Title: Li v. State of Oregon
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S51612
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 14, 2005

FILED:  April 14, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
MARY LI
and REBECCA KENNEDY;
STEPHEN KNOX, M.D., and ERIC WARSHAW, M.D.;
KELLY BURKE and DOLORES DOYLE;
DONNA POTTER and PAMELA MOEN;
DOMINICK VETRI and DOUGLAS DEWITT;
SALLY SHEKLOW and ENID LEFTON;
IRENE FARRERA and NINA KORICAN;
WALTER FRANKEL and CURTIS KEIFER;
JULIE WILLIAMS and COLEEN BELISLE;
BASIC RIGHTS OREGON;
and AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF OREGON,
Respondents,
Cross-Appellants,
and
MULTNOMAH COUNTY,
Respondent,
Cross-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF OREGON;
THEODORE KULONGOSKI,
in his official capacity as
Governor of the State of Oregon;
HARDY MYERS,
in his official capacity as
Attorney General of the State of Oregon;
GARY WEEKS,
in his official capacity as
Director of the Department of Human Services
of the State of Oregon;
and JENNIFER WOODWARD,
in her official capacity as
State Registrar of the State of Oregon,
Appellants,
Cross-Respondents,
and
DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE COALITION,
CECIL MICHAEL THOMAS, NANCY JO THOMAS,
DAN MATES, and DICK JORDAN OSBORNE,
Appellants,
Cross-Respondents.
(CC 0403-03057; CA A124877; SC S51612)
En Banc
On certified appeal from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted December 15, 2004.
Michael C. Livingston, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for Appellants, Cross-Respondents State of Oregon et al.  With him on the briefs were
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Peter Shepherd, Deputy
Attorney General.
Kelly Clark, of O'Donnell &amp; Clark, LLP, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for Appellants, Cross-Respondents
Defense of Marriage Coalition et al.  With him on the briefs were
Kristian Roggendorf, Portland, Herbert G. Gray, Beaverton, Kelly
E. Ford, of Kelly E. Ford, P.C., Beaverton, Kevin Clarkson, of
Brena Bell &amp; Clarkson, Anchorage, Alaska, Benjamin W. Bull and
Jordan Lorence, of Alliance Defense Fund, Scottsdale, Arizona,
Raymond M. Cihak and Pamela S. Hediger, of Evashevski Elliott
Cihak &amp; Hediger, Corvallis. 
Kenneth Y. Choe, pro hac vice, American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation, New York, argued the cause for Respondents,
Cross-Appellants Mary Li et al.  Lynn R. Nakamoto, of Markowitz,
Herbold, Glade &amp; Mehlhaf, P.C., Portland, cooperating counsel for
ACLU Foundation of Oregon, filed the briefs.  With her on the
briefs was Kenneth Y. Choe.
Jacqueline A. Webber, Assistant County Attorney, Multnomah
County, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for
Respondent, Cross-Appellant Multnomah County.  With her on the
briefs were Agnes Sowle, County Attorney, Multnomah County, Katie
A. Lane, Assistant County Attorney, Multnomah County, and
Christopher D. Crean, Assistant County Attorney, Multnomah
County.
Barry Adamson, Lake Oswego, filed a brief amicus curiae for himself.
Joseph Wetzel, of Wetzel, DeFrang &amp; Sandor, Portland, and
Paul Benjamin Linton, Northbrook, Illinois, filed a brief for
amicus curiae United Families International.
Melanie E. Mansell, Salem, and David R. Langdon, of Law &amp;
Liberty Institute, Cincinnati, Ohio, filed a brief for amicus
curiae Family Research Council.
Daniel A. Hill, of Adams, Day &amp; Hill, Salem, and Dwight G.
Duncan, North Dartmouth, Massachusetts, filed a brief for amicus
curiae Alliance for Marriage.
Mark Johnson, of Johnson Renshaw &amp; Lechman-Su PC, Leslie
Harris and Michael Moffitt, of the University of Oregon School of
Law, Eugene, and Susan M. Murray and Beth Robinson, or Langrock
Sperry &amp; Wool, LLP, Burlington, Vermont, filed a brief for amici
curiae Vermont Freedom to Marry Task Force; Vermonters for Civil
Unions Legislative Defense Fund; Pride at Work; AFL-CIO,;Parents,
Families and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG); National Gay
and Lesbian Task Force; The National Lesbian and Gay Law
Association; Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
(Lambda Legal); National Black Justice Coalition; Heterosexuals
for the Right of Gays and Lesbians to Marry; Human Rights
Campaign Foundation; Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders
(GLAD); Freedom to Marry; Family Pride Coalition; and Asian
Equality.
Randall J. Wolfe, P.C., Lake Oswego, Vincent P. McCarthy,
Senior Regional Counsel and Kristina J. Wenberg, Staff Counsel,
for American Center for Law &amp; Justice, New Milford, Connecticut, 
John Tuskey, Senior Research Counsel, Shannon Woodruff, Associate
Research Counsel, and Laura Hernandez Associate Research Counsel,
Virginia Beach, Virginia, filed a brief for amicus curiae
American Center for Law and Justice.
