Title: State v. Aaron A. Allen
Citation: 2010 WI 10
Docket Number: 2007AP000795
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 11, 2010

2010 WI 10 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP795 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Aaron Antonio Allen, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 11, 2010  
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis P. Moroney 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 10
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP000795  
(L.C. No. 
1995CF952095) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Aaron Antonio Allen, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 11, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   The members of the court disagree as to 
the disposition of petitioner Aaron Antonio Allen's motions for 
the recusal of Justice Michael J. Gableman citing the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution; Article I, Sections 
1 
and 8 
of 
the 
Wisconsin Constitution; and Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(g). 
¶2 
On February 4, 2010, Justice Michael J. Gableman 
informed the members of the court that he was withdrawing from 
participation in the court's consideration of Allen's recusal 
No. 
2007AP000795   
 
2 
 
motions and was withdrawing his separate written opinion.  Only 
six justices are therefore participating. 
¶3 
Three justices, Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, 
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, and Justice N. Patrick Crooks, would 
order briefs and oral argument, as the parties have requested.   
¶4 
Three justices, Justice David T. Prosser, Justice 
Patience 
Drake 
Roggensack, 
and 
Justice 
Annette 
Kingsland 
Ziegler, would issue an order denying the motions.   
¶5 
Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justices Bradley and 
Crooks write in support of their proposed disposition. 
¶6 
Justice Roggensack, joined by Justices Prosser and 
Ziegler, writes in support of their proposed disposition.  
¶7 
Individual writings by Justices Crooks, Prosser, and 
Ziegler are also filed. 
¶8 
Because the members of the court disagree as to the 
disposition of Allen's motions as set forth above, the motions 
are not granted.  No four justices have agreed to grant the 
motions.  
 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
1 
 
¶9 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.; ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.; N. 
PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, 
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, and Justice N. Patrick Crooks join 
this opinion and proposed order regarding Allen's recusal 
motions.1 
¶10 When Allen's pro bono counsel first filed recusal 
motions on April 17, 2009, challenging Justice Gableman's 
participation, perhaps none would have foreseen the extent to 
which these motions would challenge this court, and have 
challenged all of us, in the months that have followed, even 
though recusal issues have been percolating under and above the 
surface for many years.2 
                                                 
1 The words "recusal" and "disqualification" are effectively 
synonymous and often used interchangeably, as we use them here.  
Some do distinguish between the two words. "Whereas 'recusal' 
normally refers to a judge's decision to stand down voluntarily, 
'disqualification' has typically been reserved for situations 
involving the statutorily or constitutionally mandated removal 
of a judge upon the request of a moving party or its counsel."  
Richard 
E. 
Flamm, 
Judicial 
Disqualification: 
Recusal 
and 
Disqualification of Judges § 1.1 at 3 (2d ed. 2007); but see id. 
at 4 n.4 (noting some dissonant use of the terms). 
2 Some of these issues, which the court needs to resolve, 
have been identified at least since 1990.   It would have been 
better 
to 
address 
our 
recusal 
practice 
thoughtfully 
and 
prospectively rather than having to react when a particular 
motion challenges an individual justice.  See Appendix A, which 
reprints the entire texts of dissents in State ex rel. National 
Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Circuit Court for St. Croix County, 
No. 90-0935-W, unpublished order (Wis. S. Ct. May 29, 1990) 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
dissenting), 
and 
Matter 
of 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Crosetto, 160 Wis. 2d 581, 466 N.W.2d 879 
(1991) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting), relating to recusal. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
2 
 
¶11 On February 4, 2010, Justice Gableman withdrew from 
further participation in the court's consideration of Allen's 
recusal motions against Justice Gableman and withdrew his 
separate writing in this matter. 
¶12 Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler conclude 
that Justice Gableman need not have withdrawn from participating 
in deciding whether the court lacks jurisdiction (power) to 
consider Allen's recusal motions directed at Justice Gableman.  
See J. Roggensack, ¶¶196-197. 
¶13 Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler further 
determine (1) that this court cannot independently review a 
justice's decision to deny a recusal motion except to decide 
whether the individual justice made the determination that the 
motion 
required, 
although 
this 
court 
can 
and 
should 
independently review denials of recusal motions by elected 
judges of the circuit court and court of appeals; and (2) that 
Allen's recusal motions have no merit. 
¶14 During the court's long, drawn-out consideration of 
Allen's motions for his disqualification, Justice Gableman has 
alternated between participating and not participating in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
In 
Crosetto, 
the 
recusal 
motion 
asked 
each 
justice 
individually to recuse himself or herself.  The per curiam 
decision, which then-Justice Abrahamson did not join, reports 
that each justice individually responded.  No motion sought 
court review of these individual decisions.  Accordingly, 
because the question was not raised, neither the per curiam nor 
Justice Abrahamson's dissent addressed the issue of what a court 
should do when a motion asks the entire court to review an 
individual justice's recusal decision.  Justice Abrahamson's 
dissent proposed actions the court should take for handling 
recusal motions.   
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
3 
 
consideration of the recusal motions directed to the court, 
finally withdrawing from participation on February 4, 2010.3   
¶15 Allen's motions to Justice Gableman individually and 
to the court (on due process grounds) were filed on April 17, 
2009.  Nearly five months later, on September 10, 2009, Justice 
Gableman denied the recusal motion directed to him individually 
in a one-sentence order that contained no explanation.4  Thus, 
the recusal motion directed to the court on due process grounds 
was not really ripe for the court's consideration until Justice 
Gableman's September 10, 2009 denial of Allen's motion. 
¶16 On September 21, 2009, Allen filed a supplemental 
motion addressed to the court, requesting the court to review 
whether Justice Gableman had considered, as required by  Wis. 
Stat. § 757.19(2)(g), whether he could not or it appeared he 
could not act impartially.   
¶17 On 
January 
15, 
2010, 
Justice 
Gableman 
filed 
a 
supplement to his September 10 order, this time providing a 10-
                                                 
3 Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedure II.L. provides: 
"When a justice recuses or disqualifies himself or herself, the 
justice takes no further part in the court's consideration of 
the matter."  In previous cases, a challenged justice has not 
participated in determining the court's response to a motion 
challenging the justice.  See State v. Am. TV & Appliance of 
Madison, Inc., 151 Wis. 2d 175, 443 N.W.2d 662 (1989); City of 
Edgerton v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 190 Wis. 2d 510, 527 
N.W.2d 305 (1995); Jackson v. Benson, 249 Wis. 2d 681, 639 
N.W.2d 545 (2002); Donohoo v. Action Wis., Inc., 2008 WI 110, 
314 Wis. 2d 510, 754 N.W.2d 480. 
4 In her writing, Justice Roggensack mentions, in reference 
to the September 10, 2009 order, that Justice Gableman "had 
plenty of time to research and carefully consider the arguments 
made in support of and in opposition to the motion."  J. 
Roggensack, ¶242. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
4 
 
paragraph explanation for his decision to deny the recusal 
motion directed individually to him.  This supplemental order 
discusses the merits of Allen's allegations and concludes: "The 
allegations in Allen's motion are simply wrong."5   
¶18 On October 16, 2009, Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and 
Ziegler issued a press release, complaining that the court 
should have responded to Allen's motion within 5 weeks after 
April 17, 2009, when Allen's recusal motion was filed.  Their 
complaint about the process and their charges about delay ignore 
the obvious complexities and challenging nature of the issues 
presented.  The recusal issue was not ripe until Justice 
Gableman denied the recusal motion on September 10, 2009; 
Justice Gableman filed a supplemental order explaining his 
participation in the case on January 15, 2010.  Justice Gableman 
withdrew from participation in the court's consideration of 
Allen's recusal motions on February 4, 2010.  It should be clear 
to everyone that this has been a difficult and time-consuming 
process for all the justices. 
¶19 The writings of the three justices who do not join 
this opinion palpably demonstrate the difficulties they have 
                                                 
5 Although Justice Roggensack's writing purports to review 
whether Justice Gableman made the required determination about 
recusal under the statute, her writing fails to review Justice 
Gableman's January 15, 2010, supplemental order. 
In the Caperton case, discussed below, the challenged West 
Virginia justice also wrote an opinion explaining why he thought 
he should participate in the case's decision.  He, however, 
acknowledged that the West Virginia court had "authority under 
Aetna [Life Ins. Co. v Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821-22 (1986)] to 
remove me from the case."  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 
S.E.2d 223, 301 (W.Va. 2008) (Benjamin, C.J., concurring). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
5 
 
faced in joining together with one voice to respond to Allen's 
recusal motions directed to the court.  The three justices' 
writings have been a moving target, based on an ever-changing 
variety of rationales.    
¶20 The State requested that if the court were to give 
plenary consideration to Allen's recusal motions——and Justices 
Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler would have you believe that 
they 
have 
given 
plenary 
consideration——"such 
consideration 
should come only after full briefing and argument by the parties 
on the matter."6  Responding to similar motions in several other 
cases, the State's briefs have recognized that "the issues are 
                                                 
6 Plaintiff-Respondent 
[State]'s 
Response 
to 
Second 
Supplement to Motion for Recusal of Justice Michael Gableman, 
Directed to the Court as a Whole, filed Dec. 21, 2009.   
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
6 
 
potentially broad and deep, deserving of full briefing and oral 
argument."7  
¶21 We agree with Allen and the State about the need for 
full briefing and oral argument.   
¶22 The court should have ordered briefs in April 2009 
when Allen filed his first motions and the State responded.  The 
court did not.  The writings today show that the court's usual 
way of proceeding to decide matters, with briefs and oral 
argument, should be followed. 
¶23 Opinions of this court should not "reach out and 
decide issues" without the benefit of full briefing by the 
                                                 
7 State v. Sveum, No. 2008AP658-CR, Plaintiff-Respondent 
[State]'s Response to Petitioner's Motion to Disqualify Justice 
Michael J. Gableman, filed Jan. 4, 2010.  See also, State v. 
Carter, 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR, 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner 
[State]'s Response to Motion for Recusal of the Hon. Michael J. 
Gableman on Constitutional Grounds ("If the full court takes up 
the motion . . . a number of other issues . . . would have to be 
addressed by the court after full briefing by the parties."); 
State v. Cross, No. 2009AP3-CR, Plaintiff-Respondent [State]'s 
Response to Motion to Disqualify Justice Michael J. Gableman, 
filed Nov. 17, 2009 ("[T]he State respectfully identifies the 
following related issues: What are the proper governing legal 
standards?  Is an evidentiary hearing necessary? . . . How would 
Justice Gableman's disqualification affect . . . all judicial 
elections 
in 
Wisconsin? 
 
As 
[Defendant's] 
motion 
for 
disqualification reflects, the issues are potentially broad and 
deep, deserving of full briefing and argument"); State v. 
Dearborn, 
No. 
2007AP1894-CR, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
[State]'s 
Response to Motion to Disqualify Justice Michael J. Gableman, 
filed Dec. 4, 2009 (similar to Cross, supra); State v. Jones, 
No. 2008AP2342-CR, Plaintiff-Respondent [State]'s Response to 
Jones' Constitutional and Statutory Motions for Recusal of Hon. 
Michael J. Gableman, filed Dec. 28, 2009 (similar to Cross, 
supra); State 
v. 
Littlejohn, No. 2007AP900-CR, Plaintiff-
Respondent [State]'s Response to Motion to Disqualify Justice 
Michael J. Gableman, filed Dec. 4, 2009 (similar to Cross, 
supra). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
7 
 
parties.  See Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 
107, ¶335, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408 (Roggensack, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
¶24 "Sound judicial decision making requires 'both a 
vigorous prosecution and a vigorous defense' of the issues in 
dispute, Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419, 
98 S.Ct. 694, 699, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978), and a constitutional 
rule announced sua sponte is entitled to less deference than one 
addressed on full briefing and argument. Cf. Ladner v. United 
States, 358 U.S. 169, 173, 79 S.Ct. 209, 211, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 
(1958)"8 
                                                 
8 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520, 572 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring). Justice 
Souter states that in Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 173 
(1958), the Court declined "to address 'an important and 
complex' issue concerning the scope of collateral attack upon 
criminal 
sentences 
because 
it 
had 
received 
'only 
meagre 
argument' from the parties, and the Court thought it 'should 
have the benefit of a full argument before dealing with the 
question'." 
The United States Supreme Court has well expressed the 
value of briefing.  See, e.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 
(1988) ("This system is premised on the well-tested principle 
that truth——as well as fairness——is 'best discovered by powerful 
statements 
on 
both 
sides 
of 
the 
question.'" 
(citations 
omitted)); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) ("The 
system assumes that adversarial testing will ultimately advance 
the public interest in truth and fairness."); Mackey v. Montrym, 
443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) ("[O]ur legal tradition regards the 
adversary process as the best means of ascertaining truth and 
minimizing the risk of error . . . ."). 
See also Stephan Landsman, Readings on Adversarial Justice: 
The American Approach to Adjudication (1988); Jerold H. Israel, 
Cornerstones of the Judicial Process, Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y, 
Spring 1993, at 5; Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology and the 
Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 Ind. L. J. 301, 316-19 
(1989).  
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
8 
 
¶25 For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that it 
is not too late to order briefs and schedule oral argument on 
Allen's motions.  Indeed, key differing approaches in the 
writings issued today evidence the need for additional input.  
We conclude that the parties should be directed to file briefs 
in this court on the issues raised in the writings issued today, 
as well as the issues raised by Allen and by the State.  
¶26 Briefs would assist on four key issues:  
I 
Briefs are needed on Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and 
Ziegler's 
attempt to divide the legal questions 
presented into segments in a failed attempt to 
persuade Justice Gableman to participate on one issue 
(court jurisdiction) but refrain from participating on 
other issues in the disposition of Allen's recusal 
motions. (¶¶27-32) 
II 
Briefs are needed on the substantive issue of whether 
this court has jurisdiction (power) to decide recusal 
motions challenging the participation of a justice in 
a particular case.  Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and 
Ziegler's 
arguments 
do 
not 
analyze 
jurisdiction.  
Rather, they are directed at policy. (¶¶33-71) 
III 
Briefs are needed on the question of how to protect 
the rights of litigants to a fair, impartial Wisconsin 
Supreme Court if the justices are not willing to 
decide recusal motions challenging the participation 
of a justice. (¶¶72-88) 
IV 
Briefs are needed on whether the grounds upon which 
Allen's motions rest justify disqualifying Justice 
Gableman from sitting on the merits of Allen's 
case.(¶¶87-116) 
* * * * 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
9 
 
I 
¶27 First, briefs are needed on the three justices' 
attempt to divide the legal questions presented into segments to 
enable a challenged justice to participate in the jurisdictional 
issue but refrain from participating in the disposition of the 
recusal motions.  
¶28 Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler try to 
articulate the question of the jurisdiction of this court as an 
abstract legal question that affects all justices equally, so 
that a challenged justice could participate on this issue.9  An 
examination is needed into whether a decision on the court's 
jurisdiction to review a justice's decision to participate 
really affects all justices equally.  We are reminded of George 
Orwell's Animal Farm:  "All animals are equal. But some animals 
are more equal than others."10   
¶29 Perhaps betraying the obvious fallacy of their claim 
that the question whether the court has jurisdiction to review a 
justice's decision to participate has an "equal affect on all 
justices," the three, try as they might, have been unable to 
address the question without offering a characterization of the 
specific circumstances and allegations presented in this case.11  
The allegations relate to one justice, not to the other six. 
¶30 The jurisdictional question raised in Allen's motions, 
no matter how phrased, is tied to the challenged justice's 
                                                 
9 J. Roggensack,  ¶¶196, 206. 
10 George Orwell, Animal Farm, ch. 10. 
11 J. Roggensack,  ¶¶202-205.   
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
10 
 
interests.  The law relating to recusal affects Justice Gableman 
personally and immediately.  The recusal motion challenges his 
participation in the present case and perhaps similar cases and 
rests on facts similar to those forming the basis of a Judicial 
Commission complaint against him pending before this court. At 
some time, every justice (as well as every appellate, circuit 
court, and municipal court judge in the state) may have a 
recusal motion directed to him or her.  All those who hold 
judicial office are therefore potentially affected by a decision 
about recusal.  But we are not affected by or interested in the 
jurisdictional issue and in the outcome of Allen's recusal 
motions in the same immediate way as Justice Gableman.  Justice 
Gableman was correct in withdrawing from participation in the 
court's decision on the recusal motions.  
¶31 It certainly appears that any challenged justice has a 
personal interest in the disposition of a recusal motion 
directed to him or her.  How can Justices Prosser, Roggensack, 
and Ziegler get around this fact?  Shouldn't the parties brief 
this issue?  Is there any case law on the issue? 
¶32 Furthermore, Justice Roggensack cites no authority for 
dividing the legal questions presented in a recusal motion into 
segments so that a challenged  justice may cast a vote on one 
issue (court jurisdiction), while being barred from casting a 
vote on other issues.  As best we can tell, the court has never 
subdivided a single matter before the court to accommodate an 
interested justice who wishes to cast a vote on a legal issue.  
Briefs are needed on this aspect of judicial disqualification. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
11 
 
II 
¶33 Second, briefs are needed on the substantive issue of 
whether this court has jurisdiction (power) to decide recusal 
motions challenging a member of the court.  This jurisdictional 
(power) issue was posed by Justice Roggensack.  It was not 
raised by the parties.  Allen and the State assumed the court 
has jurisdiction (power).12  Why shouldn't they? 
¶34 This court has jurisdiction over the Allen case and 
therefore has jurisdiction over all issues properly presented.  
It is well established that all Wisconsin courts, including 
municipal courts, have jurisdiction over federal constitutional 
claims.13   
¶35 Justice Roggensack's writing argues that "a majority 
of the justices on this court do not have the power to 
disqualify a fellow justice from participation in a proceeding 
before this court."  J. Roggensack, ¶207.  This statement 
appears to answer a jurisdictional question——"does the court 
have power to disqualify a justice?"  Yet the question is then 
analyzed not as a matter of the court's jurisdiction (or power) 
but as a question of judicial policy, that is, "should the 
court, as a matter of judicial policy, disqualify a justice?"   
                                                 
12 J. Roggensack, ¶195. 
13 In Milwaukee v. Wroten, 160 Wis. 2d 207, 222, 466 
N.W.2d 861 (1991), declaring that a municipal court has the 
power to declare a municipal ordinance unconstitutional, this 
court stated:  "[O]nce a court, including a municipal court, 
appropriately invokes its jurisdiction, it has the power to 
exercise all of its constitutional powers within the framework 
of that conferred jurisdiction." 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
12 
 
¶36 Justice Roggensack in fact acknowledges that the court 
has jurisdiction, at least for the limited review required by 
Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g).  Beyond that, the reasons offered for 
a lack of jurisdiction are policy reasons, including the 
inability to substitute a justice of this court, the differences 
between justices of this court and the elected judges of the 
circuit courts and court of appeals, and the "deeply divided" 
nature of the court's current membership.  J. Roggensack, ¶¶217-
218 & nn.9 & 10, ¶¶226-227.   
¶37 These arguments implicate judicial policy, or at most 
offer reasons why review of individual recusal decisions by this 
court might have negative consequences, and why Justices 
Prosser, Roggensack and Ziegler therefore choose not to provide 
such review.  See also J. Prosser, ¶¶248, 255-257.  But such 
analysis does not affect the jurisdiction, or power, of the 
court as an institution.   
¶38 We discuss whether such policy concerns can outweigh a 
litigant's right to a fair tribunal at ¶¶72 to ¶86, after we 
discuss the jurisdictional (power) question below. 
¶39 This court has exercised its jurisdiction to decide 
disqualification motions directed against individual justices at 
least since 1898, when it decided Case v. Hoffman, 100 Wis. 314, 
72 N.W. 390 (1897), reh'g granted, 74 N.W. 220 (1898).  In Case, 
the court had already rendered a decision.  After the decision 
was rendered, the court was asked to decide whether the author 
of the opinion (who died after the decision was released) had 
been disqualified from participating under what is now Wis. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
13 
 
Stat. § 757.19(2)(e), because he had previously decided the 
matter as a trial judge.  
¶40 The Case court declared that the deceased justice had 
individually decided before authoring the opinion that he could 
participate in the case: "[C]ertain we are that he concluded 
that he was not disqualified . . . ."14  Nevertheless the Case 
court then reviewed the deceased justice's decision regarding 
his ability to sit on the case and overturned the deceased 
justice's decision to participate, holding he had previously 
decided the matter as a trial judge.  The result was that the 
judgment in which the deceased justice participated was vacated 
and the cause reargued.  Thus in 1898 a majority of the court 
exercised power to disqualify a fellow justice by vacating the 
decision in which the justice had unlawfully participated.   
¶41 The court explained Case v. Hoffman, just as we have, 
in State v. American TV & Appliance of Madison, Inc., 151 
Wis. 2d 175, 
180, 
443 
N.W.2d 
662 
(1989), 
as 
follows: 
"Acknowledging the certainty that Judge Newman [the deceased 
justice] had concluded he was not disqualified and that it was 
his duty to participate in the decision, the court nevertheless 
held that Justice Newman was legally disqualified . . . ."15  
                                                 
14 Case v. Hoffman, 100 Wis. 314, 355, 72 N.W. 390 (1897), 
reh'g granted, 74 N.W. 220 (1898). 
15 Furthermore, in Jackson v. Benson, 2002 WI 14, ¶2, 249 
Wis. 2d 681, 
639 
N.W.2d 545, 
the 
court 
exercised 
its 
jurisdiction 
over 
a 
motion 
challenging 
Justice 
Wilcox's 
participation in a case and decided that the motion was not  
timely filed.  The court did not dismiss the motion for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
14 
 
¶42 In Donohoo v. Action Wisconsin, Inc., 2008 WI 110, 314 
Wis. 2d 510, 754 N.W.2d 480, Donohoo "assert[ed] that Justice 
Butler 
was 
disqualified 
by 
law 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(f) because of his substantial financial and personal 
interest in the outcome of the case . . . ."  Donohoo, 314 
Wis. 2d 510, ¶14.  This court applied an objective standard to 
the recusal motion based on § 757.19(2)(f) and after reviewing 
the facts concluded "that the facts alleged by Donohoo do not 
support a finding that Justice Butler was disqualified by law 
from participating in this matter."  Donohoo, 314 Wis. 2d 510, 
¶3.  Once again the court reviewed the merits of an allegation 
that a justice was statutorily disqualified.   
¶43 These cases demonstrate that our past review of 
individual justices' disqualification decisions has not been 
confined to a limited review of "whether that individual justice 
made the determination that the motion required," as Justice 
Roggensack asserts.16  The reference to the determination of an 
individual justice applies only to Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g), 
which is only one of the bases for disqualification and the only 
statutory disqualification provision that requires a judge to 
make a subjective determination.17    
                                                 
16 J. Roggensack, ¶208. 
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 757.19 creates a mandatory duty for 
judges to disqualify themselves in certain circumstances.  The 
full text of Wis. Stat. § 757.19(1)-(2) reads: 
757.19 Disqualification of judge.   
(1) In this section, "judge" includes the supreme 
court justices, court of appeals judges, circuit court 
judges and municipal judges. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
15 
 
¶44 Furthermore, 
even 
in 
disqualification 
motions 
involving the subjective determination of a justice under Wis. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) Any judge shall disqualify himself or herself from 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding when one of 
the following situations occurs: 
(a) When a judge is related to any party or 
counsel thereto or their spouses within the 3rd 
degree of kinship. 
(b) When a judge is a party or a material 
witness, except that a judge need not disqualify 
himself or herself if the judge determines that 
any pleading purporting to make him or her a 
party is false, sham or frivolous. 
(c) When a judge previously acted as counsel to 
any party in the same action or proceeding. 
(d) When a judge prepared as counsel any legal 
instrument 
or 
paper 
whose 
validity 
or 
construction is at issue. 
(e) When a judge of an appellate court previously 
handled the action or proceeding while judge of 
an inferior court. 
(f) When a judge has a significant financial or 
personal interest in the outcome of the matter. 
Such interest does not occur solely by the judge 
being a member of a political or taxing body that 
is a party.  
(g) When a judge determines that, for any reason, 
he or she cannot, or it appears he or she cannot, 
act in an impartial manner. 
This court has drawn a distinction between the "objective" 
and "subjective" criteria for mandatory disqualification based 
on the statutory language of Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(a)-(g).  Our 
past 
cases 
have 
held 
that 
the 
first 
six 
criteria 
for 
disqualification, Wis. Stat. § 757.19(a)-(f), "are susceptible 
of objective determination, that is, without recourse to the 
judge's state of mind."  Am. TV, 151 Wis. 2d at 175, 182. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
16 
 
Stat. § 757.19(2)(g),18 the court reviews the judge's subjective 
determination using objective standards.19  State v. Harrell, 199 
Wis. 2d 654, 663-64, 546 N.W.2d 115 (1996).20   
¶45 Thus, this court has provided a forum to determine 
whether a justice has violated an objective or subjective 
statutory ground of disqualification. 
¶46 Inasmuch as this court provides review of a justice's 
recusal decision on state statutory grounds, this court cannot 
discriminate against a due process disqualification challenge to 
a justice by refusing to review the federal constitutional 
issue.  "[T]he Federal Constitution prohibits state courts of 
general jurisdiction from refusing [to enforce a federal right] 
solely because the suit is brought under a federal law. . . . A 
                                                 
18 Section 757.19(2)(g) requires disqualification only "when 
a judge determines that, for any reason, he or she cannot, or it 
appears he or she cannot, act in an impartial manner"  (emphasis 
added). 
19 See State v. Am. TV, 151 Wis. 2d 175, 443 N.W.2d 662 
(1989); City of Edgerton v. Gen. Cas. Co., 190 Wis. 2d 510, 527 
N.W.2d 305 (1995); Donohoo v. Action Wis., Inc., 2008 WI 110, 
314 Wis. 2d 510, 754 N.W.2d 480. 
20 Justice Roggensack, ¶240, recognizes that an objective 
standard is used to determine whether Justice Gableman in fact 
made a subjective decision about his impartiality and his 
ability to participate in the present case under § 757.19(2)(g).   
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
17 
 
state may not discriminate against rights arising under federal 
laws."21  
                                                 
21 McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233-34 
(1934); see also Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990) ("The 
Supremacy Clause forbids state courts to dissociate themselves 
from federal law because of disagreement with its content or a 
refusal to recognize the superior authority of its source."); 
Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 
57 (1912). 
"Since shortly after the founding of the Republic, it has 
been well established that state courts are obliged to enforce 
applicable principles of federal law when they adjudicate state 
causes of action."  Martin H. Redish & John E. Muench, 
Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Courts, 75 
Mich. L. Rev. 311, 311 (1977) (citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)). 
This court declared in Terry v. Kolski, 78 Wis. 2d 475, 
482, 254 N.W.2d 704 (1977), that the federal constitution "not 
only 
permits 
state 
courts 
to 
exercise 
jurisdiction 
in 
enforcement of federal laws, to the extent permitted by 
Congress, but mandates that federal causes of action and federal 
rights, unless exclusively reserved to the federal courts, must 
be enforced by state courts."  Terry v. Kolski, 78 Wis. 2d at 
482 (quoting The Federalist Papers and Charles Dowd Box Co., 
Inc. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962):  "We start with 
the premise that nothing in the concept of our federal system 
prevents state courts from enforcing rights created by federal 
law.  Concurrent jurisdiction has been a common phenomenon in 
our judicial history, and exclusive federal court jurisdiction 
over cases arising under federal law has been the exception 
rather than the rule."). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
18 
 
