Title: Bell v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC10-916
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 7, 2013

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-916 
____________ 
 
GARY FONTAINE BELL, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[February 7, 2013] 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
In this case, we consider whether certain comments made by a prosecutor 
were impermissible.  Gary Fontaine Bell seeks review of Bell v. State, 33 So. 3d 
724 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), in which the First District Court of Appeal affirmed 
Bell’s convictions and sentences for lewd and lascivious molestation on a victim 
under twelve years of age by an offender eighteen years of age or older and for 
failure to appear.  The First District addressed, inter alia, the following statement 
made by the prosecutor during closing argument in regard to the victim’s age, an 
element of the molestation charge:  “[S]o without any evidence contradicting [the 
State’s evidence,] the State has proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt the first 
 
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element of the charge.”  Bell, 33 So. 3d at 726 (emphasis omitted).  The First 
District held that because the victim’s age “was not an issue which only [Bell] was 
capable of refuting, [the prosecutor’s] comment could not be construed as a 
comment on [Bell’s] right to remain silent.”  Id. at 727. 
 
The First District’s decision expressly and directly conflicts with Shelton v. 
State, 654 So. 2d 1295, 1296 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), in which the Fourth District 
addressed a similar prosecutorial comment on the lack of evidence contradicting an 
element of the crime of sale of cocaine:  “But is there anything showing that [the 
defendant] didn’t make that sale?  He was there.”  The Fourth District held that the 
comment was improper because “it could have been interpreted by the jury as a 
comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.”  Id. at 1297.  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
We agree with the First District that the prosecutor’s comment did not 
constitute an improper comment on Bell’s right to remain silent.  The statement 
concerned an issue that witnesses other than Bell could have refuted.  We 
determine, however, that the First District erred in holding that a second 
comment—which implicitly referenced Bell’s failure to testify—likewise did not 
constitute an improper comment on Bell’s right to remain silent.  Moreover, we 
determine that two additional comments challenged by Bell in the First District, 
but not expressly addressed by that court, constitute improper burden shifting.  We 
 
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nonetheless conclude that objections to the improper comments were not preserved 
and that the comments did not constitute fundamental error and thus do not require 
reversal.  We also reject an unpreserved argument with respect to the prosecutor’s 
voir dire questions.  Accordingly, we approve the result of the First District’s 
decision affirming Bell’s convictions and sentences. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Bell was charged by amended information with one count of lewd and 
lascivious molestation on a victim under twelve years of age by an offender 
eighteen years of age or older and one count of failing to appear at a hearing held 
on August 27, 2007.  Bell pleaded not guilty to both charges and moved to have 
the charges severed.  The trial court denied Bell’s motion, and the case proceeded 
to a jury trial.  The jury convicted Bell of both counts as charged.  The trial court 
sentenced Bell to ten years in prison for the molestation charge and to a concurrent 
five-year sentence for his failure to appear, followed by five years’ probation.  The 
trial court also designated Bell as a sexual predator. 
During voir dire, the prosecutor asked the jury panel the following 
questions:  “Now, would anyone just right off the bat tell me that if all I have is a 
[sic] word of a child to evaluate as the evidence, that that’s not enough; I would 
need more?”; “Without hearing any other thing about the case, could you tell me 
right now that the testimony of a child alone would be insufficient for you?”; and 
 
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“[I]f you heard the testimony of a child telling what happened and there were no 
other eyewitnesses, would that not be enough for you under any circumstances?” 
Bell objected to these questions at the close of the State’s voir dire and 
moved for a new panel, arguing that the prosecutor’s questions were simply “a 
backhanded way” of asking prospective jurors to “promise to come back with a 
guilty verdict if we have a child saying he did it.”  The trial court denied Bell’s 
request, but told Bell to “[f]eel free to rehabilitate as you see fit.”  Although Bell 
stated on the morning of the trial that he “continued to renew [his] objections to the 
Court’s denial of the various pretrial motions that [he] filed,” Bell failed to renew 
his specific objection to the State’s voir dire. 
During trial, the State presented evidence regarding the molestation charge 
through the testimony of both the victim and the victim’s mother.  In addition, the 
State presented portions of a videotaped interview of the victim conducted by a 
case coordinator from the Gulf Coast Kids House, a child advocacy center 
composed of representatives from various agencies involved in the investigation 
and prosecution of child abuse cases.  The testimony of the victim’s mother and the 
taped interview of the victim—taken shortly after the victim first reported the 
abuse to her mother—corroborated the essential facts of the victim’s testimony 
that: while Bell was married to the victim’s mother several years earlier, he had 
molested the victim on multiple occasions while her mother was at work and the 
 