John F. Fagan, Sr., of PACNW Elder Law Office, LLC, The
Dalles, filed a brief for amicus curiae Stronger Families for
Oregon.
James N. Westwood, of Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, Pamela A.
Harris, Toby J. Heytens, and Karl Michael Remon Thompson, of
O'Melveny &amp; Myers, LLP, Washington, D.C., filed a brief for amici
curiae American Friends Service Committee; National Coalition of
American Nuns; Unitarian Universalist Association; Alliance of
Baptists; Joan L. Beck, Daniel E.H. Bryant, Barbara Carnegie
Campbell, Karen Crooch, Tim Crump, David Dornack, Jan Fairchild,
Maurice Harris, Marcia Hauer, David Isaiah Hedelman, Jeanne
Knepper, Hector Lopez, Lynne Smouse Lopez, Karen McClintock,
Casey Moffett-Chaney, Elizabeth Oettinger, Penny Senger Parsons,
Christine Riley, Emanual Rose, Kim Rosen, Eugene Ross, Glenna T.
Shepherd, Anthony C. Thurston, Tara Wilkins, Dana Worsnop, and
Judith Youngman.
John Paul Graff and Katherine H. O'Neil, of Graff &amp; O'Neill,
Portland, and Ruth N. Borenstein, Sylvia M. Sokol, of Morrison &amp;
Foerster LLP, San Francisco, California, filed a brief for amici
curiae Doctors Richard S. Colman, Rodica N. Meyer, and Lorah
Sebastian.
Edward J. Reeves, of Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, filed a
brief for amici curiae The Juvenile Rights Project, Inc.; The
National Association of Social Workers; The Oregon Chapter of the
National Association of Social Workers; Open Adoption &amp; Family
Services, Inc.; The Oregon Psychiatric Association; and the
Oregon Psychological Association.
Beth A. Allen, of Lane Powell Spears Lubersky LLP, Portland,
filed a brief for amici curiae Oregon Gay and Lesbian Law
Association; Equity Foundation, Inc.; Love Makes a Family, Inc.;
Rural Organizing Project, Inc.; Cascade Aids Project; Parents and
Friends of Lesbians and Gays, Oregon State Council; and Parents
Friends of Lesbians and Gays, Portland Chapter.
Les Swanson, Portland, filed a brief for amici curiae Paula
Abrams, Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Vincent Chiapetta, Garrett Epps,
Steven K. Green, James Huffman, M.H. "Sam" Jacobson, Stephen
Kanter, Susan F. Mandiberg, James M. O'Fallon, Margaret Paris,
and Dean M. Richardson.
Maureen Leonard and Ellen Taussig Conaty, Portland, with the
assistance of Honorable Betty Roberts, Portland, filed a brief
for amici curiae Legal Momentum (formerly NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund); National Association of Women Lawyers; National
Council of Jewish Women; National Organization for Women (NOW)
Foundation, Women's Law Project, Northwest Women's Law Center,
Naral Pro-Choice Oregon; Young Women's Christian Association
(YWCA) of Salem; National Organization for Women (NOW), Oregon
Chapter; League of Women Voters of Oregon; National Council of
Jewish Women (NCJW), Portland Section; American Association of
University Women (AAUW) of Oregon; and Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association (OTLA).
Donna R. Meyer, of Fitzwater &amp; Meyer, LLP, Clackamas, with
the assistance of Paul M. Smith and William M. Hohengarten, of
Jenner &amp; Block LLP, Washington, D.C., and Nathalie F.P. Gilfoyle,
of American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C., filed a
brief for amici curiae American Psychological Association.
Charles F. Hinkle, of Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, filed a
brief for amici curiae Civil Rights and Historians.
James E. Leuenberger, Lake Oswego, and Mathew D. Staver, pro
hac vice, Longwood, Florida, filed briefs for amicus curiae
Liberty Counsel. 
GILLETTE, J.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case
is remanded to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss the
action.
*On appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Frank L. Bearden, Judge. 
GILLETTE, J.
The dispute underlying this declaratory judgment case
began when the Chair of the Multnomah County Board of 
Commissioners ordered the Records Management Division of
Multnomah County (the county) (1) to issue marriage licenses to
same-sex couples who applied for such licenses from the county. 
Pursuant to those licenses, approximately 3,000 same-sex couples
participated in individual marriage ceremonies conducted by
various officials empowered under Oregon law to perform
marriages.  Those officials forwarded the documentation generated
by each ceremony to the State Registrar, who maintains a central
record of marriages performed in Oregon.  The State Registrar,
however, refused to register the documents on the ground that
same-sex marriages do not comport with the provisions of ORS
chapter 106, which regulates marriages performed in Oregon.  As a
result, the plaintiffs in this case -– nine same-sex
couples, (2) the advocacy group Basic Rights Oregon, the
American Civil Liberties Union, and the county (collectively,
plaintiffs) -- brought this action against the State of Oregon,
the Governor, the Attorney General, the Director of the
Department of Human Services, and the State Registrar
(collectively, the state) seeking a declaration that the statutes
prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying on the same terms as
opposite-sex couples violated Article I, section 20, of the
Oregon Constitution. (3)  
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court
declined to hold that Article I, section 20, required making
marriage itself available to same-sex couples.  Instead, the
trial court ruled that ORS chapter 106 violated Article I,
section 20, by denying certain benefits to same-sex couples that
otherwise were available to married opposite-sex couples by
virtue of their marriages.  The state appealed that judgment to
the Court of Appeals, which in turn certified the appeal to this
court pursuant to ORS 19.405(1). (4)  We accepted the certified
appeal and, for the reasons that follow, now reverse the judgment
of the trial court.