¶47 Is there any guiding principle that differentiates 
between 
this 
court's 
power 
or 
jurisdiction 
when 
the 
disqualification 
challenge 
is 
based 
on 
statutory 
disqualification standards, whether objective or subjective, and 
when the challenge is based on the objective standard of the due 
process clauses of the federal and state constitutions?  Should 
a 
litigant 
challenging 
a 
justice's 
participation 
on 
constitutional grounds be due less process from this court when 
he alleges that the constitution has been violated than when he 
alleges that our statutes have?22   
                                                                                                                                                             
The doctrine that state courts must enforce federal claims 
has generally arisen not in cases involving constitutional 
claims, but in cases involving the authority and obligation of 
state courts to enforce federal statutes.  The general rule 
emanating from these cases is that unless Congress prohibits 
adjudication in a state court, "a state court cannot 'refuse to 
enforce the right arising from the law of the United States 
because of conceptions of impolicy . . . . '"  Testa v. Katt, 
330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947) (quoting Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. 
Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 222 (1916)).  This doctrine, 
developed with regard to state court implementation of federal 
statutes, clearly applies to the obligation of state courts to 
enforce federal constitutional rights. 
22 In addition, Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution guarantees that every person shall be afforded a 
remedy for wrongs committed against his or her person, property, 
or liberty.  "The court has long held that the 'certain remedy' 
clause of this provision, while not guaranteeing to litigants 
the exact remedy they desire, entitles Wisconsin residents 'to 
their day in court.'"  A litigant challenging a justice on due 
process grounds is entitled to a day in a Wisconsin court on the 
claim presented.  Estate of Makos v. Wis. Masons Health Care 
Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 552, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997) (citing Metzger 
v. Dep't of Taxation, 35 Wis. 2d 119, 129, 150 N.W.2d 431 
(1967).  For a lengthy discussion of Article I, Section 9, see 
Justice Crooks' concurrence in Estate of Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 
61-68. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
19 
 
¶48 Furthermore, in discussing the court's power over 
recusal motions, we should examine the court's judicial  powers.  
The court has inherent authority to ensure "that the court 
functions efficiently and effectively to provide the fair 
administration of justice."23  The court has stated that it "has 
express, 
inherent, 
implied and incidental judicial power.  
Judicial power extends beyond the power to adjudicate a 
particular controversy and encompasses the power to regulate 
matters related to adjudication."24  With regard to the explicit 
constitutional powers of this court, our court has stated that 
"the judiciary's 'superintending power is as broad and as 
flexible as necessary to insure the due administration of 
justice in the courts of this state.'"25  Moreover, the court has 
stated that "it was unsound jurisprudence to refuse to exercise 
judicial power where there was an established need for it and no 
explicit constitutional barrier to its exercise."26  Don't 
recusal motions addressed to the court establish a need for the 
court to exercise its judicial power?  Our colleagues are silent 
about the court's judicial powers. 
                                                 
23 City of Sun Prairie v. Davis, 226 Wis. 2d 738, 749-50, 
595 N.W.2d 635 (1999). 
24 State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 44, 315 N.W.2d 703 
(1982). 
25 Flynn v. Dep't of Admin., 216 Wis. 2d 521, 548, 576 
N.W.2d 245 (1998) (quoting In re Hon. Charles E. Kading, 70 
Wis. 2d 508, 520, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975)).  
26 In re Hon. Charles E. Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 523, 235 
N.W.2d 409 (1975). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
20 
 
¶49 Because this court has express, implied, incidental, 
and inherent powers; because the court has supervisory and 
administrative authority over all courts in Wisconsin, including 
the supreme court;27 because this court is obligated to support 
the United States Constitution as the supreme law of the land;28 
because each justice is required to and does take an oath to 
support the federal and state constitutions;29 because this court 
has inherent competency to adjudicate federal constitutional 
claims; because both the federal and state constitutions 
guarantee due process;30 and because this court decides motions 
to disqualify justices and other decision makers on objective 
and subjective statutory grounds and due process grounds, 
doesn't this court have not only the power (jurisdiction) to 
hear a due process recusal motion but also a constitutional 
obligation to hear Allen's motions and to decide whether a 
justice of this court is disqualified on due process grounds 
from sitting on a case?  It appears to us that the court does 
have such authority.  Briefs would help. 
¶50 Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler want us to 
believe that this court does not have the power to disqualify a 
justice, regardless of the nature of the allegations.  Yet they 
cite no statutory or constitutional provisions or case law, 
                                                 
27 Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(1). 
28 U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2 (supremacy clause). 
29 U.S. Const. art. VI, § 3; Wis. Const. art. IV, § 28. 
30 U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Wis. Const. art. I, § 8. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
21 
 
either in Wisconsin or in any other state or in the federal 
system, to support their assertion that the court lacks 
jurisdiction. 
¶51 They 
seem 
to 
imply 
that 
litigants 
seeking 
to 
disqualify an allegedly partial justice on the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court must look only to the Wisconsin Constitution, which 
provides 
for 
impeachment, the next election, disciplinary 
proceedings, 
address 
of 
the 
legislature, 
or 
a 
mandatory 
retirement age.31  Thus our colleagues confuse disqualifying a 
justice from participating in a case or a number of cases with 
removing a justice totally from office.  Allen has not sought 
Justice Gableman's removal from office; he asks removal only 
from the present case.   
¶52 Removal of a justice from office is a rare and extreme 
measure and is not a serious option for a litigant who has a 
                                                 
31 J. Roggensack, ¶224 & n.15.   
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
22 
 
pending case in the Wisconsin Supreme Court and seeks to be 
heard before a court composed only of impartial justices.32    
¶53 Are 
our 
three 
colleagues 
concluding 
that 
the 
constitutional means for removing a justice are the exclusive 
ways of excluding a justice from participation in a case on 
disqualification grounds?  If so, they cite no authority.  
Indeed, the court has summarized the cases as stating that "when 
a judge is removed, he must be removed by the constitutional 
method.  [Prior cases] do not say that sanctions short of 
removal are constitutionally defective."33 
¶54 Briefs 
are 
needed 
on 
whether 
the 
court 
has 
jurisdiction (power) over Allen's recusal motions under the 
                                                 
32 Constitutional grounds for impeachment are limited and 
are unlike the grounds for recusal.  The next elections for a 
member of this court are in April 2011, April 2013, and April 
2015.  The next election for Justice Gableman is about eight 
years away.  Our three colleagues forget (or deliberately 
ignore) that "[t]he Code of Judicial Ethics . . . has no effect 
on [a judge's] legal qualification or disqualification to 
act . . . ."  Am. TV, 151 Wis. 2d at 185.  Thus the Judicial 
Code route does not benefit a litigant like Allen who seeks an 
impartial tribunal. Am. TV, 151 Wis. 2d at 185.  "Address of the 
legislature" dates back to English law and to the original 1848 
Wisconsin constitution.  It allows removal of a judge from 
office by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to 
each house.  It has never been done.  William R. Moser, 
Populism, 
A 
Wisconsin 
Heritage: 
Its 
Effect 
on 
Judicial 
Accountability in the State, 66 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 12-19 (1982).  
The legislature has not enacted a mandatory retirement age for 
judges. 
The Wisconsin constitution and statutes also provide for 
removal by recall elections, another method unavailable to an 
individual litigant. 
33 In re Hon. Charles E. Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 522-23, 238 
N.W.2d 409 (1975).  
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
23 
 
court's express, inherent, implied, and incidental powers, and 
superintending and administrative authority, or whether the 
constitutional provisions on removal from office are exclusive, 
preempting the court's power to review a challenged justice's 
decision to participate in a case. 
¶55 Our three colleagues support their stunning, counter-
intuitive legal conclusion that this court lacks jurisdiction 
"by the past practices of this court and by the past, and 
current, practices of the United States Supreme Court."34  Yet 
they acknowledge that "practices do not establish precedent."35   
¶56 We have discussed the court's past practices in 
recusal.  See ¶¶39-45.  They do not support the position of the 
three justices.  
¶57 With regard to the practices of the United States 
Supreme Court, Justice Roggensack offers no reasons why the 
practice at the United States Supreme Court, whose rules, 
practices, jurisdiction, and powers are different from our own, 
should control the practice or jurisdiction of this court. 
¶58 In any event, the United States Supreme Court has not 
been consistent in handling motions addressed to the Court for 
recusal of a justice.  Sometimes the Court has a docket entry 
statement simply denying the motion seeking recusal of a 
                                                 
34 J. Roggensack, ¶207. 
35 J. Roggensack, ¶208. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
24 
 
justice, with the challenged justice apparently participating in 
the denial.36 
¶59 Other times the Court has a docket entry statement 
merely stating a denial of the motion by the challenged justice, 
with or without an explanation or statement by the challenged 
justice.37 
¶60 A different docket entry statement was used in Cheney 
v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
541 U.S. 913 (2004).  The first docket entry statement referred 
the motion addressed to the Court requesting Justice Scalia's 
recusal to Justice Scalia.38  This seems to make clear that the 
court as a whole took jurisdiction over the motion in the first 
instance.  Justice Scalia then individually denied the motion, 
                                                 
36 See, e.g., Ernest v. U.S. Attorney for the S. Dist. of 
Alabama, 474 U.S. 1016, (1985) (J. Powell); Kerpelman v. 
Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland, 450 U.S. 970 (1981) (C.J. 
Burger); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 409 U.S. 1029 (1972) 
(J. Powell & J. Rehnquist).  
Because the Court's denial of the recusal motion offers no 
explanation and does not show the reasoning of the justices in 
deciding the recusal motion, the assumption is that the 
individual justice's decision has not been subject to court 
review.  The failure of the Court to review an individual 
justice's decision on recusal motions has been criticized in the 
legal literature. 
37 See, e.g., Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 1301 (1980) (J. 
Rehnquist); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 901 (1972) (J. Rehnquist); 
Gravel v. United States, 409 U.S. 902 (1972) (J. Rehnquist); Guy 
v. United States, 409 U.S. 896 (1972) (J. Blackmum & J. 
Rehnquist). 
38 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 540 
U.S. 1217 (2004). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
25 
 
publishing a memorandum opinion.39  No court order was issued by 
the Court denying the motion.  
¶61  The citation by Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and 
Ziegler, ¶220, to Justice Jackson's concurring statement in 
Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 897 (1945), 
is misguided.  A concurrence by two justices lacks the authority 
of the Court.  In fact, when the Court decided Jewell Ridge, a 
majority of the justices refused to adopt an order which stated 
that the Court was "without the authority" to disqualify an 
individual justice.  See Appendix B, ¶¶138, 144 (citing William 
H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is 65-67 
(1987)).  We examine this incident in detail in Appendix B, 
¶¶140 to 148.  The Jewell Ridge concurrence is of historic 
interest, but has no legal significance or impact on this court. 
¶62 An examination of recusal practice at the United 
States Supreme Court reveals that even while the Court has, as a 
matter of tradition or general practice, left recusal decisions 
to individual justices, the Court appears always to have 
retained jurisdiction over recusal motions and maintained the 
authority to guarantee a fully qualified panel of justices.  At 
least once, the members of the Court have, by majority vote, 
curtailed another sitting justice (Justice William O. Douglas) 
from participation in the court's decisions.  See Appendix B, 
¶¶161-162. 
                                                 
39 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 541 
U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
26 
 
¶63 The parties should be invited to bring forth more 
information about the United States Supreme Court that may be 
helpful in informing this court about issues of jurisdiction and 
recusal practice.  It would be helpful for briefs to address 
whether, even if the United States Supreme Court were to disavow 
its authority to disqualify a justice, such a pronouncement 
would have a controlling effect on this court's jurisdiction, 
which rests on Wisconsin law.40 
¶64 Without briefs, Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and 
Ziegler have reached the extraordinary conclusion that this 
court never has power to guarantee that all members are 
impartial.  If they truly believe this, why would they not just 
dismiss or deny Allen's motions, explaining the court's lack of 
jurisdiction?41  But the justices do not take this course of 
action.  
                                                 
40 Looking beyond our own country's borders to other common 
law systems confirms that courts of ultimate jurisdiction will 
review recusal or disqualification motions relating to one of 
their own members.  "Courts of last resort in Australia, South 
Africa, and the United Kingdom all recognize the right of a 
petitioner to seek review of a negative recusal decision by a 
single high court judge."  R. Matthew Pearson, Note, Duck Duck 
Recuse? Foreign Common Law Guidance & Improving Recusal of 
Supreme Court Justices, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1799, 1828 
(2005). 
41 A dismissal of a recusal motion and a denial of a recusal 
motion have different meanings. In our appellate practice, 
denial of a motion, a petition for review, or an appeal 
addresses the merits of the issue presented.  In contrast, a 
dismissal of a motion, a petition for review, or an appeal 
ordinarily signifies that there is a defect in the filing or 
that the court lacks jurisdiction to reach the merits of the 
issue presented.  For a discussion of dismissal of an appeal, 
see 6A Callaghan's Wisconsin Pleading and Practice (With Forms) 
§§ 53.7-53.24 (Rev. 2005). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
27 
 
¶65 Rather, they base their decision to deny Allen's 
recusal motions on the substance of Allen's allegations.  The 
three conclude that Allen's motions are "legally insufficient to 
state a claim cognizable under the . . . federal and state 
constitutions,"42 and that "[n]o potential constitutional due 
process violation has been alleged here based on Justice 
Gableman's participation in Allen's case."43 
¶66 Thus, Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler have 
gone to extreme lengths to write on the court's jurisdiction 
over Allen's recusal motions addressed to the court, and then 
would not dispose of the motions on this basis.     
¶67 We have also explored the disqualification experience 
of other states.  Around the country and over the years, some 
state high courts have reviewed recusal decisions of their 
individual members; others have not.  See Appendix C , ¶¶172-
184.  Recusal practice and procedure has been a matter of 
tradition or prudential considerations, not an espousal of a 
lack of jurisdiction or power.  See Appendix C, ¶171 & n.39.44 
¶68 Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler have made no 
attempt 
to 
distinguish 
this 
court's 
supposed 
lack 
of 
jurisdiction (power) from the views of state supreme courts that 
                                                 
42 J. Roggensack, ¶199; see also id., ¶238. 
43 J. Roggensack, ¶237. 
44 For surveys of various recusal standards and practices in 
the states (focused mainly on the trial courts), see, e.g., 
Richard E. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification ch. 28 (2d ed. 
2007); Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges 
the Judges?, 28 Val. U. L. Rev. 543 (1993-94). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
28 
 
have acknowledged that they have such jurisdiction and have 
exercised it.  Rather than addressing or distinguishing the 
considerable authority that undermines their position, they 
simply ignore it. 
¶69 Nothing we have learned thus far about the recusal 
practices of other state supreme courts provides a reason for 
this court to divest itself of an important aspect of its 
established jurisdiction or to depart from its established 
practice of providing review of an individual justice's decision 
not to disqualify himself or herself, especially when a 
constitutional claim is argued.  In the wake of continuing 
concern about whether elected judges can be impartial, now is 
hardly the time to lessen our protections for impartial 
tribunals. 
¶70 In sum, the writings of Justice Prosser, Justice 
Roggensack, and Justice Ziegler on the court's jurisdiction over 
recusal motions appear to have three major flaws (among others): 
They assert that a challenged justice has no personal interest 
in deciding the issue of the court's jurisdiction.  Their 
writings have no support in the law.  Their writings on the 
court's jurisdiction (power) are not determinative of the issues 
presented by Allen's recusal motions.   
¶71 Briefs from adversarial parties are needed on the 
issue of the court's jurisdiction to review a challenged 
individual justice's decision to participate in a case. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
29 
 
III 
¶72 Third, we turn to the implications of a decision that 
the court must not exercise jurisdiction over recusal motions 
addressed to it.  Briefs are needed on how to protect the rights 
of litigants to a fair, impartial Wisconsin Supreme Court when 
the justices are not willing, as a matter of policy, to decide 
recusal motions challenging the participation of a justice in a 
particular case.  Allen and the State have assumed that the 
rights of litigants to an impartial tribunal trump the court's 
discomfort or anxiety about the consequences of judging one of 
its own. 
¶73 A motion challenging a justice's disqualification is 
disquieting to the challenged justice and to the other justices. 
Any question related personally to a fellow justice, whether 
recusal or violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, "is not 
only a serious one, but is also an unwelcome and a delicate one 
to his associates. . . .  But, unwelcome as the question is, it 
must be met, and it must be met squarely, and with a single 
desire to ascertain and administer the law as it is."45 
 
¶74 Recusal motions against a colleague and proposed rules 
about recusal pose significant personal and legal difficulties 
for all the justices.  These difficulties are exacerbated in the 
present case by the Judicial Commission's pending action against 
Justice Gableman for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  
                                                 
45 Case v. Hoffman, 100 Wis. 314, 354, 72 N.W. 390 (1897), 
reh'g granted, 74 N.W. 220 (1898). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
30 
 
The allegations in that matter share some factual basis with 
Allen's allegations for disqualification in the present order. 
¶75 Words cannot and do not fully capture our feelings of 
disquiet when we are asked to sit in judgment of a peer, knowing 
that we have worked with that justice and will continue to work 
with that justice for years to come.  We shall see the justice 
at every oral argument, court opinion decision conference, 
petition for review conference, ceremony to admit lawyers, rules 
hearing, open administrative conference, judicial conference, 
educational seminar, and other court and non-court functions. 
¶76 Despite the disquiet that a motion challenging a 
justice's disqualification causes, this court has stated that 
when a "movant has questioned the integrity of a justice of this 
court 
and 
hence 
the 
integrity 
of 
a 
decision 
of 
the 
court . . . [i]t behooves the court in the defense of its own 
legitimacy and of its integrity to consider such claims."46  
¶77 Yet Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler appear 
to conclude that policy reasons such as collegiality and public 
perception justify the court's not deciding recusal motions 
challenging a member of the court.47  The three justices seem to 
believe that independent review by the court of an individual 
justice's 
recusal 
decision 
might 
exacerbate 
the 
public 
                                                 
46 City of Edgerton v. Gen. Cas. Co., 190 Wis. 2d 510, 513-
14, 527 N.W.2d 305 (1995). 
47 J. Roggensack, ¶¶217-218, 226-227. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
31 
 
perception that members of the court are biased or result in an 
increased volume of recusal motions.  See J. Prosser, ¶255.48  
¶78 Justice Prosser suggests at ¶256 that the court should 
have denied Allen's motion "quickly, without comment," to avoid 
"exposing controversy within the court."  We think otherwise.  
We believe that a hallmark of our courts in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence is that a court explains its decision.  A court 
should be transparent and accountable by giving reasons for its 
decisions, reasons that can be evaluated and used to inform 
future decisions by the litigants, reviewing courts, and the 
public.   
¶79 "An unreasoned decision has very little claim to 
acceptance by the defeated party, and is difficult or impossible 
to accept as an act reflecting systematic application of legal 
principles.  Moreover, the necessity of stating reasons not 
infrequently changes the results by forcing the judges to come 
to grips with nettlesome facts or issues which their normal 
instincts would otherwise cause them to avoid."49   
¶80 Do Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler truly 
believe that any public perception of this court will be 
improved 
if 
this 
court 
places 
any 
challenged 
justice's 
individual 
decision 
of 
impartiality 
beyond 
any 
form 
of 
meaningful review? 
                                                 
48 There is no indication that the states that routinely and 
rationally provide such review are either beset with excessive 
recusal motions or suffer any lessened public confidence. 
49 Paul D. Carrington et al., Justice on Appeal, 10 (1976). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
32 
 
¶81 In the Kading case upholding the court's power to 
impose a Code of Judicial Conduct for judges, the court 
explained that the Code was "a response to the compelling need 
to maintain public confidence in the judiciary. . . .' [N]othing 
tends to bring courts or the administration of justice into 
disrespect more than the spectacle of a prejudiced judge sitting 
in judgment upon the rights of litigants.  A lack of confidence 
in the integrity of courts rocks the very foundations of 
organized society, promotes unrest and dissatisfaction, and even 
encourages revolution.'"50   
¶82 Would it not command greater public respect and 
confidence if the court read briefs and heard arguments on 
Allen's recusal motions, analyzed the facts and applied the law 
in a full opinion, as we would in review of allegations asserted 
against any judge of any another court in the state? 
¶83 If the court itself is not willing to decide due 
process issues of disqualification of a justice because of  
judicial policy reasons, then is it not incumbent on the court 
to establish a procedure for an impartial state tribunal to 
decide recusal motions challenging a justice of this court?  The 
court can do it.  The court has inherent power "to promulgate 
rules . . . and 
the 
power 
to 
provide 
process 
where 
none 
exists."51 
 
Briefs 
and 
full 
consideration 
of 
alternative 
                                                 
50 In re Hon. Charles E. Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 524, 235 
N.W.2d 409 (1975) (quoting In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 620, 214 
N.W. 379, 216 N.W. 127 (1927)). 
51 State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 536, 221 N.W. 603 (1928).  
See also State v. Cannon, 199 Wis. 401, 402, 226 N.W. 385 
(1929). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
33 
 
processes available to this court for deciding recusal motions 
challenging a justice are needed. 
¶84 As a practical matter, Justices Prosser, Roggensack, 
and Ziegler are implicitly telling all litigants in Wisconsin 
that they need to go to the federal courts to seek relief from a 
Wisconsin justice who they believe is biased.  If Justices 
Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler believe that the court should 
not review an individual justice's decision to participate in a 
case on policy grounds, is it good judicial policy to close the 
Wisconsin courthouse doors and force litigants into the federal 
courts?    
¶85 Federal review is not easy for a litigant.  It 
involves more costs and more delay.  Litigants challenging state 
court recusal decisions may go to federal district court using 
an application for a writ of habeas corpus, or bringing a suit 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.52  Or they can seek review in the United 
States Supreme Court by way of a petition for certiorari.  There 
                                                 
52 See, e.g., Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2271 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting); Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1985); 
Fieger v. Ferry, 471 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2006); Bradbury v. 
Eismann, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81289 (D. Idaho Sept. 8, 2009); 
Massey Energy Co. v. Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70330 (S.D. W. Va. 2007).  
Allen's most recent recusal filing, dated December 11, 
2009, states that he is attempting to perfect the record here 
should the matter have to go to federal court.  See Justice 
Crooks' concurrence, ¶189 n.5. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
34 
 
is only a 1.1% chance of the United States Supreme Court 
granting such a petition.53      
¶86 Justices 
Prosser, 
Roggensack, 
and 
Ziegler 
appear 
fixated on the recusal motions from their perspective as members 
of the court and from the perspective of a challenged justice.54  
                                                 
53 Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in dissent in Caperton 
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2272 (2009), that 
the United States Supreme Court grants certiorari for only 1.1% 
of all petitions filed. 
For petitioners proceeding in forma pauperis, as indigent 
prisoners like Allen often must, the percentage of petitions 
granted is even lower, perhaps as low as 0.3%.  See, e.g., Saul 
Brenner, Granting Certiorari by the United States Supreme Court:  
An Overview of the Social Science Studies, 92 Law Library J. 
193, 195 (2000) (analyzing data from the Court's 1995 term), 
available 
at 
http://www.aallnet.org/products/pub_llj_v92n02/2000-17.pdf. 
54 Our three colleagues express concern, ¶224, that a 
challenged justice's due process rights will be violated if the 
court acts on the recusal motions.  J. Prosser, ¶250.  Their 
writings do not, however, spell out just what rights a 
challenged justice has that are protected by due process 
guarantees or what liberty interest is at stake.  Also, they 
forget that if the court were to review a justice's decision to 
participate, the justice would be afforded the same rights and 
processes afforded judges of the circuit courts and other 
decision makers when this court reviews recusal motions on 
appeal. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
35 
 
They appear totally insensitive to the due process rights of 
litigants and the interests of the people of Wisconsin in a 
fair, impartial Wisconsin Supreme Court.55     
IV 
¶87 Fourth, briefs are needed on whether the grounds upon 
which 
Allen's 
motions 
rest 
justify 
disqualifying 
Justice 
Gableman. 
¶88 One 
of 
the 
grounds 
upon 
which 
Allen's 
motions 
challenging 
Justice 
Gableman's 
participation 
rest 
is 
due 
process——the guarantee of a fair trial in a fair tribunal——as 
most recently addressed by the United States Supreme Court in 
                                                                                                                                                             
For this court reviewing on appeal recusal motions directed 
to trial court judges, see, e.g., State v. Walberg, 109 
Wis. 2d 96, 105-09, 325 N.W.2d 687 (1982) (the court held that a 
circuit court judge's refusal to disqualify himself violated due 
process); State v. Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d 654, 546 N.W.2d 115 
(1996) (reviewing and affirming the circuit court judge's denial 
of a recusal motion; addressing the merits objectively under 
Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(a) and addressing whether the judge made 
the 
required 
subjective 
determination 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(g)); State v. Carprue, 2004 WI 111, ¶¶1, 69, 274 
Wis. 2d 656, 683 N.W.2d 31 (the court of appeals reversed the 
conviction "because Carprue was denied due process by a circuit 
court judge who appeared partial to the prosecution"; the 
supreme court reinstated the conviction, concluding that the 
judge's conduct "did not deprive Carprue of his right to a fair 
trial");  State v. Hollingsworth, 160 Wis. 2d 883, 894-95, 467 
N.W.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1991) (the  court of appeals considered a 
federal due process challenge against a circuit court judge). 
55 Justices Roggensack, Prosser, and Ziegler suggest that 
Allen gets due process, that is, gets a fair tribunal, when he 
relies solely on a challenged justice to determine whether the 
justice can be fair and impartial.  J. Roggensack, ¶223.  It is 
not much comfort to Allen or any litigant to have the challenged 
Justice be judge of his or her own impartiality.  See J. Crooks, 
¶188 (quoting Justice Kennedy's decision in Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 
at 2263, about the weakness of subjective determinations). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
36 
 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. 
Ct. 2252 (2009).  According to Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263, 
"the Due Process Clause has been implemented by objective 
standards that do not require proof of actual bias."  A litigant 
may be denied due process when "there is a serious risk of 
actual 
bias——based 
on 
objective 
and 
reasonable 
perceptions . . . ."  Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263; See J. 
Crooks, ¶188.     
¶89 Our three colleagues give Caperton short shrift——two 
brief paragraphs.  They announce at ¶222 that "Caperton has no 
relevance here."  They devote a single brief paragraph to 
Caperton at ¶238.  Our colleagues just don't seem to get it.56  
All state courts are bound by the teachings of Caperton, and 
Caperton is generally viewed as a major case involving more than 
campaign contributions and affecting court practice across the 
                                                 
56 Justice Ziegler's writing more fully addresses Caperton.  
Justice Ziegler concludes that briefs would not be helpful.  She 
has apparently determined by herself the nature of "a Caperton 
analysis" and established a threshold "level" below which this 
analysis is not required.  Justice Ziegler's opinion, ¶261.  No 
one argues that Allen's allegations are just like the basis for 
disqualification addressed in Caperton.  But as the majority in 
Caperton recognized, by applying previous due process cases in 
the context of judicial elections "as new problems have 
emerged," 129 S. Ct. at 2259, the due process standard must be 
applied to factual situations "not presented in the precedents."  
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
37 
 
country.57  Without significant analysis, our colleagues seem to 
treat Caperton as merely an outlier rather than an important 
statement 
about 
the 
constitutional 
requirement 
of 
fair 
                                                 
