Title: New Jersey v. Camey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 1, 2019

New Jersey v. Camey Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In September 2013, the Passaic Police Department received a 9-1-1 report of a brutally beaten body of a woman, later identified as “Katie,” in a wooded area near a river bank behind a ShopRite store. Sergeant Bordamonte, the lead detective in the matter, was tipped off that Katie was last seen with a person described as a “violent Mexican male” on the night before Katie’s death. The informant said that the man had assaulted another woman. Officers located that male, defendant Rafael Camey, at a bar he frequented after work. A detective advised defendant of his Miranda rights and interviewed him in Spanish, his native language, but presented him with a consent form for a buccal swab printed in English. After defendant signed the untranslated form, another detective took a buccal swab from defendant and released him. Weeks later, Bordamonte sent defendant’s DNA sample, along with approximately twenty other samples to the State Police Laboratory for testing. In June 2014, the State Police notified Bordamonte that DNA found on Katie’s body matched defendant’s DNA profile. That day, defendant was placed under arrest and charged with felony murder, murder, and aggravated sexual assault. The issues this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review involved two key pre-trial determinations involving the DNA evidence from defendant: (1) the trial court ruled the results of a buccal swab that had been excluded on the basis of invalid consent inadmissible under either of the State’s inevitable discovery arguments; and (2) the trial court applied an inevitable discovery analysis in rejecting the State’s application to take a second buccal swab from defendant. The second determination raised a novel question: Under what circumstances, if any, may the police apply to conduct a new search for immutable evidence like DNA? Is a suspect’s DNA off-limits to law enforcement for all time if an initial search was invalid? Or, are there situations in which law enforcement may seek a new buccal swab to examine a person’s DNA? The Supreme Court affirmed suppression of the first swab, however, the State's application for a second swab called for a remand for further proceedings. "To apply for a new buccal swab for DNA evidence under Rule 3:5A, the State must demonstrate probable cause for the new search. That showing may include evidence that existed before the initial invalid search, but cannot be tainted by the results of the prior search. In addition, to deter wrongdoing by the police, the State must show by clear and convincing evidence that the initial impermissible search was not the result of flagrant police misconduct." Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Rafael Camey (A-73-17) (080574)Argued January 2, 2019 -- Decided August 1, 2019LaVECCHIA, J., writing for the Court. The Court reviews two key pre-trial determinations involving the DNA evidence from defendant Rafael Camey, who stands charged with murder. First, the trial court ruled the results of a buccal swab that had been excluded on the basis of invalid consent inadmissible under either of the State’s inevitable discovery arguments. Second, the trial court also applied an inevitable discovery analysis in rejecting the State’s application to take a second buccal swab from defendant. The second determination raises a novel question: Under what circumstances, if any, may the police apply to conduct a new search for immutable evidence like DNA? Is a suspect’s DNA off-limits to law enforcement for all time if an initial search was invalid? Or, are there situations in which law enforcement may seek a new buccal swab to examine a person’s DNA? On September 30, 2013, the Passaic Police Department received a 9-1-1 report of a brutally beaten body of a woman, later identified as “Katie,” in a wooded area near a river bank behind a ShopRite store. Sergeant Bordamonte, the lead detective in the matter, was familiar with “Tina,” a prostitute, who placed the 9-1-1 call. Bordamonte interviewed Tina, who said that Katie was “the new girl on the block” and that she saw Katie with a person she described as a “violent Mexican male” on the night before Katie’s death. Tina said that she had been choked by the same man during a paid sexual encounter. She also said that the man had assaulted another woman. Police obtained a statement from Katie’s husband, who stated that Katie was a prostitute and drug addict who would “disappear for days at times.” Later, Bordamonte learned that Katie’s husband had been arrested for aggravated sexual assault and kidnapping and that there had been a domestic violence incident between him and Katie. Over the next weeks, the police interviewed Tina again, as well as other people who knew Katie. The police also interviewed and took, with consent, buccal swabs from numerous individuals who were in the vicinity of where Katie’s body was found. On October 20, 2013, Tina called police to report that she saw the violent male. Police responded to her location, where Tina made an on-scene identification of defendant. 1 The next night, officers went to a bar that defendant frequented after his work shift and detained him. A detective advised defendant of his Miranda rights and interviewed him in Spanish, his native language, but presented him with a consent form for a buccal swab printed in English. After defendant signed the untranslated form, another detective took a buccal swab from defendant and released him. Several weeks later, Bordamonte sent defendant’s DNA sample, along with the approximately twenty other samples collected from local homeless individuals, to the State Police Laboratory for testing. On June 25, 2014, the State Police notified Bordamonte that DNA found on Katie’s body matched defendant’s DNA profile. That day, defendant was placed under arrest and charged with felony murder, murder, and aggravated sexual assault. During pre-trial applications, the trial court was required to evaluate defendant’s consent to the buccal swab. The court determined that the consent obtained from defendant was invalid and ordered suppression of the DNA test results from that swab, holding that the swab was the product of an illegal detention, the consent form presented to defendant was written in English and never translated for defendant into his native Spanish, and defendant was never informed of his right to refuse or that the DNA would be sent to a police lab for analysis in a criminal investigation. Thereafter, the trial court also rejected the State’s further argument that the swab’s results were admissible under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. The court followed the formulation of that doctrine adopted for use in New Jersey in State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214 (1985) (Sugar II). The court determined that the State failed to show that proper, normal and specific investigative procedures would have been pursued. The court noted there was “little urgency” and “little use of legal process” throughout the investigation and referenced Bordamonte’s “infrequent use of the legal process,” throughout his career. The court further pointed to other investigatory failings or shortcomings, citing as “shocking” the failure to interview defendant’s roommates or co-workers regarding his whereabouts on the night of the murder, and the failure to seek a search warrant for the home of Katie’s husband, despite his criminal history, including his prior incident of domestic violence involving the victim. The court rebuffed the State’s argument that it would have inevitably obtained defendant’s DNA because police are statutorily required to take a DNA sample from persons arrested for certain enumerated violent crimes including sexual assault (with which defendant was charged here). Because defendant was arrested primarily based on the illegally obtained DNA sample, the court would not allow the State to rely on an arrest based on those DNA results to justify the taking of another swab. Moving on to the State’s application to compel defendant to provide a new buccal swab under Rule 3:5A, the trial court denied the motion. The court concluded that the application must also be evaluated under inevitable discovery and held that the doctrine’s application already had been rejected by the court. 2 The Appellate Division affirmed on interlocutory appeal, and the Court granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal. 234 N.J. 6 (2018).HELD: The Court affirms the suppression of DNA evidence from the first buccal swab. The trial court’s thorough and detailed reasons for denying admission of this evidence, under either of the State’s two inevitable discovery arguments, are clearly sustainable on appeal. However, the State’s application for a second buccal swab calls for a remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and its new test, derived in part from aspects of the independent source doctrine: To apply for a new buccal swab for DNA evidence under Rule 3:5A, the State must demonstrate probable cause for the new search. That showing may include evidence that existed before the initial invalid search, but cannot be tainted by the results of the prior search. In addition, to deter wrongdoing by the police, the State must show by clear and convincing evidence that the initial impermissible search was not the result of flagrant police misconduct.1. A buccal swab is a common method to collect specimen material for DNA testing. But it is also a “search,” and must be obtained in a manner consistent with constitutional search and seizure principles for valid use in a criminal prosecution. To pass muster, a search must be conducted pursuant to a search warrant or must fall within an exception to the warrant requirement. Obtaining voluntary consent to conduct a buccal swab is one way to obtain a constitutionally valid swab without a search warrant. Another means for obtaining a swab is to utilize judicial authority to compel a suspect to submit to an investigative detention. Pursuant to Rule 3:5A-1, investigative detention orders can compel a defendant “to submit to non-testimonial identification procedures for the purpose of obtaining evidence of that person’s physical characteristics.” Rule 3:5A-4 provides the substantive standards for issuance of such an order. (pp. 17-20)2. Whereas consent can serve as an exception to the warrant requirement, the