Title: STATE v LOPEZ
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14714
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: January 14, 1980

No. 14714 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS . DANIEL HERMAN LOPEZ, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: A. Michael Salvagni, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Donald White, County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana Submitted on briefs: October 4, 1979 Decided : .IFt: 2 .- - Filed: f c,.. Mr. ~ustice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. his is an appeal by defendant-appellant, Daniel H. Lopez, from a judgment of the District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County, the Honorable W. W. Lessley presiding, rendered upon a jury verdict convicting him of aggravated assault and attempted theft. The defendant was sentenced to the state prison for twenty years on aggravated assault and ten years on attempted theft, the sentences to run concurrently. The District Court designated defendant a dangerous offender. According to both defendant Lopez and the victim, Steven A. Wiscombe, there was an early morning encounter between the two men near the Durston Road, west of Bozeman, Montana, on July 11, 1978. The testimony as to the circum- stances of this encounter is contradictory. Wiscombe testified that he arrived in Bozeman after midnight and decided against staying in a motel. He, there- fore, drove out of town, found an accommodating spot and went to sleep in his sleeping bag. Wiscombe was awakened by defendant shaking him, beating him with a rock, swearing, and demanding Wiscombe's car keys. A struggle ensued in which defendant Lopez lost his glasses but obtained the car keys. Lopez attempted to drive away in the car, but Wiscombe grabbed a door handle and broke a side window, causing Lopez to swerve off the road. The men scuffled over the car keys, and the confrontation ended when Lopez fled. Wiscombe returned to his sleeping spot where he picked up his belongings and Lopez's shaving kit. He then drove to Bozeman Deaconess Hospital where he was treated and hospitalized for three days with head and face lacerations, a small fracture of the skull and possible nerve damage. Defendant Lopez was linked t o the i n c i d e n t by t h e finding of h i s g l a s s e s and bike a t t h e scene and by f i n g e r p r i n t s on a tube of toothpaste from h i s shaving k i t which Wiscombe had picked up. Lopez, on t h e o t h e r hand, t e s t i f i e d t h a t Wiscombe attempted t o run him o f f t h e road and t h a t he f e l l i n t o a d i t c h and l o s t h i s glasses. H e s t a t e d t h a t a s he was climb- ing o u t of t h e d i t c h t o t h e roadway, he threw a rock a t Wiscombe t o s t o p him from advancing on t h e defendant. Lopez contends he d i d n o t intend t o h u r t Wiscombe b u t w a s only t r y i n g t o defend himself. I n an attempt t o g e t away, Lopez t e s t i f i e d he jumped i n t o the c a r and t r i e d t o take o f f . Wiscombe then broke t h e s i d e window and caused Lopez t o d r i v e i n t o t h e d i t c h . Lopez s t a t e d he could n o t g e t o u t on the d r i v e r ' s s i d e because Wiscombe had a rock i n h i s hand and had expressed i n t e n t i o n s of k i l l i n g Lopez. Lopez then crossed t h e console, e x i t e d through t h e passenger door and f l e d across a f i e l d . H e w a s a r r e s t e d near t h e scene of t h e i n c i d e n t a t approximately 7:20 a.m. t h e same morning. Lopez appeals h i s convictions of aggravated a s s a u l t and attempted t h e f t contending t h a t he was denied e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel. Further, defendant complains t h a t t h e sentence imposed by t h e D i s t r i c t Court was based upon a p r e j u d i c i a l presentence r e p o r t and therefore w a s improper. Two i s s u e s a r e presented f o r t h i s Court's review: 1. Was defendant denied a f a i r t r i a l because he d i d n o t receive adequate and e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel? 2. Was the sentence imposed by t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court proper? I n r e c e n t y e a r s t h i s Court has addressed t h e i s s u e of adequate a s s i s t a n c e of counsel on a number of occasions. See S t a t e v. Maldonado (1978), Mont . , 578 P.2d 