Title: GRABS v MSLA CARTAGE INC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13008
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: February 2, 1976

No. 1.3008 LN THE 5UPREME COlJKT O F THE STATE OF M O N T A N A 1975 - E V E L Y N GRABS , Plainrif f and Appellant, -vs - MISSOULA CARTAGE C O M P A N Y , INC., Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Hon. Edward T. Dussault, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Tipp and Hoven, Missoula, Montana Douglas G . S k j e l s e t argued, Missoula, Montana For ~ e s p o n d e n t : Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana Larry E. Riley argued, Missoula, Montana Submitted: December 2, 1975 Decided: FF_b - 2 1376 M r . Justdce John Conway flarrison delivered the Opinion of the Court, P l a i n t i f f Evelyn Grabs appeals from a judgment i n favor of defendant Missoula Cartage Company, Inc., based on a jury verdict rendered i n Ravalli County, January 3, 1975. The relevant f a c t s were agreed t o by the p a r t i e s and a r e generally s e t f o r t h i n the p r e t r i a l order. O n May 2, 1973, p l a i n t i f f Grabs was driving her 1972 Chrysler automobile from Hamilton, Montana, toward Missoula proceeding north on U. S. Highway 93. Her destination was her home located northwest of a place commonly known a s Beer Can H i l l , which can be reached by turning a t the Blodgett Creek Road, approximately one and one-half miles from Hamilton, near an e x i t leading t o t h e Tolman Meat Company premises. It was a c l e a r afternoon and v i s i b i l i t y was normal. A t t h i s p a r t i c u l a r point along the route, U.S. Highway 93 t m m s temporarily 90" t o the west f o r about 1,000 f e e t . The next 360 f e e t of highway i s occupied by a bridge, and 360 f e e t from t h e end of t h e bridge the highway again bends 90" and returns t o i t s northerly course. In the approximate middle of t h i s f i n a l curve toward the north, l i e s the Blodgett Creek Roadcexit leading toward Beer Can H i l l and p l a i n t i f f ' s residence. O n the day of t h e c o l l i s i o n , p l a i n t i f f signaled a l e f t turn a s she passed t h e middle of t h e bridge and glanced i n her r e a r view mirror. She then saw defendant's vehicle, a 1969 Auto Car semi-tractor with t r a i l e r , carrying 39 tons of wood chips, which a t t h a t moment was passing a l o c a l bar about one-fifth of a m i l e from p l a i n t i f f ' s position. p l a i n t i f f ' s c a r rounded the curve and ,V - t d . slowed near the Blodgett Creek Road turnoff. It stopped t o wait f o r a red pickup truck which appeared t o be approaching a t a speed, l a t e r established, a t about 50 miles per hour. Moments l a t e r , she was h i t from behind by defendant's vehicle. The c o l l i s i o n occurred i n t h e r i g h t hand lane of t r a f f i c . Both vehicles were pointed n o r t h a t the time of t h e accident. P l a i n t i f f received treatment from both a general p r a c t i t i o n e r and an orthopedic surgeon s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e accident. She a l s o received c e r t a i n treatment as an o u t p a t i e n t a t a h o s p i t a l i n Hamilton. A t t r i a l , defendant admitted t h e negligence of i t s d r i v e r , but contended t h e case was proper f o r jury consideration on t h e i s s u e of whether o r n o t p l a i n t i f f was c o n t r i b u t o r i l y negligent. p l a i n t i f f ' s motions f o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t and f o r judgment not- withstanding t h e v e r d i c t were denied by t h e d i s t r i c t court. P l a i n t i f f contends these r u l i n g s were improper and t h a t h e r con- duct could n o t have c o n s t i t u t e d contributory negligence as a matter of law. W e agree. The power of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o d i r e c t a jury v e r d i c t i s controlled by s e c t i o n 93-5205, R.C.M. 1947, which s t a t e s : 11 Where, upon t h e t r i a l of an i s s u e by a jury, t h e case presents only questions of law, t h e judge may d i r e c t t h e jury t o render a v e r d i c t i n favor of t h e p a r t y e n t i t l e d thereto." The c l a s s i c test employed t o determine whether a question is one of f a c t o r law, involves t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a r u l e of reason. Where reasonable men could draw d i f f e r e n t conclusions from t h e presented evidence, t h e question i s one of f a c t . But i f only one conclusion could reasonably be drawn, t h e question is one of l a w , properly resolvable through t h e procedural device of d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t . Shields v. Murray, 156 Mont. 493, 481 P.2d 680; Pickett v. Kyger, 151 Mont. 87, 439 P.2d 57; Bridges v. Moritz, 149 Mont. 273, 425 P.2d 721; P a r i n i v. Lanch, 148 Mont. 188, 418 P.2d 861; Holland v. Konda, 142 Mont. 536, 385 P.2d 272. Reduced t o i t s fundamentals t h e defense of contributory negligence must be supported by proof t h a t p l a i n t i f f was negligent, and t h a t such negligence was t h e proximate cause of t h e i n j u r i e s . Gilleard v. Draine, 159 Mont. 167, 496 P.2d 83; De,Verniero v. Eby, 159 Mont. 146, 496 P.2d 290; Jackson v. William Dingwall Co., 145 Mont. 127, 399 P.2d 236; Thompson v. Llewellyn, 136 Mont. 167, 346 P.2d 561. Defendant argues t h a t p l a i n t i f f was contributorily negligent i n t h a t she f a i l e d t o make her turn,though she might reasonably have done so i n l