inevitable discovery doctrine under Sugar II can preserve the admissibility of evidence obtained without a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement. The Court agrees with the trial court’s determination that inevitable discovery was the correct prism through which to evaluate the State’s request to avoid exclusion of the DNA results from defendant’s illegal buccal swab. While no published New Jersey opinion has applied the inevitable discovery doctrine to immutable DNA evidence, many other states have. The Court rejects arguments that DNA identification evidence is exempt from an inevitable discovery analysis merely because it reveals uniquely identifying information about an individual’s identity. The trial court and Appellate Division here correctly determined that the doctrine could be used to evaluate DNA evidence. (pp. 21-27)3. The Court also agrees with the trial court’s application of the inevitable discovery standard to defendant’s buccal swab and has no difficulty affirming its findings, which were based on the determination that the State failed to meet the first prong of the Sugar II test by clear and convincing evidence. The State argues that police either would have 3 applied for a search warrant or an investigative detention to obtain a buccal swab from defendant or would have acted on its probable cause to arrest him. But the events of the actual investigation suggest otherwise, as the trial court found. (pp. 27-30)4. The trial court also used an inevitable discovery analysis to parse the State’s application under Rule 3:5A for an order to take a new buccal swab and rejected the request essentially for the reasons already given in its previous inevitable discovery ruling. The Court is unconvinced that an inevitable discovery framework is correct in these circumstances. The doctrine generally addresses completed searches that cannot be replicated. A key factor in the trial court’s decision here was its perception that the State was seeking to obtain through legal means the same evidence that it had earlier obtained unlawfully. But DNA is not an item like guns, drugs, or documents. A new DNA sample might provide the same information as the original sample, but each sample is evidence in its own right -- and the exclusionary rule bars the use of the same evidence that was illegally obtained or “poisoned fruit” evidence that would not have been discovered but for the initial, illegally obtained evidence. The State’s request to compel a new sample must therefore be viewed for what it truly is: a request to obtain a new buccal sample -- new evidence -- notwithstanding that it will lead to the same uniquely identifying information that DNA provides. A properly issued judicial order under Rule 3:5A-4 should be available to law enforcement, on the right terms. (pp. 30-33)5. The Court fashions a standard tailored for the unique nature of DNA evidence and a fair assessment of whether a second buccal swab sample should be allowed. The test is derived in part from aspects of the independent source doctrine, as set forth in State v. Holland, 176 N.J. 344, 360-62 (2003). Noting that flagrancy is a high bar that requires active disregard of proper procedure, or overt attempts to undermine constitutional protections, the Court adopts the following test: First, the State must demonstrate that probable cause exists to conduct the new search. The court should look at the showing advanced by the State to demonstrate probable cause. The evidence may involve the same evidence that existed at the time of the illegal search. Thus, Tina’s statements and her identification of defendant are not off-limits. Second, the court should determine whether the State’s showing of probable cause is untainted by the results of the prior search. Here, that means that the probable cause must be independent of the information obtained through the results from the prior swab. Third, to deter wrongdoing by the police, the Court requires the State to show by clear and convincing evidence that the initial impermissible search was not the result of flagrant police misconduct. The Court notes that a buccal swab is minimally intrusive and stresses that it is considering only a Rule 3:5A application which addresses minimally intrusive identification procedures. The Court remands to allow the State to demonstrate whether it can meet the standard announced. Because the original judge made extensive credibility determinations about the witnesses before the court, as well as about Tina, who was not before the court, the Court refers this matter to the Assignment Judge for assignment. (pp. 33-36) 4 The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART, and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting, expresses the view that there is no basis to reverse the trial court’s suppression order and to remand before a different judge, because the State cannot prove by clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not engage in flagrant misconduct when they unlawfully detained Camey three times, unlawfully interrogated him, and unlawfully secured a buccal swab without his consent. Justice Albin notes that the trial court properly applied the inevitable discovery doctrine -- the theory presented by the State at the suppression hearing -- and that its factfindings must be accorded deference. Justice Albin also explains that the majority’s retreat from Holland’s rigorous independent source test -- the test for determining whether a “seizure of evidence was independent of, and untainted by, earlier illegal police misconduct” -- diminishes the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. In Justice Albin’s view, allowing the State to rely on the same evidence to establish probable cause permits the police a do- over after a failure to adhere to constitutional dictates.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent. 5 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 73 September Term 2017 080574 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rafael Camey, Defendant-Respondent. On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division . Argued Decided January 2, 2019 August 1, 2019Lila B. Leonard, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Lila B. Leonard, of counsel and on the brief, and Christopher W. Hsieh, Chief Assistant Passaic County Prosecutor, on the brief).Stefan Van Jura, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Stefan Van Jura, of counsel and on the brief, and Laura C. Sutnick, Designated Counsel, on the brief).Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Alexander Shalom, Tess Borden, Edward Barocas, and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief). 1 JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, defendant Rafael Camey stands charged with murder. Thepolice discovered the victim’s lifeless body behind a supermarket in Passaicand swabbed it for DNA evidence. The victim had been brutally beaten andwas partially disrobed; the cause of her death was blunt force trauma anddrowning. The ensuing investigation led the police to search for a particular violentindividual with whom the victim had been seen. To try to solve the crime, thepolice swabbed multiple individuals for DNA including defendant. His DNAprofile matched the DNA found in the victim. In this interlocutory appeal, wereview two key pre-trial determinations involving the DNA evidence fromdefendant. First, after the trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress DNAresults from a buccal swab obtained on the basis of invalid consent, which theState no longer contests, the State sought admission of the excluded DNAresults on the basis of inevitable discovery. The State argued that it couldhave obtained a buccal swab from defendant under N.J.S.A. 53:1-20.20 orthrough an application for investigative detention under Rule 3:5A-4. The trialcourt agreed to employ an inevitable discovery analysis and ruled the results 2 from that buccal swab inadmissible under either inevitable discoveryargument. The Appellate Division affirmed the suppression of the results fromthat swab. Second, the State filed a separate application under Rule 3:5A-4 to takea second buccal swab from defendant. The court again turned to theframework of an inevitable discovery analysis and rejected the application.The Appellate Division again affirmed. Like the trial court and the Appellate Division, we hold that the policeviolated the Fourth Amendment in the way they obtained defendant’s DNA.As a result, the results from that search cannot be used. DNA evidence, however, is immutable. It is unlike a completed searchof a home in which the police already removed contraband -- a search thatcannot be repeated. After a person is swabbed for DNA, of course, his DNAremains intact. It will be the same ten years from now as it was several yearsago. The application for a second buccal swab from defendant calls intoquestion the standard to which the State should be held when making anapplication for a judicially sanctioned swab as part of an investigativedetention, see R. 3:5A-4, after the State’s previous swab -- secured through anunconstitutional search and seizure -- was excluded. Notwithstanding theimmutability of DNA information, the second buccal swab does not lose its 3 character as a second search and seizure merely because the new buccalevidence will provide the same uniquely identifying information availablefrom an individual’s DNA that the initial buccal evidence provided. The appeal thus raises a novel question: Under what circumstances, ifany, may the police apply to conduct a new search for immutable evidence likeDNA? Is a suspect’s DNA off-limits to law enforcement for all time if aninitial search was invalid? Or, are there situations in which law enforcementmay seek a new buccal swab to examine a person’s DNA? We conclude that a traditional inevitable discovery “look-back” analysisfor alternative reasoning to support admission of already-seized evidence is apoor fit for the analysis needed in these circumstances. Instead, we draw fromthe independent source doctrine to analyze the question and frame anappropriate test. To apply for a new buccal swab for DNA evidence underRule 3:5A, we conclude that the State must demonstrate probable cause for thenew search. That showing may include evidence that existed before the initialinvalid search, but the showing cannot be tainted by the results of the priorsearch. In addition, to deter wrongdoing by the police, the State must show byclear and convincing evidence