The pertinent facts are undisputed.  In February and
March 2004, some members of the Multnomah County Board of
Commissioners began discussing privately whether same-sex couples
could marry under Oregon law and, if they could not, whether that
disability violated the couples' constitutional rights.  Those
commissioners then asked the Multnomah County Counsel for her
view.  Counsel opined that the marriage statutes set out in ORS
chapter 106 might not proscribe such marriages but that, even if
they did, such a proscription would violate the rights of same-sex couples under Article I, section 20.  Counsel further opined
that, although no court decision had held that Article I, section
20, required that marriage be available to same-sex couples, this
court's decision in Cooper v. Eugene School Dist. No. 4J, 301 Or
358, 364-65, 723 P2d 298 (1986), stated that governmental
officials have "a duty to follow the Constitution regardless of
whether a court has ruled on the constitutionality of a
particular issue."  Expanding on that notion, counsel advised the
commissioners that the marriage statutes set out in ORS chapter
106 could not be used to bar same-sex marriages, if the
commissioners were of the opinion that those statutes were
unconstitutional: 
"The County's duty to act in compliance with the
Constitution applies even when a court has not yet
found a particular statute or government action
unconstitutional.  Therefore, if the Oregon
Constitution prohibits Multnomah County from denying
marriage licenses to same sex couples, the County may
not rely on the marriage statute to continue to do so." 
Thereafter, on March 3, 2004, the county directed the Multnomah
County Records Management Division to begin issuing marriage
licenses to same-sex couples. (5)  As already indicated, in the
weeks that followed, the county issued marriage licenses to
approximately 3,000 same-sex couples, and the documents reporting
the marriages performed pursuant to those licenses were forwarded
to the State Registrar.
At the Governor's direction, the State Registrar
refused to file or register any same-sex marriage records that
were forwarded to that office.  In letters sent to same-sex
couples to whom the county had issued licenses, the State
Registrar explained that (1) the Attorney General had concluded
that Oregon's marriage statutes currently defined marriage as a
union between a male and a female and, for that reason, (2) the
Governor had directed state agencies not to give legal effect to
marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples.  The letter
concluded that such licenses did not constitute marriage records
as described in Oregon law.  The State Registrar returned the
records to the county officials who had issued them.  
Plaintiffs then filed the present action in Multnomah
County Circuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 
Initially, plaintiffs were nine same-sex couples, the advocacy
group Basic Rights Oregon, and the American Civil Liberties
Union.  The trial court later granted the county status as a
plaintiff-intervenor.  In addition to the original defendants --
the State of Oregon and its Governor, the Attorney General, the
Director of the Department of Human Services, and the State
Registrar -- the trial court allowed four more individuals and an
organization, the Defense of Marriage Coalition (DOMC), to be
added as defendant-intervenors. 
In this court, the parties limit their arguments to the
constitutional issue that plaintiffs raised below.  However, if
same-sex marriages presently may be licensed and performed as a
matter of statutory law under ORS chapter 106, then the
constitutional question that plaintiffs raise would be
irrelevant.  We therefore first address the question whether ORS
chapter 106 authorizes marriages between same-sex couples. (6)
Our review begins with ORS 106.010, which defines
marriage in Oregon.  That statute provides:
"Marriage is a civil contract entered into in
person by males at least 17 years of age and females at
least 17 years of age, who are otherwise capable, and
solemnized in accordance with ORS 106.150."
Although the phrase "entered into in person by males * * * and
females" suggests that marriage in Oregon is a contract between a
male and female, it is not necessarily dispositive.  However,
when that phrase is read in context with other statutes relating
to marriage, no doubt remains.  ORS 106.150(1), which is cross-referenced in ORS 106.010, requires the parties to a marriage to
declare that "they take each other to be husband and wife." 
(Emphasis added.)  Similarly, under ORS 106.041(1), the
authorization accompanying a properly issued marriage license
requires the official conducting the marriage ceremony "to join
together as husband and wife the persons named in the license." 
(Emphasis added.)
Although the legislature has not defined the terms
"husband" or "wife" for the purposes of ORS chapter 106, under
this court's methodology for interpreting statutes, we give those
words their "plain, natural and ordinary meaning."  PGE v. Bureau
of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). 
Here, by their respective dictionary definitions, "husband" means
"a married man," and "wife" means a "married woman."  Webster's
Third New Int'l Dictionary, 1104, 2614 (unabridged ed 2002).  As
a result, although nothing in ORS chapter 106 expressly states
that marriage is limited to opposite-sex couples, the context
that ORS 106.150(1) and ORS 106.041(1) provide leaves no doubt
that, as a statutory matter, marriage in Oregon is so limited. 