296, 35 St.Rep. 420; S t a t e v. Miller (1977), Mont. -, 568 P.2d 130, 34 St.Rep. 838; S t a t e v. Brooks (1976), 171 Mont. 45, 554 P.2d 753; S t a t e v. McElveen (1975), 168 Mont. 500, 544 P.2d 820. These c a s e s have c o n s i s t e n t l y recognized t h e accused's r i g h t t o counsel as r e q u i r e d by t h e S i x t h and Fourteenth Amendments t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and A r t i c l e 11, Section 24, of t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . It i s undisputed t h a t t h i s r i g h t t o counsel encompasses t h e r i g h t t o e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel. S t a t e v. McElveen, To determine t h e adequacy of d e f e n d a n t ' s counsel t h i s Court uses t h e " f a r c e and sham" test. S t a t e v. Noller (1963), 142 Mont. 35, 381 P.2d 293, 294. This test s t a t e s : ". . . [To] p r e v a i l on a claim of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y inadequate r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a defendant must m e e t t h e burden o f proving h i s c o u n s e l ' s performance was s o woefully inadequate as t o shock t h e con- science of t h e c o u r t and make t h e r e s u l t a n t pro- ceeding a f a r c e and mockery of j u s t i c e . " S t a t e v. Miller, 568 P.2d a t 132. ( C i t a t i o n s omitted.) I n applying t h e test t h i s Court r u l e d : "To determine t h e adequacy of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , w e must look a t t h e s e r v i c e s rendered by appointed counsel i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e reasoning set f o r t h by J u s t i c e John C. Harrison i n S t a t e v. Forsness 159 Mont. 105, 110, 495 P.2d 176, 178: "'Claimed inadequacy of counsel must n o t be t e s t e d by a g r e a t e r s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of a p p e l l a t e counsel, nor by t h a t c o u n s e l ' s unrivaled opportunity t o study t h e record a t l e i s u r e and c i t e d i f f e r e n t tactics of perhaps doubtful e f f i c a c y . Success i s n o t t h e test o f e f f i c i e n t counsel, f r e q u e n t l y n e i t h e r v i g o r , z e a l , nor s k i l l can overcome t h e t r u t h . "' S t a t e v. McElveen, 544 P.2d a t 822. F u r t h e r , i n Williams v. Beto ( 5 t h C i r . 1965), 354 F.2d 698, 706, t h e c o u r t s t a t e d : " . . . the f a c t t h a t some o t h e r lawyer followed a d i f f e r e n t course i n another case, o r would have done d i f f e r e n t l y had he been a c t i n g as counsel, i s no ground f o r branding t h e appointed attorney with t h e opprobrium of ineffectiveness, o r in- f i d e l i t y , o r incompetency. The p r a c t i c e of law i s an a r t a s w e l l as a science. A s no two men can be exactly a l i k e i n the p r a c t i c e of the pro- f e s s i o n , it is b a s i c a l l y unreasonable t o judge an attorney by what another would have done, o r says he would have done, i n the b e t t e r l i g h t of hindsight. . . " (Citations omitted. ) With t h e guidance of these general p r i n c i p l e s , w e examine t h e a l l e g a t i o n s of defendant concerning h i s coun- s e l ' s ineffectiveness. Defendant c i t e s t h r e e alleged mistakes by counsel and t h e D i s t r i c t Court a t t r i a l , the cumulative e f f e c t of which he contends deprived him of a f a i r t r i a l . W e d i s c u s s these "mistakes" i n t h e order defen- d a n t r a i s e s them on appeal. The f i r s t "mistake" w a s the f a i l u r e by t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o remove defense counsel, Larry Moran, on defendant's objection following the submission of an a f f i d a v i t by M r . Moran on t h e morning of t r i a l . This a f f i d a v i t s t a t e d i n e f f e c t t h a t M r . Moran was g e t t i n g no cooperation from defen- d a n t i n terms of preparing a defense and would be a b l e t o do l i t t l e a t t r i a l o t h e r than s i t a t the counsel t a b l e . Despite t h i s a f f i d a v i t , t h e D i s t r i c t Court proceeded t o t r i a l , and M r . Moran continued t o represent defendant. Defendant contends it was e r r o r not t o remove M r . Moran on defendant's objection. W e disagree. I t i s t r u e t h a t M r . Moran, by h i s a f f i d a v i t , s t a t e d he would have d i f f i c u l t y i n representing t h e