that the initial impermissible search was not theresult of flagrant police misconduct. The approach adopted protects a 4 suspect’s constitutional rights and recognizes the legitimate public interest in afair assessment of whether a second buccal swab sample should be allowed. In sum, we affirm the suppression of DNA evidence from the first buccalswab. We hold that the trial court’s thorough and detailed reasons for denyingadmission of this evidence, under either of the State’s two inevitable discoveryarguments, are clearly sustainable on appeal. However, the State’s applicationfor a second buccal swab calls for a remand. We vacate the AppellateDivision’s affirmance of the denial of the State’s application to take a newbuccal swab from defendant and remand for further proceedings consistentwith this opinion and the new test set forth herein. I. The pertinent facts from the pre-trial applications and related evidentialproceedings involve the State’s investigation into the death of a woman whosebody was discovered in a secluded area of Passaic and the narrowing of theinvestigation to defendant. A little after 6:00 p.m. on September 30, 2013, the Passaic PoliceDepartment received a 9-1-1 report of a body in a wooded area near a riverbank behind a ShopRite store. Sergeant Bordamonte, the lead detective in thematter, testified that the deceased -- later determined to be a woman named 5 Katie1 -- had been “beaten very, very brutally” and was partially disrobed. Anautopsy revealed that the cause of death was blunt force trauma and drowning. Bordamonte was familiar with Tina, the person who placed the 9-1-1call. The police knew she was a prostitute who frequented the area whereKatie’s body was located and that she had provided useful information in otherpolice investigations. Bordamonte interviewed Tina the day after Katie’s body was found.Tina told Bordamonte that Katie was “the new girl on the block” and that shesaw Katie with a person she described as a “violent Mexican male” (the violentmale) at about 11:00 p.m. on the night before Katie’s death. Tina said that shehad been choked by the same man during a paid sexual encounter. She alsosaid that the man had assaulted another woman, Ashley, and that a friend,Dennis, would be better able to describe this man because Dennis “definitelyknows who he is.”2 Bordamonte showed Tina photographs from the policedatabase and later drove her around in the hope that she might recognize theman she recalled seeing with Katie. Neither effort produced an identification,and Tina agreed to contact the police if she saw the man again. According to1 We have assigned fictitious names to many individuals discussed herein, including the victim, her husband, and the informant. 2 Those statements were not borne out in independent interviews of Ashley and Dennis. 6 Bordamonte, Tina appeared to be under the influence of an intoxicatingsubstance during this initial interview. Later that day, police obtained a statement from Katie’s husband,Martin. According to Martin, Katie was a prostitute and drug addict. He saidthat he had not seen her for one or two days and that it was not uncommon forher to “disappear for days at times.” Bordamonte later learned, through acriminal history search, that Martin had been arrested for aggravated sexualassault and kidnapping and that there had been a domestic violence incidentbetween him and Katie. Three days after finding Katie’s body, Bordamonte conducted a secondinterview with Tina in which she repeated that she last saw Katie with theviolent male the night before her body was found. During this interview, Tinaagain appeared to Bordamonte to be under the influence of drugs. That same day, police officers conducted on-scene interviews withapproximately sixteen homeless individuals who were in the vicinity of whereKatie’s body was found and from whom the police received consent to takebuccal swabs. None of the individuals whom the police interviewed andswabbed were able to provide information related to Katie’s death.Beforehand, police had administered buccal swabs to at least four otherhomeless individuals who were in the area near where Katie’s body was found. 7 On October 8, 2013, police interviewed a friend of Katie’s, Penny, whoreported that Katie and Martin were having “marital problems.” Penny alsostated that, on the night before Katie’s body was found, she saw her with aman named Richard and she believed Richard was involved in the murderbecause he had not been back since that night. Richard was subsequentlyinterviewed, and he confirmed that he saw Katie the night before her body wasfound. Others interviewed by Bordamonte included a woman who reportedthat she had acted as a lookout for Katie while Katie had a sexual encounterwith a Polish man the day she was killed. According to this report, Katie andthat man were alone for a long time. On October 18, 2013, Tina was interviewed for a third time. Shereiterated that she last saw Katie walking away from others toward a moresecluded area with the so-called violent male and added that the “rumor in thestreet” was that someone called “Blaze” killed Katie.3 Two days after thisinterview, Tina called police to report that she saw the violent male aboutwhom she had been telling them. Police responded to her location, where Tinamade an on-scene identification of defendant by pointing him out.3 At the suppression hearing, Bordamonte could not confidently confirm that Tina was under the influence of drugs during the October 18 interview , unlike his observations from earlier interviews, but he stated that her behavior that day suggested that she may have been. 8 Thus, despite the investigation leading in various directions, by October21, 2013, defendant was a person of interest in the investigation into Katie’smurder. That night, officers went to a bar that defendant frequented after hiswork shift and detained him. Detective Alex Flores advised defendant of hisMiranda4 rights and interviewed him in Spanish, his native language. Floresalso presented defendant with a consent form for a buccal swab printed inEnglish. After defendant signed the untranslated form, another detective tooka buccal swab from defendant and released him. Several weeks later, on January 13, 2014, Bordamonte sent defendant’sDNA sample, along with the approximately twenty other samples that thepolice had collected from local homeless individuals, to the State PoliceLaboratory for testing. Bordamonte testified that he waited so he could submitthe samples in a single group, conceding that the submission “was a touchdelayed.” On March 18, 2014, Tina provided police with another formal statement,this time shortly after her incarceration, during which she was drug-free. Thisstatement was consistent with her previous statements regarding Katie and theviolent male. Also, after viewing photographs depicting eighteen of thetwenty individuals who had either consented to buccal swabs or been4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 9 interviewed as part of the investigation, Tina picked out defendant as theviolent male she had described. On April 8, 2014, police brought defendant in for a second interview .Detective Reinaldo Arroyo read defendant his Miranda rights in Spanish andrepeated them, upon defendant’s request, before conducting the interview.Defendant was released at the end of that interview. On June 25, 2014, the State Police notified Bordamonte that DNA foundon Katie’s body matched defendant’s DNA profile. That day, defendant wasbrought to police headquarters, was read his Miranda rights in Spanish, andspoke with police for several hours. He was placed under arrest at theconclusion of that interview and charged with felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3); murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1); and aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(6). II. During pre-trial applications, the trial court was required to evaluatedefendant’s consent to the buccal swab. The court already had ordered thesuppression of defendant’s three statements, which the State does not conteston appeal. With respect to the buccal swab, the court determined that theconsent obtained from defendant was invalid and ordered suppression of theDNA test results from that swab. The court held that the swab was the product 10 of an illegal detention, the consent form presented to defendant was written inEnglish and never translated for defendant into his native Spanish, anddefendant was never informed of his right to refuse or that the DNA would besent to a police lab for analysis in a criminal investigation. Thereafter, the trial court also rejected the State’s further argument thatthe swab’s results were admissible under the inevitable discovery exception tothe exclusionary rule. The court followed the formulation of that doctrineadopted for use in this State in State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214 (1985) (Sugar II),which has a three-pronged test that the State must satisfy by clear andconvincing evidence. The court determined that the State failed to show that proper, normaland specific investigative procedures would have been pursued, rejecting, inparticular, the State’s assertion that Bordamonte would have applied for asearch warrant for defendant’s DNA had defendant denied consent. Inreaching that conclusion, the court reasoned that although Bordamontecollected DNA samples from twenty “homeless males” and several otherpeople by the time detectives obtained defendant’s DNA on October 21, 2013,the swabs were not taken to the lab until January 13, 2014. The court notedthere was “little urgency” and “little use of legal process” throughout theinvestigation and referenced Bordamonte’s “infrequent use of the legal 11 process,” throughout his career.5 The court further pointed to otherinvestigatory failings or shortcomings as reinforcing the conclusion that policewould not have obtained a warrant for DNA. For example, the court cited as“shocking” the failure to interview defendant’s roommates or co-workersregarding his whereabouts on the night of the murder, and the failure to seek asearch warrant for the home of Katie’s husband, Martin, despite his criminalhistory, including his prior incident of domestic violence involving the victim. The court added that, even if Bordamonte had applied for a warrant or aRule 3:5A investigative detention order when taking the buccal swab fromdefendant, the court “would have been very concerned as to whether theapplication met the standard required.” Among other things, the court citedcredibility concerns attributed to Tina’s criminal history and her substantialnarcotics impairment at the time of two of her statements relied on by theState. To the extent that the State argued that it would have inevitably obtaineddefendant’s DNA because police are statutorily required to take a DNA samplefrom persons arrested for certain enumerated violent crimes under N.J.S.A.53:1-20.20, including sexual assault (with which defendant was charged here),the court rebuffed the argument. Explaining that defendant was arrested5 The court also relied on a past internal investigation involving Bordamonte. 