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victim’s sister was playing outside; and on at least one occasion, Bell had placed a 
ring on the victim’s finger prior to molesting her and told the victim that she was 
now his wife. 
Regarding the charge of failure to appear, the State presented the testimony 
of the Escambia County Clerk of Court, a deputy with the Escambia County 
Sheriff’s Office, and a prisoner transport officer for U.S. Transport to establish that 
Bell was not present at multiple court dates between August and December 2007—
including the August 27 hearing—and that Bell was discovered in Las Vegas, 
Nevada, in December 2007.  Bell did not testify in his own defense, but he 
presented the testimony of his mother and sister in an attempt to discredit the 
testimony of the victim and her mother. 
During initial closing argument, the prosecutor made several statements that 
Bell challenged on appeal.  Specifically, on appeal Bell challenged the following 
comments, emphasizing the underlined statements. 
[1] As to count 1 the State must prove 2 elements beyond and to 
the exclusion of every reasonable doubt in order for you to convict the 
defendant.  The first element is that [the victim] was under the age of 
12.  The evidence that we presented that was the testimony of her 
mother who testified as to her date of birth and importantly the 
testimony of [the victim] who you obviously could tell she was a 
young girl and told [you] her date of birth was 6/11/97[1] so without 
any evidence contradicting
                                         
 
1.  The prosecutor’s summary of the evidence on this fact is incorrect.  Both 
the victim and her mother testified that the victim was born on June 20, 1997. 
 that the State has proven to you beyond a 
reasonable doubt the first element of the charge. 
 
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[2] The second element is that Gary Bell intentionally touched 
in a lewd or lascivious manner the genitals, genital area or clothing 
covering the genitals or clothing covering the genital area of [the 
victim].  Now the evidence we have presented to prove that is of 
course the testimony of [the victim]. 
In cases like this, it is always a one-person’s word against 
another
 
.  In these particular cases— 
Bell’s counsel objected at this point, arguing that the prosecutor should be “talking 
about this case, not talking about all the cases.”  The trial court sustained the 
objection, and the State continued: 
 
[3] In this particular case it is the word of [the victim] against 
the plea of not guilty that Gary Bell has entered
 
[4] What were the circumstances when [the victim] first told 
this information?  Well the circumstances were she was living with 
her mom and her siblings and her new stepdad.  That she felt safe.  
That it was a happy home environment and that she told her mom. 
.  Let’s talk about [the 
victim].  When you are evaluating whether someone is telling the truth 
you take a step back from their words.  You saw [the victim].  You 
heard what she said.  You saw her demeanor.  You saw how she 
communicated.  You could tell a little bit about the emotion she was 
feeling.  You could hear her voice.  You saw the looks on her face.  
That’s some information . . . .  
 
. . . . 
 
Take a step back from that.  Why would she be saying this 
today?  Is there any reason why she would be making it up?  Does she 
have any motivation to want to get Gary Bell in trouble or to unjustly 
accuse him?  What’s going on today, what was going on a year and 4 
months ago?  Whatever was going on had nothing to do with him.  He 
was out of the picture.  He wasn’t—had no part in her life.  He wasn’t 
a player.  There was nothing going on with her mom and him.  She 
moved on, married another man, had another baby.  They moved on 
with their life. 
 
So if you are looking for a reason to not believe [the victim] 
there isn’t one.  Because there is no evidence that she would have 
made this up at this particular time under these particular 
 
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circumstances
 
.  And that’s the consideration you should make in 
deciding whether or not her testimony is credible. 
The State concluded its argument by stating: 
 
[5] This is a very important day for the defendant no doubt. 
 