57 For different views on the effect of Caperton, see, e.g, 
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("[I]t 
is unclear whether the new probability of bias standard is 
somehow limited to financial support in judicial elections, or 
applies 
to 
judicial 
recusal 
questions 
more 
generally"); 
Examining the State of Judicial Recusals after Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey: Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 
Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy, 111th Cong. 
(2009) 
(available 
at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_091210_2.html 
(last 
visited Dec. 12, 2009); U.S. Fidelity Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Mich. 
Catastrophic 
Claims 
Ass'n, 
773 
N.W.2d 243 
(Mich. 
2009); 
Comments: Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.: Due Process 
Limitations on the Appearance of Judicial Bias, 123 Harv. L. 
Rev. 73 et seq. (2009); Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, 
Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton, 123 Harv. L. 
Rev. 80 (2009); Lawrence Lessig, What Everybody Knows and Too 
Few Accept, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 104; Penny J. White, Relinquished 
Responsibilities, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 120 (2009); Terri R. Day, 
Buying Justice: Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Campaign Dollars, 
Mandatory Recusal and Due Process, 28 Miss. C. L. Rev. 359, 363 
(2008-09); John Gibeaut, Caperton Capers: Court's Recusal Ruling 
Sparks States to Mull Judicial Contribution Laws, A.B.A. J., 
Aug. 
2009, 
at 
21, 
available 
at 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/caperton_capers; 
James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Campaign Support, 
Conflicts of Interest, and Judicial Impartiality: Can the 
Legitimacy of Courts Be Rescued by Recusals?, CELS 2009 4th 
Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1428723; Stephen M. Hoersting & Bradley 
A. Smith, Speech and Elections: The Caperton Caper and the 
Kennedy Conundrum, 2009 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 319; Kevin C. Newsom 
& Marc James Ayers, A Brave New World of Judicial Recusal? The 
United States Supreme Court Enters the Fray, Ala. Lawyer, Sept. 
2009, 
at 
5; 
Judicial 
Disqualification 
After 
Caperton, 
Judicature, July-Aug. 2009, at 4; Statement of H. Thomas Wells 
Jr., President, American Bar Association Re: Ruling of The 
Supreme Court of The United States in Caperton Et Al. v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., Inc., Et Al. (June 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/statement/statement.cfm?relea
seid=671 (last visited Jan. 5, 2010). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
38 
 
tribunals.  How should the principles articulated in Caperton be 
applied in different factual settings?  Answering this question 
is no easy task, but briefs, argument, and serious deliberation 
would greatly assist us in interpreting and applying Caperton.   
¶90 State supreme courts, other than Michigan, have not 
yet begun to address the ramifications of Caperton. 
¶91 Recently, the Michigan Supreme Court abandoned its 
past practice that individual justices alone respond to motions 
to recuse, without review.58  In November 2009, the Michigan 
court adopted a rule stating that if a justice's participation 
in a case is challenged, the challenged justice shall decide the 
issue and publish his or her reasoning for the decision.  If the 
challenged justice denies the motion for disqualification, then 
upon a party's motion to the court the entire court shall decide 
the motion for disqualification and explain the reasons for its 
grant or denial of the motion for disqualification.59 
                                                 
58 See U.S. Fidelity Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Mich. Catastrophic 
Claims Ass'n, 773 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. 2009); Adair v. State Dep't 
of Ed., 709 N.W. 2d 567 (Mich. 2006).  
59 See Michigan Supreme Court, Amendment of Rule 2.003, ADM 
File No. 2009-04, effective Nov. 25, 2009, available at 
http://courts.michigan.gov/SUPREMECOURT/Resources/Administrative
/2009-04-112509.pdf.  Although the newly adopted rule itself is 
not long, the order adopting it includes many pages of 
concurring and dissenting opinions, with attachments, sharply 
debating the merits of the change. 
A pre-Caperton 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutional challenge to 
Michigan's recusal practice allowing recusal in the sole 
discretion of the challenged justice was dismissed by a federal 
court for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted.  Fieger v. Ferry, 2007 WL 2827801 (E.D. Mich. 2007). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
39 
 
¶92 Adoption of this rule followed years of acrimonious 
dispute among the justices.  Following the Caperton decision, 
former Michigan Chief Justice Clifford Taylor declared that 
"Caperton has to mean that the challenged justice can't make the 
recusal decision alone."60     
¶93 Caperton explicitly announced the need for objective 
review to recusal challenges to a judge.  A judge's own inquiry 
into actual bias is not adequate for due process purposes.  
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265, declares that "[t]he failure to 
consider objective standards requiring recusal is not consistent 
with the imperatives of due process."  Protection is needed, 
according to Caperton, against a judge making his own recusal 
decision because an appellate court cannot easily superintend or 
review a judge's subjective determination.  Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 
at 2263.61  Indeed, when the challenged justice in the Caperton 
                                                 
60 U.S. Fidelity Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Mich. Catastrophic 
Claims Ass'n, 773 N.W.2d 243, 246 n.12 (Mich. 2009). 
61 Caperton originated in West Virginia where, unlike in 
Wisconsin, the justices do not review a challenged justice's 
decision to participate in a case.  See State ex rel. Cohen v. 
Manchin, 336 S.E.2d 171, 175-76 (W. Va. 1984) ("[W]here a motion 
is made to disqualify or recuse an individual justice of this 
Court, that question is to be decided by the challenged justice 
and not by the other members of this Court."); West Virginia 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 29. 
No issue appears to have been raised in either the West 
Virginia court of appeals or the United States Supreme Court 
regarding whether the West Virginia court of appeals must or 
should decide the disqualification issue.   
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
40 
 
case explained his individual decision not to recuse himself, he 
acknowledged that the court retained "authority under Aetna 
[Life Ins. Co. v Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821-22 (1986)] to remove 
me from the case," but that the court had not exercised this 
authority.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 
301 (W. Va. 2008) (Benjamin, C.J., concurring).  Presumably if 
the West Virginia court had been willing to keep its own house 
in order, no due process violation would have occurred and 
review by the United States Supreme Court would not have been 
necessary. 
¶94 So how do the three justices, Justices Prosser, 
Roggensack, and Ziegler, review Justice Gableman's individual 
decision to participate in the present case?  They act contrary 
to the dictates of Caperton that a judge's own inquiry is not 
adequate for due process.  Our three colleagues expressly limit 
their 
review 
to 
"establishing 
whether 
the 
judge 
made 
a 
determination requiring disqualification."62  They state that 
they will not "address whether [Justice Gableman] correctly or 
incorrectly decided the [disqualification] issues presented [to 
him]."63   
                                                                                                                                                             
A collateral lawsuit in federal district court challenged 
the constitutionality of this West Virginia practice.  After the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision, this suit was dismissed without 
prejudice by stipulation of the parties.  See Massey Energy Co. 
v. Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, No. 2:06-cv-00614, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70330 (S.D. W. Va. 2007) (stipulation of 
dismissal without prejudice filed July 24, 2009). 
62 J. Roggensack, ¶240 (quoting Donohoo v. Action Wis., 
Inc., 2008 WI 110, ¶24, 314 Wis. 2d 510, 754 N.W.2d 480.  See 
also J. Roggensack, ¶208. 
63 J. Roggensack, ¶240. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
41 
 
¶95 Asking 
the 
justice 
whose 
impartiality 
has 
been 
challenged to provide the only and final word as to whether he 
or she is in fact impartial makes little sense.  That an 
independent judge is to decide matters presented to a tribunal 
is central to our normal concepts of due process.64  See J. 
Crooks, ¶190.     
¶96 Commentators have variously described a lack of 
independent review of a judge's decision on a recusal challenge 
as "one of the most heavily criticized features of U.S. 
disqualification law,"65 a "Catch-22"66 and akin to having a 
student "grade his own paper."67  
¶97 All the justices agree that a recusal motion should go 
to the individual justice in the first instance.  The only cases 
at issue here are those in which a justice determines that he or 
she is unbiased, but a litigant believes otherwise and seeks 
court review.  The judge's own self-affirmations provide no 
                                                 
64 Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory 
Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 Yale 
L. J. 455, 457 (1986) ("[T]he participation of an independent 
adjudicator 
is 
at 
least 
a 
necessary 
condition . . . for 
satisfying the requirements of due process"). 
65 James Sample, David Pozen, Making Judicial Recusal More 
Rigorous, 46 Judges' J. 17, 21 (2007). 
66 Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented 
Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. Kan. L. Rev. 531, 571 
(2005). 
67 Examining the State of Judicial Recusals after Caperton 
v. A.T. Massey: Hearing Before the House Judiciary Comm's 
Subcomm. On Courts and Competition, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) 
(testimony 
of 
Charles 
G. 
Geyh), 
available 
at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Geyh091210.pdf. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
42 
 
serious reassurance to the litigant, and little protection for 
the 
values 
of 
uniformity, 
public 
confidence, 
and 
error-
correction.   
¶98 Nevertheless, 
Justices 
Prosser, 
Roggensack, 
and 
Ziegler ignore these values and Caperton.  Does their reasoning 
demonstrate a disconnect between this court's interpretation of 
§ 757.19(2)(g) as a subjective standard and the objective 
standard recognized in Caperton?  Justice Crooks' concurrence 
explains, ¶192, that we cannot ignore the ramifications of 
Caperton on our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 757.19 and on 
recusal law in Wisconsin.  A proper interpretation of the 
statute could avoid the need to reach constitutional questions.68  
Briefs are needed on the interplay of Caperton and § 757.19, the 
statute mandating disqualification. 
¶99 In the views of Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and 
Ziegler, the procedural guarantee of independent review of a 
judge's impartiality applies to all decision makers except the 
                                                 
68 In State v. Harrell, then-Justice Abrahamson argued that 
Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) should be applied using an objective 
test: "[W]hether a reasonable, well-informed observer familiar 
with judicial ethical standards, the judicial system, and the 
facts and circumstances of the case would harbor reasonable 
doubts about a judge's ability to be impartial under the 
circumstances."  State v. Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d 654, 666, 645 
N.W.2d 115 (1996) (Abrahamson, J., concurring). 
Justice Kennedy in the Caperton majority opinion recognized 
that in order "to maintain the integrity of the judiciary and 
the rule of law[,] . . . States may choose to 'adopt recusal 
standards more rigorous than due process requires.'"  Caperton, 
129 S. Ct. at 2266-67 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. 
White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
43 
 
seven justices of this court, where the legal issues may be most 
challenging and the stakes the highest. 
¶100 Turning to the need for briefs on the merits of 
Allen's 
allegations, 
three 
justices, 
Justices 
Prosser, 
Roggensack, 
and 
Ziegler, 
conclude 
at 
¶231 
that 
"Allen's 
allegations do not even begin to approach a due process 
violation."69  We do not decide whether Allen's allegations would 
be successful.  This issue should be briefed and argued.     
¶101 On the basis of the parties' motions and memoranda, we 
can only conclude that the allegations are sufficient to justify 
briefs, oral argument, and full consideration. 
¶102 Allegations of bias in favor of prosecutors and 
against criminal defense counsel and against criminal defendants 
are cognizable grounds for a motion to the court to disqualify a 
judge.  Cases have so held.70 
                                                 
69 Justice Roggensack's opinion, ¶234, cites a pre-Caperton 
case, Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1997) for the 
proposition that "the preclusion of bias that is guaranteed by 
due process to every party is bias against the specific party 
who is then before the court or bias due to the judge's having a 
financial interest in the outcome of the particular case then 
pending."  The case states only that "the floor established by 
the Due Process Clause clearly requires a 'fair trial in a fair 
tribunal,' before a judge with no actual bias against the 
defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case."  
Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904-05. 
70 See, e.g., State v. Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 96, 106-07, 325 
N.W.2d 687 (1982) (holding that recusal is required when a 
defendant can show that bias of circuit court against counsel 
affected the defendant's interests); State v. Hollingsworth, 160 
Wis. 2d 883, 467 N.W.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that 
circuit 
court's 
"dressing 
down" 
defense 
counsel 
did 
not 
translate into prejudice against the client in that case).  
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
44 
 
¶103 United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens 
has written that "[a] campaign promise to 'be tough on crime,' 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also James J. Alfini et al., Judicial Conduct and 
Ethics § 4.05D (4th ed. 2007) (a judge's antipathy toward a 
party's attorney should be examined as an aspect of bias or 
prejudice); Thomas R. Phillips & Karlene Dunn Poll, Free Speech 
for Judges and Fair Appeals for Litigants: Judicial Recusal in a 
Post-White World, 55 Drake L. Rev. 692 (2007) (asserting that 
adequate remedy needed for litigants whose due process rights to 
an impartial forum may be compromised by overenthusiastic 
judicial campaign speech); Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: 
Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 
1059, 1089 (1996) ("[w]hether due process requires recusal based 
on a campaign promise about adjudication is a question likely to 
turn on the fairly specific facts of the case: the nature of the 
promise and the nature of the case in which the promise might 
arguably drive the decision."); Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution 
Judges: 
'Tough 
on 
Crime,' 
Soft 
on 
Strategy, 
Ripe 
for 
Disqualification, forthcoming, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. ___, *1 (2010), 
draft 
available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1513186 
(advancing 
"the 
following 
slightly 
scandalous 
claim:  
Particularly in our post-Caperton, political-realist world, 
'tough on crime' elective judges should recuse themselves from 
all criminal cases"); Carol Schultz Vento, Disqualification of 
Judge for Bias Against Counsel for Indigent, 54 A.L.R. 5th 575 
(2009) (collecting cases); Joanna Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on 
Crime: How Campaigns For State Judiciary Violate Criminal 
Defendants' Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1101, 1127 
(2006) (declaring "a recusal remedy is the best way to balance 
the need for free, open campaigns with the dangers that arise 
when judges win votes by declaring their intent to be tough on 
crime and then hear alleged criminals' cases"). 
The State objects to Allen's motion on the grounds, inter 
alia, that it raises First Amendment issues and raises questions 
related to the independence of judicial candidates.  Although 
Caperton refers to Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 
U.S. 765 (2002), Caperton is silent about the relationship of a 
candidate's free speech rights and recusal.  This is another 
topic on which briefs would be helpful. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
45 
 
or 'to enforce the death penalty,' is evidence of bias that 
should disqualify a candidate from sitting in criminal cases."71   
¶104 Chief Justice Roberts in dissent in Caperton, 129 S. 
Ct. at 2269, queried: "If the supporter wants to help elect 
judges who are 'tough on crime,' must the judge recuse in all 
criminal cases?"72 
¶105 Judge Posner, writing for the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, ruled on whether a trial in 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court, with Judge Christ T. Seraphim 
presiding, was a trial by a biased tribunal violating the 
defendant's federal constitutional rights.73  The issue was 
whether Judge Seraphim's antipathy towards defense counsel for 
raising legal issues on behalf of his client constituted bias or 
the appearance of bias against the defendant.  
                                                 
71 John Paul Stevens, Opening Assembly Address, American Bar 
Association Annual Meeting, Orlando, Florida, August 3, 1996, 12 
St John's J. Legal Comment. 21, 30-31 (1996). 
72 Indeed the well-funded campaign defeating West Virginia 
Justice Warren McGraw, which was the subject of the Caperton 
lawsuit, was waged with TV ads accusing Justice McGraw of 
"[l]etting a child rapist go free" and labelling him "too soft 
on crime.  Too dangerous for our kids."  Deborah Goldberg et 
al., The New Politics of Judicial Education 2004 4-5 (2005), 
available 
at 
http://brennan.3cdn.net/dd00e9b682e3ca2f17_xdm6io68k.pdf 
(collecting campaign advertisements). 
73 Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1985) (in 
effect overturning State v. Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 96, 325 
N.W.2d 687 (1982), in which this court held that the apparent 
bias 
had 
been 
harmless 
error 
although 
"Judge 
Seraphim's 
impartiality toward the defendant can reasonably be questioned 
based on his conduct toward defense counsel."  109 Wis. 2d at 
107.). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
46 
 
¶106 The federal court described Judge Seraphim's attitude 
toward the role of the defense counsel in that case as follows: 
Judge Seraphim "indicated that good behavior [by the defendant's 
counsel] meant not just avoiding unethical conduct but also not 
pressing too hard, even well within ethical boundaries, in favor 
of an obviously guilty defendant."74   
¶107 Judge Posner explained that he was not sure that Judge 
Seraphim was actually biased against the defendant but that 
"[i]n judging the fairness of a trial it is sometimes helpful to 
adopt the vantage point of the defendant and ask whether a 
rational albeit criminal individual could be persuaded that he 
had had a fair trial . . . ."75  From the vantage point of the 
defendant, according to  the court of appeals, "[t]he appearance 
was of a judge who had made up his mind at the start that the 
defendant was guilty . . . ."76 
¶108 The federal court of appeals ordered the defendant 
released unless the State brought the defendant to trial within 
120 days.      
¶109 Broadly speaking, Allen's allegations against Justice 
Gableman are that the Justice believes defense counsel should 
not claim statutory or constitutional rights for a guilty client 
                                                 
74 Walberg, 766 F.2d at 1074. 
75 Walberg, 766 F.2d at 1077. 
76 Walberg, 766 F.2d at 1077-78. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
47 
 
or perhaps a certain type of guilty client.77  This allegation is 
similar to Judge Seraphim's implying he was angry at the lawyer 
"because the client was unworthy of the protracted efforts that 
the lawyer was making on his behalf."78     
¶110 The recusal motions in the present case are not, as 
Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler would have us believe, 
merely 
limited 
"at 
[their] 
heart . . . [to 
a] 
judicial 
candidate's announced concerns for issues bearing on law 
enforcement."  J. Roggensack, ¶231.  The grounds for the recusal 
motions in the present case, it can be argued, may be 
characterized in the same way that Judge Posner characterized 
Judge Seraphim's conduct in the Walberg case, namely as a 
judge's 
view 
towards 
the 
function 
of 
defense 
counsel 
constituting 
bias 
or 
the 
appearance 
of 
bias 
against 
a 
defendant.79  
                                                 
77 The allegation that Justice Gableman looks askance at 
zealous advocacy on behalf of at least some criminal defendants 
is arguably related to the merits of Allen's case.  The issues 
we are reviewing in Allen's case implicate the right to 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal.  Allen's supplemental 
petition for review formulates an issue as follows: "Whether 
requiring a defendant to respond to a no-merit report with 
arguable claims that were overlooked by appointed counsel, and 
barring the defendant from ever raising any claim not so raised, 
conflicts with the right to counsel on direct appeal." 
78 Walberg, 766 F.2d at 1077. 
79 For another way of presenting this argument, see State v. 
Sveum, No. 2008AP658, now pending before this court.  The Sveum 
motion for recusal against Justice Gableman relies on Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(f) (disqualification mandated when a judge has a 
significant financial or personal interest) and due process, 
asserting:  
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
48 
 
¶111 Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler (¶¶199, 238) 
conclude that Allen's factual allegations cannot support a 
cognizable due process claim.  They criticize Allen's motion for 
not offering documentation of "the manner in which Justice 
Gableman has treated defendants who have appeared in criminal 
proceedings in courts over which Justice Gableman has presided."  
They themselves supplement the record, ¶¶245-246.  If we had 
briefs, the parties might bring forth documentation and argue 
whether the proof the three justices offer relates to matters at 
issue here.  
¶112 In State v. Sveum, defense counsel argues that Justice 
Gableman has an unbroken record of siding with the State in 
criminal cases in this court.80  Briefs and arguments might 
debate the accuracy and relevance of this argument.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Justice 
Gableman 
has 
a 
disqualifying 
"personal 
interest" in this, and perhaps every, criminal appeal 
because his statements, direct and through his lawyer-
agent establish that he first judges the defendant 
himself 
in 
a 
criminal 
case, 
by 
an 
inherently 
subjective and personal moral scale, and only then is 
willing to judge the merits of the defendant's case, 
assuming that the defendant does not fall below a 
threshold of evilness, heinousness, or despicable 
character.  As to criminal defendants who fall below 
that 
threshold, 
Justice 
Gableman 
believes 
that 
meritorious arguments rightly cannot be made. . . . If 
the defendant does not pass muster on the moral scale 
at the first step, he ought not have benefit of legal 
rules that otherwise favor him.   
Petitioner's [Sveum's] Motion to Disqualify Justice Michael J. 
Gableman at 2. 
80 Petitioner's 
[Sveum's] Motion to Disqualify Justice 
Michael J. Gableman at 31-34, Exhibit F.  State v. Sveum, No. 
2008AP658. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
49 
 
¶113 The question for this court may ultimately revolve 
around determining when "tough on crime" judicial electioneering 
risks depriving a criminal defendant of the constitutional right 
to an unbiased judge.  Not an easy question, but an important 
one.  The role of this court should be to face and decide this 
challenging and recurring issue, not to avoid it. Briefs would 
help. 
¶114 Furthermore, the grounds for the recusal motions in 
the present case can also be characterized as stating "extreme 
facts," see J. Ziegler, passim, although there is a question 
whether "extreme facts" is the appropriate standard.  We need 
briefs and oral argument to explore the correct due process 
standard and to then demonstrate how that standard should be 
applied to the facts of the case.   
¶115 Justice Crooks at ¶¶189 and 191 highlights the highly 
unusual allegations and circumstances in the instant case.  We 
comment, as did the United States Supreme Court in Caperton, 
that we know of no other case in Wisconsin or elsewhere that 
presents similar facts: 
A. 
A campaign television ad by Justice Gableman's 
campaign 
characterizing 
a 
"loophole" 
his 
opponent found as a public defender in a 
criminal case.  The ad is the subject of a 
pending 
charge 
by 
the 
Wisconsin 
Judicial 
Commission 
against 
Justice 
Gableman 
as 
a 
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, SCR 
60.06(3)(c).81 
                                                 
81 A video copy of the television ad is attached with 
similar 
recusal 
motions 
filed 
in 
State 
v. 
Carter, 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR, Defendant's Motion for Recusal of Hon. Michael 
Gableman on Constitutional Grounds (Attachment E-8). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
50 
 
B. 
The Report of the Judicial Conduct Panel 
(three judges) on the Judicial Commission's 
complaint against Justice Gableman, in which 
the majority of the panel found no violation.  
One 
judge 
on 
the 
panel 
criticizes 
the 
television 
ad 
as 
having 
a 
misleading 
implication and as showing disdain for the 
role of criminal defense counsel. Another 
judge concludes that the ad was a statement 
that misrepresented a fact in violation of SCR 
60.06(3)(c).82 
C. 
The comments of Justice Gableman's counsel at 
the hearing before the Judicial Conduct Panel 
and at a meeting with media, demeaning the 
role of criminal defense attorneys.83   
D. 
The Board of Governors of the State Bar of 
Wisconsin's unanimous Public Policy Position 
regarding the constitutional right of criminal 
defendants 
to 
effective 
legal 
assistance, 
apparently in response to the campaign ad at 
                                                 
82 See In Re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings against the 
Honorable Michael J. Gableman, No. 2008AP2458-J, at *17-19, 20-
36 (Deininger, J., concurring; Fine, J., concurring), available 
at http://wicourts.gov/news/archives/2009/docs/gableman.pdf. 
83 Justice Gableman's counsel defended the ad as putting the 
"focus on Butler's willingness to find loopholes.  He is willing 
to find a loophole for a person so evil that he raped an 11-
year-old girl with learning disabilities.  And that he's so 
evil, that once he got out of jail, he went on to molest another 
child.  So the focus is on Butler's willingness to find 
loopholes for even people that are despicable as this person 
is . . . ."  Hearing Transcript at 14.   
See also Justice Gableman's counsel's comments at an 
interview with media on September 16, 2009, available on 
Wisconsin 
Eye, 
www.wiseye.org/wisEYE_programming/ARCHIVES-
courts.html): The ad has "to do with his [Justice Butler's] 
judgment and his willingness to subvert the criminal—our system 
of criminal——bringing criminals into account. . . . Mitchell 
raped an 11-year-old girl with learning disabilities.  He 
[Justice Butler] didn't have to take that——represent that 
criminal.  He could have walked.  I mean don't you have 
standards?"  
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
51 
 
issue 
and 
comments 
by 
Justice 
Gableman's 
counsel.84 
¶116 Even if this were an easy case on the merits of the 
allegations, and it is not, and even if one supposes that 
Allen's motions would fail to move the court in the final 
analysis, the court should still take up and decide the matter 
in a manner that provides guidance for judges and litigants in 
future cases.  This case presents an opportunity for this court 
to begin to develop a sorely needed jurisprudence of judicial 
disqualification.  We are persuaded that the court needs briefs 
and oral argument to help the court decide as the State puts it, 
the potentially "broad and deep" issues presented. 
* * * * 
¶117 Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler conclude 
that Justice Gableman need not have withdrawn from participating 
in deciding whether the court lacks jurisdiction to consider 
Allen's recusal motions directed at Justice Gableman.  See J. 
Roggensack, ¶¶196-197. 
¶118 Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler further 
determine (1) that this court cannot independently review a 
justice's decision to deny a recusal motion except to decide 
whether the individual justice made the determination that the 
                                                 
84 See Tom Solberg, [State Bar of Wisconsin] Board of 
Governors adopts policy position reaffirming the essential role 
of defense attorneys in the criminal justice system (Dec. 4, 
2009), 
http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=News&Template=/CM/
ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentId=88343 (last visited Dec. 13, 2009) 
("In response to recent statements made in connection with a 
dispute over Supreme Court campaign ads, the State Bar of 
Wisconsin reaffirms its commitment to the right to counsel."). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
52 
 
motion 
required, 
although 
this 
court 
can 
and 
should 
independently review denials of recusal motions by elected 
judges of the circuit court and court of appeals; and (2) that 
Allen's recusal motions have no merit. 
¶119 The writings by Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and 
Ziegler make false accusations and stretch, misconstrue, or omit 
relevant law. Even with such an effort, the writings are 
inconsistent and incoherent.  It is evident that the three 
justices joining have had to cobble together their disparate 
views on three questions: (1) whether the court has jurisdiction 
(power) to disqualify a justice for any reason at all; (2) 
whether as a matter of policy the court should ever exercise 
such jurisdiction (or power) to disqualify a justice for any 
reason; and (3) whether the grounds stated in these recusal 
motions have merit justifying recusal. Because the justices fuse 
and obfuscate distinctions between jurisdiction, policy, and the 
merits of Allen's allegations, their writings do not cogently or 
convincingly answer any of these three issues.  Either they miss 
these distinctions or hope that the reader will miss them.   
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
53 
 
¶120 Allen's 
recusal 
motions 
have 
spawned 
a 
cottage 
industry 
that 
has 
occupied 
the 
court,85 
not 
always 
                                                 