defendant. M r . Moran, however, a l s o s t a t e d f o r t h e record t h a t he would ". . . proceed a s f a r a s I am able. I have never shirked m y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r duty as a public defender. I ' l l give whatever I can on behalf of M r . Lopez." By t h i s statement, M r . Moran i n d i c a t e d t h a t he would r e p r e s e n t defendant t o t h e b e s t of h i s a b i l i t y i n s p i t e of defendant's r e f u s a l t o cooperate i n t h e preparation of t h e defense. M r . Moran was appointed t o r e p r e s e n t defendant approximately t h r e e weeks before t h e t r i a l . Apparently, t h i s lack of communication e x i s t e d throughout t h i s period. Defendant, however, f a i l e d t o r e q u e s t d i f f e r e n t counsel u n t i l t h e morning of t r i a l . He continued t o o b j e c t throughout t h e t r i a l t o having M r . Moran r e p r e s e n t him. "Although t h e a t t o r n e y c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p i s o r d i n a r i l y a p r i v a t e matter, a defendant does n o t have t h e unbridled r i g h t t o discharge coun- sel on t h e eve of t r i a l . " S t a t e v. Miller, supra, 568 P.2d a t 132. ( C i t a t i o n s omitted.) Furthermore, ". . . while t h i s r i g h t t o counsel includes t h e r i g h t of an i n d i g e n t defendant t o have counsel appointed f o r h i s b e n e f i t f r e e of charge t o him . . . it never has been held t h a t t h i s r i g h t t o counsel a l s o comprehends a r i g h t of an i n d i g e n t defendant t o have counsel of h i s choice appointed f o r him. Rather, it i s t h e duty of t h e c o u r t t o appoint counsel f o r t h e i n d i g e n t defendant, and unless t h e r e is good cause shown why t h e appoint- ment of a p a r t i c u l a r a t t o r n e y should n o t have been made, t h e defendant must accept t h e a t t o r n e y s e l e c t e d by t h e c o u r t unless he waives t h e r i g h t t o be represented by counsel. This proposition of l a w is supported by numerous cases." S t a t e v. Forsness, supra, 495 P.2d a t 179. ( C i t a t i o n s omitted . ) Counsel here d i d t h e b e s t he could under t h e circum- stances. The D i s t r i c t Court on two occasions expressed confidence i n M r . Moran's a b i l i t i e s , and a c a r e f u l reading of t h e t r a n s c r i p t i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e defense provided w a s adequate. Apparently M r . Moran f i l e d h i s a f f i d a v i t s o l e l y because defendant refused t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e preparation of h i s defense. It i s a general r u l e t h a t a p a r t y who p a r t i c i p a t e s i n o r c o n t r i b u t e s t o an e r r o r cannot complain of it. S t a t e v. M i l l e r , 568 P.2d a t 132. W e f i n d no m e r i t i n defendant' s a l l e g a t i o n . The second "mistake" according t o defendant was two- f o l d . I t involved t h e inference on two s e p a r a t e occasions t h a t defendant may have had a p r i o r conviction on h i s record The f i r s t occurred during t h e v o i r d i r e of t h e jury when defense counsel Moran s t a t e d : ". . . There may be evidence i n t h i s case of a p r i o r conviction of t h i s defendant. I f t h a t does, i n f a c t , come i n t o evidence, w i l l any of you assume g u i l t i n t h i s case?" The second occurred when t h e S t a t e was attempting t o introduce i n t o evidence defendant's g l a s s e s . The following colloquy took place: "BY MR. WHITE: (County Attorney) -- "Q. And, may I have t h e glasses? Can I borrow them j u s t f o r a second? And, I hand you what has been marked S t a t e ' s Exhibit 6. Can you i d e n t i f y these? A. Y e s , t h e s e a r e t h e g l a s s e s which I found i n t h e d i t c h , then. "Q. And, you took them and placed them i n t h e bag i n which they w e r e contained? A. Y e s , I d i d . "Q. That would be only i n your possession s i n c e t h a t time? A. I mailed them t o t h e S t a t e Iden- t i f i c a t i o n Bureau i n Helena where P h i l Conover checked them f o r f i n g e r p r i n t s , and he returned them t o m e , and then I mailed them t o t h e S t a t e Prison where they attempted t o i d e n t i f y them, and they returned them t o m e . "MR. WHITE: I would o f f e r i n t o evidence S t a t e ' s 6 , your Honor. "MR. MORAN: N o o b j e c t i o n , your Honor." Although defendant concedes t h a t no a c t u a l evidence of p r i o r convictions w a s introduced, he argues t h a t t h e above r e f e r - ences t o p r i o r convictions w e r e p r e j u d i c i a l . While w e question t h e p r o p r i e t y of defense counsel's v o i r d i r e question, t h e f a c t s of t h i s case do n o t i n d i c a t e t h a t defendant was prejudiced. When t h i s question was asked, Judge Lessley immediately s t a t e d : "There w i l l be no evidence of t h e p r i o r conviction i n t h i s cause." The record i n d i c a t e s no such evidence w a s introduced. The jury was instructed that they were to be governed solely by the evidence introduced at trial and the law as stated by the judge. There is nothing here to indicate that the jury disregarded that instruction to defendant's preju- dice. Further, there is nothing in the chain of custody colloquy which placed into the record evidence of a prior conviction. The fact that a defendant admittedly has suf- fered a prior felony conviction is not error. These vague references then, if error, are not reversible error; how- ever, we would condemn this kind of tactic in the future. Finally, defendant argues that counsel's failure to object to a self-defense instruction offered by the State deprived him of a fair trial. The instruction stated: "You are instructed that the defense of justifi- able use of force or self-defense is an affirma- tive defense and the defendant has the burden of proving self-defense to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt." Defendant submits that this instruction is a misstatement of the law and is prejudicial because it appears to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Recently, in State v. Cooper (1979), - Mont. I 589 P.2d 133, 36 St.Rep. 30, this Court reaffirmed the general rule in Montana regarding jury instructions on self- defense. Quoting State v. Grady (1975), 166 Mont. 168, 531 P.2d 681, we stated: "'The law in Montana is that although the burden of persuasion remains on the State, in order to avail himself of the affirmative defense of self- defense, the defendant has the burden of pro- ducing sufficient evidence on the issue to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt.'" 589 P.2d at 136. In Cooper we tacitly rejected an argument by the Mon- tana County Attorneys Association that a defendant should be required t o prove h i s a f f i r m a t i v e defense by a preponderance of t h e evidence. Arguments s i m i l a r t o t h e one by defendant here w e r e r e j e c t e d by t h i s Court i n Cooper. Although Cooper d e a l t with a s l i g h t l y milder instruct.ion than t h e one pre- sented here, we reach t h e s a m e r e s u l t . A t f i r s t glance defendant appears t o raise an i s s u e s i m i l a r t o t h a t r a i s e d i n Sandstrom v. Montana (1979), U . S. , 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39. This case, however, is e a s i l y distinguished from Sandstrom with t h e h e l p of two o t h e r United S t a t e s Supreme Court cases, P a t t e r - son v. New York (1977), 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281, and Leland v. Oregon (1952), 343 U.S. 790, 72 P a t t e r s o n was concerned with t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y under t h e Due Process Clause of burdening t h e defendant i n a New York murder t r i a l with proving extreme emotional d i s t u r - bance as defined by New York law. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court r u l e d t h a t r e q u i r i n g t h e defendant t o prove h i s a f - f i r m a t i v e defense by a preponderance of t h e evidence d i d n o t v i o l a t e due process and s t a t e d : ". . . t h e u n i v e r s a l r u l e i n t h i s country was t h a t t h e prosecution must prove g u i l t beyond a reasonable doubt. A t t h e same t i m e , t h e long- accepted r u l e was t h a t it was c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y permissible t o provide t h a t various a f f i r m a t i v e defenses w e r e t o be proved by t h e defendant. This d i d n o t l e a d t o such abuses o r t o such wide- spread r e d e f i n i t i o n of c r i m e and reduction of t h e prosecution's burden t h a t a new c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r u l e was required . . . Nor does t h e f a c t t h a t a majority of t h e S t a t e s have now assumed t h e bur- den of disproving a f f i r m a t i v e defenses--for what- ever reasons--mean t h a t those S t a t e s t h a t s t r i k e a d i f f e r e n t balance a r e i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e Con- s t i t u t i o n . " Patterson, 5 3 L.Ed.2d a t 292-93. I n Leland t h e defendant r a i s e d t h e a f f i r m a t i v e defense of i n s a n i t y which, by Oregon s t a t e s t a t u t e s , he w a s required t o prove. One of t h e s t a t u t e s i n question provided: "'When t h e commission of t h e a c t charged a s a crime i s proven, and t h e defense sought t o be e s t a b l i s h e d i s t h e i n s a n i t y of t h e defendant, t h e s a m e must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt'. . ." 343 U.S. a t 792. The defendant t h e r e argued t h a t t h e s t a t u t e i n question, i n e f f e c t , required a defen- d a n t pleading i n s a n i t y t o e s t a b l i s h h i s innocence by d i s - proving beyond a reasonable doubt elements of t h e crime necessary t o a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y and t h e r e f o r e v i o l a t e d due process of law. To determine the merits of t h i s challenge, t h e Court ruled t h a t t h e s t a t u t e must be viewed i n i t s r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r r e l e v a n t Oregon l a w and i n i t s p l a c e i n t h e t r i a l of t h e case. On reviewing a l l t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s i n t h e case, t h e Court s t a t e d : ". . . Although a p l e a of i n s a n i t y was made, t h e prosecution w a s required t o prove beyond a rea- sonable doubt every element of t h e crime charged, including, i n t h e case of f i r s t degree murder, premeditation, d e l i b e r a t i o n , malice and i n t e n t . The t r i a l c o u r t repeatedly emphasized t h i s r e - quirement i n its charge t o t h e jury'. . . These and o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s , and t h e charge a s a whole, make it c l e a r t h a t t h e burden of proof of g u i l t , and of a l l t h e necessary elements of g u i l t , w a s placed squarely upon t h e S t a t e . A s t h e jury was t o l d , t h i s burden d i d n o t s h i f t , b u t r e s t e d upon t h e S t a t e throughout t h e t r i a l , j u s t a s , according t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s , a p p e l l a n t was presumed t o be innocent u n t i l t h e jury w a s convinced beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t he was g u i l t y . The j u r o r s were t o consider s e p a r a t e l y t h e i s s u e of l e g a l s a n i t y p e r se--an i s s u e set a p a r t from t h e crime charged . . ." 343 U.S. a t 794-796. A review of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s given i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , i n l i g h t of t h e holdings i n Patterson and Leland, reveals t h a t t h e burden of proof d i d n o t s h i f t t o defendant. T i m e and again t h e jury w a s i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e defendant w a s presumed t o be innocent and t h a t t h e S t a t e must prove t h e defendant's g u i l t beyond a reasonable doubt. The contested i n s t r u c t i o n here, while worded a l i t t l e s t r o n g e r than t h e self-defense i n s t r u c t i o n t h i s Court favors, d i d n o t have t h e e f f e c t of s h i f t i n g t h e burden of proof from t h e S t a t e t o t h e defendant. The use of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , d i d n o t deprive t h e defendant of a f a i r t r i a l and f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was n o t i n e f f e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , While t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was n o t improper i n l i g h t of t h e f a c t s i n t h i s case, w e r e a f f i r m our holding i n S t a t e v. Cooper, supra, and urge t h a t t h e self-defense i n s t r u c t i o n approved i n t h a t case be used i n a l l criminal cases involving an i s s u e of self-defense. The second i s s u e r a i s e d by defendant i s whether t h e sentence imposed by t h e D i s t r i c t Court was proper. Defendant f i r s t contends t h a t t h e presentence r e p o r t does n o t comply with