few other states" allow appellate courts to consider the merits of the 
appeal after a defendant dies); see also State v. Al Mutory, 581 S.W.3d 741, 752-55 
13 
 
 
 
(Tenn. 2019) (collecting cases). Thus, there has been no trend away from our current 
approach that would suggest Hollister is now unsound. 
 
2. We Are Not Clearly Convinced More Good Than Harm Would Come 
from Overruling Hollister 
 
We are also not clearly convinced more good than harm would come from 
overruling Hollister because Hollister strikes a fair balance between the numerous 
competing interests at stake in a criminal appeal. See McCullough, 308 Kan. at 1036 
(court may depart from precedent if clearly convinced more good than harm would come 
from overruling it). For example, some states dismiss criminal appeals upon the death of 
the defendant, leaving the conviction intact. See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 481 Mass. 
582, 590 n.14, 118 N.E.3d 107 (2019) (listing cases). But this approach disregards the 
defendant's right to appeal. And while that right is statutory and not constitutional, see 
State v. Rocheleau, 307 Kan. 761, 763-64, 415 P.3d 422 (2018), it is nevertheless "an 
integral part of the judicial process." Hollister, 300 Kan. at 474 (Luckert, J., dissenting); 
see also Al Mutory, 581 S.W.3d at 754 (recognizing "state courts have allowed appeals as 
of right from a conviction to continue because they find the right to appeal is far too 
valuable to be lost at death").  
 
A defendant's family will often have an interest in the outcome of an appeal as 
well. Criminal convictions and sentences are often accompanied by a financial 
component, such as restitution, and these financial obligations may fall upon the 
defendant's estate in the event of the defendant's death. See State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 
764 (Alaska 2011). "The right to inherit, or to take by will or otherwise, may be affected" 
by the criminal conviction. Jones, 220 Kan. at 137; see K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 59-513. And 
the defendant's family may also want to vindicate the name and reputation of their 
deceased relative. See State v. Makaila, 79 Haw. 40, 45, 897 P.2d 967 (1995). Simply 
dismissing the appeal after the defendant's death would disregard these interests. 
14 
 
 
 
 
Abating ab initio, on the other hand, would serve the interests of the defendant and 
the defendant's family, but it would disregard the interests of other parties. For instance, 
abating ab initio would ignore the State's interest in maintaining the defendant's 
conviction. See State v. Gleason, 349 So. 3d 977, 981 (La. 2022) (recognizing "the state 
has an interest in preserving a presumptively valid conviction"); Makaila, 79 Haw. at 45 
(same). And vacating a potentially valid conviction could have negative consequences for 
victims not only emotionally but also financially when restitution is ordered as part of the 
judgment. See Al Mutory, 581 S.W.3d at 749; see also Wheat v. State, 907 So. 2d 461, 
463 (Ala. 2005) (noting trend away from abatement ab initio likely to continue as "the 
courts and public begin to appreciate the callous impact such a procedure necessarily 
has on the surviving victims of violent crime"). 
 
We believe our current approach as exemplified in Hollister ably balances the 
competing interests of all the relevant parties. By not simply dismissing the appeal, the 
defendant and the defendant's family still have an opportunity to challenge the conviction 
and, in some cases, to ensure the constitutionality of criminal proceedings. See, e.g., 
Karson, 297 Kan. at 638 (addressing deceased defendant's claim that a law enforcement 
search violated the defendant's state and federal constitutional rights because the claim 
presented question of public importance). And by not abating ab initio, our current 
approach honors the interests of the State and any victims.  
 