i g h t of t h e uncontested facts. Defendant points out the oncoming pickup truck was approximately 300 yards from p l a i n t i f f ' s c a r when it stopped f o r the turn, and a t the r a t e of 50 m i l e s per hour the pickup would not have reached the turnoff f o r another twenty seconds. F i r s t , we determine whether or not p l a i n t i f f ' s f a i l u r e t o turn could reasonably constitute negligence under the law. Does the law permit such an inference under these circumstances? In Montana, the t e r m "negligence" i s defined a s a want of such attention t o the nature or probable consequences of the a c t o r ommission a s a prudent man ordinarly bestows i n acting i n h i s own concerns. Section 19-103 (16), R. C.M. 1947; Flansberg v. Montana Power Co., 154 Mont. 53, 60, 460 P.2d 263. The standard of conduct imposed on those alleged t o have been contributorily negligent has h i s t o r i c a l l y been the same a s t h a t imposed on the negligent defendant. 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, 5 464, Comment a. The driver of a motor vehicle i n Montana may not follow another vehicle "more closely than is reasonable and prudent'' under the circumstances, section 32-2160, R.C.M. 1947. The law imposes several duties on t h e attempting l e f t turns on two-way roadways. Such turns must be made from "that portion of the r i g h t half of the roadway nearest the center l i n e thereof", section 32- 2164(b), R.C.M. 1947, and only a f t e r the proper signal has been made, section 32-2167, R.C.M. 1947. The driver of a vehicle intending t o turn left "shall yield the r i g h t of way t o any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction" which is close enough t o the intersection t o constitute an immediate hazard, section 32-2171, R.C.M. 1947. Section 32-2171 also has been interpreted a s including a duty t o maintain a proper lookout f o r vehicles approaching from the rear. Bellon v. Heinzig, 347 F.2d 4. Defendant subscribes t o the view that under these f a c t s a jury should decide whether p l a i n t i f f ' s conduct f e l l below the standard of care by f a i l i n g t o in some way remove herself from the path of the oncoming truck by beginning the turn o r a t l e a s t by moving t o some other place. Yet, defendant does not suggest, and there i s no evidence, that p l a i n t i f f was i n violation of any of the s t a t u t e s cited heretofore, o r that she was i n any way negligent, other than her f a i l u r e t o t u m , against her b e t t e r judg- ment, i n front of a vehicle approaching a t the r a t e of 50 miles per hour. It cannot be said, under the f a c t s of t h i s case, t h a t an ordinarily prudent person would apprehend o r anticipate, under the uncontested f a c t s , the f a i l u r e o r i n a b i l i t y of the truck driver t o stop h i s vehicle before what became the point of impact. It has been established that one i s not required t o anticipate the negligence of another. Merithew v. H i l l , 167 F.Supp. 320; Fulton v. Choyteau County Farmers' Co., 98 Mont. 48, 37 P.2d 1025. Regarding plain- t i f f ' s f a i l u r e t o begin her turn, we quote the words of M r . Justice Stewart i n Stevens v. City of Butte, 107 Mont. 354, 365, 85 P.26 339: If In making a choice between two courses t o pursue, one i s not required t o make the correct choice in l i g h t of after-events, but only such choice a s a reasonably prudent person might make under the known o r obvious circumstances. * * *" The law does not contemplate a standard of care so l o f t y a s t o require the driver of a preceding vehicle t o vacate i t s lawful location i n order t o clear the way f o r an admittedly negli- gent driver approaching from the rear. Such a rule, when carried t o i t s logical extreme, would impose upon a l l vehicles legitimately stopped f o r purposes of turning, the affirmative duty t o s t a y c l e a r of approaching t r a f f i c , regardless of the circumstances. To be sure, reasonable, s a f e and prudent drivers must always be aware of the t r a f f i c behind them, especially, a s Bellon points out, when an approaching vehicle attempts t o pass a preceding vehicle attempting t o turn. But, the primary responsibility must be on those drivers who have the opportunity t o detect t h e potentially hazardous s i t u a t i o n ahead, sections 32-2160 and 32-2171, R.C.M. 1947. Erickson v. P e r r e t t , M o n t . s The d i s t r i c t court erred i n denying the motion f o r a directed verdict. Cause i s remanded t o the d i s t r i c t court. GD- hief Justice- M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell dissenting: I dissent. This i s t h e second time i n the past month t h a t a majority of t h i s Court has reversed a jury determination concerning negligence and proximate cause. See: Erickson v. P e r r e t t , M o n t . 9 P.2d , 33 St.Rep. 109. In t h e i n s t a n t case the majority has decided a s a matter of law t h a t p l a i n t i f f was not g u i l t y of contributory negligence when she stopped on a curve i n the highway r a t h e r than completing a l e f t turn onto a side road. Whether t h i s conduct constituted ordinary care under a l l the circumstances of the case was f o r t h e jury t o decide. So was the question of proximate cause. Where d i f f e r e n t conclusions a r e possible under t h e evidence, t h e court may not decide l i a b i l i t y a s a matter of law. These a r e m y views of the law. I would affirm the judgment based on t h e jury verdict. Justice.