The trial court thus did not err in accepting the parties'
stipulation to that effect.
We return to the issues that the parties litigated at
trial.  Plaintiffs, whose motion for summary judgment was
successful, argued that the right to marry is a "privilege" under
the Oregon Constitution and that Article I, section 20, prohibits
using sexual orientation or gender as a basis to deny such a
privilege.  In advancing that argument, plaintiffs sought four
forms of relief: (1) a declaratory judgment stating that the
marriage statutes set out in ORS chapter 106 were
unconstitutional; (2) a declaratory judgment stating that the
State Registrar's refusal to file and register the records of
same-sex marriages in Oregon was unconstitutional; (3) as an
alternative to the second form of relief, judicial review under
Oregon's Administrative Procedures Act, ORS 183.310 to 183.690,
of the final agency orders that prohibited registration; and (4)
in the event that no adequate remedy existed under one or more of
the first three proposed forms of relief, a writ of mandamus
compelling the State Registrar to process the records of the
same-sex marriages already licensed and performed in Oregon.  
As noted, the trial court agreed with plaintiffs'
constitutional premise.  However, the court declined to grant the
relief that plaintiffs sought, viz., extension of the right of
marriage to same-sex couples.  Instead, the court fashioned a
judgment that purported to extend the benefits of marriage to
same-sex couples without altering the Oregon statutes limiting 
the right to marry to opposite-sex couples.  The court's
rationale was that the aspect of the marriage statutes that
violated Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution was
the resulting denial to same-sex couples of the benefits of
marriage that were available to opposite-sex couples. 
In fashioning a remedy for that perceived
constitutional violation, the trial court drew heavily on the
approach that the Vermont Supreme Court took in Baker v. State,
170 Vt 194, 744 A2d 864 (Vt 1999). (7)  Citing Baker, the trial
court held that it is "incumbent upon the legislature to evaluate
the substantive rights afforded to married couples and to provide
similar access to same-sex domestic partners."  As a result, the
trial court ordered the legislature to create a remedy consistent
with the court's holding within 90 days of the commencement of
the next regular or special legislative session, whichever
convened first.  With respect to plaintiffs' fourth claim for
relief, which had sought a writ of mandamus compelling the State
Registrar to register the previously unrecorded same-sex marriage
records, the court held that ORS 432.405 (8) mandated
registration of marriage records as a nondiscretionary function
of the State Registrar's office.  It therefore ordered the
Registrar to register the records of the same-sex marriages that
had been performed pursuant to the Multnomah County
licenses. (9)  
The appeals and cross-appeals now before this court
followed.  In November 2004, while the appeals were pending,
Oregon voters adopted Ballot Measure 36 (2004), a voter-initiated
amendment to the Oregon Constitution aimed at defining marriage
as a relationship between one man and one woman.  That amendment,
which became effective on December 2, 2004, provides:  
"It is the policy of Oregon, and its political
subdivisions, that only a marriage between one man and
one woman shall be valid or legally recognized as a
marriage."
This court solicited supplemental briefing before hearing oral
arguments in these matters, asking the parties to address the
effect (if any) of that new constitutional provision on the
issues raised in these appeals.  In that regard, we need not
examine each and every issue tendered to us by the responding
parties respecting Measure 36; indeed, most are not relevant to
the present proceedings.  One issue, however, is pertinent,
because it affects the prospective ability of five of the
plaintiff same-sex couples to pursue their claims that Article I,
section 20, entitles them to obtain marriage licenses on the same
terms as opposite-sex couples.  That issue is whether Measure 36
is an operative statement of law or whether it is only a
statement of aspirational principle that requires some further
action to make it enforceable.  If it is the former, then the
measure forecloses the five same-sex couples from obtaining the
marriage licenses that they seek.  If it is the latter, then the
measure may not foreclose their Article I, section 20 claim.  We
turn to that issue. (10)
In interpreting voter-initiated constitutional
provisions, our goal is to discern the intent of the voters. 
Flavorland Foods v. Washington County Assessor, 334 Or 562, 567,
54 P3d 582 (2002).  In doing so, the text of the constitutional
provision itself provides the best evidence of the voters'
intent.  Martin v. City of Tigard, 335 Or 444, 451, 72 P3d 619
(2003).  This court also considers the context of the provision,
which includes other relevant constitutional provisions, case law
from this court, and any relevant statutory framework in effect
at the time that the voters adopted the provision.  Id.  If the
voters' intent is clear from the text and context, then the court
does not look further.  If the provision's meaning remains
ambiguous, however, the court will consider the history of the
provision in an effort to resolve the matter.  Flavorland Foods,
334 Or at 567.
In this case, the text of the new constitutional
provision states that its substantive content is the "policy" of
Oregon.  The parties disagree about the legal effect of the term
"policy" in the new provision:  Is it an operative statement of
law or just an aspirational principle that requires further
action to establish an enforceable restriction? 