This is also a very important day for [the victim], her family 
and the people of the State of Florida who I represent
 
.  And we are 
asking you if you feel the evidence has proved the charges beyond and 
to exclusion of a reasonable doubt that you follow the law and you 
hold the defendant responsible for the crimes he committed and you 
reflect so in your verdict of guilty as charged. 
After the State’s initial closing argument, Bell moved for a mistrial, arguing 
that comments 3 and 4 were an attempt to lessen the State’s burden of proof and 
improperly referred to Bell’s right to remain silent.   Bell argued that the 
appropriate standard is “whether or not [the victim’s] testimony is believable 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  It’s not which one do you believe.”  The trial court 
denied Bell’s motion, and the defense presented its closing argument. 
Regarding the failure to appear charge, in the closing argument the defense 
contended that Bell had unintentionally missed his August 27, 2007, court date and 
that Bell thereafter fled town “out of fear upon realizing that he had missed court.”  
The defense claimed that Bell had therefore not left town based on his 
“consciousness of guilt”—as argued by the State—but rather had fled “because he 
was scared to death” after missing his August 27 court date. 
The State presented rebuttal closing argument.  On appeal, Bell challenged 
the following portions thereof and again emphasized the underlined comments. 
 
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[6] Now, remember, we are in a court of law.  We make 
decisions and findings of fact based on evidence.  What the attorneys 
say standing up before you is not evidence.  It may be argument of 
what the evidence showed.  It may be trying to point out things that 
were important.  It may be discussing credibility of a witness.  We are 
not allowed [to] testify. 
 
For example, I can’t stand up here and say the reason that Gary 
Bell wasn’t in court is because he knowingly and intentionally didn’t 
want to be here, he was scared and he ran off.  I can’t say that because 
I am not a witness and that’s not evidence.  Well, by the same token 
the defense attorney can’t stand up here and tell you the reason Gary 
Bell wasn’t in court is because he was scared and he took off after he 
missed court because he was scared because he missed court.  Really?  
Well, did you hear any testimony, any evidence that supports that 
statement
The prosecutor then stated: 
?  Because if you didn’t, that’s not evidence and it should 
not be considered by you.   Because that’s why we are here for you to 
evaluate evidence. 
[7] Unlike television this wasn’t very glamorous and it didn’t 
take that long, but it is exceedingly important because this is our 
community and you are sitting as a jury of the defendant’s peers.  And 
not only is the defendant depending on you but so are the people of 
the State of Florida.  I know you have been very patient in listening to 
the evidence today and I know that you have been very attentive in 
listening to me now and I have every confidence that you will listen to 
the Court and will follow the law. 
Bell’s counsel objected, arguing that “[the prosecutor’s] confidence is not 
appropriate.  I object.  She is not testifying.”  The trial court sustained Bell’s 
objection and the prosecutor concluded her closing argument. 
On appeal to the First District, in addition to arguing that the trial court erred 
in failing to grant a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s impermissible comments 
during closing argument, Bell argued that the trial court abused its discretion in 
 
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failing to grant a new jury panel based on the prosecutor’s comments during voir 
dire and erred in failing to sever the failure to appear charge.  The First District 
rejected without discussion Bell’s voir dire argument and held that the trial court 
did not err in denying Bell’s motion to sever the charges.  Bell, 33 So. 3d at 725-
26. 
Regarding the closing argument comments, Bell contended that comments 1 
through 7 were not only fairly susceptible of being interpreted as comments on 
Bell’s right to remain silent but also impermissibly shifted the State’s burden of 
proof to Bell.  The First District specifically addressed Bell’s challenge to only two 
of the comments—comments 1 and 3.  The First District determined that because 
both comments concerned issues that witnesses other than Bell were capable of 
refuting, neither comment could be construed as a comment on Bell’s right to 
remain silent.  Id. at 726-27.  Without discussing the additional closing argument 
comments or Bell’s alternative burden-shifting argument, the First District 
affirmed Bell’s convictions and sentences. 
 
In the analysis that follows, we resolve the conflict between Bell and Shelton 
by concluding that the First District did not err in holding that because comment 1 
concerned an issue that the witnesses other than Bell could have refuted, comment 
1 was not susceptible of being construed as a comment on Bell’s right to remain 
silent.  We then explain why the First District erred in holding that comment 3 was 
 
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likewise not improper.  We further explain why comments 2 and 4—not expressly 
discussed by the First District in its opinion—were improper under the alternative 
burden-shifting argument raised by Bell.  We conclude, however, that no 
objections to the improper comments were properly preserved and that the 
improper comments did not result in fundamental error.  Finally, we address and 
reject Bell’s voir dire challenge. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Closing Argument Comments 
 
A defendant has the constitutional right to decline to testify against himself 
in a criminal proceeding.  See U.S. Const. amend. V; art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.  In 
furtherance of this right, we have consistently held that “any comment on, or which 
is fairly susceptible of being interpreted as referring to, a defendant’s failure to 
testify is error and is strongly discouraged.”  Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 37 
(Fla. 2000) (quoting State v. Marshall, 476 So. 2d 150, 153 (Fla. 1985)); see also 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.250 (prohibiting prosecuting attorneys from commenting before 
the jury or court on defendant’s failure to testify on his or her own behalf).  
“[W]here the evidence is uncontradicted on a point that only the defendant can 
contradict, a comment on the failure to contradict the evidence becomes an 
impermissible comment on the failure of the defendant to testify.”  Rodriguez, 753 
So. 2d at 38. 
 