85 Similar recusal motions have been filed in seven other 
criminal cases.  See State v. Carter, No. 2006AP1811-CR (motion 
filed Oct 2, 2009; J. Gableman issued order individually denying 
the motion on Oct. 21, 2009); State v. Cross, No. 2009AP3-CR 
(motion 
filed 
Nov. 
11, 
2009; 
J. 
Gableman 
issued 
order 
individually denying the motion on Nov. 20, 2009); State v. 
Dearborn, No. 2007AP1894-CR. (motion filed Nov. 20, 2009; J. 
Gableman issued order individually denying the motion on Dec. 
17, 2009); State v. Jones, No. 2008AP2342-CR (motion filed Dec. 
16, 2009; J. Gableman issued order individually denying the 
motion on Jan. 22, 2010); State v. Littlejohn, No. 2007AP900-CR 
(motion 
filed 
Nov. 
19, 
2009; 
J. 
Gableman 
issued 
order 
individually denying the motion on Nov. 20, 2009); State v. 
McGuire, No. 2007AP2711-CR (motion filed Oct 2, 2009; J. 
Gableman issued order individually denying the motion on Nov. 
20, 2009; supplemental motion filed Nov. 30, 2009); State v. 
Sveum, No. 2008AP0658-CR (motion filed Dec. 21, 2009; J. 
Gableman issued order individually denying the motion on Jan. 
22, 2010). 
In another criminal case, the defendant asserts that 
Justice Roggensack should be disqualified under Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(e) (setting forth an objective standard) because she 
"previously handled the action or proceeding while judge of an 
inferior court."  See State v. Henley, No. 2008AP697-CR (motion 
directed to Justice Roggensack, filed on Oct. 31, 2009; Justice 
Roggensack issued a memorandum decision denying the motion on 
Nov. 25, 2009; defendant filed motion asking for court review 
and oral argument on the motion, filed on Jan. 11, 2010). 
In a civil case, a motion for recusal of Justices Annette 
K. Ziegler and Michael J. Gableman was filed on June 19, 2009, 
on due process grounds relating to contributions in their 
election campaigns.  See Krier v. Villione, Nos. 2006AP1573 & 
2006AP2290 (motion filed on June 30, 2009; Justices Ziegler and 
Gableman each individually denied the motion on July 23, 2009). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
54 
 
constructively.86  We are concerned that because the issues 
raised by Allen's recusal motions have not been handled in an 
open, 
transparent, 
comprehensive 
manner, 
today's 
numerous 
writings will generate a new series of unintended consequences. 
                                                 
86 Here are some repercussions of the recusal motions.  
Counsel with other pending recusal motions have moved to delay 
oral argument on the merits of the cases until the recusal 
motions have been decided.  The court did not respond to defense 
counsels' motions to postpone oral argument.  Yet in State v. 
Allen the court has not ordered briefs on the merits of the case 
or scheduled oral argument.  Chief Justice Abrahamson and  
Justices Ann Walsh Bradley and N. Patrick Crooks filed a 
statement with the clerk of court on October 15, 2009, objecting 
to treating State v. Carter, No. 2006AP1811-CR, differently from 
other cases.  The statement asked that orders on the recusal 
motions be issued simultaneously and that the Carter case be 
removed from the oral argument schedule.  In response to this 
filing, Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler issued a press 
release on October 16, 2009, complaining that the court should 
have responded to Allen's motion within five weeks after the 
motion was filed on April 17, 2009.  Oral argument in these 
other cases has proceeded or is proceeding, except for Allen, 
with defense counsel guarding against the possibility that they 
may have forfeited or waived their recusal motions; the State 
has not offered its position on waiver and forfeiture.   
Public 
and 
private 
displays 
of 
acrimony 
(sometimes 
unfortunately personal) among the justices flared.  Public 
discussion of internal conference matters ensued.   
In the interim, the court adopted a recusal rule addressing 
a collaterally related issue regarding campaign contributions.  
Justice Roggensack wrote an op-ed piece for publication in 
newspapers defending her vote to adopt that rule, a writing that 
some may view as tangentially related to the issues at hand.  
The rule was later rescinded when Justice Prosser, in the 
majority, withdrew his vote, dissatisfied with the wording of 
the rule.  An amended version of the rule was adopted on January 
21, 2010 by a 4-3 vote. 
Each 
of 
these 
events 
is 
perhaps 
understandable 
and 
explainable under the circumstances at the time each occurred, 
even if in hindsight and reflection not always praiseworthy.   
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
55 
 
¶121 We have described some of the subject areas upon which 
briefs are needed.  There are other areas too.87   
¶122 We have had to explore many of these subjects in the 
legal literature without the assistance of briefs and fully 
focused arguments.  We offer the results of our research in the 
Appendices, as set forth in the margin.88 
 
¶123 In sum, disqualification of judges is an issue of 
immediate significance and law development, especially as a 
result of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Caperton 
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).  United 
                                                 
87 The State's replies to recusal motions in pending cases 
have identified related issues to be briefed and considered by 
this court:  
What are the First Amendment implications?  Is an 
evidentiary hearing necessary?  Are the Judicial 
Conduct Panel's findings and conclusions relevant and, 
if 
so, 
are 
they 
sufficient 
for 
resolving 
the 
constitutional issues?  Are statements or positions of 
third parties relevant?  Are a judicial candidate's 
statements about potential legal issues or judicial 
philosophy relevant?  If judicial disqualification 
were found, can it be purged, and if so, how?  What 
would be the scope of disqualification?  Every 
criminal-related case?  Every case involving an 
attorney 
who 
has 
moved 
for 
Justice 
Gableman's 
disqualification?  Every State Public Defender case?  
How would Justice Gableman's disqualification affect 
this Court's operations in every criminal-related case 
for which review is sought?   How would it affect all 
judicial elections in Wisconsin? 
88 Appendix A. Unresolved Recusal Issues:  The National 
Union Fire Insurance and Crosetto Cases.  ¶¶128 to 136 
  Appendix B.  The United States Supreme Court Retains 
Jurisdiction to Disqualify One of Its Own Members.  ¶¶137 to 166 
  Appendix C.  The Recusal Practice of Our Sister State 
Supreme Courts Is Instructive.  ¶¶167 to 185 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
56 
 
States Supreme Court Chief Justice Roberts identified in dissent 
at least forty "fundamental questions" that "courts will now 
have to determine."89  This court's recently rescinded and re-
adopted amendment to the rules for judicial disqualification 
based solely on campaign contributions further highlights the 
need for our sound deliberation and guidance on the challenging 
and 
emotionally 
fraught 
issues 
surrounding 
judicial 
disqualification. 
¶124 Unwarranted recusal motions, like any unwarranted 
court proceeding, should not be condoned.  "A tension exists 
between the public's right to a judge who is impartial and has 
the appearance of impartiality on the one hand and the need to 
ensure that the law of disqualification is not abused by 
litigants and attorneys for purposes of delay or judge shopping.  
The law of disqualification attempts to ensure that a balance 
between these policy considerations is achieved."90   
¶125 Our decisions on recusal motions should strike such a 
balance and provide workable guidance for future cases and 
should assure the public that the court is committed to 
providing a fair, impartial Wisconsin supreme court. Briefing 
and argument will help assure that we meet these goals.  
¶126 Our proposed order, which garners only three votes, 
would read as follows:  
                                                 
89 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
90 State ex rel. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Cir. Court for 
St. Croix County, No. 90-0935-W, unpublished order (Wis. S. Ct. 
May 29, 1990) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
57 
 
IT IS ORDERED that within 30 days after the date of 
this decision Allen must file a brief in this court 
addressing the issues raised herein and in his 
motions; that within 20 days of filing the State must 
file either a brief or a statement that no brief will 
be filed; and that if a brief is filed by the State, 
within 10 days of the State's filing Allen must file 
either a reply brief or a statement that no reply 
brief will be filed. 
¶127 For the reasons set forth, we would order briefs and 
oral argument on Allen's recusal motions against Justice 
Gableman addressed to the court. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
1 
 
 
APPENDIX A.  Unresolved Recusal Issues: The National Union Fire 
Insurance and Crosetto Cases 
¶128 Two writings from 1990 and 1991 relate to recusal 
issues which have not been resolved and which still trouble the 
court.   
¶129 In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Circuit Court 
for St. Croix County, No. 90-0935-W, unpublished order (Wis. S. 
Ct. May 29, 1990), the circuit court judge granted the opposing 
party's motion for a new trial.  The insurance company moved for 
recusal under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g), arguing that the judge 
had shown bias and prejudice against the insurance company's 
insured and its counsel.  When the judge declined to recuse 
himself, the insurance company petitioned for a supervisory writ 
from this court as a remedy.  The court denied the petition, 
offering no rationale.  Then-Justice Abrahamson dissented.  The 
reasons stated in the  dissent are hauntingly relevant now. 
¶130 The full text of Justice Abrahamson's dissent follows: 
The petition in this case goes to the heart of the 
judicial system——the right to a fair trial before an 
impartial judge.  The National Union Fire Insurance 
Company alleges, rightly or wrongly, that the circuit 
court judge's self-declaration of impartiality is not 
supported by the record and that the judge's recusal 
is required by law.  I believe that this court owes 
the petitioner, the legal community and the public 
more than a cryptic order denying the petition without 
any explanation.  I believe that the court ought to 
decide the merits of the Insurance Company's petition 
in this case and should provide guidance to the 
circuit judges on the issue of disqualification.  I 
would therefore order a response. 
I. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
2 
 
The facts giving rise to this petition are undisputed.  
After a jury verdict in favor of National Union Fire 
Insurance Company (here the Insurance Company), the 
circuit court granted the opposing party's motion for 
a new trial.  The Insurance Company then requested, 
pursuant to sec. 757.19(2)(g), Stats. 1987-88, that 
the circuit judge recuse himself from any further 
proceedings in the case because he had evinced bias 
and prejudice against the Insurance Company's insured 
and its counsel.  The circuit judge reviewed the 
record and determined that he was able to be impartial 
at the new trial. 
On April 17, 1990, the Insurance Company petitioned 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
for 
a 
supervisory 
writ 
prohibiting the circuit judge from presiding over the 
new trial.  On April 18, 1990, the court of appeals 
denied the order apparently on the ground that a 
petition for a supervisory writ was not the proper 
procedure; rather, the Insurance Company would have to 
challenge the circuit judge's denial of the recusal 
motion on appeal from the judgment entered after the 
new trial.  Pursuant to sec. 809.71, the Insurance 
Company now petitions this court for a supervisory 
writ prohibiting the circuit judge from presiding at 
the new trial. 
II. 
The first issue is whether the Insurance Company may 
seek review of a denial of a recusal motion by 
supervisory writ.  Commentators and courts who have 
considered the procedure for review of a judge's 
denial of a recusal motion have concluded that a 
petition for a supervisory writ of prohibition or 
mandamus, rather than appeal, is the recommended 
procedure.N1 
N1 
Several 
federal 
courts 
of 
appeals 
have 
recommended this procedure.  "The less technical, 
more modern, and probably more widely held view 
is that mandamus is available. . . . " Stempel, 
Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 52 Bklyn. L. Rev. 
589, 637 (1987).  See also Moore, Appellate 
Review of Judicial Disqualification Decisions in 
the Federal Courts, 35 Hastings L.J. 829 (1984); 
Hjemfelt, Statutory Disqualification of Federal 
Judges, 30 Kansas L. Rev. 255, 262-63 (1982); 
Leubsdorf, 
Theories 
of 
Judging 
and 
Judge 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
3 
 
Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 237, 275-76 
(19787) [sic]; Fall, Liljeberg v. Health Services 
Acquisition Corp.: The Supreme Court Encourages 
Disqualification of Federal Judges Under Section 
455(a), 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 1033, 1041; Comment, 
Questioning 
the 
Impartiality 
of 
Judges: 
Disqualifying Federal District Court Judges Under 
28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 60 Temple L. Q. 697, 730-35 
(1987); Note, Judicial Disqualification in the 
Federal Courts: A Proposal to Conform Provisions 
to Underlying Policies, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 525, 543-
44 (1982). 
In any event, as an alternative procedure the 
Insurance Company also sought leave to appeal a 
non-final order as an alternative procedure in 
the court of appeals. 
The United States Supreme Court has declared review by 
appeal after trial inadequate.  In Berger v. United 
States, 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1921), the Court stated: 
"The remedy by appeal is inadequate.  It 
comes after the trial, and if prejudice 
exists, it has worked its evil, and a 
judgement of it in a reviewing tribunal is 
precarious.  It goes there fortified by 
presumptions, 
and 
nothing 
can 
be 
more 
elusive of estimate or a decision than a 
disposition of mind in which there is a 
personal judgment." 
Because the judge deciding judicial disqualification 
in the first instance is the very judge who is charged 
with being partial, prompt review by an appellate 
court 
before 
trial 
when 
possible 
is 
especially 
important to preserve the integrity of the trial, to 
foster public confidence in the judicial system, and 
to avoid the subtle, subconscious pressure on an 
appellate court to uphold a judgment rendered after 
trial. 
I conclude that the Insurance Company's petition for a 
writ of prohibition is the proper procedure to seek 
review in the court of appeals and in this court of a 
circuit court judge's denial of a motion to recuse. 
III. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
4 
 
The law of judicial recusal cannot be found in a 
single statute, court rule or case.  It is found in 
several places.  The judge and the reviewing court 
must consider whether judicial disqualification is 
required by statute.  Sec. 751.19, Stats. 1987-88, is, 
however, only the beginning.  [footnote to text of 
Wis. Stat. § 757.19 omitted]  Other statutes may come 
into play.  Furthermore our case law dictates that 
judges and reviewing courts must also consider the 
Code of Judicial Ethics, the Fourteenth Amendment's 
due process clause, and the common law doctrine of 
fair trial.  And this court might also review a 
judge's 
denial 
of 
a 
recusal 
motion 
under 
its 
superintending power.  Each of these sources of the 
law of disqualification——and the listing is probably 
not 
complete——may 
have 
a 
significant 
impact 
on 
resolution of the case at bar. 
A tension exists between the public's right to a judge 
who 
is 
impartial 
and 
has 
the 
appearance 
of 
impartiality on the one hand and the need to ensure 
that the law of disqualification is not abused by 
litigants and attorneys for purposes of delay or judge 
shopping.  The law of disqualification attempts to 
ensure 
that 
a 
balance 
between 
these 
policy 
considerations is achieved. 
Statutory Grounds for Judicial Disqualification.  When 
a motion for recusal is made, both the judge and the 
reviewing court should look to the statutes to 
determine whether the motion should be granted.  Sec. 
751.19, Stats. 1987-88, provides, inter alia, that 
"any 
judge 
shall 
disqualify 
himself 
or 
herself . . . when a judge determines that, for any 
reason, he or she cannot, or it appears he or she 
cannot, 
act 
in 
an 
impartial 
manner." 
 
Sec. 
751.19(2)(g).  In State v. American TV & Appliance, 
151 
Wis. 2d 175, 
183, 
443 
N.W.2d 662 
(1989) 
(Abrahamson, 
J. 
not 
participating), 
this 
court 
interpreted sec. 751.19(2)(g) as adopting a subjective 
test for impartiality and appearance of impartiality: 
a justice's (or judge's) determination that he or she 
is impartial or that there is no appearance of 
partiality cannot be challenged by the parties or a 
reviewing court.  In this case the circuit judge has 
decided he is not biased against the Insurance 
Company.  I cannot determine from the order of either 
the court of appeals or this court whether the denial 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
5 
 
of the petition in the instant case is based on the 
reasoning of American TV. 
Congress and the commentators are critical of the 
subjective test.  It does not protect litigants 
adequately.  In 1874 Congress adopted an objective 
test 
for 
disqualification of federal judges "to 
promote public confidence in the impartiality of the 
judicial process by saying, in effect, if there is a 
reasonable factual basis for doubting the judge's 
impartiality, he should disqualify himself and let 
another judge preside over the case."  H.R. Rep. No 
1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Ad. News 6351, 6355. 
The court's adoption of the subjective test in 
American 
TV 
has 
significantly 
reduced 
the 
effectiveness of sec. 751.19(2)(g).  The legislature 
or the court (under its rule-making power) [footnote 
to Wis. Stat. § 751.12 (1987-88) omitted] should amend 
sec. 751.19(2)(g) to establish, in addition to the 
subjective test, an objective test: A judge or justice 
should also disqualify himself or herself in any 
proceeding in which his or her impartiality or 
appearance 
of 
impartiality 
might 
reasonably 
be 
questioned.  With the hope that a change will be 
proposed, I call this matter to the attention of the 
Revisor of Statutes and the Law Revision Committee, 
secs. 13.83(1)(c), 13.93(2)(d), Stats. 1987-88, the 
Judicial Council, the State Bar of Wisconsin and other 
interested persons. 
Code of Judicial Ethics.  The Code of Judicial Ethics 
sets forth a subjective and an objective test to 
determine a judge's impartiality.  Code of Judicial 
Ethics, 36 Wis. 2d 252, 256, Standard 3 (1967).  The 
subjective 
test 
is 
based 
on 
the 
judge's 
own 
determination of his or her impartiality.  Under the 
objective test the judge or reviewing court must 
determine whether a reasonable person on these facts 
would conclude that the judge is partial or that there 
is an appearance of partiality. 
In State v. Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 96, 105-06, 325 
N.W.2d 687 
(1982), 
and 
State 
v. 
Asfoor, 
75 
Wis. 2d 411, 436, 249 N.W.2d 529 (1977), the court 
applied the Code and concluded that the subjective and 
objective tests are to be used to determine whether a 
circuit judge should be disqualified from sitting. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
6 
 
The American TV decision may cast doubt on the 
applicability 
of 
the 
two 
tests 
and 
of 
the 
applicability of Standard 3 of the Code of Judicial 
Ethics in cases where a litigant challenges the 
judge's denial of the recusal motion in an appellate 
court.  The court wrote in American TV that "the Code 
of Judicial Ethics governs the ethical conduct of 
judges; it has no effect on their qualification or 
disqualification to act and a judge may be disciplined 
for 
conduct 
that 
would 
not 
have 
required 
disqualification under sec. 757.19, Stats."  151 Wis. 
2d at 185. 
Any conflict or confusion in our cases might be 
clarified in this case or by legislative amendment to 
the statutes or by court amendment to the Supreme 
Court Rules.  SCR ch. 60 sets forth the Code of 
Judicial Ethics. 
Due Process.  A third source of law that must be 
considered on any challenge of judicial partiality is 
the federal and state constitutions.  The due process 
clause guarantees the right to a neutral and detached 
judge.  See Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. LaVoie, 475 
U.S. 
813 
(1986); 
Liljeberg 
v. 
Health 
Services 
Acquisition Corp., [486 U.S. 847], 108 S. Ct. 2194 
(1988); State v. Walberg, supra, 109 Wis. 2d at 105; 
Guthrie 
v. 
W.E.R.C., 
111 
Wis. 2d 447, 
454, 
331 
N.W.2d 331 (1983).  The United States Supreme Court 
has stressed that fairness requires not only "an 
absence of actual bias in the trial of cases" but also 
"'the appearance of justice.'"  In re Murchison, 349 
U.S. 133, 136 (1955).  See also Guthrie, supra. 
Common Law.  A fourth source of law that has bearing 
on judicial disqualification is the common law.  This 
court has recognized the existence of a common law 
philosophy 
or 
position 
with 
respect 
to 
disqualification that applies along with the statutory 
provisions for disqualification.  Guthrie v. W.E.R.C., 
supra, 111 Wis. 2d at 456. 
Superintending Power.  The fifth basis this court may 
use for disqualifying a judge is its "superintending 
authority over all courts."  Wis. Const. art. VII, 
sec. 3(1).  The constitutional grant of superintending 
control over all courts and judges vests in this court 
an independent and separate jurisdiction to adopt 
measures necessary for the due administration of 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
7 
 
justice in the state, including assuring litigants a 
fair trial.  See Wickhem, The Power of Superintending 
Control of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1941 Wis. L. 
Rev. 153 (1941); State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 44, 
315 N.W.2d 703 (1982); In re Hon. Charles E. Kading, 
70 Wis. 2d 508, 520, 235 N.W.2d 409, 238 N.W.2d 63, 
239 N.W.2d 297 (1975). 
This list of laws applicable to disqualification is 
not all inclusive.  Litigants may be able to cite 
other sources of law which the judge and a reviewing 
court should consider.N4 
N4 For discussion of judicial disqualification in 
addition to those cited elsewhere herein, see 
also J. Shaman, S. Lubet, and J. Alfini, Judicial 
Conduct and Ethics ch. 5 (1990); L. Abramson, 
Judicial Disqualification under Canon 3C of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct (American Judicature 
Society 1986); Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial 
Interest 
as 
Grounds 
for 
Disqualification 
of 
Federal Judges, 35 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 662, 
(1985); Rieger, The Judicial Councils Reform and 
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act: Will Judges 
Judge 
Judges?, 
37 
Emory 
L. 
J. 
45 
(1988); 
Weinstein, The Limited Power of the Federal 
Courts of Appeals to Order a Case Reassigned to 
Another District Judge, 120 Fed. Rules Dec. 267 
(1988); Symposium, Judicial Ethics, 35 L. & 
Contemp. Prob. 1 (1970); Kilgarlin and Bruch, 
Disqualification and Recusal of Judges, 17 St. 
Mary's L.J. 599 (1986); Sparks, Judicial Recusal: 
Rule 18 a, 12 St. Mary's L.J. 723 (1981); Lewis, 
Systematic [sic] Due Process: Procedural Concepts 
and the Problem of Recusal, 38 U. Kansas L. Rev. 
381 (1990); Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking under 
the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct 
and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
283 (1982); Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 
Yale L. J. 605 (1947); Note, Disqualification of 
Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 Harv. 
L. 
Rev. 
1435 
(1966); 
Note, 
State 
v. 
Fie: 
Determining the Proper Standard for Recusal of 
Judges in North Carolina, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 1138 
(1987); Note, A District Judge Must Request a 
Visiting Judge to Hear any Motion to Disqualify 
Him, 
20 
S. 
Tex. 
L. 
J. 
395 
(1980); 
Note, 
Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or 
Prejudice, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 236 (1978). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
8 
 
See also State v. Carviou, [154 Wis. 2d 641, 454 
N.W.2d 562] (Ct. App. 1990). 
I conclude that the court ought to order a response to 
the petition in this case.  The court should then 
decide the petition, providing guidance on the proper 
procedure for invoking appellate review of a circuit 
judge's denial of a recusal motion and on the laws 
applicable to disqualification under the circumstances 
of this case. 
* * * * 
¶131 The 
recusal 
motion 
in 
Matter 
of 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Crosetto, 160 Wis. 2d 581, 466 N.W.2d 879 
(1991) rested on statutory grounds of Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(f) 
and (2)(g) and on "federal and state constitutional provisions," 
which was a secondary and not very well developed argument.  The 
essence of the motion was that Crosetto had sued the justices in 
federal court and although the federal case had been dismissed, 
Attorney Crosetto alleged that each justice was biased.1  
¶132 In Crosetto, the recusal motion asked each justice 
individually to recuse himself or herself.  The per curiam 
decision, which then-Justice Abrahamson did not join, reports 
that each justice individually responded.  No motion sought 
court review of these individual decisions.  Accordingly, 
                                                 
1 In other states some justices have recused themselves when 
so challenged.  Others have not.  See, e.g., Grievance 
Administrator v. Fieger, 179 N.W.2d 123, 149-150 (Mich. 2006) 
(statement of four challenged justices, rejecting, inter alia, 
the argument that lawsuits filed by an attorney against justices 
of the court disqualified them from presiding over his attorney 
disciplinary case); Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, No. 
36175, ___ P.3d ___, 2009 WL 2882874, *3-4 (Idaho Sept. 10, 
2009) (chief justice recusing on basis of federal lawsuit filed 
by district court judge against the justices; other justices 
continued to hear the matter). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
9 
 
because the question was not raised, neither the per curiam nor 
Justice Abrahamson's dissent addressed the issue of what a court 
should do when a motion asks the entire court to review an 
individual justice's recusal decision.  Justice Abrahamson's 
dissent proposed what actions the court should take for handling 
recusal motions. 
¶133 The court sanctioned Attorney Crosetto.  Justice 
Abrahamson dissented.  The Crosetto dissent went beyond the 
case, outlining some key questions the court should address 
relating to recusal, questions that were then troublesome and 
unanswered and are still troublesome and unanswered.  One 
significant issue raised in the dissent is that due process 
requires the application of an objective fairness standard, in 
contrast to the subjective standard the court was using under 
Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g). 
¶134 This "subjective standard" interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) underlies Justice Roggensack's writing 
today, and it is problematic.   
¶135 Justice Abrahamson also urged the court to accept the 
offer of the Judicial Council to assist the court in adopting a 
rule of procedure relating to a justice's recusal.  The court 
did not accept the Judicial Council's offer of assistance on 
this subject before or after Crosetto. 
¶136 Here is the full text of the part of Justice 
Abrahamson's dissent in Crosetto addressing generally recusal of 
justices of this court: 
Attorney Crosetto moved that the seven justices recuse 
themselves.  The motion papers assert that the risk of 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
10 
 
bias is "impermissibly high" because Attorney Crosetto 
and other plaintiffs in a federal suit against the 
justices relating to the integrated bar "levelled 
direct, personal, and substantial criticism against 
the justices in pleadings and in a brief filed in the 
federal lawsuit."N15 Memorandum in Support of Motion, 
p. 3. 
N15. Attorney Crosetto reasons that the justices 
have a personal interest in this disciplinary 
proceeding as follows: (1) allegations in the 
lawsuit——e.g., accusing the justices of violating 
Attorney Crosetto's civil rights for more than a 
decade, of reneging on a promise given under 
oath, and of possibly giving inconsistent answers 
under 
oath 
to 
interrogatories——may 
seriously 
damage the justices' reputations; (2) an elected 
justice's interest in reputation is greater than 
almost any financial interest he or she may have; 
(3) 
this 
proceeding 
gives 
the 
justices 
an 
opportunity 
to 
diffuse 
and 
diminish 
the 
allegations against them by reprimanding Attorney 
Crosetto and thus tarnishing Attorney Crosetto's 
reputation.  Some lawyers apparently believe that 
voicing a complaint against a judge jeopardizes 
the attorney or the clients.  See lawyers' 
comments reported in the Wisconsin Equal Justice 
Task Force, Final Report, p. 244 (1990). 
Recusal is a serious matter.  Court statistics show 
that circuit court judges recused themselves in more 
than 4,000 cases in 1990.  The issue of recusal of a 
justice has arisen at least three times in this court 
in the last 18 months. 
The majority opinion suggests that Attorney Crosetto's 
motion for recusal was untimely.  When and how should 
a litigant move for recusal of a justice?  Does the 
court's hearing the matter on oral argument or on 
briefs affect the timing or procedure?  Ordinarily 
parties do not know whether justices have recused 
themselves until the opinion is released. 
Is the subjective standard set forth in American TV 
and Appliance of Madison, Inc., 151 Wis. 2d 175, 182-
83, 
443 
N.W.2d 662 
(1989) 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
not 
participating), the correct standard?  Compare State 
ex rel. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Cir. Court for 
St. Croix County, Case No. 90-0935-W, Order filed May 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
11 
 