12 primarily based on the illegally obtained DNA sample, the court would notallow the State to rely on an arrest based on those DNA results or hissuppressed statements to justify the taking of the swab sample. The court alsoquestioned whether Tina, who had not appeared in court, had sufficientcredibility to support an arrest based on her claim that she had been assaultedby defendant in the past. Moving on to the State’s application to compel defendant to provide anew buccal swab under Rule 3:5A, the trial court denied the motion. The courtconcluded that the application must also be evaluated under inevitablediscovery and held that the doctrine’s application already had been rejected bythe court. The State filed an interlocutory appeal from both rulings, which theAppellate Division granted. The Appellate Division stated that the trial court’s“detailed and well-reasoned oral decision” was consistent with Sugar II andproperly considered whether Bordamonte would have obtained a searchwarrant, rather than whether he could have. Noting that an appellate court isnot at liberty to supplant the trial court’s credibility determinations with itsown “merely because [it] might have reached a different conclusion,” theappellate court affirmed the trial court. The Appellate Division held that, “inlight of the record and the judge’s detailed conclusions,” the trial court did not 13 abuse its discretion in suppressing the results of the first buccal swab, denyingthe State’s motion to admit the evidence under inevitable discovery, anddenying the motion to compel a second buccal swab also under an inevitablediscovery analysis. The State moved for leave to appeal. We granted the State’s motion. 234 N.J. 6 (2018). We also granted leave to appear as amicus curiae to theAmerican Civil Liberties Union -- New Jersey (ACLU). III. The State maintains before this Court that it has shown by clear andconvincing evidence that the evidence from the first buccal swab would havebeen inevitably discovered under the three-prong test set forth in Sugar II. With regard to the denial of its application under Rule 3:5A to take asecond buccal swab, the State argues that it has probable cause to collectdefendant’s DNA today “based [in part] on the robust investigation the policeconducted” before obtaining defendant’s DNA sample on October 21, 2013.Regardless of any alleged constitutional violation in connection with obtainingthe first swab, the State argues that defendant should not be permitted to“suppress his identity.” Defendant maintains that the State failed to satisfy the Sugar test andlargely relies on the trial court’s findings and reasoning. Defendant also 14 disputes that the State could have obtained defendant’s DNA pursuant to N.J.S.A. 53:1-20.20. And, in response to the State’s argument that defendantcannot “suppress his identity” in connection with an application for a secondbuccal swab under Rule 3:5A and otherwise, defendant reasons that DNA is“something of evidentiary value” and, as “identity-related evidence,” it can besuppressed just like other evidence. The ACLU emphasizes that the State established only that it wasplausible -- not that it was inevitable, as required under Sugar -- thatBordamonte would have applied for a warrant to search defendant had policenot performed an invalid consent search. It urges that we not disturb the trialcourt’s determinations about Bordamonte’s credibility as a witness or secondguess the evidence the court considered in making the determination aboutwhat he would have done. More fundamentally, the ACLU challenges the useof inevitable discovery in this setting. It contends police officers would haveno incentive to seek warrants even when they have probable cause to search ifthey could simply argue inevitable discovery later. The ACLU also argues that the leading inevitable discovery casesrequire an inevitable discovery despite -- not simply in the absence of -- theunlawful behavior. In this case, the ACLU maintains that the application for ajudicial warrant to take a second buccal swab would not have occurred despite 15 the unlawful buccal swab. The ACLU reasons that, because the lawful processthat “would have” resulted in inevitable discovery was not independent fromthe unlawful process that actually was pursued, any use of the inevitablediscovery doctrine in this matter should be invalid. IV. A. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect individuals fromunreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Gathers, 234 N.J. 208, 219(2018). “Those provisions impose a standard of reasonableness on theexercise of discretion by government officials to protect persons againstarbitrary invasions.” State v. Chisum, 236 N.J. 530, 544-45 (2019) (quotingState v. Maristany, 133 N.J. 299, 304 (1993)). In balancing an intrusionagainst the promotion of legitimate governmental interests when performing areasonableness analysis, the balance generally is struck “in favor of theprocedures described by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.” Statev. O’Hagen, 189 N.J. 140, 149 (2007) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 , 619 (1989)). The warrant requirement interposes a neutral magistrate between thepolice officer and the person against whom the search is directed, unless the 16 search falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. SeeState v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 210 (2001). Evidence that is seized inviolation of the warrant requirement, and any recognized exception to it, isexcluded as a general rule. Ibid. Those very basic principles provide the starting point to our analysis. B. This appeal concerns the taking of a buccal swab from defendant, whichproduced nontestimonial DNA identification information about defendant.This is a unique category of evidence. DNA evidence is extremely useful for identification purposes in criminalprosecutions as well as for exonerations. See Dist. Attorney’s Office for theThird Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55 (2009) (“DNA [evidence] hasan unparalleled ability both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and to identifythe guilty. It has the potential to significantly improve both the criminaljustice system and police investigative practices.”). The United StatesSupreme Court has stated that the difference between using DNA analysis andfingerprint databases to identify a suspect “is the unparalleled accuracy DNAprovides.” Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 , 451 (2013). As a result, “theutility of DNA identification in the criminal justice system [has become] 17 undisputed.” Id. at 442. Our own case law recognizes as much. See State v.Sterling, 215 N.J. 65, 103-04 (2013); see also O’Hagen, 189 N.J. at 163. Presently, all fifty states require the collection of DNA for certain -- ifnot all -- felony convictions. King, 569 U.S. at 445; see, e.g., 34 U.S.C. §12592 (creating federal index to facilitate law enforcement exchange of DNAidentification information); N.J.S.A. 53:1-20.20 (requiring collection of DNAupon conviction of certain crimes and upon arrest for a limited set ofenumerated offenses). Thus, in New Jersey, and other jurisdictions, lawenforcement uses the collection of DNA as an important tool in identification. A buccal swab is a common method of law enforcement collection ofspecimen material for DNA testing. But, it is also beyond dispute that thetaking of a buccal swab “for the purposes of obtaining a DNA sample is a'search.’” O’Hagen, 189 N.J. at 149 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17);accord Gathers, 234 N.J. at 221. And because a buccal swab constitutes asearch, it must be obtained in a manner consistent with constitutional searchand seizure principles for valid use in a criminal prosecution. To pass constitutional muster, a search must be conducted pursuant to asearch warrant or must fall within an exception to the warrant requirement.See Sullivan, 169 N.J. at 210. “One well-recognized exception to the warrantrequirement is consent.” State v. Cushing, 226 N.J. 187, 199 (2016) (citing 18 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 219 (1973)). Obtaining voluntaryconsent to conduct a buccal swab is one way to obtain a constitutionally validswab without a search warrant. To ensure validity, warnings given to anindividual informing about the right to refuse consent help the State later carryits burden to demonstrate that the consent was truly a voluntary, knowing, andintelligent waiver of the right to be free of such an intrusion. See State v.Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 354 (1975). Another means for obtaining a swab is to utilize judicial authority tocompel a suspect to submit to an investigative detention, which is thefunctional equivalent of an application for issuance of a search warrant. SeeState v. Hall, 93 N.J. 552, 557-59 (1983) (recognizing judicial authority toauthorize investigative detentions founded on the Judiciary’s constitutionalauthority governing search and seizure). Taking a lead from the United StatesSupreme Court in Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 , 727-28 (1969), ourCourt concluded that for certain detentions, which are minimally intrusive,produce reliable evidence, and can be effected “without abuse, coercion orintimidation,” the proofs required for an investigative detention order need notrise to probable cause. Hall, 93 N.J. at 561-62; accord In re AllegedAggravated Sexual Assault of A.S., 366 N.J. Super. 402, 409-10 (App. Div.2004). 19 Court rules now formalize the guidelines for issuance of an order forinvestigative detention to compel lineups, fingerprinting, and other minimallyintrusive identification procedures. See State v. Rolle, 265 N.J. Super. 