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Similarly, “the State may not comment on a defendant’s failure to mount a 
defense because doing so could lead the jury to erroneously conclude that the 
defendant has the burden of doing so.”  Id. (citing Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181, 
188 (Fla. 1991)).  Such comments run afoul of due process, which “requires the 
state to prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt” and establishes 
“that a defendant has no obligation to present witnesses.”  Jackson, 575 So. 2d at 
188. 
 
In this case, the First District expressly considered two comments challenged 
by Bell and determined that neither comment was fairly susceptible to being 
interpreted as a comment on Bell’s right to remain silent.  The first of the 
comments—comment 1—concerned the general lack of evidence presented by the 
defense regarding the victim’s age, an element of the molestation charge.  The 
prosecutor argued that “without any evidence contradicting [the State’s evidence,] 
the State has proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt the first element of the 
charge.”  Bell, 33 So. 3d at 726 (emphasis omitted).  The First District held that 
because the victim’s age “was not an issue which only [Bell] was capable of 
refuting, this comment could not be construed as a comment on [Bell’s] right to 
remain silent.”  Id. at 727.  We agree. 
Bell’s testimony was not the exclusive means by which the defense could 
have challenged the State’s evidence regarding the victim’s age.  Because the 
 
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prosecutor’s comment highlighted the lack of contradictory evidence regarding an 
element of one of the charges, as opposed to the absence of Bell’s individual 
testimony specifically, we conclude that the comment was not fairly susceptible of 
being interpreted as a comment on Bell’s right to remain silent.  See Rodriguez, 
753 So. 2d at 38.  We, accordingly, disapprove Shelton to the extent that it 
conflicts with our holding.  Where the evidence is uncontradicted on a point that 
witnesses other than the defendant can contradict, a comment on the failure to 
contradict the evidence is not an impermissible comment on the failure of the 
defendant to testify. 
Nor does comment 1 constitute improper burden shifting.  The prosecutor 
specifically stated that the State carried the burden of proving the victim’s age 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  “[A] prosecuting attorney may comment on the jury’s 
duty to analyze and evaluate the evidence and state his or her contention relative to 
what conclusions may be drawn from the evidence.”  Evans v. State, 838 So. 2d 
1090, 1094 (Fla. 2002).  When considered in context, the prosecutor’s comment is 
properly understood as a statement on the jury’s duty to analyze the evidence 
presented at trial followed by the prosecutor’s argument regarding what conclusion 
the jury should reach from the evidence.  We therefore conclude that comment 1 
was not improper. 
 
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The First District also expressly addressed comment 3, that “[i]n this 
particular case it is the word of [the victim] against the plea of not guilty that [Bell] 
entered.”  Bell, 33 So. 3d at 726 (emphasis omitted).  The First District determined 
that when considered in context, the challenged comment was part of an argument 
“that no evidence had been offered to suggest the victim had a motive to lie.”  Id. 
at 727.  The First District held that because “[w]itnesses other than [Bell] could 
have been called to testify regarding the victim’s alleged motive to lie, . . . the 
prosecutor’s comment is not fairly susceptible to being interpreted as an erroneous 
comment on [Bell’s] right to remain silent.”  Id.  We disagree. 
By asserting that Bell’s not guilty plea constituted the sum of the evidence in 
support of his innocence, the prosecutor impermissibly highlighted the fact that 
Bell did not testify on his own behalf.  See Smith v. State, 358 So. 2d 1137, 1137-
38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (holding that prosecutor’s comment stating that the “basic 
issue” in the case was whether the jury believed the State’s witness or the 
defendant constituted improper comment on the defendant’s failure to testify in his 
own behalf).  The prosecutor’s comment was fairly susceptible of being interpreted 
as a comment on Bell’s right to remain silent and was therefore error.  See id.; see 
also Rodriguez, 753 So. 2d at 37. 
 