Defense counsel argues more good than harm would come from overruling 
Hollister in favor of the doctrine of abatement ab initio. We recognize abatement ab initio 
is the rule in federal courts, at least as to appeals as of right. Libous, 858 F.3d at 66. And 
about a third of our sister states and the District of Columbia follow the doctrine. See 
People v. Schaefer, 208 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1287, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497 (2012); People 
v. Johnson, 499 P.3d 1045, 1047 (Colo. 2021); Lee v. United States, 257 A.3d 1023, 1024 
(D.C. 2021); People v. Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d 461, 464, 719 N.E.2d 662 (1999); State v. 
15 
 
 
 
Holbrook, 261 N.W.2d 480, 481 (Iowa 1978); State v. Carter, 299 A.2d 891, 895 (Me. 
1973); State v. Burrell, 837 N.W.2d 459, 470 (Minn. 2013); State v. Mott, 569 S.W.3d 
555, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019); State v. Campbell, 187 Neb. 719, Syl., 193 N.W.2d 571 
(1972); State v. Poulos, 97 N.H. 352, 354, 88 A.2d 860 (1952); People v. Nowell, 80 
Misc. 3d 689, 695, 195 N.Y.S.3d 413 (Sup. Ct. 2023); State v. Dixon, 265 N.C. 561, 562, 
144 S.E.2d 622 (1965); State v. Marzilli, 111 R.I. 392, 393, 303 A.2d 367 (1973); State v. 
Clark, 260 N.W.2d 370, 370-71 (S.D. 1977); State v. Free, 37 Wyo. 188, 188, 260 P. 173 
(1927). 
 
But there has been a marked trend away from abatement ab initio among the states 
in recent years. See Nowell, 80 Misc. 3d at 695-706  (recognizing trend away from 
abatement ab initio but ultimately adhering to binding precedent adopting doctrine); Al 
Mutory, 581 S.W.3d at 748 n.7, 750. Since we issued Hollister, five states have explicitly 
overruled precedent applying the doctrine of abatement ab initio. See Gleason, 349 So. 
3d at 982-83; Hernandez, 481 Mass. at 599; Payton v. State, 266 So. 3d 630, 640 (Miss. 
2019); Al Mutory, 581 S.W.3d at 750; Majors v. State, 465 P.3d 223, 225 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 2020). And one state declined to adopt the doctrine as a matter of first impression. 
State v. Isaak, 988 N.W.2d 250, 253-54 (N.D. 2023).  
 
Indeed, many courts consider the doctrine to be out-of-step with modern trends 
toward recognizing victims' rights and providing restitution. See Al Mutory, 581 S.W.3d 
at 749; Payton, 266 So. 3d at 639. Kansas has enacted constitutional and statutory 
protections to victims in criminal proceedings. See Kan. Const. art. 15, § 15(a); K.S.A. 
74-7333 (entitled "[b]ill of rights for victims of crime"). And Kansas statutes generally 
require sentencing courts to impose restitution as a part of a defendant's sentence. K.S.A. 
21-6604(b)(1); K.S.A. 21-6607(c)(2). We are not persuaded abatement ab initio is 
consistent with these constitutional and statutory protections.  
 
16 
 
 
 
 
Defense counsel also suggests more good than harm would come from overruling 
Hollister and following those states that allow a criminal appeal to continue after the 
defendant's death with substitution of another party. As we noted above, the question of 
who has authority to pursue a criminal appeal after the defendant dies is separate from the 
question of whether our position on abatement is correct.  
 
Moreover, many of these states have procedural rules that allow for substitution of 
a party during the pendency of an appeal. See, e.g., Fiveash v. State, 458 S.W.3d 774, 
775 n.1 (2015); Makaila, 79 Haw. at 45; Surland v. State, 392 Md. 17, 36, 895 A.2d 1034 
(2006); Payton, 266 So. 3d at 640-41; State v. McGettrick, 31 Ohio St. 3d 138, 142, 509 
N.E.2d 378 (1987); State v. Webb, 167 Wash. 2d 470, 478, 219 P.3d 695 (2009). Kansas 
currently has no such rule. See Hollister, 300 Kan. at 473 (Luckert, J., dissenting) (noting 
"Kansas statutes do not provide a criminal procedure for substituting a party in a criminal 
defendant's appeal"). 
 