applicable s t a t u t o r y law because it does n o t consider t h e needs and p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of t h e defen- dant, nor does it consider any a s p e c t s of r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . This complaint i s burdened with t h e s i n s of omission and does n o t deserve discussion. Judge Lessley held a d i s - p o s i t i o n a l hearing and a t t h e o u t s e t t o l d defendant t h a t t h e r e would be no r u l e s of evidence, etc., unless defense objected s o t h a t they could g e t i n anything they wanted and n o t be hampered by formal requirements. Defendant had copies of t h e presentence r e p o r t , psychological r e p o r t s , and w a s a b l e t o cross-examine t h e author of t h e presentence r e p o r t . There were many, many witnesses--lay, doctor, and religious--who t e s t i f i e d f o r the defendant f o r a t o t a l hearing of 8 4 pages of t r a n s c r i p t . W e cannot conceive of any way t h i s hearing could have been conducted more f a i r l y . See S t a t e v. Metz (1979), Mont. - 1 - P.2d , 36 St.Rep. (Cause No. 14682, decided December 19, 1979). Defendant further asserts that he has been convicted of only one violent offense--rape in Missoula in 1969. It is apparent that defendant failed to take into account that he had also been convicted of the present offense--aggravated assault. The District Court's finding was therefore not erroneous. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. B Justice d We concur: v 4 - u ? ~ a , Chief Justice Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting: I would reverse the.judgment and grant a new trial. In doing so, I must state that I would first have to adopt a different standard than the "farce or sham" test which is the rule in this State. A defendant is not simply entitled to counsel, he is entitled to competent counsel. A "farce or sham" test seems to be judged in essence by the mere fact that the defendant had counsel and that his performance did not shock the conscience of the court. The case must be approached from the special circumstances existing here. The prosecuting witness Wiscombe testified that the defendant assaulted him; the defendant testified that he did not assault Wiscornbe, rather, Wiscombe assaulted him, and that was acting in self defense. The remaining physical evidence corroborated neither story. Thus, the jury was presented with a clear question of credibility. Needless to say, the fact that the defendant had been previously convicted of a felony, even though the jury did not know what that felony was, could have had a strong impact on the jury. The voir dire question by defense counsel obviously was meant to take the string out of any evidence introduced establishing that defendant had been previously convicted of a felony. And the trial judge's comment in relation to the question by defense counsel served only to emphasize that the defendant did in fact have a previous felony record. The trial court immediately responded to the voir dire question asked by defense counsel: "There will be no evidence of - the prior conviction in this cause." (Emphasis added.) Surely the jury knew by this comment of the trial judge that the defendant in fact had a previous conviction. And -13- when t h e w i t n e s s added t h a t t h e g l a s s e s , a l l e g e d t o be, and e s t a b l i s h e d t o be those of t h e defendant, w e r e s e n t t o t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , t h e j u r y had no doubt t h a t t h e defendant had a previous f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n f o r which he was s e n t t o p r i s o n . They could conclude t h e r e f o r e t h a t it was most l i k e l y a s e r i o u s o f f e n s e . Under t h e s e circumstances, defense c o u n s e l ' s q u e s t i o n , i n conjunction with t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s response and t h e w i t n e s s ' s statement. ;hat he had s e n t t h e g l a s s e s t o t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r i d e n t i - f i c a t i o n , could w e l l have been an important and i n a p p r o p r i a t e f a c t o r i n t h e j u r y ' s d e c i s i o n t o b e l i e v e Wiscombe r a t h e r t h a t t h e defendant. I would, t h e r e f o r e , r e v e r s e t h e c o n v i c t i o n and g r a n t a new t r i a l .