482,486 (App. Div. 1993). Pursuant to Rule 3:5A-1, investigative detention orderscan compel a defendant “to submit to non-testimonial identification proceduresfor the purpose of obtaining evidence of that person’s physical characteristics.”Rule 3:5A-4 provides the substantive standards for issuance of such an order: An order for an investigative detention shall be issued only if the judge concludes from the application that: (a) a crime has been committed and is under active investigation, and (b) there is a reasonable and well-grounded basis from which to believe that the person sought may have committed the crime, and (c) the results of the physical characteristics obtained during the detention will significantly advance the investigation and determine whether or not the individual probably committed the crime, and (d) the physical characteristics sought cannot otherwise practicably be obtained. [R. 3:5A-4.] 20 C. Our analysis in this matter begins from the vantage point of the trialcourt’s foundational finding that defendant’s initial buccal swab was takenthrough invalid consent -- a finding that the State does not dispute. Rather, theState claims the results of that swab should be admitted on the basis ofinevitable discovery. Whereas consent can serve as an exception to the warrant requirement,the inevitable discovery doctrine can preserve -- if certain conditions aresatisfied -- the admissibility of evidence obtained without a warrant or a validexception to the warrant requirement. Specifically, the inevitable discoverydoctrine allows for the admission of evidence obtained through lawenforcement’s unconstitutional conduct if that evidence would have beendiscovered in the absence of that unlawful conduct. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 444-48 (1984). Inevitable discovery tempers the “social costsassociated with the exclusionary rule” by placing “police in the same positionthat they would have been in had no police misconduct occurred.” Sugar II, 100 N.J. at 237. The doctrine is rooted in the deterrent goal of the exclusionary rule. Topromote that objective, the exclusionary rule prevents the prosecution frombeing in a better position than if the illegal conduct had not taken place; it is 21 not meant to punish the prosecution by putting it in a worse place. Id. at 236-37. Considered a narrow exception to the exclusionary rule, our standard forallowing evidence on the basis of inevitable discovery requires the State todemonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, id. at 240, that (1) proper, normal and specific investigatory procedures would have been pursued in order to complete the investigation of the case; (2) under all of the surrounding relevant circumstances the pursuit of those procedures would have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the evidence; and (3) the discovery of the evidence through the use of such procedures would have occurred wholly independently of the discovery of such evidence by unlawful means. [Id. at 238.] Our standard for inevitable discovery does not require “the State [to]demonstrate the exact circumstances of the evidence’s discovery.” State v.Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 552 (2015) (quoting State v. Sugar, 108 N.J. 151, 158(1987) (Sugar III)). Rather, “[t]he State need only present facts or elements --proving each such fact or element by a preponderance of the evidence -- that incombination clearly and convincingly establish the ultimate fact and lead tothe conclusion that the evidence would be inevitably discovered.” Sugar III, 108 N.J. at 159. That said, the doctrine cannot be used to elide the warrantrequirement. Sugar II specifically warned against that. 100 N.J. at 240 n.3(stating that when illegal conduct “consists simply of the failure to obtain a 22 search warrant, the exception should not be applied to circumvent the warrantrequirement . . . or to defeat the deterrent purposes espoused in theexclusionary rule” (citing Nix, 467 U.S. 431 ; United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1974); Commonwealth v. Benoit, 415 N.E.2d 818 (Mass.1981))). V. With that general background in mind, we review first the trial court’suse of the inevitable discovery doctrine to evaluate the State’s request to avoidexclusion of the DNA results from defendant’s illegal buccal swab. We agree with the trial court’s determination that inevitable discoverywas the correct prism through which to analyze the unique immutablenontestimonial identification evidence that was obtained in this case. Theimmutable nature of the evidence does not exempt it from the analyticframework that controls for inevitable discovery. First, nothing about ourdecisions in Sugar or any other related case suggests that the exclusionary ruleand its exceptions do not apply with equal force to evidence based on mutableand immutable characteristics. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Davisindicates that the exclusionary rule applies to both forms of evidence. 394 U.S. at 724 (discussing fingerprint evidence). And, no decision -- federal or 23 state -- has ruled that an inevitable discovery analysis may not be used withrespect to such evidence. While no published New Jersey opinion has applied the inevitablediscovery doctrine to DNA evidence -- an immutable characteristic -- manyother states have engaged in such an analysis using the standard. For example, in People v. Diaz, police obtained blood and hair samplesfrom the defendant -- who was accused of sexual assault -- without a searchwarrant even after he refused to voluntarily provide the samples. 53 P.3d 1171 , 1173 (Colo. 2002) (en banc). After determining that taking the sampleswithout a warrant was an illegal search and did not meet any exception to thewarrant requirement, the Supreme Court of Colorado undertook an inevitablediscovery analysis and held that the evidence was not admissible under thedoctrine because the prosecution failed to show “that an independent policeinvestigation was being conducted, or that the police would have inevitablydiscovered the evidence through such an investigation despite theirmisconduct.” Id. at 1175-76. Similarly, in the Louisiana decision State v. Lee, police obtained asubpoena duces tecum authorizing the taking of a buccal swab from thedefendant in the course of an investigation into the serial rape and killing ofmultiple women. 976 So. 2d 109, 120-21 (La. 2008). The Supreme Court of 24 Louisiana determined that a subpoena duces tecum was insufficient to obtainthe sample legally and concluded that the buccal swab taken from thedefendant was an illegal warrantless search. Id. at 124-27. Nonetheless, thecourt undertook an inevitable discovery analysis and determined that the swabwas admissible. Id. at 131. The extensive police investigation in Lee demonstrated to the SupremeCourt of Louisiana that “the State satisfied its burden of showing by apreponderance of the evidence there was a parallel and independentinvestigation unrelated to the illegal search that would have inevitably andlegally yielded defendant’s DNA.” Ibid. The court described the multipleleads that the investigating police department had, independent of the illegalbuccal swab, that would have inevitably led them to legally obtain a buccalswab from the defendant. Id. at 128-31. The court pointed to facts thatshowed that the police and other investigating agencies were diligentlypursuing multiple independent leads based on DNA found at the crime scenes,a composite sketch which bore a striking resemblance to the defendant, adescription of a car seen at one of the crime scenes belonging to theperpetrator, and multiple telephone tips. Ibid. The court explained that thepolice were actively working with the other agencies such as crime lab expertsand a serial killer task force to solve the murders prior to receiving the results 25 of the defendant’s buccal swab. Ibid. For those reasons, the court’s evaluationled it to conclude that the necessary proofs for inevitable discovery werepresent. Id. at 131. The Supreme Court of Florida reached a similar resultwith respect to a blood sample obtained from the person last seen with amurder victim on the ground that, even if, as the defendant argued, the initialsample had been illegally obtained through coerced consent, the independentand preexisting investigation into the defendant would inevitably have led to asample being legally taken. Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So. 2d 495, 514 (Fla.2005). Diaz and Lee are illustrative of the universe of cases that demonstratethat courts have been using an inevitable discovery framework to considerotherwise excluded immutable evidence as a matter of course. 6 We reject thearguments advanced before us that DNA identification evidence is exemptfrom an inevitable discovery analysis merely because it reveals uniquelyidentifying information about an individual’s identity. The trial court and6 See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1207 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying inevitable discovery to illegally obtained fingerprints because law enforcement had uncovered, independent of the prior misconduct, sufficient incriminating evidence against the defendant to give rise to probable cause for his arrest, upon which the police would have eventually acted and thus lawfully obtained the defendant’s fingerprints). 26 Appellate Division here correctly determined that the doctrine could be used toevaluate DNA evidence. As for the trial court’s application of the inevitable discovery standard todefendant’s buccal swab, we agree with that also. We have no difficulty affirming the trial court’s detailed findings, whichwere based on the determination that the State failed to meet the first prong ofthe Sugar II test by clear and convincing evidence. The State argues thatpolice either would have applied for a search warrant or a Rule 3:5Ainvestigative detention to obtain a buccal swab from defendant or would haveacted on its probable cause to arrest him. But the events of the actualinvestigation suggest otherwise, as the trial court found. Once Bordamonteand the other officers involved illegally obtained defendant’s buccal swab, theinvestigation slowed to a virtual halt. The State concedes that the police hadzeroed in on defendant as a primary suspect and that they were fully aware thatDNA evidence would be the lynchpin of this case. Yet, Bordamonte testifiedthat he did not send defendant’s DNA to the lab for almost three months,during which time officers received no new information or investigative leads. Even after Bordamonte sent defendant’s DNA to the lab, investigatorsfailed to question defendant’s co-workers and roommates to ascertain hiswhereabouts on the night of Katie’s murder or to corroborate Tina’s story. 