In examining the text of a constitutional provision
adopted by initiative or legislative referral, this court
typically gives words of common usage their plain, natural, and
ordinary meaning.  Coultas v. City of Sutherlin, 318 Or 584,
588-89, 871 P2d 465 (1994).  The dictionary definitions most
applicable to the word "policy," as it is used in this context,
are:
"a:  a definite course or method of action selected (as
by a government, institution, group, or individual)
from among alternatives and in the light of given
conditions to guide and usually determine present and
future decisions.  b(1):  a specific decision or set of
decisions designed to carry out such a chosen course of
action (2):  such a specific decision or set of
decisions together with the related actions designed to
implement them c:  a projected program consisting of
desired objectives and the means to achieve them[.]" 
Webster's at 1754.  Clearly, a "policy" may be something more
than a set of intentions.  Giving the word its plain and ordinary
meaning, a "policy" can be a concrete course of action, the law
necessary to implement it, or both.  
The foregoing definitional review is not dispositive;
the wording of Measure 36 still could be hortatory.  However, two
other considerations demonstrate that the amendment is intended
to state present law.
First, Measure 36 states that "only a marriage between
one man and one woman shall be valid or legally recognized." 
That is a statement not only of the policy itself, but also of
particular consequences that are to occur as a result of that
policy.  Such wording is operational, not aspirational.  
Second, Measure 36 lacks any wording directing the
legislature to carry out the stated policy by appropriate
legislation.  If the measure were aspirational only, then we
reasonably might expect to see such wording.  
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the use of the
word "policy" in Measure 36 is intended to signal a presently
enforceable tenet of Oregon constitutional law.  And, with respect to the remaining text, there is no ambiguity
regarding the measure's substantive effect.  Today, marriage in
Oregon -- an institution once limited to opposite-sex couples
only by statute -- now is so limited by the state constitution as
well.  As the later-enacted (and more specific) constitutional
provision, Measure 36 resolves any prospective claims that
plaintiffs may have had under Article I, section 20, to obtain
marriage licenses.  The claims of the five same-sex couples that
they are entitled as a matter of state law, now or hereafter, to
obtain marriage licenses and to marry thus fail.
The parties also differ over the effect, if any, of the
adoption of Measure 36 on the remaining issues in these appeals
and, particularly, on the remedy that the trial court fashioned. 
In that regard, plaintiffs argue that, although the text of the
measure prohibits same-sex marriage itself, it omits any
reference to the benefits of marriage.  Therefore, according to
plaintiffs, Measure 36 does not speak to the issue whether
Article I, section 20, prohibits using gender or sexual
orientation as a basis for denying the benefits of marriage. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs urge this court to conclude that the
voters did not intend to hinder this court from fashioning a
remedy in these appeals that extends such benefits to same-sex
couples.  However, the issue of the availability of marriage
benefits to same-sex couples is not properly before us.  At
trial, plaintiffs did not seek access to the benefits of marriage
apart from, or as an alternative to, marriage itself.  The trial
court therefore improperly went beyond the pleadings in
fashioning the particular remedy that it chose.  We do not
address that topic further.
Plaintiffs also raise issues concerning the effect of
Measure 36 on the remaining same-sex couples, who received
licenses and participated in marriage ceremonies before that
measure became effective.  They argue that the measure cannot be
construed to affect the legal validity of those relationships
because nothing in the text or context of the measure indicates
an intent to either (1) retroactively invalidate the challenged
marriage contracts; or (2) prospectively invalidate those
contracts from the effective date of Measure 36. (11)  That
argument assumes that those marriages were legally valid before
the adoption of Measure 36.  However, we disagree with that
premise.  As we explain below, the county did not have authority
to issue the licenses for the marriages in question.
This court decides cases on subconstitutional grounds
when it can, even if the parties present only constitutional
arguments for the court's consideration.  See, e.g., State v.
Conger, 319 Or 484, 490, 878 P2d 1089 (1994); Zockert v. Fanning,
310 Or 514, 520, 800 P2d 773 (1990) (so stating).  Here, the
spark that ignited this controversy was the county's decision to
issue marriage licenses to otherwise-qualified same-sex couples. 
DOMC argued below -- and continues to argue on appeal -- that, as
a matter of law, the county lacked legal authority to make that
decision.  If DOMC's position is correct, then the marriage
licenses at issue here were void ab initio, and this case is at
an end.  We turn now to that inquiry. 
Early in Oregon's statehood, this court recognized in
Rugh v. Ottenheimer, 6 Or 231 (1877), that, even at common law,
the state had an interest in marriage contracts and was entitled
to exercise legislative control over them.  Id. at 236. 
Extending that notion into the civil law context, the court in
Rugh concluded:     
"The marriage relation, affecting the whole
public, and being an institution of society, affecting
more deeply than any other the foundations of social
order and public morals, has always been under the
control of the legislature."
Id. at 237 (emphasis added).  
Subsequent decisions by this court further acknowledged
the sovereignty of the state -- and, by extension, state law --
in matters involving marriage.  For example, in Heisler v.