29, 1990 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); and Liljeberg 
v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 
108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988), adopting the 
objective standard. 
Is it appropriate for the court to prohibit justices 
from explaining, either in a published opinion or in a 
document in the case file, why they recuse themselves, 
while justices may explain in an opinion why they are 
not recusing themselves? N16 
N16. On September 6, 1990, this court adopted the 
following interpretation of Procedure L.1. of the 
Court's 
Internal 
Operating 
Procedures: 
["]A 
justice who recuses himself or herself may file 
with the court or as part of a published opinion 
only the statement that: A. The justice took no 
part.  B. The justice did not participate.  C. 
The 
justice 
withdrew 
from 
participation.["]  
Compare American Bar Association Code of Judicial 
Conduct (1990), Canon 3 E and F which state: "E. 
(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself 
in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned . . . . F. A judge 
disqualified by the terms of Section 3E may 
disclose on the record the basis of the judge's 
disqualification.  If following the disclosure of 
any 
basis 
for 
disqualification 
other 
than 
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, 
the parties and lawyers, without participation by 
the judge, all agree that the judge should not be 
disqualified, and the judge is then willing to 
participate, the judge may participate in the 
proceeding.  The agreement shall be incorporated 
in the record of the proceeding." 
What action should the court take when all or a 
majority of justices have to recuse themselves?  BAPR 
responded to Attorney Crosetto's recusal motion in 
part by pointing out that the Supreme Court must hear 
the matter because it is the only entity with 
jurisdiction 
to 
decide 
attorney 
disciplinary 
proceedings.  The Judicial Council has raised similar 
issues 
concerning 
disciplinary 
action 
against 
a 
justice of the Supreme Court.  See Judicial Council 
Report dated April 26, 1990.  The Judicial Council 
reviewed the problems, asked the court to consider the 
adoption of a rule or procedure relating to the 
handling of such matters, and offered to assist the 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
12 
 
court with drafting a rule. The court has not 
responded to the Council's report. 
This case demonstrates the need for this court to 
address promptly issues relating to recusal. 
Matter 
of 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Crosetto, 
160 
Wis. 2d 581, 601-604, 466 N.W.2d 879, (1991) (Abrahamson, J., 
dissenting). 
* * * * 
APPENDIX B.  The United States Supreme Court Retains 
Jurisdiction to Disqualify One of Its Own Members 
¶137 Multiple lessons are learned from a review of the 
disqualification practices of the United States Supreme Court to 
inform the court of its powers and jurisdiction to review a 
justice's refusal to recuse himself or herself.2 
¶138 Over the years, numerous challenges have been made to 
United States Supreme Court justices.  The Court has never held 
that it lacks the power to exclude a judicial peer from 
participation in a case.  Most importantly, for our purposes, 
seven justices of the United States Supreme Court refused to 
adopt an order in 1945 stating that the Court was "without the 
                                                 
2 For discussions of judicial disqualification and the 
United States Supreme Court, see, e.g., Richard E. Flamm, 
Judicial Disqualification § 29.4 (2d ed. 2007); Debra Lyn 
Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 Hastings L. J. 657 
(2005); Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented 
Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 Kan. L. Rev. 531 (2005); John 
Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judicial Disqualification, 62 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 237 (1987); Paul B. Lewis, Systemic Due Process: 
Procedural Concepts and the Problem of Recusal, 38 U. Kan. L. 
Rev. 381 (1990); William H. Rehnquist, Sense and Nonsense About 
Judicial Ethics, 28 The Record of the Ass'n of the Bar of the 
City of N.Y. 694 (1973); Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding 
the Henhouse?: Recusal and the Procedural Void in the Court of 
Last Resort, 57 Rutgers L. Rev. 107 (2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 Brook. L. Rev. 589 (1987). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
13 
 
authority" to rule on the participation of a justice in a case.  
A recounting of this incident appears in William H. Rehnquist, 
The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is 65-67 (1987).  The 
Court has not adopted such an order since 1945.  Indeed, as we 
shall explain, the Court has retained its power to rule on 
motions for a justice's disqualification and has exercised its 
authority over the disqualification of a justice.3 
¶139 The general practice of the United States Supreme 
Court has been not to review the recusal decision of an 
individual justice.4  In contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's 
                                                 
3 The United States Supreme Court has not explicitly 
confronted a motion by a litigant arguing that the Court should 
disqualify one of its justices from participating as a matter of 
constitutional due process.  All the recusal motions have been 
decided before Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. 
Ct. 2252 (2009). 
4 The practice of federal district courts and federal courts 
of appeal regarding recusal seems to vary. 
For discussions of judicial disqualification in the federal 
district courts, see, e.g., Leslie W. Abramson, Specifying 
Grounds for Judicial Disqualification in Federal Courts, 72 Neb. 
L. Rev. 1046 (1993); Edward G. Burg, Meeting the Challenge: 
Rethinking Judicial Disqualification, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 1445 
(1981). 
For a brief discussion of the procedure for disqualifying 
appellate 
judges, 
see 
Richard 
E. 
Flamm, 
Judicial 
Disqualification ch. 29 (2d ed. 2007). 
For further discussions of judicial disqualification in the 
federal courts of appeal, see, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial 
Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 Iowa L. 
Rev. 1213 (2002); Jason Hutt, Note, A Wrong Without A Remedy: 
Proposing a Recusal Procedure for Circuit Court Judges, 22 Vt. 
L. Rev. 627 (1998) (noting the absence of a procedure to recuse 
federal circuit court judges whose objectivity can reasonably be 
questioned). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
14 
 
practice has been to review the decision of an individual 
justice to participate.5 
¶140 In discussing disqualification in the United States 
Supreme Court we start by examining Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. 
                                                                                                                                                             
In Aronson v. Brown, 14 F.3d 1578, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994), 
the court described recusal practice in federal appellate courts 
as follows: 
[A]ppellate courts have reviewed charges that a member 
of the same appellate court should have recused or be 
disqualified in a particular case.  Such reviews have 
been conducted in a variety of ways, adapting the 
procedure to the circumstances.  In Maier v. Orr, 758 
F.2d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1985) a panel of the 
Federal Circuit that did not include the challenged 
judge decided whether that judge should have recused 
in terms of [28 U.S.C.] § 455, in response to a 
party's motion made after the party received an 
adverse decision authored by the challenged judge.  In 
Hepperle v. Johnston, 590 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1979) the 
court considered the appellant's request that eight 
judges who sat on prior appeals be disqualified for 
personal bias or prejudice; a three-judge panel of 
that circuit, one member of which was one of the eight 
challenged judges, decided the issue.  In Scarrella v. 
Midwest Federal Savings & Loan, 536 F.2d 1207, 1209 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885, 97 S. Ct. 237, 
50 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1976), a motion that all the judges 
of the court of appeals recuse themselves was decided 
by a three-judge panel of the court.  In In re Charge 
of Judicial Misconduct, 691 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1982) a 
complaint 
alleging 
misconduct 
under 
28 
U.S.C. 
§ 372(c)(1) was filed against three judges of the 
court of appeals; it was decided by a single judge of 
that court, who was not one of the accused judges. 
5 See Case v. Hoffman, 100 Wis. 314, 72 N.W. 390, reh'g 
granted, 74 N.W. 220 (1898); State v. Am. TV & Appliance of 
Madison, Inc., 151 Wis. 2d 175, 443 N.W.2d 662 (1989); City of 
Edgerton v. Gen. Cas. Co., 190 Wis. 2d 510, 527  N.W.2d 305 
(1995); Jackson v. Benson, 249 Wis. 2d 681, 639 N.W.2d 545 
(2002); Donohoo v. Action Wis., Inc., 2008 WI 110, 314 
Wis. 2d 510, 754 N.W.2d 480. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
15 
 
Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 897 (1945), one of the early notorious 
cases seeking disqualification of a justice.  We begin here 
because the case demonstrates that the Court does not have a 
consistent practice in coping with disqualification challenges, 
that the Court's disqualification practices have been subject to 
criticism, and that the Court has refused to hold that it lacks 
the power to exclude the participation of a judicial peer.  We 
examine the Jewell Ridge concurrence at length because it is 
often cited by judges in recusal cases, as Justice Roggensack 
has, without any explanation, and without any understanding of 
its historic context and meaning as a concurrence.  See J. 
Roggensack, ¶220. 
¶141 In a motion for a rehearing in Jewell Ridge, Justice 
Black's participation in the case was challenged on the ground 
that one of the litigants was represented by a lawyer who had 
been Justice Black's personal attorney and former law partner.6  
The entire Court, with Justice Black participating, issued a 
docket entry statement as follows:  "Petition for rehearing 
denied."7 
¶142 Justice Jackson, joined only by Justice Frankfurter, 
filed a four-paragraph concurrence without a citation to any 
legal authority, objecting to the Court's issuing an order 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Black-Jackson Feud, 
1988 Sup. Ct. Rev. 203, 208. 
7 Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 897 
(1945). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
16 
 
deciding the motion.  Justice Jackson concluded that Justice 
Black alone should respond to the motion for disqualification. 
¶143 Justice Jackson observed that the "[p]ractice of the 
Justices over the years [about motions to disqualify] has not 
been uniform, and the diversity of attitudes to the question 
doubtless leads to some confusion as to what the bar may expect 
and as to whether the action in any case is a matter of 
individual or collective responsibility."8  Justice Jackson also 
opined that the complaint was "one that cannot properly be 
addressed to the Court as a whole and for that reason I concur 
in denying it."9 
¶144 Seven members of the Court disagreed with Justices 
Jackson and Frankfurter; the seven treated the disqualification 
motion as one addressed to the Court, and they answered it for 
the Court.  Indeed a majority refused to adopt an order proposed 
by Chief Justice Stone stating that the Court was "without the 
authority" to rule on Justice Black's participation.10 
¶145 The late John P. Frank, in what remains one of the 
seminal dissertations on judicial disqualification, concluded 
that although "Jackson's views on the subject are not at all 
points clear, his statement shows an enormous difference of 
                                                 
8 Jewell Ridge, 325 U.S. 897, 897 (1945) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
9 Jewell Ridge, 325 U.S. 897, 897 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
10 See William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It Was, 
How It Is 65-67 (1987). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
17 
 
opinion in the Supreme Court on the subject of disqualification 
of its members."11 
¶146 Justice Black's participation in Jewell Ridge and 
Justice 
Jackson's 
concurrence 
have 
generated 
substantial 
commentary, and the case is best understood in its historical 
context.  The Jewell Ridge concurrence was authored amidst a 
sharp rivalry among members of the Court over both judicial 
principles and the question of who might be appointed the next 
Chief Justice.12  As a generalization, "the Court of the 1941-54 
era featured human rather than institutional dimensions of 
judging . . . in contrast to the Court of today."13  More 
particularly, Justices Jackson and Black had a personal and 
                                                 
11 John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale L.J. 
605, 605-06 (1947).  Professor Frank was first a law clerk to 
Justice Black and later a sympathetic biographer of Justice 
Black.  See Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Black-Jackson Feud, 1988 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 203, 223. 
12 See generally Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Black-Jackson 
Feud, 1988 Sup. Ct. Rev. 203, 204-07.  Like several of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's  appointees to the United States Supreme 
Court, Justices Black and Jackson were appointed to the Court 
from high political offices, without prior judicial experience, 
and both had ambitions of becoming Chief Justice, if not 
President.  See Hutchinson at 207; William Domnarski, The Great 
Justices, 1941-54: Black, Douglas, Frankfurter & Jackson in 
Chambers 2-4, 22-23, 101 (2006). 
13 William Domnarski, The Great Justices, 1941-54: Black, 
Douglas, Frankfurter & Jackson in Chambers 166 (2006). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
18 
 
jurisprudential 
rivalry 
that 
one 
contemporary 
journalist 
characterized as a "blood feud."14   
¶147 Justice Jackson's concurrence was widely understood 
then (and now) to have been authored primarily as a public 
criticism of Justice Black's participation in the case, rather 
than as a finely reasoned legal argument.15  Furthermore, Jewell 
Ridge was decided when no federal disqualification statute 
                                                 
14 Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Black-Jackson Feud, 1988 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 203, 216 (citing, inter alia, Doris Fleeson, Supreme 
Court Feud: Inside Story of Jackson-Black Battle Laid Before a 
Harassed President, Washington Evening Star, May 16, 1946, at 
15).  Justice William Douglas, another ambitious rival of 
Jackson's, later recounted that "it was very evident . . . that 
Bob Jackson thoroughly disliked Hugo Black and was out to 
destroy him.  I mean destroy him in the sense of discrediting 
him."  See William Domnarski, The Great Justices, 1941-54: 
Black, Douglas, Frankfurter & Jackson in Chambers 40-41 (2006). 
15 See John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale L. 
J. 605, 605-06, 607 n.5 (1947) (summarizing contemporaneous 
editorials); Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Black-Jackson Feud, 1988 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 203, 208 (1988). 
The year after Jewell Ridge, when President Truman named 
then-Treasury Secretary Vinson as the next Chief Justice, and 
with public rumors that Justice Black had threatened to resign 
if Justice Jackson got the center seat (and vice versa), Justice 
Jackson sent a then-scandalous public cable to Congress while 
still serving as lead prosecutor in the Nuremburg trial of Nazi 
war criminals.  Justice Jackson openly criticized the handling 
of the conflict of interest he perceived in Jewell Ridge and 
warned that "if it is ever repeated while I am on the bench I 
will make my Jewell Ridge opinion look like a letter of 
recommendation by comparison."  Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Black-
Jackson Feud, 1988 Sup. Ct. Rev. 203, 220-21. 
While Jewell Ridge has received intense scrutiny as an 
historical incident, the case is not cited in reference to 
recusal in Eugene Gressman et al., Supreme Court Practice (9th 
ed. 2007), a leading treatise on Supreme Court practice,. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
19 
 
applied to Supreme Court Justices.16  Today, 28 U.S.C. § 455, as 
amended in 1974, sets out objective standards and grounds for 
disqualification, and they apply to Justices of the Court.17   
                                                 
16 See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 830 (1972) (Rehnquist, 
J.). 
17 Before 1974, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) required "any justice or 
judge . . . to disqualify himself in any case in which he has a 
substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a 
material witness, or is so related to any party or his attorney 
as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the 
trial, appeal, or proceeding therein."  This section was amended 
in 1974 to omit the phrase "in his opinion," in order to 
eliminate the subjective standard and to adopt an objective 
standard.  See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453 (S. Rep. No. 93-419), 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974). 
The current version of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) provides that a 
judge "shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 
The purpose of the 1974 amendment was explained in Roberts 
v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1980), as setting forth 
an objective standard so that a judge's subjective decision 
regarding his or her impartiality was no longer determinative of 
disqualification under § 455.  See also Liteky v. United States, 
510 U.S. 540, 546-48 (1994) ("The 1974 revision made massive 
changes . . . . 
Subsection 
(a) . . . was 
an 
entirely 
new 
'catchall' 
recusal 
provision, 
covering 
both 
'interest 
or 
relationship' and 'bias or prejudice' grounds . . . all to be 
evaluated on an objective basis, so that what matters is not the 
reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance" (emphasis in 
original).). 
Another effect of the 1974 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 455 
was to challenge the traditional "duty to sit" rationale for 
resolving close questions of disqualification in favor of 
sitting 
on 
a 
case. 
 
See 
Richard 
E. 
Flamm, 
Judicial 
Disqualification § 20.8 at 605 (2007) (the duty to sit rule was 
displaced); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief Williams' Ghost: The 
Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 
813, 865 (2009) (the legislative intent was to abolish the duty 
to sit rule). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
20 
 
¶148 In sum, Justice Jackson's concurrence is just that——a 
concurrence, not an opinion of the Court.  Justice Jackson's 
concurrence was not adopted by the Court in Jewell Ridge and has 
not been expressly adopted thereafter. 
¶149 Despite Justice Jackson's Jewell Ridge concurrence, 
the rules of the United States Supreme Court treat motions for 
recusal the same as any other motion.  Motions for recusal, like 
all motions, are addressed to the entire Court.18  
¶150 The Court has not been consistent in handling motions 
addressed to the Court for recusal of a justice.  Sometimes the 
                                                 
18 See S. Ct. Rule 21. 
These motions are in contrast to the more limited and 
specific category of Applications to Specific Justices, governed 
by S. Ct. Rule 22.  See Eugene Gressman et al., Supreme Court 
Practice § 16.1, 833-35 (9th ed. 2007). 
Sometimes a party may use a less formal method than a 
motion, such as a letter to the clerk's office, to suggest 
recusal to an individual justice.  See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, 
Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 
Iowa L. Rev. 1213, 1215-16 (describing the recusal of three 
justices from considering the request for a stay of the 
execution of Napoleon Beazley in 2001). 
In some circumstances a justice, without a recusal motion, 
voluntarily recuses himself or herself.  See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. 
v. Abdullahi, No. 09-34, 130 S.Ct. 534, 2009 WL 3517904 (Nov. 2, 
2009) ("The Chief Justice and Justice Sotomayor took no part in 
the consideration or decision of this petition."). 
Other times a justice, without a recusal motion, may 
explain his decision not to recuse.  See Microsoft Corp. v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 1301-03 (Justice Rehnquist's statement 
explaining his decision not to disqualify himself when his son 
was a partner in a law firm representing a party, Microsoft, on 
other related matters); Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 
U.S. 451, 466-67 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., recusing himself 
without motion because of his strong feelings about the issue in 
the case). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
21 
 
Court has a docket entry statement simply denying the motion 
seeking recusal of a justice, with the challenged justice 
apparently participating in the denial.19 
¶151 Other times the Court has a docket entry statement 
merely stating a denial of the motion by the challenged justice, 
with or without an explanation or statement by the challenged 
justice.20 
¶152 A different docket entry statement was used in Cheney 
v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
541 U.S. 913 (2004).  The first docket entry statement referred 
the motion addressed to the Court requesting Justice Scalia's 
recusal to Justice Scalia.21  This seems to make clear that the 
court as a whole took jurisdiction over the motion in the first 
instance.  Justice Scalia then individually denied the motion, 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Ernest v. U.S. Attorney for the S. Dist. of 
Alabama, 474 U.S. 1016, (1985) (J. Powell); Kerpelman v. 
Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland, 450 U.S. 970 (1981) (C.J. 
Burger); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 409 U.S. 1029 (1972) 
(J. Powell & J. Rehnquist).  
Because the Court's denial of the motion to recuse offers 
no explanation and does not show the reasoning of the justices 
in deciding the recusal motion, the assumption is that the 
individual justice's decision has not been subject to court 
review.  The failure of the Court to review an individual 
justice's decision on recusal motions has been criticized in the 
legal literature. 
20 See, e.g., Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 1301 (1980) (J. 
Rehnquist); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 901 (1972) (J. Rehnquist); 
Gravel v. United States, 409 U.S. 902 (1972) (J. Rehnquist); Guy 
v. United States, 409 U.S. 896 (1972) (J. Blackmum & J. 
Rehnquist). 
21 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 540 
U.S. 1217 (2004). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
22 
 
publishing a memorandum opinion.22  No court order was issued by 
the Court denying the motion. 
¶153 Justice Rehnquist wrote in 1972 that "under the 
existing practice of the Court disqualification has been a 
matter of individual decision . . . ."23  Later, in Hanrahan, 
Justice Rehnquist wrote:  "Since generally the Court as an 
institution leaves such motions [of recusal], even though they 
be addressed to it, to the decision of the individual Justices 
to whom they refer, . . . I shall treat the motion as addressed 
to me individually."24 
¶154 In the Cheney case, the Court's docket entry statement 
referring the recusal motion to Justice Scalia simply stated:  
"In accordance with its historic practice, the Court refers the 
motion to recuse in this case to Justice Scalia."25 
¶155 The operative words are "practice," "generally," and 
"historic practice."  Stating that the "historic practice" and 
"practice" of the Court leave disqualification to the individual 
                                                 
22 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 541 
U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.). 
23 Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 833 (1972) (emphasis 
added). 
24 Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 1301, 1301 (1980) (emphasis 
added). 
25 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 540 
U.S. 1217, 1217 (2004) (emphasis added).  Indeed the movant in 
the Cheney case asked the Court as a whole to address the 
motion.  See Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-
Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. Kan. L. Rev. 531, 
575 (2005) (documenting public statements of the Sierra Club at 
the time the motion was filed). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
23 
 
justice is not the same thing as stating that the Court does not 
have the power or jurisdiction to determine or review an 
individual justice's alleged disqualification.  To those who 
write and read opinions carefully, the word "generally" leaves 
open the possibility of a different practice or result at a 
later date or in a different circumstance.  As one commentator 
describing the practice at the United States Supreme Court 
phrased it, "[A]lthough the standard for recusal has received 
significant judicial attention, the actual procedure by which 
the decision is made is truly a creature of tradition."26 
¶156 Finally, the docket records of the Court and the 
"historic practice" of the Court do not tell the complete story 
about how the Court treats recusal of justices as a collective 
decision. 
¶157 The Justices benefit from deliberate consultation with 
their colleagues about disqualification.  Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg has stated that "[i]n the end [recusal] is a decision 
the individual Justice makes, but always with consultation among 
the rest of us."27 
¶158 Common judgment about recusal is not only used on an 
ad hoc basis but is also used to memorialize recusal policies in 
anticipation of recurring situations.  In 1993, seven sitting 
justices publicly issued a "Statement of Recusal Policy" 
                                                 
26 R. Matthew Pearson, Note, Duck Duck Recuse?  Foreign 
Common Law Guidance & Improving Recusal of Supreme Court 
Justices, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1799, 1813-14 (2005). 
27 An Open Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 
Conn. L. Rev. 1033, 1039 (2004) (emphasis added)). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
24 
 
relating to relatives who practice law and whose law firms may 
appear before the Court.28  Chief Justice Roberts, who took his 
seat on September 29, 2005, adopted this written policy on 
September 30, 2005.29  
¶159 A comparable recognition of the Court's collective 
responsibility was also invoked when Justice Thurgood Marshall 
sent his October 4, 1984, memorandum to the other Justices, 
"describing a new policy on recusals he proposed to adopt in 
cases involving the NAACP."30  Justice Marshall received "crisp 
blessings" in writing from all eight other Justices.31 
¶160 These 
actions 
evidence 
a 
clear 
and 
sensible 
willingness on the part of the Justices to exercise their 
collective supervisory power over both the possibility of actual 
bias and the appearance of fairness at the Court. 
¶161 An even clearer exercise of the Court's inherent 
institutional responsibility to provide a qualified group of 
justices was evidenced on October 17, 1975, when eight of the 
                                                 
28 See Richard E. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification, Appendix 
D at 1101 (2007) (reproducing the policy as issued by press 
release).  See also Ginsburg, 36 Conn. L. Rev. at 1039 
(describing the shared policy as a "written agreement——anyone 
can read it"). 
29 See Ross E. Davies, The Reluctant Recusants: Two Parables 
of Supreme Judicial Disqualification, 10 Green Bag 2d 79, 91-92 
(2006).  Justice Alito has also agreed to this existing policy. 
30 See Ross E. Davies, The Reluctant Recusants: Two Parables 
of Supreme Judicial Disqualification, 10 Green Bag 2d 79, 81-82 
(2006). 
31 See Ross E. Davies, The Reluctant Recusants: Two Parables 
of Supreme Judicial Disqualification, 10 Green Bag 2d 79, 81-82 
(2006). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
25 
 
court's nine members met and voted (7 to 1, with Justice White 
in opposition), to effectively strip the voting and writing 
power of Associate Justice William O. Douglas.32  Specifically, 
the other justices agreed that Justice Douglas would not be 
assigned to write any opinions and that the court would not 
mandate any 5-4 decisions in which Justice Douglas was in the 
majority.33  Justice Douglas had suffered a serious stroke and 
"[h]is disturbingly uneven behavior inside the Court and in 
public showed that he was not well enough to serve as a judge."34 
¶162 In other words, "when Douglas failed to recuse 
himself . . . the rest of the Court took over and made the 
decision for him."35  The method and reasons for such action are 
different than the present case, but the invocation of the 
                                                 
32 See Ross E. Davies, The Reluctant Recusants: Two Parables 
of Supreme Judicial Disqualification, 10 Green Bag 2d 79, 88-89 
(2006) (citing Justice Byron White, Letter of Oct. 20, 1975, 
reprinted in Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Man Who Once Was Whizzer 
White 463-65 (1998)). 
33 See Ross E. Davies, The Reluctant Recusants: Two Parables 
of Supreme Judicial Disqualification, 10 Green Bag 2d 79, 88-89 
(2006) (citing Justice Byron White, Letter of Oct. 20, 1975, 
reprinted in Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Man Who Once Was Whizzer 
White 463-65 (1998)). 
34 Ross E. Davies, The Reluctant Recusants: Two Parables of 
Supreme Judicial Disqualification, 10 Green Bag 2d 79, 88 (2006) 
(citing David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 995, 1052-56 (2000)). 
35 Ross E. Davies, The Reluctant Recusants: Two Parables of 
Supreme Judicial Disqualification, 10 Green Bag 2d 79, 89 
(2006).  For another example of the justices joining to force 
the removal of an incapacitated justice in 1924-25, namely 
Justice Joseph McKenna, see David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude 
on the U.S. Supreme Court, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 995, 1015-16 
(2000). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
26 
 
Court's institutional power over its individual members is 
clear. 
¶163 The conclusion to be drawn from the disqualification 
practice of the United States Supreme Court is that the public 
practice 
has 
not 
been 
consistent. 
 
Justices 
apparently 
informally confer and agree on disqualification practices.  Most 
importantly, the Court has never denied its power to decide the 
disqualification of one of its members or its obligation to 
provide a legally qualified forum to all litigants.  Indeed the 
Court has exercised its power to disqualify one of its own 
members, Justice William O. Douglas, and forced the retirement 
of another, Justice Joseph McKenna. 
¶164 What is clear from examining the disqualification 
practice of the United States Supreme Court is that it generally 
has not reviewed the individual decision of a Justice in 
response to a recusal motion, but has not ceded its power to 
disqualify one of its own members.36  
¶165 Thus the practice of the United States Supreme Court 
is very different from the practice of the Wisconsin Supreme  
Court.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court has repeatedly reviewed an 
individual justice's decision to participate in a case.  See 
¶¶39-45.  The practice in this state has been to exercise, 
rather than to reserve, our jurisdiction to decide the merits of 
a justice's response to a disqualification motion, "in the 
                                                 
36 The United States Supreme Court has, however, reviewed 
the decisions of state court judges to participate in cases and 
has held that a failure to recuse may constitute a violation of 
due process.  See Caperton and cases cited therein. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
27 
 
defense 
of 
[the 
court's] 
own 
legitimacy 
and 
of 
its 
integrity . . . ."37 
¶166 Numerous proposals have been floated to change the 
disqualification practice at the United States Supreme Court.  
No one has suggested that the Court lacks the power to change 
its disqualification practice to provide for Court review of an 
individual justice's decision not to recuse himself or herself. 
* * * * 
APPENDIX C.  The Recusal Practice of Our Sister State 
Supreme Courts Is Instructive 
¶167 This 
year's 
decision 
in 
Caperton 
has 
spurred 
increasing commentary and a certain amount of hand-wringing 
among lawyers and judges.  With good reason.  One need not 
understand the furthest implications of the decision to know 
that these implications will be significant.   
¶168 Dissenting from the decision, Chief Justice Roberts 
observed that "Judges and litigants will surely encounter 
other[] [uncertainties] when they are forced to . . . apply the 
majority's decision in different circumstances."  129 S. Ct. at 
2272 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia proclaimed: 
"[T]he principal consequence of today's decision is to create 
vast uncertainty with respect to a point of law that can be 
raised in all litigated cases in (at least) those 39 States that 
elect their judges."  129 S. Ct. at 2274 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
                                                 
37 City of Edgerton v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 190 
Wis. 2d 510, 513, 527 N.W.2d 305 (1995). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
28 
 
¶169 An outpouring of literature and commentary discussing 
a "post-Caperton" landscape has already begun.38  State courts, 
and most immediately our own, are on the front lines of 
resolving the boiling and at times contentious uncertainty. 
¶170 In addressing "where we go from here," understanding 
the current recusal practices of state supreme courts and 
assessing "how we got here" will be invaluable.  We have 
therefore looked around the country at the history and practice 
                                                 
38 See, e.g., Comments: Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.: 
Due Process Limitations on the Appearance of Judicial Bias, 123 
Harv. L. Rev. 73 et seq. (2009); Pamela S. Karlan, Electing 
Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton, 123 
Harv. L. Rev. 80 (2009); Lawrence Lessig, What Everybody Knows 
and Too Few Accept, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 104 (1990); Penny J. 
White, Relinquished Responsibilities, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 120 
(2009); Terri R. Day, Buying Justice: Caperton v. A.T. Massey: 
Campaign Dollars, Mandatory Recusal and Due Process, 28 Miss. C. 
L. Rev. 359, 363 (2008-09); John Gibeaut, Caperton capers: 
court's 
recusal 
ruling 
sparks 
states 
to 
mull 
judicial 
contribution laws, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2009, at 21; James L. Gibson 
& Gregory A. Caldeira, Campaign Support, Conflicts of Interest, 
and Judicial Impartiality: Can the Legitimacy of Courts Be 
Rescued by Recusals?, CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on 
Empirical 
Legal 
Studies 
Paper, 
available 
at 
SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1428723; Stephen M. Hoersting & Bradley 
A. Smith, Speech and Elections: The Caperton Caper and the 
Kennedy Conundrum, 2008-09 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 319; Kevin C. 
Newsom & Marc James Ayers,  A brave new world of judicial 
recusal? The United States Supreme Court enters the fray, 70 The 
Alabama 
Lawyer 
5 
(2009); 
Judicial 
Disqualification 
After 
Caperton, Judicature, July-Aug. 2009, at 4; Statement of H. 
Thomas Wells Jr., President, American Bar Association Re: Ruling 
of The Supreme Court of The United States in Caperton Et Al. v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., Et Al., June 8, 2009, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/statement/statement.cfm?relea
seid=671 (last visited Jan. 5, 2010) ("[T]he standards laid out 
by the court must not be viewed as the final word on this 
issue."). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
29 
 
of recusal decisions, particularly in the other states' courts 
of last resort. 
¶171 Three core observations: 
1. 
Caperton raises problems that most state high 
courts have not yet begun to address.  One recent 
exception is the Michigan Supreme Court. 
2. 
Some state high courts have reviewed recusal 
decisions of their individual members; others have 
not. 
Courts 
have 
altered 
their 
practice 
at 
different points in their history. 
3. 
State supreme courts' recusal practice, at least 
before Caperton, has been a matter of tradition or 
prudential considerations, not an espousal of a 
lack of power or jurisdiction.39  
                                                 
39 See, 
e.g., 
Fidelity 
Ins. 
& 
Guar. 
Co. 
v. 
Mich. 
Catastrophic Claims Ass'n, 773 N.W.2d 243, 254 (2009) (Young, 
J.) (noting "170—year-old disqualification practice"); In re 
modification of Canon 3A(7) of the Minnesota Code of Judicial 
Conduct, 438 N.W.2d 95, 95 (Minn. 1989) ("It has long been the 
practice of this court to honor decisions of its individual 
members as to whether to participate in a pending proceeding."); 
Goodheart v. Casey, 565 A.2d 757, 762 (Pa. 1989) ("[U]nder our 
law, a strong tradition has been established which recognizes 
that each judge has the primary responsibility for determining 
the 
validity 
of 
a 
challenge 
to 
his 
or 
her 
participation . . . ."); Noriega Rodriguez v. Rafael Hernandez 
Colon, 120 D.P.R. 267, 20 P.R. Offic. Trans. 285, 289, 296 (P.R. 
1988) (noting one past instance of "collegially pass[ing] on the 
tenability 
of 
the 
disqualification 
of 
one 
of 
the 
justices . . . "; discussing "[d]ifferent factors, traditions, 
legal circumstances and principles of judicial organization," 
comparing other jurisdictions, and ultimately adopting the 
"practice" that the Court not decide recusal motions en banc). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
30 
 
¶172 Several 
states' 
supreme 
courts 
have 
explicitly 
exercised or reserved the authority of the state's highest court 
to disqualify one or more of its own members.40 
¶173 Board of Justices of Burlington v. Fennimore, 1 N.J.L. 
190, 1793 WL 176 (N.J. 1793), is cited as an early example of a 
court sitting in judgment of one of its own.41  In Fennimore the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Judicature of New Jersey 
had an interest in the case.  The court published a declaration 
by the other two judges that "the interest was too remote and 
indefinite," and that it was therefore appropriate for him to 
sit and preside. 
¶174 In another early case, in 1863, the Supreme Court of 
Florida, faced with the question whether stock-holder and 
                                                 
40 See, e.g., Mosk v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 
601 P.2d 1030 (Cal. 1979) (court lawfully composed of pro 
tempore justices disqualified a justice from participation after 
all other justices had recused themselves); Mitchell v. Sage 
Stores, 143 P. 2d 652 (Kan. 1943) (court denied the motion to 
recuse a justice; the challenged justice did not participate in 
deciding the motion); State ex rel. Hall v. Niewoehner, 155 P.2d 
205, (Mont. 1944) (court reviewed and denied motion to recuse 
four of five justices on its merits); State ex rel. Dep't of 
Transp. v. Barsy, 941 P.2d 969 (Nev. 1997) (court denied motion 
to disqualify justice) (overruled on other grounds by GES, Inc. 
v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001)); Goodheart v. Casey, 565 
A.2d 757, 764 (Pa. 1989) ("Where disqualification is raised 
before the Court and the merit of the motion obvious, the 
remaining Justices have the duty to request that Justice to 
accede to the recusal request."); In re Inquiry Concerning a 
Judge, 81 P.3d 758, 761 (Utah 2003) (per curiam) (court denied 
motion to disqualify a justice from judicial disciplinary 
proceedings because the facts "do not create a reasonable basis 
for questioning [his] impartiality . . . ;" challenged justice 
did not participate in reviewing the motion). 
41 See, e.g., John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 
Yale L.J. 605, 612 (1947). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
31 
 
trustee relationships of two of its members were sufficient to 
disqualify them under the state statute, concluded that when 
there is any question about the qualification of a judge "the 
safest and legal way of determining the same is by a decision of 
the Court . . . ."42 
¶175 The Florida Supreme Court recognized in 1979 that its 
procedural treatment of requests for disqualification of a 
justice had not always been consistent.43  In In re Estate of 
Carlton, 378 So. 2d 1212, 1216-17 (Fla. 1979), the Court 
"receded" from earlier cases and adopted what it called the 
"modern" view that each justice must determine for himself both 
the legal sufficiency of a request seeking his disqualification 
and 
the 
propriety 
of 
withdrawing 
in 
any 
particular 
circumstances. 
 
The 
selection 
of 
different 
practices 
at 
different times makes clear that it is a choice made by the 
court for prudential reasons, not for lack of jurisdiction. 
¶176 In 1927, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma disqualified 
two of its own justices from participating in a contempt 
proceeding in which the lawyer argued the justices were biased 
against him.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court flatly rejected the 
argument of the two challenged justices that they should be "the 
sole and only judges of their own qualifications, and that, if 
                                                 
42 Trustees Internal Improvement Fund v. Bailey, 10 Fla. 
213, 1863 WL 1012, *5 (1863). 
43 In re Estate of Carlton, 378 So. 2d 1212, 1216 (Fla. 
1979) 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
32 
 
they abuse this discretion . . . the only remedy is by a 
proceeding for impeachment."44 
¶177 The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that under the 
state constitution and laws (which are substantially similar to 
those in Wisconsin), the court had the power and authority, when 
the question was properly presented, to disqualify any one or 
more of its members.  When "it was provided what constitutes 
disqualification for justices of the Supreme Court, but no 
provision was made under the law as to how or in what manner the 
question of disqualification was to be determined . . . the 
question should be determined by the court the same way as any 
other question properly before it . . . ."45 
¶178 Some state supreme courts have promulgated rules of 
procedure for supreme court review of the disqualification of a 
justice by the court. 
¶179 Most recently, in November 2009, the Michigan Supreme 
Court discarded its past practice that individual justices alone 
respond to motions to recuse,46 without review.  The Michigan 
                                                 
44 State ex rel. Short v. Martin, 256 P. 681, 685 (Okla. 
1927). 
45 State ex rel. Short v. Martin, 256 P. 681, 687 (Okla. 
1927) (reviewing numerous cases; the two challenged justices 
participated and dissented). 
46 See Fidelity Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Mich. Catastrophic 
Claims Ass'n, 773 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. 2009); Adair v. State Dep't 
of Ed., 709 N.W.2d 567 (Mich. 2006). 
A pre-Caperton 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutional challenge to 
Michigan's recusal practice allowing recusal in the sole 
discretion of the challenged justice was dismissed by a federal 
court for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted.  Fieger v. Ferry, 2007 WL 2827801 (E.D. Mich. 2007). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
33 
 
Supreme Court has now adopted a rule stating that if a justice's 
participation in a case is challenged, the challenged justice 
shall decide the issue and publish his or her reasoning for the 
decision.  If the challenged justice denies the motion for 
disqualification, then upon a party's motion to the court the 
entire court shall decide the motion for disqualification and 
explain the reasons for its grant or denial of the motion for 
disqualification.47 
¶180 Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 16.3, promulgated by 
the Supreme Court of Texas, requires that an appellate judge or 
justice faced with a motion to recuse must either individually 
grant the motion or certify the matter to the entire court for 
en banc consideration.  The challenged judge or justice must not 
participate in the court's decision on the motion.  Tex. Rules 
App. Proc. Rule 16.3. 
¶181 The Vermont Supreme Court adopted Rules of Appellate 
Procedure modeled on the Texas rule to provide that a justice 
faced with a disqualification motion must either disqualify 
himself or herself or certify the matter to the other members of 
the Court for decision.  The challenged justice may not sit to 
consider the motion.  Vt. Rules of App. Proc. Rule 31(e)(2).  
                                                 
47 See Michigan Supreme Court, Amendment of Rule 2.003, ADM 
File No. 2009-04, effective Nov. 25, 2009, available at 
http://courts.michigan.gov/SUPREMECOURT/Resources/Administrative
/2009-04-112509.pdf.  Although the newly adopted rule itself is 
not long, the order adopting it includes many pages of 
concurring and dissenting opinions, with attachments, sharply 
debating the merits of the change. 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
34 
 
This rule supersedes the prior practice that an individual 
justice rules on a motion to recuse.48 
¶182 The Vermont court promulgated its rule on an emergency 
basis in 1987 without resort to the customary procedures for 
notice and comment because of the large number of pending 
motions to disqualify and the fact that the "existing appellate 
rules 
and 
Code 
[did] 
not 
provide 
suitable 
and 
adequate 
procedures for ruling upon motions to disqualify."  Reporter's 
Notes to Vt. Rules of App. Proc. Rule 31(e)(2)——1987 Emergency 
Amendment. 
¶183 In other states, statutes set forth a procedure for 
the supreme court to review a justice's disqualification.  For 
example, a Nevada statute provides that the Supreme Court of 
Nevada 
sits——without 
the 
participation 
of 
the 
challenged 
justice——to determine whether alleged bias or other grounds 
require the disqualification of one of its members.  Nev. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 1.225(4) (2009). 
¶184 In several states, the historic practice appears to be 
for an individual justice of the supreme court to decide a 
                                                 
48 See State v. Hunt, 527 A.2d 223, 224 (Vt. 1987) ("For 200 
years our law has dictated that each individual judge decide 
according to the dictates of conscience the issue of his or her 
ability to sit impartially in judgment."). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
35 
 
motion for his or her recusal without decision or formal review 
by the other members of the court.49   
                                                 
49 See, e.g., Stilley v. James, 53 S.W.3d 524 (Ark. 2001) 
(motion to disqualify all justices; "each justice individually 
declines to disqualify"); In re Estate of Carlton, 378 So. 
2d 1212, 1216-1217 (Fla. 1979) (each justice must determine for 
himself both the legal sufficiency of a request seeking his 
disqualification and the propriety of withdrawing in any 
particular circumstances); People v. Wilson, 497 N.E.2d 302, 
303-04 (Ill. 1986) (Simon, J.) (Justice Simon individually 
recusing himself "to avoid the appearance of impropriety"; "I 
reject 
the 
suggestion 
advanced 
by 
the 
State's 
Attorney . . . that 
my 
colleagues 
have 
the 
authority 
to 
disqualify me. . . . I also reject the suggestion that my 
colleagues have the authority to order me to participate."); 
Peterson v. Borst, 784 N.E.2d 934 (Ind. 2003) (Boehm, J.) 
(individually denying recusal motion; explaining nonrecusal, 
applying 
"reasonable objective person" analysis); Dean v. 
Bondurant, 
193 
S.W.3d 
744, 
746 
(Ky. 
2006) 
(Roach, 
J.) 
(individually granting recusal motion; "the decision to recuse 
should not be made lightly by a Kentucky Supreme Court 
Justice."); In re modification of Canon 3A(7) of the Minnesota 
Code of Judicial Conduct, 438 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. 1989) (motion 
addressed 
to 
court 
to 
remove 
the 
chief 
justice 
from 
participation; court memorandum states:  "[W]e have declined to 
rule on this motion and instead we refer the matter to Chief 
Justice Popovich individually for decision."); In re Waltemade, 
1974 N.Y. LEXIS 1851 (N.Y. Ct. on the Judiciary 1974) (court 
dismisses motion to recuse chief judge of court of appeals; "the 
practice of the Court is for the individual Judge to decide the 
question; Chief Judge denied the motion); Noriega Rodriguez v. 
Rafael Hernandez Colon, 120 D.P.R. 267, 20 P.R. Offic. Trans. 
285, 296 (P.R. 1988) (considering different approaches and 
adopting individual decision of a justice as a prudential 
matter); Cohen v. Manchin, 336 S.E.2d 171, 175-76 (W. Va. 1984) 
(challenged justice declined to recuse himself; court concluded 
that "where a motion is made to disqualify or recuse an 
individual justice of this Court, that question is to be decided 
by the challenged justice and not by the other members of this 
Court."). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
36 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
In Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, No. 36175, ___ P. 3d 
___, 2009 WL 2882874 (Idaho Sept. 10, 2009), a trial court judge 
moved to disqualify four of the five justices of the Idaho 
Supreme Court, presiding over a disciplinary case.  The Chief 
Justice recused himself, and the remaining four justices denied 
the disqualification motions filed against them; they held 
against the trial court judge on the merits.  Although observing 
that disqualification is left "to the sound discretion of the 
judicial officer himself," id. at *5, the opinion issued by all 
four justices reviewed the disqualification claims.  This 
opinion can be interpreted to mean that the four justices were 
joining individually in collectively denying the motion to 
recuse.  (Kidwell, J., dissenting on grounds other than 
disqualification). 
No.  2007AP795.ssa.awb.npc 
 
37 
 
¶185 None of these observations regarding the history and 
the recusal practices of the state supreme courts provides a 
reason for this court to depart from its established practice of 
reviewing an individual justice's decision not to disqualify 
himself or herself.  Those high courts which have, in the past, 
chosen not to review the recusal decisions of individual 
justices must now contend with how they will guarantee due 
process in the wake of Caperton.  In Wisconsin we should stay 
the course. 
                                                                                                                                                             
For justices' various viewpoints regarding the question 
whether the Mississippi Supreme Court may remove a sitting 
justice over his objection from considering a case, see Tighe v. 
Crosthwait, 665 So. 2d 1341 (Miss. 1995).  Because the justice 
eventually recused himself, the issue became moot.  In a later 
case, on a motion to disqualify five of the nine justices 
(including the chief justice), because of the "importance of the 
issue," the challenged "justices have submitted the motion and 
those filed in other cases to the en banc conference for 
consideration by the full Court."  See Washington Mut. Finance 
Group v. Blackmon, 925 So. 2d 780, 783, 797 (Miss. 2004), in 
which the Chief Justice wrote "for the court" holding that the 
motion is without merit and should be denied as to each of the 
justices.  The other four challenged justices concurred in the 
decision.  The Tighe decision is not mentioned. 
No.  2007AP795.npc 
 
1 
 
¶186 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  I have not 
voted to deny or to grant these motions, nor has Chief Justice 
Abrahamson or Justice Bradley.  I agree with them that a denial 
is clearly inappropriate now.  These motions deserve full 
briefing and oral arguments.1  Applying law to facts, after 
briefing and argument, is the job that Wisconsin Supreme Court 
justices were elected to do, and this court should do it.    
¶187 The circumstances surrounding this matter have changed 
in significant ways.  After reviewing the allegations and the 
relevant case law, I was initially ready, in the early stages of 
the matter, to deny the motion directed to the court to require 
Justice Gableman's recusal.  My initial position was based on my 
understanding at that time that the reasoning of the majority of 
the court would address the petitioner's arguments concerning 
Caperton, and that the reasoning would be set forth in a denial 
order.  I expected that the court would take the position that 
we had jurisdiction or power to consider the matter fully.  My 
initial position was also based on the allegations in the 
initial motion having to do with campaign statements.  I 
expected I would be voting with the majority of the justices in 
denying the motion.  As it turns out, my expectation could not 
be realized.   
¶188 I write separately to express my consternation, first, 
that three justices refuse to address adequately the very 
serious issues raised by these motions.  Because they take the 
position that the court has no power to do what Allen asks, 
                                                 
1 Chief Justice Abrahamson's writing, ¶¶ 116, 125-127. 
No.  2007AP795.npc 
 
2 
 
their writings dodge the analysis that could be undertaken to 
distinguish Allen's due process claim from that of the litigant 
in Caperton2——analysis that is essential to the disposition of 
this matter.3  The writings by Justices Roggensack and Prosser, 
thus, essentially treat the due process claim as nonjusticiable.  
That was the approach of Justice Scalia's dissent4 regarding the 
due process claim presented in Caperton.  On matters of United 
States constitutional law, this court is bound by the holding of 
the majority of the United States Supreme Court.  Further, 
whatever Caperton may or may not mean, it at least is clear that 
a justice's subjective determination that he or she can be 
impartial is no longer enough:   
The difficulties of inquiring into actual bias, and 
the fact that the inquiry is often a private one, 
simply underscore the need for objective rules.  
Otherwise there may be no adequate protection against 
a judge who simply misreads or misapprehends the real 
motives at work in deciding the case.  The judge's own 
                                                 
2 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 
(2009) (reversing a judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia on the grounds that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was 
violated when a justice in the majority participated in the case 
when objective standards required recusal). 
3 Like Justice Ziegler, I would have this court interpret 
and examine the applicability of the Caperton decision, though I 
would have this court order briefing and oral argument before 
doing so, and Justice Ziegler would not.  See Justice Ziegler's 
writing, ¶271. 
4 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2275  (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
("The Court today continues its quixotic quest to right all 
wrongs and repair all imperfections through the Constitution. 
Alas, the quest cannot succeed——which is why some wrongs and 
imperfections have been called nonjusticiable."). 
No.  2007AP795.npc 
 
3 
 
inquiry into actual bias, then, is not one that the 
law can easily superintend or review . . . .     
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263 (2009).  
Thus, "[i]n lieu of exclusive reliance on that personal 
inquiry," an analysis of a claimed Due Process Clause violation 
considers "objective standards that do not require proof of 
actual bias."  Id.  It is highly significant that in reaching 
the decision that recusal was required in the Caperton case, the 
United States Supreme Court stated directly, "We do not question 
[Justice Benjamin's] subjective findings of impartiality and 
propriety.  Nor do we determine whether there was actual bias."  
Id.  It is therefore abundantly clear that a determination that 
a subjective finding was made by a justice——a determination that 
Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler make in Part II.B.——
simply cannot be dispositive.  
¶189 Second, without briefing and without discussion of the 
supplemental filings, which have not been taken up by the court, 
this motion has been disposed of without a thorough airing of 
most of the issues.5  The supporting material in the supplemental 
                                                 
5 A supplemental filing providing additional authorities was 
filed August 13, 2009. A supplemental motion filed September 21, 
2009, directed to the court as a whole, seeks review of Justice 
Gableman's individual denial of the motion for recusal on 
statutory and ethical grounds, and alleges that he did not make 
the determination required by Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g), which 
mandates a justice's disqualification when in fact or in 
appearance, the justice cannot act in an impartial manner.  A 
second supplement to the motion was filed December 11, 2009, and 
it summarizes the reasons for the new filing thus: 
This supplement is necessary because (1) the Court has 
not ruled on the parties' joint position that full 
briefing is necessary to resolve the important issues 
presented in Mr. Allen's motion, (2) inclusion of 
other recent developments following the filing of 
No.  2007AP795.npc 
 
4 
 
filing of September 21, 2009, is particularly troubling.  It 
details public statements made by Justice Gableman's attorney 
before a three-judge panel of the court of appeals, and at a 
press conference thereafter.6  These statements, made on Justice 
Gableman's behalf to explain his campaign strategy against an 
opponent, startled and appalled many in the legal community.  
The statements have changed this case drastically for several 
reasons.  While Justice Gableman has recently publicly pledged 
to treat all persons fairly, including defendants in criminal 
cases, he has not repudiated any of the public statements made 
by his attorney, even those made at the press conference.   The 
statements made at the press conference included one attacking 
the opponent as a public defender for being "willing to 
represent" a person accused of a sex crime against a child and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Allen's 
original 
and 
supplemental 
motions 
are 
necessary to complete the record, especially should 
this matter have to go to federal court, and (3) 
recent statements by certain members of the Court 
reflect a serious misunderstanding of the possible 
relevance of the First Amendment to the issues of 
recusal raised in Allen's motion. 
6 The statements made before the panel as part of a hearing 
on an ethics complaint brought by the Wisconsin Judicial 
Commission included statements that deliberately conflated the 
roles of a justice and a public defender.  They included 
statements that Justice Gableman's opponent was "willing to find 
a loophole, whatever result that manifests," even for a 
defendant who was "evil," and that the message of a campaign ad 
was, "[T]his guy is willing to find a loophole for such an evil 
person, do we really want him on the State Supreme Court if 
that's his mindset?"  In the matter of Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against the Honorable Michael J. Gableman, Wisconsin 
Judicial Commission v. Hon. Michael J. Gableman, No. 2008AP2458-
J, slip op. at 18 (2009) (Deininger, J., concurring) (quoting 
Tr. of Oral Argument). 
No.  2007AP795.npc 
 
5 
 
characterizing that representation as "willingness to subvert 
our system of . . . bringing criminals into account."  Those 
statements dramatically misrepresent the role of attorneys in 
the criminal justice system and, as the most recent filing by 
Allen, dated December 11, 2009, indicates, the statements have 
drawn a response from the Wisconsin State Bar Board of 
Governors.  The Board unanimously adopted, by a vote of 43-0, a 
public policy position originally proposed by the Criminal Law 
Section of the State Bar, composed of both prosecutors and 
defense counsel, as well as judges, that reiterates the 
necessity 
of 
"vigorous 
representation 
for 
all 
criminal 
defendants," in order to maintain the integrity of the justice 
system.7       
¶190 Justice Gableman informed the members of the court, on 
February 4, 2010, that he was withdrawing from participation in 
the court's consideration of the recusal issue; his decision to 
do so recognizes the bedrock principle of law that predates the 
American justice system by more than a century——that "no man is 
allowed to be a judge in his own cause"——a principle recently 
repeated by Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for a majority of 
                                                 
7 The full text of the position can be found at the web site 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Bar 
Association 
(http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=News&Template=/CM
/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=88343). 
No.  2007AP795.npc 
 
6 
 
the United States Supreme Court in the Caperton  case.8  I 
commend him for his withdrawal decision.   
¶191 The record now before the court contains serious 
allegations, some of which go well beyond campaign speech.   
Given the allegations that have been presented to the court, 
especially the evidence detailed in the supplemental motion, I 
believe this court has no choice but to exercise its power to 
address these motions on the merits.  
¶192 Though, as noted above, I initially expected to vote 
to deny Allen's motion, I cannot join any opinion that is based 
on the premise that the court simply has no power to entertain 
the motion.  Further, I cannot join any disposition of Allen's 
motions that fails to recognize and deal with the fact that 
Caperton 
requires, 
at 
a 
minimum, 
a 
new 
look 
at 
our 
interpretation of the recusal statute.  I join Chief Justice 
Abrahamson and Justice Bradley, and I write separately for the 
reasons given and because of my concern for the institution of 
the Wisconsin court system——an institution that exists, not for 
its 
own 
sake, 
but 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
protecting 
the 
constitutional rights and liberties of Wisconsin citizens. 
                                                 
8 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 
(2009) (reversing a judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia on the grounds that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was 
violated when a justice in the majority participated in the case 
when objective standards required recusal). 
No.  2007AP795.npc 
 
7 
 
¶193 For the foregoing reasons, I concur.  
 
