Title: Ruffin v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 367, 2018
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: February 19, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RAMON RUFFIN, 
 
 
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No. 367, 2018 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
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Appellant,  
 
 
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Court Below:  Superior Court of the         
 
 
 
 
 
 
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State of Delaware  
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
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Cr. ID No. 1312005545A (K) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
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Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
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Appellee. 
 
 
 
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Submitted: November 21, 2018 
Decided: 
February 19, 2019 
 
Before VALIHURA, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 19th day of February 2019, upon consideration of the brief under 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c), appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw, and the State’s 
response, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
This is the appellant Ramon Ruffin’s appeal from the Superior Court’s 
denial of his first motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 61.  The underlying charges stemmed from a 2013 attempted armed robbery, 
during which the robber struck the victim in the head with a handgun before fleeing 
in a white minivan.  After a police chase, the driver of the van—Ruffin—and a 
backseat passenger, Wilbur Doughty, were apprehended and taken into custody.  
Doughty was released after questioning.  Ruffin was indicted in 2014 and tried on 
2 
 
charges of attempted robbery, assault, aggravated menacing disregarding a police 
officer’s signal, and weapon offenses.  Neither Ruffin nor Doughty testified at 
Ruffin’s trial.   
 
(2) 
Ruffin’s defense at trial admitted that Ruffin was the driver of the white 
minivan but denied that he committed the attempted robbery and assault and 
suggested that it was Doughty who did.  The jury found differently and convicted 
Ruffin of the charged offenses.  On direct appeal, we affirmed Ruffin’s convictions.1 
 
(3) 
Ruffin filed a timely pro se motion for postconviction relief based on 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.  The 
Superior Court appointed postconviction counsel for Ruffin.  Postconviction counsel 
did not amend the postconviction motion. 
 
(4) 
After obtaining an affidavit from Ruffin’s trial counsel addressing the 
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the State’s response to the 
postconviction motion, and replies filed by Ruffin and his postconviction counsel, a 
Superior Court Commissioner issued a report recommending that the postconviction 
motion should be denied.2  By order dated June 14, 2018, upon a de novo review of 
the record, the Superior Court adopted the Commissioner’s report and 
recommendation and denied the postconviction motion.  This appeal followed. 
                                
 
1 Ruffin v. State, 131 A.3d 295 (Del. 2015). 
2 State v. Ruffin, 2018 WL 2202278 (Del. Super. Ct. Comm’r May 9, 2018). 
3 
 
 
(5) 
On appeal, postconviction counsel has filed a no-merit brief and a 
motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  Postconviction counsel 
asserts that, based upon a complete and careful examination of the record, there are 
no arguably appealable issues.   
 
(6) 
In a written response to postconviction counsel’s brief and motion, 
Ruffin asks us to consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his 
trial counsel’s failure to move for a mistrial in a timely fashion and to request an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of tainted in-court identifications.  Also, in a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel that was not raised in the postconviction motion, 
Ruffin contends that his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to request that 
the gun seized from the minivan be submitted for DNA testing.  Finally, Ruffin 
claims that the prosecutor’s closing argument improperly vouched for statements 
that Doughty made to the police before he was released. 
 
(7) 
When reviewing the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief on 
appeal, we consider the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any 
substantive issues.3  Rule 61(i)(3) provides that any ground for relief that was not 
asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction is barred unless 
the movant can establish cause for relief from the procedural default and prejudice 
                                
 
3 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
4 
 
from a violation of the movant’s rights.4  To establish cause, the movant must 
demonstrate that an external impediment prevented him from raising the claim 
earlier.5  To establish prejudice, the movant must show actual prejudice resulting 
from the alleged error.6  
 
(8) 
Ruffin failed to raise his prosecutorial misconduct claim on direct 
appeal, and we can find neither cause for failure to raise the claim nor prejudice from 
the alleged error.  The prosecutor is entitled to argue all legitimate inferences of guilt 
that flow from the evidence presented at trial.7  “Improper vouching occurs when a 
prosecutor implies that he or she has superior knowledge, beyond that logically 
inferable from the evidence.”8  In this case, the prosecutor’s closing arguments 
concerning Doughty’s lack of involvement in the planning and commission of the 
attempted robbery, assault, and other offenses, were all permissible inferences from 
the evidence presented at trial.  Ruffin’s prosecutorial misconduct claim is barred 
under Rule 61(i)(3). 
  
 
(9) 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant 
must prove that his trial counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and 
                                
 
4 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 
5 Younger, 580 A.2d at 556. 
6 Id. 
7 Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 567 (Del. 1981). 
8 Saunders v. State, 602 A.2d 623, 624 (Del. 1984). 
5 
 
that his defense was prejudiced as a result.9  A movant asserting a claim of ineffective 
assistance must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice to substantiate the 
claim.10  Although there is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was 
professionally reasonable,11 there is no need to analyze whether an attorney 
performed deficiently if the alleged deficiency did not prejudice the movant.12 
 
(10) Ruffin cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s 
failure to request that the gun recovered from the minivan be submitted for DNA 
testing.  Because Ruffin did not raise this claim in the postconviction motion, we 
reviewed the claim for plain error.13  Plain error is error that is “so clearly prejudicial 
to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial.”14 
 
(11) In this case, forgoing DNA testing of the gun seized from the minivan 
protected Ruffin in the event the results were incriminating and, as illustrated in this 
case, provided his defense with an argument of insufficient evidence based on the 
State’s failure to produce the test results.15  A decision made in pursuit of reasonable 
                                
 
9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) 
10 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).  
11 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
12 Laster v. State, 2019 WL 507683 (Del. Feb. 8, 2019) (citing Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 825 
(Del. 2013); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697)). 
13 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8.  Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986).  
14 Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100. 
15 Hr’g Tr. at 56–58 (Oct. 28, 2014).   
6 
 
trial strategy does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.16  Under plain 
error review, Ruffin’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without merit. 
 
(12) Finally, the Superior Court did not err when concluding that Ruffin’s 
postconviction motion failed to show that his trial counsel was ineffective.  Ruffin 
raised the tainted in-court identifications and the denial of his motion for mistrial as 
issues on direct appeal without success.  Having failed to prevail on the merit of the 
claims on direct appeal, Ruffin cannot succeed on the claims now by reframing them 
as grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
(13) After careful consideration of the parties’ positions on appeal, we 
conclude that the judgment denying Ruffin’s postconviction motion should be 
affirmed.  We are satisfied that postconviction counsel made a conscientious effort 
to examine the record and the law and properly determined that Ruffin could not 
raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.17        
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice  
   
                                
 
16 Allison v. State, 2010 WL 3733919 (Sep. 24, 2010) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 689 (1984)). 
17 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 
442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).