Heisler, 152 Or 691, 55 P2d 727 (1936), the court wrote:
"In the state of Oregon, 'marriage' is a civil
contract entered into with the consent of the state,
between a man and woman, competent to so contract, in
the presence of two witnesses, solemnized by some one
authorized by statute (Code 1930, § 33-104) for that
purpose."
Id. at 693 (emphasis added).  Still later, in Dakin v. Dakin, 197
Or 69, 72, 251 P2d 462 (1952), the court categorized the marital
relationship as "one in which the state is deeply concerned and
over which it exercises a jealous dominion." 
Finally, the court underscored the scope of that
dominion in Garrett v. Chapman, 252 Or 361, 449 P2d 856 (1969). 
There, the court acknowledged the rule that marriages deemed
valid in the states where they are performed generally will be
recognized in Oregon as well.  When it did so, however, the court
also expressly allowed for "exceptions to the general rule where
the policy of this state dictates a different result than would
be reached by the state where the marriage was performed."  Id.
at 364 (emphasis added). 
The foregoing cases demonstrate that the state and,
more specifically, the legislature, is the locus of power over
marriage-related matters in Oregon.  If that power is broad
enough to preempt other states' contrary marriage policies, it
inescapably is broad enough to preempt similar policies generated
by a political subdivision of this state, such as the county.  It
is true that nothing in ORS chapter 106 expressly reserves
exclusive authority over marriage to the state; however, we
cannot ignore this court's jurisprudence that expressly
recognizes that exclusive authority, absent some clear
legislative directive to the contrary.  We conclude that Oregon
law currently places the regulation of marriage exclusively
within the province of the state's legislative power.
The county, however, contends that it lawfully
exercised state authority when it directed county employees to
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.  Specifically, the
county points out that the constitutional home rule provision for
counties, Article VI, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution,
requires county officials to perform all the duties delegated to
their counties under the state constitution.  Those duties, the
county argues, include the requirement contained in Article XV,
section 3, of the Oregon Constitution to take an oath or
affirmation to support the state and federal
constitutions. (12)  The county then asserts that, under this
court's decision in Cooper, 301 Or 358, the county was fulfilling
the duty of its commissioners to uphold the constitution when it
directed county employees to begin issuing marriage licenses to
same-sex couples.  The county, however, reads too much into too
small a part of Cooper.
Cooper involved judicial review of an administrative
decision of the Eugene School District (the district).  The
district had suspended a teacher who had persisted in wearing
religious dress while teaching, in contravention of state
statute.  After a hearing, the State Superintendent of Public
Instruction (the superintendent) revoked the teacher's teaching
certificate.  The teacher subsequently challenged the
superintendent's revocation order on constitutional grounds, and
the Court of Appeals set aside the order based on federal First
Amendment jurisprudence.  301 Or at 360.  Thus, the case was, as
this court noted from the outset of its opinion, an ordinary one
of judicial review of an administrative order in a contested
case.  Id. at 361.  
The court's repeated references in Cooper to the nature
of the case before it provide context for the part of the court's
opinion on which plaintiffs rely:
"What the parties wanted the Superintendent to decide
was the constitutional validity of the law forbidding a
teacher to wear religious dress while on duty.  The
Superintendent, adopting the hearing officer's
memorandum of law, concluded that he had no power to
decide the constitutional question. * * *
"Enough judicial opinions have said that agencies
cannot pass on the constitutionality of laws entrusted
to them to support the cautious conclusion of the
hearing officer's memorandum, at least as to federal
agencies; but more recently the proposition has been
questioned.  It deserves examination."
Id. at 362-63 (footnote omitted).  Stated differently, the crux
of the issue in Cooper was whether the superintendent -- as an
administrative adjudicator -- had authority to rule on a
constitutional question, in the context in which the question
arose in that case.
In considering that issue, the court noted that, in the
main, treatise writers tended to place discussion of
administrative agencies' supposed lack of authority to pass on
constitutional questions within their broader discussions of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.  By that
theory, the failure of a party to present a constitutional theory
to an administrative agency, but to later assert such a theory to
a reviewing court, did not violate the exhaustion principle.  See
id. (citing 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 74, § 20.04
(1958); Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 438
(1965)).  The court in Cooper distinguished that analysis,
however:
"This is not such a case.  Opinions denying agency
power in constitutional cases only as an explanation
for dispensing with the normal exhaustion requirement
are weak authority for a holding that an agency should
not consider a constitutional claim when a party
chooses to exhaust that process [before the agency,
rather than waiting for judicial review], or that the
agency errs if it does decide the issue. * * *.
"Long familiarity with the institution of judicial
review sometimes leads to the misconception that
constitutional law is exclusively a matter for the
courts.  To the contrary, when a court sets aside
government action on constitutional grounds, it
necessarily holds that legislators or officials
attentive to a proper understanding of the constitution
would or should have acted differently.  Doubt of an
agency's obligation to decide constitutional challenges
to its governing statute is itself a question of
interpreting the agency's statutory duties.  The
agency's duty to decide such challenges would not be
doubted if the legislature provided for it expressly
rather than doing so implicitly under the general term
'law' in the Administrative Procedure Act provisions
that require a final order in a contested case to
include the agency's conclusions of law, ORS
183.470(2), and subject the order to reversal if it
violates a constitutional provision, ORS
183.482(8)(b)(C) * * *."