Comment 2—that “[i]n cases like this, it is always a one-person’s word 
against another”—was also improper.  As in comment 3, comment 2 highlights the 
 
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fact that while the victim testified, Bell did not.  We therefore determine that 
comment 2 was fairly susceptible of being interpreted as a comment on Bell’s right 
to remain silent.  See Smith, 358 So. 2d at 1137-38; see also Rodriguez, 753 So. 2d 
at 37. 
 
We also find error in comment 4 that “if you are looking for a reason to not 
believe [the victim] there isn’t one.  Because there is no evidence that she would 
have made this up at this particular time under these particular circumstances.”  
Although this comment does not directly implicate Bell’s failure to testify, it is 
nonetheless improper.  By stating that “there is no evidence” to contradict the 
victim’s testimony, the prosecutor highlighted Bell’s failure to present any 
evidence impeaching the State’s witness.  The prosecutor’s comment thereby 
implied that Bell had a burden of proof regarding the witness’s credibility, and 
unlike in comment 1, the prosecutor did not correct any false impression by 
reminding the jury that the State at all times retains the burden of proof.  Because 
comment 4 could have led the jury to erroneously believe that Bell had the burden 
of presenting such evidence, it was improper.  See Rodriguez, 753 So. 2d at 38; see 
also Jackson, 575 So. 2d at 188. 
 
We determine that none of the remaining comments during closing argument 
were improper.  In comment 5, the prosecutor exhorted the jury:  “[I]f you feel the 
evidence has proved the charges beyond and to exclusion of a reasonable doubt[, 
 
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then] follow the law and . . . hold the defendant responsible for the crimes he 
committed and . . . reflect so in your verdict of guilty as charged.”  A prosecutor’s 
comment “is not erroneous because the prosecutor was simply advising the jury to 
follow the law.”  Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1283 (Fla. 2005).  For the 
same reason, comment 7—in which the prosecutor told the jury, “I know you have 
been very attentive in listening to me now and I have every confidence that you 
will listen to the Court and will follow the law”—was not improper.  See id. 
Additionally, although comment 6—relating to Bell’s absconding—
specifically implicates Bell’s failure to produce certain evidence at trial, it was not 
improper.  Our case law recognizes an exception to the “fairly susceptible” test for 
comments that constitute an “invited response” to a theory argued by the defense.  
Rodriguez, 753 So. 2d at 39.  We have held, for example, that  
the prosecutor’s statement to the jury that “[y]ou haven’t . . . heard 
any evidence that [the defendant] had any legal papers in the cell with 
him” was a proper rebuttal to the defense attorney’s statement in 
closing that an adverse witness could have had access to and based his 
testimony on the defendant’s “legal papers.” 
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Dufour v. State, 495 So. 2d 154, 160 (Fla. 
1986)); see also Poole v. State, 997 So. 2d 382, 390 (Fla. 2008) (holding that a 
prosecutor’s statement “that there was no evidence . . . that someone else inflicted 
the injuries on the victims” was invited response to defense counsel’s argument 
that the defendant “acknowledged that he committed the crimes of sexual battery, 
 
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robbery, and burglary but denied that he was the person who inflicted the injuries 
on” the victims). 
Here, defense counsel argued during closing argument that Bell did not have 
the requisite intent to support a conviction for failure to appear at the August 27 
hearing.  The defense claimed that Bell had unintentionally missed the August 27 
hearing and had thereafter left town “out of fear upon realizing that he had missed 
court.”  During rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor responded that 
the defense attorney can’t stand up here and tell you the reason Gary 
Bell wasn’t in court is because he was scared and he took off after he 
missed court because he was scared because he missed court.  Really?  
Well, did you hear any testimony, any evidence that supports that 
statement
Because the prosecutor’s comment was a direct rebuttal to the defense attorney’s 
argument, it falls within the “invited response” exception to the fairly susceptible 
test and was therefore not improper. 
?  Because if you didn’t, that’s not evidence and it should 
not be considered by you.  
 
Having considered the totality of the prosecutor’s closing argument, we now 
examine whether the improper comments—comments 2, 3, and 4—require 
reversal.  Because Bell failed to preserve an objection to any of the comments and 
the comments do not cumulatively constitute fundamental error, Bell is not entitled 
to relief. 
 