 
To overcome this obstacle, defense counsel argues K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-225 
provides for substitution in criminal appeals. That statute allows for substitution after a 
party's death in civil cases. K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-225(a). And the statute has been 
applied in civil appeals. See Seal v. Seal, 212 Kan. 55, 56, 510 P.2d 167 (1973); Long v. 
Riggs, 5 Kan. App. 2d 416, 418, 617 P.2d 1270 (1980), overruled on other grounds by 
Graham v. Herring, 297 Kan. 847, 305 P.3d 585 (2013).  
 
Even though K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-225 is a rule of civil procedure, defense 
counsel notes we have "held in the past that the code of civil procedure may apply in 
criminal proceedings when the code of criminal procedure provides no contrary 
provisions." State v. Edwards, 299 Kan. 1008, 1016, 327 P.3d 469 (2014). And under 
K.S.A. 22-3606, the Legislature has provided that the statutes and rules governing civil 
appeals apply to criminal appeals.  
 
17 
 
 
 
 
We question the wisdom of applying a rule of civil procedure to this criminal 
appeal because doing so may create more problems than it solves. For instance, could the 
State move for substitution under the statute even if no other party wished to prosecute 
the appeal? Would the substituted party have a right to appointed counsel? And who 
would pay for the attorney's services if there were insufficient funds in the defendant's 
estate? We believe these contingencies are best addressed through the rule-making or 
legislative process rather than by judicial fiat. See Hernandez, 481 Mass. at 599-600 
(declining to interpret rule of civil procedure as allowing substitution in criminal appeals 
because "[g]iven the practical considerations involved . . . the Legislature would be the 
appropriate body to adopt that particular approach"). 
 
 
In the end, Hollister ably synthesizes a long-established court policy on the 
treatment of criminal appeals after a defendant's death with our mootness jurisprudence. 
It also establishes an appropriate equilibrium among the opposing interests involved in a 
criminal appeal. Hollister was issued 10 years ago and in that time the decision has not 
proven to be difficult to administer or otherwise unworkable. We are not convinced that 
Hollister was originally erroneous or unsound due to changing conditions. And we are 
not persuaded that defense counsel's proposed alternatives would be superior to our 
current approach to abatement issues. Thus, we continue to adhere to Hollister under the 
doctrine of stare decisis. 
 
II. There Was Sufficient Evidence to Support Moeller's Conviction 
 
Next, Moeller argues there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for 
securities fraud under K.S.A. 17-12a501(3). This issue is not moot because a potential 
finding of insufficient evidence would be the first step toward exonerating Moeller, and 
under Hollister and our mootness doctrines, exoneration remains a "case or controversy"  
18 
 
 
 
even after death. See 300 Kan. at 468. But before addressing the merits of Moeller's 
sufficiency challenge, we will review some additional relevant facts and identify the 
relevant legal framework applicable to Moeller's challenge. 
 
A. Additional Facts 
 
Moeller had a business buying surplus inventory from stores and reselling it for a 
profit. He arranged to buy $9,500-worth of carpet remnants from Carpet Factory and 
resell them. Moeller later claimed the carpet remnants he picked up were not the ones he 
originally agreed to buy so he did not pay for them. Carpet Factory reported the incident 
to law enforcement, and the State charged Moeller with felony theft.  
 
 
While Moeller's theft charges were still pending, Moeller spoke with one of his 
employees, Mike Maxie, and Maxie's ex-girlfriend, Diane Brunner. Brunner had just 
cashed out her IRA and was looking to invest the money somewhere. Brunner understood 
"investing" to mean "make money off my money."  
 
Moeller told Brunner about his business idea "Blade Caddy," which she assumed 
was a carrying case for a saw blade. Moeller said he needed a few investors to get the 
business started. While Moeller did not specifically ask Brunner for money, he told 
Brunner, "[Y]ou have to put in money for this investment if you want to invest in this." 
He explained there would not be any profits for a few months while he got the business 
off the ground, but then he would repay any money she invested along with some of the 
profits. Brunner thought it sounded like a good idea, but she was not sure she could trust 
Moeller because she did not know him very well. She asked Maxie, and he said he 
thought it was a legitimate investment. Brunner wrote Moeller a check for $9,500 and 
wrote "Blade Caddy" on the memo line. Brunner wrote the check expecting to get her 
money back plus some of the profits based on how well the product sold.  
 
