Title: UPTON v. STATE ex. rel. OKLAHOMA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
Citation: 2000 OK 46, 71OBJ1744, 9 P.3d 84
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2000

UPTON v. STATE ex. rel. OKLAHOMA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS Annotate this Case UPTON v. STATE ex. rel. OKLAHOMA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS 2000 OK 46 9 P.3d 84 71 OBJ 1744 Case Number: 91618 Decided: 06/20/2000 Mandate Issued: 07/21/2000 Supreme Court of Oklahoma MARTIN UPTON, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, and OKLAHOMA MERIT PROTECTION COMMISSION, Defendants/Appellants. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION I. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF PITTSBURG COUNTY; HONORABLE STEVEN W. TAYLOR, JUDGE. ¶0 While Upton, a state employee, was receiving temporary total disability for an on-the-job injury, State terminated his employment under the terms of 74 O.S.1994 § 840-2.21 because of excessive absenteeism. The Merit Protection Commission sustained the dismissal. On appeal the district court reversed, holding the discharge violated the Workers Compensation Act, 85 O.S.1994 §5(B). The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the district court's decision and State sought certiorari. Upon certiorari earlier granted, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION IS AFFIRMED. Michael T. Oakley, Oklahoma Department of Corrections, Oklahoma City, OK, for the appellant. Joseph L. McCormick, Oklahoma Merit Protection Commission, Oklahoma City, OK, for the appellant. Michael R. Green of Stites and Green, Tulsa, OK, for the appellee. Lavender, J. ¶1 Today's cause presents a question of first impression, i.e., whether the Oklahoma Department of Corrections [State or DOC] can terminate Upton [employee or appellee] while he is receiving compensation (temporary total disability) for an on-the-job injury under the terms of the Workers Compensation Act, 85 O.S.1994 §§ 1 et seq. I FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 The facts in the case are undisputed. Upton, a DOC employee, suffered an on-the-job injury on March 25, 1996 for which he was awarded temporary total disability II STATE CANNOT TERMINATE EMPLOYEES WHILE THEY ARE RECEIVING TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY UNDER PROVISIONS OF THE WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT ¶4 Resolution of State's appeal requires the Court to construe the provisions of 85 O.S.1994 § 5(B) and 74 O.S.1994 § 840-2.21(D), which on first examination appear in conflict. Since today's cause implicates the meaning and intent of legislative enactments and there are no disputed facts, it poses only a question of law. Hence, the applicable standard of review is de novo. ¶5 The contested provision of the Oklahoma Personnel Act provides that State "may" ¶6 It is fundamental that statutory construction begins with ascertainment of legislative intent which is often manifested in the law's stated purpose. "It is . . . the general purpose of this act to establish for the state a system to recruit, select, develop and maintain an effective and responsive work force; . . . to provide for adequate and reasonable protection and security for those who have entered and will enter into the service of the state. . . ." ¶9 As further evidence of the legislative intent encompassed within the two acts at issue here, we reviewed the process by which the OPM met its charge to prepare rules (and amendments thereof) to satisfy the mandate of § 840-2.21(D). OPM proposed guidelines - implementing § 840-2.21(D) - in 1993. Amended Rule 530:10-15-10(j)(2) & (3), Permanent Rules of the Office of Personnel Management, provides in pertinent part: "(2) If an employee does not return to the original position or an alternate position within 1 year after the start of leave without pay, the Appointing Authority may terminate the employee under Section 840-7b(D).* An Appointing Authority that uses Section 840-7b(D)* as authority to terminate an employee shall give the employee a copy of (k) of this Section. Termination of permanent classified employee under this Section is subject to the pretermination hearing requirements of Section 840-6.4 of Title 74 of the Oklahoma Statutes. (3) If Section 5(A)(2) [now 85 O.S. § 5(B)] of Title 85 of the Oklahoma Statutes prevents the Appointing Authority from terminating the employee, the Appointing Authority shall place the employee on leave without pay according to that law. The rights and benefits of this Section and Section 840-7b(D)* shall no longer apply." [Emphasis added.] [* Section 840-7b(D) is now renumbered as § 840-2.21(D).] The amended rule's text demonstrates cognizance of the 1992 amendment - which forbids termination of an employee who is receiving TTD - to 85 O.S.1991 § 5 . ¶10 It is within the ambit of the identified purposes and intent that the Court views the provisions of the two acts in issue. Also, we are mindful that because of the Workers Compensation Act's remedial nature, it should be accorded liberal construction in favor of those entitled to its benefits. ¶12 Today's holding does not render 74 O.S.1991 § 840-2.21(D) void of legal significance. Under its terms State may still terminate employees solely because they are absent from work for periods of time longer than one year when they are receiving forms of compensation - other than TTD - allowed under the terms of the WCA, e.g., temporary partial disability. III SUMMARY ¶13 Today's pronouncement addresses a conflict between two statutes governing State's right to terminate - solely because of absenteeism - an employee who is receiving temporary total disability . The later-in-time declaration of legislative intent is today given effect with the result that the provisions of 74 O.S.1994 § 840-2.21(D) are repealed to the limited extent they are inconsistent with the provisions of 85O.S.1994 § 5(B). Section 840-2.21(D) remains efficacious insofar as it governs State's right to terminate absent employees who are receiving forms of compensation - other than TTD - authorized under the terms of the Workers Compensation Act. ¶14 Upon certiorari earlier granted, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION IS AFFIRMED. ¶ 15 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR. FOOT