Bell’s contemporaneous objection to comment 2 was presented on a legal 
basis other than that which he now argues on appeal.  His objection therefore failed 
 
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to preserve the issue for appeal.  See Aills v. Boemi, 29 So. 3d 1105, 1108 (Fla. 
2010) (“In order for an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific 
contention asserted as legal ground for the objection . . . below.”) (quoting Harrell 
v. State, 894 So. 2d 935, 940 (Fla. 2005)).  Moreover, although Bell moved for a 
mistrial on the basis of comments 3 and 4, Bell failed to raise a contemporaneous 
objection to either comment2
 
Fundamental error is that which “reaches down into the validity of the trial 
such that a guilty verdict . . . could not have been obtained without the assistance 
of the alleged error.”  Wade v. State, 41 So. 3d 857, 868 (Fla. 2010).  We 
determine that the cumulative effect of the improper closing argument comments 
did not deprive Bell of a fair trial.  See Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 622 (Fla. 
2001) (“[T]he Court examines the totality of the errors in the closing argument and 
 and thus failed to preserve a challenge to either 
comment for appeal.  Scott v. State, 66 So. 3d 923, 929 (Fla. 2011) (holding that a 
motion for mistrial raised after the prosecutor’s closing argument is insufficient to 
preserve the issue of improper prosecutorial argument for appeal where the 
defendant did not also contemporaneously object to the alleged error).  
Accordingly, we review the challenged comments for fundamental error.  See id.; 
see also Aills, 29 So. 3d at 1109. 
                                         
 
2.  The First District’s declaration that comment 3 was “objected to 
contemporaneously, and thus, the issue was properly preserved,” Bell, 33 So. 3d at 
726, is not supported by the record. 
 
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determines whether the cumulative effect of the numerous improprieties deprived 
the defendant of a fair [trial].”).  The victim’s testimony at trial was corroborated 
in detail by the victim’s mother, who testified regarding what the victim had told 
her nearly two years before.  The victim’s testimony was further corroborated by 
the videotaped interview taken of the victim by an independent child abuse case 
worker shortly after the victim first revealed the molestation.  Moreover, both the 
trial court and the prosecutor properly told the jury that the attorney’s arguments at 
closing were not to be considered as evidence, and the jury was properly instructed 
regarding the legal standard that the State must meet to achieve a conviction.  
Based on the record, we determine that the prosecutor’s improper comments did 
not affect Bell’s trial such that a guilty verdict could not have been obtained in 
their absence.  See Wade, 41 So. 3d at 868. 
B.  Voir Dire Comments 
Bell also argues that the First District erred in rejecting his argument that the 
prosecutor’s questions during voir dire were used to “pre-condition” the jury to 
return a guilty verdict and impermissibly referred to his right to remain silent.  
Specifically, Bell challenges the prosecutor’s line of questioning asking:  “[W]ould 
anyone just right off the bat tell me that if all I have is a [sic] word of a child to 
evaluate as the evidence, that that’s not enough; I would need more?”; “Without 
hearing any other thing about the case, could you tell me right now that the 
 
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testimony of a child alone would be insufficient for you?”; and “[I]f you heard the 
testimony of a child telling what happened and there were no other eyewitnesses, 
would that not be enough for you under any circumstances?” 
Bell’s challenge to the prosecutor’s voir dire was not preserved for appeal.  
Although Bell objected to the prosecutor’s voir dire, he failed to renew his 
objection prior to the jury being sworn.  See Joiner v. State, 618 So. 2d 174, 176 
(Fla. 1993) (holding that to preserve a contemporaneous objection to voir dire, a 
defendant must renew the objection prior to the jury being sworn or accept the jury 
subject to the specific prior objection in order to “apprise[] the trial judge that [the 
defendant] still believed reversible error had occurred”); Barnette v. State, 768 So. 
2d 1246, 1247 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (“[T]he appellant did not properly preserve 
this issue for appellate review because he failed to renew his objection and motion 
for mistrial before the jury was sworn.”).  We therefore review the challenged 
questions for fundamental error.  Mendoza v. State, 964 So. 2d 121, 131 (Fla. 
2007) (unpreserved challenge to voir dire comments is reviewed for fundamental 
error).  We conclude that the voir dire questions do not constitute error, much less 
fundamental error. 
To the extent Bell argues that the prosecutor’s questions impermissibly 
referred to his right to remain silent, we reject Bell’s claim.  We have previously 
concluded that a prosecutor’s voir dire questions exploring prospective jurors’ 
 