19 
 
 
 
 
The next day, Moeller cashed Brunner's check and used the proceeds to obtain a 
cashier's check to pay the outstanding balance Moeller owed to Carpet Factory. After 
Moeller repaid Carpet Factory, his theft charge was dismissed.  
 
 
Over the next several months, Moeller repaid Brunner about $3,000 but only after 
Brunner pestered him about the status of her investment. She eventually reported the 
incident to the Kansas Securities Commission, and Special Agent Chad Entsminger 
investigated the complaint. During a phone call, Moeller told Entsminger that Brunner 
had not made an investment; rather, the two had made a personal deal based on an idea he 
had that could make them both some money. He denied the deal had anything to do with 
Blade Caddy, and he claimed he had had nothing to do with Blade Caddy for 20 years. In 
a later phone call, Moeller told Entsminger that Brunner had "invested" but Moeller had 
paid back some of Brunner's money. Moeller also mentioned there were two other 
investors, but he did not specify what Brunner and the other investors had invested in.  
 
 
The State charged Moeller with securities fraud, or in the alternative, theft by 
deception. The case went to a bench trial. The State called several witnesses including 
Brunner and Special Agent Entsminger. Moeller also testified in his own defense. He 
explained he had originally patented the Blade Caddy in 1989 but the patent was now 
expired. He denied asking Brunner to invest in Blade Caddy. Rather, he said he told 
Brunner he would like to borrow some money, but he never told her what the money was 
for. He also claimed the money was just a loan, and he had paid Brunner back in full.  
 
 
The district court found Moeller guilty of securities fraud under K.S.A. 17-
12a501(3). On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed Moeller's conviction, concluding it 
was supported by sufficient evidence. Moeller, 2023 WL 4278212, at *3-5.  
 
20 
 
 
 
Moeller now challenges the panel's holding. He claims the evidence does not show 
he acted with "fraud or deceit" within the meaning of the securities fraud statute. He also 
argues his transaction with Brunner was simply a loan and did not involve a security. 
 
B. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Framework 
 
"When a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to 
support a conviction, an appellate court looks at all the evidence 'in a light most favorable 
to the State to determine whether a rational factfinder could have found the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Harris, 310 Kan. 1026, 1030, 453 P.3d 1172 
(2019). An appellate court generally will not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary 
conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations. State v. Pepper, 317 Kan. 770, 777, 
539 P.3d 203 (2023). 
 
To the extent this issue also requires interpretation of statutes, that is a question of 
law subject to unlimited review. State v. Stoll, 312 Kan. 726, 736, 480 P.3d 158 (2021). 
Additionally, Kansas has adopted the 2002 Uniform Securities Act, and we "often look to 
decisions from other courts as persuasive authority when interpreting uniform laws." 
State v. Lundberg, 310 Kan. 165, 170-71, 445 P.3d 1113 (2019).  
 
C. Moeller's Conduct Meets the Definition of "Fraud or Deceit" 
 
Moeller was convicted of violating K.S.A. 17-12a501(3), which provides, "It is 
unlawful for a person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of a security, 
directly or indirectly . . . to engage in an act, practice, or course of business that operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon another person." 
 
Moeller first argues the evidence fails to show he engaged in "an act [of] . . . fraud 
or deceit" within the meaning of K.S.A. 17-12a501(3) because the evidence does not 
21 
 
 
 
show he said anything to Brunner that misled or deceived her in order to obtain her 
money. The panel rejected this argument, holding "Moeller's diversion of Brunner's 
'investment' to take care of his personal financial obligations amounted to . . . [an] act . . . 
of 'fraud' or deceit'" under the statute. Moeller, 2023 WL 4278212, at *3. 
 