Id. at 364-65 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).  
The footnote omitted from the foregoing material quotes
Article IV, section 31(g), and Article XV, section 3, of the
Oregon Constitution, which require state legislators and other
elected officials to swear, before taking office, that they will
uphold the state and federal constitutions.  The footnote goes on
to state:
"As these provisions show, the constitution does not
contemplate that legislators and officials will act as
they think best and leave the constitutionality of
their acts to the courts. * * * The Superintendent of
Public Instruction himself holds a constitutional
office, Or Const, Art VIII, § 1, and must satisfy
himself that he conducts it in accordance with the
constitution."
Plaintiffs rely on that footnote to justify the
county's actions in this case.  As the full context of the
footnote makes clear, however, the court in Cooper did not view
the constitutional duty to take the oath as creating a general
license for any governmental official to go forth and remedy any
constitutional wrong that the official perceived.  Instead, the
court made its statement concerning an official's independent
duty to consider the constitution in the context of an agency
official deciding a contested case, a circumstance in which the
particular official (there, the superintendent) specifically was
authorized by statute to exercise quasi-judicial authority to
resolve a legal dispute between the parties before him.  Clearly,
the official's authority to conduct and decide the contested case
was pivotal.  That is why the court, instead of setting out a
general pronouncement concerning "legislators and officials,"
returned at the end of the footnote in question to focus
specifically on the official whose contested case decision was
before the court.
Properly understood, then, the footnote in question
from Cooper (and, indeed, the entire opinion in that case) stands
for the proposition that a governmental official must, within the
scope of that official's otherwise lawfully delegated authority,
take care to consider the meaning of the state and federal
constitutions when executing official duties.  But when Cooper is
read properly, it contains no hint that the duty to be mindful of
the state and federal constitutions somehow grants to a
governmental official powers not otherwise devolved by law on
that official to take actions and fashion remedies that, under
any other circumstances, would constitute ultra vires acts.  In
reaching a contrary conclusion in the appeals before us here, the
county erroneously transmogrified a governmental official's
ongoing obligation to support the constitution into an implied
grant of authority, respecting any laws that the official must
administer, to prescribe remedies for any perceived
constitutional shortcomings in such laws without regard to the
scope of the official's statutory authority to act.  
These appeals illustrate the distinction.  County
officials were entitled to have their doubts about the
constitutionality of limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples. 
But, marriage and the laws governing it are matters of statewide,
not local, concern.  Thus, the remedy for such a perceived
constitutional problem would be either to amend the statutes to
meet constitutional requirements or to direct some other remedy
on a statewide basis.  Obviously, any such remedy must originate
from a source with the authority to speak on that basis.  The
legislature has such authority and, in an appropriate adversary
proceeding, the courts have it as well.  But there is no source
of law from which the county could claim such authority.  To the
contrary, the county's involvement in the license-issuing process
is ministerial only.
These appeals do not require us to explore the full
range of actions from which a governmental official might choose
in vindicating that official's personal constitutional vision. 
Cooper illustrates one such way that that might occur, if the
official has quasi-judicial authority.  Another available choice,
when an official is vested with discretion, is to choose not to
act, such as when a prosecutor chooses not to prosecute a case
under a statute of questionable constitutional validity.  Yet a
third choice, when an official has no discretion, might be to
decline to perform a statutory duty and leave it to a party
aggrieved by that action to seek a contested case decision or
judicial intervention through mandamus or declaratory judgment
proceedings.  But none of those alternatives is analogous to what
the county did here.
Our point is vividly illustrated by comparing this case
to that of Hewitt v. SAIF, 294 Or 33, 653 P2d 970 (1982), a case
relied on by the county as an example of remedy-shaping that this
court should emulate here.  Hewitt was a case in which this
court, exercising constitutionally delegated judicial authority,
was asked to determine whether the denial of rights to certain
workers' compensation benefits based on the gender of the
prospective recipient was unconstitutional.  The court held that
it was.  Id. at 50.  Turning to the question of fashioning a
remedy -- the authority for which indisputably lies with the
judiciary in cases properly before it -- the court carefully
considered whether to make the remedy affirmative, i.e., to order
that the benefits in question be made available to the improperly
excluded class, given the legislature's obvious stake in the
workings of the workers' compensation system.  Id. at 50-52.  The
court ultimately chose the affirmative remedy of extending the
benefits in question to the deprived class only when it satisfied
itself that to do otherwise would thwart the overall legislative
purpose behind the underinclusive statute.  Id. at 53.
The key to the court's choice of remedy in Hewitt was
the fact that the court had the constitutional authority to
fashion such a remedy.  There is no basis for assuming, as the
county does, that the court would have purported to fashion any
remedy, much less the one that it chose, had it not had that
authority.  In the present appeals, by contrast, the county had
no such authority and, because it did not, it could not
permissibly fashion the affirmative remedy that it decreed.  It
follows that the marriage licenses that the county issued to
same-sex couples were issued without authority and, as such, were
void ab initio.  The trial court erred in not so holding.