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predisposition against a certain kind of witness did not constitute an impermissible 
comment on the defendant’s right to testify.  See Pope v. State, 679 So. 2d 710 
(Fla. 1996).  In Pope, the prosecutor asked the jury panel: 
[A]ssuming someone takes the stand and they’re testifying and they 
admit to using alcohol and maybe using a lot of alcohol, or there’s 
testimony about someone having used alcohol, would you just sort of 
automatically become prejudiced towards that person to the point that 
you would form an opinion about their truthfulness or their guilt or 
anything of that nature? 
Id. at 715.  We concluded that “the state’s comment was not susceptible to being 
construed as a comment on Pope’s right to testify” because the question did “not 
focus on this defendant,” but instead “related to any witness who might take the 
stand and admit to the consumption of alcohol and whether the juror would find 
that witness believable.”  Id.  Similarly, a prosecutor’s voir dire inquiry into 
whether any prospective juror “couldn’t find the defendant guilty . . . unless there 
was an eyewitness, other than the victim” is not an impermissible comment on the 
defendant’s right to remain silent.  Barnette, 768 So. 2d at 1246-47. 
 
The voir dire comments at issue here are similar to those upheld in Pope and 
Barnette.  The prosecutor’s comments were designed to ascertain whether any 
potential juror might be inclined to discount the testimony of a witness simply 
because the witness was a child.  Because the panel had previously been informed 
of the charges against Bell, the State’s comments were most reasonably understood 
as referring to the victim’s testimony.  The prosecutor neither implicitly nor 
 
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explicitly referred to any potential evidence to be presented by the defense.  Given 
this context, the prosecutor’s comments were not fairly susceptible of being 
interpreted as referring to Bell’s failure to testify.  See Pope, 679 So. 2d at 715; 
Barnette, 768 So. 2d at 1246-47. 
Additionally, to the extent Bell argues that the prosecutor’s voir dire 
comments preconditioned the jurors to convict Bell, we reject his argument.  
Although a prosecutor may not interrogate a prospective juror “as to his attitude 
toward a particular witness who is expected to testify in the case, . . . especially 
when [the juror] knows in advance that the prosecution has only the one primary 
witness to prove its case,” this prohibition extends only to “question[s of] 
prospective jurors as to the kind of verdict they would render under any given state 
of facts or circumstances.”  Smith v. State, 253 So. 2d 465, 470-71 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1971) (holding that a prosecutor’s voir dire question asking whether jurors 
“[w]ould convict on the testimony of a person who has been granted immunity if 
the State [p]roves this case beyond a reasonable doubt” was improper) (emphasis 
omitted); see also Dicks v. State, 93 So. 137, 138 (Fla. 1922) (holding that the trial 
court properly sustained an objection to hypothetical voir dire questions 
“containing what purport[ed] to be the testimony subsequently to be introduced 
and eliciting . . . a reply as to whether [a juror] would acquit or convict on such 
testimony”); Renney v. State, 543 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (holding 
 
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that prosecutor’s request that jury commit to finding of guilt “if we prove every 
element of the crime, but don’t prove one particular fact” was improper). 
Here, the prosecutor did not ask prospective jurors to commit to a specific 
vote.  Instead, the prosecutor asked whether any juror would be unable to evaluate 
the testimony of a child witness without bias or prejudice based on the witness’s 
age.  Rather than seeking to discover how potential jurors would vote based on 
specific testimony, the prosecutor sought to ascertain whether any prospective 
juror carried an underlying distrust of child witnesses.  The prosecutor’s questions 
were therefore within the State’s right “to ascertain latent or concealed 
prejudgments by prospective jurors.”  Stano v. State, 473 So. 2d 1282, 1285 (Fla. 
1985) (“The test for determining a juror’s competency is whether that juror can lay 
aside any prejudice or bias and decide the case solely on the evidence presented 
and the instructions given.”).  Accordingly, we reject Bell’s challenge to the 
prosecutor’s voir dire questions. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
Bell failed to properly preserve an objection to any of the challenged 
comments made by the prosecutor.  And the improper comments made by the 
prosecutor during closing argument did not constitute fundamental error.  
Accordingly, we approve the First District’s affirmance of Bell’s convictions and 
sentences. 
 
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It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D08-5315 
 
 
(Escambia County) 
 
Michael Ryan Rollo of Michael Ryan Rollo, P.A., Pensacola, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, Criminal 
Appeals Division, and Giselle Denise Lylen and Christine Ann Guard, Assistant 
Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent