Title: Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Inc. v. Scott
Citation: 300 N.E.2d 50
Docket Number: 873S158
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: August 20, 1973

300 N.E.2d 50 (1973)
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF SOUTH BEND, INC., Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
Richard E. SCOTT, Appellee (Plaintiff below), Justin Keenan, M.D. and Bernard A. Mason, M.D., Appellees (Defendants below).
No. 873S158.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
August 16, 1973.
Concurring Opinion August 20, 1973.
*51 Roland Obenchain, South Bend, for appellant.
J. Chester Allen, Jr., Arthur A. May, South Bend, for appellees.
HUNTER, Justice.[*]
The instant case involves a negligence action brought against a hospital for injuries sustained by a patient. Plaintiff Scott was severely burned by hot water (140° F.) while he was using a hospital toilet. Plaintiff activated a bed pan flusher hot water knob (shoulder level) which was located in proximity to the toilet flusher (small of back level) and was inundated by the scalding water. The facts set out below are those found by the trial court in support *52 of his granting plaintiff's motion to correct error:
The jury returned a negative verdict on the issue of the hospital's negligence. Plaintiff's motion to correct errors was sustained by the trial court, supra, granting a new trial. The hospital appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment. Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Inc. v. Scott (1972), Ind. App., 290 N.E.2d 80. Plaintiff has petitioned this Court for transfer of his cause. The following issues are raised in his petition:
(1) Was the Court of Appeals correct in holding, as a matter of law, that the trial court was unaware of the correct test of contributory negligence?
(2) What is the correct standard of law to be applied on the issue of contributory negligence?
(3) Did the Court of Appeals apply the correct standard to the facts of the instant case?
It is established in Indiana that the burden of proving contributory negligence is on the defendant. Sheptak v. Davis (1965), 246 Ind. 499, 205 N.E.2d 548. The trial court in the instant case has determined that the hospital failed to meet its burden of proof on the issue of Scott's contributory negligence. In discussing this issue, the Court of Appeals states:
Thus, the critical issue here is whether the trial court's ruling is incorrect on the question of Scott's contributory negligence. It is clear that the Court of Appeals has ignored the rulings of Bailey v. Kain (1963), 135 Ind. App. 657, 192 N.E.2d 486, viz., that the trial court's action in granting a new trial is given a strong presumption of correctness. In Bailey, the jury returned a negative verdict against the plaintiff at trial. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, which was sustained by the trial court. The defendant appealed, seeking to overturn the trial court's action. In affirming the judgment below, the court said:
Since the decision in Bailey, supra, we have adopted our present Rules of Trial Procedure. Trial Rule 59(E)(7), IC 1971, 34-5-1-1 lends support to the holding in Bailey and delineates the functional requirements of the trial court where a new trial is granted:
The trial judge in the instant case complied with the above rule by setting out his findings of fact. He exercised his historic duty to insure that the jury system remains a rational process. The trial judge's power is not exercised in derogation to the right to trial by jury. Indeed, he serves as a safeguard of that right by warranting that the jury system does not become a whimsical tool without restraint.
On consideration of the granting of a new trial, the trial judge has an affirmative duty to weigh conflicting evidence. Novak, Admx. v. Chi. &amp; Calumet Dist. Transit Co. (1956), 235 Ind. 489, 135 N.E.2d 1. The trial judge sits as a "thirteenth juror" and must determine whether in the minds of reasonable men a contrary verdict should have been reached. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Spidel (1964), 246 Ind. 458, 202 N.E.2d 886. An appellate court cannot assume the responsibility of weighing conflicting evidence in reviewing the trial judge's action on a motion for a new trial (here a motion to correct error). State v. Bowling (1970), 253 Ind. 634, 256 N.E.2d 392. The sole duty of an appellate court is to examine the record to see if:
(a) The trial court abused its judicial discretion;
(b) A flagrant injustice has been done the appellant; or
(c) A very strong case for relief from the trial court's ordering a new trial has been made by the appellant. Bailey v. Kain, supra. We are committed to the logic expressed nearly one hundred years ago in the landmark case of Christy v. Holmes (1877), 57 Ind. 314, which logic still stands inescapable today:
An examination of the record in this case does not disclose that the trial judge abused his discretion in granting a new trial, nor does it appear that a flagrant injustice has been done the defendant hospital, nor has the hospital made a strong case for relief from the trial court's ordering a new trial. Under these circumstances an appellate court should be reluctant to second guess the trial court's decision.
In weighing the conflicting evidence, the trial court has concluded that the plaintiff, Scott, was not contributorily negligent. The reasons for this conclusion were based upon Scott's physical disabilities and the fact he had no knowledge of the bed pan flushing device and that he had no appreciation or awareness of a danger existing behind the toilet. The Court of Appeals decided as a matter of law that the reasons for granting a new trial were incorrect. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not apply the ordinary reasonable man test and, therefore, an inaccurate rule of law was applied in the court below. As enunciated by the Court of Appeals:
However, an examination of the record discloses that the trial court was cognizant of the proper test to be applied on the issue of contributory negligence. The trial court tendered the following instructions to the jury on this issue:
The Court of Appeals cites the test of contributory negligence to be as follows:
In our opinion the trial court did apply the correct standard when granting the new trial. Further, the Court of Appeals has made an incomplete statement of the law of contributory negligence.
The general rule on the issue of the plaintiff's contributory negligence is that the plaintiff must exercise that degree of care that an ordinary reasonable man would exercise in like or similar circumstances. Bain, Admx. v. Mattmiller (1938), 213 Ind. 549, 13 N.E.2d 712. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Restatement 2d of Torts § 463. Thus, the critical scope of inquiry here is an examination of the standard of care which Scott was required to exhibit. Lack of reasonable care is the factor upon which the presence or absence of negligence depends. Bixenam v. Hall (1969), 251 Ind. 527, 242 N.E.2d 837. We hold that a departure from the general rule is required where the plaintiff is suffering from physical infirmities which impair his ability to function as an "ordinary reasonable man." The proper test to be applied in such cases is the test of a reasonable man under the same disabilities and infirmities in like circumstances. On the issue of contributory negligence, mental condition and/or physical incapacities are factors to be considered.[1] Avey v. St. Francis Hospital &amp; School of Nursing, Inc. (1968), 201 Kan. 687, 442 P.2d 1013; Jones v. Bayley (1942), 49 Cal. 2d 647, 122 P.2d 293; Keith v. Worcester &amp; B.V. St. Ry. (1907), 196 Mass. 478, 82 N.E. 680.
Dean Prosser has treated negligence with authoritative analysis and lends this discussion:
As stated by the Florida Court of Appeals:
And put another way by the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut:
*58 In a California negligence case, the trial court had instructed the jury that one "whose faculties are impaired is required to use a greater amount of caution than one who does not suffer from any such disability." On appeal, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the granting of a new trial and said:
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Perry v. Fredette (1970), 110 N.H. 114, 261 A.2d 431, emphasized that the "standard of care applied to children and persons with physical disabilities is more flexible than that applied to the adult without disabilities." 261 A.2d  at 432.
The Appellate Court of Indiana spoke to the question of physical infirmities affecting contributory negligence in 1909:
As the rule is stated in C.J.S.:
The Court of Appeals has extracted the general rule as to contributory negligence, but has not taken into account the facts and circumstances of the instant case. The correct test to be applied in determining Scott's standard of care is the test of a reasonably prudent man suffering from the same maladies and disabilities under like circumstances as those here.
In the instant case, the trial judge has exercised his affirmative duty to weigh conflicting evidence. He has determined that the hospital was guilty of negligence and that Scott was free from contributory negligence. These are his findings of fact which should not be disturbed on the appellate level. We are committed to support his judgment here.
The plaintiff herein is also asserting a claim of malpractice against the attending physicians, Drs. Mason and Keenan. We find no merit to the alleged malpractice claims. At the close of all the evidence, *59 the trial court granted Dr. Mason's motion for judgment on the evidence. The plaintiff alleges error here in that under proper orders from Dr. Mason, he would have had supervision which would have avoided the accident. However, an examination of the record reveals no evidence from which an inference can be drawn that had a different order been given, Scott would be accompanied to the toilet by a nurse or attendant. Nor is there a showing of what type of order would have mandated such supervision. We find no error upon this issue.
The plaintiff Scott contends that it was error for the trial court to submit to the jury the issue of Scott's contributory negligence as it bears on the liability of Dr. Keenan. The issue of contributory negligence was submitted to the jury without objection, and without a motion to withdraw the same. Therefore, the question is not properly before us on appeal.
For all of the foregoing reasons, transfer of this cause is granted and the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and GIVAN and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.
DeBRULER, J., concurs with statement to follow.
DeBRULER, Justice (concurring).
In this case, I vote to grant transfer and to remand the case to Judge Kopec with instructions to vacate his grant of a new trial and to reconsider the motion to correct errors. He should be instructed to apply the standard of contributory negligence enunciated in the majority opinion, and to make a new ruling on such motion to correct errors. Such new ruling should also be supported by new findings in support of granting the new trial, if that should be his new ruling.
[*]  Assigned to this office July 26, 1973.
[1]  There is abundant case law authority supporting the proposition that physical infirmities are factors to be considered on the issue of contributory negligence:

Millsaps v. Brogdon (1911), 97 Ark. 469, 134 S.W. 632 (cripple);
Armstrong v. Day (1930), 103 Cal. App. 465, 284 P. 1083 (blind in one eye);
Tomey v. Dyson (1946), 76 Cal. App. 2d 212, 172 P.2d 739 (impaired hearing);
Kerin v. Baccei (1939), 125 Conn. 335, 5 A.2d 876 (defective vision);
Crawley v. Jermain (1920), 218 Ill. App. 51 (defective vision and hearing);
Deshazer v. Cheatham (1930), 233 Ky. 59, 24 S.W.2d 936 (old age);
Wilson v. Freeman (1930), 271 Mass. 438, 171 N.E. 469 (deaf);
Heger v. Meissner (1954), 340 Mich. 586, 66 N.W.2d 220 (cripple);
Mackie v. McGraw (1948), 183 Or. 204, 191 P.2d 403 (defective hearing);
Brunner v. John (1954), 45 Wash. 2d 341, 274 P.2d 581 (cripple).