In summary, we conclude as follows.  First, since the
effective date of Measure 36, marriage in Oregon has been 
limited under the Oregon Constitution to opposite-sex couples. 
Second, Oregon statutory law in existence before the effective
date of Measure 36 also limited, and continues to limit, the
right to obtain marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples. 
Third, marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples in Multnomah
County before that date were issued without authority and were
void at the time that they were issued, and we therefore need not
consider the independent effect, if any, of Measure 36 on those
marriage licenses.  In short, none of plaintiffs' claims properly
before the court is well taken.  Finally, the abstract question
whether ORS chapter 106 confers marriage benefits in violation of
Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution is not properly
before the court. 
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the
case is remanded to the circuit court with instructions to
dismiss the action.
1. The county's actions in this case were sometimes those of the
chair alone; at other times, they were those of the chair acting
with the concurrence of certain other members of the Board of
Commissioners.  However, no legal distinction attaches to those
factually different circumstances.  We therefore refer throughout
this opinion to "the county" as the pertinent actor.
2. According to the pleadings, four of the same-sex couples had
obtained marriage licenses from the county and had participated in
marriage ceremonies.  Four other couples had been denied licenses -- two by Lane County officials and two by Benton County officials. 
The ninth couple wished to obtain a marriage license in the future.
3. Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution provides:
"No law shall be passed granting to any
citizen or class of citizens privileges, or
immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall
not equally belong to all citizens."
4. ORS 19.405(1) provides:
"When the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of an
appeal, the court, through the Chief Judge and pursuant
to appellate rules, may certify the appeal to the
Supreme Court in lieu of disposition by the Court of
Appeals.  The Court of Appeals shall provide notice of
certification to the parties to the appeal." 
5. The ministerial aspects of issuing marriage licenses in
Oregon have, by statute, long been a county function.  For
example, county clerks are charged with the responsibility of
physically issuing the licenses, ORS 106.041, and collecting
applicants' licensing fees, ORS 106.045.  The county clerk is
also the entity that must receive a couple's written application
and verify that the legal requirements for issuing a marriage
license have been met.  ORS 106.077.  County clerks, however,
cannot issue marriage licenses contrary to the statutes set out
in ORS chapter 106 that circumscribe their functions.  ORS
106.110.
Multnomah County does not have a "county clerk." 
Instead, the county's charter provides that, "[f]or purposes of
county services and the administration of county affairs, the
board of county commissioners shall establish administrative
departments."  Multnomah County Home Rule Charter 6.20.  In turn,
the Multnomah County Code establishes the Department of Business
and Community Services (of which the Records Division is a
subsection) and has assigned to the Records Division the job of
administering "marriage license and domestic partner registration
services."  MCC § 7.001(T).
6. At trial, the parties stipulated that ORS chapter 106 does
not allow same-sex marriage.  Of course, that stipulation as to
the state of the applicable law is not binding on this court. 
7. In Baker v. State, 170 Vt 194, 744 A2D 864 (Vt 1999), the
Vermont high court unanimously held that excluding same-sex couples
from the secular benefits and protections incident to marriage
violated the "common benefits" clause of the Vermont Constitution. 
Although declining to decide whether the denial of marriage
licenses operated as a per se denial of rights under the Vermont
Constitution, the Vermont court's limited ruling nevertheless held
that the same-sex plaintiffs before it were  entitled to obtain the
same benefits and protections that Vermont law afforded to married
opposite-sex couples.  To that end, the Vermont court ordered the
state's marriage statutes to remain in effect for a reasonable
period while its legislature enacted and implemented corrective
measures.  Ultimately, the new legislation took form as state civil
union statutes.  See Vt Stat Ann title 15, §§ 1201-1207; title 18,
§§ 5160-5169 (2004).
8. ORS 432.405(1) provides:
"A record of each marriage performed in this state
shall be filed with the Center for Health Statistics and
shall be registered if it has been completed and filed
in accordance with this section and rules adopted by the
State Registrar of the Center for Health Statistics."
9. Following the trial court's direction, the State Registrar
registered the challenged marriage licenses.  The trial court did
not address plaintiffs' second and third claims for relief, both
of which also had sought processing of the challenged marriage
licenses.   
10. This court ordinarily resolves issues tendered to it on a
subconstitutional basis, where that is possible.  See, e.g., State
v. Conger, 319 Or 484, 490, 878 P2d 1089 (1994) (so stating). 
However, there is no subconstitutional answer to the prospective
aspect of the claims of those five couples.  We therefore are
required to address that aspect of those claims under Measure 36.
11. The county also argues that ORS chapter 106 violates the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  That
issue, however, was not raised before the trial court and therefore
is unpreserved.  We do not consider it.   
12. Article XV, section 3, of the Oregon Constitution provides:
"Every person elected or appointed to any
office under this Constitution, shall, before
entering on the duties thereof, take an oath
or affirmation to support the Constitution of
the United States, and of this State, and also
an oath of office."