27 They also never sought to obtain a search warrant for Katie’s husband’s home,despite learning about his past criminal history and domestic violence againstKatie. The trial court found particularly troubling for the State’s inevitablediscovery analysis Bordamonte’s failure to utilize legal processes to lawfullyobtain critical information. Although the police could have applied for theinvestigative detention of defendant under Rule 3:5A or a search warrant, thetest under Sugar II is whether the police would have made the applications.We will not disturb the trial court’s findings; in an appeal, we defer to findingsthat are supported in the record and find roots in credibility assessments by thetrial court. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471-72 (1999). Here, Bordamontetook no affirmative steps to secure legal process, making this case unlike Statev. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 290 (1990).7 See also State v. Premone, 348 N.J. 7 In Johnson, the Court held that the fruits of a search conducted on the basis of illegal consent were admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. 120 N.J. at 290. There, a detective was preparing a search warrant for the defendant’s bedroom at the same time as interrogating officers obtained an illegal confession and consent from the defendant to search the bedroom. Id. at 289. At that time, the detective had typed one-and-a-half pages of the affidavit for the warrant and suspended his typing efforts only after the defendant consented to the search. Ibid. On that record, the Court determined that had the interrogating officers not illegally obtained the defendant’s consent for a search, the detective would have completed the search warrant he was in the process of preparing, that the application would have been granted, and that the officers would have inevitably exercised the warrant and found the evidence. Id. at 290. 28 Super. 505, 510, 515 (App. Div. 2002) (refusing to apply inevitable discoverywhere the State argued it could have obtained the information through a searchwarrant but had not taken steps in that direction). Nor can the State prevail on its argument that it would have obtained abuccal swab by relying on probable cause to arrest defendant for the assault onTina and allegedly other women, according to her. Again, the State did nottake any steps during the weeks it was waiting for the DNA testing to comeback from the lab to respond to Tina’s claims that defendant was dangerous.Our standard of proof requires that the State carry its burden by clear andconvincing evidence in order for otherwise excluded evidence to be allowed inthrough inevitable discovery. Sugar II, 100 N.J. at 240. We are unpersuadedby the State’s arguments that it has met that high standard. 8 In sum, for thereasons stated, there is no basis for disturbing the findings and conclusion ofthe trial court, affirmed by the Appellate Division, that the State has not8 The State relies on the Seventh Circuit case Sutton v. Pfister to support its contention that N.J.S.A. 53:1-20.20 -- which requires arrestees for certain offenses to provide DNA -- is sufficient to satisfy the inevitable discovery doctrine in this case. 834 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2016). We find the State’s analogy unpersuasive as the Seventh Circuit follows the federal inevitable discovery standard, which imposes a preponderance of the evidence burden on the State. Id. at 821. The New Jersey standard, as set out in Sugar II, requires the State to overcome a higher, clear and convincing burden of proof. 100 N.J. at 240. 29 proven that the results of defendant’s buccal swab should be allowed inthrough inevitable discovery. VI. A. Finally, we turn to the State’s application under Rule 3:5A for an orderto take a new buccal swab. The trial court used an inevitable discoveryanalysis to parse this request, commenting in so doing that the request wascoming very late in the investigatory proceedings -- approximately three andone-half years after the discovery of Katie’s body. We observe that the Statedid not argue for the application of any other test. And, as noted, the courtrejected the request essentially for the reasons already given in its previousinevitable discovery ruling. We are unconvinced that an inevitable discovery framework is correct inthese circumstances. The doctrine generally addresses completed searches thatcannot be replicated. A key factor in the trial court’s decision here was its perception that theState was seeking to obtain through legal means the same evidence that it hadearlier obtained unlawfully. That “look-back” logic would, for example, bar abelated application for a search warrant that would allow the police to lawfullyrecover a murder weapon it had discovered only through an initial illegal 30 search, and rightly so -- the exclusionary rule would have little meaning if itcould be sidestepped by using the fruits of unlawful conduct to secure legalmeans through which to obtain the same evidence. The exclusionary rulewould be stripped of its deterrent value and reduced to a procedural speedbump if such were the case. But DNA is not an item like guns, drugs, or documents. DNA isdifferent in that immutable evidence lives on. Always. And the breadth of itextends beyond the swab. A new DNA sample might provide the sameinformation as the original sample, but each sample is evidence in its ownright -- and the exclusionary rule bars the use of the same evidence that wasillegally obtained or “poisoned fruit” evidence that would not have beendiscovered but for the initial, illegally obtained evidence. The State’s requestto compel a new sample must therefore be viewed for what it truly is: arequest to obtain a new buccal sample -- new evidence -- notwithstanding thatit will lead to the same uniquely identifying information that DNA provides.That one’s identity does not change and is revealed through DNA does notalter the fact that it is still a new sample. An easy-to-imagine example illustrates this point. Defendant’s buccalswab has been found inadmissible because it was illegally obtained. But thereare other ways to obtain a sample of defendant’s DNA. If, for example, he 31 were to be seen in a public place drinking from a paper cup, one could notreasonably argue that the State would be precluded from retrieving the cup andtesting the DNA sample left on it by defendant. The same reasoning leads tothe logical conclusion that if law enforcement has a basis for obtaining alawful buccal sample, defendant cannot shield his DNA-revealednontestimonial identifying information because it once was obtained illegally.There is simply no basis to distinguish a subsequent, lawful buccal swab fromthe lawful collection of DNA from other sources. Both are new evidence. Rule 3:5A provides law enforcement with an avenue for making a lawfulrequest for a new sample. A properly issued judicial order under Rule 3:5A-4should be available to law enforcement, on the right terms. Other courts haverecognized as much. In the Diaz case from Colorado discussed above, theColorado Supreme Court took a similar step. 53 P.3d at 1175-78. Despite itsholding that the original blood and hair samples must be suppressed, the courtdetermined that under the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, “an illegalseizure of previous identification samples from the defendant by the policedoes not foreclose the prosecution from obtaining identity evidence throughproper means after filing of the case.” 9 Id. at 1177. The court reasoned that in9 Under the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[n]otwithstanding the initiation of judicial proceedings, and subject to constitutional limitations, upon request of the prosecuting attorney, the court may require the accused to 32 seeking the new nontestimonial identification evidence, “the prosecution d[id]not rely on information or evidence the police obtained by means of an illegalsearch and seizure.” Ibid. So the important question to be decided is by what standard the Statemay obtain a judicial order for the taking of a new buccal swab through a Rule3:5A application after a prior buccal sample has been suppressed. B. Because the look-back approach that undergirds inevitable discoveryseems a poor fit for these circumstances -- where, again, the State seeks not theadmission of previously obtained evidence but rather new evidence that willprovide the same information as the suppressed evidence -- we fashion a testbetter tailored for the unique nature of DNA evidence and a fair assessment ofwhether a second buccal swab sample should be allowed. The test we envision is derived in part from aspects of the independentsource doctrine. Generally, the independent source doctrine allows for theintroduction of evidence tainted by unlawful police conduct if the informationgive any nontestimonial identification.” Colo. R. Crim. P. 16(II)(a)(1). Nontestimonial identification “includes, but is not limited to, identification by fingerprints, palm prints, footprints, measurements, blood specimens, urine specimens, saliva samples, hair samples, specimens of material under fingernails, or other reasonable physical or medical examination, handwriting exemplars, voice samples, photographs, appearing in lineups, and trying on articles of clothing.” Colo. R. Crim. P. 41.1(h)(2). 33 leading to discovery of the evidence is independent of the previous unlawfulconduct. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 443. Similar to the inevitable discoverydoctrine, the State bears the burden of proving that the independent sourcedoctrine should apply by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Holland, 176 N.J. 344, 362 (2003). Under New Jersey law, the State must show that probable cause existed to conduct the challenged search without the unlawfully obtained information. It must make that showing by relying on factors wholly independent from the knowledge, evidence, or other information acquired as a result of the prior illegal search. Second, the State must demonstrate . . . that the police would have sought a warrant without the tainted knowledge or evidence that they previously had acquired or viewed. Third, regardless of the strength of their proofs under the first and second prongs, prosecutors must demonstrate by the same enhanced standard that the initial impermissible search was not the product of flagrant police misconduct. [Id. at 360-61.]Flagrancy is a high bar, requiring active disregard of proper procedure, orovert attempts to undermine constitutional protections. See State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 398 (2012) (distinguishing, in the context of a search warrantaffidavit, the omission of details that would undermine a finding of probablecause from affirmative misstatements for purposes of a flagrant misconductanalysis); see also State v. Chaney, 318 N.J. Super. 217, 226-27 (App. Div. 34 1999) (finding that the initial unlawful entry by police into a motel roomwhere they discovered contraband was not flagrant misconduct because the“arrest warrants for a person with the same name as defendant, whose lastknown address was the motel in which defendant was registered,” gave policean objectively reasonable basis to believe they were authorized to enter theroom). The test we now tailor for an application under Rule 3:5A for a newbuccal swab for DNA, when the previously obtained sample was declaredinvalid and suppressed, is as follows. First, the State must demonstrate thatprobable cause exists to conduct the new search. The court should look at theshowing advanced by the State to demonstrate probable cause. The evidencemay involve the same evidence that existed at the time of the illegal search.We do not exclude its consideration. We permit but do not require newevidence. Thus, Tina’s statements and her identification of defendant are notoff-limits. Second, the court should determine whether the State’s showing ofprobable cause is untainted by the results of the prior search. Here, we meanthat the probable cause must be independent of the information obtainedthrough the results from the prior swab. 10 Third, to deter wrongdoing by the10 The dissent appears to misapprehend our test. Post at ___ (slip op. at 13). The salient point of Holland’s second prong is encompassed in the first and second parts of our test. 35 police, we track the third prong of the independent source doctrine and requirethe State to show by clear and convincing evidence that the initialimpermissible search was not the result of flagrant police misconduct. Finally, because of the privacy interest involved, we consider the degreeof the intrusion posed by the State’s second search. A buccal swab isminimally intrusive. King, 569 U.S. at 463. We note that we are consideringonly a Rule 3:5A application which addresses minimally intrusiveidentification procedures. See Rolle, 265 N.J. Super. at 486. We do not attempt to apply this new test on this record. Rather, aremand is in order to allow the State an opportunity to demonstrate whether itcan meet the standard announced. There may be additional witnesses andother evidence that it seeks to put before a factfinder. We follow normalprocedures and send this back for the trial courts to handle. Because theoriginal judge made extensive credibility determinations about the witnessesbefore the court, as well as about Tina, who was not before the court, we referthis matter to the Assignment Judge for assignment. VII. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the AppellateDivision. We remand this matter to the Superior Court, Law Division forfurther proceedings consistent with this opinion. 36 CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ- VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent. 37 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rafael Camey, Defendant-Respondent. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting. The fundamental rights afforded to a suspect by our Federal and StateConstitutions cannot be cut and trimmed to fit the investigatory objectives oflaw enforcement. Even those under investigation for heinous offenses areentitled to the full protection of the law. The trial court determined that the police unlawfully secured a buccalswab from defendant Rafael Camey by unconstitutionally detaining him andhaving him sign a consent form in a language he did not understand andwithout informing him of his right to refuse. The court found that the policethree times unlawfully detained Camey and three times unlawfully interrogatedhim. At the conclusion of a testimonial hearing, the court suppressed evidenceof the buccal swab and the DNA test results of that swab. The court held thatthe inevitable discovery doctrine did not allow the taking of a second buccal 1 swab from Camey because the State had not presented credible evidence thatthe investigating detective would have secured a warrant through lawfulmeans. The Appellate Division concluded that the trial court -- based on itsdetailed factual findings -- did not abuse its discretion in suppressing thebuccal swab and forbidding the taking of a second one. Despite the trial court’s proper application of the inevitable discoverydoctrine -- the theory presented by the State at the suppression hearing -- themajority reverses. The majority does so based on its newly created andweakened version of the independent source doctrine set forth in State v.Holland, 176 N.J. 344, 360-61 (2003) -- a new test crafted specifically forimmutable evidence, such as DNA evidence. The majority, however, retainsan important feature of the Holland test -- barring a second search if the initialimpermissible search was “the result of flagrant police misconduct.” Ante at___ (slip op. at 36). In light of that still operable flagrancy factor, the majority’s remand fora new suppression hearing before a different judge is not justifiable. The trialcourt’s factfindings were sustained by the Appellate Division and, by anymeasure, detail police officers engaging in flagrant misconduct in violation ofCamey’s constitutional rights. On the record before us, given the deference 2 that must be accorded the trial court’s factfindings, see State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007), the State cannot prove by clear and convincing evidencethat the police officers did not engage in flagrant misconduct when theyunlawfully detained Camey, unlawfully interrogated him, and unlawfullysecured a buccal swab without his consent. Thus, even under the new test, thetaking of a second buccal sample is barred. I dissent because there is no basis to reverse the trial court’s suppressionorder and to remand before a different judge. I also dissent because themajority’s retreat from the rigorous Holland test -- the test for determiningwhether a “seizure of evidence was independent of, and untainted by, earlierillegal police misconduct” -- diminishes the deterrent effect of theexclusionary rule. See 176 N.J. at 360. I. A. The trial court conducted a several day suppression hearing, takingtestimony and making credibility determinations. The trial court’s detailedfactual findings are the starting point of our discussion. Those detailedfindings about police misconduct remain valid despite the State’s change oflegal theory for the admission of a second buccal swab. The trial court made the following findings. 3 While investigating the brutal murder of a woman named Katie,1 analleged sex worker, the Passaic Police Department secured “consent” to takebuccal swabs from at least a dozen homeless people who resided in the area ofthe murder. Sergeant Roy Bordamonte was the lead investigator. Cameybecame a “person of interest” during the investigation. The police “grabbed”Camey in a bar, detained him without probable cause, and transported him toheadquarters, where he was not free to leave. According to the court, thepolice engaged in “a blatantly illegal detention.” At headquarters, Detective Alex Flores -- a Spanish-speaking officer --read Camey his Miranda2 warnings, but made no “effort to have himunderstand them.” When Camey said, “I don’t understand and I don’t know,”the police did not address his lack of comprehension. Camey spoke virtuallyno English, had only a second-grade education, and had no prior experience inthe criminal justice system. The court concluded that “the State ha[d] notproven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant understood andknowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights,” and suppressed thestatement he made.1 Katie is a fictitious name assigned to the victim by the majority. 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 4 The police secured a buccal swab from the unlawfully detained Cameyfor DNA testing -- not by consent but by unlawful means, according to thecourt. Before taking the buccal swab, the police never translated the English-worded consent form given to the Spanish-speaking Camey, never advised himthat he had a right to refuse to consent to the taking of the swab, and never toldhim that the swab would be sent to a police lab for DNA testing as part of acriminal investigation. While acknowledging “that the police wereinvestigating a terrible crime,” the court nevertheless concluded that the policecommitted “egregious constitutional violations.” The police did not arrestCamey, and he was released. The police unlawfully detained Camey a second time -- without awarrant or probable cause. Camey was “grabbed” while doing his laundry andtransported to headquarters for questioning. The trial court described this as a“blatantly illegal detention.” According to the court, the police did not ensurethat Camey knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, andalthough the statement elicited was “exculpatory,” it nonetheless was not theproduct of a “free will.” The court found the police conduct “offensive to[Camey’s] due process” rights. Again, Camey was released. The police unlawfully detained Camey a third time and transported himto headquarters for another round of questioning. Once more, the police failed 5 to obtain from Camey a valid waiver of his Miranda rights. During a six-and-one-half-hour interrogation, the police did not offer Camey food, although hestated he was “dying of hunger,” and did not offer him a bathroom break.During the interrogation, Sergeant Bordamonte verbally abused Camey, callinghim a “little freak,” a “motherf***ing liar,” and a “tutti-frutti.” SergeantBordamonte threatened Camey that if he persisted in his denials that he wouldbe deprived of water. The court referred to this detention, as it did to theprevious two, as “a blatantly illegal detention” during which the policeextracted a “legally involuntary” statement. The police conduct in this case was so shocking to the court that itremarked: I have rarely seen such blatant disregard for the most basic of constitutional safeguards. The cited case law talks about techniques that are offensive to due process. The procedures here were