Moeller bases his argument on the interpretation of the words "fraud or deceit" in 
K.S.A. 17-12a501(3). When interpreting statutes, our guiding principle is that the 
Legislature's intent governs if that intent can be ascertained. State v. Strong, 317 Kan. 
197, 203, 527 P.3d 548 (2023). "In ascertaining legislative intent, courts begin with the 
statute's plain language, giving common words their ordinary meaning. If, however, the 
statute's language is ambiguous, courts may consult canons of construction to resolve the 
ambiguity." 317 Kan. at 203. 
 
The Kansas Uniform Securities Act (the Act), K.S.A. 17-12a101 et seq., provides 
only that the terms "fraud," "deceit," and "defraud" as used in the Act are not limited to 
common law deceit. K.S.A. 17-12a102(9). This suggests the words "fraud" and "deceit" 
as used in K.S.A. 17-12a501(3) bear their "'ordinary, contemporary, common 
meaning[s]'" rather than a specific legal meaning. Midwest Crane & Rigging, LLC v. 
Kansas Corporation Comm'n, 306 Kan. 845, 851, 397 P.3d 1205 (2017). And we have 
recognized dictionaries are a good source for the ordinary meanings of words. 306 Kan. 
at 851. Black's Law Dictionary defines "fraud" as "[a] knowing misrepresentation or 
knowing concealment of a material fact made to induce another to act to his or her 
detriment" and "deceit" as "[t]he act of intentionally leading someone to believe 
something that is not true; an act designed to deceive or trick." Black's Law Dictionary 
802, 510 (11th ed. 2019). 
 
Here, the evidence shows Moeller's actions were designed to deceive or trick 
Brunner. Brunner testified Moeller told her about the Blade Caddy business as an 
investment opportunity, and she wrote a check to him for the purpose of investing in that 
22 
 
 
 
business. Her testimony is corroborated by the check, on which she had written "Blade 
Caddy" on the memo line. Both witness testimony and documentary evidence show 
Moeller did not invest that money in the Blade Caddy business. Instead, he used 
Brunner's money to repay Carpet Factory. In turn, Moeller's theft charges were dismissed. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence Moeller devoted any time or money to the Blade 
Caddy business besides securing a patent over 20 years earlier. Viewing this evidence in 
a light most favorable to the State, a rational fact-finder could conclude Moeller engaged 
in an act that operated as a fraud or deceit on Brunner.  
 
Moeller claims the evidence is insufficient because he never said anything to 
Brunner about Blade Caddy. He also highlights Brunner's testimony that she would not 
have invested if Maxie had not told her it was a good investment. But these arguments 
are just invitations to reweigh the evidence, which appellate courts do not do. Pepper, 
317 Kan. at 777. Furthermore, even if Moeller had not made any fraudulent or deceitful 
representations to induce Brunner's investment at the outset, his act of cashing Brunner's 
check and using the money to pay off a personal financial obligation provides sufficient 
evidence of a deceitful act under K.S.A. 17-12a501(3). And while Brunner may not have 
agreed to hand over her money without Maxie's approval, that fact does not render 
Moeller's conduct any less fraudulent or deceitful.  
 
D. The Transaction Between Brunner and Moeller Involved the Sale of a Security 
in the Form of an Investment Contract 
 
Moeller next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence proving his fraudulent 
conduct occurred "in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of a security." K.S.A. 
17-12a501. The State charged Moeller with committing securities fraud in connection 
with the sale of a security in the form of an investment contract. See K.S.A. 17-
12a102(28) (defining "security" to include investment contracts). And the Court of 
Appeals held the evidence was sufficient to show Moeller's transaction with Brunner was 
23 
 
 
 
an investment contract. Moeller, 2023 WL 4278212, at *4-5. Moeller challenges the 
panel's conclusion, arguing the evidence shows Brunner loaned him the money for an 
unspecified purpose, not in connection with a security, i.e., an investment contract. 
 
For purposes of the Act, K.S.A. 17-12a102(28)(D) defines an "investment 
contract" as "an investment in a common enterprise with the expectation of profits to be 
derived primarily from the efforts of a person other than the investor." This statutory 
definition essentially codifies a four-part test this court adopted to determine if a 
particular financial transaction constitutes an investment contract. See Activator Supply 
Co. v. Wurth, 239 Kan. 610, 617, 722 P.2d 1081 (1986) (citing State ex rel. Owens v. 
Colby, 231 Kan. 498, 646 P.2d 1071 [1982]) ("investment contract" requires:  [1] an 
investment of money; [2] in a common enterprise; [3] with the expectation of future 
profits; and [4] from the efforts of others.); see also Colby, 231 Kan. at 502-04 (adopting 
test for investment contracts under federal securities law set forth in S.E.C. v. Howey Co., 
328 U.S. 293, 301, 66 S. Ct. 1100, 90 L. Ed. 1244 [1946]). Thus, to establish that 
Moeller's fraud occurred in connection with a security, the State needed to establish the 
existence of an investment contract by proving the following elements:  (1) Brunner 
made an investment; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with the expectation of profits; and 
(4) those profits were to be derived primarily from the efforts of another.  
 
Moeller challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the first two 
elements of an investment contract—that is, whether Brunner made an investment and 
whether that investment was in a common enterprise. But we agree with the Court of 
Appeals' conclusion that the State presented sufficient evidence as to both elements. 
 
First, the evidence was sufficient to show Brunner made an investment. The term 
"investment" is not statutorily defined, but we have interpreted the term in the context of 
the Act to mean that an "investor must commit his assets to the enterprise in such a 
24 
 
 
 
manner as to subject himself to financial loss." Wurth, 239 Kan. at 617 (citing Hector v. 
Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 [9th Cir. 1978]).  
 
 
Moeller likens his case to State v. Hood, 255 Kan. 228, 873 P.2d 1355 (1994). 
There, a man entered a written contract to purchase a percentage of his cousin's interest in 
a restaurant. The cousin then used the money from the sale for personal purposes. The 
Kansas Office of the Securities Commissioner concluded the two men had entered an 
investment contract and the cousin's conduct constituted securities fraud. But this court 
disagreed, explaining nothing in the terms of the written contract specified that the money 
from the sale was to be invested in the restaurant or to become part of its capital. 255 
Kan. at 232-33. 
 
Moeller claims that like Hood, he did not tell Brunner he would use the money for 
Blade Caddy. But this argument views the evidence in a light most favorable to Moeller, 
contrary to our standard of review. According to Brunner, Moeller told her he needed 
investors to get the Blade Caddy business off the ground and she would need to put 
money in if she wanted to invest in the business. She wrote "Blade Caddy" in the memo 
line of the check she gave to Moeller. And Special Agent Entsminger testified Moeller 
used the word "invest" when describing Brunner's act of giving Moeller money. Viewing 
this evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence establishes that Brunner 
invested in Moeller's fabricated startup. 
 
Moeller also argues Brunner did not make an "investment" because she did not 
subject herself to financial loss. He relies on Brunner's testimony indicating she did not 
intend to lose money and would not have invested in Blade Caddy if she thought she 
might lose money. But viewed in a light most favorable to the State, this testimony 
suggests Brunner expected Blade Caddy to be profitable—it does not prove she was not 
at risk of financial loss. See S.E.C. v. Rubera, 350 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (even 
though investors gave money to pay phone management program hoping to yield 
25 
 
 
 
financial gains and program offered buyback option, investors still subjected themselves 
to financial loss because they took on risk that individual phones would not be profitable, 
or the entire enterprise would fail).  
 
Second, Moeller argues the State failed to show his transaction with Brunner 
involved a common enterprise. K.S.A. 17-12a102(28)(D) defines a "common enterprise" 
as "an enterprise in which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with those of either 
the person offering the investment, a third party or other investors."  
 
As Moeller notes, courts have recognized a common enterprise may be shown in 
two different ways:  (1) horizontal commonality—an enterprise common to a group of 
investors; and (2) vertical commonality—an enterprise common to the investor and the 
seller, promoter, or some third party. See Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1455 (9th 
Cir. 1989). Some jurisdictions require horizontal commonality to establish a common 
enterprise while other jurisdictions recognize both horizontal and vertical commonality. 
Compare Stenger v. R.H. Love Galleries, Inc., 741 F.2d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1984) ("This 
Circuit has strictly adhered to a 'horizontal' test of common enterprise, under which 
multiple investors must pool their investments and receive pro rata profits."), with S.E.C. 
v. Infinity Group Co., 993 F. Supp. 321, 322 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (noting several federal 
circuit courts recognize vertical as well as horizontal commonality).  
 
We have not had occasion to interpret the statutory definition of "common 
enterprise" to determine the test for commonality under the Act. But the plain language 
of K.S.A. 17-12a102(28)(D) defines "common enterprise" to include both vertical and 
horizontal commonality. See Strong, 317 Kan. at 203 (when interpreting statutes, courts 
first look to plain language). Vertical commonality is encompassed in the phrase "an 
enterprise in which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with those of . . . the 
person offering the investment [or] a third party." K.S.A. 17-12a102(28)(D). And 
horizontal commonality is encompassed in the phrase "an enterprise in which the 
26 
 
 
 
fortunes of the investor are interwoven with those of . . . other investors." K.S.A. 17-
12a102(28)(D). And the statute's use of the phrase "either . . . or . . ." indicates the 
presence of just one type of commonality is sufficient to satisfy this element. See Garner, 
Garner's Modern English Usage 383 (5th ed. 2022) ("either . . . or . . ." frames two 
alternatives). Thus, the State can prove the existence of a common enterprise under the 
Act by proving either horizontal commonality or vertical commonality. See State v. 
Brown, 295 Kan. 181, 196-97, 200, 284 P.3d 977 (2012) (if statute lists options within a 
means, State need only provide sufficient evidence of one option to sustain conviction). 
 
And here, there is sufficient evidence of vertical commonality—that is, an 
enterprise in which Brunner's fortunes were interwoven with Moeller's. See K.S.A. 17-
12a102(28)(D); see also Hocking, 885 F.2d at 1455 (vertical commonality is shown by an 
enterprise common to the investor and the seller, promoter, or some third party). Brunner 
testified Moeller said he needed the money to get his Blade Caddy business started and 
once product began to sell, Brunner would receive a share of the profits. Thus, Brunner's 
prospect for financial gain was dependent on the success of Moeller's business. Because 
there is sufficient evidence of vertical commonality, the State provided evidence 
sufficient to establish the "common enterprise" element under K.S.A. 17-12a102(28)(D), 
and we need not address whether there was sufficient evidence of horizontal 
commonality.  
 
Moeller insists the evidence shows the money Brunner gave him was a loan and 
not an investment. And he testified to this fact at trial. But Brunner repeatedly testified 
that she "invested" or made an "investment" in Blade Caddy and that Moeller said she 
would receive her money back plus a portion of the profits. She also testified that Moeller 
said it would take several months for the business to get off the ground before it would 
generate profits for distribution. And when Moeller spoke with Special Agent 
Entsminger, Moeller did not describe the transaction as a loan. Rather, he said Brunner 
had "invested." Resolving all questions of credibility in favor of the State, as we must do, 
27 
 
 
 
this evidence would support a finding that Brunner made an investment in a common 
enterprise. See State v. Kuykendall, 264 Kan. 647, 651, 957 P.2d 1112 (1998) (On 
sufficiency review, "all questions of credibility are resolved in favor of the State."). 
 
Moeller does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the final two 
elements of an investment contract—that Brunner expected to profit and that the profit 
would come from the efforts of others. And our independent review of the record 
confirms there was sufficient evidence to support these elements.  
 
As a result, the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Moeller's conviction 
for securities fraud under K.S.A. 17-12a501(3). 
 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
* * * 
 
LUCKERT, C.J., dissenting:  For the reasons more fully explained in my dissent in 
State v. Hollister, 300 Kan. 458, 472-74, 329 P.3d 1220 (2014), I dissent. Regardless of 
the policy reasons for the majority's position, without a statutory process for continuing a 
criminal case after the defendant's death, Kansas appellate courts lack authority—or a 
statutory process—to consider this appeal.