 
 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶194 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   Aaron Antonio Allen 
(Allen) moves the court for an order disqualifying Justice 
Michael Gableman from further participation in these proceedings 
after the entire court, including Justice Gableman, acted to 
accept Allen's petition for review.  Allen bases his motion on 
the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 1 and 8 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶195 Allen's motion assumes that a majority of this court 
has the power to disqualify a fellow justice from participation 
in a pending matter.  This assumption presents a question for 
the entire court because each justice is equally affected by 
whether we conclude that a majority of the court has the power 
to disqualify a fellow justice.   
¶196 Our decision on this issue does not depend on the 
factual context in which it arises, i.e., the issue would be the 
same if the motion to disqualify were directed at any justice.  
This is so because the vote of each justice on the scope of the 
court's power in regard to preventing a judicial peer from fully 
performing his or her elected office affects every justice on 
the court, in this case and in future cases as well.  Therefore, 
if one justice were disqualified from participating in the 
decision on whether four justices may disqualify a fellow 
justice from fully performing his or her elected office, all 
justices would be disqualified from participating because all 
are equally affected by our decision on this issue. 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
2 
 
¶197 For the reasons set forth in Section II.A., we 
conclude that a majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court does not 
have the power to disqualify a fellow justice from fully 
performing his or her elected office as a justice of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court.  Justices David T. Prosser, Patience 
Drake 
Roggensack 
and 
Annette 
Kingsland 
Ziegler 
join 
the 
conclusions above and Section II.A. of this opinion.  Justice 
Michael J. Gableman chose to withdraw from participation in 
Section II.A., even though United States Supreme Court Justices 
do not recuse themselves from similar motions.  United States 
Supreme Court Justices at whom disqualification motions are 
directed participate in the decisions on such motions.1   
¶198 In addition, Allen moves the court, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) (2007-08),2 for an order disqualifying 
Justice Gableman from participating in the consideration of this 
matter, 
alleging 
that 
he 
is 
disqualified 
by 
law 
from 
participation. 
¶199 We conclude in Section II.B. that Allen's motion is 
legally insufficient to state a claim cognizable under the due 
process clauses of the federal and state constitutions and that 
Justice Gableman fully performed his responsibilities under Wis. 
Stat. § 757.19(2)(g).  Accordingly, we vote to deny Allen's 
motion to disqualify Justice Gableman.  Justices David T. 
                                                 
1 See infra ¶26, notes 11-12. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
3 
 
Prosser, Patience Drake Roggensack and Annette Kingsland Ziegler 
join in this decision.  Justice Michael J. Gableman has never 
participated in the decision set out in Section II.B.   
¶200 Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bradley and Justice 
Crooks decide that they have the power to disqualify another 
duly elected justice from participation in a pending matter if 
they think he or she should be removed.  See Chief Justice 
Abrahamson, 
Justice 
Bradley 
and 
Justice 
Crooks's 
writing 
[hereinafter Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing], passim.  However, they 
do not decide Allen's motion, preferring to have briefing and 
oral argument before they do so.  Id.  
I. BACKGROUND 
¶201 Allen has filed one motion to Justice Gableman 
individually and two motions to the court as a whole, seeking to 
disqualify Justice Gableman from further participation in this 
proceeding.  Allen's first motion was filed on April 17, 2009.  
Allen claims that Justice Gableman's continued participation 
violates his rights under the due process clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Sections 1 and 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution and 
that Justice Gableman is disqualified by law, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 757.19(2)(g), from further participation.  
¶202 Allen bases his disqualification motions, to the court 
as a whole and to Justice Gableman individually, on campaign 
speech by Justice Gableman, campaign speech by his campaign 
committee and its spokesman and campaign speech by independent 
third parties during the course of Justice Gableman's 2008 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
4 
 
campaign.  Allen also objects to comments Justice Gableman's 
defense counsel made.  Allen alleges that the campaign speech 
and defense counsel's speech evidence bias and the appearance of 
bias by Justice Gableman against all defendants in criminal 
proceedings. 
¶203 On September 10, 2009, Justice Gableman addressed 
Allen's motion that was directed to him individually.  He issued 
a written order denying Allen's motion for his disqualification 
based 
on 
Allen's 
assertion 
that 
Justice 
Gableman 
was 
disqualified by law, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g), from 
participating in this proceeding, and that Justice Gableman's 
continued participation denied him due process of law.3  Justice 
Gableman's 
September 
10, 
2009, 
order 
was 
followed 
by 
a 
Supplemental Motion for Recusal in which Allen requested the 
entire court to "determine whether [Justice Gableman] actually 
made the determination required by Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g)." 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Whether Four Justices Have the Power to 
Disqualify a Fellow Justice 
¶204 One part of this proceeding involves a motion that 
four 
justices 
disqualify 
a 
fellow 
justice 
from 
further 
participation.  That motion is based on sweeping allegations 
that campaign speech, including multiple radio and television 
commercials by the justice's campaign committee and independent 
                                                 
3 Justice Gableman further explained his reasons for denying 
Allen's motions in a supplemental order issued January 15, 2010. 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
5 
 
third parties, as well as statements by defense counsel,4 are all 
attributable to a justice and that this "speech" evidences bias 
and the appearance of bias against all defendants in criminal 
proceedings.  Allen alleges he would be denied due process of 
law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Sections 1 and 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution if that justice participates in this proceeding.   
¶205 Allen makes no allegation that Justice Gableman is 
biased against him personally, that he has had any past 
involvement in or knowledge of Allen's case, or that he has any 
stated position toward the issues that Allen has presented in 
this 
case. 
 
In 
short, 
Allen's 
motion 
effectively 
seeks 
disqualification of a justice in all criminal cases on grounds 
of alleged bias against all criminal defendants. 
¶206 Whether four justices have the power to disqualify a 
fellow justice from fully performing his or her elected office 
is a question that the entire court ought to address in advance 
of deciding Allen's motions directed at Justice Gableman.  A 
decision on this issue is necessarily for the entire court 
because we have never decided this question and each justice on 
the court is equally affected by whether we conclude that a 
majority of the court has the power to disqualify a fellow 
                                                 
4 Justice Crooks finds fault with Justice Gableman's silence 
in regard to statements his attorney is alleged to have made.  
Justice Crooks's dissent, ¶189.  However, as Justice Crooks 
surely knows, Justice Gableman is involved in pending litigation 
and it is not uncommon for a party to refrain from comment at 
such a time.  
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
6 
 
justice.  Our decision on this issue does not depend on the 
factual context in which it arises, i.e., the issue would be the 
same if the motion to disqualify were directed at any justice.  
This is so because the vote of each justice on the scope of the 
court's power in regard to preventing a judicial peer from fully 
performing his or her elected office affects every justice on 
the court, in this case and in all future cases as well.  
Therefore, if one justice were required to disqualify himself or 
herself from consideration of so important a question, every 
justice would be required to disqualify himself or herself.   
¶207 We conclude that a majority of the justices on this 
court do not have the power to disqualify a fellow justice from 
participation in a proceeding before this court.5  Our decision 
is supported by the past practices of this court and by the 
past, and current, practices of the United States Supreme Court.   
¶208 While our past practices do not establish precedent, 
we note that in all past decisions of this court, when the 
justice against whom a disqualification motion was made was 
capable of deciding the motion, our review has been limited to 
whether that individual justice made the determination that the 
motion required.  In such cases, "[t]he reviewing court [] 
objectively decide[s] if the judge went through the required 
exercise of making a subjective determination. . . .  This is 
                                                 
5 The Wisconsin Constitution establishes a Wisconsin Supreme 
Court consisting of seven co-equal justices.  Wis. Const. art. 
VII, § 4(1).  The Constitution does not grant any particular 
justice or group of justices power over a judicial peer with 
respect to whether he or she may hear a particular case. 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
7 
 
all that is required."  Donohoo v. Action Wis., Inc., 2008 WI 
110, ¶¶24-25, 314 Wis. 2d 510, 754 N.W.2d 480 (concluding that 
Justice Butler, himself, decided that he could be impartial);6 
see also Jackson v. Benson, 2002 WI 14, ¶2, 249 Wis. 2d 681, 639 
N.W.2d 545 (concluding that the motion to vacate an opinion in 
which Justice Wilcox participated was frivolous due to the 
inordinate delay); City of Edgerton v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 
190 Wis. 2d 510, 521-22, 527 N.W.2d 305 (1995) (concluding that 
Justice Geske's disclosure in open court that she would be 
impartial despite the nature of her husband's employer showed 
she, herself, made the required subjective determination); State 
v. Am. TV & Appliance of Madison, Inc., 151 Wis. 2d 175, 183, 
443 N.W.2d 662 (1989) (concluding that once Justice Bablitch, 
himself, decided that he could be impartial, he was not 
disqualified by law from participating in the proceeding).   
¶209 The rationale in those cases is consistent, but 
Donohoo, Jackson, City of Edgerton and American TV do not 
address the broader issue that affects each justice equally, 
with which we are concerned in Section II.A.  That is, does a 
majority of the justices on this court have the power to prevent 
                                                 
6 Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing implies that in Donohoo v. 
Action Wis., Inc., 2008 WI 110, 314 Wis. 2d 510, 754 N.W.2d 480, 
the court reviewed the merits of  whether a justice ought to 
have disqualified himself.  Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, ¶42.  
That is incorrect because the court did not decide whether 
Justice Butler correctly concluded that he could be impartial.  
The  court decided only that "Justice Butler clearly determined 
that he could be impartial."  Donohoo, 314 Wis. 2d 510, ¶25 
(emphasis added). 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
8 
 
a sitting justice from fully participating in the work of his or 
her elected office.   
¶210 In Donohoo, Jackson, City of Edgerton and American TV, 
the motions seeking disqualification of a justice came after the 
court had issued its decision in a pending case.  However, as 
with Allen's motion, In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Crosetto, 
160 
Wis. 2d 
581, 
466 
N.W.2d 
879 
(1991), 
disqualification 
was 
sought 
before 
the 
court 
issued 
its 
decision.  In Crosetto, the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed 
whether 
all 
justices 
ought 
to 
be 
disqualified 
from 
participation.  Crosetto's motion for disqualification alleged 
that each justice had a personal interest in the disciplinary 
proceeding because of Crosetto's personal criticisms of the 
justices in an ancillary proceeding.  Id. at 584.  Crosetto 
based his motion for disqualification on the appearance of a 
lack of impartiality.  Id.  He cited Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2), and 
he also cited the due process clauses of the federal and state 
constitutions as legal bases for his motion.  Id. at 583. 
¶211 Six justices on this court did not convene to decide 
whether a seventh justice could participate in the decision in 
Crosetto.  Instead, each justice of the court decided Crosetto's 
due process motion for himself or herself.7  As the court 
explained: 
                                                 
7 Chief Justice Abrahamson is the only justice now serving 
on the Wisconsin Supreme Court who was also a member of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court when In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Crosetto, 160 Wis. 2d 581, 466 N.W.2d 879 (1991), was 
decided. 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
9 
 
The members of this court, individually, have 
determined 
that none has a significant personal 
interest 
in 
the 
outcome 
of 
this 
disciplinary 
proceeding such as would require our disqualification.  
Each is satisfied that his or her impartiality in this 
proceeding is unimpaired and, further, that our acting 
in this matter does not create the appearance of a 
lack of impartiality. 
Id. at 584 (emphasis added). 
¶212 Chief Justice Abrahamson, who was a member of the 
court that decided Crosetto's motion, did not disqualify herself 
or request that the other justices decide Crosetto's due process 
challenge for her.  Instead, she individually decided for 
herself that she was not disqualified from further participation 
by 
the 
due 
process 
clauses 
of 
the 
federal 
and 
state 
constitutions or by Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2).8  Id.  She also wrote 
a separate opinion that dissented from the discipline imposed 
and addressed whether a justice should apply a subjective or an 
objective standard to Crosetto's motion for disqualification.  
Id. at 602-03 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).  The issue of 
whether someone other than then-Justice Abrahamson should decide 
whether she should be disqualified was never mentioned in her 
separate opinion.   
                                                 
8 Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing above attempts to divert 
attention from a comparison of then-Justice Abrahamson's acts in 
Crosetto with her current position by asserting that she "did 
not join" the per curiam opinion.  Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, 
¶10 n.2.  This is not a forthright statement to the reader.  
Chief Justice Abrahamson, then-Justice Abrahamson, was the only 
woman justice when Crosetto was decided.  Therefore, the 
statement in the per curiam that "her impartiality in this 
proceeding is unimpaired" must refer to the decision of then-
Justice Abrahamson.   
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
10 
 
¶213 However, now that the disqualification motion is not 
directed at her, Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing argues that four 
justices of this court have the power to disqualify another 
justice from participation.  Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, ¶34.  
This position is in direct conflict with the action that she 
took on her own behalf in Crosetto.  She cites Case v. Hoffman, 
100 Wis. 314, 74 N.W. 220 (1898), in support of her contention.  
Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, ¶¶39-41.  However, Case does not 
support the position she takes. 
¶214 Case arose in a very interesting context because 
Justice Newman, for whom disqualification was sought, was dead 
when the court took up the motion.  Case, 100 Wis. at 354.  
Justice Newman had previously participated in the decision, but 
he had never ruled on the disqualification motion.  Id.  
Therefore, the remaining justices had to decide it, as Justice 
Newman obviously could not.  Accordingly, Case is not support 
for this court to determine that a majority of the justices have 
the power to disqualify a justice from participating in a 
proceeding before the court.   
¶215 It is imperative to note that Case was published long 
before 
then-Justice 
Abrahamson's 
decision 
in 
Crosetto. 
Therefore, if Chief Justice Abrahamson truly understood Case's 
holding to require the court to act in the manner that she now 
urges, she would have acted differently in Crosetto.  The reader 
should note that despite more than 50 pages of narration and a 
voluminous appendix, Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing fails to mention 
any reason for Chief Justice Abrahamson's change of position, 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
11 
 
now that it is not she, but rather, a different justice, who is 
the subject of a disqualification motion.  
¶216 Abrahamson, 
C.J.'s 
writing 
also 
cites 
State 
v. 
Carprue, 2004 WI 111, 274 Wis. 2d 656, 683 N.W.2d 31, as support 
for the power of four justices to disqualify another justice.  
Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, ¶86 n.54.  Carprue does not support 
their position.  Carprue involved a claim that a circuit court 
judge should have disqualified herself.  Carprue confirmed that 
a judge's decision about disqualification is "up to the judge's 
own determination.  This provision 'leaves the responsibility of 
withdrawal to the integrity of the individual judge.'"  Carprue, 
274 Wis. 2d 656, ¶61 (quoting State v. Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d 654, 
665, 546 N.W.2d 115 (1996)).   
¶217 Furthermore, it is a vastly different matter for this 
court to review whether a circuit court judge should have 
participated in a proceeding at the circuit court than it is to 
conclude that the majority of this court has the power to 
disqualify a fellow justice from participation in a pending 
matter.  When a circuit court judge is disqualified from 
participating in a proceeding, another circuit court judge takes 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
12 
 
his or her place.  However, when a supreme court justice is 
disqualified, no other person can take his or her place.9 
¶218 The critical nature of a justice's decision on a 
motion for disqualification was explained by United States 
Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the context of the 
question of disqualification of a Supreme Court Justice.  She 
said, "Because there's no substitute for a Supreme Court 
Justice, it is important that we not lightly [disqualify] 
ourselves."  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Day, Berry & Howard 
Visiting Scholar:  An Open Discussion with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
36 Conn. L. Rev. 1033, 1039 (2004).   
¶219 The Wisconsin Supreme Court's history of requiring the 
justice who is the focus of a disqualification motion to decide 
the motion is consistent with the precedent of the United States 
Supreme Court.10  When a motion is made to disqualify a justice 
                                                 
9 Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing extensively relies on judicial 
disqualification 
opinions 
regarding 
circuit 
court 
judges, 
without informing the reader that the judge who was the focus of 
the motion was a circuit court judge and without pointing out 
the difference between our disqualifying a circuit court judge 
as compared with disqualifying a judicial peer.  See discussions 
of In re Hon. Charles E. Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 235 N.W.2d 409 
(1975); State v. Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d 654, 546 N.W.2d 115 
(1996); State v. Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 96, 325 N.W.2d 687 (1982).  
Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, passim. 
10 In a 2004 interview, United States Supreme Court Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg clearly explained that the decision about 
whether 
a 
Supreme 
Court 
Justice 
is 
disqualified 
from 
participation in a proceeding is always made by the individual 
justice.  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Day, Berry & Howard Visiting 
Scholar:  An Open Discussion with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 Conn. 
L. Rev. 1033, 1039 (2004).   
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
13 
 
of the United States Supreme Court, either the justice for whom 
disqualification is sought addresses the motion individually, 
e.g., Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, 
541 
U.S. 
913 
(2004)11 
(Justice 
Scalia 
sitting 
individually in response to the Sierra Club's motion to 
disqualify him), or, less frequently, the entire Supreme Court, 
including the justice for whom recusal is sought, issues a one 
sentence denial of the motion for disqualification, e.g., Ernest 
v. United States Attorney for the Southern District of Alabama, 
474 U.S. 1016 (1985).12 
¶220 The United States Supreme Court has never held that a 
majority of that Court has the power to disqualify a judicial 
peer, i.e., a duly appointed and confirmed United States Supreme 
Court Justice, from participating in any case to come before the 
Court because of an allegation that the justice at whom the 
                                                 
11 See also Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 
(2000) (wherein Justice Rehnquist responded denying a motion for 
his disqualification); Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 1301 (1980) 
(Justice Rehnquist denying a motion for his disqualification); 
Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 901 (1972) (Justice Rehnquist denying a 
motion for his disqualification); Gravel v. United States, 409 
U.S. 902 (1972) (Justice Rehnquist denying a motion for his 
disqualification); Guy v. United States, 409 U.S. 896 (1972) 
(Justice Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist individually denying 
motions requesting disqualification of each justice). 
12 See also Kerpelman v. Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md., 
450 U.S. 970 (1981) (summary denial of motion to disqualify 
Chief Justice Burger); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 409 
U.S. 1029 (1972) (summary denial of motions to disqualify 
Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist). 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
14 
 
motion was directed was not impartial.13  As Justice Robert 
Jackson explained, "[t]here is no authority known to me under 
which a majority of this Court has power under any circumstances 
to exclude one of its duly commissioned Justices from sitting or 
voting in any case."  Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, 
United Mine Workers of Am., 325 U.S. 897, 897 (1945) (Jackson, 
J., concurring).  
¶221 Similarly, in the more than 150 years that the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court has served the people of Wisconsin, it 
consistently has followed the practice of the United States 
Supreme Court in regard to disqualification of a judicial peer.   
¶222 Allen cites Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 
556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), as support for his 
assertion that a majority of this court should disqualify a 
judicial peer.  Caperton has no relevance here.  First, the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
was 
not 
considering 
the 
                                                 
13 In 1975, after Justice William O. Douglas suffered a 
serious stroke that left him severely compromised, seven of the 
remaining justices decided not to assign Justice Douglas any 
more opinions to write.  However, they did not disqualify 
Justice 
Douglas 
from 
all 
further 
participation 
in 
Court 
proceedings, even in his very compromised condition.  He was not 
forced off any case.  See David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on 
the U.S. Supreme Court:  The Historical Case for a 28th 
Amendment, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 995 (2000).  The action taken 
regarding Justice Douglas has nothing to do with whether four 
justices can disqualify a fully competent member of this court 
from a pending proceeding.  Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing's 
description of the actions taken by the United States Supreme 
Court after Justice Douglas had suffered a stroke is not 
accurate.  See Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, ¶62, Appendix B, 
¶¶161-62.  
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
15 
 
disqualification of a judicial peer in Caperton; rather, it was 
considering the disqualification of a state court justice.  
Second, the state court justice did decide all motions for his 
disqualification; other state court justices did not decide 
them, even though they voiced their opposition to his decisions.   
¶223 Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing also asserts that a federal 
constitutional claim must be addressed and that a state 
constitutional claim must have a remedy.  The writing then 
assumes that a majority of the court must decide those claims.  
Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, ¶46, ¶47 n.22.  We agree that 
constitutional questions properly presented should be addressed 
and that providing a remedy for meritorious claims is important.  
However, addressing claims and providing a remedy do not require 
that a majority of the court have the power to disqualify a 
fellow justice from court proceedings.  Constitutional claims, 
both federal and state, are addressed by the individual justice 
against whom the allegations were made, just as they were in 
Crosetto, when then-Justice Abrahamson decided for herself 
whether the allegations that the due process clauses of the 
federal and state constitutions required her disqualification.  
Crosetto, 160 Wis. 2d at 584.  As the opinion she joined stated, 
"Each is satisfied that his or her impartiality in this 
proceeding is unimpaired and, further, that our acting in this 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
16 
 
matter 
does 
not 
create 
the 
appearance 
of 
a 
lack 
of 
impartiality."  Id. (emphasis added).14  
¶224 Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bradley and Justice 
Crooks contend that four justices of this court have the power 
to remove another justice under our superintending powers.  
Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, ¶48.  There is a process by which a 
justice may be removed from the court, but only with due process 
accorded to the justice.  All judges and justices accept the 
constitutional provisions for their removal and the remedies 
available under the judicial code upon election to the judicial 
branch of government.15  However, those bases for removal are a 
far cry from what Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing is proposing.  She 
asserts that four justices can disqualify a fellow justice based 
on the allegation that a defendant's due process rights were 
violated by campaign speech.  She accords no substantive 
                                                 
14 Chief Justice Abrahamson, then-Justice Abrahamson, was 
the only woman justice on the Wisconsin Supreme Court when 
Crosetto was decided.  Therefore, she did decide, for herself, 
Crosetto's motion to disqualify her on the basis of the state 
and federal due process clauses.   
15 A justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court can be removed 
only through impeachment (Wis. Const. art. VII, § 1), defeat in 
an election (Wis. Const. art. VII, § 4(1) & § 9; Wis. Const. 
art. XIII, § 12), as part of a disciplinary proceeding by the 
supreme court for cause or disability (Wis. Const. art. VII, 
§ 11), by address (Wis. Const. art. VII, § 13), or if the 
legislature were to impose a mandatory retirement age (Wis. 
Const. art. VII, § 24(2)). 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
17 
 
standards and no procedural due process.  Such a suggestion is 
shocking.16 
¶225 Finally, Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bradley and 
Justice Crooks assume that if they have the power to force 
another justice off a pending case, both an impartial court and 
the appearance of an impartial court will result.  Abrahamson, 
C.J.'s writing, passim.  Their unspoken assumption is based on 
the faulty premise that giving four members of the court the 
power 
to 
disqualify 
a 
fellow 
justice 
will 
increase 
the 
appearance of impartiality of the court.   
¶226 This 
is 
a 
deeply 
divided 
court, 
at 
a 
very 
philosophical level concerning how a state supreme court should 
function.  The public perception of this court is also deeply 
divided.  Therefore, four justices forcing another justice off 
the court is just as apt to be perceived as a biased act 
resulting in a biased tribunal, as is the justice remaining on 
the case and participating in it after he or she has considered 
the disqualification motion.  What Chief Justice Abrahamson, 
                                                 
16 We note Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing's lengthy narration of 
her version of proposed decisions that she contends were 
presented in the private meetings of the justices.  Abrahamson, 
C.J.'s writing, ¶¶14-19.  In the past, we have not publicly 
discussed what we believed transpired in our private meetings 
while a case was being considered.  We also have not discussed 
proposed 
decisions, 
considering 
preliminary 
opinions 
the 
confidential work product of the court.  We are at a loss to 
determine why Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing has taken this tack as 
it adds nothing to the legal reasoning in her opinion.  Perhaps 
it 
is 
an 
attempt 
to 
justify 
Chief 
Justice 
Abrahamson's 
extraordinary delay in permitting the public release of our 
decision on Allen's recusal motion. 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
18 
 
Justice Bradley and Justice Crooks propose is the opening of 
Pandora's Box to ever-increasing attempts to manipulate the 
outcomes in pending matters by changing the composition of the 
court that will decide the issues presented.   
¶227 Actual fairness and the appearance of an unbiased 
tribunal are very important to us, but impartiality will not be 
furthered by granting four justices the power to prevent another 
justice from fulfilling his judicial office.  
¶228 In summary, as is the practice of the United States 
Supreme Court and has been the practice of this court for more 
than 150 years, we, who join in this opinion, conclude that a 
majority of the justices on the Wisconsin Supreme Court do not 
have the power to disqualify a fellow justice from participation 
in a proceeding before this court.   
¶229 Justices David T. Prosser, Patience Drake Roggensack 
and Annette Kingsland Ziegler join in this opinion.17   
B. Whether Justice Gableman Made 
the Required Determination18 
¶230 Motions such as Allen's have institutional impacts on 
the court as a whole.  Such motions with their allegations of 
bias and the appearance of bias receive significant attention in 
                                                 
17 Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing is filled with name-calling 
directed at the members of the court who have joined in this 
opinion.  Name-calling is not legal reasoning.  Name-calling 
reflects poorly on the justices who resort to its use and 
reflects 
adversely 
on the dignity of this court as an 
institution.  We have not responded in kind.   
18 Justice Gableman has never participated in the decision 
set out in Section II.B. 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
19 
 
the mass media and tend to undermine the public's trust and 
confidence in the impartiality of this court's decisions and in 
the integrity of all justices, not only the justice at whom the 
motion is directed.  Accordingly, motions to disqualify a 
justice are never routine matters for the court. 
¶231 At 
its 
heart, 
Allen's 
motion 
is 
based 
on 
the 
allegation that a judicial candidate's announced concerns for 
issues bearing on law enforcement is sufficient to violate 
Allen's constitutional right to due process of law.  His motion 
extensively quotes 
campaign speech and Justice Gableman's 
attorney's defense of that speech.  However, Allen's allegations 
do not even begin to approach a due process violation.   
¶232 Not every pleading that labels itself as a due process 
challenge actually states such a challenge.19  Therefore, as a 
foundational matter, we independently review whether a complaint 
states a claim upon which relief may be granted.  John Doe 1 v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, ¶12, 303 Wis. 2d 34, 734 
N.W.2d 827.  In so doing, we accept the facts set forth in the 
pleadings as true for purposes of determining the sufficiency of 
the pleading.  Id.  However, we do not accept the pleadings' 
legal conclusions.  Id. 
¶233 The United States Supreme Court has explained that due 
process is violated only when a practice "offends some principle 
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
                                                 
19 Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing has ignored this basic premise 
of law.   
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
20 
 
people as to be ranked as fundamental."  Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
LaVoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821 (1986).  The right to an impartial 
judge is so rooted in our traditions as to be fundamental, and 
therefore, 
it 
is 
guaranteed by due process.  State v. 
Hollingsworth, 160 Wis. 2d 883, 893, 467 N.W.2d 555 (Ct. App. 
1991). 
¶234 However, the preclusion of bias that is guaranteed by 
due process to every party is bias against the specific party 
who is then before the court or bias due to the judge's having a 
financial interest in the outcome of the particular case then 
pending.  Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1997). 
¶235 This bias of a constitutional nature is not a 
generalized displeasure with a particular group, when that group 
is not also a constitutionally protected class.  Aetna, 475 U.S. 
at 820-21 (concluding that allegations of a judge's general 
hostility toward insurance companies does not support the 
conclusion that such a judge's participation violated due 
process).  The bias Allen alleges is bias against every person 
who is a defendant in every criminal proceeding; it is not bias 
against Allen.   
¶236 Bias also is not a judge's past interpretation of 
issues that may appear again in a party's pending case.  State 
v. O'Neill, 2003 WI App 73, ¶16, 261 Wis. 2d 534, 663 N.W.2d 292 
(concluding that a judge's use of a procedure that was earlier 
challenged is not evidence of bias against the defendant). 
¶237 Allen has alleged no particularized bias by Justice 
Gableman against him personally, nor has he alleged that Justice 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
21 
 
Gableman had any financial interest in the outcome of his case.  
Allen has not alleged that Justice Gableman has had any past 
contacts of any type with him or his case.  Allen has not 
alleged that Justice Gableman even knows who he is.  No 
potential constitutional due process violation has been alleged 
here based on Justice Gableman's participation in Allen's case.   
¶238 Allen's claim is not comparable to the claim made in 
Caperton.  Caperton was based on claims of particularized bias 
against a party in a pending case because of actions taken by 
the other party.  Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263-64.  Those 
actions were alleged to have directly benefitted a justice who 
at that time was about to decide Caperton's case.  Id. at 2265.  
Here, there has been no allegation of bias against Allen because 
of 
any 
connection 
between 
Justice 
Gableman 
and 
Allen.  
Accordingly, Allen has failed to state a claim cognizable under 
the due process clauses of either the federal or state 
constitution.  
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
22 
 
¶239 Allen 
also has sought disqualification based on 
statutory grounds.20  He alleged that Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) 
requires 
Justice 
Gableman's 
disqualification. 
 
Section 
757.19(2)(g) provides: 
(2) Any judge shall disqualify himself or herself 
from any civil or criminal action or proceeding when 
one of the following situations occurs: 
. . . 
(g) When a judge determines that, for any reason, 
he or she cannot, or it appears he or she cannot, act 
in an impartial manner. 
¶240 Our most recent consideration of an alleged violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) occurred in Donohoo.  There, 
Donohoo alleged that Justice Butler contravened § 757.19(2)(g) 
when he accepted financial contributions from an attorney who 
had a case pending before the court.  Donohoo, 314 Wis. 2d 510, 
¶25.  As we considered Donohoo's allegations, we reiterated the 
standards that are applied by this court to a justice's 
                                                 
20 The federal court system has established an expanded rule 
that satisfies various due process and other non-constitutional 
concerns.  See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006).  Wisconsin also employs a 
statutory scheme to guide judges and justices in fulfilling 
their 
obligation 
either 
to 
participate 
or 
to 
disqualify 
themselves.  See Wis. Stat. § 757.19.  However, as we have 
recognized in the context of judicial disqualification, "not all 
questions of judicial qualification . . . involve constitutional 
validity."  State v. Kywanda F., 200 Wis. 2d 26, 35, 546 N.W.2d 
440 (1996).  "The adoption of [disqualification] statutes that 
permit 
disqualification 
for 
bias 
or 
prejudice 
is 
not 
a 
sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional requirement under 
the Due Process Clause."  Id. at 36 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. 
v. LaVoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986)). 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
23 
 
disqualification decision in regard to an alleged violation of 
§ 757.19(2)(g).  Id., ¶24.  We said: 
Appellate 
review 
of 
[the 
justice's] 
subjective 
determination is "limited to establishing whether the 
judge 
made 
a 
determination 
requiring 
disqualification."  American TV, 151 Wis. 2d at 186 
(further citations omitted).  The reviewing court must 
objectively decide if the judge went through the 
required 
exercise 
of 
making 
a 
subjective 
determination. 
Id. (citing Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d at 663-64).  In addition, when 
a motion is made to disqualify a justice from past or future 
proceedings, we do not address whether the justice correctly or 
incorrectly decided the issues presented.  Am. TV, 151 Wis. 2d 
at 183.  As we explained,  
To the extent prior cases cited by the State suggest 
that a reviewing court, in determining whether a judge 
should have recused himself, is to independently and 
objectively determine whether there was an appearance 
of 
[]partiality, 
. . . 
or 
whether 
the 
judge's 
impartiality can reasonably be questioned . . . they 
are inapplicable to a determination whether a judge 
was disqualified by sec. 757.19(2)(g), Stats. 
Id. at 183-84.   
¶241 We now apply these standards to the decision made by 
Justice Gableman.  The motion to disqualify Justice Gableman has 
been pending before the court since April 17, 2009.21  Prior to 
addressing Allen's motion, Justice Gableman had all of Allen's 
submissions before him.  He also had the response of the State, 
which was filed April 28, 2009.  When he denied Allen's motion 
requesting him to disqualify himself, he said: 
                                                 
21 On August 13, 2009, Allen filed a letter supplementing 
the authority he previously cited for his April 17, 2009 motion. 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
24 
 
Having 
considered 
the 
motion 
of 
defendant-
appellant-petitioner, 
Aaron 
Antonio 
Allen, 
individually directed to Justice Michael J. Gableman 
for his recusal from participation in Case No. 
2007AP795, and after careful consideration of the 
motion for recusal; 
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to Justice Michael 
J. Gableman individually is hereby denied. 
¶242 The order denying Allen's motion was released on 
September 10, 2009, after "careful consideration of the motion."  
Justice Gableman authored the order with all of the alleged 
grounds for disqualification that are now before the court.  He 
had plenty of time to research and carefully consider the 
arguments made in support of and in opposition to the motion.  
He made a subjective determination that the grounds specified in 
Allen's motion did not warrant his disqualification.  The order 
that was issued is objective proof of Justice Gableman's 
subjective decision.  Justice Gableman's order satisfied the 
test we set out in Donohoo.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
Justice Gableman made the decisions he was required to make, 
just as Chief Justice Abrahamson did in Crosetto.  
¶243 Although we are probably pointing out the obvious, the 
affirmative vote of four justices is required to grant a pending 
motion.  There are not four justices who have voted to grant 
Allen's motions.  Therefore, his motions, that were first 
presented to the court on April 17, 2009, are denied.   
¶244 Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing laments that we did not 
order 
briefing 
on 
Allen's 
motions 
to 
disqualify 
Justice 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
25 
 
Gableman.22  The writing concludes with a proposed "ordering" of 
briefs on Allen's motions.  The proposed "order" is unfortunate 
for at least two reasons.  First, the "order" is without legal 
authority.  This is so because our internal operating procedures 
require the affirmative vote of four justices before briefing on 
an issue that was not set forth in the petition for review may 
be 
ordered. 
 
IOP 
II.B.1. 
 
Allen 
did 
not 
list 
the 
disqualification of Justice Gableman either in his petition for 
review or in his supplemental petition for review, and there are 
not four justices who have voted to have additional briefing on 
the issues his motions raise.  Second, the proposed "order" may 
cause unnecessary confusion, and perhaps expense, for the 
participating attorneys who are "ordered" to file briefs on 
motions that have not garnered the affirmative votes of four 
justices.   
¶245 And finally, we cannot leave this decision without 
noting, with a degree of sadness, that in satisfying his 
perceived need to attack Justice Gableman's fairness, Allen did 
not bother to investigate the manner in which Justice Gableman 
has treated defendants who have appeared in criminal proceedings 
in courts over which Justice Gableman has presided.  Had Allen 
made even a cursory investigation into the person who is Justice 
Michael Gableman, he would have found that in 2003, while the 
Circuit Court Judge of Burnett County, Justice Gableman founded 
the Burnett County Restorative Justice Program, an alternative 
                                                 
22 Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, ¶¶21-22, passim.  
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
26 
 
model to the traditional criminal court's adversary proceeding.23  
Justice Gableman remained the chairman of the Burnett County 
Restorative Justice Program for six years.  During that time he 
proposed and oversaw the development of numerous special 
services to criminal defendants:  the Inmate Community Service 
Program, a program under which inmates could reduce their jail 
time by working for charitable and municipal organizations,24 and 
the Victim-Offender Mediation Program, a program that permits 
willing victims the opportunity to take an active part in the 
rehabilitation of the offender.25  In 2006 as Judge in Burnett 
County, Justice Gableman founded the Burnett County Drug and 
Alcohol Court that presented an alternate way of approaching 
                                                 
23 Restorative Justice Receives $42,000 Bremer Grant, Inter-
County Leader, Sept. 21, 2005 (available at http://www.the-
leader.net) (enter 9/21/05 as the issue date in the "search 
archives" box; then follow "Restorative Justice Receives . . ." 
hyperlink). 
24 Joan O. Fallon, Judge Asks Grantsburg to Consider Inmate 
Work Program, Inter-County Leader, July 20, 2005 (available at 
http://www.the-leader.net) (enter 7/20/05 as the issue date in 
the "search archives" box; then follow "Judge Asks Grantsburg 
. . ." hyperlink). 
25 Nancy Jappe, Restorative Justice Has New Staff, Inter-
County Leader, Feb. 15, 2007 (available at http://www.the-
leader.net) (enter 2/15/07 as the issue date in the "search 
archives" box; then follow "Restorative Justice Has . . ." 
hyperlink). 
No.  2007AP795.pdr 
 
27 
 
longstanding drug and alcohol addiction problems that many 
criminal defendants struggle to overcome.26 
¶246 Accordingly, based on our discussion above, Justices 
Prosser, Roggensack and Ziegler vote to deny all of the motions 
that Allen has filed seeking the disqualification of Justice 
Gableman. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Nancy Jappe, County Celebrates First Drug and Alcohol 
Court Graduation, Inter-County Leader, July 11, 2007 (available 
at http://www.the-leader.net) (enter 7/11/07 as the issue date 
in the "search archives" box; then follow "County Celebrates 
. . ." hyperlink); Nancy Jappe, County Board Hears Reports on 
Drug Court and Lakes and Rivers Association, Inter-County 
Leader, Jan. 24, 2007 (available at http://www.the-leader.net) 
(enter 1/24/07 as the issue date in the "search archives" box; 
then follow "County Board Hears . . ." hyperlink). 
No.  2007AP795.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶247 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  Several justices 
have forced the court to address the limits of the court's power 
to respond to recusal motions. 
¶248 The options before us are stark: either we approve the 
proposition that a majority of justices have plenary power to 
exclude a colleague from participating in pending cases, thereby 
nullifying 
election 
results 
and 
potentially 
changing 
key 
decisions of the court, or we conclude that we simply do not 
have this authority.  Although one may posit a limited power 
that the court could employ in a truly extreme and egregious 
situation, that power——once recognized——could not be contained.  
It would grow like a cancer, and gravely damage the institution. 
¶249 Because 
the 
preservation 
of 
the 
court 
as 
an 
institution is more important than any case or any member of the 
court, I believe we must reject the notion that we possess the 
power to prevent each other from participating in individual 
cases. 
¶250 Justices confronted with a truly extreme situation in 
which a justice ought to withdraw from a case but is unwilling 
to do so, may resort to personal and collective persuasion.  
These justices will outnumber a lone colleague who refuses to 
withdraw.  If necessary, they may delay a case, and they may 
seek the involvement of the Judicial Commission.  These steps 
are clearly preferable to overturning the will of the electorate 
and cutting off the procedural safeguards built into review by 
the 
Judicial 
Commission 
by 
barring 
a 
colleague 
from 
participating in a case. 
No.  2007AP795.dtp 
 
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¶251 If I am mistaken about this court's power to remove a 
justice from an individual case before it is decided, the United 
States Supreme Court can tell me so.  The Supreme Court 
certainly did not do that in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 
556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
¶252 In Caperton, the Supreme Court reversed a decision and 
removed a West Virginia justice from a case in a fact situation 
that was radically different from the facts here.  The Supreme 
Court did not order the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
to remove a fellow justice. 
¶253 The Supreme Court was deeply divided in Caperton, 
especially about the ramifications of its decision upon lower 
courts.  Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in his dissent that 
the Court had provided "no guidance to judges and litigants 
about when recusal will be constitutionally required.  This will 
inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that judges are 
biased, however groundless those charges may be."  Id. at 2267 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
¶254 Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy came 
to a different conclusion.  He declared that "Massey and its 
amici predict that various adverse consequences will follow from 
recognizing a constitutional violation here——ranging from a 
flood of recusal motions to unnecessary interference with 
judicial elections.  We disagree."  Id. at 2265. 
¶255 At least with respect to Wisconsin, Justice Kennedy 
has been proven wrong.  To date, the Caperton decision has had 
disastrous consequences for the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  The 
No.  2007AP795.dtp 
 
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Allen motion was filed in anticipation of Caperton, but it has 
been followed by nine additional recusal motions against members 
of this court.  The Wisconsin State Public Defender's office has 
invited the entire defense bar to file recusal motions against 
one of the justices in criminal cases.  The number and savagery 
of these motions is unprecedented and amounts to a frontal 
assault on the court. 
¶256 The court should have denied Allen's motion quickly, 
without comment.  This would have avoided exposing controversy 
within the court.  Several justices rejected this course, 
preferring to take the controversy public. 
¶257 In my view, the failure of the court to reject Allen's 
motion quickly and decisively has exacerbated our dilemma.  The 
court must do better. 
¶258 For the reasons stated, I join the opinion of Justice 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2007AP795.akz 
 
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¶259 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the opinion of Justice Patience Drake Roggensack and write 
separately to emphasize that the due process standard for 
judicial recusal as set forth by the United States Supreme Court 
in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 
2252 (2009), is not implicated by Allen's motion.  By arguing 
for Caperton's application, the writings of Chief Justice 
Abrahamson and Justice Crooks are "painting a mule to resemble a 
zebra, and then going zebra hunting.  But paint does not change 
the mule into a zebra."  State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court of 
Rock County, 51 Wis. 2d 434, 448, 187 N.W.2d 354 (1971) (Hansen, 
J., dissenting).  
¶260 Moreover, in Caperton, the Supreme Court did not hold 
that a majority of the court has the power to disqualify a 
judicial peer, the question we are presented with in this case.  
Rather, the Supreme Court reviewed a state court justice's 
denial of a recusal motion, holding that in that "rare 
instance," Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267, the justice's recusal 
was required because there was an objective risk of actual bias 
that rose to an unconstitutional level, id. at 2265.  The  
writings of Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Crooks expand 
Caperton to an extent that it could include an attack on 
virtually any justice for nearly any reason and allow litigants 
to "pick their court" by filing recusal motions against certain 
justices and not others.  Such an expansion of Caperton could 
cause gridlock in the court and delay justice being dispensed.  
The Supreme Court made clear that it did not intend such 
No.  2007AP795.akz 
 
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consequences.  Unlike the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the United 
States Supreme Court is the highest court in the land, and no 
higher court can further review a U.S. Supreme Court Justice's 
recusal decision.  Had the Supreme Court intended that justices 
now be endowed with the authority to second guess a judicial 
peer's recusal decision post-Caperton, it would have led the 
charge by changing its own operating procedures or otherwise 
providing for review of a judicial peer.1  To my knowledge, it 
has not. 
¶261 Simply stated, unlike the motion for disqualification 
in Caperton, the motion to disqualify Justice Gableman is 
appropriately resolved without resort to the Due Process Clause 
of 
the 
Constitution. 
 
Caperton 
involved 
extreme 
and 
extraordinary facts which the Supreme Court recognized in its 
majority opinion no less than a dozen times.  Not only are the 
pending recusal motions in Allen devoid of facts which rise to 
the level of a Caperton analysis, unlike in Caperton, here there 
is no "person with a personal stake" in Allen who "had a 
significant and disproportionate influence" in placing Justice 
Gableman on the case "by raising funds or directing [his] 
                                                 
1 Originally appearing in the Act of December 5, 1974, Pub. 
L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455 (2006)), 28 U.S.C. § 455 is entitled "Disqualification of 
justice, judge, or magistrate" and provides that "(a) Any 
justice, judge, or magistrate [magistrate judge] of the United 
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned."  "He shall also 
disqualify himself in the following circumstances: (1) Where he 
has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal 
knowledge 
of 
disputed 
evidentiary 
facts 
concerning 
the 
proceeding . . . ."  Id., § 455(b)(1). 
No.  2007AP795.akz 
 
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election campaign when the case was pending or imminent."  See 
id. at 2263-64.  Neither Allen nor the State had any influence 
in placing Justice Gableman on the court, and no amount of 
briefing can alter that fact.  To be clear, I do not join in the 
view expressed by the writings of Chief Justice Abrahamson and 
Justice Crooks that a Caperton analysis is implicated or the 
view that the justices on this court have the power to 
disqualify a fellow justice from participation.2  Nevertheless, 
even if those writings assume that such an analysis should be 
undertaken, Allen's allegations fail to implicate Caperton.  
Accordingly, this court should deny Allen's motion and roll up 
the welcome mat to those who wish to "judge shop" in Wisconsin.   
                                                 
2 To be certain, I do not agree with the view expressed by 
the writings of Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Crooks that 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2252 
(2009), should apply in this case.  See Justice Crooks's 
writing, ¶188 n.3.  Rather, I interpret Caperton for the purpose 
of explaining why Caperton is not implicated, i.e. explaining 
just how different a due process claim under Caperton is from 
Allen's claim. 
No.  2007AP795.akz 
 
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¶262 This court should not promote the use of Caperton to 
"judge shop."  "Judge shopping" has always been taboo.3  In 
Caperton, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that basic tenet when it 
concluded that a litigant's efforts to "choose[] the judge," id. 
at 2265, through directing a justice's election campaign and 
thus placing that justice on that contributing party's pending 
case did not pass constitutional muster.  "Just as no man is 
allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears of bias 
can arise when——without the consent of the parties——a man 
chooses the judge in his own cause."  Id.  I agree.  In this 
case, by seeking to remove a justice from sitting on a case even 
though the allegations fail to state a due process claim as set 
forth in Caperton, Allen's efforts effectively amount to "judge 
shopping."  As an institution, this court should not condone 
such manipulation regardless of whether it is done to place a 
justice on a particular case or remove a justice from a 
particular case.  Permitting such "judge shopping" damages this 
court as an institution, inappropriately politicizes the court, 
                                                 
3 Of course, a litigant may substitute a circuit court judge 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.20 (2007-08).  However, in that 
scenario, as well as in Caperton, in which recusal was required 
of a justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 
the judge can be replaced and the case fully heard.  See W. Va. 
Const. art. VIII, § 2 ("When any justice is temporarily 
disqualified or unable to serve, the chief justice may assign a 
judge of a circuit court or of an intermediate appellate court 
to serve from time to time in his stead.").  In contrast, when a 
Wisconsin Supreme Court justice is absent from participation in 
a case, the parties and the citizens of the state are deprived 
of a full court to decide the issues.  The issues we decide have 
statewide significance and consequently do not affect only the 
litigants before the court.  Hence, justices have a duty to stay 
on cases and decide the issues if they can.  SCR 60.04(1)(a). 
No.  2007AP795.akz 
 
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and nullifies the votes of the electorate.  Accordingly, I write 
to clarify at least one reason why the due process standard for 
judicial recusal as set forth in Caperton is not implicated in 
this case.  
¶263 It is true that the Supreme Court stated in Caperton 
that "there are objective standards that require recusal when 
'the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or 
decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.'"  
Id. at 2257 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).  
The "extreme facts"4 in Caperton amounted to one of the "rare 
                                                 
4 Emphasizing the rarity of a case in which the Constitution 
requires recusal, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
referenced Caperton's "extreme" or "extraordinary" facts no less 
than a dozen times: 
* Justice Benjamin "received campaign contributions in 
an extraordinary amount from, and through the 
efforts of, [Don Blankenship, A.T. Massey Coal Co.'s 
chairman, chief executive officer, and president]."  
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2256. 
* "Though not a bribe or criminal influence, Justice 
Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude 
to Blankenship for his extraordinary efforts to get 
him elected."  Id. at 2262. 
* "Not every campaign contribution by a litigant or 
attorney creates a probability of bias that requires 
a judge's recusal, but this is an exceptional case."  
Id. at 2263. 
* "[T]he fact remains that Blankenship's extraordinary 
contributions were made at a time when he had a 
vested stake in the outcome" of his pending case.  
Id. at 2265. 
* "On these extreme facts the probability of actual 
bias rises to an unconstitutional level."  Id. 
No.  2007AP795.akz 
 
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instances" in which the constitutional standard was implicated.  
Id. at 2267.  In contrast, the allegations in this case, like 
                                                                                                                                                             
* "Our decision today addresses an extraordinary 
situation where the Constitution requires recusal."  
Id. 
* "The facts now before us are extreme by any 
measure."  Id. 
* "It is true that extreme cases often test the bounds 
of legal principles . . . .  But it is also true 
that 
extreme 
facts 
are 
more 
likely 
to 
cross 
constitutional limits . . . ."  Id. 
* "In each [prior recusal] case the Court dealt with 
extreme facts that created an unconstitutional 
probability of bias . . . . The Court was careful to 
distinguish the extreme facts of the cases before it 
from those interests that would not rise to a 
constitutional level."  Id. at 2265-66. 
* The Court was not flooded with motions after the 
prior recusal cases, which was "perhaps due in part 
to the extreme facts those standards sought to 
address."  Id. at 2266. 
Several commentators have emphasized the "extraordinary" or 
"extreme" facts that warranted recusal in Caperton.  See, e.g., 
Terri R. Day, Buying Justice: Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Campaign 
Dollars, Mandatory Recusal and Due Process, 28 Miss. C. L. Rev. 
359, 373-76, 380 (2009) (noting that Justice Kennedy repeatedly 
emphasized the extreme and rare facts of the case and finding 
that the Court "articulated a vague standard based on extreme 
facts"); Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, 
and the Lessons of Caperton, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 80, 81, 97 (2009) 
("[T]he Court's opinion focused explicitly only on the way that 
extraordinary fusions of money into a judicial election may 
threaten judicial impartiality"; "[T]he divide between the 
Justices in the Caperton majority and those in the dissent was 
over 
the 
availability 
of 
a 
'judicially 
discernible 
and 
manageable standard' for distinguishing between the 'extreme' 
campaign 
support 
that 
requires 
recusal 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
constitutional law and the ordinary operation of an elected 
judiciary in which judges routinely participate in cases 
involving 
individuals 
who 
supported 
(or 
opposed) 
their 
election."). 
No.  2007AP795.akz 
 
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"most disputes over disqualification [can] be resolved without 
resort to the Constitution." Id.; see also Fed. Trade Comm'n v. 
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948); Pamela S. Karlan, 
Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton, 
123 Harv. L. Rev. 80, 97 (2009) ("[T]he divide between the 
Justices in the Caperton majority and those in the dissent was 
over 
the 
availability 
of 
a 
'judicially 
discernible 
and 
manageable standard' for distinguishing between the 'extreme' 
campaign 
support 
that 
requires 
recusal 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
constitutional law and the ordinary operation of an elected 
judiciary in which judges routinely participate in cases 
involving 
individuals 
who 
supported 
(or 
opposed) 
their 
election."). 
¶264 Far from governing disqualification disputes that do 
not 
implicate 
a 
litigant's 
due 
process 
rights, 
Caperton 
"addresse[d] an extraordinary situation where the Constitution 
require[d] recusal" because a party directly influenced a 
judge's election at a time when that party's case was pending, 
and it was "reasonably foreseeable . . . that the pending case 
would be before the newly elected justice."  129 S. Ct. at 2264-
65.  In Caperton, "a person with a personal stake in a 
particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence 
in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing 
the judge's election campaign when the case was pending or 
imminent."  Id. at 2263-64.  In such "an exceptional case," the 
Supreme Court concluded that "based on objective and reasonable 
perceptions," there was a serious risk of the judge's actual 
No.  2007AP795.akz 
 
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bias in sitting on that particular case between those particular 
parties.  Id. at 2263. 
¶265 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. was a pending case 
when the campaign efforts of Don Blankenship, A.T. Massey's 
chairman, chief executive officer, and president, "had a 
significant and disproportionate influence" in electing Justice 
Brent Benjamin to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 
and therefore placing him on A.T. Massey's case.  Id. at 2264.  
Before the appeal was actually filed, the opposing party, 
Caperton, 
moved 
to 
disqualify 
Justice 
Benjamin 
in 
that 
particular case between those particular parties.  Id. at 2257.  
Caperton 
claimed 
that 
based 
on 
the 
conflict 
caused 
by 
Blankenship's involvement with Justice Benjamin's campaign, 
Justice Benjamin's recusal was required under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  Id.  Justice Benjamin denied the motion.  Id.  
A.T. Massey filed its petition for appeal, and the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of West Virginia granted review.  Id.  A majority of 
the court, joined by Justice Benjamin, ultimately reversed the 
$50 million jury verdict against A.T. Massey.  Id. at 2258.   
¶266 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether due process was violated when Justice Benjamin 
denied Caperton's recusal motion.  Id. at 2256.  The Supreme 
Court concluded that based "in all the circumstances of [that] 
case, due process require[d] recusal."  Id. at 2257.   
¶267 The "extreme facts" that amounted to a due process 
violation, id. at 2265, are as follows.  A $50 million jury 
No.  2007AP795.akz 
 
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verdict had been entered in favor of Caperton against A.T. 
Massey before the election for the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia, and it was "reasonably foreseeable . . . that the 
pending case would be before the newly elected justice."  Id. at 
2264-65.  Blankenship made a $3 million contribution in support 
of Benjamin to replace the incumbent justice "at a time when 
[Blankenship] had a vested stake in the outcome" of a pending 
case that was to come before the court.  Id. at 2265.  The $3 
million was comprised of the $1,000 statutory maximum to 
Benjamin's campaign committee, $2.5 million to the "And For The 
Sake Of The Kids" organization that supported Benjamin, and over 
$500,000 on mailings and advertisements to support Benjamin.5  
Id. at 2257.  The $3 million "eclipsed the total amount spent by 
all other Benjamin supporters and exceeded by 300% the amount 
spent 
by 
Benjamin's 
campaign 
committee." 
 
Id. 
at 
2264.  
According to Caperton, Blankenship spent $1 million more than 
the total amount spent by the campaign committees of Benjamin 
and the incumbent justice combined.  Id.  The election was 
decided by fewer than 50,000 votes.  Id.  Benjamin won the 
election with 53.3 percent of the votes.  Id. at 2257. 
                                                 
5 In its recent decision in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission, No. 08-205, slip op. (U.S. Jan. 21, 2010), 
the United States Supreme Court recognized the fundamental 
constitutional right to political speech, id. at 23, and struck 
down as unconstitutional federal law that prohibits corporations 
from making independent expenditures for speech that expressly 
advocates the election or defeat of a candidate, id. at 50.  The 
Supreme 
Court 
"conclude[d] 
that 
independent 
expenditures, 
including those made by corporations, do not give rise to 
corruption or the appearance of corruption."  Id. at 42. 
No.  2007AP795.akz 
 
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¶268 Based 
on 
the 
relative 
size 
of 
Blankenship's 
contribution in comparison to the total amount of money 
contributed to the campaign; the total amount spent in the 
election; the apparent effect such contribution had on the 
outcome of the election; and the temporal relationship between 
the contribution, the election, and the pendency of the case, 
the Supreme Court concluded that there was a serious, objective 
risk of Justice Benjamin's actual bias in sitting on that 
particular case between Caperton and A.T. Massey.  Id. at 2263-
64.  
¶269 However, nowhere in the Caperton decision does the 
Supreme Court state that any lesser fact situation would have 
required Justice Benjamin's recusal in that case, and nowhere 
does the Supreme Court conclude that he would be required to 
recuse himself from an unrelated civil case that involved 
different parties.  To suggest that Caperton says otherwise is 
to invent new law and to invite recusal motions based upon 
"spin" instead of whether a justice can be fair and impartial.  
Such practice is destructive to the credibility of the court, as 
justices are always presumed to be fair and impartial.6  To be 
clear, nowhere in Caperton does the majority state that anything 
less than this "perfect storm," created by those extreme and 
                                                 
6 There is a "presumption of honesty and integrity in those 
serving as adjudicators."  Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 
(1975); see also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 273 (1941) 
("[T]o impute to judges a lack of firmness, wisdom, or honor" is 
a premise "which we cannot accept."); Milburn v. State, 50 
Wis. 2d 53, 62, 183 N.W.2d 70 (1971) (recognizing that there is 
a presumption that a judge "in fidelity to his oath of office, 
will try each case on its merits"). 
No.  2007AP795.akz 
 
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extraordinary facts coupled with the timing of the election and 
the parties' pending case, would be sufficient to constitute a 
due process violation.  See id. at 2264, 2265 (recognizing as 
"critical" the "temporal relationship between the campaign 
contributions, the justice's election, and the pendency of the 
case" and likewise stating that objective standards required 
recusal when Blankenship's "significant and disproportionate 
influence" was "coupled with the temporal relationship between 
the election and the pending case").  In fact, the Supreme Court 
cautioned that "[a]pplication of the constitutional standard 
implicated in [Caperton] will [] be confined to rare instances."  
Id. at 2267. 
¶270 Although referenced in Chief Justice Abrahamson's 
writing, see ¶104 n.72, any mention of television advertisements 
in support of Justice Benjamin is notably absent from the 
Supreme Court's decision in Caperton.  While the Chief Justice 
references the content of the television advertisements as if it 
was part of the Caperton decision, in actuality, that was not 
even mentioned.  
¶271 In contrast to the "extreme facts" in Caperton where 
the probability of actual bias of a justice of a lower court 
rose to an unconstitutional level, 129 S. Ct. at 2265, the 
allegations in Allen involve a judicial peer and fail to state a 
due process claim because no "person with a personal stake" in 
Allen "had a significant and disproportionate influence" in 
placing Justice Gableman on the case "by raising funds or 
directing [his] election campaign when the case was pending or 
No.  2007AP795.akz 
 
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imminent."  See id. at 2263-64.  Neither Allen nor the State had 
any influence in placing Justice Gableman on the court, and no 
amount of briefing can alter that fact.  Allen's allegation that 
Justice Gableman's campaign speech evidences his bias against 
all criminal defendants and therefore requires his recusal in 
Allen simply does not implicate the due process standard for 
judicial recusal set forth in Caperton. 
¶272 For these reasons, I join the opinion of Justice 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK. 
No.  2007AP795.akz 
 
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