beyond offensive. They not only were unfair to the defendant, they were unfair to the victim, since the evidence that was illegally gathered has been suppressed. B. The trial court addressed the legal theories presented by the parties. TheState argued that, despite the constitutional violations, the police inevitablywould have sought a buccal swab from Camey that linked his DNA to thevictim. The court, relying on State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 238 (1985), 6 rejected the State’s inevitable discovery argument because it concluded thatSergeant Bordamonte would not have secured a warrant by lawful means forthe buccal swab through ordinary investigative means. The court came to thatconclusion based on the entirety of the police conduct toward Camey -- thefailure to secure lawful consent for the buccal swab, and the three illegaldetentions and three illegal interrogations. The Appellate Division sustainedthe trial court’s factfindings. The trial court further came to that conclusion because of Bordamonte’sinfrequent recourse to the warrant procedure during his law enforcementcareer. For example, in this case, Sergeant Bordamonte did not apply for awarrant to search Camey’s home. Nor did Bordamonte apply for a warrant tosearch the home of the victim’s husband, who allegedly had been having“problems” with his wife and who had been arrested for an alleged act ofdomestic violence against her. In addition, the husband had a previous arrestfor aggravated sexual assault and had been fired from his job for showingnaked pictures of himself to co-workers just one day before his wife was lastseen alive. Having determined that the State failed to prove by clear and convincingevidence that the police would have proceeded by lawful means to secure a 7 warrant for the taking of a buccal swab, the court suppressed the DNA resultsfrom the first buccal swab and barred the taking of a second one. C. The State did not argue the applicability of the independent sourcedoctrine before the trial court or the Appellate Division. That doctrine becamethe focus of attention for the first time during oral argument before our Courtand now has become the doctrinal basis for the majority’s new standard as itapplies to immutable identification evidence. That new standard is a retreatfrom the independent source doctrine as articulated in Holland, 176 N.J. at 360-61. In Holland, this Court determined that when the State procures evidenceby unconstitutional means, the State bears the burden of demonstrating that alater “seizure of evidence was independent of, and untainted by, earlier illegalpolice conduct.” 176 N.J. at 360. Under Holland, to establish an independentsource for the procuring of evidence untainted by the initial unconstitutionalseizure of evidence, the State must satisfy three prongs. Id. at 360-61. First,the State must demonstrate that it relied on “factors wholly independent fromthe knowledge, evidence, or other information acquired as a result of the priorillegal search” to prove “that probable cause existed to conduct the challengedsearch.” Ibid. Second, it must establish, “by clear and convincing evidence, 8 that the police would have sought a warrant without the tainted knowledge orevidence that they previously had acquired or viewed.” Id. at 361. Third, itmust clearly and convincingly show that “regardless of the strength of theirproofs under the first and second prongs, . . . that the initial impermissiblesearch was not the product of flagrant police misconduct.” Ibid. When the initial impermissible search is the product of flagrantmisconduct, the independent source doctrine cannot be invoked to justify asubsequent search relating to the initial search. See ibid. In othercircumstances, the focus of the Holland test is whether the subsequent searchis actually tainted by the “earlier illegal police conduct.” See id. at 360.Understanding the potential for the independent source doctrine to underminethe deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule, our Court cautioned: Only by rigorously applying the rule’s three prongs can we be satisfied that an error of the State’s making does not subvert the warrant requirement under Article I, paragraph 7 [of the New Jersey Constitution]. .... We stress that courts must apply scrupulously each part of the test, and that the government’s failure to satisfy any one prong of the standard will result in suppression of the challenged evidence. [Id. at 362-63.] 9 “The jurisdiction of appellate courts rightly is bounded by the proofs andobjections critically explored on the record before the trial court by the partiesthemselves.” State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 19 (2009). The majority hasdeclined to limit itself to the arguments advanced before the trial court andAppellate Division, and in the State’s brief for leave to appeal to this Court --the applicability of the inevitable discovery doctrine. Having decided to lookfor another doctrinal basis to review a subsequent search for immutableevidence, the majority does not adhere to our well-established jurisprudenceon the independent source doctrine. Here is how the majority has reconfigured the independent sourcedoctrine for immutable evidence. Under the majority’s new standard, after anunconstitutional seizure of immutable evidence, (1) the “State mustdemonstrate that probable cause exists to conduct the new search” and thatshowing may be based on “the same evidence that existed at the time of theillegal search”; (2) “the court should determine whether the State’s showing ofprobable cause is untainted by the results of the prior search”; and (3) “theState must show by clear and convincing evidence that the initialimpermissible search was not the result of flagrant police misconduct.” Anteat ___ (slip op. at 35-36). 10 The majority’s test, like the traditional Holland test, bars a subsequentsearch when the initial impermissible search was the product of flagrant policemisconduct. On that basis alone, this Court should affirm the AppellateDivision, which determined that the trial court’s factfindings were supportedby sufficient credible evidence in the record. The trial court never used theterm “flagrant police misconduct” because the independent source doctrine hadnot been invoked by the State. But the court’s detailed factfindings referred towhat can only be described as flagrant misconduct. The taking of the buccalswab occurred after the police “grabbed” Camey from a bar without a warrantor probable cause and subjected him to a “blatantly illegal detention.” Thepolice then interrogated Camey while running roughshod over his Mirandarights -- questioning him even though he did not comprehend his rights. Onthat same day that the police unlawfully detained Camey and violated hisMiranda rights, the police secured Camey’s “consent” to a buccal swab bygiving him an English-worded consent form that he could not understand andby not advising him that he had a right to refuse to consent to the s earch.Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court concluded that thepolice had engaged in “egregious constitutional violations.” It can hardly be disputed that the trial court, in functionally equivalentlanguage, found that the initial taking of the buccal swab was “the result of 11 flagrant police misconduct.” See ante at ___ (slip op. at 36). The majoritystates that a finding of flagrancy “requir[es] active disregard of properprocedure, or overt attempts to undermine constitutional protections.” Ante at___ (slip op. at 34). The record is replete with factfindings that satisfy themajority’s definition of flagrancy. Based on the deferential standard accordedto a trial court’s factfindings, Elders, 192 N.J. at 244, a finding that the policeengaged in flagrant misconduct is inescapable. Because flagrancy is determinative even under the majority’s test, aremand is pointless. No further witness-credibility factfindings are required onthat issue and therefore a remand to a different trial judge cannot be justified.The trial court thoughtfully and deliberately considered and weighed thetestimony and understood the consequences of suppressing evidence that mightmake it difficult for the State to prosecute Camey for a heinous crime.Suppressing evidence -- evidence secured illegally -- will not receive publicadulation, even when our case law demands the result. Despite that reality, thecourt fulfilled a core judicial function by adhering to the dictates of theConstitution and upholding fundamental rights. The court’s well-reasoneddecision to suppress the buccal swab evidence and bar the taking of a secondbuccal swab should be affirmed. 12 II. Last, the majority needlessly abandons Holland’s rigorous independentsource test in cases of unconstitutional seizure of immutable evidence andtherefore diminishes the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule when thepolice violate a person’s constitutional rights. The majority has discardedHolland’s second prong that requires the State to establish that “the policewould have sought a warrant without the tainted knowledge or evidence thatthey previously had acquired or viewed.” 176 N.J. at 361. The majority hasreplaced that meaningful prong with one that places little burden on the Statefor a previous unconstitutional search or seizure. The majority requires that the State “demonstrate that probable causeexists to conduct the new search,” a showing that the majority permits to bebased on “the same evidence that existed at the time of the illegal search.”Ante at ___ (slip op. at 35). The police, however, must always establishprobable cause to conduct a search, whether it is the first or the last one.Additionally, allowing the State to rely on the same evidence to establishprobable cause merely permits the police a do-over after a failure to adhere toconstitutional dictates. Police officers will have a lesser incentive to get awarrant for the taking of a buccal swab when suppression leads to the policeusing the same probable-cause evidence to secure a proper search warrant. 13 Defense attorneys will soon see the futility of filing suppression motions,leading to police practices that are indifferent to the Constitution’s warrantrequirement. The majority articulates no good reason for jettisoning Holland’sinsistence that the State prove that “the police would have sought a warrantwithout the tainted knowledge” from the evidence acquired from anunconstitutional search. See Holland, 176 N.J. at 361. III. For the reasons expressed, I respectfully dissent. 14